British Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century (The Oxford History of Philosophy) [1 ed.] 9780199586110, 019958611X

Table of contents :
Cover
British Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century
Copyright
Acknowledgements
Contents
Abbreviations
Introduction
The Present Volume
Scope
1: An Age of Transformation
Case vs Shaftesbury
Scope and Branches of Philosophy
Logic
Ethics
Natural Philosophy
Metaphysics
In with the New
Moderns and Ancients: New Wine in Old Bottles
Social Context
Religion and Philosophy
2: Philosophy in the Universities
The Arts Curriculum
Philosophy in the Curriculum: General Context
Rhetoric
Divinity
Philosophy Curriculum: Logic
Proliferation of Logic Textbooks
Moral Philosophy
Natural Philosophy
Metaphysics
Reform and Innovation: Measuring the Pace of Change
Religion, Politics, and the Universities
Dissenting Academies
3: Cross-Currents, Conduits, and Conversations
Conduits: Travel
Correspondence
Books and Translations
Dialogues with the Dead
Platonism
Stoicism, Scepticism, and Epicureanism
Pierre Gassendi
Hugo Grotius
René Descartes
Nicolas Malebranche
Spinoza
4: Aristotelianism and its Enemies
Scholastic Aristotelianism
Aristotelianism and the Curriculum
Expatriate Aristotelianism
Scotism
Eclectic Aristotelianism: The Blackloists
Kenelm Digby
John Sergeant
Anti-Aristotelians: Ramists
William Ames
Bacon´s Critique of Aristotle
5: Bacon and Herbert of Cherbury
Francis Bacon
Intellectual Milieu
Reception
Edward Herbert (1582-1648)
Reception of De veritate
6: Thomas Hobbes
Political Philosophy before 1650
The Debates of the 1640s
Hobbes
Elements of Philosophy
Passions and Politics
Morality
Reception
Hobbes-Bramhall debate
Positive Reception
Margaret Cavendish
Philosophical Critics
Reception Abroad
7: A Cambridge Enlightenment
Platonism and British Philosophy
Theology
Apologetics
Epistemology
Ethics
Metaphysics
Influence
Anne Conway
Cudworth, Shaftesbury, and Locke
Richard Cumberland and the Cambridge Enlightenment
Cumberland and Cambridge Platonism
8: From Philosophy to Science
Science and Religion
Aristotelianism/Scholasticism
First Swallows
Mechanical Philosophy
Atomism
Experimentalism
Natural Philosophy and the Response to Scepticism
Walter Charleton
Robert Boyle (1627-1691)
Boyle´s Corpuscularianism
Boyle and Scepticism
Boyle´s Natural Theology
Boyle´s Influence
Alternative Hypotheses: Invisible Powers
Material Powers
Isaac Newton (1642-1727)
9: John Locke
Biographical Context
Two Treatises
Religious Toleration
Essay Concerning Human Understanding
Contemporary Reception
Critics
Edward Stillingfleet
Anti-scepticism: Sergeant and Lee
Catharine Trotter Cockburn
European Reception
10: Freethinkers, Idealists, and Women Philosophers
Freethinkers
John Toland (1670-1722)
Shaftesbury
Samuel Clarke
English Malebranchians
John Norris (1657-1712)
Women Philosophers: Mary Astell, Damaris Masham, and Catharine Trotter
Mary Astell
Damaris Masham
Catharine Trotter Cockburn (1679-1749)
Arthur Collier (1680-1732) and George Berkeley (1685-1753)
Prospect: The Eighteenth Century
Biographical Appendix
Bibliography of Books and Articles Consulted
Reference Works
Primary Sources
Studies
Name Index
Subject Index

Citation preview

T H E O X F O R D HI S T O R Y O F P H I L O S O P H Y

British Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century

THE OXFORD HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY The Lost Age of Reason: Philosophy in Early Modern India 1450–1700 Jonardon Ganeri Thinking the Impossible: French Philosophy since 1960 Gary Gutting British Ethical Theorists from Sidgwick to Ewing Thomas Hurka British Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century Sarah Hutton The American Pragmatists Cheryl Misak

British Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century Sarah Hutton

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OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 2/4/2015, SPi

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Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP, United Kingdom Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries # Sarah Hutton 2015 The moral rights of the author have been asserted First Edition published in 2015 Impression: 1 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Control Number: 2014956884 ISBN 978–0–19–958611–0 Printed and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials contained in any third party website referenced in this work.

Acknowledgements The research for this book was made possible by two periods of research leave from Aberystwyth University. I was fortunate in being granted membership of the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, and a visiting fellowship at Wolfson College Cambridge, which enabled me to benefit from the rich research resources of each. My thanks to all of them. Among the many people with whom I have profitably discussed my work, particular thanks are due to Leslie Armour, Stephen Clucas, Alan Gabbey, John Rogers, and Ann Thomson, as well as to Mark Burden, Guido Giglioni, John Henry, Richard Serjeantson, and M. A. Stewart for sharing their expertise with me. I also thank Dawn Goldstone for editorial assistance. I am grateful also for the constructive comments of the referees on earlier drafts of the book, and for the patience and helpfulness of the Oxford University Press philosophy editor, Peter Momtchiloff. Sarah Hutton

Contents Abbreviations

ix

Introduction

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1. An Age of Transformation

7

2. Philosophy in the Universities

26

3. Cross-Currents, Conduits, and Conversations

51

4. Aristotelianism and its Enemies

72

5. Bacon and Herbert of Cherbury

92

6. Thomas Hobbes

114

7. A Cambridge Enlightenment: The Cambridge Platonists and Richard Cumberland

136

8. From Philosophy to Science: Natural Philosophy of Boyle, Newton, and Others

160

9. John Locke

185

10. Freethinkers, Idealists, and Women Philosophers: Philosophy from 1690 to 1710—and after

208

Biographical Appendix Bibliography of Books and Articles Consulted Name Index Subject Index

227 243 271 280

Abbreviations CHPT

The Cambridge History of Political Thought, 1450–1700, ed. J. H. Burns and Mark Goldie. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

CHRP

The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, ed. Charles Schmitt, Quentin Skinner, and Eckhard Kessler. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

CHSP

The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, ed. Dan Garber and Michael Ayers. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

CSMK

The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch and Anthony Kenny. 3 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984–91.

HUO

The History of the University of Oxford, gen. editor T. H. Aston. 5 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984–97.

JHI

Journal of the History of Ideas.

JHP

Journal of the History of Philosophy.

ODNB

Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Sept 2010.

Introduction The seventeenth century was a defining period in British philosophy. This is the period in which for the first time, British philosophy was definitively put ‘on the map’, producing philosophers of international stature and lasting influence. Its most famous names, Hobbes and Locke, rank alongside such world-class philosophers as Descartes and Spinoza and Leibniz in the modern philosophical canon. Bacon too belongs with this constellation of great thinkers, although his status as a philosopher tends to be obscured by his status as father of modern science. The significance of the British achievement in philosophy is underscored by the fact that the seventeenth century was a period of transformational change which is normally regarded as the dawn of modernity following the breakdown of the Aristotelian synthesis which had dominated intellectual life since the middle ages.1 In this period British philosophers are acknowledged to have contributed significantly to the shape of European philosophy from their own time to the present. Nowadays early modern philosophers are, to quote Donald Rutherford, ‘celebrated for the depth and rigor of their treatments of perennial philosophical questions’, and are acknowledged to have made ‘major contributions in almost every area of philosophy, and in many cases their conclusions continue to serve as starting points for present-day debates’.2 Whatever the reason why we continue to value early modern philosophers today, it is not at all certain that we value them in the same way as their contemporaries, or that the debates of their time necessarily anticipate the concerns of the present. Furthermore, none of them worked in isolation. As Roger Woolhouse reminds us, Noteworthy individuals, such as Bacon, Hobbes, or Gassendi, are not isolated mountains in a flat desert landscape. They have an influence on an intellectual scene which encompasses a whole host of lesser thinkers, and they act as focuses for movements of thought which find powerful expression in them before passing on, often changed, or with added force.3

1 The view that modern philosophy originates in the seventeenth century may be traced back to Hegel. But see Robert Pasnau, Metaphysical Themes 1274–1671 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2011), pp. 1–5, for a revisionist view. 2 Donald Rutherford, Companion to Early Modern Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 1. 3 Roger Woolhouse, The Empiricists (Oxford: OUP, 1988), p. 67.

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To understand where these ‘noteworthy individuals’ sit in relation to that intellectual scene is the task of the historian. It is my aim in the present volume to relocate these ‘mountains’ in the context of their times, and to provide a richer picture of the intellectual landscape from which they emerged.

The Present Volume The history of British seventeenth-century philosophy is not usually treated on its own. It is normally slotted into a broader European narrative about the rise of modern philosophy, which focuses on just a few individuals, who are classified using categories which they themselves would not have recognized (e.g. as ‘empiricists’ or ‘rationalists’, ancients or moderns). The history which I present here attempts a different approach. The basic premise of the present volume is that Bacon, Hobbes, and Locke were not the only philosophers of their time. Nor were they the only ones of enduring influence. I therefore aim to apply a more generous view of context, both by including the ‘also rans’ of philosophy, and giving some attention to the social, political, and cultural conditions in which philosophers practised. My starting point will be what constituted philosophy for the seventeenth century.4 I focus on individuals, rather than particular branches of philosophy or philosophical themes, and I treat seventeenth-century philosophy as an ongoing conversation, as a means of setting philosophers in relation to one another. Like all conversations, some voices will dominate, some will be more persuasive than others, and there will be enormous variations in tone from the polite to polemical, fairminded, matter-of-fact, loquacious, reticent, intemperate. The conversation model allows voices to be heard which would otherwise be discounted. By this means I provide what might be called a ‘thick description’ of seventeenth-century intellectual culture, setting marginal and ‘major’ thinkers within a more integrated account of seventeenth-century philosophy which attempts to view it in its own terms, taking account of institutions, and the modes of circulation of ideas. I set the philosophy of Bacon, Hobbes, and Locke in relation to the philosophical context within which it was produced, a context made up of figures normally regarded as ‘minor’ players in philosophy (e.g. Herbert of Cherbury, Cudworth, More, Burthogge, Norris, Toland) as well as others who have been completely overlooked (notably female philosophers). Crucially, instead of emphasizing the break between seventeenth-century

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This is an approach more familiar to historians of Renaissance Philosophy, especially Charles Schmitt and Quentin Skinner, who have attempted to understand the thought of periods they have studied in relation to its own time, and not through the preoccupations of the present day. See Charles Schmitt, Quentin Skinner, and Eckhard Kessler (eds), The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). For a discussion of approaches to the history of philosophy, see Bernard Williams, ‘Descartes and the Historiography of Philosophy’, in The Sense of the Past: Essays in the History of Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), pp. 257–65, and Sarah Hutton, ‘Intellectual History and the History of Philosophy’, History of European Ideas, 40 (2014): 935–7.

INTRODUCTION

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philosophy and its past, the conversation model makes it possible to trace continuities between the Renaissance and seventeenth century, across the seventeenth century and into the eighteenth century, while at the same time acknowledging the major changes which occurred. A measure of selection is perforce necessary: it is simply not possible to give comprehensive coverage of all philosophy and philosophers of any period. That would be a project for an encyclopedia, not a history. Within the confines of a single volume it is neither possible nor desirable to give an in-depth account of the philosophical arguments of every philosopher. I have, therefore, structured the main part of the narrative around the dominant philosophical voices of the century. These include the canonical trio, Bacon, Hobbes, and Locke, but also Herbert of Cherbury, the Cambridge Platonists, and Robert Boyle. The coverage of this history is therefore something of a compromise between inclusiveness and canonicity. To focus on the most famous is justifiable in terms of the importance of their contributions to philosophy, both in the judgement of their contemporaries and in the judgement of later generations. But I have tried to ensure that the attention accorded them does not mean the exclusion of others. The contributions of the lead figures in any chapter are treated to a greater or lesser extent as focal points for debates in which their contemporaries participated, especially the debates which they provoked. In this way they figure as representative of dominant themes and distinctive approaches in their period, rather than as precursors of modern interests. The group of individuals highlighted also provides a broad chronological framework for the volume, across the generations from Bacon and Herbert, through to Locke. Admittedly, the fit between an individual’s main output and the chronology is not perfect, but it helps to preserve a measure of historical and thematic unity for each section.

Scope For the purposes of this history, I take ‘British’ in a geo-historical sense to cover the Stuart kingdoms (England, Scotland, and Ireland) and principality (Wales). The British scope of my account also extends to the diaspora, such as it was, of philosophers of these islands who lived or worked in Europe. I do not take Britishness as an organizing principle for the contents of the volume. Reference to origins is treated as incidental to the philosophical activities of the figures discussed. It will no doubt be noticed that most of the philosophers discussed at any length were of English origin. It is a fact of the historical record that England produced more philosophers of note in the seventeenth century than the rest of the Stuart kingdoms put together. In the eighteenth century, of course, this changes, with the rise to pre-eminence of philosophy in Scotland, a development which is recognized in what has come to be called the Scottish Enlightenment. However, the seventeenth-century hinterland of the Scottish Enlightenment has hitherto remained almost entirely terra incognita. The attention paid to philosophers of Scottish origin in the ensuing chapters will, I hope, go some

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INTRODUCTION

way towards opening up some of that unexplored territory and show that it is not as bleak or barren as it has sometimes been portrayed.5 There is less to say about philosophy in Wales and Ireland, for the simple reason that there are very few philosophers of Welsh or Irish origin in this period. But these are not overlooked. British philosophers did not live and work in isolation from the rest of Europe. The origins and interchange of ideas are an important aspect of the history of philosophy, and cannot be confined within national boundaries. I therefore include a chapter on the cross-currents between British and European philosophy and conduits of philosophical ideas between Britain and Europe. In the course of writing, I have been struck by how closely philosophers of this period were aware of the philosophy of their contemporaries or near contemporaries. Cross-referencing to one another is often explicit in their writings. But it is also evident from the themes which they treat and the arguments which they employ. Strikingly, but not surprisingly, the philosophers to whom most frequent reference is made are the canonical names of today: Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes, and Locke. But also important are non-canonical figures like Gassendi and Grotius. As this cluster of names suggests, philosophical interchange crosses national and confessional boundaries, so did the philosophers themselves. It is also striking that so many philosophers in this period were in dialogue with one another, through letters and travel as well as by means of books. Contrary to the image created by those philosophers who announced their modernity by repudiating philosophies of the past, seventeenth-century philosophers did not work in isolation from one another, and their ties with past philosophy were strong. There are continuities of theme and terminology from medieval philosophy,6 and some of the most distinctive innovations in seventeenth-century philosophy were shaped by the recovery of ancient thought and creative dialogue with the philosophers of antiquity. As historical markers, centuries make artificial boundaries which do not correspond exactly to the events which they encompass. Few philosophers’ lives fit neatly within the bounds of the seventeenth century. Some of the most distinguished philosophers of the seventeenth century were by birth and intellectual formation Elizabethans (Bacon, Hobbes, and Herbert). Others whose formative years were within the century (Lord Shaftesbury, George Berkeley, Gershom Carmichael), published in the eighteenth century. I have therefore treated the chronological termini of the period as fluid, focusing chiefly on those the major part of whose lives fall within the seventeenth century, but pointing both forwards and backwards to philosophy produced in adjacent centuries.

5 Most notoriously by H. R. Trevor-Roper, ‘The Scottish Enlightenment’, Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, 58 (1967): 1635–58. The seventeenth century is something of a blind spot in the history of Scottish philosophy. See Alexander Broadie, A History of Scottish Philosophy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009). 6 On the continuities between medieval and seventeenth-century metaphysics, see Pasnau, Metaphysical Themes.

INTRODUCTION

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The first chapters are broadly contextual. Chapter 1 gives some account of perceptions of philosophy in the period, and provides a broad overview of some of the developments which took place within different branches of philosophy across the century. Chapter 2 deals with the educational context, with the teaching of philosophy in the universities, which was the main locus for logic. The third chapter discusses intellectual exchange, giving an account of the cross-currents between British and European philosophers, and between seventeenth-century philosophy and ancient philosophy. Arguably the most enduring philosophical conversation in the seventeenth century was the conversation with Aristotle. Notwithstanding the decline of Aristotelianism which had formed the backbone of all branches of philosophy since the middle ages, Aristotle’s philosophy remained a point of reference for seventeenth-century philosophers, even if it was often a negative one. The intellectual framework into which the thought of Bacon, Herbert, Hobbes, and Locke was received was one dominated by the philosophy of Aristotle, which is discussed in Chapter 4. This is therefore in some sense a contextual chapter. The coverage thereafter is chronological, focusing on the lead figures in each quartile of the period, each of whom is discussed in relation to both the intellectual context which he addressed and the debates generated his philosophy. Chapter 5 deals with two of the earliest innovators, Francis Bacon and Edward Herbert. Chapter 6 focuses on Thomas Hobbes, setting his philosophy in relation to the historical context, and the political debates surrounding it. This is followed by a chapter on midseventeenth-century Cambridge, which focuses on the Cambridge Platonists, their followers, and associates, including Richard Cumberland. Chapter 8 on natural philosophy gives special attention to Walter Charleton and Robert Boyle. Chapter 9 discusses Locke, placing his philosophy in its immediate political and intellectual context, and surveying the debates which his philosophy provoked. The concluding chapter draws threads together in a survey of the state of philosophy at the turn of the eighteenth century. To presume to write a history of seventeenth-century philosophy is an act of temerity in view of the fine work done by eminent scholars of Locke, Hobbes, Bacon, and others. My work would not have been possible without their scholarship. I aim to give a fuller picture of seventeenth-century British philosophy than is customarily offered, both in terms of the numbers of philosophers discussed, and the variety of their contributions. What I offer as a historian is a descriptive account which maps the philosophical terrain of the seventeenth century in such a way as to give the reader both a sense of the richness of the material, and some means of navigating through it. Those who look to past philosophers for insights into modern arguments are likely to be disappointed. Those readers who want more detailed accounts of particular arguments and specialist discussions of individual philosophers are well served by the many recent ‘companions’ and ‘handbooks’ devoted to early modern philosophy, not to mention specialist monographs on individual philosophers and

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INTRODUCTION

the weighty tomes of the Cambridge History of Philosophy.7 Nevertheless, even such readers will, I hope, discover more about philosophy in seventeenth-century Britain than any standard histories supply. I content myself with the hope that this account of British philosophy in the seventeenth century will serve as a reference point for those who wish to explore it further.

7 E.g. Desmond Clarke and Catherine Wilson (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy in Early Modern Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Peter Anstey (ed.), Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Stephen Nadler (ed.), Companion to Early Modern Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002).

1 An Age of Transformation The seventeenth century was an age of transformation, in which the intellectual landscape of Britain was radically redrawn. As its traditional Aristotelian foundations crumbled, the rise of Cartesianism, the founding of the Royal Society, and triumph of Newtonian physics signal seismic shifts in the philosophical understanding of the world. Among the philosophers who emerged from this shakedown, Bacon, Hobbes, and Locke command the attention of philosophers to this day. The backdrop to these developments was one of the most politically turbulent periods in modern British history, a period of civil and religious conflict, the outcomes of which would determine the political and religious map of the United Kingdom for three centuries. The time-span covered in this volume is more or less coterminous with the period between union of the crowns of England and Scotland in 1603 and the accession of the Elector George of Hanover to the British crown in 1714. When James VI of Scotland acceded to the English throne, the concept of a single national church was unchallenged, the Pilgrim Fathers had not yet sailed for New England, and Britain was a minor player on the international scene. Any hopes that the peaceful accession of King James to the English throne would guarantee long-term political security did not survive his reign. Within less than a decade, the Thirty Years War engulfed Europe. During the 1640s, England, Scotland, Wales, and Ireland were wracked by civil wars which brought down the monarchy and the established church (both the King and the Archbishop of Canterbury were executed) resulting in a period of de facto republican rule. By the time of Locke’s death in 1704, Britain had emerged from a century of political turmoil, which had altered the religious and political landscape in fundamental ways. Republicanism was now thinkable, religious dissent a fact of spiritual life and anticlericalism increasingly vocal. Memories of the Civil War and interregnum were now overlaid by memories of the more recent upheavals which dispossessed James II and VII and brought William III to power in 1688. Although the outward forms of monarchy remained in 1704, the balance of power had shifted towards Parliament. Theological debates of the kind occasioned by the predestinarian Calvinism of the Caroline era had long since given way to doctrinal quarrels of other kinds (most notably the Trinitarian debates of the 1690s). An accommodation of sorts between the established church and religious dissent was enshrined in the Toleration Act of 1689, while the Act of Settlement of 1701 had determined a Protestant succession for the future through the House of Hanover. In 1707 the

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Act of Union formalized the political union of England and Scotland which James I had failed to achieve in 1603. With the establishment of North American colonies, and the emergence of Britain as a sea power, the foundations of Britain’s colonial future had been laid, while the founding of the Bank of England marked the beginnings of the future capitalist economic order. The new-found economic prosperity of the late Stuart period, together with the rise of print culture, created the conditions of a new, more diverse cultural climate, which benefited from relaxation of censorship with the lapse of the Licensing Act in 1695. The chronologies of political and intellectual history rarely match, but by coincidence, the reigning dynasty of the seventeenth century could boast some of the most intellectual members of the ruling class of any European monarchy. Though no King Solomon, James VI and I was more intellectual than any reigning monarch before or since. His granddaughter, Electress Sophia of Brunswick Lüneberg, through whom the Hanoverians claimed their title to the British throne, might have been the most philosophical of British queens had she lived to succeed the last Stuart monarch, Queen Anne.1

Case vs Shaftesbury The changes in British philosophy were no less profound than the political, social, economic, and religious changes witnessed in the seventeenth century. The rest of this chapter will attempt to characterize those changes by means of a brief survey of the different branches of philosophy, and of contemporary views on the nature of philosophy and philosophical innovation. I shall then discuss some of the other factors which affected the practice of philosophy, including style, social context, and religion. We can gain a measure of quite how extensively philosophy changed in the course of the seventeenth century by comparing two philosophers from the opposite ends of the century: John Case (1539/46–1600) and Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury (1671–1713), the last of the Elizabethans and one of the first philosophers of the Enlightenment. John Case was probably the most distinguished of English philosophers at the end of Elizabeth I’s reign.2 Case was an Aristotelian philosopher who had worked all his life at Oxford, where he had been linked to (though not always fully part of) the University. All his books (apart from his Praise of Musike) were discussions of Aristotelian philosophy, covering the branches of philosophy contained within the Aristotelian synthesis: logic, moral philosophy,

1

Sophie was the interlocutor of Leibniz at the Hanoverian court, as was her daughter, Sophie Charlotte, Queen of Prussia. The Electress’s sister, Elisabeth von der Pfalz, correspondent of Descartes, was one of the foremost women philosophers of the age. 2 On Case see C. B. Schmitt, John Case and Aristotelianism in Renaissance England (Kingston: McGill Queens, 1983).

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physics, psychology, politics, economics. In the century following his death in 1600, the certainties of Case’s philosophical world dissolved. Already under pressure at the turn of the century, the Aristotelian world view and the philosophical synthesis which sustained it collapsed. At the threshold of the next century, the Earl of Shaftesbury was one of the most promising of the up-coming new thinkers. Where Case’s philosophical formation was during what we might not unreasonably describe as the pax Elizabethiana of the late sixteenth century, Shaftesbury’s philosophical formation belongs to the late seventeenth century (he was tutored by John Locke). His first published philosophical work, An Inquiry Concerning Virtue and Merit (1699), anticipates the writings produced during the period of his most concentrated published output, the first decade of the eighteenth century. An Inquiry was, he claimed, a ‘more professed and formal’ exposition of what ‘lies concealed’ in his later work.3 Shaftesbury’s Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times (1711) brings together both his Inquiry and works which he published between 1705 and 1710. Informally presented in a variety of genres and styles (epistles, soliloquys, essays), Shaftesbury’s Characteristics range freely over a range of topics: morality, politics, religion, politeness, art, and aesthetics. He thus anticipates so much of eighteenth-century philosophy in subject matter, tone, and style. In 1694 he described to Locke his idea of human-centred education, which drew eclectically from many sources. What I count True Learning, and all that wee can profitt by, is to know our selves; what it is that makes us Low, and Base, Stubborn against Reason, to be Corrupted and Drawn away from Vertue, of Different Tempers, Inconstant, and Inconsistent with ourselves; to know how to bee always Friends with Providence . . . and to be Sociable and Good toward all men . . . Whilst I can get any thing that teaches this, whilst I can search any Age or Language that can assist me here, Whilst Such are Philosophers, and Such Philosophy whence I can learn ought from of this kind, there is no Labour, no Studdy, no Learning that I would not undertake.4

As philosophers, Shaftesbury and Case could not be more divergent—the one an academic, writing in Latin primarily for a university-student readership, the other a layman, writing in English for other gentlemen of his class. The first was bound by rules of formal academic disputation and exchange, where his subject matter was dictated by another text, or set of texts (Aristotle’s works). Reading was an important part of the culture of a gentleman like Shaftesbury, but not bookishness. Like other educated men of his class, he had respect for classical antiquity, but he was not bound to the authority of a single author. Case studiously covered all the branches of philosophy, Shaftesbury knew no such obligation. Physics (natural philosophy) does not figure prominently among his interests, but for Case it was an essential 3 Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury, Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, ed. Lawrence E. Klein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 399. 4 Lord Ashley to Locke, in The Correspondence of John Locke, ed. E. S. de Beer, 8 vols (Oxford: Clarendon, 1976–89), vol. 5, p. 153.

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part of the philosophical corpus. Although Case ranged beyond the letter of Aristotle to incorporate topical themes in his discussion of politics, economics, and ethics, the content and scope of these discussions is set by Aristotle. Shaftesbury, by contrast, considered ‘the most ingenious way of becoming foolish is by a system’.5 Unfettered by the requirements of the teaching curriculum, he was exposed to a wide range of intellectual and cultural influences, which he was free to explore. His explorations took him to entirely new areas, such as aesthetics and art theory. His chosen preferred medium, the ‘miscellany’ of short essays, suited the polite conversation of an essentially social milieu. The contrast between Case and Shaftesbury far exceeds the shared ground of their interest in philosophy. But the contrast is instructive, because it provides an indicator (albeit a very general one) of the changes which transformed British philosophy in the seventeenth century—these include changes in both the content of philosophical enquiry, and the manner in which it was pursued. Of course the Shaftesbury–Case polarity does not reflect every new development in philosophy, but it does register the decline of the Aristotelian synthesis, the impact of other ancient philosophies such as Stoicism, Platonism, and Scepticism, the emergence of the vernacular as the language of philosophy, the relocation of philosophy outside the academies into more public social spaces, shifts of emphasis which raised the profile of moral philosophy, and the emergence of new areas of philosophical interest (aesthetics). The absence of natural philosophy from Shaftesbury’s philosophical horizons is itself an indicator of the greater degree of specialization which accompanied the development of seventeenthcentury philosophy and this was most marked in natural philosophy where the ground was laid for the emergence of modern science as a separate discipline. Where John Case had been equipped, as an Aristotelian, to write on natural philosophy (his Lapis philosophicus is a commentary on Aristotle’s Physics), by the late seventeenth century the development of ‘experimental philosophy’ required a degree of technical support and mathematical specialization which the philosophical allrounder would be unlikely to have. The narrower scope of Shaftesbury’s philosophical interests is also indicative of the demise of the unity of philosophy embodied in the Aristotelian synthesis.

Scope and Branches of Philosophy Whatever their differences, one thing on which Case and Shaftesbury could have agreed was a broad definition of philosophy as the love of wisdom. This ancient definition was also the most widespread in the period.6 As Thomas Stanley avers on

5

Shaftesbury, Characteristics, ed. Klein, p. 130. See, for example, Johnnes Micraelius, Lexicon philosophicum (Stetin, 1662; first published Jena, 1653), p. 1003; cf. Antoine Le Roy, Floretum philosophicum (Paris, 1649), p. 174 (both produced in Lessico intelletuale). David Abercromby, Academia scientiarum (London, 1687), p. 152. 6

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the title page of his History of Philosophy (1655), philosophers are ‘those on whom the Attribute Wise was conferred’. Another commonplace definition was Cicero’s claim that philosophy is the knowledge of the causes of things human and divine.7 Although everyone agreed on the centrality of reason to philosophy, Hobbes was unusual in conceiving of philosophy as coterminous with rationality. ‘Philosophy’, he writes in De corpore, ‘is natural reason, innate to every man’ (‘Ratio naturalis, in omne homine innata’). More particularly, ‘Philosophy is the knowledge, acquired through correct reasoning, of effects or phenomena from the conception of their causes or generations and also of generations which could exist from the knowledge of their effects’.8

Logic Although, throughout our period, all branches of philosophy were affected by the same general trend, the displacement of Aristotelianism as the common core of philosophy, the subdivisions of philosophy established by Aristotle did not change. In logic, Aristotelianism maintained its hold, thanks to the university curriculum.9 The main challengers to traditional Aristotelian logic were Ramus, Bacon, and Descartes. The earliest attempts to change things were first by Pierre de la Rame´e (Ramus) in the sixteenth century. Ramus considered dialectic applicable to all branches of knowledge and gave it a central place in the arts curriculum. But in reshaping of the arts curriculum he used a simplified logic, amalgamating dialectic and rhetoric, and instituting the use of method as an aid to study. One of the influential adjustments he made concerned dialectics, or the part of logic which was traditionally regarded as dealing with probable arguments used in rhetoric, as distinct from the type of arguments used in the demonstrative sciences.10 Francis Bacon’s Novum organum (or New Organon) (1620) was explicitly pitched against the bastion of Aristotelian logic, the Organon, with the intention of laying the basis of a logic of discovery. Although an English epitome was printed in 1676 Bacon’s Novum

7 J. A. Scherzer, Vademecum sive manuale philosophicum, ristampa (Lipsia, 1675), p. 155. (Source: Lessico Intelletuale.) 8 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651), ch. 16. Cf. De corpore, 1.2, p. 2 (‘Philosophia est effectuum sive phaenomenon ex conceptis eorum causis seu generationibus, et rursus generationum quae esse possunt, ex cognitis effectibus per rectam rationcinationem acquisita cognitio’) and 1.8, p. 7 (‘Subjectae Philosophiae, sive materia circa quam versatur, est corpus omne cuius generatio aliqua concipi . . .’). 9 On seventeenth-century logic, see Gabriel Nuchelmans, ‘Logic in the Seventeenth Century’, in CHSP; E. Jennifer Ashworth, Language and Logic in the Post-Medieval Period (Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company, 1974); W. S. Howell, Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500–1700 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956); Lisa Jardine, ‘Humanistic logic’, in CHRP; Marco Sgarbi, The Aristotelian Tradition and the Rise of British Empiricism: Logic and Epistemology in the British Isles (1570–1689) (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013). 10 Ashworth, Language and Logic, ch. 6; Sachiko Kusukawa, ‘The Reception of Melanchthon in Sixteenth-Century Cambridge and Oxford’, in Günter Frank and Kees Meerhoff (eds), Melanchthon und Europa (Stuttgart: Jan Thorbecke Verlag, 2002), pp. 233–54.

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organum did not succeed in supplanting the logical instruments of university instruction, but its methodological principles would be taken up by experimental natural philosophers. The main instrument of Cartesian logic was the so-called Port Royal logic of the French Jansenists, Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole, Logique ou l’art de penser, 1662. The Port Royal logic enjoyed huge success across Europe as well as Britain.11 As its title indicates, it presents logic as the art of thinking from basic principles, rather than the art of reasoning or disputing well. The authors explicitly distance their work from Aristotle and Ramus, presenting their work as ‘logic freed from the Pedantic dust of the schools’. Emphasizing the practical character of logic, and the importance of experiment in demonstration, and of a method which proceeds from simple things to more complex, they align themselves with Descartes, by quoting the four rules of method from his Discours. The decisive shift away from scholastic logic is evident in the sources which William Wotton recommends for logic at the end of the century: ‘Des Cartes’s Discourse of Method, Mr. Lock’s Essay of Humane Understanding, and Tschirnhaus’s Medicina Mentis’.12

Ethics In ethics the rejection of Aristotelianism was no less transformational even though Aristotelian assumptions persisted in much moral philosophy and Aristotle’s ethical writings continued to be used in the universities. Seventeenth-century ethical theory is characterized by a confidence in reason as a guide in ethical matters. In his Academia scientarium (1687) David Abercromby defines ‘Ethica’, as, ‘that Art which directs us how to act always conformably to right reason’.13 The view that moral principles are innate was widespread, and was developed in important ways by the more Platonist thinkers, notably Cudworth who argued for the existence of moral absolutes, existing independently of the mind and the physical world. The ideal of a rational ethics finds its fullest expression in natural law theory, which is based on the idea that moral principles are discoverable naturally by human reason. For some, indeed, reason is natural law. The concept of natural law was not new in the period. An influential figure here is the Spanish Jesuit Francisco Suarez, whose major synthesis of scholastic moral and legal theory, Tractatus de legibus,

11 It was revised several times, the most important being the 1683 edition: Introduction, to Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole, Logic, or, The Art of Thinking, ed. Jill Vance Buroker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. ix. It grafts Cartesian theory of knowledge onto the older Aristotelian structure of the categories. Antoine Le Grand’s Institutio philosophiæ (London, 1672) is another source for Cartesian logic. It was reprinted twice and translated as An Entire Body of Philosophy (London, 1694). 12 William Wotton, Reflections on Ancient and Modern Learning (London, 1694), p. 156. 13 Abercromby, Academia, p. 68. On seventeenth-century moral philosophy see especially Stephen Darwall, The British Moralists and the Internal ‘ought’, 1640–1740 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); J. B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Terence Irwin, The Development of Ethics: A Historical and Critical Study, vol. 2: From Suarez to Rousseau (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

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ac Deo legislatore (1612) was foundational for discussions of natural law and a frequent point of reference in political debates (see Chapter 6).14 Natural law theory was revitalized and reconfigured by Hugo Grotius (see Chapter 3), for whom the fundamental principles of natural law were not of themselves moral, but the means by which moral norms might be deduced and moral obligation established. After Grotius, natural law was developed and applied in different ways by Hobbes, Locke, and Cumberland, through whom it became a central strand of political philosophy. Natural law theorists aspired to found a science of ethics, based on clear, universal principles, whence the norms of conduct can be deduced with mathematical certainty. This invocation of a mathematical model of deductive reasoning was influenced by the new mechanical philosophy of Descartes. However, the confidence in reason which it implies was tempered by increased realization of the limited power of reason to guide and motivate virtuous behaviour. Another characteristic feature of seventeenth-century moral philosophy is the prominence accorded to the emotions (or passions) in moral obligation and moral action.15 Traditionally, the passions came within the purview of physiology, and there is a long history, in both Stoic and Christian traditions, of regarding the passions negatively, as turbulent, disruptive forces in need of control by reason. The Aristotelian tradition, however, regarded them as integral to a life of virtue. The renewed attention to the passions may be linked to a revival of interest in Stoicism and also in Platonism (see Chapter 3). But more than anything, it was influenced by Descartes’s Passions de l’aˆme [Passions of the Soul] (1649). Descartes, too treats the passions as physical, and he claims that he discusses them as a natural philosopher (en physicien), not as a moral theorist. Nevertheless, his account of the passions focuses attention on their role in achieving the good life. Cartesian passions are corporeal motions which affect the soul, ‘those perceptions, sensations or emotions of the soul . . . which are caused, maintained and strengthened by some movement of the [animal] spirits’16 which intermediate between body and soul, enabling the soul to influence the body in order to maintain the well-being of both mind and body as a unity. The passions are therefore not negative impulses to be suppressed, but ‘they are all by nature good’.17 Henry More offers an essentially Cartesian account of the passions in his Enchiridion ethicum (1668), in which he develops the notion that

14 An edition was printed in London in 1679. On scholastic natural law theory, see Annabel S. Brett, Liberty, Right and Nature: Individual Rights in Later Scholastic Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). On natural law in the seventeenth century, see Knud Haakonssen, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy from Grotius to the Scottish Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Knud Haakonssen (ed.), Grotius, Pufendorf and Modern Natural Law (Dartmouth & Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999). 15 See especially Susan James, Passion and Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Susan James, ‘Reason, the Passions, and the Good Life’, in CHSP. 16 Descartes, Passions, CSMK, vol. 1, p. 338. 17 Descartes, Passions, CSMK, vol. 1, p. 403–4.

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moral awareness has a physical dimension, by positing what he calls a ‘boniform faculty’, which anticipates Shaftesbury’s notion of ‘moral sense’ (see Chapter 7). The revival of interest in Epicureanism had an impact on the development of new ethical theories, such as those of Shaftesbury and Locke, which accord the senses an essential role. Of particular importance was the Epicurean notion that the pleasure is the highest good, which was adapted especially but not exclusively by natural law theorists to account for motivation and the discovery of ethical norms. Shaftesbury’s social conception of ethics as ‘the Philosophy of Manners’ is anticipated by Thomas Stanley, who expresses the view that ethics is concerned with conduct in general.18 Thomas Blount concurred that moral philosophy ‘consists in the knowledge and practise of civility and good behavior’.19

Natural Philosophy The branch of philosophy which underwent the most fundamental transformation in the seventeenth century was natural philosophy. At the beginning of the century the parameters of the discipline were set by Aristotle’s Physics and biological works, but also De anima, which was studied as part of natural philosophy. By 1700 Newton’s Principia had opened the way for the emergence of science as a separate discipline from philosophy, setting the seal on the abandonment of the Aristotelian philosophy of nature. Drawing on the 1700 Oxford lectures on natural philosophy by the Newtonian John Keill, John Harris declared that the only true natural philosophers were experimenters and ‘the mechanical philosophers who explicate all phenomena of nature by matter and motion’.20 The decline of Aristotelian natural philosophy is closely linked to new discoveries and developments in astronomy, medicine, and mechanics, which collectively undermined the authority of Aristotelian physics. But it was especially the advent of powerful alternative theories, in the form of Cartesian physics and the revival of Epicurean atomism, which prepared the way for Boyle and Newton. Proponents of new natural philosophies such as Gilbert, Charleton, Cudworth, and Viscount Stair adopt the term ‘physiologia’ or physiology for natural philosophy. According to Stair, ‘physiology is the knowledge of phenomena of nature and the sufficient causes and effects for its perfection. It is also called physics or natural science.’21 (Stair himself was a convert from Aristotelianism to the new philosophy: having started his career teaching a ‘thoroughly scholastic’ curriculum in Glasgow, 18 Thomas Stanley, The History of Philosophy: containing those on whom the attribute of wise was conferred (London, 1655), vol. 3, p. 226. 19 Thomas Blount, Glossographia (1656), s.v. ‘Philosophy’. 20 John Harris, Lexicon technicum (London, 1708), s.v. ‘Physiology’. 21 ‘Physiologia est cognitio phaenomenon naturae & causarum sufficientium & efficacium ad ea perficienda, dicitur etiam physica aut naturalis scientia’, James Dalrymple, Viscount Stair, Physiologia nova (Leiden, 1686), p. 10.

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he ended up as a proponent of experimental philosophy). With the shift to empirical methods of enquiry, the scope of natural philosophy changed. As new philosophies of nature shifted attention away from the Aristotelianism onto the physical world (‘phenomena of nature’), study of the soul, which once came within the purview of natural philosophy, became the subject of ‘pneumatology’—a branch of metaphysics.

Metaphysics There was a discernible revival in scholastic metaphysics in the earlier part of the century. The Disputationes metaphysicae (1597) by the Spanish Jesuit Francisco Suarez was especially influential. Suarez’s metaphysics was taken up by Protestants and Catholics alike, and set the mould for instruction in metaphysics for centuries.22 However, overall the status of metaphysics was in decline. Increasingly, metaphysics came to be derided as ‘abstruse’ or ‘useless’ knowledge, and it was often associated with scholasticism. The Aristotelian origins of metaphysics explain why, for the most part, the principal authorities on metaphysics continue to be the Aristotelian and scholastic philosophers of the previous century: Abercromby cites Vasquez, Suarez, and Valentia. A late English champion of metaphysics was the neo-Aristotelian John Sergeant, who attributes the failings of contemporary philosophy to their ignorance of metaphysics. In his Solid Philosophy Asserted (1697), Sergeant defended metaphysics ‘that most Solid, most Clear and most Incomparable Science’, which supplies both ‘the Evidence and Certainty of the Principles’ on which other sciences depend, as well as dealing with spiritual beings and substantial forms.23 The seventeenth century saw the bifurcation of metaphysics into two distinct domains: into the science of being, on the one hand, which was concerned with general terminology and principles, and into ‘pneumatology’ on the other, which concerns itself with spiritual beings. This development, which has sixteenthcentury origins,24 is implicit in Bacon’s differentiation between philosophia prima (axioms) and natural theology (which deals with angels and spirits). David Abercromby incorporates the dual definition of metaphysics in his Academia scientiarum (1687): one aspect of ‘Metaphysick’ deals with spiritual or immaterial beings and the supernatural, ‘Beings, as abstracted from all matter; and is so called, because it treats of things somewhat besides, above, or beyond Nature’. But metaphysics is also concerned with ontological questions, with Essence, Existence, and ‘three properties of every Being, its Unity, Goodness, and Truth’.25 William Wotton’s idea of metaphysics is of the former type: ‘Metaphysicks is properly that Science which 22 Richard Serjeantson, ‘Becoming a Philosopher in Seventeenth-Century Britain’, in Peter Anstey (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 25. 23 John Sergeant, Solid Philosophy Asserted (London, 1697), pp. 114 ff. 24 Charles Lohr, ‘Metaphysics’, in CHRP, p. 629. This more restricted view of the scope of metaphysics is associated with Lutherans like Scheibler. 25 Abercromby, Academia, p. 104.

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teaches us those Things that are out of the Sphere of Matter and Motion, and is conversant about God, and Spirits, and Incorporeal Substances’.26 Despite the rhetoric of rejection of metaphysics (Shaftesbury doubted whether metaphysics was worthy of the name philosophy), new philosophy required new metaphysics, even if by another name. Both Bacon and Hobbes retain a place for philosophia prima in the architecture of philosophy, albeit in radically reconfigured form. In Locke, the place of metaphysics is taken by his epistemological classification of knowledge in terms of relations between word, idea, and thing. William Wotton treats Locke’s Essay as a substitute for metaphysics. Wotton also cites among other modern sources for metaphysics Descartes’s Meditations and Malebranche’s Recherche de la verite´.27 Wotton nevertheless questioned whether modern writers had anything new to say on metaphysics, which the ancients had not already said. An alternative to the Aristotelian tradition can also be found in Platonizing thinkers. An early example of Platonist metaphysics produced in England was Contemplationes metaphysicæ (1648) by the Bohemian immigrant, George Ritschel, a member of the Hartlib circle, who was for a short time at Oxford, where his book was published. According to Ritschel, metaphysics deals with the being of things (esse rerum) which derive from God. Metaphysics supplies the axioms and ideas which obtain in all arts and discipline. He compares it to a vital spirit which irrigates all sciences. His book, fundamentally Neoplatonic in its basic assumptions and terminology, consists largely of a discussion of abstract terms.28 The only major work of metaphysics produced in Britain in the period, Henry More’s Enchiridion metaphysicum (1671) is a pneumatology, or science of spirits. More explicitly excluded the traditional subject matter of metaphysics as the science of ‘being qua being’. For More, metaphysics is a kind of ‘natural theology’, and yields a proper understanding of natural philosophy. Shaftesbury may have had More in mind when he declared that he could not see the point of ‘defining of material and immaterial substances’, dismissing such philosophy as ‘delusive and infatuating on account of its magnificent pretensions’.29 As the study of soul, psychology belonged within the domain of pneumatology. Perhaps one of the most interesting developments here is discussion of ideas of consciousness and unconsciousness, which owe something to Cartesianism, and figure particularly in Locke’s conception of the person. Another

26

Wotton, Reflections, p. 157. He also cites Poyret’s Cogitationes de Deo and Van Velthuysen’s De initiis primae philosophiae. Plato is the ancient philosopher he cites for metaphysics. 28 Contemplationes metaphysicæ ex naturaˆ rerum & rectæ rationis lumine deductæ (Oxford, 1648). Ritschel cites Francis Bacon and Herbert of Cherbury. His ‘metaphysics was known to Cambridge Platonists’ More, Cudworth, and Smith, and was known in Europe by, among others, Jungius (Hamburg), Mersenne and Gassendi. See Martin Mulsow, ‘ “Sociabilitas”: Zu einem Kontext der Campanella-Rezeption im 17. Jahrhundert’, Ricerche filosofiche e materiali storico-testuali’, Bruniana & Campanelliana, 1 (1995): 205–32, p. 214. 29 Shaftesbury, Soliloquy, in Characteristics, ed. Klein, p. 129. 27

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important discussion comes in the philosophy of Ralph Cudworth which draws on Plotinus.30

In with the New The changes and modifications that we can track in the different branches of philosophy did not take place without comment. On the contrary, both traditionalists and innovators were very conscious that theirs was an age of philosophical innovation. Writing a generation later than Francis Bacon, the first English historian of philosophy, Thomas Stanley, had no doubt that philosophy had made great progress, and that this was measurable by the yardstick of history. Nor is it unseasonable at this time to examine the Tenents of old Philosophers, when so great variety of Opinions daily spring up; some of which . . . being of late invention will receive addition, when advanced to such height wee look down to the bottom from which Philosophy took her first rise, and see how great a progress she hath made, whose beginnings are almost inscrutable.31

In his Baconiana, the future Archbishop of Canterbury, Thomas Tenison, celebrated Francis Bacon as the supreme example of the trend for philosophical innovation which he saw as characteristic of the period. There lived in part of the last, and this, Century, many memorable Advancers of Philosophical Knowledg. I mean not here such as Patricius, or Telesius, Brunus, Severinus the Dane, or Campanella. These, indeed, departed from some Errors of the Ancients, but they did not frame any solid Hypothesis of their own. They only spun new Cobwebs, where they had brush’d down the old. Nay, I intend not, in this place, either de Chart [Descartes], or Gassendi. They were, certainly, great Men, but they appeared somewhat later, and descended into the depths of Philosophy, after the Ice had been broken by others. And those I take to have been chiefly Copernicus, Father Paul the Venetian, Galileo, Harvey, Gilbert, and the Philosopher beforeremembred, Sir Francis Bacon, who, if all his Circumstances be duly weigh’d, may seem to excel them all.32

In this extract, Tenison situates Bacon as the first among equals in a constellation of innovators: Nicolaus Copernicus, Paolo Sarpi, Galileo Galilei, William Harvey, and William Gilbert. Tenison also acknowledges, in a back-handed sort of way, the Italians Francesco Patrizi, Giordano Bruno, Tommaso Campanella, the Dane Petrus Severinus (Peder Soerensen), and the French philosophers Rene´ Descartes and Pierre Gassendi. Tenison’s assessment of Bacon’s position among philosophical innovators of the seventeenth century represents a retrospective view from a particular point in the seventeenth century. (Well before Tenison made his pronouncement on Bacon’s 30 See Udo Thiel, The Early Modern Subject: Self-Consciousness and Personal Identity from Descartes to Hume (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 31 32 Stanley, History, Preface. Thomas Tenison, Baconiana (London, 1679), pp. 6–7.

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pre-eminence, the Royal Society had established the credentials of its own methodology, claiming to be the scion of Sir Francis Bacon, whose experimental philosophy was set in opposition to Cartesianism). In acknowledging Bacon Tenison reminds us that Europe had its innovators just as much as Britain. Furthermore the culture of innovation to which Bacon contributed was not new with the seventeenth century, but can be traced back to the high Renaissance. Bacon himself contributed to the idea that progress had been made since ancient times—albeit that the advances in human knowledge were slow and limited.

Moderns and Ancients: New Wine in Old Bottles Nowadays it is customary to regard Descartes as the watershed between ‘old’ and ‘new’ philosophy. Although seventeenth-century philosophers were conscious of the philosophical innovations of their age, by no means all of them would have agreed with this modern view of the origins of philosophical modernity. For one thing, there were different datings of the watershed between old and new. Descartes’s older contemporary, Rudolphus Goclenius, was no less certain that the watershed philosopher was Socrates, that all philosophy prior to Socrates was philosophia vetus and all post-Socratean philosophy counted as philosophia nova.33 Leibniz’s category of ‘recentiores’ extends back to the fifteenth century. In its turn, scholastic philosophy had its own clear division between the via moderna of Ockham, Buridan, and Marsilius of Inghen and the via antiqua of Thomas Aquinas and Albertus Magnus, a division dating from 1425.34 It is certainly the case that philosophers of the seventeenth century had a strong sense of modernity but they were also conscious of tradition, and subscription to new ideas did not necessarily mean abandonment of the old. The idea of setting the ancients against the moderns to weigh their relative merits is a trope which only comes into vogue at the end of the period, the classic discussion being William Wotton’s Reflections upon Ancient and Modern Learning (1694). It was more common in the seventeenth century to de-emphasize the differences: a more cogent way of understanding the relationship between philosophers past and present seemed to be to underline the similarities between the present and the past. Many, like Thomas Stanley, believed much contemporary philosophy was a rehash of ancient philosophy, ‘raked out of the ruines of antiquity, which ought to be restored to their first owner’.35 Nicholas Hill describes his Philosophia epicurea (1601), which revives ancient atomism, as ‘Novantique philosophy’, that is ‘neither new nor old’ 33 Rudolph Goclenius, Lexicon philosophicum, quo tantam clave philosophiae fores aperiuntur (Frankfurt, 1613; repr. Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1980), p. 819. 34 Pasnau, Metaphysical Themes, pp. 84–5. See also Pasnau’s discussion of the problem of historical categories, pp. 1–5. Also Roger Ariew, ‘Modernity’, in Robert Pasnau (ed.), The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy, 2 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), vol. 1, pp. 114–26. 35 Stanley, History, Preface.

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(nec nova nec vetus). The term ‘novantique’ was more commonly used to signify a conjunction of ancients and moderns, where contemporary philosophers, as novantiqui, were presented as revivers of ancient philosophies: thus Descartes was the new Democritus, Hobbes a modern Strato. A supreme exponent of the novantique approach was Ralph Cudworth, whose True Intellectual System of the Universe is a vast store house of ancient philosophical doctrines with which he correlates contemporary philosophy. As late as 1702, in his immensely popular Lexicon Technicum John Harris who praises Newton for opening ‘a New World in Natural Philosophy’, still finds room for Hermetic Philosophy, and lists the Grecians and Phoenecians among the originators of ‘Mechanical philosophy’.36 For Richard Burthogge the conjunction of ancient and modern betokens universality, as he indicates in the title of his Organum vetus & novum, or, A Discourse of Reason and Truth (1678). Burthogge’s title finds an echo in Jean Baptiste Du Hamel’s Philosophia vetus et nova (1678). First published in Paris, this was printed in London in 1685 and was specifically designed for teaching (‘ad usum scholae accommodata’). Du Hamel’s earlier De consensu veteris et novæ philosophiæ (1663) was also published in England for university use, since it was printed in Oxford in 1669. This sets Plato, Aristotle, and Epicurus alongside Descartes, and includes discussion of chemical philosophy. Rather than opposing modern to ancient philosophy, it was more common to register differences in terms of schools of philosophy. Most commonly that difference was expressed in terms of difference from Aristotelianism and the philosophy of the schools. An example is Philosophia naturalis by the Dutchman Adrian Heereboord, whose textbooks were widely used in the mid-seventeenth century. Heereboord identifies three schools of philosophy: Aristotelianism, Ramism (or anti-Aristotelians), and new philosophy (‘recentiores’). Each one is characterized by a progressively reductive account of the scope and subdivisions of philosophy: Aristotelians deal with the full range of Aristotelian philosophy from physics through to politics, ethics, logic. The Ramists cover logic, physics, and ethics. The ‘recentiores’ (Descartes, Regius, and Berigardus) focus on physics—though Descartes also treats metaphysics and method.37 Heereboord’s classificatory scheme testifies to the pervasive hold of Aristotle’s philosophy well into the seventeenth century. But the two alternatives which he lists reflect the changes taking place. A late example of differentiation between schools of philosophy in terms of adherence to Aristotle comes in Academia scientiarum (1687) of Boyle’s admirer David Abercromby, who defines natural philosophy as ‘the knowledge of Natural Bodies, or of the Natural Causes of Things’. He then distinguishes between two schools of philosophy according to their principles: Aristotelian Philosophy, which ‘acknowledgeth three Principles of every thing, Matter, Form, and Privation’, and ‘the New Philosophy’, which holds ‘but two simple 36 37

John Harris, Lexicon technicum (London, 1708), s.v. ‘Hermetical’. Adrian Heereboord, Philosophia naturalis (London, 1684).

