British Traders in the East Indies, 1770-1820: At Home in the Eastern Seas': VOLUME 19 (Worlds of the East India Company) 9781783275533, 9781787449305

Table of contents :
Copyright
Contents
List of illustrations
Preface
Acknowledgements
A note on orthography and unit conversion
Abbreviations
Introduction: the Indian origins of the British country trade
Chapter One Merchant friends: country traders and the Malays I
Chapter Two Political allies: country traders and the Malays II
Chapter Three Inadvertent imperialists: country traders and British officials
Chapter Four Smugglers and enemies: country traders and the Dutch
Chapter Five The decline of the country trade in the Malay Archipelago
Conclusion
A note on sources
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

WORLDS OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY  Volume 19

British Traders in the East Indies 1770–1820

WORLDS OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY ISSN 1752-5667 Series Editor H. V. Bowen (Swansea University) Editorial Board Andrew Cook (British Library) Rajat Datta (Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi) P. J. Marshall (King’s College, London) Nigel Rigby (National Maritime Museum) This series offers high-quality studies of the East India Company, drawn from across a broad chronological, geographical and thematic range. The rich history of the Company has long been of interest to those who engage in the study of Britain’s commercial, imperial, maritime and military past, but in recent years it has also attracted considerable attention from those who explore art, cultural and social themes within an historical context. The series will thus provide a forum for scholars from different disciplinary backgrounds, and for those whose have interests in the history of Britain (London and the regions), India, China, Indonesia, as well as the seas and oceans. The editors welcome submissions from both established scholars and those beginning their career; monographs are particularly encouraged but volumes of essays will also be considered. All submissions will receive rapid, informed attention. They should be sent in the first instance to: Professor H. V. Bowen, Department of History and Classics, Swansea University, Swansea SA2 8PP Previously published titles are listed at the back of this volume

BRITISH TRADERS IN THE EAST INDIES 1770–1820 ‘At Home in the Eastern Seas’ W. G. Miller

THE BOYDELL PRESS

© W. G. Miller 2020 All Rights Reserved. Except as permitted under current legislation no part of this work may be photocopied, stored in a retrieval system, published, performed in public, adapted, broadcast, transmitted, recorded or reproduced in any form or by any means, without the prior permission of the copyright owner The right of W. G. Miller to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 First published 2020 The Boydell Press, Woodbridge 978-1-78327-553-3 hardback 978-1-78744-930-5 ePDF The Boydell Press is an imprint of Boydell & Brewer Ltd PO Box 9, Woodbridge, Suffolk IP12 3DF, UK and of Boydell & Brewer Inc. 668 Mt Hope Avenue, Rochester, NY 14620–2731, USA website: www.boydellandbrewer.com A CIP catalogue record for this title is available from the British Library The publisher has no responsibility for the continued existence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate Cover image: map taken from ‘Nederlandsch Oost-Indie’ by A. Baedeker (Rotterdam, Otto Petri, 1870 (?)), Engraved by D. Heyse.

For Janet Miller (née Carnie) and Margaret Joy Miller (née Dodds)

“Pedagang orang paling giat di antara umat manusia ini, Tuan. Dia orang yang paling pintar. Orang menamainya juga “saudagar”, orang dengan seribu akal … Perdagangan membikin orang terbebas dari pangkat-pangkat, tak membeda-bedakan sesama manusia, apakah dia pembesar atau bawahan, bahkan budak pun.” Pramoedya Ananta Toer “Traders are the most dynamic of all people. They are also the cleverest. They are also referred to as a “saudagar”, people with a thousand schemes … Trade also frees a person from being concerned about other people’s status; traders don’t differentiate between individuals, be they important people, those of low rank, or even slaves.” Pramoedya Ananta Toer, Jejak Langkah (Hasta Mitra, 2000) pp. 400–1

CONTENTS

List of illustrations

xi

Preface xiii Acknowledgements

xv

A note on orthography and unit conversion

xvii

Abbreviations xix Introduction: the Indian origins of the British country trade

1

Chapter One  Merchant friends: country traders and the Malays I

19

Chapter Two  Political allies: country traders and the Malays II

51

Chapter Three  Inadvertent imperialists: country traders and British officials

97

Chapter Four  Smugglers and enemies: country traders and the Dutch 151 Chapter Five  The decline of the country trade in the Malay Archipelago

177

Conclusion 185 A note on sources 187 Bibliography 191 Index 209

ILLUSTRATIONS

Maps 1  The Malay Archipelago and surrounding countries, with places mentioned in the text.

xxi

2  The western Malay Archipelago, with places mentioned in the text.

xxii

3  The eastern Malay Archipelago, with places mentioned in the text.

xxiii

Figures 1  European ships of various countries anchored at Whampoa, near Canton, in the Pearl River, late eighteenth century. Chinese artist. (Goteborgs stadsmuseum. In the Public Domain and published with permission under Creative Commons).

10

2  A country trader vessel, from the painting, ‘The “Charlotte of Chittagong” and other vessels at anchor in the River Hoogly’ by Franz Balthazar Solvyns. 1792. (© National Maritime Museum, London, BHC1100).

11

3  From a View of “Batavia Roads”, 5 October 1815 from the “Indefatigable” by Joseph Arnold. (Published with the permission of the National Library of Australia, PIC volume 560 R79650).

23

xii Illustrations 4  Syarif Kasim of Pontianak’s letter to T. S. Raffles in Malacca, 14 February 1811, agreeing to a request that he take care of the English country traders trading at Pontianak. (© The British Library Board, MSS Eur.D.742/1, fol. 33a).

90

5  View of the Entrance to Dorey Harbour, or “New Albion” as it was referred to by English country traders in the 1790s, with Forrest’s vessel, “Tartar Galley”. (From Thomas Forrest, A Voyage to New Guinea and the Moluccas, (1780) (1969), plate 12, opp. page 150).

112

6  Robert Townsend Farquhar in 1817 when Governor of Mauritius. (Reproduced with the permission of the National Archives Department, Coromandel, Mauritius).

121

7  View of Ternate with ships, in about 1860. (A lithograph by C. W. Mieling, from S. A. Buddingh, Reizen over Java (1859–61)).

158

The author and publisher are grateful to all the institutions and individuals listed for permission to reproduce the materials in which they hold copyright. Every effort has been made to trace the copyright holders; apologies are offered for any omission, and the publisher will be pleased to add any necessary acknowledgement in subsequent editions.

PREFACE

Historians have long acknowledged the importance of country traders in the increase in English trade with China and in the expansion of British influence in Southeast Asia in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. However, comparatively little is known about the individuals who carried out this trade. From amongst the hundreds of ships’ captains who engaged in innumerable commercial transactions between 1770 and 1820, only a few have received any great attention. An account of the life of Francis Light has been published because of his association with the founding of Penang while Thomas Forrest has received some attention because of the published accounts of his ground-breaking voyages. No diaries or ships’ logs are readily available, even if they exist at all. A couple of general reminiscences of life at sea which include some references to the country trade may be found, but are not detailed and were written decades after the events they describe. The only extant description of life on a country trader ship is to be found in a series of letters written by a youthful 3rd Officer, John Adolphus Pope, who sailed in the Western part of the Malay Archipelago between 1786 and 1788. The reason for the paucity of documented material lies in the fact that unlike the actions of the servants of the large trading companies, the operations of the country traders only came into official records when there was some misadventure, when they were allotted an official task or when they fell foul of Company procedure. The present work is an attempt to fill this vacuum. It will show how important the impact of the country traders was, firstly, on a selection of the Malay societies with which they came into

xiv Preface contact, for British trade and empire building, and as an irritant to the Dutch administration. It will demonstrate through the experience of numerous individuals how they contributed in a variety of ways to these historical developments.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The late David Bassett first stimulated my interest in country traders. I am most grateful to the following people who provided advice, guidance and support during research for this work: Radin Fernando, Anthony Reid, Robert Cribb, Barbara Andaya and Annabel Gallop. Russell Jones, Khasnor Crouch, Dianne Lewis, James Fox, Greg Fealy, Virginia Hooker, George Quinn, Jan Herivel, Terry King, Campbell Macknight, Andrew Smith, Margaret Steven, Peter Worsley, John Bastin, Huw Bowen, Roxanne Missingham and Michael Laffan all assisted me in different ways. Ann Smith read and edited the entire manuscript and made significant suggestions about the arrangement of the work. Any errors remain mine alone. Peter Sowden of The Boydell Press bore with unstinting patience my many queries and guided me during the publishing process. The work could not have been undertaken without the assistance of the staff of the ANU Library, the National Library of Australia, the British Library and the Bodleian Library. I am also grateful to Karina Pelling, CartoGIS, College of Asia and the Pacific, ANU, for the production of the maps. The following institutions were most generous in granting permission to reproduce the illustrations included in the text: Goteborgs stadsmuseum, Goteborg, Sweden; National Library of Australia, Canberra, Australia; National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, UK; Asia Pacific and Africa Collections, British Library, London, UK; National Archives Department, Coromandel, Mauritius.

A NOTE ON ORTHOGRAPHY AND UNIT CONVERSION

Spelling of place names follows that of contemporary English usage, hence “Amboyna”. Alternative versions are given in parenthesis on the first occasion the word occurs in the text, e.g. “Ambon”, “Amboina”.

Weights and measures 1 picul = 60 kg (133 lbs) = 100 katis (cattee)

ABBREVIATIONS

ASAA Bod. Lib BFC BKI BL BpolC BSC EIC IIAS

Asian Studies Association of Australia Bodleian Library, Oxford Bengal Foreign Consultations Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indie British Library Bengal Political Consultations Bengal Secret Consultations East India Company (Great Britain)   International Institute for Asian Studies (Netherlands) Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (Singapore) ISEAS JMBRAS Journal of the Malaysian Branch Royal Asiatic Society Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkekunde KITLV MBRAS Malaysian Branch Royal Asiatic Society Madras Political Consultations MpolC Madras Military Consultations MMC MPC Madras Public consultations National Archives (The Hague, Netherlands) NA Nordic Institute of Asian Studies NIAS NS New Series Oriental and India Office Collections. British Library OIOC (Asia Pacific and Africa Collections) SFR Sumatra Factory Records SOAS School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London Straits Settlements Records SSR

xx Abbreviations TBG VOC

Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-, Land-, en Volkenkunde uitgegeven door het Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie [Dutch East India Company]

Map 1: The Malay Archipelago and surrounding countries, with places mentioned in the text.

Map 2: The western Malay Archipelago, with places mentioned in the text.

Map 3: The eastern Malay Archipelago, with places mentioned in the text.

Introduction THE INDIAN ORIGINS OF THE BRITISH COUNTRY TRADE

To distinguish it from the trade which took place between India and Britain, the British in India referred to trade along the coast of India and between Asian ports as the “country” trade.1 From the 1770s, with the increase in European and Parseeowned ships captained by English commanders, the term “British country trade” came to define a whole new category of this activity. It was nothing less than a “commercial revolution” in the

1

For various connotations of the term “country trade” or “intra-Asian trade” in its widest sense see, Furber, Holden, John Company at Work: A Study of European Expansion in India in the Late Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951); Furber, Holden, Rival Empires of Trade in the Orient 1600–1800 (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1976); Furber, Holden, Private Fortunes and Company Profits in the India Trade in the 18th Century, edited by Rosane Rocher (Aldershot: Variorum, 1997), chap. X, p. 112; Andaya, L. Y., The World of Maluku: Eastern Indonesia in the Early Modern Period (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993), p. 281; Riello, Giorgio and Tirthankar Roy, How India Clothed the World: The World of South Asian Textiles, 1500–1850 (Leiden: Brill, 2009), p. 16; Greenberg, Michael, British Trade and The Opening of China 1800–42 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951), p. 10. “Country trader” may apply to both the vessel and to the merchant mariner in charge of the ship. Tagliacozzo uses the term “Anglo-Indian country traders”, Tagliacozzo, Eric, ‘A Necklace of Fins: Marine Goods Trading in Maritime Southeast Asia, 1780–1860’, International Journal of Asian Studies, 1:1 (2004), 23–48.

2

Introduction

Indian Ocean.2 Not only was this characterized by a change in the nature of the trade, but was also a result of the huge increase in tonnage. The largest focus of this trade was Southeast Asia. But while this study is chiefly about the country traders in the Malay Archipelago, it is necessary to explain the Sub-continental origins of the group. Europeans, in particular Portuguese laymen, had been trading privately in Asia since the sixteenth century when Europeans first arrived in numbers. Portugal had trading bases in India, East Asia and Southeast Asia. As Boxer has noted, whatever their official role, “… many of the ‘fidalgos’ and clerics who affected to despise all commercial pursuits, were themselves traders on a considerable scale, either from necessity or from choice”.3 British private trade in India originated in the seventeenth century in parallel with the official trade of the largely monopolistic English East India Company (EIC). Much of this private trade was undertaken by Company servants and was initially centred on Surat, on India’s west coast.4 The major part of this early trade by EIC servants was carried out covertly using Asian shipping or on Company vessels. However, in 1665 the English Company cut its losses and said its own shipping would not be involved in port-to-port trade in the Indies. By 1675/76 the right of Company servants to engage in private trade was asserted.5 It benefitted the Company to thus permit private trading by its servants, for in doing so the Company could minimize the amounts it paid its staff. Private trading was permitted to allow the servants of the company the capacity to obtain a “competency” in their situation. The Company, it was said, John Company, p. 180. Boxer, C. R., Francisco Vieira de Figueiredo; A Portuguese Merchant-Adventurer in South East Asia, 1624–1667 (‘s-Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1967), p. 50. For the Portuguese in the country trade, see also Furber, Rival Empires, pp. 266–7. 4 Watson, Ian Bruce, Foundation for Empire: English Private Trade in India 1659–1760 (New Delhi: Vikas, 1980), p. x. 5 Watson, Foundation for Empire, pp. 64–5, 74–5; Marshall, P. J., East Indian Fortunes: The British in Bengal in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), p. 19. 2 Furber, 3

Introduction

3

paid its servants “mere pittances and allowed them to recoup themselves by private trade”.6 Permitting its servants to be involved in local trade opened up the risk of corruption by Company employees, for their careers became a series of conflicts and compromises between their private goals and public duties.7 Balancing this conflict of interest between the Company’s ends and an adequate income for the individual was an issue that filled much of the correspondence between India and Leadenhall Street. There was a need to ensure the profits made by private trading did not negatively impact on the profits of the Company or the attention devoted to their own pursuits by the servants did not lead to neglect of their official duties. There were numerous ways the servants could, and did, profit from local trade. They could engage in the legitimate purchase, shipment and sale of local goods between Indian and other Asian ports. In addition, however, they could rent out vessels of which they had ownership, or part-ownership, to the Company to carry Company goods or other employees. They could purchase goods privately from local producers, selling them to the Company at a higher price. They could themselves buy the Company’s goods, retailing them locally at a higher price.

Free merchants In addition to the private trade carried on by Company servants, from about the 1650s “free merchants”, independent of the Company, owning and commanding their own vessels, also began to engage in the country trade.8 These former Company servants, or naval officers from East Indiamen, may have Hallward, N. L., William Bolts: A Dutch Adventurer under John Company (Cambridge: University Press, 1920), p. v. 7 Reber, Anne Lindsey, ‘The Private Trade of the British in West Sumatra, 1735–1770’ (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Hull, 1977), preface. 8 Bassett, D. K., ‘The British Country Trader and Sea Captain in South East Asia in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries’, Journal of the Historical Society, University of Malaya, 1:2 (1961), 9–14, at p. 9. 6

4

Introduction

acquired enough capital to purchase their own vessels by serving as naval officers for Indian or Armenian traders. Hamilton says English seamen were much sought after by Indian owners, to whom they paid “very handsome salaries”,9 and there was a thriving free merchant community of Europeans at Madras by the 1670s.10 The private trading vessels owned and commanded by British citizens were restricted to ports east of the Cape of Good Hope; the trade to Europe was to remain the privilege of the EIC. In contrast to the English East India Company, the Dutch East India Company (VOC), participated in the local Asian trade, in addition to shipping goods to and from Europe. Officially it did not allow its VOC servants to trade privately.11 As a result, many Dutch officials clandestinely cooperated with the British to improve their income and as a consequence actually encouraged the growth of the British country trader fleet. As will be demonstrated below, the rivalry of the two Companies, their contrasting policies regarding private trade and their different interpretation of the principle of the right to free navigation within the Archipelago were continuing issues impacting on country traders during the decades under consideration here. By the 1740s there was a shift in British country trading from Surat, Bombay and other ports on the west coast of India, to the Coromandel Coast. By this time Madras had become the centre of the British private trade with British-owned vessels.12 However, most of the trade was still between Indian ports, as well as between the west coast of India and the Gulf, with only a smaller proportion to “the eastward”, i.e. the Malay Archipelago and Canton. The 1750s saw the end of the era where British interest in India was focused merely on trading posts, to one characterHamilton, Alexander, A New Account of the East Indies, ed. by Sir William Foster, (2 vols, London: Argonaut Press, 1930, orig. 1727), vol. 1, p. 133. 10 Bassett, ‘The British Country Trader’, p. 11. 11 “The English East India Company placed less restrictions than any other on the private concerns of its servants”: Furber, Private Fortunes, chap. VII, p. 25. 12 Watson, Foundation for Empire, p. 42. 9

Introduction

5

ized by military expansion in the interior; a so-called shift from “factory” to “fort”,13 or what Furber calls a shift from an Empire of Trade to an Empire of Conquest.14 The British expansion and consolidation on the sub-continent was exemplified by the 1757 victory by Clive over the Mughal army at Plassey and the English victory over their colonial rivals, the French, in 1760, as part of the Seven Years’ War (1756–63). Madras, Bengal and Bombay became the three Presidencies and the seats of British power. Following this territorial expansion, in 1773, as part of an attempt to curb excessive exploitation of the local population by the Company and its servants, the Regulating Act in England established Calcutta as the main political centre with the supreme Governor-General and Council having authority over Madras and Bombay. The “Free merchants”, or “Free mariners” as they were also now called when they traded at sea, began to dominate the country trade. Free mariners could be retired or dismissed Company servants, sailors permitted by the Company to become free merchants, as well as deserters and shipwrecked mariners.15 Increasingly, Company servants involved in the country trade found themselves competing with the growing coterie of free mariners. Company servants at Bencoolen, for example, in the 1760s and 1770s found they had to compete in private trade with the “numerous Bengal captains who were swelling British traffic to eastern Indonesia”.16 To take one settlement as an example, at Madras in 1786 there were 175 Europeans who had come out as sailors or soldiers but were by that time private citizens trading in the town.17 These merchants had become extremely influential and the Madras government was dependent on their wealth and banking facilities. At that time, other than opening a shop, the easiest occupation to

Foundation for Empire, pp. 1, 16. Rival Empires of Trade, p. 328. 15 Watson, Foundation for Empire, p. 139; Furber, Rival Empires of Trade, p. 306. 16 Reber, The Private Trade, pp. 316, 391. 17 Furber, Private Fortunes, chap. IV, pp. 256, 276. 13 Watson, 14 Furber,

6

Introduction

enter was that of captain or owner of a country trading vessel, and this occupation was extremely lucrative.18 There was at the same time a shift in some areas away from indigenous commerce. Shipping moved from the Indian trade centres of Masulipatnam, Surat and Hugli to the English centres of Madras, Bombay and Calcutta as British trade replaced Indian trade, as well as superseding that of other European nations, Dutch, French and Danish. The prosperity of Bengal, a centre of private British trade even before Plassey, increased as the century wore on.19

Dimensions of the country shipping The country trade saw a remarkable growth during the eighteenth century amounting to hundreds of vessels. Furber says that in 1713/14 there were 15 or 20 country traders berthed at Calcutta; in 1743/44 there would have been 40 or 50.20 By 1783, according to Parkinson, the total number of ships in the country trade was 128 and by 1791, the number had increased to 575.21 By 1802 the home fleet of Calcutta alone was said to consist of seventy-seven vessels.22 From the statistics available for ships arriving at Whampoa in China, where many of the products carried by country traders from the Malay Archipelago ended up, in 1786 there were 23

Private Fortunes, chap. IV, p. 258. East Indian Fortunes, p. 29; Watson, Foundation for Empire, pp. 42, 110. 20 Furber, Rival Empires, p. 131. 21 Parkinson, C. Northcote, Trade in the Eastern Seas 1793–1813 (Cambridge: University Press, 1937), p. 336. This figure approximates that of Furber, quoting the contemporary source, Lambert, reporting in 1793 that the Bengal country trade had increased fourfold during the previous ten years. Furber, John Company, p. 182, quoting Anthony Lambert’s unpublished report on the country trade of Bengal in 1793: British Library, Eur. Mss. D 281. 22 Marshall, P. J., ‘Private British Trade in the Indian Ocean Before 1800’, in Ashin Das Gupta and M. N. Pearson (eds), India and the Indian Ocean 1500–1800 (Calcutta: Oxford University Press 1987), pp. 276–300, at p. 295. 18 Furber,

19 Marshall,

Introduction

7

English country ships and 28 Company ships.23 In 1787 there were 33 country ships and 29 Company ships.24 By the trading season of the year 1800, there were still 21 country ships and 19 Company vessels anchored at Whampoa, with the number of country vessels increasing again, until in 1821 there were 36 country ships to 21 Company ships.25 Shipbuilding of European-style vessels also increased to cater for this growth in the country trade.26 Seventy-seven new vessels were launched at Calcutta alone in the twenty years between 1781 and 1802.27

Expansion of the British country trade eastward During the early stages of Bengal’s growth as a trading port, the records reflect the still relatively minor interest in ports to the east. For example, in 1734, nine British country vessels sailed from Calcutta for Surat, six for the Persian Gulf, four for Madras and only four to “Eastwards”.28 But the dynamic commerce of the Indian hinterlands and the availability of supplies following British occupation provided fortuitous conditions for private traders.29 The British country trade in the Malay Archipelago Bulley, A., Free Mariner: John Adolphus Pope in the East Indies, 1786–1821 (Putney: BACSA 1992), p. 10. 24 Morse, H. B., The Chronicles of the East India Company trading to China 1635–1834 (5 vols, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926–9), vol. 2, p. 136. 25 Morse, Chronicles, vol. 2, p. 348; vol. 4, p. 4. The numbers continued to grow; in 1833 the figures were 82 and 25 respectively. The actual tonnage is more difficult to calculate. Parkinson states the total tonnage of the country trade in 1791 was 175,407 (Parkinson, Trade in the Eastern Seas, p. 336), while country tonnage in the South China Sea alone, according to Furber, stood at 4,000 tons in 1780, but by 1790 had increased to 25,000 tons (Furber, John Company, p. 174). 26 Furber, John Company, pp. 186–7. For details on the nature of the vessels themselves and the shipbuilding industry, see Parkinson, Trade in the Eastern Seas, chap. 11; Bulley, Anne, The Bombay Country Ships, 1790–1833 (Richmond: Curzon, 2000; Coates, W. H., The Old ‘Country Trade’ of the East Indies (London: Imray, Laurie, Norie & Wilson, 1911), pp. 51–76. 27 Marshall, ‘Private British Trade’, p. 295. 28 Furber, Private Fortunes, chap. IX, p. 14. 29 Watson, Foundation for Empire, p. 134. 23

8

Introduction

between 1770 and 1820 could not have been possible without the phenomenal growth in this commerce by the British on the sub-continent, especially in Bengal. There had, of course, been sporadic British country trading to the eastwards during the seventeenth century. In addition to trading along the Indian coast, country traders commenced trading to places across the Bay of Bengal like Bantam, and other places on Java outside of Dutch control, as well as to the Mergui Archipelago. Of the three spheres of interest, that is, the Indian coastal ports, the Persian Gulf, and to the eastward, the latter was initially the least developed.30 Nevertheless, according to Hamilton, a number of “English free merchants were settled at Merjee” (Mergui), by at least 1700, but were ordered to return to Madras by the Company.31 Exactly when country trading to the northern area of the Straits of Malacca began is not easy to determine,32 but it probably goes back to the 1660s and 1670s, specifically the ports of Aceh (1666), Kedah, Tenasserim and Phuket (Junk Ceylon), where contemporary accounts mention British country vessels visiting those ports.33 In so far as the country traders did make those visits, Bassett gives credit to them for the maintenance of British connections with the Malay states which led to the revival of official British interest in the area after a lapse of almost a century. It was several decades after that 30

For the shift from West to East and vicissitudes of trade after Plassey, see Marshall, East Indian Fortunes, pp. 76–105. 31 Hamilton, A New Account, vol. 2, p. 35. 32 Bassett, ‘The British Country Trader’, p. 12. 33 Bassett, D. K., ‘British Commercial and Strategic Interest in the Malay Peninsula during the Late Eighteenth Century’, in D. K. Bassett, British Trade and Policy in Indonesia and Malaysia in the Late Eighteenth Century (Zug: Inter Documentation Company 1971), pp. 50–71, at p. 50; Bassett, D. K., ‘The British “Country” Trader and Mariner in South-East Asia c. 1660–1715’, in D. K. Bassett, The British in South-East Asia During the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Hull: The University of Hull, Centre for South-East Asian Studies, 1990), pp. 1–32; Bassett, ‘The British “Country” Trader and Mariner’, p. 3. For the fluctuating country trade with Kedah during this early period, see Bassett, D. K., ‘Anglo-Kedah Relations c. 1735–1765’, in D. K. Bassett, The British in South-East Asia During the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Hull: The University of Hull, Centre for South-East Asian Studies, 1990), pp. 33–61.

Introduction

9

before country traders made regular calls to Johore, Trengganu and Pahang, and even later, in the 1730s, before there was a regular connection with Selangor and Linggi, areas considered rather dangerous. Four British country ships were recorded as trading in Selangor between October 1760 and March 1761.34 By 1768 the English country traders appear to be trading regularly with Trengganu, with a French source citing six vessels carrying on a barter trade there at that time.35 Then there was always the trade, including that carried out by country traders, between India and the British factory at Bencoolen, founded in July 1685. Private trade by Company servants from Fort Marlborough along the west coast of Sumatra to places like Natal and Tapanuli, also grew. From 1737 to 1746, Company servants at Bencoolen, both in their capacities as private traders and as Company officials, extended their range and were active in purchasing pepper from Banjermasin.36 Trade to Riau began in about 1765 and was strongly entrenched there by 1771.37 Increasingly, as the eighteenth century progressed, the eastern component of the total country trade of India superseded the other branches, and certainly by the 1790s was the leading component.38 One feature of the rising trade in the Bay of Bengal was that of the trade routes through the Malay Archipelago, including those that extended as far as Canton.

Growth of China trade Intermittent trade between the British and China in the early seventeenth century developed into a regular trade from the 1670s. The main product sought was tea, tea first having reached

34

Bassett, ‘British Commercial’, p. 123. Dunmore, John, ‘French Visitors to Trengganu in the Eighteenth Century’, JMBRAS, 46:1 (1973), 144–59 at p. 148. 36 Reber, The Private Trade, pp. 89–118. 37 Bassett, ‘British Commercial’, p. 123. 38 Tripathi, Amales, Trade and Finance in the Bengal Presidency, 1793–1833 (Bombay: Orient Longmans, 1956), p. 36, quoting from Lambert’s report of 1794. 35

Figure 1: European ships of various countries anchored at Whampoa, near Canton, in the Pearl River, late eighteenth century. Chinese artist. (Goteborgs stadsmuseum. In the Public Domain and published with permission under Creative Commons).

Figure 2: A country trader vessel, from the painting, ‘The “Charlotte of Chittagong” and other vessels at anchor in the River Hoogly’ by Franz Balthazar Solvyns. 1792. (© National Maritime Museum, London, BHC1100).

12 Introduction England in the late 1650s or early 1660s.39 Sales of the product in London rose phenomenally in the 1760s, from 2,558,081 lbs in 1759 to 8,075,794 in 1772, 14,000,000 in 1785–6 and 23,000,000 by the end of the century.40 It was this expansion of the China tea trade that was the “chief stimulus” to country trading. There was a steady increase in tea exports from 1713 to 1740, but the real upsurge seems to have come about 1740.41 As the tea trade “exploded by 300% over the years 1764–1800”, it led to an increase in the number of country traders based in Bengal.42 Initially the trade in tea was paid for by imports of cotton and wool from India, as well as specie from the home country, but increasingly the sale of tin and pepper from the Archipelago helped to pay for the rising demand for tea.43 Opium too became a major item imported, illegally, through Canton, and this too was done through the country trader network.44 It was also other more exotic products from the Malay Archipelago that were providing the imports at Canton by which tea, as well as porcelain, silk and other Chinese products could be purchased. It was the country traders who occupied this “specialized domain”, either by bringing the products of the Archipelago back to India to be loaded onto Canton-bound ships, or by sailing

39

Sources differ on the date. Reid, Anthony and Radin Fernando, ‘Shipping on Melaka and Singapore as an Index of Growth, 1760– 1840’, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 19:1 (1996), 59–84, at p. 61; Furber, Rival Empires, p. 126. 40 Furber, Rival Empires, pp. 175, 357–8. 41 Furber, Rival Empires, pp. 279, 131. 42 Tagliacozzo, Eric, ‘Coasting to Canton: Junks, Country Traders, and the Southeast Asian “Exotica Trade”’, in Geoffrey B. Hainsworth (ed.), Globalization and the Asian Economic Crisis: Indigenous Responses, Coping Strategies, and Governance Reform in Southeast Asia (Vancouver: Centre for Southeast Asia Research, Institute of Asian Research, University of British Columbia, 1999), pp. 39–58, at p. 42. 43 For the importance of cotton imports to China see Bowen, H. V., ‘British Exports of Raw Cotton from India to China During the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries’, in Giorgio Riello and Tirthankar Roy, How India Clothed the World: the World of South Asian Textiles, 1500–1850 (Leiden: Brill, 2009), pp. 115–37. 44 Tagliacozzo, ‘Coasting to Canton’, p. 41.

Introduction 13 direct to Canton themselves.45 Their trade was facilitated by the gradual decline of the monopoly controlled by the VOC.46 By the 1780s, country traders were bringing three-quarters of all British goods to the Middle Kingdom.47 In addition to opium and textiles, there was the whole “pharmacopoeia” of products from the Malay Archipelago: trepang, betel, gum benjamin, birds’ nests, bird of paradise feathers, bezoar stones, cloves, camphor, dammar, diamonds, dragon’s blood gum, ivory, gold dust, nutmeg, mace, pearls, pepper, tortoise shells and beeswax.48 There had developed therefore a mutually dependent relationship between the Company and the country traders. The country trader had the skills, contacts and vessels to obtain the products in the archipelago, and provide the goods that could be sold in Canton using bills drawn on Calcutta or London. Most importantly, by smuggling opium into China through the medium of the country traders, the Company remained at arm’s length from this illegal operation.

Categories of country trader Parkinson divided the country trade into two groups, one originating from Bombay, the other from Bengal.49 These differences, he stated, were due to the nature of the vessels and the character of the trade. He saw the larger Bombay ships as primarily transporting cotton to Canton, while the more numerous, Calcutta-based vessels were generally smaller and sailed mainly to Madras or to the Malay Archipelago.50 For the purposes of the present study it is appropriate to envisage the two groups slightly differently. Firstly, there were those country traders who, for at least part of their voyage, actually traded within the Archipelago. Their ships were 45

Lewis, Dianne N., ‘The Growth of the Country Trade in the Straits of Malacca, 1760–1777’, JMBRAS, 43:2 (1970), 114–30, at p. 118; Tagliacozzo, ‘Coasting to Canton’, p. 47. 46 Reid and Fernando, ‘Shipping on Melaka’, p. 59. 47 Tagliacozzo, ‘Coasting to Canton’, p. 47. 48 Tagliacozzo, ‘Coasting to Canton’, p. 44. 49 Parkinson, Trade in the Eastern, pp. 335ff. 50 Parkinson, Trade in the Eastern, pp. 343–56, based on Elmore.

14 Introduction smaller in size; about 400 tons. While it is true that most of the Malay country trade was centred on Calcutta, some of these vessels had as their homeport Madras or Bombay. This group should be differentiated from those country traders who only sailed through the Archipelago. There were vessels from not only Bombay, but Calcutta as well, which predominately sailed from those ports directly to Canton, basically transiting the Archipelago. This latter group may, at different times, have called at the British or Dutch ports of Bencoolen, Penang, Singapore, Malacca or Batavia, but they were not interested in trading at Malay ports within the Archipelago itself.51 They may have collected products saleable in Canton from country vessels lying within the Archipelago.52 Parsees were the owners of many of these larger country traders sailing between India and China.53 This is not to imply that the country traders who did trade at Malay ports did not as well often sail onto Canton to discharge their cargo. However, a proportion of the smaller vessels returned to Calcutta, where their products were transferred onto larger ships which then sailed on to Canton. Examples of both types of country trader, those trading within the Archipelago as well as those merely transiting, will be discussed below.

Agency houses An important feature of the business world in British India after the occupation and development of Bengal was the rise of the agency houses. These private business enterprises, founded in many cases by ex-servants of the Company, had, like the country traders, a modus vivendi with the Company.54 They were particularly strong in Bengal where by 1790 there were 15 agency houses in existence. They controlled nearly all of the private wealth, banking, remittances and insurance, as well as dominating trade in certain products. They largely controlled the country trade

51

See Marshall, ‘Private British Trade’, p. 298. Trade in the Eastern, pp. 350–1. 53 Tagliacozzo, ‘A Necklace of Fins’, p. 38; Bulley, The Bombay Country. 54 Tripathi, Trade and Finance, p. x; Marshall, East Indian Fortunes, p. 47. 52 Parkinson,

Introduction 15 as well,55 though individual owner/captains could become independent of the agency houses following successful voyages.56 Among the most influential of the agency houses were Fairlie and Company, Colvin and Co., Lambert and Ross, Joseph Barretto and John Palmer and Company. It is from these South Asian origins that the British country traders described in the following pages operated. While Furber,57 Marshall,58 Greenberg,59 Bassett,60 Lewis,61 Parkinson62 and Tagliacozzo63 among others have written about the importance of the Malay Archipelago country trade in a broad sense, apart from biographies that have focused on three country traders, Francis Light, Thomas Forrest and John Adolphus Pope, little has been written about the hundreds of individuals who made up this coterie of important mariners.64 The country traders who operated out of West Borneo have been the focus of F. Andrew Smith’s articles.65 Jan Herivel continues to Trade and Finance, p. 11. John Company, p. 161. 57 Furber, John Company; Furber, Rival Empires. 58 Marshall, ‘Private British Trade’. 59 Greenberg, British Trade. 60 Bassett, British Trade; Bassett, ‘The British Country Trader’. 61 Lewis, ‘The Growth of the Country’. 62 Parkinson, Trade in the Eastern. 63 Tagliacozzo, ‘Coasting to Canton’. 64 Clodd, H. P., Malaya’s First British Pioneer; the Life of Francis Light (London: Luzac, 1948); Bassett, D. K., ‘Thomas Forrest, an Eighteenth Century Mariner’, in D. K. Bassett, British Trade and Policy in Indonesia and Malaysia in the Late Eighteenth Century (Zug, Inter Documentation Company 1971), pp. 30–49; Bulley, Free Mariner. 65 Smith, F. Andrew, ‘Missionaries, Mariners, and Merchants: Overlooked British Travelers to West Borneo in the Early Nineteenth Century’, Borneo Research Bulletin, 33 (2002), 45–61; Smith, F. Andrew, ‘Captain Burn and Associates: British Intelligence-gathering, Trade, and Litigation in Borneo and Beyond During the Early Nineteenth Century’, Borneo Research Bulletin, 35 (2004), 48–69; Smith, F. Andrew, ‘An “Arch-villain” to be Rehabilitated? Mixed Perceptions of Pangeran Anom of Sambas in the Early Nineteenth Century; With an Appendix on John Hunt’, Borneo Research Bulletin, 38 (2007), 101–17; Smith, F. Andrew, ‘Daniel Smith’s Last Seven Years: Hardships in Country Trade in the East Indies in the Early Nineteenth Century’, Borneo Research Bulletin, 39 (2008), 1–15; Reece, Bob and F. Andrew 55 Tripathi, 56 Furber,

16 Introduction undertake research on James Scott.66 Bonney researched in detail the period of Light’s life during the acquisition of Penang.67 Except for Light’s and Pope’s letters and Forrest’s published voyages, little contemporary writing by the country traders themselves has come to light.68 There are no ships’ logs or journals for country traders, as there are for EIC and British navy vessels. The reminiscences by country traders that exist are general in scope and were written decades after the events they describe.69 References to country traders in EIC and VOC official records are intermittent and usually deal with matters of interest only to the Companies. Port records provide little information about individual country traders. The present work provides new information about a number of less well-known country traders from among the many hundreds, virtually unknown, who participated in the country trade, as well as emphasizing the country trading activities of more well-known individuals of the time. It is from the depiction of specific voyages that general conclusions about the nature of the country trade in the Malay Archipelago are drawn. This study shows the important political role a number of country traders played in various Malay principalities, as well as presenting supporting evidence for Bulley’s assertion of country trading as a “crucial element of the process of European expansion in … Southeast Asia in the later eighteenth century”.70 Smith, ‘Joseph Burn and Raffles’s Plan for a British Borneo’, Borneo Research Bulletin, 37 (2006), 27–49. 66 Herivel, Jan, ‘“A Perfect Malay” James Scott, Country Trader’ (paper delivered at the ASAA Conference, Sydney, 2011). 67 Bonney, R., Kedah 1771–1821: The Search for Security and Independence (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1971). 68 Marsden, William, A Grammar of the Malayan Language with an Introduction and Praxis (London: Cox and Baylis, 1812); Kratz, E. U., ‘Some Malay Letters on Trade’, Indonesia Circle, 44 (1987), 3–16. 69 Eastwick, Robert William, A Master Mariner: being the life and adventures of Captain Robert William Eastwick, edited by Herbert Compton (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1891); Coates, The Old ‘Country Trade’; Richardson, William, A Mariner of England: an account of the career of William Richardson from cabin boy in the Merchant Service to Warrant Officer in the Royal Navy (1780–1819) as told by himself, edited by Colonel Spenser Childers (Greenwich: Conway Maritime Press, 1970). 70 Bulley, Free Mariner, p. ix.

Introduction 17 Finally, it discusses the difficulties for the country traders of operating within the area covered by the Dutch trading network, yet at the same time, reveals the impact they had at times on Dutch control. Discussion on these issues will be based upon a single case study of the fraught relationship between one British country captain, Walter Dawes, and Dutch officials.

One MERCHANT FRIENDS: COUNTRY TRADERS AND THE MALAYS I

To help understand how the country traders collected the products of the Malay Archipelago so necessary for the China trade, it is valuable to examine the nature of the contacts between them and the people and rulers of the region. Little is known about many of the country traders of this time. A select few, such as Francis Light, the founder of Penang, have always enjoyed the limelight in historical narratives, but most of his compatriots seldom find a place, though their activities as intermediaries between the local Malays and the outside world were of great importance at a time when the dealings of many Malays with foreigners were curtailed by the VOC. Even from the few sources available, it is possible to ascertain that a large number of lesser-known English country traders were regular visitors and sojourners. Like Light, many felt at home in Malay society, advising local rulers, and generally associating with both the Malay nobility and common people while trading. Through examples of the cross-cultural interaction between the two parties – British country traders and Malays – a more detailed picture will emerge of the variety of individuals involved in the country trade, the different levels of relationship which resulted in the successful trading patterns that developed over many decades, and the impact these contacts had on historical events in several Malay societies.

20 British Traders in the East Indies

The Malay world in the late eighteenth century The British country traders operated during a critical phase of the history of the Malay states; a time when the Malay community was adjusting to an increasing European influence.1 The country traders were themselves an important element in this influence. Furthermore, our understanding of the way the local Malay communities evolved in the later decades of the eighteenth and the early decades of the nineteenth centuries may be enhanced by a closer look at the sporadic and inadequately recorded interactions between the Malays and their British trading partners. The Malay world of this period encompassed Malay-speaking people living in trading communities both in coastal (pesisir) areas and, to a lesser extent in the hinterlands, of Borneo, Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula. As well, they clustered on the shores of the islands of the eastern part of the archipelago and areas of the southern Philippines where Malay was the lingua franca. The people lived under the leadership of sultans or subordinate rulers, who governed numerous independent Malay states and principalities “of various sizes and various degrees of political and military (naval) power”.2 Scholars have described these clusters of Malay habitation as “coastal polities”, “harbour-centred city states”, “kingdoms and statelets” or “merchant cities”, most of which had an “amorphous nature”.3 1

For the debate on European influence on Malay states see Lieberman, Victor, ‘Wallerstein’s System and the International Context of Early Modern Southeast Asian History’, Journal of Asian Studies, 24:1 (1990), 70–90. 2 Lapian, Adrian B., ‘Violence and Armed Robbery in Indonesian Seas’, in John Kleinen and Manon Osseweijer (eds), Pirates, Ports, and Coasts in Asia: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives (Singapore: ISEAS, 2010), pp. 131–46, at p. 132. 3 Manguin, Pierre-Yves, ‘The Amorphous Nature of Coastal Polities in Insular Southeast Asia: Restricted Centres, Extended Peripheries’, Moussons, 5 (2002), 73–99, at pp. 73, 88; Lombard, Denys, ‘The Malay Sultanate as a Socio-economic Model’ in Denys Lombard and Jean Aubin (eds), Asian Merchants and Businessmen in the Indian Ocean and the China Sea (New Delhi: Oxford University Press 2000), pp. 113–20; Lindblad, J. Thomas, ‘The Outer Islands in the 19th Century: Contest for the Periphery’, in Howard Dick, et al. (eds), The Emergence of a National Economy: An Economic History of Indonesia, 1800–2000 (Crows

Merchant friends 21 The leaders reigned through a hierarchy of noblemen and local potentates who nominally acknowledged their rule. It was a rather loose system of statehood based on loyalty and mutual interests, which allowed room for manoeuvre and divergence but was much less conducive to the creation of centralized, large states. Many on Sumatra, the Malay Peninsula and Borneo were riverine principalities described as “insubstantial” and frequently “impermanent”.4 During the period under consideration even those relatively powerful realms such as Johore, Aceh, Tidore and Ternate experienced a “loosening of centres of control”,5 which encouraged smaller principalities to assert varying amounts of independence. Constantly shifting relationships were a vital component of Malay politics and it was this fluidity which presented both difficulties and opportunities for the country traders. One common feature of the scattered Malay states was their dependence on trade. Maritime trade was the main source of income for harbour-centred states, and this trade by definition could only be overseas, i.e. foreign, trade.6 There was a vast web of trade and exchange of tropical and marine products.7 The concept of the country trader would not have been an alien one

4

5 6

7

Nest: Allen & Unwin 2002), pp. 82–110, at p. 84. In Malay writing the classifier negeri is usually used, e.g., Negeri Pontianak. The commonly used, but far from appropriate English word “state” will be preferred for convenience. Bronson, Bernet, ‘Exchange of the Upstream and Downstream Ends: Notes Toward a Functional Model of the Coastal State in Southeast Asia’, in Karl L. Hutterer (ed.), Economic Exchange and Social Interaction in Southeast Asia: Perspectives from Prehistory, History and Ethnography (Ann Arbor: Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies, the University of Michigan, 1977), pp. 39–52, at p. 51. Andaya, B. W., Perak, The Abode of Grace: A Study of an Eighteenth-century Malay State (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 10. Manguin, Pierre-Yves, ‘The Merchant and the King: Political Myths of Southeast Asian Coastal Polities’, Indonesia, 52 (1991), 41–54, at p. 49. Warren, James F., ‘A Tale of Two Centuries: The Globalization of Maritime Raiding and Piracy in Southeast Asia at the End of the Eighteenth and Twentieth Centuries’, in Peter Boomgaard (ed.), A World of Water: Rain, Rivers and Seas in Southeast Asian Histories (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007), pp. 125–52, at p. 129.

22 British Traders in the East Indies in most societies; the overseas merchant played an important role from the earliest history and may be found in the myths of many of the coastal Malay states,8 and the upsurge in country trading led to a growth in the commerce of many of the Malay states.9 Existing throughout the archipelago at the same time as this pattern of scattered Malay states was the trading network of the VOC with its centre at Batavia and forts protecting its trading factories at Makassar (Fort Rotterdam), Amboyna (Fort Victoria), Ternate (Fort Orange), and smaller outposts at other ports.10 Often unenforceable agreements had been entered into with a number of the Malay rulers. As shall be explained in Chapter 4, the Dutch presence too presented risks and opportunities for the English country traders. Two other factors contributed to the political volatility despite the general increase in wealth for many rulers as a result of increased trade and economic activity.11 Firstly, the Bugis emerged as a force to be reckoned with in the Malay world after the defeat of Makassar by the Dutch in 1669. Their presence intensified following further unrest on Sulawesi in the eighteenth century, and they found a safe haven among the Malay states in Sumatra, Borneo and in the Malay Peninsula, eventually becoming a major political force in Selangor and Johor.12 It is not surprising, therefore, to find the Bugis and other Malays thriving in local trade and fostering commercial connections with the British country traders, who for their part, were equally bent upon opposing the VOC’s trade monopoly in the archipelago. The second factor was the attacks on coastal settlements and shipping by the Iranun from the southern Philippines, who “burst 8

Manguin, ‘The Merchant and the King’, p. 53. Kathirithamby-Wells, J., ‘The Age of Transition: The Mid-eighteenth to the Early Nineteenth Centuries’, in Nicholas Tarling (ed.), The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, (2 vols, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), vol. 1, pp. 572–619, at p. 602. 10 For a full list of Dutch establishments see Huysers, Ary, Beknopte Beschryving der Oostindische Establissementen (Utrecht: Abraham van Paddenburg, 1789). 11 Webster, Anthony, Gentlemen Capitalists; British Imperialism in South East Asia 1770–1890 (London: Taurus, 1998), p. 31. 12 Andaya, L. Y., The Kingdom of Johor, 1641–1728 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 119–30. 9

Figure 3: From a View of “Batavia Roads”, 5 October 1815 from the “Indefatigable” by Joseph Arnold. (Published with the permission of the National Library of Australia, PIC volume 560 R79650).

24 British Traders in the East Indies quite suddenly into Southeast Asian history in the second half of the eighteenth century”.13 Not only did their presence lead to shifting political alliances, it also increased the sheer physical danger of sailing in the region.14 The location of Malay port-polities, sometimes surrounded by mangroves and located up river beyond the spying eyes of the Dutch officials, proved conducive to the operations of country traders. Many of the smaller ports were quite isolated, and it was these “remoter harbours” – that is, remote for Europeans – which were “the special province of the Country trade”.15 The Dutch were in many cases unable to enforce the requirement on the Malay rulers not to trade with foreigners.16 This loose control also meant that the country trader had experience of ports and waters that was denied to the ships of the EIC.17 It was, therefore, into this complex and unsettled region that the country traders sailed and engaged with their Malay trading partners.

Features of the relationship: provisioning, trading, socializing, communicating While the historical importance of the country trade is usually seen in the wider context of international trade as providing products from the Archipelago for the China market, this role was based on the familiarity that the free mariners had built up over the years with the many local Malay communities, a familiarity which had consequences not limited to trade alone. Warren, J. F., Iranun and Balangingi: Globalization, Maritime Raiding and the Birth of Ethnicity (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2002), p. 53. 14 Warren, ‘A Tale of Two Centuries’, p. 133. 15 Bulley, A., Free Mariner: John Adolphus Pope in the East Indies, 1786–1821 (Putney: BACSA, 1992), p. 37. 16 Lewis, Dianne N., ‘British Policy in the Straits of Malacca to 1819 and the Collapse of the Traditional Malay State Structure’, in Brook Barrington (ed.), Empires, Imperialism and Southeast Asia: Essays in Honour of Nicholas Tarling (Clayton: Monash Asia Institute, 1997), pp. 17–33, at pp. 27–8. 17 Bulley, Free Mariner, p. 39. 13

Merchant friends 25 It is convenient to see the relationship between the country traders and these communities under four headings, viz., obtaining provisions, engaging in commerce, socializing and undertaking political activities. Frequently these forms of contact occurred concurrently. They all included communicating in spoken and written Malay. The involvement by the country traders in politics will be dealt with in a separate chapter.

Provisioning The most basic transaction between the British country traders and the Malays had to do with the purchase of supplies such as water, food and firewood. Obtaining firewood and refilling the casks with water along the coastal strips may not always have involved contact with the locals, though in many cases it did. If extended stays were necessary, it could result in closer relations. In theory Batavia, or other Dutch ports for which they had a pass, were the only ports country traders were allowed to enter (see below Chapter 4), and it was said that it was difficult for British ships, even in an emergency, to take on drinking water and firewood outside Batavia. But many country traders visited other ports which were nominally within the Dutch sphere of influence.18 It was not only ships that were trading within the archipelago that obtained provisions, but also country traders sailing through the Archipelago from India to Canton, particularly via the Eastern passage, that would replenish supplies on the small islands between Halmahera and New Guinea. Supplies of shipboard provisions could be purchased directly from the residents of small villages, without visiting a major port. For example, on 14 February 1789, the American, Samuel Shaw, the first American Consul to Canton, described how three British vessels purchased “from the Malays” not only firewood on the islands of the Straits of Sunda, including Krakatoa, but also “bullocks, fowls, ducks, pigs, turtle and fruit in abundance”.19 Knaap, Gerrit, Shallow Waters, Rising Tide: Shipping and Trade in Java around 1775 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1996), pp. 45, 49, 56. 19 Shaw, Samuel, The Journals of Major Samuel Shaw, the First American Consul at Canton, with a Life of the Author by Josiah Quincy (Boston: Crosby and Nichols, 1847), p. 319, footnote. 18

26 British Traders in the East Indies John Adolphus Pope, then 3rd mate on the country trader Princess Royal, provides in his correspondence many examples of the occasions when he led landing parties to obtain wood and water along the Aceh coast and the shores of the Malacca Straits in 1786 and 1787. He describes spending three days cutting firewood and “filling water” in May 1786 on the then largely uninhabited island of Penang.20 Pope also provided an account of getting water on “Pulo Trocton … near the continent of Malay”, about a day’s sail from Kedah, where he got water from a small pool which formed a rivulet.21 Inexperienced crew members sometimes feared going ashore on watering parties, but repeated visits led not only to familiarity with the locals, but even genuine friendships. It could also lead to enjoyable recreational activities. The Princess Royal repeatedly obtained firewood in the “straits of Colon” off Selangor, which gave the young, observant 3rd Officer Pope an opportunity to study the insects and trees!22 Captain J. W. Court, another country trader, was familiar with watering places in the Moluccas during the 1790s and reported to the British naval fleet preparing to occupy Amboyna that “On the island of Ceram, called by the natives Seram, wherever a village is to be seen, you may be sure of finding wood and water and fresh provisions such as deer, wild hogs, turtle, fowls and goats”. On Misool also, wherever there was a village, one could “expect the same refreshments as on the island of Ceram excepting deer”.23 James Horsburgh’s directions for sailing in the region also contain information about places to obtain provisions, or those to avoid. For example, he provided a warning received from the True Free Mariner, p. 39. Free Mariner, p. 56. Andaya identifies Trocton as one of the Langkawi Islands: Andaya, B. W., ‘Gathering “Knowledge” in the Bay of Bengal: The Letters of John Adolphus Pope 1785–1788’, JMBRAS, 87:2 (2014), 1–19, at p. 8. 22 Bulley, Free Mariner, pp. 60, 68. 23 Information collected from Captain Court, commander of a vessel, respecting the winds and weather, etc., to be expected between the Straits of Malacca and the Molucca Islands. British Library, Oriental and India Office Collections, Madras Military Consultations (hereafter, BL, OIOC, MMC), 5 January 1796. The report is attached to Rainier’s letter to Elphinstone, 30 November 1795. 20 Bulley, 21 Bulley,

Merchant friends 27 Briton (Captain Clarke) and the Royal Charlotte, concerning the situation in September 1797 on islands near the northwest part of Sumbawa: “From the numerous huts seen, there appeared to be a populous village, probably Laboo Padee; but although the natives seemed friendly and desirous of bartering poultry, etc., there was some reason to think that landing might not be altogether safe”.24 Thomas Forrest, who acquired a vast knowledge of provisioning points throughout the archipelago, was always careful to seek permission of the local leaders before commencing to purchase supplies. At Lirung in the Talaud Islands on his voyage to the Moluccas and New Guinea in 1775 he presented the chiefs with several cloths. The following day, “… many small canoes came on board; we bought kalavansas [a kind of bean], potatoes, some rice, and two goats, all very reasonable in the price, which we paid in coarse calicoes, red handkerchiefs, etc.”25 This practical information about provisioning points was accumulated and frequently passed on. It would sometimes eventually appear in printed form in publications that were useful for British officials and EIC vessels. For the locals who resided in these harbours the contacts benefited their economy and it added to their awareness of the growing influence of another European power in the region, in addition to that of the Dutch. Nevertheless, for all the potential that such shore parties and charting activities offered by way of the accumulation of knowledge and the development of mutual understanding between the country traders and the local Malays, the results were less substantial and not as far-reaching as the opportunities provided by more formal trading and diplomatic contacts.

