Buddha Mind - Christ Mind: A Christian Commentary on the Bodhicaryāvatāra 904293848X, 9789042938489

Table of contents :
Dedication
Table of Contents
Some Words Ahead
A Word on the Translation • Ernst Steinkellner
Abbreviations
PART I: INTRODUCTION TO THE BODHICARYĀVATĀRA
1 The Bodhicaryāvatāra: Text and Author
2 The Legend of Śāntideva
3 The Subject of the Bodhicaryāvatāra
4 The Bodhicaryāvatāra’s Impact
5 Methodological Considerations
PART II: BODHICARYĀVATĀRA: ENTERING THE COURSE TOWARDS AWAKENING
1 Bodhicaryāvatāra 1: In Praise of the Spirit of Awakening (Bodhicittānuśaṃsa)
2 Bodhicaryāvatāra 2: Confession of Sins (Pāpadeśanā)
3 Bodhicaryāvatāra 3: Adopting the Spirit of Awakening (Bodhicittaparigraha)
4 Bodhicaryāvatāra 4: Vigilant Care for the Spirit of Awakening (Bodhicittāpramāda)
5 Bodhicaryāvatāra 5: Preserving Circumspection (Saṃprajanyarakṣaṇa)
6 Bodhicaryāvatāra 6: The Perfection of Patience (Kṣāntipāramitā)
7 Bodhicaryāvatāra 7: The Perfection of Vigor (Vīryapāramitā)
Excursus: Śāntideva and the Buddhist Hells
8 Bodhicaryāvatāra 8: The Perfection of Absorption (Dhyānapāramitā)
9 Bodhicaryāvatāra 9: The Perfection of Insight (Prajñāpāramitā)
10 Bodhicaryāvatāra 10: Transference of Merit (Pariṇāmanāpariccheda)
Appendix: Outline of the Bodhicaryāvatāra • Ernst Steinkellner
Bibliography
Index of Scriptural References
General Index

Citation preview

CHRISTIAN COMMENTARIES ON

NON-CHRISTIAN SACRED TEXTS

Buddha Mind – Christ Mind A Christian Commentary on the Bodhicaryāvatāra

by

Perry Schmidt-Leukel with a new translation by

Ernst Steinkellner and Cynthia Peck-Kubaczek

BUDDHA MIND – CHRIST MIND A CHRISTIAN COMMENTARY ON THE BODHICARYĀVATĀRA

CHRISTIAN COMMENTARIES ON NON-CHRISTIAN SACRED TEXTS

GENERAL EDITOR Catherine Cornille EDITORIAL

BOARD

David Burrell, Francis Clooney, Paul Griffiths, James Heisig EDITORIAL ADVISORS Daniel Joslyn-Siemiatkoski, Leo Lefebure, Daniel Madigan, Joseph O’Leary, Nicolas Standaert, Paul Swanson, Elliot Wolfson

The series “Christian Commentaries on Non-Christian Sacred Texts” provides a forum for Christian reflection on the meaning and importance of sacred texts (scriptures and religious classics) of other religious traditions for Christian faith and practice.

BUDDHA MIND – CHRIST MIND A CHRISTIAN COMMENTARY ON THE BODHICARYĀVATĀRA

BY

PERRY SCHMIDT-LEUKEL

WITH A NEW TRANSLATION BY

ERNST STEINKELLNER,

AND

CYNTHIA PECK-KUBACZEK

PEETERS LEUVEN – PARIS – BRISTOL, CT 2019

A catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

ISBN 978-90-429-3848-9 eISBN 978-90-429-3849-6 D/2019/0602/96 Copyright © 2019 by Peeters Publishers All rights reserved

“This mind is the mind of ultimate equality. It is great compassion. This mind attains Buddhahood. This mind is Buddha.” Shinran, Jōdo monrui jushō (Mondō) “Let the same mind be in you that was in Christ Jesus.” Paul, Letter to the Philippians 2:5

To the memory of Oskar Schramm (1959-2009) and Kenneth Hutton (1964-2018) who both loved the Bodhicaryāvatāra and practiced a good deal of its spirit.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SOME WORDS AHEAD ................................................................... XIII A WORD ON THE TRANSLATION (by Ernst Steinkellner) ................ XIX ABBREVIATIONS .............................................................................. XXV PART I: INTRODUCTION TO THE BODHICARYĀVATĀRA CHAPTER 1 THE BODHICARYĀVATĀRA: TEXT AND AUTHOR ...............................

3

CHAPTER 2 THE LEGEND OF ŚĀNTIDEVA.......................................................... 1. The Legend Unfolds ............................................................ 1.1 The earliest written form of the legend ....................... 1.2 An early oral form of the legend.................................. 1.3 The fourteenth-century forms of the legend ................ 1.4 The late forms of the legend ....................................... 2. The Legend Interpreted ....................................................... 2.1 Relating the legend to a person ................................... 2.2 Relating the legend to the text .................................... 2.3 Śāntideva as an ignorant monk: the text as revelation . 2.4 Śāntideva as the “great paṇḍita”: the text as an intellectual masterpiece ....................................................... 2.5 Śāntideva as compassionate Bodhisattva: the text as an existential matrix ......................................................... 2.6 Śāntideva as miracle-working Siddha: the text as a powerful elixir .............................................................

50

CHAPTER 3 THE SUBJECT OF THE BODHICARYĀVATĀRA ...................................... 1. Structure and Subject .......................................................... 2. The Bodhicaryāvatāra Compared ......................................... 3. The Bodhicaryāvatāra’s Audience .........................................

53 53 59 70

13 15 15 19 24 34 38 38 41 43 46 47

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CHAPTER 4 THE BODHICARYĀVATĀRA’S IMPACT ................................................. 1. The Wider Impact ............................................................... 2. The Impact within Buddhist‒Christian Dialogue ...............

75 75 82

CHAPTER 5 METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS............................................ 97 1. Trans-religious Commentarial Writing ................................ 97 2. Levels and Contexts of Interpretation.................................. 103

PART II: BODHICARYĀVATĀRA: ENTERING THE COURSE TOWARDS AWAKENING TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY CHAPTER 1 BODHICARYĀVATĀRA 1: IN PRAISE OF THE SPIRIT OF AWAKENING (BODHICITTĀNUŚAṂSA).................................................................... Translation: 1:1-3 .................................................................... Commentary: 1. The Source of the Good .............................. Translation: 1:4-14 .................................................................. Commentary: 2. The Redeeming Spirit ................................... Translation: 1:15-36 ................................................................ Commentary: 3. The Miracle of the Good .............................. CHAPTER 2 BODHICARYĀVATĀRA 2: CONFESSION OF SINS (PĀPADEŚANĀ) ............ Translation: 2:1-25 .................................................................. Commentary: 1. Evoking the Spirit by Venerating Its Incarnations ......................................................................................... Translation: 2:26-66 ................................................................ Commentary: 2. Facing the Abyss and Finding Refuge ...........

111 111 111 116 117 127 128 139 139 141 145 147

CHAPTER 3 BODHICARYĀVATĀRA 3: ADOPTING THE SPIRIT OF AWAKENING (BODHICITTAPARIGRAHA) ................................................................. 153 Translation: 3:1-9 .................................................................... 153 Commentary: 1. Resonating With the Spirit .......................... 154

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Translation: 3:10-23 ................................................................ Commentary: 2. Imitation of the Buddhas .............................. Translation: 3:24-33 ................................................................ Commentary: 3. How Life Becomes Meaningful.....................

163 164 175 176

CHAPTER 4 BODHICARYĀVATĀRA 4: VIGILANT CARE FOR THE SPIRIT OF AWAKENING (BODHICITTĀPRAMĀDA) ................................................................... Translation: 4:1-12 .................................................................. Commentary: 1. What is at Stake ............................................ Translation: 4:13-26 ................................................................ Commentary: 2. A Desperate Situation? ................................. Translation: 4:27-48 ................................................................ Commentary: 3. Facing the True Enemies ..............................

181 181 182 185 186 190 192

CHAPTER 5 BODHICARYĀVATĀRA 5: PRESERVING CIRCUMSPECTION (SAṂPRAJANYARAKṢAṆA) ................................................................... Translation: 5:1-17 .................................................................. Commentary: 1. Mind Matters ................................................ Translation: 5:18-58 ................................................................ Commentary: 2. Watch Your Mind ........................................ Translation: 5:59-70 ................................................................ Commentary: 3. Watch Your Body ......................................... Translation: 5:71-109 .............................................................. Commentary: 4. Watch Your Behavior....................................

203 203 204 219 221 229 230 236 238

CHAPTER 6 BODHICARYĀVATĀRA 6: THE PERFECTION OF PATIENCE (KṢĀNTIPĀRAMITĀ)............................................................................ Translation: 6:1-8 .................................................................... Commentary: 1. Exposition: Forbearance versus Hate ............. Translation: 6:9-21 .................................................................. Commentary: 2. The Benefit of Suffering ............................... Translation: 6:22-75 ................................................................ Commentary: 3. Overcoming Anger at Others’ Misdeeds .......

255 255 255 260 261 266 270

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Translation: 6:76-98 ................................................................ Commentary: 4. Overcoming Anger at Others’ Success .......... Translation: 6:99-111 .............................................................. Commentary: 5. Welcoming One’s Enemies ........................... Translation 6:112-134.............................................................. Commentary: 6. Love as True Worship...................................

286 288 291 292 295 297

CHAPTER 7 BODHICARYĀVATĀRA 7: THE PERFECTION OF VIGOR (VĪRYAPĀRAMITĀ) ............................................................................. Commentary: 1. A Note on the Structure of Chapter 7 .......... Translation: 7:1-15 .................................................................. Commentary: 2. A Wake-Up Call from Carelessness .............. Translation: 7:16-30 ................................................................ Commentary: 3. Overcoming Dejection .................................. Translation 7:31-66.................................................................. Commentary: 4. Spiritual Power ............................................. Translation: 7:67-75 ................................................................ Commentary: 5. The Alertness of the Spiritual Warrior ..........

305 305 307 308 310 311 315 318 324 325

EXCURSUS: ŚĀNTIDEVA AND THE BUDDHIST HELLS ....................... 331 CHAPTER 8 BODHICARYĀVATĀRA 8: THE PERFECTION OF ABSORPTION (DHYĀNAPĀRAMITĀ) ......................................................................... Commentary: 1. A Note on the Structure of Chapter 8 .......... Translation: 8:1-38 .................................................................. Commentary: 2. The Legacy of the Śramaṇas ......................... Translation: 8:39-88 ................................................................ Commentary: 3. The Delusion Inherent in Sexual Desire ....... Translation: 8:89-110 .............................................................. Commentary: 4. Equality......................................................... Translation: 8:111-158 ............................................................ Commentary: 6. Self-love and Altruism ................................... Translation: 8:159-186 ............................................................ Commentary: 6. Putting the Exchange into Practice ...............

347 347 349 351 361 364 375 377 388 391 402 404

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 9 BODHICARYĀVATĀRA 9: THE PERFECTION OF INSIGHT (PRAJÑĀPĀRAMITĀ) ........................................................................... Commentary: 1. Preliminary Remarks ..................................... Translation: 9:1-5 .................................................................... Commentary: 2. Gradual Insight and the Illusion of Conceptual Grasping............................................................................ Translation: 9:6-57 .................................................................. Commentary: 3. Illusionism, Radical Apophasis and Soteriological Efficacy ......................................................................... Translation: 9:58-116 .............................................................. Commentary: 4. The Philosophical Justification of Emptiness (I): No-Self and No-Thing ............................................................. Translation: 9:117-151 ............................................................ Commentary: 5. The Philosophical Justification of Emptiness (II): No-Causality ........................................................................... Translation: 9:152-168 ............................................................ Commentary: 6. The Missionary of Emptiness........................ CHAPTER 10 BODHICARYĀVATĀRA 10: TRANSFERENCE OF MERIT (PARIṆĀMANĀPARICCHEDA)............................................................... Commentary: 1. Developing Loving Kindness and the Dedication of Merit ............................................................................ Translation: 10:1-18 ................................................................ Commentary: 2. For Those on the Bad Plains of Existence .... Translation: 10:19-50 .............................................................. Commentary: 3. For Those on the Good Plains of Existence .. Translation: 10:51-58 .............................................................. Commentary: 4. Śāntideva Praying for Himself ......................

XI

413 413 415 416 425 429 444 449 467 470 488 489

493 493 495 497 503 505 512 513

APPENDIX: OUTLINE OF THE BODHICARYĀVATĀRA BY ERNST STEINKELLNER ..... 517 BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................... 521 INDEX OF SCRIPTURAL REFERENCES ............................................... 555 GENERAL INDEX ............................................................................ 567

SOME WORDS AHEAD

On October 27, 1986, representatives of many religious communities, following an invitation by Pope John Paul II, met in Assisi for the first multi-religious prayer for peace. As the Buddhist “prayer,” the 14th Dalai Lama recited twenty verses from the tenth chapter of the Bodhicaryāvatāra.1 I wonder whether after the ceremony some of the Christian representatives approached the Dalai Lama with something like “What a marvelous text you just cited!” In any case, at this event of highly symbolic meaning, the Dalai Lama communicated the Bodhicaryāvatāra to a wider multi-religious audience in a way that called for a reaction. Here is one. Personally, my first encounter with the Bodhicaryāvatāra took place in 1981 through its beautiful German translation by Ernst Steinkellner (Śāntideva 1981). I was just finishing my undergraduate studies in theology. Alongside theology, I also studied philosophy with an emphasis on Buddhist philosophy. After completing my theology degree, I wrote my Master’s thesis in philosophy on the understanding of death in early Buddhism, a work that became my first published monograph (SchmidtLeukel 1984). I was fascinated to see how strongly and prominently the existential challenge of mortality – so vigorously present in early Buddhism – still featured in the Bodhicaryāvatāra, a comparatively late Indian Buddhist text. At that time I was part of a kind of “Bible study” group. However, it was not the Bible that we – as Buddhists and Buddhism admirers – read, discussed and contemplated, but various scriptures from the Buddhist traditions. With Steinkellner’s new German translation in hand (a decade prior to the 1990s, when a wave of new translations of and commentaries on the Bodhicaryāvatāra were published), it was immediately clear that in our little circle, we would study this text extensively. One night after such a meeting, I thought it would be nice if the medieval tradition of writing scriptural commentaries were revived, commentaries with a primarily theological-spiritual emphasis, so that I could compose 1  As far as I can tell from König, Waldenfels 1987, 21-24, these were the verses: 1-3, 5, 17, 19, 20-26, 28, 37, 39, 41, 47, 55-56, while some verses had been modified for the purpose of this event.

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one on this impressive text. I felt somehow amused and sad at the same time about this strange and completely unrealistic idea – as it appeared to me then. It was the type of fantasy you know for sure will never have a chance to become true. It would be better, particularly from a Buddhist perspective, not to cling to it. Not clinging to an idea, however, does not necessarily imply that it goes away. At least in my case, this odd idea somehow found a permanent place of residence in a corner of my sub-consciousness, popping up now and then to say “hello” and evoking each time that same mixture of amusement about this crazy juvenile fancy and sadness about its unrealistic nature (okay, I admit – the sadness feature proves that I wasn’t fully detached). Two and a half decades later I heard about Catherine Cornille’s exciting new series called “Christian Commentaries on Non-Christian Sacred Texts,” whose first volume appeared in 2006. When I met Catherine in 2007 at a symposium in Basel on “Multi-Religious Identity”2 I enthusiastically congratulated her on her new project. This aroused my old slumbering subliminal inmate and I told Catherine, jokingly, about my long ago silly idea of writing a theological commentary on the Bodhicaryāvatāra, adding that I was not pursuing the idea seriously. Another five years later, more or less out of the blue, Catherine dropped me an e-mail asking if I still remembered what I had told her. “The project is yours,” she wrote, “if you are interested. Please let me know if this speaks to you and how.” The offer was serious, no doubt, and for the first time my unaccomplishable fantasy transmuted into a realizable project. I must confess that – due to theological reasons – I find it difficult to believe in providence (whether karmic or divine), but this had the kind of smell and smack of it. So I began working on a proposal and asked Ernst Steinkellner whether he could imagine producing – together with a competent native speaker – a new English translation of the Bodhicaryāvatāra based on his excellent German translation and the Sanskrit text. Although he had already retired from his university post, Ernst was – and still is – a highly productive researcher. Not infrequently scholars at that stage in their careers are even busier than ever before. As another friend once told me: “I urgently need a sabbatical from retirement.” All the more was I gladly surprised, and if truth be told, extremely delighted, when Ernst immediately agreed and soon found in Cynthia Peck-Kubaczek the right

2

 Published as Bernhardt, Schmidt-Leukel, eds., 2008.

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person to cooperate as a native speaker in the English translation. As Ernst explains in his “Word on the Translation,”3 the first draft of the translation developed and changed in tandem with the growth of the commentary and was not finished before the commentary had assumed its final shape. Despite the fact that our joint reflections influenced the translation of the text and the writing of the commentary, Ernst Steinkellner takes exclusive responsibility for the first and I myself for the latter. The commentary is not primarily of a philological nature, even if it attempts to do due justice to a number of crucial philological issues, issues related in particular to the still dubious history of the text’s genesis. Nor is the commentary of a similar genre as the traditional Buddhist commentaries. Being a trans-religious commentary, its own methodology had to be devised with the goal of equally satisfying the interests of Western scholarship, Buddhist readers and those Christians who are keen on gaining a deeper understanding of other faiths and discovering there substantial relationships to particular strands within their own tradition. With all three groups, the commentary – or better, its author – shares an interest in truth: the truth about the text and the truth expressed in the text (more on methodology is found in chapter 5 of Part I). The work has two parts. Part I deals with what the tradition of German exegetical writing calls Einleitungsfragen (introductory matters): What do we know about the age, origin, variants and editorial history of the text? Who was its author and who, his audience? What is its genre and how does it compare to similar texts of its time? What is its actual subject, its structure and style? And finally, what is its significance and reception history, especially within the context of the Buddhist-Christian encounter? These are the questions treated in Part I. To some readers they may perhaps appear too technical. But in some sense they lay the foundation for the commentary proper, which makes up Part II. Nevertheless, it is possible to skip the first part and immediately jump to the text and commentary itself. But whenever it appears to be helpful in the understanding of Part II, cross-references point the reader back to issues addressed in Part I. Traditional Buddhist commentaries on the Bodhicaryāvatāra begin by recounting the legendary life of Śāntideva, although these accounts do not regard the story a legend, but fact. However, there is no such thing

3

 See below, pp. XIX-XXIII.

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as the legend of Śāntideva; there are many, stemming from different periods of the text’s reception history. As my comparative investigation of a number of these legends shows, they actually do not tell us very much about the author (or authors?) of the Bodhicaryāvatāra, but they do tell us a great deal about the growing reputation and developing interpretation of the text. The history of these legends can thus be read as a different, namely, narrative type of commentary on the text – at least this is what I suggest in chapter 2 of Part I. That is why I have treated the legends in quite some detail. Whenever I felt that it was necessary to mention the Sanskrit versions of the Buddhist terms used in the Bodhicaryāvatāra, I have done so. And some Buddhist concepts are so specific that they balk at being translated. A few of these have by now entered the English language, so I treat them as English words and write them without diacritics, as for example samsara, karma, nirvana, Buddha, Dharma, Sangha – the last three being capitalized since they are seen by the Buddhist tradition as the “three jewels” (triratna). As usual, many people helped in bringing this book about and they all deserve my deepest gratitude. First of all, Ernst Steinkellner, from whose grand expertise in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism I benefitted in numerous ways. Cynthia Peck-Kubaczek, through her amazing linguistic skills, not only helped in the creation of the new translation but also took the pains of doing the linguistic copy-editing of the whole commentary. At various points I received advice and crucial information from such esteemed colleagues as José Cabezón, Helmut Eimer, Peter Gäng, Chiko Ishida, Andreas Kretschmar, Hermut Löhr, Carola Roloff (Bhikṣunī Jampa Tsedroen), Akira Saito, and Andrew Skilton. My doctoral students, with whom I read through the whole Bodhicaryāvatāra, as well as the participants of a small study group at the United Theological College in Bangalore, India, with whom I read large chunks of the text, provided me with many valuable questions and insights. Writing a study like this requires a great deal of research. All in all I spent six years on the project, three years of these being research leaves. I am very grateful to Muenster University’s Cluster of Excellence “Religion and Politics” and the Faculty of Protestant Theology for setting me free for three semesters, and to the Volkswagen Foundation, which sponsored another three semesters through one of their Opus Magnum grants. I am deeply grateful to Catherine Cornille, not only because she invited me to write this commentary but also for creating this series of Christian Commentaries on Non-Christian Sacred Texts, which provides

SOME WORDS AHEAD

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such a marvelous opportunity for deep learning from the spiritual riches and profound wisdom cherished in the various world’s religious traditions. Thanks also to the two anonymous reviewers who swiftly gave their o.k. to the publication and to everybody at Peeters for their professional handling of the production process. Special thanks go to Rita Corstjens for her wonderful work in collating the indexes. In his own commentary on the Bodhicaryāvatāra, the 14th Dalai Lama recounts what was said about Patrul Rinpoche (1808-1887), the teacher of his teacher: When he “explained this text auspicious signs would occur, such as the blossoming of yellow flowers, remarkable for the great number of their petals.”4 I certainly do not expect the reader of this text to experience any auspicious signs. My feelings resemble more those of the (presumable) redactor of the Bodhicaryāvatāra, who says at the beginning of the text that he composed it primarily for his own edification. To me it was more than auspicious that the favorable circumstances came together to make my 35-year-old fantasy come true. But like the author of verse 1:3, I wouldn’t mind if the result should turn out to be of some use to a few other people as well.

4

 Gyatso 2009, 1.

A WORD ON THE TRANSLATION E. Steinkellner

When Perry Schmidt-Leukel honored me by asking whether I could imagine translating my German translation of the Bodhicaryāvatāra into English, I imprudently thought the task would not be too difficult. However, when I asked some native speakers amongst my colleagues if they would like to contribute, I was turned down, for most acceptable reasons. Luckily, Cynthia Peck-Kubaczek, with whom I have cooperated for many years, was interested. Although not a scholar in the field, she is well acquainted with its subjects and terms, and because of her conceptual acuity and literary taste, I was happy to take advantage of her linguistic abilities, with their lucidity and elegance. Without her efforts under sometimes difficult circumstances, this translation would not have come about. My gratitude goes first of all to her. After her work was finished and discussed, upon going through her translation in detail I found that there were numerous instances, not really surprisingly, where on my part I saw the need for changes in the interpretation of the text as found in my old German translation. It seems that after some maturation and due to the general progress in scholarship and understanding,5 I felt I had a better grasp of the Sanskrit text and Śāntideva’s intent than I had had almost forty years ago. Moreover, as a result of being confronted with Perry’s on-going questions and his pointing out inconsistencies, I continued to revise the translation, both to his and my own satisfaction. It is at this point, therefore, that I wish to acknowledge my sincere gratitude also to Perry for pushing me to many improvements, as well as for the pleasure of continuously cooperating with him in a most productive and felicitous manner. Thus, the final translation turned out not to be merely an

5  Of recent publications that were helpful in various ways for improving the content of my 1981 translation, the following were particularly valuable: Tauscher 1995, Williams 1998, Gómez 1999, Buddhismus in Geschichte und Gegenwart (1999), Mahoney 2002, Ruegg 2002, Saito 2004, Saito 2006, Schmithausen 2007, Harrison 2007, The Cowherds 2011.

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English translation of the old German one of 1981, but is, in fact, a veritable new English translation of the original Sanskrit text. As in 1981, I used the text edited by P. L. Vaidya (Darbhanga 1960) based on the edition by L. de La Vallée Poussin (1901-1914) and added occasional corrections to this edition (V) in parentheses.6 I mainly used the only commentary extant in Sanskrit for the major part of the stanzas, the Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā by Prajñākaramati (ca. second half of the 10th century CE), in Vaidya’s edition.7 Compared with the other Indian commentaries,8 currently only available in their Tibetan translations,9 Prajñākaramati’s commentary is not only the most extensive by far, but also, aside from terminological and grammatical explanations, it is rich in citations from scriptures and scholastic treatises, as well as in elaborate digressions in various instances of systematic importance. In other words, this commentary is the most valuable representative of the commentarial culture of his time, and only rarely did I feel the need to deviate from his understanding.10 Śāntideva’s words were spoken with the aspiration of convincing his recipients, first and foremost Buddhist monastics, of the value of his central point, the “spirit of awakening” (bodhicitta). Yet, considering the all-encompassing horizon of this spirit on the one hand, and the fact that Śāntideva relied on real-life examples to clarify more general or even unusual ideas and arguments on the other, I cannot but assume that he intended his audience to include lay people as well. In transmitting his enthusiasm for the “spirit of awakening” Śāntideva uses, although adhering to an overall Buddhist didactic structure, a language also well adapted to the capacities of a more general audience. Nevertheless, even beyond chapter 9, which is devoted to the theoretical conceptions accompanying 6  The sources of some of the better readings are found in M (Minayeff 1890), LVP (de La Vallée Poussin 1901-1914), Bh (V. Bhattacharya 1960) and L (Lindtner 1991). Other improvements and minor corrections are my own. 7  For a survey of the manuscripts known at present, those used in the editions of Minaeff 1890, Śāstrī 1894 and La Vallée Poussin 1901-1914, as well as many not yet consulted, cf. Stender 2014. Eight old more or less complete palm-leaf manuscripts, most of them in proto-Bengali script, are still available. Only one of them, now in the Tibet Museum of Lhasa, has been examined so far (cf. Lindtner 1991). Lindtner judged it to be “very accurate” and reported mostly scribal errors, collating it with the edition of V. Bhattacharya 1960. 8  Cf. Ruegg 1981, 84f. 9  See vol. 100 of the Peking edition. 10  I certainly do not share the somewhat depreciating evaluation of his work by Kate Crosby and Andrew Skilton in the introduction to their translation (cf. Crosby, Skilton 1995, xli‒xlii).

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and underpinning his topic, he reveals himself to be a well-informed expert in the Buddhist tradition, above all in Madhyamaka thought. This background, too, must be respected in a translation, whether with respect to everyday levels of expressions or terminological ones.11 I will give some examples of this. For saṃsāra I use “cycle of existences” or “cyclic existence.” When Śāntideva employs terms from dogmatic traditions, I translate in accordance with their dogmatic meaning. Vāsanā, which would read nicely as “(habitual) tendency” (BCA 9:22, 33) for Western eyes, has been translated as “latent impression” or “impregnation” so as not to obscure the implication of continuity of the merely causally connected phases in a beginningless mental stream; or asañjñisamāpatti, “unconscious absorption,” (9:49) the term for a specific type of absorption. For citta and manas I stick to translating with “mind,” except in the case of bodhicitta.12 I regularly translate pāpa with “sin.” I use this because of its import in value that is equal for a Buddhist or a Christian, without, however, thereby implying the definition in Christian theology. Accomplished Bodhisattvas are distinguished from those still on the path by way of capitalization. A more difficult and even controversial topic may be seen in my translating the term satya (9:2f) with “reality,” since a majority of scholars and translators opt for translating this with “truth.” An appropriate translation of Sanskrit satya depends on making a decision between these two concepts, because both belong to the scope of this word but not, to my knowledge, to any one word within the usual Western translation languages. Sanskrit satya and Tibetan bden pa have both meanings – the epistemic or ethic one (“truth,” “goodness”) and the ontologic one (“reality,” “existence”) – since the term can be used for referring either to a subjective (viṣayin) or an objective aspect (viṣaya). The practice of most scholars to translate satya consistently as “truth,” without any further differentiation, leads, in my view, to difficulties in understanding. After all, “truth” and “true” are terms that qualify 11  All terms signifying human or other beings are translated with the gender given in the text in order not to distort the conceptions of the past that are linguistically reflected therein. While in Sanskrit names in the masculine gender may be considered universal if contextually suggested, this fact will possibly not alleviate the burden for modern gender consciousness. Preferably, then, such masculine terms may be understood by modern readers as referring to beings that transcend gendered differentiation. Women are, however, mentioned also separately, as are nuns. 12  In the latter case, scholars and translators have experimented in many directions with a host of proposals. For a survey, cf. Wangchuk 2007, 69f.

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A WORD ON THE TRANSLATION

statements or propositions and concepts or beliefs on the basis of whichever theory of these terms’ relationship to the referent, since “truth” simply does not refer to particularized entities, be they things or mental events.13 When translating the two satyas referred to by Śāntideva (9:2f.) with “reality,” it must be kept in mind that only the “ultimate” (paramārtha) is reality in the proper sense. The “conventional” or “customary” (saṃvṛti) is the surface reality of everyday life (vyavahāra). It is, due to mistaken projections, a “veiling” as the domain (viṣaya) of the knowledge, language and activities of ordinary people (pṛthagjana). As such, it is not a reality in its own right, but still real enough because it is the unavoidably necessary starting point from which the ultimate as the domain (viṣaya) of the knowledge of the spiritually advanced “noble ones” (ārya) can be approached. The conventional as reality is constituted by language and conception, expressed as “proliferation” (prapañca) in the terminology of the Madhyamaka tradition, whereas the ultimate is beyond all proliferation. Since it is beyond proliferation, it cannot be a “truth.” And since the conventional derives its provisional and illusionary character from its relationship to the ultimate, it cannot be a “truth” either. In this respect I take my lead from the way in which I understand Madhyamaka thought as interpreted by Candrakīrti.14 In general, it is my impression that Śāntideva’s conception of the two satyas follows Candrakīrti’s explanation in Madhyamakāvatāra 6:23ff and its Bhāṣya.15 This is at least supported to a great extent by Prajñākaramati, who in his commentary not only cites most of these stanzas, but also applies Candrakīrti’s comments in the Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya to them in his own explanations. 13  Cf. Broido 1988, 54 and fn. 15; Brunnhölzl 2004, 72-77; Newland, Tillemans 2011, 4f, 8-10; and Priest, Siderits, Tillemans 2011, 131-150. 14  For detailed and painstakingly concept-focused elaborations of the rich later Tibetan Madhyamaka traditions, in particular of Tsoṅ kha pa, cf. the studies and translations in Tauscher 1995 and Tauscher 1999, as well as Ruegg 2002, 168-202, and the collected papers in Ruegg 2010. 15  The Sanskrit text of part of the sixth chapter (6:1-97) of the Madhyamakāvatāra was edited by Xuezhu Li in China Tibetology 1, 2012, 1-16. Li’s critical edition of the stanzas of the whole chapter was published in JIPh 43, 2015, 1-30. The Tibetan translation of the complete Bhāṣya was edited by Louis de la Vallée Poussin (Bibliotheca Buddhica IX) St.-Pétersbourg 1912, and translated in Le Muséon 8, 1907, 249-317, 10, 1911, 272-358, and 11, 1912, 236-328 (up to 6:165). 6:166-226 was translated by Helmut Tauscher, Wien 1981.

A WORD ON THE TRANSLATION

XXIII

The main reason for choosing “reality” in translating satya in the case of BCA 9:2 is the fact that Candrakīrti defines conventional satya (saṃvṛtisatya) as the domain (viṣaya) of those who see falsely (mṛṣādṛś, MA 6:23d), and reality (tattva), that is, ultimate satya (paramārthasatya), as the domain of those who see correctly (samyagdṛś, MA 6:23c).16 It is the fully accomplished “noble ones,” the Buddhas, who with their pure view (śuddhadṛṣṭi) see reality (tattva) as it is (yathābhūta, avitatha), without any proliferations. In other words, they see reality (tattva) by not seeing it in a conceptually distorted way (cf. MA 6:29). For the Buddhas, as well as for the released ones, there is only one reality, a reality that escapes all comprehension; the conventional reality (saṃvṛtisatya) differs only in that the unreleased world of sentient beings is suffering and in need of a Buddha’s teaching (cf. MMK17 24:9-10). That means that we are facing here two realities only because two different points of view as “features of cognition” (Broido 1988) are said to be possible in regard to what is one and the same reality. It is out of compassion that the released ones willingly take on the error (moha) of a conventional reality for the sake of being able to guide those still attached to worldly affairs towards release from all suffering (BCA 9:76-77).18 As for the name of Śāntideva’s work, I keep to translating bodhicarya as “the course towards awakening.” This is supported by BCA 6:107c; 9:14b, 38a; and 10:32b, as well as by most of the manuscripts surveyed in Stender 2014. The Dūn-huáng version and, above all, the Tibetan tradition read instead bodhisattvacarya, namely, “the bodhisattva’s course.”19

16  MA 6:23: “All entities bear two natures (rūpa) that are constituted through the right and the false view. That which is the domain of those who see correctly is declared as reality (tattva), (while that which is the domain) of those who see falsely as conventional reality (saṃvṛtisatya).” This is explained by Candrakīrti in the Bhāṣya (Bibliotheca Buddhica IX) 103, 3-7 and was roughly copied by Prajñākaramati (BCAP 174, 23-25). 17  Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, ed. L. de la Vallée Poussin (Bibliotheca Buddhica IV) 1903-1913 (Reprint Osnabrück 1970). 18  For a survey of theories around the period of Śāntideva among Mādhyamikas on the two satyas and their “relationship,” cf. Ichigo 2016. 19  I am grateful to Anne MacDonald for various improvements to this “Word.”

ABBREVIATIONS

AASP AN ATBSt BCA BCAP Bh DN L LVP M MA MMK MN Mv PS PTS SN SRKK ŚS Thag V Vism Vn WSTB

Austrian Academy of Sciences Press Aṅguttaranikāya Arbeitskreis für tibetische und buddhistische Studien Bodhicaryāvatāra Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā Bhattacharya 1960 Dīghanikāya Lindtner 1991 de La Vallée Poussin 1901-1914 Minayeff 1890 Madhyamakāvatāra Mūlamadhyamakakārikā Majjhimanikāya Mahāvagga of the Vinayapiṭaka Pāramitāsamāsa Pāli Text Society Saṃyuttanikāya Subhāṣitaratnakaraṇḍakakathā Śikṣāsamuccaya Theragāthā Vaidya 1960 Visuddhimagga Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde

PART I

INTRODUCTION TO THE BODHICARYĀVATĀRA

CHAPTER 1

THE BODHICARYĀVATĀRA: TEXT AND AUTHOR

Introducing the Bodhicaryāvatāra (BCA) (“Introduction to” or “Entering the Course towards Awakening”) by identifying its author and age has become considerably more difficult over the past two or three decades. Earlier, it was more or less undisputed1 that the BCA is a masterpiece by Śāntideva, one of the last major representatives of the Madhyamaka school of Buddhist philosophy in India (and, according to the Tibetan tradition, a member of this school’s Prāsaṅgika branch). Moreover, Śāntideva was thought to have lived and taught in the first half of the eighth century at the great monastic university of Nālandā, and to have also composed the Śikṣāsamuccaya (“Collection of Rules”) (ŚS), of which much2 is an anthology of excerpts from Buddhist texts relevant to the Bodhisattva path. In content and structure, though not in style or length, the ŚS is very similar to the BCA, sharing with the latter a number of identical verses and passages. Hence there was no reason to question whether both scriptures originated from the same author, since the ŚS seemed to provide scriptural and doctrinal authority to the largely poetical verses of the BCA. Above all, given that the ŚS is explicitly mentioned and its study recommended in BCA 5:105, it also seemed clear that the ŚS was composed before the BCA, with the BCA drawing the quintessence from the scriptural tradition as presented in the ŚS in a new and fascinating way. This was also the understanding in the Tibetan commentarial tradition and how it is explicitly described in the Tibetan version of what is now seen as presumably one of the oldest forms of the legend of Śāntideva’s life.3 However, the discovery, among large numbers of scriptures found in Dūn-huáng (1906-1908), of an at that time unidentified Tibetan version of the 1

 See, for example, Ruegg 1981, 82-86.  As shown by Harrison 2007, the Śikṣāsamuccaya does in fact contain more original (non-cited) text than was originally assumed. Embedded in the ŚS is a short text of twenty-seven verses (kārikā) which, together with the ŚS, is also handed down as a separate scripture in the Tibetan canon. For the text of the kārikās in Sanskrit, Tibetan and English, see Clayton 2006, 119-126. 3  Cf. de Jong 1975, 176f. See below, pp. 15-19. 2

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PART I

Bodhicaryāvatāra, and its later closer investigation has – as Akira Saito phrases it – “rather dramatically changed the situation.”4 The Dūn-huáng version of the BCA differs markedly from its “canonical”5 version, i.e. the version contained in the Tengyur section of the Tibetan canon. First of all, the Dūn-huáng version is considerably shorter (having about 200 fewer verses).6 But this is not due to a part having been lost, as is the case with the Chinese version of the BCA. In the case of the Dūn-huáng version, the issue of length is far more complex. On the one hand, although there are also a number of missing verses when compared to the canonical version, the places where these verses are missing are scattered throughout the text. But on the other hand, the Dūn-huáng version also contains verses not found in the canonical text. At least in some sections, its text appears more consistent and reads more smoothly. Thus some scholars now assume that the Dūn-huáng text is the earlier one, whereas the canonical version is the product of one or even several later redactors.7 Most telling is the fact that the explicit recommendation of the ŚS in BCA 5:105 is not found in the Dūn-huáng text, as well as the fact that some of the extra material contained in the canonical BCA seems to be taken from the ŚS. Moreover, the ŚS has one verse which is only found in the Dūn-huáng version and not in the canonical BCA. This would most likely imply – as Akira Saito holds – that this verse was “cited,”8 suggesting that the Dūn-huáng BCA is earlier than the ŚS, and the ŚS earlier than the canonical BCA. In addition, the Dūn-huáng text begins with three introductory verses of which the first two are identical to the well-known prologue of Nāgārjuna’s MMK.9 This is different in the canonical version, where we 4

 Saito 2010, 17.  I adopt this epithet for the present purpose from Crosby, Skilton 1995, XXXI. 6  On a more formal level, the Dūn-huáng version differs from the canonical one in that the first is divided into nine and the latter into ten chapters. This, however, is just due to the fact that chapters 2 and 3 of the canonical version are contracted into a single chapter (chapter 2) in the Dūn-huáng version. The suspicion of some scholars that the tenth chapter of the BCA is inauthentic is not confirmed by the Dūn-huáng version, whose ninth chapter is similar to (though shorter than) the tenth chapter of the canonical BCA. See Crosby, Skilton 1995, XXXIII, and Liland 2009, 10. 7  Cf. Saito 2000; Crosby, Skilton 1995, XXXI. 8  Saito 2010, 20. 9  Saito 2010, 20f, fn. 9 provides the following translation of the first three verses of the Dūn-huáng version: “The Perfect Buddha who has taught the dependent arising, The blissful, the quiescence of verbal proliferation, Non-extinction, non-origination, 5

CHAPTER 1

5

instead find verses (BCA 1:1-3) closely resembling the opening of the ŚS. Was the beginning of an older version (i.e. the Dūn-huáng BCA) deliberately replaced by verses that would link the BCA closer to the ŚS? The Dūn-huáng version also bears a different title,10 Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra (“Introduction to” or “Entering the Course of a Bodhisattva”), and names a different author, Akṣayamati. All this has led Akira Saito to question the authorship of Śāntideva. Saito concludes that the Dūnhuáng version (or more precisely, the Sanskrit text on which the Tibetan translation in the Dūn-huáng version is based) was written by someone named Akṣayamati in the early eighth century, while Śāntideva composed the ŚS a few decades later.11 Then at some later stage, and under the influence of the ŚS, the canonical version of the BCA was produced, perhaps by the author of the ŚS or a third person, “after omitting, supplementing and changing the contents”12 of the original version (the one preserved in Tibetan translation in the Dūn-huáng manuscripts). The opening verses were replaced by new ones in order to better match the ŚS, and BCA 5:105 was inserted in order to express the preference of the ŚS over Nāgārjuna’s Sūtrasamuccaya, mentioned in the Dūn-huáng version as well as, still, in BCA 5:106. These conclusions are clearly tentative. It could also be that “Akṣayamati” is just an epithet or a different name for Śāntideva13 – as Saito himself Non-cessation, non-eternity, Non-coming, non-going, Non-differentiation, non-identity, I do homage to him, The best of preachers. The Buddhas and Bodhisattvas who, keeping good conduct, Remove all injuries from living beings And accomplish any kind of goodness, I do respectful homage to them.” The Chinese version of the BCA is in fact ascribed to Nāgārjuna, which might have to do with the introductory verses; cf. Dietz 1999, 29; Liland 2009, 9. 10  Different from the Sanskrit text of the BCA, but not different from the other Tibetan translations, which are based on the Sanskrit text but carry the same title as the Dūn-huáng version (perhaps inspired by it?). 11  Crosby, Skilton (1995, XXXIIf) accept this as a possibility. 12  Saito 2010, 22. 13  Particularly in the legendary records about Śāntideva’s life, we find various names for him: Śāntadeva, Śāntivarman, Acalasena, Bhusuku, and, perhaps as an epithet, “Akṣayamati” (in the version of Sa-bzang Mati Panchen, see below, p. 26, fn. 40). The Tibetan historian Bu-ston (1290-1364) mentions the view that the version of nine chapters (as found in the Dūn-huáng text) – or (the text is not entirely clear) the ninth

6

PART I

assumed for a while.14 And it may also be the case that it was Śāntideva who, after having composed the ŚS, changed his first version of the BCA at a later stage in his life,15 a version that then may or may not have experienced further editing by other hands. There is, however, the objection that if Śāntideva himself revised the text, one would expect improvements rather than elements that disrupt its flow.16 And yet, the alterations of a more disruptive nature could still be due to later editing. Presumably, all of these questions can only be assessed with more confidence after far more comparative and detailed work has been done on the Dūn-huáng version and the canonical recension. Nonetheless, it is undeniable that “the text clearly underwent a great deal of change”17 – a finding all too familiar to students of Biblical texts. So when referring to the Bodhicaryāvatāra and to “Śāntideva” in my subsequent comments and reflections, the reference (if not indicated otherwise) is to the Sanskrit text of the canonical version and to its imagined author, while being fully aware that this “author” is perhaps not a single individual. The canonical BCA exists in four versions: (1) a Sanskrit text, also included in the Sanskrit commentary of Prajñākaramati (10th cent.),18 (2) the version as found today in the Tibetan canon (TT 5272), (3) a Mongolian translation of the Tibetan canonical version, and (4) a Chinese version (Taishō 1662). These four versions of the canonical BCA differ only slightly from each other with the exception of the Chinese text, which lacks chapters 3 and 4 and a large part of chapter 2.19 The colophon to the Tibetan canonical text speaks of two earlier Tibetan translations based chapter of the BCA – was written by someone named “Akṣayamati.” See de Jong 1975, 181f, Saito 1993, 14ff and Sam van Schaik, blog of 4 Feb 2014: http://earlytibet. com/2014/02/04/the-original-bodhicaryavatara/. More recently, the issue of the name of the BCA’s author has been taken up anew in Saito 2018. 14  See Saito 1993, 20ff. 15  Harrison 2007, 227f. 16  Garfield, Jenkins, Priest 2016, 56. 17  Śāntadeva 1995, 108. 18  According to Liland 2009, 72-88, a large number of other Sanskrit manuscripts (altogether 52) have been identified but not yet taken into account for a new critical edition of the Sanskrit text. These seem to reflect various stages in the development of the Sanskrit texts, including some “major revisions and additions” (Liland 2009, 88). But none of these seems to be as old as the source translated in the Dūn-huáng version. 19  Cf. the synoptical overview in Liland 2009, 10 and the verse-by-verse synopsis of the Sanskrit, Tibetan and Chinese text in the “Thesaurus Literaturae Buddhicae” of the University of Oslo: http://www2.hf.uio.no/polyglotta/index.php?page=volume&vid=24 See also Dietz 1999, 29-31.

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7

on two different Indian texts: The first was translated in the ninth century by Sarvajñādeva (8-9th cent.) and Kawa Paltsek (dPal-brtsegs, 8-9th cent.) based on a manuscript from Kashmir. The second was translated in the late tenth or early eleventh century by Dharmaśrībhadra together with Rinchen Zangpo (Rin-chen-bzan-po, 10-11th cent.) and Śākya Lodro (Śākya-blos-gros) and was based on a manuscript from the “Central Land” (madhyadeśa). In the late eleventh century this second translation was revised by Sumatikīrti and Ngok Loden Sherab (Blo-ldan-shes-rab, 11th cent.). This revision is now the final canonical version.20 Saito assumes that the first translation, based on the Kashmiri manuscript, is in fact identical to the one found in Dūn-huáng, of which, however, so far no Sanskrit prototype has been discovered.21 The colophon to the Tengyur shows that the Tibetans were fully aware of the existence of three different versions of the BCA: two versions with different Indian origins and the text of the canonical version as one that had undergone at least one revision. As can be seen from the various legendary accounts of Śāntideva’s life (see below, chap. 2), they also knew that these versions differed in length and in the number of chapters. An early royal catalogue of Buddhist scriptures (lHan kar ma, dated 824) mentions a version with 600 verses; the hagiographers speak of 700 verses for the shorter version. Nevertheless, if the information on length given by the catalogue is only approximate, both may indeed relate to the text that was found in Dūn-huáng. Thus the three characteristics by which the Tibetan tradition distinguished the canonical BCA from the non-canonical one (which is presumably the Dūn-huáng version) was that the latter is shorter (composed of 700 or 600 verses), that it is divided into nine instead of ten chapters, and that it is related to an Indian source from Kashmir.22 This awareness of three,23 or at least 20  The colophon is quoted and translated in Saito 1993, 16f and Liland 2009, 27. See also Dietz 1999, 31, and Kretschmar 2004, 14. 21  See Liland 2009, 86 and 88; Saito 1993, 18. 22  All three characteristics are put together in the section on Śāntideva’s life as found in the BCA commentary of Sa-bzang Mati Panchen (14th cent.) (cf. Sazang 2006, 30; Chodron 2013, 41). According to Tāranātha (16/17th cent.), however, the non-canonical shorter version was not based on a source from Kashmir, but on one from eastern India. Perhaps he wanted to give the Kashmiri lineage more authenticity, as Liland (2009, 29) speculates. Tāranātha himself belonged to the Jonang school, which was often under suspicion and thought to have Kashmiri origins. 23  Some sources speak of three versions. The three versions would thus be the Dūnhuáng version plus the two different translations of the text from the “Central Land”, the second of which became the canonical version.

8

PART I

two24 different versions naturally raised the question of authenticity. As we will see in the next section, the hagiographers projected this problem back to Śāntideva’s own lifetime, having him decide for the canonical version as the correct one.25 The Tibetan tradition also displays awareness of the fact that the text was circulating under two different names: Though all Tibetan translations and almost all commentaries26 give the same title as in the Dūnhuáng version, “Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra,”27 the various hagiographers refer to the text by both titles or also simply as “Caryāvatāra.”28 On the other hand, it appears that all extant manuscripts of the Sanskrit text are invariably called “Bodhicaryāvatāra.”29 Two possibilities have been discussed – that the longer title Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra is a later extension, or that Bodhicaryāvatāra is an abbreviation of the proper longer title. The fact that all known Sanskrit manuscripts bear the short form may speak in favor of the first assumption; however, as long as no Sanskrit original of the Dūn-huáng version has been discovered we cannot be sure whether it, too, carries the short title. However, further support for the assumption that the short title is the original one might be gathered from the BCA itself, inasmuch as verse 10:1 (“…as I ponder over “Entering the Course towards Awakening”) may be interpreted as quoting the title “Bodhicaryāvatāra.” Additionally, verse 9:14 presents the phrase bodhicarya (“course towards awakening”) as a basic concept. The question of the original title is related to the question of the BCA’s central topic, as we will see in chapter 3. Yet whichever title may be the earlier, the text is about both the “course towards awakening” and “the course of a Bodhisattva” in that it presents an understanding of awakening in terms of the Bodhisattva ideal. Hence, bodhi (“awakening,” often also translated as “enlightenment”) and bodhisattva (the being who pursues the

24  The one based on the Kashmir manuscript (presumably = the Dūn-huáng version) and the canonical version as based on the “Central Land” manuscript. 25  According to Kretschmar 2004, 18 (based on Saito 1993), there are three Tibetan commentaries that do not refer to the canonical version of the BCA, but to one that is identical or very similar to the Dūn-huáng version. However, the majority of traditional Tibetan scholars seem to have ignored these commentaries (Kretschmar 2004, 18) – perhaps because of the non-canonical status of the root text. 26  With the exception of the Tibetan translation of the Indian commentary ascribed to Vibhūticandra. 27  “Byang chub sems dpa’i spyod la ˈjug pa.” 28  E.g. Tāranathā. Cf. Chattopadhyaya 2010, 218f. 29  See Liland 2009, 9.

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awakening of a Buddha) do not signify divergent orientations, ideals or goals, but belong closely together.30 As we will see in the next chapter, the Tibetan hagiographic tradition ascribes to Śāntideva not only the Bodhicaryāvatāra and the Śikṣāsamuccaya, but also a third text called Sūtrasamuccaya (“Collection of Sūtras”). This seems to be based on two verses of the BCA (5:105f), which according to one possible reading seem to say in verse 106 that there are two texts with the title “Sūtrasamuccaya,” one written by Nāgārjuna and the other, presumably, by Śāntideva.31 Yet while the Sūtrasamuccya ascribed to Nāgārjuna is well known, “no work entitled Sūtrasamuccaya attributable to Śāntideva is known to exist.”32 A number of scholars have therefore supported the view that the attribution of a third work to Śāntideva derives from a misreading of BCA 5:105f.33 For the purpose of the present commentary, this question can be left aside, and thus this chapter will conclude with some final remarks on the dating of the BCA. On the terminus ad quem there are two main approaches: The first approach is based on the assumption that the text of 600 verses mentioned in the lHan kar ma catalogue is more or less identical to the Dūn-huáng version of the BCA. Its Tibetan translation can then be safely dated before 824. This is corroborated by the dating of its translators, whose names are given in the Tengyur colophon of the BCA. 30

 Similarly Ruegg 1999, 116.  The verses are: śikṣāsamuccayo ˈvaśyaṃ draṣṭavyaśca punaḥ vistareṇa sadācāro yasmāt tatra pradarśitaḥ saṃkṣepeṇa-atha vā tāvat paśyet sūtrasamuccayam āryanāgārjuna baddhaṃ dvitīyaṃ ca pratyatnataḥ The reading suggestive of two Sūtrasamuccayas would be: “Certainly the Śikṣāsamuccaya ought to be examined repeatedly, since there it teaches good conduct in detail. Now moreover, one should also see briefly the Sūtrasamuccaya, And diligently [one should study] the second [Sūtrasamuccaya] Composed by the noble Nāgārjuna.” See Clayton 2006, 36f. See also below p. 238. 32  Ruegg 1981, 84. 33  As has been explained by Barbra Clayton (2006, 36f), the question is whether to read dvitīya (“second”) as being related to Sūtrasamuccaya or to the recommended study. That is, one should first study the Śikṣāsamuccaya and then, secondly, Nāgārjuna’s Sūtrasamuccaya. This question is not necessarily related to the issue of the insertion of verse 5:105, which is absent in the Dūn-huáng version. For “second” would then not mean “second” to the study of the ŚS, but to the study of the Ākāśagarbha-sūtra, mentioned in 5:104. See also Saito 2010, 17f. 31

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PART I

If therefore the translation of the Dūn-huáng version took place around 800, the Sanskrit text underlying the Dūn-huáng version was perhaps composed in the early eighth century, as is now assumed by Saito.34 But this suggestion depends on establishing the terminus a quo, which is more difficult (see below). Regarding the Tibetan translation of the canonical version of the BCA, we can assume, based on the Tengyur colophon, a date around 1000, with a later revision in the second half of the eleventh century. The Sanskrit text of the canonical BCA was therefore presumably composed (maybe in stages) between the eighth and tenth centuries, with further changes of the Tibetan text in the late eleventh century – if the Sanskrit text underlying the Dūn-huáng version was indeed composed in the early eighth century and if it precedes the Sanskrit text of the canonical version. The second approach for establishing the terminus ad quem depends on the fact that two verses from the BCA (1:10 and 7:28) are quoted in the Tattvasiddhi. The Tattvasiddhi is ascribed to Śāntarakṣita, who is thought to have died in 788.35 If this ascription and the date of Śāntarakṣita’s death are both correct, the BCA thus would have been composed before 788, but Śāntarakṣita’s authorship of the Tattvasiddhi is very dubious. The calculation of the terminus a quo hinges to a large extent on the assumption that the author of the BCA was a famous teacher at Nālandā called “Śāntideva,” as reported in the hagiographies.36 Moreover, it is assumed that he was already renowned during his lifetime. Hence it seems reasonable that he would have been mentioned by the two famous Chinese pilgrims, Xuanzang (Hsüan-tsang) or Yijing (I-tsing) (who were in India from 630[?]–645[?] and 671[?]–685/95[?], respectively, and who both spent some time at Nālandā), if he had lived at their time or before. But he is not mentioned by either one. Śāntideva’s active period would thus have to be placed later, somewhere between 685/95 and 788.37 Yet it seems that this line of reasoning depends on too many questionable assumptions. It is not only based on the weak argument of ex silentio (his not being mentioned), as de Jong rightly remarked.38 34

 See Saito 2010, 18 and 22; Saito 2018.  See Ruegg 1981, 82, fn. 266; 88f; de Jong 1975, 179f; Clayton 2006, 32. It has even been speculated further that Śāntarakṣita composed the Tattvasiddhi before he left for Tibet in 763, which would give an even earlier terminus ad quem. 36  For various approaches based on information taken from the hagiographic records, see Clayton 2006, 31f. 37  See Pezzali 1968, 38. 38  Cf. de Jong 1975, 180. 35

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11

It also presupposes that Śāntideva was a reputed Nālandā teacher. The alleged Nālandā connection, however, comes from hagiographic records whose historical value is highly questionable. The hagiographers clearly refer to the ten-chapter version and thus not to the (presumably) earlier one. In this longer version (and the related ŚS), it is possible to detect some implicit evidence for a possible relation to Nālandā: (1) The ŚS quotes from so many different Buddhist texts that its author must have had access to a large Buddhist library of the kind that existed in Nālandā. (2) BCA chapter 9 seems to reflect a lively culture of philosophical debate as was found in Nālandā. (3) The BCA begins with a Bodhisattva liturgy (mahāpuja) as practiced in Nālandā.39 But a close link between the BCA and the ŚS only applies to the person responsible for the longer, canonical version of the BCA. If this is not the same person as the one who authored the shorter and presumably earlier version of the BCA, one piece of evidence for the Nālandā connection collapses. This is also relevant for the second one, insofar as the wisdom chapter of the shorter version (chapter 8) is less extensive and less sophisticated than its equivalent in the longer canonical version (chapter 9). Moreover, real or virtual debates were not confined to Nālandā. Nor was the Bodhisattva liturgy exclusively related to Nālandā. Thus while the redactor of the canonical BCA may (or may not) have had a relation to Nālandā, this is far less clear for the author of its shorter and presumably earlier version. Such considerations give a much greater scope for the terminus a quo, which might then go back to the seventh century. In the absence of any further evidence, the terminus a quo can presumably only be fixed in relation to the Buddhist texts mentioned in the shorter version of the BCA and the philosophical positions adopted.40 Thus if one assumes some dependency on Candrakīrti, we would have a possible reference point for the terminus a quo, if Candrakīrti can indeed be dated to something like 600-650. All of this implies that apart from the legends, we cannot say much about the author of the BCA. He was certainly a learned Mahāyāna Buddhist of the Mādhyamika brand, i.e. a follower of the philosophy of Nāgārjuna and critical of the rival Yogācāra school, despite some nearness of his understanding of bodhicitta to the Buddha Nature doctrine. 39  For arguments (1) and (2), see Williams 1995, VIII; for argument (3), Crosby and Skilton in: Śāntideva 1995, 13. 40  The latter criterion, however, is accompanied by many uncertainties. See Saito 1996.

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He was also almost certainly a monk, although it appears far less certain that he was a monk at the famous monastic university of Nālandā. In the next chapter, I will suggest that the legends surrounding Śāntideva do not provide any additional historical information about the author of the BCA. They may be better understood as reflections on the BCA itself and its growing reputation.

CHAPTER 2

THE LEGEND OF ŚĀNTIDEVA

There are a number of different versions of the legend of how the Bodhicaryāvatāra came into existence and of what kind of person its author was. In her influential study of 1968, Amalia Pezzali undertook a first synoptic comparison based on four different versions.1 Since then, several other versions of the legend have come to academic attention, and yet apart from an important article by J.W. de Jong in 1975, so far no new yet sound comparative analysis has been carried out.2 In the following, I will compare eight versions (of eleven3) and suggest a working hypothesis on the legend’s development. I will also suggest an interpretative approach that does not relate the legend(s) to a (perhaps fictitious) person named “Śāntideva,” but sees them as a different type of “commentary” on the text associated with his name: the Bodhicaryāvatāra. The eight versions are: I) A Sanskrit version (14th cent.) as first published by Haraprasād Śāstri in 19134 and re-published in Pezzali 1968, 27-32, and in de Jong 1975, 168-175.

1

 Cf. Pezzali 1968, 1-45.  A recent comparison by Chodron 2013 is rather superficial and suffers from prejudices and inaccuracy. She takes no note of de Jong’s important demonstration that versions I and II are the oldest ones, and considers Bu-ston’s version, without any further justification, to be the norm by which all others are to be judged. She accuses summaries of the legend by Western writers of being culturally prejudiced and takes the Abhayadatta version (as translated in Dowman 1985) as “an extreme version of this tendency” (Chodron 2013, 32) without noticing that this is neither a contemporary nor a Western version, but an Indo-Tibetan version considerably older than Bu-ston and above all, one that apparently exerted some influence on Bu-ston. 3  I am not considering two older versions contained in the BCA commentaries by Sönam Gyaltsen Pal Zangpo (1312-1374) and by Pawo Tsuglak Trengwa (1504-1566). According to Kretschmar (2004, 6, fn. 21 and 23), the first is very close to version II below, while the second combines versions II and IV. Of the more recent versions, I consider only briefly the one found in the BCA commentary of Khenpo Kunpal (or Kunzang Pelden) (1862-1943) (see Amtzis, Deweese, eds., 2004, vol. 1, 163-175; Pelden 2007, 17-22). I will touch upon this version occasionally where it appears to be relevant. 4  This has been re-published with a French translation in Pezzali 1968, 27-32, and (the Sanskrit text only) in de Jong 1975, 168-175. 2

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II) A version ascribed to Vibhūticandra (12-13th cent.).5 III) A version attributed to Abhayadatta (11-12th cent.?) as found in the Tantric text Eighty-four Mahāsiddhas (grub thob brgyad bcu rtsa bzhi’i lo rgyus).6 IV) The version by Bu-ston (bu ston rin chen grub) (1290-1364) in his History of Buddhism in India and Tibet.7 V) The version by Sa-bzang (sa bzang mati paṇchen) (1294-1376) in his BCA commentary.8 VI) The version by Tāranātha (1575-1635) in his History of Buddhism in India.9 VII) The version by Sumpa Khenpo Yeshe Peljor (sum pa mkhan po ye shes dpal ‘byor) (1704-1788) in his History of the rise, progress and downfall of Buddhism in India.10 VIII) A modern Tibetan version as contained in The Jewel Garland of Buddhist History (1970).11 These eight versions will allow us to look at the development of the legend over three periods: an early stage (versions I‒III), an important formative stage in the fourteenth century (versions IV‒V), and a later stage in which the legend more or less assumes its full form (versions VI‒VIII).

5  As contained in the Tibetan translation of a BCA commentary ascribed to Vibhūticandra, who is also supposed to be the translator. Published in Tibetan with a French translation in de Jong 1975, 168-177; translated into English in Amtzis, Deweese, eds., 2004, vol. 1, 334-339. 6  Translated into English in Abhayadatta 1979, 145-149, and in Dowman 1985, 222-226. 7  Tibetan text and a French translation in Pezzali 1968, 4-11; an English translation in Obermiller 1986, 161-166. 8  Translated into English in Sazang 2006; also included in Chodron 2013, 35-42. 9  Tibetan text with a French translation in Pezzali 1968, 11-18; English translation in Chattopadhyaya 2010, 215-223. 10  Tibetan text with a French translation in Pezzali 1968, 18-20. 11  Published in Tibetan (Chos-‘byung-zin-bris-nor-bu ‘phreng-wa) by Tibetan Cultural Printing Press, Dharamsala 1970. An English translation in Tsonawa 1985. Martin (1997, 198) gives the date of the source as 1980. According to the translator, however, this translation is based on a Tibetan text published in Dharamsala 1970 (Tsonawa 1985, IX). The text itself might be much older, but I was unable to find out more about its origin. Chodron (2013, 29) places it in the 17th century, but does not give any evidence for this.

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1. THE LEGEND UNFOLDS Pezzali assumed that the oldest hagiographic record of Śāntideva’s life is the version in Bu-ston’s History of Buddhism in India and Tibet,12 supposedly written in 1322-1323.13 However, as J.W. de Jong was able to show, the Sanskrit version contained in a Nepalese fragment dating to the fourteenth century, which was published by Śāstri, is almost identical to the version of the legend contained in the Tibetan translation of a BCA commentary ascribed to Vibhūticandra. This commentary, not considered by Pezzali, was presumably composed before Bu-ston, that is, between the late twelfth and early thirteenth century. As a result of his close comparison, de Jong concluded convincingly that these two versions must have derived from the same source14 and thus together constitute the earliest form of the legend that we have. This observation gives us a starting point for reconstructing the legend’s possible development. 1.1 The earliest written form of the legend According to versions I and II, the person who later received the ordination name “Śāntideva” (no birth name is mentioned in these versions) was born “in the south”: in Śrīnagara (version II), as the son of a king named Śrī Mañjuvarman (version I) or Mañjuśrīvarman (version II). Previously (in his youth or in his previous lives?), he had venerated the Buddhas of the past and practiced the Buddhist path, and thus had laid the roots for his later liberation. He followed the Mahāyāna and was educated in all the arts. His mother, the principal queen, was an incarnation of a kuliśayoginī (= the female Tantric deity “Vajrayoginī”). When the prince was about to be consecrated as his father’s successor, his mother poured boiling hot water over him and warned him: If he were to become king, he would [“in this dark age” (version II)] inevitably cause suffering to the people by his passions and as a result go to hell, causing him far greater pain than this water.15 He should therefore 12

 Pezzali 1968, 21, 32.  De Jong 1975, 162. 14  De Jong 1975, 178. 15  The comparison of the pain brought by hot water and the torments of hell appears to be reflecting BCA 7:12: “Even touched by hot water you are hurt, delicate child. How can you stay so calm after deeds that [lead] to hells?” The verse’s (presumably metaphorical) use of “delicate child” may also explain why the narrative relates the episode to Śāntideva’s mother and her still young son. BCA 7:12, however, has no parallel in 13

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PART I

eschew the reign and instead go to the land of the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas (version I) / to the land of Bhaṃgal (Bengal) (version II) to receive the blessing of Mañjughoṣa (= Mañjuśrī). The prince accepted his mother’s advice, took his best horse and left home, riding without drinking or eating for several days until he reached a forest [near the borders of Bengal (version II)] where he saw a beautiful girl and stopped. When he spotted fresh water, the girl prevented him from drinking it, telling him that the water was poisoned. Instead, she gave him ambrosia-water and meat (or meat broth). After the meal, the girl told him about her master, who lived in the middle of the forest. He was a yogi of high spiritual accomplishment and great compassion who had achieved the samādhi (state of contemplation) of Śrī Mañjuvajra (a meditation deity associated with Mañjuśrī). Overwhelmed with joy, feeling like a beggar who had found a jewel, the prince asked the girl to take him to her master. The master accepted him as his disciple. Staying with him for twelve years, the prince learned from the master his specific way of meditation and finally attained the vision of Mañjughoṣa. At this point, the master sent him away to the region of “Madhyadeśa.” There the prince called himself “Acalasena” and entered the service of the king of Magadha as one of his knights or guards. He carried a sword made of wood, which he hid in a scabbard, while keeping his mind firmly focused on the dharma. When his fellow guards became jealous of him, they denounced Acalasena by telling the king about his wooden sword, supposedly unsuitable for defending the king. A weapon inspection was thus announced by the king. When it was Acalasena’s turn, he first refused to present his sword. But the king insisted, so Acalasena took the king aside and told him to cover one eye with his hand. When the Dūn-huáng version. Thus if this verse inspired the legend, this would constitute further evidence for the assumption that the legend presupposes the completion of the canonical version of the BCA (see also below, fn. 20). The converse assumption – that the legend inspired the insertion of vs. 7:12 – appears less likely given that vs. 7:12 is coupled with vs. 7:13, which shows no relation to the legend. What we do not find in BCA 7:12 is the link of hot water/hell with kingship. This feature of the narrative takes up a well-known motif connected to the Buddha’s own renunciation of a royal career. In Jātaka 538, the Buddha describes his former life as prince Temīya. After having been king of Benares for twenty years, he suffered for eighty thousand years in the Ussada hell as a result of the violent deeds inevitably connected to exerting royal power. For this reason, when he was again reborn into a royal family, he pretended to be lame, deaf and dumb in order to escape a new life of kingship, which would inescapably lead to further suffering in hell. In telling this Jātaka, the Buddha explicitly relates this story to his renunciation as prince Siddhattha. See Cowell 2003, vol. 6, 2-19.

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the king saw the sword, its bright radiance caused his uncovered eye to fall out of its socket and onto the ground. Realizing that the king was now convinced of his power, Acalasena put the king’s eye back into its place and healed the king’s pain. He then left the king and went to the great monastery of Nālandā to become a monk. After his ordination, he was given the name Śāntideva (“peace-god”) due to his serenity. Having heard the Tripiṭaka (the Buddhist canon), he persistently practiced meditation [on light (version II)], even while eating (bhu-ñjāna), sleeping (su-pta) and walking to the hut (ku-ṭiṃ gata) (for defecating?). Because of this constant dwelling in the samādhi (meditative state) called bhusuku (after the first syllables of the three above verbs), he himself became known by the name “Bhusuku.”16 After a while, some ignorant monks became suspicious of whether Śāntideva/Bhusuku had any knowledge at all and conceived a plan to test him by asking him to recite the scriptures during the next major recitation assembly (version I). According to version II, an evil-minded monk doubted whether Śāntideva was really meditating17 and so decided to test him. When asked to do the recitation, Śāntideva refused repeatedly, replying: “I don’t know anything.” Yet the monks continued with the preparations for the assembly, setting up an elevated seat for the reciter, and invited Śāntideva to take a place on it surrounded by many people (version II), or by great pandits (version I). He pondered to himself, “I have composed three texts, the Sūtrasamuccaya, the Śikṣāsamuccaya and the Bodhicaryāvatāra,” whereupon he decided to recite the latter. But he first asked the assembly whether he should recite something old or something “that comes after this” (i.e. something new). This alternative is then explained as being the words of the Buddha (something old) and later texts based on the Buddha’s words (something new). A justification of newer texts is given with the help of a quotation from Ratnagotravibhāga (5:18): they need to contain the meaning of and serve the same purpose as the old texts. Versions I and II differ slightly in this explanation, with version II inserting an additional quotation

16  In a Tibetan text of the 12th-13th century, a meditational practice – called “bhusuku” – is described as abandoning “mental elaborations” and all activities other than the three involuntary activities signified by the word bhusuku: “Here bhu stands for bhuñj – the activity of eating; su for sutana [svapana] – sleeping; and ku for kutisara [kūṭīsara] ‒ defecating” (Bentor 2000, 344). However, it may not be excluded that this practice was called bhusuku due to the influence of the Śāntideva legend. 17  See de Jong 1975, 171, 176.

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PART I

from BCA (10:51).18 Out of curiosity (version I) / amazement (version II), the assembly then asked Śāntideva to recite something new and he recited the Bodhicaryāvatāra. When he arrived at BCA 9:35 (quoted in full in versions I and II): If neither existence nor non-existence stands in front of the mind, then, with no objective support, it finds rest, for there is no other way.

the Bodhisattva Mañjuśrī appeared in the air and then disappeared together with Śāntideva (version II) / levitated gradually together with Śāntideva until they both disappeared (version I). The monks immediately rushed to Śāntideva’s room, where they found his three scriptures, which they then made famous in the entire world. I have paraphrased versions I and II in detail because this will help us to better understand the legend’s further transformation. But before turning to the other versions, it may be useful to highlight a few aspects of this early form. First, the legend ends with Śāntideva’s disappearance, with no indication of his existing any further on the human plane. While this is different in all other versions of the legend, here it appears a quite apt illustration of the quoted verse (BCA 9:35). Second, Śāntideva clearly and repeatedly states that he has no knowledge of the scriptures. After he “heard” the Tripiṭaka, he did not memorize or study it, but continuously meditated. (This, however, contradicts the statement that he pondered, shortly before the recitation, on the three texts he had composed, and the further remark that these texts were found in his room after his disappearance). Third, different from the other versions, the name “Bhusuku” does not appear as a nickname or derogatory term, but is explained as indicating a certain type of continual meditation.19 Fourth, the high spiritual level (the direct vision of Mañjuśrī, the Bodhisattva of wisdom), which enabled Śāntideva both to turn a wooden sword into a powerful weapon and produce the Bodhicaryāvatāra merely by practicing meditation (instead of studying), had been achieved before he came to Nālandā through his practice with the forest yogi. Fifth, no abbot performing the ordination nor any master of Śāntideva is mentioned (whether by name or otherwise) for his time at Nālandā. Sixth, no name is mentioned for Śāntideva during the time of his youth and his meditational practice 18

 Cf. de Jong 1975, 177f.  This was also noticed by Pezzali (1968, 33), but she was unable to make much sense of it, since it was not clear to her that this version is in fact older than that of Bu-ston. 19

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19

under the forest master. Seventh, neither of the two early versions displays any knowledge of the existence of several text versions of the BCA,20 and hence they do not record any disputes about the authenticity of different versions. 1.2 An early oral form of the legend While version I is clearly Indian and version II (ascribed to the Indian Vibhūticandra) was presumably translated from an Indian source (which is also supported by the fact that version II refers to the BCA by its Indian title Bodhicaryāvatāra instead of the otherwise standard Tibetan title Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra), the only other version of the legend that seems based on Indian sources is version III, the one ascribed to the oral transmission of Abhayadatta (or Abhayadānaśrī).21 Version III may thus also draw upon comparatively early material, but not necessarily from a 20  An interesting question is whether the early written versions of the legend presuppose the longer canonical text of the BCA or the shorter text. The only BCA verse quoted in both versions of the legend is BCA 9:35. But while the verse is given, it is not mentioned that it is from the ninth chapter. Hence, the quotation could also be from chapter 8:26 (of the Dūn-huáng version or its Sanskrit prototype). The quote of BCA 10:51, which explicitly mentions the “tenth” chapter and thus clearly refers to the canonical version, is an insertion found only in version II. Evidence that both versions I and II relate to the longer canonical version instead of the older, shorter one is Śāntideva’s pondering before the recitation, which characterizes him as the author of three scriptures. This is based on BCA 5:105, which has no parallel in the Dūn-huáng version, i.e. the short BCA. However, as has been said, this “pondering” contradicts the statement that Śāntideva did nothing but meditate and hence might be an insertion, even already in the Nepalese fragment. Yet his authorship of three texts is then once again implied by the legend’s feature that the three texts were found in his cell after his disappearance. 21  This version of the legend is found in the Tibetan Tantric text Grub thob bryad bcu rtsa bzi’i lo rgyus (“The Legends of the Eighty-four Mahāsiddhas”). According to the colophons of its manuscripts, it was “narrated by the Great Guru Abhayadatta Śrī of Campārṇa in India” and “translated by the bhikṣu sMon grub shes rab” (Dowman 1985, 384f). According to Dan Martin, “the work should probably be regarded as an oral amplification, for the purpose of translation into Tibetan, of the (probably earlier) work by Slob-dpon Dpa’-bo ’od-gsal. In other words, it seems likely that there is no Indianlanguage written text behind our ‘history’, although there ought to be one behind the work of Slob-dpon Dpa’-bo ’od-gsal” (Martin 1997, 27). Slob-dpon Dpa’-bo ’od-gsal is the Tibetan name of Ācārya Vīraprakāśa, whose songs (Grub thob brgyad bcu rtogs pa’i snying po rdo rje’i glu) are also contained in Dowman’s translation (at the beginning of each chapter). They do not, however, contain any hagiographic material. Dowman (1985, 388) assumes “the late eleventh or early twelfth century” as the date for the Tibetan text, while Martin (1997, 27) sees the 12th century as possible though not “very certain.”

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PART I

written text. Given, however, that version III shares some material with versions I and II, although in a variant form, it may have been influenced to some extent by the common source that de Jong has postulated for versions I and II. Unlike all other versions of the legend, version III does not report anything about Śāntideva’s pre-Nālandā life. It only mentions his royal descent and his ordination at Nālandā during the reign of king Devapāla (which would have been in the first half of the ninth century). The king is depicted as a generous benefactor of the monastery, which by then hosted seven hundred monks. As in versions I and II, no birth name is given for Śāntideva, but the legend relates that in Nālandā he was given the derogative nickname Bhusuku – explained as “lazy bum” – “because he did only three things: eat, sleep and wander around.”22 Moreover, he had a huge appetite and so ate five bowls of rice every morning. Bhusuku was extremely slow in his studies and unable to take part in the customary Sūtra recitations. When the abbot therefore encouraged him to leave the monastery, Bhusuku replied: “I have not broken any of the rules. It is not right to throw me out. It is just that I have no luck in learning academic subjects.”23 So he was allowed to stay. The next time it was his turn for the recitation, Bhusuku agreed to do so. All of the monks decided to attend and have fun at his expense. The night before, the abbot threatened to expel him if he failed the next morning. And so Bhusuku had to confess that he would not be able to succeed. The abbot thus advised him to recite the mantra of Mañjuśrī (“arapacana”) the whole night through, with his meditation cord tied around his neck and knee to prevent him from falling asleep. While reciting the mantra, Mañjuśrī appeared, but Bhusuku did not recognize him. After Mañjuśrī revealed his identity, Bhusuku asked him for the power (siddhi) of the most excellent wisdom. Mañjuśrī granted his wish and disappeared. The next morning the assembly hall was decorated and many people had arrived, including the king and his court. All were expecting “to have a good laugh.” After Bhusuku sat down on the recitation throne, his body began to levitate and “became extraordinarily radiant.”24 He asked the assembly whether he should recite the Sūtras “or explain them 22  Abhayadatta 1979, 146. Dowman (1985, 222) reads: “nothing but eat, sleep and stroll for the sake of his digestion.” 23  Abhayadatta 1979, 146. 24  Ibid. 147. According to Dowman 1985, 224, he levitated “above the cushions, his body glowing and pulsating with light.”

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21

in a way that has not been done before?”25 The pandits, the king and the people began to laugh and the king replied: “You have developed a method of eating that has never been seen before, and a method of sleeping and strolling about that has never been seen before. Now preach us the Dharma in a way that has not been done before.”26 Then Bhusuku recited the ten chapters of the Bodhicaryāvatāra. Upon finishing, he rose up in the air. Everyone was amazed and inspired in their faith. They praised Bhusuku as a great master, now giving him the name Śāntideva because he had brought their pride to peace. Afterwards they asked him for a commentary, which he wrote and gave them. But when they further asked him to become their abbot, he refused. Instead, he took off his robes and left the monastery. Śāntideva went to a large town called “Dekira” or “Dhokiri.” He made himself a sword of wood with a gilt handle and became one of the king’s guards. Being generously paid, he served the king for twelve years with unwavering dedication.27 On one occasion, all of the guards made offerings to the goddess Umā. When cleaning their swords it was noticed that Śāntideva’s sword was made of wood. This was subsequently reported to the king. When the king demanded to inspect his sword, Śāntideva warned him that this would cause him harm. But the king insisted. So Śāntideva asked the king and his servants to cover one eye (Dowman 1985, 225) / their eyes (Abhayadatta 1979, 148). As soon as he drew his sword out of its sheath, its radiant light blinded their uncovered eyes (Abhayadatta: even their covered eyes). The king and his servants fell on their knees, pleading him to put the sword back into its sheath and (according to Dowman) asking for forgiveness. Śāntideva restored their eyesight by anointing their eyes with his tears, or (according to Dowman) with his spittle. He was asked to stay as a priest, but he declined and left the city. Śāntideva moved to a hut or walled cave in the mountains. There he was seen killing animals and eating their flesh. When this was reported to the king, he, together with his court, went to see Śāntideva, asking him how he could do harm to living beings. But Śāntideva replied

25

 Abhayadatta 1979, 147.  Ibid. 27  Robinson translates this as “never deviating from his noble aim” (Abhayadatta 1979, 148); Dowman (1985, 225) reads: “constantly attentive to the ultimate nature of reality.” This may be an allusion to the name Acalasena, which is apparently not found in this version. 26

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“I have not killed anything,”28 or, according to Dowman, “I am no butcher, (…) I am a healer.”29 When he opened the door of his hut, the animals, restored to life, ran out doubled in number and disappeared in the distance. Seeing this, the king and his entourage “realized that all existing things are illusory, only a dream.”30 Then Śāntideva recited the verses: These animals which I killed In the beginning did not come from anywhere. In the duration, they did not stay anywhere. In the end, they were not destroyed into anything. From the outset, existing things are not real, So how can the killing and the killed be real? Behold, still having compassion for living beings, Bhusuku has said this.31

In this way Śāntideva converted the king and all of his entourage to the truth. Śāntideva himself realized the unity of body, speech and mind and the siddhi of the Mahāmudrā.32 He lived for one hundred years and then went to the world of the Ḍākas or Ḍākinīs. If we compare version III to versions I and II, there are some striking differences. First, version III has no pre-history of Śāntideva’s life before Nālandā, but it does introduce a post-history of his life after Nālandā. This involves, second, the story of Acalasena’s sword being shifted to the period of Śāntideva’s life after Nālandā. The episode is described in more 28

 Abhayadatta 1979, 149.  Dowman 1985, 226. 30  Abhayadatta 1979, 149. According to Dowman (1985, 226), Śāntideva taught them “that all elements of experience are merely dream and illusion.” The motif of killing, eating and subsequently reviving animals is found in the Grub thob bryad bcu rtsa bzi’i lo rgyus also as a feature of the Siddha Virūpa, where it serves the same purpose of demonstrating the illusory nature of things (cf. Dowman 1985, 44ff; Abhayadatta 1979, 28f). 31  Abhayadatta 1979, 149. Dowman (1985, 226) translates: “The deer I took for venison Never came into existence, Never lived on earth, And will not cease to be. If no entities of experience have substance, What is the reality of hunter and victim? Alas, you pitiful people, You called me Bhusuku!” 32  In Tantric Buddhism, “mahāmudrā” (“great seal”) signifies the enlightened realization of the non-dual relationship between “emptiness” and the phenomena. See also Dowman 1985, 5ff. 29

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detail and differently, as for example the king’s eye does not fall out, but he is blinded. Third, the vision of Mañjuśrī does not occur before Nālandā (while staying with the forest yogi), but in Nālandā the night before the recitation and as a result of the mantra-practice recommended by the abbot. Fourth, the story of killing, eating and reviving the deer is introduced as a new feature of the legend and placed, alongside the story of Acalasena’s sword, in the period after Śāntideva’s departure from Nālandā. (However, Śāntideva’s consumption, at least on one occasion, of meat or meat broth is also a feature of versions I and II.) Fifth, Śāntideva is given this name only after the recitation of the Bodhicaryāvatāra. Sixth, the full levitation takes place after the recitation of all ten chapters. Verse 9:35 is not mentioned and there is no appearance of Mañjuśrī during the recitation, but a slight levitation and the strong radiation of Śāntideva’s body at its beginning. Seventh, here the name Bhusuku is used clearly and strongly in a derogatory sense and, most importantly, Bhusuku is truly ignorant, lazy and eating too much. He is neither learning the Sūtras nor practicing a form of continual meditation; he is even unable to recognize Mañjuśrī. Accordingly, there is no mention of him having authored three texts, although upon the monks’ request he is able to compose a commentary on the Bodhicaryāvatāra for them, this presumably referring to the Śikṣāsamuccaya. Despite these and other differences (e.g. the invitation and his refusal to become abbot in Nālandā; the invitation and his declining to stay with the king), version III shares some crucial aspects with versions I and II, or offers variations of them. First, in line with I and II, it maintains that the Bodhicaryāvatāra was not the product of scholarly studies, but the result of Śāntideva’s close relation to Mañjuśrī as attained through meditative practice (which was learned under the forest yogi, according to versions I and II) or mantra recitation (learned in Nālandā from the abbot, according to version III).33 The “I don’t know anything” of the Indian written versions is radicalized in version III, where the BCA is presented as entirely the result of direct inspiration from Mañjuśrī. Second, version III intensifies the parallelism between Acalasena and Bhusuku being tested: Just as a wooden sword is miraculously turned 33  Taken together with the parallelism between Śāntideva and the wooden sword, this explains why the story of the sword had to be shifted to a period after Nālandā: It was only after and through the contact with Mañjuśrī that the idle Bhusuku turns into Śāntideva, the producer of the Bodhicaryāvatāra, and his wooden sword into a powerful weapon.

24

PART I

into a powerful weapon, the numbskull Bhusuku is miraculously turned into the producer of the BCA. The spiritual power of the BCA is as supernatural as the shining force of Acalasena’s weapon. Third, in all three versions, Śāntideva’s question of what to recite functions as an expression of the legend’s high esteem for the BCA. It is paid the same if not even greater respect as the “texts of old,” that is, the Sūtras. Fourth, toward its end version III does not quote BCA 9:35, the verse expressing the abstention from the categories of being and non-being, but rather presents (or quotes?34) a different verse that emphasizes the illusory nature of thinking in terms of origination, duration and destruction. This can be read as a Tantric variation of the basic Madhyamaka theme of neither being nor non-being, as in BCA 9:35. The concluding verse of version III, presented as the quintessence of the story about consuming and reviving the deer, is placed explicitly into the context of the Tantric Mahāmudrā tradition. In all three versions, these verses are linked to a paramount spiritual experience: according to versions I and II, levitating and disappearing from the visual realm in the company of Mañjuśrī; in version III, attaining the Mahāmudrā-siddhi by realizing the unity of body, speech and mind. 1.3 The fourteenth-century forms of the legend In fourteenth-century Tibet, two more versions of the legend were composed. They modified and combined some of the earlier material and added various new features and episodes: version IV, contained in Bu-ston’s (1290-1364) famous History of Buddhism in India and Tibet, thought to have been written in 1322-23, and version V, contained in the BCA commentary of Sa-bzang (1294-1376), a student of the Jonang master Dolpopa (1292-1361). Comparing these two versions with each other and also with the preceding versions I‒III demonstrates a significant change in the image of Śāntideva.

34  Dowman (1985, 227f) refers to the songs of a Tantric author named Bhusukapāda (contained in the Caryā-pada) as, for example: “What is increate from the beginning can have neither birth, nor death nor any kind of existence. Bhusuka says, or Rāuta says, ‒ this is the nature of all; nothing goes or comes, there is neither existence nor non-existence there…” (Dasgupta 1962, 42). One might also think of the following verse of Bhusuka-pāda: “The clouds of compassion are shining always after pressing down the duality of existence and non-existence. The wonderful has risen up in the sky…” (ibid. 109).

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In contrast to versions I‒III, what these two versions have in common is that they tell the legend over three periods – Śāntideva’s life before, in and after Nālandā – thus combining the three earlier versions which had either no post-history (and could have none, because the protagonist had left the visible sphere) or no pre-history. But they differ partly in how they distribute their story material over these three periods. Most notably, both Bu-ston and Sa-bzang introduce a new episode to the postNālandā period, an episode that could have been placed nowhere else and which may have been the driving force behind their interest in rendering Śāntideva’s disappearance as merely temporary: his authorization of the correct BCA version! According to Bu-ston, Śāntideva levitated after reciting verse 9:35. But while his body rose up higher and higher and finally became invisible, his voice continued the recitation until the whole text was complete (no appearance of Mañjuśrī is mentioned).35 After the recitation, the monks rehearsed the text of the BCA, but some of them remembered only seven hundred verses, others a thousand verses, while still others more than a thousand verses. Thus they were in doubt about which of these three was the correct version. They also wondered where Śāntideva’s two other scriptures were stored, the Śikṣāsamuccaya and the Sūtrasamuccaya, which he had recommended reading in the text of the BCA itself. When they learned that Śāntideva now lived in the south, near the sanctuary of Śrīdakṣiṇa, a delegation of two monks was sent to ask him these questions. After they had finally found Śāntideva, he told them where to look for his two other writings (“in the store-room of his school house, written in the small characters of the paṇḍits”36) and confirmed the version of a thousand verses as the correct one. Moreover, “he gave his instructions on how to explain these works and act according to them.”37 35  This version of the levitation is reminiscent of a miracle performed by the Buddha. According to MN 49, the Buddha once demonstrated his superior status to an assembly of Brahmins by vanishing before their eyes while continuing to speak. And the verse he spoke resonates – remotely – with BCA 9:35: “Having seen fear in every mode of being And in being bound to cease to be, I did not affirm any mode of being, Nor did I cling to any delight [in being].” Ñāṇamoli, Bodhi 2001, 428. 36  Obermiller 1986, 163. Note that this is different from the early versions, in which the monks, after Śāntideva’s disappearance, search his room and find his other writings. 37  Ibid. 163.

26

PART I

According to Sa-bzang, Mañjuśrī appeared during the recitation of verse 9:35. During the recitation of the “dedication” chapter (i.e. the final chapter), Śāntideva levitated, rising higher and higher together with Mañjuśrī until his body disappeared, whereas his voice continued reciting the whole text. After his disappearance, he went to the south. At Nālandā, the pandits wrote down what they had heard. The scholars from Kashmir produced a text of nine chapters, and a scholar from Central India a version of ten chapters. The rest is similar to Bu-ston: a delegation is sent to Śāntideva, who identifies the ten-chapter version as the correct one and also tells them where to find his other two texts (“on the rafters of the ceiling in his room”38). Thus both Bu-ston and Sabzang use the option (offered by version III) of a post-Nālandā part of the legend for projecting the decision about the authoritative, i.e. canonical, version of the BCA back to Śāntideva himself. Yet while Bu-ston was apparently aware of all three Tibetan variants of the BCA, Sa-bzang seems to have known only two versions.39 Moreover, in Sa-bzang’s account, Śāntideva is identified towards the end of the recitation as Akṣayamati40 – the name of the author of the BCA according to the Dūn-huáng text.41 Another important feature that Bu-ston and Sa-bzang have in common (and share with version III) is that “Bhusuku” is now rendered as a derogatory nickname (in contrast to versions I and II). Perhaps under the influence of version III, they also adopt the motif that Śāntideva, alias Bhusuku, should be expelled from the monastery if it turns out that he is not studying “the 3 Wheels of the Doctrine”42 (Bu-ston) or “not performing the three wheels of activities appropriate for monks”43 (Sa-bzang). When prompted to recite the Sūtras, Sa-bzang has Śāntideva 38

 Sazang 2006, 31.  See above, chap. 1, pp. 6-8. 40  In Sazang 2006, 30, the name or epithet “Akṣayamati” is only given in translation (“inexhaustible intelligence”). The paragraph quoted in Saito1993, 20f, to prove the identity of Akṣayamati with Śāntideva (a theory still supported in Saito 1993 but rejected in Saito 2010), is from the catalogue section of the Derge edition of the Tengyur (bsTan ‘gyur dKar chag). Yet the Śantideva hagiography found in the Derge Tengyur (folios 77b4-79b1) is in fact the only slightly edited text of the Sa-bzang Mati Panchen version. The editor was probably Zhu chen Tshul khrims rin chen (1697-1774) himself. I am very grateful to Carola Roloff and Helmut Eimer who helped me verify this assumption. 41  See above, p. 5. 42  Obermiller 1986, 162. 43  Sazang 2006, 29. The three wheels of activities could be: studying, meditating and working for the monastery. See Amtzis, Deweese, eds., 2004, vol. 1, 329. 39

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replying, “I know nothing” and only consenting to the recitation after repeated requests. Bu-ston softens this part of the story. After initially claiming to be unable to do the recitation, he tells the preceptor that he will only agree if asked by him. Sa-bzang repeats the motif of the high recitation chair found in the earlier versions, but Bu-ston exaggerates it by having the monks raising the chair so high that climbing it appears impossible. Bhusuku, alias Śāntideva, however, ascends the seat by lowering it through his magical powers with a gesture of his hands. However, there is one commonality between Bu-ston and Sa-bzang that distinguishes their versions markedly from the earlier ones: To them, Bhusuku was not only a stern meditator but also an extraordinary scholar who merely concealed his virtues and abilities, calmly enduring being called a “Bhusuku.” According to Bu-ston, Śāntideva “heard the Doctrine from the Saint (Mañjuśrī), meditated over it and composed treatises of profound meaning. But, in his external life, he was known to others as doing nothing else but eating, sleeping and walking about.”44 According to Sa-bzang, he “trained thoroughly in the entire Tripiṭaka, the three baskets of the Buddha’s sermons. He summarized and categorized the most important meanings and composed three texts known as (…). His primary activity was inwardly and very diligently dwelling in perfect meditation on profound Samadhi. However, outwardly, people could not perceive this.”45 So when at the recitation assembly Śāntideva was asked to recite something new, Bu-ston presents him as rationally calculating that his Śikṣāsamuccaya is too long for recitation and the Sūtrasamuccaya too short, while the Bodhicaryāvatāra communicates “in few words … an extensive subject matter.”46 Neither Bu-ston nor Sa-bzang cite any verses to explain or legitimize the idea of reciting “something new” instead of the established Sūtras, whereas this is a significant feature in versions I and II. It appears that for Bu-ston and Sa-bzang, Śāntideva’s reciting the BCA in place of the Buddha’s Sūtras was no longer in need of any justification. Fully in line with this new image of Śāntideva as a humble, initially unrecognized but extremely able scholar is that both versions of the legend now also provide him with an important master – “the abbot Jinadeva”47 (according to Sa-bzang) or “Jayadeva, the foremost of 44

 Obermiller 1986, 162.  Sazang 2006, 29. 46  Obermiller 1986, 163. 47  Sazang 2006, 29. 45

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PART I

500 Paṇḍits”48 (according to Bu-ston).49 Yet outside the Śāntideva legend, this Jinadeva or Jayadeva is (as far as I am aware) not mentioned anywhere as an outstanding figure of Nālandā. It is only Tāranātha, in developing the legend still further (see version VI), who declares Jayadeva to have been the successor of the well-known Nālandā teacher Dharmapāla (c. 530-560).50 Yet, although Tāranātha claims that Jayadeva was “a scholar of many śāstras,” Tāranātha also confesses that he has “not come across any detailed account of him.”51 Perhaps Tāranātha’s only information on Jayadeva was from the hagiographies of Bu-ston and Sa-bzang. Indeed, at the stage in which the legend begins to develop Śāntideva’s image as an excellent scholar, it might very well be a fabrication that Śāntideva had an allegedly “famous” teacher, a teacher who is otherwise unknown. This may also hold for Bu-ston’s remark at the end of his version that one hundred commentaries on the BCA were written in India. Śāntideva’s intellectual abilities are further emphasized by Buston and Sa-bzang both presenting him in other parts of the legend as someone who in debates could defeat non-Buddhists with ease. This new image of Śāntideva raises the question of how Bu-ston and Sa-bzang define the role of Mañjuśrī. Sa-bzang largely follows the pattern of version II, that is, Śāntideva accepting his mother’s advice52 to renounce a royal career and go to Bengal in order to be blessed by Mañjuśrī. The beautiful girl53 – now also designated as an emanation (just as Śāntideva’s mother had been) – leads him to her master, from whom Śāntideva learns to meditate until he attains the ability to see Mañjuśrī. According to Sa-bzang, Acalasena54 carries a wooden sword because it represents the object in Mañjuśrī’s hand. And, as noted above, Mañjuśrī still appears upon the recitation of BCA 9:35. Hence Mañjuśrī, who plays no further role in Śāntideva’s life after Nālandā, is presented as someone preparing Śāntideva’s way. This fits in with a new episode featuring Mañjuśrī introduced by Sa-bzang: The night before Śāntideva’s 48

 Obermiller 1986, 162.  Note that no abbot or master is mentioned in versions I and II. It is version III that introduces such a figure to the legend. But here, the abbot has no name and does not function as a scholar, but advises Bhusuku to practice mantra meditation. 50  Chattopadhyaya 2010, 214. 51  Ibid. 198. 52  The story of his mother scalding him with hot water is softened by her pouring “cold water” over him. See Sazang 2006, 27. 53  Sa-bzang cuts the feature that she fed Śāntideva with meat or meat broth. 54  “Acalasena” is rendered in version V in the Tibetan translation as “Mi g.yo ba sde” and in the English translation as “Miyowade.” 49

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consecration as the heir to his father’s throne, he has a dream in which he sees Mañjuśrī sitting on the throne and claiming this throne for himself: “O only son, this is my throne, I am your spiritual teacher. For you and me to sit upon one throne is not good manners.”55 This episode belongs to the new material that is not contained in the earlier versions of the legend but is shared by Bu-ston and Sa-bzang.56 Bu-ston, perhaps under the influence of version III, keeps the story of Śāntideva’s pre-Nālandā life rather short. As a further new feature, both Bu-ston and Sa-bzang give Śāntideva’s birth name as “Śāntivarman,” apparently modelled as a combination of “Śāntideva” and his father’s name “Mañjuvarman” or “Kalyāṇavarman” (as in Bu-ston’s version). Sa-bzang emphasizes that Śāntivarman was “skilled in many branches of common knowledge and martial arts.”57 Bu-ston also refers to this royal education, but adds the note that Śāntivarman learned in particular “the methods of propitiating Mañjuśrī” from a certain yogi.58 The night before his coronation, Śāntivarman saw in a dream Mañjuśrī sitting on the throne, claiming the throne for himself alone and promising to protect Śāntivarman. As a result, Śāntivarman renounced his succession to the throne and immediately went to Nālandā. Bu-ston thus omits the mother’s warning against the bad karmic results of kingship and the encounter with the beautiful girl, whereby the episode of Śāntideva’s learning under the forest yogi is shifted, in a very condensed form, to his youth. The episode of Acalasena’s sword is moved to Śāntideva’s postNālandā life (as in version III59), but similar to Sa-bzang, Bu-ston also clarifies the symbolic relationship between the wooden sword and Mañjuśrī by stating that the sword carried the seal of Mañjuśrī. In Nālandā, Śāntideva, according to Bu-ston, learned the doctrine from Mañjuśrī and then composed his three treatises. Apart from his brief remark about Mañjuśrī’s seal on Acalasena’s sword, Mañjuśrī plays no further role in the rest of Bu-ston’s version of the legend except in the conclusion, when Bu-ston briefly quotes an appraisal by Kṛṣṇa (Nagpo-pa) that Śāntideva “touched with his head the lotus-like feet of

55

 Sazang 2006, 27.  See below, fn. 76. 57  Sazang 2006, 27. 58  Obermiller 1986, 162. 59  Bu-ston also speaks only of the king’s eye being blinded, not of its falling out, which may also indicate some influence by version III. However, unlike version III, it is only the king who is blinded and there is no record of any subsequent healing. 56

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Mañjuśrī.”60 Sa-bzang, in his concluding remarks, quotes an even stronger statement from Jetāri that Śāntideva was an emanation of Mañjuśrī. Thus, in the fourteenth-century versions of the Śāntideva legend, while Mañjuśrī continues to be significant, this role is now subservient to the image of Śāntideva as an outstanding scholar, this in turn being in contrast to Śāntideva’s earlier image of being a stern meditator or just a well-meaning dunce (version III). The image of the extraordinary scholar embodying the wisdom of Mañjuśrī is further expanded and complemented by Śāntideva being depicted as a compassionate benefactor, a powerful siddha and a Buddhist missionary – three features that are expressed in the new material presented by both Bu-ston and Sa-bzang, but also in some of the details they have added to episodes of the earlier versions.61 Sa-bzang reports that already in his youth, Śāntideva – as prince Śāntivarman – “always wished to benefit his ministers, relatives, friends” and that he “demonstrated great compassion and concern for the destitute, sick, impoverished, and disabled. He demonstrated only the conduct of a Bodhisattva.”62 Bu-ston reports how Śāntideva, in his postNālandā life, resolved a great dispute through his miraculous power and brought peace.63 On another occasion, in the time of a great famine, he obtained means for the livelihood of “thousands of beggars, tormented by hunger and thirst.”64 Śāntideva’s compassion, in conjunction with his magical powers, is illustrated in a startling episode newly appearing in Bu-ston’s and Sa-bzang’s versions of the legend. Both place this episode in the period after Nālandā. In the west of Magadha (Bu-ston) or the south of India (Sa-bzang), Śāntideva lived among five hundred followers of “heretical” (pāṣaṇḍaka) teachings. After a natural disaster they were all suffering because they could no longer find any food. Śāntideva took an alms bowl full of rice he had been given, blessed it and then gave it to the people. It satisfied the hunger of all and as a result, the heretics adopted the Buddhist teachings.65 60

 Obermiller 1986, 166.  As for example Bu-ston describing, as mentioned above, the seat for the recitation in Nālandā being raised so high that Śāntideva had to use magical powers to first lower and then ascend it. 62  Sazang 2006, 26. 63  Apparently Bu-ston imagines this “dispute” to have been a religious debate; later versions of the legend take it as a war. 64  Obermiller 1986, 164. 65  Bu-ston 1986, 164; Sazang 2006, 30. 61

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A final major episode newly introduced by Bu-ston and Sa-bzang is Śāntideva’s competition with a Hindu pandit named Śaṅkaradeva (Bu-ston) or Śaṅkananda (Sa-bzang).66 Sa-bzang places this episode into the pre-Nālandā period, between the story of Acalasena’s sword and Śāntideva’s ordination in Nālandā. Bu-ston also tells it subsequently to the sword episode, but with both episodes in the post-Nālandā period. Bu-ston and Sa-bzang, however, differ in a number of details. According to Bu-ston,67 Śāntideva (nowhere does Bu-ston mention the name “Acalasena”) went to Śrīparvata in the south, where he became a devotee of the tantric deity Ucchūṣma,68 living as a naked beggar and feeding himself on the wash-water from dirty dishes. A female servant of the local king once noticed how the wash-water she threw away began to boil as soon as it touched the body of the ascetic.69 At that time, the “heretical teacher” Śaṅkaradeva announced to the king that in two days he would draw a maṇḍala of Maheśvara (a Hindu term for the creator god) in the sky: “If you are unable to destroy it, I shall burn down all the Buddhist images and books, and make you adopt the Brāmaṇic Doctrines.”70 When the king tried in vain to find someone who would accept the challenge, his servant told him about the ascetic. After Śāntideva was found, he told them that while he had the power to defeat Śaṅkaradeva, he would need a pot with water, some garments and fire. On the day of the contest, after Śaṅkaradeva had just completed a quarter of the maṇḍala, Śāntideva created a mighty storm that not only destroyed the maṇḍala, but also hit “herbs, trees and cities” and the people were “swept away.” The “heretical teachers were scattered … and carried away into the different regions. (Everything) was covered with great darkness.” Śāntideva emitted a light from his forehead to guide the king and the queen. Since they had lost their clothes in the storm and were covered with dust, he gave them the water to wash, the garments to dress and the fire to warm themselves. “Thereafter the temples of the

66

 Possibly an allusion to the Advaitin Śaṅkara.  See Bu-ston 1986, 165. 68  Ucchūṣma belongs to the group of krodha-vighnāntaka, that is, wrathful deities who protect sacred territory and destroy inner and outer obstacles. Ucchūṣma is an expression of compassion in that he contributes to the salvation of beings by burning up passions and false views. See Bischoff 1956, 6-11; Linrothe 1999, 19-30, 27. Śāntideva’s relation to Ucchūṣma is not mentioned in Sa-bzang’s record of this episode, but has been retained in the later versions of Tāranātha and Sumpa Khenpo. 69  Indicating the enormous power (heat = tapas) achieved by this ascetic. 70  Bu-ston 1986, 165. 67

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heretics were destroyed, and (the people) were converted to Buddhism. And to this day that place is known as ‘the spot where the heretics were vanquished’.”71 This rather violent account appears in Sa-bzang’s version in a softened format. According to Sa-bzang,72 this episode took place in a region (not further specified) where the king supported Hindus as well as Buddhists. The Hindu pandit Śaṅkānanda declared a challenge to the Buddhists in a magical contest. At the end the losers would have to become followers of the winner’s teachings. One of the senior Buddhist monks was concerned about whom to choose for the Buddhist side. A Buddhist layman told him about a recent encounter with a yogi: When pouring out dirty wash-water, this yogi had stood in front of his house; as soon as the water touched the yogi’s feet, it started to boil. After the Buddhists found the yogi (Acalasena) and asked for his help, he agreed to stand for them in the upcoming contest. The local king prepared an open place for the debate and a large crowd of Hindu and Buddhists pandits gathered. The contest had two parts: first a philosophical debate, which was easily won by Acalasena.73 This was followed by the magical contest: With his powers, Śaṅkānanda painted a large maṇḍala in the sky. Acalasena reacted by creating a massive storm that “carried away the king and the non-Buddhist yogi, blowing down all the trees in the area. Thus he subjugated the challengers.” Sa-bzang seems to have known nothing about the sub-plot related by Bu-ston about cleaning, dressing and warming the king and his wife. This motif is rather transformed into an act of general care. No destruction of non-Buddhist temples is mentioned, but rather their peaceful conversion: “Then through the power of his Samadhi, he summoned the people before him, sanctified them, gently touching them in blessing, and gave them clothing and other gifts. They became harmless, and were established in the state of bliss. The non-Buddhist panditas entered the Buddhist doctrine and Buddhist knowledge flourished in that area.”74 Both Sa-bzang and Bu-ston begin their records of the Śāntideva legend with a list of “seven wonders” or “wonderful stories.” Although

71

 Ibid.  See Sazang 2006, 28f. 73  Note that this took place, according to Sa-bzang’s version, before Nālandā! In other words, according to this version of the legend, Śāntideva was already considered an eminent teacher in his pre-Nālandā life. 74  Ibid, 29. 72

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their lists are quite different,75 the setting up of such lists testifies to a new tendency of giving the legend a standardized form. Despite their differences, the lists solidify the picture gained from our analysis of the fourteenth-century versions: Śāntideva is now presented as an inspired and extraordinary scholar, a compassionate Bodhisattva, a miracleworking Siddha, and a successful missionary. As will be shown in the next section, this image is consolidated further in the later versions of the legend. An open question is the origin of all the new material that Bu-ston and Sa-bzang have in common.76 If the usual dating of Bu-ston and Sa-bzang is correct, it is very unlikely that one version is based on the other. We would rather have to assume that they composed their legends at around the same time and independently. This, however, would imply the existence of a so far unidentified version or versions of the legend dating to sometime between the early versions I to III and the fourteenth-century versions IV and V. Although both Sa-bzang and, even more so, Bu-ston seem influenced to some extent by version III, neither adopts the story of Śāntideva’s eating five portions of rice, or the episode of eating and reviving the deer. These two features may have been considered too offensive to these authors so that the omission was perhaps deliberate. Indeed, as mentioned above, Sa-bzang even omits Śāntideva consuming meat or meat broth during his first encounter with the female student of the forest master. Yet in the later versions of the legend, Śāntideva’s eating habits and the deer episode become firm components. For the first five versions of the legend, we can thus reconstruct the following development (version α = the common source of the Nepalese fragment and the Vibhūticandra version, as postulated by de

75  According to Sa-bzang (2006, 26) the “seven wonders” are: (1) abandonment of his kingdom, (2) achievement of high attainment, (3/4) complete victory over the two bodies of knowledge [presumably: sūtra and tantra], (5) renouncing the world (becoming a monk), (6) seeing the truth, and (7) demonstration of miracles. Bu-ston (1986, 11) has the following list of seven “wonderful stories”: (1) securing his tutelary deity, (2) his acts in Nālandā, (3) refutation of his opponents, (4) the story of the pāṣaṇḍakas (multiplication of rice), (5) (feeding) the beggars, (6) the king (and the wooden sword), and (7) victory over the heretical teacher. 76  Namely: (1) “Śāntivarman” as Śāntideva’s birth name; (2) Śāntivarman’s vision (in a dream) of Mañjuśrī on the throne; (3) identifying Śāntideva’s master at Nālandā as “Jayadeva”/ “Jinadeva”; (4) the miraculous multiplication of rice; (5) the story of the boiling wash-water; (6) the magical contest with “Śaṅkaradeva” / “Śaṅkānanda.”

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Jong; version β = the source [or sources] of the material that Bu-ston and Sazang Sa-bzang share, but is not found in versions I to III77): version α

version I

version II

version III

version β

version IV

version V

1.4 The late forms of the legend Both Tāranātha (1575-1635) and Sumpa Khenpo (1704-1777) adopt, in their versions of the legend (versions VI and VII), Bu-ston’s list of “seven wonderful stories.”78 And, most saliently, all three of the late versions (VI to VIII) now follow the same sequence of events: (1) Śāntideva’s renunciation of the throne due to a vision of Mañjuśrī and the advice of his mother; (2) the encounter with the girl/woman and the practice under the forest yogi; (3) his service under a king and the story of the wooden sword; (4) his ordination under Jayadeva at Nālandā; (5) his concealed activity of study and meditation while outwardly appearing to neglect his monastic duties, merely to be eating five portions of rice a day and sleeping; (6) the first recitation of the BCA, including his levitation at or after verse 9:35; (7) his reappearance in the south and the visit of the Nālandā delegation; (8) the story of the deer; (9) the magical contest with Śaṅkaradeva. In addition, versions VI and VIII continue the sequence with (10) the feeding of the hungry, and (11) the stopping of a war. This shows that Tāranātha (and through him, the versions after him) was thus influenced by version IV (Bu-ston, from whom he gets “the seven wonderful stories”), by version V (Sa-bzang, 77  Given that version III shares some elements with versions I and II, it can be assumed that it draws to some extent on the same source as they do. 78  Cf. Chattopadhyaya 2010, 220; Pezzali 1968, 20. See above, fn. 75.

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whom he follows in the sequence of events) and by version III (Abhayadatta, from whom he adopts the “five portions of rice” and the story of the deer). While the three later versions (VI to VIII) do not contain any new material, they display a change in emphasis and some variations in specific episodes. Thus the overall image of Śāntideva does gain new features. One such feature is, in Tāranātha’s version, the change of Śāntideva’s role in his service of the king from that of a guard to the post of a minister.79 He was invited to become a minister because “he was skilled in all arts and was extremely intelligent.”80 He carried the wooden sword as a symbol of his tutelary deity. As minister he “spread there the fine arts that were not known before. He also helped (the king) to rule the country according to the Doctrine.”81 Due to jealousy, his fellow ministers accused him of being an impostor and pointed out that even his sword was only made of wood. After the demonstration of his sword’s power, he was recognized as a “siddha.” The king tried to persuade him to stay, but Śāntideva (the name “Acalasena” is no longer mentioned) decided to leave. He did not do this, however, without giving a word of final advice to the king, namely, to rule his country according to the Buddhist teachings and to establish twenty centers for the Buddhists.82 At some stage in his life (Tāranātha gives no details), Śāntideva “went to a battle-field and stopped the war with his miraculous power.”83 This is apparently a reinterpretation of Bu-ston’s report about Śāntideva appeasing a major dispute. Given this new political facet in the hagiographic picture of Śāntideva, it is interesting to see how Tāranātha relates the story of Śāntideva’s renouncement. In his version of the legend (and similar in Sumpa 79  In this, Tāranātha seems to be expanding on an aspect in the story of the wooden sword as found in Bu-ston’s version. Bu-ston relates that Śāntideva came to the rescue of the king when the king was surrounded by people seeking the king’s life. As Bu-ston (Obermiller 1986, 164) explains, this riot had occurred because the people were dissatisfied with what they obtained for their livelihood – a classical Buddhist topos first appearing in Dīgha-Nikāya 5. This explanation might have easily triggered Tāranātha’s understanding of Śāntideva’s role as being more than just a guard. 80  Chattopadhyaya 2010, 216. 81  Ibid. 82  Sumpa Khenpo (Pezzali 1968, 18f) also reports that Śāntideva became a minister and served the king for “twelve years,” but does not go into further detail. It should be noted that according to the earliest written versions, Śāntideva practiced for “twelve years” under the forest master. It was version III (omitting the stay in the forest) that first mentions a “twelve-year” period of royal service. 83  Chattopadhyaya 2010, 220.

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Khenpo’s version), Tāranātha relates both the story of Śāntideva’s dream of Mañjuśrī occupying the throne and that of his mother’s warning not to accept the crown. However, it was only in a dream that his mother – who is explained as being Tārā in the guise of his mother – poured hot water over his head, saying: “Kingdom is nothing but the unbearable boiling water of hell. I am consecrating you with this.”84 Thus the pessimistic Buddhist motif, originating in the Jātakas and vividly present in the early versions I and II (though already confined in version II to “this dark age”), that kingship inevitably involves the kind of deeds leading to hell has disappeared. Kingship may be a “hellish” type of burden, but Tāranātha’s (and Sumpa Khenpo’s) version of the legend conveys the rather optimistic idea that a country can be ruled in accordance with the dharma. Another feature of Śāntideva’s renunciation story that is reminiscent of Buddha’s own renunciation, namely, his leaving his father’s palace on his best horse, is also lost or dropped in the versions of Tāranātha and Sumpa Khenpo. Here, Śāntideva is “walking” for twenty-one days before he reaches the forest. In Tāranātha’s version, this is part of a recurrent theme: Śāntideva’s itinerant nature, which first appears in version III. After the demonstration of his sword’s magical power, Śāntideva is invited to stay (as in version III), but he declines. When invited by the delegation from Nālandā to return, he declines. And when being urged to stay after reviving the deer, he declines again. This motif is not meant to express unsteadiness in his character; it follows a typological feature in the hagiographies of many siddhas. In the case of Tāranātha, it also seems to express Śāntideva’s humbleness; he refuses to accept leading positions that would honor and reward his extraordinary skills. Yet it also conveys the message that Śāntideva was indeed worthy of such honors. The more critical aspects of the legend are softened in Tāranātha’s version and fully deleted in that of Sumpa Khenpo. The female disciple of the forest master is no longer a beautiful girl, but just a woman. She does not give Śāntideva meat to eat, and gives him “sweeter water,” not poisoned water. Although Śāntideva appears to be doing nothing but eating and sleeping, the derogatory nickname “Bhusuku” is not mentioned. While Tāranātha still reports that Śāntideva ate five large portions of rice a day, Sumpa Khenpo turns them into five small portions. The story of the deer is related by Tāranātha as follows: After Śāntideva was visited by the delegation from Nālandā, he lived in a forest monastery

84

 Chattopadhyaya 2010, 215.

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together with five hundred monks. “With his magic power, he used to devour the flesh of the animals that entered his cell.”85 The other monks noticed that the animals did not come out of his cell and were reduced in numbers. Some even saw him eating them by looking through his window. But when they accused him of the act, all of the animals came back to life and emerged from his cell, stronger than before. In significant contrast to version III, no philosophical explanation is given.86 In Sumpa Khenpo’s version, the episode is defused still further: It is not stated that Śāntideva was devouring deer, nor that anyone watched him doing so. His fellow monks merely got suspicious because the animals entered his cell without coming out. Yet once they were about to accuse him, all of the deer came out again. The story is thus turned into just another version of the persistent motif of Śāntideva being misjudged by his fellow men: suspected of being a cheater by his fellow guards or ministers, of being idle by his fellow monastics at Nālandā, and now of being a meat eater by his fellow hermits. In other words, he is not given the honor he really deserves – as of course all of these people recognize after realizing their mistakes. Considerable softening can also be seen in the episode of the magical contest. Both Tāranātha and Sumpa Khenpo present Śāntideva towards the end of the legend as a follower of Ucchūṣma. But they do not mention him going naked or living only on wash-water. When destroying Śaṅkaradeva’s87 maṇḍala with a powerful storm, the Hindus are just blown to a land beyond a river and Buddhism begins its revival. Mañjuśrī’s role remains important. In the versions of Tāranātha and Sumpa Khenpo, it is Mañjuśrī who paves Śāntideva’s way. While he does not appear in the post-Nālandā section of the legend, prior to Śāntideva’s stay in Nālandā he is still prominent. According to Tāranātha, Śāntideva had visions of Mañjuśrī from an early age due to merits from previous lives. He sees Mañjuśrī on the throne before he renounces the kingship, and the forest yogi not only teaches him to attain a perpetual vision of Mañjuśrī, but, according to Tāranātha, the yogi was none other than Mañjuśrī himself. Although Mañjuśrī does not appear during the recitation of the BCA in these versions, Tāranātha states explicitly that when in 85

 Chattopadhyaya 2010, 219.  Thus Pezzali, who did not pay any attention to the Abhayadatta version, is unable to make any sense of this episode and wonders how it found its way into the legend (Pezzali 1968, 22). 87  This name is mentioned in Sumpa Khenpo’s version, but not in that of Tāranātha. 86

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Nālandā, Śāntideva learned the doctrine from Mañjuśrī. There is no doubt that for both hagiographers, the BCA is the outcome of inspiration from Mañjuśrī.88 It contains, as Sumpa Khenpo phrases it, “the meaning of all the Mahāyāna Sūtras.”89 And while Tāranātha still reports the confusion about the three different BCA versions and Śāntideva’s authorization of the canonical version as the correct one, Sumpa Khenpo takes no notice of this problem whatsoever. In his version of the legend, this was apparently no longer in doubt, and correspondingly he has the Nālandā delegation only asking Śāntideva the whereabouts of his other two writings. Version VIII, in all probability a fairly modern product, has nothing new to add. It uses the structure of the legend and the sequence of events as established in versions VI and VII. Here and there it inserts a few features from earlier versions of the legend that are absent from the later versions, as for example the use of “Bhusuku” as a derogative nickname. What is perhaps remarkable is that the report of the magical contest between Śāntideva and Śaṅkaradeva reassumes some of its earlier violent character. The conditions of the competition, as proposed by Śaṅkaradeva, were that the doctrine and the temples of the loser should be destroyed. Thus, to “fulfil the conditions of the contest, non-Buddhist temples were closed and many non-Buddhists embraced the Buddhist doctrine.”90 The message here is of course: it was the Hindus’ own fault that Buddhists had to close down the Hindu temples. 2. THE LEGEND INTERPRETED 2.1 Relating the legend to a person “Life stories are only told if there is a reason to tell them.”91 Right, but is this reason necessarily the person whose life is being told, or could 88  Different from Bu-ston and Sa-bzang, Tāranātha and Sumpa Khenpo record that before the first recitation of the BCA, Śāntideva had composed only his two other writings, the Śikṣāsamuccaya and the Sūtrasamuccaya (see Chattopadhyaya 2010, 217; Pezzali 1968, 19). Hence they seem to imply that the BCA was inspired during its first recitation, which would be in line with the Abhayadatta version (version III). The influence of version III on their versions is also evident from their inclusion of the story of the deer and of his consuming five portions of rice. 89  Pezzali 1968, 19. 90  Tsonawa 1985, 64. In another more recent version of the legend, contained in the BCA commentary of Khenpo Kunpal (1862-1943), Śāntideva himself is presented as the one who “demolished the temples of the tīrthikas.” Amtzis, Deweese, eds., 2004, vol. 1, 173. 91  Roesler 2010, 2.

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it be also something else? It seems natural to interpret hagiographic legends as related to a particular person, and hence to analyze them for reliable biographical information. Although it is regularly avowed by contemporary scholars that this is more or less a vain endeavor, and that hagiographies have various other objectives, looking for at least a few biographical facts still seems to be the first expectation brought to such legends by their interpreters. This has also been the case in approaching the Śāntideva legend. As Frederik Liland states: The accounts of his life are hagiographic in character … They can therefore not be read literally, but as documentation of how Śāntideva was revered, and what he has meant to the tradition of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Still, there is no need to disregard them completely as historical evidence, and they may well be giving us some accurate information regarding the individual himself.92

In general, this approach may not seem unreasonable. But does it work in the case of Śāntideva? Paul Williams, for example, just after stating that “it would be pointless to try and demythologize the traditional Life of Śāntideva in order to find some historical core,”93 immediately proceeds with his own attempt “to glimpse through the mists of devotion the real Śāntideva […].”94 While Williams tries to capture something of Śāntideva’s humble, wise and compassionate character, it is usually something else that almost all scholars have derived from the legend and then taken more or less for granted: the assumption that Śāntideva was a monk at Nālandā or even a student of an abbot/scholar named “Jayadeva,” supposedly the successor of the well-known Dharmapāla (6th cent.). Yet as we have seen, the “information” about a teacher of Śāntideva named “Jayadeva” or “Jinadeva” is absent from all early versions of the legend. It is only found in the versions of the fourteenth century, which are interested in constructing a new image of Śāntideva as an eminent scholar (initially in disguise). The earlier versions do place Śāntideva in Nālandā, but they do not present him as a scholar, much less a major scholar. On the contrary, choosing Nālandā as the BCA’s birthplace might well have been a rhetorical means for expressing the miraculous nature of the BCA: coming from an unlearned monk but gaining the highest praise

92

 Liland 2009, 14f.  Williams 1995, IX. 94  Ibid. X. 93

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of a most learned audience. Moreover, as noted above,95 with Saito’s studies on the genesis of the BCA, even inner-textual evidence for a Nālandā connection (derived from the relation between the BCA and ŚS) is quite weak and might at best only indicate that Nālandā was possibly the place where the BCA was revised and brought in line with the ŚS. We just do not know, and there is no good reason to rely, even in this regard, on the legend as a source of historical information. In addition to the usually uncritically assumed Nālandā connection of Śāntideva, it has been asked whether the legend might be combining the lives of two different people: Śāntideva, the learned Buddhist philosopher from Nālandā, and Bhusuku, or Bhusuka, a later (8-12th cent.?) Tantric poet from Bengal,96 who was perhaps the author of some Tantric Tibetan works attributed to “Bhusuku,” alias Śāntideva.97 Such inquiries are usually carried out by examining whether the texts of the BCA and the ŚS display any Tantric features,98 or at least ideas that would not exclude a Tantric connection.99 Yet why postulate a person, or several persons, behind the text in order to link the legend with the text? Would it not be far more straightforward to read the legend as an interpretation of the text itself, rather than as a record of a person who supposedly authored it? “Śāntideva” is clearly and unambiguously identified by the legend as the author of a specific text. So why not take “Śāntideva” as a symbol for the text itself and the legend therefore not as a record of the unknown life of an unknown person, but as a different kind of commentary on a well-known text? Ulrike Roesler has summarized the findings of contemporary scholarship on Buddhist hagiographic material as follows: “…biographies can express beliefs or illustrate theories, they can function as a commentary on doctrinal issues or authenticate the teaching, and they can be didactic tools, depicting models to be emulated or inspiring faith.” 100 What I would like to add in relation to the Śāntideva legend is this: They can also function as a commentary on a specific text, in our case, the Bodhicaryāvatāra.101 Liland tells us that the legend primarily demonstrates 95

 See above, pp. 9-12.  Bhusuka-pāda. Cf. Dasgupta 1962, 9, 35-50; Ruegg 1981, 106. 97  See Pezzali 1968, 87-89. 98  See Pezzali 1968, 43-45. 99  See Clayton 2006, 33. 100  Roesler 2010, 3. 101  It is this text that the legend, in all its versions, puts in the center; the other two scriptures ascribed to Śāntideva are clearly subordinate. 96

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“how Śāntideva was revered, and what he has meant to the tradition of Mahāyāna Buddhism.” This then might be translated into: through the figure of “Śāntideva” the legend shows how the Bodhicaryāvatāra was revered and what this text has meant to the tradition.102 So if “life stories are only told if there is a reason to tell them” (U. Roesler), the reason in our case, I suggest, is the tremendous impact of a particular text. 2.2 Relating the legend to the text The development of the Śāntideva legend displays a range of typological features: In some respects, Śāntideva’s life is depicted as an analogy to the legendary life of the Buddha. In various other respects, it adopts stereotyped features of a tantric Siddha. While the features reminiscent of the Buddha legend are more prominent in the early stages of the legend’s development, the typical features of the tantric Siddha increase with the later versions. In versions I and II we encounter motifs of the Buddha legend such as the royal descent, the renunciation, the indirect though clear reference to Jātaka 538,103 using the best horse for the flight from the palace, and receiving a first meal from a girl after a longer period of fasting. These features are gradually reduced in later versions. All versions retain the royal descent and (apart from version III) the renunciation, but others are lost or are no longer understood in some of the later versions (e.g. the implicit reference to the Jātaka, which is fully lost in Bu-ston’s version, and no longer understood in Tāranātha’s and Sumpa Khenpo’s versions or in version VIII104). On the other hand, characteristics of the tantric Siddha increase with the later versions, as for example, Śāntideva’s itinerant nature and, most obviously, his supernatural abilities. Versions I and II are still comparatively moderate in this respect: They just report the miraculous power of the wooden sword, the healing of the king’s eye and Śāntideva’s levitation at the end of the recitation of the BCA. Abhayadatta’s version adds to these the radiation 102  This double option of reading the legend either as commentary on a person or as commentary on a text is to some extent mirrored by the fact that the Śāntideva legend traditionally appears either as part of historical writings or as part of commentaries on the BCA. I think Kaoru Onishi (2010, 632) got it right when he says: “In societies with pre-modern culture, legends about authors are created and confirmed through the interpretation of texts attributed to them.” 103  See above, pp. 15f, fn. 15. 104  They have his mother say that kingship is like hell, not that the evil deeds connected with it lead to rebirth in hell.

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of his body at the beginning of the recitation and the story of consuming and reviving the deer. In later versions this list is augmented with the miraculous lowering of the recitation seat (only in Bu-ston!), the multiplication of the rice and the miraculous feeding of the poor, the heat of his body causing water to boil, radiating light from his forehead, and, of course, the magical competition with Śaṅkaradeva – a battle in which Śāntideva also displays the “wrathful” element of the classical four siddha actions.105 It is by means of the miraculous that Śāntideva became “known as a siddha,”106 as explicitly stated in Tāranātha’s and Sumpa Khenpo’s versions. How do these typological aspects of the legend relate to reading it as commentary on a text? In this respect, I suggest, the legend primarily reflects the BCA’s central topic, the concept of bodhicitta.107 Bodhicitta, the “mind” or “spirit” (citta) of “enlightenment” or “awakening” (bodhi) is the seed cultivated by a Bodhisattva that leads to the full fruit of Buddhahood. It is the mind of the or a Buddha. A Bodhisattva follows not just the path as taught by the Buddha. He follows the path that the Buddha himself chose for becoming a Buddha. It is an ancient Buddhist idea that all future Buddhas pass through basically the same kind of development symbolized by the same course of events. Hence, it is not surprising when hagiographies related to the Bodhisattva ideal adopt features from the Buddha legend. With the rise and flourishing of Buddhist Tantrism, the Bodhisattva ideal became absorbed into the new ideal of the Siddha108 and bodhicitta was transformed along the lines of Tantric concepts.109 In particular, the concept of “bodhicitta as the unity of emptiness and compassion” is not only crucial in Mahāyāna Buddhism and the Madhyamaka school, but is also fundamental in Tantric Buddhism.110 Yet in addition to these general observations, the legend also 105  These are “pacification, enrichment, control and destruction”; see Dowman 1985, 7. For an interpretation of the destructive aspects of this contest in terms of the fourth of these actions, see the remarks of Dzogchen Khenpo Chöga in Amtzis, Deweese 2004, vol. 1, 333f. 106  Chattopadhyaya 2010, 216. See also Pezzali 1968, 19. 107  See below, pp. 55-58. 108  See Dowman 1985, 10f. 109  Cf. Dasgupta 1962, 27-29; Bharati 1993, 177f. 110  The formula “śūnyatākaruṇābhinnam bodhicittam” is found in the important Tantric text Guhyasamājatantra (see Dasgupta 1962, 15). The related expression “śūnyatākaruṇāgarbha” (“the germ of emptiness and compassion”) is found, among other places, in Nāgārjuna’s Ratnāvalī (4:96) and in two of the root verses of Śāntideva’s ŚS (21, 23). Cf. Sasaki 2006.

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tells us more specific aspects of what the Bodhicaryāvatāra meant to the tradition. Through the legend in its various forms, the text is presented as a revelation, as an intellectual masterpiece, as an existential matrix and as a powerful elixir. 2.3 Śāntideva as an ignorant monk: the text as a revelation When asked to recite the Sūtras, the late versions of the legend only mention Śāntideva’s initial refusal without any further explanation. In contrast, all three of the early versions plus the versions from the fourteenth century have Śāntideva stating that he is simply unable to do the recitation. They differ, however, in their interpretation of his blatant statement “I don’t know anything.” While the fourteenth century versions take it as a kind of understatement, the early versions cite it as evidence that the Bodhicaryāvatāra is not the product of intellectual brilliance or diligent study, but of an act of inspiration from Mañjuśrī. The early versions differ on how Śāntideva became open to this inspiration: through his twelve years of meditational practice under the forest yogi which he continued in Nālandā, according to versions I and II; through the desperate but intense mantra recitation of just a single night, according to version III. But all of the early versions agree that the text is not the result of scholarly effort. In version III Śāntideva has to ask for all of his wisdom from Mañjuśrī. Śāntideva’s intellectual inability obviously serves as a rhetorical means for emphasizing the supranatural origin, the “revealed”111 nature of this text. And the highly intellectual environment of Nālandā functions as that particular type of background which will make the supernaturally derived wisdom of the BCA even more shining: even the Nālandā monks were baffled when listening to this text for the first time. Interpreting the text as Mañjuśrī’s revelation finds some support in the BCA itself. Mañjuśrī (or Mañjughoṣa) is mentioned three times in 111  It may sound inappropriate to use the concept of “revelation” in a Buddhist context. Yet, in line with Peter Masefield (Masefield 1986) I don’t think it really is. The word of the Buddha does have a revelatory quality in as much as it parallels the idea of śruti (“what has been heard” – the designation of the revealed nature of the Vedas). The “thus have I heard” at the beginning of each Buddhist Sūtra might very well be an allusion to the concept of śruti (see also Sharma 2005, 69), and consequently Buddhist monks (the “true Brahmins”) see themselves as those who are “born from the mouth of the Buddha” (DN 27:9), parallel to the Brahmins’ claim of being born from the mouth of the divine puruṣa (see Schmidt-Leukel 2013).

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chapter 2 (vss. 13, 22, 50), but appears here in the context of the Bodhisattva liturgy and thus in the company of other major Bodhisattvas without any elevated position. This, however, is different in chapter 10. Here we find him mentioned in six verses, and these are quite relevant to understanding the text as revelation. In the first passage (10:13-14), Mañjuśrī is again mentioned alongside other Bodhisattvas (10:11-12, 15). In vss. 10:13-14 Mañjuśrī, who is traditionally venerated as the Bodhisattva of wisdom (prajñā), is also praised as the one through whose might bodhicitta and compassion have arisen, thus symbolically identifying him as the source of the Bodhisattva path. The next two verses that mention him (10:51, 53) can be directly related to the legend. Verse 10:53 expresses Śāntideva’s fervent wish to see Mañjuśrī without impediment and learn everything he asks from him, which is – according to the legend – exactly what Śāntideva achieved at an early stage and which disposed him to receive the BCA from Mañjuśrī. Verse 10:51 is quoted in version II of the legend, just before the first recitation of the BCA, as part of the justification for reciting “something new” instead of the Buddha’s own word. Remembering one’s previous lives is traditionally understood as one of the tripartite knowledge attained in awakening, while the “Joyful Stage” marks the beginning of the Bodhisattva path. Śāntideva’s prayer in verse 10:51 to attain these two through Mañjuśrī’s grace (parigrahāt) can thus be deciphered as his wish to be guided by Mañjuśrī from beginning to end on his own path to awakening and finally to full Buddhahood. In quoting this verse the legend depicts Śāntideva as a Buddha-to-be, protected by Mañjuśrī, thereby justifying the text’s recitation. Verse 10:54 expresses Śāntideva’s wish to follow Mañjuśrī on his Bodhisattva path and strive and act for the salvation of all beings. Most significant, however, is verse 10:58, which mentions Mañjuśrī as Śāntideva’s principal source of inspiration and is the last verse of the BCA: I bow before Mañjughoṣa by whose grace my mind is set on the good. And I venerate the spiritual friend by whose grace it thrives.

The legend underlines the difference between the intellectual inability of Śāntideva and the supranatural wisdom displayed in the Bodhicaryāvatāra through the parallel of Acalasena’s wooden sword. The sword (of discriminating wisdom) is one of the chief symbols of Mañjuśrī, as is made explicit in versions IV and V. It is only through the link to Mañjuśrī that this otherwise useless item turns into an extremely powerful weapon. The same way, it is only through Mañjuśrī that a monk, not

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learned in the Sūtras, becomes able to recite – or should we say “radiate” – the BCA. Both transformations occur in situations in which Acalasena/ Śāntideva is suspected of being an impostor – just pretending to carry a real sword, or just pretending to meditate – and suspected of not fulfilling a monk’s duties. Again Nālandā functions as the perfect surrounding for attesting to the marvelous nature of the BCA. The revelatory quality of the Bodhicaryāvatāra is also marked by the embarrassing fact that Śāntideva, through his question, suggests reciting “something new” instead of the traditional Sūtras. The BCA is thereby put on the same level as the word of the Buddha, if not above it. While the BCA is not presented as something that supersedes the Sūtras, it is nevertheless depicted as a text that conveys the essence of the Sūtras in a new and hitherto unparalleled form. To be the vessel for this new revelation was, according to the subtext of the earliest versions (I and II), Śāntideva’s mission. The name of Śāntideva’s father appears as Mañjuvarman (version I) or Mañjuśrīvarman (version II). His mother, a deity, sent him to Bengal in order to be blessed by Mañjughoṣa (= Mañjuśrī) and it was there that he learned from the mysterious forest master (later interpreted as Mañjuśrī himself) to be in the constant presence of Mañjuśrī. At the climax of his “mission,” that is, the first recitation of the BCA, Mañjuśrī became visible through the words of the text. Once his mission was completed, Śāntideva disappeared, together with Mañjuśrī, from the visible sphere. That this disappearance began, according to some versions, at verse 9:35 is a particularly clear reason for taking the legend as a commentary on the text: As the mind comes to peace by retreating from the notions of being and non-being, Śāntideva literally rises above that realm which is made up entirely of being and non-being. Underlining the extraordinary or supranatural nature of an insight, message or text by pointing out the limitations of the messenger is a well-known topos in the history of religions. A famous Buddhist example is Hui-Neng, the Sixth Patriarch of Ch’an or Zen Buddhism, who is legendarily presented as an illiterate and simple scullion, but nevertheless as the author of the influential Platform Sūtra – a case in which the epithet “sūtra” already expresses that Hui-Neng is placed on one level with the Buddha, and the text on the same plain as the Buddha’s words.112 Another example is Muhammad, who, according to the hagiographic tradition of Islam, was illiterate and thus impossibly the author

112

 See Yampolsky 1967, 71, 125, fn. 1

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of the Qur’ān.113 To mention a third prominent example, one might be inclined to quote the words from the Gospel of Matthew, which has the people of Nazareth say about Jesus: “Where did this man get this wisdom and these deeds of power? Is this not the carpenter’s son?” (Mt. 13:54f). 2.4 Śāntideva as the “great paṇḍita”: the text as an intellectual masterpiece In his commentary, Khenpo Kunzang Pelden (1862-1943) introduces Śāntideva as the “great paṇḍita.”114 And according to Tāranathā, Śāntideva and Candragomin “were famed among the learned as ‘the two wonderful teachers.’”115 As it emerged from the comparison of the different versions of the legend, Bu-ston’s and Sa-bzang’s versions transform the image of Śāntideva into that of an extraordinary scholar, although initially one in disguise. Both of them continue to affirm his meditation practice, but in addition to this, they emphasize that he also studied the scriptures and composed his own three treatises. This development could take off from the remark in versions I and II that Śāntideva pondered which of his three texts he might recite. Yet with Bu-ston and Sa-bzang, his purported inability to recite the Sūtras is now clearly taken as an understatement. This is presumably a reflection of the first three verses of the BCA, in which Śāntideva, as in the ŚS, speaks of himself as someone who has “nothing new to say” and is “not skilled at composition” (BCA 1:2). Thus we read in Bu-ston that Śāntideva “speaks of his own person as of an ordinary being.”116 If Śāntideva was a great master in disguise – according to Paul Williams “a recurrent theme” in Buddhist hagiographic literature117 – his initial refusal to recite the Sūtras would also be reminiscent of the Buddha’s own example, who frequently agreed to certain requests only after being asked three times. Sa-bzang and Tāranathā report that Śāntideva only accepted to take part in the recitation after having been asked repeatedly. And according to Bu-ston, Śāntideva told his preceptor that he could only accept if prompted by him. 113

 See Schimmel 1995, 54-57.  Amtzis, Deweese, eds., 2004, vol. 1, 163. 115  Chattopadhyaya 2010, 18. 116  Obermiller 1986, 164. 117  Williams 1995, VII. 114

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In line with the development of this new image is also the introduction by both Bu-ston and Sa-bzang of Śāntideva authorizing the canonical version of the BCA as the correct one. In addition to the levitation during/after the recitation of verse 9:35, this act of authorizing a specific text is another clear example of the legend being a kind of commentary on the text. Understood as a commentary, the image of Śāntideva as an eminent scholar conveys the notion of the BCA as an intellectual masterpiece. For Bu-ston, the BCA communicates “in few words … an extensive subject matter.”118 For Sumpa Khenpo, the BCA contains the quintessence of “all Mahāyāna Sūtras.”119 Such judgments mirror the high esteem in which the text was held. And if with his new image as a great scholar, Śāntideva is now also presented in all versions of the legend from the fourteenth century onwards as a victor in philosophical debates, this very likely reflects the BCA’s ninth chapter being appreciated as a clear example of how to silence philosophical opponents. Interestingly, the perception of the BCA as an intellectual masterpiece and the corresponding image of Śāntideva as a great scholar does not compete with the earlier image of the BCA as an inspired or revealed text. The claim that Śāntideva was in fact a serious student and that Jayadeva (or Jinadeva) is now introduced as his master is not meant to refute that the true master was Mañjuśrī, or as Sa-bzang affirms, that Śāntideva was in truth himself an emanation of Mañjuśrī. And while Bu-ston and Sa-bzang presuppose or explicitly say that Śāntideva composed all three of his texts before the first recitation of the BCA, the later versions of the legend even return to the earlier motif of version III, where the BCA was inspired spontaneously during its recitation. Both Tāranathā and Sumpa Khenpo concur that in the course of his studies at Nālandā, Śāntideva composed only the Śikṣāsamuccaya and the Sūtrasamuccaya, while the Bodhicaryāvatāra apparently did not come into existence until its initial recitation. 2.5 Śāntideva as a compassionate Bodhisattva: the text as an existential matrix As the comparison has revealed, the later versions of the legend from the fourteenth century onwards add to Śāntideva’s image of being a great 118 119

 Ibid. 163.  Pezzali 1968, 19.

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scholar that of his being a compassionate Bodhisattva. This is done in particular by expanding on the description of his youth, by introducing further hagiographic material, and finally by re-interpreting his service to the king as that of a minister. Much of the BCA’s content and in particular of the dedication chapter (BCA 10) is echoed when Sa-bzang writes the following about Śāntideva’s youth: “… he always wished to benefit … He demonstrated great compassion and concern for the destitute, sick, impoverished, and disabled.”120 This compassionate attitude and its corresponding actions are exemplified in some of the new episodes, particularly in the story of the multiplication of the rice, the feeding of the thousand or “thousands of” (Bu-ston) beggars during the famine, and the mention of Śāntideva having prevented a war. This material confirms Jonathan M. Augustine’s general observation that Buddhist and Christian hagiographies display a “remarkable theological similarity (…) between Christian saints’ and bodhisattva monks’ motivations for participating in charitable activities. Both Buddhist ‘compassion’ (jihi) and Christian ‘love’ (caritas) motivated acts of selfless service of others.”121 In the case of Śāntideva, one does not only see such general parallels between Buddhist compassion and Christian love, but more specifically, some startling analogies in the hagiographic representation. The multiplication of the rice naturally reminds one of the multiplication of bread in Mt. 14:13-21. In both, not only is there the miraculous element of making very little enough for feeding very many; there are also the two additional features that the little food was donated and that it was first “blessed” before being shared with the hungry.122 This might trigger speculations about a remote Christian influence.123 Moreover, in both cases, the combination of compassionate and miraculous action serves to support a specific message. Jesus fed those who listened to his teachings; in the case of Śāntideva, the miracle was combined with the successful effort to turn the “pāṣaṇḍikas” away from their non-Buddhist path to that of the Buddha. 120

 Sazang 2006, 26.  Augustine 2005, 6. 122  According to Bu-ston’s version the number of the crowd is given as five hundred (Obermiller 1986, 164) while Matthew has the figure of five thousand. 123  Another feature of the legend that is somewhat reminiscent of Christian narratives is the healing of the blind king. According to version III (as rendered by Dowman), Śāntideva performs this miracle through the application of some of his spittle, which may be compared to Mk. 8:23. 121

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From the fourteenth-century versions, the Śāntideva legend presents compassionate action combined with missionary activities: the fostering of Buddhism and the fighting of non-Buddhist teachings. This aspect is not only found in the story of the multiplication of the rice. It is also present in the story of Acalasena’s sword, in which the king is converted to Buddhism and turned into a promoter of Buddhism, and above all in Śāntideva’s magical contest with Śaṅkaradeva, whom Bu-ston characterizes as a devotee of Maheśvara (the “Great God”) and a defender of “the Brāhmaṇic Doctrines.”124 This contest ends not only with the conversion of many Hindus to Buddhism, but also with the displacement of the unconverted and the destruction of their temples. It is this part of the legend that takes us to the heart of inter-religious hostility. Such hostility is usually rooted in the conviction – on all sides – that fighting for one’s own faith and fighting against the other’s faith is for the benefit of the people, because only one’s own faith is seen as leading to liberation and salvation. Fighting the other’s faith is thus an act of fighting delusion and falsity, and therefore viewed as an act of love or compassion.125 In this respect, the legend reflects in its own way not only the long and all too often violent history of Buddhist‒Hindu tensions;126 more specifically, one can see this also as a reflection of the anti-Hindu and particularly anti-theistic sections of the wisdom chapter (BCA 9). According to the later versions of the legend, Śāntideva implemented the Bodhisattva ideal also on the political plane while acting as a minister for twelve years, helping the king “to rule the kingdom according to the Doctrine.”127 This is perhaps one of the most striking developments of the legend, given the deep skepticism against the exertion of political power found in the legend’s early versions in the words of warning of Śāntideva’s mother. Both views, however, are in accordance with the text of the BCA itself. It contains passages such as 6:128-130, showing a full awareness of the potentially dark side of political power, or the immediately following passage of 6:131-132, suggesting an attitude of disdain regarding political loss or gain. But one also finds verse 6:134, which recalls the Buddhist ideal of the universal ruler, the cakravartin, and in verse 10:39, the explicit prayer or wish that the king might rule in accordance with the Dharma. 124

 Obermiller 1986, 165.  See also Schmidt-Leukel 2013b. 126  Cf. Schmidt-Leukel 2008a. 127  Chattopadhyaya 2010, 216. 125

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According to Sa-bzang, Śāntideva “demonstrated only the conduct of a Bodhisattva.”128 Perhaps not in every respect, but certainly in this one, Śāntideva functions as a role model.129 In depicting Śāntideva as someone who incorporates and lives out what the BCA teaches, the text is implicitly presented as an existential matrix. This becomes explicit when, in Bu-ston’s version, Śāntideva not only tells the delegation from Nālandā which of the three texts of the BCA is the correct one and where to find his other two writings, but when “thereafter he gave his instructions how to explain these works and act according to them.”130 For the legend, the Bodhicaryāvatāra is a deeply practical work that can and wants to be lived. Again this reflects the text itself, which says in verse 5:109, “I will read only with my body. For what is the use of reading words? How can mere reading about the healing arts save the sick?” 2.6 Śāntideva as miracle-working Siddha: the text as a powerful elixir Finally, how shall we interpret the fact that the legend increasingly presents Śāntideva as a miracle-working Siddha? Can this, too, be seen as a commentary on the text? And if so, what kind of understanding does it convey? Some of the magical features, like the radiation from his body and its levitation, his extremely powerful body heat, and his ability to bring about a mighty storm, are quite standard. Indeed, generating strong body heat or levitating one’s body are ancient notions. They indicate the high spiritual level attained by Śāntideva and, hence, also indicate the high spiritual level of the BCA. But how can one understand the apparently more offensive features, in particular the two reported incidents of Śāntideva eating meat, which are both suppressed in Buston and Sa-bzang? That he was given meat or meat broth by a beautiful female disciple of the mysterious forest yogi might indicate the Tantric affiliation of Śāntideva’s early meditation master.131 More offensive is certainly the story of Śāntideva consuming the deer, despite their subsequent revivification. 128

 Sazang 2006, 26.  As Roberts (2010, 183f) rightly points out, not every aspect of the life of a saint may be meant as a general model. 130  Obermiller 1986, 163. Emphasis mine. 131  Though it was not the eating of meat, as such, that was forbidden in early Buddhism, but the killing of animals, vegetarianism became more and more standard for the Buddhist life style. In Buddhist Tantrism, however, meat eating was one aspect of its transgressive features. See also Schmithausen 2000. 129

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The first decisive clue is found in the verses Śāntideva speaks at the end of the Abhayadatta version: The deer he ate were not real. They never came into existence, had no duration and were not destroyed. Hence there was no killing. As a result, the king and his servants realized the illusory, dream-like nature of all things. As I suggested above, in Abhayadatta’s version these verses replace BCA 9:35 – the verse that was highlighted in the legend through Śāntideva’s levitation – and can easily be seen as a variant of the same subject: the understanding of emptiness (śūnyatā) as a liberation from thinking in terms of being and non-being. The insight that all phenomena are “illusory, like a dream,” is reminiscent of an old Mahāyāna phrase found in such important texts as Nāgārjuna’s MMK132 and Śūnyatāsaptatikārikā,133 or the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra.134 It even goes back to pre-Mahāyāna texts such as the SN,135 and is alluded to in BCA 9:151.136 While healing people from delusion is a central theme in Buddhism in general, healing them from the illusion of being and non-being is a central theme of the Madhyamaka school in particular. And it is also a central theme of the BCA. According to BCA 9:5, the crucial difference between yogis and worldly people is that the latter do not realize the illusory nature of their ordinary perception of the world. Overcoming all forms of illusion is, according to the BCA, a process that reaches fulfilment in the perfection of wisdom. The seed of wisdom is bodhicitta, “the spirit of awakening,” which initiates and drives the whole process. Śāntideva compares bodhicitta to an alchemist substance, a “penetrating healing elixir” (BCA 1:9) that

132  MMK 7:34: “Like a dream, like a magician’s illusion, like a city of gandharvas, likewise birth and likewise remaining, likewise perishing are taught.” (transl. S. Batchelor) University of Oslo, Thesaurus Literaturae Buddhicae. http://www2.hf.uio.no/polyglotta/index.php?page=volume&vid=27. 133  Śūnyatāsaptatikārikā 66: “Karma-formations (saṃskāra) are like the city of Gandharvas (gandharvanagara), illusion (māyā), mirages (marīci), nets of hair (keśoṇḍuka), foam (phena), bubbles (budbuda), phantoms (nirmitaka), dreams (svapna) and wheels of firebrand (alātacakra).” Lindner 1982, 65. 134  Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra 2:40f: “All objective facts … are like a magical illusion, like a dream. (…) Even Nirvana, I say, is like a magical illusion, is like a dream. How much more so anything else.” Conze 1995, 98f. 135  According to SN 22:95, the five constituents of the human person should be regarded like “a lump of foam, … a water bubble, … a mirage, … a plantain trunk, … a magical illusion.” See Bodhi 2000, 951f. 136  “The destinies are like a dream. If examined, they are [without a core] like the stem of a plantain tree.”

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transforms ordinary humans into Buddhas.137 It is “this elixir that was created to eliminate death for all beings, this inexhaustible treasure that appeases the wretchedness of all beings, the best remedy for healing the diseases of all beings…” (BCA 3:28f). Confronted with the suspicion of having killed animals, Śāntideva replies, “I am no butcher (…) I am a healer.”138 In relating the image of Śāntideva as the Siddha who heals people from the illusion of being and non-being to the text of the BCA, we may perhaps conclude that the BCA participates in what it describes: the text itself has the power to transform, to destroy and revive. If bodhicitta is compared to an alchemistic transforming substance, the BCA, too, becomes this powerful elixir in that as it expresses and inspires the “spirit of awakening.” Not only the Siddha is able to perform miracles. The text can perform the miracle of turning ordinary people into Bodhisattvas. To use a Christian term: Inasmuch as it has the potential to bring about what it signifies, it shares a “sacramental” quality.

137  It is significant that this metaphor of bodhicitta as an alchemistic elixir marks the point at which the Tantric tradition of Tibet could be linked to the BCA. See, for example, Gyatso 1994, 117. See also Pelden 2007, 48. Stephen E. Harris has also pointed out that this metaphor is close to Tantric ideas (see Harris 2017, 344). He is clearly right in pointing out that the BCA contains the strategy of using the energy of the defilements toward overcoming them, which “bears a resemblance to one of the best known features of Buddhist tantra” (ibid. 345). But he also states that “the most distinctive elements of the tantric tradition are absent from the BCA” (ibid.). 138  Dowman 1985, 226.

CHAPTER 3

THE SUBJECT OF THE BODHICARYĀVATĀRA

1. STRUCTURE AND SUBJECT I would briefly like to describe according to the tradition how one resorts to the discipline of the Sons of the Buddhas. (BCA 1:1)

This is how the author of the introductory verses1 describes the Bodhicaryāvatāra’s purpose and subject. “Sons of the Buddhas” is a standard designation for “Bodhisattvas.” The BCA is thus put in line with other Mahāyānist short compendia (samāsa) of the Bodhisattva path, as for example the Pāramitāsamāsa (“Compendium of the Perfections”) ascribed to Āryaśūra (7th cent.?)2, and the Madhyamakāvatāra (“Entering the Middle Way”) by Candrakīrti (7th cent.).3 Both texts belong philosophically to the same school as the BCA, the “Middle Way School” (madhyamaka), based on ideas associated with Nāgārjuna (2nd3rd cent.). Like many other works of traditional Sanskrit literature, the BCA is written mostly in verses of a less complex nature (anuṣṭubh), making it not a “poem” in the strict sense of the term, but rather something like “regulated rhythmical prose.”4 It deals with its topic in various stylistic forms of a poetic, devotional and philosophical nature5 and, as should be emphasized, mostly in terms of personalized reflections that 1  See above, Part I, chap. 1, pp. 4f, fn. 9, on the different opening verses in the Dūnhuáng version. 2  Regarding the ascription of the Pāramitāsamāsa to Āryaśūra, Carol Meadows has expressed serious doubt that the PS was indeed written by the same Āryaśūra who is known as the author of the famous Jātakamālā (Meadows 1986, ii, 20). As a result of her research, she assumes that the PS is much later than the Jātakamālā (usually dated around the 4th cent.) and may well stem from the same “period in which Śāntideva also wrote his works, that is, to around the 7th or 8th Century A.D.” (ibid. 21). For the Sanskrit text with an English translation, see Meadows 1986, 156-261. A new edition of the Sanskrit text with a German translation is found in Saito, N., 2005. 3  See Ruegg 1981, 71. An English translation is found in Huntington 1989, 147196, and in Padmakara Translation Group 2002, 55-114. 4  Crosby, Skilton 1995, xxxix. 5  Ruegg 1981, 83; Gómez 1999, 324.

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are written in the “first person” and may be characterized as contemplative or meditational. Accounts of the Bodhisattva path usually follow one of the two schemes on hand, that is, they are either structured by an elucidation of the “six perfections/virtues” (pāramitās)6 that the Bodhisattva is meant to cultivate, or by an elucidation of the “ten levels” (bhūmis)7 that mark the Bodhisattva career as a gradual development in ten stages towards the Bodhisattva’s ultimate goal of Buddhahood. The Pāramitāsamāsa is a good example of the first approach, the Madhyamakāvatāra, of the second. The two types of accounts of the Bodhisattva path are interconnected in that the first six of the ten bhūmis are traditionally correlated with the six pāramitās, each of the first six bhūmis being characterized by the perfection of one of the successive pāramitās. Structurally the BCA is closer to the first option, that is, an account of the Bodhisattva path by means of the “six perfections.” Yet it develops its own creative variation on the scheme, breaking up the scholastic specifications and doctrinally fixed expectations connected with it. Taking a closer look at this will provide us with a clearer understanding of the specific nature of the BCA’s own perspective on the Bodhisattva path and thus give us a better grasp of its true subject. In terms of chapters, the canonical BCA displays the following broad structure:8 I. Chapters 1-3: Importance, arousal and adoption of bodhicitta (including a Bodhisattva liturgy or ritual [anuttarā pūjā = “supreme worship”] in 2:1-3:99); II. Chapters 4-5: Guarding and preserving bodhicitta; III. Chapters 6-9: Pāramitās three to six: patience/forbearance (kṣānti), vigor (vīrya), absorption/meditation (dhyāna), insight/ wisdom (prajñā); IV. Chapter 10: Dedication/transfer of merit. It would also be possible to contract chapters 1-5 and see them as a single part dealing with bodhicitta, followed by a treatment of the last four pāramitās and finally, the dedication of merit. This gives rise to the question of what happened to pāramitās one and two, i.e. to giving/generosity  This scheme is presented by most of the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras.  A scheme based on the Mahāvastu, the Daśabhūmika-sūtra and the Bodhisattvabhūmi. 8  The same broad structure underlies the Dūn-huáng version, which combines chapters 2 and 3 into one chapter so that it has only nine chapters in total. 9  See Dayal 2004, 54-58; Gómez 1995; Crosby; Śāntideva 1995, 9-13. 6 7

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(dāna) and morality (śīla). One might understand the sum of the first three chapters (which are only two chapters in the Dūn-huáng BCA) as being the treatment of dāna because, as Ernst Steinkellner once argued, “the resolve, and its putting into practice, of striving for enlightenment for the sake of all beings is the highest and most crucial form of giving/surrender (dāna).”10 Chapters 4 and 5 could then be interpreted as the treatment of “morality” (śīla). Alternatively, one could understand chapter 5 as a combined treatment of dāna and śīla, because it is in BCA 5:9-11 that both perfections are explicitly mentioned for the first time. Because of this irregularity regarding the pāramitā scheme, one might even be tempted to see this structure as “the result of the superimposition of a different scheme on the original,” which Kate Crosby and Andrew Skilton suggested at least as a possibility.11 However, kṣānti, vīrya, dhyāna and prajñā are explicitly referred to in their respective chapters and, in the canonical BCA,12 the opening verses of chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9 clearly explain the progress of the text in terms of the order of at least these four pāramitās, making it unlikely that the pāramitā scheme has been entirely superimposed. Nevertheless, Crosby and Skilton do have a point inasmuch as the BCA has in fact its own internal substructure underlying the pāramitā scheme and is thereby – I suggest – interpreting the latter in its own peculiar way. My reconstruction of the BCA’s structure is dependent on three observations: First, the real subject of the BCA is not the Bodhisattva career as such, neither in terms of the pāramitās nor of the bhūmis, but rather bodhicitta, that is, the “mind/spirit of awakening,” which is the essential and decisive characteristic of a Bodhisattva.13 Second, for Śāntideva, bodhicitta does not only stand at the beginning of the path. It can be developed from its initial – almost miraculous – arousal up to its final completion in and through prajñā (wisdom/insight).14 Third, this process of gradually perfecting bodhicitta is marked by overcoming bodhicitta’s essential opposites or “enemies,” the kleśas (“defilements”),

10

 Steinkellner 1981, 15 (my translation).  Crosby, Skilton 1995, xxxiv. 12  Only BCA 8:1 has no equivalent in the Dūn-huáng version. See Saito 2000, 41. 13  See Matics 1971, 31: “The Mind of the Bodhisattva is the real theme of Śāntideva’s work….” Or: Crosby, Skilton 1995, xxxiv: “the theme of the work is the cultivation of the Awakening Mind.” 14  See also Gómez 1995, 183: “For Śāntideva, the first moments of the thought of awakening have to be protected and nurtured until they grow into full-blown awakening.” Similarly, Hedinger 1984, 17. 11

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which are (predominantly): greed, hate and delusion. The inner structure of the BCA15 may then be reconstructed as follows16: I. The generation of bodhicitta (1:1-3:33) Introductory verses (1:1-3) 1. Praise of bodhicitta (1:4-36) 2. Arousal of bodhicitta by means of the Bodhisattva ritual (2:1-3:9) 3. Adoption of bodhicitta (3:10-33) II. The cultivation of bodhicitta in overcoming the kleśas (4:1-8:186) Prelude (4:1-26) 1. The defilements (kleśas) as the true enemies of bodhicitta (4:27-48) 2. Guarding one’s mind (citta) as the central task (5:1-109) 3. Overcoming hate through patience/forbearance (kṣānti) (6:1-134) 4. Overcoming the defilements by vigorously (vīrya) developing the wholesome forces (including meditative qualities, dhyāna) (7:1-8:186) Introduction and exhortation (7:1-15) Summary statement of the six wholesome forces (7:16) 4.1 Confidence (lack of dejection) (7:17-30) 4.2 All powers (7:31-66) 4.3 Full dedication (7:67-73) 4.4 Self-control (7:74-8:88) 4.5 Sameness of others and oneself (8:89-8:110) 4.6 Exchange of the others and oneself (8:111-8:186)17 III. The perfection of bodhicitta (and final destruction of the kleśas) in and through prajñā (9:1-168) IV. The application of bodhicitta through dedication/transfer of merit (10:1-58) 15  Unfortunately, so far neither a complete edition of the Dūn-huáng version has been published, nor a complete synopsis of the Dūn-huáng version and the canonical version. All subsequent observations regarding the inner structure of the BCA thus only apply to the canonical version. They will certainly be in need of significant correction and modification once we have a fuller and more detailed account of the exact relation between these two textual versions. 16  Which basically follows the structure suggested in Steinkellner 1981. See also Steinkellner’s outline of the BCA in the Appendix, below, pp. 517–519. 17  BCA 7:16 has a parallel in the Dūn-huáng version (6:2), but the two contemplations about the sameness of self and others and the exchange of self and others do not appear in the chapter on dhyāna (Dūn-huáng chapter 7), but still as part of chapter 6, the chapter on vīrya (= BCA 7). See Saito 2000, 29 and 33-40.