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Principles of all things, Matter, and Motion; that, as the Material Cause; this, as the Efficient’.38 In his Physiologia Epicuro-Gassendo-Charltoniana (1654), Walter Charleton follows Gassendi in subdividing philosophy into four ‘General Orders’, three of which integrate the old and new in some way. The ‘Renovators’ (such as Ficino, and Copernicus) revive ancient philosophy; the ‘Electors’ or eclectics ‘cull and select out of others’ (Fernel and Sennert); while the ‘Assertors of Philosophical Liberty’ respect no particular tradition but subject all philosophies to the same rational examination: they ‘ponder the Reasons of all, but the Reputation of none, and then conform their assent when the Arguments are nervous and convincing’.39 The only ‘order’ of philosophers to be bound to tradition are the Pedants (Aristotelians and Scotists). Charleton expresses the anti-dogmatic spirit of contemporary philosophy by invoking the idea of libertas philosophandi or ‘philosophical liberty’ to express the freedom to choose between different schools of philosophy.40 On the whole, when asserting their freedom to philosophize seventeenth-century philosophers exhibit a strong sense of intellectual pluralism, rather than outright rejection of particular philosophies. But the claim to philosophical freedom is to be encountered in specifically anti-Aristotelian contexts, for example in Nathaniel Carpenter’s Philosophia libera (1621) or in Bacon’s assertion of the right to question the authority of Aristotle in Advancement of Learning.41 Libertas philosophandi was also construed to mean freedom from theology, as for example by James Dalrymple, in his Physiologia nova experimentalis. Thus interpreted, the freedom to philosophize, gave rise to the idea of the philosophical ‘libertine’ or freethinker.

Social Context Changes in the scope and content of philosophy were accompanied by changes of a different order which were not of themselves philosophical, but had a profound effect on the practice and content of philosophy. Firstly there were social changes which affected participation in philosophy. The seventeenth-century relocation of philosophy outside the academies goes hand in hand with the emergence of a new type of philosopher who was neither a cleric nor a university teacher.42 Following Herbert of 38

39 Abercromby, Academia, pp. 152–5. Charleton, Physiologia, 3. ‘Libertas philosophandi’ is an idea associated with scepticism, and goes back to the Middle Ages, and ancient scepticism. See Ian Maclean, ‘The “Sceptical Crisis” Reconsidered: Galen, Rational Medicine and the Libertas Philosophandi’, Early Science and Medicine, 11 (2006), pp. 247–74; and M. A. Stewart, ‘ “Libertas philosophandi”: From Natural to Speculative Philosophy’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 40 (1994): 29–46. 41 Nathaniel Carpenter, Philosophia libera (Frankfurt, 1621; Oxford, 1622); Francis Bacon, Advancement of Learning, ed. Michael Kiernan (Oxford, 2002), p. 28. Also Pierre Charron who makes ‘liberte´ d’esprit’ one of the four pillars of wisdom, except in matters of religion: Charron, De la sagesse (Paris, 1630). 42 See Richard Tuck, ‘The Institutional Setting’, in CHSP, and Richard Serjeantson, ‘Becoming a Philosopher in Seventeenth Century Britain’, in Anstey (ed.), Oxford Handbook, pp. 9–32. 40

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Cherbury, we might call him the philosophical layman (laicus). Although some of these laici were philosophical aristocrats (Bacon, Herbert, Boyle, and Shaftesbury), laicization increasingly meant democratization. The most distinguished thinkers of the period were drawn from among the ranks of professional men, who were advisers and tutors to magnates and their families. Hobbes was an employee of the Earls of Devonshire and Locke was, for a time, a member of the household of the first Earl of Shaftesbury. Several philosophers had a medical background: Locke studied medicine with Thomas Sydenham, and Walter Charleton was a qualified physician, as were Richard Burthogge and Francis Glisson. There were at least four philosophers were who were professional lawyers (Sir Francis Bacon, James Dalrymple, Viscount Stair, Sir Matthew Hale, and Sir George Mackenzie of Rosehaugh). It is quite likely that many clergymen were frustrated philosophers, there being no employment for philosophers: for example John Norris and Arthur Collier. The social relocation of philosophy outside the universities helps explain the appearance of women among the ranks of philosophers.43 As with their male counterparts, the first women philosophers emerge from the ranks of the nobility: Anne Conway was a Viscountess, Margaret Cavendish a Duchess. Subsequently, British women philosophers are drawn from the educated middle classes: Damaris Masham, Mary Astell, and Catharine Trotter Cockburn. Another aspect of the extra-mural move of philosophy was, literally, the new spaces which served as fora for philosophical discussion. There had always been circles where philosophical ideas were discussed in a non-academic context, and the seventeenth century is no exception. Although Britain lacked the lay academies which were such a strong feature of sixteenth-century Italy, new ideas flourished in a number of notable intellectual groupings such as the circle of the ‘Wizard Earl’ of Northumberland and the Welbeck circle to which Hobbes belonged. In the second half of the seventeenth century the development of a ‘lay’ philosophical culture was boosted by the rise of the coffee-house and the development of print culture, and with it the increasing availability of books, and the rise of journals. Two examples of philosophical clubs which started to appear in the second half of the century are James Harrington’s ‘Rota Club’ which was set up in 1659 for discussing political ideas, and the ‘Dry Club’ formed by Locke and his associates after he returned from exile. The philosophical controversies of the latter part of the century, especially those provoked by Hobbes, Locke, and the freethinkers, reflect this widening social participation in philosophy. Although the philosophical calibre of these debates was highly variable, they nevertheless bear testimony to a strong culture of intellectual engagement with philosophy among the general public. These debates drew interventions from a whole variety of people, from clergymen to merchants. Increasingly 43

Jacqueline Broad, Women Philosophers of the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

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the contributors were non-clerical and non-academic. By the end of the century women began to contribute as well as men. It was in these circumstances that Mary Astell, Damaris Masham, and Catharine Cockburn’s philosophical views appeared in print. However, broadening social participation in philosophy did not mean that there were no constraints on women. Social convention required anonymity in publication. Astell, Masham, and Cockburn all published anonymously. Anne Conway eschewed print publication altogether, but the convention of anonymity was observed when her book was published posthumously. Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of Newcastle, is the great exception, since she not only dispensed with anonymity, but published many works in her own right. However, the price of this was public ridicule. Further evidence of philosophical interest among the general public may be gathered from library lists. Gentlemen’s libraries of the period show a broad range of philosophical texts from Aristotle’s works to the latest European philosophy. One example is the library available to Hobbes at Hardwick Hall; another is the library of Lord Conway. The chronological listing of acquisitions in the Conway library catalogue enables us to see just how up to the minute the philosophy accessions were. To judge by the books in his library, Sir Kenelm Digby kept abreast of new developments in philosophy. As one might expect from an eclectic thinker like Digby, his books included Aristotle (Erasmus’ Greek edition) and modern scholastics (Gilbert Jack and Thomas Barlow) as well as the works of his Paris contemporaries, Descartes and Hobbes. He also owned Spinoza’s introduction to Descartes’s Principles of Philosophy and a lot of Platonist texts (editions of Plotinus and Plato), as well as Sextus Empiricus. Among the moderns we find Bacon, Boyle, Gassendi, Charleton, More’s apology for Descartes, and six volumes of Margaret Cavendish’s works. Libraries were not the prerogative of gentlemen: one of the largest in the late seventeenth century was the library of the Rotterdam merchant Benjamin Furly, which was frequented by Locke during his exile. Clerics too had philosophical books, and they too read philosophy. Archbishop Tillotson’s library included works by Gassendi, Descartes, Herbert of Cherbury, Bacon, Cudworth, Culverwell, Boyle, Charleton, Henry More, and Hobbes, as well as Aristotle, Plato, Plotinus, Glisson, Campanella. The largest clerical library, Bishop Stillingfleet’s library of 10,000 books, is rich in philosophical resources. This was acquired by Narcissus Marsh for the library which he founded in Dublin in 1701. Book ownership patterns also reveal that partisanship is a poor guide to private collections. As one would expect, owners of Hobbes’s writings included his admirers, for example Thomas Lockey whose manuscript copy of Human Nature was used for the unauthorized edition of 1650. But copies of his works are found in the libraries of those hostile to him, like Ralph Cudworth, James Nairn, and Francis Atterbury.44 Part of the reason for this is that in See, for example, M. C. T. Simpson, ‘The Library of the Reverend James Nairn (1629–1678): Scholarly Book Collecting in Restoration Scotland’, Ph.D. diss. (University of Edinburgh, 1987); Feingold, ‘Mathematical Sciences’, HUO, vol. 4, p. 419. 44

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order to refute your foe, you have to read him. Although the contents of libraries provide some indication of the availability of philosophical books, the picture is incomplete, since records are incomplete and they were vulnerable to depredation in times of civil unrest. In his An Humble Apologie for Learning and Learned Men (1653) Edward Waterhouse laments the depredations suffered by ‘famous Libraries of Our own Nation,’ in ‘Our late unhappy Wars’. One major collection lost in this way was the Conway library of some 11,000 books, which was a casualty of the Irish rebellion in 1641.45 Wider social participation which contributed to the development of lively general philosophical culture brought with it other non-philosophical developments which affected the character of seventeenth-century philosophy. The most important were changes in style, the adoption of the vernacular as the language of philosophy and development of modes of philosophizing which did not require the highly specialist technical training necessary in the traditional philosophy of the schools. Here, Descartes led the way, with his direct appeal to the philosophical amateur, that is the reader without a formal academic training, who would require only common sense in order to follow his arguments. His choice of his native French for both his more popular as well as for his more technical philosophical writings widened the social spectrum of his audience. The success of Cartesianism, despite hostility within the universities, may be attributed, at least in part, to its take-up by the non-traditional philosophical readership which it was able to reach by this means. It is no coincidence that most of the first female philosophers found their way to philosophy via Descartes. Latin was still in use as the international language of philosophy, but it was becoming the second language: Henry More wrote in English, but translated his Opera omnia into Latin for international consumption. Robert Boyle, too had his writings translated for the same purpose. Thomas Hobbes broke his general rule of writing in Latin when he wanted to address a more general audience, as he did when he wrote Leviathan in English. The Cambridge Platonists were among the first philosophers to publish primarily in English. In so doing, they coined many English philosophical terms, some of which form part of our modern philosophical vocabulary. Philosophers also begin to adopt new forms (sometimes experimentally) for communicating with a wider philosophical public—the essay, the dialogue, and even the philosophical romance. Locke addressed his Essay not to the learned, but to ‘polite company’, and appealed to individual experience. Henry More’s Divine Dialogues was designed for a non-specialist readership. The use of fiction pioneered by Bacon’s New Atlantis was continued by Nathaniel Ingelo and Joseph Glanvill.46

45

Sarah Hutton, Anne Conway (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 21. Nathaniel Ingelo, Bentivolio and Urania (London, 1660); Joseph Glanvill, ‘Anti-Fanatical Religion and Free Philosophy: In a Continuation of the New Atlantis’, in Essays on Several Important Subjects in Philosophy and Religion (London, 1676). 46

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Religion and Philosophy Finally, something should be said about religion, which was an important part of the context in which people philosophized in early modern times. Religion was central to daily lives and at the heart of contemporary politics. Across Europe, the seventeenth century was a period of religious strife and fragmentation. In the view of Locke, religion was ‘a perpetual foundation of war and contention’ which he held responsible for the devastating wars in which ‘coals from the alter’ have kindled ‘all those flames that have made such havoc and desolation in Europe, and have not been quenched but with the blood of so many millions’.47 In the British Isles as in Europe major tensions divided Protestants from Catholics and anti-Catholicism is a persistent theme in both politics and religion throughout the seventeenth century. But tensions also divided Protestantism itself. In the earlier part of our period, the established churches of England and Scotland were at best uncomfortable coalitions of the Protestant groups, significant numbers of whom (though to varying degrees), did not think that the Reformation had been fully accomplished either in terms of creed and doctrine, or in terms of ecclesiastical polity. The struggles between these groups, between Episcopalians and Presbyterians on both sides of the border, as well as among different shades of Calvinists, and between the new sects which appeared mid-century, impacted on philosophy. The collapse of central ecclesiastical authority during the Civil Wars was followed by a proliferation of competing sects, resulting in major debates about the foundations of religious authority. Similarly, freethinkers flourished more easily after the lapse of the Licensing Act in 1695. Locke’s gloomy assessment of the deleterious impact of religion, however, is only one part of the picture. The religious history of the period is by no means entirely negative. Religion and philosophy were not opposed to one another, and religious authority was neither a unified monolith or uniformly antithetical towards philosophy. Seventeenth-century Britain produced fine examples of religious philosophy— in fact it was in this period that the term ‘philosophy of religion’ was introduced (by Cudworth). Much seventeenth-century philosophy was concerned with religious questions. In time-honoured tradition enshrined in the university curriculum, philosophy was allied to religion in subordinate relation as the ‘handmaid of theology’. In the university context, its main application was in ‘natural theology’ which aimed to provide rational arguments for theological tenets, without encroaching on the mysteries of faith (what Thomas Barlow called ‘the abstruse mysteryes . . . beyond the reach of Mans understanding’).48 The close proximity of philosophy and theology

47 John Locke, Two Tracts on Government, ed. Philip Abrams (London: Cambridge University Press, 1967), pp. 160–1. 48 Thomas Barlow, A Library for Younger Schollers, ed. Alma De Jordy and Harris Francis Fletcher (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1961), p. 44.

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within the university curriculum goes some way towards explaining the intellectual ties between them. These will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. But to take a philosophical interest in religion was not the preserve of theologians. Almost every natural philosopher of the period—e.g. Charleton, Boyle, Wilkins— wrote on religion. Beyond the universities, philosophers continued to discuss a raft of traditional topics which originated in the domain of natural theology and ethics, ranging from the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, to free will and necessity. These topics were as important in the new philosophies, as the traditional philosophy of the schools. Francis Bacon’s separation of philosophy and theology did not diminish his respect for the former. Hobbes, too, presumed to philosophize about God. Natural philosophers like Boyle regarded their enterprise as thoroughly godly. The lecture series which Boyle endowed by his will (the so-called Boyle lectures) was devoted to the apologetic end of demonstrating the compatibility of philosophy and religion and refuting atheism. The main changes to the way philosophers discussed religion were in the philosophical terms of the discussion, rather than the topics discussed. But new themes do emerge in the later half of the century: one was religious toleration, another was the relationship of natural reason to religious belief. For their part, theologians made it their business to assess philosophical arguments in terms of their implications for theology and religious belief. The most famous examples, to be discussed later, were Bramhall’s controversy with Hobbes about liberty and necessity, and Stillingfleet’s controversy with Locke in which he expressed concern about the sceptical consequences of Locke’s position, especially for the doctrine of the Trinity. The pervasiveness of religion in all areas of seventeenthcentury thought makes it impossible to extract it as a separate theme. In seventeenth-century Britain, philosophy underwent transformational change which affected all thinkers of the period. The decline of Aristotelianism, the changes in style and medium, and the shift to wider participation in philosophy took place over the course of time. These changes were not confined to the British context. And, as we shall see, in this period, British philosophers begin to make formative contributions to the development of European philosophy. In order to understand and assess their contribution, it is important not to overlook the continuities between old and new. One area where the interplay of tradition and innovation is most apparent is in the philosophy taught at the universities, which is the subject of Chapter 2.

2 Philosophy in the Universities From medieval times to the seventeenth century philosophy was a largely academic affair. In Britain, as elsewhere, most philosophy took place within the universities. However, as we have noted, this changes in the seventeenth century when philosophy becomes a predominantly extramural activity. Nevertheless, the universities retained an important role in philosophical education and in shaping the philosophical discussions that continued beyond their walls. This chapter will be largely devoted to discussing philosophy within the academies, and the changes in philosophical education that occur across the century. University history is one means of gauging the state of philosophy in a given period. From records such as regulations, curricula, and notebooks it is possible to construct a picture of what constituted philosophy as a subject studied at university, as well as gain a sense of the changes that took place, and the pace of those changes. The picture of the state of philosophy to be obtained in this way is limited by virtue of the fact that it can only be as complete as the records themselves, and it does not extend beyond the academies. In a period when the most significant philosophy was produced outside the universities, this is a significant limitation. Another limitation is that the picture of philosophy which it yields by definition omits those who did not attend university—most notably women, but also autodidacts like Locke’s friend, Benjamin Furly, and the occasional gentleman amateur, like Robert Greville or Robert Boyle. However, the state of university philosophy in any given period does provide some idea of the scope and place of philosophy within the intellectual horizons of its time, even for those who did not come to philosophy via the academic route. Importantly, it is useful for gaining a sense of the intellectual formation of those philosophers who attended university but did not make their careers there, as was the case with Lord Herbert, Hobbes, Locke, and Bacon. Even if the most significant philosophers of the age manifested their originality by repudiating the philosophy which they studied at university, it was through those studies that they were inducted into the subject. Furthermore, since most arts students studied some philosophy as part of their curriculum, this meant that after completing their studies, they constituted the major part of the general readership for philosophy. The university curriculum is an important indicator of the level of philosophical awareness which an educated layman might be expected to have. This goes some way towards accounting for the fact that so many people felt themselves qualified to make

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interventions in philosophical debates in print, notably the debates provoked by the philosophical writings of Hobbes and Locke. There were only two universities in England, Oxford and Cambridge. Wales had none while Trinity College in Dublin was the only university college in Ireland. Scotland, by contrast could boast a clutch of four universities of which the most ancient were St Andrews (St Salvators, St Leonards) and Glasgow, while the others were of late sixteenth-century foundation, Aberdeen (King’s College and Marischal College), and Edinburgh.1 In terms of size Oxford and Cambridge topped the league. The newest and smallest foundation was Trinity College Dublin, founded in 1591.2 Attempts to found new colleges in Chelsea and at Durham during the Commonwealth period did not succeed,3 while London’s Gresham College, which had been founded in 1597, never developed into a full-scale educational college. After the Restoration, when nonconformists were denied admission to English universities on confessional grounds, alternative arrangements had to be made for educating their clergy and young men. The first of the so-called dissenting academies were founded after the Restoration in order to supply the educational needs of the dissenter communities.

1 Total numbers in Scottish universities were Edinburgh 600; Glasgow 400; Aberdeen 300; St Andrews 150. Trinity College Dublin reached 340 by the end of the seventeenth century. In the 1620s and 1630s Oxford and Cambridge peaked at around 3,000. On Scottish universities, see R. G. Cant, ‘Origins of the Enlightenment in Scotland: The Universities’, in R. H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner, The Origins and Nature of the Scottish Enlightenment (Edinburgh: Donald, 1982), 42–64; R. G. Cant, University of St Andrews: A Short History (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1970 (1946)); R. L. Emerson, ‘Scottish Universities in the Eighteenth Century, 1690–1800’, Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, 167 (1977): 453–74. For Oxford, HUO, vol. 4. On Cambridge, see Victor Morgan and Christopher Brooke (eds), A History of the University of Cambridge, vol. 2: 1546–1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); J. Twigg, The University of Cambridge and the English Revolution, 1625–1688 (Woodbridge: Boydell, 1990); C. N. L. Brooke (ed.), A History of the University of Cambridge (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988–2004); John Gascoigne, Cambridge in the Age of the Enlightenment: Science, Religion and Politics from the Restoration to the French Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Sarah Bendall, C. Brooke, and P. Collinson, A History of Emmanuel College (Cambridge: Boydell, 1999). 2 R. B. McDowell and D. A. Webb, Trinity College Dublin 1592–1952: An Academic History (Dublin: TCD Press, 2004). See in particular the studies by Elizabethanne Boran and Alan Ford, ‘Libraries and Learning: The Early History of Trinity College, Dublin from 1592–1641’ (Ph.D., University of Dublin, 1995); Elizabethanne Boran, ‘An Early Friendship Network of James Ussher, Archbishop of Armagh, 1626–1656’ in Helga Robinson-Hammerstein (ed.), European Universities in the Age of Reformation and Counter Reformation (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 1998), pp. 116–34; Elizabethanne Boran, ‘The Libraries of Luke Challoner and James Ussher, 1595–1608’, in Helga Robinson-Hammerstein (ed.), European Universities in the Age of Reformation and Counter Reformation, pp. 75–115; Alan Ford, ‘ “That bugbear Arminianism”: Archbishop Laud and Trinity College, Dublin’, in Ciaran Brady and Jane Ohlmeyer (eds), British Interventions in Early Modern Ireland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 135–60; Alan Ford, ‘Who went to Trinity? The Early Students of Dublin University’, in Helga Robinson-Hammerstein (ed.), European Universities in the Age of Reformation and Counter Reformation, pp. 53–74. Alan Ford, Theology, History, and Politics in Early-Modern Ireland and England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 3 There were also proposals to found universities at Ripon (1604), York (1640), Manchester (1641), and the Isle of Man (1644). See J. Twigg, The University of Cambridge, p. 207.

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It is often assumed that the universities were bastions of conservatism, slow to take up new ideas. This view is based on the fact that university statutes universally stipulate Aristotle as the prime author for all branches of study, including philosophy. However, university statutes by themselves are a poor guide to what students actually studied or the teaching methods used, since they do not reflect actual teaching practice or the content of curricula. The evidence of reading lists, tutors’ notes, and student comments shows that there was considerable variety in teaching practice and the syllabus used by individual tutors. The universities certainly came in for strong and deserved criticism from reformers like Francis Bacon, John Webster, and John Dury. Notwithstanding the fact that traditional structures and curriculum remained in place throughout the seventeenth century, there was disparity between statutes and what was actually taught, and considerable variation both within and between universities. For example, the Elizabethan and Laudian statutes of Oxford stipulate that Aristotle and Porphyry should be used for the teaching of logic. But Seth Ward states that Aristotle’s Organon was not publicly lectured in his day.4 The earliest reforms to impact on philosophy teaching were the Ramist-inspired reforms of the late sixteenth century in Scotland and Dublin. Andrew Melville (1545–1622), principal of Glasgow University, who had encountered the ideas of Pierre de la Rame´e (Ramus) while he was studying at several universities in France and Germany, instituted changes which placed emphasis on studia humanitatis, and rejected metaphysics in favour of moral philosophy.5 The Melvillian Reforms restored Glasgow’s reputation, and were imitated elsewhere, e.g. at the new foundation at Edinburgh, where Melville’s pupil, Robert Rollock (1559–99), was first principal. However, in time general resistance to the reforms limited their impact and metaphysics was restored at Glasgow. At Trinity College Dublin the Laudian reforms of 1631 replaced the strongly Ramist curriculum with an Aristotelian one. In Oxford, the Laudian Statutes of 1636 affirmed the supremacy of Aristotle. If the universities themselves were structurally ill adapted for incorporating new developments within the statutory curriculum, many individual lecturers and regents were modernizers, and the wider university environment offered a reasonably congenial environment for new research to natural philosophers like Boyle, Locke, and Sydenham long before experimental philosophy became part of the curriculum. Locke, for example, was able to develop his interests in natural philosophy and medicine by attending Thomas Willis’s lectures on anatomy and a class on chemistry by the German, Peter Stahl, and followed the work of Boyle and Hooke. Isaac Newton conducted experiments and wrote his seminal work while a university don.

Mordechai Feingold, ‘The Humanities’, in HUO, vol. 4, pp. 298–9. J. Kirk,‘ “Melvillian” Reform in the Scottish Universities’, in A. A. MacDonald et al. (eds), The Renaissance in Scotland: Studies in Literature, Religion, History, and Culture Offered to John Durkan (Leiden: Brill, 1994), pp. 276–300. 4 5

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The Arts Curriculum In seventeenth-century Britain, the University Bachelor of Arts was fundamentally a humanistic course of study, designed to educate gentlemen and the professional class (the clergy, doctors, and lawyers).6 Most students who enrolled at one of the universities did not progress to higher subjects, unless they were destined for a career in the church or universities. A university education laid the foundations not just of the higher disciplines, but of non-specialist or ‘lay’ learning of the majority who did not proceed to Masters level and beyond. University education was not just for future clerics and dons. Lord Conway, for example, took the view, ‘Education is the greatest Estate one can give’, and had low opinion of General Monck’s son for his lack of it. Conway was himself a reader of Descartes, and stipulated that his nephews should also be instructed in Cartesian philosophy when they studied at Cambridge.7 Latin was the language of education, and by the seventeenth-century improvements in the standard of school education meant that students arrived at university with a high level of linguistic skills. At university these were expanded and developed along with the necessary critical skills for reading texts in Latin and Greek. Although Aristotle remained the officially prescribed author for study in both England and Scotland, students were exposed to a greater or lesser degree to different thinkers and schools of thought among the repertoire of classical texts used either for the purposes of improving their Greek, or as sources for moral and political exempla. All those who studied the arts curriculum received training in instrumental reasoning and rhetoric. Whether they proceeded BA or not, all students were exposed to classical writing and classical thought, which were not studied as they were later, as ‘the classics’, but provided the textual sources for most parts of the curriculum. The humanist syllabus which they followed was not conceived dogmatically as embodying a classical standard to be upheld as a value in itself, but was modelled on the Renaissance humanistic idea that humanistic learning was relevant to everyday life. Through their humanistic studies undergraduates were exposed to a range of classical philosophy beyond the Aristotelian core curriculum, and were trained in the humanistic tools required for accessing it—namely language skills and the critical reading of texts.

6 Feingold, ‘The Humanities’, pp. 215–18, and Richard Tuck, ‘The Institutional Setting’, in CHSP; W. T. Costello, The Scholastic Curriculum at Early Seventeenth-Century Cambridge (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958); M. H. Curtis, Oxford and Cambridge in transition, 1558–1642 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959); Hugh F. Kearney, Scholars and Gentlemen (London: Faber, 1970); Jefferson Looney, ‘Undergraduate Education at Early Stuart Cambridge’, History of Education, 10 (1981): 9–19; Mordechai Feingold, ‘Aristotle and the English Universities in the Seventeenth Century: A Re-evaluation’, in Helga Robinson-Hammerstein (eds), European Universities in the Age of Reformation and Counter Reformation (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 1998), pp. 135–48. 7 See Sarah Hutton, Anne Conway: A Woman Philosopher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 22.

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All students were required to read writings in Latin and Greek, through which they might also be exposed to philosophical currents such as scepticism, atomism, and stoicism. For example Cicero was a hardy perennial of the curriculum, and a source for philosophical scepticism.8 Cicero’s De natura deorum furnished arguments that might be applied in natural theology. Another staple of the curriculum was Seneca. An example of someone who put his humanistic training to good use is John Selden, who drew on Tacitus in his political thought. Another is Joseph Glanvill, who may have been introduced to scepticism through his university studies. Even those who, like Bacon and Locke, were critical of the education they received would have had some exposure to classical philosophy via the humanist curriculum during their undergraduate years. Hobbes is a good example of a philosopher who was a humanist first (translator of Thuycidides) and philosopher only later. Although he scorned school logic he did learn the basics. According to Aubrey, Hobbes ‘did not much care for logick, yet he learnd it, and thought himselfe a good disputant’.9 A basic grounding in philosophical reasoning contributed to the development of a lay critical readership for philosophy, which manifested itself in the responses to the philosophy of Locke and Hobbes emanating from outside the universities. For most of the seventeenth century, university teachers were all-rounders rather than specialists. Locke’s early career in Oxford is a case in point—he was successively praelector in Greek, in rhetoric, and censor of moral philosophy. Then as college tutor, he put his pupils through the exercises of scholastic disputation. Individual colleges did have specialists in philosophy, and there begins to be increasing specialization in the form of the founding of specialist chairs at both English and Scottish universities. Some of the first were in natural philosophy starting with Sedleian professorship of natural philosophy (1621), and the Savilian chairs of astronomy and geometry (1619), at Oxford, followed in the second half of the century by the founding of the Lucasian professorship of mathematics at Cambridge in 1663 (the first holders being Barrow (1664), Newton (1669), and Whiston (1702)) and the first Regius professorship of mathematics at St Andrews in 1668 (the first appointment being the Newtonian, James Gregory).10 The Plumeian professorship of astronomy and experimental philosophy was founded at Cambridge in 1704 (the first holder was the Newtonian Roger Cotes, appointed in 1704). New chairs in civil law were created at Edinburgh (in 1700) and Glasgow (in 1710) where natural law was taught as the basis of civil law. The end of the regenting system in Scottish universities opened the way for more specialized teaching of philosophy. Professorships did not always have the effect of enhancing the level of study. A case in point is the White professorship of moral philosophy at Oxford which was founded in 1621, without

8 C. B. Schmitt, Cicero Scepticus: A Study of the Influence of the Academica in the Renaissance (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972). 9 John Aubrey, Brief Lives, ed. Andrew Clark, 2 vols (Oxford, 1898), vol. 1, p. 329. 10 Cant, University of St Andrews, p. 86.

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stipulation as to what should be taught (though the Laudian Statutes specify Aristotle’s ethics, economics, and politics). This chair was in fact a failure, and had become redundant by the 1670s.11 In practice at Oxford it was the Regius professor of divinity who dealt with moral philosophy.

Philosophy in the Curriculum: General Context Philosophy was a central component of the university curriculum, both at junior and more advanced levels. The structure of the university curriculum was such that even those who did not proceed beyond undergraduate level studied logic, ethics, and probably also some natural philosophy. All students received some grounding in logic, and, proceeded thence to other subjects. Philosophy was studied not as an end in itself, but as part of a course of study leading at the higher levels to vocational specialism in either divinity, law, or medicine. Philosophy was integral to the university curriculum at all levels, starting with logic and ethics (and even natural philosophy) in the undergraduate curriculum and proceeding to metaphysics as part of MA study. For example, the future cryptographer and founding member of the Royal Society, John Wallis, describes the order of study at Emmanuel College, Cambridge, in the 1630s: ‘my first busi-ness was to be the study of Logick . . . From Logick, I proceeded to Ethicks, Physicks and Metaphysicks.’12 It is not much of an exaggeration to claim, as Robert Sanderson did in his compendium of physics,13 that the entire university curriculum consisted of philosophy: Sanderson defined philosophy very broadly as the all-encompassing discipline comprising the liberal disciplines insofar as they are concerned with truth (‘ad veri ac boni rationem modo spectantium’). The branches of the curriculum to which philosophy applied were the ‘instrumental’ subjects (grammar, logic, rhetoric) and higher levels of study (medicine, law, and theology). The rest of philosophy comprised the theoretical faculties or sciences (physics, metaphysics, and mathematics) and active sciences or ‘prudentiae’ (ethics, economics, politics). The proper order of study commences with the instrumental part and proceeds upwards to the higher faculties.

Rhetoric Philosophy was not taught in isolation from other disciplines, especially rhetoric and theology. For undergraduates, philosophy was closely allied with rhetoric, the Feingold, ‘Humanities’, p. 326. John Wallis, ‘Autobiography’, in Christoph J. Scriba, ‘The Autobiography of John Wallis, F.R.S.’, Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London, 25.1 (1970): 17–46. Wallis was an undergraduate, when Richard Holdsworth, author of ‘Directions for a Student in the Universitie’ (see note 46), was master of the college. 13 Physicae scientiae compendium. This dates from 1617, but was first published 1671 and reprinted 1690. 11 12

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classical art of communication which was enshrined in the arts syllabus. One of the major changes effected by Ramus was to bring dialectics and rhetoric into even closer relation. Whether they did so under the aegis of these reforms or not, all university students were trained in rhetoric. Among the tutors responsible for this training was John Locke, who held the post of praelector in rhetoric at Christ Church college in 1663. It is no accident that the most prominent philosophers of this period were highly conscious of the expressive power of language, took pains to write with clarity, and criticized verbosity. Bacon was perhaps the most critical of stylistic embellishment and bombast, and the least clear in his own written style, given his fondness for gnomic statements. By contrast for both Locke and Hobbes clear definitions and precise use of words were foundational. While holding to an ideal of simplicity they were skilful in their use of metaphor and phrasing. Hobbes, in particular, displays a savage wit.

Divinity Philosophy had traditionally been regarded as ancilla theologiae, the handmaid of theology, and the structure of the university syllabus reinforced the connection between philosophy and theology. For those who proceeded to MA study, philosophy (metaphysics) was taught in relation to divinity. The Oxford tutor Thomas Barlow underlines the point that God is the object of metaphysical study in the title of the metaphysics textbook which he evidently published for his own use in 1637: Exercitationes aliquot metaphysicæ, de Deo: quo`d sit objectum metaphysicæ, quo`d sit naturaliter cognoscibilis [Metaphysical Exercises about God: That he is the Object of Metaphysics and Naturally Knowable].14 Some idea of what philosophical sources might have been used, and how the relationship of philosophy to theology worked in practice can be gained from the annotated syllabus compiled by his namesake at Cambridge, A Library for Younger Schollers. In this Barlow makes a distinction between natural and supernatural divinity. Philosophy has a role in the first since it is ‘atteined by the light of nature’ while the latter depends on ‘the light of scripture and Revelation’.15 Natural divinity is accessible by the light of nature ‘by that natural understanding, a law of reason writ in our hearts, by the finger of God, & Nature’.16 From this we may deduce information about the divine attributes, God’s relationship to his creatures. By the light of Nature we may arrive at a knowledge of God’s attributes, grasp that he is ‘the first principle of being’ that he governs all things, and that ‘hee is the end to which all things does or shall tend’. To develop 14 Exercitationes aliquot metaphysicæ, de Deo: quo`d sit objectum metaphysicæ, quo`d sit naturaliter cognoscibilis (Oxford, 1637; repr. 1658). 15 Thomas Barlow, A Library for Younger Schollers, ed. with bibliographical index by Alma De Jordy and Harris Francis Fletcher (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1961), p. 18. 16 Barlow, A Library for Younger Schollers, p. 19. This is a frequently used analogy, also used by the Cambridge Platonists and John Wilkins.

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skills in natural divinity, Barlow makes various recommendations as to suitable reading matter, including ‘the best Pagan Authors’, as supreme examples of what unaided human reason can achieve.17 These are Plato, Aristotle, Homer, Theognis, Epictetus, Seneca, Stobaeus, Iamblichus, Hierocles, and Marcus Aurelius, especially as important sources of ‘good morall principles’. Barlow’s syllabus conforms to the prevailing view that religion and ethics are linked. Barlow also reminds his students of the importance of philosophy for theological controversy, especially for ‘understanding the Schoolemen, & a great part of ordinarie Controversies’, advising his students to ‘oft reviewe, & keepe your Logick, & Metaphysicks and that part of Physics especially which treats de Anima’. Francis Bacon makes a similar distinction between ‘Divinitie, or Inspired Theologie’ and ‘Natural Theologie’. The first of three branches of philosophy, as described in The Advancement of Learning (1605) is ‘Divine Philosophy’, which he defines as that knowledge or Rudiment of knowledge concerning GOD, which may be obtained by the contemplation of his Creatures: which knowledge may bee truely tearmed Divine, in respect of the obiect; and Naturall in respect of the Light.18

By contrast, the Ramist William Ames (1576–1633), who taught in exile in Franeker, integrates philosophy and religion still more closely in his Technometria (1633).19 To Ames philosophy, especially moral philosophy, is not a distinct discipline from theology, since he held it is impossible that a philosophy of ethics can teach civil good independently of grace. Technometria provides a framework for integrating theology with the other intellectual disciplines.

Philosophy Curriculum: Logic Logic formed the foundation of university study and was a staple part of the arts curriculum in the first two years of study. Logic was an area of contention, as well as change. Traditionally logic teaching was based on Aristotle’s Organon and Porphyry’s Isagoge or Introduction (to Aristotle’s Categories). This discusses the basic five predicables (quinque voces) set out in the Categories: genus, species, differentia, property, and accident. Use of the Isagoge in the Latin translation by Boethius, as a propaedeutic to Aristotelian logic, goes back to medieval times. However, seventeenth-century logic teaching owed more to Renaissance humanism than medieval scholasticism. There was less emphasis on formal argument, logic was allied to rhetoric, and there was usually some attempt to use the original Greek.20 17 18

Barlow, A Library for Younger Schollers, pp. 19 and 21. Francis Bacon, The Advancement of Learning, ed. Michael Kiernan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000),

p. 78. 19 Modern edition: Technometry trans. with introduction and commentary by Lee W. Gibbs (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1979). See Chapter 4 for Ames and Ramism. 20 See Feingold, ‘Humanities’, pp. 276–306 for logic at Oxford.

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Nevertheless, there was widespread criticism of academic logic. Much of this echoed Renaissance humanists’ criticism of the ‘barbarisms’ of medieval scholasticism: the chief complaint was that logic only served for disputation. The proBaconian university reformer John Webster derided Aristotelian logic as ‘Spider Webs of Sophistical or fallacious argumentations’.21 John Locke, who scorned scholastic logic as ‘learned Gibberish’,22 counselled parents: be sure not to let your Son be bred up in the Art and Formality of Disputing, either practising it himself, or admiring it in others; unless, instead of an able Man, you desire to have him an insignificant Wrangler, Opiniater in discourse, and priding himself in contradicting others, or, which is worse, questioning every thing, and thinking there is no such thing a truth to be sought, but only Victory in Disputing.23

Despite such criticisms, university logic continued to be regarded as a useful training in methodical reasoning and it was perceived as valuable outside the universities. Among educated laymen, Edward Hyde expressed the view that ‘though we do not make our conversation in syllogisms, and discourse in the mood and figure, our conversation and our discourse is much the more reasonable and the better formed, by the experience we have had in that art’.24 Similarly, Roger North, while acknowledging that logic was boring (‘a very dull science’) insisted that ‘the rules of logic regulate the mind and make it more just to weight other learning’.25 Writing in 1677 Robert Southwell explained to his nephew the value of studying logic as a preparation for professional life, because it would equip him ‘to be powerful and ready in argumentation, to define what is just and to persuade others to believe it, such will be the great business of your life in the profession of the law’.26 A decade later, David Abercromby maintained in his Academia scientiarum that ‘Logick is the Art of Disputing well’, and that it ‘is natural to all Mankind’ and equivalent to reasoning (‘the use of our Reasoning Faculty’). Chief among the skills it teaches is ‘the Art of making Syllogism’. The authorities which Abercromby cites are, besides Aristotle, all scholastic: e.g. Arriaga, Ruvius, Guilleminot.27 William Wotton regarded logic as ‘the Foundation of all Knowledge’ and adopted the Port Royal definition of logic as ‘the Art of Reasoning’. Although he regarded modern logic as superior as a tool of discovery, he acknowledged the use of ‘the common logick’ for detecting fallacious reasoning.28 If traditional university logic was regarded as useful for the education of

21

John Webster, Academiarum examen (1653; 1654), p. 331. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. with an introduction, critical apparatus, and glossary by Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 3.10.9, p. 495. 23 John Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, edited by John W. and Jean S. Yolton (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 241. 24 Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, A Dialogue Concerning Education (Glasgow, 1764), p. 40. 25 Lives of the Norths, ed. Jessop (London, 1890), vol. 3, pp. 16–17; quoted in Feingold, ‘Humanities’, p. 306. 26 27 Feingold, ‘Humanities’, p. 286. Abercromby, Academia scientiarum, p. 101. 28 William Wotton, Reflections (1694), pp. 155–7. 22

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a gentleman, the new, less technical Port Royal logic, which treated logic as the art of thinking must have had even stronger appeal outside the academies.

Proliferation of Logic Textbooks The centrality of logic in the university curriculum is testified by the proliferation of logic textbooks which are by far the most common type of printed philosophy text throughout the period.29 The university presses supplied local demand. Aristotelianbased logic texts predominated in the first half of the century. There were barely a handful of medieval writers reprinted (Ockham was one). The most continuously printed logic texts in the seventeenth century were Edward Brerewood’s Elementa logicæ (ten printings), Samuel Smith’s introductory Aditus ad logicam (first published 1615 with twelve reprintings including eight in Oxford), and Robert Sanderson’s Logicæ artis compendium (eleven editions before 1700, all printed in Oxford).30 In both England and Scotland, Franco Burgersdijk’s serviceable Institutiones logicae and Keckermann’s Systema logicae were widely used textbooks throughout the period. Burgersdijk was printed in Cambridge seven times, and once in London. Other European logic texts used in British universities included two Jesuit authors, Martinus Smiglecius (Marcin Smiglecki, 1562?–1618), whose Logica saw four Oxford printings, and the so-called ‘logica mexicana’ of Antonio Ruvio, Commentarii in universam Aristotelis dialecticam, which was printed in London in 1641. Another European text printed in Oxford was the Manductio ad logicam of Philippe Du Trieu (1580–1645), which was used as a text by Locke’s students, perhaps because it contained Gassendi’s short piece on demonstration, De natura demonstrationis. Narcissus Marsh’s Institutio logicae in usum juventis academicae Dubliniensis, which was based on Du Trieu’s Manductio, and Dudley Loftus’ Logica seu introductio (1657) were printed in Dublin, evidently to supply local needs at Trinity College Dublin. Edinburgh-educated Thomas Gowan supplied the need for logic textbooks for use in his dissenting academy in Connor, County Antrim. His Ars sciendi sive logica novo methodo disposita (1681) is broadly Aristotelian, but shows the impact of his exposure to the Port Royal logic, Clauberg, and Cartesian natural philosophy.

29 E. Jennifer Ashworth, ‘Text-books: A Case Study—Logic’ [1400 to 1557]. In J. B. Trapp and Lotte Hellinga (eds), The Cambridge History of the Book in Britain, vol. 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 380–6; E. Jennifer Ashworth, Language and Logic in the Post-Medieval Period (Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company); W. S. Howell, Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500–1700 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956). For a survey of British logic books, see Marco Sgarbi, The Aristotelian Tradition and the Rise of British Empiricism: Logic and Epistemology in the British Isles (1570–1689) (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013). 30 Many of the books in use were imported from overseas, so British publishing is not, of itself, a guide to the market for academic books. However, the publication of books in university towns (chiefly Oxford and Cambridge) is an indicator of local demand for teaching.

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His Logica elenctica (1683) is a manual for scholastic-style disputation, largely based on Keckermann and Burgersdijk.31 The picture of traditional logic teaching is not one of unrelieved scholasticism. For the most part the logic texts register the impact of Renaissance humanism. They are generally more discursive and less technical than the medieval scholastic logic. Thus Sanderson following Keckermann’s Gymnasium logicum (1606), included a historical survey of logic covering pre-Aristotelians, Aristotelians, Stoics, Scholastics (Alexander of Hales and Petrus Hispanus), Lullians, and Ramists. He criticizes Ramus for mutilating logic by narrowing it, imposing a single method, and altering terms. Nevertheless he accepted the importance of method in logic. He insists that logic is not an aid to disputation, but an instrument of understanding. The parts of logic are first ‘Simple conceiving’ (Porphyry, Categories), secondly Propositions (De interpretatione) and argument or method (Aristotle’s Organon). He emphasizes two methods: invention and doctrine. Invention involves the discovery of precepts through perception, observation, proof by trial, and induction, and progresses from concrete particulars to universals. The method of doctrine or discourse transmits the knowledge thereby obtained, descending from universals to particulars. Sanderson’s conception of invention is suggestive of Baconian influence, possibly anticipating Descartes. The main changes in the teaching of logic reflect the impact on the one hand of Ramism and of Cartesianism on the other. Francis Bacon’s Novum organum attacked Aristotelian logic, but it does not appear to have been taken up as a textbook of logic. An English epitome was printed in 1676 which was added to printings of Sylva sylvarum from 1677, but this was aimed at natural philosophy rather than the teaching of logic.32 Measured in terms of English imprints, Pierre de la Rame´e was the most popular European author for dialectic for the first half of the century: his Dialecticae libri duo saw twelve seventeenth-century editions and ten translations, together with a fair number of commentaries (e.g. by Piscator, Wilhelm Scribonius, and Friedrich Beurhaus).33 In Scotland, Ramist dialectic appears to have been more in request in the second half of the century, to judge by references in Scottish logic theses and library lists.34 Nevertheless, Ramism was not adopted universally or

31 Philippe Du Trieu, Manductio ad logicam (Oxford, 1662 and 1678); Narcissus Marsh, Institutio logicae in usum juventis academicae Dubliniensis (Dublin, 1679, 1681, 1697); Dudley Loftus, Logica seu introductio (Dublin, 1657); Thomas Gowan, Ars sciendi sive logica novo methodo disposita (London, 1681); Thomas Gowan, Logica elenctica (Dublin, 1683). 32 The Novum Organum of Sir Francis Bacon . . . epitomiz’d, for a clearer understanding of his natural history (London, 1676). This was added to printings of Sylva sylvarum from that date (1676, 1677, 1683, 1685). 33 Howell, Logic and Rhetoric; Sachiko Kusukawa, ‘The Reception of Melancthon in Sixteenth-Century Cambridge and Oxford’, in Günter Frank and Kees Meerhoff (eds), Melanchthon und Europa (Stuttgart: Jan Thorbecke Verlag, 2002). 34 Christine Shepherd, ‘Philosophy and Science in the Arts Curriculum of the Scottish Universities in the 17th Century’ (Ph.D. Diss. Edinburgh, 1975). , p. 99.

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wholesale. For example in Edinburgh the 1628 curriculum prescribed Ramus in the first year, but students moved on to the traditional logic texts, Aristotle’s Organon and Porphyry’s Isagoge, in their second. Cartesian influence on logic came chiefly through the Port Royal logic of Arnauld and Nicole (see Chapter 1). Apart from this there are a few instances of Cartesian method being taken up—by Henry More, for example, and by John Aubrey, who made notes from the Discours on the four stages of Cartesian method (from doubt, through analysis, ordering experience and resolution), with a view to incorporating it in his proposed educational syllabus.35 The Port Royal logic was rapidly adopted for university use. Between 1674 and 1687 there were four printings of a Latin version, in London (Logica, sive ars cogitandi . . . ad rationem dirigendam utilia) and one in Cambridge in 1687. The English translation, Logic or the Art of Thinking (1685) continued to be reprinted well into the eighteenth century. It was studied in French too.36 The Port Royal logic marks a major shift away from the logic of disputation to the logic of discovery. It was influential through Locke, who drew on it in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Signal evidence of the changes Port Royal inspired in the teaching of logic is the speedy uptake by the universities of Locke’s Essay in the abridged form prepared by John Wynne, which came to be widely used for undergraduate teaching.37 The Port Royal logic was used by Gershom Carmichael, who commended it as ‘the best Logick that I know extant under the name of Logick’, and noted its usefulness as a textbook, ‘tolerably adapted for the Use and teaching in a University’.38 Carmichael’s own ‘Compend of Logick’ (1711), which was revised and published as Breviuscula introductio ad logicam (1720, 1722), is based on Arnauld, with whom he agreed that not all ideas originate in sensation, but only ideas of physical things are derived from the senses. Ideas of thinking, judging, and reasoning originate in the mind, whence we derive our idea of God and of lasting happiness. The evidence of teaching practice indicates that students were encouraged to read a range of recent logic texts. Richard Holdsworth, for example, recommends both recent Protestant scholastics like Burgersdijk, Keckermann, Magirus, and Scheibler, but also Catholic commentators like Smiglecki (Smiglecius), Zabarella, Fonseca, and the Coimbra Commentaries. And even while studying traditional logic, a student might also be studying contemporary works in other areas of philosophy. For example, in 1689, George Fleming’s list of logic books included Du Trieu’s

35

The notes are printed in Aubrey on Education, ed. J. E. Stephens (London: Routledge and K. Paul, 1972), pp. 153–5, Appendix B. 36 Howell, Logic and Rhetoric, pp. 350–63. Jill Vance Buroker, Introduction to her edition of Arnauld and Nicole, Logic or the Art of Thinking (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 37 An Abridgment of Mr. Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding, by John Wynne (London, 1696). 38 Gershom Carmichael, Natural Rights, ed. James Moore and trans. Michael Silverthorne (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2002), p. 380.

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Manductio and Smiglecki’s Logica, as well as Crakanthorpe and Sanderson.39 Several writers on logic follow Burgersdijk in advocating a mixed approach which combines Aristotelian logic with Ramist method. John Prideaux’s Heptades logicae even treats Aristotelian and Ramist method as the same.40 The Edinburgh curriculum in the 1630s started with Ramus before moving on to Aristotle. Even proponents of post-Cartesian logic might offer a mix of old and new in their teaching. Gershom Carmichael apparently made only selective use of the Port Royal logic in his teaching, focusing on ‘Apprehension’ and ‘Judgement’. For his students’ very first introduction to logic at the beginning of their studies, he seems to have used Aristotle, for he tells us that he ‘insisted very largely on the forms of Propositions & Syllogismes both Categoricall & those that are not so’.41 This kind of transitional conjunction of scholasticism with the Port Royal logic is captured by William Wotton when he defines Logick as ‘the Art of Reasoning’ but comments that by logic ‘Men commonly understand the Art of Disputing, and making Syllogisms’.42

Moral Philosophy Moral philosophy was another important component of the undergraduate curriculum. Herbert of Cherbury considered that ethics was a fundamental part of education. ‘The learning of morall Philosophy and the Practice of Virtue’, he wrote is, ‘the most necessary knowledge and useful exercise of man’s life’.43 Locke too underscored the relevance of ethics to practical affairs of life and politics. The education of a gentlemen, he wrote, should be ‘most properly concerned in moral and political knowledge. And thus the studies which more immediately belong to his calling are those which treat of virtues and vices, of civil society and the arts of government, and so will take in also law and history’.44 Aristotle continued to supply the backbone of the teaching of ethics in the universities, despite the opinion of those like John Webster that Aristotelian ethics was ‘the dark Lamp of a blind Pagan’.45 Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics was used as a textbook for moral philosophy in Oxford, with the added function of being used to improve students’ linguistic skills. John Aubrey followed this model for his proposed

39 John Magrath (ed.), The Flemings in Oxford (Oxford Historical Society; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1904–24), vol. 2, pp. 273–6; Crakanthorpe and Smiglecius were obtained from his brother who acquired them ten years before (The Flemings in Oxford, vol. 2, p. 282 and vol. 1, p. 295). John Yolton, ‘Schoolmen, Logic and Philosophy’, in HUO, vol. 5, p. 589. 40 Howell, Logic and Rhetoric, pp. 300–16. 41 Howell, Logic and Rhetoric, p. 379. 42 Wotton, Reflections, p. 154. 43 The Life of Edward, First Lord Herbert of Cherbury, ed. J. M. Shuttleworth (London, New York, & Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 25. 44 ‘Some Thoughts Concerning Reading and Study for a Gentleman’, in John Locke, Political Essays, ed. Mark Goldie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 350. 45 John Webster, Academiarum examen (1653). He derived this view from Lambert Daneau.

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academy, assigning ‘Aristotle’s Ethics in Greek, to improve their Greek together with the science’.46 In the first half of the century, scholastic authorities figure on university reading lists for ethics, especially Suarez. Another popular scholastic author in use in England was Eustachius of Santo Paulo’s manual of ethics Ethica, sive, summa moralis disciplinae, printed several times at Cambridge and London between 1654 and 1707.47 Thomas Barlow’s recommended reading for ethics included John Case’s Speculum moralium, Suarez, the Coimbra Commentators, Franciscus Pavonius’ Summa ethicae, Buridan, Medina, Johannes Crell’s Ethices elementa Racoviae. For the ‘speculative’ and ‘disputing part’ of ethics he also recommended schoolmen such as Gabriel Vasquez, Gregorius de Valencia, Didacus Alvarez, Johannes Malderus, Gregorius Martinez. One Italian text is listed: Alessandro Piccolomini, Dell’ institutione morale.48 Reading in ethics recommended by Nathaniel Sterry, brother of Peter Sterry and fellow of Merton College, was also largely scholastic: his 1648 list includes Eustachius a Sancto Paulo, Aristotle, Crell, Whitby, commentaries by Gregory of Valencia and Cajetan on Aquinas as well as classical authors (Cicero and Epictetus).49 Lectures might be published for pedagogical use, as was the case with Robert Sanderson’s 1646–7 lectures on moral obligation, which were printed in 1646 as De juramenti promissorii obligatione and De obligatione conscientiae. Both books were used as textbooks after the Restoration and reprinted many times.50 There were in fact very few textbooks of moral philosophy of British provenance: one such, Daniel Whitby’s textbook of ethics, Ethices Compendium (1684) has a strong Christian emphasis and defines ethics and natural law in broadly traditional terms. Ethics is a practical discipline for explaining and attaining human happiness (‘disciplina practica, rationem humanae foelicitatis, consequendae explicans docensque’), virtue is a habit (‘habitus electivus’). His discussion of the law of nature indicates a confidence in human reason, but makes no reference to contemporary debates: natural law is a dictate of reason, which regulates conscience, advising men what to do or refrain from doing (‘dictamen rationis; hujus enim est officium conscientiae regulas dare, eamque regere, hominis admonere, quid faciunt, vel omittant’).51 It was standard practice to include other classical authorities besides Aristotle in the teaching of ethics, especially Cicero, Plutarch, Seneca, and Epictetus, and sometimes also Plato and Marcus Aurelius. In David Abercromby’s Academia scientiarum (1687) the chief authorities on ethics are all classical philosophers: Aristotle, Seneca, 46 Feingold, ‘The Humanities’, p. 324; Aubrey on Education, p. 116. Cf. Richard Holdsworth, Directions for a Student in the Universitie (c.1648), printed in H. F. Fletcher, The Intellectual Development of John Milton, 2 vols (Champaign, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1956–61), vol. 2, pp. 623–55, p. 643. 47 Eustachius a Sancto Paulo, Ethica sive summa moralis disciplinae (London, 1658; repr. four times until 1693). On Eustachius, see Roger Ariew, Descartes among the Scholastics (Leiden: Brill, 2011). 48 Barlow, A Library for Younger Schollers, p. 2. 49 Feingold, ‘Humanities’, p. 322. 50 In 1661, 1665, 1670, 1676, 1683, 1686, 1696 and into the eighteenth century. 51 Daniel Whitby, Ethices Compendium (Oxford, 1684), pp. 1 and 39. Produced for Oxford use, this was reprinted several times.