Horsburgh, James, The India Directory, or, Directions for Sailing to and from the East Indies, China, Australia, and the Interjacent Ports of Africa and South America; Originally compiled from Journals of the Honourable Company’s ships, and from Observations and Remarks resulting from the experience of twenty-one years in the navigation of those seas, 7th edn (2 vols, London: Allen, 1855), vol. 2, p. 783. 25 Forrest, Thomas, A Voyage to New Guinea and the Moluccas, 1774–1776, with an Introduction by D. K. Bassett (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1969, orig. 1780), p. 160. 24

28 British Traders in the East Indies

Trading As already noted, country traders played a critical role in the circular pattern of trade involving India, the Malay Archipelago and China which was of such benefit to the EIC. Opium, arms and cotton goods from India were sold in the Malay ports and then cash, or goods from the Archipelago, were either traded directly in Canton or transported first to India to then be re-shipped to China. Particularly between 1780 and 1850 trade as a whole greatly expanded in Southeast Asia.26 The Agency Houses supported these commercial activities in what Webster calls “the important marginal market function of the archipelago”.27 The country traders operated through the main European ports such as Malacca, Penang and Batavia. But they also traded in many of the main native ports of the archipelago, Aceh, Pedir, Kedah, Riau, Trengganu, Pontianak and Mempawah, as well as many smaller settlements. Given that no log books of country ships have been found to exist, the circuitous routes of some voyages can only be identified by examining port records.28 Even here the information may be of a general nature and deliberately vague, but from the information that does exist, we know that the routes of those traders transacting business in the Archipelago required frequent port calls and the voyages were often long drawn out. The Princess Royal, for example, departed Calcutta sometime before December 1785, then called at Madras, Kedah, Penang, Perak, Aceh, various ports on the Pedir coast, Selangor, Malacca, Macao and Canton, before returning to Malacca, various ports on the Pedir coast once again, the Malabar coast of India, then Bombay, 26

Reid, Anthony, ‘A New Phase of Commercial Expansion in Southeast Asia, 1760–1850’, in Reid, Anthony (ed.), The Last Stand of Asian Autonomies: Responses to Modernity in the Diverse States of Southeast Asia and Korea, 1750–1900 (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 57–81, at pp. 67, 78. 27 Webster, A., ‘British Export Interests in Bengal and Imperial Expansion into South-east Asia, 1780–1824: The Origins of the Straits Settlements’, in B. Ingham and C. Simmons (eds), Development Studies and Colonial Policy (London: Frank Cass 1987), pp. 138–74, at p. 154. 28 Knaap, Shallow Waters, p. 56. “… the pattern of many a country trader for whom Batavia was just one stop in a trading journey which could include many other ports”.

Merchant friends 29 then back to Aceh, Malacca, Trengganu, Macao and Canton for a second time, before returning to Malacca, the Pedir coast again, Mergui, Rangoon, and finally only returning to the home port of Calcutta in October 1788.29 The Transfer, on an ill-fated voyage in 1795, sailed from India to Penang, then to the west coast of Sumatra where she visited Natal, Padang and Bencoolen, before sailing to Batavia.30 From there she sailed to Pontianak, called at Mempawah, visited other ports including Bangka, before sailing back to Mempawah. To guarantee the success of these circuitous voyages, the country traders employed their familiarity with local trading practices. After 15 years’ trading on Junk Ceylon (Phuket), Light’s knowledge of the correct procedures to follow was acknowledged by the locals (in this case mostly Thais), who compared Light favourably with another trader. One Thai official wrote, “When the captain of the sloop brings merchandise to sell here, according to the customary practice the Governor and council and the chief merchants will agree on prices. They undertake the selling goods to the people and make a small profit. You were here formerly and so you know all about this”.31 By way of comparison, Captain Thomas Wilson, master of the Minerva, sold goods directly to the people, which was “contrary to the rule and custom of the state”.32 A barter system appears to have been much in use (though not exclusively as Light’s letters show). Often the cargo may well have been a single product, to be used for exchange elsewhere, as was the case in the Nicobar Islands, where the trade was almost totally in coconuts. These the natives sold to country ships, which carried Free Mariner, pp. 55–141. Nicholl, R., ‘The Letter of William Midwinter’, Brunei Museum Journal, 5:4 (1984), 46–52. For the ill-fated nature of the voyage, see below. See also the description of the circuitous 1769 voyage of the London Galley in Vos, Reinout, Gentle Janus, Merchant Prince: The VOC and the Tightrope of Diplomacy in the Malay World, 1740–1800 (Leiden: KITLV, 1993), pp. 123–4. 31 Chao Phy Thaland to Light, 11 November 1787, quoted in Simmonds, E. H. S., ‘The Thalang Letters, 1773–94: Political Aspects and the Trade in Arms’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies University of London, 26:3 (1963), 592–619, at p. 607. 32 Chao Phy Thaland to Light, 11 November 1787, quoted in Simmonds, ‘The Thalang Letters’, p. 607. 29 Bulley, 30

30 British Traders in the East Indies them to Pegu, where they would be exchanged for “a full cargo of teak timber”.33 As further evidence of the barter system, in 1786 Pope’s ship called at Kedah where opium and piece goods were exchanged for the sole product of block tin.34 Captain Court was another country trader who found that payment for provisions in the Moluccas was best done in kind. Of the island of Ceram, he wrote, “… cash is not much in valuation – Nagore blue cloth, and white baftas are the best articles to exchange for refreshments. Course cutlery is [also] a good article of exchange”.35 Not infrequently country traders were regarded more favourably than officials of the large trading companies. In a number of places it is recorded that EIC officials were not welcomed by the locals. This was the situation in Pegu.36 It was also the case at Banjermasin earlier on in the eighteenth century, where, in 1714, EIC supercargo Daniel Beeckman had to pretend to the locals he was a country trader.37 When the people came out to his ship they told the English that if they were Company servants they were advised to depart, “because their Sultan and their oran-cays [orang kaya, or great men], would by no means have any dealings with us …”. “Finding no other method to introduce ourselves, we were forced to assure them that we were private traders, and came thither on our own account to buy pepper” Kratz notes that the Malay elite seemed to be able to distinguish between Light as a country trader and as a representative of the EIC after he became Superintendent of Penang, and judged him favourably because of his long trading connections with them even when strained political relations existed.38 In the larger Malay states in particular a formal trading procedure needed to be adhered to.39 Country traders usually The Journals of Major, p. 279. Free Mariner, p. 57. 35 BL, OIOC, MMC, 5 January 1796, Court’s report attached to Rainier to Elphinstone, 12 December 1795. 36 Bulley, Free Mariner, p. 35. 37 Beeckman, Daniel, A Voyage to the Island of Borneo (Folkestone: Dawsons of Pall Mall, 1973, orig. 1718), p. 49. 38 Kratz, E. U., ‘Some Malay Letters on Trade’, Indonesia Circle, 44 (1987), 3–16, at p. 3. 39 Andaya, B. W., ‘The Indian “Saudagar Raja” (The King’s Mer33 Shaw,

34 Bulley,

Merchant friends 31 established relations with the ruler of a state or principality, though actual trade negotiations were conducted with the senior trade official, the saudagar raja, or royal merchant, who was often an Indian Muslim. The saudagar raja would most likely be the one to “meet the incoming traders, to settle prices and amounts, and arrange all preliminaries prior to any audience with the king”.40 He would deliver the ruler’s goods to the purchaser, as well as perform other duties when necessary, such as act as interpreter, be official envoy, or fill the role of correspondent. The growing prevalence of the country traders posed longterm questions for the saudagar raja.41 In a sense, a duplication of effort and role could be developed as a country trader became more familiar with the culture, protocol and language, as well as becoming personally known to the ruler. Westerners might “undermine the delicate (traditional) relationship between ruler, merchant and noble on which the careers of most royal agents rested”.42 The country trader William King listed the necessities for success as being on good terms with the raja, conversant with the trade, the laws and the customs of the people, resilient to the dangerous climate and having an abundance of patience.43 Despite the actions of a number of unscrupulous country traders that caused dissension, disputation and even violence, not to mention the risk that their ship might be “cut off”, in the majority of cases commercial activities appear to have proceeded with equanimity and been of benefit to both parties. Over the decades there was an accumulation of corporate knowledge among the English country traders about the products, trading patterns, protocols and trading capacity of individual Malay negeri.44 40

41 42

43 44

chant) in Traditional Malay Courts’, JMBRAS, 51:1 (1978), 13–36. Andaya, B. W., ‘The Indian “Saudagar”’, pp. 28–9; For a letter from a saudagar raja, see Marsden, William, A Grammar of the Malayan Language with an Introduction and Praxis (London: Cox and Baylis, 1812, p. 142. Andaya, B. W., ‘The Indian “Saudagar”’, p. 31. Andaya, B. W., ‘The Indian “Saudagar”’, p. 31 Warren, J. F., The Sulu Zone 1768–1898 (Quezon City: New Day, 1985), p. 45. See Andaya, B. W., ‘Gathering “Knowledge”’.

32 British Traders in the East Indies While some of this information may have been kept confidential for commercial reasons,45 much of it would have become readily available through the interaction among the country traders themselves, as well as between them and the EIC servants in regard to the China trade. Officers and crews not infrequently changed ship and agency house.46 Officers visited each other’s ships while in port.47 Ships sometimes even travelled in convoy, with officers boarding one another’s vessel during the course of the voyage.48 Pope relates how Captain Bailes of the Industry, a “genteel well bred man”, “has obligingly given me every information in his power”49 when their ships were anchored at the same time at Ayer Labu. Bailes, said Pope, “has been a good deal on board of us”. The accumulation of knowledge is encapsulated in Captain Elmore’s useful description of the trading protocols and what he calls the “mercantile habits” at the small negeri of Singkil (Singkel) on the north-west coast of Sumatra: On your arrival here, you will send your boat well manned and armed up the river, with your linguist, or some person who can speak the language of the natives. About half way up the river towards the town you will see a single house, belonging to the Shabundar (Syahbandar. Harbourmaster). To this man you may declare your business, and he will send express to the merchants: you need not therefore proceed any further, but wait an answer, and conform to his directions. For a small present, which is necessary and expected, he will give you information of what is most in demand, and what goods the merchants wish most to dispose of. I need not tell you the goods you ought to affect to have least of and a reluctance to sell, as well as those you ought to make a favour to receive although they may be the very goods you most want. The Sulu Zone, p. 45. Free Mariner, p. 77. 47 Bulley, Free Mariner, p. 107. 48 Bulley, Free Mariner, p. 89. 49 Bulley, Free Mariner, p. 112. 45 Warren, 46 Bulley,

Merchant friends 33 The merchants will soon come on board, and, upon showing your musters, will settle the prices. Be careful to be prepared to repel an attack, and suffer none but the head merchants to come on board, and none with arms or offensive weapons. The prices being settled you will have boats on board daily with their exports, principally benzoin and camphor. … You should break the cakes of benzoin and examine it carefully, for they will adulterate it, as well as the wax: and I trust this caution will suffice for all the Malay coast.50

Elmore, after sixteen years trading in the Archipelago, published his Directory in 1802. It included similar information about trading at numerous other places, together with directions for sailing around Sumatra, along both the east and west coasts of the Malay Peninsula, around Borneo, and along the coasts of Java and Sulawesi. Elmore in turn acknowledged his use of charts by earlier country traders. The accumulated information would have proved invaluable not only to the country traders themselves, but eventually to English officials and in the nineteenth century to the large private trading companies. Knowledge being necessary for power, it proved indispensable during the increasing role of the British in Southeast Asia. At the same time, for many Malays, it was their trading partners, the British country traders, who drew them in a more substantial way into contact with the China trade, the West and the world capitalist economy.51

Elmore, H. M., The British Mariner’s Directory and Guide to the Trade and Navigation of the Indian and China Sea; Containing Instructions for Navigation from Europe to India and China, and from Port to Port in those Regions, and part adjacent; with an Account of the Trade, Mercantile Habits, Manners and Customs of the Natives (London: Printed by T. Bensley, 1802), pp. 79–80. 51 Warren, Iranun and Balangingi, p. 13. 50

34 British Traders in the East Indies

Socializing There was a prevailing fear of landing at Malay ports among a number of the less knowledgeable English country traders who were based in India. Even Horsburgh, in his Pilot, warned that parts of the Malay Archipelago were dangerous. For example, along the north coast of Sumatra, “… the chief places of trade to the eastward of Acheen are Pedir, Bourou, and Tulosamaway; but ships ought to be on their guard, and not put too much confidence in the people with whom they trade, nor suffer them to be much in their debt; when this has been the case, many ships have been cut off, as the easiest manner of settling their engagements”.52 Other mariners around the Bay of Bengal thought Malays were not to be trusted. William Richardson, a country trader in India who, though he never went as far the Malay Archipelago, thought Malays “a savage and treacherous people”.53 Higher pay was paid to crew members for voyages to the Archipelago compared to those along the Indian coast.54 Despite these attitudes and other similar negative ones even by country traders who actually sailed into the archipelago, a number of the merchant mariners left positive impressions of Malay society, having established close personal relations with local communities. These country traders developed more than just a trading or political interest in the inhabitants. On occasion, they sought to adopt local ways and stay for extended periods in Malay societies. Again, the writings of Thomas Forrest provide an ideal illustration of this tolerant attitude and partiality towards the Malay world. Many examples exist of his empathy for indigenous society, but his stay at Mindanao describes the relationship in the most extensive and colourful detail. By the end of April Horsburgh, James, Directions for sailing to and from the East Indies, China, New Holland, Cape of Good Hope, and the interjacent ports, compiled chiefly from original journals at the East India House, and from journals and observations made during twenty-one years experience navigating in those seas, (2 vols, London: Printed for the author and sold by Black, Parry and Kingsbury, 1809–11), vol. 2, p. 68. 53 Richardson, A Mariner, p. 84. 54 Bulley, Free Mariner, p. 152. 52

Merchant friends 35 1775 Forrest had completed his voyage to the Moluccas and New Guinea. Despite this, he diverted to Mindanao, arriving in early May, and remained there until January the following year. Why did he remain eight months at Mindanao? The monsoon winds, repairs to the Tartar Galley and news of the abandonment of the English settlement on Balambangan may have been contributing factors, but from his own account of his residence there, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that Forrest continued to live in Mindanao simply because he enjoyed the company of the people. David Bassett has summarized well the harmonious and cordial nature of the relationship between Forrest (together with his two European crew members), and the people of Mindanao during the long residence there. The stay “… was characterized on [Forrest’s] side by punctilious respect for local social customs, a friendly and insatiable curiosity and a complete lack of patronage or condescension”.55 For their part, the genuine hospitality of the Raja Muda (Crown Prince) and his father is clear. Bassett makes the interesting comparison between Light’s similar affinity with the Sultan on Kedah in 1785–6 and his later falling out with the Sultan once Light became the superintendent of Penang, pursuing his own and the Company’s interests. Forrest was sufficiently fond of Mindanao to include not only a detailed description of the country in his book, but also a vocabulary of the language and a genealogy of the ruling family. John Adolphus Pope was another who recorded his fondness for Malay society. On one of his numerous visits to “Irelaboo” (Ayer Labu, Ayer Laboo) on the north coast of Aceh, delays in obtaining water because of bad weather led to a residence of ten days. On this occasion Pope was making use of a Malay boat to try and get over the bar of the river to transfer the water to the ship.56. He would sleep overnight with Malay friends in Gingham (Gighen) where he would sketch local scenes or discuss illustrations from a volume of the Chambers Encyclopedia which he had with him. “After a good supper of rice, fish curry, etc., we slept along side of each other till daylight, when I resumed my Bassett, D. K., ‘Introduction’, in Forrest, Thomas, A Voyage to New Guinea and the Moluccas, 1774–1776 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1969, orig. 1780), pp. 1–22, at pp. 11–13. 56 Bulley, Free Mariner, pp. 66, 108–10. 55

36 British Traders in the East Indies way back to Irelaboo and endeavoured to get out of the river”. For breakfast Pope had plantains and milk and when his clothes were soaked, used sarong “wrappers”, “so that we were in the true Malay style”. Despite several social faux pas at Gingham he developed a genuine fondness for the people and the place, and “would not have regretted staying there a month or two”. Pope wrote favourably of the Malay government and society, which he said, was very harmonious and had light taxes. “In fact,” he continued, “it seems to be the golden age revived …”.57 Andaya concludes that Pope had “a genuine pleasure in meeting new acquaintances and in re-visiting places where he could have already made friends”.58 On an earlier occasion, while being held virtually to ransom in Kedah, Pope nevertheless became friends with the saudagar raja’s son, Dul Baddul; they discussed religion, walked about the town and through the fields together and swapped presents.59 In the end Pope was sad to depart, and the two agreed to exchange letters. Pope was young (14 or 15 years), but intelligent, educated, well-balanced and “full of intellectual curiosity”.60 Among other things, he collected cultural material for Sir William Jones, the oriental scholar. Nevertheless, for all his familiarity with the Malays, Pope was not ignorant of the possibility of an attack by Malays and he could be critical of the Malay “character”. He was, for example, like the rest of the crew, highly suspicious of the Raja of Pedir.61 At Pedir, Pope identified items from the Flyer, “a large ship from Bengal”.62 The Flyer had been cut off, and the Captain and officers had been “cruelly butchered in cold blood”. It was not uncommon for the captains of country trading vessels to remain on-shore while goods were being unloaded and loaded. Several frequently accepted the hospitality of the local rulers. The crew of the Transfer thought it unexceptional that Free Mariner, p. 109. Andaya, B. W., ‘The Future of Asia: Cross Cultural Conversations’, IIAS Newsletter, 38 (2005), 24–5, p. 25. 59 Bulley, Free Mariner, pp. 59–60. 60 Bulley, Free Mariner, pp. 48–51. 61 Bulley, Free Mariner, pp. 82, 85. 62 Bulley, Free Mariner, p. 82. 57 Bulley, 58

Merchant friends 37 Captain Thomas Sadler stayed five nights with Panembahan (ruler subordinate to a Sultan) Kassim while trading at Mempawah in July 1795. While Robert Lander, as agent for the merchants Freeshard and La Premadie, owners of the Duke of Clarence and the Dutchess, was in the Spice Islands principally to collect spices, the length of his stay suggests that he too enjoyed the company of the people. He travelled widely on native craft, visiting most of the principal settlements on the north-east coast of Ceram and on the west coast of Halmahera, and passed an eight-month residence on the island of Gebe. During 1797 he even spent five months at Tidore with Nuku.63 So, while most of the information imparted by Lander in the interview he had with Resident Jones had to do with the spice trade, that being the Resident’s main interest, it is nevertheless possible to gain a picture of the intimate association Lander had with the local inhabitants. Jones had to concede it was the country traders who best knew the ports and the people. “They are the more easily enabled to transact any negociation [sic] of this kind by Nooko’s people …”, he wrote.64 By April 1798 Lander had left the Duke of Clarence and had joined Captain Francis Lynch on the Diana. When Lynch too was interviewed by Jones, he stated that he had been to Tidore, Bachian, Ceram Laut, Goram and New Guinea to collect spices. Clearly Lander and Lynch were familiar with and were welcomed by the people in many places. They could provide Jones with the locations where spices were sold and the volume shipped out of the Moluccas the previous year.65 Another example of a long residence by a country trader in a native settlement was that of John Currie, Chief Mate of the Duke of Clarence. He spent five months in 1797 at Ceram Laut, as he explained to the British Resident at Amboyna, Robert Townsend Farquhar, when Farquhar was attempting to suppress 63

See Chapter 3. Jones to Governor-General, 27 April 1798, British Library, Oriental and India Office Collections, Madras Public Consultations (hereafter BL, OIOC, MPC), 31 August 1798. 65 Lynch’s testimony, 16 April 1798, BL, OIOC, MPC. 31 August 1798. 64

38 British Traders in the East Indies the shipping of spices by the country traders.66 Currie was actually building a boat during his five-month stay at this small island to the east of Ceram. He would raise the English colours every Sunday, or whenever a ship was sighted. While Currie’s sojourn at Ceram Laut may have been motivated principally by trade, the fact that he could stay at least six months in a Malay settlement, have the cooperation of the inhabitants to build a boat, and be so closely involved with the community that a number of residents were considerably in debt to him, demonstrates that he was closely involved in the society and had positive attitudes about living in the Malay world. Many British did not look kindly upon these close associations with the Malays. A country trader could, of course, immerse himself so much in Malay society that he became alienated from his own social milieu, even by the relatively enlightened standards of the time. It remains the fact that many examples exist showing close social contact between the Malays and the country traders built up over an extended period of time. Country traders who had not visited Southeast Asia or who had had unfortunate experiences still held negative attitudes, often considering the Malays “treacherous”. But many who came into contact with them gained a largely positive impression, communicated fluently in Malay, appreciated the hospitable society, stayed for long periods and became well-informed about many aspects of local culture.

The country traders’ use of the Malay language Country traders conducted their trade negotiations in the Malay language, for they needed to be competent in at least colloquial, spoken Malay for their business to be successful. “Every person, of whatever nation, who frequents a port of trade must negotiate his business in this tongue’, William Marsden, the one-time EIC servant at Bencoolen and contemporary authority on Malay, wrote in 1812.67 He explained that Malay was not used in India, 66

Currie’s testimony dated 3 November 1799, BL, OIOC, MPC. 11 July 1800. 67 Marsden, A Grammar, p. ii.

Merchant friends 39 but “is known only to those merchants and seamen who are engaged in what is denominated the Eastern trade”. Earlier, the country trader Thomas Bowrey’s dictionary of spoken Malay, published in 1701, was based on the author’s extensive experience as a trader in Asia between 1669 and 1688.68 He travelled widely in Asia generally, and in Southeast Asia alone visited Phuket (Junk Ceylon), Aceh, Java, Borneo, Kedah and Perak. With a command of the Malay language, Bowrey advised, English traders would be able to converse with the people without the assistance of “a prevaricating interpreter”.69 The “Malayo tongue” he wrote, was “so absolutely necessary to trade in those seas”.70 Malay had been the means of communication between Malays and overseas seafarers and merchants from the time of earliest contacts.71 Indian, Chinese, Arab and Persian traders who needed to communicate with each other and with the local Malay merchants, seamen and port authorities, had used Malay as the lingua franca. While there were many varieties of Malay with local dialects and differing levels of sophistication, the language of trade was in a simple form, known since the eighteenth century as Pasar (Bazaar) Malay or Low Malay.72 Bowrey called it “basa dagang” (Bahasa dagang, “the language of trade”) and said it was different to the Malay spoken on the Malay peninsula.73 Marsden too noted the difference between the language used in trading and the more “inherited” and literary Malay: “… the style of idiom [of Malay] which [foreigners in the Malay Archipelago] may have learned to speak with fluency, and which effectually answers the purposes of their business, being very different from Bowrey, Thomas, A Geographical Account of Countries round the Bay of Bengal, 1669 to 1679, ed. by Richard Carnac Temple (Cambridge: Hakluyt Society, 1905). 69 Bowrey, Thomas, A Dictionary English and Malayo, Malayo and English, to which is added some Short Grammar Rules and Directions for the Better Observation of the Propriety and Elegancy of this Language (London: Printed by Sam Bridge for the author, 1701), Preface, no page number. 70 Bowrey, A Dictionary, p. xli. 71 Sneddon, James, The Indonesian Language, its History and Role in Modern Society (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2003), p. 41. 72 Sneddon, The Indonesian Language, p. 42. 73 Bowrey, A Dictionary, unnumbered page. 68

40 British Traders in the East Indies that of books or even of conversation amongst the superior class of Malay …”.74 Restricted to trading matters, and not used for wider community use, it was relatively easy to pick up.75 While at Kedah, very early in the voyage, John Adolphus Pope began learning Malay from the captain of a Dutch ship who happened to be on board, and from two “girls” which the captain had with him. Pope claims he was soon able to “chatter away with some little satisfaction”.76 Later, his Malay became more fluent; he became “adept” in the “country language” as he put it.77 The majority of country traders only used spoken Malay. For this reason, few examples of the actual Malay language of country traders remain. Light’s letters, as will be explained, are the exception. Certainly, the examples from the late seventeenth century used by Bowrey are all taken from the language he heard spoken in ports and are the sounds written down by an Englishman, according to English orthography.78 Marsden was generally complimentary of Bowrey’s work, but criticized one particular aspect; it was based purely on the spoken word. He wrote that Bowrey’s “extensive knowledge of the language of the people whose ports he frequented as a trader, he laudably rendered permanent and useful to his countrymen by committing to paper all the words with which his memory furnished him”.79 Marsden noted that there were a number of other negative features of the work, including inconsistency in orthography and incorrect translations, (one reason possibly being because the Marsden, William, A Dictionary of the Malayan Language, in two parts, Malayan and English, and English and Malayan (London: Printed for the author by Cox and Baylis, 1812), p. vii. See also Adelaar, K. A. and D. J. Prentice, ‘Malay: Its History, Role and Spread’, in S. A. Wurm, P. Muhlhausler and D. J. Tryon (eds), Atlas of Languages of Intercultural Communication in the Pacific, Asia and the Americas (2 vols, Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1996) vol. 2:1, pp. 673–93, at p. 674. 75 Reid, Anthony, Charting the Shape of Early Modern Southeast Asia (Singapore: ISEAS, 2000), p. 159; Sneddon, The Indonesian Language, p. 42. 76 Bulley, Free Mariner, pp. 58–61. 77 Bulley, Free Mariner, p. 62. 78 Raja Masittah Raja Ariffin, ‘Thomas Bowrey (1650–1713)’, Jurnal Dewan Bahasa, 36:7 (1992), 664–9, at p. 664. 79 Marsden, A Grammar, p. xl. 74

Merchant friends 41 work was written a number of years after Bowrey had left the Eastern Seas and returned to London). Marsden seems to imply that the failures could be traced to the fact that Bowrey “appears to have been entirely ignorant of the written language”.80 Malays at the time wrote their language almost entirely in Jawi (Arabic) script of which the Riau standard appears to have been predominant.81. The few examples provided in Bowrey’s dictionary in Jawi or, “the original character” as Marsden called it, were prepared not by Bowrey but by another person, an Oxford scholar. In many ports of the archipelago, even among Malays themselves, those who could write Malay may well have been limited to a smallish number; to scribes employed in court circles and religious teachers.82 John Adolphus Pope, after he had become “quite adept” in spoken Malay, as noted above, described his personal frustration when attempting to learn written Malay: “I intended to have learnt to write it, but I find there is not a man on board that can either write or read”.83 Of the few examples of the Malay used by country traders that are available, the transliterations are idiomatic, as there were no standard rules for Romanization at that time. Bowrey wrote, for example, “Brapa de billecan etoo”, which in modern Indonesian/Malay would be, “Berapa dibelikan itu?”.84 To express in Malay the equivalent of the English sentence “When we had taken our leave one of another, we boarded the ship and they returned home”, Bowrey wrote, “Manacala camee sooda cata satoo pada satoo tabbee kitta sooda masooc capal daen deoran combalee ca roomah nea”. This is quite idiosyncratic; written A Grammar, p. xl. Adelaar, K. A., ‘Malay: The National Language of Malaysia’, in S. A. Wurm, P. Muhlhausler and D. J. Tryon (eds), Atlas of Languages of Intercultural Communication in the Pacific, Asia and the Americas (3 vols, Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1996) vol. 2:1, pp. 729–33, at p. 731. 82 Reid, Anthony, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450–1680; Volume One, The Land below the Winds (London: Yale University Press, 1988), pp. 224–5. The level of literacy is unclear. 83 Bulley, Free Mariner, p. 62. 84 Bowrey, A Dictionary, no pagination; given in the section entitled ‘Miscellanies/Dialogues, English and Malayo’. “How much did you buy that for?”. Other examples, with a discussion of Bowrey’s Romanization, are given in Raja, ‘Thomas Bowrey’. 80 Marsden, 81

42 British Traders in the East Indies today in standard Indonesian this would be, “Manakala kami sudah kata satu pada satu tabik, kita sudah masuk kapal dan dia orang kembali ke rumahnya”. Bowrey provides three terms for a trader; “Soodagar” (saudagar) – “a merchant adventurer”; “oran veniaga” (orang meniaga/berniaga) – “a trader”; “dagang” – a merchant. Forrest, who gives several examples of spoken Malay as well as a vocabulary in his Voyage to New Guinea,85 provides an example of spoken Malay as used in an argument over the sale of a kora-kora (type of local vessel). A disgruntled Tuan Hadjee, the guide on Forrest’s voyage, is quoted as saying, “Billa corocoro, tida mow bili, tida mow jual” – “Belah corra corra, tidak mau beli, tidak mau jual”.86 It remains the case, therefore, that the words found in Bowrey and the few sentences given by Forrest are probably the closest examples we have of the Pasar (Bazaar) Malay spoken by many of the country traders. However, a select number of the most experienced and successful country traders, as can be seen in the Light Letters in the Marsden Collection, may have been able to read and write Malay in the more formal, sophisticated style.87 One of the reasons Light was made first Superintendent of Penang in 1786 was because the EIC recognized, among other qualifications, “his knowledge of the Malay language”.88 Light was, as noted above, also at least able to read Thai.89 The collection of Malay-language Light Letters provide a number of examples of the written negotiations which sometimes occurred between the

A Voyage to New Guinea, pp. 214, 297–8. A Voyage to New Guinea, p. 214. “Divide the corra corra, it won’t be bought, or sold”. As late as 1838 an English naval officer sailing in Malay waters would idiosyncratically transcribe “Tidak bagus! tidak bagus!” as “Teda bagoose! Teda bagoose!”: Osborn, Sherard, Quedah or Stray Leaves from a Journal in Malayan Waters (London: Longmans, 2005, orig. 1857), p. 152. 87 Kratz, ‘Some Malay Letters’, pp. 4, 11. The Marsden Collection is housed in SOAS, London, and catalogued at MS 40320. The author has not seen the original letters, only those that have been published. 88 Quoted in Clodd, Malaya’s First, p. 41. 89 Simmonds, ‘The Thalang Letters’. 85 Forrest, 86 Forrest,

Merchant friends 43 more accomplished country traders and Malays.90 Trust and friendship between the country traders and their contacts in the Malay Archipelago were essential, as noted by Kratz and Simmonds.91 One element of this trust would have been the capacity to communicate in correct Malay. Captain Lindsay, for example, albeit a country trader, in contrast to Light was less successful in 1786 because “he did not know the people”.92 The Light Letters reveal many levels of relationships, from familiarity between equals, to that of status-conscious superiors to inferiors. All of Light’s letters in Malay however, are written in “the best of Malay traditions”.93 They comply perfectly with the extensive norms for Malay letter writing. This was no small achievement. In Malay society letter-writing was a refined art and the elaborate language used very different from the Pasar Malay spoken by most country traders. It shall be shown below how much Forrest’s refined letter to Nuku’s father was appreciated, as well as the significance of the traditional nature of Kassim’s letters to Raffles.

References to country traders in Malay literature and letters When Europeans first arrived in Southeast Asia these “foreign merchants were acknowledged and honoured figures”.94 According to Reid, however, Southeast Asian sources show a gradual change from neutrality towards Europeans, to “hostility”.95 It has to be said that country traders make comparatively few appearances in Malay writings. This is hardly surprising in light of the fact that “the ruler and the ruler’s household tend to dominate” as subjects in traditional Malay literature.96 90

Kratz, ‘Some Malay Letters’, p. 11. Kratz, ‘Some Malay Letters’, p. 11; Simmonds, ‘The Thalang Letters’, p. 607. 92 Simmonds, ‘The Thalang Letters’, p. 603. 93 Kratz, ‘Some Malay Letters’, p. 11. 94 Reid, Charting the Shape, p. 155. 95 Reid, Charting the Shape, p. 173. 96 Murtagh, B., ‘Portrayals of British Individuals in Malay Literature’, in V. Braginsky and B. Murtagh (eds), The Portrayal of Foreigners in 91

44 British Traders in the East Indies The portrayal of even Malay individuals with idiosyncratic personalities is rather rare. Among those British that do make an appearance, the majority are rulers and officials.97 However, the few places where country traders are briefly mentioned provide important glimpses into how these particular Englishmen were perceived by the local inhabitants. These traders appear not so much because of any interest in them as individuals, but because they are seen to play a significant role in the unfolding of events.98 In the Hikayat Nakhoda Muda, a work written in 1788, there are a number of stanzas of conversation involving the country trader Thomas Forrest. During a voyage to Semangka in southern Sumatra, Forrest requested provisions from a local Malay community leader, Kjai Demang. The provisions are provided after approval is granted by the local Dutch sergeant: Maka kata kapitan itu, “Kjai Demang, tolong pada hamba! Mintak tjarikan hamba ajam atawa itik atawa kambing akan bekal hamba belajar”. Serta didengar Kjai Demang kata surian itu dengan koperal serta kapitan itu, maka kata Kjai Demang, “Baiklah kapitan! Hamba tolong, tetapi hamba minta djandji hari pagi. Kalau boleh hamba tolong, djangan kapitan suka. Kalau tiada boleh hamba tolong, djangan pulak kapitan gusar pada hamba.99 Indonesian and Malay Literatures, Essays on the Ethnic “Other” (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 2007), pp. 107–64, at p. 110. 97 Murtagh, ‘Portrayals of British’, p. 121. 98 Murtagh, ‘Portrayals of British’, p. 123. 99 Drewes, G. W. J., De Biografie van een Minangkabausen peperhandelaar in de Lampongs … (s-Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1961), pp. 134–5; Marsden, W., Memoirs of a Malayan Family written by themselves (London: Printed for the Oriental Translation Fund, 1830), pp. 51–2; Malay Concordance Project, Hikayat Nakhoda Muda. “Captain [Forrest] said, ‘Kjai Demang, help me! Please look for chickens, ducks or goats for my provisions to sail’. When he heard this, Kjai Demang spoke to the [Dutch] sergeant, corporal and captain. Then Kjai Demang said, ‘O.K. Captain, I’ll help you, but give me until tomorrow morning. If I can help you, I trust you’ll be pleased. But if on the other hand I can’t help you, please don’t be angry with me.’” Author’s translation.

Merchant friends 45 Later, Forrest testified before the Bencoolen Governor in favour of Kjai Demang about an incident in which Dutch officials had been killed at Semangka. His testimony influenced a decision by the Bencoolen Council to allow Kjai Demang and his people to settle in British territory.100 The language of the Hikayat Nakhoda Muda is neither that of pasar Malay, nor of the more refined language of the Malay courts, but nearer to “inherited” Malay. Nevertheless, the references to Forrest demonstrate how the presence of the English trader had been influential in the course of events and as a result had entered to some extent into the consciousness and writings of the Malay people. Country traders are also mentioned in more “historical” literature such as the Tuhfat al-nafis, Misa Melayu and Cerita Banka. In the Misa Melayu (a history of Perak), there is a short description of an unnamed English country trader that highlights several features of the foreigner which the Malays obviously considered unusual, wearing their hat at an angle and raising it in a form of greeting, for example: Datang-lah Inggeris hebat yang nyata, Dengan persembahan di-bawa-nya serta. Mengadap Sultan yang terala, Mengangkatkan chepiau senget kepala, Bermacham jenis di-bawa-nya pula, Dagangan dibawa dari Benggala.101

In addition to the many types of merchandise he had brought from Calcutta, in a later part of the work the writer also informs us that the trader sold the Sultan two cannon of reasonable quality. In the Tuhfat al-nafis, a Malay account of the Memoirs of a Malayan Family, p. 80; Drewes, De Biografie van een, pp. 133ff. 101 Raja Chulan, Misa Melayu (Kuala Lumpur: Pustaka Antara 1966), p. 166; Misa Melayu, Malay Concordance Program, http://mcp.anu. edu.au/N/Misa_bib.html. “Along came a most distinguished Englishman / Making compliments as he went / He approached the most distinguished Sultan / Raising his hat which was set on a slant / All sorts of things he brought with him / Goods he had carried from Bengal”. Author’s translation. 100 Marsden,

46 British Traders in the East Indies history of Riau and Johore from a Bugis perspective, we obtain a glimpse of two of the country traders, Captain Glass and Captain Geddes, involved in political events there, and we are given an indication of the personal relations between the captains, the rulers and concubines. In the version of events provided by the writer of the Tuhfat, Glass conspired with the Sultan of Trengganu to incite the Dutch attack on Riau. The Tuhfat also provides an account of the death of Geddes: Syahadan adalah sebab perang Yang Dipertuan Muda Raja Haji dengan kompeni Holanda itu sebab Tun Kecik Tun Dalam Yang Dipertuan Terengganu muafakat dengan Kapitan Gelasi mencari jalan keroskan negeri Riau, iaitu adalah Yang Dipertuan Terengganu ada menaruh seorang anak Cina yang baik rupanya anak Cina itu, baharu dimasukkannya Islam, diberinya nama Si Jamilah. Maka dikehendaki oleh Kapitan Gelasi itu, make diberi oleh Raja Kecik Tun Dalam minta kepada Kapitan Gelasi itu membuat pokok pangkal perkelahian di Kuala Riau itu, supaya sakit hati orang-orang Riau akan kompeni Holanda itu. Maka dipakailah oleh Kapitan Gelasi Jamilah itu, lalulah bunting. Maka tatkala Kapitan Gelasi hendak pergi ke Riau membuat pokok perkelahian dengan Peransis di Kuala Riau itu, maka Si Jamilah itu ditnggalkannya kepada adiknya yang bernama Kapitan Gelis, disuruhnya bawa ke China. Maka sepeninggalan Kapitan Gelasi pergi ke Riau membuat pokok perkelahian dengan Peransis di Kuala Riau itu, maka Kapitan Gedis pun belayarlah hendak ke China. Tiba-tiba dengan takdir Allah Ta’ala serta sampai di Kuala Ibai di laut Terengganu maka angin besar pun turun. Maka kapal Kapitan Gedis pun pecahlah dan segala Holanda yang di dalam kapal itu pun matilah semuanya tiada yang tinggal barang seorang jua pun dan Si Jamilah itu pun matilah juga. Syahadan adalah pada waktu kapal Kapitan Gedis pecah itu ada perahu-perahu yang lain bersama-sama pecah. Ada kira-kira seratus

Merchant friends 47 puluh buah semuanya masuk dengan perahu orang Sambas besar kecil, dan serta selub Yang Dipertuan Terengganu iaitu Raja Kecik Tun Dalam pun pecah juga adanya. 102

Munshi Abdullah was another contemporary Malay writer. He wrote more about British people than any other author of the time, but did not mention country traders per se, being, as was typical, more interested in rulers and officials. While he did include the following unflattering description of English sailors in his Hikayat, judging from the numbers involved, these sailors are most likely to have been Europeans from naval vessels or East Indiamen rather than English officers, and certainly not indigenous crew members, of country vessels: Ali Haji, Tuhfat al-Nafis, ed. by Virginia Matheson Hooker (Kuala Lumpur: Yayasan Karywan dan Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1998), pp. 244–5: “The reason that there was a war between Yang Dipertuan Muda Raja Haji and the Dutch Company was because Raja Kecik Tun Dalam, the Yang Dipertuan of Trengganu, conferred with Captain Glass about a way of destroying Riau. The Yang Dipertuan of Trengganu had an extremely beautiful Chinese woman who had just been converted to Islam and whom he named Jamilah. Captain Glass wanted her, so Raja Kecik Tun Dalam gave her to him, with the request that Captain Glass provoke a disturbance just off the Riau River, so that people there would be resentful towards the Dutch Company. Captain Glass slept with Jamilah, and she became pregnant. He later left for Riau, intending to incite a dispute with the French at the mouth of the Riau River. He left Jamilah with a close associate, Captain Geddes, who would take her back to China. After Captain Glass had left for Riau to create trouble with the French at the entrance to the river, Captain Geddes set sail for China. It happened that by the decrees of Allah Almighty, when he reached the estuary of the Ibai River, just off the Trengganu coast, a strong wind sprang up. Captain Geddes’ ship was wrecked and all the Dutchmen and Englishmen on board were lost. Not a soul survived, including Jamilah. When Captain Geddes’ ship was wrecked, about 110 other perahu were also lost, together with various perahu from Sambas and a selub [small, one mastered boat, from “sloop”] belonging to the Yang Dipertuan of Trengganu ….” (English translation by Matheson and Andaya from Raja Ali Haji ibn Ahmad, The Precious Gift (Tuhfat al-Nafis): an annotated translation, by Virginia Matheson and Barbara Watson Andaya (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press 1982), pp. 167–8).

102 Raja

48 British Traders in the East Indies Maka jikalau datang sebuah dua kapal Inggeris singgah di Malaka, maka orang-orang Malaka semuanya menutup pintu rumahnya; maka adalah berkeliling lorong itu beberapa matrus itu mabok, ada yang memechakan pintu-pintu rumah orang, dan yang ada mengejar perempuan-perempuan berjalan, dan yang ada berkelahi sama sendirinya ….103

Nevertheless, there are instances in the sparse records that exist, of country trader officers drinking while on shore, in which case Abdullah’s description may also be appropriate for the British officers of country traders. Pope describes a drunken ball at Malacca in 1787 which was attended by Dutch officials and tradesmen, country trader officers and Eurasians.104 He also wrote of the English and Irish sailors of the Vienna who “play the devil” when they went ashore at Rangoon.105 There is the incident, discussed below, in which Kassim claims that Sadler’s drunkeness was the cause of his being murdered at Mempawah. Whether true or not, it would suggest that drunkenness was not unknown as a feature of English country trader behaviour. In a dispute involving the vessel Munster Lass between the 1st Officer Charles Class and the Captain John Bound, it is recorded they spent several hours in Malacca drinking heavily, arguing about the matter.106 Letters provide an important source for references to country traders in Malay writings. Considerable importance was placed in Malay society on the format of a letter as has been mentioned in respect of Thomas Forrest’s and Francis Light’s letters. Tradibin Abdul Kadir, Munshi Hikayat Abdullah (2 vols, Singapore: Malaya Publishing House, 1960) vol. 1, pp. 55–6. “When one or two English ships called in at Malacca all the people shut their doors. All along the lanes straggled drunken sailors who smashed in the doors of the houses, followed women about in the street, and started fights with each other”. (Translation by A. H. Hill from Abdullah bin Abdul Kadir, Munshi, Hikayat Abdullah, an annotated translation by A.H. Hill, JMBRAS, 28:3 (1955) 1–354, at p. 70. 104 Bulley, Free Mariner, p. 102. 105 Bulley, Free Mariner, pp. 128, 131. 106 Malacca Protocol Books, 8 July 1786, BL, OIOC. 103 Abdullah

Merchant friends 49 tionally, a great deal of respect was shown by a recipient both to the writer and the bearer of a letter. The titles, honorifics and the length of the flattering salutations included in the letter were ways of showing high regard for the addressee. One early canon of Malay letter-writing actually includes the forms of address for writing to captains of East Indiamen,107 and presumably this form of address could have been used also for captains of English country traders. Malay letters to Europeans at the time, instead of referring to the addressee in terms of a relationship, as would have been the case in writing to another Malay, ascribed the addressee in terms of friendship. Hence, the following terms were most commonly used; seri paduka sahabat beta, paduka sahabat beta or sahabat beta.108 An unflattering account of one country trader, Captain Clark, is given in a letter from the Sultan of Trengganu to Francis Light.109 Clark went to Trengganu with a letter he alleged was from the Governor-General in Calcutta, and he requested to enter the river of Trengganu to undertake repairs. The Sultan greeted him with all the correct ceremony such an important envoy was entitled to.110 However, whilst there, Clark sold opium without following the customary procedures and the Sultan wrote to Light requesting that the Governor-General be informed and that Clark not be permitted to come to Trengganu again. Not all relations between country traders and Malays went well. But whether the contacts were replenishing provisions, trading, or socializing, the country traders and Malays had a considerable impact one upon the other. Different Malay societies were impacted in different ways and to a differing extent, but overall, the R. J., ‘Letter-writing’, in Wilkinson, R. J. (ed.), Papers on Malay Subjects Part III, Malay Literature (Kuala Lumpur: Printed by J. Russell at the F.M.S. Government Press, 1907), pp. 21–48, at p. 27. Wilkinson does not say what that form of address was. 108 “my very honorable friend”, “my honorable friend”, or, “my friend”. Wilkinson, ‘Letter-writing’, p. 35. 109 Marsden, A Grammar, pp. 139–40. Jawi script, English translation by Marsden. See also Andaya, B. W., ‘The Indian “Saudagar”’, p. 18. 110 Marsden, A Grammar, p. 139. (Maka dianya membawa surat daripada Raja Bengal kepada kita. Maka kita sambutlah surat itu dengan istiadat surat raja-raja yang besar-besar serta beberapa kesukaan dan keredaan). 107 Wilkinson,

50 British Traders in the East Indies influence cannot be underestimated. Conversely, many country traders were influenced by the Malay society with which they came into contact. Some became influential as a result, switching to service within the EIC. Others became wealthy through the extensive trade in which the engaged, while yet others returned again and again to the region or stayed for extended periods because they were attracted to the Malay way of life. The English country traders were not a homogenous group, but those who traded within the Archipelago had a sufficiently different relationship with the Malay communities to differentiate them as a group from other European contemporaries. This differentiation, and their particular role in the extension of British influence in the region, is the subject of a subsequent chapter.

Two POLITICAL ALLIES: COUNTRY TRADERS AND THE MALAYS II

In addition to having a commercial relationship, on occasion the cooperation that existed between the country traders and the principalities of the Malay Archipelago from 1770 to 1820 developed a political character. The politics of trade, “was a labyrinth presenting countless difficulties”.1 Despite the paucity of sources, it is clear that a number of country traders became active participants in local politics as a consequence of their trading activities. We shall examine in more detail the decisive role of country traders in the history of four Malay states: Johore, Kedah, Tidore and Mempawah/Pontianak. As previously mentioned, it was a time of political insecurity in many realms in the area, partly because of the dispersal of traditional authority. In the Western part of the archipelago it was frequently the endemic problem of the anak raja, succession disputes, which made the “Malay waters during this period increasingly unsafe”.2 Conflict between Burma and Siam was also a destabilizing factor for states like Kedah and Trengganu. The presence of the Bugis, particularly in the Straits of Malacca. intensified the insecurity. In the Moluccas, the decline of the traditional four kingdoms and a weakening of central authority Vos, Reinout, Gentle Janus, Merchant Prince: The VOC and the Tightrope of Diplomacy in the Malay World, 1740–1800 (Leiden: KITLV, 1993), p. 3. 2 Andaya, B. W., Perak, The Abode of Grace: A Study of an Eighteenth-century Malay State (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 28, 32. 1

52 British Traders in the East Indies relative to the periphery of the four major states, together with resistance to Dutch authority, meant this region too, was unstable.3 In eastern Sulawesi, political instability was caused by raiding and “mobile bands of armed men” from large and small polities.4

Johore The early country trader, Alexander Hamilton, made an “incidental” call at Johore in 1703, but in the second half of the eighteenth century the first recorded visit of a country trader to Riau, capital of the Bugis-dominated Johore empire, appears to be that of the Plassey (Captain Austin) in 1765.5 The growing presence of country traders in Riau during the 1770s had a positive impact on that Bugis entrepôt, Riau blossoming through the expansion of trade with the British country traders.6 Through cooperation with the Bugis, the British “were rapidly capturing an increasing proportion of the trade of the Archipelago”.7 For example, between 1768 and 1774 the volume of tin from Riau imported by country traders into Canton rose from 3,310 piculs to 19,360 piculs.8 Andaya, L. Y., The World of Maluku; Eastern Indonesia in the Early Modern Period (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993), pp. 114–16; Katoppo, E., Nuku, Sulthan Saidul Djehad Muhamad el Mabus Amirudin Sjah Kaitjil Paparangan, Sulthan Tidore: riwajat perdjoangan kemerdekaan Indonesia di Maluku Utara, 1780–1805 (Bandung: Kilatmadju Bina Budhaja, 1957); Widjojo, Muridan, The Revolt of Prince Nuku, Cross-cultural Alliance-making in Maluku, c.1780–1810 (Leiden: Brill, 2009). 4 Velthoen, Esther J., ‘“Wanderers, Robbers and Bad Folk”: The Politics of Violence, Protection and Trade in Eastern Sulawesi 1750–1850’, in Anthony Reid (ed.), The Last Stand of Asian Autonomies: Responses to Modernity in the Diverse States of Southeast Asia and Korea, 1750–1900 (Houndsmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 367–88, at p. 368. 5 Bassett, D. K., British Trade and Policy in Indonesia and Malaysia in the Late Eighteenth Century (Zug: Inter Documentation Company, 1971), p. 51. 6 Lewis, Dianne, Jan Compagnie in the Straits of Malacca, 1641–1795 (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1995), p. 92. 7 Lewis, Jan Compagnie, p. 94; Bassett, British Trade, p. 51. 8 Bassett, British Trade, p. 67 quoting Morse, H. B., The Chronicles of the East India Company trading to China 1635–1834 (5 vols, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926–9), vols 2, 5. 3

Political allies 53 The growing importance of the country traders heightened concerns among the Dutch who argued the country trade at Riau was in contravention of a 1758 treaty they had with Johore.9 They reacted strongly in 1778, commencing action to curtail Riau, and specifically the English country trade, ordering Riau to confiscate the products of the country traders. Despite these instructions, the trade continued. The heightened international hostility between The Netherlands and Britain added to the local tensions between the Dutch and Riau.10 Some country traders saw it to their advantage to exaggerate the possibility of a British invasion of Malacca. James Glass was one who pushed this line. As already noted, he was active in the Malay World in the 1780s, having established an especially close connection with Trengganu. His vessel, the Prince Henry weighed 350 tons, typical of the country traders that sailed between ports of the Archipelago. It had twelve cannon and 50 crew.11 By March 1782, the tensions between the Dutch, British and the Bugis had reached such a point that when a country trader, the Betsy (Captain Robert Geddes), on contract to the EIC to deliver a cargo of opium, was captured in Riau waters by a French privateer allied to the Dutch, it was the decisive act that led the ruler of Riau, Raja Haji, openly to seek a quarrel with the Dutch at Malacca. Governor-General Hastings had sent the Betsy to Riau to sell opium to meet the Canton remittances, and, the

Jan Compagnie, pp. 101–2. See also Chapter 4 below. Gentle Janus, pp. 129–33. 11 Netscher, E., De Nederlanders in Djohor en Siak 1602 tot 1865. Historische Beschrijving (Batavia: Bruining & Wijt, 1870), p. 210, note 1. Glass was at Trengganu in 1787 and the following year he carried ambassadors from the Sultan of Trengganu to Bengal in the Prince Henry. The Sultan wanted him to be appointed in Trengganu as British resident, one reason being it would ensure security against Siam: Bassett, British Trade, p. 89; Bonney, R., Kedah 1771–1821: The Search for Security and Independence (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 80–1 footnote 19. See also Andaya, B. W., ‘An Examination of the Sources Concerning the Reign of Sultan Mansur Shah of Trengganu, 1741–1795’, JMBRAS, 49:2 (1976), 80–106, p. 84 re Glass’s close relationship with Trengganu. 9 Lewis, 10 Vos,

54 British Traders in the East Indies country trade with Riau was seen as so important by Bengal, that a decision had been made to establish a trading post at the port.12 The circumstances surrounding the Betsy affair remain unclear. While Raja Haji may have preferred to deal with the Dutch, and possibly was even a party to the plot to seize the Betsy,13 when he received no payment for a proportion of the cargo, he came to the conclusion that the Dutch had gone back on their agreement to share the spoils of the seizure. Furthermore, any interference with the flourishing country trade now overshadowed the unstable political alliance that the Bugis had with the Dutch. Raja Haji demanded compensation for the capture of the Betsy, and was said to have stated that the British were already resentful, and his own subjects critical, because of the negative impact the capture of the ship was having on their livelihood.14 He believed that by September 1782, five British ships had already by-passed Riau. The Dutch believed the capture of the cargo of the Betsy would bring a “splendid windfall”, as well as arguing legalistically that the Betsy should not have been trading at Riau as it had no VOC pass to do so and therefore the Dutch did not have to pay compensation to Riau. Relations between Riau and the Dutch deteriorated to such an extent that Batavia decided to attack Riau, one of the reasons given being Riau’s support for British country traders over many years.15 Governor De Bruijnof in Malacca imagined that Raja Haji “was conspiring with his English trading associates” against the VOC.16 The Dutch decided to end the Bugis threat and at first blockaded then attacked, Riau. The Bugis initially enjoyed some success in the war, resisting the Dutch during 1783. But with the fortuitous arrival of a large Dutch fleet from Europe when the Bugis themselves were laying siege to Malacca, Raja Haji was killed in June 1784.17 Riau itself fell to the Dutch in October of the same year. Gentle Janus, p. 134; Lewis, Jan Compagnie, p. 105; Bassett, British Trade, pp. 68–9. 13 Vos, Gentle Janus, p. 135. 14 Lewis, Jan Compagnie, p. 106. 15 Vos, Gentle Janus, p. 144. 16 Vos, Gentle Janus, p. 145. 17 Lewis, Jan Compagnie, p. 109; Vos, Gentle Janus, pp. 162–3. 12 Vos,

Political allies 55 One of the clauses of the treaty imposed on the new Sultan of Johore, was that no foreign shipping would be admitted to Riau (and other Johore ports).18 Riau was placed under VOC rule, governing the Malay establishment “in true colonial style”.19 Its prosperity was ruined and those who traded on the seas lived in “fear and anxiety”, as the Tuhfat al-Nafis, a Malay history of the time, put it.20 Lewis concludes succinctly, “The Batavian government was determined that Riau would never again act, as it had from 1761 to 1784, as a centre of the English country trade in the Archipelago”.21 The Malays and Bugis scattered to various parts of the archipelago and by 1787 there were only a few Chinese occupying the area.22 At the end of that period, the country traders, who had for twenty years brought prosperity to Riau, proved a disastrous liability for the inhabitants. For the country traders themselves, the loss of a central entrepôt at Riau meant they had to return to a trading pattern frequenting a variety of ports around the archipelago. Hence their enthusiastic urging of Calcutta to establish a trading post on Penang as a substitute for Riau, through a grant from the Sultan of Kedah.23 Governor-General Cornwallis appeared to be sympathetic to their situation when he wrote, “Since the capture of Riau, the vessels and Prows from the Moluccas, the Celebes, Borneo and even the Philippine Islands have not had any established Port to which they could resort with a certainty (as formerly) of meeting our Merchants with the Productions of Bengal & the Coasts of Coramandel [sic], and Malabar …”.24 Raja Haji’s successor, Raja Ali, fled to Mempawah and later, to Sukadana, on the west coast of Borneo. Here Captain Glass attempted to continue the involvement of the country trade in Johore’s political affairs.25 On 26 February 1785 Raja Ali sent a Jan Compagnie, p. 110. Gentle Janus, p. 181. 20 Quoted in Vos, Gentle Janus, p. 179. 21 Lewis, Jan Compagnie, p. 110. 22 Vos, Gentle Janus, p. 185. 23 James Scott, country trader, to Bengal, 28 October 1785, SSR 2, fol. 16, quoted in Vos, Gentle Janus, p. 202. 24 Letter from Calcutta to Penang, 2 May 1786, SSR 2, fols 114–115, quoted in Vos, Gentle Janus, p. 203. 25 Netscher, De Nederlanders, p. 209. 18 Lewis, 19 Vos,

56 British Traders in the East Indies letter to the Governor-General.26 Even in its English translation it can be seen that it is a traditional Malay letter in which the first part is full of praise for the addressee, indicating great respect. Raja Ali explained that he had “been expelled from my native country which is Rhio”, by the Dutch, “to the port of Succadana and this war is on account of the friendship which is between me and the English Company”. He indicated that after “many months Captain Glass came to me” and Raja Ali asked him why no Englishman had come to his assistance. He was asked by Glass why he had not written to the Governor-General to request the support of the British, because the English Company had previously sent an English flag and seal to Riau – possibly a reference to the official embassy under Forrest attempting to establish a trading base there.27 Thus interpreting the Dutch war against him as being the result of his friendship with the English Company specifically, Raja Ali requested a seal, a flag and an “army”, on the basis of the longstanding friendship between himself and the EIC. He believed that he could “fix myself in the port of Succadana” and that this would protect him, and by implication, Sukadana as well. Raja Ali, probably encouraged by Glass, and led by the Captain to equate the country traders with the EIC, requested that the flag, the seal and the “army” be sent specifically by Captain Glass “because he knows the customs of the Malay ports, and also he is acquainted with me, and I know him”.28 Despite the urging of both Captain Glass and Raja Ali, the Governor-General refused to assist him because of the newly signed treaty between Britain and Holland following the AngloDutch War of 1780–4. Calcutta continued to refuse to be drawn into local disputes in the Archipelago. Sukadana was subsequently attacked and destroyed by Dutch and Pontianak forces, 26

British Library, Oriental and India Office Collections (hereafter BL, OIOC), Factory Records (Straits Settlements) IOR/G/34/2, fols 29–32. Only the English translation is given in the OIOC Records. 27 English text in Logan, J. R., ‘Notices of Penang’, The Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Sea, NS, 2 (1858), 182–283, at pp. 187–8. Dutch text, translated from the English version, in Netscher, De Nederlanders, pp. 210–11. 28 BL, OIOC, Factory Records (Straits Settlements) IOR/G/34/2, fols 29–32, Raja Ali letter 26 February 1785.