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In this interpretation of the BCA’s structure, the six “perfections” (pāramitās) are thus envisaged from the perspective of the development of bodhicitta. The pāramitās are understood as perfections of different aspects of bodhicitta and hence find their completion, together with bodhicitta, in prajñā (see BCA 9:1).18 Bodhicitta is a particular state or quality of the mind: the mind that seeks awakening out of an altruistic motivation, not for one’s own sake but for the sake of the whole world. A Bodhisattva does not strive for the awakening of the arhat, but for Buddhahood, because only a fully awakened Buddha is of best service to the world. Being a ‘Buddha in becoming,’ which is the classic meaning of “bodhisattva,” is thus equivalent to adopting and developing this kind of altruistic mind. Hence, bodhicitta is not only crucial at the beginning of the Bodhisattva path, but throughout: It is both the mind of the beginner who resolves to embark on the Bodhisattva’s way to Buddhahood and the mind of the one who proceeds on this path to the very end (1:15-16). It is the mind that finds its consummation when Buddhahood is finally achieved and is thus ultimately the mind of all the Buddhas (1:10; 3:22-23): Buddha mind. This, of course, presupposes the Mahāyāna concept according to which a Buddha is of maximum benefit for all, a being perfect in wisdom and compassion, who for the sake of the world does not disappear from saṃsāra. As Francis Brassard rightly states: “Bodhicitta is therefore the means to an end as well as the end itself.”19 In this sense, the mental quality of bodhicitta is capable of development: it can and needs to be cultivated and perfected. This is the core of the cultivation of the pāramitās, which corresponds to and is marked by overcoming the mental qualities antagonistic to bodhicitta: the kleśas, the defilements of self-centered greed and hostility rooted in delusion. This interpretation of the BCA’s inner structure is supported by a number of remarks about the different pāramitās in the BCA. The first explicit mention of the “perfection of giving” (dānapāramitā) (vss. 5:9f) and of the “perfection of morality/moral discipline” (śīlapāramitā) (vs. 5:11) underlines Śāntideva’s view that these two pāramitās refer to mental qualities. As he illustrates: Enemies are not removed by killing all of them, but by killing the one mental state of enmity (vs. 5:12); likewise, the whole earth cannot be covered by leather, but will be 18  This is also the view of Mi-pham, rendered by Lobsang Dargyay (1987, 97) as: “There is no development of bodhicitta without the development of the six pāramitās.” 19  Referring to Śāndideva’s concept of bodhicitta. Brassard 2000, 70.

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covered by the leather of just one sandal (vs. 5:13). Cultivating these two pāramitās thus means to develop a mind (citta) that is generous and morally good. The defilements (kleśas), however, have penetrated one’s mind (vs. 4:29). Developing the pāramitās therefore involves fighting the kleśas (vs. 6:19), with the mind as the battle place. The cultivation of the third pāramitā, “patience/forbearance” (kṣānti), is primarily directed against “hate” (dveṣa), the worst of all evils (vs. 6:2) – a view that only makes sense if bodhicitta is essentially understood as an altruistic mind and thus very antagonistic toward “hate.” The pāramitā of “vigor” (vīrya), which is the basis of enlightenment (vs. 7:1), encompasses, according to BCA 7:16, also that which Śāntideva presents as the essence of the cultivation of the pāramitā of meditative absorption (dhyāna),20 namely the “sameness of others and oneself,” and the “exchange of others and oneself.” The cultivation of these two mental attitudes is absolutely central to bodhicitta (vs. 8:89): They transform the defilement of self-centered greed into the altruistic spirit. The kleśas are essentially of three types – greed, hate and delusion – and thus, in the end, the whole mass of kleśas can only be overcome by the final pāramitā of wisdom/insight (prajñā) (vss. 4:46f). Awakening, however, the consummation of insight, is much more than merely the absence of the defilements (vss. 9:45-49). It entails the true understanding of reality’s ultimate nature and – correspondingly – of the non-ultimate nature of what delusion takes to be real. The central subject of Śāntideva’s account of the Bodhisattva path is thus, as we can now summarize, the nature, preservation and cultivation of bodhicitta from the perspective of the Madhyamaka school of Mahāyāna Buddhism. In other words, the true subject of the BCA is the human mind (citta) with regard to its possible transformation from a state of self-centered greed, hate and delusion to that of altruistic awakening. Or more generally, the BCA is about the fight between good and evil, and about bodhicitta as the good that overcomes evil. In this sense, the subject is clearly stated in the third verse of the text after the introductory verses (BCA 1:6): Therefore the good is always weak; in contrast, the power of evil is great and terrible. What other good can overcome it if there were not the spirit of complete awakening?

20  This applies at least to the canonical version. The Dūn-huáng version treats them under the vīryapāramitā; see above, p. 56, fn. 17.

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2. THE BODHICARYĀVATĀRA COMPARED Having identified bodhicitta as that which determines the Bodhicaryāvatāra’s specific perspective on the Bodhisattva path, it is worth looking briefly at the BCA in comparison to the two other succinct compendia of the Bodhisattva path from the same school. Apparently all three works – the BCA, the Madhyamakāvatāra (MA) and the Pāramitāsamāsa (PS)21 – were composed at roughly the same time. One may assume, though not take for granted, that Candrakīrti, author of the MA, lived slightly earlier than the author of the first version of the BCA.22 Nevertheless, there seems to be no clear and unambiguous evidence that the BCA, as a text, depends on the MA. As has been mentioned, the BCA is closer to the PS in that it follows (at least to some extent) the scheme of the six pāramitās, whereas the MA is structured on the ten bhūmis. Only in relation to the chapter on wisdom/insight (prajñā) does the BCA appear to be somewhat closer to the MA than to the PS.23 Both the BCA and the MA use the wisdom chapter to present typical Madhyamaka argumentations in relation to the non-substantiality of all things and the not-self of persons, combined with a critique of the four-fold origination24 (MA 6:8-170; BCA 9:58-151), as well as for an exposition of their understanding of the two-truths/realities (MA 6:2244; BCA 9:2-5) and a critique of the Yogācāra school of Mahāyāna Buddhism (MA 6:45-97; BCA 9:16-30).25 Yet apart from the common use of some standard arguments, there are no strong, much less literal conformities, nothing that might indicate any kind of textual dependency. But it should be noted that most of the BCA’s chapter 9 (more precisely 9:1-151) differs considerably from the style of personalized 21

 On the dating of the PS, see above, p. 53, fn. 2.  See above, p. 11. 23  With its 226 verses, the chapter on insight (prajñā) is by far the longest of all the chapters of the MA; the five other pāramitās (dāna: 17 verses; śīla: 10 verses; kṣānti: 13 verses; vīrya: 2 verses; dhyāna: 1 verse) and the four additional bhūmis are treated only briefly. The prajñā chapters in the BCA (168 verses) and in the PS (74 verses) are shorter, second to their chapters on dhyāna (BCA: 186 verses; PS: 79 verses). Ruegg (1981, 83) mistakenly denoted BCA 9 as the longest chapter. For a comparison of the MA and BCA, see Dexter 2013. 24  The rejection of the idea that things arise from themselves, from something else, from both or from neither. 25  The refutation of other philosophical schools has been significantly expanded in the canonical version of the BCA. That is, the verses BCA 9:106-142ab, which contain critiques of the doctrine of the divine creator (īśvara) and of certain Sāṃkhya teachings, have no parallel in the Dūn-huáng version (see Saito 1994 and 1996). 22

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contemplation and reflection otherwise so characteristic of the BCA. Given that there is nothing of this kind of first-person writing in the MA other than in its introduction and conclusion, and very little of it in the PS,26 which is generally written in a more doctrinal and scholastic style, I conclude that if there is any influence of the MA on the BCA at all, it might be seen in the style in which the BCA’s chapter 9 is composed. The wisdom chapter of the PS is of a very different nature. Typical Madhyamaka arguments and refutations are only hinted at, not elaborated on or demonstrated. The critique of the four-fold origination, for example, is placed in an altogether different chapter and explained in the context of the cultivation of patience (kṣānti) (see PS 4:32-34). Instead, the PS’s chapter on wisdom presents a skillful account of the interplay between wisdom and the other pāramitās, an extended praise of the benefits that come along with wisdom, an indication of how to acquire wisdom, and a summary of its application to various doctrinal issues (in PS 6:54-70). The latter displays at least some remote similarity to the MA (6:181-218). One feature, however, that the wisdom chapters of the PS and MA clearly share is their explicit emphasis – towards the end of these chapters – that the perfection of wisdom does not imply the cessation of compassion (PS 6:64; MA 6:225).27 This has no direct parallel in the BCA, although one might understand the concluding verses of 26

 E.g. PS 1:6-12, 30, 32; 2:5-6; 4:5-7.  In MA 12:40-42 (alternative numbering 11:49-51), it is quite explicit that the Buddha, out of compassion, remains in saṃsāra and refrains from nirvāṇa, but not from Buddhahood! It is crucial for an understanding of the Bodhisattva path not to confuse these two issues by claiming, for example, that a Bodhisattva would voluntarily abstain from Buddhahood. The Bodhisattva strives to become a Buddha (instead of becoming merely an arhat) in order to be – as a Buddha – of utmost benefit to all. This view is in line with PS 6:64f and, in a different reading, also with PS 5:10: iti lokahitāvekṣī buddhabhāvagataspṛhaḥ kuryāt sātatyayogena dhyānārambhasamudyamam Meadows (1986, 223), however, translates the first line as: “Thus taking into consideration the welfare of the world, without the eager desire to reach the state of a Buddha [immediately]…” (similar translation in Saito, N. 2005, 226). This translation is based on interpreting gata as “moving away,” thus giving it a negative meaning. Yet there is no need for this reading; it is also possible to translate the same phrase as “with an eager desire set on the state of a Buddha.” (I’m grateful to Carola Roloff and Peter Gäng, with whom I could discuss this problem, and to Ernst Steinkellner, who suggested the alternative translation.) The BCA deals with this issue in its own typical manner by giving it a personal, intuitive expression: “Release (nirvāṇa) is the leaving behind of everything: and my mind strives for release. If I have to give up everything, it is better to give it to all beings.” BCA 3:11. 27

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the BCA’s wisdom chapter (BCA 9:152-168) as a personalized demonstration of wisdom (prajñā) not being the end of compassion. Not only do their chapters on wisdom show no signs of any direct borrowing or dependence, but the other parts of these three introductions to the Bodhisattva path do not either.28 Despite the fact that they articulate their ideas within the framework of the same philosophical school,29 they nevertheless appear to be independent works, with each having their own distinctive approach. To what extent does this observation also apply to their treatment of bodhicitta, the BCA’s real subject? In this respect, once again the PS is closer to the BCA than is the MA. As mentioned above, the BCA explicitly understands bodhicitta in a two-fold way (BCA 1:15-17): as the initial resolution (praṇidhi) to strive for awakening out of compassion for all beings, and as the actual striving (prasthāna).30 Śāntideva compares this to the decision to embark on a journey and the actual travelling towards the goal. Given the tendency in earlier Mahāyāna texts of confining bodhicitta only to the first meaning,31 it is this extended interpretation that enables Śāntideva to understand the whole Bodhisattva career, the process of the cultivation of the pāramitās, in terms of the inner development of bodhicitta up to the point of its completion in the perfection of prajñā, that is, in awakening itself. A similar conception is found in the PS. In its chapter on the fourth pāramitā of vīrya (vigor/ striving), the PS distinguishes three undertakings or determinations (samādāna). These can be understood, according to the detailed discussion by Carol Meadows, as related to three successive phases in the career of the Bodhisattva: “He must first of course armor himself with the thought of enlightenment [i.e. bodhicitta, P. S.-L.], then practice the caryā, that is, actively gather the equipment with the intention of helping others; and, finally, achieve a state of effortlessness and complete altruism in which all his actions naturally conduce to the winning of the

28  The PS, however, shares with the ŚS (and hence to some extent also with the BCA) a particular interest in the Akṣayamati-sūtra. In its first verse the PS refers to the practice of exchanging self and others that is so prominent in the BCA. However, the PS gives no further account of this practice and uses a slightly different term (parātmavyatihāra instead of parātmaparivartana). On this, see Part II, chap. 8, p. 400. 29  Whether one should narrow this down further to the Prāsaṅgika type of the Madhyamaka school is questionable regarding the PS. 30  This distinction (including the terminology) seems to have been influenced by the Gaṇḍavyūha-sūtra. See Rao 2013, 4f; Lopez 1990, 214, fn. 58. 31  See Wangchuk 2007, 197.

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highest goal and hence lead to the supreme end (paraniṣṭhā), or to completion (samudāgama).”32 These three phases (the beginning, practice, and completion of the Bodhisattva path) are apparently summarized in the PS under the distinction of “setting out” (prasthāna) and “adherence” or “standing firm” (viṣṭhāna) in PS 4:31 and 39.33 This would then be roughly equivalent to Śāntideva’s distinction between two forms of bodhicitta in BCA 1:15-17, even if prasthāna then has a different meaning in these two cases. Anyway, it is quite obvious that the PS, throughout the text, does not confine bodhicitta to merely the initial decision of embarking on the Bodhisattva path, but sees it as crucial in the development of at least the first four pāramitās (giving, morality, patience, vigor).34 As far as the MA is concerned, bodhicitta appears structurally as the ordering principle of all ten bhūmis in that each one of them is characterized as a stage in the generation/cultivation of bodhicitta.35 The foundational role of bodhicitta for the whole path of the Bodhisattva is emphasized in the first verse, which states that “every Buddha is himself born from a bodhisattva” – nicely36 inverting the usual designation of Bodhisattvas as “Sons of the Buddhas,” while the “generative causes” of these Buddha Sons “are the thought of compassion, non-dualistic knowledge, and the thought of awakening [i.e. bodhicitta; P.S.-L.].”37 Apart from this, however, the MA does not go into any details of how bodhicitta is at work on each of the different bhūmis.38 Thus we can safely conclude that the idea of understanding the Bodhisattva career in terms of the cultivation of bodhicitta is present in these two other companions of the Bodhisattva path, but that only in the BCA it has become the central focus of the path’s exposition. This is in line with a further observation regarding the absence, or near absence, in the BCA of certain doctrinal topics that one might expect to feature more prominently in a Mahāyāna treatise about the

32

 Meadows 1986, 95.  See the discussion in Meadows 1986, 303, fn. 31.1, and Saito, N. 2005, 211f. 34  See PS 1:61; 2:57; 3:9; 4:32. 35  Cf. Huntington 1989, 20. 36  And typical for the Madhyamaka school, which likes to illustrate logical interdependence by the view that not only the father begets the son, but also the son the father (who would not be a “father” without offspring). 37  Huntington 1989, 149. 38  MA 11:24 (or 12:15, according to the alternative numbering) may even be understood as seeing the importance of bodhicitta primarily at the beginning of the path. 33

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Bodhisattva career.39 This refers in particular to the doctrines of the Buddha Nature (buddhadhātu) or Buddha Germ (tathāgatagarbha), the Three Bodies of a Buddha (trikāya) and the Buddha Fields (buddhakṣetra). Yet this lack is not specific to the BCA. The MA does have a longer section on the trikāya (12:5-18), two brief mentions of the buddhakṣetra (11:2; 12:11) and perhaps an implicit reference to the tathāgatagarbha doctrine as a provisional teaching (6:95).40 But nothing about the trikāya doctrine is found in the PS, nor of the tathāgatagarbha teaching, and there is only one brief mention of the buddhakṣetra (PS 5:43). The BCA mentions one of the three Buddha bodies, the dharmakāya, in vs. 1:1 and briefly the Buddha Fields in vs. 2:24 (plus an implicit but clear reference in vs. 7:44 and a reference to sukhāvatī, the land of Buddha Amitābha, in vs. 10:4). But there is no, or at least no explicit, reference to the tathāgatagarbha teaching.41 The scarcity of references to Buddha Bodies and Buddha Lands in the PS and BCA may be the result of their focus on the mental training of the adept, which is particularly the case in the BCA with its attention on bodhicitta. The absence of an explicit tathāgatagarbha doctrine may be due to its association with the Yogācāra and Tantric traditions. Yet one may speculate whether bodhicitta, as the seed of Buddhahood in one’s mind, may function for the Mādhyamikas as a replacement and substitute of the rival schools’ tathāgatagarbha teaching, which was suspect because of its alleged nearness to the ātman of the Upaniṣads.42 Another point worthy of comparison is the question of the relationship between the production of karmic merit and the striving for awakening. For both the MA and the PS, this question is decisive in their understanding of the pāramitās. The MA and PS both advance the view that the cultivation of the pāramitās not only generates karmic merit leading to a good rebirth, but also contributes towards the goal of Buddhahood (see MA 2:7; 3:12 and PS 1:44; 2:8). According to Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya (62-63), the first three pāramitās – generosity, morality and patience – are particularly qualified as generating merit, 39

 See for example the respective observation in Todd 2013, 68.  See Huntington 1989, 249f, fn. 123. See also Ruegg 1981, 73, fn. 233. 41  Schmithausen (2007b, 567f) and Pettit (1999, 121f) have discussed a possible influence of the tathāgatagarbha teaching on BCA 6:118, 126 and 9:104 (alternative numbering 9:103), respectively. 42  Whether bodhicitta functions indeed as an analogy to the tathāgatagarbha depends on whether every sentient being is thought to have the potential of developing bodhicitta. This assumption can be supported by BCA 9:104, as has been argued by John Pettit. 40

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while the two last pāramitās – meditation and insight/wisdom – generate knowledge (jñāna). The fourth pāramitā, strength/vigor, can generate both.43 This view lies behind the MA (3:12) as well as the PS.44 In the PS, the cultivation of the pāramitās is understood as a development from an initially self-centered practice of generosity, morality and patience, that is, a practice motivated by the desire for one’s own karmic profit (before the Bodhisattva path has been taken up) that moves towards a practice not for one’s own sake but for the sake of others, a practice motivated by compassion (see PS 6:5). This development involves the overcoming of any clinging and attachment not only to the idea of a “self,” which is behind the self-centered, merit oriented practice, but ultimately to any reified notion of “self,” “other” or “action” (as something done by the self in relation to the other). The goal is thus a practice of the pāramitās marked by non-dual insight.45 The development from a still self-centered practice to one of complete freedom from attachment is often expressed by the distinction between the “worldly” (laukika) and the “supramundane” (lokottara) practice of the pāramitās, as for example in MA 1:16 (here in relation to the first pāramitā of dāna, generosity): “That act of generosity which is empty of giver, giving and recipient is called supramundane perfection; and that which is attached to [concepts of] these three is taught as a mundane perfection.”46

Candrakīrti repeats this distinction in relation to morality (MA 2:9) and to patience (MA 3:10). According to Meadows, the PS is also “clearly based on a laukika/lokottara understanding of the pāramitās,”47 even if the terminology is slightly different (see PS 4:24). Can something similar be said of the BCA as well? The BCA, too, sees the pāramitās as generating karmic merit and as contributing towards the goal of Buddhahood (e.g. BCA 6:133f).48 By the power of bodhicitta the Bodhisattva “gains oceans of merit” (vs. 7:29). 43

 See Huntington 1989, 224, fn. 7.  The latter has been convincingly shown by Meadows 1986, 65. 45  See Meadows 1986, 48. 46  Huntington 1989, 150. The locus classicus in the Mahāyāna Sūtras is Abhisamayālaṅkāra 1:10:8. See Conze 1984, 198f. 47  Meadows 1986, 62. 48  According to Dayal 2004, 179f, it is a widespread conviction in the earlier Mahāyāna literature that the practice of the Bodhisattva is for his own benefit and the benefit of others, while later texts almost exclusively emphasize the altruistic motivation. 44

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The BCA can even encourage the practitioner to consider the benefits resulting from “right desire,” that is, the “desire for the good” (BCA 7:3346) and compares the pleasures of the Buddha Land into which the Bodhisattva may fairly expect to be reborn with the horrors of hell (vss. 7:44f). But the Bodhisattva should “directly or indirectly … only act for the benefit of all beings, and alone for the sake of all beings, he should orient everything toward awakening” (vs. 5:101). It is not his karmic merit that the Bodhisattva should strive for, but the well-being of all beings. And precisely in so doing, there will be “nothing that is not meritorious for him” (vs. 5:100). Moreover, compassionate service to all beings is the true “worship of the Buddhas, this alone is the full realization of one’s own goal, this alone is the destruction of the suffering of the world.” And “therefore, this alone should be my resolve!” (vs. 6:127). The BCA thus transforms the relationship between striving for Buddhahood and generating karmic merit into an existential paradox: Merit is generated if it is not sought as merit for oneself, but if one seeks only the well-being of others. This paradox is expressed at several places in the BCA, as for example: “All those who are suffering in the world are so out of longing for their own happiness. All those who are happy in the world are so out of longing for the happiness of others” (vs. 8:129). “Those who wish to escape suffering are simply rushing toward suffering. Already by desiring happiness they foolishly destroy their happiness like enemies do” (vs. 1:28). “If you have love of yourself, you must not love yourself.” (vs. 8:173a).

These lines belong to the most frequently quoted verses from the BCA, which is evidence of the strong impact that this paradox has made on many people and is still going to make. It is, as Donald Lopez rightly observed, “firmly rooted in the doctrine of karma” in that one’s merit is the result of one’s selfless care for others.49 But at the same time this paradox goes far beyond such ethical thinking as it is based on the balancing of merit and demerit or reward and punishment. It goes to the point of not only interchanging the two elliptical foci of “self” and “others,” but even of “others” and the “Buddhas.” This is because the Buddhas are seen as those who have completed the exchange of “self” and “others” and in their compassion have thus made the whole world their 49

 Lopez 1990, 188.

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own self (vs. 7:126). Thus any selfless service to other sentient beings is at the same time the true worship of the Buddhas. In the end, the dedication and transference of merit to all beings, so characteristic of the Bodhisattva, is understood by the BCA as the expression and practice of exactly this existential paradox. How would this relate then to the distinction between a “worldly” and a “supramundane” practice of the pāramitās? The laukika/lokottara terminology is not found in the BCA, but one may understand the ninth chapter as an account of the kind of insight that ultimately turns the worldly practice of the pāramitās into a supramundane one. On this basis, one may read the last two verses of chapter 9 as an implicit reference to the laukika/lokottara scheme, as is suggested in Ernst Steinkellner’s rendering of BCA 9:168: “When will I ever explain emptiness in terms of conventional reality to those who harbor the misconception of perceiving [substantial existence], and carefully the accumulation of meritorious acts in terms of not perceiving [the triple division of gift, giver and recipient]?”50

Within this scheme, the “supramundane” practice of the pāramitās is characterized as being entirely free from reifying notions, that is, from any belief in the reality of action (gift/giving), self (giver) and other (recipient). It is the practice rooted in non-dual insight or emptiness. At various places in the BCA (e.g. vss. 4:47; 5:57; 5:63; 6:31; 8:115; 9:7678) Śāntideva seems to indicate that understanding emptiness does not terminate the practice of the pāramitās. On the contrary, it provides the ultimate foundation upon which the creative and flexible handling of illusions can be based, especially the handling of the notion of “self” in the paradoxical interpretation of self-interest and altruistic selflessness climaxing in the exchange of self, others and Buddhas. Yet as we will see below, the issue of how to understand the relation between emptiness and compassionate practice is one of the most disputed matters in the interpretation of the BCA.51 A final comparative consideration concerns the relationship between the BCA and the Subhāṣitaratnakaraṇḍakakathā (SRKK), a work also ascribed to Āryaśūra. What makes their relation particularly interesting is the fact that the two texts share eleven verses that are either identical 50  In his interpretation of the verse, Steinkellner follows Prajñākaramati’s Pañjikā (281, 22f), which refers to the “purification of the three parts” (trikoṭipariśuddhi). 51  See below, pp. 80-82, 90-92.

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or have only minor variations. On the basis of a careful study of the different versions of the SRKK, Heinz Zimmermann has argued that the SRKK was presumably composed over a long period stretching from the fourth (or even second) to the ninth century CE.52 According to Zimmermann, the text can be divided into three parts. It appears likely that the first part (chapters 1-4 = vss. 1-33) forms the root version of the SRKK, to which, at a later but still relatively early stage, the second part (chapters 5-22 = vss. 34-157), was added. At a much later stage the text was further enlarged by a third part (chapters 23-27 = vss. 158-190). The first part, the root text, reminds the reader of the brevity and preciousness of human existence, an existence that in the course of the cycle of rebirth (saṃsāra) is difficult to attain. Rebirth as a human being has only been achieved through the accumulation of karmic merit and hence one should make the best of one’s life by listening to the Buddha’s Dharma and by accumulating further merit, primarily through the practice of generosity. In chapter 4 it is emphasized that generous giving generates the rewards, in subsequent rebirths, of plenty of wealth and power (artha), sensual and erotic pleasure (kāma), a long and healthy life in beautiful bodies, etc. The details of these promises clearly demonstrate that the text was not addressed to a monastic community, but rather to lay followers from affluent and powerful classes (see also SRKK vss. 5f) or at least to those desiring such status. The motif of do ut des, giving in order to receive (karmic benefits), is further, and excessively, elaborated in the second part (chapters 5-22), with no indication that this is connected to the Bodhisattva ideal. This, however, is different in the third part, the final addendum. The author of chapters 23-27 apparently understood parts one and two, i.e. the SRKK of 22 chapters, as an exposition of the first Bodhisattva perfection of generosity (dāna) and thus felt the need to add with these last chapters some brief remarks on the remaining perfections – morality, patience, vigor, concentration and wisdom – in order to transform the SRKK into a text about the six Bodhisattva pāramitās. The verses that the SRKK shares with the BCA are found in two different layers of the SRKK.53 Four verses appear in the first part (in 52 53

 See Zimmermann 1975, 20. Much of this, however, remains speculative.  These are (see Zimmermann 1975, 21): SRKK 17: BCA 4:17 SRKK 18: BCA 4:23 SRKK 19: BCA 4:21 SRKK 20: BCA 4:20 SRKK 166: BCA 6:1

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chapter 3 = vss. 15-20), and deal with the value of human life. Another seven verses appear in the third part (in chapter 24 = vss. 166-175), in the section on “patience”/”forbearing” (kṣānti). As Zimmermann suggests,54 Śāntideva probably drew on the SRKK’s chapter 3 for his own praise of human existence in the BCA’s chapter 4, while conversely, the parallel verses in SRKK’s chapter 24 may have been taken from the BCA’s chapter 6, which is also on kṣānti. If Śāntideva did indeed draw on chapter 3 of the SRKK (instead of vice versa55), his use is markedly different from the spirituality of both the root SRKK and of its 22-chapter version. Śāntideva adopts the praise of human existence (BCA 4:20 // SRKK 20)56 and especially the praise of human rebirth under those SRKK 167: BCA 6:2 SRKK 168: BCA 6:3 SRKK 172: BCA 6:47 SRKK 173: BCA 6:48 SRKK 174: BCA 6:49 SRKK 175: BCA 6:41. In addition, SRKK 169 seems to have been influenced by BCA 5:12 and SRKK 8 is partly similar to SRKK 20. 54  This is suggested by Zimmermann 1975, 15-21, 215-225. 55  Which could of course be excluded if Zimmermann’s reconstruction of the SRKK’s textual development is correct. 56  The second half of BCA 4:20 and SRKK 20 are also found in Mātṛceta’s Śatapañcāśatka (1:5), a work which might date from the second century CE. However, as a whole, BCA 4:20 is much closer to SRKK 20. In all three texts the second half of the verse invokes the canonical parable of the turtle: “…as for a [blind] turtle to stick its neck through the opening of a yoke [floating] in the vast ocean” (BCA 4:20). But in the first part of the verse, both SRKK 20 and BCA 4:20 relate the parable only to the rare and difficult opportunity of rebirth as a human being, while Śatapañcāśatka 1:5 relates the parable to the rarity of human rebirth and the favorable circumstances of hearing the Buddha’s teaching. Given that the BCA has several other verses in common with SRKK, while the second half of BCA 4:20 is the only line that the BCA has in common with the Śatapañcāśatka, I think it unlikely that Śāntideva was influenced by the latter (for a different view, see Zimmermann 1975, 19). The parable of the turtle is frequently invoked in Buddhist texts and goes back to MN 129 (PTS III 169f), where it illustrates the difficulty of regaining human rebirth once one has fallen into the lower forms of human existence. According to this parable, this is as difficult or unlikely as for a blind turtle that comes to the water surface once in a hundred years to put its neck into a yoke with just one hole floating somewhere in the vast ocean. See Ñāṇamoli, Bodhi 2001, 1021. The question of whether Śāntideva was influenced by Mātṛceta’s Śatapañcāśatka is insofar of some interest, as Yijing (I-tsing), who spent several years at Nālandā, reports that in Nālandā, Mātṛceta’s Śatapañcāśatka and his Varṇārhavarṇa Stotra were both recited on a regular basis. According to Yijing, Mātṛceta’s reputation as a Buddhist poet was so high that “in India all who compose hymns imitate his style, considering him the

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favorable circumstances that allow one to hear and practice the word of the Buddha (BCA 1:4; see SRKK vss. 1 and 11). Yet he omits entirely the exhortation, so prominent in the SRKK, to use this rare opportunity for the practice of generosity (particularly in donating to the saṅgha, the monastic community) with the prospect of achieving “food and drink, bed and seat, jewel garlands, clothes and adornment, girls of highest excellence” (SRKK vs. 21) or “horses, … elephants, … a palace, … control over villages, towns and the whole earth” (SRKK vs. 23), etc. Instead, Śāntideva understands the preciousness of human life as the rare opportunity for generating bodhicitta. He adopts the view, expressed in SRKK vs. 7, that one should follow the example of the Buddha by finding one’s delight in the welfare of others. For Śāntideva, however, the happiness resulting from altruism has a very different quality from the gratification of selfish desires (see BCA 1:25-28). To Śāntideva, the “wish-fulfilling jewel” (cintāmaṇi) is not karmic merit as such (as in SRKK vs. 3), but the altruistic spirit of bodhicitta (see BCA 1:11, 25f, 36). Thus Śāntideva contrasts the admonition in SRKK vs. 10 of not letting one’s life pass “without bearing fruit,” in the sense of not missing its opportunity of acquiring karmic merit, with his personalized confession that his life is now “bearing fruit” because he has taken up the altruistic spirit of the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas (BCA 3:25). The root SRKK has only a slight indication of the final goal of leaving saṃsāra, in verse 13 (chapter 2). And although a relation between merit and final enlightenment (seed and fruit) is established in verse 15, this affirmation remains without further consequence. It rather lures potential sponsors of the saṅgha with the blunt promise of erotic pleasures to be enjoyed with the earthly women of one’s harem, or with the heavenly apsarās as the fruit of karmic merit (vss. 26, 29, 31), including the consumption of fine wine served by beautiful girls (vs. 32) – a notion expanded upon massively in chapters 5-22. For the most part, the spiritual direction of this text is thus more or less directly opposite that of the BCA.57

father of literature” (Takakusu 1896, 157). If Śāntideva had any connection with Nālandā (which, as we have seen in chapter 2, is far from clear), one might expect to find something of Mātṛceta in his BCA. The theory (based on Tāranātha’s History of Buddhism in India) that Mātṛceta could be identical to the author of the SRKK appears rather contestable (see Meadows 1986, 6f.). 57  Perhaps with the exception of BCA 10:10. But even here, the spirit is different in as much as the context is not gaining karmic merit or reward but the Bodhisattva’s compassionate dedication of merit.

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3. THE BODHICARYĀVATĀRA’S AUDIENCE Post-modern philosophical trends have created a heightened sensitivity for the contextual nature of allegedly all human thought. Whether this reflects a universally valid (and thus astonishingly a-contextual) insight, or is itself bound to a particular context, is an issue that we may leave aside – at least for the moment. From a hermeneutical perspective there is, I suggest, no doubt that the question of the envisaged audience or readership of a particular text may help in getting a better understanding of the text itself. But this is presumably even more important when exploring the kind of methodological issues that inevitably arise if a particular text will be interpreted, and commented on, within a quite different context by and for a different audience – as it is the case with a contemporary interpretation within an interreligious setting. Recent students of the BCA are in agreement that it “assumes a male audience throughout.”58 The main argument in support of this view is – as Amod Lele puts it – that in the BCA “the reader’s sexual cravings are always discussed in terms of a man’s craving for a woman.”59 The assumption of an intended male audience or readership60 is further supported by grammatical evidence. What is less clear, however, is whether the audience was supposed to be exclusively male monastics. Crosby and Skilton have taken this for granted, assuming the credibility of the Nālandā motif of the legend and pointing out that a number of rules in BCA chapter 5 (vss. 5:85, 88-98) are taken from the monastic codex, the prātimokṣa.61 Kaoru Onishi sees the BCA as a work with many “monastic aspects,” that is, “a text written by a monk, not by a lay person, composed for monks, not for lay people, and produced in a monastic community rather than a lay community.”62 He combines this assessment with the invective that this supposedly all-important nature of the

58

 Crosby, Skilton 1995, xxix.  Lele 2007, 27. He thus specifies the intended reader as “a heterosexual male” (ibid.). 60  It is often assumed that the BCA was at least originally meant as a text for oral recitation, but I don’t think that this is beyond doubt. It is certainly written in a form that facilitates memorization, but this is nothing unusual in a Buddhist context and does not exclude that the text can also be read. To see it as a primarily oral text may reflect the feature of the legend according to which the BCA was first presented in the form of an oral recitation. 61  See Crosby, Skilton 1995, xxvii-xxix, 32f. 62  Onishi 2010, 619. 59

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text has been largely neglected and ignored in previous studies.63 The imputation of exclusively male monastics as the intended audience has, however, been contested by Lele with recourse to verses 8:17-25 and 141-151, which may presuppose lay people possessing their own private property. Lele thus criticizes lābha (“possessions,” “gain,” “acquisition,” etc.) in these verses being translated with “alms” by Crosby and Skilton as unjustified and biased towards an exclusively monastic reading.64 However, there is evidence that the accumulation of wealth, generated from donations, was also a problem within the monastic community.65 Hence one might justly assume that the text addresses predominantly male monastics, even though it is less clear whether it was exclusively composed for them. Uncontested is the assumption that the intended audience or readership of the BCA consists of Buddhists. Buddhist teachings are taken for granted (and as familiar to the audience); non-Buddhists are referred to in a way that clearly presupposes a Buddhist audience (e.g. vss. 6:13, 65). Taking into account chapter 9, one might even go further and assume that the intended audience is also, at least to some extent, familiar with the specific philosophical tenets of both the Madhyamaka school and its Buddhist as well as non-Buddhist rivals. This presupposes a significant degree of learnedness, as does the fact that the addressee is supposed to understand Sanskrit and be “well versed in the ideas of classical Sanskritic culture.”66 Further, one may legitimately assume that the BCA is intended for beginners or potential beginners on the Bodhisattva path, not for those who are already significantly advanced. In not providing any lengthy explanations of basic terms and features of the Bodhisattva path, the text apparently presupposes a Buddhist audience that is also already familiar with the Bodhisattva ideal.67 But what the text clearly intends to achieve is to encourage its audience to make the resolve of entering that path and remaining steadfast on it once any tribulations are encountered. The 63  He also suggests that, given the highly individualistic thinking about religion in today’s Western world, contemporary Tibetan scholars are not inclined, for pragmatic reasons, to acknowledge or even emphasize the monastic character of the BCA. Onishi 2010, 633. 64  See Lele 2007, 28f. 65  See Boucher 2008, 64-84. 66  Lele 2007, 27. 67  This is another feature that the BCA shares with the PS. See Meadows 1986, 37, 62f.

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text seeks to win its listener or reader over for the life as a Bodhisattva. Perhaps the strongest means for doing this is its wide use of first person reflections.68 Much of its appeal may well be due to its “often touchingly personal mode of expression,” as Ernst Steinkellner suggests.69 Writing in the first person inevitably challenges the reader or listener by implicitly evoking his identification with the text. Can the reader join the author’s “I”? Does the personal perspective of the author resonate with the listener’s own experience? Is the reader/listener prepared to follow and embark on the path? This implicit call for the reader’s consent leads us to the question of the extent the BCA is bound to its original context. Should it be taken, as Luis Gómez once put it, as an “Indian document or world classic?”70 Of course no one would deny that the BCA is an Indian document; it clearly bears the marks of its time and context. Yet what Gómez has in mind is whether the BCA, despite having been composed for Indian, Sanskrit-speaking male Buddhists in a predominantly monastic setting of the seventh or eighth century, nevertheless has something important to tell a much larger audience, not only beyond its original time and place, but also beyond the confinements of males,71 monastics or even Buddhists. Can it be legitimately considered “a timeless expression of universal human longings,”72 as it has been, according to Gómez, by many of its modern Western interpreters? If we see the BCA as a religious text, as a text of the Buddhist tradition, there is no doubt that in a Buddhist understanding, the text conveys a message that is certainly of universal relevance and rests on a truth that is indeed “timeless,” even if the concrete expressions of the Dharma are as much subject to transition and corruption as everything else. Taking the text as a religious document and taking it seriously at this level implies grappling with its claim of being rooted in a universal truth. And this is also what one will have to expect from the attempt at a trans-religious commentary. 68  Within the wealth of Buddhist literature, the literary model of this personalized style can probably be identified as the canonical Thera- and Therīgāthā, the songs of the early Buddhist monks and nuns. Especially BCA chapter 8 shows several reminiscences to the Theragāthā at times getting close to almost literal paraphrases. 69  Steinkellner 1981, 18 (my translation). 70  Gómez 1999, 265. 71  A good example in this regard is the discussion among Buddhist feminists of whether some features of the Bodhisattva ideal, in particular the aspect of putting others before oneself, are not counterproductive for feminist objectives. See Gregory, Mrozik 2008, 203-208, and, in the same volume, Tworkov 2008. 72  Gómez 1999, 266.

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In Mahāyāna Buddhism, a Bodhisattva is understood as someone who is not only guided by the word of the Buddha to his or her own salvation, but who takes the Buddha as an example to emulate or imitate. What makes a Bodhisattva a Bodhisattva is the serious effort of becoming a Buddha himself. In its intention to win Buddhists over for embarking on the Bodhisattva path, the BCA encourages its audience to follow the example of the Buddha, which involves above all generating and cultivating the Buddha’s mind of perfect compassion. It is therefore no surprise that the BCA has been frequently compared by modern interpreters with Thomas à Kempis’ Imitatio Christi73 – a work that encourages its readers to follow in the footsteps of Jesus Christ and to realize Christ’s mind. The two questions of, first, the BCA’s universal relevance and, second, its relation to Christian spirituality are interconnected in that Christian texts also convey a message of universal meaning. Yet before I address the hermeneutical problems involved when looking at the BCA from both a Buddhist and Christian perspective, I will first turn to the specific impact that the BCA has had in and beyond classical India, in particular in the context of the Buddhist‒Christian encounter until now.

73  Onishi mentions as examples Auguste Barth (1893), Louis Finot (1920), Moritz Winternitz and T.R.V. Murti (see Onishi 2010, 623f.). Further names can be added, such as Barbra Clayton and Francis Brassard.

CHAPTER 4

THE BODHICARYĀVATĀRA’S IMPACT

1. THE WIDER IMPACT Despite being a comparatively late Buddhist text, the Bodhicaryāvatāra developed a startling influence that continues still today. It quickly achieved considerable popularity in India and its neighbors Sri Lanka,1 and Nepal.2 Even if Bu-ston’s claim of one hundred Indian commentaries on the BCA appears an exaggeration connected to his new image of Śāntideva as a major scholar,3 the Tibetan canon contains six commentaries4 of Indian origin in Tibetan translation.5 One of these, the Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā by Prajñākaramati, is also preserved in Sanskrit.6 Under the rubric of “commentaries,” the Tibetan canon includes some more texts of Indian origin related to the BCA. These, however, are either confined to certain sections or no proper commentaries at all but abbreviated summaries or excerpts.7 As we saw above, the text of the BCA (or better, its two different versions) was translated into Tibetan, Chinese and Mongol.8 We also know of a Uighur translation (13th/14th cent., as part of a commentary), of which however only a fragment is left.9 1

 See Bechert 2005, 71.  Cf. Liland 2009, 17-26. 3  See above, pp. 27f. 4  Liland 2009, 17-21, speaks of eight commentaries, Dietz 1999, 35, even of ten. But two, however, are not full commentaries, one dealing only with chapter 9, another only with chapters 9 and 10, and two are merely a shorter and a longer excerpt. The actual number of Indian full commentaries preserved in Tibetan is six. According to Liland 2009, 88f, there is a further Sanskrit commentary – not yet studied – of which apparently no Tibetan translation exists. 5  For a list with brief descriptions, see Dietz 1999, 35-38. 6  So far there is no complete English translation of Prajñākaramati’s Pañjikā. For an English commentary on the BCA based on the Pañjikā, see Sharma 2012. 7  See Eimer 1981. 8  See above, p. 6. 9  See Raschmann, Zieme 1985. 2

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The incomplete Chinese translation dates from the late tenth century and thus from a period when the golden age of Chinese translation activities was long over. In China the BCA remained comparatively insignificant, this perhaps due, as Hajime Nakamura has explained, to the awkward style of its translation.10 Yet as Fredrik Liland suggests, a more decisive reason may have been a general lack of serious interest in new Indian Buddhist ideas on the side of Chinese Buddhism during the Song era.11 This was different in Mongolia, where the BCA became one of the most important Buddhist scriptures. A first translation into Mongolian (from Tibetan) together with commentary dates from 1305. It was revised several times, the last time in the eighteenth century as part of the printing process of the new Mongol translation of the Tibetan Tengyur.12 Various Mongolian commentaries on the BCA and other works dealing with its contents were written during the nineteenth century. According to Khuslen Soninbayar, the BCA was taught throughout Mongolia at many of its monasteries. “Some monks recited the entire text by memory as part of their daily recitations at their temples.”13 New translations into contemporary spoken Mongolian were published in 2008 and 2009,14 which indicates that the BCA has not lost its relevance and is part of the current revival of Buddhism in Mongolia. The prominence of the BCA in Mongolia is clearly due to the massive influence of Tibetan Buddhism, where the BCA had by far its strongest impact. This cannot only be seen from the development of the Śāntideva legend in Tibet15 and from the comparatively large number of Indian commentaries translated into Tibetan, but also from the impressive list of commentaries produced in Tibet itself.16 According to Michael Sweet, the BCA is quoted in all major Tibetan works on the Bodhisattva Path.17 10

 Nakamura 2007, 283.  Cf. Liland 2009, 37-44. 12  Cf. ibid. 45-51 and Soninbayar 2013. 13  Soninbayar 2013, 111. 14  See ibid. 112f. 15  See above, pp. 46-52. 16  For a list of sixteen Tibetan commentaries and other bits of information, see Kretschmar 2004, 22ff. Liland 2009, 33, lists ten commentaries from the dKa’gdams pa school, all written between the 12th and 14th centuries. A second wave of commentarial writings on the BCA began in the 19th century. One reason for the long gap between these two periods may be the intense confessional hostilities in Tibet between the 16th and 18th centuries, which climaxed in the suppression of numerous works by authors who did not belong to the dominant dGe lugs pa school. See Pelden 2007, XIIIf and Smith 2004. 17  Sweet 1977, 4f. 11

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Moreover, it inspired a whole genre of meditation manuals, the so-called Mental Purification (Blo sbyong) literature, which centered very much on the BCA’s chapter 8.18 The influence of the BCA through this particular genre is still thriving, as can be seen from a recent publication that adapts and “translates” traditional Tibetan meditations based on the BCA for a contemporary Western audience.19 The BCA’s chapter 9 inspired extensive philosophical controversies, above all about the question of the intellectual accessibility of ultimate truth triggered by the apparently negative statement in BCA 9:2, 20 and, closely related, about the nature of ultimate truth or reality. Is ultimate truth to be taken as “a mere negation of inherent existence,” or is this negation itself to be taken as indicating an ultimate reality that, since ineffable, is beyond affirmation and negation, “beyond existence and non-existence”?21 This triggered a long debate22 in Tibetan Buddhism (with Indian roots) between emptiness being interpreted in terms of “self-emptiness” (rangtong/rang stong: ultimate truth meaning that all things are empty of inherent existence), or in terms of “emptiness of other” (shentong/gZhan stong: ultimate reality being empty of all conceptual differentiation). This debate also impacted and was further nourished by interpretations of the BCA. Fredrik Liland rightly concludes: “In Tibet the BCA gained a status unlike any other place it travelled (…).”23 And according to Michael Sweet, “The BCA is one of the handful of Indian texts which is known by all lamas with any pretensions to learning, regardless of sect, many of whom memorize it in its entirety.”24 Liland even dares to judge that “In the Tibetan tradition (…) the text has gained a status and a wide range of uses that is perhaps unchallenged by any other authentic or claimed sūtras of the Buddha.”25 It is well known that the BCA exerts a strong influence on Tenzin Gyatso, the 14th Dalai Lama, who himself is one of the text’s contemporary commentators.26 “It is the Bodhicaryāvatāra which supplies the

18

 See Sweet 1996; Liland 2009, 33f.  See Michie 2012. 20  See Sweet 1977, 20-41; Liland 2009, 34ff. 21  See Williams 1999, 141ff; Williams 1998, 1-28. 22  See Hookham 1991, 11-18. For an account of the debate and its interpretation along the lines of the Yogācāra‒Madhyamaka difference, see Brunnhölzl 2004, 445-526 23  Liland 2009, 93. 24  Sweet 1977, 5. 25  Liland 2009, 92. 26  See Gyatso 2005; 2009b (which both discuss BCA 9) and Gyatso 2009. 19

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ideals and practice of His Holiness the Dalai Lama…” as Paul Williams has said.27 Or in the Dalai Lama’s own words: In my life I have read this book and listened to explanations of it many times. I have thought deeply about the meaning it contains and have even had the good fortune on many occasions to teach it myself. Consequently, I have some experience of the advice contained here, and can confidently say that it continues to be relevant and useful today. If we sincerely try to put the core of these teachings into practice, we need have no hesitation about whether they will be effective. Cultivating qualities like love, compassion, generosity, and patience is beneficial not only on a personal level but is helpful to all sentient beings and even to maintaining harmony with the environment. This is why I encourage people to observe such practices; it’s not merely so that the tradition may be preserved.28

As is evident from this statement, the 14th Dalai Lama considers the content of the BCA by no means to be only of an inner-Buddhist relevance, but of universal significance, including specific problems of the contemporary world, as for example the ecological crisis. Against this background it is easily understood why the Dalai Lama chose to recite from the BCA’s chapter 10 as his contribution to the first interreligious prayer meeting at Assisi in 1986.29 His high esteem for the BCA is surely one of the reasons why the BCA enjoys such a huge popularity today, a popularity that goes far beyond the borders of the Tibetan tradition.30 Its leaping of these borders means that the BCA has also acquired religious relevance in those branches of Mahāyāna Buddhism where it was neglected in the past, as can be seen from the fact that a first Japanese translation (1921) was done by Kawaguchi, the head of a Zen monastery in Tokyo,31 and the first Spanish translation (1993) by a Spanish ZenBuddhist monk, who included explanations from a Zen-Buddhist perspective.32 To summarize, upon its composition the BCA quickly became popular within Indian Buddhism, though its influence in India remained somewhat limited due to its comparatively late date. Its influence was very limited within the Chinese cultural sphere of Mahāyāna Buddhism (China, Vietnam, Korea, Japan). But its impact within the world of 27

 Williams 1995, IX.  From Tenzin Gyatso’s foreword in Tobden 2005, VII. 29  See above, p. XIII. 30  See Liland 2009, 72. 31  See ibid. 55f. 32  See Melis 2005, 216. 28

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Tibetan and Mongolian Buddhism and – most strikingly – in contemporary Western Buddhism, has been almost unparalleled.33 Regarding the latter, Luis Gómez ventured to say in 1999 “that the Bodhicaryāvatāra most likely now occupies the third position among the most frequently translated Indian Buddhist texts, after the Dhammapada and the ‘Heart Sutra’.”34 Perhaps by now its position should be assessed as even higher. The first Western edition of the BCA, published in 1889/90 by the Russian Indologist Ivan P. Minayeff, was based on manuscripts in the collection of the British colonial civil servant Brian H. Hodgson (18001894).35 Meanwhile, the BCA has been translated into Bengali, Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, French, German, Hindi, Italian, Japanese, Norwegian, Polish and Spanish36 – for some languages, there are even numerous different translations. There are, for example, at least eleven different translations into English.37 On the basis of her survey of seventeen translations into Western languages, Nicole Martínez Melis distinguishes two translation periods reflecting two different types of interest: A first period primarily marked by the academic interest of what she describes as “cultural archeologists,” and a second period, beginning in the 1970s, which brought about translations marked by the religious or spiritual interest of “practicing Buddhists.”38 While there is some truth to this distinction, it is nevertheless in need of modification. There were also comparatively early translations motivated by religious interests, as for example the Japanese translation by Kawaguchi of 1921. And translations of a primarily academic interest continued well beyond the 1970s, as for example the 1981 translation by Ernst Steinkellner. Moreover, there are also religiously motivated translations carried out to academic standards, as has been rightly pointed out by Liland.39

33  Impressive as the impact of the BCA in fact is, given the limitations of its influence in Indian and, in particular, in Chinese Mahāyāna, it is an exaggeration to describe the BCA’s position in Mahāyāna as similarly “privileged” as that of the Dhammapada in “Hinayāna Buddhism” or of the Bhagavadgītā in Hinduism, as has been done by Nicole Martínez Melis (Melis 2005, 211). 34  Gómez 1999, 262f. 35  Cf. Liland 2009, 51f. 36  See Liland 2009, 53. 37  Liland 2009, 53, lists fifteen English translations, of which ten are translations of the entire work. Yet this does not include Sharma (1990, erroneously listed under the Hindi translations). 38  Melis 2005, 218. 39  See Liland 2009, 53. Similarly Nelson 2016.

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That a certain blending of academic and religious interests has occurred can be seen even more clearly in the academic studies and debates that the Bodhicaryāvatāra has evoked in more recent years. These center to a large extent on the concept of ethics in combination with a particular type of spirituality as found in either the BCA (Williams 1998, Brassard 2000, Roy 2011, Hutton 2014) or the ŚS (Hedinger 1984, Mahoney 2002, Mrozik 2007), or in both scriptures taken together as expressive of more or less one set of ideas (Clayton 2006, Lele 2007, Todd 2013). These debates are not purely “academic” inasmuch as their horizon is often marked – sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly – by the question of whether, in the face of contemporary global challenges, the “compassionate spirit of Buddhism can play some part in helping lead the world in a more positive direction,”40 be this a skeptical question or a more affirmative assumption. In a similar vein, Kate Crosby and Andrew Skilton explain “the remarkable appeal and impact” of the BCA through their view that it “addresses spiritual issues which are as relevant now as they were (…) over twelve centuries ago.”41 While some of these major studies, like those of Hedinger, Williams, Brassard and Mahoney, have focused more on the spiritual aspects of Śāntideva’s thought, and others, like those of Clayton, Mrozik, Lele, Todd, Roy and Hutton, more on the ethical dimension, all of them display a full awareness that both aspects are closely interwoven and as such cannot be separated from the larger epistemological or “metaphysical” issues connected to the understanding of emptiness or “insight” in Śāntideva’s writings. The latter has been treated in much detail in Michael Sweet’s influential thesis of 1977 on the BCA’s chapter 9. A most lively debate involving all three – ethics, spirituality and metaphysics/epistemology – has been triggered by Paul Williams’ study Altruism and Reality, in particular by its last chapter, which forms more than a third of the book and carries the provocative subtitle “How Śāntideva Destroyed the Bodhisattva Path.”42 In his criticism, targeted at BCA 8:101-103, Williams presents a complex argument, one that he accentuated in the subsequent discussions. This argument might be reduced to the following: Williams assumes that Śāntideva wants “to

40

 Goodman 2009, 217.  Crosby, Skilton 1995, XXVII. 42  See Williams 1998, 104-176, 213-257. 41

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draw an ought from an is,”43 that is, to derive the moral imperative to be selfless (in a compassionate way) from the metaphysical position that no self exists. Yet given that (im)moral selfishness is related to the conventional notion of self, the insight into the non-existence of the self on an ultimate level in itself does not necessitate the overcoming of selfishness. In order to achieve the latter, Śāntideva rejects the notion of “self” not only on the level of “ultimate truth,” as all Mādhyamikas do, but also on the level of “conventional truth.” As a consequence, according to Williams’ interpretation, Śāntideva holds that “there can be no distinguishable and therefore differentiating subjects for pains either ultimately or conventionally.”44 This, so Williams, destroys – albeit unintentionally – the Bodhisattva Path in two respects: First, the notion of “pain” becomes unintelligible if it is not understood in relation to “subjects who are in pain.”45 Second, the compassionate actions of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas seeking to remove pain become equally unintelligible because the notion of an “action” implies an actor, i.e. “a person (as subject) as the locus of the actions.”46 And by implication it would no longer make sense to take the Bodhisattva vows, for a vow implies the notion of an identifiable and distinguishable person (“me”) who actually decides to take the vows.47 Summarizing his argument Williams states: ... if he himself takes his reasoning at Bodhicaryāvatāra 8:101-3 seriously, (…) Śāntideva has indeed completely destroyed the path to full Buddhahood for the benefit of all sentient beings. Without persons even conventionally there are no pains. Without pains there is no removal of duḥkha. Without removal of duḥkha there is no Buddhahood. On the other hand with pains there are persons. With persons at least conventionally there are differences between persons. With differences between persons it is not possible to argue for the moral imperative to remove pain based on the argument of Bodhicaryāvatāra 8:101-3.48

43  Ibid. 104. This part of Williams’ argument has been, I think convincingly, questioned by Barbra Clayton (2001, 88ff.) by drawing attention to the fact that Śāntideva includes among his premises that pain ought to be prevented just because it is painful. Hence, the argument “is not deriving an ought from an is, but an ought from an ought” (Clayton 2001, 97, fn. 12). 44  Williams 1998, 164. 45  Ibid. 165. 46  Ibid. 166. 47  Ibid. 168. 48  Ibid. 174.

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The subsequent debate about Williams’ attack became in part very technical and involved numerous related or implicit issues. Nevertheless one can discern two broad tendencies among the replies. One line of counter-criticism asserts that Williams misconstrued Śāntideva’s intention as that of an isolated and purely logical argument without paying sufficient attention to the fact that it is placed in the context of a meditational practice.49 The other line focusses on the Buddhist concept of “self” or “person,” holding that Śāntideva’s argument does not involve a full-blown denial of the “self” on the conventional level, but a different and in fact more flexible and less isolationist type of construing the “self” in order to bring it in line with the purpose of the Bodhisattva path.50 2. THE IMPACT WITHIN BUDDHIST‒CHRISTIAN DIALOGUE Hardly any of the initial critical respondents to Williams addressed the fact that his criticism in Altruism and Reality had and has an interreligious dimension.51 In his 1995 “General Introduction” to the English translation of the BCA by Kate Crosby and Andrew Skilton, Williams praised the BCA as “one of the greatest works of world spirituality,”52 many of whose insights could be heeded without requiring “an acceptance of Buddhism or a denial of any other faith.”53 In the following years, Williams, who is not only a major scholar of Mahāyāna Buddhism but was himself a practicing Buddhist for over twenty years, underwent a radical change and finally entered the Roman Catholic Church in 49  This is found in Pettit 1999, Clayton 2001, Wetlesen 2002, Schmithausen 2007 and Harris 2011. 50  This is at the center of the replies of Siderits 2000a and 2000b, Clayton 2001, Wetlesen 2002 and Harris 2011. Siderits and Wetlesen deny that Śāntideva’s argument involves a rejection of the self on the conventional level, but hold that Śāntideva’s overall argumentation amounts to the construction of a different type of self-concept on the conventional level (see Siderits 2000a, 416 and 422; Wetlesen 2002, 45). For Williams’ replies to Pettit and Siderits, see Williams 1999 and 2000. The motive of defending Śāntideva against Williams’ critique is also behind several contributions to The Cowherds 2016, especially Westerhoff 2016. 51  Some may have initially simply been unaware of this. Barbra Clayton, however, realized the frontal nature of Williams’ criticism in characterizing it as a kind of “Why I am not a Buddhist” argument (Clayton 2001, 86). And Wetlesen affirms (presumably against Williams) some strong analogies between the Christian understanding of love and Śāntideva’s view of compassion (Wetlesen 2002, 74-79). 52  Williams 1995, VIII. 53  Ibid. XXVI.

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2000. Though in the revised version of his renowned textbook Mahāyāna Buddhism, published in 2009, Williams still maintains his assessment of the BCA as “one of the gems of Buddhist and world spiritual literature,”54 he has nevertheless explicitly stated on several occasions that his criticism of Śāntideva played an important role in his conversion process55 – or perhaps vice versa? His close investigation (in Williams 1998, 29-51, written in the early 1990s) of Śāntideva’s statement in BCA 8:98 that the person reborn is not the same as the one who died56 made him realize – “for the first time” – that the Buddhist doctrine of rebirth “offers no hope for the individual person.”57 Moreover, “the Buddhist conceptions of persons (…) as actually nothing more than conventional constructs” removes, so Williams, from Buddhism “a mainstay of coherent ethics,” i.e. “the primacy and irreducible uniqueness of the person.”58 In both respects, as he confesses, he found Buddhism wanting and “Christianity intellectually tempting.”59 In three related publications, Williams offers additional criticism of Śāntideva that is of a more specifically Christian theological nature. In a publication from 2004, he argues that Śāntideva’s objections against a creator God – as found in the BCA’s chapter 9 – are all based on an understanding of inner-worldly causality and thus do not apply to an understanding of metaphysical causality as found in Aquinas’ concept of creation.60 Nevertheless, the atheism that these arguments are meant to support has, according to Williams, disastrous consequences for Buddhist soteriology. For, “In not comprehending the ontological origin of things in God, the Buddhist also cannot be oriented towards the true spiritual end of things. … Thus (Thomas would urge) the Buddhist’s failure is not just a failure of ontology. It is in spiritual terms a complete failure.”61 Moreover, the Buddhist rejection of God implies a lack of existential humility (in not gratefully acknowledging one’s own createdness). “And without humility there can be no charity. Without charity there is no true virtue.”62 54

 Williams 2009a, 66. Compare with the first edition Williams 1989, 58.  See Williams 2002, 202f; Williams 2006, 51f; Williams 2011, 163f. 56  In chapter 2 of Altruism and Reality, Williams 1998, 29-51. 57  Williams 2011, 163; Williams 2006, 51f. 58  Williams 2002, 202f. 59  Ibid 203. 60  Williams 2004, 107. 61  Ibid. 110 (emphasis in the original). 62  Ibid. 110. It is interesting that Ippolito Desideri (see below), despite his high appreciation of Tibetan Buddhist moral values and virtues, stated that the only virtue he found missing (or insufficiently emphasized) was that of “humility.” Desideri 2010, 391. 55

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Further criticism is directed explicitly against any Buddhist and implicitly against any Christian attempts to understand Jesus Christ along the lines of a Bodhisattva,63 which has indeed been variously suggested, as, to mention just two examples, on the Buddhist side by the 14th Dalai Lama64 and on the Christian side by Hee-Sung Keel65 (or as by Paul Williams himself at an earlier stage66). According to Williams, this view of Christ would entail two possibilities, neither of which could be acceptable for Christian orthodoxy. If Jesus’ suffering on the cross was real, then he was just a “beginner” on the Bodhisattva path. But if Jesus was an emanation from a highly developed Bodhisattva or even a Buddha, then his suffering on the cross together with his whole human appearance would have been – according to Buddhist premises – of an unreal, magical nature.67 So far there have been only a few reactions to Williams that take into account the religious or interreligious dimension of his criticism68 and in these, his interpretation of the Bodhicaryāvatāra played only a marginal role. This was, until recently, also true regarding the role of the BCA in Buddhist‒Christian dialogue in general. One of the reasons is that this dialogue has focused to a significant extent on TheravādaBuddhism and on Mahāyāna-Buddhism in its Sino-Japanese strands.69 Given that the BCA traditionally had no relevance in TheravādaBuddhism70 and very little relevance in the Buddhist traditions of the Chinese cultural realm (including Korea, Japan and Vietnam), it has played no particular role in the dialogues between Christians and those Buddhists. In line, however, with the startling prominence that the BCA enjoys in Tibet, the text has indeed attracted attention in the context of dialogue between Christianity and Tibetan-Buddhism. This, though only indirectly, can already be seen in the writings of one of the antecedents of Christian‒Buddhist dialogue, the Jesuit 63

 For an overview, see Schmidt-Leukel 2016b.  Gyatso 2002, 83. 65  Keel 1996. 66  See Williams 1989, 231. 67  See Williams 2004, 57f, and 2011, 165f. 68  See O’Grady 2003, Cabezón 2007, Schmidt-Leukel 2007, Studstill 2008. 69  Overviews on Buddhist–Christian dialogue are provided in: Spae 1980; Ingram 1988; Schmidt-Leukel 1992; von Brück, Lai 1997 (note that the English translation of this work: von Brück, Lai 2001, is in fact a significantly abridged version), Ingram 2009. 70  However, the BCA was known and valued among Mahāyāna Buddhists living in Theravāda countries, as for example in Sri Lanka. See Bechert 2005, 71. See also below, Part II, chap. 10, p. 506. 64

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Ippolito Desideri (1684-1733), who lived in Tibet from 1715 to 1721. In his Notizie Istoriche del Thibet, Desideri deals extensively with Tibetan Buddhism. His account closely follows Tsongkhapa’s Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment (Lam rim chen mo), but Tsongkhapa was influenced by Śāntideva and thus, some of the ideas and practices to which Desideri refers through Tsongkhapa’s work originate from Śāntideva.71 Desideri mentions in particular the practice of exchanging self and other (cf. BCA 8:111-173), the ritual and formal undertaking of the Bodhisattva vows (cf. BCA 3:1-23) and the practice of confession (cf. BCA 2:27-66).72 In his Inquiry Concerning the Doctrines of Previous Lives and Emptiness, Desideri explains the central Christian commandment of loving one’s neighbor as oneself by referring to the practice of exchanging self and other.73 Yet while Desideri praises the Buddhist writings on the Bodhisattva virtues as “most lovely and practical” and as “wise sayings, and very useful teachings,”74 he is full of disdain for the teaching on “emptiness” because it led the Tibetans “to directly and explicitly deny the existence of the true God.”75 He tries to resolve this tension by distinguishing three types of “atheism,” of which only one would apply to the Tibetans: If (first) atheism, “in its widest sense,” entails the rejection of any divinity as well as morality and immortality, it would not apply. If it means (second), in a more narrow sense, the explicit and reflected rejection of true divinity, then the term would apply. If it (third) entails even the implicit rejection of “any divinity, true or false” in theory and practice, “I do not consider them as such.”76 As Trent Pomplun holds, “Desideri still noted that Tibetans confessed an object of refuge and prayer that possess most of God’s 71  See Desideri 2010, 718, fn. 958. Desideri was familiar with the work of Śāntideva (Pomplun 2010, 92). According to Pomplun (2011, 404, 407), the BCA plays a major role in Desideri’s Inquiry Concerning the Doctrines of Previous Lives and Emptiness (Mgo skar). Unfortunately there is no complete English translation of this text. Lopez and Jinpa (2017) have translated only some excerpts which do not reflect the full degree of Desideri’s engagement with the BCA. But they have identified three indirect and deliberately modified references to the BCA (4:23b; 5:109; 7:14a; see Lopez, Jinpa 2017, 47, 53, 76). In The Origin of Living Beings and of All Things (Byun kyuns), Desideri quotes, among various Madhyamaka writings, also BCA 9:33 (Stucco 2016, 182f). 72  Desideri 2010, 369f and 388. 73  He renders the second part of the Dual Commandment as: “to cherish all other human beings worthy of being cherished like yourself, as if you exchanged [self and other].” Lopez, Jinpa 2017, 237. 74  Desideri 2010, 369. 75  Ibid. 371. 76  Ibid. 375.

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attributes: goodness, peace, omniscience, omnipotence, and infinite compassion” and thus granted to them the possibility of implicit faith and grace.77 Desideri sees a strong commonality between Buddhism and Christianity, not only at the level of moral values and practice, but also in relation to contemplation.78 He admits that at the highest level of contemplation, Tibetan Buddhists “are aiming at the same goal as we Christians, … a perfect, calm, and blissful transcendence of himself and all perceptible things.” But they differ in “the choice of the means.” While Buddhists pursue the goal of utter transcendence by following the teaching of emptiness and a practice by which “the person completely disappears to himself, and everything else disappears from his cleansed and purified vision, as if all of it were entirely nonexistent,” the Christian contemplative pursues this goal by losing him- or herself completely in God. While the Buddhist seeks a state “without the slightest inclination toward anything,” the Christian seeks “to be totally attached to him [i.e. God; P.S.-L.], being completely lost in him so to speak, and incapable of any other feeling, taking no notice of any other object, like a man who is plunged into the deepest part of the ocean and completely loses all sense of direction and sees the earth entirely disappear from view.”79 The choice of Desideri’s words clearly illustrates the closeness he perceived between Christian and Buddhist contemplative practice and experience. In this respect, the Society for Buddhist-Christian Studies was connecting itself to an old tradition when it dedicated a panel of its 2013 meeting to a comparison of the Jesuit contemplative classic Loyola’s Spiritual Exercises with the BCA.80 In contemporary dialogue, the BCA has become relevant at least at three points in time; each time it was the 14th Dalai who put the text into play.81 The first was at the Middlebury College Symposium on the Christ and the Bodhisattva (Vermont, USA) held in 1984. In his 77

 Pomplun 2010, 95f.  E.G. Bargiacchi, in his fine reconstruction of Desideri’s interpretation of “emptiness” (Bargiacchi 2009), has unfortunately not taken note of this interesting passage, in which Desideri points to the strong affinity between Christian contemplative practice and contemplation informed by “emptiness.” 79  Desideri 2010, 390f. 80  See SBCS Newsletter Fall 2013. 81  During the so-called Naropa Dialogues, which were held at the Naropa Institute in Boulder, Colorado, between 1981 and 1985, apparently (as far as one can see from their documentation in Walker 1987) no role was played by Śāntideva or the BCA. 78

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contribution to the symposium, the Dalai Lama gave a brief outline of mental exercises conducive to bodhicitta, the “spirit of enlightenment.” While according to the Dalai Lama, the whole set of exercises requires belief in rebirth, he stated that those who do not accept rebirth could nevertheless practice “the equalizing and exchange of self and other” as described by Śāntideva.82 In the particular context of this symposium, it is evident that this was intended as a recommendation for Christians. In another contribution at the same symposium, Robert Thurman elaborated further on the Dalai Lama’s remark and provided his own account of the Bodhisattva, making extensive use of the BCA. At the end of his paper, Thurman presented the resurrected Christ and the Bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara as two symbols of hope, and described the encounter of these two “universal Messiahs of humankind and all living beings” symbolically as: “the two-armed, delicate, wounded, broken, crucified embodiment of self-emptying, self-sacrifice, simultaneously bursting into the thousand-armed, powerful, omnipresent, radiant, triumphant embodiment of the deathless energy of love.”83 As far as the concluding discussion is documented, there was at least one among the participating Christians, Brother David Steindl-Rast, who felt able to align himself, to some extent, with such a view, by suggesting a parallel between the Pauline idea of a Christian living out (or trying to live out) the Christ reality “in us,” and the Buddhist idea of the Bodhisattva as “living out the Buddha nature within the Bodhisattva.”84 The second major point at which the BCA played some role in Buddhist‒Christian dialogue was the John Main Seminar held in London in September 1994. The organizers invited the participants to speak on selected texts from the Gospels. Thupten Jinpa, who at the time functioned as the Dalai Lama’s interpreter, underlined the extraordinary nature of this dialogue: “For the first time in history, the head of a major non-Christian religion was publicly teaching and commenting on the sacred Christian Gospels.”85 The resulting publication, The Good Heart (first edition in 1996), can be counted as one of the classics of Buddhist‒Christian dialogue. Yet it was less noticed – despite having been pointed out by Thupten Jinpa86 – that the Dalai Lama interpreted the 82

 Gyatso 1987, 225.  Thurman 1987, 95. 84  Lopez, Rockefeller 1987, 255f. 85  Thupten Jinpa in his contribution to Gyatso 2002, 165. 86  “There are many Mahayana classics that outline the way of the bodhisattva. Of these, perhaps the most well-known and certainly most influential is Shantideva’s A 83

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selected Gospel texts from a perspective informed to a large extent by the BCA (he mentioned the text explicitly several times but also employed it tacitly). It would be only a minor exaggeration to state that in these talks, the Dalai Lama commented on the Gospel passages through the lens of the BCA. I will therefore come back to his views expressed on this occasion at several places in the commentary below. The general approach of the Dalai Lama in his interpretation of the Gospels (in the light of the BCA) was that Buddhism and Christianity have much in common and much to enrich each other in the areas of ethics and spiritual practice, yet that their ways part when it comes to questions of philosophy and metaphysics.87 Particularly problematic from a Buddhist perspective is the belief in a divine creator, especially if “God” is meant to signify more than an “ultimate ground of being,”88 which is “beyond language and conceptuality.”89 Insofar, however, as belief in God and the Buddhist teaching of emptiness are equally conducive to living a compassionate life, the Dalai Lama, following the ideas of “skillful means” and “relative truth,” accepts the concept of God as a legitimate means for people with the corresponding dispositions and inclinations.90 The third point involves a whole series of dialogues that became known as the Gethsemani Encounters and together form a major stage in the development of the Buddhist‒Christian inter-monastic dialogue. The Cistercian Abbey of Our Lady of Gethsemani was the monastery of Thomas Merton (1915-1968), who himself had been familiar with and deeply impressed by the BCA, as can be seen from two remarks in his Asian Journal.91 Gethsemani was chosen as the venue for these meetings because of the bond of mutual affection between the Dalai Lama and Thomas Merton. The first took place in 1996, followed by further meetings in 2002, 2008 and 2015.92 The Dalai Lama took part in the first meeting, Guide to the Bodhisattva’s Way of Life. … Anyone who has attended a discourse by the present Dalai Lama may have observed the overwhelming influence this book exerts on his thoughts and deeds. The reader of this volume will also notice the liberty and spontaneity with which the Dalai Lama refers to this celebrated Mahayana text.” Ibid. 171. 87  Gyatso 2002, 81f. 88  Ibid. 73. 89  Ibid. 55. 90  See ibid. 74, 82. 91  See Merton 1999, 135 and 247. On p. 135 (entry of June 29, 1968) he quotes from the BCA (8:160) in the translation of L.D. Barnett (The Path of Light, 1909). 92  On the first three of these meetings, see Blée 2011, 141-144. As far as I can see from the documentation (Mitchell, Skudlarek 2010), the BCA did not play any role at Gethsemani III, which was dedicated to the environmental crisis.

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which was dedicated to various aspects of monastic spiritual life in Buddhism and Christianity. Although he mentioned Śāntideva only once,93 his contributions nevertheless drew on various topics from the BCA. In particular, as already in his lectures at the John Main Seminar, he pointed out the close affinity between the Christian love of enemies and the Buddhist indiscriminate compassion (karuṇā) and forbearance (kṣānti).94 The second Gethsemani Encounter in 2002 was dedicated to the question of the understanding, place and transformation of suffering in Buddhist and Christian spirituality. The Dalai Lama, who had to cancel his participation on short notice due to health problems, sent a contribution to the conference which was taken, together with a text from Pope John Paul II, as a basis for the dialogues.95 Without explicitly mentioning Śāntideva, the Dalai Lama referred in his text to the significant idea that suffering can develop positive aspects depending on the attitude one takes: “If you are able to transform adverse situations into factors of the spiritual path, hindrances will become favorable conditions for spiritual practice”96 – an idea found at several places in the BCA (particularly in the BCA’s chapter 6). Fully in line with the BCA, he gave this idea an altruistic twist, that is, accepting one’s own suffering in order to liberate others from their suffering,97 and ended with the maxim “The more we care for the happiness of others, the greater our own sense of well-being becomes,”98 clearly reminiscent of BCA 8:129b: “All those who are happy in the world are so out of longing for the happiness of others.” That the Dalai Lama’s input was inspired by the BCA was then made explicit in the statements of Thubten Chodron and Geshe Lhundub Sopa, who both participated in the dialogue.99 Also at Gethsemani II, Geshe Lobsang Tenzin presented his understanding of the relationship between the Buddhist teachings of not-self, emptiness and compassion: The understanding of emptiness is not directed against any kind of “self” concept, but is meant to dissolve a rather specific, that is, a dualistic, self-centered view. It undermines the clinging to oneself as the independent center of the universe. Understanding emptiness would thus imply replacing “that sense of independent 93

 See Mitchell, Wiseman 1997, 151  See ibid. 148f, 190-192. 95  See Mitchell, Wiseman 2010, VII-XVI. 96  Ibid. 16. 97  Ibid. 16. Cf. BCA 8:105, 10:56. 98  Ibid. 17. 99  Cf. ibid. 17f. 94

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selfhood” by a new “relational sense,” a “connectedness with all” that is expressed in “infinite love and compassion for all.”100 In addition to Paul Williams, another Christian who engaged substantially with the BCA was the French theologian and later Cardinal Henri de Lubac (1896-1991). Between 1950 and 1958, as a result of the encyclical Humani Generis (1950) directed against the ideas of the nouvelle théologie, de Lubac was banned from teaching theology. During these years, he published three books on Buddhism.101 They are, however, more of an apologetic than dialogical nature. It is not really Buddhists whom de Lubac seeks to address, but Western intellectuals sympathizing with Buddhism and questioning Christian superiority claims. In addition, his arguments may have also been fueled by his attempts to avert tendencies in contemporary thinking which he saw as undermining the theological idea of personhood.102 In the first chapter of his Aspects du Bouddhisme (Aspects of Buddhism), containing a thorough critique of the Buddhist concept of love or charity (charité), de Lubac makes extensive use of the BCA, which he read in the translations of L. Finot and, partly, L. de La Vallée-Poussin. De Lubac falters between, on the one hand, considerable respect or even admiration for Buddhist charity 103 and, on the other hand, a sharp rejection of similarities with Christian charity as “illusory,”104 assessing Buddhist charity as “being in striking contrast to Christian charity.”105 He ends up with a fulfilment theology according to which Buddhist charity is “a presentiment of true Charity” which “at its best … resembles Christian charity as a dream resembles reality.”106 Accordingly, “The great Bodhisattvas of charity are like remote, floating, unreal prefigurings of the Christ.”107

100

 Ibid. 43f.  Henri de Lubac, Aspects du Bouddhisme, Paris: Éditions du Seuil 1951; idem., La Rencontre du Bouddhisme et de l’Occident, Paris: Aubier 1952; idem., Aspects du Bouddhisme 2: Amida, Paris: Éditions du Seuil 1955. An English translation of Aspects du Bouddhisme by George Lamb was published in 1953 (with a different Foreword, perhaps by the translator?). An English translation of Aspects du Bouddhisme 2: Amida by Amita Bhaka was published in 2002/3 in Buddha Dhyana Dana Review 12:5-6 and 13:1, available online: http://www.bdcu.org.au/bddronline/index.html. 102  For this interpretation of de Lubac’s context, see Grumett 2008, 223. 103  “Here we reach the highest peak of Buddhism – one of the highest peaks to which humanity has attained” – with explicit reference to Śāntideva (de Lubac 1953, 27). 104  Ibid. 31. 105  Ibid. 46. 106  Ibid. 49. 107  Ibid. 101

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De Lubac raises various severe objections against “Buddhist charity.” The Buddhist ideal is so excessively exaggerated that it becomes ultimately unrealizable. The deeper reason behind this tendency is, according to de Lubac, the abstract nature of the ideal. It is not directed towards concrete, specific persons. The neighbor is not loved for himself as in Christianity. The Buddhist ideal is rather directed against suffering as such, abstract from any specific suffering person – a criticism for which de Lubac, long before Paul Williams, cites BCA 8:94, 101f.108 Moreover, Buddhist charity is just a means, not an end in itself. It is a means to overcome one’s own attachments and thus ultimately remains self-centered – an argument for which de Lubac draws on Max Scheler.109 Being just a means, its value is only provisional. In the end, any love or charity is replaced by the absolute indifference which results from the “perfection of wisdom,” the understanding of emptiness: “Buddhist charity, being provisional and not final, and remaining a means extrinsic to the end sought, vanishes inevitably when it is regarded from the point of view of absolute truth.”110 The one decisive reason for “all the insufficiency – all the falsity, in fact – of the Buddhist religion”111 is for de Lubac its ignorance of the one true God. God being eternal and God being love makes love eternal and prevents it from being just provisional. And because man is made in the image of God, love of one’s neighbor is based on the love of God and is always concrete and specific.112 Despite any “negative theology,” which emphasizes divine ineffability and inconceivability, de Lubac insists that “In Christianity … affirmation always triumphs in the end.”113 While the Buddhist teaching of emptiness is the culmination of an all-encompassing illusionism or “Docetism,” which makes Buddhism like a dream to itself, the Christian spirit of affirmation is rooted in the idea of a genuine incarnation, of the divine word becoming flesh.114 Such a staunch negative evaluation of a text (and its content) so cherished within major parts of the Buddhist world cannot but cause strong irritation (for Buddhists and for Christians too, I suggest) and might be more apt to throw a negative light on the critic than on the object of his 108

 Ibid. 38f.  Ibid. 42. 110  Ibid. 46. 111  Ibid. 51. 112  See ibid. 41, 45. 113  Ibid. 51. 114  See ibid. 37. 109

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critique. Though de Lubac is by far not the worst example, his criticism of the Buddhist concept of love or charity nevertheless reflects a general line of anti-Buddhist apologetics and polemics as can be found in a number of theological works from particularly the first half of the twentieth century.115 It was only the actual dialogue with Buddhists themselves that caused at least some Christian theologians to change their views.116 While in apologetic and polemical controversy, opponents are keen to highlight real or imagined weaknesses in the belief of the religious other in order to demonstrate the superiority of one’s own faith, the overall goal of inter-religious dialogue is exactly the opposite: detecting the strengths and possible truths in the other’s faith in order to learn from them. This is hardly the case in de Lubac’s books on Buddhism and certainly not found in what he has to say on Buddhist love. Moreover, the apologetic motivation is a fertile ground for the tendency of distorting the other’s tradition. In the case of de Lubac’s interpretation of the Bodhisattva ideal, he ignores, or downplays, the Mahāyāna view that a Buddha is perfect in both wisdom and compassion. De Lubac is clearly wrong when he states that the Buddha, “the Supreme Being,” cannot be defined in terms of charity and that charity has no place in “any account of man’s last end.”117 That he was in fact aware of the opposite emerges just a few pages later when he speaks of the “great compassion” as a mark of the Buddha(s).118 In support of his claim that charity is of merely provisional value in Buddhism and is overcome by the insight into emptiness, he quotes the simile from MMK 13:8 of the purge that effects evacuation but must also be evacuated itself, and then relates the simile to charity,119 knowing that in its original source it is related precisely to “emptiness” rather than to compassion. And although he quotes BCA 9:75-77, thus seeing how the teachings of emptiness can sustain a constructive use of “illusion,” he nevertheless affirms that all kinds of illusion need to be overcome. Scholars such as Williams and de Lubac do not represent the last word that Christians have to say on the BCA. And there are signs that this text is about to acquire a more significant role in future Buddhist–Christian

115

 Schmidt-Leukel 1992, 36-68.  As an example, see Spae 1980, 111-127. 117  De Lubac 1953, 41. 118  See ibid. 44. 119  See ibid. 42. 116

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dialogue.120 In his doctoral thesis of 2016, Luke A. Perera offered a rather favorable view of Śāntideva’s discourse on emptiness. Perera sees the Bodhisattva as oscillating between the perception of the world of suffering and the teaching that the universe is ultimately at peace. “The two perspectives should be treated as complementary rather than contradictory (…).”121 It is through the work of the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas that the two perspectives enter into a redemptive interaction: “The emptiness doctrine … is a promise of plenitude, an unfathomable state of peace and insight concretely embodied in the Buddhas and made accessible by them as a possibility for others.”122 Based on this decidedly non-nihilistic understanding, Perera compares the Bodhisattva ideal of working for the salvation of all with the Carmelite ideal of “coredemption,” that is, of participating through one’s own spiritual life in the mediation on Christ’s salvation of other beings. According to Perera, the commonalities between Christian charity and the Buddhist spirit of enlightenment (bodhicitta) are sufficiently substantial as to “lead Buddhists and Christians to a fruitful assimilation in which the two ideals influence and condition each other.”123 The up to now most appreciative treatment of the BCA from a decidedly Christian perspective has been submitted by Mark Heim. In his recent monograph Crucified Wisdom: Theological Reflection on Christ and the Bodhisattva,124 Heim explores the question of how a Christian can doctrinally and practically accommodate the insights of the Mahāyāna Bodhisattva ideal and even more so, how such insights may enrich and deepen the Christian faith. According to Heim, the Bodhisattva path, as laid out in the BCA, shows an “obvious and profound similarity” with the imitation of Christ “in that the disciple/follower of Jesus is called to practice altruistic acts toward neighbor and enemy in much the same way that an aspirant bodhisattva does. Śāntideva’s material on cultivation of the perfections is full of concrete instruction and inspiration that flow easily across traditional boundaries. This is an area for continual mutual

120  In 2002 and 2003, Terrence Tilley read two papers on the BCA at the Comparative Theology section of the Catholic Theological Society of America. His papers were never published but served to instigate a process of discussion and reflection within the CTSA. 121  Perera 2016, 161. 122  Ibid. 160. 123  Perera 2015, 142. 124  Heim 2019.

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encouragement.”125 However, Heim’s main interest is not in these practical commonalities but in the wider doctrinal issues surrounding the Bodhisattva ideal: emptiness, Buddha Nature and the three Buddha bodies (trikāya). He interprets the BCA primarily through the eyes of modern and contemporary Tibetan commentators such as Kunzang Pelden, Geshe Kelsang Gyatso, Geshe Yeshe Tobden, and the 14th Dalai Lama. This reading enters at times a doctrinal rigidity and (alleged) unambiguity into the BCA that is not found in the text itself. However, it is an approach that corresponds to Heim’s theological background which is also more rooted in later Trinitarian doctrine (or better: Heim’s own version of it) than in the founding texts of the New Testament itself, or more precisely, the New Testament is interpreted from the perspective of such later doctrines rather than vice versa. Trinitarian speculation forms the “matrix” for Heim’s learning from Mahāyāna Buddhism.126 By and large he remains faithful to his approach taken in The Depth of the Riches. A Trinitarian Theology of Religious Ends.127 That is, according to Heim, a theological understanding of actual religious diversity needs to be grounded in the innertrinitarian relations and in the relations of the Trinitarian God to the world. From a Christian perspective, other religions can be assessed positively to the extent that their teachings can be deciphered as insights into some fundamental aspects or features of the Trinity.128 To Heim, there is a nonpersonal, a personal and a communion dimension to the Trinitarian God. Mahāyāna Buddhism has gained deep insight into the nonpersonal dimension. Within the Trinity, the nonpersonal dimension consists in that all of the three persons are empty of themselves while at the same time mutually indwelling. Their emptiness is their participation in their joint divine nature which thus transcends the level of their interpersonal relations. These two forms of the impersonal dimension (emptiness of oneself, mutual indwelling) are also present in the interrelation between God and the creation. God is absent from the creation, that is, the creation is empty of God, in order to enable its own distinctness. But God is also deeply immanent in the creation in order to sustain its being. Heim sees these two aspects reflected in the Buddhist teachings of emptiness and Buddha Nature: Emptiness, the absence of a self or own-being 125

 Heim 2019, 223.  Ibid. 12-19. 127  Heim 2001. 128  See also Heim 2003; 2014. 126

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in humans as well as in everything, represents the insight in the groundless nature of creation when seen exclusively in its “creatureliness”.129 But emptiness has also a positive dimension in as much as it is the source of that insight which turns ordinary beings into Buddhas. Its aspect as Buddha Nature corresponds to the immanence of God’s creative presence. According to Heim we can thus establish a two-fold non-duality between God and the creation: God and the creation share non-dually in emptiness as no-self and in emptiness as divine immanence. As seen from a Christian perspective, Buddhist insight reaches deep into the apophatic dimension of the divine life, God’s “incommunicable dimension … as unknowable mystery.”130 But it remains deficient regarding the other two dimensions, the personal and the communion dimension. Although all three dimensions are known to both religions, they are differently organized and valued.131 “Each tends to take one dimension as fundamental for interpretation of the others.”132 In Christianity, the hermeneutically dominant dimension is that of communion. None of the two traditions can thus be fully absorbed by the other one or completely exhaust their insights. Each has its own specific strengths and specific deficits, which must neither be mistaken as flat oppositions nor as fully translatable into each other.133 But this constellation leaves ample room for reciprocal learning and inspiration. Although I disagree with Mark Heim on a number of more specific issues – both, at the Buddhist and the Christian end – I think his key intuition of understanding major religious traditions as different systematizations of similar and substantially interconnected dimensions or features is hermeneutically very fruitful.134 The sincerity and openness that he displays in his engagement with the BCA are unparalleled and clearly show the way ahead. Our brief survey of the BCA’s impact on Buddhist-Christian dialogue so far demonstrates that the issues raised in relation to this particular text are of crucial importance for the relationship between the two religious traditions at large. Is the BCA evidence – as held by de Lubac – of 129

 Heim 2019, 129, 135.  Ibid. 173. 131  Ibid. 176. 132  Ibid. 16. 133  See ibid. 194, 261f. 134  For a debate of this constructive aspect of Heim’s concept see Schmidt-Leukel 2017a, 240-243; for a critique of his theological presuppositions see Schmidt-Leukel 2017b, 125-131. 130

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“a striking contrast”135 and an obvious difference in spirit between the two religions,136 or does it testify to a strong affinity and complementarity between bodhicitta, the spirit of the Bodhisattva/Buddha and the spirit of Christ, as others such as the Dalai Lama, Robert Thurman, Steindl-Rast and Luke Perera suggest? Is the Buddhist analysis of the self radically opposed to Christian personalism, or is there room for reciprocal illumination – as held by Mark Heim? Will the Buddhist not-self teaching ultimately undermine the value and reality of genuine love, or is it apt to enhance it? Is the philosophy of “emptiness,” with all its antitheistic arguments – as found in the BCA – further proof that Buddhism is ignorant of that reality which Christians call “God” (as held by de Lubac and Williams), or is there a legitimate understanding of both emptiness and God that not only allows, but even requires their compatibility (as adumbrated, albeit carefully, in the Dalai Lama’s remark on a apophatic reading of the word “God”)? These are the kind of fundamental questions that have immediately emerged when the BCA entered the realm of Buddhist–Christian dialogue, and they will naturally form the basis of the subsequent commentary. While cross-religious interpretation of sacred texts carries the promise of putting inter-faith dialogue on firm textual ground, it also raises a number of specific and difficult hermeneutical problems. As it is evident in de Lubac’s treatment of the BCA, these problems emerge in part from rival religious superiority claims, and nourish, in an almost aprioristic manner, the suspicion that inter-religious hermeneutics is inevitably doomed to failure, serving nothing but useless and counterproductive religious self-affirmation. Such hermeneutical pessimism, however, is countered by the experience that inter-faith dialogue has in fact often led to a better understanding of the religious other. At least the radical position claiming that religions are incommensurable to such an extent that no mutual understanding is possible at all seems self-refuting: For, making this claim in a justified way would presuppose that at least the claimant has in fact understood several religions. How else could one know that they are mutually inaccessible? Thus I will now turn to the hermeneutical guidelines I have tried to observe in undertaking this adventurous risk of trans-religious commentarial writing.

135

 De Lubac 1953, 46.  Lamb translates: “the utterly different spirit informing the two religions” (ibid. 32). Yet “utterly” has no parallel in the original (see de Lubac 1951, 30). 136

CHAPTER 5

METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. TRANS-RELIGIOUS COMMENTARIAL WRITING As a rule, scripture-based religions have long traditions of commentarial writing. In Buddhism and Christianity this genre of religious literature has existed for more than one and a half thousand years.1 Moreover, it was not only canonical scriptures of these traditions that received commentaries. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the Bodhicaryāvatāra – despite not being a sūtra in the technical sense – has been and continues to be subject to a considerable number of commentaries. Far less common to these two traditions, however, is the genre of cross- or trans-religious commentaries, despite some significant exceptions. In China, for example, trans-religious commentarial writing was practiced between Daoists, Confucians and Buddhists over a long period of time.2 And within Christianity, numerous commentaries have been written on the scriptures of the Tanakh, the Hebrew Bible, although it was – of course – not perceived as the scripture of a different religion. Yet, it is precisely the last example that demonstrates the dangers and challenges accompanying this kind of theological writing. Christians have claimed that Jews do not understand the true meaning of their scriptures because they do not see, and do not want to see, that their own scriptures point to their fulfilment in Jesus Christ. Accordingly, the traditional Christian interpretation of the Jewish scriptures has often 1  Given the wealth of traditional Buddhist commentaries and sub-commentaries, Richard Nance has rightly rejected the view (fashionable in some circles) that in Buddhist Studies, the focus on scriptures is the misleading result of a “Protestant presupposition” of Westerns scholars of Buddhism: “To dismiss the careful study of Buddhist texts as evidence that one is in the grip of a ‘Protestant presupposition’ is to do a disservice to the complexity of the Indian Buddhist tradition – a tradition in which practices aimed at the meticulous exegesis and analysis of claims existed alongside (and, at times, were thoroughly interwoven with) practices of devotion, sorcery, and ritual.” Nance 2014, 11f. 2  Gentz 2013, 129f.

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been employed to demonstrate the church’s claim of superiority over the synagogue and – far too often – even an explicitly supersessionist agenda, that is, the self-understanding of the church as the “true Israel” which replaces the Jewish religion.3 A theologian as influential as Karl Barth could write in 1937 (and after the Holocaust still reissue the work without any changes) that Judaism “once was the human response to his revelation as demanded and ordered by God” but … is now – and even this example had to be made – a rejected, deflated religion, because it is deprived of its basis and object, now the Jewish religion from which God has turned his face, one religion among many others and not more than they! It only has one advantage over them and that is something terrible: that it once was more than they are, yet that it is definitely (“endgültig”) no longer.4

However, the continuous practice of reading and writing on the texts of the Hebrew Bible has also had its impact on the more recent changes in Christian attitudes toward the Jewish religion. Efforts to understand the Tanakh from a Christian perspective without thereby disseizing the Jews of their canon can result in refreshing contributions to a fruitful and creative Jewish–Christian dialogue and be a lasting source of reciprocal inspiration, especially since it is now also complemented by Jewish efforts to comment on the New Testament.5 There is the legitimate and reasonable hope that trans-religious commentarial writing will provide more substance and precision to interreligious dialogue. But much depends on how such writing is done. Transreligious commentaries may easily be perceived – and, as the example of classical Christian readings of the “Old Testament” shows, be actually intended – as an act of “religious hegemony of domestication of the other.”6 This would render inter-faith dialogue a disastrous disservice instead of the anticipated support. I do agree with Catherine Cornille that “the conscious use of the symbols, rituals, and teachings of another religion for one’s own religious aggrandizement may indeed appear irresponsible and unethical, and an expression of religious arrogance.”7 Though I would go further and say that it may not only “appear” so, 3

 Ruether 1979, 117-182.  English translation based on the German original, Barth 1960, 361 (emphasis in the original). See also Schmidt-Leukel 2017b, 281f. 5  See Levine, Brettler 2017. 6  Cornille 2014, 13. 7  Ibid. 14. 4

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but that it is “unethical” and an act of “religious arrogance” if such appropriation is indeed done purposefully for “one’s own religious aggrandizement.” Already in the 1980s, Aloysius Pieris rightly criticized such an attitude as “theological vandalism.”8 However, religious selfaggrandizement does not have to be the purpose of trans-religious commentarial writing. What distinguishes interreligious dialogue from interreligious controversy is, as I have said before, the serious effort not to identify the weak points of the religious other, but to discover the strengths in the other’s faith in order to learn from it.9 In genuine dialogue the motivation of mutual learning is ideally found on both sides. Trans-religious commentarial writing provides a good instrument for such reciprocal learning. By interpreting a text of another religious tradition, the commentator may draw new insights from it that are pertinent to his or her own tradition. This, in turn, may provide people from the other religious tradition, the one to which the interpreted text belongs, not only a new and unusual perspective on their scripture, but may also contribute to their better understanding of the commentator’s tradition. Trans-religious commentarial writing would then be a splendid example of what Arvind Sharma has aptly called “reciprocal illumination.”10 That is, texts, teachings, practices, symbols, etc. from two different traditions can reciprocally shed new light on each other, which helps people on both sides to arrive at a deeper, wider and therefore better understanding of reality. Moreover, discovering or establishing significant, and perhaps unexpected, resonances between the two traditions might contribute in a substantial way to both traditions re-defining their self-understanding, especially in relation to each other. Such an approach, however, is more difficult and complicated than it might appear at first sight. If “it is necessary” – in trans-religious commentarial writing – “to make sense of the other tradition from within one’s own horizon,”11 the question is whether such “fusion of horizons” can lead to anything but misunderstanding. Searching for a proper understanding of the root text within its original religious context is the precondition for any attempt to make it fruitful for the theological discourse within the religious world of the commentator. To that end, 8

 Pieris 1988, 41, 53ff, 85.  See above, p. 92. 10  Sharma 2005. 11  Cornille 2014, 13. 9

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a careful distinction must be made between the horizon of the root text and the horizon of the commentator. But this does not necessarily imply that the two horizons are as separate as one might assume. There may be real affinities – not fabricated but brought to the fore in the process of commentarial writing. Moreover, if trans-religious commentarial writing is consciously placed within the context of an existent dialogue, the two horizons are already in contact and perhaps even intersecting. Any misinterpretation may find its correction within the ongoing process of dialogue. Hence it can never be sufficient to conceive a Christian commentary on a non-Christian sacred text “simply as a commentary written by Christians for Christians.”12 It rather needs to be written with both traditions in mind, the one within which the text emerged and where it is still being used as a spiritual authority, and the one shaping the background of the commentator. Moreover, the commentary needs to be written in view of the dialogical encounter between both traditions as it already exists and in relation to its envisioned possibilities or opportunities. And, I would like to add, it has to take into account the highly advanced methods of analyzing classical texts through the lens of today’s sharpened historical consciousness. As far as I am aware, there have been, until now, no Buddhist commentaries on Christian texts13 and only two14 Christian commentaries (in the full sense of the term) on Buddhist scriptures: the joint commentary by Leo Lefebure and Peter Feldmeier on the Dhammapada and Joseph O’Leary’s commentary on the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa. The two works follow rather different methods, which is – to some extent – rooted in different theological background assumptions. Lefebure and Feldmeier 12  Cornille 2006, 5. This is a point where I differ from Cornille. She has developed a number of very helpful reflections on the methodological and hermeneutical issues surrounding comparative theology in general and trans-religious commentarial writing in particular. And while her elaboration on the process of learning from other religions has become increasingly differentiated and insightful, she says little about the dialogical nature, the give and take, or the collaborative aspect of interreligious theology (see Cornille 2006, 2013, 2014, 2016, 2018). 13  There are, however, some moves in that direction, as, for example, the Dalai Lama’s talks on selected passages from the Gospels (Gyatso 2002) or Ayya Khema’s notes on the Sermon of the Mount and 1 Cor. 13 (Khema 1995). 14  Heim’s book on the Bodhicaryāvatāra (Heim 2019) is not a commentary in the stricter sense, although it certainly bears a number of commentarial features (see above, pp. 93-95). Despite its title, John and Linda Keenan’s book (Keenan 2011) is less a Christian commentary on the Prajñāpāramitā-hṛdaya-sūtra than a commentary on the Gospel of John in the light of John Keenan’s adoption of Mahāyāna philosophy. As such it is part of a series of similar writings by Keenan (see Keenan 1995, 2005, 2015).

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present their commentary as an exercise in “sapiential conversation,” seeing Buddhism as a repository of that kind of extra-Christian wisdom in which the Christian theological tradition has often been interested.15 They recognize significant “points of contact” between Buddhist wisdom – as offered in the Dhammapada – and Christian wisdom: the connection between wisdom and the alleviation of suffering, the acquisition of wisdom through learning from others and through “careful attention, both to oneself and the world,” and its, at least in part, connection to a monastic life.16 Yet these are regarded as points of contact between what they characterize as distinct systems that are by and large separate. The main commonality is seen in “the shared horizon of contemporary life.”17 Apart from that, both the starting point and the destination of the two traditions are assessed as “sharply” different, primarily because Buddhist wisdom centers around a universe “where the operations of karma are inexorable,” whereas Christian wisdom looks at “God as the Lord of the universe.”18 This assessment is reflected in the formal structure of the commentary. The translation of each chapter is followed first by an exposition of the “Buddhist Context” (both this and the translation come from Peter Feldmeier19) and second by a “Christian Response” written by Leo Lefebure.20 “In the Christian Responses of this commentary, we offer a conversation as we travel along our respective paths.”21 The use of this metaphor is somewhat puzzling given that the authors do not see Buddhists and Christians travelling along the same path but two paths from different starting points to different destinations. How, then, can they engage in conversation? Is there at least one segment of the route that both have in common before their ways will part again? Lefebure and Feldmeier admit that despite all differences between the two traditions, “the concrete attitudes, values, and actions recommended are often quite similar.”22 But how is this if the paths are supposed to be so different and separate? Or is the similarity after all only an apparent one? The answer to such questions lies in the focus on what Feldmeier 15

 Lefebure, Feldmeier 2011, 5-9.  Ibid. 18f. 17  Ibid. 21. 18  Ibid. 17. 19  On Feldmeier’s own Christian theological views, see his comparative theological study on Buddhaghosa and John of the Cross: Feldmeier 2006. 20  On Lefebure’s theological views on Buddhism, see Lefebure 1993. 21  Lefebure, Feldmeier 2011, 24. 22  Ibid. 25. 16

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and Lefebure call “wisdom sayings.” A “wisdom saying” is a fragment and as such it “may inspire more than one appropriation.” In other words, “the parts do not require (…) only one vision of the whole.”23 Hence, the commonalities can be genuine – but they do not alter the assessment of the sharp difference between the two visions to which they belong. They remain “points of contact” between two separate realities – the different paths, in some sense, crisscrossing at several points. A remarkably different approach, both in form and attitude, is found in O’Leary’s commentary.24 Far from denying the differences between the conceptual world of the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra on the one hand and the theology of Paul and John on the other, he sees a significant commonality in “the central theme of ‘nonduality’.”25 He treats the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa “as a living scripture that can still speak to us under the changed conditions of the contemporary world.”26 Moreover, and more importantly, he believes that “the Christian thoughts that the Buddhist text may call to mind are not in a merely extrinsic relationship to it,” but are rather indicative of “a pregnant affinity.”27 In the light of the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa he describes Christian nonduality as “a union of God and humanity or an indwelling of God in creation which goes beyond the mystical and has affinities with the Mahāyāna discovery of nirvāṇa in saṃsāra.”28 Accordingly, O’Leary “refrain(s) from partitioning the Buddhist material off from its Christian interpretation,”29 but rather presents his understanding of the Buddhist text in close intersection with the affinities to Pauline and Johannine theology that he perceives in it. Buddhist non-dualism can “correct and enrich”30 or “reinforce and enrich”31 Christian theology because, according to O’Leary, a profound form of non-duality is already there. In evident contrast to the theological background assumptions of Feldmeier and Lefebure, O’Leary sees the promise of serious dialogue in kindling “the hope of a time when both traditions will meet in a shared vision of reality.”32

23

 Ibid. 21.  O’Leary 2018. 25  Ibid. 4f. 26  Ibid. 3. 27  Ibid. 4. 28  Ibid. 6f. 29  Ibid. 3. 30  Ibid. 26. 31  Ibid. 24. 32  Ibid. 280. 24

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O’Leary’s “hope” resonates with me; I sympathize, however, due to its tidiness, with the careful distinction made by Feldmeier and Lefebure between the elucidation of the Buddhist context and the Christian response. Yet in the case of my commentary, the Christian response resembles in several ways that of O’Leary, most surprisingly – at least to me – in that I, too, found striking resonances with Mahāyāna thinking in the theologies of Paul and John. So let me now lay out in more detail the methodological parameters by which the present commentary proceeds. 2. LEVELS AND CONTEXTS OF INTERPRETATION In his Imitatio Christi, which has so often been compared to the Bodhicaryāvatāra,33 Thomas à Kempis writes: “Truth (…) is to be sought in reading the Holy Scriptures; and every part must be read in the spirit in which it was written.”34 While the first half of this sentence explains why commentarial writing is such a prominent genre in scripture-based traditions, the second half captures in a nutshell why trans-religious commentaries are such a delicate matter. The question to what extent a commentary emerging from a different religious background is able to read the respective scripture “in the spirit in which it was written” can only be answered in and through the commentary itself. However, in order to take into account Thomas’ admonition as much as possible, let us first look briefly at the principles of commentarial writing in the Buddhist tradition. A kind of ground rule or basic presupposition in Indian Buddhism was that “commentators had to speak for – but not as – Buddhas.”35 The monastic rule regards “misreporting the dharma” a serious offence.36 The corresponding admonition “Do not misrepresent the Blessed One; it is not good!”37 resonates strongly with Thomas’ warning that scripture “must be read in the spirit in which it was written.” But how could fidelity to the intention of Buddha be ascertained? And why was such speaking “for the Buddha” – in addition to the repetition of what had been heard from the Buddha – regarded as necessary? What was the purpose of proper 33

 See above, p. 73.  Imitatio Christi 1:5; Kempis 2012, 17. 35  Nance 2014, 44. 36  Ibid. 38. 37  Ibid. 41. 34

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commentarial writing? Among the traditional answers to such questions we also find that a skillful teacher of the dharma should give explanations for what appears recondite or concealed (guhya).38 The Buddhist tradition has developed guidelines for exegetical commentarial writing. In one of these guidelines, the Vyākhyāyukti ascribed to Vasubandhu (5th cent.), the author establishes five aspects that must be considered when discussing Buddhist scriptures.39 The five aspects move beyond the text into a kind of meta-reflection and in this sense complement what is said in the text itself. A commentary should state (1) the purpose of the text (prayojana) and give (2) a summary of its meaning (piṇḍārtha). That is, it should explain the why and what of the root text. In the same way in which the purpose of a text can only be established on the basis of its meaning, the understanding of its overall meaning depends on the correct understanding of (3) the meaning of the phrases (padārtha). However the full meaning of the individual phrases is only captured if they are seen in a larger context. A commentary should therefore elucidate (4) their connections to other passages and points of doctrine (anusandhi). This includes not only an elucidation of the internal structure of the text or a specific doctrine, but also its place within, and coherence with, the wider doctrinal background. Finally a commentary should discuss (5) possible objections and supply the necessary responses to them (codyaparihāra). The primary purpose of this point is the critical assessment of the text as a means of establishing its truth.40 Vasubandhu’s guidelines are thus rather straightforward: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Why is the text saying this? What is its main point? How is this point developed? How does it relate to the context? How is it to be assessed? What is its truth?

A Christian commentary on a Buddhist text cannot – and does not intend to – “speak for the Buddha.” Nor does a Christian commentary on a text by the Buddhist poet Śāntideva (or Akṣayamati) aim to speak in his place. But it certainly has to try as effectively as possible to catch what the text is intending to say, both in its own time and – possibly  Ibid. 51f, referring to the Dharmasaṅgīti.  Nance has provided an English translation of the Vyākhyāyukti’s first chapter (based on its Tibetan recension). See ibid. 129-152. 40  See ibid. 105-120. 38 39

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– today. Vasubandhu’s points can therefore be appropriated for a Christian commentary, albeit with a few variations regarding guidelines four and five. This is, at least, what I am attempting to do. The following commentary will proceed according to the chapters of the BCA. Each chapter is further divided into several sections or segments. This division is largely, though not strictly, based on Ernst Steinkellner’s outline of the text.41 The respective segments vary considerably in length (from three verses to fifty-eight), and each chapter has between two and six such segments. In addition, chapters 7 – 10 will each have a separate commentarial section dealing with the structure and nature of the respective chapter as a whole. Between chapters 7 and 8 I have placed a longer excursus on “Śāntideva and the Buddhist Hells.” In general, the commentarial discussion involves four different levels.42 At the first level, I interpret the meaning of the respective section and its verses within the Bodhicaryāvatāra itself. This corresponds to the first three of Vasubandhu’s five points. I discuss the purpose and place of the respective section within the context of the BCA, its main point, and how this point is argued by the verses in this segment. As for Vasubandhu’s fourth point, I distinguish between two types of contexts beyond the BCA: the Buddhist context and the context of Buddhist– Christian dialogue. At the second of my four levels, I deal with the larger Buddhist context of the respective section. In so doing, I focus primarily on the Buddhist background as it precedes or is contemporaneous to the BCA and much less on later Buddhist developments, although at times these are brought into play as well.43 In order to interpret the BCA properly, it seems to me more important to understand how its ideas developed and what position it took within the Buddhist spectrum of its own era, than seeing where its ideas led later – even if this might also be illuminating. The faithfulness to the older Buddhist tradition and the wealth of material and motifs originating from the canonical Nikāyas or Āgamas is one of the hallmarks of the BCA. Only after considering these

41

 See the Appendix, below, pp. 517-519.  Not all of the four levels are present in each commentarial section, but more or less in each chapter. 43  In this respect, my commentary differs significantly from Heim 2019, who, deliberately, looks at the BCA through the eyes of certain modern Tibetan commentators as far as their works have been translated into English. I have considered these works only occasionally, with the exception of the 14th Dalai Lama because he is an important protagonist in contemporary Buddhist–Christian dialogue. 42

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intra-textual and intra-Buddhist dimensions and relations of the respective sections, do I bring in Christianity. At the third level, I relate the meaning of the respective section to the context of Buddhist–Christian dialogue. That is, I examine how the position of the BCA may be relevant to some of the main ongoing strands in Buddhist–Christian conversation. This obviously involves applying a contemporary perspective. How can what we find in the BCA amend Christian misperceptions, misunderstandings and prejudices regarding Buddhism? How does it relate to issues that are part of the sharpened critical awareness of our times, such as gender justice, social justice, issues of interreligious tolerance and appreciation, justifications of violence, the relationship between religion and ethics, etc.? And at a fourth level, I ask to what extent the contents of the BCA might go beyond the current strands and trends in Buddhist–Christian dialogue and invite new routes of comparison or, better, reciprocal illumination. In this respect, what I found most illuminating were the rather strong affinities between certain motifs in the BCA and some crucial features of Johannine and, all the more, Pauline theology. So what about Vasubandhu’s fifth point: examining possible objections to the text and supplying responses in its defense? Understanding my commentary as a theological commentary – in addition to all the historical and text-hermeneutical discussions it contains – I strongly sympathize with Vasubandhu’s interest in truth, which is what underlies his fifth point. But I cannot share Vasubandhu’s dogmatic presupposition, according to which the truth of the text is taken for granted, making the task of the fifth point consist only in demonstrating this truth to those who are as yet unable to see it. Even less do I share his Buddhist exclusivism, which he makes explicit when enumerating the personal qualities that a suitable commentator must possess. According to Vasubandhu, an appropriate commentator must be fully aware that … our own great teachings are stated as antidotes to the teachings of outsiders. The teachings of outsiders do not instruct one in the beginning, middle, and end of pure practice, since [their] earlier and later [teachings] are contradictory. Moreover, those [teachings] are not good, since they are faulty in word and meaning. (…) They are impure, since they are sites for corrupt practices that occur at each stage [of training]. They are unrefined, since [at each stage] they are accompanied by latent tendencies for the afflictions that occur at other stages. Our teachings are the opposite of these.44 44

 Nance 2014, 131.

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However, I also do not share similar exclusivist stances on the Christian side, or the kind of petty inclusivism as found, for example, in Paul Griffiths’ statement that for a Christian (he says “Catholic”) theologian, “interpreting the pages” of non-Christian scriptures can only mean “to prepare them for inscription into the margins of the sacred page,” which for him is contained exclusively in the Christian canon.45 But such an approach is not the only option when writing a trans-religious theological commentary. Vasubandhu’s important instruction to discuss objections and provide suitable responses can indeed be followed if one assumes that the teachings of the insiders and “outsiders” are not incompatible. If the spirit in which the root text was written is not antagonistic to the spirit in which the text is trans-religiously read, the responses can be aimed precisely at objections presupposing that kind of antagonism. Complying with Vasubandhu’s fifth rule and its crucial interest in truth can then also mean defending the view that the spirit is ultimately one and manifests itself as Buddha mind and as Christ mind. We cannot take this for granted. But it is the theological premise – or better: hope – that underlies my theological approach.46

45 46

 Griffiths 2014, 45.  See Schmidt-Leukel 2017a and 2017b.

PART II

BODHICARYĀVATĀRA: ENTERING THE COURSE TOWARDS AWAKENING

TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY

CHAPTER 1

BODHICARYĀVATĀRA 1 IN PRAISE OF THE SPIRIT OF AWAKENING (BODHICITTĀNUŚAṂSA)

TRANSLATION: 1:1-3 Object and purpose of this work 1. After reverent obeisance before the Buddhas with their [spiritual] Sons and their Body of Truth (dharmakāya) and before all those worthy of praise, I would briefly like to describe according to the tradition how one resorts to the discipline of the Sons of the Buddhas. 2. I have nothing new to say here and I am also not skilled at composition. Therefore I do not imagine it will be of benefit to others and have written this work to imbue my own mind. 3. First of all this reinforces in me the strength of mental clarity that brings forth what is wholesome [for final release]; should then someone else of a like disposition to mine reflect upon it, for this reason too would it have a purpose.

COMMENTARY 1. The Source of the Good The three opening verses of the canonical Bodhicaryāvatāra are perhaps of a secondary nature: They are not found in the Dūn-huáng version (which has an alternative beginning1) but closely parallel the beginning of the ŚS.2 They describe the topic and nature of the book as an introduc1

 See above, Part I, chap. 1, pp. 4f, fn. 9.  See ŚS 1:1: “After humble reverences to the blessed Buddhas with their sons and the Law [dharmakāya], and all the Worshipful ones, I will now set forth the entrance into the discipline of the Bodhisatvas [sic], in collected sayings of deep purport. And in this book I have naught that is new to tell; nor have I skill in composing; for this very cause I am not making an effort for the welfare of others; this book of mine is intended to cultivate my own mind, yet through this my work the impulse of faith to cultivate 2

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tion to the Bodhisattva path and emphasize its faithfulness to the tradition. Although the BCA includes a great deal of pre-Mahāyāna Buddhist thought, the “tradition” referred to here is primarily that of the Mahāyāna. The usual reverence to the “three jewels” – Buddha, Dharma and Sangha (saṅgha) – appears in a Mahāyānist version: the Dharma is referred to as dharmakāya, the “Body of Truth (Dharma),” and the Sangha, the community,3 is represented through the “Sons [of the Buddha],” i.e. the Bodhisattvas (similarly in 2:1 and 2:26). In later Mahāyāna the term dharmakāya usually appears as part of the doctrine of the “three bodies” (trikāya) of a Buddha, that is, nirmāṇakāya, his physical body (sometimes understood in a docetist manner as mere appearance of physicality), saṃbhogakāya, his supranatural “celestial” body, and dharmakāya, his ultimate body of the Dharma in its highest or “formless” sense, as inconceivable and ineffable truth. The trikāya doctrine, though widespread in later Mahāyāna, was originally closely linked to the Yogācāra school, which may be the reason why the term dharmakāya appears in the whole text of the BCA only once, which is here. While neither the use nor the meaning4 of the term are necessarily confined to the trikāya teaching, its understanding as the “formless body,” as the ultimate and ineffable truth or reality, is more or less identical to what would be called “ultimate truth/ reality” (paramārthasatya) in the Madhyamaka school. We may thus assume that the latter is also the sense in which the term is employed in vs. 1:1. That the third “jewel,” besides Buddha and Dharma, is represented by the Bodhisattvas, the “Sons [of the Buddhas],” indicates that Śāntideva takes the Bodhisattva ideal as the Sangha’s true destiny. Although the idea that the members of the Sangha are “true son(s) of the Blessed Lord, born from his mouth” is already found in pre-Mahāyāna canonical texts,5 the phrase “Sons of the Buddhas” assumes a more radical the good gains increase; and if but one fellow-creature fashioned of like elements to myself may behold that truth, and another should see him, then this book will not have been in vain.” Bendall, Rouse 1922, 1f. 3  The term saṅgha can refer to three different groups: (1) the monastic orders of monks and nuns; (2) the larger, “fourfold” community that includes, in addition to monks and nuns, male and female lay-followers; (3) the “ārya saṅgha”, i.e. the “noble Sangha,” which refers to all those who have attained one of the four degrees of saintliness. See Schmidt-Leukel 2006, 73f. 4  “Dharmakāya” may also refer to the qualities of a Buddha. 5  Dīgha-Nikāya 27:9 (Walshe 1995, 409). The phrase “born from his mouth” has a double meaning: On one hand, it refers to the Buddha’s teaching as the cause of becoming his “son.” On the other hand, it is clearly an allusion to the puruṣa myth in Ṛg-Veda 10:90 and the Brahmanical claim of having been born from the mouth of the puruṣa.

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meaning when it is related to the Bodhisattvas: While in early Buddhism the monk or nun follows the path leading to nirvāṇa as taught by the Buddha, the Bodhisattva follows the path leading to Buddhahood as it was followed by the Buddha himself. As will be seen in the next section, Śāntideva boldly declares (1:9) that the “wretch” lost in samsara (saṃsāra) immediately becomes a “son of the Buddha” as soon as bodhicitta, the “spirit of awakening/enlightenment,” the serious wish to live for the ultimate well-being of all, has arisen.6 This may easily arouse associations with some principal concepts in the Pauline writings of the New Testament: In Romans 8, Paul declares that “all who are led by the spirit are sons of God”7 (Rom. 8:14) so that Jesus Christ “might be the firstborn among many brothers” (Rom. 8:29). The image is not exactly the same as that of the “Sons of the Buddha,” since those following Jesus are not called “sons of Christ” but rather his “brothers” who thus are, like him, “sons of God.” Nevertheless, in both cases the metaphor of near biological kinship is employed to establish an essential similarity between the Buddhas and the Bodhisattvas as well as between Christ and his followers, respectively. Thich Nhat Hanh has a legitimate point when he addresses the Buddha and the Christ as “brothers” because of the proximity of the spirit which both manifest.8 The decisive role in becoming a “son of the Buddha” or, together with Christ, a “son of God” is played in both cases by a “spirit”: bodhicitta, the “spirit of awakening,” which is the same in each Buddha and Bodhisattva, and hagion pneuma, the Holy Spirit or the “spirit of God” (Rom. 8:9), being likewise the same in Jesus Christ and in his followers. Moreover, the antagonism between bodhicitta and its “enemies” (BCA 4:27-48), the defilements (kleśas), which is so central to the BCA,9 has its astonishing counterpart in Paul’s presentation of a parallel antagonism between the As such it is part of the early anti-brahmanical Buddhist polemics. See also SchmidtLeukel 2008a. 6  In the BCA the two aspects of bodhicitta – the aspiration for awakening/enlightenment (bodhi), that is, the wish to become a Buddha, and the compassionate motivation – are inseparable, because the Bodhisattva strives for the awakening of a Buddha precisely because it is as a Buddha that he can render the best service to all sentient beings. Hence the Bodhisattva’s bodhicitta is essentially an expression of the Bodhisattva’s compassionate motivation. See also Part I, chap. 3, pp. 57f. 7  The translation “sons of God” corresponds to the Greek huioi theou. Note that some translations have watered down the radical nature of this statement by translating it as “children of God.” 8  See Nhat Hanh 1999, 171-202, especially 200f. 9  See above, Part I, chap. 3, pp. 55-57.

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“spirit (pneuma) of God” and the “flesh” (sarx). In Paul’s writings, “flesh,” despite carrying connotations reminiscent of passions associated with the body, does not refer to bodily existence as such, but to an inner attitude that is “hostile to God” (Rom. 8:7). While the “fruit of the spirit” is “love” (Gal. 5:22), the “works of the flesh” are “fornication, impurity, licentiousness, idolatry, sorcery, enmities, strife, jealousy, anger, quarrels, dissensions, factions, envy, drunkenness, carousing, and things like these” (Gal. 5:19-21). The startling parallel between bodhicitta and kleśas on one hand and pneuma and sarx on the other will continue to occupy us throughout the text. The replacement of the terms “dharma” and “saṅgha” by “dharmakāya” and “Sons of the Buddha” (viz. bodhisattvas) in vs. 1:1 is reminiscent of two major Mahāyāna doctrines: the teaching of “emptiness” (śūnyatā), rendering all effable forms of the Dharma as preliminary, and the Bodhisattva ideal that understands the path of the Bodhisattva to be the superior path of salvation, the “great” or “eminent vehicle/path” (mahāyāna).10 In terms of content, vs. 1:1 of the canonical BCA thus resonates to some extent with the alternative opening of the Dūn-huáng version, which uses the famous words of Nāgārjuna’s prologue to the MMK to point to the transcategorial nature of the highest Dharma and similarly underlines the eminence of Bodhisattvas.11 Verses 2-3 offer a polite understatement through which Śāntideva seeks to avert the impression that he is boasting. Again he affirms his faithfulness to tradition by claiming that he has nothing new to say. But he also downplays his abilities as a compiler – a motif that is later so fancifully elaborated in the legend.12 He humbly pretends that he only composed this work for his own sake, since he does not imagine it being useful to others. This, however, would be in startling tension to the key idea of the whole book, according to which the Bodhisattva should “directly or indirectly … only act for the benefit of all beings” (5:101). 10  As Jan Nattier (2003) has shown, in the earliest period of Mahāyāna texts, the term “Mahāyāna” was not used to designate a particular school or teaching, but functioned as “a synonym of the ‘bodhisattva path’” (Nattier 2003, 195). It was seen as “great” or “eminent” in that it was far more demanding than the usual path of the “Hearers” (śtāvakas) and in terms of the moral eminence of its goal: taking the great burden “for the benefit of all beings” (Ugraparipṛcchā 2C = Nattier 2003, 213). 11  See again Part I, chap. 1, pp. 4f, fn. 9. 12  See above, Part I, chap. 2, pp. 17f, 20f, 23f, 46f. Notice, however, that only the later versions of the legend present Śāntideva as a great scholar in humble disguise; the earlier versions underline his intellectual shortcomings in order to emphasize the supernatural and inspired origin of the BCA.

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Śāntideva thus hastens to add that the text might have an additional use if it should be of some help to a like-minded person. What is more interesting than these courtesies is how Śāntideva describes the “use” of the text. This allows us to see what he, in fact, hopes to achieve in others, namely that it “reinforces … the strength of mental clarity that brings forth what is wholesome [for final release].” This half line captures in a few words one of the most central convictions of Buddhism: that insight is the “aurora” of everything wholesome (AN 10:121). Buddhism’s striking confidence in the power of insight is based on its understanding that all things, good or bad, proceed from the mind, as is famously declared in the two opening verses of the Dhammapada.13 If good is expected to come out of a clear mind, the opposite is due to a deluded mind. In line with the Buddhist tradition, both Mahāyāna and non-Mahāyāna, Śāntideva shares the optimism that the mind, purified from its delusions, will bring forth what is good, even if this optimism – as we will see – shows some serious cracks and is far from being naïve. It nevertheless corresponds to the fundamental Buddhist belief that the “vices” are “defilements” of the mind: They do not represent its true nature, but are rather impurities of an originally pure mind, stains in a mind that is inherently stainless or luminous.14 A Christian might ask: Where does such Buddhist confidence come from? Why, in a Buddhist context, should one assume that the mind is originally pure and good? On Christian grounds one would argue that God, the creative source of everything, is perfectly good and hence created humans in God’s own good image. This original goodness has been gravely affected by sin. Yet through Jesus Christ, who is called by the New Testament the “image of the invisible God” (Col. 1:15), and through the spirit that was in Christ, the original goodness of humans as God’s image can be restored by being transformed into Christ’s likeness (Rom. 8:29; 2 Cor. 3:18). But what is the basis for the Buddhist trust in the mind’s original goodness or purity15 – a purity that can be restored or better: uncovered?16 The overwhelming majority of thinkers in the later Mahāyāna tradition answer this question by pointing to the 13

 See also Lefebure, Feldmeier 2011, 36.  See particularly Harvey 1995, 166-176. 15  It is a confidence that Buddhism shares with Jainism and with the Upaniṣadic tradition; all hold that the original nature of the soul is unstained. 16  The original purity of the mind is not understood in a chronological sense and thus there is no myth of a “fall” from this original purity. It is thus uncovered rather than restored. 14

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dharmakāya: If the Buddhas manifest perfect goodness and if their ultimate nature or “body” is nothing but ultimate reality itself, this reality must be the source of all goodness; their perfect compassion is the “‘overflow’ of the dharmakāya.”17 This answer, though not (yet) given here, seems to be what the BCA suggests. It is an issue that we will ponder further as we proceed in the text. TRANSLATION: 1:4-14 The meaning of the spirit of awakening 4. The luck of favorable circumstances is exceedingly difficult to attain; once achieved it fosters the goal of humankind. If this is not seen as beneficial, how shall this juncture ever present itself again? 5. As lightning flashes for an instant in a night darkened by masses of clouds, in the same way the world could once recognize acts of merit for an instant through the help of the Buddhas. 6. Therefore the good is always weak; in contrast, the power of evil is great and terrible. What other good can overcome it if there were not the spirit of complete awakening? 7. It is precisely this benefit that the Great Sages have found in their age-long explorations, because the fully developed bliss [of buddhahood] quite easily causes the vast flood of beings to leap out [of the ocean of suffering]. 8. Those who long to overcome the hundred-fold suffering of existence, who wish to remove evil from all beings and enjoy multitudinous bliss, must never give up the spirit of awakening (bodhicitta). 9. The wretch who is tied to the cycle of existence is instantly proclaimed a son of the Buddhas as soon as the spirit of awakening has arisen in him and he is worthy of veneration in the worlds of human and celestial beings. 10. When it has grasped this impure figure [of a body], it brings about the priceless figure of a Buddha-jewel. So reach out firmly for this [healing] elixir called “spirit of awakening” which is apt to thoroughly penetrate! 11. You, who wander around the market places of existences, reach out firmly for the jewel of the spirit of awakening, which has been seen as priceless by the imponderably Wise, the sole caravan drivers of the world. 12. For, like a plantain tree after it has borne its fruit, all other wholesome deeds die; the tree of the spirit of awakening, however, always bears fruit and does not die, [it] is truly fruitful.

17

 Williams, Tribe 2000, 176.

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13. Even if one has committed terrible sins, in its protection one escapes instantly, just as one escapes great dangers when protected by a hero. Why don’t ignorant beings take refuge in it? 14. It burns up major sins instantly and completely, like the fire at the end of the eons. The wise Maitreyanātha described its immeasurable benefits to Sudhana.

COMMENTARY 2. The Redeeming Spirit Śāntideva begins his introduction to the Bodhisattva way by identifying what makes this way possible at all: the appearance of a Buddha in a18 world (vss. 4-7). In this he follows the pattern of the most ancient doctrinal scheme of the Buddhist path of salvation, which regularly starts with the words: “A Tathāgata appears in the world (…) teaches the Dharma (…) reveals a holy life (…).”19 Śāntideva gives the solemn words of the ancient scheme a more dramatic note: The appearance of a Buddha equals the one brief moment of a bright flash lightening the dark night (vs. 5). The metaphor of light and darkness in connection with the teaching of the Buddha is itself traditional and illustrates the power of the Buddha’s proclamation to dispel the darkness of delusion. For Śāntideva, too, the appearance of a Buddha enables the world to understand or recognize what is good (vs. 5), but even more, it gives the world the power to accomplish “the goal of humankind” (puruṣārtha) (vs. 4), which is – as can be seen from the subsequent verses 1:11 and 3:32f – nothing but the arousal and completion of bodhicitta. The “spirit of awakening” is the only force strong enough to overcome “the power of evil,” i.e. the defilements (vs. 6). This is what the Buddhas have found (vs. 7) and it is this spirit that they spread through their activities. This is also why they are called the “sole caravan drivers of the world” (vs. 11). The solus of the Buddhas underlines the soteriological exclusivity of the spirit of awakening as the sole force to overcome evil. Śāntideva therefore interprets the traditional doctrine of the rareness of (re-)gaining rebirth as a human being, of being born at a time and in a world where the teaching of a Buddha is available, and of being in such 18  Note that according to Buddhist cosmological speculations, there exist, diachronically and synchronically, many or even innumerable worlds. 19  E.g. DN 2; 3; MN 27; 38, and other places.

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a lucky condition that one is able to follow the Buddhist path,20 as referring to the precious opportunity of taking up bodhicitta (see also vss. 4:13-26, which repeat and expand on this theme). In stating that “the good is always weak” while “the power of evil is great and terrible,” vs. 6 underlines the rareness of this opportunity: like a single flash of lightening in the midst of a dark night. But Śāntideva is far from suggesting that the power of bodhicitta itself might be weak. On the contrary, nothing but bodhicitta is strong enough to overcome evil (vs. 6b). The redemptive force of bodhicitta is further illustrated in vss. 8-14. First of all, it is characterized as a power to transform a samsaric being instantaneously into “a son of the Buddhas” (vs. 9). This transformation is of the most radical nature: It is a new birth into the family of the Buddhas (see also 3:25); a human wretch transformed into someone worthy of veneration; the body no longer an image of impurity but the precious icon of a Buddha.21 The change is compared to the transformation of a substance (into gold) by an alchemistic elixir (vs. 10), and is also characterized as a process of “healing” (see also 1:26; 3:28f). In a lucid essay, Stephen E. Harris has interpreted the alchemistic metaphor as an illustration of Śāntideva’s strategy, found throughout the BCA, of utilizing the psychological energy of the defilements in the struggle to overcome them, a strategy which is in line with the basic Tantric concept of overcoming evil not just by its opposite but also by means of itself.22 The redeeming power of bodhicitta is further described in terms of karma. According to vs. 12, the karmic results of bodhicitta are fundamentally different from those of any other meritorious work (or thought, as one might add, keeping in mind that for Buddhism, karmic acts are performed in “thought, word and deed”). While the beneficial results of ordinary good karmic 20  This is referred to in vs. 4 as “the luck of the favorable circumstances.” More technically, these are defined by the absence of “eight unfavorable circumstances” (akṣaṇa): (1) rebirth as a denizen of hell, (2) as a ghost, (3) as an animal, (4) as a barbarian, (5) as a deity (the gods are too deluded by celestial pleasures); (6) as a human being with false religious views, (7) as a human being in times without a Buddha or his teaching, (8) as a debilitated human. See Steinkellner 1981, 153, fn. 3; Dayal 2004, 59; Rao 2013, 61. See also ŚS 1:2. 21  See also BCA 1:36 and 2:10-19, the latter giving the characteristic example of the ritual veneration of the Buddha bodies as influenced by bhakti spirituality. The pious veneration of the Buddha’s body and, in particular, its thirty-two special marks is also at the center of Matṛceta’s poetry, which was, according to I’tsing, regularly recited in Indian Buddhist monastic institutions (Takakusu 1896, 156f). 22  Harris 2017. A clear example is found in BCA 4:43, see below, p. 195; see also Part I, chap. 2, pp. 50-52.

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performances are only of a temporal duration, bodhicitta “always bears fruit and does not die” (vs. 12). This statement apparently relates to the transcendent nature or origin of bodhicitta, its rootedness in that immortal reality whose existence is the ultimate ground that makes the appearance of Buddhas possible and without which the path of the Bodhisattva would not be available. Bodhicitta “does not die” because it springs forth from the indestructible bottom of reality. Even more, the positive karmic force of bodhicitta is said to immediately annihilate all negative karmic residues from one’s “terrible sins.” Here Śāntideva draws on a powerful image from Buddhist cosmology: Bodhicitta burns up all bad karmic results “instantly and completely” like the cosmic fire that destroys a whole world at the end of its period within the chain of successively originating and decaying worlds (vs. 14).23 But Śāntideva does not only employ cataclysmic imagery. He also compares bodhicitta’s power over any negative karmic residues to a strong hero, in whose protection “one escapes instantly” the great dangers of one’s bad deeds, that is, the danger of rebirth in hell. Such personalization of bodhicitta as a hero underlies the way in which Śāntideva turns to the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas for protection in the face of his sins as part of the Bodhisattva liturgy as expounded in chapters 2 and 3. Buddhas and Bodhisattvas are nothing but personal manifestations of bodhicitta.24 Śāntideva repeatedly underlines the immediate or “instantaneous” character of bodhicitta’s existential impact (vss. 9, 13, 14). As far as I can see (and somewhat surprisingly so), this has not yet caught much scholarly attention. How should one understand the instantaneous and complete nature of this new birth into the family of the Buddha (3:25) combined with the equally instantaneous destruction of all negative karma? Is this an instantaneous change of nature or an instantaneous change in the awareness of one’s true nature? Brassard, who opts for the latter, presents the graphic comparison to someone who is in great anxiety because of huge financial problems. He is instantaneously released from his fears as soon as he learns that he is about to receive a significant inheritance. Accordingly, Brassard understands the arising of bodhicitta as “the moment when one becomes aware of the fact that one’s true reality is to desire the welfare of all sentient beings, that one is already a Bodhisattva.”25 To Brassard, the arising of 23  The reference in vs. 14b is to the Gaṇḍavyūha-sūtra (contained in the Avataṃsakasūtra as chapter 39), where Bodhisattva Maitreya teaches Sudhana the benefits of bodhicitta through numerous similes (see: Cleary 1993, 1476-1489). See also Rao 2013, 63f. 24  See also Perera 2015, 139. 25  Brassard 2000, 108.

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bodhicitta is thus the awareness of one’s “true nature.”26 Wangchuk, however, points out that Tibetan Buddhists have distinguished between two distinct models of understanding salvation, which differently influence how one interprets the rise and impact of bodhicitta: first a “generation model,” according to which one achieves Buddhahood in terms of becoming something new, and second a “revelation model,” according to which one achieves Buddhahood in terms of becoming what one already is.27 Wangchuk suggests that this distinction may help in better understanding “the controversies surrounding the issues of gradualism (rim gyis pa) versus simultaneism (cig char ba),”28 but unfortunately he does not discuss this issue in relation to BCA 1:4-14. He seems to see Śāntideva, as a Mādhyamika, more on the side of the “generation model,” but does not elaborate on the understanding of the instantaneousness of bodhicitta in Śāntideva’s presentation, although he does note the difference in this respect between Śāntideva and Candrakīrti.29 Is it an instantaneous change in one’s nature or in the awareness of one’s nature? The general Buddhist trust in the original purity of the mind seems – as pointed out by Brassard – to speak more in favor of the latter alternative.30 And this, of course, would support an interpretation of bodhicitta as analogous to the Buddha Nature doctrine. The redeeming power of bodhicitta, however, is not primarily related to one’s own karmic misery. In being the spirit of perfect altruism, bodhicitta is in the first place about the redemption of all others and is thus the power at work in those “who wish to remove evil from all beings” (vs. 8). Only as such, that is, only because of its radically altruistic nature, is it capable of burning up one’s own negative karma.31 All beings are therefore exhorted to reach out for bodhicitta, for the sake of others and thereby for their own sake as well (vss. 8, 11, 13). This way of combining self-interest (striving for one’s own salvation) with altruism 26

 Ibid. 70.  Wangchuck 2007, 39f. 28  Ibid. 39. 29  Ibid. 40, fn. 83. 30  Brassard 2000, 109. 31  This is unambiguously emphasized in Tibetan commentaries. See for example Khenpo Chöga’s comment: “The negative deeds that one has committed in former lifetimes persist as mental patterns [bag chags], mental habits within one’s mind. These negative actions and habits all derive from ego-clinging. The thought, ‘I will free all beings from their suffering and establish them on the level of perfect buddhahood’ is the opposite of all such negative mental patterns. This thought is not based on ego-clinging. The more one progresses in the realization of egolessness, the more these former negative patterns will fall apart.” (Amtzis, Deweese, eds., 2004, 452) 27

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(striving for the salvation of all others) is most typical for the Mahāyāna Bodhisattva ideal and runs as a common thread through the BCA. Much of the rich symbolism in these eleven verses that actually start off the BCA (given the probable secondary nature of the three introductory verses) finds striking parallels in Christianity, parallels that by no means are merely at a superficial level. The comparison of the Buddha to a bright flash of light in the middle of a dark night immediately reminds one of the Prologue to the Gospel of John (1:4f), which speaks of Christ’s appearance as a “light shining in the darkness,” a light that is “the light of all people” and is “not overcome by darkness.” Marion Matics and Louis Gómez have both pointed out that the way Śāntideva presents the appearance of a Buddha as the crucial event making salvation possible is “reminiscent of the Christian doctrine of Grace,”32 or, even more, is evidence that there is an element in Buddhism that can legitimately be called “grace.”33 I think the parallel is even more substantial. For Śāntideva, the Buddha is not just the one who through his action makes bodhicitta available, but is himself a manifestation or – as we could also say – an embodiment (an “incarnation”) of bodhicitta inasmuch as it is, in the Mahāyāna understanding, only through bodhicitta that he himself has become a Buddha. In a similar way, Jesus Christ is presented in the prologue of John as the embodiment of the logos (Jn. 1:14), i.e., of the divine “word.” If we interpret the meaning of the divine logos or “word” as ‘God in the mode of self-revelation,’ the prologue of John tells us that ultimate divine reality is disclosed or “visible,” that is, becomes the light of the world and unfolds its redeeming power, through its manifestation in Jesus Christ. In this sense, God was redeemingly active in Christ (2 Cor. 5:19) and the spirit of Christ is and reflects the spirit of God. This, I suggest, may indicate even more than just a deep structural parallel to Śāntideva’s understanding of the Buddha as the revealing manifestation of bodhicitta and the redeeming light of the world: From a Christian theological perspective, it may be taken as evidence of a profound inner affinity between bodhicitta and logos, or between the spirit of the Buddha and the spirit (pneuma) of Christ.34

32

 Śāntideva 1971, 35.  Gómez 1985, 172ff. 34  For a comparison between bodhicitta and the understanding of charity in the writings of Thérèse of Lisieux, see Perera 2015. “Perhaps,” Perera writes, “a reimagining of charity in the light of bodhicitta could make use of that pregnant phrase of St. Paul, ‘the mind of Christ’ (…).” Perera 2015, 142. 33

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Comparing the arising of bodhicitta in one’s mind to a new birth (vs. 9) indicates a further important parallel. In John we meet the idea that the follower of Christ undergoes a new birth “from water and spirit” (Jn. 3:5), that is, through the spirit of Christ and the water of baptism. It is worthwhile to quote again Matics, who has rightly drawn attention to this parallel: When Bodhicitta arises, one’s birth is completed, one’s human nature is well-taken, one is born into the Buddha-family, and one now becomes a Buddha-son. The moment is specific – today, now, a particular instant, at once, as in another world the moment of baptismal regeneration is specific, and in the same way one experiences rebirth, he is born into the family of Christ, and he becomes a child of God. The symbolism is almost the same, as is also the effect.35

Though Paul does also speak of the followers of Jesus as those “born in accordance with the spirit” (Gal. 4:29), he generally prefers the related image of death and resurrection. Baptism signifies that one has died to one’s old life and is resurrected to a new life in Christ (Rom. 6:1-12) or in Christ’s spirit. According to Paul, a follower of Christ has received “the spirit that is from God,” the “mind of Christ” (1 Cor. 2:12, 16). As is the case with bodhicitta, the arising of this spirit in one’s heart has the power and the inner dynamics to transform one’s whole existence, which Paul, like Śāntideva, expresses by using the image of a bodily transformation: While Śāntideva speaks of the body as being transformed from an “impure figure,” signifying the wretched state of samsaric existence, into the “priceless figure of a Buddha-jewel” (vss. 9f), Paul speaks of the existential state of the Christian by using the image of the body as the temple of God’s spirit: “You know that you are God’s sanctuary and that God’s spirit lives in you, don’t you? … God’s sanctuary is holy. And you are that sanctuary!” (1 Cor. 3:16f; see also 1 Cor. 6:19). And similar to the idea of a transformation into the “figure of a Buddha image” Paul speaks of being conformed to the image of Christ (Rom. 8:29) or transformed into Christ’s likeness through the power of the spirit (2 Cor. 3:18). As we have seen, bodhicitta is also called a “(healing) elixir” (1:10). In the New Testament the idea of healing is particularly prominent in relation to those deeds of Christ that he performs through the power of the 35

 Śāntideva 1971, 37.

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spirit (Lk. 4:16-21).36 His acts of miraculous healing are presented as signs of the merciful reign of God. It is not only, and not primarily, the ailments of the body that Christ’s spirit is able to heal, but also the sufferings of the soul (Mt. 11:28-30). According to the Gospels, there is a strong connection between healing, the expulsion of evil spirits and the forgiving of sins (Mk. 2:17; Lk. 5:31). Paul sees the healing power of the spirit along the lines of his preferred metaphor of death and resurrection, which corresponds to the antithesis between life under the flesh or sin, and life through the spirit. “The mind set on the flesh is death, but the mind set on the spirit is life and peace” (Rom. 8:6), and the “spirit of life” sets one free “from the law of sin and of death” (Rom. 8:2). Sin has lost its power “to separate us from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus” (Rom. 8:39). This leads us to the question of how to understand, on one hand, the relation between the redemption from sin or flesh by the spirit of Christ and, on the other hand, the redeeming power of bodhicitta in relation to sin or evil (pāpa) and its karmic mechanisms. As is well known, Paul understands “sin” (hamartia) not as much in the sense of single, sinful acts, but as an almost personalized power hostile to God.37 Ordinary human existence is, for Paul, as much under the power of sin as it is, for Buddhism, under the power of delusion, entangled in the web of samsara wrought out of the defilements and their evil karmic consequences. Even in their new life through Christ’s and the Buddha’s spirit, both the follower of Christ and the follower of the Buddha on the Bodhisattva path live within a persistent tension between the flesh and the spirit, or the defilements and the spirit.38 Yet in both cases the spirit is seen as stronger and carries the promise of redemption. In Christianity this is largely understood in terms of forgiveness. If sins are forgiven, the power of sin to separate one from God is broken. Despite falling back into sin again and again, the acceptance of forgiveness is how the spirit of God takes 36  Gómez (1985, 169) has suggested that the Buddhist use of “medical imagery” in relation to the human predicament might be indicative of “a basic disagreement” between Buddhism’s and Christianity’s “conceptualization of good and evil.” But he himself relativizes this judgment by pointing out that “Christ is also a healer” and that “there is a concept of sin in Buddhism” (ibid. 170). 37  See Sanders 1991, 35f. See also Ridderbos 1977, 93: “For Paul, therefore, sin is not in the first place an individual act or condition to be considered by itself, but rather the supra-individual mode of existence in which one shares through the single fact that one shares in the human life-context and from which one can only be redeemed by being taken up into the new life-context revealed in Christ (Col. 2:13).” 38  This point is strongly made in Dunn 1998, 477-482.

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precedence over sin and replaces its egocentric structure by opening up the sinner, who in Luther’s famous words is “curved into himself” (incurvatus in se ipsum), and freeing him to the love of God and neighbor. Similarly, Śāntideva declares bodhicitta as a force under whose protection one escapes the most terrible sins, which are burnt up “instantly and completely” (vss. 13-14). In describing the spiritual antagonism between good and evil, both Paul and Śāntideva make use of personalization: In Paul it is “sin” that is described as a personal force; in Śāntideva it is bodhicitta that is personalized as a protecting hero. Moreover – as we will see more clearly further down in the text – Śāntideva presents the defilements as “enemies.” In particular, Śāntideva’s personalization of bodhicitta for dealing with one’s samsaric entanglement closely resembles Christian practice: Sins are admitted and confessed to the Buddhas and the Bodhisattvas;39 they are, as we will see, understood as an injury to the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, as something causing them grief, and thus they can be and are in fact asked to forgive these sins (6:124).40 The reasoning behind this is quite clear: bodhicitta is the spirit of unlimited compassion – of compassion with and for those caught in samsaric defilements (see also 2:6) – and the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas are the ones who have perfected bodhicitta. The personalization of bodhicitta is not merely metaphorical. Turning to the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas (as performed in the liturgy making up chapters 2 and 3 of the BCA) is therefore a practical way for evoking bodhicitta, the spirit of compassion that overcomes all sin and its karmic consequences. Whether through Christ or through the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, it is in both cases the spirit of forgiving and compassion which redeems, that is, which breaks the power of sin or defilement. Yet is the spirit of Christ not confined to the followers of Christ, bound to baptism in his name? If so, this conviction would set narrow limits to any attempt to identify genuine affinities between the Holy Spirit and the Spirit of Awakening. A “Christomonism,” confining the spirit to Christ, “tends to minimize the work of the Holy Spirit in the lives of others,” as Stanley Samartha has rightly observed. According to Samartha, the rejection of the “filioque” (= “and the Son”) by the Orthodox churches, that is, of the clause that the spirit proceeds from the 39

 See the commentary on BCA 2:26-66 below.  Gómez (1985, 71, fn. 93) has rightly emphasized that this is an important feature of the concept of sin in the BCA. 40

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Father “and the Son,” a clause that had been inserted by the Western church into the Nicene Creed, has “far reaching ecumenical significance.”41 This rejection allows the theological possibility of recognizing manifestations of the Spirit which are not mediated by Christ and are thus located outside the confinements of Christianity.42 Analogously, the characterization of the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas as the “sole caravan drivers” (vs. 11), as the only guides to liberation (because of their mediation of bodhicitta), inevitably raises the question for Buddhists of whether they can understand Christ as a Buddha or Bodhisattva in that sense.43 Moreover, would it be possible, from a Christian perspective, to argue that the spirit of Christ, or more precisely, the spirit of God that was in Christ, constitutes our true nature, as bodhicitta is interpreted by a significant strand of Mahāyāna?44 According to the Biblical tradition humans are created in the image of God and – as has been said above – if Christ is regarded as the image of God in the sense that he is the kind of human being that all humans are destined to be (as much as Śāntideva can speak of bodhicitta as accomplishing “the goal of humankind” [BCA 1:4]), one may argue that the spirit of Christ represents our true nature in the sense of our true destination or in the sense of the force moving us towards this goal. If this dynamism is not confined to Christians, one can expect to find evidence of its reality in a variety of forms outside Christianity. Among more recent theologians, it was doubtlessly Karl Rahner (1904-1984) who emphasized most strongly the link between Christology and “anthropology” (in the sense of the inquiry about human nature) in his famous dictum that all theology is anthropology.45 This view is based on Rahner’s conviction that there is no essential difference between the divine presence in Jesus called “spirit,” that is, the divine self-communication to the human mind, and its presence in all other human beings.46 According to Rahner, God has communicated “himself” to all human beings right from the start, that is, as 41

 Samartha 1987, 88f.  On the relevance of the filioque issue for a Christian theology of religions, see Lai 1994, 38ff. 43  See for example Gyatso 2002, 83f. See also Part I, chap. 4, pp. 86f. 44  See above, Part II, chap. 1, p. 120. 45  See Rahner 1978, 225. 46  It is in this sense that Rahner can say about the “hypostatic union,” that is, the union of the divine and the human nature in Christ: “This union is distinguished from our grace not by what has been offered in it, which in both instances, including that of Jesus, is grace.” Rahner 1978, 202. In Rahner’s terminology, “grace” stands for the divine self-communication to the human mind (see ibid. 208). 42

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part of the complex act of divine creation. This is why Rahner calls the divine presence to every human being a “supernatural existential.”47 As Rahner uses the term, “existential” signifies a common feature of human existence or “nature.” But by calling this feature “supernatural” rather than just “natural,” Rahner highlights its divine character. For, if “nature” is theologically equivalent to being created, the one and only uncreated or “supernatural” reality is God. Yet characterizing the presence of the divine (the “supernatural”) as a general feature of human existence or “nature” (the “existential”) opens up the whole issue of pantheism or non-dualism. Rahner replies to this issue as follows: The difference between God and the world is of such a nature that God establishes and is the difference of the world from himself, and for this reason he establishes the closest unity precisely in the differentiation. For if the difference … is itself identical with God, then the difference between God and the world is to be understood quite differently than the difference between categorical realities. (…) Pantheism could therefore be called a sensitivity to (or better, the transcendent experience of) the fact that God is the absolute reality, the original ground and the ultimate term of transcendence. This is the element of truth in pantheism. Conversely, a religious dualism which in a primitive and naïve way understands the difference between God and the reality of the world created by him simply as a categorical difference is basically very unreligious because it does not grasp what God really is, that is, because it understands God as an element within a larger whole, as a part of the whole of reality. (…) The term of transcendence is indefinable because the horizon itself cannot be present within the horizon, because the term of transcendence cannot itself really be brought within the scope of transcendence and thus distinguished from other things.48

Rahner’s understanding of God as the un-encompassable ultimate horizon of everything that is, as such, intrinsically present to the human spirit as the final transcendental ground of all our understanding provides not only a fruitful approach for understanding the universal presence of the divine spirit. In its necessarily “indefinable” (because of itself constituting the non-circumventable “space” or “horizon” within which everything else finds its definition) nature it also provides, from a Christian perspective, a bridge of understanding for the relationship between God and emptiness, as I will point out later on.49 47

 Ibid. 126-133.  Rahner 1978, 62f. 49  See below, Part II, chap. 9, pp. 484f. 48

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TRANSLATION: 1:15-36 Two types of the spirit of awakening 15. Briefly, this spirit of awakening is to be known as twofold: as the mental resolution to strive (praṇidhi) for awakening and the actual striving (prasthāna) for awakening. 16. Just as one understands the difference between someone who wants to leave and someone who is on his way, accordingly the learned should recognize the difference between these two types [of the spirit of awakening]. 17. The mental resolution for awakening bears ample fruit even in the cycle of existences, but not the uninterrupted stream of merit that the attitude of striving brings.

In praise of the spirit of awakening 18.-19. As soon as one takes on this spirit for the redemption of the entire world of beings with a steadfast mind, uninterrupted streams of merit rise in him infinite as space, even when asleep or frequently distracted. 20. For the benefit of those who are devoted to the inferior ways, this was explained with reasons by the Buddha himself in the “Question of Subāhu.” 21.-22. Immeasurable merit is bestowed on the well-meaning person who thinks, “I want to eliminate the headache of beings”; how much more is given to the one who wishes to liberate every single being of unmatched pain and to endow every single being with immeasurable virtues. 23. Whose mother and whose father is likely to have this kind of desire for benefit? And which deity, which seer, which Brahma-god? 24. Never, not even in a dream, have these beings had such a desire, not even for their own sake. Why then should it grow in them for the benefit of others? 25. How is this unique, unparalleled jewel of a being born, who desires the wellbeing of others in a way that does not arise in others even for their own sake? 26. How shall one measure the merit of this jewel of spirit, the seed of the joys of the world and the remedy for its suffering? 27. Merely desiring the benefit [of all beings] is more meritorious than worshipping the Buddhas; still more so is striving for the perfect happiness of all beings. 28. Those who wish to escape suffering are simply rushing toward suffering. Already by desiring happiness they foolishly destroy their happiness as enemies do. 29.-30. Whence shall come a good person who likewise procures satisfaction in every happiness for those manifold tormented beings starving for happiness, who eases all pain and even removes delusion? Whence is such a friend to come? Or whence such merit?

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31. Indeed one praises someone who repays a service with another, but what can be said of a Bodhisattva who is good without being solicited? 32.-33. People honor someone who offers a few people a feast as someone who does a good deed, merely because he has humiliated them by serving them one pitiable meal that extends their lives by half a day. How much more someone who forever grants ceaseless fulfillment of all desires to a limitless number of beings until the ceasing of beings [infinite] as space? 34. But one who in his heart nurses evil against such a host, the Son of Buddha, will stay in the hells for as many eons as the moments in which the evil thoughts were raised. Thus said the Master. 35. For him whose mind, then, is devoutly disposed, a fruit may arise that is larger than that earlier evil because only with great effort is evil possible against the Sons of the Buddha, while effortless is the good. 36. I worship their bodies in which this excellent jewel of spirit has arisen, against which even wrong doing results in happiness. I seek my refuge in these treasure troves of happiness.

COMMENTARY 3. The Miracle of the Good Having praised the redeeming power of bodhicitta, Śāntideva turns to the question of how this spirit materializes. But before he does so, he introduces his famous distinction between two types of bodhicitta: first, the resolution to strive for Buddhahood, which means the resolution to enter the Bodhisattva path, and second, the actual practice of this path (vss. 15-17). Although this distinction has been subject of much sophisticated consideration and interpretation in the Tibetan commentarial tradition,50 the general idea behind it is well illustrated by Śāntideva’s comparison with a journey: it is the difference between the initial resolution to embark on this journey, which presupposes the aspiration to reach the goal, and the actual journey, which presupposes the faithful dedication to all the individual parts of the journey that bring one closer to that goal.51 The distinction is important because it serves as a summary of what Śāntideva develops in the remainder of his book: He first considers how bodhicitta as a resolve arises (chapters 1-3) and then turns 50  For a brief and helpful summary of the most significant classical interpretations, see Khenpo Kunpal’s commentary in Amtzis, Deweese, eds. 2004, 237-241. For a detailed overview, see Wangchuk 2007, 246-251. 51  See also above, Part I, chap. 3, pp. 57f.

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to the different aspects of the journey towards Buddhahood, that is, the development of the Bodhisattva virtues (pāramitās) (chapters 4-9), with bodhicitta understood as the driving motivation. In the sense of the actual striving, bodhicitta means maintaining and intensifying one’s aspiration for the goal by applying it to the development of each of the pāramitās until attaining the goal of the journey, the completion and fulfillment of bodhicitta in the awakening of a Buddha.52 But how can the first step been taken? How does the wish to strive for Buddhahood arise? Given that striving for Buddhahood is to strive for the salvation of all beings (vs. 18) and given that all who are meant to bring about this desire are deluded people, caught in the web of the self-centered defilements of greed, hate and delusion, the arising of a genuine intention to work for the ultimate benefit of all seems more than unlikely: it seems to be a miracle. As I understand the Bodhicaryāvatāra, Śāntideva believes that bodhicitta is born out of two motivations: First, the still self-centered motivation of gaining karmic merit. This is why bodhicitta is praised as earning oneself the highest possible merit whatsoever. Along the lines of this type of motivation, Śāntideva is also ready to instrumentalize the backside of this argument, that is, to warn against demerit or bad karma as leading to the undesired horrors of hell. From this motivation Śāntideva derives an existential insight that might even be persuasive without belief in hells, expressed in the paradox that those who selfishly desire their own happiness thereby “foolishly destroy their happiness” (vs. 28). Later in the text, he will add a corresponding insight to this, namely, that “all those who are happy in the world are so out of longing for the happiness of another” (8:129). Altruism is thus praised not only as something good for others, but also the true fulfillment of all selfish longing for happiness. As will become evident in BCA 8, Śāntideva is convinced that the selfish motivation of merit-making can be absorbed and transformed into the realization of compassion, seeing the suffering of others as one’s 52  Brassard (2000) has a point when he argues “that not only the desire for enlightenment but also the actual progression toward it depends on having undergone a change of mind” (53). But I think he goes too far in his criticism of the understanding of the two types of bodhicitta as “resolve” and “implementation” (41). His suggestion that in the “change of mind” required for this progression, “an act of will or commitment … does not have any role to play … because it reinforces the distinction between subject and object” (46) would probably hold for the perfect realization of the goal, but not for the journey towards it. This suggestion finds almost no support in the BCA, where Śāntideva appeals repeatedly to acts of will and commitment.

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own suffering. The compassionate wish to remove “their” suffering will then coincide with the wish to remove one’s own suffering, for “they” are no longer seen as others, but as one’s “self”. Yet there is another, second line of motivation, which is based on the attractiveness of the good itself. This argument is of a transcendental nature (in a Kantian sense). Despite all delusion, there is still something in our mind that enables us to discern what is good.53 We are able to recognize bodhicitta, the spirit of unrestricted and unlimited compassion or altruism, as the highest and utmost good. And this kind of insight attracts us towards this good and works thereby against the evil power of the defilements. Here, in vss. 18-36 of BCA 1, we see how Śāntideva begins evoking the two motivations he believes may trigger bodhicitta – despite the fact that its arising in the midst of darkness remains a miracle. Following his distinction of two types of bodhicitta, Śāntideva declares that already aspiring for the welfare of all beings is more meritorious than the veneration of the Buddhas (later, in BCA 6, he goes as far as claiming that working for the benefit of all beings is in fact the true worship of the Buddhas54), and even more meritorious is the actual striving for their happiness by following the Bodhisattva path (vss. 26-27). Bodhicitta is presented as having its own inner dynamic pushing towards its further development (vss. 18-20). This is supported by a reference to the Subāhuparipṛcchā-sūtra, where the Buddha explains that the wish to bring happiness to “boundless masses of sentient beings” must itself have “boundless roots” so that even “if I should be inattentive or fall asleep, still (these roots of virtue) will day and night, from moment to moment, increase, expand, and become utterly perfected.”55 Yet even apart from the inner dynamism of bodhicitta towards its own manifestation as the actual striving, already the initial wish to save all beings by becoming a Buddha is producing “immeasurable merit.” In vss. 21f, Śāntideva illustrates this by alluding to the following well-known story from the Buddha’s own Bodhisattva career. The Bodhisattva, i.e. Gautama Buddha in one of his previous lives, was once a merchant who decided to embark on a mercantile expedition over the sea. Because his father had lost his life on a similar journey, his mother 53  See also BCA 7:19, where the ability to recognize good and bad is presented not only as a major precondition, but also as a crucial ability for enabling one to follow the Bodhisattva path. 54  See BCA 6:125-127. See below, Part II, chap. 6, pp. 297-303. 55  Quotation taken from: Amtzis, Deweese, eds., 2004, vol. 1, 245.