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Plato, and Cicero. Reporting on his study of moral philosophy to his father in 1689, George Fleming said that his reading included Aristotle’s ethics, but also Stier.52 The teaching of ethics was closely allied to history. In the study of ethics, history was treated as a repository of examples of practical morality. John Milton regarded history as an important source of moral knowledge, and therefore made it the culmination of curriculum in his Of Education, ‘to set them [students] right and firm, instructing them more amply in the knowledge of virtue and hatred of vice’.53 But not all would have agreed with Lord Herbert that ‘Christians and heathens are in a manner agreed concerning the definitions of vertues’.54 By the second half of the century reading lists reflect the new developments of the period, especially natural law theory, through its major exponents Grotius, Pufendorf, and Richard Cumberland. Henry More’s Enchiridion ethicum is another text recommended for moral philosophy, as were Crell’s Ethica Christiana and Heereboord’s Melemata. Other modern writers cited include Grotius, Descartes, Edward Reynolds, Hugo Grotius, Cureau de la Chambre, and Bacon (Essays). One of the most popular works on ethics was Pierre Nicole’s Moral Essays (1677) which saw seven editions between 1677 and 1696.

Natural Philosophy The scholastic curriculum is often cited as evidence of the universities’ backwardness in natural philosophy (science). Certainly the curriculum did not reflect cutting-edge developments. The course of study available to John Wallis at Cambridge in the 1630s, for example, did not include what he calls ‘the Speculative part of Physick and Anatomy; as parts of Natural Philosophy’. However, Wallis did in fact manage to study these, by extending the scope of his studies to include areas of natural philosophy which were not part of the standard curriculum, but which were available within the university. In this way he became familiar with ‘the New Philosophy’: ‘tho’ I had no Design of Practising Physick. And I had then imbib’d the Principles of what they call the New Philosophy’.55 He mentions with some pride that he was the first to make the circulation of the blood a subject for a disputation. Wallis’s experience shows the university did foster the new science, even if it was not, initially, available for study on the standard curriculum. But even here changes are registered in the prescribed reading, with a higher proportion of scholastic texts in the first half of the century. For instance, Brasenose tutor Thomas Sixsmith’s early seventeenthcentury reading list on natural philosophy is deeply scholastic, with commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics and other writings on natural philosophy by Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza, Antonio Rubio and Zabarella, Dominicus Ban˜ez, Antonio Ruvio and the 52 53 54

Yolton, ‘Schoolmen, Logic and Philosophy’, HUO, vol. 5, p. 589. Quoted in Feingold, ‘Humanities’, p. 336. 55 Herbert, Life, ed. Shuttleworth, p. 24. Wallis, ‘Autobiography’, 29.

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Coimbra Commentators. In the mid-1650s, the natural philosophy reading list compiled by Thomas Barlow also lists recent scholastics (Ruvio, Toletus, Peirera, Aegidio Romano, Jacob Martini), but also includes non-Aristotelian works— Magnen’s Democritus reviviscens, Bacon’s Sylva sylvarum and works by Gassendi, Descartes, Digby, and Thomas White.56 There were also textbooks which combined older and newer ideas, tailored for educational purposes (ad usum scholæ accommodate) such as Francis Willis’s Synopsis physicæ tam Aristotelicæ, quam novæ (1690) and Adriaan Heereboord’s Meletemata. Heereboord names the ‘novatores’ in philosophiae naturalis as Descartes, Telesio, Campanella, and Bacon. More, Boyle, and Nathaniel Carpenter also figure on Oxford reading lists, as well as contemporary European authorities such as Johannes Clauberg, Rohault, Du Hamel, and Gassendi’s Syntagma. George Fleming’s reading in natural philosophy included, besides Sanderson’s compendium of Aristotelian physics, Daniel Sennert’s ‘Physics’ and Robert Boyle. Fleming’s brother Henry too studied Boyle, and evidently supplemented the study of Aristotle with Gassendi, Kenelm Digby, and John Wilkins.57 At the turn of the century, a widely used scientifically up-to-date textbook of natural philosophy in use was Jean Le Clerc’s Physica, sive de rebus corporeis,58 which was used by, among others, Gershom Carmichael. The ‘new philosophy’ was certainly pursued within the precincts of the universities. Restoration Oxford is often credited with being the most forward-looking, as the crucible of the experimental science of the Royal Society. It was at Oxford that the club of Experimenters around John Wilkins attracted a cluster of the future founders of the Royal Society, among them Robert Boyle, Thomas Willis, and Seth Ward as well as John Locke. Oxford fostered the empirical medicine of Sydenham and was home to the Oxford Philosophical Society founded in 1683, of which Robert Plot was the director of experiments. And Newtonianism was promoted at Oxford by the Savilian professors David Gregory (1691) and John Keill (1712). However, Cambridge’s claims to forward-thinking in natural philosophy are no less strong. A lively scientific group that was formed in Trinity College included Isaac Barrow, Walter Needham, John Nidd, Alexander Akehurst, and Francis Willughby. Francis Glisson and John Wallis were among several founder members of the Royal Society who studied at Cambridge. The botanist John Ray was a Cambridge man, while the university’s most eminent natural philosopher was Isaac Newton, whose Philosophia naturalis principia mathematica (1687) was published while he was a Fellow of Trinity College and Lucasian professor of mathematics in the University. The new natural philosophy was not neglected elsewhere. Scottish and Irish universities made important contributions to the development of natural philosophy—notable alumni

56 Feingold, ‘The Mathematical Sciences’, in HUO, vol. 4, pp. 403–4. Patricia Reif, ‘The Textbook Tradition in Natural Philosophy, 1600–1650’, JHI, 30 (1969): 17–32. 57 Yolton, ‘Schoolmen, Logic’, p. 589. See also Feingold, ‘The Mathematical Sciences’, pp. 402–5. 58 English editions were printed in London in 1696 and Cambridge in 1705 and 1708.

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are the Newtonian David Gregory, who taught at Edinburgh, and William Molyneux, graduate of Trinity College Dublin and founder of the Dublin Philosophical society.

Metaphysics Metaphysics was taught as part of the MA curriculum. Metaphysics had something of a chequered history in seventeenth-century universities. University reformers were hostile: John Webster derided ‘the Schools prime Philosophy or Metaphysical learning’ as ‘nothing but vain opination, void of Scientifical demonstration, and cleer verity’.59 Indelibly associated with Aristotelianism, metaphysics was a target for Ramist attack. As a result it was abandoned at Glasgow in the wake of Melvillian reforms, but returned to the syllabus within a few years. There were later attempts to remove metaphysics from the curriculum in Scotland—which led the St Andrews colleges in 1695 to lobby for retaining it in the third year and allocating physics to the third year. In fact the overwhelming majority of textbooks on metaphysics printed in Britain were Aristotelian and these are fairly evenly distributed across the century. The most frequently printed British textbooks of metaphysics were those by Robert Baron, Richard Crakanthorpe, and Gilbert Jack. European textbooks were also popular: Christoph Scheibler, Franco Burgersdijk, Andreas Frommenius, Johannes Combachius, and Johann Stier were printed in England. There were of course many foreign imprints of metaphysics texts in use in the universities. The only non-scholastics among metaphysicians were Georg Ritschel (whose Contemplationes metaphysicæ was printed in Oxford), Descartes (whose Me´ditations saw one Latin and one English printing), and Henry More (Enchiridion metaphysicum). Subsequently Jean Le Clerc’s Ontologia (first published in Britain in 1692), which contains a section on metaphysics in the form of pneumatology, was used as a university textbook. Scholastic authorities on metaphysics continue to appear on reading lists and in lectures in Scotland: for example in his Glasgow metaphysics lectures for 1665, William Blair cites scholastics Vasquez, Ariaga, Suarez, Hurtado, and Compton.60 But often modern writers are discussed as well, as in John Tran’s 1679 Glasgow lectures on metaphysics, which draw mainly on scholastics (with cautions about using Suarez); but he also cites More and Clauberg.

Reform and Innovation: Measuring the Pace of Change Although the traditional structure of the arts curriculum remained largely unchanged in all universities of the British Isles, the teaching content reflects changes and developments in contemporary philosophy. The old story that the universities were slow to respond to new currents of thought and particularly hostile to experimental 59 60

Webster, Academiarum examen, p. 86. Shepherd, ‘Philosophy and Science in the Arts Curriculum’.

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natural philosophy doesn’t hold true. There certainly are examples of resistance to new ideas, and older preferences died hard. For example, in 1668 the vice-chancellor of Cambridge, Edmund Boldero, banned the use of Descartes in disputations there. In Scottish Universities, concerns about Descartes recur in teachers’ notes. John Wishart’s lecture notes cite More’s Enchiridion ethicum and share his concerns about Cartesianism and atheism: ‘If the Cartesian philosophy were to be accepted both in physics and metaphysics I shudder to think what a precipitous and dangerous descent into atheism this would mean for moral souls’.61 His worries were echoed in the 1680s by Robert Forbes, regent/principal of King’s College, Aberdeen, who attempted to stem the tide by devoting his logic theses of 1680 and 1684 to refuting Descartes. The focus of his attack is Cartesian doubt and the proof of the existence of God from the idea of God. To judge by his references Forbes had certainly read Descartes’s Meditations and Discours. His critique takes in the pro-Cartesian Dutch Wittich, which suggests that the Leiden disputes were the source for his antiCartesianism.62 In Oxford in the 1690s the vice-chancellor tried to prevent the Lockean John Wynne from being appointed Lady Margaret Professor. The attempt was unsuccessful. The transition away from scholasticism was gradual. Aristotelian and scholastic textbooks like those of Burgersdijk and Sanderson continued in use, as is evident from the number of editions printed at Oxford and Cambridge. Another example is the Scotist Eustachius a Sancto Paulo, whose compendia of scholastic philosophy were hugely popular in Europe. Eustachius’ Summa philosophiæ quadripartite, which has the distinction of being judged by Descartes to be the best textbook in philosophy, was printed three times in Cambridge in the 1640s.63 Christoph Scheibler’s philosophical compendium Philosophia compendiosa which covers logic, metaphysics, physics, ethics, politics, and economics, as well as astronomy, optics, and geometry, was printed seven times in England between 1628 and 1675, chiefly in Oxford.64 In Scotland, a frequently cited foreign imprint was Franciscus Le Rees, Pars quarta philosophiæ (1648).65 Robert Sanderson’s compendium of physics, Physicae scientiae compendium, dating from 1617, was first published in Oxford in 1671 and reprinted twice. William Ayleworth’s Metaphysica scholastica (1675) was also in use in Scotland as late as 1690. In 1687, the visitation to St Andrews University recommended retaining the Aristotelian metaphysical categories ‘which frequently occur in the scholastic philosophy and divinity’, but specified that ethics should be

Christine Shepherd, ‘Newtonianism in Scottish Universities in the Seventeenth Century’, in Campbell and Skinner (eds), Origins, pp. 65–85, 70–1. See Shepherd, ‘Philosophy and Science in the Arts Curriculum’, p. 27 for critique of moderns. 62 Shepherd, ‘Philosophy and Science in the Arts Curriculum’, p. 139. 63 Cambridge, 1640, 1648, 1649. On Eustachio, see Ariew, Descartes among the Scholastics. 64 Oxford, 1628, 1631, 1639, 1647, 1657, 1671; London, 1685. 65 Franciscus Le Rees, Pars quarta philosophiæ, . . . ubi de metaphysica, meteoris, et de anima agitur. Editio secunda (Paris, 1648). 61

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purged of ‘scholastic and theologic disputes’.66 The 1696 rules specify that in logic and metaphysics examples ‘will be most fitly taken from the peripatetic philosophy, though it be not intended to assert all that philosophy in the physics or their parts can give examples of such questions as these’.67 The overall impression to be derived from reading lists and lecture notes points to a steady, if at times halting, assimilation of new developments. A useful indicator of the updating of philosophical reading is the ‘Directions’, by Richard Holdsworth, sometime master of Emmanuel College, Cambridge. Holdsworth’s Directions were originally written in the 1640s as a guide to reading for his students at Emmanuel College.68 They were revised by Joshua Barnes a generation later. Already in the 1640s Holdsworth included new thinkers like Descartes and Galileo alongside traditional Aristotelian texts. Joshua Barnes continued in the same vein, updating the list to reflect recent developments. Cartesian natural philosophy gains more prominence, and he adds Descartes’s Me´te´ores and De passionibus to the list, as well as Cartesian authors like Le Grand, Regis, and Rohault. Barnes’s rationale for these additions was, precisely, to take account of changes, ‘because the course of Philosophical studies is now altered’. We should, of course, be careful not to assume that the mere presence of a book on a reading list means that it was either used or was highly regarded. In a few cases, the comments of students or tutor survive. John Wallis makes no mention of the books he read while an undergraduate at Holdsworth’s college in the 1630s, but what he says about his studies is not suggestive of an innovative curriculum. For he tells us, as others do, that his logic studies made of him a ‘good disputant’. He also mentions that his studies involved ‘consulting the schoolmen . . . according to the Methods of Philosophy, then in fashion in that University’.69 It is interesting to note that, even though his tutor was the Cambridge Platonist Benjamin Whichcote, his Divinity studies included ‘Systematick and Polemick Theology’. A revealing comment, from Gershom Carmichael, is a reminder that tutors might select a textbook for practical reasons, and not because they had a high opinion of the content: in his notes on his past teaching practice (written in 1712) Carmichael says of Jean Le Clerc’s Physics that it is ‘a book that has nothing to recommend it, but that it furnishes occasion to talk about a great many different things’.70 The works of Descartes and Gassendi start to appear on university reading lists and in library catalogues from the 1650s, and there is evidence that colleges were beginning to acquire works by Descartes, Gassendi, Digby, and Mersenne at this time. Descartes was gradually incorporated into the undergraduate curriculum. Cartesianism had advantages from a pedagogical point of view because it offered

Quoted in Shepherd, ‘Philosophy and Science in the Arts Curriculum’, pp. 39–51. Shepherd, ‘Philosophy and Science in the Arts Curriculum’, p. 47. 68 Printed in H. F. Fletcher, The Intellectual Development of John Milton (Champaign, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1961), vol. 2, pp. 623–55. Original MS Emmanuel College MS 48. 69 70 Wallis, ‘Autobiography’, p. 29. Carmichael, Natural Rights, ed. Moore, p. 386. 66 67

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a comprehensive philosophical scheme combining metaphysics and natural philosophy which accounted for observable natural phenomena.71 The reception of Hobbes’s ideas was, by contrast with Descartes, complicated. Hobbes initially had friends in Oxford (e.g. Henry Stubbe) and he was praised by Oxonians Seth Ward and Ralph Bathurst as well as Thomas Barlow and Edward Bagshaw, though some of his early admirers developed reservations after 1651. But he also had enemies, notably John Wilkins, Brian Duppa, Seth Ward, John Wallis, Robert Boyle. Hobbes’s philosophy certainly set the agenda for the topics debated in universities, but his writings do not figure in recommended reading, except in the works of his opponents. However, he had plenty of readers, for both positive and negative reasons, the latter including Anthony Wood, Samuel Parker, Edward Bernard (Savilian professor of astronomy), and Francis Atterbury.72 Scottish universities present a similar picture to England, of a basically Aristotelian curriculum giving way to modern developments through a process of continuous revision. Until the 1660s the philosophy taught was largely Aristotelian. However there was increasing use of modern humanist commentators like Zabarella, Toletus, and the Coimbra Commentators, and the popular seventeenth-century textbooks like those of Franco Burgersdijk. In 1654, Robert Baillie told the Dutch Calvinist Voetius that Keckermann, Scheibler, and Burgersdijk were used in Scottish universities. Scholastic books and textbooks continued to be acquired throughout the seventeenth century, but new ideas increasingly gained ground. Descartes was introduced at first with caution about atheism, followed by Cartesian authors like Clauberg, Rohault, and Le Grand. By the late 1670s and 1680s Cartesianism was accepted.73 Descartes and Cartesian writers like Clauberg and Le Grand start to appear in the 1650s, reaching clear acceptance by 1670s. Henry Scougal (1650–78) is credited with being the first regent at King’s College, Aberdeen, to base his teaching on Cartesian principles, thereby putting an end to scholastic disputatiousness. Between 1660 and 1680 it was not unknown for a regent to include Aristotle in an overview of natural philosophy which extended to such moderns as Ramus, Gassendi, Clauberg, Henry More, Robert Boyle, Rohault, and Leeuwenhoek.74 Subsequently, as in England, Cartesianism was repudiated in favour of Newtonianism. By the 1680s sixteen regents were teaching Newton.75 This pattern bears out the point made by the professors at St Leonard’s, St. Andrews in opposition to attempts to impose a prescriptive curriculum in 1695: ‘There is no man that diligently searches after truth in Philosophie but will, as oft as he goes over a course of teaching find occasion to alter or add something, especially at

71 72 73 74 75

Feingold, ‘Mathematical Sciences’, p. 412. Feingold, ‘Mathematical Sciences’, pp. 413–19. Shepherd, ‘Philosophy and Science in the Arts Curriculum’, p. 112. Also Cant, ‘Origins’, p. 47. Shepherd, ‘Philosophy and Science in the Arts Curriculum’. Christine Shepherd, ‘Newtonianism in Scottish Universities in the Seventeenth Century’, pp. 69–70.

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such a time when there are new opinions in philosophie vented every day which ought some way or other at least to be taken notice of.’76 The process of transition from a traditional to a modern curriculum in Scottish universities may be illustrated from the metaphysics lectures of William Blair of Glasgow. Initially, scholastic authorities such as Vasquez, Ariaga, Suarez, Hurtado, and Compton are the main sources cited by Blair. He also uses Protestant recensions (Burgersdijk and Keckermann). But in 1665 he begins to refer to the moderns, mentioning Descartes and quoting Henry More’s Immortality of the Soul favourably. In his 1677 lectures he cites, besides Descartes and More, Clauberg and Le Grand. From Gershom Carmichael’s 1712 reflections on his earlier practice as a teacher, we gather that he introduced logic in the first year, along with Greek, progressing to metaphysics using Gerard de Vries’s Determinationes ontologicae as his textbook, then proceeding to ‘Pneumaticks’ which discussed the idea, attributes, operations, and existence of God. He used Pufendorf for natural law and Le Clerc’s Physica as a textbook of ‘Physics’ in the final year, together with practical demonstrations. Descartes’s metaphysics remained controversial with Carmichael, he attacked Descartes’s proofs of the existence of God, in his lectures on metaphysics for 1704 and 1712, and accused him of doubting the existence and goodness of God. In Ireland, the curriculum at Trinity College Dublin retained traditional elements well into the eighteenth century. Initially there was a strong Ramist emphasis, reflecting the influence of, among others, the Ramist Sir William Temple (provost from 1609 to 1627). In 1700 students of philosophy were still studying Aristotle, and Robert Baron’s Metaphysica generalis and Eustachius a Sancto Paulo’s Ethica sive summa moralis disciplinae continued in use for ethics and metaphysics. As late as 1738 the logic curriculum taught used Burgersdijk’s Institutiones logicae and Smiglecius. But by the end of the seventeenth century Descartes, Gassendi, Malebranche, and Locke were also being studied, along with Jean Le Clerc’s modernizing textbooks of logic and natural philosophy.77 The take-up of new philosophy in the academies could be swift, as can be seen in the reception of Locke’s Essay, which attracted almost immediate interest. Most colleges acquired it in the 1690s, as did the Dissenting Academies. In Ireland in 1692 it was being used at Trinity College Dublin, having been recommended to the Provost, St George Ashe, by Locke’s friend William Molyneux. It remained on the curriculum of Trinity College, where Berkeley first encountered it as a student there in 1700. The Oxonian John Wynne proposed publishing an epitome in 1695. In 1696 76

p. 55.

Cited in Cant, ‘Origins’, p. 47. Also in Shepherd, ‘Philosophy and Science in the Arts Curriculum’,

Feingold, ‘Mathematical Sciences’, pp. 405–13 and 419–26. Jean Le Clerc, Logica sive ars ratiocinandi (London, 1692); Jean Le Clerc, Physica sive De rebus corporeis libri quinque in quibus, præmissis potissimis corporearum naturarum phænomenis & proprietatibus, veterum & recentiorum de eorum causis celeberrimæ conjecturæ traduntur (London, 1696). These were reprinted several times and also in use at Cambridge. 77

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Locke reported to Molyneux that it was beginning to ‘get some credit in Cambridge’ the evidence being that two questions were debated at commencement, Probabile est animam non semper cogitare and Idea dei nonest innata.78 It was central to the syllabus which Jonathan Edwards studied at Harvard. Gershom Carmichael used Two Treatises alongside Pufendorf in his Glasgow lectures of 1702–3. There were, to be sure, opponents, but attempts to counter Locke’s influence were ineffective79—for example the unsuccessful attempt to block the appointment of John Wynne (Locke’s epitomizer) as Lady Margaret Professor.

Religion, Politics, and the Universities The universities were directly affected by the political upheavals of the period, which impacted on student numbers and in many cases led to purges of teachers. The worst period was during and immediately after the Civil War, as the mathematician and natural philosopher John Wallis testifies: ‘It hath been my Lot to live in a time, wherein have been many and great Changes and Alterations’, noting particularly that ‘by our Civil Wars, Academical Studies were much interrupted in both our Universities’.80 During the Civil War, Oxford was made the Royalist centre of operations, with the King and court housed in the university. Edinburgh University was disrupted by the Whiggamore Raid and Cromwellian occupation. In both England and Scotland, politically motivated purges of the universities carried out in the name of religious conformity truncated the careers of many, but the careers of others were advanced. Among those who lost their posts as a result of the Earl of Manchester’s purges of the University of Cambridge in 1644 were two early readers of Descartes, James Duport and Robert Creighton. The logician Robert Sanderson was another who was deprived of his fellowship during the Civil War. By contrast, Henry More took the Covenant and retained his fellowship at Christ’s College. At the Restoration, a readiness to compromise protected many, though by no means all. In Cambridge, More and Cudworth managed to retain positions, despite hostility from doctrinaire royalists. Others were less fortunate: Benjamin Whichcote was turned out of his post as Provost of King’s, and John Worthington had to relinquish the Mastership of Jesus College. Trinity College Dublin was badly hit by the political struggles of the time: in 1641 the provost was forced to flee. Despite promises of religious toleration by the returning king, a confessional bar came into effect at the universities. In England, the 1662 Act of Uniformity, requiring subscription to the Church of England had the effect of excluding many university teachers, and many would-be undergraduates. At Oxford, the blind John Troughton (1637–81), identified by Anthony Wood as a scholastic metaphysician, was expelled 78 The Correspondence of John Locke, ed. E. S. De Beer, 8 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976–89), vol. 5, p. 678. Letter 2115. 79 80 Feingold, ‘Mathematical Sciences’, p. 425. Wallis, ‘Autobiography’, p. 39.

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from Oxford in 1662 for religious nonconformity. The same fate befell Theophilus Gale, who had started his career as lecturer in logic at Magdalen College, Oxford, where he had been an associate of John Owen and Thomas Goodwin. Under terms of the Test Act (1673), Oxford and Cambridge persisted in excluding dissenters, a situation which did not substantially change after the 1689 Toleration Act. Reversals of ecclesiastical fortune affected Scotland just as much. The Scottish Episcopalian Robert Baron, sometime principal of Marischal College, Aberdeen, prudently left Scotland in order to avoid taking the Covenant. In the 1660s, with the return of episcopalianism in Scotland, half the Scottish professoriate suffered dismissal.81 But the situation was reversed after 1688—when the so-called ‘Presbyterian Inquisition’ following the Williamite settlement led Scotland’s leading Newtonian David Gregory, an Episcopalian in religion, to quit his chair at Edinburgh University. Scotland’s loss was Oxford’s gain for he was appointed to the Savilian Chair of Astronomy in 1691. Creedal conformity also affected Isaac Newton himself. As a secret antitrinitarian, Newton prudently resigned his fellowship at Trinity College and to take up the post of Master of the Mint. In 1700 Scottish universities had yet to go through the convulsions of further repressive interventions, culminating in the Simson affair of 1717.82 But they were already set on a course towards secularization, which would remove faith-based restrictions on students and teachers, thereby opening the way for universities to develop unfettered by sectarian squabbles. The eighteenth-century Scottish universities would also reap the benefits to the structural and pedagogical reforms of the late seventeenth century, which abolished the regenting system, and instituted specialist chairs, notably in medicine, law, and philosophy.83 By these means the institutional ground was being laid for the flowering of Scottish academic philosophy in the Scottish Enlightenment. By contrast with Scottish universities English universities persisted in excluding dissenters, under terms of the Test Act (1673), a practice which would contribute to the sterility of English university philosophy in the eighteenth century and which would stimulate the development of colleges for nonconformists outside the university system—the so-called Dissenting Academies. At Trinity College Dublin the monopoly of the Church of Ireland was entrenched, to the continuing disadvantage of both dissenters and Roman Catholics. However, the effect of this was somewhat mitigated by the fact that the college statutes required that a high proportion of places be reserved for native Irish students. The college’s recovery after a century of turmoil was further boosted by the founding of Marsh’s Library in 1701, which incorporated Edward Stillingfleet’s collection of 10,000 books. The intellectual achievement of

Cant, ‘Origins of the Enlightenment in Scotland: The Universities’, p. 42. James K. Cameron, ‘Theological Controversy: A Factor in the Origins of the Scottish Enlightenment’, in Campbell and Skinner (eds), Origins, pp. 117–18. See also Shepherd, ‘Philosophy and Science’. 83 Feingold, ‘Mathematical Sciences’, p. 447. 81 82

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the college is signified by its two most notable philosophical alumni, William Molyneux and George Berkeley.

Dissenting Academies In England, Dissenters responded to the educational discrimination enshrined in the Clarendon Code by founding their own colleges outside the university system, known as Dissenting Academies. There had been cases before the restoration when university teachers had been excluded for religious reasons. One example is William Ames. Another is the Presbyterian Henry Jeanes (1611–62), who had started his career as a university teacher of metaphysics, physics, and logic at Oxford and subsequently taught in his own home. Anthony Wood reports that by ‘pecking and hewing continually at Logick and Physicks, [he] became a most noted and ready Disputant’.84 The earliest post-Restoration Dissenting Academies, were set up as philosophy schools.85 Initially the tutors were all educated at Oxford or Cambridge, with the result that the philosophy curriculum was modelled on the universities, with Latin the main language for instruction. As in the universities, the new texts were introduced alongside the old. In 1689 the Bethnal Green Academy was still using Suarez’s metaphysics. Contemporary authorities like Pufendorf and Le Clerc’s Ontologia and logic were also in use. But nonconformists did produce texts of their own. The most substantial philosophical work was by Theophilus Gale, founder of one of the earliest academies, in Newington Green, London. Gale’s learned account of the origins of knowledge and truth, The Court of the Gentiles (1669), was written after he left Oxford. Five times reprinted, it was evidently a publishing success. Like Cudworth’s True Intellectual System of the Universe, with which Gale’s book has many affinities, Gale traces a heritage of philosophical truth through ancient philosophy, giving prominence to Platonism. His Ideae theologiae (1673) and Philosophia generalis (1676) recuperates aspects of this work. In time there was demand for textbooks specifically for nonconformist academies. Thomas Gower is an early example of someone who responded to this demand. Gower’s Ars sciendi sive logica novo methodo disposita and Logica elenctica were produced for use in his dissenting academy in Connor, County Antrim, and were also used as textbooks in other dissenting academies in England and at Harvard. Despite the political and religious turmoil of the period, seventeenth-century universities retained their function as educators of the gentry and professions. Although there was much that was archaic about the philosophy which was taught 84 Mark Burden, ‘Academical Learning in the Dissenters' Private Academies, 1660–1720’ (Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 2012). 85 David Wykes, ‘The Contribution of the Dissenting Academy to the Emergence of Rational Dissent’, in K. Haakonssen (ed.), Enlightenment and Religion: Rational Dissent in Eighteenth-Century Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); M. A. Stewart, Independency of the Mind in Early Dissent, Congregational Lecture, 2004 (London: Congregational Memorial Hall Trust, 2004).

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within their walls, they embraced the major developments in contemporary thought, albeit in varying degrees and at a variety of paces. By the close of the century the philosophy curriculum had transformed. Aristotle had been comprehensively replaced by modern authors, only retaining a foothold for linguistic and historical reasons. Experimental natural philosophy was now part of the course of study. The teaching of logic, metaphysics, and ethics had been adjusted in line with thinking of the post-Cartesian era. Although philosophy retained its place as part of a general undergraduate education, it was poised to become a more specialist study, especially in Scotland, where the abolition of the regenting system and the appointment of specialist chairs laid the ground for the flowering of Scottish philosophy in the eighteenth century. In Ireland, Trinity College Dublin was beginning to produce thinkers of the first rank. Even if the most original philosophy of the seventeenth century was produced largely outside the universities, they had a significant role in the reception, critique, and transmission of the philosophical developments of the period.

3 Cross-Currents, Conduits, and Conversations ‘La lecture de tous les bons livres est comme une conversation avec les plus honneˆtes gens des sie`cles passe´s’ (Descartes, Discours de la me´thode)

The most familiar image of the seventeenth-century philosopher is probably Descartes’ self-presentation as a lone thinker pursuing his philosophical investigations not by reference to others, but simply by using the resources of his own mind—namely native ‘good sense’ or ‘reason’ (defined as ‘the power of judging well and of distinguishing the true from the false’).1 Descartes made such a virtue of self-reflection that he claimed that ignorance of other philosophy was an advantage to clear thinking, even that the study of other philosophy only served to render those who studied it less capable of reason than they would have been had they never done so. Other seventeenth-century philosophers sound variations on this theme—Bacon in his repudiation of past philosophy, especially ancient philosophy, and Hobbes, in his recommendation that one should read oneself instead of books.2 The image of the lone philosopher reliant solely on the internal workings of the mind is captured elegantly in the frontispiece which graces Margaret Cavendish’s Philosophical and Physical Opinions (1655). This features a portrait of Margaret Cavendish by Abraham van Diepenbeeck accompanied by a verse description of her as alone, without books: Studious She is and all Alone Most visitants, when She has none, Her Library on which She look’s It is her Head, her Thoughts her Books. Scorninge dead Ashes without fire For her owne Flames doe her Inspire.3

Rene´ Descartes, Discourse on the Method, CSMK, vol. 1, p. 111. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Noel Malcolm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), vol. 2, p. 19. Hobbes translates the saying ‘nosce teipsum’ (know thyself ) as ‘Read thyself ’. 3 Margaret Cavendish, Philosophical and Physical Opinions (London, 1655). 1 2

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However, such solipsistic images of the philosopher as a lone thinker, deducing truth by means of his (or in Cavendish’s case, her) own unassisted reason, belies actual practice. In reality seventeenth-century philosophers, Margaret Cavendish included, did not philosophize in isolation. Even Descartes acknowledged that his project of self-instruction (‘le dessein que j’ai de m’instruire’) could not progress without engaging with others. The ‘Objections’ and ‘Replies’ to his Meditations exemplify just this point. Philosophical conversations in any period might be direct (discussing or refuting one another’s theories) or indirect (taking up topics treated by others). Philosophical interchange gave seventeenth-century British philosophy an international dimension. This chapter will give some account of the main philosophical cross-currents of the period, indicating the main conduits of philosophical interchange available to seventeenth-century Britons—travel, translation, access to books, correspondence, intellectual circles. The second half of the chapter will survey the principal philosophers, both ancient and modern, with whom British philosophers interacted.

Conduits: Travel In order to understand how encountering other philosophy was made possible it is essential to consider the means of intellectual exchange. This is particularly important in view of the role of European philosophers in the intellectual history of the seventeenth century. In philosophical dialogue then, as now, conversations could be with one’s contemporaries or predecessors (Gassendi with Bacon, Locke with Descartes). In some cases it was quite literally conducted personally (an example is Henry More’s correspondence with Descartes). Every bit as important as books and journals for intellectual exchange was the direct contact between philosophers made possible by overseas travel. The intellectually curious traveller would be sure to visit men of ideas. The most important philosophical calling point was the network organized by the French Minim friar, Marin Mersenne, in Paris. A friend of, among others, Descartes and Gassendi, Mersenne was an important facilitator of new philosophical, scientific, and mathematical thinking, through his extensive correspondence and his ‘academie parisienne’. This was host not just to Frenchmen like Samuel Sorbie`re and Claude Mydorge, but to foreigners visiting Paris. The British visitors included Hobbes, Kenelm Digby, Thomas White, and Edward Lord Herbert of Cherbury. It was through the Mersenne circle that Hobbes’s reputation as a philosopher was established, long before he published any philosophical writings.4

4 Helen Hervey, ‘Hobbes and Descartes in the Light of some Unpublished Letters of the Correspondence between Sir Charles Cavendish and Dr John Pell’, Osiris, 10 (1952): 67–90. For drafts of the Cavendish–Pell letters, see British Library MSS, Additional 4280 and 4278. For Hobbes and the Cavendish circle, see Chapter 5.

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There were, of course, many non-philosophical reasons for foreign travel—trade, diplomacy, education, and exile—most of which provided opportunities for philosophical exchange.5 In some cases diplomatic postings made possible the interchange of philosophical ideas: this was true for Herbert of Cherbury, British ambassador in Paris from 1619 to 1624, and Sir John Finch, English resident at the Medici court in Florence, and subsequently Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire (1672–81). Sir William Boswell, English Resident at The Hague from 1632 to 1650, had a deep personal interest in new learning, and acted as a key point of interchange between like-minded persons, including members of the Cavendish circle. Locke’s first overseas trip was as secretary to the 1665 embassy to the Elector of Brandenburg, during which he had the opportunity to observe a community where different religious groups were able to practise their faith in harmony with one another. Henry Oldenburg, secretary to the Royal Society was a native of Bremen, who originally came to England on a diplomatic mission. A major reason for foreign travel was educational. It seems to have been more common for Scottish students than for English ones to complete their university studies in Europe. One of the most travelled was Duncan Liddel (1561–1613) of King’s College, Aberdeen, who went to University of Frankfurt an der Oder, to study mathematics and philosophy with fellow Scot John Craig.6 After returning to Scotland in 1582 Liddel moved for a while to Breslau; thence to Rostock, where he proceeded MA in philosophy, back to Frankfurt, Helmstedt, and back to Scotland in 1606. In 1603 Patrick Dun (baptized 1581, d. 1652), followed Liddel to the University of Helmstedt, then visited the University of Heidelberg and the Huguenot academy at Nıˆmes, before graduating in medicine at Basel in 1607 and returning to Aberdeen to teach logic. Early in his career Robert Leighton travelled in France and in the Spanish Netherlands. The monarchist political theorist Sir George Mackenzie of Rosehaugh (1636/8–1691) studied law at the University of Bourges. Many British students of medicine went to Europe as part of their training. Sir John Finch, for example, studied anatomy at Padua (MD 1657), while Nathaniel Fairfax and Richard Burthogge studied medicine in Leiden in 1662 (Fairfax having been ejected from a church living, Burthogge after graduating from Oxford). Sir Robert Sibbald was another who studied in Leiden. Thereafter he proceeded to Paris and Angers, where he graduated MD. Although not a student at the time, it was to further his medical knowledge that Locke visited Montpelier during travels in France between 1675 and 1678. Learning French enabled him to follow French philosophical 5 On the intellectual consequences of exile, see Timothy Raylor, ‘Exiles, Expatriates and Travellers: Towards an Intellectual and Cultural History of the English Abroad, 1640–1660’, in Philip Major (ed.), Literatures of Exile in the English Revolution and its Aftermath, 1640–90 (Aldershot: Ashgate 2010), pp. 15–43. 6 G. Molland, ‘Scottish-Continental Intellectual Relations as Mirrored in the Career of Duncan Liddel (1561–1613)’, in Paul Dukes (ed.), The Universities of Aberdeen and Europe: The First Three Centuries (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1995), pp. 79–101.

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debates and to make a translation of Nicole’s Essais de morale. He also made the acquaintance of Franc¸ois Bernier and Gilles de Launay, two followers of Gassendi. Many of the sons of the gentry concluded their education by travelling in Europe— a practice which later developed into ‘the grand tour’. Francis Bacon spent two and a half years in France, between leaving Cambridge and starting his legal training at Grays Inn. The European educational tour of the young Robert Boyle took him to France, Italy, and Switzerland in the company of one of his brothers and their tutor Isaac Marcombes. Every such young traveller would be accompanied by a tutor: both Thomas Hobbes and Thomas Burnet travelled to Europe in this capacity, so enabling them to develop contacts in France and Italy. Locke, too, acted as tutor to a young Englishman, Caleb Banks, while he was in France in 1677. Some who studied abroad did so for religious reasons. This applied particularly to Catholics, some of whom subsequently found posts abroad. One such was the Irish Jesuit Henry FitzSimon (1566–1643) who taught philosophy at Douai after studying in Paris. Another Irish Jesuit, Andrew Sall (c.1620–82), taught moral philosophy, logic, physics, and metaphysics for seventeen years at several Jesuit colleges and universities in Spain, before returning to Ireland and converting to Protestantism. The English Jesuit Thomas Carleton Compton (1591–1666), author of Philosophia universa (Antwerp, 1649), taught at St Omer and Lie`ge after studying at St Omer, Madrid, and Valladolid.7 Another English Jesuit, Anthony Bonville (1623–76), taught philosophy at Florence before being appointed professor of philosophy at the University of Parma. The future Catholic Archbishop of Dublin, Peter Talbot (1618/20–1688) studied and then taught philosophy at Coimbra. The Irish Scotists Hugh Macaughwell, Luke Wadding, and John Punch were all sent abroad to study and remained overseas: Macaughwell studied at Salamanca, Wadding at Lisbon and Coimbra, Punch at Louvain and Cologne. Another Irish Catholic, Michael Moor (Morus) (1640–1726), studied with the Oratorians in Paris. Although he was briefly Provost of Trinity College Dublin in 1689, most of Moor’s career was spent in Paris. Many of the Scots who studied in Europe found employment in the Protestant universities and academies of Germany, France, and the Netherlands.8 This was easier at a time when Latin was the common linguistic currency for educated Europeans. Scots teaching in European universities included William Makdowell (MacDowell) who taught at Groningen, John Murdison who taught at Leiden 1603–5, Gilbert Jack who taught at Leiden, and Mark Duncan at Saumur. After studying at Aberdeen and Heidelberg, Walter Donaldson (c.1570–1630) held appointments at Frankfurt and Sedan. Duncan Liddel was made professor of mathematics at Helmsted. Adam Steuart 7 Jesuit teachers of philosophy at Lie`ge included Francis Fitton and Edward Courtney. Listed in T. M. McCoog, English and Welsh Jesuits, 1555–1650, 2 vols (Southampton: Catholic Record Society, 1994–5). 8 See Paul Dibon, L’Enseignement philosophique dans les universite´s ne´erlandaises a` l’e´poque pre´Carte´sienne (1575–1650) (Diss., University of Leiden, 1954); Paul Dibon, La Philosophie ne´erlandaise au sie`cle d’or (Paris/New York: Elsevier, 1954).

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(1591–1654) taught philosophy at Saumur in 1617, and subsequently at Sedan and Leiden, where he joined forces with Revius in his dispute with the pro-Cartesian Heereboord. John Cameron (1579–1625) was appointed to teach philosophy at Saumur, and thereafter taught at Bergerac, Bordeaux, and Montauban, with a brief spell as Principal at Glasgow (1622–4). Dubbed ‘Bezaemastix’ for his opposition to the stern Calvinism of Theodore Be`ze, Cameron’s pupils included the French Protestant theologian Moı¨se Amyraut. Walter Donaldson (baptized 1574), graduate of King’s College, Aberdeen, studied law at Heidelberg from 1599, before taking up an appointment as professor of law at Sedan in 1603, where he remained for sixteen years. His son held a succession of posts abroad, first at Sedan as professor of natural and moral philosophy, thereafter as academy principal. Subsequently he was appointed principal of the new Protestant academy proposed at Charenton and then principal at the academy of La Rochelle. For a number of expatriate professors, however, sojourn abroad was involuntary: William Ames ended up in Franeker, after being ejected from Cambridge in 1609. In 1611 Andrew Melville took up an appointment at Saumur after imprisonment in the Tower of London by James VI and I. In a century plagued by civil and religious disturbances, not all foreign travel took place under peaceful conditions. Forced exile could sometimes be beneficial, however. For example, as a haven for European Protestant refugees from the Thirty Years War, England benefited from the energy and vision of men like Samuel Hartlib, who acted as an important conduit of new scientific and philosophical ideas and was a refugee from Bohemia. The exiled Huguenots Michel Le Vasseur and Franc¸ois la Pillonnie`re, who settled in England, were a conduit for Malebranche’s philosophy. The same reasons that brought European exiles to Britain took British philosophers in the reverse direction. Hobbes’s voluntary exile in Paris during the English Civil Wars gave him the chance to participate in the philosophical circles of Mersenne and Mydorge. In the case of the Scottish jurist James Dalrymple, Viscount Stair (1619–95), retirement to Leiden in 1682 seems to have been personal choice. While there he published his Physiologia nova experimentalis (1686). In 1683, following the implication of his patron the first Earl of Shaftesbury in plots to forestall the succession of James II, John Locke went into self-imposed exile in the Netherlands, which was the philosophical and political hub of the Huguenot re´fuge.

Correspondence Letters have always been an important medium of intellectual exchange, especially for the international traffic of philosophical ideas: Charles Cavendish’s wide range of correspondents included the Hamburg philosopher Joachim Jungius. Hobbes’s correspondence is an important source for his intellectual milieu.9 John Locke’s correspondence with Molyneux, published as Some Familiar Letters between Mr Locke and 9

Thomas Hobbes, Correspondence, ed. Noel Malcolm, 2 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).

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Several of his Friends (1708) was the source of several important additions to his Essay Concerning Human Understanding. It was via epistolary circulation that Leibniz’s first comments on Locke’s essay were aired. Private letters were especially important for women as a means of philosophizing: Anne Conway’s correspondence with Henry More and Damaris Masham’s correspondence with John Locke and with Leibniz are examples. The exchange of letters between Mary Astell and John Norris published in Letters Concerning the Love of God (1695) originated as a private correspondence. It was common practice among recipients to share the content of letters. The seventeenth century saw the institutionalization of letter-exchange with the establishment of two major public correspondence networks in England: the first of these was the ‘Office of Addresses’ organized by the intelligencer Samuel Hartlib, during the Commonwealth period.10 This functioned as an intellectual news network, through which new ideas were circulated and thinkers put in touch with each other: it was through Hartlib, for example, that More and Descartes were put in touch with each other. The second major correspondence network of the period was the one set up by the Royal Society. As a disseminator of new ideas, this performed a similar function to Hartlib’s epistolary network. It was conducted in a more formal way by the society’s secretary, an office performed for many years by Hartlib’s friend, Henry Oldenberg. These formal correspondence networks facilitated contact with overseas networks and academies from the second half of the century.

Books and Translations Although some philosophers had contact through letters or personal acquaintance, books were the main vehicle for the circulation of philosophy across Europe and across time. Editions and translations of both classical and contemporary texts were of key importance in the seventeenth century. At a time when Latin was still the lingua franca of Europe, vernacular translation was not an essential prerequisite for the dissemination of ideas. Hobbes, Bacon, and Herbert of Cherbury all wrote primarily in Latin for international consumption, as did Gassendi and Grotius. Locke’s Epistola de tolerantia was written in Latin for European consumption and subsequently translated into English (by his friend William Popple) appearing as A Letter Concerning Toleration in 1690. The quantity of English translations of European philosophy is therefore not a good guide to the reception of works originally written in Latin. However, translation of Latin works into English is some indicator that there was a non-learned readership for philosophy. With increasing use of the vernacular as the language of philosophy, together with a 10 Charles Webster, The Great Instauration: Science, Medicine and Reform, 1626–1660 (London: Duckworth, 1975); Mark Greengrass, Michael Leslie, and Timothy Raylor, Samuel Hartlib and Universal Reformation: Studies in Intellectual Communication (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

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widening audience for philosophy, translation into English increased in importance, as did translation from English into Latin or French. Among the translations from French by Hobbes’s friend, John Davies of Kidwelly, were Cureau de la Chambre, Art de connoistre les hommes, Boileau’s The Life, and Philosophy, of Epictetus, and La Rochefoucauld’s Maximes of Epictetus, all published in 1670. Many vernacular and Latin translations and editions of English philosophy were printed in the Netherlands, which was a major centre of the European book trade.11 With the rise of the learned journal and the adoption of French as the language of intellectual exchange, translation into French was increasingly important for the dissemination of British Philosophy in Europe. For example Lady Masham’s A Discourse Concerning the Love of God was published in French as Discours sur l’Amour Divin (1705). In the second half of the seventeenth century specialist journals played an important role in circulating ideas and information about new books. Some of the most important of these were international, for example Jean Le Clerc’s Bibliothe`que choisie and Bibliothe`que universelle and Henri Basnages’s Histoire des ouvrages des savans centred in the Huguenot re´fuge in Holland. The first (abridged) version of Locke’s Essay was published in French in Jean Le Clerc’s Bibliothe`que choisie in Le Clerc’s translation as ‘Extrait d’un livre anglois . . . intitule´ essai philosophique concernant l’entendement’. Le Clerc also published translations of excerpts from Cudworth’s True Intellectual System in Bibliothe`que choisie. French translations of a substantial number of articles from the Royal Society’s Philosophical Transactions were printed in the Journal des Sc¸avans between 1665 and 1701.12 A consequence of the increasing use of the vernacular by British philosophers was that, for the purposes of reaching an international audience, translation into Latin became more common. With an eye to the wider circulation of his works, Robert Boyle commissioned Latin translations of his own works for both home and European consumption. As a result he was probably the most translated natural philosopher with over twenty-six translations to his name. Henry More is another who translated his works into Latin in order to reach a European audience. Hobbes wrote most of his works in Latin, and arranged for a translation into Latin of the only work of his first published in English, Leviathan. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society was the most important medium for natural philosophy, but its being in English was a disadvantage for international circulation. To remedy this a Latin translation of the first volumes was commissioned from Christoph Sand in 1671.13

11

Cornelis W. Schoneveld, Intertraffic of the Mind: Studies in Seventeenth-Century Anglo-Dutch Translation with a Checklist of Books Translated from English into Dutch, 1600–1700 (Leiden: Leiden University Press for the Sir Thomas Browne Institute, 1983). 12 Anthony Turner, ‘An Interrupted Story: French Translations from Philosophical Transactions in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries’, Notes and Records of the Royal Society, 62 (2008): 341–54. 13 Acta Philosophia Societatis Regiae in Anglia anni . . . 1665, 1666, 1667, 1668 (Amsterdam, 1672). There had been an earlier, but less than satisfactory, translation of the volume for 1669 by John Stirpin (Turner, ‘An Interrupted Story’).

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Dialogues with the Dead In the seventeenth-century dialogue with other philosophers through books was just as likely to be a dialogue with the distant past, as with the recently dead. Descartes himself acknowledged that: the reading good books is like having a conversation with the most distinguished men of past ages—indeed, a rehearsed conversation in which these authors reveal to us only the best of their thought.14

Notwithstanding the forceful repudiation of ancient philosophy by Bacon and Hobbes, some of the most significant new developments in seventeenth-century philosophy resulted from a creative engagement with philosophies of the past. In fact the potential for conversation with ancient philosophy was probably richer in the seventeenth century than at any previous time. Before the fifteenth century many ancient philosophers were known only through part of their writings (as was the case with Plato) or indirectly through references to them in early Christian writings or Aristotle himself. By 1600 most of the extant corpus of classical philosophy had been recovered, thanks to the labours of humanist scholars since the early Renaissance. Aristotle now had to compete with the rest of philosophical antiquity, especially Platonism, Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Scepticism, which could be accessed in modern translations or original language editions. In the early modern period, ancient philosophers were studied not as ‘dead’ philosophers for antiquarian reasons only, but as thinkers to be evaluated for what they could contribute to the present. That did, of course, mean that it was necessary to accommodate ancient philosophy to the religious and cultural circumstances of early modern Christian Europe. Chiefly for these reasons, seventeenth-century readings of ancient philosophy are often very different from modern ones. Nevertheless, the general direction of the study of ancient philosophy was towards a better historical understanding of the texts and more philosophically acute readings of them.

Platonism The longest philosophical conversations with antiquity were the conversations with Plato and Aristotle. Aristotelianism which had formed the backbone of scholastic philosophy since the Middle Ages will be discussed in the next chapter. By contrast, the legacy of Platonism was more diffuse and discontinuous. Since Patristic times, when Augustine, Clement, Origen, and others drew on it, Platonism has had a history of adaptation to meet the philosophical needs of Christianity. Plato was interpreted

14 Descartes, Discourse, CSMK, vol. 1, p. 113. ‘La lecture de tous les bons livres est comme une conversation avec les plus honneˆtes gens des sie`cles passe´s, qui en ont e´te´ les auteurs, et meˆme une conversation e´tudie´e en laquelle ils ne nous de´couvrent que les meilleures de leurs pense´es’.

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as ‘Moses talking Attic Greek’, and the accommodation of Platonism to Christianity was made the more plausible by misunderstandings: Dionysius the Areopagite (Pseudo-Dionysius), for example, was mistakenly identified with the Dionysius converted by St Paul. The Platonist philosophy of the Christian era owes much to the later Platonists and has a strong religious focus. It is also highly diverse: two preeminent examples, the Irishman John Scottus Eriugena15 and the German Nicholas of Cusa, did not have access to the full corpus Platonicum but drew heavily on Pseudo-Dionysius. Even during the ascendancy of scholastic Aristotelianism, Platonism was important in the metaphysics of Thomistic philosophy. In the Renaissance, the full corpus of Plato’s dialogues was made available for the first time since antiquity in the editions and Latin translations by the Italian humanist philosopher Marsilio Ficino (1433–99).16 In order to recommend his translations of the newly recovered Platonic corpus to Christian society, Ficino stressed Plato’s religious credentials. Thereafter, throughout the early modern period Plato was read as a proto-Christian sage, and his philosophy of love reinterpreted as chaste and spiritual Platonic love. The recovery of later Platonists, notably Plotinus, served to reinforce the treatment of Platonism as a religious philosophy. Christian Platonism was well established by 1600, by which time Ficino’s translation had been superseded by others. The edition with Latin translation by Jean de Serres (Serranus) and Henri Estienne (Stephanus) (1578) was the most widely used in England. A Latin translation of a selection of Plato’s works was published in England in 1673, with a Preface by John North, and an English translation of the Apology and Phaedo in 1675.17 The main exponents of Christian Platonism in Britain were the philosophers known as the Cambridge Platonists—the subject of Chapter 7. John Norris and Shaftesbury were also philosophers in the Platonic tradition (see Chapter 7).

Stoicism, Scepticism, and Epicureanism Another strand of classical philosophy which had a significant impact on seventeenth-century philosophy was Stoicism. The Stoic emphasis on the passions was important in moral philosophy, and stoicism was an important source for natural law theory of Hugo Grotius (see below). The Stoic notion of seminal principles or common notions is significant for the epistemologies of Herbert of Cherbury, the Cambridge Platonists, and John Wilkins (see Chapters 5, 7, and 9),18 while the Stoic conception of the pneuma is a source for the cosmological views of Cudworth and 15 John Scottus Eriugena, Divisione naturae was edited and printed in Oxford in 1681. A translation of Cusanus’ Idiota was printed as The Idiot in London in 1650. De visione Dei was translated by Giles Randall and published in London in 1646. 16 James Hankins, Plato in the Italian Renaissance, 2 vols (Leiden: Brill, 1989). 17 Platonis de rebus divinis dialogi selecti (Cambridge, 1673; repr. 1683); Plato his Apology of Socrates, and Phædo (London, 1675). An English translation of Dacier’s French translation was published in 1701. 18 For the ‘notiones communes’ see Cicero, De legibus I, 8, 24; Tusculan Disputations I, 24, } 57.

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More. Stoic philosophy was known directly through Cicero and Seneca, but also through adaptations, notably the Christian Stoicism of Joost Lips (Justus Lipsius) whose De constantia (1584) saw three English imprints and three translations.19 Another source for Stoic moral philosophy was the French Stoic Guillaume du Vair, whose Philosophie morale des Stoiques (1585) was twice translated as The Moral Philosophie of the Stoicks by Thomas James in 1598, and again by Charles Cotton in 1664.20 There were two seventeenth-century English translations of Du Vair’s De la constance et consolation ´es calamitez publiques.21 Du Vair’s English translator, Thomas James underlined the closeness of Stoicism to Christianity: ‘that no kinde of philosophie is more profitable and nearer approaching unto Christianitie than the philosophie of the Stoicks’.22 And it was this aspect that attracted Sir George Mackenzie of Rosehaugh (1636/1638–1691), author of Religio stoici (1663).23 A major difference between the seventeenth-century study of ancient philosophy and that of the Renaissance is the prominence of Scepticism and Epicureanism.24 In the Renaissance, the writings of Cicero were the main source of sceptical ideas. These continued to furnish a range of arguments that had been taken up as debating points in natural theology. Another source of ancient scepticism was the work of Galen.25 New to the conversation with classical philosophy was Pyrrhonian scepticism, knowledge of which was recovered with the writings of Sextus Empiricus, first printed in a Greek edition in 1621 by Petrus and Jacobus Chouet, and translated into Latin by Henricus Stephanus and Gentian Hervet in the late sixteenth century. Seventeenth-century scepticism took many forms. It is rarely encountered in explicitly Pyrrhonian or Ciceronian forms, but was a diffused presence in a variety of philosophical contexts. It was mediated by works like Charron’s De la sagesse (1601) which was strongly influenced by Montaigne, and which proved popular in the English translation by Samson Lennard.26 Charron was a source for the mitigated 19 De constantia was printed in London, 1586, 1592, and Oxford in 1663. It was translated into English as Two Bookes of Constancie (1595) by P. Short and with the title A Discourse of Constancy (by R.G., 1654, and by Nathaniel Wanley, 1670). 20 Charles Cotton’s translation was reprinted several times, 1667, 1671, 1682. 21 A Buckler against Aduersitie: or A Treatise of Constancie trans. Andrew Court (London, 1622), and The True Way to Vertue and Happinesse (London, 1623). 22 G. Du Vair, The Moral Philosophie of the Stoicks, ed. R. Kirk, trans. T. James (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1951), p. 45. 23 Printed in Edinburgh and in London, 1665, and translated as The Religious Stoic (London, 1685, 1693, 1698). The Scottish bishop Robert Leighton was another who accepted this view of Stoicism. See David Allan, ‘Reconciliation and Retirement in the Restoration Scottish Church: The Neo-Stoicism of Robert Leighton’, The Journal of Ecclesiastical History, 50 (1999): 251–78. 24 Richard H. Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza, rev. edn (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979); C. B. Schmitt, Cicero Scepticus: A Study of the Influence of the Academica in the Renaissance (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972); C. B. Schmitt, ‘The Rediscovery of Ancient Skepticism in Modern Times’, in Miles Burnyeat (ed.), The Skeptical Tradition (Berkeley, Los Angeles, & London: UCLA Press, 1983), pp. 225–51. 25 Ian Maclean, ‘The “Sceptical Crisis” Reconsidered’: Galen, Rational Medicine and the Libertas Philosophandi’, Early Science and Medicine, 11 (2006): 247–74. 26 Of Wisedome (1608) was reprinted many times.