Political allies 57 resulting in Raja Ali’s flight to the inland town of Matan. Riau never regained the importance it had enjoyed as a trading centre frequented by the country traders. It is quite evident that the increasing presence and successful trading activities of the country traders at Riau over the previous two decades had had a critical influence in the fate of the state of Johore; in addition to exerting an economic influence through trade, by directly engaging in the politics of the time, the country traders had played an active, indeed, a decisive, role in the unfolding of momentous events.29

Kedah, and the influence of Francis Light Shortly after he went to Junk Ceylon (Phuket, Thalang) in 1771, Francis Light’s trading activities led him into political involvement in Thai politics.30 But it was in Kedah that Light became most actively engaged in politics as the Sultan, Muhammed, sought to secure his country at a time of international instability. Light’s involvement, which continued over several decades, had serious consequences for the Sultanate. As a country trader acting for the Madras firm of Jourdain, Sulivan and De Souza (that is, not as a Company servant), Light signed in 1771 a defensive contract with Kedah, the first such agreement “ever signed by any Malaysian state with the English”.31 Because of the fact that Sultan Muhammed had 29

At this time, following the fall of Riau, the ruler of Selangor, Sultan Ibrahim, in June 1785 sent a similar letter to that of Raja Ali to the Governor-General requesting British recognition. He specifically asked that the acknowledgement of such an “alliance” be sent by a country trader, “Captain Light or Captain Forrest or Captain Scott or any other Captain … that we may consult and fix upon some means of trading with the Buggesses …”. BL, OIOC, Factory Records (Straits Settlements) IOR/G/34/2, fols 31–32. 30 Simmonds, E. H. S., ‘The Thalang Letters, 1773–94: Political Aspects and the Trade in Arms’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies University of London, 26:3 (1963), 592–619, at p. 593. 31 Bonney, Kedah, p. 35. For the early contacts between Britain and Kedah see Bassett, D. K., ‘Anglo-Kedah Relations c. 1735–1765’, in D. K. Bassett, The British in South-East Asia During the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Hull: The University of Hull, Centre for South-

58 British Traders in the East Indies already approached the English, Light’s presence and influence negated the Danish East India Company’s attempt to open a factory at Kuala Kedah.32 As part of the agreement, Light took two armed vessels, powder, arms and thirty sepoys to Kedah, remaining there until May 1772 when the EIC took over his firm’s trading rights.33 Sultan Muhammad was also induced by Light to write to the EIC when Light’s firm did not agree to enter into an offensive treaty with Kedah. Light continued to be involved in negotiations between the Sultan and the Company, the Sultan relying heavily on his advice and Light arranging a compromise contract signed on 20 April 1772.34 Though the contract was later not ratified by Madras, these actions meant that the country trader was nevertheless enhancing his considerable political connections with Kedah. During the reign of Sultan Abdullah (1778–98), the most significant event was the establishment of a British settlement on one of Kedah’s islands, Penang, by the EIC in 1786. The roles of the country traders, Thomas Forrest, Francis Light and James Scott were vital in this critical political development.35 Again, the Sultan was primarily motivated by feelings of insecurity in respect of Siam and Burma. Light’s role as the go-between between Kedah and the EIC was critical because it would appear that Light greatly modified his translation of the conditions put forward by the Sultan in order that they would be acceptable to the Company.36 Sultan Abdullah understood he had made Light his representative (wakil), and Light said he had been appointed by the Sultan as his “agent”.37 The Sultan made a grave mistake in trusting Light, for Light actually worked against Kedah’s interests. No formal approval for Britain to occupy the island was ever given by the Sultan and, following his appointment as Superintendent, East Asian Studies, 1990), pp. 33–6. Kedah, p. 39. 33 Bonney, Kedah, pp. 36, notes 43, 48. 34 Bonney, Kedah, p. 44; Bassett, British Trade, pp. 53–5; Bassett, D. K., ‘The British Missions to Kedah and Acheh in 1772: Some Belated Reflections’, in D. K. Bassett, The British in South-East Asia, pp. 62–94. 35 Bonney, Kedah, pp. 52–78; Bassett, British Trade, pp. 43–6, 53–8. 36 Bonney, Kedah, p. 60. 37 Bonney, Kedah, p. 68, note 57. 32 Bonney,

Political allies 59 Light’s actions in taking formal possession were illegal.38 The Sultan also did not receive full compensation for the loss of trade suffered by Kedah to Penang as he had asked. Light continued to prevaricate in negotiations over an offensive alliance between Kedah and the EIC and his avoidance of paying compensation forced Sultan Abdullah to impose a duty on rice exported from Kedah to Penang. Towards the end of 1786 Light involved his fellow experienced country trader, Captain Glass, in negotiations. Light’s knowledge of Kedah enabled him to play the decisive role in the British occupation of Penang and it was his deception of the Sultan that had serious implications for Kedah. While, fortuitously, Kedah did not require British assistance in defence against Siam or Burma in the short term, it nevertheless lost control of part of its territory. At the same time, its trade declined, with many local merchants being attracted to Penang.39 The number of prahus, for example, visiting Penang from the Straits increased dramatically – 31 in 1786, 403 in 1787 and 1,836 by 1799.40 While some of these were from Kedah itself, many would have been prahus that previously traded to Kedah, and which now were finding it more profitable to trade at Penang. If Kedah did not actually “disintegrate” at this time, as did several other Malay states,41 it was forced to change from a position where trade was the basis of its economy to one where it had to devise new policies for wealth creation, most importantly the opening of new lands for agricultural production.42 Relations between Light and Sultan Abdullah deteriorated so badly in 1791 that violent clashes between Kedah and the British occurred in April of that year, leaving Kedah in a much Kedah, p. 77. Lewis, Dianne N., ‘Kedah – The Development of a Malay State in the 18th and 19th Centuries’, in A. Reid and L. Castles (eds), Pre-Colonial State Systems in Southeast Asia: The Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Bali-Lombok, South Celebes (Kuala Lumpur: MBRAS 1979), pp. 36–43, at pp. 40–1. 40 Nordin H., Trade and Society in the Straits of Melaka: Dutch Melaka and English Penang, 1780–1830 (Singapore: NUS Press, 2007), p. 74. 41 Lewis, ‘Kedah – the Development’, pp. 41–2. 42 Lewis, ‘Kedah – the Development’, p. 42. 38 Bonney, 39

60 British Traders in the East Indies weaker position.43 By a settlement of the hostilities which was signed on 1 May 1791, Abdullah received compensation of only $6,000 per annum (far less than that requested), agreed to many watered-down conditions and still did not have a guarantee of protection against foreign powers which had been the main reason for his original granting of permission to the Company to form a trading settlement on Penang. A further treaty was signed in 1800 between Britain and Kedah which recognized the British occupation (but not by cession) of Penang and Province Wellesley. Among the terms, Britain agreed to pay Sultan Abdullah’s successor $10,000 per annum.44 No protection against Kedah’s enemies was guaranteed. In 1810 Sultan Ahmad was still trying to obtain British protection against Siam and Burma based on the false assumption that Light’s negotiations in 1785 had included such an undertaking.45 In all of the contacts between the EIC and Kedah it was Francis Light who was the principal promoter and negotiator for the occupation of the Kedah territory of Penang. Until 1786 he was a country trader. Following his appointment as Superintendent of the British settlement, while nominally a Company servant, in many respects he continued to act as a country trader. His actions meant the loss of territory and income for Kedah without the security of a defensive alliance which it believed it had a right to by its concessions to Britain. Political involvement in the Malay state of Kedah by the country trader Light had important repercussions for Kedah. Furthermore, as shall be demonstrated in the next chapter, the establishment of the British base on Penang was one of a series of stages which altered the traditional balance of power in the whole of the Malay world by bringing into the equation the powerful English East India Company.46

Kedah, pp. 93–100. Kedah, p. 107. 45 Bonney, Kedah, pp. 102, 118, note 78. 46 Bonney, Kedah, p. 61.

43 Bonney, 44 Bonney,

Political allies 61

Tidore, and the influence of Thomas Forrest, Robert Lander, William Risdon, J. W. Court, Francis Lynch and William Grieg In the eastern part of the Malay Archipelago too, country traders played a critical role in local politics, especially in the Sultanate of Tidore. Tidore was, with Ternate, Bachian and Gilolo, one of the four traditional Sultanates in the northern Moluccas. With its rival Ternate, it was one of the centres of the trade in cloves. Various country traders operated in a spasmodic fashion in the Moluccas in the years up to 1770. The term “eastern trade” as used by contemporary country traders operating out of Bencoolen and Riau meant commerce to any ports to the east, including Borneo ports such as Mempawah, Banjermasin and Pasir, as well as ports on Java, Bali and in the Moluccas. During the 1760s, though the importance of the traditional spice trade was declining in comparison with the rise of the China trade, it still had some value,47 and there were a number of country traders who continued to challenge the cherished Dutch monopoly in the trade. Furthermore, pepper could be acquired at Banjermasin, and opium sold at all the ports. The bulk of this early eastern trade was brought to Bencoolen by Malay prahus. Several at least of these prahus were actually based at Bencoolen and owned or hired by EIC servants acting in a private capacity (virtually “country traders”). In addition, servants of the Company at Bencoolen acquired the ship Success (Captain David Rannie) to participate in country trading “to the eastwards” in 1765. She made two further trips there in 1766 and 1767, as did other country traders such as the Tartar and the Betsy. At least four other vessels went as far as Batavia and may have even ventured further east. In 1768, country traders were even found to be initiating the beginnings of a factory at Blambangan on Southeast Java. Other ships continued to “the eastward” during the years 1769–73 though it is not clear where to the east of Batavia they actually sailed. With what has been described as the “marked expansion in British Indiabased country trade to Bencoolen and Batavia after 1768”, it 47 Bassett,

British Trade, p. 9.

62 British Traders in the East Indies is possible that other similar vessels from India sailed directly to eastern Indonesia without calling at Bencoolen.48 Thomas Forrest’s famous voyage to New Guinea and the Moluccas in 1774–5 marks the first identifiable political involvement by a country trader in the affairs of a Moluccan state.49 While, strictly speaking, it was a voyage of an EIC vessel under the command of a person who was at that time a member of the Company’s Bombay Marine, in reality it was a 20-month-long reconnaissance by a free-wheeling individual who was essentially an independent trader in spirit, behaviour and experience. A review of Forrest’s life reveals him as a bona fide country trader rather than a Company servant.50 He certainly regarded himself as a country trader when he wrote that he had had, “… above twenty-five years practice in what is called the country trade in India, during which time I made no less than eighteen voyages from Indostan to the eastward”.51 For his voyage to the Moluccas he chose a local vessel, the Tartar Galley, partly to avoid arousing the suspicions of the Dutch and partly because the small vessel could enter shallow waters. Forrest’s official purpose on the New Guinea and Moluccas voyage was to locate areas of the Spice Islands outside of Dutch control. This meant making contact with local rulers – essentially a diplomatic mission, though he was also encouraged to assess the trading potential of the area. He avoided the main centres of population and from among the Moluccan rulers, met only the Sultan of Bachian, and that by coincidence.52 But he did gather a great deal of information that was new to the English at that time. His book on eastern Indonesia was the

British Trade, pp. 11–25; Reber, Anne Lindsey, ‘The Private Trade of the British in West Sumatra, 1735–1770’ (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Hull, 1977). 49 Forrest, Thomas, A Voyage to New Guinea and the Moluccas, 1774–1776, with an Introduction by D. K. Bassett (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1969, orig. 1780). 50 Bassett, British Trade, pp. 30–49: Bassett, D. K., ‘Introduction’, in Forrest, A Voyage to New Guinea, pp. 1–22. 51 Forrest, Thomas, A Voyage from Calcutta to the Mergui Archipelago (London: Sold by J. Robson and Balfour, Edinburgh, 1792), p. 93. 52 Forrest, A Voyage to New Guinea, p. 48. 48 Bassett,

Political allies 63 main reason he briefly mixed in the same company as such illustrious people as Sir Joseph Banks and William Marsden.53 As a consequence of his voyage, Forrest continued to be a point of contact and political intermediary for visitors to India from the Moluccas during the early 1780s. In 1781, during one of the bloodiest periods of hostility between the Tidorese on the one hand and the Dutch/Ternate forces on the other, the Tidorese sent an appeal to Forrest (“Captain Farris”) imploring him for assistance from the British. This letter, sent by the Sultan of Sulu on behalf of the claimant to the Tidore sultanate, Prince Nuku, was carried by a Spanish sailor who had deserted from a Dutch vessel.54 Nuku became a significant figure in the politics of the Moluccas and had been rebelling against Dutch sovereignty since 1780. His campaign to assert his rights and regain occupation of the capital, Soasio, on the island of Tidore, was to last until 1797. Forrest was considered so important to their cause by the Tidorese he is mentioned personally twice in another letter from Nuku, this time to the English at Bencoolen, dated 25 March 1785.55 In the letter Nuku describes the efforts that he and his people had gone to, to assist the crew of two English vessels (not named) that had met with difficulties off Ceram. Three of the marooned English crew members were put on a country trader, the Sea Queen (Captain Douglas), while other members of the crew were transported to Portuguese Timor where it was hoped they would be able to obtain a passage to Bencoolen. But even more indicative of the hope that Nuku placed in establishing support from the English through the assistance of a country trader, was Nuku’s harking back in his letter of March British Trade, p. 38. Farquhar, Robert Townsend, An Account of the Tidoreeze Revolutions, from the Year 1779 containing several remarkable incidents relative to Newco and his family …, in British Library, Oriental and India Office Collections, Madras Military Consultations (hereafter BL, OIOC, MMC), 18 February 1803. Text of the letter itself not included in Farquhar’s Account. 55 Gallop, Annabel Teh, Golden Letters, Writing Traditions of Indonesia: Surat Emas, Budaya Tulis di Indonesia, with Bernard Arps (London: The British Library, 1991), pp. 38–9, 129–30. 53 Bassett, 54

64 British Traders in the East Indies 1785 to the letter Forrest himself had sent to Nuku’s father in 1777 in which the English at Bencoolen say they wish to establish friendship with the Sultan:56 “Maka tertulis dalamnya bahwa Kompeni Inggris mau hendak masuk bersahabatakan dengan Tuan Sultan di Maluku”.57 Nuku attributed the troubled political situation of the Moluccas to the Dutch and, recalling the offer in the letter provided by Forrest, said that the Moluccas required a physician who could cure it of the torment that now afflicted it.58 He went on to say that he and his ministers had received sincere reports of the English Company and in return for the right to spices, the Company was implored to help the people of Moluccas in opposing the Dutch. The letter was signed not only by Nuku, but also by 120 leaders of Tidore. A delegation consisting of Muhammad Saleh, a writer and several other officials, accompanied the letter. What particularly impressed the Tidorese, and presumably contributed to persuading them to rely on the English, was the way Forrest’s Malay letter was composed. According to Nuku, writing later in 1785, the words in Forrest’s letter were very beautiful and the prose had a “sweet” feel to it, and it enchanted and impressed Nuku’s father.59 In traditional Malay society, correct 56

“seorang Kapitan pada Inggris namanya p-a-r-s” (A captain of the English whose name was Forrest). It is unlikely that the date is correct, because Forrest was in England for most of 1777. The letter could have been provided by Forrest during his 1775 voyage, or on a later voyage. He was undertaking secret voyages for the Governor-General during the late 1770s and in 1780, Bassett, British Trade, p. 37. 57 “It is stated in the letter that the English Company wish to enter into a friendly relationship with the Sultan in the Moluccas.” Gallop, Golden Letters, pp. 38, 130. Illustration of the letter p. 39, transliteration by E. U. Kratz, pp. 129–30. Translation by the author. 58 “Pada hal mengingatkan pula perkatan kapitan p-a-r-s [Forrest] bagai yang tersebut, mau hendak jua mencahari siapa tabib yang boleh dapat mengobati pada menghilangkan kesakitan kami di Maluku ini.” 59 “Istimewah pula menyebutkan di dalam warkahnya itu segala perkataan yang sangat indah-indah dan kalam yang manis cita rasanya. Sebab itulah ayahandaku oleh Tuan Sultan terlalu enak dan amat berahilah ia akan bunyi pulanya yang tersebut bagai demikian itu jua”. Gallop, Golden Letters, p. 130.

Political allies 65 letter writing was very important in formal relationships and a highly regarded form of political communication. In 1786 Forrest was given the task by the Bengal government of escorting back to the Moluccas a delegation from Nuku which had visited India.60 This was a delicate diplomatic task, for Forrest had to explain to Nuku that while the British appreciated the assistance Nuku had provided to English shipping increasingly using the Eastern passage to China, the Bengal Government was not in a position to assist him materially in his opposition to the Dutch because of the prevailing peace agreement in Europe. While Forrest’s voyage was never completed, proceeding only as far as Bencoolen, the preparations that were put in place demonstrate the extent to which the Bengal Government was prepared to entrust a major diplomatic task in a volatile political situation to a country trader because of his local knowledge and connections. These responsibilities necessitated not only an ability to converse in Malay and familiarity with Malay courtesies and conventions, as well as a knowledge of the politics of the region built up through experience over a long period of time, they also required that the country trader was trusted by the local elite. The political involvement of country traders in Tidore affairs continued in the 1790s principally through the activities of Robert Lander, William Risdon and Captain J. W. Court. Lander was 3rd Officer on the Duke of Clarence under John Hayes when it and the Duchess sailed from India via Tasmania to Dorey (Dore, Manokwari) on the north coast of New Guinea in 1793 and founded the ill-fated British trading base of “New Albion” (September 1793– May 1795), discussed further in Chapter 3.61 The coastal villages of West Irian were under the suzerainty of Tidore. Lander was 60

Details of the voyage are in a number of the Bengal Political Consultations of 1786 and 1788 and the Fort Marlborough Public Consultations, Sumatra Factory Records of 1786 and 1787. For details see Miller, W. G., ‘Thomas Forrest on the West Coast of Sumatra, 1786–87’, unpublished paper, ASAA, 3rd National Conference, Brisbane, 24–9 August 1980. 61 Lee, I., Commodore Sir John Hayes, his Voyage and Life, 1767–1831, with some account of Admiral D’Entrecasteaux’s voyage of 1792–3 (London: Longmans, 1912, p. 79; Haga, A., Nederlandsch Nieuw Guinea en de Papoesche Eilanden: historische bijdrage, 1500–1883 (2 vols, Batavia: Bruining, 1884), vol. 1, pp. 345–7.

66 British Traders in the East Indies left second-in-command at New Albion, subsequently becoming 1st Officer and later Captain of the Duchess, the country vessel that remained at Dorey after the Duke of Clarence sailed back to India. When New Albion was abandoned, Lander resided for eight months on Gebe, an island between Halmahera and New Guinea. He continued to sail and trade in the Moluccas for the next ten years, enjoying the protection of Nuku. The political cooperation between the country traders and Nuku during the 1790s was confirmed in the testimony of Lander when he was interviewed by the Resident of Amboyna, William Jones, in 1798 after the British had occupied the Moluccas. The support rendered by the country traders gave sustenance to Nuku’s campaign against the Dutch.62 During the time of the British settlement at Dorey, statements from both Chinese and Tidore traders declared that it was common knowledge that Nuku had granted trading rights in the area of New Guinea to the British. The British country traders were able to move freely in the waters between Halmahera and New Guinea (the area known as Raja Ampat) on account of the protection they enjoyed from Nuku. Following the abandonment of New Albion in May 1795, the relationship was sufficiently close that Nuku invited the country traders on the Duke of Clarence and the Duchess to make their base at Waru on the eastern end of Ceram. The presence of the British traders strengthened Nuku’s position both materially and politically. At this time, it was also believed by the Dutch that Nuku’s half-brother, Janalabdin, had been returned from exile in Ceylon by a British country trader.63 At the same time, another country trader, William Risdon was fulfilling a similar role to Lander. He was originally 2nd Officer on the Duke of Clarence. He returned to India from Dorey with Hayes, but later made several trips back to the Moluccas as Captain of the Duke of Clarence. (He finally sailed for England in 1801.) Examination of Mr. Robert Lander, 24 April 1798, British Library, Oriental and India Office Collections, Madras Public Consultations (hereafter BL, OIOC, MPC), 31 August 1798. 63 Lee, Commodore, p. 182; Haga, Nederlandsch Nieuw, vol. 1, pp. 345–7, 355–8. 62

Political allies 67 The important role country traders played in Tidore affairs was confirmed by Captain J. W. Court, the country trader left in charge at New Albion, who subsequently became master of the Duke of Clarence.64 He was interviewed by one of Admiral Rainier’s officers at Penang in late 1795 soon after the country trader arrived on his way back from the Moluccas on one of his trips.65 Court was described as “a gentleman who had been 27 months cruizing in the vicinity of the Moluccas”. He not only provided important provisioning and meteorological information for the British naval fleet, but political information as well, emphasizing the closeness of the relationship between the British settlement at Dorey and Nuku. The presence of the country traders continued to enhance Nuku’s position commercially and militarily, as it did his standing among his people. It was during this period while based at eastern Ceram that Nuku sent two envoys to the British government in Bengal on the Duke of Clarence. The embassy was cordially received in Bengal and generated a considerable amount of public attention. Presents for Nuku were given by the Bengal government to the envoy. According to John Shaw, one of the owners of the country ships, these presents consisted of a friendly letter for Nuku, arms and ammunition “to a great amount in value”, as well as an EIC flag and a gold seal engraved with Nuku’s name and titles. The envoys and the presents were conveyed back to the Moluccas by the country traders Duke of Clarence (Captain Risdon), the Sultan (Captain Court), and the Phoenix (Captain Stewart). They departed in January and February 1796,66 precisely the time that Amboyna was occupied by the British Navy under Admiral Rainier. The British Resident at Amboyna between 1799 and 1802, Robert Townsend Farquhar, was in no doubt that the English country traders were politically supportive of Nuku during this period in the mid-1790s, while at the same time he was apparently ignorant of, or preferred not to concede, that the Company itself had supported Nuku in his cause. Nederlandsch Nieuw, vol. 1, p. 364. BL, OIOC, MMC, 5 January 1796. 66 Shaw to Clive, 29 March 1800, BL, OIOC, MPC, 11 July 1800; Lee, Commodore, p. 166. 64 Haga, 65

68 British Traders in the East Indies He placed that responsibility on the country traders: “… the commanders of these vessels loaded Prince Newco [sic] with honors and presents and supplied him with cannon and all kinds of warlike stores”.67 Further clear evidence of the political involvement of the country traders is in a letter written jointly by Risdon, Stewart, Court and Nuku to the Dutch-supported puppetSultan of Tidore, Kamaloedin, as well as those sengaji (leaders) of Tidore still allied to the Dutch, calling on them to desert the Dutch and acknowledge British suzerainty.68 In the letter the country traders exaggerated the alliance between Nuku and the EIC and undertook political actions far beyond any authority they might have had.69 They raised the English flag on Maba. Nuku in the letter entreated his “brother” to desert the Dutch now that the British had supplanted them. The British captains also advised the Dutch-allied Tidore ruler and chiefs to acknowledge British rule. In an indication of the commercial motivation for the assistance that they provided, the country traders promised that they would pay well for spices, in money, ammunition or in another form that was desirable. For their part, the Dutch were convinced of the collaboration between the country traders and Nuku. Another country trader active in the area and the one who gave the greatest assistance to Nuku in his campaign against the Dutch was Francis Lynch. Lynch first appears in the records in early 1796 as Captain of the Diana, a vessel owned by the Bengal merchant William Fairlie. Lynch was fortunate at that time to have as a member of his crew, Robert Lander, who, as we have seen, already had over two years’ experience trading and living in the Moluccas. Lynch was principally obtaining spices through his association with Nuku. In addi67 Farquhar, An Account of

the Tidoreze Revolutions; Examination of Mr. Robert Lander, 24 April 1798, BL, OIOC, MPC, 31 August 1798. 68 Roo, L. W. G. de, ‘J.W. Cranssen te Ternate, 13 September 1799 – 18 Juni 1801’, TBG, 16 (1867), 503–35, at pp. 504–5. The Malay original is lost, but the Dutch translation is quoted in full in de Roo. 69 de Roo, ‘J.W. Cranssen’, p. 504: “Nu is de Engelsche Comp. met mij Koning Noekoe in vriendschapp getreden, en dat wel met den band dat niemand zal breeken” (The English Company now has a bond of friendship with Nuku that no-one can break).

Political allies 69 tion to the benefits this trade may have brought Nuku, the most decisive support was the naval support given by Lynch to Nuku’s efforts to seize the Tidore capital, Soasio, from the Dutch and Dutch-supported Tidore elements. Nuku had frequently requested official British support to achieve the reoccupation of the capital, but it had been refused. For example, he dispatched an impressive embassy of 99 korakora to meet Admiral Rainier in May 1796 at Amboyna, but the request for official assistance from the Navy was turned down. Rainier was reluctant to enter into any political or military cooperation with a native ruler. During the last months of 1796 and the early months of 1797 Nuku continued his campaign with the assistance of the country traders. On 13 March 1797, a European vessel appeared at Bachian and demanded the keys of the fort.70 The demand was repeated on 21 March when the vessel had been joined by two others and a fleet of smaller vessels belonging to Nuku’s fleet. The European ships opened fire and Nuku’s troops then landed without opposition from the Bachianese. According to the Dutch, “sepoys” also landed. Though the names of the vessels are not given in the Dutch accounts, it is reasonable to suppose that that they were the country traders Duke of Clarence, Phoenix and Sultan, which were with Nuku at Maba eleven months previously. The first of these vessels had in the meantime been to India, but had departed from Calcutta again on 7 December 1796.71 Nuku moved north almost immediately after the capture of Bachian. He lay off Gita and sent envoys to invite the sengaji and kimelaha (types of leaders) of Tidore to meet at the island of Mare. There they agreed to join his campaign and returned to Tidore to demand the royal regalia from the Dutch-appointed Sultan Kamaloedin and to inform him they now considered Nuku as their Sultan.72 Kamaloedin and the Dutch garrison abandoned Tidore and fled to Ternate on 12 April 1797. Nuku, again assisted by the country traders and leading a fleet of seventy kora-kora 70

Leupe, P. A., ‘De verdediging van Ternate onder den Gouverneur Johan Godfried Budach 1796–1799, eene bijdrage tot de geschiedenis onzer Oost-Indische bezittingen’, BKI, 8 (1865), 262–363, at p. 290. 71 Lee, Commodore, p. 167. 72 Leupe, ‘De verdediging’, p. 293.

70 British Traders in the East Indies appeared before Tidore and achieved his long-denied ambition of reoccupying the capital of the realm from which he had fled seventeen years before. The task of capturing Tidore had been achieved without British naval support, and with the assistance only of the country traders. After his capture of the Tidore capital, Nuku lost no time in continuing his campaign against Tidore’s long-standing rival, the Dutch-allied Ternate. It was a military decision which almost brought him immediate success against the disorientated and under-manned allies. On 25 April 1797 Nuku’s forces made two landings on Ternate with two of the British ships assisting, though the British did not take part in the actual attack. The ships’ presence added a certain protection for the Tidore craft; when the latter were counter-attacked, they could seek refuge within range of the British vessels’ guns.73 But the Tidore forces did not consolidate the gains they made in overrunning one of the forts, Kayu Merah, and from then on, Fort Orange never came under the same threat that it had been following the initial landings. Subsequent operations which Nuku carried out alone against Ternate were unsuccessful. During the campaign against Ternate the Dutch knew that Nuku, while in charge, was receiving assistance from the British country traders. Nuku was observed by the Dutch standing on the deck of one of the vessels.74 The Dutch Governor was convinced that Nuku would inflict a terrible death upon them should he prevail, writing that the British “pirates” would remain far off and be unable or unwilling to prevent it. It was known for a fact that the British were supplying Nuku with arms and ammunition, for on a barrel of gunpowder captured by the Dutch were the English words “King of Tidore”.75 The British vessels departed at the end of April 1797 with Nuku firmly established on Tidore and the Dutch still in possession of Ternate.76 For several months the situation on Ternate improved, but the country traders returned again in or about July and supported Nuku’s blockade. 73

Leupe, ‘De verdediging’, p. 295. Leupe, ‘De verdediging’, p. 299. 75 Leupe, ‘De verdediging’, p. 301. 76 Haga, Nederlandsch Nieuw, vol. 1, p. 301. 74

Political allies 71 The Diana under the command of Francis Lynch was also believed to be assisting Nuku in the blockade of Ternate from about this time.77 Lander, in his own account, said he was at Tidore between July and December 1797.78 During a heavy attack that Nuku launched on Ternate on 27 August, a British brig was present, although it did not approach close to the area of fighting. A subsequent attack on 31 August 1797 was said by the Dutch to be in the command of an Englishman. From the British brig flags were flown conveying orders to the attacking units of kora-kora.79 Until October of that year the country captains appear to have been anxious to avoid a personal and direct confrontation with the Dutch. On the 20th of that month however, they struck an open, undisguised blow against the Dutch when they captured the Dutch vessel, the Banda’s Welvaren, which was protecting supply lines between Sahu and Ternate. The ship was seized by Risdon on the Duke of Clarence, accompanied by the schooner Experiment.80 Later, the prize and the prisoners were taken to Amboyna and the vessel eventually to Calcutta, where it arrived on 2 September 1798.81 Possibly emboldened by the capture of the Banda’s Welvaren and anxious to swiftly conclude the siege, on 28 October 1797 the British demanded the surrender of Ternate in the form of a “request” to the Dutch Governor Budach that he should place it under British protection.82 The summons was delivered to the shore by Robert Lander, who claimed that Captain Risdon had a commission from Bengal to accept the surrender of Ternate. Budach rejected the demand, asserting that he could protect himself satisfactorily against Nuku’s attacks. When this attempt by the country traders failed, they appear to have abandoned plans to assist Nuku in conquering Ternate and concentrated on trading on Ceram. The decisive naval assistance 77

Jones to Madras, 4 July 1797, BL, OIOC, MPC, 15 September 1797. Examination of Mr. Robert Lander, 24 April 1798, BL, OIOC, MPC, 31 August 1798. 79 Leupe, ‘De verdediging’, pp. 305–7. 80 Lee, Commodore, p. 168; Leupe, ‘De verdediging’, p. 314. Lee incorrectly gives the year 1797 as 1798. 81 Madras Courier, 12 September 1798, quoted in Lee, Commodore, p. 168. 82 Haga, Nederlandsch Nieuw, vol. 1, p. 372. 78

72 British Traders in the East Indies that Nuku was to receive subsequently from the British came from the Royal Navy. Though even on that occasion, as shall be seen, the role of the country traders was vital. At the beginning of 1798 Nuku’s position was secure, despite the withdrawal of the country traders. Their support had contributed to the recovery of the capital of Tidore, but an apparent reluctance on their part to take an active, belligerent role in attacking Ternate had resulted in a stalemate between Ternate and Tidore. Despite their severely weakened position, the Dutch were able to resist Nuku’s attacks. In January 1798 British naval officers based at Amboyna flirted with the idea of assisting Nuku to conquer Ternate, but the official position of the British Resident was only to occupy it if the Dutch agreed that it should not be surrendered, but be placed under British protection.83 That January, at least one country ship, the Ruby from Bengal, was in the vicinity.84 During 1798 and the first part of 1799 the stalemate between Ternate and Tidore continued, with both sides launching occasional attacks upon the other. With the arrival in January 1799 of a new British Resident at Amboyna, Robert Townsend Farquhar, there was a shift in attitude by the British administration towards the conquest of Ternate, which in turn included a renewed role for the country traders. Farquhar believed that this final Dutch settlement in the Moluccas should be taken by the British. Meanwhile in Fort Orange, a new Dutch Governor arrived to replace Budach in September of the same year. Willem Jacob Cranssen was as much a zealot for the Dutch cause as Farquhar was for the British and he attacked Tidore in October and again in April 1800, both without success.85 Farquhar initially wanted to conquer Ternate without Nuku’s support but half-hearted naval attempts to get it to surrender in 1799 failed, and the stalemate continued during 1800. The British campaign was however eventually successful, as discussed in Chapter 3. The consequences for Tidore from the support 83

Jones to Madras, 11 January 1798, BL, OIOC, MPC, 27 April 1798. Noted in the log of HMS Hobart, 28 January 1798, Public Records Office (PRO), Captain’s Journals, ADM 51/1265, Sunday, 28 January 1798 (naval dating). 85 For more on Cranssen, see Chapter 4. 84

Political allies 73 of Lynch, and indirectly through him, the EIC, were immense. Not only had Nuku established authority over the whole of the Tidore realm for which he had been fighting for twenty years, he had also participated in the defeat of his traditional rival Ternate and its European overlord, the Dutch. Nuku and Farquhar met at Ternate in October 1801 and discussions regarding a treaty were commenced. On 12 November Nuku was recognized by the British as Sultan of Tidore in a ceremony that Farquhar described as the climax of twenty years of struggle by the now decrepit, 66-year-old Nuku.86 He did not explain that the British had given their official support most reluctantly and that it had been the country traders who had been Nuku’s most consistent and important ally. Under the terms of the treaty,87 Nuku was acknowledged as superior in status to the Sultan of Ternate, a reversal of the positions Ternate and Tidore had held under the Dutch. Britain agreed not to intervene in such internal affairs of Tidore as the appointment of officials, the administration of justice, the selection of a successor to the position of Sultan or the nomination of a Raja Muda. Compared to contemporary Dutch treaties, the Sultan was considered as an independent monarch. Nuku was referred to by Farquhar at this time as “an old friend and ally of the English”.88 Unfortunately for Nuku, while he continued to retain his position on Tidore, the treaty entered into by Farquhar was not ratified by the British administration in Bengal. Farquhar himself was reprimanded for going too far in recognizing native administrations and extending British authority to Ternate. But Nuku continued to rule after the departure of the British and the return of the Dutch to the Moluccas in June 1803 until his death on 14 November 1805. The short period around the signing of the treaty with Farquhar was the zenith of Nuku’s power and influence in the Moluccas. 86

Farquhar to Madras, 1 January 1802, BL, OIOC, MPC, 25 June 1802. 87 Attachment to Farquhar’s letter of 1 January 1802, BL, OIOC, MPC, 25 June 1802. 88 Farquhar to Madras, 1 January 1802, BL, OIOC, MPC, 25 June 1802.

74 British Traders in the East Indies The death of Nuku and the return of the Moluccas to the Dutch did not end the involvement of the country traders in Tidore politics. William Grieg, Captain of the Lord Minto, was operating in the Moluccas in the period between the first and second British occupations, 1803–10. He too made a decisive impact on Tidore politics at that time. Grieg was there principally to trade in spices, but he also undertook diplomatic tasks for the Bengal administration, seeking to retain some degree of contact with the local Sultans who were opposed to the Dutch. In India, Grieg was particularly close to Governor-General Lord Minto (governed 1806–13), after whom his vessel, owned by Joseph Baretto and Company, was named.89 The Lord Minto was a 200-ton vessel, built in 1807. By the second half of 1807 the Dutch had reasserted their control over much of the Tidore realm. They attacked the island of Tidore on 13 November 1806 forcing Nuku’s successor, Janalabdin, to flee.90 Only one year after the death of Nuku, the Dutch reoccupied the island that had been lost to them since 12 April 1797. They controlled not only the islands off the west coast of Halmahera, including the island of Tidore itself, but the Tidore settlements along the east coast. Janalabdin had been forced to flee further east to Misool, with a number of his followers established on Salawati.91 By October 1807, Janalabdin was in such a difficult position he had recommenced correspondence with the Dutch and Governor Cranssen was optimistic that he could conclude a peace treaty, for Janalabdin had promised to come to Amboyna and submit to Dutch rule. A commission was sent by the Dutch to escort him to the Dutch settlement, but when it arrived, Janalabdin refused to accompany them, providing the excuse that he had to remain in the Papuas to settle a purely internal dispute among the Tidore chiefs. Janalabdin’s change of mind can be linked however to the appearance of the Lord Minto. Grieg passed through Malacca

Mathison, John and Alexander Way Mason, An East India Register and Directory for 1809, corrected to the 15th August 1809 …, 2nd edn (London: Blacks and Parry, 1809), p. 120. 90 Haga, Nederlandsch Nieuw, vol. 1, p. 439. 91 Haga, Nederlandsch Nieuw, vol. 1, p. 442. 89

Political allies 75 in October and anchored off Tidore on 14 November 1807.92 He learnt to his surprise of the conquest and plunder of Tidore by the Dutch twelve months before (Grieg thought it was eight months previously), and then sailed eastwards to search for Janalabdin and his family who had fled to New Guinea. Between January and April 1808, Grieg was, as he wrote, “… mostly on the east side of the large island Gilolo” where he assisted “… a number of the Sultan’s resolute people against the Dutch”. Grieg’s “assistance” was quite considerable, for the Dutch sent a fleet of kora-kora and 25 soldiers to Maba to attack the Lord Minto and Janalabdin’s supporters.93 The Dutch were able to burn Osso (between Gotowasi and Patani) on one occasion, but could not drive the British vessel away, or overpower it. Conversely, the Lord Minto and the Tidorese were unable to force the Dutch expedition to retreat. Eventually, the Dutch expedition withdrew from the area in early April. While assisting the Tidorese to the east of Gilolo/Halmahera, Grieg received letters from Janalabdin begging him to continue to assist the Tidorese against the Dutch. Grieg was on his way to bring Janalabdin back from New Guinea to Halmahera when the two met at Gebe on 6 April and the Lord Minto then brought the Sultan and his wife back to Osso on Halmahera. From that time on until the beginning of August, with strong pockets of resistance being exercised in the area by the Dutch and Ternate, Grieg conceded that “we, in conjunction with the Sultan (Janalabdin) and his people, had many skirmishes and battles with the Dutch and Ternate people with various success”.94 A stalemate appears to have eventuated and with hostilities subsiding in August, Grieg set sail for Calcutta, leaving the Sultan at Osso. Grieg left behind two of the Lord Minto’s guns and “all the ammunition we could spare”.95 Janalabdin urged Grieg to

92

Grieg to Bengal, 29 December 1808, British Library, Oriental and India Office Collections, Bengal Political Consultations (hereafter BL, OIOC, BPolC), 2 January 1809. 93 Haga, Nededrlandschs Nieuw, vol. 1, pp. 443–4. 94 Grieg to Bengal, 29 December 1808, BL, OIOC, BPolC, 2 January 1809. 95 Ibid.

76 British Traders in the East Indies return within six months with further arms, otherwise he, Janalabdin, would be driven back once more to Papua. Grieg by then had been nine months in the Moluccas and his presence had been decisive in enabling the Tidorese to resist the Dutch. Grieg said that the period he spent in the Moluccas “was attended with great loss to us without any prospect of getting reimbursed”.96 Grieg had also undertaken survey work and produced a chart of Maba entitled, Bay of Maba on the Island of Gilolo, surveyed by Mr. Grieg commanding the ship Lord Minto 1808.97 Maba was part of the area that was a centre of opposition to Batavia; it consisted of Maba, Weda and Patani and was known locally as Gamrange.98 The resistance mounted by Janalabdin with Grieg’s support provoked the Dutch into adopting a new course of action, for they then embarked on a policy of dividing the realm and promoting an alternative Sultan. Grieg carried with him to India an envoy from Janalabdin, named “Moosleem”, or “Mussaleem”, who bore a letter for the Governor-General.99 Janalabdin (transcribed as “Zyne ool Aubdeen” in the records) recalled the assistance his father Nuku “afforded to the English when they took possession of Fort Orange”. He explained his distressed situation and requested British assistance. “I wish that a small vessel may be dispatched to me with warlike stores, and that she may remain here for a short time”. He outlined the crucial benefit the country trader had been to him: “I have … derived essential assistance from the Lord Minto, commanded by Captain Grieg, who has been here for nine months”. The Sultan also requested a number of armaments: “200 barrels of gunpowder, 300 muskets, 10 six pounders and 12 swivels”. A longer list of items accompanied the correspondence and was enclosed in the official records: most of the items consisted of additional armaments, or parts 96 Ibid.

Listed in India Office, A Catalogue of Manuscript and Printed reports, field books, memoirs, maps, etc., of the Indian Surveys, deposited in the map room of the India Office (London: Sold by W.M. Allen, 1878). 98 Andaya, L. Y., The World of Maluku, p. 282. 99 King of Tidore to Lord Minto, 14 August 1808, English translation in BL, OIOC, BPolC, 2 January 1809. 97

Political allies 77 thereof, such as gun belts, musket flints, 6-pounder priming wires, grape shot and musket shot.100 In Calcutta, Grieg supported the envoy’s request for arms and assistance and expressed a willingness to transport them back to the Moluccas himself. Janalabdin, with Grieg’s intercession, found a sympathetic figure in the Governor-General, who, “being disposed to comply with the request of the King of Tidore … detailed in the list submitted by Captain Grieg” agreed to a shipment of the material.101 The Council Secretary, J. Monkton, on behalf of Minto, wrote Janalabdin a most encouraging letter in which he expressed concern for Janalabdin’s current situation, recalled Nuku’s assistance to the British in the attack on Ternate and during the Moluccan occupation, and had “great satisfaction in complying with His Majesty’s application for a supply of ordnance, arms and ammunition which as specified in a separate list have been delivered to His Majesty’s Ambassador”.102 Minto also sent personal presents, together with the Company’s flag and a gold seal. He asked that Janalabdin would assist any British ships which touched at any part of the Tidore territory for the purposes of refitting or the procurement of supplies. Grieg thus had been very persuasive. Minto returned the Tidore ambassador and sent the considerable array of armaments requested, “on the ship bearing His Lordship’s name, commanded by Captain Grieg”. In the Moluccas Janalabdin again had been under considerable pressure from the Dutch but was saved by the return of the Lord Minto. Janalabdin wrote to Lord Minto from Maba thanking him the gifts.103 The munitions so strengthened Janalabdin’s position that he was henceforth never in danger of being dislodged from his position on the east coast of Halamahera, though he was never able to recapture his capital, Soasio. 100 List

of Ordnance and ordnance stores required for the King of Tidore, BL, OIOC, BPolC, 2 January 1809. 101 BL, OIOC, BPolC, 2 January1809. 102 English translation 14 January 1809, BL, OIOC, BPolC, 16 January 1809. 103 Letter from King of Tidore, Maba, 1809, BL, OIOC, BPolC, 5 August 1809.

78 British Traders in the East Indies The British occupied the Dutch settlements in the Moluccas in 1810. Unfortunately for the British authorities, a dispute over succession in Tidore was to prove a problem for the administration throughout the second occupation of the Moluccas which the country traders were unable to assist in resolving. The more than 30-year role of the country traders in the politics of Tidore had come to an unsatisfactory conclusion.

Mempawah/Pontianak, and the influence of Thomas Sadler, Alexander Hare, Joseph Burn, Daniel Smith and John Palmer Country traders also played a significant role in the politics of the West Borneo states of Mempawah and Pontianak in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Mempawah was the older of these two West Borneo negeri, in many ways a traditional riverine principality. In 1795 when an event of some consequence involving the country trader Thomas Sadler took place, Mempawah was more than a simple river settlement, for it had by then established its own history, implementing the traditional administration of a typical Malay kerajaan, as exemplified by the existence of the Hikayat Upu Daeng Menambung, written about 1845, a substantial, traditional Malay chronicle that describes events in the Mempawah court in the eighteenth century.104 In addition to Malay, Dyak and Bugis elements, the society of Mempawah, as with many other Malay courts, came to have a significant Arab influence, and Mempawah in the mid-eighteenth century was considered a centre of Islamic learning.105 The ruler had the title, Fritz, Die Chroniken van Sambas und Mempawah: Einheimische Quellen zur Geschichte West-Kalimantans (Heidelberg: Julius Groos, 1991). See also its significance in Andaya, L. Y., The Kingdom of Johor, 1641–1728 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 8, 18, 19 notes 16, 20, and Raja Ali Haji ibn Ahmad, The Precious Gift (Tuhfat al-Nafis): An Annotated Translation, Virginia Matheson and Barbara Watson Andaya (eds) (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 5–6. 105 Willer, J. T. ‘Eerste proeve eener Kronijk van Mampawa en Pontianak’ [A preliminary chronicle of Mempawah and Pontianak], TBG III, 516–62 and VI (new series III) (1855–7) at pp. 517–18; Abdullah, H. W. Muhd. Shaghir, Upu Daeng Menambon Raja Mempawah dan Saudara-saudaranya [Upu Daeng Menambon, Raja of Mempawah, 104 Schulze,

Political allies 79 adapted from Javanese, of Panembahan, a position subordinate only to that of Sultan. Situated on the Mempawah river, the capital, also called Mempawah (or Trusan), was close enough to the sea to be a port for regional vessels, but far enough upstream to be protected from piracy. Mempawah flourished as a state based on trade from the catchment of the river; the upstream people marketed forest products and agricultural goods in exchange for imported items, as was typical of other estuarine states of Borneo and Sumatra.106 The local products included rice, rattan, beeswax, sago and diamonds. Gold too was exported in considerable amounts from about 1760, when goldfields were opened in the interior by Chinese miners.107 These products were exchanged and his relatives] (Pontianak: Yayasan Pendidikan dan Da’wah Islamiyah Al Fathanah, 1982), pp. 5–7. 106 Heidhues, Mary Somers, ‘The First Two Sultans of Pontianak’, Archipel, 56 (1998), 273–94, at p. 275; Goor, J. van, ‘Seapower, Trade and State-formation: Pontianak and the Dutch’, in J. van Goor (ed.), Trading Companies in Asia (Utrecht: HES Uitgevers, 1986), pp. 83–106, at pp. 89–92; Willer, ‘Eerste Proeve’, p. 518. For discussion of the hulu-hilir [upstream-downstream] characteristic of a Malay state, see Bronson, Bernet, ‘Exchange of the Upstream and Downstream Ends: Notes toward a Functional Model of the Coastal State in Southeast Asia’, in Karl L. Hutterer (ed.), Economic Exchange and Social Interaction in Southeast Asia: Perspectives from Prehistory, History and Ethnography (Ann Arbor: Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies, the University of Michigan, 1977), pp. 39–52; Kathirithamby-Wells, J., ‘Hulu-hilir Unity and Conflict: Malay Statecraft in East Sumatra before the Mid-nineteenth Century’, Archipel, 45 (1993), 77–96; Kathirithamby-Wells, J., ‘Siak and its Changing Strategies for Survival, c.1700–1870’, in Anthony Reid (ed.), The Last Stand of Asian Autonomies: Responses to Modernity in the Diverse States of Southeast Asia and Korea, 1750–1900 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 217–43; Andaya, B. W., ‘Adapting to Political and Economic Change: Palembang in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries’, in Anthony Reid (ed.), The Last Stand of Asian Autonomies: Responses to Modernity in the Diverse States of Southeast Asia and Korea, 1750–1900 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 187–215; Barnard, Timothy P., Multiple Centres of Authority: Society and Environment in Siak and Eastern Indonesia 1674–1827 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2003). 107 Heidhues, Mary Somers, Golddiggers, Farmers and Traders in the ‘Chinese Districts’ of West Kalimantan, Indonesia (Ithaca; Cornell SE Asia Program, 2003), p. 33.