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tried with all her might to prevent him from leaving. As she finally threw herself on the ground, grasping his feet, her son became angry and kicked her head in an attempt to escape her grip. Initially his expedition went quite well. Even after suffering a shipwreck, he escaped to an island where beautiful women cared for him. Travelling on, he came to various cities where he always met with further pleasant experiences. Yet then things changed. Upon arriving in a new city, its gates closed behind him as soon as he entered. At its central square he had to witness a horrible scene: a man being tortured by a wheel of knifes circling above him and cutting off the flesh of his head. Asking the reason for this, the Bodhisattva learned that this man had once mistreated his mother. Being thereby reminded of his own behavior towards his mother, the iron wheel immediately jumped from the other man’s head to his own. Under horrendous pain he was now told that he would have to bear the wheel for 66,000 years and could only be redeemed if someone else turned up with the same kind of karmic guilt. Upon hearing this, the Bodhisattva felt such a strong compassion that he decided to carry the wheel for ever so that never again would anyone else have to suffer this pain. The moment he uttered this vow, the wheel disappeared.56 Apparently referring to this story, which Śāntideva could assume to be well known by his audience, he speaks of the “immeasurable merit” gained by someone who wishes to eliminate the headache of beings. Accordingly, the merit would be infinitely greater by someone “who wishes to liberate every single being of unmatched pain…” (vss. 21-22). Śāntideva does not employ this story only to lure listeners to the immeasurable merit produced by bodhicitta. He uses the inconceivability of the Bodhisattva’s compassionate decision in this story to underline the utter inconceivability of perfect bodhicitta. No one, no mother nor father, no deity, not the Vedic “seers” (ṛṣī) nor any of the chief Brahma-deities has ever had this kind of desire, “not even in a dream” and “not even for their own sakes” (vss. 23-24). How, then, is it at all possible that a being is born who harbors this inconceivable desire for the well-being of all (vs. 25)? In a world caught in the web of selfishness, is the realization of perfect altruism not complete fiction? “Whence shall come” such a being “who eases all pain and even removes delusion?” – asks Śāntideva in vss. 29-30 and leaves his question unanswered. He takes it on faith that the Buddhas and the major celestial Bodhisattvas are such beings and 56  Avadānaśataka 36. See Schlingloff 1963, 73f. For the reference to this story see Kheno Kunpal’s commentary; Amtzis, Deweese, eds., 2004, vol. 1, 247.

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that they manifest the perfection of bodhicitta. As such they are indeed “unparalleled” (vs. 25) and elicit admiration and veneration. This is how Śāntideva imagines that the second motivation for bodhicitta works: Witnessing or contemplating acts of goodness evokes spontaneous feelings of praise, of acknowledging the goodness of the good deeds. This, says Śāntideva, is true even for minor acts of goodness. Someone is seen as praiseworthy if he does something good in order to return a favor; how much more so is a Bodhisattva who does good to others without this kind of motivation (vs. 31). Almost cynically, Śāntideva states that someone is honored even if he just donates, in a condescending manner, “one pitiable meal” to those who are needy and thereby extends “their lives by half a day.” How much more so will someone arouse praise who satisfies the infinite number of beings forever (vss. 32-33)? This is to be taken quite literally. If the Bodhisattva vows to remain in samsara until all are saved and if the number of beings is actually infinite, as is apparently supposed in a number of Mahāyāna texts, he will stay there forever. Acknowledging and indeed praising goodness wherever it is seen presupposes not only the appeal of the good but, by implication, the existence of something in our mind or heart that is able to resonate with this appeal. Allowing oneself to be attracted by the perfection of goodness as it is seen in the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, which is the inner logic of their veneration, is for Śāntideva a means of awakening their spirit within oneself. In this sense he can say that the fruit which arises from a mind devoted to the Buddhas overturns the fruit of evil (vs. 35). Moreover, for Śāntideva there is no alternative: there is nothing in between a life dominated by the defilements and a life moving towards Buddhahood, that is, a life driven by bodhicitta. Not acknowledging the goodness of the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, but raising evil thoughts against them pushes one to the hells that are the fruit of evil (vs. 34).57 Yet on the other hand, the compassion and mercy of the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas is truly all-encompassing and hence they will even work particularly towards the salvation of those who in their delusion have turned against them, which encourages Śāntideva to take refuge in their boundless mercy (vs. 36; see also 2:6).58 The last word 57  The reference in vs. 34 is presumably to the Praśāntaviniścayapratihārya-sūtra, quoted in ŚS 85 with the words: “As often, O Manjuśrī, as one Bodhisatva cherishes towards another feelings of hatred or contempt, for so many aeons he must make up his mind to abide in the nethermost hells.” Bendall, Rouse 1922, 88. 58  The remark in vs. 36 that in relation bodies of the Bodhisattvas “even wrong doing results in happiness” seems an indirect reference to a verse from the Upāyakauśalya-sūtra

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about hells is thus one of optimism, which will become explicit in BCA 10:4-16. How else could it be if bodhicitta is really stronger than all evil? The appeal of bodhicitta is its compassionate nature providing a refuge even for the sinner. This explains why focusing in loving veneration (bhakti) on the Buddhas’ and Bodhisattvas’ goodness is the appropriate attitude from which bodhicitta may arise, as will become fully evident in the next two chapters of the BCA. A Christian may once more feel reminded of the spirit of Christ, who prayed on the cross that those who tortured him to death may be forgiven because in their delusion they “know not what they do” (Lk. 23:34). There is no question that for Christians, Christ is as much an incarnation – an embodiment – of all-embracing selfless love and compassion as the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas are for Śāntideva. He “worship(s) their bodies” because of “this excellent jewel of spirit” (vs. 36) that they embody, just as Christians worship Christ’s body on the cross as an embodiment of the same spirit. Daisetz Suzuki once famously remarked that “(w)henever I see a crucified figure of Christ, I cannot help thinking of the gap that lies deep between Christianity and Buddhism.”59 Suzuki found the sight of the crucified Christ “almost unbearable,”60 “a terrible sight … with the sadistic impulse of a psychically affected brain.”61 “What is needed in Buddhism is enlightenment, neither crucifixion nor resurrection,”62 and so Suzuki sharply contrasted the image of the crucified Christ with the images of the Buddha sitting in serene meditation or the Buddha lying peacefully when entering final Nirvana, both images expressive of his awakening. Although Suzuki understands that crucifixion and resurrection symbolize in their own manner a way to oneness, he nevertheless replies: “Could not the idea of oneness be realised in some other way, that is, more peacefully, more rationally, more humanly, more humanely,

that is quoted in ŚS 168. Tatz (1994, 45) translates it as: “Even to the defiled they are givers of well-being.” This relates to the story of the Bodhisattva Priyaṃkara. He was so handsome and attractive that his appearance aroused heavy sexual passion in women. But through his miraculous powers he caused all women lusting after him to be reborn in heaven as men, which in Mahāyāna was considered advantageous. In this sense Śāntideva says: “I worship their bodies in which this excellent jewel of spirit has arisen, against which even wrong-doing results in happiness,” apparently alluding thereby to the story and verse from the Upāyakauśalya-sūtra. 59  Suzuki 2002 [1957], 113. 60  Ibid. 117. 61  Ibid. 119. 62  Ibid. 116f.

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less militantly, and less violently?”63 Suzuki’s polemical confrontation completely neglects that according to the Buddhist tradition, both Mahāyāna and non-Mahāyāna, the Buddha, too, had to undergo several cases of self-sacrifice, generally seen as the “perfection of giving,” the perfection of selflessness in conjunction with utter benevolence, before he finally achieved the serenity of full awakening.64 Śāntideva understands it as an essential aspect of bodhicitta that it involves the readiness to suffer for the benefit of others, even up to and including sacrificing one’s life: “If the suffering of many comes to an end through the suffering of one, then a compassionate one must by all means develop this suffering for others and for himself” (BCA 8:105). A more appreciative comparison of the image of Christ and the image of the Buddha in the context of their veneration might thus correlate the suffering Christ with the depiction of the suffering Bodhisattva, and the resurrected or ascended Christ with the awakened Buddha, rather than following Suzuki’s antagonism between crucifixion and resurrection on one hand and bodhi (enlightenment/ awakening) and parinirvāṇa (final entry into nirvāṇa upon the Buddha’s death) on the other.65 Śāntideva’s central question of how bodhicitta may arise provokes the parallel inquiry of how the spirit of Christ arises in his followers. I suggest that the two ways envisioned by Śāntideva – the selfish desire for merit and fear of punishment on one hand, and the inner appeal of the altruistic spirit itself on the other – can also be identified in Christianity. They may even apply to other religious traditions as well. An example from the Islamic tradition is the instructive anecdote told about the early Muslim mystic Rābi’a of Basra (d. 801), who once went through the streets of Basra with a burning torch in one of her hands and a bucket of water in the other. When asked what she was going to do with these, she replied: “I want to throw fire into Paradise and pour water into Hell so that these two veils disappear, and it becomes clear who worships God out of love, not out of fear of Hell or hope for Paradise.”66 The motivation of finding one’s own salvation (and avoiding damnation) is undeniably of crucial importance in all religions of salvation. But it appears that the spirit of salvation itself implies this self-centered motivation being 63

 Ibid. 120.  See also below, Part II, chap. 3, pp. 164-167. 65  On this, see Paul Hedges’ important suggestion that the idea of the suffering Bodhisattva and the suffering of Christ may be reciprocally illuminative (Hedges 2016). 66  Quoted after Schimmel 1975, 38f. 64

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transformed into a motivation triggered by the appeal of a reality other, greater or deeper than the ego-self, one that is intrinsically connected with the spirit of love and compassion. To Christians, the appeal of Christ’s love is rooted in the belief that it reveals God’s love. According to the First Letter of John (4:9), it is the love of God that was made manifest in Jesus. As has been shown above, according to Paul it is this spirit of God that was in Christ. This has its basis in Jesus’ own self-understanding inasmuch as he considered his own merciful deeds as imitating the unrestricted mercy of the “father.” Thus he encouraged his followers to do the same (Lk. 6:36).67 Seeing Jesus’ love as reflecting God’s love gives Christian love a responsive note. If Christ’s love reveals the love of God, one is encouraged to follow Christ not only because of the goodness of his love, but because of being the recipient of God’s love. Receiving love triggers a loving response, which from a Christian perspective is directed towards one’s neighbor as it was practiced by Christ. Seeing the glory of God in Christ, the follower of Christ is transformed into Christ’s image “through the spirit” (2 Cor. 3:18). To a Christian, the presence of all-embracing love in the midst of the world is in the end as much of a miracle as it was to Śāntideva: a miracle in the genuine and theologically qualified sense of a “miracle” as a sign of God’s presence. The topic of following Christ by imitating Christ has become a central feature of classical Christian spiritual literature, the best known example being Thomas à Kempis Imitatio Christi to which – as we have seen68 – the BCA has more than once been compared. The imitation of Christ has also been understood by much of Christian spiritual theology as a process, as a kind of gradual transformation often designated as “sanctification” or “deification” or “divinization” (theosis). This may be compared to Śāntideva’s idea of the further development of bodhicitta by actually following the Bodhisattva path up to its final completion in the attainment of Buddhahood. The church father Irenaeus of Lyon (2nd cent.) explains the process of deification as the fulfillment of the true destiny of human beings. He thus understands the Biblical idea that humans were created in the “image of God” (imago dei) as the presupposition for their transformation into the “likeness of God” (similitude dei). In this sense, the Eastern orthodox tradition of Christianity has seen the coming of Christ as the fulfillment of the creator’s intention, 67 68

 See Vermes 1981, 44; Vermes 1993, 157ff, 200ff.  See above, Part I, chap. 3, p. 73.

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expressed in the famous statement that God became human so that humans might become God (Athanasius of Alexandria, 4th cent.). Śāntideva, in line with the bulk of the Mahāyāna tradition, assumes that the spiritual journey on which the Bodhisattva embarks will take enumerable lives before finally reaching its completion. This implies a radical revaluation of reincarnation: once being born as “a son of the Buddha” through the arousal of bodhicitta, reincarnation will no longer be the meaningless roaming about in samsara, but the basis for the Bodhisattva’s gradual perfection (through the practice of the pāramitās) until attaining Buddhahood, the journey’s goal.69 Traditional Christianity, however, has tended to confine the time of the process of sanctification or deification to just one lifetime. Some contemporary theologians have therefore speculated whether Christianity may become more hospitable to the idea of further progressive sanctification beyond death. For the Sri Lankan Methodist theologian Lynn de Silva (1919-1982), this speculation was the direct result of his dialogue with Buddhism,70 for John Hick (1922-2012) it was partly the result of his dialogue with Buddhism and Hinduism and partly an implication of his “soul-making” or “person-making theodicy.”71 Others, such as Geddes MacGregor (19091998), developed their speculations about progressive sanctification primarily out of philosophical and inner-Christian considerations.72 This is to some extent also true of the influential Roman-Catholic theologian Karl Rahner, who argued regarding the contemporary understanding of purgatory that nothing “decisive (can) be said against the notion of a personal maturation in this interval,” that is, between death and ultimate fulfillment, and raised the question whether the doctrine of purgatory “could not be a starting point for coming to terms in a better and more positive way with the doctrine of the ‘transmutation of souls’ or of ‘reincarnation,’ which is so widespread in eastern cultures (…).”73 Other 69  On the idea of a gradual perfection over a long series of reincarnations as a presupposition of the Bodhisattva path, see Steinkellner 2003. 70  See de Silva 1968; 1982a; 1982b. Like Karl Rahner, but more decidedly so, de Silva suggests reinterpreting the doctrine of purgatory in terms of progressive purification or sanctification after death. 71  See Hick 1985. The inner connection between Hick’s theodicy and his eschatology can best be seen from Hick 1990, 88-105, 145-160. While Hick initially affirmed progressive sanctification after death but rejected the idea that this might take place through reincarnations in this world, at a later stage he became more open also to the latter possibility (see Hick 1999, 241-252; 2009, 191-206). 72  See MacGregor 1978; 1982. 73  Rahner 1978, 442.

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theologians, however, are more skeptical, either about the whole idea of progressive sanctification after death, or, in particular, about reincarnation, seeing it as incompatible with the Christian belief in the uniqueness of each person. For the moment we will have to leave this question at this stage and take it up again once we have gained a fuller and better understanding of how reincarnation is presented in the BCA.74 The two subsequent chapters (BCA 2 and 3) form an inner unity and need to be read in conjunction. Together they present the liturgical sequence of a more or less standardized Bodhisattva ritual, or more precisely, a bodhicittotpāda ritual, that is, a ritual meant to foster the arousal of bodhicitta,75 also referred to as anuttarapūja (“supreme worship”). The ritual as found in the BCA can be divided into eight different sections76: sections 1-4 in BCA 2 and sections 5-8 in BCA 3. Śāntideva, however, is far from just outlining a liturgical format. He rather performs the ritual (at least in writing), thereby making the reader not only a witness of the worship, but implicitly drawing him into it. The remainder of chapter 3 presents the immediate outcome of the ritual: Śāntideva’s dedication to all beings, his commitment to the Bodhisattva path and his exuberant rejoicing in the newly found meaning of his life. The origins of the ritual, as Wangchuk suggests, do not only lie in the evolving formal ritualization of the profession of the Bodhisattva vows (the vows to strive for Buddhahood for the sake of all beings), but may go back to the ancient ritualized Buddhist practices of formally undertaking the monastic rules (prātimokṣa), including the processes of confessing transgressions and the ritualized restauration and subsequent declaration of the Sangha’s purity.77 Yet as is undeniably evident from the text itself, central parts of the ritual owe their specific form and flavor to the impact of the Hindu bhakti movements, which were on the rise at the time of the BCA’s composition, that is, religious movements celebrating divine love and grace as the root of our salvation.

74

 See below, Part II, chap. 2, p. 152; chap. 4, p. 190; chap. 8, pp. 377-384.  See Wangchuk 2007, 180f. 76  Dayal 2004, 54-58, suggests a structure of six parts that combines parts 1 and 2, and 6 and 7. While the number of the ritual’s parts differed in the tradition preceding the BCA, in most cases it seems to have consisted of seven sections (see Śāntideva 1995, 9ff). See also below, Part II, chap. 2, pp. 142f, fn. 4. 77  See Wangchuk 2007, 176-179. 75

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BODHICARYĀVATĀRA 2 CONFESSION OF SINS (PĀPADEŚANĀ)

TRANSLATION: 2:1-25 Bodhisattva ritual 1. Extolment 1. In order to obtain this spiritual jewel, I properly worship the Buddhas, the flawless jewel of the True Teachings, and the Sons of the Buddhas, the oceans of virtues.

2. Offering 2.-6. All the flowers and fruits and various herbs, and all the clear and enchanting precious stones and waters that exist in the world, the mountains made of gems, the pleasant clearings in the woods favorable to seclusion, the vines that radiate with their adornments of beautiful flowers, and the trees whose branches are weighted with magnificent fruits, and the scents and fragrances in the worlds of the gods and others, the wish-granting trees and the trees of precious stones, the lotus-filled ponds, so charming with the songs of their wild geese, the wild plants and cultivated plants or all the other adornments for those who are to be worshiped, and everything that belongs to no one within the expanse of the space, I embrace all this with my mind and offer it to the eminently Wise Ones with their Sons. May they accept it, they to whom the best offerings are due and who in their great compassion take pity on me! 7. Without merits, I am very poor; I have nothing else for an offering. May the Masters, who are [always] thinking of the welfare of others, thus accept this for my welfare by virtue of their powers! 8. I give myself completely and utterly to the Victors and their Sons. Seize me, you exalted beings! Out of loving devotion (bhakti), I will become your servant (dāsa). 9. Having been taken possession by you, I now live without fear. I work for the salvation of all beings. I am leaving the evils of the past behind me and no longer commit other evils. 10.-11. In fragrant bath houses, bewitching with their columns of glowing gems and radiant beaded canopies, and floors of clear and shining crystals, with

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many jugs made of precious stones that are full of pleasant scents, water, and flowers, I prepare a bath for the Buddhas and their Sons with songs and instruments. 12. And I dry their bodies with fragrant, immaculate and priceless cloth. I then hand them exquisite, beautifully dyed and well-perfumed robes. 13. With heavenly, many-colored shimmering robes that are soft and fine, and with exquisite jewelry I adorn Samantabhadra, Ajita, Mañjughoṣa, Lokeśvara and the other Bodhisattvas. 14. With the best perfumes, whose fragrance spreads through all three thousand worlds, I anoint the bodies of all kings of the Wise Ones, which glisten like well-refined, well-polished and well-washed gold. 15. With all the fragrant, delightful blossoms like those of the coral tree, the blue lotus and jasmine, I worship the venerable kings of the Wise Ones, and with heart-warming braided garlands. 16. I burn incense for them with clouds of smoke, enchanting with its heavy, pervading scent. And I present them an offering of many different soft and firm foods and of drinks. 17. I offer them lamps made of gems standing on golden lotus blossoms, and I toss all sorts of lovely flowers onto the tiles sprinkled with perfume. 18. To these beings of love I offer countless radiant celestial palaces decorated with hanging garlands of pearls and adorned with sweet songs of praise filling all directions. 19. To the great Sages I offer magnificent tall parasols of gems beaded with pearls and with elegant golden shafts. 20. Let rise up henceforth the heart-warming clouds of offerings and the clouds of music and choirs that bring bliss to all beings! 21. And may flowers and gems and other precious things incessantly rain down upon all the jewels of the true teachings, upon the shrines, and upon the icons! 22. Just as Mañjughoṣa and the other Bodhisattvas revere the Victors, also I revere the protecting Buddhas with their Sons. 23. I praise these oceans of virtues in hymns with seas of harmonious tones. May countless choirs of praise rise up to them unaltered! 24. As many atoms as are there in all the Buddha fields, so often do I throw myself down before the Buddhas of all three times, with the Teaching and the most excellent Community. 25. I greet all the shrines and all the abodes of the Bodhisattva. I bow before the venerable teachers and ascetics.

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COMMENTARY 1. Evoking the Spirit by Venerating Its Incarnations Śāntideva opens the Bodhisattva ritual not simply by the usual homage to the “three jewels” of Buddha (or “Buddhas”1), Dharma and Sangha (once more substituting the saṅgha with the Bodhisattvas, for him the true saṅgha). Right from the start he emphasizes the objective of the ritual: “to obtain this spiritual jewel,” i.e. the “spirit of awakening.” He insists that the way he venerates the three jewels is the “proper” (samyak) form of “worship” (pūjā) – which may perhaps indicate an awareness of the strong (Hindu) bhakti influence on this ritual. In any case, why should it be wrong, from his perspective, to worship the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas in more or less the same way as Hindus worship their deities? After all, it is his view that the compassionate spirit adored in the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas infinitely surpasses (and perhaps fulfills?) any spiritual values that one might recognize in the Hindu deities and Vedic seers (BCA 1:23). Śāntideva admits his poverty: What he can offer to the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas is only in his mind – although this comprises all of the beauty of this world. He asks them to accept his offer (vss. 2-6), for he is not only poor (daridra) in terms of worldly possessions (presumably indicating his monastic status) but also in terms of religious merit (apuṇya) (vs. 7). So he relies on their great compassion and is confident that they will have mercy on him (vs. 6). After all, it is the spirit of “thinking only of the welfare of others” (vs. 7) that they embody and only as embodiments of this spirit are they worshiped. In light of their pity, Śāntideva has more to offer than the beautiful gifts in his imagination: He dares to give himself “completely and utterly to the Victors and their sons,” i.e. the Buddhas and the Bodhisattvas (“victor” = jina is a traditional epithet of the Buddha, because of his victory over all negative forces). He becomes their servant out of bhakti, “loving devotion” (vs. 8). This act of self-surrender has two implications: first his own commitment to their altruistic spirit, expressed in his willingness to turn away from evil, and second his taking refuge in their protection (see vss. 22, 33, 51), which liberates him from fear in view of his past failures (vs. 9). Just as in Hindu bhakti, in which the human love of God is inspired by 1  The affirmation of a plurality of Buddhas is of course crucial in the Mahāyāna context, where all Bodhisattvas strive to become Buddhas themselves.

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God’s prior love for humans, Śāntideva’s loving devotion to the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas is responsive, too, and triggered by the compassion and love that they have for him. Because they have shown themselves as “beings of love” (maitrī = “loving kindness,” vs. 18), he can express his love to them in the tender and highly emotional ways characteristic of the bhakti ritual. In verses 10-24 we find all of the typical features of a bhakti inspired pūjā.2 The Buddhas and Bodhisattvas or their representational icons (pratimā) (vs. 21) are bathed and their bodies dried, are clothed with beautiful garments, and perfumed and anointed like kings. They are offered flowers, flower garlands, lamps, incense, music and hymns. They are served food and drinks. Gems, garlands of pearls, parasols and celestial palaces are presented to them as signs of acknowledging their royal status. In all of this, says Śāntideva, he follows the manner the Bodhisattvas themselves revere the Buddhas (vs. 22) and expresses his own total self-surrender by prostrating before the three jewels innumerable times (vs. 24). Apart from Mañjuśrī, here referred to as Mañjughoṣa (vss. 13 and 22), who as we saw in our analysis of the Śāntideva legend stands in a special relationship to this text and its supposed author,3 the BCA mentions the celestial Bodhisattvas Samantabhadra, Ajita and Avalokiteśvara (here as Lokeśvara). Samantabhadra plays a prominent role in the Lotus Sūtra, where he figures in the final chapter as the object of devotion and visualization, and in the Gaṇḍavyūha-sūtra, to which Śāntideva already referred twice in chapter 1. According to a tradition based on the Gaṇḍavyūha-sūtra, Samantabhadra made ten vows, vows that reflect most of the structure of Śāntideva’s Bodhisattva ritual4: the vow of 2  On the practice of pūjā in the Hindu context, see Rodrigues 2006, 227-234; and Narayanan 2007. On the ritual veneration of the Buddha within Theravāda Buddhism, see Crosby 2014, 43-68. 3  See above, Part I, chap. 2. 4  Crosby and Skilton (Śāntideva 1995, 9) assume that before the BCA these vows (as embodied in the Gaṇḍavyūha-sūtra) “provided, for several centuries at least, a widespread model for the Supreme worship.” See also Williams 2009a, 137f., who points out the similarity between Samantabhadra’s vows and the Tibetan Bodhisattva ritual, which depends largely on the BCA. According to Idzumi (1930, 228) the recitation of the Hymn on Samantabhadra’s Vows “formed a regular part in the Buddhist service already in the seventh century (…).” The hymn itself seems to mention (vs. 12) six limbs of the liturgy: “Salutation, Offering, Sympathetic Joy, Request, Solicitation” (Idzumi 1930, 236). This may imply that the liturgy existed before this hymn was composed, but not necessarily so. It could also indicate that the hymn was a major factor in the creation or, at least, further configuration of the ritual. In any case, the relationship is clearly very

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venerating (1) and praising the Buddhas (2), of making offerings to them (3), of admitting his sins (4), of rejoicing in the good (5), of requesting the Buddhas to teach (6) and to stay in the world (7), of following their teachings (8), of benefitting all living beings (9) and of transferring his merit to them (10).5 Moreover, Samantabhadra is associated with the ultimate basis of all Buddhas and hence is sometimes identified as the ultimate root and personification of bodhicitta.6 “Ajita” is another name for Bodhisattva Maitreya, who is known and revered in all strands of Buddhism as the Bodhisattva who will be the next Buddha in our world.7 Avalokiteśvara is probably the most popular Bodhisattva of all, generally seen as the most perfect expression of boundless compassion.8 Together with Mañjuśrī, the Bodhisattvas mentioned represent and personalize different aspects of bodhicitta: its aspects of wisdom (associated with Mañjuśrī) and compassion (associated with Avalokiteśvara), its aspect of being the root of all Buddhas (Samantabhadra) and of its inner dynamism towards future Buddhahood (Maitreya). Regardless of whether such symbolism is intentional or Śāntideva is just giving a random sample of the most popular Bodhisattvas, the text leaves no doubt that these Bodhisattvas are venerated as embodiments or incarnations of bodhicitta. As can be seen from verse 25, this veneration also has a more mundane dimension. It is, to some degree, extended to Buddhist shrines and temples, including the pilgrimage sites marking the places where the Bodhisattva, that is, Siddhārtha Gautama, lived before he became a Buddha, and to “the venerable teachers and ascetics” who keep the spirit alive. Venerating the celestial Bodhisattvas as incarnations of the spirit involves, as we may conclude, reverence to the Buddhist “church,” with her institutions and clergy. There is a communal dimension in Śāntideva’s

close. The ŚS refers to the hymn (as Bhadracarya) several times in its comments on the Bodhisattva liturgy (see ŚS 290-297). ŚS 13, however, also quotes a passage from the Bhaiṣajyaguruvaidūryaprabha-sūtra, which mentions the ritual in its form having seven limbs. 5  See Cook 1991, 78. For Samantabhadra’s vows towards the end of Avataṃsakasūtra 39 (= Gaṇḍavyūha-sūtra), see Cleary 1993, 1511-1518. There is also a close connection between Samantabhadra and Mañjuśrī. According to Idzumi (1930, 229) “the Hymn was known at one time in its history as Mañjuśrīpraṇidhāna and not as Samantabhadra-praṇidhāna.” 6  See Wangchuk 2007, 105, 228. 7  On the meaning of Maitreya in different Buddhist traditions, see Sponberg, Hardacre 1988. 8  On Avalokiteśvara, see Williams 2009a, 221-226.

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spirituality, which, though not a focal point, pops up at various places in the text. The basic thought underlying Śāntideva’s version of the Bodhisattva ritual is well expressed in a statement of the Śikṣāsamuccaya: “… this thought of enlightenment is produced by the sight of the Visible Body of Buddha” (ŚS 10).9 The appreciation, veneration and loving devotion to the concrete Buddhas and Bodhisattvas as embodiments of bodhicitta triggers the arousal of the same spirit in one’s own mind, which finds its expression in one’s own dedication to their aim of saving all beings and in one’s complete self-surrender. The material or mental offerings reach their climax and inner telos in this act of self-commitment. Again one is reminded of the theology of Paul, who encourages the followers of Christ “by the mercies of God, to present your bodies as a living sacrifice, holy and acceptable to God, which is your spiritual worship. Do not be conformed to this world, but be transformed by the renewal of your mind…” (Rom. 12:1f). The responsive nature of Christian love, pointed out above, has a clear parallel in Śāntideva’s confidence that he may surrender himself to the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas because their unbound compassion embraces him as someone short of spiritual merit. The Buddhas and Bodhisattvas are not merely models and prototypes of a compassionate life. They also bring about a compassionate mind in their worshippers by making them experience themselves as recipients of compassion. This, I think, gives us a clue for a better understanding of the next section of the ritual: the confession or admission of sins. As noted above, all the constitutive features of the bhakti inspired pūjā are present in Śāntideva’s veneration of the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. But what about the most crucial part of it: darśana, the seeing and being seen by the deities? The “sight” of the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas is manifest, but the aspect of being seen by them seems to be expressed more indirectly, that is, being exposed to the eyes of the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas is reflected by the awareness of one’s own shortcomings in the light of their compassion.

9  Bendall, Rouse 1922, 11. Literally: “… is [also] arisen on the sight/on seeing the form-body (rūpakāya) of a Buddha” (E. Steinkellner). The “form-body” can either refer to the physical appearance of a Buddha or to his supranatural “body” (saṃbhogakāya), which is usually the object of meditational “vision.” Both types of form-bodies are represented in idols, statues, paintings, etc.

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TRANSLATION: 2:26-66 3. Refuge 26. I take refuge in the Buddha until I have gained the essence of awakening. I take refuge in the Teaching and in the host of Bodhisattvas.

4. Admission of sins 27. To the Fully Enlightened Ones in all directions and the Bodhisattvas with great compassion, I declare with folded hands: 28.-29. All of the sins that I, blind creature, have committed in the beginningless cycle of existences or here in this life, or have merely caused, those that I have approved because of my blindness to the harm they cause me, I confess these crimes now, tormented by remorse. 30.-31. All the offenses I have committed in body, speech and mind due to malice toward the three jewels, toward my father and mother or other worthy persons, the terrible sins that I, sinner corrupted by many defilements, have committed, I confess all this, oh Guides.10 33. But how can I escape this? Protect me quickly! Let not a quick death overtake me before my sins have been erased! 34. Death does not ask what we have done or not done; it destroys us through our blind confidence. Neither the strong nor the ailing can trust it, the unexpected lightning bolt. 35. I have often sinned for matters pleasant and unpleasant. I did not realize that I must give up everything and go away. 36. Those I dislike will no longer be; he who is dear to me will no longer be; I myself will no longer be; nothing will any longer be. 37. Everything I experience will become memory; everything will be gone as if a vision in a dream and will not be seen again. 38. While I have lingered in this world, numerous friends and foes have passed away, but the sins I have committed because of them stand before me dreadfully. 39. I did not recognize that I, as they, am a passing traveler. Due to delusion, to affection and hate, I have sinned many times. 40. Life declines day and night without ceasing and no increase occurs. Why should I not die?

10  According to Steinkellner, vs. 32 is presumably interpolated: “But how can I escape this? I am always in fear, oh Guides. May death not quickly happen to me when the mass of (my) sins has not been erased!”

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41. Although I’m lying here in bed and my relatives are around me, I must bear all the pain slicing my guts alone. 42. When you have been grasped by the messengers of Yama, where is a relative, where a friend? Merit alone is then salvation, but that is not something I have cared for. 43. Out of fondness for the vagrant life, besotted I have accumulated many sins without realizing the peril, oh Lords. 44. Even someone who is led away today to have one of his limbs cut off dries up, is thirsty, looks wretched, and sees the world upside down. 45.-46. And what, then, will happen to me when the gruesome messengers of Yama have snatched me, when I have been devoured by horror and fever, have been defiled by the flowing of my feces, and when I search for escape everywhere with fearful glances? What good one will deliver me from this great peril? 47. If I have found no salvation in the world and have fallen back into confusion, what will I then do in this place of great terror? 48. Right now I take refuge in the mighty Lords of the world, the Victors who strive to save the world and who take all fear. 49. With all my heart, I take refuge in the Teaching they have realized, which ends the horror of the cycle of existences, and in the host of Bodhisattvas. 50. Beside myself with fear, I give myself to Samantabhadra, and also to Mañjughoṣa I give myself of my own accord. 51. To Avalokita, the Lord of fully compassionate nature, in dread I shout a cry of pain. May he protect me, sinner! 52. In search of salvation, I shout to the noble Ākāśagarbha and to Kṣitigarbha with all my heart, and to all others with great compassion. 53. I bow before the Bearer of the Vajra, at whose sight the evil ones, the messengers of Yama and others, flee in horror in all four directions. 54. I have violated your commandments; I now see the peril and in dread take refuge in you. Make an end to this peril swiftly! 55.-56. Even when frightened of a passing illness, one does not ignore the words of the physician; how much less so if someone has been gripped by the four hundred and four diseases, of which only one is sufficient for all the people in our world to perish, and against which one finds no remedy in any direction. 57. Yet I ignore the word of the omniscient physician who eliminates all pain. Disgrace to me in my abysmal blindness! 58. I stand with extreme caution also at other abysses, how much more so at the unending abyss of thousands of miles. 59. Death will certainly not come today! This comfort fits me not. Unavoidably, the hour nears when I shall no longer be. 60. Who has made me fearless, or how am I going to escape? Certainly I shall no longer be. Why does my mind remain calm?

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61. What wealth is left to me of what I once enjoyed and now is gone, what I was so fond of that I ignored the word of the Master? 62. I will leave this world of the living, of relatives and friends, and go somewhere alone. Of what use to me then are all friends and enemies? 63. This thought alone then suits me by day and by night: Suffering inevitably follows sin. How can I escape it? 64.-65. All of the sins that I, deluded fool, have amassed, all that is offensive by nature and offensive by the rules, I confess all of this in front of the Lords and throw myself again and again at their feet with folded hands and full of fear of suffering. 66. May the Lords recognize my transgressions for what they are! They are reprehensible, oh Lords. I do not want to commit them again.

COMMENTARY 2. Facing the Abyss and Finding Refuge The section starts with the traditional words of taking refuge to the “three jewels” – once more replacing the Sangha with the Bodhisattvas (see vs. 1:1) – and expresses that this taking refuge is a constant process until the goal of awakening is attained (vs. 26). This is followed by the next limb of the liturgy, the confession. However, verses 27-66 contain far more than merely a confessional formula, though elements of such a formula are clearly present. Śāntideva speaks about his transgressions in fairly general terms as “offenses … committed in body, speech and mind” (vs. 30) – or in “thought, word and deed,” as it is phrased in Christian liturgies. This refers to the three basic forms of human conduct: mental, verbal and bodily actions, which produce either bad or good karmic tendencies. In Buddhism mental action is generally seen as the source from which verbal and bodily actions spring.11 Such transgressions include not only “deeds” directly committed by oneself, but also transgressions that one has indirectly but deliberately caused or approved (vss. 28-29). Śāntideva characterizes his sins as expressions of “malice toward the three jewels,12 my father and mother or other worthy persons” (vs. 30), a list that is obviously reminiscent of the traditional “five grave offences” (ānantara karma) leading inevitably to hell: killing one’s mother, one’s father, an arhat, maliciously shedding the blood of a 11 12

 See above, Part II, chap. 1, p. 115.  I.e. buddha, dharma (teaching, eternal law, truth) and saṅgha (order, community).

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Buddha, or creating a schism in the Sangha.13 Śāntideva is thus admitting that the presence of at least the mental root of such grave offences is in himself. He interprets his “sins” as violations of the commandments given by the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas (vs. 54) or as acts “offensive by nature and offensive by the rules” (vs. 64), the later presumably referring to the Buddhist “instructions” in general, which include the precepts for lay followers and monastics. A more specific kind of confession is found much later, in BCA 7:37f, where Śāntideva admits that he had “not fulfilled the hopes of the poor,” “not given fearlessness to those in fear,” “nor … made the tormented happy.” In the present section, Śāntideva confesses his sins as manifestations of his blindness (vs. 28), in a form that goes far beyond a confessional formula: a meditation (or lamentation) on the interconnectedness of “sin” (pāpa), death and “blindness” or delusion (moha), constituting an existential abyss from which one can be saved only through the great compassion embodied in the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. In presenting the connection between death, sin and blindness, Śāntideva draws on insights from the core of traditional Buddhist teachings, though he presents these in a radicalized way characteristic of Mahāyāna developments. A central feature of human ignorance (avidyā) is denying or suppressing one’s own transience. The truth of Freud’s famous statement that “in the unconscious every one of us is convinced of his own immortality”14 lies at the bottom of the early Buddhist understanding of delusion or ignorance. It is graphically expressed in Buddhist stories like that of Kisāgotamī, who learns the reality of death only when her own baby dies, or of the four excursions of Siddhārtha Gautama, who by encountering an old, an ill and a dead man realizes his own mortality for the first time in his life.15 This usual but nevertheless deluded way of living, namely, as if one were immortal, is echoed in the above verses (e.g. 34-36, 39f, 59f). Śāntideva gives the realization of one’s own mortality an even stronger form by presenting death as both the end of the ego and of the world – at least of the world as experienced by the ego: “I myself will no longer be, nothing will any longer be” (vs. 36; see also 2:60). In the light of death, the world appears unreal like a dream, “everything will be gone as if a vision in a dream” (vs. 37). This is the sitz im leben, the existential and experiential basis of 13

 E.g. AN 5:129 (PTS III 146).  Freud 1974, 289. 15  See Schmidt-Leukel 2006, 20-22; 30f. 14

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the philosophical explanation of conventional reality as a dream. Śāntideva expounds on this in BCA 9 (see 9:151). Not repressing the idea of one’s mortality and becoming aware of life’s transience is the first step to understanding that life is only ostensibly real, that its nature is ultimately unreal. The delusion of living as if one were immortal is accompanied by several fateful consequences. According to traditional Buddhist teaching, it leads, first of all, to attachment to the perishable things of the world, since one ignores that nothing can be kept forever. Not realizing that one “must give up everything” (vs. 35), one clings to what is pleasant and averts the unpleasant, that is, one develops the three basic defilements seen as the root of all evil: greed, hate and delusion, referred to (for the first time in the BCA) in 2:39. In an ancient text from the canonical Nikāyas, greed is explained as the deluded reaction to a pleasant sensation and hate as the deluded reaction to an unpleasant sensation (AN 3:68). All three defilements are thus interrelated and together they are responsible for the production of immoral deeds, since these arise from greed and hate. They are the roots of the sins of which Śāntideva speaks (vss. 35, 39). And “sin” inevitably leads to suffering (vs. 63). This needs to be understood in two ways: it causes suffering to others, as the immediate result of one’s mistreating them, and it causes suffering to oneself. The latter is again understood in a twofold sense: one’s future suffering under a bad rebirth, e.g. in one of the hells, as a result of one’s negative karma, and the immediate suffering due to the inherently unsatisfactory nature and inevitable loss of what one clings to. In this section, however, Śāntideva seems to focus on the first type of suffering, the negative karmic consequence of suffering in hell (see vss. 44-46). Old age, disease and death are traditionally addressed as the messengers of Yama, a deity associated with the realm of death and hell.16 With the arrival of these messengers, one inevitably realizes one’s own mortality and sees how much of one’s life was spent mindlessly. Remembering one’s misdeeds and shortcomings creates tremendous fear, not just of death, but of the inevitable horrors of hell. In fact, one is brought to a state even more miserable than that of someone condemned to bodily mutilation (vss. 38-47). This fear could have been prevented by leading a life mindful of one’s transience, listening to the word of the Buddha and putting his teachings into practice. The Buddha is praised, throughout

16

 Sometimes “birth” is also counted among the messengers of Yama, e.g. in MN 130.

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the Buddhist tradition, as “the omniscient physician who eliminates all pain” (vs. 57). No one, even when suffering from some sort of ordinary illness, would ignore the words of a good physician who is able to cure the disease (vs. 55). But Śāntideva’s understanding of the human condition is grimmer. One’s delusion is so strong that one even ignores the healing words of the Buddha. Delusion is truly abysmal (vss. 57f, 61). None of one’s friends can help and the situation seems hopeless (vs. 62f). The only hope is the boundless compassion of the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, which embraces even those who in their utter blindness have ignored their words and violated their commandments. It is their great compassion to which Śāntideva takes his refuge, thus relieving his existential fear (vs. 48-54). In the end, it is only in the light of their compassion that he is ready and able to admit his sins and face the abysmal nature of his blindness (vss. 27, 32f, 64f). Śāntideva does not explain how their compassion will protect him from the consequences of his negative karma. As we saw above, he is convinced that the awakening of bodhicitta by taking refuge in the Bodhisattvas creates positive karmic energies which are infinitely stronger than the negative ones and “burn these up.”17 He personalizes the power of bodhicitta in the form of asking the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas for forgiveness.18 This idea seems to be invoked here as well, when he prays to them to “make an end” to the peril of his negative karma (vs. 54). Yet what exactly is he asking for in this prayer? Most probably his plea is based on the idea of merit transfer, which is so closely associated with the Bodhisattva ideal. The protection granted by the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas would thus be through the power of their own infinite merit. When transferred to the sinner, who himself has no merit to offer (vs. 7), this overturns the power of his negative karma or demerit and thereby saves him from being lost in abysmal delusion. Śāntideva can rely on the Bodhisattvas’ readiness to transfer their merit to him because this is what they have vowed to do. He can be sure that his sins will not prevent them from doing this because of their perfection of kṣānti (“patience/forbearance”), which implies their readiness to forgive. The whole idea of merit transfer is thus another expression of compassion. In the end, it is the spirit of compassion that saves. It is a spirit that comes from beyond the web of defilements (a “beyond” that may also be imagined as one’s true nature). At the sight of this spirit, embodied 17

 Cf. BCA 1:14. See above, Part II, chap. 1, pp. 117-120.  See above, Part II, chap. 1, p. 119. See also BCA 6:124.

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in the Bodhisattvas, the messengers of Yama “flee in horror in all four directions” (vs. 53).19 Is this not another way of saying that love is stronger than death (Songs 8:6)? Despite Śāntideva’s serious wish for betterment (vs. 66), he is convinced that taking refuge in the Buddha, the Dharma and the Bodhisattvas is something he will have to repeat, not only for the rest of his life, but for innumerable lives until he himself once becomes a Buddha (vs. 26). Śāntideva’s skepticism about the ability of deluded beings to observe the word of the Buddhas and his reliance on the compassion of the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas in relation to human sinfulness is indicative of a particular development in Mahāyāna Buddhism, one that is particularly manifest in so-called Pure Land Buddhism, a fairly ancient strand of Mahāyāna. This strand finds its climax in the views of Shinran Shōnin (1173-1262), according to whom any religious “self-effort” is doomed to miss its goal of liberation, since it only reinforces one’s deluded selfcenteredness. And yet, the redeeming force of unbound and unconditioned compassion, embodied in Buddha Amitābha (= Amida), which appears to the “self” as an “other power,” is ultimately the true nature in and of everything.20 Although Śāntideva does not go as far as Shinran, one can, at least retrospectively, discern the presence already in the

19  This is said in view of the Bodhisattva Vajrapāṇi, who originally functioned as a kind of guardian of the Buddha. He is often depicted with a particularly strong, herculean kind of appearance, so that it is quite fitting when Śāntideva describes him as shying away the messengers of Yama. Yet even so, he embodies compassion. In the ŚS (274) Śāntideva quotes from the Tathāgataguhya-sūtra and gives the following explanation of how Vajrapāṇi acquired his extraordinary strength: “There are ways, sir, by which a Bodhisattva obtains strength like this. And what are they? In this world, sir, the Bodhisattva renounces body and life, but he does not renounce the Good Law. He bows before all creatures, and does not let his pride grow. He is compassionate to weak creatures, and does not dislike them. When any are hungry he gives them the best food. When any are frightened he gives them protection. When any are ill he exerts himself for their complete cure. The poor he rejoices with plenty. At a shrine of the Tathāgata he does repairs with a lump of plaster. He lets people hear pleasant speech. He goes share for share with those afflicted with poverty. He carries the burdens of the weary and exhausted. These are the ten ways, sir.” Bendall, Rouse 1922, 251f. The Bodhisattvas Ākāśagarbha and Kṣitigarbha appear frequently as a pair, Ākāśagarbha (the “Space Womb”) being associated with insight into universal emptiness, and Kṣitigarbha (the “Earth Womb”) being particularly known for his vow to empty the hells. Ākāśagarbha is explicitly mentioned in the ŚS (64f). On the other three Bodhisattvas mentioned in vss. 50f, see above, pp. 142f. 20  For two brief overviews on Shinran, see Unno 1996 and Williams 2009a, 259-266. For more extensive treatments, see Ueda 1989; Ueda, Hirota 1989; and (from a Christian perspective) Keel 1995.

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BCA of this development,21 which puts reliance on grace above reliance on self-effort.22 Moreover, Śāntideva’s radicalization of human lostness is once more reminiscent of Pauline theology, particularly Paul’s confession of his own inability to do what is good in the well-known chapter 7 of his Letter to the Romans. Like Śāntideva in vss. 46 and 63, Paul too cries out “Wretched man that I am! Who will deliver me from this body of death?” (Rom. 7:24) while putting his trust in the compassionate spirit of God as it has become manifest in Jesus. There is a final aspect that deserves to be addressed before we move on to the next sections of the ritual in chapter 3. In view of the inevitability of death, Śāntideva repeats three times that after death, “I myself will no longer be” (vs. 36 and vss. 59f). If this is to be taken literally, one might ask how serious he really is about the prospect of having to face horrific punishments in hells. Would this not entail his “ego” continuing to exist? Later in the BCA Śāntideva indeed claims that any concern for one’s future well-being in the next life is actually not for oneself: “The idea is wrong that also thereafter there will be none but me, because only someone has died and only another is born” (BCA 8:98). From this perspective of the insubstantiality and transience of an “ego” that is not going to survive its death, how should we then understand all this fear of hells? As we will see, the part it plays in Śāntideva’s considerations is not insignificant. But for the moment, until we have gained a fuller understanding of Śāntideva’s views, we must leave the question at this.

21  In fact, Pure Land Buddhism is not entirely absent from Śāntideva’s thought. Sukhāvatī, the pure land created by Buddha Amitābha, is explicitly mentioned in BCA 10:4 and referred to in 7:44. It is also mentioned in the Hymn on Samantabhadra’s Vows (vss. 49, 57-62), on which the Bodhisattva liturgy seems to be modelled (see Idzumi 1930, 240f) and in Nāgārjuna’s Suhṛllekha, vs. 121 (see Kawamura 1975, 91). 22  I therefore disagree with Matics’ view that “even here” the text in the end “places the essential emphasis … upon nothing more than self-help” (Śāntideva 1971, 41). His interpretation is based on a reading of vs. 2:7 (“let the Lords … accept this through my own effort,” ibid. 148), which is significantly different than the present translation as well as the Tibetan interpretation of the verse, which speak of the power of the Bodhisattvas. I do, however, agree with both Dayal 2004, 56, and Matics in Śāntideva 1971, 40, that relying on the Bodhisattvas is in line with the bhakti spirituality which is so vividly displayed in this chapter.

CHAPTER 3

BODHICARYĀVATĀRA 3 ADOPTING THE SPIRIT OF AWAKENING (BODHICITTAPARIGRAHA)

TRANSLATION: 3:1-9 5. Joyful approval of goodness 1. With joy I find pleasure in the goodness that has been accomplished by all beings and through which the suffering in bad destinies comes to an end. May the oppressed be happy!1 2. I find pleasure in delivering all creatures from the sufferings in the cycle of existences. I find pleasure in the bodhisattva-nature and buddhahood (buddhatva) of the Saviors. 3. I find pleasure in the fact that the Masters, ocean-like, yield the spirit of awakening which brings happiness to all beings and to all beings brings ease.

6. Request for instruction 4. With folded hands I implore the perfect Buddhas in all directions: May they light the lamp of the Teaching for those who have stumbled into suffering due to delusion!

7. Request to stay 5. With folded hands, I request the Victors who wish for final release (nirvāṇa): May they stay for endless ages! May this world not be blind!

8. Offering of merit 6. Through the goodness I have gained in this way, may I be able to allay all the suffering of all sentient beings.

1  Between stanzas 1 and 2, the Tibetan version of the BCA has a verse not found in the Sanskrit version: “I rejoice in the accumulated virtue that acts as a cause for enlightenment.” (see Wallace and Wallace in Śāntideva 1997, 33). Tibetan commentaries therefore follow a different verse numbering, with vs. 2 becoming vs. 3, etc.

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7. I am a remedy for the sick. May I, as well, truly be a physician and a nurse for them until the disease no longer returns. 8. Through showers of food and drink may I quench the agony of hunger and thirst. May I be drink and food during the periods of starvation in the small eons. 9. May I be an inexhaustible treasure for beings in need. May I stand by them with manifold forms of support.

COMMENTARY 1. Resonating With the Spirit After presenting the first four sections of the Bodhisattva ritual in BCA 2 (extolment, offering, refuge, confession), verses 1-9 of BCA 3 render the last four sections (joyful approval of goodness, requesting [the Buddhas] for instruction, requesting [the Buddhas] to stay, offering/dedication of merit).2 While the sequence clearly mirrors the vows of Samantabhadra,3 a close comparison with the text of the “Hymn on Samantabhadra’s Vows” (Samantabhadra-praṇidhāna) also reveals the distinct and creative nature of the version in the BCA. In the Samantabhadrapraṇidhāna (vs. 9), for example, the fifth section of the ritual, “rejoicing in goodness,” is expressed in a rather dry and scholastic way: And what is the happiness of all beings, the Learners, the non-Learners, Pratyeka-Buddhas, Bodhisattvas, and all the Buddhas, in the ten quarters, – for all that I feel sympathetic joy.4

BCA 3:1-3 gives this a much more vivid character and different accentuation. The central feature, muditā, i.e. “sympathetic” or “appreciative joy,” is traditionally one of the four “divine abidings” (brahmavihāra) – loving kindness, compassion, sympathetic joy, equanimity – that is, one of four interconnected states of one’s mind which one needs to cultivate on the Buddhist path.5 Śāntideva restores and intensifies this original connection of muditā with karuṇā (compassion): The good he 2  Note that the whole liturgy forms a single chapter in the Dūn-huáng version of the BCA. See above, Part I, chapter. 1, p. 4, fn. 6. 3  See above, Part II, chap. 2, pp. 142f. 4  Idzumi 1930, 235. 5  Traditionally karuṇā is the loving/equanimous mental attitude in the face of people’s suffering and muditā the loving/equanimous mental attitude in the face of people’s (spiritual) well-being. See also Schmidt-Leukel 2006, 53f; 68f.

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rejoices in is the goodness of ending people’s suffering and of relieving them from their pain (vs. 1b). It is the good of mercy and compassion that gives reason to rejoice. And this good, as Śāntideva emphasizes, springs from bodhicitta (vs. 3), which constitutes the true nature of the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas (vs. 2).6 In response to Śāntideva’s question of how it is possible for the selfless spirit of awakening to arise within selfish and deluded beings (see vs. 1:25), I identified two different motivations: first, the paradoxical motivation of a self-centered interest which realizes that selfless bodhicitta produces the highest merit, and second, the inner appeal of the good itself.7 Given that for Śāntideva the key purpose of the Bodhisattva ritual lies in the generation of bodhicitta, these two fundamental motivations are operative in how Śāntideva presents and “performs” the liturgy. While the first motivation plays a particular part in the confession of sin insofar as the averting of demerit and hell is an implication of longing for merit, the second motivation is dominant in the joy that Śāntideva feels – and intends his audience to feel – at the nature and work of the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas: such joy is a joyful resonance with their compassionate spirit. When he feels delight at “the fact that the Masters (…) yield the spirit of awakening which brings happiness to all beings and to all beings brings ease” (vs. 3), this “yielding” has a twofold sense: First, the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas yield bodhicitta within themselves and the joyful result of this yielding is their own work for the ease and happiness of all beings (cf. vss. 3:22-23). Second, the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas yield bodhicitta also in the sense that by their example they inspire and evoke bodhicitta in other beings who venerate them and decide to follow and imitate them. In this second sense, Śāntideva can state at the end of BCA 3 that he invites all beings to enter the path to Buddhahood: that is, having himself become a “Buddha-son,” he too wishes to evoke bodhicitta in all beings (cf. vs. 3:33). Śāntideva also rejoices in that the masters, through bodhicitta, bring happiness and ease “to all beings” (vs. 3). The vow to strive for the salvation of all sentient beings and, even as an accomplished Buddha, not to 6  Note that in BCA 3:2 Śāntideva is not talking about “Buddha Nature” in the doctrinal sense of the tathāgatagarbha teaching. In the present passage, bodhisattvatva and buddhatva refer to the essential nature or meaning of what it is to be a Bodhisattva or Buddha. Nevertheless, this is a further piece of evidence that Śāntideva sees bodhicitta in functional analogy to the Buddha Nature doctrine. See above, Part I, chap. 1, p. 11; chap. 3, pp. 62f, Part II, chap. I, p. 120. 7  See above, Part II, chap. 1, pp. 129f.

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leave samsara before this goal has been achieved, is a standard feature of the Bodhisattva ideal. After the completion of the ritual Śāntideva commits himself to this striving “as long as all have not yet been released” (vs. 3:21). The deeper reason for this universal scope of the vow is the undifferentiated nature of Buddhist love (maitrī) and compassion (karuṇā), that is, its equal extension towards friend and foe as opposed to the preferential nature of ordinary love.8 If loving compassion is practiced without making any differences between people, then nobody is excluded. But does the all-embracing salvific intent of the Buddhas imply that actually all beings will be saved? For various reasons, this question is difficult to answer. In pre-Mahāyāna Buddhism it is deliberately left open. The Buddha is compared to a gate keeper who knows the door but not how many will pass.9 Within the context of Mahāyāna it is often assumed that the number of sentient beings is literally infinite so that the salvific activity of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas would never come to an end.10 Moreover, some influential Mahāyāna texts are unclear about the question of whether some people, called icchantikas, might perhaps be irredeemable.11 But what is beyond dispute is the unrestricted scope of great compassion, extended to all, including the icchantikas, which at least gives rise to universal hope. Philosophical backing is given to such hope when the emptiness of all beings is understood as implying that – at the level of true reality – they are already saved (cf. BCA 9:104, 151). Though most12 Christians happily share the confidence that the redeeming love of God as it has become manifest in Jesus Christ is of a similarly all-embracing nature, excluding none, the Bodhisattva ideal may still present a wholesome challenge: Has Christian trust in the boundless love of God produced a similarly strong soteriological optimism, or has it found far too often an insurmountable restriction at the gloomy and desperate belief in eternal, irredeemable damnation – as expressed in Dante’s Divine Comedy where he infamously supplies the gates of hell with the inscription: “All hope abandon, ye who enter

8  On this, see also ŚS 19: “Thus he must educate his mind that he may feel in each case the same affection for all creatures that naturally centres in his son, or in himself.” Bendall, Rouse 1922, 21. 9  See AN 10:95. 10  See also BCA 1:32f. 11  See Liu 1984. 12  Except, perhaps, those who endorse an interpretation of the doctrine of double predestination in the sense of predetermination instead of timeless knowledge.

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here”? Can Buddhism encourage Christianity to increase and widen its hope?13 The next two sections of the Bodhisattva liturgy (vss. 4-5) follow from the affirmation of the Buddhas’ and Bodhisattvas’ unrestricted compassion, and express the practitioner’s confidence in the form of prayer: Relying on their compassionate resolve to work for the salvation of all, the Buddhas are requested not to leave samsara (though they could, had they not vowed the contrary) and to continue enlightening the deluded ones “for endless ages.” This kind of prayer leaves no doubt that this is indeed what they will do and is thus just a different form of expressing one’s faith and hope as based on their compassionate spirit. The liturgy ends – as does the whole text of the BCA in chapter 10 – with the offering or dedication of merit to all suffering beings. With this act the ritual has achieved its goal: After resonating with the compassionate spirit of awakening, the practitioner attunes to and generates this spirit in himself by dedicating all his spiritual efforts and achievements to the welfare of all others. Through this he becomes a Bodhisattva or – given the regular practice of the ritual – renews his commitment to the Bodhisattva path. Śāntideva expresses this dedication in four meaningful images (vss. 6-9): he wants to become “able to allay all the suffering of all living beings” like a good physician or nurse who is able to cure this disease. In this case, the role model is clearly Gautama Buddha himself, who is often praised as the good physician throughout the Buddhist tradition – as also in the preceding verses of BCA 2:55-57. The Buddha brings healing through his teaching. The Four Noble Truths are traditionally compared to the medical procedure of stating the symptoms, diagnosing their cause, prognosticating the curability and applying the therapy.14 But the Buddha also takes care of his “patients” in a more immediate and corporal sense, as for example in the famous passage of the Vinaya where he, like a nurse, tends to a monk suffering from diarrhea (see Mv 8:26:1-4). The three further images employed in vss. 7-9 13  I fully agree with Anthony Kelly’s and Werner Jeanrond’s call for an “Inter-Hope Dialogue” (cf. Jeanrond 2013, 74-77). But it is somewhat surprising how little attention the issue of Christian eschatological pessimism in contrast to Buddhist soteriological optimism is given in this otherwise fine collection of essays on hope in Buddhism and Christianity (Harris 2013; see however, the contribution of Peggy Morgan, especially p. 125f). See also the rather hesitant discussion of Christian belief in eternal damnation in contrast to Buddhism by Leo Lefebure in Lefebure, Feldmeier 2011, 297-303. For a positive reply to this Buddhist challenge, see Largen 2009, 157f. 14  As for example in Vimutti Magga 11:2. See Ehara, Soma, Kheminda 1977, 275.

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(medicine, food/drink, treasure) have close parallels in the eighth chapter of the influential Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra, which is considerably older than the BCA, probably dating from the 2nd or 3rd cent. CE. Śāntideva may in fact be drawing on this source,15 because the phrase of the “small” or “short eons”16 (vs. 8) echoes the respective section in the Vn: “During the short aeons of famine, they [viz. the Bodhisattvas] become food and drink.”17 The images of medicine for the sick, food and drink for the starving and inexhaustible treasure for those who are needy relate to fundamental and, no doubt, at the time of Śāntideva omnipresent situations of human need and suffering: disease, starvation, poverty. These are taken as pars pro toto of painful human dependency, and as his wish “May I stand by them with manifold forms of support” (vs. 9) shows, the Bodhisattva commits himself to being at their avail and to become their help and support. But in what sense is he doing this? The answer to this question depends in part on whether one interprets the dedication or transfer (pariṇāmanā18) of merit19 according to a transaction or a transformation20 model: In the transaction model, the Bodhisattva transfers his karmic merit to those who are lacking in good karma in a way analogous to a financial transaction – a sum of money being transferred from one account to another in order to balance the latter’s deficit.21 According to the transformation model the transfer is not, at least not directly, to another beneficiary but to a different purpose: The Bodhisattva transforms the usual intention of making merit for one’s own benefit by dedicating his merit to the purpose of awakening, “so that it will not contribute to his rebirth in heaven or to other worldly rewards, but to his future attainment of Buddhahood. (…) Other beings will of course benefit from this transformation, but only in the distant future when the bodhisattva has succeeded in becoming a 15

 Chapter 8 of the Vn is extensively quoted in ŚS 324ff.  According to Buddhist cosmology, a certain period during the existence of a universe. 17  Thurman 1976, 70. 18  This would be the usual term. However, it is not found in the text of the BCA, apart from the, perhaps secondary, title of chapter 10. 19  BCA 3:6 reads śubha (“goodness,” “anything auspicious”), which is also used in vss. 3:1 and 3:10, instead of the more usual puṇya (“merit”) as in vss. 1:17 or 1:19. Śubha refers to anything “good” or “right” that one does, as for example in 7:42, where it is distinguished from puṇya. Yet both terms seem to be used interchangeably in vss. 10:1-2. 20  I borrow this term from Nattier 2003, 114. 21  The image famously used by Dayal 2004, 188-193. 16

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Buddha (…).”22 Instead of the analogy of a financial transaction, this can be illustrated by drawing on Śāntideva’s own image of becoming a physician: The diligent student of medicine does not undertake the pains and efforts of his studies primarily for his own benefit, e.g. to become an honored and wealthy doctor, but ultimately for the benefit of his future patients by becoming able to cure their diseases. In this case the merit is also dedicated to others, but in a more indirect sense. Both concepts seem to be present in the BCA. The transaction model, for example, is apparently presupposed in parts of the BCA’s chapter 10, and, as we have seen, underlies Śāntideva’s turning to the celestial Bodhisattvas in asking for their protection and even forgiveness.23 Hence it is feasible that also in BCA 3:6-9 Śāntideva is intending to transfer the merit resulting from his performance of the ritual to all beings in the sense of the transaction model. He would be (or become) medicine, food, and money for the needy ones insofar as his merit earns them exactly this kind of this-worldly blessings from which he himself refrains by giving away his merit to them. But I suggest that the present passage can also be understood in the sense of the transformation model (as it is obviously the case in BCA 10:51-57). This would be more in line with the respective verse in the “Hymn on Samantabhadra’s Vows” (vs. 12), which states at the end of the ritual: “Whatever goodness, accumulated by me accruing from the Salutation, Offering, Confession, Sympathetic Joy, Request, Solicitation, all this I dedicate towards awakening.”24 In the transformation model, Śāntideva dedicates his merit – any merit, but also the merit resulting from the performance of the ritual25 – to his own further progress on the Bodhisattva path so that through his spiritual advances he will become increasingly more able to alleviate others’ suffering, a process which will be completed only when the full awakening

22  Nattier 2003, 114f. This is the concept of merit transfer (pariṇāmanā) as it is found at the early stages in the development of the Bodhisattva ideal, as Jan Nattier has pointed out on the basis of her studies of the Ugraparipṛcchā, a text frequently referred to in the ŚS. 23  See above, Part II, chap. 2, pp. 149-151. 24  Idzumi 1930, 236. 25  Traditionally, the veneration of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas is in itself believed to be a meritorious act. But according to Śāntideva it should be seen as part of the transformation model. The sheer desire for the well-being of others is more meritorious than the veneration of the Buddhas (1:27). Serving the sentient beings is the true veneration of the Buddhas (6:125-127) and the veneration of the Buddhas is meritorious precisely because they have realized and inspire such altruistic spirit (6:112-117).

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of Buddhahood is finally gained.26 So in a sense, through the act of merit dedication, at the end of the ritual he reminds himself of the reason he is performing the liturgy at all: to proceed on the path not for his own benefit but for the sake of those who suffer.27 Though these two concepts of understanding the dedication or transfer of merit are clearly different, they don’t need to be seen as contradictory.28 The relationship between the two concepts may in fact be very close insofar as the dedication of merit along the lines of the transaction model contributes to the further spiritual development of the Bodhisattva. In the transaction model, the donation of one’s merit is itself an act of selfless giving, a giving that as such immediately generates new merit of the kind that promotes progress on the path toward full awakening.29 This is expressed in a typically paradoxical way in ŚS 147: “Only from renunciation comes the success of one’s own acts.”30 Perhaps Śāntideva is thinking of both models when he summarily says about the Bodhisattva (BCA 5:101): “Be it directly or indirectly, he should only act for the benefit of all beings, and alone for the sake of all beings, he should orient everything toward awakening.” Ultimately the way towards awakening requires both models to be relativized: “One must exercise oneself in making no difference between others and self, if the thought of becoming a Buddha is to become strong. Self and not-self exist only relatively (…).”31 From this perspective all merit will always be for oneself as well as all others.

26  This interpretation coheres to some extent with the views of Nagao (1991, 83-90) and Clayton (2006, 76-88), who suggest that the dedication of merit entails that the Bodhisattva employs his merit as a means to remain in samsara for the benefit of all beings. 27  Paul Williams also speaks in relation to the transfer of merit as “a constant reminder of the reason for undertaking the long journey to full enlightenment” (Williams 2009a, 203). 28  Charles Goodman (2009, 91f) has argued strongly in favor of an understanding of the present passage in terms of the financial transaction model. Yet I think that he unnecessarily constructs a strict “either-or” situation in his interpretation of Śāntideva’s ethical thinking. 29  This is affirmed in ŚS 147 and indirectly in ŚS 158: “When merit has been applied to enlightenment, there is no interruption in the root of good till he be seated under the Bo-tree….” Bendall, Rouse 1922, 156. See also ŚS 18, which states that “the growth of purity should be fostered in due manner by constantly preserving thus the renunciation of self, goods, and merit.” Ibid. 20. 30  Ibid. 144. 31  ŚS 357. Ibid. 315.

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The distinction between the two models is however important in that the transformation model allows for the possibility that the Bodhisattva can, and intends to, support suffering beings not merely through his mental acts of merit transaction. The statement in BCA 3:9 and the preceding images may then be read as the firm dedication to help needy ones also through charitable action.32 Though the Bodhisattva will be able to render perfect service only as the future Buddha that he wants to become, he nevertheless can make himself available to people’s needs while still on the path towards awakening. To do so is an integral element of this path. This understanding, as we will see in more detail in the discussion of the next section, is supported by the fact that according to the ŚS (kārikā 4) and the BCA (3:10), the dedication of merit is part and parcel of a threefold act of giving that involves the surrender of one’s 32  This still leaves the question of how such action is reasoned. According to Amod Jayanti Lele (2007), Śāntideva’s spiritual ethics do not support the following ideas: “first, that great suffering comes from material deprivation and other’s wrongdoing; second, that deprived people gain an inherent benefit from coming to acquire the material goods they lack; third, that one will be led to prevent wrongdoing, especially violence, out of compassion for its victims; …” (Lele 2007, 6). Lele’s two main arguments are that, first, according to Śāntideva there is no benefit in having or receiving material goods and that, second, it can be very beneficial to be the victim of wrongdoing if one understands this as an opportunity for overcoming anger. According to Lele’s interpretation of Śāntideva, the Bodhisattva will therefore not make material gifts in order to alleviate the suffering resulting from poverty, but only to produce esteem in the recipient’s mind for the Bodhisattva and the Bodhisattva path, and that he will not prevent the wrongdoing of other in order to protect their victims, but in order to protect the wrongdoer from the negative karmic consequences. Though Lele’s observation regarding the spiritual benefit of voluntary renunciation and the spiritual opportunity of developing forbearance when being victimized are correct in relation to those who have entered the Bodhisattva way, it does not follow that they also apply in relation to the Bodhisattva’s compassion with the ordinary “worldling” or – as often related in a number of Jātakas – with animals who indeed suffer dire straits or from being the object of violence. Though the compassion of the Bodhisattva will ultimately aim at leading all beings to Buddhahood (see BCA 3:33 and 10:1), this does not exclude that compassion also triggers actions providing more immediate forms of relief. The task of the Bodhisattva is thus twofold: to help the deprived and victimized in their present needs, and to gradually lead them to a deeper understanding of the roots of suffering, thus guiding them towards the Bodhisattva path. This twofold aim is clearly expressed in a number of the verses in Vn 8, as for example in our case: “During the short aeons of famine, they become food and drink. Having first alleviated thirst and hunger, they teach the Dharma to living beings.” Thurman 1976, 70. This corresponds to the example set by Gautama Buddha, who not only taught non-attachment to the monk suffering from diarrhea, as one may speculate he perhaps did, but also attended – and obviously primarily so – to the monk’s more immediate needs by washing and nursing him, as the text affirms beyond speculation (Mv 8:26:1-4).

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person, one’s enjoyments or goods (bhoga) and one’s merits to those in need.33 Emerging from the Bodhisattva ritual as someone who has himself become a Bodhisattva (or has renewed his commitment) means that through the ritual’s different sections bodhicitta has been brought forth. After recognizing the ultimate merit of altruistic selflessness and the supreme joy evoked by contemplating the goodness of its manifestation in the work of the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, Śāntideva resonates with their spirit, and in following their example, he too devotes his life to the redemption of all beings. The Bodhisattva ritual has thus reached its end by signifying and effecting the generation of bodhicitta, which is of course not a conclusion but the beginning of, and initiation into, a new life. Given that a “sacrament” is understood in much of the Christian tradition as a “sign and instrument” of grace, one might appropriately call the Bodhisattva ritual a sacramental enactment of bodhicitta. The attractiveness of the good, to which Śāntideva appeals, and the spiritual effect of its contemplation are presumably at the heart of any religion: “whatever is true, whatever is honorable, whatever is right, whatever is pure, whatever is lovely, whatever is of good repute, if there is any excellence and if anything worthy of praise, let your mind dwell on these things” writes Paul in Philippians 4:8. He too knows of the resulting joy and its beneficial outcome: “Rejoice in the Lord always; again I will say, rejoice! Let your forbearing spirit be known to all men” (Phil. 4:4). As much as the Bodhisattva liturgy is intended to make people resonate with the “spirit of awakening,” Paul encourages the followers of Christ to resonate with Christ’s spirit, which is poured into their hearts. In both cases this resonance means practicing kindness and forbearance and alleviating the suffering of fellow beings. Here and there the inspiration to do so comes from beyond and is mediated by the incarnations of the spirit: Christ, Buddhas, Bodhisattvas. So far, the ritual dimension of Buddhist practice and the bhakti elements in Buddhist spirituality have been largely neglected in Buddhist‒Christian dialogue.34 While it would be tempting and presumably enriching to venture a more detailed comparison of the Bodhisattva liturgy with Christian forms of ritual practice (given the commonalities and differences between Christian and Buddhist liturgical expressions of exhortation, offering, 33

 Cf. Mahoney 2002, 69-91.  For Marianne Moyaert’s important call to pay more attention, in comparative theology, to the ritual dimension of religious life, see Moyaert 2018. 34

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confession, exaltation, prayer and dedication), I will confine myself to underlining the strong analogy in the sacramental function of liturgical enactment: in both traditions the ritual is meant to generate what it signifies – evoking the imitation of Christ and the imitation of the Buddha, as we are now going to see. Only then will I be in a position to discuss the now obvious issue of still more striking analogies between the dedication of merit, particularly in its transactional sense, and some interpretations of the Christian doctrine of atonement. TRANSLATION: 3:10-23 Self-surrender 10. All my lives and enjoyments, the merit that I will have acquired in the three times, I sacrifice without misgiving in order to realize the goals of all beings. 11. Release (nirvāṇa) is the leaving behind of everything: and my mind strives for release. If I have to give up everything, it is better to give it to all beings. 12.-13. I have left this body to all living beings to do with as they like. May they beat me without end, may they revile me, cover me with dust, may they play with my body, deride it, mock it. I have given them the body, so what do I care? 14. May they let me accomplish works that bring them pleasure; but may no harm ever come to anyone who attends to me! 15. May those who are angry or dissatisfied with me precisely for that reason always achieve all their goals! 16. Those who slander me and harm me, who mock me, may they all obtain awakening! 17.-18. May I be a protector of the defenseless, a guide for the traveler, for those who wish to reach the other shore, a boat, a dam, a bridge, a lamp for those who need a lamp, a bed for those who need a bed, a servant for all beings who need a servant! 19. May I be a wish-fulfilling jewel for living beings, a treasure vase, a magic formula, a miracle herb, a tree that grants wishes and a wish-fulfilling cow! 20.-21. Just as the earth and the other elements are useful in many ways for the inestimable number of beings inhabiting the endless space, so may I also benefit in many ways all the beings harbored by the space, as long as all have not yet been released!

Bringing forth of the spirit of awakening. 22.-23. Just as the earlier Buddhas have grasped the spirit of awakening (bodhicitta), and as they have remained ever steadier in the practices of a

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bodhisattva, so too would I like to bring forth the spirit of awakening for the benefit of the world, and in just this way I wish to perform these practices one after the other.

COMMENTARY 2. Imitation of the Buddhas Śāntideva commits himself to the salvation of all beings by a threefold act of “giving” (dāna): the surrender of his life (or, in the context of reincarnation: lives), possessions or goods (bhoga = literally “enjoyments”) and merit (vs. 10). While this threefold surrender provides the basic structure of the ŚS,35 the current passage of the BCA focusses on the first aspect of “giving”: self-surrender.36 The term ātmabhāva (“all my lives”), used here (vs. 3:10) and in the ŚS, cannot be reduced to bodily existence but includes the whole person in its corporal and mental dimensions,37 although the body (kāya) plays a prominent role. Complete self-surrender – in all of one’s lives – is the ultimate form of “giving” (dāna). It is the first and foremost of the six Bodhisattva virtues (pāramitā) because it constitutes the matrix of the Bodhisattva’s existence as radical pro-existence. The ŚS underlines this succinctly in stating: “giving is the Bodhisattva’s awakening.”38 The BCA makes the same point in vs. 11 but gives it an illuminating twist in combining “giving” with one of the most crucial features of Buddhist spirituality: “nonattachment”: “Release (nirvāṇa) is the leaving behind of everything: and my mind strives for release. If I have to give up everything, it is better to give it to all beings.” From the early beginnings of Buddhism onwards, the principal reason for non-attachment is the impermanence of all things (apart from nirvana), or, from an existential perspective: the reality of death. Death will inevitably separate us from everything that we blindly believe to possess, including our “own” bodies. In the face of impermanence, attachment only causes suffering. The key to liberation lies therefore in that kind of 35

 As has been convincingly shown by Mahoney 2002.  The offering of merit has already been addressed in vss. 6-9. The fact that not more attention is given here to the surrender of possessions or enjoyments may indicate that Śāntideva is primarily writing for a monastic audience. 37  See also Mrozik 2007, 23, following Luis Gómez. 38  ŚS 34, quoted from the Ratnamegha, but put in a prominent place as the conclusion of the ŚS’s first chapter; Bendall, Rouse 1922, 36. 36

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insight which leads to genuine inner detachment. Inasmuch as, according to the Buddhist teaching of not-self (anātman), attachment culminates in the identification of one’s possessions and one’s bodily-mental existence as “self” or as “belonging to the self,” detachment culminates in surrendering all forms of self-centeredness. The clou of vs. 11 is making detachment, as the door to nirvana, beneficial to other beings: If everything, including one’s bodily existence, is to be given up – either, involuntarily and painfully, through the process of dying or, voluntarily and liberatingly, through the process of mental detachment and selflessness – it can also be given away to other beings.39 And the latter, says Śāntideva, is “better” or “best” (vara). Why? The answer is based on the intuition of the superior value of release with compassion over release without compassion – an intuition backed by the conviction that universal emptiness supports compassionate release rather than private (or selfish) release. Why else should such giving to all beings be better than mere detachment? It is this intuition/conviction that Śāntideva sees materialized in the life of the Bodhisattva. The “spirit of awakening” finds its paradigmatic expression in the “perfection of giving” (dānapāramitā) practiced by the Bodhisattva. Verses 10-11 are thus Mahāyāna Buddhism in a nutshell: the union of detachment and compassion in the act of complete self-surrender. In the Upāsakaśīla-sūtra (chap. 9) the Buddha is asked: “World-honored One, how does a true bodhisattva know that he himself is a true bodhisattva?” The Buddha replies: “If a bodhisattva does not spare his body and life, he definitely knows that he is a true one.”40 The ultimate test on the realization of bodhicitta is the readiness of giving/sacrificing one’s life. There is a long tradition behind this view. On the one hand it goes back to the canonical statement in the popular Metta-Sutta that the true norm of selfless and boundless love is the love of a mother who “would protect her only child at the risk of her life.”41 On the other hand the prime example and role model is once more Gautama Buddha, or more precisely, Gautama Buddha in his previous lives as the Bodhisattva. In many of the Jātakas, the canonical or semi-canonical “records” of these lives, the focus is on the spiritual development of the Bodhisattva

39  The inner connection between the experience of transience, detachment and giving as the best form of detachment is also illustrated in ŚS 18-20. 40  Shih 1994, 43. 41  Sutta Nipāta 149 (1:8). Saddhatissa 1985, 16.

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towards his future Buddhahood.42 At the center of this focus is the “perfection of giving,”43 while “the gift of the body is consistently described not as an ordinary act of dāna but as the paradigmatic example or fullest embodiment of dāna-pāramitā.”44 The gift of the body is seen as the fullest manifestation of compassionate pro-existence. In several Jātakas the Bodhisattva gives himself, viz. his flesh, quite literally as food to the starving, as for example when he feeds his own flesh to the hungry tigress who is about to eat her own cubs, or when in an earlier life as a hare he presents himself as a meal to a begging ascetic. He literally becomes “drink and food” (BCA 3:8) in the story about his life as an elephant that throws itself off a mountain in order to provide its flesh to seven hundred starving men as food and its entrails as water bags.45 Quite obviously this kind of becoming “drink and food” for the needy is not understood in terms of merit transaction, but as concrete embodied action within a transformational concept of merit dedication. The central role of self-surrender and bodily sacrifice for the Bodhisattva ideal is firmly rooted in the pre-Mahāyāna Jātaka tradition.46 On his own way to Buddhahood, the Mahāyāna follower walks in the footsteps of that particular Bodhisattva who finally became Buddha Gautama. This developed into the firm conviction in Mahāyāna (again with solid pre-Mahāyāna roots) that this is the path of all Buddhas, one which all Bodhisattvas must adopt. This is the conviction underlying vss. 10-23, being most clearly stated in vss. 22-23: In his own practice of bodhicitta, Śāntideva follows the example of “all the earlier Buddhas.” Given the special importance of the “gift of the body” for the Bodhisattva ideal, the ambivalent relationship to one’s body – either as a prime object of attachment or as an instrument of “giving” in the sense of altruistic proexistence – is a topic that will reappear throughout the further text of the BCA under various aspects. One specific aspect is introduced in verses 12-16: how bodily surrender works against the vice or defilement (kleśa) of hate/anger (a topic that Śāntideva will develop more fully in BCA 6). The experience of 42

 See Ohnuma 2007, 36.  Ibid. 45. 44  Ibid. 46. Similarly ibid. 168. 45  For these and other examples, see Ohnuma 2007, 273-283. 46  In the Rāṣṭrapālaparipṛcchā-sūtra – a text quoted several times in the ŚS – the Buddha gives a long list of examples, taken from the Jātaka tradition, of how he, during his former lives, sacrificed himself or parts of his body for the sake of other beings. See Boucher 2008, 131-136. 43

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being beaten, reviled or derided is a typical situation of hate producing new hate, as is so succinctly stated in Dhammapada 3-5, where this prominent text of the Buddhist tradition recommends not giving room to thoughts like “He reviled me! He struck me! He defeated me!”47 Śāntideva’s understanding, in line with the early Buddhist tradition, is that this can only be done if one has become detached from one’s body: “I have given them the body, so what do I care?” (vs. 13). Yet in combining detachment with compassion he goes further, declaring his wish that those who harm him should not only never suffer any negative karmic consequences from their actions (vs. 14), but on the contrary that their mistreating him should ultimately contribute to their own achievement of awakening (vss. 15-16).48 This loving attitude towards one’s enemies finds still another example in one of the early Buddhist teachings. In the famous parable of the saw,49 the Buddha encourages his followers: “… even if bandits were to sever you savagely limb by limb with a twohandled saw (…) you should train thus: ‘Our minds will remain unaffected, and we shall utter no evil words; we shall abide compassionate for their welfare, with a mind of loving-kindness, without inner hate.’”50 Self-surrender and the gift of the body are not confined to surrendering oneself to evildoers. It has a much broader range, implying, as Susanne Mrozik summarizes, that Bodhisattvas “use their bodies to satisfy the immediate needs and wishes of others.”51 Or, as stated in ŚS 330: “They walk the earth working the world’s good by all kinds of ways and means (…).”52 With a whole bouquet of metaphors, this is outlined in vss. 17-21. Many of these metaphors are common currency in Buddhist literature and emphasize the spiritual guidance received from the Buddha and the Sangha through the Dharma. The Buddha is called the “protector of beings” whose active presence in the world after his awakening is depicted by Buddhist art through the hand gesture of protection 47

 Carter; Palihawadana 2000, 3.  This corresponds to the statement in BCA 1:36 that even wrongdoing against the bodies of Bodhisattvas may result in happiness. It is not entirely clear how this happens. The perpetrator may come to recognize his evil deeds and change his life’s direction – as in the famous case of Aṅgulimāla’s failed attempt to murder the Buddha (MN 86) – or it may be assumed that a transformative impulse will emerge from the Bodhisattva’s body (see Mrozik 2007, 42f, 49f), even if touched aggressively. 49  MN 21; referred to also in MN 28 where the parable is applied to a situation of being attacked and reviled – similar to the one contemplated by Śāntideva. 50  MN 1:129; Ñāṇamoli; Bodhi 2001, 223. 51  Mrozik 2007, 45. 52  Bendall, Rouse 1922, 294. 48

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(abhayamudrā). As we saw in places like BCA 1:13 and 2:22, 33, 51, Śāntideva attributes protective power to bodhicitta, the Buddhas and the Bodhisattvas. The “other shore” is a standard metaphor for nirvana, with the Buddha the one who shows the way to the other shore by providing the Dharma as the raft to cross over. Guiding those who have gotten lost and kindling a lamp for those in the dark are metaphors taken from the standard formula in which the Buddha is praised at the conclusion of many Buddhist Sūtras. Apart from their being embedded in the wider Buddhist tradition, Śāntideva’s use of these metaphors may be further inspired by the Vajradhvaja-sūtra (referred to in BCA 7:46). ŚS 22ff quotes from this Sūtra a passage with a wealth of metaphors for the Bodhisattva’s redeeming activity; several of these, such as the lamp, refuge, resting place and servant (cf. ŚS 23, 29), appear in BCA 3:17-18. While most of these metaphors highlight the spiritual service rendered by the Bodhisattva who, in following the footsteps of the Buddha, is keen to convey the Dharma, some of them, like being a “bed for those who need a bed” and a “servant for all beings who need a servant” seem to indicate that the Bodhisattva also caters for mundane needs of living beings. ŚS 331 states that in their work for the “world’s good,” Bodhisattvas among other things become “villagers, guides, and charioteers, they become traders, merchants, householders, kings, courtiers, chaplains, messengers, learned physicians” and – as theologians will be pleased to learn – “men versed in the scriptures.”53 In the ŚS, this list immediately precedes a further list of wonderful things that a Bodhisattva may become, including “the wishing-gem” and “the trees that give all desires,” that is, two of the six items mentioned by Śāntideva in vs. 19. The wishfulfilling jewel and wish-granting tree are symbols of a magical force, well known in the Buddhist world, that makes wishes come true. Similarly the “treasure vase” is a never-ending source of riches and the “wishfulfilling cow,” a never-ending source of milk. The “magical formula” (siddhavidyā, i.e. mantra) removes obstacles and prolongs life; the “miracle herb” is the one medicine against all diseases. Traditionally, some of these symbols have also been interpreted in a religious sense. In particular, the wish-fulfilling jewel has been compared with nirvana in that it, like the wish-fulfilling jewel, “satisfies every desire,” “causes delight” and “is full of lustre”54 Though Buddhist texts leave no doubt that nirvana is indeed the ultimate happiness that satisfies every desire, the 53

 Ibid. 294.  Milindapañha 321. Rhys-Davids 1963, vol. 2, 193.

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Buddhist tradition has also interpreted the wish-fulfilling function of these miraculous items in terms of mundane and temporary forms of happiness.55 In the end, the task of the Bodhisattva is both “to satisfy the immediate needs and wishes of others” and thereby to gain “an opportunity to attract living beings to the Dharma.”56 This twofold aspect of the Bodhisattva’s work is affirmed in the final verse of this chapter (vs. 3:33), where Śāntideva invites all beings “to buddhahood and, in the meantime, to worldly happiness.” Śāntideva completes his bouquet of metaphors by making two final points, the variety of services that a Bodhisattva is willing to render and the universal scope of his salvific intentions: He wishes to benefit the beings “in many ways,” which he compares to the four elements that also support beings in a variety of ways.57 And he works for the release of the “inestimable number” of “all the beings” harbored by the “endless” space (ākāśa) (vss. 20-21). In both respects he imitates the Buddhas who were once themselves Bodhisattvas, and following their example he vows to bring forth and cultivate bodhicitta58 through the performance of the Bodhisattva practices, the pāramitās, for the benefit of the world (vss. 22-23). With this we have the full picture: From a Mahāyāna perspective,59 a Buddha (as different from an arhat and a pratyekabuddha) is someone who is not content with gaining his own liberation, but uses his awakening to work for the salvation of all others. The original role model is provided by the traditional, pre-Mahāyāna view of Gautama Buddha. His activities during the forty-five years after his awakening were not motivated by any self-centered interest, because everything he wanted for himself had been achieved at the time of his awakening. After his awakening, all his activities were driven entirely and exclusively by compassion. The Buddha – and thereby every Buddha – was thus regarded as an icon of a complete symbiosis of perfect wisdom (awakening) and compassion (working for the redemption of others).

55

 See Amtzis, Deweese, eds., 2004, vol. 3, 119-121.  Mrozik 2007, 45. 57  Again this has a strong parallel in ŚS 21, which, in quoting the Akṣayamati-sūtra, not only emphasizes the various ways in which the elements support the beings, but also connects this metaphor to the gift of the body, in that the body is itself “an aggregation of the four elements” and should be of service to the beings. See Bendall, Rouse 1922, 24. 58  This mirrors his definition in BCA 1:15-17 of the two kinds or aspects of bodhicitta as being resolve and practice; see Part II, chap. 1, pp. 128f. 59  See Part I, chap. 3, pp. 57f. 56

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This symbiosis was achieved as the result of an extremely long spiritual development stretching back over innumerable lives during which the future Buddha, i.e. the Bodhisattva, trained his mind towards attaining Buddhahood by developing the “virtues” (pāramitās) of a Bodhisattva. This process was triggered by an initial resolve to strive for Buddhahood. Retrospectively the Buddhist tradition increasingly understood this as a compassionate resolve right from the start, as the conscious decision to strive for awakening in order to be able to render other beings the best possible service. From a Mahāyāna perspective, the compassionate nature of this resolve is the reason why the being who finally became Gautama Buddha chose the Bodhisattva career, the path leading to Buddhahood, instead of alternative paths such as that leading to just his own liberation (as an arhat) or to an imperfect form of Buddhahood (as a pratyekabuddha). This makes Gautama Buddha the model for every Mahāyāna Buddhist who also decides to become a Buddha, that is, who also chooses the Bodhisattva path and follows or “imitates” the Buddha. The initial resolve to do this, expressed in the Bodhisattva vow or vows, is the seed that, when properly cultivated, will grow into full Buddhahood. It is the “spirit of awakening” (bodhicitta), but in the particular sense of the compassionate awakening of a Buddha. The whole existence of a Buddha, and hence (by intention) of a Bodhisattva, is compassionate pro-existence: living only for the benefit of others. The first and foremost virtue to be developed is therefore dānapāramitā, the “perfection of giving.” In its comprehensive form, it is a complete surrender to all others: the surrender of one’s bodily existence (one’s life or lives), of one’s possessions, and of one’s religious pursuit or merit. As has been stated above, the concept of the Bodhisattva path as an imitation of the Buddha(s) constitutes a startling analogy to the Christian ideal of the imitation of Christ (imitatio Christi).60 This analogy becomes particularly solid and significant in how Śāntideva describes the attitude of self-surrender. This can be condensed to at least four parallels. First, words like: “I have left this body to all living beings to do with as they like. May they beat me without end, may they revile me, cover me with dust, may they play with my body, deride it, mock it” (vss. 12ff) will remind every Christian of the passion of Christ, who left his body to those who beat him, tortured him, mocked him and finally crucified him. Second, the crucial point of surrendering the body to one’s enemies

60

 See Part II, chap. 1, p. 135f.

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with the intention that they may ultimately attain salvation arouses an even stronger parallel to Christ’s passion. These two parallels form the basis of two further, almost irresistible ones: Third, the parallel between an interpretation of Christ’s death in terms of substitutionary atonement and the transactional concept of merit transfer; and fourth, the parallel between an understanding of the Eucharist as a reenactment of Christ’s death through consuming bread and wine in remembrance of Christ’s gift of his flesh and blood and the Bodhisattva’s bodily self-surrender in becoming food and drink for those in need. The first two parallels, I think, are genuine and significant. At least the image of Christ’s passion as it is rendered in the synoptic Gospels corresponds to the attitude related by Śāntideva. Especially Christ’s prayer on the cross that his executioners be forgiven resonates deeply with the compassionate disposition of the Bodhisattva towards his enemies, as has already been stated.61 In this, Christ reflects and incarnates the spirit of God as the ultimate source of loving compassion. More difficult is the third parallel, although this appears to be a particularly close one. A long tradition within the Christian interpretation of Christ’s death, beginning with the idea of Jesus Christ as the sacrificial lamb carrying away the sin of the world, understands the crucifixion as a substitutionary act.62 This thought was developed in a variety of ways, ranging from the idea that with his death Christ paid the ransom by which the sinners could be bought free from Satan, to the influential medieval concept of Anselm of Canterbury according to which Christ’s death was necessary as an act of satisfaction to God who had been dishonored by human disobedience. Since humans were unable to render the adequate penitence, God himself did so through Jesus Christ as his son. Another version became prominent during the Reformation. It is based on the reformers’ interpretation of Paul, whereby atonement was understood as an act of justification taken in a predominantly legal sense. The only human without sin is Jesus, and on the cross his unique righteousness was exchanged against the sin of humanity: A mutual transaction in which the justice of Christ was credited to sinners and their sins to Christ, with him thus bearing the punishment on their behalf to set them free. The latter model, which came to be known as “imputative justification,” shows the greatest resemblance to the transactional interpretation of the Bodhisattva’s merit transfer. The compassionate Bodhisattva renounces his merit and transfers it to those who are lacking in it, thereby saving them from 61 62

 See also Part II, chap. 1, pp. 133f.  For a brief summary and critique, see Hick 1993b, 112-126.

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the otherwise gloomy outcomes of their sins in the form of infernal punishments. Yet while this model is indeed a powerful expression of compassion and grace within a Buddhist framework, it is far more problematic within a Christian context, where the understanding of Christ’s death as substitutionary atonement has come, from Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) onward, under increasingly heavy theological criticism.63 A major objection, and perhaps the weightiest one, is the ambivalent feature that substitutionary atonement inscribes into the image of God. On the one hand, it implies a wrathful God who can only be reconciled by the sanguinary sacrifice of an innocent victim, his son. On the other hand, it presents God as the one who, out of his mercy and on our behalf, becomes himself the innocent victim through his incarnation in Jesus Christ. This ambivalence ends up in an inconsistency: On the one hand, the crucifixion constitutes the mercy of God, because without the cross, God’s remission of human sin would be impossible. On the other hand, the crucifixion represents or expresses God’s mercy, because his mercy motivated him to incarnate and undergo this sacrifice. This ambivalence is absent from the transactional model of merit transfer in the Buddhist context and this difference makes the parallel, despite the startling resemblance of some of its features, rather problematic. Within a Christian context, the problem lies in that the ambivalent image of God is hardly in line with the Biblical record of Jesus’ understanding and representation of a merciful God. John Hick has somewhat drastic but illuminatingly made this point: Had Jesus believed in substitutionary atonement, he should have told a different version of the parable of the prodigal son. On the return of the repentant son, the father replied that he cannot forgive him until his elder innocent brother has been killed in order to pay the price for his younger brother’s sins.64 There is a broad tendency in contemporary Christian theology to remove this distorting ambivalence from the Christian interpretation of the crucifixion by understanding it as fully representative and expressive, but not as constitutive of God’s love.65 Jesus represents God’s unconditioned mercy in retaining it in the face of his worst enemies. The word (logos) 63  For a summary of theological and non-theological objections within the contemporary discussion see Heim 2006, 20-33. 64  Hick 1993a, 41. See also Largen 2009, 40-43. 65  For two prominent examples, see from Protestant theology, Schubert Ogden (1992, 90-104) and from Roman Catholic theology, Karl Rahner (1975). Rahner, however, still calls Jesus’ death the “cause” of God’s salvific will, but in a sense that cannot be subsumed under the usual concepts of causality (ibid. 267). In fact Rahner takes it as a “sign” and “real symbol” of God’s salvific will.

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of God “becomes flesh,” i.e. assumes human expression, in the life and death of Jesus, who himself claimed to imitate God’s mercy in all of his words and deeds.66 The interpretation of the cross as representing rather than constituting God’s love does not trivialize human sin and guilt. It is indeed human sin that causes Jesus’ crucifixion. Forgiveness presupposes that that which needs to be forgiven is truly wrong, terribly wrong. This is an inherent feature of evil, and when it comes to Buddhism this feature is expressed in the seemingly iron law of negative karmic retribution. But from a Mahāyāna point of view, there is a way out, because this law can be crossed by means of merit transfer, that is, by the Bodhisattva’s mercy.67 This takes us to the fourth parallel. The belief that we – both as God’s creatures and as sinners – can and do only live through God’s mercy (which is always present, but is expressed in a specific way through Christ) has found its ritual form in the Eucharist, where bread and wine represent both the gift of God’s mercy through his creation and the gift of God’s mercy through the life and death of Jesus. On the one hand, Eucharistic spirituality is an act of “gratitude” (the term’s literal meaning) for God’s gifts and, on the other hand, it entails the readiness to share with others what has been received. As Pope Benedict XVI wrote in his encyclical letter Deus Caritas Est (no. 14): “‘Worship itself’, Eucharistic communion, includes the reality both of being loved and of loving others in turn. A Eucharist which does not pass over into the concrete practice of love is intrinsically fragmented.”68 As the Bodhisattva ritual celebrates the merciful spirit of awakening with the inner intention to invoke this spirit in the practitioner, the Eucharistic celebration of God’s love in Christ aims at inspiring similar acts of loving self-surrender. In the context of Buddhist‒Christian dialogue, this Eucharistic spirituality has been powerfully exemplified (through the power of the powerless) by Father Michael Rodrigo, a Sri Lankan priest and member of 66

 See Part II, chap. 1, p. 135.  Mark Heim (2019, 247-255) has argued that the Buddhist law of karma would rule out a substitutionary model in the interpretation of Christ’s death, because “bodhisattvas cannot violate karma to help beings” (254). Yet this standpoint ignores or downplays (see Heim 2019, 212) how widespread the transaction model in the Buddhist understanding of merit transfer actually is. It is, as Paul Williams (1989, 208) has pointed out, not even confined to Mahāyāna Buddhism, which demonstrates that the law of karma is less rigid and allows for significantly more flexibility than is sometimes assumed. 68  See http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_benxvi_enc_20051225_deus-caritas-est.html 67

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the Oblates’ order (OMI). Following Christ as the one who “lay Himself down on the table of love,”69 Michael Rodrigo went together with two Christian sisters to one of the poorest, most underdeveloped and exploited areas of Sri Lanka. They shared the harsh life of the deprived peasantry, and worked together with them and with the Buddhist village monks toward simple steps of improvement. The Buddhist monks accepted “Father Mike,” who had publicly adopted the five precepts of a Buddhist layman and refrained from any baptizing activity. But his commitment to the poor was not appreciated by all, and after deliberately ignoring some severe warnings to leave, he was shot on 10 November 1987 while publicly celebrating the Eucharist. Father Mike lived with the conviction that “the basic matrix of all religions is precisely this area of self-sacrifice and selflessness which is the only true human,”70 a conviction he elaborated in his theological thesis.71 When I met him in 1985 in his small and modest dialogue center in Buttala, I saw how in his interaction with the village people he drew on the stories of the Bodhisattva’s self-sacrifice in the Jātakas. Another Sri Lankan theologian appropriately described his life in words that are strongly reminiscent of Śāntideva in their echoing of the Bodhisattva ideal in a Eucharistic spirituality: Being free is our inherent capacity to love those who hate us, insult us, ridicule us, slander us, make fun of us, and spread false news and gossip. But loving, blessing, praying for, serving and helping these people without expecting anything in return: this is each one’s true freedom and the manifestation of one’s humility. This is Fr. Mike’s teaching.72

The example of Michael Rodrigo helps to identify a fifth parallel which is less visible on first sight: the parallel between the Bodhisattva’s triple surrender of life, possession and merit and the traditional Christian ideal of embarking on “the way of the cross.” In his Imitatio Christi (2nd book, chap. 11), Thomas à Kempis describes “the way of the cross” as the total renunciation of all possessions, of oneself and of any thought 69

 From his poem “Communion”; Fernando 1988, 76.  Ibid. 21. 71  “The Moral Passover from Selfishness to Selflessness in Christianity and the other Religions in Sri Lanka.” Fr. Mike wrote his thesis from 1971-1973 at the Institut Catholique de Paris. It was published in two volumes of the Sri Lankan journal Quest (part I in 1981 as Quest 65, and part II and III in 1979 as Quest 54). See Dornberg 1987, 312, 455. 72  See http://www.omiworld.org/en/content/news/1243/24-years-ago-assassinationof-fr-michael-rodrigo-omi/ 70

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of merit. A person like that, he says, would be of great inspiration to others (2nd book, chap. 12). Although the idea of following Christ by transferring religious merit to others is less familiar to the Christian tradition,73 the idea of following “the way of the cross” in realizing Christ’s selfless and compassionate spirit is absolutely central. It finds a striking and paradoxical instantiation in Paul’s wish to be “accursed and cut off from Christ for the sake of my people,” the Jews (Rom. 9:3). The belief that some people, the saints, follow Christ in such radical ways is mirrored in what has been the practice of innumerable Christians in the past: Turning to the saints and asking that they intercede with God for them – a practice not that far from asking the Bodhisattvas to make good for one’s own shortcomings with their merits. TRANSLATION: 3:24-33 Praise of its being brought forth 24. If thus a wise one has joyfully grasped the spirit of awakening, may he be enthusiastic about this spirit as follows, in order to nurture it for the future: 25. Now my birth bears fruit; I have happily acquired a human existence. Now I have been born into the family of the Buddhas. Now I am a Buddha-son. 26. Now, like people who act according to the customs of their family, I must behave in such a way that no disgrace comes to this immaculate [Buddha] family. 27. Like a blind man might find a pearl in piles of rubbish, so too has this spirit of awakening – I don’t know how – arisen in me, 28. – this elixir that was created to eliminate death for the world [of beings], this inexhaustible treasure that appeases the wretchedness of all beings, 29. – the best remedy for healing the diseases of the world, the tree that gives rest to all those who are weary from straying on the paths of existences, 30. – the bridge, open for all travelers, so they can pass over bad destinies, the moon of a spirit that has risen in order to bring the afflictions of the world to rest, 31. – the great sun that drives away the darkness of ignorance of the world, the fresh butter that is produced by churning the milk of the True Teaching. 32. This meal of happiness, which satisfies all beings who pass by, is now prepared for the caravan of beings roaming on the paths of existences who are hungry for the enjoyment of happiness. 73  But not entirely alien. There is not only the reliance on the Saints’ greater merit in asking them for their intercession, but also the idea of co-redemption within Carmelite spirituality (on the latter, see Perera 2016, 163-184).

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33. Verily, in front of all the Saviors, the world is today invited by me to buddhahood, and in the meantime, to worldly happiness. May the gods, the antigods and all other beings rejoice!

COMMENTARY 3. How Life Becomes Meaningful Bodhicitta, for Śāntideva, is twofold: the initial resolve to embark on the Bodhisattva path and its realization through actually undertaking the journey (see vss. 1:15-17). Having just laid out that bodhicitta amounts to complete self-surrender, Śāntideva knows that it will take intense enthusiasm to “nurture” and further cultivate this spirit (vs. 24). But, says Śāntideva, there is indeed a very good and profound reason for such enthusiasm, a reason that he mentioned right at the beginning of the BCA: The insight that the realization of bodhicitta is the true goal of life (vs. 1:4),74 making one’s life fruitful and meaningful (vs. 3:25). Human existence will be rather meaningless if it is spent as just one passing state in the potentially endless flow of samsara. But understood as the precious and rare condition in which bodhicitta can be brought about, life assumes a different quality – it becomes a new life. The new birth is the true birth: the birth into the Buddha family75 through bodhicitta (see BCA 1:9). This is what life can and is meant to be. Life is meaningful if it is, and to the extent that it is, of genuine benefit to others – this is how Śāntideva’s message may be paraphrased. The excitement of the new-born Bodhisattva springs up from the deep feeling of having attained a meaningful existence. Happy are those who strive for the happiness of others, as Śāntideva says in BCA 8:129. Śāntideva is sufficiently realistic to briefly hit a different, more sober note. The elevated status of the new family into which one is born as a Bodhisattva (and one must remember that this was written in the context of a profoundly hierarchical society) demands that one must behave accordingly (vs. 26). But after this short interlude, apparently an attempt to gain sufficient energy from the initial enthusiasm for the tougher parts of the journey lying ahead, Śāntideva continues to celebrate the newly

74

 See Part II, chap. 1, pp. 117, 125f.  For the understanding of Bodhisattvas as “Sons” of the Buddhas, see above, Part II, chap. 1, pp. 112f. 75

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found meaning in life through a further set of highly attractive metaphors (vss. 27-32). The set is carefully constructed: At the center we find eight metaphors of bodhicitta (vss. 28-31), which are framed by two further metaphors referring to the person in whom bodhicitta has emerged (vss. 27 and 32). In part, the metaphors of bodhicitta resemble and are variations of the metaphors that Śāntideva used in vss. 3:17-19 as illustrations of his selfsurrender to the service of all beings.76 Here, Śāntideva himself provides the clue for interpreting his metaphors. The first seven present bodhicitta as the answer to specific aspects of the human predicament (as understood by Buddhism): It is the elixir that liberates from death, the treasure that removes the world’s fundamental inability to provide satisfaction and the medicine that heals suffering: that is, three interrelated aspects of duḥkha (“suffering,” “frustration”). It is the tree that offers rest from roaming about in samsara and the bridge to cross over to the other shore: two images related to the Buddhist message of nirvana as the final release from samsara. The “tree” in particular is apt to arouse the association of the “bodhi tree,” the tree that symbolizes the Buddha’s awakening (bodhi). It is the moon whose calm and gentle light appeases the “afflictions,” the three principal kleśas of greed, hate and delusion. And the sun removes the darkness of ignorance (ajñāna). Like the tree, the moon has some additional symbolic meaning inasmuch as it is reminiscent of the day of the full moon, which is also related to the Buddha’s awakening and is the special day for the Sangha’s gatherings. Moreover, the shadows in the moon reveal the image of a hare, i.e. the Buddha in a previous life in which he offered himself as food to a begging ascetic. This ascetic was none other than the god Śakra in disguise; he then painted the hare’s image on the moon as a permanent reminder of the Buddha’s selfless act. Because of being all this, bodhicitta is finally presented in the eighth metaphor as the essence of the Dharma, its finest outcome won from it just as butter is won from milk. The framing metaphors in verses 27 and 32 are only indirectly related to bodhicitta. Their more immediate referent is Śāntideva himself, whose literary “I” stands for everyone who has newly entered the way of the Bodhisattva: bodhicitta has arisen in him like a gracious coincidence, like the wonder (“I don’t know how”) of a blind man finding a precious pearl in a heap of rubbish (vs. 27). In verse 32 he is no longer blind (and

76

 See above, pp. 167-170.

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poor). The metaphor is now that of a (probably affluent) host who invites (see vs. 33) the “caravan of beings” who are leading the meaningless life of roaming about in samsara to a feast, “a meal of happiness,” which includes both their mundane well-being and ultimately their attainment of Buddhahood. The whole world is invited and all beings, good or bad,77 may rejoice (vs. 33). “What is the meaning of life?” Religions are certainly prime among those cultural phenomena in human history where answers to this perennial question are provided. But in taking a closer look at Buddhism and Christianity one can see that both are far from declaring that life is meaningful just as it is. In fact, their initial perspective is rather dim. As it is, life is far from being fine. Both faiths, however, agree that life can become meaningful. The meaning of life, so to speak, consists in providing an opportunity of becoming meaningful. Within Christianity the meaning of life is, in principle, based on the goodness of its creator. But traditionally all Christians believe that creation has become spoiled, although they differ on the question of the precise extent this has happened. The meaning of life as is found in the imitation of Christ is thus compared to a new life; baptism, as its symbolic entry, is likened to a new birth or to death and resurrection.78 In Pauline theology, being in Christ is even praised as a “new creation” in which “everything old has passed away” (2 Cor. 5:17; see also Gal. 6:15). The meaning or purpose of the old life lies apparently in its possibility of being, here and now, transformed (reborn or resurrected) into the new one. However, the ultimate source of the old and of the new creation is one and the same. Buddhism, in its form seen in the BCA, is also aware of a distinction between an old and new life: the old life of samsaric existence and the new life as a member of the family of the Buddhas. It is clear that the source of the new life of bodhicitta is ultimate or absolute reality (paramārthasatya). This can also be referred to as dharmakāya (as in BCA 1:1) or, in other branches of Mahāyāna, as “Buddha Nature” (buddhadhātu or tathāgatagarbha). It is, however, less clear whether – and if so, in what sense – ultimate reality can also be regarded as the ground or source of samsaric existence. Samsara, at least according to later doctrinal developments,79 has no beginning in time and hence no 77

 Represented by the peaceful and wrathful deities.  See above, Part II, chap. 1, pp. 122f. 79  Initially the question of the beginning of samsara is regarded as one of the unanswerable questions. 78

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first cause in any chronological sense of “first.”80 This does not exclude the possibility of understanding the impermanent reality of samsara as being grounded in, or based upon, a more profound and ultimate reality, or as the appearance of ultimate reality in a “veiled” or obscured form. Whatever position Buddhist philosophers have taken on this issue, they are convinced that the condition making salvation possible is present in samsara, and thus it can be discovered and pointed out by the Buddhas. The fact that there are Buddhas at all is itself seen as the best proof of such a presence. When Śāntideva likens the arousal of bodhicitta to the discovery of a pearl by a blind person in the midst of a heap of rubbish, he not only emphasizes the wondrous nature of this discovery and the great joy of this lucky incident, but he also presupposes that the pearl, though hidden amongst the vices, is really there. Compared to Śāntideva’s other metaphors, the metaphorical use of the pearl is less frequent in Buddhism, apart from perhaps a quite prominent parable in the Lotus Sūtra (8:36-41): A poor man is unaware that he in fact owns a precious pearl or gem (ratna), which was once, without his knowledge, sewn into his robe by a wealthy friend. Only when one day he meets his old friend again does he discover with the friend’s help the hidden gem, which makes him extremely happy. While this parable differs from Śāntideva’s metaphor in various respects, the point of reference is similar. The Lotus Sūtra, like the BCA, relates the joyful discovery of the pearl or gem to the recognition of one’s potential for Buddhahood. Among the more unusual metaphors is also Śāntideva’s comparison of the invitation to Buddhahood with an invitation to a festive meal (taken up from BCA 1:32-34). Yet there is at least one instance in the Milindapañha where nirvana is compared to food in five different ways: like food, nirvana supports life because it makes an end to old age and death; it increases strength because it brings about supernatural powers; it is the source of beauty because it generates the beauty of holiness; it stops pain because it puts an end to suffering; it overcomes hunger because it satisfies the beings’ longings.81 There is no indication that Śāntideva’s metaphor of the festive meal was directly inspired by the Milindapañha. Yet the existence of such a metaphor in a widespread and relatively early Buddhist text makes Śāntideva’s use somewhat less surprising. 80  On the difficult issue of “creation” in Buddhism, see the various contributions to Schmidt-Leukel 2006b. 81  Milindapañha 320. Cf. Rhys-Davids 1963, vol. 2, p. 192.

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More surprising is perhaps, once again, the resemblance between Śāntideva’s metaphors of the pearl and the meal, on the one hand, and three parables in the New Testament on the other: the hidden treasure, the precious pearl and the festive banquet. In the synoptic Gospels the imagery employed in the context of becoming a follower of Jesus is less radical than that in Johannine or Pauline theology. The Synoptics do not speak of a “new birth” or “resurrection” to a “new life” or “new creation” but of submission under the merciful reign (“kingdom”) of God. Among many other parables, entering the “Kingdom of Heaven” is compared to finding a treasure hidden in the field, to discovering a precious pearl of great value (Mt. 13:44f)82 and to the invitation to a great banquet (Mt. 22:1-10; Lk. 14:15-24). Though the nub of the synoptic parables is obviously quite different from Śāntideva’s metaphors, there are some remarkable commonalities: the unexpected and surprising nature of finding a hidden treasure, the joy about the treasure’s and the pearl’s discovery, and the joyful character of the banquet (actually a wedding meal). In the Gospels, the parable of the banquet is aimed at the exhortation to accept and not turn down the invitation. This aspect is not explicit in BCA 3:32f, but will become very prominent in the next chapter (4:1326), where Śāntideva warns severely against missing the precious opportunity of making one’s life meaningful. As chapter 1 begins with the extolment of bodhicitta, so ends chapter 3. Śāntideva underlines this link by using images clearly connecting both chapters, like the image of a new birth as a “Buddha-son” (vss. 1:9; 3:25), the host of a “meal” (vss. 1:32-34; 3:32f) or that of a “caravan” of beings (vss. 1:11; 3:32). The Bodhisattva ritual, celebrated for the generation of bodhicitta, is thus surrounded by its praise, and so the first three chapters (or two in the Dūn-huáng version) make up a cohesive unit. They form the exposition for the nurturing and development of bodhicitta that is treated in chapters 4 to 9. As argued above, these chapters are only loosely structured by the six pāramitās. In fact, the cultivation of bodhicitta is explained more in terms of overcoming its true enemies: the defilements (kleśas).83 What follows is therefore a detailed exposition of Śāntideva’s belief that bodhicitta is the only good strong enough to overcome the “great and terrible power of evil” (BCA 1:6).

82  While the hidden treasure is found by accident, the pearl is not discovered by a blind man but by a merchant who deals in pearls. 83  See above, Part I, chap. 3, pp. 55-58.

CHAPTER 4

BODHICARYĀVATĀRA 4 VIGILANT CARE FOR THE SPIRIT OF AWAKENING (BODHICITTĀPRAMĀDA)

TRANSLATION: 4:1-12 Responsibility of a bodhisattva 1. If such a son of the Victor has secured the spirit of awakening, he should strive, continuously and tirelessly, not to deviate from the rules [of a bodhisattva]. 2. One may consider whether or not to carry out what has been taken on hastily, what has not been properly probed, even if one has promised to do so. 3. Why do I postpone, however, what has been probed by the Buddhas and by their Sons of great wisdom, and also by me as far as I am able? 4. Yet, if after such a promise I do not fulfil this in practice, I would have broken my word to them all. What destiny, then, would fall to me? 5. It has been said that he who does not actually give, although in his mind he has thought about giving, will become a hungry or thirsty ghost, even if the gift was merely a trifle. 6. If I were to preach the highest happiness with all my heart and then to deceive the whole world, what destiny, then, would fall to me? 7. Only the Omniscient One knows the inconceivable course of acts (karman) so that only he liberates these people, even if they have abandoned the spirit of awakening. 8. Therefore, any failure of a bodhisattva is particularly serious, because if he fails, he has destroyed the goal of all beings. 9. If another impedes the meritorious work of a bodhisattva even for a moment, there will be no end to his bad destinies, since he has damaged the goal of all beings. 10. Because if one hurts the welfare of even a single sentient being, one will perish; how much more then [if one hurts the welfare] of all the beings that abide in the endless space? 11. And thus, one is swung back and forth in the cycle of existences, through the force of one’s transgressions and the force of one’s spirit of awakening, and delays one’s arrival at the Bodhisattva levels.

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12. Therefore I must carefully do what I have promised. If I do not make an effort today, I will [soon] have fallen deeper and deeper.

COMMENTARY 1. What is at Stake With chapter 4 Śāntideva takes his audience on an emotional rollercoaster ride: After his enthusiasm on the arousal of bodhicitta at the end of chapter 3, he now confronts the addressee, on the one hand, with the seemingly hopeless dilemma between the utter seriousness of the Bodhisattva’s resolve and the tremendous scale of his responsibility, and on the other hand, the terrifying prospect of his apparent inability to meet the task. Yet some rays of hope are inserted which finally turn into a firm and confident promise towards the end of the chapter. In this way Śāntideva gives dramatic expression to his central theme of the antagonism between bodhicitta and the defilements (kleśas). Śāntideva starts where he stopped: Taking up the thread of vs. 3:27 (behaving in accordance with the standards of the Buddha family) and presupposing the twofold nature of bodhicitta (as resolve and practical realization), the new born Bodhisattva is first exhorted to now put his resolve into practice by his continuous and tireless effort of not deviating from the precepts (śikṣā)1 (vs. 1). The subsequent verses are written as a persistent interplay between the Bodhisattva’s inner reflections (see vs. 24) on the doctrine2 and his personal reactions.3 He begins with reviewing his resolve: If someone has made a resolve too hastily and without sufficient consideration, it is justified to rethink and perhaps change one’s mind, even if the resolve had taken the form of a public promise. But this is not applicable to his Bodhisattva vow, since this is a resolve which has been carefully probed by the Buddhas and the great Bodhisattvas and even by the new Bodhisattva himself, that is, Śāntideva’s literary “I.” Hence there is no justification to postpone its practical realization (vss. 2-3). Moreover, stepping back from his resolve would imply breaking a promise given to “all,” the Buddhas and all beings (see vss. 4, 1  In contrast to some of the commentarial tradition, Śāntideva does not specify what exactly he means by śikṣā (precepts, instructions, rules). His exhortation can thus be taken as a general admonition to follow the Bodhisattva path with all its implications. 2  Vss. 2-3a; 5; 7-11; 13a; 16; 20-22; 32-33; 36b-37; 39a; 40a; 45; 46b-47a; 48b. 3  Vss. 3b-4; 6; 12; 13b 15; 17-19; 23-31; 34-36a; 38; 39b; 40b-44; 46a; 47b-48a.

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6). The karmic results would be terrible (vs. 4). Once more, Śāntideva presents the way of the Bodhisattva as an act of “giving,” of pro-existence. If one does not fulfill a promise even in relation to a minor gift, the karmic result will be one’s rebirth among the hungry ghosts (pretas).4 How much worse will be the karmic result if one does not fulfill the promise of giving the highest happiness to all the world (vss. 5-6; cf. vs. 3:33)! No doubt this will lead to rebirth in hell (see vss. 21, 25). The failure of a Bodhisattva is particularly grave because of the cosmic scale of his promise and because it negatively affects the chance of all beings to attain their goal (artha) of life, which is, as we have seen,5 their own realization of bodhicitta and Buddhahood (vs. 8). The gravity of the Bodhisattva’s failure is further expounded, or better, exaggerated, in verses 9-10. By all Buddhist standards, it is clearly an exaggeration to say, as in vs. 9, that only one brief moment of impeding the work of a Bodhisattva will trigger bad rebirths “endlessly.” This exaggeration has a rhetorical rather than doctrinal justification, as can be seen from vs. 10: Impeding the work of a Bodhisattva does not just harm a single being, but (indirectly) harms the infinite number of beings whom the Bodhisattva is going to benefit. Hence the negative retribution in the form of bad rebirths is also going to be infinite or “endless.” One must keep in mind, however, that this reflection is not really directed at “another” person. The person who might impede the work of the Bodhisattva, and that Bodhisattva, is none other than the beginner on the Bodhisattva path himself if he does not put his resolve into practice. If the fresh Bodhisattva does not turn into a mature Bodhisattva, it is not only his problem: The welfare of potentially all beings depends on him. This is at stake when it comes to the realization of his resolve. The performance of a Bodhisattva is inseparably interwoven with the fate of all. The pressure created through the vss. 4-6 and 8-10 in relation to the Bodhisattva’s responsibility and the infinite negative karmic consequences 4  According to Amtzis, Deweese, eds., 2004, p. 37, the reference in this verse is to two scriptures: the Dharma-saṃgīti-sūtra, according to which that “one who intends in his thoughts, ‘I will give this to him’, even if it is only a small and ordinary thing, like squeezed dough of barley-flour, but then does not actually give it, that person will be reborn as a preta”; and to the Smṛtyupasthāna-sūtra, which says that “one who (merely) intended to give a tiny thing but does not do so will take a rebirth as a preta, while a being who does not give (something) despite having made an (actual) commitment (to do so) will go to hell.” The latter is also referred to (indirectly) in ŚS 125. 5  Cf. BCA 1:4; 3:10.

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of his possible failure is balanced by vs. 7, which brings some comfort into this otherwise hardly bearable situation. It promises hope for Bodhisattvas even if they have abandoned the spirit of awakening. Steinkellner’s translation relates the activity of their liberation (mocayati) to the “Omniscient One,” i.e. the Buddha.6 The Buddha knows their karmic situation and thus knows how to liberate them despite their own failure. Other translators7 relate the liberating potential to the “course of acts,” the karmic condition of the failing Bodhisattva, implying that this might entail sufficient stores of merit to overcome his current failure. While the latter interpretation corresponds to some of the Tibetan commentaries,8 Steinkellner’s reading matches my suggestion in the context of chapter 2: By their own karmic merit the Bodhisattvas and the Buddhas (the latter through the merit they gained as Bodhisattvas) make good, via merit transaction, the demerit of the sinner, thus providing protection against the otherwise negative karmic consequences of his transgressions.9 The strongest hope, however, is perhaps derived from the liberating power of bodhicitta itself, which according to vs. 1:12 “always bears fruit and does not die.” If bodhicitta cannot die, its neglect or abandonment will be only temporary. Nevertheless, as vs. 4:11 makes clear, such a failure severely interferes with the Bodhisattva’s spiritual progress by delaying his arrival at those levels (bhūmi) of the Bodhisattva path where he will successively and consistently perfect the Bodhisattva virtues (pāramitās). Instead the Bodhisattva is driven back and forth by the antagonistic powers of bodhicitta and his own transgressions. Behind the latter, as will become clear very soon, are lurking the defilements (kleśas), the Bodhisattva’s true enemies. The present section ends with the renewed resolve to put all efforts into the practical implementation of one’s Bodhisattva vows (vs. 12). But is this going to work? Is the whole 6

 Similarly Wallace and Wallace (see Śāntideva 1997) and Sharma 2012, p. 88.  E.g. Barnett (Śāntideva, no date), Matics (Śāntideva 1971); Batchelor (Shantideva 1993); Crosby and Skilton (Śāntideva 1995); Berzin (Shantideva 2004). Still other translations leave the question of what may liberate those who abandoned bodhicitta as an open mystery known only to the Buddha, as for example Elliott (Shantideva 2007) or Hangartner (Shantideva 2005), both based on the Tibetan text. A translation that differs from all these readings is provided by the Padmakara Translation Group: “As for those, losing bodhicitta, Lead others nonetheless to liberation, Karmic law is inconceivable And only understood by the Buddha.” Shāntideva 2006, 54. 8  See for example, Amtzis, Deweese, eds., 2004, vol. 4; Pelden 2007; Tobden 2005. 9  See Part II, chap. 2, pp. 141, 150f. 7

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issue of putting bodhicitta into practice just a question of mental effort and willpower? Before proceeding to an answer, Śāntideva first draws his picture in even darker colors.

TRANSLATION: 4:13-26 Value of life 13. Countless Buddhas have passed by, searching for any kind of being; through my own fault, their art of healing was not directed at me. 14. If I remain today as I have been again and again, I will fall into bad destinies, get ill and die, be maimed and torn apart or worse. 15. When will I then obtain what is almost impossible to attain: the appearance of a Buddha, faith, the very state of being human and the ability to continue in doing what is wholesome? 16. Health and a day with enough food and no worries are a deceptive moment of life; the body is like a borrowed object (kāyo yācitakopamaḥ Bh instead of kāyopācitakopamaḥ V). 17. To be human will certainly not be attained again if I behave this way. But if one does not attain the human state, there is only evil. Where should the good come from? 18. If I do not do what is wholesome although capable of doing the wholesome, how will I do the same when I am distraught by the sufferings in bad destinies? 19. And if I do not do what is wholesome but rather accumulate evil, then even the word “good destiny” is wiped out [for me] for hundreds of millions of eons. 20. This is why the Exalted One has said: to attain the human state is as difficult as for a [blind] turtle to stick its neck through the opening of a yoke [floating] in the vast ocean. 21. Due to a [heavy] sin committed in a single moment, one dwells for an eon of the world in the deepest hell. [And] a good destiny is [also] out of question if one has accumulated sins since time without beginning. 22. And one will also not be liberated if one confesses merely this single sin, because (yasmāt M instead of tasmāt V) even as one is confessing it, a new sin is committed. 23. There is no greater deception, there is no greater delusion, if upon reaching such a favorable opportunity, I do not pursue what is wholesome. 24. And if after such thoughts I continue to persist in my delusion, I will again be grieving for a long time, haunted by Yama’s messengers. 25. Long will the unbearable fire of the hells burn my body, long will the fire of remorse burn my indecisive mind.

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26. I do not know how, but I have gained a site of [possible] advantage extremely difficult to reach, and although I am now aware of it, I am still being led (nīto Bh instead of nīye V) to the same hells.

COMMENTARY 2. A Desperate Situation? Verses 13-26 continue the personal reflections of the new Bodhisattva as someone now fully aware of the tremendous scale of his responsibility (vss. 2-12) but seriously fearing his inability to live up to his resolve. Apparently presupposing the doctrine of a beginningless existence in samsara, Śāntideva ponders the idea that he must have already met countless Buddhas in the past who were eager to heal him, but were unable to do so because of his own faults. So why will he do better this time? And if he again misses the opportunity, he will have to face a new round of falling back into the evil realms of samsaric existence as animal, demon or denizen of hell, where he will have to suffer the most horrendous tortures (vss. 13-14). It would take an inconceivably long time before he once again regained human existence and could live under favorable circumstances, including the encounter with the teachings of a Buddha (vs. 15).10 The rarity and preciousness of such an opportunity is underlined by the famous canonical parable of the blind turtle (vs. 20),11 which appears frequently in both early and later Buddhist texts. Its locus classicus is the canonical pre-Mahāyāna Bālapaṇḍita Sutta (= MN 129), which relates the parable to rebirth in the animal realm but applies even more to the still lower realms of the ghosts and hells: “Suppose a man threw into the sea a yoke with one hole in it, and the east wind carried it to the west, and the west wind carried it to the east, and the north wind carried it to the south, and the south wind carried it to the north. Suppose there were a blind turtle that came up once at the end of each century. What do you think, bhikkhus? Would that blind turtle put his neck into the yoke with one hole in it?” “He might, venerable sir, sometime or other at the end of a long period.” “Bhikkhus, the blind turtle would sooner put his neck into that yoke with a single hole in it than a fool, once gone to perdition, would take to regain the human state, I say. Why is that? Because there is no practicing of the 10

 See BCA 1:4 and the discussion on this in Part II, chap. 1, pp. 117f.  Verses 17, 20, 21 and 23 have more or less exact parallels in SRKK. For a brief discussion on the issue of dependency, see above, Part I, chap. 3, pp. 66-69. 11

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Dhamma there, no practicing of what is righteous, no doing of what is wholesome, no performance of merit. There mutual devouring prevails, and the slaughter of the weak.”12

The danger of missing the precious opportunity of following the Buddhist path, as it is offered by human existence, is fostered by the deceptive nature of those passing moments when one is free from worries. They make one easily forget about life’s brevity and transience (vs. 16) – one of the major existential problems to which the Buddhist message refers.13 But the lower forms of samsaric existence, into which one might then fall back, do not provide the opportunity to perform wholesome deeds and generate new karmic merit (vs. 17). Moreover, if as a human being one does not practice what is good, how should one expect to do so in the sub-human existences (vs. 18)? The prospect of regaining human rebirth thus becomes extremely unlikely (vss. 17 and 19). Vs. 21 brings this already rather hopeless prospect to an absurd climax: If just a single sin14 may trigger the existence in hell for the duration of a whole eon, how should one ever be able to leave the hells, given that one has accumulated innumerable sins from one’s beginningless existence in samsara? Even confession does not offer a lasting solution. While one sin is confessed, the next is already committed. Or, as one may also understand the sentence: Even expiation through suffering in hell as a consequence of one’s sins will not help, because it leads to new acts of sinning

12

 Ñāṇamoli, Bodhi 2001, 1021.  See above, Part II, chap. 2, pp. 148-150. 14  What kind of “sin” might Śāntideva have in mind? Steinkellner inserts “heavy.” This brings Śāntideva’s statement in line with traditional Buddhist dogmatic, which teaches that rebirth in the Avīci-hell is the result of the following five “grave” or “heavy” offenses: (1) killing one’s father, (2) killing one’s mother, (3) killing an arhat, (4) splitting the Saṅgha, (5) hurting a Buddha. In some parts of Mahāyāna Buddhism one finds a tendency to add all sorts of other offenses to this list, particularly those of a cultic nature, e.g. destroying stupas, disparaging the Mahāyāna, etc. In the context of BCA chapter 4, it appears to me far more likely that Śāntideva continues his reasoning from vss. 4:9 and 1:34 (see above, Part II, chap. 1, p. 132, fn. 57). In 1:34 Śāntideva argues that someone who harbors negative thoughts against a Bodhisattva “will stay in the hells for as many eons as the moments in which the evil thoughts were raised.” The scriptural quotation to which he presumably refers speaks of negative thoughts harbored by one Bodhisattva against another. This motif is taken up in vs. 4:9. And this would imply that the “sin” mentioned in vs. 4:21 is to “impede the work of a Bodhisattva just for one moment.” This, as the context makes pretty clear, is the young Bodhisattva’s own hesitation and failing to put his vow into practice, which impedes the work of that Bodhisattva he had vowed to become. 13

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(vs. 22).15 The only true solution is to get to the root of the problem, to the source from which transgressions spring (see vs. 4:46). The theme of life’s deceptive nature, briefly mentioned in vs. 16, is taken up again in vss. 23-26: The greatest delusion is not to understand that the precious character of human existence lies in its rare and special opportunity of generating and practicing bodhicitta. Even this insight, however, may be too weak to set one free from delusion, and one may very well still fall back into the hellish circle of karmic retribution (vss. 24 and 26). Verses 23 and 24 introduce the term moha, which is one of the standard Buddhist designations for “deception” or “delusion” and as such, is one of the triad of the three defilements (kleśa): greed, hate and delusion. As the next section will show, they are the true root of the problem and the only solution lies in overcoming them. Unlike a Bodhisattva, the follower of Jesus does not vow to save all beings. In this respect he or she trusts in the redeeming love of God, as it appeared in Christ, which extends to all. But this does not exclude that the follower of Jesus sees himself or herself as participating in passing on and actively sharing God’s love in Christ. According to Paul and Pauline theology, Christians are called to accept one another as they have been accepted by Christ (Rom. 15:9). Christ shall take form in them (Gal. 4:19). Christians are compelled by Christ’s love and should no longer live for themselves but for him (2 Cor. 5:14f), which means that they become ambassadors of Christ and take part in his ministry of reconciliation (2 Cor. 5:18-20). In this sense Paul can speak of his 15  Steinkellner derives vedayitvā and vedayan from the causative of vid, vetti, meaning “to bring to knowledge” or “to inform,” instead of “to feel” or “to experience”), hence the translation as “confesses” and “confessing.” Translators who take the second route interpret vs. 22 as relating to the experience of suffering for one’s sin/sins in hell, as, for example, in the translation of Crosby and Skilton: “Yet having experienced that, one is still not released since, while experiencing, one begets more evil still” (see Śāntideva 1995, 27). This, however, would imply that one can produce new negative karmic acts while suffering in hell, which could then only be of a mental nature (e.g. hateful thoughts). Indeed, this is how Kunzang Pelden in his commentary explains the matter, concluding: “Be that as it may, if beings who are in hell (the place in which their karma has fructified) also accumulate karma while they are there – which will then be experienced in due sequence – it follows that there can be no chance of liberation from such a state. Personally, I do not see how this can be so….” Pelden 2007, p. 152. Yet the conclusion that liberation appears to be impossible results already from vs. 21 – something that Kunzang Pelden rejects. I suggest that this absurd situation of creating further bad karma in hell might well be deliberately constructed by Śāntideva in order to point out that the way to liberation appears impossible if it is not based on the radical epistemic deconstruction which he will suggest as part of the perfection of prajñā.

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responsibility as an apostle in words reminiscent of Śāntideva: “…an obligation is laid on me, and woe betide me if I do not proclaim the gospel!” (1 Cor. 9:16). In the wake of such ideas, the author of the Letter to the Colossians can even speak of “rejoicing” in his sufferings for others’ sake, because this is “completing what is lacking in Christ’s afflictions” (Col. 1:24).16 In the Christian tradition, the idea that following Christ means doing Christ’s work, that it is the responsibility of Christians to make Christ work through them, has been typically expressed in a widespread and often varied poem ascribed to Teresa of Ávila:17 Christ has no body now on earth but yours, no hands but yours, no feet but yours, yours are the eyes through which he looks compassion on this world, yours are the feet with which he is to go about doing good.

Though the imagery is undeniably different, the sentiment is not very far away from the Bodhisattva ideal according to which each individual Bodhisattva joins in the redeeming or liberating activity of the Buddhas and celestial Bodhisattvas by taking the vow to work like them for the ultimate (and penultimate!) well-being of all. For Christians, the feeling of being unable to live up to their task is therefore not unknown either. Within the New Testament the probably closest parallel to Śāntideva’s confession of his desperate inner state is found again in Paul, in the famous seventh chapter of his Letter to the Romans. However, it is not in light of his responsibility as an apostle of Christ that Paul feels hopeless – at least rhetorically – but in relation to the Law. Behind this lies the fundamental conflict that Paul sees between “sin” or “flesh” and the “spirit” of God or Christ, which reveals – as has been said – a strong affinity to Śāntideva’s perception of the conflict between the defilements (kleśas) and the spirit of awakening (bodhicitta).18 A closer look at BCA 4 and Rom. 7, however, will have to be postponed until I have discussed 16  In his dissertation, Luke Perera (2016, 163-184) has pointed out the strong affinities between the Carmelite spirituality of “co-redemption” with the Bodhisattva ideal in general and its explanation in the BCA and ŚS in particular. While the term “co-redemption” will clearly appear highly suspicious to Protestant theology, Perera uses it in a way that is based on the above-quoted Pauline statements: “…the Christian can, through union with Christ, participate in his saving work: (…) he or she can become an ‘extension’ of Christ’s humanity in which his redemptive work is continued” (ibid. 184). 17  According to the Oxford Dictionary of Quotations, this quotation is not found in the writings of Sr. Teresa (see Knowles 2009, 684). 18  See above, Part II, chap. 1, pp. 113f, 122-124.

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the remainder of the chapter, which will provide us with a fuller picture. Before moving on to this, there is one more aspect that, in the face of the history of Christian‒Buddhist dialogue, deserves some attention. The Buddhist teaching of reincarnation has sometimes caused Christians to question whether Buddhism might be lacking in adequately acknowledging the worth and value of human life. According to Winston King (1907-2000), for example, Buddhist belief in reincarnation “in logic and somewhat in fact … disvalues man. For just as animals are ex-men, so men are only ex-animals.”19 In Christian apologetic writings on Buddhism, the idea of fluid boundaries between animals and humans, which Christian authors have seen implied by Buddhist belief in reincarnation, has been treated by many with “trivialization and sarcasm.”20 Others, however, as for example Joseph Estlin Carpenter (1844-1927), saw Buddhist reincarnation more positively and understood it as an expression of the belief in an inner unity of all beings.21 Śāntideva leaves no doubt about his appreciation of the special value of human existence. In accordance with early Buddhist convictions, as his use of the parable of the blind turtle demonstrates, the particular worth of being human consists in that it alone provides the opportunity for morally responsible behavior and for crucial spiritual development.22 As he will say in BCA 7:14: “Upon finding the boat of human existence, cross the great stream of suffering! Fool, it is not the time to sleep! This boat is hard to find again.” Even if, on Buddhist premises, mind is not exclusively connected to human beings, human existence like no other form of life in samsara carries the promise of evoking and manifesting the mind’s most valuable potentialities, but also its most frightening deviations. TRANSLATION: 4:27-48 Destruction of the defilements 27. I do not know what to make of it. As if deluded by spells, I do not know by whom I am bewildered, who is here in me. 19

 King 1963, 87.  Harris 2006, 50. 21  See Carpenter 1923, 188, 237. 22  As in the parable of the turtle, Śāntideva apparently ignores or skips the idea – so popular in the Jātakas and in folk Buddhism – that the Bodhisattva can further develop the pāramitās while existing as an animal. 20

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28. Enemies such as greed and hate have neither hands nor feet, are neither brave nor wise. How have they been able to enslave me? 29. They have already penetrated my mind and fight me from a safe position, yet I am not even angry with them. Shame on this misplaced tolerance! 30.-31. Even if all the gods and men were my foes, they could not bring about the fire of the deepest hell, at whose touch also not even the ashes of mount Meru would be found. That is where the powerful enemies, the defilements, instantly thrust me. 32. Also the life of all other foes is surely not as long as that beginningless and endless, extremely long one of my enemies, the defilements. 33. All other foes serve welfare in a way if treated properly. But if these defilements are cared for, they become ever more agonizing. 34. If such unremitting long-lived enemies dwell in the heart, the only source of the flowing flood of disaster, how can I delight in the cycle of existences without fear? 35. If these guardians of the dungeon of life and the jailers of the damned in the hells stay in the house of my mind, a cage of greed, how can I be happy? 36. As long, therefore, as these enemies are not obviously destroyed, I will not lay down the yoke [of discipline]. Proud ones, who are angry at someone who has insulted them, even if he be unimportant, are unable to sleep until they have destroyed him. 37. Furious at the forefront of battle, violently killing the miserable wretches destined by nature to die, they do not count the pain of the blows of arrows and spears, and do not turn back without having reached their goal. 38. Now that I have raised myself to destroy the natural enemies, the constant causes of all suffering, why should I be desperate and miserable, even because of hundreds of calamities? 39. For no reason they display the wounds inflicted by enemies like adornments on their limbs. But I have begun to realize the great goal [of the welfare of all beings]; how can suffering stop me? 40. Intent only on their own livelihood, fishermen, pariahs, farmers and others bear hardships such as cold and heat. Why should I not bear the same for the welfare of the world? 41. Although I myself am not free from the defilements, I have committed myself to liberating all beings from the defilements as far as the space in the ten directions. 42. Not knowing my limitations, I am talking then like a madman. I will therefore never be retreating from the destruction of the defilements. 43. That is what I shall cling to, and in full enmity I will fight all except the one defilement that brings the destruction of the defilements. 44. Let my entrails gush out, my head fall! But I will never bow down before my enemies, the defilements.

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45. An enemy, even if he has been driven away, might find asylum in another country and return from there with collected forces; but there is no such course for this enemy, the defilements. 46. Where can that which sits in my mind go if it has been driven out? Where can it reside and work on my destruction? Yet weak of mind, I do not exert myself. The miserable defilements can only be defeated by the direct awareness that is insight (prajñā). 47. The defilements do not dwell in the sense-objects and not in the group of senses, not between them or elsewhere. So where are they, shaking the whole world? It is just an illusion. So free yourself, my heart (hṛdaya LVP instead of hṛdayaṃ V), of fear! Strive for insight! Why do you torture yourself in the hells to no avail? 48. With such resolution I will do my best to adhere to the precepts as taught. How can someone who could be cured by remedies become healthy, if he does not follow the physician’s directions?

COMMENTARY 3. Facing the True Enemies The three23 cardinal “defilements” – delusion, greed and hate – are addressed in vss. 27-29. They were briefly mentioned earlier in BCA 2:39 as the source of “sins.” Here, in chapter 4, they appear as the one fundamental source of the fresh Bodhisattva’s desperate situation. In order to put his resolve into practice and make genuine progress on the Bodhisattva path, he needs to overcome his “true enemies,” the defilements. The only way this can be achieved, namely through insight (prajñā), is clearly expressed towards the end of the chapter (vs. 46). This is the conclusion to which the deliberations of the whole chapter have led, thereby setting the scene for all the subsequent chapters. The specific nature of the defilements is at the center of vss. 27-29. Understanding what the defilements really are is the key to their destruction. Although it is a general Buddhist conviction that the defilements do not constitute the true nature of the mind or spirit, which is regarded as “originally pure” or “luminous,” 24 the defilements too are of a mental nature (vs. 28) and have “penetrated” the 23  At times Buddhist literature speaks of more than three defilements and adds phenomena such as envy, pride, doubt, wrong views, etc. But whatever is counted as defilement is regarded as a variation of the three cardinal forms. 24  See above, Part II, chap. 1, p. 115.

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mind (vs. 29). Given that the spirit of awakening has also been generated within the Bodhisattva’s mind, the battle between bodhicitta and the defilements is to be fought mentally. A crucial question in this respect is how the Bodhisattva conceives his ego or “self,” because the defilements are “here in me” (vs. 27). No doubt, they are strong and powerful (see vs. 31), though not in and of themselves (vs. 28), but because they are tolerated by the “I.” They operate from “a safe position” because the ego is “not angry” with them (vs. 29). Yet such tolerance is totally misplaced. The nature of the defilements as enemies who enslave the ego becomes apparent only through the inner strife of the Bodhisattva. The tension between his hesitation, in the face of the burden of his resolve, and his fear, in light of the dire karmic consequences of not living up to this resolve, is in fact a great opportunity for discerning the real nature of the defilements as one’s true enemies and to transform one’s inner mental disunity into a determined fight between the new identity of the Bodhisattva as a “son of the Buddha family” and the defilements as the main character traits of his old ego. Śāntideva illustrates the nature of the defilements as “enemies” in two steps. Verses 30-35 deal with them as enemies of one’s own well-being and vss. 41-42 as enemies of one’s new identity as Bodhisattva, that is, of one’s commitment to all beings.25 Each of these two sections is followed by the Bodhisattva’s self-encouragement to take up the fight against the defilements with utmost dedication and energy. Finally, vss. 45-47 proclaim how this battle can and will be won. The concluding vs. 48, together with the first verse of chapter 5, reconnects with the beginning of chapter 4 in interpreting this mental combat as the way of how to live by the rule, i.e. of how to put bodhicitta into practice. Because the defilements form the root of one’s failures and wrongdoings, Śāntideva designates them as those who throw one into Avīci, the lowest and hottest of all hells26 (vss. 30-31), and as the prison guards and torturers of hell (vs. 35). But they are not only responsible for one’s 25  This is a further example of Śāntideva’s overall strategy to transform self-interest into altruism and render altruism as the true fulfilment of self-interest. See above, Part II, chap. 1, pp. 120f. 26  The Buddhist tradition knows of several hells. While there is no consensus about the exact number of hells, a widespread tradition lists sixteen main hells (eight hot and eight cold) plus various side-hells. The Avīci-hell, the hottest of the hot hells, appears frequently in Buddhist texts as a topos for an exceptionally terrible punishment. See the excursus on Buddhist hells, pp. 331-345.

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rebirth in hell. In fact, the defilements are the cause of one’s samsaric existence in general (vs. 34).27 And given that each sentient being spends an unfathomable length of time in samsara before entering the Buddhist path, the defilements are apparently extremely long-lived (vs. 33). How then should one ever find happiness as long as the defilements still live in the house of one’s thinking (mati), thereby turning it into a “cage of greed” (vs. 35)? In the interest of one’s own happiness, these enemies need to be defeated. An interesting aspect is touched upon briefly in vs. 33. As Śāntideva will explain in a later part of the BCA, one should treat one’s enemies well, because they are to be regarded as benefactors contributing to one’s spiritual well-being in that they provide the opportunity to practice toleration (kṣānti) (see vss. 6:99-111). This logic, however, is not applicable to the defilements as enemies. To treat them well would only create more suffering (duḥkha). They are the only enemies that one should fight and they need to be fought at all costs (vss. 36-40). With the same vigor and determination shown by people who don’t find rest before they have retaliated an offense, or by warriors who fight furiously at the forefront of a battle, the Bodhisattva should take up the yoke of his spiritual effort and not shun the pains this will imply. This is because in his fight, he is about to destroy the cause of all suffering (vs. 38). Warriors carry their wounds and scars proudly as signs of their courage – for no (good) reason in the eyes of Śāntideva (vs. 39). Ordinary folk and low caste people endure all sorts of hardship just to sustain their lives. The Bodhisattva, however, has a far better reason for not shying away from any hardship, namely, his great aim of working for the welfare of all (vss. 39-41). Hence the defilements are his enemies not only because they cause his own suffering in samsara, but because they obstruct his struggle against the suffering of all other beings28 in hindering him from realizing his Bodhisattva vow. Being not free from the defilements, his 27  According to traditional doctrinal formulas, the cause of samsaric existence is designated as “thirst” or “craving” (tṛṣṇā) (in the Four Noble Truths) or as “ignorance” (avidyā) (in the Chain of Dependent Origination). It is, however, not uncommon to treat the three defilements as a variation of ignorance and thirst, inasmuch as thirst is inseparably linked with ignorance/delusion and expresses itself in attractive and aversive forms of attachment. In vs. 4:28 Śāntideva uses “thirst” as a synonym for greed (usually lobha or rāga). 28  The phrase “all beings … as far as space in the ten directions” (vs. 41) is frequently used in Buddhist texts to capture the innumerable and presumably infinite number of beings. The “ten directions” are the four cardinal direction and the four intermediate directions plus the zenith and the nadir.

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firm dedication to fight them in the name of the Bodhisattva vow sounds like the talk of a madman (vss. 41-42). And yet there is paradoxical wisdom in it: evil being fought by the evil itself. Is not aggression against the defilements a defilement in itself? And is “clinging” to the Bodhisattva vow not just another form of attachment? Yes, but in this case it is a defilement and a clinging that works toward the good. All defilements, says Śāntideva, need to be destroyed, apart from the one “defilement” that brings the destruction of them all: the struggle against the defilements in the name of the Bodhisattva vow (vs. 43). In a correspondingly martial language, his literary “I” proclaims his rigid firmness, not minding any costs (vs. 44). It is with this idea that Śāntideva gets rather close to the basic strategy of Buddhist Tantrism, that is, utilizing the defilements in one’s struggle against them.29 In order to overcome the defilements, it is crucial to see that they are of a purely mental nature (vss. 45-47). They do not exist in the objects of the senses, nor in the senses themselves nor anywhere else in the body (vs. 47a).30 Being only in one’s mind they have nowhere to escape once they are exorcised (vss. 45-46a). This can be done – and only can be done – through that special awareness or intuition which is prajñā (“insight” / “wisdom”) (vs. 46b). For Śāntideva it is not sufficient to understand the defilements, as in the early Buddhist tradition, as the “deluded” attitude towards pleasant (“greed”) and unpleasant (“hate”) sensations.31 The whole situation in which the Bodhisattva finds himself is a deception: he is “bewildered” and “as deluded” (vimohita) “by spells” (vs. 27). Even more: Not just his inner situation, the whole world is under the sway of the defilements. And this is delusion too, a gigantic deception, a phantasmagoria (māyā) (vs. 47b). The hellish captivity in samsara, caused and organized by the defilements, is not just metaphorically a nightmare; it is literally a kind of dream. This is what prajñā reveals and this insight destroys the defilements because the force of an illusion persists only as long as the illusion is taken as being real. Once its true 29

 See Harris 2017, 344f. See also above, Part II, chap. 1, p. 118.  Compare the discussion in Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika, 147-190, where Dharmakīrti rejects the view that the defilements result from matter and/or corporal processes. In order to justify his view that the defilements can be overcome by insight, he tries to prove their purely mental nature as well as that of their causes. See Jackson 1993, 351-387. The conviction that the defilements originate in delusion and that this is the main reason it is possible to overcome them is shared by both Mādhyamikas and Yogācārins. See also Steinkellner 2003, 106. 31  See above, Part II, chap. 2, p. 149. 30

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nature as an illusion is recognized, intuitively and with unquestionable certitude, its power evaporates.32 Śāntideva’s answer to the self-tormenting thoughts of the fresh Bodhisattva is radical, because it amounts to a complete change in one’s perception of reality. Śāntideva’s intention is not to demythologize, in a kind of Bultmannian mood, only such ideas as hells and heavens. When Śāntideva says that the defilements are the guardians and jailers of hell (vs. 35), his idea is that the defilements are the cause of those sins and wrongdoings which lead to rebirth in hell and trigger infernal suffering.33 When he now speaks of the defilements’ sway over the “whole world” as māyā, his demythologization captures the whole of what is usually considered to be real. This explains why Śāntideva carries his analysis of the Bodhisattva’s subjugation to the vicious circle of “sin producing karmic retribution producing new sin” to such absurd extremes that no solution appears to be feasible. In the end, the solution is not found inside this system of defilement-driven and karma-regulated samsaric existence, but only by taking a totally new, fresh and liberating perspective from outside, that is, through that specific prajñā-generated view (prajñādṛṣṭi, vs. 46) which sees the whole system as a phantasmagoria. The way the Bodhisattva can free his heart and mind is thus summarized in Śāntideva’s imperative: “Strive for insight (prajñā)!” (vs. 47b). In conclusion, and as a transition to chapter 5, vs. 4:48 implies that this pursuit of insight is the way to keep the Bodhisattva precepts, their essence and purpose. If this is done, the cure prescribed by the great physician, the Buddha (see BCA 2:55-57), will work and one’s heart be healed. While in vs. 4:46 Śāntideva presents prajñā as the only antidote against the defilements, in vs. 1:6 he declares bodhicitta to be the only force overcoming evil. This inevitably raises the question of the relationship between these two – a question of profound significance for the 32  That this is Śāntideva’s argument becomes very clear from his discussion in 9:31f. To the objection that one might still cling to a woman even if one knows she is just a magical creation, Śāntideva replies that this is only the case if the inclination to ascribe existence to her has not yet vanished entirely. 33  See also Śāntideva’s similar statement in BCA 5:4-7. Perhaps Śāntideva also thinks of the more specific idea that the “personnel” of the hells (guards, torturers, etc.) are, unlike the prisoners of hell, not themselves samsaric beings who are reborn into such positions, but are various kinds of magical creatures produced by the karmic forces of those who suffer under them. This understanding of the infernal staff is explicitly presupposed and discussed in Vasubandhu’s Vimśatikā 4-6 (see Kochumuttom 1989, 168-170, 262-264). Yet even if this is what Śāntideva has in mind, it is still the defilements that create the karma which creates these figures. See also below, pp. 336-338.

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overall interpretation of the BCA, since the relationship between Śāntideva’s exposition of prajñā in chapter 9 and his exposition of bodhicitta through chapters 1 to 8 hinges upon the answer to this question. I suggest that the concluding verses of chapter 4, in connection with vs. 1:6, provide an important clue. Let us take Śāntideva’s metaphor of the “house” of the mind (vs. 35) and extend it (following vs. 46) to the whole world. Prajñā is then what allows one to see the house from outside, that is, from the perspective of that universal “emptiness” (śūnyatā) which we may call “boundless openness” (in Maso Abe’s adaptation of Bodhidharma’s famous phrase34). As seen from inside, the house constitutes the world in which one lives and it sets that world’s limits. From outside, the house is deconstructed as a phantasmagoria. Yet the house has windows, i.e. the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, and bodhicitta is the light from outside that shines through them into the house (or: like a flash in the dark night, see BCA 1:5). Bodhicitta is (!) prajñā in the form in which it manifests inside the house through the appearance of the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. Perfected bodhicitta is prajñā, or to stay with our metaphor: Having perfected bodhicitta is having left the house and understood its deceptive nature from outside. The light coming in from outside has the power to weaken or dissolve those parts of the house on which the light falls. What appeared to be solid turns out to be flexible and plastic. This is what happens to the Bodhisattva’s ego. Inside the house it is part and even the center of the world. Seen from outside, it is part and the center of an illusionary construct, and moreover, it is unmasked as its constructor. The ego is both component and architect of the “house of mind.” Inasmuch as the ego is the constructor, its role is decisive; inasmuch as the ego is a component of the illusion, its function is flexible. Through a process of recoding and reprogramming the ego, bodhicitta gains the power to reconstruct or reconfigure the “world.” Throughout the text of the BCA, we will see how Śāntideva works with a concept of the ego as a flexible, because ultimately illusory, construct, thereby instrumentalizing it for the purpose of reconstructing the Bodhisattva’s identity in transforming him into another window of prajñā, a manifestation of bodhicitta for the sake of all those still captured in the house. Part of this reconstruction or reconfiguration of the ego is its alienation from the defilements by learning to perceive them as foes rather than friends. 34  See Abe 1995, 31. For Bodhidharma, see the first “case” in the “Blue Cliff Record” (Bìyán Lù).

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Now we can see the analogy with Paul’s theology in Romans 7 in its amazing scope, but can also identify specific differences. Like Śāntideva, Paul first constructs a seemingly hopeless scenario (see Rom. 7:24),35 and as in BCA 4 the problem culminates in the realization that the ego is driven by contradictory forces. While Śāntideva speaks of being bewitched and bewildered by a power “here in me” which he does not understand, but which is then identified as the defilements, Paul similarly speaks of being enslaved by the power of sin (Rom. 7:14) and of not understanding what he is doing (Rom. 7:15). He then continues: “But in fact it is no longer I that do it, but sin that dwells within me” (Rom. 7:17). This wording is very similar and partly identical (“it is no longer I” – δὲ οὐκέτι ἐγώ) to his famous statement in Gal. 2:20: “… it is no longer I who live, but it is Christ who lives in me.” Sin can as much live in Paul’s ego as Christ can. Similarly the person on the Bodhisattva path discerns in his ego both the defilements and bodhicitta. In Rom. 7 the tension appears superficially as a conflict between Paul’s consent to the Jewish law and his failure to keep it. But underneath lies the more fundamental conflict between his will’s consent to what is right and the inability to put his will into practice (Rom. 7:18-20). This is presented as an expression of the overall conflict between spirit and flesh, for “the law is spiritual; but I am of the flesh” (Rom. 7:14).36 Many interpreters have construed the inner conflict in Rom. 7 as relating exclusively to Paul’s spiritual state before he became a follower of

35  As part of the debate surrounding the so-called “New Perspective on Paul,” New Testament scholars have differed widely on the question as to what extent this was written as an autobiographical reflection of personal experience or as a general parenesis, or both. For a brief overview, see Starnitzke 2004, 241f. A variant of the interpretation as parenesis has been presented by Stowers, who understands the literary genre as “a type of prosōpoiia, speech-in-character” (Stowers 1994, 264). According to Stowers, Romans 7 is a rhetorical apologia of Paul’s position that gentiles are not under the obligation to keep the Jewish law because they would not be able to do so anyway due to their strong passions. The fictive “I” would thus represent the character of that type of non-Jew. His addressees would be judaizing gentiles whom he wishes to win for the Christian way (Stowers 1994, 258-284). Stowers claims that his interpretation is free from anachronism and would match the hermeneutical horizon of Paul’s addressees. The problem, however, is that if Stowers were right, Paul expressed himself in a form that is extremely prone to being misunderstood. It would have been fairly easy for Paul to clarify that the inner conflict described so dramatically in Romans 7 is merely a problem of judaizing gentiles. And is it not quite improbable that Paul viewed Jews as being free from such conflicts? 36  See also the parallel statement in Gal. 5:17: “For what the flesh desires is opposed to the Spirit, and what the Spirit desires is opposed to the flesh; for these are opposed to each other, to prevent you from doing what you want.”

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Jesus.37 This, however, is hardly plausible if one accepts that, in Paul’s understanding, the tension between flesh and spirit remains present in the life of a Christian, despite of their being freed from the law (Rom. 7:6). I agree with James Dunn’s remark on Rom. 7: “None of this, it has to be said, reads like the description of a state or experience which is now wholly past for the writer. (…) It is precisely the one who knows that Jesus Christ provides the answer who goes on to observe calmly that the ‘I’ continues to be divided between mind and flesh.”38 As Dunn argues, the conflict between flesh and spirit, between a life enslaved by sin and a life set free by “Christ in me,” is an “expression of the eschatological tension. It arises because the believer lives in the overlap of the ages and belongs to both at the same time.”39 The age of man’s new creation in Christ has already started, but its perfection is still pending. The age of the old creation, spoiled by sin, is running out but still present. The follower of Christ, as seen by Paul, participates simultaneously in these two overlapping ages, which thereby become two realities: the reality constructed by the perspective of the “flesh” and the true reality, newly created by God.40 The way the new and true reality breaks into the transient but still powerful reality of the flesh is through Christ’s spirit of divine love and forgiveness. Being no longer under the law is for Paul being no longer under the curse of divine condemnation (Rom. 8:1) but under the blessing of divine justification through forgiveness. For the present moment, however, this new reality is only recognized in faith, “dimly” and “as “in a mirror,” while its perfect and unobstructed vision is still to come (1 Cor. 13:12). The simultaneity of living in two realities has some affinities to Śāntideva’s concept of the word as māyā, or, more precisely, to the double perspective of, on the one hand, the deluded view that takes illusion to be real and, on the other hand, the enlightened view that unmasks illusion in the light of prajña. However, an obvious difference lies in the eschatological paradigm underlying Paul’s thought, one that does not underlie Buddhist thought. While the element of being protected against the negative karmic results of one’s sins is by no means lacking in Śāntideva’s understanding of bodhicitta and can even take the form of forgiveness,41 an eschatological order of realities seems to be totally alien 37

 See Dunn 1998, 472f, and Starnitzke 2004, 249f, who both reject this view.  Dunn 1998, 474. 39  Ibid. 474f. 40  Wolter 2011, 95. 41  See above, Part II, chap. 2, p. 150. 38

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and absent. Yet this might be the typical situation of where to apply the hermeneutics of Arvind Sharma’s “reciprocal illumination.”42 The eschatological dynamism behind the inner spiritual struggle as it appears in Paul may help in discerning some kind of eschatological feature in Śāntideva’s view, at least on the individual level. This is because the perfection of prajñā will only be realized once Buddhahood has been attained, which to the practicing Bodhisattva lies in some indefinite future. The light that shines from beyond can thus also be understood as a promise of the things to come. Its present manifestation through bodhicitta would be a kind of prolepsis, the dawn of future brightness.43 Although such an interpretation may claim some provisional credit, it would still belong, from a Mahāyāna point of view, to the realm of māyā (due to its presupposition of an order of realities in time). This, however, may conversely shed some light on Paul’s conception in throwing up the question of to what extent his eschatological scenario should be taken as literally true, or whether it might be legitimately interpreted as a symbolic figuration of the redeeming power emerging from that unfathomable divine reality which ultimately blasts away all conceptual constructs, including chronological ones.44 In the end this amounts to the perhaps most crucial issue in a Christian reading of the BCA: the relationship between ultimate reality as revealed through Buddha in prajñā and ultimate reality revealed as God through Christ. If Paul, like Śāntideva, also entertains the idea of living in two realities, or in two different perspectives on reality, does this result in a similar understanding of the ego as a flexible construct? This question is difficult to answer and we will have to wait until we see more fully how Śāntideva reconstructs the ego of the Bodhisattva.45 But it is worth noting that Paul’s understanding of the ego is indeed not that of a fixed substance or identity. Concepts such as being a new creation in Christ or the participation in Christ’s death and resurrection indicate the transformation of the “ego” being so radical that it does raise questions about its identity: To what extent is the new creation, and hence the newly created ego, still identical with the old one? What ensures the identity between the ego that has died and the ego that is resurrected? It is well known that Keiji Nishitani (1900-1990), from a Buddhist point of view, 42

 Cf. Sharma 2005. See above, Part I, chap. 5, p. 99.  See also Steinkellner 2003. 44  See above, Part II, chap. 1, pp. 125f. 45  See below, commentary on 6:112-134 (pp. 295-303) and 8:89-189 (pp. 375-388). 43

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referred to Gal. 2:20 in order to question essentialist and substantialist views of the ego within a Christian context. If Paul says “It is no longer I who live, but Christ lives in me,” Nishitani’s asks, “who speaks these words actually?”46 If it is Paul, his statement is wrong, for it would still be he who is living. If it is Christ who is speaking, the statement becomes nonsensical. The paradox pointed out by Nishitani indicates that also in a Christian context, the identity of the ego should not be taken as a fixed identity, as substance, but as a flexible identity construct. According to Shizuteru Ueda, the real question aimed at by Nishitani is: “What is actually going on when a human being says ‘I’?”47 Paul’s understanding of the ego in which sin lives and the ego in which Christ lives can indeed be better construed as expressing two different modes of how to understand and construct one’s own identity, instead of signifying two different substances.48 Ueda, in further elaborating on Nishitani’s stimulus, draws on Paul’s talk of death and resurrection in order to characterize the identity transformation as it is triggered by the practice of zazen: “it is to die into nothingness and to awake and rise again to live out of nothingness.”49 Can living in the mode of “Christ in me” be seen as qualitatively analogous to living as a Bodhisattva (bodhicitta in me)? This takes us back to the question of how to relate the ultimate reality pointed at through the idea of God as revealed in Christ to the ultimate reality pointed at through “nothingness” or “emptiness” (śūnyatā). One final remark shall be added which will also take us to the discussion in the first section of the next chapter. It is a frequent phenomenon, found in various religions, to have spiritual struggle expressed in militant language: as a war, battle, fight, etc. which one should enter like a brave warrior and with suitable spiritual weapons. Paul50 (Rom. 7:23) and Śāntideva (BCA 4:37, 39, 44f) employ military language. The most famous example of spiritual struggle and actual violent combat not only forming a linguistic continuum, but coalescing in that the latter can become a form of the first, is certainly the Muslim concept of jihad. Another example is the Christian liberation theology, where the struggle for social reform or revolution is presented as a spiritual duty and does 46  Ueda 2001, 49ff. Ueda relates the question to various dialogues between Nishitani and his Christian student Kazuo Muto. According to Fischer-Barnicol (1965/66, 210), Nishitani also raised this question with Christian theologians in Basel and Marburg. 47  Ueda 2001, 51. 48  See, for example, the respective suggestion in Starnitzke 2004, 250. 49  Ueda 2001, 46. 50  Even more so, the pseudo-Pauline Letter to the Ephesians (see Eph. 6:10-20).