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scepticism of Joseph Glanvill’s Scepsis scientifica (1665), in which he argued that although we cannot find truth, we can try to avoid error by following clear rules. He also argued that this mitigated scepticism was consistent with Baconian science. Epicurean philosophy attracted new interest as a source for natural and moral philosophy.27 The main repositories for Epicurean ideas were Diogenes Laertius and Lucretius’ poem De rerum natura, which was well known in the Renaissance.28 But Epicurus had a reputation as an atheist, and his materialism was problematic for his early modern readers. However, like other ancient philosophies, Epicureanism was ‘Christianized’ for seventeenth-century consumption, opening the way for the adoption of Epicurean ideas in natural and moral philosophy. The ‘baptism’ of Epicurus was the achievement of the French philosopher Pierre Gassendi (see next section). Walter Charleton was the most significant disseminator of Epicureanism in England, drawing on him in both his moral and natural philosophy (see Chapter 8). A translation of Antoine Le Grand’s early work on Epicurean philosophy was published in 1676 as Divine Epicurus, or, The Empire of Pleasure over the Virtues.

Pierre Gassendi The work of Pierre Gassendi (1592–1655) is a pre-eminent example of constructive engagement between seventeenth-century philosophy and ancient philosophy. Gassendi was a philosopher in the humanist mould, who used the historical and textual methodologies developed by humanist scholars to investigate alternatives to Aristotle within the corpus of ancient philosophy.29 Having encountered Pyrrhonist scepticism in the writings of Sextus Empiricus, he concluded that no philosophy was immune from the destructive power of sceptical critique. Gassendi first made his mark as an anti-Aristotelian philosopher, with his Exercitationes paradoxicae adversus Aristoteleos (1624). In this work he applied sceptical arguments to expose Aristotle’s philosophy as contradictory, meaningless, and incapable of yielding true conclusions. Gassendi then turned to scepticism itself and to Epicureanism in order to find alternatives to Aristotelianism, especially in natural philosophy. 27 Margaret J. Osler (ed.), Atoms, Pneuma and Tranquility: Epicurean and Stoic Themes in European Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 28 The only published translation was a partial one by John Evelyn, who translated book 1 (1656). A full English translation was made by Lucy Hutchinson, which she did not publish: Lucy Hutchinson, The Translation of Lucretius, ed. Reid Barbour and David Norbrook; Latin text by Maria Cristina Zerbino; in The Works of Lucy Hutchinson, vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 29 Lynn Sumida Joy, Gassendi, the Atomist: Advocate of History in an Age of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Popkin, History of Scepticism; Antonia LoLordo, Pierre Gassendi and the Birth of Early Modern Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Margaret J. Osler, ‘How Mechanical was the Mechanical Philosophy? Non-Epicurean Aspects of Gassendi’s Philosophy of Nature’, in Christoph H. Lüthy, John E. Murdoch, and William R. Newman (eds), Medieval and Early Modern Corpuscular Matter Theories (Leiden: Brill, 2001), pp. 423–65; also Antonio Clericuzio, ‘Gassendi, Charleton and Boyle on Matter and Motion’, in Lüthy, Murdoch, and Newman (eds), Medieval and Early Modern Corpuscular Matter Theories, pp. 468–82.

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Gassendi turned to the philosophy of Epicurus to replace Aristotle, whom he denounced as an atheist. This was a bold move in light of Epicurus’ reputation as an atheist, and it required a considerable scholarly effort on Gassendi’s part to rehabilitate him as a philosopher worthy of attention in a religious age. The fruits of this scholarship were Gassendi’s Philosophiæ Epicuri syntagma and his commentary on the writings of Epicurus (Animadversiones in decimum libum Diogeni laertii) which were first published in his Opera omnia of 1658. Gassendi’s rehabilitation of Epicurus involved rejecting aspects of his philosophy—his denial of the immortality of the soul, and his attribution of motion to chance. Gassendi revised Epicurean atomism, to provide an atomistic account of the structure of matter, which explained macrolevel properties in terms of micro-level structure. The properties of atoms which he retained from Epicureanism (size, shape, weight, and solidity) are fundamentally compatible with mechanistic theory, but he also attributed to atoms an inclination to motion. Gassendi exonerated Epicurus from many of the charges laid against him as an atheistical philosopher, blaming his detractors for presenting a distorted view of his philosophy. In his own posthumously published Syntagma philosophicum (1658), which incorporates his work on scepticism and Epicureanism, Gassendi sought to replace the logic, physics, and ethics of Aristotle with a new philosophy based on Epicureanism. Lord Herbert, Hobbes, William Petty, and Sir Charles Cavendish were all acquainted with Gassendi personally. Gassendi’s work on Epicurus became known in England principally through Thomas Stanley and Walter Charleton, though a number of others had direct contact with him. Stanley’s History of Philosophy (1655–6) incorporates Gassendi’s life of Epicurus. Charleton (of whom more in Chapter 8) is particularly important for disseminating Gassendi’s Epicurean natural philosophy in Britain by means of his Physiologia Epicuro-Gassendo-Charltoniana (1654). Gassendi’s Philosophiæ Epicuri syntagma,30 and his Instituto logica were both published in London in 1660 (reprinted 1668).31 Instituto logica was also appended to the Oxford edition of Du Trieu’s Manductio ad logicam in 1662 (reprinted 1678).32 Gassendi’s work was well received in Oxford in the 1650s and 1660s.33 Thomas Barlow lists Gassendi and Descartes alongside Digby, White, and Bacon’s Sylva sylvarum in his recommended reading for students of natural philosophy. Robert Boyle apparently read Gassendi at an early point in his study of natural philosophy. It is most likely that it was at Oxford that John Locke first encountered Gassendi. If assessed in terms of book lists, editions, and translations, the impact of Gassendi on 30

Philosophiæ Epicuri syntagma, continens Canonicam, Physicam, & Ethicam of 1649. His Institutio astronomica was a popular as a textbook for the new astronomy, with several English printings by 1702. Two editions were conveniently published with Galileo’s Sidereus Nuncius and Kepler’s Dioptrices, London, 1653, 1675, 1683, 1702. 32 Philippe Du Trieu, Manuductio ad logicam (Oxford, 1662, 1678). Also printed with this was Gassendi, Elegans dissertatiuncula de natura demonstrationis. 33 Feingold, ‘Mathematical Sciences’, in HUO, vol. 4, pp. 405–12. 31

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British philosophy appears considerably less than Descartes, but there is no question that through Hobbes, Boyle, and Locke his influence on mainstream natural philosophy was considerable.

Hugo Grotius Another example of constructive engagement between ancient and modern philosophy, in this case Stoicism, is to be found in the philosophy of another influential European thinker, the Dutchman Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), whose impact on British philosophy, especially moral and political philosophy, was extensive. Like his friend Lord Herbert of Cherbury, Grotius combined an interest in scepticism and an interest in the rational content of religious belief. In his De veritate religionis Christianae (1627) Grotius attempts to accommodate divergent religious beliefs by focusing on their common core. The appeal of this work, which was the most frequently published of his writings in Britain (with six Latin editions and eight in English—not counting extracts) probably derives from his concern to find a solution to religious conflict. But it was Grotius’ contribution to natural law theory which made most impact on political and moral philosophy. Grotius’ discussion of natural law is contained in his De jure belli ac pacis [On the Rights of War and Peace] (Paris, 1625), which was translated into English in 1654.34 Although natural law theory may be traced back to Thomas Aquinas, Grotius’ contribution marks a radical departure from the Aristotelico-scholastic tradition. He sought to develop a science of ethics based on a limited number of universally recognized principles. In De jure belli ac pacis Grotius founds political association in the law of nature, which he derived from the principle of self-preservation. This principle was the basis of social (and therefore political) life since men form themselves into society for security. Grotius rejects Aristotle’s view of virtue as a mean between extremes. He did nevertheless subscribe to the generally accepted view, endorsed by Aristotle, that man is distinctive by virtue of his reason and his desire for social life. Grotius’ development of the idea of natural law owes much to ancient philosophy, especially Stoicism and scepticism. A key source for these was Cicero’s De finibus and De legibus, where he found arguments in support of the claim that the natural law is grounded in the principle of selfpreservation. Grotius followed Cicero in inferring thence a fundamental right to seek happiness and security and the means to achieve these. He drew on the Stoic

34

Hugo Grotius, Of the Law of Warre and Peace (London, 1654; repr. 1655, 1682). On Grotius see Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories: Their Origins and Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Knud Haakonssen (ed.), Grotius, Pufendorf and Modern Natural Law (Aldershot & Dartmouth: Ashgate, 1999); Knud Haakonssen, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy from Grotius to the Scottish Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996). For a different assessment of Grotius, see Perez Zagorin, ‘Hobbes as a Theorist of Natural Law’, International History Review, 17 (2003), pp. 239–55. Also Noberto Bobbio, Thomas Hobbes and the Natural Law Tradition, trans. Daniela Gobetti (Chicago & London: Chicago University Press, 1993).

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concept of oikeiosis, according to which human beings are by nature sociable, in order to support his own view of mankind as fundamentally social. Significantly, Cicero’s argument had been designed to refute sceptics who denied that knowledge of moral principles was possible. Grotius’ concern with scepticism is signalled by his use of the figure of Carneades as one of the interlocutors in his own dialogue.35 Grotius’ treatment of natural law offended religious sensibilities, because he treated the decalogue not as a summary statement of natural law, but as positive law which, like any instituted laws, may be altered. He also decoupled moral philosophy from theology, and argued for a common set of universal principles as the basis of religious belief. The discussions of natural law in British moral and political thought owe much to Grotius, and his theories were quickly absorbed into the fabric of seventeenthcentury natural law debates. The first to take up Grotius’ ideas in Britain was the scholarly lawyer, John Selden, whose interest was more historical than philosophical.36 But the most powerful response to Grotius’ ideas was by Selden’s friend Thomas Hobbes. In fact Jean-Jacques Rousseau thought their political theories were of a piece. Grotius was an important point of reference for Locke and Cumberland (as we shall see in later chapters). And his indirect influence through the discussions which they generated was strong, particularly through the response to them by the German jurist Samuel Pufendorf (1632–94).37 Through Locke and Pufendorf, Grotius contributes to the Scottish natural law tradition, in which Gershom Carmichael was a key figure. Carmichael would later edit and comment on Pufendorf ’s work on natural law.38

Rene´ Descartes The European philosopher who had the most far-reaching impact on seventeenthcentury philosophy was Rene´ Descartes. In the seventeenth century Descartes’s reputation as a philosopher rested mainly on his Principia philosophiae (1644). Descartes’s writings were circulating in Britain from the 1640s, but the first work 35 For discussion of Grotius’ scepticism see Richard Tuck, ‘Grotius, Carneades and Hobbes’, and Robert Shaver, ‘Grotius on Scepticism and Self-Interest’, both reprinted in Haakonssen (ed.), Grotius, pp. 85–104 and 64–83. 36 Richard Tuck, ‘Grotius and Selden’, in CHPT, pp. 499–539; M. B. Crowe, ‘An Eccentric SeventeenthCentury Witness to the Natural Law: John Selden (1584–1654)’, Natural Law Forum, 12 (1977): 184–95. 37 Pufendorf regarded Grotius as foundational in natural law theory. See Thomas Mautner, ‘Grotius and Scepticism’, JHP, 66 (2005): 577–601, p. 578. But see Bobbio, Thomas Hobbes and the Natural Law Tradition. Bobbio argues that Hobbes and not Grotius is the father of modern natural law tradition. 38 S[amuelis] P[ufendorfi], De officio hominis et civis juxta legem naturalem, libri duo [Two Books on the Duty of Man and Citizen in Relation to Natural Law by Samuel Pufendorf] (Leipzig, 1709). Supplementa et observations ad C[larissimi] V[iri] Sam[uelis] Pufendorfii Libros Duos de officio hominis et civis (Glasgow, 1718). For an English translation by Michael Silverthorne see Gershom Carmichael, Natural Rights on the Threshold of the Scottish Enlightenment: The Writings of Gershom Carmichael, ed. James Moore and Michael Silverthorne (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2002).

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by Descartes to be translated into English was Discours de la me´thode which was published in 1649 as A Discourse of a Method for the Well-Guiding of Reason, and the Discovery of Truth in the Sciences.39 This was followed by The Passions of the Soule in 1650.40 A Latin version of the Discours was printed in Cambridge in 1668.41 The first version of Me´ditations to be published in England was the Meditationes de prima philosophia in 1664. Me´ditations did not appear in English until 1680, when William Molyneux published his translation together with Hobbes’s objections.42 A Latin edition of his letters was printed in 1668, and Henry More’s correspondence with Descartes was published in his 1662 philosophical writings.43 Cartesianism was also disseminated by textbooks such as Adrian Heereboord’s Philosophiae naturalis, originally published in Leiden in 1654: this saw several English imprints in Oxford and London. The earliest knowledge of Descartes’s philosophy was among those like Hobbes and Digby who had contact with the Mersenne circle. Hobbes and the mathematician John Pell were among the first Englishmen to engage with Descartes directly.44 Hobbes was one of the philosophers invited to contribute objections to Descartes’s Me´ditations. Herbert of Cherbury owned a copy of the Me´ditations given to him by Descartes himself. It was possibly via Hobbes that John Selden acquired a copy of the Discourse. Probably the most influential figure in the early reception of Cartesianism in England was Henry More, who is credited with coining the term Cartesianism.45 More was not only one of the first Englishmen to take an interest in Cartesianism, but also one of the first to advocate the teaching of Descartes’s philosophy in English Rene´ Descartes, A Discourse of a Method, for the Well-Guiding of Reason, and the Discovery of Truth in the Sciences (London, 1649). This was based on the 1637 French original, rather than the Latin version (1644). 40 Rene´ Descartes, The Passions of the Soule in Three Books (London, 1650). 41 Rene´ Descartes, Renati Des Cartes specimina philosophiæ: seu dissertatio de methodo (London, James Flesher, 1664). 42 Rene´ Descartes, Six Metaphysical Meditations (London, 1680). 43 Rene´ Descartes, Renati Descartes Epistolæ (London, 1668). Henry More, A Collection of Several Philosophical Writings (London, 1662). 44 On the reception of Cartesianism in England see Marjorie Nicolson, ‘The Early Stage of Cartesianism in England’, Studies in Philology, 26.3 (1929): 356–74; Sterling P. Lamprecht, ‘The Role of Descartes in Seventeenth-Century England’, Studies in the History of Ideas, 3 (1935): 181–240; L. Laudan, ‘The Clock Metaphor and Probabilism: The Impact of Descartes on English Methodological Thought, 1650–1665,’ Annals of Science, 22 (1966): 73–104; Arrigo Pacchi, Cartesio in Inghilterra: da More a Boyle (Rome & Bari: Laterza, 1973); John Gascoigne, Cambridge in the Age of the Enlightenment: Science, Religion and Politics from the Restoration to the French Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); G. A. J. Rogers, ‘Descartes and the English’, in J. D. North and J. J. Roche, The Light of Nature (Dordrecht: Springer, 1985), pp. 281–302. 45 See especially, Alan Gabbey, ‘Philosophia Cartesiana Triumphata: Henry More (1646–1671)’, in T. M. Lennon, J. M. Nicholas, and J. W. Davis (eds), Problems in Cartesianism (Kingston & Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1982). Also Charles Webster, ‘Henry More and Descartes, some New Sources’, British Journal for the History of Science, 4 (1969), pp. 359–77. See also, Theo Verbeek, Descartes and the Dutch: Early Reactions to Cartesian Philosophy, 1637–1650 (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1992). 39

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universities. He entered into correspondence with Descartes in 1648, at the instigation of Samuel Hartlib. More wished to persuade Descartes that all substance, both corporeal and incorporeal, is extended, and that God Himself is res extensa. He disagreed with Descartes over existence of the void, his rejection of final causes, and his denial that animals have souls. He also raised the problem of the transmission of motion from one body to another, if motion like shape is merely a mode of body. He notes places where Descartes is not fully self-consistent, or has dissembled his position, notably in his claim that the universe is indefinite in extent but not infinite. More also rejects all Descartes’s proofs of the existence of God apart from the ontological argument, on the grounds that this was the only one likely to have force with atheists. Initially More commended Cartesianism as ‘one of the best Engines I can finde against such erroneous fabricks in Religion’,46 but he subsequently revised his assessment in the light of what he saw as its potentially atheistic applications, a view which was widely shared. Eventually More came to doubt the theological credentials of Cartesianism, and he called Cartesians ‘nullibists’ (i.e. nowhere-ists), since they argued for the existence of the soul but couldn’t locate it. He added a number of scholia to the Latin edition of his collected works (Opera omnia 1675–9), in order to underline his reservations. Thus, having initially done so much to promote Cartesianism, Henry More eventually became identified as an antiCartesian. His critique of Descartes was influential in the latter half of the seventeenth century in the universities of England and Scotland, as well as with European anti-Cartesians, notably Pierre Daniel Huet. Another promoter of Cartesianism was the educational reformer John Webster, who commended it as preferable to scholasticism on grounds of certainty: ‘the learned Renatus des Chartes’, he declared in his Examen, ‘hath happily performed, having gone back to the very basis of all, which is, that there is mens cogitans, which can no way feign, or excogitate it self not to be, which is a more certain and undeniable principle than ever the Schools invented, or built upon’.47 Descartes also found a champion in Gilbert Clerke whose De plenitudine mundi (1660) undertakes to defend Cartesian philosophy against the views of Bacon, Hobbes, and Seth Ward. Other English admirers of Descartes subscribed to modified versions of Cartesianism, especially his natural philosophy. This is true, in different ways, of Robert Hooke as of Sir Kenelm Digby. Another kind of hybrid Cartesianism is John Clarke’s translation of the Traite´ de physique (1671) by the Cartesian Jacques Rohault, which was published in England in 1692, and was to become one of the widely used textbooks of natural philosophy in England. The notes supplied by Samuel Clarke were ‘taken’, as the subtitle tells us, ‘mostly out of Sir Isaac Newton’s Philosophy’.

46 The Conway Letters: The Correspondence of Anne, Viscountess Conway, Henry More, and their Friends: 1642–1684, ed. M. H. Nicolson, rev. S. Hutton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 204. 47 John Webster, Academiarum examen (London, 1653), p. 84.

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It also incorporates the notes which Antoine Le Grand had provided for his own 1682 annotated edition of the Latin version of Rohault’s Traite´.48 Antoine Le Grand (1627/8–1699) was Descartes’s most consistent advocate in late seventeenth-century Britain. A French Franciscan resident in England from 1656, Le Grand published most of his writings in London. Le Grand had originally published on Stoic and Epicurean ethics—English translations of which appeared in 1669 and 1675.49 Thereafter, he turned his attention to Cartesianism, casting his recensions in scholastic format. His Philosophia veterum e mente Renati Descartes, more scholastico breviter digesta (1671) offers a digest of the theory of the passions which attempts a convergence of Seneca, Epicurus, and Descartes. This was expanded into a compendium for university use (ad usum juventutis academicae) which was reprinted several times.50 His Historia naturae (1679) attempted to apply Cartesian principles to natural phenomena, illustrating these from a variety of experiments. These works were subsequently published in an English translation by Richard Blome with the title An Entire Body of Philosophy According to the Principles of the Famous Renate Descartes (1694). Le Grand also defended Descartes against his English detractors. His Apologia pro Renato Descartes, contra Samuelem Parkerum (1679) vindicates Descartes of the charges of atheism made by Samuel Parker in his Disputationes de Deo (1678). Subsequently Le Grand became embroiled in controversy with his fellow Catholic, the Blackloist John Sergeant, who attacked Descartes’s philosophy as sceptical, and as the originator of the ideism (the doctrine that the only objects of knowledge are ideas, not things) with which he charged both Locke and Malebranche (see Chapter 9).51 The many reprints of Le Grand’s works testify to an enduring interest in Descartes in England, despite the criticisms of Henry More and others. And to judge by their scholastic format Le Grand’s success was within the universities, bearing out the claims of Robert Forbes, regent/principal of King’s College, Aberdeen, who complained in 1680 that ‘The schools are loud with the name of Descarts. Cartesianism flourishes more and more each day, and in flourishing grows proud and insolent.’52 It was perhaps to counter this that anti-Cartesian textbooks like those of Johannes Schuler were published for university use.53 Descartes was one

The notes were translated by The´ophile Bonet. Le Grand published his edition of Rohault in London in 1682 (reprinted 1692 and 1696). 49 Thomas Mautner, ‘From Virtue to Morality: Antoine Le Grand (1629–1699) and the New Moral Philosophy’, Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik, 8 (2000): 209–32. 50 Antoine Le Grand, Institutio philosophiae secundum principia Renati Descartes, nova methodo adornata et explicata, ad usum juventutis academicae (London, 1672; repr. 1675, 1678). 51 Antoine Le Grand, Dissertatio de ratione cognoscendi, et appendix de mutatione formali (1698) and Several Smaller Pieces against M. J. Sergeant (1698). 52 Christine Shepherd, ‘Philosophy and Science in the Arts Curriculum of the Scottish Universities in the 17th Century’. Ph.D. diss., University of Edinburgh, 1975, p. 139. 53 Johannes Schuler (d. 1676), Exercitationes ad principiorum Descarti primam partem (Cambridge, 1682 and [1686]). Also his Examinis philosophiæ Renati Des-cartes specimen, sive Brevis & perspicua principiorum philosophiæ Cartesianæ refutatio (Cambridge, 1685). 48

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of the ‘unprofitable writers’ whom the diehard Aristotelian Robert Baillie, principal of Glasgow University denounced: Descartes was a ‘very ignorant atheist’ and ‘fatuous heretic’, whose books, Baillie declared, he would ‘gladly consent to the burning of ’.54 The impact of Cartesianism was more widespread than it is possible to document. As later chapters will show, Descartes remained the most important point of reference for most philosophers, whether they named him or not. But even where Descartes was a point of departure for many, he was also the focus of critique. The women philosophers who, as we have noted, were beneficiaries of the ‘Cartesian turn’ in philosophy, were not uncritical recipients of Cartesianism.55 In her Philosophical Letters (1664) and Observations upon Experimental Philosophy (1666) Margaret Cavendish critiques Descartes’s dualism, from the position of a materialist. As a substance monist, Anne Conway too rejected the Cartesian account of mind and body, because it could not explain mind–body interaction. In her Principia philosophiae (1690) she argued furthermore that it is contradictory to suppose that God, as a perfect being, would create a substance so unlike himself as body as conceived by Descartes. However, her critique of Cartesian dualism is tempered by her acknowledgement of Descartes’s elucidation of the laws of mechanical motion in his physics.

Nicolas Malebranche While Descartes’s philosophy remained controversial in the second half of the seventeenth century, the version of Cartesianism developed by Nicolas Malebranche (1638–1715) seems to have enjoyed something of a success.56 In the last decades of the seventeenth century there was a flurry of Malebranche translations. This was probably sparked by the celebrated debate in which Antoine Arnauld attacked Malebranche in Des vrais et faux ide´es [On True and False Ideas] (1683). A Latin translation of La Recherche de la verite´ [The Search after Truth] was published in London in 1687 (De inquirenda veritate libri sex), followed in 1694 by two English translations. One of these, by Thomas Taylor, was published in Oxford, the other, by the dissenter Richard Sault, in London. Sault’s translation was republished in 1695, along with Le Vasseur’s account of Malebranche’s controversy with Arnauld and Regis. Christian Conferences: Demonstrating the Truth of the Christian Religion and Morality (a translation of Conversations chre´tiennes) and Sault’s translation A Treatise of Nature and Grace both appeared in London in 1695. Four years later, James 54 Quoted in Christine Shepherd, ‘Newtonianism in the Scottish Universities in the Seventeenth Century’, in H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner (eds), The Origins and Nature of the Enlightenment in Scotland (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1982), p. 65. 55 Jacqueline Broad, Women Philosophers of the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), Introduction. 56 Charles McCracken, Malebranche and British Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983); Stephen Nadler (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Malebranche (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

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Shipton brought out his translation of Traite´ de Morale, A Treatise of Morality (1699).57 The person who did more than anyone to popularize Malebranche was John Norris (see Chapter 10). The Oxford admirers of Malebranche included besides Norris, Thomas Taylor, Arthur and William Collier, Christopher Codrington and his friends Richard Steele and Joseph Addison. Francis Atterbury owned works by Norris and Malebranche. In Dublin, Malebranche’s sympathetic readers included William Molyneux, William King, and Peter Browne, Provost of Trinity College. It was while he was a student at Trinity that George Berkeley encountered Malebranche. The points at issue were chiefly Malebranche’s epistemology (the so-called ‘Vision of all things in God’ which supports the claim that we know things only through God) and his occasionalism (according to which God alone is the cause of all things, and God is the only being to be loved). Malebranche was decried as an enthusiast— irrational visionary—by Browne and John Sergeant. Richard Burthogge concurred, though he found much in Malebranche that was ‘surprizing and excellent’. John Keill dismissed the doctrine of the vision in God as ‘unintelligible jargon’ and ridiculed his occasionalism as a novelty that defied common sense. Locke’s critic James Lowde found Malebranche’s account of his doctrine of the vision of God contradictory and the doctrine itself contrary to experience. The most eminent English philosophical critic of Malebranche was Locke himself, whose ‘An Examination of P. Malebranche’s Opinion of Seeing All Things in God’, published posthumously in 1706, rejects the view that ideas exist separately from the act of perception.58

Spinoza The philosophy of Baruch de Spinoza (1632–77) sent shock waves through the philosophical and ecclesiastical establishments at the end of the seventeenth century. However, Spinoza figures only peripherally in seventeenth-century British philosophy, largely for the reason that the notoriety which he so swiftly acquired obstructed impartial discussion of his philosophy. The first English translation of any of Spinoza’s writings was by Charles Blount, whose Miracles, No Violations of the Laws of Nature (1683) includes Blount’s translation of chapter 6 of Tractatus

57 Father Malebranche’s Treatise Concerning the Search after Truth, trans. T. Taylor (Oxford, 1694; republished 1700); Malebranch’s Search after Truth, trans. Richard Sault (London, 1694); Malebranch’s Search after the truth . . . To which is added . . . several particulars of his controversie with Monsieur Arnaud Dr. of Sorbonne, and Monsieur Regis, professor in philosophy at Paris. Written by Monsieur Le Vasseur, vol. 2 (London, 1695); A Treatise of Morality, trans. James Shipton (London, 1699). Henry Oldenberg apparently made a part translation of La Recherche (Noel Malcolm, ‘The Library of Henry Oldenburg’, Electronic British Library Journal (2005): n. 22). 58 This is one of four responses to Malebranche and John Norris drafted by Locke. See Paul Schuurman, ‘Vision in God and Thinking Matter: Locke’s Epistemological Agnosticism used against Malebranche and Stillingfleet’, in Sarah Hutton and Paul Schuurman, Studies on Locke: Sources, Contemporaries, and Legacy (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008), pp. 177–93.

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theologico-politicus. A part translation of the Tractatus theologico-politicus appeared in 1689,59 but most read him in Latin. Most references to his philosophy are negative. An exception to the chorus of vilification was Henry Oldenburg, who visited Spinoza in 1661 and entered into correspondence with him, by means of which he was a channel of communication between Spinoza and Boyle.60 However, particularly after the publication of Tractatus theologico-politicus, denunciations were the order of the day. Henry More led the way with two short pieces Epistola altera and Demonstrationem duarum (published in his Opera omnia, 1679). In Viscount Stair’s Physiologia nova experimentalis of 1681, Spinoza figures as an ‘execrable atheist’, alongside Vanini, and ‘Horrendus Hobbesius’. Spinoza’s name even appears in university disputations for refutation (e.g. Alexander Cockburn’s theses of 1679).61 Stillingfleet also attacked him, but Locke steered clear. The Boyle lectures provided fertile ground for attacks on Spinoza for atheism and impiety—a notable example being the celebrated sermons by Samuel Clarke who attacked Spinoza as ‘the most celebrated atheist of our time’.62 According to Aubrey the Earl of Devonshire asked Hobbes’s opinion on Spinoza’s Tractatus theologico-politicus on its appearance in 1670. Hobbes is said to have responded ‘Ne judicate ne judicemini’ (‘judge not lest you be judged’).63 Anne Conway was one of the few to make objections to Spinoza which weren’t coloured by ad hominem remarks. She did not subscribe to the general interpretation of his single-substance monism as materialistic and atheistic, since she evidently saw parallels with her own substance monism. Her principal objection focused on his pantheism, his identification of God with nature (deus sive natura), that he ‘confounded’ God with created things. Richard Burthogge is another critic of Spinoza, remarkable for his measured tone. His Essay upon Reason and the Nature of Spirits (1694), criticizes Spinoza’s conception of God on the grounds that it entails that God is infinite extension and does not exist necessarily. As with Hobbes, Spinoza’s works are to be found not only in the libraries of free thinkers like the merchant Benjamin Furly, but also in the book collections of those least likely to acknowledge an interest, for example James Nairn, Ralph Cudworth, 59

Baruch de Spinoza, A Treatise Partly Theological, and Partly Political (London, 1689). Sarah Hutton, ‘Henry Oldenburg and Spinoza’, in Paulo Cristofolini (ed.), L’He´re´sie Spinoziste (Amsterdam & Maarssen: APA-Holland University Press, 1995). Spinoza’s English reception, see Rosalie Colie, Light and Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957); Rosalie Colie, ‘Spinoza in England, 1665–1730’, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 107 (1963): 183–219; Rosalie Colie, ‘Spinoza and the Early English Deists’, JHI, 20 (1959): 23–46; Sarah Hutton, ‘Reason and Revelation in the Cambridge Platonists and their Reception of Spinoza’, in K. Gründer and W. Schmidt-Biggeman (eds.), Spinoza in der Frühzeit seiner Religio¨sen Wirkung (Heidelberg, 1984), pp. 181–200; Sarah Hutton, ‘Edward Stillingfleet and Spinoza’, in W. van Bunge and W. Klever (eds), Disguised and Overt Spinozism (Leiden: Brill, 1996), pp. 261–74. 61 Shepherd, ‘Philosophy and Science in the Arts Curriculum’. 62 Samuel Clarke, A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, ed. Ezio Vailati (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 20. 63 John Aubrey, Brief Lives, ed. Andrew Clark, 2 vols (Oxford, 1898), vol. 1, p. 357. 60

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and Stillingfleet. Notoriety generated curiosity: the Scottish Historiographer Royal James Fall was probably not untypical when he said of Tractatus theologico-politicus that he was ‘sorry such books are printed but since they are my curiosity leads me to desire a sight of them’.64 And it was not uncommon for those suspected of materialism to be branded Spinozists, as was Locke by William Carroll.65 Matthias Earbery identified Spinoza as a deist in his Deism Examin’d and Confuted (1697), linking Spinozism with scepticism. Like Henry More, he attributed Spinoza’s errors to his uncritical absorption of Cartesianism. Earbery also identifies Gassendi as a source. The interest shown in Spinoza by subversive figures like Toland (in Letters to Serena) and Blount only served to confirm the suspicions of his detractors who regarded him as a materialist atheist. Herbert of Cherbury was accorded the dubious distinction of being yoked together with Spinoza and Hobbes in Christian Korholt’s De tribus impostoribus magnis (1680, reprinted 1700) [Of the Three Great Impostors]. Subsequently, Jean Colerus’ biography, La Vie de Spinoza (1705), helped to mitigate the predominantly negative view of Spinoza. An English translation of this was published in London in 1705.66 As this brief survey shows, seventeenth-century Britons kept abreast of the latest thinking in contemporary philosophy as well as with current interpretations of ancient philosophy. In at least two cases a renewed dialogue with past philosophy was mediated via contemporary Europeans (Grotius and Gassendi for scepticism and Epicureanism). British philosophers were thus in conversation not just with one another, but with European philosophy, old and new. For the most part, these conversations took place in a non-institutional context, outside the universities.

64 M. C. T. Simpson, ‘The Library of the Reverend James Nairn (1629–1678): Scholarly Book Collecting in Restoration Scotland’ (Ph.D. diss., University of Edinburgh, 1987), p. 200. 65 William Carroll, A Dissertation upon the Tenth Chapter of the Fourth Book of Mr. Locke’s Essay, Concerning Humane Understanding. Wherein that author’s endeavours to establish Spinoza’s atheistical hypothesis, . . . are discover’d and confuted (London, 1706). 66 The Life of Benedict de Spinosa (London, 1706).

4 Aristotelianism and its Enemies Change is the watchword of philosophy across Europe in the early seventeenth century. In large measure this resulted from a widespread sense of the inadequacy of prevailing philosophical systems. And that meant Aristotelianism, which had been the mainstay of academic philosophy since the Middle Ages. Long before 1600, the monopoly of Aristotelianism on all branches of philosophy had been broken by the humanist recovery of the full, extant corpus of classical philosophy. The twin challenges of Ramism and the rise of scepticism (in both its Ciceronian and Pyrrhonist forms) made significant inroads into the philosophical standing of Aristotelianism.1 By 1600 Aristotelian natural philosophy was being further undermined by mounting evidence from cosmological discoveries and research in mechanics, which rendered Aristotle’s physics increasingly untenable. But the fortune of Aristotelianism was not one of simple decline. Not only did it keep its hold in the educational institutions, but some aspects of Aristotelian philosophy enjoyed a brief renaissance at the turn of the century. Although many seventeenth-century philosophers sought to make a break with tradition, there were also those who sought modifications from within. Prominent among these were the British eclectic Aristotelians, Kenelm Digby and Thomas White. This chapter surveys the state of British Aristotelianism in the seventeenth century, and discusses both those who attempted to modernize it from within, and the attack on it by Ramus and Francis Bacon. Aristotelianism has had a bad press in histories of seventeenth-century philosophy. The negative image painted by its early modern critics has been allowed to dominate historical assessments of its contribution to early modern philosophy, where it is often dismissed as undifferentiated ‘scholasticism’. In the eyes of its early modern detractors, the shortcomings of Aristotle’s philosophy were perceived as compounded by the accretions and distortions of scholasticism. A resounding theme of the would-be modernizers in the period is that scholasticism fails to deliver ‘sound knowledge, and demonstrative verity’, being ‘meerly verbal, speculative, abstractive, formal and notional, fit to fill the brains with monstrous and airy

1 For the history of early modern scepticism, see R. H. Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza, rev. edn (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979) and C. B. Schmitt, Cicero scepticus: A Study of the Influence of the Academica in the Renaissance (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972).

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Chymaeras’.2 Taking his cue from both Descartes and Bacon, John Hall associated Aristotelianism with poor quality students, and the acquisition of technical terminology which they could not understand. In his An Humble Motion to the Parliament of England Concerning the Advancement of Learning (1649) he writes: Peripatetick Philosophy, [is] suited onely (as Mounsieur Des-Cartes sayes) to wits that are seated below Mediocrity, which will furnish them with those rare imaginations of Materia prima, Privation, Universalia, and such Trumpery, which they understand no more then their Tutors.3

Charles Schmitt’s work on Renaissance Aristotelianism has done much to correct the view that the hold of Aristotle was necessarily detrimental to early modern philosophy.4 Close examination of seventeenth-century Aristotelian philosophy does not produce a picture of scholastic barbarism and sterility of ideas. Aristotelianism was not a monolithic block but comprised multifarious strands, ranging from scholastic Aristotelianism deriving from medieval times, to humanistic Aristotelianism which focused on texts purged of what was considered medieval ‘barbarism’, to eclectic Aristotelianism which sought to modify Aristotelian thought in the light of new developments. These various strands provided an inherited body of doctrines and arguments, from proof of the existence of God to the structure of the physical world, which impinge on seventeenth-century philosophy, often setting the terms for debate or providing points of departure for the philosophies which superseded it. In late sixteenth-century Europe Aristotelianism experienced something of a revival, exemplified in the work of the Paduan, Jacopo Zabarella, and the Italian Protestant convert, Giulio Pace (Pacius). This is also true of Oxford, where the most prominent example of a humanist Aristotelian philosopher is John Case (1540–1600) (who figured in Chapter 1). Case may justly be described as England’s foremost early modern Aristotelian philosopher. He was a product of Elizabethan Oxford where he taught throughout his life. The example of Case illustrates that Aristotelianism was well-adapted to the needs of a university philosophy course in the sense that it provided a grounding in the art of reasoning, and comprehensive coverage of all the branches of philosophy. Case’s publications are all discussions of Aristotelian philosophy, from logic and physics through to politics and metaphysics. One or two, but not all, are basic introductions clearly designed for pedagogical purposes. Case had a wide knowledge of Aristotelian philosophy. His sources include both medieval authorities (such as Thomas Aquinas and Walter Burley) and contemporary humanistic Aristotelian scholarship (for instance Zabarella and the Coimbra Commentators). He was responsive to recent currents of thought, notably 2

John Webster, Academiarum examen (London, 1654), p. 67. John Hall, An Humble Motion to the Parliament of England Concerning the Advancement of Learning (London, 1649). 4 C. B. Schmitt, Aristotle and the Renaissance (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983); C. B. Schmitt, John Case and Aristotelianism in Renaissance England (Kingston: McGill Queens, 1983). 3

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Machiavellism, Paracelsianism, and Ramism. Instead of being bound to the letter of Aristotle in his teaching, it was his practice, in humanist fashion, to introduce contemporary examples into his discussions—some of these are obviously topical, for instance, whether a woman should rule, stage plays, as well as such subjects as immigration, inflation, the death penalty, whether women should be enlisted in the forces, and even whether mothers should breast-feed their own children. In this respect, Case was evidently an interpreter of Aristotle for his times. He was also respected by his peers: his writings were reprinted abroad, and they remained on Oxford reading lists well into the seventeenth century: Thomas Barlow includes Case on his reading list for moral philosophy. John Aubrey evidently valued Case’s works for their propaedeutic value. In his Idea of Education (begun in 1669) Aubrey recommends Case on the curriculum for logic (despite being ‘out of fashion . . . he writes very plain’). He also recommends Case for ethics (of which ‘the disputation part is very plain and easy to introduce beginners’) and avers that, ‘Case’s Politics is said to be the best book he wrote and very good for a young man to peruse’.5 Case was not an original thinker, but he exemplifies the resilience and adaptability of Aristotelianism in the late Renaissance and early seventeenth century. The value of Case is that he is in many ways a representative thinker, who illustrates the fact that to be an Aristotelian was not necessarily to be backward-looking. Case was part of what Charles Schmitt identified as an Elizabethan Aristotle revival based on better texts and translations, and modern commentaries. This reformed Aristotelianism was revitalized by humanism, which encouraged the use of original languages or recent Latin translations, and put a strong emphasis on moral philosophy. For the first time since the Middle Ages, Oxford was producing works of extensive scholarship and monographic studies: Case’s Oxford contemporaries in this enterprise include John Rainolds, whose work on rhetoric, with Griffith Powel’s study of logic and Richard Hooker’s Of the Lawes of Ecclesiastical Polity, are important representatives of the reinvigorated English Aristotelianism of the late sixteenth century. In the wake of this came renewed interest in medieval philosophy. Henry Savile’s edition of Thomas Bradwardine’s De causa Dei (1618) was motivated by growing interest in the theological issue of divine predestination. There were Oxford printings of John Buridan’s commentaries on Aristotle’s ethics (1637), and politics (1640). Also in Oxford, William of Ockham’s Summa totius logicæ was printed in 1675. It is a mark of the increased status of British philosophy that Case’s work was sufficiently well regarded in Europe to be republished there in the early seventeenth century. The Aristotelian tradition which these figures represent is the starting point for the philosophers of the seventeenth century, and provided the context within which the work of Francis Bacon, William Harvey, Thomas Hobbes, and Isaac

John Aubrey ‘Idea of Education’, in Aubrey on Education: A Hitherto Unpublished Manuscript by the Author of Brief Lives, ed. J. E. Stephens (London: Routledge and K. Paul, 1972), pp. 75 and 79. 5

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Newton was received.6 After all, as Schmitt remarks, in order to go beyond Aristotle, one had first to understand him. Case and Bacon are therefore part of a continuous trajectory of philosophical revival. Seen in that perspective, Case’s Aristotelianism is not a countervailing tendency to the drive for reform headed by Francis Bacon, but a stage in a long process of philosophical renewal.

Scholastic Aristotelianism Aristotelianism was commonly, but by no means universally, derided as ‘scholasticism’ in the seventeenth century. But ‘scholastic philosophy’ itself covers a wide range of philosophy within the peripatetic tradition, from major works and commentaries to textbook recensions designed for pedagogical use. All these constituted philosophy of the ‘schools’, since they were products of the universities. But it is helpful to distinguish between those which are more directly engaged and those working with traditions inherited from the great medieval masters and those reformed Aristotelians, like John Case, who were indebted to Renaissance humanism. For present purposes I reserve the term ‘scholastic’ for the peripatetic traditions deriving from the great doctors of the Middle Ages, such as Thomas Aquinas. In continental Europe, scholastic Aristotelianism too had been going through a period of post-Tridentine renewal and revitalization in the late sixteenth century. Spain led the way in rewriting Aristotle as a Christian philosopher: the most widely influential scholastic philosopher engaged in this enterprise was the Spanish Jesuit Francisco Suarez (1548–96), whose Disputationes metaphysicae (Salamanca, 1597) exemplifies a new type of systematic treatise, arranged according to the author’s view of the subject, rather than as a commentary on others.7 Suarez’s metaphysics was epitomized for university use in Protestant countries, and some of these textbooks were reprinted in English editions, e.g. Franco Burgersdijk’s Insitutionum metaphysicarum, published in London in 1653 and twice in Oxford in the 1670s. Another was Christoph Scheibler’s Metaphysica, which saw three printings at Oxford.8 A number of expatriate Scots were at the forefront of the reintroduction of metaphysics in Protestant universities in northern Europe. Among these, Walter Donaldson and Gilbert Jack were indebted to Suarez, as was the ‘Aberdeen doctor’, Robert Baron (c.1596–1639), Professor of Theology at Marischal College. His posthumously 6 Schmitt, Aristotle and the Renaissance; Schmitt, John Case; Michael Edwards, ‘Aristotelianism, Descartes, and Hobbes’, The Historical Journal, 50 (2007): 449–64. 7 J. A. Trentman, ‘Scholasticism in the Seventeenth Century’, in Norman Kretzmann et al. The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 818–37, p. 835; H. A. Krop, ‘Natural Knowledge of God in Neo-Aristotelianism: The Reception of Suarez’s Version of the Ontological Argument in Early Seventeenth-Century Leiden’, in E. P. Bos and H. A. Krop (eds), Franco Burgersdijk (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1993), pp. 67–82; Charles Lohr, ‘Metaphysics’ in CHRP, pp. 535–638. 8 Franco Burgersdijk, Insitutionum metaphysicarum libri duo (Leiden, 1640; London, 1653; Oxford, 1675, 1677); Christoph Scheibler, Metaphysica (Giessen, 1620; Oxford, 1637, 1638, and 1665).

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published Metaphysica generalis (1654)9 treats metaphysics as the science of ‘ens quatenus ens’, reflecting the influence of Suarez and Fonseca. Apparently unfinished, this substantial treatise (479 pages) is a systematic study of metaphysics which cites a wide range of scholastic authors, including Cajetan, Ruvio, the Coimbra Commentators, and Zabarella. The reprinting of Baron’s book in London, Oxford, and Cambridge indicates that it was used in the teaching of metaphysics at these universities.

Aristotelianism and the Curriculum While seventeenth-century Aristotelianism certainly did not address or anticipate the philosophical concerns of Bacon and Descartes, the continued use of Aristotle was not of itself a sign of resistance to new ideas, any more than an interest in new philosophy entailed complete rejection of Aristotle. Take, for example, Thomas Barlow, who was appointed Lady Margaret Professor at Oxford in 1660. In 1637, Barlow published a set of six exercises on metaphysical topics, Exercitationes aliquot metaphysicae de Deo, appended to an Oxford printing of Scheibler’s Metaphysica (it was reprinted separately in 1658). Barlow’s Exercitationes covers such topics as the existence of God, the nature of evil, eternity and immensity, all discussed by reference to modern scholastic philosophy. He treats some scholastics as authoritative (e.g. Suarez, Molina, Vasquez) and he argues against others (e.g. Durandus and Vorstius). The book was evidently designed for university use, exemplifying the habit of mind of the disputatio. After the Restoration, Barlow made no secret of his suspicions of the early Royal Society, and his antipathy towards ‘what they miscall New-Philosophy’.10 His reading for natural theology (defined as ‘being grounded on the Law of Nature (or Moral Law)’) lists Aquinas and Suarez alongside Grotius (De Jure belli ac pacis). He seems to have been as concerned that scholastic sources were ‘popish’ as that they exhibit corrupt and spurious scholarship, but he allowed that ‘when they speak of Moral Duties, and those things which are within the compass of Natural reason . . . we shall find many things well, and some very acutely said’.11 The longevity of Aristotle on the curriculum can to some extent be explained in terms of pedagogy. In Cambridge, Richard Holdsworth recommended reading Aristotle in order to improve one’s Greek.12 At Oxford, the Organon continued to be studied for logic and Nichomachean Ethics for moral philosophy as well as for teaching Greek. For his proposed academy John Aubrey likewise assigned his students ‘Aristotle’s Ethics in Greek, to improve their Greek together with 9 Baron, Metaphysica generalis (Leiden, 1654). Reprinted in London (1657 and 1658), Oxford (1660), and Cambridge (1685). 10 Thomas Barlow, General Remains (London, 1693), p. 157. Barlow lists Descartes, Gassendi, Du Hamel, and Mersenne as promoters of both new philosophy and ‘the Roman Religion’, p. 158. 11 Thomas Barlow, Autoschediasmata, de studio theologiae, or Directions for the choice of books in the study of divinity, published 1699, pp. 2, 32, 40. Also in his Generall remains. 12 Holdsworth, Directions, p. 643.

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the science’.13 This was a view shared by Isaac Barrow, the first Lucasian Professor of Mathematics at Cambridge. Although a proponent of the new natural philosophy, Barrow believed that truth should be gathered from multiple sources, ancient as well as modern, and he lectured on Aristotle’s Rhetoric after the Restoration. In 1668 Ralph Bohun, tutor to John Evelyn’s son, justified starting with scholasticism on the grounds that Aristotle was pervasive in both the professions, as well as in the universities. Even such a stringent critic of Aristotle as John Webster proposed to retain some parts of the corpus Aristotelicum: ‘there are many things in his History of Animals, and some things in his Politicks, Ethicks, Logick, Metaphysicks, and Rhetorick, that are commodious and useful’.14 For the first half of the seventeenth century political theory remained indebted to Aristotelianism, which provided the conceptual framework for discussion of forms of government and the conception of politics as the pursuit of the good life. Aristotle’s analysis of types of government formed the basis of many of the discussions of monarchy in the fraught years of civil war and its aftermath, for example in Robert Filmer’s Observations on Aristotle’s Politiques Touching Forms of Government (1652). However, with the later development of natural law theory in politics and ethics by Grotius and Pufendorf, Aristotle’s hold was loosened. In 1690 John Tran, regent of Glasgow, was criticized by commissioners for not discussing the law of nature, which they considered to be ‘the great foundation of all ethics’. Tran was said to be ‘too much addicted to the old logical method of signing efficient, material, formal, and final causes’.15 Aristotelianism also provided the basis for some of the first attempts at a philosophy of language, as for example, for George Dalgarno, who collaborated with John Wilkins in the project of producing a universal language. In his Ars signorum (1661) Dalgarno adopts Wilkins’s idea of basing a language scheme based on a classification of simple notions. The philosophical tables which he drew up for this are based on Aristotle’s categories. And it has recently been argued that John Locke’s theory of language is indebted to Aristotelianism.16 Of course, it must be acknowledged that many if not most British Aristotelians were philosophically derivative, for example, Robert Baron and the Oxford ViceChancellor Robert Pinck. As late as 1680, Pinck published Quaestiones selectiores in Logica, Ethica, Physica, Metaphysica inter authores celebriores repertae. On the other

13

14 Aubrey, Aubrey on Education, p. 116. Webster, Academiarum examen, p. 104. James Moore, ‘Natural Rights in the Scottish Enlightenment’, in Mark Goldie (ed.), Cambridge History of Eighteenth Century Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 295–6. 16 James Knowlson, Universal Language Schemes in England and France, 1600–1800 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975); M. M. Slaughter, Universal Languages and Scientific Taxonomy in the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982); E. J. Ashworth, ‘Do Words Signify Ideas or Things? The Scholastic Sources of Locke’s Theory of Language’, JHP, 19 (1981): 299–326; Hannah Dawson, Locke, Language and Early-Modern Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 15

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hand, the impact of scholastic Aristotelianism on British thought should not be underestimated. Suarez’s Tractatus de legibus, ac Deo legislatore (1612) was the major source for discussions of natural law, and had an important role in English and Scottish political debates of the first half of the seventeenth century. Another area where late scholastic philosophy had enormous impact was in the debates concerning the compatibility of freewill and divine predestination, which was generated by Luis de Molina (1536–1600), author of the Concordia (Lisbon, 1588). Known as the De auxiliis dispute, this spills over into British philosophical theology through its takeup by Dutch Calvinist scholastics like Conrad Vorst.

Expatriate Aristotelianism Aristotelian philosophy was especially strong among expatriate Scots. Most of the Scots who taught philosophy in European universities in the first half of the seventeenth century were Aristotelians: for example William Makdowell (MacDowell), who taught at Groningen, John Murdison, who taught at Leiden from 1603 to 1605, Mark Duncan at Saumur (1570?–1640), Walter Donaldson (c.1570–1630) at Frankfurt and Sedan, Adam Steuart (1591–1654) at Saumur in 1617, and subsequently at Sedan and Leiden. Several of these also published abroad: Donaldson was author of Synopsis philosophiae moralis (Frankfurt, 1622), Moralis disciplinae summa (Hanau, 1610) and Synopsis oeconomia (Paris, 1620). Adam Steuart is credited with Gemina dissertatio metaphysica de deo published in Leiden in 1647 (now lost). The expatriate Scotsman Gilbert Jack (Jaccheus) (c.1577–1628) dominated Aristotelianism at the University of Leiden, where he taught for twenty-five years. Like so many Scots, Jack originally moved to Europe to pursue further studies, after his undergraduate course (in his case at Marischal College, Aberdeen). Jack studied at Helmstedt, the centre of the Aristotelian revival in northern Europe, and at Herborn, a leading centre for Ramism and Reformed Theology, where he was a student of Piscator. He was appointed professor of logic at Leiden, succeeding Petrus Bertius as professor of ethics in 1607. Jack was a reformed Aristotelian who, like Case, made use of recent Aristotelian scholarship, including Zabarella, Suarez, and the Coimbra Commentators. He pioneered the reintroduction of metaphysics at Leiden, introducing it at first in his lectures, and subsequently in textbooks, such as his Primae philosophiae institutiones (Leiden, 1616), which registers the growing impact of Suarez in the Netherlands at this time.17 Jack was also author of a textbook of Aristotelian physics, Institutiones physicae (1614).18 These books catered for the syllabus of their time, within which the primary purpose of philosophy was to serve the needs of theology. One of the contemporary issues which Jack addressed 17 Gilbert Jack, Primae philosophiae institutiones (Leiden, 1616), repr. in Cambridge in 1649 as Primæ philosophiæ sive Institutionum metaphysicarum libri sex. Auctore Gilberto Jacchæo. 18 Gilbert Jack, Institutiones physicae (Leiden, 1614; repr. 1615, 1624, 1644, 1646).