80 British Traders in the East Indies for cloth, iron, textiles, salt, tobacco and opium. A contemporary English description said there were “a great number of Chinese merchants settled [at Mempawah] and seldom less than four or five of their junks, which generally arrive in February or March”, reiterating that Mempawah was “one of the best markets to the eastward for opium”.108 In 1795 Mempawah was still a leading port on the west coast, albeit declining in comparison with its near neighbour, Pontianak. Its troubles began when it was drawn into the rivalry between the Bugis and the Dutch after the fall of Riau in 1784. As has been shown, Raja Ali sought refuge first in Mempawah and then in Sukadana. The Dutch destroyed Sukadana and then with the assistance of Mempawah’s new rival port, Pontianak, attacked Mempawah in 1786. The Sultan of Pontianak, Abdulrahman, appointed his son and heir, Syarif Kassim, as Panembahan in Mempawah, driving the previous ruler into exile in the upstream, but significantly, the productive, region of the state. The exiled ruler was accompanied by a large number of members of the traditional court. The state remained divided, the political instability leading in the meantime to a decline in trade for (lower) Mempawah.109 This was the unstable political environment in which the country trader, Captain Thomas Sadler, was undertaking trade for a number of the Bengal agency houses in 1795. Mempawah was ruled by an inexperienced young man facing the hostility of a large section of his population, his sources of income much diminished. Sadler’s impact on Mempawah affairs was an unfortunate and unintended one. He had considerable experience of the Malay Archipelago, having been sailing in the region for at least twelve years.110 By 1791 he was commander of the Stag, a vessel of 300 William, Oriental Commerce; containing a geographical description of the principal places in the East Indies, China and Japan. Also, the rise and progress of the trade of the various European nations with the Eastern world (London: Black, Perry and Co., 1813), p. 418. 109 For details on internal affairs in Mempawah in these years see Miller, W. G., ‘Different Perspectives on the Resistance of a Malay State: Mempawah 1787–1808’, Indonesia and the Malay World, 41:141 (2013), 348–69. 110 Nicholl, R., ‘The Letter of William Midwinter’, Brunei Museum Journal, 5:4 (1984), 46–52, at p. 51. 108 Milburn,

Political allies 81 tons; on a voyage from Bengal to Batavia it called at Penang in February of that year.111 Sadler also sailed between Bengal and Batavia in 1792. According to William Midwinter, a young officer on the Transfer (Sadler’s ship in 1795), Sadler was “beloved very much and promis’d fair to have become one of the first trade captains”.112 Sadler’s final, ill-fated voyage passed through Penang in February 1795, from there, as has been stated, the Transfer sailed down the west coast of Sumatra, visiting Natal, Padang and Bencoolen, reaching Batavia in March. It sailed to Pontianak in April and first called at Mempawah in May. It departed again the same month, visiting other nearby ports, including Bangka, before arriving back in Mempawah in July.113 The Transfer arrived for the second time at Mempawah on Sunday 12 July. The description of events given by the ship’s officers provides a rare detailed account of day to day activities. Sadler immediately went ashore, remaining there during the course of that week while the cargo was transferred from the ship by jolly boat and long boat. On Thursday 17 July the captain sent a message back to the ship ordering all the chests of opium and bales of textiles remaining on board to be sent ashore. The 1st Officer, Samuel Groube, followed instructions the following morning, Friday; the goods transferred comprised 17 chests of opium marked “B”, six bales marked “LR&C”, 31 pieces of blue cloth and a musket.114 The jolly boat, together with the coxswain Mr Bowan, did not return to the ship that evening, or during the following day. The officers on board were a little surprised but thought that Sadler was still negotiating with Kassim. When the 3rd officer, Martin Bolam, went back and approached the shore on Sunday 20 July in the long boat he became suspicious. There was a large crowd on the beach “seemingly in great confusion, India Company. Bengal Consultations relating to Prince of Wales Island 1780–1824 with indexes. Appendix to Consultation 2 December 1791 (National Library of Australia, microfilm M470-535). 112 Nicholl, ‘The Letter’, p. 51. 113 Nicholl, ‘The Letter’, pp. 46–50. 114 The opium chests and bales of cloth were probably from the Bengal Agency houses Joseph Baretto and Lambert and Ross respectively. See Webster, Anthony, Gentlemen Capitalists: British Imperialism in South East Asia 1770–1890 (London: Taurus, 1998), p. 41. 111 East

82 British Traders in the East Indies armed”.115 Bolam was not prepared to land, but the next day, when Sadler’s Malay servant boy was able to meet with Kassim, Kassim informed him that Sadler had left the beach to return to the ship on 18 July. Kassim also informed the Malay servant boy that Sadler had departed with the full payment for the goods he had brought ashore, as well as for the goods he had left on the previous trip, which had not been paid for previously. When Groube and the other officers received the report from Sadler’s servant boy they concluded that the Captain and the jolly boat’s crew had perished. There were two possible explanations. Either the men had been killed by Kassim’s people before leaving the shore or they had been attacked and killed by pirates while rowing to the ship. While it is a fact that there were Ilanun “pirates” in the vicinity and it was the time of the year when the Ilanun made their presence felt in the region,116 this seemed the less likely of the two possibilities. They believed it was unlikely Sadler would have left the shore at night with the payments he had received. Furthermore, because all of the boat’s crew were strong swimmers, it was felt at least one would have survived any attack. To all intents and purposes there had been a close and friendly relationship between Sadler and Kassim. Sadler was accustomed to staying overnight with Kassim during his visits. Staying ashore was not unusual among country traders,117 though some Englishmen considered it too dangerous. Captains of country vessels would also stay in Abdulrahman’s house in Pontianak.118 115 Malacca

Protocol Books 5 August 1795, Groube, [Protest], 22 July 1795. This is the ship’s officers’ account, as presented in the proceedings for 5 August 1795 of the General Prothocol Books [Registers of Legal Deeds] of Malacca. It was written by the officers of the Transfer a few days after the event and presented to authorities two weeks later when the ship arrived at Malacca, that port having been occupied by the British in 1795. For a detailed reconstruction of events see Miller, W. G., ‘Why Did Syarif Kassim Kill Captain Sadler at Mempawah in 1795?’, JMBRAS, 85:1 (2012), 63–84. 116 Eklof, Stefan, Pirates in Paradise: A Modern History of Southeast Asia’s Maritime Marauders (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2006), p. 9. 117 Dunmore, John, ‘French Visitors to Trengganu in the Eighteenth Century’, JMBRAS, 46:1 (1973), 144–59, at p. 148. 118 Nicholl, ‘The Letter’, p. 49. “Rajah” was the way the English referred to Panembahan Kassim.

Political allies 83 Midwinter in a letter he wrote recording the events at Mempawah said that Sadler had requested his hand organ be included among the final load of goods. This would suggest that Sadler was intending to have a relaxing social time with Kassim when the unloading was finished. In other respects, Midwinter agrees with Groube’s conclusion about Sadler’s fate. He does however add one important aspect to the officer’s version of events; he indicates that locals had reported that Sadler had left the shore on Friday “on account of having words with the Rajah”. This was the only hint from the English accounts that there was a disagreement between Sadler and Kassim. Despite the conclusion reached by the crew on the spot, the perception that Sadler had been killed while returning to the Transfer received general acceptance among the British for a number of years. The first account in the Calcutta Gazette says simply that Sadler was “cut off” by the Malays, at the same time referring to the “piratical marauders” who infested those seas.119 James Horsburgh, the compiler of important nautical information about the Eastern Seas, also accepted this interpretation, writing in his Directions, published between 1809 and 1811, “Captain Sadler, of the ship Transfer, was attacked in his boat and killed, when proceeding from the shore toward the ship with some valuable returns for goods sold. This happened, I believe, in the Mampava [sic] River”.120 John Hunt, who wrote a sketch of Borneo for Raffles in 1812, mentioned the Sadler incident, though he mistakenly thought that it took place in 1769. He specifically related that it was the Sambas pirates who killed Sadler and his boat crew, and that “a prodigious quantity of gold dust” was lost.121 119 Calcutta

Gazette, 22 October 1795, no. 608, p. 1. James, Directions for sailing to and from the East Indies, China, New Holland, Cape of Good Hope, and the interjacent ports, compiled chiefly from original journals at the East India House, and from journals and observations made during twenty-one years experience navigating in those seas (2 vols, London: Printed for the author and sold by Black, Parry and Kingsbury, 1809–11), vol. 2, p. 323. For more on one-time country trader Horsburgh, see Chapter 3. 121 Hunt, J., ‘Sketch of Borneo or Pulo Kalamantan, communicated by J. Hunt, Esq. in 1812 to the Honorable Sir T. S. Raffles, late Lieut. Governor of Java’, in J. H. Moor, Notices of the Indian Archipelago and 120 Horsburgh,

84 British Traders in the East Indies No retaliatory action appears to have been taken either by private trading interests in British India or the Bengal government in respect of Sadler’s death. By October 1795, the Supreme Court in Calcutta had granted approval for the administration of Sadler’s estate, with Mr Charles Lambert being appointed as executor to administer it. Captain Sadler’s creditors and debtors in Calcutta were called in to settle affairs.122 Kassim later admitted to the murder. In 1808, he succeeded his father and became Sultan of Pontianak. It was rumoured in Pontianak at that time that back in July 1795, Kassim owed Sadler Sp.$30,000 which he had delayed in paying.123 Finally, Sadler called in the debt “in very pressing and it was said severe language”.124 According to Joseph Burn, another country trader, who was residing in Pontianak at the time of Kassim’s succession to the Sultanate, Kassim, under pressure, paid Sadler the amount owing and received a receipt. Kassim then invited Sadler to an entertainment to demonstrate that they should depart on good terms. However, when Sadler left the entertainment after dark, he was immediately stabbed with a kris, and it was reliably believed that Kassim had carried out the first stabbing. The entire boat’s crew was killed, with the exception of one Malay crew member who escaped, eventually making his way to Pontianak. Thus, Kassim regained the payment, as well as recovering the receipt by which he was able to demonstrate that he had paid the debt and had had no hand in Sadler’s disappearance.125 Further unequivocal evidence of Kassim’s responsibility for Sadler’s murder is contained in Captain Macdonald’s report of a

Adjacent Countries …, Appendix (Singapore: no publisher, 1837), pp. 12–30, at p. 24. 122 Calcutta Gazette, 22 October 1795, no. 608, p. 1. 123 Joseph Burn letter to Stamford Raffles, 12 February 1811, BL, OIOC, Raffles Collection, vol. XI, Mss. Eur. E 109, p. 57. 124 Ibid. 125 Ibid. See also Reece, Bob and F. Andrew Smith, ‘Joseph Burn and Raffles’s Plan for a British Borneo’, Borneo Research Bulletin, 37 (2006), 27–49 and Smith, F. Andrew, ‘Captain Burn and Associates: British Intelligence-gathering, Trade, and Litigation in Borneo and Beyond during the Early Nineteenth Century’, Borneo Research Bulletin, 35 (2004), 48–69.

Political allies 85 meeting with Kassim in January 1813.126 Captain D. Macdonald was in the Indian Navy127 and met Kassim at Pontianak during a campaign on the west coast of Borneo against the Sambas pirates. While Sadler and the Transfer are not mentioned specifically in Macdonald’s account, Kassim acknowledged killing an English country trader several years before while ruler of Mempawah. There being no other known accounts of country traders being killed at Mempawah, Kassim can only have been referring to Sadler. In this version, Kassim claimed that he had been trading with the Englishman for some time, but on this occasion a consignment of small arms, having been left on credit during the previous voyage, had proved to be faulty. When the trader returned and demanded payment, it was refused. When it was not received, the trader demanded entry into Kassim’s presence and abused Kassim in foul language. The trader was also said to be intoxicated. Furthermore, he took a pistol from his pocket and threatened to shoot Kassim. If that was not bad enough, it was said too that the trader violated “the sanctity of the harem”, “ill-using one of the inmates”.128 It was as a result of all this that Kassim said he stabbed the trader. Macdonald accepted Kassim’s version of events. He remarked that Kassim “never ceased to lament, nor failed to make mention [of the event] in his devotions”. He accepted that Kassim paid the debt, even though the Transfer “was in his power”. As we know, the Transfer remained off-shore and the ship’s officers were careful not to land after they became suspicious. The goods were never paid for. From the extant evidence, the conclusion must be that Sadler, with twelve years’ experience trading in the region, having been sufficiently sanguine as to accept hospitality in Kassim’s residence D., A Narrative of the Early Life and Services of Captn. D. Macdonald, extracted from his Journal and other Official Documents (Weymouth: Benson and Barling, 1835), pp. 114–16. 127 The Indian Navy was also known as the Bombay Marine. For the history of the Bombay Marine/Indian Navy see Sutton, Jean, Lords of the East: the East India Company and its Ships (London: Conway Maritime, 1981), pp. 139–54; Sutton, Jean, The East India Company’s Maritime Service 1746–1834: Masters of the Eastern Seas (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2010). 128 Macdonald, A Narrative, pp. 114–16. 126 Macdonald,

86 British Traders in the East Indies for four nights, and having provided credit to Kassim for several months during the period between the first and the second 1795 visits, does not appear to have been acting in a manner which was designed to deceive Kassim, as believed by Macdonald. Therefore, while Macdonald’s account does provide us with Kassim’s confession to the murder, it does not provide a satisfactory explanation as to why the crime took place. The underlying reason for Kassim’s drastic action, while never stated, appears to have been the critical financial position the Panembahan was in as a result of Mempawah’s current economic difficulties. The state was still divided. Kassim’s portion of the realm was cut off from the rich gold-mining areas as well as the Dyak population who were such a vital component of Mempawah’s economy under an appanage system.129 In 1795 Kassim was a young man, relatively inexperienced in governing, imbued with a culture that condoned the violent seizure of vessels under particular circumstances and was one who could be confident of the support of the strongest power in the region, the Dutch. Because he was in financial difficulties and needed to maintain his power and status, he acted in a manner that he later came to regret. This incident involving the death of a country trader impacted subsequent political developments in Mempawah and Pontianak, for the memory of the event altered Kassim’s attitude and behaviour to the dominant Western powers when the British became more influential in the archipelago. Clearly, Kassim was still concerned about its implications even as late as 1813 when he spoke to Macdonald. Initially, Kassim’s succession to the Sultanate of Pontianak in 1808, though approved of and supported by the Dutch, was, as noted above, jeopardized by the murder of Sadler.130 The country trader, Joseph Burn, a self-acclaimed confidant of both 129 Goor,

‘Seapower, Trade and State-formation’, p. 89. For full analysis see Miller, ‘Why did Syarif ’. 130 Joseph Burn letter to Stamford Raffles, 12 February 1811, BL, OIOC, Raffles Collection, vol. XI, Mss. Eur. E 109, p. 57; Heidues, ‘The First Two’, pp. 285–6; Veth, P. J., Borneo’s Wester-Afdeeling, Geographisch, Statistisch, Historisch (2 vols, Zaltbommel: Joh, Noman en Zoon, 1854–6), vol. 1, pp. 368–9.

Political allies 87 Sultans, Abdulrahman and Kassim, reported that the leading Malays in Pontianak, who had a say in the nomination of the new Sultan, knew that it was Kassim who had murdered Sadler and his boat’s crew through the Malay crew member who had escaped in 1795. As already noted, it was known that Kassim owed Sadler Sp. $30,000. Kassim was also said to have been cruel to the Chinese. The leaders raised objections to Kassim’s becoming Sultan. Burn relates that when Sultan Abdulrahman was dying in February 1808, he was implored by community leaders not to appoint Kassim as his successor. This was not only because he was said to be a man of cruel disposition. It was also thought Pontianak would, as a result of Sadler’s murder, attract the enmity of the British.131 Abdulrahman does appear to have had reservations about Kassim at this time and according to Burn, was considering preferring his other son, Osman, in the succession. Burn said he was warned by the old Sultan to guard against Kassim and never attend him alone. Nevertheless, despite Abdulrahman’s concerns and the opposition of the leaders as a consequence of the Sadler murder, Kassim did succeed to the Sultanate and was eventually accepted by the people. The new Sultan had only recently returned to Pontianak from ruling Mempawah. With Sadler’s death apparently still weighing on his conscience, he exhorted Burn not to be apprehensive and said that he would convince the Englishman that he was not the “bad man” that he supposed Burn imagined him to be.132 A cordial relationship appears to have developed, for Burn later speaks favourably of Sultan Kassim as “ a man of much knowledge of the world in comparison to some of the Malay Rajas”.133 A considerable change had thus come about in Kassim’s approach to international affairs between 1795 and 1808. In 1795 he was still closely associated, both personally and politically, with the Dutch. He would not have been aware of the 131 Joseph

Burn letter to Stamford Raffles, 12 February 1811, BL, OIOC, Raffles Collection, vol. XI, Mss. Eur. E 109, pp. 58–9. 132 Joseph Burn letter to Stamford Raffles, 12 February 1811, BL, OIOC, Raffles Collection, vol. XI, Mss. Eur. E 109, pp. 61–2. 133 Joseph Burn letter to Stamford Raffles, 12 February 1811, BL, Raffles Collection, vol. XI, Mss. Eur. E 109, p. 149.

88 British Traders in the East Indies powerful British presence that was soon to have an effect on the region. He may even have considered the British weak and inept, conscious of the fact that the English factory at Balamabangan had been overrun by Ilanun in 1775 and that the Dutch had conquered Riau, a favoured marketplace of English traders, in 1784. Penang had been settled by the British only comparatively recently, in 1786, Malacca occupied in 1795 without replacement of the Dutch administration, while Admiral Rainier’s conquest of Amboyna and Banda with a large, impressive British naval force did not take place until February 1796. At that time Kassim would prefer the option of allegiance with the Dutch. He was not concerned about an official retaliation from the British for any unlawful behaviour he carried out against a private British trader. Even as late as 1808, as a sign of his allegiance to the Dutch, he wrote to the Governor-General in Batavia informing him of the death of Abdulrahman, of his own ascension to the Sultanate of Pontianak, and of the arrangements he had put in place to govern Mempawah.134 However, from 1808, with prominent people of Pontianak concerned about his suitability as a Sultan, Sadler’s death must have begun to prey upon Kassim’s mind. By 1810 he demonstrated he had a change of attitude, increasingly favourable towards the British. In that year he welcomed British country traders and officials, and certainly by 1811 had become conscious of the need to remain on good terms with both the British official representatives and the country traders.135 Official British contacts with Malay rulers, through the intermediary of country traders, recommenced in that year with Raffles’ preparations in

134 Kassim

to Batavia 13 Muharram 1223 A.H. (AD 1808), Letter in Meursinge, A., Maleisch Leesboek voor Eerstbeginnenden en Meergevorderden, Derde stukje (Leyden: Luchtmans, 1847), pp. 11–12. 135 Willi of Gais, Johannes, The Early Relations of England with Borneo to 1805 (Langensalza: Beyer and Sohne, 1922), p. 134. According to Willi, Kassim, with his father, appears to have approached the British on Penang as early as Decmber 1803 requesting them to help in protection against Anum, “the pirate brother of the King of Sambas”. This would have been shortly after the first British occupation of Moluccas when Kassim and Abdulrahman might have become aware of the growing strength of the British.

Political allies 89 Malacca for the invasion of Java.136 Kassim’s letters to Raffles, in response to Raffles’ approaches at a time of British resurgence in the region, show he realized it was time to appease the British and seek their assistance, or at least to keep his options open. Kassim wrote three letters to Raffles in the course of 1811 as well as one in 1814. The letter that Kassim wrote to Raffles on 14 February 1811 is of particular interest in respect of the Sadler affair. In it, Kassim, while entreating the British to act to combat piratical raids on local shipping, spells out several examples of piracy that had previously taken place in the West Borneo area. He refers to three British mariners whose ships had been cut off by Pangeran Anom, the Raja of Sambas, and other “pirates”: Captain Ross, Captain Drysdale and the captain of the ship Commerce.137 Kassim makes no mention, of course, of the disappearance of Captain Sadler some fifteen years earlier. In his letter Kassim promises to remain on friendly terms with the British and even agrees to Raffles’ request to take care of the English captains and traders who visit Pontianak: “… with reference to your request that we continue to befriend and take care of all the English trading captains that are fond of coming to do business at Pontianak … we wish to remain friends with and place our hopes only in the English Company … [therefore] … this we promise to undertake”.138 C. E., Raffles of the Eastern Isles (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1954), p. 141; Smith, F. Andrew, ‘Daniel Smith’s Last Seven Years: Hardships in Country Trade in the East Indies in the Early Nineteenth Century’, Borneo Research Bulletin, 39 (2008), 1–15, at p. 2. 137 Gallop, Annabel Teh, The Legacy of the Malay Letter: Warisan Warkah Melayu (London: British Library, 1994), p. 32 illustration, p. 213 text; Gallop, Golden Letters, p. 42 illustration, Romanized text pp. 132–3; Ahmat Adam, Letters of Sincerity: The Raffles Collection of Malay Letters (1780–1824): A Descriptive Account with Notes and Translation (Kuala Lumpur: MBRAS, 2009), pp. 286–92, Romanized text, English translation. 138 [Dan seperkara lagi sahabat kita mintak kita jangan berubah daripada sahabat bersahabat dan memeliharakan segala kapitan-kapitan saudagar-saudagar Inggeris yang suka datang berniaga ke negeri Pontianak itu sekali sahabat kita selaksa kali kita ada suka sahabat

136 Wurtzburg,

Figure 4: Syarif Kasim of Pontianak’s letter to T. S. Raffles in Malacca, 14 February 1811, agreeing to a request that he take care of the English country traders trading at Pontianak. (© The British Library Board, MSS Eur.D.742/1, fol. 33a).

Political allies 91 Kassim’s next letter of 12 March 1811 to Raffles confirms his continuing favourable attitude towards the English country traders.139 He asks that his regards be passed on to the country captain Alexander Hare and requests that Hare send a ship to trade in Pontianak where he will be given every assistance: “… And we send our many regards to Mr. Hare. If Mr Hare would like to send a ship to trade at Pontianak, carrying goods and thirty chests of fresh opium they will be moved very quickly. We will provide speedy assistance”.140 Clearly Kassim had established a close relationship with Hare and saw the country traders as an important part of the trade at Pontianak. Hare continued his association with Pontianak during the British interregnum, maintaining a link between Kassim and Raffles.141 In comparison to the negative legacy of the death of Captain Sadler and its repercussions in Pontianak, the role of the country trader Joseph Burn was more positive, confidential and direct. From the internal evidence in his letters to Raffles and considering the extended length of his stay at Pontianak, it would appear that Burn’s self-confessed impact was not exaggerated. His influence on Raffles and subsequent British policy towards Pontianak was considerable, but his position as a confidant of both Abdulrahman and Kassim can be said to have been the conduit for an alteration in the direction of politics in the West Borneo states. bersahabat dengan sahabat kita orang putih Kompeni Inggeris karena pada ketika ini sekali-kali tiada manaruh pengharapan yang lain lagi melainkan kepada sahabat kita Kompeni Inggeris juga yang kita harap-harap pada siang dan malam … itu kita punya janji ini adanya]. Ahmat Adam, Letters of Sincerity, pp. 286–92. Author’s English translation. 139 Adam, Letters of Sincerity, pp. 292–5; Gallop, The Legacy, pp. 214–15. 140 “Dan lagi kita kirim tabek diperbanyak-banyak kepada sahabat kita Mister Hare. Jika Master [sic] Hare suka menyuruhkan sebuah kapal datang berniaga ke Pontianank membawa dagangan beserta apiun baru barang tiga puluh peti nanti boleh lekas laku; kita boleh tolong dengan segeranya jua adanya.” Author’s English translation. 141 de Haan, F., ‘Personalia der periode van het Engelsch bestuur over Java 1811–1816’, BKI, 92:4 (1935), 477–681, at p. 565, and Chapter 3 below.

92 British Traders in the East Indies Burn was a country trader based at Bombay and then Madras between 1803 and 1810.142 Captain of the Fair Armenian as early as 1803, he went to Pontianak in 1806 as the commercial agent of the Madras Agency House, Parry, Lane and Co.143 In that year Parry sent Burn via the General Wellesley (Captain Dalrymple) a mixed consignment of cloth, rice, steel and other goods to sell. Burn also commanded the General Wellesley during part of this voyage. A portion of the cargo was seized by Abdulrahman, this misadventure bringing long-running legal actions against Burn in Penang. But Burn appears to have resolved the matter with Abdulrahman and was close to the Sultan by the time the ruler died in early 1808.144 In 1810 Burn was still based at Pontianak, possibly as agent for Alexander Hare, and even for Kassim himself. John Leyden referred to Burn as Abdulrahman’s “principal associate”,145 while Reece and Smith suggest he was acting like Kassim’s “kind of private secretary”.146 By that year, he was on such confidential terms with Kassim that the Sultan was showing him the letters and presents Marshal Daendels was sending him from Java (which he would be inclined to do anyway because of the need to make amends for the murder of Sadler).147 The quality of Kassim’s Malay letters provides indirect evidence of the influence Burn had on Kassim. Burn’s letter to Raffles of 12 February 1811 was written just two days before the first of Kassim’s own letters to Raffles.148 The closeness of the dates can be of no coincidence. The high standard, from a traditional Malay perspective, of Kassim’s letter to Raffles is evidence of the value Kassim placed on the intended rela142 Smith,

‘Captain Burn’, p. 50. G. H., Thomas Parry, Free Merchant, Madras, 1768–1824 (Madras: Higginbothams, 1938), p. 120. 144 For details of Burn’s life see Smith, ‘Captain Burn’ and Reece and Smith, ‘Joseph Burn’. 145 Leyden, John, ‘Sketch of Borneo’, in J. H. Moor, Notices of the Indian Archipelago and Adjacent Countries (Singapore: no publisher, 1837; repr. London: Frank Cass, 1968), Appendix, pp. 93–109, at p. 101. 146 Reece and Smith, ‘Joseph Burn’, pp. 29–30. 147 Reece and Smith, ‘Joseph Burn’, p. 46. 148 ‘Papers relating to Pontianak’, BL, OIOC, Raffles Collection, Vol. XI, Mss. Eur. E. 109. 143 Hodgson,

Political allies 93 tionship with the British. Burn must have emphasized Raffles’ position and persuaded Kassim to write such a respectful letter. At the same time, Burn’s own full and detailed report demonstrates the regard he too had for Raffles’ position and the desire he had to impress the Agent to the Governor-General with the Malay States, as Raffles was then called. In addition to being of political importance, Kassim’s letter is also considered one of the most beautiful illuminated Malay letters still extant.149 The quality and form of a traditional Malay letter reflected the status of the receiver, and this letter has all the characteristics of the highest quality, during a reign when the highest standards of royal letter-writing were upheld.150 In his letter Burn emphasized that he was intimate with both Abdulrahman and Kassim and that they sought him out for political advice. He claims both of them were in his financial debt: “… there was another European at Pontiana who had claims to a large account not only on the Sultaun, but also on Panembahan (meaning myself being there at Pontiana …)”.151 Burn indicates that he and Kassim were given a private audience with Abdulrahman shortly before the Sultan died, after which Abdulrahman spoke to Burn alone: “The head people being present also, the Sultaun then dismissed the whole of them except the Panembahan, he then … told me what resolutions had been taken, and strictly enjoined his son to behave well to me after his death, as I had suffered very great injury from both himself and Panembahan …”.152 A fourth English private trader who had an influence on the affairs of Pontianak was Daniel Smith. He sailed between Penang Golden Letters, p. 42 Golden Letters, pp. 42–3. For analysis of traditional Malay letters see Ahmat Adam, Letters of Sincerity, pp. 6–17; Wilkinson, R. J. ‘Letter-writing’, in R. J. Wilkinson, (ed.) Papers on Malay Subjects Part III, Malay Literature (Kuala Lumpur: Printed by J. Russell at the F.M.S. Government Press, 1907), pp. 21–48; Wilkinson, R. J., “Notes on Malay Letter-writing”, in R. O. Winstedt, Malay Grammar (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1927), pp. 183–205. 151 BL, Raffles Collection, Mss. Eur. E 109, Burn’s letter to Raffles, 12 February 1811, p. 58. 152 BL, Raffles Collection, Mss. Eur. E 109, Burn’s letter to Raffles, 12 February 1811, pp. 59–60. 149 Gallop, 150 Gallop,

94 British Traders in the East Indies and the west coast of Borneo for at least four years between 1810 and 1814.153 His knowledge of affairs was such that Kassim recommended him to Raffles as an informant and in 1811 sent two orang-utans to Raffles on board Smith’s ship.154 The Bengal merchant, John Palmer is mostly remembered as the founder and head of the important Agency House, Palmer and Co.155 But in 1812 he himself travelled to the west coast of Borneo on a trading voyage and it can be argued therefore that he falls within the definition of a country trader while on that voyage. He resided at Pontianak for three weeks and became close to Kassim. Following the visit, he continued a correspondence with the Sultan through the use of other country traders and he possibly also acted as Kassim’s trading partner in Bengal.156 On his return to Bengal following his trip to Pontianak, Palmer attempted to recommend Kassim to Lord Minto.157 At the same time, in his letters to Pontianak, Palmer exhorted Kassim to improve his country and people, which could be done by listening to the advice of the country traders Daniel Smith and Captain Scott. “I shall be very glad to find that you and Cap Smith become staunch friends for he is good and was very kind to me on a long and tiresome passage from Penang … Smith and Scott are very sensible men and you would do well to listen to their advice for the improvement of your country”.158 Palmer and Kassim continued to exchange gifts, Palmer sent textiles and other items, including a rifle gun, while Kassim sent a servant boy to Palmer’s wife.159 Palmer also offered to send Kassim a carriage 153 Smith,

‘Daniel Smith’s’, p. 2. Adam, Letters of Sincerity, p. 296. 155 Webster, Anthony, The Richest East India Merchant: The Life and Business of John Palmer of Calcutta 1767–1836 (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2007); Tarling, Nicholas, ‘The Prince of Merchants and the Lion City’, JMBRAS, 37 (1964), 20–40. 156 Smith, F. Andrew, ‘Missionaries, Mariners, and Merchants: Overlooked British Travelers to West Borneo in the Early Nineteenth Century’, Borneo Research Bulletin, 33 (2002), 45–61, at pp. 53–4. 157 Palmer to the Sultan of Pontianak, 1 January 1813 (written as 1812), Bodleian Library Oxford (hereafter Bod. Lib.), Ms. Eng. Lett C.81. 158 Palmer to the Sultan of Pontianak, 9 January 1813, Bod. Lib., Ms. Eng. Lett C.81. 159 Palmer to the Sultan of Pontianak, 9 January, 24 February, 28 April 1813, Bod. Lib., Ms. Eng. Lett C.81–82. 154 Ahmat

Political allies 95 when the roads of Pontianak were wide enough to take it. Politically, he encouraged Kassim to participate in English attempts to eradicate the worst of the “piracy” by Sambas and the Ilanun. He told Kassim that by improving justice and trade in Pontianak, his state would flourish. Because of his brief sojourn in the Malay Archipelago, Palmer’s influence in the political affairs of Pontianak should not be equated with that of those country traders who spent many years in the state and felt at home in the local society. Palmer lamented the fact that he did not know Malay and therefore could not get to know as much as he would have liked. Nevertheless, he did become sensitive to aspects of the trading protocols within a Malay state. He realized that for the Sultan, “his esteemed friend”, to be seen to be directly involved in trade was against his dignity.160 He bore no prejudice against Islam, Palmer offering to billet Kassim’s son in Calcutta so that he could receive the best education: “If you please to send your son for education to Calcutta I will protect him and make him a learned man as well as a true believer, for we have learned Mohumudan doctors here …”.161 Despite the closeness of the relationship and the hospitality shown to him, in an unintended throwback to Sadler’s murder, Palmer had to confess that he felt “frightened” while staying at Pontianak, having to “sit by the side of men wearing crises [keris, kris], who could have killed me unresisting either from revenge or desire of plunder”.162 It is safe to conclude that the death of Sadler, the presence of Burn, the friendship of Palmer and the services of other country traders such as Hare and Smith had important consequences not only for the internal dynamics of politics in Mempawah, but also for the way Kassim and the state of Pontianak regarded the British and the wider world. By the end of his reign in 1819, Kassim was considered by the Dutch as one of the most astute 160

Palmer to the Sultan of Pontianak, 24 February 1813, Bod. Lib., Ms. Eng. Lett C.81. 161 Palmer to the Sultan of Pontianak, 28 April 1813, Bod. Lib., Ms. Eng. Lett C.82. 162 Palmer to the Sultan of Pontianak, 9 January1813, Bod. Lib., Ms. Eng. Lett C.81.

96 British Traders in the East Indies of all Malay rulers.163 It can be argued that, to some extent at least, this was a consequence of his long and close association with the British country traders. These examples of the role of country traders in the internal politics of four Malay negeri, Kedah, Johore, Tidore and Mempawah/Pontianak demonstrate the variety of ways in which they had an influence on the course of events. They had an influence in Trengganu, Selangor, Perak and other Malay states as well. The patronage of the British was welcomed because they brought cargoes of cloth, opium and munitions.164 Primarily, the presence of the country traders could enrich the state through increased trade, at the same time increasing the danger of possible retaliation by trading competitors, the Dutch. But the advice of country traders was also clearly valued by local rulers, for they acted as important conduits between the Malay states and the British. They could help to point policy in a particular direction, and their military and naval support could increase a state’s power and influence. At the same time, a close relationship could prove as dangerous as it could prove beneficial. In a variety of states and in different ways the presence of the country traders was manifest, and it was at times quite decisive in the unfolding political events in the native states of the archipelago.

163 Heidues,

‘The First Two’, pp. 292–3. B. W., To Live as Brothers: Southeast Sumatra in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993), p. 216.

164 Andaya,

Three INADVERTENT IMPERIALISTS: COUNTRY TRADERS AND BRITISH OFFICIALS

In the sense that colonies promote the trade of the mother country, it is often said that “Trade follows the Flag”.1 However, in respect of British penetration into Southeast Asia in the second half of the eighteenth century, while the nautical surveys of officials Alexander Dalrymple and John McCluer were critical,2 it was more often the traders who chartered the seas, made the initial contacts, adopted local customs and accumulated the practical knowledge that made it possible for EIC servants subsequently to establish colonies and raise the Union Jack. This chapter does not go over the strategic and policy issues of British expansion into Southeast Asia, which have been discussed in depth by others.3 Brewer, E. Cobham, Dictionary of Phrase and Fable (London: Cassell, 1912), p. 1241. 2 Griffin, Andrew, ‘London, Bengal, the China Trade and the Unfrequented Extremities of Asia: The East India Company’s Settlement in New Guinea, 1793–95’, British Library Journal, 16 (1990), 151–73. 3 Harlow, Vincent T., The Founding of the Second British Empire 1763– 1793. Volume 1, Discovery and Revolution; Volume 2, New Continents and Changing Values (London: Longmans Green, 1952, 1964), at vol. 1, pp. 62–145, vol. 2, pp. 329–418; Bassett, D. K., British Trade and Policy in Indonesia and Malaysia in the Late Eighteenth Century (Zug: Inter Documentation Company, 1971), pp. 1–29, 50–107; Lewis, Dianne N., ‘British Policy in the Straits of Malacca to 1819 and the Collapse of the Traditional Malay State Structure’, in Brook Barrington (ed.), Empires, Imperialism and Southeast Asia: Essays in Honour of Nicholas Tarling 1

98 British Traders in the East Indies It rather attempts to provide examples of the crucial, albeit sometimes unintended and on occasion, even reluctant role of individual British country traders in British imperial expansion, and to show the dependence British officials placed upon the activities of the country traders. While the country traders were keen to establish trading posts and purchase goods from under the noses of the Dutch, a distinction should be drawn between their endeavours and the imperialistic ambitions of the likes of Alexander Dalrymple, Robert Townsend Farquhar, William Farquhar and Thomas Stamford Raffles. We may consider the groundwork of what Harlow calls “the Second British Empire” in Southeast Asia in the late eighteenth century as being marked by the following stages: the brief establishment of the outpost at Balambangan in 1773–5, the capture of Padang on Sumatra’s west coast from the Dutch in 1781, the founding of Penang (1786), the occupation of Malacca in 1795 and that of Amboyna and Banda between 1796 and 1803. A post at Balambangan was again established briefly in 1803, the Moluccas were occupied once more in 1810 and Lord Minto’s Java expedition in 1811 set up the English administration there until 1816. These various forays and expeditions into the Malay Archipelago may be seen as culminating in the founding of Singapore in 1819. In nearly all of these events, a vital role was played by country traders. Their local knowledge of the archipelago, their established contacts with the indigenous rulers, their familiarity with (Clayton: Monash Asia Institute, 1997), pp. 17–33; Tarling, Nicholas, ‘The Relationship between British Policies and the Extent of Dutch Power in the Malay Archiplago 1784–1871’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 4:2 (1958), 179–92; Bastin, John, ‘Raffles and British Policy in the Indian Archipelago, 1811–1816’, JMBRAS, 27:1 (1954), 84–119; Webster, A., ‘British Export Interests in Bengal and Imperial Expansion into South-east Asia, 1780–1824: The Origins of the Straits Settlements’, in B. Ingham and C. Simmons (eds), Development Studies and Colonial Policy (London: Frank Cass, 1987), pp. 138–74; Webster, A., ‘British Expansion in South-East Asia and the Role of Robert Farquhar, Lieutenant-Governor of Penang, 1804–5’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 23:1 (1995), 1–25; Webster, Anthony, The Twilight of the East India Company: The Evolution of Anglo-Asian Commerce and Politics, 1790–1860 (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2009).

Inadvertent imperialists 99 the seas, even their Malay language ability, were essential elements which the Company officials could draw upon to undertake their imperialistic adventures. A study of the on-the-spot role of the many individual country traders reveals their frequently undervalued contribution to the expansion of the British Empire into the Malay Archipelago. In describing the influence of “certain British sea captains” in Bugis affairs, David Bassett warned of the “danger of interpreting European influence in the Malay Archipelago simply in terms of political suzerainty or commercial monopoly by the great East India Companies”.4 More recently, Bowen has demonstrated that by maintaining what he calls “private networks” in places where Company servants did not operate, the country traders were linking in and extending Britain’s global maritime empire.5 Lewis has cogently argued that the country traders were the driving force behind the commercial reasons for the quest for a “post” in the archipelago.6 They were active as part of the “traditional Asian networks of commerce” rather than initiating a new pattern of trade.7 At the same time, as Harlow has demonstrated,8 with Britain having suffered the loss of her American colonies and increasingly desirous of territory in the Pacific, there were British leaders and officials who had not only commercial interests, but strategic and diplomatic reasons to actually obtain territorial possessions for the crown to rival those of Spain and Holland in Southeast Asia. The commercial and political aims often became complimentary, or merged, leading to the “symbiotic” connection between the free mariners and the Company officials, similar perhaps to the relationship, described

British Trade, p. 82. Bowen, H. V., ‘Britain in the Indian Ocean Region and Beyond: Contours, Connections, and the Creation of a Global Maritime Empire’, in H. V. Bowen, et al. (eds), Britain’s Oceanic Empire: Atlantic and Indian Ocean Worlds, c.1550–1850 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 45–65, at p. 64. 6 Lewis, ‘British Policy’. 7 Webster, Anthony, Gentlemen Capitalists; British Imperialism in South East Asia 1770–1890 (London: Taurus, 1998), pp. 20–1. 8 Harlow, The Founding, vol. 1, p. 8. 4 Bassett, 5

100 British Traders in the East Indies by Webster, which developed between the Company and the agency houses in India.9 It has been seen that one way by which country traders made and maintained contact with Malay rulers was through the diplomatic tasks which they undertook on behalf of the EIC and that this had important political consequences for the Malay states. It was no less significant for the Company. At the most basic level of political activity, country traders were frequently entrusted with letters to be delivered to Malay rulers on behalf of the Company.10 For example, Thomas Forrest was given the responsibility of acting as an envoy for Governor-General Hastings when the Bengal government requested Raja Haji of Riau to accept a British commercial resident in 1784.11 The ultimate objective of the mission was to establish a small trading post at Riau, but the commission itself is evidence of the important diplomatic work that country traders could be entrusted with. This diplomatic task required a substantial knowledge of Malay protocol and customs in light of the high status that letters, and their bearers, were held in Malay society. On other occasions country traders were importantly, more than just envoys in matters of international diplomacy. While the country traders and EIC officials may have had some complementary aspirations, there were often disagreements between individuals from the two groups. More often than not there were social differences as well in an ambivalent relationship between the rather informal country traders and the more status-conscious servants of the Company. It was not totally black and white, however, and a number of country traders were able at times to bridge the gap between official service and private trading. Some clearly overstepped the mark and acted in a manner in which they had no Company authority. As we have seen in the case of the Moluccas, to advance their own purposes, they promised benefits to native rulers which they were in no position to deliver. The Twilight, p. 11. Gallop, Annabel Teh, The Legacy of the Malay Letter: Warisan Warkah Melayu (London: British Library, 1994), pp. 53, 105. 11 Bassett, British Trade, pp. 68–9. 9 Webster, 10

Inadvertent imperialists 101 Without imperialistic ambitions themselves, the country traders opened the way for and occasionally forced the hand of their expansionary-minded counterparts. The merchant mariners provided as examples of this unintended but critical role in the waxing of British influence in the Malay Archipelago are William Kerton, James Scott, Thomas Forrest, Captain Court, John Hayes, Francis Lynch, William Grieg, Joseph Burn, Alexander Hare and Francis Light.

Captain William Kerton and his vital role in the capture of Padang from the Dutch When war broke out with Holland in 1780, the British at Bencoolen took the opportunity of the presence of five East Indiamen returning from China to launch an expedition against the Dutch settlement of Padang, further up Sumatra’s west coast.12 While Henry Botham, a servant of the Company, and Captain John Clements, the Commander of the East Indiamen, were put in charge of the expedition, the Bencoolen Council also instructed Captain William Kerton of the snow Elizabeth (a county trader owned by Captain Douglas) to take part. Kerton had been sailing along the Sumatran coast for at least three years. With Kerton as Commander, the ship is recorded in the shipping arrivals at Fort Marlborough from as early as 1778.13 It was Kerton’s considerable experience of the route to be taken by the expeditionary fleet that was of particular value to the Council. The Council wrote, “… from your long acquaintance with the ports of this coast, we are induced to hope you will be particularly servisable [sic] in piloting the five Indiamen …”.14 The Dutch outstation of Poolo Cinquo (Pulau Cingkuk, Painan) was captured first. The Elizabeth was left there, under the command of the Chief Mate, W. Tabour, while the rest of the expedition proceeded to Padang, which fell on 18 August Kathirithamby-Wells, J., The British West Sumatran Presidency 1760– 1785; Problems of Early Colonial Enterprise (Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit Universiti Malaya, 1977), p. 170. 13 British Library, Oriental and India Office Collections, Sumatra Factory Records (hereafter BL, OIOC, SFR) 20 August 1778, 178. 14 BL, OIOC, SFR, 6–7 August 1781, 112, letter to Captain Kerton. 12

102 British Traders in the East Indies 1781. Captain Kerton sailed on board the flagship of the fleet, the East Indiaman Glatton, to act as pilot. It was in this role that Kerton received the most fulsome praise from Botham, who wrote, “We had very unfavourable winds during the whole of our passage and it was solely owing to Captain Kirton’s great attention that we arrived here as we did merely by the assistance of the land winds …”.15 Later, in September, when the Fort Marlborough Council sent another East Indiaman, Lord North, to Padang to consolidate the administration, Captain Kerton was again to “… act as pilot on board the Lord North, Mr. Tabor to take charge of the Elizabeth”.16 Kerton was paid £119.2s.6d to cover the expenses of the expedition. The Commanders of the East Indiamen were also generous in their appreciation of Kerton’s role, writing to the Council praising his effort. The following letter and notes are recorded in the Council proceedings of 29 September 1781: Honble Sir & Sirs, As it is but justice to acknowledge the very particular services of Captn. Kirton in conducting our ships thro’ the monsoon and difficult navigation we were obliged to pass on our late expedition against the Dutch Settlements on this coast. We with pleasure take this public method of declaring that we think ourselves much indebted to his abilities, care, and watchful attention through the whole course of our passage, both up and down this coast, and that we shall be happy to find his … disinterested conduct meets with substantial approbation of the Board. … In consequence of the very strong recommendation of Captain Kerton, the Committee agree to make him an allowance of £500 and to recommend him to the Court, that as we have always found him a most deserving officer they would provide him 15

BL, OIOC, SFR, 2 September 1781, 127, Botham to Fort Marlborough, 19 August 1781. Author’s emphasis. 16 BL, OIOC, SFR, 29 September 1781, 152.

Inadvertent imperialists 103 either by giving him a rank in the Bombay Marine or any other shape they shall think proper.17

The inclusion of several Minangkabau people in the expedition had been considered vital, for “experience had taught the British that successful trading in the Minangkabau settlements depended entirely upon the cooperation of the inhabitants”.18 Whether or not Kerton had a role as an intermediary between the British and the Minangkabau is not known from the available records, but it is conceivable that he could have, considering his long experience in trading to Padang. What is known is that a local Malay leader and his two sons had already been transported to Pulau Cingkuk on the Elizabeth and had remained there with the Chief Mate. Furthermore, the Elizabeth continued to be used by Botham both as a transport ship and for patrol duties during the first months of the occupation of Padang. It was also used by Botham to bring several “Malay” (Minangkabau?) chiefs to Bencoolen to try and persuade the Council not to destroy the fortifications at Padang and to retain the former Dutch settlement for the British.19 The country trader had provided valuable assistance in at least three ways. Firstly, his ship acted as a guarding vessel on the recently captured outstation of Pulau Cingkuk; secondly he himself proved indispensable as a pilot; and thirdly, the application of his sailing skills on the notoriously difficult west coast of Sumatra ensured a rapid voyage to the battle scene. It is also quite probable that his acquaintance with the local rulers ensured that they were comfortable travelling on British vessels during the course of the campaign and, later on, whilst they were negotiating with Fort Marlborough. Eventually, Padang was returned to Holland by the treaty ending the war in May 1784, and in practice repossessed by

17

BL, OIOC, SFR, Proceedings Secret Committee, 29 September 1781, 154. 18 Kathirithamby-Wells, The British, p. 171. 19 BL, OIOC, SFR, Proceedings Secret Committee, 25 September 1781, Henry Botham to Council, 16 September 1781.

104 British Traders in the East Indies the Dutch in July 1785.20 Nevertheless, the country trader had demonstrated that with local knowledge a British naval force could attack and conquer a Dutch settlement in the Malay Archipelago, the first time one had done so for over a hundred years.

Francis Light and James Scott Francis Light, the country trader who was most influential in Kedah’s history as noted in the previous chapter, and his business partner James Scott, were arguably the strongest advocates for the establishment of a British trading post in the Malay world. They had been shipmates on HMS Arrogant before venturing East and probably commenced trading along the west coast of Thailand and Malaya; Light, as we have seen, in about 1771 and Scott in 1774. Light’s vital role in the founding of Georgetown on “Prince of Wales Island” (Pulau Pinang) is well known and has been thoroughly analysed.21 Operating out of Junk Ceylon in 1784 Scott and Light advocated a port on the eastern side of the Bay of Bengal as a means of competing with the Dutch.22 Both men proved to be invaluable sources of information for the British administration in India, although Light exaggerated the potential commercial and security value of Penang to Bengal while at the same time, misleading the Sultan of Kedah regarding the political benefits to be received from the British occupation of the island. The Light letters23 show how both men were totally familiar with the important issue of the correct way to carry-on a correspondence in Malay society; among other things how correctly to address Malay royalty and aristocracy. Scott and Light were The British, p. 178. Clodd, H. P., Malaya’s First British Pioneer: the Life of Francis Light (London: Luzac, 1948); Bonney, R., Kedah 1771–1821: The Search for Security and Independence (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 27–102; Webster, Gentlemen, pp. 40–8; Herivel, Jan, ‘“A Perfect Malay” James Scott, Country Trader’ (paper delivered at the ASAA Conference, Sydney, 2011); Herivel, Jan, ‘“A little estimable population”: The Early Days of Penang, 1786–1830’ (unpublished paper). 22 Clodd, Malaya’s First, p. 35; Bassett, British Trade, p. 75. 23 See Chapter 1, footnote no. 87. 20 Kathirithamby-Wells, 21

Inadvertent imperialists 105 sometimes both addressees of a single letter.24 Scott, like Light, unquestionably had an affinity with the local society. On one occasion in 1786, the Thai people of Junk Ceylon, suffering from starvation, had requested Light to send supplies specifically by Scott, because, as mentioned in Chapter 2, a previous shipment under Captain Lindsay had been unsuccessful as Lindsay did not know the locals as well as did Scott.25 But country traders were not all of the same mould and a distinction existed between Scott, who remained a country trader, and Light, who adapted, to some extent and with qualified success, to the role of a Company servant. In 1786 when both Light and Scott were advocating British trading bases at Penang and Junk Ceylon, Scott showed less finesse in his argument than Light, and his rather “hectoring” tone to the Governor-General in India may have been one reason why only Penang, and not Phuket, was occupied.26 When they were both again petitioning for another English base on Junk Ceylon following the founding of Penang in late 1786, Scott again was less sophisticated in his address to the Governor-General.27 The contrast is also evident in Scott’s assessment of the person who should be chosen by the EIC to administer a British factory. Scott is highly critical of the official who had been dispatched by the Company in a previous attempt to establish such a British foothold in 1771 in a mission sent to the Sultan of Kedah. That youthful envoy of the Company was Edward Monckton, disparagingly described by Scott as “… a gentleman used to the luxuries in India”.28 Later, Scott’s letter describing Light in favourable terms, “a man of local knowledge and an enlarged experience,”29 was in marked contrast to how he viewed Monckton. There is no evidence that Light took such a critical view of Monckton. Kratz, E. U., ‘Some Malay Letters on Trade’, Indonesia Circle, 44 (1987), 3–16, at p. 11. 25 Simmonds, E. H. S., ‘The Thalang Letters, 1773–94: Political Aspects and the Trade in Arms’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies University of London, 26:3 (1963), 592–619, at p. 603. 26 Simmonds, ‘The Thalang’, pp. 600–1. 27 Simmonds, ‘The Thalang’, p. 605. 28 Clodd, Malaya’s First, p. 36. 29 Clodd, Malaya’s First, p. 41. 24

106 British Traders in the East Indies Nevertheless, while Light may have had the better temperament to adapt to the role of an EIC official than did Scott, hence his appointment in 1786 as Superintendent of the first permanent British base in the Malay Archipelago since the establishment of Bencoolen in 1685, his experience as a country trader did not necessarily guarantee his success as a colonial administrator. He was unwilling to relinquish his trading activities, which he continued with Scott, thus ensuring for the partnership a virtual monopoly in many areas of trade, stifling further development of Penang. Trade with the Malay states, Aceh and the east coast of Sumatra was successful,30 which may be accounted for by the well-developed contacts Light and Scott already had with those areas. But the commercial performance of the settlement as a whole and Light’s administration of the colony was severely condemned in a review undertaken in September 1795 and in subsequent reports.31 When Light died in October 1794, Scott continued trading out of Penang, and his superior local knowledge and his affinity with Malay society, while an asset in his trading, caused him to have difficulties with Light’s successor as Superintendent, Major Macdonald. It may well be that Macdonald did not approve of Scott’s domination of the trade of Penang, and he may also have been bitter about not being able to take part in business himself. But the manifest reasons given by Macdonald for his dislike of Scott were personal: Scott’s “… freer manners, and his close contacts with the various races of the peninsula”.32 Scott had by this time truly adapted to local society and manners. He was described as “a perfect Malay”, and had adopted “Malay dress, manners and mode of living”, more so than Light had done. It was not only Major Macdonald who found his Malay “… dress, manners and mode of living … dishonourable and degenerate”.33 Scott had previously been criticized by another EIC official, Colonel Low, for being too involved in local poli-

Gentlemen, p. 47. Gentlemen, p. 45. 32 Fielding, K. J., ‘The Settlement of Penang by James Scott’, JMBRAS, 28:1 (1955), pp. 37–51, at p. 39. 33 Fielding, ‘The Settlement’, p. 39. 30 Webster, 31 Webster,

Inadvertent imperialists 107 tics.34 Even other country traders, such as John Adolphus Pope, considered Scott’s behaviour eccentric for having “led a vagrant life amongst the Malays” and for having “adopted the dress and customs of the Malays”.35 By this time, Scott had had over twenty years’ experience trading in the region. It would appear that a country trader could immerse himself so much in Malay society that he became alienated from his own social milieu. Whatever may have been the gulf between Scott and the EIC and however many his faults in the eyes of a number of officials, these same officials were not above making use of his experience when the need arose. In 1794, at a time when Britain was preparing to attack the Dutch possessions in the Moluccas, as a consequence of his long involvement in the archipelago, Scott was able to provide London with a list of native states of the archipelago that had entered into treaties with the Dutch. He encouraged London to promote trade with those states which were still independent of the VOC.36 Company officials were also not loath to partake of his hospitality. He entertained the Secretary of the expedition sailing to seize Amboyna, Walter Caulfield Lennon, at a party at his residence as the expedition passed through Penang.37 So, while these differences existed, in their own way both Scott and Light contributed to the extension of the British empire, Scott more “inadvertently” than Light. Scott argued for a British trading base on Penang, handed over the extensive local information, the fruits of his long experience in the Malay world, to the British navy and the company establishment. He even, through his business network on Penang, supported the growth of the British colony, albeit in a way which favoured himself. But he refused to join completely in the society of a colonial establishment. Light was happy to go the next step; to outwit, some would say betray, one of his Malay trading partners (the Sultan of Kedah), to become an employee of the EIC, to raise the British flag and establish the British colony at 34

Simmonds, ‘The Thalang’, p. 613. Bulley, A., Free Mariner: John Adolphus Pope in the East Indies, 1786–1821 (Putney: BACSA, 1992), p. 107. 36 Fielding, ‘The Settlement’, p. 47. 37 Fielding, ‘The Settlement’, p. 47. 35

108 British Traders in the East Indies the head of the Malacca Straits on the periphery of the Dutch sphere of influence. In this respect Light is the more “imperialistic” of these two country traders.

