British Politics: The Basics [2 ed.] 2020021110, 2020021111, 9780367189488, 9780367189549, 9780429199509

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication
Table of Contents
List of figures
List of tables
List of boxes
Preface
Part I: Introduction
Chapter 1: British politics in flux
MPs’ Expenses Claims – A Watershed Moment?
Turbulence Begins: The Scottish Referendum
General Election, 2015
EU Referendum, 23 June 2016
Cameron Resigns
May in Government: A ‘Land Grab’ for the Centre Ground?
‘Brexit means Brexit’
The June 2017 General Election – Cautious May’s Big Gamble
A Continuity Election
Attempted Explanations for this Period of Political Turbulence
Further Reading
Chapter 2: The evolution of Britain's political system
The Witan
Curia Regis
Lords and commons meet separately
Parliament’s authority increases
Civil war, 1640–49
Glorious revolution, 1688–89
The hanoverian dynasty
The first prime minister
Political parties
Patronage
The enlightenment
The influence of the French revolution, 1789
Great reform act 1832
Political parties from the mid-nineteenth to the late twentieth century
Lords–commons conflict resolved
Further lords reforms
Parliamentary terms
Votes for women
Devolution
Epilogue
Questions for Discusion
Further Reading
Websites
Part II: The political context
Chapter 3: Introductory overview of the British political system
The underlying ideas
Voting and party government
The major parties
Legislature: House of commons and house of Lords
The executive
Pressure groups
Local government
European union
The media
Questions for discussion
Further reading
Websites
Chapter 4: The social and economic context
Economic beginnings
Imperial beginnings
Industrial revolution and the marxist analysis
Changing class strata
Why no revolution?
Social mobility and education
Economic inequality
Inequalities of the 1980s have never ben erased
Land ownership
Regional differences
Gender
Ethnicity
Questions for discussion
Further reading
Websites
Chapter 5: Political culture
Political culture
Key historical factors in the evolution of British political culture
Economic influences
The constitution
Extremism
Deference
Civil society
Crime
Welfare state
Is British society too open?
MPs’ expenses and the erosion of trust
The ‘Celebrity Politician’
Conclusion
Questions for discussion
Further reading
Chapter 6: The unwritten constitution
Historical emergence of constitutions
‘Dignified’ and ‘efficient’
Parliamentary sovereignty
Sources of the constitution
Amendment of the constitution
Separation of powers
Moran’s ‘core’ and ‘contested’ elements of the constitution
‘Core’
‘Contested’
Current constitutional issues
Further reading
Websites
Chapter 7: Political ideas I: up to New Labour
The emergence of political ideas
Core philosophies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
Post-war developments in political ideas
Further reading
Website
Chapter 8: Political ideas II: from New Labour to Brexit
Cameron’s conservatism
Liberalism
Coalition after May 2010
The ‘Corbyn Revolution’
Rise of UKIP (and in 2019 the Brexit Party)
Impact of CoronaVirus, 2020
Gren Thinking
The Political Fringe
Starmer wins Leadership Contest
Concluding comment
Questions for discussion
Further reading
Websites
Part III The mediating agencies
Chapter 9: Political parties
Functions
Party government from the mid-nineteenth century
The conservative party
Labour party
Liberal democrats
UKIP and the Brexit party
The political fringe
Nationalist parties
Funding political parties
Conclusion: Two-party system in decline?
Questions for discussion
Further reading
Websites
Chapter 10: Pressure groups
Types of pressure groups
Origins of pressure groups
Civil society and pressure groups
Pressure groups and government
Political theory and pressure groups
Questions for discussion
Further reading
Websites
Chapter 11: The mass media
Evolution of political communication
Decline of the press
The broadcast media
Televised election debates
News values
‘Spin’
Question of bias
Regulation of the press
New media
Questions for discussion
Further reading
Websites
Part IV: The legislature
Chapter 12: The monarchy
Functions
Popularity of the monarchy
Excessive cost of royals?
Present power of the monarchy
The monarchy and politics
Questions for discussion
Further reading
Websites
Chapter 13: The House of Lords
Introduction
Present composition
Functions of the house of Lords
Reform
Questions for discussion
Further reading
Websites
Chapter 14: The House of Commons
The power of the Commons
Reforming the Commons
Social background of MPs
Expenses Scandal
Further Reading
Websites
Chapter 15: Voting behaviour in the UK
Early history
The electoral system(s)
The diminishing influence of class on voting
Low election turnout
Other factors influencing voting behaviour
The May 2010 general election
The May 2015 general election
General Election of 2017
Questions for discussion
Further reading
Websites
Chapter 16: The 2019 general election
Background
The Campaign
2019 Election Results
‘The Red Wall’ Shattered
Class and Voting
Gender
Turnout
Tactical Voting
Scotland
Wales
Northern Ireland
Political Parties
Matthew Goodwin’s Conclusions
Further Reading
Part V: The executive
Chapter 17: The prime minister and cabinet
Cabinet
The prime minister
Deputy prime minister
The ‘core executive’
Questions for discussion
Further reading
Websites
Chapter 18: Ministers and civil servants
Ministers
Civil service
Political advisers
Who makes policy – minister or civil servant?
Reforming the civil service
‘Quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisation’, quangos
Questions for discussion
Further reading
Websites
Chapter 19: Policy-making in British government
Policy-making as a ‘system’
Models of policy-making
The policy cycle
Policy-making example: managing the economy
Questions for discussion
Further reading
Websites
Part VI: Sub-national government
Chapter 20: Devolution
Northern ireland
Devolution in the 1970s
Scotland
Wales
Northern Ireland
Devolution: related problems
English nationalism
Regions of England
Greater London government
Scottish independence referendum and its impact
Questions for discussion
Further reading
Websites
Chapter 21: Local government: provenance and decline
Provenance
Post-war decline
Thatcher and local government
The professional in local government
Further reforms
Parish councils
Abolition of the audit commission
Elected mayors
‘Revolutionary’ devolution of powers to local government in 2014–15
The northern powerhouse
Local government association
Politics and local government
Westminster responsibility for local government
Questions for discussion
Further reading
Websites
Chapter 22: The judiciary and politics
Overlooked?
Subordinate?
Autonomous?
Judicial posts
The courts and their personnel
The recruitment of judges
‘Judicial activism’
Enforcing european law
Enforcing the european convention on human rights
Questions for discussion
Further reading
Websites
Part VII: Conclusions
Chapter 23: The extraordinary Brexit saga
The european idea
De Gaulle’s veto
Heath finally victorious 1972
Euro-scepticism gathers strength
Immigration helps growth of UKIP
Cameron grants an in–out referendum, 2013
Theresa May and Brexit
Divorce bill
Negotiations begin on trade relationship
Transitional Period
Factions in conservative party
May limps on
Misconduct in public office?
Key turning point in Brexit saga
Aftermath of election – Brexit troubles over?
Post-Brexit concerns
Questions for discussion
Further reading
Chapter 24: Britain and the world
Historical perspective
The empire and decline
The spheres of foreign policy
The european union as a focus of foreign policy
The anglo-american bond – a special relationship?
The growth of euro-scepticism
Questions for discussion
Further reading
Websites
Chapter 25: Concluding comments: an uncertain future
Weakening of the centre ground
The ‘cultural war’
Impact of the coronavirus pandemic 2020
Other problems pending at time of writing
Questions for Discussion
Further reading
Glossary
Index

Citation preview

“So much changed in British politics between 2015 and the 2020s. Only a genuine expert could explain successfully its significance within a broader understanding of the Basics of that politics. Unsurprisingly Bill Jones is the author who has achieved that.” Alan Ware, Worcester College, University of Oxford, UK “Comprehensive enough to tell students what they need to know yet concise enough to ensure it's a resource to which they will want to return to again and again, this update is a very welcome addition to introductory texts on the ever-changing politics of the UK.” Tim Bale, Queen Mary University of London, UK “Bill Jones manages to cover an amazing amount of ground in this clear and succinct book. It works brilliantly as a compact introductory guide to the British political system, to its history and wider context, and to British politics today.” Kevin Theakston, University of Leeds, UK

BRITISH POLITICS THE BASICS

Fully updated and expanded, the second edition of this still compact text on British politics expertly analyses the major changes in British political life, placing them revealingly within the context of the evolution of British society from absolute monarchy to representative democracy. The author considers each of the major components of British politics in digestible chapters, such as the Monarchy and the House of Lords, the Commons, voting behaviour, parties and pressure groups, the prime minister and cabinet, devolution, local government, and foreign policy. The book includes two new chapters on the EU referendum and Brexit, and the extraordinary December 2019 election, as well as coverage of events such as the coronavirus pandemic, and the respective travails of the increasingly split two major political parties. This readable and comprehensive introduction will be of key interest to A-­level students, undergraduates and those new to the study of British politics. Bill Jones is Senior Honorary Research Fellow at Liverpool Hope University where he was formerly Professor of Politics and History.

THE BASICS

The Basics is a highly successful series of accessible guidebooks which provide an overview of the fundamental principles of a subject area in a jargon-­free and undaunting format. Intended for students approaching a subject for the first time, the books both introduce the essentials of a subject and provide an ideal springboard for further study. With over 50 titles spanning subjects from artificial intelligence (AI) to women’s studies, The Basics are an ideal starting point for students seeking to understand a subject area. Each text comes with recommendations for further study and gradually introduces the complexities and nuances within a subject. THE QUR’AN (SECOND EDITION)

SPORTS COACHING

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EDITION)

JULIANE HOUSE

NICHOLAS WALLIMAN TOWN PLANNING SEMIOTICS

TONY HALL

DANIEL CHANDLER WOMEN’S STUDIES (SECOND EDITION) SPECIAL EDUCATIONAL NEEDS AND

BONNIE G. SMITH

DISABILITY (THIRD EDITION) JANICE WEARMOUTH

SIGMUND FREUD JANET SAYERS

SPORT MANAGEMENT ROBERT WILSON AND MARK PIEKARZ

BRITISH POLITICS (SECOND EDITION) BILL JONES

For a full list of titles in this series, please visit www.routledge. com/The-­Basics/book-­series/B

BRITISH POLITICS T H E B AS ICS SECO ND EDITION

Bill Jones

Second edition published 2021 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2021 Bill Jones The right of Bill Jones to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. First edition published by Routledge 2016

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Jones, Bill, 1946– author. Title: British politics : the basics / Bill Jones. Description: Second edition. | Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2021. | Series: The basics | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2020021110 (print) | LCCN 2020021111 (ebook) | ISBN 9780367189488 (hardback) | ISBN 9780367189549 (paperback) | ISBN 9780429199509 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Great Britain -Politics and government -21st century. Classification: LCC JN238 .J66 2021 (print) | LCC JN238 (ebook) | DDC 320.441 -dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020021110 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020021111 ISBN: 978-0-367-18948-8 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-367-18954-9 (pbk) ISBN: 978-0-429-19950-9 (ebk) Typeset in Bembo by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear

To my wonderful wife Carolyn

CONTENTS



List of figures List of tables List of boxes Preface

Part I Introduction

xii xiii xv xvii

1

  1 British politics in flux   2 The evolution of Britain’s political system

3 21

Part II The political context

35

  3   4   5   6   7   8

37 47 70 86 98 111

Introductory overview of the British political system The social and economic context Political culture The unwritten constitution Political ideas I: up to New Labour Political ideas II: from New Labour to Brexit

x

contents

Part III The mediating agencies   9 Political parties 10 Pressure groups 11 The mass media Part IV The legislature 12 13 14 15 16

The monarchy The House of Lords The House of Commons Voting behaviour in the UK The 2019 general election

Part V The executive 17 The prime minister and cabinet 18 Ministers and civil servants 19 Policy-­making in British government Part VI Sub-­national government 20 Devolution 21 Local government: provenance and decline 22 The judiciary and politics Part VII Conclusions 23 The extraordinary Brexit saga

131 133 153 166

187 189 199 205 219 239

257 259 283 301

323 325 342 359

375 377



contents

24 Britain and the world 25 Concluding comments: an uncertain future

399 412



426 431

Glossary Index

xi

FIGURES

  4.1 Distribution of income in UK 56   4.2 How unequal is income in different countries? 57   4.3 UK Gini co-­efficient, 1961–2015/16 58   4.4 Income share over time 59   4.5 How is wealth shared in Great Britain? 60   4.6 Per capita income in the UK 60   4.7 Half of England is owned by 25,000 landowners – less than 1% of the population 62 11.1 Most popular newspapers in the UK as of September 2019 168 11.2 How left- or right-­wing are the mainstream UK newspapers? 169 12.1 Popularity of monarchy 193 16.1 Turnout falls slightly in 2019 246 17.1 The wiring of the core executive 279 19.1 Input–output model of policy-­making 302 19.2 Policy-­making initiators 306 19.3 Policy-­making: bureaucratic and legislative hurdles 310 21.1 Structure of local government 344 22.1 The three spheres of government and location of judiciary 361 22.2 Courts in the UK 363 23.1 Headline result of 2016 EU referendum 381 25.1 UK party membership, 2019 413

TABLES

  4.1 People from more affluent backgrounds do better educationally than those from poorer families   4.2 Life destinations in UK society   8.1 British political ideas timeline 10.1 Differences between the Health Select Committee recommendations and the government’s childhood obesity plan 12.1 Support for monarchy by age and party 13.1 Composition of the House of Lords, 29 November 2019 14.1 Women MPs by party 14.2 Ages of MPs elected at general elections, 1979–2019 14.3 Black and minority ethnic MPs elected at general elections 14.4 Education of MPs elected in general elections, 1979 to 2017 15.1 How Great Britain voted (%), 1983–2005 15.2 Decline of class voting, 1992–2005 15.3 Class is no longer a reliable indicator of how a person will vote, 2017 15.4 2015 general election results 15.5 England vote share, 2017 election

52 55 126 162 194 200 213 214 215 216 226 226 228 234 237

xiv

tables

15.6 16.1 16.2 17.1 18.1 18.2 18.3 19.1 21.1 21.2

National share of seats Voters by social class in 2019 election Age and voting Changes in Brexit ‘War Cabinet’ membership over time Changing titles in civil service hierarchy Principal central departments Major ministerial departments Economic measures that governments can adjust Function of local authorities Summary of local government structure

237 244 245 262 289 290 290 319 345 349

BOXES

  4.1 Classifying ‘class’   4.2 Private education 11.1 How accurate is John Lloyd’s critique of the media? 11.2 The British press and ‘phone hacking’ 11.3 Government trying to control media endangers democracy says Sky’s Adam Boulton 14.1 The legislative process 14.2 Social background of MPs, 1979–2017 15.1 Tougher penalties urged for those who break electoral laws 15.2 Classifying class 16.1 Labour’s ‘competency problem’ 16.2 Johnson unified the leave vote 17.1 Johnson warns cabinet 17.2 Rapid churn of ministers harmful 17.3 The 13 February 2020 reshuffle 18.1 The ‘generalist’ in the civil service 18.2 Dominic Cummings – a ‘career psychopath’? 18.3 Civil servants and ministers: how they get their own way 18.4 Ministers and civil servants: relationships and the Priti Patel case, March 2020

49 54 176 178 182 209 213 223 224 250 252 261 263 277 291 293 295 296

xvi

boxes

19.1 Institute for Government studies on policy-­making in government 20.1 Powers of the devolved assemblies 20.2 Elections for the London Assembly and mayor 21.1 Local government: election and function 22.1 The function of the law in society 22.2 Brexit and judicial review 22.3 European Convention on Human Rights 23.1 Key issues in 2016 referendum 23.2 Dominic Cummings, mastermind of the successful Leave campaign 23.3 ‘We’ve got our country back!’ 23.4 Dream of reversing Brexit shattered 23.5 Brexit and reputation of British government 25.1 Britannia unchained

312 328 335 356 359 368 371 381 388 391 392 393 419

PREFACE

As readers will discover, my opening chapter serves as a rather long preface to this book in that it seeks to analyse all the extraordinary changes which have crowded into UK politics since the first edition of this book appeared in 2016. The eternal verities of British politics – stable political culture, class-­based voting, conservative judiciary, strong executive government – have all been turned on their head over the past few years – maybe the past decade. Inevitably I’ve had to add a full chapter on Brexit and another on the extraordinary December 2019 election. So many other chapters have had to be fully updated and expanded to allow room for changes to be explained and analysed. A final short chapter looks, despite his safe majority and dominant political position, to an uncertain future and tries to identify the array of icebergs Boris Johnson needs to avoid as he tries to steer the ship of state clear of the dangers surrounding the repercussions of Brexit and the coronavirus pandemic. This has been a difficult book to write because of timing issues. I had the manuscript ready to send in summer of 2019 but the threat of an election stayed my hand and fortunately so. I finally finished the second edition early February 2020 but even then my worry was astonishing things might happen before the book came out. I just hope I managed to include all the major changes in this new edition …

xviii

preface

For UK citizens the future might seems bedecked with dangerous, even ominous, imponderables but to the student of British politics, it is a guarantee that the compelling interest it has provided for us over the past few years, is likely to continue for some time yet. I’d like to thank the editorial team at Routledge for their professionalism and warmth – it’s always a pleasure to work with them, especially Andrew Taylor and Sophie Iddamalgoda. Many thanks also to Sally Quinn for her thorough copy-editing. I must also extend my warmest thanks to my patient and meticulous wife, Carolyn, who has helped with spotting so many typos and other mistakes: those she’s missed I accept must therefore be my own responsibility. Bill Jones Beverley April 2020

Part I INTRODUCTION

1 British Politics in Flux

What’s interesting is we’ve moved more to a politics of identity than a politics of the economy. (George Osborne’s bemused yet accurate reflection in the wake of the Referendum result (Independent, 17 December 2016))

Since the first edition of this book was published in 2016, British politics has experienced so much political turbulence that many of its perceived constants have fragmented or even disappeared to be replaced by new features. My final chapter in the first edition charted the negative trends which had been apparent for some years: declining turnout; increasing lack of trust in politicians and our institutions; the repercussions of the worldwide economic meltdown 2008–09; and the unexpected 2015 Tory election victory. Since then we’ve had the pivotal Referendum result on 23 June 2016; the shock general election which so weakened Theresa May in June 2017; and finally the historic 2019 election which routed Corbyn’s Labour Party and returned Boris Johnson with a substantial majority and the prospect of five, possibly ten years in power. Andy Beckett writes of US and UK politics during these years being characterised by:  Hung parliaments; rightwing populists in power; physical attacks on politicians; Russian influence on western elections; elderly leftists galvanising young Britons and Americans; rich, rightwing leaders in both countries captivating working-­class voters – scenarios close to unimaginable a decade ago have become familiar, almost expected.

4

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Not since the 1970s had there been a decade containing ‘two general elections, a referendum about Europe, fears for the environment, a rising threat of political violence and a pervasive sense of foreboding’ (Beckett, 2019). Then, just as the intractable divisions created by Brexit seemed less intense after Britain left the European Union (EU) at the end of January 2020, along came the coronavirus, which, ironically perhaps, succeeded in finally uniting the whole country in its attempts to resist and overcome the pandemic. This opening chapter seeks to update and delve a little deeper into these extraordinary crises and upheavals plus give consideration to their possible causes and implications.

MPs’ Expenses Claims – A Watershed Moment?  In May 2008 the High Court ruled in favour of a Freedom of Information request into expense claims by UK members of parliament. The Daily Telegraph acquired access to all the details of expenses claims and, correctly judging this was a potentially sensational story, carefully issued it in discrete sections, revealing the extraordinary claims being made. The most lucrative ‘scam’ utilised was ‘flipping’ homes. Members of Parliament (MPs) were allowed to claim expenses on the second home they needed for their work in the London-­based legislature. By re-­nominating second homes they were able claim expenses, including mortgage payments and in several cases able to sell their homes, buy another and do the same thing once again. This enabled some MPs to manipulate their expense accounts to acquire considerable wealth: something unlikely to impress voters. Other expenses included payment for everyday expenses – improvements, cleaning, making numerous claims below the £250 limit requiring receipts; and up to £400 a month for food. The public, hearing how their elected MPs could get them, the tax payers, to pay for things ordinary people had to fund themselves, were generally outraged. Both big parties offered examples of egregious claims – Labour’s Elliot Morley MP received a 16 month prison sentence for claiming for mortgage payments after the debt had been paid off! In retrospect the public did not factor in the many calls for increases in MPs’ pay which had been turned down but offset by



british politics in flux

increases in expenses. Many MPs felt such claims were justified given their relatively low salaries compared with comparable UK professional occupations and other legislatures worldwide. Moreover, most MPs criticised had in reality acted within the limits of expenses rules. However, the regime, once exposed, appeared outrageously inappropriate and unfair to a public which had recently experienced a world financial meltdown and a resultant recession. Some politicians interviewed in the Emily Maitlis BBC programme (24 March 2019) on the scandal suggested the already thin degree of trust between government and people had catalysed the process which ultimately erupted in the June 2016 referendum vote. Maybe the decade of turbulence and crises began with this major loss of faith in our political class (see Beckett, 2019)?

Turbulence Begins: The Scottish Referendum The delegation of domestic powers to Scotland during the early years of Blair’s 1997 government was designed to satisfy desires for regional autonomy but its success seemed merely to encourage nationalist (Scottish Nationalist Party, SNP) sentiment north of the border. The referendum held in the autumn of 2014, would, in the words of SNP leader Alex Salmond, decide the issue of independence ‘for a generation’. The campaign, however, unleashed a bolt of nationalist political energy which anticipated events to come over the next three turbulent years. The SNP went on to lose the vote 55.3% to 44.7% but its acquired energy gathered strength for the party all over Scotland at all levels right up to the 2017 election and later the one in December 2019.

General Election, 2015 After the five years of Tory–Lib Dem Coalition government, opinion polls, which had reflected early big Labour leads, settled on predicting another hung parliament with Ed Miliband probably emerging as prime minister (PM). Professor John Curtice’s BBC Exit Poll defied the pre-­election polls and the results trickling in soon proved there would be no dead heat, so widely predicted it had almost been accepted in advance as a fact, but a small overall majority for David Cameron. For him this was a huge, unexpected

5

6

introduction

victory. Maybe his offer of an EU membership referendum was responsible for his surprise victory? When Miliband resigned, more signs of ‘turbulence’ appeared. Jeremy Corbyn, a veteran ‘hard-­left’ Labour MP had scrabbled to accumulate the requisite 35 MP nominations, required by the rules, to stand in the leadership contest. So confident were the majority of ‘moderate’ MPs that he was bound to lose, some helped nominate the Islington MP on the democratic principle that his wing of the party should anyway be represented. Corbyn’s rousing unreconstructed socialism, surprisingly to many, struck a resonant note with older former Labour members who had left in disgust at Tony Blair’s New Labour and younger cohorts of young voters, now convinced the ‘centrist’ approach had failed and who yearned for a message of hope. As for David Cameron, his confidence could not have been higher at this time. He shared with an ecstatic 2015 party conference the following thoughts: “I really believe we’re on the brink of something special … We can make this era – these 2010s – a defining decade for our country … one which people will look back on and say: ‘That’s the time when the tide turned.’ ” (Beckett, 2019).

EU Referendum, 23 June 2016 The 1975 in–out Referendum on UK membership of the then EEC, far from resolving attitudes towards the transnational body, merely stored up future discontents manifested in the run-­up to the 1992 EU Maastricht Treaty which greatly extended its powers. The growth of the United Kingdom Independence Party’s (UKIP) ‘People’s Army’, led by the ebullient former City trader, Nigel Farage, had alerted Conservatives to the strong possibility that their Euro-­sceptic voters might favour UKIP and thus deny them power in future elections. To prevent this, Cameron – against the advice of some of his closest advisers including George Osborne – offered that in–out referendum in his manifesto in 2013. Many thought he had done so in the expectation that the Liberal Democrats (Lib Dems), in another coalition, would prevent it ever happening. His victory, ironically, robbed him of such a veto but his Old Etonian confidence led him to believe that, as in the Scottish 2014 vote, his leadership of the Remain cause would reinforce the status quo.



british politics in flux

The campaign became bitter as both sides used exaggeration and outright lies in their efforts to win the vote. Remain claimed, via a Treasury study, that leaving would cost each family an annual £4,300. Leave hired a bus emblazoned with the claim that membership of the EU cost the country £350 million a week. The figure was dismantled in the media and shown to be little more than half this sum but Leave denied its falsity and the bus continued to tour the country. Leave’s campaign strategist, Dominic Cummings, later claimed that without this exaggerated statistical ploy the campaign would not have been won. Leave advocates, like Liam Fox, reassured voters that leaving would be straightforward: the ‘easiest deal in human history’. Around the halfway mark Remain seemed to be winning the argument and Leave switched its emphasis squarely on to immigration. A poster showing crowds of immigrants queuing up for entry was likened to Goebbels’ 1930s propaganda and Leave claimed Remain would allow up to 70 million Turks into the country via the EU even though that country was not, and is unlikely to ever become, an EU member. On 24 June 2016 the result again over turned most of the poll predictions: Leave 51.9%, Remain 48.1%. Analysis of the vote revealed that the older the voters the more likely they were to vote Leave – 60% of those 65+; 73% of 18–24 year olds voted Remain, also 66% of the 25–34 cohort. What type of people voted? A total of 57% of graduates voted Remain – 64% of postgraduates plus more than four in five of those in full-­time education. Of those who left at school-­leaving age, a large majority voted Leave. Predictably Conservatives voted 42–68 for Leave, Labour 63–37 for Remain, UKIP 4–96 for Leave, Lib Dem 64–36 Remain and Greens 75–25 Remain.

Cameron Resigns Despite having said he’d stay on as PM even if he lost the vote, his decision to go was probably wise as it would have been hard for a champion of Remain to lead the difficult process of implementing the nation’s verdict. Most commentators thought Boris Johnson might become PM with his close Leave campaign colleague, Michael Gove, as chancellor but on launch day the latter decided that after all, he did not think Boris was the man for the job,

7

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s­uggesting himself as a replacement. ‘He’s done the dirty on us mate’ was the grim reaction of Johnson’s Australian election strategist Lynton Crosby. Andrea Leadsom was left as the only Leave candidate. She sought to play up her status as a mother compared to the childless Theresa May but when this attracted adverse comment she withdrew, leaving May to accept what effectively became a coronation.

May in Government: A ‘Land Grab’ for the Centre Ground? In her acceptance speech on 13 July 2016 in front of Number 10, May was surprisingly ambitious. She talked about the people who had voted Leave through frustration and anger. She spoke about: fighting against the burning injustice that, if you’re born poor, you will die on average 9 years earlier than others, if you’re black, you’re treated more harshly by the criminal justice system than if you’re white. If you’re a white, working-­class boy, you’re less likely than anybody else in Britain to go to university. If you’re at a state school, you’re less likely to reach the top professions than if you’re educated privately. If you’re a woman, you will earn less than a man. If you suffer from mental health problems, there’s not enough help to hand. If you’re young, you’ll find it harder than ever before to own your own home. But the mission to make Britain a country that works for everyone means more than fighting these injustices.

This speech, which could just as easily have been written for a Labour PM, was a clear attempt to occupy the perceived holy grail in British politics – the ‘centre ground’ – where, it was widely believed, most elections are won or lost. Labour, it was argued, had failed to offer proper opposition to the government and was flailing in disarray under their new hard left leader, Jeremy Corbyn. It had in effect vacated the centre ground which was now up for grabs – hence May’s attempt at a ‘power grab’ on Labour territory. Early evidence, perhaps, of her desire to banish Labour to the periphery of UK politics. The state-­schooled May moved swiftly to place her stamp on the new government: George Osborne was summarily – some say



british politics in flux

‘brutally’ – sacked as chancellor along with Michael Gove and most of Cameron’s other privately educated group of colleagues. Instead ministers were promoted with whom she had worked closely at the Home Office. She also startled the UK’s commentators by appointing the three leading Leave campaigners to senior cabinet posts in charge of the Brexit process: Boris Johnson as foreign secretary, David Davis as secretary for the ‘Department for Exiting the European Union’ (DxEU) and Liam Fox to International Trade (DIT). Finally, she moved into Downing Street as her joint chiefs of staff, her two Home Office aides, Nick Timothy and Fiona Hill. Both acted as effective but often feared, loathed and often scathingly rude aides, ruthlessly fighting for May’s interests throughout Whitehall.

‘Brexit means Brexit’ Ensconced in Number 10, May appeared rather opaque in her attitudes on Brexit, repeating the less than meaningful phrase ‘Brexit means Brexit’ time and again. In reality nobody knew what kind of severance from the EU the vote had implied and indeed vagueness over this question dogged the negotiations throughout this vexed Brexit dominated period. MPs were divided on both sides of the aisle. Some – Remainers and moderate ‘Leavers’ – preferred a ‘soft’ Brexit, as closely aligned as possible with the status quo. Others, including moderate Leavers and the more vehement members of the Euro-­ sceptic European Research Group (ERG) chaired by Jacob Rees-­ Mogg, were implacably committed to a ‘hard’ Brexit whereby the Single Market, the Customs union and the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) were all to be ‘cleanly’ abandoned. Maybe half of the Tory Euro-­sceptic ERG, around 40 MPs, were happy to leave with no deal at all. Former chancellor, Nigel Lawson, was a former ‘Big Beast’ who supported Leave, along with investment financiers like Tory MP Jacob Rees-­Mogg and, in the business community, investment financiers like Crispin Odey.

The June 2017 General Election – Cautious May’s Big Gamble ‘Not another one!’ cried ‘Brenda from Bristol’ on a news bulletin ‘vox pop’ when she heard of May’s shock announcement of a snap

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election on 18 April. The nation might have agreed with Brenda but they might have doubted May’s explanation: that she needed an increased majority – she had inherited a mere 12 from Cameron when she acceded to Number 10 – to counter Westminster frustration at her lack of Brexit process. From the outset she’d enjoyed complete support from her own party, and indeed from Labour too. Corbyn’s long established Euro-­scepticism plus the large numbers of Labour constituencies which had voted Leave ensured he directed his MPs through government lobbies on the big Brexit issues. True, several Labour Remainer MPs believed they should respect the referendum result; others worried Leave voting Labour supporters in northern constituencies might desert ship. For their part, Labour Remainers argued the Leavers had delivered a mendacious campaign to an ill-­informed electorate. And besides that the majority of Labour voters – around two-­thirds – had voted Remain. To cynical commentators May, advised by party elder statesmen including the usually wise William Hague, was keen to exploit the 23% poll lead she enjoyed over Corbyn’s party. It was an open goal she just couldn’t resist. There were hurdles to cross. She had consistently ruled out a ‘snap election’ and the Fixed Term legislation meant she would have to pass enabling legislation. But the euphoria which greeted her decision swept all before it and before long she was offering the country the promise of ‘Strong and stable government’ as the choice compared with Corbyn’s ‘coalition of chaos’. The problem now was that May proved no natural campaigner during this long (six week) campaign. Her stock phrases – we need ‘strong and stable government’ in preference to Labour’s ‘coalition of chaos’ – were repeated ad nauseam and she seemed to prefer to address groups of the party faithful rather than face Corbyn in a television debate. By contrast Corbyn was seen on news bulletins being feted in wildly enthusiastic meetings as he travelled all over the country. The polls still showed a Conservative lead in double figures even close to polling day but something seemed to be happening which nobody could yet analyse. The announcement of Professor John Curtice’s exit poll at 10.00 p.m. Thursday 8 June was even more sensational than his exit poll of 7 May 2015. Instead of an increased majority for May, it



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predicted a loss of majority with Labour winning 30 more seats. The nation’s political world was in pandemonium for a while as the news sunk in. Many denied its veracity, as in 2015, but the early results all fitted the main predictions which were eventually more or less proved correct. The Tories remained the largest party on 310, having actually increased their vote share by 5.5% to 42.4%, despite their loss of any majority: as always, the crucial question was how that vote was distributed. From managing before the election with a majority of 12, May was now well short of the 326 required for an overall majority. Given her original intentions this was catastrophic failure. Corbyn, who had been written off by Tories and mainstream columnists alike, had achieved the biggest increase in Labour’s vote – 9.5% to 40% overall – since 1945, plus winning 30 seats to bring Labour numbers from 232 back up to a more healthy 262. From being 23 points behind, Corbyn had hauled his party to nearly equal the Tories’ 43% share of the vote: an astonishing achievement. Tory performance north of the border, however, provided some small consolation. In Scotland the SNP lost 21 seats, and in the process its call for a second independence vote for the time being. The Tories actually won 13 seats north of the border – 12 more than in 2015 – and without them would have been unable to govern even with the help of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). Lib Dems, the most pro-­Remain party in the election, won four more seats but were well short of their hopes: into the bargain losing former leader Nick Clegg, whose Sheffield Hallam seat went to Labour. The DUP gained two seats, taking their number up to ten, a figure May was soon to realise she needed. UKIP’s challenge to both Labour and Tories faded dramatically with leader Paul Nuttal failing to win his Boston and Skegness constituency and its overall vote sinking from four million in 2015 to a mere 1.8 million two years later. In the 1990s John Major had struggled with a tiny minority but refused to do any deal with Northern Ireland’s DUP for fear that party’s unreliability might undermine the fragile Peace Process. A desperate Theresa May ignored such fears and, with some difficulty, agreed a deal with the DUP in exchange for a £1 billion payment which even The Times described as a ‘bung’.

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A Continuity Election Professor Michael Moran (2017) argues that far from being an astonishing anomaly, the 2017 election was in line with a number of developments in train for several years previously. Voter loyalty fickle. He pointed out that with the decline of voter attachment to political parties, voters were now more likely to swing in different directions. Tory poll leads reflected the party’s lead at the start of the campaign but the poor campaign led to a rapid decline in the Conservative lead and the fading of May’s dream of an increased majority. Class no longer as important. The traditional pattern of middle classes voting Tory and working classes voting labour was modified in an election where Labour polled much better with degree-­ holding middle-­class voters, and Tories gained greater traction than hitherto with school-­leaving age unskilled working-­class voters. This trend was to be expressed even more fully in the 2019 election. New forms of participation. Labour’s invention of a cheap form of membership where members choose the leader had galvanised membership, especially among the young. With half a million members Labour now resembled a social movement rather than a traditional political party. The Conservative Party, in contrast, had not greatly increased its membership of 150,000 or so members, the majority of whom were (and still are) elderly, white, male and well-­off. With half a million voters leaving the electorate every year, it’s obvious Labour’s future, awash with eager young activists and despite a tendency for voters to become more Conservative supporting as they get older, at the time looked more promising from this perspective, than their Tory opponents. New identities. Voters in the UK are increasingly influenced by where they live, most obviously in Scotland where the Scottish Conservatives advanced in 2017 precisely by stressing their Scottish identity and their differences with the dominant English Conservatism based in London.



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Attempted Explanations for this Period of Political Turbulence Attempts to explain the spread of populism in British politics together with its concomitant turbulence have not been wanting. Steve Richards, in his The Rise of the Outsiders: How Mainstream Politics Lost its Way, attributed turmoil to the strictures of a globalised economy added to the fact that politicians ‘failed calamitously to find ways of telling the truth about what they can do and what they believe, with conviction, they should do. Instead their attempted explanations fell flat, allowing space for the outsiders to flourish mendaciously.’ Another persuasive explanation is offered by a book written in 1992, J.K. Galbraith’s Culture of Contentment. This book suggested that two-­thirds of people are doing, and have for a long time, really quite nicely: he shrewdly comments: ‘that individuals and communities that are favoured in their economic, social and political condition attribute social virtue and political durability to that which they themselves enjoy’. The result of this ‘contentment’ is a somewhat dangerous complacency: ‘no-­one fixes what doesn’t seem broken’. The one-­ third who were not doing well in developed western societies tend not to participate in the political system and so were virtually invisible to the well-­off two-­thirds. But beware, warned Galbraith presciently, what happened in communist countries could easily repeat itself in developed western countries: ‘The present age of contentment will come to an end only when and if the adverse developments that it fosters challenge the sense of comfortable well-­being’. Galbraith saw three plausible possibilities for change to happen. ‘They are: widespread economic disaster, adverse military action that is associated with international misadventure, and eruption of an angry underclass.’ That third possibility has maybe occurred in the form of widespread recent eruptions of populism. Yet, for me, the most persuasive in-­depth explanation has been offered in the book by David Goodhart, The Road to Somewhere where he introduces the idea of a spectrum of opinion from ‘Somewheres’ to ‘Anywheres’. He is not, of course, suggesting that two discrete camps exist by these names, merely that these are two end points on a spectrum which fully describe only small minorities.

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His analysis mostly refers to the UK but also draws on developments in America and Europe too. Anywheres are characterised by education and mobility: a degree at a residential university, perhaps, followed by a professional job in another city with possibly a period working abroad. Their ‘progressive individualism’ worldview makes them favour immigration, EU integration, equality and human rights. They may be patriotic but less nationalistic. They accept a meritocratic society based on achievement, care about the state of society and accept the inevitability of change. Somewheres are more conservative and locally oriented who feel uncomfortable about changes like mass immigration which can transform local communities and introduce conflict. Like 60% of British people, they still live within 60 miles of where they were born. They suspect an ‘achievement society’ in which they might well be struggling to compete plus the lack of status accorded to lower educational levels. This is not to say they do not recognise female equality or the rights of minorities, free speech and individual choice. ‘They want some of the same things that Anywheres want, but they want them more slowly and in moderation.’ (Goodhart, 2017, p. 6). Goodhart argues that Anywheres are chiefly the product of the ‘baby boomer’ generation, generously garlanded with status and often upward social mobility by higher education. From being the preserve of a small elite in the early 1960s this Anywhere worldview has become more general, permeating society and becoming dominant as its recipients have worked their way into positions of power and influence. For Somewheres, by contrast, the story is different: industrial society has slowly died reducing the status and well-­being of the working class and the respect accorded to it. A group of older less well educated white people have even been dubbed ‘the left behind’: poor, resentful and angry at their current lot. But Anywheres, whilst more successful and powerful than Somewheres, are not numerically so. ‘Although I have made up the labels’, writes Goodhart, seeking to confirm their reality,  I have not invented the two value clusters that are clearly visible in a host of opinion and value surveys – with Anywheres making up 20 to



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25 per cent of the population, compared to around half for Somewheres (and the rest Inbetweeners).  (p. 4)

Goodhart sees Anywheres as ‘cheerleaders for restless change’, who embrace globalisation. Somewheres have been squeezed out of the national conversation and of opportunities – hence the awful state of vocational education and apprenticeships in a ‘graduate dominated society’, not to mention the dearth of housing for young families in the southeast. In other words Anywheres, though the minority, have set standards across society with which Somewheres find themselves uncomfortable and hard to accept. Whilst disadvantaged in many areas of activity, the vehicle of democracy however means they ‘cannot be ignored’; it offers them a route whereby they can express themselves and for once make their numerical power felt. This they have been doing via the main political parties, newly minted parties or outside that system altogether. When economic conditions have been favourable to both groups, delivering better material prosperity or health care, the incipient conflict between the two groups dies down but when a shock is administered like the 2008–09 economic crisis, the differences are articulated and the perceived ‘establishments’ have taken the hit, as in the case of Donald Trump’s election in the USA and Brexit in the UK. Goodhart sees populism politics as here to stay, having grown roots in so many developed countries. Identity issues appear to be as important if not more so than economic ones (see title quotation to this chapter), though this is clearly a hugely important factor: 56% of British people describing themselves as ‘have-­nots’ voted for Brexit. It is worth adding that David Goodhart thinks that the objections Somewheres make about Anywhere values are not illegitimate and should not be condemned as the ill-­informed product of the ill-­educated. He sees the latter not as ‘bigots and xenophobes’ – they have in most cases accepted most of the ‘great liberalisation’ of the last 40 years regarding race gender and sexuality – ‘But compared with Anywheres their acceptance has been more tentative and selective and has not extended to enthusiasm to mass immigration’ (p. 8). He suggests ‘It is time that Anywheres stopped looking

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down on Somewheres, white or non white, and learnt to accept the legitimacy of their “change is loss” worldview and even accommodate some of their sentiments and intuitions’ (p. 12). This view is reinforced by Michael Ignatieff in the Financial Times (7 September 2016) who took Nick Clegg to task for complaining about Brexit: Clegg has a bad case of high-­minded liberal self-­regard and it leaves him perpetually baffled that the people he calls populists stole support from under his nose. Presenting yourself as the voice of reason isn’t smart politics. It’s elitist condescension. Brexiters had their reasons and their reasons won the argument. The Brexit Effect: Party System Under Pressure to Change

It would be incorrect to attribute too much influence to the Brexit process but that it has been far-­reaching is undeniable. Alongside ‘left’ and ‘right’, usually measures of difference on economic policy has been added an ‘open’ or ‘closed’ axis, or, regarding the EU, ‘Remain/Leave’. In the Conservatives a large contingent of Euro-­ sceptics formed the 50-odd-­strong ERG which acted like a party in its own right with an hierarchy and ‘whips’ to organise its voting. Given May’s minority government after June 2017, this group was able to pressure her into continually traipsing back and forth to Brussels seeking concessions they refused to give and threatening that if her own, hugely unpopular, deal was not approved, an immensely damaging ‘no deal’ exit would take place on the appointed day of departure, 29 March 2019. Labour was also divided. Jeremy Corbyn had long been opposed to the EU as a corporate stitch up against working people and he had voted with Tory sceptics from the 1990s onwards. By contrast, most of his long-­standing MPs were moderate ‘social democrats’ rather than left-­wing socialists like Corbyn and his close group of left-­wing advisers. Moreover, they were mostly Remain supporters who opposed Brexit and felt a second referendum should be held with Remain as an option. This led, in mid-­February 2019, to the defection of eight Labour and three Tory MPs to form The Independent Group (TIG) of MPs, sitting on opposition benches. Many expected a flood of MPs to join this new centrist grouping, given the polar extremes characterising political ideas at the time. But the



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new group, eventually named ‘Change UK’ soon sank from public view and on 20 December ceased to exist at all. 2019 Elections: Euros May 2019 and General Election 12 December

The May 2019 Euro-­elections delivered yet more shocks to an almost traumatised UK politics. The Brexit Party, invented by Nigel Farage in the previous January topped the poll with 34% of the vote – no doubt fuelled by Leave voters. The Lib Dems, on 21%, also did well courtesy of Remain voters who liked its clear pro-­Remain stance. The two major parties, however, did disastrously badly: Labour garnering only 14.6% – only two points above the Greens’ 12.5% – and the Tories bombed to a record low 9%! However, if anyone thought the general election, called by Boris Johnson for 12 December, would mirror these earlier Euro-­ elections patterns they were in for a huge shock: opinion had shifted – voters were sick and fed up with Brexit skirmishing. Johnson’s tough line on Brexit attracted many Leave voters from the Brexit Party even before the election was called so that when the campaign began the latter had slumped to single figures in the polls. When the results trickled in, validating once again John Curtice’s Exit Poll, the Conservatives won 43.6% (365 seats) Labour 32.2% (203 seats), Lib Dems 11.5% (11 seats) and the Brexit party a mere 2% (0 seats). Johnson’s muscular Brexit presence had squeezed Farage’s creation on to the margins, making his own party the effective ‘totally for Brexit Party’. Labour suffered from a confused campaign and a lacklustre leader, ending up with only 32.2% of the vote. Despite the predictions that Brexit had created a volatile, unpredictable four-­party system, the two major parties between them, as in 2017, attracted the vast majority of the votes (76%). Johnson’s robust tactics had worked. The Brexit Party, which had triumphed so spectacularly in May was destroyed in December. On 20 December 2019, Johnson was able to pass his withdrawal bill into law by a massive majority. Despite being highly unpopular in the country, he had managed to fulfil the hopes of the small sliver of Tory voters who had made him PM: he had passed his Brexit deal, ‘put Farage back in his box’ and trounced Corbyn at the polls. Max Hastings commented that ‘the only people who

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think Johnson is a nice guy are those who don’t know him’. But he won what historians are already saying was probably a pivotal election. Turbulence Not an Exclusively British Phenomenon

As Eatwell and Goodwin (2018) explain, ‘national populism parties have been in existence since the 1980s’ (for example, FN in France, Freedom party in Austria, UKIP in UK) and more recently have emerged in Turkey, Justice and Development Party; Denmark, Danish People’s Party; Greece, Golden Dawn; Finland, Finns Party; Hungary, Fidesz; Sweden, Democrats; Poland, Law and Justice Party; Italy, 5 Star and the League; Germany, AfD; Spain, Vox; and by no means least, USA – Trump’s victory in 2016. Following elections all over Europe in 2017, some have suggested it has already peaked with right-­wing movements curbed electorally in the Netherlands – Wilders’ progress was checked in March 2017; in France Marine Le Pen lost heavily to Emmanuel Macron the following May; and in the UK’s June election UKIP were crushed by a return to two-­party dominance. When Angela Merkel was reconfirmed as chancellor on 24 September it seemed the right-­wing’s challenge had been resisted. However the anti-­ immigrant Alternative for Germany (AfD) managed to win 13% of the vote, the biggest vote for a right-­wing party since 1945. (For more on this tendency see also Edgar (2017) and Behr (2017).) Goodhart as well as Eatwell and Goodwin argue, however, that these populist right-­wingers are so deeply rooted they are here to stay for the long term. Britain’s Place in the World

The Suez disaster in 1956 suggested that America will recognise the so-­called ‘special relationship’ with the UK only as long as it does not threaten US interests. Moreover, Britain’s gradual retreat from adequate front line defence forces marks a sharp decline in her world power status. As part of the EU, Britain was able to act as a conduit for American power; as well as act as a counter to the Franco-­German axis. However, the 2016 referendum decision placed a huge question mark over the UK’s position in relation to



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the rest of the world. The reality of Britain’s declining influence cannot be denied, as The Economist’s influential columnist Bagehot observed on 29 June 2017: In the aftermath of the Suez crisis, Dean Acheson lamented that Britain had lost an empire and failed to find a role. In the subsequent decades post imperial Britain in fact found several new roles: as a fulcrum between Britain and America; as an old hand at globalisation in a re-­globalising world; as a leading exponent of neo-­liberalism. Thanks to the combination of the financial crisis and Brexit, it has lost all of these functions in one great rush. The windows have shattered and the ceiling has fallen in.

further Reading A very clear, basic introduction to politics can be found in Taylor’s 30-Second Politics. Thanks are owed to (the now late) Michael Moran who allowed me to draw on his ‘new’ Preface to his republished Governance and Politics in the UK (2017). Goodhart’s (2017) book is almost compulsory reading for this troubled period in UK political history. Eatwell and Goodwin (2018) is very helpful for understanding the electoral consequences of the rise of right-­wing populism. Bagehot (2017) Britain’s decline and fall, The Economist, 29 June. Beckett, A. (2019) The age of perpetual crisis: how the 2010s disrupted everything but resolved nothing, Guardian, 17 December. Behr, R. (2017) On both sides of the Atlantic populism has run aground, Guardian, 5 July. Burn-­Murdoch, J., Ehrenberg-­Shannon, B., Wisniewska, A. and Rai, A. (2017) Election 2017: how the UK voted in 7 charts, Financial Times, 9 June. Cummings, D. (2017) How the Brexit Referendum was won, Spectator, 9 January. Eatwell, R. and Goodwin, M. (2018) National Populism: The Revolt Against Liberal Democracy, Pelican. Edgar, D. (2017) We thought Homo Brexitus was the future, but he isn’t winning any more, Guardian, 28 June. Galbraith, J.K. (1992) The Culture of Contentment, Houghton Mifflin. Garton Ash, T. (2017) Divided, confused: and facing the worst of both worlds, Guardian, 23 June.

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Goodhart, D. (2017) The Road to Somewhere: The Populist Revolt and the Future of Politics, Hurst. Ignatieff, M. (2016) Michael Ignatieff on the lessons for liberals in Nick Clegg’s memoir, Financial Times, 7 September. Kettle, M. (2017) Here is Britain’s new place in the world: on the sidelines, Guardian, 7th July. Lehman-­Haupt, C. (1992) Review of ‘Culture of Contentment’, New York Times, 6 April. Maitlis, E. (2019) Expenses: The Scandal which Changed Britain, BBC2, 24 March. Mattinson, D. (2017) Just when you thought the neat left-­right divide was over, two party politics is back, Guardian, 25 June. Merrick, R. (2017) Brexit: vote leave chief who created £350m NHS claim on bus admits leaving EU ‘could be an error’, Independent, 4 July. Moran, M. (2017) Governance and Politics in the UK (3rd edition), Macmillan. Richards, S. (2017) The Rise of the Outsiders: How Mainstream Politics Lost its Way, Atlantic. Taylor, S. (2012) 30-Second Politics, Icon. White, S. (2017) Senior Tories urge Theresa May to call a snap election, Politics Home, 7 March.

2 THE EVOLUTION OF BRITAIN’S POLITICAL SYSTEM

The British political system is the product of an extraordinary evolution, from Anglo-­Saxon times to the twentieth century, when our present structure essentially emerged. From absolute monarchy to representative democracy in a millennium-­and-a-­half would not be too bad an approximation of the transition involved. The history and ancient nature of this process tell us the British are a conservative people, slow to change and keen to hang on, even with a degree of nostalgia, to outdated symbols of our monarchical past, like the annual opening of parliament and the ceremony attending the Queen’s Speech.

THE WITAN The story begins with the Anglo-­Saxon Witangemot – or Witan – itself probably related to the German assemblies or folkmoots from whence our islands’ then immigrant inhabitants originated. This King’s Council, comprising the most powerful people in the kingdom, including senior clergy, was very much the creature of the monarch. He decided on its composition; it was summoned at his command, he presided over its proceedings and was dismissed by him as well. But the Witan did accrete certain important functions. While it usually had little influence on royal succession, it did issue a formal approval of a new monarch. In 1013 Aethelread was called back from exile by the Witan and re-­established as monarch after the death of the Danish King, Sweyn Forkbeard. The Witan also

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p­ roffered advice to the King and he was expected to listen respectfully to its views on taxation and what laws should be passed. But this tradition of seeking the Witan’s advice on revenue and the law, as well as legitimation of the succession, was the crucible of what later matured into democratic parliamentary government.

CURIA REGIS The Normans’ eleventh-­century invasion destroyed much of the Anglo-­Saxon heritage but their own ‘King’s Council’, the Curia Regis, effectively continued the tradition of the Witan and, indeed, strengthened it, coming to deal with all the functions of government, whether law-­making (legislative), policy implementation (executive) or interpretation and enforcement of the law (judicial). Crucially it took on two incarnations: a large assembly of all the King’s landholders plus his officers, which met when summoned; and a smaller version in permanent session that included his chief officers of the state, or, if we prefer, his ministers. This smaller curia, was in effect the King’s court, which was not static but moved around the kingdom with him. So here we see the embryo of the King’s ‘government’ or executive and, in its wider form, of parliament.

LORDS AND COMMONS MEET SEPARATELY At the time of Magna Carta, when the nobles forced King John to moderate his rule, he agreed to expand his council to include more ordinary people or commoners, though in practice they were drawn from the landed gentry, business people and lawyers. Representatives were drawn from the shires and the centres of population, and eventually this entailed some form of election. During the fourteenth century this speaking assembly, or ‘parliament’, began to meet separately: the nobility in what became known as the House of Lords with the commoners in the House of Commons. King John had also been obliged to submit his proposals for taxation to this parliament and, over time, it became the lower house which acquired precedence in this respect. This ability to control the source and extent of the nation’s finances was the crucial lever used by parliament to extract recognised rights regarding its powers and functions.



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PARLIAMENT’S AUTHORITY INCREASES The Hundred Years War was substantially funded by grants from parliament and, in consequence, its authority grew accordingly. Its power increased still more when Henry VIII used it to legitimise his break from Rome, his establishment of a separate church and his looting of the monasteries. Henry was still, however, in the sixteenth century, the very image of the absolute monarch, able to oversee and command every aspect of his 1000-strong court, served by brilliant (genuine) commoners like Thomas Wolsey (father a butcher) and Thomas Cromwell (father a blacksmith); and he was able to pick and choose wives from his court (even when they were already married) as well as frame them and others who had lost his favour (like the aforementioned Cromwell) in order to execute them. However, after the reign of Elizabeth I the power of the monarch began to wane. Charles I, denied much-­needed funds by parliament, tried to rule without it, resulting in the so-­called Long Parliament, when he refused to convene it after 1640 (it finally came to an end long after the Civil War – in 1660).

CIVIL WAR, 1640–49 It now seems remarkable that it happened, but a parliament with a powerful sense of grievance, and led by the extraordinary Oliver Cromwell, rose up against Charles I, raised and trained its own army and defeated the serried ranks of royal cavaliers and their professional troops. Some aristocrats sided with parliament, though most stayed true to their class and supported the King against what has been described a kind of middle-­class revolution. Having been defeated in the first Civil War (1642–45), the King escaped to lead another charge at parliament’s forces (1648–49) but after a second defeat he was tried for treason and beheaded January 1649. IDEAS AND CIVIL WAR, 1642–49

Political ideas about government seemed to polarise during the Civil War. Charles sought to adduce the merits of ‘absolute ­monarchy’ on the grounds that the King was appointed by God and therefore was beyond criticism or any judgment by mere

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parliamentary mortals. For their part, the multifaceted forces arrayed against him allowed their thoughts to embrace a wide range of alternative forms of government and society at the 1647 Putney Debates. The Levellers movement, for instance, sought popular sovereignty, one man one vote, equality before the law and tolerance of differing religious beliefs. Cromwell and his army supporters balked at such radicalism and suppressed these flights of fancy, yet it is possible to discern the first emergence at this time of the ideas which later created the representative democracy which has ruled Britain since the early twentieth century.

GLORIOUS REVOLUTION, 1688–89 The restored monarchy discovered, despite appearances, it was very much not business as usual. The monarchy had been bested by a body with some claim to represent the country and from now on monarchs ignored public sentiment at their peril. Consequently, the attempts of James II to introduce Catholicism to what was now, largely, a Protestant nation repelled the political class in his own country. William of Orange was approached by seven leading politicians – Whig and Tory – and invited to overthrow his father-­inlaw. This was an astonishing act of treason according to one point of view, but it is always the victors who write the history and, in 1689, William proceeded to become such a person, and with the minimum of bloodshed. On 11 April 1689, William and his wife, Mary, were crowned King and Queen, but they had accepted the Declaration of Rights, subsequently embodied in the Bill of Rights, which effectively gave parliament the final say in making the law of the land. The historic importance of this ‘Glorious’ revolution is that it opened the door to genuine democratic government through a generally – though imperfect – representative parliamentary assembly.

THE HANOVERIAN DYNASTY As Queen Anne died without an heir, a great-­grandson of William I was invited – a second imported monarch – to rule Britain, in addition to his native Hanover. While he preferred his homeland to these new damp shores and never really learnt the language, his



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dynasty dominated the century, with his son and grandson becoming George II and George III, respectively. George I was happy to leave governing to his ministers, all of whom were MPs.

THE FIRST PRIME MINISTER George I communicated with his committee of ministers, or cabinet, as it had come to be called, via the most senior finance minister. For a long time this key intermediary was the First Lord of the Treasury, Robert Walpole: initially called the first ‘prime minister’, with an irony destined soon to disappear as Walpole came to dominate the middle of the eighteenth-­century government of the country. He was followed by a number of exceptional talents, especially Pitt the Elder and his son, Pitt the Younger, who became PM at the astonishingly early age of 24, in 1783.

POLITICAL PARTIES Inevitably, if a large number of people in an assembly hold substantial power, they will seek to group together the better to win votes. In the eighteenth century, the two main groupings – not yet organised ‘parties’ – were the Whigs and the Tories. THE WHIGS

This group was formed in the late seventeenth century, when it resisted the Catholicism of James II, but became associated thereupon with Nonconformity, the industrial interest and reform. They dominated during the century via the so-­called Whig ‘junto’, which lasted until the Tories took the lead under Pitt the Younger. The Whigs went on to form the basis of the Liberal Party in the nineteenth century. THE TORIES

This group supported James II after 1680. Although they accepted the Glorious Revolution, they then supported the ‘Jacobite’ ‘Pretenders’ to the throne; as a result, they stayed out of power until the reign of George III.

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PATRONAGE This was a crucial means of controlling power in the eighteenth century; it was used by the aristocracy and the monarch to control personnel in the Commons and to reward supporters from all walks of life. The monarch owned over 100 offices, as well as many sinecures, pensions and contracts – monarchs could therefore deploy their largesse in such a way as to advance their own policies. The large landowners used their power of appointment to help determine who sat in the Commons via the ‘rotten boroughs’ and ‘pocket boroughs’ that were in their gift.

THE ENLIGHTENMENT The twentieth-­century philosopher and historian Bertrand Russell argued that Descartes initiated this intellectual movement in Europe in the seventeenth century with his individualistic assertion that ‘I think, therefore I am’: a tacit rebuttal of the religious and feudal ideas of his age. The ferment of ideas called the Enlightenment which swept through Europe in the eighteenth century arguably began in the late seventeenth century in Britain with the advance of science: Isaac Newton and thinkers like Thomas Hobbes. Essentially, Enlightenment thinkers applied the tests of reason and humanity to existing social, economic and political conditions and came up with answers fundamentally challenging traditional assumptions about religion, the role of the individual and relationships between state and citizen. In France, Voltaire flayed the ancien régime with his wit and rational critiques; his works and those of similar writers affected the intellectual atmosphere in which all political activity took place. Freedom of speech and movement, tolerance of differing views and beliefs, the sanctity of the individual and the reality of people’s basic rights plus the obligations of the state to the citizen were all ideas picked up and applied in Britain by the likes of John Locke, Adam Smith, David Hume and Tom Paine. Baron Montesquieu, the French Enlightenment thinker, contributed the idea of the ‘separation of powers’: the idea that the three functions of government – legislative, judicial and executive (making laws, interpreting laws and implementing them, respectively) – should be embodied



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in separate institutions, thus balancing each other’s power and preventing tyranny by any single centre. Meanwhile, across the Atlantic the framers of the US constitution produced their classic Enlightenment document – the American constitution – built around the same notion of the separation of powers. All this ferment of ideas and activity created a sense in which the British form of government, already praised for its emphasis on liberty, was ripe for further reform.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, 1789 Events in France had a huge impact on encouraging reform and a movement for democracy throughout Europe. Bliss it was … to be alive, But to be young was very Heaven.

So wrote the young poet William Wordsworth of the French Revolution, which began in 1789. While the course of the Revolution took much of the passion out of the reform movement, ‘liberty, equality and fraternity’ were ideas which, thanks to the likes of Tom Paine, crossed the Channel. Such thinkers helped to advance the idea that individual citizens had the right to help determine how they were governed, rather than by a hereditary monarchy or by religious ideas. In the aftermath of the French Revolution, dissatisfaction grew at the need for constitutional reform in Britain. Henry ‘Orator’ Hunt was just one of the radical voices causing a stir among the working classes in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars. In August 1819 he headed up to Manchester to give a speech now immortalised in history. THE PETERLOO MASSACRE

This famous event occurred when Hunt addressed 60,000 people who were assembled to support the idea that the new industrial towns should be granted representation by MPs. As Martin Wainwright wrote in the Guardian on the 188th anniversary of the event (13 August 2007):

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Less than 2% of the population had the vote at the time, and resentment was sharpened by ‘rotten boroughs’ such as the moribund Wiltshire village Old Sarum which had 11 voters and two MPs. Manchester, Leeds and Liverpool had none. Plans to elect a ‘shadow parliament’ put the wind up the Tory government which was also frightened that the power of Henry ‘Orator’ Hunt, the main speaker at Peterloo, might turn the Manchester crowd into a mob. The local volunteer yeomanry, described as ‘younger members of the Tory party in arms’, was ordered to disperse the meeting, with fatal results.

The 11 deaths, however, were not in vain, as the indignation generated by the massacre led directly to the formation of the Chartists and fed into the movement for the Great Reform Act.

GREAT REFORM ACT 1832 The government of Lord Liverpool (1812–27) was widely seen as reactionary, seeking to douse possible flames of revolution in Britain. There were widespread signs of unrest – in Spa Fields and the Peterloo Massacre, being just two examples – and repressive legislation like the so-­called ‘Six Acts’. George Canning, who briefly became PM in 1827, was a more liberal Tory but was followed by the Duke of Wellington, who considered the British constitution to be ‘perfect’ and not in need of reform. It was finally Lord Grey’s Whig government that passed the Great Reform Act in 1832. Amid threats to create new peers to overcome passionate resistance in the Lords and much popular agitation, the bill was passed, inaugurating the age of democratic government in Britain. The Act did not expand the electorate to much more than half a million out of a population of 14 million – but that was double what it was before – and it did abolish anomalies like ‘rotten boroughs’ and constituencies (like Old Sarum), which had virtually no voters but still returned an MP. The system was now placed on a new basis: a beginning had been made on the road to democracy. The Great Reform Act was followed by further Acts, of 1867, 1884 and 1885, which expanded the electorate to some five million voters and achieved a rough correspondence between population and representation throughout the country. Now it was elections that determined the colour of government and not the will of the



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monarch or the aristocracy. Queen Victoria was not without influence, but the role of the monarch had been reduced effectively to one of ceremonials and symbolism.

POLITICAL PARTIES FROM THE MID-­nineteenTH TO THE LATE twentieTH CENTURY Now that voters really mattered, political parties began to organise in the country, hence the many old buildings – Conservative and Liberal Clubs – which are still to be seen all over the country, which acted as headquarters for them. This section tells the story of the British parties up to the end of the twentieth century. CONSERVATIVE PARTY

This emerged from the Tory grouping, a name which is still interchangeable with its subsequent nomenclature. In the wake of the 1832 Act, Robert Peel was active in establishing the basis of the modern party, registering members and drawing up a programme in 1834: the Tamworth Manifesto. The party represented and advanced the interests of the landed gentry but increasingly came to represent those of industry, commerce and property in general. In the twentieth century, the Tories seemed to be the ‘natural party of government’, in that they were in office two-­thirds of the time, to Labour’s one-­third. Churchill more or less accepted Labour’s changes in the 1950s but when the economy began to decline in the 1960s the Conservatives urged a return to a more ‘free market’ economy. Edward Heath, PM 1970–74, did not really deliver such an outcome but he did succeed in negotiating the UK’s entry into the European Community, a historic and still hugely controversial decision. By the end of the decade Margaret Thatcher had become leader and after 1979 she pursued a robust policy of making the British economy competitive again. This entailed allowing traditional and inefficient industries to go bankrupt, confronting and subduing the trade unions and imposing her formidable personality upon her party. By 1990, it had had enough and John Major took over, until his political capital was exhausted as the 1997 election approached.

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LIBERAL PARTY

This emerged in the 1860s from an amalgam of the Whigs, the Manchester Radicals and disenchanted Conservatives – often followers of Robert Peel. Its outposts in the country can still be seen in the form of ‘Reform’ and Liberal clubs in towns, cities and countryside. The party tended to speak for the ‘newly’ rich entrepreneurs, advocating ‘classical’ free market economics and opposing aggressive foreign policies in favour of encouraging world trade. After periods of power led by the ‘Grand Old Man’, William Gladstone, the Liberals won a huge landslide victory in 1906. They thereupon enacted historic legislation reforming parliament and laying the foundations of the welfare state. When World War I broke out, however, Herbert Asquith was found not to be equal to the task and his hugely talented junior, David Lloyd George, the ‘Welsh Wizard’, took over, going on to become a great war leader. However, Asquith was not happy to be usurped by the younger man and the feud between them caused the party to rupture in the 1920s into two factions, both of which gradually lost support until, by 1950, it had only 12 seats. LABOUR PARTY

At the end of the nineteenth century, trade unions realised that they could better advance the cause of their members by organising to get representatives directly elected to parliament. In 1900, an embryonic body was established which won seats in the 1906 election and later played a role in government during World War I. By 1924, the party had tasted government via the short minority premiership of Ramsay MacDonald, the illegitimate son of a Scottish crofter. It experienced a second period of government in 1929–31, but then suffered a long period of opposition until its leaders shared power with Winston Churchill in his coalition government during World War II. In 1945, it won a surprise landslide under its leader Clement Attlee, who led the historic post-­war government that introduced nationalisation of the key utilities, as well as the welfare state. Labour also ruled in 1964–70 and 1974–79 (under Harold Wilson and James Callaghan), but suffered a long period in opposition until 1997, when Tony Blair won a landslide victory.



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LORDS–COMMONS CONFLICT RESOLVED With the Commons controlling financial decisions and coming to dominate the major debates of the day, it became increasingly difficult for a PM to sit in the Lords. The Conservatives, moreover, controlled the majority in that chamber by virtue of the hereditary peers. The conflict was brought to a climax by the Liberal government of 1906, when Lloyd George’s challenge to ‘Mr Balfour’s Poodle’ lit the blue touch paper to a massive constitutional battle, which the Lords eventually lost in 1911, when its powers were reduced to that of delay of a bill by 24 months. From now on, no PM could sit in the Lords and the number of ministers who could do the same effectively became limited as well. In 1949 the period of delay of a bill was reduced to a single year.

FURTHER LORDS REFORMS In 1958 life peerages were introduced – serving to revive the energy of a chamber some said was fast becoming moribund – and in 1963 the Peerage Act enabled peers, should they wish, to renounce their titles. In 1999 hereditary peers were banned from sitting in the Lords, apart from a compromise 92 who still remain at the time of writing, as does a comprehensive reform of the second chamber.

PARLIAMENTARY TERMS In 1715 the Septennial Act was passed, extending the maximum term a parliament could run from three to seven years and, indeed, most of them did run for approximately that period in the eighteenth century. During the nineteenth century, however, the average was four years and the 1911 Parliament Act reduced the maximum to five years. But PMs still wielded the power to call an election when the polls and the economy suggested they might win. However in 2011 the Conservative–Lib Dem coalition government passed the Fixed Term Parliament Act, which obliges MPs to face re-­election every five years on the first Thursday in May of the fifth year after the previous general election; the next election is due in 2024. However the Act does allow for elections between the five year terms, providing two-­thirds of MPs vote in

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favour, something which took place when Theresa May (surprisingly) announced an election in April 2017. The Act was also suspended in 2019 when Boris Johnson was given leave to call an election when Jo Swinson’s Lib Dems agreed to amend the Fixed Term Parliaments Act 2011 via the Early Parliamentary General Election Act 2019. This enabled the 2019 election to occur without the requirement by the former’s terms of a two-­thirds Commons majority.

VOTES FOR WOMEN Mary Wollstonecraft wrote a pamphlet in support of women’s rights as early as 1792 and John Stuart Mill urged votes for women around the middle of the nineteenth century. But the cause did not progress and it took the militant grouping called the ‘suffragettes’, under the Pankhursts, to add momentum to the campaign. During World War I, women worked in the war effort and the movement won votes for women aged over 30 in 1918. In 1928, full voting rights were accorded to women.

DEVOLUTION These major decentralising reforms were made in response to the growth of nationalist movements in Wales and Scotland. IRELAND

This ‘part’ of Britain, which the British government had long ruled badly, was partitioned, with six of its northeast counties forming the province of Northern Ireland. It thus effectively received devolution, with a legislative assembly, via the Government of Ireland Act 1920. But the nationalist minority within the province continued the struggle for unification with the Irish Republic and blighted British politics with three decades of ‘the Troubles’ between Catholics and Protestant communities from the end of the 1960s. Eventually the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 established the basis for the formation of a power-­sharing government, which, somewhat belatedly, came into being in 2007.



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WALES AND SCOTLAND

In 1998 the Blair government set up the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly.

EPILOGUE From being an absolute monarchy at the close of the Dark Ages, British government saw the evolution of an advisory council into a bicameral legislature that assumed much of the monarch’s power but paradoxically chose to vest it in the leader of the biggest party elected to the lower house of the legislature. Instead of an ‘absolute’ monarch, we now arguably have a secular ‘president’ in the form of the PM – certainly when the office was in the hands of Thatcher and Blair. Something which has transformed the way politics is conducted since the inception of democracy are the media, which now permeate and ventilate – for good and ill – every aspect of the system, from elections to appointed quangos.

Questions for Discussion 1. Identify the key benchmarks in the evolution of British government from absolute monarchy to representative democracy. 2. Was it necessary for democratic evolution for Charles I to be beheaded? 3. Where do you think continued evolution of British government might take it?

Further READING The major textbooks deal with this historical perspective: Jones et al. (2018), Kingdom (2013: variously in the first four chapters) and Leach et al. (2006: ch. 3). The two brilliant books by Moran (2017) and McTavish (2019) are well worth reading for original and profound analyses. Black, J. (2000) Modern British History Since 1900, Macmillan. Jenkins, S. (2018) A Short History of England, Profile. (Highly recommended.) Jones, B. (2004) The Dictionary of British Politics, Manchester University Press.

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Jones, B., Norton, P. and Daddow, O. (2018) Politics UK (9th edition), Pearson (ch. 2). Kingdom, J. (2013) Government and Politics in Britain: An Introduction (3rd edition), Polity. Leach, R., Coxall, B. and Robins, L. (2006) British Politics, Palgrave (ch. 3). McTavish, D. (2019) Themes and Flux in British Politics, Routledge. Moran, M. (2017) The End of British Politics? Palgrave. Schama, S. (2002) A History of Britain, Vol. III, BBC Publications. Tombs, R. (2015) The English and Their History: The First 13 Centuries, Allen Lane.

WEBSITES British Government and Politics on the Internet, from the School of Politics, International Relations and Philosophy, Keele University, www.keele. ac.uk/depts/por/ukbase.htm. European Consortium for Political Research, www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr. Political Education Forum, www.politicaleducationforum.com/site/content_ home.php. (Useful for students intending to study politics at university.) UKPOL, www.ukpol.co.uk.

Part II THE POLITICAL CONTEXT

3 Introductory Overview of the British Political System

This chapter seeks to set the scene of the British political system by explaining briefly how its major elements – voting, parties, the media and so forth – interact with each other. This provides an over-­arching introduction to the more detailed explanations which follow in subsequent chapters.

THE UNDERLYING IDEAS It is important to appreciate, as the previous chapter explained, that British democracy was never planned; rather, it evolved out of a completely different original autocratic system. Few countries enjoy the luxury of the USA in the late eighteenth century, whose founding fathers, presented with a ‘blank page’, were able to plan something close to their idea of an ideal democratic political system. It took a millennium for the present British system to evolve, but it is possible to identify the key ideas – these days none of them uncontested – which have evolved to make it work. Britain is a representative democracy: citizens vote for representatives, who formulate the laws of the land and also serve to form its government. But governments in such a system cannot assume they have an indefinite lease on power: elections make governments answerable to voters; regular elections ensure that any government which has not earned the confidence of voters can be removed by them. This is the sine qua non of any genuine democracy. Countries like Russia, China, Cuba and Turkey where autocratic rulers

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control the media, suppress opposition, elect sham legislatures and choreograph extensions of their rule might claim to be democracies but fool only the gullible of their citizens and, possibly, themselves. At election time democratic governments have to defend their records and, usually, offer a new manifesto, or set of proposals for the forthcoming session. Meanwhile, those parties opposing the government use every opportunity, especially during the ‘official’ four-­week campaign (the unofficial campaign can be months or even years long) which precedes an election, to criticise and offer alternative programmes. Elections make governments accountable or responsible to voters.

VOTING AND PARTY GOVERNMENT In a country of 66.6 million people (2020 estimate), any kind of direct democracy substantially involving every citizen is not possible. So representatives are elected to a national parliament, where the issues of the day are discussed and new laws are debated before being passed into law. Across the UK, 650 MPs are elected by 47.9 million registered voters from constituencies, each containing on average (2017 figures): 56,000 Wales, 68,300 Northern Ireland, 67,200 Scotland and 72,200 England. While MPs are elected individually, it would be very difficult for so many people to agree on detailed courses of action, so, since the middle of the nineteenth century – before that there were only ‘groupings’ in parliament, essentially the Whigs and Tories – activists have combined with like-­minded people to form and run modern political parties. These provide the vehicles which enable democracy to function (even its current supporters would probably add, ‘just about’). These organisations seek membership from voters and seek to create policies likely to attract votes not just from their own members and supporters but from the totality of voters. They also, through their networks of local branches, seek to win local and national electoral contests at constituency level by campaigning via leaflets, meetings and door-­to-door canvassing. After polling on election day, the party with the most elected MPs forms the government, its party leader becoming PM, who, according to the ritual, is invited to do so by the person who used to run governments in pre-­democratic times: the Queen.



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The second largest party of MPs becomes the official opposition, which provides a ‘shadow’ government, critically monitoring government actions and, with the next election in mind, seeking to assemble its case for being the ‘government in waiting’. During the two world wars of the twentieth century, coalition governments were formed to prosecute the conflict more effectively. In peacetime, British elections, using the simple majority system (‘first past the post’), have tended to produce one-­party governments but in May 2010 a hung parliament was returned – one with no overall majority – resulting in a coalition between the biggest party, the Conservatives, and the third largest, the Lib Dems. Labour became the opposition. In 2015, to the great surprise of almost everyone, including the party leadership, the Conservatives won an overall majority, albeit small. Theresa May, who became PM in July 2016, lost this majority in the election she called in 2017 but survived through a collaboration with the Northern Ireland DUP.

THE MAJOR PARTIES Conservatives

The Conservatives (alternatively ‘Tories’) have been the major party of government in the democratic era: in power for two-­thirds of the twentieth century and doing pretty well in the twenty-­first. The party represents the core interests of business, property owners and the middle classes, though it argues, as do all political parties, that its remedies are the best ones for all citizens in all classes and therefore the nation as a whole. Ideologically it has traditionally been pragmatic, though Margaret Thatcher’s period of leadership witnessed an injection of ideological zeal which still flourishes on the party’s right wing. Labour

Labour began life in 1900 as the party of the workers, typically members of trade unions. Traditionally it has condemned free enterprise capitalism’s attendant social inequality, in favour of ‘high tax and high spend’ economic and social policies, seeking to detach some of the wealth from the rich to assist the plight of the less

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­ ell-­off. However, the party has never commanded the confidence w of all working-­class voters and during the 1980s Thatcher was able to attract a large segment of the working class through a mix of policies, combined with a degree of disillusion with Labour. After 18 years in opposition in the latter part of the twentieth century, Labour moved towards acceptance of capitalism, with ‘New Labour’ policies which married this support to that of well-­funded free public services like health and education. Labour used to have an ideologically oriented ‘left wing’, but the experience of the early 1980s, when the party was viewed as extreme and impractical, dissuaded such tendencies during the Blair and Brown years (1997–2010) but, in the wake of Ed Miliband’s election loss in 2015, the left-­wing socialist Jeremy Corbyn was elected by a large majority and when challenged in 2016 proceeded to repeat his victory even more decisively. However, after he led his party into the 2019 defeat he eventually stood down as leader in April 2020. Liberal Democrats

The Lib Dems were born out of the merging of the small Liberal Party with the break-­away Social Democratic Party (SDP) in 1988. Its centrist message – capitalism plus generous welfare services – was essentially adopted by Tony Blair’s New Labour during the 1990s. However, under the leadership of Paddy Ashdown and Charles Kennedy it increased its number of MPs to 62 in 2005. Then, in 2010, under Nick Clegg, it eschewed alliance with Labour, to instead support a coalition with the Conservatives; in partial consequence, it suffered a disastrous meltdown of support in 2015, ending up with only eight MPs. In 2019 its leader Jo Swinson’s high hopes of scores of new MPs were dashed when they only managed to return 11 MPs. Nationalist parties

Nationalist parties are those favouring independence for their respective countries. They are active in the ‘Celtic fringe’ and seek devolved governments for Scotland and Wales. The SNP won a thumping majority – 69 seats of the Scottish Parliament’s 129 – in the 2011 elections and came close to winning its independence



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referendum in September 2014. In 2015 it virtually swept the board by winning 56 of the 59 available MPs north of the border. In 2017 it managed only 35 seats but in the pivotal 2019 election its numbers in Westminster were back up to 48. In Wales, in 2016, Plaid Cymru won 11 out of the 60 available seats, with Labour’s 28 making it the governing party; in 2019 it won four seats. In the Northern Ireland Assembly elections of 2016, Sinn Fein won 28 out of the 108 seats available – the DUP triumphing with 38 seats. Sinn Fein won four seats in the 2015 general election but, as in previous elections, refused to take up its seats. The party held its seven seats in 2019 but the DUP was two seats down at eight MPs, having seen its Deputy leader, Nigel Dodds, defeated. UKIP emerged in the 1990s to appeal to a fast growing Euro-­ sceptic constituency, threatening Conservative marginals and making its influence felt in areas where immigration was perceived as a problem demanding a radical solution. Its leader, Nigel Farage, by 2014 had established himself as a national political figure, winning two television debates on British membership of the EU with deputy PM (DPM) Nick Clegg in April 2014 and receiving its two first MPs when Douglas Carswell and Mark Reckless defected from the Conservatives and won their resultant by-­elections. In the 2015 election UKIP won an impressive 12.6% of the vote but lost one of its MPs; in 2017 it went on to lose its remaining MP Douglas Carswell who failed to stand for election. The Brexit Party was created in January 2019 by Nigel Farage to exploit the chaos of Theresa May’s handling of the issue. Offering a simple message of delivering the 2016 vote it won a remarkable victory in the May Euro-­elections, winning 33.2% of the vote and a record 28 seats. However, Farage’s hopes of yet more success in the December 2019 election were denied when, having lost the initiative to Boris Johnson, the party failed to win a single seat. On the far right, the British National Party (BNP) emerged in 1982 from an amalgam of smaller far-­right groupings. It has enjoyed some success at local council level and it won two seats in the European Parliament in 2009. In the 2010 general election it gained 1.9% of the vote without winning any seats. Like many fringe parties it has tended to suffer from factional disputes. The English Defence League (EDL), an Islamophobic far right party was founded in 2009 but has not significantly troubled the vote counters in subsequent elections.

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LEGISLATURE: HOUSE OF COMMONS AND HOUSE OF LORDS The legislature is the body which makes the laws and is the platform on which the affairs of the nation are conducted. The Commons is the elected chamber and, since the Parliament Act of 1911, is dominant over the unelected Lords. Legislative proposals or bills can be initiated in either house and a complex process of readings and debates takes place, involving both Houses, until the Queen’s signature passes a measure formally into law. The Commons provides the foundation and platform of most major political careers – the PM has not sat in the Lords for over a century – and the Lords’ power only of delay makes its benches repositories for mostly retired senior politicians and others distinguished in their various professions. However, as well as providing a forum for debate, the Lords performs a useful function in detailed revision and amendment of bills as they pass through, often in dire need of such attentions. Reform of parliament, especially of the antiquated Lords, whose members are appointed and not elected, has been a recurring theme in British politics for well over a century but the Lords remains stubbornly unreformed overall, despite several attempts following Tony Blair’s abolition of the hereditary principle in 1998.

THE EXECUTIVE PRIME MINISTER AND CABINET

These politicians provide the pinnacle of the nation’s executive arm of government, in charge of the day-­to-day running of the country. This comprises the nation’s political leadership at any one time and the nerve centre of the most important decisions. The PM chooses a senior ministerial team, which comprises the cabinet, and while it is the PM’s leadership which is crucial, senior ministers help him or her to formulate policies, deliver them into practice and gather and sustain support within the majority party in parliament as well as the country as a whole. If PMs have the full support of their parties, they can usually rely on passing whatever measures they think fit.



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MINISTERS

The PM nominates a cabinet of (usually) some 20–23 members to fill the main offices of state, plus a clutch of junior ministers, all of whom have to belong to one of the two Houses of Parliament (Commons or Lords). They, the ministers, are ‘our’ (i.e. the voters’) representatives in the centre of government, representing the party we have elected and implementing the policies we have endorsed in the winning manifesto. The extent of their control and their success defines the degree of democracy we have – just how much control we have is a subject of much debate. CIVIL SERVICE

Civil servants staff the departments of state in Whitehall and elsewhere. Senior officials advise ministers and often their skill (senior civil servants are highly educated and able) plus experience (they are permanent professionals, unlike the transient ministers nominally in charge) enable them in many cases to become the real authors of departmental policy. REFORM

Under Thatcher, routine functions of the big departments were hived off to become executive agencies. The British civil service is non-­partisan and permanent: it still tends to be led by arts graduates from elite universities rather than graduates in the sciences.

PRESSURE GROUPS These are groups which seek to influence policy; unlike political parties, they do not seek to take control of government. There are two basic types: ‘sectional’ groups representing different groups in society, like workers or business; and ‘cause’ groups, championing ideas or ideals like protecting the environment, animals or abused children. Each policy area attracts an almost permanent cluster of groups determined to advance their particular interest through influencing the decision-­making process. ‘Insider’ groups tend to be at the centre of the process, while ‘outsider’ groups are more

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removed and often use loud public demonstrations to exert influence.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT Local government employs hundreds of thousands of people and performs essential functions like collecting and disposing of rubbish, street cleaning, planning and promoting the economic interests of local areas. Local government developed enormously during the early twentieth century but after 1945 it was extensively reformed and entered a decline. It lost functions to other bodies and became controversial during the 1980s when Thatcher passed measures to reduce its powers and replace its functions with other bodies, such as the so-­called ‘arms­length’ quasi-­autonomous non-­governmental organisations (quangos).

EUROPEAN UNION The EU was a major ‘player’ in British politics by virtue of the fact that, as a member of the Brussels-­based body, Britain was obliged to recognise that EU law was superior to domestic law, thus threatening the very British notion of parliamentary sovereignty. The EU became a major factor in British politics, especially the party political debate, once ‘Euro-­scepticism’ became a force to be reckoned with. This view maintained that membership of the EU impaired the independence of the country through loss of sovereignty and loss of identity as the EU was nudged by its unelected personnel towards some vision of a united Europe. This perspective emerged within the Tory Party initially, during the 1980s, and was then encouraged by Margaret Thatcher’s sympathetic conversion to the view. But soon a significant section of the country as a whole, often concerned at the rapid inflow of immigrants in the early years of the twenty-­first century, began to feel that the advantages of being a member of the EU were slight or even non-­existent. In 2013 David Cameron, alarmed at how UKIP was winning support from hitherto Tory voters, decided to promise an in–out referendum in the EU, should he win the 2015 general election. When he unexpectedly did win an overall majority he was obliged to hold the vote on 23 June 2016 and, despite leading the Remain campaign, managed to lose the vote 52–48%. A long period of anguish ensued during



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which negotiations with the EU made little progress until November 2018 when a draft agreement was presented to the Commons for ratification. After much noisy debate during 2019 Theresa May was still unable to pass her deal and when she resigned in July Boris Johnson took over as party leader and PM. He called, and won handsomely, a general election on 12 December and successfully took Britain out of the EU on 31 January 2020.

THE MEDIA The media perform a crucial role, as they are the mediating agent, interpreting messages between the government and people, not to mention the different elements of the political system, as well as influencing both the context in which decisions are taken and those decisions themselves. Good relations with and effective use of the media are central to the successful conduct of politics. A major criticism of New Labour under Blair was that it focused too much on media presentation. Boris Johnson has shown a tendency to avoid media interrogations if he can help it, refusing to be interviewed by the intimidating Andrew Neill during the 2019 campaign and refusing access to No 10 briefings to certain journalists. But arguably any government these days is driven by the 24–7 media coverage: the constant pressure which focuses on key politicians and the need to feed the ‘feral beast’ (as Blair called the media). Given the appointment of spin doctors, however, to manage party– media relations, it must be admitted that much of the obsession with the media derives from the desire to win points over the ‘enemy’ parties.

QUESTIONS for DISCUSSION 1. Explain the terms ‘legislative’ and ‘executive’. 2. Explain the roles of local government, House of Commons and Lords, and the media.

Further READING All the major textbooks contain introductory sections from which students new to British politics will benefit. Hertner and Jones

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(fothcoming 2021) was first published in 1990 and remains, excuse my partisanship, the best source for both A-­level and undergraduate students. It provides in-­depth analyses of political ideas, political institutions and major policy areas like economic and foreign policy. A much shorter text is the Introduction to King (2015). For a critical analysis of the British system see Jones (2014). Crick, B. (2000) In Defence of Politics, Continuum. (Classic analysis of politics as a process of negotiation and compromise.) Hertner, I., Jones, B., and Norton, P. (forthcoming 2021) Politics UK, Routledge. Jones, O. (2014) The Establishment, Allen Lane. King, A. (2015) Who Governs Britain? Penguin. Lasswell, H. (1936) Who Gets What, Where When and How? McGraw-­Hill. (Another classic text defining the essence of political activity.) Paxman, J. (2002) The Political Animal, Michael Joseph. (Fascinating analysis of the kind of people who enter politics and rise to wield power.) Tansey, S.D. and Jackson, N. (2008) Politics: The Basics (4th edition), Routledge. (Best-­selling concise analysis of the world of politics in the modern age.)

WEBSITES The Internet is a valuable source for facts and ideas about British politics, though has to be used with care. British Government and Politics on the Internet, from the School of Politics, International Relations and Philosophy, Keele University, www.keele. ac.uk/depts/por/ukbase.htm. (An excellent resource.) European Consortium for Political Research, www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr. UKPOL, www.ukpol.co.uk.

4 THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT

Understanding political institutions and behaviour without awareness of social and economic factors in the society of the country concerned is to understand only part of the complete picture. In democratic systems like Britain – where government, in theory at least, serves the people – it is political demands generated by society to which the system is supposed to respond. Elections, the legislature, executive and so forth are merely the shell, the structure within which political activity occurs. A country’s economy will therefore be of key importance, as it will help explain those key political facts of how wealth is generated and distributed.

ECONOMIC BEGINNINGS Agriculture was the dominant economic activity from Roman times, through the Anglo-­Saxons, Normans and beyond. The Black Death (1346–53) wiped out half the workforce, helping for a while to push up agricultural wages. Wool became the dominant commodity in medieval times; it was produced in the heartlands of England and exported to the textile cities of Europe. So important was it that the Speaker’s seat in the House of Lords was symbolically stuffed with wool: ‘The Woolsack’. Textile production evolved by the seventeenth century, ready for the huge cotton expansions connected with Empire and the Industrial Revolution. Land and its close relation, agriculture, provided the livelihood of 75% of the population, as late as 1730 but as the industrial economy surged so this proportion shrank: a third in

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1800, a fifth by 1850, a fortieth by 1970 and a hundredth by 2000 (Nicolson, 2012, p. x).