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was the then topical issue of predestination and divine foreknowledge. Jack drew on Suarez’s theory of divine concurrence to argue that natural agents can only produce effects because they are in some way predetermined to do so by God as first cause. Jack’s attempt to accommodate a measure of free will with divine predetermination appears to have been regarded as Arminian, and probably explains his suspension from his post in 1619. Jack’s reputation was such that in 1627 he was invited to be the first White Professor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford (apparently through the mediation of his friend Hugo Grotius). However, he chose to stay in Leiden. Jack’s influence was primarily through his role as pedagogue—largely through his textbooks but also through his pupils, who included Gisbert Voetius, Franco Burgersdijk, and Abraham Heidanus. Jack’s pupils were not all faithful to their master. His relations with Burgersdijk were strained, largely for institutional reasons, since Burgersdijk was hired to teach at Leiden at a time when Jack had been suspended. In the controversy surrounding Cartesian philosophy in the Netherlands in the 1640s, Voetius remained faithful to his scholastic roots, continuing to defend substantial forms against Descartes. Another pupil of Jack’s was Jacobus Revius, author of Suarez repurgatus, which, as the title suggests, was more critical of Suarez than was his teacher. Revius too opposed Descartes. Some other pupils of Jack were accommodating towards Cartesianism, however. One of them, Abraham Heidanus, defended Descartes against Voetius, while another, Henricus Reneri, who was to become professor of philosophy at Deventer, befriended Descartes and promoted his philosophy. This dispute drew in Adam Steuart, who sided with Revius in his dispute with the proCartesian Heereboord.19 Scottish Aristotelians were influential in other ways. In the preface to his hugely successful manual of logic, Jack’s student Franco Burgersdijk acknowledges that his model was the Institutiones logicae (Saumur, 1612) of his colleague Marc Duncan.20 Burgersdijk also produced a manual of metaphysics (Institutionum metaphysicarum published posthumously in 1640—heavily dependent on Suarez’s Disputationes metaphysicae),21 a manual of moral philosophy (Idea philosophiae moralis), physics (Idea philosophiae naturalis) and a manual of politics, which circulated widely both

19 Paul Dibon, La Philosophie ne´erlandaise au sie`cle d’or (Paris & New York: Elsevier, 1954); Theo Verbeek, La Querelle d’Utrecht: Rene´ Descartes et Martin Schook (Paris: Les Impressions nouvelles, 1988); Theo Verbeek, Descartes and the Dutch: Early Reactions to Cartesian Philosophy, 1637–1650 (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1992). 20 ‘Methodum petii ex ipsa artis natura. In quo tamen ex parte secutus sum institutum clarissimi viri Marci Duncani, in Academia Salmuriensi Professoris Philosophiae praestantissimi, et olim collegae mei conjunctissimi, cujus accuratae Institutiones Logicae majus auxilium mihi tulerunt in meis Institutionibus apte ordinandis, quam ullae aliae’ (Dibon, La Philosophie ne´erlandaise, p. 105). Duncan’s Institutiones logicae was printed in Saumur in 1612, and reprinted in 1655. 21 Burgersdijk critiques Herbert of Cherbury’s De veritate for proposing common notions are innate. See Chapters 5 and 9 for Herbert of Cherbury and Locke’s criticism.

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in Europe and Britain.22 Burgersdijk’s logic (of which the most famous non-Aristotelian reader was Spinoza), was his most widely successful work. It was reprinted eight times in England alone, up until 1689. Only Robert Sanderson’s compendium of logic saw more English editions (11). According to Dibon, both Duncan and Burgersdijk anticipate the four instruments of Johannes Clauberg’s La logica novantique.23 One of Burgersdijk’s Leiden pupils, Adrian Heereboord was, like Clauberg, receptive to Cartesianism. The publishing history of Burgersdijk’s works lends substance to the claim that he was one of the most widely read philosophers of the first half of the seventeenth century.24 Aristotelianism continued to attract adherents throughout the seventeenth century, despite the advent of new alternatives. A minority of these, like Alexander Ross, were dogmatists, hostile to other philosophies, especially new thinking. Ross defended Aristotle against Hobbes and attacked the eclectic Aristotelian Kenelm Digby.25 As late as 1691, the Irish Catholic Michael Moor (Morus) (1640–1726) attacked Cartesianism from an Aristotelian standpoint in his De existentia Dei, et humanae mentis immortalitate.26

Scotism Another school of largely expatriate scholastic philosophy was Scotism. Named after its originator, the medieval Franciscan philosopher John Duns Scotus, ‘subtle doctor’ (doctor subtilis), Scotism enjoyed something of a resurgence in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The early seventeenth century was a highpoint of Scotist scholarship when Scotus’ works were edited and commented, with major contributions from British and especially Irish Franciscan philosophers. Foremost among these was Luke Wadding (1588–1657), who had studied with Suarez and oversaw the edition of Scotus’ works published in Lyons in 1639. He was assisted in this entreprise by John Punch (1599–1672/3), who was also the author of a work of Scotist philosophy, Philosophiae cursus integer (3 vols, Rome 1642–3). Another Irish Franciscan, Hugh Macaughwell (Hugo Cavellus) (1571? –1626), was acclaimed for his editions of and commentaries on a number of Scotus’ works in the 1620s: Doctoris subtilis J. Duns Scoti quaestiones super libros Aristotelis de anima (Lyons, 1625); F. Ioannis Duns Scoti . . . in Tertium et Quartum Sententiarum Quaestiones Subtillisimae (Antwerp, 1620). Scotist philosophy was not confined to scholarship, and circulated through 22 A combined version of these texts Idea philosophiæ tum naturalis, tum moralis, siue Epitome compendiosa vtriusq[ue] ex Aristotele excerpta & methodice` disposita was printed in Oxford for university use in the 1631, where it was reprinted four times. 23 Dibon, La Philosophie ne´erlandaise, p. 105. 24 E. P. Bos and H. A. Krop (eds), Franco Burgersdijk (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1993). 25 Alexander Ross, Leviathan Drawn out with a Hook: or Animadversions upon Mr Hobbs his Leviathan (London, 1653); Alexander Ross, The Philosophicall Touch-stone: or Observations upon Sir Kenelm Digbie’s Discourses of the nature of bodies, and of the reasonable soule (London, 1645). 26 Michael Moor (Morus), De existentia Dei, et humanae mentis immortalitate (Paris, 1691).

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scholastic textbooks, such as Eustachius a Sancto Paulo’s Summa philosophiæ quadripartite (1640).27 Among the Scotists, who were active in England some adopted a modernizing approach which accommodated contemporary philosophy. One such was Antoine Le Grand, the defender of Descartes: his first work was a summary of Scotist theology (see Chapter 3). Another was the English Franciscan convert Christopher Davenport (aka Franciscus a` Sancta Clara, c.1595–1680) who insisted that Scotus was not bound by the letter of Aristotle, and took an eclectic approach in his attempt to construct a ‘restored physics’ that combined Scotism with the new natural philosophy, including Copernicanism and atomist matter theory.28

Eclectic Aristotelianism: The Blackloists Another factor which explains the longevity of Aristotelianism was its accommodation to the new. One manifestation of this was the university curriculum, where adjustments were made in natural philosophy and metaphysics, while Aristotle’s ethical writings continued to be used for teaching moral philosophy. As we saw in Chapter 1, textbooks like Heerebord’s Meletemata might combine Aristotelian moral philosophy with non-Aristotelian natural philosophy. Outside the universities, the impact of new ways of thinking was registered in attempts to accommodate adherence to Aristotle with new philosophy. In many respects those who did so were complying with a well-established tradition within Aristotelianism, that has been called ‘eclectic Aristotelianism’.29 It is a moot point whether they are more properly considered eclectic or ‘novantique’ thinkers. The foremost English examples are the recusant philosophers Thomas White, Sir Kenelm Digby, and John Sergeant, who identified themselves as the ‘Blackloists’, after the alias ‘Blacklo’ adopted by Thomas White, the English Catholic priest who was the leader of a reforming Catholic group.30 Both Digby and White frequented the circle of Marin Mersenne in Paris, with whom they shared an interest in new scientific theories of Galileo, and where 27 Eustachius a Sancto Paulo, Summa philosophiæ quadripartita, de rebus dialecticis, ethicis, physicis, & metaphysicis (Cambridge, 1640; repr. 1648, 1649). See Roger Ariew, Descartes among the Scholastics (Leiden: Brill, 2011). 28 On the Franciscans and seventeenth-century Scotism, see Canice Mooney, Irish Franciscans and France (Dublin: Clonmore & Reynolds; London: Burns & Oates, 1964); Jacob Schmutz, ‘L’He´ritage des subtils: cartographie du Scotisme de l’aˆge classique’, Les E´tudes philosophiques (2002): 51–81; Ariew, Descartes among the Scholastics; Anne Davenport, ‘Scotus as the Father of Modernity: The Natural Philosophy of the English Franciscan Christopher Davenport in 1652’, Early Science and Medicine, 12 (2007): 55–90; Anne Davenport, ‘English Recusant Networks and the Early Defense of Cartesian Philosophy’, Journal of Early Modern Studies, 1 (2012): 65–85. 29 The term was coined by Schmitt, Aristotle and the Renaissance, ch. 4. 30 Dorothea Krook, John Sergeant and his Circle: A Study of Three Seventeenth-Century English Aristotelians, ed. with an introduction by Beverley C. Southgate (Leiden: Brill, 1993); B. J. Dobbs ‘Studies in the Natural Philosophy of Sir Kenelm Digby’, Ambix 18 (1971): 1–25; John Henry, ‘Atomism and Eschatology: Catholicism and Natural Philosophy in the Interregnum’, British Journal for the History of Science, 15 (1982): 211–39; John Henry, ‘Sir Kenelm Digby: Recusant Philosopher’, in G. A. J. Rogers et al. (eds), Insiders and Outsiders in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2010), pp. 43–75.

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they encountered the atomistic theories being promoted by Pierre Gassendi, and the ‘mechanical’ philosophies being elaborated by Hobbes and Descartes. Both Digby and White were receptive to new ideas, but they sought to retain a broadly Aristotelian framework within which to place them. The modified Aristotelianism of the Blackloists bears many strong family resemblances in the ways in which they sought to reconcile Aristotelian concepts with the new ideas and terminology of the new thinking. In particular White’s philosophy bears many similarities to Digby’s. Both adopt a method of argument based on definitions and axioms. Both elide features of mechanical doctrine of body with Aristotle’s. For both, bodies are extended magnitudes differentiated by density and rarity, incapable of self-motion and subject to change. They adapt the doctrine of substantial forms and corpora minima to accommodate corpuscularianism. They preserve final causality while movement of bodies is explained in terms of efficient cause. Like Digby, White argued that only corporeal entities are subject to change, and that, by contrast, the soul is an incorporeal and unchanging entity. Both White and Sergeant sought to combat what they perceived as the sceptical tendencies of the new philosophies. White’s De mundo was his first attempt to reconcile Aristotelianism with the new science. Inter alia he attempted to combine heliocentric cosmology with the Aristotelian system, which he achieved in part by dismantling the apparatus of the Ptolomaic universe—for example he denied the existence of solid spheres, and that the stars shine by reflected light. He nevertheless maintained that the universe is finite. He argued that all motion needs an efficient cause, that all bodies are moved by external causes. White develops this modified Aristotelianism further with his Institutionum peripateticarum (1647, 1652) (translated as Peripateticall Institutions, 1656), a work which is underpinned by syllogistic logic. White asserted the importance of definitions of terms: ‘all Science is lastly resolv’d into the unity of Definitions’.31 Every natural being is defined metaphysically (‘under the notion of Being’), physically (‘by sensible qualities’) and morally (‘its capacity for Existence’ considered ‘from the quality of its motion’).32 Commencing with body, he adopts the Cartesian idea of body as extension (‘Extension or Divisibility is . . . but the very nature of Quantity’), but he nevertheless retains scholastic notions of potency and act—every body is a ‘magnitude’ consisting of ‘a Compound of act and power’, ‘knowledge rises from our Senses’.33 According to White, bodies are differentiated by their relative rarity or density, which corresponds to their being moist or dry, hot or cold, light or heavy. They are also distinguished according to whether they exhibit centrifugal and centripetal motion. All these properties, he claims, are ‘deduc’d . . . out of the most simple notion of Quantity’.34 White explains movement by means of ‘intelligences’,

31 32 33 34

Thomas White, Peripateticall Institutions (1656), Sig A55. White, Peripateticall Institutions, pp. 202, 203. White, Peripateticall Institutions, pp. 32, 201. White, Peripateticall Institutions, p. 51.

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which are soul-like entities, but not actually souls. These are endowed with ‘Understanding, Will, and Action’ and ‘rule over Bodies as Instruments’— the greatest nobility of Intelligences is, to excell according to Will; the middle, according to Understanding; the lowest, according to Action: though, ’tis clear, that these notions are so correspondent to one another in Intelligences, that, as much as the Will of one excells that of another, so much, too, must both its Understanding and power of Acting.35

Other topics discussed by White include electrical and magnetic attraction, the generation of plants and animals, the motion of the heart (for which he opted for Descartes’s theory), the motion of animals, planets, sea, air, tides, motion of earth. He also discusses the nature of man. There is a polemical edge to the more philosophical of White’s other writings. His Institutionum ethicarum, sive Stateræ morum (1660) deals with the state of souls after death as well as ‘mores circa amabilia homini’. He attacked Joseph Glanvill in his anti-sceptical Sciri, sive sceptices & scepticorum a` jure disputationis exclusio (1663) (translated as An exclusion of scepticks from all title to dispute, 1665). He also published Euclides physicus, sive De principiis naturæ stœcheidea (1657).

Kenelm Digby Digby’s main philosophical work was his Two Treatises. In the one of which, the nature of bodies; in the other, the Nature of mans soule; is looked into: in way of discovery, of the immortality of reasonable soules: this was published in Paris in 1644 and several times reprinted in London. Two Treatises was the first discussion in English of a corpuscular natural philosophy. The first part, The Nature of Bodies, serves as a prelude to Digby’s theory of the soul set out in the second treatise. Although far longer than the accompanying treatise on the soul, it deals with a whole range of questions in natural philosophy, including the composition of matter, the causes of motion, gravity, the nature of light and colour. Digby’s citation of Galileo, Harvey, and Descartes in Two Treatises indicates his receptiveness to new ideas, which is also evident from his adoption of a deductive methodology, in order to construct his natural philosophy. Like White, he commences with a quasi-Cartesian conception of body as extension (‘Biggenesse or Quantity’), and proceeds to deduce the fundamental features of the physical world. Unlike White, he explains physical phenomena in terms of local motion and bodies impacting on one another. From the idea of extension (‘the most simple notion of Quantity’) he deduces ‘the prime division of Bodies, into Rare and Dense’, from which he deduces local motion (defined as ‘the Qualities of diuiding and being divided’) and ‘the common properties of Grauity and Leuity’. From these he deduces ‘the foure first Qualities’, the elements,

35

White, Peripateticall Institutions, pp. 304–5.

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‘the second qualities’ and the operations of life, all ‘Subject of the lawes of partes and of rarity and Density’. Digby frequently defers to the authority of White, but he also adduces experimental evidence, and cites William Gilbert, Harvey, and Descartes. Digby is at pains to stress that his philosophy follows ‘the same solid way, which Aristotle walked’, and felt it necessary to include an apology for his approach. He writes with contemporary Aristotelians in view (‘any unpartiall Aristotelian’), whom he seeks to persuade that there is substantial overlap between his natural philosophy and Aristotle’s. He argues that Aristotle was not a dogmatist, that he urged that truth should come before authority. Digby insists that his followers among the peripatetics and scholastics were following Aristotle’s direction when they made modifications in the name of truth, and he argues that there has always been a tradition of deviation from the master (‘it ever hath been the common practice of all grave Peripateticks and Thomists to leave their Masters, some in one article, some in another’). He is critical of latterday Aristotelians who object to changes being made and ‘frame a wrong sense of the doctrine he hath left us, which generally we follow’. He accuses ‘the latter Sectatours, or rather pretenders, of Aristotle’ of misunderstanding Aristotle, and of having ignorantly introduced doctrines which were not supported by the text—including the reifying of terms which were originally ordinary words of common speech. In this way the meaning of terms like ‘Qualities, Actions, Places, Habits, or Relatives’ have been distorted. He insists that his own use of ‘Quantity, of Rarity and Density, of the four first Qualities, of the combinations of the Elements, of the repugnance of vacuities,’ is ‘exactly and rigorously Aristotles’.36 Citing Aristotle’s writings on natural philosophy (De generatione et corruptione and Parva naturalia), he claims that the key concepts in his own theory of body match Aristotle’s ideas of ‘Quantity, of Rarity and Density, of the foure first Qualities, of the combinations of the Elements, of the repugnance of vacuities’.37 He interprets the Aristotelian notion of minima naturalia as essentially atomistic. He does, however, acknowledge that the accommodation of Aristotelianism and the new philosophy could not be sustained for logic and metaphysics, but since the aim of his philosophy is to prove the existence and nature of the soul, he doesn’t think it necessary to treat of these: were it our turne, to declare and teach Logike and Metaphisikes, we should be forced to goe the way of matter, and of formes, and of priuations, in such sort as Aristotle hath trodden it out to us, in his workes of that straine. But this is not our taske for the present; for no man that contemplateth nature as he aught, can choose but see that these notions are no more necessary, when we consider the framing of the elements, then when we examine the making of

36 37

Kenelm Digby, Two Treatises (Paris, 1644), p. 343. Digby, Two Treatises, p. 343.

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compounded bodies: and therefore, these are to be sett apart, as higher principles, and of an other straine.38

Digby’s stated purpose in studying the physical world was to understand the limits of mechanistic explanations, and so to lead us to recognise that there must be something other than body operating in the physical world. The second, shorter, part of Two Treatises discusses the incorporeal substance whose existence is thereby inferred. Here too, Digby elides Cartesian and Aristotelian ideas. The fact that we are able to form ideas, abstracted from external corporeal things, shows we have a mind, and distinguishes us from animals. The human soul is an unextended, thinking thing. Its operations of human soul: simple apprehension, ‘thinking and knowing’, ‘discoursing’. He also adds an account of how these produce action (‘how a man proceedeth to action’). Digby bases his arguments for the immateriality of the soul on each of these operations. He concludes with a discussion of the relationship of the soul to the body, and the state of the soul when separated from the body. Digby and White were taken seriously as natural philosophers by their contemporaries. Digby’s work had a wide distribution and is frequently encountered in university reading lists on natural philosophy, along with White. Thomas Barlow recommends them both in his ‘A Library for Young Scholars’. John Webster recommended both for the reformed curriculum of his Academiarum examen (1653). White was regarded highly by Marin Mersenne. White’s De mundo was studied by Robert Sibbald at Edinburgh in the late 1650s. Perhaps the most signal confirmation of White’s standing as a thinker is Hobbes’s critique of White’s De mundo libri tres (Paris, 1642). Hobbes’s critique is not just a devastating expose´ of the shortcomings of White’s attempt to retain a broadly Aristotelian framework: attacking White, Hobbes was taking on a significant target, thereby accruing both fame and stature to his own philosophical position. Hobbes and White appear to have remained on good terms, however.

John Sergeant The last of the Blackloists, John Sergeant, maintained his loyalty to Aristotelianism into the 1680s and 1690s. In his The Method to Science (1696) and Transnatural Philosophy (1687) he was still using syllogistic reasoning and deploying metaphysical principles based on Aristotle’s ten categories.39 Like his Blackloist predecessors, Sergeant nevertheless saw himself as receptive to new ideas, citing his agreement with Bacon that sense knowledge was the basis of knowledge and that the aim of natural philosophy was to provide general principles or maxims. However, unlike Bacon, he attributed the failures of human knowledge to a mistaken focus on natural 38

Digby, Two Treatises, p. 344. J[ohn] S[ergeant], The Method to Science (London, 1696). J[ohn] S[ergeant], Solid Philosophy Asserted (London, 1697). J[ohn] S[ergeant], Transnatural Philosophy, or Metaphysics (London, 1700). 39

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causes rather than on ‘trans-natural’ or transcendent causes, which only metaphysics can supply. In Solid Philosophy Asserted (1697) he defends metaphysics, ‘that most solid, most clear and most incomparable science’, on which the ‘evidence and principles’ of all other sciences depend. The scope of metaphysics includes the formal/essential nature of things, the unity of bodies, mind (soul), existence, God, spiritual beings. True knowledge required the application of reason and metaphysical principles to the data supplied by the senses. He also insisted on the importance of a grounding in logic (‘the Art of Logick is absolutely necessary, to range and distinguish our Notions into Common Heads, and to descend from those General Heads all along by Intrinsecal Differences’).40 He agreed with both Aristotle (and, for that matter, Locke) that knowledge originates from the senses. But his theory of knowledge, like Aristotle’s, involves the soul receiving forms of things. Sergeant argued that these forms contain the essential characteristics of things, including their physical properties. They are transmitted from external objects by means of ‘effluviums’ emitted from the objects. These ‘effluviums’ were corporeal and apparently made up of fine particles which he called atoms, which stimulate the production of corresponding spiritual notions of the things within the soul. Exactly how this is achieved, he does not explain, but it evidently depends on similarity between ideas and their objects. Like Digby and White, Sergeant recasts many scholastic concepts in everyday terms. One example is the notion of substantial forms, which he accuses modern philosophers of misrepresenting by reifying them: they conceited the Form was a kind of Distinct Thing, or at least a part of a Thing Supervening to the Matter, its Compact, and Compounding the Ens, after that gross manner as Two Things in Nature do Compound a Third.41

Rather, he argued substantial forms are nothing but divers Notions or Considerations of the Thing, formally, as it is a Thing. Wherefore, to say, a Body is Compounded of Matter and Form, is no more, in Literal Truth, than to say that there can be no more Considerations of a Body, taken formally, as it is a Thing.42

As we shall see (Chapter 9), Sergeant attacked both Descartes and Locke as ‘ideists’, because they ‘ground all their Discourses on Ideas; that is, (as themselves express it, and as the Word declares,) on Similitudes or Resemblances; which Similitudes, . . . are meer Fancies’.43 He appended a chapter by chapter critique of Locke’s Essay to his Solid Philosophy, motivated by concern about Locke’s scepticism and the

40 41 42 43

Sergeant, Solid Philosophy Asserted, p. 72. Sergeant, Solid Philosophy, p. 94. Sergeant, Solid Philosophy, p. 94. Sergeant, Solid Philosophy, Preface, sig. a4v.

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deleterious appropriation of Locke’s epistemology in the cause of deism by the likes of John Toland.

Anti-Aristotelians: Ramists The subject of the last section of this chapter is anti-Aristotelianism. Despite the loyal efforts of the likes of the Blackloists and Alexander Ross, the tide had turned against Aristotle. As noted in Chapter 3, one of the most devastating attacks in the seventeenth century was Pierre Gassendi’s sceptical demolition of Aristotle in his Exercitationes paradoxae adversus Aristoteleos (1624). In Britain the main challenge to Aristotle came firstly from the followers of the French Protestant, Pierre de la Rame´e, or Petrus Ramus, and secondly from Francis Bacon. Ramism was an important part of the sixteenth century’s philosophical legacy to the seventeenth century, in both England and Scotland.44 Ramus’ name was held to be practically synonymous with anti-Aristotelianism, but the innovations which he spearheaded in his Dialecticae animadversions (1543) were more a matter of organization than of fundamental differences of philosophy. Thus although Ramus was generally regarded as antiAristotelian, the changes he made were in many respects just a simplification of Aristotle (see Chapter 2). Although Ramism is considered to have been progressive because it undermined the authority of Aristotle, the net effect of Ramism was not to destroy Aristotelianism, but to streamline it for pedagogical purposes. The Scots led the way with the take-up of Ramism in Britain. It was a Scot, Roland MacIlmaine, who was responsible for the first Latin edition of Ramus’ Dialecticae (1574) to be published in Britain, and for the first English translation of Ramus. Several Scots studied under Ramist professors in Europe, for example Gilbert Jack, who, studied under Piscator at Herborn, and James Martin (Jacobus Martinus, Jacques Martin) (fl. 1577), who held a post in Paris and allegedly at Turin. Another was Andrew Melville, whose university reforms helped to reinvigorate the Scottish universities, and are credited with recovering Glasgow University from decline. Melville encountered both Ramism and its critics at first hand during his travels in Europe: at the Colle`ge de France in Paris, he studied both with Ramus and his great opponent Adrien Turne`be. He also studied at Poitiers law school, which was a centre for Ramism. Robert Howie, first principal of Marischal College, Aberdeen, where he taught philosophy, was greatly influenced by Johannes Piscator at Herborn. Other Scots were involved in anti-Ramist disputes while abroad, for example Robert Balfour, author of books on Aristotelian logic published in Bordeaux, where he was

44

On Ramus and Ramism, see Mordechai Feingold, Joseph S. Freedman, and Wolfgang Rother (eds), The Influence of Petrus Ramus (Basel: Schwabe, 2001); Joseph S. Freedman, ‘The Diffusion of the Writings of Peter Ramus in Central Europe, c.1570–c.1630’, Renaissance Quarterly, 46 (1993): 98–152; Howard Hotson, Commonplace Learning: Ramism and Its German Ramifications 1543–1630, Oxford-Warburg Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

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appointed principal of the College de Guienne in 1602. Melville’s pupil, Robert Rollock (1555–99), carried Melville’s reforming philosophy with him to the newly founded university of Edinburgh when he was appointed there in 1598. In England, Cambridge was the main centre of Ramism, the adherents of which included George Downame (d. 1635), William Perkins (1558–1602), Laurence Chaderton (c.1536–1604), John Preston (1587–1628), Gabriel Harvey (c.1550–1631), and later John Milton. Others disseminated their Ramism beyond Cambridge: Anthony Wotton (1561?–1626) was the first Gresham professor of divinity. The logician, Alexander Richardson (d. c.1621) exercised his influence in an extramural capacity, through his private academy in Barking where he offered instruction to students wishing to proceed MA. His The Logicians School-Master, or, A Comment upon Ramus ‘Logicke’ was published posthumously in 1629. Richardson’s students included William Temple (1554/5–1627), and Thomas Hooker, and he had considerable influence at the newly founded Harvard College, where The Logicians SchoolMaster was a key text.45 Along with two other prominent Ramists, William Perkins (1558–1602) and William Ames (1576–1633), Hooker developed applications of Ramism in Covenant Theology. William Temple, whose primary interests were primarily in dialectic, was something of a Ramist crusader, who engaged in a series of high-profile disputes in the 1590s.46 The first of these was with Everard Digby in Cambridge, and resulted in Digby’s ejection from the university. Subsequently Temple attacked the Herborn Ramist Piscator, Georg Liebler, the Aristotelian professor of natural philosophy at Tübingen, and Theodor Zwinger’s interpretations of Aristotle’s ethics.47 Temple was appointed provost of Trinity College Dublin in 1609, where he helped establish the strongly Ramist ethos of the college.

William Ames The most important of the English Ramists was the expatriate William Ames, who taught at the University of Franeker,48 having suffered what would now be called constructive dismissal from Cambridge. Ames devised a reformed curriculum which 45 Perry Miller, The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1954), p. 185. 46 William Temple, Epistola de dialectica (1582); William Temple, P. Rami dialecticae libri duo (Cambridge, 1584; Frankfurt, 1591). On Temple’s controversies see Lisa Jardine, Francis Bacon: Discovery and the Art of Discourse (London & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1974). Also Stephen Gaukroger, Francis Bacon and the Transformation of Natural Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), ch. 2. 47 Temple’s various disputes gained a higher profile through the Frankfurt-based We´chel press, which republished them in 1583, 1586, 1587, and 1593, as well as an edition of Temple’s Epistola de dialectica (Frankfurt, 1584). 48 Lee W. Gibbs, ‘William Ames’s Technometry’, JHI, 33 (1972): 615–24; William Ames, Technometry trans. with introd. and commentary by Lee W. Gibbs (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1979). Ames was appointed to the newly founded Harvard College but he died before he could make the journey to New England.

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is described in his Technometria (1633). The simplified curriculum which Ames proposes integrates theology with the other disciplines, and eliminates metaphysics. Ames subsumes ethics within divinity, and subordinates politics to it. He rejected Aristotelian metaphysics on the grounds that it appropriates the subject matter of other disciplines: on the one hand knowledge of the infinite, and of the first being, properly belongs to theology, on the other, the conceptual terminology of metaphysics belongs more properly to logic. Ames concurred with Ramus that Aristotelian philosophy was replete with impieties. He constructed a quasi-Platonist epistemology, according to which divine ideas are the archetypes (‘coppy-platform’) of our ideas, which are imprinted in the mind by God. Ames’s sources include Plato and the Roman enyclopedists, but also, despite his critique of Aristotle, the German systematic Aristotelians Keckerman and Alsted. He also adopted, but reinterpreted, Aristotle’s five qualities or powers of mind: knowledge, art, prudence, wisdom, and intellect (scientia, ars, prudentia, sapientia, intellectus).49 Ames’s opposition to Aristotle, therefore, was not based on philosophical refutation, but was effected through a reconceptualization of philosophy and reorganization of philosophy as a discipline. Ames was appointed to the newly founded Harvard, but died before he could take up the appointment.50 However, he was held in high regard by the leading American intellectuals, Cotton Mather, Increase Mather, and John Cotton. The first called him the ‘angelical doctor’. Ames’s English works were printed in 1642, and his Opera omnia were printed in Amsterdam in 1658–1. The Ramist tradition seems to have flourished in the American colonies. Harvard students studied Ames’s Philosometa and Alexander Richardson’s Ramist Logician’s Schoolmaster (1629 and 1657). While studying at Yale, Samuel Johnson (1696–1772), an early disciple of Berkeley and first president of King’s College, New York, considered Ramus and Ames to be two of the most important modern philosophers.51

Bacon’s Critique of Aristotle The most systematic repudiation of Aristotelian philosophy was by Francis Bacon. Aristotle was not the only ancient philosopher whom Bacon criticized, but his critique was the more devastating because of the key position occupied by Aristotle in the early modern university curriculum. Bacon’s hostility to Aristotelian philosophy may owe something to the Ramist environment in which he studied while at Cambridge between 1573 and 1575.52 He charged Aristotle with reducing natural philosophy to a set of logical categories which bore little or no relation to experience. Aristotle was not concerned with ‘the internal truth of things’ but with merely verbal

50 Aristotle, Nichomachian Ethics, 6.3–6. Gibbs, ‘William Ames’s Technometry’. Joseph J. Ellis, The New England Mind in Transition: Samuel Johnson of Connecticut, 1696–1772 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973); Miller, New England Mind, p. 119. 52 Gaukroger, Francis Bacon, p. 43. 49 51

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arguments fashioned for the purpose of supporting his theories. Bacon regarded Aristotelianism, like most philosophies of his time, as poorly founded in experience. Bacon thought Aristotle’s observational method far too limited, and inadequate for discovering the truth of things. Instead of being founded on observation, axioms and conclusions are framed arbitrarily, and experience is made to fit them ex post facto. Bacon was prepared to concede that in works like Historia animalium and Problemata, Aristotle’s use of observation and experiment had something to commend it: the wisedome and integritie of Aristotle is worthy to be obserued, that hauing made so diligent and exquisite a Historie of liuing creatures, hath mingled it sparingly with any vaine or fayned matter.53

However, instead of basing his axioms on experience, he imposed his own nostrums on his observations, and so ‘made experience a slave to his fancies’. In this respect, ‘he is more to be blamed than his modern Followers’ who are ‘a Sect of Scholastical Philosophers, who have altogether forsaken experiments’.54 Bacon set out to remedy the defects of Aristotelianism by developing a methodology productive of new knowledge. Bacon’s charges against Aristotle as a philosopher extended far beyond his logic and unproductive methodology. He criticized Aristotle for failing to deal with the affections in his ethics, a subject central to moral philosophy, in Bacon’s view. Aristotle also failed to fully treat the role of the affections in his Rhetoric. He did, however, commend him for placing rhetoric between logic and moral philosophy ‘as participating of both: for the Proofes and Demonstrations of Logicke, are toward all men indifferent, and the same: But the Proofes and perswasions of Rhetoricke, ought to differ according to the Auditors’.55 He also mounted a strong rhetorical attack on Aristotle for his autocratic philosophical style: he never acknowledged his philosophical forbears, except to refute them, and he invented arbitrary terminology: I cannot a little maruaile at the Philosopher Aristotle: that did proceede in such a Spirit of difference & contradiction towards all Antiquitie, vndertaking not only to frame new wordes of Science at pleasure: but to confound and extinguish all ancient wisedome; insomuch as hee neuer nameth or mentioneth an Ancient Author or opinion, but to confute and reproue: wherein for glorie, and drawing followers and disciples, he tooke the right course.56

Aristotle therefore bears responsibility for how he came to be treated as an unquestioned authority, ‘the Dictator’ of the schoolmen. Bacon, for his part, was taking a leaf from his own analysis to apply Aristotle’s ‘Spirit of difference & contradiction’ against him. Bacon’s anti-Aristotelianism was taken up by the experimental philosophers of the 1650s and 1660s. The Royal Society apologist Joseph Glanvill attacked

53 55

Bacon, Advancement of Learning, p. 26. Advancement of Learning, p. 129.

54

56

Novum organum (1676), p. 9. Advancement of Learning, p. 81.

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Aristotelianism as litigious, poorly founded in experience, unable to account for the phenomena of nature and inconsistent with itself. Glanvill brought a sceptical dimension to his critique in his The Vanity of Dogmatizing (1661, expanded as Scepsis Scientifica, 1665) accusing Aristotelians of dogmatism, the best antidote to which is scepticism. Other critics questioned the basis of the Christianization of Aristotle which had been effected in the Middle Ages—Henry More rejected modern Aristotelian ‘naturalists’ such as Pomponazzi as atheistic, and subsequently Arthur Collier (see Chapter 10) highlighted the incompatibility of Aristotelian matter theory with Christianity. Nevertheless, even among his critics, Aristotle had value as a source of arguments and information about ancient philosophy (for example in the writings of the Cambridge Platonists). Aristotelianism waned as other philosophies emerged to replace it. In this process, Bacon’s critique of Aristotle should be seen more as symptomatic of a trend than as the trigger of a revolution. The critiques of Aristotle by Ramus, Bacon, and others notwithstanding, Aristotelianism proved remarkably resilient. Not only did it remain entrenched in the universities, but, in the face of modern challenges, it was kept alive by ‘novantique’ attempts to compromise (exemplified, as we have seen, by Thomas White). Furthermore, Aristotelian premises would continue to shape the philosophical debates of the seventeenth century. For example, in debates about the nature of the will, and of substance (notably in Bramhall’s critique of Hobbes, and Stillingfleet’s objections to Locke). And in some quarters it retained sufficient vitality to respond to its modern critics—as happened with John Sergeant. Although (as we shall see in Chapter 9) some of Sergeant’s objections to the new philosophies of Locke and Descartes were shared by others, the Aristotelian grounds of his objections were not. The most disabling loss of authority for Aristotelianism was in the domain of natural philosophy. Stripped of his authority as the prince of philosophers, Aristotle had become just another ancient philosopher.

5 Bacon and Herbert of Cherbury ‘Memorable Advancers of Philosophical Knowledg’ (Tenison, Baconiana)

At the forefront of the search for new beginnings in British philosophy, the names of three Elizabethans resound through the philosophical conversations of the seventeenth century: Francis Bacon, Edward, Lord Herbert of Cherbury, and Thomas Hobbes. This chapter discusses the first two. Hobbes will be the subject of a separate chapter (Chapter 6). Of the three of them, Herbert is today very much in the shadows of the other two. But in the eighteenth century he was regarded, along with Bacon, as one of the pillars of the Enlightenment. In the annals of the Age of Reason Herbert figures as an anti-religious philosopher, and Bacon as the father of empirical science, of which the supreme exponent was Isaac Newton. Their reputations rest on partial aspects of their legacy, which distort their contribution to philosophy. In their own day, both received recognition as forward-thinking philosophers, which was rather closer to how each of them saw his philosophical enterprise. Although their philosophical interests diverged, they shared a good deal as philosophers who moved in court circles. Both were ennobled for their services to the crown. And, in different ways, the career of each was blighted by his fortunes in royal service. Bacon had to resign his post as Lord Chancellor when he was impeached for taking bribes. Since the duties of office left him little time to pursue his programme for the advancement of learning, his forced retirement from public life allowed him to devote more time to his philosophical projects. Herbert, who served James I as ambassador in France between 1619 and 1624, also fell from favour, though in his case in the more honourable circumstances of a disagreement with his government’s policies in France. Having failed to secure compensation for the debts incurred during his embassy, he retired from public life to his estates in Wales, until the outbreak of Civil War destroyed his tranquillity. In 1644, faced with a choice between surrendering Montgomery Castle to Parliamentary forces and thereby salvaging his means of intellectual life, or resisting attack and thereby risking the destruction of everything he owned, he negotiated safe passage for himself and his library as the price of capitulation. Thereafter, Herbert spent his last years in straitened circumstances in London, preparing his writings for publication. He made a last trip to France, where

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he met Gassendi and Mersenne. The printed books from his library are preserved at Jesus College, Oxford, to this day. Although Bacon and Herbert were very different as thinkers, they shared the common aim of seeking new foundations for philosophical enquiry. To this end Bacon developed an empirical epistemology for the furtherance of the knowledge of nature, while Herbert’s epistemology is founded on innate principles within the mind, with a view to demonstrating the grounds of certainty against scepticism. Where Bacon separated philosophy from religion, Herbert sought to clarify the fundamental principles of religious belief as the basis for religious eirenicism. Bacon targeted philosophical tradition, especially Aristotelianism, while Herbert was more concerned about the threat from contemporary scepticism. Whether Herbert and Bacon recognized any parallels in their interests is not known. However, they both had strong links to French intellectual circles, both held high offices of state, and there was a family link through Lord Herbert’s brother, the poet George Herbert, whom Bacon counted as a friend.

Francis Bacon In 1679, Thomas Tenison, the future Archbishop of Canterbury, declared that among the ‘many memorable Advancers of Philosophical Knowledg’ of recent times, Francis Bacon ‘if all his Circumstances be duly weigh’d, may seem to excel them all’.1 In so saying, he was voicing a view that was fast becoming commonplace. Whatever the merits of Tenison’s judgement, it was not uncommon in the latter half of the seventeenth century to view Bacon as a major modern philosopher. Today he is remembered chiefly for his methodological contribution to the development of empirical science and as a modernizer, a judgement anticipated by the founders of the Royal Society who hailed him as one of the society’s greatest inspirations at its inception in 1660. However, Bacon was a philosopher in his own right, and his philosophical interests were integral to his overarching lifetime project: the reform of all branches of human knowledge and its philosophical foundations. Bacon sought to end the sterility of so much intellectual endeavour and the unproductiveness of philosophical enquiry, by proposing new approaches to replace traditional modes of thinking. In particular he sought to institute a natural philosophy which would lead to new discoveries of material benefit to human life. And he aspired to raise the profile of this new natural philosophy by making it central to intellectual and civic life. The aspects of this programme most relevant to the history of philosophy are his radical proposals for reforming epistemology and method, his reorganization and revision of the subdivisions of philosophy, and his own contribution to natural and moral philosophy.2 1

Thomas Tenison, Baconiana (London, 1679), p. 7. On Bacon as a philosopher, see Marta Fattori, Introduzione a Francis Bacon (Roma: Laterza, 1997); Marta Fattori, Francis Bacon: terminologia e fortuna nel XVII secolo (Rome: Edizione del Atteneo, 1984); 2

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Intellectual Milieu As a senior lawyer, MP, and member of the Privy Council, Bacon was supremely well connected with the most influential people in the land. However, constructing his intellectual formation and his subsequent intellectual milieu is difficult, because there is both too much and too little direct evidence to go on. Bacon’s formal education commenced at the University of Cambridge, where he studied at St John’s College from 1573 to 1575. But like so many sons of gentlemen, he left without taking a degree. Since he was only 12 years old when he enrolled, it is hard to believe that Cambridge had much formative influence, though it was very likely that he was exposed to the Ramist critique of Aristotelianism then gathering strength in that university. His penchant for classification has been linked to the Ramist emphasis on method, and the Ramist practice of organizing knowledge in dichotomous tables. But his classificatory genius could equally well have been fostered in his legal studies—the physician William Harvey quipped that he philosophized like a lord chancellor. After Cambridge, Bacon spent a couple of years studying in France. Little is known about his activities during this period beyond the fact he seems to have started his legal studies there. Bacon does not reveal much about the scientific and philosophical circles with which he was associated. But enough is known to suggest that, contrary to what has sometimes been claimed, he was not an insular or isolated thinker. He certainly was aware of contemporary intellectual developments. He knew of the work of William Gilbert, and was a patient of William Harvey. Bacon apparently witnessed Cornelis Drebbel’s demonstration of a ‘submarine’, and knew of the work of both Galileo and Kepler: he sent Kepler a copy of Novum organum via Sir Henry Wotton, the English Ambassador in Vienna, who was a conduit for information about intellectual developments in Europe, including accounts of experiments. Herbert of Cherbury is another possible line of connection between Bacon and European intellectual life. Bacon was personally acquainted with Constantijn Huygens and had links to the libertins erudits in France, through Fortin de la Hoguette, who visited him in England and to whom Bacon gave a copy of his recently published De augmentis scientiarum. Fortin may have been responsible for French translations of his Essays, which circulated in libertine circles in France. Other European contacts with an interest in science and philosophy included the Swiss jurist E´lie Diodati (1576–1661), who had facilitated the publication of Galileo’s Discorsi . . . intorno a due nuove scienze [Dialogues Concerning Two New Sciences] (1638), and who visited Bacon in 1619. Bacon was also well versed in the Renaissance natural philosophy, on which he drew liberally and eclectically in his own theories, chiefly from anti-Aristotelian systems of Telesio, Doni, and Gilbert (despite criticizing

Stephen Gaukroger, Francis Bacon and the Transformation of Early-Modern Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Lisa Jardine, Francis Bacon: Discovery and the Art of Discourse (London & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1974).

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aspects of their systems).3 Bacon had clearly performed many of the experiments which he describes in his writings, presumably with the help of assistants like his secretary, William Rawley, and the young Thomas Hobbes, who spent some time with him. Exactly when Bacon conceived the idea of a reformation of philosophy is unknown. During his early career he was preoccupied with establishing himself as a lawyer, and winning the patronage of high-placed persons. Having been left unprovided for when his father died, securing financial independence was a priority and remained a major preoccupation throughout his life. One of the first hints we have of his interest in philosophy, and his grand design for its reform, is a letter to his uncle, Lord Burghley, in 1592 in which he told him of his ‘vast contemplative ends’ in which, taking ‘all knowledge to be my province . . . I hope I should bring in industrious observations, grounded conclusions, and profitable inventions and discoveries’.4 He called this ambitious project his Instauratio magna or Great Instauration. Every one of his works from his earliest Praise of Knowledge (1593) and the unpublished ‘Temporis partus maximus’, to his later Novum organum (1620) and Sylva sylvarum (1627), were part of his endeavour to rethink intellectual foundations and to replace old systems of thought with a new kind of philosophy. In fact Bacon never completed the great project which he envisaged, largely because his political and legal career absorbed most of his time. The parts of the programme which he did accomplish were his critique of existing systems of thought, his new method (Novum organum) and materials for a new natural history (the posthumously published Sylva sylvarum). His published works, therefore, constitute only a part of what he originally planned. Nevertheless, the grand design of his Great Instauration was fully conceived by 1611, and a large proportion of the detail filled out by the time of his death. Bacon’s ‘Great Instauration’ was to consist of a new organon or instrument of enquiry and a new natural history. He also planned to supply the rules for putting the new method into practice and a repository of provisional theories resulting from his own enquiries employing his new method. This would also contain examples of the kind of investigations he envisaged. Taken together, these would constitute the true philosophy of nature. However, the last part of this programme was never carried out. The only example of investigations which he completed was the Abecedarium naturae. And a good deal of the rest remained in manuscript form. Bacon’s programme required, first, a radical and comprehensive reappraisal of customary patterns of thought and received systems of philosophy, which he undertook in the first work that he published as part of the Instauratio magna, his Of the

Graham Rees, ‘Bacon’s Speculative Philosophy’, in Marku Peltonen (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Bacon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 121–45; Guido Giglioni, Francesco Bacone (Rome: Carrocci, 2011). 4 Bacon, ‘To my Lord Treasurer’, printed in Resuscitatio, or, Bringing into publick light severall pieces of the works, ed. William Rawley (London, 1657), p. 96. 3

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Proficiencie and Advancement of Learning (1605), the only philosophical work which he published in English. Addressed to King James I, this amounts to a prospectus for his entire programme. The first book is an eloquent defence of all aspects of learning. The second book surveys the current state of human knowledge and identifies those areas most in need of reform and reinvestigation, as well as analysing the reasons for the failure of progress by existing methods of enquiry. Among these, he identified natural philosophy (which includes what would now be called ‘science’) as the most neglected branch of learning. His analysis of the ills of the state of knowledge and his recommendations for reform extended beyond natural philosophy, to all aspects of human knowledge, politics, ethics, and history. This section of Advancement of Learning was considerably expanded in the later Latin version, De dignitate et augmentis scientiarum (1623). Bacon restated his proposed programme in other works in the Novum organum (1620). In the Distributio operis of the Novum organum he sets out a six-part plan of the Instauratio magna as follows: First, The Divisions of the Sciences. Second, The New Organon; or Directions for the Interpretation of Nature. Third, The Phenomena of the Universe; or a Natural and Experimental History for the Foundation of Philosophy. Fourth, The Ladder of the Intellect. Fifth, Forerunners, or Anticipations of Second Philosophy. Sixth, Second Philosophy; or Practical Science.5

Of the incomplete part of his programme, the ‘Ladder of the Intellect’ was intended to illustrate the order of discovery. ‘Forerunners of Second Philosophy’ would contain some of Bacon’s findings using traditional methods of investigation. ‘Second Philosophy’ was to be the results of his new ‘correct’ mode of enquiry. Most of Bacon’s philosophical work was produced in two periods of intense activity, when circumstances permitted him some respite from the demands of his legal and political career. In the first of these, the years 1603–13, he conceived his project and commenced work on it. In fact the first mention of the great instauration comes from an unpublished work from this period, Temporis partus maximus (1603) which is subtitled, ‘Instauratio magna imperii humani in universum’. His most important publication from these years was The Advancement of Learning, but he also wrote many pieces which were intended as part of the scheme, though they were never actually published. ‘Cogitata et visa’ (1607) and ‘Redargutio philosophiarum’ (1608) continued the critique of earlier philosophy which he published in Advancement of Learning. ‘De interpretatione naturae proemium’ (1603) and ‘Scala intellectus, sive, Filum labyrinthi’ (1607) sketch plans for broadening the horizons of knowledge. 5 Francis Bacon, The New Organon, ed. Lisa Jardine and Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 14. See also Sachiko Kusukawa, ‘Bacon’s Classification of Knowledge’, in Peltonen (ed.) Cambridge Companion to Bacon, pp. 47–74.

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‘Valerius terminus of the interpretation of nature’ (1603) contains the earliest account of his doctrine of ‘idols’, or the forms of error to which human beings are prone. He was already formulating his conception of a new natural philosophy, in which natural and experimental histories would be central. ‘Redargutio philosophiarum’ (1608) argues that this should be based on observed experience while in ‘Cogitationes de scientia humana’ (c.1604) he discusses a theory of body, and defends Democritean atomism. Another period of intense activity was 1620–1, during which he produced and published his major philosophical work, the Novum organum, together with the outline of the Instauratio magna project. After his fall from political grace in 1621, Bacon had more leisure to devote to philosophical pursuits. During this time he produced an expanded Latin version of The Advancement of Learning (De dignitate et augmentis scientiarum) and an expanded edition of his most enduringly popular work The Essayes or Counsels, Civill and Morall.6 He also wrote Sylva sylvarum which was published posthumously, along with New Atlantis. Although he worked on further parts of his grand project, this remained incomplete when he died in 1626. Although Bacon clearly failed to complete as much as he had planned of his project, there is a technical sense in which it was never designed for completion (though this is not the reason for his failure to accomplish what he intended). One of Bacon’s major innovations was the idea that philosophical enquiry should be a collective enterprise. This is born partly of his recognition of the limitations of human knowledge generally, and of the weak capacity of individual human reason. But it was also intended as a corrective to what he had identified as one of the great defects of the past philosophy—a preoccupation with authority and systems. He complained of ‘the overmuch credite that hath beene given unto Authors in Sciences,’ which had the effect of stultifying further enquiry. One of Bacon’s chief criticisms of his predecessors, both ancient (like Plato and Aristotle) and modern (like Telesio and Gilbert), was that they were too preoccupied with making their mark by developing complete systems of thought, which had become ends in themselves, without discovering anything new. By contrast, he noted a different pattern of development in ‘the arts mechanical’ (such as navigation and printing) where rough and ready beginnings had been improved by successive refinements across time: in arts Mechanicall, the first deviser coms shortest, and time addeth and perfecteth: but in Sciences the first Author goeth furthest, and time leeseth and corrupteth. So we see, Artillerie, sayling, printing, and the like, were grossely managed at the first and by time accommodated and refined: but contrary wise the Philosophies and Sciences of Aristotle, Plato, Democritus, Hypocrates, Euclides, Archimedes, of most vigor at the first, and by time degenerate and imbased.7

6 7

The third edition published in 1625 contains fifty-eight essays. Bacon, Advancement of Learning, p. 28.

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Bacon eschewed system-building, favouring, instead, collective enquiry which would combine the endeavours of many researchers, without being confined to the investigations and theories of particular individuals. His aim was not just to inspire and involve others to continue his endeavours, but to transform the nature of philosophical investigation into open-ended enquiry, the conclusions of which are provisional. Natural philosophy as envisaged by Bacon is necessarily incomplete. The foundational premises of Instauratio magna were, first (in contradiction of contemporary assumptions), that knowledge is neither fixed nor already highly advanced, but can be vastly increased. Secondly, Bacon stressed the importance of experience as the foundation of knowledge. A major theme of his critique of existing philosophies was that they were insufficiently grounded in experience: In general . . . philosophy is built upon an excessively narrow basis of experience and natural history, and bases its statements on fewer instances than is proper. Philosophers of the rational type are diverted from experience by the variety of common phenomena, which have not been certainly understood or carefully examined and considered; they depend for the rest on reflection and intellectual exercise.8

Bacon’s idea of natural history is fundamental to his new methodology: compiling a natural history involves gathering particulars or observations from actual experience in order to supply the pool of data which forms the basis of induction: ‘For knowledges are as PYRAMIDES, whereof HISTORY is the BASIS: So of NATURAL PHILOSOPHY the BASIS is NATURAL HISTORY’.9 Furthermore, for Bacon, the value of all knowledge was ultimately practical. It is not enough to have knowledge, but it is necessary to transmit it and put it to use. New discoveries therefore hold out the prospect of bringing social benefits, very much as the technological advances of the recent past like navigation and printing had done. Bacon also departed from tradition by making a clear separation between religious and secular philosophy. For Bacon, the worst philosophers were those like Robert Fludd and Paracelsus who mixed philosophy and theology. He did, however, retain a place for natural theology. This is enshrined in his reorganization of the branches of philosophy which is set out in The Advancement of Learning. Bacon’s classificatory scheme of knowledge treats philosophy as one of three branches of human knowledge, each one of which corresponds to a faculty of the human mind: history to memory, poetry or fiction to imagination, and philosophy to reason. There are, in turn, three branches of philosophy, which he calls Divine (natural theology), Natural (physics), and Human (ethics). This kind of subdivision of knowledge, and the correlation between knowledge and human faculties, was not unusual in the Renaissance. What is unusual is the realignments which Bacon’s

8 9

Francis Bacon, Novum organum, ed. Lisa Jardine and Michael Silverstone, p. 51, Aphorism 62. Bacon, Advancement, p. 85.