Thomas Forrest: knowledge gatherer and envoy to the Malay world Forrest’s whole life is virtually a chronicle of the ambivalent relationship between the country trader and the Company: one moment working officially as an envoy to the Malay states for the Governor-General and as an officer of the Bombay Marine; the next moment in trouble with Company officials for his supposedly dubious trading practices. The details of Forrest’s life as we know them have been described by Bassett,38 but for the purposes of understanding his role in contributing to British expansion in the Malay Archipelago it is important to emphasize particular features. Forrest wrote ground-breaking works which provided the most comprehensive information in English on the archipelago at that time, certainly the Eastern part, and gave him “unrivalled” knowledge of the area.39 As we have seen, Forrest was also entrusted by the Company with important and at times highly secretive diplomatic undertakings in connection with the local rulers of the Malay world. The voyage to the Moluccas in 1774–6 is perhaps most well-known, but there were numerous other occasions on which he was commended for his efforts, particularly in helping England to maintain friendly relations with indigenous rulers.40 He was also entrusted with a secret mission, which actually never reached fulfilment, to incite the Raja of Boni to rebel against the Dutch. Furthermore, he undertook a survey of the Tenasserim-Mergui coast, and provided the Governor-General with important information on Kedah, Riau, Aceh and particularly, in British Trade, pp. 30–49; Bassett, D. K., ‘Introduction’, in Forrest, Thomas, A Voyage to New Guinea and the Moluccas, 1774–1776 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 1–22. 39 Bassett, D. K., ‘Thomas Forrest, an Eighteenth Century Mariner’, in D. K. Bassett, British Trade and Policy in Indonesia and Malaysia in the Late Eighteenth Century (Zug, Inter Documentation Company 1971), pp. 30–49, at p. 36. 40 cf. Kathirithamby-Wells, The British, pp. 49–52. 38 Bassett,

Inadvertent imperialists 109 light of subsequent developments, Penang.41 He was one of the country traders at Riau during the height of its prominence and, as has been noted, was carrying a formal letter from the GovernorGeneral to Riau at the time it was attacked and conquered by the Dutch.42 Nevertheless, on two occasions he had extended disputes with the Court of Directors in London over payments for expenses incurred on his voyages; in 1779 in respect of the Tartar Galley, and in 1788 relating to a voyage of the Esther brig. He also frequently quarrelled with local Company officials. One serious disagreement with the local Bencoolen Council took place in 1786 when Forrest embarked on a private trading venture along the west coast of Sumatra at a time when he should have been engaged in the important diplomatic voyage of returning the Ambassador of Tidore and his retinue to the Moluccas.43 On this particular assignment, Forrest disregarded the deadline laid down by the Governor-General for the completion of the voyage, acted contrary to the information he had given to the Bencoolen Council and in so doing, misled them, and engaged in private trading while he was officially occupied on a diplomatic mission. To top it off, he wrote a petulant, personal letter to the Bencoolen Council, complaining of his treatment: “… You talk of disrespect”, he wrote. “Was it decent to keep an officer of my rank and character, standing at your Council table like a culprit, though crippled with the gout, until the pain of it forced him to help himself to a chair”. The Council wrote not only to Bengal, but also to the Court of Directors, charging Forrest with non-compliance and disobedience of orders.44 The dispute with the court of Directors was still proceeding as late as 1791. Forrest may have been somewhat contumacious when dealing with British officialdom, but his affinity with Malay society cannot be questioned. Music for him was one important medium

41

Bassett, ‘Thomas Forrest’, pp. 44–5. Bassett, ‘Thomas Forrest’, p. 43. 43 Miller, W. G., ‘Thomas Forrest on the West Coast of Sumatra, 1786– 87’, unpublished paper, ASAA, 3rd National Conference, Brisbane, 24–9 August 1980. 44 BL, OIOC, SFR, 27 December 1786, 467. 42

110 British Traders in the East Indies of cultural communication.45 As Bassett has described it, Forrest brought domestic chores to a halt in the Papuan longhouse at Dory Harbour by playing his flute and persuading a local girl to sing for him. He presented a flute and two violins to the Raja Muda of Mindanao and he played a part of the 3rd sonata of Corelli to the Sultan of Aceh. Marsden said that for these “whimsical practices”, Forrest was known amongst the Malays as “Capitan Geela”, the Mad Captain.46 At the same time, as we have seen, during his New Guinea–Molucca voyage, he spent eight months of 1775 in the Sultanate of Mindanao, where he displayed a “punctilious respect for local social customs, a friendly and insatiable curiosity and a complete lack of patronage or condescension”.47 This is not to say that Forrest got on well with all Malays at all times. Though he sailed with a Malay crew through the archipelago in the small Tartar Galley for eighteen months (he had two European officers with him), he had a strong disagreement with Tuan Haji, the person who was the official guide to the Moluccas. Forrest shows here the only real signs of condescension, or disparagement towards any individual. Bassett was unable to determine where the fault lay for the “altercation” that broke out between the two.48 Scott and Forrest appear like-spirits. It is little wonder that Forrest, in contrast to the more priggish opinions of officials, described Scott as “a very sensible and intelligent gentleman”.49 Despite his ambivalent relationship with EIC officialdom and his relaxed attitude to the Malay people, Forrest’s contribution

45

46 47 48 49

Irving, D. R. M., ‘Trading Tunes: Thomas Forrest, Malay Songs, and Musical Exchange in the Malay Archipelago, 1774–84’, in Tara Alberts and D. R. M. Irving (eds), Intercultural Exchange in Southeast Asia: History and Society in the Early Modern World (London: Taurus, 2013), pp. 203–35; Irving, D. R. M., ‘Hybridity and Harmony: Nineteenth-century British Discourse on Syncretism and Intercultural Compatibility in Malay Music’, Indonesia and the Malay World, 42:123 (2014), 197–221, at pp. 201–2. Bassett, ‘Introduction’, p. 13. Bassett, ‘Introduction’, pp. 11, 13. Bassett, ‘Introduction’, p. 13. Quoted in Bassett, British Trade, p. 45.

Inadvertent imperialists 111 to the knowledge on which British expansion was based, and his role as an intermediary, is without parallel.

Captain Court, John Hayes, Francis Lynch and other country traders in the eastern archipelago The role of country traders in respect of their impact on the native states of Eastern Indonesia has been described in Chapter 2. Thomas Forrest’s contact with Tidore facilitated an intermittent but continuing and significant relationship between the aspiring Sultan Nuku and the official British administration. As shall be shown in Chapter 4, the practice by other country traders of testing the effectiveness of the Dutch trade monopoly in spices in the Moluccas continued for at least the next thirty years. These activities by the country traders, together with the knowledge and experience they gained, meant that the role they played leading up to the first British occupation of Amboyna in 1796 was more considerable than has hitherto been assumed. Furthermore, during the period of actual occupation of Amboyna, Banda and Ternate (1796–1803), their role was critical to British success. It will be shown that they were drawn upon for both advice and material assistance by the Company officials. In this regard, their role in Eastern Indonesia had important implications for later British imperial expansion in the Archipelago as a whole. The importance of Robert Lander and William Risdon in the politics of Ternate and Tidore has been demonstrated. Lander, Risdon and their country trader colleagues, through these activities, also made a significant contribution to British enterprise in the Moluccas and subsequently, the extension of British power. John Hayes took leave of his position as an officer in the Bombay Marine to undertake a trading voyage to collect spices at Dorey, of which he had heard about from Captain John McCluer. McCluer, also of the Bombay Marine, had made a survey of the coast of New Guinea under orders of the Company in 1791 and 1792.50 Hayes’ two vessels, the Duke of Clarence and the Duchess

50

Hocking, John Pearce, A Supplement to the Account of the Pelew Islands (London: Printed by Bulmer, 1803), p. 2.

Figure 5: View of the Entrance to Dorey Harbour, or “New Albion” as it was referred to by English country traders in the 1790s, with Forrest’s vessel, “Tartar Galley”. (From Thomas Forrest, A Voyage to New Guinea and the Moluccas, (1780) (1969), plate 12, opp. page 150).

Inadvertent imperialists 113 arrived at Dorey Bay on 18 September 1793 (unaware that it was the same place that Forrest had visited in 1775). The British settlement that Hayes established lasted, precariously, until May 1795. Though at times Hayes referred to his naval position in order to give greater weight to his actions, the expedition was not sanctioned by the Company. The two vessels were owned and managed by the firm of private merchants, Udney, Frieshard and Laprimaude.51 The Dutch historian A. Haga argues that the expedition did have official recognition of some sort, and that it was part of a continuous grand plan of the British to undermine the Dutch spice monopoly, a plan that had begun with Forrest and continued with McCluer.52 For Haga, the fact that it was believed by the Dutch that there were sepoys at Dorey, that the settlement existed as long as it did, that McCluer and Hayes corresponded with Bengal and that the officers who commanded at Dorey were all to play a part later in the war with the Dutch, convinced him the settlement could not have been possible without the help of the Company.53 While Haga’s conclusions are incorrect, Hayes’ actions illustrated the grey area which existed at times between a country trader and a Company servant and how this grey area could be exploited when it suited country traders to do so. The settlement was not approved by the Governor-General when he was informed of it by William Risdon who had sailed back to Bengal as commander of the Duke of Clarence. When Risdon returned to New Albion in May 1795 it was immediately abandoned. Nevertheless, the impact the presence of the country traders and the existence of the factory in the contested area of the Moluccas had on the local Malays and on the Dutch was an early indication of a re-assertive British presence in the Malay world. Concurrently, the acquisition of knowledge about Lee, I., Commodore Sir John Hayes, his Voyage and Life, 1767–1831, with some account of Admiral D’Entrecasteaux’s voyage of 1792–3 (London: Longmans, 1912), p. 79; Griffin, ‘London, Bengal’, pp. 151, 166–7. 52 Haga, A., Nederlandsch Nieuw Guinea en de Papoesche Eilanden: historische bijdrage, 1500–1883, (2 vols, Batavia: Bruining, 1884), vol. 1, pp. 353–4. 53 Haga, Nederlandsch Nieuw, vol. 1, p. 354, “zonder hulp der compagnie ware de vestiging niet mogelijk geweest”. 51

114 British Traders in the East Indies the geography and contemporary politics must have been an encouragement for any future British advancement. It is important to reiterate that Hayes, during his two years’ absence from the Bombay Marine on the New Albion expedition, was fulfilling the role of a country trader. In 1794, he sailed from Dorey to Macao and Canton to trade in products of the Archipelago. While he intimated on one occasion that he was sent to China by Commodore Mitchell, whom he met in Batavia, his real purpose became apparent when he wrote to the Dutch supercargo at Canton, van Braam, “This deviation of my route to Chine [sic] I took upon myself, in order to ascertain the value of the several productions I met at different places there”.54 Van Braam noted on 22 July 1794 that Hayes had spices on board his ship.55 McCluer also gave testimony to the Dutch that Hayes had misleadingly claimed at Macao to have established New Albion on the order of the Bengal Government.56 McCluer said that although he and Hayes had been in the Bombay Marine together, at the time of the Dorey establishment Hayes was simply the Captain of a trading vessel and not then in the Company service .57 McCluer took sorely needed provisions to New Albion on the Venus from Macao in 1794. It would appear that he too was by then acting as a free merchant, for he had resigned his office as commander of the Company ships undertaking survey work 54

Quoted in Leupe, P. A., ‘Captain John McCluer en zijn verrichtingen om de Oost, 1790–1795’, BKI, 25, 4e volgreeks, 1st deel (1877), pp. 250–78 at p. 269. 55 Leupe, ‘Captain John McCluer’, p. 276. 56 Quoted in Leupe, ‘Captain John McCluer’, p. 255. McCluer’s journal is said to be lost, but he gave an account of his voyages to the Dutch Governor-General in a letter dated Kupang, 25 April 1795. The English original of this letter has not been found, but the Dutch translation is quoted in full in Leupe. The chart of McCluer’s voyage was published by Alexander Dalrymple in 1792, Chart of the Track and Discoveries of the East India Company’s Cruizers “Panther” and “Endeavour” under the command of Lieut. John McCluer, 1790, 1791 and 1792. 57 Leupe, ‘Captain John McCluer’, p. 259. “Hij matigde zich t’ onregt een gezag aan daar hij geen pretentie toe had, als zijnde hij alleen bevelhebber van een koopmansvaartuig en niet van de Marine der Comp. te dier tijd.”

Inadvertent imperialists 115 to assist the people of the Pelew Islands.58 Irrespective of the fact that McCluer was critical of Hayes for assuming an official status which was unwarranted, he may not have been above taking a similar position himself, alternating between Company servant and country trader when the situation required it. When McCluer brought sorely needed supplies to New Albion he also assisted in getting the Duchess seaworthy again and sailed to Buru to purchase equipment. In doing so, he called at Gebe and in one account, on 25 October 1794 raised the British flag on the island and formally took possession of it in the name of George III. A map, Plan of the Island Geby by John McCluer 1794 was published by Dalrymple in 1795. McCluer informed the Dutch that he called at Gebe only because of a leak in his ship, and for no other reason.59 Notwithstanding the failure of New Albion, the British, through the country traders and McCluer, were acquiring a greater familiarity with the waters of the Moluccas. They were also becoming increasingly knowledgeable about the politics of the region through their association with Tidore and were engaging in the local trade of the region so successfully that several of the country traders who first travelled to the Moluccas with the New Albion expedition subsequently remained there. Captain Court, who had been left in charge at Dorey by Hayes and was contacted by Nuku during 1794, played a role in Tidore’s continued resistance to Dutch rule. When New Albion was abandoned, Nuku, aware that the British were interested in acquiring spices, invited Captain Court and his crew to join him at his headquarters at Waru on eastern Ceram and promised to obtain spices for them in abundance. The testimony of Robert Lander, chief mate of the Duchess, who remained at New Albion during the whole period of its existence, provided evidence of warm relationship between Nuku and the country traders. “I remained at Dorey twenty-one months. From Dorey Leupe, ‘Captain John McCluer’, pp. 253–4; Haga, Nederlandsch Nieuw, vol. 1, pp. 330–1. 59 Leupe, ‘Captain John McCluer’, p. 256. McCluer returned to Calcutta. He departed again from Bengal in the Venus in August 1795, but presumably his ship foundered, for he was never heard of again. Lee, Commodore, p. 182. 58

116 British Traders in the East Indies we proceeded to Wauroo on the Eastern part of Ceram, by the invitation of Sultan Nooko, and remained there about six weeks. From thence we went to Gabie (Gebe) accompanied by the Sultan, with the ships Duke of Clarence and the snow Duchess”.60 Irrespective of the unofficial nature of the country traders’ activities, greater awareness in Calcutta of the political situation in the Moluccas followed by Fort William’s hesitant move towards closer official ties with Tidore were the result of the country traders transporting two of Nuku’s envoys from Gebe to Bengal. Nuku dispatched these two envoys on the Duke of Clarence with letters for the Bengal government.61 This embassy, in the final analysis, may be said to have proved unsuccessful insofar as no actual alliance was agreed to by the British. Despite this, the visit attracted a certain amount of publicity and the envoys were cordially received by the Governor-General. The Madras Courier of 23 December 1795 recorded their arrival at Calcutta and went on, “three [sic] native princes of the islands are passengers on the Duke of Clarence for Bengal, where they mean to tender homage and implore the protection of the British Government”.62 Even this simple acknowledgement of the mission by the Bengal government demonstrates a growing recognition of the political situation, while the sending of presents to Nuku must be seen as going some way towards the recognition of Nuku as a legitimate authority in the area. Risdon returned the envoys to Gebe,63 by which time the British had occupied Amboyna. It has already been seen that Court was one who provided valuable information about provisioning to Admiral Rainier’s British naval expedition to the Moluccas. Rainier captured Amboyna Examination of Mr. Robert Lander, Amboyna, 24 April 1798, British Library, Oriental and India Office Collections, Madras Public Consultations (hereafter BL, OIOC, MPC), 31 August 1798. 61 Ibid. 62 Quoted in Lee, Commodore, p. 166. The third person may have been Ibrahim, a “prince” of Ternate, who had crossed sides and joined forces with Nuku. The envoys are likely to have been Nuku’s “goegoegoe” (an official) and Ismael, Nuku’s “secretary”, as described by Haga, though Haga gives the date as 1796. Haga, Nederlandsch Nieuw, vol. 1, p. 352. 63 Lee, Commodore, p. 166. 60

Inadvertent imperialists 117 on 16 February 1796. When the fleet passed through Penang in November 1795 Court was interviewed by one of Rainier’s officers.64 Rainier reported that, “On my arrival at Prince of Wales Island found from information Captain Newcome had acquired from the ship Duke of Clarence just arrived from those seas, that it is full early enough to leave the Straits of Malacca by the latter end of January”. In addition to sailing information, Court was able to provide the British fleet with up-to-date political and economic information as well. On the island of Ceram … Nagore blue cloth, and white Baftas are the best articles to exchange for refreshments. Course cutlery is a good article of exchange. The village of Savoy (= Sawai?) about the middle of the island on the north coast and the village of Wauroo (Waru) on the NE end of the island are particularly plentiful in refreshments, and Mr. Court says he thinks if his name is mentioned to the natives it may be the means of your being better supplied as he is well known to them. On the island of Mysol (Misool) wherever a village is to be seen you may expect the same refreshments … He says you must be very careful not to hoist Dutch colours as there are many islands in those seas which are not subject to the Dutch, whose natives hold the Dutch in the greatest detestation. A Red English ensign is the only English colours they are acquainted with”.

This is in addition to the information which James Scott, the unorthodox country trader based at Penang, provided Rainier.65 Francis Lynch was a country trader who played an even more vital role in the British advance into the eastern Malay Information collected from Captain Court, commander of a vessel, respecting the winds and weather, etc., to be expected between the Straits of Malacca and the Molucca Islands. British Library, Oriental and India Office Collection, Madras Military Consultations (hereafter BL, OIOC, MMC), 5 January 1796. The report is attached to Rainier’s letter to Elphinstone, 30 November 1795. 65 Rainier to Elphinstone 30 November 1795, BL, OIOC, MMC, 5 January 1796. 64

118 British Traders in the East Indies Archipelago. When he first appears in the records in early 1796 as Captain of the Diana, Lynch was fortunate to have as a member of his crew the aforementioned Robert Lander, who had already had over two years’ experience trading and living in the Moluccas and who had recently left the service of Frushard and Laprimandaye. It becomes apparent there was a growing sequence of country traders by whom was passed on the knowledge and experience indispensable for the British official occupation. When operating in the Moluccas in the 1790s, Lynch too was principally obtaining spices through his association with Sultan Nuku of Tidore.

An ambivalent relationship After the British established their authority on Amboyna the administration came to rely heavily on the country traders in a variety of other ways. Before discussing this assistance, it is necessary to understand that the same ambivalence towards the country traders that has been seen elsewhere on the part of the British officials, existed in the Spice Islands as well. The Company officials insisted on continuing the Dutch monopoly in the trading of spices, the very policy the country traders had been accused of undermining when it had been imposed by the Dutch administration. William Jones, the British Resident at Amboyna after Admiral Rainier, acted to prevent the country traders from trading in spices. Spices were grown throughout the whole of the Molucca Islands, even though the Dutch policy of extirpation had been at least partly successful in limiting the best quality cloves to the Ambonese islands, with the superior classes of nutmeg and mace restricted to Banda. In a far-sighted and thoughtful report, Jones floated the idea of excluding private trading from the Moluccas, recommending cooperation with Nuku in this matter.66 The “smuggling” of which Jones wrote was from Amboyna to Ceram, where the spices were sold to the country traders who were supporting, and being encouraged by, Nuku: “… The cloves are carried away by the Ceram 66

Jones to Bengal 27 April 1798, BL, OIOC, MPC, 31 August 1798.

Inadvertent imperialists 119 junks and thence transported to islands inhabited by people who profess themselves subjects of the King of Tidore (or Prince Nooko as he is styled by the Dutch) where vessels come to purchase them”. Jones recommended that action should be taken in India against the country traders. In April 1798, he interviewed Captain Lynch and First Mate Lander and sent the transcript to Bengal as evidence of what he saw as the “smuggling” that was going on to the detriment of the Company.67 At that time, the Diana was owned by William Fairlie, James Scott and Lynch himself. Scott had another vessel, the Phoenix (Captain Moore), also sailing in the Moluccas, and there were other country ships as well. From the Diana’s manifest, it was known that the ship had spices on board: 150 picul of cloves and 60 picul of long nutmegs. Moore stated he had over 44 picul of cloves on board. Lynch claimed that he had obtained his spices from the subjects of Nuku on Tidore, Bachian, Ceram and New Guinea, but did not deny that some of the cloves might have originated from Amboyna. Lander too confirmed that they had been purchased at those places, and the previous year at Waru as well. Moore’s cargo had been acquired at Ceram Laut, (that is, the east end of Ceram), and at Goram. Altogether, Lynch speculated that perhaps 1,000 picul of cloves had been carried away by “private” traders during the previous year, though two-thirds of this would have been on Makassar prahus, there being twenty of these craft on the south coast of Ceram at the time he gave his evidence. According to the country traders, the spices were mostly purchased with cloth. Perhaps attempting to play down their trade in weapons, Lynch said that the country traders sometimes sold a few arms, but it was the Makassarese who chiefly traded in them. The other country traders mentioned in Jones’ interviews were the Tweed (Captain Duncan) owned by James Scott, the Duke of Clarence (Captain Risdon) and the Sultan (Captain Court). Lynch in his answers went so far as to state that Halmahera, Bachian and Obi had been taken possession of “in the name of the Company” by the country traders. There was no denial therefore of their activities, indeed, the 67

BL, OIOC, MPC, 31 August 1798.

120 British Traders in the East Indies traders defended the rectitude of their actions. They asserted that they had not purchased spices on any of the Company’s spice islands, and were trading with a “free and independent” people, who “had a right to dispose of their property to whom they please, and further declared, that some of the Rajas or head people had applied for English colours which were supplied to them”.68 For their part, the Company servants were equally certain that the activities of the British country traders were illegal, or at any rate, that they should stop, being detrimental to the Company’s profits. However, they were uncertain of their authority to take action. As Lynch argued, their activities were legitimate because “… those ships have all permission to trade as far Eastward as they please, within the Company’s limits”, and the spices were all “entered at Bengal” and “the Company’s duties paid”.69 Moore also maintained that his cargo would be delivered through customs in India, or any of the Company’s ports.70 Jones felt that he could not but report all the facts to Bengal, with the recommendation that action be taken there, where legal advice was available, at the same time suggesting that port clearances for private vessels sailing to the Moluccas be withheld.71 He was thus recommending that Bengal withdraw permission for the private traders to trade in the Moluccas. At the same time, Jones conceded that the Company’s inability to pay promptly for spice deliveries at its Amboyna market due to a lack of specie, helped to drive the growers into the arms of the “smugglers”.72 The intensity of spice trading by the country traders in the vicinity of Ceram also became clear in the report by Captain Skinner, commander of the brig Experiment, who was employed by Robert Farquhar, the Deputy Resident at Banda, to take a trip 68 69

70 71 72

Moore’s statement to Jones, 8 June 1798, BL, OIOC, MPC, 26 October 1798. Lynch’s statement, April 1798, BL, OIOC, MPC, 31 August 1798. Moore’s statement to Jones, 8 June 1798, BL, OIOC, MPC, 26 October 1798. Jones to Bengal, 27 April 1798, BL, OIOC, MPC, 31 August 1798. Jones to Bengal, 20 June 1798, BL, OIOC, MPC, 20 October 1798.

Figure 6: Robert Townsend Farquhar in 1817 when Governor of Mauritius. (Reproduced with the permission of the National Archives Department, Coromandel, Mauritius).

122 British Traders in the East Indies around the islands in March and April 1798. At Geser on Ceram Laut, Skinner found the Diana loading spices. At Waru, he was told that the Tweed and the Duke of Clarence had sailed from there only a fortnight before, laden with spices.73 The British government at Madras welcomed Jones’ advice, but appears to have done little in practice. The Resident was given official approval to apply the old monopoly and introduce checks on smuggling at the local level, but no firm action was taken in India. The Governor of Madras wrote to the Governor-General in Bengal on the issue: “Although we have not thought it necessary to frame any particular regulations for the trade of the Moluccas, considering our general instructions to our Residents there for the prevention of smuggling to be sufficient, we yet conceive it so essentially necessary to preserve exclusively in the hands of the Company the monopoly of the spice trade, that we think every instance of interference with it by individuals should be peremptorily checked”.74 The Madras government tactfully suggested that the Bengal Presidency might see fit to introduce some of Jones’ proposals. Vested interests of people in Bengal must have influenced matters otherwise. The Bengal government, merely exhorted Jones to do what he could at the local level to prevent the breach of the monopoly. Country trading in the Moluccas was still active during 1799, and Jones wrote in November 1798 as the country trade continued – seven months after his first proposals to Madras – that the Company could only expect to suffer unless plans to suppress it were implemented.75 Jones was forced to consider the Company’s relationship with Nuku, whose position was increasingly powerful, thanks in part to the support and prestige he had received through his connections with the country traders. “Nuku”, Jones conceded, “has it in his power, by collecting a piratical party, to disturb these islands, particularly if the natives should have any inclination to rebel”, 73

Skinner’s account of his journey in BL, OIOC, MPC, 26 October 1798. 74 Clive to Mornington, 10 November 1798, BL, OIOC, MPC, 10 November 1798. 75 Jones to Bengal, 23 November 1798, BL, OIOC, MPC, 23 February 1799; Wright, H. R. C., ‘The Moluccan Spice Monopoly, 1770– 1824’, JMBRAS, 31:4 (1958), i–iv, 1–127, at p. 29.

Inadvertent imperialists 123 and he considered it “impolitic to disgust him”.76 He therefore proposed a modus vivendi with Nuku. The difficulty of entering into such “negotiations of alliance” – as Jones put it – particularly with regard to the European post-war situation, was that Nuku was a “rebel” in the eyes of the Dutch, and British negotiations with him might not be accepted as valid. However, the immediate need to preserve the spice monopoly and the growing influence of Nuku impelled Jones to move towards negotiation. Partly as a result of the actions of the country traders, the British were thus being forced to devise policies that saw them extending their influence politically into the eastern part of the Malay Archipelago. Jones’ replacement as Resident at Amboyna in 1799, the young, ambitious, imperialistic Robert Townsend Farquhar, was even more active in his campaign to prevent the country traders purchasing spices in the Moluccas.77 He was in charge of the British administration there for three years from 27 January 1799 until 17 January 1802. Farquhar was enthusiastic about the potential of the Moluccas, was hostile to the Dutch on Ternate, and was a strong advocate of British maintaining an ongoing presence in the area. His eloquence in praise of the area’s resources knew no bounds: “It comprises the most valuable group of islands in the habitable globe in regards both to the produce of the soil and the treasures it embosoms in the hitherto but imperfectly explored mines with which the mountains abound. The gold in some parts is the purest of any yet discovered in the Eastern Seas …Those indigenous plants (spices) notwithstanding all the exertions of the Dutch to exterpate [sic] them, grow … in greater abundance in the hills (on Obi) than the tares in the fields of Europe”.78 Farquhar was more vitriolic in his criticisms of the country traders than Jones. He accused them of stealing the Company’s spices, falsely making themselves out to be “delegates from the supreme government”, and of smuggling in the Company’s lands. He was in agreement with Jones that if Tidore contacts with the British were maintained only through the liaison of 76

Jones to Bengal, 27 April 1798, BL, OIOC, MPC, 24 August 1798. On Farquhar, see Miller, W. G., ‘Robert Farquhar in the Malay World’, JMBRAS, 51:2 (1978), 123–38; Webster, ‘British Expansion’. 78 Farquhar to Madras, 1 January 1802, BL, OIOC, MPC, 25 June 1802. 77

124 British Traders in the East Indies country traders, it would be detrimental to the national interest: “though it is unquestionably our interest to cultivate and improve our friendship with that powerful and well affected Prince, still it cannot but be highly injurious to the revenues of the Company to promote these views through the channel of persons who are not covenanted, and consequently little attached to their interest by and where their own is immediately concerned”.79 He stated specifically that the amount lost to the Company during the previous two years through “contraband” was £400,000. As part of the policy to counteract the “smuggling” he was in favour of Jones’ suggestion of obtaining Nuku’s assistance to prevent the sale of spices among his subjects. Unlike Jones, Farquhar saw an agreement with Nuku in wider terms than simply the prevention of smuggling of spices. He realized the advantages of British involvement in what he believed was the vast wealth of the realm of Tidore itself, and whereas thus far it had been the country traders who had reaped the benefits of trading with Tidore, Farquhar believed these should be at the disposal of the Company and the British nation as a whole. For this reason, he believed that closer official relations should be established with Nuku.80 During the second half of 1799 Farquhar continued his actions against the country traders. He conducted a hongi expedition (the annual trip carried out by the Dutch to ensure the extirpation of spice trees in unauthorized locations to maintain the Dutch monopoly in the products)81 around the island of Ceram as part of his measures, to impress on the inhabitants the might of European authority. He was away for seven weeks in October and November 1799 and demonstrated that he was prepared to risk more decisive action than Jones against the country traders and the subjects of Tidore to maintain the Company’s privileges. At Ceram Laut, Farquhar found the First Mate of the Duke of Clarence, John Currie, who was building a boat and had been left there by Captain Risdon to collect a cargo. Currie was obviously on intimate trading relations with the local chiefs and with Raja Muda (Janalabdin) and with Ibrahim, both of whom were resi79

Farquhar to Bengal, 4 April 1799, BL, OIOC, MPC, 12 July 1799.

81

Wright, ‘The Moluccan’, p. 8.

80 Ibid.

Inadvertent imperialists 125 dent in the area and both in his debt.82 Currie had been there since June. Witnesses questioned by Farquhar said that Currie had claimed to represent the British nation, and that he hoisted the British colours at the village “every Sunday” and when sighting a ship. Several of the witnesses claimed that a number of junks loaded with cloves, including some belonging to Currie, departed for Goram when they heard of the approach of the hongi, and that these cloves had come from Amboyna. Currie was ordered to go to Amboyna, for Farquhar accused him not only of smuggling, but also of disturbing the internal security of the Moluccas. Currie must have subsequently been released, for in early 1800 he made a statement in Penang in which he described his movements at Ceram Laut and criticized Farquhar for the manner in which he had interviewed him.83 Currie refused to sign the written statement compiled by Farquhar of his interview at Ceram Laut. His Penang statement was enclosed with a letter from John Shaw, part-owner of the Duke of Clarence, to Lord Clive, in which Shaw severely criticized Farquhar’s actions. Shaw gave an account of the long history of relations between the British country traders, Nuku and the Bengal government. Nuku’s envoy (“vakeel”) “received from the Governor-General, for the Sultan, a letter containing a friendly answer, together with arms and ammunition to a great amount in value, the Honble Company’s flag, and a golden seal, engraven with the name and titles of the Sultan. The presents were shipped on board three merchant men, the Duke of Clarence, Captn Risdon, the Sultan, Captn Court, and the Phoenix, Captn Stewart, fitted out through the agency of Messrs Frushard and Laprimandaye of Calcutta, and those ships with the Sultan’s vakeel, his secretary and attendants, as passengers sailed from Calcutta, during the months of January and February, 1796 on trading voyages to the Moluccas, with the knowledge, and by permission of the Government of Bengal for the purpose of purchasing spices from the subjects of the Sultans of Tidore and Ternate …”.84 Shaw stressed the 82

Farquhar to Madras, 20 February 1800, BL, OIOC, MPC, 11 July 1800. 83 Shaw to Lord Clive, Governor of Madras, 29 March 1800, BL, OIOC, MPC, 11 July 1800. 84 Shaw to Clive, 29 March 1800, BL, OIOC, MPC, 11 July 1800.

126 British Traders in the East Indies legitimacy of the trading arrangements since 1795, the fact that they were conducted with the permission of the government of Bengal, and the fact that Ceram Laut was ten miles from the east end of Ceram, far from Amboyna and its “dependencies” and lacking any European fort or settlement. Farquhar had, Shaw maintained, no legal right to arrest Currie. Shaw also gave his account of the embassies of Nuku to Bengal. He expressed the resentment the country traders felt at the government’s attitude to them since the Moluccas had fallen to the British. They stood to lose considerably by this official interference in their trade; Nuku was said to be Sp.$8,000 in debt to the country traders, and Raja Muda, Sp.$10,000.85 Farquhar was more decisive than Jones in his actions against the native “smugglers” as well. At Waru, on 21 October 1799 he took into custody Raja Muda and Prince Ibrahim and had them sent to Madras.86 By these actions, through his policy of maintaining the spice monopoly for the Company against the country traders, Farquhar was being drawn into the internal political affairs of the Moluccas. The country traders themselves were not promoting the extension of British territory, even when they overstepped the mark in their cooperation with Tidore by insinuating to Nuku that they represented the British Crown, going so far as to raise the Company flag at Maba, one of Nuku’s settlements on Halmahera. As noted previously, Nuku recaptured his capital, Soasio, on Tidore, with the assistance of the country traders in April 1797. Lynch’s Diana was involved in the campaign against the Dutch-occupied Ternate. Lander remained at Tidore between July and November 1797 assisting in the blockade of Ternate. So, while the country traders may appear at first glance to be committed imperialists in supporting Nuku against the Dutch and by raising the British flag at Maba and on Ceram, this is not the case. They took these actions as supporters of Nuku. 85

Ibid., and Farquhar to Madras, 20 February 1800, BL, OIOC, MPC, 11 July 1800. 86 Farquhar to Madras, 31 May 1800, BL, OIOC, MPC, 18 July 1800. For the wretched situation into which they were to fall in Madras see, A. Grant, Town Major at Madras, to Buchan, Secretary of Government, 22 July 1800, BL, OIOC, MPC, 25 July 1800.

Inadvertent imperialists 127 Clearly Nuku was not about to accept the replacement of one European power by another. His intention was to regain control of the Sultanate of Tidore, which he eventually did. The intention of the country traders, primarily in the region for business, was limited to locating and securing friendly ports from which they could continue trading.

Country trader contribution to the British occupation of the Moluccas The country traders contributed to the extension of British authority inadvertently through the inevitable dependence of the Company servants on their services. During the first British occupation, despite the opposition Jones and Farquhar displayed towards the country traders over the spice trade, the Company servants were only too happy to make use of the services of the country vessels in bringing scarce supplies of specie, food and other necessities to the English settlement of Amboyna when the Company’s ships were late in arriving.87 Jones sold cloves from the Company’s store to Lynch on the Diana in 1798 and even employed him to drive away Bugis and Ceram prahus that were sailing in the vicinity of Amboyna.88 In 1799 Jones was obliged to purchase piece goods from Lynch to the value of nearly Sp.$50,000 with bills on Bengal and he chartered Lynch’s vessel to carry spices for the Company to Madras. Jones himself took passage on Lynch’s vessel back to India after handing over authority to Farquhar. All this despite the fact that in November 1798 he had warned that unless “private traders (be) absolutely prohibited from coming to these islands” the produce of the islands would be lost to the Company.89 But the most conspicuous example of the dependence of the officials on the cooperation of the country traders occurred during the British siege of Ternate. The British Navy officers on Amboyna had a strong predilection to conquer Ternate, or “place it under British protection”, according to the Kew 87

Wright, ‘The Moluccan’, p. 33. Wright, ‘The Moluccan’, p. 34. 89 Quoted in Wright, ‘The Moluccan’, p. 29. 88

128 British Traders in the East Indies Letters.90 Even Rainier had considered doing so. Naval vessels launched several bombardments against Fort Orange, the Dutch stronghold on Ternate, during 1797, 1798 and 1799, but failed to bring about its surrender. The British military commander at Amboyna, McNeal, refused to supply troops to support the navy’s attacks on the grounds that there were insufficient forces and he did not have the authority to do so.91 Jones too was opposed to attacking Ternate, correctly interpreting Bengal’s policy. Madras informed Jones that he was not obliged to receive charge of any conquest by the Navy “which may be dangerous or injurious to the great objects of your care, Banda and Amboyna”.92 Farquhar however, always believed that the last Dutch stronghold in the Moluccas should be captured by the British: “… Ternate ought to have been taken long ago, as well for the honor of the British arms as the commerce of England”, he wrote soon after assuming his position at Amboyna.93 It would also, he argued, strengthen the Company’s currently operating monopoly in trade (though he advocated that free trade should be exercised eventually). Farquhar’s first attempt to take Ternate on 10 February 1801 using only Company forces under the new British military commander at Amboyna, Colonel Burr, was an embarrassing failure, with a “great loss … sustained in killed and wounded”.94 Farquhar had specifically instructed Burr not to accept Nuku’s offer of help: “Having been advised by Mr. Farquhar, the Resi-

90

91

92 93 94

Hall, D. G. E., A History of South-East Asia (London: Macmillan, 1955), p. 281. The exiled William V of The Netherlands issued these “Letters” to Dutch officials ordering them to place the Dutch Company’s possessions in British hands to prevent them being seized by the French. Rainbow, S. G., ‘English Expeditions to the Dutch East Indies during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars’ (unpublished MA thesis, University of London, 1933), p. 135. Secretary Webbe, Fort St George, to Jones, 2 June 1798, BL, OIOC, MPC, 11 June 1798. Farquhar to Madras, 5 April 1799, BL, OIOC, MPC, 12 July 1799. Details in Burr’s dispatches, 28 February 1801, BL, OIOC, MMC, 2 June 1801.

Inadvertent imperialists 129 dent of the Moluccas, from motives of policy to dispense with his (Nuku’s) services, they were accordingly declined”.95 Farquhar was therefore obliged to reconsider the assistance from Tidore, and it was to John Hayes, the one-time country trader, and Francis Lynch, a currently practising country trader, that Farquhar turned to carry out the role of liaising with Nuku. John Hayes had returned to Amboyna as a captain, once more in the Bombay Marine. Hayes was sent by Burr in late February 1801 to cruise off Ternate. Tidore was selected as the base for the second expedition.96 Farquhar’s knowledge that he could rely on Tidore may have been no small factor in his decision to mount another offensive, though he made little mention in his reports of his cooperation with Nuku. It is in Burr’s accounts that support from that quarter is most clearly evident. Hayes had a major role in organizing the Tidorese, no doubt based on his previous association with Nuku while establishing New Albion. He provided the Tidorese vessels with guns, there being about two hundred Tidorese kora-kora accompanying the British ships. The close cooperation between the British and the Tidorese was evident to the Dutch,97 and while Burr was disappointed in the way the Tidorese conducted frontal attacks, he did acknowledge their overall indispensability to the success of the campaign. This was particularly so in respect of the blockade, for though the British could not breach the stoutly defended Fort Orange, the six-week-long embargo on supplies forced the Dutch to surrender on 20 June 1801. (Thus, despite Farquhar’s reluctance to acknowledge the fact, Nuku finally received what he had requested of Rainier in 1796, that is, British cooperation in the capture of Ternate.) Francis Lynch was also crucial to the successful capture of Ternate. He had been cooperating with Nuku in attempting to blockade Ternate since the latter’s seizure of the Tidore capital, Soasio. Though Burr made no mention in his dispatches of Lynch’s services during the siege, those services being perhaps less concerned with military action than intelligence and liaison 95

Burr to Madras, 28 February 1801, BL, OIOC, MMC, 2 June 1801; Haga, Nederlandsch Nieuw, vol. 1, p. 405. 96 Burr to Madras, 31 July 1801, BL, OIOC, MMC, 3 November 1801. 97 Haga, Nederlandsch Nieuw, vol. 1, p. 407.

130 British Traders in the East Indies work, Farquhar, in his reports, admitted the debt the British owed to the country trader. In addition, besides Lynch and his vessel the Bangalore, it would appear that at least one other country trader was present during the Ternate campaign, for Farquhar mentioned the Phoenix as well, when he gave instructions to Lynch to proceed to Tidore to make preparation with Nuku. He wrote to the country trader on 13 March 1801 requesting that, “… On your arrival at Nuku’s residence you will exert yourself in preparing from fourteen to twenty boats so as to render them capable of carrying guns of large calibre, chiefly nine-pounders; this is an object of the first importance. You will also see the fascines, gabions [i.e., forms of fortifications] etc. agreeable to the memorandum I gave you this morning, prepared by the arrival of the fleet which will sail from this place [i.e. Amboyna] in the course of about ten days”.98 Lynch also had to obtain as much intelligence as possible about the condition of the Ternate defences; “… You will of course, on this service, make every enquiry in your power as to the state of the enemy’s settlement at Ternate so as to enable you to afford such information to the Commanders of the land and sea forces as may prove conducive to the success of the enterprise”.99 In addition to his liaison role with the Tidore forces, Lynch took an active part in the campaign itself. In a dispatch to Lynch, Captain Brougham, aide-de-camp to Burr, wrote, “ I enclose [sic] you a memorandum of the number of Tidorians whom the Sultan is desired to furnish this afternoon”.100 Crew members of the Bangalore appear to have actually acted as troops, for Brougham also wrote, “The Colonel having heard of your very zealous and handsome offer of garrisoning Kiamera [Kayu Merah – a fort on the south of the island], has desired me to express his acknowledgements for such an uncommon instance of public spirit, and as his own troops are much harassed from occupying so many posts, he is pleased to accept the services of your havildars and

98

BL, OIOC, MMC, 7 September 1801. Farquhar to Lynch, 13 March 1801, BL, OIOC, MMC, 7 September 1801. 100 Brougham to Lynch, 12 June 1801, BL, OIOC, MMC, 7 September 1802. 99

Inadvertent imperialists 131 sepoys who will compose a part of the garrison Kiamera if you will be kind enough to order them to join the camp”.101 Farquhar stated explicitly that Lynch acted as interpreter for the Commander of the English forces: “his perfect knowledge of the languages, manners and customs of these countries, rendered him particularly well suited to fill”.102 In a similar tone, likewise recommending Lynch to the Governor of Madras, the Resident and Commander wrote in a joint letter, “His knowledge of the languages and customs of the Malays gave great facility and added a considerable dispatch to the execution of the different services required of Nuku and his subjects”, continuing, “… and to this object of public benefit he sacrificed many important considerations of private advantages as a trader for three to four months”.103 Farquhar, knowing that Lynch came from Calcutta, also wrote to the Governor-General, recommending favourable consideration be given to Lynch. He drew attention to the regard in which Lynch was held by the Tidorese, “whom he had long been in the habit of trafficking with”.104 In light of the fact that the previous British large-scale attack on Ternate, embarked upon without Tidore support, had failed, it can be argued that the work of liaising with and the marshalling of the Tidorese by John Hayes and Francis Lynch was the decisive factor in achieving success. Indeed, Astle was worried that the early resistance the British met with during the second campaign placed the entire British occupation of the Moluccas in danger.105 The importance of the Tidore role in the campaign will become even clearer in Chapter 5, when it will be shown that the Dutch position was never actually overrun, but that it was the success of the blockade, for which the Tidorese were largely responsible, which led to the Dutch surrender. 101 Ibid.

102 Farquhar

to Bengal, 11 July 1801, British Library, Oriental and India Office Collections, Bengal Foreign Consultations (hereafter BL, OIOC, BFC), 9 September 1801. 103 Burr and Farquhar to Madras, 10 December 1801, BL, OIOC, MMC, 15 June 1802. 104 Farquhar to Bengal, 11 July 1801, BL, OIOC, BFC, 9 September 1801. 105 Astle to Burr, 2 June 1801, BL, OIOC, MMC, 2 June 1801.

132 British Traders in the East Indies

Continuing country trader support in the Archipelago Lynch continued to trade in Eastern Indonesia during 1802, for we know that his ship, the Bangalore, was wrecked near the Salayer Islands during that year. At that time Lynch was still seeking payment for the expenses he had incurred during the siege of Ternate.106 Burr had guaranteed that the Company would meet Lynch’s expenses when he originally wrote to Lynch during the Ternate campaign: “… and of course it becomes my duty to direct the said ship Bangalore to remain here [at] the risk and responsibility of the Honorable East India Company of Great Britain upon the terms specified in your letter”.107 It is not known if Lynch’s requests for reimbursement were met by the Madras Government, but Wright stated that Lynch received the right “which he earnestly solicited, of trading for spices on Halmahera, as a reward for services at the taking of Ternate”.108 The country traders were also involved in negotiations about the nature of the political settlement that would be put in place following the capture of Ternate. An undertaking appears to have been given to Nuku that the Sultanate of Gilolo would be reinstated.109 Nuku reminded Madras that “During the campaign against Ternate, before that place had surrended [sic] to the English, Colonel Burr, Captain Hayes and Captain Lynch promised the Tuan Gilolo, that as soon as Ternate was in the British possession, he should be established on the throne of Gilolo and urged him on those grounds to make us of his exertions in fighting against the common enemy”.110 While other country traders such as Lander continued to experience difficulties with the British Moluccan administration over trade in spices, by the second half of 1803 Lynch was again 106 Lynch

to Madras, 8 August 1802, BL, OIOC, MMC, 7 September 1802; Wright, ‘The Moluccan’, p. 36. 107 Burr to Lynch, no date, BL, OIOC, MMC, 7 September 1802. 108 Wright, ‘The Moluccan’, p. 36. 109 For the importance of the four traditional Sultanates, one of which was Gilolo, see Andaya, L. Y., The World of Maluku: Eastern Indonesia in the Early Modern Period (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993), p. 81. 110 Nuku to Madras, 18 Hadji 1216, BL, OIOC, MMC, 15 October 1802.

Inadvertent imperialists 133 providing assistance to British officialdom. He was cooperating with Farquhar, who had been appointed Special Agent to the Malay States and Commissioner for the Restoration of the Moluccas to the Dutch, after the Moluccas were returned to the Dutch in June 1803. Because of Lynch’s intimate knowledge of the area, in 1804 he was entrusted with a special mission to the Moluccas to try and retain British links with the indigenous forces there that were opposed to the Dutch. At that time Britain was anticipating re-opening the settlement at Balambangan. When the English base at Balambangan was withdrawn in 1805, Lynch returned to Penang and like fellow country trader Francis Light before him, moved into the Company administration. Farquhar had been appointed Lieutenant-Governor of Penang in 1804. Lynch became Deputy Master Attendant at Penang and was still in the position when his knowledge of the Moluccas again brought him to the attention of higher officials. Whether Lynch continued in trade is unknown.111 When Britain re-occupied the Moluccas in 1810, Admiral Drury and the Governor-General, Lord Minto, saw the logic of having an experienced person such as Lynch as part of the new British administration. They wanted him as Master Attendant and Malay interpreter in Amboyna. Lynch assisted in the capture of Banda in 1810 and Drury said of his qualifications and talents, “He has not only traded but resided in that quarter (i.e. the Moluccas) for some years, is perfectly acquainted with the manners and customs of the natives and being in other respects a man of considerable ability, is well calculated for the appointment”.112 The reason why Lynch’s appointment was blocked by the Resident provides some evidence of Lynch’s background and status. William Bryant Martin, who had been Acting Resident at Bencoolen, was appointed Resident at Amboyna during the second British occupation. He was prepared to accept Lynch for the subordinate position of Deputy Master Attendant at one of the English dependences, Ternate or Banda, but not as Master Attendant at Amboyna. He may have opposed Lynch from a lack Malaya’s First, p. 144. It would appear that he ceased to command actual vessels, an embargo having been placed on Penang officials engaging in private trade in 1805. 112 Drury to Minto, 26 April 1810, BL, OIOC, MPC, 11 May 1810. 111 Clodd,

134 British Traders in the East Indies of respect for country traders, a prejudice against Indian-born citizens, or because of a personal dislike of Lynch. While he conceded that Lynch had previously rendered valuable service to the British, he felt the position at Amboyna required “… the union of considerable activity and intelligence”, which, he seemed to imply, Lynch did not possess. “Captain Lynch”, he continued, “is a native of India, and in the event of the right Honorable the Governor-General in Council considering it to be proper to make a provision for him, he appears to me to be sufficiently qualified to fill the subordinate situation of Deputy Master Attendant”.113 Martin got his way, for Lynch appears not to have become part of the second Moluccan administration, a fact which Martin may have had cause to regret in light of the considerable difficulties he encountered dealing with the local rulers during the course of his administration.

William Grieg’s role during the second British occupation of the Moluccas In the period between the first and second British occupations, 1803–10, Captain Grieg sailed several times into this area where Britain was seeking to retain contact with the local Sultans who were opposed to Dutch rule. Grieg was there principally to trade in spices and other products. But while, as has been shown, he was strengthening the position of the exiled Tidore leader, he was undertaking diplomatic tasks for the Bengal administration. As already mentioned, Grieg was close to Governor-General Lord Minto, after whom his vessel, owned by Joseph Baretto and Company, was named.114 Grieg’s voyages ensured that the British remained informed of the current political situation in the eastern part of the Malay Archipelago. His presence made certain that links were retained with Malay rulers and that the 113 Martin

to Bengal, 31 December 1810, British Library, Oriental and India Office Collections, Bengal Political Consultations (hereafter BL, OIOC, BPolC), 23 February 1811. 114 Mathison, John and Alexander Way Mason, An East India Register and Directory for 1809, corrected to the 15th August 1809 …, 2nd edn (London: Blacks and Parry, 1809), p. 120.

Inadvertent imperialists 135 British continued to be favourably viewed by local native powers who were hostile to the Dutch. After the British navy again seized the Dutch ports in the Moluccas in 1810 and set up the second British administration, Grieg must have again been in the area. He conveyed the news of the situation at Maba to the newly-established British administration at Amboyna in July of that year, including the information that Janalabdin had died and that his son, Jamaludin, had been elected Sultan by the people of Maba.115 Grieg was employed by the British administration at Amboyna to sail again to Maba to request that the Tidorese send representatives to Amboyna to discuss an agreement between the two sides. As already noted, the succession dispute in Tidore was to prove a problem for the British throughout the second administration of the Moluccas.

Stamford Raffles and country traders Thomas Stamford Raffles is seen as the exemplar of the British empire-builder in the Malay world during the period under consideration, with the founding of Singapore considered the pinnacle of Britain’s successful resurgence in the area. Raffles, like other EIC officials before him, was dependent upon the knowledge and the services of country traders. In his use of country traders to search for a permanent trading centre, he was following Robert Townsend Farquhar, of whom he was an acknowledged admirer. Raffles arrived to take up his post as Assistant Secretary in Penang on the day that Farquhar penned his final dispatch as Lieutenant-Governor of that settlement.116 According to Bastin, it was “one of the first official documents he (Raffles) ever read in the East, and he took its lesson to heart”.117 Eleven years later, when writing his History of Java, Raffles could still write of Farquhar that “… no man is more extensively acquainted with the interests and resources of 115 Amboyna

to Bengal, 25 October 1810, BL, OIOC, BPolC, 16 February 1811. 116 September 1805; Bastin, ‘Raffles’, p. 87; Wurtzburg, C. E., Raffles of the Eastern Isles (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1954), p. 30. 117 Bastin, ‘Raffles’, p. 87.