IMPERIAL BEGINNINGS During the reign of Elizabeth I (1558–1603), intrepid British adventurers began to explore the extremities of the known world and push back its frontiers. The nation’s maritime traditions and navigational expertise were substantial advantages in this competitive process. Britain did not access the kind of bounty exploited by Spain in the gold and silver mines of Latin America, but it did establish lucrative trading relations with India – for example, in spices and tea – as well as colonising the eastern seaboard of North America. Maritime interests grew rich on the slave trade, whereby, along with other nationalities, 12 million Africans were uprooted from Africa and taken as slaves across the Atlantic in horrific journeys.

INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION AND THE MARXIST ANALYSIS During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries a number of factors – inventions within the indigenous cotton manufacturing industry, abundant coal reserves and plentiful cheap Irish labour immigration – combined to transform Britain’s economy. For good or ill, this ‘revolution’ was destined to spread and engulf not just Britain but eventually the whole world. The consequences were manifold: an influx of workers from rural areas into cities to work in factories; the emergence of great metropolises in the north; the formation of municipal governments in response to related problems of health and sanitation; a surge of exports to the expanding Empire, creating huge individual and corporate wealth; the creation of a small number of super-­rich ‘capitalist’ industrialists, often new entrepreneurs but frequently linked to the old aristocracy; and the corresponding creation of a huge ‘proletarian’ mass, who were more prosperous than earlier workers but hugely disadvantaged compared with the rich. It is also worth registering that as well as increasing material wealth the severe threat to the world’s climate was initiated by this industrial revolution.



the social and economic context

The new inequalities caused by this revolution had a transforming effect on the nation’s society and politics. Emergent newly rich middle-­class business people were determined to wrest away the power the landed gentry had enjoyed for centuries. The downside of capitalism – economic downturns, unemployment, industrial injuries, employment of women and children in dangerous industries like mining – prompted the growth of defensive organisations: trade unions. Once equipped with the vote, the working classes were wooed by both the major parties but it was the unions which set up a party to represent the interests of this newly defined capitalist-­created class: Labour. Karl Marx, a highly intellectual observer, of German origin, living in London during the nineteenth century, believed he had discerned the motive forces of history: conflict between differing ‘classes’ in society (Box 4.1). Marx argued that at every stage in human history there had been a dominant and a subservient class, with the former being the one which controlled the means of wealth production, be it agriculture, wool, cotton or whatever. The subservient class, argued Marx, would be convinced by the blandishments of the dominant class that these social arrangements were quite right and proper – no more, as they said, than ‘common

Box 4.1 Classifying ‘class’ Many sociologists have produced ways of classifying social strata but the most widely used is the ABC scale, which is as follows (with current approximate percentages of the overall population in parentheses): A

Upper middle: professional, higher managerial (3% of all households) B Middle: middle managers (16%) C1 Lower middle: junior managers, routine white collar (26%) C2 Skilled: plumbers, carpenters, mechanics (26%) D Semi-­skilled and unskilled: manual workers (17%) E Residual: dependent on long-­term benefit (12%)

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sense’. But this state of affairs was due to end: as capitalists maximised profits, workers would come to realise the extent of their exploitation and would begin to develop a ‘revolutionary consciousness’. This polarisation of society into what Marx called a small bourgeoisie and a proletarian mass would eventually express itself, he predicted, in a sweeping away of the former dominant class, followed by an interregnum period and then the formation of a ‘classless society’. However, even though Marx’s analysis of the forces creating and changing society was remarkably accurate, in the view of many historians, history’s eventual narrative did not work out according to his ‘scientific’ rules.

CHANGING CLASS STRATA If class, as is usually the case, is defined primarily in terms of occupation, things have evolved differently from Marx’s confident predictions – though see Eagleton (2011). We have seen neither an extreme polarisation of society nor the dawn of a classless one. In 1911 the working class comprised 74.6% of the labour force, while professionals, including managers and administrators, comprised only 7.5%. After Edwardian times, the economy grew rapidly to include mining, ship building and steel, but after World War II competition from other parts of the world reduced such industries to virtual basket cases by the 1980s, along with the newer industries of vehicle production and electronics. By 1991 the equivalent figures were 37.7% working class and 34% professional. As Moran noted, ‘The workers as traditionally understood, are now in a minority’ (2005, p. 43).

WHY NO REVOLUTION? Marx was confident that revolutions would sweep through the industrialised countries but, despite a few wobbly moments (for example the 1926 National Strike), Britain survived reasonably comfortably. And this was despite astonishing levels of inequality in the nineteenth century, which have not narrowed significantly during the twentieth or into the twenty-­first. Why should this be? Why did the British masses not rise up in protest against the small



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rewards they were receiving, while the owners of capitalist enterprises lived in unprecedented luxury? Some commentators argue that the British are not ideological and reject extremist measures. Marxists tend to explain it in terms of ‘false consciousness’, the fact that the ‘capitalist hegemony’ of the institutions of the state – government, business, education, the media – enable it to ‘brainwash’ society into thinking capitalism is the only possible way of organising the economy and that inequality is a natural, unavoidable and necessary product of such a system. Others argue – perhaps more convincingly – that workers are extremely wary of risking what little they have for the speculative gains which might be won via the turbulence of revolution. It is perhaps not surprising that it is often young middle-­class people who advocate revolution – the working classes cannot afford that luxury. Class was certainly made a major political issue while Jeremy Corbyn was Labour leader and some saw this as a barrier to the party’s success. Bagehot in The Economist (2020) observed that Labour’s ‘obsession’ had backfired: ‘it went into the [2019] election offering the biggest transfer of power to the workers in history only to see more workers vote for an Old Etonian with the middle name of de Pfeffel than for comrade Corbyn’. He went on to note that:  If Jeremy Corbyn reversed Blairism ideologically, he intensified it sociologically, making it even more middle class and southern. The big difference is that Mr Corbyn’s middle class tribunes are under the impression that they’re working class heroes sticking it to the Man. In this new class war, the Labour Party is on the side of the ‘haves’ rather than the ‘have nots’. The majority of the party’s members have university degrees. … In December the Labour Party beat the Tories among degree holders by 43% to 29% but lost among people who have only GCSEs (or lower) by 25–58%.

SOCIAL MOBILITY AND EDUCATION The most usual way of moving ‘up’ in social class is through education, especially higher education. However, education itself mirrors class, with children from ‘lower’ social categories doing less well

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than those from higher strata; 80% of higher professional children attain five or more GCSEs at grades A* to C, while only 30% of those from the lower supervisory group manage the same. The Social Mobility Commission (30 April 2019) declared social mobility to be ‘entrenched’ and ‘virtually stagnant’ (see Table 4.1).  Those from high income backgrounds were 80% more likely to acquire a professional job than working-­class people of the same age. Chair of the Commission Dame Martina Milburn, said, ‘Being born privileged means you are likely to remain privileged. But being born disadvantaged means you may have to overcome a series of barriers to ensure you and your children are not stuck in the same trap.’ The report found that 52% of disadvantaged teenagers leave school without qualifications and find only low paid, low skilled jobs are available to them. Moreover, few have the resources to move to the places where higher paid jobs, including professional ones, are more available, for example in London and other large urban areas. PRIVATE EDUCATION

Britain is unusual in having, running parallel to a state run system, highly developed private primary and secondary educational sectors. Comprising only 7% of the whole, children who pass through them tend to do immensely better in exams and later careers than Table 4.1 People from more affluent backgrounds do better educationally than those from poorer families Minimum two A levels Higher income Low income (free school meals)

40% 15%

University admissions Higher income Low income

43% 20%

Professional jobs Higher income Low income

60% 34%

Source: data from the Social Mobility Commission.



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those who attend ordinary state schools. Schools like Rugby, Shrewsbury, Marlborough and, the most prestigious of the lot, Eton and Harrow, attract the children of the wealthiest upper-­ middle class. Places in the elite universities of Oxford and Cambridge in consequence also go disproportionately – about a half, even though they represent such a tiny part (7%) of the overall numbers of children – to privately educated people (or ‘public school’ educated as we oddly refer to it). These favoured recipients then go on to dominate most of the top jobs and professions: the law, directors of big companies, judges, top posts in the armed forces and the civil service (see Box 4.2). For example, only 1% of the population is educated at Oxbridge, 78% of the bar attended those universities (Mohamed, 2020). MASS HIGHER EDUCATION AND SOCIAL MOBILITY

During the early 1960s, around 5% of children went on to university; by the end of the century the figure was closer to 40%. But studies show that the main beneficiaries were middle-­class children – working-­class children saw only a small percentage increase in their share of university places. This increase in no way broke the privately educated hegemony over powerful positions in business, the law, the civil service, parliament and the media. The massive post-­war increase in white-­collar jobs in both the public and private sectors enabled children born during the twentieth century to enjoy ‘upward social mobility’, that is, their eventual occupations were ‘higher’ than those of their parents. The 2019 study The Class Ceiling by Friedman and Laurison, identified how the importance of social mobility is invoked by politicians to embrace the idea of fairness. ‘If some people are more likely than others to get the most highly prized jobs, regardless of whether they are the most able or work the hardest, most people would agree this is unfair’ (p. 8). Alan Milburn’s Social Mobility Commission (2019) argued that ‘professions like the media, law and medicine remained a closed shop’ and were not doing enough to open themselves up to a wider pool of talent’, as Table 4.2 from The Class Ceiling shows. The changes outlined in Table 4.2 are summarised in the following quotation from the two authors. 

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Box 4.2 Private education Writing in the Guardian, 22 February 2008, historian David Kynaston ruefully noted the conclusions of the autumn 2007 Sutton Trust report: This ranked the success of schools, over a five-­year period, at getting their pupils into Oxbridge. Top was Westminster school with a staggering 49.9% hit rate. In other words, if you pay your annual boarding fees of £25,956, you have a virtually evens chance of your child making it to Oxbridge – the pathway to the glittering prizes that will almost certainly lie ahead. Altogether, there were 27 private schools in the top 30, 43 in the top 50 and 78 in the top 100. Put another way, the 70th brightest sixth-­former at Westminster or Eton is as likely to get a place at Oxbridge as the very brightest sixth-­formers at a large comprehensive. I found it hard not to be angered as a citizen – and ashamed as an Oxford graduate – to see these figures. Importantly, this grotesque skewing is not confined to Oxbridge admissions. The Independent Schools Council (ISC), which represents the private schools, claimed in November that pupils at its schools were now five times more likely than the national average to be offered a place at one of the Russell Group universities, the top 20 out of more than 100 universities. ‘These results show once again’, justifiably boasted the ISC’s chief executive, ‘the superb job done by ISC schools in preparing pupils for entry to leading universities.’ A report in the next day’s Guardian revealed that of the 30,000 candidates achieving three A grades in their A-­level exams, only 176, or 0.5%, were drawn for the those – the poorest – receiving free school meals.



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In Britain about half of those who get elite jobs are from upper-­middleclass backgrounds, although only about a third of all Brits come from these backgrounds. People from working-­class backgrounds do sometimes make it into elite jobs but it is rare; only about 10% from working class backgrounds (3.3% of people overall) traverse the steepest upward mobility path. Put another way, people from the upper middle class origins have about as 6.65 times more chance of landing an elite job compared to people of working class backgrounds. Origins, in other words, remain strongly associated with destinations in contemporary Britain. (Friedman and Laurison, 2019, p. 13)

Table 4.2 Life destinations in UK society Working class: semi-routine (like sales, retail assistants, care worker, landscape); routine (waiter, cleaner, truck or bus driver); never worked or long-term unemployed. Intermediate: lower professional or managerial origins (book keeper, secretary, teaching assistant); self-employed (plumber, carpenter, hairdresser, taxi driver); lower supervisory and technical (chef, electrician, communication operator). Professional and managerial: elite occupations (higher: CEO, professor, engineer, stock broker, doctor, military officer); (lower: teacher, nurse, journalist, store manager, IT consultant). From these three points of origin they calculate life destinations as follows: Working class origins: 33.3% 3.3% move into professional and managerial 5.0% move into lower professional and managerial 9.2% move into intermediate 15.0% remain in same point of origin Intermediate origins: 35.2% 5.6% move into professional and managerial 7.9% move into lower professional and managerial 10.2% remain in point of origin 11.4% move into working class Professional and managerial origin: 31.2% 6.2% move into working class 7.3% move into intermediate 8.8% move into lower professional and managerial 8.9% remain in elite Source: data from Friedman and Laurison, 2019.

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ECONOMIC INEQUALITY Capitalism tends to create ‘winners’ – who establish successful enterprises or occupy high-­income occupations or have been born into the families of those who have done so – and ‘losers’ – who may have failed to obtain a good education, have lost their jobs or been unable to find them. It has long been a reality in both the USA and the UK for luxurious homes in big cities to exist side by side with slums or homelessness. INCOMES

During the twentieth century, income inequalities began to decrease throughout most developed countries but towards the end of it the salaries gap between the high and low paid began to grow (see Figure 4.1) as British firms began to adopt US-­style remuneration. At the same time, Margaret Thatcher brought down the top rate of tax to 40% and pursued economic policies – necessary or not – which caused widespread unemployment and loss of workforce expertise in key areas like engineering.

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Figure 4.1 Distribution of income in UK. Source: © The Equality Trust 2012–2019.

Source: © The Equality Trust 2012–2019.

Figure 4.2 How unequal is income in different countries?

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Figure 4.3 UK Gini coefficient, 1961–2015/16. Source: © The Equality Trust 2012–2019.

Inequality Measurements: Figure 4.2 shows how income is distributed in the UK and Figure 4.3 shows how inequality in the UK compares with other countries according to the Gini coefficient index of inequality. GINI COEFFICIENT

This is an index produced by relating the wealth and income of the richest 10% to that of the poorest 10%; a high rating means high inequality, while a low one means low inequality (see Figure 4.3). According to this index Sweden, Denmark and Holland are at the low end while the UK is higher up the table, along with the USA and Canada. In his book, Who Runs Britain? Robert Peston (2008) reflects how the index soared during the Thatcher years of the 1980s, eased down a little under Major before climbing again under Blair and Brown, until Brown’s redistributive policies after 2001 produced some slight reductions. This was only temporary, however, as the inequality gap took off yet again after 2005, as shown in Figure 4.2 before tumbling downwards, when high salaries for once declined during the 2008 recession.



the social and economic context

WEALTH

‘The UK’s 1000 richest people have as much wealth as the poorest 40% of households’ (Equality Trust, 2017). Wealth relates to the assets owned by British people in the form of property, shares and savings accounts. Here the inequality is strikingly greater than in income, as Figures 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 show.

Inequalities of the 1980s have never been erased Writing in the Observer (8 March 2020), Torsten Bell, the head of the Resolution Foundation, argues that both the right, who champion UK high unemployment and the left who say inequality is always rising, are wrong. He detects the source of inequality originating in the 1980s which produced ‘strong income growth and soaring inequality’. For the richest fifth, spending power (household disposable income before housing costs) in 1978–88 grew by 64%; for the second richest, 36%; while for the poorest fifth, it was only 7%. The vast gap thus caused held throughout 1988–99, when         















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average spending power was around 15%. During the period 1999–2009 government policies benefited the poorest fifth to the tune of 36% while the richest fifth got 34% richer; the  middle fifths did less well during this decade, averaging around 25%. From 2009–2019 the richest fifth’s spending was bettered by only 2.3%, the same as the poorest fifth. Middle quintiles benefited by around 7% but the slowdown in income growth meant the gap between top and bottom still reflected that opened up during that Thatcher decade.  (Bell, 2020)

The French economist Thomas Piketty published an influential book in 2014 called Capital in the Twenty-­First Century. In it he claims to show that, apart from a period in the middle of the twentieth century, wealth has appreciated faster than wages have grown. This means that the inequality gap is much more related to inherited wealth than to annual income. He predicted that it will continue to grow unconstrained, perhaps until some calamity strikes. He called for an international redistribution of wealth to pre-­empt such a disaster. So far there has been no positive response to his suggestion.

Land Ownership On 18 April, the Guardian led with a story based on the book Who Owns England? (Shrubsole, 2019), which reveals that half of England is owned by less than 1% of its population. This comprises 25,000 people, mostly aristocrats and corporations (see Figure 4.7) plus 17% ‘City bankers, oligarchs and newly moneyed industrialists’. John Trickett MP, Labour shadow minister for the Cabinet Office, called for a Commons debate on the issue commented: The dramatic concentration of land ownership is an inescapable reminder that ours is a country for the few and not the many. It’s simply not right that aristocrats, whose families have owned the same areas of land for centuries, and large corporations exercise more influence over local neighbourhoods – in both urban and rural areas – than the people who live there. (quoted in Evans, 2019)

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Figure 4.7 Half of England is owned by 25,000 landowners – less than 1% of the population. Source: Guardian, 28 April 2019. Tim Adams review, Guy Shrubsole: www.theguardian. com/money/2019/apr/17/who-owns-england-thousand-secret-landowners-author; permission granted by The Land Is Ours and Who Owns England, Tony Gosling.

THE SUPER-­RICH

This tiny minority cause substantial controversy as the media love to highlight their extravagant lifestyles. The Sunday Times ‘Rich List’ in 2014 revealed that from 88 billionaires in 2013, the 2014 figure was 104, representing a combined wealth of more than £301 billion; the UK has more billionaires per head of population than any other country and London has more than any other city in the world, with 72 – its nearest rival being Moscow, with 48. Moreover billionaires have had a habit of moving all their finances offshore to tax havens so that their tax obligations to the country where they live and utilise tax funded national infrastructure is reduced to a fraction of what they would have been within national jurisdiction. In August 2018 Britain’s richest man, Sir Jim Ratcliffe, announced he was moving to Monaco, thus joining Sir Philip Green the controversial owner of high street retail giant Arcadia. Should we worry about the super-­rich? Well, maybe we should as the super-­rich seem to have been chosen by party leaders as their



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funding ‘cash cows’: Labour seems to have chosen them on occasions to complement the trade union funding, its traditional source of wealth; the Conservatives still depend on them for most of their income. Labour, surprisingly perhaps, when in office 1997–2010, did everything possible to persuade the super-­rich to take advantage of lenient UK tax laws and live here, while their wealth in offshore tax accounts was left unmolested by the Inland Revenue. Most opinion polls show a large majority of Britons resent these huge rewards which they regard as immoral, yet even when very moderate tax proposals were aimed at them in the autumn of 2007, a barrage of objections were levelled at the chancellor, who eventually backed down. Maybe allowing people to become so very, very rich is morally bad for any society with even the slightest aspiration towards equality. On the other hand, it can be argued that having them live in one’s country, distasteful inequality notwithstanding, creates advantages for the whole of society, as the super-­rich spend their money and can create new businesses within it. The book, The Spirit Level by Wilkinson and Pickett, suggests that inequality is bad for society – being associated with all kinds of social dysfunction, with problems increasing in proportion to growing inequality. In the run-­up to the 2019 general election Jeremy Corbyn attacked the existence of billionaires, briefly attracting criticism from press mostly owned by billionaires, but on 12 December he lost the argument when defeated by Boris Johnson. UNDERCLASS

The US sociologist Charles Murray discerned a near permanent group of people at the ‘bottom’ of US society who were, in effect, not subscribing to US social values: they did not live in stable families but often in single-­parent ones, where children were allowed to run free and lacked good male role-­models of steady workers and caring fathers. Murray suggested such a group also thought there is little shame in living off welfare and even indulging in crime or drugs. It followed that their children tended to grow up with an inadequate moral compass and very vulnerable to anti-­ social influences. He called this group – maybe 5% of society – an ‘underclass’. In the 1990s he journeyed over to Britain where he diagnosed, in articles for the Sunday Times, a similar phenomenon.

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In 1994 he wrote an article entitled ‘New Victorians … and the new rabble’, in which he predicted rich middle-­class people were likely to retreat to ‘gated’ communities, where they would live protected and isolated lives while the rest of society lived at the mercy of a ‘rabble’ expressing many of the underclass values. Most commentators dismissed this as highly unlikely but, it has to be said, that in July 2007, Professor Danny Dorling of Sheffield University published a report which suggested that, indeed, an increasing segregation in urban centres could be discerned where middle-­class people lived lives wholly separate from working-­class people, and vice versa. In January 2015, the Joseph Rowntree Foundation reported that, as a result of poverty, poor education and employment, as many as 40% of British families were ‘too poor to play a part in society’ (see Wintour, 2015).

REGIONAL DIFFERENCES Britain has a major north–south divide, with a more prosperous south and a more depressed north, where so many of the traditional industries died out a couple of decades ago. London is relatively untypical, too, having not only a vibrant financial and business service economy but a multicultural society as well. Attempts to devolve businesses to other regions have been only partially successful. In the summer of 2014 chancellor George Osborne called for further investment in northern cities and infrastructure, his so-­ called ‘northern powerhouse’. Labour’s economic policy, too, adopted a similar stance on northern cities. In the wake of the Scottish independence referendum of 2014, devolution of power within England reignited as a political issue, when local government leaders in the north, like Manchester’s Richard Leese, demanded more power over their budgets and more options for economic development. On 3 November 2014, Osborne announced just such a deal for Manchester and its region. A report appearing on 19 January 2015, from the Centre for Cities, suggested that government attempts to close the north–south gap seemed to have failed. From 2004 onwards cities in the south have grown at twice the rate of cities elsewhere: 11.3% compared with 5.5%. In 2013 there were 26.8% more businesses in the southern cities than ten years earlier, compared with 13.7% in the rest of the UK.



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Even worse, the government’s enthusiasm for Osborne’s plan did not survive the change of government following the Brexit referendum in June 2016. Writing around that time the BBC’s Kemal Ahmed noted that while GDP per capita is £45,000 a year in London, this was 2.5 times the figure in Wales or the northeast where the figure was £18,000. And whilst the average weekly wage was £670 in London, it was £480 in the east Midlands. Finally, he notes that across the UK wealth had risen by 13% since 2008, in the northeast, east and west Midlands ‘net wealth has fallen’. In a successful bid to win seats in the north Johnson proposed to invest huge amounts in the north to reduce its disadvantage compared with the south. At the time of writing it remains to be seen if he fulfils his promises.

GENDER As in so many countries, women in Britain have been treated unfairly compared with men for most of its existence; in the nineteenth century it was possible for a man to beat his wife and own her property while she had no legal redress and could not divorce an abusive or unfaithful spouse. In the late twentieth century many of these legal inequities were removed but social attitudes take longer to change and many women still receive lower wages than men for similar work and tend to be employed in lower-­ status jobs: clerical assistants, cleaners, shop assistants and the like. They are often, moreover, employed only part-­time and can suffer discrimination should they have children and wish to return to their jobs. It remains the case that women suffer from various kinds of inequality which frequently feature on the political agenda: 1. Up to three million women and girls across the UK experience rape, domestic violence, stalking or other forms of violence each year. 2. The full-­time gender pay gap is 10%, and the average part-­ time pay gap is 34.5%. 3. Women make up 32% of MPs, a big increase but at 10% of board directors in FTSE 100 companies this represents a reduction.

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ETHNICITY It would be fair to say that, over the past half century, ethnicity has become almost as important a dividing line in British society as class. Successive influxes of refugees, such as the Huguenots (French Calvinists) in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and Jews fleeing pogroms in Russia during the nineteenth century, were absorbed without too much dislocation, but the thousands of impoverished Irish immigrants during that same century was less problem-­free and they, often responsible for massive infrastructure achievements, had to face forms of discrimination. Immigration after 1945 was initially from the Commonwealth and during the 1950s black Caribbeans, working often in the public services, were the victims of crude racism. It was the same with those from the ‘New Commonwealth’ – India, Pakistan and then Uganda – when new immigrants became ‘ghetto-­ised’ in certain areas, for instance Asians in Southall and West Indians in Willesden. In 1968 Enoch Powell, a prominent Tory MP, delivered his infamous ‘rivers of blood speech’ prophesying violent civil strife if immigration was not checked. Those seeking asylum from world trouble-­spots like Bosnia, Iraq and Afghanistan provided another stratum of difference to be integrated not without difficulty. But the most severe problem with immigration occurred during the first decade of the twenty-­ first century, when thousands of east Europeans – Poland, Romania, Bulgaria – entered the UK by virtue of being members of the EU, which had ‘freedom of movement of labour’ as a founding principle. Various pressure groups emerged seeking to change an ‘over­liberal’ open-­door policy, for example Migration Watch UK and then UKIP, which argued withdrawal from the EU was the only way to solve the problem. It was true that such an influx, while contributing economic benefits, put excessive strain on public services in some parts of the country and might have forced wages down in certain unskilled occupations. On top of that, an unknown number of illegal immigrants regularly manage to enter the country and this adds fuel to the flames created by newspapers like the Daily Express and Daily Mail, UKIP and the right wing of the Conservative Party. In 1986 the foreign-­born population was 6.2%; by the 2011 census the figure was 13.8%. During the 2016 referendum



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campaign the immigration issue was a major bone of contention and, arguably, swung the result in favour of Leave. Johnson declared in the wake of his 2019 victory that he would introduce an ‘Australian-­style points system’ whereby (according to Dr Alan Gamlen of Monash University, Melbourne), ‘economically relevant characteristics’ like ‘education, language skills and work experience’ will be used to select immigrants from the EU.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION 1. Why is it that the gross inequalities of capitalist societies manage to survive without any genuine threat to their existence? 2. Are socio-­economic inequalities harmful to society? 3. Have women achieved anything like genuine equality with men in the UK? 4. Is it inevitable that immigrants will face some degree of hostility in a new country?

FURTHER READING Provocative ideas can be read in the book by Eagleton (2011), who argues that Marx, far from being discredited (which is the current consensus), has been proved more and more right in his analysis as events unfold, suggesting the formation of monopoly capitalism and its possible collapse. The book by John Hills (2014) is a cornucopia of facts and arguments destroying popular myths about the welfare state. Friedman and Laurison (2019) is a hugely impressive study of social mobility in the UK. Ahmed, K. (2016) Britain’s inequality map: stark and growing, BBC, 2 December. Bagehot (2020) The perils of Lennonism, The Economist, 15 February. Ball, T. (2020) Extent of elite schools’ grip on Oxbridge revealed, Sunday Times, 13 January. Bell, T. (2020) The myths of both left and right stop us seeing the true story of inequality, Observer, 8 March. Cadwalladr, C. (2008) It’s the clever way to power, Observer, 16 March. Centre for Cities (2015) Cities outlook 2015, 19 January. Clark, T. (2014) Hard Times: The Divisive Toll of the Economic Slump, Yale University Press.

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Crump, T. (2010) How the Industrial Revolution Changed the World, Robinson. Dorling, D. (2014) Inequality and the 1%, Verso. Easton, M. (2019) State of the Nation report: inequality in UK ‘entrenched from birth’, BBC, 30 April. Eagleton, T. (2011) Why Marx Was Right, Yale University Press. Elliot, L. (2015) The regions cannot thrive with Whitehall in charge, Guardian, 19 January. Equality Trust (2019) The UK’s 1000 richest people have as much wealth as the poorest 40%, 16 May. Evans, R. (2019) Half of England is owned by less than 1% of the population, Guardian, 17 April.  Friedman, S. and Laurison, D. (2019) The Class Ceiling: Why it Pays to be Privileged, Policy Press. Halsey, A. and Webb, J. (eds) (2000) Twentieth Century Social Trends, Macmillan. Hennessy, P. (1992) Never Again, Jonathan Cape. Hills, J. (2014) Good Times, Bad Times: The Welfare Myth of Them and Us, Policy Press. James, L. (2006) The Middle Class: A History, Abacus. Kynaston, D. (2007) Austerity Britain, 1945–51, Bloomsbury. Kynaston, D. (2008) The road to meritocracy is blocked by private schools, Guardian, 22 February. Lansley, S. (2012) The Cost of Inequality, Gibson Square. Lee, C. and Dorling, D. (2011) The geography of poverty, Socialist Review, October. Miles, D. (2005) The Tribes of Britain: Who Are We? And Where Do We Come From? Phoenix. Mohamed, H. (2020) ‘The promise of social mobility today only works for a tiny few’: an extract from People Like Us by Hashi Mohamed, Observer, 12 January. Mohamed, H. (2020) People Like Us, Profile. Moran, M. (2005) Politics and Governance in the UK (1st edition), Palgrave. Murray, C. (1994) Underclass: the crisis deepens, and The new Victorians … and the new rabble, Sunday Times, 22 May and 29 May. Nicolson, A. (2012) Gentry: Six Hundred Years of a Peculiarly English Class, Harper. Peston, R. (2008) Who Runs Britain? Hodder. Piketty, T. (2014) Capital in the Twenty-­First Century, Harvard University Press  Social Mobility Commission (2019) Social mobility in Great Britain: state of the nation in 2018–19, Sixth annual report of SMC, 29 April.  Shrubsole, G. (2019) Who Owns England? Blackwell.



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Wilkinson, R. and Pickett, K. (2009) The Spirit Level, Penguin. Wintour, P. (2015) Joseph Rowntree Foundation report on poverty, Guardian, 19 January.

Websites National Statistics, www.gov.uk/government/organisations/office-­for-national­statistics. Office of National Statistics, www.ons.gov.uk/.

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5 Political Culture

All political systems reflect the traditions and nature of the society it purports to rule: the political context. For the purposes of this volume, three elements are identified as constituting such a context: political culture, the social and economic context (see Chapter 4) and the constitution (see Chapter 6).

POLITICAL CULTURE This rather vague concept is nevertheless crucial when trying to understand any democratic system of government. One useful definition is that provided by Maclean (McLean and Macmillan, 1996) in his Dictionary of Politics (p. 379): political culture is ‘the attitudes, beliefs, and values which underpin the operation of a particular political system’. These will include, he writes: ‘knowledge and skills’; ‘positive and negative emotional feelings’ towards the system of government; and evaluative judgments about it. How important is political culture? Often overlooked by students of politics, perhaps because the idea lacks clarity, the political culture of a country is vital in determining its stability and its degree of political success. Political culture is one of the key factors which mediate demands made upon political systems and often determines outcomes. People often wonder why characteristics persist in a country over long periods or why attempts to import new systems fail. For example, Russian history shows a marked authoritarian tendency: the tsars were succeeded by a man sometimes described as the



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Red Tsar, Joseph Stalin. Following the implosion of his creation, the Soviet Union, there were hopes democracy would emerge and expunge the authoritarian tendency. But Vladimir Putin’s career suggests otherwise, as he has come to express this same tendency and, what is more, win popularity for so doing. From a different viewpoint, George Bush was intent on introducing democracy into Iraq after Saddam Hussein, but it proved a frail enough plant and, arguably, after Nouri al-­Maliki’s period in power up to September 2014, followed by the brutal ISIS occupation (2014–19), proved even more fragile.

KEY HISTORICAL FACTORS IN THE EVOLUTION OF BRITISH POLITICAL CULTURE First, unlike many European countries, Britain met pivotal challenges sequentially and not at the same time. In the sixteenth century, a settlement was reached between church and state; in the seventeenth century, conflict between monarch and parliament was resolved through the limitation of the monarch’s powers; while in the nineteenth century social unrest was mitigated by the gradual extension of the franchise to include all classes of voters by the middle of the twentieth century. So, when a problem arose, there tended to be a focus of energy mobilised to solve it and, the Civil War notwithstanding, mostly without bloodshed. Other countries, for example France and Russia, were not so fortunate. Second, the centuries-­long growth of the British Empire proved hugely popular with British citizens, who were proud of the worldwide reach their tiny island had established. Thousands flocked to live in the new colonies and enjoy a standard of living far higher than at back home. This national confidence provided the ‘feel good’ element which politicians relish and which helps maintain stability. The downside of such exuberant nationalistic confidence could often be expressed in the form of a sense of superiority towards other countries, together with more openly racist attitudes.

ECONOMIC INFLUENCES The means by which wealth is created in a society is of great importance in determining its political culture. Britain’s role as the

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first industrialised country meant its social divisions were accentuated. This created conflict between the ‘haves’ and ‘have-­nots’ but rarely anything approaching the kind of revolution Karl Marx predicted as inevitable. Why? There are two main reasons. First, working people opted to hang on to what little they had, rather than risk all on a potentially bloody revolution. Second, the British ruling class, while frequently happy to resist calls for reform, were sufficiently wise to recognise changed political reality and make concessions to head off crises and avoid threats to their wealth and privileges. This meant that upper and middle-­class young ideologues seeking to enthuse workers with revolutionary ideas were mostly ignored. So Britain was able to proceed from an agricultural society to an industrial one – a huge change – with minimal dislocation. The tenets of capitalism – using capital to set up businesses, to hire and fire as the business requires and to enjoy the full fruits of success – have been more or less accepted by British people and still are. They may complain bitterly about the unfairness of fabulous wealth being manufactured from the labours of the poor but rising up to dispossess the wealthy has never been an idea embraced by Britain’s poorer classes, even when urged on by middle-­class idealists. Most would like to earn more money and enjoy an ever-­ improving standard of living; Britons are substantially accepting of materialistic values. Marx would have condemned such false consciousness, whereby, as he would argue, the ruling class has used the media and state institutions to inculcate the subordinate masses into ignoring the fact of their exploitation.

THE CONSTITUTION Their famous constitution is venerated by Americans and its provisions are widely known. Britain’s lack of anything similar means its system of government is generally not very well understood. This may help explain why support for and participation in the political system has declined over the past few decades. But the truth is that parts of the system are well supported, others less so and still others are quite unpopular. Take the example of free speech. We tend to take many such basic human rights for granted, but imagine the uproar if any criticism of the government were suddenly to be



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banned by the home secretary. This would certainly ignite passionate demonstrations and protests, which could easily become violent. Having our liberal democratic rights snatched away might remind us how valuable they are, like setting up voluntary bodies (political parties) to represent common interests and to have the right, through voting, to dismiss any government of the day. Some aspects of the constitution are more controversial; ancient ones are sometimes seen as past their usefulness. Diminishing Legitimacy

First, membership of the EU was, until the early 1990s generally accepted as legitimate but from hereon it was seen by a growing minority as an institution to which British affiliation was inappropriate. Accordingly, after ‘Leave’ won the 2016 in–out referendum on EU membership, after a painful three-­and-a-­half years of conflict and division, Britain left the EU on 31 January 2020. Second, the House of Lords is widely seen as beyond any utility, despite the fact it plays a vital role in revising and amending bills. It has been stripped of much of its powers and hereditary entitlements. The debate about its future occurs mostly below the radar of the average voter: intensely fought over only in the Westminster village. Third, the role of the monarchy is disputed by some who believe an elected head of state would be preferable. Since the lives of the royals have become something of a soap opera – neither the bowing out from royal duties imposed on Prince Andrew for his association with sex offender Jeffrey Epstein, nor the voluntary exit to Canada of Prince Harry with his American wife, Meghan, reflected well on the unity and popularity of the royal family. Respect for them has declined, though Prince William, his marriage and Prince George have caught the public’s imagination and the Queen is still revered as wholly dedicated to her role. Fourth, the Church of England, while being the ‘official’ church of the UK, headed by the Queen, commands very little support in the present day. Over half the general public claim not to be ‘religious’ and only 5% regularly attend church. Fifth, the Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs), November 2012, were elected officials the purpose of whom was unclear both

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regarding the detail of their role and, more importantly, the need for their creation in the first place. Average turnout in these elections was only 10–20% of the electorate and to date the PCCs have been the recipients of more criticism than praise. Increasing legitimacy

Other elements are maybe not yet fully accepted but nonetheless appear to be on the way to being so. Devolution reforms offer examples here. The devolved assemblies were created in 1997–98 and have had four elections to date. The Scottish Parliament won a high degree of acceptance but faced a powerful challenge from the SNP, the governing party since 2012, which called a referendum for September 2014 to decide if Scotland should be allowed independence or not. In the event the ‘Yes’ to independence case lost to the ‘Nos’ 55 to 45. The Welsh Assembly was initially regarded coolly by its electors but it would now be hard to imagine politics in Wales without it, after over a decade. The Northern Ireland Assembly is founded on the unstable foundation of a province still simmering with sectarian differences below the surface but, again, it would now be hard to imagine this part of the UK without its devolved assembly.

EXTREMISM British history does not manifest any clear leaning towards the ideological extremes. The political fringe in Britain has included all the usual exoticisms of anarchists, Trotskyists, communists, fascists, Maoists and the like, but on no occasion have such beliefs ever taken root. The Labour Party emerged from a marriage of trade unions and socialist societies of varying degrees of fervour. Marxists set out their stall as well as Christian socialists and the gradualist Fabians. During World War I, leaders of the influential Independent Labour Party (ILP) tended to be pacifist and some Labour activists were enthused by the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. But once the Labour Party found its identity, it proved to be one eschewing the Moscow-­led Communist Party of Great Britain and closer to the safe reformism of the Fabians. During the 1930s Oswald Mosley created his British Union of Fascists, a version of



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what was happening in Germany, but it failed to ignite and became further proof that British people do not respond to ideological extremes. It was also the case that British political methodology remained essentially parliamentary during even the most turbulent inter-­war years; even the 1926 General Strike, while briefly threatening insurrection, soon deflated into resigned failure. This does not mean that violent displays do not occasionally occur; examples include the city riots of the early 1980s, the poll tax riots in 1990 and the city riots during the summer of 2011. But such episodic events were not any prelude to a wholesale rejection of the political system. However, a lurch into the extremes can never be ruled out. The erosion of democratic processes and the growth of cynical mistrust in politicians, within a context of economic austerity, create exactly the conditions in which a fringe ideology might suddenly take off; UKIP and its successor, the Brexit Party, might be seen as an example of this tendency; it was a sad reflection on the mental state of some right-­wing activists that one of them, Thomas Mair, during the campaign, murdered the highly respected Labour MP, Jo Cox, apparently for supporting Remain. Indeed, the spread of right-­wing national populism throughout Europe of which UKIP–Brexit Party was the home manifestation, were encouraged by the visceral emotions released by the drawn out, intractable Brexit procedures. Impact of Brexit on Political Culture

The decision to Leave by 52% to 48% in June 2016 followed a bitter and hugely divisive campaign in which exaggeration and mendacity featured throughout. Remain voters felt especially aggrieved and did their very best either to delay or revoke Brexit, or to fight for a settlement as close as possible to the status quo. There were nationwide demonstrations by Remainers, involving million strong marches and cross-­party alliances in the Commons to frustrate May’s attempts to push her deal through parliament. Leave voters for their part were infuriated that what they saw as the ‘Establishment’ were preventing the ‘will of the people’ – 17.4 million voters – being implemented as promised by the main political parties after the referendum and in their 2017 manifestos. The country had apparently set like concrete into two blocks of

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c­ onvinced opinion, neither prepared to compromise or even listen to hated members of the other side. Nothing like this division could be recalled in British history, since possibly the 1926 National Strike. At the heart of this conflict was one of constitutional legitimacy. The Conservative Party under Cameron was terrified immigration­fuelled UKIP support would usurp Tory votes and deny its ability to win elections. He finally sought to pre-­empt such a development in 2013 by offering a referendum on EU membership. The result endorsed Leave but, according to the unwritten constitution, it is the Commons which has sovereign authority: referendums can only ever be advisory. However a national vote of this kind was invested with a political authority which was apparently undeniable and so the stage was set for the extended, bitter process which ultimately led to May’s resignation and her replacement by Boris Johnson who, using a degree of ruthlessness, renegotiated the withdrawal bill, called and won a general election and achieved Brexit on 31 January 2020. Johnson’s unorthodox but effective tactics were applauded on the right, reviled by the left but welcomed by a substantial section of the nation who were suffering extreme ‘Brexit fatigue’. Over time Leavers and Remainers polarised into two rival tribes unwilling to listen and debate rationally but, rather, were intent upon heaping accusations and abuse upon each other. MPs complained of being harassed and abused – Anna Soubry, a Remain supporting Tory MP was loudly called a ‘Nazi’ by a leave activist James Goddard who was handed down a suspended jail sentence in July 2019. She was just one of scores of MPs who received a mounting level of abuse which some British citizens now felt appropriate to hurl at public figures associated with the Brexit debate. Decline of Civility

British politics has never been especially polite but the Brexit conflict saw standards of civility sink to new and worrying levels where opponents ceased to listen respectfully and discuss rationally in favour of raised voices and angry denunciation. An important factor facilitating this decline has been the use of social media. It is now possible for anyone to send an abusive email to an MP or to abuse



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people in arguments on social media. Cloaked in the anonymity of social media, people are prepared to aim insults and accusations at people they would never dream of making were they face to face with them. Older citizens deplore this abandonment of civility – this author included – and hope, probably vainly, that this is a passing phase.

DEFERENCE Political deference equates with respect for the law, government institutions and an absence of dissent. Social deference means the acceptance that some people are innately superior by virtue of social rank. A ‘gentleman’ used to be seen as an educated person, speaking in a received pronunciation fashion, who dressed well, was polite and clearly had decisive ‘leadership’ qualities. For this reason the military recruited only the privately educated into its ranks, until World War I so depleted them that ‘lower-­status’ replacements from the lower-­middle classes were deemed necessary. In similar fashion the traditional professions – the law, civil service, banking, not to mention the new profession of broadcasting – looked first to recruit from the same privately educated middle classes. The Conservative Party drew most of its MPs from the same sources. Labour, too, drew some of its leading lights – Attlee, Gaitskell, Crosland and Benn (who later removed this reference from his Who’s Who entry) – from public schools. However, deference from party members and the working classes in general was often granted only through gritted teeth. The 1950s was probably the last decade in which British society could be described as deferential in this sense. During the 1960s a cultural transformation occurred which swept away much of this type of thinking. Factors involved included: trail-­blazing, taboo-­breaking writers – Kingsley Amis, John Braine, Harold Pinter – who attacked the traditional order of things and poked fun at its representatives like the Edwardian Harold Macmillan and the aristocratic Alec Douglas-­Home; jazz and rock and roll, which galvanised youth through the expression of individualism and rebellion; the emergence of an alternative grammar-­school-educated elite, who resented the hegemony of a class which in other ways had scarcely distinguished itself; and the

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decline of religion as a social glue which legitimised social difference and respect for ‘superiors’. The consequences of this cultural revolution was made manifest in: the (albeit brief ) ‘hippy’ phenomenon, which rejected traditional materialism among many other things; reform of the law on homosexuality; and a tendency to regard all politicians as objects of derision. SATIRE

The magazine Private Eye emerged as a weekly satirical bible for this new way of thinking and the BBC’s That Was the Week That Was, during the 1960s provided a hugely successful weekly send-­up of all things traditional and serious. Politicians tried hard to understand the new zeitgeist; Tories elected two grammar-­school products, Edward Heath and Margaret Thatcher, to avoid appearing too old fashioned but neither displayed much, or indeed any, of the sense of humour which underlay this new cultural consciousness. Later PMs, Blair especially, cleverly disarmed such attacks with self-­deprecation and a realisation that Heath’s angry denunciations were counter-­productive. Satire remains a strong element of British political culture, reflected in such television successes in recent decades as Yes Minister, Spitting Image, Bremner, Bird and Fortune and The Thick of It, plus a style of media reporting which often looks for the satirical angle. ‘Cultural War’

Certain issues are contested but, in the UK, not so much in elections relating to things like patriotism, same sex marriage, drug use, immigration, equality and diversity. Blogger and Journalist, Ed West argues that Conservatives have been losing this ‘culture war’ because key groups in the arts, media, academe and business have for decades leaned to the left (see section on this in Chapter 25).

CIVIL SOCIETY Civil society is the densely complex web of relationships between citizens – social, economic and via voluntary groups. Such connections are vitally important in providing the ‘soil’ in which healthy



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democracies can grow. For example, membership of the cubs, scouts and sporting clubs fosters the ability to lead and be led, be part of a team, to lose as well as win with good grace. Studies in the USA, especially Bowling Alone by Robert Putnam (2000), suggests Americans are withdrawing from such voluntary activity into the cocoons of their own flat-­screen-equipped lounges. Studies in Britain suggest the situation is not currently comparable but declining voter turnout and (apart from Labour) party membership removes the idea that the UK has nothing to worry about. One study of volunteering in the UK reveals that it correlates closely with income, with higher-­income groups much more likely to volunteer than low-­income groups.

CRIME The decline of deference has also had an impact on crime. When people more or less accepted their position in society, they were not too unhappy that the upper social strata received more financial rewards and more power. However, as more and more people began to feel an equal entitlement to success, some of those lower down in the hierarchy were not willing to accept inferiority and turned to illegality as a means of advancing their socio-­economic status. This is one of the reasons, perhaps, why there was a huge crime wave between the advent of Thatcher in 1979 and the demise of John Major’s government in 1997. Tackling crime effectively has become a major political demand over recent decades. Ironically, the fact that crime figures halved 20 years after 1995 did not convince a large section of society, who continued to believe crime is on the rise. However, in 2017 crime figures showed the biggest rise for a decade (Travis, 2017). The inability of police to contain crime became an issue in the 2019 election with Johnson promising to add 20,000 police to forces across the country.

WELFARE STATE After the introduction of pensions in the early twentieth century, welfare measures were added incrementally until the major extension of them after 1945, when Labour won its historic landslide. The experience of combating the common Nazi foe for five long

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years had a transforming effect on British political culture: the sense of ‘togetherness’ was so intensely felt that once it was clear the war was going to be won, a consensus grew that measures should be taken to ensure that everyone, rich as well as poor, who, after all, had fought the war in harness, should benefit from national wealth post-­war. Free health care and education quickly became major expectations and very quickly became part of the nation’s life. Additional measures, like sick and unemployment pay, added to a raft of support measures from the state, which almost amounted to ‘cradle to grave’ provision. It is fair now to say that the British have become used to such assistance and are very closely attached to the National Health Service (NHS), so much so that any party seeking to dismantle it would lose support – even the suggestion that the Conservatives might do so became a negative in 1997 and subsequent elections. It would be fair to say that the British have become habituated to welfare services, expect to receive them and until recently would punish at the ballot box parties proposing to cut them. The ‘austerity policies’ of the Coalition government after 2010 received a remarkable degree of support, thanks to effective blaming by Conservatives of earlier Labour governments for the nation’s high levels of debt (the legitimacy of which is still hotly disputed by Labour). However, after nine years of such policies, public service cuts, especially at local government (spending cut by 40% since 2010) May’s government was forced to signal ‘the end of austerity’ in October 2018. Moreover, in the 2019 election campaign, both main parties competed in offering substantial welfare handouts to their potential voters. Support for those receiving benefits shows a different pattern. During the 1980s Thatcherite policies were very unpopular and sympathy was extended towards the unemployed and those on other benefits. However, the recession that began in 2007 led to a distinct hardening of views towards those in need: as shown by research quoted by David Binder on the ‘Politics and Policy’ website of the London School of Economics (August 2013) 15% of the public in 1994 thought people live in need because of laziness or a lack of willpower, compared with 23% in 2010. During the same period, adherence to the view that people live in need because of injustice in our society declined from 29% to 21%.



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However, later reports of the British Social Attitude surveys suggest a softening in social disapproval and greater sympathy for those surviving on subsistence benefits. No doubt the widespread dissatisfaction with the Universal Credit system – intended to unify benefits while providing incentives to work – which came in for much criticism 2017–19, will have enhanced public empathy with benefit recipients.

IS BRITISH SOCIETY TOO OPEN? Some suggest British political culture has become too liberal, placing too much emphasis on free speech and freedom generally to the point where national security has become vulnerable. A 2008 report from the Royal United Services Institute suggested that British society’s relaxed attitude: is in stark contrast to the implacability of the Islamist terrorist enemy. ‘Fractured institutional integrity’ means that when the unexpected occurs, the response is likely to be incoherent, ad hoc, short-­term and uncertain. … We look a soft touch. We are indeed a soft touch. (Prins and Salisbury, 2008)

MPs’ EXPENSES AND THE EROSION OF TRUST The banking crisis in 2008–09 produced a deep economic recession with widespread redundancies and bankruptcies. Anger was felt against the bankers, with loathing focused especially on Sir Fred Goodwin, former head of the Royal Bank of Scotland, who, after presiding over a cataclysmic £28 billion loss, was rewarded with a £700,000 pension (he later agreed to a £200,000 reduction). And then came the MPs’ expenses scandal. This revealed that while ordinary people were having to absorb reductions in income or benefits, MPs were exploiting a generous expenses regime to fund things for which ordinary people had to pay themselves, including landscaping gardens and buying up London properties, often on a bogus basis (and selling them at huge profit). While bankers were not accountable, MPs were, and suffered a furious backlash from many quarters. Some MPs were revealed as claiming for mortgages on London homes which had already been paid off; prison ­sentences

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were handed out to some of the offenders, for example Scunthorpe MP, Elliot Morley. The outcome of this fusion of discontents was a shift in political culture whereby a raft of reforms was thought desirable and achievable. While some did take place, for example (as expected) reform of the expenses system, fixed-­term parliaments, election of select committee chairs by committee members rather than appointment by the whips, many others were quietly dropped or, as with voting reform, defeated in the referendum of May 2011 (see also Chapter 1).

The ‘Celebrity Politician’ This western world creation is the consequence of a merging of the public prominence of politicians with a popular culture – as the tabloid press reveals daily, try the Daily Star for instance – more than a little obsessed with celebrities. Some young people in surveys say that their ambition is to be a ‘celebrity’ as if this accolade is available to them regardless of any special talent. John Street’s 2004 article offers an insightful analysis of this new phenomenon. His examples for that time include Tony Blair playing an electric guitar in an attempt to appear like a pop star, body builder film star Arnold Schwarzenegger being elected governor of California and then the converse examples: Bob Geldof and Bono acquiring important political personas; rock stars bitterly criticising Blair’s decision to join the USA in invading Iraq; and comedians like Mark Steel and the late Jeremy Hardy becoming known for their sharply critical political material. Closer to the present we have reality television and business celebrity Donald Trump elected president in 2016; and Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn addressing a massive Glastonbury audience from the Pyramid stage in June 2017. Perhaps the best example of this hybrid creation is Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine, an actor who progressed from playing the television drama president of his country to actually being elected as such in May 2019. ‘Politics is show-­business for ugly people’, was the perhaps unfair quip popularised by US chat-­show host, Jay Leno, but clearly it is impossible for the two cultures – political and celebrity – to be kept apart as they operate within the same media



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context. The development of ‘populist’ politics, where politicians seek to present themselves as ‘outsiders’ opposing a corrupt political elite, has tended to accelerate this fusion, as the emergence of Beppo Grillo, an Italian right-­wing comedian turned politician who founded his now powerful 5 Star movement in 2009. Nigel Farage performed this role very effectively for his two political creations, UKIP and the Brexit Party, though his public school and City trader background made his outsider claim more than a little contradictory. Yet voters seemed not to notice as they warmed to his beer swilling, cigarette smoking, joke cracking persona. The fact is that adapting or recruiting aspects of the celebrity culture can project or ‘market’ a politician much more effectively than merely traditional methods as it finds easy and instant resonance with the tabloid press and social media like Twitter, Facebook and Instagram. Another aspect of this phenomenon is the ‘teflon coating’ it can provide. In the late nineteenth century, the career of Charles Stuart Parnell, the Irish Home Rule MP, was destroyed when his adulterous relationship with Mrs O’Shea was revealed. Such deviations from conventional morality were sustained, though in weakened form during the twentieth century and David Mellor was forced to resign in 1992 when his affair with actress Antonia De Sancha was breathlessly (and mendaciously) reported in the tabloids. A similar public disapproval of marital infidelity caused Democrat front runner Gary Hart to drop out of the presidential race in 1988. Since then we have witnessed Donald Trump in the USA, and Boris Johnson in the UK, both ‘celebrity politicians’, appear to be immune to such career ending disapproval. Indeed, it might be argued that such unorthodoxies are almost ‘priced in’, maybe even expected from such figures. Celebrities seem to be given a ‘free pass’ on such matters, maybe because it’s seen as part of ‘celebrity behaviour’: the public rather expects celebs to vicariously live out a form of life unavailable to most ordinary people. So the fact that almost a score of women publicly claimed Trump had sexually molested them did not unduly affect his ability to function successfully as a politician. His rallies, a campaign feature he continued consistently once in the White House, remained adulatory in the extreme, even his female supporters excusing his behaviour as if that of a ‘lovable rogue’. Precisely the same reaction

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seems to have been made to Johnson’s serial infidelities, which have also entailed the birth of extramarital children, though the exact number is unknown (see Street, 2004).

CONCLUSION ‘A civic culture’? Writing in the 1960s, Almond and Verba produced The Civic Culture, a major study in political culture. They saw Britain as having the ‘ideal civic culture’, that is, one that ‘combined or balanced the values of citizen participation and self­confidence with a trust in the elites and a responsiveness to their laws’ (quoted in Jones and Kavanagh, 1994, p. 25). In the UK, judged the authors: ‘Citizens are sufficiently active in politics to express their preferences to rulers, but not so involved as to refuse to accept decisions with which they disagree. Thus the civic culture resolves the tension between popular control and effective governance’ (quoted in Watts, 2003, p. 18). Clearly, such an analysis requires an update. Participation rates have plummeted, along with trust in our elites, and perhaps stability, especially given the divisive impact of Brexit, is no longer so assured. The erosion of deference has made the country easier to live in for many people but at some cost to authority and trust. A more enthusiastic embrace of market forces has added dynamism to the economy but also instability as wealth and income gaps have grown apace. Our civil society is still robust but has suffered a decline since the days of Almond and Verba’s book. It is by no means certain that, if written today, such a study would produce such an optimistic set of conclusions.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION 1. How different are the political cultures of the USA and the UK? 2. What changes to UK political culture have been introduced by digital technology? 3. Would you say UK political culture over the past two decades has moved to the right or to the left? 4. How do you account for the emergence of ‘celebrity politicians’?



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FURTHER READING Books on UK political culture are not abundant but good starts are those by Almond and Verba (1965), Beer (1982a, 1982b) and Kavanagh (1972). Those interested in the impact of the digital revolution on politics generally are strongly advised to read Jamie Susskind’s (2018) brilliant book listed below. Street’s (2004) excellent article on ‘celebrity politicians’ is also highly recommended. Almond, G. and Verba, S. (1965) The Civic Culture, Little, Brown. Beckett, A. (2019) The age of perpetual crisis: how the 2010s disrupted everything but resolved nothing, Guardian, 17 December. Beer, S. (1982a) Modern British Politics, Faber. Beer, S. (1982b) Britain Against Itself: Political Contradictions of Collectivism, Faber. Goodwin, M. (2020) Left behind on the right, Sunday Times Culture Supplement, 15 March. Jones, B. and Kavanagh, D. (1994) British Politics Today (5th edition), Manchester University Press. Kavanagh, D. (1972) Political Culture, Cambridge University Press. Mackenzie, R. and Silver, A. (1968) Angels in Marble, Heinemann. Maclean, I. (2010) The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics, Oxford University Press. Maclean, I. and Macmillan, A. (1996) The Concise Dictionary of Politics, Oxford University Press.  Montifiore, S.S. (2003) Stalin: The Red Tsar, Knopf Doubleday. Moran, M. (2011) Politics and Governance in the UK (2nd edition), Palgrave. Prins, G. and Salisbury, R. (2008) Risk, threat and security: the case of the United Kingdom, RUSI, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 22–27. Putnam, R.D. (2000) Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community, Simon & Schuster. Rose, R. (ed.) (1974) Studies in British Politics, Macmillan. Street, J. (2004) Celebrity politicians: popular culture and political representation, BJPIR, Vol. 6, pp. 435–452. Susskind, J. (2018) Future Politics, Oxford University Press. Travis, A. (2017) Crime rise biggest in a decade, ONS figures show, Guardian, 20 July. Watts, D. (2003) Understanding US/UK Government and Politics, Manchester University Press. West, E. (2020a) Why conservatism is doomed, Unherd (blog), 9 March. West, E. (2020b) Small Men on the Wrong Side of History, Constable.

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6 The Unwritten Constitution

Constitutions provide the ‘rules of the game’ for states, determining how their political systems are allowed to operate. If they know nothing else about its constitution, most British people know that their country has no written document upon which it is inscribed. But, like many other well-­known truths this is not quite correct. Much of the constitution is actually written down, in the form of acts of parliament relating to, for example, who can vote and how elections should be run. What Britain lacks is a complete codified document, like the US constitution.  Autocratic regimes also produce constitutions from time to time, but autocrats tend to ignore rules or change them, if they prove inconvenient, so unsurprisingly they are most commonly associated with genuine democracies: frequency of elections and what kind of voting system is to be used, what constitutes a majority in the legislature, what powers the head of the executive has and so forth.

Historical emergence of constitutions From the earliest days there were no written down constitutions – the monarch ruled more or less as he pleased and that was that. Most countries up to the eighteenth century did not question the idea of monarchical rule and it would have been difficult in any case to suddenly stop off and formulate a new system. The situation of the embryonic USA was therefore unusual: the successful rebellion of the original 13 states against British rule provided a tabula rasa, a clean slate. Their constitution was drawn up by a



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committee of very ingenious and able men in 1787 – the so-­ called Founding Fathers – and became possibly the most important constitution ever drafted. From thereon more and more nations began to produce similar documents; for example France has produced a number, as its regimes changed, the most recent dating from 1958’s 5th Republic version. The USSR also had a famously liberal constitution dating from 1936, though in practice Stalin totally ignored its major provisions. Indeed it seems acquiring a written constitution is to an extent viewed as ‘validating’ a regime. Usually constitutions are created by consensus – significantly such innovations as devolved assemblies in the UK have been put out to referendums before being implemented. However, Britain’s system of government, originating long before rules were formally written down, was created more out of conflict than agreement: for example, constitutional monarchical rule was born of a Civil War, the execution of one king and the fleeing of a second. However, once all the seventeenth century constitutional matters were sorted out, together with laying the democratic foundations of the nineteenth century, most of the ensuing century was conducted without constitutional matters arising very much at all; it was only in the 1990s that it topped the political agenda once again.

‘Dignified’ and ‘efficient’ Walter Bagehot, the most famous authority on the British constitution, made a distinction between those antique, mostly monarchy related, aspects which were ‘dignified’ – i.e. had a mostly ceremonial function, like the royal family, Privy Council and, to a degree, the House of Lords – and the ‘efficient’ or ‘working’ aspects like the Commons, departments of state, the law courts. As our institutions age political analysts sometimes run their eyes over them – the Commons, the cabinet, maybe – to detect any tendency of a shift from ‘efficient’ to ‘dignified’.

Parliamentary sovereignty Basic to the whole system of British government is the notion that it is only the Queen in parliament which can make the law, or

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indeed unmake it. Unlike in the USA the courts cannot strike down a law as being contrary to the constitution. No other body can set aside its statutes. After the Glorious Revolution of 1688, the King agreed to be bound by the laws of parliament, and his courts of law too. Parliament is at the peak of the constitution and, as the Commons is the dominant element of it, elections to that body determine which party leader forms the government and controls the destiny of the country.

Sources of the constitution Moran (2011) notes the eclectic nature of the British constitution: 1. ‘Normal’ statutes: these are laws passed affecting the power of the state. For example habeus corpus, 1679, limits the right of the state to detain anyone and without trial. Since then the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 1974, was passed to increase state powers in relation to those suspected of such offences; as it was a ‘temporary’ measure, it has been renewed every year since and further strengthened by the Anti-­Terrorism, Crime and Security Emergency Act in 2001. 2. ‘Super statutes’: these are those which parliament cannot easily over-­rule as they originate in treaties in connection (before Brexit) with the European Union, the establishment of devolved assemblies in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, or, another identified by Moran, the abolition of hereditary peerages in the Lords, not something which parliament could be likely to reverse in the foreseeable future. Hence these are statutes of a heavier timber than the normal ones applying to electoral law and so forth. This was especially true of EU law which was superior to domestic law and over-­ruled it. The UK agreed to be bound by the 1957 Treaty of Rome in 1972 and then by its modifications added by the Single European Act 1986 and the European Communities (Amendment) Act in 1993 which implemented the Maastricht Treaty. When the UK left the EU in January 2020, all this legal architecture fell away.



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3. Case law: this comprises the interpretations of how various laws have been applied. Often application changes with circumstance so accumulated judicial opinion can often acquire the status of law in itself. 4. Common law: this kind of law dates back to Norman times and has been distilled from ‘custom and precedent’, often relating to traditional rights and freedoms upheld by courts over centuries, freedom of speech and assembly being among them. Common law however is over-­ruled by statute law. 5. Royal prerogative: these powers are in effect the residual powers of the monarch regarding summoning and dissolving parliament, appointing judges, creating peers, signing treaties, declaring war and the like. Because they are in the hands of the crown, parliament’s approval is not deemed necessary. Over time, however, little by little, PM and cabinet have come to exercise these powers, causing reformers like Tony Benn to criticise the PM as a ‘medieval monarch in Downing St’. Gordon Brown’s period in power witnessed: the legal entrenchment of a merit-­based civil service that works for governments of all political complexions; a modest role for parliament regarding international treaties; and the reduction of the PM’s role in appointing bishops to that of merely passing on to the Queen the name chosen by the Crown Nominations Commission. The coalition government also introduced fixed five­year parliamentary terms, terms which, with Commons approval, were set aside in 2017 and 2019 to allow elections to take place within the statutory five-­year period. However, perhaps the most important part of the royal prerogative – the power to go to war or deploy troops overseas – remains with the PM (Allen, 2012). 6. Conventions: these are perhaps quintessentially British phenomena in that they lack the force of law but have been followed for so long that they have come to be seen as automatically applicable. Examples include the practice whereby the PM, since early twentieth century, will sit in the Commons and not the Lords; that the Queen will dissolve parliament when the PM requests it and that the PM will resign if defeated on a motion of confidence. However these unwritten rules can be tested as they were during the frenzied battle over Brexit.

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Conventions only work as long as there is consensus as to their legitimacy; Peter Hennessy (The Economist, 2018) has called this the ‘good chap’ theory of government. If one side refuses to be ‘good chaps’ then a degree of chaos follows in which, during Brexit conflicts the Speaker John Bercow, a Remainer by sympathy, interpreted some conventions in a way which favoured the anti-­Brexit cause (see Bercow, 2020; Rawnsley, 2020). 7. Institutional rules: Moran points out that the internal rules of our major institutions virtually have constitutional significance, for example, Erskine May, the bible of parliamentary procedure in the Commons. 8. Works of authority: there are a number of hugely respected works on the constitution – for example, Coke’s Institutes of the Laws of England (in Coke, 2003), and A.V. Dicey’s Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution – which have considerable persuasive power where clarity is uncertain.

Amendment of the constitution In the USA there are several hurdles to be cleared before any aspect of the constitution can be amended: it can be effected either by a two-­thirds majority in both Houses of Congress or a ‘convention’ of states called by two-­thirds of state legislatures. Britain is unusual in having no special ‘entrenchment’ of its constitution: a simple majority vote can do it – many criticised the 52–48 2016 referendum vote as insufficient grounds for proceeding with Brexit. However: 1. Bills with constitutional content usually have their committee stage on the floor of the Commons rather than in a standing committee. 2. It has now become accepted that major constitutional proposals should first be subject to a referendum – as in the case of devolution, changing the voting system and, of course, EU membership. 3. Devolution itself has arguably removed some constitutional items away from the orbit of Westminster but power is still only delegated: it can be limited or abolished altogether should parliament so decide.



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Separation of powers During the eighteenth century, the French political thinker, Montesquieu, believed England had a ‘separation of powers’ which produced a balance whereby the legislature, executive and judiciary checked each other. The framers of the US constitution were influenced by his analysis and embodied it in their creation. However, he was mistaken, as the executive is actually formed out of the largest group in the legislature and the ‘independence of the legislature’ is mostly a fiction. In the USA this mistake has perhaps had good consequences as the legislature is elected separately from the executive and the senior judiciary appointed by the president. Separate elections give separate legitimacy and power not found in British government, meaning that a British PM has more relative power than a US president who has to contend with the elected Congress; the PM on the other hand can be deposed if his party fails to support him while the president is guaranteed office until it officially expires after four years. Referendums and the authority of Parliament

According to all constitutional theory, it is the Commons which stands at the apex of political power in the UK. MPs are elected and it is their views, tempered occasionally by votes in the Lords, which determine how the UK is governed. However the introduction of referendums in the 1970s to decide devolution issues established a precedent that any serious constitutional issue should be put to a national vote. After much wrangling David Cameron finally allowed such a vote on EU membership, an issue of the utmost controversy. When in 2016 the vote went the Leave way, it was confronted by a parliament containing a majority of Remain supporters who tried their best to delay or dilute the implementation of the decision. According to the constitutional theory and practice, the referendum result was only advisory but in practice its narrow, but clear 52–48 margin, carried a political imperative which MPs found difficult to ignore.

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Moran’s ‘core’ and ‘contested’ elements of the constitution In the USA the constitution occupies a revered place in national life in which its authority is unquestioned. In the UK there is nothing to equal such respect though Moran (2011) – recognising that such considerations delve into ‘political culture’ – makes a useful distinction between those aspects of the constitution which are accepted without cavil and those which attract controversy.

‘Core’ Moran (2011) identifies a number of items: 1. Rule of law: the government is not allowed to exceed the limits of its own laws or it is judged to be ‘ultra vires’ and procedures exist for citizens and groups to challenge government if it does transgress. The addition of EU law has led government to be cautious unless new laws are not compatible with domestic as well as this more recent supra-­national law. 2. Procedural democracy: these are the rules whereby a government is elected, serves its time in office and then is subjected to another judgment by voters. Moran is right to say that these rules are so ingrained ‘that it occurs to virtually nobody to change them’, but some minor changes are made from time to time and, it might be observed, these rules cannot be so widely absorbed, if only 60% of voters can be bothered to vote in a general election, as in 2001. 3. Accountability: that governments should explain themselves and be subject to challenge and dismissal is never questioned. 4. Liberal freedoms: by the same token virtually no one challenges the right of someone to freedom of speech or assembly. However, especially in the wake of restrictions resulting from terrorist acts, recent changes in the law have shown that even these core elements are not infrequently altered, diminished to a degree or threatened.



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‘Contested’ 1. Territorial unity: the emergence of passionate nationalist movements in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland reveal that this has become a tenet of the constitution which is looking increasingly tenuous. 2. Parliamentary supremacy: membership of the EU saw a challenge to parliamentary sovereignty which many Euro-­sceptics opposed. And, from ‘below’, devolution has ushered in challenges based on a new legitimacy delegated to assemblies within UK territory. 3. Crown legitimacy: in the nineteenth century the Queen and her family were above criticism and occupied a near sacred position, albeit mostly ceremonial at the heart of the constitution. During the twentieth century the royal family still commanded huge public support, especially during the war when they symbolised the national struggle. But after the late 1960s when the royals made the (probable) mistake of allowing the light of publicity to steal away their magic, their position began to be criticised. The demise of deference and the growth of intrusive tabloid reporting meant that the marriage of Prince Charles to Lady Diana Spencer was pored over like no other and it is hardly surprising it failed to survive. Similar problems were encountered when Prince Andrew’s friendship with convicted paedophile, Jeffrey Epstein, and Prince Harry and his wife Meghan’s disenchantment with their UK life as members of the royal family.

Current constitutional issues Referendums and the authority of Parliament

According to all constitutional theory, it is the Commons which stands at the apex of political power in the UK. MPs are elected and it is their views, tempered occasionally by votes in the Lords, which determine how the UK is governed. However the introduction of referendums in the 1970s to decide devolution issues established a precedent that any serious constitutional issue should be put to a national vote. After much wrangling David

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Cameron finally allowed such a vote on EU membership, an issue of the utmost controversy. When in 2016 the vote went the Leave way, it was confronted by a parliament containing a majority of Remain supporters who tried their best to delay or dilute the implementation of the decision. According to the constitutional theory and practice the referendum result was only advisory but in practice its narrow, but clear 52–48 margin carried a political imperative which a large group of MPs felt they had to honour. A written constitution?

In the last two decades pressure has grown for the official writing down or ‘codification’ of the uncertain aspects of the constitution. Constitutional reformers, like members of the pressure group Charter 88, have long argued for such a document, arguing: In favour 1. The executive has grown over mighty and needs to have limits clearly applied to it. 2. The erosion of civil rights requires the clearest possible statement of what rights every citizen is entitled to. 3. The specific powers and responsibilities of each part of the state needs to be delineated to prevent power being misused. 4. People would be able to refer to a document to learn about their rights. More conservative elements argue: In opposition 1. Checks and balances work well enough as it is and the real problem of British government is not centralisation but fragmentation of power to new assemblies and groups. 2. A written constitution would put enormous power in the hands of unelected judges, whose interpretation of disputes would create new aspects of constitutional law. 3. It would introduce an inhibition to change which is inimical to British government whose unwritten constitution has allowed government to adapt and develop organically.



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In February 2008 it seemed the justice secretary and Lord Chancellor, Jack Straw, had opted in favour of a written document. Speaking at the George Washington University, Washington, DC, he revealed plans to draw up a written constitution within two decades. Reformers tended to regard this statement with a ‘we’ll believe it when we see it’ scepticism. A British Bill of Rights? 

In the same speech, Straw also expressed his wish that a British Bill of Rights be drawn up:  In the United Kingdom many duties and responsibilities exist in statute, common practice or are woven into our social and moral fabric. But elevating them to a new status in a constitutional document would reflect their importance in the healthy functioning of our democracy.

After criticising the idea of a specifically British Bill of Rights as confusing to the voter, Marcel Berlins, legal editor of the Guardian, was equally dismissive of Straw’s vision of a 20 years hence written constitution: Written constitutions have been needed to control the governance of countries that have emerged from some kind of upheaval – by revolution, independence from a colonial master, geo-­political re-­arrangement (such as the break-­up of Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union), the overthrow or accession of a dictator, or some other drastic change, as in post-­ apartheid South Africa. Britain has encountered none of these. Its constitution – untidy, only partly written, bits and pieces to be found here and there – continues, on the whole, to serve the country well. It is in no danger of collapse or breakdown. Let the government forget its dreams of a perfect constitutional document. We don’t need one. (Berlins, 2008) Conservative Views on Human Rights

At the Conservative Spring conference in 2013 home secretary Theresa May – suspected of harbouring leadership ambitions –

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s­uggested that if successful, in 2015, Conservatives might withdraw from membership of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) on the grounds that it damaged Britain’s national interests. She had been infuriated by her inability to return radical Islam preacher Abu Qatada to his native Jordan for fear that he would be tortured by the authorities there.

further reading Major texts: Moran (2011, ch. 5); Kingdom (2014, ch. 3); Jones (2011, ch. 15); Leach et al. (2006, ch. 10); Kavanagh (1972, ch. 10). An interesting short book by lawyer Brice Dickson (2019), urges a partially written constitution. Allen, Graham, MP (2012) The Government must be held to its promise to ‘enshrine in law for the future the necessity of consulting Parliament on military action’, British Politics and Policy at LSE, July. Bercow, J. (2020) Unspeakable: The Autobiography, W&N. Berlins, M. (2008) Our untidy constitution serves Britain well, Guardian, 18 February. Bogdanor, V. (ed.) (2003) The British Constitution in the Twentieth Century, Oxford University Press. Brazier, R. (1994) Constitutional Practice, Oxford University Press. Coke, E. (2003) The Selected Writings and Speeches of Sir Edward Coke, Volume One, edited by S. Sheppard (PDF ), Liberty Fund. Dicey, A.V. (1885, 1886, 1889, 1893, 1897, 1902, 1908) Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, Macmillan & Co. Dickson, B. (2019) Writing the United Kingdom Constitution, Manchester University Press. IPPR (1992) A New Constitution for the United Kingdom, Mansell. Jones, B. (2004) Dictionary of British Politics, Manchester University Press. Kavanagh, D. (1972) Political Culture, Oxford University Press. Kingdom, J. (2014) Government and Politics in Britain, Polity. Leach, R., Coxall, B. and Robins, L. (2006) British Politics, Palgrave.  Moran, M. (2011) Politics and Governance in the UK (2nd edition), Palgrave. Norton, P. (1993) The Constitution: approaches to reform, Politics Review, Vol. 3 No. 1. Oliver, D. (2003) Constitutional Reform in the UK, Oxford University Press. Rawnsley, A. (2020) Unspeakable by John Bercow review: now who’s out of order? Review of Bercow’s memoir (see above), Observer Review, 8 February.



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The Economist (2018) Britain’s good chap model of government is coming apart, Editorial, 18 December.

Websites Campaign for the English regions, www.cfer.org.uk. Constitution Unit, www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-­unit.

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7 POLITICAL IDEAS I Up to New Labour

This chapter examines British political ideas that emerged through the narrative arc of events as theory met practice in terms of changed political realities over three turbulent centuries of British political history. People are motivated to act on the basis of what is important to them, often, for example, the material comfort of themselves and their families, but also on what they believe is important to them, their feelings of identity or where they belong, attitudes towards their country and, maybe, the future of the human race itself.

THE EMERGENCE OF POLITICAL IDEAS It is easy to forget how political ideas as we understand them are of such recent provenance. During the medieval era there were debates around the religious and political status quo but they were limited in scope and dissemination. The Civil War (1642–49) saw the emergence, with the development of printing, of a fierce pamphlet debate about kingship. In 1647 this debate surfaced within Cromwell’s New Model Army, when it was headquartered in Putney, creating the Putney debates, chaired by Cromwell himself. Here a vigorous discussion began between those who wanted to compromise and keep the monarchy and those, like the so-­called Levellers, who wanted a radical new system of politics based upon one man one vote, biennial elections plus new constituencies with authority based in the elected House of Commons. The leader of



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this radical group, Colonel Thomas Rainsborough, declared famously ‘I think that the poorest he that is in England hath a life to lead as the greatest he.’ Debate was terminated once Charles I escaped and new battles loomed – Cromwell was in any case worried by the radicalism displayed – but the first and influential outline of a possible new political order for Britain had been articulated. The Enlightenment – that ferment of liberal ideas which swept through Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries – emphasised the application of reason and the prime importance of the individual as opposed to reverence for an omniscient church plus the monarchy as the natural form of political rule. Such views seem unexceptional in the present day but at the time they were perceived as subversive, if not revolutionary. These ideas, in fact, were the midwife of democratic ideas in the nineteenth century, which successively saw the extension of the voting franchise and the emergence of the Conservative and Liberal political parties. It was the advent of democratic government which saw political ideas take off to become the source of inspiration and route to power for political movements. From concentrating on favoured forms of government, the focus of political ideas now moved on to such questions as: the desirable degree of state involvement in everyday life; the health of the economy; levels of poverty and government’s obligation, if any, to alleviate it; not forgetting the central role of the state in foreign affairs. During the nineteenth century the founding political ideas of our age were established; they were destined to be heavily amended by political events and practice.

CORE PHILOSOPHIES IN THE nineteenth AND twentieth CENTURIES Liberalism

Liberalism (with a small ‘l’) originated with seventeenth-­century British and European Enlightenment philosophers such as John Locke (1632–1704) and Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712–78). Their writings marked a break with traditional unquestioning deference towards church and state. Locke believed in applying reason to all

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aspects of life, as well as toleration of different ideas and beliefs, and the idea that people had ‘rights’ or natural entitlements. These ideas helped break the straightjacket of traditional acceptance of the then dominant monarchical rule, but during the nineteenth century they were further developed by the likes of Adam Smith (1723–90), Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806–73). Their works helped create a ‘liberal’ body of ideas: people should be free to do as they wished as long as their actions did not impinge on the freedom of others; government should only intervene in our lives if absolutely necessary (‘minimal government’); and government should evolve towards genuine representative democracy. In the middle of the century the Liberal Party emerged out of a combination of former supporters of the Tory Robert Peel, the Whigs and the Manchester Radicals led by Richard Cobden (1804–65) and John Bright (1811–89). This last group contributed towards so-­called classical liberalism. Adam Smith (1723–90) argued that business should be allowed to produce the goods people wanted at the price they were prepared to pay. Provided competition remains fair, he maintained, the ‘invisible hand’ of the market will ensure goods are produced at the lowest possible prices at the quality levels consumers desire. This fundamental statement in favour of market-­led, free enterprise capitalism did not initially gain the acceptance of Conservatives but, ironically perhaps, was warmly embraced by them later, in the twentieth century, not least by Margaret Thatcher. Liberals also argued that government interference with ‘markets’ would seriously harm or disable their potency: capitalism should be left to work its own magic. However, towards the end of the nineteenth century thinkers like T.H. Green (1836–82) and Alfred Marshall (1842–1924) – the New Liberals – came to the conclusion that the inequalities produced by the free enterprise economy disadvantage the prospects of the poor compared with the rich. Liberal thinker L.T. Hobhouse (1864–1929) urged a levelling of the playing field through taxation to fund a minimum standard of living and old age pensions for the poor. Yet while the Liberal Party was one of the dominant parties of the nineteenth century, with William Gladstone (1809–98) becoming PM four times, their fortunes withered during the twentieth century, partly through the personal



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conflict between the brilliant David Lloyd George (1863–1945) and the cerebral but old fashioned Herbert Asquith (1852–1928), not to mention the rapid rise of the Labour Party, with its socialist ideas. Socialism

Socialism put the economy at the heart of its argument. This was because industrialisation had transformed traditional society into new forms, which some applauded and others hated. It followed that applause tended to come from those who had benefited – in some cases hugely – from the changes; and the criticism from those who had not done so well or felt they had fared badly. Capitalism, or free enterprise, was the process whereby energetic entrepreneurial people set up the means to make the things people wanted – food, clothes, furniture, jewellery – and employed (paid) other people to produce them. Employers saw this as a virtuous circle in which everyone became better off, but some critics argued that the rewards of this new system were distributed unfairly. While the owners of businesses grew fabulously rich, able to buy huge mansions, employ scores of servants and live away from the dirt and noise of the town and city, workers were often paid a tiny fraction of the wealth they created and were forced to bring up their families in insanitary and squalid conditions. Moreover, capitalism had a cyclical tendency: business could ‘boom’ vigorously and everyone might indeed benefit for a period; but it also had ‘busts’, when economic activity would slump into recession. When the latter occurred, most successful owners of business could live off their savings for a while and wait for the business upturn; workers, however, usually had few savings and faced unemployment, poverty and even starvation. In hard times it is still those in low-­paid employment who always seem to pay the highest price. Those who made this critique of capitalism – and, of course, many still do – elaborated the set of beliefs and arguments known as ‘socialism’. This asserted that the inequalities produced by capitalism made it dysfunctional as the means by which people lived their lives. Instead, they advocated, depending on their radicalism, a series of alternatives. Revolutionary socialists like Karl Marx

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(1818–83) and later Lenin (1870–1924) and Trotsky (1879–1940) urged workers to rise up, throw off their ‘chains’ of poverty and employment, and establish a new ‘classless’ society in which distinctions between ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ would disappear and everyone would live in equal relationship to each other. The dangers which attended revolutionary action, however, especially widespread violence, worried many who alternatively adopted a reformist – or social democratic – attitude, whereby inequalities would be reduced through gradual reform. The Labour Party contained some revolutionaries but in practice its leadership tended to favour the incremental, some call it the ‘social democratic’, route. They tended to agree with and adopt the ideas of the New Liberals and, as the twentieth century wore on, those of the liberal John Maynard Keynes (1883–1946), who favoured government intervention to manage the economy effectively, and William Beveridge (1879–1963), whose report in 1943 urged the birth of the welfare state to eliminate the ‘five giants’ of want, ignorance, squalor, idleness and disease. Conservatism

Conservatism as a philosophy is harder to define, as it lacks recognisable core elements. Rather, it comprises a series of tenets plus something which Lord Hailsham (1907–2001) called more an ‘attitude of mind’, a non-­ideological, pragmatic approach to problems. Conservatives argue that business is the source of hugely beneficial outcomes for everyone. According to them, it is people with energy and organisational skills who set up businesses, often putting all their wealth and resources at risk. They have to toil and graft for days on end to make their business work; few people are prepared to make that sacrifice and few have the skills to succeed; they therefore ‘deserve’ to succeed and to receive the accompanying wealth as their reward. Promise of such rewards provides the incentive for such people to invest so much of themselves and their talents. Conservatives’ attitude to socialism’s critique is the quite reasonable one that paying people more is fine if the business climate allows but if wages go up too much products will not succeed at selling in the marketplace, business will fail and maybe thousands of workers will end up unemployed. Their response to ‘equal pay’,



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for which some socialists used to call, is that human nature is such that those who are not inclined to work hard will merely do less to receive the same pay as those who work very hard, resulting in a situation where the rich and energetic support or subsidise those lazy and talentless ‘parasites’ – or ‘dole scroungers’ to use the pejorative terms on other people’s efforts. Capitalism’s Hierarchy of Rewards

Far better, they argue, that people should be paid according to their talents and contribution: you work hard, you earn money and prosper. Result? Everyone is content. If you lazily refuse to work, you fail to prosper and your family suffers. It’s your fault, so don’t complain. Any attempt to assist the feckless will merely encourage others to adopt the same lifestyle. Conservatives love Herbert Spencer’s (1820–1902) comment: ‘The ultimate result of shielding men from the effects of folly, is to fill the world with fools.’ Who decides how much workers should earn? It will depend on the market concerned say Conservatives. If certain skills are in short supply – skilled surgeons, for example – then high salaries are required to attract able people to enter the long training and rare skills required for that section of the medical profession. A surgeon will be paid more than, say, a plumber whose skills are easier to develop and require only a short period of training. But plumbers will be paid more than, say, shop assistants, as the skills required for working in a shop are abundantly available with minimal training required: they can therefore command only modest rewards. In this way, allowing for the time and effort required to train for the task, the hierarchy of rewards in a free economy is constructed, though not without criticism. A criticism of this hierarchy of rewards is that society needs low paid workers – shop assistants, fruit pickers, as well as managers and lawyers – and few would contend that the minimum wage is sufficient to support a family or any kind of tolerable existence. Many would doubt whether City financiers who make millions by non-­productively moving shares and funds around, are worth their huge mansions and private jets, but they would insist they work extremely hard and deserve their rewards. One certain feature of this earning hierarchy is that as technology has

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advanced, advanced education and training have increasingly become a requirement of employment. HUMAN NATURE

Conservatism is based on a more pessimistic view of human nature than the other two ideologies mentioned above. Tories believe that people need to be forced to be law-­abiding, deserving heavy penalties if they steal property or otherwise break the law. They also believe society requires elites, specially trained in elite schools and universities, to fill the most influential and powerful positions in business, the professions, public administration and politics. Socialists and liberals tend to be more optimistic, believing people are basically good but are more likely to become less so as a result of the environment in which they are brought up which also impact on how people’s characters form. They are opposed to ‘elitism’ and prefer an open meritocratic society where anyone with the ability can ascend to the highest positions in the land. ATTITUDES TOWARDS CHANGE

Conservatives, almost by definition, are keen to respect the past and ‘conserve’ the present, to support the status quo. As they are usually the people doing well out of the present, they are less keen to rock the boat, hating the idea of revolution and distrusting any rapid change. Liberals, on the other hand, are not afraid of change, especially regarding political structures, where they have always argued for democratic improvements. Socialists, too, favour change – in some cases radical change – so that wealth is distributed more fairly in society and opportunities for advancement are equally available to everyone. Redistributing wealth, however, is not easy, as those who possess wealth and the power attached to it, fight hard to hang on to it.



political ideas: up to new labour

POST-­WAR DEVELOPMENTS IN POLITICAL IDEAS THE POST-­WAR CONSENSUS

So we see that the emphasis of political ideas shifted from forms of government before the middle of the nineteenth century to the social and economic health of the nation in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In the 1945 election, Labour astonished everyone, not least themselves, by defeating the massively popular war leader Winston Churchill (1874–1965) in a landslide election victory. In power with a huge majority, of 146, Labour under Clement Attlee (1883–1967) for the first time had to face the responsibility of government. From the early days, Labour members had viewed private ownership as the evil heart of capitalism and had called for public ownership of the economy. However, their zeal seemed to stop once Labour had nationalised one-­fifth of the economy, creating a mixed economy. Their version of ‘common ownership’ was to dispossess owners of the major utilities, such as the providers of gas, electricity and water, take them over and then run them through boards accountable to government ministers. They also hugely extended government-­funded welfare services, including free education and, most importantly, the NHS, established in 1948. In 1950 Labour won a small majority, of five, despite, owing to the vagaries of the first-­past-the-­post system, winning a million-­ and-a-­half more votes than the Tories. The Liberals continued their half-­century-long decline, returning only 12 MPs. After 20 months in power, Attlee sought to increase his fragile majority at another election. However, this time, despite another record number of votes for Labour, it was the Conservatives who won, with a majority of 16; the Liberals slipped even further, garnering only nine seats. In office, the 76-year-­old Churchill, displaying perhaps traditional Tory pragmatism, decided, for the most part, to accept Labour’s substantial changes. A period ensued when, despite rancorous political argument, basic agreement persisted on the post-­war consensus of the mixed economy plus the welfare state. How long this ‘settlement’ held is a matter of dispute but by the end of the 1960s it was looking decidedly thin. British people had enjoyed a

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steady improvement in living standards following the austerities of the war and the immediate post-­war years; however, the British economy was not performing well relative to its chief rivals abroad, especially Germany and Japan. This hurt and had political salience, especially as the two major nations defeated in 1945, Japan and Germany, were both enjoying an economic renaissance. In power 1964–70, Labour governed cautiously; ‘revisionist’ socialists believed equality now could be achieved via social reform, without the need for more nationalisation; left-­wing Labour members continued to urge for ‘more socialism’ – meaning more state control – producing a divided party. Now Conservatives to the right and Labour MPs to the left were calling for radical change: Tories a return to a genuine market economy and left-­wingers a more full-­blooded programme of state control. The 1970s was a troubled decade, ravaged by inflation and industrial action. The Labour Party was dominated by the big unions. The 1980s, however, was about to usher in a remarkable change in British political life and the ideas which informed it. THE THATCHER ‘REVOLUTION’

Margaret Thatcher (1925–2013) came to power when the British economy was failing to compete abroad, much of it surviving only through government subsidy. She instantly announced an unremittingly tough new approach, soon to attract the ‘ism’ placed after her name: end inflation through raising interest rates; end over-­ manning; allow non-­profitable industries to go bankrupt; reduce taxation drastically; and, most important for many Tories at that time, take on and overcome trade union power. This extreme version of market force capitalism she drove through with a resolution reinforced by her famous victory in the 1982 Falklands War over the Argentine aggressors. A massive domestic battle ensued in 1984–85, when the miners’ union under Arthur Scargill (1938–) led what some described as a heroic, others a reckless, strike against the government’s plan to close scores of pits all over the country. After a period of intense civil and political conflict, the miners were defeated and along with them the power of unions for the indefinite future.



political ideas: up to new labour

Thatcher believed in rewarding hardworking individuals, returning nationalised industries to the private sector as well as demanding that citizens act responsibly regarding payment of local taxes. She introduced a highly successful policy of enabling council house tenants to buy their own houses; over a million did so, many of them opting to vote for the political source of this good fortune. Applying similar logic, she set about returning nationalised industries to the public sector. Among the enterprises she ‘sold’ back to the public were British Telecom, British Gas, British Airways, Rolls-­Royce, British Steel, and the water and electricity companies. Her reforming enthusiasm did not stop there: she introduced a system of tendering in local government so that many of its functions were put out to tender and then taken over by private owners and employees. She also introduced a new form of local government finance. Concerned that those paying the highest rates were often wealthy Conservatives, while many of the lower-­paid (often voting Labour) enjoyed exemptions and subsidies, she introduced the community charge or poll tax, whereby everyone was obliged to pay the same basic charge whatever their income. For many, Thatcherism marked a high point of very necessary, brave political reform of a failing economy; for others, it epitomised the callous disregard the champions of capitalism reserved for the ordinary people who manned the British economy and its public services. But even her Labour critics could not deny that ‘Thatcherism’ did much to revive the faltering British economy. NEW LABOUR AND ‘BLAIRISM’ SOCIALISM DISOWNED

After 18 years in opposition, having lost elections in 1979, 1983, 1987 and then for a fourth successive time in 1992, Labour realised it had drastically to change its approach if it ever wanted to re-­enter 10 Downing Street. Labour’s vowed intention to replace the capitalist economy with a ‘socialism’ which most voters associated, negatively, with inefficient, over-­manned and corrupt nationalised industries had not proved a recipe for success. Party leader Neil Kinnock (1942–) began a process of reinventing his party as one

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comfortable with a free enterprise economy and perceived as capable of running both the economy and public services successfully. ‘Socialism’ became a dirty word and it somehow disappeared from Labour policy documents. Two young MPs, Tony Blair (1953–) and Gordon Brown (1951–), assisted by a highly skilled media manager, Peter Mandelson (1954–), set about rebuilding their party around a different set of beliefs. MEDIA MANAGEMENT

These three worked tirelessly to create ‘New Labour’. It was certainly something of a public relations process – the nation had to be convinced Labour ideas had changed for the party to become electable – but it was hugely assisted by Brown’s convincing display of economic competence in opposition and elsewhere by Blair’s brilliant command of television and other media. With Labour’s working-­class constituency sharply reduced by Thatcher’s windingup of traditional industries, Labour needed someone to appeal to middle-­class voters in the south. Blair, with his public school and Oxbridge background plus his youthful good looks and attractive family, was the ideal person to sell this message of a party transformed and now perceived as ‘safe’ to run the economy. Having accepted, or rather ‘embraced’, free enterprise capitalism, New Labour arguably became one of the most pro-­business governments of modern times. However, critics argued that New Labour, having improved the party’s poor public relations, soon became obsessed with news management and spin (see Chapter 9). ECONOMIC POLICY

Critics also claimed that Brown and Blair ran the economy pretty much along lines of which Thatcher would have approved. Far from restoring privatised concerns to public ownership as they had earlier promised, Labour accepted them as fait accomplis, and, further, the Labour government even privatised some more public bodies, leading some to detect a ‘post-­Thatcher consensus’. Such a unity of view, however, did not extend to public expenditure. Few could deny that the NHS and education had been starved of the funds they needed during the 1980s and 1990s. After a two-­year



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period of restraint, Gordon Brown began to inject billions into these two central public services. This behaviour would seem to place New Labour squarely in the tradition, if not of the now discredited socialism, then certainly in that of ‘social democracy’, as practised in many European countries: using the fruits of capitalist economies to benefit the lower paid. New Labour’s liberal approach to social issues like equal rights for women and gay people tended to confirm such an analysis. ROLE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR

A major issue for New Labour, however, concerned the role which might be played in public services by the private sector. It has long been a tenet of Conservative thinking, reinforced by Thatcher, that private business is more dynamic and efficient than public services, because of the discipline applied by the profit motive. The private sector has to pay its way and be efficient in minimising costs, while the public sector frequently allows ‘good money to be spent after bad’, with nobody brought to account. Once into their second and third periods in government, it became clear that Blair tended to agree with this Conservative axiom in relation to the NHS and other services, while Brown, who desperately resented Blair’s continuing presence in Downing Street, apparently did not. Brown’s position appealed to the unions, who feared the private sector would introduce the profit motive where it did not belong and result in public sector workers suffering lower pay and less secure employment. FOREIGN POLICY

Few in the party objected to Blair being conspicuously pro-­EU, even to the extent, early on, of wishing to join the euro. He was, however, well out of step with a wide swathe of his party over other aspects of foreign policy. Successful military interventions in Kosovo (1999) and Sierra Leone (2000) led him to believe that British military power could be used to resist the malign power of arbitrary autocratic rule in other parts of the world. But such ‘humanitarian intervention’ ceased to produce easy victory in the  case of Iraq, in the joint action with the USA, led by the

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r­ ight-­wing George Bush Jnr (1946–): with Saddam Hussein (1937–2006) deposed, the post-­invasion process swung hopelessly out of control and into a bloodbath. In consequence Labour’s most successful ever leader became ostracised by his own party, wandering around its periphery like a lost soul but still preaching his often very sensible nostrums.

further READING A good basic introduction to political ideas can be found in Taylor’s 30-Second Politics. A fairly full treatment of current political ideas can be found in chapters 4, 5 and 6 of Jones and Norton (2013). Hennessy (2006) is a wonderful political and social history of Britain after 1945; it is essential reading for a full understanding of the period and the ideas which underlay it. Heywood (1998) is a very good analysis of the main political ideologies of our time. Hennessy, P. (2006) Having It So Good, Allen Lane. Heywood, A. (1998) Political Ideologies, Macmillan. Jones, B. and Norton, P. (2013) Politics UK (8th edition), Routledge. Marquand, D. and Seldon, A. (1996) The Ideas That Shaped Post-­War Britain, Fontana. Marshall, O. and Laws, D. (2004) The Orange Book: Reclaiming Liberalism, Profile Books. (The book reflects how a section of the Lib Dems developed enthusiasm for market forces in contrast to more traditional progressive views in the party.) Scruton, R. (2017a) On Human Nature, Princeton University Press. Scruton, R. (2017b) Conservatism: Ideas in Profile, Profile. Taylor, S. (2012) 30-Second Politics, Icon.