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not only take the form of vocal “prophetic anger” but also of militant action. Dialogue between so-called “Engaged Buddhists” and Christian theologians has provoked the question of whether such forms of verbal and actual militancy would not be seriously at variance with Buddhist spirituality. Masao Abe (1915-2006) often asserted that “in Buddhism the notion of justice or righteousness is rather weak” so that it might learn in this respect from “Western religions.”51 Rita Gross (1943-2015), more specifically, called for a Buddhist adoption of a “prophetic voice” in the sense of “social criticism, protest against misuse of power, vision for a social order more nearly expressing justice and equity,”52 a call that provoked a number of critical reactions from the Buddhist side.53 In light of such concerns it seems interesting to note that Śāntideva not only uses rather martial language when speaking about the battle against the defilements. He even accepts that this type of verbal and mental aggression is itself a kind of “defilement” – although an acceptable one, because its aim is not inflicting but ending suffering (vss. 4:38, 43). What would this position entail if the defilements were not merely thought of as phenomena in an individual’s mind but also as something that, on a social level, can assume structural and institutional forms, as has been suggested by David Loy?54 Along the lines of such deliberations, John Makransky proposed that the Tibetan idea of “wrathful, enlightened deities” expressing “fierce compassion” might function as a Buddhist counterpart to the “prophetic anger” of the Abrahamic religions.55 Seeing social criticism as an implication of the Bodhisattva’s compassionate strife for the liberation from suffering would then “amend the classical interpretation of the six perfections to include not only one’s personal interactions with others but prominently also communal organization and action to address social and ecological problems and needs.”56

51

 Abe 1995, 16.  Gross 1993, 134. 53  For Gross’ response to these criticisms, see: Gross, Radford Ruether 2001, 165-182. 54  Loy 2003. 55  Makransky 2014, 124f. 56  Ibid. 129. 52

CHAPTER 5

BODHICARYĀVATĀRA 5 PRESERVING CIRCUMSPECTION (SAṂPRAJANYARAKṢAṆA)

TRANSLATION: 5:1-17 Guarding the mind 1. He who wishes to keep the rules [of a bodhisattva] must carefully watch his mind. He who does not watch the fleeting mind cannot keep the rules. 2. Untamed elephants in heat do not cause in this world the havoc that is caused by that unleashed elephant mind, in the deepest and the other hells. 3. If that elephant mind is tethered all over with the shackle of mindfulness (smṛti), all peril disappears and all good is near. 4.-5. Tigers, lions, elephants, bears, snakes and all enemies, all the guardians of hell, Dākinī witches and Rākṣasa demons, they are all bound when the single mind is bound. By taming the single mind, they all are tamed. 6. For all kinds of peril and boundless suffering arise from nothing but the mind. This has been proclaimed by the Herald of Reality. 7. Who has carefully forged the weapons in hell, who the scalding iron floor? And whence do those women [who torment adulterers] come? 8. The Wise One has taught that all this has arisen from a sinful mind. Therefore, in the threefold world, nothing is frightening but the mind. 9. If perfection of giving (dānapāramitā) means taking the poverty of the world away, the world being poor even now, how would the earlier Saviors have possessed this perfection? 10. The perfection of giving has been explained as being due to a mind that abandons all of one’s own to all beings, as well as the fruit of this act. Therefore this perfection is nothing but the mind. 11. Where shall I bring fish, for instance, so that I am not causing their death? But if a mind of abstention has been obtained, that is considered the perfection of moral discipline (śīlapāramitā). 12. How many evil beings, infinite as the sky, could I kill? But when the angry mind is killed, all enemies are killed.

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13. Where might there be leather to cover the whole earth? With the leather of but one sandal the earth is covered. 14. In the same way, I cannot restrain external things. But I can restrain my own mind. What is it to me whether other things are restrained? 15. Even together with speech and a body, a sluggish mind does not bear the fruit that a sharp one bears alone, such as brahmahood. 16. Prayers and all austerities are pointless, even when practiced for a long time, if an idle mind is set on something else. This has been explained by the Omniscient One. 17. In vain they roam about in space to destroy suffering, to find happiness, they who have not cultivated this cryptic mind, the very essence of all there is.

COMMENTARY 1. Mind Matters Chapter 4 concluded that the proper way of keeping the Bodhisattva rule is to focus on the mind: bodhicitta is put into practice and cultivated by fighting the defilements through striving for insight (prajñā). Through chapters 5 to 8, Śāntideva develops this conception of spiritual practice in much detail, whereby the perfection of the Bodhisattva virtues (pāramitās) provides the outer frame.1 His general focus on the mind is specified in the opening verse of chapter 5 by the directive of watching (rakṣaṇa) it. The main topic of the whole chapter is that this needs to be done through the cultivation of “mindfulness” (smṛti) and “circumspection” (saṃprajanya) (vs. 23) – a practice which has been central to Buddhist spirituality since its early beginnings2 and is included in the “Noble Eightfold Path” as its seventh limb. In the scriptures of the Pāli canon (tipiṭaka), the practice is described extensively in MN 10 and DN 22,3 and parts of it also appear in a very old standard scheme of the path of salvation.4 In an important essay, Lambert Schmithausen has shown how this practice was further 1

 On the question of the BCA’s overall structure, cf. Part I, chap. 3, pp. 53-58.  With possibly pre-Buddhist roots. See Schmithausen 1976, 254. 3  This text is known as the “Sūtra of the Foundations of Mindfulness” (Pāli: Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta; Sanskrit: Smṛtyupasthāna-sūtra). 4  I mentioned this scheme briefly in Part II, chap. 1, p. 117. It is found in DN 2; 3; MN 27; 38 and also throughout the Pāli tipiṭaka. For a detailed analysis, see Frauwallner 1953, 162-173. There is a close connection between the “Noble Eightfold Path” and this scheme insofar as the eight limbs of the Eightfold Path correspond to the various stages and practices described in the scheme. On the relationship between the 2

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developed in reciprocal interaction with the development of Buddhist doctrine. From an originally mental exercise it first turned into a means of interiorizing the Buddhist analysis of life as transient, unsatisfactory and not the self, and finally, in Mahāyāna Buddhism,5 of life’s illusory nature, apparently echoed in BCA 5:57. Yet as we will see, Śāntideva retains a fair amount of the original flavor of the practice. Verses 2-3 take up a well-known simile from early Buddhism used in the context of mindfulness practice: The mind needs to be guarded by mindfulness like a wild elephant is tamed by tying it to a firm post.6 The need for tethering and taming the mind is explained by its extremely dangerous nature, because the guardians and torturers of the hells including all their instruments arise from the mind (vss. 4-8).7 Doctrinal authority is given to this view by a reference to a Buddha word in vs. 8a, which probably8 alludes to the famous beginning of the Dhammapada 1: Mind is the leader of mental states. Mind is supreme, mind it creates. If with a mind that is not clean One does speak or does anything, Then after him does woe follow As wheels behind oxen feet do go.9 practice of smṛti and saṃprajanya in all three classical places (Eightfold Path, Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta, and the scheme of the path of salvation), see Schmithausen 1976, 251, 254. 5  Schmithausen (1976, 259) notes that in many of the Mahāyāna treatments of mindfulness, the presentation is less standardized and far more flexible than in earlier Buddhism, something which can also be observed in BCA 4. 6  E.g. MN 125 (PTS III 132, 136); Thag 1141. The simile is again used in BCA 5:40 as well as in ŚS 118, where it is connected to the practice of mindfulness. 7  The “scalding iron floor” is already mentioned in early texts such as MN 130, AN 3:37, Jātaka 530 and Mahāvastu 1:9. According to ŚS 71f, the “women” are phantoms produced by one’s own bad karma. After enticing their victims, they then turn into iron and crush and devour the men. According to the tradition of the Saddharmasmṛtyupasthāna, apparently taken up in the Pañjikā, such “women” appear at the top and bottom of a very thorny kind of tree (śālmalī trees, referred to in BCA 10:6) and then drag their victims up and down these trees (see Śāntideva 1997, 48, n. 86). A depiction of this particular type of torture in a Siamese Theravāda chanting book (18th cent.) can be seen in Appleton, Shaw, Unebe 2013, 30. For the respective section from the Saddharmasmṛtyupasthāna, see Matsunaga; Matsunaga 1972, 88. This tradition has also been included in Rashīd al-Dīn’s traditional record of Buddhist hells in Jahn 2013, LIV. See also below, pp. 331-345. 8  There is a nearly parallel statement in MA 6:89, where the reference is apparently to the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra. Yet MA 6:89 is far more general, not limited to the “sinful mind” as here. But MA 6:89 may have had its influence on BCA 5:17. Moreover, while none of the quotations given in ŚS 121f fit exactly, they do seem to relate to BCA 5:17. 9  Translation by Medonza 1984, 1.

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Śāntideva’s own words, however – that nothing in the world is “frightening but the mind” (vs. 8b) and that the mind is the source of “all kinds of peril and boundless suffering” (vs. 6) – are exceedingly harsher. The sense in which the mind is the cause of rebirth in hell was already explained in the previous chapter in terms of the defilements (BCA 4:2935): They penetrate the mind and lead to the kind of living that ends up in hell. Given this background it is clear that Śāntideva understands guarding the mind through mindfulness as the main means for tackling the defilements. That Śāntideva refers to the defilements as one’s true enemies has again a parallel in the Dhammapada, which speaks of the uncontrolled mind as one’s enemy (Dhp 42). But the mind is ambivalent. It is the unguarded mind that is so utterly dangerous, while the guarded mind brings about all that is good (BCA 5:3), a view that also finds its support in the first three sections of the Dhammapada (Dhp 1-43). The topic of the mind’s ambivalence is continued in vss. 15-17 by accentuating the importance and spiritual efficiency of a properly trained and guarded mind. Vs. 15 underlines that the positive karmic results of a concentrated mind alone will be far better than those of an untrained and lazy mind accompanied by words and deeds. Given as an example is rebirth in a heavenly world as a Brahma deity, which is traditionally regarded as the karmic fruit of the meditative development of the four mental states called “divine abidings”: loving kindness, compassion, sympathetic joy and equanimity.10 Vs. 16 adds a further example in quoting a Buddha word11 showing again that deeds (“austerities”) and words (“prayers”) are spiritually pointless if they are not accompanied by an undistracted mind (vs. 16). Vs. 17 finally declares that happiness cannot be found without the meditative cultivation of the mind, which is characterized as the secret or “cryptic” (guhya) essence of all things.12 Mind matters, is Śāntideva’s message, and the resulting imperative is to take care primarily of one’s mind. The emphasis of the crucial and at the same time highly ambivalent nature of the mind constitutes the framework of vss. 9-14, which present an important interpretation of the first two pāramitās: the perfection of 10

 As for example in DN 13. See also above, Part II, chap. 3, pp. 154f.  Stephen Batchelor traces the quotation in vs. 16 to the Samādhisaṃgraha-sūtra (see Shantideva 1993, 198, fn. 13). 12  See above, fn. 8. Other translations interpret “dharma” in “dharmasarvasvaṃ cittaṃ” not in the sense of “all there is” but as the whole teaching (Dharma), so that the cultivation of the mind appears as the essence of the Buddhist teaching and practice. For the critique of Yogācāra see BCA 9:15b-35. 11

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giving (dānapāramitā) and the perfection of morality (śīlapāramitā).13 In response to the question of what the “perfection” of these two virtues consists in, Śāntideva produces a series of different arguments showing that it lies not in a comprehensive achievement of their external effects, but in the perfection of the mind, the inner motivation. He begins with a doctrinal argument. It is taken for granted that the Buddhas have perfected all of the pāramitās. This excludes the possibility that the perfection of giving consists in the external result of all poverty having been removed from the world, since this is obviously not the case. Therefore the criterion of perfection cannot lie in its external results; it must be the perfect inner motivation (vss. 9-10). His second argument is ethical and relates to the perfection of morality. This argument corresponds to the Buddhist conviction that words and deeds originate from the mind. The example presented is vegetarianism as a form of not-killing (vs. 11). How can one protect fish from being consumed by oneself if not by one’s inner decision to refrain from eating living beings? The absurdity of protecting others externally against oneself demonstrates that the criterion of “perfection” has to be internal, it refers to the perfection of the mind. All moral precepts thus imply the inner element of “abstention,” the abstention from harming, stealing, adultery, lying and intoxication. The third argument is more of a psychological or sapiential nature. How can one get rid of, forever, all one’s enemies, people considered evil? Probably never if one were to try to solve the problem externally by killing them all, since given the infinity of samsara, their number may be infinite. But all enemies can indeed be wiped out if one wipes out the mental attitude that regards other beings as enemies (vs. 12). How this can be done will be explained by Śāntideva in the context of his treatment of kṣāntipāramitā, the perfection of patience (see BCA 6:22-111). His final argument is both epistemological and pragmatic: According to an ancient Buddhist teaching, the world, its origin, its end and the way to its end are all found “in this fathom-long body, along with its perceptions and thoughts,” that is, internally. And this is contrasted with the 13  Perhaps even of the third to fifth pāramitā. Vs. 12 may well be intended as a hint at the “perfection of patience” (kṣāntipāramitā). And without too much imagination, one might see in vss. 14b and 15a an allusion to the “perfection of vigor” (vīryapāramitā) and in vss. 15b-17, an allusion to the “perfection of absorption” (dhyānapāramitā). Given the explicit mention of the “perfection of giving” (dānapāramitā) and the “perfection of morality” (śīlapāramitā) in vss. 9-11, the overall message of vss. 9-17 would thus be that guarding the mind through mindfulness and circumspection is a decisive element in all of the first five pāramitās.

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impossible attempt to reach the end of the world externally by running.14 Śāntideva’s simile in vss. 13-14 works analogously: As it is impossible to find a piece of leather that covers the whole world, perfection does not and cannot consist in having gotten all things right externally. Yet as the whole earth is perfectly covered for oneself with just the leather of one’s sandals, perfection consists in the perfect restraint of one’s mind. This is what matters; anything else is beyond one’s control. Śāntideva’s view that “in the threefold world, nothing is frightening but the mind” (vs. 8) is radical and perhaps a poetic exaggeration. However, far too often the events of history, be they from his own days or from yesterday, have proven him right.15 Nevertheless, his position as sketched in vss. 9-14 raises a number of serious questions both in relation to the general ethical discourse and to the more specific dialogue on morality between Buddhists and Christians. Time and again, Buddhism has been accused by Western and/or Christian scholars of promoting an ethics of merely moral sentiments, which in addition are seen as of only self-centered and provisional value.16 It has been argued that Buddhist ethics is an ethics of inaction confining itself to the avoidance of morally bad action (not harming, not stealing, not lying, etc.), supposedly not recommending, or even discommending, good action, let alone any social engagement for the common benefit.17 It has also been argued that 14

 AN 4:45 (PTS II 48). Translation from Woodward; Hare 1932-36, vol. II, 57.  I am writing this on the evening of March 26, 2015, the day it turned out that a pilot killed 149 people on board an aircraft that he deliberately crashed in a combined act of murder/suicide – from a historical perspective one of the more “minor” cases demonstrating the mind’s dangerousness, but from the perspective of those involved, certainly an extreme example. 16  The view “that morality is at best preliminary to awakening and at worst an obstacle to its attainment” has been critically analyzed by Damien Keown (2001, 83-105) as the “transcendency thesis.” Its apologetic and polemical flavor in the writings of various Christian theologians is obvious in statements like “…attaining absolute and complete resignation (…), this is also the all dominant perspective of the lauded Buddhist morality” of Ernst Haack, a German Protestant church leader at the end of the 19th century (see Schmidt-Leukel 1992, 57). 17  In his extensive study on the four bahmavihāra in early Buddhism, Theravāda and early Mahāyāna, Maithrimurthi holds that as far as early Buddhism is concerned, the cultivation of love and compassion implies for monks and nuns only “passive altruism” in the sense of refraining from harming others, not any altruistic activities apart from teaching the Dharma (Maithrimurti 1999, 184f). This is, as he admits, different in early Buddhism in the case of lay followers (ibid. 162), in Mahāyāna Buddhism (e.g. ibid. 240f), and in later Theravāda orthodoxy, a development he explains as resulting from Mahāyāna influence (ibid. 212-214). Though his study is no doubt very careful, one may nevertheless ask if he does not overemphasize the differences between lay ethics 15

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the cultivation of morally good sentiments (such as loving kindness, compassion and sympathy) is recommended only for the karmic benefit of the practitioner, not for the well-being of his or her neighbor (which usually would require some kind of action flowing from such mental practice) and that in attaining the higher levels of spiritual progress, even those morally positive mental attitudes are to be abandoned in favor of utter indifference, often (mis)taken as the meaning of Buddhist equanimity (upekṣā). Max Weber (1864-1920) famously described Buddhism as the maximal expression of the “asocial character of all true mysticism,” attributing to it a purely individualistic, self-centered nature, interested only in the cultivation of inner mental states while rejecting any moral activity, let alone social activity, in the world.18 Albert Schweitzer, in his widely read 1936 study on Indian religions, held that both Jesus and the Buddha put their moral emphasis on inner perfection. However, whereas the cultivation of a loving mind commands loving action in the case of Jesus, according to Schweitzer, it does not do so in the case of the Buddha. If Buddhists or even the Buddha himself are sometimes reported as engaging in forms of charitable activity, they do so, Schweitzer holds,

and monastic ethics in early Buddhism. Paradigmatic, for example, is his treatment of the Metta Sutta (Sutta Nipāta 1:8). The love of a mother protecting her child with her life (which is, unquestionably, a strong act) is taken as the model of love (mettā) and the text demands the adoption of this attitude towards all beings. While the text shows no indication that this demand is to be restricted only to lay followers, this fact remains without any consequences in Maithrimurthi’s conclusions. He rather concerns himself with the question of whether the example of the mother has not been mistaken (presumably by the author of the sutta?) as illustrating maitrī or mettā (ibid. 53f). Yet when dealing with the Mahāyāna tradition of taking motherly love as a role model, he refers to the Metta Sutta as a canonical root of this tradition (ibid. 271f). But this continuity contradicts his overall argument. Moreover, I’m afraid that he does not do sufficient justice to the Jātaka tradition, which presents the altruistic activities of a future Buddha as an essential part of his spiritual development towards Buddhahood, not as something in opposition to it. At this point, I suggest, it is undeniably clear that the Mahāyāna tradition is in continuity with early Buddhist motives and cannot (in this respect) be accused of having changed their meaning, although Maithrimurthi does accuse it of this (ibid. 165). This also includes the issue of social activity. In Jātaka 31, the Bodhisattva appears as the young Magha who becomes the leader of a movement to improve the desolate state of his village through various social activities such as building roads, digging water tanks, setting up a common hall and practicing charity; the result of this is a decline in criminality and drunkenness. All of these activities are explained as motivated by abiding in loving kindness. Like other relevant Jātakas, this story is not dealt with by Maithrimurthi. 18  Weber 1988, vol. 2, 230 (my translation). For a profound analysis and criticism of Weber’s views, see Tambiah 1984.

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contrary to the renunciation of life and the world as it is allegedly commanded by their own teachings.19 Such contrasts are not a matter of the past. Since the 1980s the influential Roman Catholic theologian Johann Baptist Metz has propagated his distinction between a “mysticism of compassion” or “of open eyes” and a “mysticism of the closed eyes,” which is lacking in compassion and exclusively focused on one’s own liberation from suffering. He ascribes the first type to Jesus and the second to the Buddha.20 In a dialogue on Buddha and Jesus between the Indian Studies scholar Axel Michaels and the Protestant theologian Ulrich Luz, Michaels has argued that in Buddhism “loving kindness” (maitrī) “is marked by gentleness and indifference, however, not by empathy.”21 It is, says Michaels, “nothing more than an indifferent goodwill”22 and thus “clearly a different love from what Paul describes.”23 Although Michaels confines these remarks to early Buddhism and admits that “Mahāyāna Buddhism developed an ethics that is quite comparable to Christian caritas,”24 he still follows the old stereotype also in the realm of Mahāyāna Buddhism when he compares Albert Schweitzer and Mother Teresa with the 14th Dalai Lama, whom he sees as “an image of personal integrity but not by all means a man of selfless good deeds.”25 Would it not have been in line with good practice in interreligious comparison to compare a Buddhist institutional leader such as the Dalai Lama with the leader of a Christian institution, e.g. with Pope John Paul II or the Archbishop of Canterbury, and Christian activists such as Albert Schweitzer or Mother Teresa with Buddhist activists like Mahā Ghosānanda or A.T. Ariyaratne? This, of course, would have made the point of his comparison impossible. But then, the objection goes: Is social activism as exemplified by Ariyaratne or Mahā 19  See Schweitzer 1960, 114f, 125f. For the entrenchment of such views as quoted from Weber and Schweitzer in a broad range of Western and Christian anti-Buddhist literature, see Schmidt-Leukel 1992, 36-141. 20  E.g. Metz 2011a, 27, fn. 41, 176f; Metz 2011b, 91. 21  Lutz, Michaels 2006, 84. 22  Ibid. 84. It is astonishing that Michaels illustrates his presentation of Buddhist love as “nothing more than an indifferent goodwill” with a long quotation from the Mettā Sutta, which illustrates the ideal of Buddhist love by the love of her mother who is ready to protect her own child with her life. This hardly matches the image that Michaels paints of Buddhist love and certainly not his view that Buddhist love is “free from fondness” (“ohne Zuneigung” – a phrase which is in the German original but has disappeared from the English translation; cf. Lutz, Michaels 2002, 98). 23  Lutz, Michaels 2006, 84. 24  Ibid. 85 25  Ibid. 77.

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Ghosānanda (and a number of others) still properly Buddhist? Are socially engaged Buddhists26 not “mistaking the boat for the shore,” as it has been expressed by James Deitrick?27 The question suggests that taking Buddhist ethics as an imperative for social action amounts to losing sight of the “other shore” of ultimate liberation in favor of mundane social commitment, that is, of falling into a kind of Buddhist heresy born out of too much intercourse with Western and Christian values. On first sight, Śāntideva’s statements in vss. 5:9-14 can easily be taken as supporting an interpretation of Buddhist ethic as “quietist” and “inactive.” Jan Nattier has quoted these verses as evidence that for Śāntideva, the perfection of giving and morality is just “a purely mental act” which “does not require actual giving of physical objects.”28 And Stephen Jenkins has asked, in reference to “Śāntideva’s sandals:” “Is compassion in Buddhist practice active or is it merely a matter of shaping a character that is most conducive toward spiritual goals? In what sense does it actually get down to relieving the suffering of others?”29 Taking Śāntideva as a principal witness for an inactive, purely mental orientation of Buddhist ethics overlooks significant pieces of counterevidence. First of all, in several places Śāntideva unambiguously demands morally good deeds. In BCA 4:5 he quotes from the Sūtras that “he who does not actually give, although in his mind he has thought about giving, will become a hungry or thirsty ghost, even if the gift was merely a trifle.”30 Also in relation to “giving”, vs. 85a of the current chapter says that the Bodhisattva “should share with the destitute, the abandoned and 26  On “Engaged Buddhism,” see Queen, King 1996; Queen, Prebish, Keown 2003; King 2005; King 2009. 27  Deitrick 2003. Lele (2007, 171) similarly holds that “Śāntideva’s works disagree with Engaged Buddhist views that see material deprivation as a real cause of suffering, and political change as a way of remedying that suffering.” I think that Lele is correct in insisting that in a Buddhist analysis, the ultimate origin of suffering is delusion and the corresponding attachment. But this, I suggest, does not exclude that compassion can be a strong motivation for alleviating suffering, also by meeting those kinds of needs occurring within delusion and suffering, although the ultimate goal of the Bodhisattva is to move beings closer towards their liberation from delusion and attachment. Is not, according to Śāntideva, the whole activity of a Bodhisattva situated within an illusionary reality? See also above, Part II, chap. 3, p. 161, fn. 32. 28  Nattier 2003, 135 and 145, fn. 18. Similarly, though more cautiously, Reiko Ohnuma (2007, 78) holds that Śāntideva’s “definitions give primary emphasis to the intention behind the gift, and seem to include the actual act of giving as a secondary element.” 29  Jenkins 2003, 40f. 30  See above, Part II, chap. 4, p. 183.

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those under vows.”31 In BCA 7:25 Śāntideva indicates the whole spectrum of real gifts when he states: “Initially, the Guide prescribes the giving of vegetables and the like. Then he gradually impels one, so that later one would give away even one’s own flesh.”32 Within the standard triad of giving one’s body, one’s possessions and one’s merit (see BCA 3:10), it is particularly the corporal dimension which unmistakably demonstrates that Śāntideva’s concept of giving is not at all that of “a purely mental act.”33 According to ŚS 22 the Bodhisattva is “showing himself as one whose deeds are his words.”34 And as Jenkins has demonstrated by a number of examples, this understanding is fully in line with the Mahāyāna concept of the Bodhisattva in general.35 Second, as I tried to clarify above, the intention in BCA 5:9-14 is to determine the criterion of the perfection or completion of the pāramitās. Śāntideva’s point is not that the perfection of giving excludes any need to actually give; his point is rather that the criterion for perfection does not lie in the external results. In this sense he rejects the view that one cannot perfect giving as long as some beings are still in need. The Bodhisattva or Buddha can have achieved the perfection of giving and still be aiming at the well-being of all, which presupposes that this has not (yet) been achieved. The criterion for the perfection of this virtue – a virtue that the Bodhisattva shows in his actions – lies not in his outer achievements but in the perfection or flawlessness of his inner motivation. Not only for Śāntideva, but from a Buddhist perspective in general, it is the motivation (and not the action in and of itself) that is decisive for its qualification as morally good and spiritually wholesome (kuśala).36 If one does something to benefit another person and this deed, due to unforeseen circumstances, 31  This verse, however, is not found in the Dūn-huáng version of the BCA (see below, fn. 53, and Ishida 1988). See also ŚS 27, which lists all kinds of goods, including food, medicine, beds and utensils, that should be given not just to the Saṅgha but also “to poor mendicants and beggars, not turning his eyes from any creature….” Bendall, Rouse 1922, 30. 32  See below, Part II, chap. 7, pp. 313f. 33  Nattier should have known better, for she herself refers to BCA 7:25 and the corporal dimension of “giving” in her discussion of self-sacrifice. See Nattier 2003, 144, fn. 16. 34  Bendall, Rouse 1922, 25. 35  See Jenkins 2003. The influential Bodhisattvabhūmi (I:10,2,10,35-46), for example, is quite specific regarding the Bodhisattva’s obligation to assist others in all kinds of worldly needs. See Engle 2016, 293-300. 36  Roy 2011, 163, is right when he writes in relation to BCA 5:9-14: “Charity, properly so-called, can never be a virtue at the actional level alone. (…) The proper objects of moral evaluation are not actions but motives.”

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in fact becomes the cause of serious damage to the other, it would still count as a good or wholesome act because of the good intention or motivation behind it.37 One of the reasons why the Buddhist assessment of actions focusses on their motivation is that among the three principle roots of evil-doing, i.e. the three defilements, delusion is seen as the cardinal root from which greed and hate emerge. From a Buddhist perspective, “evil is basically wrong-viewing rather than bad.”38 Buddhist ethics is part and parcel of overcoming the defilements. And the reason for overcoming the defilements is the removal of suffering, one’s own as well as that of all others, or as Śāntideva expresses it: suffering is to be prevented and removed simply because it is suffering, regardless of who is suffering (see BCA 8:102-103). This is why it is so difficult, indeed presumably impossible, to neatly place Śāntideva’s ethics into one of the usual boxes of either virtue ethics, consequentialism, or an ethics of duty. In fact it shares significant aspects of each of them.39 Third, Śāntideva’s concentration on the mind is based on the Buddhist conviction that words and deeds spring from the mind, as stated in the opening verses of the Dhammapada. I agree with Roy’s summary of the respective Buddhist position: “The inner or motivational aspect of a deed always precedes and causes it, goes ahead of the action. Any deed has roots in them originally, the action is actually their expression.”40 To care for the mind, that is, for “right view” and “right intention” (the first two limbs of the Eightfold Path) is thus also a means of insuring that one will get words and deeds right (the third and fourth limbs of the Path).41 In this sense, Śāntideva states later in the present chapter (vs. 5:97): “The practices outlined for bodhisattvas are countless, but

37  This was tragically illustrated by the plane crash mentioned above (fn. 14). A pupil booked on the plane returning home from a student exchange trip had forgotten her passport at the home of her host parents. In order to help their guest not miss the plane, the hosts rushed by car back to their house to get her passport and brought it to the airport. Although this action in a sense “caused” (as one of a whole chain of causes) her death, presumably no one would assess it as a bad action although the ultimate effect of it was extremely bad. For the general Buddhist position on this issue, see Schlingloff 1962, 30f. 38  Roy 2011, 307. 39  See Harvey 2000, 51; Todd 2013, 33. 40  Roy 2011, 101. 41  See, for example, the unambiguous statement in MN 8 (PTS I 44): “I say that even the inclination of the mind towards wholesome states is of great benefit, so what should be said of bodily and verbal acts conforming [to such state of mind]?” Ñāṇamoli; Bodhi 2001, 127.

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the cleansing of the mind is the practice that he should, of necessity, perform first.” One’s performance in words and deeds not only has an impact on the external world and other sentient beings, but also has a repercussion on one’s mind. According to a standard Buddhist conviction, karma not only impacts the quality of one’s future rebirth but also one’s continuing moral and spiritual development in one’s present life. On that account the cultivation of one’s mind is of primal significance for the cultivation of one’s own personality, which the Bodhisattva, in terms of the transformational concept of merit-transfer, dedicates entirely to the wellbeing of all others. As in Buddhism, performing good deeds is also seen as important in Christianity. The parable of the Good Samaritan (Lk. 10:25-37) or the so-called King’s Speech in Matthew (Mt. 25:31-46) put a strong emphasis on acting: “Go and do likewise” (Lk. 10:37) – “…you did it to me” (Mt. 25:40). This does not imply that the motivation behind, and expressed in, such deeds is regarded as less important. Pabitrakumar Roy has certainly a point when he sees a close affinity between Śāntideva’s focus on the right mind and Jesus’ teaching (in the Sermon on the Mount) “that the thought of lust and the hating disposition make a man an adulterer and a murderer….”42 The parallel appears even stronger in Jesus’ teaching on purity and impurity, where he holds that a person is defiled by what emerges from his heart: “evil intentions, murder, adultery, fornication, theft, false witness, slander” (Mt. 15:18). The emphasis on the good mind or heart is still stronger in the theology of Paul when he plays off works of generosity (of a clearly Bodhisattva type) against a heart of love (1 Cor. 13:3): “And if I give all my possessions to feed the poor, and if I deliver my body to be burned, but do not have love, it profits me nothing.” For a long time such emphasis on the inner quality of a good heart and upright motivation was central to Christian spirituality;43 it is in modern times that the pendulum has swung to external action. Thomas à Kempis could still follow Paul and state: “Without charity external work is of no value….” And as Thomas knows all too well, “that which seems to be charity is oftentimes really sensuality, for man’s own inclination, his own will, his hope of reward, and his self-interest….” Like Paul (love “does not seek its own,” 1 Cor. 13:5) – and Śāntideva – he thus concludes that 42

 Ibid. 101.  See also the numerous examples given by Leo Lefebure in his commentary on the citta vagga of the Dhammapada (Lefebure, Feldmeier 2011, 63-67). 43

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“he who has true and perfect charity seeks self in nothing.”44 Buddhism’s concentration on the mind – as the source of words and deeds, as the root of good and evil, and as the field open to cultivation – together with its long experience in an immense repertoire of methods for the exploration, education and elaboration of the mind is certainly something from which Christianity can profit, given its own, once strong, awareness of the mind’s crucial role in spiritual life. I will come back to this in my commentary on the next section (BCA 5:18-58). If my interpretation of BCA 5:9-14 is correct, Śāntideva’s point is that we should focus on the state of our mind, while the external outcome is not under our control (see vs. 5:14). But even then the problem indicated in vs. 5:9 remains unsolved. If the Buddhas have perfected all of the pāramitās and selflessly pursue their goal of benefiting all beings, why is there still any suffering in the world? This is a Buddhist version of the problem of evil or theodicy, which affects not only Christianity.45 If God is omnipotent and perfectly good, why is there any evil in the world? Some attempts to solve the Buddhist version of the problem of evil are not that different from some of the solutions suggested in Christian theology. One Buddhist solution holds that though the Buddhas have the wish to remove all suffering, their power to do so is limited.46 An example of this position is found in the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra (chap. 9): “Bhagavan, if the resources of Bodhisattvas are inexhaustible and if they have compassion, why are there poor people in the world?” “Avalokiteśvara, that is solely the fault of the actions of those sentient beings themselves. If this were not so, if sentient beings’ own faults did not become obstacles, then beings could always engage in actions, and they would have inexhaustible resources; in which case how could any suffering appear in the world?” “Avalokiteśvara, for example, the fact that hungry ghosts, whose bodies are pained by thirst, perceive the watery ocean as dry is not the ocean’s failing. It is a fault resulting from those hungry ghosts’ own actions.”

 Imitatio Christi 1:15; Kempis 2012, 28.  For the position that in Buddhism and Hinduism the problem of evil appears in forms parallel to the theistic problem of theodicy, see Gregory 1986 and Völker 2014. For the underlying issue of the origin of illusion, see below, pp. 458f, commentary on BCA 9:107-108. 46  Within Christianity the solution suggested by so-called “process theology” pursues a similar strategy. Under the influence of the process-philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, process theology holds that God is not really omnipotent. God’s power is only of a persuasive nature; it is not coercive. God can inspire goodness, but not force it upon chaotic matter or a resistant spirit (see Griffin 1976). 44 45

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“Similarly, the absence of good results is not the failing of the ocean-like generosity of the Bodhisattvas. The faulty actions of those sentient beings who are like the hungry ghosts are their own fault.”47

This concept seems to be echoed in BCA 4:13, where Śāntideva moans that “countless Buddhas” have been unable to save him due to his “own fault.” Yet this understanding is at variance with his belief that Buddhas and Bodhisattvas can transfer their own karmic merit to those whose karmic record is poor. Other Buddhist attempts to answer the question why there is still misery in the world despite the Buddhas’ and Bodhisattvas’ continuous compassionate activities assume that they have very good reasons to allow a certain amount of evil to persist. Such reasons are compatible with their compassionate intentions, because they see some suffering as connected to the achievement of higher goods or values.48 One such explanation is offered in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (8:23): If there really are such bodhisattvas who are encountered in the world, who, having accumulated merit (…), have reached the ten masteries and attained unequaled and preeminent capabilities to benefit others, then why do we still see sentient beings encountering severe penury and suffering in the world? This is because bodhisattvas see that, if they were to bestow riches, the actions of sentient beings in their consequent stage of wealth would constitute obstacles that would result in suffering and that this would hinder the good that they [otherwise] might engender. It is because bodhisattvas see that if they lack riches, they will be able to realize detestation of evil transmigration. It is because bodhisattvas see that if they were to bestow riches on them, then they would nurture the causes for all manner of evil states. It is because bodhisattvas see that if they were to bestow riches on them, this would be the cause for them to oppress an untold number of beings. 47

 Powers 1995, 262f.  Christian analogies to this type of solution are the so-called “free-will-defense” and its further development in John Hick’s “person-making theodicy.” If God wishes to bring about beings with limited though genuine and morally relevant freedom, there has to be a world in which evil is possible and in which God does not prevent morally evil decisions. One reason this kind of freedom is valuable consists in it being a logical prerequisite of a spiritual maturation – a “person-making” process – that is driven by a genuine responsibility for oneself and one’s fellow beings. For a brief description of the free-will-defense, see Kreiner 2006. The classic statement of the “person-making theodicy” is Hick 1990b; a brief summary is found in Hick 1990, 88-105. Within Hinduism, a similar solution has been developed by Rāmānuja (see Carman 1981, 176-179). For the relevance of this type of theodicy in Christian‒Buddhist dialogue, see SchmidtLeukel 2006c, 143-155. 48

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These are the reasons why, although bodhisattvas are not lacking in such capabilities, yet [poor and suffering] sentient beings are seen in the world.49

The Mahāyānasaṃgraha thus emphasizes that the Bodhisattvas seek to bring about moral goods and values for which too much wealth might constitute a serious obstacle. A structurally similar answer is offered in the highly popular and influential Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra (chap. 10). While the Mahāyānasaṃgraha underlines the spiritual and moral dangers connected to material affluence, the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa points to the moral and spiritual values and virtues that can only be developed in a world where suffering presents a serious challenge. It is only in a world like ours that: …there are ten virtuous practices which do not exist in any other Buddhafield. What are these ten? Here they are: to win the poor by generosity; to win the immoral by morality; to win the hateful by means of tolerance; to win the lazy by means of effort; to win the mentally troubled by means of concentration; to win the falsely wise by means of true wisdom; to show those suffering from the eight adversities how to rise above them; to teach the Mahāyāna to those of narrow-minded behavior; to win those who have not produced the roots of virtue by means of the roots of virtue; and to develop living beings without interruption through the four means of unification. Those who engage in these ten virtuous practices50 do not exist in any other Buddha-field.51

The existence of suffering and all forms of moral and natural evil in this world is explained as a deliberate means employed by the Buddha to enable the spiritual maturation of beings. At the level of ultimate reality, each “Buddha-field” – a world either created or supervised by a Buddha – “is a field of pure space, but the Lord Buddhas, in order to develop living beings, do not reveal all at once the pure realm of the Buddha.”52 Śāntideva does not pursue the problem of evil briefly touched upon in vs. 5:9 any further. But if one raises the question why an ultimate reality in which in fact all are saved is veiled by a reality replete with suffering and is revealed by the Buddhas not “all at once,” but only by means of inspiring people to take up and realize the compassionate 49

 Keenan 2003, 98.  This refers to the list of 10 pāramitās, which adds to the first 6 (giving, morality, patience, vigor, absorption, wisdom): (7) skill in means (upāya), (8) determination expressed in the vows (praṇidhāna), (9) spiritual power (bala), and (10) knowledge (jñāna). 51  Thurman 1976, 83. 52  Ibid. 80. 50

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sprit of awakening, Śāntideva’s favored answer may very well be along the lines of the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa: that the Bodhisattva pāramitās could not exist in any other kind of world. A world in which evil can be overcome is apparently more adequate as the veil of ultimate reality than a world in which no evil ever existed. For the rest of the chapter, Śāntideva expounds in more detail why and, in particular, how to develop mindfulness and circumspection in relation to one’s mind, one’s body and one’s behavior. As can be seen from the content, his addressees are primarily male monastics.53 Traditionally the cultivation of “mindfulness” (smṛti) is related to four different areas: body (including breathing), feelings, mind, and mind-objects (including various perceptions, sensual as well as mental impressions, doctrinal ideas, spiritual states and obstacles, etc.). The cultivation of “circumspection” (saṃprajanya) is originally described in the old scheme of the path: He becomes one who acts in full awareness when going forward and returning; who acts in full awareness when looking ahead and looking away; who acts in full awareness when flexing and extending his limbs; who acts in full awareness when wearing his robes and carrying his outer robe and bowl; who acts in full awareness when eating, drinking, consuming food, and tasting; who acts in full awareness when defecating and urinating; who acts in full awareness when walking, standing, sitting, falling asleep, waking up, talking, and keeping silent.54

In the canonical scheme this practice is closely related to the “guarding of the senses” (indriyasaṃvara). This practice entails not only being fully aware of all sensual impressions and mental perceptions (note that the mind is included among the senses!) but to guard the senses (including the mind) against attraction and aversion, which otherwise may easily originate in dependence on sensual impressions. Such feelings are considered dangerous because they are the root-forms of greed and hate, two of the cardinal vices.55 As the text itself explains: “Since, if he left the 53  The canonical BCA contains 15 verses (vss. 40, 81, 85, 88-98, 105) that are not found in the Dūn-huáng version. As Ishida (1988) has shown, several of these verses are concerned with issues of the rules and life of male monastics. But this is also true of various verses contained in both versions (e.g. vss. 21, 30, 35, 46, 72 and probably more). 54  MN 27 (PTS I 181), Ñāṇamoli; Bodhi 2001, 274. 55  This is also reflected in the “Principle of Dependent Origination” (pratītyasamutpāda), according to which the unwholesome attitudes of “thirst” (tṛṣṇā) and “clinging” (upādāna), i.e. limbs eight and nine, which lead to rebirth and suffering (ten to twelve), arise in dependence on the six senses (the five senses plus mind), sensecontact and feeling (limbs five to seven).

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eye-faculty, hearing-faculty, smelling-faculty, tasting-faculty, touchingfaculty, mind-faculty unguarded, evil unwholesome states of covetousness and grief might invade him….”56 At the end of chapter 5, Śāntideva summarizes: “The characteristic of circumspection (saṃprajanya) is briefly just this: a constant observation of all physical and mental states” (vs. 108), which is fully in line with these ancient Buddhist practices. TRANSLATION: 5:18-58 Mindfulness and circumspection 18. This is why the mind steered [by mindfulness] must be well sustained by me [with circumspection]. Of what use to me are the many other observances without the observance of watching the mind? 19. Just as one carefully protects a wound amidst an unruly crowd, so should you among villains always protect the wound of the mind. 20. Afraid of a little pain from a wound, I protect the wound with care; why not the wound of the mind, for fear of being crushed by the mountains in the Saṅghāta hell? 21. For, leading such a life even among sinners and also among beauties the firm ascetic is unshaken. 22. May my belongings well vanish, my honors, body, and life; may also all else that is good vanish, but never my mind! 23. I salute those who wish to protect the mind. May you preserve mindfulness (smṛti) and circumspection (saṃprajanya) with all effort! 24. Just as a person afflicted by disease is not capable of any activity, a mind that is lacking these two is not capable of any beneficial activity. 25. In the mindfulness of one whose mind lacks circumspection, the subjects heard, reflected, and contemplated are not retained, just as water does not stay in a cracked jug. 26. Many are learned, devout and exert themselves, and yet they sully themselves with sin through the flaw of not-circumspecting. 27. Like a thief, not-circumspecting sets out to steal mindfulness, and those who are bereft thereof are heading for a bad destiny, although they have collected merits. 28. That band of robbers, the defilements, is looking for an entrance. When they find the entrance, they rob our merits and destroy life in a good state.

56

 MN 27, abbreviated after Ñāṇamoli; Bodhi 2001, 274.

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29. We must therefore never remove mindfulness from our mind’s door. Even if it is gone, bearing in mind the torments of hells, it must be set up again. 30. Mindfulness comes easily to those fortunate, devoted ones who live together with teachers, through the instruction of the masters, even through fear of them. 31.-32. “The Buddhas and Bodhisattvas direct their unobstructed gaze at everything. Everything is right before their eyes. Also I stand before them.” With this thought, one should abide, filled with awe, respect and fear. In this way also the recollection of the Buddha will always be his. 33. When mindfulness stands at the door of the mind to protect it, circumspection follows, and when arrived, it will not depart again. 34. This mind must first of all always be taken care of in the following way: I must always behave as if I had no senses, like a wooden log. 35. The eyes should never wander aimlessly. The gaze should always be lowered, as if in deep contemplation. 36. To rest the gaze, one might well sometimes look at the horizon, and if one has seen a mere figure, one may look at him to greet him. 37. To recognize dangers on a path or the like, one should constantly look in the four directions. One should stop and look toward the horizon and, only in turning around, behind oneself. 38. And after one has checked, one may go on ahead or turn back. After ascertaining what must be done in all situations, this is how one should proceed. 39. Having undertaken an action intending to hold the body this way, again from time to time one should examine how the body is held. 40. Similarly, the mind, that elephant in heat, must be supervised with great effort so that it, bound to the tall post of reflecting on the Teaching, does not break loose. 41. This is how the mind is to be observed: “What is my [mind] engaged with?” so that it does not even for an instant throw off the yoke of concentration. 42. If one is unable [to behave so] because of some danger or a celebration, one may act at will. For it is said that at a time of giving (dāna), discipline (śīla) can be ignored. 43. One should not think about anything else than what one has deliberately begun to do. One should first complete only this, devoted to it wholeheartedly. 44. For in this way all will be done well, otherwise neither, and also the flaw of not-circumspecting will thus develop further. 45. May one fight the eagerness for any kind of chitchat, as often occurs, and for all curiosities. 46. Mindful of the rules of the Buddhas, one should, without hesitation, earnestly avoid useless activities such as crumbling dirt, pulling out grass, and drawing lines.

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47. If one feels like moving or also speaking, one should first test one’s mind and act sensibly with resolution. 48. If one realizes that his mind is attracted or repelled, one should neither act nor speak; one should then remain like a wooden log. 49.-50. When the mind is scattered or scornful, arrogant and conceited, particularly course, false and deceitful, when it shows off by aggrandizing itself or criticizing, when it is contemptuous and argumentative, then one should remain like a wooden log. 51. Once again my mind seeks profits, honor, glory, it seeks followers and it seeks tributes. That is why I remain like a wooden log. 52. My mind does not care for the interests of others, it only thinks of my own advantage, and, loving company, it wants to talk. That is why I remain like a wooden log. 53. It is intolerant, lazy, timid, arrogant and gossipy, and it is biased in favor of my followers. That is why I remain like a wooden log. 54. If in this way one has recognized that the mind is defiled or uselessly bustling here and there, may the hero always bring it firmly under his control through an antidote. 55.-57. Resolute, friendly, steady, full of respect and reverence, full of timidity and full of fear, calm, determined to win over others, undeterred by the conflicting desires of the ignorant, compassionate in the understanding that they are this way due to the defilements, in faultless matters always at my own or other beings’ disposal, I wish to keep the mind without conceit (māna) like a magical creation. 58. Continually mindful of having gained the best moment [of birth as a human being] after such a long time, I wish to keep such a mind as unshakable as Mount Sumeru.

COMMENTARY 2. Watch Your Mind This section begins with a series of verses underlining the need to protect and guard the mind by mindfulness and circumspection (vss. 18-27): Without such guarding of the mind, all other practices are useless (vs. 18). One should take care of the mind even more than one would take care of a bodily wound, because the results of neglecting the mind will be incomparably worse than those of neglecting the body (vss. 19-20). An unguarded mind will undermine any beneficial activity (vs. 24). The teachings of the tradition, their reflective consideration

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(after all, Śāntideva is a philosopher) and contemplative practice will have no lasting effect without the watchful guarding of the mind (vs. 25). Because of its neglect, many will fail, even among the educated, faithful and diligent (vs. 26), and thus, despite their merits, they will have to face a bad karmic destiny (vs. 27). But guarding the mind helps the ascetic to remain strong in face of such temptations as may arise from contact with sinners and beautiful women (vs. 21). Caring for one’s mind should thus have priority above everything else (vs. 22). Hence Śāntideva pays homage to those who practice mindfulness and discernment with all their strength (vs. 23). From the further development of the chapter we will see how Śāntideva understands the interplay between these two mental tasks: In order to work against the defilements, constant mindfulness or attentiveness needs to be accompanied by circumspection, that is, by insight into what is wholesome and unwholesome and into the interrelatedness of the three marks of existence: transience (anitya), suffering (duḥkha) and not-self (anātman). With vss. 28-33, Śāntideva clarifies in what sense he speaks of “watching.” This takes him directly to the heart of this traditional practice: the struggle against the defilements. The defilements, which according to 4:29 have entered the mind, can only do so if the gates of the mind are unguarded. Picking up his image of the mind as a house (4:35), Śāntideva compares the defilements to thieves and robbers who seek to enter and steal all merit (vss. 28-29). The image seems to be triggered by the close connection between the cultivation of awareness and the “guarding of the senses” (indriyasaṃvara), that is, by the ancient idea of the senses as “doors” or “gates” (also present in vs. 33) and the need to ward off the “invasion” of covetousness and grief (the latter being understood as resulting from aversion). Already Dhammapada 40 speaks of the mind as a “city” or “fortress” which must be protected.57 In the Visuddhimagga, the famous fifth century compendium of Theravāda Buddhist doctrine, Buddhaghosa describes the same practice in similar pictures as Śāntideva: For when these doors are open und unguarded, Then thieves will come and raid as ’twere a village.

And like Śāntideva he explains the thieves as the “defilements” (Pāli: kilesa).58  Similarly the Gaṇḍavyuha-sūtra as quoted in ŚS 122f.  Ñāṇamoli 1999, 37.

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Mindfulness and circumspection protect against the development of greed and hate in that they are conducive to not-grasping. This is explicitly stated in the exposition of the “guarding of the senses” in the context of the path of salvation scheme (e.g. MN 27: “he does not grasp at its signs and features”) and in the elaborate form of the “Sūtra on the Foundations of Mindfulness” (MN 10): “he abides independent, not clinging to anything in the world.”59 By mindfulness one observes the coming and going of impressions and by circumspection one avoids getting positively or negatively attached to pleasant or unpleasant feelings. The mere registration of such impressions and feelings, refraining from any form of other mental activity, is in itself non-attachment. Śāntideva illustrates such a mental demeanor with the image of remaining “like a wooden log,” which first appears in vs. 34 and reappears refrain-wise in vss. 48-53. This image suggests both non-reaction to the lures of sensual and mental impressions (vss. 34, 48!) and the firmness of the otherwise flickering mind, often compared in Buddhist literature to a fidgety, jumping monkey. The second aspect of firmness is further underlined by the image of the unshakable Mount Sumeru (vs. 58). Vss. 35-39 and 4160 take up instructions from (or connected with) standard descriptions of how to practice mindfulness and circumspection. This practice is not confined to sitting meditation (through which it may be developed further), but is recommended as permanent training, whether one is walking (vss. 35-38a) or assuming any of the other bodily postures (standing, sitting, lying; see 38b-39). The instruction of keeping one’s gaze lowered while walking, which is particularly emphasized (vss. 35f), is a graphic expression of the practice’s general tendency to ward off possible distractions by upholding persistent concentration.61 There are, however, specific situations that require a modification of this 59  Ñāṇamoli; Bodhi 2001, 274, 146f. The opposite attitude is described in MN 38 (PTS I 266f): “On seeing a form with the eye, he lusts after it if it is pleasing; he dislikes it if it is unpleasing. (…) Engaged as he is in favouring and opposing, whatever feeling he feels (…) he delights in that feeling, welcomes it, and remains holding it. As he does so, delight arises in him. Now delight in feeling is clinging.” Ibid. 359. 60  Vs. 40 is missing in the text of the Dūn-huáng version (see above, fn. 53). It repeats the image of the taming of the wild elephant from vss. 2-3. The verse seems to interrupt the flow of vss. 34-41, but may serve to introduce the final word, in vs. 41, that the mind “does not throw off the yoke of concentration.” 61  This is part of the monastic rule of different Buddhist schools, found, for example, in the Prātimokṣa (formula of rules) of the Mahāsāṃghikas, Mūlasarvāstivādins and Theravādins (for the first two, see Prebish 1966, 96f). As in the BCA, it is also emphasized in the Vism I, 19 and 39.

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practice as, for example, an immediate danger or participation in communal celebrations. Śāntideva underlines that under certain circumstances, the rules (or some of them) may be ignored, particularly in favor of practicing “giving” (vs. 42).62 As we have seen, for Śāntideva “giving” (dāna) characterizes the mode of the Bodhisattva’s whole life as proexistence. Hence his point is that compassion has priority over the strict observance of rules. This is an application of the principle of epikeia, the violation of a rule in favor of a higher good or the rule’s true spirit, a principle which will be stated in vs. 84. Particularly when the Bodhisattva is in community with fellow human beings, some of the rules that regulate his behavior when alone may need to be changed. But this does not mean giving up mindfulness. Rather, mental concentration, as Śāntideva now explains, will take other forms (vss. 43-47): wholehearted devotion to what one is currently doing, self-containment in the face of idle talk, etc., avoiding useless, absentminded activities and rather acting sensibly and with resolution. With the central principle of staying immune to aversion and attraction, Śāntideva resumes his motif of remaining like a wooden log (vs. 48). In vss. 49-53 this attitude is recommended in all cases of mental inclinations that get dangerously close to the usual patterns of mundane behavior, presumably the kind of things the new Bodhisattva was used to before taking the monastic vows (as is apparently suggested by the “once again” in vs. 51). Nearly all of these negative forms of inner behavior are marked by self-centeredness and its correspondingly aversive attitude towards others. In all these cases, remaining like a wooden log means not giving in to such inclinations. This, however, does not imply falling into mental torpor. On the contrary, the practitioner is encouraged to develop, as “antidotes,” mental qualities that are the opposite of selfishness and aversion (vs. 54). It is an ancient Buddhist recipe to overcome unwholesome mental states and inclinations by developing correspondingly wholesome ones, as for example, overcoming greed with the idea of impurity, hate with loving kindness, delusion with wisdom, bad behavior with good behavior, wrong beliefs with true beliefs, etc.63 How this reverse attitude should look is vividly portrayed in vss. 55-57: an attitude determined by 62  Apparently Śāntideva is not only thinking of the alms-round, in which a monk leaves the monastery to receive the gifts of lay-followers. From vs. 5:85 and the parallel in ŚS 128f, it is clear that the Bodhisattva monk should also practice “giving” by sharing with the needy what he himself has received. 63  See for example AN 6:107-116 or MN 8.

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friendliness, steadiness, calmness, compassion, etc., free from the usual selfishness and with the mind under one’s firm control, like a magical creation.64 This shows that firmness and immunity of the mind (“like a wooden log”) is not caginess or indifference towards one’s fellow beings. If it is indifference, then only towards one’s own egotistic tendencies.65 In vss. 29-33, the exhortation to steadily watch one’s mind is based on the fear of the infernal consequences if this is neglected, on the respect for one’s spiritual masters, and on the awe in the face of the Buddhas and (celestial) Bodhisattvas, before whose “heavenly eye” nobody will remain hidden. But the exhortation is also based on the appealing promise that mindfulness comes easily if supported by the fellowship of one’s masters (vs. 30a) and that discernment will follow when mindfulness is properly developed (vs. 33). Now, at the end of this section and after the presentation of the practice’s positive outcome, exhortation turns into confident dedication accompanied by the calm and grateful joy that it is human life which provides this precious opportunity of developing mindfulness (vs. 58). Mind matters – and mindfulness is the workable way of how to put this insight into spiritually fruitful practice. Since the 1960s, Christianity has seen several waves of intensive interest in and adaptation of Asian meditative practices.66 This has involved Hindu forms of meditation like mantra meditation and yoga, but also, and even more, Buddhist forms, in particular Japanese Zen meditation (both with and without kōan practice). Mindfulness meditation has attracted some interest (primarily as a stress-reduction technique) in the secular realm, but less so among Christians67 despite its revival in Theravāda Buddhism triggered by the schools of the “New Burmese Method” and the “Thai Forest Tradition,” and despite its popularity with Western Buddhists through its propagation by people such as 64  Vss. 55 and 57 have a parallel in ŚS 127, where they enjoy a special emphasis by being called the “essence of a world of texts.” This is also interesting in terms of the BCA’s relation to the ŚS. If it should become safe that the Dūn-huáng version of the BCA is earlier than the ŚS, the occurrence of these and other verses of the BCA in the ŚS would have to count as citations from the BCA! 65  In this respect, the attitude strongly resembles Buddhaghosa’s depiction of equanimity (Pāli: upekkhā) as the attitude of expecting no reward when benefitting others. See Vism 9:123. 66  See Baier 2009, vol. 2, 813-940. 67  This observation may need some modification in relation to Christians who live in Theravāda Buddhist countries and are involved in Buddhist‒Christian dialogue. See also Harris 2019.

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Nyāṇaponika Mahāthera68 (1901-1994) and Jack Kornfield.69 Nonetheless some aspects of Zen practice share significant similarities with the development of mindfulness. Among the motives that have made Christians (especially, but by no means only, Roman Catholics) interested in Zen meditation, the following two are particularly prominent. In the early stages, some Christian pioneers – as is particularly clear in the case of the highly influential German Jesuit Hugo M. Enomiya-Lassalle (1898-1990) – studied Zen practice as a means of furthering Christianity’s inculturation and adaptation to Japanese culture,70 a strategy that had the backing of the magisterium of the Roman Catholic Church since Vatican II.71 A second prominent motive was the expectation that adopting certain Asian meditation techniques might make a significant contribution toward reviving Christianity’s mystical tradition, which had declined seriously during the modern era. These two motivations were accompanied by two corresponding assumptions: first, that some forms of Eastern meditation, e.g. yoga, but even more, the Zen practice of just-sitting (shikantaza), carry only few cultic or ritual features of their religious home traditions, if any at all, so they can be easily detached from those traditions and adopted as forms of Christian practice without too many doctrinal difficulties. The second assumption was that such practices display sufficient similarity to ancient contemplative and ascetic practices of the Christian mystical traditions that their adoption could sustain similar experiences. Both assumptions continue to occupy the debate: In a Buddhist response to Christians reporting their experiences with Buddhist forms of meditation, Grace Burford summarized their views as “(t)he techniques (…) can (…) be separated from their experienced results, or – more precisely – from the interpretations of those experiences. The practitioners can be Christians, the techniques Buddhist, and the resulting experiences interpreted along Christian lines. (…) So a Christian can engage in a Buddhist practice, gain from it something meaningful in Christian terms and remain a Christian.”72 Burford herself feels slightly 68

 Nyāṇaponika 1962.  Kornfield 1993. 70  See Baier 2009, vol. 2, 871-904. This observation is also true of Henry Le Saux / Swami Abhishiktananda and his initial intention of practicing Vedāntic forms of spirituality in order to facilitate the inculturation of Christianity in India. 71  See the Vatican documents Gaudium et Spes 28, Ad Gentes 18; see also Blée 2011, 36-38. 72  Burford 2003, 58f. 69

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uncomfortable with this view. She admits that Buddhist practice can become meaningful for Christians and enrich their spiritual life, but is prepared to “disagree with Christians about how to interpret the experiences that arise from applications of Buddhist practices….”73 Such misgivings attest to an awareness of the at least historically undeniable fact that Buddhist meditative practices have been developed as integral parts of a Buddhist path of salvation. If that is ignored, the adoption of such practices by Christians could easily become a form of “theological vandalism,” as it was branded by the Sri Lankan theologian Aloysius Pieris as early as in the 1970s and 80s.74 The alternative, as Pieris puts it, is not to “baptize” Asian religions and thereby intrumentalize them, but to let oneself be baptized by them and enter the Jordan of their spirituality.75 To Pieris, this means entering that realm of experience as it is preserved in the other religious tradition and developing from there a “core-to-core dialogue” in which the boundaries of orthodoxy may have to be redefined.76 That is, trans-religious experiences with meditative practices will have to challenge religions also at the level of interpretation. Bardwell Smith, for example, testifies that his “experiences of Buddhist spiritual practice (…) have aroused immense gratitude for the fragile gift of life, plus a healthy respect for Buddhism’s ‘three poisons of anger, greed, and ignorance,’ for they prod us to realize our essential nature.” This resonates deeply with what Śāntideva is trying to communicate. But Bardwell Smith goes on and states that his experience with Buddhist practice helped him, as a Christian, to understand more about “what becoming a Christian means.”77 I suggest that such experiences require, on the side of Christian theology, also a new understanding of what it means to be or become a Buddhist. Concerning the second assumption of there being a strong affinity between Buddhist meditation practices and the contemplative tradition of pre-modern Christianity, a particular similarity between Buddhist mindfulness meditation and the practices of the Hesychasts has often been affirmed.78 With origins in the fourth century and perhaps earlier, the Hesychastic practice of restraining the senses and cultivating mental 73

 Ibid. 59.  Pieris 1988, 41, 53, 55, 85. 75  Ibid. 55, 85. 76  See Pieris 1989, 124. 77  Smith 2003, 45. 78  See Zaleski 1994 and Lefebure, Feldmeier 2011, 51-55 and passim. From the perspective of Orthodox Christianity: Leloup 2009. 74

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concentration has an unbroken tradition within the Eastern Orthodox Church up until today. Hesychasm had also, via John Cassian (4th–5th cent.), its impact on the formation of the Benedictine monastic tradition of the western Church. While today only few Orthodox Christians are involved in Buddhist‒Christian dialogue, Benedictines are intensively committed to Buddhist‒Christian inter-monastic dialogue. As Carol Zaleski has pointed out with explicit reference to BCA 5: Śāntideva’s combination of “attentive self-observation, remembrance of death, and the felt surveillance of the all-seeing Buddhas and Bodhisattvas”79 shows a striking similarity to numbers 47-49 of Benedict’s “Instruments of Good Works” listed in chapter 4 of his rule: 47. To see death before one daily. 48. To monitor one’s actions ceaselessly. 49. To know for certain that God sees us everywhere.80

Inter-monastic dialogue, in particular, has increasingly challenged the early assumption that the undeniable similarities between Hindu or Buddhist and Christian contemplative practices would facilitate the theological dimension of an adaptation process. Inter-monastic dialogue has not only helped due attention being paid to the monastic contexts of such practices. It has also furthered the insight that each of these practices “involves a different anthropology and a distinctive way of living that is in conformity with the inner logic of each system,” as Fabrice Blée states in his sensitive and detailed review of inter-monastic dialogue.81 “Convergences and divergences cannot be looked at in isolation from the specific coherence proper to each of the religious ways….”82 This is strongly confirmed by the fifth chapter of the BCA, where it is obvious that the training and cultivation of mindfulness is organically interwoven with the purpose and practice of the Bodhisattva path. The corresponding insight that commonalities and differences between religions “cannot be looked at in isolation” calls, as Blée puts it, for a new theological understanding of both religious otherness and Christian identity.83 This does not mean that Christians should refrain from adopting Buddhist meditative techniques, but rather suggests that adopting them should be accompanied by a reception of their respective settings. As a result, the 79

 Zaleski 1994, 98.  Ibid. 99. 81  Blée 2011, 175. 82  Ibid. 83  See ibid. 175-186, 193-198. 80

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whole debate about Christian experiences with Asian forms of meditation is gradually shifting to the question of the extent that forms of religious double-belonging are feasible.84 From a Buddhist perspective it is certainly Thich Nhat Hanh who most strongly emphasizes the practice of mindfulness as a suitable meeting ground for Buddhists and Christians. He boldly states, “To me, mindfulness is very much like the Holy Spirit.”85 It has been asked, however, whether he might not be too inattentive to the different contexts in which Buddhist and Christian practices are embedded.86 Such inattentiveness is certainly found in most of the recent psychological interest in possible therapeutic effects of mindfulness practice, which deliberately abstains from taking into account the religious feature of this practice.87 That this must not be inevitably so has been demonstrated by the humanist psychologist Erich Fromm (1900-1980), who appreciated mindfulness meditation precisely as an approved way of dealing with unwholesome forms of desire, something that he regarded a common concern of Buddhism and Christianity.88 TRANSLATION: 5:59-70 The body 59. Why else does the [dead] body not defend itself when dragged about by vultures hungry for meat? 60. Why, O mind, do you think that this heap is yourself and watch over it? If it is separate from you, what do you care if it decays? 61. Oh, you fool! You do not take a clean wooden doll for yourself; why do you protect this stinking machine that has been forged from filth? 84  See, for example, Cornille 2002, Knitter 2009, Drew 2011, D’Costa, Thompson 2016. 85  Nhat Hanh 1996, 14. 86  Kiblinger 2005, 98-100; Grünschloss 2008, 261f. 87  See, for example, Herbert, Forman 2010. For a therapeutic approach that takes into account the religious context of mindfulness training and the spiritual background of the patient, see Vandenberghe, Costa Prado 2009. 88  In both of his probably best-known works To Have or to Be? and The Art of Loving, Fromm devotes a major section to the contemplative lifestyle. His own understanding of Buddhist meditation was inspired by Zen meditation and mindfulness practice. On the first, see his contribution to Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis (co-authored with D.T. Suzuki and R. de Martino) (1960), on the latter, his contribution to the festschrift for Nyāṇaponika, Des Geistes Gleichmass (1976).

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62.-63. First, just with your imagination, lift off this wrapping of skin; then with the knife of insight separate the flesh from the skeleton of bones. Split also the bones and look at the marrow inside. Check for yourself whether there is a core. 64. If you have looked carefully in this manner and found no core therein, now tell me why you still protect the body. 65. You cannot eat the impure flesh nor drink the blood, cannot slurp the guts. So what will you do with the body? 66. Yet it is right to keep it as food for vultures and jackals. The body of human beings is but a crutch for actions. 67. Even if you thus keep it, pitiless death will ruthlessly deliver your body to the vultures. What will you do then? 68. Knowing that he will not stay, one does not give a servant clothes or other things. After eating, the body will leave. Why do you bear the costs? 69. Therefore give the body its wages, and devote yourself now, O mind, to your own concerns, because one does not give someone all the wages he has earned. 70. Imagine the body as being a ship, because it comes and goes, and then let the body move to your will to accomplish the aims of living beings.

COMMENTARY 3. Watch Your Body In vss. 5:18-58 Śāntideva deals with mindfulness and circumspection as an approved method of preventing greed and hate from entering one’s mind. But what about the third of the three cardinal defilements: delusion, regarded as the root of greed and hate? Why should one be keen on tackling greed and hate, even in their subtle forms of positively clinging (in attraction) to pleasant sensations and negatively clinging (in aversion) to unpleasant ones? Or why should one be motivated to ward off one’s stronger forms of selfish and aversive mental attitudes? In line with general Buddhist convictions, Śāntideva believes that the motivation to watch one’s mind is intrinsically connected to the goal of overcoming the principal delusion, that is, the false construction of a self. And this, as now becomes clear, has much to do with the mind’s relation to the body. In vss. 59-64 Śāntideva integrates a number of early Buddhist traditions. The phrase “Why else…?” at the beginning of vs. 59 is a link to the central point of the previous section, according to which it is the

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mind that matters, not the body. Without the mind, that is, when dead, the body is nothing, just food for the vultures. Again this is an idea found in the third chapter of the Dhammapada, the chapter on the mind, which – as we have seen – apparently stands in the background of BCA 5. Dhammapada 3:41 describes a dead body as lying on the earth, unconscious. The aspect of being food for others is found in SN 22:95: When vitality, heat, and consciousness Depart from this physical body, Then it lies there cast away: Food for others, without volition.89

The attribute “without volition” in combination with being “food for others” reappears in Śāntideva’s remark that a dead body does not defend itself against the vultures, which he takes as evidence that only mind matters. The assumption that BCA 4:59 might be influenced by SN 22:95 is based on two further observations. SN 22:95 is the canonical text that contains a particular series of metaphors which became a kind of persistent mantra for all Mādhyamikas90 when emphasizing the nonsubstantiality of all things, their lack of any essence: Form is like a lump of foam, Feeling like a water bubble; Perception is like a mirage, Volitions like a plantain trunk, And consciousness like an illusion, So explained the kinsman of the Sun.91

In particular, the metaphor of the plantain or banana trunk is used to illustrate the absence of any inner kernel or core. If one unrolls the coil that makes up such a trunk, no heartwood is found. In BCA 9:151 the image is used in the typically Mahāyāna sense of the doctrine of universal emptiness. Here, in 5:62-64, the image is merged with a simile from the “Sūtra of the Foundations of Mindfulness” (MN 10): “Just as though a skilled butcher of his apprentice had killed a cow and was seated at the crossroads with it cut up into pieces, so too, a bhikkhu reviews this same body….”92 The image of the woodcutter searching in vain for the core 89

 Bodhi 2000, 953.  See above, Part I, chap. 2, p. 51. 91  Bodhi 2000, 952f. 92  MN 10 (PTS I 58). Ñāṇamoli, Bodhi 2001, 148. 90

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of the plantain tree coalesces with the image of the butcher who “unrolls” the body and does not find any core. Through vss. 5:60f, this combined image is linked, again quite traditionally, with the Buddhist not-self teaching that none of the five constituents93 which make up the mentalcorporal individual being should be regarded as the self (ātman) or as a property of the self. Thus, like a butcher who cuts up an animal, the practitioner of mindfulness should, in his imagination, cut up his own body, reminding himself that it is lacking any substance that could count as the self. Instead, he should see his body as “impure” (vs. 65), as a “stinking machine that has been forged from filth” (vs. 61). Like the simile of the butcher, also this remark alludes to the “Sūtra of the Foundations of Mindfulness,” in particular to the contemplation of the impurity of the body (which appears pure and beautiful at best only outwardly) and to the contemplation of corpses at different stages of decomposition. While these practices are touched upon briefly at this point in the text, Śāntideva picks them up again and more extensively in BCA 8:30-32, 41-71. Yet while 8:41-71 deals with that type of “foulness-meditation” whose main purpose is to combat greed and in particular sexual lust, in the present context the point is to free oneself from the basic delusion of mistaking the body as one’s self, from the illusion of identifying with the body, which constitutes the strongest form of attachment and hence a major cause of the other two defilements, greed and hate. It is as foolish to regard the body, which is a “heap” of flesh and bones, as one’s self as it would be foolish to identify a wooden doll as one’s self (vs. 61). Perhaps the “heap” in vs. 60 also alludes to a heap of garden waste, a famous simile given in MN 22: If garden waste such as grass, sticks, branches or leaves are collected and burned, no one would think: “People are carrying us off and burning us….” In the same way one should not identify with any of the five constituents by regarding them as the self or as belonging to the self.94 Not regarding the five constituents as oneself therefore means not being attached to what is transitory. Here Śāntideva takes one of these constituents, the body, and recalls the old message: “If it is separate from you, what do you care if it decays?” (vs. 60b). In any case, whatever one were to do, there is no way to avoid the death of one’s body (vs. 67). Thus it is better not to cling to it. 93  I.e., (1) “form” (= body), (2) feelings, (3) perceptions, (4) mental formations (including volition and karmic formations), and (5) consciousness. 94  See Ñāṇamoli, Bodhi 2001, 235.

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Śāntideva, however, does not stop at this classical Buddhist attitude. He suggests an alternative approach to one’s body, one that is markedly influenced by the Bodhisattva ideal. The somewhat sarcastic statement that in the end, the dead body will become food for the vultures (vss. 59, 66) also shows how to make use of the living body. We should take care of the body precisely because it is of some use to others (vs. 66a). The Bodhisattva should view his body as a useful instrument in the realization of the Bodhisattva ideal (see also vs. 8:184), as a “crutch for actions” (vs. 66), a ship that can be used to “accomplish the aims of living beings” (vs. 70). The image of the “ship” in this verse carries various connotations. The attribute of “coming and going” refers to birth and death, but it may also include the idea of the repeated “coming and going” of several bodies in the course of reincarnation. More profoundly, however, it evokes the association of crossing the stream of samsara, of reaching one’s ultimate goal, as in BCA 7:14. In this sense, viewing the body as if it were a ship reminds one of the rarity and preciousness of human rebirth, the only form of rebirth in which one can embark on the Buddhist path. However, the ultimate goal of the Bodhisattva is not his own salvation, but the wellbeing of all. The rare occasion of one’s embodiment as a human being is therefore the precious opportunity to use this body as a tool in the service of all others. This view is confirmed by ŚS 143: The body should be regarded as “the servant of all creatures” and should be protected “as for the good of all creatures.”95 Vss. 68-69 also use the image of the body as a servant, with just a slight shift in meaning: The body should indeed be treated like a servant (vs. 68), but as a servant to one’s aim of realizing bodhicitta (vs. 69) and hence of serving others. Any protection of the body should thus be done while remaining mindful of its transitory nature and one should not try in vain to prevent this (vs. 68). Physical needs should be taken care of only with the aim of, and to the extent necessary to, making the best use of the body for the Bodhisattva’s task. In this sense not everything should be paid back to the body; the body serves primarily the purpose of the Bodhisattva (vs. 69). With vss. 5:18-58 Śāntideva continues the series of various remarks on the body made in the foregoing chapters. His view of the human body is highly ambivalent. On the one hand the body stands for the human predicament; bodily existence is a preeminent manifestation of life’s transience. It is the body that bears the marks of old age, disease

95

 Bendall, Rouse 1922, 140f.

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and death, and is as such a major factor of suffering. Suffering is the result of transience in combination with attachment as it emerges from delusion.96 As long as the body is healthy and beautiful, it nourishes the illusion of immortality and promises a deceptive kind of happiness by providing sensual gratification. As such it is the main object of attachment. The identification with the body as one’s self is the strongest form of attachment. The Buddhist effort of overcoming attachment through dispelling delusion is thus directed against the illusion of immortality by recalling again and again the body’s mortal nature, and against the illusion of corporal happiness as true satisfaction by highlighting the body’s impurity. On the other hand the human body represents the rare and precious opportunity of salvation, or, in a Mahāyāna context, of embarking on the Bodhisattva path. In this sense Śāntideva is able to say that the spirit of awakening transforms the impure body into “the priceless figure of a Buddha jewel” (BCA 1:10). From this perspective, the goal is not simply non-attachment to the body, but the use of the body as an instrument – and even as an object – of “giving,” that is, of the Bodhisattva’s pro-existence.97 From Śāntideva’s point of view, detachment from the body – no longer making it the object of one’s central desire – puts one in the position of using the body for the sake of all beings, thereby turning it into an important tool on the Bodhisattva path. This attitude to the body has much in common with Augustine’s famous distinction between uti and frui. Uti stands for the detached use of things as suitable tools in pursuit of some higher goal, while frui signifies the enjoyment of clinging to something for its own sake.98 For Augustine, the fun96

 See above, Part II, chap. 2, 148f.  See above, Part II, chap. 3, 164-170. 98  See the brief description in Augustine’s De Doctrina Christiana 1.4: “For to enjoy a thing is to rest with satisfaction in it for its own sake. To use, on the other hand, is to employ whatever means are at one’s disposal to obtain what one desires, if it is a proper object of desire; for an unlawful use ought rather to be called an abuse. Suppose, then, we were wanderers in a strange country, and could not live happily away from our fatherland, and that we felt wretched in our wandering, and wishing to put an end to our misery, determined to return home. We find, however, that we must make use of some mode of conveyance, either by land or water, in order to reach that fatherland where our enjoyment is to commence. But the beauty of the country through which we pass, and the very pleasure of the motion, charm our hearts, and turning these things which we ought to use into objects of enjoyment, we become unwilling to hasten the end of our journey; and becoming engrossed in a factitious delight, our thoughts are diverted from that home whose delights would make us truly happy. Such is a picture of our condition in this life of mortality.” Transl. by Marcus Dods; see: http://www. intratext.com/IXT/ENG0137/_P6.HTM 97

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damental delusion of human beings consists in a false orientation that makes the things of the world the objects of desire (frui), instead of using them as means (uti) in one’s striving for ultimate happiness as it results from union with God. This false orientation leads inevitably to frustration and suffering because the things of the world cannot fulfill one’s expectations. They are unable to provide lasting satisfaction. Leo Lefebure is absolutely right when he points out: “Augustine insists as firmly as the Buddhist tradition on the need for detachment, for not clinging to any finite realities.”99 But the correspondence goes even deeper if one considers the kind of “use” that Śāntideva recommends, namely as means of pro-existence. I agree with Thomas Reynolds when he holds with regard to Buddhism and an Augustinian type of Christianity that both aim at “a fundamental transformation of human desire into a dynamically attuned yet nonattached posture of compassionate orientation toward others…,” an attitude that he calls (to use an expression of Gabriel Marcel) “availability.”100 Thus Śāntideva describes a transformation of one’s attitude to the body from an attached one, relating to the body as one’s self, to a detached one, viewing the body as an instrument of one’s activities for the sake of all beings. This takes us one step further in understanding Śāntideva’s concept of the “self” as a flexible construct. We already noticed that he tells his audience to distance themselves from the defilements by seeing these no longer as features of one’s mind but as one’s enemies who invaded the mind. Now he instructs, as part of the training of mindfulness, to distance oneself from the body by no longer regarding it as one’s self. In line with the older Buddhist tradition, this is first presented as a message of relief. Whoever is detached from the body by no longer regarding it his or her self will be free from the fear that death might destroy him or her (cf. BCA 2:36, 59f with 5:60f). Yet his suggestion that one should not only detach oneself from the body, but consciously use it as a tool in service of others indicates a further step in

99  Lefebure 1993, 124. Later Lefebure has laid more stress on the differences in Buddhist and Christian responses to the existential problem of life’s transience, inasmuch as Christians “have looked to the resurrection of Jesus as the definitive answer…” (see Lefebure, Feldmeier 2011, 166). But he still underlines that many Christians, like Buddhists, “did seek a way of seeing in contemplation that would free them from fear of death, detach them from craving and unite them perfectly to the unconditioned” (ibid. 167). However, what is the resurrection of Jesus if not an expression of the perfect union with the unconditioned? The Christian understanding of “eternal life” must certainly not be mixed up with the kind of everlasting existence entailed in the idea of the samsara. 100  Reynolds 2002, 327.

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his reconstructing and recoding the “self,” which will climax in the transferal of the idea of the “self” from oneself to others. He introduces this aim in the next chapter and deals with it at length in chapter 8, again in the context of one’s relation to the body. TRANSLATION: 5:71-109 Code of conduct 71. Master of himself in this way, may he always smile, refrain from furrowing his brows, be the first to speak words of welcome, be a friend to the world. 72. He should not put down benches in haste with a crash and not pound on doors. He should always delight in silence. 73. Moving silently and calmly, the heron, the cat and the thief achieve their favorite goal. This is also how the ascetic should always move. 74. He should respectfully accept the words of those who are good at directing others and help without being asked. He should be a pupil of everyone at all times. 75. He should express his approval of all good words. If he sees someone doing something well, he should encourage him with praise. 76. He should speak in their absence about the merits of others and should speak again with delight in public. And if his own renown is spoken of, he should only consider that others are able to appreciate virtues. 77. The aim of all endeavors is satisfaction; this can hardly be achieved, even through wealth. Thus I would like to enjoy the happiness of satisfaction due to the virtues others have struggled for. 78. I do not only lose nothing in this life and great happiness in the next will be mine; but through various animosities, mine will be the suffering of dissatisfaction in this life and great suffering in the next. 79. He should speak confidently and orderly, clearly and with warmth, pleasant to hear and rooted in compassion, gentle and measured in tone. 80. He should always look at living beings directly, as if drinking them with his eyes: By relying only on them, Buddhahood will be mine. 81. Great good accrues from long-lasting devotion and certainly accrues from practicing the antidotes with a view to [Buddhas and Bodhisattvas as] the field of virtues and that of benefactors, as well as to the distressed. 82. He should always be skillful, full of energy and active of his own accord. In no matters should he give way to someone else. 83. Giving (dāna) and the other perfections are, in turn, each more excellent. Following no other way than that of the dike of conduct [of a bodhisattva], he should not forfeit a higher [good] for a lesser one.

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84. Recognizing this, he should always devote himself to the benefit of others. Even what is forbidden is permitted to the compassionate one who is aware of the benefit. 85. He should share with the destitute, the abandoned and those under vows. He should eat moderately. He should give away everything except for the three robes. 86. He should not harm his body for a lowly reason because it serves the Teaching of the Good Ones, for only in this way can he quickly fulfill the hope of living beings. 87. Thus he must not sacrifice his life for someone whose disposition for compassion is imperfect; but for one equally disposed, he shall give it away. In this way, nothing is lost. 88. He should not recite the Teaching to someone healthy [but] without respect, to someone wearing a turban, an umbrella, a cane or a sword, or veiling his head. 89. Profound and sublime, he should not recite it to those who are not adequate, or to women not accompanied by a man. He should give the same respect to both the lesser and the higher Teachings. 90. [But] he should not introduce someone worthy of the higher Teachings to the lower Teachings; he should also not attract people, forsaking proper conduct, by [merely reciting] the Sūtras and Mantras. 91. It is not allowed to publicly spit out teeth-cleaning twigs or phlegm. It is also forbidden to urinate and more in water and on cultivated soil. 92. He should not eat with his mouth full, noisily and with an open mouth. He should not sit with hanging feet. He should not rub both arms at the same time. 93. He may not travel with someone else’s wife if she is alone, nor may he sleep or sit with her. Observing and asking, he should avoid anything that could offend people. 94. He should not give orders with one finger, but politely with the entire right hand. He should point out directions in the same manner. 95. For a small alarm he should not shout at someone with upraised arms. On the other hand, he may perhaps snap his fingers. Otherwise he would not be restrained. 96. He may lie down, with circumspection, in any direction to sleep, in the manner of the Master on the bed of release, getting up quickly, and certainly before any summons. 97. The practices outlined for bodhisattvas are countless, but the cleansing of the mind is the practice that he should, of necessity, perform first. 98. Three times per night and per day he should perform “the three components” (triskandha) [that is: confession of sins, approval of goodness, ripening of awakening]. He thereby wipes away the rest of his sins, because he relies on the spirit of awakening and on the Victors. 99. In whatever situation he finds himself, be it through his own accord or that of others, he should diligently perform those practices which suit that situation.

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100. For there is nothing that the sons of the Victors should not practice [for the good of all beings], nothing that is not meritorious for him who conducts himself like that. 101. Be it directly or indirectly, he should only act for the benefit of all beings, and alone for the sake of all beings, he should orient everything toward awakening. 102. And he should never leave, even at the cost of his life, the spiritual friend who holds on to the vows of a bodhisattva and knows the meaning of the Great Vehicle.

Sources 103. And from the “Liberation of the Worthy Sambhava” he should learn how to behave with regard to teachers. That which was pronounced by the Buddha [and is presented here] and the other [matters that are not presented], he should know from the Sūtras. 104. The rules [of bodhisattvas] can be found in the [Mahāyāna] Sūtras. Thus he should recite the Sūtras. And in the “Sūtra of Ākāśagarbha” he should examine the worst grave transgressions. 105. He should also by all means look again and again at the “Collection of Rules” (Śīkṣāsamuccaya), for this is where the conduct of the righteous ones has been explained at length. 106. Or [for explanations] just in brief he should as well look carefully at the “Collection of Sūtras” (Sūtrasamuccaya), the companion [work of this type], which was composed by the noble Nāgārjuna. 107. What is prohibited in these works and what is prescribed, that he should practice knowing the rules in order to guard the mind of all beings.

Circumspection 108. The characteristic of circumspection (saṃprajanya) is briefly just this: a constant observation of all physical and mental states. 109. I will read only with my body. For what is the use of reading words? How can mere reading about the healing arts save the sick?

COMMENTARY 4. Watch Your Behavior This section of the fifth chapter contains fourteen verses (vss. 81, 85, 88-98, and 105) that are not found in the Dūn-huáng version101 and are 101

 See above, p. 218, fn. 53.

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presumably a later addition.102 Particularly salient is that the majority of these verses deal explicitly with issues of monastic rule, in most cases related to etiquette.103 In addition to emphasizing modest, decent, unagitated and non-idle behavior (vss. 91f, 94-96), special attention is given to interactions with women, where any type of suspicious appearance must be avoided (vss. 89, 93). These instructions, together with vs. 85,104 clearly show that the text, at least here, is addressed to male monastics.105 Regular (individual) ritual practice is recommended in vs. 98.106 Of particular interest is one of the monk’s and Bodhisattva’s finest obligations: the spread of the Dharma. In addition to the ancient regulation of not teaching the Dharma in an inappropriate way, e.g. to an unaccompanied woman (vs. 89a), or to someone who by his behavior shows a lack of respect (vs. 88), it is underlined that the Bodhisattva should not try to attract people by teaching only the sūtras and mantras without paying sufficient attention to right conduct, which is traditionally regarded as 102

 See Part I, chap. 1, pp. 3-6.  These are vss. 88-98. Most of them refer to the minor rules of the sekhiyā dhammā or śaikṣā dharmā sections of the Theravāda Pātimokkha or the Prātimokṣa of the Mahāsāṃghikas and Mūlasarvastivādins respectively. An exception is vs. 93, which refers to rules of the more severe classes. See Prebish 1966 and, on vs. 5:88f, Nance 2014, 36-43. 104  Only the clothing of a monk consists of three pieces. Vs. 85 belongs to the (presumably) added verses. The verses shared by the canonical BCA and the Dūn-huáng version also seem to presuppose at least a monastic audience (vss. 35 and 72f, for example, refer to rules of the śaikṣā dharma), but the relation to exclusively male monastics is less evident. 105  On the question of the audience of the BCA, see Part I, chap. 3, pp. 70-72. 106  BCA 5:98 has a close parallel in Ugraparipṛcchā 16b: “Three times in the daytime and three times at night (…) he should recite the Triskandhaka dharma-text” (Nattier 2003, 259f). On the basis of her detailed discussion of the verse, Jan Nattier suggests that the Triskandhaka was most likely a liturgical formula “which was used to structure a formal ritual of confession” and thus a text, but not necessarily a written text. Following Masao Shizutani she rejects the view that this text is identical with the text of the Triskandhaka contained in the Tibetan canon (Peking 950; Derge 384; for an English translation see: http://enlight.lib.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/JR-BH/bh117559.htm), because the content of the latter reflects developments of Mahāyāna which are later than the Ugraparipṛcchā (see Nattier 2003, 117-121). While this argument makes sense in relation to the Ugraparipṛcchā, it is not that clear whether it would also apply to the canonical BCA, which is much younger than the Ugraparipṛcchā. According to ŚS 290, which refers to the respective verse of the Ugraparipṛcchā, the three parts of formula are “Confession of Sin, Delight in Merit, Solicitation of Buddhas” (Bendall, Rouse 1922, 263f.). Steinkellner also understands the term Triskandhaka as referring to a ritual in three parts or sections, namely the confession of sins, the approval of merit or goodness, and the ripening of awakening, as explained by Prajñākaramati (personal communication from Ernst Steinkellner). 103

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the principal point in instructing lay followers (vs. 90). Noteworthy is Śāntideva’s admonition of showing equal respect to the teachings of the Mahāyāna and non-Mahāyāna schools. That these are nevertheless distinguished as “higher” and “lesser” ones (vss. 89f) suggests that “equal respect” should not be taken too literally. The underlying idea is that the “lesser” teachings are appropriate for those who are spiritually less advanced, while the Mahāyāna teachings should be taught to a spiritually more mature audience (vs. 90a), an idea which is characteristic of the Buddhist approach to the diversity of religious teachings.107 The topic of monastic etiquette is also found at other places in the fifth chapter (see vss. 35 and 72f). Nevertheless, there is a difference between the supposedly added verses and the rest of the present section, inasmuch as vss. 71-87 and 99-102 focus less on behavior itself and more on the motivation behind it, as well as the spirit expressed in such behavior. The friendly, open and supportive spirit that the Bodhisattva should display in his interaction with others (vss. 71 and 74) continues the description of his positive inner attitude in vss. 55-57. Far from confining himself to the development of a morally good mind, the Bodhisattva is exhorted to “help without being asked” (vs. 74, similarly vs. 82) and to share even his alms meals with those in need (vs. 85).108 Like his deeds, his words should be shaped by a friendly and compassionate attitude towards others (vs. 79). In this context, the inner tension between sympathetic joy (the attitude corresponding to compassion) and envy or resentment is addressed: If the Bodhisattva sees others doing something good and laudable he should praise and encourage them openly; even on the quiet he should not complain about other people, but speak only well of them (vss. 75f). If he himself is praised, he should not become proud of this, but only rejoice in the others’ ability to recognize virtues (vs. 76). There is no reason for him to become jealous. For he should remind himself that animosities and resentment will only lead to dissatisfaction and negative karmic results, while sympathetic joy, that is, rejoicing in the achievements of others, can cause him real satisfaction and happiness (vss. 77f).109 Psychologically this will only work if the Bodhisattva has already developed that kind of altruistic sentiment which evokes genuine compassion. But the advice is fully in line with Śāntideva’s 107

 See Schmidt-Leukel 2013c, 2019.  See also ŚS 128f. “If he sees a poor creature, he must give him a share of his alms.” Bendall, Rouse 1922, 128. 109  The opposite of this attitude had been described in BCA 4:49-53. 108

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general view that ultimately, altruism paradoxically coincides with selfinterest, so that loving kindness to others is also of greatest advantage to oneself. This becomes explicit in vs. 80, where the Bodhisattva is encouraged to see all beings with love (“as if drinking them with his eyes”), because he will attain Buddhahood only through his compassionate striving for their sake.110 This attitude is turned into a principal maxim in vs. 101: “Be it directly or indirectly, he should only act for the benefit of all beings, and alone for the sake of all beings, he should orient everything toward awakening.” This maxim is reinforced in vss. 99f and 107, according to which the ultimate purpose for a Bodhisattva of all his practices and observance of the rules lies in his goal of guarding “the mind of all beings” (vs. 107). This demonstrates that Śāntideva understands the practice of mindfulness, summarized in vs. 108, as another aspect of the overall process of putting bodhicitta into practice, neatly expressed in the concluding verse (vs. 109), which continues the conclusion of chapter 4 (vs. 4:48): the practical observation (reading with one’s body!) of all these Buddhist spiritual exercises is part of how bodhicitta develops its healing power. Śāntideva briefly addresses two important implications of his maxim: the first refers to the question of self-sacrifice (vss. 86f), the second to the principle of epikeia (vss. 83f). As has been noted above, the readiness to sacrifice one’s life for the sake of others is deeply embedded in the understanding of the Bodhisattva’s existence as pro-existence.111 In light of what Śāntideva said about the proper use of the body (vss. 5:66-70) and in accordance with his maxim that the Bodhisattva should “only act for the benefit of all beings,” he now clarifies that a bodily sacrifice is not justified or recommended under all circumstances. Given that the body is a crucial tool in practicing the Dharma and that the ultimate goal of such practice, i.e. Buddhahood, is for the sake of all beings, one should not harm the body for some minor reason or insignificant benefit. Usually the body should be protected, not out of selfish interest, but because the protection of the body of someone who follows the Bodhisattva path is in the interest of all beings in that his efforts will lead to the fulfillment 110  Compared to vs. 80, the subsequent vs. 81, which is absent from the Dūn-huáng version, presents a more sober and scholastic summary: The Bodhisattva will produce great good if he practices the antidotes to the defilements with constant devotion, motivated by thinking of the “field of virtues” (as exemplified by the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas), by gratitude to all his benefactors (such as his parents) and by compassion for those who suffer. 111  See Part II, chap. 3, pp. 164f.

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of their hopes (vs. 86). Along the lines of this argument, Śāntideva continues that one should therefore not sacrifice one’s life for a person who is less well disposed towards compassion, i.e. towards the Bodhisattva path. This is because such a sacrifice would not be in the interest of all beings. From their perspective it is better if a person is saved whose compassion is greater, i.e. someone who is more advanced on the path. If, however, the sacrifice of one’s own life would save the life of someone whose compassion is equally strong, then one should do so – since in this case “nothing is lost” (vs. 87) from the perspective of those who will benefit from the existence of compassionate Bodhisattvas. This argument may sound rather stilted. But it needs to be read against the background of a specific aspect of the ideal of self-sacrifice in the context of the Bodhisattva path. According to a general Buddhist idea, the worthier the recipient is, the better is the spiritual (and karmic!) value of a gift. This idea is not unreasonable. Most people would presumably agree that it is morally and spiritually better to make a donation to a charity than, say, to the mafia. Given this general notion, the idea emerged that if a Bodhisattva sacrifices his body for a worthy person, the Bodhisattva achieves thereby much more merit than he would in the case of a less worthy person. But then, paradoxically, sacrificing oneself for mean or evil people would be even more selfless and more compassionate, because in such cases the due karmic benefit for the Bodhisattva himself is much lower.112 This seems to be the reasoning that Śāntideva rejects. There is no doubt that for Śāntideva, too, the gift of one’s own life is an expression of ultimate compassion. Yet as a matter of prudence, he does not encourage people following the Bodhisattva path to carelessly put their lives at risk out of excessive religious enthusiasm. The decisive criterion to make such a radical act meaningful must be the real benefit of as many as possible, in principle all people (see also vs. 8:145). The second case of applying his maxim is as crucial as it is controversial. Śāntideva recalls the Buddhist idea of a hierarchy of values according to which a higher value should not be disregarded in favor of a lesser one. That is, if one follows the Bodhisattva path, walking on the dike of conduct as it holds for a Bodhisattva,113 a lesser virtue should not be 112  Regarding this background of Śāntideva’s argumentation, see the textual material, and the convincing analyses, presented in Ohnuma 2007, 53-64. 113  The clause at the end of vs. 83 (anyatrācārasetutaḥ) is not easy to understand and thus the existent translations differ widely. One problem is how to understand anyatra (“except” or “on another”). If one opts for “except” (e.g. Crosby and Skilton or Wallace and Wallace), it follows that Śāntideva is formulating an exception to the rule stated in

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realized at the expense of a higher one. Śāntideva could take this idea of a hierarchy of values/virtues for granted, because it is presupposed by the concept of different levels (bhūmis) of the Bodhisattva’s progress: each level is linked to a particular virtue (pāramitā), so the attainment of these ascending levels corresponds to the gradual perfection of the respective virtues – an idea that clearly suggests a hierarchy in their value (vs. 83). According to Śāntideva’s general maxim, the highest value is to act only for the benefit of others. If this value is not to be disregarded in favor of a lower value, its realization may – under certain circumstances – permit or even require one to violate particular rules (vs. 84). This presupposes that keeping the rules merely for their own sake, or merely for one’s own benefit, represents a lower value. This principle, known to the ethical discourse in the Western tradition as the principle of epikeia, is given a longer explication in the eighth chapter of the ŚS, which draws on various examples of scriptural evidence for its justification. While the brief remark in BCA 5:84 does not specify which kind of transgressions may be permissible for the sake of practicing compassion, the ŚS makes it unmistakably clear that this does not just relate to minor rules of etiquette, but also to far more severe cases such as sexual misconduct or the first part of vs. 83. That is, he would then be asserting that in some cases a higher virtue should be sacrificed in favor of a lesser one. Yet this does not make good sense if one keeps in mind that for Śāntideva, the highest virtue is to serve all other beings. In fact, the idea of a legitimate, justified or even necessary violation (which is spelled out in vs. 84) is not related to the hierarchy of virtues or values, but to specific rules. This is explained in the eighth chapter of the ŚS by employing the idea of a hierarchy of values in that the value of practicing compassion is higher than the value of making merit by keeping the rules (see also ŚS 286, where compassion is explicitly declared as the supreme virtue). Hence, if in a specific situation the practice of compassion requires the breaking of a rule (and thus implies demerit for oneself), the Bodhisattva is to choose the higher value of compassion. He should not sacrifice the higher good of the well-being of all others for the lesser good of his own faithfulness to the rules, as is specified in ŚS 165. In the light of such consideration it seems to be advisable to translate anyatra in a way that does not suggest an exception from the rule of the hierarchy of values, but rather its confirmation: The Bodhisattva should not divert from the specific dike of conduct as it applies to Bodhisattvas, which is constituted by the idea that there is a hierarchy of values. The “other way” would then be the way of those who hold that monastic and moral rules are to be kept under all circumstances, regardless of whether such conduct is in conflict with the practice of compassion or not. In terms of content, this interpretation would be in line with the Tibetan text (and the translations based on the Tibetan version of the BCA, e.g. Batchelor or Padmakara Translation Group), although the Tibetan translation of the clause deviates from the Sanskrit wording. This may indicate that the early Tibetan translators were aware of the difficulties. I am particularly grateful to Ernst Steinkellner, who helped me gain a clearer understanding of the philological aspects of this translation problem.

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killing. The idea behind the permission of such transgressions is “that to attain other’s good is more important than one’s own good” (ŚS 165).114 That is, if the Bodhisattva sees that the furthering of the good of another being requires him to transgress a particular rule, he must do so even if this were to imply that he will have to bear the negative karmic consequences of such behavior. The implication is therefore, once again, to give the well-being of others preference over one’s own selfish interests (in this case, over the selfish interest of making merit). The fear of being punished in hell should never hold one back from actively working for the salvation of others. Yet breaking a rule requires first that the behavior is genuinely motivated by compassion and second that the Bodhisattva is indeed able to discern the objective benefit (vs. 84). A final instruction concerns the Bodhisattva’s readiness to learn. It is not surprising that Śāntideva emphasizes the need to learn from the Sūtras and the texts about the rules (vss. 103-107),115 or that he also stresses the need to learn from the direct guidance of the community leaders (vs. 74) and one’s personal guru (vs. 102). More surprising and indeed exciting is his view that a Bodhisattva should be prepared to learn something from everybody (vs. 74). Presumably Śāntideva did not have followers of other religions in mind when writing the Bodhisattva “should be a pupil of everyone at all times,” but who knows? If we take him by his word, this would be a fine encouragement for Buddhists to engage in an inter-faith dialogue that is open to the serious possibility of mutual learning. It constitutes a fine parallel to Paul’s instruction: “test everything; hold fast to what is good” (1 Thess. 5:21). As we have seen, in chapter 5 Śāntideva expounds on the cultivation of mindfulness and discernment predominantly from the perspective of traditional, male Buddhist monastic life. But he gives his presentation of monastic conduct a twist that is unmistakably shaped by the Bodhisattva ideal. Everything that the Mahāyāna monk does should be primarily directed towards the benefit of all beings (vs. 101). While monastic discipline is a tool for guarding and training one’s mind, the mind should be trained for the overarching goal of protecting the minds of all sentient beings (vs. 107). Compassion needs to take precedence, if necessary even over compliance with monastic rules (vs. 84). In the long run, the Bodhisattva drive with 114

 Bendall, Rouse 1922, 162.  Note that the instruction to study the ŚS in vs. 105 is missing in the Dūn-huáng version of the BCA. On this as well as the interpretation of the subsequent verse, see above Part I, chap. 1, pp. 5 and 9. 115

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which Śāntideva – in line with the general Mahāyāna tendency116 – equips the Buddhist monastic ideal has contributed to the transformation and flexibilization of Buddhist monasticism in the Mahāyāna tradition and sometimes even to its replacement by other forms of clergy or clerical lifestyle. Nevertheless, monasticism still plays an important role in many Buddhist schools, including Mahāyāna ones. I would like to conclude my commentary on this chapter by drawing particular attention to two issues: the relevance of Śāntideva’s views for monastic renewal and for a spiritual attitude toward rules and precepts. The appreciation of monasticism is something that Buddhism shares with most forms of Christianity (even in Protestantism, certain semimonastic brotherhoods and sisterhoods have reemerged). According to Thomas Merton (1915-1968) – one of the main pioneers of intermonastic dialogue – Buddhist and Christian concepts of monastic life have significant commonalities: Buddhist and Christian monasticism start from the problem inside man himself. Instead of dealing with the external structures of society, they start with man’s own consciousness. Both Christianity and Buddhism agree that the root of man’s problems is that his consciousness is all fouled up and he does not apprehend reality as it fully and really is; that the moment he looks at something, he begins to interpret it in ways that are prejudiced and predetermined to fit a certain wrong picture of the world, in which he exists as an individual ego in the center of things. This is called by Buddhism avidya, or ignorance. From this basic ignorance, which is our experience of ourselves as absolutely autonomous individual egos – from this basic wrong experience of ourselves comes all the rest. This is the source of all our problems. Christianity says almost exactly the same things in terms of the myth of original sin. (…) Consequently, Christianity and Buddhism look primarily to a transformation of man’s consciousness – a transformation, and a liberation of the truth imprisoned in man by ignorance and error.117

Merton’s summary resonates perfectly well with Śāntideva’s deliberations in the present chapter, and like Śāntideva himself, Merton, too, is keen on giving monastic discipline a strong altruistic twist: The whole purpose of the monastic life is to teach men to live by love. The simple formula, which was so popular in the West, was the Augustinian 116  See Jenkins 2010/11, 310: “... all the figures considered here, Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, Śāntideva, Āryadeva, Bhāviveka, and Candrakīrti agree on the basic point that a bodhisattva may do what is normally forbidden or inauspicious, akuśala.” 117  Merton 1975, 332.

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formula of the translation of cupiditas into caritas, of self-centered love into an outgoing, other-centered love. In the process of this change the individual ego was seen to be illusory and dissolved itself, and in place of this self-centered ego came the Christian person, who was no longer just the individual but was Christ dwelling in each one.118

As we know from Merton’s journals, he read the BCA more than once and liked it “very much.”119 What impressed him most about the BCA was, in his own words, the “dissolution of the self in ‘belonging to everyone’ and regarding everyone’s suffering as one’s own” – thereby obviously referring to chapter 8.120 According to Merton, the future of monasticism will be shaped decisively by an environment in which monasticism is no longer, or at least increasingly less so, supported by social plausibility structures. In such a situation, it will be essential that monastics from different religious traditions join in rediscovering and refocusing on the spiritual core of the monastic life form, which, says Merton, neither depends on a particular culture or society nor on specific monastic institutions.121 Today, after decades of Buddhist‒ Christian inter-monastic encounter, there is no doubt that – as PierreFrançois de Béthune OSB expressed it – the “place” of this encounter “is found at the meeting point of two movements: contemplative renewal and the movement of dialogue.”122 Monastic renewal under the conditions of the contemporary world includes: a strong focus on the spiritual nucleus of monastic life, a vital sensitivity for social responsibility (requiring the union of actio and contemplation), and the flexibility to develop new forms of monastic life that account for the social changes in modernity and postmodernity. In all three respects, Śāntideva’s strong amalgamation of the traditional Buddhist monastic discipline with the overarching altruistic ideal of living the monastic life for the sake of all others, together with his endorsement of the principle of epikeia, is highly pertinent. Especially his admission that compassionate action may permit (or even necessitate) the breaking of rules can be read as providing legitimacy to any necessary amendments of monastic rules and/or lifestyles if they turn out to become counterproductive under contemporary conditions. However, Śāntideva’s admission is not without its own problems. 118

 Ibid. 333f  Merton 1999, 247. See also Part I, chap. 4, p. 88. 120  Ibid. 135. 121  Cf. Merton 1975, 342. 122  Béthune 2002, 72. 119

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In a Buddhist‒Christian dialogue about the monastic rule of Saint Benedict, published in 2001, the question of the irreversibility or adaptability of monastic rules popped up repeatedly. During this dialogue, the Zen Buddhist Norman Fischer advocated the view that altruism should always take precedence and stated (presumably referring to BCA 5:84): “One sacred text says that if by violating a rule you benefit others, it’s all right to do so.”123 The Vipassana teacher Joseph Goldstein, who has close links to both the Theravāda and the Tibetan Buddhist tradition, replied: “I’ll admit that stories of monks who would give up their lives rather than break a rule shock me – but I also respect them…” and he quoted, somewhat approvingly, the example of a monk who refused to leave his retreat even for the compassionate purpose of visiting another monk who was seriously ill.124 However, in his discussion of the main Buddhist precepts, Goldstein problematized this very attitude by the example of the first śīla of not-harming or not-killing. “What do we do when carpenter ants are eating the wood frame of our house or animals are a vector for some disease? At those times when it seems that killing is the only solution, the precepts of ethical and non-harming behavior remind us to consider alternatives and, if no other possibilities seem viable, to act with compassion rather than aversion and irritation.”125 This exchange between two contemporary Western Buddhists throws some light on the difficult questions surrounding Śāntideva’s position on epikeia. It is just a small sample of the long inner-Buddhist debate on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of breaking the rules under certain conditions.126 At the center of this debate127 has always been the problem of using force.128 From the moment when Buddhism provided inspiration and legitimization for political decisions, Buddhists had to address the 123

 Henry 2001, 58.  Ibid. 125  Ibid. 40f. 126  The influential Bodhisattvabhūmi ascribed to Asaṅga has a long section stating and describing at some length that the Bodhisattva, out of compassion, may violate all kinds of precepts. See Tatz 1986, 70-73; Engle 2016, 278-283. 127  Another major issue relates to sexual behavior. For overviews of the more recent debates in the West about Buddhist sexual misconduct within master‒pupil relationships, see Bell 2002 and Kaza 2004. 128  Over the last two decades, a number of books on Buddhism and violence have been published that shed a different light on the former cliché of Buddhism as an always peaceful and non-violent religion. For brief summaries with extensive literature, see Schmidt-Leukel 2004 and Jerryson 2017. On the more specific issue of “compassionate killing,” see Jenkins 2010/11 and 2013, Schmithausen 2003 and 2007a. 124

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question of whether – and if so, under which conditions – the use of force, including corporeal violence, would be legitimate. Is it legitimate to punish evil-doers in order to secure and retain public order and safety? Is it legitimate to entertain an army in order to defend the country?129 Is it legitimate to use violent means in order to remove a tyrant? Is it legitimate to resort to violence in order to protect the Buddhist community and its teachings? Especially in Mahāyāna Buddhism, but to some extent in Theravāda as well,130 the answers were marked by the idea of a hierarchy of values in which compassion was ranked above strict obedience to precepts and rules. In Mahāyāna Buddhism, the scriptural locus classicus that permits and even requires the breaking of rules in the name of the Bodhisattva’s compassion is found in the Skill in Means Sūtra (Upāyakauśalya-sūtra), perhaps dating back to the first century BCE. The Sūtra illustrates its position through a few stories, of which two acquired particular prominence. One is the story of the ascetic Jyotis, the Buddha in a previous life (as the Bodhisattva), who had practiced celibacy for forty-two thousand years. Still looking young and handsome, a woman fell intensively in love with him. Threatening that she would die if he were to ignore her advances, Jyotis after some consideration decided to break his vows in order to save her life and make her happy, even though, as a result of this transgression, he would go to hell. Yet because his decision was motivated entirely by compassion, he actually went to the heavenly Brahma world.131 The other story is about the previous life of the Buddha as a ship’s captain named Mahākaruṇā (“Great Compassion”). On board were five hundred merchants, but also one evil person who intended to kill the merchants and steal their possessions. The ocean deities informed the captain of the evil-doer’s thoughts. They also told him that the five hundred merchants were all Bodhisattvas on their way 129  On the Buddhist discourse about a possible justification of war, see, in addition to the literature given in fn. 128, Keown 2018 and, with special reference to Sri Lanka, Bartholomeusz 2002, Harris 2003 and Young 2009. 130  For the debate on whether “compassionate killing” can be justified within the Theravāda doctrinal framework, see Gethin 2004 and Keown 2016. More familiar to Theravāda is the idea of defending the Dharma or even fighting for it (dharma / dhamma yuddhaya), which in some interpretations involves the use of force and violence. However, behind the idea of defending the Dharma stands the altruistic reason that such defense is ultimately in the interest of humanity. As a more recent example, see Tessa Bartholomeusz’s study (2002) on the Buddhist justification of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. 131  See Tatz 1994, 34f. The story is referred to in ŚS 167.

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to awakening. Killing them would earn the evil-doer terribly bad karma, bringing him to the hells for a very long time. As a result captain Mahākaruṇā considered the following options: “There is no means to prevent this man from slaying the merchants and going to the great hells but to kill him.” And he thought, “If I were to report this to the merchants, they would kill and slay him with angry thoughts and all go to the great hells themselves.” And he thought, “If I were to kill this person, I would likewise burn in the great hells for one hundred-thousand eons because of it. Yet I can bear to experience the pain of the great hells, that this person not slay these five hundred merchants and develop so much evil karma. I will kill this person myself.”132

Then Mahākaruṇā committed the murder. But as a result of his compassionate motivation, he did not go to hell. Instead, his life in samsara was shortened by one hundred-thousand eons and even the robber attained rebirth in a paradisiacal world.133 These two key stories from an influential early Mahāyāna scripture confer significant points. First the whole question of whether it is legitimate for the Bodhisattva to break the rules out of compassion is discussed within the context of the Bodhisattva’s “skill in means.” The liberal permission of violating the precepts is not given in any sweeping way, but is tied to the condition that the Bodhisattva has indeed developed this particular skill, that is, he must know that the illegitimate behavior is actually the right and only remedy in that particular situation.134 This condition is also mirrored in Śāntideva’s clause that transgressing the rule “is permitted to the compassionate one who is aware of the benefit” (vs. 84). Second, the unlawful deed as such triggers negative karmic results for the Bodhisattva – something he knows and is prepared to accept as the price for his compassion. Only under the condition of this kind of substitutionary attitude, in which he is willing to bear the negative karmic consequences (rebirth in hell) that would otherwise fall on someone else, his compassion works against these bad karmic consequences, outdoing them by the positive karmic merit produced thereby. Third, in the case of “compassionate killing,” compassion is developed 132

 Tatz 1994, 73f.  Although the Upāyakauśalya-sūtra is quoted in several places in the ŚS, it is remarkable that in the justification of compassionate killing the ŚS does not refer to the story of the ship’s captain but to the Ratnamegha-sūtra, according to which “the slaying of a man who was intending to commit a deadly sin, is allowed” (ŚS 168; Bendall, Rouse 1922, 164). Yet the message of both scriptures is clearly the same. 134  See also Keown 2001, 153f. 133

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towards both the evil-doer and his potential victims. Yet in the story of the ship’s captain, the idea is not as much to save the lives of the five hundred merchants, but to save them from performing the murder themselves and hence to save them as much as the evil-doer from the negative karmic consequences. This aspect is emphasized in ŚS 167 by quoting from the Upāyakauśalya-sūtra: “If the Bodhisattva should produce a root of good in one being, and should fall into such a sin as would cause him to fry in hell for a hundred thousand ages, he must endure to fall into that sin and bear that hellish pain rather than to omit the good of that one being.”135 It has been discussed whether this type of thinking helps in determining the philosophical nature of Mahāyāna Buddhist ethics as being either a form of virtue ethics136 or consequentialism.137 A certain role is played by both aspects: the development of one’s own compassionate mind and the consideration of objective consequences. As Schmithausen has pointed out, the relevant issue is one of balancing values with regard to specific situations.138 I think Schmithausen is also right in suggesting that the sitz im leben points us beyond monastic life toward the realm of politics. The discussion of “compassionate killing” provides (usually lay) rulers with some ethical guidelines on how to bring their handling of power in line with Buddhist spirituality.139 This also indicates how much this kind of reasoning is open to misuse. It can easily serve to justify a variety of violent political activities ranging from war to cases of religious suppression and intolerance.140 Śāntideva’s clause confronts us with a genuine dilemma. On the one hand it underlines the important insight that rules and precepts cannot cover all life situations. On the other hand it opens the doors for turning Buddhist precepts into their opposite. A principle is needed that allows a certain amount of flexibility. In Buddhism this principle has been sought and found in the sphere of the mind. It is the right motivation, the right intention that is regarded as most important, because everything proceeds from the mind (Dhammapada 1). Hence it is not surprising that Śāntideva deals with the difficult issue of epikeia in the context of a chapter that is dedicated to the cultivation of the mind. For Śāntideva the right motivation 135

 Bendall, Rouse 1922, 164.  Keown 2001. 137  Goodman 2009, esp. pp. 78-88. 138  See Schmithausen 2007a, 423. Similarly Jenkins 2013, 473f. 139  See Schmithausen 2003, 45f. 140  See on this Kleine 2006. 136

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takes precedence over strict obedience to the rules, and in the course of the Bodhisattva ideal, right motivation is identified as compassion. Pabitrakumar Roy is right when he ascribes to Śāntideva the view, “Virtue cannot simply be a performance of law-abidingness.”141 And if, as it is stated in ŚS 286f, compassion is seen as the master-virtue “in which are included all the virtues of the Buddha,” the question of whether an act flows from a compassionate mind becomes more important than the question of whether the act conforms to the rules. This triggers a new understanding of the rules themselves. The rules become a means, a skillful means, and so serve compassionate aims. They should help in the development of a compassionate mind and may function as guidelines on how to live a compassionate life. Therefore they can be broken or changed in cases where they would become dysfunctional. The problem, however, is that such flexibilization of the rules also implies the danger that morally objectionable acts are justified as a means towards an allegedly compassionate end. The position that Śāntideva takes in vs. 5:84, together with its wider Buddhist context, is once more strikingly reminiscent of some crucial motifs in Pauline theology, that is, of Paul’s two interconnected views that the whole law is summed up in the one commandment of loving one’s neighbor as oneself (Gal. 5:14; Rom. 13:8) and of his position that the spirit takes precedence over the letter (2 Cor. 3:6; Rom. 2:27-29; 7:6). Paul’s position on the Jewish Law was by no means entirely negative. This clearly emerges from his understanding that in love, which he sees as the one central commandment for Christians, the whole law is fulfilled.142 The Christian is free from the law in the sense that he or she fulfills its true purpose: love. The relation between the law and love may thus be interpreted as an expression of Paul’s famous contrast between letter and spirit. If love is not only the consummation and fulfillment of the law but also its true spirit, it becomes obligatory not to comply with the letter of the law at the expense of love as its true spirit. And if one lives in love, abiding by the letter of the law becomes at best secondary if not irrelevant. For Paul, the Christian “‘discerns what really matters’ (…) when his love grows in knowledge and judgement.”143 This interpretation is in line with Paul’s famous statement in 1 Cor. 6:12: “‘All things are lawful for me’, but not all things are beneficial. ‘All things are lawful for me’, but I will not be dominated by 141

 Roy 2011, 163.  See also Sanders 1991, 99ff. 143  Westerholm 1984, 243. 142

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anything” – except by love, as we might add. The love (agapē) in which the love of God and love of neighbor coincide is the central criterion in determining what is “beneficial” and the central means by which to avoid new forms of servitude (“attachment”) other than the service of God and neighbor. A similarly strict focus on love is found in Johannine theology, especially in the First Letter of John, where love is declared to be knowledge of God and oneness with God: “everyone who loves is born of God and knows God. (…) God is love, and those who abide in love abide in God, and God abides in them” (1 Jn. 4:7b; 16b). Revealingly, it is in his commentary on the First Letter of John that Augustine makes his famous statement “Love, and do what you will” (dilige, et quod vis fac).144 This position probably comes closest to Śāntideva’s statement in 5:84. But it also leads to similar problems, as can be seen from Augustine’s position on the legitimacy of war. As in Buddhism, Augustine’s approach in ethical matters is marked by a focus on the inner spiritual attitude. Hence, according to Augustine, “the real evils in war are love of violence (nocendi cupiditas), revengeful cruelty (ulciscendi crudelitas), fierce and implacable enmity, wild resistance, and the lust of power (libido dominandi) and such like.”145 Correspondingly, his judgement on war is different if war is fought out of a “good” motivation, such as fulfilling the will of God in rebuking human pride or curbing “licentious passions.”146 Christians have to fight “justly, only for the sake of peace, and always, Augustine insisted, with a down-cast demeanor, without anger or lust.”147 In characterizing the proper Christian motivation that justifies the use of violence, Augustine uses formulations such as “a sort of kindly harshness”148 or “compassionate afflicting,”149 which resonate closely with the Buddhist idea of “compassionate killing.” And in illustrating his views, Augustine quickly jumps from the example of the good parent who punishes his son out of fatherly love to a war that is waged for the benefit of the attacked nations.150  In epistulam Ioannis ad Parthos, tractatus VII, 8; PL 35, 2033.  Augustine in Contra Faustum Manichaeum, quoted from Langan 1984, 21. 146  Cf. Langan 1984, 22, 25. 147  Walzer 2002, 925. 148  “benigna quadam asperitate.” Epistola 138 (2:14). “We often have to act with a sort of kindly harshness, when we are trying to make unwilling souls yield, because we have to consider their welfare rather than their inclination.” Langan 1984, 25. 149  “misericorditer adversatur.” Epistola 138 (2:14). 150  See Epistola 138 (2:14). 144

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So far, the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the use of violence has not been a central topic on the agenda of Buddhist‒Christian dialogue.151 My brief remarks on the justification of force along the lines of Mahāyānist ideas and Augustinian thinking may illustrate not only a strong similarity in their argumentation, but also the obvious danger of instrumentalizing such positions to give legitimacy to highly problematic violent activities. The dilemma is the same in both religions. Rigid abiding by the rules may miss the spirit behind the rules as much as their flexibilization may prepare the path for misuse in which the spirit is actually neutralized. Perhaps the dilemma is inevitable. The real question may not be how we can avoid it, but how to live with it skillfully. One way of doing so may consist in looking at “good” or “compassionate” motivation not merely from a subjective or spiritual point of view, but rather to complement this with the more objective perspective of publicly and rationally contestable arguments. The Mahāyāna tradition insisted that compassion alone is not sufficient to justify a break of the precepts. Compassion must be accompanied by insight, by the firm knowledge that such unusual behavior will indeed be the best means to bring about the benefit of the beings. Today this might be interpreted as an indication that such insight needs to be confirmed by a discourse and consensus that is as broad as possible.

151  See, however, the contributions to Buddhist-Christian Studies 36 (2016) 51-114 on “Liberation Theology and Engaged Buddhism,” and Harris, E. 2010, 105-129.

CHAPTER 6

BODHICARYĀVATĀRA 6 THE PERFECTION OF PATIENCE (KṢĀNTIPĀRAMITĀ)

TRANSLATION: 6:1-8 Hate 1. Good conduct, giving and the worship of Buddhas which one has practiced for thousands of eons: hate destroys all that. 2. There is no evil equal to hate; there is no austerity equal to patience. That is why one should cultivate patience with effort in various ways. 3. If the sting of hate sits in the heart, the mind does not come to rest, it does not know the pleasure of joy, it finds neither sleep nor contentment. 4. Even those whom a master honors with goods and respect and who have sought his protection wish to ruin him as unbearable for his hate. 5. Even his friends dread him. He gives, but no one is close to him. In short, there is nothing that can make an angry man happy. 6. He who vigorously destroys anger, which he recognizes as an enemy causing this and that tribulation, will be happy in this world and the next. 7. Because I embark on what I dislike and because I thwart what I like, dissatisfaction sets in. Hate feeds on this nourishment and destroys me. 8. That is why I want to destroy the nourishment of this enemy, because this adversary has no other goal than my destruction.

COMMENTARY 1. Exposition: Forbearance versus Hate With chapter 6 Śāntideva begins his treatment of the Bodhisattva virtues (pāramitās) three to six.1 The groundwork has been done in 1

 See my analysis of the BCA structure in Part I, chap. 3, pp. 53-58.

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chapters 1 to 5: The Bodhisattva path is characterized as a process in which the spirit of awakening (bodhicitta) is developed from its initial arising to its fullness in Buddhahood, that is, in a perfected mind that combines wisdom (prajñā) with compassion (karuṇā). This process is presented as a spiritual battle between bodhicitta and the three key defilements (kleśas): greed, hate and delusion. Throughout that process – and in the course of this battle – the motivation of the practitioner on the Bodhisattva path is gradually transformed. There is a constant interplay between two motivating forces: self-interest in one’s own happiness, i.e. the wish to create karmic merit for oneself, and the altruistic interest in the happiness of others, i.e. the inner impulse of bodhicitta to work for the liberation of all beings. Initially, the self-centered person seeks to develop bodhicitta because this generates the highest merit for oneself. But the development of bodhicitta implies that altruism will gradually replace self-interest. This, as Śāntideva sees it, is the inner paradoxical dynamic of the Bodhisattva path. The resolution is offered in chapters 8 and 9. Chapter 8 expounds the perfection of compassion/altruism as an exchange of self and other. If the other is accepted as one’s own self, self-interest is fully turned into the altruistic interest in the other’s wellbeing or, conversely, altruism finally becomes one’s true self-interest. This is undergirded – not undermined – by chapter 9, where both “self” and “other” are deconstructed, thereby enabling the exchange of which chapter 8 speaks. This goal of the Bodhisattva path, the attainment of Buddhahood in the Mahāyāna sense, is anticipated at the end of chapter 6. The Buddhas are those who have accepted all beings as their self (6:126). Therefore the Bodhisattva’s altruistic love for all beings is the true veneration of the Buddhas (6:127). It is in the light of this goal that we need to see the exposition of the present chapter which Śāntideva presents in verses 1-8. In the first chapter (1:6) bodhicitta was introduced as the only force strong enough to overcome evil. In chapter 4 (4:27-48) evil was specified as the defilements, the Bodhisattva’s true enemies against which he fights the spiritual battle. And in vs. 4:43 Śāntideva went as far as speaking of “enmity” against the defilements as something like the only justified defilement. Chapter 5 further developed the motif of the spiritual battle by explaining mindfulness and circumspection as a defensive strategy, as the guarding and protecting of one’s mind against its enemies. In a sense, chapter 6 continues the perspective of chapter 5. The practice of mindfulness and circumspection is to be maintained in situations of suffering. But chapter 6 also changes from defense to attack: The defilement of

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“hate” or “anger” needs to be destroyed vigorously (vs. 6:6) and vs. 6:41 even speaks of the “hate of the hate.” As stated before, according to the traditional Buddhist understanding all three defilements form an inner unity, greed being the deluded reaction to a pleasant sensation and hate the deluded reaction to an unpleasant sensation (AN 3:68).2 Chapter 6 focusses especially on “hate” (dveṣa), which is called the greatest of all evils (vs. 6:2). This is in line with ŚS 164, which says that “hate” is far worse than “passion” (rāga) because hate is directly opposed to the Bodhisattva ideal. The view is also consistent with other Mahāyāna texts3 and it underlies vs. 6:8: The enemy “hate” has no other goal than destroying the Bodhisattva by ruining his altruistic intentions. This is another example of Śāntideva’s characteristic strategy to drastically inverse our “normal” ways of thinking. Whereas usually “hate” is seen – following its own inner logic – as an attitude that seeks to destroy the other, this is – according to Śāntideva – just camouflage. In truth, “hate” seeks the destruction of the one who hates (vss. 6:7-8). Overcoming hate is thus not only in the interest of the other, it is also in the best interest of oneself. In characterizing “hate” as the worst evil, Śāntideva takes a radical stance. This can be seen by comparing BCA 6:1 with MA 3:6. The two verses are fairly similar. The latter says that anger “destroys in a single moment merit accumulated through generosity and morality practiced over the course of eons (…).” But this is stated about the “anger directed against the son of the conquerors,” that is, against a Bodhisattva.4 In contrast, Śāntideva knows of no such restriction. According to vs. 6:1, it is anger as such, anger against whosoever, that destroys all such merit. The reason for taking this far more radical position is clear: According to Śāntideva’s understanding, anger against any sentient being is ultimately the anger directed against the Buddha-sons or Buddhas because the Buddhas have identified themselves with all sentient beings (vss. 6: 122 and 124). Having characterized “hate” as the greatest evil, kṣānti is introduced as the best antidote (vs. 2). This position is also found in other treatises about the Bodhisattva path, such as the Madhyamakāvatāra (chap. 3) or the 2

 See above, Part II, chap. 2, p. 149.  See Keown 2001, 153f. But also in pre-Mahāyāna texts such as Aṅguttara Nikāya 3:68 we read that “Lust … is slightly blameworthy but slow to fade away; hatred is very blameworthy but quick to fade away (…).” Bodhi 2012, 289f (PTS AN I, 200). 4  Huntington 1989, 153. 3

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Pāramitāsamāsa (chap. 3).5 The term kṣānti, often translated as “patience,” has actually a number of connotations; it implies “endurance,” “toleration,” “composure” and “forbearance.” As we will see, the last is of central importance in Śāntideva’s understanding of kṣānti and even gets very close to the notion of “forgiveness.” It is primarily the aspect of “forbearance” that makes kṣānti such an outstanding tool against “hate.” In his explication of kṣānti, Śāntideva first follows the traditional scheme of three types of kṣānti, although not too strictly:6 (1) duḥkhādhivāsanākṣānti: endurance of suffering, (2) parāpakāramarṣaṇakṣānti: endurance or forbearance regarding others’ misdeeds, especially in the face of being harmed by others, (3) dharmanidhyānakṣānti: the endurance or forbearance through reflecting the Dharma.7 As we will see, in Śāntideva’s interpretation the second type of kṣānti is at the center of his interest. While the first type of kṣānti serves primarily as a preparation for the second, the third type of kṣānti supports the second by means of insight into the truth of the Dharma. Śāntideva does not stop at this point. He expands the traditional structure of treating the three types of kṣānti by adding three further sections, sections that bear his own signature even more clearly. The reason for this expansion is that Śāntideva is not just interested in explaining kṣānti. His main concern is how to overcome hate or anger. Different from the Madhyamakāvatāra or the Pāramitāsamāsa and also the Śikṣāsamuccaya (!), Śāntideva thus adds a section on “envy” or “jealousy” which he – psychologically sensitive – reads as another version of 5

 Huntington 1989, 153f; Meadows 1986, 194-207.  See also ŚS 179-188. See Hedinger 1984, 30-35; Mahoney 2002, 128-130. The scheme is also employed in the Pāramitāsamāsa. See Meadows 1986, 88. Crosby and Skilton have suggested a sequence and allocation of verses that differ from that suggested by Steinkellner: duḥkhādhivāsanākṣānti (“forbearance through endurance of suffering”) = vss. 11-21, (2) dharmanidhyānakṣānti (“forbearance as a result of reflection upon the teaching”) = vss. 22-32, (3) parāpakāramarṣaṇakṣānti (“forbearance of the endurance of injuries from others”) = vss. 33-75 (see Śāntideva 1995, 44). Evidently Śāntideva’s structure is not entirely systematic, so there is a great deal of overlap between parākāramarṣaṇakṣānti and dharmanidhyānakṣānti in vss. 22-75. As the commentary will show, Śāntideva integrates both into one consecutive argumentation. 7  There is a certain ambivalence about the interpretation of dharmanidhyānakṣānti. While in some places it is understood as forbearance that is enabled and supported by reflecting on the Dharma, in other places it is understood as an endurance of reality as it is reflected by the Dharma. This difference, however, has hardly any impact on the actual outcome. Both aspects are combined in Dale Wright’s interpretation of it as “the capacity to tolerate more comprehensive visions of reality that undermine long-standing habits of mental insecurity” (Wright 2009, 95). 6

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“anger”: anger not about one’s own suffering or others’ wrongdoing, but about their well-doing.8 With the concluding two sections, Śāntideva goes beyond a primarily passive understanding of kṣānti. It is important not merely to endure one’s enemies, but to actively welcome them and, even more, to extend one’s love and service to them with the same degree as to all beings. Śāntideva’s focus on the aspect of forbearance, even to the extent of forgiveness and love of enemies, directly invites comparison with the Christian ideal of loving one’s enemies as it is found in the Sermon on the Mount. The 14th Dalai Lama has acknowledged this affinity and dealt with it in his talks on the Gospels during the John Main Seminar in 1994.9 I will therefore come back to his remarks at several places in the commentarial sections. One additional note on the structure of chapter 6 is in place. Interwoven with the fabric of the whole chapter is the tension between selfinterest and altruism. This can already be seen in the exposition. Verses 3-5 appeal to common sense and offer examples from all kinds of experience to underline the message that “there is nothing that can make an angry man happy” (vs. 5b). Hate not only ruins one’s own contentment and joy, it also destroys human relationships so that “no one is close” to someone filled with hate (vs. 5a). This, as Śāntideva illustrates through the example of a wealthy, powerful lord or master, cannot even be compensated by “giving” goods or bestowing honors on others (vss. 4 and 5a). Śāntideva returns to this kind of argument at the end of the chapter, where he promises “good fortune, fame and well-being, beauty, health, joy and a long life, and the copious pleasures of a universal king” to the one who practices kṣānti (vss. 133-134). But there is no doubt that the real aim of this practice is Buddhahood, which implies the perfection of altruism. Śāntideva’s strategy to promote kṣānti by praising the worldly goods and mental benefits that its development will bring cannot conceal the fact that this is just the external wrapping of the harsher message that liberation can come only through suffering (vs. 12). The teaching that suffering itself is good if, and in as much as, it contributes to the ultimate goal of the Bodhisattva is prepared by the image of the spiritual fight to which verses 7-8 allude. The spiritual fight is directed against the defilement of “hate” or “anger” and the 8  Interestingly, this addition is in line with canonical material. Aṅguttaranikāya 5:162, for example, also mentions the necessity to overcome one’s anger about someone who is of good behavior. 9  See Gyatso 2002, 45-66; see also above, Part I, chap. 4, pp. 87f.

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reward will be happiness (vs. 6). But this battle can only be won if one is ready to endure suffering. On the one hand Śāntideva thus remains faithful to the central Buddhist proclamation of a path that leads to the end of suffering. But he wants to show that this path itself inevitably involves the endurance of suffering as an antidote against hate. He substantiates this paradoxical message by an indirect, yet nevertheless obvious, allusion to the First Noble Truth. The First Noble Truth describes suffering among other things as existential dissatisfaction, as “union with what is displeasing,” as “separation from what is pleasing” and as “not to get what one wants.” In verse 7, Śāntideva states that hate springs from this kind of dissatisfaction, which can be prevented – as he will now argue – by enduring suffering. TRANSLATION: 6:9-21 Patience 1. Endurance of suffering 9. Even if the worst hardships befall me, I must not let my serenity be shaken. In dejection, too, there is no advantage; instead what is wholesome is lost. 10. If there is a remedy, then why be dejected? And why be dejected, if there is no remedy? 11. We do not want suffering, insults, affronts, slander, neither for us nor for those we love. But for enemies it is the reverse. 12. Happiness is attained with difficulty, suffering remains easily. Yet only through suffering do we escape. Therefore, my mind, be firm! 13. The devotees of Durgā and the people of Karṇāṭa endure pain such as burning and cutting for nothing; why am I timid when it is for liberation? 14. There is nothing that practice cannot master. By practicing mild pains, great agony becomes tolerable as well. 15. Mosquitoes, gnats, flies, hunger, thirst and other painful sensations and afflictions such as severe itching, why do you disregard these as useless? 16. Do not let yourself get sensitive to heat and cold, rain and wind, exhaustion in travel, sickness, imprisonment or beatings; if you do, you will suffer still more. 17.-18. If some rage forward even more fiercely when they see their own blood, while others faint even from seeing someone else’s blood, then this comes from the firmness or the weakness of their minds. Therefore one should not be defeated by suffering and should overcome pain.

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19. Even when suffering, the prudent one should never let the serenity of his mind be shattered, because it is a fight with the defilements, and in battle it is easy to be wounded. 20. Those are victorious heroes who defeat their enemy by seeking the blows of the enemy with their chest; all the others just kill those already dead. 21. And another advantage of suffering is that through agitation, arrogance vanishes, and compassion for those in the cycle of existences, the fear of sin, and love of the Victor arise.

COMMENTARY 2. The Benefit of Suffering Verses 9-10 continue the theme of vss. 7-8: If anger and hate find their nourishment in feelings of frustration or dissatisfaction, then it is essential to avoid such feelings. Hence Śāntideva exhorts his audience to maintain serenity even in the face of “worst hardships” (vs. 9 and vs. 19) and not to fall into dejection. Dejection, he argues, is to no reasonable avail. If a problem can be solved, then there is no need to be dejected; if not, dejection will not help either.10 This kind of humerous proverbial wisdom has been called by the 14th Dalai Lama “one of the most effective approaches to deal with suffering.”11 In terms of simple logic, Śāntideva’s argument is indubitably correct. How effective it might be psychologically is a different question. But it reveals what Śāntideva has in mind when he speaks about the endurance of suffering and even of liberation through suffering. He is not recommending a state of mental despair, depression or despondency (see also BCA 7:17-30). In line with the Buddhist tradition, such sentiments are not regarded as helpful or wholesome at all. In other words, kṣānti in the face of suffering implies maintaining equanimity and serenity. It implies the “effort” (vs. 2) of avoiding dejection and despondency. In the next ten verses, Śāntideva contrasts the attitude of timid dejection with the mental strength and determination required for the spiritual battle on the Bodhisattva path. He first recalls the usual inclination of averting suffering. That all beings “desire pleasure and recoil from

10 11

 Also quoted in ŚS 180.  Gyatso 2002, 54.

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pain” is a Buddhist axiom.12 Śāntideva alludes to this in vs. 11 (and again in vs. 34), but somewhat sarcastically remarks that people do not always wish that for their enemies. Yet how can this desire be fulfilled? In contrast to suffering, happiness, says Śāntideva, is difficult to attain. And true happiness, the final escape from suffering, is only found through suffering (vs. 12), that is, through a spiritual fight that will inevitably involve suffering: the “fight (is) with the defilements, and in battle it is easy to be wounded” (vs. 19). As in the case of the courageous and victorious warrior, the pain one must endure during combat should only increase one’s firm determination (vss. 6:17-18, 20; see also 4:3638). Śāntideva reminds his Buddhist audience of the Hindu followers of the goddess Durgā, who in their religious pursuit do not shy away from hurting themselves. The Bodhisattva shall not engage in the same kind of austerities as Durgā devotees (see vs. 35), but he should show the same degree of determination (vs. 13). The readiness and ability to bear suffering can be trained and developed by constant practice. “There is nothing that practice cannot master” (vs. 14). Hence Śāntideva recommends regarding minor forms of affliction such as itchy mosquito bites, hunger and thirst, cold and heat, but also “sickness, imprisonment or beatings” as welcome opportunities to exercise kṣānti whereby one can prepare oneself for the greater suffering still to come (vss. 14-16), the suffering involved in the complete self-surrender of the Bodhisattva to the beings (vss. 6:125; see also 3:12-13). The main purpose of patiently enduring suffering, of keeping one’s mind firm and serene despite all sorts of afflictions, is to prevent anger and hate from arising. But – as Śāntideva says in verse 21 – suffering has another, further benefit, one that takes us back to the central spirituality of the Bodhisattva. The experience of unexpected suffering can destroy any illusory pride or arrogance (“it won’t happen to me”) and make one more empathic for the suffering of others. It thus fosters the development of compassion, the central virtue of a Bodhisattva. It helps one to see and “fear” the negative outcomes of evil or sin (pāpa) and increases one’s love or heartfelt longing for the Buddha, to whom Śāntideva here refers by the epithet “Victor” (jina), the one who has mastered suffering, who has been victorious in his spiritual battle against the defilements and has perfected compassion for all. 12  E.g. MN 51, 94, DN 23. The observation that people torment themselves and others despite the fact that no one likes suffering is already discussed in these canonical texts; they probably stand in the wider background of Śāntideva’s deliberations.

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As much as it is the common confidence of all the major religious traditions that the ultimate religious end implies freedom from suffering, a conviction also shared by all of them is that one should accept and bear suffering if it occurs as part of one’s religious pursuit. Yet in a number of early comparative studies on Buddhism and Christianity, authored by apologetically minded Christian scholars, this has been disputed, especially in relation to Buddhism. In his comparison of Buddhism and Christianity, first published in 1890, Archibald Scott, for example, held that “Christianity, unlike other religions which promise salvation from suffering, offers salvation through suffering. It alone asserts the utility of suffering.”13 And Monier Monier-Williams, in 1889, contrasted Jesus and Siddhārtha Gautama as follows: “The one taught men to be patient under affliction, and to aim at the glorification of the suffering body, the other taught men to be intolerant of affliction, and to aim at the utter annihilation of the suffering body.”14 The present chapter of the BCA clearly proves such simplistic contrasts to be wrong. It rather confirms that “a thorough examination of the roles that suffering plays in the mystical traditions of Buddhism and Christianity discloses a much more nuanced picture in which Buddhist dukkha itself appears as a transformative aspect of the Dharma.”15 Nevertheless, such contrasts are still found, not just among Christians but also among Western Buddhist practitioners, perhaps also as part of a negative reaction to an exaggerated glorification of suffering in some strands of the Christian tradition. Buddhism is then easily – and mistakenly – viewed as a means of avoiding suffering. The key message of the Four Noble Truths that there is an ultimate liberation from suffering may thus “lead to a grave spiritual error, the notion that suffering is something to be avoided, prevented, escaped, bypassed.”16 This judgement comes from Norman Fischer, himself a Western Buddhist of Jewish background. In his Zen-Inspired Translations of the Psalms, Fischer recommends the spirituality of the Psalms as an antidote to this kind of limited and misleading perception of Buddhism: I have seen many Western Buddhist students suffer a great deal because of this error, thinking and believing they could go beyond or had gone beyond their suffering, only to find that it was there all along, underneath 13

 Scott 1890, 201.  Monier-Williams 1889, 545. 15  Urbaniak 2014, 9. 16  Fischer 2003, xvi. 14

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their seeming calmness and insight, and that because they had not seen and accepted it, they allowed it to grow far worse. The Psalms make it clear that suffering is not to be escaped or bypassed. Much to the contrary, suffering returns again and again, a path in itself, and through the very suffering and the admission of suffering, the letting go into suffering and the calling out from it, mercy and peace can come (this is most poignantly expressed, of course, in the example of Jesus).17

Fischer’s view that only by “the admission of suffering … mercy and peace can come” accords with Śāntideva’s statement that we escape suffering only through suffering (vs. 12). This view does not imply that suffering is good as such. In his interpretation of kṣānti, the 14th Dalai Lama likewise affirms that “we should not have the erroneous notion that … suffering is beautiful, that suffering is what we all must seek.”18 But suffering can be used “as a means to progress.”19 This attitude, he says, “involves a voluntary acceptance of hardships for a higher purpose.”20 To Śāntideva this “higher purpose” is, as we have seen, the overcoming of hate as a most dangerous defilement. And hate is so dangerous because it is directly opposed to the compassionate spirit of bodhicitta. Ultimately, the benefit of patiently enduring hardship lies therefore in its capacity to contribute to the development of compassion. As Śāntideva concludes in vs. 6:75: “It is therefore fitting to be truly pleased with the suffering in this world, which takes away the suffering of all” (see also vs. 8:105). The litmus test is therefore the endurance of suffering which is directly inflicted upon oneself by other people. As we will see in the next section, it is here that it is most crucial to conquer anger and hate and develop an alternative attitude. Once again Śāntideva’s teachings exhibit striking resonances with the theology of Paul. According to Paul, “we boast in our sufferings, knowing that suffering produces endurance, and endurance produces character and character produces hope” (Rom. 5:3-4). While Paul concurs with Śāntideva that suffering is beneficial in that it brings about endurance, it may appear as a significant difference that in Paul’s understanding, the connection between suffering and endurance has an eschatological orientation.21 But this orientation, too, reveals some affinities with Śāntideva’s 17

 Ibid.  Gyatso 2002, 54. 19  Gyatso 2009, 56, with direct reference to BCA 6:12. 20  Gyatso 2002, 51. 21  On the eschatological dimension of suffering in Paul’s theology, see Dunn 1998, 484. 18

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thought. Paul’s understanding of “hope” is closely linked to his belief that through suffering, the follower of Jesus shares in Jesus’ own suffering.22 In the second chapter of his Letter to the Philippians Paul suggests that sharing in the suffering of Jesus is identical to sharing in Christ’s spirit. Philippians (2:6-11) contains the famous hymn presenting Christ’s suffering as an act of “self-emptying” (kenosis) and has attracted much attention in Buddhist‒Christian dialogue.23 According to a strong line in contemporary New Testament scholarship, the statement in Phil. 3:6f that Christ emptied himself although “being in the form of God” does not refer to a divine pre-existence of Christ, but to his being created in the likeness of God. In contrast to Adam and Adam’s disobedience, Christ as the new Adam was not attached to being like God, but emptied himself and became a slave obedient to death.24 Regarding Christ’s kenosis Paul’s emphasis lies on his exhortation: “Let the same mind be in you that was in Christ Jesus” (Phil. 2:5). And this mind of self-emptying is specified in the immediately preceding verses (Phil. 2:1-4): If then there is any encouragement in Christ, any consolation from love, any sharing in the Spirit, any compassion and sympathy, make my joy complete: be of the same mind, having the same love, being in full accord and of one mind. Do nothing from selfish ambition or conceit, but in humility regard others as better than yourselves.

Sharing in Christ’s spirit evidently implies an attitude of compassion and altruistic love. Paul is convinced that Christ’s suffering is expressive of God’s love and compassion. God is full of mercy and compassion (Rom. 9:15) so that Paul calls God “the Father of mercies and the God of all consolation” (2 Cor. 1:3). God’s consolation and mercy, as it became evident in Christ’s self-emptying up to the point of death, is upheld even in the face of the worst human sin, that is, even for those who crucified Christ. The crucifixion thereby becomes the sign and affirmation of God’s all-encompassing mercy and forgiveness. And it enables the followers of Jesus to share this mercy and consolation with all those who suffer (2 Cor. 1:4-7). 22

 See ibid. 484-487. See also Sanders 2015, 716-720.  See, for example, Cobb, Ives 1990; Corless, Knitter 1990; Ives 1995; von Brück, Lai 1997, 450-461; Keenan 2015; Schmidt-Leukel 2017b, 412-421. See also Cabanne 1993, who rightly underlines that Paul’s emphasis is on the “mind” and hence suggests that Christian‒Buddhist dialogue should focus on the relation between bodhicitta and the mind of Christ. 24  For a summary of the arguments in favor of this interpretation and discussion of the objections, see Dunn 1998, 281-288. 23

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In the present section of the BCA, Śāntideva does not speak of any consolation in the face of suffering. Yet as we have seen in preceding sections (vss. 2:7-9, 2:26-66), he draws essential consolation from his reliance on the mercy and compassion of the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. He returns to this motif towards the end of chapter 6 (see vs. 6:124). As much as, for Christians, Christ reflects the mercy of ultimate reality, for Śāntideva the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, through their compassion, are transparent to the light of ultimate truth which shines into the darkness of the defilements. This light kindles the spirit of awakening in the Buddhist practitioner just as it lets the follower of Jesus share in Christ’s spirit. The inner affinities between Śāntideva’s and Paul’s views of the connection between patience in the face of suffering and the development of compassion become quite apparent in the Letter to the Colossians (3:12f), which – although presumably a pseudepigraph – is nevertheless close to Paul’s theological thinking: As God’s chosen ones, holy and beloved, clothe yourselves with compassion, kindness humility, meekness and patience. Bear with one another and, if anyone has a complaint against another, forgive each other; just as the Lord has forgiven you, so you also must forgive.

The specific way in which Śāntideva encourages his audience to “bear with one another” will become clearer in the following section.

TRANSLATION: 6:22-75 2. Endurance of injustice 22. I hold no anger against bile and the other [bodily fluids], even though they cause great suffering. What sense is there in being angry with sentient beings? They, too, have a reason for their anger. 23. Just as sharp pain develops despite not being wanted, anger forcibly arises despite not being wanted. 24. Someone does not get angry at will upon deciding “I want to be angry,” nor does anger arise upon thinking “I want to arise.” 25. All transgressions and the manifold evils are due to their respective causes. Nothing is independent. 26. The complex of causes does not think “I want to produce,” nor does what has been produced think “I have been produced.” 27. What is accepted, untenably, [by the Sāṅkhya] as primordial matter, what is conceived as the self, that, too, does not come about upon thinking “I shall become.”

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28. For something unarisen [as eternal] does not exist [as something arisen]. Who could, then, wish to become? And since it engages with objects, [an eternal self] can also not stop [its activity ever]. 29. Further, an eternal and non-sentient self [as assumed by the Vaiśeṣika] is clearly inactive, like space. How could something that does not change be active, even if it were to become connected with further conditions? 30. What at the time of activity remains the same as before, what is its role for activity? Which of the two [self and activity] causes the other, if a connection [is expressed as] “the activity of the [self]”? 31. Thus everything depends on something else; also that upon which it depends is dependent. If in this manner, things do not move on their own like magic creations, what is one angry about? 32. If one thinks that in this way, too, resisting [anger] is impossible, for who resists whom, we say it is possible. Because there is dependency, we believe that suffering comes to an end. 33. May he, therefore, even if he has seen a friend or foe doing wrong, be serene in the thought that they have corresponding causes. 34. If, however, all living beings were to succeed as they desire, then no one would suffer, since no one desires suffering. 35. Out of rashness, anger, lust for unattainable women and so on, they torment themselves with beds of thorns and other tortures, with food deprivation and other punishments. 36. Some commit suicide: they hang themselves, throw themselves off a cliff, consume poison or harmful substances or other things, and commit crimes. 37. If, at the mercy of the defilements (ºvaśyatvād M instead of ºvaśyavād V), they even destroy their precious body in this way, how shall they then spare the bodies of others? 38. How is it possible that there is not only no compassion for those who, bewildered by the defilements, work on their own destruction, but even anger arises? 39. If the nature of fools is pestering others, it is as inappropriate for me to be angry at them as at a fire whose nature is burning. 40. And if this fault is accidental and all beings are pleasant by nature, even then being angry at them is just as unjustified as being angry at the air when it is filled with biting smoke. 41. If one ignores the first cause, such as a rod, and is angry at the person driving it: he, too, is driven by hate. Hate of the hate would be more fitting. 42. I, too, in the past have caused similar pain to sentient beings. Therefore it serves me quite right, the bringer of harm to these beings. 43. His weapon and my body, both are the cause of suffering. He has grasped the weapon, I the body: at which shall I be angry?

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44. This boil in the form of a body, which I have procured, cannot bear being shoved around. What should I, blinded by craving, be angry about if it hurts? 45. I do not long for suffering, but in my foolishness I long for the cause of suffering. Why am I angry at others, if it is my fault that I am suffering? 46. Just as the sword-leaved forest, just as the birds of hell are caused only by my own actions, so too this present suffering. So what am I angry about? 47. Spurred on solely by my own actions, people are doing harm to me. They will therefore go to the hells. Is it not I who has ruined them? 48. For them, if I practice patience, a large guilt of mine will be annulled; but due to me, they go to the hells, with their long-lasting torments. 49. I myself am the one who does them wrong and they are my benefactors. Why do you reverse it, oh wicked-minded, and become angry? 50. It might be the purity of my heart, if I still do not land in the hells. If I have saved myself, then what will happen to them? 51. They will not be saved if I were to wrong them in return. But my course [as a bodhisattva] will be forsaken. Then the pitiable are lost.

3. Endurance because of realizing the Teaching 52. Nothing can ever injure the mind because it is without [physical] shape. But since it holds onto the body, the mind is tormented by suffering. 53. Slander, insults and defamation, all this does not hurt the body. Why then, oh mind, are you angry? 54. Will the malevolence others bear for me devour me in this or another life and thus, be repulsive to me? 55. If it is repulsive to me because it prevents my success: my success will already pass in this life, but sin will tenaciously persist. 56. Best would be if I were to die today, not live a long, false life. For, even if I linger on a long time, the suffering of death will be the same for me. 57.-58. In a dream someone enjoys a hundred years of happiness and then awakens, another is happy for just a moment and then awakens. When awake, is not happiness gone for both? The same holds in the hour of death for one with a long life and for one with a short one. 59. Although I have acquired many possessions and tasted delights for long, I shall go forth empty-handed and naked, as if I had been robbed. 60. But what if I live off my profit and erase my sins and do what is good? Is not someone in anger for the sake of profit more likely to erase merits and to sin? 61. If the only thing I live for perishes, of what use to me then is this life, which fosters nothing but evil?

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62. If you hate someone who slanders you because he ruins you (sa tvān instead of sattvān V), why do you not also fly into a rage over someone who slanders others?25 63. You are lenient with those who are malevolent when their malevolence is directed against others, but are not lenient with your slanderer, who also depends on the unfolding of the defilements. 64. Also those who destroy and revile images, stūpas, or the True Teaching (saddharma) do not deserve my hate, because the Buddhas and the other Perfected Ones are not distressed. 65. When they hurt our teachers, relatives and the ones we love, one should realize, as has been said, that this has its causes and suppress one’s anger. 66. Distress caused by the sentient and the insentient is inevitable for sentient beings. The sentient one is aware of this pain. Therefore endure this pain! 67. Some do wrong out of delusion, others, deluded, get angry. Who among them do we call faultless and who do we call guilty? 68. Why in the past did you behave in such a way that you are so tormented by others? Everything is due to actions. Who am I to change that? 69. But since I know this, I shall strive to do what is good so that all will be of a friendly mind towards each other. 70.-71. When a house is on fire and the flames have jumped to the house next door, one pulls out the straw and other things that could catch fire and moves them away; in the same way the mind is being burnt by the fire of hate because it is clinging to something which must be given up, on the spot, for fear that the body of merits might be burnt. 72. If a man condemned to death is released after his hand has been cut off, is this misfortune? If one is spared hells through human sufferings, is this misfortune? 73. If already now one cannot stand a minor pain, then why not fight anger, the cause of hellish pains? 74. Because of anger, I have been tortured in the hells a thousand times, [thereby] serving neither myself nor others. 75. But this suffering is not of this kind and will bring great benefit. It is therefore fitting to be truly pleased here with the suffering, which takes away the suffering of the world.

25  Alternative reading: If you hate someone who slanders you because he ruins sentient beings (sattvān instead of sa tvān), why do you not also fly into a rage over someone who slanders others?

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COMMENTARY 3. Overcoming Anger at Others’ Misdeeds In verses 22-75, Śāntideva combines the patient endurance of others’ misdeeds (parāpakāramarṣaṇakṣānti) with the patience/endurance as it results from seeing the Dharma (dharmanidhyānakṣānti).26 The fifty-four verses form a complex yet continuous argument which can be outlined in seven steps and a preliminary conclusion. First (vss. 22-33), if the practitioner on the Bodhisattva path becomes subject to the aggression of others, who should the fresh Bodhisattva be angry with? Responding to this question, Śāntideva draws on the Buddhist teachings of not-self (anātman), dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) and illusion (māyā). The anger of others does not spring from any substantial and immutable selves. It is not deliberately produced, but originates due to “respective causes” (vs. 25). And these causes, too, depend on further causes. There is no autonomy in this chain of causes; each cause depends on another cause just as a magical creation depends on the magician. And if a magician is also like this, that is, if there is no cause that would itself be unconditioned (this is presumably the reason why Śāntideva inserts at vss. 27-30 a brief critique of Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika27), then everything obtains a surreal character (vs. 31).28 Against the objection that then nobody would be able to do 26

 See above, p. 258, fn. 7.  In vs. 28 Śāntideva argues that a self which is supposed to be eternal could neither have any influence on its arising, because it never arose, nor could it, as an eternal being, ever stop its essential activity, that is, its conscious registration of perceptions (cf. BCA 9:61). In vss. 29-30 he argues that an insentient and immutable self can even less be conceived as actively influencing anything. Thus even for those who, in contrast to Buddhism, assume an eternal self, this self can have no impact on the stream of causally conditioned events. Vs. 28a has puzzled a number of translators and commentators. One could interpret anutpannaṃ as “not yet arisen”: Something that has not yet arisen, does not yet exist. So who should then wish to become. But this does not apply to the concept of an eternal self which is thought to be unarisen in the sense of being eternal, that is, without origination. The other option would be to interpret tan nāsti as a denial of the existence of such an unarisen eternal self. There is no doubt that Śāntideva contests the existence of an eternal self. But here he argues under the presuppositions of those who do believe in its existence, as becomes clear from vs. 27 and vs. 28b. He wants to show that even if such an eternal self is presupposed, it can have no deliberate impact on the course of things. 28  The analogy is presumably based on Nāgārjuna’s MMK 7:34, according to which all phenomena are “like a magician’s illusion.” See also the parallel passage in ŚS 180, which quotes from the Ugraparipṛcchā (12a): “All that is composite is made of illusion, its mark is that it is in a state of flux” (Bendall, Rouse 1922, 176). See also Nattier 2003, 246. 27

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anything against the origination of anger (because all are subject to the respective causes), Śāntideva responds that the opposite is the case. It is precisely because of the principle of dependent origination – and its unmasking as an illusion (māyā) – that a solution is possible (vs. 32). (Both the objection and the response have a structural similarity to vss. 9:31-35, where they find a slightly fuller treatment.) Śāntideva’s first conclusion is that there is no reason for the practitioner to be angry with anyone, neither friend nor foe (vss. 31 and 33). In the second step of his argument, Śāntideva inquires deeper into the nature of the main cause of aggressive behavior, the defilements, and asks for the proper reaction (vss. 34-41). Although nobody wants to suffer, people do actually torment their bodies and their minds for all sorts of reasons, religious or mundane, and even kill themselves. They do so because they are driven by the defilements. If in their delusion they even harm themselves, why should they hesitate to harm others? Aggression springing from delusion manifests both as auto-aggression and as aggression against others. Such people deserve the Bodhisattva’s compassion, not his anger (vss. 34-38). This, says Śāntideva, applies regardless of whether people’s nature is ultimately bad or good. If the first, they cannot be held responsible; if the second, anger should not be directed against them, but against that what obscures their good nature, the defilements. Hence it is more fitting to hate the hate than the one who is under the sway of hate (vss. 39-41). In his third step, Śāntideva re-directs the attention from the aggressive other to oneself, which leads to the identification of a further cause, one’s own bad karma (vss. 42-49). In his past (whether in the present or in former lives), the practitioner on the Bodhisattva path has likewise inflicted suffering upon other beings.29 The suffering that he now experiences at the hand of others is the result of his own bad karma. He himself is the cause of that suffering just as he is the cause of the suffering that follows bad deeds in the form of infernal punishments (vss. 42, 45b, 46). Both the aggressive behavior of others and one’s own suffering under their misdeeds have one common origin, attachment. “His weapon and my body, both are the cause of suffering. He has grasped the 29  One clear example of this type of causality is found in the Saddharmasmṛtyupasthāna. After a being has been punished in hell for an extremely long time because of practicing oral or anal sex, the same being will have to face further suffering once it has regained human existence. And among such sufferings is “having wives intent on murdering them in various ways” (Cabezón 2017, 54). The evil intentions and deeds of such “wives” are thus caused by the negative karmic residues of their husbands.