136 British Traders in the East Indies East insular India”.118 He referred to Farquhar’s “able report on the Eastern Islands”.119 By 1810, when Raffles had risen in the ranks and been appointed by the Governor-General to the position of Agent to the Governor-General with the Malay States (the same position that had been held by Farquhar),120 Raffles consulted and employed a number of country traders in his preparations for the invasion of Java. Planning the best route for the large fleet sailing to Java in the unfavourable southeastly monsoon was one issue. He wrote while at Malacca that, “In order to ascertain the most advantageous passage for the expedition from hence to Java several of the most experienced Eastern Traders both here and at Penang have been consulted, particularly Captains Carnegy, Grieg, Tait, Stewart, Scott and Smith …”.121 William Grieg, for one, had intended to continue trading between India and the Moluccas, but his ship was commandeered by the Governor-General for the Java expedition. Minto wrote to Stamford Raffles at Malacca where the latter was preparing for the expedition, “You will find my friend Grieg in this affair. He is placed at your disposal and is peculiarly suited, as well as his ship, to many useful purposes”.122 Raffles took Minto’s advice and received much reliable and useful information from Grieg, though the future Lieutenant-Governor of Java and founder of Singapore on occasions, as shall be shown, spoke disparagingly of country traders. In April 1811 Raffles employed Grieg to sail off Java and Bali obtaining,

Raffles, Thomas Stamford, The History of Java (2 vols [London: Black, Parbury and Allen 1817]; repr. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1965), vol. 1, p. 231. 119 Ibid. Farquhar may have been Lord Minto’s first choice as Lieutenant-Governor of Java, but by the time he came to make an appointment, Farquhar was already in charge of Mauritius: Boulger, Demetrius Charles, The Life of Sir Stamford Raffles (London: Horace Marshall, 1897), p. 136. 120 Wurtzburg, Raffles, p. 104. 121 British Library, Raffles Collection (hereafter BL, Raffles Collection), vol. I, Eur. Mss. C.34. 122 Minto to Raffles, 11 March 1811, BL, Raffles Collection, Eur. Mss. C.34. 118

Inadvertent imperialists 137 among other things, information about Daendels’ movements.123 When Grieg returned in May, Raffles reported the fact to Minto: “The enclosed extract from Capt. Grieg’s journal will convey to your Lordship the outlines of the information received from the Eastern part of Java and evince how actively and usefully the services of Captain Grieg have been employed”.124 He also sent Grieg to Borneo to contact Sultan Kassim of Pontianak. “I have again dispatched Capt. Greig [sic] to the Eastward with letters to the Sultan of Pontiana and every possible assistance to enable him to make an actual and regular survey of this Passage and I am confident that he will effect his purpose and return to Malacca by the 25th Inst.”.125 While off the coast of Borneo, Grieg surveyed the Karamata Passage and his survey led to the selection of this route for the expedition to Java later in the year.126 This passage differed from the one recommended by the Navy. It has to be said that the country traders were not entirely in agreement themselves about the best route to Java, some suggesting the fleet sail north of Borneo, others that it use the Bangka Straits.127 Raffles went with that recommended by Grieg and Burn. Grieg was also ordered to undertake survey work near the island of Penembangan, ahead of the fleet, during the course of the voyage.128 Minto praised Grieg, “the successful application of whose nautical talents and exertions [resulted in] a safe and direct passage for the great armament of Java”.129 His opinion of the trader’s character and contribution is illuminating: “a remark123 Raffles

to Minto, 13 April 1811, BL, Raffles Collection, Eur. Mss. C.35. Daendels was the pro-French Governor-General appointed in 1808. 124 Raffles to Minto, 6 May 1811, BL, Raffles Collection, Eur. Mss. C.35. 125 Raffles to Minto, 6 May 1811, BL, Raffles Collection, Eur. Mss. C.35. 126 Wurtzburg, C. E., ‘Who Planned the Sea Route of the Java Expedition in 1811?’, The Mariner’s Mirror: The Journal of the Society for Nautical Research, 37 (1951), 104–8, at p. 104. 127 Raffles to Minto, 22 May 1811, BL, Raffles Collection, Eur. Mss. C.34. 128 Wurtzburg, Raffles, p. 160. 129 Minute of Lord Minto, BL, OIOC, BPolC, 16 October 1812.

138 British Traders in the East Indies ably intelligent country shipmaster, who is perfectly at home in the Eastern seas. He has already been of the greatest use, both by missions to some islands adjacent to Java and more particularly by having pointed out the passage which we are now making to Java and ascertained its practicability by actual survey himself … Grieg is a plain, modest, unassuming Fife-man, with excellent natural parts and character”.130 Minto, liberal-minded and lacking in hauteur, was an advocate of Company officials learning and communicating in Asian languages with the local people. It is little wonder he was an admirer of a country trader such as Grieg.131 Grieg was to find not all Company officials as obliging as Minto. Because of his secondment to the Java expedition, Grieg was unable to return to the Moluccas to collect the payment owed to him by the Tidore Sultan, Jamaludin. He asked the British Resident, Martin, to collect it for him. This Martin refused to do, saying the amount requested was excessive. The Governor-General finally decided the matter in Grieg’s favour, paying Grieg in India and ordering the stipend paid by the British to Jamaludin to be reduced until the debt had been cleared.132 Raffles makes specific mention of other country traders he made use of at this time of preparation for the attack on Java. For example, he reported that Captain Court of the Amboyna, on his way back from the Moluccas (once more in British hands), provided him with information about the prevailing French rule on Java. Raffles retained the Amboyna at Malacca, believing that the vessel would be useful for his purposes.133 The advice and services of mariners who had previous experience as country traders and who had moved into the Company service were also to prove of considerable benefit. Francis Lynch, Gilbert Elliot, 1st Earl of, Lord Minto in India: Life and Letters, edited by the Countess of Minto (London: Longmans, Green, 1880), p. 278. 131 Wurtzburg, Raffles, pp. 54–5. 132 Grieg to Bengal, 25 February 1811, BL, OIOC, BPolC, 9 March 1811; Martin to Bengal, 17 April 1812, BL, OIOC, BPolC, 16 October 1812; Bengal to Martin, 16 October 1812, BL, OIOC, BPolC, 16 October 1812. 133 Raffles to Minto, 30 April 1811, BL, Raffles Collection, Eur. Mss. C.35. 130 Minto,

Inadvertent imperialists 139 previously employed by Farquhar, wrote to Raffles on 17 January 1811 that he had “… the pleasure of sending you the information I furnished Mr. Farquhar when in England. Admiral Drury has also a copy of the same”. At the same time, however, Lynch “… was extremely sorry” he could not find the chart he promised Raffles of the coast of Java; “it is either been stole [sic)] or given away by myself to some one that I do not recollect”.134 Lynch apparently bore no ill-will to Martin at this stage; he had been corresponding with Martin, presumably providing him with information in respect of the situation in the Moluccas. These details too he promised to send to Raffles. John Hayes was now Commodore in the Bombay Marine and unquestionably he drew upon the experience he had had sailing for a short period as a private trader in the Eastern Seas.135 Minto wrote to Raffles that, “I bring Commodore Hayes with high command as a most efficient and intelligent member of such an enterprize”.136 The number of country trader vessels that were actually part of the invasion fleet is not known, but there must have been many more than the two that are known to have been requisitioned into service, the Lord Minto and the Amboyna. The size of the invasion fleet varies in different accounts. According to Minto, it comprised 81 vessels.137 Twenty-five of these were British Navy vessels.138 Nine were EIC naval vessels, or “Company’s cruisers”, including the Malabar under Commodore John Hayes, and there were 57 “transports”.139 134 Lynch

to Raffles, 17 Jan. 1811, BL, Raffles Collection, Eur. Mss. E.105 135 Hayes was appointed Master Attendant at Fort William in 1809. Lee, Commodore, p. 223. 136 Minto to Raffles, 11 March 1811, BL, Raffles Collection, Eur. Mss. C.34. 137 Lord Minto, quoted in Wurtzburg, Raffles, p. 157. 138 James, William, The Naval History of Great Britain from the declaration of war by France in 1793 to the accession of George IV (6 vols, London: Bentley, 1878), vol. 6, p. 33. 139 James and Boulger give the figure for the total fleet as “nearly one hundred”, but this included captured Dutch vessels. James, The Naval History, vol. 6, p. 33; Boulger, The Life of, p. 125. Sophia Raffles says

140 British Traders in the East Indies The “transports” would have been made up of East Indiamen and any number of country traders.140 Following the successful invasion, during the period of the British administration on Java between 1811 and 1816, use was made of country traders on many occasions and for more than simply conveying supplies. When Raffles employed Grieg to investigate the Karamata Passage, Grieg was “assisted by Captain Burn who (had) long been a resident at Pontiana and is understood to have once brought a fleet without difficulty through the passage”.141 We have already noted Burn’s influence on events in the Malay court of Pontianak. Raffles, who would have known Burn in Penang,142 was, during the course of the next few years, not only to seek Burn’s assistance with the route to Java, but perhaps more significantly, he was to make use of Burn’s extensive knowledge of Borneo to formulate his long-term plans for a British port in the Malay Archipelago. Thus, while a number of country traders simply acted as envoys for Raffles in his communications with the native states, Burn went further and provided Raffles with detailed reports on the history and contemporary situation in respect of the states of Borneo. Raffles used Burn’s information in his dispatches to Minto.143 Bastin has written that “Raffles was always a person who was easily influenced, and the fact that he was deluged with a mass of information regarding Borneo from J. Burn at Pontianak, and Alexander Hare, who had trading contacts with Banjermasin, must have resolved him in any course

the fleet was “upwards of ninety sail”: Raffles, Sophia, Lady, Memoir of the Life and Public Services of Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, F.R.S … (London: John Murray, 1830), p. 87. 140 For more on the use of country traders as transports by the EIC, see Bulley, Free Mariner, pp. 185–92, “The Country Ships as Transports, 1809–1810”. 141 Raffles to Minto, 22 May 1811, BL, Raffles Collection Eur. Mss. C.34. 142 Smith, F. Andrew, ‘Captain Burn and Associates: British Intelligence-gathering, Trade, and Litigation in Borneo and Beyond during the Early Nineteenth Century’, Borneo Research Bulletin, 35 (2004), 48–69, at p. 55. 143 Bastin, ‘Raffles’, p. 93, footnote 60.

Inadvertent imperialists 141 he had already decided before he left Malacca”.144 In May 1813 Burn was appointed as a Company servant to Kupang, but did not survive long and died there, probably within two years.145 Smith believes Burn’s information was included in the 1000 pages of Raffles’ “former history, present state, population and resources” of Borneo that was lost in the fire on the Fame.146 Much of Burn’s information was used by John Leyden when he wrote his Sketch of Borneo for Raffles while their ship was sailing between Malacca and Batavia.147 After Leyden’s death on Java, Raffles, obviously impressed with the contents of the report, himself presented Leyden’s paper at a meeting of the Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen (Batavian Society of Arts and Sciences) on 24 April 1813.148 Raffles, as he developed and modified his policy regarding the extension of British influence in Southeast Asia during his Governorship of Java also made use of the information from one, John Hunt, whose 1812 report made a great impression on him.149 Hunt was born in India and was most likely involved in the country trade, for he was supercargo on the Harrier when the vessel was wrecked on the north coast of Borneo in 1810.150 He became Commercial Agent at Pontianak in 1813.151 His report to

144 Bastin,

‘Raffles’, p. 93. ‘Captain Burn’, p. 62. 146 Ibid., p. 65. 147 Leyden, John, ‘Sketch of Borneo’, in J. H. Moor, Notices of the Indian Archipelago and Adjacent Countries (Singapore: no publisher, 1837; repr. London: Frank Cass, 1968), Appendix, pp. 93–109; Smith, ‘Captain Burn’, p. 48. 148 Smith, ‘Captain Burn’, p. 50. 149 Hunt, J. ‘Sketch of Borneo or Pulo Kalamantan, communicated by J. Hunt, Esq., to the Honorable Sir. T. S. Raffles, late Lieut. Governor of Java’, in J. H. Moor, Notices of the Indian Archipelago and Adjacent Countries (Singapore: no publisher, 1837; repr. London: Frank Cass, 1968), Appendix, pp. 12–30; Bastin, ‘Raffles’, p. 93. 150 Smith, F. Andrew, ‘An “Arch-villain” to be Rehabilitated? Mixed Perceptions of Pangeran Anom of Sambas in the Early Nineteenth Century; with an Appendix on John Hunt’, Borneo Research Bulletin, 38 (2007), 101–17, at p. 109. 151 de Haan, F., ‘Personalia der periode van het Engelsch bestuur over Java 1811–1816’, BKI, 92:4 (1935), 477–681, at p. 585. 145 Smith,

142 British Traders in the East Indies Raffles contains more information about northern Borneo than does Burn’s and may have been written as early as 1812.152 Raffles used Hunt’s report to develop his policy for a base in the archipelago, as well as his policy towards Sambas piracy. On the former policy, Raffles emphasized a trading post, rather than a fully-fledged colony, wanting to restrict trade to Banjermasin, Pontianak and Brunei to increase “British Authority” in the region. But his intention at this stage for the Western part of the archipelago was “without any view whatever to an increase of territorial possessions or infringements on the just rights of the dependent Native States”.153 As part of this policy he appointed another country trader, his friend, Alexander Hare, as British Agent.154 Hare had been a country trader at Malacca since at least 1801 and though considered somewhat “eccentric”,155 spoke Malay and was knowledgeable about the archipelago. Raffles admired him as “a gentleman whose desire after useful knowledge and whose zealous exertions in the cause he has undertaken, are perhaps unrivalled”.156 (Raffles’ close friendship to Hare is exemplified by the fact that it was to Hare that Raffles gave an account of his meeting with Napoleon on St. Helena.)157 Regarding the treaties with the native states, Raffles believed he was continuing to act in his former appointment as Political Agent to the Governor-General with the Malay States, not as the LieutenantGovernor of Java, in hope that these treaties would continue to stand even if Java was returned to the Dutch.158 Borneo was vital to this plan. He appointed Hare Resident at Banjermasin, where, Raffles hoped, the British would be able to establish a settlement to prosper as a British base after the return of the Dutch to Java.159 Here the former country trader was placed in a position of considerable power by Raffles not only as Resident 152 Smith,

‘An “Arch-villain”’, p. 110. 1813, quoted in Bastin, ‘Raffles’, pp. 98–9. 154 Bastin, ‘Raffles’, p. 96. For Hare, see de Haan, ‘Personalia’, pp. 562– 5. 155 Wurtzburg, Raffles, p. 185. 156 Quoted in de Haan, ‘Personalia’, p. 563. 157 Wurtzburg, Raffles, p. 404. 158 Bastin, ‘Raffles’, p. 105. 159 Bastin, ‘Raffles’, pp. 106–7. 153 September

Inadvertent imperialists 143 but as “Political Commissioner of Government for the native states of Borneo”.160 London rejected Raffles’ plans regarding Borneo specifically and, as Bastin has put it, “it remained for James Brooke to carry Raffles’s ideals into Borneo many years later”.161 As Raffles modified and circumscribed his plans for British authority in the Malay Archipelago after he came to accept that Java would be returned to the Dutch and he was losing confidence that any agreements he had entered into with Malay native states when he was Lieutenant-Governor of Java would be honoured by the British government, he still had hopes of retaining British trading influence in the region.162 By this time the plan was to be based on “a great commercial emporium”163 which would attract trade by undermining the Dutch monopolistic system. In November 1817, when Raffles was departing England to take up the long-promised governorship of Bencoolen, he penned a paper on “Our Interests in the Eastern Archipelago” for the head of the India Office, George Canning, in which he proposed the occupation by the British of a free-trade port at the southern end of the Malay peninsula.164 This place, he wrote, would be “for the protection of our commerce in the Eastern Archipelago against the power of the Dutch to exclude us from it, viz., our taking immediate possession of a port in the Eastern Archipelago, the best adapted for communication with the native princes; for a general knowledge of what is going on at sea, and on shore, throughout the Archipelago: for the resort of the independent trade, and the trade of our allies; for the protection of our commerce and all our interests, and more especially for an entrepôt for our merchandise”. By including the term “the independent trade” Raffles must have still envisaged a role for the country trader for much of Raffles’ so-called independent trade 160 de

Haan, ‘Personalia’, p. 565. ‘Raffles’, pp. 108, 119. 162 For a more favourable comparison of Raffles’ plans for an English base in the Archipelago to those of Robert Farquhar, see Webster, ‘British Expansion’, pp. 14–21. 163 Raffles to Addenbrooke, 10 June 1819, quoted in Boulger, The Life of, p. 309. 164 Quoted in Boulger, The Life of, pp. 268–73. 161 Bastin,

144 British Traders in the East Indies would be that undertaken by country traders. While the new port would also be of benefit to Britain as a staging post between India and China, significantly he wrote, “The commanders of the country ships look to me to protect their interests, and even to support the dignity of the British flag”.165 Raffles was incorrect in his opinion that the new port would benefit the English country traders, for, as we shall see in Chapter 5, Singapore was a contributing factor in the decline of the country trade. The story of the selection of Singapore is well known and much debated.166 Though the country traders were very much in the mind of Raffles when he was developing a plan that resulted in the establishment of Singapore, there is no evidence that by the time of the decisive 1819 cruise during which he founded the colony, country traders actually assisted Raffles’ in his decision to fix the precise location of his “entrepôt”. Two of the six vessels on the expedition, however, were country traders based in Calcutta; the Mercury (J. R. Beaumont) and the Indiana (James Pearl).167 They were hired to carry troops and stores. Raffles, when he was departing Singapore, wrote to William Farquhar whom he left in charge, that he was “entirely satisfied” with the conduct of the commander of the Mercury.168 Two small privately-owned ships from Penang were also part of the fleet.169 Nevertheless, there were previous references to Singapore involving country traders: from his reading of Malay history, Raffles was aware that Singapore had once before been a port of trade and he no doubt was also aware that the early country trader, Alexander Hamilton, had been offered the island as a present by the Sultan of Johore in 1703.170 Furthermore, Boulger suggests that it was from Captain Grieg (“Greigh”), as to Court of Directors, 14 April 1818, quoted in Boulger, The Life of, p. 268. 166 See, for example, Wright, Nadia H., William Farquhar and Singapore: Stepping out from Raffles’ Shadow (Penang: Entrepot, 2017). 167 Buckley, Charles Burton, An Anecdotal History of Old Times in Singapore … (2 vols. [Singapore: Fraser and Neave, 1902]; repr. Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1965), p. 27. 168 Buckley, An Anecdotal, p. 44. 169 See also Wurtzburg, Raffles, p. 481. 170 Hamilton, Alexander, A New Account of the East Indies (2 vols, London: Argonaut Press, 1930, orig. 1727), vol. 2, p. 52. 165 Raffles

Inadvertent imperialists 145 early as during the preparations for the invasion of Java, that the suggestion of Singapore might have come.171 Raffles felt sure that the free mariners would support his selection of the site with its protected harbour: “you have only to ask any India captain his opinion of the importance of this station, even without the harbour which has been discovered”, he wrote in a letter to Charles Assey soon after establishing Singapore in January 1819.172

Country traders in British colonial society For all of his reliance on country traders, together with his strong advocacy of the principle of free trade, Raffles had reservations about his fellow countrymen in respect of their overall behaviour and their role as intermediaries with the Malays. In his long 1817 paper on “Our Interests in the Eastern Archipelago” which set out the need for a free port, he explained that one of the advantages of such a base would be “the wholesome restraint it would impose upon the conduct of our own countrymen trading in the Archipelago”. He went on, “… the peaceable natives of the islands should not be kept at the mercy of every mercantile adventurer of our own nation. The inducements and facilities to rapine are too numerous in that quarter to be overlooked”.173 His critical comments about country traders are similar to Farquhar’s, noted above, when insisting that the country traders were “persons who were not covenanted” and that they were damaging the Company’s profits in the Moluccas. A year before, in 1816, when writing his History of Java, Raffles had expressed similar feelings. “It must be admitted”, he wrote, “that the line of conduct pursued by the English towards the Malayan nations, had by no means been of a conciliatory or prepossessing character. Our intercourse with them had been carried on almost exclusively through the medium of adventurers, little acquainted with either the country or people, who have been frequently more remarkable for boldness than princiThe Life of, p. 307. in Boulger, The Life of, p. 310. 173 Quoted in Boulger, The Life of, p. 273. 171 Boulger, 172 Quoted

146 British Traders in the East Indies ple”.174 It would appear that Raffles decided to include a hasty addendum in his History when, during the printing of the book, the assistance he had received from country traders must have come to mind. In a footnote he added, “This general remark is not intended to apply to the traders of Pinang (Prince of Wales’s Island), who are in general well-informed and most honourable in their dealings, possessing great experience in the trade, and acquaintance with the habits and character of the natives”.175 It was not only Raffles who had mixed opinions concerning country traders. Through the whole period under consideration, it is clear that country traders as a group had an ambivalent relationship with the officials of the East India Company and did not always fit in well with colonial society. Thomas Forrest, as noted above, was close to Governor-General Warren Hastings and served the Company meritoriously, on both open and secret missions, but had a difficult relationship with officialdom. For his knowledge of the Archipelago he was welcomed by the Directors on a trip to London and he was so well-known in society that he was the one who introduced William Marsden to Sir Joseph Banks and other members of the Royal Society. But as Bassett has said, Forrest was in the final analysis, “a working seaman and not a man of considerable independent means”.176 Respected for his skills as a mariner and on account of his depth of knowledge of the region, his free-wheeling and independent actions placed him somewhat outside mainstream colonial society as witnessed by his dispute with the Bencoolen Council. Country traders were by no means a uniform group. There were those that were closer to the Company and more highly regarded in colonial society. Thomas Sadler, at the time of his death, was respected and considered to have had a bright future as a country captain by others in the country trade. The Supreme Court in Calcutta approved the administration of Sadler’s estate and his executor placed notices in the Calcutta Gazette, confirming his standing in Bengal. The death of Captain Walter Dawes, who died in the Malay Archipelago on a voyage to China, as we shall see in Chapter 4, was likewise lamented in the Calcutta press. He 174 Raffles,

The History of Java, vol. 1, p. 231.

176 Bassett,

British Trade, p. 38.

175 Ibid.

Inadvertent imperialists 147 was listed in the Calcutta East-India Register as Managing Owner and Commander of his vessel.177 John Hayes, was a high-ranking member of the Bombay Marine. John Adolphus Pope, the young 3rd Officer on the Princess Royal between 1786 and 1788 was close to and an admirer of Sir William Jones.178 He progressed upwards in the country trade, became a ship’s captain and ended life as a successful and respected businessman in Bombay, maintaining his intellectual interest in Oriental culture.179 However, even those country traders who later joined the Company service were not necessarily fully accepted into colonial society or without criticism. Francis Light was criticized by his immediate successors as Superintendent of Penang because, with some justification, his policies and actions were preferential to his business partner, James Scott. Light always remained as much country trader as Company servant.180 Francis Lynch was not appointed to a more senior position in the Moluccas probably because of his origin of birth, his case exposing the incipient racism and prejudice among some Company servants. Low social status, unacceptable personal behaviour and a different interpretation of the law were also factors which alienated country traders from members of official society. John Hunt was born in India and suffered prejudice like Lynch. Macdonald said he was “a half-caste gentleman, [and] had spent some years in the Malay trade”.181 Even Marsden, while admitting to the value of Bowrey’s dictionary, called it the work of “an illiterate person”, simply because Bowrey appears not to have known written Malay.182 As for Joseph Burn, one reason he resided for as long Mathison, John and Alexander Way Mason, An East-India Register and Directory for 1804: corrected to the 1st January, 1804, containing Complete Lists of the Company’s Servants, Civil, Military, and Marine, At the different Presidencies in the East-Indies: With Indexes to the same, and Lists of Casualities during the last Year, together with Lists of the Europeans, Mariners, etc. Not in the Service of the East-India Company, and Merchant Vessels employed in the country trade (London: Printed by Cox, Son and Baylis, 1804), p. 98. 178 Bulley, Free Mariner, pp. 49–51. 179 Bulley, Free Mariner, pp. 193–217. 180 See Webster, “British Expansion’, pp. 6, 23. 181 Smith, ‘“Arch-villain”’, p. 10. 182 Marsden, William, A Grammar of the Malayan Language with an Introduction and Praxis (London: Cox and Baylis, 1812), p. xl. 177

148 British Traders in the East Indies as he did in Pontianak may have been because he was out of favour among the English community in Penang where he had been on trial.183 Several Naval officers appear to have borne a particular bias against country traders, particularly against certain individuals. Captain Macdonald of the Indian Navy was most disparaging of country traders in general and Thomas Sadler in particular.184 Writing in his memoirs, Macdonald said of one of his crew, unnamed, who had been in the Indian Navy prior to becoming a country trader, that he was, “a drunken and troublesome fellow who had been more than once punished and at last run: I mention him as a sample of the class of Europeans employed by some of the inferior merchants engaged in that trade”. He went on to say that, “At that time, to practise deceit upon the unsuspecting natives was not deemed a dishonour among European traders”. An anonymous member of the Company’s Council at Canton who may have been a supercargo on one of the Company’s China ships, advocated during the early 1780s that the Company dispense altogether with the services of country traders.185 Hare and Scott were definitely considered eccentric, though valued for their local knowledge. One practical area in which it was acknowledged the country traders contributed to British expansion was that of chart making. A number of references have already been made for example, to original charts drawn up and made available to the public by Forrest and Grieg. James Horsburgh was one country trader who went on to provide, with Alexandre Dalrymple, the most valuable contribution to the charting of the seas of the Malay Archipelago. He spent 21 years in the country trade during which time he accumulated a vast amount of information about the ports, coasts and seas. On returning to London he published this accumulated data in works which went into numerous editions. For his navigational achievements, he was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society and later succeeded Dalrymple as hydrographer 183 Smith,

‘Captain Burn’, pp. 50–6. D., A Narrative of the Early Life and Services of Captn. D. Macdonald, extracted from his Journal and other Official Documents (Weymouth: Benson and Barling, 1835), pp. 103, 116. See also Chapter 2. 185 Bassett, British Trade, p. 62. 184 Macdonald,

Inadvertent imperialists 149 to the EIC. Horsburgh acknowledged the contribution of many other country traders in his “Directions”.186 Robert Laurie, another well-known engraver and publisher, included information derived from country traders in his sailing directions in the Malay Archipelago.187 For example, he includes a note on one of his maps of the Bay of Bengal, that the Bale of Cotton Rock was “seen by Captn. Widgeon of the London (a country ship) in the month of April 1767”.188 One may conclude that there was a great diversity among country traders. Besides the differences between those who were respectable and those who gave the group a bad reputation, there was also a disparity between those who spent more time in Calcutta, Bombay or Madras and those who spent more time in the Archipelago. The former were chiefly employed in the country trade between India and China. They sailed through the Archipelago but were not intimately acquainted with Malay society. On the other hand, those who were based in the Malay Archipelago itself or spent longer periods in the area, while they may also have gone to Canton, were more acquainted with the complexities of the Malayan seas, the Malay language, customs and norms. A tentative conclusion might be that those in the former category were more at home in British colonial society while the latter group had a more problematic relationship with Company officials and European social circles. Operating within and between two different cultures, they may have been the ones more prone to bend the rules in both colonial and Malay society. Andrew S., ‘Horsburgh, James (1762–1836)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford: University Press, 2004), online edn, Jan 2008 [http://www.oxforddnb.com.rp.nla.gov.au/view/article/13810, accessed 3 June 2017]; Bulley, Anne, The Bombay Country Ships, 1790–1833 (Richmond: Curzon, 2000), pp. 212–14. 187 Laurie, Robert and James Whittle (eds), The Country Trade East India Pilot, for the Navigation of the East-Indies and Oriental Seas, within the limits of the East India Company, extending from the Cape of Good Hope to China, New Holland, and New Zealand, with the Red Sea, Gulf of Persia, Bay of Bengal and China Seas: chiefly composed from actual surveys and draughts communicated by experienced officers of the East-India Company, and from The Neptune Oriental by M.D’Apres de Mannevillette, neatly engraved on Ninety-Three plates, comprising eighty-seven charts (London: Printed and Published by Robert Laurie and James Whittle, 1799). 188 Laurie, The Country Trade East India Pilot, map number 28. 186 Cook,

150 British Traders in the East Indies In nearly all stages of British imperial advancement in the Malay world between 1770 and 1820, the British country traders played a critical role. The local knowledge they were able to impart, the native contacts they could provide, the military and maritime support they could render were essential components of the successful British advance. Despite the inferior social position the country traders occupied within British colonial society and the limited space their activities occupy within official records of the EIC, they were undoubtedly a cornerstone of British expansion and consolidation of power in the Malay Archipelago.

Four SMUGGLERS AND ENEMIES: COUNTRY TRADERS AND THE DUTCH

The British country traders were a growing problem for the Dutch trading network during the second half of the eighteenth century. Conversely, the Dutch presence was one of the many difficulties that the country traders had to contend with in the Malay Archipelago. The life of a British country trader operating in the Malay Archipelago in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was never easy.1 In addition to the usual perils of the sea and the extremely fluid local political situation, merchant mariners had to be cognizant of the current international alliances operating in Europe if their journeys were to end peacefully and profitably. In particular, whether Britain and The Netherlands were in a state of war, or at peace, was of critical importance. Captain Walter Dawes of the country trader Lucy Maria2 appears to have been unfortunate in that, in 1804, he was forced to call in at Dutch Ternate to seek assistance. It would appear that he was not well-informed either about the local political 1

For the difficulties and hardships faced by country traders, see, Smith, F. Andrew, ‘Daniel Smith’s Last Seven Years: Hardships in Country Trade in the East Indies in the Early Nineteenth Century’, Borneo Research Bulletin, 39 (2008), 1–15, at p. 8; Tagliacozzo, Eric, ‘A Necklace of Fins: Marine Goods Trading in Maritime Southeast Asia, 1780–1860’, International Journal of Asian Studies, 1:1 (2004), 23–48, at pp. 39–40. 2 The Lucy Maria is referred to as Lucia Maria in the Dutch records.

152 British Traders in the East Indies situation or of the fact that hostilities had broken out in Europe between the English and the Dutch. Events surrounding this individual voyage provide a singular example of the intricacies of the inter-relationship between Dutch, English and Indonesian politics in the Archipelago at a time when, as Anthony Webster has described it, there was “a complex overlay of European rivalry upon existing indigenous disputes and feuds”.3

Different concepts of free trade in the Malay Archipelago in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries The VOC was founded in 1602 and within a few years engaged Hugo Grotius, founder of international law, to argue its case for freedom of navigation and trade in the Malay Archipelago.4 “I shall base my argument on the following most specific and unimpeachable axiom of the Law of Nations, called a primary rule or first principle, the spirit of which is self-evident and immutable, to wit: Every nation is free to travel to every other nation, and to trade with it”, he wrote in his famous Mare Liberum.5 Grotius was involved in negotiations with England over fishing rights in the North Sea and trade in the East Indies in 1613 and 1615. But British and Dutch concepts of free trade differed markedly, and these differences were to prove a bone of contention in the Malay Archipelago for the next two centuries. Grotius’ theories gave the Dutch room to argue that where alliances existed with sovereign nations, exclusivity of trade and monopoly

3

Webster, A., ‘British Expansion in South-East Asia and the Role of Robert Farquhar, Lieutenant-Governor of Penang, 1804–5’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 23:1 (1995), 1–25, at p. 1. 4 Borschberg, Peter, Hugo Grotius, the Portuguese and Free Trade in the East Indies (Singapore: NUS Press, 2011), p. 3. 5 Grotius, Hugo, The Freedom of the Seas or the Right which belongs to the Dutch to take part in the East Indian Trade; a dissertation by Hugo Grotius, translated with a revision of the Latin text of 1633 by Ralph van Dieman Magoffin, edited with an introductory note by James Brown Scott (New York: Oxford University Press, 1916), p. 7.

Smugglers and enemies 153 rights could exist, whereas the British argued that all ports in the Malay Archipelago should be open to all countries.6 All attempts to find agreement between Britain and Holland to work together had collapsed by the time the Amboyna massacre took place in 1623.7 British officials never admitted to the right of the Dutch to exclude foreign navigation from the Archipelago, and as for the British country traders, they continually denied it existed at all.8 The VOC endeavoured to maintain a monopoly in the trade of cloves, nutmeg, mace (and cinnamon in Ceylon), in the seventeenth century and very much succeeded in doing so. They would have liked to do the same with pepper, but its cultivation was not restricted to a few islands in the eastern the part of the archipelago, and the attempted monopoly was unsuccessful. The early elimination of the British from the spice trade meant the rivalry was “transferred to other fields”.9 The competition between the European nations placed the Malay states in an invidious position, which they occasionally tried to exploit, but which, on numerous occasions, disadvantaged them greatly. Raffles expounded on the disconnect between the Dutch and British over access to the products of the Malays in a report to Lord Minto: “As the connexion of the English with the Malay states has always been the subject of the greatest anxiety and jealousy to the Dutch, it may be suspected that they have not given to the Malays and the Javanese a more favourable idea of the English than they have given the English of the Malays”.10 The principles regarding trading practices that were implemented by the Governor-General and Council at Batavia from the year 1650 were set out in the “General Instructions” compiled Hugo Grotius, p. 69. Hugo Grotius, pp. 30–1. 8 Tarling, Nicholas, ‘The Relationship between British Policies and the Extent of Dutch Power in the Malay Archipelago 1784–1871’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 4:2 (1958), 179–92, at p. 179. 9 Meilink Roelofsz, M. A. P., Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago between 1500 and about 1630 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), p. 205. 10 May 1811, Malacca, quoted in Raffles, Sophia, Lady, Memoir of the Life and Public Services of Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, F.R.S … (London: John Murray, 1830), p. 38. 6 Borschberg, 7 Borschberg,

154 British Traders in the East Indies by the Board of Directors of the VOC, the Heeren XVII. These orders remained in force until the end of the Company’s rule in 1799,11 and probably were still in application in 1804. The Instructions explained that there were three different categories of territory with which the VOC had to deal. Firstly, areas it had conquered and controlled by mid-seventeenth century (Batavia (Jakarta), Malacca, Makassar, parts of Java). Secondly, areas where the VOC enjoyed exclusive trading rights negotiated though monopoly contracts with rulers (Ternate, Amboyna). Thirdly, areas where the VOC traded with other rulers through freely negotiated agreements, in competition with merchants from other nations. Only in these last areas, where the local people already had their own laws, were these local laws to be respected and trade was to be conducted according to local principles. However, the spice monopoly should, if necessary, be maintained by force of arms everywhere. Interlopers were described by the Dutch as pirates, smugglers and enemies.12 The British were increasingly prevented from trading in the archipelago during the seventeenth century: after being debarred from Amboyna following the “massacre”, in the middle of the century they were excluded from places like Makassar, Banjermasin and Jambi, and finally, in 1682, from Banten. The Dutch were most successful in their rivalry with the British between 1601 and 1684.13 Britain established the fort at Bencoolen in 1685, finally conceding, “that the pursuit of trade in the East Indies was impossible without corresponding territorial commitments”.14 Britain’s main intention was to prevent the Dutch Boxer, C. R., The Dutch Seaborne Empire 1600–1800 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1965), pp. 103–5. 12 See, for example, the official Dutch correspondence quoted in Haga, A., Nederlandsch Nieuw Guinea en de Papoesche Eilanden: historische bijdrage, 1500–1883 (2 vols, Batavia: Bruining, 1884), vol. 1, p. 378 and Vos, Reinout, Gentle Janus, Merchant Prince: The VOC and the Tightrope of Diplomacy in the Malay World, 1740–1800 (Leiden: KITLV, 1993), p. 126. 13 Gaastra, Femme S., ‘War, Competition and Collaboration: Relations between the English and Dutch East India Company in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries’, in H. V. Bowen, et al. (eds), Worlds of the East India Company (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2002), pp. 49–68, at p. 49. 14 Bassett, D. K., The Factory of the English East India Company at Bantam 11

Smugglers and enemies 155 gaining a complete monopoly over pepper as they had done with the rarer spices.15 From Bencoolen and from their Indian ports, British vessels were permitted to trade through the Dutch ports of Malacca and Batavia – indeed encouraged to do so because of the port dues which enriched the Dutch coffers – but not through the local principalities with which the Dutch had agreements. These agreements usually included a clause excluding other foreign merchants.16 These various treaties, according to Resink, “brings us the image of a Company with vast authority at sea and much more restricted authority over a scattering of strongholds and settlements in port towns and coast areas plus some hinterland”.17 Viewed from a British perspective, the local principalities with which the Dutch had treaties were “genuine patrimonial states” and, as the treaties themselves recognized the sovereignty of the native rulers, the British were also entitled to trade with them. During the course of the 200-year existence of the VOC, serious attempts were made by knowledgeable people within the organization to change the monopolistic principles adhered to by the Heeren XVII, as they believed they were not in the longterm interest of the Company.18 These attempts failed, one of the chief arguments against change being that having invested so much in establishing its power in Asia in comparison with other European nations, the Dutch had a right to a privileged position in the trade of the area. As a consequence, the continuation of the monopoly meant that clandestine trade by other European powers, as well as “smuggling” by Asian traders, continued in many areas. In practice, a significant factor which impacted on whether there was strict adherence to the guidelines set out for Dutch administrators to follow was the interpretation by the local offi1602–1682, ed. and introduced by Dianne Lewis (Pulau Pinang: Penerbit Universiti Sains Malaysia, 2010), p. 219. 15 Ibid., p. 218. 16 Boxer, The Dutch Seaborne, p. 115. 17 Resink, G. J., Indonesia’s History between the Myths: Essays in Legal History and Historical Theory (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1968), pp. 98, 155. 18 Arasaratnam, S., ‘Monopoly and Free Trade in Dutch-Asian Commercial Policy. Debate and Controversy with the VOC’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 4:1 (1973), 1–15, at pp. 1–5.

156 British Traders in the East Indies cial at the “periphery”. Governors and other VOC officials on the spot sometimes found it necessary to act outside the principles set down by the Heeren XVII.19 In the case of Captain Dawes, it shall be shown that the role and personality of the local Dutch administrator was indeed a vital factor in Dawes’ bad luck story. Numerous other examples exist during the two centuries of trading rivalry of the individual interpretation that a local Dutch administrator could make in respect to a visit by a foreign vessel. For instance, in 1744 the Dutch Resident of the port of Semarang seized Captain Hughes of the Neptune, accusing him of selling 150 chests of opium.20 The Neptune had to sail away leaving its captain behind. After Hughes was tried and found not guilty by the Dutch in Batavia – he claimed he was only restocking stores and obtaining water – he was released in 1745. Similarly, in 1766/7, Captain Netherton of the Tartar had a bad experience when the Dutch Resident at Rembang arrested Netherton’s officer in charge of a landing party, together with the boat’s crew. They were accused of smuggling. On this occasion, the Dutch refused to pay compensation for the loss of the voyage.21 There are also numerous examples of local Dutch officials and private residents, providing assistance to British country traders and mariners who found themselves in difficult situations. The local Dutch resident on Salayer, Bekkisbaker, in 1762 escorted Thomas Forrest to Makassar after Forrest’s vessel the Bonetta was wrecked on a shoal near Salayer.22 Forrest eventually reached Bencoolen via Batavia. Daniel Smith was also treated well by the Dutch during the period of Daendels’ administration, after his ship was captured and he was forced to spent six months

The Dutch Seaborne, p. 107; Gaastra, ‘War, Competition and Collaboration’, p. 56. 20 Reber, Anne Lindsey, ‘The Private Trade of the British in West Sumatra, 1735–1770’ (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Hull, 1977), pp. 106–10. 21 Ibid., p. 68. 22 Bassett, D. K., British Trade and Policy in Indonesia and Malaysia in the Late Eighteenth Century (Zug: Inter Documentation Company, 1971), p. 33, quoting from Forrest, Thomas, A Voyage from Calcutta to the Mergui Archipelago (London: Sold by J. Robson and Balfour, Edinburgh, 1792), pp. 72–3, 78, footnote. 19 Boxer,

Smugglers and enemies 157 on Java.23 In an article Barbara Andaya discusses the sharing of knowledge about trade between the country traders and local Dutchmen.24 In the first half of the eighteenth century, Dutch maritime power world-wide, though still impressive, declined, especially in comparison to that of Britain. Its naval power waned and its trading vessels were generally less efficient and technically not as advanced as those of the British.25 In the Malay world this coincided with the VOC’s wars in Java. By the middle of the century, the British country traders were taking advantage of the increased opportunities. The subsequent decline in Dutch trade was further exacerbated by the very “oppressive commercial monopoly which the VOC strove to maintain in the seas which it claimed to control”.26 Nevertheless, in the 1780s the Dutch still had a network of “establishments” which stretched across the archipelago from West Sumatra to Banda.27 This comprised twelve substantial ports, including Batavia, Amboyna, Malacca, Padang, Ternate, Macassar and Banda. These often included a fort, such as Fort Victoria at Amboyna, Fort Orange at Ternate and Fort Rotterdam at Makassar, where a military force of several hundred personnel 23

Smith, ‘Daniel Smith’s’, p. 2. Even British naval vessels might be welcomed hospitably by local Dutch Residents. In September 1770, James Cook in the Endeavour was able to replenish on Sawu and in 1789 William Bligh received very considerate and helpful treatment at Kupang. Banks, Joseph, The Endeavour Journal of Joseph Banks, 1768–1771, ed. J. C. Beaglehole (Sydney: State Library of New South Wales, 1962), pp. 151–77; Bligh, William, A Voyage to the South Sea, undertaken by Command of His Majesty for the Purpose of Conveying the Bread-fruit Tree to the West Indies, in His Majesty’s Ship the Bounty … Including an Account of the Mutiny on Board the Said Ship … ([London: George Nicol, 1792]; repr. Adelaide: Libraries Board of South Australia, 1969), pp. 227–35. 24 Andaya, B. W., ‘Gathering ‘Knowledge’ in the Bay of Bengal: The Letters of John Adolphus Pope 1785–1788’, JMBRAS, 87:2 (2014), 1–19, at pp. 8–9. 25 Boxer, The Dutch Seaborne, p. 120. 26 Boxer, The Dutch Seaborne, pp. 117–18, 122; Hall, D. G. E., A History of South-East Asia (London: Macmillan, 1955), p. 271. 27 Huysers, Ary, Beknopte Beschryving der Oostindische Establissementen (Utrecht: Abraham van Paddenburg, 1789).

Figure 7: View of Ternate with ships, in about 1860. (A lithograph by C. W. Mieling, from S. A. Buddingh, Reizen over Java (1859–61)).

Smugglers and enemies 159 could be quartered. In addition, there were further minor Dutch coastal establishments, most numerous along the north coast of Java and the west coast of Sumatra, but also including posts on Borneo, such as those at Banjermasin and Sukadana. This long-established commercial and administrative infrastructure still provided obstacles to the country traders’ ability to sail and trade freely in the Archipelago. Following the British conquest of Dutch-controlled Nagapatnam in India during the fourth Anglo-Dutch war of 1780–4, Dutch authority in the Eastern Seas weakened further. In Article 6 of the Peace of Paris (Versailles, 20 May 1784), the Dutch were forced to concede the right of the British to navigate through the Archipelago without obstruction.28 The British insisted on this because of the need to protect their increased volume of shipping to Canton, which had to sail through the Archipelago. But the issue of whether the British could trade in the Eastern Seas remained an “intractable” one.29 The British diplomats in Europe were willing to guarantee the Dutch monopoly in spices in order to bolster the anti-French party in the United Provinces. In the region itself however, the difficulty for the Dutch to maintain control of the monopoly was exacerbated, as the Dutch trade between India and the Malay Archipelago declined and the British private trade continued to increase.30 In the 1780s, as the British country trade (and the Chinese junk trade) flourished with the expansion of the China tea market, the Dutch made a determined bid to reinforce many of their agreements with Malay principalities and, despite the general decline of the VOC and the weakening of their position, they enjoyed military successes in Riau and Selangor.31 Thus, when the Malay Archipelago assumed a crucial strategic, as well as trading significance for Britain because of the China trade,32 History of, p. 280. Tarling, “The Relationship between”, p. 184. 30 Arasaratnam, Sinnappah, ‘Dutch Commercial Policy and Interests in the Malay Peninsula, 1750–1795’, in Blair B. Kling and M. N. Pearson (eds), The Age of Partnership: Europeans in Asia before Dominion (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1979), pp. 159–89, at p. 162. 31 Ibid., pp. 178–9. 32 Tarling, ‘The Relationship between’, p. 180; Webster, A., ‘British Export Interests in Bengal and Imperial Expansion into South-east 28 Hall, 29

160 British Traders in the East Indies tensions between the two European nations intensified. Finally, as a strategic move against France in the Revolutionary War of 1792–1802, Britain captured Dutch Malacca in 1795 and Amboyna and Banda in 1796. The competitive tin trade in the Archipelago was one particular commercial area in which the Dutch lost ground. In the rivalry to supply the Canton market (in exchange for tea) much of the trade was taken over by the British country traders and by the 1790s, the British were shipping more than twice the amount of tin to China as the Dutch; a few years previously the Dutch had shipped more than all other nations put together.33 In the increasingly important products of opium and firearms also, the British, through country traders, had a virtual monopoly.34 It has been said that the country traders robbed the VOC of so much of its commercial revenues that they were (partly) responsible for its downfall in 1799.35 It was against this background of two centuries of complex trading rivalry, at a time when the Dutch had experienced a maritime decline and their trade was increasingly under pressure, that in 1804 the English country trader Lucy Maria sailed into the Dutch-held port of Ternate.36

33

34

35

36

Asia, 1780–1824: The Origins of the Straits Settlements’, in B. Ingham and C. Simmons (eds), Development Studies and Colonial Policy (London: Frank Cass 1987), pp. 138–74, at p. 150. See also Lewis, Dianne N., ‘British Policy in the Straits of Malacca to 1819 and the Collapse of the Traditional Malay State Structure’, in Brook Barrington (ed.), Empires, Imperialism and Southeast Asia: Essays in Honour of Nicholas Tarling (Clayton: Monash Asia Institute, 1997), pp. 17–33. Arasaratnam, ‘Monopoly and Free Trade’, p. 13. Reid, Anthony, A History of Southeast Asia: Critical Crossroads (Chichester: Wiley Blackwell, 2015), p. 201; Arasaratnam, ‘Dutch Commercial Policy’, pp. 162–3. Jacobs, Els M., Merchant in Asia: The Trade of the Dutch East India Company during the Eighteenth Century (Leiden: CNWS Publications, 2006), p. 286. The rivalry continued for another twenty years until largely resolved diplomatically under the Anglo-Dutch treaty concluded in London in 1824 that recognized two separate spheres of influence.

Smugglers and enemies 161

The Anglo-Indian ship The Lucy Maria as a 750-ton three-masted ship, built in Calcutta in 1801, was one of the country traders that sailed through rather than traded in the Archipelago. She departed Bengal on 1 November 1803, on a permit to sail to Canton dated Calcutta, 25 October 1803,37 one of 26 country ships that sailed to China that season.38 Her captain, Walter Dawes, was both the “Managing Owner” and Commander of the vessel,39 a “worthy” person who enjoyed a position of some status in Calcutta as indicated by his listing in the East India Company’s register and directory. On its way to China the ship had sailed to the east of Halmahera and was in the vicinity of Morotai. Because many of his crew were sick or had died, Dawes decided to turn back to the settlement of Ternate, which, along with Amboyna and Banda, had been returned to the Dutch in 1803.40 The Lucy Maria anchored off Ternate on 31 January 1804. Wieling, Carel Lodewijk, Memorie van den Staat waar in zig de Provintie Amboina bewind op den 30e April, 1804, overgegeven door den afgaand Gezagwoordenen GeEligeerd Ternaats Gezaghebber Carel Lodewijk Wieling, aan den Wel Edele Gesteenger Heer Willem Jacob Cranssen, aankomend Gouverneur en Directeur in het Gouvernement Amboyna en verressorten, National Archives, The Hague (hereafter NA), Van Alphen Collection, Aanwinsten 1900: XXII, President der Commissie tot Overname der Molukken in 1817–1818, no. 305; Mathison, John and Alexander Way Mason, An East-India Register and Directory for 1804: corrected to the 1st January, 1804, containing Complete Lists of the Company’s Servants, Civil, Military, and Marine, At the different Presidencies in the East-Indies: With Indexes to the same, and Lists of Casualties during the last Year, together with Lists of the Europeans, Mariners, etc. Not in the Service of the East-India Company, and Merchant Vessels employed in the country trade (London: Printed by Cox, Son and Baylis, 1804), p. 98. Details of the voyage are from Wieling’s report and the enclosures sent with it. Wieling gives the weight of the ship as 770 tons. 38 Sutton, Jean, The East India Company’s Maritime Service 1746–1834; Masters of the Eastern Seas (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2010), p. 210. 39 ‘List of Merchant Vessels belonging to the Port of Calcutta’ in Mathison, An East-India Register (1804), p. 98. 40 The route through Eastern Indonesia was used increasingly from the 1770s during the Northeast monsoon, at which time of the year it was difficult to sail through the Malacca Straits and the South China Sea. It was known as the “Eastern Passage” or “Pitt’s Passage” after 37

162 British Traders in the East Indies The roll-call at departure from Calcutta had been 110 men; the composition of the crew was typical of many country traders, being made up of English officers, with ratings a mixture of other nationalities, including 32 Moors,41 17 Portuguese, 8 Malays, 2 Arabs and 1 Chinese. Twenty-six crew members had died by the time the ship arrived at Ternate. By April the numbers were reduced to 71. Of the 39 missing crew members at that time, most had died, though a number had jumped ship. The rate of death of approximately 35% or more is most abnormal. Figures for other country traders are not available, but mortality rates on Dutch East Indiamen at that time were less than 10%, on some voyages as low as 2% (at a time when the death rate on shore was 4%). On the Swedish East India Company ships the average was 12.56%, on the Danish Company ships between 7 and 9%, and on the Ostend Company vessels between 7.6 and 8.3%.42 From the violence of the epidemic, the disease that swept through the Lucy Maria is most likely to have been typhus, or “ships fever”. It could appear suddenly, was unpredictable, and virtually untreatable. The main European centres in the Moluccas, Amboyna, Ternate and Banda, that, as mentioned, had been occupied by Britain in 1796, were returned to the Dutch in the year before the Lucy Maria arrived. The Dutch Administrator of Ternate in 1804, Carel Lodewijk Wieling, thought at first the ship was an English frigate when he saw it flying the British ensign. He had received advice that a British expedition out of Malacca was to be sent to attack Amboyna again and imagined it to be part of that fleet. As the vessel arrived at night, he sent a boat to investigate under cover of darkness and discovered that it was its discovery by Captain Wilson in the Pitt in 1758–9. Morse, H. B., The Chronicles of the East India Company trading to China 1635–1834 (5 vols, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926–9), vol. 5, p. 74. 41 Indian Muslims. 42 Koninckx, C., “The Swedish East India Company (1731–1807)”, in Jaap R. Bruijn and Femme S. Gaastra (eds), Ships, Sailors and Spices: East India Companies and Their Shipping in the 16th, 17th and 18th Centuries (Amsterdam: NEHA, 1993), pp. 121–38, at p. 134.

Smugglers and enemies 163 not a frigate, but a trading vessel. English and Malay could be heard coming from on board. A flag requesting assistance had been raised on the topmast. Wieling, still suspicious, ordered the Lucy Maria to anchor within range of the guns of Fort Orange at Ternate and sent an officer on board to request details of the ship and to find out its purpose. Having ascertained that it was a trading vessel headed for China with a cargo of cotton and rice,43 he sought to ensure that no smuggling of goods would take place and no communication would be entered into with the residents of Ternate, except Dutch officials in the Fort. Wieling’s suspicions thawed sufficiently to allow an agreement that the sick crew members be taken to hospital, the cost to be paid for by the sale of cargo. Nevertheless, as Wieling had been ordered to embargo all British ships, the Lucy Maria’s sails were taken off to prevent her sailing away. Wieling had also wanted to dismantle the ship’s rudder, but as it was under bales of cotton in the hold and stretched two feet into the water, its removal was not possible. The stalemate continued through February, March and until 7 April when Wieling received further instructions from Amboyna on what action to take.

Background to the war in Europe and local tensions Captain Dawes had the misfortune of arriving at Ternate just at a time when war in Europe between the Dutch and the English was renewed. The peace which followed the signing of the Treaty of Amiens in March 1802 and which was intended to lead to the restoration of most of the Dutch possessions did not last long. Britain saw the Treaty as a way of protecting her security, and 43

It is highly likely that the cargo also consisted of opium, officially an illegal import into China, and as a consequence, carried on country ships rather than East Indiamen. Tagliacozzo, Eric, ‘Coasting to Canton: Junks, Country Traders, and the Southeast Asian “Exotica Trade”’, in Geoffrey B. Hainsworth (ed.), Globalization and the Asian Economic Crisis: Indigenous Responses, Coping Strategies, and Governance Reform in Southeast Asia (Vancouver: Centre for Southeast Asia Research, Institute of Asian Research, University of British Columbia, 1999), pp. 39–58, at p. 41. Opium was often not listed in the ship’s manifest.