Website History Learning site, www.historylearningsite.co.uk/british-­politics/political-­ ideas/.

8 Political Ideas II From New Labour to Brexit

Political ideas do not develop on their own – they are influenced by contemporary events and ideas, even opposing ones. Just as Thatcher influenced the emergence of New Labour, so Conservative thinking was influenced by Blair. The two leading Conservative figures from 2005 were David Cameron and George Osborne, both of whom admired Blair; some even suggested they were the ‘heirs’ to him.

CAMERON’S CONSERVATISM Having enjoyed 18 years in power (1979–97), the Conservatives themselves had then to accept the bitter experience of opposition for 13 years: 1997–2010. Rather like Labour in the 1980s, Conservatism was out of touch with the times. By hanging on to the memory of Thatcher, future home secretary Theresa May suggested in 2002 that they were seen as the ‘nasty party’: overly focused on business, unconcerned with the poor, hostile to gays and immigrants. Under the successive leadership of William Hague, Iain Duncan Smith and Michael Howard, the party lost two more elections and during this period barely rose above 30% support in the opinion polls. This episode illustrates that political ideas do matter – on the economy and cultural issues – not just in terms of a party running the country successfully, but, even more important politically, for how positively voters perceive it. Finally the message that something drastic had to be done penetrated the party’s higher leadership and one ambitious backbench MP began a journey to

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re-­brand the Conservatives – in the process preparing his own application for the nation’s top job. David Cameron’s impressive ‘no notes’ speech at the 2005 party conference meant his ‘interview’ with the party had been a striking success and in December he easily won the leadership contest. He then embarked on a series of well publicised policy projects designed to show that the Conservatives: were no longer hostile to gays and wanted more Conservative women in the Commons; were determined to provide the ‘greenest’ possible government; and wanted social policy to cater centrally for the less well-­off. It was a brilliant campaign, worthy even of New Labour’s spin machine: the polls showed it worked. Within two years the Tories under Cameron had relegated Thatcherism, for the time being at least, to the back burner and shouldered their way into the political centre ground. They were now again electable. However, it was clear also that, economically, their shadow chancellor, George Osborne, was still cut from traditional Tory cloth. It was also clear that a substantial section of the Conservative Party was still deeply hostile to the idea of an EU whose members they believed were moving steadily towards the 1957 Paris Treaty’s ‘ever closer union’. Theresa May’s opening speech as Cameron’s successor appealed to the centre ground by promising to end the ‘burning injustices’ which held back life advancement for working-­class people and to relieve the pressure on those who were ‘just about managing’. However, the febrile atmosphere created by her struggle to achieve an agreed Brexit deal, the EU and the British public overwhelmed any chances of pursuing her long held political objectives, apart, possibly from announcing in October 2018 that eight years of ‘austerity’ was over. Boris Johnson charged into the leadership of his party, promising to ‘Get Brexit Done’ and when faced with Commons opposition called a general election on 12 December. Despite his party’s ineffectual performance under three years of May, he registered a thumping victory of an 80-seat majority. During his campaign he deployed not just a promised conclusion of Brexit but many rather extravagant public spending promises, especially aimed at those northern Labour seats his party went on to win. Johnson likes to describe himself as a kind of ‘Brexity Hezza’: someone who is anti-­EU but, like Heseltine, believes in government intervention to improve living conditions, stimulate



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investment and achieve economic growth. Whether Johnson fulfils these essentially ‘One Nation’ (dating back to Benjamin Disraeli’s approach) Conservative promises, or whether major more traditional Thatcherite Tory elements of his party allow him to do so, remains unknown at the time of writing. Johnson’s conduct of trade talks with the EU during 2020 guaranteed that like much of the early twentieth century Conservatives would again be arguing about ‘free trade versus protectionism’.

LIBERALISM The flame of nineteenth-­century Liberalism flickered ever more feebly when the party returned only six MPs in October 1955 but in the October 1974 election the Liberals managed a minor breakthrough, with 13 seats. The party’s political message had not changed a great deal – Keynesian economics, pro-­welfare state, internationalism and pro-­Europe – but it acted as a ‘protest’ outlet for people fed up with the other two big parties. As such it gained a measure of success. During the 1970s it helped Labour survive when its tiny majority eventually disappeared, and during the early 1980s it found an ally in the temporary flourish of the breakaway SDP, which had formed after four senior Labour former cabinet ministers – the so-­called ‘Gang of Four’ – could no longer stomach the left-­wing of their party, led by Tony Benn. The left-­dominated party produced a left-­wing manifesto for the 1983 election, dismissed by Labour’s Gerald Kaufman as ‘the longest suicide note in history’. Labour lost disastrously and was nearly outvoted by the Liberal–SDP Alliance, which had formed in 1981. The SDP lasted only until 1988 before it faded away but its ideas – a continuation of the moderate social democracy of post-­ war Labour governments – represented a repository of ideas from which New Labour could fashion its voter-­friendly prospectus during the 1990s. Substantial elements of the defunct SDP merged with the Liberals in 1988 to create a new party: the Liberal Democrats. This party, capably led first by Paddy Ashdown and then Charles Kennedy, continued to proselytise its centrist ideas and, combined with its role as ‘protest vote’ party, managed to increase its representation to 62 by 2005. Lib Dem leaders variously offered themselves as either leaning

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towards fellow progressive Labour or as ‘equidistant’ and independent. As the ‘third’ party in the field, the Lib Dems could afford to offer ambitious policies, as there was little chance of them ever being in a position to deliver them. This all changed in May 2010.

COALITION AFTER MAY 2010 In May 2010 Labour (258 seats) lost the election but the Conservatives (307 seats) did not win an overall majority. They were forced to form a coalition with the Lib Dems (57 seats) to form a workable majority in order, they claimed, to deal with post-­ recession austerity. This laid the basis for what became a successful political cooperation, but principles were stretched to the limit and beyond, as both parties were forced to abandon some dearly held objectives. Coalitions remove the option for parties in government to automatically enact their most favoured political ideas. Instead, ‘give and take’ or ‘compromise’ both become elements in the quiver of ideas of any party participating in such a political alliance; voters, however, do not always recognise the need for compromise and react with dismay to ‘abandoned principles’. The major ideas to be frustrated for the Lib Dems were: • Access to education. Lib Dems would have liked to abolish university tuition fees and won support from students for championing this, even signing public pledges to this effect. However, they were forced to renege when fees were increased by the coalition to a massive £9000 per year. This U-­turn caused a revulsion amongst Lib Dem supporters which has not completely disappeared. • Constitutional reform. Under the terms of the coalition, Cameron had allowed a referendum on replacing ‘first past the post’ with the ‘alternative vote’, but he broke his vague promise to take a low profile in the campaign and the vote was lost heavily. • Reform of the Lords. Nick Clegg hoped this high-­profile reform would be seen as a major Lib Dem achievement by the time of the 2015 election. However, Tory MPs and peers decided to sabotage it and it failed. In retaliation, Clegg refused to support reform of constituency boundaries, which would have given the Tories an extra 20 MPs in 2015.



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In his 2013 party conference, Clegg listed 16 things which he claimed his party had prevented the Tories from doing since 2010, including: tax cuts for millionaires, the return of selective education, enabling employers to fire workers without any reason being given, and scrapping a number of welfare measures, including housing benefit for young people. Cameron, not to mention the serried ranks of his right-­wing MPs, were adamant they hated coalitions and would try their utmost to win on their own terms in order to govern alone. Labour, disillusioned with the Lib Dems, made the same point just as passionately. However, Nick Clegg, aware that ‘good partnership’ might prove to be a key political notion in any age of coalition government, declared at his conference that the Lib Dems in coalition would restrain the ‘nasty’ excesses of the Tories, whilst neutralising spendthrift Labour tendencies, should they be in coalition with them. For its part, Labour was careful to keep policy lines open with the Lib Dems, in case 2015 brought another hung parliament. The result, of course, saw Clegg’s party reduced to a mere eight MPs, an apparently hopeless position. However, the surprise elevation of the hard-­left Jeremy Corbyn as Labour leader in September 2015, allowed Lib Dem’s new leader as well as former coalition business secretary, Vince Cable, to suggest that their party now had a chance, possibly along with moderate Labour supporters, to occupy the vacated centre ground.

The ‘Corbyn Revolution’ In the wake of his defeat in 2015, Ed Miliband resigned and an election took place for a new Labour leader. The campaign revealed the established figures of Yvette Cooper and Alan Milburn offering uninspired warmed up programmes gleaned from the previous ideas of Blair, Brown and Miliband: they made little impact. Instead the campaign’s energy was provided by Jeremy Corbyn, a so-­called ‘hard-­left’ rebel on Labour’s backbenches for 32 years who only managed the necessary 35 nominations to stand for the party’s leadership through the kindness of colleagues who felt his views should have an airing. However, he soon discovered he was addressing packed meetings and assisted by 16,000 young volunteers charged towards a crushing 60% victory on the first ballot on

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12 September 2015. In the wake of Labour’s defeat he benefited from the anger of so many at the Conservatives’ deficit reducing ‘austerity’ policies and the enthusiasm of young people for someone who offered, for them, a new analysis and, for once, a substantial helping of hope. Critics were quick to point out that most of these ideas had been mooted and then defeated during the 1980s, but this made no difference: he won easily. Corbyn, and his shadow chancellor John McConnell, offered a Marxist analysis of Britain’s ills with solutions varying from widespread renationalisation, much higher taxes on the rich, an assault on corporate tax dodging, plus a wealth tax as recommended by French economist, Thomas Piketty (2014). However his ideas clashed with MPs elected during previous eras who could be described as ‘moderates’ who feared this was too strong an electoral potion to win an election; Corbyn engaged with these moderates in a bitter war of words and ideas in which neither side convinced the other. The EU referendum in June 2016 provided another powerful element to the conflict. Despite voting Remain, Corbyn, according to his critics, had not really thrown much energy into the side of the campaign he claimed to support. Corbyn’s hero was Tony Benn who had urged UK leave this ‘capitalist club’ created by the 1957 Paris Treaty. He had voted ‘Out’ in 1975 and against the Maastricht and Lisbon treaties in 1992 and 2007 respectively. Challenged for the leadership in 2016 he again won convincingly but still failed to reverse Labour’s dire poll ratings. Moderates despaired but became hopeful in 2017 when PM Theresa May called a snap election, with the intention of destroying completely the lowly rating Labour Party, at that time 23 points behind the Tories. However, Tory plans to rely on a ‘presidential’ campaign with May as the centre, faltered when she proved an indifferent campaigner. Corbyn’s socialist message, especially the lure of no university tuition fees and massive funding of public services, again resonated with young voters. By polling day Labour had improved hugely on its initial poll position to virtually equal the Tory voting result. For his supporters this was evidence that socialism, killed off by Blair, Brown and Mandelson, had been rediscovered by a new generation of voters.



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Rise of UKIP (and in 2019 the Brexit Party) As we have seen amply demonstrated in this chapter, new political ideas form often in response to political problems and rival strategies for reversing Britain’s post-­war relative economic decline. A contemporary problem, exacerbated by post-­recession austerity, has been low-­paid employment being snapped up by floods of economic migrants from eastern Europe. A major section of voters, mostly on the right and usually older, together with Conservative Euro-­sceptics and an unquantifiable number who felt frustrated with the inability of the politicians of any party to deliver discernible benefits, was gathering for a decade or more before Blair left office. In the 1991 this public opinion phenomenon coalesced to manifest itself in the form of UKIP. UKIP grew rapidly in size and influence being instrumental in forcing Cameron to call the EU referendum in June 2016 which eventually took the UK out of the EU in January 2020. A year earlier Farage had created a successor to UKIP, called the Brexit Party which had only one major aim: to ensure UK left the EU in accordance with the referendum. It trounced the big parties in the May 2019 Euro-­elections but after Johnson became PM in July was effectively marginalised when the Tory Party successfully hardened its view on delivering Brexit at all costs. By that time, moreover, voters were impatient that the painfully lingering Brexit issue be resolved. Despite Johnson’s majority and UK departure from the EU in January 2020, Brexit was not ‘done’. Negotiating a new trade agreement with the EU now occupied the top of the political agenda for the foreseeable future. National Populism

This tendency, however, is not limited to Britain. ‘National Populism’ has emerged as a feature of democratic politics throughout the developed world. France’s Front Nationale (name changed to National ‘Rally’ in 2018) was founded in 1972 but recent decades have seen far right anti-­immigrant parties spring up in Hungary (Fidesz), Sweden (Sweden Democrats) Poland (Law and Justice) and most other European countries even including Germany (Alternativ for Deutchland). And, of course, in the USA Donald Trump has taken over the Republican Party with very similar ideas. These parties often try to avoid similarities with Fascism or Nazism but they all share certain

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characteristics: a belief in ‘nativism’, that their country should be inhabited exclusively by the ‘home’ ethnic group – non-­native groups are seen as threatening to the state; that there ‘us’ the ‘people’ have been duped and misled by ‘them’ an arrogant, selfish and incompetent elite; or it could be an insidious and traitorous minority – hence Victor Orban’s thinly disguised anti-­semitism in Hungary. UKIP is founded upon similar ideas and ‘populist’ political methods. Brexit, 2016

In 2013 Cameron’s Conservative Party, about a third of which could be described as ‘Euro-­sceptic’, became terrified UKIP would attract so many ‘anti-­immigrant’ votes from them that they would deny the party political power. In 2013 Cameron promised, if re-­ elected in 2015, to offer an in–out referendum on EU membership. In 2015 the polls suggested another hung parliament but surprisingly they were proved wrong by the result which gave Cameron a majority of 17. Any hopes a Lib Dem coalition partner might veto such a vote, were now erased: he announced it would occur on 23 June 2016. The campaign was bitter and mendacious on both sides but especially Leave who promised, among other things that: ‘Reaching agreement with the EU would “be one of the easiest in human history”.’ When Leave won a surprise 52–48% victory the nation discovered that reaching an agreement would take three frustrating and demoralising years in which the complexity of the disengagement became horrendously clear as well as the enduring visceral intractability of both Remain and Leave. George Osborne, Tory chancellor, had assumed that warnings of dire economic consequences would persuade voters to back the status quo. To his bewilderment voters revealed that in this issue ‘identity politics’ was stronger than economic considerations. The impact of the Brexit debate upon UK political ideas has been profound. The left–right spectrum, usually used to describe political ideas has been found wanting by Brexit; it refers essentially to economic ideas with equality and collectivism of the left and individualism and free enterprise on the right. As Osborne ruefully discovered, ‘identity’ outbid economics for many in the referendum. An alternative ‘open–closed’ spectrum emerged which bisects the traditional one.



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Open Freetrade Internationalist Pro humanitarian intervention

Closed Protectionist tariffs Nativist or Nationalist Isolationist

It is too soon to conclude how this new element will reshape political ideas but during the debates following the referendum, it was clear that ‘Remain’ and ‘Leave’ had carved out an identity of almost equal emphasis to ‘left’ and ‘right’. Labour left-­wingers – Corbyn, Dennis Skinner, Graham Stringer – tended to be closer to Leave while Labour ‘right-­wingers’ (often called ‘centrists’) – Chuka Ummuna, Hilary Benn, Chris Leslie – were firmly of the Remain persuasion. Some commentators predicted the new factions created by Brexit, might well reshape our two-­party dominated political system (see Chapter 9).

Impact of CoronaVirus, 2020 From quiet early beginnings the spread of this infection in the early months of 2020 caused extraordinary convulsions in the UK way of life and the sudden acceptability to a Conservative government of policies which they had bitterly condemned when advocated by their Labour opponents. Jonathan Freedland (2020) commented on this in the Guardian: Meanwhile, a Conservative government has torn up 40 years of small­state, free market doctrine, first promising to spend a staggering £330bn, and then on Friday evening committing to pay 80% of the wages of workers who have had to down tools, with ‘no limit’ on the funds available. The chancellor, Rishi Sunak, did not exaggerate when he said nothing like this had ever been done before. Even hardcore socialism usually stopped short of calling for the government to take on the payroll of private sector employers. Now it’s Tory party policy.

Why did this extraordinary U-­turn happen? There was no real option is the answer. Once a country is under the threat like a pandemic, market forces and minimal government become irrelevant: government is the only source of remedial measures. As Rishi Sunak declared in one of his powerful speeches at this time: ‘This

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is no time for ideology or orthodoxy.’ So too were the ideas that, as individuals are responsible for their own destinies, welfare provision should be discouraged and maintained at the lowest possible level. A similar reverse was very evident over the idea that failing companies should be allowed to fail rather than be propped up by government support. The government faced the possibility that such a laissez-­faire approach might mean that when the virus has finally blown itself out, there would be no viable economy whatsoever left to be revived (Rawnsley, 2020). Even more to the ideological point, former Tory MP, Mathew Parris, pertinently asked whether it was true  that it is immoral or unwise to borrow more than we can afford but that it’s ultimately impossible because we’ll be unable to repay our national debt and our international credit will run out. If that’s no longer true then somebody credible on the right had better explain why. And the tories had better brace themselves for serious questions about how we can do it for a virus but not to save shipyards or the planet from climate change. Or double the future capacity of our hospitals, or prison modernisation plans, or legal aid limits, or nurses and carers’ wages. But if on the other hand, it is true that our creditworthiness is limited, somebody credible on the right had better explain where those limits lie, why we’re not breaching them and how and when we’re going to repay what we’re borrowing today to get us through tomorrow. And what the bill is likely to be. (Parris, 2020)

Green Thinking The Green Party’s election of its first MP in 2010 had made it more than just another ‘fringe’ party, as indeed its broad environmental ideology arguably deserves. ‘Deep green’ thinking rejects ‘industrialism’ as a thoughtless waste of finite natural resources and calls for a radical restructuring of the economy and political system to make it sustainable, and genuinely fair and democratic as well. This degree of radicalism is way ahead of what most people are prepared to accept – how many would give up travel by car, for instance? – and so most of the main parties have clothed themselves in ‘light green’ ideas, which aim to reduce pollution, protect the environment and introduce renewable energy sources to combat climate change. This last



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topic, however, is controversial; for instance, at least one 2010 coalition cabinet member was accused of being a ‘climate change denier’. True to its radical core, the Green Party’s manifesto for 2015 included: the renationalisation of the railways; a maximum of ten times the wages of the lowest-­paid worker for company bosses; and a universal wealth tax to reduce the inexorable increase in inequality caused by the appreciation of capital assets.

The Political Fringe Far Left Ideas

British socialism is usually associated with cautious incremental reform but it has always been accompanied by a raucous left-­wing periphery advocating more radical and revolutionary change. The Social Democratic Federation (SDF ) was founded in 1881 and provided a Marxist input into the genesis of the Labour Party in 1901 but the gradualist trade unionists who dominated this process, shared little common ground with revolutionary aims and the SDF soon evolved into the British Socialist Party with many of its members later helping form the British Communist Party in 1920. Marx had a vision that an exploited working class would eventually organise and rise up to cast off the chains of the property owning class and proceed to cooperate with other workers in a socialist economy which gave them a fair share of profits produced. However the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution established the Soviet Union allegedly as the ‘home’ of international socialism which commanded ‘communist’ parties worldwide to follow Moscow’s directives as to how the struggle should be fought. British Labour, while supporting the USSR against its enemies, rejected any institutional connection with the fledgling British ‘communist’ party, even when the Soviet Union became a close ally in the fight against Nazism after 1941. The ideas of the Soviet leader, Lenin, and his successor Stalin, set the context within which Britain’s far left developed its own thinking. Joseph Stalin argued that collectivising land and property while eliminating ‘bourgeois’ economic power was achieving ‘socialism in one country’. Critics argued that in reality, his endless show trials, arbitrary arrests and an intrusive secret police amounted to a

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‘­totalitarian’ tyranny rather than the hope of the world’s struggling working classes. His former colleague and rival, Leon Trotsky, on the other hand insisted revolution should be pursued not just in Russia but worldwide. On Stalin’s orders Trotsky was assassinated in 1940 but ironically, perhaps, it is the latter’s influence which has endured. Young idealists all over the world are still inspired by Trotsky’s vision of international revolution liberating the exploited working masses. In Britain during the 1980s the militant tendency infiltrated the Labour Party in an attempt to take it over. Other groups included the Workers Revolutionary Party, and the Socialist Workers Party. Often young members of these bodies later joined the Labour Party and in some cases (for example Alan Milburn) achieved high office. Once Jeremy Corbyn became leader in 2015 many more members gravitated from the ‘fringe’ into mainstream politics. Following Labour’s disastrous 2019 defeat, the centrist inclined Keir Starmer initially took the lead in polls, followed by Rebecca Long-­Bailey, widely seen as the ­Corbynite ‘continuity candidate’. On 4 April 2020, Starmer easily defeated LongBailey to become Corbyn’s replacement as Labour leader. Far Right

Benito Mussolini’s ‘Fascism’ was a set of ideas based on xenophobic nationalism, the supremacy of the state and loyalty to a charismatic leader. Fascists viewed democracy as weak submission and preached military strength and national ‘greatness’. Adolf Hitler added a racial coda to the ideology lauding the Aryan race as the dominant influence in the emergence of Europe, with the Germans as the finest examples. Other races, it followed, had proved through their defeat, were inferior. Jews were attacked as lower than vermin and as a race which should be expelled or even destroyed. Sir Oswald Mosley founded the British Union of Fascists but this was a charismatic leader who failed to find any traction with British voters. His suggestion that parliament, once elected, should transfer power to a leader who would impose a ‘corporate state’ unimpeded by political parties or opposition, was coldly received by voters and Mosley’s electoral achievements were close to nothing. This did not mean, however, that his far right message disappeared. The National Front, formed in 1967 argued that diluting the British race through intermarriage was enfeebling the national breed. Jews



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were identified as part of an international conspiracy and repatriation of black immigrants was deemed necessary. The National Front was succeeded by the BNP which began to win local government seats under its Cambridge-­educated leader, Nick Griffin. In 2009 the party won two Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) in the Euro-­ elections and some feared the party might have made a breakthrough. However, Griffin’s appearance on Question Time in October 2009 had a counter-­productive effect: the feeble, incoherence of his performance perhaps led to the decline reflected in the BNP’s widespread loss of council seats in the 2013 elections and the loss of their two MEPs in 2014. The far right continued in other forms however. In 2009 the EDL, led by Tommy Robinson (real name Stephen Yaxley-­Lennon) became active; in 2011 the Islamophobic Britain First was formed; and in 2013 the Nazi-­inspired National Action appeared, closely related to Thomas Mair, the murderer during the 2006 referendum campaign of the much admired Labour MP for Batley and Spen, Jo Cox. Looking to the future, the Sunday Times (24 March 2019) ran a story about white supremacists, arising from a statement made by Neil Basu, the UK head of counter-­terrorism, in the wake of the New Zealand Mosque tragedy where 50 Muslim worshippers were gunned down. He warned that from neo-­Nazi chatter picked up by intelligence, ‘the next terrorist attack in Britain was “most likely” to come not from embittered jihadists returning from Syria but from the extreme right’ (Kerbaj and Allen-­Mills, 2019).

Starmer wins Leadership Contest Late in the writing of this book, the three-­month-long contest for Labour’s leadership was concluded on 4 April 2020. Starmer’s pitch for the leadership was that he’s seeking to build on the policy development of Corbyn, more particularly with eight pledges upon: economic justice – tax increases for top 5% of earners; social justice – abolish Universal Credit; climate justice – place ‘Green New Deal’ ‘at heart of everything we do’; promote peace and human rights – no more illegal wars; common ownership of public services rather than profit making for shareholders, including ‘rail, mail, energy and water; end outsourcing of NHS, local government and justice system’; defend migrants’ rights; ‘full voting rights for EU nationals, immigration system based on compassion and

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dignity’; strengthen workers’ rights and trade unions – fight low pay and insecure work; radical devolution of power, wealth and opportunity – devolve power, wealth and opportunity away from Whitehall, a federal structure within which devolution can take place, abolish House of Lords. Whilst these 2019 manifesto elements had been popular, some other offers, like free broadband had been judged by voters, according to YouGov survey, to be more than the country could afford and Labour to be massively less trusted on the economy than the Tories. It will be Starmer’s task to provide a robust opposition, evolve a popular programme of policies and inspire trust again in Labour’s economic management, lost hopelessly since the glory days of Tony Blair.

CONCLUDING COMMENT It would be fair to say that the three great sets of political ideas, described in Chapter 6, which emerged during the early period of our democracy have been reinterpreted out of all recognition. British left-­of-centre thinking eschewed ‘socialism’ from the late 1980s until 2015, but not the underlying principles regarding the need for social policy to alleviate hardship suffered by the poor. Yet, economically, New Labour adopted more than a few of the prescriptions issued by the hated Thatcher. Why? Because they worked and no alternatives seemed to be available. But this transference of key ideas – ‘political cross-­dressing’ as it is sometimes called – was not just one way. Cameron and Osborne greatly admired Tony Blair and noted how, under him, Labour had managed to gauge the tenor of contemporary society correctly regarding homosexuality, race relations, the environment and questions of equality. Modern Conservatives happily drew upon New Labour ideas when it suited and, again, crucially, when they worked. However, after 2015, it seemed those on the left rejected the ‘post Thatcher consensus’ on economic policy. Both New Labour and Cameron Conservatism had failed to solve problems caused by the 2008 economic recession. When Labour chose its new leader in the wake of Ed Miliband’s resignation, members opted for the hope and energy of the socialism rejected by Blair and Brown. Jeremy Corbyn’s policies, embodied in Labour’s 2017 manifesto, proved very popular and helped Corbyn



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hugely to increase Labour’s share of the vote in the election of that year. It is worth noting that, as political ideas are usually published and publicised, it is easy for parties to ‘poach’ the ideas of others; this has been very much the fate of the Liberal Party during the last century. John Maynard Keynes was a Liberal and a very great economist. His ideas of government managing the economy to achieve specific ends, like full employment, were freely available and adopted by Labour during the war. The famous wartime report produced by a fellow Liberal, William Beveridge, was also adopted by Labour to provide a major part of Labour’s 1945 programme for government. As for the future, it is worth recalling that all political ideas arrive as frail and delicate saplings and many perish before they find the fertile soil of political circumstance and people willing to be their champions. ‘Socialism’ had to wait many decades before it could boast a majority government dedicated to its principles. Which ideas will survive the future? UKIP’s nostalgic isolationism maybe, or perhaps the environmentalism of the Green Party? Pessimism or Optimism? 

Finally, the main Times leader on New Year’s Day 2020, questioned the widespread pessimism underlying much political thought by pointing out that  now, with 20 years of the 21st century having elapsed, it bears repeating that there has never been a better time to live … the scourges of hunger and extreme poverty have been repelled if not eradicated. The Swedish author Johan Nordberg points out that in 1820 some 94% of humanity subsisted on an income of less than $2 a day at current values. The equivalent figure today is less than 10%. … The development of more productive methods of agriculture such as the Green Revolution initiated half a century ago, means that the world produces enough food to provide at least 3000 calories for every person on the planet. … Societies have become better and more peaceful because of the power of ideas. In the realm of values, the spread of the rule of law, democracy and the advancement of women have all tended to restrain pointless violence. Enlightenment principles of deliberately using knowledge to improve people’s lives retain their power. It is a positive thought to take into the new decade.

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For a ‘timeline’ of political ideas, see Table 8.1. Table 8.1 British political ideas timeline Period

Ideas

13th–16th century (medieval era) 17th century (Civil War) 17th–18th century

Justifications for monarchical rule, religious and economic status quo Pamphlet for and against royal rule. Putney debates (1647) discuss detail of democratic government Enlightenment introduces new ways of thinking: apply reason to social questions; religious toleration; rights of individual to include right to vote; limited government; separation of powers; limit power of kings and all governments Socialism emerges mid-century: critique of capitalism’s malign social effects; common ownership for private property; remove gross inequalities; introduce genuine democratic government Conservatism emerges as ideology. Conservative Party: approves capitalism and justifies its inequalities; defends power structure’s status quo; resists socio-economic reform Liberalism based on liberal philosophers emerges as ideology. Liberal Party seeks: representative democracy; political and economic freedom; laissez-faire economy; welfare reforms Labour adopts Keynesian economic management and welfare state ideas from Beveridge Labour in power under Attlee nationalise 20% of the economy (the mixed economy) and establish the welfare state, including the NHS The Conservatives in power basically accept the consensus on the mixed economy and welfare state Labour in power is less radical: no more radical economic reforms Liberalism is fighting for survival Labour is in power but ‘revisionists’ oppose more nationalisation while the left-wing members urge more of it; revisionists form breakaway SDP, which allies with Liberals in 1988 to form the Lib Dems

19th century

1939–45 (World War II) 1945–51

1951–64 1964–70

1974–79



political ideas: new labour to brexit

Period

Ideas

1979–90

Conservatives in power under Margaret Thatcher see a low-tax, high-interest economy, end subsidies to ailing industries, fight union power, reform local government finance, privatise as much of the public sector as possible New Labour, with Blair then Brown in power, rejects socialism and defeat of capitalism in favour of aspects of Thatcherism (e.g. privatisation) but maintains views on welfare state and public services (which are generously refunded); liberal on gays and equal rights; Blair favours ‘humanitarian intervention’ abroad and joins US invasion of Iraq Coalition government, led by Cameron, between Conservatives and Lib Dems Under Cameron, Conservative leader from 2005, Conservatism becomes centrist; he rebrands the previously ‘nasty’ party’s image on gays, women, environment and social policy but retains traditional Thatcherism on the economy. Party opposed to political integration with the EU The Lib Dems win support as a ‘protest’ party that is pro welfare and EU Chief idea is to remedy government indebtedness Tories increasingly hostile to EU: in response to UKIP’s success, Tories turn up heat on economic migrants Labour seeking to rebuild economic reputation and find new policies to regain power while keeping options open re coalition with Lib-Dems Conservatives win overall majority against all expectations and set fair to have possibly a decade in power but faced need to hold in-out referendum on EU Membership Leave vote won 52%–48%, plunging UK into frenzy of debate and chaotic ‘Brexit’ negotiations about future relationship with EU Murder of Jo Cox, MP by far right extremist raised question of far right violent political action.

1997–2010

2010–15

7 May 2015 (general election)

23 June 2016 (EU Referendum)

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Period

Ideas

January 2019 July 2019

Brexit Party created by Nigel Farage Boris Johnson becomes PM and swears he’ll ‘get Brexit done!’ 12 December 2019 Tories win general election under Boris Johnson with majority of 80. 31 January 2020 UK leaves EU

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION 1. 2. 3. 4.

Do Conservatives merely reflect the self-­interest of the wealthy? Do Labour ideas entail too much control over everyday life? Was there a ‘post-­Thatcher consensus’? Are you pessimistic or optimistic about the future?

further READING A fairly full treatment of current political ideas can be found in chapters 4, 5 and 6 of Jones et al. (2018). Hennessy (2006) is a wonderful political and social history of Britain after 1945; it is essential reading for a full understanding of the period and the ideas which underlie it. Aaronovitch, D. (2019) Corbynistas think the voters let them down, The Times, 19 November. Freedland, J. (2020) As fearful Britain shuts down, coronavirus has transformed everything, Guardian, 20 March. Hennessy, P. (2006) Having It So Good, Allen Lane. Heywood, A. (1998) Political Ideologies, Macmillan. (A very good analysis of the main political ideologies of our time.) Jones, B., Norton, P. and Daddow, O. (2018) Politics UK (9th edition), Routledge. Kerbaj, R. and Allen-­Mills, A. (2019) White neo Nazi’s: Britain’s next wave of terror, Sunday Times, 24 March. Lawson, D. (2020) Talking Green is easy: it’s being green that’s hard’, Sunday Times, 8 February. Marantz, A. (2020) Boredom is the enemy: how the trolls took over, Guardian, 7 February.



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Marquand, D. and Seldon, A. (1996) The Ideas That Shaped Post-­War Britain, Fontana. Marshall, O. and Laws, D. (2004) The Orange Book: Reclaiming Liberalism, Profile Books. (The book reflects how a section of the Lib Dems developed enthusiasm for market forces in contrast to more traditional progressive views in the party.) Parris, M. (2020) Magic money tree will cost the Tories dear, The Times, 28 March. Piketty, T. (2014) Capital in the Twenty-­First Century, Harvard University Press.  Rawnsley, A. (2020) The coronavirus crisis ignites a bonfire of Conservative party orthodoxies, Observer, 23 March. Sylvester, R. (2020) Boris should learn from Thatcher’s mistakes, The Times, 5 February. The Times (2020) Getting better: pessimism about the future is a recurring theme in political thought yet the world has never been a better or wealthier place, Leader, 1 January.

WEBSITES Conservative Party, www.conservatives.com. Labour Party, www.labour.org.uk. Liberal Democrats, www.libdems.org.uk. Green Party, www.greenparty.org.uk.

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Part III THE MEDIATING AGENCIES

This part, in three chapters, moves on to address what I am calling the ‘mediating agencies’. These are the means whereby in a democracy people communicate, via parties and pressure groups, with the institutions of government – the legislature and the executive – and how communication is facilitated and ‘mediated’ throughout by political parties, pressure groups and possibly the key agency of them all: the mass media.

9 POLITICAL PARTIES

Parties have already been introduced in the previous chapters but this chapter aims to shed more light on how they work in practice.

FUNCTIONS HARMONISING

Parties perform the vital role in a democracy of organising and articulating the multifarious interests within society, many of which are in sharp conflict. Trying to make sense of what 60 million people think or want would be impossible without the intervention of parties. They offer broad ‘churches’ of ideas and policy objectives which attract support and participation from the different sections of society. So, if you are a farmer or a businessman, you will know that the Conservative Party, the traditional party of land owners and business, is likely to offer you support; if a trade unionist, you might feel the same about the Labour Party. Parties help put together coalitions of interest and provide coherence for them before feeding their demands into the political system. Parties make democracy possible. RECRUITMENT OF PERSONNEL

Parties draw in people to run the political system, providing a means whereby people can be turned into candidates and then

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‘politicians’ operating at local, national or even at EU level (though since Brexit, this last is less likely in the UK). Such recruits come from all sections of society, though proportionately, it has to be said, much more from the well-­off middle classes. Ramsay MacDonald, the first Labour PM, was the illegitimate son of a Scottish crofter; David Blunkett the blind son of an impoverished Sheffield family who overcame his disability to become home secretary. These two were extraordinary exceptions. At the other end of the social scale Conservative cabinet minister Douglas Hurd and premier David Cameron came from privileged backgrounds, went to Eton and Oxbridge before smoothly entering, and then rising to the top in the world of politics. But it has to be said that some privately educated MPs also sit on the Labour benches, as do a (very small) proportion of working-­class MPs on the Tory side. PARTICIPATION AND EDUCATION

Parties not only involve people directly through their activists and candidates, but they also encourage and educate society to become aware of and engaged in a system ultimately dependent on public involvement. CHOICE

Parties organise coalitions of interests to provide all voters with (admittedly) broad but usually fairly clear choices at election time. ACCOUNTABILITY

The party in opposition is a ‘government in waiting’, usually impatiently so. Through its questioning and challenging of the government the opposition holds it to account on behalf of the whole electorate. In democratic politics, parties tend to claim that their collection of policies will be best for the country as a whole. Given that such policies have been crafted to serve particular sections of the electorate, voters might conclude at the end of the parliamentary term that the party in power has not succeeded in serving anything approximating to the overall national interest; alternatively they might conclude the government has just been incompetent. It follows



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that when voters make such negative judgments, they might well proceed to vote that party out of office at the next election. Some parties are more successful than others: Conservatives, governed for two-­thirds of the twentieth century, with Labour and the (original) Liberal Party having to make do with the remaining third. CONTROLLING THE EXECUTIVE

The leader of the winning party at election time becomes PM, who then chooses the 100 or more senior and junior ministers required to run the government. These elected ministers represent the channel of democratic control bestowed upon the winning party by voters. It is assumed these party political ministers will govern in harmony with the majority opinion expressed in the election which put them in power. Parties provide that ‘live’ representational wire which connects voters with the government of the day. Whether they succeed in doing so is often the subject of sharp controversy, itself the essence of democratic politics. Few would argue that democratic government is possible without parties: they provide the crucial link which enables the system to work to the extent that it does.

PARTY GOVERNMENT FROM THE MID-­nineteenTH CENTURY Conservatives and Liberals alternated in periods in power 1867–1914, their efforts made more difficult by the 80 or so Irish Nationalist MPs present in the Commons. The Labour Party was originally set up in 1900 as the political arm of the trade unions, socialist societies and working-­class voters; by 1924 it briefly held power, albeit as a minority government under Ramsey MacDonald. The Liberal Party was dominant during the late nineteenth century and before World War I, but thereafter it began to fracture, due to a rift between Asquith and Lloyd George and the increasing relevance of Labour’s message as the champion of the recently enfranchised working-­class voters. Its number of MPs had shrivelled to a handful by the 1950s but slowly recovered during the 1960s and 1970s. During the 1980s it allied with the breakaway SDP, and morphed into the Lib Dems in 1988. The Lib Dems

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went on to rally the centre ground, winning 62 seats in 2005 but, tainted by its role in Cameron’s coalition government from 2010, it crashed to only eight MPs in 2015, recovering slightly to 14 in 2017 then falling back to 11 in 2019, despite having absorbed several MPs in the previous two years from both Labour and Conservative parliamentary parties. The Conservative Party is arguably Britain’s traditional party of government: its PMs held power for 57 years of the twentieth century. In May 2015 it won its first overall majority since 1992, with a majority of only 17. The 2016 ‘Brexit’ referendum saw Cameron replaced by Theresa May who struggled to implement UK’s exit from the EU. Her attempt to improve on the majority she inherited from Cameron crashed and burned in 2017 when she lost her majority altogether and had to cling to power in a ‘hung parliament’ (minority) sustained by the ten members of the Northern Ireland DUP. She resigned in July 2019 and her replacement Boris Johnson went on to win a famous victory in the December 2019 election. After 1945, a Labour and Tory duopoly dominated for two decades. ‘New Labour’ in 1997 (‘new’ was merely a rhetorical not official suffix) established the first of four governments, three under Tony Blair, but the fourth, under Gordon Brown, failed to win the inconclusive May 2010 election. On this occasion, Conservative David Cameron allied his 307 MPs with Nick Clegg’s 57 to form a coalition government, the first peacetime coalition since the 1930s. Concern about Britain’s membership of the EU and related incoming east European migrant workers gave rise to UKIP, which, under Nigel Farage, commanded around 17% support in December 2014 opinion polls. It did well in local elections and handsomely won the European Parliament elections in May 2014. In the autumn of that year Tory MPs Douglas Carswell and Mark Reckless defected to UKIP and successfully fought by-­elections in their own constituencies under their new banner. The May 2015 election saw it muster 13% of the vote but – disappointingly for its supporters – retained only one of its two MPs. The Brexit Party – in a sense the successor to UKIP – was formed by Nigel Farage in January 2019 and its pro-­Brexit stance helped it to win easily the Euro-­elections of May that year. However in the December



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e­ lection, Johnson’s Conservatives so effectively took over the Brexit Party’s mantle that Farage’s party failed to win any Commons seats at all. On the political fringe in Britain, parties can command reasonable voting support but the ‘first past the post’ voting system means they are not able to focus support in any one constituency and they end up failing to win the seats their vote might be seen to justify. The Green Party polled 2.7% and has one MP, whose seat was won in May 2010. Caroline Lucas was re-­elected in 2015, 2017 and 2019, each time with an increased majority. The various left-­wing Marxist parties are nowhere near winning a seat and the neo-­fascist BNP is also riven by internal disputes – its support almost disappeared in 2015; the Islamophobic EDL is not dissimilar (see Chapter 7).

THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY The Conservative Party is arguably Britain’s traditional party of government: its PMs holding power for 57 years of the twentieth century. The nineteenth-­century PM Benjamin Disraeli envisioned an alliance between the aristocracy and the working classes. Despite the party’s defence of the landed and business interests, it has been able, crucially, to win sufficient working-­class votes to achieve and maintain office on a regular basis. In 1945 it was crushed by the Attlee landslide but it was back in office only six years later, willing to accept Labour’s mixed economy and the welfare state. After a period of Labour dominance in the 1960s and 1970s, Margaret Thatcher moved her party robustly to the right in the 1980s, winning three general elections, in 1979, 1983 and 1987. John Major extended the party’s run of success with victory in 1992; this was perhaps a victory too far, as his loss in 1997 was dramatic and foreshadowed 13 years in the wilderness of opposition. David Cameron, following the failed leaderships of William Hague, Iain Duncan Smith and Michael Howard, was the person who realised drastic ‘detoxifying’ changes were required to win power, something he almost managed in the May 2010 general election, after which his party, though the largest, had to ally with the Lib Dems to create a credible government. In May 2015 it won its first overall majority since 1992, with a slim majority of

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17. The unexpected 2016 ‘Brexit’ referendum victory saw Cameron replaced by Theresa May who struggled to implement the UK’s exit from the EU. Her attempt to improve on the majority she inherited from Cameron crashed and burned in 2017 when she lost her majority altogether and had to cling to power in a ‘hung parliament’ (minority) sustained by the ten members of the Northern Ireland DUP whose support was only won via a £1 billion in extra public expenditure. After her failure to persuade the Commons to pass her November 2018 Withdrawal Bill, she resigned in June 2019 and was replaced, after a leadership contest, by Boris Johnson. Johnson negotiated a new deal with the EU, albeit at the expense of his close ally, the DUP, and persuaded the opposition parties to allow him to fight a general election on 12 December which he won with a majority of 80. Leadership

Tory leaders used to ‘emerge’ through a series of party soundings but after Alec Douglas Home’s short period as leader (1963–65) elections were introduced, producing Edward Heath in 1965 as the first leader so chosen. Thatcher controversially stood against Heath in 1975 and surprisingly won the leadership of her male-­dominated party. She then went on to win the 1979 election and, after she achieved military victory over Argentina in the Falklands War, she was able to win a landslide in 1983, another victory in 1987 and proceed to leave the imprint of her right-­wing philosophy on the nation after 11 years in power. Major, was (unfairly as his party was divided over EU membership) perceived as a ‘weak’ leader – his successor as PM, David Cameron, aside from his referendum mistake, was a strong leader and Theresa May, having accepted the poisoned chalice of Brexit when leading a minority government, another weak one. CONSTRAINTS

In theory and according to its rules, the Conservative leader is given much authority to lead but in reality he or she has to: avoid policy divisions – crucial, as voters punish parties which cannot agree; sustain morale – and leads in the polls, even when events



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intervene; maintain a balance among the leadership – Thatcher had to compromise with her ‘wet’ or liberal Conservative opponents on several occasions; and keep leading figures onside. Thatcher and Blair both suffered from resignations by key colleagues (Lawson and Howe for the former, Cook for the latter). May’s constraints included her lack of a majority but perhaps, more significantly, her lack of appropriate political skills. ORGANISATION

The 1922 Committee is the body representing Tory MPs; it jealously guards its independence. Usually it conforms to party culture and supports the leader but with John Major and his successors (up to and including Cameron) it has often voiced its displeasure behind the scenes over trends in leadership policy or style. Central Office is the party’s bureaucracy and contains the important Research Department where Cameron, amongst other future leading Tories, cut their political teeth. There are several party groups that represent strands of opinion in the party: the Tory Reform Group on the left, the Bow Group at the centre and the No Turning Back Group on the right. William Hague introduced a number of reforms: a board to run the party’s affairs; a rule that all parliamentary candidates should be chosen by all members of a constituency party; a rule that a motion of no confidence would require 15% of Tory MPs to request it; and a new party forum to discuss policy.

LABOUR PARTY ORIGINS

Labour began as a ‘bottom up’ party rather than ‘top down’ like the Tories and its procedures reflect rather more internal democracy than one finds among the Conservatives, though this difference narrowed markedly under Blair, and even, allegedly, under Corbyn. The party was set up by the trade unions with the enthusiastic support of the socialist societies to help elect supporters into the Commons. They hoped thereby to improve their attempts to influence legislation by direct intervention. In 1918 the party acquired

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a socialist constitution and an annual conference with policy-­ making powers. The party has always had to resolve the tensions between those who favour rapid and radical reform and those who prefer slower, safer progress towards change through peaceful consensual parliamentary methods. LEADERSHIP

Labour has always had an instinctive suspicion of authority and prescribed collective leadership as a substitute for any possibly over­powerful leadership. Ironically, the party has twice had leaders – Ramsay MacDonald and Tony Blair – who were indeed charismatic and powerful but were subsequently accused of betraying party principles plus being shallow and self-­seeking. In 1981 a new system of electing the leader was introduced, involving an ‘electoral college’ comprising MPs, unions and members, each vested with a third of the voting power. This system was criticised in 2010 when Ed Miliband failed to win the MPs’ and members’ section but triumphed because of support only in the unions. The electoral college was abandoned by Ed Miliband for a ‘one member, one vote’ system. Corbyn was elected as the great hope of the left but critics claim the tight control imposed by his regime and his own disinclination to accept alternative views, did not, in the end, produce much change at all. Certainly when Corbyn finally stood down in the wake of the disastrous 2019 election defeat, his left-­ wing supporters among the party’s 400,000–500,000 members controlled most of its levers of power. Political commentator Vernon Bogdanor argued in February 2020 that the party needed to remove every trace of a party leader ‘who has sympathised with the IRA or similar terrorist organisations, much less had truck with anti-­Semitism’.  POWER CENTRES IN THE LABOUR PARTY CONFERENCE

The 1918 constitution set this up as the ‘policy-­making parliament’ of the party. Unions were allowed to represent their whole membership in numerical terms when casting their votes – the block



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vote – and so dominated the big decisions. It became a platform for fiery speeches, where a name could be made, and it was always more influential than the Tory equivalent, which is more of a rally of supporters. Left-­wingers in the party have tried to use the conference to advance their political agenda through moving their resolutions and getting them passed. However, once the party is in power, the conference is only an external influence: the real decisions are made by majorities in parliament, not conference. Parliament, after all, is answerable to all voters in the country, not just trade union or Labour Party members. Nonetheless, in the 1970s, by ignoring conference decisions Harold Wilson and James Callaghan eventually found they had alienated the unions and thereby caused themselves intractable political problems. NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (NEC)

This is voted in every year by the membership, so trade unions have again tended to play a major part in controlling it. Once, the NEC used to lead policy-­making and in the early 1980s, with the left in the ascendant, it became a focus of left-­wing interest. Under Blair, however, it lost this function and hence much of its importance. Under Corbyn, the NEC assumed some of its former potency whilst also coming under complete control by him and his supporters. TRADE UNIONS

Given that the unions created the party and provided most of its funding, they have tended to exercise considerable power. However, during the 1970s, union power was perceived by voters as malign and, despite their loss of power after the defeat of the miners during the 1980s, the link has still been problematic, especially as Ed Miliband’s election in 2010 was the result crucially of union votes cast for him rather than his brother David. Cameron delightedly made considerable political capital out of Ed being ‘in the pocket’ of the unions. Unions certainly wield substantial power in the party by virtue of being its main source of funding. In recent years Len McLuskey, leader of the UK’s biggest union, Unite, emerged as a powerful supporter of Jeremy Corbyn and his ­left-­wing

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agenda; in the wake of the 2019 electoral defeat, his position at once appeared diminished. PARLIAMENTARY LABOUR PARTY (PLP)

As elected MPs, the PLP has special authority, but constitutionally it is only one power centre, and not always the most important. However, when Corbyn won the leadership in 2015, the bulk of the PLP was ‘moderate’, still supporting policies closer to Blair and Brown. When Corbyn appeared to be only a half-­hearted Remain supporter during the 2016 referendum campaign, a vote of no confidence was moved which he lost heavily but the thousands of new members in the party, attracted by his left-­wing policies, re-­elected him by an even bigger majority. Labour moderates mostly kept quiet after this defeat but the breach with Corbyn widened again during the Brexit discussions when he was accused, accurately, of being a long-­time Leave supporter and made only a pretence of supporting Remain. His vote Out in 1975 plus his votes against the Maastricht and Lisbon treaties gave some credence to these accusations but when a split did occur only eight MPs joined the new ‘Independent Group’ in February 2019; Tom Watson’s ‘British Future’ group of moderates, formed in early March 2019 offered more evidence of PLP divisions but when he stood down as deputy early in November 2019 the threat of a breakaway group of moderates disappeared. POWER AND LEADERSHIP ISSUES IDEOLOGICAL DIVISIONS

Differences between the radical left, who wanted to advance rapidly towards left-­wing goals, and the ‘revisionists’, who favoured the slower parliamentary reformist route, has plagued Labour politics, especially during the inter-­war years and the 1950s, through to the end of the 1980s. During the 1970s the party seemed to offer two programmes of action: an official revisionist one and an alternative left-­wing one. In the early 1980s this conflict reached its zenith, with the left winning temporary control. Consequently, the 1983 election manifesto was described by Gerald Kaufman as ‘the longest



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suicide note in history’, an accurate prediction as Thatcher won the election by a massive landslide. By the later 1980s the party had learnt how to absorb such conflicts, as they prove unattractive to voters: as Lloyd George famously noted, ‘you can’t make a policy out of an argument’. However, as has been explained, the election of Jeremy Corbyn as leader in 2015, placed a revived version of Bennite socialism in charge and caused an unprecedented gulf to open up between left and right. EXPERIENCE OF LEADERSHIP

MacDonald was accused of ‘betraying’ the party when he left Labour to lead the Conservative-­dominated National Government in 1931. His successor a few years later, Clement Attlee, was an exceedingly modest man with little or no charisma but he proved an exceptionally able PM as well as a highly respected one. Harold Wilson was a clever and devious politician who did not always carry his party. James Callaghan was pro-­union and proved an able party leader but was eventually overwhelmed by union militancy and was defeated by Thatcher in 1979. Michael Foot was a favourite of the left but the 1983 election was a disastrous defeat which crippled the party for many years. Using policy review groups, Neil Kinnock bravely and cleverly nudged the party away from the voter-­unfriendly left-­wing end of the spectrum but it was Tony Blair who swept it into the centre ground and everything else before him in 1997. Blair, a gifted politician and superb communicator, could do no wrong for several years; while not achieving a great deal in his first term, he won the 2001 election by another landslide. However, by then, a widespread suspicion had grown that Blair relied too much on media management or ‘spin’: his formidable spin doctors Peter Mandelson and Alistair Campbell were seen as part of the problem rather than the solution. Some date the catastrophic decline in trust in politicians to Blair’s ‘spin’ obsession. In 2003 Blair’s decision to join George Bush’s invasion of Iraq soon proved a disaster, as the aftermath turned into a protracted bloodbath. To make things much worse, Blair’s chancellor, Gordon Brown, constantly plotted and lobbied to replace him and their enmity became widely and damagingly known. Blair won a third

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election in 2005 but, by 2007, political support draining away, was forced to stand aside and allow Brown to take over. The Scot’s fraught period in power, however, hugely disappointed Labour supporters and no doubt himself. Apparently paralysed by indecision and beset by gaffes and other disasters, his premiership sank into ridicule until in 2008 the world economic crisis arrived. Brown was then able to make a major, if widely unappreciated, contribution to the amelioration of the effects but by then voters had mostly lost faith in him and his party and in May 2010 Labour lost over 90 seats in a crushing defeat. Cameron, however, was still some 20 seats short of the required 326 seats for an overall majority and was forced to strike a coalition bargain with Nick Clegg’s Lib Dems, an agreement which, despite frequent disagreements between the two parties, held firm. In 2015 Labour, despite leading for much of the time since 2010 in the polls, suffered an even worse defeat, losing nearly 100 more seats. Labour’s disastrous run of defeats continued in December 2019 when it lost 60 seats including several in its traditional industrial heartlands, being reduced to the lowest number of seats since 1935. Jeremy Corbyn resigned and a three-­month-long leadership contest followed which narrowed down to a choice between Sir Keir Starmer, seen as a more moderate policy advocate; Rebecca Long-­Bailey, viewed as the ‘continuity candidate with Corbynism; and Lisa Nandy, an interesting mix of policies reflecting her individual take on politics. After a good-­natured series of nationwide hustings, the results, on a 62% turnout of party members were: Starmer 275,780 votes (56.2% of vote); Long-­Bailey 135,218 (27.6%) and Lisa Nandy 79,597 (16.2%). The deputy leader was Angela Rayner, a ‘soft’ rather than ‘hard’ left MP on 52.6% of the vote. It remains to be seen how effective Starmer will be in turning around Labour’s political fortunes. At least his forensic barrister’s skills should stand him in good stead when facing the notoriously poor on detail Boris Johnson at PMQs.

LIBERAL DEMOCRATS The product of the 1988 merger of the Liberal Party and the SDP (a breakaway from the Labour Party), the Lib Dems initially embodied centrist political thinking, with affinities both to



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‘­revisionist’ Labour and left-­leaning Conservatism. Its first leader, the energetic Paddy Ashdown, tended to side with Labour but his successor, Charles Kennedy, was less keen, being strongly opposed to the Iraq War. He was replaced by Menzies Campbell in 2005, who, after failing to make any impact, gave way to Nick Clegg in December 2007. Clegg it was who threw in his 57 MPs to enable David Cameron to command a stable majority in a coalition negotiated in May 2010. However, many people had voted for Clegg to prevent rather than enable a Tory-­led government and, combined with the fate of a cuts-­based economic policy, support for Lib Dems slumped from 24% in May 2010 to barely double figures in spring 2014, when the party came fifth in the European elections. Until the next election, the party could no longer assume the mantle of ‘protest party’, attractive to those unwilling to endorse either of the big parties. At his 2013 conference Clegg offered his party as a force for moderation which, in the event of another (not unexpected) hung parliament, would, in coalition with Labour, restrain prodigal spending, or, with the Tories, prevent excessive cuts hitting the poor. This perhaps made the best out of a parlous position but subsequently falling or static opinion poll rating for the party suggested this offer did not impress voters. Nemesis arrived on 7 May 2015, when the Lib Dems lost 47 seats and were left with a paltry eight; Clegg survived but many of its leading lights – David Laws, Danny Alexander, Simon Hughes and Charles Kennedy – failed to return to the Commons. Tim Farron took over as leader in 2015 but his anguish between his religious principles and his attitude towards gay sex proved a distraction during the 2017 election campaign and when the party failed to make much progress in that election he was replaced by the veteran Vince Cable. The party’s fortunes appeared to look up initially under Cable but in July 2019 an injection of youth took place when Jo Swinson was elected leader. During the period 2018–19 several defectors from Labour and Tories swelled its parliamentary numbers but in November its new leader, Swinson, made the mistake of being persuaded by the SNP to agree to Boris Johnson’s proposed general election. Swinson hoped her ‘revoke Brexit’ message would summon droves of Remainer voters into the polls in support but in the event she mustered only 11.5% of the vote and 11 MPs. To

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make matters even more humiliating, she also lost her own seat, apparently ending her own promising political career.

UKIP and the Brexit Party The progress of this party was remarkable after its creation in the 1990s, at times even establishing a four-­party system in the UK. In spring 2014 came UKIP’s sweeping successes in the local and European elections. However, despite its vibrant advance, the party suffered from a number of shortcomings: overly dependent on its charismatic, maverick leader, Nigel Farage; its supporters tended to be at the senior end of the age range; and, apart from wishing to withdraw from the EU and halt immigration, its policies – notably on the economy and public services – were not well understood or, indeed, coherently worked out. Some pointed out that the party’s strength lay in the south of the country, in places affected directly by immigration. The party reached its greatest level of success in the mid-­2010s, when it gained two members of Parliament and was the largest UK party in the European Parliament. By-­election results in 2013–14, at Eastleigh, South Shields, Rotherham, Wythenshawe and, most dramatically, Middleton and Heywood on 9 October 2014, suggested the party was also making deep inroads into traditionally strong Labour areas. In May 2015 this proved to be the case, as UKIP votes contributed to many Labour losses in the north of England. The party went on to poll a massive 13% of the vote but failed to win any target seats, Farage managing only third place in Thanet South. A series of unappealing rows broke out in the party over Farage’s leadership style and the party’s popularity slumped after a series of leaders failed to cement their positions. Realising UKIP was failing politically Farage set up a ‘replacement’ organisation, The Brexit Party in January 2019 committed solely to ensuring Brexit happened when at the time considerable doubt existed as to whether it would, given its lack of parliamentary support. The Brexit Party instantly polled well and in the May 2019 Euro-­ elections romped home with 31% of the vote and 29 seats. However, once Boris Johnson succeeded Theresa May, his total commitment to ‘Get Brexit Done’ cleverly eroded the Brexit Party’s support among voters and squeezed it on to the margins – where at the time of writing it still remains.



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The Political Fringe Ideas of the political fringe have already received comment and analysis in the foregoing chapter. The Far Left

There have been a number of small left-­wing parties in Britain ever since the nineteenth century: the British Communist Party, founded in 1920 and which remained outside the mainstream but not without considerable influence within the trade union movement. During World War II, sympathy with Soviet suffering helped the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) win a much wider profile and a membership of 60,000. In the 1945 election two communists – Willie Gallacher and Phil Piratin – were elected though the early intimations of the Cold War helped to reduce support for the party which lost its MPs in 1950. Trotskyist fringe parties appeared including the Socialist Workers Party founded by Tony Cliff; Gerry Healey’s Workers Revolutionary Party during the 1970s, prominent members of which included Corin and Vanessa Redgrave; and the Socialist Labour Party founded by miner’s leader Arthur Scargill in 1996. While providing a training ground for a handful of future left-­ wing Labour members none of these tiny parties greatly worried vote counters at elections. However, it should be noted that several of Jeremy Corbyn’s close circle of advisers spent their early formative years as passionate activists in this part of the political fringe. Seamus Milne, Corbyn’s press secretary, ironically given his political stance, was educated at exclusive Westminster School and Oxford before working as a journalist for the CPGB. Milne’s close colleague and fellow Labour Party adviser, Andrew Murray, similarly, was privately educated before also joining the CPGB. It is perhaps ironic that after nearly a century during which Labour kept the CPGB at arm’s length, two of its adherents could end up advising the Labour leader. Some claim these two are responsible for Corbyn’s often conciliatory attitude towards Vladimir Putin, seen by some as still pursuing the aims of the defunct Soviet Union.

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Far Right

These small parties owe some of their provenance ideologically to Fascism and Nazism and in Britain to the neo-­fascist National Front, formed in 1967. The BNP emerged in 1997 and under the leadership of Nick Griffin enjoyed a brief surge in 2009 when it won two northeast MEP seats but after 2012 its electoral challenge effectively shrivelled. Britain First, an anti-­immigrant and anti-­ Islam party offered a ‘vigilante’ threat: Thomas Mair shouted ‘Britain First’ after murdering Remain supporter and labour MP Jo Cox in 2016. The EDL, founded 2009, led by ‘Tommy Robinson’ (real name Stephen Yaxley-­Lennon) occasionally won headlines connected with its eccentric leader whom UKIP unwisely recruited as a supporter. Unlike the far left, the far right does not seem to attract politicians who gravitate into the mainstream.

NATIONALIST PARTIES In Scotland and Wales the UK-­wide political parties are augmented by the SNP and Plaid Cymru, respectively. The major UK parties fail to gain any traction in Northern Ireland, which has a very different political culture. The Devolution Acts which created the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly were originally designed to take the weight off Westminster and the heat out of nationalism, but in the case of Scotland it seemed merely to whet nationalist appetites for genuine independence. On 18 September 2014 a referendum was held for Scottish voters on whether they wished to remain part of the UK. The SNP leader, Alex Salmond, led a sensationally successful ‘yes’ campaign, which generated enormous energy and passion throughout Scotland, especially reaching young people and those who, in the past, had not shown much interest in politics. The ‘no’ campaign was led by a former Labour chancellor, Alistair Darling, who represented the pro-­union Labour, Conservative and Lib Dem parties south of the border. Salmond lost the first television debate but won the second handsomely and, as polling day approached, the momentum seemed to lie marginally with the SNP-­led campaign. However, this was when the former Labour PM, Gordon Brown, entered the campaign with a series of



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barnstorming speeches which may have tipped the balance in favour of the pro-­unionists, who eventually won 55–45. However, the excitement generated by the ‘yes’ campaign continued to resonate well into the 2015 general election campaign, with the SNP’s membership swelling over the 100,000 mark. Labour had expected to lose a fair number of its 41 Scottish seats but was left traumatised by the loss of all but one of them as the SNP won 56 of the 59 available seats. This number slumped to 35 in the 2017 election when Scottish voters swung away from the idea of a second referendum. But in December 2019 the near certainty that Brexit would extract Remain supporting Scotland from the EU helped the SNP win a near clean sweep of Scottish seats: 48 out of the 59 available.

FUNDING POLITICAL PARTIES To survive and function, Labour and Tory parties currently need well over £20 million a year each. However, income flows have reduced catastrophically since their individual memberships have plummeted, just when state-­of-the-­art communication requires yet more expenditure. Labour now has only 200,000 members and Conservatives possibly just over half that number. Other countries in Europe employ state funding but the disdain in which politicians are held in Britain would make that difficult, if not impossible. The result has been a reliance on big donors: trade unions for Labour plus a number of rich supporters and mainly rich business people for the Tories and UKIP. The problem with this is that such people seldom give away money without expecting favours in return and that makes the practice profoundly undemocratic. Even the Lib Dems can get into trouble this way: in February 2014 one of their biggest donors, Sudhir Choudhrie, turned out to be a major international arms dealer. Sir Hayden Phillips’ inquiry into the subject suggested a cap on donations of £50,000 – good for the Tories, but not for Labour, which relies on large union donations to survive.

CONCLUSION: TWO-­PARTY SYSTEM IN DECLINE? In 1950, 97% of votes went to Labour and the Tories but during the 1960s support for the Liberals and the nationalists grew. During

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the 1980s the Alliance emerged, wining over a quarter of all votes in 1983, though its support soon fell. The Lib Dems, formed in 1988, made good headway during the 1990s, along with the nationalists in Wales and Scotland. By 2005 the two-­party system appeared to be fragmenting, with smaller parties taking 28% of the vote and 78 seats; in 2010 the smaller parties commanded over 30% of votes and won 91 seats. However, the 2015 election, when the Tories won an overall majority, suggested that, despite fragmentation, majorities for the big parties are still possible. Theresa May’s 2017 election was atypical of recent ones in that over 83% of votes were cast for the two big parties with the smaller parties losing out. Many voices judged the impact of Brexit – the growth of UKIP and then the Brexit Party had changed Britain’s party system from a ‘two-­and-a-­half ’ one to a fully fledged four party system. However in 2019 this proved, as in 2017, not to be the case. The SNP fared very well, as small parties in regional areas often do, but after the Tories squeezed the life out of the Brexit Party, the two main parties still garnered 76% of the vote. The impact of Brexit caused defections from both big parties. TIG was formed in February 2019 when eight Labour and three Conservative MPs defected from their parties largely in objection to their respective policies on Brexit (Bagehot, 2019). On 29 March TIG announced it had become a political party, to be called Change UK. The first electoral sign of fragmentation arrived with the 2019 local elections. Here we saw the two big parties both losing vote share: from 85% in 2017 down to 65% at the 2019 locals. Conservatives lost 1300 seats and 49 councils while Labour, against expectations for an opposition party midway through an unpopular government’s term of office, failed to make any gains, lost 85 seats and control of five councils. The vanished votes were diverted to the Lib Dems – who gained 708 seats and control of 18 councils. Writing in the Observer on 5 May 2019, Andrew Rawnsley judged ‘Multi-­party politics is alive and kicking. The fragmentation of voter allegiances continues. Neither the red tribe nor the blue clan is exhibiting a capacity to get anywhere near to speaking for a majority of Britons.’



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QUESTIONS for DISCUSSION 1. Is Labour a more democratic party than the Conservatives? 2. Why did the Liberal Party lose influence in the early twentieth century? 3. Do you think the Green Party is destined to become a major party? 4. How big an influence did the Brexit process have on the UK political party system?

FURTHER READING Recent books on British political parties are still awaited, as most teachers and students now seem to use the bigger textbooks, which have appeared since the early 1990s, for coverage of such aspects. Readers seeking chapters on UK parties can find them in: Jones et al. (2018, chs 4, 5, 6 and 11); Kingdom (2014, chs 2, 12 and 13); Moran (2011, chs 14 and 15). A useful snapshot of how the main parties shaped up as the 2015 general election approached was given in four ‘Why Vote …’ books, published by Biteback, which appeared December 2014: Conservative (Nick Herbert), Labour (Dan Jarvis), Lib Dems (Jeremy Browne) and UKIP (Suzanne Evans). The books by Ford and Goodwin (2014) and Eatwell and Goodwin (2018) are excellent analyses of the growth of right-­wing politics in the UK and beyond over the past decade. Bagehot (2019) The great rescrambling of Britain’s parties, The Economist, 19 January, p. 36. Bale, T. (2011) The Conservative Party from Thatcher to Cameron, Polity. Baxter, S. (2020) Corbynism croaks and Labour sees the light, Sunday Times, 8 February. Beech, M. and Lee, S. (eds) (2011) The Cameron–Clegg Government, Palgrave. Bogdanor, V. (2020) Labour faces a painful reckoning: those who enabled Corbynism can’t be trusted with its future, New Statesman, 5 February. Carswell, D. (2012) The End of Politics and the Birth of iDemocracy, Biteback. Clarke, A. (2012) Political Parties in the UK, Palgrave. Driver, S. (2011) Understanding Party Politics, Polity. Eatwell, R. and Goodwin, M. (2018) National Populism: The Revolt Against Liberal Democracy, Pelican.

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Ford, R. and Goodwin, M. (2014) Revolt on the Right: Explaining Support for the Radical Right in Britain, Routledge. Jones, B., Norton, P. and Daddow, O. (2018) Politics UK (9th edition), Routledge. Kingdom, J. (2014) Government and Politics in Britain, Polity. Moran, M. (2011) Politics and Governance in the UK (2nd edition), Palgrave. Rawnsley, A. (2019) A cynical Westminster fix won’t end the Brexit nightmare of May and Corbyn, Observer, 5 May.

WEBSITES Conservatives, www.conservativehome.com.Liberal Democrat Voice, www. libdemvoice.org/.

10 PRESSURE GROUPS

Pressure groups, rather like political parties, ‘mediate’ on behalf of the people but in their case it is between groups or sections of society, rather than individuals and the government. They do not attempt to win control of government in the way parties do. Rather, they are organised groups in society that seek both to defend and to promote their own interests by influencing specific policies. Elections occur every five years in Britain (unless the 2011 Fixed Term Parliament Act is bypassed), providing individual representation, but pressure groups, it can be argued, sustain their functional representation between elections.

TYPES OF PRESSURE GROUPS ECONOMIC GROUPS

Trade unions seek to defend and advance members’ interests in relation to pay and conditions of work. Business groups represent smallto medium-­sized concerns as well as the big mega corporations, though the multinationals are often so large they deal directly with government rather than via lobbying organisations. CAUSE GROUPS

Sectional groups represent discrete groups in society, for example old people (Age Concern), the homeless (Shelter), children (National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children) or motorists (Automobile Association).

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Attitude groups advance ideas they believe benefit society as a whole, such as human rights (Liberty), legal reform (Howard League for Penal Reform) and voting reform (Electoral Reform Society). OTHERS

In addition there are: peak associations or umbrella groups representing collections of groups like the trade unions (the Trades Union Congress, TUC) or the Confederation of British Industry (CBI); fire brigade groups which emerge to champion specific problems an historical example of which was the nineteenth century Anti-­Corn Law League. Others, which could be local, might be residents campaigning to divert a ring road, or national like the Road Traffic Reduction Campaign; and finally episodic groups, for example groups which are not ostensibly political, like golf clubs or scout troops, but become so when needing to defend or advance their interests.

ORIGINS OF PRESSURE GROUPS Even pre-­democratic societies contained political groupings but democracies in effect give them licence to organise and openly apply influence wherever they can. William Wilberforce’s Committee for the Abolition of Slavery was founded in 1787 and, following a long campaign managed to persuade an unreformed parliament to ban the activity by 1806; ending the trade and the practice took longer. Others in the nineteenth century included, as mentioned, the Anti Corn Law League, the Salvation Army and the British Red Cross. In time, governments began to appreciate the value of such groups, encouraging or even subsidising their activities. As government began to extend its concerns in the twentieth century, especially after Labour’s 1945 victory, groups formed both to inform and to influence government. Nationalised industries delivered something approaching monopoly power to their unions, which, in the case of the coal or electricity industries, could bring them and the country to a halt in short time. Pressure groups became more professional, with skilled negotiators and press ­officers



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expert at using the media, frequently recruited at graduate level. Indeed, pressure groups have evolved to the point where they can offer interesting and worthwhile careers for able young people.

CIVIL SOCIETY AND PRESSURE GROUPS ‘Civil society’ was mentioned in Chapter 5, ‘Political culture’, and refers to the ‘non-­political’ relationships people have with families, business, church, school and voluntary associations such as scouts, guides, football and cricket clubs. These are the agencies whereby young people become engaged with and socialised into society; they learn how to lead, be led and perform as part of a team, to discuss and negotiate, to make both agreements and compromises. These relationships are the way young people the world over absorb the values and culture of their societies and provide the precondition of democratic activity, the soil in which it grows. Britain has always had a plethora of voluntary bodies, suggesting its political culture is healthily receptive to democracy. However, there have been signs such health might be waning. Membership of political parties has slumped since the early 1950s and membership of some voluntary bodies has declined severely. US political scientist Robert Putnam (2000) has charted the decline of his own country’s voluntary groups and the growth of ‘passive’ members of many of them, doing nothing more than renewing annual memberships. Other scholars, like Peter Hall (1999), judge Britain’s civil society is in a less parlous state; Sheffield University’s ‘Citizen Audit’ (2001 – see Pattie et al., 2004) reinforces such a judgment. Survey evidence suggests, however, that it is people in higher-­ income categories who are much more likely than others to volunteer. A 2016 study by the Understanding Society Policy Unit by Raj Patel dismissed the impact of Cameron’s 2010 ‘Big Society’ initiative as negligible and noted a 52% to 43% fall in people active in one or more voluntary organisations between 1993 and 2012.

PRESSURE GROUPS AND GOVERNMENT The relationship between these two is by no means as conflicted as might be expected given the potential clashes involved. Both sides of the table in meetings share certain objectives, in that they: seek

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policies which work to mutual advantage; share knowledge likely to make policies more effective; and need to support new policies to ensure they are acceptable to the nation as a whole. Government, therefore, has much incentive to keep such groups onside. In the same way, pressure groups face every incentive to accept the code of discretion and passive support of the consultation process: to be an ‘insider’, to use Wyn Grant’s term. Grant (2000) has argued that the vast majority of pressure groups aim for status close to the heart of the policy-­making process: the place where influence can most efficiently be brought to bear. Such groups tend to apply their pressure quietly, steadily and effectively at the pressure points likely to produce favourable outcomes. ‘Outsider’ groups often pursue hard-­to-achieve objectives – sometimes ideological in character – and engage in noisy public campaigns which, while possibly sowing seeds for the future, seldom achieve their immediate objectives. GOVERNMENT METHODS

While government and pressure groups share common aims and recognise their need to cooperate, there is also an element of conflict in the relationship: pressure groups try to apply influence which government often wishes to resist. The ‘weapons’ used can be identified as follows. CONSULTATION STATUS

Groups bask in the warmth of government attention and are delighted to be given a permanent place on advisory committees. As such they have two main roles: providing sounding boards and inside information when government pursues change and reform – for example, seeking to reduce salt and sugar content in food. When such changes are mooted in such cases, food industry groups will lobby for changes to be purely voluntary: a condition which can mitigate reform and cause long delays of implementation. Such groups also function as crucial policy-­forming advisory groups when changes in the law are thought to be necessary in the public interest.



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PUBLIC RELATIONS

The government has vast resources to deploy in resisting the blandishments of pressure groups. Just how government can bring large organisations to heel was demonstrated by Alistair Campbell in his ‘dodgy dossier’ fight with the BBC in 2003; Campbell used every trick in the book to ‘win’ his side of the contest, bringing down the BBC’s director-­general and chairman in the process. THE LAW

During the 1980s Thatcher’s determination to subdue the miners’ union was achieved in part through changing the law so that its funds could be sequestered if new laws were transgressed on balloting members before strike action. Labour also passed laws making certain kinds of demonstration against the Iraq War illegal. FORCE

Ultimately, government can utilise force to overcome challenges from groups which challenge its authority. In the past, the most common challenges originated in industrial action by trade unions; during that bitter 1980s miners’ strike police were used to subdue striking miners, causing bitterness which remains to this day in former mining areas. PRESSURE GROUP METHODS

In a scene from the 2014 film Selma, Dr Martin Luther King demands that president Lyndon B. Johnson change the law to make it easier for black people to register for voting. He replies, ‘You have one issue, I have a hundred.’ He may have been trying to refuse Dr King but his excuse was quite correct: the perennial problem of pressure group leaders is to find the approaches likely to make their single issue one which the government just has no option but to take seriously. These methods can be seen along a spectrum, from peaceful to occasionally violent.

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PETITIONS AND LETTERS

If attracting sufficiently large numbers, these can feature in mainstream news and be quite influential. The arrival of online petitions, run by bodies like Avaas and 33 Degrees, can have a considerable impact, with signatures running into the hundreds of thousands. Letters to MPs and the press are usually less influential but if enough are received MPs can certainly be influenced to take further action. MEETINGS

Groups seek to make contact with those who exercise executive power. One small local-­government example, experienced by the author, is the Friends of Roundhay Park in Leeds, who ask senior members of Leeds Parks Department to attend and contribute to their meetings. Until January 2020, weekly meetings took place between the government and the so-­called B5 bloc of business groups which include the CBI, the British Chambers of Commerce, the Institute of Directors, Make UK and the Federation of Small Businesses. Andrea Leadsom, the business secretary, announced these meetings would be terminated as trade negotiations with the EU were about to begin (Jones, 2020). MEDIA CAMPAIGNS

Groups will focus much energy and resources on catching the media’s attention, often with photo-­opportunities to add appeal. DEMONSTRATIONS

These are often marches with placards carried through the centre of towns and cities or could be colourful stunts like those tried by Fathers 4 Justice to attract attention to their cause. VIOLENCE

This is a high-­risk strategy, as public sympathies can as easily be lost as won by group action, as the early suffragettes discovered.



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DIRECT ACTION

This approach can quite easily slide into violence but the technique of chaining oneself to blocks of concrete in tunnels close to a big development has been used to some effect by environmental campaigners. However, the Darley Oaks Farm case in 2006 illustrated the limits of direct action when activists stole the remains of Gladys Hammond, the mother-­in-law of the owner of a farm which bred guinea pigs for experimentation. Public outrage resulted and middle-­class leader of the group, Jon Ablewhite, was eventually sent down for 12 years. However, if handled carefully and if respectable middle-­class opinion can be won over, direct action to prevent business development or airport runways can assist rather than detract from the causes involved. APPLYING PRESSURE

Pressure groups are clever at spotting where ‘power’ or ­decision-­making activity is concentrated and applying pressure accordingly. GENERAL PUBLIC

Groups publicise their activities and hope to recruit activists as well as raise funds. OTHER GROUPS

Alliances of like-­minded groups emerge as groups realise this maximises their effect. It also helps neutralise those groups which work against their causes. PARTIES

Groups will aim for the party likely to be most receptive. So business groups will head for the Tories, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament for Labour, though, significantly, while winning much support within Labour, official party policy has never been to give up nuclear weapons.

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PARLIAMENT

Groups seek support in both Houses and look for officers for their executives for publicity purposes. They also work closely with MP allies, drafting amendments to legislation to which they are opposed. MINISTERS AND CIVIL SERVANTS

Contacts with ministers are invaluable but civil servants often know more about the detail of what concerns groups and have the advantage of staying put, while ministers end up moving on. EUROPEAN UNION

Some 3000 groups now apply pressure on decision-­makers in Brussels, employing about 10,000 personnel. No doubt in the wake of Brexit, the importance of Brussels lobbying will diminish but there may be an opposite tendency: once out of the EU the need to influence EU policy, once formal routes are eliminated, might make such mechanisms even more important. PROFESSIONAL LOBBYING AND ‘SLEAZE’

Professional lobby groups offer useful and lucrative employment to young politicians on the way up and to retired politicians looking for appropriate work to fund their retirement. These companies, of which there are over 50, essentially hire themselves out to establish contact with people or organisations – usually business ones – wishing to influence or change a particular policy or piece of legislation. In the mid-­1990s there were 30 Tory MPs working for lobbying companies, being paid anything up to £10,000 a year or more to exploit their contacts with all the entry points described above. Tamsin Cave and Andy Rowell, in their 2015 book, sum up lobbying as follows: Lobbying is a serious, hidden feature of British politics. Commercial lobbyists, that is the thousands of people whose paid job it is to



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i­nfluence decisions taken by our politicians, operate without scrutiny. They are invisible. Lobbying is best done, is most effective, when no one is watching. (p. 1)

Back in the 1990s this kind of activity by MPs was not thought to be in any way shameful at the time, but when Sunday Times journalists, posing as businessmen, successfully asked two Tory MPs to ask questions on their behalf, there was outrage and such activities by MPs were quickly viewed as undemocratic and self-­seeking. The case of Neil Hamilton, who was taking money from the owner of Harrods to do the same thing, was hugely publicised and condemned as ‘sleaze’. Perhaps this case represented a change of our political culture regarding such activities, from passive toleration to disapproval verging on condemnation. The result was the judge-­led committee of inquiry, the Nolan-­ chaired Committee on Standards in Public Life. This recommended that MPs should register any interests they might have with a new parliamentary commissioner. Sleaze did not disappear once the Nolan machinery began to work – far from it – but it did show that parliament can move to rectify faults in the way it works once they become evident. When David Cameron came to power in 2010 he made a speech about lobbying which for a Tory PM was rather counter intuitive: ‘We all know how it works. The lunches, the hospitality, the quiet word in your ear, the ex-­ministers and ex advisers for hire helping big business find the right way to get its way’ (Cave and Rowell, 2015, p. 13). However, after six years in power Cameron did little or nothing to restrain the lobbying industry. Wyn Grant’s (2018) book on lobbying contains a revealing table of how the activities of business lobbyists can dilute or even destroy intended government action. His table (Table 10.1) juxtaposes the recommendations on obesity of the Health Select Committee in 2017 with the government’s eventual obesity plan. Personal contacts and ‘cronyism’ ‘It’s not what you know but who you know’ is the cliché often sagely mouthed by the older generation to the young along with a finger tapped knowingly against the nose, suggesting that it’s

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Table 10.1 Differences between the Health Select Committee recommendations and the government’s childhood obesity plan Health Select Committee recommendations

Childhood obesity plan

Strong controls on price of unhealthy food and drinks Tougher controls on marketing and advertising of unhealthy food and drink A centrally led reformulation programme to reduce sugar in food and drink

No mention of price promotions

A sugary drinks tax on full-sugar soft drinks, with all proceeds targeted to help those children at greatest risk of obesity

No mention of marketing and advertising Targets in nine categories of food contributing most to children’s sugar intake, but action is voluntary until 2020 and no mention of penalties or sanctions [Sugar ‘tax’ to be introduced in April 2018]. Benefit of the doubt but the devil is in the detail – proceeds to go to school sports and unclear whether targeted at those at greatest risk Labelling mentioned, in context of Brexit and greater flexibility, but no details or commitments No mention of education or information about diet No mention of stronger powers for local authorities

Labelling of single portions of products with added sugar to show sugar content as teaspoons Improved education and information about diet Stronger powers for local authorities to tackle the environment leading to obesity Early intervention to offer help to ‘Recommitting’ to Healthy Start families affected by obesity Voucher Scheme; income from sugar level to schools including an incentive premium Source: Grant, 2018, p. 55; House of Commons Health Select Committee, 2017, p. 8.

p­ ersonal influence behind the scenes which determines much of what goes on in politics. Karl Marx argued that democratic institutions were mere façades for decisions reached by powerful rich men mostly in private. In the nineteenth century, when cabinet



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members were likely to be sitting alongside former school or university friends, relations by blood or marriage, there is no doubt such personal contacts were often crucial. Marxists still maintain this reality remains with us – and it is a fact that of the 55 PMs Britain has had, 19 went to Eton (the two latest being Cameron and Johnson), seven to Harrow and six to Westminster, not to mention many more who served as cabinet members. Also true is that rich businessmen regularly meet with government ministers, with whom they possibly share school, university or family contacts, to discuss important economic policy matters. Labour has governed for far less time but when its leaders have done so pressure groups like the trade unions have exercised substantial influence. During Jeremy Corbyn’s tenure as leader the Unite union, led by Len McLuskey exercised considerable influence in determining the party’s left-­wing stance. Role of political donors Along with the decline of party memberships, parties began to look to rich individual donors to fund their activities. Labour looked to leftish inclined businessmen like Dr Chai Patel, owner of the Priory Clinics and Richard Caring who owns a clothing business as well as the Ivy Restaurant. Jeremy Corbyn might have deterred donors from the business world but his success in increasing his party membership up to 500,000 resulted in an influx of membership subscriptions that made big donors less important. The Conservatives, with a membership of around 150,000 are heavily reliant on rich donors, some of them Russian ‘oligarchs’, many others City financiers. The Metro reported on 21 November 2019: ‘Cash boosts from millionaire entrepreneurs, a private hospital owner, a Russian banker and property developers allowed Boris Johnson’s party to raise 26 times more than Labour in donations by the first week of the election campaign’ (Brown, 2019). Newspapers also regularly feature stories about clashes of interest between business interests and political donors. For example, the Guardian ran a story in January 2020, about the Done brothers, owners of a chain of betting shops and generous donors to the Tories, who also made money from treating gambling addicts via their ownership of the private health clinic company, Health Assured (Davies, 2020).