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weapon, I the body: at which shall I be angry?” (vs. 43). It is the other’s attachment to his evil intentions and one’s own attachment to one’s body which jointly produce the infliction of harm through the perpetrator and the experience of suffering by the victim. To recoil from suffering while embracing its cause via attachment is a form of delusion (vs. 45a). Moreover, if it is one’s own negative karma that causes others to inflict suffering upon oneself, one is actually also responsible for the fact that the perpetrators will suffer in the hells as a result of their misdeeds (vs. 47b). It is not they who do wrong to oneself, but “I myself am the one who does them wrong” (vss. 49a). They, one’s supposed enemies, are actually one’s benefactors, as Śāntideva now indicates and further expounds in vss. 99-111. Thus there is no reason whatsoever to be angry with them (vss. 46b, 49b). So what to do? In the fourth step of his argument Śāntideva confronts the practitioner with two alternatives, soteriological egotism and retaliation, both unacceptable for someone following the Bodhisattva path (vss. 50-51). The first alternative would be to purify one’s own heart and withdraw from samsara into one’s own private nirvana. One could thereby save oneself, but be of no help to others, which contradicts the Bodhisattva vows. The second alternative, retaliation, is even less acceptable. In this case, not only others are not helped, but also one’s own path as a Bodhisattva will be ruined. Thus how should one proceed in accordance with the Bodhisattva path? Śāntideva’s answer is that one needs to look more deeply into the relation between the origination of hate and attachment. In the fifth step, he points out the mental nature of attachment (vss. 52-54). Suffering, even if caused by physical pain, is a mental problem. The mind cannot be physically hurt, but we suffer under bodily pain because we are attached to the body (vs. 52, as already presupposed in vs. 43). Attacks such as “slander, insults and defamation” cannot hurt the body and, under the presupposition of rebirth, cannot put an end to one’s existence (vs. 53-54). They hurt the mind due to its bodily attachment. In the sixth step, Śāntideva argues that behind the attachment to one’s body lies the attachment to the wrong goals in life, that is, to artha (wealth/power) and kāma (mundane, especially sexual pleasure) (vss. 55-59). Here Śāntideva draws on the traditional Buddhist critique of the Vedic goals in life going back to the early days of the śramaṇa movements.30 Any worldly goods and mundane achievements will pass

30

 See Schmidt-Leukel 2006, 13-18, 26f.

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away with death, but one’s “sins” or transgressions will have their karmic results beyond death (vs. 55). There is no point in being attached to life if this is lived only for worldly pleasures. Neither wealth nor pleasure will survive one’s bodily death and both cannot be taken to the next life (vs. 59).31 But what if the anger about others’ misdeeds does not spring from attachment to wealth and pleasure? What if someone justifies his anger by pointing out that the enemy’s attacks are directed against one’s religious pursuit? In the seventh and final step of his argument, Śāntideva treats this protest as self-centeredness in religious disguise (vss. 60-64). If one lives one’s life not for the accumulation of wealth and pleasure, but for the creation of karmic merit, anger is still not justified because it will ruin merit (vs. 60, similarly vs. 102). The reading of vss. 62f is ambiguous. Either Śāntideva is pointing out the egocentric motivation in one’s anger. One is angry if the attack goes against oneself, but less angry if someone else is blamed, although in both cases the slander arises from the defilements. Or, in the alternative reading, vss. 62f deal with someone defending his anger with the argument that he has been attacked by the enemy because he follows the Bodhisattva path and cares for other beings. Hence the slanderer indirectly harms those beings. One’s anger, so the selfdefense, does not spring from an egocentric motivation but only from one’s care for other beings. Śāntideva replies by asking whether the same anger is also felt if similar attacks are directed against others. If not, this justification of one’s anger is hardly honest but smacks of huffiness in religious disguise. Finally, even if Buddhism itself is attacked, there is no justification for hating the attacker, since the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas will not suffer under such incidents (vs. 64).32 In vss. 65-75 Śāntideva draws a preliminary conclusion: There is no case in which anger could be justified. One should be aware that hate always has its causes (vs. 65); that suffering is inevitable (vs. 66); that both the evildoer and the one who reacts in anger are equally deluded (vs. 67); and that the injustice one suffers through others is actually not injustice at all but the result of one’s own evil karma (vs. 68). Therefore, one should suppress one’s anger (vs. 65), endure one’s suffering (vs. 66), not accuse 31

 Note the interesting parallel between BCA 6:59 and Mt. 6:19-21.  Kate Crosby (1999) has argued that vs. 6:64 may quite likely presuppose the belief that the Buddha is present in sacred images, stūpas and the Dharma, so that the attacks are actually directed against the Buddha. The Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, however, do not react with vengeance but with forbearance. 32

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anyone (vs. 67), accept what cannot be changed (vs. 68) and, most importantly, work for reconciliation, that is, for a situation in which all will interact with each other in friendly ways (vs. 69). Putting all of this into practice requires detachment (vss. 70-71). Suffering in human existence is nothing compared to suffering in hells. It is therefore in one’s own best interest and in the interest of others to bear the present suffering so that one avoids the much worse forms of suffering in the hells (vss. 72-74).33 From a genuine Bodhisattva perspective, one should even be “truly pleased with,” or – to cite Paul – “boast” (Rom. 5:3) in “the suffering in this world, which takes away the suffering of all” (vs. 75). Or, as Śāntideva will say in vs. 8:105: “If the suffering of many comes to an end through the suffering of one, then a compassionate one must by all means develop such suffering for others and for his own sake.” In my subsequent discussion I will focus on three main issues: (1) the similarities in Christian and Buddhist approaches to hate and being hated and the differences in their metaphysical justification; (2) the issue of freedom and determinism; and (3) the question of limits to tolerance. First, the 14th Dalai Lama has argued that the principles of non-retaliation and non-discriminating kindness toward all beings, including compassion toward one’s enemies (see also ŚS 181f), constitute close parallels between Śāntideva’s view of the Bodhisattva path and the Sermon on the Mount.34 These principles are firmly rooted in the Buddhist tradition. The principle of non-retaliation, for example, is found in the Dhammapada vs. 5: “Not by hatred will enmity at all times appeased be. It is appeased with amity, this is law from eternity”35 (see also vss. 133, 201). Maintaining loving kindness and compassion even toward one’s worst enemy is already taught in the famous parable of the saw (see MN 21).36 I agree with Lefebure’s and Feldmeier’s conclusion of their commentary on the Dhammapada: “The teachings of Shakyamuni Buddha and of Jesus Christ converge in challenging us to move beyond resentments to a reconciliation that does not dwell on wrongs suffered in the past.”37 Śāntideva’s statement that one should hate the hate but 33  Note the striking similarities between BCA 6:72 and Mt. 18:8-9, and between BCA 6:73 and the Imitatio Christi 1:24:6 “Learn then, to suffer little things now that you may not have to suffer greater ones in eternity. (…) If a little suffering makes you impatient now, what will hell fire do?” Kempis 2012, 48. 34  Gyatso 2002, 47-52. 35  Medonza 1984, 5 36  See above, Part II, chap. 3, p. 167. 37  Feldmeier, Lefebure 2011, 40.

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not the person who hates (vs. 6:41) is reminiscent of Gandhi’s famous words “Hate the sin and not the sinner.”38 This conviction is also widespread among Christians, because it is grounded in Pauline teachings such as “hate what is evil, hold fast to what is good” (Rom. 12:9) and “God proves his love for us in that while we still were sinners Christ died for us” (Rom. 5:8). It is especially in relation to the latter that the Christian imitation of Christ gets pretty close to Śāntideva’s conclusion that ultimately suffering is to be accepted because it is for the sake of others. This, however, is also the point which the 14th Dalai Lama has designated as “a point of departure between Buddhists and Christians.”39 He sees clearly that the all-encompassing love proclaimed and practiced by Jesus is rooted in the belief in God’s indiscriminate mercy.40 He accepts that this belief provides an efficient foundation for a spirituality which is very close to that of the Bodhisattva. But he treats this belief as an upāya, as a means,41 although one that – as he argues – is hardly acceptable from the perspective of Buddhist Madhyamaka philosophy: The entire Buddhist worldview is based on a philosophical standpoint in which the central thought is the principle of interdependence, how all things and events come into being purely as a result of interactions between causes and conditions. Within that philosophical worldview it is almost impossible to have any room for an atemporal, eternal, absolute truth. Nor is it possible to accommodate the concept of a divine Creation.42

In his own commentary on the Bodhicaryāvatāra, the Dalai Lama presents the same argument (referring to vss. 6:24-31): “Buddhism teaches that everything arises from causes and conditions and that therefore there is no such thing as an uncaused cause. (…) Belief in such a creator is simply not logical.”43 In vss. 6:26-31, Śāntideva does not explicitly discuss the issue of a divine creator. And his reference to Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika focusses not on their concept of God, but on their concept of an immutable self.44 Nevertheless, the problem he alludes to is how it could be possible for an immutable self to function as an active cause. According to Śāntideva,  From his Autobiography, Part IV, chap. 9. See Gandhi 1983, 242.  Gyatso 2002, 55. 40  Ibid. 48f. 41  See ibid. 50-52, 55f, 73f, 81f. 42  Ibid. 81f. 43  Gyatso 2009, 60. 44  See Radhakrishnan, Moore 1989, 349-452; Sharma 2009, 149-168, 175-190; Puligandla 1997, 119-143, 157-180. 38 39

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being a cause that is efficient within the web of causally connected processes – processes which underlie origination and decay – implies that the cause itself has also been subject to some form of mutation or change. Such changes are not only incompatible with the idea of immutability. They are also incompatible with the idea of an uncaused cause, since if the cause itself undergoes certain changes, then these have been affected by some other cause or causes. This argument has indeed an impact on the question of how to conceive of a divine creator. If creation is understood as a causal activity on, or even interaction with, the created, the creator can be neither immutable nor entirely uncaused. The creative activity of the creator must itself have its causes. As Śāntideva says in vs. 9:126: “If God created without intending to, it would follow that he depends on something else. And even if he intends to, he would depend on his wish. How could one who creates have the sovereignty [appropriate to God]?” Śāntideva is dealing here with both his criticism of the concept of the self according to the Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika, and with the concept of a divine creator (īśvara) – the latter being developed more explicitly in chapter 9 (9:61-70; 119-126). A detailed treatment of these issues will therefore be deferred to the commentary on the respective sections of the ninth chapter.45 Here just one remark pointing toward a possible solution might be added. The Dalai Lama’s statement that within the Buddhist worldview “it is almost impossible to have any room for an atemporal, eternal, absolute truth” needs some modification. In pre-Mahāyāna Buddhism there are at least two evident candidates for precisely such an eternal and unconditioned truth/reality (note that the one word satya means both “truth” and “reality”). First, the Dharma is clearly thought to be eternally true.46 To be sure, the Dharma can be forgotten and rediscovered, can degenerate and disappear – but this relates only to the Dharma as a teaching. It does not relate to the eternal truth or content that is expressed in the teaching (see AN 3:136). In this respect, the Buddhist Dharma closely resembles the wider Indian idea of sanātana dharma, eternal truth. Second, in the canonical texts, nirvana is clearly presented as an “unconditioned” (asaṃskṛta) and “deathless” (amṛta) reality.47 According to Udāna 8:3 and Itivuttaka 43, it is only due to the fact that “there is” such a reality which is not subject to dependent origination that a liberation for the world of 45

 See below, Part II, chap. 9, pp. 450-452, 472f, 478-486.  See Conze 1962, 92-106. 47  See Pandit 1993, 312-339; Collins 1998; Schmidt-Leukel 2016. 46

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dependent existence, the world of samsara, is possible at all. Things do get more complicated with the Madhyamaka position that nirvana is not different from samsara. Yet this position needs to be seen within the context of Nāgārjuna’s general interpretation of “emptiness” (śūnyatā), which is basically a critique of the idea that human concepts could grasp reality as it truly is (MMK 18:9). That is, the conditioned reality of samsara is in the end as inconceivable and ineffable as the unconditioned reality of nirvana. This implies that the distinction between samsara and nirvana as two different ontological realities is given up, or better: that its validity is confined to the level of conceptual, i.e. conventional truth. The distinction between samsara and nirvana thus reappears as the epistemological difference between the conventional realm of “worldly veiled truth/reality” (lokasaṃvṛtisatya), that is, the truth as it is expressed via conceptual distinctions (including the distinction between conditioned and unconditioned reality) and the “truth/reality in the ultimate sense” (paramārthasatya), which is ineffable and beyond all human concepts. Yet without realizing this absolute truth, Nāgārjuna says, nirvana cannot be attained. While “absolute truth” relates to reality in the ultimate sense (tattva), “relative” or “conventional truth” relates to an ultimately illusory image of reality (māyā). And “dependent origination” is – as a conceptual construct – part of this relative, illusory truth.48 In his commentary on the Bodhicaryāvatāra, the Dalai Lama himself admits that the Madhyamaka tradition does actually affirm absolute truth. He explains that “absolute truth is something that we have to experience with a mind free of concepts” and that “according to absolute truth” things perceived via conceptual constructs “have no true existence.”49 With reference to BCA 6:31, he states that through the understanding of the dependent nature of everything, things which “we normally perceive as real and solid will be seen as something insubstantial, like magical illusions.”50 In his talks during the John Main Seminar, he hinted at a possible way of how to solve the tension between Christian reasoning, which presupposes God, and Buddhist reasoning, presupposing conditioned reality, namely by understanding the concept of God along the lines of the Madhyamaka distinction between absolute and relative truth. “One could say that the Creator is the ultimate and 48  For Śāntideva’s version of the two truths/realities, see below, pp. 419-425, commentary on vss. 9:2-5. 49  Gyatso 2009, 120, 122. 50  Ibid. 62.

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the creation is the relative, the ephemeral. In that sense, the Creator is absolute and ultimate truth.”51 This, however, would require that the absolute nature of God is not conceived as an absolute cause, but, as the Dalai Lama says, that “God” can be understood “in terms of something which is inexpressible, something which is beyond language and conceptuality.”52 This is certainly a suggestion that deserves to be explored further, as I will do in the course of discussing chapter 9.53 There is a second major issue involved in Śāntideva’s strategy to appease hate by pointing out that “all transgressions and the manifold evils are due to their respective causes” (vs. 6:25) – an issue which is as much of concern from a Christian as from a Buddhist point of view. At some places in chapter 6, one might easily get the impression that the way Śāntideva employs the teaching of dependent origination not only excludes the possibility of an immutable self being involved in human behavior, but also of any form of deliberate self-determination and personal responsibility – in other words, that he denies free will and assumes determinism. This impression becomes particularly strong when he includes karmic causality as one relevant factor and argues that the misdeeds committed by others against oneself are not their fault, but are caused by one’s own bad karma (e.g. vss. 6:45, 47, 49, 68). The morally sensitive nature of this issue has become particularly evident in the course of Buddhist‒Jewish dialogue. Tibetan Buddhists have repeatedly explained the Tibetan suffering under the Chinese and the Jewish suffering during the Holocaust as a result of collective karma.54 The issue here is not as much the scholastic question of whether it is doctrinally possible to assume something like collective karma, but rather the repugnant implication that the victim – even collectively – is blamed as the culprit. But is this not what Śāntideva implies in vss. 6:47 and 68? In an important canonical text (AN 3:62),55 three different world views are rejected because, as the critique goes, each one of them entails a denial of human responsibility, leads to inaction and thereby undermines the motivation to strive for liberation: the views that whatever a person experiences, pleasure or pain, is caused (1) by past karma, or (2) by a divine 51

 Gyatso 2002, 56.  Ibid. 55. 53  See below, Part II, chap. 9, pp. 478-488. 54  See, for example, Kamenetz 1995, 122f; King 2005, 208f. See also the similar critique against a deterministic karma theory in Kaufman 2005, 24-26. 55  PTS AN I, 173-177. Bodhi 2012, 266-270, lists the sutta as no. 61 in the Book of Threes. 52

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creator, or (3) happens just randomly. In contrast, the Buddhist position is that human beings are not only “heirs” of their actions (= karma) but also “owners” (e.g. MN 135, AN 5:161). This ownership of one’s deeds implies personal responsibility and the freedom to act otherwise. According to a key Buddhist conviction, the central karmic activity is volition, because it presides over one’s actual behavior (AN 6:63): “For having willed, one acts by body, speech, or mind.”56 A number of canonical texts clearly presuppose that this will obtains over a perhaps limited, but nevertheless genuine free choice.57 The third of the three unwholesome views is rejected because it denies any karmic consequences of one’s deeds at all; that is, it denies that people are “heirs” of their deeds. The first and the second view, however, are rejected because they deny “ownership”; they deny that people are responsible and free to act otherwise. Does Śāntideva succumb to the first of the three unwholesome views, to a deterministic concept of karma? If the misdeeds of the perpetrator are caused by the evil karma of his victim, it seems that the perpetrator was not free to refrain from committing his evil deeds. But then the victim, whose bad karma supposedly has caused the misdeeds of the perpetrator, was presumably also not free but performed his own bad deeds in the past because these were similarly caused by the evil karma of someone else. Yet this would then entail the collapse of the whole idea of karma as a kind of just or due recompense of one’s deeds, with the implication that one is called to avoid bad deeds because of their negative results and perform good deeds because they earn karmic merit. Nobody could be free to make such a morally significant choice, because all deeds and choices would be causally determined by the karma of someone else who is not free either. Although Buddhist popular belief and literature are replete with stories that indeed ascribe (in contrast to texts such as AN 3:62) whatever a person experiences to his or her karma, there are also a number of Buddhist texts taking a more differentiated approach. They count karma as just one possible cause among a standard list of eight causes of unpleasant experiences, which includes factors of a physical, biological and social nature.58 In this context, a most pertinent discussion is found in the Milindapañha (4:1:62-66): How 56

 PTS AN III, 415. Bodhi 2012, 963.  See also McDermott 1980, 179f. 58  For example, SN 36:21 (PTS SN IV, 230-231): “Bile, phlegm, and also wind, imbalance and climate too, carelessness and assault, with kamma result as the eighth.” Bodhi 2000, 1279. See also AN 4:87 (PTS AN II, 87); 5:103 (III, 131); 10:60 (V, 110). 57

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was it possible that the Buddha got wounded by a flying splinter of rock when Devadatta assaulted him? And how could the Buddha be afflicted on some occasions by diseases? These questions presuppose that all such negative experiences should be the result of bad karma. But this view is emphatically rejected. There was no longer any negative karma operating in Gautama’s life after his achievement of Buddhahood. Drawing on the standard list of eight causes, the Buddha’s painful experiences are therefore explained by purely natural causes. The fact that he was wounded by Devadatta is explained exclusively by Devadatta’s hate against the Buddha and by the ballistic mechanisms that caused the rock splinter to hit the Buddha’s foot (MP 4:1:64, 66). “And the ignorant go too far when they say that every pain is produced as the fruit of Karma” (MP 4:1:63).59 The wider Buddhist tradition thus offers the possibility of not ascribing everything to karma. It assumes, in addition to natural causes, personal responsibility as a source of causing suffering to others. Hence there is no doctrinal necessity to understand the impact of karma or the influence of the defilements in a deterministic sense. It would fit the overall textual evidence much better if karmic influence is understood as being of a dispositional rather that deterministic nature, at least as far as human behavior is concerned. Buddhist texts usually ascribe to human beings the ability to act either in line or against their karmic dispositions. Hence I agree with Christopher Gowans’ conclusion: Kamma is not a form of determinism about actions. …the Buddha thinks we are always free to choose the morally better or worse course. (…) To some extent our character may be determined by past actions, but our character never fully determines our actions.60

A similar position is also assumed by Sally King, although she expresses herself in highly ambiguous terms. On the one hand, she claims “There is no such thing as a ‘free will’ in Buddhism,” on the other hand, she holds “This does not mean, however, that Buddhism sees humankind as fully determined.”61 She tries to solve this obvious contradiction by stating: “Thus, personal choice is neither ‘free’ (totally isolated from external influence) nor ‘determined’ (totally caused by external factors), but influenced.”62 Yet this clearly implies the affirmation of “free will,”

59

 Rhys-Davids 1963, vol. 1, 193.  Gowans 2003, 105. See also ibid. 83-87. 61  King 2005, 95. 62  Ibid. 98. 60

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because “free will” does not entail that there are no conditioning influences (whether of an external or internal nature, e.g. character inclinations). It rather implies that despite such influences, there is some room left within which a conscious and deliberate choice can be made that is not causally predetermined by something other than the subject of this choice. Naturally, in a Buddhist context this immediately raises the question of who the subject of such free choices might be. But, as again Christopher Gowans has shown, this subject does not necessarily have to be an immutable “substance-self,” which would contradict the Buddhist not-self teaching. The subject can also be thought of – perhaps even better so – as a “process-self,” that is, “a structured nexus of continuous, interacting processes, both mental and physical, that are in constant change (…).”63 The concept of a process-self allows for the Buddhist view that the free choices of a person have their repercussion on the person itself, so that the person, to some extent, is responsible for the formation of his or her own personality. In other words, the processself changes itself through its own decisions. This, in turn, is a basic presupposition of the whole idea of the Bodhisattva path as a process through which the practitioner gradually develops the six perfections and thereby also expands and further develops his or her freedom.64 Such a view is fully in line with Śāntideva’s understanding of the Bodhisattva path as a spiritual battle between the defilements and the developing “spirit of awakening” (bodhicitta). It is obvious that Śāntideva both implicitly and explicitly exhorts the practitioner to fight this battle and carry on in pursuing the Bodhisattva path. Śāntideva therefore presupposes that the practitioner is free to do so. Although the practitioner is, on the one hand, caught by the defilements and, on the other hand, depends on, and calls upon, the help of the Bodhisattvas, and although he or she would not be able to progress without the power of bodhicitta, there still seems to be a causal factor involved, one that is nothing but his or her own free choice. But has Śāntideva not lost a significant point of his argumentation if some form of personal responsibility needs to be postulated? Would this imply a drawback, so that, after all, anger against the perpetrator remains justified, because and inasmuch as the perpetrator is personally responsible and not merely a slave to his own defilements or just the passive executor of the victim’s negative karma? Not really. Śāntideva’s argument that hate 63 64

 Gowans 2003, 96.  See also Wright 2009, 97.

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and anger are always detrimental to the spiritual development of the practitioner still stands. And a better understanding of the causes and conditions that exert their influence on the behavior of the perpetrator is still an efficient means to appease one’s anger. We don’t have to subscribe to a fully-fledged determinism in order to accord some weight to the circumstances, at least regarding a better understanding of the evildoer: Why would this person have acted so cruelly? Upon what would such an act depend? Following this line of thought, we can often see how it depends on many prior conditions – the way this person was treated, either recently or over time, by everyone – his parents, family, friends, at work, and on the street. If we can see that others, including ourselves, operating under similar circumstances, would have probably reacted similarly, then the weight of blame we attribute to this person is diminished. Understanding is always the solvent that cools down our anger and directs us to more constructive relations.65

Śāntideva’s remark that people cause suffering to themselves and others because they act under the delusion of the defilements and that they therefore deserve our compassion instead of our anger (vss. 6:35-38) finds its echo in Jesus’ prayer at the cross “Father, forgive them; for they do not know what they are doing” (Lk. 24:34). That people are under the sway of sinful entanglement which heavily conditions and reduces their own freedom is an implication of the Christian doctrine of the “original sin” (and among Christian theologians, some have likewise been inclined to take this doctrine even to the point of denying human freedom). If, however, we reject karmic determinism – in particular, if we do not assume that the actions of the perpetrator are determined by the negative karma of the victim – we can still make some sense of Śāntideva’s exhortation to consider our own role in the causes and conditions that influence the evildoer’s behavior. We might not speculate on our deeds in past lives, but in a number of conflicts it is indeed very helpful to consider which of one’s own actions in the present life may have contributed to a hostile quandary.66 Nonetheless, all of these considerations should not make us blind to the fact that Śāntideva’s approach is radical. Given his Madhyamaka background, antagonisms such as freedom versus determinism or processself versus substance-self count, in the end, as products of the insoluble aporias as they typically and inevitably arise from any kind of conceptual 65

 Wright 2009, 120f.  See also King 2005, 209f.

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thinking. Whether a subject is regarded as free or unfree, in both cases there is the conceptual distinction between the subject and the attribute that reciprocally condition and presuppose each other – as is also the case with substance and process. According to the Madhyamaka analysis, such conceptual interdependency is a sign that the bifurcations are merely mental constructs and do not describe reality as it is in itself. Absolute truth is beyond conceptual understanding. As we will increasingly see, on the assumption that the conceptual construction of reality is never able to provide us with an accurate picture of reality, Śāntideva tends to play with our concepts and turn a number of standard views upside down if he feels that this will lead to a more Bodhisattva-like behavior. A third and final point needs to be addressed: the limits of tolerance. The Buddhist ideal of non-violence and non-retaliation has often been met with approval, respect and praise. Śāntideva combines this ideal with what appears to be a limitless endurance of any form of mistreatment: “May they beat me without end, may they revile me, cover me with dust, may they play with my body, deride it, mock it. I have given them the body, so what do I care?” (BCA 3:12-13; similarly 6:125). Now, even if someone is willing to tolerate all sorts of cruelties done to him or herself, what about the situation in which someone else is the victim? “If the monk passively tolerates this situation of cruelty to another person, can we regard that as an image of the perfection of tolerance? Clearly not; our reaction will not be one of admiration.”67 The reason, as Dale Wright further expounds, is that “to tolerate such acts is to collaborate in them.”68 Wright therefore accuses the traditional Buddhist understanding of kṣānti as undercomplex.69 In the case of evils such as genocide or slavery, “it would be better to react to these evils in anger or rage than to allow them to continue.”70 The traditional Buddhist Bodhisattva ethics, he holds, seems to be blind regarding the value of supporting justice and fighting injustice: …we realize that the task of supporting and upholding justice is not among the central virtues of classical Buddhism. What we find in the classic texts are stories that valorize selfless tolerance of harm to oneself alone, rather than narratives that instruct Buddhists about how to act in face of injustice to others.71

67

 Wright 2009, 113.  Ibid. 111. 69  See ibid. 70  Ibid. 71  Ibid. 113. 68

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As I have stated above,72 a similar critique has been expressed by other contemporary Buddhists, such as Rita Gross, who demanded the adoption of a “prophetic voice” that calls and acts for justice and righteousness, or Masao Abe, who admitted that “in Buddhism the notion of justice or righteousness is rather weak and thus Buddhism often becomes indifferent to social evil and injustice.”73 But there has also been countercriticism. Gross has related that the social criticism she associated with the “prophetic voice” has been accused by fellow Buddhists as “strident and oppressive” and as promoting “intolerance, self-righteousness, and sometimes violence.”74 Abe, too, despite his own suggestion to adopt the concern for justice, simultaneously warned that “justice, when carried to its final conclusion, often results in punishment, conflict, revenge and even war.”75 Yet does the toleration of injustice to others not equally lead to evils? Does it not, as Wright holds, amount to collaboration and participation in the tolerated evil?76 The dilemma between compassionate endurance or non-retaliation, on the one hand, and becoming guilty of collaboration by not fighting against the evil done to others, on the other hand, is serious. It is not entirely unknown to Buddhism and appears in the context of Buddhist discussions about the ideal ruler. The influential Mahāyāna “Sūtra of the Golden Light” (Suvarṇabhāsottama-sūtra) deals with the question of whether a good king should exempt the evildoers in his country from punishment (chap. 12, 134-145). The answer given by the Sūtra follows exactly the argument presented by Dale Wright: …when a king overlooks an evil deed in his region and does not inflict appropriate punishment on the evil person, in the neglect of evil deeds lawlessness grows greatly, wicked acts and quarrels arise in great number in the realm. (…) All the kings of the gods will say to one another: ‘Unlawful is the king, for he supports the side of the lawless.’77

That is, by tolerating and not punishing the evildoers in his country, the king would actually support them and hence himself become lawless. He would be responsible for the increase in suffering resulting from his lenient politics. But if he punishes evil deeds appropriately, he thereby 72

 See above, Part II, chap. 4, pp. 201f.  Abe 1995, 16. 74  Gross, Radford Ruether 2001, 165. 75  Abe 1995, 15. 76  Wright 2009, 111. 77  Emmerick 1970, 59. 73

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implements and promotes the law of karma, that is “the fruition and fruit of deeds well and of deeds ill done.”78 The Sūtra is quoted in the Śikṣāsamuccaya, but not with this advice to the king, but with two long formulas, one for the confession of sins, calling upon the pity and compassion of the Buddhas (ŚS 160-164),79 the other for the development of benevolence as an antidote against hate (ŚS 216-210).80 While the first passage has some similarity to BCA 2:27-32, 64-65, the second is fairly close to various passages in BCA 10. This observation is interesting insofar as it shows that both horns of the dilemma, the need to fight against evil-doing and the need for compassion as a means against anger, are present in one and the same text. But it is also apparent that Śāntideva is more interested in the second than in the first. The same dilemma is found in the Satyaka-parivarta. Similar to the “Sūtra of the Golden Light,” the Satyaka-parivarta (chap. 8) emphasizes that “A wise person should not be too compassionate.”81 A ruler who is too compassionate, the Sūtra argues, “will not chastise the wicked people of his kingdom, which will lead to lawlessness (…).” But the same text also states (chap. 6) that the good ruler should chastise in a moderate and benevolent way. He should use punishment like “a father” who “with love and compassion teaches his son by being tough (…). A father does not intend to abandon or harm his son, but in order to stop his son’s negative behavior and prevent it in the future, he is tough.”82 In this respect the text gets very precise. To combine toughness with compassion means that in order to tame the wicked ones, the king “should tie them up, put them in prison, beat them, warn, scold, or rebuke them, exile them from the state, confiscate their property, and so forth.” But he should refrain from “taking their lives, destroying their sense organs, or cutting off their limbs (…).” He should not “wish to abandon or harm them,” but consider them “with love and compassion … as his sons.”83 The Śikṣāsamuccaya (ŚS 165) includes a brief reference to this text and accepts both attitudes: being compassionate as a father to his son, but also, for the sake of the world’s good, not being excessive in compassion. Facing this dilemma the 14th Dalai Lama pointed out “that tolerance and patience,” as taught in the Bodhicaryāvatāra, “do not imply 78

 Ibid. 59.  See ibid. 10-13. 80  See ibid. 9-10, 14-16. 81  Jamspal 2010, 72. 82  Ibid. 53. 83  Ibid. 79

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submission or giving in to injustice.” Though there are situations in which the use of force may be an option, it would still be better to refrain from violence because of its incalculable consequences. The decisive point, however, is to withstand evil without giving rise to anger or hate.84 The latter is evidently in line with Śāntideva’s views. Moreover, BCA 6:69 implies that the Bodhisattva should also work for the improvement of human action in terms of fostering friendly interaction and reducing the causes and reasons for hate. But as we have seen above, BCA 5:84 may also imply that in some situations, the Bodhisattva will have to take recourse to the use of force.85 As we will now see, Śāntideva has to say more about anger and kṣānti. He is aware that anger does not just spring from one’s own suffering and from being mistreated by others. Anger may also spark at the well-doing of others, thereby assuming the form of envy and jealousy. TRANSLATION: 6:76-98 Envy 76. If others find the happiness of joy in praising abundant virtues of their neighbors, why are you not pleased as well, oh mind, when praising them? 77. And this happiness of joy in you is irreproachable, a source of happiness. Also the virtuous do not reject this best means of attracting others. 78. “But it is his happiness.” If thus it is not dear to you, then [any compensation] is suspended, such as the payment of wages, and thus the visible and invisible [fruits of our actions] are likely to be destroyed. 79. Moreover, you appreciate the pleasure of others when your own virtues are praised; if the virtues of others are praised, you do not appreciate your own pleasure. 80. Because you long for the happiness of all beings, you have developed the spirit of awakening. Why are you now angry at those beings who have found happiness of their own accord? 81. You wish buddhahood, venerable in the three worlds, for all beings; why are you upset when you see them being paid a little respect? 82. He who feeds someone whom you should be feeding is giving in fact to you. You find someone nourishing your family and do not rejoice but are angry. 84

 Gyatso 2002, 108f.  See above, Part II, chap. 5, pp. 243f, 250-253.

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83. What does he not wish for all beings who wants their awakening? How can someone have the spirit of awakening if he is angry about the success of others? 84. If someone did not receive the gift, it remains at the home of the donor; in no case is it then yours. What do you care whether it has been given to someone or not? 85. Should he [when praised] ward off his merits, the kindly disposed ones, even his own virtues? If given something, should he not accept it? Tell me, whereby are you not irritated? 86. Not only do you not complain about yourself, you who have committed sins, you even want to quarrel with others who have gathered merit. 87. If something unpleasant befalls your rival, would that, in turn, satisfy you? Yet, nothing will happen without a cause, merely because of your wish. 88. And if it has happened because of your wish, are you then happy when he is unhappy? Even if there might be an advantage in this, is not the disadvantage much greater? 89. Because this is a terrible hook that those fishermen, the defilements, have been handed out. The guards of the hells will buy you from them and boil you in their cauldrons. 90. Praise, glory and honor contribute neither to merit nor to long life, strength or health, nor comfort of the body. 91. Yet this is likely to be the goal for the wise one who knows what is best for him. One who craves for the amusement of the mind will spend his time drinking, gambling and so forth. 92. For the sake of glory, they sacrifice their wealth; they even bring death upon themselves. Are syllables [of praise] perhaps edible? And when dead, who enjoys this pleasure? 93. When praise and glory have passed, my mind appears to me like a child unhappily crying over a ruined sand castle. 94. As for sound, since it is not sentient, it is not possible that it praises me. That someone else is pleased with me that is the reason for my pleasure. 95. What do I have from whether another’s pleasure is in me or in someone else? He alone has the happiness of this pleasure; not its smallest bit is mine. 96. If my pleasure comes from his pleasure, so may it be mine in all cases. Why am I not pleased when they are pleased due to their goodwill toward others? 97. So joy arises in me [only] because I have been praised. So even in this case [my joy] is not related in this manner [to the pleasure of others]. Thus, it is merely childish. 98. These words of praise and so on destroy my peace of mind and the perturbation [with the cycle of existences], they cause envy of virtuous ones as well as anger at their success.

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COMMENTARY 4. Overcoming Anger at Others’ Success A widespread Buddhist schema lists four mental states which are referred to as “divine abidings” (brahmavihāra) and “unlimited states” (apramāṇa): loving kindness (maitrī), compassion (karuṇā), sympathetic or empathetic joy (muditā) and equanimity (upekṣā). They are “divine” because of their sublime nature and they are “unlimited” because they are to be extended to everybody, without exception and without discrimination. All four form an inner unity. Loving kindness and equanimity complement each other inasmuch as loving kindness protects equanimity against deteriorating into unconcerned indifference, and equanimity protects loving kindness against deteriorating into greed and partiality.86 This inner attitude of even-minded kindness or loving equanimity unfolds as compassion in the face of others’ suffering and as empathetic joy in the face of others’ happiness. Having argued that the Bodhisattva’s right reaction to his enemy is compassion (vs. 6:38), Śāntideva now deals with the Bodhisattva’s development – or lack – of empathetic joy. According to Śāntideva, this lack is just another version of hate or anger manifesting as envy and jealousy. That Śāntideva is dealing with empathetic joy (without using the term muditā in this technical sense) is clear from the fact that he only refers to the anger about the praise of another’s actual merits. He does not treat the kind of anger that arises when someone else is praised without justified reason. Śāntideva’s treatment comes in two parts: In verses 76-89, he unmasks envy and jealousy as expressions of self-centered anger which contradict the spirit of awakening. In verses 90-98, he points out the vanity of praise and glory, confronting it with empathetic joy as a far more worthwhile good. Why, asks Śāntideva (vss. 76-78), would a practitioner on the Bodhisattva way not be glad if he sees someone praising the virtues of another person? Why does he not feel the same delight as the lauder? The joy about another’s good achievements is a blameless source of happiness and a legitimate way of attracting others. To be happy about the virtues of another person is like paying him or her the due recognition. It can be compared to the payment of due wages or to the positive results of one’s 86  This view is found, for example, in Buddhaghosa’s treatment of the four brahmavihāras in his Visuddhi Magga (317-319).

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virtues in the here and now (“visible”) and in the sense of earning religious merit (“invisible”). Would the envious person really wish to deny the appropriateness of such rewards? If not, why not give such reward to others in the form of sympathetic joy? One is certainly pleased when others are delighted about oneself and praise one’s own virtues. So why is one not similarly delighted if others are praised (vs. 79)? Such lack of sympathetic joy does not come from the spirit of awakening. It contradicts this spirit, which seeks the happiness of all87 and wants them to become Buddhas (vss. 80-81, 83). If someone else praises a person whom the Bodhisattva should praise, the situation is like someone else feeding a person whom the Bodhisattva should feed. The Bodhisattva should accept all people as his family.88 The gift of praise to the other is therefore actually a gift to the Bodhisattva himself, to his family (vs. 82). What would be the advantage if someone else withheld the gift of fair praise (vs. 84)? Would it be better if the one who is praised did not have such laudable virtues (vs. 85)? The practitioner on the Bodhisattva path should complain about his own shortcomings, but not feel angry about the merits of others (vs. 86). Would he be satisfied if something bad happened to his rival? Would he even delight in the other’s sorrow? If so, this could only be because of rather dubious advantages. The spiritual disadvantage of schadenfreude will be far greater (vss. 87-88). Any advantage of putting oneself in the first place, even at the detriment of others, would be shortlived (as will become clear in vss. 90-98; see also 8:139-154). If one gives room to such feelings, one has been caught by the defilements and will be heading towards hell (vs. 89). In order to ward off the danger of envy and jealousy, Śāntideva now turns to the antidote. One cannot share in honest joy about another’s merits because one seeks praise and honor for oneself. But this, as Śāntideva tries to show, is an empty goal. Being praised by others neither increases one’s religious merit nor helps one’s physical needs (vs. 90). The joy of being praised by someone else rather resembles the pleasure sought in amusements like drinking and gambling (vs. 91). And striving after it can be as ruinous as these (vs. 92). Moreover, the joy of being praised is of no use beyond death and it may quickly disappear. Aspiring 87  The “three worlds” (trailokya) is a frequently used Buddhist term referring to all spheres of samsaric existence: (1) the world of sensory experience, (2) the world of subtle form, i.e. some of the heavenly realms, (3) the world beyond subtle form, i.e. heavenly spheres of a purely spiritual nature. 88  See also ŚS 183f: “he must love … all beings as sons (…).” Bendall, Rouse 1922, 179.

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after fame is like building a sand castle; it will not last and the inevitable disappointment is childish (vss. 92-93). What then, asks Śāntideva, makes praise and honor so attractive? It cannot be the words alone. Is it the joy that others may have about oneself? But this is their joy and the one being praised has no share in it (vs. 94-95). Thus Śāntideva picks up, ironically, the argument that the person lacking in sympathetic joy had produced in vs. 78. And in vs. 96 he repeats the response already given in vs. 79, but now pointing out that true sympathetic joy is indiscriminate: Either my joy about being praised is purely selfish, with it being childish and incongruent with the Bodhisattva way (vs. 97). Or my joy about being praised is about the joy of the one who praises me. In this case it would be genuine – and blameless – empathetic joy. But then the same joy should arise if someone else is praised, with the lauder being happy about the merits of another (vs. 96). In vs. 98, Śāntideva concludes the section with a final word of warning against the search for honor and praise. The exhortation of being immune to praise and blame is part of Buddhist monastic spirituality since its early days.89 Yet here Śāntideva uses this warning in order to state explicitly what underlies his whole argument: the self-centered search for praise is the cause of envy and anger in the face of another’s virtue and success. This prepares the resumption of the topic in chapter 8. There he will argue that the self-centeredness lying at the root of the problem is only in place if the “self” has been exchanged against the “others” (8:139-154). If one has accepted the others as one’s own self “then you may practice jealousy and pride without hesitation” (vs. 8:140).90 While this is the ultimate goal, Śāntideva fully reckons with the selfishness of the practitioner who is still on the path. In startling contrast to his critique of the vanity of praise and fame, he can nevertheless lure the practitioner to practice kṣānti by promising that the “one who is patient already in this life attains good fortune, fame and well-being…” (vs. 6:134), which is another example of how Śāntideva employs the dialectic tension between self-interest and the altruism of bodhicitta.91 In Christianity, “envy” (invidia) is traditionally counted as one of the seven “deadly sins.” As in the BCA, classical moral and spiritual theology has often noticed its close connection with schadenfreude and anger, with 89

 E.g. MN 22:37-39; DN 1:1:5-6.  See below, Part II, chap. 8, pp. 393f. 91  See above, pp. 255f, 259f. 90

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pride and thirst for glory. For Paul, “envy” belongs to the works of the flesh (Gal. 5:21) and is opposed to the spirit: “If we live by the Spirit, let us also be guided by the Spirit. Let us not become conceited, competing against one another, envying one another” (Gal. 5:25f). In the Gospel of Matthew, Jesus reacts to envy among his disciples with a paradox saying that matches Śāntideva’s predilection with inverting usual standards: “whoever wishes to be the first among you must be your slave” (Mt. 20:27). But what about the lack in empathetic joy? Joseph Epstein famously stated in his essay on envy: “Of the seven deadly sins, only envy is no fun at all.”92 The only joy it knows is schadenfreude, which is the exact opposite of compassion and sympathetic joy. As in Buddhism, for Paul compassion and sympathetic joy belong closely together: “Rejoice with those who rejoice, weep with those who weep” (Rom. 12:15). In practicing compassion one should remain cheerful (Rom. 12:8). In the same context, Paul also urges and encourages the followers of Christ to bless their enemies, to feed them if they are hungry, to give them something to drink if they are thirsty, not to repay evil by evil, but to “overcome evil with good” (Rom. 12:14-21). This takes us back to Śāntideva. If running after praise and glory is spiritually detrimental, should one not then be grateful to those who undermine one’s praise? Should one not develop a completely different attitude to one’s enemies, welcoming them as one’s benefactors? TRANSLATION: 6:99-111 Enemies are benefactors 99. So those who have risen up against me, in order to undermine praise and the like, are they not here to protect me from falling into miserable states? 100. The shackles of gains and honor are also unfitting for me, a seeker of liberation. Why should I hate those who free me from these shackles? 101. Those who, as if through the power of the Buddhas, have become a locked gate in front of me when I want to plunge into suffering, why should I hate them? 102. “He has obstructed my merits!” Anger at him is also not right. There is no austerity equal to patience. And was it not he who brought it about? 103. If due to my own fault I am not patient with him, then, although an occasion for merit is offered, I built an obstacle myself.

92

 Epstein 2003, 1.

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104. For, that alone, without which something else does not exist but is present when that exists, is its cause. How can one call that an obstacle? 105. The beggar who appears at the right time does not create an obstacle to giving. And if you meet a mendicant, one does not speak of an obstacle to entering the mendicant’s way of life. 106. It is very easy to find beggars in this world, but very difficult to find wrongdoers. For, no one will harm me if I do not harm. 107. To me, an enemy is therefore as welcome as a treasure found without effort at home, because he helps me on the path to awakening. 108. So this fruit of patience, which was won both by me and by him, should first of all be handed over to him, because my patience presupposes him. 109. If an enemy should not be honored because he has no intention of my achieving patience, then why does one honor the True Teaching, although it, too, is cause of fulfilment without intention? 110. If one does not honor an enemy because his intention is to do harm, how else can my patience arise? As with a doctor who takes care of my health? 111. Thus patience arises verily depending on his evil intentions. He certainly is therefore a cause of patience, whom I must worship like the True Teaching (saddharma).

COMMENTARY 5. Welcoming One’s Enemies In vss. 99-111 Śāntideva returns to an aspect that he had introduced in vss. 48-49: viewing one’s enemies as welcome occasions to practice kṣānti in the sense of forbearance. If the practitioner on the Bodhisattva path understands the vanity of fame and the spiritual danger in thirst for praise, he can develop an entirely different attitude towards those who undermine his reputation. He should not hate them but welcome them, because they provide him the opportunity to detach himself from empty and spiritually harmful ties such as clinging to praise (vss. 99-101). The practitioner may object that this does not turn his enemy into a benefactor because, after all, the enemy’s intentions are hostile and not friendly (vs. 109). The hostility may even be directed against the religious pursuit of the practitioner (vs. 102). Already in vs. 64 Śāntideva addressed the realistic situation that such enmity could be religiously motivated, that it may come from those “who destroy and revile images, stūpas or the True Teaching.” Yet even such anti-Buddhist enmity is no reason to hate one’s enemies.

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Śāntideva produces several arguments to support his view that the malevolent intention of the enemy does not justify a hateful reaction. Firstly, anger or hate is always of negative spiritual consequences. Secondly, to honor the enemy as providing a welcome opportunity for practicing forbearance does not imply an endorsement of his evil intentions. One also honors things that have no intention at all, such as the Dharma. Not the intention is decisive, but the objective opportunity for spiritual growth (vs. 109). And this opportunity is offered by the enemy, even if unwillingly so. If such an opportunity is not used, it is the practitioner’s fault, not the enemy’s. The evil intention of the other is not an obstacle, just as a beggar is not an obstacle but an opportunity to practice giving (dāna), the first pāramitā. Or just as meeting a homeless ascetic is not an obstacle but an inspiring opportunity to take the same path – presumably an allusion to the Buddha legend, that is, to Prince Siddhārtha’s resolve to leave the world after meeting a mendicant on his fourth excursion (vss. 102-105). The malevolent intention of the enemy is, thirdly, necessary for developing the spiritual value of kṣānti as forbearance. If the enemy’s intention were good, if he would harm the practitioner with a benevolent intention, such as a doctor who sometimes has to cause pain to his patient in order to cure him, how could one practice forbearance with the enemy (vs. 110)? As far as the resulting opportunity is concerned, the enemy’s behavior is indeed as beneficial, spiritually, as is the painful treatment by a doctor (see also vs. 7:23). But in the case of the enemy this beneficial opportunity is only due to the enemy’s malevolence. “Thus patience arises verily depending on his evil intentions” (vs. 111). It is with respect to this opportunity that enemies are to be welcomed (vss. 106-108). With this argument Śāntideva adopts the position of the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra, according to which the Bodhisattva virtues can only be developed in a world where the corresponding evils actually exist: charity can only be practiced in a world where there is genuine poverty, just as forbearance can only be practiced if there are hateful people. This argument, as we have seen above, is highly significant for the solution of the Buddhist version of the problem of evil.93 In Christianity, the notion of welcoming one’s enemies is well known. In the Christian ascetic tradition we find it as part of a spirituality that closely resembles the mental atmosphere of the current chapter. Once

93

 See above, Part II, chap. 5, pp. 215-219.

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again this can be illustrated by Thomas à Kempis Imitatio Christi (1:12). Suffering, he writes, is to be welcomed because it helps us to detach ourselves from the world and not to put our hope in worldly things. Moreover, It is good for us sometimes to suffer contradiction, to be misjudged by men even though we do well and mean well. These things help us to be humble and shield us from vainglory. When to all outward appearances men give us no credit, when they do not think well of us, then we are more inclined to seek God Who sees our hearts.94

As in the BCA, enemies are viewed here as an opportunity for one’s own spiritual progress. This is, at least in part, also the case in the Sermon on the Mount. The Dalai Lama has underlined the close parallel between Śāntideva’s view that the practice of patience or forbearance requires an enemy and the words of Jesus according to which there would be nothing special in loving only those who love oneself (cf. Mt. 5:46-47).95 Here, too, enemies are seen as an opportunity to develop an attitude that differs decisively from the usual rule of repaying like with like. But in another sense, Jesus’ words can also be seen as being in line with this rule. Being good to friend and foe alike “repays” or, better, reflects the very attitude of God “who makes his sun rise on the evil and on the good, and sends his rain on the righteous and on the unrighteous” (Mt. 5:45). Jesus’ words aim at emulating this non-discriminating love of God in one’s own attitude towards others. The Dalai Lama has called Jesus’ comparison of God’s and – in response to this – our love with the indiscriminate blessing of the sunlight “a wonderful metaphor for compassion. It gives you the sense of its impartiality and all-embracing nature.”96 Similarly, Keiji Nishitani has identified this non-discriminative aspect of Christian love (agapē) with the Mahāyāna Buddhist understanding of compassion (karuṇā). He has pointed out that the usual discriminating sentiments of “hating one’s enemies and loving one’s friends” “belong to the field of the ego. Indifferent love belongs rather to the realm of the non-ego.”97 This, he argues, points toward an aspect of non-ego (anātman) in the nature of God: A quality is implied here of transpersonality, or impersonality. (…) We get an idea of this personal impersonality from the nondifferentiating love that

94

 Kempis 2012, 24.  Gyatso 2002, 48. 96  Ibid. 49. 97  Nishitani 1983, 59. 95

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makes the sun rise on the evil as well as the good, and the rain fall on the just and the unjust alike.98

This perfection, Nishitani says, is radically different from and even incompatible with the idea of a personal God who has his predilections in electing some and rejecting others.99 In the history of ChristianBuddhist dialogue, Nishitani’s views have caused intensive debates. Three aspects have proved to be of particular relevance. First, the tendency on the Buddhist side to (mis)understand “personality” in terms of the egocentric self instead of the self-less love as is associated with agapē and karuṇā. Second, the admittance that the selfless love of Christ represents at least to some extent the Buddhist unity of emptiness and compassion. And third, the consensus between Buddhists and Christians that ultimate reality cannot be adequately conceived in the image of an egocentric, mighty monarch.100 In the Sermon on the Mount, the non-differentiating love of God functions not merely as the model of Christian love, but also as its prime motivation. It is because of God’s indiscriminate love that the followers of Jesus should love friend and foe alike. In the remaining verses of the present chapter we find a reasoning that comes astonishingly close to such motivation. Here it is the indiscriminate compassion of the Buddhas that urges the Buddhist practitioner to extend his love and compassion to all. TRANSLATION: 6:112-134 Love for all sentient beings 112. This is why the Sage has stated that the sentient beings are a field of merit and the Victors are a field, since many have reached the highest fulfilment by upholding these. 113. If one attains the particular properties of a Buddha through sentient beings in the same way as through the Victors, then why not rank sentient beings with the same dignity as the Victors? 114. The eminence of an intent is not given through itself, but is indebted to its effect. Yet the eminence of sentient beings is then the same; they are therefore equal to the Victors. 98

 Ibid. 60.  See ibid. 100  See Schmidt-Leukel 2017b, 412-421. 99

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115. That one with a friendly intent deserves to be venerated, that is verily the eminence of sentient beings. The merit that comes from faith in the Buddhas is verily the eminence of the Buddhas. 116. For their share in obtaining the properties of a Buddha, sentient beings are therefore equal to the Victors; and yet none is equal to the Buddhas, those oceans of virtue in endless divisions. 117. If in any being, one finds a virtue of those who are a unique collection of the essence of virtues, be it ever so small, then even the three worlds are not enough to worship it. 118. Yet, in bringing forth the properties of a Buddha, the most excellent share is found in sentient beings. In accordance with this share, sentient beings should be worshiped. 119. Moreover, how else can we show our gratitude to these true relatives, whose help is immeasurable, if we refrain from valuing sentient beings? 120. What we do for them, for whose sake they dismember their bodies, even enter Avīci, the lowest hell, is well done. This is why, in every manner, one should do only good even to one’s greatest enemies. 121. For whose sake even my Masters are so indifferent toward themselves, why do I act arrogantly toward these other masters [the sentient beings] and not serve them? 122. With whose happiness the great Sages are pleased, with whose misery, saddened; when I satisfy them, all the great Sages are satisfied, when I offend them, the Sages are offended. 123. As for one whose body is enveloped in flames, not a single sensation brings ease, just so for those who are full of compassion: there is no cause for joy when sentient beings suffer. 124. This is why today I wish to confess as sin to have caused all Those of great compassion to suffer by bringing suffering to people. May the Sages bear with what caused them distress. 125. To pay homage to the Buddhas, today I shall become a servant for the world with all my heart. May crowds of people set their feet on my head or kill me! May the Protector of the World be satisfied with me! 126. Beyond all doubt, in their compassionate nature they have made this whole world [of sentient beings] their own self. Are then these beings not recognized as the Protectors themselves in the form of sentient beings? How could it be fitting to disrespect them? 127. This alone is the worship of the Buddhas, this alone is the full realization of one’s own goal, this alone is the destruction of the suffering of the world. Therefore, this alone should be my resolve! 128.-130. Just as when a single servant of the king tyrannizes a great people, the prudent people cannot change this because he is actually not alone and the

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king’s power is his power, no one should wrong a weak person who has become guilty, for the guardians of the hells and the Compassionate Ones are his power. Therefore one should worship sentient beings, just as a servant does a cruel king. 131. What could an angry king do that is equal to the punishment in the hells, as experienced through the misery caused for sentient beings? 132. What could a satisfied king bestow that is equal to buddhahood, as experienced through the ease caused for sentient beings? 133.-134. But let us set aside a future buddhahood that arises from the worship of sentient beings! Do you not see that while still in the cycle of existences one who is patient already in this life attains good fortune, fame and well-being, beauty, health, joy and a long life, and the copious pleasures of a universal king?

COMMENTARY 6. Love as True Worship Śāntideva ended the previous section not merely with the statement that forbearance presupposes the evil intensions of the enemy, but with the provocative statement that the evildoer should thus be as much honored as the Dharma (vs. 6:111). This is now continued and expanded. The two fields of earning karmic merit are the sentient beings and the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. Sentient beings are to be served by working toward their well-being and liberation; the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas are to be venerated. Yet, as Śāntideva now argues, both fields are of equal value (vss. 112-118) and they are ultimately identical (vss. 119-127). He concludes the chapter with reminding his audience of the fruit earned from serving the Buddhas through serving sentient beings and of the danger resulting from doing the opposite (vss. 128-134). Śāntideva begins by referring to the scriptural teaching that Buddhahood, the highest goal of the Bodhisattva, can be achieved by means of these two fields of merit, the sentient beings and the Buddhas (vs. 112).101 We should keep in mind that on the path of the Bodhisattva, engaging in meritorious acts is an essential part of spiritual development. As mentioned above, in early Buddhism the size of karmic merit was seen as depending on the spiritual worth of those to whom the meritorious activity relates. For example, 101  Śāntideva is possibly not referring to a particular verse, but to a widespread tradition. Fairly close to BCA 6:112 is however a quotation from the Dharmasaṅgīti-sūtra found in ŚS 153: “The field of sentient beings is a bodhisattva’s Buddha field from which the qualities of a Buddha are attained” (translation from Goodman 2016, 148).

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a gift donated to an ordinary person was believed to be considerably less meritorious than the gift donated to a spiritually noble person.102 This principle contradicts Śāntideva’s attempt to equate the two fields of merit. Hence he needs to defend his intended equation of the two fields of merit; he does so by the argument developed in the preceding verses. Decisive in terms of merit is not the subjectively good or bad intention of the person who is being served, but (at least for the Bodhisattva) the objective occasion offered by sentient beings in view of developing the Bodhisattva virtues. Ordinary sentient beings are by no means equal to the Buddhas in terms of their subjective intentions and their own virtues. On the contrary, in this respect the difference is immense (vss. 116-117). However, in terms of the objective effect that ordinary sentient beings (in particular – as he argued before – evil-minded people) have on the Bodhisattva’s ability to develop his Bodhisattva virtues, they are indeed equal to the Buddhas (vss. 114, 116a, 118). The eminence of the Buddhas as a field of merit lies in the confidence that one can and should have in them. The eminence of sentient beings as a field of merit lies in the loving mind that one can and should develop towards them (vs. 115).103 Sentient beings even have “the most excellent share” in providing the Bodhisattva with the opportunity to develop the properties of a Buddha, that is, to bring the pāramitās to perfection (vs. 118). And those who have developed a loving mind towards all sentient beings in the most perfect way are the Buddhas.104 The belief that the Buddhas have perfected the loving mind towards sentient beings becomes the starting point for Śāntideva’s argument that the two fields of merit are not only equal but are actually one.105 The true way of showing our gratitude to the immeasurable help received by the Buddhas is honoring and serving sentient beings (vs. 119).106 102

 See above, Part II, chap. 5, pp. 241f.  The same verse is also found in ŚS 157. 104  In ŚS 145 the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa is quoted as saying that one stands in the eminence of the Buddhas by developing benevolence for all beings in seeking their liberation. 105  All the remaining verses of chapter 6 (vss. 119-134) are also found in ŚS 155-157. In the ŚS, vs. 6:118 of the BCA appears as the conclusion, following the verse corresponding to BCA 6:134. 106  As far as the BCA is concerned, vss. 120-121 suggest that “these true relatives” from vs. 119 refers to the Buddhas. In the ŚS the situation is somewhat ambiguous. While Bendall and Rouse (1922, 154) retain this ambiguity and translate: “Moreover, what better repayment could there be for sincere friends and incomparable helpers if you relinquish the propitiation of creatures?”, Goodman (2016, 151) relates the “relatives” to the sentient beings who have been one’s relatives and benefactors in previous lives: “Moreover, when they have been your relatives, they have sincerely conferred upon you innumerable benefits. If you give up on making them happy, what kind of recompense would that be?” 103

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The Buddhas, when they were still Bodhisattvas, have done everything for the sentient beings. They have sacrificed their bodies for other sentient beings, and in order to console sentient beings and alleviate their suffering, they even enter Avīci, the worst of all Buddhist hells.107 Out of regard for sentient beings, they have been utterly negligent about themselves. How could one then honor the Buddhas and simultaneously neglect sentient beings and not serve them (vss. 120-121)? Whatever one does to sentient beings, whether one harms them or serves them, is done to the Buddhas (vs. 122). The Buddhas are nothing but compassion for sentient beings (vs. 123). In their unlimited compassion, the Buddhas have identified themselves with sentient beings, they “have made this whole world [of sentient beings] their own self” (vs. 126). Every harm done to sentient beings is therefore a sin against the Buddhas, and they are asked for their forbearance or forgiveness (vs. 124). Conversely, the Buddhas are honored by becoming “a servant for the world with all my heart” (vs. 126). Even more so, serving sentient beings “alone is the worship of the Buddhas, this alone is the destruction of the suffering of the world.”108 And this alone should therefore be the resolve of the Bodhisattva (vs. 127). Having reached this climax, Śāntideva concludes the chapter on kṣānti with a corresponding exhortation. The Buddhas’ compassionate identification with all sentient beings includes evildoers. Serving sentient beings in return must therefore not exclude evil minded enemies. One should in no way harm such a person. Even harming someone guilty would mean to harm the Buddhas and therefore result in infernal punishment. In this sense, the Buddhas and the guardians of the hells are the powerful protectors of all beings, including evildoers (vss. 128-131). On the other hand, the reward following benevolent service to all is incomparable. Ultimately it will be the achievement of Buddhahood. Penultimately it will be, if not in this life then at least in one’s future rebirths, “good fortune, fame and well-being, beauty, health, joy and a long life, and the copious pleasures of a universal king” (vss. 132-134). With this final exhortation Śāntideva returns to his message at the beginning of the chapter: Whereas hate is bad for oneself and leads to unhappiness, patience, especially in the sense of compassionate, benevolent 107  The belief that Bodhisattvas even go to hell also appears in vs. 8:107 and vss. 10:11-15. The idea can take different forms, depending on whether it involves some kind of vicarious suffering on the side of the Bodhisattva (as is apparently the case in vs. 6:120) or not. See below, Part II, chap. 10, pp. 497-503. On the Buddhist hells, see the excursus on pp. 331-345. 108  See also BCA 1:27. Cf. above, Part II, chap. 1, p. 130.

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forbearance, will lead to happiness (cf. vss. 6:1-6). Once more, this illustrates his basic principle that all those who seek their own happiness are unhappy, while all those who seek the happiness of others are happy (see vss. 8:129; 1:27-28). Throughout chapter 6, various parallels between Śāntideva’s Bodhisattva ethos and the Sermon on the Mount have been discerned. Here, in the chapter’s final section, we come across the probably most striking correspondence. In the Sermon on the Mount, the non-differentiating love of God functions in two ways: as the model of Christian love and as its prime motivation.109 The follower of Jesus should emulate God’s indiscriminate love for the righteous and the unrighteous in likewise extending his own love towards friend and foe, as does Jesus, the prime example of someone who is as merciful as God is. It is a general Mahāyāna Buddhist conviction that every Bodhisattva follows the footsteps of the Buddhas in order to become as perfect in his compassion as they are and achieve full Buddhahood. Śāntideva gives this belief a special touch in two respects: First, at least in part, the practitioner on the Bodhisattva path follows the Buddhas out of gratitude. Having benefitted from their achievement – and still doing so in relying on their compassion in the face of his own sins (vss. 6:124; 2:27-66) – he shows his gratitude to them by serving ordinary beings. And like the Buddhas themselves, he does so by extending his compassion to friend and foe. Yet, second, the practitioner’s emulation of the Buddhas goes much deeper. Ultimately he does not merely serve sentient beings, but – like the Buddhas – completely identifies with them and accepts them as his own self, as Śāntideva explains in detail in chapter 8 (see vss. 8:111-173). In this second respect, Śāntideva is presumably inspired by the wellknown canonical record of the Buddha’s care for an ill monk. In the Pāli Tipiṭaka, the story is transmitted in in the Mahāvagga (8:26:1-4) of the Vinaya Piṭaka. When the Buddha visited a group of his monks, he discovered that one among them, suffering from diarrhea, “lay fallen in his own evacuations.” The other monks neglected the sick person because they regarded him as “of no service” to them. Then, together with Ānanda, the Buddha himself took care of him: And the Blessed One poured the water over that Bhikkhu; and the venerable Ānanda wiped him down. And the Blessed One taking hold of him at his head, and the venerable Ānanda at the feet, they lifted him up, and laid him down in his bed. 109

 See above, p. 295.

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Then the Buddha exhorted the other monks by saying: Ye, O Bhikkhus, have no mother and no fathers who might wait upon you! If ye, O Bhikkhus, wait not upon the other, who is there indeed who will wait upon you? Whosoever, O Bhikkhus, would wait upon me, he should wait upon the sick.110

In this episode the Buddha’s kindness to the sick monk is accompanied by a double identification, one that has reappeared in this chapter. In admonishing the monks that they should care for one another like mothers and fathers would do and in giving them a practical example, the Buddha himself becomes like a parent to the sick person. This tacit identification of the Buddha as a caring parent, together with the general notion of the Bodhisattva as belonging to the Buddha family (vs. 3:25), may be reflected in Śāntideva’s talk of the Buddhas as one’s bountiful “true relatives” (6:119). But there is a second identification in this influential story, the self-identification of the Buddha with the suffering person, expressed in his words: “Whosoever would wait upon me, should wait upon the sick.” I take it as highly likely that this (in conjunction with the traditional formula about the development of the four “divine mental states”111) is reflected in Śāntideva’s belief in the Buddhas as being those who have made the suffering beings their own self.112 The story is immediately reminiscent of Jesus’ identification with those who suffer in the so-called King’s Speech about the Day of Judgement, as related in the Gospel of Matthew (Mt. 25:31-46): I was hungry and you gave me food, I was thirsty and you gave me something to drink, I was a stranger and you welcomed me, I was naked and you gave me clothing, I was sick and you took care of me, I was in prison and you visited me. (…) Truly I tell you, just as you did it to one of the least of these my brothers, you did it to me. (…) I was hungry and you gave me no food, I was thirsty and you gave me nothing to drink, I was a stranger and you did not welcome me, naked and you did not give me clothing, sick and in prison and you did not visit me. (…) 110

 All quotations from Rhys-Davids, Oldenberg 1988, 240f.  The formula says that the practitioner should unfold loving kindness, compassion, sympathetic joy and equanimity towards “all as to himself.” Buddhaghosa explains this as regarding all beings as equal to oneself, without considering anyone as “another being” (Visuddhimagga 9:47, pp. 308f). See also below, chap. 8, pp. 399f. 112  Actually, the story is referred to in ŚS 155 shortly before the long parallel with BCA 6:119-134. The ŚS, however, does not quote the story from the canonical Vinaya, but from the Bhikṣuprakīrṇaka. 111

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Truly I tell you, just as you did not do it to one of the least of these, you did not do it to me.

As with the Buddhist story, the Gospel narrative also contains the double identification of Jesus with those who suffer as himself and of himself as their brother. This twofold identification needs to be understood in the context of the Gospels’ view of Jesus as one who reflects the indiscriminate mercy of God. Jesus’ identification with those who suffer is a mirror of God’s identification with them. This has been perfectly captured by the Islamic version of the same motif. Among the so-called Holy Hadiths (ḥadīth qudsī), which relate not just the words of the Prophet but also revelatory words of God, we find the following one. On the Day of Judgement God will speak: O son of Adam, I fell ill and you visited Me not. He will say: O Lord, and how should I visit You when You are the Lord of the worlds? He will say: Did you not know that My servant So-and-so had fallen ill and you visited him not? Did you not know that had you visited him you would have found Me with him? O Son of Adam, I asked you for food and you fed me not. (…) O son of Adam, I asked you to give Me to drink and you gave me not to drink. (…) Had you given him to drink you would have surely found that with me.113

In this Islamic parallel to Matthew, the notion of Jesus as an image of God is taken to its logical end. It is God him-, her- or itself who identifies directly with those who suffer. Any harm and any service done to them is done to God.114 The parallel to Śāntideva’s proclamation that all service rendered to sentient beings and all harm caused to them is ultimately done to the Buddhas is indeed startling. If we can justly interpret the compassionate mind of the Buddhas as a window through which the light that emerges from ultimate reality shines into samsara and illuminates its darkness (see BCA 1:5-6),115 the parallel becomes even more dense – perhaps to the point that allows or even compels us to say that the Buddha mind and the Christ mind are non-different. In Buddhism, Christianity and Islam, the non-dualism between this world and ultimate reality clearly assumes an ethical concretization. But what about the ontological dimension? During the John Main Seminar, the Dalai Lama, despite his emphasis on the differences in Christian and 113

 Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim 6232; Ibrahim, Johnson-Davies 1997, 88-90.  See also Psalm 51,4: “Against you, you alone, I have sinned (…).” 115  See above, Part I, chap. 4, p. 87. 114

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Buddhist reasoning, acknowledged the similarity between the Buddhist emulation of the Buddha and the Christian notion of sharing the mind of Christ. According to the Dalai Lama, “one of the grounds on which the presence of Buddha-nature in all people is argued is the human capacity for empathy. (…) This Buddha-nature, this seed of awakening, of perfection, is inherent in all of us.”116 It will certainly facilitate the practice of compassion and forbearance towards evildoers, if one believes that they, like all sentient beings, harbor the seed of the good. Referring to the Buddhas’ self-identification with all beings, Śāntideva asks in vs. 6:126 the rhetorical question of whether or not all beings need to be recognized as the Protectors, that is, as the Buddhas, in the form of sentient beings? Is this a hint at the Mahāyāna doctrine of the Buddha Nature in every sentient beings? According to Lambert Schmithausen, vs. 6:126 should indeed be seen as an allusion to the Buddha Nature doctrine, but only in the sense of the Buddhas’ spiritual and ethical identification with all sentient beings.117 Indeed, Śāntideva does not use the typical terminology current to the Buddha Nature discourse, such as tathāgatagarbha, the “germ of the Buddha,” perhaps because of the proximity of this teaching to the Yogācāra school. But as John Pettit has pointed out, the ŚS cites a number of texts that actually belong to the Buddha Nature tradition. Pettit assumes that Śāntideva may have been influenced by this tradition and that the statement in vs. 9:104 (in Pettit’s counting, 9:103), according to which the “living beings are by nature fully released,” displays such influence.118 Perhaps we may assume that for Śāntideva the Buddhas’ perfection of the exchange of self and others has become possible through their insight in the non-duality between true reality, in which all beings are already “fully released,” and its samsaric, māyā-like appearance. In the next chapter Śāntideva deals with the question of the power that leads to the realization of Buddhahood. As we will see, vs. 7:18 apparently suggests that all beings have the potential to become Buddhas and vss. 7:29-30 seem to imply that Śāntideva refers to this potential as bodhicitta.119

116

 Gyatso 2002, 104f.  Schmithausen 2007b, 567f. 118  Pettit 1999, 121f. 119  This would be further confirmation that Śāntideva’s use of bodhicitta has some functional analogy to the notion of Buddha Nature. See above, Part II, chap. 3, pp. 155, 178f. 117

CHAPTER 7

BODHICARYĀVATĀRA 7 THE PERFECTION OF VIGOR (VĪRYAPĀRAMITĀ)

COMMENTARY 1. A Note on the Structure of Chapter 7 With chapter 7, Śāntideva continues his treatment of the pāramitās, moving from the third pāramitā, kṣānti, to the fourth one, vīrya, that is, vigor, strength, effort or energy.1 He begins with an important statement: awakening (bodhi) is based on vigor (vs. 1). From the perspective of Christian‒Buddhist dialogue this will immediately invoke the Christian designation of Buddhism as a religion of self-redemption, as it has been voiced so often by Christian apologetics. However, in vss. 30-31 of the same chapter, Śāntideva reaffirms his fundamental conviction that the practitioner is “carried” towards his goal by the power of bodhicitta, the spirit of awakening. We thus need to be careful with too hasty theological assignments. Before I pursue this question further by means of looking at the text in detail, it is necessary to say a few words about the composition of the present chapter. The chapter contains three verses (vss. 16, 31, 32) that refer to its structure but have puzzled interpreters – and have sometimes inspired adventurous theories – because the three verses are not easy to harmonize with one another.2 The confusion, however, disappears once we compare chapter 7 of the canonical BCA with the corresponding sixth chapter of the Dūn-huáng version.3 In the

1  For the place of chapter 7 within the overall structure of the BCA, see Part I, chap. 3, pp. 53-58. 2  See, for example, the discussion by Crosby and Skilton in Śāntideva 1995, pp. 63-65. 3  See Part I, chap. 1, pp. 3-6.

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Dūn-huáng version the chapter is composed as follows (brackets refer to the equivalent verses in the canonical BCA):4 6:1 6:2-17 6:18-26 6:27 6:28-30 6:31 6:32 6:33 6:34-42 6:43 6:44-64 6:65-67 6:68-79 6:80-85

(7:1) (7:16-31) (7:60-68) (7:70) (7:72-74) (7:69) (7:71) (7:75) (8:91-99) (8:101) (8.114-134) (8:136-138) (8:155-166) (8:168-173)

This synopsis allows us to reconstruct the (perhaps original) composition of the chapter as follows (verses according to the Dūn-huáng version; the corresponding verses of the canonical version are given in brackets): Vs. 1 (7:1) introduces the topic and vs. 2 (7:16) announces the structure of the whole chapter in terms of the six limbs or “aids of vigor” – a structure that is followed strictly in the text: [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]

Lack of dejection (aviṣāda): 3-16 (7:17-30) All powers (balavyūha): 17-24 (7:31a, 31b, 60-66) Full dedication (tātparya): 25-29 (7:67-68, 70, 72-73) Self-control (ātmavidheyatā): 30-33 (7:74, 69, 71, 75) Sameness of others and oneself (parātmasamatā): 34-42 (8:91-99) Exchange of others and oneself (parātmaparivartana): 43-85 (8:101, 114-134, 136-138, 155-166, 168-173)

The “powers” are specified in vs. 17a (7:31a) as four powers and are briefly addressed in section [2], vss. 17b-24 (7:31b, 60-66): (1) (2) (3) (4)

Right desire (chanda): 17b (7:31b) Stamina (sthāma): 18-19 (7:60-61) Joy (rati): 20-23 (7:62-65) Letting go (mukti): 24 (7:66)

As can be seen, the sixth chapter of the Dūn-huáng version has a consistent layout (made explicit in what are now vs. 16 and vs. 31 of the canonical version). This structure, however, has undergone some expansion 4

 The synopsis is based on Saito 2000, 29-40.

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and reconstruction, but also some disruption, in the corresponding seventh chapter of the canonical BCA. The most significant changes in the canonical BCA are: (1) the interpolation (if the canonical version is indeed later) of vss. 7:2-15, (2) the interpolation of vss. 7:32-59, and (3) the restructuring of chapters 7 and 8 by transferring the last two limbs of the six “aids of vigor” as mentioned in vs. 7:16 (= Dūn-huáng version 6:2) to chapter 8.

This restructuring is indicated in what is now vs. 7:32 (a verse not contained in the Dūn-huáng version), with its mentioning the four powers of vs. 7:31 (although with partly different terms: chanda, māna, rati, tyāga), continuing with “full dedication” (tātparya) and “self-control” (vaśitā) in accordance with the list of the six “aids of vigor” from vs. 7:16, but dropping the final two limbs of that list, because these have been moved to chapter 8. The interpolation of vss. 7:32-59 expands the brief remarks on the first two of the four powers (as mentioned in vs. 7:31), i.e. on right desire (vss. 7:33-45) and on self-confidence / pride (vss. 7:46-59). The reason for the shifting of “sameness of others and oneself” and “exchange of others and oneself” to the next chapter (on the perfection of meditative concentration) may be that the roots of this praxis are found in the meditative cultivation of the four divine mental states (brahmavihāra).5 The interpolation of vss. 7:2-15 seems to serve as a general exhortation pointing out the mental evils against which the development of vigor is directed. TRANSLATION: 7:1-15 Introduction 1. He who is patient in this way should resort to vigor, because awakening is based on vigor. For there is no merit without vigor, just as there is no movement without wind. 2. What is vigor? Exertion in what is wholesome. What is its opposite called? Sloth, a tendency toward what is vile, and self-contempt due to dejection.

The opposites 3. Out of indifference to the suffering in the cycle of existences, sloth arises through inactivity, a taste for pleasures, and a zest for sleeping and idling about. 5

 See below, Part II, chap. 8, pp. 347f, 399f.

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4. Tracked down by hunters, the defilements, you are trapped in the net of births. Do you now still not know that you have entered the jaws of death? 5. Do you not see how your companions are gradually killed? And yet you surely take to sleep like a buffalo among butchers. 6. How can you enjoy food, or sleep, or making love (rati) when death is watching you and every exit is blocked? 7. When death is amply prepared, it will arrive quickly. Even if you then, illtimed, abandon sloth, what will you do? 8.-10. “This I did not achieve; this was begun but left half done; death has come all of a sudden. Oh! I am lost!” you think and watch desperate relatives, their faces in the grip of grief with swollen, tearful, bloodshot eyes, and the faces of the messengers of Yama, and tormented by the memory of your sins, with the screams from the hells in your ears, delirious, limbs smeared with excrement out of fear, what will you do? 11. “I’m like a fish [kept] alive [to be eaten].” Thus it is right that you fear already here; how much more so, sinner, when faced with the terrible suffering in the hells. 12. Even touched by hot water you are hurt, delicate child. How can you stay so calm after deeds that [lead] to hells? 13. Idle yet eager to be rewarded, delicate child, affluent in pain, you are caught by death, you who you thought were immortal. Woe, unfortunate one, you will perish. 14. Upon finding the boat of human existence, cross the great stream of suffering! Fool, it is not the time to sleep! This boat is hard to find again. 15. Having discarded the most worthy delight in the Teaching, followed by endless joy, how can you delight in causes of suffering such as excitement and laughter?

COMMENTARY 2. A Wake-Up Call from Carelessness Obviously, Śāntideva’s appraisal of vigor is rooted in his understanding of the Bodhisattva path as a spiritual warfare between bodhicitta and its enemies, the defilements (an image he returns to in vs. 67). As in mundane war, the spiritual fight, too, needs courage and vigor (cf. 4:3638, 6:17-20). It requires a strong determination which is at odds with sloth,6 attachment to sensual pleasures and insufficient self-confidence 6  Already in pre-Mahāyāna Buddhism “sloth” (= ālasya in BCA 7:2-3, 7 and 71), in the form of styāna and in combination with “sleepiness” (middha), is counted as one of

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(vs. 2). What all three have in common is a lack of motivation to take up and fight the spiritual struggle against the suffering in samsara, one’s own and that of others (vss. 2-3, cf. vss. 33-36). From a Buddhist perspective, the third type of demotivation, “self-contempt due to dejection,” is a particular menace for the practitioner on the Bodhisattva path.7 Śāntideva deals with it extensively in vss. 17-30. The other two types (sloth, clinging to sensual pleasures) are more characteristic of the ordinary “worldling,” although the Bodhisattva practitioner may not be entirely immune from relapsing into such moods. Like the “worldling” who has not even realized the need to engage in such a spiritual endeavor (vs. 4), also he may need at times a wake-up call that warns him against a careless and thoughtless lifestyle – a call that Śāntideva voices in a rather jarring way (vss. 4-15). To this end Śāntideva draws on the most fundamental Buddhist motif, the ignoring and suppression of transience coming along with the thirst for sensual pleasure (kāma-tṛṣṇā, as it is called in the Second Noble Truth). This false orientation of existential striving will inevitably be shattered when the harsh reality of one’s own mortality can no longer be denied (vss. 7-11).8 The devotion to what is “vile” (kutsitāsakti, vs. 2) is nothing but the clinging to sensual gratifications (vss. 3, 6), which in Buddhist ascetic literature are often presented as nauseating if seen in the harsh light of transience. In the next chapter, Śāntideva gives a range of drastic examples of this way of looking at sensual pleasures in the context of so-called “foulness meditation” (aśubha-bhāvanā) (see 8:2-25, 40-84). He connects his reminder of human mortality with the fear of horrific suffering in hell, and it is neither the first9 nor the last time10 that he does so in this text. In vss. 12-13 it is stated that scalding a child with hot water is nothing compared to the pain of hell – a threat that, as we saw above, inspired a corresponding feature in the Śāntideva legend. Śāntideva himself, when still a small child, was taught this gruesome lesson, according to the legend, by his own mother in order to turn him the five obstacles (nīvaraṇa) that hinder the attainment of meditative absorption. The Sarvāstivādins considered “sloth” (styāna) as a mental feature connected with all unwholesome states of mind; see Gethin 2017, 148f. Śāntideva also refers to styānamiddha, in BCA 8:185. 7  See also ŚS 20; 180f; PS 6:4. 8  On the “messengers of Yama” (vs. 9), see also BCA 2:42-46, above, Part II, chap. 2, pp. 149f. 9  See BCA 2:33-47, 59-62; 5:59-70; 6:56-59. 10  See BCA 7:33-46; 9:156-166.

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away from the pursuit of a princely career and to send him on the religious path.11 As before (see 4:13-26), Śāntideva emphasizes the extraordinary value of human existence; it alone offers the opportunity to embark on the path of salvation. Being reborn as a human being is a rare opportunity which, if missed, will not come back easily (vs. 14). The shout in vs. 14 “Fool, it is not the time to sleep!” provides the “zest for sleeping” in vss. 3 and 5-6 with a deeper existential meaning: in their careless living, people snore away the precious chance inherent in their human existence. The fleeting enjoyments of worldly life are nothing compared to the delight in the Dharma. And while the first inevitably leads to suffering, the latter ultimately results in “endless joy” (anantarati, vs. 15). Here, Śāntideva uses the word rati, which is highly ambivalent inasmuch as it can refer to enjoyment in general, but also to sexual pleasure in particular, as it does in vs. 6. This ambiguity is a typical feature of the present chapter. In his illustration of spiritual vigor, Śāntideva employs terms that are usually connected with, from a Buddhist point of view, problematic orientations in life, such as desire (chanda), pleasure (rati) and pride (māna), thus providing them with an alternative and highly positive meaning. His message is: taking up the spiritual path and doing so with determination and exertion is not only as desirable, as pleasurable and as satisfying as the pursuit of worldly goods, but infinitely more so. TRANSLATION: 7.16-30 The aids of vigor 16. Lack of dejection (aviṣāda), all of the powers (balavyūha), full dedication (tātparya), self-control (ātmavidheyatā), the sameness of the others and oneself (parātmasamatā), and the exchange of the others and oneself (parātmaparivartana) [are the aids of vigor].

Lack of dejection 17. One must not let one’s courage sink: “How could awakening ever be mine?” For the Buddha, who speaks the truth, said this truth: 18. “Even those who by virtue of efforts have attained supreme, almost unattainable awakening have once been gnats, mosquitoes, flies and worms.”

11

 See above, Part I, chap. 2, pp. 15f, fn. 15.

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19. How much more I, human by birth and able to know good from bad, should I, when not forsaking the instructions of the Omniscient One, not attain awakening? 20. Yet, I’m afraid of having to sacrifice a hand, a foot and other parts. For lack of discrimination I may well be confused about what is difficult and what is easy. 21. I shall be cut up many times, gored, burned and torn to pieces for countless millions of eons. Still, awakening will not be mine. 22. This suffering of mine, however, which yields full awakening, is limited, like the pain from the extraction (utpāṭana° M instead of utpādana° V) when the suffering from an embedded thorn is gone. 23. Even all physicians restore health through painful treatments. Thus, to alleviate the many pains, one must endure a slight one. 24. Yet such treatment, even if appropriate, has not been imposed by the True Physician; through temperate treatment he heals the severely diseased. 25. Initially, the Guide prescribes the giving of vegetables and the like. Then he gradually impels one, so that later one would give away even one’s own flesh. 26. When also in regard to one’s own flesh comprehension dawns as in regard to vegetables, is it then difficult for him who gives up flesh and bones? 27. He does not suffer because he has relinquished sin. He is not distressed, because he is prudent. For the mind suffers through false conceptions, the body through doing wrong. 28. Through doing good, the body is pleased; the mind is pleased through prudence. What could frighten the Compassionate One who remains in the cycle of births for the benefit of others? 29. Already through the power of the spirit of awakening he wipes out past sins and gains oceans of merit; thus he rushes faster [toward his lofty goal] than even the Hearers [toward their modest one]. 30. What reasonable person would despair if he rushes like this from happiness to happiness on the carriage of the spirit of awakening, which spares him the fatigue from all exertion?

COMMENTARY 3. Overcoming Dejection After verse 7:16, the verse listing the contents (equivalent to vs. 6:2 in the Dūn-huáng version of our chapter12), Śāntideva now deals 12

 See above, pp. 305-307.

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(vss. 17-30) with the first of the six limbs in aid of vigor, non-dejection (aviṣāda). It is directed against dejection (viṣāda), the third of the three opposites as mentioned in vs. 2, that is, the challenge specific to the practitioner on the Bodhisattva path. The ŚS quotes from the Bodhisattvaprātimokṣa that a Bodhisattva must not be overcome by the thought “I cannot gain the highest illumination.”13 Śāntideva, typical for his way of putting things, assumes the insider’s perspective – “How could awakening ever be mine?” (vs. 17a) – and provides consolation by means of scriptural authority. The Buddha speaks the truth (vs. 17b) and he has affirmed that all the enlightened beings have once been poor and paltry creatures such as “gnats, mosquitos, flies and worms” (vs. 18).14 In having achieved the rare opportunity of human rebirth (connecting with vs. 14), one has already made significant progress. As a human being, one possesses the mental ability of knowing good from bad (vs. 19). As we saw in discussing chapter 1, Śāntideva regards this ability as crucial in the initial arousal of bodhicitta. Being able to feel and acknowledge the appeal of what is good calls for a positive response and presupposes something in our mind or heart that resonates with this appeal.15

13

 ŚS 20, Bendall, Rouse 1922, 23.  According to Pelden 2007, 241, vs. 18 paraphrases a quotation from the Subāhuparipṛcchā-sūtra, a text from which Śāntideva also quotes at BCA 1:18-20. Pelden renders it as: “This, moreover, is how Bodhisattvas should perfectly train themselves. They should reflect that if even lions, tigers, dogs, jackals, vultures, cranes, crows, owls, worms, insects, flies, and stinging gnats will awaken into the state of unsurpassable Buddhahood, why should they, human beings, allow their diligence to weaken – a diligence that will lead to Buddhahood? They should never allow this to happen even at the costs of their lives.” 15  See above, Part II, chap. 1, pp. 131f. As we will see in the rest of this chapter, Śāntideva makes ample use of this ability in distinguishing the desire, pleasure and pride of a Bodhisattva from the unwholesome variants of such sentiments. The fact that Śāntideva underlines the crucial spiritual significance of the ability to distinguish good from bad is rather telling, given the widespread Western (and today also Eastern) cliché of the allegedly negative Western tendency to think in dualities in contrast to the allegedly positive Eastern non-dual thinking. Whatever the latter might be, such a clear distinction between negative dualism and positive non-dualism is itself, of course, a fine example of dualist thinking. In any case, as we can see here, Śāntideva regards the ability of such dualistic understanding as an important condition for a human being’s capacity to embark on the Bodhisattva path. It is only in relation to ultimate reality that dualistic thinking comes to its limits. But not in order to give way to non-dual “thinking” (all thinking operates via conceptual dualities), but rather to non-dual or, more precisely, non-conceptual experience. 14

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Yet this admiration of the good acts performed by the Bodhisattvas is part of the problem. The Bodhisattvas are known and revered because of their readiness to sacrifice themselves for the sake of others.16 Hence the practitioner is afraid that in following their path he too will have to “sacrifice a hand, a foot or other parts” (vs. 20).17 He fears that he will be unable to do so, and thus it is precisely the admiration of the high ideal that disheartens him. This prompts Śāntideva to return to a topic that he had extensively treated in chapter 6, the endurance of suffering and injustice (see 6:9-75). The focus, however, is different. In chapter 6, such endurance was directed against the defilement of hate, whereas here the enemy is dejection. While he weighed spiritual joy against worldly pleasures in vs. 15, he now responds by weighing suffering in samsara against the suffering on the Bodhisattva path. The timid practitioner needs to understand that while samsaric suffering is difficult, the Bodhisattva’s suffering is comparatively easy (vs. 20). Suffering in samsara is meaningless and potentially endless, while the Bodhisattva’s suffering is limited and meaningful. Samsaric suffering, especially in the hells, goes on “for countless millions of eons” and is to no spiritual avail (vs. 21), whereas the Bodhisattva’s suffering “yields full awakening” and is limited, like a painful medical cure (vss. 22f). The Bodhisattva’s suffering has a therapeutic effect and the Buddha is the “True Physician,” healing the practitioner with a gradual, adjusted and temperate treatment (vs. 24). Moreover, although the actual performance of the Bodhisattva may turn progressively more radical and more self-sacrificial, it will subjectively become increasingly more bearable or less difficult. This astonishing effect, says Śāntideva, will be the result of the practitioner’s growing in wisdom and compassion (vss. 25-28), the two key virtues of a Bodhisattva. In vss. 25-26, Śāntideva masterfully presents the epitome of Mahāyāna: the Bodhisattva ideal in a nutshell. “Initially,” that is at one’s early contact with the Buddhist community, the lay follower is asked to support the Sangha by donating food and other basic gifts for their livelihood. This is the beginning of dāna, the first 16

 See above, Part II, chap. 3, pp. 166f; chap. 5, pp. 241f.  That Bodhisattvas give away “hands or feet” is a phrase found rather often in Mahāyāna texts, as for example in the Vajradhvaja-sūtra, to which Śāntideva refers in 7:46b. See ŚS 24 or Cleary 1993, 623: “They may give their heads or eyes Or give their hands or feet, Skin, flesh, bones, marrow, and so on – All they give up unbegrudgingly.” 17

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Bodhisattva virtue of generosity, an initial small exercise in pro-existence. At the end of the path, when the lay supporter has become a Bodhisattva, he will be ready to give away his own flesh, performing the climax of compassionate pro-existence. The development from one end of this path to the other is a long and gradual process. But it is possible through a deepening understanding of the not-self teaching, that is, through a realization of detachment that enables one to give one’s own life as if it were a donation of a vegetable. Through such insight, which implies practical realization, the Bodhisattva, in a sense, does not suffer when he behaves in such a radically selfless way, because “the mind suffers through false conceptions, the body through doing wrong” (vs. 27).18 Nothing can frighten the one whose compassion has replaced his former selfcenteredness (vs. 28). The driving force behind this radical transformation is the “power of bodhicitta.” It not only extinguishes the negative karma of one’s past deeds (vs. 29), as Śāntideva already affirmed in BCA 1:13. It is a chariot that carries the practitioner “from happiness to happiness,” “spares him the fatigue from all exertion” and brings him swiftly to his goal, that is, the achievement of full Buddhahood, not merely one’s own personal awakening as in the case of the “Hearers” (śrāvakas), the followers of the pre-Mahāyāna schools (vss. 29-30). Such promises are far from being modest; they are exorbitant and compel us to review the standard accusation by Christian apologetics that Buddhism is a religion of self-redemption.19 It is true that vs. 18 speaks of the attainment of awakening “by means of effort” (utsāhavaśāt), but this needs to be balanced with everything said in vss. 29-30. Moreover, there is certainly not much redemptive self-effort presupposed for insects (cf. vs. 18). As I have suggested above, in Śāntideva’s thought bodhicitta assumes a place analogous to that of Buddha nature in other branches of Mahāyāna. If “gnats, mosquitoes, flies and worms” have finally achieved Buddhahood, they must have done so because of some liberative potential in them that infinitely surpasses their natural abilities. However, even if bodhicitta is the real power of redemption, this does not imply that it works without or against one’s efforts. Perhaps we must say that it works in turning one’s efforts into an effort that is no longer 18

 See also ŚS 180-182 describing this as the “happiness in all things.”  See, for example, Monier-Williams 1889, 546-559; Scott 1890, 226-236; Sterling Berry 1890, 108f. For a more recent example, see Magliola 2014, 36f. Further examples are discussed in Schmidt-Leukel 1992, 57-62. 19

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conceived as one’s own effort. A paradox of grace becomes apparent, one that resembles Paul’s similarly paradoxical formulation in Phil. 2:12-13: “…work out your own salvation with fear and trembling, for it is God who is at work in you, enabling you both to will and to work for his good pleasure.” For Paul, too, salvation is not “worked out” without utmost effort, although the motivation and realization emerges from “God in you” or “Christ in me” (Gal. 2:20).20 What is looming in Śāntideva’s view of bodhicitta became most explicit about five hundred years later, when Shinran designated shinjin, the “entrusting heart/ mind,” as the true bodhicitta,21 understanding shinjin as the participation in the Buddha nature whose compassionate essence is, to him, most clearly represented in the saving Bodhisattva vow of Amida (= Amitābha) Buddha. The frequent accusation of Buddhism as a religion of self-redemption by Christian authors has often been combined – somewhat surprisingly – with reproaches of it fostering inertness (at times explained by the flagging impact of tropical climates) and the mortification of all human emotions. According to Monier-Williams, for example, the Buddhist maxim is to “aim at inaction, indifference, and apathy, as the highest of all states.”22 According to Sterling Berry, “the supreme effort” for Buddhists is “to crush and repress their nature until they have purified themselves from all taint of desire and made themselves the cold, passionless, emotionless beings, in which its ideal is realized and due preparation made for the consummation of extinction.”23 These charges are as wanting as the unqualified label of “self-redemption,” as will become even more evident in the following section. TRANSLATION: 7:31-66 The powers 31. The [four] powers of right desire (chanda), stamina (sthāma), joy (rati), and letting go (mukti) serve the realization of the goal of living beings. Through the fear of suffering one may develop [right] desire in contemplation of its advantages. 20

 See above, Part II, chap. 4, pp. 198-201.  E.g. Jōdo wasan 107: “Shinjin … is none other than the mind aspiring for great enlightenment.” Hirota 1997, vol. I, 354. See also Takayama 2000, 129. 22  Monier-Williams 1889, 560. 23  Sterling Berry 1890, 111. 21

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32. Uprooting the opposites in this way, one should strive to increase one’s exertion (utsāha) with the help of the [six] powers of right desire (chanda), selfconfidence (māna), joy (rati), letting go (tyāga), full dedication (tātparya), and self-control (vaśitā).

Right desire 33. I must do away with innumerable faults, my own and those of others, among which effacing even a single fault takes streams of eons. 34. Yet there is but nothing in me to begin the extinction of these faults. If immense suffering is my destiny, why does my heart not burst? 35. And I must secure many virtues, my own and those of others. In this, the cultivation of every single virtue might well take streams of eons. 36. I have never cultivated even a trifling virtue. To no purpose I have wasted the somehow gained miraculous birth [as a human being]. 37. I did not find happiness through the festivals in worship of the Sublime One, I have not honored the Teaching, have not fulfilled the hopes of the poor. 38. I have not given fearlessness to those in fear, nor have I made the tormented happy. I became a thorn in the womb of a mother for nothing but pain. 39. Since in previous existences I lacked the desire for the Teaching, such misery has befallen me now. Who would forsake the desire for the Teaching? 40. Moreover, the Wise One has declared right desire to be the root of all wholesome deeds. And the root of this desire is constant contemplation on the fruits that ripen therefrom: 41. For sinners, sundry suffering, despair and fear accrues, as well as the shattering of their hopes. 42. On whatever the desire of those who do good is set, it will be honored because of their good deeds with the gift of the fruit. 43. On the other hand, on whatever the desire for happiness of those who sin is set, it will be destroyed because of their sins by the weapons of pain. 44. Due to their wholesome deeds, the Buddha-sons, who were resting in the womb of large, fragrant and cool lotus flowers, whose brilliance was caused by the food of the Victors’ sweet voice and whose beautiful bodies then came forth from the lotus blossoms unfolding through the radiance of the Wise Ones, will be born in the presence of the Buddha [Amitābha in the Sukhāvatī paradise]. 45. Screaming with pain when the jailers of Yama pull off his entire skin, sprinkling the body with copper molten through blazing heat and tearing apart its flesh by hundreds of blows from flaming swords and spears, due to his sins he plummets again and again into the hells plastered with red-hot iron. 46. In such contemplation one should carefully develop therefore the desire for the good.

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Self-confidence One should be self-confident (māna), however, and cultivate this in the manner of Vajradhvaja. 47. On first surveying all the causal conditions, one may embark on something or not. Not beginning is certainly better than ceasing after having begun. 48. This habit proliferates also in a further existence, as well as suffering from sin; another task as well as the time for that task are lost, and this, too, is not accomplished. 49. One should assume self-confidence concerning these three: one’s task, the mental weaknesses, and [one’s] capacity. “I alone must do it.” This is the self-confidence concerning one’s task. 50. These people, dependent on defilements (kleśāsvatantro M instead of kleśasvatantro V), are not able to achieve their goal. Therefore I must do it on their behalf, since I am not as incapable as they are. 51. Why does someone else do menial work when I am around? If I do not do it due to haughtiness, then may my self-confidence rather end. 52. Facing a dead lizard, even a crow turns into an eagle. If my mind is powerless, even a minor weakness will do harm. 53. Is it not so that weaknesses are frequent when, due to dejection, one is not energetic? But when uplifted and eager to act, one is hardly overcome even with major weaknesses. 54. This is why I shall weaken my weaknesses with a firm mind. When weakness has conquered me, it is ridiculous wishing to defeat the three worlds. 55. For I have to defeat everything, nothing may defeat me. This is the selfconfidence that I must assume, because I am a son of the lion-like Victors. 56. Beings defeated by arrogance are miserable, not self-confident. The confident one does not succumb to an enemy, but these are in the power of the enemy arrogance. 57.-58. Arrogance (māna) has led them to a bad fate; even if they are human beings, they are cheerless, eat the bread of others, are slaves, stupid, ugly, weak and humiliated from all sides, the wretched ones stiff in their arrogance. If they, too, are counted among the self-confident, then tell me what the truly wretched look like. 59. These are truly self-confident and victorious, only these are heroes, who carry [their] confidence to victory over the enemy arrogance, who shatter this enemy arrogance, even if it manifests mightily, and then freely display the fruit of their victory to people. 60. Amidst the hordes of defilements, may he be a thousand times more proud. He is invincible in droves of defilements, like a lion in droves of deer. 61. Even under great distress the eye does not see taste. So, even when in distress, he will not fall under the power of the defilements.

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Joy 62. May he devote himself wholeheartedly to whatever task comes by, intoxicated by this task, insatiable, as if he wanted to snatch up the fortune of a jackpot. 63. Action is undertaken for the sake of happiness; yet, happiness may or may not come about. But for whom action as such is happiness, how can he be happy when inactive? 64. With sensual pleasures, like honey on a razor blade, he does not get tired in the cycle of existences. How should he get tired with the nectar of merits, sweet in their ripeness and auspicious? 65. This is why, even if an action has been completed, he should immerse himself in the next action, just as the elephant, hot from the midday sun, when he has reached a lake right away immerses himself.

Letting go 66. When he has adhered to a task until his strength has waned, he should leave it to take it up again. He should also leave what was well done, eager for ever more.

COMMENTARY 4. Spiritual Power With vss. 31-66 Śāntideva turns to the second limb of the six aids of vigor, as mentioned in vs. 16, the powers (bala). Vs. 31 specifies these as the four powers of “(right) desire” (chanda), “self-confidence” or “stamina” (sthāma), “joy” (rati), and “letting go” (mukti). As has been explained above, in the Dūn-huáng version of the BCA the corresponding section comprises only eight verses (= BCA 7:31, 60-66): “Desire” is covered by vs. 31b, “stamina” is characterized in vss. 60-61 (with dṛpta for “proud” in vs. 60), “joy” in vss. 62-65, and “letting go” in vs. 66. While the canonical version leaves the sections dedicated to “joy” and “letting go” unchanged, the illustration of “desire” and “stamina” has been expanded significantly. Vs. 32 (which is not contained in the Dūnhuáng version) reflects the fact that in the canonical BCA, the final two limbs of the six aids of vigor (as mentioned in vs. 16) have been moved to the next chapter, so that, after the treatment of the powers, chapter 7 ends with the third and fourth limb, that is, with “full dedication” (tātparya, as in vs. 16) and “self-control” (here vaśitā instead of ātmavidheyatā).

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Buddhist scriptures know of many different lists of spiritual powers, with an enormous variety regarding the number and nature of the listed powers. But I am not aware of any list that corresponds exactly to the one given in vs. 31. Possibly, the compilation of this particular list of four powers is Śāntideva’s own work. This suggests that he sees them as closely interconnected, which is also confirmed by his explanations. Spiritual power comprises a fervent desire for the good, that is, for living one’s life as a Bodhisattva; the self-confidence and indeed pride in being someone who takes up the challenge and follows the Bodhisattva path; the excitement, or even lust, in doing the work of a Bodhisattva; and the ease that enables one to pursue the Bodhisattva path vigorously but without clenching.24 The whole section on the four powers seems to be written not without some irony. Śāntideva builds on emotions or mental states which, in the Buddhist tradition, are seen with much skepticism. Twice he feels the need to back his views with scriptural authority (vss. 40, 46b).25 Desire, pride and pleasure, he says, are not always bad. On the contrary, their outright condemnation in the name of Buddhist indifference can simply be a hidden excuse for one’s own inertness. And non-attachment, as Śāntideva argues in vs. 66, does not at all mean inaction, but refers to the inner freedom of consistently gaining new strength for further action. In vss. 33-38 Śāntideva confronts the infinite size of the Bodhisattva’s task with the subjectively felt complete inability to fulfill it. Talking of the innumerable faults of all beings in vs. 33 (and, in vs. 35, of the many virtues to be cultivated in all beings) is unmistakably reminiscent of the Bodhisattva vow (explicitly mentioned in vs. 70): to work ceaselessly for the liberation of all. The confession of one’s failure 24  Śāntideva’s sober warning against overexertion may be inspired by the Buddha’s famous advice to Soṇa, a former musician. In the Pāli Tipiṭaka, Soṇa is declared to be the “foremost among those who arouse energy/vigor” (AN 1:205; see also Bodhi 2012, 109). But the Buddha also warns him against overdoing by reminding him of how he used to play the Vīnā in the past (AN 6:55, PTS III, 374f, also Thag 638, Vinaya Piṭaka, Mahāvagga 5:1:15-17): “‘What do you think, Soṇa? When its strings were too tight, was your lute well tuned and easy to play?’ ‘No, Bhante.’ When its strings were too loose, was your lute well tuned and easy to play?’ ‘No, Bhante.’ (…) So too, Soṇa, if energy is aroused too forcefully this leads to restlessness, and if energy is too lax this leads to laziness. Therefore, Soṇa, resolve on a balance of energy, achieve evenness of the spiritual faculties, and take up the object there.’” Bodhi 2012, 933. 25  According to Pelden 2007, 246, the reference in vs. 40 is to the Sagaramati-sūtra: “Aspiration is the root of every virtue.” Vs. 46b refers to the Vajradhvaja-sūtra; see below, fn. 27.

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and sins in vss. 34, 36-38 is connected to the confession of sins in 2:27-66. It also evokes the lamentation about the apparently hopeless entanglement in the web of defilements in vss. 4:13-26. Vss. 4:14, 21 and 26 are reflected in vs. 7:14, as much as vss. 4:1-4 are echoed in vs. 7:47. In 4:46 the development of insight (prajñā) is declared to be the only effective weapon against the defilements, and this is in line with vss. 7:27-30. But in the present section, Śāntideva pursues a different strategy – one that we have also encountered before. Evil is not fought by its opposite, that is, by the union of wisdom and compassion, but by a strong self-interest. The miserable spiritual condition (described in vss. 33-38) springs from a lack of right desire, the desire for the Dharma (vs. 39), that is, the desire for what is good (śubha, vs. 46a). It is from this desire that all wholesome things will flow; it can be awakened through the contemplation on the negative and positive fruits that grow from false or right living (vs. 40). At its bottom, desire is always desire for happiness (cf. vs. 63a). But true and lasting happiness will only emerge from right living, whereas the reward of sin is immeasurable suffering (vss. 41-46).26 It is therefore in one’s own self-interest to follow the Bodhisattva path. It is this insight that produces the spiritual power of right desire. Śāntideva continues his employment of self-interest for the purpose of developing vigor in his explanation of the second power, “stamina” (sthāma), as “self-confidence” or “pride” (māna). He uses māna throughout vss. 46b-61, but sharply distinguishes right pride or self-confidence from unwholesome arrogance (also māna, see vss. 56-59). In order to do so, he refers to the role model of Bodhisattva Vajradhvaja (vs. 46b), who may indeed serve as an excellent example of the Bodhisattva’s pride.

26  The Buddha Land referred to in vs. 44 could actually be any of the several Buddha Lands. However, the interpretation that it is the Pure Land Sukhāvatī of Buddha Amitābha is suggested by its explicit mention in BCA 10:4. The traditional belief is that once beings are born in Sukhāvatī they will attain there the highest awakening without any further effort. Yet their rebirth in the Pure Land of Amitābha is seen by the tradition not as the result of their own efforts, but of the immense karmic merit that Buddha Amitābha acquired when he was still the Bodhisattva Dharmākara. This stands in some tension to Śāntideva’s statement that their rebirth in the Pure Land is “due to their wholesome deeds.” Besides, birth in the Pure Land happens in the “womb of Lotus flowers” because there are no women in the Pure Land. And the reason for this is that in Mahāyāna Buddhism the goal is to become a Buddha who – traditionally – must be male. For the key Pure Land Sūtras, see Gómez 1996; for the Pure Land tradition, see Foard, Solomon, Payne 1996.

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In ŚS 280, Vajradhvaja is quoted with his decision (in the face of the sentient beings’ inability to save themselves): I will strive – I can do it. I will not turn away. I will not protect myself. I will not be afraid. I will not fear. I will not turn back. I will not shrink from the task. Why is this? I will certainly carry the burdens of all sentient beings. (…) I will set all sentient beings free. I will completely save all sentient beings from the wilderness of birth, from the wilderness of old age, from the wilderness of death and rebirth, from the wilderness of all downfalls, from the wilderness of all cyclic existence, from the wilderness of the destruction of their wholesome states, from the wilderness that arises from not knowing – from all these, I will set all sentient beings free. All sentient beings are caught in the net of craving, covered with the distortions of ignorance, (…) not skilled at getting free (…). I am the helmsman, the leader, and the torch-bearer. I show the path to peace. I have obtained the opportunity to practice. I am skilled in means. I know how to help.27

It is obvious that this is the mental attitude that Śāntideva has in mind when he speaks of the Bodhisattva’s pride as summarized in vss. 49b-50: “I alone must do it.” This is the self-confidence (or: pride = māna) concerning one’s task. These people, dependent on defilements, are not able to achieve their goal. Therefore I must do it on their behalf, since I am not as incapable as they are.

The practitioner’s determination should be firm. Giving up and waiting for the next life is not an option. Such indecision will evolve into an inclination that reappears in any future rebirth. Śāntideva’s admonition neither to shift one’s responsibility on someone else (vss. 49b-51), nor to postpone it to another life reflects the widespread spiritual maxim ascribed to Rabbi Hillel: “If not I, who else? … If not now, then when?”28 Right pride or self-confidence is crucial in view of the task, one’s mental weaknesses, and one’s capabilities (vs. 49a). But it must not be 27  ŚS 280-282, quoting here from the Vajradhvaja-sūtra. Translation from Goodman 2016, 266f. See also Bendall, Rouse 1922, 256f. The Vajradhvaja-sūtra has been incorporated into the Avataṃsaka-sūtra. See Cleary 1993, 530-693 (book 25). Vajradhvaja is depicted as a prime example of the perfection of giving. 28  His original words, according to the Talmud, Pirkei Avot 1:14, are: “If I am not for me, who will be for me? And when I am for myself alone, what am I? And if not now, when then?” See: https://www.sefaria.org/Pirkei_Avot.1.14?lang=bi&with=all&la ng2=en

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confused with arrogance (vss. 56-61). The Bodhisattva’s pride is to be everyone’s servant (vs. 51; cf. 3:18; 6:121, 125).29 True pride, says Śāntideva, is to overcome arrogance, which belongs to the defilements (vs. 59). For a Bodhisattva, the reason to be proud is his defeat of the defilements, including arrogance (vs. 60). This argumentation is similar to Śāntideva’s earlier remarks about “hate of the hate” (6:41) or about the justified “defilement” of enmity against the defilements (4:42f). In order to support such spiritually healthy self-confidence, the Bodhisattva needs to weaken his weaknesses with a firm mind (vs. 7:54). This is certainly easier said than done. Śāntideva gives a piece of advice from everyday experience: one’s weaknesses may indicate a lack in motivation: “Is it not so that weaknesses are frequent when, due to dejection, one is not energetic? But when uplifted and eager to act, one is hardly overcome even with major weaknesses” (vs. 53). Spiritual power therefore presupposes that the good work is done with enthusiasm. This is where the power of joy or even “lust” comes in. In vss. 15 and 31f, Śāntideva uses rati (“lust”), which primarily refers to sexual pleasure, for the delight that the Bodhisattva should have in his task. Although he replaces rati in vss. 62-65 with sukha, he still compares it to the sensual enjoyments of which one can never get enough (vs. 64), or to the enthusiasm someone feels who is mad about gambling (vs. 62). But in vs. 63 Śāntideva takes an important step beyond the strategy that he employed in vss. 40-46a: True spiritual joy is not merely connected to the fruit of one’s work or to its anticipation. Ideally, the Bodhisattva’s joy is his delight in the work itself. He finds his satisfaction in his activity and this is why he cannot be happy with inaction. He enjoys his work as much as an elephant hot from the sun enjoys a refreshing bath. Driven by this kind of enthusiasm, the Bodhisattva, as soon as he has completed a task, will take up a new one (vs. 65). This gives Śāntideva the chance for his brief, ironic remark on detachment (vs. 31: mukti, or vs. 32: tyāga) in vs. 66. As for the true Bodhisattva, “letting go” is not retreating from activity into inaction. On the contrary, “letting go” means taking a refreshing break that will renew one’s strength for the next task. After all, Śāntideva is sufficiently realist to admit that the Bodhisattva’s strengths are not infinite. He thus recommends the Bodhisattva, if exhausted, to retreat temporarily. However, if his true joy is in his work, he will proceed with his activity as soon as he can. 29  See also ŚS 23, quoting from the Vajradhvaja-sūtra: “bodhisattvas give themselves away as servants.” Goodman 2016, 26.

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Averting the idea that the renunciant life is one of inaction was not only a Buddhist concern. As is well known, it is also a major topic in the Bhagavadgītā. The view that one can achieve liberation by inaction is rejected (Gītā 3:4), while right action is defended as a path to salvation (3:20). The Gītā’s solution that action can and must be performed without attachment (3:19) is not altogether dissimilar from the ethos of the Bodhisattva. Yet in the present chapter, Śāntideva does not emphasize detachment. He rather employs human sentiments and emotions as possible sources of spiritual power by giving them a different twist.30 This is probably most evident in vs. 63. Whereas in vss. 40 and 46 right desire is motivated by the self-centered fear of hell and the longing for Amitābha’s paradise, vs. 63 relativizes such future expectations and focusses entirely on the joy that the Bodhisattva finds in doing his work. This anticipates vs. 8:129b, where Śāntideva says that “all those who are happy in the world are so out of longing for the happiness of another.” The transformation of self-interest into altruism is at the same time their paradoxical coincidence. The Bodhisattva’s spiritual power – his desire, pride, pleasure and ease – lies in striving for the happiness of all others. But how shall we understand – and assess – the exorbitant aims of a Bodhisattva? Is the Bodhisattva’s pride, his vow to liberate all sentient beings in all possible worlds, not the utmost form of presumptuousness? As far as the BCA is concerned, the vow needs to be read in the light of what Śāntideva says at the beginning of chapter 5 (see especially vss. 5:914). The emphasis is on the corresponding inner attitude, not on the actual outcome. The resolution to liberate all beings means: No one is to be excluded, no one must be left behind. The Bodhisattva’s compassion must be all-encompassing. He should not be disgusted by particular beings, even if their sins are like scarlet (to paraphrase Isaiah 1:18). On the Bodhisattva Vajradhvaja, whom Śāntideva presents as the role model for the Bodhisattva’s pride, the respective scripture says (as quoted in ŚS 279f): … even when the hostility of sentient beings gets in the way, the bodhisattva doesn’t turn away from them, and does not get separated from dedicating wholesome actions. When the muddiness of sentient beings’ false views gets in the way, the bodhisattva doesn’t turn away from them. When sentient beings have angry thoughts, the bodhisattva doesn’t go far from them. (…) the muddiness of the depravity of sentient beings doesn’t cause the bodhisattva to fall away from the vow to save all living beings… 30

 See also Śāntideva 1995, 65.

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The bodhisattva, when paying attention to foolish people is not disgusted by the problems of others. (…) As for the mass of suffering and the various distorting actions that all sentient beings have produced, those distorting actions because of which they do not see the buddhas, do not hear the Dharma, and do not know the religious community – with my own body, I will accept that mass of suffering, heaped up by three kinds of distorting actions. (…) I take ownership of this great mass of suffering.31

The Bodhisattva’s vow to save all – without exception – is a manifestation of the indiscriminate nature of his love and compassion.32 In the description of such love as quoted above from the Vajradhvaja-sūtra, a Christian will immediately feel reminded of the love that tradition has ascribed to Christ. He is the one who excludes nobody, who came to heal the sick and reconcile the sinners, who prayed that even those who brutally murdered him should be forgiven, who carried the “mass of suffering” caused by the “distorting actions” of sentient being with his own body. Seen in this light, Christ appears as the ideal Bodhisattva. Once again the conclusion suggests itself that Christ’s mind is bodhicitta. Or to put it the other way round, that the Buddha’s mind (the perfection of bodhicitta) is Christ’s mind. TRANSLATION: 7:67-75 Full dedication 67. He should guard himself against the blows of the defilements, and hit the defilements with all his might, as if he were in a sword fight with a skilled foe. 68. Just as he would then hastily pick up the dropped sword in terror, so should he pick up the dropped sword of mindfulness, the hells in mind. 69. Just as poison, when it has entered the blood, spreads through the body, so a fault spreads through the mind when it has found a flaw. 70. Just as someone carrying a full pitcher of oil, when watched over by men with drawn swords, pays it full attention out of fear of dying should he stumble, so also the one who has taken on the vows of a bodhisattva. 71. He should fight sleep and sloth setting in just as swiftly as someone who swiftly jumps up when a snake slides into his lap. 72. He should ponder, extremely worried about any blunder: “How shall I do this so it does not happen to me again?” 31

 Goodman 2016, 265f.  See the discussion of this in Part II, chap. 6, above, pp. 293-295.

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73. For this reason, he should seek the company [of spiritual friends] or the task received [through their counsel]: “Under these circumstances how might I exercise mindfulness?”

Self-control 74. This is how he should make himself nimble, recollecting the “Sermon on Vigilance” (Apramādakathā), so that, even before an action begins, he is prepared for anything. 75. Just as a tuft of cotton obeys the comings and goings of wind, he should obey the force of vigor, and in this way, success will prosper.

COMMENTARY 5. The Alertness of the Spiritual Warrior The third and the fourth of the six aids of vigor (according to vs. 16), full dedication (tātparya) and self-control (ātmavidheyatā; vaśitā in vs. 32), are dealt with in the concluding verses of the canonical version of the BCA. Again, the difference between the Dūn-huáng version and the canonical recension is interesting inasmuch as vs. 69 and vs. 71 appear in the Dūnhuáng version between vs. 74 and vs. 75. That is, they are subsumed under “self-control.” The dangerous “poison” referred to in vs. 69 was thus apparently understood as the “sleep and sloth” of vs. 71. Connecting back to the image of vs. 1b, Śāntideva concludes that the Bodhisattva should be in full control of himself as much as the movements of a tuft of cotton are controlled by the wind. This will guarantee the Bodhisattva’s spiritual progress – turning the warning from vs. 1b (no merit without vigor!) into a positive promise: vigor will lead to success! Self-control is the combination of mindfulness (smṛti, vss. 68, 73), alertness and flexibility (laghu) in readiness for action (vs. 74). The action itself is part of the spiritual fight against the defilements (vss. 67-68). The Bodhisattva needs to be on guard in order to stay on track, not lose his Bodhisattva path and fall into hell – a threat emerging from the defilements. The images Śāntideva employs are grim: dropping one’s sword in combat (vs. 68), noticing a snake sliding into one’s lap (vs. 71), not spilling the oil in a full vessel at the risk of being killed (vs. 70).33 All three images indicate a situation of extreme danger which requires the maximum degree of alertness. 33  The image in vs. 70 is old and already found in Jātaka 96. It is also referred to in ŚS 356.

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As the remedy Śāntideva recommends recollecting the Buddha’s word (vs. 74) and taking recourse in the monastic spiritual councilor (vss. 72-73). It is not entirely clear whether the reference to Apramādakathā in vs. 74, also found in chapter 8 (8:185), is to a specific text or to the general teaching of the Buddha about the spiritual significance of “vigilance” or “attentiveness” (apramāda). There are various canonical texts running under this or similar designations. In the Pāli Nikāyas and their Sanskrit equivalents there is an Appamāda Vagga in the Dhammapada (the second chapter) and there are several in the fifth division of the Saṃyutta Nikāya. Kate Crosby and Andrew Skilton make the interesting suggestion that the reference could also be to the Buddha’s last word “Strive with vigilance” or that it might actually refer to the fourth chapter in the BCA which is named bodhicittāpramāda (“Vigilant Care for the Spirit of Awakening”).34 One of the key stanzas of the Śikṣāsamuccaya (kārikā 27), which appears a few lines before the simile of the oil carrier, emphasizes “vigilance” (apramāda) together with smṛti and saṃprajanya, that is, the twin topic in BCA chapter 5 (cf. vs. 5:23): Successful accomplishment of the right efforts is from maintaining vigilance (apramāda), and through mindfulness (smṛti), immediate awareness (saṃprajanya), and profound thought.35

This verse easily reads as a summary of the concluding verses of BCA chapter 7. Whatever Śāntideva had in mind when referring to the “Sermon of Attentiveness/Vigilance,” the close connection between BCA chapters 7 and 8, on the one hand, and chapters 4 and 5, on the other, is evident. A final remark is in place about vss. 72-73. Despite the depiction of the extreme threat of the Bodhisattva’s failure and the plastic presentation of the Bodhisattva’s unfathomable task, Śāntideva is fully aware of the much more sober human reality. He recommends that the practitioner, in his actual failures, not only rely on the compassion of the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, but that he seek concrete spiritual help through the advice of his monastic councilor. Here we encounter the fundamental Buddhist conviction that one needs a master in order to make spiritual progress, a guide who can teach the practitioner how to avoid his chronic mistakes and how to practice in order to develop new and alternative forms of behavior. This can correct another prejudice and 34

 Śāntideva 1995, 174.  ŚS kārika 27. Translation from Clayton 2006, 126.

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misperception of Buddhism that was once widespread among Christian apologetic authors, the view that in the Buddhist path of salvation, fellowship or communion is irrelevant. It was in particular Max Weber who promoted this view. According to Weber, in Buddhism assurance of salvation is not only “sought in a psychic state remote from activity,” but there is, according to Weber, also no social community that can help: “The specific asocial character of all genuine mysticism is here carried to its maximum.” That the Buddha should have founded a monastic community appears to Weber therefore as a “contradiction” and, he speculates, it was perhaps the work of his later followers.36 Weber was aware that in Mahāyāna Buddhism the Bodhisattva assumes a decisive part in the salvation of others, but he is wrong in viewing this as a departure from early Buddhist principles. He misses the crucial Mahāyāna Buddhist belief that the Bodhisattva merely follows in the footsteps of the Buddha, and that the Buddha, from the early beginnings onwards, was seen as the one who had become a full Buddha only due to the fact that he was able to teach the path to others and to establish the community for the ultimate well-being of all. Although the Sangha thus has a significant role in the path of salvation, Buddhism has also preserved a sense of the worth of contemplative solitude as we will see in the next chapter. Yet even in this respect, the climax of meditative retreat is, according to Śāntideva, the preparation of one’s mind for the utmost form of altruism. The various features that add up to the Bodhisattva’s vigor in his fight against the defilements are all more or less familiar to Christian spiritual traditions. In conclusion to the commentary to this chapter, let me once more take a brief look at Paul. What makes up vigor in the strife between the spirit and the flesh? Just as Śāntideva warns the practitioner who has begun to cultivate bodhicitta not to relapse, Paul warns the followers of Christ in his letter to the Galatians not to end up with the flesh once they have started to live in the spirit (Gal. 3:3). Especially Paul’s Second Letter to the Corinthians contains a range of parallels to the features of spiritual vigor as presented by Śāntideva. Paul, too, is aware of the danger of dejection, of losing heart in the exertion of God’s ministry (2 Cor. 4:1, 16). But it is the confidence and hope which emerges from the light of God in one’s heart that dispel the darkness of delusion and enable one to become Christ-like (2 Cor. 4:4-6). Paul knows of a right

36

 Weber 1958, 213f.

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desire, of the spiritual longing for the eschatological fulfilment of one’s hope. The experience of God’s Spirit in one’s heart kindles such longing and nourishes hope, and it is perceived as an instalment of the expected fullness (2 Cor. 5:1-5). “Therefore,” says Paul, “we are always cheerful/ confident (tharrountes)” (2 Cor. 5:6; see also 5:8). Even in the midst of all kinds of affliction, his joy is overflowing (2 Cor. 7:4; see also 6:10). According to Gal. 5:22, joy (chará), together with love, peace, patience, kindness, generosity, faithfulness and gentleness, is the “fruit of the Spirit” – as is “self-control” (egkrateia). Moreover, Paul also knows of a right form of spiritual pride or boasting (kauchesis), which is a major topic in his letters to the Corinthians: For our proud confidence is this: the testimony of our conscience, that in holiness and godly sincerity, not in fleshly wisdom but in the grace of God, we have conducted ourselves in the world, and especially toward you (2 Cor. 1:12).

Paul distinguishes between “boasting in the mode of the flesh” (2 Cor. 11:18; see also Gal. 6:12f) and “boasting in the Lord” (2 Cor. 10:17). The latter is boasting of one’s weakness, “so that the power of Christ may dwell in me. (…) …for whenever I am weak then I am strong” (2 Cor. 12:9-10; cf. 11:30). Pride goes wrong if it boasts of the ego, and hence Paul can say that he may never boast of anything but the cross of Christ, “by which the world has been crucified to me and I to the world” (Gal. 6:14). The pride of Christ’s follower is in fulfilling the law of Christ, that is, “to bear one another’s burden” (Gal. 6:2-4). For the law of Christ is “whoever wishes to be the first among you must be the slave of all,” an attitude for which Jesus’ own life is the prime model (Mk. 10:44f), as much as the Bodhisattva – whose true pride is being a servant of all – follows the model of the Buddha.37 What is less prominent in Paul’s understanding of spiritual vigor is the feature of mindfulness and vigilance. Although he does exhort the followers of Christ to “not fall asleep as others do, but (…) keep awake and be sober” (1 Thess. 5:6; see also 1 Cor. 16:13), this “keeping awake” (grēgorōmen) has predominantly an eschatological connotation (see also Mk. 13:34f; Mt. 24:42f). Alertness consists in mental preparedness for the imminent apocalyptic events. To be sure, it also has the connotation of “keeping awake and praying” because “the spirit is willing but the 37

 See above, Part II, chap. 1, pp. 112f.

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flesh is weak” (see Mk. 14:38; Mt. 26:41). But it was only at a later stage in the development of Christian spiritual practice, as for example in the Hesychastic tradition, that this turned into a contemplative exercise resembling Buddhist forms of practicing mindfulness.38 Conversely, an eschatological perspective is not entirely absent from Śāntideva’s presentation of spiritual vigor and the corresponding motivation. The positive goal of attaining Buddhahood is always accompanied by the threat of running astray and ending up in hell. In contrast to the later Christian tradition, “hell” is not a major topic in the theology of Paul. He certainly warns that those who do the works of the flesh “will not inherit the kingdom of God” (Gal. 5:21b; 1 Cor. 6:9-10), but it is difficult to determine what exactly this would imply.39 In the BCA, “Bearing in mind the torments of hells” (5:29) is a persistent part of spiritual motivation. Before I proceed to chapter 8, it may thus be useful to take a more detailed look at this particular aspect.

38 39

 See above, Part II, chap. 5, pp. 227-229. See also Zaleski 1994, 101-105.  See Dunn 1998, 491f, 497f; Sanders 2015, 337-341.

EXCURSUS

ŚĀNTIDEVA AND THE BUDDHIST HELLS

In the BCA, the Buddhist hells (naraka or niraya) are omnipresent. In nine of its ten chapters the hells are either explicitly or implicitly1 mentioned – the only exception being the jubilant chapter 3. Yet given that in the Dūn-huáng version chapters 2 and 3 form a single chapter, in fact the “hells” appear in every chapter of the BCA. With the growth and doctrinal development of the Buddhist tradition, belief in hells became increasingly elaborate.2 Basically, hells are thought to be realms of the physical world (kāmadhātu) lying deep underneath the Indian subcontinent (jambudvīpa). Originally rebirth in the hells, the worst possible form of reincarnation, was regarded as the result of strong evil karma. But from comparatively early on, a tendency developed to link the threat of infernal rebirth to ever smaller forms of transgression.3 Life in hells is believed to last extremely long, sometimes as long as a full world-age (kalpa) or even many times such an age.4 Nevertheless existence in hell is not literally everlasting.5 One day the denizen will pass away and be reborn in some other form of existence. Different hells are already depicted in some canonical texts, such as Sutta Nipāta 3:10, AN 3:37, MN 129 and MN 130, with various tortures described in graphic, sadistic detail.6 Over time, cosmological speculations about the exact number, forms and structures of the hells 1

 See BCA 2:45-47; 9:151.  For an overview, see Kirfel 1920, 199-206; Matsunaga; Matsunaga 1971. The most comprehensive study is Van Put 2005, which also provides a survey of previous works, ibid. 22-26. On the early beginnings of Buddhist notions of hells, see Braarvig 2009. For an excellent analysis – focusing on the connection between hells and sexuality – see Cabezón 2017, 43-77. 3  In Mahāvastu 1:22, for example, rebirth in the Saṅghata hell is said to be the result of crushing worms when digging up the earth, or of crushing lice with one’s fingernails. 4  The bodies of the victims, with all their horrific injuries, are – as a result of evil karma – constantly renewed so they suffer the same tortures again and again. 5  This is why some translators use the word “purgatory” instead of “hell.” 6  Other samples of such horrific descriptions are found in Jātaka 530 and 544. A detailed depiction of the eight hot hells is given in Mahāvastu 1:4-27. 2

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became increasingly rife and sophisticated. According to a widespread scheme, there are eight hot hells7 whose floors are made of hot iron, and eight cold hells8 with floors of ice. In addition there are four types of neighboring hells attached in four layers to each of the four sides of the hot hells,9 so that each of the principal hot hells is surrounded by sixteen sub-hells. This amounts to a total of 144 hells (16 principal hells and 128 sub-hells attached to the 8 hot hells).10 Avīci hell is generally considered the worst of all. This scenario, or at least a very similar one, seems to be presupposed in the BCA. In BCA 10:4-5 Śāntideva summarily refers to the hot and cold hells, showing that he is familiar with an elaborate form of Buddhist infernal cosmography. Some hells are mentioned directly by their names (Avīci: 6:120; Saṅghāta: 5:20, 10:8; Vaitaraṇī: 10:10) or indirectly by means of their typical scenery or particular types of tortures.11 Śāntideva’s frequent references to various gruesome torments in hells such as being burnt, boiled, gored, mutilated, skinned, torn to pieces, crushed, etc.12 are all in line with the standard descriptions, but are rather less than more detailed compared to those found in the respective Buddhist scriptures.13

7  Saṅjīva, Kālasūtra, Saṅghāta, Raurava, Mahāraurava, Tāpana, Prātapana and Avīci. All of the eight hot hells are mentioned in Jātaka 530 and seven of them in the Pāli Kathāvatthu (23:3). Some early texts list only seven hot hells, others ten. 8  Arbuda, Nirabuda, Aṭaṭa, Hahava, Huhuva, Utpala, Padma and Mahāpadma. The cold hells were added at a later stage. A detailed overview of the different enumerations and classifications of hells in Buddhist texts is provided by Demoto 2009, 66-70, and Van Put 2005, 13-16. 9  That is, the exit gates on all four sides of a principal hell lead directly into the first sub-hell, from there to the second, and so on. There are no sub-hells for the cold hells (perhaps because all sub-hells are imagined as hot hells). The system of sub-hells varies in some later scriptures, and in some places the cold main hells appear as a different type of sub-hells. See Van Put 2005, 52-55, 71-77. 10  This is the number and nature of hells according to the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (3:58f). See Pruden 1988-90, vol. II, 457f. But the text assumes that the actual number of hells is far greater inasmuch as there are, in addition to the principal hells and their respective sub-hells, numerous individual hells (ibid. 458f.). For the system of hells according to the Saddharmasmṛtyupasthāna-sūtra (2nd-4th cent. CE), cf. Demoto 2009; Stuart 2015. 11  According to the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, the sword-leaved forest and the thorny śālmalī trees (mentioned in BCA 6:46 and 10:6) belong to the Kṣuramārga sub-hell, while the infernal river Vaitaraṇī (BCA 10:10) counts as one of the sub-hells. 12  E.g. BCA 4:14; 4:25; 4:30f; 5:4-7; 5:20; 6:46; 6:89; 7:21; 7:45; 10:5-16. 13  See, however, the selective (ŚS 69) but still rather lengthy and explicit depiction of the hells in ŚS 69-76, drawing heavily on the Saddharmasmṛtyupasthāna-sūtra.

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Fairly traditional are also Śāntideva’s general statements regarding the causes that lead to infernal rebirth. It is the “sins” (pāpa) in thought, words and deeds that lead to hell (vss. 2:28-31), deeds resulting from anger and greed (vss. 6:74; 9:156-157) caused by a self-centered way of life (vss. 8:123, 126; 8:171). However, it is here that one can observe some sharpening and a pointed emphasis in the BCA. Behind evil deeds stand the defilements, which are therefore the true cause of the hells, that is, of one’s own rebirth in them (vss. 4:27-31). Moreover, one’s sins against other beings are likely to cause them to commit sins in return and thus, one becomes guilty of their heading towards a bad destiny as well (vss. 6:47f). Even worse, such sins are not merely committed against other sentient beings. They are sins against the rules of the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas (vs. 2:54) and against the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas themselves vs. (2:30), who out of their compassion, identify with sentient beings (vss. 6:122-126). Everybody who lives at a time and place where he or she can hear the Dharma is in a particularly ambivalent situation. On the one hand, one has gained the rare and precious opportunity of entering the path of salvation. On the other hand, if one ignores the Buddha’s teaching and does not follow it, one finds oneself in the precarious situation of consciously disregarding the advice of the Buddha and violating his rules (vss. 1:4, 34; 2:57f; 4:23, 26; 5:109; 9:163). This applies even more – and thus is even more precarious – to someone who has entered the Bodhisattva path but is in danger of relapsing. In this situation, hell will be the inevitable prospect. This is why Śāntideva does not discuss any other possibilities of a bad yet altogether less harmful rebirth (e.g. in the realms of the animals or hungry ghosts).14 Further, the private nirvana of the arhat is no longer an option for someone who has made the Bodhisattva vows (vs. 6:50). Hence the only alternative is to follow the Bodhisattva path or go to hell. This explains why, in Śāntideva’s treatment of human transience, the fear of death is almost equivalent to the fear of hell (e.g. vss. 2:33-47, 57-63; 4:2-26; 7:3-15). Śāntideva further aggravates his analysis of the practitioner’s predicament by arguing that hindering the work of a Bodhisattva triggers a mechanism that makes hells virtually inescapable. This is because the Bodhisattva whose work is hindered is none other than the practitioner himself if he were to relapse and revoke his decision, or if he were not doing his very best to

14

 These are only briefly mentioned or indicated, see BCA 4:5; 8:40; 10:17f.

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live up to it (see vss. 1:34; 4:21-25). Moreover if – as one may interpret vs. 4:22 – the suffering in hell produces further evil thoughts, thereby generating ever new negative karma, any escape from hell becomes virtually impossible.15 However, it is not at all Śāntideva’s intention to depict the practitioner’s situation as entirely hopeless. With his radical sharpening of the existential choice between the fate of hell or the Bodhisattva path, Śāntideva pursues at least the following four goals: First, the fear of hell and prospect of future Buddhahood shall appeal to the practitioner’s self-interest.16 It will be for his own greater happiness if he or she follows the Bodhisattva path. A clear example of this strategy is Śāntideva’s employment of the fear of hell as a motivation to practice mindfulness (vss. 5:29; 7:68).17 How the ethical dimension of the Bodhisattva path is underpinned by this kind of self-interest is also evident in Śāntideva’s reference to the guardians of hell as the protectors of the weak and even of guilty people (vs. 6:130). These protectors are so strong and merciless, it is in one’s own best interest not to harm those who are guilty or feeble.18 Second, the inconceivable suffering in hell exceeds in an immeasurable way all the suffering that one will have to face on the Bodhisattva path (e.g. vss. 6:72-74, 131; 7:11-12; 8:82-84, 126). With this, Śāntideva is again taking up an early Buddhist motif.19 But he transforms it by arguing that the kind of suffering that appears negligible compared to suffering in hell is an inevitable part of the Bodhisattva path. This strategy is thus in a sense still “hedonistic.” Some comparatively minor suffering in this world, as a Bodhisattva, is much better than the immeasurable suffering in the hereafter (vs. 6:72): If a man condemned to death is released after his hand has been cut off, is this misfortune? If one is spared hells through human sufferings, is this misfortune? 15

 See above, Part II, chap. 4, pp. 187f, fn. 14 and 15.  Har Dayal (2004, 205) has spoken of this strategy as “pure hedonism.” This, however, applies at best only to the beginning of the path. 17  This is fully in line with the canonical scriptures. In MN 130, negligence (pamajjati) is declared to be the root cause leading people to hell. 18  A good example may be the Saddharmasmṛtyupasthāna threat that in the Saṅghāta hell, “those who have raped native women or passed them on to others while serving duty as victorious soldiers in a foreign country are hung upside-down from trees and burnt. As the flames reach their mouths they attempt to cry out in agony but instead of making a sound, the flame rushes inside their bodies to burn their innards.” Matsunaga; Matsunaga 1972, 112. 19  See MN 129 and 130. 16

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Such imagery will not be alien to Christian readers (cf. Mk. 9:43-48). Third, as horrible and inevitable as the prospect of infernal rebirth may appear, it serves as the dark background against which the light of bodhicitta shines even brighter. If one develops the altruistic mind of bodhicitta, it immediately overpowers the negative karmic energies of one’s sins.20 Under its protection, one escapes the otherwise inescapable hells (vss. 1:13f). Although the motivation here is also one of self-interest, this strategy prepares Śāntideva’s central point that in the end, radical altruism and self-interest coincide. Fourth and finally, his goal is to show that the danger of hell drives the practitioner into the arms of the Bodhisattvas, that is, the apparent hopelessness of his situation spurs him or her to constantly seek the protection of the compassionate Bodhisattvas (vss. 1:35, 2:6, 64-66) and thereby motivates the practitioner to follow their example (vss. 6:124-127). He can rely on the Bodhisattvas as beings who even descend into the hells in order to save the denizens from their ordeal (vss. 6:120; 8:107; 10:4-16), and he will find “pleasure in the fact that the Masters, ocean-like, yield the spirit of awakening which brings happiness to all beings and to all beings brings ease” (vs. 3:3). In some places in the BCA, Śāntideva does not merely say that the defilements are the root cause triggering the deeds that lead to rebirth in hell. He goes further in claiming that the hells are the mind’s own creation, as for example in vss. 5:7-8: Who has carefully forged the weapons in hell, who the scalding iron floor? And whence do those women [who torment adulterers] come from? The Wise One has taught that all this has arisen from a sinful mind. Therefore, in the threefold world, nothing is frightening but the mind.

This naturally raises questions about the ontological status that Śāntideva ascribes to the hells. Does he consider them merely products of human imagination? Is existence in hells similar to a purely mind-based 20  Similar ideas are not unknown outside Mahāyāna Buddhism. In Milindapañha 80, Nāgasena defends the view that “though a man should have lived a hundred years an evil life, yet if, at the moment of death, thoughts of the Buddha should enter his mind, he will be reborn among the gods.” He compares this to a huge load of stones which do not sink into the sea if they are carried by a boat (Rhys Davids 1963, vol. I, pp. 124f). Braarvig (2009, 275) is thus wrong in claiming “in early Buddhism, contrary e.g. to Christianity, to express your faith in the last moment before death has no effect on your fate in the afterlife – the principle of kamma is merciless and impossible to change.”

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horrific dream that lacks in more solid reality?21 The answer is not easy, nor is it straightforward. It needs to take into account two different issues: first, the Madhyamaka distinction between the two truths or realities (satya) and second, the particular nature of certain infernal phenomena, such as the hells’ personnel and infernal beasts. First of all, there is no indication that for Śāntideva the ontological status of the hells – and of rebirth in the hells – is essentially different from rebirth in the other realms of samsara, such as the realm of hungry ghosts, animals, human beings or deities. If Śāntideva says that the hells are created by the mind, or – more precisely – by the karmic energies caused by the defilements (see vss. 4:27-31; 5:1-8; 6:46; 8:40, 71), this does not necessarily imply that the ontological nature of the hells resembles the bardo states the mind experiences, according to some Tibetan traditions, between two reincarnations. This is because it is a general Buddhist belief that each world system, with all its five or six realms of rebirth, is created by the collective karmic energies of the sentient beings from the previous world. As it is summarized in the Abhidharmakośa (4:1): The variety of the world arises from action (karma). It is volition and that which is produced through volition. Volition is mental action…22

As such, this view is not expressive of an ontological idealism. It rather regards karmic energies as being the creative factor that causes a new world to arise. The evil karma of beings leads to the emergence of the lower realms of existence; their good karma is responsible for the emergence of the human and heavenly realms. When Śāntideva says that the hells are created by the mind (vss. 5:1-8) or by one’s actions/karma (vs. 6:46), this is therefore fully in line with general Buddhist cosmological speculations.23 And yet, things are not as simple as that. The Buddhist tradition before Śāntideva had experienced a longer debate about the specific nature of the infernal torturers and jailers, as well as of the wild beasts, horrible birds, ogresses or female temptresses in the hells. Are these real 21  This seems to be what Amod Lele suggests when writing (2007, 185): “More broadly, he claims that the hells, and fear and suffering more generally, are created by the mind alone (BCA V.6-7), even though he does not subscribe to the more general Yogācāra position that everything is created by the mind (BCA IX.17-37).” 22  Pruden 1988-90, vol. 2, 551. 23  See, for example, Abhidharmakośabhāṣya at 3:59c‒d: “The sixteen hells are created through the force of the actions of beings (…).” Pruden 1988-90, vol. II, 459.

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sentient beings in the sense that they have been reborn into these kind of positions? This is already reported as a disputed issue in the Kathāvatthu (20:3) and in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (at 3:59a‒c). A number of Buddhists held that these are not proper samsaric beings,24 but phantoms manifested entirely by the bad karma of the denizens.25 This is clearly the position taken by the ŚS in view of the infernal temptresses (see ŚS 71). We may therefore assume that this is also what Śāntideva has in mind when he says in BCA 4:35 that the “guardians of the dungeon of life and the jailers of the damned in the hells stay in the house of my mind.” Yet their ontological nature is a special case. If the torturers and temptresses in the hells are phantoms in a narrow sense, this does not imply that the whole realm of hells is a phantasmagoria, at least not in a sense that would make the hells ontologically different from life in other realms and forms of samsaric existence. This, however, is not the position of the Yogācārins. Vasubandhu uses the example of the phantom nature of the infernal guards to illustrate his position of an objective idealism. To him, the infernal guards are not a special case. They just demonstrate that different minds can collectively experience the same kind of phantom without thereby turning the phantom into a mind-independent reality. But in contrast to Buddhist realism, Vasubandhu ascribes the same illusory status to all reality.26 In this respect Amod Lele’s remark that Śāntideva “does not subscribe to the more general Yogācāra position that everything is created by the mind”27 may be misleading. Śāntideva’s target in his critique of the Yogācārins is not their illusionism, but rather their attempt to exempt the mind from this. According to Śāntideva, the mind (vss. 9:27f) and all forms of samsaric existence are illusory (vs. 9:158), that is, they share the nature of māyā (vss. 4:47b, 9:151a). The guards and creatures of hell are a special phantom within the framework of an illusory world: a dream within a dream. From the perspective of absolute reality, there is neither suffering nor happiness, there are no beings nor any place where they might be 24  Because the jailers, torturers, etc. are not in hell to suffer the result of their negative karma. Moreover, if they were samsaric beings, they would have no choice but to constantly earn new bad karma. 25  In contrast, Yama is considered – on account of respective scriptural statements – as a proper samsaric being who can and will one day be reborn in some other place (with presumably a new being filling his position, as is the case with a number of particular deities). 26  See his argument in the Viṃśatikā 1-7. Kochumuttom 1989, 164-170. 27  See above, p. 336, fn. 21.

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reborn (vss. 9:153-154). In the highest sense of truth, all are saved (vss. 9:104, 151b). However, as long as people do not break through to this liberating insight, the samsaric worlds, including the hells, are as real to them as a dream (and any dream within a dream) is real to the dreamer (vss. 9:88, 100, 141, 151, 158, 169). Thus, Śāntideva takes the hells as “real” within the boundaries of relative reality (saṃvṛtisatya). That is, to him the hells (with the exception of their personnel) are at least not less real than ordinary human life. Śāntideva would be misread if one were to regard his approach to the ontological status of the hells as an exercise in demythologization.28 In the end, the hells are indeed illusory. But they are as illusory as human life or any other form of samsaric existence, and therefore they are also as relatively real as ordinary human life. The horrors of hell and the troubles in life form a continuum – even if the first are thought to exceed the latter by gigantic proportions. Does this give us a clue of how to make sense of such beliefs? It is noteworthy that some of the early canonical texts on hells draw a link between criminal punishments in the human world and infernal punishment. MN 130 recalls that kings tend to torture criminals in many ways. A robber, for example, is “…flogged with whips, beaten with canes, beaten with clubs;” the kings will have “his hands cut off, his feet cut off, his hands and feet cut off; his ears cut off, his nose cut off, his ears and nose cut off;” they subject him “to the ‘porridge pot,’ to the ‘polished-shell shave,’ to the ‘Rāhu’s mouth,’ to the ‘bark dress,’ to the ‘antelope,’ to the ‘meat hooks,’ to the ‘coins,’ to the ‘lye pickling,’ to the ‘pivoting pin,’ to the ‘rolled-up palliasse’”; he will be “splashed with boiling oil, … thrown to be devoured by dogs, impaled alive on stakes, and having his head cut off with a sword.”29

Once a sinner has died, King Yama, who reigns over the hells, will ask him: Good man, did it never occur to you – an intelligent and mature man – “Those who do evil actions have such tortures of various kinds inflicted on them here and now; so what in the hereafter? Surely I had better do good by body, speech, and mind”?30

28  Although this is not entirely clear, this kind of demythologization seems to be the approach of Daigan and Alicia Matsunaga in their suggesting a “symbolic” understanding (1972, 60, 72, 81). 29  Ñāṇamoli, Bodhi 2001, 1031 (repeating p. 1016). 30  Ibid.

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It is not clear what all these various tortures consisted of. But it is apparent that the huge variety of torturing methods, which Buddhist imagination ascribes to the numerous hells, has its model in the wealth of cruel punishments practiced in ancient India.31 This link is made explicit in the related sutta of MN 129, where the Buddha speaks of a “robber culprit” who is punished by being struck with a hundred spears in the morning, a hundred spears at noon and a hundred spears at night, and then gives the following simile: Then, taking a small stone the size of his hand, the Blessed One addressed the bhikkhus thus: “What do you think, bhikkhus? Which is greater, this small stone that I have taken, the size of my hand, or Himalaya, the king of the mountains?” “Venerable sir, the small stone that the Blessed One has taken, the size of his hand, does not count beside Himalaya, the king of the mountains; it is not even a fraction, there is no comparison.” “So too, bhikkhus, the pain and grief that the man would experience because of being struck with the three hundred spears does not count beside the suffering of hell; it is not even a fraction, there is no comparison.”32

The text continues with the description of the infernal tortures, such as the “fivefold transfixing” (“a red-hot iron stake” being driven through the victim’s two hands, his two feet and his belly); being cut up with axes and adzes; being harnessed to a chariot and drawn back and forth on the burning ground; being forced to climb a great mound of glowing coals; being boiled in a red-hot metal cauldron and finally being thrown into the hottest and worst of all hells. The analogy drawn by the Buddhist texts between extremely cruel forms of criminal punishment on earth and the incomparably worse forms of infernal tortures presents the latter as an additional and inescapable form of punishment. There may be criminals who escape being punished by earthly kings. But nobody can escape the punishment in the realm of king Yama. Daigan and Alicia Matsunaga are right in stating “There is no question that hell has been used as a device of fear by all major religions and Buddhism is no exception.”33 And the Matsunagas are also right in holding that this is not the only function of the Buddhist 31  See also Van Put 2005, 78: “No matter how cruel, it goes without saying that the main source of inspiration for hellish tortures came from common local methods of punishment.” 32  Ñāṇamoli, Bodhi 2001, 1018. 33  Matsunaga; Matsunaga 1972, viii.

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concept of hells. The same “actions” (in thought, word or deeds) that lead to infernal punishment are also responsible for the suffering in the here and now, not only the suffering inflicted by the evil-doer upon others, but also the suffering one creates for oneself. In this sense the meaning of the Buddhist hells may be taken as “symbolic,” without concluding that they are merely of a symbolic nature.34 There is no doubt that greed, hate and delusion, the roots of all evil deeds leading to hell, are also at the bottom of the numerous and exceedingly ferocious hells that humanity has created here on earth since its early days. Suffering caused to others and to oneself, whether here or in the hereafter, originates in the defilements – and this is fully in line with Śāntideva’s views. But apart from this basic and important message, the symbolic function of the Buddhist hells appears to be rather limited and more or less confined to being a source of unbearable fear. As we have seen, Śāntideva recommends in BCA 7:40-46 the “constant contemplation” of the fruits of one’s deeds, including the sinister prospect of infernal tortures (vs. 7:45). But one may wonder if there is more to this contemplation than the generation of angst. The different hells are correlated roughly to different types of transgressions,35 and the detailed description of the wealth of tortures frequently constructs a connection between a particular kind of sin and the respective punishment.36 Nevertheless, the pedagogical value of such correspondences seems to be small, if any. One example of a case in which one might detect some pedagogical significance in imagining specific infernal punishments may be the description in the Saddharmasmṛtyupasthāna of the outcome of sexual child abuse. “Here those who kidnap and molest children have the vision of their own children being physically tormented by steel hooks and pokers. They also are held upside down by the demons while molten liquid is poured into their anal orifices searing through their bodies until it burns out of their skulls.”37 The contemplation of the first form of punishment obviously tries to create empathy for the misused children by seeing one’s own children being tormented. But this is nevertheless a fairly poor means, since it ignores that misuse often happens within one’s own family. Much of the Buddhist descriptions of infernal agonies is 34

 See Matsunaga; Matsunaga 1972, viii‒ix. See also above, fn. 26.  For the rather strict correlation in the Saddharmasmṛtyupasthāna, see Demoto 2009, 65. 36  For various examples, see Cabezón 2017, 48-61. 37  Summary according to Matsunaga; Matsunaga 1972, 111. 35

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rather along the line of the second kind of punishment. The descriptions – and their corresponding visualizations in meditation practice – of the infernal torturing methods are sadistic to an exorbitant degree and are frequently of a sexual nature.38 In a number of cases the offenses punished in this way can hardly be assessed as misdeeds at all – at least not from a contemporary perspective. The Saddharmasmṛtyupasthāna, for example, proclaims that “Those who indulge in oral sexual practices have nails driven through their mouths and out the back of their heads by the hell demons. They also have bowls of molten copper poured down their throats and it penetrates scorching through their entire bodies until finally it escapes through their anal orifice.”39 And “Those who commit homosexual acts are attracted in this hell to a man of flame who burns them with his embrace.”40 Those who preach belief in a divine creator will have to suffer in a “place which is filled with flaming molten copper. An iron fish inhabits this boiling mass and chases the sinners until it catches them in its mouth. Then the sinners are forced to suffer doubly by having half their bodies burnt in the liquid and the other half bitten by the fish. There are also diamond beaked worms in the liquid that bite the sinners and when they attempt to open their mouths and scream out in agony, the molten copper pours within.”41 Severe punishments are also promised for those who destroy Buddhist temples, Buddhist images, or Buddhist scriptures. They will go to the worst of all hells, Avīci. “Every part of their body is burnt by a flame”; they are forced “to climb up the burning mountains of the hell”; “chunks of iron … rain down on them”; they are “pulverized from head to toe” and then restored to suffer the same tortures again and again. They are devoured by wild beasts;42 they “have molten copper or hot 38  For example, according to the Saddharmasmṛtyupasthāna “the man who deliberately engages in improper relations with a woman leading a virtuous life” is placed by the demons “on the burning hell floor studded with iron hooks. As they begin to cry out in agony, the demons then take a long bow-string shaped worm and insert it into their rectums. This worm with its sharp teeth, burning sensors and poisonous sting scorches its entrance into the body and proceeds to devour the entrails as it releases its painful poison. Gradually, it works its way upwards consuming whatever it touches until it arrives at the head. There, in order to make its escape, it cracks open a hole in the skull and slithers out.” Following the summary in Matsunaga; Matsunaga 1972, 127. 39  Ibid. 111. See also Cabezón 2017, 53f. According to Van Put (2005, 85f), this represents an increasing tendency in the development of the Buddhist teachings on hells. 40  Matsunaga; Matsunaga 1972, 112. 41  Ibid. 123. 42  Ibid. 132f.

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coarse sand rubbed into their eyes. The fingers and hands that destroyed the Dharma are in turn cut off by sharp swords.”43 Whatever kind of symbolism one may read into such descriptions, they seem to display a psychopathic imagination and the practice of their visualization and contemplation raises the serious question of whether this form of meditation does not belong more on the side of the respective evil, than on the side of a therapeutic means. That such visualization practices still prevail can be seen from their vivid and “warm” recommendation in Kunzang Pelden’s commentary on the BCA.44 And in present day Thailand, the depiction of infernal tortures in popular “theme parks” serves the “moral” education of the Buddhist laity and especially young children.45 In contemporary Western literature on Buddhism, the hells do not feature prominently.46 However, as José Cabezón has rightly stated: “whatever one’s reaction to this literature, it would be foolish to simply disregard it, for it teaches us a great deal about the Buddhist world at an important point in history.”47 The lesson, though, is hardly only about the past. Cabezón’s warning is even more apt when it comes to a Christian reflection on Buddhism. This is because Christianity (like other major religions) is not at all free of similarly sadistic products of human imagination. This is already the case in one of the earliest explicit descriptions of hell found in the influential Apocalypse of Peter, dating from the early second century CE. The resemblance of its infernal tortures to those reported in the Buddhist scriptures is striking. Sinners are hung by their tongues, their hair, necks or loins. They are thrown into pits full of filth or filled with unquenchable fire, tormented by venomous beasts devouring their flesh, worms devouring their entrails, birds hacking their bodies. They are tormented by red-hot irons; their eyes are burnt, their lips cut off; fire enters their mouths and entrails. They are cast onto pillars of fire or of sharp swords, or cast off high places again and again. They are chastised with all sorts of pains and their flesh is cut off. They are

43

 Ibid. 135.  Pelden 2007, 400-407. 45  See Anderson 2016. 46  A particularly telling example is The Cowherds 2016. This volume, produced by a group of fine scholars, is in its entirety dedicated to Madhyamaka ethics with a focus on Śāntideva. However, the significance of belief in hell for Śāntideva’s ethics and soteriology is ignored almost entirely. One does not find “hell” in the index and the few places in the book where the hells are mentioned at all are predominantly quotations from traditional Buddhist texts. 47  Cabezón 2017, 71. 44

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chained with chains of fire. They are forced to mount hills of fire, and after slipping off, they have to mount up again. They are thrown into a river of fire or bound to wheels of fire. Young girls who have not kept their virginity are chastised badly and their flesh is torn into pieces; slaves who were not obedient to their masters are tormented with fire. Other transgressions mentioned in the Apocalypse of Peter include speaking blasphemously of the way of righteousness, slandering it or merely doubting it, persecuting followers of the righteous path, creating and worshiping idols, engaging in illegitimate sexual relations, in homosexual relations, fornication, abortion, murder, trusting in one’s riches and despising widows or women with fatherless children, lending money and taking usury, deceit, false witness, hypocrisy, forsaking God’s commandments, not honoring one’s father and mother, being disobedient to them, not honoring elders, etc. As in Buddhism, sometimes there are obvious correlations between specific transgressions and particular types of tortures. But different from Buddhism, it is declared again and again that there will be no end to all this suffering.48 In the course of Christianity’s further development, at least four different infernal realms were distinguished. However, it was not before the end of the Middle Ages that this distinction had become fairly standard: (1) purgatory (purgatorium), that is, a realm of pain and suffering but serving the gradual purification of the soul, which at some stage will go from there to heaven. Then limbo, with its two compartments of (2) the limbus puerorum and (3) the limbus patrum. The limbus puerorum was the final destination of all infants who died before being baptized and were therefore excluded from the full beatific vision of God. But a number of theologians did not conceive the limbus puerorum as a place of suffering; instead it was seen as a place of some natural beatitude, albeit less blissful than the supernatural beatitude of heaven. Something similar applies to the limbus patrum, which harbored the patriarchs and righteous ones of the old covenant before they were brought from there to heaven by Christ after his descent to “hell,” that is to limbo, between his crucifixion and resurrection. Many theologians believed that the limbus patrum was also the place, in this case, the permanent place, of all righteous gentiles, in particular of heathens such as Plato or Aristotle, whose philosophy had become so highly respected in Christianity. Finally there was (4) hell in the proper sense (infernum), that is, the place of irreversible damnation and suffering.

48

 James 1926, pp. 514-518, 523f.

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Only few theologians rejected the idea of an irredeemable hell. It was in particular Origen of Alexandria (2nd–3rd cent.) and his school who interpreted all infernal suffering as a painful but ultimately successful purification process. In the end, everybody will be saved. But this position was judged as heretical, so that belief in eternal damnation became a touchstone of orthodoxy. Another point of controversy was the question of the ontological status of hell and the material nature of its punishments. John Scotus Eriugena, the distinguished scholar of the ninth century who taught at the court of King Charles the Bald, strongly rejected the view of heaven and hell as physical places. Heaven stands for the return to God and the fire of hell is an image for insatiable desire, the darkness of ignorance and the remorse about one’s former sins. Following the tradition of Origen, Eriugena rejected the idea of eternal damnation.49 Painful remorse will not last forever and those who mourn will be comforted.50 Eriugena’s position, however, could not prevail and was officially and repeatedly condemned. Most medieval theologians defended both the material and irreversible character of hell. At the beginning of the modern era, the Jesuit theologian Francisco Suárez (1548-1617) taught both as the true doctrine of the Catholic Church. Ignatius of Loyola (1491-1556), the founder of the Jesuit order, introduced the contemplation of hell into the first week of his famous “spiritual exercises.” The practitioner is advised to see in imagination the vast fires, and the souls enclosed, as it were, in bodies of fire … To hear the wailing, the howling, cries, and blasphemies against Christ our Lord and against His saints (…) With the sense of smell to perceive the smoke, the sulphur, the filth, and corruption. (…) To taste the bitterness of tears, sadness, and remorse of conscience. (…) With the sense of touch to feel the flames which envelop and burn the souls. (Exercises 066-070).

In order to increase the mental impact of his contemplation and visualization, the practitioner should accompany his practice by a reduction of food and sleep and by chastising the body, “that is, to inflict sensible pain on it. This is done by wearing hairshirts, cords, or iron chains on the body, or by scourging or wounding oneself, and by other kinds of austerities” (085).51

49

 For brief summaries, see O’Meara 1969, 57-60; Flasch 2016, 210-220.  Flasch 2016, 217. 51  Translation by Louis J. Puhl, SJ. 50

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In Christianity, “hell” represents the idea of ultimate evil and, as in Buddhism, one might ask if the graphic representation and imagination of it do not belong to this evil. Theologically speaking, ultimate evil is the unredeemable, irreconcilable rift in the divine‒human relationship. Significant strands in contemporary theology therefore either deny the existence of “hell” in this sense, or regard it as a symbol of and warning against such an utter existential possibility, without however implying that this possibility has ever materialized, or will ever do so in the future (this is the well-known position taken by Karl Rahner52). If hell were to become real, God’s salvific will would have ultimately failed. 53 To Śāntideva, “hell” stands for ultimate suffering. It, too, has symbolic meaning, but it is seen as a symbolic reality within the dimension of “relative” or, better, “veiled” or “obscured” (saṃvṛti) reality. It does not represent the ultimate nature of reality. As we have seen, Śāntideva makes hell almost inescapable. He is not explicitly denying the general Buddhist belief in the non-eternity of hell, but with the idea of accumulating further negative karma in hell (probably implied in vss. 4:21f), he makes it virtually everlasting. Yet it is not irredeemable. The powerful antidote is bodhicitta. Its fire is stronger than the fire created by the most vicious sins (vss. 1:13f). Bodhicitta originates from the ultimate nature (paramārtha) of reality and becomes manifest through the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. Its essence is compassion. And this compassion is stronger than hell. Relying on the Bodhisattvas’ compassion, one escapes the infernal outcome of one’s negative karma. Emulating their compassion, one strives to liberate all others from their dreadful fate. The fear of hell, the fear of one’s own utmost suffering, is a spiritual incentive only at the beginning of the path. Towards the end it shall be fully transformed into compassion with the suffering of others. Once they have been accepted as one’s own self, the fear of one’s own suffering in hell becomes the fear of their suffering in hell. This is the spirit that overcomes hell (vss. 10:416); this is the spirit revealing that from the perspective of ultimate reality, all beings are saved (vss. 9:104b, 151b).