164 British Traders in the East Indies understood that this would involve French evacuation from, and the neutrality of, The Netherlands.44 But the number of French troops in the “Batavian Republic” (established in 1795) increased during the early part of 1803 and France entrenched its position in the country.45 As The Netherlands was unable to remain neutral in the war between France and Britain, there was a growing feeling that war would be renewed and Britain finally declared war on the Batavian Republic in June 1803.46 In August of that year, news of the restoration of hostilities was received by the British in Malacca, via India.47 The Dutch in Batavia learned of the deteriorating situation the following month, and the Dutch outposts in the Moluccas in December.48 One might have expected therefore, that Dawes too would have heard in Calcutta of the outbreak of war before he departed in November 1803. If he did know by the time he was sailing through the Moluccas he must have been so desperate that he gambled on the Dutch authorities being sympathetic to a merchant vessel, despite it flying the British flag. The feelings of alarm and insecurity that would have existed in both Dutch and British settlements in the Malay Archipelago during this time of war would have been exacerbated by the existence of French and British naval fleets cruising the Bay of Bengal. The French fleet was under the command of Rear Admiral Linois, and it attacked the

Schama, Simon, Patriots and Liberators: Revolution in the Netherlands 1780–1813 (Oxford: Alfred A. Knopf, 1977), p. 139. 45 Ibid., pp. 440, 442. 46 Tarling, Nicholas, Anglo-Dutch Rivalry in the Malay World 1780–1824 (Sydney: Cambridge University Press / University of Queensland Press, 1962), p. 65. 47 Farquhar to Bengal, 29 August 1803, British Library, Oriental and India Office Collections, Madras Public Consultations (hereafter BL, OIOC, MPC), 16 December 1803. 48 Haga, Nederlandsch Nieuw, vol.1, p. 421. The “official” news of a formal state of war existing between the English and the Batavian Republic did not arrive at Ternate until 5 April 1804: Wieling, Memorie van den Staat. 44

Smugglers and enemies 165 English settlement of Bencoolen on 2 December 1803.49 For his part, Admiral Peter Rainier, Commander-in-Chief of the English East Indies fleet (and the English commander who had previously captured Amboyna and Banda in 1796) had ordered Captain Bathurst to take several vessels to the area of the Straits of Malacca to protect the EIC East Indiamen, as well as the country ships, sailing on the route between India and China.50 Early in 1804 a major encounter, known as the Battle of Pulo Auro (Pulau Aur), between the French Navy and the English East India China fleet returning from Canton took place in the South China Sea as the EIC ships approached the Straits of Malacca. The lead up to this battle commenced in January 1804, when Dawes was sailing to Ternate. There had been considerable discussion in Canton during that month amongst the captains of the China fleet as to which return route would provide the safest passage from the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean as, with the outbreak of war, they knew French naval vessels could be waiting to attack them.51 In the end, the China fleet decided to sail through the Malacca Straits rather than one of the straits further east. When it did take this route and encountered the French squadron, far from being disrupted and damaged by the engagement, the China fleet recorded a unique and much-celebrated “victory” over Linois on 16 February 1804. Though the fleet was not escorted by naval vessels, several of the large East Indiamen posed as British man-of-war.52 There were at least eight country traders in the fleet.53 Further evidence of the heightened state of hostilities that existed can be found in the recurring accounts in the Calcutta Parkinson, C. Northcote, War in the Eastern Seas, 1793–1815 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1954), p. 210. 50 Ibid., p. 206. 51 Sutton, The East India Company’s Maritime, p. 213. 52 Ibid., p. 217 and Parkinson, War in the Eastern Seas, p. 224. Captain Dance, the commodore of the China fleet, was regaled as a hero on arrival in London. 53 Sutton, The East India Company’s Maritime, p. 222, footnote 35, i.e., Shah Nisera, Jahangir, Minerva, David Scott, Ardecir, Neptune, Canon and Gilwell. 49

166 British Traders in the East Indies press of the capture of British vessels by French privateers. The hostilities in Europe had also rekindled rival stratagems between the Dutch and British over the Moluccas. For their part, with the renewed outbreak of war, the Dutch were justified in their concerns that Britain still had aspirations to retain links to the Moluccas and enter into agreements with local rulers to export spices and other products and possibly undermine Dutch authority. As noted previously, Robert Farquhar, former British administrator in the Moluccas, was personally most enthusiastic about retaining British links with the Moluccas and actively campaigned to retain the relationship with Tidore and undermine Dutch authority.54 Manifestations of British intrigue were another factor that reinforced the suspicious attitude of the Dutch authorities on Ternate towards Captain Dawes and the Lucy Maria.

Tidore affairs Added to the tense international atmosphere, the local security situation in the Moluccas in 1803 and 1804 was extremely volatile because of the ongoing confrontation between the Sultanate of Tidore and the Dutch. It had been the British who had for the most part sided with Tidore, and even more damning for 54

Miller, W. G., ‘The Moluccas under the British’ (unpublished MA thesis, University of Hull, 1974), pp. 123–38. By 1804, Farquhar had been appointed Lieut. Governor of Penang. When news of the renewal of hostilities in Europe was received, he was less confident that such links could be re-established through open diplomacy, but felt that if the British could re-install their base at Balambangan, as officially he had been ordered to do, Sulu could be used as a site to maintain contact with local Moluccan rulers. In December 1803 when at Balambangan, he instructed as follows the officer he left in command: “Should opportunities offer, you are to address not only the Sultauns of Sooloo and Borneo, but also those of Mangindanao, Boney (Bone) and Tidore, informing them of Balambangan being reestablished by the English as a free port, and inviting their subjects to resort [h]ither to barter their merchandize for the produce of India and Europe.” Farquhar’s instructions, British Library, Oriental and India Office Collections, Bengal Secret Consultations (hereafter BL, OIOC, BSC), 8 July 1805.

Smugglers and enemies 167 Dawes, amongst the British it had been the country traders who had been associated most closely with the “rebellious” state. This factor too did not bode well for the captain and crew of the Lucy Maria. Following the return of Ternate by the English to the Dutch on 19 May 1803 and their subsequent departure on 23 May, Nuku continued to fly the English flag at his capital Soasio on Tidore.55 Delicate negotiations commenced between Nuku and the returning European power. The man given responsibility for all negotiations with native powers was Willem Jacob Cranssen (see below), even though at least one prominent Dutch official considered Cranssen an inappropriate person to have responsibility for native affairs.56 For their part, the English had not helped to clarify the new political situation, having, in the midst of a somewhat chaotic withdrawal, neglected to explain to Nuku their official position in respect of their future relationship with him: that is, that he would no longer enjoy their official support. They informed him that the Dutch would do him no harm, though they appear to have omitted to clarify the situation of the native rulers when negotiating the terms of the hand-over with the Dutch. Neither in the official correspondence between the English and the Dutch at the time, nor in the later report of the English officer in charge, James Oliver, is the future position of the native rulers mentioned. While Cranssen did not meet Nuku personally during the Governor’s visit to Ternate between 5 August and 3 September 1803, negotiations were carried out through third parties.57 Some progress appeared to be made in the discussion of terms for a reconciliation between the Dutch and Tidore, with Cranssen Widjojo, Muridan, The Revolt of Prince Nuku, Cross-cultural Alliance-making in Maluku, c.1780–1810 (Leiden: Brill, 2009), p. 84. 56 Haga, Nederlandsch Nieuw, vol. 1, p. 414, Widjojo, The Revolt of Prince Nuku, p. 4. 57 Cranssen, Willem Jacob, “Secret anntekeningen gehouden door den eersten Commissaris, van den dach van zijn aankomst op Ternaten, tot den dach van zijn vertrek, dat gevolg heeft gehad op den 3de September 1803”, in Rapport van Ternatenen eenige andere dat Establissement betrekkelyke papieren, NA, Van Alphen Collection, Aanwinsten 1900: XXII, President der Commissie tot Overname der Molukken in 1817–1818, no. 304. 55

168 British Traders in the East Indies insisting that Nuku make a request to be pardoned by the Dutch and Nuku requesting that a new treaty be signed.58 However, Cranssen secretly wrote to Batavia that Nuku’s “pretensions” should not be ratified by the Governor-General.59 During the first part of 1804, that is, the time that Dawes was at Ternate, Cranssen, from Amboyna, “continuously intervened in the affairs on Ternate”,60 hindering local attempts to improve the Dutch relationship with Nuku. On 13 January 1804, Cranssen’s position was formally strengthened when he was appointed the Governor of the Eastern Provinces, with Ternate (and Banda) made subordinate to Amboyna. In reality though, as the person given responsibility for relations with the native rulers since the beginning of the restoration, he had always had the final word in any negotiations with Tidore.61 The arrival in the Moluccas in December 1803 of rumours of the renewed outbreak of war in Europe possibly gave Nuku hope that he would be able to avoid all his obligations to the Dutch and this news may have been a contributing factor to further unrest.62 But January 1804 was also the time of the expiration of the six-month period within which Nuku’s terms in any reconciliation had had to be accepted, and no decision had been received from Batavia. In fact, Governor-General Siberg had failed to meet any of Nuku’s demands, while still writing to Nuku in conciliatory tones.63 It would appear that Cranssen and Batavia were merely playing for time, and while they showed no open hostility to Nuku, were nevertheless anticipating gaining control over Tidore by delaying a decision on Nuku’s specific demands. Their hope appears to have been that the old Sultan The Moluccas under the British, pp. 190–1; Widjojo, The Revolt of Prince Nuku, p. 85. 59 Cranssen, ‘Secret anntekeningen gehouden’. 60 Widjojo, The Revolt of Prince Nuku, p. 86. 61 Miller, The Moluccas under the British, pp. 194–5; Widjojo, The Revolt of Prince Nuku, p. 86. 62 Haga, Nederlandsch Nieuw, vol. 1, p. 422. 63 Siberg, Johannes, ‘Aan de koning en grooten van Tidor’, Kasteel Batavia, 27 January 1804, in Rapport van Ternatenen eenige andere dat Establissement betrekkelyke papieren, NA, Van Alphen Collection, Aanwinsten 1900: XXII, President der Commissie tot Overname der Molukken in 1817–1818, no. 304; Miller, The Moluccas under the British, p. 195. 58 Miller,

Smugglers and enemies 169 would die, and a more manageable ruler could be installed, this plan being thwarted by Nuku’s longevity.64 In light of Tidore’s longstanding contacts with the British and that it had been British country traders who had been Nuku’s closest allies, the question has to be asked, why did Dawes not seek assistance from Tidore, rather than Ternate? It may have been because, as one of the country traders who sailed directly between India and China, and not of the group who had actually traded within the Malay Archipelago, he was not aware of the close association that existed. Furthermore, in light of the disease ravishing his crew, he may have believed that he would receive superior medical care at the European-controlled settlement of Ternate, rather than at Tidore. Given this long-standing, relentless hostility between Tidore and the Dutch, and the extensive British associations with Tidore, it is totally understandable that the Dutch authorities were nervous of the arrival of a large British vessel in their midst.65

The Dutch authorities In 1803 Wieling had been appointed one of the Commissioners to negotiate the restoration of the Moluccas from the British to the Dutch. In 1804, he was Administrator of Ternate, subordi64

Though Wieling made further conciliatory gestures towards Nuku after June 1804, from that time onwards until Nuku’s death on 14 November 1805 there was a deterioration in security in Ternate and the surrounding seas and a gradual slide into a state of open conflict. Haga, Nederlandsch Nieuw, vol. 1, pp. 423–32, Miller, The Moluccas under the British, pp. 197–202. 65 Subsequent events show that the Dutch were indeed justified in their concern that an alliance between Tidore and the English might still be a possibility. In July 1806 English navy vessels commanded by Captain Elphinstone, who had served in the Moluccas during the British occupation, dropped anchor off Tidore and enjoyed cordial relations with Nuku’s successor, Janalabdin. In reality, the navy vessels were only guarding EIC ships proceeding to China and had no political intentions, but their presence was of concern to the poorly defended Dutch garrison. As noted in Chapter 2, of more serious consequence for the Dutch was the appearance of the country ship Lord Minto, off Tidore, at the end of 1807.

170 British Traders in the East Indies nate to the Governor at Amboyna. The more influential figure in the actions taken against Dawes however was the Governor of Amboyna, Cranssen. Cranssen’s background and character are also important factors in understanding the treatment meted out to Dawes and is indicative of the importance of local officials in the unfolding of events as mentioned earlier.66 As already observed, before the British occupation, Cranssen himself had been Governor of Ternate, having arrived there for the first time on 12 September 1799. His task had been to strengthen the Dutch position against both the English and the rebellious Tidorese. At that time, Ternate, administratively separate from Amboyna, had its own Governor and Council, housed in the “formidable” Fort Orange.67 Ternate had a European population of about 700 people, about one-fifth of the total population.68 Amboyna and Banda had fallen to the English in 1796, but Dutch Ternate resisted English attempts to conquer it. At that time, Cranssen successfully improved the defences: existing batteries were strengthened and additional ones were erected, the powder magazines were made safer and local vessels were repaired.69 The first British attack in February 1801 was repelled, but the second one in June was more substantial. This time the siege and blockade, with country traders and Tidore forces playing a critical role as noted in Chapter 3, created such distress and fear among the Dutch inhabitants that tensions arose between Cranssen and his Council. Other members of the Council wanted to surrender, but Cranssen

66

For a discussion of the significance of the role of local officials in determining policy see, Boxer, The Dutch Seaborne Empire, pp. 107–8 67 Huyers, Beknopte Beschryving der Oostindische, p. 35. 68 Precise statistics are not available, but in 1828 the Sultan of Ternate had 36,000 subjects, while the European population was said to have fallen to 339. Clercq, F. S. A. de., Bijdragen tot de Kennis der Residentie Ternate (Leiden: Brill, 1890), p. 34. 69 Roo, L. W. G. de, ‘J. W. Cranssen te Ternate, 13 September 1799 – 18 Juni 1801’, TBG, 16 (1867), 503–35, at p. 511; Leupe, P. A., “Stukken betrekkelijk de verdediging van Ternate door den Gouverneur Willem Jacob Cranssen 1800–1801, en de overgave van het gouvernement aan de Engleschen op den 21 Junij 1801, door den Raad van Politie aldaar”, BKI, 3:5 (1870), 215–338, at pp. 222–7.

Smugglers and enemies 171 refused to capitulate. The Council mutinied, arrested Cranssen, and negotiated a surrender with the British on 20 June.70 Cranssen was a long-serving servant of the VOC, having arrived in Batavia as a corporal in 1780 aged about 17.71 He had worked his way up through the administration before his appointment as Governor at Ternate and was fiercely loyal to the Dutch Crown. A later investigation into the surrender of Ternate vindicated Cranssen. One Dutch writer, Leupe, has conceded that though he was not lacking in courage, zeal and industry, Cranssen was deficient in tact and diplomacy.72 The British knew of his reputation as a “great enthusiast” for the Dutch cause; Robert Farquhar, the English Resident in the Moluccas between June 1798 and January 1802, referred to Cranssen as “a Dutchman of an extremely violent disposition, but at the same time, a man of ability and enterprise”.73 Before he returned to the Moluccas as Governor of Amboyna in 1803, Cranssen served in the Dutch administration in Batavia and Malacca.74 70

71 72

73

74

Farquhar to Madras, 5 July 1801, BL, OIOC, MPC, 12 September 1801. For the disagreement between Cranssen and the Council which led to Cranssen’s arrest see, Leupe, ‘Stukken betrekkelijk de verdediging’ and Roo, ‘J. W. Cranssen te Ternate’. The Sultan of Ternate’s account of events, favourable to Cranssen, is given, in Malay, in Clercq, Bijdragen tot de Kennis der Residentie, pp. 329–31. Before Ternate was returned to the Dutch in 1803, two of the three members of Council who had arrested Cranssen sought political asylum with the English on Penang. The third member had died. Many Dutch officials in the Indies remained ambivalent over the French occupation of The Netherlands. For example, see Schama, Patriots and Liberators, p. 450: “Vice Admiral Pieter Hartsinck, who had been instructed in 1802 to defend Java, decided to turn a blind eye to orders to rendezvous in 1803 with Linois’ smaller flotilla and together attack the British China fleet”. Leupe, ‘Stukken betrekkelijk de verdediging’, p. 337: ‘Extract uit de Gekwalificierde Rolle te Batavia’. Ibid., p. 220. Farquhar to Bengal, 9 May 1803, British Library, Oriental and India Office Collection, Madras Political Consultations (BL, OIOC, MPolC), 15 November 1803. Later, when the English conquered Java in 1811, Cranssen became unsympathetic to the new French government in The Netherlands (the latter was a Department of the French Empire between 1810 and 1813) and he accepted a position as a member of the Council in Raf-

172 British Traders in the East Indies By 1804 therefore, when the Lucy Maria arrived at Ternate in a distressed state, from bitter experience as well as by temperament, Cranssen was not one to be sympathetic to British vessels. His personal role in proceedings must be considered as an important factor in the severe treatment that befell Captain Dawes and his crew.

The fate of the Lucy Maria When the Lucy Maria first arrived at Ternate, Wieling, though suspicious, was somewhat constrained in his actions against the English vessel by the terms of the Treaty of Amiens. However, following the arrival of official news of the outbreak of war on 5 April, Wieling had orders to seize all English ships. It is unsurprising then, that shortly after, on 7 April, a full list of the ship’s crew was compiled. By 8 April, an inventory of the ship’s cargo was completed. A list of the letters carried for people in Macao and Canton, as well as fles’ administration, as well as other positions. He developed a close relationship with English officials, many of whom were fellow Masons, and he accumulated extensive landholdings on Java: Travers, Thomas Otho, The Journal of Thomas Otho Travers 1813–1820, ed. John Bastin (Singapore: Government Printer, 1960), p. 91; Jordaan, Roy and Peter Carey, ‘Thomas Stamford Raffles’ Masonic Career in Java: A New Perspective on the British Interregnum (1811–1816)’, JMBRAS, 90:2 (2017), 1–34 at pp. 15, 27. Raffles wrote favourably of Cranssen’s role as President of the Bench of Magistrates and as member of the Council in his History of Java (vol. 1, p. xii). Raffles’ last days in Batavia were even spent in Cranssen’s house: Boulger, Demetrius Charles, The Life of Sir Stamford Raffles (London: Horace Marshall, 1897), p. 212. Cranssen was ostracized by his fellow Dutchmen after Java was returned to The Netherlands in 1816 and has received a critical assessment in Dutch writing. De Haan says he was a narrow-minded person of modest ability, with a violent way of speaking: de Haan, F., ‘Personalia der periode van het Engelsch bestuur over Java 1811–1816’, BKI, 92:4 (1935), 477–681 at p. 525. Raffles, during a trip to the Continent in 1817, attempted unsuccessfully to intervene with the Dutch Colonial Minister and even the King of the Netherlands on Cranssen’s behalf (Wurtzburg, C. E., Raffles of the Eastern Isles (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1954), pp. 419–20; Jordaan and Carey, ‘Thomas Stamford’, pp. 18–19). Cranssen died in Java in 1821, aged 58.

Smugglers and enemies 173 other papers seized on the vessel, was compiled on 3 May, while at the same time, the ship’s chests were opened and the ship’s weapons were taken on shore. While it is not known if sick crew members were still on the ship or had been brought on shore by this time, it is a fact that difficulties in relations arose between the Dutch Administrator and Dawes because of a shortage of medicine.75 From the evidence available, it can be concluded that the ship was claimed as a prize by the Dutch and its cargo and ordnance were confiscated. Given the hostility that prevailed at the time and Cranssen’s background and character, nothing less could be expected. In many instances when such a seizure occurred, the crew of merchant vessels would eventually be returned to their home port on neutral vessels.76 The first indication received by the English back in Calcutta that all was not well with the Lucy Maria was on 25 May 1804. An announcement was made in the Calcutta Gazette that the Lucy Maria had not arrived at her destination in China by 29 March.77 The Madras Government Gazette reported later that year on 27 September that three crew members of the Lucy Maria had arrived at Madras as passengers on another ship. They had been previously landed at Tranquebar (Tharangambadi), a port south of Madras, where there was a Danish factory.78 The report described how the Lucy Maria had departed Bengal and had, during the course of the voyage, been afflicted by “a contagious malady, but of what nature we have yet to learn”. The Madras Gazette report stated that the sickness which raged through the ship’s crew in the course of a few weeks “destroyed nearly the whole of the ship’s company” even before it put into Memorie van den Staat. This was precisely the time that Matthew Flinders was detained on the Isle de France (Mauritius) by the French. Flinders, strictly speaking a British naval officer, not a merchant mariner, was highly regarded as a surveyor and navigator, not as a fighting officer. The English in Calcutta, for example, believed his detention to be “contrary to all the former usages of war”. Calcutta Gazette, 13 September 1804 (Supplement). 77 Calcutta Gazette, Thursday, 31 May 1804, p. 1. 78 Calcutta Gazette, 18 October 1804 (Supplement) quoting from the Madras Government Gazette, 27 September 1804. 75 Wieling, 76

174 British Traders in the East Indies Ternate – an exaggeration, for, as we have seen, there were still 71 crew-members on the ship at Ternate in April 1804. The Madras report also stated that from Ternate, the ship put into Amboyna, and that from there it was sent to Batavia. It would appear most likely that after seizure in Ternate, the ship, or at least its crew, was transferred, under the control of the Dutch, to Batavia via Amboyna, for the Madras Gazette report further states that Captain Dawes was one of the few who remained alive when the ship departed Amboyna. But a few days later, on the way to Batavia, he too succumbed to the sickness and died. The three crew members, Messrs Hammond, Fukon and Sexton, who arrived at Madras via Tranquebar were said to be the only survivors. This again may not be absolutely correct, for it is known that several of the crew had jumped ship in Ternate. Nevertheless, the ravages caused by the disease and the hostility of the Dutch administration resulted in the near total destruction of the ship’s company and the loss of the voyage.

Prevailing Anglo-Dutch hostility While the disease which afflicted the Lucy Maria was undoubtedly the major factor which destroyed the voyage and led to the death of Captain Dawes and the majority of his crew, events at Ternate in 1804 must also be seen in the context of the entrenched AngloDutch trading rivalry in the Malay Archipelago. The case of the Lucy Maria demonstrates the British country traders at the turn of the nineteenth century were operating in an extremely volatile area, one consisting of changing international alliances, shifting diplomatic loyalties and fluctuating political ascendancies. Placed in an intolerable position, Captain Dawes decided to sail into an enemy port, thus compounding a difficult situation. His only option appears to have been to throw himself upon the mercy of the Dutch. But the situation at Ternate could not have been more dangerous. The Dutch are revealed as being particularly apprehensive because of their declining influence economically and strategically in the Malay Archipelago, one reason for which was the growing intrusions of English country traders themselves during the previous two decades. Wieling and Cranssen’s personal attitudes may also have been influenced

Smugglers and enemies 175 by the decades-long presence and role of the English country traders, an influence that then had a bearing on official Dutch action. Locally, there was a persistent state of insecurity in the waters around Ternate because of the long-standing dispute with Tidore. The arrival of a large vessel commanded by a British country trader, a person who was a member of a group of merchant seamen that had for several decades been in close contact with the Tidore rulers, would have heightened Dutch apprehensions. There was a Dutch Governor at Amboyna who bore at that stage of his career a considerable degree of personal hostility to the British. This arose out of his temperamental character, his strong loyalty to the Dutch Crown and as a result of the humiliating Dutch capitulation to the English when he had previously been administrator of Ternate. Dawes would have been unaware of Cranssen and his background. The outbreak of hostilities in Europe, together with the contemporary naval engagements between the French and British navies in waters in the vicinity of Ternate taking place precisely at the time of Dawes’ arrival at Ternate, would also have meant that treatment meted out to the captain and crew of the Lucy Maria was as severe as possible. There is evidence that difficulties arose between Dawes and the Dutch over a shortage of medicine.79 The Dutch, though severe in their reaction because of the current state of hostilities, appear to have acted within the accepted rules of behaviour at that time. Had war not broken out, it is quite possible the ship would not have been seized and the sick crew would, in all probability, have been more hospitably treated, though Cranssen’s personal attitude would not have made this a certainty. Individual British country traders had met with difficulties with Dutch authorities in the past, but mostly this was because the Dutch believed them to be breaking the trading monopoly in areas where the VOC had signed treaties with local rulers. Nevertheless, the record is one Memorie van den Staat. Taken from an extract from the Proceedings of the Council of Amboyna enclosed with Wieling’s report.

79 Wieling,

176 British Traders in the East Indies of unpredictable fortunes; the reception which a British ship received was in many cases dependent on the attitude of the individual governor at the settlement. The events surrounding the loss of the Lucy Maria are a cogent example of the many dangers that the increasingly prevalent British country traders faced in the volatile, shifting political situation that existed in the Malay Archipelago between 1770 and 1820.

Five THE DECLINE OF THE COUNTRY TRADE WITHIN THE MALAY ARCHIPELAGO

By 1820 the British country traders who had operated successfully for over fifty years in the Malay Archipelago faced a changing world. While private vessels continued to sail to Canton and were still referred to as “country traders”, the nature of the maritime trade within the Malay Archipelago was changing dramatically. Locally, the most important factor to bring about this change was the establishment and immediate success of the trading entrepôt of Singapore in 1819. With Singapore, the pattern of the local, or “native” trade within the Malay Archipelago altered in a way that Raffles had foreseen. He knew that the “native authorities” of the archipelago would “hail with satisfaction the foundation and the site of a British establishment, in the central and commanding situation”.1 It would not only improve relations with British “merchants” as he had foretold, but change the whole pattern of the trade undertaken by country traders. In Singapore, from an original population made up of mainly indigenous groups with only a few dozen Malays and Chinese,2 1

Raffles to William Farquhar, 6 February 1819, quoted in Buckley, Charles Burton, An Anecdotal History of Old Times in Singapore (2 vols [Singapore: Fraser and Neave, 1902]; repr. Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1965), p. 41. 2 Turnbull, C. M., A History of Modern Singapore 1819–2005 (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009), p. 25.

178 British Traders in the East Indies the Chinese, Malay and Indian communities quickly expanded. In 1824, there were still only 74 resident Europeans.3 Singapore began to replace Riau, the focal trading port for country traders which had been largely destroyed by the Dutch in 1784.4 Towards the end of 1819, a group of Bugis amounting to 500 people relocated from Riau to Singapore in a block,5 and by 1824 there were 1,925 Bugis there, “all traders, not agriculturalists”.6 The trade through Riau, and Malacca, correspondingly fell.7 With this changed pattern, the trade was coming to Singapore; there was less need for the country traders to go to the native ports.8 In two-and-a-half years from 1819 to 1821, of the 2,889 vessels that entered Singapore, only 383, or 13.2%, were manned by Europeans. While admittedly smaller craft, the remaining 2,506 were manned by natives of other nations. In 1822 the percentage of European vessels, at 8.8%, was even lower.9 Horsburgh would be proved correct when he wrote in 1819 that “The Bugguese prows from Celebes and other parts of the Eastern Islands will resort to the settlement of Singapore with their goods, and barter them for our manufactures, in preference to going to Malacca or Batavia, and it will soon become a depot for the Eastern traders”.10 By March 1820, William Farquhar could report that merchants of all descriptions were collecting there, there were many Chinese houses and the Bugis village had become an “extensive town”.11 It was the Bugis-Makassar trading network that carried exotic products of the Archipelago An Anecdotal, p. 154. Trocki, C. A., Prince of Pirates: the Temenggongs and the Development of Johor and Singapore 1784–1885 (Singapore: University Press, 1979), p. xx. 5 Buckley, An Anecdotal, p. 60. 6 Buckley, An Anecdotal, p. 154. 7 Buckley, An Anecdotal, pp. 69–70; Reid, Anthony and Radin Fernando, ‘Shipping on Melaka and Singapore as an Index of Growth, 1760–1840’, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 19:1 (1996), 59–84, at p. 78. 8 Trocki, Prince of Pirates, p. 35; 9 Buckley, An Anecdotal, pp. 71, 79. 10 James Horsburgh, quoted in Buckley, An Anecdotal, p. 61. 11 Quoted in Buckley, An Anecdotal, p. 65. 3 Buckley, 4

Decline of the country trade 179 to Singapore and through which the European products went as far as the islands of Aru.12 Few European vessels were to play a role in the trade of the “Outer Islands” of the Archipelago in the nineteenth century.13 Singapore became the centre for the Indian opium traffic and the gambier trade, as well as attracting the Bugis prahu and Chinese junk trade.14 The Treaty of London of 1824, which had the intention of settling the long-standing territorial and trading disputes between the British and the Dutch in the Malay Archipelago, including the matter of the status of Singapore, might, at first glance, be seen as enhancing the position of the British country traders. After all, as part of the Treaty, the Dutch, finally, agreed not to discriminate against British trade, with both parties promising “to admit the subjects of each other to trade with their respective possessions in the Eastern Archipelago” (Article 1). Furthermore, neither party would have a treaty “with a native power to exclude the trade of the other party” (Article 3). (Amboyna, Banda and Ternate were excluded from these clauses, the Dutch still jealously attempting to guard their traditional monopoly of spices.)15 However, more significantly for the country trade, the Treaty confirmed the principle of free trade and in so doing, made possible the blossoming of native trade. Article 4 stated that the two countries’ civil and military authorities were not “to impede a free communication of the natives in the Eastern Archipelago with the ports of the two governments, respectively, or of the 12

Harmonic, Gilbert, ‘The Bugis-Makasar Merchant Networks: The Rise and Fall of the Principle of the Freedom of the Seas’, in Denys Lombard and Jean Aubin (eds), Asian Merchants and Businessmen in the Indian Ocean and the China Sea (New Delhi: Oxford University Press 2000, pp. 255–67, at p. 261. 13 Lindblad, J. Thomas, ‘The Outer Islands in the 19th Century: Contest for the Periphery’, in Howard Dick, et al. (eds), The Emergence of a National Economy: An Economic History of Indonesia, 1800–2000 (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin 2002), pp. 82–110, at pp. 91–2. 14 Trocki, Prince of Pirates, p. 38; Tagliacozzo, Eric, ‘A Necklace of Fins: Marine Goods Trading in Maritime Southeast Asia, 1780–1860’, International Journal of Asian Studies, 1:1 (2004), 23–48, at p. 31. 15 Treaty of London (17 March 1824). http://historyofbengkulu.blogspot.com.au/search/label/Treaty [Accessed 3 April 2017].

180 British Traders in the East Indies subjects of the two governments with the ports belonging to native powers”. And even with the Spice Islands, the British could have commercial intercourse “through native Asiatic powers” (Article 7). This clause lifted the legal, physical and psychological restrictions the Dutch had imposed on any native traders associating with the British. They could no longer be considered as smugglers, and the British as pirates. Together with the convenient location of Singapore for the native traders at the southern end of the Malacca Straits, these clauses made it no longer necessary for the country traders to trade in the ports of the Archipelago. After the 1824 Treaty the British even used Arabs, Chinese and Bugis as “useful agents for the distribution of British goods … in order to import goods to Dutch-controlled ports at a lower rate of duty”.16 Along with the changes in the pattern of Buginese, Chinese, Malay and Indian trade, the composition of the British mercantile presence in the Malay Archipelago had also changed. New businesses owned by the British took root in Singapore. Several of these firms in Singapore were headed by former mariners. That of Alexander Laurie Johnston, formerly owner and commander of a private trading vessel, was probably the first and most significant.17 Johnston could be said to personify the transformation from country trader to resident merchant.18 Alexander Guthrie arrived in 1820 and commenced the long-running trading company in partnership with a former captain of East Indiamen, and one familiar with the China trade, Thomas Talbot Harrington.19 After four years Raffles could report that there were nine European mercantile houses.20 16

Wright, H. R. C., ‘The Anglo-Dutch Dispute in the East, 1814– 1824’, Economic History Review, 3 (1950–1), 229–39, at p. 237. 17 Buckley, An Anecdotal, p. 62. 18 Trocki argues the transformation commenced even earlier, with Penang and British Malacca. Trocki, Prince of Pirates, pp. 34–5; Trocki, C. A., Opium and Empire: Chinese Society in Colonial Singapore, 1800–1910 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 50–1. 19 Buckley, An Anecdotal, p. 65: Cunyngham-Brown, S., The Traders: A Story of Britain’s South-East Asian Commercial Adventure (London: Neuman Neame, 1971), p. 23. 20 Raffles to Dr Raffles, 12 January 1823, quoted in Boulger, Demetrius Charles, The Life of Sir Stamford Raffles (London: Horace Marshall, 1897), p. 332.

Decline of the country trade 181 As well, elsewhere in the Archipelago, European business structures had changed. The invasion and conquest of Java by the British in 1811 resulted in a degree of mercantile penetration which continued after the colony’s return to the Dutch in 1816.21 The commercial networks, or “commodity chains”, in the Archipelago formerly used by the British country traders had taken a dramatic shift. In Java, the British mercantile interests that stayed on after 1816 “formed the most dynamic European element in the commercial life of the island”.22 Though not all were successful, as exemplified in the collapse of the firm Thomas Macquoid, Davidson and Company,23 businesses such as Gillian Maclaine and Co. founded in 1822, were part of a “Global Re-organization of Trade”, commencing in 1800.24 The change included a shift from the symbiotic relationship that had existed between the EIC and the country traders – often fuelled by capital originating from the Agency Houses in India – to one where British mercantile firms established their own offices in Batavia and Singapore.25 Older agency houses from Bengal like Palmer & Co. may have established business activities in Batavia during the British occupation and set up agencies in Singapore in 1819, but they appear to have failed to compete with the newer mercantile enterprises. For example, at the beginning of 1824 there were twelve European firms in Singapore, only three of which were branches of Agency Houses in Calcutta.26 One of these was Palmer’s, who, though personally not a great admirer of Raffles, was nevertheless a strong advocate for Singapore.27 By 1827 none of the European residents in Knight, G. R., Trade and Empire in Early Nineteenth-Century Southeast Asia: Gillian Maclaine and his Business Network (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2015), p. 6. 22 Knight, Trade and Empire, pp. 8, 58. 23 Lamb, Rebecca, Macquoid of Waniassa: Portrait of a Colonial Sheriff (Wanniassa: Waniassa Publications, 2006), p. 62. 24 Knight, Trade and Empire, pp. 16, 50–2. 25 In respect specifically of the cotton trade to Java, see Van der Kraan, Alfons, Contest for the Java Cotton Trade, 1811–40: An Episode in Anglo-Dutch Rivalry (Hull: The University of Hull Centre for South-East Asian Studies, 1998), p. 12. 26 Buckley, An Anecdotal, pp. 165–6. 27 Webster, Anthony, The Richest East India Merchant: The Life and Busi21

182 British Traders in the East Indies Singapore were linked to Indian agency houses.28 The reasons for the failure of the older agency houses were both external and internal, but one factor was certainly the “competitive pressures” from the new merchants.29 With the flow of local products to Singapore coupled with the establishment of the new British mercantile enterprises there, the necessity for free merchant mariners declined. The descending hierarchy of the trading chain now went from the British firm at the top, through Chinese businessmen (taukehs or compradors), to smaller Chinese traders. This was a time of growing Chinese immigration to Southeast Asia and an increase in the junk trade.30 These smaller Chinese traders had links with, as Trocki puts it, “the headmen of the Malay settlements in the upriver areas … and along the many sea routes leading from Singapore throughout maritime Southeast Asia”.31 The new British mercantile firms were thus distancing themselves from the producers in the Malay world. Even the ability for the English to speak Malay was no longer the necessity it had been.32 With a significant section of the Singapore trade being in opium, most of the European merchants there had their eyes not on the native trade but on the long-distance China opium trade.33 The trade

ness of John Palmer of Calcutta 1767–1836 (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2007), p. 103. 28 Buckley, An Anecdotal, pp. 202–3. Kobayashi refers to the new mercantile firms as “agency houses” but they are distinguishable from the earlier Indian-based firms, and the British merchants were “unfamiliar with the local Asian way of doing business” (Kobayashi, Atsushi, ‘The Role of Singapore in the Growth of Intra-Southeast Asian Trade, c. 1820s–1852’, Southeast Asian Studies, 2:3 (2013) (https:// englishkyoto-seas.org/2014/01/vol-2-no3-atsushi-kobayashi/) [accessed 2 October 2017]). 29 Webster, The Richest, pp. 112, 130. 30 Trocki, Opium and Empire, pp. 30, 55. This is not to imply that country traders too would not have had contacts with Chinese traders earlier on in Riau and Chinese mining settlements. 31 Trocki, C. A., Singapore: Wealth, Power and the Culture of Control (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 19. 32 Trocki, Singapore: Wealth, p. 17. 33 Trocki, Opium and Empire, p. 57.

Decline of the country trade 183 within the Archipelago now “was carried on by Malaysian or Chinese traders and thus called the “native trade”.34 Despite a decline within the Malay Archipelago, the private trade between India and Canton continued, indeed increased, during the 1820s.35 The country traders from India who called at Singapore to collect the products of the Archipelago on their way to Canton were those that sailed through the Archipelago, not traded in it. At the new port they loaded the marine goods. The private vessels increased in importance for the British trade to Canton; in 1820 the number of country vessels was not much more than those hired directly by the Company (23 to 27), but by 1833 the proportion of private vessels had risen to nearly 77% of all English ships (82 compared to 25).36 The term “country trade” gradually lost, first its distinctive meaning and then its currency. It came to be used even for privately-owned vessels sailing to Europe. Morse used the term “country” in his compilations from the official records of the Canton trade for the final time for the year 1822.37 After that date he used the term “private” for any English shipping not owned by the EIC itself.38 In official correspondence however, private vessels could still be referred to as “country ships” at least well into the 1830s, and the term was in use, according to Furber, until the end of the century.39 In 1825 the first paddle steamer from England arrived in Bengal. It marked another stage in the decline of the country Opium and Empire, p. 57, see also Tagliacozzo, Eric, ‘Coasting to Canton: Junks, Country Traders, and the Southeast Asian “Exotica Trade”’, in Geoffrey B. Hainsworth (ed.), Globalization and the Asian Economic Crisis: Indigenous Responses, Coping Strategies, and Governance Reform in Southeast Asia (Vancouver: Centre for Southeast Asia Research, Institute of Asian Research, University of British Columbia, 1999), pp. 39–58, at p. 47; Van der Kraan, Contest for the Java Cotton, p. 20. 35 Tagliacozzo, ‘Coasting to Canton’, p. 47. 36 Morse, H. B., The Chronicles of the East India Company trading to China 1635–1834 (5 vols, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926–9), vol. 3, p. 369, vol. 4, p. 343. 37 Morse, Chronicles, vol. 4, p. 53. 38 Morse, Chronicles, vol. 4, p. 71. 39 Morse, Chronicles, vol. 4, p. 360; Furber, Holden, Rival Empires of Trade in the Orient 1600–1800 (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1976), p. 4. 34 Trocki,

184 British Traders in the East Indies trade of the eighteenth century.40 One writer could declare that by the middle of the century when steam replaced sailing ships, “the expression ‘Country Service’ seems to have fallen into desuetude”.41

Sutton, Jean, Lords of the East: The East India Company and its Ships (London: Conway Maritime, 1981), p. 126. 41 Coates, W. H., The Old ‘Country Trade’ of the East Indies (London: Imray, Laurie, Norie & Wilson, 1911), p. vii.

40

CONCLUSION

The importance of the country trade for the East India Company’s growing China trade during the period under consideration has long been recognized.1 But just how the English country traders operated in the Malay Archipelago has thus far only been lightly touched upon. The makeup of the group, how they conducted their trade and what impact they had on local political developments has also been less extensively examined. As noted in Chapter 3, David Bassett has written that there is a “danger of interpreting European influence in the Malay Archipelago simply in terms of political suzerainty or commercial monopoly by the great East India Companies”.2 As he suggested, the individual private sea captains who successfully traded in the area had a significant impact on local societies. Many country traders were comfortable in the societies and states of the Malay Archipelago and they had gained valuable insights into how to successfully operate in those societies. Their role in strengthening traditional rulers both militarily and politically in a way favourable to these rulers was often critical. They were knowledgeable about the seas. They established important contacts between the British and the local rulers and frequently acted as intermediaries and envoys. From the individuals discussed, it is possible to begin to obtain a general picture also of the significant role country traders played in assisting officials of the EIC in prosecuting the commercial, political and strategic interests of the Company. Hall, D. G. E., A History of South-East Asia (London: Macmillan, 1955), p. 424. 2 Bassett, D. K., British Trade and Policy in Indonesia and Malaysia in the Late Eighteenth Century (Zug: Inter Documentation Company, 1971), p. 82. 1

186 Conclusion Having a familiarity with local societies, the country traders were, somewhat inadvertently, decisive in the outcome of events at an international level. Despite the ephemeral and fugitive nature of the documentation relating to the hundreds of country traders who sailed in the Malay Archipelago between 1770 and 1820, it is clear that their accumulated knowledge and their actions were significant in providing the basis for the British penetration of the Archipelago during the last decades of the eighteenth and the first decades of the nineteenth centuries. Finally, the English country traders were a constant irritant to the Dutch, threatening their monopoly and undermining their political authority in those centres where the VOC sought to ensure European control.

A NOTE ON SOURCES

The major reason for our lack of knowledge about the majority of the country traders who operated in the Malay Archipelago is the paucity of original sources. Few country traders appear to have left personal accounts of their voyages; the only known detailed account of a trading voyage between 1770 and 1820 is that by John Adolphus Pope who, as a young (14 years of age!), junior officer on a country trader, wrote in a series of letters of his activities and giving his impressions of the Malay archipelago and Canton during the period between December 1785 and September 1788.1 It provides a unique “detailed working of a Country ship to a degree that has never before been attained”.2 Forrest’s valuable accounts of his various trips are not of his trading voyages per se.3 Horsburgh’s writings are based on his experience as a country trader, but do not give detailed information about his actual voyages. A number of other country traders have left us with general reminiscences, written many years after the events described.4 Coates’ publication for example, Bulley, A., Free Mariner: John Adolphus Pope in the East Indies, 1786–1821 (Putney: BACSA, 1992), pp. 55–141. 2 P. J. Marshall in Bulley, Free Mariner, p. ix. 3 Forrest, Thomas, A Voyage from Calcutta to the Mergui Archipelago (London: Sold by J. Robson and Balfour, Edinburgh, 1792); Forrest, Thomas, A Voyage to New Guinea and the Moluccas, 1774–1776, with an Introduction by D. K. Bassett (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1969, orig. 1780). 4 Eastwick, Robert William, A Master Mariner: being the life and adventures of Captain Robert William Eastwick, edited by Herbert Compton (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1891); Richardson, William, A Mariner of England: an account of the career of William Richardson from cabin boy in the Merchant Service to Warrant Officer in the Royal Navy (1780–1819) as 1

188 A note on sources is a general work, not restricted to the English country trade. It includes private trade, including that of Asian shipping, over many centuries and in many parts of the continent.5 There are no log books for country vessels as there are for EIC craft and British navy ships, except on a few occasions when a country ship was seconded to serve the EIC.6 Bulley describes how some personal details of country traders may be obtained from their applications for indentures – the permission granted by the EIC to practise as a country trader in India – and other Bombay records.7 None specifically relate to events in the Malay Archipelago. Bulley has prepared an unpublished list of the Bombay country ships for 1790–1833.8 Unlike references to servants of the EIC, the country traders rarely enter into the official records of the Company. When officials themselves undertook country trading activities, these, understandably, are not described in detail in official correspondence. Country traders make infrequent appearances in the official archives only when they were recruited by the Company to perform an official task or when the captain made a formal statement to authorities concerning an irregular or unforeseen event, such as the loss of a voyage. The latter reports were known as a “Protest”. The ships officers’ report to Malacca authorities about Thomas Sadler’s death at Mempawah is a case in point. Port records show the names of vessels arriving and departing, and while valuable, these records provide few details of the cargo, the crew, and how and where the ship interacted with the local Malays. As successful citizens of Madras and Bengal, particular events in their lives may justify a mention in the local media in told by himself, edited by Colonel Spenser Childers (Greenwich: Conway Maritime Press, 1970). Alexander Hamilton wrote a detailed account of his experiences, but his voyages were undertaken for the most part in the late seventeenth century. 5 Coates, W. H., The Old ‘Country Trade’ of the East Indies (London: Imray, Laurie, Norie & Wilson, 1911). 6 Bulley, Anne, The Bombay Country Ships, 1790–1833 (Richmond: Curzon, 2000), p. 208. 7 Bulley, The Bombay Country, p. 212. 8 Bulley, Anne, The Bombay Country Ships 1790–1833 with Lists of Captains and Nominal Owners (1995, revised 1999). Located in the British Library.

A note on sources 189 those British establishments. Light’s letter’s – only the published ones have been sighted by the author – provide unique examples of correspondence entered into by Malay rulers and one country trader.9 Notwithstanding these various contemporary sources, as Furber has said, for the most part, country traders are “obscure and unsung” soldiers of fortune.10 Heather Sutherland has written that the crucial roles of country captains are “beginning to emerge from the wings, although they will never be as visible as the bureaucratic state enterprises”.11 In this regard, amongst modern works, Furber himself wrote a chapter on the country trade in John Company and in Rival Empires of Trade, though his works only marginally refer to trading in the Malay world.12 Northcote Parkinson wrote a seminal chapter on the subject in Trade in the Eastern Seas. Anne Bulley has written on the Bombay country ships and shipping industry.13 David Bassett wrote a number of ground-breaking articles on country traders in Southeast Asia commencing in 1961 with his ‘The British Country Trader and Sea Captain in South East Asia in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries’. F. Andrew Smith has written on the country traders who operated around Borneo, in particular Daniel Smith and Joseph Burn.14 Kratz, E. U., ‘Some Malay Letters on Trade’, Indonesia Circle, 44 (1987), 3–16; Simmonds, E. H. S., ‘The Thalang Letters, 1773–94: Political Aspects and the Trade in Arms’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies University of London, 26:3 (1963), 592–619; Marsden, William, A Grammar of the Malayan Language with an Introduction and Praxis (London: Cox and Baylis, 1812). 10 Furber, Holden, John Company at Work: A Study of European Expansion in India in the Late Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 161. 11 Sutherland, Heather, ‘Geography as Destiny? The Role of Water in Southeast Asian History’, in Peter Boomgaard (ed.), A World of Water: Rain, Rivers and Seas in Southeast Asian Histories (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007), pp. 27–70 at p. 49. 12 Furber, Holden, Rival Empires of Trade in the Orient 1600–1800 (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1976). 13 Bulley, The Bombay Country Ships. 14 Smith, F. Andrew, ‘Daniel Smith’s Last Seven Years: Hardships in Country Trade in the East Indies in the Early Nineteenth Century’, 9

190 A note on sources Dianne Lewis has focused on the early country trade in the Malay world in ‘The Growth of the Country Trade in the Straits of Malacca, 1760–1777’ while Eric Tagliacozzo discusses the country trade to China in relation to the exotic products of the Archipelago.15 On the country trade as a general phenomenon and its importance to the wider story of British influence in India, the Company’s trade with China and the extension of British power in Asia there are any number of highly-regarded works, including Marshall, P. J., East India Fortunes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), Ashin Das Gupta and M. N. Pearson’s, India and the Indian Ocean 1500–1800 (Calcutta: OUP, 1987), Greenberg, Michael, British Trade and The Opening of China 1800–42 (Cambridge: University Press, 1951), Anthony Webster’s, Gentlemen Capitalists; British Imperialism in South East Asia 1770–1890 (London: Taurus, 1998) and Nicholas Tarling’s, Anglo-Dutch Rivalry in the Malay World 1780–1824 (Sydney: Cambridge University Press / University of Queensland Press, 1962).

Borneo Research Bulletin, 39 (2008),1–15; Smith, F. Andrew, ‘Captain Burn and Associates: British Intelligence-gathering, Trade, and Litigation in Borneo and Beyond during the Early Nineteenth Century’, Borneo Research Bulletin, 35 (2004), 48–69. 15 Tagliacozzo, Eric, ‘Coasting to Canton: Junks, Country Traders, and the Southeast Asian “Exotica Trade”’, in Geoffrey B. Hainsworth (ed.), Globalization and the Asian Economic Crisis: Indigenous Responses, Coping Strategies, and Governance Reform in Southeast Asia (Vancouver: Centre for Southeast Asia Research, Institute of Asian Research, University of British Columbia, 1999), pp. 39–58.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary sources: manuscript and archival collections Bodleian Library (Bod. Lib.), Oxford Letter-books and papers of John Palmer (1766–1836) Ms. Eng. Lett C.81–C.82 British Library (BL), Oriental and India Office Collections (OIOC), London Bengal Foreign Consultations (BFC) Bengal Political Consultations (BPolC) Bengal Secret Consultations (BSC) Factory Records (Straits Settlements) IOR/G/34/2 Fort Marlborough Public Consultations, Sumatra Factory Records (SFR) Madras Military Consultations (MMC) Madras Political Consultations (MPolC) Madras Public Consultations (MPC) Malacca Protocol Books 1786–1825 R/9/22/2 Raffles Collection, Vol. XI, Mss. Eur. E 105; Mss. Eur. E 109 Raffles Collection, Eur. Mss. C.34; C.35 National Archives (NA), The Hague Cranssen, Willem Jacob, “Secret anntekeningen gehouden door den eersten Commissaris, van den dach van zijn aankomst op Ternaten, tot den dach van zijn vertrek, dat gevolg heeft gehad op den 3de September 1803”, in Rapport van Ternatenen eenige andere dat Establissement betrekkelyke papieren, Van Alphen Collection, Aanwinsten 1900: XXII, President der Commissie tot Overname der Molukken in 1817–1818, no. 304.

192 Bibliography Siberg, Johannes, ‘Aan de koning en grooten van Tidor’, Kasteel Batavia, 27 January 1804, in Rapport van Ternatenen eenige andere dat Establissement betrekkelyke papieren, Van Alphen Collection, Aanwinsten 1900: XXII, President der Commissie tot Overname der Molukken in 1817–1818, no. 304. Wieling, Carel Lodewijk, Memorie van den Staat waar in zig de Provintie Amboina bewind op den 30e April, 1804, overgegeven door den afgaand Gezagwoordenen GeEligeerd Ternaats Gezaghebber Carel Lodewijk Wieling, aan den Wel Edele Gesteenger Heer Willem Jacob Cranssen, aankomend Gouverneur en Directeur in het Gouvernement Amboyna en verressorten, Van Alphen Collection, Aanwinsten 1900: XXII, President der Commissie tot Overname der Molukken in 1817–1818, no. 305. National Library of Australia, Canberra. East India Company. Bengal Consultations relating to Prince of Wales Island 1780–1824, with indexes, microfilm M470-535. Public Record Office (PRO), London Journal of the Proceedings of His Majesty’s Ship Hobart, Captn. V. V. Ballard from 27 Aug. 1797 to 27 Aug. 1798, ADM 51/1265. Captain’s Journals.