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POLITICAL THEORY AND PRESSURE GROUPS PLURALISM

Robert Dahl, the US political scientist, argued that power should be, and largely is, distributed across a large number of groups in society and decisions should be reached through a process of negotiation, with the government acting as kind of ‘referee’. CORPORATISM

Phillipe Schmitter saw groups as intermediaries between government and citizen but saw government as suborning key groups on to its own side so that they become in effect part of the machinery of government influence. It was argued that Labour applied a ‘corporate’ approach during the 1970s when it recruited the unions as its agent and made them part of government, to the nation’s detriment. POLICY NETWORKS

This view, associated with Jordan and Richardson (1987), sees groups forming ‘communities of influence’ around particular policy areas, being brought in to advise, offer information and often support in implementation. In this way groups provide essential cogs in the policy-­making process.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION 1. Would you say that pressure groups are inevitably pitted against the government of the day? 2. Explain the difference between ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ groups. 3. Have pressure or ‘lobbying’ groups virtually gained control of the policy-­making process? 4. ‘It’s not what you know but who you know.’ To what extent do you think this is true of British politics?



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further READING Professor Wyn Grant’s writings on pressure groups (1989, 2000) are well worth reading, if now a little dated; the book by Duncan Watts (2007) is also valuable and still reasonably up to date. More up to date is Grant’s short, readable Lobbying published in 2018. The other excellent book on this topic is Cave and Rowell’s (2015) book. Ashford, N. and Timms, D. (1992) What Europe Thinks: A Study of Western European Values, Dartmouth. Brown, F. (2019) Tories received 26 times more than Labour in first week of election, Metro, 21 November. Cave, T. and Rowell, A. (2015) A Quiet Word: Lobbying, Crony Capitalism and Broken Politics in Britain, Vintage. Davies, R. (2020) Hypocrisy of betting bosses’ millions from care of addicts, Guardian, 17 January. Grant, W. (1989) Pressure Groups, Politics and Democracy in Britain, Phillip Allan. Grant, W. (2000) Pressure Groups and Politics, Macmillan. Grant, W. (2018) Lobbying, Manchester University Press. Hall, P. (1999) Social capital in Britain, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 417–461. Jones, C. (2020) Businesses left rattled as Leadsom cuts contact, The Times, 11 January. Jordan, G. and Richardson, J.J. (1987) Governing Under Pressure, Martin Robertson.  Patel, R. (2016) The state of social capital in Britain: a policy briefing from understanding society, Essex University. Pattie, C., Seyd, P. and Whiteley, P. (2004) Citizenship in Britain Values, Participation and Democracy, Cambridge University Press. Putnam, R.D. (2000) Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community, Simon & Schuster  Watts, D. (2007) Pressure Groups (Politics Study Guides), Edinburgh University Press.

Websites Friends of the Earth, www.foe.co.uk. Greenpeace, www.greenpeace.org.uk. Outrage, www.outrage.org.uk. TUC, www.tuc.org.uk.

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11 THE MASS MEDIA

The most important ‘mediating’ agency in any democracy has to be the mass media: the press, radio, television plus the vital impact of the ‘new’ media spawned by the Internet and the digital revolution. This is the means whereby government learns about voters and citizens learn about their government. It is also how the different institutions of government learn about each other. In other words, the media enable any and all political systems to work. As they are the means whereby society receives information from government, control of the media is a highly sensitive subject: in autocracies, like modern-­day Russia, Cuba and China, they are rigidly controlled, so that only approved messages are transmitted downwards to the people and anyone offering dissenting messages to other members of society is seen as a risk and often action is taken against them. This is not to say, however, that, in democracies, governments do not seek to exert control over the media, as they most assuredly do, every day they are in power. It is relatively easy for autocracies to control traditional print and broadcast media though less so the relatively unregulated ‘new’ media like Facebook and Twitter. It is in democracies that the media play the most central role because where expression of views is not controlled it follows that many will wish to express them, whether supportive of government or not. Freedom of expression is the key foundation of democracy; for a political system to be genuinely democratic its media have to be substantially free from interference. While the law can guarantee such freedom from government control, those with the means to own or influence the



the mass media

media can pose threats to the viability of democracy. Moreover, the media and those who control it is one of the many aspects of democratic politics which have radically changed over the past few years. Some commentators now argue that, armed with the power of social media, political parties can manipulate voters in a manner never before experienced.

evolution of political communication Britain, as one of the first democracies, has a wide range of media outlets, each with distinctive histories. Printing technology was imported from Germany in 1476 by William Caxton, who built up his business around Oxford, the first book he produced being Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales. Printed versions of the Bible during the sixteenth century, especially in English translation, broke the church’s control on its teachings but the Civil War (1642–49) witnessed the first propaganda war via printed pamphlets. Regular newspapers appeared in the eighteenth century and then in the late nineteenth century cheap daily papers arrived, together with the phenomenon of their owners, the so-­called ‘press barons’. Tabloid newspapers sell in the greatest bulk though their content, on balance, does little to create an informed democracy (see Figure 11.1). The Sun and Daily Mirror offer many pages on sport and celebrity gossip but give little space to political news and analysis. The tabloids tend to be directed at less well educated readers: for example the Sun, it is alleged, aims to cater for those with a reading age of ten. The ‘mid-­tabloids’, the Daily Express and Mail, however, contain more news and comment. The so-­called broadsheets – in reality only the Telegraph remains a broadsheet – or ‘quality’ press – The Times, Telegraph, Guardian, Independent and Financial Times – allocate plenty of space to political news and comment usually by well known, respected columnists. Despite, on most occasions, supporting specific parties, ‘quality’ papers at least effect a degree of objectivity and consider opposing arguments. In theory, this latter section of the media ideally informs our democratic system but, aiming at more educated strata, their circulations are a fraction of that of the tabloids which also support parties and thereby exercise considerable power. The Sun may not offer any sophisticated analysis of the political scene but, given that the vote of a politically

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Figure 11.1 Most popular newspapers in the UK as of September 2019. Source: © Statista 2020, J. Johnson, Oct 4, 2019. www.statista.com/statistics/1025741/ most-popular-newspapers-in-the-uk/. Notes * Data was collected every day beginning 15 May 2018, with the results showing an average of the collected data over this time period. ** Interviews on which the data is based vary by newspaper, with each exceeding 7,500 respondents. The data has been weighted by YouGov to be nationally representative of demographics in Great Britain.

ignorant voter is of equal weight to that of wise political columnist, it is no surprise that Rupert Murdoch, owner of the Sun and other media, has exercised such influence on British politics over the past 30–40 years. Also contributing usefully to democratic enlightenment are the weekly journals like the widely respected The Economist, New Statesman and Spectator plus the monthly Prospect. While top columnists might influence the political class in government or opposition, during election campaigns it is probably the tabloids which cause more votes to be switched through their robust, unashamed campaigning for the parties they have decided to support: for Labour, only the Mirror, the rest usually support the Conservatives. During the 1990s most of the print press supported the Conservatives but then disillusion with the Major government



the mass media

caused the press to turn to Labour. During the next decade, much of this support fell away from Labour and when the Sun, after 12 years of supporting Labour, decided to back David Cameron in September 2009, the press was again dominantly and raucously pro-­Conservative, helping Cameron win his 2015 victory. The Sun also, along with the Daily Mail and Express, had a big role to play in the victory of Leave in the 2016 Referendum and the subsequent (ongoing) national controversy it caused. The Brexit supporting right-­wing press again was instrumental in smearing Opposition leader, Jeremy Corbyn, and banging the pro-­Brexit drum during the election campaigns for the 2017 election, in which May lost her majority but won the most seats and the December 2019 ‘Brexit’ election when Johnson won his historic victory; in this latter Tory victory, the right-­wing tabloids again played a prominent role. Perceptions of Newspaper Bias

A Times article in March 2017 gives an interesting take on how readers view the political slant of their newspapers. Figure 11.2 shows most people have spotted the bias reasonably well. For example, the Guardian, Mirror and Independent are seen as generally

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Figure 11.2 How left- or right-wing are the mainstream UK newspapers? Source: permission granted from YouGov.

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left of centre while the Daily Mail, Express and Sun are seen as right of centre. However, it seems odd to regular readers that The Times, traditionally seen as the voice of the British Establishment should be perceived as more left of centre than right of centre. Newspaper Readership and Political Choice

Does the bias of the newspaper you read affect the way you vote? A study by YouGov of 50,000 voters in the 2017 election suggest that on balance people vote in accordance with their favourite daily read. The majority of readers of the Conservative-­supporting Daily Mail, Telegraph, Express, Sun and The Times, voted Tory. However 30% of Sun readers voted Labour as did 24% of Times readers though only 12% of Telegraph readers and 15% of readers of the Daily Mail. Readers of Labour-­supporting Guardian and Daily Mirror were even more likely to vote in accord with their newspapers’ choice. Readers of the Independent, which did not endorse any party, were also much more likely to vote Labour. So reading a newspaper is likely to reinforce existing loyalties but that probably determines the choice of paper in the first place. Young people often start echoing their parents’ views though while some dissent as ‘rebelliously’ youthful, others mature into different political beliefs as their lives progress.

DECLINE OF THE PRESS Circulation figures do not reveal the disastrous annual decline they are currently suffering: nearly 3% each year for dailies and Sunday publications combined. According to the online Media Briefing, print journalism is suffering from the encroaching effects of the new media: news is now available, often free of charge, online and young people are not acquiring the habit of daily readership as their parents did. The Sun and Daily Mail have been declining at a lesser rate, of 2% per year, but the downward direction is clear: within five years, overall circulation is predicted to decline by almost a quarter. This decline explains why newspapers have tried a multitude of techniques – endless competitions, including bingo, expanding



the mass media

sports sections – to revive their fortunes, but to little avail. This economic imperative helps explain why ‘common denominator’ topics like celebrity gossip and scandalous exposures figure so highly on their pages, especially the tabloids. It also helps explain why the News of the World resorted to illegal ‘hacking’ of mobile phones to get celebrity stories at any cost (see Box 11.2 later in the chapter). It is true that the print media is not as important as it was three or four decades ago but it nevertheless still exercises significant influence, otherwise the 2011–12 Leveson Inquiry into its behaviour would not have been so keenly followed and debated. Most newspapers support a particular party during election campaigns, but do they have any effect? It is fair to say that it is hard to measure the direct influence of reading a newspaper on how someone votes, but it is reasonable to assume lengthy exposure over time must have an impact. And some content can swing votes: studies have shown that the Sun’s vigorous anti-­Labour campaign succeeded in the 1992 general election (‘It’s The Sun Wot Won It’ boasted a Sun headline in the wake of the Conservative victory). Newspaper news coverage, furthermore, does tend to set the news agenda for the day in news bulletins and current affairs broadcast programmes, like BBC’s morning Today programme on Radio 4. Figure 11.2 shows how the party allegiance of newspaper readers broke down in 2005 and 2010.

the broadcast media Broadcasting is still the key medium when it comes to transmitting political messages, although social media are catching up fast. Radio was used by Hitler to great effect during his rise to power. Roosevelt also used it to augment his presidential power during the 1930s. British PM Baldwin’s relaxed ‘fireside chats’ for the first time brought his reassuring voice into every living room in the country. But even he could not compete with Winston Churchill’s famously stirring wartime broadcasts, which roused the nation to resist the Nazi threat. Churchill, however, proved ineffective on television, unlike Richard Nixon, whose 1952 ‘Checkers’ speech saved his political life by deflecting accusations of sleaze with homely stories about his growing-­up experiences and the eponymous puppy sent by a supporter to his daughter. His presidential debate in 1960 was

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less successful: he appeared sweaty and ill at ease compared with the Hollywood good looks of John Kennedy. Politicians everywhere watched and learned that this was now the key medium on which to conduct their searches for power. All the parties included a few people who were ‘good on the box’ – for example, Macmillan for the Tories and Anthony Wedgwood (later Tony) Benn for Labour. From 1964 onwards election campaigns were conducted virtually, via the television, with razor­sharp competition to win coverage on news bulletins for pithy campaign ‘sound-­bites’ and photo-­opportunities such as Margaret Thatcher cradling a calf in 1979. How television companies dealt with political issues became a potent political issue, often focusing on whether their coverage was biased or not (see below). After much soul searching and delay, the Commons agreed to let in the cameras as late as 1988; it took over another two decades for televised campaign debates between party leaders to make their first appearance, in April 2010. Some politicians are ‘naturals’ on television, for example Tony Blair and David Cameron; Thatcher was not naturally skilled but she worked hard to make herself over time a formidable opponent for even the cleverest interviewers, including Robin Day and Brian Walden. Others, like Ted Heath, found it hard to shine on television, while Ed Miliband and the hapless Theresa May seemed to lack the natural affinity for it.

TELEVISED ELECTION DEBATES The famous Nixon–Kennedy debates took place in 1960 but it was not until 2010 that Britain followed suit. The delay was because incumbent PMs did not want to provide a national platform for opponents. In 2010, PM Gordon Brown felt so unpopular that he decided the gamble of televised debates was worth the risk. In the event the Lib Dem, Nick Clegg, was the main beneficiary and because of this unwelcome success – Cameron’s critics blamed his failure to win an overall majority on the debates – the Tory leader, fearful of allowing opponents the same platform, tried his best to sabotage arrangements to repeat them in 2015. In the end he was successful in limiting televised debates to one occasion at the start of the campaign; but it was a seven-­way leadership debate, ‘diluted’



the mass media

by the small parties, and not the head to head with Miliband that Labour sought. Perhaps Cameron was wise to risk the accusation of being scared, as even in this forum Ed Miliband was able to show he was by no means the caricature of a weak and indecisive leader Cameron had tried so hard to create in his public utterances. In 2017 Theresa May also refused a head to head with Jeremy Corbyn and in the party leaders’ debate Amber Rudd took her place to perform perfectly competently. Boris Johnson was carefully handled during the 2019 campaign and direct head to head confrontations avoided. Instead, an hour long interview of both Labour and Tories separately was conducted by Julie Etchingham with Lib Dem and SNP leaders controversially excluded. Despite his reputation for unpredictability, Johnson survived these tests virtually gaffe-­free. However, compared with the 10.3 million who tuned into the first 2010 TV debate, interest seems to have waned (Sharma, 2019). Johnson’s handlers successfully avoided any interrogation by television’s most formidable interviewer, Andrew Neill. Once in power, Johnson was accused by the editor of the BBC’s morning Today programme of a ‘Trumpian’ attempt to delegitimise the BBC after ministers were banned from appearing on it (Moore and Devlin, 2020).

news values Some question how certain trivial stories manage to claim front-­ page prominence in the tabloid press. It is important to remember that the print media are still essentially businesses, required to sell copies to survive. This means that their content has to attract the interest of buyers or the business fails; as sales have fallen off so ‘news’ has to some extent been redefined. Surveys show that detailed news and comment on political subjects are minority interests; only the more educated readers buy the quality press and have access to such material. The more ‘popular’ papers find that they have to be more hard-­headed and offer stories on such subjects as personalities, especially if they have transgressed in some way, for example committed adultery or financial fraud. If celebrities are involved – pop singers, soap or film stars – then the story is often seen as huge and likely to sell lots of papers: but such stories have

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nothing to do with democratic politics. Other topics which dominate the news when they arise include major crimes or disasters: the public share a morbid interest in the misfortunes of others. On television, news items that can be accompanied by vivid pictures are often favoured, for example volcano eruptions and other natural disasters. Clearly, news values dominated by celebrity trivia are not ideal nourishment for a mature democracy: only the quality press, up-­ market weeklies, BBC Radio 4 plus television channels BBC2 and BBC4 seriously address this requirement. Serious politics is a minority interest; without the assistance of television and radio it is hard to see how our imperfect democracy would function at all. Two minutes of exposure on prime-­time television can enable a politician to make more contact with voters than several months of assiduous door-­knocking. It follows that politicians need the assistance of people who understand how to manage the media to absorb and transmit their messages to voters.

‘spin’ Political parties, in another sign of US-­style professionalism, began to use advertising agencies towards the end of the twentieth century. Tories used Saatchi and Saatchi during the 1970s and Labour went on to use advertising men like Philip Gould and Stephen Carter. Close to leading politicians, ‘spin doctors’, like Labour’s Peter Mandelson and Alastair Campbell and later the Tory’s Andy Coulson, acquired a reputation as ruthless and possibly mendacious manipulators of the news. Campbell finally stepped down in 2003 after he tended to become the focus of too many stories rather than merely their source. Tony Blair also suffered from being associated with the deliberate massaging of news items – ‘spin’ – and in consequence lost credibility in office. Writing in the Sunday Times (16 March 2003), Bernard Ingham, Thatcher’s former press secretary, declared that ‘spin is everywhere’ and that ‘Blair has forfeited the trust of the nation’. This is not to say, however, that Blair was not the most gifted political communicator of his generation, blessed with a near magical ability to transform hackneyed political phrases into what sounded like oratory. Maybe the public began eventually to notice the mismatch



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between what Blair claimed to be the case and what they perceived not to be. His passionate insistence before, during and after the Iraq War, that Saddam Hussein was hiding ‘weapons of mass destruction’ blasted a hole in his political reputation from which it has never recovered.

question of bias Many politicians complain that the media are ‘biased’ against them. Harold Wilson used to claim that while the print press was dominated by Tory-­supporting papers, television was Labour’s medium. However, in 1971, when Panorama’s ‘Yesterday’s men’ asked how much money he had made out of his memoirs, he was drawn to perceive a right-­wing bias in the BBC. Margaret Thatcher was also convinced of the Corporation’s bias, but to the opposite side. She tended to see the BBC through the same jaundiced lens as her colleague, Norman Tebbit: ‘that insufferable, smug, sanctimonious, naive, guilt ridden, wet, pink, orthodoxy of that sunset home of that third rate decade: the 1960s’ (Kureishi, 2011, p. 92). The problem, however, probably lies with the politicians rather than with the media (although see Box 11.1). Committed to their beliefs, politicians tend to believe they are always right and that anyone who fails to agree with them must somehow be ‘biased’. Thatcher, again, once said she would like to have four hours of airtime to get her message over, rather than the few minutes here and there which the media provided. This betrays another tendency of politicians: an urge to control the media so that it delivers more, to them, desirable messages. While this is easily understandable, democracy would collapse if control of the media fell to a single political force. It follows that it is autocrats and dictators whose rule is characterised by an iron control of the media. Boris Johnson, himself a journalist by profession, should in theory be in favour of a free press, but in February 2020, locked out certain journalists from lobby briefings attracting bitter criticism even from the supportive Daily Mail (Glover, 2020).

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Box 11.1 How accurate is John Lloyd’s critique of the media? An influential critique of the media was made in What the Media Are Doing to Our Politics (2004), by John Lloyd, himself a journalist, who has worked on a number of broadsheet newspapers. His argument is that the media have ‘Decided that politics is a dirty game, played by devious people who tell an essentially false narrative about the world and thus deceive the British people.’ In support of his thesis Lloyd points to the aggressive interviewing techniques which assume politicians are dissembling liars. Tony Wright, MP, then chair of the Administration Select Committee, argued, in the Guardian, 10 October 2005 (quoted in Lloyd, 2005), that the media should accept some responsibility for the ‘culture of contempt’ which had contributed to a collapse of trust in politics and politicians. The late Anthony Sampson, in the same feature, reviewing a number of other contributors on Lloyd’s argument, concluded that most felt he was right and that many distinguished people ‘felt genuine anguish … at being misrepresented by the media’. Finally, David Leigh, for the ‘hacks’, chipped in with his own experience that most politicians, when asked difficult questions, constantly evade or tell ‘downright lies’. In addition, they utilise skilled PR firms or intimidating lawyers; ‘They conceal what they can conceal and what they can’t they distort.’ If left unchallenged, he argues, power will invariably act in this way and in a democracy it is necessary for civil society to be ‘truculent and unfettered’. His idea is that the media provide an essential counterbalance to power, even if it is democratically elected power. Marxist critics – for example, Adorno and the so-­called Frankfurt School – assert that, given that the privately owned capitalist economy includes the media in its orbit of control, then its outlets inevitably play a role in assisting societal control and the maintenance of the present unequal distribution of power in society. It is true that the press and large sections of the broadcast media are owned privately but against this it can be argued that media



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organisations strongly resist government attempts to control them, that investigative journalism regularly embarrasses and shames government, and that television journalism is much more bipartisan than press journalism, by law in the case of the BBC.

Political Satire and Political Interviews

During the 1960s, That Was The Week That Was, introduced hard­hitting political satire to British political culture – followed by the puppet-­featuring Spitting Image in the 1980s. Political documentaries also became significant in the form of the BBC’s Panorama and Granada’s World in Action. Robin Day, moreover, did much to end the traditional deference to politicians with his hard-­hitting interviews, followed up by the likes of Brian Walden and the later doyen of the aggressive interview, Jeremy Paxman (who retired from fronting Newsnight in 2014). This satirical tendency has had the effect, healthy or otherwise, of tending to present British politicians as fundamentally risible.

regulation of the press Journalists are mostly dedicated to complete freedom in what they are allowed to write and publish. Freedom of speech is certainly a bedrock of democracy but in pursuit of sales some newspapers, particularly the tabloids, have not been afraid to invade the privacy of people, especially celebrities. The Press Complaints Commission, mostly comprising leading members of the press, was supposed to provide some regulation but its strictures were frequently ignored. After a number of well publicised excesses by the press, particularly the illegal ‘hacking’ of mobile phones by the News of the World, it was decided that something had to be done (see Box 11.2). The result was the Leveson Inquiry (July 2011 to November 2012) into the culture, practices and ethics of the press. Its report proposed a new system of regulation, underpinned by a Royal Charter. However, most of the press rejected something which they felt smacked too much of ‘government control’ and instead set up their own body, the Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO). The deadlock continues into the present, with most newspapers

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Box 11.2 tHe British press and ‘phone hacking’ This explosive story first appeared on the news radar in January 2007, when Clive Goodman (royal editor) and his colleague Glenn Mulcaire of the News of the World were convicted of accessing messages – ‘phone hacking’ – left on the phones of newsworthy people. This procedure was relatively straightforward, being based on the known default code settings of phone manufacturers; it is also illegal. News of the World editor Andy Coulson resigned but his employer, Rupert Murdoch, who owned News International (NI), claimed Goodman was merely a ‘one-­off ’ rogue reporter. Nick Davies of the Guardian refused to accept this and claimed phone hacking was more widespread; in September 2007 the New York Times implicated Coulson in backing up the Guardian story. Despite these accusations and warnings from colleagues, David Cameron controversially appointed Coulson as his press secretary in July 2007 on the advice of his chancellor, George Osborne. Claims that Coulson was involved in authorising illegal activity continued to be made and in January 2011 he resigned as Cameron’s trusted media guru. Then it was revealed by the Guardian that the phone of murdered teenager Milly Dowler had been hacked; police suggested there may have been 4000 people whose phones had been hacked. This prompted the Leveson Inquiry, with much attendant focus on close Tory links to the Murdoch press. In October 2013 the trial began of Coulson, Rebekah Brooks (former editor of the Sun and chief executive of News International) plus several others. Coulson was found guilty of conspiring to hack phones on 24 June 2014 and sentenced to 18 months; Brooks and her husband were cleared. Cameron faced criticism that he had shown bad judgment in employing someone under such a cloud and that he had done so only to curry favour with the Murdoch press.



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having decided to support IPSO rather than the alternative backed by the Royal Charter. The Independent Monitor of the Press (IMPRESS) is an alternative to IPSO, which fully follows the Leveson Report guidelines but no major media outlet has signed up to it. The press regulation regime in the UK is still somewhat confused and conflicted in the wake of the Leveson Inquiry.

new media Less subject to the law and regulation are the so-­called ‘new’ and ‘social’ media which have burgeoned astonishingly over the past two decades. Just as printing in the fifteenth century caused a revolution in political communication, followed by broadcasting in the twentieth century, so digital technology is causing further turbulent changes. At the most basic level there is currently an abundance of information about politics available online. People can now use email to communicate with a worldwide audience of people – so that we have MPs writing directly to constituents and online lobbyists like Avaaz pushing humanitarian campaigns. We also have the potential for ‘online democracy’, whereby people can be linked to decision-­makers via their computers and can express ‘instant’ views or even vote online. While this could produce useful results it also runs the risk of misuse from power-­seeking demagogues – majority votes might well overwhelm minorities – or, as we have seen, terrorists transmitting information about bomb-­ making or recruiting supporters. ‘Blogs’ or online commentary have become a regular part of the political universe, with sites like the right-­wing gossip vendor Guido Fawkes attracting huge traffic and occasionally making the mainstream headlines. Some claim blogs are making newspapers obsolete but this is a gross exaggeration. Blogs spring up in their thousands but not many last more than a few years (mine included) and, with most being staffed by sole bloggers, they lack the resources to provide a comprehensive news service. Virtually everyone now owns a mobile phone and the ‘smart’ phones are in reality pocket-­sized computers, capable of a wide range of functions which could have political significance: emailing, blogging, even voting or receiving news bulletins and broadcasts. 38 Degrees is a UK-­based pressure group that seeks to inspire

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online petitions or write-­ins to MPs and other decision-­makers, mostly on left-­of-centre issues. Social networking also has huge potential politically. Campaigns which formerly might have included a word-­of-mouth element can now exploit individuals’ personal networks to advance messages from politicians to voters. Given the brevity of its messages Twitter has proved surprisingly effective at rapidly distributing messages over a huge area. George Galloway once told Radio 4’s Week at Westminster that he could now communicate direct to the 150,000 people who followed him on Twitter. In America, of course, Donald Trump has made Twitter, often during the small hours with no advisers present, a prime instrument of domestic and foreign policy. Writing in The Times on 17 October 2012, former spin doctor to Tony Blair, Alistair Campbell, marvelled at the dramatic emergence of social media – in particular Facebook, founded in 2004, and Twitter, launched in 2006 and now in Britain with over ten million people on it (more than the number buying a daily newspaper). He went on to say that what politicians really fear is losing control: Nobody controls how the message lands. What this offers politicians is the opportunity to communicate directly without having to rely on the old media. There is an inescapable momentum behind the flow of political power to individuals and movements which recognise no national boundaries. Social Media’s role in Elections

The Brexit decision and the election of Trump as US president in 2016 brought a new democratic concern to the fore: the use of social media to assist the winning of elections. Carol Cadwalladr, an Observer journalist investigated this issue with award winning assiduity. She discovered that a couple of companies Cambridge Analytica (CA) and AggregateIQ were able to access massive amounts of data about millions of Facebook members who were also voters. This was done through employing a social scientist, Dr Aleksander Kogan, who elicited in-­depth data through ‘paying people to take a personality quiz which also allowed not only their Facebook profiles to be harvested, but also those of their friends – a process then allowed by the



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social network’. This data enabled CA to target voters, a former CA employee told Cadwalladr ‘the goal [was] to capture every single aspect of every voter’s information environment. And the personality data enabled CA to craft individual messages.’ ‘Finding “persuadable” voters’, writes Cadwalladr, ‘is key for any campaign and with its treasure trove of data, CA could target people high in neuroticism, for example, with images of immigrants “swamping” the country. The key is finding emotional triggers for each individual voter’ (Cadwalladr, 2017). According to a CA employee, the company’s mission was ‘psychological warfare’: the same methods the military used to effect sentiment change … ‘winning hearts and minds’. This evidence suggests Facebook users were effectively being spied upon, their privacy violated, without ever knowing about it. Especially worrying for many was that this operation was financed and controlled by a right-­wing US billionaire, Robert Mercer, also a major backer of Donald Trump. Martin Moore an London School of Economics researcher discovered money had been poured into this operation totally legally because the UK’s electoral laws were ‘weak and helpless’. This diligent investigative journalism won Cadwalladr awards and has set in motion considerable concern in parliament and government that democracy, not just in the UK but everywhere, has been weakened by this connection with social media. Dominic Cummings, architect of the successful Leave campaign, reckoned the result ultimately swung on the votes of 600,000 people. Cadwalladr (2017) concluded that It’s not a stretch to believe that a member of the global 1% found a way to influence this crucial 1% of British voters. The referendum was an open goal too tempting a target for US billionaires not to take a clear shot at.

Democracy is not the only aspect of life to suffer from social media. Young people drawn into its apparently life enhancing embrace have discovered it provides a forum for bullying, and a cause of acute stress. Because the new media is so instant it encourages greater usage and because it can be anonymous it has, according to the police, encouraged harassment, blackmail and other illegal actions. It has opened up the world to an astonishing connectivity but there has been a high price to pay.

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Box 11.3 Government trying to control media endangers democracy says Sky’s Adam Boulton Johnson’s deliberate exclusion – some blamed Dominic Cummings – of certain journalists from a No 10 briefing set a worrying precedent for Adam Boulton of Sky News. Here are extracts from his Sunday Times article on the issue. In Westminster and Washington, relations between the government and journalists are at their lowest ebb … In Whitehall the stand-­off flared into an unprecedentedly ugly incident in the foyer behind the shiny black door of No 10 Downing St last week. First a security guard divided accredited correspondents into separate groups on either side of a carpet. Next Boris Johnson’s communications director, Lee Cain, himself a former reporter … gave the order: ‘Those invited to the briefing can stay – everyone else, I’m afraid will have to leave.’ After some argument the journalists all walked out in solidarity, among them Laura Kuenssberg, Robert Peston, and Beth Rigby from the BBC, ITV and Sky, and representatives of all the national newspaper groups. David Frost, the government’s official spearheading negotiations with the EU, did not get to deliver his briefing …    What is important is that readers, listeners and viewers are increasingly missing out on the information they need to function as independent citizen in a democratic society. Instead they are being manipulated by elected governments anxious to avoid being held to account by any outside force, be it parliament, the judiciary or the media … What is at stake is whether the government should deny the public the facts and background to the decisions it takes, information which should be available on the record and of a type which was briefed freely in the past, is now being handed out as a favour to selected journalists in the expectation of favourable coverage.    The difference today [compared with New Labour days] is that the executive branch seems willing to do away with any of



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the traditional checks and balances to unfettered government including the free press. And thanks in large part to the arrival of digital media, the clout of the MSM has been so eroded that a malign government could effectively snuff it out.  (Boulton, 2020)

A Quantified Society: the enormous risks to politics posed by the digital revolution

The accumulation of data is increasingly used for commercial purposes and to predict and control human behaviour. Of the world’s stored information, 98% is now in digital form: more data are gathered as there is more social activity by and through digital systems and platforms; the cost of digital storage has halved every two years; an explosion of computational power has enabled the increase; it is easy and cheap to replicate digital data. In the 50 years following Gutenberg’s invention of the printing press 600 years ago, eight million books were printed. Now, the amount of data doubles every two years. Analysis of 509 million tweets reveals people’s moods followed similar daily and weekly patterns across cultures and around the world. Moods have been ‘datafied’. Accumulation and analysis enables prediction of moods, movements and even opinions. One Facebook user discovered Facebook had accumulated, over three years, enough information to make a 1222 page document covering every aspect of his life, friends and family. Facebook has nearly three billion users, all of whom represent mountains of data which can be used for good or ill. When we search the web the contents of each search are of infinitesimal value – but when searches are aggregated they offer a profound window into searchers’ thoughts, beliefs, concerns, health, market tastes, sexual preferences, and much more besides. … The commercial value of Facebook lies primarily in the data that it harvests from its users, which can be used for a range of purposes, from targeted advertising to building face recognition A1 systems. (Susskind, 2018, pp. 66–71)

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Governments are interested in big data too, from municipal regimes designing smart cities to central governments using data to monitor compliance. It can be used to predict what will happen – whether a convict will re-­offend or a patient die. Information and control are very closely connected and will be vastly more so in the digital future. ‘We’ve never lived in a world where technology is seamlessly integrated into the fabric of social life … We don’t know what it’s like for large swathes of our lives to be recorded, tracked and processed’ (Susskind, 2018). Reviewing Jamie Susskind’s book, Future Politics in the Guardian, Rafael Behr (2018) concludes:  No aspect of public life will be undisturbed by systems that are evolving faster than people realise, and written codes that very few can decipher. The era is foreseeable when life-­changing decisions such as legal judgements, medical diagnoses, hiring and firing, are routinely made by intelligent machines operating to instructions written by other machines with no human programming input. Where in that chain does political accountability lie?

Brian Appleyard, reviewing the same book in the Sunday Times, summarises thus: Power in the future, says Susskind, will take three forms – force, scrutiny and perception control. Force will be partially annexed by algorithms – for example, your car might actually prevent you exceeding the speed limit. The law, says Susskind, would even intrude on mere ‘naughtiness’. Scrutiny will be entirely algorithmic and any dissident or bad behaviour might be used to limit our lives. Perception control (managing what we see and hear) will be so easy we won’t know it’s happening – like now in fact.

A book by Andrew Marantz (2020b) argues that right-­wing trolls have done much to drag neo-­fascist ideas from the extreme periphery closer to the mainstream, as evidenced by the extra energy provided for Trump’s 2016 campaign through accessing these ideas.



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questions for discussion 1. How much influence do you think newspapers exercise on voting attitudes? 2. To what extent has ‘new technology’ usurped the functions of the traditional print media? 3. Are interviewers justified in being aggressive with their politician interviewees? 4. Should social media be prevented from having any role in democratic elections?

further reading The best book on the mass media up to undergraduate level is Street (2011). A still solidly useful review of theory is McQuail (1983). For a penetrating critique read Lloyd (2004). For an entertaining history of a tabloid paper, read Chippendale and Orrie (1992). On new technology Cadwalladr, especially her Ted Talk (2019) is a vividly useful source. But by far the best book on the new media is Jamie Susskind’s Future Politics and should be compulsory reading for all students of politics. Appleyard, B. (2018) Review of Future Politics, by Jamie Susskind, Sunday Times, 28 October. Behr, R. (2018) Review of Jamie Susskind’s Future Politics: when life-­ changing decisions are made by machines, Guardian, 5 December. Boulton, A. (2020) No 10 is trying to control the media, and everyone in our democracy should be afraid, Sunday Times, 8 February. Butler, D. and Butler, G. (2000) Twentieth-­Century British Political Facts, 1900–2000, Palgrave Macmillan. Cadwalladr, C. (2017) The Great British Brexit Robbery: how our democracy was hijacked, Observer, 7 May. Cadwalladr, C. (2019) Facebook’s role in Brexit: and the threat to democracy, Ted Talk, April. Campbell, A. (2012) 140 reasons why politicians are out of touch, The Times, 17 October. Chippendale, P. and Orrie, C. (1992) Stick It Up Your Punter, Mandarin. Glover, S. (2020) Denying journalists access to briefings is outrageous censorship that Boris Johnson should be ashamed of, Daily Mail, 5 February. Ingham, B. (2003) The wages of spin, Sunday Times, 16 March. Jones, N. (1995) Sound-­Bites and Spin Doctors, Indigo.

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Jones, N. (1999) Sultans of Spin: The Media and the New Labour Government, Orion. Kureishi, H. (2011) Collected Essays, Faber. Lloyd, J. (2004) What the Media Are Doing to Our Politics, Constable. Lloyd, J. (2005) From the Daily Star to the BBC: we must all change, Guardian, 10 January. McQuail, D. (1983) Mass Communication Theory: An Introduction, Sage. Marantz, A. (2020a) Boredom is the enemy: how the trolls took over, Guardian, 7 February. Marantz, A. (2020b) Anti-­Social: How Online Extremists Broke America, Picador. Mason, R. (2020) PM’s briefing ban on section of the media denounced in Commons, Guardian, 5 February. Moon, N. (1999) Opinion Polls: History, Theory and Practice, Manchester University Press. Moore, M. and Devlin, K. (2020) No 10 is accused of Trump tactics over Today interview ban, The Times, 23 December. Roberts, R. (2017) How people voted in the election according to which newspaper they read, Independent, 14 June. Seymour, R. (2010) Caroline Flack’s death shows how social media has democratised cruelty, Guardian, 21 February. Seymour-­Ure, C. (1991) The British Press and Broadcasting Since 1945, Blackwell, Sharma, R. (2019) The popularity of election debates appears to have been dwindling since they started in 2010, I, 19 November. Street, J. (2011) Mass Media: Politics and Democracy, Palgrave. Susskind, J. (2018) Future Politics, Oxford University Press.

WEBSITES Huffington Post, www.huffingtonpost.co.uk. (Excellent online newspaper.) Guardian, www.theguardian.com/uk. Guido Fawkes Blog, www.order-­order.com. (Most popular blog in the UK.) Independent, www.independent.co.uk. Telegraph, www.telegraph.co.uk. The Times, www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news. UK Media Internet Directory, newspapers, www.mcc.ac.uk/jcridlan.htm.

Part IV THE LEGISLATURE

Chapter 1 of this book explained how the legislature, starting from an advisory council to Anglo-­Saxon and then Norman monarchs, emerged over centuries of British history as the body, by the late seventeenth century, ultimately responsible for making the laws of the land. In the fourteenth century the hereditary House of Lords, comprising mostly the aristocracy, separated from the (more or less) elected, though then less powerful, House of Commons. During the nineteenth century it was still possible for the PM to sit in the Lords but after the 1911 Parliament Act, the climax of a major struggle for power between the two chambers, the Commons emerged supreme. Since that year, no PM has ruled from a seat in the Lords. This is not to say that the Lords does not still perform important functions, as Chapter 13 explains. Chapter 15 examines elections to the House of Commons, and Chapter 14 examines the chamber itself.

12 THE MONARCHY

‘Royalty is a Government’, wrote Walter Bagehot (2001) in his classic study of the British constitution, ‘in which the attention of the nation is concentrated on one person doing interesting actions. A Republic is a Government in which that attention is divided between many, who are all doing uninteresting things.’ Thus did Bagehot declare his preference for a constitutional monarchy rather than a republic and define a role for the monarchy which, arguably, it still performs, at least partially. In medieval times the Plantagenets and Tudors were absolute monarchs, able to govern by whim alone, should they choose. To exercise this God-­endorsed and indeed God-­like authority was the seductive lure which caused the War of the Roses and many other bloody succession struggles. The Civil War (1642–49) was a conflict which put an end not only to Charles I but also to the idea of absolute, divine right monarchy itself. Within a few decades of this struggle, kings and queens were viewed essentially as figureheads, symbols of the nation; their effective political power, following the trauma of a beheaded King, had just melted away. In our modern democracy, monarchs are the living ghosts of a vanished autocracy. Now the monarch is seen by many as politically a mere shell, a useful fiction mobilised on national days, festivals and when foreign dignitaries visit. But others offer a more critical, more social analysis, for example the former editor of the New Statesman, Kingsley Martin (1897–1969), who declared: ‘The Monarchy … is the secret well from which the flourishing institution of British Snobbery draws its nourishment.’ This view sees Britain as incorrigibly

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obsessed with class differences, with the monarchy at its fulcrum. Replacing it with an elected head of state, such critics insist, would remove a symbol, though antique, of the inequalities and class hatred which mar our present-­day society. Other critics claim the monarchy still exercises power, albeit only in the circumstance of a hung parliament. In such times historian Peter Hennessy sees the ‘continuing political influence of the monarchy’ as significant, in that he or she has the power to choose the PM (Church Times, 2012). Ben Pimlott (1996), biographer of the Queen, disagrees, arguing that should she ever seek to exercise such nominal powers they would soon be dismantled. The popularity of the monarchy has varied considerably over time, even during Victoria’s long reign. The 1930s Abdication Scandal when Edward VIII gave up his throne to marry the twice divorcee American, Wallis Simpson, divided opinion, but the refusal of George VI (Edward’s brother who replaced him as King) to leave London during the Blitz, restored positive public attitudes towards royalty. During the 1960s the left-­wing Labour MP, Willie Hamilton, dared to criticise the royal family, calling the queen a ‘plastic doll’, Princess Margaret a ‘floozy’ and Prince Charles a ‘twerp’; only the Queen Mother received his grudging praise. His solution – a republican abolition of the monarchy – had little traction at the time but such views have never disappeared. The monarchy has constantly tried to defend and improve its public standing whilst not letting in too much of the ‘light’ which Bagehot warned would damage its essential ‘mystery’.

FUNCTIONS First, according to Bagehot, the Queen has ‘the right to be consulted, the right to encourage, the right to warn’, and over the years she has advised 12 PMs (including the present incumbent Boris Johnson), all of whom met her at regular weekly one-­hour meetings. She got on with some – surprisingly Labour’s Wilson and Callaghan – better than others – Tories Heath and Thatcher. PMs, it appears, are impressed by the Queen’s knowledge of current issues: Wilson apparently thought her advice ‘wise’ but others, like Heath, saw the weekly meeting as something of a chore. PMs do not lack for advice and, as such, the monarch’s is unlikely to rank



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especially highly. Given that she has an hour’s time every week of the most powerful person in the country, there is little or no evidence that her influence has extended much beyond preventing Tony Benn, when postmaster general, from removing the Queen’s head from postage stamps in the 1960s. Second, as the head of the armed forces, the monarch undertakes many ceremonial duties but because the Queen commands fervent loyalty from all three arms of the military, it is maintained that this command is more than just symbolic but rules out any possibility of a military coup ever being considered, let alone carried out. Third, the monarchy has traditionally been held to be a moral template for the nation: virtually above criticism. Thus, when King Edward VIII, during the 1930s, fell in love with a woman who was divorced (a source of shame at that time), he was forced to abdicate. During the 1950s Princess Margaret was forbidden to marry a man she loved, Peter Townsend, because he too had been divorced. Since then, perceptions of the monarchy, and indeed divorce, have changed. As already mentioned, Walter Bagehot reckoned that the key to the public’s regard for the monarchy was its mystique or ‘magic’ upon which too much light should not be cast. He was probably right. Once the veil was lifted during the 1970s the inevitable downs as well the ups of royal family life were placed under the eager microscope of media scrutiny, not just in the UK but for a worldwide audience, fascinated by the world’s most famous royal family. The notoriously intrusive British tabloid press correctly calculated that their readers liked nothing better than reading about the foibles, love lives, divorces, indeed nothing was too trivial about the royals to be eagerly consumed. The royal family has become a national soap opera into which the British public – not to mention the millions abroad as well – are constantly tuned. As a result of all this scrutiny it has turned out that, with the exception of the Queen herself, the royals were no better and possibly a little worse than the rest of us, at least as regards marital fidelity and attitudes towards money. A poll in the Observer, 14 September 1997, revealed that only 12% were satisfied with the monarchy, with 74% wishing it to be ‘modernised’; admittedly this was a low point and polls have varied before and since.

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Fourth, the monarch offers a symbol of national unity. Bagehot argued members of the public need a soothing and believable set of symbols to make them feel content with their government: the monarch provided precisely this. Ben Pimlott’s 1996 study, The Queen, suggested the monarchy is a mirror in which the nation sees itself. In 1953 the huge ritual of the Queen’s coronation was a triumphant ceremonial symbol of the nation, as successive royal weddings and events also proved and, indeed, continued to do so with the birth of Prince George in July 2013 to the Duke and Duchess of Cambridge.

Popularity of the Monarchy The 2015 YouGov opinion poll graphs (Figure 12.1) revealed the popularity of the monarchy was more or less in sound condition. The marriage of Prince William to Catherine Middleton and the subsequent birth of their children provided plenty of positive coverage for the royals. The Duke of Edinburgh crashing his Landrover in January 2019 into another car was an example of negative publicity but when the Duke, already retired from public life, surrendered his driving licence, the problem was seemingly resolved. Prince Harry’s marriage to mixed race American actress, Meghan Markle in 2018, provided tabloid hacks with a hugely popular story, which, initially at least, further reinforced the popular status of the monarchy. However, two years later it seems the couple were not as happy as they first seemed. Harry complained bitterly at how the media unfairly criticised his wife – they took legal action against the Daily Mail – and relations with his brother William seemed to have deteriorated. The Duke and Duchess of Sussex, as they were now titled, announced they wished to establish a separate status for themselves whereby they would spend more time in Canada and the USA, though still participating in royal activities. Quite how this much-­discussed issue will affect royal family popularity remains to be seen at the time of writing. A scandal which certainly did affect the perception of the royals was Prince Andrew’s involvement with billionaire financier Jeffrey Epstein and the allegations of sexual relations with a teenage girl procured by his American friend. Andrew’s disastrous Newsnight interview on 17 November 2019 was designed to exonerate the prince but soon



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Figure 12.1 Popularity of monarchy. Source: Ipsos MORI.

proved to be the reason why he was forced to stand down from royal duties. Dealings with the modern media have certainly proved to be an Achilles heel for the Royal Family. Certainly public interest in the royal family (see Table 12.1) has not faded as Peter Morgan’s hugely acclaimed film The Queen (2006) and his multiple season Netflix drama The Crown (2016–19) have amply demonstrated. From having their lives followed by the public like a soap opera the royals finally, and many say triumphantly, graduated to the real thing.

Excessive Cost of Royals?  One of the reasons for negative views of the monarchy is its alleged excessive cost. In June 2014 Buckingham Palace said the cost of the monarchy – not including security – was the equivalent to just over one penny a week for every UK resident: a favourable presentation of costs but not one necessarily shared by the public who tend to

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Table 12.1 Support for monarchy by age and party In September 2015 YouGov asked respondents: ‘Generally speaking, do you think the monarchy is a good or a bad thing for Britain?’ Responses by party were as follows: Good (%)

Bad (%)

Conservatives Labour Lib Dems UKIP

88 57 77 67

15  8  4  5

Ages 18–24 Age 60+

61 79

 5  5

Source: data from YouGov.

compare overall costs with their own expenditures. Under the formula established in 2012, the Sovereign Grant, which replaced the 1760 Civil List, rose to £82 million for the year 2018–19 which perhaps is not so huge a figure when it is considered that the Queen has given up luxuries like the Royal Yacht Britannia and now voluntarily pays income tax, though we do not hear how much. When the economy is not doing well, however, and the government is making cuts, some ask why our monarchy cannot be as low-­cost and low-­key as those in Scandinavian countries. For example in 2018 there was criticism, pre-­his 2019 scandal, of Prince Andrew’s £14,7000 spent on a golfing trip to Muirfield – ‘Airmiles Andy’ the tabloids had already dubbed him – of Prince Edward’s £46,000 private charter flight to Eastern Europe and Prince Charles’s £246,000 on a private jet to Nelson Mandela’s funeral. The campaigning group, Republic, argue the Sovereign Grant is only a part of what the monarchy costs us: if security and local visits are included their figure is close to £350 million per annum (Republic, n.d. ). Many think the Queen is fabulously rich but, whilst she’s certainly not poor, her estimated wealth of £430 million places her well down on the 300 richest people in the UK. The ‘Privy Purse’ is the income the Queen receives from her land



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and property portfolio such as the Duchy of Lancaster: it produces some £17 million a year. Other members of the Royal Family draw upon the Privy Purse for expenses and it is also used for the upkeep of Balmoral. Defenders of the monarchy point to the huge attraction the monarchy provides to tourists who flock to the home of the world’s most famous monarch, earning billions in foreign currency which easily exceeds any incidental costs to taxpayers.

PRESENT POWER OF the MONARCHY Bagehot placed the monarchy in the ‘dignified’ category of the constitution, as opposed to the ‘efficient’ parts, like the House of Commons. Political scientist and former Labour cabinet minister Andrew Adonis challenged that judgment: Add to its charismatic power the royal family’s wealth, its influence over policy and government, its status as the head of the honours system and the hereditary aristocracy, and the monarchy looks every bit as ‘efficient’ as most departments of state. Indeed, it is a department of state, for the Court and royal household are an enterprise as elaborate and relentless about self promotion as any Whitehall ministry. (Adonis and Pollard, 1997, p. 134)

Should the monarchy be replaced by an elected head of state? To imagine the monarchy’s future stretching ahead indefinitely does, indeed, seem unlikely, but, as Professor John Gray observed (2007): Happily, we do not face in Britain any of the horrors that have accompanied the building of nation states in other parts of the world. Still, it would be unwise to take our good fortune too much for granted. The monarchical constitution we have today – a mix of antique survivals and post-­modern soap operas – may be absurd but it enables a diverse society to rub along without too much friction.

Who might be elected as a head of state? This is an interesting but unanswerable question. Retired PMs – Blair? Major? – might ­consider standing for such a post but given that the popularity of the royals is much higher than that of politicians, it would be better to look elsewhere. My own guess is that a nationally well liked and

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highly respected non-­political person – maybe someone like Sir David Attenborough – might fit the bill but there are precious few of such personalities and Sir David himself – at the time of writing is 93 – might prefer a quiet retirement after such a full and active life. King William, not Charles? Given the popularity of princes William and Harry, the British press loves to speculate that William might ‘leapfrog’ his father when the Queen finally dies or decides to abdicate. However, Prince William, it seems, has no ambitions to precede his father to the throne.

THE MONARCHY AND POLITICS By tradition our constitutional monarch steers well clear of political controversy, but occasionally the Queen has stated a political view. On her Silver Jubilee in 1977, in what was thought a Labour-­ inspired ploy to weaken the SNP, she said,  I cannot forget that I was crowned Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Perhaps the Jubilee is a time to remind ourselves of the benefits which union has conferred, at home and, in our international dealings, on the inhabitants of all parts of this United Kingdom.

Again, in early September 2014 the government was so worried, following a poll showing the ‘yes’ campaign was in the lead in the run-­up to the referendum on Scottish independence, that the Queen was prevailed upon to make her concern known. Given the Queen’s need for political neutrality it was her private secretary and the cabinet secretary who stage managed the intervention – a much more nuanced one than in 1977 – by having her mention on 14 September 2014, to a woman outside the church she attends when at Balmoral, that, in respect of the referendum, ‘people will think very carefully about the future’. This was so nuanced, one might think, as to be scarcely an intervention at all. If Prince Charles ever becomes King, his many written letters to ministers on a variety of topics and made public in May 2015 suggest limiting political interventions by the monarch might prove more of a problem.



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QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION 1. Does the monarch wield any effective power in the modern political system? 2. Has publicity reduced the ‘magic’ of the monarchy? 3. Would an elected head of state be an improvement on our hereditary monarchy?

FURTHER READING Walter Bagehot’s The English Constitution is a good starting point for further reading, as it is on all constitutional topics; Lord Altrincham’s 1958 Is the Monarchy Perfect? is also a useful introduction to the debate over the monarchy. However, the best short coverage of this ancient institution is by Philip Norton, chapter 14 in Jones and Norton (2013). Adonis, A. and Pollard, S. (1997) A Class Act: The Myth of Britain’s Classless Society, Penguin. Bagehot, W. (2001) The English Constitution, Oxford University Press. Bogdanor, V. (1995) The Monarchy and the Constitution, Oxford University Press. Bond, J. (2012) The Diamond Queen, Sevenoaks. Carrell, S., Watt, N. and Wintour, P. (2014) The real story of the Scottish referendum, Guardian, 16 and 17 December. Church Times (2012) Interview: Peter Hennessy journalist, historian, peer, 21 December. Gray, J. (2007) Monarchy is the key to our liberty, Guardian, 29 July. Gristwood, S. (2020) Retaining the royals: why has the British monarchy survived – and thrived? History Extra website, 31 January. Hardie, F. (1970) The Political Influence of the British Monarchy 1868–1952, Batsford. Haseler, S. (2012) The Grand Delusion, I.B. Tauris. Jones, B. and Norton, P. (2013) Politics UK (8th edition), Routledge. Lord Altrincham et al. (1958) Is the Monarchy Perfect? John Calder. Pimlott, B. (1996) The Queen, Harper Collins. Republic (n.d.) Worth every penny? The real cost of the monarchy to British taxpayers, https://www.republic.org.uk/sites/default/files/wortheverypenny.pdf.

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Websites Royal family, www.royal.gov.uk. Prince of Wales, www.princeofwales.gov.uk/. Nominations for honours process, www.direct.gov.uk/en/government citizensand rights/UKgovernment/Honoursawardand medals/Index.htm. Constitutional Monarchy Association, www.monarchy.net.

13 The House of Lords

Introduction The House of Lords emerged out of the Anglo-­Saxon Witangemot and the Norman Curia Regis as gatherings which advised the King. By the fourteenth century it comprised earls and barons on a hereditary basis, plus leading churchmen: the church was probably the country’s richest institution after the monarch and also wielded considerable political power. It met separately from the ‘lower’ House of Commons, which was – although it was a haphazard and eccentric system – actually elected and hence was more representative of the nation as a whole. During the nineteenth century the ramshackle elections to the Commons, vulnerable to corrupt pressures and with huge differences in voting qualifications, were reformed along democratic lines to create a uniform and coherent system. This gave the Commons a legitimacy which the Lords, with its built-­in Conservative majority, could not equal. In the first decade of the twentieth century conflict between the two chambers reached a climax when David Lloyd George’s historic challenge was successful; from the 1911 Parliament Act onwards it could exercise only a two-­year delay on legislation, and in 1949 this was reduced to one year. In 1958 the Life Peerages Act made it possible for individuals to be elevated to the peerage for the course of their lifetimes. Only three hereditary peerages were subsequently created (all by Margaret Thatcher). The Peerage Act 1963 made it possible for hereditary peers, should they wish, to give up their title, in the case of Lords Home

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(who became Alec Douglas-­Home), Stansgate (Tony Benn) and Hailsham (Quintin Hogg) to pursue their political careers. Finally, the House of Lords Act 1999 abolished the hereditary principle, apart from 92 such peers, on a transitional basis, in lieu of a wholly reformed chamber.

PRESENT COMPOSITION Membership of the Lords is controlled by the government of the day in that the PM suggests names for the Queen to approve. These are often retired senior politicians, or distinguished representatives of the business world, academe, civil service, army or the arts. In 1999 the nominal membership of the chamber was 1,300; since then it has been reduced (in 2015) to around 780. As mentioned above, hereditary peers have been largely abolished. Life peers now provide the dominant element; as Table 13.1 shows, there is no Conservative majority and cross-­benchers hold the balance of voting power.

FUNCTIONS OF the HOUSE OF LORDS Some critics of the UK constitution argue that the House of Lords should be completely abolished as it serves no useful function. While the overall utility of what it does is open to debate, there can be no doubt, however, that it does do a number of things and some of them not too badly. Table 13.1  Composition of the House of Lords, 29 November 2019

Party/group

Total

Conservatives Labour Lib Dems Bishops Other Female Average age

241 180 94 26 64 221 70

Source: House of Commons Library.



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CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTION

The Upper House has the power of veto over any proposal to extend the life of a parliament beyond the present five-­year limit. It can also delay a bill after its second Commons reading for a period of a year, a useful weapon in the final year of a parliamentary term. The last time the delay was imposed was over the 2004 Hunting Act. DELIBERATIVE FUNCTION

Regular debates take place in the Lords – some say that its unique mixture of experience and expertise make these debates superior to those in the Commons. This is especially so as peers are not as closely controlled as MPs by the whips and can more easily speak their minds. However, it remains the case that a debate in the Lords seldom attracts much attention unless the resultant vote defeats the government on an important bill. LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION

The legislative process in the Lords is similar to that in the Commons in terms of the cycle of ‘readings’ and is accessible to amendments in similar fashion. Bills concerning finance do not concern the Lords, but all others do. INITIATING BILLS

The Lords takes some pressure off the Lower House by introducing a number of non-­controversial bills, especially those concerning local government. Peers can also move private members’ bills, though they account for no more than 3% of the chamber’s time. REVISION AND AMENDMENT

This is probably the most important role performed by this chamber. A proportion of legislation, and some say it is a worryingly big proportion, is not very carefully drafted and contains loopholes and ambiguities. The experienced legislators sitting in the Lords are able to sift through the clauses of proposed new laws and iron out

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wrinkles which would otherwise make some laws difficult or even impossible to implement. SELECT COMMITTEES

The Lords has its own array of select committees and can create more as its members think fit. The most important used to be the European Union Committee, monitoring draft EU laws through seven sub-­committees, containing co-­opted members. Since January 2020 this importance has disappeared. JUDICIAL ROLE

The Lords used to perform the function of the highest appeal court in the land but since October 2009 this has been performed by the newly created Supreme Court (see Chapter 22).

REFORM The reform of the Lords has been a perennial question in discussions about the British constitution since the dawn of democracy in the nineteenth century. But while its powers have been trimmed and its membership transformed, no comprehensive reform of the chamber has taken place. Why? It has not been for want of ideas; rather, there have been too many ideas and nowhere near a consensus on what would be best. Even on the subject of appointment there is no agreement. Enthusiasts for more democracy argue that any new chamber should be elected or contain a substantial elected component; more established members value their freedom from constituency pressures and, many perhaps, recoil at the need to fight elections. In January 2000 Lord Wakeham’s Royal Commission offered a 550-strong chamber with the possibility of an elected component of 65, 87 or 195 members. The Commons rejected all the various options offered and the issue hung fire until May 2011, when Nick Clegg, DPM, tasked with constitutional reform, came up with a new plan. He suggested a 300-strong chamber with 80% elected by proportional representation (PR) and the remaining 20% appointed as non-­partisan cross-­benchers. Each member of the new chamber would serve a 15-year term. On 6 August the proposal was ­abandoned



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in view of fierce opposition from Labour and 90 Tory MPs who voted against the measure. In retaliation Clegg withdrew support for the redrawing of constituency boundaries which Conservatives hoped would enable them to win an extra 20 or so seats in the 2015 election. When Cameron created 26 new peers in his August 2015 honours, he was heavily criticised for ‘cronyism’ and for elevating Conservative donors. Boris Johnson faced similar criticism after his 2019 victory for elevating to the two former MPs, Zac Goldsmith and Nicky Morgan, to enable them to continue their ministerial careers from the second chamber. On 19 January 2020 the Sunday Times ran a story that the PM was planning to relocate the House of Lords to the north, probably York – disused government-­owned land near the railway station – or possibly Birmingham in the Midlands. The move would be part of the emphasis Johnson wishes to place upon shifting the government’s perspective to reward those formerly Labour voting areas who had switched to support him in the 2019 election (Shipman, 2020). As part of her pitch for Labour’s leadership Rebecca Long-Bailey suggested the Lords become an elected by PR Senate ‘with a voice for all regions and nations of the UK’ (Savage, 2020). The Lords faced severe criticism in February 2020 when their investigation revealed that expenses claims by peers had leapt 29% in the year to March 2019. Some members had claimed over that year for more than an MP’s salary: for example Lord Cunningham – £79,437. Moreover, 110 peers collectively claimed over £1 million, despite not having made any spoken or written contribution to the House (Calver and Urwin, 2020). Perhaps contemplating these and other shortcomings of the Lords, Quentin Letts launched a blistering attack on the chamber in the Sunday Times 26 July 2020, concluding with these words: ‘The House of Frauds has gone beyond a joke. It needs to be detonated.’

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION 1. Is it possible to adduce a case for a hereditary element within political institutions? 2. What is the case for abolishing the Lords and having a unicameral democratic chamber? 3. How important is it that the upper chamber is elected rather than appointed?

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FURTHER READING Once again, Norton in chapter 17 of Jones and Norton (2013) provides an excellent short introduction to the chamber. Donald Shell (2007) provides a longer and more thorough treatment, as does another book by Norton (2013). Baldwin, N.D.J. (2005) Parliament in the 21st Century, Politicos. Barnett, A. (1997) This Time: Our Constitutional Revolution, Vintage. Calver, T. and Urwin, R. (2020) House of Lords expenses spiral out of control, Sunday Times, 23 February. Criddle, B. and Norton, P. (2005) The make-­up of Parliament, in P. Giggings (ed.), The Future of Parliament, Palgrave. Fitzpatrick, A. (2011) The End of the Peer Show? Constitution Society/Centre Forum. Jones, B. and Norton, P. (2013) Politics UK (8th edition), Routledge. Letts, Q. (2020) This House of frauds needs an end-of-the-peer-show, Sunday Times, 26 July. Norton, P. (2013) Parliament in British Politics (2nd edition), Palgrave Macmillan. Russell, M. (2012) Elected second chambers and their powers: an international survey, Political Quarterly, Vol. 83, No. 1, pp. 117–129. Savage, M. (2020) ‘Constitutional revolution’ needed to rescue union, warns Brown, Guardian, 18 January. Shell, D. (2007) The House of Lords, Manchester University Press. Shipman, T. (2020) Boris sends House of lords north, Sunday Times, 19 January. Tyrie, A. (1998) Reforming the Lords: A Conservative Approach, Conservative Policy Forum.

Websites Crossbench peers, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crossbencher. Members of the House of Lords, www.parliament.uk/mps-­lords-and-­offices/ lords/www.offical-­documents.gov.uk/document/cm70/7027.pdf.

14 The House of Commons

From the primitive seed of an advisory council to Anglo-­Saxon and then Norman kings, the slender plant was nourished and strengthened by the authority it came to exercise over taxation and the revenue received by the king to run his court, build his palaces, fight his wars. In the fourteenth century the aristocratic element of the Kings Council, or ‘parliament’ broke off from the House of ‘Communes’ to form two separate chambers. By the seventeenth century the king – at this time Charles I – was dependent on the funds granted by parliament and found that when he tried to rule without it, he was unable to do so. When Charles tried the tactic of coercing parliament, he found, to his consternation, that it was able to produce a leader in Oliver Cromwell (1599–1658) who not only refused to deliver funds but also raised, trained and led an army against him, which soundly defeated him in battle, imprisoned and finally beheaded him in January 1649. From this time onwards, the monarch had to accept a subservient role to parliament and surrender effective rule to the dominant political balance within it. Throughout the eighteenth century the status and power of the Commons grew, accompanied by constant calls for reform to make it more representative. In the early nineteenth century the calls became louder, echoed and led by politicians and extraordinary campaigners like Henry (Orator) Hunt (1773–1835) and William Cobbett (1763–1835). The Great Reform Act of 1832 began the process of establishing the franchise on a genuine democratic basis. By 1884 it had been extended to

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every adult male citizen: women, of course, had to wait until 1928 for the same privilege to be granted them. Some constitutional historians perceive the mid nineteenth century as a kind of ‘golden age’ characterised by a small electorate, loose party discipline and MPs with independent means. In these days before whips’ discipline emerged, debates actually determined votes and, as Mackintosh observed: ‘The House sacked cabinets, it removed individual ministers, it forced the government to disclose information, it set up select committees to carry out investigations and frame bills and it rewrote government bills on the floor of the House’ (Mackintosh, 1962b, p. 613). Since those days the vitality of the House’s democratic function has been vitiated by a number of factors. 1. Expansion of the electorate. As the franchise expanded, parties realised they needed to offer a coherent programme or manifesto at election times. If elected they needed to make good on their promises. Given time limits and this need for a regular majority to enact their programme, governments invested whips with the task and the powers to impose the necessary discipline. Debates became predictable, almost unnecessary, as MPs, following instructions, trooped obediently through the lobbies. 2. Power of PM. The monopoly now exercised over appointments and dismissals by the PM, hugely assisted the PM in bending his party to his wishes. Moreover, by the late twentieth century the 100-plus ministers delivered the regular uncritical ‘payroll vote’ in support of his cause. It was only during the Brexit ‘Civil War’ that Tory MPs, like Dominic Grieve, David Gauke and others rebelled against their own government so desperate had they become to halt the government’s rush to sever the EU link. 3. Growth of ‘loyal’ opposition. As the majority party became synonymous with government, the second biggest party became a kind of ‘government in waiting’, ready to fight elections as the ‘heir apparent’, with a ‘shadow’ cabinet ready to slot into positions of control. But from early days its name was ‘Her Majesty’s Loyal Opposition’. 4. Pressure group influence. The extending tentacles of government into the economy and the everyday life of the nation, especially



5.

6.

7.

8.

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after the election of the 1945 Labour government, encouraged the growth of groups defending or promoting sectional interests. The most powerful groups became vital to the government as sources of information and influence with their members. Pressure groups now increasingly collaborated with ministers and senior civil servants in forming policy, pushing humble MPs even more towards the periphery of genuine power. Influence of media. According to democratic theory, elected members mediate between voters and government. However, MPs cannot adequately represent 43 million voters: the media compensate for much of the shortfall. This means MPs now compete to communicate via the media – especially, these days the ‘new’ digital Internet media like Facebook and Twitter. Traditional media employ a host of journalists and editors to interpret and explain both to government and to voters; the new media, in contrast, provide a much more direct relationship, albeit one which seems sadly to dispense with traditional civilities and politeness. Membership of the EU. Since 1972, Britain was a member of the European Community and the authority of Parliament has been reduced as laws passed by this multinational body take precedence over laws passed in the UK parliament. The 2016 Leave campaign to ‘take back control’ of borders and legislation won the right to lead the UK out of the EU’s embrace in January 2020. The lack of a Commons majority after the 2017 election created the circumstances in which Boris Johnson successfully insisted he’d ‘Get Brexit Done’, winning a majority of 80 seats to ensure that this objective would be achieved. In theory at least the ‘reclamation’ of power ceded to the EU in 1972, should make Commons sovereignty even stronger. Judicial review. This procedure is the means whereby an individual or group can challenge whether the government has acted according to its own laws. This has meant that judges have been able to decide the word of the law, rather than Parliament. Boris Johnson suggested that the Supreme Court’s ruling that his prorogation of parliament in September 2019 was illegal, was ‘wrong’, and he might well take action to reduce the powers of the Supreme Court. Referendums. These were introduced in the early 1970s as a means of deciding constitutional matters of great importance.

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Technically referendum results are only advisory – constitutionally only Parliament has ‘sovereign power’. But the purely political imprimatur of a direct national referendum majority in 2016 trumped the constitutional theory of representative government. So? Given how much power has drained away from the institution, and the fact that the majority of bills pass through untroubled by amendment, certainly from the Opposition, can parliament be seen as a meaningless rubber stamp with which we might as well dispense? Not really. Parliament still performs functions essential to the exercise of democracy.   1. Sustains government. The House of Commons is the fulcrum of the democratic system: the arithmetic of its composition determines the government of the day. In February 1979 the Commons voted down the Labour government, ushering in 18 years of Conservative rule. Moreover, MPs can still defeat governments, however strong party discipline might be. When there is no Commons majority as 2017–19 government can become virtually impossible.   2. Constrains government action. Whilst the Commons is receptive – because of the majority it commands – government proposals, any truly alien, outlandish ones, are likely to be excluded. The legislative process also modifies bills to make them politically acceptable; for example in January 2004 constant adjustment of the university ‘top-­up fees’ measure enabled Blair to scrape through by just five votes.   3. Sounding board of the nation. Enoch Powell MP used to argue that following a debate the House was always better informed once representatives of all sections and regions have voiced their views. This they can do: throughout the various debating and committee stages of the legislative process; in debates on ‘Ten Minute Rule’ bills; adjournment debates; and private members bills.   4. Considers proposals for new laws of the land. The seven stage process of considering a bill enables its principles to be discussed, its details considered in minute detail and amendments to be added to refine and make measures workable in practice.



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Box 14.1 The legislative process a. first reading (purely explanatory of its aim); b. second reading (a major debate); c. committee stage (clauses examined by a standing committee); d. third reading (bill reassessed after committee stage); e. then up to the Lords, where a similar process occurs; f. return to the Commons to consider Lords’ amendments; g. royal assent turns bill into law of the land.

  5. Recruitment and training of ministers. By rule ministers can only be drawn from parliament so it provides both socialisation into the ways of government and detailed training in its subject matter via debates, committee and constituency work. Some consider such training inadequate, it has to be said, arguing that running huge departments of state is a fiendishly complex and difficult job. On the other hand the Commons encourages effective persuasion: the essence of democratic government whether on the street or in departmental committees.   6. Political education. What happens in the House informs the media and the public. It is true that many MPs prefer the airwaves to the House to disseminate their views but it remains a fact that once the House is in recess during the summer, political life slows down and fades into the background.   7. Looking after constituents. MPs receive on average over 200 letters a week and in this respect their role resembles that of a social worker, pursuing grievances and queries and taking action accordingly. Often their replies explain the letter should have been directed elsewhere but in many cases they write to ministers on behalf of their constituents or even raise the matter on the floor of the House itself.   8. Legitimising decisions. Most societies adopt some way of showing that a law has been passed, often through a degree of ceremony and ritual. The centuries-­old procedures of the Commons,

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culminating in the monarch’s signature, provide such a function admirably.   9. Scrutiny of executive. (a) Question Time: every Wednesday at noon the PM answers questions from all-­comers; it is mostly a knockabout partisan session for the benefit of MPs rather than effective scrutiny but it is the most watched part of the parliamentary week. On other days departmental ministers face 30 minutes of questions according to a rota. This occurs in a less heated atmosphere and pressure can often be applied on matters of policy or efficiency. 10. Select committees. These all party groups of MPs, now appointed independently of the whips, are able to investigate policy areas of their choice and to summon witnesses to give evidence and answer questions – if the matter is high profile, in front of television cameras. After 1979 the system was reformed so that all departments were complemented by a select committee and their influence has increased accordingly. However, whilst the government will be influenced and will read committee reports, it is not obliged to debate them or take any action (though it may well do both if minded). 11. Party committees. All parties have a wide range of committees on virtually every departmental topic. There are also a number of all-­party committees and ad hoc ones on specific topics. These are useful for MPs wishing to advance a constituency matter – for example, lobbying for a local hospital on the health committee – or simply to learn the ropes of a new speciality with a view to promotion in the future.

The power of the Commons While the Commons has lost a huge amount of its power to influence policy, it is still the defining forum of the nation’s politics, providing the colour, the atmosphere, the drama of the crucial decisions which shape the nation’s destiny. It lost power up to the 1970s but has enjoyed something of a renaissance since. Major’s small majority after 1992 made many votes cliff-­hanging events and Blair’s growing band of rebels did the same for him as his policies on the welfare state and then Iraq earned the enmity of a good third of his parliamentary party, who did not hesitate to vote against their



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own government when they felt they had no other option. In a similar fashion, Cameron’s 2010 Conservative intake proved lively enough to rebel and cause party whips considerable problems. But while the chamber has increased its power vis-­à-vis the executive, it is still very much in the subservient position. And this despite two decades of reform.

Reforming the Commons In 1978 the Select Committee on Procedure reported that the relationship between the Commons and government ‘is now so weighted in favour of the government to a degree which arouses widespread anxiety and is inimical to the proper working of our parliamentary democracy’. Strong words and reform of the select committee system – led by Norman St John Stevas in the early 1980s – has already been mentioned. Other notable recent reforms have included. Devolution

Since 1999 the devolution of power to a national parliament in Scotland and assemblies in Wales and Northern Ireland has removed their respective domestic concerns from the agenda of the Commons. The ‘West Lothian Question’ still remains however: this is a complaint by English MPs that, while Scottish and Welsh MPs at Westminster, can cast votes on English domestic matters, English MPs cannot reciprocate. National Audit Office (NAO) and Public Accounts Commission

The NAO replaced the Exchequer and Audit Department of the Comptroller and Auditor General – the official entrusted with the task of ensuring government funds have been disbursed as intended. Now the Comptroller and Auditor General acts independently of Treasury control and on the basis of formal statutory authority, not convention as before.

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‘Special’ standing committees

These used only to scrutinise the clauses of bills but after 1980 some were allowed to hold hearings into the subject matter of the bills and to hear from witnesses. Opposition days

Twenty-­nine days used to be set aside for the opposition to choose topics for debate. In 1981, ‘supply days’ (as these opposition debating days are called) were reduced to 19 but in 1985 they were increased to 20 and three were given to the second largest opposition party – usually the Lib Dems. Televising parliament

In 1996, a proposal to televise the Commons was defeated – it was felt by traditionalists that the Commons in sessions has a unique, almost mystical quality, which the cameras would ruin. Successive votes in the 1970s similarly rejected the proposal, but slowly opinion was changing, and in 1989, television was finally allowed its first shy peep and the world continued to turn as before, despite the earlier dire predictions. People have become familiar with the Commons in a way not possible before through the regular clips which appear on the news bulletins; the famous chamber has never been more viewed. But television is a cruel master; MPs now prefer to queue up to speak to the cameras on the green outside the Houses of Parliament, on the grounds they will be seen by millions on the ‘telly’ but only by a few MPs if they deliver their views in the chamber.

Social background of MPs Some claim that MPs elected to the Commons should mirror the society they represent; others are satisfied with a much less comprehensive reflection. Certainly the membership of the chamber does not offer anything like a mirror image; MPs are predominantly middle-­aged, privately educated, white and male; the tables below illustrate.



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Box 14.2 social background of MPs, 1979–2017 Gender There were 208 female MPs elected at the 2017 general election (32% of all MPs). This is the highest ever number and proportion. In 1979 there were 19 women MPs, 3% of the total (see Table 14.1).

Table 14.1 Women MPs by party LAB

CON

LD

SNP

Other

11 10 21 37 101 95 98 81 99 119 104

 8 13 17 20 13 14 17 49 68 67 87

0 0 2 2 3 5 10 7 0 4 7

0 0 1 1 2 1 0 1 20 12 16

0 0 0 0 1 3 3 5 4 6 6

Percentage of women MPs by party 1979  4  2  0 1983  5  3  0 1987  9  5  9 1992 14  6 10 1997 24  8  7 2001 23  8 10 2005 28  9 16 2010 31 16 12 2015 43 21  0 2017 45 21 33 2019 51 24 64

 0  0 33 33 33 20  0 17 36 34 33

 0  0  0  0  4 13 12 22 17 25 25

Number 1979 1983 1987 1992 1997 2001 2005 2010 2015 2017 2019

Sources: Cowley and Kavanagh, The British General Election of 2017 (2018, and previous editions); House of Commons Library, Women in the House of Commons: Background Paper, 21 August 2018; House of Commons Library, General Election 2019: Full Results and Analysis, 28 January 2020; © 2020 House of Commons Library.

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LGBT: 47 MPs elected in 2017 were openly lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans or queer (LGBTQ), 7% of the total. This was the highest ever recorded figure.

Age A total of 53% (344) of MPs elected in 2017 were aged over 50. Following the election, the proportion of MPs aged 70 and over increased to 4% (28). Thirteen MPs aged under 30 were elected (2% of the total) (see Table 14.2).

Table 14.2 Ages* of MPs elected at general elections, 1979–2019 Election Average 18–29 30–39 40–49 50–59 60–69 70+ Not Total age at known election (years) 1979 1983 1987 1992 1997 2001 2005 2010 2015 2017 2019 prov.

49.6 48.8 49.0 50.0 49.3 50.3 51.2 49.9 50.6 51.1 51.0

 6 10  4  1 10  4  3 14 15 13 21

120 120 112   82   92   79   89 112   92 104 109

205 223 252 259 255 236 191 193 209 189 182

203 201 197 211 225 247 249 218 214 201 194

87 86 79 95 69 83 100 98 98 115 105

14  9  6  3  8 10 14 15 22 28 21

– – – – – – – – – – 18

635 649 650 651 659 659 646 650 650 650 650

Sources: House of Commons Library, Members’ Names Information Service; House of Commons Library research; © 2020 House of Commons Library. Note * As of March 2020, verified information about age was not available for 101 MPs mostly those first elected at the 2019 general election. Age data for 83 Members has been gathered from a variety of public sources.

Ethnicity A total of 52 MPs were from non-­white backgrounds, 8% of the total (see Table 14.3). Around 14% of the whole UK population are from a non-­white background.

 4  5  9 12 13 16 23 32 41

 0  1  0  0  2 11 17 19 22

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2

0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Other  4  6  9 12 15 27 41 52 65

Total  2  2  2  3  4  6 10 12 20

0 0 0 0 1 4 5 6 6

CON 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 18

LD 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0

SNP

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Other

 1  1  1  2  2  4  6  8 10

Total

Sources: Rallings and Thrasher (2016); House of Commons Library, CBP7186 General Election 2015; British Future, 52 minority MPs to sit in ‘most diverse UK Parliament ever’, 9 June 2017; British Future, ‘Diversity milestone’ as one in ten now from an ethnic minority background, 13 December 2019; © 2020 House of Commons Library.

1987 1992 1997 2001 2005 2010 2015 2017 2019

SNP

LAB

LD

LAB

CON

% of all MPs by party

Number

Table 14.3 Black and minority ethnic MPs elected at general elections

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Education A total of 82% of MPs were graduates and 24% have attended Oxford or Cambridge (see Table 14.4). And 29% of MPs attended fee-­paying schools. Substantially more Conservatives experienced private education compared to Labour; in 2017 the percentages were 48–15.

Table 14.4 Education of MPs elected in general elections, 1979 to 2017 % attending educational institution 1979 1983 1987 1992 1997 2001 2005 2010 2015 CON Fee-paying school University Oxford/ Cambridge LAB Fee-paying school University Oxford/ Cambridge LD Fee-paying school University Oxford/ Cambridge SNP Fee-paying school University Oxford/ Cambridge

2017

73

70

68

62

66

64

60

54

50

44

68 49

71 48

70 44

73 45

81 51

83 48

81 43

80 34

81 30

83 34

18

14

14

15

16

17

18

14

16

13

59 21

53 15

56 15

61 16

66 15

67 16

64 16

72 17

77 21

84 20

55

52

45

50

41

35

39

39

13

30

45 27

65 30

73 27

75 30

70 33

69 27

79 31

81 28

100 13

92 17

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

7

6

– –

– –

– –

– –

– –

– –

– –

– –

75 0

62 0

Sources: Cowley and Kavanagh, The British General Election of 2017 (2018, and previous editions); © 2020 House of Commons Library.

Occupation The legal profession provided a background for 53 Conservative MPs in 2017 compared to 30 Labour. Business, commerce or managerial background accounted for 123 Conservatives yet only



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23 Labour MPs. Teaching and local government were the occupations of 25 labour MPs, the armed services for 13 Conservatives. Journalism and publishing were about equally popular: 17 Conservatives, 14 Labour.

Parliamentary experience A total of 87 MPs elected in 2017 had no previous Parliamentary experience (13%). And 551 (85%) had been MPs in the 2015–17 Parliament and 12 were re-­elected having served as MPs further in the past. Sources: House of Commons Library (November 2019); Criddle (2018)

Expenses Scandal MPs receive a salary of nearly £70,000 a year, over double the national average. Yet in the spring of 2009 details of expenses claims made by MPs was acquired by the Daily Telegraph; the newspaper cleverly released information about MPs little by little, thus maximising the impact. MPs were allowed fairly generous expenses: they could claim for travel, research assistance and, if they did not live in London, for a second home. However, it seems that over time, a fair proportion of MPs had been claiming for things ordinary tax payers were obliged to pay for themselves: work on their gardens, food, home improvements. Much worse it became clear that some MPs were claiming for mortgage payments on ‘second homes’ when the mortgage loan had been totally repaid. Some MPs, it was clear, had claimed fees to improve ‘second’ properties and then sell them on at a considerable profit. The outrage throughout the summer of 2009 was palpable. Never regarded with any real respect, the reputation of MPs was dragged through the gutter, both the offending and the not inconsiderable number of those who were innocent.

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further Reading Baxter, H. and Bercow, J. (2019) A Woman’s Place is in the House: Why We Need More Women MPs and How to Become One, Macmillan. Brunskill, I. (ed.) (2019) The Times Guide to the House of Commons, Times. Cowley, P. (2002) Revolts and Rebellions: Parliamentary Voting Under Blair, Politico. Cowley, P. and Kavanagh, D. (2018) The British General Election of 2017, Palgrave Macmillan.  Criddle, B. (2018) Parliamentary representation, in B. Jones, P. Norton and O. Daddow, Politics UK (9th edition), Routledge, pp. 203–225. House of Commons Library, number 1528, Social Background of MPs. Rallings, C. and Thrasher, M. (2016) British Electoral Facts: 1832–2006, Routledge. Rhodes James, R. (2017) An Introduction to the House of Commons, Collins. Rush, M. (2005) Parliament Today, Manchester University Press.

Websites Parliament, www.Parliament.uk. Unlock Democracy campaign, www.unlockdemocracy.org.uk.

15 Voting Behaviour in the UK

EARLY HISTORY Britain famously has had an elected legislative chamber since medieval times. But back then there were great variations as to the small numbers of those who had the right to vote; most of those who did were qualified by virtue of owning a certain amount of property. Dunwich in Suffolk had only 32 inhabitants yet sent two MPs to the Commons while bustling industrial cities like Leeds, Manchester and Birmingham sent none. In 1780, a survey estimated the whole electorate numbered a mere 214,000: less than 3% of the then eight million total population. Calls for reform in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, in the wake of the French Revolution, elicited repressive reactions from a spooked establishment like the ‘Peterloo massacre’ in August 1819 when 11 people were killed by a cavalry charge at a meeting in support of parliamentary reform. But these forces and arguments eventually brought forth the 1832 Great Reform Act; according to PM Lord Grey (1830–34), confirming the British ruling class’s ability to bend in order to avoid fracturing, it was to ‘prevent the necessity of revolution’. This chapter analyses voting behaviour in general up to 2017 but the crucial ‘Brexit’ election of 2019 deserves a chapter (number 16) of its own. EXTENDING THE FRANCHISE

This famous Act did not greatly add to the size of the then 366,000 electorate but most of the smaller boroughs were abolished, and

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seats were distributed more fairly to the newer towns and cities. Further Reform Acts in 1867 and 1884 increased the electorate to approaching eight million; the 1872 Ballot Act made voting secret, thus removing the ease with which votes could be bought or coerced. By 1918 male voting lost its link with property, and women over 30 also won the right to vote; though they, or their husbands, required also property worth a rateable value of £5. In 1928 the voting age for women was made the same as men, 21. Finally, in 1969, 18-year-­olds were given the vote. A debate currently continues as to whether, as in Scotland, 16–17 year olds should be given the vote. Voters have to be citizens of the UK, the Commonwealth or the Republic of Ireland; British citizens who have lived abroad for up to 20 years may also vote. Members of the House of Lords (who are already members of parliament), those convicted of a crime and in prison, some categories of mental patients plus those found guilty of electoral malpractice are excluded from voting. Since the Electoral Administration Act 2006, candidates for public elections can be as young as 18 years, though civil servants, members of the armed forces and ordained members of the Church of England cannot stand as candidates.

THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM(S) Traditionally, the British electoral system has been perceived as simple ‘first past the post’ (FPTP). However, even though opponents of reform have been seen to have the upper hand for most of the recent past, several aspects of Britain’s voting system have in reality been reformed, so that now it is more accurate to speak in the plural, of ‘electoral systems’: SUPPLEMENTARY VOTE

This is used to select the London mayor and entails voters indicating a first and second choice. If no candidate wins 50% of the vote, second preferences are distributed, adding to the first preferences, until someone exceeds the halfway mark.



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SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE (STV)

This is most commonly associated with Ireland but, given its very representative quality, it has been introduced for all elections in Northern Ireland – where communities have experienced severe conflict – plus local elections in Scotland. Voters register their preferences right down the list of candidates in large multi-­member constituencies. A quota is set based on the number of voters divided by the number of candidates plus one. Candidates who make it first time are elected outright and subsequent ones come through on the basis of second, third and, if necessary, other preferences until the quotas are filled. ADDITIONAL MEMBER SYSTEM

Based on the German system, this entails voters having two votes. The first is cast for candidates in a geographical constituency, the second for candidates in a ‘top-­up pool’ and is for a party. The percentages won by each party – as long as they are over 5% – determine how many members of each ‘party list’ are judged elected. This system is used (albeit in a modified form) for the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly and for the Greater London Assembly; it has helped parties with thin support to improve their democratic representation even those, like the Conservatives, who oppose the system in principle and voted against its introduction. REGIONAL PARTY LIST (PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION)

Voters choose from party lists in multi-­member constituencies with the percentages gained by each party determining their share of the available seats. This is the system used for the elections to the European Parliament. Those at the top end of the lists are the candidates likely to be elected. FIRST PAST THE POST (OR ‘SIMPLE PLURALITY’ SYSTEM)

This is still the one used at general elections for seats in the Westminster Parliament. While this system tends to deliver winning parties with large majorities, which are then likely to provide stable

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and decisive government, it has been found lacking from the democratic viewpoint: •

•

•

Candidates can be elected on a minority of the vote; for example, with four candidates standing, all with similar levels of support, someone with 26% of the vote could win, with all remaining votes effectively ‘wasted’. Reformers argue that the preferences used in other systems help to make every vote count. In 2010, two-­thirds of MPs were elected on minority votes. The system favours the bigger parties, as any party with wide but shallow support will not win many individual contests. For example, in 2005 Labour won only 35% of the vote but 55% of the seats; in 1983 the SDP–Liberal Alliance won 26% of the vote yet under 4% of the seats. In 2015 UKIP polled 13% of the votes yet returned only one MP. Given this bias towards the big parties, smaller ones have great difficulty in breaking into the level of voting, reckoned to be around 30%, at which they would begin to win large numbers of seats. This tends to perpetuate two-­party dominance, when the reality on the ground might feature several robust varieties of political preferences.