52 53

 See Rahner 1978, 443f.  See Hick 1985, 198-201, 242-261.

CHAPTER 8

BODHICARYĀVATĀRA 8 THE PERFECTION OF ABSORPTION (DHYĀNAPĀRAMITĀ)

COMMENTARY 1. A Note on the Structure of Chapter 8 The canonical version of the BCA places the present chapter under the rubric of the fifth Bodhisattva virtue (pāramitā): the perfection of meditative absorption (dhyānapāramitā). But let us recall what has been said at the beginning of our commentary on chapter 7: Significant parts of chapter 8 are not found in the corresponding chapter of the (presumably) earlier Dūn-huáng version (= Dūn-huáng chapter 7), but in the preceding chapter on the perfection of vigor (vīryapāramitā).1 This concerns in particular the two contemplations of “the sameness of others and oneself” and “the exchange of others and oneself,” which the Dūnhuáng version treats in its chapter 6 (which corresponds to BCA 7) as numbers five and six of the “six aids of vigor.” In the Dūn-huáng version, the chapter on meditative absorption primarily deals with the praise of ascetic seclusion for the purpose of meditation. On this, however, it has a number of extra verses without counterparts in the canonical BCA. Conversely, the canonical chapter 8 has numerous verses that are not found in the Dūn-huáng version (neither in its chapter 7 nor 6).2 Among these are the three longer sections of vss. 8:102-113, 139-154 and 174184.3 As we will see, the contemplation of the equation and even identification of self and others most likely has its roots in the ancient meditative practice of the brahmavihāra. With the shift of these two 1

 See above, Part II, chap. 7, pp. 305-307.  See Saito 2000, 29-48 and Ishida 2010, 2013, 2014. 3  This accounts for the otherwise somewhat odd repetitions (vss. 116 5 109, 158 5 111 and 159 5 139, vss. 109, 111 and 139 all being absent from the Dūn-huáng version), which are clearly signs of later redactional work. 2

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contemplative exercises from the previous to the present chapter, the canonical BCA makes an important point. It places the mental development of the Bodhisattva’s identification with all other beings – in which the Bodhisattva follows the model of the Buddhas (see vs. 6:126) – at the center of meditative cultivation. More traditional topics, such as the praise of ascetic solitude and the so-called foulness meditation, are given the status of a preparation for the cultivation of the altruistic essence of bodhicitta (vs. 89), while topics such as the various absorptive levels (dhyāna) or the development of the higher mental faculties (abhijñā)4 are entirely absent from this chapter. Yet as we will see, meditative absorption and the practice of mindfulness meditation will appear in chapter 9, where they form the model and basic pattern for some of Śāntideva’s argumentative strategies.5 In the Dūn-huáng version, the chapter begins with what is now BCA 8:4. The preceding vss. 1-3 – apparently a later addition – provide us with an overview of the chapter’s content in its present (presumably) reworked form. Vss. 1-2 place the chapter into the BCA’s overall topic of the fight between bodhicitta and the defilements (as does vs. 4). The purpose of meditative absorption lies in overcoming mental distractions (vs. 2), that is (in traditional, positive terms), in the generation of contemplation or mental “single-pointedness”6 (see also the concluding vs. 8:186). Such focusing is necessary for the liberation from the defilements (vs. 1). Overcoming the distractions requires the “seclusion” (viveka)7 of body and mind by means of severing the attachment to the world (vs. 2), which is specified more closely as “love” as well as “greed for profit and other things.” The structure of the whole chapter unfolds in expanding the ideas comprised in these three verses. There are three main parts: First, the renunciation of the world (vss. 2-88) via seclusion of body (vss. 4-38) and mind (vss. 39-88); second, the development of the mental focus (vss. 89-158) by contemplating the equality (vss. 90-110) and the exchange (vss. 111-158) of self and others; and third, the embodied practice of the bodhisattva’s 4  Cf. for example the section on dhyānapāramitā in the PS 5 (Meadows 1986, 220239). 5  See below, Part II, chap. 9, pp. 424 and 449f. 6  Cittaikāgra – a term explicitly used in vs 8:39 introducing the section on the seclusion of the mind. 7  As has been pointed out by Crosby and Skilton (see Śāntideva 1995, 78f), the term viveka-ja (“born of seclusion”) is intrinsically connected to the ancient description of the generation of meditative absorption.

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altruistically transformed self-understanding (vss. 159-184). The chapter ends with the two concluding verses 185-186. TRANSLATION: 8:1-38 Introduction 1. If one has increased vigor in this manner, one should stabilize one’s mind in meditative absorption, because a person whose mind is distracted is caught in the fangs of the defilements.

Renunciation of the world 2. By secluding body and mind [from the world] distraction does not set in. Therefore one should renounce the world and then utterly shun distracting deliberations. 3. Due to love, and also to greed for profit and other things, one does not renounce the world. Therefore to renounce these, may the prudent consider the following:

Seclusion of the body 4. Realizing that the defilements are eradicated by one who through tranquility (śamatha) is well provided with insight (vipaśyanā), one should first strive for tranquility. But this comes from indifference to rejoicing in the world.

Renunciation of love and false friendship 5. Which transient being can love transient beings? Since for thousands of lives the one you love may not be seen again. 6. Not seeing the beloved one, one becomes sorrowful and does not remain in absorption. And even on seeing the beloved one, one is not satisfied: one is troubled by keen desire as before. 7. One does not see what there is, one loses the [wholesome] fright [of the hells], one is still scorched by the same grief because one yearns for companionship with the beloved. 8. Since one is preoccupied with the beloved one, a short life passes by again and again. Through an impermanent friend (mitreṇa M instead of dharmeṇa V), the permanent Teaching is lost. 9. He who lives the way of fools will certainly drift towards a bad state. Yet he who does not live their way is not appreciated by them. What is gained from linking up with fools? 10. One moment they are friends, one moment they are enemies. When there is reason for joy, they are enraged. The vulgar are hard to please.

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11. When given good advice, they get angry and they keep me from what is good. If they are not listened to, they, angry, drift towards a bad state. 12. Jealousy of superiors, quarrels with peers, despise of inferiors, intoxication by praise and hate for being censured. So when would any good come from a fool? 13. Self-aggrandizement, belittling of others, talking about the pleasures in cyclic existences: some sort of such ill is surely to come to one fool from another. 14. In this way calamities accrue also for the former, since he keeps company with the latter. I want to live alone, happy and with an undefiled mind. 15. One should withdraw from a fool! If one is met, one should win him over with pleasantries. But not with the intent of becoming familiar, rather as an indifferent well-disposed person. 16. Just as the bee takes pollen from the flower, I will live anywhere with nothing but what serves the Teaching, unfamiliar as the unpreceded new moon.

Renunciation of greed for profit and fame 17. The fear of approaching death will come forth to the mortal who thinks “I am wealthy and honored, and many ask after me.” 18. In whatever a mind confused by happiness searches for pleasure, all that will present itself turned into suffering multiplied thousandfold. 19. The wise one should therefore not crave for this pleasure. From craving arises fear. But this goes away just by itself. Make yourself steadfast and just wait! 20. There have been many wealthy and many famous. One does not know where they went with their wealth and with their fame. 21. Others despise me, true; why am I pleased when being praised? Others praise me, true; why do I worry when being reviled? 22. With their various preferences, sentient beings are not satisfied even by the Victors, let alone by ignorant ones like me. Why, then, concern oneself with the world? 23. They revile a being that is poor, they think badly of someone wealthy. How can pleasure arise with those with whom it is naturally disagreeable to live? 24. The Buddhas said that a fool is nobody’s friend, since for fools affection does not emerge without their own interest. 25. Affection through one’s own interest is nothing but affection for oneself, just like grief over losing possessions, for this is caused by the loss of comfort.

Life in the wilderness 26. Trees do not think ill and are not hard to please. When will I dwell with those with whom living is agreeable?

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27. Lingering in an abandoned temple, at the foot of a tree, or in caves, when will I go along unconcerned without looking back? 28. When will I roam freely and without a home in the wild expansive regions owned by no one? 29. When will I roam about with the wealth of a mere clay bowl, in the robes of a monk of no use to thieves, fearless, not attending to my body? 30. When will I enter the charnel ground destined to myself and weigh my decaying body against other corpses? 31. For surely this, my body, will also become so putrid that not even jackals will creep up to it due to its stench. 32. Although seen as a whole, the pieces of bone that belong to this body shall be strewn all over; how much more so the other beloved one. 33. A human being is born alone, and quite alone it dies. No one else shares in its agonies. Of what use are the beloved ones who obstruct [my merits]? 34. Just as someone who wanders on a road takes lodging, so too he who is wandering on the road of existences takes lodging in a birth. 35. As long as he is not carried out from there by the four men to the charnel ground, mourned by the world, he should move to the woods. 36. Free of praise and opposition, the poor body is all alone. Dead to the world already, he does not grieve when he dies. 37. Moreover, no one will stand around and torment him with their grief, and no one will distract his recollection, say, of the Buddha. 38. Therefore I must always cherish solitude, which is delightful and effortless, brings beatitude and soothes all distractions.

COMMENTARY 2. The Legacy of the Śramaṇas It is for the eradication of the defilements, says vs. 4, that one must give the mind its meditative focusing. The two major types of Buddhist meditative practice are mentioned: śamatha meditation, i.e. exercises for the calming of the mind, and vipaśyanā, i.e. exercises8 arousing insight into the three basic features (trilakṣana) of unredeemed, samsaric existence: its “transience” (anitya), its unsatisfactory and distressing character (duḥkha) and its lack of a substantial, immutable self (anātman). The 8  Usually connected to the training of “mindfulness” (smṛti) and “circumspection” (saṃprajanya), treated in BCA 5.

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relationship between insight and mental concentration is explained as reciprocal. Calming of the mind will lead to deepened insight. But insight is also a precondition of the śamatha practice: through insight one must become indifferent to the luring of the ordinary worldly goals. The subsequent verses clarify these as the clinging to beloved persons (vss. 3-8) or false friends (vss. 9-16), and the attachment to profit and fame (vss. 17-25). Behind this stands the Buddhist critique of the ordinary – and Vedic (!) – goals in life. Sensual/erotic enjoyment (kāma) (vs. 40) and wealth/power (artha) (vs. 71) are unable to provide lasting satisfaction. Only someone who no longer aims at artha and kāma will be willing to leave the world and pursue the goal of liberation by leading the life of a homeless ascetic. Vss. 5-38 expound on the insight that evokes such renunciation (the “seclusion of the body”) and thereby prepares the right mental concentration. In turn, vss. 39-88 show how mental concentration will deepen and radicalize this insight (the “seclusion of the mind”). Internalizing the three features of samsaric existence is crucial for both the bodily and the mental rejection of the worldly distractions, even if understanding the full implications of the not-self (anātman) aspect is primarily reserved for the seclusion of the mind and the subsequent contemplations. After this twofold seclusion, the practitioner will be ready to concentrate on the deconstruction of the old and the development of a new self-concept – one that is at the heart of bodhicitta, the mind of the Buddha-to-be. As in several other places of the BCA9 – and in line with the bulk of the Buddhist tradition10 – Śāntideva once more presents the realization of existential transience as most crucial. Life’s evanescence implies the futility of all clinging; nothing, neither the beloved person nor cherished property can be kept forever. Transience, in combination with clinging, causes suffering (vss. 5-6, 17, 20, 25). Not just the actual loss, or the fear of loss, is distressful; what is transient is essentially unable to satisfy the deepest human longing (vss. 6, 21). The mundane pleasures arising from artha and kāma are deceiving. They lure one into a life that will inevitably end up in suffering (vss. 18-19). In this sense, love is proverbially blind (vs. 7). Dismissing the wholesome fear of hell, one will miss the rare opportunity of following the non-transient truth of the Dharma (vss. 7-8). The realization of transience, not only of loving relations and material possessions, but also and primarily of one’s own life (vss. 30-33), 9

 E.g. BCA 2:33-47; 6:55-59; 7:4-15.  See Schmidt-Leukel 2006, 31-37.

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becomes the prime motivation for giving up the deceiving pleasures and turning one’s back on the world. These general topics of the classical Buddhist existential analysis are interwoven with the contrast of either living in the company of fools or in the freedom of ascetic solitude.11 Both motifs go back to the early days of Buddhism, especially its roots in the ancient Indian śramaṇa movements that propagated the goal of liberation (mokṣa) as superior to the Vedic goals of artha and kāma.12 In order to gain the liberating insight, according to the śramaṇas it was indispensable to renounce the world, withdraw to the wilderness and practice various austerities and meditative exercises. Canonical Buddhist collections such as the Sutta-Nipāta13 or the Theragāthā14 are replete with texts celebrating the ideal of the Buddhist hermit and mocking the foolishness of ordinary worldly goals. A fairly ancient narrative scheme of the Buddhist path of salvation, frequently repeated throughout the canon, begins with the decision of a householder, upon hearing the word of the Buddha and gaining insight into the limitations of mundane life, to renounce the world and retreat to the wilderness, where he practices moral restraint and mental concentration in order to attain the liberating awakening.15 As Jan Nattier and Daniel Boucher have shown, this ascetic heritage has also played a major role in the development of the Bodhisattva ideal.16 Although the Bodhisattva does not strive primarily for his own liberation, but seeks to become a Buddha for the sake of all sentient beings, nevertheless some early texts17 consider his renunciation of the world and the practice, at least temporarily, of an eremitic lifestyle as

11  Much of this is the work of the redactor. Vss. 9-13, 15-16, 24-25, which develop the topic of the “fool,” have no parallel in the Dūn-huáng version but are fairly close to some of the verses quoted from the Candrapradīpa-sūtra in ŚS 194-195. 12  See above, Part II, chap. 6, pp. 272f. 13  See Bodhi 2017. See especially the Muni-sutta (207-221) and the Khaggavisāṇasutta (35-75), both being part of the Sutta Nipāta. The Khaggavisāṇa-sutta compares the eremitic itinerant life in solitude with the behavior of a rhinoceros – a simile which, in a range of later Buddhist texts, became standard for describing the ideal of the life in the wilderness. See also ŚS 194-196. 14  See Norman 1997. For a substantiation of the highly likely influence of the Theragāthā on later wilderness texts, see also Boucher 2008, 69-71. 15  E.g. DN 2; 3; MN 27; 38, and passim. 16  Nattier 2003; Boucher 2008. 17  Boucher (2008, 53 and 193, fn. 48) mentions the Rāṣṭrapālaparipṛcchā-sūtra, the Ratnarāśi, the Kāśyapa-parivarta, the Ugraparipṛcchā and the Candrapradīpa-sūtra of the Samādhirāja-sūtra, all quoted in the eleventh chapter of the ŚS.

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indispensable for accomplishing his goal.18 According to this tradition, a life in solitude is sought in order to prepare oneself for the task of everybody’s liberation.19 But there is more behind the present section of the BCA. The praise of a solitary life in the wilderness in combination with the rejection of sexual desire and the sharp criticism of any striving for “fame and profit” is a characteristic feature of a group of texts that are all quoted in the eleventh chapter of the ŚS.20 It is clear that chapter 11 of the ŚS stands in close relation to the redactional revision of the canonical BCA 8.21 In this group of texts, the ascetic heritage is celebrated in view of the purported, harshly condemned decadence of the cenobitic monastic Sangha. It is therefore very well possible (although not stated explicitly) that the verses of the present section (which censure erotic love, worldly company and greed for fame and profit, while condemning the deluded attitude of “fools”) are also directed against such Buddhist monks who have outwardly renounced the world, but inwardly have not become indifferent to the temptations of a mundane life.22 The ideal of seclusion in the wilderness would then function as a counter-image inculcating the 18  See Nattier 2003, 131; Boucher 2008, 53. ŚS 193 quotes the following verse from the Candrapradīpa-sūtra: “And all those who long for Awakening and are disenchanted with bad conditioning, In order to help sentient beings, Should turn towards the wilderness…” (Goodman 2016, 190). 19  See Nattier 2003, 132-135. 20  See above fn. 17. The Rāṣṭrapālaparipṛcchā-sūtra (17) names the “clinging to” and “extortion to profit and honor” as two major “pitfalls of bodhisattvas,” along with “lack of respect” and “ingratitude and fondness for deceit” (Boucher 2008, 127). 21  As another piece of evidence, note that the quotation of a Buddha word in BCA 8:24, which is not found in the Dūn-huáng version (see above, fn. 11), apparently refers to the following verse from the Candrapradīpa-sūtra: “Fools are divisive by nature; where is there a true friend among ordinary people?” (Goodman 2016, 191), which is cited in ŚS chapter 11 (ŚS 194). 22  Compare, for example, BCA 8:12-13, 17 with verses such as the following from Rāṣṭrapālaparipṛcchā-sūtra (29f) directed against decadent monks: “Seeing monks rich in virtues, they speak ill of them. These hypocrites are given to immorality and deception and cause the ruin of women, for they are truly horrible. A householder is not as covetous with passions as these [corrupt monks] after going forth. They would have wives, sons, and daughters just like a householder. At which household they are favored with robes, alms, and requisites, they are desirous of the [householder’s] wife, for these ignoble ones are always under the spell of the defilements. (…)

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Buddhist ideal in the face of clerical corruption. The wished-for and idealized nature of the life in the wilderness finds its poetic expression in the refrain-like use of the words “when will I…?” (vss. 26-30), which is strongly reminiscent of Theragāthā 1091-1145.23 Part of this counter-image is not only the outer and inner withdrawal from the secular or monastic company of “fools” and their mundane concerns through the practice of solitude, voluntary poverty and bodily neglect (vss. 26-29), but also the internalization of one’s own mortality by means of the charnel ground meditation (vss. 30-32). The latter is an ancient Buddhist meditation practice. In observing discarded corpses at different stages of their decomposition, the practitioner reminds himself that his own body is of the same nature and has to face the same fate.24 As we will see in the next section, there is a variant of this practice that aims primarily at eradicating sexual desire (see BCA 8:41-71). The practice mentioned in vss. 30-32 is directed against the habitual suppression of one’s own mortality. In combination with the eremitic lifestyle, such intensified meditation on transience transforms one into a living dead, into someone who is “dead to the world” while still alive (vss. 34-38). Having cut all ties of attachment, the practitioner is no longer afflicted by the pain of loss that actual death usually brings. In forestalling death, he mentally escapes it. Being a “living-dead,” he is at the same time a “living-liberated one” – as Jean Przyluski once aptly summarized this ancient ascetic ideal.25 Already in BCA 5:60-64, Śāntideva expounded on the relation between the charnel ground mediation and the existential realization of the not-self teaching,26 something that here too seems to be hinted at (see vs. 8:32). The not-self teaching also stands behind the critique of Just as they themselves, their coterie of students is also not very disciplined. They will spend their days and nights in conversation about food and sex. They [the senior monks] always give favorable treatment to them for the sake of service, not for the sake of virtue. Surrounded by their own groups of pupils, [these monks think,] ‘I will always obtain veneration here from these people’” (Boucher 2008, 138). In their translation, Crosby and Skilton have interpreted not only 8:5-25 (especially vss. 17-25), but also 8:140-154 as reflecting a strong criticism of the state of the Sangha (see Śāntideva 1995, 79, 81). 23  See also the similarity between BCA 8:86-88 and texts such as Theragāthā 842865. The criticism of monastic decadence in combination with the praise of ascetic solitude is also already found in the Theragāthā; see, for example, Thag 949-980. 24  See, for example, MN 10; 13; 119. 25  Przyluski 1937, 114. 26  See above, Part II, chap. 5, pp. 230-232.

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“fools” in vss. 8:24-25. The fool is denoted a false friend because he is not really concerned about anyone else’s well-being. His friendship is motivated by selfishness, treating the other as a means for his own advantage – his affection being in truth only affection for himself. As will become clear in vss. 8:89-158, it is the opposite of precisely this kind of attitude that the Bodhisattva is meant to achieve by means of deepened contemplation and the application of the not-self teaching. And as the final section of chapter 8 (vss. 159-184) will show, this also results in a transformed attitude toward “one’s own” body, again something that Śāntideva has already indicated in vss. 5:66-70. But what then about the Bodhisattva’s dealings with “fools”? Is he not himself guilty of following the principle of self-gratification when quitting their company because such company is disagreeable instead of pleasurable (vs. 23)? Is the instruction to no longer concern oneself with the world but rather retire to a life in solitude (vss. 22 and 26) not in open contrast to the purported Bodhisattva ideal of working for the salvation of “fools”? This objection was also raised in Buddhist circles.27 It was countered by an argument that Jan Nattier has fittingly characterized as the argument of “tactical investment.” The practices undertaken by a Bodhisattva while retiring into solitude “will eventually enable him to benefit all beings when he finally becomes a Buddha (…).”28 Nattier compares this to a student of medicine “who devotes herself night and day to solitary study, cutting herself off from family and friends and withdrawing from normal social interactions, but with the ultimate aim of being able to use the skills she is acquiring to accomplish the healing of others.”29 Once more we find here an example of the general Buddhist tendency to emphasize the priority of the right motivation behind one’s behavior. In the case of the Bodhisattva, this motivation is determined by the combination of detachment with compassion. In itself, leaving the world and retiring to the wilderness is not yet detachment. Even those Mahāyāna texts that celebrate an eremitic lifestyle are pretty clear about this point, admitting that some Buddhist recluses may in their thoughts 27  As an example of this objection, Nattier (2003, 134) quotes from the Ta chih-tu lun (Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra, a commentary ascribed to Nāgārjuna): “For the Bodhisattva the rule is to save all beings; so why does he keep himself apart, in the woods and the swamp, in solitude and in the mountains, preoccupied only with himself and abandoning beings?” See also Boucher 2008, 59. 28  Nattier 2003, 132. 29  Ibid. 134. See also above, Part II, chap. 3, p. 158f.

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still “be preoccupied with the village,” their mind burning “with the fire of the defilements.”30 But as other Buddhist texts affirm, this may also apply in the other direction. Already the Aṅguttaranikāya (AN 4:138) of the Pāli-Tipiṭaka states that that there are those who have “gone on retreat by body but not … by mind,” whereas others have “not gone on retreat by body” but have done so “by mind.” The first is explained as someone who “resorts to remote lodgings in forests and jungle groves, but there he thinks sensual thoughts, thoughts of ill will, and thoughts of harming.” In contrast, the second has not left the world physically, but “thinks thoughts of renunciation, thoughts of good will, and thoughts of harmlessness.”31 Prominent and influential Mahāyāna scriptures such as the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra endorse this view, emphasizing that not the lifestyle as such, whether the householder’s or the hermit’s, is decisive but only the inner attitude.32 If a Bodhisattva “dwells in the dwelling of friendliness and of great compassion towards all beings, then he dwells detached even when he dwells in the neighborhood of a village.”33 We may take BCA 8:15-16 as a testimony that Śāntideva is not only aware of such a position, but actually shares it. The hermit Bodhisattva should treat “fools,” if he is in contact with them,34 in a friendly manner, but should not familiarize with them. Hence the simile of the bee. Widespread in Buddhist literature, it is probably first found in Dhammapada vs. 49: “As a bee without harming the flower, its colour or scent, flies away, collecting only the honey, even so should the sage wander in the village.”35 Śāntideva emphasizes the aspect of detachment: The bee takes what it needs without clinging to a particular flower. The Bodhisattva should take what he needs in order to practice the Dharma without becoming attached. Similarly, Śāntideva’s critique of love and desire in vss. 8:3 and 5-6 is also directed only at a clinging kind of affection (sneha). Its target is not the all-embracing loving kindness and compassion that the Bodhisattva is meant to cultivate. The crucial difference is that the first type of affection is interspersed with 30

 Rāṣṭrapālaparipṛcchā-sūtra 30; similarly ibid. 58 (see Boucher 2006, 139, 168).  Bodhi 2012, 517. 32  Cf. Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra, pp. 332-333; 385-395. See Conze 1995, 204-205, 230-235. 33  Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra, p. 392; Conze 1995, 233. 34  Even hermits do not live in solitude all the time. On the specified conditions under which they can be in contact with others, see Nattier 2003, 132f, and Boucher 2008, 61-63, 74-75. 35  Narada 1993, 53. 31

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selfish concern, whereas the Bodhisattva’s altruistic love presupposes selflessness. Despite some significant differences, the parallels between Buddhist and Christian renouncement of the world, including later developments, are striking. One difference is certainly the apocalyptic context of early Christian renunciation, which is absent from Buddhism. But even behind this difference we can discern a common theme – the transience of the present life (1 Cor. 7:31). Another major difference is that monasticism is far less central to Christianity than it is to Buddhism. But then again, a spirituality of renunciation was pivotal in early Christianity as well. It took about three centuries however before it assumed monastic forms. When Jesus called his followers to leave their families, jobs and possessions, he did so because of his belief in the imminence of apocalyptic cataclysmic events. After Jesus, the first generation of Christians still shared this imminent eschatological expectation, now connected to their belief in Christ’s early return (1 Thess. 4:13-18). The corresponding world renouncement was spiritualized and transformed into the inner mental attitude of having (wife and property) as though one had not (1 Cor. 7:29-31), or of being in the world but not from the world (Jn. 17:6-19). That the apocalyptic events did not materialize was largely understood as a delay. The expectation continued to be kept alive and the inner detachment from the world was fostered by the repeated persecutions that early Christianity had to endure. The emergence of Christian monasticism corresponds with the gradual consolidation of the Church within the Roman Empire. A number of early Christian hermits were critical of the spiritual implications of this process, seeing the Church as being in danger of becoming too complacent. In contrast, they saw their own radical asceticism and withdrawal into the desert as a revival of the true imitation of Christ and its renunciant spirit. Moreover, they often understood their lifestyle as a “white martyrdom,” seeing themselves as following the sanguinary “red martyrdom” of previous Christian generations. While the Christian martyrs had literally died to the world, their ascetic heirs did so spiritually. As has been shown by Mathieu Boisvert, the practice and motivation of early Christian monks, usually hermits, displays astonishing commonalities with those of Buddhist recluses. Four interconnected motifs stand out in their close similarity to the spirituality of Buddhist renouncers: (1) sharpening the awareness of one’s own mortality (memento mori), (2) averting external and (3) internal distractions, and (4) developing single-mindedness (monotropos or monozônos). Unlike their Buddhist

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counterparts, Christian ascetics did not frequent charnel grounds. But in order to keep “death before their eyes” (Benedict of Nursia, 480?547), it was not unusual for them to contemplate over human skulls or even, as in some cases, to live in tombs36 or have their cells built like tomb houses.37 Averting external distractions was practiced by leading a life of poverty and celibacy and retreating from society to a life of solitude in the desert.38 As with Śāntideva (vs. 8:36), the Christian hermits could describe themselves as being “dead to the world.”39 However, freedom from external obligations and distractions was by no means considered sufficient. The deeper goal was to overcome internal distractions, that is, the passions of the flesh, and to tame the mind by calming its mental processes.40 Influential theologians such as Origen (2nd-3rd cent.) understood the fight against mental distractions and the pursuit of apatheia in the sense of Paul’s spiritual struggle between spirit and flesh.41 Again we can discern strong parallels between Śāntideva’s concept of the Bodhisattva path as a battle between bodhicitta and the defilements, and Paul’s contrast between spirit and flesh. Just as Śāntideva places the withdrawal into solitude into the context of the spiritual fight against the defilements (vs. 8:1), the Christian “ascetics in general” saw themselves “as engaged in a ‘battle against the flesh’.”42 The single-mindedness that the Christian ascetics aimed at was just the other side of the coin, the positive side of their efforts to avert external and internal distractions: the mind should focus exclusively on God. However, the Christian God is characterized as love, and knowing God is to be filled with love. Hence Christian recluses saw themselves confronted by a challenge similar to that of the Buddhist hermits. Was not their withdrawal into solitude a betrayal of the Christian ideal of love? Defenders of world renouncement asserted that the goal of apatheia, of the dispassionate state, is to make room for God’s love.43 Yet what kind of love is a hermit able to practice? There remains the paradox expressed by Basil the Great (329/330-371): “love of God … requires separation from the world and solitude…; love of neighbor requires 36

 Boisvert 1992, 130f.  Brown 2008, 219, fn. 21. 38  Boisvert 1992, 127. 39  Ibid. 130. 40  Ibid. 131. 41  See McGuckin 1985, 36. 42  Clark 2013, 14. 43  See Louth 2007, 100; McGuckin 1985, 33f. 37

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community.”44 One response to this challenge was certainly the rapid rise of cenobitic instead of eremitic forms of monasticism. Benedict of Nursia praised the cenobitic life as the strongest form of monasticism. Although he did not condemn the eremitic practice, he recommended that the hermit be first well trained in the life of a monastic community before following the call to solitude.45 But the challenge persisted. Martin Luther saw a fundamental conflict between monasticism and the divine commandment of loving and serving one’s neighbor.46 According to Luther, the monk ultimately follows a selfish goal in seeking his own perfection instead of attending to the needs of his fellow beings. God, says Luther, does not need our works, our neighbors do.47 In the present day, Thomas Merton has vindicated ascetic solitude against the charge of spiritual selfishness.48 In his 1960 essay Notes for a Philosophy of Solitude,49 Merton develops arguments which in a fascinating way reverberate Śāntideva, although at the time of his writing, Merton was apparently not yet familiar with the BCA. The solitude of the hermit, says Merton, reflects the fundamental truth that “in reality, all men are solitary.”50 His statement “Every man is a solitary… Death makes this very clear, for when a man dies, he dies alone. … And … each one must also live alone”51 resonates strongly with Śāntideva’s “A human being is born alone, and quite alone it dies” (vs. 8:33a). Most people, says Merton, refuse to realize this fundamental solitude. The manifold diversions of ordinary life have the hidden purpose of distracting one from this unbearable insight. In renouncing diversion and distraction, the hermit renounces this existential illusion about oneself and the world. A central part of this is to discard the image of oneself as it has been formed in the context of worldly distractions and relations. The inner withdrawal results in an “emptiness of heart in which self-assertion has no place.”52 Although the hermit is “dead to the world” and the

44

 Timko 2000, 868.  Cf. Benedict’s Rule, chapter 1. See Henry 2001, 146f. 46  See Chadwick 1985, 5; Brück 1983, 230. 47  Brück 1983, 288. Interestingly, Henri de Lubac addresses the critique that the ascetic goal is the selfish aim of perfecting oneself not only against Buddhism but likewise against the spirituality of “Eastern Christianity” (de Lubac 1953, 144, fn. 131). 48  Merton 2013, 84. 49  Merton 2013, 177-207. First published in Merton, Disputed Questions, 1960, 177-207. 50  Merton 2013, 66. 51  Ibid. 68. 52  Ibid. 70. 45

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world to him,53 the hermit nevertheless experiences a deep unity with all men54 – and a solidarity in facing the common defilements or, as Merton calls it, the common “predicament,” while searching for liberation. This, Merton insists, is “a special form of love” for all. If we love mankind, can we blind ourselves to man’s predicament? You will say: we must do something about this predicament. But there are some whose vocation it is to realize that they, at least, cannot help in any overt social way. Their contribution is a mute witness, a secret and even invisible expression of love which takes the form of their own option for solitude in preference to the acceptance of social fictions. (…) Such solitaries know the evils that are in other men because they experience these evils first of all in themselves. Such men, out of pity for the universe, out of loyalty to mankind, and without a spirit of bitterness or of resentment, withdraw into the healing silence of the wilderness, or of poverty, or of obscurity, not in order to preach to others but to heal in themselves the wounds of the entire world.55

The solitary ascetic is of no use to the world, says Merton, if “use” is understood in mundane terms. But he is nevertheless of utmost significance. In his invisible existence and radical contrast to all worldly standards, he is ultimately a sign of the absolute transcendence and otherness of God.56 Translating this into Śāntideva’s terms would require speaking of the Bodhisattva as a sign of the absolute transcendence and otherness of ultimate reality as it is expressed in the philosophy of emptiness. Whether this translation is indeed justified, both from a Christian and a Buddhist perspective, is a question that we must defer to the discussion of BCA chapter 9.57 TRANSLATION: 8:39-88 Seclusion of the mind 39. Free from all other concerns, my attention fixed undivided on my mind, I shall strive for collecting the mind and taming it.

The passion of the flesh 40. For, sensual desires (kāma) cause misfortune in this life and the next: here due to prison, death and mutilation, and thereafter in the hells and other miserable states. 53

 Ibid. 80.  Ibid. 69. 55  Ibid. 76f. 56  Ibid. 83. 57  See below, Part II, chap. 9, pp. 440-444, 464-466, 478-488. 54

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41.-43. For whose sake you have often politely greeted the matchmakers and for whose sake you have not recounted sins or disgraces in the past, have even exposed yourself to danger and wasted money, the very ones whom embracing became utmost bliss, they are surely these bones, nothing else, unattached and belonging to no one. Why don’t you embrace them lustfully and find bliss? 44.-45. The face which you once saw as it was hardly lifted, lowered in modesty, or did not see when covered by a veil, this face has now been exposed by vultures, as if they had pity on your distress. Look at it! Why do you flee now? 46. What was well protected even from the gaze of others is meanwhile being devoured. Why, jealous one, don’t you protect it? 47. You have seen the clumps of meat eaten by vultures and others: someone else’s fodder is adorned with garlands, sandalwood and jewelry. 48. Although it does not move, you are shocked by a skeleton seen in this state. Why were you not afraid when it was moved as if by some demon that enters corpses? 49. Spit and feces of these come from the same food. Of these you find the feces disgusting. Why are you fond of drinking the spittle? 50. Lovers, crazy about excrement, do not enjoy soft cotton-filled cushions because they do not reek of foul odors. 51. About what you are passionate even when covered, why is it not dear when uncovered? If it brings you nothing, why do you caress what is covered? 52. If you have no passion for what is foul, why then do you embrace the other pile of tendon-linked bones smeared with slime of flesh? 53. You yourself have plenty of what is foul. Be satisfied with that alone! Forget the other sack of shit, you lecher of filth. 54. “The flesh of this is dear to me.” So you want to see it and touch it. Why do you yearn for flesh, which is insentient by nature? 55. What you are yearning for, this mind, you cannot see or touch, and what you can does not think. Why do you embrace that for no reason? 56. That you do not realize the body of the other to consist of excrement is not surprising. Amazing is that you do not understand your own as only consisting of excrement. 57. Other than a young mud-born lotus, unfolding under the rays of a cloudless sun, what pleasure has he whose mind is addicted to excrement in a pile of dirt? 58. If you do not want to touch earth and other things because they are sullied by excrement, why do you want to touch the body from which this has emerged? 59. If you have no passion for what is foul, why then do you embrace the other born in a soil of excrement, sprouting from it and nourished by it? 60. Because it is small, you do not want the unclean worm that emerges from excrement, yet the body made of plenty of excrement and even born from excrement, you like.

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61. Not only do you not despise that you yourself are excrement, you crave for other vessels of excrement, lecher of filth. 62. If tasty camphor and other spices or rice and other food have dropped from the mouth or have been spat out, even the earth is considered unclean. 63. If you, although it is obvious, do not take it for excrement, then look also at the other ghastly bodies thrown onto the charnel ground. 64. Although you know it, why are you again enraptured with exactly what frightens you greatly when the skin is ripped open? 65. This fragrance, although put on the body, is from nothing other than from sandalwood. Why are you enraptured with someone through the scent of something else? 66. Is it not fortunate if one has no passion for a body because of its natural bad smell? Why do people, with their penchant for what is worthless, smear it with scent? 67. What has happened here to the body if sandalwood smells good? Why are you enraptured with someone through the scent of something else? 68.-69. If a naked body encrusted with dirt, with long hair and nails and stained yellow teeth is naturally appalling, why is it painstakingly cared for like a sword for killing oneself? The earth is full of crazy people zealously deceiving themselves. 70. Of course you are terrified by the sight of some skeletons at the charnel ground; in the charnel ground of a village, where walking skeletons crowd, you are cheerful. 71. Yet this, despite being such an impure pile of bones, cannot be had without a price. For its sake is the toil of earning and the agony in the hells and other bad states. 72. A child is unable to earn a living. What could make him happy in youth? Youth is spent with earning. The old one – what does he do with the pleasures of love? 73. Some, badly wanton, come home exhausted from working till dusk and lie down in the evening as if dead. 74. Others, suffering the hardship of being away on military campaigns, even for years do not see the sons and wives for whom they long. 75. Deluded by love, they have not attained what they have sold themselves for. Instead, working for others they have spent their lives quite in vain. 76. The wives of others, who have sold themselves and forever carry out errands [of their masters], give birth beneath the trees of the jungle and other [rough places]. 77. In order to live, they throw themselves into battle at the risk of their lives. For the sake of pride the love-crazed deluded ones become slaves. 78. Some lovers are mutilated, others impaled; one sees them being burned to death, as well as being slain with spears.

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79. Realize that a fortune is a misfortune without end because of the distress in acquiring and protecting it, and at its loss! Because of such obsession, those whose mind is set on wealth find no chance for liberation from the suffering of existence. 80. Thus the wants of the lecherous are great, small in contrast, the pleasures, like the snatches of a little grass while a beast pulls a cart. 81. For this bit of pleasure, even for a beast not difficult to attain, the luck of the favorable moment, extremely difficult to attain, is lost by one defeated by his fate. 82.-83. The effort he takes upon himself at all times for the sake of his surely mortal and trivial body that will plunge into the hells and other bad states, with even a hundred millionth fraction of that effort, buddhahood would be possible. Greater is the suffering than the suffering during the practice of the bodhisattvas, but for the lecherous there is no awakening. 84. Neither sword nor poison, neither fire nor abyss nor a foe is comparable to sensual desires (kāma), if one bears in mind the agony in the hells and other bad states. 85. Recoiling from sensual desires, may one generate delight in the seclusion in calm wilderness realms that are free of strife and toil! 86. The happy ones, fanned by silent, gentle forest breezes, wander about on lovely faces of rock broad as palace terraces and cooled by the sandal balm of the moon’s rays, and ponder on the well-being of others. 87. As long as he likes, he lives anywhere – in an empty dwelling, at the foot of a tree, in caves – and free of the nuisance of protecting possessions he wanders about as he wants, carefree. 88. The joy of contentment he savors who moves and lives by his own choice, bound to none, is difficult to attain even for Indra [the king of the gods].

COMMENTARY 3. The Delusion Inherent in Sexual Desire In his section on the seclusion of the mind, Śāntideva focusses almost exclusively on a critique of (being distracted by) sexual desire (kāma), taking it as the prime example of greed, that is, of one of the three principal defilements: greed, hate and delusion.58 Once more Śāntideva 58  Seen in the larger context of chapters 8 and 9, Śāntideva follows the ancient strategy of overcoming the defilements by their opposite: In chapter 8, greed is fought by developing the notion of impurity, hate by developing loving kindness; in chapter 9, delusion is fought by developing wisdom/insight (see above, Part II, chap. 5, pp. 224f).

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follows the traditional paradigm that explains greed as the deluded attitude towards pleasant sensations, and hate as the deluded attitude towards unpleasant sensations (AN 3:68).59 In other words, he does not deny the pleasurable aspect of sex (vss. 42, 80-81), but his emphasis is on its deceiving implications. Lust belies the true, that is, the transient (vss. 43-48, 70) and impure nature (vss. 49-69) of the desired object, and conceals the far too costly price that one has to pay for such enjoyment (vss. 40, 71-84). At the end, he offers an alternative, the far better happiness accompanying an eremitic life of external and internal detachment from the world in the wilderness (vss. 85-88). This cannot be achieved without effort either. But its ultimate reward, Buddhahood, is much more worth its price (vss. 82-83). In order to analyze the delusion inherent in sexual desire, Śāntideva draws on a particular version of the ancient Buddhist practice of the “charnel ground” or “foulness meditation” (aśubha-bhāvanā = lit.: impurity meditation).60 The corpses left behind on the open field of a charnel ground give the practitioner the graphic opportunity to contemplate the body’s transience and impurity (especially of its entrails) as it becomes apparent in the various stages of the body’s disintegration, decomposition and destruction through wild animals. In a number of Buddhist texts, the body’s impurity is treated as an integrative part of its transience. But the contemplation of impurity also assumed a more specific significance in the context of the practice’s further development. At an early stage, apparently, two different variants of the practice emerged:61 In one, the transience and impurity of the corpses on the charnel ground are imaginatively transferred to one’s own body in order to produce detachment from it: “This body too is of the same nature, it will be like that, it is not exempt from that fate.”62 In the second, the goal of the meditation is not detachment from one’s own body but from the longing for other bodies. In this type of meditation it is primarily the

59

 See above, Part II, chap. 2, p. 149; chap. 4, pp. 195f; chap. 6, p. 257.  The practice is widespread, both in Mahāyāna and non-Mahāyāna schools (overviews in Mrozik 2007, 83-111, and Cabezón 2017, 227-236; for a more comprehensive treatment, see Wilson 1996). Nāgārjuna addresses it in Ratnāvalī 148-170 and Suhṛllekha 25. It is also mentioned several times in the ŚS (e.g. 77f, 81, and 209ff). Cabezón calls it a “pan-Indian technique” that is also found in non-Buddhist ascetic traditions (Cabezón 2017, 228). 61  For the first type, see MN 10 or DN 22; for the second type, see MN 13 or Thag 726-39. 62  MN 10. Ñāṇamoli, Bodhi 2001, 148. 60

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transience and impurity of the other body that should be internalized. In this context the body’s impurity is emphasized as an antidote against sexual desire.63 Here the meditator is usually male (i.e. a Buddhist monk), while the decomposing and impure body is female.64 Śāntideva refers to the first type of this practice in vss. 5:59-70 and 8:30-32, while the present section is primarily, though not exclusively (see vss. 8:53, 56, 61), concerned with the second. In emphasizing the transience of the female body, Śāntideva connects to what he already said in verse 8:5: love in the form of erotic desire means deceiving oneself about the reality of impermanence and not-self. The desired body is ultimately nothing but “bones … belonging to no one” (vs. 8:43). Being afraid in the company of skeletons on the charnel ground, while enjoying their company when they walk, still alive, around in a village is a sign of suppressing the true nature of mortal existence (vss. 69b, 70).65 To Śāntideva, the human skin functions as the real-symbol of such self-deception, employing the early Buddhist image of the human body as a “sack of shit” (vs. 53): The body, or more precisely the skin, is presented as a bag or sack filled with various kinds of impurities that has an opening at each end.66 The skin thus conceals all the inner impurities and their repulsive nature, which becomes obvious when the body decomposes (vs. 64). Here Śāntideva gets extremely sarcastic: In vss. 44-45 he introduces a feature well known from Indian poetry and 63  Cabezón 2017, 222: “To effectively counteract desire one needs to resort to a strategy that undermines its cause, the mind’s tendency to construct the object as a thing of beauty, as something worth desiring. … Desire is subdued when the body ceases to be perceived as beautiful, and it ceases to be perceived as beautiful only when it is seen as foul or impure (…).” 64  See, for example, Candrakīrti’s Bodhisattvayogācāracatuḥśatakaṭīkā (his commentary on Āryadeva’s Catuḥśataka) §§229f, referring to Nāgārjuna’s Ratnāvalī 48-51, 57-58. See Lang 2003, 158f. Like monks, nuns too were certainly encouraged to meditate on the foulness of their own body. There are, however, only rare cases reporting nuns mediating on the foulness of the male body (Mrozik 2007, 90; Cabezón 2017, 228). 65  The verse is reminiscent of the popular story about the conversion of the Buddha’s two main disciples, Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana. When both attended an annual mountain festival and saw the crowd, the thought occurred to Śāriputra that in a hundred years none of them will exist anymore. And the visionary talented Maudgalyāyana suddenly saw the joyous people as skeletons. Śāriputra then spoke: “These are the ways of passion and wantonness. In life and its affairs what satisfaction is there either for the foolish or the wise? Ere long all these poor devotees who indulge in sensual pleasures will have to leave their bodies unsatisfied, and die.” Mahāvastu III, 57f; Jones 1987, vol. 3, 59f. 66  See MN 10:10; Ñāṇamoli, Bodhi 2001, 147.

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theater – the young and beautiful girl, seen by her lover, lowers her face in modesty (or coquetry), or hides it bashfully behind the jālikā, a net or face-veil.67 Now, on the charnel ground, the lover, who was so keen to see her face, has an even more exposed view; for the vultures have removed her skin. Why does he flee that sight? Likewise, if the lover was longing for the body of the beloved when it was covered by clothes, why does he not long for the same body when it is truly naked, i.e. when not only its clothes but also the cover of the skin has been removed (vs. 51)? Sexual desire wants to see and touch the other’s body, but it cannot stand the body’s full exposure. It only works as long as the real nature of the body, its impurity and transience, remains concealed. That is, sexual desire operates through an inherent mechanism of delusion. Seen in its reality, the body does not evoke any desire; on the contrary, it is repulsive. Śāntideva drastically summarizes the transient and impure nature of the body by depicting it as made of, consisting in, being born of and nourished by excrement (vss. 56-63). The reek of excrement leads him to another symbol of delusion: the body’s improvement by means of adornment (vs. 47), body care (vss. 68f) and, in particular, fragrant perfume (vss. 65-67). The purpose of all this is to conceal the body’s actually repellent nature and thus functions as an instrument of deceit.68 Yet what triggers this kind of self-deception? From Śāntideva’s insistence that the object of sexual desire is in reality transient, foul and unsatisfactory, we can conclude that the yearning is actually for permanence, beauty and satisfaction. These are not found in the specific object of carnal desire, the other’s body. If it is only the flesh that one is yearning for, why then is one not delighted with the plain, insentient flesh of a corpse? And if it is not the flesh but the other’s mind that is desired, then this – being purely mental – cannot be the proper object of sexual desire (vss. 54-55). Behind the yearning for permanence, beauty and 67  I am indebted to Dr. Renate Syed for clarifying this background to me. The passage does not imply that in the pre-Muslim period, women in India generally wore a face-veil. 68  According to Buddhaghosa, such dressing up of the body helps to cultivate the delusion of seeing it as “me” or “mine” (Vism 195 = 6:90): “But by rubbing out the stains on its teeth with tooth sticks and mouth-washing and all that, by concealing its private parts under several cloths, by daubing it with various scents and salves, by pranking it with nosegays and such things, it is worked up into a state that permits of its being taken as ‘I’ and ‘mine’. So men delight in women and women in men without perceiving the true nature of its characteristic foulness, now masked by this adventitious adornment. But in the ultimate sense there is no place here even the size of an atom fit to lust after” (Ñāṇamoli 1999, 189).

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satisfaction, which sexual desire misdirects to the wrong object, lies the thorn of one’s own mortality, as Śāntideva indicates in verses 56 and 61. The denial of transience regarding the other’s body is simultaneously the suppression of one’s own mortality. Śāntideva’s perspective on sexuality is thus entirely shaped by the traditional Buddhist analysis of “thirst” (tṛṣṇā) as an “ignoble search,” that is, as an existential disorientation:69 And what is the ignoble search? Here someone being himself subject to birth … aging … sickness … death, seeks what is also subject to birth … aging … sickness … death. (…) And what is the noble search? Here someone being himself subject to birth … aging … sickness … death, having understood the danger in what is subject to birth … aging … sickness … death, seeks the unborn … unageing … unailing … deathless supreme security from bondage, Nibbāna.70

The “noble search,” that is, the alternative and only meaningful orientation of one’s life, is indicated in vss. 5771 and 83. The Buddha – and the goal of Buddhahood that the Buddha represents – implies permanence, beauty72 and the ultimate satisfaction of all human thirst. In contrast to sexual pleasure, the goal of Buddhahood is truly worth its price. In vss. 71-80 Śāntideva sketches the hardship that for many people is inevitably connected with obtaining sexual pleasures.73 Such pleasures are neither for the infant nor for the aged. The young man does not yet have the necessary resources (vs. 72). And for the adult, affording the means (artha) is normally a huge burden. Moreover, it leads him/her to repeated suffering in hell (vss. 41-42a, 71, 81).74 For many people, their 69

 See on this Schmidt-Leukel 2006, 31-37.  MN 26:5-12. Ñāṇamoli, Bodhi 2001, 254-256. 71  The lotus flower growing in muddy water but displaying immaculate purity when fully blossomed is a common Buddhist symbol for the Buddha. See, for example, AN 4:36 (II, 38f), where the Buddha says about himself: “Just as a blue, red, or white lotus flower, though born in the water and grown up in the water, rises above the water and stands unsoiled by the water, even so, though born in the world and grown up in the world, I have overcome the world and dwell unsoiled by the world.” Bodhi 2012, 426. 72  In numerous Buddhist scriptures, extraordinary beauty is ascribed to the Buddha, both his physical appearance and his teaching. On the bodily beauty of the Buddha, see Powers 2009, 6, 10, 21f, 31, 178-180, etc. On the possibility of Buddhist aesthetics, see Cabezón 2017, 266-273. 73  Here, too, Śāntideva draws on fairly old and standard Buddhist depictions. See for example canonical texts such as MN 13 and 14. 74  Being a form of greed, sexual desire binds one to samsara, and inasmuch as it leads to the performance of gravely unwholesome acts (in thought, word and deed), it results in an infernal rebirth (for the connection between specific sexual activities and their respective punishments in hell, see the excursus on hells above, pp. 331-345). 70

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livelihood is difficult to earn, such as through heavy physical labor or by serving as a mercenary. Others may engage in criminal activities, earning severe punishments but hardly the desired pleasures (vss. 73-75, 77-78). Not only is the plight of men bitter. In pursuit of the traditional goals of artha and kāma, also women sell themselves (or their working power) and still live in poor circumstances, even without a proper shelter for giving birth (vs. 76). And if some profit is made, it causes further trouble to protect it and pain if it is lost (vs. 79a). By far the greatest loss, however, is the waste of the rare opportunity to follow the teachings of a Buddha. In sum, the effort and suffering connected to the obtainment of sensual pleasures is far greater than the effort and suffering involved in the Bodhisattva path. And while the former leads to nothing but continued suffering, the latter carries the ultimate promise of a satisfactory reward (vss. 81-81).75 Even if Śāntideva’s characterization of the travails of ordinary life may well be accurate in view of the majority of his contemporaries, the dark colors in which he paints this image serve primarily as a negative background (vs. 84) against which he presents the blessings of the solitary life in the wilderness in an even brighter light. As much as he downplays the joys in ordinary worldly existence, he remains silent about the hardship and dangers connected to the eremitic lifestyle.76 Instead, he contrasts the poor sensual pleasures sharply with the rich pleasures enjoyed by the Buddhist renouncer, to which he refers in each of the four concluding verses with a different term: delight (rati, vs. 85), happy contentment (dhanya, vs. 86), freedom from care (yatheṣṭa, vs. 87), and joyful bliss (sukha, vs. 88). The contrast is underlined in that at least two of these terms (rati and dhanya) have sexual connotations – a stylistic means that Śāntideva already used in BCA 7:15, 31f, 62-65. The pleasure of the lonesome Bodhisattva emerges from his indulgence in the beauty and wealth of untouched nature, his boundless freedom, his liberation from the burden of possessions and, most importantly, from his pondering on the well-being of others – which will be the main topic of the present chapter. Foulness meditation is not a bygone thing. Even in the absence of public charnel grounds it is still practiced – be it in contemporary 75  Note that whereas here Śāntideva’s perspective is marked by criticizing the foolishness of suffering for the ordinary goals in life, in BCA 6:34-38 his perspective is dominated by compassion. 76  See Boucher 2008, 54: “In Buddhist literature, the wilderness is regularly cited as a place of manifold dangers, including robbers, wild animals, demons, drought, and famine.”

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morgues, anatomical institutes, hospitals or just through the substitute of relevant photographs.77 The practice has not been left uncriticized, also by Buddhists themselves.78 The Kyoto School philosopher Yoshinori Takeuchi accused it as leaning “in the direction of … a sick obsession” and bordering on “pathological abnormalities.”79 No doubt, how Śāntideva presents the foulness meditation in his poetic depiction is crass but not unique. The use of the skin as a symbol of self-deceit, especially in the context of a rigorous attitude against sexual desire, is also known to the Western ascetic tradition. Contrasting the beauty of the human, often female and sometimes naked, body with its nauseating entrails became a common motif in late medieval and early modern artistic representations of the contemplation of death (memento mori) and human vanity (vanitas vanitatum), including portraits of young and pretty women80 depicted with half of their skin removed.81 Yet neither in the Buddhist nor the Christian context is such a depiction in literature or art simply an expression of hostility against the body. In both traditions the image and assessment of the human body is more complex. As we have seen, and will continue to see towards the end of chapter 8, Śāntideva’s own view of the body is considerably more positive than his remarks in the context of foulness meditation may suggest. Susanne Mrozik is right in stating that the “ascetic discourse … does not represent a rejection of bodies; to the contrary, it affirms their value because it regards bodhisattva bodies as integral to the welfare and happiness of others.”82 To Śāntideva, the body is not only an indispensable instrument for the Bodhisattva’s salvific activity;83 through the power of bodhicitta it is turned into “the priceless figure of a Buddha-jewel” (BCA 1:10). The body of a Buddha is worth of adoration and functions as a direct source of wholesome inspiration (see BCA 1:36; 2:10-19). Śāntideva does not fail to indicate this aspect even in the midst of his 77

 See Cabezón 2017, 530.  There is clear evidence in the canonical texts that the practice was not considered suitable for everybody. See SN 54:9. See also Cabezón 2017, 230f. 79  Takeuchi 1983, 18f. 80  There are also few similar images of men, e.g. Johann Michael Eder’s portrait “A man, half alive, half skeletonized.” 81  As a famous example, see Giuseppe Archimboldo’s (16th cent.) “Vanitas.” See also the popular medieval motifs of “The Three Living and the Three Dead” or “The Dance of Death.” Examples from contemporary art are found in the work of Fernando Vicente or Gage Opdenbrouw. 82  Mrozik 2007, 101. 83  See BCA 3:10-13, 5:66, 70; 6:125; 7:28; 8:159-184. 78

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depiction of the body as a “sack of shit” when referring to the Buddha as the lotus flower that grows out of all the muddy impurities, “unfolding under the rays of a cloudless sun” (vs. 8:56), that is, exhibiting unstained purity. The ancient symbol of the lotus flower growing in and out of the mud indicates a radical transformation of bodily existence: “visions of foul bodies give way to visions of pure bodies.”84 In his momentous study on the body in early Christianity, Peter Brown has convincingly argued that Christianity has always been a rather polyphonic movement and that there was no such thing as “a single Christian ‘doctrine of the body’.”85 But even within that strand of early Christianity that is a typical candidate of extreme body hostility, in the ascetic theology of the desert fathers, we actually find a more complex attitude. On the one hand, the body was regarded as part of God’s good creation. On the other hand, it was seen as spoiled by the original sin. But then, there was also the confident expectation that the body will be transformed, like that of Christ, on the day of resurrection, and that to some extent such transformation may even be anticipated in the here and now. The idea that resurrection is not simply the creation of a new body, but the glorious transformation of the old body goes back to Paul (see 1 Cor. 15:42-44). The focus of the ascetic effort, however, was not on the body as such, but on the human heart or mind. The real target of all physical mortification was the purification of one’s heart. The disappearance of sexual desire and fantasies, without remainder, was seen as a sign that such purification had, by the grace of Christ, finally reached its perfection.86 The body was important as a God-given instrument to bring about the cleansing of the soul.87 “Life in the desert revealed, if anything, the inextricable interdependence of body and soul. (…) it was possible to ‘humble’ the body (…) so that one could actually bring humility to the soul.”88 It resonates with Śāntideva’s mindset when John Climacus (579-649) writes that the Christian ascetic “finds himself in an earthly and defiled body, but pushes himself into the rank and status of the incorporeal angels.”89 In the course of this process, the “yearning for bodies,” that is, the desire for sexual union with another embodied 84

 Mrozik 2007, 110.  From the new Introduction to the twentieth anniversary edition. See Brown 2008, xxxvii‒xli, here xl. 86  See Brown 2008, 226-233. 87  See ibid. 235f. 88  Ibid. 236. 89  Ibid. 237. 85

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human being, “would be transmuted into an equally boundless transcendence of differences.”90 But does such hoped-for “transcendence of differences” also transcend derogatory forms of affirming gender difference? The Buddhist practice of foulness meditation is, as Cabezón puts it, “in theory, gender neutral” and could be exercised by monks as well as nuns.91 Similarly, the Christian desert fathers regarded “male and female bodies … as equally charged with sexual feeling,” and presented virginity as an ideal for both.92 In practice, however, foulness meditation “fueled the fire of misogyny,”93 just as in the writings of the desert fathers “women were presented as a source of perpetual temptation” for the male body, which earned the monks the reputation that they “hate women.”94 A crossreligious exploration of the body image95 in connection with an inquiry into the roots of religious misogyny is an important desideratum of future interreligious theological work. And this cannot be accomplished without an in-depth comparative study of religious attitudes toward sexuality.96 Moreover, in order to be religiously fruitful, such investigations need to become part of interreligious dialogue.97 What kind of insight could be gained from Śāntideva in the context of such dialogue? As I have tried to show, his main point is to draw our attention to the connection between sexual desire and existential selfdeceit. In this regard, most of his statements remain largely within the framework of a fairly standard Buddhist perspective. But is there also a more specific contribution that he could make? According to José Cabezón, Śāntideva suggests a cure for the delusive dimension of sexual desire that goes beyond the usual meditative techniques, including foulness meditation, namely, the utter deconstruction of the desired 90

 Ibid. 239.  Cabezón 2017, 228. 92  Brown 2008, 243. 93  Cabezón 2017, 228. Similarly Mrozik 2007, 90f. 94  Brown 2008, 242f. 95  For comparative overviews of the body in various religious traditions, see Coakley 2000 and Greenberg 2018. 96  A broad comparative overview is offered by Parrinder 1998. Detailed overviews of Buddhist attitudes to sexuality are offered by Faure 1998 and Cabezón 2017. For an overview of Christian attitudes, see Fuchs 1983. 97  The need for an interreligious dialogue on religious attitudes toward human sexuality is affirmed by Parrinder 1998, 261, and Cabezón 2017, 245f. Cabezón has undertaken the very helpful task of formulating some principles for a sexual ethics of Buddhism that is also open to a broader discourse. His prime principle is that sexual behavior is non-virtuous if it harms self or other (see Cabezón 2017, 519-528). 91

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object.98 In Cabezón’s analysis, Śāntideva applies, in typical Mādhyamika fashion, the fourfold negation (catuṣkoṭi) in order to demonstrate that ultimately sexual desire is deluded because it is without an object. That is, the object of sexual desire is (1) not x, (2) not non-x, (3) not both x and non-x, and (4) not neither x nor non-x. Verse 8:54, says Cabezón, represents the first negation: here the idea is negated that the body alone (x) is the object. In vs. 8:55 we see the second negation: the mind (nonx), too, is not the object of sexual desire. Vs 8:48, Cabezón speculates,99 may stand for the third negation: a body plus some (ghost-like) mind (both x and non-x) is also not the desired object. The fourth remaining position would be that sexual desire is for a particular person, not merely the body, not merely the mind, nor some body moved by some mind, but the specific mind-body union of a particular person (neither x nor non-x). This option, Cabezón admits, is not indicated in the text itself. Though Śāntideva could have easily refuted it by pointing out that such an individual person is only a mental construct based on the fleeting and instable course of events. Through the argument of the fourfold negation, “Śāntideva is attempting to deconstruct sexual desire by showing that … its object … is nowhere to be found. Rather than resorting to conventional antidotes (that the body is impure, etc.) Śāntideva attempts to show the pointlessness of sexual desire ‘at its core’ (…). If it is absurd to desire the body, the mind, both, and neither, what is left to desire?”100 Cabezón is clearly right in pointing out that Śāntideva’s overall philosophical and soteriological position is grounded in the comprehensive deconstructive criticism of the Mādhyamikas. This is especially evident in chapter 9, where Śāntideva explicitly applies this logical/ontological criticism to the case of sexual desire (see vss. 9:31f). Nevertheless, I think that in both chapters 8 and 9, Śāntideva’s argument takes a slightly different twist. He employs deconstructive logic for a constructive or, better, a reconstructive aim. An important clue can be taken from vss. 9:76-78. Here the belief in the existence of the other person is admitted – even if such belief is, in terms of ultimate truth, an erroneous construct – because it is qualified as a wholesome error, one that is necessarily implied in the development of compassion. From this we may conclude that for Śāntideva, the question of the right attitude 98

 See Cabezón 2017, 260-263.  According to Cabezón, the third and fourth negation are not explicitly carried out in the current text. See ibid. 261f. 100  Ibid. 263. 99

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toward one’s fellow beings is not decided by a radical deconstruction of the other, at least not by this alone, but by the criterion of whether the other is construed as an object of one’s selfish desires101 or as the proper recipient of one’s compassion. Note that in the present section of chapter 8, Śāntideva contrasts sexual desire – and its low pleasures – with the compassionate and blissful attitude of the hermit who sets his mind “on the well-being of others” (vs. 8:86). Not the illusory construction of self and other as such is the problem, but whether this construction functions as a means of selfishness or of compassion.102 Śāntideva is interested in the deconstruction of self and other inasmuch as it enables the re-construction of a different relation between self and other, even – as we will see – to the extent of a complete identification with the other as one’s own self or of both as members of one body. As in the theology of the desert fathers, the yearning for the other’s body, for sexual union, is to be transformed into a transcendence of difference through unrestricted love or compassion. José Cabezón – I think rightly so – points out that a major assumption within the Buddhist attitude to sex consists in seeing sexual desire as a purely mental affair.103 This assumption strains strongly against the dominant contemporary perspective, informed by a scientific world view, which regards sexual desire as fundamentally a physical phenomenon rooted in our socio-biological nature.104 Do the ideas of Christian and Buddhist ascetics about sex go against human nature? I suggest that there is, in the ascetic traditions of both religions, an awareness that sexual desire is indeed deeply ingrained in – in Christian terms – humanity’s “post lapsal” nature, or – in Buddhist terms – its samsaric constitution. The transformation of such a deep-seated inclination is neither easy nor is it entirely at our will. According to the desert 101  And, pace Cabezón, Śāntideva is far from not resorting to the traditional antidote of contemplating the body’s impurity (see the quotation at fn. 98), but – on the contrary – makes heavy use of it. 102  This explains why various Mahāyāna texts, some of them approvingly quoted in ŚS 164-168 and possibly alluded to in BCA 5:84, 101 (see above, pp. 242-244), permit a Bodhisattva to engage in sexual relations if this is motivated by compassion instead of selfish desire (see also Cabezón 2017, 280-296). 103  Cf. Cabezón 2017, 241-247. 104  The question of whether desire is a mental phenomenon that can be overcome by means of insight, or whether it is rooted in the body’s physical nature and hence cannot be overcome, was also a point of classical controversies between Buddhist philosophers and their materialist opponents. See for example Dharmakīrti, Pramāṇavārttika, 146-178, 187, 216. See Jackson 1993, 351-427.

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fathers, it requires a particular act of divine grace,105 and according to a number of Mahāyāna masters, a merely cognitive understanding of emptiness is insufficient to bring about the hoped-for change. Only a direct intuitive realization truly eradicates sexual desire.106 Perhaps these are two different ways of acknowledging the supra-natural character of such transformation. The same applies – and perhaps even more so – to the transformation of the presumably even deeper inclination of relating the notion of “self” exclusively to what one perceives as one’s own body and mind. And Śāntideva moves on to deconstruct and reconstruct this inclination as well. TRANSLATION: 8:89-110 Contemplation: 89. With distracted thoughts calmed through reflecting in this and other ways on the good effects of seclusion, one should then cultivate the spirit of awakening (bodhicitta).

The sameness of others and oneself 90. First, one should seriously contemplate the sameness of others and oneself in the following manner: All have the same suffering and the same happiness. I must protect them as myself. 91. As the manifold body, with its various [parts], hands and so on, must be protected as a unit, so just like it all this diverse world [of sentient beings] by nature not different in happiness and suffering. 92. Though my own suffering does not hurt in other bodies, nonetheless even this suffering is difficult for me to bear because of the love I have of myself. 93. Moreover, even if another’s suffering cannot be felt by me, nonetheless his suffering is difficult for him to bear because of his love of himself. 94. I must eliminate another’s suffering because it is suffering like my own suffering. I must help others as well, because they are sentient beings, just like the sentient being that I am. 95. If exactly the same happiness is dear to both me and others, then what distinguishes me so that I am bent on happiness only in this [my own case]? 96. If both I and others dislike fear and suffering, then what distinguishes me so that I protect that one but not the other?

105

 Cf. Brown 2008, 230-232.  Cf. Cabezón 2017, 256, 264.

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97. “His suffering does not hurt me.” If he is therefore not protected, also the suffering of the future body does not hurt me. For what reason then do I protect it? 98. The idea is wrong that also thereafter it will be none but me, because only someone has died and only another is born. 99. If that suffering which he himself has felt must be protected against only by him, a pain in the foot does not matter to the hand. Why is it protected by the latter? 100. If this, although false, emerges from one’s sense of a self: What (yad M instead of tad V) is false, one’s own or another’s, must be rejected as strongly as possible. 101. A continuum and an aggregate are unreal, such as a trail [of ants] and an army. He to whom the suffering belongs does not exist. So whose might it be? 102. Without distinction, surely all kinds of suffering are without an owner. Simply because they are suffering they must be eliminated. What could then cause a restriction [to one’s own suffering or that of another]? 103. If one asks “Why must suffering be eliminated?” Because all agree on this. If it must be eliminated, all [suffering] is of this kind; if not, then my own [suffering] neither, like all [suffering of sentient beings without distinction] (sarvavat M instead of sattvavat V).

On suffering through compassion 104. “If through compassion great suffering accrues, why developing it at all cost?” Seeing the suffering of the world, how can the suffering due to compassion be great? 105. If the suffering of many comes to an end through the suffering of one, then a compassionate one must by all means develop such suffering for others and for his own sake. 106. Therefore the Bodhisattva Supuṣpacandra, although he knew the harm threatening from the king, did not shy away from his own suffering on account of sacrificing himself for the many who suffer. 107. Those Bodhisattvas, whose mental continuum is fully developed in this manner and what they are devoted to is nothing but the suffering of others, plunge into the worst of hells like wild geese into a cluster of lotuses. 108. Have not those who are oceans of joy when beings are liberated accomplished their task through these alone? What would be the use of a liberation not relished? 109. And if then the bodhisattva has even wrought the welfare of others, he is neither proud nor haughty, nor expecting the fruit of his deeds, because he craves for nothing but the welfare of others. 110. Just as I guard myself to the end from censure, I will practice the mental attitude of protecting and being compassionate towards others as well.

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COMMENTARY 4. Equality In accordance with his confidence, expressed in BCA 1:10, that bodhicitta transforms the impure body into “the priceless figure of a Buddha-jewel,” it is only natural to have the meditation on the body’s impurity being followed by the meditative development of bodhicitta (vs. 8:89). It is here that the two major motivations, which Śāntideva addresses throughout his work, coalesce: selfless altruism is in the best interest of the self or, conversely, self-interest finds its true fulfilment in selfless altruism. This is achieved by the appropriation of a new concept of “self.” Śāntideva develops this notion in the course of two meditative exercises: the contemplation on the sameness (or equality) of self and others (vss. 90-103) and the exchange of self and others (vss. 111-158). Underlying these two meditations are actually three steps: The (1) equality and (2) exchange of self and others are interspersed and interlinked by (3) an expansion of the self that embraces the whole world,107 an expansion corresponding to the Bodhisattva’s “great compassion” (vss. 104-110). The meditation in vss. 90-110 bears the form of an argument responding to possible or actual objections.108 As has been mentioned in the introductory part to this commentary, the dual genre of this section (as meditation and argumentation) plays a certain role in the contemporary dispute about its adequate interpretation.109 Śāntideva begins with a normative statement that can be taken as a Buddhist formulation of the Golden Rule: “All have the same suffering and the same happiness. I must protect them as myself” (vs. 90b),110 and he ends with the practitioner’s resolution to fulfill this norm (vs. 110). First Śāntideva explains 107  Schmithausen 2007 allocates the three steps as follows: the equality of self and others (vss. 90-103), the expansion of the self-concept to include others (vss. 111-119) and, finally, the exchange of self and others (vss. 120-158). 108  See also the parallel statement of the argument in ŚS 357-362. Vss. BCA 8:97, 98, 100, 101a, 104, 107-109 have close parallels in ŚS 357-360. However, contrary to Crosby and Skilton (see Śāntideva 1995, 80, 176), the verses are not quoted from the Tathāgataguhya-sūtra, but were perhaps composed by Śāntideva himself (see Schmithausen 2007, 558, fn. 28; Harrison 2007, 224-226; Goodman 2016, 331-333). 109  See above, Part I, chap. 4, p. 82. 110  See also Schmithausen 2007, 559f and Wetlesen 2002, 72-74. Contrary to the opinion of some scholars (e.g. Freiberger, Kleine 2011, 228), the Golden Rule has a long tradition in Buddhism and is by no means absent from early Buddhism and from Theravāda, as one may see from Sutta Nipāta 705, Dhammapada 129f or SN 5:55:7.

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why the Golden Rule applies. Despite their diversity, sentient being are all equal in that they strive for happiness and recoil from pain (vs. 91).111 Yet, an opponent may ask, is there not the crucial difference that everybody only feels one’s own pain, in one’s own body? Right, says Śāntideva, but nevertheless, all are alike in that for all their own suffering is difficult to bear because of everyone’s self-love (vss. 92-93). Given that there is no essential difference between sentient beings in relation to suffering and happiness, one should work for the happiness of others and protect them against suffering in the same way one does for oneself (vss. 94-96). The opponent, however, may continue: If one only feels one’s own suffering but not that of the other, why should one care for the other in the same way as for oneself? Śāntideva replies with a counter-question: If not, why then should one care now about one’s well-being in the next life (and strive to gain a happy rebirth and avoid a bad one)? In the present body one does not feel the suffering of the future body. The future body is certainly different from the present one. And if the sense of self is connected to the body, then the future body will not be “me” in the sense of the current “self”: “only someone has died and only another is born” (vs. 98b).112 Hence the belief is false that one should ward off only the suffering felt in one’s own body, that is, the present body (vss. 97-99). This false belief, which implies a morally false behavior, namely a selfish one, stems from the inclination to think in terms of an individual “self” (ahaṃkāra). Therefore it must be rejected by all (vs. 100). The deceiving notion of the individual “self” (ātman) is applied to the continuum of successive momentary events (dharmas) that account 111  This is, again, an ancient Buddhist axiom (all beings “desire pleasure and recoil from pain,” MN 51, 94, DN 23) to which Śāntideva already alluded in BCA 6:11 and 34. See above, Part II, chap. 6, pp. 261f. 112  In the Milindapañha (2:2:1, p. 40), the question of the identity between the deceased and the reborn person is answered with the paradox that the reborn person is “neither the same nor another” (Rhys-Davids 1963, vol. 1, 63), It appears as if Śāntideva assumes the more radical and one-sided version that the reborn person is not the same person. However, this impression is deceiving. Śāntideva speaks of “another” because he relates the “self” closely to the body. If only one’s present body is regarded as “self,” the reborn one is another. This view is explicitly taken in the corresponding section in ŚS 358 (see also Schmithausen 2007, 561f). In caring for the future body, one actually appropriates another body by extending the notion of “self” to it. A somewhat similar argument has been presented by Derek Parfit. According to Parfit, how we relate to our future self (e.g. the teenager to his anticipated self as an aged person) is essentially similar to how we relate to a different person. From this Parfit concludes: “We ought not to do to our future selves what it would be wrong to do to other people,” e.g. causing one’s future self a painful death by heavy smoking in one’s youth (Parfit 1989, 320).

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for one’s existence through time, and to the aggregates of mental and physical components (skandhas) that jointly form the individual’s present bodily appearance. However, neither a continuum nor an aggregate exist as such. They are not substances but merely designations for composite phenomena – either for a continuum, as for example a trail of ants, or for an aggregate, such as an army formed by individual soldiers. If the “self” functions in the same way as a designation for a continuum and an aggregate, it is as unreal (= unsubstantial) as these. And since no persistent and substantial (individual = indivisible) “self” exists, suffering is not really owned by an individual self. Hence there is no reason to confine the protection against suffering to merely one particular present body-self. Suffering needs to be eliminated simply because it is suffering, without any restriction to “one’s own” suffering (vss. 101-102). But why then, the opponent may ask further, should one ward off suffering at all? Śāntideva’s answer is entirely pragmatic: “Because all agree on it.” Thus, if suffering is bad, it should be eliminated for all beings; if not, there would be no reason to eliminate it in the case of one’s own body either, that is, in the case of oneself (vs. 103). Now the imaginative opponent turns against the Bodhisattva ideal. If suffering is bad and should be avoided or eliminated in any case simply because it is suffering, is it then not completely wrong to increase one’s suffering by developing the great compassion of the Bodhisattva? Indeed, this will certainly imply more suffering for oneself, as Śāntideva affirms repeatedly (e.g. vss. 4:40, 6:75, 7:22, 8:105). Śāntideva gives a fourfold reply (vss. 104-109): (1) If one abandons the self-centered perspective and keeps in mind the suffering of the whole world, the suffering of the individual Bodhisattva is not “great” in any quantitative sense (vs. 104). (2) The suffering of the Bodhisattva is “great” only in a heroic sense: Through his suffering, the sum total of suffering is not increased, but rather reduced, since the suffering of many is thereby brought to an end. Out of their compassion Bodhisattvas do not shy away from sacrificing themselves for the sake of others (vs. 105-106).113 They even enter into the worst of all hells in order to alleviate the lot of the denizens. (3) In suffering for others, the Bodhisattva is simultaneously also suffering for 113  This refers to the story related in the Samādhirāja-sūtra (chap. 35). Despite being warned of the danger, Supuṣpacandra went to the realm of the vicious King Śūradatta in order to preach the Dharma for the liberation of numerous beings. His mission was successful, but as a result King Śūradatta had him killed and dismembered before finally realizing the saintly nature of his victim. At the end of the story, the Buddha reveals that he himself had been this wicked king in a previous life. See Śāntideva 1995, 177.

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his own benefit. It is a great joy for the fully developed Bodhisattva to see how his own suffering does indeed liberate others (vss. 107-108).114 (4) The reason for this joy is, in the end, not self-centered pride or a sense of reward (vs. 116).115 Rather, the striving for the well-being of others has become the Bodhisattva’s very own goal (vs. 109), his new self-understanding, as Śāntideva will point out in the subsequent verses. In serving others, he is only serving his new, all-encompassing self. The contemplation of this argumentative discourse is framed and interspersed by the metaphor of the unity (or coherence) of the body. In vs. 91, the whole world of diverse beings, who all deserve to be protected equally, is compared to the body that needs to be protected as one unity, despite consisting of different parts. The body metaphor is continued and expanded in vs. 99: One should care about the suffering of others – even if this is not felt in one’s own body – in the same way in which the hand cares for the foot even if the pain of the foot is not felt by the hand. This aspect is then integrated with the former one in vs. 114: All parts of the body, like the hands and other limbs, need to be cherished or loved individually because they are part of one unit; that is, each being needs to be loved not as an “other” but because it is part of the unity of the world.116 Through his use of the body metaphor, Śāntideva illustrates a change in the understanding of “self” and “selves.” Treating all beings equally as members of one larger unity, despite their being different, implies not making any differences in how suffering is alleviated and happiness induced. This undifferentiated care for different 114  Vss. 107-108 may have been influenced by Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkara 4:26: “Since even Avīci hell becomes a realm of delight for one of compassionate nature…” (Maitreyanātha/Āryāsaṅga 2004, 40) and by the Kāraṇḍavyūha-sūtra. The latter relates that when Avalokiteśvara enters Avīci hell, its fires are turned into a lotus pool (see Thomas 1952, 72-75; Studholme 2002, 122). See also Part II, chap. 10, pp. 497-503, and the excursus on the Buddhist hells, p. 335. 115  See the preliminary justification of the Bodhisattva’s “pride” in BCA 7:46-61. 116  Note that in the Dūn-huáng version of the BCA, vss. 99, 101 and 114 form a direct sequence (= 6:42-44), whereby in the Dūn-huáng version the middle verse (vs. 6:43, equivalent to BCA 8:101) diverges strongly. Ishida (2004, 34) translates: 6:42b: “A pain of the foot is not that of the hand. Yet why is it (foot) protected by the other (hand)? 6:43: Continua and aggregates are, like garlands, the flow of water, or forests, delusions in one’s memory and intellect. All of the world is the mind. 6:44: Why are not living beings loved as a part of the world just like the way that hand etc. are loved as a part of the body?” Vss. 8:100, 102-113 of the canonical BCA have no parallel in the Dūn-huáng version and are apparently interpolated. See also Ishida 2010, 2013, 2014.

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sentient beings is the way to no longer perceive all, including oneself, as individual units or selves, but as members of a single larger unit, of one overarching self or body. Śāntideva’s use of the body metaphor is of particular relevance because he speaks almost interchangeably of “body” and “self” (e.g. vss. 8:92-93, 97-98, 159-173). The body functions as the prime referent for the concept of “one’s self” (vs. 115). Whatever is said about the body has implications for the self and vice versa. In the present section, Śāntideva plays dialectically with this body-self at three different levels. (1) The body is ambivalent. On the one hand, it functions as a symbol of the essential equality of all sentient beings: all feel their own pain in their own bodies equally, and because of loving their own body-self they all equally recoil from pain. On the other hand, the body functions as a symbol of ethical inequality: one only needs to care about the pain felt by oneself, that is, by one’s own body. (2) The self-concept in the sense of ethical inequality needs to be deconstructed.117 The notion of an individual body-self is not substantially real. It is merely a conventional designation for an aggregate of different components in space and a continuum of sequential events in time. (3) However, a new body-self can be reconstructed if it is transformed into the notion of the unity of the large cosmic body, the world, which comprises all sentient beings as its parts. This notion, despite being similarly unreal (after all, it is also a composite of different parts in space and time), should nevertheless be cultivated because it involves the mutual care of all in that they no longer see themselves as different and opposed selves, but as different parts of the one all-encompassing body-self. Both the deconstruction of the individual self and the reconstruction of the new all-encompassing self presuppose the Buddhist not-self teaching (as alluded to in vss. 100-102) or better, its radicalized form in terms of “emptiness” (śūnyatā), that is, the non-substantiality of everything.118 Śāntideva’s use of the body metaphor – and even more so, his further elaborations in the remainder of the chapter – show that he handles different self-concepts in a creative, imaginative and pragmatic way; that is, he treats them as means (upāya) which can be used either in an unwholesome or in a wholesome way, depending on whether they 117  But note that this deconstruction is primarily the work of vss. 100-102 as they appear in the canonical BCA. In the Dūn-huáng this is only hinted at. See the preceding footnote. 118  See vss. 9:79-88, where Śāntideva radicalizes the deconstruction of the self to the deconstruction of each component down to the atom. In vs. 9:150 he clearly states the emptiness of the whole world.

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obstruct or foster the development of compassion. In this sense, Śāntideva first employs the notion of the equality of self, then deconstructs the selfish self, then reconstructs an expanded notion of a self that encompasses all, and finally arrives at an exchange of self and others by which the Bodhisattva identifies completely with others. At this stage, altruism and self-interest become indistinguishable. The current debates about Śāntideva’s contribution to a philosophical foundation of Buddhist ethics have been triggered by Paul Williams’ accusation that Śāntideva’s argumentation in the present section of the BCA is not only incapable of substantiating Buddhist (or any kind of) ethics, but that it even “destroyed the Bodhisattva path.”119 Williams understands Śāntideva as fallaciously attempting to derive an ethical “ought” (the moral duty not to be selfish) from an ontological “is” (there is no self).120 In his critique, Williams assumes, for the sake of argument, the Madhyamaka distinction between ultimate and conventional truth. He rightly holds that the denial of a self at the ultimate level does not imply a rejection of the self at the conventional level. On the contrary, the Madhyamaka emphasis on the logical interdependence of all concepts even requires the idea of a person or self (conventionally) as presupposed by any discourse about sensations or the moral quality of behavior: Without a self there is neither pain (as felt by a self), nor any selfish or non-selfish attitude towards the selves who feel pain. But, according to Williams, in vss. 100-102 Śāntideva not only rejects the self in an ultimate sense but also in the conventional sense. This move is fateful. It undermines – although unintendedly – the whole Bodhisattva ideal: If one argues that selfishness is wrong because there are no selves, not even conventionally, then there are also no selves who experience pain (and hence no need for liberation) and no selves who could set off to liberate others from their suffering (and hence no liberators).121 Among the multifaceted responses that Williams’ critique has elicited, I would like to highlight just two points. First, as Barbra Clayton has aptly remarked, Śāntideva does not conclude “an ought from an is.”122 At least one of his premises is clearly normative inasmuch as Śāntideva assumes that suffering is to be avoided simply because it is suffering. As we have seen, the justification for this is entirely pragmatic (“because all agree on 119

 See above, Part I, chap. 4, pp. 80-82.  Williams 1998, 104. 121  See ibid. 174. 122  Clayton 2001, 97, fn. 12. 120

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this,” vs. 8:103). Second, Śāntideva does not reject any kind of conventional self. Instead he develops a new self-concept at the conventional level. Śāntideva employs the not-self teaching – and even more, the antidote of universal emptiness (śūnyatā) – for a double purpose: on the one hand he deconstructs the kind of conventional self-concept that restricts protection against suffering only to the suffering of the current individual body-self (vss. 100-102). But on the other hand, he reconstructs a new sense of body-self that understands all suffering as the suffering of one universal, all-encompassing body-self, to which all sentient beings belong as body parts caring for the sake of the whole body by caring for each other. Thus Williams is right in saying that the moral imperative to remove each other’s pain presupposes a conventional self. However, this conventional self is not to be based on the individual body (the specific and partial physicomental conglomerate), but on the all-encompassing body which is the “whole world” (jagat). Suffering should not be seen as individually owned (vs. 102); instead, suffering is owned by the world, it is “the suffering of the world” (jagadduḥkhaṃ, vs. 104).123 In order to be motivated by the suffering of the world, the Bodhisattva needs to identify with the world of beings as his new self. This is what, according to Śāntideva, the Buddhas have done (vs. 6:121) and what the Bodhisattva develops by the practice of expanding the self: “Just as you wish to protect yourself from pain and sorrow and the like, in the same way you should practice the attitudes of protecting and being compassionate with regard to the world” (vs. 8:117).124 I think Jon Wetlesen got it right when he suggests that Śāntideva’s intention is the “transformation of the motivational structure of a bodhisattva from an individualistic to an interpersonal self-understanding”125 or, in more simple words, “transforming one’s self-conception from a smaller to a bigger self.”126 123  This view also implies relativizing the striving for just one’s own happiness. In ŚS 361 this is illustrated by an arresting picture based on the metaphor of the whole world as one body: “when the world is burnt in the fire of pain, what delight can there be in one’s own happiness? When one is burning all over, what happiness is there if one nail is not burned?” Bendall, Rouse 1922, 317f. 124  This is fully in line with the traditional and influential Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitāsūtra, which says in chap. 1:6: “A Bodhisattva should therefore identify all beings … with his own self, like this: ‘As I myself want to be quite free from all sufferings, just so all beings want to be quite free from all sufferings.’” And the Bodhisattva should combine this thought with the awareness of emptiness, that is, with the thought that no self nor component (dharma) exists. See Conze, 1995, 93. 125  Wetlesen 2002, 51. 126  Ibid. 64.

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This view fits in well with Śāntideva’s remarks on rebirth. As we have seen, throughout the BCA Śāntideva draws on the alternative between the negative prospect of future suffering in the hells and the glorious prospect of achieving Buddhahood. It is quite evident that in vss. 8:9798 Śāntideva is not censuring the attitude of taking care of one’s wellbeing in a future life, which one should be doing if vss. 101-102 are read as directed against any kind of self-concept. The alternative reading is, as Wetlesen has shown, to understand the care for one’s future wellbeing as an intermediary step in the development of the bigger self: It is reasonable to care for my future well-being because this care implies expanding the concept of self beyond the present body to embrace the other body that will be born (vs. 98). This implies that “there is no relevant difference between my own future welfare and the present or future welfare of others because I can identify with both, and thus incorporate these states of welfare into my conception of myself.”127 Hence, “I should be as concerned about the welfare of others as for my own.”128 Actually, the welfare of others is then no longer the welfare of “others” but has become “my own” welfare, that of the new and bigger self (see also vs. 8:116).129 The metaphor of the whole world of sentient beings as constituting one body underlies various other images that Śāntideva uses in the BCA. He frequently addresses “the world” or “the world of beings” as one entity. It suffers under the defilements (vs. 4:47), but is guided (vs. 1:11) and saved (vs. 2:40) by the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas (vs. 4:41). The Bodhisattva is fully dedicated to the world (vs. 10:54), caring for the suffering of the world (vss. 3:5f; 6:75; 10:55) and is ready to suffer for the world (vss. 4:40, 10:56). Especially the talk of bodhicitta as the medicine for the world’s suffering (vss. 1:26, 3:28-30; see also 10:57) suggests the image of the world as a single ailing body. Where does this body metaphor come from? As has been said above, Śāntideva regards the body as the main point of reference in the habitual construction of the I-consciousness (see vss. 8:111, 115, 158). The idea of accepting the whole world of beings as one’s self could therefore easily bring about the image of the world as one or “one’s” body. Perhaps Śāntideva was also familiar with the tendency in some strands of the Mahāyāna to view the whole world as the body of the Buddha (as in the 127

 Ibid. 58.  Ibid. 129  Ibid. 41. 128

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Avataṃsaka-sūtra) or to equate the Bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara (mentioned in vss. 2:51 and 8:118) with the cosmic body of the puruṣa (as in the Kāraṇḍavyūha-sūtra). However, as far as I am aware, none of these possible sources of inspiration contains the particular feature of the different body parts cooperating for each other’s sake and for the well-being of the whole body. But this feature is crucial in Śāntideva’s use of the metaphor. And it is the most prominent feature of the body metaphor as we find it in the ancient Mediterranean world, including the writings of Paul.130 New Testament scholars take it for granted that Paul’s employment of the body metaphor, especially in 1 Cor. 12:12-27 and in Rom. 12:45, was influenced by its widespread use in ancient political literature, where it signified the necessary cohesion of a society. Such use goes back as far as the 4th or 5th centuries BCE.131 If one were inclined to postulate some Western influence on Śāntideva’s application of the metaphor, such influence would therefore not necessarily be of a Christian origin but, as in the case of Paul as well, stem from the wider Mediterranean realm.132 Yet neither can we exclude the possibility of Christian influence,133 nor the possibility of an autonomous creation by Śāntideva himself. In their use of the body metaphor, Paul and Śāntideva show some significant similarities and dissimilarities. Both stress the need of 130  The metaphor is also found in the Islamic world, perhaps due to Christian influence. One hadith (Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī 5665, Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim 2586) says: “Thou wilt see the faithful in their having mercy for one another and in their love for one another and in their kindness towards one another like the body; when one member of it ails, the entire body (ails), one part calling out the other with sleeplessness and fever.” (Maulana Muhamma Ali, A Manual of Hadith, p. 379, online: http://www.sacred-texts.com/isl/ hadith/had33.htm) And a famous poem by the Iranian poet Sa’dī (13th cent.) reads (Buehler 2008, 212): The human family is one body with many parts ‒ creations arising from one unseen essence. Any harm to any part summons an awakening ‒ a disease and a healing response from all parts. You who fail to feel the pain of others cannot be called truly human. 131  This has been a widely researched topic. For a brief summary with the most crucial references, see Mitchell, M. 1991, 157-160 including notes. 132  Note that while Paul mentions a number of different body parts (foot, hand, ear, eye, head and “less honorable members”), Śāntideva only mentions foot and hand and mentions other parts only summarily (BCA 8:91; 99; 114). The restriction to hands and feet is known from some classic sources (see Mitchell, M. 1991, 159, fn. 566). 133  See, for example, Dayal (2004, 42f), who felt some Christian influence on the BCA to be quite likely. For a possible Christian influence on the Śāntideva legend, see above, Part I, chap. 2, p. 48.

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mutual care for the sake of each other and of the whole body. Because the members belong to one and the same body, they also belong to each other in sharing their sufferings and joys (cf. Rom. 12:5, 1 Cor. 12:20 and 25f). Like Śāntideva, Paul also stresses the unselfish nature (in the moral sense) of the love that all should have for each other (“love is not self-seeking,” 1 Cor. 13:5). Paul and Śāntideva both affirm that the body members have a basic equality as well as a specific difference. But while Śāntideva’s emphasis is more on the aspect of equality (BCA 8:92-96), Paul stresses the diversity and equal value of the different contributions by the different members to the one body (1 Cor. 12:14-24). For Paul, being different and being low is no reason for exclusion (1 Cor. 12:1522). Although less emphasized, this aspect is not entirely absent in Śāntideva. He not only holds that the Bodhisattva should see himself as connected to others (BCA 8:137), but that he should especially identify with the “lowly” ones (BCA 8:140). A major difference consists in that Paul explicitly applies the body metaphor only to the Christian community. The larger body is the church, the “body of Christ,” of which one becomes a member by being baptized (1 Cor. 12:12-13). Śāntideva knows of no such restriction. To him, the larger body is the whole world of sentient beings. This may be challenging for Christians: Is the non-selfish love of which Paul speaks in 1 Cor. 13:5 in the end rather selfish, being confined to fellow Christians, the baptized members of Christ’s body? In a short comparative essay, John Sheveland has raised this issue and suggests an answer by stating a “tension between objective and subjective redemption, between what Christ has done for all and what Christians must do … to apprehend those effects and be Christ’s body.”134 According to Sheveland, Paul assumes that objectively all humanity is saved so that “all bodies, by virtue of the gracious work of God in Christ, are members of this redeemed, justified body (…). Membership in the body of Christ and solidarity with one another obtains independent of the extent to which one’s own group or group’s narrative supports it.”135 In this account, the baptized members of the church would be those whose “narrative” subjectively supports the view that objectively all human beings, without restriction, belong to the one body of Christ. While even in this case Śāntideva’s perspective is still significantly wider in that it does not merely encompass human beings, but 134

 Sheveland 2010, 185.  Ibid. 180.

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all sentient beings, it is not entirely clear whether Sheveland’s reading of Paul can be sustained. The question of how to understand Paul’s notion of “the body of Christ” has been subject to much speculation and debate among New Testament scholars.136 One line of interpretation, represented by the influential work of Ernst Käsemann, relates Paul’s idea to the gnostic primal man who “embraces the All in its entirety.”137 Especially the conclusion of the hymn in Philippians that “every knee shall bend … and every tongue confess that Jesus Christ is Lord” (Phil. 2:10f; see also 1 Cor. 15:20-28) could be seen as indicative of such a model. Today, however, the majority of New Testament scholars seem to reject any gnostic implications of Paul’s notion.138 Moreover, it is also unclear whether Paul really taught some kind of apocatastasis, the final salvation of all, so that indeed all would become members of Christ’s body.139 And it is even less evident whether such final salvation of all was seen by Paul as being merely the disclosure and ultimate manifestation of a reality that is objectively already given. Such ideas, I suggest, are legitimate theological speculations.140 But it is doubtful whether they represent the theology of Paul and underlie his notion of the “body of Christ.” There may be a more promising way of grounding the ideal of allembracing, non-selfish love in the New Testament, including Paul’s writings, than relating it to Paul’s theology of Christ’s body. In Rom. 13:8-10 Paul presents reciprocal love as the fulfillment of the law. This echoes Jesus’ saying in Mt. 7:12 that the Golden Rule (“do to others as you would have them do to you”) is the essence of the law and the prophets. Neither in Paul nor in the Gospels is the application of the Golden Rule confined to one’s ethnic or religious community. It rather applies, as in BCA 8:90, universally. This becomes still more evident in its radicalization by the commandment of loving one’s enemies. Not even they are excluded from the commandment to love one’s neighbor. Again we can see an unmistakable correspondence between the Gospel (Mt. 5:43-48) and Paul (Rom. 12:14-21). In the first instance, it is God whose love for human beings is indiscriminate. God’s love excludes nobody; it embraces the righteous as well as the unrighteous. This should 136

 A summary of the different positions is found in Pelser 1998.  Pelser 1998, 527. 138  Dunn 1998, 549f. 139  See also above, Part II, chap. 7, p. 329. 140  See also above, Part II, chap. 3, p. 156, and the excursus on hells, pp. 344f. 137

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be reflected in the human attitude to one’s enemies (Mt. 5:45.48). As Paul can say, God loved us when we were still God’s enemies (Rom. 5:810). Hence we too should not repay evil by evil, but be good to everyone (Rom. 12:17f). The prime reflection and, in this sense, revelation of God’s indiscriminate love is Jesus, who forgave his murderers.141 As we have seen, Śāntideva also celebrates a loving attitude that is extended to one’s enemies.142 And when he says in the present section that the Bodhisattva must not shy away from suffering that brings about the redemption of others (BCA 8:105), Christians will feel reminded of Christ’s own self-sacrifice. The spirit of Christ that inspires his followers resonates strongly with the spirit of the Buddha that inspires the Bodhisattvas who follow the course leading to Buddhahood. TRANSLATION: 8:111-158 The exchange of others and oneself 111. Due to habit accrues the notion of “I” with respect to someone else’s drops of semen and blood, although there is no reality [behind this notion]. 112. Why isn’t thus also someone else’s body recognized as being I? That one’s own body is another is quite certain and not difficult [to grasp]. 113. Upon recognizing oneself as beset with faults and others as oceans of virtues, one should cultivate renouncing to be an I and accepting the other. 114. Why are the sentient beings for being parts of the world not just as cherished as the hand and other limbs for being parts of the body? 115. Just as the notion of “I” refers by habit to this, my own body, which is without a self, why doesn’t by habit also with respect to others the [notion of them] being “I” come about? 116. And if in this manner the bodhisattva has even wrought the welfare of others, he is neither proud nor haughty. And even by feeding myself [to others], hope for reward does not come about. 117. Just as you wish to protect yourself from pain and sorrow and the like, in the same way you should practice the attitudes of protecting and being compassionate with regard to the world. 118. For this reason, the Bodhisattva Avalokita, the Lord, dedicated even his name to take also the fright of people away when they are bashful at a gathering. 141

 See above, Part II, chap. 3, pp. 172-174 and chap. 6, pp. 293-295.  See above, Part II chap. 6, pp. 270-286.

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119. One should not shun a difficult task, since by force of habit one is not pleased without that very task before which one trembled once upon hearing of it. 120. He who would like to save himself and others quickly should practice this highly mysterious exchanging of the other and oneself. 121. Since through exceeding love of a self, even a minor threat causes fear, who would not abhor this self, which is fraught with dangers like an enemy, 122. a self that kills birds, fish and wildlife with the intent of fending off illness, hunger, thirst and other miseries, and hostile, stands in the way, 123. a self that would murder even father and mother for the sake of rewards and honor, that would rob the property of the Three Jewels so that it might become fuel in the worst of hells? 124. What clever person would covet this self, protect it, and worship it? Who would not consider it an enemy but even respect it? 125. “If I give, what will I eat?” Such concern for the sake of oneself is the character of a men-eating demon. “If I eat, what will I give?” Such concern for the sake of others is the character of a king of gods. 126. On tormenting another for the sake of oneself, one will be roasted in the hells and other bad states. But on tormenting oneself for the sake of others, one will succeed in everything. 127. The desire to raise oneself, which results in a bad future fate, in baseness and stupidity, by transferring precisely this [desire] to another, a good fate, honor and knowledge [are achieved]. 128. On dominating another for the sake of oneself, one will experience slavery and other dependencies. But on dominating oneself for the sake of another, one will experience mastery and other freedoms. 129. All those who are suffering in the world are so out of longing for their own happiness. All those who are happy in the world are so out of longing for the happiness of others. 130. Why so many words? Just behold this gap between the fool who pursues his own goals and the wise one who acts for the goals of others! 131. It is certainly not possible to achieve buddhahood, how even happiness in the cycle of existences, if one does not exchange one’s own happiness for the suffering of another? 132. Enough about the next life! Even visible benefits in this world are not achieved when the servant does not do the work, and the master does not pay the wages. 133. The deluded refrain from inducing mutual happiness, the source of happiness in the visible and the invisible worlds, and by causing mutual distress they embrace gruesome suffering. 134. The troubles that the world offers, the many sufferings and dangers, all of this comes from grasping a self. So of what use is this grasping to me?

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135. If one does not evade the self, one cannot escape suffering, just as one cannot escape being burnt if one does not evade fire. 136. To calm my own suffering and to calm the suffering of others, I therefore offer myself to others and adopt others as myself. 137. “I am connected to others.” Assure yourself of that, my mind! Now you may think of nothing other than the benefit of all sentient beings. 138. It is not fitting to see, for example, to one’s own benefit and so on with eyes and other senses that belong to others; it is not fitting to move to one’s own benefit with hands and other limbs that belong to others. 139. Therefore, wholly committed to sentient beings, whatever you see in this body, take all of that away from it and use it to the advantage of others! 140. Think of lowly and other beings as being yourself, and of yourself as being others, and then you may practice jealousy and pride without hesitation: 141. That person is honored, not me; I am not rich like he is; he (ayam aham M instead of aham aham V) is praised, I must be censured; I am unhappy, he is happy. 142. I do the work, while he stands around at ease; he, it is true, is important in the world, I am insignificant indeed and worthless. 143. What can be done by someone who is worthless? Every person (ātman) has their merits. There are people among whom I am poor; there are people among whom I am better. 144. That my morals and views are full of shortcomings, for example, is due to the power of the defilements, not due to myself. As far as possible, I should be cured; I have even accepted painful [cures]. 145. But if I am incurable for him, why does he despise me (avamanyate M instead of avamanyase V)? Of what use are his merits to me? He, on the other hand, is rich in merits. 146. He has no pity at all for people stuck in the predator jaws of bad destinies; beyond that, proud of his virtues, he wants to surpass the prudent. 147. On noticing that someone is equal to himself, he strives for profits and honors to be obtained for himself, even by fighting, to gain his superiority: 148. If only my virtues would become obvious everywhere in the world, and if only no one would any longer hear about the virtues that are his! 149. Would that also my failures be hidden, the honor would be mine, not his! – Now I have easily become wealthy; I am revered, but he is not. 150. Finally, after a long time, we see delighted that he has been put down, a laughing stock to all the world, vilified here and there. 151. Since this wretch actually measures himself with me, does he really have so much erudition, wisdom, beauty, relatives and possessions? 152. When I hear such merits of my own being praised here and there, I savor a feast of joy, excited and with goose bumps.

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153. Even if he had possessions, we would have to take them away by force and give him only enough to live on if he does our work. 154. And he must be deprived of happiness, laden with our distress forever. We have all been pained by him hundreds of times in the cycle of existences. 155. Innumerable eons have passed while you were seeking your own benefit. Through this great toil you have gained nothing but suffering. 156. So at my bidding apply yourself without hesitation to this [practice of exchanging the others and yourself]! You will see the advantages of this later, because the Buddha’s words are true. 157. If you had done this work earlier, you would not be in this state, not to mention the bliss of perfection that is a Buddha’s. 158. Just as you have formed, therefore, the notion of “I” with respect to someone else’s drops of semen and blood, so cultivate this notion also with respect to others!

COMMENTARY 5. Self-love and Altruism After the meditation on “the sameness of self and others,” Śāntideva turns to “the exchange of self and others” (see BCA 7:16). There is some debate on where one should see the exact beginning of this section. Lambert Schmithausen, for example, suggests that the “exchange” does not begin until vs. 8:120.143 The transition between contemplating the “sameness” and the “exchange” is certainly somewhat fluid. While one reason for this is the heavy editing and restructuring of the text in the canonical BCA (compared to the Dūn-huáng version), there is also another, internal reason. In a sense, Śāntideva takes three instead of merely two steps: He first contemplates the equality of self and others, then expands the self-concept to include the whole world, and on this basis performs the imaginative exchange of self and others.144 As we have seen, the expansion of the self is induced by Śāntideva’s reconstruction of the Bodhisattva’s “self” as no longer related to the individual body but to the all-encompassing “body,” the whole world of sentient beings. This expansion constitutes the basis for a further reconstructive move regarding the Bodhisattva’s self-conception: imagining others as oneself, and oneself as another; in other words, putting oneself in the others’ shoes 143

 Schmithausen 2007, 566, fn. 48.  See above, p. 377.

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and seeing oneself through the other’s eyes. In my understanding, this exchange is prepared in vss. 111-119, supported in vss. 120-137 by the central argument that selfless altruism is in the best interest of the self, and carried out imaginatively in vss. 138-158.145 In vss. 111-119 the key term is “habit” (abhyāsa) (vss. 111, 115, 119), in combination with “cultivating” (bhāvayati) (vs. 113). According to Śāntideva, the illusion of a “self” is developed by habit. As has been shown, Śāntideva views the notion of “self” as usually related to the individual body. But even “one’s own” body, he now argues, has never been one’s own: right from the start, i.e. its conception, it grew out of the father’s semen and the mother’s blood (vss. 111 and 158). Thus, if the notion of “self” or “I” is developed by habit in relation to a body that never was one’s own,146 why should it not be possible to cultivate the new habit of relating the same notion to other bodies as well (vss. 112 and 115)? The result of such mental cultivation – or, as we might also call it, reprogramming – would not only be to consider all sentient beings as parts of the one body constituted by the world, but to care for them in the same way one used to care for the parts of that body which was considered, through old habit, to be one’s own (vss. 114, 117). Highly advanced Bodhisattvas have cultivated this new habit to the extreme. That is, their care extends to others, be it caring for the comparatively minor distress of people who feel uncomfortable at gatherings (vs. 118)147 to not even shying away from sacrificing their life to feed other beings (vs. 116).148 Such deeds are not done for one’s own sake in terms of the earlier notion of the individual “own” or “self,” but, in line with their new self-conception, for the sake of all (vs. 116). An action that appeared extremely frightening from the old self-centered perspective is now perceived as a task one enjoys completing. This radical 145  The latter is to a large extent the work of the redactor. Vss. 139-154 are not contained in the Dūn-huáng version. There, vss. 155-173 follow directly after vss. 114138 (with the exception of vss. 167 and 135, which have also been interpolated). 146  In a sense, this is a variant of his argument in vss. 8:97f: Neither the future body is our own, nor the past or present body. It is only by habit that we regard it as “me” or “mine.” 147  This alludes to the Bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara’s vow to liberate sentient beings from various fears as related in the Gaṇḍavyūha-sūtra. Here the “fear of surrounding crowds” (parṣacchāradyabhaya) is explicitly mentioned. See Läänemets 2006, 321; see also Cleary 1993, 1276. 148  The Bodhisattva’s joyful readiness to become “food and drink” for others has already been expressed in BCA 3:8. For some famous examples from Buddhist literature, see the commentary on this verse (Part II, chap. 3, pp. 166f).

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change, Śāntideva promises, can be achieved by the force of cultivating the new habit (vs. 119), and as he already assured the reader in BCA 6:14: “There is nothing that practice cannot master.” In verse 113 Śāntideva sounds a motif that becomes key in verses 120137: The development of a new self-concept (by which one not only loves others as much as one loves oneself but as being oneself) is in one’s own best self-interest, even from the perspective of the old selfish conception of self. This is because living in the mode of self-centeredness leads inevitably to massive suffering, not just for others (vss. 121-123) but also for oneself (vss. 133-135). “The troubles that the world offers, the many sufferings and dangers, all of this comes from grasping a self” (vs. 134a). In contrast, the result of the new mode of a selfless self will bring happiness to all. The exchange of self and others is therefore in the interest of oneself and others (vss. 120, 136). Self-love and altruism paradoxically coalesce if one understands that ultimate happiness is only found in not seeking one’s own happiness but the happiness of others (vs. 129). Śāntideva holds that this is not just true in view of the ultimate goal of attaining Buddhahood (vss. 131a, 155-157), but is also confirmed by everyday experience: Are those who pursue nothing but their own interest really happier (vss. 130b, 133; see also BCA 1:28)? Even on a mundane level it is true that refraining from making others happy or, worse, actively causing them anguish leads to unhappiness on all sides, whereas “inducing mutual happiness” is “the source of happiness in the visible and the invisible worlds.” (vss. 130133).149 So what does this mean in practice? In BCA 3:11 Śāntideva declares: “Release (nirvāṇa) is the leaving behind of everything: and my mind strives for release. If I have to give up everything, it is better to give it to all beings.” It is this understanding which underlies his idea of giving the self away to others (see vss. 136, 139, 159). It is not enough just to abandon the wrong notion of the selfish self. Such abandoning needs to be realized by giving precedence to the other (vss. 124-128). When one identifies with the other as one’s self, selfish interest is transformed into something very different. That new and wholesome form of “selfishness” acts entirely in the interest of the other, now regarded as one’s self (vss. 138-140). Even “jealousy and pride” (vs. 140), as two prominent forms of an egotistic attitude, can be practiced if one identifies oneself with the other and looks at oneself through their eyes. 149  It is noteworthy that in vs. 8:132 Śāntideva underlines his point with the rather profane example of economic interdependence.

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Śāntideva illustrates this attitude in the form of a longer monologue (vss. 141-154). It is, however, a curious monologue: the monologue of another person, but a person with whom the practitioner now identifies as “I.” As in popular body-switch movies, it is through the other’s eyes – now adopted as one’s own perspective – that the practitioner looks at himself. If one reads carefully through this baffling sequence, it becomes clear that “jealousy and pride” are treated differently, depending on whether they are expressed by the upper ones (vss. 147-154), or felt by the underdogs, the ones who are neglected, exploited, censured, unhappy and regarded as insignificant (vss. 141-146),150 presumably even in the Sangha.151 The “pride” of the lowly appears as a kind of defiant self-esteem in the face of experienced humiliation and neglect. Given that the Bodhisattva is called to look at himself through the eyes of the lowly, as Śāntideva explicitly says in vs. 140, his sharing in their “jealousy” and “pride” will turn into bitter self-criticism if he realizes that he himself is in the position of the person considering himself supreme. Verses 147-154 describe how the self-understanding of those who think of themselves as superior is perceived by those of a mean 150  My interpretation rests on Steinkellner’s suggestion to insert a colon at the end of vs. 147 so that the vss. 148-154 appear as the thoughts of the superior ones as seen from the perspective of the lower ones, the perspective which the Bodhisattva is called to assume. If one decides against the colon, assuming that the literary “I” is always the same person (from vs. 141 to vs. 154), the text would suggest that the “I” once had a low social status, whether in society or in the Sangha (vss. 143-146), but then advanced to a better position so that the former underdog could now turn the tables, compete and even defeat those who were once superior to him (vss. 148-154). Vss. 143-147 could then be taken as an illustration of “jealousy,” while vss. 147-154 would primarily illustrate “pride.” Steinkellner and I agree that this is also a possible interpretation, but we both feel that the insertion of the colon might be more suitable than assuming that the literary “I” has such a steep career. Be that as it may. The consequences of this contemplation for the practitioner who sees himself through the eyes of the underdog are in both readings equally painful and wholesome. Among Tibetan commentators another interpretation has been advanced. Kunzang Pelden (2007, 298-304), in his commentary on the BCA, suggests that vss. 141-146 represent envy and pride as felt by those who are of a lower status in relation to the practitioner, while vss. 147-150 refer to those who are of an equal status and vss. 151154 of those who are higher than the practitioner. A similar interpretation is adopted by Geshe Yeshe Tobden (2005, 222-228). While this interpretation appears somewhat strained in view of the verses themselves, it might find some support in the call of vs. 140a to identify oneself with the “lowly and other beings,” which is then understood, in a typically scholastic manner, as “lowly, equal and superior.” 151  See the discussion of this aspect by Crosby and Skilton in Śāntideva 1995, 81. A similar critique of the influential and wealthy (!) members of the Sangha is found in the Rāṣṭrapālaparipṛcchā-sūtra; cf. Boucher 2008, 138f.

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status. From their perspective, the upper-class people – even in the Sangha – manifest the most vicious forms of pride and resentment: They seek honor and glory only for themselves and they delight in seeing others being despised. They not only rob others of their just share in praise but even of their possessions; moreover, they mistreat them, driven by feelings of revenge (vs. 154). This is at least how the lowly perceive the thoughts and acts of the higher ones, and Śāntideva recommends seeing oneself in the position of the lowly. Here the exchange of self and others unmistakably assumes a strong connotation of social and ecclesial criticism. Defining social relations in terms of an all-pervasive hierarchy was – and often still is – a common experience in caste-shaped India,152 not just in the Hindu society, but also within the Buddhist Sangha, despite its nominal rejection of caste hierarchies. It is obvious that to Śāntideva, identifying oneself with the lowly implies a sympathetic understanding for their suffering and a comprehension of their feelings of envy and pride, in reaction to the far worse manifestation of envy and pride in those who consider themselves superior. Yet by looking at oneself through the eyes of lowly ones, the practitioner sees himself in the role of both the lowly and those who are higher. The underdogs’ bitter experience of their masters’ behavior holds up a mirror in which the practitioner of this meditation may recognize himself: a painful, but certainly wholesome exercise that the Bodhisattva must not evade (vss. 156-157). With the exchange of self and others, Śāntideva has reached the point at which two main lines in his argumentation culminate, meet and coincide. Throughout the BCA he is persistently appealing to people’s selfinterest and to the moral attraction of altruism. In his creative development of the self-concept from the egotistic identification with one’s body to a universally expanded self and finally a radical exchange of perspective, he arrives at a transformed notion of “self” in which altruism and self-interest assume a paradoxical identity: true happiness is the result of seeking the happiness of others rather than one’s own (vs. 8:129), exchanging self and others will alleviate the suffering of others and oneself (vss. 8:120, 136),153 or, as he will say in the subsequent section: “If you have love of yourself, you must not love yourself. If your self must be protected, it should not be protected” (vs. 173). 152  Verse 154 apparently refers to the alleged cosmic justice of social mistreatment for those who deserve to be mistreated due to the negative karma generated in past lives. 153  Note the close parallel to BCA 8:120 in ŚS 361.

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From here we can now answer the question that emerged toward the end of chapters 1 and 2.154 When Śāntideva states that death is also the end of the “I” (see BCA 2:36, 59f), he thinks of the fleeting nature of the selfish self being projected – by habit – on one’s transitory bodily existence. The fear that the “I” will cease to exist is appropriate; this is indeed true of the “I” that is fully identified with the body.155 But in hoping for a good rebirth and even more, in fearing rebirth in hell, the notion of the “self” is already extended to “another” body (the re-born or new-born body) to which the mind extends as its future “self.” This view of “self” is wholesome inasmuch as it fosters a more serious and less negligent attitude toward one’s life, especially its ethical challenges. But perfection is only achieved if the notion of “self” is expanded so radically that it embraces all sentient beings and even more, gives preference to others over oneself. As long as there is anyone suffering, the Bodhisattva will regard this as “his” suffering, suffering that needs to be alleviated. Thus, Śāntideva accepts the idea of rebirth as long as the self-concept has not yet been fully extended to embrace all. For one who identifies with all, there can no longer be an individual rebirth. In a sense, he is reborn in all. Paradoxically, he is free from rebirth and is reborn in all – he is free from samsara and remains in samsara as long as there are still any unredeemed beings. Śāntideva’s reconstruction and transformation of the self is firmly rooted in the traditional Buddhist not-self teaching (the self is a manmade illusion born out of attachment to the world) and in the radicalization of this teaching by the Madhyamaka philosophy of emptiness (the absence of a substantial self or essence in each and everything). To be sure, adopting the whole world as one’s self is still an illusion, but a beneficial one because it fosters happiness and overcomes suffering. Such skillful employment of an illusionary notion is only possible against the 154

 See above, Part II, chap. 1, pp. 136f; chap. 2, p. 152.  This may also be the deeper sense behind vs. 8:5: “Which transient being can love transient beings? Since for thousands of lives the one you love may not be seen again.” At first sight, the verse confirms the view of self-identity in terms of a process. There is no stable and immutable self, but there are “selves” in the sense of individual lines of persistent change and transformation over innumerable lives. This notion is also presupposed in the concept of the spiritual development of a Bodhisattva, which also extends over innumerable lives but is nevertheless regarded as the development of a particular individual. However, the phenomenal “ego” does not survive such transformation. This indeed raises the question of how one transient “ego” can love another transient “ego,” since their “egos” never remain the same. The beloved friend is “impermanent” (see vs. 8:8). 155

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background of the underlying insight into universal emptiness, which Śāntideva presents in the subsequent chapter as the perfection of wisdom/insight (prajñā). Understanding the emptiness of the whole world and treating the whole world as one’s self are therefore the two sides of one and the same coin. It is an ancient Buddhist teaching that following the Noble Eightfold Path, especially its moral principles, is beneficial for both others and oneself. According to AN 8:39 the “noble disciple” who practices Buddhist morality “gives to an immeasurable number of beings freedom from fear, enmity, and affliction,” and thereby “he himself … enjoys immeasurable freedom from fear, enmity, and affliction.”156 In SN 5:47:19 this is compared to two acrobats performing a balancing act together. Just as each acrobat protects his partner by protecting himself and protects himself by protecting his partner, the follower of the Buddhist path protects other beings by protecting himself by developing mindfulness, and protects himself by protecting others by developing “patience, harmlessness, loving kindness, and sympathy.”157 The widespread and influential Dhammapada (vss. 131f) expresses this idea in a way that gets fairly close to BCA 8:129: Whoever, seeking his own happiness, harms with the rod other pleasureloving beings experiences no happiness hereafter. Whoever, seeking his own happiness, harms not with the rod other pleasure-loving beings, experiences happiness hereafter.158

But as can be seen from this passage, the idea takes a more radical form in the BCA: While the Dhammapada only mentions the motive of pursuing one’s own happiness, Śāntideva speaks explicitly about pursuing the happiness of the other. How did Śāntideva arrive at his notions of extending the self to others and of exchanging self and others? As is clear from BCA 6:126, he views the Buddhas as the decisive role models. They “have made this whole world [of sentient beings] their own self.” Through the meditative practice of extending his self-conception to other beings, the Bodhisattva emulates the Buddhas; after all, a Bodhisattva is defined as someone who follows the Buddhas in order to become a Buddha himself. In commenting on BCA 6:126, I have argued that Śāntideva 156

 PTS IV, 246, quoted from Bodhi 2012, 1174.  PTS V, 169, quoted from Bodhi 2000, 1648. 158  Narada Thera 1993, 124f. 157

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may ultimately have been inspired by the famous narrative from the Vinaya about the Buddha’s identification with the ill and suffering monk.159 But how can we explain the extension of such identification to all sentient beings? It is certainly implied in the Bodhisattva’s vow to work for the liberation of all. Yet as an explanation, this would only defer the question: Why should the Bodhisattva direct his liberating efforts to all? I suggest a twofold answer: On the one hand, the universal scope of the Bodhisattva’s intention is an immediate implication of the non-discriminating nature of loving kindness and compassion. Non-discriminative love embraces everybody equally and hence, ideally, all. On the other hand, this non-discriminating nature is an implication of the Buddhist not-self teaching. All forms of discriminating love, which embrace one’s friends but reject one’s foes, carry the mark of attachment and selfishness. In contrast, selfless love, being free from any attachment, makes no differentiation and is therefore extended equally to all. Given that Mahāyāna Buddhism has radicalized the not-self teaching by developing it into the teaching of non-substantiality or universal emptiness, it is no surprise that various Mahāyāna scriptures exhort the Bodhisattva to combine the insight into universal emptiness with universal compassion, which then takes the form of identifying oneself with all beings. This is not only found in the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitāsūtra, which explicitly states that the Bodhisattva should “identify all beings … with his own self.”160 We find a very similar passage also in the fourteenth chapter of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, which is associated with the Yogācāra branch of Mahāyāna Buddhism. The passage in question (vss. 14:37-41) closely parallels the ideas expressed in BCA 8. Once the Bodhisattva has become aware of the selfless nature of all beings and sees the useless function of the individual self, because it generates suffering, he discovers the notion of “the great self which is of great use” (vs. 14:37).161 This new notion of an all-embracing self allows the Bodhisattva to liberate all without expecting any reward, in the same way that one would not expect a reward from oneself (vss. 14:38-39). The Bodhisattva is able to bear what otherwise appears unbearable (vs. 14:40) 159

 See above, Part I, chap. 6, pp. 300f.  See above, p. 383, fn. 124. 161  The idea that “the notion of the great self” (mahātmadṛṣṭi) is useful for the task of the Bodhisattva is strikingly parallel to Śāntideva’s conception of relating the “self” to the body of the world of all sentient beings. 160

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precisely because he entertains the notion of “sameness of self and beings” (satvātmasamān) (vs. 14:41).162 The development of non-differentiating love with the aid of contemplative exercise points toward the ancient meditative practice of the four “divine abidings” (brahmavihāra), also called the four “unlimited” or “immeasurable states” (apramāṇa): loving kindness, compassion, sympathetic joy, equanimity.163 It is here that we not only find a form of meditation that extends loving kindness and compassion to all sentient beings, but also contains the element of expanding the “self” to embrace all: With a heart (cetasā) that is filled with friendship, for some time he pervades one direction, (then) a second, a third, a fourth, (then the sphere) above and below, everywhere identifying himself with everything (sabbattatāya), for some time he pervades the whole world with a heart that is filled with friendship, that is wide, great, immeasurable, without hostility, invulnerable.164

The practice is very old, perhaps even of pre-Buddhist origin, as some Buddhist texts themselves suggest.165 Of particular interest in our context is the phrase “identifying himself with everything (sabbattatāya).”166 In his Visuddhimagga (9:47), Buddhaghosa (5th cent.) explains the term sabbattatāya as follows: loving-kindness etc. should be extended … to all classed as inferior, medium, superior, friendly, hostile, neutral, etc. just as to oneself (attatā); equality with oneself (atta-samatā) without making the distinction “This is another being’ (…).167

Given that the identification of oneself with all other sentient beings was regarded as crucial for the mental development of a Bodhisattva and given that such identification is explicitly mentioned as part of the ancient meditative cultivation of love and compassion, it becomes intelligible why Śāntideva gives the extension of the self to others such a prominent place in his work. This may also explain why its place was moved from the chapter on the 162  For the Sanskrit text plus Chinese, Tibetan and French translations, see: https:// www2.hf.uio.no/polyglotta/index.php?page=fulltext&view=fulltext&vid=85&cid=18249 5&mid=&level=1 For an English translation, see Maitreyanātha/Āryāsaṅga 2004. See also Maithrimurti 1999, 208, fn. 70. 163  See above, Part II, chap. 3, p. 39; chap. 6, 157f; chap. 7, 175. 164  MN 7; quoted from Vetter 1988, 27. The practice is described in a number of canonical texts, such as MN 52, 83, 99, 127; DN 13, 17; AN 5:192, as well as other places. 165  Cf. Maithrimurthi 1999, 39. 166  Ñāṇamoli; Bodhi (2001, 120) translate sabbattatāya as “to all as to himself.” 167  Ñāṇamoli 1999, 301.

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perfection of vigor to the chapter on meditation. As we have seen, the actual “exchange of self and others” (parātmaparivartana) is developed by Śāntideva on the basis of the meditative expansion of the self. A very similar term, namely “interchange of self and other” (parātmavyatihāra), is mentioned at the very beginning of the Pāramitāsamāsa (vs. 1:1),168 but without any further explanation of the respective practice. The PS presumably does not predate the BCA, and may actually date from around the same time.169 Given the lack of any precedence, Lambert Schmithausen has therefore suggested that this specific practice, at least in its elaboration as a swap of perspectives, might be Śāntideva’s own creation.170 “If you but consider what peace a good life will bring to yourself and what joy it will give to others, I think you will be more concerned about your spiritual progress,” says Thomas à Kempis in his Imitatio Christi (1:11). The argument that leading a good life, especially a morally good life, will benefit others and oneself is rife within Christianity. But so is the paradoxical merger of self-interest and altruism as we find it in the BCA. A popular story, widespread among Christians and perhaps of Jewish origin, explains the difference between heaven and hell with the parable of the long spoons or stiff arms. In hell, people are sitting at a banquet of rich food. But they are starving. They cannot reach their mouths because their spoons are too long or their arms so stiff they cannot bend them. In heaven, the situation is basically the same. But all are happy because they feed each other. The parable resonates well with Paul’s exhortation in Gal. 6:2: “Bear one another’s burdens, and in this ways you will fulfil the law of Christ.” This is clearly consistent with Śāntideva’s conviction that those who only seek their own happiness will surely miss it, whereas “inducing mutual happiness” is the true “source of happiness” (see vss. BCA 8:130b, 133 and 1:28). But his understanding goes further: Happiness is not just the result of benefitting each other. Altruism is in and of itself a felicific attitude. This belief is also shared by Christians. In traditional Christian spiritual literature it is met frequently under the rubric of “self-denial” in the imitation of Christ. The standard biblical reference is Mt. 16:24f:171 Then Jesus told his disciples: “If any want to become my followers, let them deny themselves and take up their cross and follow me. For those 168

 Cf. Meadows 1986, 157, 263.  See above, Part I, chap. 3, p. 53, fn. 2. 170  Cf. Schmithausen 2007, 566. 171  Similarly Mt. 10:38f. See also the parallels in Mk. 8:34f, Lk. 9:24, 17:33, Jn. 12:24f. 169

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who want to save their life will lose it, and those who lose their life for my sake will find it.”

These words are pretty close to Śāntideva’s paradoxical maxim that if one loves one’s self one should not love it (cf. BCA 8:173, 129, 136).172 Yet what does it mean to deny oneself and lose one’s life for the sake of Christ? In the Gospels, this idea is defined by the imitation of Christ. The disciple is called to follow Christ and emulate his love for the world up to the point of self-denial, as Christ did on the cross. As we have seen above, Jesus identified himself with the lowly and needy ones in a way that resembles the Buddha’s identification with the sick.173 And just as Śāntideva concludes from this that the true veneration of the Buddha is therefore the loving dedication to one’s fellow beings, Christians understand their charitable work as the true veneration of Christ. It is well known, for example, that Mother Teresa of Calcutta taught seeing the face of Christ in everyone and serving Christ by serving the poor. However, what is less frequent in Christian spiritual literature is the idea of identifying with suffering others in the same way Christ did. Becoming like Christ is actually a strong motif in Paul’s theology of the “Christ in us.”174 But in the course of Christian history, this notion often receded to the background in favor of the idea to see and serve Christ in the other. Nevertheless, the motif of emulating Christ by identifying oneself with others as Jesus did is not entirely absent. If we look once more at the radical forms of spirituality practiced by the desert fathers we meet an astonishing similarity to Śāntideva’s concept of extending and exchanging one’s self. In his treatise On Prayer (and it seems no accident to find this striking parallel in a tract on contemplative prayer), Evagrius Ponticus writes about the true monk: Blessed is the monk who regards every man as God after God. Blessed is the monk who looks with great joy on every one’s salvation and progress as if they were his own. Blessed is the monk who regards himself as ‘the off-scouring of all things’ (1 Cor. 4:13). A monk is one who is separated from all and united with all. A monk is one who regards himself as linked with every man, through always seeing himself in each.175 172

 See also Gómez 1973, 373, fn. 36.  See above, Part II, chap. 6, pp. 300f. 174  See above, Part II, chap. 4, pp. 198-202. 175  Philokalia VI, 68f. Quoted from the English translation by G.E.H. Palmer, Philip Gerrard, Archimandrite Kallistos Ware, available at: https://archive.org/stream/Philokalia-TheCompleteText/Philokalia-Complete-Text#page/n37/mode/2up 173

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Here the follower of Christ emulates Jesus’ identification with others while simultaneously regarding his selfish self as the off-scouring of all things. The reference to Paul’s first letter to the Corinthians further underlines this emulation of Christ. This is because in the immediately preceding verses, Paul speaks of making oneself “fools for the sake of Christ” (1 Cor. 4:10): “When reviled, we bless; when persecuted, we endure; when slandered, we speak kindly” (1 Cor. 4:12b-13a) – this is the attitude that Jesus showed when he was reviled, persecuted, slandered and finally killed. “Do Buddhist charity and Christian charity exist on the same level?” – asks Henri de Lubac after quoting extensively from BCA 8.176 He emphatically denies this: “the identification of Buddhist charity with Christian charity even when made with certain reservations, can only take place through misunderstanding (…).” According to de Lubac, the two religions are informed by an “utterly different spirit.”177 As we have seen above,178 his harsh judgement was based primarily on two assumptions: First, in contrast to Christian charity, Buddhist charity is not ultimate but provisional; it “vanishes inevitably when it is regarded from the point of view of absolute truth.”179 And second, “in the final analysis,” Buddhism, including its conception of charity, remains false, “because it lacks the only possible Foundation: God, creative Love.”180 De Lubac was either unable or unwilling to see that according to Śāntideva, boundless love and compassion are grounded in the ultimate truth of emptiness, not revoked by it. And he was unwilling to accept that there is more to the similarity between the strong Christian tradition of “negative” or “apophatic theology” and the Buddhist teaching on emptiness than a superficial analogy.181 We will have to continue the reflections on this issue when analyzing chapter 9.182 TRANSLATION: 8:159-186 Treating one’s own body 159. Whatever you observe, like a foreign spy, in this body of yours, take all that away and use it to the advantage of others. 176

 De Lubac 1953, 30.  Ibid. 31f. 178  See Part I, chap. 4, pp. 90-92. 179  De Lubac 1953, 46. 180  Ibid. 51f. 181  Cf. ibid. 129f. 182  See below, Part II, chap. 9, pp. 440-444, 478-486. 177

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160. This body is well off, the other is doing badly. The other is on the ground, this body is high up. The other toils, this one does not. Thus you shall be jealous of yourself. 161. But depriving yourself of happiness, apply yourself to the suffering of others. Check the crooked ways of this body of yours: When does it do what? 162. Let an offence fall on its head alone, even if it was committed by another, and reveal its offence to the Great Sage, even if small. 163. Tarnish its reputation by proclaiming the better reputation of others, and employ it like a low slave for the needs of sentient beings. 164. One should not praise this body full of faults due to its portion of accidental assets. Act so that no one may recognize his assets! 165. In short, whatever harm you have done others to benefit yourself, let all that evil fall upon yourself for the benefit of sentient beings. 166. Under no circumstances should one grant power to this body so that it could become foul-mouthed. It should be established in the conduct of a newlywed girl: bashful, timid and withdrawn. 167. “Act this way! Stay that way! You may not do that!” Such, indeed, is the control to be enacted. It must be punished if it transgresses these orders. 168. If you will not do this, O my mind, even though you have thus been instructed, I will punish precisely you, for all faults lie with you. 169. Where do you want to go? I will have seen you. I will smash all your pride. The old times when I was destroyed by you have changed. 170. So let go right now of any hope that even today you still had a goal of your own. I have sold you to the others, as you do not care for [their] great distress. 171. For if I do not hand you over to the sentient beings due to negligence (pramādataḥ Bh pramodataḥ V), you will hand me over to the guards of hells. No doubt about it. 172. In that way, moreover, I have been handed over already many times by you and have long been tormented. These hostilities in mind, I shall cut you off, slave to your own goals. 173. If you have love of yourself, you must not love yourself. If your self must be protected, it should not be protected. 174. The more this body is protected, the more delicate it becomes and the more it will certainly fall down. 175. But even when it falls in this way, this whole earth is not enough to satisfy its longing. Who, then, will still its longing? 176. He who demands the impossible meets with hardship and the ruin of his expectations, but he who does not expect anything will have everlasting fulfillment.

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177. One must therefore not allow the body any freedom to let its longings expand. Good, truly, is that which one, even if yearned for, does not grasp. 178. This gruesome, impure idol of a body, whose end lies in ashes, which, unmoving, is moved by someone else, why do I conceive it as mine? 179. What good is this machine to me, be it alive or dead? How is it different from a lump of clay, for example? Alas, O notion of “I” (hāhaṃkāra Bh instead of hāhaṃkāraṃ V), you do not pass away! 180. By siding with the body, one earns suffering to no purpose. What is the good of hate or love for that which is like a log of wood? 181. It shows neither love nor hate, regardless of whether I take care of it in this way or it is devoured, for example, by vultures. Why do I love it? 182. On its humiliation I am angered and on its adoration I am pleased. But if the very body is not aware [of this], for whose sake am I striving then? 183. Also those who are in favor of this body are of course my friends. Yet everyone is in favor of their body; why are those not dear to me as well? 184. Without concern I have therefore renounced the body for the welfare of the world. From now on, despite full of faults, I shall carry it like a tool for this task. 185. Enough then, about worldly ways! I shall follow the wise ones, warding off torpor and drowsiness with the “Sermon on Vigilance” in mind. 186. Therefore, to eliminate all obstruction, I shall draw the mind away from wrong paths and practice concentration constantly on the proper object.

COMMENTARY 6. Putting the Exchange into Practice In chapter 5, Śāntideva teaches that the Bodhisattva should regard and treat his body as “a crutch for actions” (BCA 5:66), as an instrument “to accomplish the aims of living beings” (vs. 5:70). Putting the “exchange of self and others” into practice therefore implies a reconsideration of the Bodhisattva’s attitude to the body. This is what Śāntideva is expounding in this final part of chapter 8. As has been seen, Śāntideva understands the body as the main object to which the notion of the “self” in its unwholesome form relates. Given that the selfish “self” is the culmination of attachment and hence, that the body is the principal object of clinging, the question arises of how the Bodhisattva can relate to “his” body without being attached to it as me or mine, while simultaneously embodying his identification and exchange with the other as his new “self.”

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In vss. 159, 163 and 184 Śāntideva repeats his view that the Bodhisattva should use the body as a tool in his care for the advantage, needs and welfare of others. But the main topic in the first part of the present section is interiorizing the view of the body from the exterior perspective of the other with whom the Bodhisattva, after the exchange, should now identify. This is first expounded in the form of an exhortation directed at the Bodhisattva (vss. 159-167) and then repeated in the form of an internal exhortation that the Bodhisattva addresses to “his” body (vss. 168-172). The next part of this section takes up the topic of verse 158, the renouncement of the former identification with the body as one’s self (vss. 173-184).183 The structure is the same: A general exhortation addressed to the Bodhisattva (vss. 173-177) is followed by an inner monologue (vss. 178-184). The exhortation reassures the Bodhisattva that renouncing the attachment to the body as his self is, paradoxically, in his best self-interest, and then the Bodhisattva reassures himself, in the form of an inner monologue, of his resolve to give up this selfidentification with the individual body and instead identify with, and care for, all sentient beings. In vss. 159-172 the main themes of the meditative exchange (cf. vss. 140-154), social hierarchy and the respective attitudes of jealousy and pride are continued. Vs. 160 reminds the Bodhisattva of how “he,” that is, the body with which he formerly identified, is perceived by lowly ones. As a result, the body must now be carefully controlled so that it no longer works for its own happiness but only for the removal of the suffering of others (vs. 161). No longer should the body become a reason for pride, but all preference is to be given to others (vss. 162-164). Others should not be blamed, not even for a justified cause, but all blame should be given to one’s own body, that is, be understood and confessed to the Buddha as one’s own offence (vs. 162).184 In a reversal of hierarchies, 183  Note that this section, apart from vs. 173, is an addendum by the redactor of the canonical BCA. Verses 174-184 have no parallel in the Dūn-huáng version. Here BCA 8:173 (= Dūn-huáng 6:85) is the last verse of chapter 6, while BCA 8:185 (= Dūn-huáng 7:56) follows after BCA 8:66 (= Dūn-huáng 7:55). 184  Crosby and Skilton have suggested that the “Great Sage” mentioned in vs. 162 does not refer here to the Buddha, as it usually does, but “to the office of ‘great sage’, occupied by the monk responsible for instilling the monastic code of discipline in the monks under his jurisdiction” (Śāntideva 1995, 178). Their suggestion is based on their understanding that I-tsing’s record would imply the common use of this epithet for superior monastic preceptors. However, in all places in his record, I-tsing clearly uses “Great Sage” as an epithet of the Buddha. And the reference given by Crosby and Skilton is far from unambiguous. I-tsing’s remark that it is the “kind object of the Great

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the body be treated as the low slave of (lowly) others (vs. 163). Never should others be harmed for the sake of one’s body-self, but only the other way round (vs. 165). Vss. 166-167 introduce and lead to the inner exhortation (vss. 168-172). It continues the reversal of hierarchies: the body must not be in a position of power but in the powerless position of “a newly-wed girl.” The status in ancient India of such a girl was one of complete dependence on and surrender to her husband and his family. This is illustrated by the commands to the bride by her new family (vs. 167a).185 In the same way the Bodhisattva, through his mind (vs. 168), must control the body (vs. 167b) that he has wed to others. In the monologue (vss. 169-172), he directly addresses his body as one whom he has sold to others (vs. 170) and whom he will control and punish in order to smash its pride (vs. 169). The Bodhisattva knows that such behavior is in his own best interest, since as a result of obeying and clinging to the body’s desires, the body has handed him over to the guards of the hells many times. And this will continue to happen if the Bodhisattva does not take control, turn the tables and hand his body over to the sentient beings (vss. 169b-172). This insight prepares the re-affirmation of Śāntideva’s central paradox that altruism is in one’s own best interest: “If you have love of yourself, you must not love yourself. If your self must be protected, it should not be protected” (vs. 173). The subsequent verses (vss. 174-178) give a further explanation for this: The desires of the body are insatiable and will therefore only end up in endless frustration, whereas the attitude of not giving into the body’s demands will result in the “everlasting fulfilment” of the awakening. With this explanation, Śāntideva anchors his paradox deeply in one of the most central Buddhist convictions: the early Buddhist understanding of “thirst” (tṛṣṇā) as that kind of desire which turns to the transitory things of this world for satisfaction and will therefore Sage” to bring the monks to a full and autonomous understanding of the Vinaya (Takakusu 1896, 119) can easily be read as also referring to the Buddha. 185  See also the remarks by Crosby and Skilton on the social status of the young bride (Śāntideva 1995, 81f). But I disagree with their view that the verses 168ff express the treatment given to the bride by her new husband: “bullying, intolerance, selling to others, and physical violence” (ibid. 82). I think that verses 169b-172 in connection with vs. 173 make it very clear that this is not the attitude of the husband toward his wife, but of the Bodhisattva to “his” body. It is not the husband who sells his wife to others. It is the Bodhisattva who has sold his body to the other beings to serve their ultimate well-being. Thus while at least the commandments in vs. 167 may be rightly seen as spoken by the husband or new family of the bride, it is the Bodhisattva who is addressing his body in vss. 169-172.

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remain ever unsatisfied because the true longing is for the “deathless.” Lasting fulfilment is only found in the experience of nirvana.186 As a result, one must not only check the body’s longings, but in particular not cling to it (vs. 177). In view of the Buddhist teaching that selfidentification with one’s body is the strongest form of clinging, vss. 178184 repeat and summarize some of the major points of this teaching: the body’s impermanence (note the hint at the foulness meditation in vs. 181); the foolishness of regarding the body as an imperishable “I”; the body as devoid of a mind; the suffering that results from attachment to the body and the egotistic attitude that goes along with it; the equality of all sentient beings; and finally, the Bodhisattva’s resolve to renounce any attachment to the body and use it, from now on, “for the welfare of the world” (vs. 184). The two concluding verses (vss. 185-186)187 continue the literary form of the inner monologue and resolution. But in terms of content they return to the overarching topic of mental cultivation though vigilance188 and the resolve of overcoming the obstruction that links “worldly ways” with “wrong paths” (as was explained in vss. 1-88 of the present chapter). In the end, the Bodhisattva’s meditative absorption189 is a special one: It consists in his single-minded concentration on the one appropriate object, the pursuit of the world’s liberation. Śāntideva’s teaching that the exchange of self and others finds its practical embodiment in giving absolute precedence to the other has been met with critical questioning, especially from contemporary Buddhist feminists. As shown, his views are situated within the context of a hierarchical milieu. It is the higher one whom Śāntideva calls to look at himself through the eyes of the lowly and then, in an exchange of order, enter into the service of the lowly by making himself the “slave” 186

 See above, pp. 367f.  The Dūn-huáng version has another verse between BCA 8:185 and 8:186 that is not contained in the Sanskrit version of the canonical BCA but only in its Tibetan version, where it is numbered 8:186 (with the Sanskrit BCA 8:186 reappearing as the Tibetan BCA 8:187). It is rendered by Wallace and Wallace as: “Like the compassionate Children of the Jinas, I shall endure the rigors of righteousness. If I do not strive day and night, when will my suffering ever come to an end?” Śāntideva 1997, 113. Note that in this context “Jina” (= “Victor”) is an epithet for the Buddha. 188  For a discussion of the reference in vs. 8:185, which is the same as in vs. 7:74, see above, Part II, chap. 7, p. 326. 189  See also Śrāvakabhūmi p. 450: “the term ‘meditative absorption’ refers to [a state in which the mind] meditates correctly on an object and recollection holds fast [to an object] one-pointedly.” Quoted from Engle 2016, 343, fn. 898. 187

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of all (vs. 8:163). However, the context of this instruction is not just shaped by hierarchies, but by male hierarchies. The gender aspect becomes particularly evident when Śāntideva advises behaving not only like a slave, but like a “newly-wed girl: bashful, timid and withdrawn” (vs. 8:166). Would he have given the same instruction to a female practitioner? More importantly, would it then still imply the same kind of spiritual learning experience? It is not the same to tell someone who is superior to behave like a slave as telling this to an actual servant. Telling a proud and high-ranking member of the monastic hierarchy to behave humbly and obediently like a newly-wed girl is very different from giving the same instruction to the newly-wed girl herself. Such contextuality is something that Śāntideva apparently does not consider. As Susanne Mrozik has put it: What is troubling for feminists is not so much that texts represent a male perspective, but that these same texts sometimes claim to represent a more universal perspective. Subsequent generations of readers, mislead by such seemingly universalistic claims, fail to acknowledge the gendered nature of Buddhist ethical ideals. They thus carry these ideals into the present without subjecting them to critical reflection.190

Such critical inquiry has been applied directly to the central Mahāyāna Buddhist ethical ideal: Throughout Buddhist history the enlightened masters have advocated behavior – such as the quintessential bodhisattva ideal of putting others before oneself – that progressive women today can easily associate with a legacy of oppression.191

Considering the experience of countless women who have suffered submission and denial of their own self due to centuries of structural and tangible male dominance, can the Buddhist advice of self-denial and submission to others really be helpful to women? Does it contribute to their liberation from suffering, or will it “affirm individual and collective patterns of abuse and low self-esteem”?192 Anne Carolyn Klein, scholar, feminist and practicing Buddhist, relates this critique directly to Śāntideva. According to Klein, Śāntideva does not acknowledge any gendered disparity. Indeed, his assumption that self-cherishing is the central human problem, his enormous emphasis on relinquishing all sense of 190

 Mrozik 2007, 126.  Tworkov 2008, 92. 192  Ibid. 97. 191

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personal entitlement in order to serve others, is a place of danger for many women in Western culture.193 The instruction to behave as everybody’s slave is also well known to Christianity (cf. Mt. 23:11, Mk. 10:43; Lk. 22:26). Given the strong similarities between the spirituality of a Bodhisattva and the Christian tradition of self-denial, it is not surprising that the same criticism has been raised by Christian feminists against traditional forms of Christian spirituality.194 In her pioneering essay “The Human Situation: A Feminine View” of 1960, Valerie Saiving Goldstein argued that for women, selflessness is actually the real sin; it should not be seen as an ideal but rather as damaging.195 And the Catholic feminist theologian Mary Daly held that in the traditional Christian culture, “an ethic of selflessness and sacrificial love” has been “accepted not by men but by women, who hardly have been helped by an ethic which reinforces the abject female situation.”196 Among Buddhist and Christian feminists some sort of consensus has emerged according to which the value of selflessness needs to be retained inasmuch as it entails a critique of abusive power in society, culture and private relations. This also includes a critique of male dominance in patriarchal structures. Under such circumstances, spirituality for women should, in the first place, foster a sense of strength and self-confidence. A difference can and should be made, as Thubten Chodron puts it, between that type of selfless behavior as results “from the wish to conform to an internalized cultural ideal,” accompanied by “feelings of inadequacy and self-doubt,” and one that arises out of compassion and generosity as “a spontaneous wish to fulfill a need,” accompanied by an experience of inner strength.197 Self-acceptance may well be seen as the precondition for practicing selflessness in a wholesome way, and self-love as the psychological requirement for loving the other as oneself.198 Although the feminist revision of the major religious traditions clearly raises new questions which require new answers,199 some insights of this 193

 Klein 2008, 98f.  For a comparative study of feminist criticism in Christian and Buddhist spirituality, see Enriquez 2011. 195  Goldstein 1960. 196  Daly 1973, 100. 197  Chodron in Gregory, Mrozik 2008, 206f. 198  See the detailed discussions in Enriquez 2011, 229-319. 199  “… Buddhist discussions of self and selflessness, or mindfulness and compassion, have never taken account of gender as a category of analysis. Who within the 2,500-yearold tradition has analyzed Indo-Tibetan theories and practices connected with emptiness in the context of how they do or do not speak to women?” Klein 2008, 132. 194

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sort are not entirely absent from the BCA. In this respect it is helpful to recollect that in the Dūn-huáng version, the mediation on the exchange of self and others appears as part of the chapter on the perfection of vigor and is counted as the final member in the list of the “six aids of vigor” (BCA 7:16). It presupposes the overcoming of any kind of dejection and the development of a strong self-confidence or even pride (vss. 7:46-59). In other words, here too a form of self-empowerment is regarded as a prerequisite for altruistic selflessness. Another closely related aspect emphasized by Buddhist and Christian feminists is that selflessness is not a value in itself, but finds its legitimate place only within a web of relations. What kind of “self” is it that feminists have in mind when they speak of women’s need of self-empowerment? Is it the seemingly autonomous individualistic self cultivated by modern Western societies on the model of male dominance, a self that asserts itself through its independence from relationships? In response to such questioning, Anne Klein has argued that “many women seek a style of identity that is powerful, yet favors the relational over the individual.”200 In this respect Klein sees Buddhist ideas as potentially helpful to the feminist concern. If the “self” is conceived in a way that does not set it by definition in opposition to relationship, then the ideal of a powerful self is not necessarily in conflict with the ideal of a compassionate self. In Mahāyāna Buddhism, a Bodhisattva can attain Buddhahood only in dependence on other beings and not as the result of an independent, sovereign achievement.201 The Buddhist teaching of “selflessness” does not imply any neglect of the “self.” On the contrary, analyzing the ways the “self” is constructed and exploring how it may be reconstructed is at the center of Buddhist practices of mental cultivation. Yet Buddhism, says Klein, has dealt with such mental cultivation in terms that are too general. And relation has hardly been analyzed in terms of specific interpersonal relationships, marked by particular personal stories.202 Traditionally Buddhists “do not elaborate how the psychological self is constructed through very specific kinds of interactions, and in dependence on various political, historical, racial, and gendered causes.”203 This is a field where contemporary Buddhists may have to learn from Western and, in particular, feminist insights. 200

 Klein 1987, 193.  Klein 2008, 109. 202  See ibid. 117-122. 203  Ibid. 133. 201

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Another important critical inquiry relates to the practicability of Śāndideva’s instructions. Is his ethics, or better the Bodhisattva ideal as such, not hopelessly overdemanding? Already Henri de Lubac objected that the excessive nature of the Bodhisattva ideal makes it “ultimately … unrealizable.”204 If Buddhism endorses a teaching that demands far too much, it would be unrealistic to assume that many people will follow it. If Śāntideva seriously intends that people do enter the Bodhisattva path for the sake of all beings, and if this is part of the reason for writing his tract, he needs “to offer some response to the overdemandingness objection that actually lessens demandingness (…).”205 First of all, one should keep in mind that Śāntideva often uses exaggerations as generally accepted stylistic devices. His audience was fully familiar with this, because such exaggerations are frequently found in the Buddhist Sūtras. In a similar way, only few Christians would conclude on the basis of Mt. 17:20f (faith as small as a mustard seed will move a mountain) that Jesus’ call for faith is overdemanding. The most fundamental response to the objection of overdemandingness, however, can be seen in Śāntideva’s argument that the Bodhisattva’s altruism converges with self-interest. As Stephen Harris has shown, this response is persuasive to the extent that one shares the fundamental Buddhist conviction that the pleasures of ordinary lives are shallow and “can never provide any lasting satisfaction,”206 whereas awakening comes along with “everlasting fulfillment” (BCA 8:176). But Harris, who dealt extensively with the objection that this is overdemanding, also points out that the requirements of the Bodhisattva ideal do not come to the practitioner all at once. They are rather part of a process of psychological transformation through which they present themselves gradually in accordance with the practitioner’s spiritual development. What appears to be difficult or even impossible at the beginning may become increasingly more feasible and less difficult.207 Harris rightly points to BCA 7:25f: At the beginning of the process the demand is the donation of vegetable; the donation of one’s own life marks the end of it.208 To the extent that the transformation works, helping others becomes a huge source of joy to the Bodhisattva, as Śāntideva never gets tired of affirming. In ŚS 362 it is called a “happiness that leads to much happiness.”209 204

 De Lubac 1953, 34.  Harris, S. 2015, 205. 206  Ibid. 213. See also Harris, S. 2014. 207  Harris S. 2015, 207-211; Harris S. 2014, 95-168. 208  Harris, S. 2015, 210. 209  Goodman 2016, 335. 205

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In line with the Mahāyāna tradition, Śāntideva understands the Bodhisattva ideal indeed as circumscribing a process of gradual mental development and transformation. The inner dynamics of this process are described as a persistent spiritual fight between the defilements (kleśas) and the spirit of awakening (bodhicitta). Yet bodhicitta is not only a force working from within the practitioner’s mind. Western interpreters of the BCA tend to overlook the crucial role of the external help that the practitioner receives from those who are further advanced or have even perfected the spirit of awakening, the Buddhas and major Bodhisattvas. In the BCA the awareness of one’s shortcomings, failures and sins is particularly pronounced. The practitioner turns to the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas asking for their help, protection and forgiveness (see again BCA 1:13-14; 2:22, 27-33, 48-54, 64-66; 6:124). After all, a Bodhisattva is someone who strives for the salvation of all beings – an idea which most evidently implies that beings can receive crucial help from Bodhisattvas. It would therefore be extremely strange if the practitioner on the path were not also to rely on the help that he or she may gain from these savior figures. But this aspect easily escapes the attention of those contemporary interpreters of Buddhism who wish to reconstruct it as an antithesis to Christian spirituality. To Śāntideva, however, the Buddhas and major Bodhisattvas are the embodiment of bodhicitta. They mediate the power of bodhicitta to those who desperately need it. And they draw it out of the unfathomable ultimate reality through which the perfection of wisdom (prajñā) pierces.

CHAPTER 9

BODHICARYĀVATĀRA 9 THE PERFECTION OF INSIGHT (PRAJÑĀPĀRAMITĀ)

COMMENTARY 1. Preliminary Remarks With chapter 9 Śāntideva proceeds to the last of the six Bodhisattva virtues, the perfection of insight or wisdom (prajñā).1 In the canonical version of the BCA the chapter can be split into three major parts: After a brief introduction (vs. 1), the first part (vss. 2-57) presents the scheme of the two realities/truths (satyadvaya) and applies it to the relation between the Madhyamaka school and other major branches of Buddhism, that is, the non-Mahāyāna realist (such as Theravāda or Sarvastivāda) or moderately realist (Sautrāntika) schools and the rival Mahāyāna school of the Yogācāra (also called Vijñānavāda or Cittamātra).2 In the argumentation of this part, the spiritual efficacy of the teaching of universal emptiness (śūnyatā) as understood by the Mādhyamikas plays a significant part. Śāntideva returns to this aspect in the third part (vss. 152-168), where he applies it to the spiritual striving of his literary “I,” that is, the practitioner on the Bodhisattva path. Between these two parts we find the bulk of the chapter. This second part (vss. 58-151) 1  Apart from the concluding verses, chapter 9 differs considerably from the intensely personal style of the other chapters of the BCA. In chapter 9 the style is that of a dense philosophical treatise in the typically polemical fashion of the Prāsaṅgikas. A number of verses resemble the corresponding chapter on prajñā in Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra (MA), which is usually regarded as earlier (see above, Part I, chap. 1, p. 11; chap. 3, pp. 53f). Prajñākaramati seems to have regarded chapter 9 as a treatise in its own right, or even an independent work. He sets it off against the preceding chapters (note that Prajñākaramati’s commentary omits the subsequent chapter 10) and introduces it with a special invocation of three verses (see Sharma 2012, 360f; Roy 2011, 179f). Yet, chapter 9 is part of all existent versions of the BCA. 2  For useful overviews of the Indian Buddhist philosophical schools, see Herman 1983; Frauwallner 2000; Williams, with Tribe 2000.

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serves to demonstrate universal emptiness, as understood by the Mādhyamikas, by means of refuting, first, a substantial ego or self (vss. 58-78), second, any substantial reality (vss. 79-116) and, third, any causal or non-causal relations (vss. 117-151). The text of chapter 9 is beset with a range of intricate problems. A comparatively minor issue are the scribal mistakes in the transmission of the Sanskrit text which has led to some confusion in verse numbering, a problem that continues in various contemporary translations, with translators’ numberings differing from verse 21/22 onwards.3 More serious difficulties are caused by the chapter’s style. In line with a standard practice of classical Indian philosophers, complex philosophical arguments are presented in a terse and dense format, often more hinted at than actually elaborated upon. Moreover, the argumentation frequently proceeds in the form of virtual controversies between various opponents and the defender of the Madhyamaka view, i.e. Śāntideva. Given that there is no explicit indication of the different roles, already traditional Buddhist commentators were at times uncertain, and of contrary opinions, on whether particular statements are to be taken as Śāntideva’s or his opponents’ position.4 Moreover, in view of the terseness of expression, “there is … often more than one plausible explanation for a verse,”5 so that translators and interpreters, when trying to reconstruct the precise course of the argumentation, often find themselves in a situation where “one can at best make an informed guess.”6 These difficulties are further aggravated by the fact that the chapter has undergone heavy editing. While there are 90 verses and a half in the Dūn-huáng version, the canonical BCA has 167 verses. Only 32 verses are identical between the two recensions. And although a number of further verses are partially identical or roughly equivalent, the Dūn-huáng version has 22 verses and a half that are not contained in the canonical BCA, either at all or in part, while the latter has 100 verses that are not, or only in part, found in the Dūn-huáng text.7 The additional and presumably interpolated verses of the canonical BCA widen the philosophical discussion considerably by extending it to non-Buddhist teachings. Among the verses that have no parallel in the 3

 See below, p. 426, fn. 37, p. 429, fn. 38.  Cf. Ishida 2004. 5  Sweet 1977, iii. 6  Crosby and Skilton in: Śāntideva 1995, 109. 7  See Saito 1993 (Introduction, 25f); 1994, 2. 4

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Dūn-huáng text are also vss. 157-164, verses that suggest a connection between the many supposedly “false paths” and the vicious work of Māra (vs. 162).8 The refutation of rival views, especially those of non-Buddhists, is in some places extremely polemical and shows no effort to make sense of the opponent’s views. Last but not least there is the problem of how to understand the general philosophical thrust of the Madhyamaka. Does the school advocate a nihilistic stance, as its opponents and some of its modern interpreters have held? Or are its arguments driven by a radical form of mysticism or transcendentalism, as has been suggested by other scholars, past and present? Or does it represent a non-cognitivist philosophy of language, which – anticipating the later Wittgenstein – rejects the idea of language as being referential in favor of a grammatical and instrumental conception?9 In the following I will not go into too much detail regarding Śāntideva’s debates with his Buddhist and non-Buddhist rivals. Instead I will focus on issues such as Śāntideva’s view of religious diversity, the hermeneutics of religious language, the pragmatics of salvation/liberation, and the nature of ultimate reality. Naturally, I will also pay particular attention to Śāntideva’s critique of the concept of God because of its particular significance in the context of Buddhist‒Christian dialogue. TRANSLATION: 9:1-5 Introduction 1. The Sage has extolled this whole cluster [of perfections] for the sake of insight. May the Bodhisattva thus develop insight, since he longs for suffering to cease.

Two types of reality Definition 2. The conventional (saṃvṛti) and the ultimate (paramārtha), these two realities (satya) we accept. Ultimate reality is not a domain of cognition. Cognition is called the conventional reality. 8  For a full synopsis of Dūn-huáng chapter 8 and BCA chapter 9, see Saito 1993 (Introduction, 31-35); 1994, 9-13. 9  For a characterization of these three approaches in recent Western Madhyamaka studies, see Huntington 1989, 25-32. For a more extensive discussion, see Tuck 1990.

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People are different due to their level of cognition 3. According to these two realities, we recognize two types of people: the yogi and the common person. Of these, common people are invalidated [in their view of the world] by the yogis. 4. Also the yogis are invalidated by ever more advanced ones through their higher level of understanding, namely by means of examples which are acknowledged by both, since for the sake of the goal [of buddhahood] they do not hesitate [to invalidate the other]. 5. The common people recognize entities and conceive them as real as well, not as an illusion. Therein lies the disagreement between yogis and common people.

COMMENTARY 2. Gradual Insight and the Illusion of Conceptual Grasping Insight, the sixth perfection, says Śāntideva in verse 9:1, has been extolled (jagau) by the Buddha as the culmination and true goal of all the perfections. This reflects the traditional Buddhist scheme of pursuing the Noble Eightfold Path10 for the sake of attaining liberating insight (bodhi = awakening). Insight is not a goal in itself: It brings the final and lasting liberation from suffering. In the context of the Bodhisattva ideal, this not only involves one’s own suffering. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the Bodhisattva is called to identify himself with the whole world of suffering beings. The perfection of insight is indispensable for the liberation of all, as it is reaffirmed in the concluding wish of this chapter (vss. 9:167f). Therefore the compassionate mind of bodhicitta finds its consummation in prajñā, while prajñā is the ultimate foundation for the realization of the Bodhisattva’s compassionate aims. According to the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra (22:397), “it is in these six perfections,” that is, in the whole course of the Bodhisattva, “that the perfection of wisdom is accomplished.”11 To the Mādhyamikas, the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras are the primal scriptural authority. In them, the Buddha teaches that the perfection of insight

10  Three of the six pāramitās (śīla, dhyāna, prajñā) correspond to the three principles that structure and comprise the Noble Eightfold Path: śīla, samādhi, prajñā. On the relation between the Noble Eightfold Path and the scheme of the six perfections, see Schmidt-Leukel 2006, 99-101. 11  Conze 1995, 236. Note that according to this line, prajñā finds its perfection in all six pāramitās, not merely in the preceding five.