Primary sources: published Abdullah bin Abdul Kadir, Munshi, Hikayat Abdullah (2 vols, Singapore: Malaya Publishing House, 1960) Abdullah bin Abdul Kadir, Munshi, Hikayat Abdullah, an annotated translation by A.H. Hill (Singapore, JMBRAS, 28:3 (1955) pp. 1–354) Bulley, A., Free Mariner: John Adolphus Pope in the East Indies, 1786–1821 (Putney: BACSA, 1992) Calcutta Gazette, (Calcutta: Francis Gladwin) vol. 24, no. 605, Thursday, 1 October 1795; vol. 24, no. 608, Thursday, 22 October 1795; vol. 41, no. 1057, Thursday, 31 May 1804; vol. 42, no. 1071, Thursday, 18 October 1804 (Supplement) Elmore, H. M., The British Mariner’s Directory and Guide to the Trade and Navigation of the Indian and China Sea; Containing Instructions for Navigation from Europe to India and China, and from Port to Port in those Regions, and part adjacent; with an Account of the Trade, Mercantile Habits, Manners and Customs of the Natives (London: Printed by T. Bensley, 1802) Farquhar, Robert Townsend, An Account of the Tidoreeze Revolutions, from the Year 1779 containing several remarkable incidents relative to Newco and his family …, in BL, MMC. 18 February 1803

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Articles and pamphlets Adelaar, K. A., ‘Malay: The National Language of Malaysia’, in S. A. Wurm, P. Muhlhausler and D. J. Tryon (eds), Atlas of Languages of Intercultural Communication in the Pacific, Asia and the Americas (3 vols, Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1996) vol. 2:1, pp. 729–33. Adelaar, K. A. and D. J. Prentice, ‘Malay: Its History, Role and Spread’, in S. A. Wurm, P. Muhlhausler and D. J. Tryon (eds), Atlas of Languages of Intercultural Communication in the Pacific, Asia and the Americas (3 vols, Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1996) vol. 2:1, pp. 673–933 Andaya, B. W., ‘An Examination of the Sources Concerning the Reign of Sultan Mansur Shah of Trengganu, 1741–1795’, JMBRAS, 49:2 (1976), 80–106 —— ‘The Indian “Saudagar Raja” (The King’s Merchant) in Traditional Malay Courts’, JMBRAS, 51:1 (1978), 13–36 —— ‘Adapting to Political and Economic Change: Palembang in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries’, in Anthony Reid (ed.), The Last Stand of Asian Autonomies: Responses to Modernity in the Diverse States of Southeast Asia and Korea, 1750–1900 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 187–215 —— ‘The Future of Asia: Cross Cultural Conversations’, IIAS Newsletter, 38 (2005), 24–5 —— ‘Gathering ‘Knowledge’ in the Bay of Bengal: The Letters of John Adolphus Pope 1785–1788’, JMBRAS, 87:2 (2014), 1–19 Arasaratnam, Sinnappah, ‘Dutch Commercial Policy and Interests in the Malay Peninsula, 1750–1795’, in Blair B. Kling and M. N. Pearson (eds), The Age of Partnership: Europeans in Asia before Dominion (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1979), pp. 159–89 Arasaratnam, S., ‘Monopoly and Free Trade in Dutch-Asian Commercial Policy. Debate and Controversy with the VOC’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 4:1 (1973), 1–15 Bassett, D. K., ‘Anglo-Kedah Relations c. 1735–1765’, in D. K. Bassett, The British in South-East Asia During the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Hull: The University of Hull, Centre for South-East Asian Studies, 1990), pp. 33–61 —— ‘British Commercial and Strategic Interest in the Malay Peninsula during the late Eighteenth Century’, in D. K. Bassett, British Trade and

202 Bibliography Policy in Indonesia and Malaysia in the Late Eighteenth Century (Zug: Inter Documentation Company 1971), pp. 50–71. Reprinted from J. Bastin and R. Roolvink (eds), Malayan and Indonesian Studies: Essays presented to Sir Richard Winstedt on his Eighty-fifth Birthday (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), pp. 122–40 —— ‘The British “Country” Trader and Mariner in South-East Asia c.1660–1715’, in D. K. Bassett, The British in South-East Asia During the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Hull: The University of Hull, Centre for South-East Asian Studies, 1990), pp. 1–32 —— ‘The British Country Trader and Sea Captain in South East Asia in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries’, Journal of the Historical Society, University of Malaya, 1:2 (1961), 9–14 —— ‘The British Missions to Kedah and Acheh in 1772: Some Belated Reflections’, in D. K. Bassett, The British in South-East Asia During the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Hull: The University of Hull, Centre for South-East Asian Studies, 1990), pp. 62–94 —— ‘Introduction’, in Forrest, Thomas, A Voyage to New Guinea and the Moluccas, 1774–1776 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 1–22 —— ‘Thomas Forrest, an Eighteenth Century Mariner’, in D. K. Bassett, British Trade and Policy in Indonesia and Malaysia in the Late Eighteenth Century (Zug, Inter Documentation Company 1971), pp. 30–49 Bastin, John, ‘Raffles and British Policy in the Indian Archipelago, 1811–1816’, JMBRAS, 27:1 (1954), 84–119 Bowen, H. V., ‘British Exports of Raw Cotton from India to China during the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries’, in Giorgio Riello and Tirthankar Roy, How India Clothed the World: The World of South Asian Textiles, 1500–1850 (Leiden: Brill, 2009), pp. 115–37 —— ‘Britain in the Indian Ocean Region and Beyond: Contours, Connections, and the Creation of a Global Maritime Empire’, in H. V. Bowen, et al. (eds), Britain’s Oceanic Empire, pp. 45–65 Bronson, Bernet, ‘Exchange of the Upstream and Downstream Ends: Notes toward a Functional Model of the Coastal State in Southeast Asia’, in Karl L. Hutterer (ed.), Economic Exchange and Social Interaction in Southeast Asia: Perspectives from Prehistory, History and Ethnography (Ann Arbor: Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies, the University of Michigan, 1977), pp. 39–52 de Haan, F., ‘Personalia der periode van het Engelsch bestuur over Java 1811–1816’, BKI, 92:4 (1935), 477–681 Dunmore, John, ‘French Visitors to Trengganu in the Eighteenth Century’, JMBRAS, 46:1 (1973), 144–59

Bibliography 203 Fielding, K. J., ‘The Settlement of Penang by James Scott’, JMBRAS, 28:1 (1955), 37–51 Gaastra, Femme S., ‘War, Competition and Collaboration: Relations between the English and Dutch East India Company in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries’, in H. V. Bowen, et al. (eds), Worlds of the East India Company (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2002), pp. 49–68 Goor, J. van, ‘Seapower, Trade and State-formation: Pontianak and the Dutch’, in J. van Goor (ed.), Trading Companies in Asia (Utrecht: HES Uitgevers, 1986), pp. 83–106 Griffin, Andrew, ‘London, Bengal, the China Trade and the Unfrequented Extremities of Asia: The East India Company’s Settlement in New Guinea, 1793–95’, British Library Journal, 16 (1990), 151–73 Harmonic, Gilbert, ‘The Bugis-Makasar Merchant Networks: The Rise and Fall of the Principle of the Freedom of the Seas’, in Denys Lombard and Jean Aubin (eds), Asian Merchants and Businessmen in the Indian Ocean and the China Sea (New Delhi: Oxford University Press 2000, pp. 255–67 Heidhues, Mary Somers, ‘The First Two Sultans of Pontianak’, Archipel, 56 (1998), 273–94 Herivel, Jan, ‘“A Perfect Malay” James Scott, Country Trader’ (paper delivered at the ASAA Conference, Sydney, 2011) —— ‘“A little estimable population”: The Early Days of Penang, 1786–1830’ (unpublished paper) Irving, D. R. M., ‘Trading Tunes: Thomas Forrest, Malay Songs, and Musical Exchange in the Malay Archipelago, 1774–84’, in Tara Alberts and D. R. M. Irving (eds), Intercultural Exchange in Southeast Asia: History and Society in the Early Modern World (London: Taurus, 2013), pp. 203–35 —— ‘Hybridity and Harmony: Nineteenth-century British Discourse on Syncretism and Intercultural Compatibility in Malay Music’, Indonesia and the Malay World, 42:123 (2014), 197–221 Jordaan, Roy and Peter Carey, ‘Thomas Stamford Raffles’ Masonic Career in Java: A New Perspective on the British Interregnum (1811–1816), JMBRAS, 90:2 (2017), 1–34 Kathirithamby-Wells, J., ‘The Age of Transition: The Mid-eighteenth to the Early Nineteenth Centuries’, in Nicholas Tarling (ed.), The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia (2 vols, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), vol. 1, pp. 572–619. —— ‘Hulu-hilir Unity and Conflict: Malay Statecraft in East Sumatra Before the Mid-nineteenth Century’, Archipel, 45 (1993), 77–96 —— ‘Siak and its Changing Strategies for Survival, c.1700–1870’, in

204 Bibliography Anthony Reid (ed.), The Last Stand of Asian Autonomies: Responses to Modernity in the Diverse States of Southeast Asia and Korea, 1750–1900 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 217–43 Koninckx, C., “The Swedish East India Company (1731–1807)”, in Jaap R. Bruijn and Femme S. Gaastra (eds), Ships, Sailors and Spices: East India Companies and Their Shipping in the 16th, 17th and 18th Centuries (Amsterdam: NEHA, 1993), pp. 121–38 Kratz, E. U., ‘Some Malay Letters on Trade’, Indonesia Circle, 44 (1987), 3–16 Lapian, Adrian B., ‘Violence and Armed Robbery in Indonesian Seas’, in John Kleinen and Manon Osseweijer (eds), Pirates, Ports, and Coasts in Asia: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives (Singapore: ISEAS, 2010), pp. 131–46 Lennon, Walter Caulfield, ‘Journal of an expedition to the Molucca Islands under the command of Admiral Rainier …’ in J. E. Heeres, ‘Eene Engelsche lezing omtrent de verovering van Banda en Ambon in 1796’, BKI, 60:3–4 (1908), 249–368 Leupe, P. A., ‘De verdediging van Ternate onder den Gouverneur Johan Godfried Budach 1796–1799, eene bijdrage tot de geschiedenis onzer Oost-Indische bezittingen’, BKI, 8 (1865), 262–363 —— “Stukken betrekkelijk de verdediging van Ternate door den Gouverneur Willem Jacob Cranssen 1800–1801, en de overgave van het gouvernement aan de Engleschen op den 21 Junij 1801, door den Raad van Politie aldaar”, BKI, 3:5 (1870), 215–338 —— ‘Captain John McCluer en zijn verrichtingen om de Oost, 1790–1795’, BKI, 25, 4e volgreeks, Ist deel (1877), 250–78 Lewis, Dianne N., ‘British Policy in the Straits of Malacca to 1819 and the Collapse of the Traditional Malay State Structure’, in Brook Barrington (ed.), Empires, Imperialism and Southeast Asia: Essays in Honour of Nicholas Tarling (Clayton: Monash Asia Institute, 1997), pp. 17–33 —— ‘Kedah – The Development of a Malay State in the 18th and 19th Centuries’, in A. Reid and L. Castles (eds), Pre-Colonial State Systems in Southeast Asia: The Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Bali-Lombok, South Celebes (Kuala Lumpur: MBRAS 1979), pp. 36–43 —— ‘The Growth of the Country Trade in the Straits of Malacca, 1760–1777’, JMBRAS, 43:2 (1970), 114–30 Lieberman, Victor, ‘Wallerstein’s System and the International Context of Early Modern Southeast Asian History’ Journal of Asian Studies, 24:1 (1990), 70–90 Lindblad, J. Thomas, ‘The Outer Islands in the 19th Century: Contest for the Periphery’, in Howard Dick, et al. (eds), The Emergence of a

Bibliography 205 National Economy: An Economic History of Indonesia, 1800–2000 (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin 2002), pp. 82–110 Logan, J. R., ‘Notices of Penang’, The Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Sea, NS, 2 (1858), 182–283 Lombard, Denys, ‘The Malay Sultanate as a Socio-economic Model’, in Denys Lombard and Jean Aubin (eds), Asian Merchants and Businessmen in the Indian Ocean and the China Sea (New Delhi: Oxford University Press 2000), pp. 113–120 Manguin, Pierre-Yves, ‘The Merchant and the King: Political Myths of Southeast Asian Coastal Polities’, Indonesia, 52 (1991), 41–54 —— ‘The Amorphous Nature of Coastal Polities in Insular Southeast Asia: Restricted Centres, Extended Peripheries’, Moussons, 5 (2002), 73–99 Marshall, P. J., ‘Private British Trade in the Indian Ocean Before 1800’, in Ashin Das Gupta and M. N. Pearson (eds), India and the Indian Ocean 1500–1800 (Calcutta: Oxford University Press 1987), pp. 276–300 Miller, W. G., ‘Robert Farquhar in the Malay World’, JMBRAS, 51:2 (1978), 123–38 —— ‘Thomas Forrest on the West Coast of Sumatra, 1786–87’, unpublished paper, ASAA, 3rd National Conference, Brisbane, 24–9 August 1980 —— ‘Why Did Syarif Kassim Kill Captain Sadler at Mempwah in 1795?’, JMBRAS, 85:1 (2012), 63–84 —— ‘Different Perspectives on the Resistance of a Malay State: Mempawah 1787–1808’, Indonesia and the Malay World, 41:141 (2013), 348–69 Murtagh, B., ‘Portrayals of British Individuals in Malay Literature’, in V. Braginsky and B. Murtagh (eds), The Portrayal of Foreigners in Indonesian and Malay Literatures, Essays on the Ethnic “Other” (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 2007), pp. 107–64 Nicholl, R., ‘The Letter of William Midwinter’, Brunei Museum Journal, 5:4 (1984), 46–52 Raja Masittah Raja Ariffin, ‘Thomas Bowrey (1650–1713)’, Jurnal Dewan Bahasa, 36:7 (1992), 664–9 Reece, Bob and F. Andrew Smith, ‘Joseph Burn and Raffles’s Plan for a British Borneo’, Borneo Research Bulletin, 37 (2006), 27–49 Reid, Anthony, ‘A New Phase of Commercial Expansion in Southeast Asia, 1760–1850’ in Reid, Anthony (ed.), The Last Stand of Asian Autonomies: Responses to Modernity in the Diverse States of Southeast Asia and Korea, 1750–1900 (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 57–81

206 Bibliography Reid, Anthony and Radin Fernando, ‘Shipping on Melaka and Singapore as an Index of Growth, 1760–1840’, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 19:1 (1996), 59–84 Roo, L. W. G. de, ‘J.W. Cranssen te Ternate, 13 September 1799 – 18 Juni 1801’, TBG, 16 (1867), 503–35 Simmonds, E. H. S., ‘The Thalang Letters, 1773–94: Political Aspects and the Trade in Arms’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies University of London, 26:3 (1963), 592–619 Smith, F. Andrew, ‘An “Arch-villain” to be Rehabilitated? Mixed Perceptions of Pangeran Anom of Sambas in the Early Nineteenth Century; with an Appendix on John Hunt’, Borneo Research Bulletin, 38 (2007), 101–17 —— ‘Captain Burn and Associates: British Intelligence-gathering, Trade, and Litigation in Borneo and Beyond during the Early Nineteenth Century’, Borneo Research Bulletin, 35 (2004), 48–69 —— ‘Daniel Smith’s Last Seven Years: Hardships in Country Trade in the East Indies in the Early Nineteenth Century’, Borneo Research Bulletin, 39 (2008) ,1–15 —— ‘Missionaries, Mariners, and Merchants: Overlooked British Travelers to West Borneo in the Early Nineteenth Century’, Borneo Research Bulletin, 33 (2002), 45–61 Sutherland, Heather, ‘Geography as Destiny? The Role of Water in Southeast Asian History’, in Peter Boomgaard (ed.), A World of Water: Rain, Rivers and Seas in Southeast Asian Histories (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007), pp. 27–70 Tagliacozzo, Eric, ‘Coasting to Canton: Junks, Country Traders, and the Southeast Asian “Exotica Trade”’, in Geoffrey B. Hainsworth (ed.), Globalization and the Asian Economic Crisis: Indigenous Responses, Coping Strategies, and Governance Reform in Southeast Asia (Vancouver: Centre for Southeast Asia Research, Institute of Asian Research, University of British Columbia, 1999), pp. 39–58 —— ‘A Necklace of Fins: Marine Goods Trading in Maritime Southeast Asia, 1780–1860’, International Journal of Asian Studies, 1:1 (2004), 23–48 Tarling, Nicholas, ‘The Relationship between British Policies and the Extent of Dutch Power in the Malay Archipelago 1784–1871’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 4:2 (1958), 179–92 —— ‘The Prince of Merchants and the Lion City’, JMBRAS, 37 (1964), 20–40 Van Dissel, D., ‘Hughes, Sir Walter Watson (1803–1887)’, Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/hughes-sir-

Bibliography 207 walter-watson-3813/text6051, published first in hardcopy 1972, accessed online 27 February 2017. Velthoen, Esther J., ‘“Wanderers, Robbers and Bad Folk”: the Politics of Violence, Protection and Trade in Eastern Sulawesi 1750–1850’, in Anthony Reid (ed.), The Last Stand of Asian Autonomies: Responses to Modernity in the Diverse States of Southeast Asia and Korea, 1750–1900 (Houndsmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 367–88. Warren, James F., ‘A Tale of Two Centuries: The Globalization of Maritime Raiding and Piracy in Southeast Asia at the End of the Eighteenth and Twentieth Centuries’, in Peter Boomgaard (ed.), A World of Water: Rain, Rivers and Seas in Southeast Asian Histories (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007), pp. 125–52 Webster, A., ‘British Export Interests in Bengal and Imperial Expansion into South-east Asia, 1780–1824: The Origins of the Straits Settlements’, in B. Ingham and C. Simmons (eds), Development Studies and Colonial Policy (London: Frank Cass 1987), pp. 138–74 —— ‘British Expansion in South-East Asia and the Role of Robert Farquhar, Lieutenant-Governor of Penang, 1804–5’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 23:1 (1995), 1–25 Wilkinson, R. J., ‘Letter-writing’, in R. J. Wilkinson (ed.) Papers on Malay Subjects Part III, Malay Literature (Kuala Lumpur: Printed by J. Russell at the F.M.S. Government Press, 1907), pp. 21–48 —— “Notes on Malay Letter-writing”, in R. O. Winstedt, Malay Grammar (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1927), pp. 183–205 Willer, J. T., ‘Eerste proeve eener Kronijk van Mampawa en Pontianak’ [A preliminary chronicle of Mempawah and Pontianak], TBG,, III, pp. 516–62 and VI (new series III) (1855–7), 69–74 Wright, H. R. C., ‘The Anglo-Dutch Dispute in the East, 1814–1824’, Economic History Review, 3 (1950–1), 229–39 —— ‘The Moluccan Spice Monopoly, 1770–1824’, JMBRAS, 31:4 (1958), i–iv, 1–127 Wurtzburg, C. E., ‘Who Planned the Sea Route of the Java Expedition in 1811?’ The Mariner’s Mirror: The Journal of the Society for Nautical Research, 37 (1951), 104–8

Theses Miller, W. G., ‘The Moluccas under the British’ (unpublished MA thesis, University of Hull, 1974) Rainbow, S. G., ‘English Expeditions to the Dutch East Indies during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars’ (unpublished MA thesis, University of London, 1933)

208 Bibliography Reber, Anne Lindsey, ‘The Private Trade of the British in West Sumatra, 1735–1770’ (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Hull, 1977)

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INDEX

Ships’ names, sea captains’ titles and published works are in italics. Page numbers in bold refer to illustrations and their captions.

Aceh  8, 21, 26, 28, 29, 34, 35, 39, 106, 108 Abdullah, Munshi see Munshi Abdullah Abdulrahman  80, 82, 88, 92, 93 see also Sultan of Pontianak Agency houses  14–15, 28, 31, 80, 81, 92, 94, 100, 181–2 see also Fairlie and Co., Colvin and Co., Lambert and Ross, Joseph Barretto, John Palmer, Parry, Lane and Co., Jourdain, Sulivan and De Souza. Agent to the Governor-General with the Malay States  93, 133, 136, 142 see also Special Agent to the Malay States Ambon see Amboyna Amboyna  22, 26, 66, 67, 69, 71, 72, 74, 88, 98, 107, 111, 116, 118, 119, 120, 125–9, 133, 134, 135, 153, 154, 157, 160, 161, 162, 163, 165, 168, 170, 171, 174, 175, 179 Amboyna  138, 139 America  25, 99 Anak Raja  51 Andaya, B. W.  36, 157 Anglo/Dutch hostility  56, 128, 151, 152–3, 159, 163–5, 169, 170–2, 174 see also Rivalry, British/Dutch

Anglo-Dutch War (1780–1784)  56, 159 Arab  78, 162 Arab traders  39, 180 Arabic script see Jawi Archipelago see Malay Archipelago Armenian traders  4 Arms  28, 33, 45, 58, 67, 68, 70, 75, 76–7, 85, 94, 96, 119, 125, 129, 130, 154, 157, 160, 173 Arnold, Joseph  23 Arrogant 104 Aru 179 Asian trade  14, 155 Assey, Charles  145 Astle, George, Captain 131 Austin, Captain 52 Ayer Laboo (Irelaboo)  32, 35–6 Bachian  37, 61, 69, 119 Bailes, Captain 32 Balambangan  35, 88, 98, 133 Bale of Cotton Rock  149 Bali  61, 136 Banca see Bangka Banda  88, 98, 111, 118, 120, 128, 133, 157, 160, 161, 162, 165, 168, 170, 179 Banda’s Welvaren 71 Bangalore  130, 132 Bangka  29, 81, 137

210 Index Banjermasin  30, 61, 140, 142, 154, 159 Banka see Bangka Banking 14 Banks, Sir Joseph  63, 146 Bantam  8, 154 Banten see Bantam Barter system  9 Bassett, D. K.  8, 15, 35, 99, 108, 110, 146, 185 Bastin, John  135, 140, 143 Batavia  14, 22, 23, 25, 28, 29, 54, 55, 61, 76, 81, 88, 114, 141, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 164, 168, 171, 174,178, 181 Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen  141 Batavian Republic  164 Batavian Society of Arts and Sciences see Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen Bathurst, Captain 165 Battle of Pulo Auro  165 Bay of Bengal  8, 9, 34, 104, 149, 164 Beaumont, J. R., Captain 144 Beeckman, Daniel  30 Beeswax 13 Bekkisbaker (Dutch Resident)  156 Bencoolen  5, 9, 14, 29, 38, 45, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 81, 101, 102, 103, 106, 109, 133, 143, 146, 154, 155, 156 Bengal  5, 7, 8, 12, 13, 14, 36, 54, 55, 65, 67, 68, 72, 73, 74, 80, 81, 84, 94, 100, 109, 113, 116, 119, 120, 122, 125–8, 134, 146, 161, 173, 181, 183 Benkulu see Bencoolen Betel 13 Betsy  53, 54, 61 Bezoar stones  13 Bills 13 Bird of Paradise feathers  13 Birds’ nests  13 Blambangan (Java)  61 Bolam, Martin  81 Bombay  4, 5, 6, 13, 14, 28, 92, 147, 149

Bombay Marine  62, 85, 103, 108, 111, 114, 129, 139, 148 Bonetta 156 Bonney, R.  16 Borneo  20, 21, 22, 33, 39, 55, 61, 79, 83, 137, 140, 141–3, 159 Borneo (West)  15, 55, 78, 85, 89, 91, 94 Botham, Henry  101–3 Boulger, Demetrius Charles  144 Bound, John, Captain 48 Bowan, Mr.  81 Bowen, H. V.  99 Bowrey, Thomas  39, 40, 42, 147 Boxer, C. R.  2 Britain  1, 53, 58, 60, 73, 88, 99, 107, 124, 134, 144, 162, 163 British  1, 4, 9, 14, 25, 33, 35, 40, 44, 45, 47, 53, 54, 59, 63, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 78, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 91, 92, 95, 96, 100, 101, 103, 104, 111, 113, 116, 118, 125, 126, 130, 132, 134, 135, 138, 140, 143, 155, 156, 164, 166, 169, 170, 171, 177, 179, 180, 183 agents  133, 142, 180 businesses  104, 107, 180–1 colonial society  145, 149–50 Empire  5, 14, 97, 98, 99, 101, 106, 107, 108, 111, 113–15, 123, 127–8, 133, 135, 140–3, 150, 186 Navy  16, 47, 67, 69, 70, 72, 88, 107, 116, 117, 127, 135, 137, 139, 148, 157, 162, 164–5, 175 see also English British officials see Company servants British traders see Country traders British/Dutch rivalry see Rivalry, British/Dutch Brooke, James  143 Brougham, Captain (Military)  130 Brunei 142 Budach, Johan Godfried  71 Bugis  22, 46, 51, 52, 53, 54, 78, 80, 99, 127, 178, 179, 180 Bulley, Anne  16 Burma  51, 58, 59, 60

Index 211 Burn, Joseph, Captain  78, 84, 86–7, 91–3, 95, 137, 140–2, 147 Burr, Daniel, Colonel  128–32 Buru 115 Calcutta  5, 6, 7, 13, 14, 28, 29, 45, 49, 55, 56, 69, 71, 75, 77, 84, 95, 116, 125, 131, 144, 149, 161, 162, 164, 165, 173, 181 Calcutta Gazette  83, 146, 173 Camphor 13 Canning, George  143 Cannon see Arms Canton  4, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 25, 28, 29, 52, 53, 114, 148, 149, 159, 160, 161, 165, 172, 177, 183 see also China Cape of Good Hope  4 Carnegy, Captain 136 Celebes see Sulawesi Ceram  26, 30, 37, 63, 66, 67, 71, 115–17, 119, 120, 124, 126, 127 Ceram Laut  37, 38, 119, 122, 124–6 Cerita Banka 45 Ceylon  66, 153 Charlotte of Chittagong  11 Charts  33, 76, 139, 148–9 China  6, 13, 14, 65, 101, 114, 144, 146, 149, 160, 161, 163, 165, 169, 173 see also Canton China trade  9, 12–13, 19, 28, 31, 33, 61, 159, 165, 180, 182, 183, 185 Chinese  39, 55, 66, 79, 80, 162, 177, 178, 179, 180, 182, 183 Chinese junks see Junks Class, Charles  48 Clark, Captain 49 Clarke, Captain 27 Clements, John, Captain 101 Clive, Edward, Governor of Madras 125 Clive, Lord see Clive, Edward, Governor of Madras Clive, Robert  5 Cloth see Cotton Cloves  13, 61, 118, 119, 125, 127, 153 Colon Straits  26

Colonial society see under British Colvin and Co.  15 see also Agency houses Commerce see Trade Commerce 89 Company see English East India Company Company officials see Company servants Company servants  2, 3, 5, 9, 14, 27, 30, 33, 38, 44, 60, 61, 62, 72, 73, 88, 97, 98, 99, 100, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 113, 115, 118–27, 133, 138, 141, 146–9, 185 Company ships  2, 3, 7, 24, 65, 114, 127, 139, 148 Compradors see Chinese Concubine(s) 46 Cornwallis, Governor-General  55 Coromandel Coast  4, 55 Corelli 110 Corra-corra see Kora-kora Corruption 3 Cotton  12, 13, 28, 30, 80, 81, 92, 94, 96, 117, 119, 127, 163 Country ships/vessels  7 Country trade, dimensions of   6–7 Country traders  decline of   177–84 in Malay literature  43–50 see also Malay literature origins in India  1–6, 7–9 political involvement with Malay states  Johore 52–7 Kedah 57–60 Mempawah 78–84 Pontianak 84–96 Tidore 61–78 relations with British officials 118–27 relations with Dutch  151, 159–76 social and trade relations with Malays 24–38 social attitudes towards  145–9 types of   13–14 use of by Stamford Raffles 135–45

212 Index use of Malay language  38–43 see also Malay Archipelago Court of Directors  109 Court, J. W., Captain  26, 30, 61, 65, 67, 68, 111–25, 138 Cranssen, Willem Jacob  72, 74, 167–8, 170–4 Crew  162, 172–4 Mortality rates  162 Currie, John  37–8, 124–6 Daendels, Marshal Herman Willem  92, 136, 156 Dalrymple, Alexander  97, 98, 115, 148 Dalrymple, Captain 92 Dammar 13 Danish  6, 173 Danish East India Company  58, 162 Dawes, Walter, Captain  17, 146, 151, 156, 161, 163–74 de Bruijnof, Governor, Malacca 54 Diamonds 13 Diana  37, 68, 71, 118, 119, 122, 126, 127 Diplomacy  74, 109 Djanalabdin see Janalabdin Dorey  65, 66, 67, 109, 111, 112, 113–15 Douglas, Captain  63, 101 Dragon’s blood gum  13 Drunkenness  48, 85, 148 Drury, William, Admiral  133, 139 Drysdale, Captain 89 Duchess  37, 65, 66, 111, 115, 116 Duke of Clarence  37, 65, 66, 67, 69, 71, 111, 113, 116, 119, 122, 124, 125 Dul Baddul  36 Duncan, Captain 119 Dutch  6, 8, 17, 22, 27, 40, 46, 52, 53, 54, 56, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 68–78, 80, 86, 87, 88, 95, 96, 98, 101, 104, 107, 108, 109, 115, 117, 119, 123, 128, 129, 131, 133, 134, 142, 143, 151, 153, 156, 157, 162, 164, 167, 169, 174, 178, 180

Dutch East India Company (VOC)  4, 13, 16, 19, 22, 54, 55, 99, 107, 152, 154–7, 159, 160, 175, 185, 186 Dutch officials  4, 17, 24, 25, 44, 45, 48, 114, 155–6, 162, 163, 164, 167, 169–71, 173–5 Dutch ports  14, 25, 103, 135, 155–9, 160, 180 see also Ports Dutch Resident see Dutch officials Dutch trade monopoly  13, 61, 111, 113, 118, 122, 124, 126, 128, 143, 152, 154, 155, 157, 159, 175, 179, 181, 186 Dutch/Anglo hostility see Anglo/ Dutch hostility Dutch/British rivalry see Rivalry, British/Dutch Dyak  78, 86 East Asia  2 East Indiaman (ship)  3, 47, 49, 101, 102, 140, 162, 165, 180 see also Glatton, Lord North East Indies see Malay Archipelago Eastern Indonesia  5, 62, 111, 132, 136, 178 Eastern Passage  25, 65 Eastern seas  41, 83, 123, 138, 139, 159 Eastern trade  7, 39, 61, 145, 179 see also Malay Archipelago EIC see English East India Company (EIC) Elizabeth  101, 102 Elliot, Gilbert, Ist Earl of Minto see Minto, Lord Elmore, H. M., Captain 32-3 Enemies  151, 154 England  66, 143, 152, 183 English  45, 48, 56, 58, 63, 64, 68, 70, 73, 76, 80, 83, 85, 88, 91, 93, 95, 98, 105, 108, 117, 131, 145, 148, 153, 162, 163, 167, 170, 173, 183 see also British English East India Company (EIC)  2, 3, 14, 16, 24, 27, 28, 30,

Index 213 31, 35, 42, 50, 53, 56, 58, 59, 60, 62, 64, 67, 68, 73, 99, 100, 105, 106, 107, 108, 110, 111, 113, 119, 120, 122, 123, 124, 125, 127, 132, 135, 138, 145,146, 148, 149, 150, 165, 181, 183, 185 Register and directory  161 see also Company servants see also Company ships Envoy  67, 69, 76, 77, 100, 108, 109, 116, 125, 185 Esther 109 Europe(an)  1, 2, 4, 5, 16, 27, 28, 33, 43, 49, 50, 65, 69, 73, 99, 110, 123, 124, 126, 148, 152, 153, 155, 159,160, 162, 163, 169, 170, 175, 178, 179, 180–1, 183, 185, 186 Exotic products  12 Experiment  71, 120 Extirpation policy  118, 123, 124 Factory 5 Fair Armenian 92 Fairlie, William  68, 119 Fairlie and Company  15 see also Agency houses Fame 141 Farquhar, Robert Townsend  37, 67, 72, 73, 98, 120, 121, 123–31, 133, 135, 136, 139, 145, 166, 171 Farquhar, William  98, 144, 178 Firewood see Provisions Flyer 36 Food see Provisions Forrest, Thomas  15, 27, 34–5, 42, 43, 44–5, 48, 56, 58, 61–5, 100, 108–11, 112, 113, 146, 148, 156 Fort Marlborough see Bencoolen Fort Orange see Ternate Fort Rotterdam see Makassar Fort Victoria see Amboyna Fort William see Calcutta France  160, 164 see also French Free mariners see Country traders Free merchants see Country traders Free navigation  4, 152 Free trade see Trade

Freeshard and La Premadie  37 see also Frushard and Laprimandaye French  5, 6, 9, 138, 159, 164 Navy  164–5, 175 privateers  53, 166 see also France Frushard and Laprimandaye  37, 118, 125 Furber, Holden  5, 6, 15, 183 Gambier 179 Gamrange 76 Gebe  37, 66, 75, 115, 116 Geddes, Robert, Captain  46, 53 “General Instructions” of the VOC 153 General Wellesley 92 George III  115 Georgetown see Penang Geser 122 Gighen 35 Gillian Maclaine and Co.  181 Gilolo (island) see Halmahera Gilolo, Sultanate  61, 132 Gingham see Gighen Gita 69 Glass, James, Captain  46, 53, 55–6 Glatton 102 Gold  13, 79, 83, 86, 123 Goram  37, 119, 125 Gotowasi 75 Governor of Madras  122, 131 Governor-General (Dutch)  88, 153, 168 Governor-General (English)  5, 49, 53, 56, 74, 76, 77, 100, 105, 108, 109, 113, 116, 122, 125, 131, 134, 136, 138, 146 Greenberg, Michael  15 Grieg, William, Captain  61, 74–7, 134, 135–7, 140, 144, 148 Grotius, Hugo  152 Groube, Samuel  81–3 Gulf (The)  4 Gum benjamin  13 Guthrie, Alexander  180

214 Index Haga, A.  113 Halmahera  25, 37, 66, 74, 75, 76, 77, 119, 126, 132, 161 Hamilton, Alexander  4, 8, 52, 144 Harbours see Ports Harbourmaster 32 Hare, Alexander, Captain  78, 91, 92, 95, 140, 142, 148 Harlow, Vincent T.  98 Harrier 141 Harrington, Thomas Talbot  180 Hastings, Warren  53, 100, 146 Havildars 130 Hayes, John, Captain  65, 66, 111, 113–32, 139, 147 Herivel, Jan  15 Hikayat Nakhoda Muda 44–5 Hikayat Upu Daeng Menambung 78 History of Java (book)  135, 145 Holland see Dutch, Netherlands Hongi 124–5 Hoogly see Hugli Horsburgh, James  26, 34, 83, 148–9, 178 Hostility, Anglo/Dutch see Anglo/ Dutch hostility Hughes, Captain 156 Hugli 6, 11 Hunt, John  83, 141–2, 147 Ibrahim  124, 126 Ilanun see Iranun Indefatigable  23 India  1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 12, 14, 25, 28, 29, 34, 38, 61, 62, 63, 65, 66, 69, 74, 84, 100, 104, 105, 119, 120, 122, 127, 134, 136, 141, 144, 149, 155, 159, 164, 165, 169, 181, 183 India Office  143 Indiana 144 Indian Navy see Bombay Marine Indian Ocean  2 Indian traders  4, 6, 39, 178, 179, 180, 182 Indonesia(n) 42 Industry 32 Interlopers 154 Iranun  22, 82, 88, 95 Irelaboo see Ayer Laboo Islam  78, 95

Ivory 13 Jakarta see Batavia Jamaludin  135, 138 Jambi 154 Jamilah 46 Janalabdin  66, 74, 75, 76, 77, 124, 135 Java  8, 33, 39, 61, 79, 92, 137–43, 153, 154, 157, 159, 181 Invasion of   89, 98, 136–40, 144, 181 Jawi (Arabic script)  41 John Palmer and Company  15, 94, 181 see also Agency houses Johnston, Alexander Laurie  180 Johor see Johore Johore  9, 21, 22, 46, 51–7, 96 Jones, Sir William  36, 147 Jones, William, Resident of Amboyna  37, 66, 118–20, 122–3, 126–8 Joseph Baretto and Co.  15, 74, 81, 134 see also Agency houses Jourdain, Sulivan and De Souza  57 Junk Ceylon  8, 29, 39, 57, 104, 105 Junk(s)  80, 119, 125, 159, 179, 182 Kalimantan see Borneo Kamaloedin  68, 69 see also Sultan of Tidore Karamata Passage  137, 140 Kassim, Syarif, Panembahan of Mempawah and Sultan of Pontianak  37, 43, 48, 80–9, 90, 91–6, 137 Kayu Merah  70, 130 Kedah  8, 26, 28, 30, 36, 39, 40, 51, relations with British  57–60, 96, 104, 108 Kerton, William, Captain 101–4 Kew Letters  127 Kiamera see Kayu Merah Kimelaha 69 King, William, Captain 31 Kirton, William see Kerton, William

Index 215 Kjai Demang  44–5 Kora-kora  42, 69, 71, 75, 129 Krakatoa 25 Kratz, E. U.  30, 43 Kris  84, 95 Kupang 141 Laboo Padee  27 Lambert, Anthony  6 n.21 Lambert, Charles  84 Lambert and Ross  15, 81 see also Agency houses Lander, Robert  37, 61, 65, 66, 68, 71, 111, 115, 118–19, 126, 132 Language see under Malay Archipelago Laurie, Robert  149 Law of Nations  152 Leadenhall Street  3 Lennon, Walter Caulfield  107 Letter writing  16, 43, 48–9, 56, 63–4, 89, 90, 91-3, 100, 104, 125 Leupe, P.A.  171 Lewis, Dianne  15, 55, 99 Leyden, John  92, 141 Lieutenant-Governor of Java  136, 141, 142, 143 Lieutenant-Governor of Penang  133, 135 Light, Francis, Captain  15, 16, 19, 29, 30, 35, 40, 42, 43, 48, 49, 57–60, 104–8, 133, 147 Lindsay, Captain  43, 105 Linggi 9 Linois, Charles-Alexandre Leon Durand, Admiral  164–5 Lirung 27 Local officials see Dutch officials London  12, 13, 41, 107, 109, 143, 146, 148 London 149 Lord Minto  74, 76, 139 see also Minto, Lord, GovernorGeneral Lord North 102 Low, James, Colonel  106 Lucy Maria  151, 160–3, 166–7, 172-6 Lynch, Francis, Captain  37, 61, 68–9, 71, 73, 111, 117–34, 138–9, 147

Maba  68, 69, 75, 76, 77, 126, 135 Macao  28, 29, 114, 172 Macassar see Makassar Macdonald, Forbes Ross, Major  106 Macdonald, D., Captain  84, 147, 148 Mace  13, 118, 153 Maclaine, Gillian see Gillian Maclaine and Co. Macquoid, Thomas see Thomas Macquoid, Davidson and Company Madras  4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 14, 28, 57, 58, 92, 122, 126, 127–8, 132, 149, 173, 174 Madras Courier 116 Madras Government Gazette  173, 174 Makassar  22, 119, 154, 156, 157, 178 Malabar  28, 55 Malabar 139 Malacca  14, 28, 29, 48, 53, 88, 89, 98, 136, 137, 138, 141, 142, 154, 155, 157, 160, 162, 164, 171, 178 Malacca Straits  8, 26, 51, 59, 108, 117, 165, 180 Malay Archipelago  2, 4, 6, 9, 12, 13, 14, 19, 25, 28, 39, 41, 53, 80, 98, 99, 101, 104, 106, 107, 108, 110, 111, 113, 117, 135, 140, 143, 146, 148, 149, 152, 159, 161, 162, 164, 177, 181, 185–6 dangers of sailing in  28, 33, 34, 36, 82, 83, 84, 89, 95, 151, 156, 174–5 language of   20, 32, 35, 38–43, 45, 64, 65, 95, 99, 131, 138, 142, 147, 149, 163, 182 politics of   20, 21, 22, 36, 51, 55, 61, 65, 78, 80, 86, 91, 95, 96, 100, 114, 115, 123, 125, 126, 134, 151, 152, 174, 185 products of   13, 28, 79, 153, 182, 183 protocols of   65, 95, 100, 104, 149, 185 rulers in  19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 30, 43, 46, 62, 65, 78, 80, 96, 98, 100, 103, 104, 108, 134, 140, 177, 185

216 Index society of   19, 20, 34–8, 40, 43, 48, 49, 64, 78, 87, 104, 105, 106, 107, 109, 110, 131, 133, 145, 146, 149, 178, 185 trade in  7, 15, 16, 21, 22, 28–33, 52, 55, 79, 96, 98, 99, 104, 106, 114, 115, 125, 142, 143, 147, 149, 152–4, 159, 169, 174, 177, 178–83, 185 Malay character  34, 36, 83, 95, 146, 153 Malay interpreter  32 Malay language see under Malay Archipelago Malay letter writing see Letter writing Malay literature  43–48, 78 Malay Peninsula  20, 21, 22, 33, 39, 143 Malay States/Principalities  8, 16, 20–2, 30, 31, 51, 59, 80, 108, 142, 143, 144, 145, 153, 155, 159, 180, 185 Maluku see Moluccas Mare 69 Marsden, William  38, 39, 40, 63, 110, 146, 147 Marsden Collection  42 Marshall, P. J.  15 Martin, William Bryant  133–4, 138, 139 Master Attendant Amboyna  133 Masulipatnam 6 Matan 57 Mates see Officers Mauritius 121 McCluer, John, Captain  97, 111, 114, 115 McNeile, Daniel, Major  128 Mempawah  28, 29, 37, 48, 51, 55, 61, 78–96 Mercantile firms  180–2 Mercury 144 Mergui Archipelago  8, 29, 108 Midwinter, William  81, 83 Military expansion  5 Minangkabau 103 Mindanao  34–5, 110 Minerva 29

Minto, Lord, Governor-General  74, 77, 94, 98, 133, 134, 136–40, 153 Misa Melayu 45 Misool  26, 74, 117 Mitchell, Commodore  114 Moluccas  26, 27, 30, 35, 37, 51, 55, 61–7, 73, 74, 76, 77, 78, 98, 100, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111–35, 136, 138,139, 145, 162, 164, 166, 168, 169, 171 Monckton, Edward  105 Monkton, J.  77 Monopoly  4, 123, 160 see also Dutch trade monopoly Moore, Captain  119, 120 Moors 162 Morotai 161 Morse, H. B.  183 Muhammad Saleh  64 Munshi Abdullah  47-8 Munster Lass 48 Music 109 Myanmar see Burma Nagapatnam 159 Napoleon 142 Natal (Sumatra)  9, 29, 81 Native states see Malay States Naval officer(s)  3, 4 Negeri see Malay States/Principalities Neptune 156 Netherlands  99, 101, 164 see also Dutch Netherton, Captain 156 New Albion  65, 66, 67, 111, 113–15, 129 New Guinea  25, 27, 35, 37, 62, 65, 66, 74, 75, 76, 110, 111, 119 Newcombe, Captain 117 Nicobar Islands  29 North Sea  152 Nuku  43, 74, 132 relations with British  63–4, 67, 69, 72–3, 77, 111, 116, 122–4, 126, 128–30, 167, 169, 170 relations with country traders  37, 63–73, 111, 115–16, 118, 119–31, 169, 170

Index 217 relations with Dutch  167–9 see also Sultan of Tidore Nutmeg  13, 118, 119, 153 Obi  119, 123 Officers  32, 47, 48, 81, 101, 110, 124, 156, 162 Oliver, James  167 Opium  12, 13, 28, 30, 49, 53, 80, 81, 91, 96, 156, 160, 179, 182 Orang-utan 94 Oriental culture  147 Osman 87 Osso 75 Ostend Company  162 Outer Islands  179 Pacific 99 Padang  29, 81, 98, 101–4, 157 Pahang 9 Painan see Pulo Cinquo Palmer, John  78, 94–5, 181 see also Agency houses, John Palmer and Company Panembahan  36, 79, 80, 86, 93 see also Kassim, Syarif, Panembahan of Mempawah Pangeran Anom  89 Papua see New Guinea Parkinson, C. Northcote  6, 13, 15 Parry, Lane and Co.  92 see also Agency houses Parsees  1, 14 Pasir 61 Patani (Halmahera)  75, 76 Peace of Paris (1784)  159 Pearl, James, Captain 144 Pearl River  10 Pearls 13 Pedir (coast)  28, 29, 36 Pegu 30 Pelew Islands  115 Penambangan Island see Penembangan Island Penang  14, 16, 19, 26, 28, 29, 30, 35, 42, 55, 58–60, 67, 81, 88, 92, 93, 94, 98, 104, 105, 106, 107, 109, 117, 125, 133, 135, 136, 140, 144, 146, 147, 148

Penembangan Island  137 Pepper  13, 30, 153, 155 Perak  28, 39, 45, 96 Persian Gulf   7, 8 Persian traders  39 Philippines  20, 22, 55 Phoenix  67, 69, 119, 125, 130 Phuket see Junk Ceylon Piece goods see Cotton Pinang see Penang Piracy/Pirates  70, 79, 82, 83, 85, 89, 95, 142, 154, 180 Plassey 5 Plassey 52 Political Commissioner of Government for the native states of Borneo  143 Pontianak  28, 29, 51, 56, 78–96, 137, 140, 141, 142, 148 Pope, John Adolphus  15, 16, 26, 30, 32, 35–6, 40, 41, 48, 107, 147 Porcelain 12 Ports  7, 21, 24, 25, 28, 33, 41, 53, 55, 79, 80, 127, 143–5, 155, 178, 180 see also Dutch ports Portugal 2 Portuguese  2, 162 Portuguese Timor  63 Prahu  55, 59, 61, 119, 127, 178, 179 The Precious Gift see Tuhfat al-nafis Prince Henry 53 Prince of Wales Island see Penang Princess Royal  26, 28, 147 Private trade  2, 3 Privateer see under French Products see under Malay Archipelago Province Wellesley  60 Provisions  24–8, 44, 67, 77, 156 Pulau Cingkuk see Pulo Cinquo Pulau Pinang see Penang Pulo Cinquo  101, 103 Pulo Trocton  26 Raffles, Thomas Stamford  83, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 98, 135–45, 153, 177, 180, 181 Rainier, Peter, Admiral  67, 69, 88, 116, 117, 118, 128, 129, 165

218 Index Raja  36, 87, 120 Raja Ali  55–7, 80 Raja Ampat  66 Raja Haji  53–5, 100 Raja Muda  35, 73, 110, 124, 126 Raja of Boni  108 Raja of Sambas  89 Rangoon  29, 48 Rannie, David, Captain 61 Ratings see Crew Reece, Bob  92 Reid, Anthony  43 Rembang 156 Remittances  14, 53 Resink, G. J.  155 Riau  9, 28, 41, 46, 52–7, 61, 80, 88, 100, 108, 109, 159, 178 Richardson, William  34 Risdon, William, Captain  61, 65–8, 71, 111, 113, 116, 119, 124 Rivalry, British/Dutch  4, 53, 104, 113, 123, 128, 133, 151–60, 166, 174, 179 See also Anglo-Dutch hostility Romanisation 41 Ross, Captain 89 Royal Merchant see Saudagar Raja Royal Navy see British Navy Royal Society  146, 148 Ruby 72 Sadler, Thomas, Captain  36, 48, 78–89, 91, 92, 95, 146, 148 Sahu 71 Salary 4 Salawati 74 Salayer Islands  132, 156 Sambas  83, 85, 89, 95, 142 Saudagar Raja  31, 36 Sawai 117 Scott, Captain  94, 136 Scott, James, Captain  16, 58, 104–8, 110, 117, 119, 147, 148 Sea Queen 63 Selangor  9, 22, 26, 28, 96, 159 Semangka 44 Semarang 156 Sengaji  68, 69

Sepoy(s)  58, 69, 113, 131 Seram see Ceram Servants see Company servants Seven Years’ War  5 Shaw, John  67, 125–6 Shaw, Samuel  25 Shipbuilding  7, 13, 14 Ships  13-14, 139–40 see also, Amboyna, Arrogant, Banda’s Welvaren, Bangalore, Betsy, Bonetta, Charlotte of Chittagong, Diana, Duchess, Duke of Clarence, Elizabeth, Esther, Experiment, Fair Armenian, Fame, Flyer, General Wellesley, Glatton, Harrier, Indefatigable, Industry, London, Lord Minto, Lord North, Lucy Maria, Malabar, Minerva, Munster Lass, Neptune, Phoenix, Princess Royal, Royal Charlotte, Sea Queen, Stag, Sultan, Tartar, Tartar Galley, Transfer, True Briton, Tweed, Venus, Vienna see also East Indiamen Siam  51, 58, 59, 60, 104 see also Thai Siberg, Johannes, GovernorGeneral 168 Silk 12 Simmonds, E. H. S.  43 Singapore  14, 98, 135, 136, 144–5, 177–83 Singkel  see Singkil Singkil 32 Sketch of Borneo 141 Skinner, Captain  120, 122 Smith, Daniel  78, 93–5, 136, 156 Smith, F. Andrew  15, 92, 141 Smugglers/Smuggling  13, 118–20, 122, 123–6, 151, 154, 155, 156, 163, 180 Soasio  63, 69, 77, 126, 129, 167 South Asia  15 see also India South China Sea  165 Southeast Asia  2, 16, 24, 28, 33, 39, 43, 97, 98, 99, 141, 182 Spain 99 Special Agent to the Malay States  93, 133, 136, 142

Index 219 see also Agent to the GovernorGeneral with the Malay States Specie  120, 127 Spice Islands  37, 62, 118, 120, 180 Spice trade  37, 61, 74, 120, 126–7, 153 Spices  37, 38, 64, 68, 114, 115, 118, 119, 120, 122, 123, 125, 132, 134, 155, 166, 179 Stag 80 St. Helena  142 Stewart, Captain  67, 68, 136 Straits of Malacca see Malacca Straits Straits of Sunda see Sunda Straits Success 61 Sukadana  55, 56, 80, 157 Sulawesi  22, 33, 51, 55, 178 Sultan  67, 69, 119, 125 Sultan Nuku see Nuku Sultan of Aceh  110 Sultan of Bachian  62, 62 Sultan of Johore  55, 144 Sultan of Kedah  35, 55, 57–60, 104, 105, 107 Sultan of Pontianak see Abdulrahman and Kassim, Syarif, Panembahan of Mempawah and Sultan of Pontianak Sultan of Sulu  63 Sultan of Ternate  73, 125 Sultan of Tidore  69, 125, 130, 135, 166 see also Jamaludin, Janalabdin, Kamaloedin, Nuku Sultan of Trengganu  46, 49 Sultanate of Gilolo see Gilolo, Sultanate Sultanate of Mindanao see Mindanao Sumatra  9, 20, 22, 33, 34, 44, 79, 81, 106, 159 Sumatra (West)  29, 32, 98, 101, 103, 109, 157 Sumbawa 27 Sunda Straits  25 Supreme Court, Calcutta  146 Surat  2, 4, 6, 7 Swedish East India Company  162 Syarif Kassim see Kassim, Syarif

Tabour, W., Chief Mate  101, 102 Tabor, W. see Tabour, W. Tagliacozzo, Eric  15 Tait, Captain 136 Talaud Islands  27 Tapanuli 9 Tartar 61 Tartar Galley  35, 62, 109, 110, 112, Tasmania 65 Tea  9, 12, 159, 160 Tenasserim  8, 108 Ternate  21, 22, 61, 63–73, 75, 76, 111, 123, 126–32, 151, 154, 157, 158, 160–75, 179 Textiles see Cotton Thai  29, 42, 57, 105 Thailand see Siam Thalang see Junk Ceylon Thomas Macquoid, Davidson and Company 181 Tidore  21, 37, 51, 61–78, 96, 109, 111, 115, 116, 118, 119, 123, 124, 126–31, 134, 135, 166–70, 175 Timor see Portuguese Timor Tin  30, 52, 160 Tortoise shell  13 Trade monopoly see Dutch trade monopoly Trade native  178, 179, 182–3 networks  7–13, 28, 115, 178, 182 procedures  28–33, 49 see also Eastern trade, Free trade, Malay Archipelago Tranquebar  173, 174 Transfer  29, 36, 81, 83, 85 Treaty of Amiens (1802)  163, 172 Treaty of London (1824)  179–80 Treaty, British –Tidore  73 Treaty, Dutch  73, 155 Trengganu  9, 28, 29, 49, 51, 53, 96 Trepang 13 Trocki, C. A.  182 True Briton 26 Trusan see Mempawah Tuan Gilolo, see Gilolo, Sultanate Tuan Haji  42, 110 Tuhfat al-nafis  45, 55 Tweed  119, 122

220 Index Typhus 162 Udney, Frieshard and Laprimaude 113 van Braam Houckgeest, A. E.  114 Venus 114 Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie see Dutch East India Company (VOC) Vienna 48 VOC see Dutch East India Company (VOC) VOC officials see Dutch officials War in Europe  163–6, 168

Waru  66, 115–17, 119, 122, 126 Water see Provisions Weapons see Arms Webster, Anthony  28, 100, 152 Weda 76 West Borneo see Borneo (West) West Irian  65 see also New Guinea West Sumatra see Sumatra (West) Whampoa  6, 7, 10 Widgeon, Captain 149 Wieling, Carel Lodewijk  162–3, 166, 169, 172, 174 Wilson, Thomas, Captain 29 Wool 12 Wright, H. R. C.  132

WORLDS OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY The Richest East India Merchant: The Life and Business of John Palmer of Calcutta, 1767–1836, Anthony Webster The Great Uprising in India, 1857–58: Untold Stories, Indian and British, Rosie Llewellyn-Jones The Twilight of the East India Company: The Evolution of Anglo-Asian Commerce and Politics, 1790–1860, Anthony Webster Scottish Orientalists and India: The Muir Brothers, Religion, Education and Empire, Avril A. Powell The East India Company’s London Workers: Management of the Warehouse Labourers, 1800–1858, Margaret Makepeace The East India Company’s Maritime Service, 1746–1834: Masters of the Eastern Seas, Jean Sutton The East India Company and Religion, 1698–1858, Penelope Carson British Naval Power in the East, 1794–1805: The Command of Admiral Peter Rainier, Peter A. Ward The Emergence of British Power in India, 1600–1784: A Grand Strategic Interpretation, G. J. Bryant Naval Resistance to Britain’s Growing Power in India, 1660–1800: The Saffron Banner and the Tiger of Mysore, Philip MacDougall Trade and Empire in Early Nineteenth-Century Southeast Asia: Gillian Maclaine and his Business Network, G. Roger Knight Lascars and Indian Ocean Seafaring, 1780–1860: Shipboard Life, Unrest and Mutiny, Aaron Jaffer

Defending British India against Napoleon: The Foreign Policy of Governor-General Lord Minto, 1807–13, Amita Das, edited and updated by Aditya Das Provincial Society and Empire: The Cumbrian Counties and the East Indies, 1680–1829, K. J. Saville-Smith British Houses in Late Mughal Delhi, Sylvia Shorto The English East India Company’s Silk Enterprise in Bengal, 1750– 1850: Economy, Empire and Business, Karolina Hutková Singapore, Chinese Migration and the Making of the British Empire, 1819–67, Stan Neal British Art and the East India Company, Geoff Quilley