The FPTP system as practised in the UK also tends to encourage parties which seek to maximise their appeal by offering a wide spectrum of ideas to win the ‘centre ground’. Under PR, parties can afford to represent more specific groups in society; this tends to produce multi-­party systems but most PR systems guard against excessive fragmentation by specifying that parties have to achieve a minimum percentage of the vote – e.g. 5% – before they are entitled to any seats in the legislature. By-­Elections

Moreover, British MPs do not have ‘substitutes’ as in many PR systems and if someone dies or resigns their seat a by-­election takes place. Because the deposit required to stand is only £500 (repayable if 5% of the vote is cast), a large number and wide variety of candidates tend to stand for the generally well publicised by-­election



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Box 15.1 Tougher penalties urged for those who break electoral laws A cross-­party parliamentary inquiry into UK democratic processes urged increasing the maximum of £20,000 fine which was considered so low that it was being ignored: unlimited fines were preferred by the report’s members. ‘The outdated nature of UK election law has pitched us into a battle for the very soul of our democracy’, said the chair of the group, Stephen Kinnock. The group was formed in the wake of the Cambridge Analytica scandal whereby the firm harvested personal data from millions of Facebook profiles without consent, in order to use it for political advertising. Kinnock added ‘Facebook and other digital giants now play a hugely significant role in our elections and referendums, but most of the current legislation was created before the phrase, “social media” even existed.’ Kyle Taylor, director of Fair Vote UK, which provided a secretariat for the inquiry said, ‘Protecting our sacred democratic institutions isn’t a partisan issue. We hope urgent action follows this report’s publication’ (Townsend, 2020).

c­ ontests, either for the fun or the fleeting publicity; virtually all of these ‘joke’ candidates lose their deposits, but succeed in adding some eccentric colour to our political life.

THE DIMINISHING INFLUENCE OF CLASS ON VOTING Britain has often been perceived as having a ‘class based’ society, a reflection of the country’s role as the initiator of the Industrial Revolution, which created a huge, largely impoverished working class, living in the older parts of cities and towns, and a small wealthy middle class, settled in the suburbs and the rural countryside. In 1911 three-­quarters of the population were manual working class; by 1951 this percentage had trimmed down to around 65%.

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During the 1950s class awareness was still very powerful and votes tended to be cast along class lines. Working-­class voters tended to vote for ‘their class’ party, Labour, and middle-­class voters for the Tories. In the 1960s Oxford political scientist Peter Pulzer produced a classic sentence often quoted in examination questions followed by the word, ‘discuss’: ‘Class is the basis of British politics: all else is embellishment and detail.’ The most frequently cited class categories are shown in Box 15.2. SOCIALISATION

Voters cast their votes to a large extent on the basis of how they have been brought up and the way they have come to earn their Box 15.2 Classifying class Traditional: Many sociologists have produced ways of classifying social strata but the most widely used is the ABC scale which is as follows (with early twenty-­first century percentages of the overall population in brackets): A

Upper middle: professional, higher managerial (3% of all households) B Middle: middle managers (16%) C1 Lower Middle: junior managers, routine white collar (26%) C2 Skilled: plumbers, carpenters, mechanics (26%) D Semi-­skilled and unskilled: manual workers (17%) E Residual: dependent on long-­term benefit (12%) In April 2013 the British Sociological Association published a survey of British class divisions which saw: an elite middle class representing 6%; an ‘established middle class’ comprising 25%; a ‘technical middle class’ at 6%; traditional manual working-­class members having declined to only 14%; ‘new affluent workers’ comprising 15%; ‘emergent service workers’ 19%; and, at the lowest level, the ‘precariat’, comprising 15% of the whole.



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living. Children from low-­paid families might identify with Labour, traditionally, with its welfare policies, ostensibly the party of the disadvantaged, but as perceptions differ so much, they might easily prefer the Conservative’s allegedly more ‘aspirational’ approach of lower taxes and more economic freedom. The nurturing role of families is always important in forming attitudes, with children often reflecting parental views, though with a fair number of dissenting rebels. PARTISAN DE-­ALIGNMENT

The predictability of class allegiances was a feature of the 1950s; two-­thirds of the working class voted Labour and four-­fifths of the middle class voted Conservative. The fact that, in addition, 90% voted for one or other of the big parties made voting behaviour very stable. The country was also homogeneous; swings from one party to another tended to be reflected throughout the country so that after only a few results in a general election it was often possible to predict the result with some accuracy. Voters used to identify strongly with one or other of the big parties. In 1964, 45% identified ‘very strongly’ with a party but by 2001 that figure had declined to less than a third of that figure, reflecting a major weakening in the moorings of voter loyalties, which had all kinds of implications. David Denver (2012) illuminatingly suggests a number of reasons why this ‘partisan de-­ alignment’ occurred: •

Working-­class occupations shrank from around 50% of the workforce in 1960 to less than 20% three decades on, having been replaced by ‘service’ industries – 70% of the workforce by 1991 – mostly staffed by non-­manual workers. These new industries were not extensively unionised, nor did their workers live in close proximity, as in the days of terraced housing close to factories. Social bonds which reinforced voting patterns were thereby weakened (see Tables 15.1 and 15.2 and Chapter 16 on the 2019 election where Conservatives sensationally won a majority of working-­class votes).

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Table 15.1 How Great Britain voted (%), 1983–2005

Conservative Labour Alliance/Lib Dem Others

1983

June 1987

June 1992

April 1997

May 2001

May 2005

42.3 27.6 25.4   4.7

42.2 30.8 22.6   3.4

41.9 34.4 17.8   5.8

30.7 43.2 16.8   9.3

31.7 40.7 18.3   9.3

32.4 35.2 22.0 11.0

Source: adapted from Leach et al. (2006), table 9.2.

Table 15.2  Decline of class voting, 1992–2005 (MORI)

AB (middle class)

C1 (lower middle class)

C2 (skilled workers)

DE (unskilled workers)

Conservative 1992 56 1997 41 2001 39 2005 37 Change 1992–2005 –19

52 37 36 37 –15

39 27 29 33 –6

32 21 24 25 –6

Labour 1992 19 1997 31 2001 30 2005 28 Change 1992–2005 +11

25 37 38 32 +7

40 50 49 40 0

49 59 55 48 –1

Lib Dems 1992 1997 2001 2005 Change 1992–2005

19 18 20 23 +4

17 16 15 19 +2

16 13 13 18 +2

22 22 25 29 +7



•

• • •

•

•

• •

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Rising prosperity enabled more people to buy their own homes – instead of renting or living on council estates. By 2000 over half of non-­manual workers lived in their own homes, a traditional middle-­class characteristic. Margaret Thatcher’s ‘right to buy’ policy enabled a million people to buy their own council home, thus weakening their connections with Labour. The deep recession of the early 1980s greatly reduced union membership and thus the closeness of such voters to Labour. Public sector versus private distinctions became important as workers in the former realised voting Labour would serve them best, while the latter discerned the same in Conservative policies. Denver (2012) cites Crewe’s analysis of how the interests of the working classes had tended to fragment so that home owners differed from renters, or better-­paid workers had more interest in tax cuts than the poorer paid. Despite their possible class allegiances, working-­class voters could be persuaded by these changes to consider supporting the Conservatives. Post-­secondary educational opportunities – 40% attended university by the end of the 1990s – encouraged a more sceptical and discriminating appreciation of political issues rather than the earlier knee-­jerk class affiliations. Experience of parties in power tended to engender a degree of cynicism about promises of parties and their capacity to deliver desired results. Labour in the late 1960s won few such prizes and neither did Ted Heath’s 1970–74 government. Ideological polarisation became so extensive in the early 1980s that activists became alienated from typical voters. Television coverage of politics increased apace from the 1950s onwards and its statutory non-­partisanship tended to encourage an appreciation of both sides of argument rather than a blind acceptance of either of the big parties.

Tables 15.1 and 15.2 tell the story up to 2005, but by April 2017 YouGov surveys reflected a sharp change in the way working-­class voters were intending to cast their votes (see Table 15.3). Theresa May’s message on the need to deliver on the 2016 referendum result had attracted substantial working-­class support. The result of the 2019 election, analysed in Chapter 16, reveals how crucial this shift in voter loyalty was to Boris Johnson’s success.

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Table 15.3 Class is no longer a reliable indicator of how a person will vote, 2017

Conservative Labour Lib Dems UKIP

Middle class votes 2017 (ABD1 voters) %

Working class voters 2019 (C2DE voters) %

46 26 14  6

43 24  7 13

Source: data from YouGov (2017).

VOTER VOLATILITY

All the above factors collectively served to weaken the emotional class link between parties and voters, with the result that voters were freer to use their own perceptions and powers of reason in deciding on which party to bestow their support. Apart from the smaller numbers who now gave more or less automatic support, voters’ allegiance was ‘up for grabs’. Denver points out that even the apparent stability of Conservative successes during the 1980s was not based on an unchanging, solid block of voters but on ‘a temporary coalition of voters which then dissolved in the inter-­ election periods’. So, it seems voters had emerged from the chrysalis of class loyalty into something like a butterfly which fluttered from party to party, depending on perceptions of their competence and the attractiveness of their policies. While party managers might complain at how their job of winning support has become so much harder, all these changes have, in fact, devolved more power to the individual voter, making the system, in theory at least, more democratic. However, voters did not necessarily view themselves as empowered by all these changes. Chapter 16 reveals how age has seemed to usurp class as the key indicator of voting allegiance: the older the voter, the more likely the likelihood of voting Tory: the younger the voter, to vote Labour.



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LOW ELECTION TURNOUT Election turnout in 1951 was 81.91%; the previous year it had been 83.61%. It averaged well over 70% for the next four decades but then it began to decline rapidly, to 71% in 1997 and then a worrying 59.38% in 2001. From there it climbed to 62.4% in 2005 and 65.11% in 2010, well below the average for the period 1950–92. Other elections fare worse than this, with those to the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly averaging below 50%; in 2014 local election turnout was 36%; and in 1999 the UK figure for turnout to the European elections was a paltry 24%. Does this matter? Yes it certainly does, if one values British democracy and wants it to work. Democracy is posited upon voter participation; if people fail to vote it suggests they have no faith in the system and it might in consequence fade away, to be replaced by something far less stable or acceptable to British society. Political scientist Paul Whiteley commented on the low turnout in 2001: ‘If this is not a crisis of democratic politics, then is hard to see what is.’ Others, like David Denver and Anthony King, disagree: all that was needed, wrote the latter, was ‘a close fought election at which a great is at stake and, make no mistake, they will turn out in droves’ (King, 2001). Evidence of continuing apathy in 2005 and again in the close-­ fought 2010 election suggests Denver and King were far from analysing this problem correctly. Especially worrying is that younger voters seem not to have absorbed the sense of voting as a civic duty: nearly a million of 18–24 year olds were not registered to vote and in 2005 only 37% of this cohort bothered to visit the polling booth. However, if an issue genuinely galvanises, it can still bring voters out in their millions – the passionate Scottish referendum campaign in 2014 led an 85% turnout and Jeremy Corbyn’s campaign for the Labour leadership in the summer of 2015 also reached thousands of new young voters. Turnout in the May 2015 general election was 66.1%, but this average hides some large variations, for instance in terms of age – 78% for those over 65 versus 42% for 18–24 year olds. Turnout in 2017 was slightly up at 69% but dipped to 65% in 2019.

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OTHER FACTORS INFLUENCING VOTING BEHAVIOUR RELIGION

Religion dominated politics during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Even during the nineteenth century the Church of England was said to be ‘the Conservative Party at prayer’, while the Liberals and Labour attracted support from Methodists and Nonconformists. But, apart from Northern Ireland, which has its own distinctive history and culture, the UK has disengaged from religion so much that the country is virtually a secular one in practice. Nor do politicians seek to embrace religion; even Alistair Campbell, the spin doctor for the famously religious Tony Blair, once told a journalist, ‘we don’t do religion’. AGE

Voters tend to move towards the Conservatives as they age, which is an advantage for that party, as older voters are much more likely to use their votes than are younger ones (as noted above). UKIP and Brexit Party supporters were predominately aged over 50. GENDER

Women supported the Tories disproportionately during the 1980s but the pendulum swung to Labour for the next two decades. In 2010, 36% of women voted for Conservatives and 31% Labour. However, in February 2014 polls showed Labour with a 42–33% lead. Women tend to be affected especially by cuts in public expenditure and the Conservatives, with fewer women MPs, were perceived as not so ‘women friendly’. NORTH–SOUTH DIVIDE

The declining economy of northern regions has inclined voters there towards benefits-­friendly Labour, while the more prosperous south support the Conservatives. Of 158 MPs in the three northern regions, the Tories mustered only 43 at the 2015 general election and have only one MP in Scotland. For its part, south of a line from



voting behaviour in the uk

the Wash to Bristol, Labour held only ten seats. This pattern was destined to be transformed by the 2019 election and the collapse of the so-­called Labour’s ‘Red wall’ (see Chapter 16). ETHNICITY

Ethnic minorities comprise some eight million according to the 2011 census; their votes are crucial in determining a raft of marginal seats. Conservatives, with their harder line on immigration, tend not to be favoured by immigrant groups, as they detect an element of racism. Labour has traditionally won some three-­ quarters of the ethnic vote, though the Conservatives are striving hard to reduce the gap. BIAS IN THE VOTING SYSTEM

Despite its apparent simplicity, the ‘first past the post’ system throws up some rather undemocratic anomalies. First, it discriminates against smaller parties with thin national support: in 1983 the SDP– Liberal Alliance won 26% of the votes, yet only 3% of the seats. A more proportional system would reduce such distortions but in the referendum on the alternative vote in May 2011, the nation voted 2–1 against any change. Second, the fact that Labour seats tend to be won in inner-­city areas where constituency size is small and turnout is low means that Labour votes win more seats than the same amount of Conservative votes, many of which are stacked up in their ‘safe’ seats in the south. This means that Labour could win an election with just 3% more votes than the Tories, while the latter need 11% more than Labour to seize victory. An expected redrawing of constituency boundaries by the Johnson government should reduce disparities in size and result in a probable extra 20 seats for the Conservatives.

THE MAY 2010 GENERAL ELECTION The general election in May 2010 was a remarkable one in that it ended with no overall majority for either of the two big parties. The significance of the election was summed up by pollster Peter Kellner in the Sunday Times, 7 September 2019:

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Labour and Conservative no longer dominate politics as they once did. In 1951 only nine MPs did not take the Labour or Tory whip; in 1979 the number had climbed to 27, but the 70 seat Conservative lead over Labour delivered Margaret Thatcher a 43 seat overall majority. This time even a 70 seat lead would have been insufficient. As well as the 57 contingent of Liberal Democrats, 28 represented eight smaller parties. To secure an overall majority of just two, the Tories would have needed 86 more MPs than Labour.

The growth of third-­party voting plus the systemic bias towards Labour meant that even a 7% lead by Conservatives over Labour was insufficient. Cameron led the biggest party but needed a solid coalition to govern for a full parliamentary term. Ironically, the Lib Dems, disappointed that their early campaign showing in the polls had not been reflected in the result, now found themselves as ‘king makers’. Both parties wooed Lib Dem leader Nick Clegg and his colleagues but Cameron had the advantage with the arithmetic – an alliance with Labour would have entailed an awkward group of small parties – and a more skilfully handled negotiation. The result was the first formal coalition government since 1945. The factors identified above suggest it will not be the last, though the expected need for a coalition after the 2015 election did not materialise, as there was an overall majority for the Conservatives, as discussed in the next section.

THE MAY 2015 GENERAL ELECTION This election was long anticipated as the verdict on a five-­year period of coalition government and as the first of the ‘fixed term’ elections consequent to the act passed in September 2011. Tories wanted to govern alone without the irritating Lib Dems snapping at their heels; Labour longed to see their long-­standing poll leads converted into a Commons majority. The coalition’s longevity had often been predicted to be short – a couple of years maybe – but it had proved surprisingly robust and had run the full five-­year term with scarcely a wobble. Despite Labour’s overall poll lead, it concealed the substantial specific Tory leads regarding leadership and economic competence. Since the 2010 campaign Conservatives had relentlessly delivered the message that it was Labour which had



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ruined the economy and caused the recession – in reality both had been initiated by the crisis in housing finance in the USA. 1. Economy. Labour MP and former Treasury minister Liam Byrne’s jokey note to his successor that ‘there is no money left’ was carried around the country by Cameron and displayed theatrically as an object of horror. 2. Leadership. In the wake of the 2010 defeat Gordon Brown had resigned and, instead of the expected elevation of David Miliband, his brother Ed, stood against him and, with trade union rather than Labour MP support, ended up winning the vote. Exploiting the union link, Cameron dubbed him ‘Red Ed’ and regularly bested and bullied him for five years at PMQs. Indeed Cameron sought to characterise Ed as weak and much too left­wing, likely to inflict appalling damage on the country if ever elected. As polling day approached most commentators predicted a hung parliament, though with the SNP routing the other parties north of the border. Despite losing the independence vote the excitement generated by the ‘yes’ campaign continued to fizz, with thousands flooding into the SNP and polls showing close to 50% support for the party. During the campaign Cameron refused to allow a repetition of the TV debates believed to have denied him victory in 2010. The Tory campaign was criticised as narrow, over-­cautious and over-­personalised. Tory election strategist Lynton Crosby’s anti-­Ed message was taken perhaps too far by Conservative MP Michael Fallon, who suggested that someone who had ‘stabbed their brother in the back’ to gain power would do the same to his country. Miliband’s campaign – mercifully gaffe-­free for once – was actually quite effective and his endorsement as ‘best prime minister’, though still well adrift of Cameron’s, improved by over ten points. His promise to end the tax-­free status of ‘non-­doms’ was well received, though the plethora of unfunded proposals by the two big parties – evidence of frustration at the stalled polls – towards the end of the campaign had little impact. Labour sought to exploit the Tory promise to reduce welfare spending by £12 billion but later in the campaign a much more effective scare story was deployed effectively by Cameron: that a minority Labour government, with the possible help of the SNP, would ruin the country.

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Anti-­Tory voters sat in front of their televisions at 10.00 p.m. confidently expecting a change of government. The BBC exit poll, however, master-­minded by Professor John Curtice of Strathclyde University, delivered a hammer blow to these expectations. This poll predicted: Conservatives 310, Labour 239, Lib Dems 10 and SNP 58. Paddy Ashdown, campaign leader for his party, declared this a re-­run of the faulty 1992 exit poll and that if it proved right he would eat his hat on television. Alistair Campbell, for Labour and of Scottish parentage, offered, for good measure, to eat his kilt. Evidence that the Tory high command also believed the polls were mistaken is offered by the ‘French kiss’ which Osborne offered to give Lynton Crosby if his strategy proved successful (a pledge which remains unfulfilled: Sunday Times, 24 May 2015). Curtice was and is the most respected psephologist in the UK: his 2010 exit poll had proved uncannily correct. That his 2015 proved less accurate was no comfort for the aspiring hat-­ eaters as his prediction actually underestimated Tory seats, which, at 331, delivered an overall majority of 12 (Table 15.4). The other bombshell, of course, was the total meltdown of Scottish Labour: its tally of seats north of the border, as Curtice predicted, slumped from 41 down to one, the same as for the Lib Dems and Conservatives. As Table 15.4 shows, the headlong rush of the SNP stopped at a still incredible 56; the Lib Dems were massacred; Plaid Cymru

Table 15.4 2015 general election results Party

Seats (gains)

Vote share % (gains)

Conservatives Labour Lib Dems SNP Plaid Cymru Green UKIP DUP Others

331 (+24) 232 (–26)    8 (–49)   56 (50) 3 1 1 8 10

36.9 (0.8) 30.4 (1.5) 7.9 (–15.2) 4.7 (3.1) 0.6 3.8 (2.8) 12.6 (9.5) 0.6 2.5



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retained its three seats; the Greens their one; UKIP, despite polling nearly four million votes, managed only to retain the by-­election seat of Douglas Carswell. Farage, once thought a ‘shoo-­in’ for Thanet South, eventually came third, as he did in his 2010 contest (see Table 15.4). As for the poor Lib Dems, instead of their hoped­for 25–30 ‘balance of power’ MPs, they lost 47 and were reduced to a tiny rump of eight from their 7.9% of the vote, their lowest tally since Jo Grimond was leader of the Liberal Party, in the 1960s. In the wake of this total reversal of expectations, Ed Miliband and Nick Clegg resigned. Nigel Farage also proffered his resignation but when his party’s executive refused to accept it, he remained in place, causing acrimonious rows to break out in the party which, though not obvious at the time, were destined to be terminal. Criticism of the ‘first past the post’ voting system was reinforced by the combined vote of UKIP and the Greens, 16.4% of voters, returning only two MPs while the SNP’s 4.7% delivered 56 MPs.

General Election of 2017 This election had not been anticipated but was caused by Theresa May’s fear that the majority she had inherited from Cameron would be insufficient to pass a Brexit bill. It was rumoured that May’s close aide, Nick Timothy, had persuaded her but she claimed her decision had been reached after an Easter walking holiday in Wales. It caused surprise as she had long maintained ‘the country needs stability and certainty’ and not the insecurities of an election campaign. But the lure of Labour’s 23 point polling deficit with the Tories proved irresistible and she went ahead, the Daily Mail welcoming the election with the pro-­Brexit headline ‘Crush the Saboteurs’. Jim Messina, a US pollster working for the Conservatives predicted they would win 470 seats, a 290 majority. Campaign Labour

Labour voters’ hearts sank when they found so much negativity about Corbyn on the doorstep. Next came Diane Abbott’s gaffe on the cost of increased police numbers also causing similar negative

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comment. Local election losses by Labour of 382 seats while Tories won 563 inspired yet more depression. Corbyn, in response, merely predicted, to much scepticism, that he’d win! Conservatives

The ‘presidential’ focus on May proved a major error as she proved a terrible campaigner, endlessly repeating stock phrases like ‘strong and stable government is required’ and Labour’s ‘coalition of chaos’. Her ducking out of head to head debates with Corbyn also seemed cowardly for a party leader, Amber Rudd having to stand in for her. May seemed unhappy when talking about herself and was not a ‘natural’ on TV as Blair and Cameron had been. Chancellor Hammond was ‘banned’ from the group of favoured media spokespeople: arguably the ‘strong economy’ card was not played as result. The social care plan in the Tory manifesto would have drained householders of their equity and huge resistance emerged all over country, especially among Tory voters. May did a U-­turn on the issue, claiming, absurdly, ‘nothing has changed’. Meanwhile Corbyn was addressing ecstatic crowds and wowing young voters with promises of no tuition fees. The Manchester bombing atrocity on 12 May 2017 caused a tragic interlude in the campaign: Salman Abedi’s suicide vest attack accounted for 22 deaths and 250 injured at a concert by Ariane Grande: Labour cleverly exploited the issue of cuts in police numbers in wake of the atrocity. Results

From being over 20 points behind, Labour managed, astonishingly to nearly equal the Conservatives’ share of the vote (see Tables 15.5 and 15.6). Having escaped a predicted landslide defeat, Labour somehow appeared to have ‘won’ but the reality was different. The Tories won the highest share of the vote (42.3%) since Margaret Thatcher’s ‘Falklands’ victory in 1983 and returned 317 MPs. This was 2.3 million more votes than they won under Cameron in his majority winning election in 2015. Moreover, their 13 seats north of the border added to their claim to be the ‘national’ party. Conservative share of manual workers’ votes rose from 32% in 2015 to



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Table 15.5 England vote share, 2017 election Party

%

Conservative Labour Lib Dems UKIP Green Party Yorkshire Party

45.6 41.9 7.8 2.1 1.9 0.1

Table 15.6 National share of seats Party

Conservative

Labour

SNP

Lib Dems DUP

Others

Seats Change

318 −13

262 +30

35 −21

12 +4

13 −2

10 +2

45% in 2017. The Economist, 29 September 2018, commented on why Labour’s surge failed to achieve a victory. Tories and non-­partisan pollsters generally agree that if Labour had a more centrist leader the Conservatives would be a good 15 points behind in the polls. The fact that Mr Corbyn now looks immovable may be bad for the country. But is certainly good for the Conservatives.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION 1. How do you think political allegiances are formed? 2. Why is class less important in British voting behaviour now compared with the 1950s and 1960s? 3. If PR voting systems were deemed best for devolved assemblies, how come FPTP is being maintained for elections to Westminster?

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FURTHER READING For a clear recent history of UK voting behaviour see Denver and Garnett (2014). The best short introduction for voting behaviour is still Denver (2012). Butler, D.E. and Stokes, D. (1974) Political Change in Britain (2nd edition), Macmillan. Byrne, L. (2015) How Labour rebuilds the radical centre, Sunday Times, 14 June. Clarke, H., Sanders, D., Stewart, D. and Whiteley, P. (2009) Performance Politics and the British Voter, Cambridge University Press. Denver, D. (2012) Elections and Voting in Britain, Palgrave. Denver, D. (2018) Elections and voting, in B. Jones, P. Norton and O. Daddow, Politics UK (9th edition), Routledge, pp. 158–180. Denver, D. and Garnett, M. (2014) British General Elections Since 1964, Palgrave. Farrell, D. (2011) Electoral Systems: A Comparative Study, Palgrave. Kellner, P. (2019) The balance of power lies in the hands of two populist tribes, not one, Sunday Times, 9 May. King, A. (2001) Election analysis, Telegraph, 17 May. Leach, R., Coxall, B. and Robins, L. (2006) British Politics, Palgrave.  Pulzer, P. (1967) Political Representation and Elections in Britain, George Allen Unwin. Townsend, M. (2020) MPs call for unlimited fines for those who breach electoral law, Observer, 18 January. YouGov (2017) How Britain voted at the 2017 general election, 13 June.

Websites Electoral Commission, www.electoralcommission.org.uk. UK Polling Report, survey and polling news from YouGov’s Anthony Wells, www.ukpollingreport.co.uk.

16 The 2019 General Election

Background ‘The 2019 election will be presented by future historians as the most consequential since the second world war’, so wrote professor Matthew Goodwin (Sunday Times, 15 December 2019); few would deny his analysis. This election was made necessary by the failure of the 2017 election to provide Theresa May with the majority she craved (see previous chapter). Instead it lost her the small majority she had inherited from David Cameron and forced her to establish a mercenary pact – cost? £1 billion – with the DUP in order to stay on as PM. When her attempts to pass her November 2018 Withdrawal Agreement failed three times, she resigned in June 2019, thus opening the door to Boris Johnson. For so long the favourite of the Conservative Party’s ageing, predominantly pro Brexit 160,000-strong membership, they smoothly ushered him into Downing Street on 23 July. Critics claimed this was undemocratic but the UK constitution is ruled by parties, not by elected presidents. Johnson soon found his attempts to overcome political barriers facing his Brexit agreement impossible without a new majority. From at first running scared of an election, his government quickly came to urge one as essential. Aware, however, of the healthy Tory poll lead, opposition parties were not initially prepared to over-­rule the five-­year conditions of the 2011 Fixed Term Parliaments Act requiring a two-­thirds Commons majority. However, while Corbyn was not opposed to fighting a December election – he thought he could win – the two other major opposition

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parties were much more bullish. The SNP was convinced, correctly, an election would swell its MP number substantially and the Lib Dems, under its inexperienced leader Jo Swinson, was very hopeful, wrongly as it turned out, its ‘revoke’ Brexit stance would attract a flood of Remain supporters to its cause. She even thought the flood of support might win them an overall majority. It was true that national polls reflected Remain support exceeded Leave by a fair margin and, adding further incentive, the Lib Dems had done well in the May Euro-­elections. Finally the temptation proved irresistible to the two smaller parties who in late October 2019 agreed to support Johnson’s simple majority emasculation of the 2011 Act, cancelling the two-­thirds requirement. Faced with this volte-­face the unity of the opposition was shattered and Corbyn decided to risk an election that in any case he privately thought he could win. The date – so fateful for all three opposition parties – was fixed for 12 December 2019. Johnson’s government had succeeded in uniting the Leave vote and marginalising the Brexit Party. Former attorney general (AG) and unofficial leader of the Tory Remainers, Dominic Grieve, was appalled at how the new government was behaving. He told a BBC documentary on Dominic Cummings, ‘Number 10 had changed from an organisation which practiced the gentle art of spin into a lying machine for propaganda’ (BBC, 2020).

The Campaign The Conservative campaign started badly but Labour’s decision not to target marginal seats in favour of wins nationwide faced internal criticism given the superior resources of the Tories. For his part Johnson was targeting Labour’s ‘Leave’ seats in the Midlands and the north where they believed life-­long Labour voters were prepared to vote Tory in order to fulfil Johnson’s claim to deliver on the 2016 vote. Mathew D’Ancona noted in a BBC2 documentary March 2020 that while campaigning in 2016 Johnson had painted seductive pictures of how leaving the EU would usher in a new era of prosperity. However in December 2019 he dispensed totally with such rhetoric in favour of a dogged ‘Let’s get Brexit Done’. With the insight of a successful politician he had sensed accurately that voters were totally fed up with the vexed issue of Brexit and wanted it over and done. Moreover, Labour’s position on Brexit



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lacked Johnson’s dramatic clarity, its objective being: to win the election, renegotiate a deal with the EU, then stay neutral to allow voters to decide if they favoured its deal or preferred to stick with Remain. Such a multi-­stage approach seemed rather opaque and also offered another referendum – something which Leavers held to be unnecessary, divisive and undemocratic. To this, Tory critics added that, if Labour triumphed, another Union sundering referendum on independence would be granted the SNP as shadow chancellor John McDonnell had already hinted. Johnson was carefully managed to avoid gaffes and exposure to any rigorous interrogation, for example from the fierce Andrew Neill. For his part Corbyn did his best but his barnstorming success in narrowing the poll gap in 2017 was nowhere near being repeated – if anything the Tory lead increased as the campaign progressed. Furthermore, any chance of collaboration between Lib Dems and Labour were scotched when neither side seemed willing to cooperate to defeat Tory candidates.

2019 Election Results The raw statistics eloquently express the size of Boris Johnson’s triumph. Conservatives 365 (+66) 43.6% Labour 213 (–42) 32.2% Lib Dems   11 (–10) 11.6% SNP   48 (+13)   3.9% DUP    8 (–2) Sinn Fein    7 (0) Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP)    2 (+2) Alliance    1 (+1) Green    1 (0)   2.7% Conservative majority: 80 seats Johnson Fulfils his Promises, Albeit Ruthlessly

Tory Party members favoured Johnson because they loved his entertaining larger than life personality but, more especially, they

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thought he could ‘sort’ Brexit: ‘put Farage back in his box’ and defeat Corbyn electorally. His opponents, both outside his party and within, doubted he could manage even one of these objectives but on 13 December he could legitimately claim to have completed his political hat-­trick. It could be argued, and certainly was at the time, that his methods were less than orthodox or indeed unethical – for example obtaining his Brexit deal via the flagrant betrayal of his close ally, the DUP. It has to be said that many attributed some of Johnson’s tough strategy to his controversial chief strategist, Dominic Cummings. As it worked out, many concluded that given the intractable stalemate in the Commons, it needed a dose of ruthlessness to break through. Besides, no one in the UK seemed to care much for the DUP anyway. Johnson, a much criticised politician both within and without his party was only the second leader in British history to pull off victory to a fourth term in office (Goodwin, 2019c). Moreover, he had finally emerged victorious on an issue which had brought down Thatcher, Major, Cameron and most recently Theresa May. Brexit ‘Shaped the Outcome’? 

Exit polls revealed 70% of Leave voters supported the Tories whilst Remainers spread their votes thinly among some four anti-­Brexit parties (assuming Labour could then be so described). Our FPTP voting system did the rest. Johnson benefited from this unity while Labour’s ambiguous stance failed to unite what could have been a possible majority. In retrospect the agreement of the opposition parties to hold the election was a disastrous decision and one which will remain a bone of contention possibly for decades. Certainly Leave constituencies registered the highest swings – formerly rock solid Labour seat Bassetlaw, for example, saw an 18% swing to the Conservatives.

‘The Red Wall’ Shattered This was the name given to the array of seats in the north of England and north Midlands which were seen as impregnable Labour strongholds. Conservative pitches were strongly made, however,



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to attract support from disillusioned Labour supporters who felt Labour had deserted them and also betrayed democracy by not supporting delivery of Brexit. On 13 December it was clear that a phenomenal 42 seats on a line north of Derby had fallen to the Tories including such areas of automatic lifelong Labour voters as Workington, Great Grimsby, Ashfield, Bishop Auckland and even Dennis Skinner’s Bolsover. Labour’s vote declined 13% in the northeast and Yorkshire, though by much less – 7% – in London and the south. Overall, one million Labour voters backed the Conservatives, according to data-­analysis company Dataprix (The Economist, 2019). Support for the Tories rose by four points in the most heavily Leave areas: the Midlands, northeast and Yorkshire. However its support was pegged back by 1% in London and the southeast. Over the nation as a whole, as John Curtice (2020) reported: where more than 60% had voted Leave in 2016, Tory support increased by an average 6%. However where support for Remain was over 60% the party’s support fell by an average of 3%. Rebels Disappointed

Dominic Grieve who had led a spirited anti-­Brexit campaign in the Commons, along with his colleague David Gauke, and had been expelled from the party for their trouble, both lost their independent fight to retain their seats. The same went for Labour’s Frank Field and the Lib Dems’ Chukka Umunna, Luciana Berger, Sarah Wollaston and Sam Gymiah. Labour lost votes in both Leave and Remain areas

In strong Leave areas Conservatives gained 6.1% of votes, Lib Dems 2.6% and Greens 1% but Labour lost a thumping 10.4%. So did Labour – which tried, through its ambiguous stance to attract both sides of the Brexit divide – thrive in strong Remain areas? The Lib Dems benefited by 4.7% and the Greens by 1.2%; the Tories’ tough line resulted in a loss of 2.9% but Labour’s subtlety backfired with a loss of 6.4%. These estimates by the BBC and Professor Chris Hanretty, reveal that Labour’s dilemma over Brexit was not solved by its 2019 stance. The so-­called ‘Red Wall’ of northern Labour

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seats, stretching from north Wales in the west to the river Humber in the east collapsed, with Labour’s 117 seats in 2017 falling to 88 in 2019 and Tory seats increasing from 40 to 68 respectively for the same elections.

Class and Voting Table 16.1 reveals just how astonishing this election result was. Oxford scholar Peter Pulzer coined a statement in 1967 subsequently used so often, followed by ‘discuss’ as an exam question: ‘Class is the basis of British party politics; all else is embellishment and detail.’ According to this view, working class votes went to ‘their’ party – Labour – while middle class ones were cast for the Tories. However, in 2019 it was, sensationally, the party of wealth and property which attracted the majority of working-­class votes. The election smashed into smithereens the idea that class is any longer a reliable determinant of voting behaviour. In 1992 the Tories’ lead over Labour among ABC1 (middle class) voters was 30% while Labour had a 10% lead among (working-­class) C2DE voters. As Table 16.2 reveals, the Conservatives reversed this highly traditional aspect of UK voting so that its working-­class majority was 42–33 and its middle-­class one 42–28. Conservative domination of middle-­ class votes was predictable but Labour’s hold on working-­class votes had melted away.

Table 16.1 Voters by social class in 2019 election

AB C1 C2 DE

CON

LAB

LD

SNP

Other

44 45 50 43

31 33 33 37

15 11  9  7

4 4 4 4

6 6 6 6

Source: Rallings and Thrasher, 2019. Notes AB professional and managerial; C1 supervisory or clerical and junior managerial; C2 skilled manual workers; DE semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers.



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Table 16.2 Age and voting

18–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55–64 65+

CON

LAB

Lib Dems

19 23 30 43 49 62

57 55 45 35 27 18

12 11 13 11 13 12

Source: data from Rallings and Thrasher, 2019.

Voting behaviour guru, John Curtice (2020), sums up the changing demography as follows: Older voters and those with few if any educational qualifications voted heavily for Leave, while younger voters and university graduates voted for Remain … Conservatives were promoting a policy that was less popular among its traditional middle class base of support, while Labour found itself identified with a stance that was less likely to appeal to its traditional working class supporters. The Brexit divide saw the two parties fishing in electorally unfamiliar waters.

Here again, the figures are hard to credit by psephological standards; age had become as big a differentiator as class used to be. It’s possible to say that the older a voter is the more likely he/she is likely to vote Tory and the younger they are, Labour. Voters arrive on the electoral roll at 18 and until they reach around 40 are likely to vote Labour. After that, at a slightly lower rate, they are more likely to vote Tory.

Gender The gender axis offered some surprises too. Conservatives registered a 19% lead among men over Labour and a 6% lead with women. ‘Blue collar men think [Labour] are dreadful sponging, effete wasters’, offered a (clearly biased) Simon Clarke, Tory MP for Middlesbrough South and Cleveland (The Economist, 2019).

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Turnout When the election was called for 12 December there were fears dark nights and possible poor weather would inhibit voters from turning out. In the event this did not happen as, while turnout was down a shade on 2017, it was well up to recent percentages suggesting voters were well aware of the vote’s importance. Turnout fell most dramatically in seats where Labour was especially strong suggesting some traditional supporters might have stayed at home (Curtice, 2019).

Tactical Voting Pollster Peter Kellner (2019) reported on the failed hope that tactical voting would help save Remainers by helping to unite their votes in opposition to Johnson’s campaign. The Observer had nominated 50 seats where tactical voting might defeat the Tory candidate: only 13 did so. Of those, nine were SNP gains in Scotland

Figure 16.1 Turnout falls slightly in 2019. Source: © 2020 House of Commons Library.



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and only four were in England: Putney and Portsmouth South returned Labour MPs, while Richmond Park and St Albans two Lib Dems. Kellner added that poll data showed  Lib Dem supporters were reluctant to help Corbyn become prime minister. Likewise Tory Remainers feared voting for a badly led Lib Dem party that might support Corbyn. These Tories preferred a Brexit Britain governed by Johnson to a stop Brexit government led by Corbyn. The big lesson is that tactical voting needs not just a common enemy but a common vision, shared by Labour and Lib Dem leaders … it was not the case with Swinson and Corbyn.

Scotland After its dip in the 2017 election down to 35 MPs the SNP bounced back in 2019 with 48 MPs, not far short of the 56 it won in 2015. It increased its vote by 8%, trouncing Scottish Tories and posing Johnson with an acute ‘independence referendum’ problem if repeated at the 2021 national elections. The Lib Dems lost their leader’s Dumbarton seat but held on in four others, while Labour managed only the single seat in Edinburgh South.

Wales Wales used to be another Labour stronghold but 2019 saw it lose six seats to the Tories including three to Tory female candidates.

Northern Ireland The DUP’s loyalty to the faithless Johnson was exacerbated by their loss of two seats including that of its Westminster leader, Nigel Dodds. The Observer noted that, ‘these results could herald major changes in the balance of power, if, as expected, another election in the province is called next year to break the deadlock in the Northern Ireland Assembly’ (Ford, 2019).

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Political Parties Despite the fact the two major parties as in 2017 again took nearly 80% of votes, the impact of the election on UK political parties has been profound. Brexit Party

This newly minted party – initiated January 2019 – rode the crest of a pro-­Brexit wave in the May Euro-­elections where it emerged as the leading vote and seat taker. Commentators were quick to point out that the UK now had a four-­party system in which polls worked differently and results were more difficult to predict. However, things changed once Boris Johnson became PM because of his total commitment to deliver on Brexit. Opinion on EU membership had polarised astonishingly on the Leave–Remain spectrum with the Brexit Party attracting the support of a large section of the Leave vote, including former Tory supporters, furious that Brexit had not been delivered. But, as is often the case with such losses of faith, strong feelings survived. So when Johnson entered the ring, apparently totally determined to achieve his oft repeated slogan of ‘Get Brexit Done!’ they began to drift back into the Tory fold. Farage’s party, from commanding poll support in the mid teens, fell back until when the campaign started it was down into single figures. Keen to strike a deal, Farage volunteered that his candidates would stand down in seats already held by Tory MPs. Johnson accepted this major concession but refused to offer any deal. In the end the Brexit Party polled only 642,303 votes or 2% of the whole and won no seats at all; even their chairman, Richard Tice, failed to win Hartlepool as he had confidently predicted. Boris Johnson had certainly succeeded in putting Farage ‘back in his box’. Far from being a transformed four-­party system, the two biggest parties accounted for 76% of the vote, only a few points down on the 2017 election result. Liberal Democrats

From its heyday in 2005 when the party won 52 seats, its trajectory has been mostly down with a number of leaders tried and then



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rejected. The election of Jo Swinson, a young and confident Scottish MP who had served as a minister in Cameron’s coalition government, initially breathed new life into the Lib Dems. However in the bitter game of political poker created by Brexit, Swinson came off very badly and left her party once again languishing with only 11 Commons representatives. Her apparent belief that making the Lib Dems the most Remain party in an already crowded field, unravelled disastrously. Part of the reason might have been her somewhat self-­regarding expectation that a tsunami of Remain support might propel her into No 10. The loss of her Dumbarton seat added a sad note to her short sojourn as leader. Lib Dems’ consolation prize was that they increased their share of the vote by 4% but for Swinson never was an adage more true than ‘politics is a rough old game’. Labour

The surprise choice of Jeremy Corbyn as leader in 2015 initiated a period when the chances of a genuinely socialist government in Britain seemed a real possibility. Never mind that critics pointed to 1983 when Labour’s manifesto – ‘the longest suicide note in history’ quipped Gerald Kaufman – presaged a land-­slide loss to the Tories, the Momentum Group formed within the party set out to entrench socialism into the fibre of the party. This to a degree happened: far left advisers like Seamus Milne, Andrew Murray and Karie Murphy enabled the left-­wing faction to take control of Labour’s power centres, helped also by the powerful left-­wing union leader of Unite, Len McLuskey. Labour’s membership swelled to over half a million but the rest of the electorate of over 40 million remained stubbornly immune to Corbyn’s charms. Critics argued that someone with no executive experience, a view on patriotism that many saw as negative and a record of supporting terrorist leaders, would never endear himself to the majority of British voters. In 2017 Corbyn’s electoral surge which almost equalled the Conservative vote, appeared to have proved, to his supporters at least, that he could easily pull down a Tory poll lead, even a big one. The result, the lowest number of MPs since 1935, left many Labour members in denial: how could a posh Old Etonian Oxbridge graduate win 50 Labour seats, many of which had been

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staunchly Labour since the 1920s (Leigh, Don Valley) and 1930s (Bassetlaw, Wakefield and Bishop Auckland) not to mention Bolsover which had never been anything but red? And all this after a decade of Tory government which had imposed harsh austerity policies and handled Brexit with the very opposite of panache. The result truly was a humiliating defeat, though the question remained whether the party’s future leadership would be a continuation of ‘Corbynism’ – the party machinery was still controlled by his supporters – or someone with a new approach. On 4 April 2020, Sir Keir Starmer was elected leader and soon reorganised his shadow cabinet to exclude Corbyn supporters, in pursuit of a new direction which would not be ‘hard left’. 

Box 16.1 Labour’s ‘competency problem’ Matthew Goodwin suggests that, despite his fine performance in 2017, Corbyn ‘had a very big competency problem … In the eyes of most voters Corbyn was neither credible or competent.’ A total of 76% of voters were not satisfied with his conduct as Leader of the Opposition; two out of three were ‘unclear’ regarding his position on Brexit; while many Labour policies were popular, the party by some margin was not seen as a credible manager of the economy (only 16% trusted him on this issue while 34% trusted Johnson); and 57% said it likely Britain would enter a recession if Labour won the election (compared to 39% for the Tories). Moreover, while the Tories led on the economy, crime and Brexit, they were not so far behind on Labour’s golden issue, the NHS (based on Goodwin, 2019a). Was Corbyn non-­credible as a potential PM? His supporters were justified in blaming the relentless and often mendacious negative campaign waged by the Tory press, especially the Sun and Mail but it also has to be said that from his election in 2015 British people had ample time to observe, listen and judge Corbyn themselves. An effective Labour opposition leader must be able to handle the inevitable media criticism.



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Conservatives

Boris Johnson’s ambition, despite his often buffoonish image and behaviour, was always to become PM. His flagrant infidelities to a long-­suffering wife and family, being sacked twice for lying, his obsessive desire to entertain, even at the cost of appearing incompetent, plus a stint as foreign secretary where his dysfunctionality seemed palpable, ultimately did not frustrate the fulfilling of his viscerally held ambition. And it has to be said that his accession injected new energy into the party’s fading authority under Theresa May. Moreover, his willingness to strain the constitution to its limits as well as betray or punish long-­term friends and allies did not prevent his eventual triumph. Like all successful democratic politicians he had read the electorate’s mind accurately: they were sick and fed up with Brexit wrangling and wanted an end to it even if at an economic cost. Just how much of a cost is the question which haunts the Conservatives in the wake of their famous victory. To voters with low salaries or on benefits, the hopeful post-­Brexit vision offered them, or even the promise of major government investment in the ‘red wall’ areas, seemed like a worthwhile bet when registering their votes. But having promised so much during his campaign and since his victory, can Johnson truly become the mythical One Nation unifier of the country? Will Brexit achieve a higher standard of living for the low paid or will it merely lead to bankruptcies, more unemployment, food banks and homelessness? And all this when so many of his ardent Tory supporters hate the idea of government investment in the economy of any kind? Moreover, the routing of Tories in Scotland plus voter indignation north of the border at Brexit, has exacerbated the threat to the union. Johnson rejected Nicola Sturgeon’s request for a second independence referendum but if the SNP’s support continues to soar, such a position will create acute political problems for him and his party. Boris Johnson appeared to have worked political miracles in winning the 2019 election but, given the additional burden of surviving the COVID-19 pandemic, delivering on the promises which made his victory possible will be a completely different matter.

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Box 16.2 Johnson unified the leave vote Chris Mullin’s novel The Friends of Harry Perkins (2019) contains this piece of advice from an old Labour activist to an ingénue candidate in a northern constituency: ‘Always remember that all the instincts of the working classes are conservative. On race, patriotism, the bomb, Brexit – you name it. It’s just that they happen to vote Labour.’ Accordingly, under May the Tories had deliberately set out to woo the socially conservative Labour voters who had voted Leave in 2016. Goodwin (2019c) cites the success of this strategy in that from the Euro-­elections of 2019 to the December election,  Conservatives surged from 36 to 76 per cent; the percentage of Conservatives returning to the fold [from Brexit Party] increased from 58% to 85%, and the percentage of Conservatives defecting to the BP crashed from 30 to 4%. Post election polls confirm the story; Johnson retained 85% of people who had voted for them in 2017 and 74% of people voting Leave in 2016. Labour, in sharp contrast only retained 72% of its 2017 electorate and not even half of Remainers.  Geography also gave Tories an advantage. The Leave vote was concentrated evenly across the country while Remainers were concentrated in cities. Of the 401 seats which had voted Leave Johnson won 73% – 292 seats. By contrast, of the 231 Remain seats, Labour won only 41% – 95 seats. They also won one-­third of Remain seats where Farage stood down his candidates (Goodwin, 2019c).

Matthew Goodwin’s Conclusions The 2019 election will be presented by future historians as the most consequential since World War II. It will be seen as an election which the British people produced what their elected representa-



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tives had proved unable to provide: an answer to Brexit. It is tempting to trace the Conservative capture of Labour heartlands such as Ashfield, Blyth Valley, Don Valley, Bassetlaw and Leith to Brexit. But that is too simplistic. What this election confirms is that new divisions over values, of which Brexit is only one manifestation, are cutting across our older ‘left versus right’ divisions over economic questions. Voters care as much about their cultural security – about tradition, identity and belonging – as they do about their economic security. Johnson has offered a package of measures – increased public spending, rebalance the regions with a pledge to respect the vote for Brexit, reform immigration and clamp down on Islamist terrorism. Goodwin sees the triumph of this offer as evidence of a ‘new unwritten law of politics: that it is easier for the right to move left on the economy than it is for the left to move right on identity’. He also asks whether 2019 might have marked one of those rare ‘critical turning points’ in British politics as in 1924, 1945 and 1997, when people reject their ‘normal’ voting behaviour and the pendulum swings decisively in a completely new direction (Goodwin, 2019c). He concludes that rather than being a pivotal election, 2019 marks ‘the latest episode in a longer term realignment’. He notes that in the UK, as in the US, many voters ‘are putting their cultural preferences ahead of traditional party loyalties’. Working-­class voters have either adopted, or have always held, certain values congruent with right-­wing thinking – on taxation, crime, patriotism and immigration. ‘Brexit has basically accelerated a longer term re-­ alignment in British politics and is reshaping the country’s political geography, pushing it into a more polarised state’ (Goodwin, 2019c). Finally, in conclusion, one of Boris Johnson’s greatest heroes can be paraphrased. This ‘Brexit Election’ was not the end of Brexit, it was not even the beginning of the end of Brexit, but it was the end of the beginning. Where subsequent Brexit negotiations take British party politics and Britain’s place economically, and in the world as a power to be respected and listened to, is something which awaits us in the future. Writing in The Times shortly after the election, Clare Foges reinforced Goodwin’s ‘cultural’ explanatory theme by claiming the Tory win was about a ‘silent majority pushing back against the shouty warriors of woke’ (Foges, 2020).

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Two Manchester University academics add their own analysis: Ethnocentric white school leavers regarded immigrants as a threatening outgroup – a ‘them’ – whose numbers should be strictly controlled. Cosmopolitan graduates saw immigration as an economic opportunity and valued open borders as an end in themselves, while many ethnic minority voters saw the hostility ethnocentric white voters expressed towards immigrants as a new expression of the old prejudices they and their parents had faced in earlier decades. (Sobolewski and Ford, 2020)

further Reading Comprehensive analyses of the election are yet to appear but at the time of writing the best short comprehensive analysis is to be found – as readers will have assumed from my references – in Goodwin’s Spectator piece in December 2019. The press articles listed below will also provide useful reading plus the BBC website. BBC (2020) Taking Control: The Dominic Cummings Story, BBC2, 17 March. Beckett, A. (2019) The age of perpetual crisis: how the 2010s disrupted everything but resolved nothing, Guardian, 17 December. Curtice, J. (2019) General Election 2019: What’s behind the Conservative Victory? BBC, 13 December. Curtice, J. (2020) Brave new world: understanding the 2019 general election, Political Insight, March. Foges, C. (2020) Tory victory was a verdict on culture wars, The Times, 23 December. Ford, R. (2019) UK: the new political landscape, Observer, 15 December. Goodwin, M. (2019a) Blue collar and true blue, the audacious Boris Johnson alliance, Sunday Times, 15 December. Goodwin, M. (2019b) Meet the new ‘left behind’: Labour’s middle class elite, Sunday Times, 22 December. Goodwin, M. (2019c) Nine lessons from the election: Boris was lucky – but he also played his hand right, Spectator, 24 December. Grieve, D. (2019) Even in Tory heartlands, Boris Johnson was merely the lesser of two evils, Guardian, 23 December. Hennig, B. (2020) Margins of victory in 2019, Political Insight, March. Johns, R., Henderson, A., Carman, C. and Larner, J. (2020) Brexit or independence? Scotland’s general election, Political Insight, March.



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Kellner, P. (2019) Tactical voting was set to be Remainers’ saviour: so what went wrong? Observer, 15 December. Kenny, M. (2020) English nationalism, the 2019 Election and the future of the British state, Political Insight, March. Mullin, C. (2019) The Friends of Harry Perkins, Scribner. Portillo, M. (2019) Unreliable. Shambolic. Boastful. That’s what I thought, but now I’m a Boris believer, Sunday Times, 22 December. Pulzer, P. (1967) Political Representation and Elections in Britain, George Allen Unwin.  Rallings, C. and Thrasher, M. (2019) The new political map of the UK, Sunday Times, 15 December. Rutter, J. (2019) How Brexit has battered our reputation for government, Guardian, 27 December. Sobolewski, M. and Ford, R. (2020) Brexit and Britain’s culture wars, Political Insight, March. The Economist (2019) What’s the story, northern Tories? Who are the Conservatives’ new voters in the north? 18 December. Tonge, J. (2020) General election 2019: Northern Ireland, Political Insight, March.

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Part V THE EXECUTIVE

The legislature creates the laws of the land and approves the broad policies by which the country is to be governed; however, it is the executive which formulates policy and proposes draft laws for approval by the legislature. Carrying out agreed policies, turning aspiration into reality, therefore, is the job of the executive. In the UK it comprises essentially: PM and cabinet; ministers and civil servants; departments of state; and non-­governmental organisations or ‘quangos’. Part V analyses how each element of the executive is constructed and how it operates. Originally, in medieval times the tip of the executive pyramid was the monarch, ruling all he, except in case of Elizabeth I, surveyed in a kingdom which morphed from England to incorporate Wales, Scotland and, until 1920, the whole of Ireland, not to mention, of course, an empire destined eventually to cover a quarter of the world’s surface. These monarchs were often peripatetic; Henry II constantly patrolling the whole of England plus his (then) possessions in France, ruling from the saddle of his horse. Usually the royal court, comprising principal officers and advisers, travelled along with him. Monarchs varied in quality and indeed longevity: some, like Henry, were talented administrators and law­makers; others, like Henry V, were essentially short-­lived warriors, while others were weak kings, like Edward II, youthful tyrants, like

Richard II, or, like Henry VI, just uninterested in the responsibilities of power. Many of them had constantly to be aware that the absolute power they wielded was much sought after by others. Ruthless rivals might consider subversive propaganda, civil war or even straightforward murder well worth the risk as the means of donning the royal ermine and wearing it long enough to achieve legitimacy and enjoy the godlike spoils of absolute power. Most of the time early monarchs drew their officers and advisers from the ranks of the aristocracy or the church but this began to change. Henry VIII employed Thomas Wolsey, the son of a butcher and cattle dealer, as his closest adviser; when he fell from power, after being raised on high, he chose Thomas Cromwell, son of a blacksmith, to take his place. Maybe his daughter with Ann Boleyn was a little influenced by this tendency; Francis Walsingham, the hugely influential principal secretary to Elizabeth I, was from the ranks of the ‘gentry’ rather than the traditional aristocracy. Inevitably, the major change was caused by the Civil War, 1642–49, in which the victorious revolt of parliament was led by the MP for Huntingdon, Oliver Cromwell, born into the lower ranks of the landed gentry. Thereafter the nature of executive power changed dramatically as the idea of democracy began gradually to permeate the political system and national culture, with the monarch plus court gradually being superseded by the ‘prime minister’ and cabinet. Chapter 17 looks at PM and cabinet, the nerve centre of government decision-­making or, as its sometimes called when advisers and civil service are included, the Core Executive.

17 THE PRIME MINISTER AND CABINET

From the 1688 Glorious Revolution onwards, as explained in previous chapters, it was the dominant force in parliament which determined the membership and colour of the executive. When the Hanoverians were drafted in, in 1714, George I was not keen on the business of government; his English language skills were so poor he required an intermediary (plus interpreter) to communicate with his cabinet. This gave the opportunity to Sir Robert Walpole, an astute member of the landed gentry and a Whig, to dominate the first half of the eighteenth century in the new role of prime minister, as Britain’s evolution towards a representative democracy continued. After the Great Reform Act 1832, PMs, rather than being the monarch’s favourite, became the leaders of the majority party after a general election; this person now was more than the ‘first among equals’ Walpole was originally said to be: he chose members of the cabinet and was the prototype of the modern version of PM we have today.

CABINET By the late nineteenth century, the UK ‘cabinet’ was the most senior committee in government: it comprised all the major portfolios and took all the major decisions. To be a member carried authority and prestige; in effect it was, and still is, the talent pool, the ‘short-­list’, from which national leaders, PMs, are usually drawn; the exceptions are when a party, as in 1997, comes to power

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after a long period in opposition. So it was that the first group of candidates to succeed Theresa May in 2019 were found among her cabinet colleagues: Jeremy Hunt, Michael Gove, Rory Stewart and Boris Johnson. SIZE AND COMPOSITION

Cabinets have varied in size over the years but usually comprise up to two dozen ministers. During the exceptional periods of the two world wars, cabinets were a quarter of that size to facilitate quick and effective decision-­making. During peacetime, cabinet contains the main ministers – chancellor, home secretary, foreign secretary, health, work and pensions and so forth; also included are the more specialist jobs of leader of the House, chief whip and attorney-­general, plus the occasional ‘all purpose’ archaic appointments like lord privy seal and lord president of the council, who often chair cabinet committees or perform specific tasks for the PM. When making appointments, PMs will take into account such things as: ability and experience – it was obvious George Osborne would be Cameron’s chancellor in 2010; gender and region – it is important cabinets should contain as many women as possible as well as a spread of regional backgrounds; groupings in the party – Cameron needed to reflect Euro-­sceptic opinion, for example; and, of key importance, loyalty – Jeremy Hunt probably retained his place in cabinet as health secretary after the 2015 general election partly for this reason. The Brexit Effect

Inevitably political parties are coalitions of differing points of view. Thatcher had to balance her cabinet ‘wets’ (consensual approach, high public spending) with ‘dries’ (those who followed her own tight control of public spending, reduce role of government policies). Cameron in turn had to balance his own party members with those of his coalition partner, the Lib Dems. And Theresa May was forced to balance, not always successfully, supporters of a ‘hard’ Brexit with those favouring a ‘soft’ version. Her first cabinet placed three prominent Leave campaigners to



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the most Brexit relating jobs in government: the Departments for Exiting the EU (DExEU); International Trade (DIT) and the Foreign and Commonwealth office (FCO). She lost her foreign secretary (Boris Johnson) and her Brexit secretary (David Davis) when both resigned in response to her July 2018 ‘Chequers’ proposed deal. ‘Brexit War Cabinet’

This was established to oversee the highly detailed Brexit negotiations in 2016. It was chaired by the PM and contained the three Brexit secretaries plus those for defence, environment, business, Cabinet Office (de facto DPM) plus the home secretary and the chancellor. The 2019 Institute for Government (IfG) study (Lloyd, 2019), noted that Theresa May’s government suffered 41 ministerial resignations, since the 2017 election debacle (pp. 7–12). Table 17.1 shows the surprisingly high turnover membership of this committee 2017–18.

Box 17.1 Johnson warns cabinet In January 2020, the Observer reported that Boris Johnson had told his cabinet ‘Shape up or I’ll sack you within weeks’. In a move advised by his strategist, Dominic Cummings, his surprising injunction was to insist ministers ‘concentrate on delivery and hard work that will “level up” the country rather than “touring TV stations” and trying to raise their personal profiles in the media’. ‘The decision of the prime minister to exert his personal authority was part of a clear attempt … to establish control from No 10 and represents a break with tradition’ (Helm and Savage, 2020).

261

Bradley

Williamson

Gove

Clark

Fox

Davis

Johnson

Rudd

Hammond

Lidington

May

Note  Backed Remain

Backed Leave

Swing voter.

Gove

Clark

Fox

Raab

Hunt

Javid

Hammond

Lidington

May

September 2018

Bradley

Bradley

Williamson Williamson

Gove

Clark

Fox

Davis

Johnson

Javid

Hammond

Lidington

May

April 2018

Source: Institute for Government analysis of Cabinet Office data on cabinet committee membership.

Northern Ireland Office

Fallon

Ministry of Defence

Davis

Gove

Davis

DExEU

Johnson

Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra)

Johnson

FCO

Rudd

Clark

Rudd

Home Office

Hammond

Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy

Hammond

Her Majesty’s Treasury

Green

Fox

Gummer

Cabinet Office

May

November 2017 February 2018

DIT

May

March 2017

EU Exit and Trade (Strategy and Negotiations (Sub-committee))

PM

Department

Table 17.1 Changes in Brexit ‘War Cabinet’ membership over time

Bradley

Williamson

Gove

Clark

Fox

Barclay

Hunt

Javid

Hammond

Lidington

May

November 2018

262 the executive



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Box 17.2 rapid churn of ministers harmful The IfG’s (2020) report on ‘Government reshuffles’, revealed that since 1997 there had been 18 housing ministers, 16 leaders of the House and seven justice ministers since 2010. On average secretaries of state serve just two years before being moved on: only a few months longer than football managers and far shorter than business CEOs who on average survive 5.5 years. The IfG argues that so short a time in office prevents ministers from making a difference. ‘Ministers are moved on just as they get to grips with their role, and departments suffer constant changes in direction. This has crippled efforts to deliver long term reform.’ The IfG urged Boris Johnson to establish an expectation that cabinet ministers serve a minimum of three years in the job. ‘Rapid turnover of ministers is exacerbated by the fact that the civil servants who advise them also change roles often.’ Tom Sasse, IfG senior researcher said: Playing musical chairs with the ministers in charge of key public priorities is not a serious way to run the country. It is disruptive, wasteful and hinders government efforts to deliver the kind of long-­term reforms needed to improve people’s lives. Dominic Cummings is right to argue that civil servants need to stay in their jobs longer and develop more expertise.

COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY

This principle – that every member of the government should toe official party policy – is enshrined in ‘Questions of Procedure for Ministers’ (known as the Ministerial Code). The obvious aim of this rule is that the business of government is a collective effort; if even one of its members cavils in public it affects the viability of the whole enterprise. Resignation is the honourable route out of such a dilemma; being sacked the less so. For Theresa May, cabinet

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d­ iscipline fell into two periods: before 2017 and then after that inglorious election result. Before the 2017 election ‘when the PM was riding high in the polls and looked unassailable, collective discipline was fairly normal. But her authority was shredded by a disastrous election campaign’ (Lloyd, 2019, p. 10). Divergent views on the most desirable Brexit outcome were freely expressed by Liam Fox, Philip Hammond and most intrusively by Boris Johnson, without any public reproof or apparent consequence whatsoever. After the July 2018 ‘Chequers Plan’ caused high level resignations, cabinet discipline virtually broke down and it became obvious rival candidates for May’s soon to be vacant job were now intent upon burnishing their credentials for No 10 rather than following the official government line. Given her loss of authority why did May last so long in office? Two main reasons: Tory MPs feared a general election in the febrile atmosphere of Brexit conflict could let hard-­left Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour into power; and, second, there were no obvious alternative candidates for what seemed a very poisoned chalice whilst the Brexit process persisted in being so intractably conflicted. CABINET FUNCTIONS

As the foremost committee in the nation, cabinet: determines the main policy guidelines – often led by the PM’s judgment; plans the handling of legislation – cabinet decides when to hold the major debates and who will speak for the government; and leads, along with the PM, the governing party in parliament and the country, with members of cabinet speaking accordingly in the House and on the media. In addition, the cabinet controls and coordinates the various government departments and provides a forum for the resolution of disputes between departments and between senior colleagues (see Box 17.3 later in the chapter). CABINET COMMITTEES

Government business is so weighty that cabinet would be overwhelmed without cabinet committees and subcommittees playing major delegated roles. When there is full agreement these committees carry the authority of full cabinet but when problems arise in a



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committee the issue might have to be referred to full cabinet for resolution. The work of these committees used, for no very good reason, to be secret but in recent decades their activities are much better known. During the 1970s their number rocketed to over 400 but during the 1980s Thatcher reduced them to just over 100. At the time of writing Johnson’s key adviser, Dominic Cummings, has declared war on what he claims is inefficient decision-­making procedures, including cabinet committees which he argues are too slow and leak too much information. The incoming PM in July 2019, Johnson, scrapped all of these committees as he focused on ‘getting Brexit done’, but Cummings has urged that they should be replaced by a system based on: ‘The XO committee, chaired by Michael Gove, was set up last year to coordinate the government’s emergency no-­deal Brexit preparations. It met every day and its cast list would change depending on which Brexit-­related issue was being discussed’ (Maidment, 2020). At the time of writing there is no indication Cummings’ intentions have been realised. CABINET BUSINESS

Typically, discussion in cabinet will flow from papers or verbal reports presented by ministers, with the leader of the House dealing with parliamentary business. In the 1970s cabinets dealt with voluminous papers and continued sitting for hours. Thatcher was less interested in discussion; as a ‘conviction politician’ she felt she knew what she wanted and merely wished her ministers to deliver it competently. Blair also shortened cabinet meetings, sometimes into mere series of brief verbal reports lasting less than an hour. Blair was also notorious for informal meetings – no minutes taken, often sitting on a sofa – with his unelected aides in which ways ahead were charted. May, as we have seen, used a cabinet committee to act as her Brexit ‘War Cabinet’. CABINET OFFICE

Until the early part of the twentieth century cabinet business took place without any record being taken. Sometimes members were unaware of decisions being taken at the nerve centre of the largest empire there had ever been. Cabinets in those days were ‘informal

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affairs – delightfully simple’ says Mackintosh, where members might well have attended school and Oxbridge together and been further connected by ties of blood or marriage. As Mackintosh observed, ‘it discussed with little pre-­digestion and no secretarial assistance all the issues of any importance’ (Mackintosh, 1962, p. 4). Sometimes members fell asleep and failed even to register that major decisions had been taken. But during World War I, such a casual approach could no longer be tolerated: when so many lives were at risk, accurate statistics and good decisions were at a premium. To this end David Lloyd George set up the Cabinet Office, headed by Sir Maurice Hankey. This grew rapidly, along with the hugely complex government responsibilities for the economy and public services, into a very high-­ powered unit which coordinates briefings for the cabinet on the top policy issues: security, foreign policy, the economy. It also provides management of the civil service, monitoring its efficiency; and it handles the disbursement of those honours and appointments in the PM’s gift. It is staffed by about 1000 people, many of them high-­fliers drawn in from all over Whitehall, who carry out these functions and, as important, follow up to ensure than policies are carried out in practice. It operates through six secretariats: Economic, Overseas and Defence, European, Science and Technology, Civil Contingencies plus Security and Intelligence. In addition, it has seen the invention of several new units, including the Social Exclusion Unit, the Policy and Innovation Unit and the Future Strategy Unit. Britain lacks the kind of vast staffing the US president has but the Cabinet Office provides, in effect, something not too dissimilar to a White House staff to advise and serve the person at the pinnacle of UK government. CABINET SECRETARY

The list of those who have filled the office since Sir Maurice Hankey (1916–35), including Sir Edward Bridges, Sir Burke Trend and Sir Norman Brook, is a roll-­call of the most important figures in the running of twentieth-­century government and the forming of its policies. The holder of this office is the key figure who connects the political side of the executive with the non-­partisan side



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– the civil service – which implements government decisions. As such, the cabinet secretary sits at the PM’s right hand, acting, in the words of Burke Trend, as ‘the prime minister’s permanent secretary’. Possibly this was why Sir Robin Butler (cabinet secretary 1988–98) resented the intimacy granted by Blair to aides like Alistair Campbell and Jonathan Powell, who, to a degree, shouldered him out of the role traditionally performed by his distinguished predecessors. Some analysts of public administration argue that the role of the cabinet secretary has diminished, losing the battle for the ear of the PM.

THE PRIME MINISTER Some commentators argue that the UK PM has become so powerful the office is more like a ‘presidency’. How did it become so powerful during the twentieth century? The reasons I suggest are fourfold. First, two the world wars placed a huge focus and expectation upon the PM. Lloyd George became synonymous with victory in the first conflict and Churchill with the second. Resisting the same formidable enemy bestowed upon the occupant of No 10 a key importance as the leader of the nation. Second, responsibility for wartime decision-­making entailed a streamlining of the bureaucracy and the reduction in cabinet size, focusing more power in the hands of the PM. Third, the electronic media have transformed the PM from a distant figure in the nineteenth century to someone, by the late twentieth, known, almost intimately, in everyone’s home, not just voice, as with Baldwin, but face, family and personality too. Even if PMs are not wholly in charge of their government machines, their media profiles make it appear as if they are. When PMs struggle, as Theresa May did, woefully, over Brexit during her time in power, the whole country could empathise with this diabetes-­ suffering politician’s resilience and stamina, even if they doubted her policies or even political competence. Finally, given that the role of PM is not defined by any written UK constitution, two incumbents in particular extended the limits of prime ministerial power, in the persons of Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair, and they have left a permanent legacy.

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ROLES OF THE PRIME MINISTER CHIEF EXECUTIVE – HIRING AND FIRING

PMs head up the government of the day: they have proved that they command trust and respect by winning an election. They appoint members of the cabinet and all the junior ministerial ranks too, though, unlike the head of government in many other countries, for example the USA, British PMs are limited in whom they can appoint, to members of either of the Houses of parliament, and even then there is a limit on recruits from the Lords – which is often used as a ‘back door’ for PMs to recruit ministers who are not members of parliament; some 20% of ministers, predominantly in the ‘junior’ category, are appointed from the Lords. PMs also need to ‘manage’ these appointees, dismissing when necessary and implementing regular ‘reshuffles’ to refresh the energy, competence and appeal of the team. Critics argue that limiting ministerial appointments in this way severely diminishes the ‘talent pool’ available for top positions in the service of the nation. PMs have to avoid suffering too many resignations. When Theresa May lost eight cabinet colleagues in the 12 months following her disastrous 2017 election (when Andrea Leadsom resigned (20 May 2019) she was the 36th cabinet minister to do so) her authority was much diminished – and indeed, close to being extinguished altogether. CHIEF POLICY-­MAKER

Departments generate the bulk of detailed new measures, based on their experience and expertise, but the general tone and direction of policy is set by the person at the top. Thatcher, for example, set the framework of lower taxes and market forces and departments sought to develop new measures within these guidelines. In another sense, the aspirant PM, namely the leader of the opposition, has the job of leading policy in a way which will win voter support. When Blair became Labour leader in 1994 he worked hard, as Neil Kinnock had before him, to drag his party away from (then) unpopular left-­wing policy positions towards a new ‘centre-­ground’ programme attractive to the electorate. After 13 years of opposition, Cameron, elected leader in 2005, performed



the prime minister and cabinet

a similar feat with his party from the right end of the spectrum as he approached the 2010 election. Theresa May launched a bid for the political centre ground when she became PM in July 2016, promising to right ‘burning injustices’ in society and work for those ‘just about managing’. Sadly for her, the overwhelming role demanded by Brexit, so dominated her government’s available time that little of this agenda was ever addressed let alone delivered. Tim Shipman, author of Fall Out, argues that Theresa May lacked policy-­making ability and in her first year depended very much on her long-­time aide and joint chief of staff, Nick Timothy. Indeed, May’s reliance on Timothy and other joint chief, Fiona Hill, was a cause of much discontent across Whitehall for the way both aides appeared, in imperial fashion, to exercise their boss’s authority by proxy. Being PM is a lonely task and often close allies and unelected aides become a major source of policy advice. Tony Blair, for example, relied on his chief of staff Jonathan Powell and his press secretary Alistair Campbell for policy advice and his long-­time friend Peter Mandelson who, after 1992, became an elected member of the Commons. PMs work very closely with departments of state in policy development but also like to have their own experts to armour them against the ‘vested interests’ of departments themselves. To this end, all PMs since Harold Wilson have maintained a Policy Unit within No 10; in 2015 the head was Camilla Cavendish, who had succeeded Jo Johnson, younger brother of London mayor Boris Johnson. Theresa May appointed John Godfrey and when he resigned in June 2017, James Marshall. In August 2019 Boris Johnson appointed as its head Munira Mirzo, astonishingly a former member of the Trotskyite Revolutionary Communist Party. PARTY-­POLITICAL LEADER

To maintain control of a regular majority in the Commons, the PM must be able to rely on party support. In the media age, the PM is the brand leader, synonymous with both party and government and as such crucial to the election prospects of his party. It is the PM who opens the most important debates in the Commons or makes the announcements designed to persuade voters to keep

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faith with the government at the next election. If successful, MPs of the governing party will give the PM their support. PM’s questions (PMQs) is a weekly period of 30 minutes which does little to illuminate the nation’s understanding of issues but, depending on how the game of ‘insult and be insulted’ plays out, does help to maintain party morale. A party leader who is regularly trashed at PMQs – as Iain Duncan Smith tended to be – will not for long command the respect of back-­benchers. During election campaigns, moreover, the PM must lead the contest for voters’ favour, travelling the country, hosting press conferences, debating on television. Cameron used to dominate Ed Miliband and then Jeremy Corbyn at PMQs; May, not the most gifted of Despatch Box performers, usually managed to out point Corbyn but only when aided by a noisy majority of her own MPs. Theresa May’s role as party leader fluctuated wildly. After a year in office the shy, hardworking vicar’s daughter standing was so high her decision to call a snap election resulted in her being forced, against her political ‘skill-­set’ to be the focus of a presidential campaign. When that role imploded and her majority was lost, MP and party members began to reappraise her more realistically: she was no Margaret Thatcher. Managing the party was essentially the job which had found her predecessor wanting too. David Cameron had pleaded with his party to ‘stop banging on about Europe’ in his 2006 conference speech but found himself making concessions to his Euro-­sceptic MPs and to UKIP’s demands on immigration policy. As UKIP’s threat to Tory votes grew, so did the imperatives urged by his Euro-­sceptic MPs. Finally, in 2013, in a bid to outflank UKIP’s appeal he offered voters a referendum providing they returned him to office in 2015. By 2016 Cameron had resigned and May his successor but the problem of party management had not become any easier: quite the opposite. The Leave win had energised the ‘sceptics’ the hard core of whom formed the ERG, also known, more swashbuckingly perhaps, as ‘The Spartans’. Led by the zealous Steve Baker and the quirky, slightly antique and fabulously rich Jacob Rees-­Mogg, May was lauded when she urged a ‘hard’ Brexit but then demonised when she U-­turned with her ‘Chequers Plan’ towards a soft Brexit. EU leaders were justified in complaining that they were being forced to deal with a problem originating as an internal Tory Party problem. It was May’s failure,



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once robbed of her majority, to persuade her party, especially the ERG, to compromise that dominated UK politics from June 2017 onwards. Boris Johnson’s popularity with party members in parliament and the individual membership has never been in doubt, the latter’s faith untroubled by the various scandals which have characterised his life and career. Few premiers can have begun their time in office with a more secure political base. However, even a few weeks into his premiership sections of his MPs were expressing dissent over a number of issues including: employment of Huawei, a strongly Chinese-­government-linked firm in establishing UK’s 5G network; go-­ahead given to HS2 fast rail project costing possibly over £100 billion; and attempts to weaken if not dismantle the BBC. SENIOR UK REPRESENTATIVE

As the head of government, the PM travels the world meeting fellow heads and seeking to advance Britain’s interests. Personal relationships can be crucial in winning support at key times, for example Thatcher’s friendship with Ronald Reagan and the support he rendered during the Falklands War. Another example of strong personal relationships at head-­of-government level was the hard-­ to-believe degree of support Tony Blair gave to George Bush over the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Boris Johnson’s close relationship with Donald Trump – some say they are very similar politicians – might assist the negotiation of a beneficial USA–UK deal. HEAD OF PATRONAGE

During the eighteenth century, the PM came to access some of the patronage used by the monarch when awards of honours and allocation of government jobs were vital instruments of persuasion. Today, the use of patronage is more limited to rewarding with honours those people who have served the government, though it is an open secret that big donors, should they be seeking titles, can easily obtain them through donations to the main political parties. In November 2018 when May awarded a knighthood to Brexiter John Hayes MP, it was widely assumed she was using her power of patronage to ‘buy’ a forthcoming vote for her Brexit deal. Hayes

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declared he would vote against it anyway. Certain elevations are almost automatic. Like the ennoblement of former PMs and Speakers though Johnson deviated from the latter by not extending this practice to former Speaker John Bercow, a hugely unpopular figure with Tory MPs for his combative personal style and role in delaying Brexit during 2019. FIRST CITIZEN

This role has been assumed, probably unwillingly, by modern PMs by virtue of the media interest in their private lives. Margaret Thatcher found the eccentricities of her husband Dennis attracted media interest (mostly positive), the wayward accidents befalling her son Mark even more so (mostly negative). No PM can afford for any family member to be seen living less than squeaky-­clean lives, as Blair discovered when an aide (Carole Caplin) of his wife was revealed to have a conman boyfriend. Lacking any children, Theresa May had no such family vulnerabilities: her husband Philip proved the proverbial tower of strength during her desperate travails as PM. At the time of writing Johnson is in his early days as PM but so far his divorce from his wife and four children, and living with girlfriend Carrie Symonds in No 10 has not attracted any substantial negative comment. It is almost as if his popularity is based to a degree, perhaps like Trump, on being seen as a celebrity ‘lovable rogue’. DIFFERING STYLES OF PRIME MINISTERS

Every PM has a distinctive style, which reflects both politics and personality. Clement Attlee

Labour PM after 1945, he was astonishingly bland and colourless. ‘He was a very modest man’, quipped Churchill, ‘who had much to be modest about.’ This was scarcely fair; politics, so often crowded with egotistical colourful characters, can sometimes resent someone so totally lacking in charisma and therefore different. But while Churchill entertained his cabinets with stirring rhetoric, it



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was Attlee, as his deputy, who efficiently worked his way through cabinet agendas when, as so often during the war, the PM was away. Attlee did the same as PM, ticking manifesto objectives off the list until almost all were achieved, including nationalisation, the NHS and independence for India. Indeed, Attlee, on some occasions, was almost too coldly business-­like. One unfortunate minister whom Attlee sacked was summoned in to be told the sad news. Upon entering his office and being told he was sacked, Attlee continued writing something but noticed his former minister was still there, waiting. ‘Might I ask why my services are no longer required?’ he stammered. Attlee seemed surprised by the question: ‘Oh … you’re no good.’ HAROLD MACMILLAN

Macmillan offered a great contrast to Attlee. He was given to more reflective exposition, though much less so than Churchill; and he was infinitely subtle and diplomatic, eliciting opinion, leading the debate and then drawing conclusions which reflected the weight of consensus: the cabinet’s perfect chairman and perhaps the benchmark for any UK PM. MARGARET THATCHER

The first woman PM, she was quintessentially a one-­off. Coming to power after fighting male prejudice in her party, she took on Ted Heath in 1975 and won; persisting in her fight, she won the 1979 election and then took on those liberal Tories in her party’s leadership. Her tough line of withdrawing government help for ailing industries and keeping interest rates high caused widespread bankruptcies and unemployment. Her position was parlous when she decided to fight against Argentina’s invasion of the Falkland Islands in April 1982. Taking on the risk, she formed a small war cabinet which saw her through to victory. Her steady nerve throughout enabled her to emerge with a hugely enhanced reputation and a confidence which enabled her to take on all-­comers within her party and the country as a whole, until her political force was finally spent in November 1990. She tended not to be a good cabinet chair, preferring to state her position and dare others to challenge her. She was always amazingly

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well briefed, which intimidated colleagues, and she worked 18 hours a day (or on occasions more). She was also ruthless with those in whom she detected even the slightest disloyalty and crushingly dismissive of anyone of whom she disapproved in cabinet; the long-­ suffering Sir Geoffrey Howe became a prime target, though Howe’s devastating resignation speech on 13 November 1990 hastened her departure from Downing Street. In politics, as in life, enemies made will often in time gain their revenge. JOHN MAJOR

Endorsed by Thatcher as her successor, Major was a totally different personality. His was a much more consensual style, seeking views and weighing them carefully. Initially he won plaudits for collegiality and being open to alternative views, especially when compared with his predecessor. But his small majority of 21 became a yoke when a hard minority of his MPs, shadowed by a similar one in cabinet, began to rebel over issues connected with the EU. Critics tended to blame him for indecision and weak leadership when he was merely seeking to deal with his rebels, egged on as they were by Thatcher in retirement. As various scandals involving unfaithful Tory MPs and financial irregularities crowded in during the mid to late 1990s, his reputation was further criticised as someone weak, unable to control his party. Maybe, as John Biffen once confided to me in an interview, that ‘he was a perfectly competent PM but at a time when the Conservative Party was ungovernable’. TONY BLAIR

Blair was more informal: ‘call me Tony’ he said at his first cabinet. But his informal unrecorded meetings on his No 10 sofa were unpopular with civil servant traditionalists, like (now Lord) Robin Butler. In his report on the decision to go to war in Iraq, Butler’s asperity was palpable in the conclusion to his 2004 report on intelligence relating to the Iraq war: ‘However, we are concerned that the informality and circumscribed character of the Government’s procedures which we saw in the content of policy-­making towards Iraq risks reducing the scope for informed collective political judgment.’



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Also criticised was his liking for running things from the centre, making UK government even more centralised, despite his programme of devolution to the Scots and Welsh. Cabinet meetings were reduced in number and substantive content. Blair seemed to want to personalise his period in power, seeking out publicity as if too aware of his visibility, popularity and vaunted persuasive skills. Perhaps his most damaging character trait was to be obsequious to the very rich and the very powerful: abroad towards President Bush and at home to the likes of billionaires Bernie Ecclestone and Rupert Murdoch. Once he left Downing Street his apparent pursuit of money-­making opportunities further stained his reputation with Labour voters who prefer their retired PMs to do good works like Gordon Brown or just enjoy retirement like Attlee and Callaghan. David Cameron

Call me Dave, the title of a 2015 biography reflects Cameron’s ‘Blairite’ preference for the informal. As a communicator he was probably in the same class as Blair and this supremely confident – some said ‘arrogant’ – Etonian for a while dominated the political landscape. He was widely criticised, however, for relying on a close group of fellow old Etonians and other privately educated acquaintances for advice and ministerial service. Like Blair’s investment in the Iraq War, Cameron’s similar error, perhaps was appeasing his Euro-­ sceptics with a promise of an in–out EU referendum in 2013. Theresa May

As home secretary, May had been a diligent, if unspectacular, incumbent of that dangerous office; avoiding major problems for six years reflected a degree of luck as well as her signature assiduity. As PM she continued to demonstrate these qualities but in this more high pressure role she exhibited a preference for secrecy, a postponement of difficult problems and a small group of chosen advisers. Her joint chiefs of staff – Timothy and Hill – ruled supreme for her first year but on Brexit Ollie Robbins became her guru and she seemed to conduct negotiations with the EU independent of her Brexit ­department. When the (to Brexiters infamous) Chequers offer was unveiled in July 2018, Steve Baker, then a junior Brexit minister,

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complained he’d been ‘sidelined’ and knew nothing of it. In cabinet, May was reportedly taciturn – listening but not changing her position and seldom compromising – was well briefed and assiduous at inviting voices around the table, but some colleagues complained she seemed not to take them on board and was happier than most with long periods of silence. Admittedly Brexit was a challenge on a scale faced by no previous PM since 1945. Boris Johnson

It is too soon to judge Boris Johnson’s PM style, but, at least during his early months, it seems to be fairly easy going given his big election win. However, when it mattered Johnson could be decisive and brutal in pushing measures through or punishing disloyalty. Past precedent from when he was mayor suggests he will leave cabinet members to run their departments and act as a kind of powerful ‘chairman of the board’, though he is likely to indulge ‘sofa government’ tendencies. The Economist (2020), some weeks in to his premiership, opined that: Mr Johnson grasps the excitement of the moment, but so far he has shown himself no more than a brilliant opportunist. If his premiership is to leave its mark, it needs to be founded on a strategic vision, not tactical campaigning.

However, his brutal reshuffle on 13 February 2020 – see Box 17.3 – which prompted his chancellor’s resignation, revealed two aspects of Johnson’s style: he seems determined to remove any obstruction to his control of the political process, especially regarding economic policy. Second, in his chief adviser, Dominic Cummings, he seems to have found both a kindred spirit and personality (see Boxes 17.1 and 17.3). The Sunday Times ran an article in February 2020 reporting that Johnson has ordered that his ‘red box’ briefings be kept short: ‘no more than four pages … two is preferable’ (Shipman, 2020b). The Economist’s columnist, Bagehot, argues that Johnson’s prime ministerial style is ‘imperial’, citing the ‘chilling nonchalance’ with which he ‘dispenses with colleagues’ and his ‘imperial taste for vengeance’ evidenced by The Godfather being his favourite film, ‘for the multiple retribution killings at the end’ (Bagehot, 2020).



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Box 17.3 The 13 February 2020 reshuffle Following Johnson’s famous election 2019 victory, a February 2020 reshuffle was much anticipated. Johnson was expected to sack some long-­serving cabinet members and recruit some new talent from recent MP intakes. Dominic Cummings had written about his preferred cabinet size – reduced from over 20 to single figures, the disposal of some departments and the creation of a big new one for business matters. Despite their close alliance Johnson did not follow his adviser’s structural recommendations. However, it was widely believed that Cummings’ fingerprints were detectable in the proposal, at the same time as the reshuffle, that the chancellor’s advisers should be stood down in favour of a joint team with No 10. This apparent attempt at improved coordination was seen as a transparent ‘power grab’ by just about everybody in politics and the media. Sajid Javid, whom Johnson had earlier promised to keep in place after the election, resigned in protest at a move which threatened to emasculate his authority and, indeed that of the Treasury, traditionally the most powerful government department and a constant check on prime ministerial tendencies to spend too much money. Commentators were unsure whether the move was intended to clear the decks for huge public spending plans or was an act of revenge by Cummings against someone he disliked. The sacking of Julian Smith, recently praised for reinstalling the Stormont government in Northern Ireland, was much criticised as punishing achievement on the basis of previous critical comments made by Smith about Brexit. Polly Toynbee in the Guardian observed ‘This reshuffle shows absolute power resides in Number 10’. In the same issue Heather Stewart’s article was headed: ‘Unity enforced, loyalty rewarded and sceptics swatted away – no matter how successful they were’. The former chancellor Kenneth Clarke, sacked from the party by Johnson in autumn 2019, tweeted this acidic comment: ‘I’m truly honoured to be asked to do absolutely nothing on behalf of this grotesque dictatorship’. Writing in the Sunday Times, Tim Shipman attributed Javid’s resignation to Johnson’s desire to ‘tear up restraints on spending’. Javid refused to give way and eventually stood down (Shipman, 2020a).

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DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER  There is no constitutional basis for this post but several PMs have found it useful to invent it, often for party political reasons. Geoffrey Howe was made DPM in 1989, though Thatcher scarcely bothered to acknowledge that any power was being deputised. Michael Heseltine was also promoted DPM, though probably as a reward for supporting Major during his 1995 ‘re-­election’ episode. John Prescott was Blair’s DPM, in his case providing a vital link between the more right-­wing ‘New Labour’ leadership and the left-­leaning ranks of the trade unions. Finally, Nick Clegg assumed the title in May 2010 to reflect his party’s role in creating the Tory– Lib Dems coalition. Interestingly, Clegg’s title won him little in respect of influence outside his own party. In May 2015 Cameron decided to dispense with the post.