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consists in understanding universal emptiness: Not only the five constituents of a human being are empty of a substantial self, as had been taught in the pre-Mahāyāna schools, but literally everything lacks a self; everything is empty of a substantial essence or “own-being” (svabhāva): Form itself does not possess the own-being of form, etc.12 Perfect wisdom does not possess the mark (of being) ‘perfect wisdom.’ A mark does not possess the own-being of a mark. The marked does not possess the own being of being marked, and own-being does not possess the mark of [being] own-being.13

As a result, all beings and all related properties “are like a magical illusion, like a dream,” including “a fully enlightened Buddha” and “even Nirvana.”14 Nāgārjuna, revered by all Mādhyamikas as their principal teacher, developed in his writings a range of philosophical arguments in support and defense of this message. But will the proclamation of universal emptiness not inevitably undermine the core teaching (dharma) of all the Buddhas, the Four Noble Truths? In response to this objection, Nāgārjuna presents his statement, as famous as it is momentous, that the teaching of the Buddhas rests on the distinction between two kinds of truth (MMK 24:9-11): The teaching of the Buddhas of the dharma has recourse to two truths: the worldly-veiled truth/reality (lokasaṃvṛtisatya) and the truth/reality in the ultimate sense (paramārthatā). Those who do not know the distinction (vibhāga) between the two truths/ realities do not know the profound point/truth (tattva) in the teaching of the Buddha [or: do not know the profound reality according to the teaching of the Buddha]. The ultimate sense [of the truth] cannot be taught without recourse to the conventional (vyavahāra). And without having attained to the ultimate sense, nirvāṇa is not attained.

These verses form an essential part of the background against which Śāntideva presents his own version of the “two truths.”15 Like Nāgārjuna, Śāntideva holds that without that particular “path” (mārga) or insight 12  This is to be repeated for the additional four skandhas: feeling/sensation, perception, formations and consciousness. See also below, fn. 34. 13  Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra 1:10. Conze 1995, 86. 14  Cf. Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra 2:40f. Ibid. 98f. 15  For a compilation of a few classical texts on the “two truths,” see Lindtner 1981. A collection of essays discussing the concept of the “two truths” in the Buddhist Madhyamaka and Yogācāra schools as well as in Vedānta is found in Sprung 1973. A translation of the commentary of Jñānagarbha (a fellow Mādhyamika and near contemporary

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indicated by the term “emptiness” (śūnyatā), enlightenment/awakening (bodhi), i.e. the experience of nirvana, cannot be attained (vs. 9:41; a verse obviously reminiscent of MMK 24:11). In order to better understand the implications of Nāgārjuna’s famous distinction and its creative adoption in the BCA, we need to briefly consider some background information. Both of the two crucial terms, satya and tattva, have epistemological as well as ontological connotations. Each of them can mean “truth” and/or “reality.” As in much of classical philosophical discourse in the West, the distinction between “truth” as a property of propositions (a proposition is “true” if it corresponds to reality) and as a designation of the reality to which true propositions or genuine knowledge refer (the “truth”) is not always strictly kept. However, to Nāgārjuna, truth/ reality in the ultimate (paramārtha) sense is beyond any words and can thus not be taken as propositional truth. It is inexpressible and can only be referred to via negations.16 Thus we read in the same tract (MMK 18:7, 9): What can be named has ceased, the domain of thought has ceased. The [true] nature of things (dharmatā) is without origination and without cessation, like nirvāṇa. (…) Not dependent on something else, peaceful,17 not elaborated by conceptual elaboration, without conceptual distinction, without diversity – this is the nature of [true] reality (tattva).

Ultimate truth/reality is not just beyond words and concepts. Its attainment comes along with the cessation or appeasing of conceptual elaboration or proliferation (prapañca), as in the practice of the so-called formless absorption (ārūpyadhyāna), referred to by Śāntideva in BCA 9:49 (and presumably in vss. 33 and 93).18

of Śāntideva) on the “two truths” is offered by Eckel 1987. For Tsoṅ kha pa’s interpretation of the “two truths,” see Tauscher 1995. 16  For a summary and philosophical discussion of different Buddhist positions regarding “ineffability,” see Burton 2004, 130-162. For a discussion of the corresponding different approaches in the interpretation of Madhyamaka, see Huntington 1989, 25-32. 17  In this context, the qualification as “peaceful” (śānta) should also be understood as a negation. It means that true reality is “at rest,” that is, free from any ontological “movement” in terms of origination, cessation or change. However, in other places Nāgārjuna calls the pacifying of the prapañca, as it comes along with the intuition of true reality, “blissful” (śiva) (MMK, dedicatory verse and vss. 5:8; 25:24). This is clearly a positive expression, but it refers to the human experience of the ultimate not to the ultimate in and of itself. 18  On the close relationship between Nāgārjuna’s “blissful pacification of conceptual proliferation” (prapañcopaśamaśiva) and the practice of ārūpyadhyāna, see SchmidtLeukel 1993. See also Vetter 1981, 91f.

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If the true nature of all things, i.e. ultimate reality, is as inconceivable and ineffable as nirvana, if – from an ultimately true perspective – there are actually no “things,” entities or “own-beings” that would originate and cease due to causal dependency, then the reality of samsara is “in truth” not different from nirvana, as Nāgārjuna explicitly says in what is probably his most famous proclamation (see MMK 25:19-22). Nāgārjuna, however, is far from presenting a reductionist interpretation of nirvana. His affirmation that samsara and nirvana are ultimately indistinguishable does not suggest that “nirvana” is simply a different name for the only true reality of “dependent origination,” i.e. samsara. Nirvana is not reduced to the level of samsara. On the contrary, samsara is, in a sense, elevated to the level of nirvana. That nirvana is free of origination and cessation and beyond all conceivability is an undisputed datum of the Buddhist tradition before Nāgārjuna. What Nāgārjuna shows is that under close investigation, the same also applies to samsara.19 According to Nāgārjuna, the logical analysis of the idea of causally connected entities in terms of dependent origination and cessation reveals the irredeemable inconsistencies of the very idea of “dependent origination.” Dependent origination, however, is nothing less than the standard Buddhist conception of samsara (with, in a sense, an inbuilt mechanism of conceptual self-destruction). According to Nāgārjuna, the Buddhist view of the world as being constituted by the two spheres of the painful samsaric realm of conditioned and transient existence, on the one hand, and blissful, unconditioned, unoriginated and deathless nirvana, on the other, does not render an accurate description of true reality. He rather understands this view as an instrument, one that if rightly used will lead to the cessation of all conceptual views, including the Buddhist one, and thereby paves the way for the intuition of the transconceptual ultimate truth/reality. Being beyond words, ultimate truth or reality cannot be taught by means of a conceptually accurate system. But neither can it be taught without recourse to the conventional view of things. This recourse then means that conventional views must be submitted to a deconstruction which reveals their illusionary, dreamlike or “superficial”20 nature. 19  See MMK 25:9 and Ratnāvalī 1:64: “What difference is there in truth, therefore, between the world and nirvāṇa, since in both there is, in fact, no coming, no going, and no abiding?” Frauwallner 2010, 227. 20  See Michael Sweet’s helpful suggestion to translate saṃvṛti satya as “superficial truth”; Sweet 1977, 21.

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Nāgārjuna characterizes conventional truth as a “worldly-veiled truth” (lokasaṃvṛtisatya). Although indispensable in everyday life, the veil of all conceptual representations (including the conceptual distinction between samsara and nirvana, or between deluded and awakened beings) needs to be removed in order to attain to the ultimate truth and thus the ultimate reality of nirvana (MMK 24:10). In other words, the traditional distinction between samsara and nirvana is indispensable in order to provide the proper soteriological orientation. As such, it is part of conventional, provisional or superficial truth.21 Yet ultimately, the distinction between samsara and nirvana loses its validity because of the inconceivable nature of the true reality (at which the concept of nirvana can only hint, without grasping it). As Śāntideva says in vs. 9:151: The destinies [in the cycle of existences] are like a dream. When examined, they are like the stem of a plantain tree [without a core]. In ultimate reality there is no difference between the released and the non-released.

Talking of “two realities” must therefore not be misunderstood as if the two were at the same categorical level.22 To those who have obtained the perfection of insight there is only one reality, namely ultimate reality – “one without a second” – if we may borrow this designation from the Vedic tradition. Or, with Nāgārjuna, true reality is “without conceptual distinction, without diversity.” As Śāntideva explains in vss. 9:106-109, the distinction between two realities is therefore itself part of the superficial or conventional reality, that is, it is only of preliminary or provisional value. In recognizing the illusionary character of all conceptually constructed reality, one inevitably implies the corresponding idea of a non-illusionary and ultimately true reality. But this correspondence is asymmetrical. It does not apply from the perspective of ultimate reality, which rather entails the voidness of all conceptual distinctions. In vs. 9:2 Śāntideva states that true reality (tattva) is “not a domain of conceptual cognition” (buddher agocara; buddhi = conceptual cognition, intellect), the latter being congruent with conventional reality. Although Śāntideva’s statement is close to Nāgārjuna’s MMK 18:7 (which speaks of the cessation of cittagocara = “the domain of thought”), it has triggered a long controversy among the schools of Tibetan 21  In contrast, Prajñākaramati allocates the first, second and fourth of the Four Noble Truths to conventional truth, while he identifies the third truth about cessation as ultimate truth. See Lindtner 1981, 184f. 22  See also the “Word” by E. Steinkellner, above, pp. XXIf.

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Buddhism.23 Did Śāntideva mean that no kind of conceptual approximation to ultimate reality is possible at all? How then could one ever point towards non-conceptual intuition? If, as Michael Sweet holds, “no Mādhyamika can or does deny that the ultimate is intuited in some way,”24 the question becomes pressing of how precisely to determine the relationship between the intuition of the ultimate and the conceptual domain. What distinguishes a non-conceptual intuition of ultimate reality from no intuition at all? What is the difference between a non-conceptual perception and an ordinary blackout (or, alternatively, the unconscious deep sleep of the Vedānta)? Śāntideva remains consistent and refrains from describing the difference between the deluded person and the spiritually advanced yogi in terms of any conceptual content of their perception or non-perception of the ultimate. Instead he establishes their difference only in terms of their different perception of conventional reality: The deluded person takes it as being real, whereas the yogi correctly perceives its illusionary character (vs. 9:5). Is thus ultimate reality, ultimate truth, for Śāntideva nothing but the insight into the faultiness and incurable deficits of the conceptual cognition of reality? Or is there, despite all inconceivability, more to ultimate reality? Is the ultimate a reality/truth behind the veil of the conventional, or is there nothing behind this veil so that the veil is only veiling its own illusionary nature?25 If the illusionary nature of the veil does not consist in it veiling true reality, if its illusionary nature consists merely in obscuring its own conceptual deficits, would that not, at the end of the day, amount to a rehabilitation of the realist inasmuch as conventional reality, despite not being true, would nevertheless be the only reality?26 This would reduce nirvana to the level of samsara instead 23

 Cf. Sweet 1977, 20-37; Sweet 1979. See also Part I, chap. 4, pp. 77.  Sweet 1977, 28. 25  There is no scholarly agreement on this. While scholars such as Edward Conze, T.R.V. Murti and Kamaleswar Bhattacharya have supported the first option, others such as Mervyn Sprung and Pabitrakumar Roy have opted for the second. 26  See, for example, Garfield 2002, 99 (quoting, affirmatively, Mark Siderits): “The ultimate truth is that there is no ultimate truth.” In BCA 9:107f we find exactly the opposite position. The ultimate truth is that there is no relative truth. I suggest that Śāntideva is more faithful to Nāgārjuna than Siderits or Garfield are. At times Joseph O’Leary adopts this reductionist reading of Nāgārjuna: “Buddhist negation does not posit anything at all. (…) In the negating itself emptiness is realized, and there is no further ultimate to be sought. Conversely, emptiness exists only as the negation of samsaric delusion. It cannot be set up as an ineffable absolute (…). Thus questers after ultimacy always find themselves referred back to the world of dependently arising phenomena” (O’Leary 2015, 281). However – and in contrast to this – he repeatedly affirms the apophatic, Neoplatonist tradition 24

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of elevating samsara to the level of nirvana.27 If ultimate truth/reality is nothing but realizing the deficient, illusionary nature of conventional reality, there would be no reason for Śāntideva to state that “ultimate reality is not a domain of cognition” (vs. 9:2), because the understanding of the logical problems inherent to conventional reality/truth are definitely regarded as an object of cognition. Methodologically Śāntideva’s abstaining from any positive conceptualization of the ultimate corresponds to the reductio ad absurdum as practiced by the so-called Prāsaṅgikas, a philosophical branch of the Mādhyamikas to which Śāntideva is traditionally assigned. According to the Prāsaṅgikas, the task of a philosophical debate is not to persuade the opponent by pointing out a positive alternative to his views, but by demonstrating the inconclusiveness of his and every other philosophical view. From this perspective, the Mādhyamika should not act as a defender of a superior philosophical system. Rather, on the basis of “examples” accepted by both sides (even if only for the sake of the argument), he is going to point out the inevitable inconsistencies in the opponents’ view in order to demonstrate the impossibility of arriving at a conceptually accurate grasp of reality (see vs. 9:4). This methodological strategy goes back to Nāgārjuna’s Vigrahavyāvartanī, according to which universal emptiness is proved only negatively, that is, by refuting all possible views.28 This is achieved by showing that, on the one hand, all views are inevitably based on the assumption of various types of real substantial entities and real relations between them, and, on the other hand, that precisely these conceptual constructions are untenable because of their inherent and irredeemable inconsistencies. The illusion is thus destroyed by means of the illusion itself, not by presenting an alternative, superior conception of what ultimate truth/reality really is. Given that traditional Buddhist scriptures frequently prohibit participating in (philosophical) debates or arguments, the justification of this hyper-critical practice is twofold: Its true goal is not to win a debate but to bring all debates to an end. And the effort is not one of self-aggrandizement, but of Christianity as a valid counterpart to the affirmation of universal emptiness (e.g. O’Leary 2011, 207-287; 2015, 213f). He calls “the broad Christian, Platonist, Indic traditions of contemplative encounter with ultimate gracious reality” a “safety net” that prevents one from falling into “blank atheism” after having swept away all images of God (O’Leary 2018, 138). From this perspective, he rejects Siderits’ maxim of no ultimate truth as ultimate truth (see O’Leary 2018, p. 6, fn. 12 and p. 99). 27  Cf. Schmidt-Leukel 2016. 28  For English translations, see Bhattacharya 1978 and Streng 1967, 221-227.

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of compassionately freeing the opponent from his illusions and thus getting him closer to the highest insight or Buddhahood (see BCA 9:4b).29 The method was further cultivated by Candrakīrti (7th cent.), who is traditionally regarded as the main proponent of the Prāsaṅgikas. As we will see, Śāntideva follows this method closely. But in his own presentation of the two truths or realities, Śāntideva highlights another important aspect: The opponents are not all at the same level of delusion. Some are less deluded than others and hence there is also a hierarchical gradation in their refutation: While the yogis invalidate the views of ordinary people, the yogis of an inferior understanding are themselves invalidated by those of a more advanced insight. As will become clear in the remainder of the chapter, “common people” are not merely ordinary “worldlings,” but more or less all non-Buddhists, whereas the yogis of different degrees represent the different branches of Buddhism: at the lowest level, the non-Mahāyāna schools,30 the so-called Śrāvakas (= “Hearers”), then, at a more advanced level, the Yogācārins, and finally at the top of the spiritual (and philosophical) hierarchy, the Mādhyamikas. The more remote a Buddhist school is from ordinary common sense realism, the more advanced it is. In contrast to common people and the various Hindu schools, the Śrāvakas have understood the non-reality of the self. They are superseded by the Yogācārins, who also understand the non-reality of all entities (dharmas) but still hold fast to the reality of the 29  For this justification, see also MA 6:118f, where Candrakīrti defends the criticism in Nāgārjuna’s MMK by reassuring: “The analysis in the [Madhyamaka]śāstra is not conducted out of fondness for debate – it teaches about the reality [expressed in the truth of the highest meaning] for the purpose of liberation. If in the course of these teachings on reality other philosophical systems are destroyed, this cannot be construed as a fault [of the Mādhyamika]. Attachment to one’s own philosophical view and aversion to the view of another is itself evidence of reified thinking. When one sets aside attachment and aversion and analyzes [all views], he will quickly find liberation” (Huntington 1989, 171). 30  I avoid referring to the non-Mahāyāna schools with the term “Hīnayāna” (“inferior vehicle”), which is an extremely polemical designation used in some Mahāyāna texts. The slightly less polemical term “Śrāvakayāna” (“vehicle of the hearers”) is based on the widespread Buddhist distinction of three different types of enlightened/awakened persons: the arhat (who attains awakening by hearing and practicing the teaching of a Buddha), the pratyekabuddha (who attains awakening without the help of a Buddha but does not lead others to awakening, i.e. does not found a Sangha), and a samyaksaṃbuddha (who in contrast to a pratyekabuddha leads others to awakening and establishes a Sangha). “Śrāvakayāna” thus refers to those schools whose teachings (from the perspective of the Mahāyānists) pursue only the goal of arhatship, that is, the awakening of a “hearer.” Śāntideva, however, argues that even arhatship cannot be achieved without insight into universal emptiness (see 9:35, 41, 45-50).

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mind, whereas the Mādhyamika has given up even the diminished form of realism as held by the objective idealist.31 It is worth noting that the idea of a progressive refutation is constructed based on the model of the two main Buddhist methods of absorption. Formbased meditation (rūpadhyāna) and formless meditation (ārūpyadhyāna) are both characterized by a progressive reduction, that is, by gradually overcoming the contents of the preceding level of absorption until finally, through the practice of formless meditation, a state is reached (“cessation of perception and feeling”) that permits no positive description whatsoever and is at times equated with the attainment of nirvana.32 In a sense, Śāntideva transfers this procedure to the level of philosophical discourse. With each “higher” school of Buddhism, remnants of conceptual realism in the teachings of the next “lower” one are overcome until finally, with the Madhyamaka, “the domain of (philosophical) thought” is brought to a standstill. This is also reflected in Śāntideva’s reference to the teachers and philosophers of the various Buddhist schools as “yogis.”33 The philosophical argument emulates, in structure and content, how meditation leads to insight. In this sense Śāntideva not only correlates his argumentation with meditative absorption, but also – as we will see in a later section – with mindfulness meditation (vss. 79-106). Śāntideva’s understanding of conventional truth as encompassing different levels is not only marked by an increase in negation. It also carries a positive implication in that some forms of conventional truth, i.e. of the Buddhist teaching, are seen as spiritually more advanced and more efficient than others. The more advanced yogis (viz. the more advanced Buddhist schools) are better equipped to foster the existential attitude of non-attachment and indiscriminative compassion. Thus, as in the case of other Mādhyamikas,34 Śāntideva’s interpretation of “conventional truth” (saṃvṛtisatya) is close to the Mahāyāna concept of “skillful means” (upāyakauśalya: “skill in means”), according to which Buddhas and Bodhisattvas adapt their teaching to the individual differences in the spiritual capacities of their audience.35 Śāntideva’s grading of different levels 31

 See also Sweet 1977, 56f.  E.g. AN 9:42-51; MN 121. See Schmithausen 1981. 33  In this, he follows a long tradition of Buddhist philosophy, which generally tended to mold their philosophical arguments according to the model of meditational practice. See Schmithausen 1973. 34  E.g. MA 6:85f, 94f. 35  On the relation between saṃvṛtisatya and upāyakauśalya, see Pye 1978, 102-117. The idea is not altogether alien to Christianity. In 1 Cor. 3:1 Paul presupposes a graded imparting of the Christian teaching in that beginners can only be given “milk” but not yet “solid food.” 32

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of saṃvṛti satya is not the same as the distinction between correct (tathya) and false (mithyā) conventional views as it is found in the writings of Candrakīrti or Jñānagarbha (8th c.). False conventional views result from hallucinations or impaired sense faculties. They are false by the standards of what is conventionally seen as true, and the decisive criterion for their falsity is their inability to sustain “effective action.” In a sense, Śāntideva transfers the criterion of efficacy to the spiritual realm and introduces different levels of such efficacy in line with the stratification of Buddhist teachings that became so characteristic in later Mahāyāna.36 Thus on the one hand conventional reality is invalidated inasmuch as it is taken in its entirety as an illusion. But on the other hand, it is precisely this understanding that allows for a kind of beneficial and skillfully adjusted employment of the conventional. Once the illusionary nature of the conceptual constructs has been figured out, they can be reconstructed in order to serve the Bodhisattva’s altruistic goals, as for example in the radical reconfiguration of self and others that Śāntideva demonstrates in chapter 8. In the next section we will see how Śāntideva’s concept of the two realities/truths is at work in his critique of the rival Buddhist schools. TRANSLATION: 9:6-57 Rebuttal of Buddhist realism 6. Even something perceptible such as visible form (rūpa) is grasped by consensus, not through a valid cognition. This consensus is false, like the consensus on what is impure and so on as to be pure and so on. 7. For, the Master taught entities in order to introduce common people [to the true doctrine]. In reality, these entities are not even momentary. If [they are taken as momentary] in terms of conventional reality, this is contradicted [by those of higher insight]. 8. This fault does not apply in terms of the conventional reality [as conceived] by the yogis. Compared to common people, it is these yogis who recognize reality. Otherwise they would also be refuted by the world when they consider women as impure. 9. [Objection:] How can merit arise on account of [worshiping] a Victor who is like an illusion? [Response:] How, even if he were really to exist? [Objection:] If a sentient being is like an illusion, how is he, once dead, born again? 10. [Response:] Also an illusion lasts only as long as the complex of its causes. Why should through the mere fact that a continuum lasts for a long time, a being exist as ultimately real? 36

 See Schmidt-Leukel 2019.

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11. [Objection:] To kill a phantom, for example, is not a sin, because it is without a mind. [Response:] Merit and sin arise, however, when a being is endowed with the illusion of a mind. 12. [Objection:] Since magic spells and the like are not capable of producing it, the mind cannot arise as an illusion. [Response:] Illusion too is manifold and arises from manifold causes. 13. Nowhere is a single cause capable of producing everything. [Question:] If someone released in terms of ultimate reality were to roam in the cycle of existences in terms of conventional reality, 14. then even a Buddha would likewise roam in the cycle of existences. What would be the purpose, therefore, of the course towards awakening? [Response:] Because as long as the causes are not cut off, illusion is not cut off either. 15. If, however, its causes are cut off, then even in terms of conventional reality there would be no cyclic existing.

Rebuttal of Buddhist idealism [Objection:] If not even the [illusionary] error (bhrānti) [of a mind] exists, whereby is illusion (māyā) cognized? 16. [Response:] If [for you] precisely illusion does not exist, then what is perceived? [Objection:] Although this form of appearance belongs only to the mind, it is nonetheless something different as such. 17. [Response:] If the illusion is nothing but mind, what is then perceived by whom? Moreover, it is said by the Protector of the world: The mind does not see the mind. 18. Just as a sword blade does not slice itself, the mind does not see itself. If you explain: “The mind illuminates itself as lamplight does,” 19. [we respond:] Lamplight is surely not illuminated since it has not been covered by darkness. [Objection:] Since, unlike a crystal, something blue does not depend on something else to be blue, 20. in the same way, one can see that some entities depend on other entities and some are independent. [Response:] If something is not blue, then it would not make itself blue by itself. 22.37 That lamplight illuminates is cognized and communicated by cognition, but that cognition illuminates, whereby is that cognized and communicated? 23. If cognition is not cognized by anything, be it illuminating or not illuminating, then even if it is communicated, it is as in vain, like the coquetry of a barren woman’s daughter. 37  Note by Ernst Steinkellner: In V, vs. 17 contains one more line, but V’s vs. 17c should be numbered 18a. This numbering error ends with verse 20. Vs. 20 must be corrected, however, based on de La Vallée Poussin’s edition, the Tibetan translation and Prajñākaramati’s commentary, so that only one line is left. That is why verse 21 is missing here. V then continues with the numbers in the edition of Minayeff.

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24. [Objection:] If there is no reflexive awareness, how can we remember a cognition? [Response:] When something other [than cognition] has been perceived, one remembers [the cognition] on account of a connection [with its object], as in the case of rat poison [which takes effect later]. 25. [Objection:] Since one recognizes [the mind] as related to other causal conditions [as in the case of mind reading and the like], also cognition illuminates itself [due to certain conditions]. [Response:] A pot one has seen by applying magic ointment is certainly not the ointment itself. 26. We do not deny, indeed, that in the world there are matters perceived, heard of, and known. In our opinion we reject, however, the conception, as the very cause of suffering, that [these matters exist] in terms of ultimate reality. 27. If illusion is thought of as neither being something other than the mind, nor not as something other: If it is something real, why is it [then] not something other [than the mind]? And if it is the same, then it does not exist in reality. 28. Just as an illusion, although it does not exist, can be seen, so is the mind [which also does not exist] as the seer. If you think that the cycle of existences is based on something real [namely on the mind], then this cycle would be of another kind [namely unreal] like space. 29. How could something that does not exist [like the cycle of existences] become effective by being based on something real? For you, to wit, it is actually the case that the mind is connected to something that does not exist and is thus quite alone. 30. If the mind has no object, then all are Tathāgatas. But if this is so, what advantage is gained given your postulation of “mind-only” (cittamātra)?

The Madhyamaka manner of thinking 31. How then do the defilements cease, even if one has recognized that [the world] is like an illusion, when passion for a conjured woman stirs even in her creator? 32. Because the latent impression in her creator for attributing existence has not worn out, thus, when he sees her, the latent impression of her as empty is feeble. 33. By holding on to the impregnation (vāsanā) of emptiness, the impregnation of existence is lost, and later, by practicing that nothing exists, even this [impregnation of something being empty] is lost. 34. When one no longer finds something that could be conceived as not existing, how then could something inexistent, without objective support, stand in front of the mind? 35. If neither existence nor non-existence stands in front of the mind (mati), then, with no objective support, it finds rest, for there is no other way.

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The nature of the Buddha and the meaning of his worship 36. Just as a wish-granting jewel or tree fulfill wishes, so the body of the Victor is seen due to his resolutions [while still a bodhisattva] and due to the disciples. 37.-38. Just as when a snake charmer empowers a stake and then passes away, that stake would appease poisons and the like even long after he is dead, so also the stake of the Victor, empowered through his compliance with the course towards awakening, achieves all ends, even when the bodhisattva is released. 39. But how would worship be fruitful if rendered to someone without a mind? Because it has been taught that the fruit [of worship and so on] is the same for a Buddha who remains and for one finally released. 40. According to the scriptures, there is a fruit in both of these cases as conventionally or ultimately real. How else would it be possible that worship rendered to the ultimately real Buddha is fruitful?

The authenticity of the Mahāyāna 41. [Objection:] Liberation is the result of directly realizing the [Four Noble] Truths. What then is the use of realizing emptiness? [Response:] Because the scripture says that there is no awakening without this path. 42. [Objection:] Isn’t the Mahāyāna unestablished? [Response:] Why is your tradition established? [Opponent:] Because it is established for both of us. [Response:] It was not established for you at the beginning [before you accepted it]. 43. And for whatever reasons you esteem these your scriptures, exercise this [assessment] also for those of the Mahāyāna. If something is true which is accepted by two different people [for example by you and a brahmin], then also the Veda and other scriptures would be true. 44. If you think that the Mahāyāna scriptures are beset with controversies, give up also your own scriptures and other scriptures, because they are [also] beset with controversies, [namely] with outsiders, as well as with members of your own and other [communities].

The inadequacies of the Śrāvakayāna 45. The Buddha’s Teaching is rooted in the state of the begging monk. Yet even this state of a begging monk is difficult for those whose mind is attached; also final release (nirvāṇa) is difficult. 46. If liberation were possible through abandoning the defilements, then it should happen immediately thereafter. But we know that even those without defilements are still capable of acts, even though undefiled ones. 47. If it is asserted that, in any case, thirst, the cause [of on-going existence], does no longer exist: Is not thirst, even if undefiled, [still] present in them, just like [an undefiled form of] confusion? 48. Thirst is caused by sensation, and sensation they have. A mind that has an object necessarily still dwells on this or that.

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49. Without emptiness, the bound mind will return, as in the case of unconscious absorption. Therefore one should contemplate emptiness. 50.38 If one assumes that a saying which would have its place in a Sūtra has been pronounced by the Buddha, why is the Mahāyāna in general not considered equal to your Sūtras? 51. If an entire scripture is [considered] faulty because a single statement is not accepted, why is not the whole [accepted as] pronounced by the Victor because a single statement is equal to one in the Sūtras? 52. Yet who would regard a statement that was not fathomed even by those headed by Mahākāśyapa as unacceptable, just because you did not understand it?

Fear of emptiness is inappropriate 53. Due to freedom from the extremes of attachment and fear (-trāsāntanirmuktyā L instead of -trāsāt tv anirmuktyā V),39 remaining in the cycle of existences is achieved for the sake of suffering beings by means of the [illusionary] error (moha) [of willingly conceiving beings as conventionally real]. This is the fruit of emptiness. 54. In this way a criticism of the perspective of emptiness is not appropriate. Therefore, without hesitation, one should certainly contemplate emptiness. 55. For emptiness is the antidote for the darkness due to the veil of the defilements and of what can be known. Why doesn’t someone who longs for omniscience contemplate this [emptiness] without delay? 56. Fear may arise of that which causes suffering. But emptiness brings suffering to rest. Why should one fear it? 57. Or there might be fear through this or that, if the so-called “I” were something [real]. But if already the I is nothing [real], then whose might fear be?

COMMENTARY 3. Illusionism, Radical Apophasis and Soteriological Efficacy In this section Śāntideva demonstrates how “yogis are invalidated by ever more advanced ones” (vs. 9:4). In vss. 6-15a he seeks to invalidate various non-Mahāyāna Buddhist schools, and in vss. 15b-35 the 38  Note by Ernst Steinkellner: Verses 50-52 are not included by Prajñākaramati (BCAP 210, 5-10), who considers the first two to be out of place (apakrama) because the topic was already dealt with in 9:43-44, and the third, because it does not fit (aśliṣṭa) the present context. 39  Note by Ernst Steinkellner: Translated with the variant reading transmitted in BCAP 210, 25 and supported by v. 76 (cf. Schmithausen 2007b, 553-557).

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Mahāyānist Yogācāra school.40 Finally, in vss. 36-57, he defends the stance of the Madhyamaka school against a range of objections as they may be advanced from a non-Mahāyāna and Yogācāra background. Verses 6-8 repeat Śāntideva’s basic hermeneutical tenet of progressive refutation as expounded in vss. 3-5. Here it is applied to the teaching of the momentariness of all entities as it was held by schools such as the Sarvāstivādins or the Sautrāntikas.41 In order to explain transience, they taught that everything perishable is composed of factors (dharmas) which exist only for the one present moment and are immediately succeeded by other, similar dharmas, etc. This raised the question about the ontological status of future and past dharmas. While the Sarvāstivādins granted some kind of reality to all dharmas, the Sautrāntikas denied any reality to what no longer exists or does not yet exist. According to Śāntideva, however, entities do not even have a momentary reality (vs. 7).42 The perception of the reality of any entity is unfounded. While such perception is based on a widespread consensus, this does not make it valid, in the same way the consensus of ordinary people about purity and impurity is not accepted as valid by yogis. If in some Buddhist teachings reality has been ascribed to transitory things, then this was only a skillful means employed by the Buddha in his initial instructions, destined for beginners on the Buddhist way. In vss. 9-15 Śāntideva addresses five objections against the teaching of universal emptiness. Four of these objections concern the meaning of Buddhist religious practice: The idea that everything is like an illusion undermines, firstly, the teaching that venerating the Buddha creates merit (vs. 9a), secondly, belief in reincarnation, as a presupposition of making merit (vss. 9b-10), and, thirdly, the possibility of earning demerit (vs. 11). The fourth objection related to religious practice appears as number five in the sequence, whereby it is claimed that universal emptiness undermines the whole purpose of striving towards liberation (vss. 13b-15a). The fifth objection appears as number four and is closely connected to the third objection: It denies the possibility of regarding the mind itself as being an illusion 40  Crosby and Skilton regard vs. 11 as the beginning of the debate with the Yogācāra. See Śāntideva 1995, 116. 41  See Frauwallner 2010, 107-115; Williams, with Tribe 2000, 113-122. 42  The reason is that every moment – regardless of how short it might be – can still be subdivided into a beginning, duration and end and hence does not escape the three times. Sheer presence evades any conceivability. Presence is just the abstract borderline between past and future and is hence as unreal as those two are. See Nāgārjuna MMK 7 and Ratnāvalī 69-71.

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(vss. 12-13a) and thus anticipates the subsequent debate with the Yogācāra. Śāntideva’s reply to the four objections regarding religious practice is, in a way, quite simple: Everything remains in place, but as conventional reality. Venerating a Buddha generates karmic merit regardless of whether the existence of a Buddha is “real” or “illusionary.” Similarly, the sentient being that earns merit or demerit and experiences the respective results over the course of several rebirths does not become more real (note that the opponent admits the illusionary nature of the self!) simply because the continuum of factors continues for a long time. And even if samsaric beings are already43 released in the ultimate sense (vs. 13, see also vss. 104b, 150-151), this does not imply that they should not continue to strive for awakening as long as they are caught in the web of illusion. Once illusion is “cut off” by means of awakening, any concept of samsaric existence no longer applies, not even in terms of conventional truth (vs. 15). Through the latter remark Śāntideva refers to the famous statement – also accepted by the Śrāvakas – that a fully awakened one can no longer be said to exist, to not exist, to exist and not exist, or to neither exist nor not exist, but “is liberated from reckoning in terms of material form [feeling, perception, formations, consciousness] (…), is profound, immeasurable, unfathomable like the great ocean.”44 43  Note the word “ādi” (“from the beginning”) in the parallel statement by Candrakīrti in MA 6:112: “Therefore the master declared that all things are from the beginning at peace, devoid of production and, by virtue of their intrinsic nature, completely unentangled in suffering: There is no production.” Here Candrakīrti even calls the nirvanic nature of things their true “intrinsic nature” (svabhāva) (Huntington 1989, 170 and 253, fns. 139-140). In vs. 104, Śāntideva substitutes svabhāva with the term prakṛti (“primordial matter”). The interchangeable use of these two terms as names for the ultimate reality is justified by Nāgārjuna’s Acintyastava, which says in vs. 45 about ultimate reality: “Also (it could be) called: an own being, the primary matter, the truth, the substance, existing entity (svabhāvaḥ prakṛtis tattvaṃ dravyaṃ vastu sad ity api); an imagined thing does not exist, a dependent (thing) does not exist.” See Tola, Dragonetti 1985, 18, 33. According to Tola and Dragonetti, this “positive description of the supreme reality (…) is a surprising one in the context of the Mādhyamika philosophy” (ibid. 49, fn. 190). Surprising to whom? The fact that it is also found in Candrakīrti and Śāntideva makes such parlance clearly less surprising. As Paul Williams has shown (Williams 1998, 1-28), a number of Tibetan commentators have interpreted vss. 9:13, 35, 104 and 111 in the sense of the Buddha Nature doctrine, which, according to Williams, was not intended by Śāntideva. But how plausible is the assumption that such “positive” terminology was exclusively used to signify “the absence of inherent existence” (Williams 1998, 12)? Why did Indian Mādhyamikas affirm a primordial nature, intrinsic nature, true nature, etc. beyond conventional reality if their intention had been the opposite? 44  MN 72:20. Modified after Ñāṇamoli; Bodhi 2001, 593f (they omit the predicate “great” in “great ocean”). Form, feeling/sensation, perception, formations, consciousness are the five skandhas that make up the individual human being. See on this also Steinkellner (1992, 405), who emphasizes that the metaphor of “the great ocean” fits in well

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Quite telling is Śāntideva’s response to objections number three and four (vss. 11-13a). The statement that from the perspective of ultimate reality all things are illusionary does not necessitate that they are actually the same as phantoms or illusions within the realm of conventional reality.45 Killing a sentient being remains an evil act and must not be confused with eradicating a phantom produced by a magician. Within the realm of illusionary existence it still makes a significant difference whether a being is seen as endowed with a mind or not (as in the case of a phantom). The emptiness of all things of substantial existence (of an “own-being”) thus signifies an illusion of a second order. As Śāntideva explicitly says in vs. 12, illusion (māyā) is of different types with different causes. But does the difference between the eradication of a phantom and the killing of a sentient being, i.e. a being endowed with a mind, not indicate that the mind is somehow special? Is the mind perhaps the only reality that cannot be regarded as an illusion, not even of a second order? To whom would the illusion belong if not to some kind of mind? And if the mind that has this illusion is itself illusionary, one would have to postulate another mind having the illusion of being a mind and so on. Śāntideva begins his critique of the Yogācāra by addressing this problem (vs. 15b), a problem that may well be regarded the rock of their position. Śāntideva dedicates the next nine verses to its discussion. His objections are based on two interrelated arguments. First, if the Yogācārin assumes that mind is the only true reality, what then is the exact status of the illusion? If illusion is different from the mind, illusion is not real and hence not an existent object that can be perceived. If, however, illusion is not different from the mind, the argument that one must postulate something different from illusion, the mind, as perceiving illusion collapses (vss. 15b-17a). Moreover,46 the problem results in an insoluble paradox: If the mind is postulated as the only true reality, and if illusion is the same as the mind, illusion would, by definition, be something real and thus no longer be an illusion. But if illusion were a reality in its own right, something that exists as an illusion, the non-illusionary mind would not be the only true reality (vs. 27). with the inconceivability of the tathāgata, but is “not used in India for something nonexistent.” 45  Which is certainly one of the reasons why Candrakīrti and other Mādhyamikas distinguish between correct (tathya) and false (mithyā) conventional views. 46  Note that this part of the argument is not contained in the Dūn-huáng version. Vss. 27-30 are only found in the canonical recension.

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If the Yogācārin assumes that illusion can be recognized despite being unreal, why then should that which recognizes illusion not likewise be considered unreal (vs. 28)? If the passive object can be unreal, why not the active subject as well? Could the Yogācārin argue that illusion is something mental but can nevertheless be recognized by the non-illusionary mind because of the mind’s self-reflexive nature in which subject and object coalesce? Śāntideva denies that this escape is available. In his second line of argumentation he tries to show that the idea of a self-reflexive mind would amount to the mind’s self-constitution (or self-causation), an idea he regards as self-contradictory and hence impossible. According to Śāntideva, the concept of the “mind” is inescapably related to, and therefore dependent on, the concept of its cognized objects. The mind is a “seer,” but is a “seer” only in interdependence with the “seen.” Something is “seen” only if there is a “seer,” and something is a “seer” only if there is something “seen.” But the “seer” cannot constitute itself by seeing itself. In support of this argument Śāntideva quotes the Buddha from the Ratnacūḍa-sūtra (vss. 17f).47 But he does not only rely on scriptural authority: “If something is not blue, then it would not make itself blue by itself” (vs. 20b). In the same way, we cannot consistently assume that the mind constitutes itself by perceiving itself. In order to perceive itself, it would already have to exist. And if it does not yet exist, it could not perceive anything, let alone itself. The popular Yogācāra defense by the analogy of a light that simultaneously illumines something else and itself is rejected by the same argument: If something is light, it was never dark, because what is dark is not “light.” And something dark cannot become light by illuminating itself (vss. 18b-19a). In vss. 24-25 Śāntideva refutes two examples by which the opponent tries to show that the mind can “see” the mind: The mind is perceiving mind when remembering a former perception, and the mind is also perceiving mind in phenomena such as “mind-reading.” Thus if the mind can perceive mind, it can also perceive itself. Śāntideva rejects both examples as invalid. In memories, the mind is not cognizing itself; a memory is rather a late effect of the mind’s former cognition of a particular object. And in the phenomenon of mind-reading, the clairvoyant mind is not perceiving its own clairvoyance but just that particular object which is (in?) another’s mind.

47

 The respective passage is quoted in full in ŚS 235.

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Towards the end of this discussion Śāntideva moves from the philosophical to the spiritual dimension. Mādhyamikas, he reaffirms, are not denying that in terms of conventional reality “there are matters perceived, heard of, and known.” They deny that such cognition perceives what is ultimately real. Imputing ultimate reality to the conceptual constructs that are operative in these ordinary means of knowledge is “the very cause of suffering” (vs. 26). Does this mean that the Mādhyamika is actually not that far away from the position of the Yogācārin? In a sense, yes. Both admit the illusionary character of samsara, with the one exception that the Yogācārin still attaches reality to one conceptual construct, that of the mind. So what would be the spiritual gain if the Yogācārin were right? If the mind is the only thing different from the illusion of samsara and is thus the only true reality, “then all are Tathāgatas” (vs. 30). But this is a consequence that Śāntideva also holds (see again vss. 9:104b, 151). Still, as he argued before (vss. 13-15), the task remains to turn philosophical insight into existential realization. The mere cognitive understanding that the world is an illusion is not enough to overcome attachment to it (vs. 31). Here Śāntideva turns from philosophy to psychology: What one understands intellectually is not necessarily what one believes in terms of deep-seated convictions or “impregnations” (vss. 32f). The very attitude of attachment demonstrates that one still attributes some sort of reality to the object of attachment. It is through intensive (meditative) practice that one can uproot the inclination of imputing reality to phenomena. However, as in formlessabsorption, the third stage of “nothing exists” (cf. vs. 33) is not yet the final one.48 This stage will be also overcome if emptiness is fully internalized; when this has been done, there is no longer any object that might be empty, nothing that one could deem to exist or not exist. Thus even the idea of universal emptiness will be emptied and finally disappear. Only when no notion of existence or non-existence presents itself to the discriminative faculty of the mind, the mind will be no longer attached to any object, it will be pacified or “ceased” (praśāmyati) (vs. 35). As long 48  At the first stage of “formless absorption” all perception of form, external or internal, is left behind so that only the awareness “space is infinite” remains. At the second stage this is also left behind and what remains is the awareness “consciousness is infinite.” This is surmounted at the third stage, which is characterized by the awareness “there is nothing.” When even this is left behind, one enters the fourth stage, abiding in “neitherperception-nor-non-perception.” This too can be surmounted, resulting in the final stage of the “cessation of perception and feeling.” See, for example, MN 77, Ñāṇamoli; Bodhi 2001, 638f.

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as the Yogācārin clings to the objective existence of the mind as the sole reality, he will not get to this final stage.49 As Śāntideva emphasizes: “there is no other way” (vs. 35).50 Śāntideva does not hold that other forms of Buddhism teach ways to awakening that in the end can still be successful although they are less efficient. He accepts their pedagogical value for beginners and certain more advanced followers of Buddhism, but he does not see them as fit to lead their adherents all the way to the final goal. Śāntideva leaves no doubt about his exclusivist position that perfect liberation can only be achieved by insight into universal emptiness (see vss. 35, 41, 45-49).51 This is the cornerstone in his defense of the authenticity – and superiority – of the Madhyamaka in the remaining verses of this section (vss. 36-57). Its discussion is interwoven, firstly, with his assurance that emptiness is compatible with compassion and, secondly, a return to the issue of the veneration of the Buddha. I suggest there is an inner connection between these two. At first glance Śāntideva bases his steep exclusivist claim on scriptural authority: “…because the scripture says that there is no awakening without this path” (vs. 41). He is, however, fully aware that the Mahāyāna scriptures which he has in mind, such as the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras, are 49  Whether this critique matches the self-understanding of Yogācāra is, of course, a different issue. I think that David Burton (2004, 132) has a strong point in suggesting: “…perhaps the frequent Yogācāra assertions of consciousness-only (cittamātra) and cognition-only (vijñaptimātra) are not to be understood as claims that consciousness alone really exists. Rather, they are statements of the Yogācāra position that the world as it is perceived by Unawakened people is a web of mere fabrications superimposed on a completely ineffable reality. That is, the world apprehended by Unawakened beings is cittamātra or vijñaptimātra in the sense that it is merely imagination.” This would imply that the positions of Yogācāra and Madhyamaka are actually much closer than the polemics on both sides claim. 50  Vs. 35 might allude to Vasubandhu’s Triṃśatikā, an important Yogācāra tract, which reads in vs. 29 (Kochumuttom 1989, 160): That indeed is the supramundane knowledge, When one has no mind that knows, And no object for its support; It follows the revulsion of basis Through the twofold removal of wickedness; The “twofold removal of wickedness” relates to the two obscurities (āvaraṇa) of kleśa (defilement) and jñeya (knowable, knowable object). See Kochumuttom 1989, 14-17, 160f. Śāntideva refers to this in vs. 9:55. 51  A similarly exclusivist statement is found in Candrakīrti’s MA 6:79a: “There is no means of finding peace for those walking outside the path trodden by the master Nāgārjuna.” Huntington 1989, 166.

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not considered by all Buddhists as authentic.52 Accepting the authority of a scripture requires criteria: Their authority cannot be based on consensus alone (vs. 43), nor can it be rejected merely because it is controversial or contains controversial passages (vs. 44). The Mahāyāna scriptures contain enough that is in accordance with the non-Mahāyāna Sūtras (“which would have its place in a Sūtra”) and hence should be accepted as equal to them (vss. 50f). The fact that there are also passages difficult to understand must not be an obstacle (vs. 52).53 The Śrāvaka should therefore accept the Mahāyāna scriptures on the basis of the same criteria on which he accepts the non-Mahāyāna Sūtras (vs. 42). These criteria can only be rooted in reason and experience.54 In the light of such criteria, it will turn out that the Mahāyāna teaching on emptiness is indispensable for achieving the goal of liberation as accepted by nonMahāyānists (vss. 45-49). It is not enough, says Śāntideva, to merely overcome “the veil of the defilements” (vs. 55). Perfect release from all attachment requires overcoming the notion of any object one might grasp (vs. 48). Otherwise there would still be confusion (moha, vs. 47)55 and liberation could not be irreversible (vs. 49).56 In other words, it is not sufficient to overcome the veil of the defilements if this is not accompanied by a liberation from “the veil of what can be known” 52  According to Bhāvaviveka, some non-Mahāyānists denounced the Mahāyāna scriptures as being the work of Māra, the Buddha’s demonic antipode. See Eckel 2008, 127f. 53  Vs. 9:52 presumably alludes to chapter 4 of the Lotus Sūtra, where Kāśyapa and Maudgalyāyana – two outstanding figures of pre-Mahāyāna Buddhism – confessed to the Buddha that they had not understood the teaching of universal emptiness. See Kern 1884, 99. 54  Classical Indian philosophy has produced intensive debates on the valid means of knowledge (pramāṇas). Buddhists tended to restrict these to perception and inference, and acknowledged the argumentative value of scriptural authority only if tradition/scripture is itself grounded in perception and inference. For an overview, see Dunne 2004, 15-52; Carpenter 2014, 171-180. 55  In general Buddhist terms, it is preposterous to speak of an “undefiled thirst” as Śāntideva does in vs. 47. The three cardinal defilements are greed, hate and delusion, all three being an expression of “thirst.” What Śāntideva is implying is that even if there are no longer any manifest forms of greed and hate, there can still be illusion, which, in turn, makes liberation unstable. As long as the Śrāvaka does not accept universal emptiness, that is, the absence of a “self” in all things, he has not yet fully realized the third of the three marks of samsaric being, so there is still “confusion” or delusion and therefore also “thirst.” 56  The highest stage of the “formless absorption,” the “cessation of perception and feeling,” is characterized as a temporary trance, so that the practitioner, after some time, “returns” to an ordinary state of consciousness.

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(vs. 55),57 that is, a liberation from the cognition of any constructed objects. This, however, can only be achieved by the contemplation of emptiness (vss. 49, 54f). According to Śāntideva, the exclusivist claim as it is taught in the Mahāyāna scriptures and interpreted by the Mādhyamikas is thus justified even when based on the criteria accepted by a Śrāvaka. The internalization of emptiness will not only bring liberation from the most subtle forms of attachment, but also from the fear of samsaric existence. It is therefore indispensable for the Bodhisattva who vows not to quit samsara before all sentient beings have been liberated. Moved by the spirit of compassion, he deliberately accepts conventional reality although he remains fully aware of its illusionary nature. It is precisely this awareness that sets him free to do so: For “fear may arise of that which causes suffering. But emptiness brings suffering to rest” (vs. 56). The Śrāvaka has at least taken one significant step in this direction inasmuch as he admits the unreality of the ego. So why should he have any fear of emptiness and not follow the path to its perfect end (vs. 57)? The compassionate practice of the Bodhisattva, says Śāntideva, is “the fruit of emptiness” (vs. 53b). This is exemplified by the Buddhas. “Seeing the Buddha” (vs. 36) is seeing someone who “achieves all ends,” because the Buddha, while still a Bodhisattva, followed “the course towards awakening” (bodhicarya, vs. 38). The Bodhisattva achieves Buddhahood due to his compassionate vows to liberate all, and due to those who are in need of liberation (“the disciples”) (vs. 36). Once he has become a Buddha he ceases to be a Bodhisattva (vs. 38). But although a Buddha is beyond the categories of “existence or non-existence” (vs. 35), with his mind fully “at rest” (vs. 35) or his being even “without mind” (acittaka, vs. 39),58 a Buddha still “works” for the benefit of all sentient beings (whom he has made his true self, BCA 6:126). Being internally at rest, his external activity is the effect of his former life as a Bodhisattva (vss. 37-38). Worshipping the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas 57  The term kleśajñeyāvṛtti clearly alludes to the Yogācāra terminology of kleśaāvaraṇa and jñeya-āvaraṇa, which according to the Yogācāra are overcome by “omniscience” (sarvajñatva) (see above, fn. 50). 58  Perhaps the terms refer to the kind of cessation (“cessation of perception and feeling” = saṃjñāveditanirodha) that forms the climax of formless absorption (see above, fn. 48 and fn. 56). However, Mahāyāna treatises usually deny that the construction-free awareness of a Buddha is equal to a permanent state of “cessation” (nirodha) (see Griffiths 1994, 156). Śāntideva also distinguishes between nirodha and a Buddha’s full awareness of emptiness, despite implicitly admitting some similarity (vs. 49).

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through the kind of pūjā that Śāntideva introduces (and performs) in chapters 2 and 3 of the BCA is therefore clearly meritorious. It inspires and nourishes the bodhicitta of the practitioner. Its meritorious force is one of the beneficial effects stemming from the Buddhas’ own performance (when they were still Bodhisattvas) and ultimately from the one true reality that the Buddhas manifest within the realm of the conventional (vss. 36-40). In a Buddha, blissful appeasement and dynamic compassionate activity paradoxically coalesce.59 Last but not least, “seeing the Buddha” also stands for “seeing the Dharma”: “Whosoever sees the Dharma (dhamma), sees me; whosoever sees me, sees the Dharma” (SN 22:87). If the teaching of “emptiness” is the perfection of the Dharma, there can be no contradiction between realizing emptiness and “seeing the Buddha.” The illusionism and radical apophasis advanced by the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamikas represent neither the general nor the majority position of Buddhists on matters of epistemology, ontology and hermeneutics. Even within Mahāyāna Buddhism this is not the dominant strand, although it is clearly an influential one. While the significance of Nāgārjuna is hardly disputed by any Mahāyānist, not all schools have followed his ideas as radically as the Prāsaṅgika. Each branch of Mahāyāna has presented its own views as the doctrinal consummation of all other schools, while nonMahāyāna schools, such as Theravāda, tend to regard Mahāyāna as a

59  On the basis of BCA 9:35-40 (in his numbering, 9:34-39) Paul Williams (2009c) has suggested that Śāntideva portrays the Buddha as a kind of robot (ibid. 121). In Williams’ reading of Śāntideva, “a buddha’s mind must lack cognitive content” (ibid. 124); in benefitting others, he acts mechanically but not as an intentional moral agent (ibid. 125-128). According to Williams, Śāntideva’s comparisons with the wish-fulfilling gem and poison appeasing miraculous stake are to be taken quite literally. However, if Śāntideva’s point is that the Buddha – not just his “mind” – is beyond the categories of existence or non-existence, that he is “nirvanized,” is a manifestation of ultimate reality, it seems hardly appropriate to describe him, at the level of relative truth (the level of any description), as a mindless robot or machine. To quote the 14th Dalai Lama from his commentary on BCA 9: “We should not have the notion that Buddhahood is a state of total apathy, devoid of feeling, emotion, and empathy toward other sentient beings. For if that were the case, there would be nothing admirable about the state of Buddhahood” (Gyatso 2005, 27). Why, otherwise, should Śāntideva speak of the Buddhas and bodhisattvas as “beings of love” (vs. 2:18)? I understand Śāntideva as dealing here with the problem of how ultimate reality, which assumes form in every Buddha, is completely “at rest” and beyond all categories of existence or non-existence, while it is simultaneously experienced as perfectly and compassionately active for the sake of all sentient beings. For a solution of the same problem by means of the teaching of the three Buddha-Bodies (trikāya), see Griffiths 1994, 87-202.

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Buddhist heresy.60 In Buddhist‒Christian dialogue the internal diversity in both traditions, Buddhism and Christianity, must not be overlooked. There is no such thing as the philosophy of Buddhism or the philosophy of Christianity. In both traditions the spectrum of positions is fairly broad and includes stances that are in part incompatible. In contrast to Śāntideva and other towering figures of the Buddhist tradition, some contemporary Buddhists with a Mahāyāna background, such as Alfred Bloom or John Makransky, have clearly affirmed the liberative potential of non-Buddhist religious traditions. However, they both hold that Mahāyāna Buddhism is more advanced in emphasizing the impossibility of, and spiritual danger in, absolutizing human concepts. According to Bloom, the anti-literalist approach to religious language in Mahāyāna-Buddhism and its view of ultimate truth as ineffable “can enliven and enrich aspects of other traditions which may be more literalist or objectivist in character.”61 According to Makransky, the corresponding Buddhist superiority claim differs from that of other religions in that Buddhism does not claim absoluteness for a single specific conception of ultimate reality. On the contrary, it claims “to express a fuller knowledge of the ways that persons mistake their representations for absolute reality.” In this sense, Buddhism may be “viewed as uniquely efficacious because it transmits its messages of liberation from a fuller awareness of how its representations (all of which are relative, conceptual constructs) may be used to undercut, rather than reinforce, the human habit of absolutizing what is not absolute and clinging to it.”62 It is presumably uncontested that the majority of Christians, in both the past and present, would not subscribe to such an extreme critique of the possibility of rendering a conceptual representation of reality that is at least somewhat accurate. And a good number of Buddhists would also not endorse the radical stance of the Prāsaṅgikas. Yet Prāsaṅgikas are radical only in one specific way. It is not unreasonable to understand them in many respects as accepting almost a realist position, as long as it remains firmly within the framework of conventional reality (see again BCA 9:26; see also MA 6:167). What they clearly deny is the capacity of our concepts to accurately capture ultimate reality. In Christianity, ultimate reality is understood to be God. In view of God, apophasis has always been a strong element of mainstream Christian theology. Again 60

 Cf. Schmidt-Leukel 2019.  Bloom 1992, 29. 62  All quotations from Makransky 2003, 359. 61

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and again it has been taken as axiomatic that in relation to God, negations are true whereas affirmations are baseless.63 Even if theologians such Thomas Aquinas tried to modify this maxim somewhat by allowing affirmations to be at least analogically true (though never literally!), the essential thrust of the maxim has seldom been rejected, at least not in pre-modern theology. The presumptuous belief that human concepts could provide a fairly accurate and intelligible image of God’s essence represents, despite the assertion of its alleged orthodoxy, in fact a quite recent theological development that is in serious conflict with the traditional view of God’s inconceivability and ineffability, or as John Hick has aptly called it, of divine transcategoriality.64 If the theological tradition has permitted some conceptual approximation of ultimate reality called “God,” it took the form of a progressive negation, as, for example, in Thomas Aquinas who holds that in considering the divine substance, we should especially make use of the method of remotion. For, by its immensity, the divine substance surpasses every form that our intellect reaches. Thus we are unable to apprehend it by knowing what it is. Yet we are able to have some knowledge of it by knowing what it is not. Furthermore, we approach nearer to a knowledge of God according as through our intellect we are able to remove more and more things from Him.65

This way of approaching the ultimate is not entirely dissimilar from the Mādhyamikas’ procedure of progressively refuting the claims of conceptual realism in relation to ultimate reality. But the big question remains of whether it is possible to assume that “ultimate reality” in a Madhyamaka and in a Christian context are in some way – and if so how – pointing in the same direction. We will have to defer the answer to this until we have considered more of Śāntideva’s exposition of the “perfection of insight.” A number of Christians committed to dialogue with Buddhists have taken the Mahāyānist epistemological and hermeneutical criticism as a strong incentive for reclaiming the once dominant tradition of apophatic theology and give it a new twist inspired by the Buddhist understanding of conventional truth as a spiritually skillful means. A typical – and fairly advanced – example of this adaptation of Buddhist philosophy is John 63  Going back to Pseudo Dionysius Areopagite, On Celestial Hierarchies (Peri tes ouranias hierarchias), chap. 2. 64  See Hick 2001, 76-89. 65  Summa contra Gentiles 1:14 (in the translation of Anton C. Pegis).

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Keenan’s project of a “Mahāyāna theology.” According to Keenan, a dynamic, non-literalist understanding of Christian doctrines is possible because “the doctrines of the Church are transcended by their own content,” as Keenan quotes Maximus Confessor.66 In the light of Mahāyāna philosophy and the Christian apophatic tradition, a Christian doctrine such as the “Trinity” is then seen as “not an essentialist inspection of the inner life of God,” but as “a description of how we in fact experience God.”67 Joseph O’Leary has emphasized that in the Madhyamaka school, conventional truth is not one-sidedly devalued, but “can be regarded in a more positive light, as the very language of ultimacy, the only language it has.”68 Similar to Keenan, O’Leary also holds that an interpretation of Christian doctrines as conventional truths or skillful means (upāyakauśalya) would have to read them as signs that “refer us back to what is given in a lived encounter with the divine.” They can awaken us to the divine, but need “to be set aside when they get in the way of such awakening.”69 O’Leary seems to be prepared to follow the logic of the “two truths” all the way, arguing and endorsing that it “radicalizes ‘theology from below’ by consigning all religious representations to the register of conventional truth, skillful means.”70 Mādhyamikas, however, are not just talking about “religious representations.” Their criticism is directed against all conceptual representations whatsoever. O’Leary is fully aware of this difference between Madhyamaka and classical Christian apophasis: “In Mādhyamika Buddhism, one transcends ‘views’ about anything, but in the Greek fathers it is only views concerning God that are problematized (…).”71 The conclusions he draws from this important realization are, however, more indicated than elaborated when he states that “the reification of God is on a continuum with the reification of self and of the data of experience.”72 Does a continuous non-reification imply that, ultimately, God, self and the data of experience are all equally ineffable? Will Christians who adopt Mahāyāna philosophy have to state, in analogy to Nāgārjuna, that there is no difference between the creation and the creator, between the fallen world and the redeemer? We will have to 66

 Keenan 1989a, 225.  Keenan 1989b, 394. More fully elaborated in Keenan 1989a, 240-259. 68  O’Leary 2010, 180. 69  Ibid. 181. See also O’Leary 2015. 70  O’Leary 2015, 371. 71  Ibid. 289. 72  Ibid. 373. 67

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pursue these questions further after looking at Śāntideva’s critique of self, things (vss. 58-116) and causes, including the divine prime cause (vss. 117-151). Another Christian theologian and philosopher of religion who has been hospitable to the idea of adopting the hermeneutics of the two truths and skillful means is John Hick. But Hick has been more critical of, as O’Leary calls it, the transcending of “‘views’ about anything.” What about the view that all views need to be transcended? Is the view that all views are merely relative truth or skillful means itself also a relative truth or skillful means? This, says Hick, would lead to a logical paradox. In order to avoid a collapse “into incoherence,” one would have to retain some realist residue or at least something like a distinction between more and less “upayic elements.”73 At the less upayic end of the spectrum, Hick sees the affirmation of a formless, ineffable ultimate reality, while the experience of this reality is expressed in a diversity of upayic forms: The notion of upaya is, then, the notion that the cosmic significance of the nirvanic experience can be conceptualised in a variety of ways, all of which communicate the importance and availability of the experience, but none of which constitutes the one and only correct way of conceptualising it.74

In this sense, Mahāyāna Buddhist hermeneutics could be applied to the religious discourse of any of the major religious traditions and would – positively – undermine their mutual superiority claims. Despite the different forms which those “means” have taken in different cultures, they prove as equally efficient if they foster equally well the salvific “shift from self-centredness to a new orientation centred in the Ultimate, even though the latter is conceptualised and therefore experienced in characteristically different ways.”75 The decisive criterion on which the judgement of salvific equality hinges is that “the fruit of the transformed state, in basic moral and spiritual attitudes and outlooks, is very similar. The awakened person is filled with a compassion (karuna) and the saved person with a love (agape) which seem in practice to be indistinguishable.”76 It is obvious that Hick does not understand his meta-views about skillful means and their equally liberating efficiency as being itself just a 73  Hick 1993a, 121. Referring to upāya in upāyakauśalya (“skill in means” or “skillful means”). 74  Ibid. 129. 75  Ibid. 133. 76  Ibid.

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skillful statement. He clearly assumes – even if only by implication and hypothetically – a normative status for them. The need to introduce some sort of distinction between statements of a lesser and stronger upayic nature has also been felt within the Mahāyāna tradition itself, which responded to this need by a distinction between provisional (neyārtha) and definitive (nītārtha). Despite some overlapping, this distinction is not the same as that of the two truths/realities. It was applied to solve the problem of contradictory statements within the numerous Buddhist Sūtras. For Mādhyamikas, the only definitive doctrine is the doctrine of universal emptiness.77 All other doctrines are qualified as provisional. The Buddha taught these as skillful means adapted to the spiritual capacities of those people who are not yet sufficiently advanced enough to understand the highest, definitive proclamation.78 Yet the “definitive” doctrine is still taught and can therefore not be easily equated with ultimate truth, which is usually deemed to be beyond words. This takes us back to the Tibetan debate about the interpretation of BCA 9:2. While the Gelukpas tended to understand Śāntideva’s statement that “ultimate reality is not a domain of cognition” as not to be taken literally, Sakyapas and Nyingmapas took it as definitive. At the end of the day, the debate is about how much conceptualization, even if only in terms of conceptual negation, must be involved in order to signify and intuit the ultimate.79 I suggest that Śāntideva’s position is fairly close to Nāgārjuna, whose attitude is aptly summarized by J.W. de Jong: The negative dialectic does not lead to the understanding of the Ultimate Truth but prepares the ground for the true insight to be gained through concentration. Prajñā transcends reason and can only, if imperfectly, be described as a mystical intuition which sees by way of not seeing (adarśanayogena).80

In vs. 9:53 Śāntideva refers to the Bodhisattva’s freedom from fear and attachment, which enables him to remain in samsara for the sake of suffering beings, as “the fruit of emptiness.” This ties in very well with John Hick’s suggestion to consider compassion/love as the prime criterion for a genuine experience of the ultimate. Ultimate reality, 77

 See Cabezón 1994, 68.  Cf. ibid. 57-59, 65-68. 79  See ibid. 175; Sweet 1979, 82-84; see also de Jong 1979, 43-58. 80  De Jong 1979, 66. Jay Garfield (2002, 170-183) regards this as the position of the Yogācāra school, which he understands as the opposite of the Madhyamaka position. The reason, however, is his dissolution of the two truth/realities in favor of conventional rather than ultimate reality. 78

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although invisible and inconceivable, is nevertheless “seen” in the Buddha, who embodies the perfection of the Bodhisattva’s compassion. In the next major part of chapter 9 (vss. 58-151), Śāntideva moves to the argumentative establishment of this one and only “definitive” doctrine: universal emptiness, beginning with the critique of a “self” or “substantial nature” in everything. TRANSLATION: 9:58-116 The establishment of emptiness The notion “I” has no object such as a substantially real and permanent self The I is not physical 58.-60. I am in no way the teeth, the hair, the nails, the bones, nor am I the blood. I am neither the mucus nor the phlegm, neither the pus nor the lymphfluid; I am not the viscous fat and not the sweat; I am neither the solid fat nor the guts; I am neither the colon nor the feces and the urine; I am neither the flesh nor the tendons; I am neither the body heat nor the body wind, and I am not the cavities and also not the six sense perceptions.

The I is not consciousness – against the Sāṅkhya 61. If I were the cognition of sound, then sound would always be cognized [because you regard the self as eternal]. But with no object, what is cognized so that it is said to be cognition? 62. If cognition is what does not cognize, then it follows that also a log of wood is cognition. Thus it is certain that there is no cognition without a cognizable object at hand. 63. [If you think that] the same [cognition of sound] cognizes color, why doesn’t it also hear at the same time? If [you think this is] because the sound is not nearby, then the cognition of this sound also does not exist. 64. How could that cognition whose nature is to cognize sound, cognize color? [Sāṅkhya:] One and the same person is conceptually taken as father and son, although [there are] in reality not [two persons]. 65. [Response: This does not apply] because [for you the three constituents of primordial matter] lightness (sattva), mobility (rajas), and darkness (tamas) are [different, but] neither son nor father. For the nature of [the cognition] connected with grasping sound is not thought of as belonging to that cognition [which grasps color]. 66. [If you think that] the same [cognition of sound grasps color] in a different nature, like an actor [in different costumes]: This actor is not unchanging

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either. If [you think] it is the same [cognition or actor] with a different nature: That would certainly be an unprecedented unity of this entity. 67. If [you think that] the other nature is not real, then you need to explain its own nature. If [you state that] it is the fact of being cognition, it follows that all humans are one and the same. 68. Also the consciousness [of the soul] and the unconsciousness [of primordial matter] would be one and the same, because the fact of being existent is the same for both. But if the difference is not real, what then shall the similarity [between cognitions] be based upon?

The I is not an unconscious soul connected with cognition – against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika 69. Also an unconscious [self, the soul] is certainly not the I, because it is unconscious like a piece of cloth and the like. If [you think that] it cognizes because it is connected with consciousness, it follows that when it does not cognize, it is dead. 70. If, however, the self remains completely unchanging, what can consciousness do for it? In this way one might also conceive of the unconscious and inactive space as being the self.

Rebuttal of undesired consequences if one does not accept a permanent self The causality of action is possible without an I 71. If [you argue that] without a self a connection between an action and its fruit is not possible, for to whom would the fruit belong if after taking action the agent has perished, 72. [we respond:] For both of us it is established that action and its fruit have different locations [here and thereafter]. But [for you] the self has no function with regard to these [action and fruit]. Is it not pointless to argue about it? 73. We do not see this happen that the [same] one connected to the action is also connected to its fruit. It is taught of the one who acts and one who reaps only by referring to the unity of an [imagined] continuum. 74. The past and the future mind are not the I, because they do not exist. If I, then, were the present mind, again the I would not exist when that has passed. 75. Just as the stem of a plantain tree is nothing if split into pieces, so too the I is not real when critically examined.

Development of compassion is possible without an I 76. “If a sentient being were not to exist, toward whom would compassion be directed?” It is the being conceived by means of an [illusionary] error (moha) [willingly] accepted for the sake of the task.

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77. If a sentient being does not exist, then for whom is the task? True! The effort is indeed due to the [willingly accepted] error (moha). But for the sake of appeasing suffering we do not reject the error regarding the task. 78. However, due to the error of [there being] a self the notion of “I”, as the cause of suffering, increases. Given that [this egotistic notion of “I”] cannot be eliminated by means of this [false belief in a self], it is better to contemplate the fact that there is no self.

Establishing the lack of intrinsic nature in all factors Through the four applications of mindfulness to the body 79.-80. The body is not the feet, not the shanks, not the thighs; the body is also not the hips; it is also not the belly, nor the back, nor the chest; it is also not the arms; it is not the hands, also not the sides, not the armpits, not what is marked by the shoulders; the neck is not the body, nor is the head. Which among these, now, is the body? 81. If this body is partly in all of these parts, it is its parts that are in the parts; but where is the body itself? 82. If the body as a whole is everywhere, in the hands and so on, then there would be as many bodies, of course, as there are hands and so on. 83. The body is neither inside nor outside. How could the body be in the hands and so on? Nor is it apart from the hands and so on. In what way, now, does it exist? 84. Thus, the body does not exist. Rather the notion of a body with regard to the hands and the like on account of a particular configuration of these is caused by an error, just as the [erroneous] notion of a person with regard to a post. 85. As long as the [respective] complex of causes lasts, the body resembles a person. Likewise, as long as this [complex] lasts regarding the hands and so on, the body is seen in these parts. 86. In the same way: Which one [among these parts] might be the foot, since it is merely a collection of toes? This too, since it is merely a collection of toe joints? And the joint, since it is merely made of its parts? 87. And its parts, since they are merely made of atoms? And this atom, since it is divided into the [six spatial] directions? But the division of the directions are [only empty] space, because they are without parts. An atom, therefore, does not exist. 88. Who would, when examining in this way, cling to the physical form, which resembles [the image in] a dream? Now, if in this way a body does not exist, then what is a woman and what is a man?

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to the sensations 89. If pain as such exists, why doesn’t it afflict those who are pleased? And if pleasure exists, for example, [in] tasty food, why does it not please someone struck by grief and the like? 90. If [you believe that] one does not experience that [particular sensation] because it is subdued by a stronger one, how can that be a sensation which is by nature not experienced? 91. Isn’t pain then present in a subtle form, while its gross form is being suppressed [by the stronger sensation of pleasure]? If [you believe that] this [subtle form of pain] might be, as mere satisfaction, different from this [gross form of pleasure], then also this different form is [only] a subtle form of this [pleasure but not of pain]. 92. If [someone holds that] pain does not arise when causes for its opposite turn up, is it then not conceded that a sensation is actually a conceptually generated inclination? 93. It is exactly for this reason that we are fostering the present examination as an antidote for this inclination, and that yogis feed on the absorptions grown in the field of conceptions. 94. If a sense and its object are apart from each other, how can the two come together? And if they are not apart, they are one and the same. So what comes together with what? 95. Even an atom cannot penetrate another atom, since it is dense and uniform. Without penetration there is no fusion, and without fusion there is no coming together. 96. It is therefore quite impossible for something that has no parts to connect. But if you have ever observed in a connection that something has no parts, then show us! 97. Moreover, for cognition, being formless, a connection is certainly not possible; nor is it for an aggregate, because it is not real, as explained earlier [cf. 9:86-88]. 98. If in this way there is no touching [of sense and sense object], how can sensation come about? What then is the purpose of this exertion [for pleasure and pain]? Who would be hurt and whereby? 99. If there is neither someone who feels, nor a sensation, then why don’t you notice that this is so, O thirst, and then fall into pieces? 100. Moreover, one sees and one touches because [sensations] have arisen together with a mind whose nature resembles a dream or a magic illusion. Therefore, a sensation is not perceived. 101. But something earlier is remembered by something arisen later, yet not directly experienced. [Sensation] also does not experience itself nor is it experienced by another.

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102. There is indeed no one who feels it. Sensation is therefore not real. Who then in this bundle without a self is so pained by it?

to the mind 103. The mind rests neither in the senses, nor in their objects such as visible form, nor in between. Neither within nor outside [the body], nor anywhere else is a mind found. 104. What is neither in the body nor anywhere else, neither entangled [with both] nor apart [from both], that is nothing. For this reason sentient beings are by nature fully released. 105. If cognition were earlier than what is cognized, based on what would it arise? If cognition were to occur together with what is cognized, based on what would it arise? 106. If it were later than what is cognized, whence would cognition then come about?

to the factors And in the same way, the arising of all factors (dharma) is not ascertained.

These applications of mindfulness do not undermine the teaching of two realities 107. [Questions:] If in this way there is no conventional reality, how then are there two realities? Is even this conventional reality given through yet another conventional reality [namely conceptions]? How then would a sentient being be released [since also this release is conceived of]? 108. [Answer:] This is a construct in the mind of a being other [than a released one]. The [released one], however, does not exist in terms of his own conventional reality. That [factor] which is bound to follow [a cause] exists [as conventionally real]; if it does not exist, there is definitely no conventional reality. 109. “Conception and the conceived”: these two are mutually dependent. Every critical examination is articulated as based on what is commonly known. 110. [Objection:] But if something is examined by means of an examination that has been examined, then there is no end of this, because also this further examination will be examined. 111. [Response:] If what must be examined has been examined, however, there is no basis for a further examination. Because it has no basis, it does not come up again. Just that is what we call release (nirvāṇa). 112. He, however, for whom these two [examination and what is examined] are real, is in a particularly wretched position: If an object is [decreed as existent] by virtue of cognition, how does one know that cognition exists?

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113. Or, if cognition is [decreed as existent] by virtue of what is cognized, how does one know that what is cognized exists? And if their reality were based on each other, then neither would exist. 114. If there is no father without a son, whence does the son come from? If there is no son, then there is no father. In the same way, these two [cognition and its object] do not exist. 115. [Objection:] The sprout emerges from the seed; the seed is indicated by just that [sprout]. Why isn’t, through a cognition that has come up due to an object, the existence of that [object] known? 116. [Response:] That the seed exists is cognized by a cognition different from [that of] the sprout. But whereby is the existence of the cognition cognized, so that the object is cognized through it?

COMMENTARY 4. The Philosophical Justification of Emptiness (I): No-Self and No-Thing In his critique of the Śrāvakas, Śāntideva insists that liberation is only possible if one does not overcome the notion of a “self” merely in relation to persons (pudgalanairātmya), but also in relation to any phenomenon (dharmanairātmya): Nothing has a substantial self or “own-being” (see vss. 9:47-49). In the present section he presents his arguments in favor of these two types of “not-self.”81 Given that the Buddhist Śrāvakas accept the not-self teaching in relation to persons,82 Śāntideva directs his critique of the ego-self against three non-Buddhist systems: the materialist Cārvāka, the dualist Sāṅkhya and the pluralist Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika (vss. 9:58-70). However, in order to persuade the Śrāvakas that not only persons but all phenomena lack a substantial “self,” he draws on the four “pillars of mindfulness” (smṛty-upasthāna), a well-established meditational practice held in high esteem by Mahāyāna and non-Mahāyāna Buddhists alike. Having modelled his philosophical arguments upon the meditative practice of the absorptions in the first section (vss. 9:2-57), he thus once more emulates a meditation practice by means of philosophical argumentation (vss. 79-116). There is no need to read between 81

 For this distinction, see Candrakīrti’s MA 6:179.  See above, p. 423. The Buddhist Pudgalavādins are perhaps an exception. Although their position is not entirely clear (too few of their own scriptures have survived), they seem to have considered the self as a function of the five groups (skandhas); it is neither simply identical with them nor entirely independent. See Priestley 1999. 82

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the lines: in vss. 9:92f he explicitly parallels his philosophical critique of “sensation” as a “conceptually generated inclination” with the meditative practice of the yogis, who contemplate sensation in order to understand their selfless nature. His message is: Highest insight is gained by meditation, yet how this works is elucidated through the philosophical arguments of the Mādhyamikas.83 The self as conceptualized by non-Buddhist philosophers is eternal, inactive, without qualities (guṇas), a nonagent, and the partaker [of all objects of knowledge].84

This is how Candrakīrti summarizes the views of the self in the various Brahmin systems. It defines the target of Śāntideva’s critique precisely. Śāntideva begins with the materialist option of identifying the body as the self (vss. 58-60). The body exists only as an assemblage of various components, and Śāntideva takes it for granted that none of the physical factors is a suitable candidate for a substantial self. Finally mentioning the “six sense perceptions” (the five ordinary senses, plus mental perception) leads him to his critique of the self-conceptions of the nonmaterialist systems. The Sāṅkhya system is based on a metaphysical dualism of two coeternal realities: matter (prakṛti) and spirit (puruṣa). Broadly speaking, puruṣa is the conscious subject without which any cognition would be impossible, while prakṛti stands for the object that the spirit cognizes. Each of these two primordial realities comprises diversity. Matter consists of three subsistent constituents (guṇas) – lightness (sattva), mobility (rajas) and darkness (tamas) – and spirit exists as a diversity of individual spiritual monads, which are distinct but similar in their nature as consciousness. While each object of cognition is thus constituted by the three guṇas, the cognizing subject is by nature free from the guṇas, despite the fact that in actual existence, spirit is closely tied to matter. Śāntideva’s critique draws primarily on the problems that arise when one tries to give a precise explanation of the relation between the two primordial realities themselves, as well as the relation within each of them between unity and diversity. 83  See also MA 6:117: “Common people are tightly bound by these reified concepts, while the meditator who does not produce such ideas obtains liberation. Wise men have declared that analysis results in the termination of reified concepts” (Huntington 1989, 171). Candrakīrti uses here the same term vicāra (“analysis/examination”) as Śāntideva in BCA 9:92. 84  MA 6:121. Translation following Huntington 1989, 171.

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According to the Madhyamaka principle of conceptual interdependence, consciousness can only be thought of as the specific cognition of a particular cognized object. If, according to Sāṅkhya, consciousness is the essence of the eternal and immutable self, then each specific cognition would have to be eternal and immutable, which is not the case. To postulate cognition without a cognized object would lead to the absurdity that one could ascribe cognition also to unconscious entities (vss. 61-62). If, however, cognition is always specific (the cognition of a sound, of a color, etc.), how can cognition be of one and the same cognizing substance? One does not cognize a sound or a color all the time, nor both at the same time (in one act of cognition). And once a specific sound or color is no longer cognized, the respective cognition has also ceased. The difference between cognized objects (and hence the different acts of cognition) cannot be explained as similar to one and the same person being simultaneously a father (in relation to his son) and a son (in relation to his father), which would make different cognized objects (and the corresponding cognitions) ultimately singular. This is because the difference between the three constituents and hence between the various objects constituted by them is thought to be real, and thus the respective cognitions are also different in their natures (vss. 64-65). Nor can one postulate an ultimately singular cognizing subject which cognizes in different ways or natures (hearing, seeing, etc.). This would be like one and the same actor playing different roles. For what would then be the true nature of this singular ultimate cognition? If it is not one among the different specific forms, if it is rather cognition as such, then all conscious individual selves would actually be one single undifferentiated consciousness and – at a further degree of abstraction – matter and spirit would also be just one undifferentiated entity, because they are the same in that they both (are presupposed to) exist. And without any real difference between the various forms of cognitions, there could be no different cognizing subjects and hence no similarity between the different mental monads. If this were the case, the whole system would collapse (vss. 66-68). One cannot escape this problem by assuming that, as in NyāyaVaiśeṣika, consciousness is not the essential nature of the self but merely its property (vss. 69-70). This would imply that the essence of the self is itself unconscious. In this case, everything that is unconscious could be regarded as the self, which is absurd. If, however, the connection between self and consciousness is seen as essential, the self would cease

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to exist as soon as it is unconscious. Moreover, if the self is thought to be essentially independent from consciousness, so that it is not affected (“remains completely unchanging”) by cognition, then consciousness (and specific cognitions) would become completely irrelevant. “In this way one might also conceive of the unconscious and inactive space as being the self” (vs. 70b). The latter remark, in combination with the hint at the undifferentiated unity as a possible result of the problems inherent to Sāṅkhya, may be an indirect reference to early forms of Vedānta. The ultimate nonduality between the individual souls (and any cosmic principles), as well as the use of “space” as a metaphor for the one true self (ātman), were already characteristic features in early Vedānta as can be seen from Bhāvaviveka’s discussion of pre-Śāṅkara Vedānta. Yet “space” is also frequently used by the Mādhyamikas (including by Śāntideva himself; see vs. 9: 155) as a metaphor for emptiness. Perceiving a certain nearness of Vedānta to Madhyamaka, Bhāvaviveka accuses Vedānta of plagiarism.85 He even suggests that the dispute might be just one of names if the Vedāntins should mean by the “supreme Self” (paramātman) the same as what the Buddhists mean when they speak of the “non-origination” of all things.86 Śāntideva, however, makes no such concession, at least not explicitly. In vss. 71-78 Śāntideva refutes two objections that the defender of an ego-self could raise against its denial. The first objection relates to the Buddhist doctrine of karmic merit and demerit. If there is no self, who earns the karmic results of one’s actions?87 Śāntideva already dealt with this criticism in the context of BCA 8:90-103 (especially vss. 8:97f). As he did there, he admits here that the future, reborn person is not strictly the same as the one who has died. Nevertheless, from the perspective of relative truth, there is a continuum, a process driven by cause and effect. Although the person who reaps is not strictly the same as the one who sowed, they both belong, conventionally, to the same continuum (vs. 9:73), even if under a still closer analysis the continuum also turns out to be unreal (vs. 8:101). In terms of an argument, the defender of the self is not in a better position. If the self is thought to be immutable, the whole process of karmic consequences could never really affect the self, so why bring forward the lack of a self as an objection (vs. 9:72)? 85

 See Qvarnström 2015, 33f.  Ibid. 35. 87  The objection is already discussed in the Milindapañha 46-48, 72. 86

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And if the self is affected by the results of deeds, one is back to the idea of the self as a fluctuating continuum, and hence also back to the further problems involved with this concept. This is because a continuum is a process in time, which immediately raises the problem of momentariness: The future mind does not yet exist, the past mind exists no longer, and the present mind ceases to exist within a moment (admitted, just for the sake of the argument as Śāntideva contended before, on closer investigation even the idea of momentary existence turns out to be untenable; see vs. 9:7). Thus what could be the basis for a self (vs. 9:74)? Under analysis, no persistent and immutable substance can be found. For this, Śāntideva quotes the popular comparison with the stem of a plantain tree consisting only of layers without any solid kernel (vss. 9:75). The second objection has been raised repeatedly against Mahāyāna Buddhism88 and is consistent with a major Christian concern regarding the genuineness of Buddhist love and compassion. Does not the denial of a self undermine the notion and practice of compassion entirely? If there is no self, who practices compassion and toward whom? Compassion requires a subject and an object. Śāntideva admits that in generating compassion, the Bodhisattva deliberately accepts illusionary imaginations. Yet this is accepted because of the task/goal (kārya) of appeasing suffering (vss. 9:76-77).89 Once more, Śāntideva’s response to the objection is closely connected with his deliberations in chapter 8. As we have seen, the understanding of the illusionary nature of the notion of self

88  An early example of both objections is found in the Prologue of the Rāṣṭrapālaparipṛcchā-sūtra 174f: [They charge:] ‘Where there is no “self,” and neither “life-principle” nor “person” is taught in anyway whatsoever, useless are efforts here for one who applies himself to morality and undertakes vows of restraint. ‘If there is in fact a Mahāyāna, but no “self,” nor “sentient being,” nor “human being” in it, useless are efforts carried out by me in it when there is no conception of “self” or “sentient being.”’ Boucher 2008, 137. 89  See also Gómez 1973, 365-367; Schmithausen 2007b, 553-557. Śāntideva may have thought of numerous passages in the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras such as this one from Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā 1:4: “Here the Bodhisattva, the great being, thinks thus: ‘countless beings should I lead to Nirvana and yet there are none who lead to Nirvana, or who should be led to it.’” Conze 1995, 90. Or he may have thought of passages such as Niraupamyastava 7 (part of the Catuḥstava, ascribed to Nāgārjuna), which says of the Buddha: “Perception of living beings by you does not take place, o Lord; but, in a highest degree, you are pervaded by compassion for living beings tortured by suffering.” Tola, Dragonetti 1985, 25. In 9:145 Śāntideva obviously paraphrases Lokātītastava 4, which also belongs to the Catuḥstava.

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enables the Bodhisattva to use this notion in a transformed and creative way, by which he expands his “self” to embrace the whole world of suffering beings (see vss. 8:90-158). In this sense, emptiness enables compassion, as Śāntideva says in vs. 9:53.90 Accordingly, if one does not understand the illusionary nature of the self, the false belief in a self becomes the basis for egotism, “the cause of suffering.” It therefore remains crucial to contemplate the absence of self (vs. 9:54). This does not contradict the Bodhisattva’s skillful employment of the transformed notion of the self, but rather remains its firm foundation. In vss. 79-106, Śāntideva contemplates the absence of a self not only in relation to persons but to everything, completing this again by rebutting certain objections against the selflessness of all phenomena (vss. 107116). As we will see, it makes a difference whether the denial of a self is only applied to human persons, or whether this denial is seen as part and parcel of a far more fundamental problem regarding the human effort to gain a conceptually consistent grasp of the world. It is against this broader horizon that Śāntideva’s interpretation of the two truths/realities assumes its full force, whereby also his view of the self’s ambivalence as the rock of unwholesome egotism, on the one hand, and as an inevitable implication of compassion, on the other, becomes more intelligible. In its early form, the four concentrations of mindfulness – on the body, the sensations, the mind, and the “factors” crucial for liberation – referred to a practice in which the meditator developed his attentiveness and directed it to these four classes of phenomena. Already the canonical records display a certain development of the practice, insofar as attentiveness is directed toward the impermanence of the four classes of objects (in the fourth class, to their impermanence as mental objects!) and the purpose is seen in the cultivation of non-attachment. Both became the basis for regarding the four classes of phenomena as neither being in one’s possession nor being one’s self. As a practice for the internalization of the Buddhist not-self (anātman) teaching, mindfulness meditation was finally broadened into a practice of contemplating universal emptiness: The body, sensations, the mind and the (spiritual) factors are not only to be regarded as “not the self” of the practitioner, but as being themselves without a self, 90  On the tension between wisdom (as an understanding of emptiness) and compassion, see also O’Leary 2018, 7-15. O’Leary rightly states that “the essence of Mahāyāna lies in the establishment of their profound unity (…)” (ibid. 11). Śāntideva establishes this unity by showing that the understanding of emptiness is the foundation for the Bodhisattva’s creative use of the “self” in terms of exchanging self and others and expanding the “self” to include the whole world of sentient beings.

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that is, they are contemplated as empty of any self-nature.91 “In Mahāyāna, the antisubstantialism has been increased up to the extreme of illusionism, the teaching of the emptiness and unreality of the whole world of phenomena (…).”92 This corresponds to what we find in BCA 9:79-106. The illusion consists in assuming that a concept – any concept – can grasp a definitive, subsistent, immutable and independent essence or nature of the phenomena named by that particular concept. Instead, each concept derives its meaning from its relation to other, correlated concepts. The whole web of concepts hinges on itself and must not be mistaken as an exact picture of reality. It rather resembles a dream. Ultimate reality, that is, reality as not-dreamed but perceived by the Awakened One (the Buddha), is not in the domain of this web of concepts (see vs. 9:2). Following the scheme of the four concentrations of mindfulness, Śāntideva begins with the body (vss. 79-85). If understood as a substantial reality, what should the body be? We speak of a “body” in relation to the assemblage of the body parts,93 and we call the latter “body parts” in relation to the body. The two concepts are interdependent. Yet where and what is the “body”? It is neither any of the parts nor in the parts, neither partly (this would be redundant: the parts are in the parts) nor as a whole. As a discrete, subsistent entity, the body does not exist. Taking it to be real would be as erroneous as mistaking (in the dark) a post for a person. And what holds true for the body applies also to the body parts (vss. 86-88). A foot does not exist in the parts of the foot, and so on. Further, the same applies to the parts of a foot, and so on down to the atoms. Even an atom cannot be regarded as indivisible. In order to combine with other atoms so that it forms spatial things, it needs to have the six directions and hence can be further divided into these. The analysis of spatial items can go deeper and deeper and never ends; it reaches out into empty space. Hence, even an atom does not exist in any substantialist sense.94 What, then, is 91  See, for example, Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, which says, relating to the four concentrations of mindfulness, in the commentary on 6:14cd: “All conditioned things are impermanent; all impure dharmas are suffering; and that all the dharmas are empty (śūnya) and not-self (anātmaka).” Pruden 1988-1990, vol. III, 925. See also Abhidharmakośabhāṣya 6:16; 7:13; 7:26. 92  Schmithausen 1976, 259 (my translation). 93  The argument has its model in the canonical simile of the chariot, which does not exist in its parts (SN 1:5:10), and in the further elaboration of the simile in Milindapañha 25-28. 94  This argument goes back to Nāgārjuna’s Ratnāvalī 1:71 and Āryadeva’s Catuḥśataka 9:15. Note the structural similarity between the argument against objects in space and objects in time (above, fn. 42).

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the result of this insight? It should be non-attachment, says Śāntideva (vs. 88). Whoever is still attached to objects has not yet abandoned the false belief in their reality (cf. vss. 9:31f, 48). Next Śāntideva turns to the sensations or feelings (vedanā), which are, according to Buddhism and other classical Indian schools, qualified as pleasurable, painful or indifferent. Śāntideva first rejects the idea that the sensations are eternal, subsistent realities, as it was assumed in Sāṅkhya, where the three fundamental sensations correspond to the three constituents of primordial matter. If sensations were objective and permanent realities, one would have to feel them all the time (vs. 89). Arguing that they are indeed always present but not always felt leads to further problems: A sensation that is not sensed is not a sensation (vs. 90). Assuming that it is still felt but, under the impact of a stronger and alternative sensation, only in a weaker form leads to confusion about the different natures of the sensations (vs. 91). If one finally admits that sensations do not exist incessantly but arise and cease due to causes, one will ultimately have to concede that the sensations represent inclinations generated by the respective concepts (and vice versa), a tendency against which critical logical analysis, like meditative practice, is used as an antidote (vss. 92f). According to the principle of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda), the sensations arise in dependence on the contact between a specific sense and its corresponding object. Such contact is experienced as either pleasant, unpleasant or indifferent. Given this background Śāntideva tries to demonstrate that contact that supposedly gives rise to the sensations is not possible at all (vss. 94-98). Imagine the contact is of a physical nature. If two realities remain separate, there is no contact. And also if they are not separate, there is no contact (vs. 94). Moreover, the assumption that they fuse at the atomic level is impossible. In order for one atom to penetrate another atom, atoms would have to have an extension (“parts” = the six directions), which they are thought not to have. Yet if they do have parts, if they are aggregates, then they are unreal and the problem is deferred to the next smaller level. The idea that contact is between a mental and a physical reality is not possible either; since a mental reality has no physical form, it cannot contact a reality that does have such a form (vss. 95-97). It is therefore not only impossible to conceptualize sensations as realities, it is also impossible to explain their origination in a conceptually consistent way. Why then should one let one’s life be dominated by the search for pleasure and the averting of pain (vs. 98)? According to the principle of dependent

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origination, “thirst,” the wrong orientation of one’s life, arises in dependence on the sensations. Insight into the fabricated, illusionary nature of the sensations and their subject, the mind, is thus directed against this “thirst” (vs. 99).95 The deconstruction of the mind (citta) in vss. 103-106a rests on two arguments. The first (vss. 103-104) draws on the problem that the relation between mind and body remains absolutely mysterious in that the mind can neither be found in the body nor outside it: the mind is not identical to the body, not different, not both, not neither. This “fourfold negation” is hinted at in vs. 104a and goes back to one of the classical “unanswerable” questions to which, long before the rise of Mahāyāna Buddhism, the fourfold negation was first applied.96 The second argument (vss. 105-106a) represents a variant of the problem of cause and effect – one of the most central instruments in the Madhyamaka’s deconstructive toolbox (see also 9:146-150). If the mind is understood as cognition, the concept is meaningful only in relation to what is cognized. But what is the causal relation between cognition and the cognized object? Cognition cannot be earlier than what is cognized, because it is thought to arise out of contact with the cognized object. Nor can it be later, since how could a cognized object exist before and thus independently of cognition (as then it would not be a cognized object)? And if cognition arises simultaneously and in conjunction with the cognized object, the cause of the cognition’s origin still remains unclear. The paradigmatic character of the argument is underlined by Śāntideva’s remark in vs. 106b that “in the same way” the origination of all factors, that is, the fourth of the four objects of mindfulness, is to be criticized. Thus if the mind is as unreal as the body, the idea of a sentient being composed of body and mind fades away. By their nature sentient beings are as unreal as samsara; that is, from the perspective of ultimate reality, sentient beings are nirvanic, “fully released” (parinirvṛtāḥ) (vs. 104b). Note that the negation here is one-sided: The reality of samsara is denied, but not that of nirvana. Nirvana is only touched by the critique if it is also conceptualized, because traditionally “nirvana” points to 95  Vss. 89-99 of the canonical BCA are apparently a later interpolation. In the Dūnhuáng version, vss. 100-103 follow directly after vs. 88 (Saito 1994, 12). The section summarizes the critique of sensations by arguments modelled on the critique of the Yogācāra in vss. 16-30 (most of which have an equivalent in the Dūn-huáng BCA). The conclusion remains the same: sensation is neither not real nor is it a self that could be affected by it (vs. 102). 96  E.g. MN 63 and 72.

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the appeasement of all conceptualization, in particular the conceptualization of nirvana itself.97 This, inevitably, raises three serious questions (vs. 107):98 First, how can one speak of “two realities” if conventional reality is regarded as unreal? Second, if conventional reality is not real, where does it come from? If it is produced by a deluded person who himself is only conventionally real, i.e. actually unreal, then conventional reality is given through another conventional reality, and so on. Third, would this not also make the idea of liberation unreal, for after all this, too, is an idea and as such is part of what is unreal, the conventional? These objections are severe and Śāntideva’s response is not entirely clear.99 He replies to questions one and three. Conventional reality is indeed ultimately nonexistent and itself a construct of the deluded mind. Thus there is only one reality (vs. 108). The idea of a liberated person is part of the conventional or relative truth and hence does not reflect the understanding of the liberated person himself. Ultimately, nothing can be said about the liberated one. If the idea of causally conditioned reality ceases – and with it every possible conception – conventional reality also disappears. The reality of the ultimate remains inconceivable and ineffable and is indicated only negatively as the cessation of all conceptual reality. What remains unanswered is the question about the origin of conventional reality, or – in other words – the origin of illusion. There may be a way to stop illusion, but where does illusion ultimately come from, especially if it is assumed that in their true nature, all beings are already released? This is part of the Buddhist version of the perennial problem of evil.100 The problem is somewhat mitigated by the insight that the illusionary realm of conventional reality is not entirely evil, but also the inevitable implication and precondition of bringing about the good of all the Bodhisattva perfections.101 In itself, however, this does not yet answer the question of the origin of illusion, although it would allow for 97  It is “beyond conceptual reasoning” (atakkāvacara; Itivuttaka 43), “beyond comparison” (natthi upamā; Sutta Nipāta 1149), “signless” (animitta; Dhammapada 92f), and “undeclared” (anakkhāta; Dhammapada 218). 98  The long section of vss. 106-142a has no parallel in the Dūn-huáng BCA. 99  The commentaries by Mipham, Pelden, Tobden, Thrangu and the Dalai Lama hardly reflect the gravity of these objections. 100  Structurally the problem is very similar to the analogous difficulty in Advaita Vedānta “of accounting for the nature of māyā, which is left unexplained in a nevernever-land neither inside (no delusion in Brahman!) nor outside (nothing outside!) the Absolute” (Loy 1999, 240). See also Gregory 1986; Völker 2017, 352-371. 101  See above, Part II, chap. 5, pp. 215-218.

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the possibility of regarding conventional reality not merely as the veil of the ultimate, but perhaps also as its skin or even body, as is actually suggested by some later developments in Mahāyāna Buddhism. Śāntideva is presumably inclined to regard the aporetic and insoluble character of the second question as part of the overall incoherent character of conventional reality. In line with the ancient Buddhist tradition of the parable of the poisoned arrow,102 he abstains from addressing the final origin of illusion and confines himself to pointing out the way to its cessation. The proximate origin of illusion is, of course, the naive reliance on the truth of the conceptually created image of reality. And the beginning of liberating insight is therefore understanding the reciprocal interdependence of all concepts, from which every critical analysis embarks in order to wipe away the web of illusion (vs. 109). This raises a further objection regarding the trustworthiness of critical analysis. Is the tool that destroys illusion not itself also illusionary? Is not then any criticism itself unfounded (vs. 110)? According to Śāntideva, this would only apply if the critical analysis were misunderstood as presuming something conceptually real. But this is not the case. Critical analysis merely demonstrates conceptual interdependence and the aporias that emerge from attempting to render thereby a consistent representation of reality (vss. 112-116). If it is understood that conceptual cognition has no basis in reality, no further critical analysis is needed and the way of release from it is paved (vs. 111). In his 1988 evaluation of the state of Buddhist‒Christian dialogue, Paul Ingram concluded: “The most complicated issues of current Buddhist‒Christian dialogue (…) emerge when the Buddhist doctrine of nonself is confronted by traditional Christian conceptions of selfhood.”103 From the late nineteenth century onward, numerous comparative studies of Buddhism and Christianity, especially when carried out by apologetically minded Christian scholars, contended that the Christian and Buddhist views of the human person are irreconcilable. Similarly, on the Buddhist side, the denial of a substantial self has been regarded for more than two millennia as – somewhat paradoxically – the non-negotiable marker of Buddhist self-identity versus non-Buddhist, especially Hindu, beliefs. Only rarely have 102  E.g. MN 63:5. In this famous parable, the Buddha teaches that if someone is hit by a poisoned arrow, what counts is the immediate removal of the arrow, not pondering on the kind of arrow, the bow, the person who shot it, his clan, etc. 103  Ingram 1988, 267.

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Buddhists followed Nāgārjuna in his view that the Buddha taught neither the self (ātman) nor not-self (anātman).104 In the West, the Buddhist not-self teaching has often been equated with the materialist denial of any “soul” (in the sense of a mental, non-physical dimension of the human being). Although remnants of this misunderstanding may still be floating about, it should by now be clear to every Christian involved in the serious study of Buddhism that traditional Buddhist anthropology counts five constituents of a human being, four of which are of a mental, non-physical nature. Indicating his idea of the way forward, Ingram points out that Buddhist and Christian teachings on the human person must not necessarily be antagonistic, inasmuch as Christianity also knows a denial of selfhood as an essential feature of its religious life. Both religions, Ingram says, could learn from each other by searching for a better understanding of the respective truths behind their doctrinal differences.105 How far can Śāntideva take us in this direction? I suggest there are at least three important aspects. First, Śāntideva can help us to overcome an infelicitous misapprehension. In earlier Western studies on Buddhism, scholars have often assumed that the teaching of universal emptiness is not only incompatible with the ideal of compassion, but is also valued as superior. At the end of the day, this means that “the non-selfness of person and dharma deprives morality of any foundation.”106 Henri de Lubac, directly referring to the BCA, has concluded that “charity … must in the end be dissipated to give place to the establishment of the Void and the absolute indifference which results from this. In actual fact, for the person who has attained to the perfection of knowledge there is no kind of sympathy or antipathy left (…).”107 De Lubac’s statement blatantly ignores that, according to BCA 6:126, the Buddhas “in their compassionate nature (…) have made this whole world [of living beings] their own self,” which is, as Śāntideva emphasizes, “beyond doubt” (ibid.). Beyond doubt is also that a Buddha has attained to the perfection of knowledge. De Lubac is right only inasmuch as a Buddha is free from discriminative love, that is, from sympathy for some and antipathy for others. This, however, does not prevent but rather enable his all-encompassing 104

 MMK 18:6.  Ingram 1988, 268f. 106  Lamotte 1987, 415. For a critique of Lamotte’s too rash interpretation of nonperception (anupalabdhi) as being non-existence, both in relation to the self (ātman) and to the nature of the perfected one (tathāgata), see Steinkellner 1992. 107  Lubac 1953, 47. See also above, Part I, chap. 4, pp. 90-92. 105

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compassion. As we have seen, Śāntideva is aware of the misunderstanding that emptiness might thwart compassion. Yet as he points out in vss. 9:76-78 and demonstrates in vss. 8:89-158, it is precisely the insight into the illusionary nature of the self-concept that allows the Bodhisattvas and Buddhas to reconstruct and employ the notion of “self” in a way that corresponds to their perfect compassion. In this sense, Śāntideva can explicitly state that the compassionate behavior of Buddhas and Bodhisattva is “the fruit of emptiness” (vs. 9:53), which is the opposite of claiming that emptiness extinguishes compassion. Thus from Śāntideva’s creative transformation and skillful use of the self-concept, we can learn how emptiness enables and supports compassion. What remains deeply mysterious is why compassion is born out of emptiness. If “nirvāṇa is the leaving behind of everything,” why, then, is it “better to give everything to all beings,” as Śāntideva says in vs. 3:11? Śāntideva himself voices the question of where this “unique, unparalleled jewel” of the spirit of awakening might come from – a spirit that “desires the well-being of others in a way that does not arise in others even for their own sake” (vs. 1:25). And he gives two significant hints: We cannot but admire the marvelous beauty of altruism displayed by the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas (vs. 3:1), and we can experience that the yearning for happiness finds its true fulfilment in the altruistic striving for the happiness of others (vs. 8:129). But again, why is this so? Śāntideva does not reckon for a moment with the possibility that the one who realizes ultimate reality would deliberately accept the illusionary notions of self and others for egocentric and hateful purposes. There is no evil fruit of emptiness and no malicious equivalent to the Buddha’s compassion. Hate is unilaterally the result of delusion, not of insight. Even if ultimate reality is inconceivable and ineffable, its fruit is the benevolent mind of the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. The spirit of awakening (bodhicitta) arises as a reflection of the light that shines through the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas into the darkness of samsaric suffering from beyond the veil of the conventional (see vs. 1:5). Second, in Śāntideva’s treatment of the not-self teaching we can see that it makes a crucial difference whether – as in non-Mahāyāna schools – a persistent and immutable self is denied only in relation to human or other sentient beings, or whether such denial is part of the overall refutation of any substantial realities whatsoever. The latter is not radical nihilism but thoroughgoing illusionism. It goes beyond the ordinary categories of existence and non-existence (vss. 9:33-35). Emptiness is not equivalent to the denial of existence within the context of a substantialist realism.

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If we dream of having a son who dies in the same dream, his non-existence (after his death) is as unreal as his former existence (see vs. 9:141). The integration of the not-self teaching in the encompassing framework of the emptiness of all phenomena shows that this teaching does not relate to anthropology, or even ontology,108 but to epistemology. Assuming a substantial and immutable self is shown to be as beset with insoluble inconsistencies as assuming any entities, whether physical or non-physical, and, as a result, also of all the possible relations between them. What is really deficient is our cognitive apparatus. Because of its inherent aporias, the conceptually generated image of the world – and of ourselves within the world – cannot correspond to true reality. But because we can understand that these aporias are an inevitable implication of our conceptual tools, we do at least know that true reality is beyond the range of concepts. From the perspective of conceptual understanding, the self and the world are therefore both utterly and equally mysterious, just as the pre-Mahāyāna tradition claimed about the transcendent (lokottara), unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) and deathless (amṛta) reality of nirvana. In a Mahāyāna context, selflessness thus also signifies the confidence that “sentient beings are by nature fully released” (vs. 9:104). Third, at least in relation to Mahāyāna it would therefore be misleading to focus the dialogue about the Buddhist not-self teaching on anthropological issues. As has been said above, it is important to keep in mind that Buddhist anthropology – within the boundaries of conventional reality – is not materialist or physicalist. And by no means does it overlook or deny the mental dimension of a human being. But in the context of universal 108  According to a number of contemporary interpreters, Madhyamaka denies the intrinsic essence of things but not their existence within a web of causally structured dependent origination and cessation. This interpretation buys only half of Nāgārjuna’s critique. Nāgārjuna’s argument actually comes in two steps. Step one: Dependent origination and cessation show that things have no independent and immutable self-nature. Step two: Without any intrinsic nature, there are no “things” that could undergo the process of origination, duration and cessation. Hence this process is as unreal as the supposed subjects. Without a thing that is transformed there is no transformation either. In other words, the denial of a substance in the name of dependent origination inevitably leads to the denial of dependent origination itself. As Nāgārjuna states in MMK 1:14: “Therefore neither a product consisting of conditions nor one consisting of nonconditions exists; if the product does not exist, how can there be a condition or noncondition?” (Siderits, Katsura 2013, 28). Likewise, without the relata there are also no relations (or interrelations): “The presently being conjoined, the conjoined, and that which conjoins – none of these exist” (MMK 14:8b; Siderits, Katsura 2013, 151). Dependent origination is part of conventional truth, and conceptual interdependence is the fabric of the veil, but they are not ultimate truth (see also Vetter 1981).

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emptiness, anthropology is not the point. The tendency is thus odd to take Mahāyāna teachings as an incentive to criticize the body‒soul dualism of the Christian tradition as a foreign Greek element, allegedly alien to the Biblical tradition.109 Nothing would be gained by this. No doubt, the Mādhyamikas were extremely critical of any Brahmin beliefs in an eternal self. However, this is only the starting point. They were no less critical of the belief in self-identical entities that exist for only one brief moment. It would thus be off track to accept the first part of the Madhyamaka critique while rejecting the latter. Both are based on the same logical arguments. Taking Madhyamaka seriously therefore means at least two things: First, an inquiry into the soundness of their arguments against the adequacy of human concepts, and, second, a consideration of the spiritual or soteriological component of such criticism. The philosophical discussion about the validity of Madhyamaka arguments and the extent to which they may have counterparts in Western philosophy has continued since T.R.V. Murti’s influential comparison of Kant and Nāgārjuna of 1955.110 And since Chris Gudmunsen’s study Wittgenstein and Buddhism,111 the discussion in terms of transcendental philosophy has been complemented, and contested, by philosophers of an analytic background focusing on logical and linguistic questions.112 Finally, studies have been undertaken that inquire into the possible correspondence between Madhyamaka arguments and postmodern deconstruction. These studies have had an impact on Buddhist‒Christian dialogue, but their impact goes in quite opposite directions.113 The force of Madhyamaka arguments has also been scrutinized against the background of quantum physics: When the physicist Anton Zeilinger states: “You know the problem is, if you 109  As an example of this tendency, see Keenan 2011, 303f. The same tendency is also found in De Silva’s classic study The Problem of the Self in Buddhism and Christianity (De Silva 1975, 72-84). The situation of De Silva, however, is somewhat different inasmuch as he emphasizes this point in the context of dialogue with Theravāda Buddhism. In the end, however, both Keenan and De Silva put their main emphasis not on anthropology, but on the spiritual dimension of the not-self teaching. 110  Murti 2010. On parallels between the “fourfold negation” (catuṣkoṭi) in Eastern and Western philosophy, see Sturm 1996. For a collection of recent studies on Buddhism and transcendental philosophy, see Girndt 2018. 111  Gudmunsen 1977. 112  See, for example, The Cowherds 2011; 2016. 113  Magliola 1997, O’Leary 1996. For an example of how they diverge, compare Magliola’s hardening of difference into contrasts (Magliola 2014) with O’Leary’s view of differences as reciprocally enriching (O’Leary 2015 and 2018).

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investigate things in detail, the nature of the things, then you can dissolve everything,”114 he sounds quite Nāgārjunian even if Zeilinger is talking about empirical investigation, while Nāgārjuna had to get along with logical and semantic investigations. Are the two types of investigation perhaps intrinsically connected? Might the puzzling indeterminism experientially observed in microphysics be explained as a failure of our conceptual apparatus, in a way that resonates with Madhyamaka arguments?115 And how might the findings of quantum physics impact Christian conceptions of reality?116 That the thrust of Buddhist not-self teachings is primarily of an existential, spiritual and indeed soteriological nature has been realized in Buddhist‒Christian dialogue for quite some time.117 It is in this respect that the resonances between Buddhism and Christianity are probably most intense. Remembering the transient nature of the world and one’s life and not being attached to either, self-abnegation out of love and in imitation of Christ – these are cherished themes of traditional Christian spirituality. But what about the radicalized form that the Buddhist not-self teaching assumes in the context of universal emptiness viz. Madhyamaka illusionism? Joseph O’Leary and John Keenan who, among Christian theologians, have gone furthest in adopting a Mahāyāna hermeneutics have both pointed out that conventional truth is – although illusionary – not exclusively negative. Precisely if its illusionary nature is realized, conventional truth can become a useful and even indispensable tool of religious life. It is, as O’Leary says, the only language that ultimacy has.118 Or, as Keenan points out with the famous words of the Heart Sūtra, form is not only emptiness, but emptiness is also form.119 This ties in well with our observation of how 114

 A. Zeilinger in Wallace 2003, 393  See the contributions of Michael Bitbol and David Ritz Finkelstein to Wallace 2003. See also Numrich 2008. 116  See Ingram 2008; Yong 2012. 117  In his groundbreaking study on the problem of the self in Buddhism and Christianity, Lynn de Silva described the complementarity of anattā (= anātman) and pneuma (= [holy] spirit) as follows: “The more a person goes beyond himself, the more is the spiritual dimension of his life deepened, the more he becomes a true person. In transcending oneself one ceases to be a self-contained entity; but self-hood is always being fulfilled by being transcended. (…) Anattā serves to stress the non-egocentric aspect and Pneuma the relational aspect of personhood. Anatta-Pneuma therefore signifies what might be called non-egocentric-relationality, or egoless mutuality.” De Silva 1975, 96. 118  See above, fn. 67. 119  See Keenan 2011, 302. 115

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Śāntideva employs emptiness to reconstruct the self-concept so it no longer causes suffering, but helps alleviate it. It is an important discovery – for some, certainly surprising – that in a Buddhist context the notion of “self” is not assessed as being unwholesome through and through.120 Both O’Leary and Keenan regard Jesus as the prime Christian model of someone who lived out a compassionate selfless self. Referring to the life of a Bodhisattva as the “compassionate enactment necessary to the integrity of wisdom itself,” O’Leary says: “In Christianity, we think of Christ in this way.” And adds: “But in an agapeic community we are all other Christs, living skillful means for expressing the love of Christ, which ‘embraces’ or ‘compels’ us (2 Cor. 5:14).”121 Keenan summarizes his very similar view in saying that Jesus lives what Madhyamaka teaches: “Jesus is the Lamb of the Passover, and his abnegation of selfhood lives out the teachings of the Heart Sūtra that all is empty of self.”122 Keenan may not be aware of how closely his statement echoes Alfred North Whitehead’s prophetic words from the 1926 Lowell Lectures: Buddhism and Christianity find their origins respectively in two inspired moments of history: the life of the Buddha, and the life of Christ. The Buddha gave his doctrine to enlighten the world: Christ gave his life. It is for Christians to discern the doctrine. Perhaps in the end the most valuable part of the doctrine of the Buddha is its interpretation of his life.123

Like O’Leary, Keenan understands the selfless self of Jesus as paradigmatic for the life of Christians:124 “It invites us to reconfigure our sense 120  There are a few exceptions, such as Masumi Shimizu. In her 1981 thesis on the self in Japanese Buddhism and the New Testament, she points out that in the context of the Mahāyāna Bodhisattva ideal, the self is not only assessed negatively but rather reconstructed into a new kind of identity that is compatible with compassion and selfless detachment. See Shimizu 1981, 143f. 121  All quotations from O’Leary 2018, 174. O’Leary underlines the proximity to the theology of Paul when he says further: “The amazing energy of identification attained by apostles and bodhisattvas comes from their freedom from self. The dharma or gospel has liberated and transformed them, but also given them the power of further protean transformations as they engage in leading different kinds of addressees to liberation. Creative joy is their mode of existence, and the mode of existence that they hold out to all: ‘Be imitators of me, as I am of Christ’ (1 Cor 11:1).” Ibid. 228. 122  Keenan 2011, 278. 123  Whitehead 1996, 55f. 124  This paragraph was written on 24/25 March 2018, when the policeman Arnaud Beltrame voluntarily offered his life, and lost it, as a ransom for the hostages of a terrorist attack in Trèbes, France.

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of who we are,” to be “one with and incarnated into the self-negating life that is Christ.”125 Keenan underlines that according to the interpretation of Jesus in the gospel of John, Christ’s selflessness is rooted in his transparency for God, without whom he cannot do anything.126 Sharing in Christ’s selflessness would thus mean sharing in Christ’s oneness with God. “We too may die to self” and thereby be united with Christ, and through Christ, to God, in the very same way that Christ is selflessly one with God.127 This mode of living selflessly in and out of God makes “God known as unknowable (…).”128 “Jesus,” says Keenan, paraphrasing the prologue of John’s gospel, “is the emptiness of God that becomes one with human form,” the “Word (that) comes from emptiness (…).”129 Keenan thus parallels “God” with “emptiness” or “ultimate reality.” Like the term “emptiness” itself, “the name ‘God’ is an apophatic marker that, following Nāgārjuna’s philosophy, takes its meaning from the surrounding cultural and historic discourse.”130 Is this kind of “functional equivalence”131 between God and emptiness justifiable in view of Śāntideva’s elucidation of prajñā? As we shall see in the next section, Śāntideva is as critical of the concept of God in Brahmin systems as he is of their concept of the self. And yet, we need to take into account the particular argumentative framework of which this critique forms an integral part. After all, this framework is his deconstruction of the concept of causality which affects the God-idea as much as it effects the Buddhist teaching of dependent origination. In this Śāntideva follows Nāgārjuna’s acclaimed and often quoted verse from MMK 1:1:132 Neither from itself, not from something other, nor from both, nor without cause, have any things whatsoever ever arisen anywhere.

125

 Keenan 2011, 80.  Ibid. 148f. 127  Ibid. 253. 128  Ibid. 251. 129  Ibid. 85. 130  Ibid. 251. 131  This helpful term was introduced by Raimon Panikkar for different concepts of different religious traditions that despite their differences perform “an equivalent function within their respective systems.” Panikkar 1978, xxii. 132  Translation from Frauwallner 2010, 192. 126

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TRANSLATION: 9:117-151 Through arguments The arguments from non-arising Factors do not arise by themselves without a cause 117. Common people see, to begin with, through perception all types of causes, because the difference in the parts, such as the stem of a lotus, is generated through a difference in the causes. 118. If it is asked what caused the difference in the causes, [this is explained] by the differences in the preceding causes. If it is asked on what grounds a cause brings forth a fruit, [this is explained] by the efficacy of the preceding causes.

Factors do not arise from an eternal cause not from God – against the Nyāya 119. [You say that] God (īśvara) is the cause of the world. Then tell, first of all, what God is. If he is the elements, so be it. But why bother if [“God”] is merely [another] name [for the elements]? 120. Moreover, [the elements] such as earth are manifold, transient, inactive, and without divine nature, are [as, for example, the earth] also trodden upon and certainly unclean. God is not [supposed to be like] this. 121. God can neither be the space, because that is inactive, nor the self (ātman), because we have already refuted that above [cf. 9:58-70]. And do you call inconceivable also the creatorship of an inconceivable [God]?

not from God accompanied by other causes 122.-123. And what did he intend to create? If the self, is that not [supposed to be] eternal? The nature of the earth and the other elements [also supposed to be eternal], as well as God [himself]; and without beginning [in cyclic existence] cognition arising from objects of cognition, as well as pleasure and pain from action (karman)? Say, what [then] did he create? If the cause has no beginning, how would the effect have a beginning? 124. Why does he not create forever, since he does not depend on something else? There is, of course, nothing else that he has not created. So what would he have to wait for? 125. If he depends [for his creation] on a causal complex, then again God would not be the cause. He were neither able not to create that causal complex [since it already exists], nor to create it if that [complex] does not exist [because God would depend on it].

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126. If God created without intending to, it would follow that he depends on something else. And even if he intends to, he would depend on his wish. How could one who creates have the sovereignty [appropriate to God]?

not from atoms – against the Vaiśeṣika and the Mīmāṃsā 127. And those who proclaim the eternal atoms as the cause have already been refuted above [cf. 9:87].

not from the eternal primordial matter – against the Sāṅkhya The Sāṅkhya thinkers believe an eternal primordial matter (prādhana) to be the cause of the world. 128. The constituents, namely, lightness (sattva), mobility (rajas) and darkness (tamas), when evenly balanced, are called “primordial matter.” The world is explained as these [constituents] when not evenly balanced. 129. It is not possible that a single entity has three natures. Thus it does not exist. Likewise, the constituents do not exist, because they each are tripartite as well. 130. But if the constituents do not exist, then the existence of [their various transformations] such as sound is quite impossible. Moreover, also [the constituents] pleasure and so on do not exist in non-conscious things such as a cloth.133 131. If [non-conscious] entities are by nature the cause of these [pleasure and so on], have not these entities already been criticized [cf. 9:79-88]? But for you precisely pleasure and so on are the causes and, therefore, not [entities] such as a piece of cloth. 132. Pleasure and so on may exist, however, due to a cloth and so on, and in the absence of these, pleasure and so on would also not exist. In addition, one never observes pleasure and so on to be eternal. 133. If pleasure were only present in a manifest state (vyakti), then why is it not [always] felt? [If you explain:] The same [pleasure] becomes subtle [and is thus later not felt]: How can [pleasure] be both gross and subtle? 134. If it were subtle after abandoning the gross state, then both the gross and subtle state would be impermanent. Then why not accept the impermanence of everything in the same way?

133  Note by Ernst Steinkellner: The constituents pleasure, displeasure and delusion (sukhaduḥkhamoha) found here, in the Sāṅkhya’s Ṣaṣṭitantra, also called prītyaprītiviṣāda in the Sāṅkhyakārikā, are synonymous with the traditional terms sattvarajastamas used above (vss. 9:65, 128). Śāntideva’s refutation, almost a parody, as most apparent in vs. 9:132, is based on the term “pleasure” (sukha), which he uses, however, in the sense of a sensation.

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135. If the gross state of pleasure is nothing other than pleasure, then the impermanence of pleasure is evident. If you believe that something non-existent does not emerge because it does not exist, 136. you have arrived [precisely] at the emergence of a manifestation [of pleasure], which did not exist [before], although you did not intend to. If, further, the fruit were [already] present in the cause, then one who eats rice would be eating excrement, 137. and then one should buy cotton seed for the price of a dress and wear it. If you believe that merely due to blindness the world does not acknowledge [that the effect is present in the cause]: Even an [obstinate] knower of the truth [such as a Sāṅkhya] behaves the same way [in that he doesn’t wear cotton seed]. 138. And even common people have this knowledge. Why do they not see it? If [you say: This is the case] since the [cognition of] common people is not [considered] a means of valid cognition, [we respond: then you have to admit that] also [their] cognition of manifest entities is false. 139. [Objection:] If an [alleged] means of valid cognition is not a [real] means of valid cognition, isn’t what has been cognized thereby false? The emptiness of entities in ultimate reality does not follow from this [alleged means of valid cognition]. 140. [Response:] If one does not contact entities that are [falsely] conceived [as existent], one does also not grasp them as non-existent. Thus, the non-existence of a false entity is obviously also false. 141. When in a dream a son has died, the imagination that he does not exist therefore prevents the arising of the imagination that he exists. But this [imagination that he does not exist in the dream] is also false.

Summary 142. Therefore, on such critical examination, there is nothing without cause, and nothing based on a single or on combined causes, 143. but also [nothing that] has come from another, remains, or passes. What is the difference, then, between an illusion and that which fools consider as real? 144. What is fabricated by illusion as well as what is fabricated by causes, where do they come from and where do they go? That must be examined. 145. What is observed due to the proximity of something else, and is not [observed] because of its absence, how can there be reality in this artefact, which resembles the image in a mirror?

The argument from arising as existent and as non-existent 146. For an existent entity, what is the purpose of a cause? Or when it does not exist, what is the purpose of a cause?

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147. Even through billions of causes, there is no change in something inexistent. How could something in this state become an [existent] entity? And what else could have become existent? 148. If there is no entity at the time of its non-existence, when will that entity come about? For this non-existence will not disappear as long as the entity has not arisen. 149. But there can be no room for an entity, if its non-existence has not disappeared. Nor does an [existing] entity become non-existent, since it would follow that it had two natures. 150. In this way there is never ever any cessation or existence. Thus this whole world is unarisen and unceased. 151. The destinies [in the cycle of existences] are like a dream. When examined, they are like the stem of a plantain tree [without a core]. In ultimate reality there is no difference between the released and the non-released.

COMMENTARY 5. The Philosophical Justification of Emptiness (II): No-Causality One part of the teaching on emptiness is that not merely persons (or sentient beings), but all things whatsoever lack a substantial self, an “own-being” or “intrinsic nature” (svabhāva). In vss. 58-116 Śāntideva presented his arguments in support of this part of the teaching. But this is, as it were, only half of universal emptiness. As Nāgārjuna concludes (MMK 1:10): Since for things without intrinsic nature there is no existence, it is inadmissible to say: When this exists, that comes to be.134

“When this exists, that comes to be” – this is exactly the formula used in the Buddhist Sūtras to summarize the principle of “dependent origination” (pratītyasamutpāda).135 In other words: with recourse to dependent origination one can show that nothing has an essence or “ownnature.” Yet if something has no essence or nature, it does not exist, at least not as that what it appears to be, and hence “it” does not originate in dependence on causes. If no banana is (essentially, substantially, by its nature) a banana, then there are no bananas. And if bananas do not exist, they do not grow either. If there are no things, there are also no properties 134

 Frauwallner 2010, 193.  See ibid. 42.

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of things, no relations between things, and no causes that would make them originate. If there is no svabhāva there is also no pratītyasamutpāda. Accordingly, Śāntideva now moves to this second part of universal emptiness, the deconstruction of the notion of causality.136 Nāgārjuna’s critique of our conceptual representation of the world does not stop at simple denial. The affirmation of non-existence is not any more suitable for capturing reality than the affirmation of existence. Therefore one cannot say that (1) there is a cause, nor that (2) there is no cause, nor that (3) both apply, nor that (4) neither applies.137 Śāntideva deals only with the first two limbs of the tetralemma:138 Nothing has arisen without a cause, nor has anything arisen from a cause, whether single or combined (see vs. 9:142). He focusses primarily on contesting views that assume the existence of causes. Only briefly and implicitly does he touch on the view that things arise without causes, which he refutes by referring to the insight that the diversity of this world and its phenomena results from a diversity of causes (“all types of causes”) (vs. 117-118). Nāgārjuna also affirmed that things do not arise from non-causes (MMK 1:12). How illusionary bananas might be, one does not harvest them from the likewise illusionary apple trees. As much as our perception of the world might turn out to resemble a dream, it is not entirely chaotic or random. But are the concepts of cause and effect by which we attempt to grasp such regularity coherent? This is what the Mādhyamikas contest. Regarding the assertion that things do arise from causes, Śāntideva deals with three problems: First, the assumption that everything arises due to preceding causes results in an infinite regress (vs. 118). This can only be avoided by postulating a first cause, a cause that is itself uncaused and hence eternal. Second, if the diversity and structure of all phenomena is explained by the diversity of their causes, the effect must somehow already be present in the cause. Having refuted these two assumptions, Śāntideva addresses a third major problem of causality, which concerns its inherent temporal structure.

136  See also Sweet 1977, 146: “The Mādhyamika is not denying the conventional functioning of causality …, but is rejecting any ultimate causal relation.” See also above, fn. 108. 137  See above, p. 457. 138  As does Nāgārjuna in MMK 1:4a: “The effect has no cause. But the effect does also not exist without a cause.” Frauwallner 2010, 192. For an application of all four limbs, see, for example, MA 6:8, 104, 114.

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When the BCA was composed (7th/8th cent.),139 not only was theistic devotion on the rise140 (with the two major braches of Vaishnavism and Shaivism), but also philosophical systems supporting it. Especially the theistic Nyāya system (which had partially fused with the Vaiśeṣika) and Vedānta (competing with the older Mīmāṃsā) were gradually gaining prominence. They gave serious consideration to the notion of a divine creator (īśvara), which even Advaita Vedānta regarded as justified at the level of conventional truth.141 Thus Śāntideva142 first addresses, and refutes, the belief in God as a possible first cause. “God” (īśvara) is not part of Śāntideva’s own terminology. Asking what exactly the theist might mean by “God,” Śāntideva mentions and discards three different options (vss. 119-121): If “God” is just another name for the primordial elements (an option suggesting itself on the basis of the Vaiśeṣika ontology), then why discuss “God” instead of the elements.143 Moreover, the elements can hardly display the kind of features that theists usually attribute to God: they are not one, not eternal, not active (creating), nor pure. The space-element (ākāśa) may be somewhat different; but like the others it, too, is inactive, which disqualifies it as being the divine creator. Nor can “God” be another name for the self (ātman), for in the light of the preceding arguments, the self cannot be established as eternal. Finally Śāntideva mentions a fourth option: considering “God” as “inconceivable” (acintya). But if God is inconceivable, would one then not have to admit that this also applies to his role as a creator? In other words, would this not rule out the option of using “God” as the ultimate explanatory limb in the otherwise infinite and thus unexplained chain of causal explanations? How could one try to explain the world as an act of divine creation if the creator and the act of creation are both inconceivable? In vss. 122-126 Śāntideva presents a complex argument based on the idea that creation means causing the beginning of the existence of some entity in time. His argument shows that this notion is aporetic. On the one hand, there is no suitable object that could be considered divinely 139

 See Part I, chap. 1, pp. 9-11.  The influence of devotional spirituality (bhakti) on the BCA is obvious in chapters 2-3. See above, Part II, chap. 2, pp. 141f. 141  For the use of the two truths scheme in Buddhism and Vedānta, see Sprung 1973. 142  Keep in mind that this only relates to the redactor of the canonical BCA. Vss. 106-142a have no parallel in the Dūn-huáng version. 143  A critique of the elements as collectively forming the “first cause” would presumably follow the model of the refutation of primordial matter in vss. 9:127b-138. 140

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created in this sense. This is because everything that makes up the world is thought, according to various Indian cosmologies, to exist without a first beginning in time: the self, the elements, samsara.144 God, too, is thought to be without beginning. This means the creator could not even create himself (apart from the logical problems involved in the notion of self-causation, which Śāntideva discusses in connection with his critique of the Yogācāra; see vss. 17-23). Moreover, if the divine creator exists without beginning in time (and if, as Śāntideva presupposes, his nature is to be a creator), he should always create. But how then could he create something with a beginning in time (which, according to Śāntideva, would have to be the characteristic of a created entity)? If God is supposed to be sovereign and independent, the creator of each and every thing, there could be nothing that he had to wait for. If, however, God’s creative activity were itself dependent on some other causal factors, God would neither be the final cause, nor the cause of everything. But does not the idea of a personal creator God inevitably imply this kind of dependency? If God creates against his intentions, he would depend on something else. Alternatively, if God creates because of his intentions, he would depend on these, that is, on the unfulfilled aims which he desires to pursue. Such a God would lack the kind of perfection and sovereignty that theists ascribe to him. Behind these arguments we can detect the general Madhyamaka conviction that the idea of a sovereign, independent creator is at variance with the logical interdependence of concepts: The very notion of a “creator” depends on the notion of a “creation,” without which the creator would not be a creator. His nature would therefore depend on the creation, which contradicts his alleged independence. In his refutation of other supposedly final or first causes (vss. 127138), one does not get the impression that Śāntideva takes these particularly seriously. Cosmological atomism is refuted with a brief hint at the preceding argument that there cannot be any indivisible objects in space (vs. 127). And he invokes the same type of argument against the Sāṅkhya belief in primal matter. Primordial matter cannot be the final or first entity, because it is not really an undifferentiated entity and therefore is not an entity at all. It is rather a composite of three constituents, each 144  In a similar move, Bhāvaviveka suggested interpreting “God” as another term for karman, which in the form of the collective karma of sentient beings is responsible, according to Buddhist cosmology, for the successive origination of new worlds. See Madhyamakahṛdayavṛtti 3:222 (Lindtner 1999, 67-70).

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of which is again composed of further parts. Moreover, there still is the unresolved problem of the fuzzy relation between matter and mind, given that the constituents of matter are also presented as mental qualities (pleasure, displeasure and delusion). Are they considered to be caused by material, non-conscious entities, or are they, conversely, regarded as being themselves first causes? To Śāntideva, sensations are to be seen as effects arising from contact with corresponding objects, as it is presupposed in the scheme of “dependent origination” (pratītyasamutpāda). It would be ludicrous to see sensations otherwise. They have a conditioned existence and hence are not first causes (vss. 131f). He rejects the assumption that each of the cardinal sensations is eternal, since that contradicts all standards of ordinary experience. The attempt to nevertheless defend such a view by introducing the idea of subtle and gross modes of their presence is refuted by the argument that such a switch between different modes of their presence implies a process of transformation which contradicts their supposed permanence (vss. 133-136a). He ridicules the defense of the permanence of sensations through the assumption that they have a hidden presence in their material causes. Although the theory that all effects are implicitly present in their causes (satkāryavāda) was particularly prominent in the Sāṅkhya and Yoga systems, it found broader attention in Indian philosophy because it offers an explanation for the regular nature of causal relations – something that Śāntideva likewise refers to in vs. 117.145 But here he shows no interest in this particular aspect of the problem. Instead he builds his polemic on a reductio ad absurdum argument: Any presence of the effect in the cause would require a significant transformation, because the effect is not strictly identical with the cause. The process of transformation, if analyzed, implies impermanence and gives rise to logical problems regarding the temporal structure of such processes (the unreality of the three times; the inability of a bygone and hence non-existent cause to produce an effect; etc.). But any denial of such transformation would be ridiculous. Neither common people nor Sāṅkhya pundits behave as if they assumed the presence of the effect in the cause in the form of strict identity, i.e. without transformation (vss. 136b-138a). But does the view of common people count as a valid means of knowledge? Śāntideva emphatically refutes this at the beginning of chapter 9 145  See Halbfass 1992, 57: The advantage of the theory is that it “postulate(s) special causes for special effects. … A special product, such as sesame oil, requires a special material cause: sesame seeds.”

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(see vss. 3, 5-6). If their views are not admitted as a valid argument, why then should one not also reject the naive realism that is held by common people (vs. 138)? This dispute about the validity of common sense gives Śāntideva the opportunity to clarify that the negation of ordinary views in the name of emptiness is situated at a meta-level. It is not a denial of existence in the same sense that such a denial would have within the framework of common sense realism. Both the existence and non-existence of something appear real within the context of the dream. The point of Madhyamaka is to say that both are as illusionary as the dream itself (vss. 140-141). Of the remaining ten verses (vss. 142-151), five are dedicated to the concluding clarification of what Śāntideva regards as the main argument against the assumption of causality, that is, against the assumption of causally induced origination and cessation (vss. 142, 146-149). The other five verses uphold the inevitable consequence: Our conceptual perception of the world is illusionary (vss. 143-145, 150-151). No concepts and conceptual distinctions whatsoever are applicable to true reality, which is beyond the conceptual realm (see vs. 9:2). The preceding argumentation is summarized in vs. 142, as mentioned above, in terms of a paradox: Nothing is without a cause, but there is also nothing with a cause, whether single or combined. But the paradox is resolved by dissolving it, that is, by the dissolution of its two components: the entity (svabhāva) that is supposed to be in need of a cause, and the idea of causation as dependent origination. Śāntideva’s main argument against causality draws on the incompatibility between the conceptual interdependence of cause and effect, on the one hand, and the implied chronological sequence of cause and effect, on the other hand. Talking of a “cause” presupposes that what is called a “cause” brings the “effect” into being, that is, causes the origination of the effect. The concept of “origination” suggests a process, a change or transformation, and thus implies time. But this cannot be grasped coherently. If the effect does not yet exist, nothing can bring it from nonexistence into existence. The parlance of “bringing it into existence” pretends that there would be an “it,” a svabhāva, which undergoes this transformation from non-existence to existence. This, however, is an illusion. Before it exists, there is no it. And no cause can have any impact on something non-existent. Hence there is nothing that a cause could bring into existence. And once something exists, no cause is needed either. For a cause is “a cause” only in logical dependence on an effect, which does not exist before it originates, as much as an effect is “an

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effect” only in logical dependence of a cause, which is no longer causing (and thus is not a “cause”) once the “effect” exists. This applies analogously also for cessation. Something cannot go from existence to nonexistence. For as long as there is an it, it still exists. And if it exists no more, there is no it of which non-existence could be predicated. It cannot exist as non-existent. That is, the same it cannot have the two natures of existence and non-existence (vss. 146-149). Hence there is neither origination, nor existence, nor cessation (vs. 150). Nothing “has come from another, remains, or passes” (vs. 143). The ordinary cognition of the world as composed of entities that interact dependent on causes and conditions, that come into existence, exist and cease to exist is like an illusion, a dream (vss. 143, 151). When one investigates origination and cessation, one finds that the origination of something through causes is the fabrication of the illusion (vs. 144). Causality as illusion resembles the reflection in a mirror, but lacks true reality (vs. 145), because the object held in front of a mirror and causing the reflection is itself merely a reflection of a reflection, and so on. The first and most dreadful of the three marks (lakṣaṇa) of existence, its impermanence (anitya), which is responsible for its unsatisfactory and painful character (duḥkha), is not ultimately real, because everything is empty of what it appears to be (anātman). One is chained to suffering only within the dreamlike fabrication called “samsara.” When the illusion is removed, what was experienced as samsara turns out to be in truth nirvana. At the level of ultimate reality, all are released (nirvṛta) (vs. 151).146 Such realization is the perfection of insight; it is awakening to what reality truly is. Hence we may conclude: bodhicitta, the spirit of awakening, is the light that shines from beyond the veil of illusion into the darkness of the samsaric nightmare made of the defilements: delusion, greed and hate. Let us look back from here at Śāntideva’s version of the two truths/ realities. By now we can confirm an important asymmetry between the two truths/realities: Conventional truth operates on the basis of concepts and conceptual distinctions, whereas ultimate truth is beyond any concepts and conceptual distinctions. This implies, first, that conventional 146  Again, if Śāntideva says that “there is no difference between the released and the non-released,” he is far from suggesting that ultimately all are non-released (see vss. 9:1315). The world has the attributes of being “unarisen and unceased” (vs. 9:150). It is not the reverse, whereby nirvana would have the attributes of the world. This can be (and is) only claimed about the concept of “nirvana,” which is logically interdependent with the concept of “samsara” and is in this sense part of conventional truth/reality.

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truth is located within the realm of illusion, while ultimate truth is marked by insight, the end of illusion. Second, the distinction between the two truths/realities obtains only within conventional reality. It is not valid from the perspective of ultimate truth. The significance of this asymmetry becomes clear when we compare the relation between the two truths/realities with the relation between samsara and nirvana. As we have seen, there is a considerable correspondence between nirvana and ultimate truth/reality. This correspondence is in line with MMK 24:11, where Nāgārjuna states that ultimate truth/reality cannot be taught without recourse to the conventional, and that without attaining to ultimate truth/reality, nirvana is not attained. We also noticed a considerable degree of correspondence between samsara and conventional truth/reality inasmuch as both belong to the illusionary realm. However, Nāgārjuna states in MMK 25:19 that there is no distinction whatsoever between samsara and nirvana, or between nirvana and samsara. This clearly expresses a complete symmetry – a symmetry that has not only given rise to much puzzling in the interpretation of Nāgārjuna, but also to the reductionist reading that Nāgārjuna is deconstructing the unconditioned nirvana for the sake of dependent origination and thus for the sake of the conditioned realm of samsara as the only true reality. The puzzle can be solved if we keep in mind the peculiar nature of the asymmetry between the two truths/realities. The denial of any distinction between nirvana and samsara refers to ultimate truth/reality, but it is made from the perspective of conventional reality – the illusionary reality where conceptual distinctions apply – in order to point towards ultimate reality where no conceptual distinctions whatsoever apply. To say that there is absolutely no difference between nirvana and samsara or, as Śāntideva has it in vs. 9:151, “between the released and the nonreleased,” is precisely the way to affirm, within the realm of conceptual distinctions, the asymmetrical difference between the two truths/realities, i.e. the difference between the realm of conceptual distinctions and the realm of no such distinctions. In other words, we hit upon the paradox that the radical asymmetrical difference between samsara (as the realm of conventional truth/reality) and nirvana (as the realm of ultimate truth/reality) can only be adequately expressed by denying that there is any difference between nirvana and samsara. From the perspective of samsara, nirvana is, on the one hand, totally different – as different as truth is from illusion – because attaining to nirvana implies, among other things, overcoming the world of conceptual differences, that is, the

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world of samsara. Thus on the other hand, it must be affirmed that at the level of nirvana (as anticipated within conventional samsaric reality), there is not the slightest difference between samsara and nirvana. The recognition of this paradoxical structure allows us to understand “conventional truth” as a dynamic movement from samsaric illusion to the realm of nirvanic truth/reality – a movement that is driven by increasing levels of negation. This is exactly how Śāntideva presents the two truths/realities in vss. 9:2-5. Thus, not everything within the realm of samsaric illusion can count as conventional truth. Only those teachings that take one nearer the ultimate truth can be called “conventional truth.” Within the course of this dynamic movement, conventional truth will finally have to overcome itself. This coincides with Nāgārjuna’s wellknown allusion to the comparison of the Buddhist teaching with a purge that must leave the body together with the sickening substance it removes.147 The Buddhist teaching fulfills this role through the doctrine of dependent origination. This doctrine drives out the belief in phenomena having a self or own-nature and replaces it with the teaching of universal emptiness.148 But as a result, universal emptiness also drives out the teaching of dependent origination and even the teaching of universal emptiness (hence the “emptiness of emptiness”) in order to remove the last remnants of the conceptual veil that constitutes illusion. In dialogue between Christian theology and Madhyamaka philosophy, the nature and value of the Christian concept of “God” can be adequately discussed only if we keep in mind this larger epistemological and soteriological strategy behind Śāntideva’s criticism. It is against this background that we can and need to ask if, within Christianity, the concept of “God” may be interpreted as fulfilling a role analogous to the role of concepts such as nirvana (nirvāṇa), ultimate truth (paramārthasatya) or emptiness (śūnyatā) in Madhyamaka philosophy. There are, broadly speaking, three different positions on this question. They differ in that they interpret Madhyamaka either as atheism, or as compatible with process philosophy/theology, or as a form of apophatic mysticism. Proponents of each of the three positions are found primarily among Christians, but, with certain qualifications, also among Buddhists. The first position understands the Madhyamaka critique of the concept of a divine creator (īśvara) as an expression of the overall atheism  See MMK 13:8, alluding to Ratnakūṭa, Kāśyapaparivarta 65.  Which is why Nāgārjuna can equate the teaching of “dependent origination” with the teaching of universal “emptiness” (see MMK 24:18f). 147 148

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ascribed to Buddhism. Proponents of this view interpret Buddhist atheism as strict. From their point of view there is nothing in Buddhism that could be regarded as a serious equivalent to the Christian concept of God. Even if it is conceded that nirvana signifies some form of transcendent reality, it can, as Paul Williams says, in no way count as “God in a Buddhist guise.”149 The teaching of emptiness is interpreted as an affirmation of the causally conditioned realm as the one and only true reality. Emptiness, it is argued, denies only the existence of substantial entities, but not the web of conditioned interrelatedness that is ultimately true/real. Buddhist and Christian proponents of this view agree on the thoroughly atheist nature of Buddhist philosophy, but they disagree about its validity, which Christian proponents strongly contest. Buddhism and Christianity are therefore considered as radically incompatible. Already Ippolito Desideri (1684-1733)150 concluded that the “logical consequence” of emptiness “is the utter denial of an uncreated, independent, inherently existing being,” a doctrine that would “absolutely shut the door to any knowledge of God.”151 Today this position is defended by scholars such as Paul Williams,152 Keith Yandell and Harold Netland.153 On the Buddhist side, there is a long tradition of anti-theistic arguments, primarily directed against various forms of Hindu concepts of God.154 Nevertheless, it is difficult to find Buddhists who can be regarded as full-blown atheists in the sense that they deny any kind of transcendent reality. Even radically anti-theistic modern Theravādins, such as Anagarika Dharmapala (1864-1933) or Gunapala Dharmasiri (d. 2015) did not deny transcendent reality as such, but theism as its adequate representation.155 This seems also true for twentieth 149  Williams 2011, 161. See also Yandell, Netland 2009, 183. Williams seems to be somewhat more open to the idea that certain forms of the Buddha nature doctrine contain some possible analogies to the concept of God. But here, too, his reservations prevail (see Williams 2009b). 150  See above, Part I, chap. 4, pp. 84-86. 151  Desideri 2010, 191. Accordingly, Desideri sees the devil as the ultimate author of this doctrine. See ibid. 364-373. 152  See Williams 2002, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2011. 153  Yandell, Netland 2009. 154  But later the critique was also extended to Muslim and Christian forms of Godbelief. For an overview and discussion of the different types of Buddhist anti-theistic arguments, see Schmidt-Leukel 2006c. 155  Dharmapala explicitly rejected the interpretation of nirvana as “annihilation” (Guruge 1965, 355) and held that “the final state of the Arhat (…) is abyakata beyond speech, and only the Arhats know what it is” (ibid. 80f). According to Dharmapala, Buddhism rejected materialism and embraced a “transcendental metaphysics” (ibid. 354).

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century anti-theistic Mahāyānists. Even if they explicitly refer to Buddhism as “atheism,” as in the case of Shinichi Hisamatsu (1889-1980) or Taixu (=T’ai-hsü, 1890-1949), they do not defend a materialist naturalism.156 As we have seen above, the 14th Dalai Lama also affirms that the principle of dependent origination makes it “almost impossible” to assume an independent, absolute creator God.157 Nevertheless he admits: “One could say that the Creator is the ultimate and the creation is the relative, the ephemeral. In that sense, the Creator is absolute and ultimate truth.”158 Paul Williams has dedicated particular attention to the anti-theistic arguments in the BCA.159 In four respects I find his engagement with Śāntideva highly problematic, but also quite revealing. First, according to Williams it is important to note that Śāntideva’s critique of a divine creator is situated within the wider context of a refutation of any form of causation.160 But, surprisingly, this observation has no impact on Williams’ countercriticism. Instead he interprets Śāntideva’s position as arguing that the Buddhist teaching of causation makes the idea of a divine creator superfluous, without discussing the fact that from a Madhyamaka perspective, the Buddhist teaching of causation makes itself no less superfluous. Second, he interprets Śāntideva’s aim as “the complete refutation of anything at all having true existence (…).” He explains “true existence” as “existence in the fullest possible metaphysical sense”161 and equates “true existence” not only with “sasvabhāva,” but also with “paramārthasat-ultimate existence.”162 However, nowhere in the BCA is Śāntideva setting out to refute “paramārthasat-ultimate existence.” Third, Dharmasiri has criticized theism in general and “the Christian concept of God” in particular as “a primitive and underdeveloped conception of the perfect and ultimate Reality” (Dharmasiri 1888, 259). According to Dharmasiri, early Buddhism was “consistently negative” in its statements about nirvana, with a very few exceptions where the Buddha “seems to have come very parallel to the Hindu doctrine of Brahman (…)” (ibid. 269f). Dharmapala also held the view that Śaṅkara displayed “the spirit of Buddha’s teachings” (Guruge 1965, 816). 156  Both, Hisamatsu and Taixu were looking for a way to express transcendence without undermining true human autonomy. To them, the teaching of Buddha nature points to the true self as a form of immanent transcendence. See Hisamatsu 1990, 45-103; Yu 2017, 405-423. 157  See above, Part II, chap. 6, p. 275. 158  Gyatso 2002, 56. 159  See Williams 2004. 160  Ibid. 95, 109. 161  Ibid. 95. 162  Ibid. 115, fn. 13.

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according to Williams, Śāntideva’s arguments against a divine creator all presuppose an understanding of causation as it is known from the area of “natural causation between things in this world.”163 This kind of causation, says Williams, does not apply to the very different way in which a Christian theologian, such as Thomas Aquinas, understands the causality of divine creation. Śāntideva misunderstands God as a causal factor within the world and within time, operating in the way of innerworldly causality, whereas creation according to Aquinas is ex nihilo and from beyond time. Thus in “attacking that which simply could not ever have been God,” Śāntideva’s critique is merely “undermining idolatry (…).”164 But if Williams is right in that Śāntideva’s critique applies only to idols, that is, to distorted and inadequate images of God and divine creativity, how then can Williams hold that Śāntideva “directly contradicts in the strongest way possible Thomas’ assertion that Deus sit (…)”?165 Williams is far from claiming that Aquinas defends an idolatrous image of God. This leads us to the fourth and probably most significant point. In his discussion of BCA 9:121b, Williams applauds Śāntideva for having “demolished God as the Unknown, the Non-conceptual, the Great Unutterable, or the Complete Mystery.”166 But how does this approval tie in with Williams’ repeated affirmation that for Aquinas, God is primarily defined as the creator, that is, as “the reason why there is something rather than nothing,”167 without any need to know the how of such creation?168 Williams admits that we don’t know what “creation” means for God169 or how it works. Moreover, following Aquinas, he admits that God cannot be defined170 and that “we cannot

163

 Ibid. 107.  Ibid. 105. 165  Ibid. 94. Williams senses this problem: He argues that Śāntideva intends to refute any causation whatsoever and hence implicitly also the divine causation that Aquinas had in mind (see ibid. 109). But this defense of Williams’ claim is weak given that he refuses to specify the nature of divine creative causality, apart from stating that it is different from this-worldly causality. If divine causality remains unknowable and strictly mysterious, as Williams admits, it is far from clear whether this “causality” is affected by Śāntideva’s argumentation. Śāntideva’s aim is to show that all our concepts of causality remain incoherent. What such concepts attempt to grasp remains deeply mysterious, even within conventional reality. 166  Ibid. 104. 167  Ibid. 108; see also 93. 168  Ibid. 107. 169  Ibid. 108. 170  Ibid. 93. 164

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know what God is but only what God is not (…).”171 Is this so different from “God as the Unknown” and “the Complete Mystery”? Perhaps Williams assumes that this kind of ignorance is redeemed by divine revelation.172 Yet this is not quite the view of Thomas Aquinas. Any propositional revelation will have to be in human words, and these are – according to Aquinas – incapable of rendering an adequate understanding of God’s nature.173 Revelation, says Aquinas, unites us with God, but “as to an unknown.”174 The second position rejects, on the basis of Whitehead’s process philosophy, a dualistic contrast between God and the world and accepts the Buddhist critique of an eternal and immutable God. However, it does not abandon God but reinterprets God in the name of emptiness. Christian theologians who are influenced by process philosophy, such as John Cobb, David Griffin or Milton Scarborough,175 analyze reality as a composite of three factors: God and the world as interdependent and nondually interrelated by both sharing in emptiness. Their understanding of “emptiness,” however, is a rather specific one. It is regarded as the opposite of static being, but simultaneously as a fertile potential, so that being is seen as a transformative process. God and the world participate in an interactive way in this empty and creative ground. Emptiness does not exist as such, but only in and through its manifestation as God and the world. God did not create the world ex nihilo. Creation is rather the continuous impulse by which God stimulates the evolution of an increasingly higher order in the world, which possesses its own creativity. At times proponents of this model oscillate between a conception that understands all three factors as distinct ultimates in their own right, and a conception that sees them as three dimensions of a single complex ultimate reality.176 In line with the latter, the world may then be described as God’s body and God as its cosmic soul, with emptiness as the symbol of the processual, transformative nature of this cosmic organism.177 Under the influence of process philosophy, the Shin-Buddhist 171

 Ibid. 98.  According to Williams, “Thomas’s approach to God is apophatic as regards our natural reasoning, but firmly cataphatic when God is seen by means of the revelation (…).” Ibid. 99. 173  Summa Theologiae I 13,1 ad 1. 174  Summa Theologiae I 12,13 ad 1. 175  See Cobb 1985, 1999; Griffin 2005a, 2005b; Scarborough 2009. 176  See Cobb 1999, 185f. 177  Ibid. 122f. 172

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scholar John Yokota has adopted a similar model.178 He takes emptiness as equivalent to the dharmakāya, the ultimate Buddha nature which is present as both Amida-Buddha, the perfect manifestation of wisdom and compassion, and the samsaric world. Amida and the world thus form a non-dual unity through their participation in the dharmakāya = emptiness. While those who are influenced by process philosophy give only a marginal role, if any, to the issue of inconceivability and ineffability,179 this is completely different in the position of apophatic mysticism. It holds that “the Buddhist notion of the ultimate is in deep harmony with the apophatic tradition of Christian theology.”180 This does not mean that “emptiness” and “God” are simply the same. The idea is rather that “God” and “emptiness” point in their own specific and different ways to the same ultimate reality.181 Within the Christian tradition of apophatic theology, the term “God” signifies the ineffability of ultimate reality. On the Buddhist side, the term “emptiness” signifies the ineffability of ultimate reality inasmuch as concepts do not correspond to the way reality truly is. In the context of the two truths/realities, the teaching on emptiness connects ultimate reality with nirvana. This way of relating God and emptiness is found, with some variations, among some key figures

178

 Yokota 2000, 2004, 2005. See also Odin 2005.  This is, in a sense, also true of Mark Heim. Although Heim is not strictly a process theologian, his approach has admittedly some affinity to this approach (see Heim 2014, 254f). But while process theologians are at times ambiguous about whether they think of a plurality of ultimates or one complex ultimate reality, Heim opts unambiguously for the latter (Heim 2014, 255f). This leads to a different ambiguity regarding his stance on the inconceivability and ineffability of God. On the one hand, Heim assumes or “hopes” (Heim 2019, 176) that the Buddhist talk of emptiness and Buddha nature refers to the same reality that he identifies as the “nonpersonal” and immanence dimension of the Trinity. On the other hand, he speaks of this dimension as “apophatic,” “incommunicable” and “unknowable” (e.g. Heim 2019, 110, 173). But does this mean that some dimension of God has the character of an ineffable mystery, while all the rest of God is fairly conceivable in human terms? Or would he be willing to admit that his Trinitarian speculations remain at a preliminary level of reflection while, at the end of the day, the ultimate nature of reality remains unspeakable? He rightly states that “the Madhyamaka Buddhist rationale for two truths is a no-view one” (ibid. 266), and raises the question “Is there a place for the two-truths teaching in theology?” (ibid. 267). His answer, however – especially regarding his Trinitarian views – remains far from unambiguous. 180  Keenan 1989a, 203. 181  For an analysis of the similarities and differences between apophatic structures in patristic theology and Zen Buddhism, see Williams, J.P. 2000. 179

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in the Buddhist‒Christian dialogue, such as John Hick, Seiichi Yagi, Keiji Nishitani and John Makransky.182 As John Hick has emphasized, the term “emptiness” plays an ambiguous role in Buddhist parlance. On the one hand it functions as an impersonal concept of ultimate reality, on the other hand it points beyond itself, and all concepts, towards the inconceivable and ineffable nature of the Ultimate. Within Christianity, the term “God” fulfills an analogous role in that it functions, on the one hand, as a personal concept of ultimate reality and, on the other hand, as a pointer towards the Ultimate’s transcategorial nature.183 In his Foundations of Christian Faith, Karl Rahner introduced the word “God” in a way which may easily be associated with Nāgārjuna’s functional view of the term “emptiness.” The word “God,” says Rahner, is our opening to the incomprehensible mystery. (…) It is always open to Wittgenstein’s protest, which bids us to be silent about things which we cannot speak about clearly. Notice, however, that he violates this rule in formulating it. The word itself agrees with this maxim if correctly understood. For it is the final word before wordless and worshipful silence in the face of the ineffable mystery.184

The affirmation of divine ineffability and inconceivability is a major teaching of the pre-modern Christian tradition and by no means just a marginal sideline. But is there not a major difference between the Christian talk of God and the Madhyamaka talk of emptiness or ultimate reality in that the latter refers to the inconceivability of all reality, whereas the term “God” relates to only one part of reality: its transcendent creator? After what I have said about the asymmetry between conventional truth and ultimate truth, it should be clear that things are not as simple as that. In Buddhism, too, the difference between samsara and nirvana is retained at the level of conventional reality. The denial of their difference refers to the level of ultimate reality, where no conceptual distinctions at all obtain. Does the Christian affirmation of divine ineffability and inconceivability likewise imply a non-difference between God and the world, the creator and the creation? In the writings of some Christian mystics, such as Meister Eckhart, this is indeed the case. 182  See Hick 1989, 1993a, 119-136; Yagi, Swidler 1990, 54f; Nishitani 1983, 46-76; Makransky 1997, 3, 370; 2008, 58-66. From the Buddhist side, however, it is regularly questioned how thoroughgoing the self-negating function of the God-concept really is. 183  See Hick 1989, 233-296, especially 287-292. 184  Rahner 1978, 51.

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At that level of truth, which Eckhart indicates with the term “Godhead,” the distinction between the creator and the creation does not apply.185 In addressing the same issue, Karl Rahner has argued that precisely the idea of “creation” implies that God and the world are not different in the way two inner-worldly realities would be different. There is rather an asymmetry of differences. As seen from the perspective of the world, God remains radically different from it as its inconceivable, absolute ground. But as seen, in a sense, from the perspective of God, “God establishes and is the difference of the world from himself (…).”186 Saying that God is the difference between God and the world is equivalent to saying that there is no difference between God and the world – but again, not in the same sense in which the difference between two innerworldly entities would be denied (e.g. between the morning star and the evening star). Thus, in this way we find in Christianity the idea of an asymmetry similar to that between the two truths: While from the perspective of conventional truth, ultimate reality is radically different from the transient world of dependent origination and cessation, this difference must be contested from the perspective of ultimate reality, precisely because of the difference between the two realities. The logical problems that inevitably arise, as Mādhyamikas have pointed out, when we try to grasp the identity of worldly phenomena (including our own identity) in the context of their location in space and in time, as well as in the web of causal contingency, are hard to deny. Could the mystery that prevails at the heart of our worldly existence not be taken as a hint at the presence of the ultimate divine reality behind the “worldly veil” (lokasaṃvṛti)? Under worldly conditions, says Paul, “we see only, as through a mirror, in enigmas” (1 Cor. 13:12).187 Is this not a telling equivalent to what Buddhists call the “veiled truth”?

185  See, for example, Meister Eckhart, sermon 56 (Quint 26), “Everything that is in the Godhead is one, and of that there is nothing to be said. (…) When I enter the ground, the bottom, the river and fount of the Godhead, none will ask me whence I came or where I have been. No one missed me, for there God unbecomes.” Walshe 2009, 294. Or, to quote another example, sermon 57 (Quint 13): “Now all things are equal in God and are God Himself.” Ibid. 279. It is in this sermon that Eckhart also formulates the self-transcending nature of the God-concept in stating that the highest goal is in taking “leave of God for God” (ibid. 296). 186  Rahner 1978, 62. See above, Part II, chap. 1, pp. 125f. 187  …βλέπομεν γὰρ ἄρτι δι᾽ ἐσόπτρου ἐν αἰνίγματι.