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classificatory scheme entailed. Bacon was well aware of the fact that he conceived the branches of philosophy in a different way, although he retained the old nomenclature.10 The first philosophy (prima philosophiae) in Bacon’s system of the sciences is not metaphysics but natural philosophy, of which metaphysics is a subdivision.11 The operative distinction between physics and metaphysics is that physics deals with variable causes that obtain in the infinity of individual experience, while metaphysics deals with fixed, unchanging, general principles. Physics draws on natural history, and supplies the data for general, conceptual conclusions or axioms of metaphysics. Bacon’s fullest account of his new method for interpreting nature is contained in Novum organum, which was intended as a new logic to replace the Aristotelian logic of the university curriculum. It opens with a set of axioms which summarize his grand project. The rest is divided into two sections: first the pars destruens or critique of existing systems and their defective epistemologies. This is followed by the pars informans which sets out proposals for a new way forward. The first part contains Bacon’s criticism of existing logic, especially syllogistic logic. The second part sets out his novel inductive method of arriving at truth in contrast to the generally received method: There are and can be only two ways to investigate and discover truth. The one leaps from sense and particulars to the most general axioms, and from these principles and their settled truth, determines and discovers intermediate axioms; this is the current way. The other elicits axioms from sense and particulars, rising in a gradual and unbroken ascent, to arrive at the most general axioms; this is the true way, but it has not been tried.12

This last, as yet untried, gradualist method of enquiry is his inductive method. Unlike the induction of scholastic logic, Baconian induction is not a simple matter of enumeration of instances. Rather ‘induction’ is a systematic procedure for arriving at general conclusions about the nature of things. He is not concerned with discovering truth per se but with the operative value of the conclusions drawn. The procedure aims to yield information about the ‘form’ or essence of things, which for Bacon, is explanatory of its workings. The knowledge of ‘forms’ which we achieve in this way being the knowledge of how things work, will enable us to apply that knowledge to the production of effects. The procedure for acquiring this knowledge requires the accumulation of a store of examples derived from observation (the ‘natural and experimental history’), which include not just phenomena observed in nature, but the results of experimental investigations. These observations are tabulated in a way designed to make it possible to recognize likenesses and differences, so as to form a 10

Bacon, Advancement, p. 81. Bacon, Advancement, pp. 80 ff. Paulo Rossi, ‘Bacon’s Idea of Science’, in Peltonen (ed.), Companion to Francis Bacon, pp. 1–46; A. Perez-Ramos, Francis Bacon’s Idea of Science and the Maker’s Knowledge Tradition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988). 12 Bacon, Novum organum, p. 36, Aphorism 19. 11

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more refined sense of the nature of the phenomenon under investigation. Key features of Bacon’s method are his inclusion of negative instances (parallel examples where the phenomenon under investigation is absent) and his use of eliminative induction so as to isolate the essential features of the phenomenon being investigated. The process of drawing conclusions entails a combination of inductive, deductive, and analogical reasoning. Baconian induction was intended to penetrate surface appearances to reveal the real essences of phenomena. To the extent that he held that the aim of natural philosophy is to discover the essences or forms of things, he shared an epistemological assumption with the Aristotelians. However, he disagreed on method, and he accepted the principle (shared by other experimentalists) that the observable properties of bodies are to be explained by their internal constitution of their parts. Of particular importance for the appeal to experience as the basis of knowledge are the capacities of the mind to assimilate that experience. Bacon was not occupied by the problem of scepticism, but he was acutely conscious of the limitations of human understanding. In Novum organum Bacon addresses the problem of error in psychosocial terms, by analysing the characteristic weaknesses to which human beings are prone, and which therefore distort how we make sense of the world. With an eye to the mnemonic power of images, he adopts the metaphor of false gods, or ‘idols’ to frame his analysis, as he had also done in The Advancement of Learning. Bacon identifies four types of error. First the ‘idols of the tribe’ are distortions arising from the structure of the human understanding, so that it operates like a crooked mirror: for example being prone to interference from a strong imagination. Secondly, ‘idols of the cave’ are errors which result from custom, education, and pet prejudices. Thirdly, ‘idols of the market place’ are false conceptions arising from the inappropriate use of language. The fourth class of idols are ‘idols of the theatre’, a term he uses for received philosophical systems, which, like stage plays, offer different scenarios, but, never having been tested by the touchstone of experience, are no better than fictions. Moral philosophy is one of the branches of human knowledge included in Bacon’s survey of the state of human learning in Advancement of Learning, where he classifies moral knowledge as ‘philosophy of humanity’.13 The main shortcomings which he identifies in existing moral philosophy are first that it has distracted attention from natural philosophy, and secondly that it has itself been misdirected to fruitless discussions of the nature of the good. The reforms Bacon sought involved a more empirically based ethics, with a shift in focus to practice rather than theory. He observes that there is no shortage of ‘examplars’ of virtue and duty, but what is lacking is knowledge of the means to achieve these. He thought that ethical knowledge requires an understanding of human nature based on the study of human

13

Ian Box, ‘Bacon’s Moral Philosophy’, in Peltonen (ed.), Companion to Francis Bacon, pp. 260–82.

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psychology through observing human behaviour. Bacon underlines that moral knowledge requires an understanding of how our appetites and affections affect our behaviour. The end of moral knowledge is to harness them to direct our actions: to ‘procure the affections to fight on the side of reason, and not to invade it’. Since ‘morall vertues are in the Minde of man by habite & not by nature’,14 he recommends habit formation through education as the most practical means of achieving virtuous ends. Just as natural history provides the basis of a new natural philosophy, so human history, including poetry, provides the concrete particulars about human nature and human behaviour on which an experiential moral philosophy is based: ‘As historye of Tymes is the best grounde for discourse of Gouernemente . . . so Histories of Liues is the moste proper for discourse of businesse is more conversante in priuate Actions’.15 His moral philosophy is epitomized in his Essayes, an unsystematic collection of observations, first published in 1597, and reissued in expanded editions at different points later in his life. Insofar as the Essayes can be said to offer an idea of goodness, it is very much of social good. Bacon stresses the value of action and public service and defines virtue in terms of philanthropy. In other respects, the Essays can be read as a handbook of practical politics.

Reception Most of Bacon’s works were written in Latin, with an educated and international readership in view rather than a learned one: his style is not academic, his dedicatee is the king rather than the universities. His first published writings (Essays and Advancement of Learning) were written in English, the appropriate language for a non-specialist audience. He presented his new ideas in a variety of informal ways, all of them characterized by brevity: the ‘myth’, the essay, and utopian fiction. The chief examples of these are De sapientia veterum (which presents new theories as reinterpreted classical myths), Essays (the main vehicle of his moral and political thought), and his utopia, New Atlantis, which contains a fictional realization of his grand project. Bacon’s Essays were his most immediately and enduringly popular work. Reprinted at least a dozen times before 1700, they were translated into French (by Jean Baudoin), Italian (possibly by Bacon’s friend Tobie Matthew), and German (in 1654). The Latin translation by William Rawley (1638), also printed selections from his other writings, and saw three European reprints. De sapientia veterum was published in a translation by Marc’Antonio de Dominis.16 Although unfinished, New Atlantis played a key role in disseminating his views among educational and social reformers of the 1640s and 1650s, as well as the general public. Bacon’s most

14

15 Bacon, Advancement, p. 134. Bacon, Advancement, p. 163. De Dominis may have revised Tobie’s translation of the Essays. See Noel Malcolm, De Dominis (London, 1994), ch. 8, pp. 47 ff. Saggi morali del Signore Francesco Bacono appeared in London, in 1681, with a dedication to Grand Duke Cosimo II of Tuscany. 16

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widely reprinted work of natural philosophy was the book to which New Atlantis was appended, his posthumous Sylva sylvarum (1626). This was reprinted no less than twelve times before 1700, and three times overseas in Jacob Gruter’s Latin translation. The majority of English reprints of Bacon’s other writings, apart from his Essays, date from before 1660. A Latin collection of his writings, Scripta in naturali et universali philosophia, was published by Isaac Gruter in the Netherlands in 1653 (reprinted 1685). The first Latin translation of Bacon’s Opera omnia published in Frankfurt in 1665 had wide diffusion in Europe, with a further edition in 1694. There were several imprints of his major writings in the Netherlands, including two editions of Sylva sylvarum (1648 and 1661), four of De augmentis scientiarum (1645, 1652, 1663, 1694), two of Novum organum (1645, 1650). His Opera omnia were printed in Frankfurt in 1661. Baconian ideas generated extensive interest outside the universities. His proposals for refounding philosophical enquiry in experience were taken up by educational reformers like Johannes Comenius and John Webster, and by members of the Hartlib circle such as Georg Ritschel. In the second half of the century Bacon’s name starts to appear on British university reading lists and lectures. However, his Novum organum did not succeed in supplanting the logical instruments of university education. Aubrey includes ‘all my Lord Chancellor Bacon’s writings’ in his recommended reading for his Idea of Education. To judge by translations and European printings of his writings, there was strong interest in Bacon’s philosophy among his European contemporaries. Bacon figures in university disputations in the Netherlands as early as the 1620s and 1630s. Already in 1627 Naude´ had listed ‘Verulam’ in his ideal library (translated in 1661 by John Evelyn as Instructions Concerning Erecting of a Library). Bacon is cited as one of the ‘novatores’ by Huygens and Gerard de Vries (Introductio, 1683). Among the philosophical modernizers in Holland who signalled their openness to new ideas by asserting their freedom to philosophize (libertas philosophandi), Johannes de Raey (1622–1701) lists Bacon, Hobbes, and Digby alongside Galileo, Gassendi, and Descartes as the anti-scholastic moderns in his Clavis philosophiae naturalis (1654) (the 1658 edition alludes to Bacon by the addition to the title of the words, Organum philosophicum). In the ‘De ratione studendi’ printed in his Meletemata, Adrian Heereboord groups critics of Aristotle according to whether they simply refuted him, or laid new foundations. Bacon is listed in the latter group along with Descartes Comenius.17

17 On the reception of Bacon see Paul Dibon, ‘Sur la rece´ption de l’oeuvre de F. Bacon en Hollande dans la premie`re moitie´ du XVIIe sie`cle’, in M. Fattori (ed.), Francis Bacon: terminologia e fortuna nel XVII secolo (Rome: Edizione Atheneo, 1984), pp. 91–115; M. Le Doeuff, ‘Bacon chez les grands au sie`cle de Louis XIII’, Fattori (ed.), Francis Bacon, pp. 155–78; C. W. Schoneveld, Intertraffic of the Mind: Studies in Seventeenth-Century Anglo-Dutch Translation with a Checklist of Books Translated from English into Dutch 1600–1700 (Leiden: Leiden University Press for the Sir Thomas Browne Institute, 1983).

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Readers of De augmentis include Peiresc, Descartes Marin Mersenne, Pierre Gassendi, and Nicolas Malebranche in France, and Constantijn Huygens and Isaac Beeckman in the Netherlands. Mersenne read De augmentis in the pirated 1624 edition, published in France. Descartes endorsed Bacon’s method as complimentary to his own, but made no comment on Baconian induction. It was his anti-scholasticism which both Mersenne and Malebranche noted. Gassendi included a chapter on ‘Logica Verulami’ in his logic. The Italian scholar and natural philosopher Cassiano dal Pozzo (1588–1657), member of the Italian Accademia dei Lincei and correspondent of Galileo, played a central role in the diffusion of Bacon’s works in Italy. Among Bacon’s German contemporaries, the most prominent philosopher to take an interest in Bacon was Joachim Jungius (1587–1657), who, like Bacon, was critical of Aristotelianism, repudiated syllogistic logic, and advocated that the study of nature should be based on experience. Jungius certainly owned books by Bacon and quotes him, but it is not clear that he was a Baconian in any meaningful sense of the term. Daniel Morhof includes a chapter on Bacon in his Polyhistor of 1681, which gives an account of Bacon’s idea of natural history. Although a philosopher of a very different temper, and one who was critical of specific aspects of Bacon’s work, Leibniz respected Bacon as an innovator, and praised his experimental method. Finally, Voltaire’s account of Bacon in his Lettres sur les Anglais (1734) contributed greatly to the esteem in which he was held by the French philosophes in the eighteenth century, by whom he was celebrated as the harbinger of Enlightenment science. Bacon’s most important and enduring legacy was methodological, in the development of experimental natural philosophy. His proposals for reforming natural philosophy contributed in a major way to the development of science as a discipline, distinguished from the other branches of philosophy by its experimental method of enquiry. It is an open question how far Bacon’s own theories about the nature and operations of the natural realm influenced other natural philosophers, although he was widely hailed as an inspiration by seventeenth-century experimentalists. The foundation of the Royal Society after the Restoration of 1660, with Bacon as posthumous patron, helped to secure Bacon’s reputation as the forefather of the experimental philosophy, and his later apotheosis as the father of scientific method. The precise debt of Royal Society experimenters, notably Robert Boyle, to Bacon’s experimental theory and practice is debatable. But in other respects the Royal Society represented the realization of his aim of raising the profile of natural philosophy through a collaborative enterprise dedicated to extending the frontiers of knowledge.

Edward Herbert (1582–1648) The Welsh philosopher Edward Lord Herbert of Cherbury was a man of many parts: courtier, soldier, diplomat, poet, musician, historian, and autobiographer. Herbert’s reputation as a philosopher rests on four books: De veritate prout distinguitur a revelatione, a verisimili, a possibili, et a falso (1624), De causis errorum (1645), De

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religione laici (1645), and the posthumously published De religione gentilium (1663). Herbert of Cherbury’s first and main philosophical work, De veritate, was first published four years after the publication of Bacon’s Novum organum, and two years before the death of Francis Bacon. Educated at University College, Oxford, Herbert seems to have developed a passion for philosophical enquiry while he was young, and he continued to pursue his interest in philosophy throughout his life. His library collection indicates that he read widely, and was well aware of the concerns of contemporary philosophy. Herbert took advantage of his travels in Europe between 1608 and 1617 to establish links with the intellectual circles in the Netherlands, France, Germany, and Italy. Subsequently he was able to strengthen his ties with French thinkers when he was appointed as English ambassador to France (1619–24). He visited France again in the 1640s. His personal acquaintances among European intellectuals included the Huguenot scholar Isaac Casaubon, the Dutch humanists Gerard and Isaac Vos (Vossius), and the liberal theologian Daniel Tilenus. Strikingly, several of his European acquaintances were at the cutting edge of new thinking in philosophy and science: Nicolas-Claude Fabri de Peiresc, Hugo Grotius, Pierre Gassendi, the Italian physician and reformist Aristotelian Fortunio Liceti, and the Huguenot scholar Claude Saumaise. Herbert also knew Marin Mersenne, who may have been responsible for the French translation of his De veritate. And through Mersenne he had contact with Descartes and Gassendi. Herbert apparently began a translation of Descartes, but this is no longer extant.18 The work to which Herbert devoted most of his philosophical attention was De veritate. Herbert began work on De veritate around 1617–19, publishing it in Paris in 1624 (apparently for private circulation). Two expanded versions followed in 1633 and 1645. The work is presented as an answer to the sceptics. Who these sceptics are, he doesn’t say, but the French provenance of De veritate suggests that a formative influence on Herbert was his encounter with the circle around Marin Mersenne, where the problem of scepticism was being discussed. Mersenne published his La Ve´rite´ des sciences contre les sceptiques [The Truth of the Sciences against the Sceptics] in 1624, the same year as the publication of Herbert’s book. That Herbert’s interest in scepticism owed much to French discussions would seem to be borne out by the fact that the two members of Mersenne’s group to whom Herbert gave copies of De veritate (Gassendi and Descartes) focused on the issue of scepticism in their

18

Biographical studies of Herbert: R. D. Bedford, In Defence of Truth. Herbert of Cherbury and the Seventeenth Century (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1979); Paolo Rossi, La vita, le opera, i tempi di Eduardo Herbert di Chirbury, 3 vols (Florence: Sansoni, 1947). For studies of his philosophy, see Sarah Hutton, ‘Lord Herbert and the Cambridge Platonists’, in Stuart Brown (ed.), British Philosophy and the Age of Enlightenment, Routledge History of Philosophy, vol. 5 (London: Routledge, 1996); Jacqueline Lagre´e, Le Salut du laı¨c: Edward Herbert de Cherbury. E´tude et traduction du ‘De religione laı¨ci’ (Paris: Vrin, 1989); J. B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

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responses. It is more than likely that Herbert had read Montaigne and Charron. It is not impossible that he may have met the sceptic La Mothe le Vayer, or the young anti-sceptic Jean de Silhon (1596–1667) whose first, and rather inadequate attempt to counter Pyrrhonism, Les deux veritez, was printed in 1626, two years after Herbert’s De veritate. But in other respects De veritate is very unlike anything produced by the French discussions of scepticism, for it presupposes a broadly Platonic metaphysics of harmonious order ordained by God, where the order of nature is expressed in correspondences between microcosm and macrocosm, nature and ideas. Man is made in the image of God and the human mind is ‘the best image and exemplar of the divine wisdom’ (‘non solùm imaginis, sed & Sapientiae suae Divinae specimen aliquod’).19 Like Bacon, Herbert’s starting point in his investigation is the inadequacy of the present state of knowledge, which he saw as a chaos of rival theories, and controversies, beset by the contradictory claims that we can know everything and that we can know nothing. His solution lay in providing a definition of truth and a method by which we can distinguish the true from the false. Herbert takes as a given that ‘truth exists’, and devotes most of De veritate to an elaborate and, it must be said, cumbersome account of the conditions which must be fulfilled for there to be true knowledge. These include that what is known must be within the scope of our cognitive capacities and that different objects of knowledge must be examined by the appropriate means of perception. Herbert’s rules for obtaining true perception specify the circumstances under which we can be sure of the truth of things, and owe a good deal to Aristotle. He distinguishes four classes of truth: truth of the thing (veritas rei), truth of appearance (veritas apparentiae), truth of concepts (veritas conceptus), and truth of the intellect (veritas intellectus). Arriving at truth, according to Herbert, entails an act of recognition, resulting from the conformity between one of the faculties of the mind and the objects appropriate to that faculty. He also claims that there are as many faculties as there are things apprehended, by which he seems to mean that the mind has an unlimited capacity to grasp the different appearances of things. Most of De veritate is taken up with an account of the faculties. Faculties are internal powers of the mind which Herbert likens to rays of the mind (radii animae). Every faculty has its appropriate object to which it is analogous. Knowledge results from its conformity or correspondence with its object. Herbert specifies that there are four faculties innate to the mind—but since he also says that there are as many faculties as there are objects, the four which he identifies must be four classes of faculty. The highest of these he calls ‘natural instinct’ (instinctus naturalis), which is

19 Edward Lord Herbert of Cherbury, De Veritate prout distinguitur a reuelatione, a verisimili, a possibili, et a falso (London, 1633), p. 43, and Herbert of Cherbury, De veritate, trans. with an introduction by Meyrick H. Carre´ (Bristol: J. W. Arrowsmith, 1937), p. 105. On Herbert and scepticism, see Richard Popkin, A History of Scepticism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), ch. 8.

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able to grasp truth intuitively with absolute conviction. Its object is self-preservation and the desire for happiness. Natural instinct is not restricted to mankind, but is to be found in all natural creatures. The second faculty is ‘internal sense’, which includes will or conscience and which is concerned on the one hand with ideas of God and his attributes, and on the other with ideas of sense, imagination, and the passions. The third faculty is ‘external sense’, which includes the five senses. Discursive reason is the lowest of the truth-seeking faculties. Unlike the other faculties, it is not a mode of perception but of analysis. Its operations include generalization, analysis, judgement, and reflection. Since discursive reason is the most error-prone faculty, it is, therefore to be guided by the application of a set of rules or ‘zetetica’ which enable it to recognize the common notions and to perform its functions. The ‘zetetica’ are a scheme of logical classification not unlike Aristotle’s categories.20 Of key importance in Herbert’s epistemology are the common notions or selfevident principles, with which the mind is furnished and which are essential for enabling us to arrive at true knowledge. According to Herbert, the common notions are ‘derived from universal wisdom and imprinted on the soul by the dictates of nature itself ’.21 Herbert refers to them as notitiae communes or koinai ennoiai, terms suggestive of a Stoic source, though they are also to be found in Euclid. Another possible source for the ‘common notions’ may be the work of the Lutheran theologian Philip Melanchthon, whose works were widely used in both Oxford and Cambridge.22 Herbert’s list of common notions is fairly extensive: causality (first, intermediate, and final causes), ideas of order, degree, and change, ‘the law of self-preservation and the desire for happiness’. They are common in the sense that they are shared by everyone—and ‘even beyond our species’. Some are immediately apparent, others have to be discovered by discursive reason.23 The certainty of the common notions is founded in universal consent. And the test of that is empirical: for they are principles shared by all rational human beings in the world (but not everyone is aware of them). For Herbert, the common notions are not knowledge, but the means to knowledge, which dispose the faculties towards conformity with their appropriate objects, which constitutes the ground of truth. The common notions provide criteria by which the truth-seeker can assess whether the conditions of true perception of things have been met, and can give assurance that he has true knowledge. It is through the common notions that we can distinguish

20 The term derives from the Greek zetein, to enquire. It was used in mathematics by Vieta, and by Joachim Jungius in the name of the short-lived Societas Ereunetica sive Zetetica (Society for Research or Investigation) which he founded in Rostock, 1622–4. 21 Herbert of Cherbury, De veritate, trans Carre´, p. 106. 22 Melanchthon, De anima p. 208. Melanchthon’s works were widely used in English universities when Herbert was an undergraduate. See Sachiko Kusukawa, ‘The Reception of Melancthon in SixteenthCentury Cambridge and Oxford’, in Günter Frank and Kees Meerhoff (eds), Melanchthon und Europa (Stuttgart: Jan Thorbecke Verlag, 2002). 23 Herbert, De veritate, trans. Carre´, pp. 126–7.

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truth from falsehood. The common notions are therefore the precondition of certainty: These Notions exercise an authority so profound that anyone who were to doubt them would upset the whole natural order and strip himself of his humanity. These principles may not be disputed. As long as they are understood it is impossible to deny them.24

Herbert’s short De causis errorum [On the Cause of Errors] (1645) supplements De veritate with further discussion of the conditions which apply to truth of appearance, and clarifications of various points. He discusses each of the five senses and errors to which they are prone. De causis errorum may have been written to clarify aspects of De veritate, and to meet objections, though there is no specific reference to criticisms, beyond an assertion of his freedom to philosophize. As we shall see, it certainly did not meet the objections raised by Herbert’s most distinguished critics, Gassendi and Descartes. The search for a solution to religious strife was a major preoccupation for Herbert. He first arrived in France in the year that the French king, Henry IV, had been assassinated by a religious fanatic, an event which heightened his consciousness of the precariousness of religious toleration in France. He was sympathetic to the cause of the Huguenots, who had won a measure of toleration only after a bloody history of persecution. Subsequently he served under Maurice of Nassau against Spanish forces in the Netherlands. Having witnessed ‘the terrors of divers churches militant throughout the world’ (‘mediis diversarum universo Orbe militantium Ecclesiarum Terroribus’) he came to the conclusion expressed in De religione laici that ‘There is no church that does not breathe threats, none almost that does not deny the possibility of salvation outside its own pale’.25 A primary purpose of De veritate was to lay the ground for Herbert’s philosophy of religion. To this end, he includes in it an account of the common notions of religion (notitiae communes circa religionem). These are essential elements of religious belief accessible to reason and shared by all people. In this respect the epistemology which he outlines in the first part of De veritate serves as a propaedeutic to grasping the essential truths of religion, sufficient for attaining eternal life. These are that (1) there is a supreme being (esse supremum aliquod Numen); that (2) this being ought to be worshipped (supremum istud Numen debere coli); (3) that true worship consists in virtue and piety; (4) that vice is to be expiated by repentance (vitia e scelera quaecunque expiari debere ex poenitentia); (5) that there is reward and punishment in

Herbert, De veritate, trans. Carre´, p. 140. ‘Nulla [ecclesia] enim non spirare minas, nulla fere extra Pomaeria sua salute proferri non negare’. Herbert Religione Laici, ed. Hutcheson, p. 87. On Herbert and religion see D. P. Walker, The Ancient Theology: Studies in Christian Platonism from the Fifteenth to the Eighteenth Century (London: Duckworth, 1972), ch. 5; Peter Harrison, ‘Religion’ and the Religions in the English Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 24 25

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an afterlife (esse praemium, vel poenam post hanc vitam).26 Herbert claims that the five common notions of religion can be discovered by use of his method of applying the four faculties. Revealed truth, by contrast, depends on authority, the certainty of which is more difficult to distinguish. The five religious common notions form the basis of his discussion of religion in all his subsequent writings, including Henry VIII. Herbert’s ideas on rational religion are developed further in his third published work, De religione laici (1645). As its title suggests this is directed to a lay and not a clerical reader. The addressee is a laicus or viator (a rational layman or wanderer) faced with the question of how to judge the competing claims of rival churches. How is he to preserve himself from their threats, and arrive at a correct judgement of where salvation lies? By identifying the essentials of religion as a minimum few which, he believed, every rational man could deduce for himself, Herbert sought to lay the foundations of religious toleration. These ideas are further elaborated in De religione gentilium which is in many ways a work of comparative religion. Herbert draws heavily on classical sources, but also extends its survey to China and the New World. He focuses on the common elements shared by different religions, including Christianity, even while condemning the abominable practices of many pagan religious rites. He argues that despite the errors of the pagans, ‘amongst those heaps of Ethnical Superstitions, a thread of truth might be found’.27 These threads of truth are the five common notions of religion, which have been obscured by corruptions introduced by priests. Both De religione laici and his posthumous De religione gentilium (1663) were highly critical of the clergy for fostering animosity between faiths, and misleading the lay public. Herbert’s view that the basis of religious belief is a minimal set of tenets common to all mankind was shared by Hugo Grotius and the Huguenot leader Philippe du Plessis Mornay, whose De la verite´ de la religion Chrestienne (1583), anticipates Grotius’ more fully eirenic De veritate religionis Christianae (1640). Herbert claimed that Grotius encouraged him to publish De veritate.28 Herbert’s view that the all men agree on the principle of self-preservation and desire for happiness, ‘ratio propriae conservationis, appetitus beatitudinis’,29 echoes the principles on which Grotius bases his idea of the law of nature in that book. Herbert’s idea that paganism preserves elements of religious truth was one which had gained currency through the Renaissance idea of a prisca theologia or ancient theology. It would be extensively developed by Cudworth in his True Intellectual System of the Universe (1678).

Herbert, De veritate (1633), pp. 210–21; De veritate, trans Carre´, pp. 291–303. Herbert, Antient Religion of the Gentiles (London, 1705), p. 3. 28 Herbert owned several of Grotius’ works, some of them gifts from the author, including De iure belli ac pacis. Most of the books by Grotius listed in his library catalogue were theological, but he owned a copy of De iure belli ac pacis (Amsterdam, 1642). C. J. Fordyce and T. M. Knox, ‘The Books Bequeathed to Jesus College Library, Oxford, by Edward Lord Herbert of Cherbury’, in The Library of Jesus College, Oxford (Oxford Bibliographical Society; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1937). 29 Herbert, De veritate (1633), 48, trans. Carre´, p. 126. 26 27

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Herbert insisted that his common notions of religion are compatible with Christianity, but his views were perceived as undermining religion, not least because he held that the veracity of revelation could be tested by reason, and indeed that saving truth is deducible by reason. From this it follows that Christian revelation is not essential to salvation. Furthermore Herbert’s rational treatment of religion led him to theologically heterodox conclusions, notably his denial of absolute reprobation and his hope for universal salvation. Not surprisingly, therefore, De religione laici aroused suspicions about Herbert’s religious orthodoxy among his contemporaries, and not just from ecclesiastical quarters. Herbert’s posthumously published De religione gentilium (1663) sealed his reputation as a danger to revealed religion. He was condemned as an atheistic impostor in the mould of Hobbes and Spinoza. One of the first to sound this theme was Christian Kortholt in De tribus impostoribus magnis [Of the Three Great Impostors] (1680). Michael Berns followed suit with his Alter der Atheı¨sten, der Heyden, und der Christen (1692). In Britain, hostile reactions to Herbert were provoked by the use made of his ideas on rational religion by his anticlerical admirers. The most important of these was the deist, Charles Blount, whose Religio laici (1683) draws extensively and openly on Herbert’s De religione laici. By emphasizing the power of human reason and Herbert’s anticlericalism, Blount transformed Herbert’s cautious eirenicism, into explicit deism. Blount claims that his argument is ‘grounded . . . upon his [Herbert’s] five Catholick or Universal principles’.30 In Oracles of Reason (1693), Blount again underlines Herbert’s anticlericalism and he makes open reference to Herbert’s common notions, and to his idea that a universal natural religion consists of virtue and the rule of right. With friends like these, Herbert became a target in anti-deist polemics well into the eighteenth century, drawing the fire of Thomas Halyburton (in his Natural Religion Insufficient, 1714) and Philip Skelton (in Ophiomaches: or, Deism Revealed, 1749). The controversies surrounding deism and natural religion probably explain why the second Latin edition of De religione gentilium was published in 1700, followed by an English translation by William Lewis with the title The Antient Religion of the Gentiles, published in 1705 (reprinted 1709 and 1711).

Reception of De veritate Herbert’s posthumous reputation as a deist has obscured his profound commitment to religious eirenicism as well as the earlier reception of De veritate.31 Few early readers of the work believed that he had intended to undermine revealed religion, though there were those who suspected his orthodoxy. The earliest responses to De 30

Blount, Religio laici (London, 1683), p. 38. R. W. Serjeantson, ‘Herbert of Cherbury before Deism: The Early Reception of the De veritate’, The Seventeenth Century, 17.2 (2001): 217–38. 31

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veritate were epistemological. It was on Herbert’s claim that De veritate was intended to combat the problem of scepticism that Herbert’s most eminent philosophical readers, Descartes and Gassendi, focused. Gassendi drafted a set of objections to Herbert in a letter which he never sent.32 He made the obvious objection to Herbert’s doctrine of the Common Notions and natural instinct that their basis is subjective. Universal consent is no criterion for judging the indubitability of the common notions: far from there being agreement among people, there is a huge disagreement among people on just about everything, a situation which Herbert’s account of truth will only perpetuate. On the basis of Herbert’s internal criterion of truth, any single person can claim that the opinions of others are unsound, but his own are correct. Far from defeating scepticism, Herbert’s system will result in scepticism. In another letter, to their mutual friend Elie Diodati, Gassendi delivered himself more forthrightly of a negative judgement on the De veritate. The best he could say for it was that it ‘is only a kind of dialectic which can well have its advantages, but which does not prevent us from being able to make up a hundred other schemes of similar value and perchance of a greater one’.33 All Herbert has produced is a maze of confusions. Herbert certainly has not found truth, which, in Gassendi’s own sceptical view, is unknowable. Descartes received a copy of De veritate via Mersenne in 1639, and he apparently read it in a French version probably prepared by Mersenne. Descartes reciprocated by sending Herbert a copy of his Meditationes. Although he was, apparently, more sympathetic than Gassendi to Herbert’s anti-sceptical intentions, he was unimpressed by Herbert’s efforts. He summarized his objections in a letter to Mersenne.34 A basic problem was that without already knowing what truth is, we could not be sure that Herbert’s account was true. A set of operations for recognizing truth is useless unless we already know what truth is. For Descartes truth is only known intuitively. Another fundamental problem was Herbert’s reliance on universal consent as the criterion of truth. Descartes objects that universal consent is unreliable since we are just as likely to find agreement on errors. Herbert’s concept of Natural Instinct is also unreliable as a guide to truth, since it derives partly from our corporeal nature. By contrast, natural light, which for Descartes is the rule of truth, is the same in all people, and entirely free from interference from our bodily nature. Aside from these sceptical objections by Gassendi and Descartes, Herbert’s epistemology was criticized by others on other counts. Franco Burgersdijk, author of several epitomes of Aristotelian philosophy, objected that since, as Aristotle held, the mind is a tabula rasa there are no innate ideas. The diplomat William Boswell

Pierre Gassendi, ‘Ad librum D. Edoardi Herberti Angli, De veritate, epistola’, in Opera omnia (Louvain, 1658), vol. 3, pp. 411–19. Herbert owned Gassendi’s Exertatio against Robert Fludd and his Exertationes paradoxae adversus Aristotelem (1636). 33 Mersenne, Correspondence, vol. 4, p. 336. Translation by Popkin, History of Scepticism, p. 133. 34 Printed in CSMK, vol. 3, p. 139. 32

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claimed that Burgersdijk’s Metaphysica was written for the express purpose of refuting Herbert. Other European readers of De veritate include Tommaso Campanella, Claude Saumaise, Daniel Heinsius, and Joachim Hübner. Gassendi claimed that Pope Urban VIII thought highly of the work, but this did not prevent it from being put on the Index librorum prohibitorum in 1633. Herbert also attracted the interest of the education reformers, Hartlib and Comenius. Hartlib praised Herbert for making the common notions the foundation of logic, and he compared Herbert’s philosophy to that of Francis Bacon, Francisco Sanchez, Rene´ Descartes, and Ramon Lull. Jan Amos Comenius also had a high opinion of Herbert’s common notions.35 The enthusiastic reception in the Hartlib circle associated Herbert with the reforming intentions of Bacon and Descartes. One of Herbert’s earliest English readers was Hobbes, who read De veritate in 1636, apparently approvingly.36 However, Hobbes’s friend Robert Payne confessed to him that he and many others found it hard to follow, that they were, ‘uncapable of his sublime conceptions’.37 The extent of Herbert’s relations with Hobbes is unexplored. The existence of an early manuscript of Hobbes’s De corpore among Herbert’s papers, suggests that they were in philosophical contact. Herbert’s final trip to Paris while Hobbes was in exile there, and around the time of the publication of his anticlerical De religione laici, raises the intriguing possibility that Herbert may have influenced Hobbes’s Leviathan. The most famous response to Herbert by a seventeenth-century English philosopher are the objections made by John Locke. These were first made in the second draft of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1671), and subsequently included as an appendix when the Essay was published in 1690.38 In Book 1, in the course of his refutation of innate ideas, Locke targets both Herbert’s common notions (as set out in De veritate), and his common notions of religion (as listed in De religione laici). Locke concedes that Herbert’s common notions are ‘clear truths’ which ‘a rational Creature can hardly avoid giving assent to’, but he denies that Herbert has demonstrated that they are innate to the mind. Furthermore, they contain terms of uncertain meaning (e.g. virtue and sin), so, consequently, cannot be used as a rule of truth—‘it will scarce seem possible, that God should engrave Principles in Mens Minds, in words of uncertain signification, such as Vertues and Sins, which amongst different Men, stand for different things’.39 35 36

Serjeantson, ‘Herbert of Cherbury before Deism’. Thomas Hobbes, Correspondence, ed. Noel Malcolm, 2 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), vol. 1,

p. 32. 37

Hobbes, Correspondence, vol. 1, p. 40. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 1.3.15–19, pp. 77–80. 39 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 19, p. 79. See R. L. Armstrong, ‘Cambridge Platonists and Locke on Innate Ideas’, JHI, 30 (1969): 187–202; R. L. Greenlee, ‘Locke and the Controversy over Innate Ideas’, JHI, 33 (1972): 251–64; G. A. J. Rogers, ‘Locke, Newton and the Cambridge Platonists on Innate Ideas’, JHI, 40 (1979): 191–205. 38

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Another English critic of Herbert’s epistemology was Locke’s contemporary Richard Burthogge. Although an admirer of Locke, Burthogge exhibits affinities with the Cambridge Platonists (see Chapter 7). He also held Herbert in high regard, referring to him in his Organum vetus et novum (1678) as, ‘the truly-Noble and Learned the late Lord Herbert’. Burthogge saw parallels between Herbert’s epistemology and Descartes’s intuitionism. Against the claim that ‘Truth consisteth in the Analogy, Agreement, Harmony of things to our Faculties’, Burthogge objects first that ‘a bare Congruity between the Object and the Understanding is not the ground of Truth, but of Sense or Intelligibility’; secondly, assent is not blind inclination, but an act of judgement, involving proposition and proof; thirdly, Herbert’s theory is no guarantee of truth, since we may just as easily mistake falsehoods for truths.40 The Cambridge Platonists certainly knew and responded to Herbert’s philosophy. The lines of connection between them extended well beyond epistemology to broadly Platonic metaphysics, and his interest in natural religion. But the Cambridge Platonists do not exhibit the same anticlericism, and their interpretation of pagan religion was more positive than Herbert’s. The fullest discussion of Herbert is by Nathaniel Culverwell who describes him as an author who ‘hath both his truth and his errour’ in his An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature (1652), which was published well before the publication of De religione gentilium.41 Culverwell interpreted Herbert’s conception of ‘natural instincts’ not as ‘connate ideas’ of the Platonist kind, but as dispositions of the soul (‘powers and faculties of the soul’). He also accepted that the mind was furnished with common notions as ‘cleare and undelible Principles, some first and Alphabetical Notions’ in human nature by which it can read the law of nature.42 George Rust used Herbert’s conception of the common notions and natural instinct in his account of ‘right reason’ in his posthumously published A Discourse of the Use of Reason in Matters of Religion (1683). Rust’s editor was Henry Hallywell, who may have chosen this moment to publish this in order to defend the idea of a ‘rational religion’ consistent with revelation against the deist’s repudiation of Christian mystery. The subtitle suggests as much: Shewing that Christianity Contains nothing Repugnant to Right Reason; against Enthusiasts and Deists. It was published in the same year as Charles Blount’s Religio laici (1683) which quotes extensively from Herbert’s De religione laici. The fortunes of both Bacon and Herbert illustrate the fact that the importance of a philosopher’s work is not contingent on his/her immunity from refutation. Bacon’s own speculations in natural philosophy and his metaphysical theory were not taken up by his successors. And his recommendations for the method of investigating

40

Richard Burthogge, Organum vetus & novum, or, A discourse of reason and truth wherein the natural logick common to mankinde is briefly and plainly described (London, 1678), p. 52–4. 41 Nathaniel Culverwell, An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature, ed. Robert A. Greene and Hugh MacCallum (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1971), p. 83. 42 Culverwell, Discourse of the Light of Nature, p. 84.

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nature were considerably redrawn by later experimenters. But the principles which underlay his inductive approach—the appeal to experience and agnosticism about explanatory theory—inspired his successors. The fact that Herbert’s epistemology failed to convince Descartes, Gassendi, and Locke, does not mean that writing De veritate was a waste of his intellectual energies. Of more significance is the fact that the greatest thinkers of the age considered it worthy of refutation. Although Herbert’s philosophy of religion failed in its aim to provide a philosophical grounding for religious toleration, its take-up in ways he did not intend among the deists and antireligious thinkers ensured that it nevertheless contributed to Enlightenment debates about the rational grounds of religious belief. Thus the major themes of their philosophies anticipate the direction of seventeenth-century natural philosophy and philosophy of religion. Although they diverged on epistemology, both Bacon and Herbert were centrally concerned with question of how we arrive at a true knowledge of things, a quest which led each of them to propose new theories, which were radically different from the received Aristotelianism of the schools. Bacon and Herbert were philosophers for their time, but, like all thinkers of any stature, their philosophy was interpreted and reinterpreted in the light of later developments, and the changing horizons of succeeding generations. British philosophy in the first quarter of the seventeenth century was as yet untouched by the Cartesian revolution of mid-century, though Herbert evidently knew Descartes. Their reforming intentions bear comparison with those of the Mersenne circle in Paris, where Descartes was the rising star. Bacon and Herbert’s quest for new beginnings in philosophy was also shared by other Britons, most important of whom was that younger contemporary of their acquaintance, Thomas Hobbes. To a far greater extent than Herbert, Hobbes was deeply influenced by developments in France. The publication of Hobbes’s Leviathan within two years of Herbert’s death announced a new philosophical voice to be reckoned with, uncompromising in its application of the new mechanical philosophy to all branches of philosophy, and radical in its materialism.

6 Thomas Hobbes ‘Great Columbus of the golden lands of new philosophies’ (Abraham Cowley, ‘To Mr. Hobbes’, Poems, 1656)

The strife-torn years of the 1640s and 1650s inevitably brought disruption to intellectual life. Nevertheless the conflicts of these decades provided a spur for debate on political and religious questions. It was as a contributor to those debates that Thomas Hobbes first came to public notice as a thinker of first importance, and Hobbes’s years of displacement in Paris proved to be the most philosophically stimulating and productive of his life. Hobbes’s political writings were designed to address the political theories in circulation at this turbulent time, yet they transcend partisan categories. Both Hobbes’s natural philosophy and his political philosophy constitute the most original application of new mechanical principles to philosophy by an English philosopher. Hobbes’s achievement was to have offered a selfconsistent, demonstrable philosophy in line with contemporary developments in mathematics and mechanics. By applying the same methodological and philosophical principles in both natural and political philosophy he proposed a viable alternative to Aristotelianism. In many respects his most original contribution to philosophy resulted from his departure from the tripartite system which he had originally planned. His greatest philosophical legacy is his political masterpiece, Leviathan, which was not originally conceived as part of his system, but was produced in response to the turn of political events. Hobbes’s contribution was such that he redefined the issues for political philosophy, not just in England, but in Europe (principally through their uptake and adaptation by Pufendorf). It also made him extremely controversial, with the result that few were willing to acknowledge a debt to him. Hobbes’s impact was so widespread in seventeenth-century philosophy that it is impossible to do justice to him in a single chapter. But that also means that Hobbes’s immediate context gives us a remarkable window on seventeenth-century philosophy in action. Through the debates with which he engaged we have a glimpse of the circulation of ideas in the context of when they were produced. Before discussing Hobbes’s philosophy, it will be appropriate to give some account of the background in seventeenth-century political thought.

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Political Philosophy before 1650 Political thought of the 1640s draws on the legacy of debates earlier in the century, when issues of sovereignty as well as resistance theory were aired in James VI and I’s debates with his Calvinist subjects and his Catholic detractors.1 These earlier debates dealt with themes such as the nature and rights of sovereignty, whether and on what grounds a tyrant might be opposed, and the relationship between spiritual and temporal authority. In his De jure regni apud Scotos (1579) George Buchanan had argued that kings derive their power by transference from the people: rulers owe their position to free people who create monarchs for their own protection. If rulers breach the laws that bind them, subjects are released from their obligation of obedience. The Catholic William Barclay entered the lists with his De regno et regali potestate (Paris, 1600), which attacks Buchanan and other ‘monarchomachs’ such as the Huguenot Vindicia, contra tyrannos (1579) (attributed to Franc¸ois Hotman). Barclay did, however, argue that in certain extreme circumstances subjects may oppose their ruler—for example if a ruler makes war on his subjects. Other European contributors to these debates were, first, Hadrian Saravia (c.1532–1613), a Protestant convert and naturalized Englishman who argued in his De imperandi authoritate (1593) that kingly power is of divine origin, challenging resistance theorists like Buchanan. Basing his claims on the bible, Saravia argued that governmental authority derived from God, not man, and that the first governments were paternal. He denied that men are by nature born free, since ‘by law of nature the son is in the power of the father’.2 The issue of sovereignty is also handled by the Venetian Marc’Antonio de Dominis (1560–1624). In his De republica ecclesiastica (1617)3 De Dominis defended James I against the Jesuits, arguing that monarchy was by divine institution, and does not derive from transference of power from subject to ruler. Kings are therefore accountable to God alone, and not their subjects. He also took an Erastian position subordinating ecclesiastical to regal power.4 Another foreigner important for the resistance argument was the Frenchman Jean Bodin, the influence of whose Les Six Livres de la re´publique (1576) continued well into the seventeenth century, with English translations by Richard Knolles in 1606 (reprinted 1635). Bodin also argued that the formation of political community by association of individuals is voluntary.5

1 Robert M. Kingdon, ‘Calvinism and Resistance Theory’, and J. H. M. Salmon, ‘Catholic Resistance Theory, Ultramontanism, and the Royalist Response, 1580–1620’, in CHPT, pp. 214–53. 2 Hadrian Saravia, De imperandi authoritate (London, 1611), pp. 125, 167; J. P. Sommerville, ‘Absolutism and Royalism’, in CHPT, pp. 347–73, p. 358. 3 Published in London when De Dominis was resident in England, and reprinted in 1620. 4 The Venetian Republic attracted interest from the Protestant north for its resistance to papal domination, and for its success in combining liberty with stability. See Noel Malcolm, De Dominis (1560–1624): Venetian, Anglican, Ecumenist and Relapsed Heretic (London: Strickland & Scott, 1984). 5 Julian H. Franklin, ‘Sovereignty and the Mixed Constitution: Bodin and his Critics’, in CHPT, pp. 298–328.

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In the 1640s these arguments were refocused on to the dispute between crown and parliament. New to the debates of the 1640s is an emphasis on natural law, but the seeds of this, along with other themes, were already sown in earlier controversies. Particularly important in pre-Civil War political theory was the Spanish Jesuit Francisco Suarez, whose major synthesis of scholastic political theory, Tractatus de legibus, ac Deo legislatore (1612) was foundational for discussions of natural law and a frequent point of reference in political debates. Also important for the context within which Hobbes engaged with natural law was the Dutchman Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) whose De jure belli ac pacis [On the Law of War and Peace, 1625] (see Chapter 3) anticipates aspects of Hobbes’s political philosophy. Like Hobbes, Grotius envisaged a pre-civil state of man in which the only law in operation was natural law: Grotius identified self-preservation as the fundamental principle of natural law. However, in his account, self-interest is qualified in three ways which mitigate its harshness: respecting the property of others, keeping promises, compensating injury. Unlike Hobbes, Grotius argued that there was a necessary link between reason and morality, and allowed that the supreme authority might rest in a republic rather than monarchy.6

The Debates of the 1640s Very little of the polemical literature generated by the troubles of the 1640s can be characterized as philosophical. However, insofar as writers presuppose a theoretical framework, the point of reference is Aristotelian and scholastic political theory. Even the more substantial defences of both sides make extensive use of the bible. There was also a revival of interest in Machiavelli, whose works were translated into English at this time, the Discourses in 1636 (with several editions later on) and The Prince in 1640. The republican Henry Neville translated Machiavelli’s complete works (though this was not published until 1688), and Machiavelli was a major source for James Harrington’s republican political theory. Royalists redeployed claims that monarchy was of divine institution or Adamic origin. Perhaps the best-known defender of royal absolutism was Robert Filmer (1588–1653), an exact contemporary of Hobbes, who would later attack Hobbes, as well as Milton and Grotius, in 1652. Filmer polemicized on behalf of the monarchy in the 1640s. His fullest statement of his position is his posthumously published Patriarcha, or the Natural Power of Kings (1680), which dates from this time or possibly earlier.7 Filmer’s defence of the hereditary right of kings was indebted to 6 For different assessments of the importance of Grotius for Hobbes, see Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories: Their Origins and Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Perez Zagorin, ‘Hobbes as a Theorist of Natural Law’, International History Review, 17 (2003): 239–55; Noberto Bobbio, Thomas Hobbes and the Natural Law Tradition (Chicago & London: Chicago University Press, 1993). 7 Haakonssen dates it from the 1640s, Tuck from 1612–13. See Richard Tuck, ‘A New Date for Filmer’s Patriarcha’, Historical Journal, 29 (1986): 183–6.

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Bodin’s Re´publique. In Patriarcha he picks up on the themes of the Jacobean debates over kingly supremacy, and attacks the idea that men are naturally free as a novel invention introduced by ‘the subtle Schoolmen’ in support of the Pope. He proffers the biblically based argument that monarchy originated in the paternal authority of Adam over his family. Filmer denied the natural liberty of men since Adam’s posterity are born into a state of subjection to paternal authority. Patriarchal and monarchical authority being the same, Adam’s monarchical authority over his family descends to his posterity. Patriarcha is best known nowadays for the uses to which it was put in late Stuart political debates. Originally written to support the claims of the crown before the Civil War, Filmer’s theory was revived to bolster the position of the crown in the 1680s. It thus became a natural target for opponents of absolute monarchy, most famously in James Tyrell’s Patriarcha non monarcha (1681) and Locke’s critique in Two Treatises of Government (written c.1683) (see Chapter 9). Calvinist resistance theory was deployed to justify opposition to the monarch. A precedent had been set by George Buchanan’s justification of the deposition of Mary Queen of Scots in his De jure regni apud Scotos, which was cited by Cromwell when justifying the execution of Charles I.8 In the 1640s the Covenanters led the argument for resistance to tyranny on the grounds that the authority of the ruler derived from a compact between citizens and the king. Such arguments were pursued most energetically by Samuel Rutherford, whose Rex Lex or, The Law and the Prince (1644), combined Calvinist resistance theory with scholastic political theory to argue that legitimate government was grounded in a covenant between king and people. His book largely consists of argument by biblical example, with a philosophical point of reference in Aristotle, who is the source for his view that man is ‘a sociall creature’, and ‘domestick societie is by natures instinct, so is civill societie naturall’. He cites Bodin to argue that political society is formed by voluntary association between men, and he cites Suarez on the natural origins of law, that ‘a power of making Laws, is given by God as a property flowing from nature, Qui dat formam, dat consequ[e]ntia ad formam’.9 Rutherford’s Lex Rex was directed against what he called ‘anti-magistratical royalists’, among whom he listed Hugo Grotius, Marc’Antonio De Dominis, William Barclay, and ‘the doctors of Aberdeen’. A more democratic variant on the resistance theories in circulation at this time can be found in the Leveller Richard Overton. In his Arrow against Tyranny (1646) and his An Appeal from the Commons (1647), both written while he was imprisoned, Overton maintained that all men are equal by birth. Although more of a visionary than a systematic thinker, Overton proposed a theory of government based on the consent of free men who place their trust in a single ruler in order to secure peace. This freedom, being a ‘propriety’ in nature, cannot be rescinded by men. Overton’s 8 Stuart Brown, ‘The Sovereignty of the People’, in Sarah Hutton and Paul Schuurman (eds), Studies on Locke: Sources, Contemporaries, and Legacy (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008), pp. 45–57. 9 Samuel Rutherford, Lex Rex or, The Law and the Prince (London, 1644), p. 22.

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materialism is suggestive of parallels with Hobbes, while his conception of property seems to anticipate Locke. Explicitly republican theory begins to be aired post regicide, by figures such as Marchmont Nedham, James Harrington, and John Milton, whose Ready and Easy Way (1660) critiques Plato redivivus by Henry Neville, translator of Machiavelli.10 In the 1670s republican thought focuses on the defence of common liberty against tyrants: the most influential republican theorist, Algernon Sidney (1623–83) picks up the anti-tyrant theme in his posthumously published ‘Court Maxims’ (written 1665–6), which attacks monarchy and justifies insurrection against tyrannical government, themes he recapitulates in his anti-Filmerian Discourses Concerning Government (written 1681–3, published 1698). Post-1688 republican ideas also circulated through the publication of the writings of earlier republicans (Ludlow, Milton, Sidney, Neville, and Harrington). John Toland would play a major role in editing these writings, which were to form the basis of the eighteenth-century canon for Whigs and republican sympathizers.

Hobbes Hobbes’s first entry into the public philosophical arena was his Elements of Law both Natural and Politic (1640), which was originally written as a defence of absolute sovereignty in response to the crisis in relations between the Crown and Parliament that eventually deteriorated into civil war and regicide. This anticipates arguments of his major work of political philosophy, Leviathan (1651). Written in the aftermath of the execution of Charles I, this too was a response to contemporary political circumstances. The impact of Hobbes’s political philosophy was immediate and profound. His books changed the terms of political theory for decades to come. Not surprisingly, therefore, he tends to be regarded as primarily a political philosopher, and his natural philosophy has received less attention. However, as the architecture of his grand philosophical design of his Elements of Philosophy shows, he regarded his political and natural philosophy as parts of a unitary whole. For Hobbes held that in all branches of philosophy, everything is ultimately explicable in terms of mechanical principles, that is to say in terms of bodies in motion. He devoted considerable time to the ‘mathematical’ study of natural philosophy throughout his philosophical career, from his earliest writings on optics until old age. His main work of natural philosophy, De corpore (1655), which incorporates his earlier investigations, was delayed by his writing Leviathan. Long after he ceased to write on political theory, he continued to publish on physics and to defend his methodology, in writings such as Problemata physica (1662) (on gravity, vacuum, heat, the tides,

10

Blair Worden, ‘English Republicanism’, in CHPT, pp. 443–75.

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and other natural phenomena), De principiis & ratiocinatione geometrarum (1666), and Decameron physiologicum: or Ten Dialogues of Natural Philosophy (1678). Educated at Elizabethan Oxford, Hobbes spurned the Aristotelian philosophy which formed the backbone of his Oxford studies. He criticized the teaching of Greek and Latin authors both at school and university, for generating destructive disputes and false ideas about political entitlement. His strictures about humanistic education notwithstanding, his own humanist training served him well and he remained a lifelong humanist, as evidenced by his translations of Thucydides (1629) and Homer (1677, 1681) and by his compendium of Aristotelian rhetoric.11 He conformed to custom by publishing in Latin for a scholarly and international readership, but he is one of the first philosophers to publish major works in English. His great work of political philosophy, Leviathan, is a masterpiece of English prose. In the context of the political debates raging among his fellow countrymen, his use of the vernacular ensured the book a wide audience. Hobbes’s philosophical career started late. He was over 40 years old when he made his first public venture into philosophy. His philosophical achievement is the more remarkable for the fact that the period of his greatest productivity was one of political turbulence and exile. Both the content and publication history of his political and philosophical writings register the divisive and disruptive political circumstances of the Civil war and its aftermath. The political reverses experienced by the Royalist cause, to which he was linked through his patrons in the Cavendish families, help to explain the fact that his system of philosophy, his tripartite Elements of Philosophy, was not published in the order which he originally planned: the third part, De cive was published first (in Paris, in 1642, with a Latin version in 1647),12 while the first and second parts (De corpore and De homine) were published considerably later, in 1655 and 1658 respectively. He interrupted work on these to publish his most famous book, Leviathan (1651). After the peaceful Restoration of the monarchy in 1660, the adverse reaction to his philosophy in England led to a moratorium being imposed on further publication of his views as the price of royal protection from his enemies. Thereafter he had to rely on translations of his works in order to answer his critics. By contrast with his notoriety in England, he enjoyed a positive reception in Europe, where he came to be regarded as the greatest living philosopher. Hobbes was well acquainted with new currents of thought as a result of direct contact with the most innovative thinkers of his time, both at home and overseas. On his travels to Europe in his capacity as tutor to the Devonshire family he met Galileo Galilei in Florence and developed links with the anti-papal group of Venetians around Paulo Sarpi, Marc’Antonio de Dominis (who had translated Bacon’s Essays), and Fulgenzio Micanzio (with whom he corresponded). Of particular importance in 11

Thomas Hobbes, A Briefe of the Art of Rhetorique (London, [1637]). This was a private printing organized by Mersenne. The Latin version was printed in the Netherlands, at the behest of Samuel Sorbie`re (Noel Malcolm, ‘Sorbie`re, Samuel’, ODNB). 12

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Paris were the group around the Minim Friar Marin Mersenne and the Montmor academy. Here he participated in discussions of new mathematical and mechanistic methods of philosophizing and came into contact with, among others, Samuel Sorbie`re, Rene´ Descartes, and Pierre Gassendi. It was in Paris that he met Thomas White and Sir Kenelm Digby. During his self-imposed exile between 1640 and 1650 Hobbes had a period of sustained close association with Parisian groups. Although he shared their interest in the new mechanical philosophy, it is clear from his Objections to Descartes’s Metaphysics (Objectiones tertiae), that Hobbes’s position was from the beginning distinct from that of Descartes. In his Objections he accepts the cogito but denies Descartes’s conclusion that the thinking subject is mind, arguing instead that thinking is a corporeal process, and that all we can know is body. He is also critical of Descartes in his early manuscript writings on optics and in letters to Descartes sent via Mersenne which comment on Descartes’s Dioptrique. In England, Hobbes was associated with the so-called Welbeck circle around Sir Charles Cavendish and his brother, William, Earl of Newcastle, who were cousins of his first employer, the Duke of Devonshire. The Welbeck circle included the natural philosophers Walter Warner and Robert Payne, who became a close personal friend. This group shared interests in optics, mathematics, and mechanics. Other friends at the cutting edge of scientific investigation were William Harvey, whom Hobbes assisted in dissections, and his sometime amanuensis, William Petty. Hobbes was also acquainted with Herbert of Cherbury, with whom he seems to have discussed an early draft of De corpore. Through the Cavendish family he met Francis Bacon, whom he served as an assistant for a short time, and who may have influenced his thinking on method and his interest in refounding philosophy. Like Bacon, Hobbes set out to provide the foundations of a new philosophy, rejecting the philosophical systems of the past. Unlike Bacon he was a systematizer, with an ambition to provide a unified philosophy which was very different in conception and method, since he set out to construct a demonstrable system of philosophy deduced from first principles. Nevertheless, in the all-encompassing scope of his philosophical ambition, he shares with Bacon a Renaissance sense of the comprehensive unity of philosophy covering all branches of knowledge. He also, like Bacon, underscored the importance of natural philosophy (i.e. science). According to his biographer Aubrey, Hobbes claimed that it was a reading of Euclid’s Elements which had inspired him to study mathematics, and to develop his own geometric method of argument by deduction from first principles. Hobbes had already embarked on his grand philosophical project some years before his first interventions in philosophical debate. His first excursion into print as a philosopher was the third set of Objections to Descartes’s Meditations (1641), but his earliest philosophical works were written for manuscript circulation. These were his critique of White (the so-called Anti-White) and his aforementioned Elements of Law.13 13 Printed a decade later as Philosophicall Rudiments Concerning Government and Society (London, 1651).