THE ‘CORE EXECUTIVE’ What is meant by the term ‘core executive’? It has become more popular in recent years as a more accurate description of how decisions are made at the centre of government. A traditional way of thinking of the government hierarchy is to envisage a pyramid, with the PM at the top and junior ministerial ranks plus civil servants making up its body. Traditional constitutional theory sees the tip of the pyramid controlling the direction of policy and the lower administrative bands implementing it in practice. Michael Moran (2005) judges that, at the very top stratum of government, distinctions between ‘policy’ and ‘administration’ are not really relevant: politicians and senior civil servants confer on a more or less equal basis. Often, depending on the topic, external experts, political advisers, maybe spin doctors too will be involved in ad hoc groups discussing policy or trying to solve a government problem. Moran discerns four characteristics of the core executive: 1. It removes the distinction between policy and administration, as explained above. 2. It emphasises interdependence and coordination: policies stream into No 10 from the departments and they have to be



the prime minister and cabinet

reconciled so that they do not conflict and can be made to appear to be part of an overall drive in a given direction – usually the main lines of the manifesto on which the government won its election to power. 3. It is based on roles rather than structures: members of the core executive will have multiple roles – slipping into its inner workings and then out, perhaps to attend to departmental business. Mere structures will not explain a great deal about the workings of government; roles explain more. 4. It focuses on decisions. Core executive members are trying to make the machine work, managing events together with several policies which may be in conflict. A sudden crisis might summon a substantially varied group drawn from all over Whitehall.

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WHAT DOES THE CORE EXECUTIVE COMPRISE?

It comprises a collection of policy-­making units and ‘actors’ at the centre of government: •

• • •

•

•

Prime Minister’s Office and related units. These include the PM’s personal staff like his parliamentary private secretary (PPS), chief of staff, foreign policy adviser, EU adviser, Forward Strategy Unit, director of communications and strategy, Office of Public Service Reform, Delivery Unit. PMs regularly tweak this machinery, creating and merging units as the need arises. Cabinet, comprising ministerial heads of the big departments, plus others like the chief whip and the attorney general. These meet weekly for at least an hour. Cabinet Office, comprising a range of coordinating committees which seek to resolve disputes between departments. Cabinet Office personnel brief committee chairs and service them. The cabinet secretary heads up the Cabinet Office and is in effect the most important civil servant, being officially its head. The cabinet secretary is always someone who has already pursued a successful career within a department. Cabinet committees. These have become increasingly important as the business of government has increased exponentially in order to take the weight off the main forum. So there will be a number of key committees concerned with economic policy, future legislation and EU matters, plus any number of temporary ad hoc ones dealing with specific matters. Moran (2011) notes that while the aim of the committees is to be small to expedite business efficiently, so many departments and interests demand representation on them that they are often as big and unwieldy as the full cabinet itself. Departmental heads. The permanent secretaries of government departments are also included in the network called the core executive; they will spend much of their time within their departments but will be drawn into the ‘core’ from time to time according to the topic and the unfolding of events.



the prime minister and cabinet

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION 1. Why do you think politicians strive so hard to become PM? 2. Rather than limit ministerial office to MPs, would you open up eligibility to anyone with the right abilities? 3. How useful is the concept of ‘core executive’ in the analysis of the British executive?

FURTHER READING In the big textbooks good short but insightful analyses are found in Moran (2011, ch. 6), Jones et al. (2018, ch. 19) and Kingdom (2014, ch. 16). The book by Anthony King (1985) is a good place to start for a deeper understanding of the office of PM, followed by Hennessy’s book on cabinet (1986). Kavanagh and Seldon’s (1999) study provides good analysis and David Owen’s (2007) book presents a theory of why PMs tend to over-­reach themselves after too long in the post. Ashcroft, M. and Oakeshott, I. (2015) Call Me Dave: The Unauthorised Biography of David Cameron, Biteback. Bagehot (2019) The Downing St Policy Unit, The Economist, 22 August. Bagehot (2020) The imperial prime minister, The Economist, 22 February. Boulton, A. (2020) Javid threatened to put a brake on No 10’s spending: and Johnson wasn’t having that, Sunday Times, 16 February. Elliott, F. (2020) Cabinet job security as bad as for football managers, The Times, 27 January. Helm, T. and Savage, M. (2020) PM to cabinet: shape up or I’ll sack you within weeks, Observer, 19 January. Hennessey, P. (1986) Cabinet, Blackwell. James, S. (1999) British Cabinet Government, Routledge. Institute for Government (IfG) (2020) Government reshuffles: the case for keeping ministers in post, 27 January. Jones, B., Norton, P. and Daddow, O. (2018) Politics UK (9th edition), Routledge. Kavanagh, D. and Seldon, A. (1999) The Powers Behind the Prime Minister, Harper Collins. King, A. (ed.) (1985) The British Prime Minister, Macmillan. Kingdom, J. (2014) Government and Politics in Britain, Polity. Lloyd, L. (2019) The Brexit effect: how government has changed since the EU Referendum, Institute for Government, March.

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Mackintosh, J.M. (1962a) Cabinet Government, Stevens. Mackintosh, J.M. (1962b) The British Cabinet, Toronto University Press. Maidment, J. (2020) Dominic Cummings ‘will scrap cabinet committees’ amid complaints they slow down decisions and leak secrets, Mail-­Online, 13 January. Moran, M. (2005) Politics and Governance in the UK (1st edition), Palgrave. Moran, M. (2011) Politics and Governance in the UK (2nd edition), Palgrave. Owen, D. (2007) The Hubris Syndrome: Bush, Blair and the Intoxication of Power, Methuen. Reilly, P. (2020) Cabinet ministers have worse job security than football managers, Sun, 27 January. Rose, R. (2001) The Prime Minister in a Shrinking World, Polity. Seldon, A. (2005) Blair, Little, Brown. Seldon, A. (2007) Blair Unbound, Simon & Schuster. Seldon, A. and Snowdon, P. (2015) Cameron at 10 – The Verdict: The Inside Story 2010–2015, William Collins. Shipman, T. (2017) Fall Out: A Year of Political Mayhem, William Collins. Shipman, T. (2020a) No 10’s Mr Punch finally knocks out the chancellor, Sunday Times, 16 February. Shipman, T. (2020b) The PM’s vanishing briefs, Sunday Times, 23 February. Smith, M. (1999) The Core Executive in Britain, Palgrave. Stewart, H. (2020) Unity enforced, loyalty rewarded and sceptics swatted away: no matter how successful they were, Guardian, 14 February. The Economist (2020) Britain after Brexit, 30 January. The Times (2020) Battle of the sexes: Boris Johnson’s plans to sack female ministers show the tory Party must do much more to elect and promote women in its ranks, Editorial, 27 January 2020. Toynbee, P. (2020) This reshuffle shows absolute power resides in Number 10, Guardian, 14 February.

Websites Cabinet Office, www.gov.uk/government/organisations/cabinet-­office. PM’s Office, www.od.pm.gov.uk. 10 Downing Street, www.number-­10.gov.uk.

18 MINISTERS AND CIVIL SERVANTS

MINISTERS It is in the minister’s name that an Act of Parliament is granted, so legally ministers are of great importance in British government. Democratically they are even more important, as they represent the ‘red line’ of democratic accountability, running from voters, who return a majority of one party to parliament, through to the leader of that party, who, as PM, allocates colleagues to the 100 or so ministerial posts. Each department has several ministers, typically a cabinet secretary of state, maybe a minister of state (a ‘senior’ version of a junior minister) and perhaps two or three parliamentary under­secretaries (PUSs). In addition, ministers usually appoint an (unpaid) parliamentary private secretary (PPS), who represents the first rung on the ministerial ladder: these are often ambitious younger MPs who serve as aides to the minister and as conduits to back-­bench opinion. They are often selected on the basis of friendship or by an established politician looking to dispense favours to admirers. They sit in on most policy meetings and, if they do well, and show promise and initiative, can reasonably expect promotion to PUS level and then maybe even higher. Members of the Lords are often given junior portfolios – comprising up to 20% of all ministerial appointments – and just occasionally cabinet jobs but within a quota limit; since Lord Salisbury in 1902, no PM has sat in the Lords. Junior ministers are usually keen to become senior ones. Promotion is likely to depend on them showing their paces, usually in the Commons by: demonstrating

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expertise in the business of their department; speaking well in debates and committees; displaying loyalty to the government and the PM; and, when required, defending and promoting the government’s cause via the media. Being close to a senior minister – sometimes they have something approaching an ‘entourage’ – can often be the means of advancing one’s chances of preferment; Labour’s Roy Jenkins, for example, was well known for his assiduity in advancing the careers of his younger protégés. How long does it take to become a minister? Rarely are they appointed directly into the cabinet, unless a party has spent years in opposition, like Labour in 1945, 1964 and 1997, or the Tories in 2010. Usually MPs have to serve an apprenticeship on the back-­ benches, then as junior ministers. Sometimes careers are still-­born early on, when periods in office are judged negatively and a stint as junior minister remains the zenith of an MP’s career. But it is possible for sacked ministers to make come backs: Harriet Harman was sacked in 1998 but was brought back into the fold in 2001, as solicitor general, but it took Gordon Brown to become PM before she could make it back into the cabinet, in 2007. TYPES OF MINISTER

Philip Norton (2018) created a typology of six types of ministers: team players, who prefer collective decision-­making; commanders, who have a clear idea of what they want and set about doing so; ideologues, who have a clear vision of what they want, like the Thatcherite Sir Keith Joseph and Nicholas Ridley; managers, who lack clear visions but are content to administer even-­handedly, reaching balanced decisions (Douglas Hurd is perhaps typical of this type); the agent, put in place to do the PM’s specific bidding; or, finally, the weak minister, who has been taken over by the civil service and is led by them. Norton doesn’t mention the clearly incompetent minister, who in practice isn’t always speedily returned to the back benches. Critics of Theresa May’s government justifiably asked why Chris Grayling, a notoriously gaffe-­prone minister who served in several ministries, maintained his cabinet post for so long.



ministers and civil servants

MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY

Ministers are individually responsible to parliament for the actions of their departments, whether they know of such actions or not. This is meant to accentuate political accountability and shield civil servants, as the, in theory, ‘neutral’ instruments of democracy, from any negative consequences. It follows that often clever civil servants who have inspired successful policies have to watch their ministers take all the credit. Their payoff is to escape censure when things go wrong. However, recent years have seen ministers prepared to blame their civil servants, for example over the bidding fiasco over the west coast railways main line in 2012. King and Crewe’s (2013) The Blunders of our Governments provides plenty of evidence of ministerial incompetence. RESIGNATION

Do ministers resign when things go wrong? The classic case was the Crichel Down affair, in 1954, when Sir Thomas Dugdale resigned over mistakes in his department even though he knew nothing about them. But apart from Lord Carrington’s resignation as foreign secretary on behalf of his department’s failings over the Falklands in 1982, examples of similar honourable resignations are hard to find. Carrington, incidentally, gains even more moral credit in that he was a junior minister to Dugdale in 1954 and actually offered to resign along with his boss but was persuaded not to.

CIVIL SERVICE ORIGINS

The British civil service grew out of the medieval monarch’s household, though the written communications and records of modern times were not so necessary when illiteracy was so widespread. Those serving the royal court were often connected to the church, as this was the main source of literacy in such times. Until the thirteenth century, Kings appointed ‘justiciars’ to provide support while they were away overseas; they developed into such powerful officers they eventually ceased to be appointed. Henry VIII continued the reforms

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initiated by his father, Henry VII, and appointed two successive secretaries famous for the extent of their power. Wolsey, the son of a butcher, accumulated such wealth his King eventually acquired it once the cardinal had, rather conveniently one has to conclude, died. Then came his protégé the great Thomas Cromwell, maybe ‘the first true civil servant’ (Pilkington, 1999, p. 10), who organised the dissolution of the monasteries and sequestration into Henry’s coffers of the church’s wealth. ‘An administrator of genius’ (Elton, 1991, pp.  180–184), Cromwell used his ‘constructive statesmanship’ to extend Henry VII’s reforms from the household to the nation as a whole, setting up separate institutions which provided the embryo of modern public administration. During the eighteenth century many public offices were filled by patronage, based on contacts and nepotism rather than merit. But one part of the emerging Empire had adopted a Chinese practice of basing public appointments on performance in common examinations. The East India Company had evolved from a successful commercial organisation into one which effectively administered large parts of India. It needed able young men, not effete sons of the aristocracy. In 1806 it set up a training college for its  employees. This meritocratic model influenced the historic Northcote–Trevelyan report into the civil service. NORTHCOTE–TREVELYAN REPORT, 1854

This report was the result of a realisation that an industrially advanced country, at the centre of a worldwide Empire, desperately needed first-­class public administration. The report advised a politically neutral civil service, appointed on merit, with clear distinctions made between three levels of staff. Staff of the administrative ‘officer’ class would advise ministers and run the departments; ‘executive’ non-­graduate staff would perform the everyday tasks; and ‘clerical’ staff would complete the essential but more routine tasks. This military-­style hierarchy worked well enough for a long time, with ‘class to class’ promotion possible for the brightest from the lower strata. The Civil Service Commission was set up in 1855 to handle recruitment and end the practice of patronage. Senior civil servants are often called mandarins because of the Chinese



ministers and civil servants

provenance of their selection method. For the next century this system served the nation well and its honest, efficient civil service was one of the nation’s boasts. Strains began to appear, however, by the middle of the twentieth century. FULTON REPORT, 1968

The civil service had been criticised for being too ‘general’; British mandarins were good but maybe the École nationale d’administration, which from 1945 provided specialised training for the French senior civil service, offered a superior alternative model in the form of its multi-­talented énarques? Critics pointed out that in 1963 the Treasury employed only 19 trained economists. Also mentioned was the bias towards a narrow middle-­class, Oxbridge-­educated recruitment pool; typically during the 1960s, only 3% of the administrative grade intake were drawn from the working class; inevitably this made them remote from the everyday life of the nation they were helping to govern. Fulton reformed the caste system, and set up a Civil Service College, later known as the National School of Government (NSG) and the Central Policy Review Staff (which became known as No 10’s ‘think tank’) to advise the PM, but the other 150 or so recommendations were either ignored or quashed by senior mandarins worried that their traditional arm-­lock on ministerial advice might be broken. Worse, in the eyes of some critics, is that the NSG was closed in 2011 with no replacement for such training. THATCHER’S REFORMS

Margaret Thatcher suspected the civil service of embodying the post-­war consensus – a set of compromises which she abhorred – and of automatically expanding and defending their bureaucratic ‘empires’. She set about reducing their number from 732,000 in 1979 to 594,000 by 1986: an impressive reduction. She also believed the private sector to be much more efficient than the public and so sought to make the latter more like the former, by injecting market forces wherever possible and drawing business people into leading roles to apply business principles. Derek Rayner, from Marks and Spencer, was invited to set up an ‘efficiency unit’ and in the

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­ inistry of Defence Michael Heseltine, himself a successful busiM nessman, pioneered his so-­called MINIS planning system. THE ‘NEXT STEPS’ REPORT

Perhaps the most important next reform was Sir Robin Ibbs – formerly of ICI – who produced the ‘Next Steps’ report in 1988. This was something of a revolution in that it separated routine functions from the more complex business of advising and supporting ministers. Within a few years, scores of ‘executive agencies’ were set up, along the lines of the Benefits Agency, the Training Agency or the long-­established Driver and Vehicle Licensing Authority in Swansea. By 1997 over three-­quarters of civil servants were employed in 200 agencies. While the reform created increased efficiency, some criticised the agencies being at arm’s length from ministerial accountability and parliamentary scrutiny (see Tables 18.1, 18.2 and 18.3). PRIVATISATION

Part of Thatcher’s zeal to reduce the public sector was manifested in her privatisation programme. Few had thought her aspiration to ‘roll back the state’ would be fulfilled – politicians frequently forget radical plans once in office – but she set about this task early on, without the benefit of anything similar having been attempted; it was the most radical reform since nationalisation itself in 1945–50. First up was British Telecom in 1984. Originally the General Post Office, it was converted to a public corporation before being floated on the Stock Exchange with great success and profit for the Treasury. Former Tory PM Harold Macmillan (Lord Stockton) complained the government was ‘selling off the family silver’ but few in his party were listening as they celebrated what became a bonanza for the government: coal, gas, steel, forestry, electricity, water and the (arguably ill-­fated) railways followed. By the mid-­1990s almost all the enterprises nationalised after the war were back in private hands. Selling back to the public things they already owned was by no means an unqualified success. The result was increased efficiencies in some areas, for instance gas, but not in others, for example

Source: www.civilservant.org.uk.

Senior Civil Service

Old title

Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Civil Service Permanent Secretary (Civil Service head of each department) Deputy Secretary Grade 2 Under Secretary Grade 3 Assistant Secretary Grade 5 Senior Principal and Principal Grade 6 and Grade 7

Very old title

Table 18.1 Changing titles in civil service hierarchy

Director General Director Director or Assistant Director Deputy Director, Assistant Director, Team Leader, Policy Manager, etc.

Nowadays often known as …

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Table 18.2 Principal central departments Departments

Ministries

Offices

Others

Education and Employment Environment

Agriculture

Cabinet

HM Treasury

Defence

Foreign and Commonwealth

(includes HM Revenue and Customs)

Health Lord Chancellor’s National Heritage Social Security Trade and Industry

Home Northern Ireland Scottish Welsh

Table 18.3  Major ministerial departments Cabinet Office Department for Business, Innovation and Skills Department for Communities and Local Government Department for Culture, Media and Sport Department for Education Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Department for International Development Department for Transport Department for Work and Pensions Department of Energy and Climate Change Department of Health Foreign and Commonwealth Office Her Majesty’s Treasury Home Office Ministry of Defence Ministry of Justice



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the railways. And voters had to live with job losses, higher charges in many cases and huge salaries for the senior management of the newly privatised enterprises. Workers in privatised industries, moreover, frequently had to put up with lower pay and less favourable terms of employment. CIVIL SERVICE PERSONNEL

Top of the departmental hierarchy (Table 18.1) is the permanent secretary, usually a career official who will have spent his or her whole time in the same department, with possible external secondments to business or the Cabinet Office. This official is directly answerable to parliament via the Public Accounts Committee, which checks that money granted to departments has been disbursed appropriately. Contrary to the Fulton philosophy, many of this most senior cohort are still Oxbridge-­educated and generalists rather than specialists (see Box 18.1).

Box 18.1 The ‘generalist’ in the civil service The 1968 Fulton report criticised the tradition of the generalist in the civil service. Unlike the French École nationale d’administration, many senior civil servants, or ‘mandarins’ as they are called, have been educated in subjects like classics, history or PPE (philosophy, politics and economics), not those most closely related to government: economics, statistics or, perhaps most importantly, law. Defenders of the ‘generalist’ argue that: 1. The people recruited are among the cleverest of their generation, coming, as they do, from the best universities. 2. Public administration is so complex and unique, it is hard to prepare anyone for its demands. Years doing the job are usually thought to be superior to education in any particular subject studied years before. 3. Ministers themselves are ‘generalists’, as few have specialised skills. The senior mandarin is therefore the public servant

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mirror image of the elected minister in charge. Together they decide, on evidence adduced by experts, what is best for the national community. Against this it can be adduced that: 1. Local government has no problems in vesting authority in specialised architects, planners, engineers and the like. Why should the highest advice to ministers be less expert? 2. French officials, with their specialised training, show that it can be worthwhile: the so-­called, énarques who graduate from the École nationale d’administration are famed for their ability and populate the highest ranks of administration in just about every walk of French public administration. 3. There have been many government failures in terms of information technology (IT) disasters, inadequate equipment for soldiers serving abroad and a welter of other incompetence like the loss of details, including bank details of about 25 million people in autumn 2007. Surely, say critics, better­trained civil servants would reduce the depressing catalogue of government failures? (See also King and Crewe, 2013.)

POLITICAL ADVISERS This group became controversial during the Blair years. Ministers have always drawn upon external advisers; often these connections were informal but political (or ‘special’) advisers (‘temporary’ civil servants appointed under article 3 of the Civil Service Order in Council 1995) began to be employed officially as long ago as the 1970s. Jack Straw, adviser to Barbara Castle, and Bernard Donoughue, to Harold Wilson, were among the first, but their number grew rapidly thereafter. Blair employed 78 of them but in 2014 the figure was down to 68, with 18 employed in No 10, including: a chief of staff (Ed Llewellyn), plus two deputies; a director of communications; a chief speech writer, plus advisers on Scotland, broadcasting, youth crime and women. Blair’s advisers, especially Alastair Campbell and Jonathan Powell, created waves because



ministers and civil servants

they were so powerful, were allowed to give orders to civil servants and annoyed senior officials by usurping their traditional role as the PM’s closest confidants. In recent years ‘special advisers (‘spads’) usually number around 90 and their influence was expanding even before Johnson hired his unusually forceful chief adviser, Dominic Cummings.

Box 18.2 Dominic Cummings – a ‘career psychopath’? Dominic Cummings began life as an adviser to Michael Gove at Education, where his maverick ideas and way of working attracted some criticism – David Cameron once described him as a ‘career psychopath’. However his successful leadership of the Leave campaign in 2016 established his reputation as a brilliant maverick who got things done. When entering No 10 in July 2019, Boris Johnson recruited the unconventional Cummings as his chief adviser. Cummings immediately seemed to assume extensive powers over all other political advisers in the civil service and Whitehall more generally. Such things are not unusual in government – Churchill had his Professor Lindeman (later Lord Cherwell) whose arrogance upset many a mandarin; Thatcher had her Alan Walters; Blair, Alistair Campbell; May, Nick Timothy and Fiona Hill – so Cummings is merely the latest manifestation of the all-­ powerful personal strategist. Cummings certainly caused ripples and waves when he included on his blog a call for ‘super talented weirdos and misfits’ to work in government. He has made it clear he has little time for what he calls ‘The Blob’ i.e. ‘the BBC, universities, quangos, law courts, the Whitehall machine … grotesque incompetents … who couldn’t even win the EU referendum despite commanding the resources of the state’ (Bagehot, 2020). He is especially contemptuous of the elite mandarins who sit atop the departmental pyramids. David Normington, a former head of the civil service, reflected mandarin concern at Cummings’ determination to bypass the usual channels.

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It is just some of the stuff he can’t resist saying about Oxbridge humanities graduates and so on. The underlying denigration of them is unhelpful, really, because it diverts attention from the interesting ideas he has. … Many of these people he will need to work with. He is going to need to work with Whitehall, not against it. It is a big machine and one person can’t change it without lots of allies. You do need the machine. On 2 February 2020, the Sunday Times reported Cummings had issued an extraordinary order to his fellow advisers: they should refuse any freebies: ‘The people’s government doesn’t take any favours. No coffees, no lunches, no drinks. Especially not with journalists.’ It went on to claim Cummings has alerted ‘spies’ in Westminster restaurants to contact him in the case of rule-­breakers (Shipman, 2020a). The Economist pointed out, however, that Cummings had been over-­ruled by Johnson on HS2, allowing Huawei to participate in creating the UK’s 5G network, plus plans to shrink cabinet and a super department for business (Bagehot, 2020). Finally, one of Dominic’s alleged ‘misfits and weirdos’, Andrew Sabisky, appointed as a ‘super-­forecaster’, to predict future trends, was sacked for having made a comment on Cummings’ own blog in 2014 that ‘eugenics’ was capable of ‘good things’ and that compulsory contraception could prevent a ‘permanent underclass’ (Shipman, 2020a).

WHO MAKES POLICY – MINISTER OR CIVIL SERVANT? This is a traditional question in political science, often appearing in examination papers, and, as with all complex problems, the answer is not straightforward. Ministers have the authority to make decisions but it is easy to believe the plot of the sitcom, hugely successful worldwide, Yes Minister, that naive, temporary ministers (few serve more than two years in a post) are easily outwitted by smooth, devious, highly educated permanent civil servants. However, in practice, most of the evidence suggests it does not work that way. In the first place, ministers are usually powerful personalities who



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understand power very well; reinforced in modern times by supportive special advisers, they should be able to get their way (see above sections on political advisers). They will mostly know what they want and will not allow even the most silky voiced mandarins to lead them astray (Box 18.3). Civil servants are socialised all their careers to play according to the rules and they are democratic ones: the minister represents the people’s will and is the ‘master’ of the mandarins, however clever and senior they might be. So even if they complain about their minister – which they frequently do – civil servants will usually do everything they can to fulfil their remit within a representative democracy. The only area where civil servants might resort to delaying tactics and other obstructive tactics is if civil service interests are involved; this might explain why many of the recommendations of the Fulton report were kicked into the ‘long grass’.

Box 18.3 civil servants and ministers: how they get their own way David Blunkett, three times a cabinet minister in Blair governments, has described in his diaries how civil servants brief ministers in such a way that the course they favour is adopted. A diary entry for March 2002 (Blunkett, 2006) reads: The civil service has a particular line that they’ve developed well over the years. First, if they don’t want you to do something, they produce the lengthiest, most obscurantist document, with no clear recommendations, but in the text itself all of the so-­called pluses and minuses, except with the minuses (which avoid them having to do what it is they do not wish to do) highlighted. The second element is to put up costings that make it impossible even to consider arguing with the Treasury, so everything is inflated beyond belief.

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Box 18.4 Ministers and civil servants: relationships and the Priti Patel case, March 2020 Relationships between ministers and civil servants are usually characterised by mutual respect and cooperation. Ministers need to achieve the aims of the government – civil servants need to keep their departments running smoothly and effectively. Usually the minister will take a case to cabinet which seeks to achieve both ends. Finally, on this vexed question, any ministers who cannot impose their will on civil service staff will not remain ministers for long. On 29 February 2020, an angry Sir Philip Rutman, permanent secretary at the Home Office, and with a 33-year civil service career spectacularly resigned, accusing home secretary Priti Patel of a ‘vicious and orchestrated briefing campaign’ against him. He accused her of bullying and creating a climate of fear among her staff. PM Johnson publicly defended her as did several leading Tory ministers and MPs but Rutman declared he would sue for ‘constructive unfair dismissal’. At least two other complaints by civil servants against Patel’s alleged bullying style emerged in the following days.

Also, if a minister is constantly undecided, civil servants are tempted to step in, if only to keep the wheels of the department turning. Relationships between ministers and civil servants are usually characterised by mutual respect and cooperation. 

REFORMING THE CIVIL SERVICE As we have seen, Britain’s civil service has come a long way since the inefficient patronage-­dominated days of the eighteenth century. Following the 1854 report and, a century later, Fulton, the civil service has undergone constant change and development. The report ‘Context for Civil Service Reform’, published June 2012, revealed that numbers employed fell from 746,000 in 1977 to 435,000 in 2010. Further reductions continue. The ‘Civil Service



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Reform Plan’, published in the same month, foresaw an additional 23% reduction on the 2010 figure, to 380,000 in 2015. The Plan makes clear that some of this reduction is driven by the need to reduce the government’s budget deficit. For the future, the Plan suggests devolving the service away from Whitehall: ‘the Civil Service will need to do less centrally and commission more from outside’ (p. 7). ‘Non Departmental Public Bodies’ or ‘Quangos’ are also targeted for reduction: from 1148 in 2010 to 838 in 2017 (TaxPayers Alliance, 2017), with three-­yearly reviews of their performance to ensure accountability and efficiency. To improve policy-­making, the Behavioural Insights Team was created in the Cabinet Office to ‘find new ways of applying insights from behavioural science to public policy’ (p. 17). An innovation designed to improve policy implementation as well as accountability, ‘non-­executive’ members drawn from business have been appointed to departmental boards. Under the leadership of Lord Browne, 59 such people have been appointed. One of the most embarrassing failures of the civil service has been its ability to manage major projects, the £12 billion NHS IT disaster being the most obvious example. The Major Projects Authority now oversees over 200 of the highest-­value and highest-­risk projects. A Major Projects Leadership Academy trains senior staff responsible for such undertakings. The Sunday Times reported in February 2020, that the new Chancellor, Rishi Sunak, would use his first budget to announce that parts of the Treasury would be moved to the north of England. It remains to be seen if notoriously London-­centric senior mandarins will consent to such an unpalatable reform (Shipman, 2020c).

‘Quasi-­autonomous Non-­Governmental Organisation’, Quangos This is a hybrid form of public funded body which in theory exists in the private sector. Such explicitly ‘non-­governmental’ bodies perform functions and receive tax-­payers’ money for doing so. Some dated back decades but others began to be noticed as they were created during the 1980s. Over the years since then a significant slice of government activity has been delivered via these ‘arm’s length’ bodies: total expenditure by them being estimated at

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between £34 and £60 billion. Examples range from: the British Film Council, the British Council, the Forestry Commission and British Nuclear Fuels, to the Herbal Medicines Advisory Committee. These bodies became controversial when they were seen as yet another means of Tory governments ‘privatising’ government activities. However Labour continued the practice until there were reckoned to be about 800 of them in 2010; the Taxpayers Alliance upped their estimate to 1162. When Cameron became PM on 2010 he declared war on them, vowing to ban 192 of them. Dan Lewis’s (2005) The Essential Guide to Quangos put the figure at 529. Quangos are not elected so have been criticised for being undemocratic and many chairs and members have been appointed to well­paid posts on political grounds. In February 2020, The Times ran a story about Johnson’s chief strategic adviser, Sir Edward Lister. He was paid a ‘six figure sum by the Malaysian property company Eco World between 2016 and 19 whilst also chairman of Home England, a government body that funds affordable housing projects’ (Greenwood et al., 2020).

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION 1. Should ministers be appointed for a minimum period, to enable them to master their portfolios? 2. Education in which subjects do you think would be most appropriate for future civil servants? 3. How persuasive do you find the ‘generalist’ argument?

FURTHER READING Still very useful for explaining the culture of the higher civil service is Barberis (1997). For good insights into working with civil servants see Barnett (1982). Hennessy (2001) is a fabulous volume on how the machine works. Kaufman (1997) is a classic ‘must read’ too. A thorough study of the civil service is Burnham and Pyper (2008). Finally, highly recommended is the perceptive and very amusing Lynne and Jay (1982). Bagehot (2020) Cummings and the blob, The Economist, 8 February. Barberis, P. (ed.) (1997) The Civil Service in an Era of Change, Dartmouth.



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Barnett, J. (1982) Inside the Treasury, Deutsch. Blunkett, D. (2006) The Blunkett Tapes, Bloomsbury. Brazier, R. (1997) Ministers of the Crown, Clarendon Press. Burnham, J. and Pyper, R. (2008) The Modernised British Civil Service, Palgrave. Butler, J. (2020) It’s time to turn a light on the dark world of special advisers, Guardian, 24 February. Cabinet Office (2010) The Ministerial Code, Cabinet Office. Campbell, A. (2020) Being a bully is just dim Dom, Sunday Times, 1 March. Elton, G.R. (1991) England Under the Tudors, Collins. Greenwood, G., Midolo, E and Fisher, L. (2020) Developer paid Johnson aide £480,000, The Times, 29 February. Helm, T. (2020) Dominic Cummings warned over civil service shake-­up plan, Guardian, 5 January. Hennessy, P. (1992) Never Again, Jonathan Cape. Hennessy, P. (2001) Whitehall, Pimlico.  HM Government (2012) The Civil Service reform plan, June. Howard, H. (2020) Pressure mounts on Priti Patel …, Mail Online, 29 February. Kaufman, G. (1997) How To Be a Minister, Faber. Kelly, R. (2020) Ministers in the House of Lords, House of Commons Briefing, No. 05226, 22 April. King, A. and Crewe, I. (2013) The Blunders of our Governments, Oneworld. Lawson, N. (1992) The View from Number 11, Bantam. Lewis, D. (2005) The Essential Guide to Quangos, Palgrave. Lynne, J. and Jay, A. (1982) Yes Minister: The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister by the Rt Hon James Hacker MP, BBC. Norton, P. (2018) Ministers, departments and civil servants, in B. Jones, P. Norton and O. Daddow (eds) Politics UK (9th edition), Routledge, ch. 20. Pilkington, C. (1999) The Civil Service in Britain Today, Manchester University Press. Rutter, J. (2020) Dom vs Whitehall, Prospect, March, pp. 10–11. Shipman, T. (2020a) No 10 spies on aides at lunch, Sunday Times, 2 February. Shipman, T. (2020b) The titans of No 10 working in tandem or pulling apart? Sunday Times, 23 February. Shipman, T. (2020c) Treasury officials to be moved north, Sunday Times, 23 February. Sparrow, A. (2012) 100 quangos abolished in cost-­cutting bonfire, Guardian, 22 August. Swyal, R. and Stewart, H. (2020) Cummings accused of fostering culture of bullying in Whitehall, Guardian, 4 March.

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TaxPayers Alliance (2017) Quangos, 17 May. Thiel, Van, S. (2018) Quangos: Trends, Causes and Consequences, Routledge.

Websites British Civil Service, www.civil-­service.gov.uk. Cabinet Office, www.gov.uk/government/organisations/cabinet-­office. National School of Government, www.nationalschool.gov.uk/index.asp.

19 POLICY-­MAKING IN BRITISH GOVERNMENT

The latter part of the last chapter discussed the balance of power in policy-­making between ministers and civil servants but the process involves many more players than just those two. ‘Policy’ is what affects us all in our day-­to-day life. During the 1980s Margaret Thatcher pursued a very clear set of policies – privatisation, reduce union power, increase productivity, reduce taxation – which had a huge impact on Britain, for good or ill. By studying how a political system finally focuses on what it wishes to do, we find out something central and basic about its character. Throughout these chapters so far we have examined how the various ‘players’, be they in the legislature, executive, pressure groups, media or judiciary, impact upon the making of these crucial decisions about how our country is to be run. In this chapter we sharpen the focus a little and examine the process and the machinery at closer range.

POLICY-­MAKING AS A ‘SYSTEM’ One helpful way of looking at the process is to see the machinery of government – legislature, executive and judiciary – as a ‘system’ of which political demands or ‘inputs’ are made and then which produces ‘outputs’ in the form of white papers, statutes, delegated legislation, benefit payments, ratified treaties and so forth, drawing upon available resources of finance, expertise and the like. Figure 19.1 illustrates the process. It also indicates a ‘feedback loop’ whereby outputs influence the situation which created the demand

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in the first place. Implementing outputs will call upon resources like land, labour, finance and expertise.

MODELS OF POLICY-­MAKING Scholars of policy studies have constructed ‘models’ of how policy is most often made in practice and consideration of such alternatives helps understanding. Just how policy is made is important: some of the models drawn from practice below are not exactly compatible with democracy. WESTMINSTER MODEL

This is the ‘official’ model, according to the constitution, whereby, on the basis of the mandate provided by voters, the PM appoints ministers, who are placed in charge of departments and where civil servants obediently strive to implement their commands. Ministers try to convince us that this is how government works; political scientists argue the reality is often very different.



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THE RULING-­CLASS MODEL

This is essentially the Marxist analysis: those who own the means of wealth creation in society are the group from which elites are recruited, values disseminated and policy directions established. This argues that society’s ‘superstructure’ of democracy is a sham, in that ruling-­class interests manipulate and control, mostly in secret behind the scenes. With a contemporary gulf between rulers and ruled, this is a frequently voiced complaint, for example by comedian/agitator Russell Brand (2014), who argues that decisions are taken by very rich people, standing behind the political system, in their own interests and not those of society as a whole. An intriguing study by Terry Eagleton, Why Marx was Right, argues that the prediction that ‘monopoly capitalism’ would evolve and emerge as hegemonic makes interesting reading for those who believe Marx’s insights were of no value. Certainly mega-­rich people are keen to influence politics. In the USA billionaire Donald Trump was challenged by Democrat billionaire, Michael Bloomberg in 2020 and in the UK very rich people help fund political parties, though flows through this source are mostly to the Conservatives rather than to Labour. PLURALISM

This approach, associated with US political scientist Robert Dahl, suggests that the various interest groups in society, connected to the economy, the professions and so forth, are all engaged in a competitive process to apply influence. He saw the government as the referee, holding the ring between participants and ensuring fair play. CORPORATISM

Philippe C. Schmitter argued that a triumvirate of ministers, civil servants and interest-­group leaders come together to ‘fix’ decisions at the top and then impose them on the nation. So, the argument runs, union leaders made deals with ministers during the 1970s which did not reflect the views of their members, let alone the mass of voters. This is a variant of the ‘elite rule’ critique that democracy

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is controlled by a small, out-­of-touch group in charge of the system. Some might argue that New Labour could be so characterised: thousands of Labour voters in the north felt policy was being formed without any consideration of their interests. Eventually thousands of this group in 2019 voted to help put Boris Johnson into Downing Street. PARTY GOVERNMENT MODEL

This analysis sees political parties as the wellsprings of policy, formulating them in opposition and implementing them in government. This is closer to the traditional or ‘official’ Westminster model which civil servants and ministers claim reflects the way things work; few believe this is an adequate analysis. WHITEHALL MODEL

This argues that it is the able, well briefed, experienced and permanent senior civil servants who in practice subtly dominate the inexperienced and temporary elected ministers of distinctly varying abilities. This is very much the satirical Yes Minister view, which, many ex-­ministers attest, has a strong basis in fact. RATIONAL DECISION-­MAKING

This line of argument sees decision-­makers acting rationally, considering options presented by their civil servants and then opting for the optimum course. Critics question whether external factors do not distort this process, for example whether politicians’ emotional attraction to an idea might not predispose them to adopt it; for example, Tony Blair seemed not to question the idea of supporting Bush’s Iraq policy, so keen was he to write a ‘blank cheque’ of support to the US president. INCREMENTALISM

Charles Lindblom is the guru behind this approach, which doubts the rationality of decision-­makers but sees them as ‘muddling through’ using precedent and a range of less rational strategies. This



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approach owes something to the notion that things often happen through blunders and miscalculations rather than by design. King and Crewe’s (2013) The Blunders of our Government provides plentiful, often amusing evidence of policies evolving into disaster. POLICY COMMUNITIES AND NETWORKS

Some political scientists – for example, academic political scientists Jordan and Richardson, and Rhodes – perceive policy ‘communities’, comprising a range of inter-­communicating groups and individuals. Membership of the community will depend upon conformity to the accepted ‘rules of the game’, as well as a measured confidentiality regarding the progress of consultations. Rhodes (1990) additionally discerned a less organised community of networks, outside the inner core and subject to frequent changes of membership. POLITICAL MARKETING

Lees-­Marshment’s (2001) book suggests, interestingly, that parties need to learn lessons more generally from marketing. She suggests Labour was ‘product based’ in the early 1980s – offering up something only the activists wanted and failing badly as a result in 1983 – and Corbyn critics argue he did something similar in 2017 and 2019. She sees the party then trying a ‘sales oriented’ approach, based on much improved campaigning and advertising. But the message was still poorly conceived and a second failure arrived with Thatcher’s 1987 victory, followed by Major’s surprise victory in 1992. Lees-­Marshment argues that once the party learnt how to listen to what the ‘market’ – i.e. voters – really wanted, under the banner of ‘New Labour’, then finally success came, in the form of the 1997 landslide and further success in 2001 and 2005. There is much to commend such an analysis but its logic suggests that politicians should merely reflect the results of opinion polls and focus groups, and abandon any attempt to refine a philosophy and lead rather than follow public views, however populist they might be.

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THE POLICY CYCLE Policy studies is quite a crowded field but most of the scholars in it recognise a three-­stage policy cycle: initiation, formulation and implementation, with the consequences of the measure, in the jargon, feeding back to influence future inputs. POLICY INITIATION

Figure 19.2 indicates the various sources of policy ideas, using the metaphor of ‘distance’ of initiators from ‘core’ decision-­makers. The source could be a letter to The Times, the mind of an incoming minister, a creative civil servant, a whim of a PM, or the product of a think tank, bursting with brilliant intellectuals. But the idea on its own is useless unless the means and the will exist to advocate it, push it up the political agenda and then make it happen. GENERAL PUBLIC

The influence of the public, perhaps paradoxically in a democracy, is, most of the time, furthest away from the centre of decision-­ making. But on election days, it can be argued, the public exercise briefly the sovereign power, though the degree of choice involved

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is only between broad party prospectuses. Sometimes the public rouses itself to demonstrate, as over Iraq in February 2003, but to no effect: their protest was ignored. In March and October 2019 a million Remain supporters filled the streets of London in two mass marches against the decision to leave the EU: again with no final effect. Politicians often feel the general public’s views, uninformed and swayed by prejudice and self-­interest, should be resisted. Douglas Hurd, former British foreign secretary, wrote, revealingly, in 1993 that  if we had followed the polls, we would have been in and out of the EU several times in the last 20 years. On matters of principle, like the monarchy and membership of the European Community, the job of the politician is to persuade, not automatically to follow. (quoted by Page, 2013) CAUSE GROUPS, MEDIA, ACADEMICS

Cause groups are the democratic means of representing opinion groups and are a constant feature of political life. They can batter away at the doors of ministers for years with no success, but, like Charter 88 in the late 1990s, suddenly find doors fly open and their views adopted virtually as government policy. Media campaigns can often be part of such activity, while academics can find that suddenly their work expresses the zeitgeist and, in similar fashion, are adopted. Economist John Maynard Keynes’s ideas were initially resisted in the 1930s but had become government orthodoxies by 1945. EXTRA-­PARLIAMENTARY PARTIES AND GROUPINGS

These can be influential when a particular party is in government; ministers turn up to their meetings and direct influence can be applied. PARLIAMENT

Groups of MPs constantly seek to impress their views on their leaderships, occasionally with success – for example, Labour MPs urging more funding for public services during the 1990s – on

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other occasions failing – for example, MPs from the same party seeking to persuade their leaders to support the unilateral abolition of nuclear weapons. On still other occasions an active group can succeed in merely blocking progress on a range of issues, like John Major’s rebels over the EU during the 1990s. MINISTERS, DEPARTMENTS, INQUIRIES AND THINK TANKS

Ministers will seek to push through their favourite policy ideas in order to attract praise and recognition. For example, Michael Foot as employment secretary felt that his health and safety legislation represented his most worthwhile achievement. Departments also devise policies of their own every week and month of the political year but there will always be politicians waiting to walk away with the credit for themselves. ‘Think tanks’ tend to be more a feature of US policy­making but Thatcher, frustrated by a civil service she felt was still immersed in the consensus views of the 1960s, reached out to right-­ wing think tanks like the Adam Smith Institute for ideas which chimed in more closely with her own instinctive beliefs. This is how the ‘community charge’ or ‘poll tax’ idea came into being (though perhaps this is not the best advertisement for the success of think-­tank ideas). Political Advisers

As Chapter 18 reminds us most PMs rely on close advisers – Churchill’s Lord Cherwell; Blair’s, Campbell and Jonathan Powell; Thatcher’s Alan Walters and so on. Dominic Cummings, elevated from architect of the 2016 Leave campaign to top adviser in No 10 is the latest ‘Svengali’ ‘guru’ type figure to appear very closely connected with the PM’s thinking. He was thought to be the source of Johnson’s idea to prorogue parliament in autumn 2019 and then in February to curb the power of the Treasury by forcing the chancellor’s economic advisers to stand down thus precipitating the chancellor’s resignation. CORE EXECUTIVE

This is the term (see Chapter 14) now commonly used to describe the phalanx of people who take the major decisions in British



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p­ olitics. It comprises the PM, of course, plus cabinet colleagues, principal aides like the press secretary, members of the Policy Unit and other close advisers on foreign affairs, the EU and so forth, the cabinet secretary, the permanent secretaries of the departments of state and members of cabinet committees. These people, it should be noted, are not all elected, but in the mix of policy-­making such distinctions do not necessarily apply when knowledge and force of argument are just as important as rank or status. These are the people who are involved in dealing with the biggest, most intractable problems facing the state: whether to join the euro, how to cope with government debt, how to stimulate the economy, how to handle emergencies, whether to go to war. POLICY FORMULATION

This occurs once the initiative has been absorbed by the government machine and enters a period of consultation and refinement. This stage can take hours, days or months, depending on its complexity and the time available; with international crises there may be only minutes to take decisions. EMERGENCIES

PMs inevitably have all the most unsolvable problems ending up on their desk. On many of them, they have precedents to guide them and an able staff to advise. But on some issues, a hijack, a kidnapping, a plane crash, a terrorist outrage or a pandemic, there might be no files in the cupboard to guide responses: vital decisions have to be made in a very short timescale upon which life and death may depend. This is when a premier’s leadership qualities are truly tested. CONSULTATION, EVOLUTION AND AMENDMENT

Some ideas are mulled over and refined while others might be rejected once their down sides are fully realised. David Evans, MP for Luton, for example, suggested an identity card system for football supporters to Thatcher which was initially welcomed by his PM, but after a long period of silence it was assumed, correctly,

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that No 10 had looked at the idea carefully and thought it best not to pursue it. LEGISLATIVE HURDLES

If there are bureaucratic obstacles to the acceptance of policy, there are of course also legislative hurdles – the not necessarily easy passage through the Houses of Commons and Lords (see Figure 19.3). Mostly the Commons majority, which supports the government of the day, will ensure measures get voted through, but sometimes they fail. The Sunday Opening Bill in 1986, for example, was voted down through an accumulation of dissident pressure group activity. Other measures can be extensively amended, like the top-­up fees (for university education) initiative in 2004. Opposi-

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tion to this bill succeeded in passing several amendments that substantially changed the detail of the final act. The Lords, too, seldom manage to end the life of something the government seriously wants to pass into law, but, for example, the Hunting Act, hugely contentious to Conservative MPs and supporters in the country, was delayed for quite some time and it took the invoking of the Parliament Act 1949 to finally pass it on to the statute books. POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

Jordan and Richardson (1987) observe that implementation can never be taken for granted and, to be successful, requires a number of conditions to be fulfilled. There must be: no conflict of authority to weaken control; uniform norms and rules in the control system; perfect obedience or perfect control; perfect information, communication and coordination; and sufficient time for the necessary resources to be mobilised. In other words, merely passing an act does not change reality unless some or all of these requirements are met. The above two students of policy in practice might also have added that another requirement is ‘acceptance’ by the voters. For example, in 1988 the poll tax (a uniform per capita local tax replacing the historical ‘rates’ levied on property) was passed into law and the act was implemented for a while but there was much dissension among British people: many refused to pay a levy which taxed the poor as much as the rich; many had refused to register their vote, disenfranchising themselves to disguise their liability for payment. Still others took to the streets – there were serious riots on 31 March 1990 in Trafalgar Square. This failure of acceptance was a decisive element in the fall of Thatcher in the autumn of that year, and one of the first actions of John Major’s successor government was to abolish the hated tax and replace it with the council tax. Box 19.1 illustrates how certain policy ‘levers’ can produce desired results.

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Box 19.1 Institute for Government studies on policy-­making in government This think tank, comprising some of the brightest and best young political scientists, former journalists, civil servants and others has produced a series of studies on policy-­making in recent years which, for students of political decision-­making, are recommended reading. The main researcher involved in these studies was Michael Hallsworth. ‘Policy Making in the Real World’ was based upon over a decade of high-­level interviews with civil servants and ministers. The study discerned four aspects of policy-­making: 1. Process – the actions recommended to produce policy. Few interviewed accepted the notion that ‘policy cycles’ were helpful when in practice the process did not necessarily follow logical progressions or occur in distinct stages. 2. Qualities – the way in which these actions should be carried out. One interviewee responded: ‘if you’ve got to be evidence-­based, and inclusive, and joined up, and consultative, and outward looking, you can’t deliver policy in a week – but ministers want policies tomorrow’. 3. Structures – the institutional requirements to facilitate improved policy-­making. 4. Politics – the manner in which politics shapes policy-­making. A ‘government’s coherent position can get overwhelmed by events’: many interviewees complained that the ‘desire to capture the news agenda, generate headlines, or be seen to be acting, could lead to over-­hasty announcements’. The history of the Universal Credit, seems to validate this complaint. A well intentioned attempt to simplify an over-­complex welfare benefits system to provide incentives for a return to work has been dogged by delays and political manoeuvring by both major parties and still, a decade after its conception, the reform is caught in the limbo of crisis.



policy-making in british government

CONSTRAINTS UPON POLICY-­MAKERS

Clearly, as the poll tax example demonstrates, the democratic system imposes rather more constraints upon policy-­makers than an autocratic one might. However, there are many other factors which are common to all, whatever the system. FINANCE

Governments must have the means to fulfil their policy objectives. Harold Wilson’s Labour government in the 1960s was stronger on stating objectives than achieving them, simply because the economy was in decline, with balance-­of-payments deficits and devaluation of the pound arising from a manufacturing base which was atrophied and uncompetitive. Cameron’s 2010 coalition government was virtually excluded from new spending initiatives by its need to focus on reducing the deficit on government spending. TIME

Passing new measures can take many months and legislative time is always severely limited, so much so that MPs who win ballots to float private members’ bills are often assailed by government departments seeking to persuade them to adopt one of their bills. New measures also often need to time to settle in and some are ‘piloted’ in different parts of the country before being rolled out nationwide. POLITICAL SUPPORT

This is required for a measure to be initiated, naturally, but is also necessary for it to pass through what may be a tortuous process of sniping and lobbyists seeking to amend it in certain ways or even out of existence. The identity card project, for example, has attracted varying degrees of support throughout its history. The Conservatives considered it and rejected it in the 1990s, but when Labour brought it back after terrorist outrages, support was seldom unanimous, with the Conservatives and Lib Dems opposing, and, in the spring of 2008, large sections of the Labour Party becoming

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sceptical. No objections ensued when Cameron’s government killed the idea in August 2010. COMPETENCE OF KEY PERSONNEL

The crucial person in this equation is the quality of the minister. An able, ambitious minister is likely to have the energy to push plans through to completion, while a weak ‘time-­server’ will be happy to let the issue lie when civil servants also less than enthusiastic about the measure might be happy to let it die a death. It can also happen that a measure’s chances of being passed depends on a minister staying in post in the ministry. By the same token, key civil servants who have absorbed expertise in a complex area might be ‘poached’ by the private sector. This happened during privatisation transitions in the 1980s, when newly privatised businesses looked to those who had helped create them to go on and help run them. COORDINATION

Some measures straddle a variety of departmental responsibilities – poverty, crime, infrastructure projects – and coordinating them can prove difficult. New Labour came to power offering ‘joined up government’ to remedy such problems, but few would claim the problem has been solved, or anything near. One approach by Blair was to set up units in the Cabinet Office, like the Exclusion Unit, to provide a more comprehensive attack on problems caused by poverty. PERSONALITY FACTORS

Most large departments have a team of ministers and sometimes their personalities clash. Some evidence of this was provided in May 1997, when Ann Widdecombe (former Home Office minister of state) criticised her former boss, Michael Howard, as having ‘something of the night about him’. The comment is thought to have done much to torpedo the former home secretary’s then current bid for his party’s leadership. The most notorious clash of personalities, however, was provided by the Labour Party in the



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form of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. These two former firm friends in opposition feuded when PM and chancellor respectively over whether Blair had promised Brown he would step down and allow his chancellor to contest and take over the leadership after a given period of time. The constant warring between the party’s two major figures had implications for several policy areas, including possible membership of the euro, the reform of public services and, not least, top-­up fees for universities. INFLUENCE OF THE EU

Membership of the EU was a contentious matter within both major parties, mostly on the grounds that it reduced UK sovereignty and threatened a ‘federal’ European encroachment into all spheres of policy. While such claims were probably highly exaggerated, it is true that the scope of EU concerns spread from the narrowly economic to extend into social affairs as well as defence and foreign policy. Of course the UK left the EU in January 2020. INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

One of the most famous quotations regarding the work of a PM was made by Harold Macmillan when he responded to a question on what, as PM, kept him awake at night, with a shaking of the head and ‘Events, dear boy, events’. Hijackings, revolutions, natural disasters or terrorist atrocities can steamroll their way onto the best­laid agenda for ordered progress and demand instant action. So 9/11 precipitated major losses on the stock exchanges and catalysed security policies the world over. In January 2008 another run on the stock exchanges – this time the result of foolish lending in the form of ‘sub-­prime’ mortgagees in the USA – caused the loss of several trillions of dollars and posed questions which, at the time of writing, Western finance ministers are still trying to solve. HS2 Given Go-­Ahead

Macmillan’s famous reply, quoted above, could also be applied to the decision, on 11 February 2020 to go ahead with the plan to build high speed rail links between London, Birmingham,

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­ anchester and Leeds. This ambitious scheme was the brainchild M of Andrew Adonis when he was Gordon Brown’s transport secretary back in 2009. Subsequent Conservative governments under Cameron and May endorsed the scheme but by the time Johnson became PM costs had spiralled from an estimated £35 billion to over £100 billion and a section of his party had joined Dominic Cummings in hotly opposing the project as a non-­cost-effective expenditure. Several influential voices echoed this analysis and had the project been starting from scratch it probably would have been abandoned. However, the ‘event’ here was Johnson’s promise to reward former Labour voters in the north for ‘lending’ their votes to him in the crucial 2019 ‘Brexit’ election. This meant that Johnson faced a big political imperative not to appear, so early on after the election, to betray his word to a key group of new constituents.

Policy-­Making Example: MANAGING THE ECONOMY As Chapter 4, on the social and economic context, emphasised, much of politics is about the economy. This should not be surprising in a democracy, as most people’s primary concern is with material things like their job, income, housing: Bill Clinton’s slogan in his successful 1992 presidential campaign was ‘It’s the economy, stupid’, designed to exploit the fact that stewardship of the economy under George Bush Senior had produced a recession. Ensuring that prosperity is delivered to the people is the sine qua non of most democratic government. Policy has to overcome the disadvantages Britain suffers economically. • •

Geography. As a small island, Britain lacks good land communications with Europe and any substantial natural resources, apart from coal. History. As the first industrial power, Britain was able to establish a position of hegemony in the nineteenth century which was reinforced by its imperial role. But competitors soon caught up and were able to utilise modern equipment to narrow the gap with the ‘workshop of the world’. During the two world wars Britain had to sell and realise huge assets to



•

•

•

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survive and ended up in 1945 virtually bankrupt. Moreover, once the Empire imploded after World War II a valuable cushion for the economy was removed. Culture. Britain’s dominant class, even when its wealth has been founded in manufacturing or trade, has tended to disdain such activity and to value the arts as a profession or the countryside as a place to live. Politics. After World War II, Labour produced a massive public sector which disadvantaged private enterprise. Furthermore, successive governments changed approaches to economic management. Economics. Britain suffered from poor industrial relations after the war, poor productivity and poor design compared with competitors like Germany, Japan, Sweden and Italy. There was also a tendency for investment in future industrial activity to be inadequate.

TWO APPROACHES TO MANAGING THE ECONOMY

Since 1945 there have been two major approaches to managing the economy: Keynesianism and monetarism. KEYNESIANISM

Maynard Keynes, in his General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936), argued that the best way to deal with recessions was, counter-­intuitively, to spend and not save. He argued that the government could stimulate economic activity in this way, thereby creating demand and employment. He argued that interest rates (monetary policy) and taxation (fiscal policy) could be used to manage the economy, to control demand and stave off the slumps which had traditionally followed booms. This approach was initially regarded as heresy by traditional economists and Treasury mandarins but the war seemed to legitimise it and by 1945 it had become the orthodoxy followed by both major parties. However, when growth began to slow in an economy, failing to stand up to the competition, government spending seemed to coincide with galloping inflation rather than the desired growth. This presaged the emergence of a new approach.

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MONETARISM

This analysis, formulated most famously by the Chicago economist Professor Milton Friedman, argued that inflation was the product of too much money circulating in the economy. The theory is that if business people and workers know the money is there, the former will push up prices for their products while the latter will demand more for their labour. The antidote to inflation therefore is to increase interest rates, to make money more expensive to borrow and thus less present in the economy: reducing ‘money supply’ therefore reduces inflation. After the runaway inflation of the mid-­1970s, Labour chancellor Dennis Healey came to accept this equation but less enthusiastically than Conservative converts like Enoch Powell, Sir Keith Joseph, Margaret Thatcher and her chancellor, Nigel Lawson. When the Conservatives came to power in 1979, this approach was applied more fully than under Healey. Monetarism combined with cutting back or restricting public spending caused widespread bankruptcies and unemployment but it did eventually make the British economy more efficient and, by the early 1990s, Labour dropped its vehement opposition and came to accept the Thatcherite approach to the economy, while still rejecting totally the concomitant attitudes towards public spending. So important was the control of interest rates in curbing inflation for Brown that, immediately on coming into power in 1997, he gave this responsibility to an independent Bank of England, advised by an expert, non-­ political committee called the Monetary Policy Committee. THE INSTRUMENTS OF MANAGEMENT

Governments do their best to control the economy to make it perform more effectively. Available to them are a number of instruments (see also Table 19.1): • •

Fiscal measures. They can adjust direct or indirect taxation to achieve objectives like raising revenue or discouraging certain activities like those causing pollution. Monetary measures. Controlling interest rates is the key instrument, as they determine the amount of money available through lending, the major means whereby business is financed and sustained.



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Table 19.1 Economic measures that governments can adjust Up

Down

Exchange rates

Reduces inflation. But makes exports more expensive

Makes exports cheaper. But increases inflation

Interest rates

Makes borrowing money more expensive so reduces amount of money in economy. This reduces inflation. But it makes survival for some companies harder, resulting in bankruptcies and unemployment

Makes it cheaper for businesses to borrow and thus improves investment. But can cause inflation

Taxes

More revenue into Treasury; antiinflationary; selective use can discourage undesirable spending e.g. on smoking. But upsets voters

Pleases voters. But reduces revenue, can be inflationary and increases consumer spending

Public spending

Increases employment, improves public services, pleases voters. But increases taxation which displeases voters, worries overseas investors

Reduces taxation, which pleases voters. But increases unemployment, public services suffer, voters unhappy

Employment laws Unions happy. But (‘up’ = favour workers; business costs increase, ‘down’ = favour loss of competitiveness business)

Business happy, unions not, costs decrease, competitiveness improves

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• • •

Stimulating trade. Governments can encourage economic activity by encouraging trade deals with foreign countries. Support and subsidies. These can be handed out to sections of the economy which either are in trouble or require assistance to develop. National infrastructure. Improving this in terms of, for example, transport or IT capacity can stimulate economic activity and produce efficiency savings.

WHO MAKES ECONOMIC POLICY?

Clearly, as the most important area of the policy-­making ‘community’, this will involve the PM, the chancellor, members of the core executive like the top officials in the Treasury, close economic advisers (Brown relied much on Ed Balls for such advice when chancellor) and the governor of the Bank of England. Inputs will also be received from connections with the EU, Washington and other international bodies, like the World Bank. Relations between PM and chancellor are always crucial. Thatcher treated Geoffrey Howe disrespectfully, for example, and paid for it by alienating him in November 1990 when her sources of support had begun to ebb. Blair endured ten years of constant tension with Gordon Brown, who was intent on taking his place in No 10. As part of this tension they disagreed over joining the euro; Blair was generally in favour but Brown so opposed he defined five tests to be met before joining could be contemplated.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION 1. Which policy-­making model seems closest to how policy is really made? 2. Consider, in turn, the contribution made to policy-­making by the media, pressure groups and civil servants. 3. How easily can government direct the development of the economy?



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FURTHER READING Certainly the best contemporary study of policy-­making is Dorey (2014). More dated but still useful texts include Parsons (1995), Wildavsky (1979) and Hogwood (1992). Brand, R. (2014) Revolution, Century. Burch, M. (1979) The policy making process, in B. Jones and D. Kavanagh (eds), British Politics Today, Manchester University Press  Burch, M. and Wood, B. (1990) Public Policy in Britain, Martin Robertson. Castles, F. (1982) The Impact of Parties, Sage. Dorey, P. (2014) Policy Making in Britain (2nd edition), Sage. Downs, A. (1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy, Harper & Row. Eagleton, T. (2011) Why Marx was Right, Yale. Easton, D. (1965) A Framework for Political Analysis, Prentice Hall. Ham, C. and Hill, M. (1998) The Policy Process of a Modern Capitalist State, Wheatsheaf. Hallsworth, M. (2011) System stewardship: the future of policy making? Working Paper, Institute for Government. Hallsworth, M. and Rutter, J. (2011) Making policy better: improving Whitehall’s core business, Institute for Government. Hallsworth, M. with Parker, S. and Rutter, J. (2011) Policy making in the real world: evidence and analysis, Institute for Government, April. Hogwood, B. (1992) Trends in British Public Policy, Open University Press. Jones, B. and Norton, P. (2013) Politics UK (8th edition), Routledge.  Jones, B., Kavanagh, D., Moran, M. and Norton, P. (2004) Politics UK (5th edition), Pearson. Jordan, G. and Richardson, J.J. (1987) Governing Under Pressure, Martin ­Robertson. King, A. and Crewe, I. (2013) The Blunders of our Governments, Oneworld. Lees-­Marshment, J. (2001) Political Marketing and British Political Parties, Manchester University Press. Lindblom, C. (1959) The science of muddling through, Public Administration Review, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 79–88. Lynn, J. and Jay, A. (1989) The Complete Yes Minister, BBC by Jonathan Lynn and Antony Jay, 1 June. Mason, R. (2020) Tory resistance to high-­speed line fades but deep misgivings persist, Guardian, 12 February. Page, B. (2013) It’s OK for politicians to ignore public opinion, Guardian, 25 March. Parsons, W. (1995) Public Policy, Elgar. Rhodes, R.A.W. (1990) Policy networks: a British perspective, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1 July.

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Rutter, J. (2020) Dom vs Whitehall, Prospect, March, pp. 10–11. Schmitter, P.C. (1977) Introduction, Corporatism and Policy-­Making in Western Europe, special issue of Contemporary Political Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 3–6. Smith, M. (1993) Pressure, Power and Policy, Harvester Wheatsheaf. Stewart, H. and Walker, P. (2020) Johnson pledges $5bn overhaul of bus services to fend off HS2 revolt, Guardian, 11 February. Wildavsky, A. (1979) Speaking the Truth to Power, Little, Brown.

Websites Demos (think tank), www.demos.co.uk. PM’s office, www.gov.uk/government/organisations/prime-­ministers-office­10-downing-­street. NO2ID (campaigning organisation), www.no2id.net.

Part VI SUB-­NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

This level of government is mostly defined as what happens outside London. Accordingly Part VI comprises chapters on devolution, local government and, although it is centred in London, the judiciary.

20 DEVOLUTION

One fairly obvious reform of a highly centralised state would be to devolve power down to regional or local units. During the years 1997–99 this is precisely what happened in the UK but the motive behind it was not so much efficiency but the recognition of national identity. Acts of Union in 1536, 1707 and 1800 had apparently set in stone the adherence of Wales, Scotland and Ireland to England, within the UK. But these unions – solid on the surface – in reality were being eroded by the forces of nationalism. In the thirteenth century Edward I had defeated the armies of the Welsh but not their sense of who they were or their resentment at being a subordinate people. Scotland was never conquered in same way as Wales and the 1707 union was engineered – some Scots believe they were hoodwinked by the English – for economic and politically strategic reasons. However, Scotland was able to retain its own church, legal and education systems: significantly more than Wales had managed. Ireland’s independent history went back centuries, to the days of the High Kings, but Henry II’s invasion in 1172 made Ireland a vassal state of England, to be characterised by absentee landlords and frequent rebellions, harshly suppressed. The mostly calm surface of the UK in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries concealed, at its peripheries, a history of bloody conquest, imperial domination and seething nationalist resentments. The feeling that Scotland required more detailed attentions from London had been reflected in 1885 when the Scottish Office was set up; the Welsh Office appeared much later, in 1965: both offices

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were headed by a cabinet minister. The Northern Ireland Office was created March 1972, in the wake of the Troubles, when the functions of Stormont were directly administered from London.

NORTHERN IRELAND Ireland was the first to insist on reinstating its independence. When rebellion proved futile in preventing union, Ireland was able to use its representation in the House of Commons after 1800 to advance its case for home rule. The Irish MPs caused so much turbulence that Liberal PM Gladstone became confused and frustrated before finally converting to their cause. The outbreak of war in 1914 destroyed the delivery of what might have proved an effective home rule solution but the harsh British reaction to the 1916 Easter Rising in Dublin ensured there was instead an armed conflict, although that did eventually bring Britain to the negotiating table. Protestants in Northern Ireland proved so formidable in their own right that a partition was granted in 1920 allowing six northern counties to continue as part of the UK. The Catholics in the new province were outnumbered two to one by the Protestants, who used the power of their majority in the devolved provincial government of Stormont to marginalise the Catholics both politically and economically and advantage their own ‘tribe’. The protests of the Catholics in the late 1960s morphed rapidly into the sectarian violence of ‘The Troubles’, set to last three decades and cost some 3500 lives. The element of violence made Ireland an especially urgent case of governance but the threat of even more helped delay any settlement until the combined efforts of John Major and Tony Blair produced the Good Friday Agreement, of 10 April 1998. This set up the Northern Ireland Assembly, once again in Stormont Castle, to which 108 members were to be elected according to PR to ensure a higher degree of social reflection than in the rest of the UK of the province’s differing and volatile elements. In June 1998 the first elections made David Trimble’s Ulster Unionists the biggest party and him the ‘first minister’. His education secretary was Sinn Fein’s Martin McGuinness, formerly closely connected with the Provisional IRA and rumoured to be a major player in the infamous Derry incident in January 1972, later dubbed ‘Bloody Sunday’.



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Trimble found himself under great pressure as a representative of the Protestant majority from Ian Paisley, leader of the hard-­line DUP, who maintained too many concessions had been made to the nationalists and that the IRA should disarm fully, beyond its willingness to do so. The election results in November 2003 reflected a new polarity, with the DUP and Sinn Fein greatly strengthened. Much to the political world’s surprise, the implacable foe of Catholicism, the 80-year-­old Paisley, and the leaders of Sinn Fein seemed to generate a new understanding from this electoral impasse. On 8 May 2007, Paisley became first minister with McGuinness his deputy; in June the following year, the latter remained in post when Peter Robinson succeeded the retired Paisley.

DEVOLUTION IN THE 1970S NATIONALIST PARTIES’ ORIGINS

John Saunders Lewis established Plaid Cymru (Party of Wales) in 1925. Initially, its prime concern was to promote the Welsh language but during the 1930s home rule was added to the list of the party’s objectives. Gwynfor Evans gained the party’s first seat in 1966, with two more added in 1974. The SNP was founded by John MacCormick in 1934, declaring from the outset that Scotland could and should raise its own taxes and pay its own way. The discovery of North Sea oil off the Scottish coast strengthened SNP demands that ‘Scottish oil’ should benefit the Scots rather than the UK as a whole. The SNP won its first seat in 1967 and then, a relative avalanche: 11 more in 1974. KILBRANDON REPORT

Nationalist stirrings led the Labour government in 1969 to set up the Royal Commission on the Constitution under Lord Kilbrandon. Independence and a federal structure were both rejected as solutions in favour of devolved legislatures with authority over domestic affairs. It was hoped these limited concessions to nationalist feeling would draw its sting, neutralise calls for independence and any threat to the Union’s viability. However, the referendum

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for a Welsh assembly was heavily defeated and the Scottish one, though returning a majority, was below the stipulation – established by opponents during the passing of the relevant bill – that it exceed 40% of the electorate. Devolution as an issue then took a back seat during the 1980s, though Margaret Thatcher’s very uncompromising English style of rule did nothing to reduce nationalists’ enthusiasm for their cause. Labour and Lib Dems cooperated over the need for devolution and when Blair’s landslide arrived in 1997 the necessary referendums and other legislation were quickly passed (Box 20.1).

Box 20.1 Powers of the devolved assemblies Scottish Parliament This was established in 1999 at Holyrood. There is a four-­year term. Elections use a ‘mixed member proportional representation’ system, sometimes known as ‘amended additional member system’, based on the German system; this allocates two votes to each voter. One vote goes to help elect the 73 Members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs) from geographical constituencies on FPTP, while the other helps elect 56 from the ‘top-­up’ pool to achieve the proportionality FPTP seldom delivers. The latter is via party lists with seats going according to the percentages achieved. So voters vote for a person with one vote and a party with the other. The Scottish Parliament has the right to pass primary legislation on home affairs and the judiciary, health, housing and local government, farming and fishing, social services and implementing EU directives. It also has the option to adjust income tax by plus or minus three pence in the pound. The powers reserved by London are in the areas of employment law, economic and monetary policy, social security benefits and pensions, passports and immigration, dealings with the EU and foreign policy.



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National Assembly for Wales The 60 Assembly Members (AMs) sit in the Senedd, in Cardiff. Forty AMs are elected from single-­member constituencies and 20 from regional lists, on the same basis as in Scotland. The Welsh Assembly lacks the ability to pass primary legislation but can pass secondary legislation to amend the former. Supporters of the Assembly campaign for the same powers as Scotland. In practice, however, certain important financial adjustments have been made: prescription charges have been abolished; tuition fees for Welsh students studying in Wales have been reduced; and there is more generous provision of nursing  care. The 2011 Referendum on law-making powers led to the Welsh executive gaining the right to propose bills to the Assembly in 20 important policy areas. The Assembly has powers and responsibilities over agriculture, fire services, economic development, environment, food, health, transport, local government, sport, town and country planning. The Government of Wales Act 2006 became law on 25 July 2006. It gave the Assembly powers similar to other the devolved legislatures. However, Assembly order-­incouncil requests – a form of direct government fiat – is subject to veto by the secretary of state for Wales and the House of Commons or the House of Lords.

Northern Ireland Assembly This was established following the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. It meets at Stormont Castle and has 108 members elected according to the single transferable vote system of PR, chosen for its ability to fully represent all the communities in the province. Members are known as Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs). The Assembly has the power of appointing the executive but this has been suspended, with authority handed back to the Northern Ireland Office, on more than one occasion (when this happened in October 2002, full power was not restored until 8 May 2007). The first and deputy first ministers are elected by a cross-­ community vote, while the remainder of the ministers are appointed

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to parties in accordance with their elected strengths. The powers which Westminster retains are divided into ‘excepted matters’, which are permanently excluded from the Assembly, and ‘reserved matters’, which may be transferred at some future date. Laws which are in conflict with the powers of the Assembly, EU law or the European Convention of Human Rights can be struck down and if the secretary of state for Northern Ireland judges a bill which has passed through the Assembly violates its constitutional powers, he or she can refuse to pass it upwards for royal assent. Transferred matters are education, health, agriculture, enterprise, trade and investment, environment, regional development (including transport), employment, finance, social development, and culture, arts and leisure. ‘Reserved matters’ are navigation and civil aviation, international trade and financial markets, telecommunications/ postage, the foreshore and sea bed, disqualification from Assembly membership, consumer safety and intellectual property. ‘Excepted matters’ are royal succession, international relations, defence and armed forces, nationality, immigration and asylum, taxes levied across the UK as a whole, appointment of senior judges, all elections held in Northern Ireland, currency and the conferring of honours.

SCOTLAND The referendum in September 1997 delivered a hefty 3–1 majority in favour of a Scottish Parliament together with a slightly smaller majority endorsing the chamber’s competence to vary tax levels by a small degree. The first elections were held in May 1999, after which a Labour–Lib Dems coalition emerged and survived the 2003 elections. However, in 2007 the SNP sensationally won 47 seats to Labour’s 46 and ruled successfully as a minority government under its able first minister, Alex Salmond. In 2011 the SNP went even further, winning an overall majority of 69 seats. In 2016, when 16 and 17 year olds were allowed to vote, accounting for 2% of those voting, the SNP won 63 seats – six down on 2011, Conservatives won 31, Labour 23, Greens 6, Lib Dems 5, others 2.



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WALES In contrast to Scotland, enthusiasm for Welsh devolution was muted, with only 50.3% in favour of an assembly and 49.7% against. Support for the idea was strongest in the Welsh-­speaking north and west and weakest in eastern areas adjoining England. In 1999 Labour took control of the Assembly. A year later Alun Michael, Blair’s choice, was forced to resign as first minister, giving way to the popular Rhodri Morgan. After the 2007 election Labour stayed in power by virtue of a coalition made with Plaid Cymru. In 2016 Labour regained power with 29 seats; Plaid Cymru 12, Conservatives 11, UKIP 7 and Lib Dems 1.

Northern Ireland The course of this new arrangement did run smoothly after 2007: Stormont government broke down creating four periods when direct rule from Westminster had to be applied: 11 February to 30 May 2000; 10 August 2001 (24-hour suspension); 22 September 2001 (24-hour suspension); 14 October 2002 to 7 May 2007; and 9 January 2017 to 11 January 2020. On 11 January, under a deal brokered in cooperation with Dublin, a power-­sharing government was re-­installed (ITV Report, 2020). In 2016 the DUP won 38 seats, Sinn Fein 28, Ulster Unionist Party 16, SDLP 12, Alliance 12, others 6.

DEVOLUTION: RELATED PROBLEMS • West Lothian question. This famous question was posed by Scottish MP Tam Dalyell in 1977 (representing West Lothian at the time): is it fair that English MPs elected to Westminster cannot have a say in the affairs of West Lothian yet possible for MPs elected from Scotland still to have a say in the affairs of West Bromwich? Critics also argue that because Labour was often dependent for its majority in the Commons on Scottish MPs, Scottish MPs are therefore doubly empowered and English MPs reduced to a lower status. Some defenders of devolution point out that this same problem was present when Ulster MPs represented their province at Westminster (voting

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•

•

•

•

•

mostly with the Conservatives) while Stormont exercised domestic jurisdiction. The whole anomaly was generally simply ignored. Cabinet responsibility. With first ministers in Belfast, Edinburgh and Cardiff, it seems unnecessary to retain secretaries of state in London. Yet these residual titles are allocated often to existing cabinet ministers, frequently with some connection to the countries concerned. Proportional representation. The PR voting systems for the devolved assemblies has greatly benefited the smaller parties (and also the Conservatives in Celtic areas) and implicitly posed the question of why Westminster retains the FPTP system. Yet on 6 May 2011, in a UK referendum on changing this system, the nation rejected it by a 2–1 majority. Pressure for equal powers for Wales. While the Scottish Parliament can pass legislation through three stages and receive the royal assent as well as adjust taxation, the Welsh Assembly can do neither. Independence demands. Devolution was designed to satisfy demands for autonomy short of independence but, with nationalist parties competing, it was always possible they might one day win power. This has happened in the case of Scotland (discussed below). ‘Control freak’ danger. Blair’s attempt to exclude Rhodri Morgan for being supposedly ‘off-­message’ and favouring the more compliant Alun Michael reveals that devolution has an Achilles heel: it gives away power from the centre but some leading politicians will still try to exert control over devolved institutions.

ENGLISH NATIONALISM Often, British, or more particularly English, people like to delude themselves that they are immune from anything so vulgar as nationalism but the facts suggest otherwise. England’s urge to expand was the original motor for imperialism, absorbing the Celtic periphery before looking overseas. Patriotism was encouraged by the Hundred Years War with France and nourished the sense of superiority which so irritated England’s neighbours. Yes this nationalism has



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tended to be passive, seldom showing itself until the external attack was threatened by the likes of Spain, France or Germany. However, a raucous form of it – flags, painted faces – is readily displayed in crowds at international sporting events. PUBLIC SPENDING

It can also be seen in the resentment felt at the ‘unfair’ shares of public spending allocated to Scotland and Wales compared with England. This is a consequence of the Barnett formula, so-­called because it originated with Joel Barnett, chief secretary to the Treasury in the late 1970s, who proposed its short-­term use for calculating the block grants to the less prosperous regions of the UK. He confessed in 2004 that it was an ‘embarrassment’ that a device intended to last one year was still in operation. The proportions for 2015–16 were based on the populations relative to England: £9.076 per head, Scotland, £10.536; Wales £11.996 and Northern Ireland £10.983. The result delivers disproportionate shares of public spending, for example much higher per capita expenditure to Scots and Welsh than to residents of England.

REGIONS OF ENGLAND John Major set up nine regions in 1994 to provide Euro-­ constituencies, endowing them with assemblies appointed by county and borough councils. Kilbrandon had advised the establishment of elected regional assemblies and in 1997 Blair’s government set up regional development agencies to coordinate regional plans with national ones, so that regional differences would eventually be reduced. However, ‘regional consciousness’ varied hugely across the country. In 2004 a referendum was held for a regional assembly in the northeast, the area where regional feeling had been shown to be highest. The result was a 3–1 rejection of the idea, a humiliation for its most fervent advocate, John Prescott, the DPM. However, in the wake of the Scottish referendum in September 2014, enthusiasm for devolution in England was reborn to some extent, with new powers being granted to city regions by the coalition government. After the December 2019 election, Boris Johnson promised to reward those former northern Labour supporters who

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had ‘loaned’ him their votes planning various ‘levelling up’ measures to fulfil his promises and reduce regional inequalities.

GREATER LONDON GOVERNMENT The Greater London Council (GLC) was set up in 1889 but its boundaries soon became outdated through urban overspill. In 1965 the provisions of the 1960 Herbert Commission were implemented, eliminating the old historic counties of London and Middlesex and absorbing parts of Kent, Surrey and Essex. Thirty-­two boroughs were designated, plus the unchanged ancient City of London authority. Margaret Thatcher’s determination to abolish the 1974 metropolitan counties was fulfilled countrywide in March 1986 and, despite a spirited left-­wing rear-­guard action by Ken Livingstone, in London too. In 1998, Labour, now in power, published A Mayor and Assembly for London, which suggested a US-­style elected mayor, elected by a supplementary vote system, plus a 25-strong elected assembly with scrutiny powers (Box 20.2). The mayor has responsibility for transport, fire services, police, culture and economic development. Currently, Greater London covers over 600 square miles and contains nearly eight million people. The elected mayor represents the person with the biggest constituency in the country. Tony Blair was criticised for seeking to veto the maverick Livingstone as Labour’s candidate but in May 2000 Livingstone left the party to stand as an independent and won an easy victory; in 2004, he won again (on second preferences), but this time as the Labour candidate. Livingstone’s attempt at a third term was foiled by the even more maverick Conservative, Boris Johnson, who won a first term in May 2008 and a second in May 2012. In 2016 Sadiq Khan, formerly Labour MP for Tooting, won the contest for Mayor, defeating Conservative Zac Goldsmith.

SCOTTISH INDEPENDENCE REFERENDUM AND ITS IMPACT On 17 December 2013, the Scottish Independence Referendum Act received the royal assent; the vote would take place on 18 September 2014. It was much commented on that that year was



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Box 20.2 Elections for the London Assembly and mayor The London Assembly is led by a directly elected mayor, who serves a four-­year term. In addition to the mayor’s powers over budgeting, strategic planning, transport and so on further powers were granted in 2006 over planning, waste, culture, sports, climate change and appointments to the functional bodies controlling the police and so forth. To stand as a candidate in the mayoral election requires a deposit of £10,000 (which is lost if the candidate polls less than 5% of the vote). The ‘supplementary vote’ system is used, whereby voters mark their first and second preferences. If no candidate receives over half the vote, second preferences are counted until the margin is reached. The mayor’s annual salary in 2007 was £140,000 (though Johnson also received a £250,000 yearly from the Telegraph). Candidates for the mayoralty tend to be a bit unusual, relative outsiders, maybe, like Ken Livingstone. In 2000, the Conservatives gambled with another outsider, the novelist Lord (Jeffrey) Archer, but his candidacy was ended when he was tried and convicted of perjury. In 2008, Boris Johnson’s victory seemed to reinforce the impression that ‘outsiders’ do well. The Assembly, which has 25 members, is also elected for a four-­year term, on the same day as the mayoral election, via an amended ‘additional member’ system (as used in German elections and in Scotland and Wales), whereby each voter has two votes, one for a constituency member and one for a regional party list. The party list seats are allocated on the basis of the percentages of the vote won by each party, with a qualifying limit of 5%. There are 14 constituencies, returning one member each, and 11 members are returned from the party list; it follows that, to be sure of being returned, candidates need to be placed high up on the party list, but the advantage of the system is that it produces a more proportional end result than the FPTP method. In 2016 there were 12 Labour members elected, eight Conservatives, two Greens, two UKIPs and one Lib Dem.

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the 700th anniversary of Bannockburn, Scotland’s famous victory over the forces of the English king, Edward II. The question put to voters? ‘Should Scotland be an independent country?’ Alex Salmond’s push for independence, as leader of the SNP, could not have come at a more propitious time for this, coinciding as it did with two years of popular governing as Scottish SNP first minister, four years into an unpopular Tory-­led government in London and a policy of austerity which angered many Scots, including previously non-­voting working-­class Scots in poor areas of the big cities. If the SNP was going to win, they could not have chosen a better platform from which to launch their campaign. The referendum marked, to a degree, the failure of the Kilbrandon settlement, which embodied hopes the Scots would be happy with extensive control over their domestic politics while still living within the context of the UK. Salmond had led an astute campaign, embodying independence explicitly in both his 2007 and 2011 election campaigns, governing with a high degree of public satisfaction and in consequence winning an overall majority of 69 seats out of 129 in the latter election. On 15 November 2013, ‘Scotland’s Future’ appeared, a 670page white paper explaining the case for independence and charting the route it might take. Salmond hailed it as the ‘most comprehensive blueprint for an independent country ever published’. He maintained it showed his government sought not ‘independence as an end in itself, but rather as a means to changing Scotland for the better’. The leader of the three main UK parties’ ‘Better Together’ campaign, former Labour chancellor Alistair Darling, dismissed the astonishingly lengthy document as ‘thick with false promises and meaningless assertions’. He spoke for all three of the Westminster-­based mainstream UK parties in asserting that ‘Instead of a credible and costed plan, we have a wish-­list of political promises without any answers on how Alex Salmond would pay for them.’ Labour was fervently against independence, as Scotland had long been further to the left than England, returning 41 of the 59 seats available for Labour and only one for the Conservatives. Without these seats, it was felt, Labour would struggle to win a UK election without Scotland. While independence would deliver an enticing political dividend for Conservatives, David Cameron was extremely



devolution

keen to avoid being the leader of a government presiding over the break-­up of the UK. He was careful, however, to listen responsively to his right-­wing colleagues who called for a reformed House of Commons which would allow only English MPs to vote on English laws, thus disenfranchising Scottish MPs. Salmond declared he would be happy to retain the Queen as head of state and also wished to remain part of the sterling area, as well as to keep Scotland a member of the EU. While the first possibility was happily granted, the governor of the Bank of England, as well as chancellor George Osborne, said they could not permit the second; Salmond dismissed the refusal as a bluff. The Scottish first minister’s wish to remain a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) while opposing nuclear weapons and the basing of Trident in Scotland was also dismissed as impossible. His similar assumption that membership of the EU would be via some kind of automatic transference was also disabused by several EU leaders. Moreover, weighty opinion formers, including US president Obama, Hilary Clinton and even the Pope, expressed degrees of hope that Scotland would not separate from the UK. POLLS

When it came to opinion polls, the ‘yes’ supporters had traditionally been in a minority. Well respected psephologist Professor John Curtice estimated the ‘yes’ campaign’s support at between 32% and 38% in January 2012. He saw the polls as stable during 2013, with the ‘no’ camp leading by 50% to 33% in the latter part of that year. On 7 September a YouGov poll in the Sunday Times put the ‘yes’ campaign in the lead. This suddenly galvanised the pro-­Union forces. Perhaps too late in the day, the ‘no’ camp, guessing their case had been too rational, now repackaged it as emotional pleas to Scotland not to destroy a Union which had worked so well since 1707, but such appeals seemed to fall on deaf ears as 18 September approached. Having shunned the tripartite ‘Better Together’ campaign led by Darling (Cameron wisely gave Labour the leading role), Brown came out of his post-­2010 purdah to barnstorm around his country, passionately extolling the benefits of the Union,

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delivering the best speech of the campaign on 17 September; it concluded with ‘What we have built together, by sacrificing and sharing, let no narrow nationalism split asunder ever.’ If anyone could firm up the fragmenting Labour vote, he could. He promised a full devolution of extra powers if the ‘no’ side won, plus retention of the much-­criticised Barnett formula: ‘devo max’, in effect. Results, 19 September

On a turnout of 85%, the ‘yes’ vote was 44.70% (1.6 million), the ‘no’ vote 55.30% (2.0 million). THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ‘NO’ RESULT

1. The ‘no’ victory at 55–45% was decisive, much bigger – by 7% – than the later polls had indicated, suggesting intending ‘no’ voters were shy of admitting it to pollsters. The Scots and the UK as a whole clearly wanted to stay united; the ‘no’ camp hoped this vote had stilled the noise for a decade; Salmond initially suggested there would not be another attempt for a ‘generation’. However, as SNP membership burgeoned and great enthusiasm was maintained, the possibility returned of another referendum in the near future; polls at the end of 2014 suggested the SNP would win such a vote. 2. The ‘yes’ vote, at 1.6 million, was still substantial, indicating a great deal of dissatisfaction with current constitutional arrangements and the way political parties operate. 3. The huge turnout – 85% – was so much bigger than any previous one that it put to shame the general election turnouts in the UK as a whole; it was 21 points higher than the 2010 election and 35 higher than the 2011 Scottish Parliament one. As the energy of the ‘yes’ campaign flowed south of the border, it seemed clear a major re-­arrangement of the UK, involving much devolution, was required. But the chances of this happening should not be overestimated: the status quo is very resilient on Britain – look how the banking meltdown of 2008–09 has not really caused any major changes.



devolution

4. Voices in England – mainly Tory MPs on the right – demanded equal powers for England in the wake of the result, linking the delivery of the two. But while the Scottish part was scheduled for January 2015, the English part was seen as a bigger problem, as Labour sees ‘English votes on English issues’ as ceding hegemony to the Conservatives for the indefinite future. 5. The vigour of the referendum campaign was transferred into the general election, May 2015 and helped the SNP win 56 seats, making it the third largest party in the Commons. The SNP’s new leader, Nicola Sturgeon felt able in early September 2015 to warn Cameron, playing on his fear the Union might break up on his watch, that if his policies were too objectionable to Scottish voters, they might call for another referendum. Cameron may have freed himself of the constraints of his former coalition partner, but the SNP was keen to flag up its own ability to constrain. 6. The momentum continued into 2015 when the SNP won a remarkable 56 out of 59 seats north of the border, reducing the other UK parties to a humiliating one each. May’s snap 2017 election, however, saw doubts re-­emerging about the viability of independence and the Conservative under the astute leadership of Ruth Davidson won 13 seats and Labour 7. 7. Come 2019, however, Sturgeon was convinced by poll ratings that a general election would see her party sweeping the board once again. Combining Jo Swinson’s Lib Dems they enabled Johnson’s amendment to the 2011 Fixed Term Parliament Act to pass on a simple majority, thus opening the gate for Johnson to win his historic 80 seat majority. On 2 February, Donald Tusk, former EU president, said there would be ‘widespread enthusiasm in the EU if Scotland applied to rejoin after independence’ (Carrell, 2020). On 5 February, a new poll in Scotland revealed a 52% rating for independence. Impact of Brexit

In the wake of this victory Sturgeon demanded a second independence referendum which Johnson bluntly refused. However once Brexit had happened pro-­Remain Scottish voters strengthened hopes of a successful referendum and dreamed of re-­applying to the EU but this time as an independent country. Ian Jack (2019) in the

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Guardian summed up the impact of Brexit with the headline to his December article: ‘The Union survived this decade intact. But only Just.’ 