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What would this imply for Śāntideva’s critique of a divine creator? From a Christian point of view, I suggest taking seriously Śāntideva’s (presumably polemical) remark that if God is inconceivable (acintya), this also applies to God’s creatorship. He is absolutely right.188 “Inconceivability” is nothing alien to the Madhyamaka tradition, nor is it used in a primarily derogative way. A “Hymn to the Inconceivable” (Acintyastava) is ascribed to Nāgārjuna, and this hymn may very well have been known to Śāntideva.189 In it, the Buddha and ultimate reality are both extolled as “inconceivable” (Acintyastava 1, 38, 59).190 Christians can admit and indeed praise the inconceivability of God’s creatorship, which implies that God’s causality cannot and must not be understood in the same way as inner-worldly causality. In this I fully agree with Paul Williams. As Thomas Aquinas argues, calling God the “first cause” must not be mistaken in any chronological or sequential sense of “first.”191 The question of whether the world is divinely created or not is, according to Aquinas, completely independent from the question of whether the world has a beginning in or of time, or whether it stretches back beginninglessly into the past. God could have created a world that has no beginning in time.192 Creatio ex nihilio (creation out of nothing), says Aquinas, must not be confused with creatio post nihilum (creation after nothing).193 There was never a time “before” creation (and hence nothing that God had to wait for), because time itself belongs to the created sphere. God can be called the cause of the world only in an analogical sense, and primarily so in the sense of being its teleological cause.194 The answer to the question “Why is there something rather than nothing?” must therefore aim at the purpose of the world; it asks about the goal for which the world is here. And this goal is nothing but God. The world exists because it is attracted to God as its eternal (timeless) fulfillment.195 188

 On Christian apophasis and divine creatorship, see also Williams, J.P. 2016.  Given that Śāntideva paraphrases in vs. 9:145 a verse from another hymn of the same collection. See above, p. 453, fn. 89. 190  See Tola, Dragonetti 1985, 14-19, 27-35. 191  This is treated more fully in Schmidt-Leukel 2006c, 166-169. See also SchmidtLeukel 2017a, 204-221. 192  See Summa contra Gentiles I, 13. 193  See Summa Theologiae I 46, 2 ad 2. 194  According to Aquinas, the teleological cause (causa finalis) is the primary cause of all causes. See Summa contra Gentiles I 37 and Summa Theologiae I-II 1, 2. 195  In this Aquinas follows Aristotle’s concept of God as the “unmoved mover.” See Summa contra Gentiles I 37. See also Summa Theologiae I 44, 4 ad 3. 189

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So far I have been exploring the possible significance of Śāntideva’s critique of the concept of God, in the name of universal emptiness, for a Christian understanding of God. But let me now ask the converse question of whether one may find in the BCA, despite and beyond Śāntideva’s critique, an awareness of that reality towards which a Christian notion of God points. There is a strong line in Buddhist thought that regards nirvana as the true goal to which all sentient beings aspire. It is the happiness, the lasting satisfaction and peace desired by all. It is not found when, due to delusion, the search for it turns to the transitory gratification that comes from worldly possessions and enjoyments. Śāntideva confesses that his mind strives for nirvana, but in a genuinely Mahāyāna spirit he is convinced that the highest realization of nirvana consists in dedicating one’s life to others (vs. 3:11) out of love (maitrī, vs. 6:115). True happiness is found in selfless love (vs. 8:129); the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas who have reached the highest goal are called “beings of love” (vs. 2:18). The First Letter of John unambiguously states that “everyone who loves is born of God and knows God” because “love is from God” and even “is God” (1 Jn. 4:7). This in itself would be enough for a Christian to acknowledge in gratitude and praise that true knowledge of God is indeed promoted through the Bodhisattva ideal. But we can go further. According to Thomas Aquinas, everybody has some innate, albeit dim knowledge of God “inasmuch as God is man’s beatitude. For man naturally desires happiness, and what is naturally desired by man must be naturally known to him.”196 However, as Aquinas continues, in our delusion we often do not realize that God is our true happiness and therefore turn to riches and sensual pleasures. Śāntideva provides us with a bridge that connects the theology of John with that of Aquinas with his insight that true happiness is found in true love. Although God or ultimate reality remains inconceivable, beyond the domain of conceptual cognition, the knowledge of God or the knowledge of ultimate reality materializes in the “beings of love.” Already in the canonical scriptures it is said that the inconceivable nirvana becomes “visible” in awakened persons because of their perfectly peaceful and benevolent attitude toward others.197 As much as Ippolito Desideri was convinced that the teachings on dependent origination and universal emptiness undermine any belief in God, he nevertheless also held that 196  Summa Theologiae I 2, 1 ad 1. http://sacred-texts.com/chr/aquinas/summa/ sum005.htm. The idea goes back to Augustine’s Confessions, book 10, pp. 20-22. 197  See AN 3:55/56 (PTS I, 158f).

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Tibetan Buddhists, “in practice, and implicitly,” actually do recognize and worship God in the form of the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, who are endowed with crucial divine attributes: (1) perfectly blessed and free from all evil; (2) omniscient, that is, seeing and understanding all things; (3) omnipotent, able to help everyone in all things; and finally, (4) infinitely compassionate without excluding anyone, wishing to do good to all without exception (…). And in whom are such perfections to be found, if not in God?198

Desideri thus judged that “these blind people, without being aware of it, accept in fact and confusedly recognize that deity whom they verbally deny through their fallacious reasoning.”199 But the blindness may have been on Desideri’s side; he could not see how the manifestation of such divine attributes was and is intrinsically connected to perfection of insight, rather than being its opposite.200 TRANSLATION: 9:152-168 Summary 152. Among the factors [explained as] empty in this way, what would be gained, what taken away? Who would be honored or reviled by whom? 153. Whence would be happiness or suffering? Or what would be liked, what disliked? What would be the thirst? For what would this thirst be, if examined as to its nature? 154. On examining, what would the world of living beings be? Which of them will die here? Which arise? Who would have lived? Who would be a relative? Who would be whose friend?

Final exhortation 155. May those who are like me embrace everything as resembling [empty] space. They are infuriated by quarrels and they are delighted by festivities. 156. In great misery, by sinful acts aspiring for their own happiness, they live their days with worries, troubles and despair, with mutual torments and mutilations. 198

 Sweet 2010, 375f.  Ibid. 377. 200  See also Mrozik 2007, 100: “Ultimate and conventional perspectives are not, in the end, at cross-purposes; they both seek to produce bodhisattvas who are dedicated to the happiness and well-being of others.” 199

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157. And when they die, they plunge into bad destinies full of long and intense agonies, while they have also repeatedly reached a good fate, and have been accustomed to pleasure again and again. 158. In [the cycle of] existence there are numerous abysses, and yet there is such unreality to it. And there is mutual contradiction. True reality would not be like this. 159. In this life, too, there are gruesome, endless seas of suffering beyond compare. Here strength is so poor, and yet life is short. 160.-161. Here one quickly lives out one’s days with great effort for livelihood and health, with hunger, fatigue and exhaustion, with sleep, with misfortunes, with fruitless encounters with fools, and certainly in vain. Solitude here is almost impossible to attain. Also what would provide here a way for preventing habitual distraction? 162. Moreover, in this life Māra, the tempter, strives to plunge us into great misery. And doubt can hardly be overcome here because the false paths are many. 163. Then again, the favorable occasion [of human life] is hard to obtain, the appearance of a Buddha is extremely rare, and it is difficult to dam the flood of defilements. Ah, what an unbroken chain of suffering! 164. Ah, how one must lament those who abide in floods of suffering and do not recognize their plight, although they are exceedingly miserable. 165. Like one who might enter again and again into a ring of fire after repeatedly bathing [in icy water], they believe in their well-being, although they are thus exceedingly miserable. 166. For those who live as if they would never grow old and die, cruel calamities will set in, topped by death. 167. When might I ever bring peace to those so tormented by the fire of suffering through my own means for happiness that have come down from the clouds of merits? 168. When will I ever explain emptiness in terms of conventional reality to those who harbor the misconception of perceiving [substantial existence], and carefully the accumulation of meritorious acts in terms of not perceiving [the triple division of gift, giver and recipient]?

COMMENTARY 6. The Missionary of Emptiness With the concluding section (vss. 152-168), Śāntideva quits the world of dry logical analysis and insensitive polemical debate, returning to the typical existential, introspective and beseeching style that makes his poem

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so special and attractive. The section is marked by the harsh contrast between the ordinary life of meaningless and potentially endless samsaric suffering (vss. 155b-166) and the insight that all the factors that keep the wheel of samsara going could be brought to a halt by the insight into emptiness (vss. 152-154). Between these two parts, he shouts out his fervent wish that his fellow human beings realize emptiness. They “are like me” – he identifies with them and their plight (vs. 155a), just as he contemplated in chapter 8. He is not blaming them for their heedless behavior, for all the suffering they inflict upon themselves and each other. The verses rather speak with a voice of empathy and compassion. Śāntideva laments their fate (vs. 164). He feels how difficult it is to escape the defilements (vs. 163), how weak one’s own power and how short one’s life is for developing the liberating qualities (vs. 159). The appearance of a Buddha is extremely rare (vs. 163), the conditions for a spiritual life unfavorable (vss. 160-161), while Māra, the diabolic antagonist of the Buddha, is actively pursuing the misery of human beings, making liberating insight even more difficult by disseminating so many “false paths” (vs. 162).201 In their ignorance, his fellow human beings do not even realize how dreadful their situation truly is. In their daily pursuits, in their amusements and worries, their struggles and fights, they resemble mad ascetics who waste their lives by taking turns to enter the heat of a fire circle and the cold of icy water (vs. 165). In the same way, they spend their repeated existences by turning from the long agonies of the hells to the good opportunities offered in human life, which they waste in futile pleasures just to fall again into the abyss of the hells (vss. 157-158a). They do so because they only search for their own happiness (vs. 156) and thereby miss the chance to really find happiness in altruistic love. Śāntideva is convinced that the experience and affliction of all this suffering as well as the stale and deceiving pleasures of samsaric life do not reflect what reality truly is. The numerous incoherencies that, as logical analysis points out, permeate our ordinary perception of the world unmask its unreal, illusionary nature (vs. 158).202 Driven by 201  Bhāvaviveka reports the reverse allegation (by non-Mahāyāna Buddhists) that the Mahāyāna teachings were created by Māra (Eckel 2008, 111, 127f). See also the examples given in Tola, Dragonetti 1996. 202  Some translators and commentators interpret the “mutual contradiction” (anyonyavirodha) mentioned in vs. 158 as the contradiction between the ordinary cognition of the world and the insight into its illusionary nature. However, I guess that this “contradiction” refers to all the incoherencies inherent to the conceptual image of the world, which function as the primary means for establishing the illusionary nature of the conceptual image.

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sympathy and compassion, Śāntideva wants to lead his fellow humans to this liberating insight (vs. 155a). They would understand the empty nature of their riches and their losses, of their likes and dislikes, of their friends and foes, of their own transient lives and the world in which they find themselves. Thirst, with ignorance – the root of all evil – would simply evaporate (vss. 152-154). But Śāntideva does not turn his back on their fate. He does not satisfy himself by putting the blame on them. He sees their liberation from suffering as his responsibility. He is dedicated to bring them peace and true happiness (vs. 167). But he also feels that he can do so only by teaching them emptiness through the means of conventional truth/reality and guiding them to a meaningful life of meritorious works, while simultaneously making them aware of conventional reality’s illusionary nature.203 In this spirit, Śāntideva now moves on to the dedication of his own karmic merit (vs. 167b) to all suffering beings, which he carries out solemnly, but with full existential austerity, in the tenth chapter. In the concluding section of chapter 9, Śāntideva reveals his mindset as that of a fervent missionary. As he declares in vss. 9:35, 45 and 49, he is convinced that there is no other way to final liberation than the contemplation of emptiness. His compassionate intention to lead his own spiritual life for the sake of all others therefore results in the ardent wish to lead others to the insight into emptiness. His exclusivism prevents him from openly inquiring into the truth that might be found in other teachings and their potential to guide people on a path to liberation, even if in different ways. He shows no attempt to understand nonBuddhist teachings in a sympathetic manner, but confronts them in the manner of a stubborn polemicist. He demonizes them as false paths created by Māra to ruin the people. Even other forms of Buddhism are appreciated only as leading people a few steps toward final liberation, but not the whole way to the final goal. We may trust that he is subjectively honest in his exclusivist conviction, although he might have known better. This ambivalence of exclusivism as an expression, on the one 203  In his translation of vs. 168b, Steinkellner follows Prajñākaramati’s commentary (Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā) and relates the “not perceiving” (anupalambha) to substantialist notions as they have been traditionally exemplified (in terms of the first pāramitā: giving, generosity) by the triad “gift, giver and recipient.” See, for example, the Aṣṭādaśāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra (chap. 21, p. 264): “The supramundane perfection of giving (…) consists in the threefold purity. What is the threefold purity? Here a Bodhisattva gives a gift, and he does not apprehend a self, a recipient, or a gift; also no reward of his giving.” Conze 1984, 199.

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hand, of the genuine wish for the salvation of others and, on the other hand, a shutting oneself off from any attempt to understand how others may already know the liberative truth is all too familiar to the Christian tradition. But this does not mean that Christians or Buddhists should continue to follow their trodden, exclusivist paths. The time is ripe for a change. Watching out for the truth of the other is not less but more compatible with the Bodhisattva spirit than confronting others as being blind and ignorant.

CHAPTER 10

BODHICARYĀVATĀRA 10 TRANSFERENCE OF MERIT (PARIṆĀMANĀPARICCHEDA)

COMMENTARY 1. Developing Loving Kindness and the Dedication of Merit May all beings be happy and secure; May they be inwardly happy! Whatever living beings there are whether frail or firm, without omission, those that are long or those that are large middling, short, fine, or gross; whether they are seen or unseen, whether they dwell far or near, whether they have come to be or will come to be, may all beings be inwardly happy! No one should deceive another, nor despise anyone anywhere. Because of anger and thoughts of aversion no one should wish suffering for another. Just as a mother would protect her son, her only son, with her own life, so one should develop toward all beings a state of mind without boundaries. And toward the whole world one should develop loving-kindness, a state of mind without boundaries – above, below, and across – unconfined, without enmity, without adversaries.1

 Sutta Nipāta, vss. 145b–150. Bodhi 2017, 179f.

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These verses from the ancient canonical Metta Sutta speak of the boundless and non-discriminating loving kindness (maitrī, Pāli: metta) that the follower of the Buddha is called upon to cultivate. The highly popular text was frequently emulated, varied and/or extended in other Buddhist scriptures. One example from a long list is the final chapter of the BCA. Developing loving kindness and compassion is part of the meditative exercise of the so-called brahmavihāra.2 In Mahāyāna Buddhism this meditation is connected to, and at times merged with, the typical Bodhisattva practice of dedicating and transferring one’s own spiritual merit (the good karma that the Bodhisattva has accumulated)3 to other sentient beings.4 It forms the conclusion of the Bodhisattva ritual, as was seen in BCA 3. Through this dedication, the Bodhisattva not only cultivates a loving and compassionate mind, but actually practices love: He or she actively benefits other beings by selflessly donating to them the good karmic results of his or her own achievements. In a sense, the practice resembles the Christian practice of intercessory prayer, which is also – at least traditionally – understood as actively contributing to the well-being of others, not merely as a means for developing friendly sentiments. One might object that a Christian who intercedes in prayer for fellow human beings does not give up any merit in the way a Bodhisattva does. But Paul, for example, in his prayer for the conversion of his fellow Jews, offered to be condemned if they were saved (Rom. 9:3). And as we have seen,5 the transference of merit is not the only way the practitioner on the Bodhisattva path seeks to alleviate the suffering of other beings. By developing a loving and compassionate mind and dedicating one’s merit, the Bodhisattva expresses the resolve to dedicate one’s whole life to the liberation of all others, which also implies helping them in whatever way possible. After a brief introduction (vss. 1-3), Śāntideva structures chapter 10 along the lines of Buddhist cosmology, with its bad and good plains of samsaric existence, thereby following the scheme of the “ten realms” (daśadhātu).6 In vss. 4-18 he extends his benevolence to all beings 2

 See above, Part II, chap. 3, pp. 154f; chap. 6, pp. 288f, chap. 7, p. 307, chap. 8, pp. 399f.  See above, Part II, chap. 2, p. 150; chap. 3, pp. 157-162. 4  This merger of meditative cultivation with the concrete activity of merit transfer can be seen in ŚS 212-219 – a section that in various respects corresponds to BCA 10. 5  See Part II, chap. 3, pp. 157-162. 6  These are: (1) denizens of the hells, (2) hungry ghosts, (3) animals, (4) demigods (asura), (5) human beings, (6) gods, (7) Hearers (śrāvaka), (8) Solitary Buddhas (pratyekabuddha), (9) Bodhisattvas, (10) Buddhas. 3

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suffering in the three lower realms of samsara, that is, the hells (vss. 4-16a), the animal realm and the realm of the pretas, the hungry ghosts (vss. 16b–18). The focus of his attention, however, is on the denizens of hells or, more precisely, on the relief that Bodhisattvas might bring them. Next, Śāntideva proceeds to the three better plains of rebirth, that is, the worlds of human beings (vss. 19-47), gods and demigods (vs. 50b), and finally those who are moving towards, or have already achieved, some type of liberation from samsaric existence (vss. 48-50). Here Śāntideva focusses on the human world, especially the Buddhist Sangha. In fact, we can say that the whole chapter concentrates on human beings, because the denizens of hells are imagined as (ex-) humans with specific human bodies, and the other samsaric beings (ghosts, animals, demigods and gods) are only mentioned comparatively briefly. Finally – and typical for the style and mood of the whole text – Śāntideva gets highly personal, praying for himself and confessing his utter dependence on the grace (parigraha, prasāda) of his favorite Bodhisattva, Mañjuśrī (vss. 51-56). The chapter concludes with his final wishes for the world and paying homage to Mañjuśrī and his unnamed personal guide (vss. 57-58).

TRANSLATION: 10:1-18 1. Through the good that falls to my share as I ponder over entering the course towards awakening, may all beings be enriched with a course towards awakening! 2. May anyone, in any part of the world, who is tormented by pains in body and mind achieve oceans of happiness and bliss through my merits! 3. To the end of the cycle of existences, may happiness never wane for them! May the world always enjoy the happiness of the Bodhisattvas! 4. As many hells as there are in the worldly realms, may the living beings in them be pleased by the pleasures of happiness in the Sukhāvatī paradise! 5. May those tormented by cold find warmth! May those tormented by heat be cooled by oceans of water pouring down from the great cloud of the Bodhisattvas! 6. May the sword-leaved forests have the splendor for them of the celestial grove Nandana, and may the thorny Śālmalī trees become wish-granting trees! 7. May the regions in the hells be enchanting, with pools filled with the fragrance of lotus blossoms, delightful and lovely with the chatter of grey geese and ducks, Cakravāka ducks, wild geese and other waterfowl!

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8. May the heap of glowing coal be a heap of gems! May the scorching ground be a floor of pure crystals! And may the mountains in the Saṅghāta hell become celestial palaces of worship, densely populated by Buddhas! 9. May the shower of coals, red-hot stones and weapons from now on be a shower of flowers! And may the mutual fighting with these weapons now be a playful tussle with flowers! 10. May those drowned in the hell-river Vaitaraṇī, with its fire-like waters, all their flesh fallen off and their skeletons the color of white jasmine, find themselves through the power of my wholesome works as celestial beings with celestial women in the celestial river Mandākinī! 11. May the servants of Yama and the appalling crows and vultures watch in fear how the darkness here in the hells is suddenly dispersed on all sides. May they, looking up in wonder to whom this brilliant radiance might belong that bestows the joy of happiness, and seeing the flaming Bodhisattva Vajrapāṇi in the sky, be united with him through the force of rapture, free from their sinister state! 12. May a shower of lotus flowers fall (patatu Bh instead of patati V), blended with fragrant water! It is seen as it puts out the hell-fires with a hiss. May the beings in hell be given the sight of the Bodhisattva Kamalapāṇi, wondering what it might be, and be unexpectedly gladdened by happiness! 13. “Come hither, come quickly, cast off your fear, brothers! We are restored to life! A youth with ribbons in the hair has appeared to us, ardently rendering us fearless; through his might all afflictions are gone, floods of joy have sprung, the spirit of awakening has arisen as well as compassion, the mother of deliverance for all beings. 14. Look at him: His lotus feet worshiped by the crowns of hundreds of deities, his eyes moist with compassion; from lovely palace galleries, where thousands of loquacious goddesses sing praises, a rain of many flowers has poured down onto his head.” On seeing the Bodhisattva Mañjughoṣa in front, may the cheers of those in the hells rise at once! 15. May the hell-beings exult at beholding in this way, through my wholesome works, the clouds brimmed with Bodhisattvas lead by Samantabhadra and bearing soothing, cool and fragrant breezes and showers! 16. May the raging pains and the fears of those in the hells abate! May those who live in bad destinies be freed from these bad destinies! 17. May animals lose their fear of being eaten by each other! May the hungry and thirsty ghosts be as happy as the eternally blissful people in the Uttarakurucontinent! 18. May the ghosts always be well fed and bathed, and may they be refreshed by rivers of milk flowing from the hands of the noble Bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara!

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COMMENTARY 2. For Those on the Bad Plains of Existence Śāntideva begins by envisaging the karmic merit gained by his composition of the BCA and dedicates it to all beings so they all may enter the course toward awakening (vs. 1).7 In particular he dedicates his merit to all who are suffering from physical and mental pain, wishing them to become partakers in the happiness of the Bodhisattvas (vss. 2-3). First he thinks of those who are suffering in the various Buddhist hells.8 With a range of tangible images of Buddhist cosmology Śāntideva wishes that hell may become heaven for them – either the ordinary heaven with its sublime sensual delights (vss. 6-7, 9-10)9 or, and even better, a spiritual paradise such as Buddha Amitābha’s pure land Sukhāvatī (vss. 4, 8).10 Verses 11-15 give a lively account of how Śāntideva envisages the appearance of major Bodhisattvas in the hells. He explicitly mentions Samantabhadra, heading an unspecified number of further Bodhisattvas (vs. 15), as well as Vajrapāṇi (a synonym for Mahāsthāmaprāpta) and Kamalapāṇi (a synonym for Padmapāṇi and as such, a different name for Avalokiteśvara) (vss. 11f), who are often regarded as the two companions of the Buddha Amitābha. Special attention is given to the appearance of Mañjuśrī alias Mañjughoṣa, that is, Śāntideva’s chosen Bodhisattva to whom he pays homage in the concluding verse of the chapter (vs. 58) – a relationship which has been broadly developed upon in the Śāntideva legend.11 Mañjughoṣa is named in vs. 14, and referred to in vs. 13 by the epithet cīrīkumāra (“youth with ribbons in the hair”).12 While the sight 7  It seems as if Śāntideva is referring here to the title of his own work (bodhicaryāvatāra: “entering the course towards awakening”), but this is not entirely clear. The (presumably) earlier Dūn-huáng version carries the title bodhisattvacaryāvatāra (“entering the course of a Bodhisattva”). See above, Part I, chap. 1, p. 5. 8  On the different hells and tortures mentioned in vss. 5-10, see the excursus on hells, pp. 331-345. 9  The Nandana grove (vs. 6) is part of Amarāvatī, the celestial abode of Indra, the king of the gods; the river Mandākinī (vs. 10) is the celestial part of the sacred river Gaṅgā. Cakravāka ducks (vs. 7) are associated with faithful love. On the wish-granting tree (kalpapādapa) (vs. 6), see above, Part II, chap. 3, p. 168. 10  See also BCA 7:44. Celestial palaces as abodes and places of worship (see vs. 8) can be part of a pure Buddha Land, as is the case of the pure land called “Sukhāvatī.” 11  See Part I, chap. 3. 12  This interpretation follows the Tibetan commentarial tradition. The person whom the denizens of hell call cīrīkumāra (vs. 13) seems to be the same who is called “Mañjughoṣa” in vs. 14. Crosby and Skilton translate cīrīkumāra as “prince in the robes

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of the other Bodhisattvas brings relief and gladness to the suffering denizens (and fear to the illusionary, infernal monsters, vs. 11), the sight of Mañjuśrī also inspires bodhicitta in them and “compassion, the mother of deliverance for all beings” (vs. 13). In other words, Mañjuśrī turns terribly tortured victims – and their likely feelings of hate – into fresh Bodhisattvas with a compassionate heart. And as we have seen in BCA 1:9, 13f, bodhicitta, once arisen, immediately erases the karmic results of the worst sins, that is, through it one escapes hell.13 After wishing once more that fear and pain be taken away from all beings in hell, Śāntideva briefly turns to the other two bad destinies of samsaric existence, the realms of the animals and of the pretas, the hungry ghosts (vss. 16-18). He wishes that animals be liberated from their condition of eating or being eaten. And the hungry ghosts, with their small throats and insatiable appetite, should be well fed14 and become as happy as the inhabitants of the mythological Uttarakuru paradise (cf. DN 32:7). Finally, all beings should become free from all bad forms of rebirth (vs. 16b), as is actually the case in the pure Buddha Lands, which do not include any hells, ghosts or animals – the birds there, with their lovely voices, being only virtual fabrications.15 The explicit and implicit references to pure Buddha Lands in general and Sukhāvatī in particular are conspicuous. There is some evidence, but none that is conclusive, that Śāntideva was familiar with either the shorter or the longer Sukhāvatīvyūha-sūtra. The ŚS does not quote from either of these texts, and refers to Sukhāvatī and Buddha Amitābha only by quoting from the Bhaiṣajyaguruvaidūryaprabharāja-sūtra (ŚS 174f).16 of a monk” and understand it as a reference to the Bodhisattva Kṣitigarbha (Śāntideva 1995, 133, 189). All these Bodhisattvas are also mentioned in BCA 2:50-53. 13  See Part II, chap. 1, pp. 117-120. 14  The idea that the pretas drink a liquid emerging from the hands of Avalokiteśvara stems from the third chapter of the Kāraṇḍavyūha-sūtra (see Studholme 2002, 123). 15  See the longer Sukhāvatīvyūha-sūtra 53; Gómez 1996, 84. 16  The idea that the Buddhist teaching is heard from the sound of the birds (BCA 10:37) may be inspired by the smaller Sukhāvatīvyūha-sūtra (§ 11); see Gómez 1996, 17. The wish that all women shall become men (BCA 10:30) is found in the Sukhāvatīvyūha texts (see Gómez 1996, 74), but is also mentioned in ŚS 175, where it is quoted from the Bhaiṣajyaguruvaiḍūryaprabharāja-sūtra. The “birth” from lotus flowers, which is typical for birth in the Pure Land (referred to in BCA 7:44), is mentioned in the same section of the ŚS. However, what the BCA says about Avalokiteśvara’s decent into the hells (8:107) and the preta realm (10:18) seems to be influenced by the Kāraṇḍavyūha-sūtra, a text that is not mentioned in the ŚS. Hence we cannot limit the scriptural resources of the BCA to the Sūtras quoted in the ŚS. Buddha Amitābha and his land Sukhāvatī feature prominently in the Kāraṇḍavyūha-sūtra. The Kāraṇḍavyūha-sūtra

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The context of this reference, however, is significant inasmuch it deals with the veneration of the Buddhas, recitation of their names, and faith in their benevolence as ways to become partakers of their karmic merit. Clearly, grace is in the air. And it extends to the hells. The idea that Bodhisattvas may voluntarily enter the hells for the sake of other beings is presented as a contested issue in pre-Mahāyāna literature,17 but it finally became widespread in Mahāyāna Buddhism.18 How Bodhisattvas serve other beings by descending into hell is described in various ways. We can distinguish at least three different types, which are all found in the BCA. One type consists in that the Bodhisattva, if necessary, is prepared to perform an evil deed which will bring him to hell. He is willing to do so if this deed is committed out of compassion, that is, if through this deed he can save other beings and, in particular, prevent others from performing the same bad deed. In the latter case, the Bodhisattva takes the negative karmic consequences upon himself in order to protect others from the otherwise inevitable infernal consequences. In this sense, the influential Upāyakauśalya-sūtra presents the Bodhisattva (i.e. Buddha Gautama in his previous lives) as the role model. He was ready to violate his vow of celibacy and go to hell in order to make a love-sick girl happy and prevent her from committing suicide. In the same vein, he murdered a robber in order to prevent him from killing five hundred merchants, as the robber had intended to do, and to prevent the merchants from murdering the robber, as they would have done if they had realized his plans. Thus by committing the murder himself, the Bodhisattva protected the robber and the merchants from going to hell. In such cases a Bodhisattva must be prepared to protect others by taking the negative karmic consequences upon himself. However, as the same text also declares, the good karma resulting from the truly selfless and compassionate intentions behind such deeds will actually erase the negative karmic impact, and thus the Bodhisattva will not end up in hell – a mechanism that only works if the Bodhisattva’s intentions are genuine.19 This kind of readiness to go to hell in the place of others appears to be implied in BCA 5:8420 as well as, perhaps, in BCA 6:120. could therefore be another possible source of the information about the Pure Land (Sukhāvatī) as found in the BCA. 17  See Kathāvatthu 23:3. 18  See, for example, Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra 8. 19  See Tatz 1994, 34f, 74f. 20  See above, Part II, chap. 5, pp. 243f.

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It seems, however, more likely that BCA 6:120 is implying that Bodhisattvas actually enter the hells (and not only develop the readiness to do so), in order to render some kind of aid to the suffering denizens there. Verse 6:12021 seems to suggest that Bodhisattvas do suffer in hell for the sake of others in a similar way to their suffering of pain when they, in their present life, sacrifice their body for others. This is quite clearly expressed in ŚS 280f, which quotes from the Vajradhvaja-sūtra: I have the courage in all misfortunes belonging to all worlds, to experience every abode of pain. (…) I resolve to abide in each single state of misfortune through numberless future ages (…) for the salvation of all creatures. And why so? Because it is better indeed that I alone be in pain, than that all those creatures fall into the place of misfortune. There I must give myself in bondage, and all the world must be redeemed from the wilderness of hell (…) and I for the good of all creatures would experience all the mass of pain and unhappiness in this my own body: and on account of all creatures I give surety for all creatures (…).22

It is, however, not clear how the Bodhisattva removes or at least alleviates the suffering of those in the hells by sharing their lot. Will he teach the Dharma? Or is it the idea to take their negative karma and the resulting painful punishments upon himself? In other words, is the idea not just to transfer one’s merit to others but to exchange it against their demerit? Given the notion of exchanging self and others, will we have to interpret BCA 8:10723 in the sense of taking upon oneself the suffering of the denizens in hell and thus absorbing their negative karma? Is this what Śāntideva has in mind when he says in vs. 10:56: “May all the sufferings of the world ripen in me, and may the world be happy through all the good deeds of the Bodhisattvas!”?24 A third type of descending into hell is the appearance of major Bodhisattvas in the hells, who by means of their sheer presence transform 21  “What we do for them, for whose sake they dismember their bodies, even enter Avīci, the lowest hell, is well done. This is why, in every manner, one should do only good even to one’s greatest enemies.” 22  Bendall, Rouse 1922, 256f. 23  “Those Bodhisattvas, whose mental continuum is fully developed in this manner and what they are devoted to is nothing but the suffering of others, plunge into the worst of hells like wild geese into a cluster of lotuses.” 24  The commentaries I could access were not helpful in this respect. But this is clearly how Crosby and Skilton interpret vs. 10:56: “The author here expresses the intention of suffering the consequences of the evil actions of others to save them from that suffering” (Śāntideva 1995, 191).

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ultimate horror into bliss and – as we can see in vs. 10:13 – by their ability to arouse bodhicitta in the hearts of the victims of torture. Verses 10:11-15 seem to be composed on the model of Avalokiteśvara’s descent into hell in the influential Kāraṇḍavyūha-sūtra (1:2).25 Upon entering Avīci hell, Avalokiteśvara extinguishes all fires and replaces the infernal cooking pot with a lovely lotus pool. Thus the Bodhisattva does not experience any harm himself. This obviously also applies to all the Bodhisattvas who Śāntideva wishes to enter hell in vss. 11-15. In BCA 8:107f, Śāntideva suggests that entering Avīci hell is a delight for those who find their happiness in helping others. But this is apparently not what he means in vss. 10:11-15. Here the appearance of the Bodhisattvas removes all infernal threats before they become harmful. Nor is his idea that the major Bodhisattvas are untouched by the horrors of hells because they realize their illusionary nature. The idea is rather that their own supernatural abilities give them the power over the infernal outcomes of negative karma, so that these can neither afflict the Bodhisattvas nor the denizens of hell. But this raises a problem. If the major Bodhisattvas are perfect in compassion and exclude nobody, why should it take the dedication of Śāntideva’s merit to cause their appearance in hell? As far as I can see, commentators ignore this problem or present rather scholastic and rationalistic explanations, as for example Kunzang Pelden. He explains the appearance of the Bodhisattvas in hell as being an apparition, a vision that arises in the mind of the denizens in hell due to three factors: the merit of the great Bodhisattvas, a devotional act directed towards the respective Bodhisattvas in the past lives of the denizens of hell, which gave them access to the Bodhisattvas’ merit, and Śāntideva’s dedication of his own merit to them.26 Should we really assume that this is what Śāntideva had in mind? I am not persuaded. And it would still leave the question unanswered of why it takes Śāntideva’s merit to make this happen. Perhaps we should better read Śāntideva’s glorious scenario as his own vision, as a sort of eschatological utopian hope expressed in Mahāyāna imagery, a hope comparable to the similar visions in Isaiah 6527 or the Book of Revelation 21.28 The extinction 25

 See Thomas 1952, 72-75; Studholme 2002, 122.  Pelden 2007, 407-409. 27  Śāntideva’s wish “May all animals lose their fear of being eaten by each other” (vs. 10:17a) immediately evokes associations of Isaiah 65:25: “The wolf and the lamb will feed together, and the lion will eat straw like the ox, and dust will be the serpent’s food.” 28  Compare BCA 10:33b: “May they always live happy! May even the word ‘death’ disappear!” with Revelation 21:4: “He will wipe away every tear from their 26

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of hell would be the extinction of utmost evil. By means of his dedicatory prayer, Śāntideva shows how seriously he is committed to this ideal and how well aware he is that its realization far exceeds his own capabilities. He can only rely on the forces of good, which he hopes to come from beyond. The sober core to his utopian imaginaire would be his firm conviction that evil – in all of its forms and consequences – can and will be defeated by bodhicitta and compassion, “the mother of deliverance.” Hoping for the impossible becomes possible if such hope rests on the confidence that, at the level of ultimate reality, all beings are essentially released. Hans-Joachim Klimkeit has raised the question of whether the Mahāyāna Buddhist belief in a Bodhisattva’s descent into hell may have been influenced by the Christian doctrine of Christ’s descent into hell between his death and resurrection.29 Given the Bodhisattva’s intention to work for the salvation of all beings, there may be no need to postulate an external influence. The idea of the Bodhisattvas’ descent to infernal regions could very well be the product of an inner-Buddhist development. In any case, the parallelism between a Bodhisattva’s and Christ’s descent is rather superficial. The motif of Christ’s descent into hell is already found in the second century. The idea is that, between the crucifixion and the resurrection, Christ delivered the patriarchs and righteous ones of the “Old Covenant” from a kind of dark state and led them to the full glory of the beatific vision to which they had no access before the crucifixion. Thus Christ did not descend into hell in order to redeem eyes, and death shall be no more, neither shall there be mourning, nor crying, nor pain anymore, for the former things have passed away,” which is influenced by Isaiah 25:8a: “He will swallow up death for all time, And the Lord GOD will wipe tears away from all faces (…).” 29  Klimkeit 1998, 191f. Klimkeit refers to E.B. Cowell’s theory, published in 1879, that the account of Avalokiteśvara’s descent into hell in the Kāraṇḍavyūha-sūtra may have been influenced by the apocryphal Gospel of Nicodemus via mediation by Manicheans. More recent scholarship tends to regard the part of the Gospel of Nicodemus recording Christ’s descent to hell to be a later addition (after the 6th cent.; see Röder 2010). This would not exclude that this part of the text may have existed earlier as a separate text (see James 1926, 95, 117). On the basis of linguistic observations made by N. Dutt and A. Mette, Studholme (2002, 12f) assumes that the prose version of the Kāraṇḍavyūha-sūtra was probably composed in the 4th cent. CE. Its earliest written fragments can be dated as older than 630 CE. Therefore any influence through the Gospel of Nicodemus is very unlikely. This does not entirely rule out an influence by Christian ideas, or by a text that later became part of the Gospel of Nicodemus, but there is no conclusive evidence either. And the parallel, I suggest, seems too weak to make such influence likely.

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all of the “lost” beings, but only those who – strangely enough – deserved to become partakers of grace. This doctrinal development is more indicative of a deviation from the spirit of Christ as it is found in the New Testament. In the Gospels and the letters of Paul, Jesus proclaims the all-embracing, non-exclusive mercy of God, to which he testifies by the sacrifice of his own life, asking God to forgive even those who are guilty of his execution. This spirit resonates much more with the universal compassion expressed in the Bodhisattva ideal than the later notion of Christ’s decent into hell. TRANSLATION: 10:19-50 19. May the blind see colors and forms, the deaf always hear, and may the pregnant give birth without throes as queen Māyā did! 20. May [the needy] receive clothing, food and drink, garlands, sandalwood and jewelry, everything they long for as conducive to their well-being! 21. May not only the timid be fearless, those oppressed by grief find joy, but also the anxious be free of anxiety and resolute! 22. May health belong to the ill ones, may they be freed from all fetters! May the weak be strong and loving each other! 23. May all regions prove favorable for all on the roads! May what they set off to do be expediently accomplished! 24. May also those embarked on ships reach their expectations! May they arrive safely on shore and then rejoice with their relatives! 25. May those fallen upon wrong paths in the forest wilderness encounter a caravan, and may they travel without fatigue, fearless of robbers, tigers or other threats! 26. May the gods grant protection in the perils of illness, wilderness and the like, to the sleeping, the insane and the careless, to helpless children and the elderly! 27. May they always be free of all unfavorable states, gifted with faith, insight and compassion, perfect in appearance and behavior, aware of their previous births! 28. May they have as many inexhaustible treasures as the Bodhisattva Gaganagañja! May they be in harmony, without despair and independent! 29. May also beings of poor energy be greatly energetic! May the deformed ascetics be of perfect beauty! 30. May whatever women there are in the world become men! May the lowly attain high positions but still not be arrogant!

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31. May all beings without exception through this merit of mine desist from all sins and always do what is wholesome. 32. Not lacking the spirit of awakening, devoted to the course towards awakening, and embraced by the Buddhas out of reach of the workings of Māra, the tempter, 33. may all these beings [when human] have an immeasurably long life! May they always live happy! May even the word “death” disappear! 34. May also all regions of the world give delight with copses of wish-granting trees, enchanting with the sound of the Teaching (dharma) and filled with Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. 35. May the ground everywhere be free of gravel and such like, smooth like the palm of a hand, soft and made of beryl. 36. May the circles (maṇḍala) of large assemblies of Bodhisattvas be seated everywhere, may they adorn the earth with their radiance! 37. May all creatures hear without ceasing the sound of the Teaching from the birds, from every tree, from the rays of the sun, and from the sky! 38. May they always attain communion with Buddhas and Buddha-Sons and worship the Teacher of the world with clouds of offerings! 39. May the god let it rain at the right time, may harvests be plentiful! And may the people be prosperous, the king righteous! 40. May also the healing plants be potent, the spells of the mutterers effective! May the Ḍākinī witches, the Rākṣasa demons, and other harmful beings be filled with compassion! 41. May not any being be unhappy, sinful and sick, abandoned or despised, and may none be evil-minded! 42. May the monasteries flourish, replete with reciting and study! May the community’s (saṅgha) integrity last forever, and may the community’s affairs be successful! 43. May the monks find solitude and love the precepts! May they meditate with pliable minds, free of all distraction! 44. May the nuns receive support free of quarrels and troubles, and may all who renounce the world likewise be of unbroken morals! 45. May the misbehaved be dismayed and ever gratified by ceasing to sin, and may they, winning a good state, not break their resolve when there! 46. May they be learned and cultured, receiving gifts, living on alms, may they be of pure mental flow, their reputation famed in all regions! 47. May the world, without enduring the suffering in miserable states and without the arduous practices [of a bodhisattva calling] reach buddhahood with a single divine body! 48. May all the perfected Buddhas be worshiped in many ways by all beings! May they through the inconceivable bliss of the Buddhas be exceedingly happy!

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49. May the wishes of the Bodhisattvas for the world be fulfilled! May what these protectors intend for the beings be accomplished! 50. May the Solitary Buddhas be happy and the Hearers, forever venerated by respectful gods, demigods and humans!

COMMENTARY 3. For Those on the Good Plains of Existence Śāntideva now extends his dedication to those who live on the better plains of samsaric existence. At first, the movement is still an ascending one and so he begins with those human beings who have a less lucky (karmic) lot, who are suffering from physical handicaps, illnesses, anxieties and griefs, or are weak and poor (vss. 19-22). He wishes that they attain what they lack and make proper use of it, as in the case of the weak, who he wishes not just to become strong but also kind and loving – a wish that is paralleled by vs. 30b, where he wants the lowly to attain a higher social position without becoming arrogant. It is the general tendency of this section to wish that human beings not only get physically, mentally, economically and socially better off, but also ethically right: “May they be in harmony, without despair and independent!” (vs. 28b) or “May all beings … desist from all sins and always do what is wholesome” (vss. 31). Śāntideva thus remains faithful to his conviction that true happiness is only found in altruism. That such wishes have practical implications is quite explicit when he says (vs. 41): “May not any being be unhappy, sinful and sick, abandoned or despised, and may none be evil-minded!” It is a practical task to care for those who are unhappy, sick, abandoned or despised, and to seek to better those who are sinful and evil-minded. Śāntideva is sensitive to the many unpredictable vicissitudes of human life. He wishes that medicine and spells work if one gets ill (vs. 40a). Witches or demons should become well-minded so that no harm comes from them (vs. 40b). He wishes protection to all who are in danger because they are travelling (vs. 23-25), or helpless like the insane, children or the elderly, or simply because they are sleeping or careless (vs. 26). Śāntideva wishes success to merchants (vs. 23), and to farmers a ground free of gravel (vs. 35). He envisages the ecological, economic and political dimensions of society when he says “May the god let it rain at the right time, may harvests be plentiful! And may the people be prosperous, the king righteous!” (vs. 39). This verse shows that the Bodhisattva ethic is by no means

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confined to an individualistic perspective, but is also concerned about the well-being of a society as a whole. Verse 39 is almost exactly identical to vs. 17 of the Pāli Mahā Jayamaṅgala Gāthā,30 which even found entry, as its coda, into the constitution of present day Sri Lanka.31 But Śāntideva not only envisages society. His vision also embraces nature. He wishes nature to testify to the Dharma in its own peculiar ways, so that the truth can be recognized in the sound of the birds,32 in the trees, the sunlight and the sky (vs. 34, 37). He imagines the world being filled with Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, and invokes the symbolism of the maṇḍala, which in Buddhist iconography represents the micro–macro cosmos scheme that sees the world, as well as each individual, permeated by the spirit of the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas (vs. 36). Having, throughout the BCA, repeatedly warned how rare and precious the opportunity to meet a Buddha is, Śāntideva now wishes this lucky chance to become a persistent and never-ending possibility (vs. 38). 30

 Compare BCA 10:39: devo varṣatu kālena sasyasaṃpattir astu ca sphīto bhavatu lokaś ca rājā bhavatu dhārmikaḥ with the Pāli verse Mahā Jayamaṅgala Gāthā 17: devo vassatu kālena sassa sampatti hotu ca phīto bhavatu loko ca rājā bhavatu dhammiko; Gunaratana 2008, 52. This striking parallel can only be explained either by direct borrowing or a dependence of both texts on an earlier joint source. As far as the second possibility is concerned, I am not aware of any such possible text (perhaps it has not yet been identified, or is lost). Regarding the first possibility, it appears that Mahā Jayamaṅgala Gāthā 17 is younger than the BCA. Verse 10:39 is also found in the Dūn-huáng version (= 9:47; personal communication by Akira Saito). Heinz Bechert has shown that the BCA was known, quoted and appreciated in medieval Sri Lanka. The earliest instance seems to be the quotation of BCA 5:12 and 6:41 by Guruḷugōmī (12th cent.) in the Dharmapradīpikāva (Bechert 2005, 71). If the concluding verses of Mahā Jayamaṅgala Gāthā (which contain vs. 17) are younger than the 12th cent., it seems very likely that they are based on BCA 10:39. In both cases the context is the dedication of merit. (I am grateful to Sven Bretfeld for his help in clarifying the possible relation between the two texts.) 31  The Constitution 2015, 177. It is not without some irony that this verse is likely to have originated from the BCA and thus from a Mahāyāna source – even if the verse itself is free of any Mahāyāna particulars. 32  The idea might be inspired by the smaller Sukhāvatīvyūha-sūtra (§ 11); see above, pp. 498f, fn. 16.

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He then proceeds to the Sangha, whose foremost task is to teach the Dharma. To a large extent, his wishes for the order reflect Śāntideva’s deep concerns about the Sangha’s actual state, as became apparent in chapter 8.33 The monasteries shall be places of recitation and study (vs. 42, 46), but the monks should not abandon the practice of solitary meditation (vs. 43). Morality and compliance with the precepts shall be high (vss. 43-45). Gifts and alms shall not endanger the purity of the monks’ motivation (vs. 46). The order shall flourish in unity and integrity (vss. 42) so that it can successfully live up to its task (vs. 42), without the impediment of an ill reputation (vs. 46). Śāntideva also mentions the order of nuns, wishing it the necessary support and freedom from “quarrels and troubles” (vs. 44). While there should be no doubt about the well-meaning nature of his wish, it nevertheless reflects the subordinate status of the order of nuns compared to monks. Vs. 44 is one of three places in this chapter where Śāntideva speaks of women. The other two are vs. 19b, where he wishes them the liberation from the pain of giving birth, and vs. 30a, where he wishes that they all shall become men. In my mind it would be unjustified to take the latter as another instance of male Buddhist misogyny. The immediate context of vs. 30b suggests a link with the lower social status of women, of which Śāntideva was well aware (see BCA 8:166f). Wishing that all females might become males might thus also be understood as wishing them to be liberated from their subordinate social role so that they can attain the higher and better position of males. However, I suppose the main motive behind this wish is to be seen in the Bodhisattva ideal itself. While earlier canonical texts confirm that women can achieve awakening (as arhats) in their female bodies (which was the main reason why the Buddha finally agreed to establish the order of nuns), it is also affirmed that a Buddha always has to be male. This is not merely due to the doctrine of the thirty-two special physical marks of a Buddha, to which hidden male genitals belong. Behind this idea stands the ancient conviction that all major figures in the world must be male: the political ruler of the human word (cakravartin), the ruler of the gods: Śakra (= Indra), as well as the high god Brahmā, but also Māra, the powerful antagonist of the Buddha, and finally, the Buddha himself.34 Given that in Mahāyāna Buddhism, the ultimate religious end shifted from arhatship to Buddhahood, it is more or less inevitable that females become 33 34

 See above, Part II, chap. 8, pp. 354f, 394f.  See, for example, MN 115:15.

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male, at least in their final body, in order to become Buddhas. Given that a Bodhisattva is by definition someone who strives to become a Buddha, Śāntideva’s wish that all women become men is thus an implication of his broader wish that all sentient beings follow the Bodhisattva path (vss. 1, 3, 32) and finally reach Buddhahood (vss. 47).35 For the remaining five higher destinies,36 Śāntideva reverses the direction, now following the degree of perfection in descending order. There is nothing he can wish for the Buddhas except that they be worshiped by all beings. This is, of course, not for the sake of the Buddhas but of the sentient beings, that they, too, may attain to the perfect bliss of the Buddhas (vs. 48). He wishes for the Bodhisattvas that their aim of liberating all beings may indeed be fulfilled (vs. 49). He does not have much to say about the Solitary Buddhas and the Hearers (śrāvaka), apart from wishing them happiness and to be the object of respectful veneration by gods, demigods and humans. This would give their (from a Mahāyāna perspective) rather selfish happiness at least some kind of beneficial role (vs. 50). As we have seen, Śāntideva’s overall wish is that all sentient beings become Bodhisattvas (vss. 1, 3), which he repeats in vs. 32. In vs. 27 he specifies this by wishing all beings the three virtues: faith (śraddhā), insight/wisdom (prajñā) and compassion (kṛpā).37 Throughout the BCA we have encountered astonishing parallels between the teaching of Śāntideva and the theology of Paul. Indeed, this triad of faith, insight and compassion virtually calls for its comparison with Paul’s famous triad of faith (pistis), hope (elpis), and love (agapē), as is found in 1 Cor. 13:13 and in 1 Thess. 1:3 and 5:8. To Paul, hope and love are both deeply interconnected with faith. In Gal. 5:6 Paul speaks of “faith working through love” – expressing a relationship that James Dunn has described as a “close association,” as 35  The wish that all reach Buddhahood without effort and within just one further paradisiacal rebirth (“with a single divine body” 5 one more celestial embodiment) parallels the famous vows of the Bodhisattva Dharmakara (the later Buddha Amitābha) that all beings, by relying on him, shall gain rebirth in his future Buddha land (Sukhāvatī) and achieve full awakening there without any further effort. The wish that all women shall become men (vs. 30a) is also part of Dharmakara’s vows (see Gómez 1996, 74) and is, in a similar form, also mentioned in ŚS 175. See above, pp. 498f, fn. 16. 36  See above, p. 494, fn. 6. 37  Śāntideva uses kṛpā (and variants) in BCA 2:6, 51f; 5:79, 84; 6:124, 126, 130; 7:28; 8:104; 9:76, 10:27, and karuṇā (and variants) in 2:27; 5:87; 6:21; 8:146; 10:14, 40. Other terms used for “compassion” are anukampamāna (2:6) and variants of dayā (5:56, 67; 6:38, 123; 8.105, 110, 117; 10:13). See Viévard 2002, 296.

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“faith-through-love” and “love-energized-faith.”38 Hope is understood as an inner dimension of faith. As much as the process of salvation begins in and through the life of faith (e.g. Rom. 1:16-17), Paul also says that we are saved “in hope” (Rom. 8:24). Faith means to follow the example of Abraham and rely on God, which now, after Christ, means trusting in God by relying on God’s revelation in and through Jesus. Hope is that element of faith that trusts in God’s faithfulness, especially regarding the eschatological fulfilment of God’s promise. In both of its dimensions, that is, love and hope, faith is equivalent to a new birth or new creation,39 so that “in Christ Jesus you are all children of God through faith” (Gal. 3:26). Yet despite the central position of faith, Paul judges love to be “greatest” (1 Cor. 13:13), since without love, faith would be nothing (1 Cor. 13:2). The elevated position Paul gives to love has probably two reasons: First, love is the fulfilment of the law (Gal. 5:13f; Rom. 13:8-10) and as such, given Paul’s Jewish background, it is the essence of keeping God’s covenant. Second, love is the “law of Christ” (Gal. 6:2), it is God’s own love which has appeared in Christ and been poured into the hearts of the faithful by the divine Spirit (Rom. 5:5-6). It is through love that the new selfless identity, the “Christ in us,” takes shape (Gal. 2:19-20).40 In Śāntideva’s triad there is a strong connection between insight and compassion. As we have seen, compassion is the seed41 and the prime fruit of insight/wisdom.42 In ŚS 286, compassion is even called the one Bodhisattva virtue that implies all others, and hence it also includes insight. This gives it a similarly elevated position to that of love in the theology of Paul. Buddhist compassion and Christian love have much in common and resonate with one another strongly; this has been a recurrent finding throughout this study of the BCA. But what is the role of faith in Śāntideva’s thought? In the BCA there is only one other verse where Śāntideva mentions śraddhā. In vs. 4:15 he speaks of the rare opportunity to obtain a human rebirth after one has fallen into the hells, and the even rarer chance of obtaining “the appearance of a Buddha, faith (śraddhā), 38

 Dunn 1998, 638.  See above, Part II, chap. 1, p. 122. 40  See also Söding 1992, 166f, 170-172. 41  Inasmuch as the bodhicitta, the compassionate spirit of awakening, is the driving force behind the perfection of all the pāramitās issuing into the perfection of wisdom (prajñāpāramitā); see BCA 9:1. The metaphor of the “seed” for the compassionate spirit of awakening is found in BCA 1:26. 42  See BCA 9:53. 39

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(…) and the ability to continue in doing what is wholesome.” This is reminiscent of the ancient doctrinal scheme of the Buddhist path of salvation,43 to which Śāntideva also alludes in BCA 1:5.44 This verse begins with the words: “A Tathāgata appears in the world (…) teaches the Dharma (…) reveals a holy life (…).” The Buddha’s appearance bears fruit in that “a householder (…) hears that Dharma” and “on hearing the Dharma acquires faith in the Tathāgata.” In and from such faith he decides to leave the world and strive for nirvana by following the Buddhist path. “Faith” therefore stands at the very beginning of the Buddhist path of salvation and accompanies it up to the point of one’s own awakening. This is in line with how Śāntideva refers to faith in the ŚS. Faith is placed even before the development of bodhicitta, as Śāntideva says in the second kārikā of the ŚS: “when one desires to make an end of pain and go to the end of joy, one must make firm the root of faith, and fix the spirit firmly on enlightenment.”45 And with the words of the Ratna-ulka-dhāraṇī, he calls faith “the guide, the mother, the producer, the protector and increaser of all virtues” (ŚS 2).46 Thus, while compassion is the completion and perfection of all virtues, faith is seen as their root or seed, planted by the healing work of the Buddha and cultivated by the practitioner until it reaches its fulfilment in insight and compassion. Towards the end of the ŚS (316-318), Śāntideva comes back to the triad of faith, insight and compassion, the latter replaced here by “loving kindness” (maitrī). Faith is defined as confidence in the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, but also as belief in their teachings, including the teaching of emptiness (ŚS 317). Wisdom signifies one’s own individual insight in the truth of these teachings (ibid.). And loving kindness/compassion is once more elevated, in a way that is strikingly reminiscent of 1 Cor. 13:1-13: Innumerable offerings of many kinds, As many as there are in a hundred billion trillion fields, When always offered to the best among humans – They all don’t add up to as much as a thought of lovingkindness.47

Thus while we can recognize a somewhat analogous position of faith and love/compassion in the triads of Paul and Śāntideva, there is a noticeable difference between hope and insight/wisdom. At first sight, it appears 43

 E.g. DN 2; 3; MN 27; 38.  See above, Part II, chap. 1, p. 117. 45  Bendall; Rouse 1922, 3. 46  Ibid. 47  ŚS 318; translation from Goodman 2016, 296. 44

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as if wisdom is insignificant for Paul and that hope plays no role for Śāntideva. But this is a misleading impression. As we have seen above, the place of hope in Paul’s understanding of the life of Christ’s followers shows significant overlapping with Śāntideva’s conception of the Bodhisattva’s vigor, especially with regard to aviṣāda, the “lack of dejection” (see BCA 7:17-30).48 The “self-confidence” that Śāntideva evokes as the antidote against dejection, the opposite of hope, is not at all only reliance on one’s own illusionary “self.” It is the reliance on the power of bodhicitta that enables the Bodhisattva to overcome his despondency (see BCA 7:2930). And bodhicitta, as we are now aware, is closely connected to faith. Moreover, hope is not restricted to oneself. On the contrary, the Bodhisattva’s hope is primarily his hope for all suffering beings in all possible worlds. The BCA’s chapter 10 is a prime example of this dimension of hope. Such universal hope, the hope for the impossible, is not merely an expression of faith. It rests on the insight into the final well-being, the being released of all, at the level of ultimate reality.49 Faith translates such insight to the level of conventional reality and manifests it through the Bodhisattva’s all-embracing compassionate life. It is the reliance on the perfect compassion of the fully developed Bodhisattvas and Buddhas that gives the practitioner on the Bodhisattva path hope in the face of his or her otherwise hopeless entanglement in the defilements.50 Conversely, the topic of wisdom is by no means absent from the theology of Paul. It rather occupies a central position inasmuch as Paul understands Christ as “the wisdom of God” (1 Cor. 1:24) or “from God” (1 Cor. 1:30), which he distinguishes sharply from “human wisdom” or the “wisdom of this world” (1 Cor. 3:19), to which God’s wisdom appears as “foolishness” (1 Cor. 1:18-31). The love of God as it appeared in Christ’s merciful selflessness up to his death at the cross, his alleged weakness, is nothing that the power-oriented “rulers of this age” could understand; otherwise “they would not have crucified the Lord” (1 Cor. 2:6-8). Paul even indicates a dimension of apophasis to what he calls the “wisdom of God,” inasmuch as it relates to “what no eye has seen, nor ear heard, nor the human heart conceived…” (1 Cor. 2:9), or when he asks rhetorically: “For who has known the mind of the Lord so as to instruct him?” (1 Cor. 2:16; similarly Rom. 11:33f). 48

 See above, Part II, chap. 7, pp. 311-315, 327-329.  See above, Part II, chap. 3, p. 156; chap. 10, pp. 501f. 50  See above, Part II, chap. 2, pp. 149f; chap. 4, pp. 182-200. 49

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To be sure, Paul’s distinction of worldly and divine wisdom is in many respects very different from Śāntideva’s distinction between the two truths or realities. But it is akin to the general Buddhist distinction between ignorance or delusion, on the one hand, and wisdom or awakening, on the other. Paul’s designation of worldly wisdom as “foolishness” (morίa) brings it close to the Buddhist “delusion” (moha). One thing that both have in common is the suppression of transience. The worldly wisdom of the “rulers of this age” is foolish also because they are not aware that they “are doomed to perish” (1 Cor. 2:6). Whereas transience is the main feature of ordinary existence which, in the end, renders all worldly goals of power/wealth (artha) and sensual pleasure (kāma) futile, true wisdom points towards the “deathless,” whether this is conceived of as the unconceivable God or the unconceivable nirvana. Once more we encounter a strong analogy between the contrast of flesh and spirit in Paul, and that between the defilements and bodhicitta in Śāntideva.51 Living in the mode of the “flesh” means being chained to death, while living in the spirit sets one free “from the law of sin and of death” (Rom. 8:2-6). Similarly, the defilements are the “hunters” that keep one trapped in the samsaric world of birth and death (BCA 7:4), whereas bodhicitta is the “elixir that was created to eliminate death for the world (of beings)” (BCA 3:28). Toward the end of chapter 9, Śāntideva expresses his fervent desire to “bring peace” to those who lived “as if they would never grow old and die,” but will inevitably and painfully have to face death (BCA 9:166f). In chapter 10, he wishes that “even the word ‘death’ (may) disappear” (10:33) – a hope shared by Paul (1 Cor. 15:26) and expressed toward the end of the New Testament: “Death will be no more; mourning and crying and pain will be no more (…)” (Rev. 21:4). If Śāntideva’s hope embraces the whole world of sentient beings, it is also a hope that he entertains for himself. TRANSLATION: 10:51-58 51. May I myself through Mañjughoṣa’s grace always go forth and obtain awareness of my previous births up to the Joyful Stage of the Bodhisattvas! 52. May I spend time with strength in whatever posture! May I, in all my births, attain the conditions for dwelling in solitude! 53. May I see without obstruction only this protector, Mañjunātha, when I wish to see or ask something! 51

 See above, Part II, cap. 1, pp. 113f, 122-124; chap. 4, pp. 189f, 198f.

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54. Just as Mañjuśrī moves to accomplish the goal of all sentient beings to the end of space in the ten directions, may the same conduct be mine! 55. As far as space abides and as long as the world abides, may I abide, dispelling the sufferings of the world! 56. May all the sufferings of the world ripen in me, and may the world be happy through all the good deeds of the Bodhisattvas! 57. May the Teaching (śāsana), the single remedy for the suffering of the world, the fountainhead of all fulfilment and happiness, last for long, promoted and venerated! 58. I bow before Mañjughoṣa by whose grace my mind is set on the good. And I venerate the spiritual friend by whose grace it thrives.

COMMENTARY 4. Śāntideva Praying for Himself With the concluding verses Śāntideva is back to the markedly personal style of the BCA. But does this mean that he is now dedicating his merit to himself? This does not make much sense given the traditional Buddhist view that people are both “owners” and “heirs” of their karma (e.g. AN 5:57; 5:161). In other words, it is the normal course of events that one’s merit is for one’s own benefit and does not need any act of transfer or dedication. What Śāntideva does is dedicate his merit to his goal of completing the Bodhisattva path, which is – by definition – not for one’s own sake but for the sake of all other beings. It is a dedication of merit according to the transformation model, so that in the long run one’s merit will benefit others.52 And yet, Śāntideva is rather humble about his own achievements. In his wishes for his own spiritual development he relies more on the grace (vs. 51: parigraha, vs. 58: prasāda) of Mañjuśrī53 than on his own merit. Everything that he may want (and need) to learn should come from Mañjuśrī (vs. 53). Mañjuśrī is his great role model; he is the Bodhisattva who Śāntideva wishes to emulate (vs. 54). One last time, Śāntideva summarizes the Bodhisattva ideal (vs. 55): As far as space abides and as long as the world abides, may I abide, dispelling the sufferings of the world!

52

 See above, Part II, chap. 3, pp. 158-160.  Mañjughoṣa (= the Gentle Voiced) (vss. 51, 58) and Mañjunātha (= the Gentle Protector) (vs. 53) are both epithets for Mañjuśrī (= the holy Gentle One) (vs. 54). 53

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… and gives it an expression which in its radicalness bursts the boundaries of human imagination (vs. 56): May all the sufferings of the world ripen in me, and may the world be happy through all the good deeds of the Bodhisattvas!

Still Śāntideva remains sober about his own progress as he has achieved so far. He sees himself as someone who has not yet completed the first stage in the development of a Bodhisattva (vs. 51).54 Within the scheme of the ten Bodhisattva stages (bhūmi), the “Joyful” (pramuditā) stage is the first. It is characterized by the perfection of giving/generosity (dāna) and the tremendous joy arising from this.55 Śāntideva may feel that the spirit of awakening has arisen in him,56 but he is still far from that perfection of generosity that includes the joyful readiness to give even one’s own flesh (see BCA 7:25).57 Regarding his own development (vss. 51-52), he thus wishes to become a monk in all his future lives, or even to live the life of a forest-dwelling hermit (a persuasion he praised so strongly in BCA 8:288). He prays for gaining all spiritual powers (see BCA 7:31-66) and the recollection of his previous lives, which is traditionally associated with the awakening of a Buddha and of an arhat.58 But for all this he depends on the support of his chosen Bodhisattva Mañjuśrī and the instruction of his personal master (kalyāṇamitra = “spiritual friend”) (vs. 58). They, like all 54  Given this “confession” it is a bit surprising that Crosby and Skilton interpret BCA 10 as an indication of the tremendous progress of the Bodhisattva: “Now he even has the power to transform the hells of cyclic existence with the glory of the various celestial Bodhisattvas” (Śāntideva 1995, 134). They try to resolve this contradiction by the assumption that in chapter 10, “Śāntideva envisages (…) that the aspiring Bodhisattva has finally entered upon the first of the Bodhisattva stages (…)” (ibid. 135). But there is no indication in the chapter itself that vss. 1-50 are spoken by a Bodhisattva who is far advanced, whereas vss. 51-58 are the text of a sheer beginner. Especially vss. 55-56 seem to contradict such a reading. They rather show that the freshest beginner may already express his wish that no sentient being shall be excluded from liberation. 55  See also Candrakīrti’s MA, chapter 1, with which Śāntideva was presumably familiar. 56  According to MA 1, the generation of bodhicitta is the beginning of the first stage. Since it would contradict the entire BCA to assume that Śāntideva sees himself as someone who completely lacks bodhicitta, I suggest that what he has not yet reached (according to vs. 51) is the completion of the first stage. 57  See also MA 1:9. 58  Vs. 10:51 is also quoted in Vibhūticandra’s version of the legend. In the context of the legend, the quotation serves as a justification for Śāntideva’s recitation of a new text instead of a canonical Sūtra. In asking Mañjuśrī for his guidance on the way to awakening and the first stage of the path to full Buddhahood, Śāntideva is presented as a Buddha-to-be. The text, inspired by Mañjuśrī, appears as an anticipated Buddha-word. See above, Part I, chap. 2, pp. 43-46.

CHAPTER 10

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Bodhisattvas, are the mediators of the Buddhist teaching that Śāntideva praises as “the single remedy for the suffering of the world” and “the fountainhead of all fulfilment and happiness” (vs. 57). Earlier in the text (BCA 3:29), he used the same image of the “remedy” (bhaiṣajya) for bodhicitta, which to him is clearly the essence of the teaching. After all, it is his mind (mati) that is set on the good through the grace of Mañjuśrī and that is kept thriving through his master (vs. 58). As we have seen in the introductory part of this commentary, Śāntideva’s relation to Mañjuśrī plays a major role in all versions of the Śāntideva legend. Its prime function is to mark the BCA as a revealed text that was inspired directly and verbally by Mañjuśrī, perhaps in a fanciful elaboration of Śāntideva’s wish in vs. 53 to learn everything from him.59 Given Mañjuśrī’s traditional image as the Bodhisattva of wisdom, the legend’s ascription of the BCA to this Bodhisattva provides the text with an extraordinary supernatural nimbus. At the level of the text itself, it underlines the crucial and indispensable need of grace for one’s insight and one’s practice. The victory over the defilements, which is the inherent promise of bodhicitta, can only originate in the source of ultimate truth/reality, just as the defilements originate in delusion. The battlefield between the two is the human mind (see BCA 4:28-47). It is well known that the 14th Dalai Lama often cites the summary of the Bodhisattva’s mind in vs. 55 “as his greatest source of spiritual inspiration and strength.”60 A Christian will probably experience vs. 56 as most moving. Indeed, this verse resonates very strongly with the traditional Christian view that on the cross, Christ was bearing the suffering of the world. One does not have to subscribe to the interpretation of Jesus’ death in terms of a substitutionary atonement in order to share this sentiment. If the crucifixion is understood as an act that is representative instead of constitutive of divine grace, if it represents the faith that divine mercy is non-exclusive and extends to all sin, even if such sin causes the worst suffering,61 we can recognize the sound and striking correspondence between the Christ mind that the follower of Jesus is called to cultivate (Phil. 2:5) and the Buddha mind that the Bodhisattva strives to reflect. 59

 See above, Part I, chap. 2, especially 43-46.  Thupten Jinpa in his Introduction to T. Gyatso’s Commentary on BCA chapter 9 (see Gyatso 2005, p. ix). 61  See above, Part II, chap. 3, pp. 170-175. 60

APPENDIX

OUTLINE OF THE BODHICARYĀVATĀRA BY ERNST STEINKELLNER

1.

In Praise of the Spirit of Awakening (bodhicittānuśaṃsa) Object and purpose of this work (1:1- 3) The meaning of the spirit of awakening (1:4-14) Two types of the spirit of awakening (1:15-17) In praise of the spirit of awakening (1:18-36)

2.

Confession of Sins (pāpadeśanā) Bodhisattva ritual (2:1-3:33) 1. Extolment (2:1) 2. Offering (2:2-25) 3. Refuge (2:26) 4. Admission of sins (2:27-66)

3.

Adopting the Spirit of Awakening (bodhicittaparigraha) 5. Joyful approval of goodness (3:1-3) 6. Request for instruction (3:4) 7. Request to stay (3:5) 8. Offering of merit (3:6-9) Self–surrender (3:10-21) Bringing forth of the spirit of awakening (3:22-23) Praise of its being brought forth (3:24-33)

4.

Vigilant Care for the Spirit of Awakening (bodhicittāpramāda) Responsibility of a bodhisattva (4:1-12) Value of life (4:13-26) Destruction of the defilements (4:27-48)

5.

Preserving Circumspection (saṃprajanyarakṣaṇa) Guarding the mind (5:1-17) Mindfulness and circumspection (5:18-58) The body (5:59-70) Code of conduct (5:71-102) Sources (5:103-107) Circumspection (5:108-109)

518

APPENDIX

6.

The Perfection of Patience (kṣāntipāramitā) Hate (6:1-8) Patience (6:9-75) 1. Endurance of suffering (6:9-21) 2. Endurance of injustice (6:22-51) 3. Endurance because of realizing the Teaching (6:52-75) Envy (6:76-98) Enemies are benefactors (6:99-111) Love for all sentient beings (6:112-134)

7.

The Perfection of Vigor (vīryapāramitā) Introduction (7:1-2) The opposites (7:3-15) The aids of vigor (7:16) Lack of dejection (7:17-30) The powers (7:31-75) Right desire (7:33-46a) Self-confidence (7:46b–61) Joy (7:62-65) Letting go (7:66) Full dedication (7:67-73) Self-control (7:74-75)

8.

The Perfection of Absorption (dhyānapāramitā) Introduction (8:1) Renunciation of the world (8:2-3) Seclusion of the body (8:4-38) Renunciation of love and false friendship (8:5-16) Renunciation of greed for profit and fame (8:17-25) Life in the wilderness (8:26-38) Seclusion of the mind (8:39-88) The passion of the flesh (8:40-88) Contemplation (8:89-158) The sameness of others and oneself (8:90-103) On suffering through compassion (8:104-110) The exchange of others and oneself (8:111-158) Treating one’s own body (8:159-186)

9.

The Perfection of Insight (prajñāpāramitā) Introduction (9:1) Two types of reality (9:2-5) Definition (9:2) People are different due to their level of cognition (9:3-5) Rebuttal of Buddhist realism (9:6-15a)

APPENDIX

519

Rebuttal of Buddhist idealism (9:15b–30) The Madhyamaka manner of thinking (9:31-57) The nature of the Buddha and the meaning of his worship (9:36-40) The authenticity of the Mahāyāna (9:41-44) The inadequacies of the Śrāvakayāna (9:45-52) Fear of emptiness is inappropriate (9:53-57) The establishment of emptiness (9:58-151) The notion “I” has no object such as a substantially real and permanent self (9:58-78) The I is not physical (9:58-60) The I is not consciousness – against the Sāṅkhya (9:61-68) The I is not an unconscious soul connected with cognition – against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika (9:69-70) Rebuttal of undesired consequences if one does not accept a permanent self (9:71-78) The causality of action is possible without an I (9:71-75) Development of compassion is possible without an I (9:76-78) Establishing the lack of intrinsic nature in all factors (9:79-151) Through the four applications of mindfulness (9:79-116) to the body (9:79-88) to the sensations (9:89-102) to the mind (9:103-106a) to the factors (9:106b) These applications of mindfulness do not undermine the teaching of two realities (9:107-116) Through arguments (9:117-151) The arguments from non-arising (9:117-145) Factors do not arise by themselves without a cause (9:117-118) Factors do not arise from an eternal cause (9:119-141) not from God – against the Nyāya (9:119-121) not from God accompanied by other causes (9:122-126) not from atoms – against the Vaiśeṣika and the Mīmāṃsā (9:127a) not from the eternal primordial matter – against the Sāṅkhya (9:127b–141) Summary (9:142-145) The argument from arising as existent and as non-existent (9:146-151) Summary (9:152-154) Final Exhortation (9:155-168) 10. Transference of Merit (pariṇāmanāpariccheda)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Translations Śāntideva (1971), Entering the Path of Enlightenment: The Bodhicaryavatara of Śāntideva, transl. by Marion L. Matics (Collection of representative works: Indian series / UNESCO ed.), London: George Allen & Unwin. Śāntideva (1981), Eintritt in das Leben zur Erleuchtung (Bodhicaryāvatāra), transl. by Ernst Steinkellner, Düsseldorf – Köln: Eugen Diederichs Verlag. Shantideva (1993), A Guide to the Bodhisattva’s Way of Life, transl. by Stephen Batchelor (6th reprint), Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives. Shāntideva (2006), The Way of the Bodhisattva, transl. by The Padmakara Translation Group (rev. edn.), Boston – London: Shambhala. Śāntideva (1995), The Bodhicaryāvatāra, transl. by Kate Crosby, Andrew Skilton, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Śāntideva (1997) A Guide to the Bodhisattva Way of Life, transl. by Vesna A. Wallace; Alan B. Wallace, Ithaca (NY): Snow Lion Publications. Shantideva (2004), Engaging in Bodhisattva Behavior, transl. by Alexander Berzin. Online at: http://www.berzinarchives.com/web/x/nav/group. html_1487505749.html

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Commentaries Amtzis, Judith S.; Deweese, John, eds. (2004), Drops of Nectar. Kenpo Kunpal’s Commentary on Shantideva’s Entering the Conduct of the Bodhisattvas. With Oral Explanations by Dzogchen Khenpo Chöga. 5 vols. Compiled and translated by Andreas Kretschmar, Version: February 2004, Online at: http://www.kunpal.com Brunnhölzl, Karl (2004), The Center of the Sunlit Sky. Madhyamaka in the Kagyü Tradition. Including a Translation of Pawo Rinpoche’s Commentary on the Knowledge Section of Śāntideva’s The Entrance to the Bodhisattva’s Way of Life (Bodhicaryāvatāra), Ithaca (NY) – Boulder (CO): Snow Lion Publications. Chödrön, Pema (2005), No Time to Lose: A Timely Guide to the Way of the Bodhisattva, commentary on Shantideva’s Guide to the Bodhisattva’s Way of Life, Boston: Shambhala. Gyatso, Geshe Kelsang (1986), Meaningful to Behold. A Commentary to Shantideva’s Guide to the Bodhisattva’s Way of Life, London: Tharpa Publications. Gyatso, Tenzin. The 14th Dalai Lama (2005), Practicing Wisdom: The Perfection of Shantideva’s Bodhisattva Way, transl. by Geshe Thupten Jinpa, Boston: Wisdom Publications. — (2009), For the Benefit of all Beings. A Commentary on The Way of the Bodhisattva, transl. by The Padmakara Translation Group (revd. edn. of: A Flash of Lightning in the Dark of Night, 1994), Boston – London: Shambala. — (2009b), Transcendent Wisdom, ed. by. B. Alan Wallace, Boulder: Snow Lion. Khenchen Thrangu Rinpoche (2002), A Guide to the Bodhisattva’s Way of Life of Shantideva. Translated by Ken Holmes and Thomas Doctor, Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications. Pelden, Kunzang (2007), The Nectar of Manjushri’s Speech. A Detailed Commentary on Shantideva’s Way of the Bodhisattva, transl. by The Padmakara Translation Group, Boston London: Shambhala. Sazang Mati Panchen (2006), A Commentary on Shantideva’s Engaging in the Conduct of the Bodhisattvas. Translated by Lama Kalsang Gyaltsen and Ani Kunga Chodron, New York: Tsechen Kunchab Ling.

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Sharma, Parmananda (2012), Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra. Original Sanskrit text with English translation and exposition based on Prajnākaramati’s Panjikā, New Delhi: Aditya Prakashan, 3rd reprint of the 1990 edition. Tobden, Geshe Yeshe (2005), The Way of Awakening. A Commentary on Shantideva’s Bodhicaryavatara. Foreword by His Holiness the Dalai Lama, Boston: Wisdom Publications. Vallée Poussin, Louis de La, ed. (1901-1914), Bodhicaryāvatāra-pañjikā. Prajñākaramati’s Commentary on the Bodhicaryāvatāra of Śāntideva (Bibliotheca Indica 150, 7 fascicles), Calcutta: Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal.

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INDEX OF SCRIPTURAL REFERENCES

Buddhist Scriptures Abhidharmakośa 4:1 336 Abhidharmakośabhāṣya 3:58f 332 3:59ac 337 3:59cd 336 6:14cd 455 6:16 455 7:13 455 7:26 455

332

Abhisamayālaṅkāra 1:10:8 64 Acintyastava 1 38 45 59

148 279, 513 259 399 319 279 224 397 424 279 156 115

Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra see Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra

486 486 486 431 486

Avadānaśataka 36 131

Ākāśagarbha-sūtra 9, 238 Akṣayamati-sūtra

5:129 5:161 5:162 5:192 6:55 6:63 6:107-116 8:39 9:42-51 10:60 10:95 10:121

61, 169

Aṅguttaranikāya 1:205 319 3:37 205, 331 3:55/56 487 3:62 278-279 3:68 149, 257, 365 3:136 276 4:36 368 4:45 208 4:87 279 4:138 357 5:57 513 5:103 279

Avataṃsaka-sūtra 39 (Gaṇḍavyūha-sūtra) 61, 119, 142-143, 222, 321, 392 Bhaiṣajyaguruvaiḍūryaprabharāja-sūtra 143, 498 Bhikṣuprakīrṇaka 301 Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā / Pañjikā XX, 66, 75, 205, 491 174, 23-25 XXIII 210, 5-10 429 210, 25 429 281, 22f 66 Bodhisattvabhūmi 54, 212, 247 I:10,2,10,35-46 212

556

INDEX OF SCRIPTURAL REFERENCES

Bodhisattvaprātimokṣa

312

Bodhisattvayogācāracatuḥśatakaṭīkā 229f 366 Biyán Lù

17 22 23 27:9 32:7

399 204, 365 262, 378 43, 112, 117 498

197

Candrapradīpa-sūtra 353-354

Gaṇḍavyūha-sūtra see Avataṃsaka-sūtra

Caryā-pada 24

Guhyasamājatantra

Catuḥśataka 366 9:15 455

Heart Sūtra 79, 464-465

Catuḥstava Lokātītastava 4 453 Niraupamyastava 7 453 Daśabhūmika-sūtra 54 Dhammapada 79, 100-101, 115, 206, 213-214, 231, 397 1-43 206 1 205, 250 2 326 3-5 167 5 274 3:41 231 40 222 42 206 49 357 92f 458 129f 377 131f 397 218 458 Dharmasaṅgīti 104 Dharmasaṅgīti-sūtra 183, 297 Dīghanikāya 1:1:5-6 2 3 5 13

290 204, 353, 510 117, 204, 353, 510 35 206, 399

Itivuttaka 43 Jātaka 31 96 530 538 544

42

276, 458

36, 161, 165-166, 190, 209 209 325 205, 331-332 16, 41 331

Jātakamālā 53 Jōdo wasan 107 315 Kāraṇḍavyūha-sūtra 501-502 1:2 501

380, 385, 498,

Kāśyapa-parivarta 353 65 478 Kathāvatthu 20:3 337 23:3 332, 499 Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra lHan kar ma 7, 9 Lotus Sūtra 142 8:36-41 179 4 436

205

INDEX OF SCRIPTURAL REFERENCES

Madhyamakahṛdayavṛtti 3:222 473 Madhyamakāvatāra 53-54, 59, 63, 257, 258, 413 1 514 1:9 514 1:16 64 2:7 63 2:9 64 3 257 3:6 257 3:10 64 3:12 63, 64 6:1-97 XXII 6:8-170 59 6:8 471 6:22-44 59 6:23ff XXII 6:23 XXIII 6:29 XXIII 6:45-97 59 6:79a 435 6:85f 424 6:89 205 6:94f 424 6:95 63 6:104 471 6:112 431 6:114 471 6:117 450 6:118f 423 6:121 450 6:167 439 6:179 449 6:181-218 60 6:225 60 11:2 63 11:24 (12:15) 62 12:5-18 63 12:11 63 12:40-42 (11:49-51) 60 Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya XXII 62-63 63

557

Mahā Jayamaṅgala Gāthā 17 506 Mahāprajnāpāramitāśāstra 356 Mahāvagga of the Vinayapiṭaka 5:1:15-17 319 8:26:1-4 157, 161, 300 Mahāvastu 1:4-27 1:9 1:22 3:57f

54 331 205 331 366

Mahāyānasaṃgraha 216-217 8:23 216 Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkara 4:26 380 14:37-41 398 Majjhimanikāya 1:129 167 7 117, 399 8 213, 224 10 204, 223, 231, 355, 365 10:10 366 13 355, 365, 368 14 368 21 167, 274 22 232 22:37-39 290 26:5-12 368 27 204, 218, 223, 353, 510 28 167 38 117, 204, 223, 353, 510 49 25 51 262, 378 52 399 63 457 63:5 459 72 457

558 72:20 77 83 86 94 99 115:15 119 121 125 127 129 130 135

INDEX OF SCRIPTURAL REFERENCES

431 219, 434 399 167 262, 378 399 507 355 424 205 399 68, 186, 331, 334, 339 149, 205, 331, 334, 338 279

Milindapanha 179 2:2:1 378 4:1:62-66 279-280 25-28 455 46-48 452 72 452 80 335 320 179 321 168 Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 4, 51, 114, 423, 430 dedicatory verse 114, 418 1:1 466 1:4a 471 1:10 470 1:12 471 1:14 462 5:8 418 7 430 7:34 51, 270 13:8 92, 478 14:8b 462 18:6 460 18:7 418, 420 18:9 277, 418 24:9-11 417 24:9-10 XXIII 24:10 420 24:11 418, 477 24:18f 478

25:9 25:19-22 25:19 25:24

419 419 477 418

Pañjikā: see Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā Pāramitāsamāsa 53-54, 59-62, 258, 400 1:1 400 1:6-12 60 1:30 60 1:32 60 1:44 63 1:61 62 2:5-6 60 2:8 63 2:57 62 3 258 3:9 62 4:5-7 60 4:24 64 4:31 62 4:32-34 60 4:32 62 4:39 62 5 348 5:10 60 5:43 63 6:4 309 6:5 64 6:54-70 60 6:64f 60 6:64 60 Prajnāpāramitā-sūtra 54, 416, 435, 453, 491 Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajnāpāramitā-sūtra 357, 398 1:4 453 1:6 383 1:10 417 2:40f 51, 417 22:397 416 Aṣṭādaśasāhasrikā Prajnāpāramitāsūtra 21 491

INDEX OF SCRIPTURAL REFERENCES

Prajnāpāramitā-hṛdaya-sūtra 100 Pramāṇavārttika 147-190 195, 374 Praśāntaviniścayapratihārya-sūtra 132 Rāṣṭrapālaparipṛcchā-sūtra 166, 353-354, 357, 394, 453 Prologue 174f 453 29ff 354 30 357 Ratnacūḍa-sūtra 17f 433 Ratnagotravibhāga 5:18 17

Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra 9 215 Saṃyuttanikāya 326 1:5:10 455 5:47:19 397 5: 55:7 377 22:95 51, 231 22:87 438 36:21 279 54:9 370

Satyaka-parivarta 8 285

Ratnamegha-sūtra 164, 249 Ratnamegha-sūtra 249 Ratnarāśi 353 Ratna-ulka-dhāraṇī 510 419 455 42 366 366 430 365

Saddharmasmṛtyupasthāna 271, 332, 334, 340-341 Sagaramati-sūtra

Samantabhadra-praṇidhāna 142143, 154, 159 9 154 12 142, 159

Śatapancāśatka 68, 118 1:5 68

Ratnakūṭa-sūtra 478

Ratnāvalī 1:64 1:71 4:96 48-51 57-58 69-71 148-170

559

319

Samādhirāja-sūtra 353 35 379 Samādhisaṃgraha-sūtra

206

205,

Śikṣāsamuccaya 3, 9, 11, 17, 23, 25, 27, 38, 40, 47, 61, 111, 144, 238, 258, 285, 326 1 164 1:1 111 1:2 118 2 510 4 161 10 144 11 353-354 13 143 18-20 165 18 160 19 156 20 309, 312 21 42, 169 22ff 168 22 212 23 42, 168, 322 24 313 27 212, 326 29 168 34 164

560 47 64f 69-76 69 71f 71 77f 81 85 118 121f 122f 125 127 128f 143 145 147 153 155-157 155 157 158 160-164 164-168 164 165 167 168 174f 175 179-188 180-182 180 181f 183f 193 194-196 194-195 194 209ff 212-219 216-210 235 274 279f

INDEX OF SCRIPTURAL REFERENCES

160 151 332 332 205 337 365 365 132 205 205 222 183 225 224, 240 233 298 160 297 298 301 298 160 285 374 257 243-244, 285 248, 250 133, 249 498 498, 508 258 309, 314 261, 270 274 289 354 353 353 354 365 494 285 433 151 323

280-282 280f 280 286f 286 290 290-297 316-318 317 318 324ff 330 331 356 357-362 357-360 357 358 361 362

321 500 321 251 243, 509 239 143 510 510 510 158 167 168 325 377 377 160 378 383, 395 411

Śikṣāsamuccayakārikā 3 2 510 4 161 27 326 Smṛtyupasthāna-sūtra 183, 204-205 Śrāvakabhūmi 450 407 Subāhuparipṛcchā-sūtra 130, 312 Subhāṣitaratnakaraṇḍakakathā 66-67, 186 1-33 67 1 69 3 69 5f 67 7 69 8 68 10 69 11 69 13 69 15-20 68 15-10 68

561

INDEX OF SCRIPTURAL REFERENCES

15 17 18 19 20 21 23 26 29 31 32 34-157 158-190 166-175 166 167 168 169 172 173 174 175 Suhṛllekha 25 121

69 67 67 67 67-68 69 69 69 69 69 69 67 67 68 67 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 365 152

Sukhāvatīvyūha-sūtra 11 498, 506 53 498 Śūnyatāsaptatikārikā 51 66 51

Suvarṇabhāsottama-sūtra 12, 134-145 284 Tathāgataguhya-sūtra 151, 377 Tattvasiddhi 10 Theragāthā 638 726-739 842-865 949-980 1091-1145 1141

72, 353, 355 319 365 355 355 355 205

Tipiṭaka / Tripiṭaka 17, 18, 27, 204, 300, 319, 357 Triṃśatikā 29 435 Udāna 8:3

276

Ugraparipṛcchā 159, 239, 353 2c 114 12a 270 16b 239 Upāsakaśīla-sūtra 9 165 Upāyakauśalya-sūtra 132-133, 248, 499

Sūtrasamuccaya 5, 9, 17, 25, 27, 38, 47, 238

Vajradhvaja-sūtra 168, 313, 319, 321-322, 324, 500

Sutta Nipāta 353 3:10 331 145b–150 493 705 377 1149 458 Khaggavisāṇasutta (35-75) 353 Metta-sutta (149 /1:8) 165, 209-210, 494 Muni-sutta (207-221) 353

Varṇārhavarṇa Stotra 68 Vigrahavyāvartanī 422 Vimalakīrtinirdeśa 100, 102, 217218, 298 Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra 217, 293

102, 158,

562

INDEX OF SCRIPTURAL REFERENCES

8 10

158, 161, 499 217

Viṃśatikā 1-7 4-6

337 196

Visuddhimagga 222 I, 19 223 I, 39 223 9:47 301, 399 9:123 225 195 = 6:90 367 317-319 288

Vimutti Magga 11:2 157

Vyākhyāyukti 104

Hindu Scriptures Bhagavadgītā 79, 323 3:4 323 3:19 323 3:20 323

Ṛg-Veda 10:90

112

Upaniṣads

63, 115

Hebrew Bible Psalms 51,4

Isaiah 1:18 25:8a 65 65:25

263-264 302

Song of Songs 8:6 151

323 502 501 501

Talmud Pirkei Avot 1:14 321

New Testament Matthew 5–7 5:43-48 5:45 5:46-47 5:48 6:19-21 7:12 10:38f

46, 291, 301 100, 214, 259, 274, 294-295, 300 387 294, 388 294 388 273 387 400

11:28-30 13:44f 13:54f 14:13-21 15:18 16:24f 17:20f 18:8-9 20:27 22:1-10

123 180 46 48 214 400 411 274 291 180

563

INDEX OF SCRIPTURAL REFERENCES

23:11 24:42f 25:31-46 25:40 26:41

409 328 214, 301 214 329

Mark 2:17 8:23 8:34f 9:43-48 10:43 10:44f 13:34f 14:38

123 48 400 335 409 328 328 329

Luke 4:16-21 5:31 6:36 9:24 10:25-37 10:37 14:15-24 17:33 22:26 23:34 24:34

123 123 135 400 214 214 180 400 409 133 282

John Prologue 1:4f 1:14 3:5 12:24f 17:6-19

100, 466 121 121 121 122 400 358

Romans 1:16-17 2:27-29 5:3-4 5:3 5:5-6 5:8-10 5:8 6:1-12

509 251 264 274 509 388 275 122

7 7:6 7:14 7:15 7:17 7:18-20 7:23 7:24 8:1 8:2-6 8:2 8:6 8:7 8:9 8:14 8:24 8:29 8:39 9:3 9:15 11:33f 12:1f 12:4-5 12:5 12:8 12:9 12:14-21 12:15 12:17f 13:8-10 13:8 15:9

189, 199, 198 198 198 198 201 152, 199 512 123 123 114 113 113 509 113, 123 175, 265 511 144 385 386 291 275 291, 291 388 387, 251 188

198-199 251

198

115, 122 494

387 509

1 Corinthians 1:18-31 511 1:24 511 1:30 511 2:6-8 511 2:6 512 2:9 511 2:12 122 2:16 122, 511 3:1 424 3:16f 122 3:19 511 4:10 402

564 4:12b-13a 4:13 6:9-10 6:12 6:19 7:29-31 7:31 9:16 11:1 12:12-27 12:12-13 12:14-24 12:15-22 12:20 12:25f 13 13:1-13 13:2 13:3 13:5 13:12 13:13 15:20-28 15:26 15:42-44 16:13

INDEX OF SCRIPTURAL REFERENCES

402 401 329 251 122 358 358 189 465 385 386 386 386 386 386 100 510 509 214 214, 386 199, 485 508-509 387 512 371 328

2 Corinthians 1:3 265 1:4-7 265 1:12 328 3:6 251 3:18 115, 122, 135 4:1 327 4:4-6 327 4:16 327 5:1-5 328 5:6 328 5:8 328 5:14f 188 5:14 465 5:17 178 5:18-20 188 5:19 121 6:10 328 7:4 328

10:17 11:18 11:30 12:9-10

328 328 328 328

Galatians 2:19-20 2:20 3:3 3:26 4:19 4:29 5:6 5:13f 5:14 5:17 5:19-21 5:21 5:21b 5:22 5:25f 6:2-4 6:2 6:12f 6:14 6:15

509 198, 201, 315 327 509 188 122 508 509 251 198 114 291 329 114, 328 291 328 400, 509 328 328 178

Ephesians 6:10-20

201

Philippians 2:1-4 2:5 2:6-11 2:10f 2:12-13 3:6f 4:4 4:8

265 265, 515 265 387 315 265 162 162

Colossians 1:15 1:24 2:13

115 189 123

1 Thessalonians 1:3 508

INDEX OF SCRIPTURAL REFERENCES

4:13-18 5:6 5:8 5:21 1 John 4:7

358 328 508 244 487

4:7b 4:9 4:16b

252 135 252

Revelation 21 21:4

501 501, 512

Apocryphal Texts Apocalypse of Peter 342-343

Gospel of Nicodemus 502

Islam Qur’ān

46

Hadith Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī 5665 385

Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim 2586 385 6232 302

565

GENERAL INDEX

Abe, Masao, 197, 202, 284 Abhayadānaśrī, 19 Abhayadatta, 13-14, 19-22, 35, 37-38, 41, 51 Absorption / meditation (dhyāna), 54-56, 58-59, 207, 217, 309, 347-412, 416, 418, 424, 429, 434, 436-437, 447, 449, 518 Ācārya Vīraprakāśa (Slob-dpon Dpa’bo ’od-gsal), 19 Ad Gentes, 226 agape: see love Ajita, 140, 142-143 Ākāśagarbha, 146, 151 Akṣayamati, 5-6, 26, 104 all powers (balavyūha), 56, 306, 310, 518 altruism, 61, 69, 120, 129-131, 193, 208, 241, 247, 256, 259, 290, 323, 327, 335, 377, 382, 391-393, 395, 400, 406, 411, 461, 505 Amitābha / Amida, 63, 151-152, 315-316, 320, 323, 483, 497498, 508 Amtzis, Judith S., 13-14, 26, 38, 42, 46, 120, 128, 130-131, 169, 183184 Anderson, Benedict, 342 anger: see hate / hatred / anger (dveṣa) animal, 21-22, 37, 50, 52, 118, 161, 186, 190, 232, 247, 333, 336, 365, 369, 494-496, 498, 501 anātta / anātman: see No(t)-Self Anselm of Canterbury, 171 anthropology, 125, 228, 460, 462-463 apophasis / apophatic (see also: ineffability / ineffable), 95-96, 402, 421, 429, 438-441, 466, 478, 482-483, 486, 511

Appleton, Naomi, 205 Archimboldo, Giuseppe, 370 arhat / arahat, 57, 60, 147, 169-170, 187, 333, 423, 479, 507, 514 Aristotle, 343, 486 Ariyaratne, A.T., 210 artha: see wealth / power Āryadeva, 245, 366, 455 Āryaśūra, 53, 66 Asaṅga, 245, 247 asceticism / ascetic, 31, 140, 143, 166, 177, 219, 222, 226, 236, 248, 293, 309, 347-348, 352355, 358-361, 365, 370-371, 374, 490, 503 aśubha-bhāvanā: see foulness meditation ātmavidheyatā / vaśitā: see self-control Athanasius of Alexandria, 136 atonement, 163, 171-172, 515 attachment / clinging, XXIII, 25, 64, 86, 89, 91, 120, 149, 161, 164166, 191, 194-196, 211, 218, 223, 230, 232, 234-235, 252, 265, 269, 271-273, 292, 308-309, 319, 323, 332, 348, 352, 354-355, 357, 362, 396, 398, 404-407, 423-424, 428429, 434-437, 439, 443, 446, 454, 456, 464 Augustine, Jonathan Morris, 48 Augustine of Hippo, 234-235, 252, 487 Avalokiteśvara, 87, 142-143, 146, 215, 380, 385, 392, 496-498, 501-502 Baier, Karl, 225-226 balavyūha: see all powers

568

GENERAL INDEX

Bargiacchi, Enzo Gualtiero, 86 Barnett, L.D., 88, 184 Barth, Auguste, 73 Barth, Karl, 98 Bartholomeusz, Tessa J., 248 Basil the Great, 359 Batchelor, Stephen, 51, 184, 206, 243 Bechert, Heinz, 75, 84, 506 Bell, Sandra, 247 Beltrame, Arnaud, 465 Bendall, Cecil, 112, 132, 144, 151, 156, 160, 164, 167, 169, 212, 233, 239-240, 244, 249-250, 270, 289, 298, 312, 321, 383, 500, 510 Benedict XVI (pope), 173 Benedict of Nursia, 228, 247, 359360 Bentor, Yael, 17 Bernhardt, Reinhold, XIV Berzin, Alexander, 184 Béthune, François de, 246 Bhaka, Amita, 90 bhakti, 118, 133, 137, 139, 141-142, 144, 152, 162, 472 Bharati, Agehananda, 42 Bhattacharya, Kamaleswar, 421-422 Bhattacharya, Vidhushekhara, XX Bhāvaviveka, 436, 452, 473, 490 Bhāviveka, 245 Bhusukapāda, 24 birth, 24, 51, 118-119, 122, 149, 175-176, 178, 180, 221, 233, 308, 311, 316, 320-321, 351, 363, 368-369, 498, 503, 507, 509, 512 Bischoff, F.A., 31 Bitbol, Michael, 464 Blée, Fabrice, 88, 226, 228 Bloom, Alfred, 439 Bodhi, Bhikkhu, 25, 68, 167, 187, 213, 218-219, 223, 231-232, 257, 278-279, 338-339, 353, 357, 365-366, 368, 397, 399, 431, 434, 493

Bodhidharma, 197 Bodhisattva ritual / liturgy (Mahāpuja; including extolment, offering, refuge, admission/confession of sins), 11, 44, 54, 56, 119, 124, 137, 139-152, 154-155, 157, 159, 160, 162-164, 168, 173, 180, 237, 239, 285, 320, 494, 517 Bodhisattva vow(s), 81, 85, 132, 137, 170, 182, 184, 194-195, 272, 315, 319, 333 Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra, 5, 8, 19, 497 body, 20, 22-26, 31, 42, 50, 112, 114, 116, 118, 122-123, 133, 140, 142, 144-145, 147, 151152, 156, 163-167, 169-170, 185, 189, 195, 204, 209, 212, 214, 218-221, 229-238, 241-242, 263, 267-269, 271-272, 279, 283, 287, 296, 299, 311, 314, 316, 324, 331, 338, 340-342, 344, 348-349, 351-352, 355-357, 362-368, 370-381, 383-388, 390-392, 394-396, 402-407, 428, 444, 446, 448, 450, 454-455, 457, 459, 463, 478, 482, 495, 500, 504, 507-508, 517-519 Boisvert, Mathieu, 358-359 Boucher, Daniel, 71, 166, 353-357, 369, 394, 453 Braarvig, Jens, 331, 335 brahmavihāra: see divine abidings Brassard, Francis, 57, 73, 80, 119120, 129 Brettler, Marc Zvi, 98 Bretveld, Sven, 506 Broido, Michael M., XXII-XXIII Brown, Peter, 359, 371-372, 375 Brück, Michael von, 84, 265, 360 Brunnhölzl, Karl, XXII, 77 Buddha Field (buddhakṣetra), Buddha Land, 63, 65, 140, 217, 297, 320, 497f, 508 Buddha Germ (tathāgatagarbha), 63, 155, 178, 303 Buddha legend, 41f, 293

GENERAL INDEX

Buddha Nature, 11, 63, 94-95, 120, 155, 178, 303, 314-315, 431, 479-480, 483 Buddhaghosa, 101, 222, 225, 288, 301, 367, 399 Buddhahood, 42, 44, 54, 57, 60, 63-65, 81, 113, 116, 120, 128129, 132, 135-137, 143, 153, 155, 158, 160-161, 166, 169170, 176, 178-179, 183, 200, 209, 236, 241, 256, 259, 280, 286, 297, 299-300, 303, 312, 314, 329, 334, 364-365, 368, 384, 388-389, 393, 410, 416, 423, 437-438, 504, 507-508, 514 buddhakṣetra: see Buddha Fields Buddha-son: see son(s) of Buddha Buddhist-Christian dialogue: see dialogue (Buddhist-Christian) Buddhist-Jewish dialogue: see dialogue (Buddhist-Jewish) Buehler, Art, 385 Burford, Grace, 226 Burton, David, 418, 435 Bu-ston, 5, 13-15, 18, 24-35, 38, 41-42, 46-50, 75 Cabanne, E.D., 265 Cabezón, José Ignacio, XVI, 84, 271, 331, 340-342, 365-366, 368, 370, 372-375, 443 Candragomin, 46 Candrakīrti, XII, XXIII, 11, 53, 59, 63-64, 120, 245, 366, 413, 423, 425, 431-432, 435, 449-450, 514 Carman, John Braisted, 216 Carpenter, Amber D., 436 Carpenter, Joseph Estlin, 190 Carter, John Ross, 167 celibacy, 248, 359, 499 Chadwick, Henry, 360 chanda: see right desire charity: see love Charles the Bald (king), 344 Chattopadhyaya, Debriprasad, 8, 14, 28, 34-38, 42, 46, 49

569

China, 76, 78, 97 Chodron, Chodrung-ma-Kunga (Lois Peak), 7, 13-14 Chodron, Tubten, 89, 409 Christ, 73, 84, 87, 90, 93, 96-97, 107, 113, 115, 121-125, 133-135, 144, 156, 162-163, 170-175, 178, 188-189, 198-201, 246, 265-266, 274-275, 291, 295, 302-303, 315, 324, 327-328, 343-344, 358, 371, 386-388, 400-402, 464-466, 502503, 509, 511, 515 Christianity, 83-84, 86, 88-89, 91, 95, 97, 106, 121, 123, 125, 133-136, 157, 174, 178, 214-215, 225-227, 229, 235, 245, 263, 290, 293, 302, 335, 342-343, 345, 358, 371, 400, 409, 422, 424, 439, 459-460, 464465, 478-479, 484-485 Christian liturgy, 147, 162-163 Christology, 125 circumspection (saṃprajanya), 203253, 256, 326, 351, 517 citta, see guarding one’s mind Clark, Elizabeth A., 359 Clayton, Barbra R., 3, 9-10, 40, 73, 80-82, 160, 326, 382 Cleary, Thomas, 119, 143, 313, 321, 392 Coakley, Sarah, 372 Cobb, John B., 265, 482 Collins, Steven, 276 compassion (jihi / karuṇā / kṛpā), XXIII, 30-31, 42, 44, 48-49, 57, 60-62, 64-65, 73, 78, 80-82, 86, 88-90, 92, 116, 124, 129-135, 139, 141-146, 148, 150-152, 154-157, 161, 165, 167, 169172, 189, 202, 206, 208-211, 215-217, 221, 224-225, 235-237, 240-244, 247-253, 256, 261-262, 264-267, 271, 274, 282, 284285, 288, 291, 294-297, 299303, 313-315, 320, 323-324, 326, 333, 335, 345, 356-357, 369, 373-374, 376-377, 379,

570

GENERAL INDEX

382, 398-399, 402, 409, 416, 424, 435, 437-438, 442-445, 453-454, 460-461, 465, 483, 490-491, 494, 496, 498-499, 501-504, 508-510, 518-519 confession, 69, 85, 139, 144, 147-148, 152, 154-155, 159, 163, 187, 189, 237, 239, 285, 319-320, 514, 517 contemplation, 16, 56, 59, 86, 162, 220, 232, 235, 246, 315-316, 320, 340, 342, 344, 347-348, 352, 356, 365, 370, 375, 377, 380, 394, 437, 491, 518 Conze, Edward, 51, 64, 276, 357, 383, 416-417, 421, 453, 491 Cook, Francis H., 143 Corless, Roger, 265 Cornille, Catherine, XIV, XVI, 98-100, 229 Costa Prado, F., 229 Cowell, E.W., 16, 502 creation, 83, 94-95, 102, 126, 173, 178-179, 199, 275-276, 278, 371, 441, 467, 472, 473, 480482, 484-486 Crosby, Kate, XX, 4-6, 11, 53-55, 70-71, 80, 82, 142, 184, 188, 242, 258, 273, 305, 326, 348, 355, 377, 394, 405-406, 414, 430, 497, 500, 514 cross / crucifixion, 84, 87, 133-134, 170-175, 265, 282, 328, 343, 400-401, 502, 511, 515 Dalai Lama 14th: see Gyatso, Tenzin Daly, Mary, 409 dāna: see giving / generosity Dargyay, Lobsang, 57 Dasgupta, Shashibhusan, 24, 40, 42 Dayal, Har, 54, 64, 118, 137, 152, 158, 334, 385 D’Costa, Gavin, 229 De Martino, R., 229 De Silva, Lynn A., 136, 463-464 death, XIII, 24, 52, 122-123, 133134, 136-137, 145-146, 148-149,

151-152, 164, 171-173, 175, 177-179, 200-201, 203, 213, 228, 230, 232-235, 265, 268269, 273, 276, 287, 289, 308309, 321, 333-335, 350, 355, 359-361, 363, 368, 370, 378, 396, 407, 419, 462, 489, 501502, 504, 511-512, 515 dedication / transfer of merit (pariṇā– manā), 26, 48, 54, 56, 66, 69, 143, 150, 154, 157-161, 163, 166, 171-173, 175, 214, 216, 491, 493-515, 519 defilements (kleśas), 52, 55-58, 113115, 117-118, 123-124, 129-130, 132, 145, 149-150, 166, 177, 180, 182, 184, 188-202, 204, 206, 213, 219, 221-222, 230, 232, 235, 241, 256-257, 259, 261-262, 264, 266-267, 269, 271, 273, 280-282, 287, 289, 308, 313, 317, 320-322, 324325, 327, 333, 335-336, 340, 348-349, 351, 354, 357, 359, 361, 364, 384, 390, 412, 427429, 435-436, 476, 489-490, 511-512, 515, 517 Deitrick, James E., 211 delusion, 49, 51, 56-58, 115, 117, 123, 127, 129-133, 145, 148150, 153, 177, 185, 188, 192, 194-195, 211, 213, 224, 230, 232, 234-235, 256-257, 269, 271-272, 282, 327, 340, 364365, 367, 380, 421, 423, 436, 458, 461, 468, 474, 476, 487, 512, 515 Demoto, Mitsuyo, 332, 340 Dependent Origination: see pratītyasamutpāda desert / desert fathers, 358-359, 371372, 374, 401 Desideri, Ippolito, 83, 85-86, 479, 487-488 Deus Caritas Est, 173 deva: see gods

GENERAL INDEX

Deweese, John, 13-14, 26, 38, 42, 46, 120, 128, 130-131, 169, 183184 Dexter, Michelle L., 59 Dharma, XVI, 16, 21, 36, 49, 67, 72, 103-104, 112, 114, 117, 141, 147, 151, 161, 167-169, 177, 206, 208, 239, 241, 248, 258, 263, 270, 273, 276, 293, 297, 310, 320, 324, 333, 342, 352, 357, 378-379, 383, 417, 423, 430, 438, 448, 455, 460, 465, 500, 504, 506-507, 510 dharmakāya, 63, 111-112, 114, 116, 178, 483 Dharmakīrti, 195, 374 Dharmapāla, 28, 39 Dharmapala, Anagarika, 479-480 Dharmasiri, Gunapala, 479-480 Dharmaśrībhadra, 7 dhyāna: see absorption / meditation dialogue (Buddhist-Christian), 82-96, 105-106, 162, 173, 190, 202, 216, 225, 228, 247, 253, 265, 295, 305, 415, 439-440, 459, 463-464, 484 dialogue (Buddhist-Jewish), 278 dialogue (interfaith / interreligious), 96, 98-99, 244, 372 dialogue (Jewish-Christian), 98 Dietz, Siglinde, 5-7, 75 divine abidings (brahmavihāra), 154, 206, 288, 307, 347, 399, 494 Dods, Marcus, 234 Dornberg, Ulrich, 174 Dowman, Keith, 13-14, 19-22, 24, 42, 48, 52 Dragonetti, Carmen, 431, 453, 486, 490 Drew, Rose, 229 Dūn-huáng version of the Bodhi(sattva)caryāvatāra, XXIII, 3-10, 16, 19, 26, 53-56, 58-59, 111, 114, 154, 180, 212, 218, 223, 225, 238-239, 241, 244, 305-307, 311, 318, 325, 331,

571

347-348, 353-354, 380-381, 391-392, 405, 407, 410, 414415, 432, 457-458, 472, 497, 506 Dunn, James D.G., 123, 199, 264265, 329, 387, 508-509 Dunne, John D., 436 Dutt, N., 502 dveṣa: see hate / hatred / anger Dzogchen Khenpo Chöga, 42, 120 Eckel, Malcolm David, 418, 436, 490 Eckhart (Meister), 484-485 Eder, Johann Michael, 370 ego: see self Ehara, N.R.M., 157 Eimer, Helmut, XVI, 26, 75 Elliott, Neil, 184 Emmerick, R.E., 284 emptiness (śūnyatā), 22, 42, 51, 66, 77, 80, 85-86, 88-89, 91-96, 114, 126, 151, 156, 165, 197, 201, 231, 277, 295, 361, 375, 381, 383, 396-398, 402, 409, 413414, 417-418, 421-423, 428-430, 432, 434-438, 443-444, 449, 452, 454-455, 460-466, 469-471, 475, 478-479, 482-484, 487, 489-491, 510, 519 enemy, 55-57, 65, 89, 93, 113, 124, 127, 147, 167, 170-172, 180, 184, 191-194, 203, 206-207, 235, 255-257, 259-262, 272-274, 288, 291-294, 296-297, 299, 308, 313, 317, 349, 387-389, 500, 518 Engaged Buddhism, 211, 253 Engle, Artemus B., 212, 247, 407 Enomiya-Lasalle, Hugo M., 226 Enriquez, Karen Bautista, 409 envy / jealousy, 35, 114, 192, 240, 258, 286-291, 350, 393-395, 405, 518 epikeia, 224, 241, 243, 246-247, 250 Epstein, Joseph, 291

572

GENERAL INDEX

eschatology, 136, 157, 199-200, 264, 328-329, 358, 501, 509 ethics / ethical, 65, 80, 83, 88, 106, 160-161, 207-211, 213, 243, 247, 250, 252, 283, 302-303, 334, 342, 372, 381-382, 396, 408-409, 411, 505 Eriugena (John Scotus), 344 Eucharist, 171, 173-174 Evagrius Ponticus, 401 exchange of others and oneself (parātmaparivartana), 56, 58, 61, 65-66, 85, 87, 256, 290, 303, 306-307, 310, 347-348, 377, 382, 388, 391-393, 395, 400, 404-405, 407, 410, 518 exclusivism / exclusivist, 106f, 435, 437, 491f, faith, 21, 40, 49, 82, 86, 92-93, 99, 111, 131, 157, 178, 185, 199, 296, 335, 411, 499, 503, 508511, 515 Faure, Bernard, 372 Feldmeier, Peter, 100-103, 115, 157, 214, 227, 235, 274 feminism / feminist, 72, 407-410 Fernando, Sr. Milburga, 174 filioque, 124-125 Finkelstein, David Ritz, 464 Finot, Louis, 73, 90 Fischer, Norman, 247, 263-264 Fischer-Barnicol, Ernst, 201 Flasch, Kurt, 344 flesh (see also: spirit and flesh), 21, 37, 91, 114, 123, 131, 166, 171, 173, 189, 198-199, 212, 230, 232, 291, 311, 313-314, 316, 327-329, 342-343, 359, 361-362, 367, 444, 496, 512, 514, 518 Foard, James, 320 forbearance / patience (kṣānti; including endurance of suffering / injustice), 54-56, 58-60, 62-64, 67-68, 78, 89, 150, 161-162, 194, 207, 217, 255-303, 305, 313, 328, 518

forgiveness, 123, 150, 159, 173, 199, 258-259, 265, 299, 412 Forman, E.M., 229 foulness meditation (aśubhabhāvanā), 232, 309, 348, 365366, 369-370, 372, 407 (Four) Noble Truths, 157, 194, 260, 263, 309, 417, 420, 428 Frauwallner, Erich, 204, 413, 419, 430, 466, 470-471 Freiberger, Oliver, 377 free will, 216, 278, 280-281 freedom, 64, 174, 216, 263, 274, 279, 281-282, 319, 353, 359, 369, 389, 397, 404, 429, 443, 465, 507 Freud, Sigmund, 148 Fromm, Erich, 229 Fuchs, Eric, 372 full dedication (tātparya), 56, 306307, 310, 316, 318, 325, 518 Gäng, Peter, XVI, 60 Gandhi, Mohandas K., 275 Garfield, Jay L., 6, 421, 443 Gaudium et Spes, 226 Gautama, 130, 143, 148, 157, 161, 165-166, 169-170, 263, 280, 499 gender, XXI, 106, 372, 408-410 Gentz, Joachim, 97 Gerrard, Philip, 401 Gethin, Rupert, 248, 309 Ghosānanda, Mahā, 210 girl(s): see woman / women / girl(s) Girndt, Helmut, 463 giving / generosity (dāna), 54-55, 57, 59, 62-64, 66-67, 69, 78, 134, 161, 164-166, 170, 181, 183, 203, 207, 211-212, 214, 216-217, 220, 224, 234, 236, 255, 257, 259, 292-293, 311, 313-314, 321, 328, 409, 419, 491, 514 God, 83, 85-86, 88, 91, 94-96, 98, 101-102, 113-115, 121-126, 134-136, 141-142, 144, 152, 156, 171-173, 175, 180, 188-

GENERAL INDEX

189, 199-201, 215-216, 228, 235, 252, 265-266, 275-278, 294-295, 300, 302, 315, 327329, 343-345, 359-361, 371, 386-388, 401-402, 415, 422, 439-441, 466-468, 472-473, 478-488, 502-503, 509, 512, 519 gods (deva), 118, 127, 139, 176, 191, 284, 335, 364, 389, 494497, 503-505, 507-508 Goldstein, Joseph, 247 Goldstein, Valerie Saiving, 409 Gómez, Luis O., XIX, 53-55, 72, 79, 121, 123-124, 164, 320, 401, 453, 498, 508 Goodman, Charles, 80, 160, 250, 297-298, 321-322, 324, 354, 377, 411, 510 Gowans, Christopher, 280-281 grace, 44, 86, 121, 125, 137, 152, 162, 172, 315, 328, 371, 375, 395, 499, 503, 512-513, 515 greed, 56-58, 129, 149, 177, 188, 191-192, 194-195, 213, 218, 223-224, 227, 230, 232, 256257, 288, 333, 340, 348-350, 354, 364, 368, 436, 476, 518 Greenberg, Judith Kornberg, 372 Gregory, Peter N., 72, 215, 409, 458 Griffin, David Ray, 215, 482 Griffiths, Paul J., 107, 437 Gross, Rita, 202, 284 Grünschloss, Andreas, 229 Grumett, David, 90 guarding one’s mind (citta), 56, 203219, 222, 517 Gudmunsen, Chris, 463 Gunaratana, Bhante Henepola, 506 Guruge, Ananda, 479-480 Guruḷugōmī, 506 Gyatso, Geshe Kelsang, 52, 94 Gyatso, Tenzin (14th Dalai Lama), XIII, XVII, 77-78, 84, 86-89, 94, 96, 100, 105, 125, 210, 259, 261, 264, 274-278, 285-286, 294, 302-303, 438, 458, 480, 515

573

Haack, Ernst, 208 Halbfass, Wilhelm, 474 Hangartner, Diego, 184 happiness, 65, 69, 89, 127-130, 132133, 153-155, 167-169, 175-176, 178, 181, 183, 194, 204, 206, 234-236, 240, 256, 260, 262, 268, 286-289, 296, 300, 311, 314, 316, 318, 320, 323, 334335, 337, 350, 365, 370, 375, 377-378, 380, 383, 389, 391, 393, 395-397, 400, 403, 405, 411, 461, 487-491, 495-497, 500-501, 505, 508, 513, 515 Hardacre, Helen, 143 Hare, E.M., 208 Harris, Elizabeth J., 157, 190, 225, 248, 253 Harris, Stephen E., 52, 82, 118, 195, 411 Harrison, Paul, XIX, 3, 6, 377 Harvey, Peter, 115, 213 hate / hatred / anger (dveṣa), 56, 58, 114, 129, 132, 145, 149, 161, 166-167, 174, 177, 188, 191192, 195, 213, 218, 223-224, 227, 230, 232, 252, 255-262, 264, 266-275, 278, 280-283, 285-288, 290-293, 299, 313, 322, 333, 340, 350, 364-365, 404, 436, 461, 476, 493, 498, 518 Hearers: see Śrāvakayāna / Śrāvakas Hedges, Paul, 134 Hedinger, Jürg, 55, 80, 258 Heim, S. Mark, 93-96, 100, 105, 172-173, 483 hell / hells, 15-16, 36, 41, 65, 105, 118-119, 128-129, 132-134, 147, 149, 151-152, 155-156, 183, 185-188, 191-196, 203, 205-206, 219-220, 244, 248-250, 268-269, 271-272, 274, 287, 289, 296297, 299, 308-309, 313, 316, 323-325, 329, 331-345, 349, 352, 361, 363-364, 368, 376,

574

GENERAL INDEX

379-380, 384, 387, 389, 396, 400, 403, 406, 490, 494-503, 509, 514 Henry, Patrick, 247, 360 Herbert, J.D., 229 Herman, A.L., 413 hermeneutics / hermeneutic, 70, 73, 95f, 100, 106, 198, 200, 415, 430, 438, 440, 442, 464, Hick, John, 136, 171-172, 216, 345, 440, 442-443, 484 Hillel (rabbi), 321 Hirota, Dennis, 151, 315 Hisamatsu, Shinichi, 480 Hodgson, Brian H., 79 Hookham, S.K., 77 Holy Spirit: see spirit of God hope, 87, 102-103, 107, 134, 150, 156-157, 182, 184, 237, 242, 264-265, 316, 327-328, 388, 403, 483, 501-502, 508-512 Hinduism / Hindu, 31-32, 37-38, 49, 79, 136-137, 141-142, 215216, 225, 228, 262, 395, 423, 459, 479-480 Hui-Neng, 45 human beings / human life / human existence, XXI, 51, 67-69, 85, 116-118, 123, 125-126, 135, 175-176, 186-188, 190, 201, 221, 224-225, 230, 233, 235, 271, 274, 279-280, 308, 310, 312, 316-317, 336, 338, 351, 360, 372, 386-387, 417-418, 431, 453, 460, 462, 489-490, 494-495, 505 Humani Generis, 90 Huntington, C.W., 53, 62-64, 257258, 415, 418, 423, 431, 435, 450 Hutton, Kenneth, 80 Ibrahim, Ezzedin, 302 icchantika, 156 Ichigo, Masamichi, XXIII Idzumi, Hokei, 142-143, 152, 154, 159

Ignatius of Loyola, 86, 344 ignorance / ignorant, 17, 23, 43, 91, 96, 117, 148, 175, 177, 194, 221, 227, 245, 280, 321, 344, 350, 482, 490-492, 512 illusion (māyā) / illusionism, XXII, 22, 51-52, 66, 91-92, 192, 195197, 199-200, 211, 215, 231232, 234, 270-271, 277, 303, 337, 360, 392, 396, 416-417, 419-423, 425-427, 429-434, 436-438, 445, 447, 453-455, 457-459, 461, 464, 469, 471, 475-478, 490-491, 498, 501, 511 imitation of the Buddhas, 164, 170 imitation of Christ / imitatio Christi, 73, 93, 103, 135, 163, 170, 174, 178, 215, 274-275, 294, 358, 400-401, 464 impermanence / impermanent, 164, 179, 349, 366, 396, 407, 454455, 468-469, 474, 476 impurity / purity, 114-115, 118, 120, 137, 160, 214, 224, 232, 234, 268, 364-368, 371, 374, 377, 430, 491, 507 incarnation, 15, 91, 121, 133, 141, 143, 162, 172 inclusivism / inclusivist, 107 inconceivability / inconceivable, 91, 112, 131, 181, 184, 186, 277, 334, 419-421, 432, 440, 444, 458, 461, 467, 472, 483-487, 504 India / Indian, XIII, XVI, XX, 3, 7-8, 10, 14-15, 19, 23-24, 26, 28, 30, 68-69, 72-73, 75-79, 97, 103, 118, 209-210, 226, 276, 331, 339, 353, 365-367, 395, 406, 413-414, 431-432, 436, 456, 473-474 ineffability / ineffable (see also: apophasis / apophatic), 77, 91, 112, 277, 418-419, 421, 435, 439442, 458, 461, 483-484 Ingram, Paul O., 84, 459-460, 464

GENERAL INDEX

insight / wisdom (prajnā), 11, 18, 43-45, 49, 51, 54-61, 64, 66-67, 80-82, 91-95, 101-102, 115, 129-130, 143, 151, 165, 169, 176, 188, 192, 195-197, 199200, 204, 217, 222, 224, 230, 253, 256, 258, 303, 313-314, 320, 338, 349, 351-353, 360, 365, 372, 374, 397, 412-492, 503, 508-512, 518 interfaith / interreligious dialogue: see dialogue (interfaith / interreligious) Irenaeus of Lyon, 135 Ishida, Chikō, XVI, 212, 218, 347, 380, 414 Islam / Muslim, 45, 134, 201, 302, 385, 479 I’tsing, 118 Ives, Christopher, 265 Jackson, Roger R., 195, 374 Jahn, Karl, 205 Jainism, 115 James, Montage Rhodes, 343, 502 Jamspal, Lozang, 285 Jayadeva / Jinadeva, 27-28, 33-34, 39, 47 jealousy: see envy Jeanrond, Werner, 157 Jenkins, Stephen, 6, 211-212, 245, 247, 250 Jerryson, Michael, 247 Jesus, 46, 48, 73, 84, 93, 97, 113, 115, 121-123, 125, 135, 152, 156, 171-173, 180, 188, 199, 209-210, 214, 235, 263-266, 274-275, 282, 291, 294-295, 300-302, 328, 358, 387-388, 400-402, 411, 465-466, 503, 509, 515 Jetāri, 30 Jewish-Christian dialogue: see dialogue (Jewish-Christian) jihad 201 jihi / karuṇā / kṛpā: see compassion Jinadeva: see Jayadeva

575

Jinpa, Geshe Thupten, 85, 87, 515 Jnānagarbha, 417, 425 John / Johannine, 102-103, 106, 121-122, 180, 252, 466, 487 John Cassian, 228 John Climacus, 371 John of the Cross, 101 John Paul II (pope), XIII, 89, 210 Johnson-Davies, Denys, 302 Jones, J.J., 366 Jong, J.W. de, 3, 6, 10, 13-15, 17-18, 20, 34, 443 joy / pleasure, 65, 142, 154-155, 159, 206, 240, 255, 259, 286287, 289-291, 297, 299, 301, 306-308, 310, 312, 315-316, 318-319, 322-323, 364, 369, 376, 399, 468-469, 518 Judaism / Jewish, 97-98, 198, 251, 263, 278, 400, 509 justice / injustice, 106, 171, 202, 266, 273, 283-286, 313, 395, 518 Jyotis, 248 Käsemann, Ernst, 387 Kalyāṇavarman, 29 kāma, 67, 272, 309, 352-353, 361, 364, 369, 512 Kamenetz, Rodger, 278 Karma / merit (see also: dedication / transfer of merit), XVI, 37, 51, 63-65, 67, 69, 101, 116, 118120, 127, 129-131, 134, 139, 141, 143-144, 146-147, 149-150, 153-155, 158-164, 166, 170-175, 181, 184, 187-188, 196, 205, 212, 214, 216, 219, 222, 236, 239, 242-244, 249, 256-257, 268-269, 271-273, 278-282, 285, 287-291, 295-298, 307, 311, 314, 318, 320, 325, 331, 334, 336-337, 345, 351, 390, 395, 425-426, 430-431, 452, 473, 489, 491, 494-495, 497, 499501, 504, 506, 513, 517, 519

576

GENERAL INDEX

Katsura, Shōryū, 462 Kaufman, Whitley, 278 Kawa Paltsek (dPal-brtsegs), 7 Kawaguchi, 78-79 Kawamura, Leslie, 152 Kaza, Stephanie, 247 Keel, Hee-Sung, 84, 151 Keenan, John P., 100, 217, 265, 441, 463-466, 483 Keenan, Linda K., 100 Kelly, Anthony, 157 Kempis, Thomas à, 73, 103, 135, 174, 214-215, 274, 294, 400 Keown, Damien, 208, 211, 248-250, 257 Kern, H., 436 Khema, Ayya, 100 Kheminda Thera, 157 Khenpo Kunpal / Kunzang Pelden, 13, 38, 46, 52, 76, 94, 128, 131, 184, 188, 312, 319, 342, 394, 458, 501 Kiblinger, Kristin Beise, 229 killing, 21-23, 50-51, 57, 147, 187, 191, 207, 244, 247-250, 252, 363, 432, 499 King, Sally, 211, 278, 280, 282 King, Winston L., 190 kingdom (of God / of heaven), 180, 329 Kirfel, Willibald, 331 Kisāgotamī, 148 Klein, Anne Carolyn, 408-410 Kleine, Christoph, 250, 377 kleśas: see defilements Klimkeit, Hans-Joachim, 502 Knitter, Paul F., 229, 265 Knowles, Elizabeth, 189 Kochumuttom, Thomas A., 196, 337, 435 König, Franz, XIII Kornfield, Jack, 226 Kreiner, Armin, 216 Kretschmar, Andreas, XVI, 7-8, 13, 76 kṣānti: see forbearance / patience Kṣitigarbha, 146, 151, 498

Läänemets, Märt, 392 lack of dejection / self-confidence, 56, 306-308, 310, 317-322, 409-410, 511, 518 Lai, Pan-Chiu, 125 Lai, Whalen, 84, 265 Lamb, George, 90, 96 Lamotte, Étienne, 460 Lang, Karen C., 366 Langan, John, 252 Largen, Kritin Johnston, 157, 172 Lefebure, Leo D., 100-103, 115, 157, 214, 227, 235, 274 Lele, Amod, 70-71, 80, 161, 211, 336-337 Leloup, Jean-Yves, 227 Le Saux, Henry / Swami Abhishiktananda, 226 letting go (mukti / tyāga), 306, 315316, 318, 322, 518 Levine, Amy-Jill, 98 Li, Xuezhu, XXII liberation, 15, 49, 51, 125, 151, 164, 170, 184, 188, 192, 202, 210211, 245, 256, 259-261, 263, 276, 278, 291, 297-298, 319, 323, 348, 352-354, 361, 364, 369, 376, 379, 382, 398, 407408, 415-416, 423, 428, 430, 435-437, 439, 449-450, 454, 458, 465, 491, 494-495, 507, 514 liberation theology 201, 253 Liland, Frederik, 4-8, 39-40, 75-79 Lindtner, Christian, XX, 417, 420, 473 Linrothe, Rob, 31 Liu, Ming-Wood, 156 Löhr, Hermut, XVI Lopez, Donald S., 61, 65, 85, 87 Louth, Andrew, 359 love (maitrī) / charity (caritas) / divine love (agape), 48-49, 65, 78, 82-83, 87, 89-93, 96, 114, 121, 123-124, 133-135, 137, 140-142, 144, 156, 165, 172-174, 188,

GENERAL INDEX

199, 208-210, 212, 214-215, 241-242, 245-246; 248, 251-252, 256, 259-262, 265, 275, 285, 294-303, 324, 328, 348-349, 354, 357-367, 374-375, 385-389, 391, 395-396, 398-399, 401-404, 406, 409, 438, 442-443, 453, 460, 464-465, 487, 494, 497, 508-511, 518 Loy, David, 202, 458 Lubac, Henri de, 90-92, 95-96, 360, 402, 411, 460 Luther, Martin, 124, 360 Luz, Ulrich, 210 MacDonald, Anne, XXIII MacGregor, Geddes, 136 Madhyamaka / Mādhyamika, XXIXXII, 3, 11, 24, 42, 51, 53, 58-63, 71, 77, 81, 85, 112, 120, 195, 231, 275, 277, 282-283, 336, 342, 373, 382, 396, 413418, 421-424, 427, 430-432, 434-435, 437-438, 440-441, 443, 450-452, 457, 462-465, 471, 473, 475, 478, 480, 483-486, 519 Magliola, Robert, 314, 463 Mahākaruṇā, 248-249 Mahāmudrā, 22, 24 Mahāpuja: see Bodhisattva ritual / liturgy Mahāsāṃghika / Mahāsāṃghikas, 223, 239 Mahāyāna, 11, 15, 38-39, 41-42, 47, 51, 57-59, 61-62, 64, 73, 78-79, 82-84, 87-88, 92-94, 100, 102103, 112, 114-115, 121, 125, 132-134, 136, 141, 148, 151, 156, 165-166, 169-170, 173, 178, 186-187, 200, 205, 208210, 212, 217, 231, 234, 238240, 244-245, 248-250, 253, 256-257, 276, 284, 294, 300, 303, 308, 313-314, 320, 327, 335, 356-357, 365, 374-375,

577

384, 398, 408, 410, 412-413, 417, 423-425, 428-430, 435-439, 441-443, 449, 453-455, 457, 459, 461-465, 487, 490, 494, 499, 501-502, 506-508, 519 Mahoney, Richard, XIX, 80, 162, 164, 258 Maithrimurthi, Mudagamuwe, 208209, 399 Maitreya, 119, 143 Maitreyanātha / Āryāsaṅga, 117, 380, 399 maitrī: see love Makransky, John, 202, 439, 484 māna: see pride / self-confidence / arrogance Manjuśrī / Manjughoṣa / Manjunātha, 16, 18, 20, 23-30, 33-34, 36-38, 43-45, 47, 132, 140, 142-143, 146, 495-498, 512-515 Manjuśrīvarman, 15, 45 Manjuvajra, 16 Manjuvarman, 15, 29, 45 Mantra / mantra meditation, 20, 23, 28, 43, 168, 225, 231, 237, 239 Māra, 415, 436, 489-491, 504, 507 Marcel, Gabriel, 235 Martin, Dan, 14, 19 Masefield, Peter, 43 Matics, Marion L., 55, 121-122, 152, 184 Mātṛceta, 68-69, 118 Matsunaga, Alicia, 205, 331, 334, 338-341 Matsunaga, Daigan, 205, 331, 334, 338-341 Maulana Muhamma Ali, 385 māyā: see illusion / illusionism McDermott, James P., 279 McGuckin, John Anthony, 359 Meadows, Carol, 53, 60-62, 64, 69, 71, 258, 348, 400 meditation / contemplation (see also: absorption / meditation), 16-18, 20, 23, 27-28, 43, 46, 50, 54, 56, 59, 64, 77, 82, 86, 132-133, 144,

578

GENERAL INDEX

148, 162, 220, 222-223, 225229, 232, 235, 246, 309, 315316, 320, 329, 340-342, 344, 347-348, 351-352, 355-356, 359, 365, 369-370, 372, 374-375, 377, 380, 391, 394-395, 399401, 407, 422, 424, 429, 437, 446, 449-450, 454-455, 490-491, 494, 507, 518 Medonza, O.R., 205, 274 Melis, Nicole Martínez, 78-79 merit: see Karma Merton, Thomas, 88, 245-246, 360361 Mette, A., 502 Metz, Johann Baptist, 210 Michaels, Axel, 210 Michie, David, 77 Mīmāṃsā, 468, 472, 519 Minayeff, Ivan Pavlovič, XX, 79, 426 mindfulness (smṛti), 203-207, 218232, 235, 241, 244, 256, 324326, 328-329, 334, 348, 351, 397, 409, 424, 446, 448-449, 454-455, 457, 517, 519 Mipham, Jamgön, 57, 458 Mitchell, Donald W., 88-89 Mitchell, Margaret, 385 monasticism / monastic / monk / nun, XX-XXI, 3, 12, 17-18, 20-21, 23, 25-27, 32-34, 36-37, 39, 43-45, 48, 67, 69-72, 76, 78, 88-89, 101, 103, 112-113, 118, 137, 141, 148, 157, 161, 164, 174, 208-209, 218, 223-224, 228, 239-240, 243-247, 250, 283, 290, 300-301, 326-327, 351, 354-355, 358, 360, 366, 372, 398, 401, 405-406, 408, 428, 498, 504, 507, 514 Monier-Williams, Monier, 263, 314315 Moore, Charles A., 275 morality (śīla), 55, 57, 59, 62-64, 67, 85, 203, 207-208, 211, 217, 220, 247, 257, 397, 416, 453, 460, 507

Morgan, Peggy, 157 Moyaert, Marianne, 162 Mrozik, Susanne, 72, 80, 164, 167, 169, 365-366, 370-372, 408-409, 488 Mūlasarvāstivā / Mūlasarvāstivādins, 223, 239 Murti, T.R.V., 73, 421, 463 Muslim: see Islam Muto, Kazuo, 201 mysticism, 102, 209-210, 226, 263, 327, 415, 443, 478, 483-484 Nagao, Gadjin M., 160 Nāgārjuna, 4-5, 9, 11, 42, 51, 53, 114, 152, 238, 270, 277, 356, 365-366, 417-423, 430-431, 438, 441, 443, 453, 455, 460, 462464, 466, 470-471, 477-478, 484, 486 Nāgasena, 335 Nakamura, Hajime, 76 Nālandā, 3, 10-12, 17-18, 20, 22-23, 25-26, 28-34, 36-40, 43, 45, 47, 50, 68-70 Ñāṇamoli, Bhikkhu, 25, 68, 167, 187, 213, 218-219, 222-223, 231-232, 338-339, 365-368, 399, 431, 434 Nance, Richard F., 97, 103-104, 106, 239 Narada Thera, 357, 397 Narayanan, Vasudha, 142 Nattier, Jan, 114, 158-159, 211-212, 239, 270, 353-354, 356-357 Nelson, Barbara, 79 Netland, Harold, 479 Newland, Guy, XXII Ngok Loden Sherab (Blo-ldan-shesrab), 7 Nhat Hanh, Thich, 113, 229 nihilism / nihilist, 415, 461 Nirvana, XVI, 51, 60, 102, 113, 133-134, 153, 163-165, 168, 177, 179, 272, 276-277, 333, 393, 407, 417-422, 424, 428,

GENERAL INDEX

448, 453, 457-458, 461-462, 476-480, 483-484, 487, 510, 512 Nishitani, Keiji, 200-201, 294-295, 484 Noble Eightfold Path, 204-205, 213, 397, 416 non-violence: see violence Norman, K.R., 353 No(t)-Self (anātta / anātman), 59, 89, 95-96, 160, 165, 222, 232, 270, 281, 294, 314, 351-352, 355-356, 366, 381, 383, 396, 398, 449, 454-455, 460-464, 476 Numrich, Paul D., 464 nun: see monasticism / monastic / monk / nun Nyāṇaponika Mahāthera, 226, 229 Obermiller, Ernst, 14, 25-30, 35, 46, 48-50 Odin, Steve, 483 Ogden, Schubert, 172 O’Grady, Paul, 84 Ohnuma, Reiko, 166, 211, 242 Oldenberg, H., 301 O’Leary, Joseph S., 100, 102-103, 421-422, 441-442, 454, 463-465 O’Meara, John, 344 Onishi, Kaoru, 41, 70-71, 73 Opdenbrouw, Gage, 370 opposites, 55, 307-310, 312, 316, 518 Origen of Alexandria, 344, 359 Padmakara Translation Group, 53, 184, 243 Palihawadana, Mahinda, 167 Palmer, G.E.H., 401 Pandit, Moti Lal, 276 Panikkar, Raimon, 466 Paradise / paradisiac, 134, 249, 316, 323, 495, 497-498, 508 pāramitās: see virtues / perfections parātmaparivartana: see exchange of others and oneself parātmasamatā: see sameness of others and oneself

579

Parfit, Derek, 378 pariṇāmanā: see dedication / transfer of merit Parrinder, Geoffrey, 372 patience: see forbearance Paul / Pauline, 87, 102-103, 106107, 113-114, 121-124, 135, 144, 152, 162, 171, 175, 178, 180, 188-189, 198-201, 210, 214, 244, 251, 264-266, 274275, 291, 315, 327-329, 359, 371, 385-388, 400-402, 424, 465, 485, 494, 503, 508-512 patience: see forbearance Pātimokkha, 239 Pawo Tsuglak Trengwa, 13 Payne, Richard K., 320 Peck-Kubaczek, Cynthia, XIV, XVI, XIV Pegis, Anton C., 440 Pelser, G.M.M., 387 Perera, Luke, 93, 96, 119, 121, 175, 189 perfections: see virtues / perfections (pāramitās) pessimism / pessimist, 36, 96, 157 Pettit, John, 63, 82, 303 Pezzali, Amalia, 10, 13-15, 18, 34-35, 37-38, 40, 42, 47 philosophy, 3, 11, 32, 47, 53, 59, 61, 70-71, 77, 88, 96, 100, 136, 149, 156, 179, 215, 222, 250, 275, 343, 360-361, 373-374, 382, 396, 413415, 417-418, 422-424, 431, 434, 436, 439-442, 449-450, 463, 466, 470, 472, 474, 478-479, 482-483 Pieris, Aloysius, 99, 227 Plato, 343 pleasure: see joy Pomplun, Trent, 85-86 Powers, John, 216, 368 prajñā: see insight / wisdom Prajñākaramati, XXII-XXIII, 6, 66, 75, 239, 413, 420, 426, 429, 491 Prāsaṅgika, 3, 61, 413, 422-423, 438-439

580

GENERAL INDEX

prātimokṣa, 70, 137, 223, 239 pratītyasamutpāda / dependent origination, 194, 218, 270-271, 276278, 419, 456, 462, 466, 470-471, 474-475, 477-478, 480, 485, 487, prayer, XIII, 44, 49, 78, 85, 150, 157, 163, 171, 204, 206, 282, 401, 494, 502 Prebish, Charles S., 211, 223, 239 precepts, 148, 174, 182, 192, 196, 207, 245, 247-250, 253, 504, 507 pride / self-confidence / arrogance (māna), 21, 151, 192, 221, 252, 262, 290-291, 307, 310, 312, 317-323, 328, 363, 380, 390, 393-395, 403, 405-406, 409-410, 511, 518 Priest, Graham, XXII, 6 Priestley, Leonard C.D.C., 449 Priyaṃkara, 133 problem of evil: see theodicy process philosophy / process theology, 215, 478, 482-483 prophet / prophetic, 202, 284, 302, 387, 465 Pruden, Leo, 332, 336, 455 Przyluski, Jean, 355 Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagite, 440 Puhl, Louis J., 344 Puligandla, Ramakrishna, 275 Pure Land (see also: Sukhāvatī), 151152, 320, 497-499 purgatory, 136, 331, 343 purity: see impurity / purity Pye, Michael, 424 Queen, Christopher S., 211 Qur’ān, 46. Qvarnström, Olle, 452 Rābi’a of Basra, 134 Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli, 275 Rahner, Karl, 125-126, 136, 172, 345, 484-485 Rāmānuja, 216 Rao, Upender C., 61, 118-119

Raschmann, Simone, 75 Rashīd al-Dīn, 205 reality: see two truths / realities reincarnation / rebirth, 41, 63, 67-68, 83, 87, 117-119, 122, 136-137, 149, 158, 164, 183, 186-187, 190, 194, 196, 206, 214, 218, 233, 249, 272, 299, 312, 320-321, 331, 333, 335336, 368, 378, 384, 396, 430431, 495, 498, 508-509 relative truth / reality: see two truths / realities renouncement / renunciation, 16, 34-36, 41, 160-161, 174, 210, 349-350, 352-353, 357-359, 405, 518 resurrection, 122-123, 133-134, 178, 180, 200-201, 235, 343, 371, 502 revelation, 43-45, 98, 120, 388, 482, 509 Reynolds, Thomas E., 235 Rhys-Davids, T.W., 168, 179, 280, 301, 335, 378 Ridderbos, Herman, 123 right desire (chanda), 65, 306-307, 310, 315-316, 318, 320, 323, 518 Rinchen Zangpo (Rin-chen-bzanpo), 7 Rinpoche, Patrul, XVII ritual: see Bodhisattva ritual / liturgy Roberts, Peter Ala, 50 Robinson, James B., 21 Rockefeller, Steven C., 87 Rodrigo, Michael, 173-174 Rodrigues, Hillary, 142 Röder, Jörg, 502 Roesler, Ulrike, 38, 40-41 Roloff, Carola (Bhikṣunī Jampa Tsedroen), XVI, 26, 60 Rouse, W.H.D., 112, 132, 144, 151, 160, 164, 167, 169, 212, 233, 239-240, 244, 249-250, 270, 289, 298, 312, 321, 383, 500, 510

GENERAL INDEX

Roy, Pabitrakumar, 80, 212-214, 251, 413, 421 Ruegg, David Seyfort, XIX-XX, XXII, 3, 9-10, 40, 53, 59, 63 Ruether, Rosemarie Radford, 98, 202, 284 sacrifice / self-sacrifice, 87, 134, 144, 163, 165-166, 171-172, 174, 212, 237, 241-242-243, 287, 299, 311, 313, 376, 379, 388, 392, 409, 500, 503 Saddhatissa, H., 165 Sa’dī, 385 Saito, Akira, XVI, XIX, 4-11, 26, 40, 55-56, 59, 306, 347, 414-415, 457, 506 Saito, Naoki, 53, 60, 62 Śākya Lodro (Śākya-blos-gros), 7 salvation / soteriology, 31, 44, 49, 73, 83, 93, 114, 117, 117, 120121, 129, 132, 134, 137, 139, 146, 155-157, 164, 169, 171, 179, 204-205, 223, 227, 233234, 244, 263, 310, 315, 323, 327, 333, 342, 353, 356, 387, 401, 412, 415, 420, 429, 492, 500, 502, 509-510 Samantabhadra, 140, 142-143, 146, 152, 154, 159, 496-497 Samartha, Stanley J., 124-125 sameness of others and oneself (parātmasamatā), 56, 58, 306-307, 310, 347, 375, 377, 391, 399, 518 saṃprajanya: see circumspection Samsara, XVI, XXI, 57, 60, 67, 69, 102, 113, 123, 132, 136, 156157, 160, 176-179, 186-187, 190, 194-195, 207, 233, 235, 249, 272, 277, 302, 309, 313, 336, 368, 396, 419-422, 434; 437, 443, 457, 473, 476-478, 484, 490, 495 Sanders, E.P., 123, 251, 265, 329 Sangha (saṅgha), XVI, 69, 112, 114, 137, 141, 147-148, 167, 177,

581

187, 212, 219, 313, 327, 354355, 394-395, 423, 495, 504, 507 Śaṅkaradeva / Śaṅkananda, 31-34, 37-38, 42, 49 Sāṅkhya, 266, 270, 275-276, 444, 440-452, 456, 468-469, 473-474, 519 Śāntarakṣita, 10 Sarvajnādeva, 7 Sarvastivāda / Sarvāstivādins, 309, 413, 430 Sasaki, Kazunori, 42 Śāstrī, Haraprasad, XX, 13, 15 satyadvaya: see two truths / realities Sautrāntika / Sautrāntikas, 413, 430 Sazang / Sa-bzang Mati Panchen, 5, 7, 14, 25-34, 38, 46-48, 50 Scarborough, Milton, 482 Scheler, Max, 91 Schimmel, Annemarie, 46, 134 Schleiermacher, Friedrich, 172 Schlingloff, Dieter, 131, 213 Schmidt-Leukel, Perry, XIII-XIV, XIX, 43, 49, 84, 92, 95, 98, 107, 112-113, 148, 154, 179, 208, 210, 216, 240, 247, 265, 272, 276, 295, 314, 352, 368, 416, 418, 422, 425, 439, 479, 486 Schmithausen, Lambert, XIX, 50, 63, 82, 204-205, 247, 250, 303, 377-378, 391, 400, 424, 429, 453, 455 Schweitzer, Albert, 209-210 Scott, Archibald, 263, 314 self / ego, 56-59, 61, 64-66, 81-82, 85, 87, 89, 94-96, 120, 129-130, 134-135, 148, 151-152, 155, 160, 165, 169, 193, 197-198, 200-201, 205, 208-209, 224, 230, 232, 234-236, 245-246, 256, 266-267, 270, 273, 275276, 278, 281-282, 288, 290, 294-296, 299-301, 303, 314, 323, 328, 333, 345, 347-348, 351-352, 356, 360, 372, 374-

582

GENERAL INDEX

384, 386, 388-410, 414, 417, 423, 425, 431, 436-437, 441442, 444-446, 448-454, 457, 459, 460-467, 470, 472-473, 478, 480, 500, 511, 519 self-confidence: see pride self-control (ātmavidheyatā / vaśitā), 56, 306-307, 310, 316, 318, 325, 328, 518 self-effort, 151-152, 314 self-interest, 66, 120, 193, 214, 241, 244, 256, 259, 290, 320, 323, 334-335, 377, 382, 393, 395, 400, 405, 411 self-sacrifice: see sacrifice self-surrender / adoption of bodhicitta, 54, 56, 141-142, 144, 153180, 262, 517 sex / sexual / sexuality, 70, 133, 232, 243, 247, 271-272, 310, 322, 340-341, 343, 354-355, 364-375 Sharma, Arvind, 43, 99, 200 Sharma, Chandradhar, 275 Sharma, Parmananda, 75, 79, 184, 413 Shaw, Sarah, 205 Sheveland, John N., 386-387 Shih, Bhikṣunī Heng-ching, 165 Shimizu, Masumi, 465 Shinran Shōnin, 151, 315 Shizutani, Masao, 239 Siderits, Mark, XXII, 82, 421-422, 462 śīla: see morality sin / sinner / sinful, XXI, 115, 117, 119, 123-124, 133, 139, 143-151, 155, 171-173, 184-185, 187-189, 192, 196, 198-199, 201, 203, 205, 219, 222, 237, 239, 245, 249-250, 261-262, 265, 268, 273, 275, 282, 285, 287, 290-291, 296, 299-300, 302, 308, 311, 316-317, 320, 323-324, 333, 335, 338, 340-342, 344-345, 362, 371, 409, 412, 426, 488, 498, 504505, 512, 515, 517

skillful means / upāya, 88, 217, 248251, 275, 381, 424, 430, 440443, 465 Skilton, Andrew, XVI, XX, 4-6, 11, 53-55, 70-71, 80, 82, 142, 184, 188, 242, 258, 305, 326, 348, 355, 377, 394, 405-406, 414, 430, 497, 500, 514 Skudlarek, William, 88 sloth, 307-309, 324-325 Smith, Bardwell, 227 Smith, Gene, 76 smṛti: see mindfulness Söding, Thomas, 509 solitude, 327, 348, 351, 353-357, 359-361, 489, 504, 512 Solomon, Michael, 320 Soma Thera, 157 Son of God, 113 son(s) of Buddha / Buddha-son, 122, 128, 155, 175, 180, 257, 316, 504 Sonam Gyaltsen Pal Zangpo, 13 Soninbayar, Khuslen, 76 Sopa, Geshe Lhundub, 89 soteriology: see salvation soul, 115, 123, 136, 343-344, 371, 445, 452, 460, 463, 482, 519 Spae, Joseph J., 84, 92 spirit and flesh, 114, 198-199, 291, 327, 359, 512 spirit of Christ, 96, 115, 121-125, 133-135, 162, 189, 199, 265266, 388, 503 Spirit of God / Holy Spirit, 113-114, 121-125, 135, 152, 171, 189, 229, 291, 328, 464, 509 Sponberg, Alan, 143 Sprung, Mervyn, 417, 421, 472 Śrāvakayāna / Śrāvakas (Hearers), 114, 311, 314, 423, 428, 431, 436-437, 449, 494, 505, 508, 519 stamina (sthāma), 306, 315, 318, 320 Starnitzke, Dierk, 198-199, 201 Steindl-Rast, David, 87, 96

GENERAL INDEX

Steinkellner, Ernst, XIII-XVI, 55-56, 60, 66, 72, 79, 105, 118, 136, 144-145, 184, 187-188, 195, 200, 239, 243, 258, 394, 420, 426, 429, 431, 460, 468, 491, 517-519 Stender, Daniel, XX, XXIII Sterling Berry, Thomas, 314-315 Stowers, Stanley K., 198 Streng, Frederick, 422 Stuart, Daniel, 332 Stucco, Guido, 85 Studholme, Alexander, 380, 498, 501-502 Studstill, Randall, 84 Sturm, Hans P., 463 Suárez, Francisco, 344 substitution, 171-173, 249, 515. Sudhana, 117, 119 suffering, XXIII, 15-16, 30, 65, 84, 89, 91, 93, 101, 116, 120, 123, 127, 129-131, 134, 147, 149150, 153-155, 157-159, 161-162, 164, 177, 179, 185, 187-191, 194, 196, 202-204, 206, 210211, 213, 215-218, 222, 234236, 246, 256, 258-269, 271275, 278, 280, 282, 284, 286, 288, 291, 294, 296, 299-301, 307-311, 313, 315-317, 320, 324, 334, 336-337, 339-340, 343-345, 350, 352, 363-364, 368-369, 375-380, 382-384, 386, 388-391, 393, 395-396, 398, 401, 403-405, 407-408, 415-416, 427, 429, 431, 434, 437, 443, 446, 453-455, 461, 465, 476, 488-491, 493-495, 497-498, 500, 504-505, 511, 513-515, 518 Sukhāvatī (see also: Pure Land), 63, 152, 316, 320, 495, 497-499, 508 Sumatikīrti, 7 Sumpa Khenpo, 14, 31, 34-38, 41-42, 47 sūnyatā: see emptiness

583

Suzuki, Daisetz Teitaro, 133-134, 229 Sweet, Michael J., 76-77, 80, 414, 419, 421, 424, 443, 471, 488 Swidler, Leonard, 484 Syed, Renate, 367 Taixu (T’ai-hsu), 480 Takakusu, J., 69, 118, 406 Takayama, Sadami, 315 Takeuchi, Yoshinori, 370 Tambiah, Stanley J., 209 Tantrism / Tantric, 14-15, 19, 22, 24, 31, 40-42, 50, 52, 63, 118, 195 Tāranātha, 7-8, 14, 28, 31, 34-38, 41-42, 46-47, 69 Tathāgata, 117, 151, 427, 432, 434, 460, 510 tathāgatagarbha: see Buddha Germ tātparya: see full dedication Tatz, Mark, 133, 247-249, 499 Tauscher, Helmut, XIX, XXII, 418 Tengyur, 4, 7, 9-10, 26, 76 Tenzin, Geshe Lobsang, 89 Teresa of Ávila, 189 Teresa of Calcutta (mother), 210, 401 The Cowherds, XIX, 82, 342, 463 Theodicy / problem of evil, 136, 215-217, 293, 458 Theravāda / Theravādins, 84, 142, 205, 208, 222-223, 225, 239, 247-248, 377, 413, 438, 463, 479 Thérèse of Lisieux, 121 thirst (tṛṣṇā), 194, 218, 309, 368, 406, 428, 436, 447, 457, 488, 491 Thomas Aquinas, 83, 440, 481-482, 486-487 Thomas, E.J., 380, 501 Thompson, Ross, 229 Thrangu Rinpoche (khenchen), 458 three bodies of Buddha: see trikāya three jewels: see triratna

584

GENERAL INDEX

Thurman, Robert A.F., 87, 96, 158, 161, 217 Tibet / Tibetan, XX, XXII, 3-10, 13-15, 17, 19, 24, 26, 28, 40, 52, 71, 75-79, 83-86, 94, 104-105, 120, 128, 142, 152-153, 184, 202, 239, 243, 247, 278, 336, 394, 399, 407, 409, 420, 426, 431, 443, 488, 497 Tillemans, Tom J.F., XXII Tilley, Terrence, 93 Timko, Philip, 360 Tobden, Geshe Yeshe, 78, 94, 184, 394, 458 Todd, Warren Lee, 63, 80, 213 Tola, Fernando, 431, 453, 486, 490 tolerance / intolerance, 106, 191, 193, 217, 250, 274, 283-285, 406 transfer of merit: see dedication / transfer of merit (pariṇāmanā) transformation, 45, 58, 89, 118, 122, 135, 158-159, 161, 166, 200201, 214, 235, 245, 314, 323, 371, 374-375, 383, 396, 411412, 461-462, 465, 468, 474475, 513 Tribe, Anthony, 116, 413, 430 trikāya (three bodies of Buddha), 63, 94, 112, 438 dharmakāya (body of Truth / emptiness), 63, 111-112, 114, 116, 178, 483 nirmāṇakāya (physical body), 112 saṃbhogakāya (celestial body), 112, 144 Trinity, 94, 441, 483 triratna (three jewels), XVI, 112, 141-142, 145, 147, 389 tṛṣṇā: see thirst truth, XV, XXI-XXII, 22, 33, 72, 91-92, 103-104, 106-107, 112, 147, 157, 245, 258, 266, 275278, 283, 310, 312, 338, 352, 360, 373, 382, 402, 413, 417425, 431, 438-443, 452, 454,

458-460, 462, 464, 469, 472, 476-480, 483-485, 491-492, 506, 510, 512, 515 Tsonawa, Lobsang N., 14, 38 Tsongkhapa, 85, 418 Tuck, Andrew P., 415 two truths / realities (satyadvaya), XXI-XXIII, 58-59, 77, 81, 277278, 283, 336, 338, 345, 382, 413, 415, 417-425, 431, 438443, 452, 454, 458-459, 462, 464, 472, 476-480, 483-485, 491, 512, 515 Tworkov, Helen, 72, 408 Ucchūṣma, 31, 37 Ueda, Shizuteru, 201 Ueda, Yoshifumi, 151 ultimate (absolute) truth / reality, XXII-XXII, 21, 58, 77, 81, 88, 93, 112, 116, 119, 121, 126, 143, 151, 171, 178-179, 200-201, 217-218, 266, 277-278, 295, 302, 312, 338, 345, 361, 373, 382, 402, 412-413, 415, 417422, 425-428, 431-434, 438-443, 455, 457-459, 461-462, 466, 469-470, 476-488, 502, 511, 515, Unebe, Toshia, 205 Unno, Taitetsu, 151 upāya: see skillful means Upaniṣads, 63, 115 Urbaniak, Jakub,, 263 Vaidya, P.L., XX Vaiśeṣika / Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, 267, 270, 275-276, 445, 449, 451, 468, 472, 519 Vajradhvaja, 317, 320-321, 323 Vajrapāṇi, 151, 496-497 Vallée Poussin, Louis de La, XX, XXIII, 90, 426 value of life, 68, 185-190, 310, 517 Vanderberghe, L., 229 Van Put, Ineke, 331-332, 339, 341

GENERAL INDEX

van Schaik, Sam, 6 Vasubandhu, 104-107, 196, 245, 337, 435 Vedānta / Advaita Vedānta, 417, 421, 452, 458, 472 vegetarianism, 50, 207 Vermes, Geza, 135 Vetter, Tilmann, 399, 418, 462 Vibhūticandra, 8, 14-15, 19, -514 Vicente, Fernando, 370 Viévard, Ludovic, 508 vigor (vīrya), 54-56, 58-59, 61-62, 64, 67, 207, 217, 305-329, 347, 349, 400, 410, 511, 518 violence / non-violence, 106, 161, 247-248, 252-253, 283-284, 286, 406 virtues / perfections (pāramitās), 27, 54-55, 57-64, 66-67, 83, 85, 127, 129, 136, 139-140, 164, 169170, 180, 184, 190, 204, 206207, 212, 215, 217-218, 236, 240-241, 243, 251, 255, 283, 286-290, 293, 296, 298, 313, 316, 319, 354, 388, 390, 413, 416, 508-510 Völker, Fabian, 215, 458 war / warrior, 30, 34-35, 48, 194, 201, 248, 250, 252, 262, 284, 308, 325 Waldenfels, Hans, XIII Walker, Susan, 86 Wallace, B. Alan, 153, 184, 242, 407, 464 Wallace, Vesna A., 153, 184, 242, 407 Walshe, Maurice, 112, 485 Walzer, Michael, 252 Wangchuk, Dorji, XXI, 61, 120, 128, 137, 143 Ware, Kallistos (archimandrite), 401 wealth / power (artha), 67, 183, 272, 352-353, 368-369, 512 Weber, Max, 209-210, 327 Westerhoff, Jan, 82

585

Westerholm, Stephen, 251 Wetlesen, John, 82, 377, 383-384 Whitehead, Alfred North, 215, 465, 482 Williams, Janet P., 483, 486 Williams, Paul, XIX, 11, 39, 46, 77-78, 80-84, 90-92, 96, 116, 142-143, 151, 160, 173, 382383, 413, 430-431, 438, 479482, 486 Wilson, Elizabeth, 365 Winternitz, Moritz, 73 wisdom: see insight Wiseman, James A., 89 Wolter, Michael, 199 woman / women / girl(s), XXI, 16, 28-29, 34, 36, 41, 69-70, 131, 133, 196, 203, 205, 222, 237, 239, 248, 267, 320, 334-335, 341, 343, 354, 367, 369-370, 372, 403, 406, 408-410, 425427, 446, 496, 498-499, 503, 507-508 Woodward, F.L., 208 world / worldly, XXIII, 22, 33, 51, 57, 60, 64-66, 78, 80, 83, 89, 91, 93-94, 101-102, 116-117, 119, 121-122, 126-127, 129, 131, 135-136, 139-141, 143-149, 151, 153, 158-159, 161, 164-165, 167-169, 171, 175-178, 181, 183, 185, 189, 191-192, 195197, 203, 206-210, 212, 214218, 223, 225, 235-236, 245246, 248-249, 255, 259, 264, 269, 272-278, 285-286, 289, 292-294, 296, 299, 302, 309310, 313, 317, 323, 328, 331, 334-338, 342, 348-361, 365, 368-369, 374-377, 379-381, 383-386, 388-393, 396-399, 401, 404, 406-407, 416-417, 419-421, 423, 425-427, 434-435, 441, 454-455, 460, 462, 464-465, 467-473, 475-477, 481-491, 493, 495, 500, 503-507, 510-515, 518

586

GENERAL INDEX

Wright, Dale S., 258, 281-284 Xuanzang (Hsuan-tsang), 10 Yagi, Seiichi, 484 Yama, 146, 149, 151, 185, 309, 316, 337-339 Yampolsky, Philip, 45 Yandell, Keith, 479 Yijing (I-tsing), 10, 68, 405 yoga, 225, 226, 474 Yogācāra / Yogācārins, 11, 59, 63, 77, 112, 195, 206, 303, 336-337,

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