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Together these lay the ground for his mature philosophy. Hobbes’s critique of Thomas White’s De mundo (1642) was perhaps undertaken in order to demonstrate his uncompromising repudiation of received philosophies: by exposing the inadequacy of White’s attempt to incorporate new philosophical and scientific thinking within a broadly Aristotelian framework Hobbes demonstrated not just the shortcomings of Aristotelianism, but the absurdity of trying to integrate it with philosophy founded on very different principles. In this way he signalled categorically that he was on the side of the moderns. His commentary airs some of the key political ideas that he was to develop in Elements of Philosophy, such as the notion that liberty entails the absence of impediments and that government entails the transfer of right for the sake of security. Elements of Law, likewise, puts a distance between his own views and traditional philosophies, especially Aristotelian political philosophy, but also more recent political ideas of figures like Bodin and Machiavelli.

Elements of Philosophy The main branches of Hobbes’s philosophy (natural, moral, and political) are enshrined in the tripartite organization of his Elements of Philosophy, reflecting the fact that Hobbes conceived his philosophy as a unified whole, encompassing the physical world, man and society. Although there is some question of whether and how the three parts of his Elements of Philosophy integrate, there is unquestionably considerable overlap between all the published parts of his philosophy. The subsections of Elements of Law—‘Human Nature’ and ‘De corpore politico’ (On the Body Politic)—anticipate the subdivisions of his Elements of Philosophy. Leviathan recapitulates and develops ideas from De cive and anticipates much of what appeared in De homine. De corpore covers logic, language, method, metaphysics, mathematics, and physics. De homine deals with psychology, the passions, and man’s condition in nature (‘The Estate and Right of Nature’). Hobbes’s broad divisions of philosophy into physics, moral philosophy, and political philosophy subsumes the traditional branches of philosophy. In De cive VI he lists the branches of philosophy as geometry, mechanics (the science of motion), physics, ethics, and political philosophy. However, the branches of philosophy are considerably redrawn, and their content significantly pared down, by comparison with the traditional divisions of philosophy. He eliminates some of the traditional content of philosophy (notably metaphysics, and religion), and revises the character of those divisions which he retains, with the result that his scheme of philosophy bears no resemblance to the traditional Aristotelian organization of the subject. In place of the traditional subject matter of metaphysics, he deals with the definitions of terms from which his arguments are derived. Names, not ideas, are for Hobbes the only universals, and true propositions consist of names united by a copula. He rejected the notion of political philosophy as practical wisdom based on past experience, proposing instead demonstrable philosophy founded on rational principles, by which he sought to provide a foundation

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for action in political society. And, as we shall see, he radically reconceived moral philosophy, which he classified as a branch of natural philosophy, deriving moral principles from human appetites, and making rational self-interest rather than received notions of virtue its foundation. He claimed that he was the first political philosopher, since, prior to publication of his De cive, what passed for the ‘Civil Philosophy’ was a mere ‘phantasme’ of philosophy, whereas his was based on clear principles. He also claimed to have invented the science of Optics. The various definitions of philosophy given by Hobbes underscore its rational and deductive character. At its most basic philosophy equates to human reason, which he considers innate (‘Philosophia id est ratio naturalis, in omni homine innata est’).14 Hobbes also defines philosophy as the knowledge of causes and effects obtained through reason. By ‘reason’ is meant analytic reason on a geometric model, according to which, by starting from self-evident first principles, conclusions are deduced by way of a process of analysis or calculation (which he called ‘computation’). This Euclidian method of demonstration derives from his work on optics. The main subject matter of all philosophy is ‘every Body, of whose Generation or Properties we can have any knowledge’.15 Thus everything is ultimately explicable in terms of mechanical principles, that is to say in terms of bodies in motion. He distinguishes two types of body—the works of nature and the works of men, which supply the subject matter of his primary subdivision of philosophy into natural philosophy (or science) and civil philosophy. Since nothing can be known which is not body, there is no place in Hobbes’s system for non-material subject matter, be these abstract essences or spirits, that is to say most of the traditional content of metaphysics and theology. Mental processes, including the exercise of reason, are physical, resulting from the movement of particles of matter Hobbes’s sense-based epistemology is consistent with the scholastic maxim that there is nothing in the intellect which does not derive from the senses. However, he arrives at this from very different premises and his account of cognition differs in fundamentals. When explaining how we derive our knowledge from the senses, he rejected the Aristotelian explanation of the properties of things in terms of substantial forms. Instead, like the mechanical philosophers, he denied that the perceived properties of things resided in the things perceived. Rather, sense impressions arise from motion. Qualities such as colour, smell, smoothness are the result of motions in the brain triggered during the act of perception. An important difference from Descartes and Gassendi, however, is his rejection of immaterial substance and his denial that direct knowledge of non-corporeal beings (souls, angels, and God) is humanly possible. Like animals, human beings are bodies, the difference being that human bodies are capable of thought. Mind is not a separate substance, but denotes the processes 14 15

Hobbes, De corpore (1655), Part 1, ch. 1, p. 1. Hobbes, The Elements of Philosophy Concerning Body (London, 1656), pt 1.1, section 10, p. 7.

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involved in thinking. Thoughts, emotions, and volitions are motions within the brain. Knowledge derives from the senses, sensations being the movement of particles in the brain resulting from the impact of bodies. Memory consists of the residual impressions made by particles during sensation. Imagination has an important role in the process of cognition as the repository of data that is used in the process of reasoning. Reasoning itself is something to be learned.

Passions and Politics Hobbes’s political philosophy is distinctive for his conception of the state of nature, the distinction he makes between ‘right of nature’ and ‘law of nature’, and his account of government based on contract. His claim that he was the first to write on ‘civil philosophy’ ignores the contributions of Grotius and Hooker’s Of the Lawes of Ecclesiastical Polity. His claim bears analysis to the extent that he can be credited with rethinking political philosophy as a demonstrable science founded on clear principles. He regarded Aristotelian political philosophy and its scholastic legacy as not worthy of the name of philosophy. Hobbes’s rejection of Aristotle is signalled categorically in the preface of De cive, where he repudiates the Aristotelian view of man as zoon politikon, a social animal, naturally fitted for government in society. Both Elements of Law and Leviathan start with accounts of the constitution and operations of the human mind, its powers, sensation, the passions, temperament, and imagination, which form the basis of his account of the condition of man in a state of liberty (the state of nature) and as regulated by law. The second parts of both Elements of Law and Leviathan move from the constitution of man and society to treat of ‘the constitution of a commonwealth’, discussing pacts/covenants, sovereignty, three forms of government, the powers of rulers, the family unit, religion, the causes of rebellion, the duties of rulers, and the nature of laws. Elements of Philosophy covers the same ground in its second and third sections. The major difference is that the first section is devoted to body (De corpore), in order to lay the ground for the discussions which follow in succeeding books of human nature and the citizen, and ultimately of the state, or body politic. Human psychology is the key to Hobbes’s political philosophy: he identifies the ‘causes’ of government in the nature of man. Far from being naturally sociable, human beings are naturally inclined to injure one another. Instead of being ruled by reason, men are in thrall to their passions, driven by desire for glory, fear of one another and the imperative of self-preservation. Since human beings are not predisposed towards social and political organization, the condition of being governed is not the natural condition of mankind. As Hobbes observes in De cive, ‘man is made fit for society not by nature, but by education’.16 For Hobbes, political organization

16

Hobbes, Philosophicall Rudiments, p. 7.

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arises from the need to reconcile the conflicts which arise from our natural condition as human beings. Although he rejected the Aristotelian view of man as zoon politikon, by nature social or political, he would have agreed with Aristotle that it is only in the context of organized society that human beings can fulfil their full potential. On Hobbes’s analysis, our make-up as human beings is bound to put us into conflict with others. He identifies four faculties of human nature: strength, experience, reason, and passion. Human beings are thus equipped to act rationally on the basis of experience, but they are also subject to emotional drives. Human beings are motivated by a combination of self-preservation, diffidence (fear), and glory. Our impulses to action are the passions which drive us, principally the desire to seek pleasure and avoid pain. Our ability to obtain our desires depends on the power we have to do so, so it follows that every person will seek to increase his/her power. The extra-social condition of human beings is one of untrammelled individual liberty, where the only impediment to any individual’s exercise of his or her liberty is the exercise by others of their liberty. Every person’s basic right of nature (ius naturale) is ‘the preservation of his own Nature’.17 And it is every person’s natural right to do anything which he/she desires and to avoid anything which might threaten his/her life. These rights are not dependent on laws, but are contingent on our being human. They obtain in the state of nature without restriction, as there is no power capable of imposing restraint. Left to themselves with no law or power to regulate them men will inevitably come into conflict. As a result the extra-social human condition or state of nature is a state of war of all against all—either actual conflict, or potential conflict, which, for Hobbes, is equally miserable because it is a state of perpetual fear. There are variant descriptions of the state of nature in Hobbes’s writings: the most negative one occurs in Leviathan, a state in which every man’s life is ‘solitary, poore, nasty, brutish and short’, ‘a Condition of Warre . . . of everyone against everyone’.18 In this condition it is rational to seek peace, and from this arises the idea of the first law of nature, a law of nature being ‘a Precept or generall Rule, found out by Reason’.19 And the first of these is for the preservation of life. Thus ‘to seek Peace and follow it’ is ‘the first and Fundamentall Law of Nature’.20 However, even though it is rational to seek peace, human nature is such that we lack the power to do so because we are in thrall to our passions, and our natural rights as human beings inevitably put us into conflict with one another. No single person has the power to prevent this. Peace can only be achieved if there is a power strong enough to maintain it. Political organization in order to set up a power capable of doing that is the solution to this problem. But this requires each individual to surrender power for the sake of self-preservation. The key to achieving that is Hobbes’s contract-based political organization whereby we agree to give up power in order 17 18 19

Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 14, ed. Malcolm, vol. 2, p. 198. Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 14, p. 192. 20 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 198. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 200.

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that a greater power (the sovereign) will guarantee our safety. Peace is the condition obtained by surrendering one’s power to another, by means of a contract. Since the keeping of that contract is essential for our safety and well-being, it follows that the foundation of justice is the keeping of promises or covenants, without which the social and political stability essential for peace could not be maintained. The keeping of promises is therefore the second law of nature.

Morality For Hobbes natural law is the same as the moral law. Hobbes deduces the laws of morality from the ‘first and fundamental Law of Nature’ (namely, ‘to seek Peace, and follow it’). All ‘the meanes of peaceable, sociable and comfortable living’ are conducive to peace.21 Likewise, qualities conducive to peace include the virtues ‘Modesty, Equity, Trust, Humanity, Mercy’, all of them consistent with the Christian moral code.22 But they are recommended on pragmatic grounds, rather than because they are inherently good. Every one of these distinctive features of Hobbes’s political philosophy overturns received political theory. His account of the formation of the state, for example, departs from a widespread view that mankind has always lived in a state of government, even during Adam’s lifetime. (This is the position of Robert Filmer, for example, who in his Patriarcha grounds it in the bible). However, although Hobbes’s political philosophy departs from received theories in fundamentals, in other respects it contains echoes. For example, there is classical precedent for the notion of a pre-social barbaric condition, analogous to Hobbes’s state of nature. The political philosophy of the scholastics Vitoria, Molina, and Mariana also recognizes a pregovernmental condition, which they describe in terms not very dissimilar from Hobbes’s state of nature. However, they did not regard this condition as natural. The terms ‘right of nature’ and ‘law of nature’ were well entrenched in early modern political theory. Unlike others who use these terms (e.g. Vitoria and Molina, or Grotius), Hobbes draws a sharp distinction between a ‘right of nature’ (ius naturale) and a law of nature—the difference between them is that a ‘right of nature’ is liberty to choose or not choose, and while law consists of an obligation or command to follow a certain course of action. The law is imposed by command of ‘him that by right hath command over others’,23 that is to say the sovereign in a state, or, in nature, God. Just as there are no fundamental moral essences, or pre-existing ethical norms, so there is no natural justice, but justice must be constructed. The overriding need to maintain peace means that the sovereign may determine both right and

21 22 23

Leviathan, ch. 15, ed. Malcolm, vol. 2, p. 242. Hobbes, Philosophicall Rudiments, p. 56. Cf. Leviathan, ch. 17, ed. Malcolm, vol. 2, p. 254. Leviathan, ch. 15, ed. Malcolm, vol. 2 p. 242.

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wrong and religious belief. Furthermore, Hobbes’s account of motivation inverts the relationship of reason to the passions. In place of the widely held view that it is the function of reason to mitigate and direct feeling, for Hobbes desire is the primary driver in all our actions. Reason is the servant of passion, since reason may be used in assisting us to achieve our desires. It is passion which motivates us to reason, and our recourse to reason varies with the strength of our desires.

Reception The history of the reception of Hobbes’s philosophy is a subject which has filled many volumes. The most there is space for here is a cursory sketch.24 In Britain, Hobbes’s reputation as a philosopher was clouded by the controversies occasioned by his published views, especially his materialism, his defence of political absolutism, and his extreme Erastianism. These controversies were inflamed by his attacks on the universities and institutional religion in Leviathan, and they fed largely on reductive and distorted accounts of his philosophical views. His ethics was interpreted as extreme conventionalism, cynically devoid of any basis in accepted moral codes or moral norms, and entirely a matter of human invention. He was widely decried as a determinist, who reduced human beings to mere mechanisms devoid of freedom of action—despite the fact that he himself took a compatibilist view of the relationship between human freedom and material determinism. It was wrongly believed that he propounded a negative view of human nature as power-hungry and egotistical, devoid of moral principles (a view which persists today). His political and materialist views were conflated with Spinoza’s, thereby helping to father the notion that Spinoza was a materialist. And he was almost universally pilloried as an atheist. Furthermore, in England, Hobbes’s reputation as a natural philosopher and mathematician was damaged by his dispute with John Wallis on squaring the circle, in which Wallis convincingly demonstrated the failure of Hobbes’s claims. This dispute, at times vituperative, was one to which Hobbes kept returning for the rest of his life. His very last publication, Decameron physiologicum (1678) continues his war with Wallis. Hobbes also took issue with the experimental method of the newly fledged Royal Society, particularly Robert Boyle’s air-pump experiments (see Chapter 8). Hobbes’s criticisms did not endear him to the Royal Society, to whose ranks he was not admitted, despite being the eminent natural philosopher of Europe at the time of its founding.

24 The fullest account of the contemporary British reception of Hobbes is Jon Parkin, Taming the Leviathan: The Reception of the Political and Religious Ideas of Thomas Hobbes in England 1640–1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). See also Samuel I. Mintz, Hunting of Leviathan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962).

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Hobbes–Bramhall debate The controversy which probably did more than any other to sully Hobbes’s reputation in Britain was his quarrel with the exiled Royalist bishop John Bramhall. The philosophical importance of the Hobbes–Bramhall debate about Liberty and Necessity is that it elicited from Hobbes elucidations of his conception of freedom, which have a direct bearing on his political philosophy. But the theological furore it created drowned out rational argument. The debate originated as a discussion instigated by their patron, the exiled Marquess of Newcastle in 1645. It became a very public dispute after the unauthorized publication in 1654 of Hobbes’s notes with the title Of Liberty and Necessity by his Welsh admirer John Davies of Kidwelly. This work was to become the most widely read of all Hobbes’s writings, and its publication brought about an instant change of tone. Believing Hobbes to have authorized its publication, Bramhall responded by publishing his side of the debate as A Defence of True Liberty from Antecedent and Extrinsecall Necessity (1655). Hobbes replied with The Questions Concerning Liberty, Necessity and Chance (1656), to which Bramhall countered with Castigations of Mr Hobbes (1658). Hobbes and Bramhall were at odds in fundamentals. Bramhall’s position was fairly standard for a rational churchman at this time. His belief in free will was consistent with the Arminian theology to which he subscribed, and the arguments which he put forward in support of his position are in line with the kind of natural theology to which as a university-educated clergyman of the Church of England he had been trained. As such he represents a tradition of philosophical theology that goes back through Suarez and Molina to Augustine. For Bramhall will is choice or ‘election’ (Latin arbitrium). Free will is free choice (liberum arbitrium). Choosing involves ‘an act of judgement and understanding’. In accordance with traditional faculty psychology, Bramhall conceived the will to be a separate faculty of the mind, and that willing involved exercising this faculty of the will in concert with the judgements of a separate faculty of intellect. Hobbes denied this. For Hobbes, the actions which we call voluntary are merely the last in a chain of antecedent causes. For Bramhall freedom and necessity are incompatible, freedom being by definition freedom from necessity. For Hobbes, ‘Liberty and necessity are consistent’.25 By contrast, Bramhall held that to be subject to necessity is not to be free. Since to be necessitated is to be compelled by external causes, it follows that freedom is absence of external compulsion. For Bramhall the will is a self-determining power, and therefore not subject to external cause. In accordance with late scholastic accounts of the will (e.g. those of Suarez and Molina) he held that the cause of free actions lies within the agent—namely the will, which he held to be self-determining because it is not constrained by external causes. For a metaphysical materialist, like Hobbes, it did not make sense to talk in terms of faculties of the soul. Nor did he accept the distinction made by Bramhall and late scholastics between will and desire. 25

Leviathan, ch. 21, ed. Malcolm., vol. 2, p. 326.

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For Hobbes, it is our desires, or appetites, that drive us. For Hobbes, freedom is absence of impediment to action. As a determinist, he held that everything happens as the necessary effect of antecedent cause. But this does not lead him to deny freedom of action. Rather, he argued that freedom is logically consistent with necessity: any voluntary action is a free action. A free man is ‘he that . . . is not hindered to do what he has a will to’; ‘a free agent is he that can do if he will, and forbear if he will’.26 Bramhall invoked the support of ‘the greater part of Philosophers and Schoolmen’. For Hobbes, however, scholasticism was a form of contaminated philosophy and terms like ‘free will’ an example of the empty jargon of schoollearning. For his part, Bramhall derided Hobbes’s terminology as ‘obscure and confused’, ‘the common conceptions of the vulgar’ and accused him of setting himself up as ‘an universal dictator among scholars’.27 Much of the ensuing Bramhall–Hobbes quarrel was a war of words, in which the participants traded insults about each other’s terminology, with Hobbes ridiculing the empty chimeras of Bramhall’s scholastic formulations, and Bramhall hectoring Hobbes for his use of ‘vulgar’ and ‘common’ terms. Although Bramhall’s arguments were largely traditional, and although Hobbes skilfully exposed their weaknesses, Bramhall drew attention to his determinism and to the destructive consequences of his philosophy for theology. By focusing on these issues, and by pursuing them relentlessly, he succeeded in damaging Hobbes’s reputation among churchmen and laymen alike. In this way this undignified dispute contributed significantly to the adverse reception of Hobbes’s philosophy in Restoration Britain. In Scotland he was denounced by Robert Baillie as ‘a professed Atheist’. Henry Scougal condemned his ‘debauched sentiments’. Gilbert Burnet spoke of the ‘pestiferous spawn’ of the ‘infernal Leviathan’.28

Positive Reception Not all Hobbes’s critics were blinkered by prejudice, though most read him from within a different philosophical framework, working from very different sets of premises. Hobbes certainly had his British admirers—in fact the early reception of Hobbes’s philosophy, including Leviathan, was positive. John Selden was a friend, Walter Charleton an early admirer. Henry Stubbe commenced a translation of Leviathan (which he abandoned in the face of the disapproval of his patron, John Owen). Sir Kenelm Digby owned several of his works, including Leviathan. In his 26 Thomas Hobbes, ‘Of Liberty and Necessity’, in Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity, ed. Vere Chapell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 39. Cf. Leviathan, ch. 21, ed. Malcolm, vol. 2, p. 324. 27 Castigations of Mr Hobbes, in John Bramhall, The Works of Archbishop Bramhall (Oxford: John Henry Parker, 1842–4), vol. 4, pp. 208 and 228. 28 M. C. T. Simpson, ‘The Library of the Reverend James Nairn (1629–1678): Scholarly Book Collecting in Restoration Scotland’ (Ph.D. diss., University of Edinburgh, 1987).

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Idea of Education, Hobbes’s friend John Aubrey recommends for politics Hobbes’s Leviathan (also Harrington’s Oceana), and for ethics ‘Hobbes’ Human Nature which is the best’ (he also recommends Charon, Bacon’s Essays, and Pufendorf ’s De justitia et jure). Seth Ward, later a founder member of the Royal Society and Bishop of Sarum, was initially impressed by Hobbes’s Euclidian method. So were Ralph Bathurst, Thomas Barlow, and Edward Bagshaw.29 Some critics of Hobbes were impressed by his philosophical acumen. Henry More for example acknowledged Hobbes’s ‘extraordinary Quicksightedness in discerning of the best and most warrantable ways of salving all Phaemonena from the ordinary allowed properties of Matter’.30 Others regarded Hobbes’s intellectual skills as the more dangerous because of the conclusions which he drew: both Robert Boyle and Joseph Glanvill feared that Hobbes’s ‘demonstrative way of philosophy’ would seduce his readers into accepting his dangerous views.31 Others adopted elements of Hobbes’s philosophy without acknowledgement. John Hall of Richmond, for example, was something of a closet Hobbist. His Of Government and Obedience (1654) reasserts the claims of monarchy on quasi-Hobbesian lines (but without acknowledging Hobbes). And his views are the more intriguing because he was evidently a Platonist. He argues that only the monarch is truly free, whereas subjects, being by definition in subjection, are not free. His position is predicated on a more positive view of human nature, and unlike Hobbes he credits God with much emphasizing his perfection and goodness which is manifested in his creation which is ‘positively good, [and] so, proportionable to the impression of Divine favour’. There is a hierarchy of beings (‘Golden chain and rank of Subordination’). The principle of self-love or ‘Philautia’ is fundamental to the law of nature (‘Natures Law, to preserve themselves and creatures of life [living beings] . . . was necessary to be kept up by this appetite of self-seeking’). Originally ‘philautia’ was a ‘happy estate of innocent coveting and enjoying’, but the unlimited appetites of men led to conflicts of self-interest. So, by the same logic as Hobbes, he argues for ‘Politique submission’ to a single ‘grand Politique body’.32 The republican political theorist James Harrington, on the other hand, was a critic of Hobbes who was politically opposed to Hobbes, but nevertheless predicts that Hobbes would in the future be thought the best writer of his time ‘for his Treatises of Humane Nature, and of Liberty and Necessity, they are the greatest of New Lights’.33 Mordechai Feingold, ‘Mathematical Sciences’, in HUO, vol. 4, p. 414. Henry More, Immortality of the Soul, Preface, p. 59 in A Collection of Several Philosophical Writings (London, 1662). 31 Quentin Skinner, ‘Thomas Hobbes and his Disciples in France and England’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 8 (1966), 153–67. 32 John Hall of Richmond, Of Government and Obedience, as they Stand Directed and Determined by Scripture and Reason (London, 1654). See J. T. Peacey, ‘Nibbling at Leviathan: Politics and Theory in England in the 1650s’, Huntington Library Quarterly, 61.2 (1998), pp. 241–57. 33 James Harrington, Prerogative (London, 1657), p. 36; Harrington, The Political Works, ed. J. G. A. Pocock (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 423. 29 30

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At the other end of the political spectrum, Robert Filmer agreed with Hobbes on the ‘rights of exercising government’ and thought the ‘rights of sovereignty . . . amply and judiciously handled’ in De cive and Leviathan. He nevertheless noted the irony that ‘I should praise his building, and yet mislike his foundation’.34 The application of Hobbesian ideas is, surprisingly, to be found in ecclesiastical contexts. The Restoration Anglican churchman Samuel Parker praises De cive for emphasizing divine dominion, insisting that God exercises his will in accordance with right reason. Parker’s receptivity to Hobbes’s Calvinism on this point was probably influenced by his anti-intellectualist agenda which targets the anti-Calvinist Platonizing theologians whom he had in mind when he objects to the idea that ‘all the effects of Gods power be a natural Emanation of his goodness’ on grounds that scripture only mentions his power.35 Another clerical application of Hobbesian political concepts was by Edward Stillingfleet, whose Irenicum adopts the logic of contractarianism to argue for religious comprehension: both dissenters and the Church itself might relinquish some of their claims for the greater good of religion as a whole.36 Many of Hobbes’s early admirers subsequently revised their views, especially in the light of the religious controversy which his views aroused. But there were others who responded to his radical views on the role of religion by using it to support more radical views of their own. The most striking instance was Charles Blount, a member of the radical Whig Green Ribbon Club, and self-professed deist. Blount drew on Hobbes in his anticlerical Great is Diana of the Ephesians (1680) and presented him with a copy of the work. He quotes from him freely in his 1683 Miracles, No Violations of the Laws of Nature.

Margaret Cavendish One of the most intriguing engagements with Hobbes’s philosophy is that of Margaret Cavendish, wife of his patron the Duke of Newcastle.37 Although she was aware of Descartes, she probably owed more to Hobbes, Charleton, and the Welbeck circle for her induction into philosophy. The Duchess had wide-ranging interests

34 Robert Filmer, Observations Concerning the Original of Popular Government (1652), in Filmer, Patriarcha and Other Writings, ed. J. P. Sommerville (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 35 Samuel Parker, An Account of the Nature and Extent of the Divine Dominion and Goodness (Oxford, 1666), p. 26. See Parkin, Taming the Leviathan, pp. 252–3. 36 See also Parkin, Taming the Leviathan, pp. 207–8. 37 See Eileen O’Neill’s Introduction to her edition of Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of Newcastle, Observations upon Experimental Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Susan James’s Introduction to her edition of Cavendish’s Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). Also Sarah Hutton, ‘Women, Freedom and Equality’, in Peter Anstey (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy in Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 501–8; Sarah Hutton, ‘In Dialogue with Thomas Hobbes: Margaret Cavendish’s Natural Philosophy’, Women’s Writing, 4 (1997): 421–32.

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extending from drama and poetry to philosophy and science. Her first published philosophy came in a collection of poetry and prose entitled Philosophicall Fancies (1653). This was followed by several semi-discursive prose writings Philosophical and Physical Opinions (1655), The World’s Olio (1655), Orations (1662), Sociable Letters (1664). She did not address religious or ethical issues, but focused instead on natural philosophy and also, to some extent, political philosophy. Her most systematic account of her philosophical and scientific views is contained in three works: Philosophical Letters (1664) (which critiques Descartes, Van Helmont, and Henry More, as well as Hobbes), Observations on Experimental Philosophy (1666) (which attacks the experimentalism of the Royal Society), and Grounds of Natural Philosophy (1668) (which contains her most fully stated natural philosophy). Although she denied ever having conversed with Hobbes, she had certainly read Elements of Law. Her response to Hobbes in her Philosophical Letters is strikingly free of the slanders and prejudices displayed by so many of his detractors. There are parallels between her ideas and Hobbes’s, though there are also clear differences. Like Hobbes, she was a materialist who sought to explain all phenomena in terms of matter in motion. But unlike Hobbes she attributed life and motion to matter. Her political philosophy too contains echoes of Hobbes. In Orations she propounds an essentially Hobbesian theory of absolute monarchy as the best way of maintaining security and peace. The liberty of subjects is guaranteed by their submission to regal authority, but Cavendish does not offer a contractarian account of the subjection of citizens. Another difference between Cavendish and Hobbes is that while the sovereign must be prepared to use force when necessary, it is virtue, not force, which sustains the body politic. The successful monarch is a benevolent dictator, ‘careful and loving’ towards his subjects, impartial, honest, and honourable in his dealings. Unlike Hobbes, she also discusses the liberty of women, which she deals with in the context of marriage, opting for a compromise on the model of Hobbesian absolute monarchy: wives are guaranteed liberty by accepting subordination to their autocratic husbands. Another female critic of Hobbes was Anne Conway (see Chapter 7), whose principal objection to Hobbes centres on his materialism. In her Principia philosophiae she couples Hobbes with Spinoza, interpreted as materialists who failed to register the ontological divide between God and the created world.

Philosophical Critics The most searching philosophical critics of Hobbes at home were the Cambridge Platonists Henry More and Ralph Cudworth and the natural law theorist Richard Cumberland. Cudworth and More (see Chapter 7) were concerned with the atheistic implications of Hobbes’s materialism but their critique of Hobbes is remarkable for its balanced tone, free of the vituperation which colours more polemical responses. Henry More expressed high regard for Hobbes’s acumen and attempted to frame his

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arguments in his adversary’s terms.38 His key argument against Hobbes was metaphysical. In his Immortality of the Soul (1659) More took up Hobbes’s claim that the idea of immaterial substance is unintelligible. Homing in on Hobbes’s definition of body, he counterposed a definition of incorporeal substance which, he believed, met the same criteria of intelligibility—the properties imputed to spirit being essentially the obverse of the properties imputed to matter by Hobbes: against the mechanical definition of matter as ‘a substance impenetrable and indiscerpible [i.e. indivisible]’. More defines immaterial substance as ‘a substance penetrable and discerpible’.39 More’s case rests on his spatialized conception of spirit, which was not widely shared, that incorporeal substance, like corporeal substance, is extended. Cudworth’s is the most extensive and philosophical of contemporary responses to Hobbes whom he critiques in both his published and unpublished writings, tackling both his political and natural philosophy. Hobbes’s Elements of Philosophy are explicitly targeted in his unpublished writings ‘On Liberty and Necessity’. Cudworth’s only critique of Hobbes to be published in his lifetime comes in his The True Intellectual System of the Universe (1678), a work which is directed at materialists and atheists of all types. At the very end of The True Intellectual System, in a section which may have been added shortly before publication, Cudworth targets first Hobbes’s materialist epistemology and secondly his political theory. In Cudworth’s various arguments against atheism Hobbes figures among ‘the Democritick and Epicurean Atheists’. He never names Hobbes but refers to him as ‘the writer of De cive’ and as Leviathan. He dismisses Hobbes’s claims to novelty by identifying parallels between the tenets of Hobbes’s philosophy and the philosophers of antiquity, particularly Protagoras and Epicurus. Cudworth objects to Hobbes’s ‘villanizing of human nature’, his treatment of justice as a ‘Factious or Artificiall thing’, with no foundation in natural justice.40 He identifies three areas of contention: the claims that religion and politics don’t mix because religion is incompatible with the interests of the sovereign, that the civil sovereign rules by fear, and that morality is a matter of convention. Cudworth’s anti-voluntarism committed him to deny that justice may be legislated. Even for God: ‘the right and authority of God himself is founded in Justice’.41 The burden of Cudworth’s objections to Hobbes’s natural law theory is that it is ‘artificiall Justice’ without foundation in natural goodness. Cudworth charged that Hobbes’s negative conception of human nature renders civil government a necessary evil, void of natural justice. This explains why ‘Atheistick Politicians’ invoke laws of nature in order to give their covenants force. But with no foundation in true justice, ‘covenants without natural justice are nothing but words and breath’.42 This is a topic to which Cudworth returns in his posthumously 38 39 40 41 42

More, Immortality, p. 59 in More, A Collection (1662). More, Immortality, p. 21, in More, A Collection (1662). Ralph Cudworth, True Intellectual System of the Universe (London, 1678), p. 890. Cudworth, True Intellectual System of the Universe, p. 896. Cudworth, True Intellectual System of the Universe, pp. 891, 892, 894.

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published Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, which probably originates from the 1650s. This contains an extensive discussion of natural justice by way of a commentary on Plato’s Theaetetus which critiques the ethical conventialism of Protagoras and Hobbes, and refutes command morality. Richard Cumberland’s De legibus naturae (1672) was primarily targeted at Hobbes, whose moral conventionalism he sought to refute by demonstrating the objective character of morality by means of a new theory of morality, based on natural law. In contrast to Hobbes, Cumberland founds natural law in the common good, which promotes maximum happiness secured through benevolence. Cumberland directly targets Hobbes by adopting the premises and methods of argument used by his adversary. He accepts the principle of self-preservation, and employs deductive reasoning, grounding his argument in mechanistic natural philosophy. He defines bodies in terms of ‘Extension, Figure and variously-compounded motions’,43 and makes no appeal to non-corporeal agents. (In point of fact, the cosmology which he invokes is Cartesian, complete with its vortical theory of planetary motion. He also draws on his own knowledge as an anatomist: his account of human physiology is informed by the research of Willis and Lower). But Cumberland takes the appeal to natural philosophy in a very different direction. At every turn he rejects Hobbes’s principles, claims flaws in his reasoning, and repudiates his conclusions. He refashions rational self-interest to align it with benevolence, and argues that on the basis of what we learn from experience, in their natural state human beings are not fundamentally anti-social, but have a strong inclination to benevolence. Human behaviour does not conform to the Hobbesian picture of conflict and expropriation, in the ‘Right of every man’s warring against all, and of arrogating everything to himself ’. Thus, although Cumberland deduces his ethical theory from human nature, he employs a radically different account of human beings as naturally social and benevolent. The purpose of his close analysis of the structure of the body is to destroy Hobbes’s grounding of his arguments on the physical nature of man.

Reception Abroad Hobbes’s European legacy was extensive. Dissemination of his philosophy was assisted by Latin editions and translations of his works. His Opera philosophica was published by Blaeu in Amsterdam, while a Latin translation of Leviathan was printed in London (1676 and 1681). De corpore politico was translated into French (published in Amsterdam in 1649)44 by his friend and admirer Samuel Sorbie`re, who was his

43

Richard Cumberland, A Treatise of the Laws of Nature, trans. John Maxwell ed. Jon Parkin (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005), p. 507. 44 Le Corps politique ou les e´le´ments de la loi, trans. Samuel Sorbie`re (1649), followed by an anonymous translation of the Elements of Law, Le Corps politique ou les e´le´ments de la loi morale et civile (n.p., 1652). A translation of the first two parts of De cive by Hobbes’s friend and correspondent Francois Du Verdus

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most consistent advocate in the Republic of Letters and who also oversaw publication of the first edition of De cive and the Latin edition of Leviathan in 1668. There were also Dutch translations of De cive (De erste beginselen van een burger-staat, 1675) and Leviathan (Leviathan of Van de Stoffe, 1667).45 D’Holbach published a French translation of Hobbes’s Human Nature in 1772. Hobbes’s natural philosophy earned him respect and admiration abroad, especially in France, where, even before publication he was well received in the Paris academies. But not everyone was so positive about it: among them Christiaan Huygens was not, apparently, impressed by Hobbes’s natural philosophy (he was sent copies of De corpore, Dialogus physicus, and Problemata physica). It was Hobbes’s political philosophy that had the most lasting influence.46 There was early interest from the Dutch thinkers Van Velthuysen, Heerebord, and De Raey, though none took up his ideas. Johan Pieter de la Court by contrast helped to disseminate Hobbes’s political ideas in publications like Consideratien en Examplen van Staat (1660). Pierre Bayle’s theory of human society and human nature are indebted to Hobbes. Although critical of his defence of absolutism, in his Dictionnaire entry on Hobbes Bayle expresses high regard for him as a political philosopher.47 The French defender of political absolutism, Jacques-Be´nigne Bossuet, drew on Hobbes without acknowledgement for his account of the origin of government. Bossuet argued in his Politique (1682) that the original state of man was an anarchic state of war of everyone against everyone. The solution required a renunciation of natural liberty in the interest of peace, though this did not entail a renunciation of sovereignty. In Lutheran Germany, the great German jurist Samuel Pufendorf was introduced to Hobbes’s writings in Jena in 1657 by his teacher Erhard Weigel. Pufendorf ’s De jure naturae et gentium registers the depth of his response to Hobbes, though he modifies Hobbes’s theories, for example by insisting that God’s right of command derives not just from his omnipotence, because that is not consonant with God’s goodness. Pufendorf made such extensive use of Hobbes that Leibniz dubbed him Hobbes’s poodle. As these examples show, Hobbes was considered a thinker to be reckoned with among European philosophers. At home, Hobbes set the terms of debate in political philosophy, ethics, and natural philosophy even for his opponents. British political thought turned on Hobbesian themes—natural law, natural rights, the state of

was printed in Paris in 1660 with the title Elemens de la politique. On Sorbie`re and Du Verdus, see Malcolm in Hobbes, Correspondence, ed. Malcolm, vol. 2, pp. 893–9, 904–13. 45 C. W. Schoneveld, Intertraffic of the Mind (Leiden: Leiden University Press for the Sir Thomas Browne Institute, 1983). 46 Skinner, ‘Thomas Hobbes and his Disciples in France and England’; Quentin Skinner, ‘The Ideological Context of Hobbes’s Political Thought’, The Historical Journal, 9 (1966): 286–317; Noel Malcolm, ‘Hobbes and the European Republic of Letters’, in Aspects of Hobbes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 457–545. 47 Skinner, ‘The Ideological Context of Hobbes’s Political Thought’.

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nature, freedom and necessity, the contractarian origins of government are all topics of discussion. For all their divergence from him, Hobbes’s successors in natural law theory address these topics, even while they assert sociability of man, and the objective grounds of morality and monarchical accountability. Refutation of Hobbes is a routine feature of political and moral writing (for example, James Tyrell’s A Brief Disquisition of the Law of Nature was printed with his Confutations of Mr. Hobbs’s Principles). Natural philosophers too, strove to retain the mechanical model, without Hobbes’s materialism—Boyle being a case in point. Philosophers of religion rose to the defence of all things immaterial. This is not to say that philosophers danced to Hobbes’s tune. He was not the only philosopher to absorb and respond to new philosophies. However, the success of Hobbes’s engagement with it and the conclusions which he drew raised the stakes for others. For what Hobbes had shown was that it was possible to construct a philosophical system on the basis of a few agreed principles, independently of the entire apparatus of Aristotelian metaphysics. He was not the first to do so, of course: Descartes had led the way. But to many of his readers, by taking the new ‘mechanical’ philosophy to its logical extreme, he exposed the destructive potential for received ideas (especially for religion) of the mechanical model first promoted by Descartes. Hobbes’s materialism was interpreted as atheistic. In the eyes of his detractors, its dangers were confirmed when Spinoza took this one step further, positing a single universal substance and equating God with nature. No forward-thinking philosopher wanted to be tarred with these brushes. The next two chapters will discuss two important strands of non-Hobbesian philosophy which were receptive to Cartesianism, both of which had to reckon with Hobbes: Cambridge Platonism and the experimental philosophy of the Royal Society.

7 A Cambridge Enlightenment The Cambridge Platonists and Richard Cumberland

Although the seventeenth century saw philosophy move out of the academies, some of the most original contributions in fact emerged from an academic context. This was especially true of the University of Cambridge, which fostered important contributions to natural philosophy, metaphysics, and moral philosophy. The Cambridge contribution to natural philosophy (noted in Chapter 2) was crowned by the achievement of Isaac Newton (to be discussed in Chapter 8). The most important English contribution to natural law theory after Hobbes was the work of a Cambridge man, Richard Cumberland. And some of the most significant philosophy to emanate from within any British university in the seventeenth century was the movement now known as Cambridge Platonism. This chapter will focus on two aspects of this ‘Cambridge Enlightenment’, Cumberland and the Cambridge Platonists.

Platonism and British Philosophy Cambridge Platonism represents a very different strand of philosophy from Hobbes. A younger generation than Hobbes, the Cambridge Platonists first come to attention around the same time, in the 1640s and 1650s. Their formative years were spent during a period when hard-line scholastic Calvinism prevailed at the university and they came to maturity during the acute religious and political strife of the Civil Wars and their aftermath, which directly affected the universities. Their philosophy was an astonishingly eirenic response to the political, confessional, and intellectual divisions of their age. Cambridge Platonism was not an isolated philosophical phenomenon, but is part of a long legacy of Platonic philosophy (see Chapter 3).1 The Renaissance recovery of the Platonic heritage spearheaded by Ficino begins to make its impact in Britain in Tudor times. An early work of Platonist metaphysics is Theoria analytica (1579) by 1 I use the term ‘Platonism’ to mean the Platonic tradition in a broad sense, taking it to include not just Plato but also those commonly referred to as ‘Neoplatonists’. The term ‘Neoplatonism’ did not come into use until the eighteenth century.

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Everard Digby (d. 1605), which draws on a variety of Platonist sources, especially the French Platonist, Jacques Charpentier (Carpentarius), and also Ficino. Digby also draws on Aristotle. The Elizabethan Oxonian Thomas Jackson is an English example of a Christian Platonist in the Renaissance mould. Herbert of Cherbury is another Oxford-educated thinker who was steeped in Platonism. And it was at Oxford that the expatriate German Georg Ritschel published his Platonist metaphysics— Contemplationes metaphysicæ ex naturaˆ rerum & rectæ rationis lumine deductae [Metaphysical Contemplations Deduced from the Nature of Things and the Light of Right Reason] (1648).2 Another early seventeenth-century Platonist who merits mention is Robert Greville, second Lord Brooke (1607–43). A contemporary of Herbert of Cherbury, Lord Brooke can be seen in some respects as a bridge figure between Herbert and the Cambridge Platonists. Like Herbert, he was an aristocrat-cum-philosopher, whose philosophical sympathies lay with Platonism, and who was concerned with religious toleration. There is no evidence that he knew Herbert, but Lord Brooke did have connections with the Cambridge Platonists through Peter Sterry, who became his chaplain in 1637.3 The title of Greville’s main work of philosophy echoes Herbert’s: The Nature of Truth its Union and Unity with the Soule, which is one in its essence, faculties, acts; one with truth (1640). Like Herbert’s De veritate it is based on Platonist metaphysics—in Greville’s case, an emanationist theory of being and causality, founded in God as the fountain of all being, and author of the goodness of the world. The book seems to have been the prologue to a more substantial work on prophetic truth which he never wrote. However, he is not motivated by the same concerns as Herbert. His focus is less on epistemology and more on metaphysics: for Greville, reason is an inward light of the soul, while the good of each individual creature is the good of all. Certainly his combination of Platonism and religious tolerance anticipates the Cambridge Platonists, but unlike them and Herbert of Cherbury, Lord Brooke’s work is partisan, closely linked to the puritan anti-episcopalian cause of the 1640s. The only critiques of Brooke came from Cambridge Platonist circles: John Wallis, the mathematician and cryptographer, then fellow of Emmanuel College, who would later play a key role in the foundation of the Royal Society published his Truth Tried, or, Animadversions on the Lord Brooke’s Treatise on the Nature of Truth in 1643. Nathaniel Culverwell, a fellow of the same college, concurs with Wallis’s criticism of Greville’s subscription to the theory of anamnesis in his Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature (1652). He also regards 2 The philosophers among whom Ritschel’s book circulated include Joachim Jungius, Mersenne, Gassendi, More, and Cudworth. According to Christ’s College student Thomas Smith, More held it in high esteem (Martin Mulsow, ‘ “Sociabilitas”: Zu einem Kontext der Campanella-Rezeption im 17. Jahrhundert’, Ricerche filosofiche e materiali storico-testuali, Bruniana & Campanelliana, 1 (1995): 205–32, p. 214). 3 Another possible link with the Cambridge Platonists is ‘Mr Sadler’, the dedicatee of his Of Truth (1640) who may have been John Sadler, who was an Emmanuel man, and friend of Ralph Cudworth.

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Brooke’s assertion that ‘absolute contradictions may meet together’ as the ‘Synopsis of all Sceptism!’ But Culverwell is disinclined to disesteem this ‘noble lord’ who was ‘known to be of bright and sparkling intellect’.4 The long history of Christian Platonism has its negative side, largely arising from early attempts to frame the doctrine of the Trinity in Platonic terms. As a result there is an equally long history of accusations that Platonism was responsible for corrupting Christian doctrine. Platonism, it was charged, was responsible for the Arian heresy. The heterodoxy of the most Platonizing of the Church Fathers, Origen, was attributed to his Platonism.5 Samuel Parker’s Free and Impartial Censure of the Platonic Philosophy (1666) is an anti-Origenist work of this kind. The correlation between Platonism and religious heterodoxy resurfaces in the seventeenth century with the rise of a new form of anti-Trinitarianism in the Commonwealth period, Socinianism, and among religious seekers of a visionary or quietist stamp. John Everard’s translation of Hermes Trismegistus (1650) and his publication of the ‘mystical divinity’ of Dionysius the Aereopagite (1653) catered to the more intellectual adherents of this latter form of esoteric Platonism which also assimilates to other traditions.6 Among these was the ‘teutonic philosophy’ of the German mystical philosopher Jacob Boehme, who found adherents in the Welsh mystic Morgan Llwyd (1619–59), the prophetess Jane Lead (1623–1704), her mentor John Pordage (1607–81), and the non-juror William Law (1686–1761). A form of mystical Neoplatonism which enjoyed some currency in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was Christian kabbalism, which attracted the interest of Peter Sterry and Anne Conway. Her mentor Francis Mercury van Helmont was a major point of contact with the German kabbalist scholar Christian Knorr von Rosenroth, whose Kabbala denudata (1677–9) contained Latin translations of writings from the Lurianic cabbala, which it presented as ancient Hebrew philosophy.7 The Cambridge Platonists themselves are often portrayed as mystics, who transcended the troubles of their times. But this is a seriously misleading assessment. Although there is certainly a mystical edge to some of them, especially Peter Sterry, their commitment to a rational understanding of religion is by definition fundamentally at odds with mysticism.8 Far from dedicating their lives to detached

4 Nathaniel Culverwell, An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature (London, 1652; repr. London, 1654, 1661, and Oxford, 1659, 1669), pp. 85, 125–6. 5 Editions of Origen and Iamblichus were produced in Cambridge in the seventeenth century. 6 Hermes Mercurius Trismegistus, his Divine Pymander (London, 1650; repr. 1657) and The Mystical Divinity of Dionysius published in Some Gospel-Treasures Opened (London, 1653; repr. 1657, 1659, 1679). In 1646 Giles Randall (translator of Cusa) published his translation of the Theologia Germanica, or Mysticall Divinity: A little golden manuall (repr. 1648). 7 Sarah Hutton, Anne Conway: A Woman Philosopher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), ch. 8, and Allison Coudert, The Impact of the Kabbalah in the Seventeenth Century: The Life and Thought of Francis Mercury van Helmont (1614–1698) (Leiden: Brill, 1998). 8 There is also a millenarian aspect of their theology, most radical in Sterry, who believed in the accomplishment of Christ’s Kingdom by military means, and most learned in More, who wrote several

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contemplation of mysteries, they were proponents of practical ethics, very much engaged with living the life of the good in this world. Although they philosophized mainly within an academic context, the Cambridge Platonists addressed the world beyond the lonely towers of academia, choosing to write primarily in English in order to reach a lay public. The most philosophically important of the Cambridge Platonists were Henry More and Ralph Cudworth. More was also the most prolific.9 But when his unpublished writings are taken into account, it is Cudworth who provides the most extensive and developed philosophical exposition of the outlook and ideas which the Cambridge Platonists shared.10 ‘Cambridge Platonism’ was not a school of philosophy in the strict sense. There is considerable variation among the philosophers grouped under that banner and they certainly did not consider themselves a school—their name was coined much later. But their shared theology, their religious rationalism and their use of Platonism to formulate the central concepts of their ethics, metaphysics, and epistemology justifies their being treated as such. Their anti-Calvinist stance in theology is consistent with their high valuation of human reason, which they accorded an important role in both religion and ethics. They stressed the moral rather than the institutional aspect of religion (Whichcote held that morality constituted 90 per cent of religion), and devoted their considerable philosophical learning to demonstrating the existence of God and the immortality of the soul. They opposed determinism in all its forms, arguing in favour of free will as the basis of moral conduct and for the autonomy of individual human subjects. In ethics they held the real existence of moral distinctions and that the human mind is equipped with the fundamental principles of virtue. In metaphysics they were dualists for whom mind is ontologically prior to matter, and soul or spirit is the fundamental causal principle in the operations of nature. They held that the human mind is equipped with the principles of reason and that the truths of the mind are superior to sense-knowledge. But they were by no means merely religious philosophers: they were fully conversant with contemporary science and philosophy. They were particularly receptive to Cartesianism, while being among Descartes’s most penetrating critics. Cudworth and More were two of the most philosophical critics of Hobbes and Spinoza.11

commentaries on the Books of Daniel and Revelation. Cudworth’s papers include a study of the book of Daniel. 9 More also wrote extensively on theological matters. His major work of theology is An Explanation of the Grand Mystery of Godliness (London, 1660). 10 Useful anthologies of their writings are C. A. Patrides (ed.), The Cambridge Platonists (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969) and Charles Taliaferro and Alison Teply (eds), Cambridge Platonist Spirituality (New York: Paulist Press, 2004). Patrides’s introductory assessment is, however, outmoded. 11 On the philosophy of the Cambridge Platonists, see J. A. Passmore, Ralph Cudworth: An Interpretation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951); Alan Gabbey, ‘Philosophia Cartesiana Triumphata’, in G. A. J. Rogers, J.-M. Vienne, and Y. C. Zarka (eds), The Cambridge Platonists in Philosophical Context: Politics, Metaphysics and Religion (Dordrecht: Springer, 1997); Michael B. Gill, ‘The Religious Rationalism of Benjamin Whichcote’, JHP, 37 (1999): 271–300; Michael B. Gill, ‘Rationalism, Sentimentalism, and

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The core members of the group were Benjamin Whichcote (1609–83), Peter Sterry (1613–72), John Smith (1618–52), Nathaniel Culverwell (1619–51), Henry More (1614–87), and Ralph Cudworth (1617–89). Apart from Henry More, who was a fellow of Christ’s College, they were all fellows of Emmanuel College, widely regarded as the most Puritan college in Cambridge. Other Cambridge scholars associated with them were John Worthington, Thomas Gale, John Sadler, Edward Waterhouse, and Nathaniel Ingelo (all fellows of Emmanuel College), together with John Sherman and Hezekiah Burton and George Rust.12 Benjamin Whichcote, the senior member of the Emmanuel men, is considered to have been instrumental in establishing the ethos and philosophical approach of the Cambridge Platonists. Against the predestinarian Calvinism which prevailed in the university, Whichcote promoted a non-dogmatic temper, philosophical openness of mind, and an optimistic view of the capacities of human reason, which can be gauged from his exchange of letters with the Calvinist theologian, Anthony Tuckney, and from his aphorisms.13 For Shaftesbury, this ‘excellent Divine, and truly Christian Philosopher’ exemplified the ‘good nature’ which he regarded as fundamental to human nature. Their entire careers were shaped by the turbulent events of the Civil War and its aftermath. Most of them benefited from promotion within the university after the downfall of the monarchy. Cudworth and Whichcote were made heads of colleges to replace those ousted by the Earl of Manchester’s purge of the university. Whichcote also served as university Vice Chancellor. Peter Sterry passed his working life among the power brokers of the English Commonwealth, first as chaplain to the parliamentary general, Robert Greville, Lord Brooke, and subsequently to the Lord Protector, Oliver Cromwell. During that time he would have had direct influence on the Cromwellian government’s policy of religious toleration, and philo-Semitism. Ralph Cudworth is another who was consulted by the Cromwellian government on matters such as the readmission of the Jews and a new translation of the bible. Their post-Restoration fortunes, however, were chequered. Sterry withdrew to quietism as head of a community of Christians known as the ‘Lovely Society’ in East Sheen. Having been ejected from his post as Provost of King’s College, Cambridge, at the Restoration, Whichcote eventually succeeded John Wilkins as vicar of St Lawrence Jewry, where the congregation would include many influential Whigs, and John Locke. More and Cudworth were the only ones who remained in post

Ralph Cudworth’, Hume Studies, 30 (2004): 149–81; Jasper Reid, The Metaphysics of Henry More (Dordrecht: Springer, 2012); John Sellars, ‘Stoics against Stoics in Cudworth’s A Treatise of Freewill’, British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 20 (2012): 935–52. Joseph Levine, ‘Latitudinarians, Neoplatonists, and the Ancient Wisdom’, in R. Kroll et al., Philosophy, Science and Religion in England, 1640–1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 85–101. 13 Benjamin Whichcote, Eight Letters of Dr Antony Tuckney and Dr Benjamin Whichcote; published with Moral and Religious Aphorisms (London, 1703). 12

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in Restoration Cambridge, and they had to fend off determined attempts to oust them as timeservers. The publishing history of their writings reflects the uncertainties generated by the political upheavals of the late Commonwealth and the Restoration, suggesting that contrary to their modern reputation for sweet reasonableness, they were regarded with hostility in some quarters. With the exception of Cudworth and More, our entire knowledge of their philosophy comes from posthumously edited writings. Culverwell’s An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature appeared shortly after he died (1652). John Smith’s Select Discourses were edited by Simon Patrick in 1660, nearly a decade after his death. Sterry’s only significant philosophical work, A Discourse of the Freedom of the Will (1675), was printed posthumously. Our only sources of Whichcote’s philosophy are posthumously published sermons and collections of aphorisms including Some Select Notions (1685) and Select Sermons (1698). This last was edited by Shaftesbury, in 1698. Other collections followed in the early 1700s: Moral and Religious Aphorisms (1703) and Several Discourses (1701–7).14 Cudworth delayed the publication of his magnum opus, The True Intellectual System of the Universe, until 1678, prior to which his philosophical ideas were known primarily through a handful of significant sermons, the most notable of which was his Sermon preached before Parliament in 1647. The True Intellectual System was originally planned as the first part of a tripartite philosophical project, the three components of his ‘intellectual system’ being the existence of God (that there is ‘an Omnipotent Understanding Being Presiding over all’), the nature of goodness (‘that the Differences of Good and Evil Morall, Honest and Dishonest, are not by meer Will and Law onely, but by Nature’) and freedom of action (‘that Necessity is not Intrinsecall to the Nature of every thing’). Some of the second part appeared as A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality in 1731. Most of Cudworth’s ethical writings remain unpublished to this day. Henry More was the only Cambridge Platonist whose works were published close to the time of composition. More’s main philosophical works are, besides his correspondence with Descartes, his An Antidote against Atheism (1653), his Of the Immortality of the Soul (1659), Enchiridion ethicum (1668), and Enchiridion metaphysicum (1671). He published two collections of his writings, A Collection of Several Philosophical Writings in 1662 and his Opera omnia in Latin translation in 1678. More’s defensive prefaces to these works, and the fact that he had to amend another work, Divine Dialogues (1668), in order to secure permission to publish, are indicative of the uncertainties he faced post-Restoration. Nevertheless, his works were in great demand. The Cambridge Platonists turned to Platonism as an alternative to the scholastic Aristotelianism which was the philosophical staple of their Calvinist colleagues. 14

Full title: Theophoroumena dogmata or Some Select Notions (London, 1685); Select Sermons (London, 1698); Moral and Religious Aphorisms (London, 1703); and Several Discourses (London, 1701–7).