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION 1. Is there a strong argument for a federal structure for the UK? 2. Is Scottish independence inevitable? 3. Should all the English regions be given extensive devolved powers?

FURTHER READING For an interesting take on devolution see Bulpitt (1983); for a more up-­to-date analysis see Deacon (2006) and (2012). On referendums see Quotrup (2005). An outstanding article by Simon Jenkins on devolution to Manchester and its region brokered by George Osborne and the city chief executive, Howard Bernstein, appeared in Guardian on 12 February 2015. Bradbury, J. (2009) Devolution, Regionalism and Regional Development, Routledge. Bulpitt, J. (1983) Territory and Power in the United Kingdom, Manchester University Press. Carrell, S. (2020) Tusk says the EU would welcome Scotland back after independence, Guardian, 2 February. Deacon, R. (2006) Devolution in Britain Today, Manchester University Press. Deacon, R. (2012) Devolution in the United Kingdom (Politics Study Guides), Edinburgh University Press. Evans, J.G. (2019) Labour and Devolution in Wales, Y Lolfa, Books for Wales. ITV Report (2020) Northern Ireland’s Stormont to resume after deal to restore power-­sharing, 11 January. Jack, I. (2019) The Union survived this decade intact: but only just, Guardian, 28 December. Jenkins, S. (2015) The secret negotiations to restore Manchester to greatness, Guardian, 12 February.  Lodge, G. and Schmuecker, K. (2010) Devolution in Practice: Policy Differences in the UK, IPPR. Mitchell, J. (2011) Devolution in the United Kingdom, Manchester University Press.



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Quotrup, M. (2005) A Comparative Study of Referendums, Manchester University Press. Yorkshire Evening Post (2014) Yorkshire could be ‘God’s Own Country’, says Leeds professor, 12 September. Smith, A. (2014) Devolution and the Scottish Conservatives (New Ethnographies), Manchester University Press.

Websites Northern Ireland Assembly, http://niassembly.gov.uk/. Scottish Parliament, www.scottish.parliament.uk. Welsh Assembly, http://gov.wales/.

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21 LOCAL GOVERNMENT Provenance and decline

PROVENANCE Local government in feudal times could virtually be defined as how lords of the manor chose to run their estates. Administrative units of ‘county’, ‘borough’ and ‘parish’ date back to Norman times, when justice – an important element of local governance – was dispensed via the county assizes, which also raised militias or defensive forces. From the late seventeenth century ‘improvement commissioners’ were appointed to attend to paving and lighting, financed by local rates. From 1600 the Poor Law obliged parishes to look after the poor and indigent via an ‘overseer for the poor’; from 1723 ‘workhouses’ were set up to accommodate those unable to care for themselves, though the ‘care’ provided was scarcely worth the name by modern standards. Local government was relatively embryonic until it burgeoned during the nineteenth century, in response to the Industrial Revolution; this created acute problems of poverty, health, sanitation, law and order, and transport. Hundreds of thousands had moved into the cities from the countryside, often crammed into appalling damp and inadequate accommodation, often several families together. Inevitably it had to be central government which took the structural initiative. The 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act set up boards of guardians to run a new kind of workhouse, though arguably no



local government: provenance and decline

less harsh in regime. In 1835 the Municipal Corporations Act required members of town councils – many of which had become self-­perpetuating oligarchies – to be elected by ratepayers and for annual accounts to be published. A third of councillors were to be up for re-­election each year and aldermen elected from within the council for six-­year terms. Later councils formed ad hoc boards to run services like health, highways, transport and education. The 1888 Local Government Act set up 62 new elected councils plus 61 county boroughs (these last being ‘unitary’, administering all functions) in England and Wales. In 1894 further complexity was added with 535 urban district and 472 rural district councils, plus 270 non-­county borough councils (with fewer powers). After these measures and the 1929 measure transferring Poor Law guardian powers to local government, the next four decades were virtually free from structural change. This allowed local government to develop its functions and acquire new roles and responsibilities; this is reputed to be local government’s ‘golden age’, when it anticipated much of what later became the ‘welfare state’: hospital care, child health, road provision, gas, electricity and public libraries. However, the time came when population overspill across local authority borders reached the point when more structural reform was needed. The complexity of the ageing system, moreover, with 1400 separate authorities, was such that a complete overhaul was overdue. The Redcliffe-­Maud Report (Cmnd 4040) was published by the Royal Commission on Local Government in England 1966–69 under the chairmanship of Lord Redcliffe-­ Maud. It recommended a nationwide pattern of unitary authorities. However, Heath’s Conservative government feared this would play into the hands of Labour, which dominated urban areas. Consequently, a ‘two tier’ system was introduced with different (and more important) functions performed at the ‘shire county’ level than at the ‘district’ ones. The Local Government Act 1972 was a huge rationalisation of the patchwork pattern of local government which had emerged over the centuries. County councils were reduced to 47, with 334 constituent district ones. A new kind of urban form of local government was also established: six metropolitan counties and their constituent 36 district councils. Bigger units would create efficiencies of scale

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and clarify the system for voters, who tended to ignore their councils and neglect to vote in their elections. However, many voters were bewildered by the removal of what little they had understood about the old system and bigger units meant town halls were further away rather than nearer. See Figure 21.1 for the structure of local government after the 1972 Act and, for its functions, Table 21.1.

POST-­WAR DECLINE If the early and mid-­twentieth century was local government’s golden age, its history since World War II has largely been one of decline. First, funding: as the range of services expanded, standards were raised, but the yield of local taxes fell away, and local government was forced to look to central government for the extra cash. By the end of the twentieth century funding which originated at the centre – including business rates set in Whitehall – was over three-­quarters of the whole. The ‘council tax’ now provides only 20% of the whole, leaving local government very much in the supplicant role regarding its dealings with the centre. Second, the loss of function: local government has seen a wide raft of its functions stripped away since 1945. Provision of gas and electricity disappeared at that time as well as hospitals, as the NHS came

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local government: provenance and decline

Table 21.1 Function of local authorities Function

County

Education Housing Social Services Highways Transport Museums and art galleries Libraries Planning Strategic planning Economic development Recreation, parks, sports facilities Weights and measures Food and health inspection Cemeteries Markets

*

District

* * * * * *

* * *

* * * * *

* *

* *

Unitary * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Source: Jones and Kavanagh, 1994, p. 201.

into being. Then senior criminal courts were lost (1973), water and sewage (1974), ambulances (1974) and elements of education like the polytechnics (1989) and colleges of further education (1993), not to mention police and fire services (1986 onwards), airports (1987) and the million plus council houses, sold to tenants during the 1980s. Local government retains responsibility for education but its control is limited; for example, the national curriculum now determines what has to be taught in schools and school budgets have been handed over, in many cases, to the schools themselves. Third, fragmentation: as central government became impatient with local government, it began to intervene, establishing agencies more independent of the existing structures, like urban development corporations to stimulate urban renewal or the variety of government-­appointed quangos (quasi non-­governmental organisations) to take care of functions once performed by local government, like local training. Finally, ‘contracting out’: this began with the Thatcher government in the early 1980s. Convinced that privately owned business

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was more efficient than the public sector, Thatcher insisted local councils put an ever-­growing list of functions out to private tender so that they could be contracted out at lower cost to private concerns. Many disputed that greater efficiency was the result and former municipal employees found their new private employers paid less and on less generous terms of employment. This shift tended to remove front-­line activities from the control of local government and make them more into ‘enabling authorities’, issuing contracts and monitoring progress.

THATCHER AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT Margaret Thatcher’s period in power saw a virtual war being waged against local government. The Local Government Planning and Land Act 1980 was the one which ordered the contracting out of functions to private enterprise; urban development corporations facilitated redevelopment free of the shackles of local government controls. The Local Government Finance Act 1982 set up the Audit Commission, tasked usefully with monitoring expenditure in a wide range of public agencies. The Rates Act 1984 introduced ‘rate-­capping’. Over half of local authorities’ funding came from central government, so local government had tried to raise rates to compensate for government cuts. Controlling the legal framework as well as funding, central government was able to squeeze local government with impunity. With the 1985 Local Government Act, Thatcher was able to abolish the Labour-­dominated metropolitan county councils and later the Ken Livingstone-­led GLC. Labour hoped for a backlash against such arbitrary dismantling of the constitution but the fact was, apart from the GLC, few missed the loss of the metropolitan counties. Perhaps buoyed up by her astonishing success, electorally and militarily, Thatcher over-­reached herself with her next attack on local government, the ‘poll tax’. The Local Government Act 1988 installed the ‘community charge’, or, as it was popularly known, the ‘poll tax’. Thatcher had long hated the way the property-­based ‘rates’ were paid disproportionately by the better-­off while poorer people received multiple discounts or exemptions. Politically this meant that Conservative voters – who favoured low rates – tended also to be the biggest



local government: provenance and decline

payers of them, while Labour – which advocated high rates to fund high levels of service – was supported by people who often paid no rates at all. This was ‘power without responsibility’ argued the Tories and the community charge was designed to distribute responsibility to every voter in the country. It was a flat charge payable by everyone, though discounts were available to students and others. The theory was that once voters realised they had responsibility for charge levels, they would vote to keep it low and that all parties would compete to keep it low as well; thus would Tory policy be served. Theory was one thing, practice another. The tax was expensive to collect, many avoided registering for it in the first place, and some well publicised rebels refused to pay. The basic problem was the regressive nature of the charge; it required the char lady to pay as much as the Duke of Westminster and this was widely seen as plainly unfair. In the spring of 1990 demonstrations against the tax spilled over into riots and this further weakened a premier whose imperious style had thoroughly tested the patience of her party, if not voters more generally. The EU was the immediate cause of her departure but few failed to recognise the major role played by her unrelenting, stubborn insistence that the poll tax was both a fair and an efficient means of raising local revenue.

THE PROFESSIONAL IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT At Westminster, the tradition has been for elected ministers to be advised by civil servants who are generalist in their talents and outlook (see Chapter 18): the theory is that someone educated to a high level, whether it be classics or history, is as well able to advise a chancellor as any economist. Such an approach was criticised in the Fulton report and to some extent ameliorated in practice, but the theory still has its supporters. In local government, on the other hand, such an approach has never been dominant. Councils are concerned with sewers and roads and buildings and have never had any doubts about employing appropriately qualified architects, lawyers, engineers or town planners. Councillors are advised not by ‘Sir Humphrey’ types but by hard-­bitten professionals with long years of experience in local government. This means that management of local government tends to be conducted by elites,

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c­ omprising senior elected members in close alliance with their professionalised chief officers. Some claim that local government is more efficient than central government, citing its ability to maintain good front-­line services after 2010, even after suffering savage budget cuts of over 40%.

FURTHER REFORMS The Local Government Finance Act 1992, conceived by Thatcher’s partial nemesis, Michael Heseltine, shifted the basis of local government taxation back to property. Houses were categorised and payments made basically according to house values. As richer people tended to live in bigger houses, this seemed much fairer and instantly removed a huge public animus against the government of the day. The two-­tier system of allocating functions had proved confusing and less efficient than the ‘unitary’ (all purpose) county authorities. Labour had always favoured Redcliffe-­Maud’s unitary authorities, as their strength lay in urban centres. The Conservatives, with strength in the shires, went for the two-­tier approach, with the top tier controlling the bigger spending functions. However, this preference was reversed by the mid-­1990s, with the Major government coming around to the view that unitary authorities were the clearer, more efficient and accountable option. John Major’s Local Government Commission was tasked with reviewing local government structures, under its chair, Sir John Banham. However, Banham refused to impose the unitary solution uniformly, preferring retention of the two-­tier approach in some localities. His successor proved more compliant but by 1998 only 46 unitary authorities had been formed: some way short of uniformity. Reforms in Scotland and Wales emphatically adopted the unitary model. County and districts in Wales were replaced in 1994 by 22 unitaries, while Scotland’s regional and district councils gave way to 32 unitaries (Table 21.2). The Local Government Act (Northern Ireland), back in 1972, had set up 26 district councils, replacing the tiered system bestowed upon the whole of Ireland (when it was part of the UK) back in 1898. Naturally, local government in these areas comes under the control of the relevant elected assembly and not central, Westminster government in London.



local government: provenance and decline

Table 21.2 Summary of local government structure Type of authority

Number of bodies

Two-tier structure   County councils   District councils

27 201

All-purpose authorities   English unitary authorities   Metropolitan districts   London boroughs   Scottish unitary authorities   Welsh unitary authorities   City of London   Isles of Scilly   Total England, Wales and Scotland total Northern Ireland district councils Grand total

55 36 32 32 22 1 1 179 407 26 433

PARISH COUNCILS There are about 8700 of these, the smallest units of local government; they are related to original church parishes but are civil, not religious. They are more common in rural than urban areas but, since 1997, 150 new councils have been established. The councils are served by some 70,000 councillors, 80% of them serving populations of less than 2500. If a vacancy occurs during a parish council’s term, such a ‘casual vacancy’ can be filled by election or co-­option. Their funding is often only a few thousand pounds, gathered via a precept on the council tax. Functions performed include things like youth activities, transport for the elderly, burial activities, play schemes, footpaths and litter collection. Surprisingly, perhaps, parish councils employ 25,000 people and spend £400 million per annum. Often these small units group together to provide services – like transport – over a wider area; many also share the services of the same parish council clerk. On 15 February 2008 the government announced that from that day local councils

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would be able to create town and parish councils without seeking permission from the government. Town and parish councils vary in size and function considerably, serving populations from 100 right up to 70,000. A ‘town council’ is a council representing a parish but which chooses to call itself a town council. The idea of the initiative is to give councils the chance to create smaller units, closer to the public, which can operate more quickly and efficiently than normal councils. Critics of UK local government, like the journalist, Simon Jenkins, point to the relatively large number of people in the smallest units of UK local government: in France 200–300, in UK over 3000. Jenkins (2006) also criticises over-­ centralisation, pointing out: The one big system that worked from day one was for London’s congestion charge. It was commissioned locally, against the advice and to the derision of Whitehall. There is nothing sacred about local as against central. It just happens to work better because it is closer to the user. The Napoleonic thesis that central government is by its nature efficient is contradicted by every shred of evidence yet believed by every denizen of Westminster. Polls suggest that people are happier and more trusting of local than of national representatives. They trust councillors more than MPs and local services more than national ones … most developed democracies devolve to their local councils, the functions that central government grasps neurotically to its bosom.

ABOLITION OF THE AUDIT COMMISSION The Audit Commission, a Thatcher-­inspired innovation, was held to be too expensive by the coalition government formed in May 2010, though the decision to abolish it was much criticised as many judged it to be a useful guarantor of efficient practice. It was announced that the Commission’s functions would be ­transferred to the voluntary, not-­for-profit or private sector. Despite this early announcement, closure did not occur until 1 April 2015.



local government: provenance and decline

ELECTED MAYORS This has probably been the major new political life-­form introduced in local government over the past decade. The idea originated most obviously in the USA, where it is common for an elected mayor to be granted substantial powers to run a town or city efficiently and peacefully, using leadership skills and energies. The New York mayoralty is probably the best-­known example to British people and it offered a striking contrast to the largely ceremonial role this office has represented in the past on this side of the Atlantic. It was first taken up by the Conservative, Michael Heseltine, when he was at the Department for the Environment; it was an idea that appealed to someone who personally believed a strong leader could transform a situation if given the authority to do so. New Labour took up the idea, Tony Blair possibly being of the same mind and personality as the Conservative cabinet minister. The fact was that executive structures in local government were not especially effective. Functions used to be run by large committees with the chairperson wielding a great deal of power. A report by Sir John Bains in 1972 urged the reduction in the number of committees running things and recommended that a central committee be formed to coordinate activities, which would include committee chairs. This was not unlike a cabinet for local government and many councils adopted the model during succeeding decades. The 2000 Local Government Act sought to change decision-­ making structures in local government by obliging all councils with over 85,000 population to choose from three alternatives: • • •

a directly elected mayor a mayor and a council manager an indirectly elected leader and cabinet.

It may seem surprising that the third option proved the most popular, but the fact is that it came closest to existing structures, influenced by the Bains Report several decades earlier. The idea here was for the ruling group in a council to elect its leader as leader of the council, who thereupon would select up to nine

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c­ olleagues to form a cabinet (in the event of a ‘no overall control’ council, the make-­up of the cabinet would change). This was more or less what happened before, so many councillors felt comfortable with it and distrusted the directly elected mayor, whose provenance seemed to bestow an over-­mighty legitimacy, and, by comparison, reduced their own importance. Copus questions the rationality of this attitude as the powers of both the elected mayor and the indirectly elected leader are nearly identical (2014, p. 577). The elected mayor was to be chosen via the supplementary vote, the system used to elect the London mayor, ensuring that the winner receives a majority of votes cast. The cause of the councillors’ caution at such a proposal can be appreciated by the role such a publicly elected official would perform. As the highly visible ‘first citizen’, elected mayors would have a mandate to lead, to form a policy framework, prepare the budget and drive ideas through the council. Moreover, the directly elected mayor would have a legal status as the head of the executive, with councillors relegated to a ‘legislative’ checking role. Given that in the ‘leader and cabinet’ model requires councillors to provide a separate ‘legislative’ form of opposition, it will be made more difficult, in that the majority group will have produced the council’s leader and their support is likely to blunt any ‘opposition’ they might deliver. The 2000 Act required councils to consult with voters via referendums but voters have not been especially excited by the idea. Of the 51 referendums up to May 2013 only 16 have said yes: Watford, Doncaster, Liverpool, Leicester, Copeland, Bristol, London, Tower Hamlets, North Tyneside, Middlesbrough, Newham, Bedford, Hackney, Mansfield, Salford and Torbay. Referendums are initiated by a resolution in council, by a local petition or intervention by central government. The average ‘yes’ vote has been 45%, with turnout around 30%. There have been four referendums on removing the post of elected mayor: in consequence two have been abolished and two retained. Elections took place in May and October 2002 and produced some surprising results, in that of the 11 mayors elected, four were independents. The mayor of Hartlepool, Stuart Drummond, was the local football team’s monkey-­suit mascot; in office he proved



local government: provenance and decline

to be a committed and, by all accounts, competent official, being re-­elected in 2009; in 2012 the Labour group on the council called a referendum on style of governance and subsequently a council leader plus cabinet system being installed May 2013. After the second round of elections for mayors, Labour ended up with seven out of the 12 (including London), suggesting that old party patterns are beginning to re-­emerge. The 2008 London contest, featuring Ken Livingstone, ex-­policeman Brian Paddick and the eccentric blond-­haired old Etonian Boris Johnson sparked much interest, with David Cameron championing his old school chum Boris to be the eventual winner, and who gained 53% of the vote. The contest was rerun in 2012 with Johnson triumphing again, 51.53% to Livingstone’s 48.47%.

‘REVOLUTIONARY’ DEVOLUTION OF POWERS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN 2014–15 Even though the September 2014 Scottish independence referendum was lost, there were calls from local government leaders, especially Manchester’s Sir Richard Lees, for matching devolution for English regions. Regional devolution had been explored via a referendum in 2004 in the northeast and it was roundly rejected 4–1. Now, however, the idea seemed to have absorbed some of the super-­charged energy of the Scottish ‘yes’ campaign. Coincidentally, both major parties had in any case been formulating new devolution policies based on giving wide-­ranging new powers to cities and their hinterlands. This was quite a step, as the UK is the most fiscally centralised of the major Organisation for Economic Co-­operation and Development (OECD) nations, with 95% of all taxation in the hands of the Treasury, while the remaining 5% (council tax) was (in 2014) frozen and capped. Manchester had already formed a collective body for all the council leaders of the ten boroughs of Greater Manchester but new powers were announced by George Osborne on 3 November 2014 to an elected mayor for the whole of that region. That new mayor’s powers were to be ‘most of the powers of the mayor of London’ plus responsibility for skills and further education. Elections will use the supplementary vote as used in London and other mayoral elections.

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Almost inevitably, this renewal of interest in devolution of increased powers to the regions had a knock-­on effect with other city regions – Leeds, Birmingham, Bristol, Newcastle – eager to negotiate and enjoy the same privileges. Tony Travers, of the London School of Economics, noted that the powers allowed by Osborne will be subject to some controls from the centre but remarks that ‘in a country as centralised as England, any offer of greater devolution has to be encouraged’. Simon Jenkins, in an outstanding article in the Guardian, 12 February 2015, analysed the November ‘deal’ between Osborne and the Manchester chief executive Howard Bernstein, and quoted Michael Heseltine’s speech to Manchester University on 3 November 2014: ‘English devolution is now unstoppable’. Later in the month, an even more spectacular devolution measure took place. Jenkins commented on 26 February 2015: George Osborne’s Manchester Devolution deal last November – so-­ called devo-­Manc – began a process that is clearly unstoppable. It devolved to the city region £2bn of spending over housing, transport, planning and skills training. Friday’s proposal [27 February 2015] is worth three times that sum, £6bn, devolving nationalised hospitals and GPs to merge with local clinics, homes and home care services. NHS ‘in crisis’ has become a national cliche. Big has not worked. Now is the turn of small.

Already, liaison is taking place locally between general practitioner commissioning groups and frantic care departments. During the devo-­Manc discussions, Osborne conceded Manchester an NHS liaison role, but the logic was merger. He faced the option of bringing all health care under Whitehall control, but the idea of piling yet more bureaucracy on the NHS was unthinkable. The only sensible alternative was to pass the NHS to the locality. Priorities would be locally decided and locally accountable. Postcode lottery would become postcode priority and postcode opportunity. There should be ‘decentralisation of blame’. If Jenkins is right and the ‘Manchester template’ is adopted nationwide in England, a revolution will have occurred. Granted such dramatic change was created by a direct ‘deal’ which short-­ circuited democratic procedures and involved George Osborne,



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the leader of Manchester Labour-­led council, Sir Richard Leese and its chief executive, Howard Bernstein.

The Northern Powerhouse George Osborne’s initiative attracted much support among northern council leaders but the hopped for roll-­out to other areas was stymied when Theresa May became PM. This quintessentially Home Counties politician proved unimpressed by the former Chancellor’s pivot towards the north and his initiative did not progress. However, Labour voters who abandoned their loyalties to vote Tory in 2019, led Johnson to promise a new emphasis on the needs of the north and hopes that these might result in structural as well as financial reforms re-­emerged.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT ASSOCIATION This body acts as an advocacy body for local government in its dealings with government. The Local Government Association (LGA) is subject to partisan control but its network of committees and sub-­committees has been an effective intervening element in central–local relations ever since it was set up in 1997.

POLITICS AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT In the earlier incarnations of local government, local property owners tended to exercise more power and influence than political parties. Joseph Chamberlain, a one-­time Birmingham city councillor and then mayor, was influential in applying Liberal ideas through an efficient local party. After he became a Liberal MP and cabinet minister the importance was emphasised of establishing a local government foundation to one’s political career, together with the advantages of party support in the localities. During the twentieth century Labour entered the picture and, for the most part, made big cities its own. By the middle of the twentieth century, all parties looked to their local councils and elections became partisan, as they remain today (Box 21.1).

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Box 21.1 Local government: election and function • • • •

•

Eligibility to vote. People aged 18 years or more can vote if they are citizens of Britain, Ireland or the Commonwealth; live in the locality; and are registered to vote. Candidates. Since 1969 can be as young as 18 years; they have to live locally and have the support of ten local people. Electoral system. Elections in England and Wales are via FPTP but in Ireland and Scotland the single transferable vote system is used, producing more coalition control. Timing of elections. Local elections take place every year on the first Thursday in May. County councils are elected in their entirety every four years but district councils have a choice of having elections for the whole council every four years – at the mid-­term point for the counties – or via one-­third of councillors standing for re-­election in each non-­county year. Functions. In metropolitan counties it was the district tier which exercised the most expensive functions, like education, housing and social services, while the county level had more regional functions, like transport and planning, functions which disappeared when these councils were abolished in 1986. In shire counties, it is the county councils which have the major functions, while the districts are limited to housing, planning, environmental health.

May 2019 Local Elections

These elections were anticipated as a barometer reading of national party fortunes and to some extent they were but in other ways painfully misleading. Conservatives did disastrously, ending up with 3564 seats – a loss of 1330 seats and 44 councils – claiming 31% of the vote; Labour had 2021 – a loss of 80 seats with 26.6% of the vote – a serious underperformance when the government party was failing so badly; Lib Dems had 1351, an increase of 704; while Greens added 84, 9.2% of the vote; and UKIP lost 145 – 4.5% of the vote. The Lib



local government: provenance and decline

Dems were delighted with their gains, interpreting them, perhaps too enthusiastically, as a sign they were attracting waves of Remain voters. As Chapter 16 explains, Lib Dems received precious reward for being the party most hostile to Brexit. Some voters were angry that there were no Brexit Party candidates on offer, Nigel Farage having decided to concentrate his resources on the later Euro-­ elections. It would be fair to say that while these results created headlines, they offered no indication of how the Brexit issue would turn out before the end of the year (see Chapters 16 and 23).

WESTMINSTER RESPONSIBILITY FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT The department dealing with local government has varied over the years, from Housing and Local Government in the 1960s, to Environment during the 1970s, then Transport, Local Government and the Regions, then the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister before coming under the Department of Community and Local Government in 2006. In 2020 local government is run from Whitehall by the Department of Housing, Communities and Local Government. The department has nine regional offices to assist its work throughout the country.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION 1. Do you think British local government is ‘local’ enough? 2. Do you consider local government is given sufficient powers to fulfil its functions? 3. Do you think a local income tax offers the best way of funding local government?

FURTHER READING Really up-­to-date texts on UK local government are in short supply but I would recommend: Chandler (2009), plus the excellent short chapter (chapter 21) by Colin Copus (2018). See also Copus (2013). Chandler, J.A. (2009) Local Government Today, Manchester University Press. Copus, C. (2013) Leading the Localities: Executive Mayors in English Local Governance, Manchester University Press.

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Copus, C. (2018) Local government, in B. Jones, P. Norton and O. Daddow (eds), Politics UK (9th edition), Routledge, ch. 21. Jenkins, S. (2006) The failure is systemic, and the system is Blair’s, Guardian, 3 May. Jenkins, S. (2008) Instead of elected local leaders, we have the police, Guardian, 27 February. Jenkins, S. (2015) The secret negotiations to restore Manchester to greatness, Guardian, 12 February. Jenkins, S. (2015) On the NHS, where Manchester leads, England’s other cities must follow, Guardian, 26 February. Jones, B. and Kavanagh, D. (1994) British Politics Today (5th edition), Manchester University Press  Miliband, E. (2014) The future is local, Guardian, 7 July. Rallings, C. and Thrasher, M. (1997) Local Elections in Britain, Routledge. Stoker, G. (2003) Transforming Local Governance in the UK, Palgrave. Wilson, D. and Game, C. (2002) Local Government in the United Kingdom, Palgrave.

WEBSITES Guide to local government, www.gwydir.demon.co.uk/uklocalgov/structure. htm. Local Government Association, www.lga.gov.uk. Local Government Information Unit, www.lgiu.gov.uk. National Standards Board, www.standardsboard.co.uk. New Local Government Network, www.nlgn.org.uk.

22 The Judiciary and Politics

OVERLOOKED? Maintaining the law is something all governments seek to do efficiently and, in most countries, fairly. Back in Britain’s early history, Henry II (1133–89), for example, saw it as his duty to reform England’s legal system and establish a national circuit of county courts. Box 22.1 The function of the law in society Legal systems and legal reasoning involve attempts to draw up general rules and procedures to govern human interaction. The law, especially in a common-­law system, is a historical enterprise … that is to say, it seeks constantly to modify the agreed rules in the light of new circumstances; in this respect, it is one large feedback loop. And it attempts to take into account not just the purposes informing any given individual’s actions, but the likely effect of such actions on the interests of others, now and in the future. Accumulated legal reasoning becomes, therefore, the great repository of wisdom about the social consequences of allowing this action or preventing that action, and it is, in an important sense, no respecter of persons: no one, as the phrase has it, is above the law. (Collini, 2020)

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So it is perhaps surprising that such an important function tends to be overlooked in analyses of British government. Perhaps this is because courts are ‘subordinate’ to parliament, which has supreme legal authority, and because they are, in theory at least, ‘autonomous’ or detached, in that they interpret rules made elsewhere. But in the present day it would be a mistake to view the judiciary – the judges and the courts nationwide – as merely of secondary importance. This chapter considers how the judiciary fits into and serves the political system and provides a thumbnail sketch of the highly complex British system of judges and courts.

SUBORDINATE? The courts cannot strike down a piece of statute law – laws passed by a legislature – as only parliament can do this. Yet, once, the monarch could always override statute via the common law using the judicial machinery; the Glorious Revolution (1688–89) put an end to this, as from then onwards statute law became superior to any other form of law. However, ‘judicial activism’ (see below) has made the courts less subordinate. Courts have the power to interpret the precise wording of a law in practice in a way that subtly changes its effect and they can ‘review’ the actions of ministers to assess whether they are within the law as written or beyond it, or, in the widely used Latin version, ultra vires.

AUTONOMOUS? Judges have autonomy in that they have virtual security of tenure: it takes both Houses of parliament to sack one and they receive their salaries on a permanent, not renewable, basis. The Commons is not allowed to discuss court cases in process or sub judice; ministers and civil servants do the same. Judges are supposed to avoid any partisan activity or, indeed, any kind of comment on current issues, following the Kilmuir guidelines of 1955, which forbade it. However, the dividing lines between the spheres of government are tenuous; membership of the legislature, executive and judiciary are not mutually exclusive in Britain (see Figure 22.1).



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JUDICIAL POSTS THE LORD CHANCELLOR

At one time, this officer was a member of all three branches of government: legislature (presiding in the House of Lords), judiciary (appointing judges, hearing appeals) and executive (member of cabinet). In the past, this position was filled by a senior heavyweight politician, for example Tory Lord Hailsham (1979–87) or Labour’s Lord Irvine (1997–2003). The post used to be effectively head of the judiciary plus speaker of House of Lords and head of the Chancery Division of the High Court. The Constitutional Reform Act (CRA) 2005 transferred these functions respectively

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to: the lord chief justice (LCJ), the Lord speaker and the chancellor of the High Court. The office still exists as an adjunct to the secretary of state for justice – the incumbent at the time of writing was Robert Buckland – but the power of the office has been greatly attenuated (for example, the requirement for the holder to be a qualified lawyer has been dropped – though Buckland is a qualified barrister). It looks as if the post of lord chancellor is steadily making its way constitutionally from the ‘efficient’ part towards the ‘dignified’. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND (DEPUTY) THE SOLICITOR GENERAL

Both these posts also have a judicial and executive role. The AG represents the government in the courts and gives advice to the government on the legality of its actions, the best recent example being the hugely controversial legality of the Iraq war in 2003. THE LORDS

This used to be the highest court in the land, in that its Appellate Committee used to sit as the highest court of appeal. However, this function was invested into a new Supreme Court in October 2009 (discussed below). JUDGES

Judges occasionally say controversial things but their autonomy is limited: a Supreme Court judge can be dismissed only by a resolution of both Houses of parliament, though judges can be rebuked by the LCJ. Some claim judges were allowed more freedom to debate public issues when Lord Woolf was LCJ (2000–05). HOME SECRETARY

This senior minister (the equivalent of what elsewhere in Europe would be called ‘minister for the interior’) has quasi-­judicial powers, including the right to influence terms of imprisonment for prisoners. Such ‘crossings’ of the boundaries between the three branches of government – legislative, executive and judicial – means the



the judiciary and politics

j­udiciary cannot be said to be either truly subordinate or truly autonomous.

THE COURTS AND THEIR PERSONNEL The court system has two major branches: one dealing with criminal law; the other with civil law (although the lowest-­level courts, staffed by lay magistrates, deal with either type of legal case). Before these two branches are explained, the short following section looks at the Supreme Court. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

This replaced a section of the House of Lords as the highest court in the land following the CRA 2005. It is the highest court in all matters of English and Welsh law, as well as law in Northern Ireland and Scotland. It is at the same time the highest court of appeal for civil and criminal cases in the UK, apart from the High Court of Judiciary, which retains the right of appeal for criminal cases in Scotland. It also has the power to resolve disputes over devolution in the UK and over the legal powers of the devolved assemblies. Figure 22.2 shows the hierarchy of courts in the UK.

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CRIMINAL LAW

This body of law is the one with which most people are better acquainted, dealing with offences against society: motoring offences, robbery, murder and so on. CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE (CPS)

This office is headed by the Director of Public Prosecutions. The police used to decide whether to prosecute a case but this was deemed unfair and in 1986 the new structure was set up, vesting the decision to prosecute in a separate body. The CPS has 42 areas, each headed by a chief crown prosecutor and each staffed by experienced lawyers. MAGISTRATES’ COURTS

These are comparatively unusual in that few other countries allow non-­lawyers to sit in judgment over their fellow citizens; this has been a practice in England since the enabling law of 1327 allowed ‘good and lawful men’ to guard the peace in every county. Around 98% of criminal cases are tried in magistrates’ courts, about two million cases a year. Many fines are now fixed penalty, and this has reduced the burden on magistrates to a degree. They can also levy fines and imprison those convicted, but only for up to six months. Mostly they deal with motoring offences but can also deal with cruelty to children and animals on the highway. There is generally a period of about 100 days between the offence taking place and it being tried. Often the business takes only seconds where a guilty plea is offered. Professional magistrates are now called district judges; they are full time and tend to serve in cities. ‘Lay’ magistrates mostly operate in rural areas. Usually white, middle class and middle aged, their uniformity of background is often criticised but their contribution to the judiciary, mostly free of charge apart from expenses, is immense. Those who disagree with their conviction at this level can appeal to the higher crown court for a review of their case.



the judiciary and politics

CROWN COURTS

These are presided over by a judge and are concerned mostly with more serious, so-­called ‘indictable’ offences, with verdicts decided by a jury; lengthy sentences can be delivered to those found guilty. Crown courts deal with around 10,000 cases every year. They operate via six ‘circuits’, with a High Court judge presiding over the most serious cases and a circuit judge or ‘recorder’ hearing the rest. Recorders are part time but are trained lawyers (solicitors or barristers). COURT OF APPEAL

Around 10% of those convicted in a crown court appeal against their sentence. The Court of Appeal may quash the conviction, uphold it or change the sentence imposed. Sentences may be appealed against, too, with the permission of the Court of Appeal. The AG may intervene if the sentence is thought too lenient and may increase the sentence. The court is served by (currently) 38 lord justices of appeal; it has two divisions to hear, respectively, appeals of a criminal or civil nature. The Civil Division is headed by the Master of the Rolls – originally the keeper of the lord chancellor’s scrolls, he became a judge in 1881 and has responsibility for solicitors – and the Criminal Division by the LCJ, who replaced the lord chancellor as the overall head of the judiciary by the CRA 2005. PRIVY COUNCIL JUDICIAL COMMITTEE

This is a legacy of Britain’s colonial history: it acts a final court of appeal for a number of former colonies, comprising law lords plus several ex officio members. It also hears legal challenges to devolved assemblies, acting as a kind of ‘constitutional court’ at this level of government. CIVIL LAW

This branch of the law is that concerned with disputes between people, for example a tenant with a landlord, a seller with a ­customer,

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or parties to a contract. Most of these cases are heard in county courts before a circuit judge or, for more important cases, the High Court. THE HIGH COURT

The High Court is divided into three: Queen’s Bench; Equity (Chancery); and domestic cases (Family Division). The three divisions are headed by judges, assisted by a total of 80 other judges. Queen’s Bench Division sits to hear writs of habeas corpus (this orders the addressee to deliver a person in custody to a court – usually to restore the person’s liberty). It may require a public body to fulfil a duty (mandamus), to desist from an action (prohibition) or to quash a decision already taken (certiorari). It also hears appeals from magistrates’ courts on points of law. From the High Court appeals go to the Civil Division of the Court of Appeal. Chancery Division deals with business – trusts, probate and land law for the most part. The Family Division deals with divorce, children and medical treatment (for example, the court gave authority to a hospital to separate conjoined twins). TRIBUNALS

These quasi-­judicial bodies now cover unfair dismissal, rents, social security, benefits, immigration, mental health and compensation for compulsory purchase. Those appearing can call witnesses and cross-­examine on most occasions. A tribunal usually comprises three people – often a mix between professional and lay. Industrial tribunals have an independent chair plus two representatives of both sides of industry. These tribunals are cheap and quick and less formal than court proceedings. In 1996 an employment tribunal told the Labour Party that all-­women short-­lists were in breach of sex discrimination law. Labour withdrew such regulations but later changed the law when in power.

THE RECRUITMENT OF JUDGES J.A.G. Griffiths, a professor at the London School of Economics, won some support for the argument that judges were drawn from



the judiciary and politics

a narrow and exclusive stratum of society: white, elderly and middle class. On top of this they do not have to retire until they are over 70; only just over a fifth are female; three-­quarters are privately educated; and senior judgeships mostly go to former barristers (though increasingly now solicitors are also selected). Critics claimed judges were out of touch with the rest of society, notoriously unable to understand, for example, the feelings of women in rape cases. It is also asserted that the background of most judges tends to inject a bias towards the government of the day, especially when it is Conservative. Partly for these reasons, selection of judges was invested in a new and independent body. THE JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS COMMISSION

This is an independent body set up in 2006 under the CRA. Previously, judges were appointed by the lord chancellor on the basis of a complex process of information feedback, which, despite the assurances of Lord Irvine (a former lord chancellor) to the contrary, was perceived as a glorified part of the ‘old boys’ ’ network. In October 2006 the new Commission set about looking for candidates to fill ten High Court judgeship vacancies and 15 for a reserve list. Candidates were to submit an application form, and short-­ listed candidates were then interviewed. All candidates were judged by five core criteria including: intellectual capacity; fairness; ability to communicate; and ability to work efficiently.

‘JUDICIAL ACTIVISM’ This is the term used for the power judges have to strike down acts by government which they judge to be ultra vires or at variance with statute law or which violated ‘natural justice’ (i.e. fair in the mind of most people). As the courts before the 1960s were largely deferential towards the government, there were few examples of review, but during that decade judges began to worry that civil liberties were being eroded and judicial review came into frequent use. One famous example was the abolition of grammar schools in Tameside in 1976, when the Labour government’s action was overturned. During the 1980s it was the Conservatives’ turn for its actions to be reviewed and reversed.

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From 500 reviews in the early 1980s, the figure increased to 1000 by 1985, 1500 by 1987 and 2000 by 1990. Since 2000 there have been 4000–5000 a year. During the 1990s Michael Howard as home secretary had his decisions overturned on several occasions: a criminal injuries scheme; the referral of parole applications by lifers; and a petition demanding a minimum sentence for the killers of Liverpool toddler Jamie Bulger. As home secretary (1997–2001) Jack Straw did not escape similar experiences. Moreover, judges have been able to interpret laws when terms are unclear, to change their effect significantly. Lord Denning in particular was able to insert ‘his own policy judgements into the loopholes left in legislation’ (Oliver and Drewry, 1998). But judicial review should not be exaggerated: most applications concern local authorities and not ministers; only a quarter are allowed to go forward; and only 10% against the government manage to win. But when ministers’ actions are negated they look bad; the judiciary have indeed come to play a role not just in the implementation of the law but in its interpretation as well.

Box 22.2 Brexit and judicial review This issue blew up shortly after the brilliant Lord Jonathan Sumption’s 2019 Reith Lectures ‘Law and the Decline of Politics’, questioned whether courts and lawyers have over-­extended their role and begun to usurp and undermine the traditional, legislative function of parliament. Once installed as PM in July 2019 Boris Johnson and his chief political aide Dominic Cummings plotted, in the light of Theresa May’s signal failures, how they would drive a new Brexit deal through the Commons. One ploy was to ‘prorogue’ or close down parliament for a period of weeks in the autumn of 2019 to restrict the delaying tactics available to a Commons which lacked a government majority. In August 2019 business woman and political activist, Gina Miller, applied for a judicial review of Johnson’s action. The result on 24 September was a unanimous decision announced by its chair, Lady Brenda Hale, that such an act was indeed ‘unlawful, void and of no effect’. Prospect magazine described Lady Hale as ‘Britain’s first judicial superstar’; some legal



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colleagues quickly criticised Lady Hale’s media prominence (Clark and Dean, 2020) but Lord Sumption, despite his recently stated views, supported the Court’s judgment. However Prospect reckoned the relatively new judicial body might have to pay a price in terms of Conservative ‘revenge’ over this question: ‘in a democracy where the ultimate master is supposed to be the people, what should the chief umpire look like?’ Johnson bluntly rejected the ruling at the time as ‘wrong’ and his AG Geoffrey Cox suggested ominously that ‘there may well have to be parliamentary scrutiny of judicial appointments’, a condition present in the USA but never in the UK. The proposed ‘Constitution, Democracy and Rights Commission’ mentioned in the Queen’s Speech was interpreted as a means of reining in ‘activist’ judges. Following Johnson’s rebuff by the Supreme Court over proroguing parliament the person thought likely to initiate action to curb the Supreme Court was Johnson’s appointment as AG Suella Braverman, described by the Guardian as thinking judicial review ‘is a political tool for activists who want to change policy by undemocratic means’ (Trilling, 2020). Sumption (2020) wondered if Braverman, in accepting Johnson’s appointment, had ‘stepped into a minefield’. He notes that ‘this government is impatient not just of legal constraints but of any constraints whatever’. Noting how resistant judges are ‘to having their wings clipped’, he scorns the government’s proposal that a parliamentary committee be awarded scrutiny over the appointment of judges. He explains that such a committee would be ‘choosing judges with different attitudes’, something on which is impossible to be certain and ‘would mark the end of judicial independence’. Adding its measured editorial voice, The Economist (2020a, 2020b) noted that the proposed terms of the commission on the constitution, democracy and rights ‘are unclear’. ‘Some Tories have long argued that interest groups have hi-­jacked judicial review and that judges are straying from ensuring ministers stick to the law into evaluating the merits of policies.’ The journal warns that the government should tread carefully, ‘Previous attempts to reform judicial review have been dropped or scaled back. And there is no guarantee the public will support reforms.’

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ENFORCING EUROPEAN LAW The UK became a member of the European Community on 1 January 1972 and on that day all Community law became ‘UK law’; all future European law became British law in addition. It might be useful to explain how the implications of this change nourished Euro-­sceptic views. Parliamentary assent was not required for such legislation: it was automatic. Questions of EU law are decided by the CJEU. Lower courts in the UK, before 31 January 2020, could ask the CJEU for a ruling on questions of law relating to the treaties of the EU. Domestic law was always subordinate to EU law, a point which infuriated the Euro-­sceptics, who hugely resented parliament losing its historic, exclusive powers. The Factortame case in 1990 demonstrated the superiority of EU law. This case concerned Spanish trawler owners, who challenged a ruling against them made under the UK Merchant Shipping Act 1988; the CJEU eventually found for their plea that EU law over-­ruled UK domestic law. The Exparte Equal Opportunities Commission 1999 case concerned a dispute over part-­time workers who were not allowed to claim under a 1978 Act for unfair dismissal or redundancy; it was ruled this was unlawful in terms of EU law. Philip Norton comments that ‘Although the Factortame case attracted considerable publicity, it was the EOC case that was the more fundamental in its implications. The courts were invalidating the provisions of an Act of Parliament’ (Jones et al., 2018, p. 611). ‘Parliamentary sovereignty’ was believed to remain intact owing to the fact that Britain could leave the EU, although the EU’s opponents claimed this is a fiction and that the power of the EU had intruded too deeply inside the political system. On 1 February 2020, they had the satisfaction of knowing their cause had finally been won.

ENFORCING THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS  This body – separate from the EU though this is often misunderstood – further strengthens judges, as it has added a new dimension to the law: human rights. Judges now can decide if human rights



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have been violated. This role used to be performed only in the Strasbourg court, which heard cases till 1998, when the Human Rights Act (HRA) was passed. Some of those earlier cases were controversial. For instance, the killing of three members of the IRA in Gibraltar was ruled a violation of the right to life. The HRA makes it illegal for local authorities to act in a way inconsistent with Convention rights. If a law is inconsistent, then the courts can leave it up to parliament to do something about it. This role makes the judges much more political and increases the tension between executive and the judiciary. Already the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), via the HRA, has had a major effect on many cases (see Box 22.3). However, the Conservative Party returned to government in May 2015 pledged to repeal the HRA, for the difficulties it posed for British courts to administer justice without external constraint. However, robust internal opposition led Cameron not to include the repeal in his government’s first Queen’s Speech, 27 May 2015.

Box 22.3 European Convention on Human Rights The HRA 1998 came into force on 2 October 2000. For the first time, individuals have a range of civil rights which are enforceable in British courts as embodied in the ECHR: • • • • • • • • • •

Article 2. Right to life Article 3. Prohibition of torture Article 6. Right to a fair trial Article 8. Right to respect for private and family life Article 9. Freedom of thought, conscience and religion Article 10. Freedom of expression Article 11. Freedom of assembly and association Article 12. Right to marry Article 14. Prohibition of discrimination The sixth protocol, article 1. Abolition of the death penalty

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QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION 1. To what extent is the judiciary ‘subordinate to’ and ‘autonomous from’ parliament? 2. What is the difference between criminal and civil law? 3. Should judges be drawn from a wider social base than at present? 4. Should appointments to the Supreme Court – as in the USA – be made subject to political inclinations?

FURTHER READING A more detailed introduction can be found by Philip Norton, Chapter 21 in Jones et al. (2018). Full-­length book introductions to the law are Golden (2000), and Mansfield (2003). For a fascinating discussion of the law see Sandel (2009). Adler, J. (2005) Constitutional and Administrative Law, Palgrave. Banner, C. and Deane, A. (2003) Off With Their Heads: Judicial Revolution in Modern Britain, Imprint Academy. Bowcott, O. (2019) Johnson’s suspension of parliament unlawful, supreme court rules, Guardian, 24 September. Bradley, A.W. and Ewing, K.D. (1997) Constitutional and Administrative Law, Longman. Clark, T. and Dean, A. (2020) Judges in the dock, Prospect, March, pp. 20–27. Collini, S. (2020) Inside the mind of Dominic Cummings, Guardian, 6 February. Golden, A. (2000) Everyday Law, Dealerfield.  Hirsch, A. (2020) Equal to Everything: Judge Brenda and the Supreme Court, L.A.G. Jones, B. (2009) British Politics Today, Manchester University Press. Jones, B., Norton, P. and Daddow, O. (2018) Politics UK (9th edition), Routledge.  Mansfield, M. (2003) The Home Lawyer, BCA.  Nolan, Lord and Sedley, Sir S. (1997) The Making and Remaking of the British Constitution, Blackstone. Oliver, D. and Drewry, G. (1998) The Law and Parliament, Cambridge University Press. Sandel, M.J. (2009) Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do? Penguin.  Sumption, J. (2020) Meddling by judges is a problem only they can fix, Sunday Times, 16 February.



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The Economist (2020) Boris v the judges, 22 February. The Economist (2020) Judging the judges, 22 February. Trilling, D. (2020) Boris Johnson’s pantomime authoritarians, overt cruelty is a winning hand, Guardian, 18 February. Windlesham, Lord (2006) The Constitutional Reform Act 2005: ministers, judges and constitutional change, Public Law, winter.

Websites Court Service, www.hmcourts-­service.gov.uk/. Direct Earnings Attachment, www.gov.uk/government/publications/direct-­ earnings-attachments-­an-employers-­guide. European Court of Human Rights, www.echr.coe.int. Judiciary of England and Wales, www.judiciary.gov.uk/index.htm. Justice, www.dca.gov.uk/judicial/judgesfr.htm. Magistrates Association, www.magistrates-­association.org.uk.

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Part VII Conclusions 

23 The Extraordinary Brexit Saga

I choose the word ‘saga’ for my chapter title deliberately because the whole story of Britain’s recent EU membership has been such a roller coaster of misunderstandings and mixed, though very powerful and divisive, emotions. It started at the end of World War II and, after many corkscrew turns, ended on 31 January 2020.

The European Idea At the end of World War II, many European politicians wanted to make obsolete the kind of European conflicts which had laid waste to the continent and much of the world. Foremost amongst these was none other than the embodiment of resistance to Nazism: Winston Churchill. In 1940 he had endorsed the idea of a full political union for Europe and warmly returned to this theme in the war’s aftermath in a number of speeches. But practice did not follow theory: when Robert Schuman produced his 1950 plan for a European Iron and Steel Community, Britain rejected its embodied vision of ‘Federal Europe’. After long procrastination at the crucial meeting Britain declined to participate, thus allowing the European unity train to depart without it.

De Gaulle’s Veto Former Foreign Office diplomat, Sir Frank Roberts, was quoted in a BBC documentary, Europe: Them and Us, January 2020, as saying the British problem was the feeling that they were on the ‘winning

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side’ and therefore ‘different’. In the late 1950s when Macmillan, abandoned by America over Suez and facing acute economic and imperial nationalism, pivoted towards joining the now vibrant European Economic Community (EEC), it was General De Gaulle, long resentful at the junior role he’d been forced to play as a western ally, who said ‘Non!’ In explanation, he produced the argument that Britain really was different, and to an extent that entry to their successful new club was simply not possible.

Heath Finally Victorious 1972 Ironically De Gaulle’s case was echoed by several influential political voices closer to home. Hugh Gaitskell warned such a step threatened to destroy ‘a thousand years of British history’; for his part Attlee commented dismissively: ‘The so-­called “Common Market” of six nations. Know them all well. Very recently this country spent as good deal of blood and treasure rescuing four of ‘em from attacks by the other two.’ Meanwhile right-­wing Conservatives bridled at the thought that the sovereignty of a worldwide power would be abated and reduced by membership of this transnational organisation. Oddly perhaps, it has been argued that France’s veto marked a sea change in UK public opinion: maybe being denied access to a club provokes a genuine desire to be accepted. Eventually the general passed away and Pompidou proved much more amenable. Edward Heath, whose Europeanism was founded on his wartime experiences, led with a third application to join the EEC following his victory in the 1970 election. However, whilst the president of France had been so accommodating, members of Heath’s own party were less so. Led by the brilliant maverick, Enoch Powell, enough opponents of entry threatened to overwhelm his slim majority of only 25. Secret whips’ contacts with Labour pro Europeans, however, resulted in 68 Labour rebels coming to Heath’s rescue.

Euro-­Scepticism Gathers Strength The UK was in the EU but the debate was only just beginning. By 1972 positions had already been articulated: Powellites railed against the loss of sovereignty and national identity: Labour opponents led



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by Tony Benn, saw the EEC as a ‘capitalist club’ advancing the interests of corporate bosses rather than working people. The 1975 referendum on membership – called by Wilson to resolve Labour’s disunity – decided by 2–1 to stay in but during the 1980s the argument broke out again in even more bitter terms. The decade started well over Europe when Margaret Thatcher (who had supported staying in) had assiduously helped set up the Single Market which removed barriers for trade within EEC member countries. But the appointment of Jacques Delors, as Commission president in 1985, saw a powerful move towards ‘ever closer union’ to quote the phrase in the founding 1957 Treaty of Rome. This was interpreted by many as an attempt to establish a federal European super-­state – a vision to which Mrs Thatcher in the Commons, October 1990, loudly declared ‘No, No, No’! This marked the ending of any sympathy she had with the Brussels-­based organisation and a period when behind the scenes she encouraged Tories to take Euro-­sceptic positions. As well as growing in the government party this sentiment was made manifest in a new party, UKIP led by Nigel Farage, a public school educated City trader who nevertheless successfully managed to pass himself off as a ‘man of the people’. From early beginnings the party attracted many former Conservative supporters and thus became a thorn in the side of Tory party leaders who were forced maybe to appear more hostile to Europe than they really were. John Major became so exasperated he called Euro-­sceptic cabinet members, ‘bastards’ and when Cameron became leader in 2005 he urged his party not ‘to keep banging on about Europe’.

Immigration helps Growth of UKIP This advice proved a vain hope with the massive inflow of Eastern European cheap labour as these countries joined an enlarged EU (as it became known after 1992), nourished the rapid expansion of UKIP and the consequent threat it posed to Conservative electoral success. The EU has ‘freedom of movement’ as one of its founding principles and enables its citizens to live and work wherever they choose within EU borders. New Labour governments, 1997–2010, were happy to ignore EU delaying mechanisms and absorb these new immigrants, as their cheap labour played an important

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e­ conomic role in agriculture and manufacturing. However, reluctant low skilled British labour was often ignored by employers in favour of eager immigrant labour. This factor exacerbated the inevitable cautious attitude accorded these often non-­English speaking people and their families. UKIP championed such grievances as did the Tory supporting tabloids like the Sun and Daily Mail.

Cameron Grants an In–Out Referendum, 2013 Cameron, PM of a coalition government with the Lib Dems after 2010, was assailed by a growing minority in his own party to hold a referendum on EU membership. This demand was supplemented by UKIP’s growing strength and his own anti-­EU Tory press. Worried UKIP might prevent him winning power in 2015 he promised a referendum should he win. The idea was to spike UKIP’s guns but, in the event, instead of a hung parliament – which would have attracted a Lib Dem veto to his promise – he surprisingly won a small overall majority. The vote was set for 23 June 2016. Was a referendum necessary? Critics say no it was not, citing the fact that ‘according to pollsters Ipsos Mori, Europe was the seventh most important issue before the 2015 election’ (Urwin, 2020, p. 33). Cameron’s decision was fateful and caused years of bitter political conflict, culminating in the wholly unlikely triumph of his fellow Etonian rival, Boris Johnson. The campaign was bitter and involved much mendacity, especially on the Leave side which at one point suggested 70 million Turks would flood into Britain – when Turkey was not even a member of the EU – if Remain won. Cameron had not taken the precaution of setting a ‘super-­majority’, of say 65% as the required benchmark for victory and the resultant 52–48% Leave majority left a huge minority seething with dismay, and anger. Cameron resigned amid some criticism but his argument was fair that a Remain supporting PM was not the right person to enact ‘Brexit’ as UK’s exit now became known. Jeremy Corbyn, the hard-­left Labour leader elected from a weak candidate field in the wake of the 2015 defeat, was strongly criticised by his more moderate MP colleagues for appearing not to support Remain with any enthusiasm. Given Corbyn remained true to his mentor Tony Benn’s



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Figure 23.1 Headline result of 2016 EU referendum. Source: Electoral Commission.

position on the EU and had voted against the EU strengthening Maastricht and Lisbon treaties, there were good reasons to believe his personal attitude was pro Brexit. The attempt to remove him in July 2016 was overwhelmingly defeated by a pro-­Corbyn mass-­ membership.

Box 23.1 Key issues in 2016 referendum Protect Economy Versus Immigration and Sovereignty A total of 40% of voters believed the economic impact of Brexit would be harmful; only 23% believed it would be positive. On the other hand, 53% believed immigration would decline if the UK left the EU. The two issues were generally equal in terms of importance to voters. While 32% felt immigration was the most important issue for them, 31% reckoned it was the effect on the economy. But in addition 16% nominated ‘Britain’s ability to make its own laws’.

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Economy Versus Cultural Concerns Also crucial was the emotive cultural one of how inflows of immigrants had changed certain areas and made them seem alien, different. Often the people concerned were less well off, at the lower end of the earnings hierarchy and feared migrant workers would drive down wages and employment opportunities. Leave’s cry of ‘we want our country back’ resonated powerfully with such voters. Remainers complained that Leave deliberately failed to make any distinction between EU immigrants and those from other parts of the world, thus unfairly building on existing anti-­ immigrant feelings and suggesting all immigrants came from the EU. Middle-­class urban dwellers tended to be less alarmed by immigration, seeing it as necessary for economic growth; helping to explain the crucial age and class divides revealed by the Referendum’s results. Remain campaigners assumed economic issues would decide the vote and assembled weighty arguments in support. But halfway through the campaign Leave shifted its emphasis to immigration and at once its prospects improved. As the end of the campaign approached the mood became more heated. Farage launched a poster depicting mostly non-­white refugees surging towards a barrier under the title ‘Breaking Point: The EU has failed us all’. Several critics likened this to Nazi propaganda during the 1930s, but Farage remained wholly unrepentant. Whilst economic issues were important they proved to be less so in the end than emotive cultural and identity ones.

Why did UK vote for Brexit?  This is a much debated point (and see recommended reading), but it seems clear that many voters were motivated by more than concerns about the EU. The fact that three million people – largely drawn from the working classes – voted in the referendum who had never voted before suggested some deep-­seated grievances were being expressed. David Goodhart’s 2017 The Road to Somewhere, suggested it reflected a national cultural clash: a group he called ‘Somewheres’, people with low educational qualifications



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who lived close to where they were born, had used the vote to express their anger at the dominant role played by ‘Anywheres’, well-­educated middle-­class people who felt at ease in the knowledge economy and relished the ability to work anywhere in Europe. For the Somewhere group, feeling neglected and forgotten, but very much in the majority, the EU had become – unjustifiably according to many – a focus for their feelings of resentment.

Britain’s place in the world Remain supporters regretted that this issue was not much debated during the campaign. 1. The EU’s key aim had been to prevent future conflict and actually achieved this: no major conflict between European powers occurred after 1945. 2. After its loss of Empire, and the Suez disaster which clouded relations with the USA, Britain needed new allies in Europe to support its place in the world. Brexit will end this support. 3. Britain’s membership of the EU drew billions of pounds in investment from countries – USA, Japan, China – which wanted access to the EU’s 500 million-­strong market. Obama, recall, was very keen that Britain should remain a member. Once out such investment will probably go elsewhere, for example, Ireland. All these factors, argued Remainers, would greatly reduce Britain’s standing in the world whilst emboldening those who offered a possible threat to Europe: for example, Russia.

Theresa May and Brexit  Theresa May, crowned as PM in July 2016 without a contest, stated, gnomically, on the vexed key topic, that ‘Brexit means Brexit’ and went on to elaborate in a Lancaster House speech a pretty ‘hard’ version of EU severance envisaging departure from

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the economically valuable Single Market and Customs Union. This provoked intense hostility from the small pro-­EU grouping within her party, including Anna Soubry, Dominic Grieve and cabinet member David Gauke. Also up in arms were the Labour’s Remain majority, the SNP and the Lib Dems. May managed to survive intact until April 2017 when she called a general election to enable her, via an increased majority, to push through her Brexit plans without any insuperable opposition. However, May proved a very poor campaigner, a major mistake was made over reform of social care provision and Corbyn was marching through the country, his massive rallies being cheered to the echo. The result was a stunning defeat for May in that she not only did not increase her majority inherited from Cameron but she even managed to lose that as well.

Divorce Bill On 11 December 2017, the PM confirmed that the UK and the EU had agreed ‘the scope of commitments, and methods for valuations and adjustments to those values’. The calculations are an estimate of the UK’s commitments to the EU, valued according to a set of agreed principles. The bill was reckoned to be £35–39 billion to be repaid over a number of years. Hard Brexiters were horrified and urged a ‘walk-­away clean Brexit’ in which the EU, to use Boris Johnson’s term could ‘go whistle’ for their money. This point of view seemed to ignore the fact that such behaviour would probably destroy any chance of good relations with our European neighbours for many years.

Negotiations Begin on trade Relationship Britain’s representatives on Brexit were much criticised. David Davis, the Brexit secretary, in charge of the negotiations with the EU’s Michel Barnier, seemed unsure of his brief and often tried to cover up his shortcomings with what he hoped was an engaging smiling and guffawing style. The EU kept insisting the UK declare what it wanted from the talks but the government’s position was paralysed by its own lack of agreement. Instead May covered up with rather pointless promises to obtain ‘the best deal for Britain’ whilst reiterating her earlier Lancaster House objectives.



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Transitional Period May’s position was much criticised not least by prominent Tory Remainers: Anna Soubry, Nicky Morgan, Michael Heseltine and even home secretary Amber Rudd. Philip Hammond was seen as champion of a ‘soft’ Brexit and during the summer of 2017 a majority formed in the cabinet for a ‘Transitional Period’ of around two years wherein membership of the Single Market and Customs Union would continue.

Factions in Conservative Party Whilst a big majority of Tories were opposed to a ‘No Deal’ outcome, about 80 MPs were convinced Brexiters and members of the ERG, chaired by the eccentrically polite and dapper and very popular with activists, Jacob Rees-­Mogg, and of this group about half (including Mogg and Iain Duncan Smith) were quite keen on a ‘no deal’ fall out on to World Trade Rules, claiming Britain would flourish under such a regime, after an initial period of adjustment. This group was countered by a much smaller group of Remainers, comprising former AG Dominic Grieve, Anna Soubry and Nicky Morgan plus more than a dozen others. However, whilst this group were quite vocal, they did not really prove sufficiently firm of purpose to defeat the government in crucial votes when Labour support threatened a defeat. On these occasions the government proved solicitous to the rebels and made promises and mostly non-­crucial concessions to retain their support. As well as the Brexit divide there were a clutch of politicians manoeuvring for May’s job once she was despatched. These included at the time Michael Gove, Boris Johnson, David Davis, Liam Fox, Philip Hammond, Jeremy Hunt, Amber Rudd and Gavin Williamson.

May Limps On In order to stay in power as PM May did a deal with the Northern Ireland DUP: she paid £1 billion to the province’s coffers in exchange for the support they duly gave. However May’s espousal of a ‘hard’ Brexit changed, possibly under the influence of

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­ hitehall’s Olly Robbins who became her chief adviser on this W thorny subject. In July 2018 she summoned her cabinet to Chequers to hear her plan for a much ‘softer’ (i.e. more closely EU aligned) Brexit. Under some duress she achieved cabinet approval but soon after she suffered the resignations of her Brexit-­supporting secretary for exiting the EU, David Davis, and her foreign secretary, Boris Johnson, a keen Brexiter and someone known to be planning to take over as PM. May managed to conclude an agreed deal with the EU in November but found that, lacking a majority, she could not persuade the Commons to pass it. On three occasions up to June 2019, it was trounced in the division lobbies by big anti­Brexit majorities. May then resigned in despair and a contest took place for her replacement. On 24 July 2019, Johnson won the leadership contest against Jeremy Hunt by 92,100 to 46,700. Much criticism was made of the undemocratic nature of this ‘election’: 160,000 members of the Conservative Party had elected him, some 0.14 of the electorate, 80% white, rich, right-­wing and over 60. However, in a party-­led democratic system it is the rule that when a PM stands down for whatever reason, another leader is sought from the party which won the previous election. He became PM on 24 July 2019, promising to fix Brexit, ‘do or die, come what may’ by leaving on 31 October, plus governing in a One Nation Tory fashion, meeting the nation’s needs in ways which would entail substantial extra public spending – calculated to be over £15 billion. Instantly he had injected more energy into the proceedings, indicating he would use every trick in the book to ‘Get Brexit Done’ and succeeded against most expectations of reopening Brexit negotiations and then achieving an agreement which both sides could accept. The fact that this deal had been agreed by betraying his DUP ally over trading arrangements to which May had sworn never to sign up, was noted but, given the paucity of support for the DUP, had no effect. Johnson had spotted the weakest link in UK objections to EU requirements and moved ruthlessly to exploit it. Another of his political tricks, no doubt advised by his infamous guru, Dominic Cummings, was to prorogue parliament to prevent scrutiny of the deal he had re-­negotiated with the EU. But this was neutralised by a Supreme Court ruling which judged such a step illegal.



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Misconduct in Public Office?  On 29 September 2019, the Sunday Times led with a story that Johnson had been having an affair with model turned businesswoman, Jennifer Arcuri who was also the recipient of favours from Johnson plus substantial sums of taxpayers’ money for a failing business. Johnson claims there was no conflict of interest as there was no ‘interest’ in the form of a relationship. The police investigated what could be a criminal offence but nothing ever came of it. The Sunday Times also ran a story that Johnson had sexually molested two young women at a Spectator dinner in 1999. This he has also dismissed as untrue. In a reflection of Donald Trump, Johnson still seems to be able to shrug off stories about his sexual peccadilloes without denting his popular support. Given he was elected by people – Tory party members – who usually strongly disapprove of such behaviour it seemed UK politics was becoming ever more Trump-­like. On 5 September in a bombshell for the PM, his brother Jo, resigned his ministerial post, after failing to resolve ‘family loyalties with the national interest’. This development was thought to be a factor why Johnson’s speech in Wakefield to a group of police cadets was so meandering and incoherent. In other words, Johnson seemed to be struggling. In retrospect this was his lowest ebb and few bets were being taken on the longevity of his fledgling administration. Yet, he had managed, via unorthodox methods, to turn around a very dire situation. Johnson’s position had begun to look wobbly at this stage so he switched his attentions to holding a December election. Aware of the Tory poll lead the opposition parties initially refused to give the PM the two-­thirds majority required to over-­rule the five-­year parliamentary term specified by the 2011 Fixed Term Parliament Act. Corbyn was known to think he could win an election, even during dark December nights campaigning, but many of his MPs were sure they’d lose their seats and desperately begged him to reject Johnson’s insistent overtures. Some Labour MPs thought that the participation of Farage’s new Brexit Party, established in January 2019 to ensure Brexit was delivered after three years of dithering conflict, and which had easily won the May Euro-­ elections, would transform the election. Johnson was very aware of

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the possibility that right-­wing Leave voters would vote Farage if they believed the Tories would not prosecute the case for Brexit with the utmost energy. His ebullient personality certainly helped him win the process of turning the Conservative Party, effectively into the Brexit Party. Farage’s Brexit Party had to watch as its opinion party polls declined disastrously.

Box 23.2 dominic Cummings, mastermind of the successful Leave campaign In 2016, Dominic Cummings was appointed as Johnson’s chief strategic adviser, guaranteeing his premiership would be a highly unconventional and bumpy ride. Cummings has been called a ‘career psychopath’ by David Cameron and his appointment displeased many in his own party who had negative views on the somewhat infamous unelected adviser. Soon the scruffily dressed Cummings had established a draconian ‘reign of terror’ among other political advisers, and was seen as effectively ‘Deputy Prime Minister’ or as someone to whom Johnson was totally in thrall; Javid was furious when Cummings personally sacked one of his senior aides without even consulting him (Mueller and Castle, 2019). The following judgment of the man is typical of those profiles which filled many news columns:  Throughout the first weeks of Mr. Johnson’s leadership, Mr. Cummings was a shadowy figure, depicted as the Rasputin directing his boss’s scorched-­earth strategy to deliver Brexit by Oct. 31, with or without a deal governing future relations, ‘come what may’. To his fans he was a genius, the man who directed the successful Leave campaign in the 2016 referendum and was sure to chainsaw his way through the political underbrush to achieve Brexit. To his opponents, he was a genius, but an evil, unprincipled one who would go to any lengths, even subverting the democratic process, to accomplish his goals. (Mueller and Castle, 2019)



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By helping Johnson to chart his ‘do or die’ exit 31 October strategy, Cummings attracted public obloquy from Sir John Major and other senior Tory figures. On 2 February Johnson praised Cummings for thinking up such good slogans as ‘Take Back Control’ for the referendum campaign and ‘Get Brexit Done’ for the 2019 election. (See also the section on Political Advisers in Chapter 18, and BBC, 2020.)

Key Turning point in Brexit Saga The situation was not good for Johnson in late October: he had no majority; he had been deserted by his brother; he faced a hostile Speaker and a cross-­party opposition which could potentially control the Commons business and keep him forever in limbo. However, the dam broke when Johnson offered the opposition party a simple short amendment to the Fixed Term Parliament Act, and the SNP, who knew the polls greatly favoured them north of the border, and the Lib Dems whose young and inexperienced leader, Jo Swinson, was excitedly hoping her party’s ultra-­Remain stance would cause floods of Remainers to possibly place her in Downing Street (it was suggested that Swinson was persuaded by recent Labour convert Chuka Umunna (Waterfield, 2020)). It was not to be, as explained in Chapter 16, Johnson won with a shattering majority of 80 won at the expense of Labour’s industrial northern ‘Red Wall’ where lifelong Labour voters chose to cause ancestors to spin in their graves, by voting Conservative. Novelist Ian McEwan (2020) commented on the key cause of the defeat: ‘A majority voted in December for parties which supported a second referendum. But those parties failed lamentably to make common cause.’ Andrew Rawnsley (2020) added his thoughts on this point,  There did exist a substantial wedge of public opinion that was as passionate in its pro-­Europeanism as the Brexiters were in their loathing of the EU. But this constituency only truly discovered itself to form an articulate identity after the vote to leave in 2016. Only then did parliamentarians fight hard, only then did folk rally in large numbers, to try to save our membership. Too late, my friends, too late.

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Labour, reduced to 203 seats, was humiliated after an indifferent and, some claim, bungled campaign plus a leader whose ratings were at an all time low for an opposition leader at the start of the campaign. The dreams of the Lib Dems were exposed as just that, fantasies, as they increased their vote share by 4% but only returned 11 MPs. The SNP, as expected, triumphed with 48 seats north of the border. As for the Brexit Party, after Farage agreed to stand down candidates in Tory held seats – a move which dismayed Labour – his polls declined even more. By the time the campaign began Farage’s party’s poll rating was in single figures. During the campaign the party was almost invisible and the final results showed it polled only 2% of the vote and gained no seats, even the much fancied one of Hartlepool for his party chairman Richard Tice. Labour’s controversial leader, Jeremy Corbyn, after contemplating his party’s disastrous performance under his leadership and the shattering of left-­wing hopes of a transforming victory, decided to stand down at the end of March 2020. No doubt he wanted to oversee his replacement by his chosen protégé Rebecca Long-Bailey. A leadership contest ensued resulting in an easy victory for the ‘moderate’ Keir Starmer on 4 April.

Aftermath of Election – Brexit Troubles Over? A shell-­shocked Britain woke up on 13 December to realise the Remain cause had been destroyed. Remainers were distraught – Leavers cock-­a-hoop. On 22 January, Johnson’s withdrawal Bill – predicted by the Bank of England to be more injurious to the economy than May’s thrice rejected version – passed into law. On 31 January, the UK formally left the EU. The drama was over. Or was it? A revolt of more than two dozen Tory MPs over the infrastructure project HS2 revealed Johnson’s Commons honeymoon had probably reached a premature end. This was ominous in that Johnson faced severe challenges in meeting his promises to those northern Labour voters who had, in his words, ‘lent’ him their votes. His plans to finance substantial infrastructure projects in these formerly ‘left behind’, depressed industrial areas were seen as crucial in maintaining Tory electoral hegemony, now reinforced by a strong group of northern Tory MPs. The acute problem which faced Johnson was that after a decade of arguing for strict financial



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parsimony he was going to have to perform a U-­turn of prodigious proportions, in the process upsetting traditional Tory opposition to such spending within his own party. In one sense, to borrow Churchill’s phrase, the UK’s exit was not any kind of end: more like the ‘end of the beginning’.

Box 23.3 ‘We’ve got our country back!’ On 24 June 2016, Nigel Farage, surrounded by ecstatic supporters, yelled ‘We’ve got our country back!’ Ever since that, for Remainers a heart plummeting moment, many came to wonder from whence exactly our country had been to be so miraculously rescued. Philip Collins used his Times column on the UK day of departure to meditate on this theme. The implication that Britain has been in servitude since 1973 would be offensive if not so manifestly absurd. … [But for] prominent Brexit cheerleaders … this is the rhetorical idiocy of the time. … For all Mr Johnson’s fabled optimism it is hard, from what he says, to glean why we are doing this at all. Remainers reported the same feeling when hearing vox pop clips of care-­worn middle-­aged people delightedly saying ‘At last, Brexit’s done! At last it’s done!’ The interviewer never seemed to pursue the point and I think, Why? Why are you so pleased? Brexit, argued Collins, had become an empty, emotional shibboleth, devoid of genuine meaning. Do Brexiters really and truly believe Johnson’s claim that by leaving the EU’s economic advantages, ‘Britain’s potential will be unleashed’? Collins goes on to ask: ‘By what measure will Brexit be judged a success or failure, in the course of time by its advocates? A higher trend of growth? A better performance than the average of European economies?’ If the economy tanks you can be sure Brexit ‘experts’ will blame other causes – Chinese–US trade war or whatever. ‘Liberation from the EU’ is perhaps the only safe claim because it can’t be

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disproved and yet, as asked above, in what ways have we been harmfully imprisoned? One suspicion, on that day of departure, was that Brexiters will continue to swallow government promises about sunlit uplands of liberation right up until their jobs are being vanished and GDP is recorded as drastically shrinking. Will they then begin to rethink their confident predictions and even contemplate rejoining? It seems unlikely at the time of writing.

Box 23.4 dream of reversing Brexit shattered On 1 February Oxford’s Professor David Runciman gave his acute analysis of why the Remainer dream of preventing Brexit had failed: From a second referendum to a government of national unity, from toppling over the cliff edge to beating a full retreat, almost anything appeared possible. Yet here we are – one day after formally leaving, just as the British people decided on 23 June 2016 – and all that is gone. What happened? Were the last four years a mirage? The emotions were real. It was the sense of possibility that was an illusion. In recent years, some surprising political outcomes have seemed to pass from being impossible to being inevitable without ever taking the time to be merely improbable. Jeremy Corbyn’s election as Labour leader was like that: what couldn’t conceivably happen suddenly couldn’t be stopped. Brexit has taken us on a much more circuitous journey. Before the referendum, plenty of people assumed that leaving the European Union was out of the question. Then, in the immediate aftermath of the vote, it looked like a fait accompli. Shocking though the result might have been, the choice was clear and we would all have to live with it – just like any other election result.



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Yet over the following months and then years, Brexit drifted back into the realms of the improbable. There were so many potential barriers in its way, and so many people determined to raise them, that what had seemed like a done deal gradually became an open question. Opposition, which might have been expected to dissipate over time, instead grew. Rather than a result to which the losing side needed to reconcile itself, it became a historic injustice to be avenged.

Box 23.5 Brexit and reputation of British government Jill Rutter, formerly of the Treasury and now a Senior Fellow of the think tank Institute of Government, in a Guardian article offered an insightful analysis that Brexit had called into question Britain’s reputation for stable government. 1. Civil Service: the impartiality of the civil service had been questioned when Chancellor George Osborne, on behalf of the Treasury, predicted a severe economic shock the day after the referendum, which never happened; there is now a danger of ‘Americanisation – with a politically appointed top layer deterring good professionals from staying’. 2. Cabinet and governance: ‘strategy and tactics since 2016 has been unclear’ and the competence of ministers doubted. 3. Parliament: Brexit arguments ‘have shown parliament’s processes to be in need of a radical overhaul, to avoid the need to resort to little known procedures at the whim of the Speaker in order to extract information from government’. 4. Judiciary:  Ministers have bridled at the willingness of judges to intervene on political issues … Boris Johnson fumed when his prorogation was coolly voided by Lady Hale and her

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c­ olleagues … Jacob Rees-­Mogg was reported as saying the supreme court had effected a ‘constitutional coup’. 5. PM: that  No 10 sources briefed that he [Johnson] would not seek the extension to EU membership was truly shocking. The roots of all this turmoil lie in the casual approach to constitutional matters that allowed David Cameron to legislate for a referendum as a stratagem to solve a problem within his own party. His memoir suggests that he toyed with the possibility of setting a minimum threshold leave would have to reach in order to win – if he had gone ahead with this, remain would have carried the day. Unlike other countries that use referendums more often and more wisely, the UK has an ad hoc approach to them that has meant since 2016 we have been grappling with how to reconcile representative with direct democracy, an issue finally resolved – though obviously not to everyone’s satisfaction – by the 2019 election. 6. The Union: the SNP has been given a potent reason to re-­ open the independence issue. Northern Ireland is now more likely to hold a border poll on unification. ‘Both nations voted to remain in 2016, but the UK system – unlike in formal federations – did not assign that any constitutional significance. (Rutter 2019)

Post-­Brexit Concerns Serious negotiations began with the EU to agree a trade deal. The EU held all the key cards though was keen to ensure Britain remained as closely aligned to EU trading rules as possible. A group of right-­wing Tories have always sought an exit which enables Britain to offer deregulated trading terms to attract the global trade



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that Brexit was, in theory at least, designed to attract. The EU hated and feared the idea of a ‘competitor’ off its northwest coast. Reflecting such worries EU negotiators insisted on a ‘level playing field’ or close alignment of British trading standards with those of the EU. But on 3 February 2020, Johnson insisted he’d refuse ‘close alignment of rules’ as well as reject the ‘jurisdiction of the EU court in any trade deal’ (Syal et al., 2020). At the time of writing this issue is likely to generate a fair bit of heat in discussions for which deadlines already seem to be looming. Anxieties about deadlines being over-­run and the UK having to resort to economically costly World Trade Organization trading standards, re-­emerged when Johnson enshrined in law the requirement that Britain would exit the transition period on 31 December 2020, whether or not an agreement had been struck. An alarming phalanx of well qualified experts, including previous trade negotiators and EU leaders themselves, now came forward warning that 11 months was no time at all to settle such complex, labyrinthine issues. The EU’s trade deal with Canada had taken seven years to negotiate. As Brexiters celebrated on 31 January and Remainers hung their heads in despair, the former had no reason to suppose Brexit had been despatched to the margins of the UK’s political concerns. A final point needs to be made about the EU’s stance. Throughout, Michel Barnier has coolly presided over a unified 27 EU members. Has Brexit weakened the EU? Almost certainly it has but it remains a fact that even the populist parties in Italy and France, who frequently lambast the EU, are not arguing that their countries should seek to follow Britain through the painful same exit door. Leave critics maintain the EU has behaved unreasonably, if not arrogantly, regarding the UK. Maybe the latter criticism has some force: if the EU had not set their bar so high on freedom of movement and Northern Ireland, Cameron might have had an easier ride leading the Remain argument in the referendum or May a genuine chance of gaining Commons approval for her Withdrawal Deal. Several commentators in the wake of the UK’s departure from the EU at the end of January 2020, believed that, having surfed a wave of Euro-­scepticism into Downing Street, Johnson’s Tory government could no longer blame Brexit for its lack of discernible output. Writing in The Times, Rachel Sylvester said that

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The prime minister insists this is ‘an astonishing moment of hope’ and ‘doubters, the doomsters and the gloomsters’ will be proved wrong. We have to hope that he is right. If not, and very appropriately, the buck will stop with him.

She reminded her readers that Nigel Lawson had seen Brexit as the way to ‘finish the Thatcher revolution and make the UK the most dynamic and freest country in the whole of Europe’. She warned that Johnson should recall that Thatcher’s fatal mistake was to ignore the impact of her tough policies upon ordinary people. If Brexit imposes harsh predations upon people already struggling on low incomes the euphoria of achieving Brexit will very soon be replaced by dissent and unpopularity. Hugo Rifkind, writing in The Times playfully observed that while UKIPers were once described as ‘fruitcakes and loonies’ by David Cameron, it seemed Remainers were now being so described, citing Alistair Campbell and Lord Adonis who had vowed not to use the celebration Brexit 50 pence pieces. Leaver celebrations for Brexit in January 2020 were short-lived: the COVID-19 pandemic posed a plethora of questions Boris Johnson’s government found great difficulty in answering. Despite his majority of 80 his future horizons, at the time of writing, are darkened with multiple political uncertainties.

Questions for Discussion 1. Why has Britain found it hard to be ‘European’? 2. What were the key issues debated during the June 2016 EU Referendum? 3. Why was the 12 December 2019 general election so important?

further Reading For useful background reading Hugo Young’s masterful history of UK and Europe 1945–2000. Shipman’s (2017) book is best for the referendum plus, for more detailed psephological analysis, see Clarke and Goodwin (2017) as well as Farrel and Goldsmith (2017).



the extraordinary brexit saga

BBC (2020a) Europe: Them or Us, 28 January. BBC (2020b) Taking Control: The Dominic Cummings Story, BBC2, 17 March. Beckett, A. (2019) The age of perpetual crisis: how the 2010s disrupted everything but resolved nothing, Guardian, 17 December. Boulton, A. (2017) No 10 drifts like the Marie Celeste: unable to navigate the reef of Brexit, Sunday Times, 2 July. Clarke, H.D. and Goodwin, M. (2017) Why Britain Voted to leave the European Union, Cambridge University Press. Collins, P. (2020) Brexit ‘liberation day’ is self-­serving fantasy, The Times, 30 January. Curtice, L. (2016) Brexit: behind the Referendum, Political Insight, September. D’Ancona, M. (2017) The Brexiteers’ immigration promises are fast unravelling, Guardian, 27 March. Farrel, D. and Goldsmith, P. (2017) How to Lose a Referendum: The Definitive Story of How the UK Voted for Brexit, Biteback. Goodhart, D. (2017) The Road to Somewhere: the Populist Revolt and the Future of Politics, Hurst. Hutton, W. (2020) The threat to Johnson’s ‘national revival’ will come from his own party, Guardian, 2 February. Liddle, R. (2019) The Great Betrayal, Hachette. McEwan, I. (2020) Brexit, the most pointless, masochistic ambition in our country’s history, is done, Guardian, 1 February. Marr, M. (2012) The History of 20th Century Britain, BBC. Mueller, B. and Castle, S. (2019) Dominic Cummings, Boris Johnson’s Rasputin, is feeling the heat of Brexit, New York Times, 8 September. Oliver, C. (2017) Unleashing Demons: The Bestselling Inside Story of Brexit, Hodder. O’Toole, F. (2019) Heroic Failure: Brexit and the Politics of Pain, Head of Zeus. Rawnsley, A. (2020) There is triumph as well as tragedy in the story of Britain and Europe, Observer, 26 January. Rifkind, H. (2020) Remoaners rise up: we’re the fruitcakes now, The Times, 3 February. Runciman, D. (2020) It was all a dream, Guardian, 1 February. Rutter, J. (2019) How Brexit has battered Britain’s reputation for good government, Guardian, 27 December. Shipman, T. (2017) All Out War: The Full Story of Brexit, Collins. Stewart, H. and Mason, R. (2019) First step towards Brexit as bill wins huge majority, Guardian, 21 December. Syal, R., Rankin, J. and Boffey, D. (2020) UK will refuse close alignment with EU rules, Johnson to say, Guardian, 2 February. Sobolewski, M. and Ford, R. (2020) Brexit and Britain’s culture wars, Political Insight, March.

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Sylvester, R. (2020) Boris should learn from Thatcher’s mistakes, The Times, 3 February. Sunday Times (2019) Jennifer Arcuri ‘told friends of affair with Boris Johnson’, 29 September. Sunday Times (2020) The buck stops with the PM now, and Britain expects, Editorial, 2 February. Urwin, R. (2020) ‘Aide Memoir’, review of Kate Fall’s ‘The Gatekeeper: Life at the Heart of No 10’, HQ in the Sunday Times, Culture supplement, 8 March. Waterfield, B. and Wright, O. (2020) Compromise and chaos on the way to get Brexit done, The Times, 31 January. Young, H. (1999) This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair, Macmillan.

24 BRITAIN AND THE WORLD

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE Britain has always been substantially beholden, and still is, to people and forces outside its borders. The very early British settlers travelled from northern and eastern Europe, often in search of good agricultural land or in retreat from hostile invasion of their existing lands. Several Celtic tribes occupied the islands when the Romans arrived with intent to conquer, unsuccessfully, in 55 bc, and then more permanently in ad 43. They stayed for four centuries and established several towns and cities as well as building a network of roads, viaducts, aqueducts and the 80-mile Hadrian’s Wall as a northern bulwark of their empire. When this empire began to implode and its power fade, other tribes began to make the journey from elsewhere in Europe with a view to settling in this damp, cool, but unusually fertile set of islands. From central Germany, in the fifth century, came the Angles, Saxons and Jutes; seven ‘Anglo-­Saxon’ kingdoms were established in south, east and central England. From northeast Ireland the Scots traversed the Irish Sea to settle in Argyll. Then in the late ninth century the Vikings invited themselves, initiating an extended war with the Saxons but also, through resultant miscegenation, adding further to the racial mix and helping to create the present-­day British. Even more formative was the 1066 Norman invasion, which effectively colonised the country, expunged the Anglo-­ Saxon ruling elite and replaced it with a French one, albeit of a variety originating from earlier Viking invasions of France.

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By the end of the first millennium British connections had been established with the outside world via successive waves of invading European tribal groups. As the second millennium got under way, more groups of immigrants arrived – for example Huguenots, Jews in seventeenth century – and the country began to acquire a character and a consciousness of its own as it set about defending and promoting what its rulers saw as its national interests. Such interests were heavily influenced by the country’s lack of natural resources, apart from coal, and its close relationship with the sea. FRONTIERS

For any state, defence of its frontiers is a fundamental interest. The 150-mile English Channel, formed only 200,000 years ago – a mere heart-­beat of geological time – has provided, since the Norman invasion, a vital barrier to those who wished to threaten the British state. Spain, France and more recently Hitler were seen off partly because this trench of water, only 21 miles wide at its narrowest point, together with its varying weather conditions, has proved such a formidable barrier. PRIMACY OF TRADE

From early on, Britain has been a trading nation, exporting metals – mostly tin and later iron – and raw material like wool and timber (now largely exhausted). As the home of the Industrial Revolution, Britain manufactured an immense range of goods, especially cotton but also steel and engineered artefacts. To facilitate such trade required peace, making Britain broadly an advocate of rules whereby international relations could be conducted in peace. EUROPEAN BALANCE OF POWER

Despite the fact that only invasion by the Normans was truly successful, fear of invasion has underlain much of the history of British foreign policy. It was thought that a dominant European power might well decide to set its sights on the country beyond the Channel and so Britain has tended to join or form coalitions to counter or pre-­empt the emergence of such dominant powers,



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whether they have been Spain, France or Germany, alone or in coalition. These three themes – protection of its frontiers, defence of trade and maintaining the European balance of power – have been constants in British relations with the outside world, with the latter interest reducing in importance by the late twentieth century. As long-­serving British foreign secretary, Viscount Palmerston, famously observed, ‘Nations have no permanent friends or allies; they only have permanent interests.’

THE EMPIRE AND DECLINE Over time, Britain’s navy proved superior to those of Spain, Holland and France: by the mid-­eighteenth century, the British Empire was a relative ‘superpower’. Even after the loss of the American colonies the Empire continued to grow in Asia and Africa, eventually occupying a quarter of the world’s landmass and containing 500 million people. However, Britain’s period of dominance did not last long; events in the twentieth century shrank Britain’s relative strength and its worldwide reach. First, Britain held no patent on the Industrial Revolution it had invented and other economies, especially those of Germany and the USA, soon caught up, and, by virtue of their superior resources and more modern machinery, were able to overtake Britain. Second, the depredations of two world wars – 1914–18 and 1939–45 – left the country bankrupt by 1945; many of the country’s overseas assets accumulated during the glory days of Empire having been sacrificed in order to defeat Hitler. Contrastingly, the USA, relatively unscathed economically by World War II, emerged as the dominant power in the world, both economically and militarily. The Soviet Union, under Joseph Stalin, sought to match the USA in military terms, as the Cold War ensued, but was never in the same league economically. Britain tried to act as if it was still one of the Big Three but few believed this fiction (except possibly a few politicians on the right). Third, Britain’s economy after 1945 was not best placed to maintain anything like its earlier strength. Building on its 2% share of world economic output in 1750, Britain soared to 23% by 1880 – at that time the USA commanded a mere 14.7%. During the mid-­nineteenth century Britain produced two-­fifths of the world’s

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manufactured goods, including over half of its iron and coal. From 1870–75 an average of £75 million – then a huge sum – was invested abroad annually. But already by 1914 Britain’s percentage of world trade had declined to 14.1% as other industrialised nations made up ground. The impact of World War I was immense in terms of finance and lost manpower but the weakening effects of World War II were yet greater, as assets had to be realised in order to prosecute the conflict against Germany and huge loans taken out from America in order to sustain it. In his book, Empire, historian Niall Ferguson controversially argues that the effects of Empire were for the most part beneficent and that Churchill, despite his love of the British Empire, decided to sacrifice it in order to defeat Hitler. However, Britain’s relative economic decline for the two to three decades after 1945 was not a topic for debate: it was a fact which any British visitor to European countries, especially Germany, could see with their own eyes. Paul Kennedy’s book The Rise and Fall of Great Powers argues that it is the available resources to powers which determine their degree of dominance and that relative economic decline almost always heralds a scaling down in the international pecking order. The UK still has the fifth largest economy in the world – some argue it is ninth (Fullfact, 2017) but its share of world trade is now a fraction of what it once was: 5.6 in 1985, 4.7 a decade later. Facing the post-­war world, Attlee was forced to recognise that defending such a vast Empire with such depleted armed forces was not viable. The Empire was based upon a myth of omnipotence which events in the war – especially, for Asian possessions, the fall of Singapore – had subverted almost totally. India was promptly – perhaps too promptly, given the civil strife which erupted in the northwest of the subcontinent – given its independence by the incoming Labour government. The Conservatives, however, found it harder to reconcile themselves to the fading away of Empire and were still prepared to defend its eroding frontiers. Their fatal error occurred in 1956, when Anthony Eden’s government collaborated secretly with the French and the Israelis to seize back the Suez Canal after Egypt’s Colonel Nasser claimed possession of it. This reckless act brought them face to face with an unpalatable reality regarding lost power. Eden was forced to retreat humiliatingly in the face of America’s refusal to support what was seen as an



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‘­imperialist’ adventure. It was now crystal clear that Britain had neither the money nor the support of its major ally to maintain its Empire. In September 1960 British PM Harold Macmillan addressed the South African Parliament and stated: ‘The wind of change is blowing through this continent. Whether we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact.’ The apartheid government received the speech in appalled silence: it would take several more decades before it, too, came to terms with the new realities. Independence for the various African colonies quickly followed until, by the end of the 1960s, there were a mere few stale crumbs of Empire left, scattered around the oceans. The residual diplomatic dividend from the Empire, the Commonwealth, was a free association of former colonies – now independent nations – representing substantial populations but with negligible political clout. Ireland chose to stay out, while India, perhaps surprisingly, opted in. The record of the organisation, which boasts a secretariat in London and regular conferences, is one of difficulty in keeping its own house in order, on matters such as apartheid and various other civil rights violations by members, plus regular somewhat vacuous statements on wider global issues.

THE SPHERES OF FOREIGN POLICY In his perceptive book Between Europe and America (2003, pp. 30–34) Andrew Gamble recalls Churchill’s 1946 invocation of Britain being at the touching point of three circles: the British Empire, Anglo-­America and Europe. Gamble suggests that ‘Britain’ should now be seen as a ‘union’ of its now devolved constituent parts. There were at least three areas in which post-­war UK foreign policy could invest its emphasis, often represented by three spheres: Europe, America, the Empire/Commonwealth. In practical terms, as the above paragraph suggests, the choice is these days limited to two, Europe or America, though the Empire should not be discounted totally, as it established a tradition for Britain of striding on the world’s stage, seeking to influence the direction in which events develop. This tendency has not been totally expunged; doubters are advised to visit the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and judge from its still splendid interior whether ministerial incumbents

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can escape the legacy of Britain’s worldwide imperial past. Perhaps the loss of Empire has also been a factor in the nourishing of nationalist sentiment in Scotland, Ireland, Wales and, no less importantly, the origin of empire, England itself.

THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A FOCUS OF FOREIGN POLICY Britain has always been ambivalent about Europe. For centuries it was the source of danger, bloody entanglements and the need for endless diplomacy. During the twentieth century it was the stage on which the bloodiest dramas in history – two world wars – were played out. There was much to recoil from some 20 miles across the Channel. Yet while advocating a sense of togetherness and the virtues of political unity, Britain could never quite accept the latter’s reality. Both Churchill and Bevin (Labour foreign secretary 1945–51) praised the idea in the wake of World War II but in time it seemed they saw it as good for the rest of Europe but not for Britain, which had its ‘proper’ place at a much bigger table, along with the USA and the USSR. So it was that Britain declined to join the movement towards a united Europe which culminated with the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and the birth of the EEC, or the ‘Common Market’ as it was more popularly known in those years. Labour, too, was not enthusiastic; Hugh Gaitskell comparing it to a loss of ‘a thousand years of British history’ (see also Chapter 23 on Brexit). However, ironically perhaps in terms of their present attitude, the Conservatives, under Harold Macmillan, decided that the ailing British economy, the surging new ‘Common Market’ one, the fading of Empire and the Suez-­related slump in Anglo-­US relations made an application to join the EEC now a viable option. It took three applications, a decade and the death of the veto-­wielding French president De Gaulle for Britain to squeeze its way uncomfortably (Edward Heath needed Labour pro-­Europe MPs support) into the EEC in 1973. A substantial minority of both major parties were opposed to the idea of joining a club of nations whose laws over-­ruled those of its members: domestic law bending the knee to Community law sounded too much like unacceptable loss of sovereignty to many in the UK. Socialists suspected the ‘capitalist club’ of the EEC would erode the ‘socialist’ achievements of Labour governments. And both sets of



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‘sceptics’ feared national identity would be sacrificed to a faceless unelected bureaucracy in Brussels. Only the Liberals agreed that Ted Heath’s achievement of winning membership was an unalloyed success. By the 1980s a ‘Euro-­sceptic’ faction in the ruling Conservative Party had developed, which grew as successive treaties strengthened what, with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, became the EU. The split over this issue among the Tories made them virtually ungovernable in the 1990s. Labour also had its doubters but they were less numerous and not prepared to create so many problems for their leadership. Tony Blair was keen to place Britain ‘at the heart of Europe’ and showed willing by addressing the French National Assembly in French, a risk few other British politicians would take, or indeed have to skills to do so. His enthusiasm for joining the single European currency, the euro, however, was not shared by chancellor Gordon Brown, who insisted on five conditions for doing so, which somehow, perhaps fortunately, never came near to being met. This meant that Britain was never quite at the ‘heart’ of Europe and became less so as Blair seemed to be far too close to US presidents Bill Clinton and George Bush, especially when he committed to the ill-­fated adventure in Iraq.

THE ANGLO-­AMERICAN BOND – A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP? The founding of the USA was won through violent revolution against the British crown in the late eighteenth century, followed by the 1812–15 war between the same countries, which entailed the British burning of Washington, DC in 1814: not the best of foundations on which to build any kind of relationship. But during the nineteenth century the two countries developed, for the most part, a good trading relationship, reinforced by common cultural and kin connections, so that someone from America was not really seen as a ‘foreigner’ when they visited Britain. Indeed, impecunious British aristocrats eagerly wooed rich American heiresses to help maintain their mansions and high standards of living. By the early twentieth century, the USA, not without reluctance, joined the fight against the Kaiser but then, repelled by Europe’s perennial squabbles, relapsed into isolationism.

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It took the subtle political skills of Roosevelt plus the aggression of the Japanese (Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941) to bring the GIs flooding back over the Atlantic. World War II cemented a collaboration that united the two countries as never before. American troops and popular culture – the films, the music – were hugely popular too and many GIs married British girls. But this high point of togetherness masked differences at the top between Churchill and Roosevelt over the conduct of the war and the determination of the USA to receive tangible returns for its loans to the UK of cash and equipment. Despite British receipt of Marshall aid and the warmth between Churchill and Eisenhower, the Suez adventure alienated the USA and brought home to the UK the stern lesson that it had lost the ability to do anything much abroad without US support. Adding some insult to injury a few years later, US secretary of state Dean Acheson said in a speech at West Point, 1962, that ‘Great Britain has lost an Empire yet not yet found a role’. The story since then has been one of Britain seeking to remind the USA of the ties that once bound the two countries and the White House keeping the British politely at arm’s length. In between there was the refusal of Harold Wilson to send troops to Vietnam, as Lyndon Johnson would have liked; Margaret Thatcher appreciating US help during the Falklands War and bonding with Ronald Reagan – though balking at his 1983 invasion of Grenada; and John Major helping George Bush Senior in the Gulf War of 1991. Then came Tony Blair, eager to pursue an ‘ethical foreign policy’ and to use American power by association and proxy to further some of his own visions for the future of the world. He succeeded in taking Clinton along with him in the Balkans, where the killing in Kosovo was curtailed and Milosevic effectively toppled. Emboldened, perhaps, by such success, he sought to articulate a philosophy of humanitarian intervention, roughly translated as ‘where evil exists in the world, it is the duty of moral states to fight it’. In a speech in Chicago in 1999, he spelt out the framework of his ideas on ‘international community’. Praising America’s role as de facto world policeman, Blair argued that other countries had a moral duty to contribute towards such interventions. How are we to decide if such action is justified? First, we must be sure of our case that action is necessary; second all diplomatic options must



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have been exhausted; third military operations must be judged whether they can be ‘sensibly and prudently’ undertaken; fourth, intervention must be taken with the long term in view; and, finally, one has to ask are there ‘national interests involved’? Shortly after this speech, on 11 September 2001, a traumatic shock was administered to the western world when two commercial aircraft, hijacked by terrorist group Al-­Qaeda, were deliberately crashed into the twin towers of the New York’s World Trade Center; 3000 were killed. In the wake of this event, Blair promised that Britain would stand ‘shoulder to shoulder’ with its ally. Despite their differences of belief, Blair and Bush forged a very close relationship, far too close in the view of many of Blair’s fellow Labour Party members. Many could accept that Britain was closely involved in the war against Afghanistan in pursuit of the Al-­Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, but the war against Iraq’s Saddam Hussein was different. Nobody questioned that he was the worst kind of psychopathic dictator, but he was not directly connected to Al-­Qaeda and Blair’s assertion that he had ‘weapons of mass destruction’ which he was prepared to use had first to be proven. It never was. In retrospect, Tony Blair has not expressed any regret at the outcome of the Iraq War though his closest policy adviser, Jonathan Powell, admitted in January 2010, ‘We got it wrong’ (Shipman, 2010). Maybe history will support the decision but from the perspective of over a decade from invasion day, it seems difficult to imagine how the events of the war can ever be placed into a favourable context, nor made congruent with Blair’s own Chicago guidelines. It has to be said, further, that the extended war in Afghanistan cannot be viewed as successful. Reviewing the 13 years of the war, Will Hutton commented, quite fairly: None of the multiple and varying objectives set by three prime ministers and six defence secretaries through our engagement in Helmand province over eight years has been met, yet cumulatively it has cost at least £40bn. The bravery of British soldiers cannot be doubted: 453 have died; 247 have had limbs amputated; 2,600 have been wounded. Tragically, many uncounted thousands of Afghans have been killed; too few of them were fighters enlisted by the Taliban. There is no improved government in Helmand. There has been no hoped-­for

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e­ conomic reconstruction: heroin production is higher than it was. The violence between tribes, families and warlords is more entrenched. Helmand is more of a recruiting sergeant for terrorism and jihadism than it was; there have been no security gains. The central government in Kabul is more rather than less threatened. If one aim was to make the British homeland safer by victory in southern Afghanistan – a fantastical claim of last resort – Britain is now less safe.

The election of Barack Obama as president in 2008 perhaps slightly cooled the relationship – Obama tended to pay more attention to Asia than Europe and Cameron’s distancing of Britain from the EU tended to encourage Obama to deal more closely with Europe’s undoubted strongest leader, Angela Merkel of Germany. Trump’s election in 2016 introduced a volatile element to the relationship. Trump lambasted NATO members who failed to pay their way but affected a warm regard for Boris Johnson when he became PM in July 2019. At the time of writing few expect Trump’s warmth to extend into forthcoming US–UK trade agreement any concessions to American economic interests.

THE GROWTH OF EURO-­SCEPTICISM British ambivalence over Europe has already been noted but the rapid progress of Euro-­sceptic views from the 1980s onwards requires some explanation. There are rather obvious explanations in terms of Britain’s island status; this has perhaps encouraged a sense of being different, apart from the ‘continent’, together with a more outgoing seaward mindset, as well as a (well-­founded) suspicion that certain nations on the French side of the Channel might look across it with predatory intent. One historical legacy of Empire has perhaps been a misplaced sense of superiority to European nations, which has occasionally come close to racism: Cecil Rhodes once opined of his own race that: ‘We happen to be the best people in the world, with the highest ideals of decency and justice and liberty and peace.’ A close companion of this kind of view was the idea that Britain was a ‘world’ rather than merely a regional ‘European’ power. Moreover, the British state had survived World War II intact; those which had been invaded and occupied – France, Belgium, Italy,



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Holland and finally Germany – maybe had less trust left to invest in the state as an institution and were willing to contemplate new supra-­national alternatives. All these factors underlay negative attitudes to Europe within the two major parties: Conservatives reluctant to abandon the imperial role; Labour suspicious of the ‘capitalist club’; and both with sections wary of surrendering any of parliament’s precious ‘sovereignty’ to any supra-­national body, especially the unelected European Commission, which apparently wielded so much power within it. Yet substantial parts of both parties were enthusiastic that Britain should participate in this exciting experiment aimed at ending Europe’s blood-­soaked experiences during the twentieth century while facilitating greater economic growth and prosperity throughout the continent of Europe. Edward Heath led the Conservatives into the EEC in 1972, supported by most of his cabinet colleagues, including Margaret Thatcher at that time. Enoch Powell was a prominent and maverick dissenter who attracted some support though not decisively so during the 1970s. It was during the 1980s that Thatcher, having accepted the pivotal 1986 Single European Act, which established the integrated single market, began to object when Commission president Jacques Delors sought vigorously to advance towards the ‘ever closer union’ envisaged by the Treaty of Rome. Her objections – sustained energetically behind the scenes throughout her years of retirement during the 1990s – helped nourish a powerful tendency on the British right to view the EU (as it became known after the 1992 Maastricht Treaty) as wasteful, corrupt, undemocratic and injurious to the potential prosperity Britain would enjoy if it withdrew from the EU. UKIP did not initially attract much support but sections of the right-­wing press, most notably the Murdoch press (Sun, The Times, Sunday Times), helped fan the flames of opposition. In 2004 UKIP won 16% of the vote in the European Parliament elections, its leader, Nigel Farage, UKIP’s leader after 2006, quickly establishing himself as a charismatic national political figure. The euro-­zone crisis, beginning in 2009, seemed to destroy the EU’s image of facilitating prosperity and replace it with that of perpetual crisis and poverty. This helped propel UKIP to even greater electoral heights: it picked up scores of councillors in the 2014 local elections and topped the poll in the European elections in May of the same year.

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In April of that year Nigel Farage had the confidence to take on Nick Clegg in a televised debate on the EU. Surveys of the public showed that he won both easily. UKIP’s opposition to immigration levels – attracting the accusation that it is a ‘closet racist’ party – strengthened its appeal to right-­ wing Conservative voters and caused Conservative leader David Cameron to be pulled far to the right to pre-­empt an appeal which might, as it then seemed, deny the party several seats in the 2015 election. He consequently toughened up policy on immigrants, making it more difficult for them to draw benefits and seeking to limit their overall numbers. He also promised an ‘in–out’ referendum in 2013 providing he won an overall majority in 2015. With that majority, albeit a small one, intact, Cameron could implement his plan and in May 2015 began a series of meetings with EU heads of government designed to win back powers surrendered to the EU over the years. However, the EU proved disinclined to make any genuine concessions to Cameron and he proved unable to prevent voters opting for Leave 52–48% in the June 2016 in–out referendum on EU membership. After three-­and-a-­half years of tortured negotiation and Commons conflict, Boris Johnson’s historic victory on 12 December 2019 enabled him to effect Britain’s exit on 31 January 2020. In February 2020, Johnson announced a defence review was to be undertaken covering the next five years of defence policy, though with the aim of ‘weighing up how closely it wants Britain to be aligned to the United States in a post Brexit world’ (Sabbagh, 2020).

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION 1. Do you think Britain’s national interests have essentially changed since the nineteenth century? 2. Given its relative decline in the twentieth century, can Britain realistically play a major role in world politics? 3. Has Britain’s place in the world been greatly weakened by leaving the EU?

FURTHER READING Many of the arguments for and against the UK’s membership of the EU are aired in daily newspapers and the weekly journals. However,



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there are a few books available too. Especially useful is the impressive book by Michael Clarke and Helen Ramscar (2020). The FT Reporters Britain and the EU – In or Out? (2015) is a good short summary and can be downloaded to Kindle free of charge. Also useful is Bootle (2015) and Cohen (2015). Bew, J. (2015) After Brexit, Britain’s place in the world is at America’s side looking at Asia, Daily Telegraph, 20 July. Blair, A.L. (1999) The Blair Doctrine, www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/ international-­jan-june99-blair_doctrine4-23/. Blair, T. (1999) Doctrine of the international community, Speech by the PM to the Economic Club, Chicago. Bootle, R. (2015) The Trouble With Europe: Why the EU Isn’t Working, How It Can Be Reformed, What Could Take Its Place? Nicholas Brealey. Clarke, M. and Ramscar, H. (2020) Tipping Point, I.B. Taurus. Cohen, Y. (2015) The British Reverence Towards Nationality, Priests Publishing. Cooper, R. (2020) War and democracy, Prospect, June. Ferguson, N. (2004) Empire, Allen Lane. FT Reporters (2015) Britain and the EU – In or Out? Financial Times. Forsyth, J. (2018) Will Britain find a new role in the world after Brexit? Spectator, 14 April. Fullfact: The UK’s Independent Fact Checking Charity (2017) Is the UK the world’s 5th or 9th largest economy? 19 May. Gamble, A. (2003) Between Europe and America: The Future of British Politics, Palgrave. Hutton, W. (2014) Right of centre ideology has lost us the war in Afghanistan and much else besides, Observer, 28 December. Kennedy, P. (1989) The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, Random House. Sabbagh, D. (2020) Defence review will look at how closely Britain aligns with US, Guardian, 26 February. Shipman, T. (2010) Tony Blair to testify at Iraq inquiry after top aide admits: we got it wrong, Mail Online, 19 January. Smith, M., Smith, S. and White, B. (1988) British Foreign Policy, Routledge.

Websites Foreign and Commonwealth Office, www.gov.uk/government/organisations/ foreign-­commonwealth-office and www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?page name=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029390554 www.ukwatch.net/article/the_future_of_british_foreign_policy. Fullfact, https//fullfact.org.

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25 Concluding Comments An uncertain future

Three-­and-a-­half years after the Brexit vote, British politics endured, during 2019, one of its most disunited years since the inter-­war years. The narrow Leave victory, 52–48%, had not brought about any clear conclusion. Remain voters claimed they could not accept a vote based upon such naked misinformation, the consequences of which, moreover, would be widespread economic harm. Leave voters, many of whom had voted out of a sense of being ignored rather than opposition to EU membership, expressed an even more angry complaint that their democratic will was now being over-­ruled by people intent upon defying the democratic statement of 17.4 million voters. As Theresa May so obviously failed to deal with the ongoing crisis, the national mood curdled into one in which two antithetical arguments, rooted into immovable tribal silos of angry opinion where the cause of EU membership became almost a secondary issue to dismay at how very badly the issue was being handled by our politicians. Leave and Remain became talismans for all kinds of division: middle class versus working class, old versus young, rural versus urban, north versus south. Boris Johnson’s victory in the 2019 ‘Brexit’ election, was won on the widespread assumption that effecting our exit from the EU would be the prelude to a fading of the anger, ushering in a coming together of the two hostile tribes and national unity at last. However, it seems unlikely this process will happen quickly; more likely, it will take months or even years, so deeply has division been driven into our political culture.



concluding comments: an uncertain future

Weakening of the Centre ground Many British people, perhaps reassuring themselves that Britain does not go in for extremism, rather hoped we might escape the collapse of the centre ground occurring all over Europe and the USA. Growing inequality, opposition to foreign immigration, the remoteness of political elites and the suspicion they were corrupt had fuelled a rash of populist parties all over Europe – Austria, Italy, France, Spain, Germany and even Scandinavia. Right-­wing parties setting their faces against foreign immigrant entry and EU control, set fire to established patterns of governance. Nigel Farage’s UKIP followed by his later creation, the Brexit Party, provided evidence that Britain was not immune to right-­wing populism. Meanwhile on the left, Jeremy Corbyn, was trying to generate a national left-­wing equivalent, summoning thousands to his rallies and the kind of devoted support populist leaders often attract. Labour party membership quickly swelled to half a million but hopes that this was an augury to a socialism sweeping the country proved premature. When faced with electoral challenges Labour failed to reflect any wider upsurge. The 2017 election provided some temporary hope for left-­wingers when Labour, after trailing in the polls eventually polled 40% of the vote. But Labour’s poll ratings fell in successive years and Corbyn’s optimism that he could defeat Johnson in December 2019 proved woefully misplaced. Figure 25.1 shows how Labour’s membership swelled towards the end of the last decade, and indeed exceeded those of all other parties combined. Conservative party membership by comparison has stood at little over 150,000 for the past few years. $OOILJXUHVDVRI$SULO²$XJXVW H[FHSWIRU613'HFHPEHU DQG 3ODLG2FW

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Figure 25.1 UK party membership, 2019. Source: © 2020 House of Commons Library.

*51 

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conclusions

Figure 25.1 also indicates how ‘third’ parties have grown in recent decades from the two party hegemony which characterised the early 1950s. An increase of this kind makes it harder for single parties to win overall majorities but suggestions that Britain’s party system was becoming a multi-­party one was contradicted by the 83% of the vote taken by Labour and Conservatives in 2017 and 76% in 2019.

The ‘Cultural War’ Cultural issues are often treated separately from ‘political’ ones which are held to be mainly economic. It is interesting to note that Ed West, a leading Tory blogger thinks ‘the left is winning’ in a longish blog post and a book entitled Small Men on the Wrong Side of History. He knows the Conservatives won in December 2019 but argues they have been losing the ‘culture war’ for decades. By this he means issues like: the traditional family, the primacy of patriotism, same sex marriage, mass immigration, ‘equality and diversity agenda’, government economic intervention, drug prevention, gender issues, pornography and the decline of Christianity. Only some of these issues – immigration for instance – has wider political salience but West argues that key social groups – generation Z, degree holders and ethnic minorities ‘lean left on cultural issues’. If the electorate had comprised only graduates then Corbyn would be PM. West believes the ‘zeitgeist’ (intellectual atmosphere of the moment) is framed by young people in the arts, media, academe and business which, Matthew Goodwin in his Sunday Times book review says, is placing conservatism ‘beyond the pale, equivalent even to Nazism … Conservatives might wield electoral power but they hold little social power.’ Personally, I’m not so sure this is the case: who won the Brexit argument so emphatically for example? Who has been attacking the BBC and the judiciary? Cultural politics are far more restricted in the UK than the USA and, anyway, Tory political victory must surely be more important than cultural issues? Cultural politics are far more restricted in the UK than the USA and winning elections puts Tory values in pole position, delivering austerity policies and reinforcing the unequal status quo. The left are winning? Labour Party supporters at the present time can only dream …



concluding comments: an uncertain future

Boris Johnson’s extraordinary triumph in 2019, moreover, suggests he might occupy Downing Street for more than his five-­year term: some have predicted he’ll be there for ten years or even more. However, political power can fade or disappear with worrying speed and depth. Labour’s huge 1945 majority disappeared after six years; the Conservatives’ exit from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1992, presaged 13 years of Labour rule. As he contemplates, along with all of us, an uncertain future, Johnson’s steering of the ship of state must avoid a number of likely icebergs in his path beginning with the coronavirus pandemic which emerged January 2020. I appreciate the list below might seem dated by the time this book appears on the shelves:

Impact of the Coronavirus Pandemic 2020 This illness affecting the respiratory system began in Wuhan, China in November 2019. Allegedly the result of marketplace transmission from animals to humans – the theory is that this was via bats which in that part of China are eaten by humans – it spread quickly in China until draconian measures regarding quarantine and social movement checked its advance. Europe then became the virus’s hotspot, especially Italy, but it spread to virtually every country in the world. Most vulnerable were older people – 70 and 80 year olds – with existing medical problems like diabetes or cardiovascular conditions. Brexit had divided the UK into two rival factions which for three years hurled contumely at each other. The coronavirus (see Box 25.1), however, unified the nation against a common, worldwide threat and calmed the tone in which politics was conducted closer to ‘business before Brexit’. Speaking on BBC Radio 4 on 17 March 2020, historian Peter Hennessey commented on the astonishing change of tone which dealing with the virus had brought to the conduct of politics. Instead of wild accusations and constant fulminations, a serious, fact-­based approach to fighting the health pandemic was both necessary and unavoidable. The biggest restrictions on public behaviour had been imposed upon the UK’s population since the wartime years of 1939–45. He predicted historians would refer to ‘BC’ before coronavirus and ‘AC’, after coronavirus. Allowing for the temporary nature of the flooding occurring in the early part of 2020, the Chinese origin coronavirus was the first

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large-­scale crisis to be faced by Johnson’s government. Sensibly putting scientific advice at the heart of its response the government took appropriate though arguably somewhat tardy precautions and, on 12 March, chancellor Rishi Sunak announced what seemed a substantial £30 billion rescue package to counter and ameliorate the effects of the virus. On Tuesday 17 March, faced with a growing crisis, Sunak announced – in line with other big European countries – an unprecedented £350 billion programme of loans and grants designed to counter the virus and protect the economy from its effects. In addition Sunak announced on 20 March 2020 that the government would pay up to 80% of employees’ wages. Commentators marvelled at how completely a Conservative government had abandoned its traditional ‘small state/minimum welfare/let failing companies go under/reduce the deficit ideology. Everyone knew that he had few fixed beliefs but who would have thought that Boris Johnson would have turned on a sixpence and adopted a course of action so radical it exceeded anything done by Churchill’s government 1939–45? ‘Herd Immunity Theory’

However the precise course to be charted to control and defeat the virus was by no means clear during the early weeks of the crisis. The highly respected journalist, Tim Shipman, political editor of the Sunday Times informed his readers on 22 March that a crucial meeting occurred on 12 March which had transformed government policy (Shipman and Wheeler, 2020). This was when the Strategic Advisory Group of Experts (SAGE) comprising scientists and medics met to examine future modelling of the virus created by Imperial College London. At the time the government was following the ‘herd immunity’ hypothesis of Professor Chris Whitty, the Chief Medical Officer, whereby the virus is allowed to take its course, allowing the 60–80% majority who survive – and presumably acquire immunity to re-­infection – to prevent the virus being passed on to the rest of the population. According to Shipman, Dominic Cummings at a private meeting had endorsed ‘herd immunity, protect the economy and if that means some pensioners die, too bad’. The ‘two month’ delay caused by the adoption of this untested theory came to a head at the 12 March SAGE meeting.



concluding comments: an uncertain future

Cummings changed his mind. In this ‘penny drop moment’ he realised he had helped set a course for catastrophe. Until this point, the rise in British infections had been below the European average. Now they were above it and on course to emulate Italy where the picture was bleak. A minister said ‘Seeing what was happening in Italy was the galvanising force across government.’ By Friday 13th Cummings had become the most outspoken advocate of a tough crackdown. ‘Dominic himself had a conversion’, a senior Tory said. ‘He’s gone from “herd immunity and let old people die” to “let’s shut down the country and the economy”.’ One of those present said ‘The mood in the room was astonishing. You could tell that something very significant had shifted.’ This realisation, shared by health secretary Matt Hancock, led to the shutdown being made official. But during the two month delay in which the hypothesis had been accepted as policy, UK figures had assumed a disturbing similarity to those of Italy, a country where deaths were soon to exceed those suffered even by China.

Other Problems Pending at time of Writing   1. Brexit. Encouraging national unity seems futile while Remainers are licking their wounds, and some Leavers, Mark Francois comes to mind, are still keen to rub Remain noses rather too thoroughly in their defeat. Maybe the passage of time will take the edge of the divisions which are still keenly felt at the time of writing.   2. Trade talks. Another crucial continuing aspect of Brexit is the talks about the UK’s trade relationship with the EU. The Single Market, ironically very much a Thatcher creation, no longer includes the UK and to retain its benefits Britain needs to align trading regulations as closely as possible with the EU. However, Thatcherite Tories are hotly opposed to this, seeing a key advantage of Brexit as being the ability to set our own regulations and sign our own trade treaties worldwide. Major friction is anticipated at the time of writing as Johnson defends ‘de-­alignment’ and the EU encourages closer versions of it as the price of access to its markets.   3. No deal possibility. Given Johnson has set a statutory deadline of 31 December for the end of the ‘Transition’ period there is a real risk of a ‘no deal’ cliff edge consequence.

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  4. Ratification of agreement with the EU. Even if the UK can agree a suitable trade deal with the EU, it still has to be ratified by the legislatures of EU member states. This means Spain might make giving up Gibraltar as its condition or Greece the Elgin Marbles.   5. Economy. The state of the economy is always a key political factor and Johnson has to absorb the possibility of a Brexit and coronavirus-­induced slow down, or recession in the economy which will severely dent his spending plans. At the time of writing, forecasts of UK GDP growth has slumped from around 3% in 2010 to only 1% for 2020. Sunak’s budget on 12 March tried to sound confidently bullish about the economic future but few MPs could doubt the uncertainty of such claims. The government’s Office for Budget Responsibility, in April 2020, warned that UK GDP could shrink by 35% during spring of that year and unemployment surge to 2 million.   6. US trade deal. The promised trade agreement with the USA is also problematic: US regulations are such that they often differ from the EU, so alignment with one disqualifies alignment with the other. And there are key differences over certain food exports which American farmers are keen to sell to the UK: those much talked about ‘chlorinated chicken’ and hormone injected beef. Moreover, the fears that Donald Trump will insist US companies be allowed to tender for privatised NHS health care have not been removed at the time of writing.   7. Public expenditure and reducing the deficit. Johnson’s promise to reward those Labour supporters who ‘lent’ their votes to him implies substantial public investment – ‘levelling up’ to use the government’s term – in those former ‘Red Wall’ northern areas. Whilst this might indeed help reinforce pro-­Tory sentiments, such public expenditure was expressly denied by earlier Thatcherite Tory chancellors like George Osborne and that wing of the party will not take kindly to policies which are effectively Labour through and through (see Box 25.1). Johnson’s problems here are complicated by public expectations. The Times published a poll on New Year’s Day 2020 indicating 57% of the public preferred more cash for public services than tax cuts (Smyth, 2020; see also Rawnsley 2020). Paul Johnson, Director of the respected Institute for Fiscal Studies warned in March 2020:



concluding comments: an uncertain future

The differences between regions are rooted in history going back decades, even centuries. Having fundamental effects on then will require reallocating capital spending for sure, and a whole lot more – investment in skills, in health, in early years, and a coherent and long term industrial strategy. It will be the work of a generation and more, not of a single parliament.

Box 25.1 Britannia unchained This was the name of a book written by six right-­wing Conservative MPs, in 2012: Kwasi Kwarteng, Priti Patel, Chris Skidmore, Dominic Raab and Elizabeth Truss. Four of this group co-­wrote an article for the website, Conservative Home, in which they said  We are convinced that Britain’s best days are not behind us. We cannot afford to listen to the siren voices of the statists who are happy for Britain to become a second rate power in Europe, and a third rate power in the world. Decline is not inevitable. The book argued that the UK has a ‘bloated state, high taxes and excessive regulation’. More controversially, it also maintained that:  The British are among the worst idlers in the world. We work among the lowest hours, we retire early and our productivity is poor. Whereas Indian children aspire to be doctors or businessmen, the British are more interested in football and pop music. These MPs were at the heart of the ERG of the Tory Party which drove the opposition against Theresa May and the support for her eventual successor Boris Johnson. It is this section of the party which is unlikely to easily accept Johnson’s promised major public expenditures in the north of England.

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  8. Disagreements with Trump. Refusal to follow the US line on rejecting Huawei involvement in establishing the UK’s 5G network plus different lines on Iran and climate change will create friction with the UK’s closest ally and putative trade agreement partner. Donald Trump has threatened that the practice of sharing intelligence with the UK might be discontinued as a result of Johnson’s decision to accept Huawei’s participation. On 10 March 2020, the government proposals won a majority but rebellious Tory MPs reduced it from 80 to 24.   9. Problems with the Union. Brexit has not gone down well in pro­Remain Scotland, nor Johnson’s refusal to grant Nicola Sturgeon a second independence referendum. The growth of support for such a vote – February 2020 polls registered over 50% – is bound to create intense political conflict with the SNP and Scottish people more generally. 10. United Ireland? Johnson will also face a major threat to the Union in the form of Northern Ireland. The province voted by a majority to remain in the EU but Leave-­supporting protestant DUP propped up May’s government for over a year before it was betrayed by Johnson in order to clinch his own deal with the EU in the autumn of 2019. Johnson had promised that he would never allow a ‘border in the Irish Sea’ to be established which required tariffs to be paid on goods coming into and out of Northern Ireland. It was precisely through such a device that Johnson installed to win his deal and go on to win a thumping majority in the December election. Northern Ireland was to stay within the EU Customs Union. That the whole island of Ireland should be united within this contrived structure was anathema to the DUP way of thinking. Opinion polls also showed a surprising narrowing of the gap of those in the province now opposing unification. The final development came on 15 February when Sinn Fein did remarkably well in Ireland’s general election. The party had deployed a left-­wing prospectus on health and housing but its manifesto also gave prominence to its ‘core political objective’ of Irish unity and its proposal to hold cross-­border referendums of the issue. 11. UK’s constitution. The 2011 referendum on voting reform probably will keep that topic languishing in the long grass for



concluding comments: an uncertain future

some time longer but the worryingly low levels of trust in the UK’s democratic institutions will mean other topics will be harder to keep off the agenda: a. Written constitution. The ‘grey’ areas revealed between executive and legislature by virtue of the proroguing of parliament affair in autumn 2019 has encouraged more calls for a written constitution to clarify who is entitled to do what. b. Citizen’s assemblies. This initiative has introduced a new feature of British democracy, already used to good effect in Ireland, Canada and the Netherlands. Cross-­party MPs – no doubt inspired by Extinction Rebellion’s campaigning – set up the structures whereby 30,000 households across the country are to be invited to join citizen’s assemblies on climate change. Participants will be selected at random from those who respond to create a 110-strong representative sample of the nation. They were to meet for four weekends in Birmingham, discussing topics including transport and energy use. c. Federal UK structure. This idea has been mooted on several occasions, most recently as a way of including Scotland and Wales more comfortably in the Union. Keir Starmer added some force to the proposal in January 2020 by calling for a ‘fully federal UK, devolving power to England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland after Brexit’ (Mason, 2020). He suggested power might be devolved from Westminster down to regions and devolved assemblies on such matters as taxation, transport and green industrial strategies. d. Role of special advisers. Johnson’s appointment of Dominic Cummings as his chief political aide poses a problem. Cummings’ blog has been eagerly reread by journalists and his promises of ‘revolutionary change’ in the way Whitehall operates has been much discussed at the time of writing. He wants to employ unusual people (‘weirdos and misfits’), abolish certain departments and clip the Treasury’s wings. How far and how long can Johnson go with his volatile adviser so bent upon ‘creative destruction’? Trump’s Steve Bannon did not last long but how long will Cummings?

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12. Climate change. The UK is keen to burnish its credentials as a leader on meeting the challenge of climate change, a topic which has climbed close to the top of the political agenda courtesy of Greta Thunberg and her supporters like David Attenborough. Johnson will be keen to claim the UK is maintaining its admirable lead compared to other nations but will face opposition from energy companies and car manufacturers, angry at what they judge the excessively early phasing out of petrol and diesel vehicles. Finally, on this issue, environmental campaigners won their case in the Appeal Court that the decision to green light a third Heathrow runway was illegal as it failed to take into account the  Paris Agreement targets to reduce emissions (Brown, 2020). 13. Social care. This contentious issue concerning the expensive care of the elderly had featured in the 2010 election campaign when Labour’s proposals were fatally condemned by the Tories as a ‘Death Tax’ and in 2017 when Labour condemned Tory plans as a ‘Dementia Tax’. Johnson had promised a brand new plan for fixing social care during the campaign but no details emerged. On day one as PM he declared he had ‘a clear plan’ for social care but by the spring of 2020 he had still not managed to set it forth (Sylvester, 2020) Given the UK’s increasingly ageing society this issue has an urgency which will not allow endless procrastination but also contains potential for political damage. Finally, as the most divisive issue in UK politics since 1945, Brexit deserves another and final mention. Times columnist, and staunch Remainer, Phillip Collins (2020), questioned whether the UK leaving the EU constituted a ‘liberation’ of any kind:  The implication that Britain has been in servitude since 1973 would be offensive if not so manifestly absurd. But for prominent Brexit cheerleaders this is the rhetorical idiocy of the time … For all Mr Johnson’s fabled optimism it is hard, from what he says, to glean why we are doing this at all.

He also wondered how Brexit was to be judged:



concluding comments: an uncertain future

By what measure will Brexit be judged a success or failure, in the course of time by its advocates? A higher trend of growth? A better performance than the average of European economies? Regional growth led by inventive regulation that would have been stifled by the EU? None of things because Brexit was, at risk of emptying the term of meaning, a philosophical project.

More certain is the fact that Brexit was by no means a done deal at the UK’s point of leaving. Its continuing relevance will be felt in terms of the trading agreement struck with the EU during 2020 and beyond as well as the medium- and long-­term impact upon the economy and employment. Commentators queued up in early 2020 to remind Johnson that from now on Brexit could not be used as an excuse for non-­completion of objectives, as it was under May. ‘Get Brexit Done’ was the slogan invented for Johnson by Cummings but once it was ‘done’ the government remained palpably hostage to its possible highly damaging effects, especially economically. Given such a formidable burden of problems to be solved, some commentators wondered if Johnson’s fabled strong majority could save him from a possible early exit from the position it had been his life-­long ambition to occupy.

Questions for Discussion 1. Do you consider Brexit remains a core political issue in UK politics? 2. To what extent has Johnson fulfilled his 2019 election promises? 3. Contrast UK relations with the EU compared to those with the USA.

further Reading Beckett, A. (2019) The age of perpetual crisis: how the 2010s disrupted everything but resolved nothing, Guardian, 17 December. Brown, A. (2020) Heathrow plans blocked by court challenge over climate fears, Sun, 27 February. Carrington, D. (2019) UK citizens’ assembly on climate emergency announced, Guardian, 20 June.

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Collins, P. (2020) Brexit ‘liberation day’ is self-­serving fantasy, The Times, 30 January.  Congressional Research Service (2015) The US–EU beef hormone dispute, US Congress. Dickson, B. (2019) Writing the United Kingdom Constitution, Manchester University Press. Garton-­Ash, T. (2020) We must now want Britain to do well, and the EU even better, Guardian, 31 January. Goodhart, D. (2017) The Road to Somewhere: The Populist Revolt and the Future of Politics, Hurst. Goodwin, M. (2020) Left ‘behind on the right’, Sunday Times Culture Supplement, 15 March. Helm, T. (2020) ‘Brexity Hezza’ or rightwing ideologue: who is the real PM? Observer, 19 January. Hutton, W. (2020) The threat to Johnson’s ‘national revival’ will come from his own party, Guardian, 2 February. Johns, R., Henderson, A., Carman, C. and Larner, J. (2020) Brexit or independence: Scotland’s general election, Political Insight, March. Johnson, P. (2020) Levelling up will be the work of a generation, not a single parliament, Institute for Fiscal Studies, 16 March. Kenny, M. (2020) English nationalism, the 2019 election and the future of the British state, Political Insight, March. Kwarteng, K., Patel, P., Skidmore, C., Raab D. and Truss, E. (2012) Britannia Unchained, Palgrave. Liddle, R. (2019) The Great Betrayal, Hachette. McEwan, I. (2020) Brexit, the most pointless, masochistic ambition in our country’s history, is done, Guardian, 1 February. Marr, M. (2012) The History of 20th Century Britain, BBC. Mason, R. (2020) Starmer calls for a fully federal UK ‘to repair shattered trust in politics’, Guardian, 27 January. O’Toole, F. (2019) Heroic Failure: Brexit and the politics of Pain, Head of Zeus. O’Toole, F. (2020) Independence day will expose Brexit as a ruse to free an imaginary nation, Observer, 26 January. Partington, R. (2020) UK Economy could shrink by 35% with 2m job losses warns OBR, The Guardian, 14 April. Parris, M. (2020) Magic money tree will cost the Tories dear, The Times, 28 March. Rawnsley, A. (2020) It won’t be easy for Johnson to keep his promises to his new friends in the north, Observer, 19 January. Shipman, T. and Wheeler, C. (2020) Coronavirus: ten days that shook Britain – and changed the nation forever, Sunday Times, 22 March. 



concluding comments: an uncertain future

Smyth, C. (2020) Voters prefer public services to tax cuts, The Times, 1 January. Sylvester, R. (2020) Tories are edging towards social care taxation, The Times, 10 March. The Economist (2020) Briefing: a united Ireland, 15 February. West, E. (2020) Why Conservatism is doomed, Unherd (blog), 9 March. West, E. (2020) Small Men on the Wrong Side of History, Constable.

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GLOSSARY

Accountable  the requirement to take responsibility for one’s actions and make redress when appropriate. Anarchism  an approach to politics which rejects the need for the state and its coercive institutions. Ancien régime  the monarchic, aristocratic, social and political system established in the Kingdom of France from the fifteenth century until the late eighteenth century under the late Valois and Bourbon dynasties. Authoritarianism  a highly directive system of government where rulers make decisions without the explicit consent of the population. Autocratic  a domineering style which takes no account of other people’s wishes or interests. Bill  name given to a legislative proposal before it has passed through the parliamentary procedures. Bipartisan  relating to an agreement between two or more political parties whose views are usually opposed. Bourgeoisie  name given by Karl Marx to the property-­owning middle classes. Brexit  abbreviated word widely used to describe ‘British exit’ from the EU. Broadsheets  name given to ‘quality’ newspapers aimed at a more educated audience and which traditionally came in this larger size.



glossary

By-­election  single-­constituency election held when a vacancy arises in the House of Commons. Cabinet  the supreme committee of government chaired by the PM. Canvassing  practice used by political activists of making contact with voters in their homes. Capitalism  term used by Karl Marx for an economic system comprising an unregulated market, private property, investment in projects and a workforce who produce profit for the owner in return for wages. Centrist  someone whose political beliefs are in the middle of the accepted left–right continuum. Coalition  when two or more political parties combine to form a joint government. Communism  a system of government in which all property is held in common and, in theory at least, all people are free and are treated equally and fairly. Consensus  ‘a general agreement’ – was widely used to describe the bipartisan agreement in the UK post 1945 on the welfare state and mixed economy. Constituency  the name given to electoral registration and voting districts in the UK (there were 650 in all in 2015). Constitutional monarch  a monarch constrained by the terms of a constitution. In the case of Britain, this leaves virtually no political power but a good deal of ceremony plus public acclaim and affection. Core executive  political science term for the apex of decision-­ makers, including PM and cabinet plus top civil servants and political aides. Coronavirus  name of the virus, causing respiratory disease named Covid 19, originating in Wuhan, China, which caused a world pandemic in 2020 which included the UK. Covid 19  see coronavirus above. Cultural revolution  term used for the overthrow of cultural values and practices during the 1960s. Democracy  system of government in which all the people are involved, if only through the act of voting. Devolution  the transfer of governmental authority from the centre to the regions.

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Direct democracy  system of democracy – possible only for small communities – which directly involves all members of a social group. Divine right  the idea that a monarch had a holy right to succeed to the throne. Electorate  all people in a country with the right to vote. Énarques  graduates of the elite French École nationale d’administration. Epistocracy  political system where decision-­making is in the ‘hands of the wise’ – a version of Plato’s ‘philosopher kings’ idea. Euro-­sceptic  those opposing the EU, even to the point of advocating national withdrawal. Executive  the function of running government on a day-­to-day basis. Executive agencies  a generic term for any government body but given a specific sense by the recommendations of the 1988 Ibbs report, which led to the establishment of the ‘Next Steps’ agencies. Fabian  member of the Fabian Society, established 1884 and dedicated to progress towards socialism through gradual change. False consciousness  Marxist idea that most people are ‘brainwashed’ in capitalist society into supporting its dominant values. Fascist  right-­wing ideology based on authoritarian nationalism. First past the post  voting system whereby the candidate receiving the most votes wins the contest, however many failed to give their support. Used famously in the UK and the USA. Franchise  right or eligibility to vote. Free speech  the freedom to express one’s views, even if they are unpopular. Gini coefficient  the measure of income distribution across a country’s citizens. Hereditary  titles in House of Lords used to be passed down by inheritance before 1998. Human rights  entitlements everyone is believed to be born with, such as the rights to life and free speech. Hung parliament  situation after an election, as in May 2010, where no party has an overall majority.



glossary

Ideology  a system of ideas and values, usually underpinning a political philosophy. Judiciary  the legal system, including law courts, judges and courts of appeal. King’s court  in medieval times this was the 1000 or so people who surrounded the king, advising, serving, entertaining, helping him and his family in whatever ways were required Legislature  the law-­making assembly of a political system. Legitimation  to give legal force to; make legal in appearance and substance. Levellers  radical group who argued for democracy in wake of the English Civil War. Manifesto  document issued by a political party during an election campaign containing policy pledges it claims it will implement if it wins the election. Marginal  a constituency where a swing in voting behaviour of a few percentage points will change the party which controls it. Poll  a survey of attitudes applied to a sample of people representative of society as a whole and thus likely to have predictive value for how people will vote in elections. Post-­war consensus  see consensus above. Pragmatism  an approach which rejects theory for how things apply in practice. Pressure group  a body comprising people who perceive common interests who seek to influence specific government policies. Quasi-­autonomous non-­governmental organisations (quangos)  public bodies which advise or administer government activities and which carry out their work at arm’s length from government control; though they still ultimately operate under ministerial control. Referendum  a ballot in which voters usually have a ‘yes–no’ choice, in British cases usually on a constitutional issue, as in the Scottish independence referendum in 2014; or a major political question, as with the EU in–out referendum 23 June 2016. Representative democracy  government whereby decisions are taken by people who are (normally) elected by popular vote to represent substantial groups of fellow citizens. Sectarian  concerning members of sects, denominations, or other (usually religious) groups.

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Society  people living together in an ordered fashion. Sovereignty  autonomy over national decision-­making or the ultimate legal authority within a state. Spin doctor  a politically appointed official specialising in the management of a senior politician’s media activities. Tabloid  popular newspapers aiming at a less educated audience. Top-­down  when decisions are taken by an elite and then imposed downwards. Westminster  often used to refer to the area of London containing the Houses of Parliament Whip  official appointed by a party in a legislature to manage its activities, especially voting according to party policy. Whitehall  term used to denote the departments of state run by civil servants.

Index

Page numbers in bold denote tables, those in italics denote figures. 1922 Committee 139 accountability 38, 92, 283; and political parties 134–135 Adonis, Andrew 195 Afghanistan 405–406 Ahmed, Kemal 65 Almond, G. 84 ‘anywheres’ 13, 14–16, 383 Appleyard, Brian 184 Ashdown, Paddy 40, 113, 145, 234 Attlee, Clement 105, 143, 272–273, 378, 402 Attorney General 362, 365 Audit Commission 346, 350 austerity 80 Bagehot, Walter 19, 51, 87, 189, 190, 191, 192, 195, 276 Ballot Act 1872 220 Beckett, Andy 3 Behr, Rafael 184 Bell, Torsten 59, 61 Benn, Tony 89, 116, 191, 378–379 Bentham, Jeremy 100

Bercow, John 90, 272 Beveridge, William 102, 125 Bevin, Ernest 404 Binder, David 80 Blair, Tony 78, 82, 108, 109–110, 124, 139, 304, 405; Cabinet meetings 265; clash with Brown 314–315, 320; Iraq war 82, 109–110, 143, 175, 271, 274, 304, 405, 407; as Labour leader 140, 143–144; as policy-maker 268, 269; and spin 174–175; style of 274–275; and the USA 406–407 blogs 179 Blunkett, David 134, 295 Bogdanor, Vernon 140 Boulton, Adam 182–183 Brand, Russell 303 Brexit 4, 9, 117, 118, 169, 240–241, 252, 377–398, 388–389, 417, 422–423; aftermath of 2019 election 390–391; Britain’s application to join the EEC 378, 404; Britain’s place in the world 383; Britain’s rejection of a

432

index

Brexit continued ‘Federal Europe’ 377; and the British government’s reputation 393–394; Conservative Party factions 385; De Gaulle’s veto on Britain joining Europe 377–378, 404; economic versus cultural concerns 382; economy, protection of, versus immigration and sovereignty 381; effect on 2019 election results 242, 253; effect on political ideas 118–119; effects on political culture 75–76; effects on the Cabinet 260–261; effects on the party system 16–17; Euro-scepticism, growth of 44, 378–379, 405, 408–410; financial costs 384; impact on devolution 339–340; and Johnson 17–18, 45, 76, 248, 251, 252, 368, 386, 387–388; and judicial review 368–369; and May 9, 76, 136, 270–271, 383–384, 385–386; no deal possibility 418; post-Brexit concerns 394–396; referendum 2016 3, 6–7, 44, 73, 76, 91, 93–94, 380–383, 381; reversal possibilities 392–393; trade relationship negotiations 384, 385, 394–395, 417; transitional period 385; UK vote for Brexit, reasons for 382–383 Brexit Party 17, 41, 75, 117, 136–137, 146, 248, 387–388, 390, 413 Britain and the World 383, 399–411, 404–405; British Commonwealth 403; economy 401–402; empire and decline 401–403; Euro-scepticism, growth of 44, 378–379, 405, 408–410; European balance of power 400–401; foreign policy 403–404; frontiers 400; historical perspective 399–401; relationship with the USA 405–408; trade 400

Britain First 148 Britannia Unchained (book) 419 British National Party (BNP) 41, 123, 137, 148 British Social Attitude surveys 81 British Sociological Association 224 British Union of Fascists 74–75, 122 Brown, Gordon 89, 108, 109, 143–144, 148–149, 172, 314–315, 318, 320, 337–338, 405 Butler, Robin 274 Cabinet see Prime Minister (PM) and Cabinet Cadwalladr, Carol 180–181 Callaghan, James 141, 143 Cambridge Analytica (CA) 180–181, 223 Cameron, David 5–6, 44, 91, 93–94, 111–113, 134, 136, 137–138, 141, 144, 161, 203, 260, 336–337, 380, 394; 2015 election campaign 233; and immigration 410; as party leader 270; as policy-maker 268–269; resignation 7–8, 270; style of 275; and television 172–173 Campbell, Alastair 143, 157, 174, 180, 230, 234, 269, 292–293 canvassing 38 capitalism 48, 49, 51, 56, 72, 100, 101; hierarchy of rewards 103–104 Cave, Tamsin 160–161 Central Policy Review Staff 287 Charles I 23, 205 Church of England 73 Churchill, Winston 105, 171, 272–273, 377, 402, 403, 404, 406 Citizen Audit 155 citizen’s assemblies 421 civil service 43, 266–267, 393; Behavioural Insights Team 297; bullying 296; departments 290; executive agencies 288; Fulton Report 1968 287, 291, 295;



generalists 291–292; hierarchy titles 289; influence on ministers 295–296; Major Projects Authority 297; ‘Next Steps’ report 288; non-executive board members 297; NorthcoteTrevelyan report 1854 286–287; origins of 285–286; permanent secretary 291; personnel 289, 291; policy-makers 294–295; political advisers 292–294, 308, 421; privatisation 288, 291; reform of 296–297; relationships with ministers 296; Thatcher’s reforms 287–288 Civil Service Commission 286 civil society 78–79; and pressure groups 155 Civil War 1642–9, 23–24, 98, 189, 205, 258 civility 76–77 Clarke, Kenneth 277 class: changing class strata 50; classification of 49–50, 224; educational differences 51–52, 52, 227; influence on voting 223–228, 226, 228, 244–245, 244; underclass 63–64; see also middle class; working class Clegg, Nick 16, 114, 115, 136, 145, 172, 203, 235, 410 climate change 422 coalitions 39, 114–115, 136, 144, 232 Collins, Philip 391–392, 422–423 Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) 147 conservatism 102–104; attitudes to change 104; Cameron’s conservatism 111–113, 124; capitalism’s hierarchy of rewards 103–104; human nature 104 Conservative (Tory) Party 11, 17, 29, 39, 111–113, 135, 137–139; 1922 Committee 139; 2017 general election campaign 236;

index

2019 election 112–113, 240–241, 242–244, 250; and Brexit 76, 136, 385; coalition with Lib Dems 114–115, 136, 144, 232, 323; constraints 138–139; election losses 111; and human rights 95–96; leadership 138; membership 12, 413, 413; organisation 139; party groups 139; political donors 163; rebranding of 111–113; traditional party of government 136 constituencies 38 constitution 72–74, 86–97; accountability 92; amendment of the constitution 90; British Bill of Rights 95; case law 89; citizen’s assemblies 421; common law 89; conventions 89–90; core and contested elements of 92–93; crown legitimacy 93; federal UK structure 421; historical emergence of 86–87; human rights 95–96; institutional rules 90; legitimacy 73–74; liberal freedoms 92; nature of 88; normal statutes 88; parliamentary sovereignty 87–88, 370, 409; parliamentary supremacy 93; procedural democracy 92; referendums and parliamentary authority 91, 93–94; reform of 114; royal prerogative 89; rule of law 92; separation of powers 91; sources of the constitution 88–90; super statutes 88; territorial unity 93; works of authority 90; written constitution 94–95, 421 Constitutional Reform Act (CRA) 2005 361–362, 367 Corbyn, Jeremy 6, 8, 10, 11, 16, 40, 51, 63, 82, 124, 413; and Brexit 142, 380–381; competency of 250; election 140, 142, 229; as Labour leader 115–116, 122, 139, 249–250; resignation 144, 390

433

434

index

core executive 278–280, 279, 308–309 coronavirus 4, 119–120, 415–417; herd immunity theory 416–417 corporatism 303–304 Coulson, Andy 174, 178 courts see judiciary and politics Crewe, I. 285, 305 crime 79 Cromwell, Oliver 23, 24, 98–99, 205, 258 Cromwell, Thomas 23, 258, 286 cronyism 161–163, 203 Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) 364 cultural war 78, 414–415 Cummings, Dominic 7, 181, 182, 242, 261, 263, 265, 276, 277; and coronavirus 416–417; and the Leave campaign 388–389; as political adviser 293–294, 308, 421 Curia Regis 22, 199 Curtice, John 5, 10, 17, 234, 243, 245 Dahl, Robert 164, 303 Dalyell, Tam 331 D’Ancona, Mathew 240 Darling, Alistair 148, 336 Davis, David 9, 384, 386 De Gaulle, General 377–378, 404 deference 77–78 democracy 37–38; and the media 166–167; online democracy 179; and voting 229 Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) 11, 41, 239, 247, 420 Denver, David 225, 227, 228, 229 devolution 32–33, 74, 90–91, 148, 211, 325–341; in the 1970s 327–328; Brexit, impact of 339–340; Cabinet responsibility 332; ‘control freak’ danger 332; elections for the London assembly and mayor 335; English

nationalism 332–333; English regions 333–334, 353–355; Greater London government 334; independence demands 332; Kilbrandon report 327–328, 336; National Assembly for Wales 74, 329; nationalist parties’ origins 327; Northern Ireland 326–327, 331; Northern Ireland Assembly 41, 74, 326, 329–330; opinion polls 337–338; powers of the devolved assemblies 328–330; pressure for equal powers in Wales 332; problems of 331–332; proportional representation 332; public spending 333; Scotland 33, 330, 331–332; Scottish independence referendum, impact of 334, 336–339; Scottish Parliament 74, 328; Wales 33, 331; West Lothian question 331 Dorling, Danny 64 Eagleton, Terry 303 Eatwell, R. 18 economic and social context 47–69; changing class strata 50; economic beginnings 47–48; economic inequality 56–61; ethnicity 66–67; gender 65; Gini coefficient 58, 58; imperialism 48; incomes 56–58, 56, 57, 59, 60; industrial revolution and Marxism 48–50; inequalities of the 1980s 59–61, 59, 60; land ownership 61–64, 62; life peerages 55; and political culture 71–72; regional differences 64–65; revolution, lack of 50–51; social class 49–50; social mobility and education 51–55, 52; superrich 62–63; underclass 63–64; wealth 59, 60 economy, management of 316–320; instruments of management 318–330, 319; Keynesianism 317;



monetarism 318; policy-makers 320; slow down, possibility of 418 Eden, Anthony 402–403 education 51–55, 108–109; access to 114; class differences 51–52, 52; mass higher education 53, 55; private education 52–53, 54 elections 37–38, 105, 389, 409–410; calling of 31–32; by-elections 222–223; electoral systems 220–223; Euro-elections 2019 17; exit polls 5, 10–11, 17, 234; first past the post system 37, 220, 221–222, 231; general election 2010 231–232; general election 2015 5–6, 232–235, 234; general election 2017 3, 9–11, 12, 116, 150, 235–237, 237; local elections 150, 356–357; London Assembly 335; low turnout 229; for mayors 335, 352–353; penalties for breaking electoral laws 223; Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) 74; social media’s role 180–181, 223; televised election debates 172–173, 233, 236, 410; see also general election 2019 Electoral Administration Act 2006 220 employment 101, 102–103 English Defence League (EDL) 41, 137 Enlightenment 26–27, 99, 125, 126 environmental issues 120–121, 422 Equal Opportunities Commission 370 equal pay 102–103 ethnicity 66–67, 231 European Convention on Human Rights 370–371 European Research Group (ERG) 9, 16, 270, 385 European Union (EU) 44–45, 417; Euro-scepticism, growth of 44, 378–379, 405, 408–410;

index

European law, enforcement of 370; as a focus of foreign policy 404–405; influence on policymaking 315; Leave campaign 7, 75–76, 388–389; and pressure groups 160; referendum 2016 3, 6–7, 73, 76, 91, 116, 118, 380–383, 381; Remain campaign 6–7, 75; trade relationship negotiations 384, 385, 394–395, 417 exchange rates 319 executive 257–258 executive agencies 43 extremism 74–77; abuse 76–77; Brexit’s effect on political culture 75–76; civility, decline of 76–77 Facebook 180–181, 183, 207, 223 far left 121–122, 147, 413 far right 122–123, 148, 413 Farage, Nigel 6, 17, 41, 83, 117, 136, 146, 235, 248, 379, 382, 390, 391, 409–410, 413 fascism 74–75, 122–123 Ferguson, Niall 402 Fixed Term Parliaments Act 2011 31–32, 239, 240 Foges, Clare 253 Foot, Michael 143, 308 foreign policy 109–110, 403–404; European Union as a focus of 404–405 Fox, Liam 7, 9 free speech 72–73, 81, 92 Freedland, Jonathan 119 French Revolution 1789 27 Friedman, Milton 318 Friedman, S. 53, 55 Gaitskell, Hugh 378, 404 Galbraith, J.K. 13–16 Gamble, Andrew 403 gender 65, 230, 245 general election 2019 3, 17, 112–113, 150, 239–255,

435

436

index

general election continued 389–390, 412; aftermath of 390–391; and Brexit 242; campaign 240–241; class and voting 244–245, 244, 245; effects of 252–254; gender 245; Johnson fulfils promises 241–242; Labour’s loss of votes and defeat 242–244; Northern Ireland 247; political parties, effect on 248–252; results 241; Scotland 247; tactical voting 246–247; turnout 246, 246; Wales 247 George I 259 Gini coefficient 58, 58 Glorious Revolution 1688–9, 24 Goodhart, David 13–15, 18, 382–383 Goodwin, Matthew 18, 239, 252–253, 414 Gove, Michael 7–8, 9 Government of Wales Act 2006 329 Grant, Wyn 156, 161 Gray, John 195 Great Reform Act 1832 28–29, 205, 219 Green Party 120–121, 137 Green, T.H. 100 Grieve, Dominic 240, 243 Griffin, Nick 123, 148 Griffiths, J.A.G. 366–367 gross domestic product (GDP) 65, 418 Hague, William 10, 139 Hall, Peter 155 Hallsworth, Michael 312 Hamilton, Willie 190 Hastings, Max 17–18 Healey, Denis 318 Heath, Edward 29, 78, 138, 378, 409 Hennessy, Peter 90, 190, 415 Henry VIII 23, 285–286 Hill, Fiona 269 Hitler, Adolf 122, 171, 400, 401, 402

Hobhouse, L.T. 100 Home Secretary 362–363, 368 House of Commons 22, 31, 42, 88, 199, 205–218; considering new law proposals 208; and constituents 209; constraining of government action 208; devolution 211; EU membership 207; expansion of the electorate 205–206; growth of loyal opposition 206; judicial review 207; legislative process 209; legitimising decisions 209–210; media influence 207; ministerial recruitment and training 209; MPs’ social backgrounds 212–217, 213, 214, 215, 216; National Audit Office (NAO) and Public Accounts Commission 211; as the nation’s sounding board 208; opposition days 212; party committees 210; political education 209; power of 210–211; power of the Prime Minister 206; pressure group influence 206–207; referendums 207–208; reform of 211–212; scrutiny of executive 210; select committees 210; Speaker 90, 272; special standing committees 212; sustaining government 208; televising the Commons 212 House of Lords 22, 42, 73, 199–204, 283; composition of 200, 200; conflict with the Commons 31, 199; constitutional function 201; deliberative function 201; expenses claims 203; functions 201–202; initiating bills 201; judicial role 201; legislative function 201; life peerages 31, 199; reform of 114, 202–203; revision and amendment 201–202; select committees 202; vetoes and delays 201 House of Lords Act 1999 200



Howard, Michael 111, 137, 314, 368 Howe, Geoffrey 274, 278, 320 HS2, 315–316 human rights 72–73, 95–96, 370–371 Human Rights Act 1998 371 Hunt, Henry ‘Orator’ 26–27 Hunt, Jeremy 260 Hunting Act 311 Hurd, Douglas 134, 307 Hutton, Will 405–406 identity politics 3, 15, 118 Ignatieff, Michael 16 immigration 7, 66–67, 117, 254, 379–380, 381–382, 410 imperialism 48 incomes: Gini coefficient 58; inequality 56–58, 56, 57, 59, 60 The Independent Group (TIG) 16–17 Independent Labour Party 74 Independent Monitor of the Press 179 Independent Press Standards Organisation 177, 179 Independent Schools Council (ISC) 54 industrial revolution 48–50 inequality 51, 63, 100; economic inequality 56–61, 58, 71–72; ethnicity 66–67; gender 65; Gini coefficient 58; incomes 56–58, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60; inequalities of the 1980s 59–61, 59, 60; regional differences 64–65; wealth 59, 60 Ingham, Bernard 174 Institute for Government (IfG) 261, 263 Institute for Government Studies, on policy-making 312 interest rates 319 Iraq war 71, 82, 109–110, 143, 157, 174–175, 271, 274, 304, 362, 405, 407

index

Ireland 326–327 Jack, Ian 339–340 Jenkins, Simon 350, 354 John, king of England 22 Johnson, Boris 3, 7–8, 9, 67, 112–113, 136, 138, 203, 227, 239, 410; 2019 election 240–241, 412; ambition 251; and Brexit 17–18, 45, 76, 248, 251, 252, 368, 386, 387–388; Cabinet reshuffle 2020 277; and control of the media 182–183; family members 272; fulfils 2019 election promises 241–242; and media bias 175; misconduct accusations 387; as party leader 271; style of 276; and television 173; uncertain future of 415; warning to the Cabinet 261 Johnson, Paul 418–419 Jordan, G. 164, 305, 311 judiciary and politics 359–373, 393–394; Attorney General and Solicitor General 362, 365; Brexit and judicial review 368–369; civil law 365–366; Court of Appeal 365; courts and their personnel 363–366, 363; criminal law 364; crown courts 365; Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) 364; European Convention on Human Rights, reinforcement of 370–371; European law, enforcement of 370; government spheres and location of judiciary 361; High Court 366; Home Secretary 362–363, 368; judges’ autonomy 360, 362; judges, recruitment of 366–367; judicial activism 360, 367–368; Judicial Appointments Commission 367; judicial posts 361–363; law’s function in society 359; Lord Chancellor 361–362; the Lords 362; magistrates courts 364; Privy

437

438

index

judiciary and politics continued Council Judicial Committee 365; subordination of courts 360; Supreme Court of the United Kingdom 207, 362, 363; tribunals 366 Kellner, Peter 231–232, 246–247 Kennedy, Paul 402 Keynes, John Maynard 102, 125, 307, 317 King, Anthony 229, 285, 305 Kinnock, Neil 107–108, 143 Kwarteng, Kwasi 419 Kynaston, David 54 Labour Party 3, 6, 8, 10, 17, 30, 39–40, 74, 102, 105–106, 113, 135, 139–144, 232–233; 2017 general election campaign 235–236; 2019 election 240–241, 242–244, 249–250, 389–390; and Brexit 16; cheap membership 12; clash between Blair and Brown 314–315, 320; conferences 140–141; Corbyn as leader 24–50, 115–116, 122, 139, 250; degree holders 51; election defeats 144, 413; electoral college 140; ideological divisions 142–143, 249; leadership 140; leadership contest 2020 123–124, 144; leadership experience 143–144; marketing 305; membership 413, 413; militant tendency 122; National Executive Committee (NEC) 141; Parliamentary Labour Party 142; power and leadership issues 142–144; power centres 140–142; and the super-rich 63; and trade unions 140–141, 141–142; and working class ideology 51; see also New Labour land ownership 61–64, 62 Laurison, D. 53, 55

Lawson, Nigel 9, 318, 396 Leadsom, Andrea 8, 158, 268 Lees-Marshment, J. 305 legislation: Ballot Act 1872 220; case law 89; common law 89; Constitutional Reform Act (CRA) 2005 361–362, 367; Electoral Administration Act 2006 220; employment laws 319; Fixed Term Parliaments Act 2011 31–32, 239, 240; Government of Wales Act 2006 329; Great Reform Act 1832 28–29, 205, 219; House of Lords Act 1999 200; Human Rights Act 1998 371; Hunting Act 311; legislative process 209; Life Peerages Act 1958 199; Local Government Act 1888 343; Local Government Act 1972 343; Local Government Act 2000 351–352; Local Government Finance Act 1982 346; Local Government Finance Act 1992 348; Local Government Planning and Land Act 1980 346; Municipal Corporations Act 1835 343; normal statutes 88; Parliament Act 1911 199; Peerage Act 1963 31, 199–200; Poor Law Amendment Act 1834 342–343; Rates Act 1984 346; rule of law 92; super statutes 88 legitimacy 73–74 Lenin, Vladimir 102, 121 Levellers 98–99 Leveson Inquiry 171, 177, 178, 179 Lewis, Dan 298 Liberal Democrats (Lib Dems) 6, 11, 17, 40, 113–114, 135–136, 144–146, 240; 2019 election 248–249, 389–390; coalition with Conservatives 114–115, 136, 144, 232 Liberal Party 30, 100–101, 113, 125, 135–136



liberalism 99–100, 113–114 Life Peerages Act 1958 199 Lindblom, Charles 304 Lister, Sir Edward 298 Livingstone, Ken 334 Lloyd, John 176–177 lobbying 160–161, 162 local government 44, 107, 292, 342–358, 347–348; contracting out 345–346; devolution of powers in 2014–15, 353–355; elected mayors 334, 335, 351–353; elections 356–357; fragmentation 345; functions 344–345, 345, 356; funding 344, 346–347, 348; Northern Ireland 348; northern powerhouse 355; parish councils 349–350; and politics 355–357; post-war decline 344–346; professionals in local government 347–348; provenance 342–344; RedcliffeMaud Report 343; Scotland and Wales 348; structure 343–344, 344, 348, 349; and Thatcher 346–347; town councils 350; Westminster responsibility for local government 357 Local Government Act 1888 343 Local Government Act 1972 343 Local Government Act 2000 351–352 Local Government Association (LGA) 355 Local Government Finance Act 1982 346 Local Government Finance Act 1992 348 Local Government Planning and Land Act 1980 346 Locke, John 99–100 London Assembly 334, 335 Long-Bailey, Rebecca 122, 144, 203 Lord Chancellor 361–362 MacDonald, Ramsay 134, 140, 143

index

McEwan, Ian 389 Mackintosh, J.M. 206, 266 Maclean, I. 70 Macmillan, Harold 273, 288, 315, 378, 403, 404 Major, John 29, 137, 138, 274 Major Projects Authority 297 Mandelson, Peter 108, 143, 174, 269 manifestos 38 Marantz, Andrew 184 markets/marketing 100, 305 Marshall, Alfred 100 Martin, Kingsley 189 Marx, Karl 49–50, 72, 101–102, 121, 162, 303 mass media 45, 166–186; bias and newspapers 169–170, 169; blogs 179; broadcast media 171–172; censorship 166; digital revolution’s risks to politics 183–184; government control of 182–183; influence on policymaking 307; influence on the House Of Commons 207; Leveson Inquiry 171, 177, 178, 179; Lloyd’s critique of 176–177; new and social media 179–184; New Labour management of 108; news values 173–174; newspapers 167–169, 168; phone hacking 177, 178; political choice and newspaper readership 170; political communication, evolution of 167–171; political satire and interviews 177; politicians’ claims of bias 175; press decline 170–171; press regulation 177–179; smart phones 179–180; social media 76–77, 83; social media’s role in elections 180–181; social networking 180; spin 174–175; televised election debates 172–173, 233, 236, 410; television politics coverage 227

439

440

index

May, Teresa 3, 39, 45, 111, 138, 139, 227, 267, 412; and Brexit 9, 76, 136, 270–271, 383–384, 385–386; Cabinets 260–261, 263–264, 265; general election 2017 10–11, 116, 235, 236; in government 8–9, 112; pact with DUP 239; as party leader 270–271; as policy-maker 269; resignation 239; style of 275–276 mayors 334, 335, 351–353 Members of Parliament (MPs): abuse of 76–77; age 214, 214; education 216, 216; ethnicity 214, 215; expenses claims 4–5, 81–82, 217; experience 217; LGTB 214; occupation 216–217; salaries 4–5; social backgrounds 212–217, 213, 214, 215, 216; women 213 Mercer, Robert 181 middle class 12, 39, 49; education 51–52, 52, 53; voters 224, 244, 244 Milburn, Dame Mertina 52 Miliband, Ed 5, 6, 115, 140, 141, 173, 233, 235 Mill, John Stuart 100 ministers 43, 268, 283–285, 294–295; bullying 296; civil service influence on 295–296; Ministerial Code 263; parliamentary private secretaries (PPS) 283; policy-makers 294–295; resignation 285; responsibilities 285; types of 284 monarchy 29, 73, 87, 189–198, 257–258; absolute monarchy 23–24; constitutional monarchy 189, 196; costs of 193–195; crown legitimacy 93; divine right 189; functions 190–192; and politics 196; popularity of 190, 191, 192–193, 193, 194; present power of 195–196; royal prerogative 89 monetarism 318

Moore, Martin 181 morality 83–84, 191, 387 Moran, Michael 12, 50, 88–90, 92–93, 278, 280 Morley, Elliot MP 4, 82 Mosley, Oswald 74–75, 122 Mullins, Chris 252 Municipal Corporations Act 1835 343 Murray, Charles 63–64 Mussolini, Benito 122 National Assembly for Wales 74, 329 National Audit Office (NAO) 211 National Front 122–123, 148 National Health Service (NHS) 80, 105, 108–109 National School of Government (NSG) 287 national security 81 nationalisation 105 nationalism 325, 332–333 nativism 117–118 New Labour 6, 40, 45, 107–110, 124, 136, 305, 314; economic policy 108–109; foreign policy 109–110; media management 108; and the private sector 109; see also Labour Party newspapers see mass media Normington, David 293–294 Northern Ireland 420; devolution 32, 326–327, 331; elections 221, 247; local government 348 Northern Ireland Assembly 41, 74, 326, 329–330 Norton, Philip 284, 370 Odey, Crispin 9 Osborne, George 3, 8–9, 64–65, 112, 118, 260; and regional devolution 353–355 Paine, Tom 26, 27 parliament 22, 42, 393; authority 23,



91, 93–94; in the Civil War 1840–9, 23–24; hung parliament 39; influence on policy-making 307–308; Lords-Commons conflict resolved 31; parliamentary terms 31–32; and pressure groups 160; sovereignty 87–88, 370, 409; supremacy 93 Parliament Act 1911 199 Parris, Mathew 120 Patel, Priti 296, 419 patronage 26, 271–272, 286 Peerage Act 1963 31, 199–200 Peston, Robert 58 Peterloo Massacre 26–27, 219 Pickett, K. 63 Piketty, Thomas 61, 116 Pimlott, Ben 190, 192 Plaid Cymru 41, 148, 327 pluralism 303 Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) 73–74 policy-making 294–295, 301–322; competence of key personnel 314; constraints 313–316; consultation, evolution and amendment 309–310; coordination 314; core executive 308–309; corporatism 303–304; emergencies 309; EU’s influence 315; extra-parliamentary parties and groupings 307; finance 313; formulation of policy 309–311; general public, influence of 306–307; HS2 go-ahead 315–316; implementation 311–312; incrementalism 304–305; initiation of policies 306–309, 306; international events 315; legislative hurdles 310–311, 310; managing the economy as an example 316–320, 319; models of 302–305; parliament 307–308; party government model 304; personality factors 314–315;

index

pluralism 303; policy communities and networks 305; policy cycle 306–316; political advisers 292–294, 308, 421; political marketing 305; political support 313–314; rational decision-making 304; ruling-class model 303; as a system 301–302, 302; and time 313; Westminster model 302; Whitehall model 304 political advisers 292–294, 308, 421 political culture 70–85; authoritarianism 70–71; Brexit’s effect on 75–76; celebrity politicians 82–84; civil society 78–79; constitution 72–74; crime 79; cultural war 78, 414–415; deference 77–78; economic influences 71–72; evolution of 71–72; extremism 74–77; legitimacy 73–74; morality 83–84; MPs’ expenses and the erosion of trust 81–82; openness in society 81; satire 78; welfare state 79–81 political ideas 98–112, 111–129; attitudes to change 104; Brexit Party 117; Cameron’s conservatism 111–113; capitalism’s hierarchy of rewards 103–104; cause groups, media and academics 307; coalition after May 2010 114–115; conservatism 102–104; Corbyn revolution 115–116; core nineteenth and twentieth century philosophies 99–104; coronavirus, impact of 119–120; emergence of political ideas 98–99; Enlightenment 99; far left ideas 121–122; far right ideas 122–123; green thinking 120–121; human nature 104; liberalism 99–100, 113–114; ministers, departments, inquiries and think tanks 308; national populism 117–118; New Labour

441

442

index

political ideas continued and Blairism 107–110; pessimism 125; post-war developments 105–110; socialism 101–102, 107–108; Thatcherism 106–107, 112; timeline 126–128; United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) 117–118 political parties 25, 133–152; accountability 134–135; choice 134; contemporary parties 39–41; controlling the executive 135; defections 150; far left 147; functions 133–135; funding 149; harmonising 133; membership 413–414, 413; mid nineteenth to late twentieth century 29–30; nationalist parties 40–41, 148–149; opposition 39; and parliament 160; participation and education 134; party committees 210; party government from the mid-nineteenth century 135–137; personnel recruitment 133–134; policy-making 304; and pressure groups 159; two-party system, decline of 149–150; voting and party government 38–39; see also Conservative (Tory) Party; Labour Party; Liberal Democrats (Lib Dems) political system evolution and overview 21–34, 37–46; civil service 43; Civil War 1840–9, 23–24; Curia Regis 22; devolution 32–33; European Union 44–45; executive 42–43; Glorious Revolution 1688–9, 24; Great Reform Act 1832 28–29; Hanoverian dynasty 24–25; increase in parliamentary authority 23; legislature 42; life peerages 31; local government 44; lords and commons 22; LordsCommons conflict resolved 31; major parties 39–41; media 45;

ministers 43; parliamentary terms 31–32; patronage 26; political parties 25, 29–30; political turbulence 13–19; pressure groups 43–44; prime minister 25; prime minister and cabinet 42; representative democracy 37–38; separation of powers 26–27; votes for women 32; voting and party government 38–39; Witan 21–22 poll tax 75, 107, 308, 311, 346–347 Poor Law Amendment Act 1834 342–343 populism 13, 15, 83, 413; national populism 18, 75, 117–118; populism parties 18 Powell, Enoch 66, 208, 378, 409 Powell, Jonathan 267, 269, 292–293 Press Complaints Commission 177 pressure groups 43–44, 153–165, 179–180; applying pressure 159; cause groups 153–154; and civil society 155; consultation status 156; corporatism 164; demonstrations 158; direct action 159; economic groups 153; European Union 160; and force 157; and the general public 159; and government 155–157; government methods 156; influence on policy-making 307; influence on the House Of Commons 206–207; and the law 157; media campaigns 158; meetings 158; methods 157–163; ministers and civil servants 160; origins of 154–155; and other groups 159; personal contacts and ‘cronyism’ 161–163; petitions and letters 158; policy networks 164; political donors 163; and political parties 159; and political theory 164; professional lobbying and ‘sleaze’ 160–161, 162; public relations 157; types of 153–154; violence 158



Prime Minister (PM) and Cabinet 25, 38, 42, 91, 259–267, 259–282, 393; Brexit, effects on the Cabinet 260–261; Brexit war cabinet 261, 262; Cabinet business 265; Cabinet committees 264–265, 280; Cabinet functions 264; Cabinet Office 265–266, 280, 314; Cabinet reshuffles 263, 277; Cabinet Secretary 266–267, 280; Cabinet size and composition 260, 280; chief executive role of PM 268; collective responsibility 263–264; conventions 89–90; core executive 278–280, 279; departmental heads 280; deputy Prime Minister 278; differing styles of PM 272–276; first citizen 272; head of patronage 271–272; Johnson’s warning to the Cabinet 261; party political leader 269–271; PM as chief policymaker 268–269; PM’s office 280; power of the PM 206, 267; Question Time 210, 270; roles of the PM 268–272; royal prerogative and the PM 89; senior UK representative 271 privatisation 107, 108, 288, 291 Public Accounts Commission 211, 291 public spending 319, 333, 418–419 Pulzer, Peter 224, 244 Putin, Vladimir 70–71, 147 Putnam, Robert 79, 155 Putney Debates 98 quangos 297–298 Raab, Dominic 419 racism 71 Rainsborough, Thomas 99 Rates Act 1984 346 Rawnsley, Andrew 389 Rees-Mogg, Jacob 9, 270, 385, 394

index

referendums 207–208, 327–328, 330; for elected mayors 352; EU Referendum 2016 3, 6–7, 44, 73, 76, 91, 93–94, 116, 118, 380–383, 381; Scottish referendum 2014 5, 74, 148–149, 334, 336–339 religion 230 Rhodes, Cecil 408 Rhodes, R.A.W. 305 Richards, Steve 13 Richardson, J.J. 164, 305, 311 Rifkind, Hugo 396 riots 75, 347 Roberts, Sir Frank 377–378 Rousseau, Jean Jacques 99 Rowell, Andy 160–161 Royal Commission on the Constitution 327–328 royal family 73, 93, 191, 192 Royal United Services Institute 81 Runciman, David 392–393 Russell, Bertrand 26 Rutman, Sir Philip 296 Rutter, Jill 393–394 Salmond, Alex 5, 148, 336, 337 Sasse, Tom 263 satire 78, 177 Schmitter, Philippe C. 303 Scotland: devolution 33, 330, 331–332; independence demands 420; local government 348; referendum 2014 5, 74, 148–149, 334, 336–339; ‘Scotland’s Future’ (white paper) 336 Scottish National Party (SNP) 5, 11, 40–41, 74, 148, 233, 240, 327, 330, 336, 394; 2019 election 247 Scottish Parliament 74, 328 select committees 202, 210 Shipman, Tim 269, 277, 416–417 Sinn Fein 41, 327, 420 Skidmore, Chris 419 slavery 48 Smith, Adam 100

443

444

index

social care 422 social context see economic and social context social democracy 108, 113 Social Democratic Federation 121–122 social media see mass media social mobility: and education 51–55; life destinations 55; and mass higher education 53, 55 Social Mobility Commission 52, 53 socialism 101–102, 107–108; far left ideas 121–122 Solicitor General 362 ‘somewheres’ 13, 14–16, 382–383 sovereignty 44, 315, 378, 381, 404–405; parliamentary sovereignty 87–88, 207, 370, 409 special advisers see political advisers Spencer, Herbert 103 Stalin, Joseph 7, 71, 121–122, 401 Starmer, Keir 122, 123–124, 144, 250, 421 statutes: normal statutes 88; see also legislation Straw, Jack 95 Street, John 82 strikes 75, 106 Sturgeon, Nicola 251, 339, 420 Sumption, Lord Jonathan 369 Sunak, Rishi 119–120, 297, 416 Supreme Court see judiciary and politics Susskind, Jamie 183, 184 Swinson, Jo 40, 145–146, 240, 249, 389 Sylvester, Rachel 395–396 taxation 22, 62–63, 100, 319; poll tax 75, 107, 308, 311, 346–347 Taylor, Kate 223 television see mass media terrorism 407 Thatcher, Margaret 29, 39, 40, 56, 78, 106–107, 137, 260, 265, 301, 320; civil service reforms

287–288; as Conservative leader 138, 139; contracting out policy 345–346; and Euro-scepticism 379, 409; family members 272; and local government 346–347; and media bias 175; privatisation 288, 291; style of 273–274; and television 172 think tanks 308 Timothy, Nick 9, 235, 269 Tories 25 town councils 350 Toynbee, Polly 277 trade unions 30, 49, 106, 109, 140–141, 141–142, 153, 154, 157, 227 Travers, Tony 354 Trickett, John MP 61 Trimble, David 326–327 Trotsky, Leon 102, 122 Trump, Donald 82, 83, 117, 180, 271, 272, 303, 387, 408, 418; disagreements with 420 Truss, Elizabeth 419 trust 5, 81–82 Twitter 180, 207 underclass 63–64 United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) 6, 11, 41, 44, 75, 117–118, 136, 146, 413; elections 409–410; and immigration 379–380, 410 United States: relationship with Britain 405–408, 420; trade agreement with 418 Verba, S. 84 volunteering 79, 155 voters and voting 37, 219–240; 2010 general election 231–232; 2015 general election 232–235, 234; 2017 general election 235–237, 237; additional member system 221; age factors 229, 230, 245, 245; ballots 220; bias in the



index

system 231; class, influence of 223–228, 226, 228, 244–245, 244; classifying class 224; early history 219–220; by-elections 222–223; electoral systems 220–223; ethnicity 231; expansion of the electorate 28–29, 71, 205–206, 219–220; first past the post system 37, 220, 221–222, 231, 332; gender 230, 245; low election turnout 229; loyalty 12, 225, 227, 228; middle class 224, 244, 244; new identities 12; north-south divide 230–231; partisan realignment 225–228, 226, 228; and party government 38–39; penalties for breaking electoral laws 223; regional party list (proportional representation) 221, 332; religion 230; Scottish Parliament 328; single transferable vote 221, 329; social class 12; socialisation 224–225; supplementary vote 220, 335, 352; tactical voting 246–247; turnout 229, 246, 246, 338; women 32, 220, 230; working class 12, 40, 49, 135, 137, 253 Wainwright, Martin 26–27

Wales 2019 election 247; devolution 33, 331; local government 348; political parties 41; pressure for equal powers 332 Walpole, Sir Robert 25, 259 welfare state 79–81, 102, 422 Welsh Assembly see National Assembly for Wales West, Ed 78, 414 Whigs 25 Whiteley, Paul 229 Wilkinson, R. 63 Wilson, Harold 141, 143, 190 Witan 21–22, 199 Wolsey, Thomas 23, 258, 286 women: inequality 65; MPs 213; votes 32, 220, 230 working class 3, 8, 14, 27, 50; education 51–52, 52, 53, 227; fragmented interests 227; home ownership 227; occupations 225; and revolution 51, 121, 122; voters 12, 40, 49, 135, 137, 223–224, 244, 244, 253 World War I 30, 32, 74, 77, 266, 402 World War II 147, 377, 401, 402, 406 young people 82, 116, 148, 155, 170, 181, 414

445