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The attraction of Platonism was that it exemplified the compatibility of reason and spirituality, and was a source of profound insight into the nature and workings of the human soul. Their recourse to Platonism was a natural consequence of their admiration for the patristic theologian Origen—encapsulated in George Rust’s anonymously published Letter of Resolution Concerning Origen (1661). Following Church Fathers like St Clement, they regarded Plato as ‘divine’. In line with the Renaissance interpreters they regarded Plato as first among philosophers and Plotinus as his key interpreter.15 They were the first English philosophers to take up the philosophy of Plotinus. However, Cambridge Platonists were not doctrinaire Platonists. Nor were they uncritical of Plato: Culverwell, for example, rejected the doctrine of the preexistence of souls, while Cudworth held Plato responsible for the separation of metaphysics from physics, to which he attributed the growth of scholastic distortions such as the doctrine of forms and qualities. The Cambridge Platonists interpreted Platonism in the context of the full corpus of classical philosophy. Among the other ancient philosophies on which they drew, ancient Stoicism has particular importance. They also read ancient philosophy in relation to contemporary scientific and philosophical developments. Associates of the Hartlib circle in their younger days, they were acquainted with the ideas of Bacon, Boyle, and the Royal Society, as well as the philosophies of Descartes, Hobbes, and Spinoza. Both Cudworth and More were fellows of the Royal Society. Their syncretic approach to philosophy was sustained by the Renaissance conception of philosophy as philosophia perennis (perennial philosophy), according to which all philosophers, both ancient and modern, are engaged in the same quest for philosophical truth, and that truth is one and the same for all time, that the questions and answers of philosophy are timeless. This is consistent with the Platonic conception of the unity, universality, and immutability of truth. It is also characteristic of the ‘novantique’ approach to philosophy widespread in the seventeenth century, which viewed the moderns as revivers of early schools of thought. Despite their reservations about Cartesianism, the Cambridge Platonists were deeply influenced by Descartes (see Chapter 3 and below). They were especially interested in Descartes’s physics. The attraction of Cartesianism, as they saw it, was that it offered both an intelligible natural philosophy, and a secure argument for the existence of incorporeal entities—spirits, souls, and God. By accounting for corporeal phenomena solely in terms of size, shape, position, and motion, the ‘mechanical’ philosophy of Descartes ‘renders the Corporeal World Intelligible to us; since Mechanism is a thing we can clearly understand, and we cannot clearly and distinctly conceive anything in Bodies else’.16 Since, on the Cartesian view, body is inert

15 Although they knew Ficino, they did not draw on his philosophy. They used his Plotinus but preferred to use more recent editions of Plato. 16 Ralph Cudworth, True Intellectual System of the Universe (London, 1678), p. 48. Cf. Locke, ‘the Modern Corpuscularians talk, in most Things, more intelligibly than the Peripateticks’ (Locke, Some

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extension, in order to explain movement, thought, and life, it is necessary to posit an active immaterial agent; ‘neither can Life and Cogitation, Sense, and Consciousness, Reason and Understanding, Appetite and Will, ever result from Magnitudes, Figures, Sites and Motions’.17 They regarded the new atomist physics as, by definition, theistic, for ‘the intrinsick constitution of this Atomick Physiology also is such, as that whoever admits it, and rightly understands it, must needs acknowledge Incorporeal Substance; which is the Absolute Overthrow of Atheism’.18 Both Cudworth and More looked to Platonism to supply the metaphysics of this new ‘Democritisme’ which had been revived by Gassendi and Descartes. We [Descartes and More] both setting out from the same Lists, though taking several wayes, the one travailing in the lower Rode of Democritisme, amidst the thick dust of Atoms and flying particles of Matter, the other tracing it over the high and aiery Hills of Platonisme, in that more thin and subtil Region of Immateriality, meet together at the same Goale, namely at the Enterance of the holy Bible, dedicating our joynt labours to the use and glory of the Christian Church.19

Theology In theology, the Cambridge Platonists’ anti-voluntarism, their firm persuasion of the compatibility of reason and faith, their optimistic view of human nature and belief in the freedom of the will, set them at odds with Calvinism, which emphasized the omnipotence of divine will and the depravity of human reason. By contrast, the Cambridge Platonists took an ‘intellectualist’ view of the divine attributes, stressing divine goodness, wisdom, and justice. Their objections to voluntarism were as much philosophical as theological, and underlie their critique of both Hobbes and Descartes. The most systematic statement of their anti-voluntarism is by Cudworth, who charged that to stress God’s will and power at the expense of his goodness and justice is tantamount to making God the author of evil: ‘it follows unavoidably, that nothing can be imagined so grossly wicked, or so foully unjust or dishonest, but if it were supposed to be commanded by this omnipotent Deity, must needs upon that hypothesis forthwith become holy, just, and righteous’.20 He believed Ockham to have been responsible for this unchristian view of God which ‘crept up afterward in the scholastic age’. A voluntarist conception of God has, on Cudworth’s view, farreaching and destructive implications for philosophy. To found truth and morality in the will of God is to render them arbitrary and uncertain, since God could, by Thoughts Concerning Education, ed. with introduction, notes, and critical apparatus by John W. and Jean S. Yolton (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 246). 17

Cudworth, True Intellectual System, p. 36. Cudworth, True Intellectual System, Preface Sig. *2v. 19 Henry More, A Collection of Several Philosophical Writings (London, 1662), Preface, sect.11. 20 Ralph Cudworth, A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, ed. S. Hutton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 14. 18

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arbitrary fiat, decree falsity to be true and wrong to be right. The consequences are scepticism, immorality, and determinism, all conducive to atheism. The voluntaristic view of God produces false philosophical systems. One such false system is that of Hobbes, another is Spinoza’s (a species of ‘hylozoic atheism’). Cartesian voluntarism and Descartes’s doctrine of the indifference of the will render Cartesianism liable to the same errors, though these are mitigated by Descartes’s theism and dualism.

Apologetics The defence of religion is at the heart of the philosophy of the Cambridge Platonists. As Henry More put it, in the Preface to his A Collection of Several Philosophical Writings (1662), ‘My Design . . . is not to Theologize in Philosophy, but to draw an Exoterick Fence or exteriour Fortification about Theologie’.21 In what Cudworth called an ‘age so philosophical’, they believed it essential to show their command of philosophy, in order to convince sceptically inclined libertines. Their religious apologetic is founded on a profound sense of the compatibility of reason and faith. Reason is the precondition of faith, and revelation subordinate to it in the sense that the purpose of revelation is to assist reason. But they were not religious rationalists in the Deist sense. Nor did they accept the traditional opposition between reason and passion. The reason which they prized was not discursive or instrumental reason (the ‘dry agonistical reasoning’ of the schools as Cudworth called it), but recta ratio or right reason (‘reason accompanied by hearty conviction’ as Henry More put it). The highest form of reason is affective reason, infused by love. This more exalted view of reason closed the gap between reason and faith. The rational man, Whichcote claimed, is ‘next to God’, while John Smith’s Select Discourses traces an epistemological ascent to knowledge of God through reason via an ascending hierarchy of four grades of cognition: the lowest combines sense with reason; in the second reason is conjoined with innate notions; the third is disembodied, self-reflective reason; and finally we reach divine love. Their high valuation of reason underlies their high estimation of virtuous pagans, even above fellow Christians. Smith claimed that, ‘The Greek Philosopher could tell [that] . . . without virtue and real goodness God is but a name, a dry and empty notion’.22 Whichcote went so far as to claim that, ‘The Good nature of a Heathen is more Godlike than the furious Zeal of a Christian’, and Cudworth was persuaded that, for all its errors, paganism contained glimmerings of truth.23 In their philosophical defence of religion they sought to use arguments of the kind that any rational atheist would accept (they shared the view of their time that atheists 21

More, A Collection, Preface General, p. 6. John Smith, ‘True Way of Attaining Divine Knowledge’, in Taliaferro and Teply (eds), Cambridge Platonist Spirituality, p. 161. 23 Benjamin Whichcote, Aphorisms (1651), in Taliaferro and Tepley (eds), The Cambridge Platonists, p. 135; Cudworth, True Intellectual System, Sig.**2. 22

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were rational!). It was with rational atheists in mind that Henry More adopted an axiomatic method in his Immortality of the Soul and his Enchiridion ethicum. The main substance of Cudworth’s True Intellectual System of the Universe is an extensive demonstration of the existence of God from the evidence of classical antiquity. By surveying ancient philosophy he sought to show the naturality of the idea of God, and the compatibility of true philosophy and theism. The resulting taxonomy of ancient philosophy classified the different philosophical schools according to how the philosophy of each correlates with theism or atheism. For Cudworth, atheism is explained as a failure in philosophical reason. Cudworth regarded Christianity as a philosophical religion and he regarded his own philosophy as a ‘philosophy of religion’ (in fact he was the first to use the term). Such was Henry More’s confidence in reason that he believed it was possible to make a rational account of the language of symbolism in order to reveal the truth of biblical prophecies and the Lurianic Kabbalah. One of his cherished projects was to convince ‘modern sadducists’ (materialists) of the existence of immaterial/spiritual beings. On the premise ‘No Spirit, no God’, that meant demonstrating the existence of witches and ghosts. He attempted to do so by applying the observational principles of the new experimental science, a project for which he teamed up with Joseph Glanvill, whose investigations of the paranormal were published in his Sadducismus triumphatus (1682). This was edited and expanded by More in several subsequent editions. To the displeasure of Robert Boyle, More also tried to use the findings of the experimenters in support of his metaphysical theories. He nevertheless respected the boundaries of faith: The Apology of Henry More (1664) sets out rules for the application of reason in religious matters, stipulating the use of only those ‘Philosophick theorems’ which are ‘solid and rational in themselves, nor really repugnant to the word of God’. George Rust reflects these priorities in his A Discourse of Truth (1677) and A Discourse of the Use of Reason in Matters of Religion (1683).24 Although they were optimists about human reason, the Cambridge Platonists were nevertheless cognizant of its limitations and the dangers of scepticism.

Epistemology Cambridge Platonist epistemology and ethics are underpinned by their view that the human mind is equipped with the principles of reason and morality.25 Cudworth’s A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality is the fullest treatment of innatism by any seventeenth-century philosopher. They refer to the innate principles

24

Rust’s Discourse of Truth was reprinted along with Joseph Glanvill’s Lux Orientalis and annotations on both texts by Henry More in Two Choice and Useful Treatises (London, 1682). 25 Sterling P. Lamprecht, ‘Innate Ideas in the Cambridge Platonists’. Philosophical Review, 35 (1926): 553–73; R. L. Armstrong, ‘Cambridge Platonists and Locke on Innate Ideas’, JHI, 30 (1969): 187–202; G. A. J. Rogers, ‘Locke, Newton and the Cambridge Platonists on Innate Ideas’, JHI, 40 (1979): 191–205.

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of the mind variously as common notions (koinnai ennoiai), seminal reasons (logoi spermatikoi), ‘praecognita’ or ‘prolepses’—terms suggestive of Stoic sources. But innatism was not exclusive to the Cambridge Platonists: as we saw in Chapter 5, the same terminology is used by Herbert of Cherbury and Philip Melanchthon.26 Innatism is common currency in natural theology, including among proponents of the new science. For example, John Wilkins’s Of the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion (1675) puts forward the concept of common notions or ‘seminal principles’ as the basis of universal consent. These are ‘such kind of Notions as are general to mankind, and not confined to any particular Sect, or Nation, or Time’.27 In his Immortality of the Human Soul (1657) Walter Charleton rejects the idea of the mind as a blank slate or tabula rasa in favour of the idea that the mind is furnished with ‘Proleptical and common notions’, such as axioms of mathematics and the idea of God.28 James Dalrymple, Viscount Stair, is another who held that the fundamental principles of knowledge and of morality are innate.29 Thus to subscribe to innate ideas was not necessarily Platonist, but some of those who objected to Locke’s rejection of innate ideas identify themselves as Platonist, for example Sherlock. The Cambridge Platonists did not treat innate ideas literally as the pre-existing content of the mind. Rather they held that the mind has an innate disposition to acquiring knowledge, and plays an active part in generating ideas. As More explained in his Antidote against Atheism (1659), innate knowledge is not like ‘a certaine number of ideas flaring and shining in the Animadversive faculty like so many Torches or Starres in the Firmanent’ but ‘an active sagacity in the Soul’.30 Cudworth’s A Treatise of Eternal and Immutable Morality contains an extended account of the activity of mind in which he argues that the mind is not the passive recipient of ideas from without, but that cognition is an active process. ‘Knowledge’, writes Cudworth, ‘is not a passion from anything without the mind, but an active exertion of the inward strength, vigour, and power of the mind, displaying itself from within’.31 Cudworth adopts the Cartesian notion of clarity and distinctness of ideas as the criterion of truth, but equally important are the Platonist notions of form (archetype) and copy (ectype), in terms of which Cudworth explains both our capacity to know and the knowability of the external world. Both the human mind and the created world bear the imprint (ectype) of the divine (archetype). The ectype of God’s wisdom in the human mind is a kind of ‘participation’ of the mind in God by which the mind is furnished with the principles necessary for acquiring knowledge. At the same time, the external world is, intrinsically, intelligible, since it too bears the imprint of God’s wisdom, which is manifest in the order and relations of its constituent parts.

26 27 28 29 30

See Chapter 5, n. 22. Wilkins, Of the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion (London, 1675), p. 55. Walter Charleton, Immortality of the Human Soul (London,1657), pp. 92–6. James Dalrymple, A Vindication of the Divine Perfections (London, 1695), p. 161. 31 More, Antidote against Atheism, p. 17 in A Collection, p. 17. Cudworth, Treatise, p. 74.

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Cudworth holds that that the raw data from the senses is not, of itself, knowledge. Sensory input is nevertheless integral to his epistemology, since without it we could not have knowledge of the body or of the external world. But the input of mind is necessary in order to make sense data intelligible, rather as the shapes on a page make no sense unless we know how to read.

Ethics The ethics of the Cambridge Platonists rest on the claim that the principles of morality are fixed and certain, and the conviction that free agency is essential for virtuous conduct. The eternity and immutability of moral principles is a theme which resounds through their writings, as is their emphasis on the free will. They shared the aspiration of the moderns to a rationally demonstrable ethics, but their moral philosophy is fundamentally practical, concerned with living the good life: ‘the chief Parts of Morality are no less demonstrable than Mathematics’, wrote Henry More in Divine Dialogues (1668), but morality is also the ‘Art of living well and happily’, as he avers in An Account of Virtue.32 At the heart of the Cambridge Platonists’ ethics is Plato’s claim in the Euthyphro that God commands what is good and that divine command does not make virtue. Goodness is good in itself. ‘What is unjust in its own nature,’ writes More, ‘Cannot by any external Consideration be made just’.33 Goodness is therefore antecedent to all law. The Cambridge Platonists can agree with natural law theorists that the law of nature is right reason, and that this is written in the hearts of men. But for them the good has force of itself, requiring no law to oblige us to seek it. ‘The Goodness, or Justice, or Righteousness’ writes Cudworth, ‘is intrinsecall to the thing itself, and this is what obligeth’.34 The practice of virtue and the attainment of the good are not mere rational exercises. Much of the focus of their ethics is moral psychology, where the impact of Cartesianism, Stoicism, and Epicureanism is clear. As with Descartes, the passions have a prominent role in their ethical thinking. More’s list of the primary or ‘primitive’ passions—Admiration (which includes ‘Generosity’), Love, Hatred, Joy, Grief, Cupidity—is strongly Cartesian. The practice of virtue involves harnessing rather than subduing or neutralizing the passions. The Cambridge Platonists adapt the Epicurean idea that the exercise of virtue is pleasurable and the attainment of good is the greatest pleasure, and redirect it to Christian ends. More writes of the ‘relish’ or taste of virtue, and posits the existence of what he calls the ‘boniform 32 Henry More, Account of Virtue (London, 1690), p. 3. On their ethical thought, see especially, Stephen Darwall, The British Moralists and the Internal ‘Ought’, 1640–1740 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); J. B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Terence Irwin, The Development of Ethics: A Historical and Critical Study, vol. 2: From Suarez to Rousseau (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 33 34 More, Account of Virtue, p. 116. Cudworth, True Intellectual System, p. 897.

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faculty’ which is the seat of happiness.35 Their anti-determinist ethics requires that to act morally, we must be free to direct our own actions. It is this which makes us responsible for what we do: according to Cudworth ‘there is Something eph hemin’ (in our power) which makes us ‘so far forth Principles or Masters of our own Actions, as to be Accountable to Justice for them’. This is the ‘liberty’ which makes us ‘capable of Praise and Dispraise, Rewards and Punishments, and the Objects of Distributive Justice’.36 Without free will rational beings would be reduced to the level of mere machines, subject to external necessity. However the Cambridge Platonists conceive of human freedom not in terms of will guided by reason (as, for example, Bramhall did) but as a power which combines the functions of will, reason, and desire. Accordingly they reject traditional faculty psychology which treats the will as a separate faculty from reason, turning instead to Plotinianism and Stoicism to formulate the idea of the self-determining soul, or autexousion, defined as ‘the having a Power to Act within ourselves’, or eph hemin (‘self-power’). More also calls virtue itself ‘an intellectual Power of the Soul’.37 Cudworth’s unpublished writings contain an extensively developed moral psychology which elaborates his conception of the soul as hegemonikon, in which consciousness has a central role in the operations of the self-determining person.

Metaphysics Henry More’s Enchiridion metaphysicum is the most substantial work of metaphysics to be produced in seventeenth-century Britain. In it More breaks with scholastic tradition, adopting instead the new mould of metaphysics as pneumatology. The book contains a systematic exposition of his philosophy of spirit or incorporeal substance, which he had developed over a number of years. Distinctive features of More’s metaphysics are, first of all, his conception of immaterial extension, the counterpart of material extension, an idea first proposed in his correspondence with Descartes; secondly his theory of infinite space; and thirdly his hypothesis of the Spirit of Nature or ‘Hylarchic Principle’. More’s conception of infinite space departs radically from the traditional view that the universe is finite, and also from Descartes’s view of the universe as indefinite rather than infinite. It is predicated on his idea of immaterial extension, and he arrives at his idea of infinite space by analogy with the infinite extension of God, conceiving it as an ‘obscure shadow’ of divine extension, possessed of many of the attributes of God (immobility, incorporeality, immensity). More’s divinized space appears to be a striking anticipation of Newton, but it is essentially a metaphysical construct. More’s conception of a ‘Spirit of Nature’ has parallels in Cudworth’s hypothesis of ‘Plastic Nature’. Both addressed the fundamental deficiency in the mechanical 35 37

36 More, Account of Virtue, p. 6. Cudworth, True Intellectual System, Preface. More, Account of Virtue, p. 176 and p. 8.

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philosophy, which could not account for the many phenomena which behave ‘contrary to the Laws of Mechanicks’,38 since it could only explain the operations of nature in terms of mere chance (‘Fortuitous Mechanism’) or by means of direct intervention of God (occasionalism). The alternative which they proposed is something of a middle way between these two extremes. Cudworth’s ‘Plastic Nature’ and More’s the ‘Spirit of Nature’ or ‘Hylarchic Principle’ are conceived as intermediary between God and the natural world. Each functions as an intermediate cause which sustains the mundane operations of the physical universe in an orderly fashion and regulates the processes of life. The two hypotheses have to recommend them the fact that they retain final causality, which Descartes had discarded. In some respects they equate to the laws of motion configured so as to operate teleologically. In other respects they constitute a kind of energy or life which infuses material things. More describes the Spirit of Nature in both quasi-emanationist terms as ‘the last Ideal or Omniform Efflux from God’, and as encapsulating ‘certain general Modes and Lawes of Nature’.39 Both hypotheses bear similarities with Plato’s anima mundi and the Stoics’ pneuma, as well as the Aristotelian vegetative soul. Although they have much in common, Plastic Nature and the Spirit of Nature are not identical in all particulars. Cudworth countenances many plastic natures, but there seems to be only one Spirit of Nature. In line with More’s conception of spirit as res extensa, the Spirit of Nature is extended. By contrast, Plastic Nature is not extended: for Cudworth extension is a property of bodies (‘resisting or antitypous extension’) while immaterial spirit is unextended (‘internal energy and self-activity’).40 Cudworth emphasizes the role of Plastic Nature or Natures in the operations of life. More discusses his Hylarchic spirit largely in relation to the cosmos as a whole. Both More and Cudworth formulated their respective hypotheses in the light of perceived inadequacies of the mechanical philosophy, which, they thought, could not explain movement and change, the union of soul and body or life itself. Each supported his theory with a different set of arguments. For example, Cudworth indicates that Plastic Nature is an answer to occasionalism, since it explains God’s immanence in the world, without requiring immediate divine intervention in the minutiae of day-to-day operations of nature. More emphasizes that the Spirit of Nature can account for phenomena inexplicable by the mechanical philosophy (e.g. sympathetic vibration of strings and tidal movement). Both Plastic nature and the Spirit of nature are said to operate ‘unconsciously’—a feature of both which has caused difficulty because it smacks of anthropomorphism. However, the unconsciousness of Plastic Nature must be understood in relation to the Cambridge Platonists’ conception of living substance and their objections to the Cartesian view that cogitation is essence of the soul, which must therefore be conscious. Against ‘the Narrow Principles of some late Philosophers’, Cudworth 38 39

Immortality of the Soul, p. 12, in A Collection. 40 More, A Collection, Preface, p. xvi. Cudworth, True Intellectual System, p. 161.

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argues that the soul is not always conscious, and that its activity includes life processes which cannot be accounted for in corporeal terms or in terms of cogitation. Drawing on Plotinus’ conception of synaisthesis, he distinguishes between self-aware states of the soul (consense) when the soul is conscious that it is thinking, and states of unconsciousness (e.g. sleeping), when the soul continues to perform vital functions (e.g. regulating heartbeat) but is unconscious of these activities.41 Plastic nature is a life function of the latter kind. More’s ‘hylarchic spirit’ came in for criticism from Matthew Hale, Robert Hooke, Robert Boyle, and the German natural philosopher Johann Christoph Sturm largely on account of his attempt to use it to explain the results of Boyle’s experimental investigations. However Cudworth and More’s vitalistic theories were taken up particularly by natural philosophers interested in botany, notably John Ray and Nehemiah Grew. Of the two hypotheses, Plastic Nature had the longest afterlife— largely thanks to the French translation of Cudworth’s hypothesis among the excerpts from The True Intellectual System which Jean Le Clerc published in his journal Bibliothe`que choisie between 1703 and 1706. To the outrage of Cudworth’s daughter, Damaris Masham, this occasioned a withering attack by Pierre Bayle, first in Basnage de Beauval’s Histoire des ouvrages des savants and subsequently in his own Continuation des pense´es diverses sur la come`te, republished in his Oeuvres Diverses (1727). The ensuing fracas served to give the hypothesis high profile, igniting a strenuous debate which lasted through the eighteenth century. An account of Cudworth’s theory along with Bayle’s critique was included by Diderot in the Encyclope´die.42 The French philosopher Paul Janet still regarded Cudworth’s theory of Plastic Nature as viable and defensible in 1848.

Influence Despite their mixed fortunes in the 1650s and 1660s, the Cambridge Platonists had a wide and enduring legacy in both Britain and Europe, as the republication and translation history of their writings bears out.43 In Britain Culverwell’s Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature was one of the most reprinted of single works of the Cambridge Platonists, with four editions. It might well have been one of the two Oxford editions that Locke read.44 Most of Cudworth and More’s philosophical writings were reprinted in the early eighteenth century. More’s A Collection 41 On Cudworth and Consciousness, see Udo Thiel, The Early Modern Subject: Self-Consciousness and Personal Identity from Descartes to Hume (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 42 The poets Alexander Pope (in ‘An Essay on Man’) and Samuel Taylor Coleridge (in his early poems) make creative use of Cudworth’s conception of ‘plastic nature’. 43 On their eighteenth-century legacy, see Michael B. Gill, ‘From Cambridge Platonism to Scottish Sentimentalism’, The Journal of Scottish Philosophy, 8 (2010): 13–31; Sarah Hutton, ‘From Cudworth to Hume: Cambridge Platonism and the Scottish Enlightenment’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 42 (2014): 1–19. 44 See n. 4.

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was republished in 1712 and 1713. The True Intellectual System of the Universe was printed in abridged form by Thomas Wise (1706, 1715, and 1732). The full text was published by Thomas Birch in 1743, while A Treatise first appeared in 1731. More’s Enchiridion ethicum appears on university reading lists, and was translated into English in 1690. More and Cudworth were the only Cambridge Platonists to have an appreciable European influence through translation. More’s Latin translation of his philosophical works was published in his Opera omnia, 1679, and contains extensive notes (scholia) responding to critics. One of the few who are named is the German Johann Cristoph Sturm. Extracts of The True Intellectual System were published in Jean Le Clerc’s Bibliothe`que choisie (1703–6). It was probably this version which was known to Leibniz, although he did possess a copy of the original. The Latin translation of Cudworth’s works by the German scholar Johan Lorenz Mosheim (1733, reprinted 1773) includes a translation of the 1731 first printing of A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality. A good deal of their legacy was theological—most immediately in the latitudinarian movement within the Church of England, and among Episcopalians in Scotland. The latitudinarians were a younger generation of divines who worked for an accommodation between the Church of England and religious dissenters: men like Simon Patrick, Edward Fowler, Gilbert Burnet, and John Tillotson, who were all promoted to bishoprics in the reign of William and Mary. John Wilkins, whom Benjamin Whichcote succeeded at St Lawrence Jewry on his translation to Chester, is another Emmanuel man who may be linked to this group. The Scottish Episcopalians James Nairn, Robert Leighton, Henry Scougal, and Gilbert Burnet were attracted by their eirenic, Platonizing outlook. The most philosophical of the Quakers, Aberdonian George Keith (1538–1716), absorbed the metaphysics of Henry More, and was for a period an associate of Anne Conway.45 The most philosophical of the Cambridge Platonists’ seventeenth-century disciples were the Aberdonian philosopher Henry Scougal (1650–78), Anne Conway (1630–79), the Oxonian John Norris (1657–1712), and Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury. Scougal, like Henry More, was receptive to Cartesianism. In his spiritual classic, The Life of God in the Soul of Man (1677),46 he describes religion in Platonist terms as the participation of soul in God. The soul is naturally inclined to the good, and as a ‘self-moving principle’ it is unconstrained by law or motivated by external rewards or punishments. There are echoes of the terminology of Henry

Sarah Hutton, ‘From Cudworth to Hume’. For the eighteenth-century legacy, see Michael B. Gill, ‘From Cambridge Platonism to Scottish Sentimentalism’, The Journal of Scottish Philosophy, 8 (2010): 13–31; Michael B. Gill, ‘Rationalism, Sentimentalism, and Ralph Cudworth’, Hume Studies, 30 (2004): 149–81. 46 Reprinted in 1691 and many times thereafter, with a preface by Gilbert Burnet. Isabel Rivers, ‘Scougal’s The Life of God in the Soul of Man. The Fortunes of a Book, 1676–1830’, in Ruth Savage (ed.), Philosophy and Religion in Enlightenment Britain: New Case Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 29–55. 45

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More, in his reference to religion as a ‘divine life’, and to ‘the sense and relish of Spiritual things’. John Norris was an admirer of Henry More with whom he conducted a brief correspondence on the subject of ‘self-love’, which he printed with his The Theory and Regulation of Love (1688). Norris represents a rather different branch of the Platonic tradition through his subsequent uptake of the philosophy of Malebranche (see Chapter 10). Another Oxford admirer of Henry More was the Royal Society apologist Joseph Glanvill (1636–80), who in Lux orientalis (1662) accepted More’s argument for the pre-existence of souls, that it provided evidence of the existence and immortality of souls. Like More, Glanvill held Plato in high regard; he was critical of aspects of Descartes’s philosophy, but agreed that Cartesianism was the best available alternative to Aristotelian natural philosophy. And, like More, he ascribed the operations of nature to the operations of a plastic spirit. In his Scepsis scientifica, Glanvill’s mitigated scepticism leads him to emphasize the limitations but not the impossibility of knowledge. His epistemology combines an empirical recognition of the importance of the senses with a measure of innatism. Glanvill’s defence of the new experimental science is not inconsistent with these views. Like Glanvill, the physician-philosopher Richard Burthogge is something of a transitional figure, who has much in common with the Cambridge Platonists, but exhibits differences which reflect his empirical training with Geulincx in Leiden. In his early works especially (1672 and 1675), Burthogge shares with the Cambridge Platonists their anti-Calvinism, their tolerant disposition and their emphasis on reason. Like them he emphasized divine goodness and proposed a vitalistic explanatory principle in his ‘hypothesis of Universal spirit’, which, like More’s hylarchic principle, infuses the physical world.

Anne Conway The only work of metaphysics by a seventeenth-century woman was Anne Conway’s posthumously (and anonymously) published Principia philosophiae antiquissimae et recentissimae (1690).47 Having had the remarkable good fortune to study philosophy with Henry More (though not at Cambridge, since women weren’t permitted to attend the universities), Anne Conway was steeped in both Cartesianism and Cambridge Platonism. Her objections to the dualistic arguments of both Descartes and More led her to develop her own metaphysical monism. Her philosophy nevertheless holds true to Cambridge Platonism in fundamentals, for it is predicated

47 This was printed in English translation as The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy in London in 1693. On Conway, see Sarah Hutton, Anne Conway: A Woman Philosopher. For a modern English translation, see Conway, The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy, trans. Allison P. Coudert and Taylor Corse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

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upon divine perfection and goodness, and the immanence of spirit. Her system is set out as a hierarchy of three orders of being (God, middle nature, and nature) in which all things derive from God by a process of continuous emanation. God being perfection and life itself, supremely just, wise, and good, all things must in some measure reflect those attributes. Matter, on a Cartesian definition of inert substance, is therefore an impossibility. Accordingly she posits a monism of substance, differentiated according to the ontological categories of her system: where God is a single, infinite spirit, created beings consist of infinite minima which she calls monads. This ontological system is also a theodicy which illustrates the justice of God in the moral dynamism which drives it: by a continuous process of metamorphosis, degenerating from and regenerating to the good, all created things eventually recyle towards their original purity. Her work also registers her exposure to both Origen and to cabbalistic Neoplatonism. Her mentor, Francis Mercurius van Helmont, brought her philosophy to the attention of Leibniz, who recognized affinities with his own philosophy.

Cudworth, Shaftesbury, and Locke Assessing the full extent of Cudworth’s influence is particularly problematic since almost none of his epistemology and ethics was published in his lifetime. But the manuscript circulation of his philosophy cannot be ruled out. And this may explain the intriguing echoes of some of Cudworth’s ideas in both Locke and Shaftesbury— in particular Locke’s ideas on consciouness and power, and Shaftesbury’s moral sentimentalism. Through their acquaintance with Cudworth’s daughter, Damaris Masham, both men may have had access to Cudworth’s manuscripts. In Shaftesbury’s case, it is conceivable that the parallels with Cudworth are to be explained by shared Platonist and Cambridge Platonist sources. Shaftesbury did in fact edit Whichcote. But common sources of this kind would not explain the parallels with Locke. Since the echoes of Cudworth in Locke occur in later additions to his Essay, published after he had taken up residence with Damaris Masham, it is plausible to suggest that these are the result of his reading her father’s manuscripts. That being so, Cudworth has some claim to being considered the grandfather of some of the most enduringly influential elements of Locke’s philosophy, especially his idea of person. However, at the present stage of scholarship, this remains not proven. Besides Shaftesbury and Locke, the philosophical readers of More and Cudworth included Newton and Leibniz. Newton made extensive notes ‘Out of Cudworth’ and from Henry More, in his ‘Quaestiones quaedam philosophiae’ notebook.48 Leibniz noted affinities as well as differences between his philosophy and theirs. Among the ethical rationalists, Samuel Clarke, John Balguy, and Richard Price all owe something 48 ‘Out of Cudworth’, Clark Library MS fN563Z; ‘Quaestiones quaedam philosophiae’, BL Add MS 3996. Isaac Newton, Certain Philosophical Questions: Newton’s Trinity Notebook, ed. J. E. McGuire and Martin Tamny (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

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to the Cambridge Platonists. Richard Price’s Review of the Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals (1758) stands out from the rest by virtue of the fact that its main debt is to Cudworth’s posthumous Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality.

Richard Cumberland and the Cambridge Enlightenment Another thinker who was a product of mid-seventeenth-century Cambridge was Richard Cumberland, sometime colleague of Cudworth and More. Cumberland’s major work, his De legibus naturae disquisitio philosophica (1672), is contemporaneous with major works of Cudworth and More. It was published four years after More’s Enchiridion ethicum (1668), and only a year after the imprimatur of The True Intellectual System was given. Cudworth’s book was published a few years later (1678), as was More’s Opera omnia (1679).49 Cumberland is normally discussed as a natural law theorist in relation to Hobbes, Locke, and the European jurisprudential tradition.50 His relationship to the Cambridge Platonists is not at once obvious, largely because they stand apart from the mainstream natural law tradition. The exception is Culverwell, who discusses the law of nature in his Discourse of the Light of Nature, where he cites with approbation both John Selden and Grotius’ natural law classic De jure belli ac pacis. But, as commentators have pointed out, Culverwell tries to hold a balance between rationalism and voluntarism.51 For Culverwell, like Cudworth, concedes that the intrinsic nature of goodness is such that ‘if there were no Law or Command, yet a Rational being of its own accord, out of meere love would espouse it self to such an amiable good’.52 As a discussion of natural law Cumberland’s book certainly sits within contemporary natural law debates—Grotius is a source, and Hobbes’s treatment of natural law a target. It is closely allied with Samuel Pufendorf ’s De jure naturae et gentium which was published in the same year. And Pufendorf would draw on Cumberland’s book extensively in the second edition

49

By coincidence, the only seventeenth-century printing of Suarez’s classic scholastic treatment of natural law, De legibus deo legislatore in England, appeared in the same decade, in 1679. An important figure for Cambridge discussion of scholastic natural law theory was Richard Holdsworth, sometime master of Emmanuel College. See J. A. Trentman, ‘Scholasticism in the Seventeenth Century’, in Norman Kretzmann et al. (eds), The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 831–2. 50 On Cumberland, see Murray Forsyth, ‘The Place of Richard Cumberland in the History of Natural Latitudinarian Doctrine’, JHP, 20 (1982): 23–42; Linda Kirk, Richard Cumberland and Natural Law (Cambridge: James Clarke, 1987); Knud Haakonssen, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy from Grotius to the Scottish Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Knud Haakonssen, ‘The Character and Obligation of Natural Law According to Richard Cumberland’, in English Philosophy in the Age of Locke, ed. M. A. Stewart (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 29–47; Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy, ch. 6; Jon Parkin, Science, Religion, and Politics in Restoration England: Richard Cumberland’s ‘De legibus naturae’ (Woodbridge: Royal Historical Society, 1999). 51 Haakonssen, Natural Law, pp. 49–50; Darwall, Internal ‘Ought’, ch. 2, pp. 24–5. 52 Culverwell, Light of Nature, p. 50.

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of De jure naturae (1684), through which it was absorbed into the jurisprudential tradition. But Cumberland, like the Cambridge Platonists, is anti-voluntarist, and his book is also a product of the same intellectual environment that produced Whichcote, Cudworth, and More. Cumberland’s proximity to them is perhaps easier to see if we set aside both their Platonist sobriquet and Cumberland’s reputation as a utilitarian. In De legibus naturae Cumberland aims to provide a demonstrable science of ethics founded on clear principles, with the certainty of mathematics. The work is conceived primarily as a repudiation of Epicureans, Stoics, and others who deny the existence of laws of nature, that is to say fixed principles of morality, or ‘Propositions of unchangeable Truth which direct our voluntary Actions about chusing Good and refusing Evil’.53 As we have already noted in Chapter 6, benevolence and the idea of common good are central to Cumberland’s theory of natural law and his book was targeted at Hobbes. Cumberland argued that the foundation of all natural laws is the common good, which is the happiest condition possible of all and everyone of us, achieved through benevolence. Cumberland’s idea of benevolence owes a good deal to Cicero, as does his idea of the rationality of God. Cicero was, of course, important for Grotius, whose optimistic view of human nature Cumberland recuperates. Cumberland conceives benevolence as an action, ‘an Endeavour, according to our Ability, to promote the common good of the whole system of Rationals’.54 From the notion of benevolence we can deduce ‘all Moral Virtues’ which flow from it necessarily as effects do from causes.55 The virtues include charity towards men, piety towards God, and sociable virtues such as the keeping of promises, gratitude, and affection, which play a role in helping us achieve happiness, as causes produce effects. Since, for Cumberland, humans are motivated to promote the common good, by the recognition that they will thereby promote our own individual good, Cumberland’s ethics appears utilitarian. The apparent utilitarianism of this position would seem to be confirmed by Cumberland’s quantitative account of the common good as an aggregate of all individual goods. However, Cumberland’s utilitarianism on these points is arguably strategic, adopted for the purpose of establishing principles on which everyone can agree, including materialists. The argument from self-interest is, furthermore, just one element of the reasoning process which leads us to recognize the fixed framework of moral certainties which underlies the order of things. The same rational processes by which we deduce what is best in any situation leads us to recognize the orderly chains of cause and effect which apply in the world, and thence to conclude that God is the first cause of these effects. An important feature of Cumberland’s natural law theory is that he grounds the rationality of his arguments and the certainty of his conclusions in the necessary 53 Richard Cumberland, A Treatise of the Laws of Nature, trans. John Maxwell, ed. Jon Parkin (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005), p. 289. Cf. Cumberland, De legibus, trans. and ed. D. D. Raphael, in British Moralists, 1650–1800, 3 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), p. 79. 54 55 Cumberland, A Treatise, p. 262. Cumberland, A Treatise, 1.10, p. 302.

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relation between cause and effect that is observable in the physical world. By examining the physical world, we come to realize that God is the author of all, presiding over a system of necessary causes in a universe which manifests his providential design. We recognize that our rational understanding of the universe conforms to the laws prescribed by God. And thus the goods which flow from benevolence are not just natural goods but moral good. The law of nature itself is conceived in mathematical terms as ‘a Proposition proposed to the Observation of, or impress’d upon, the Mind with sufficient Clearness, by the Nature of Things, from the Will of the first Cause’.56 Thus the relationship between benevolence and the individual happiness of all rational creatures may be deduced by reason in the same way that we deduce the necessary causal connections exhibited in the rational order of the created universe.

Cumberland and Cambridge Platonism There is no question that Cumberland and the Cambridge Platonists diverged in important respects. For example Cudworth’s fundamentally Platonist arguments for the foundations of morality are of a very different order from Cumberland’s, and he rejects the idea that morality originates in law of any kind, or that moral obligation stems from law. Cudworth discusses the relationship between law and morality in an important section of his critique of Hobbes in his A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality. For Cudworth, all law, natural and human, is in effect positive law, since all laws derive their force from the good or natural justice. Laws made by an authorized commander (lawful ruler) are binding by virtue of the immutable principle that promises should be kept. However, the differences between Cumberland and the Cambridge Platonists with respect to natural law and innate ideas should not obscure the fact that they had common concerns. For one thing, Cumberland and Cudworth were engaged in the same enterprise—the refutation of Hobbes. Both the Cambridge Platonists and Cumberland sought to combat the dangers of Epicurean materialism, with its deleterious consequences for morality. They each sought a new ethical theory to defeat voluntarism and in so doing they sought to defend the objective character of moral goodness, and to give a rational account of moral obligation.57 Both conceived a correspondence between the moral universe and the physical universe. For both, the created world manifests the goodness of God in its very design. Cudworth’s intellectual system is a universe of mind, made up of intellectual natures, which maps onto an atomist-mechanist view of the natural world, while Cumberland’s moral universe is one which may be

56 Cumberland, A Treatise, 5.5, pp. 495–6. ‘Lex naturae est propositio a natura rerum ex voluntate Primae Causae menti satis aperte oblata vel impressa’, in Raphael (ed.), British Moralists, pp. 93–4. 57 Jon Parkin, from whom I differ as to the character of Cambridge Platonism, notes other affinities between Whichcote, Culverwell and Cumberland in his Science, Religion and Politics, pp. 80 ff.

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deduced by applying the mathematical reasoning of the mechanical philosophy. Cudworth, like Cumberland, insisted on the providential character and intelligibility of the universe—its intelligibility being manifest in the ‘mechanical’ view of corporeal things. Both Cumberland and the Cambridge Platonists were receptive to Cartesianism (though Cumberland seems to have been less aware of—or at least seems not to have been concerned by—the potential for atheism which Cudworth and More perceived in Cartesianism). Cudworth, like Cumberland, subscribes to a basically Cartesian version of the mechanical philosophy. For Cumberland this offers a system of ‘rationals’ where everything is logically connected necessarily in what he called a ‘whole system of rationality’ and ‘a most exquisite machine’: sense impressions result from the motion of bodies moving according to the unchanging laws of motion which are ‘impress’d by God’ as the efficient cause, and that are ‘by him preserv’d unchang’d’.58 Cumberland also shared with the Cambridge Platonists’ receptiveness to contemporary science and a wide knowledge of classical philosophy as well as a profound antipathy to Hobbes. And they agreed that they should tackle their materialist opponents on their ground, adopting the same principles of reasoning as their adversaries. Thus Cumberland appeals to the evidence of the senses analysed in terms of mechanical laws of cause and effect. And it is for the same reason that he does not use arguments from innate ideas, which he held to be ineffective for tackling materialists (Epicureans), who are his chief targets. This is a point reiterated by James Lowde, in his A Discourse Concerning the Nature of Man (1694). Lowde acknowledges that Cumberland did not appear to favour ‘common or natural Notions’, but he did not attack them because he was writing ‘in an Age more Philosophically curious and inquisitive, in an Age that will-not believe any thing, but what comes fairly attested and sufficiently prov’d’.59 Cumberland is emphatic that he is favourably disposed to any argument which ‘looks with friendly Aspect upon Piety and Morality’60—a position which does not exclude arguments of the Platonists. There are, moreover, echoes of the Cambridge Platonists in his idea that the mind is endowed with innate powers which enable it to arrive at the first cause (God), via a chain of subsidiary causes. The mind is furnished with powers which equip it for the ‘knowledge and observance of the Laws of Nature and consequently for the practice of Virtue’.61 These powers include right reason, the power of forming universal ideas, knowledge of number, weight, and measure, the power to recognize established order and to regulate the passions. He holds out the possibility that ‘such Ideas might be both born within us, and impress’d from without’.62 On mind, the authorities he cites are Descartes, Digby, and Henry More. Cumberland also echoed the Cambridge Platonists in holding the principle that goodness is written in our hearts and that the

58 59 60 62

Cumberland, A Treatise, 1.25, p. 33. James Lowde, A Discourse Concerning the Nature of Man (London, 1694), pp. 68–9. 61 Cumberland, A Treatise, p. 253. Cumberland, A Treatise, p. 373. Cumberland, A Treatise, Introduction, section 5, p. 253.

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principles of justice and morality are ‘in their own Nature, Good’ and would be even were there no law. Like the Cambridge Platonists, Cumberland held a benign view of the deity and the compatibility of reason and faith. Revelation accords with reason (‘Nothing contradictory to the just Conclusions of our reason, could ever be revealed by God’),63 while natural law requires the exercise of reason and judgement, and therefore a mind capable of so doing. Conceivably, the appearance of Cumberland’s book was a contributory factor in the delay in publishing Cudworth’s The True Intellectual System which appeared six years after the imprimatur was given. It may even have led Cudworth to abandon plans to publish A Treatise of Eternal and Immutable Morality. Whatever the reason for Cudworth’s tortoise-paced publication plans, Cumberland’s book proved timely. Despite its rambling and diffuse argument, Cumberland’s De legibus naturae enjoyed considerable success in the post-Hobbesian environment in which it was published. Cumberland came to be seen alongside Grotius and Pufendorf as one of the founders of modern natural law theory. His book was reprinted several times before 1720 (with three overseas editions). Samuel Parker made use of it in his Demonstration of the Divine Authority of the Law of Nature (1681). There were two full English translations in the eighteenth century (by John Maxwell in 1727 and by John Towers in 1750). Samuel Pufendorf ’s use of Cumberland in De jure naturae (1684) together with Jean Barbeyrac’s edition (Amsterdam, 1744) and French translation (Traite´ philosophique des lois naturelles, Leiden, 1744, reprinted 1747) sealed Cumberland’s European standing as a classic text in the jurisprudential tradition. However, Barbeyrac was responsible for a Lockean reading of Cumberland (as well as of Pufendorf and Grotius) which influenced eighteenth-century British interpretations of both Cumberland and the European natural law theorists.64 In Britain, Cumberland’s arguments were pruned and repackaged by Locke’s friend James Tyrell, who published an adaptation-cum-translation in 1692, entitled A Brief Disquisition of the Law of Nature. Tyrell says that he undertook this with the encouragement of Robert Boyle and published it with Cumberland’s approval. Tyrell’s version was designed to widen the readership of De legibus so as to include ‘the Nobility and Gentry of our own Nation, (as well as others of a lower rank) who either do not understand Latin, or else had rather read Epitomes of greater Works, than take the Pains to peruse the Originals’ (Preface). He also anchored it within a wider ethical context by adding the Moral Aphorisms from Henry More’s Enchiridion Ethicum, defending More’s axioms as both ‘natural’ and ‘moral’, and as ‘the true results of Natural Reason’.65 He also invokes John Wilkins’s Of the Principles and 63

Cumberland, A Treatise, Introduction, section 27, p. 281. Richard Cumberland, Traite´ philosophique des loix naturelles (Amsterdam, 1744) trans. Jean Barbeyrac (Amsterdam, 1744). Barbeyrac’s French translation of Grotius, Le Droit de la guerre et de la paix (Amsterdam, 1724) was the basis of the anonymous English translation of 1738. See Haakonssen, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy. 65 James Tyrell, Preface to A Brief Disquisition of the Laws of Nature (London, 1692), p. 91. 64

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Duties of Natural Religion as the authority on natural religion, and he drew on Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding to answer objections raised in Chapter 5. Tyrell’s abridgement saw several reprintings (three at home—1693, 1701, 1727—and three abroad in Lübeck 1683, 1693, and 1694). A Brief Disquisition was the principal source for knowledge of Cumberland’s theory in Britain. But the texts which accompanied Tyrell’s translation highlighted Cumberland’s place within a broader tradition of moral rationalism distinct from the natural law tradition. And it was a tradition within which the Cambridge Platonists held pride of place. By juxtaposing More and Cumberland, Tyrell’s Brief Disquisition highlights the signal contribution to British ethical debates of seventeenth-century Cambridge. Between them, the Cambridge Platonists and Cumberland pursued the central issues of seventeenth-century ethical debates which were thrown up by contemporary philosophy, by Hobbes and Descartes. They focused especially on the nature of goodness, moral motivation, moral obligation, practical morality, and the problems which voluntarism posed for moral accountability. Key aspects of their thinking anticipate characteristic features of British ethical thought of the next hundred years. For example, Cumberland’s benevolentism was taken up by natural law theorists of the Enlightenment, while Cambridge Platonists anticipate the moral sentimentalism of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, and the rational intuitionism of Samuel Clarke and Richard Price. Although it is their ethical theory which has proved to be their most enduring legacy, the philosophical importance of the Cambridge school was not confined to ethics. In their own time they represented a real alternative to what were perceived as the Epicurean and sceptical tendencies of contemporary philosophy. They were fully engaged with the philosophical debates of the post-Cartesian age: with materialism, scepticism, causality, the relationship of mind and body. They engaged with the old question of the relationship of philosophy to religion, by pressing questions about the relationship of the new philosophy to religion. They adjusted their metaphysical speculations to the findings of the new science. The Cambridge school of the seventeenth century should therefore be considered modernizers. Unlike most philosophical reformers of the period, however, their thought is coloured by their humanism. Their profound respect for the philosophers of the past was neither dogmatic nor antiquarian. The philosophical conversation which they maintained with the Stoics, Plato, Plotinus, and others was as creative as their engagement with their contemporaries. The philosophical language of today still bears the imprint of that creative interchange in such terms as ‘consciousness’, ‘self-determination’, and ‘Cartesianism’, all of them Cambridge Platonist coinages which we are more likely to associate with John Locke.

8 From Philosophy to Science Natural Philosophy of Boyle, Newton, and Others The seventeenth century is often referred to as the century of the ‘Scientific Revolution’, because the foundations of modern experimental science are taken to have been laid in this period. The development of experimental science was not exclusive to Britain, but the work of Bacon, Hooke, Boyle, and Newton, and the founding of the Royal Society in 1660, give Britain good claim to be seen as a leader in this field. Although the term ‘scientific revolution’ captures the radical intellectual shift which new methods for the investigation of nature involved, it is misleading, since it implies a complete and sudden break with what went before. The emergence of modern science was in fact a longer and messier process, the termini of which are still a matter of debate. It is now well established that the new approaches to knowledge evolved from earlier developments. A consequence of these developments was the separation of the scientific investigation of nature from philosophy. The scope of philosophy had always extended to natural philosophy. What would later be called ‘science’ was still a branch of philosophical scientia, and was generally referred to as natural philosophy. The separation of science from philosophy was not fully accomplished by the time of Newton, who continues to be referred to as a philosopher throughout the next century. Bacon, Hobbes, and most of the figures closely associated with the development of science regarded their enterprise as philosophical. Most of them had broader interests in philosophy. In many cases, their ‘scientific’ pursuits were just one aspect of wider philosophical pursuits. This is particularly true of Robert Boyle, who reflected not just on the nature of things, but on morality and religion. The early investigators at the Royal Society, like Boyle, were referred to as virtuosi or accomplished gentlemanly all-rounders, indicative that part of the appeal of the new natural philosophy was, precisely, that a grounding in academic learning was not a prerequisite.1 In consequence it was also accessible to ‘amateurs’ other than virtuosi, including practitioners like Robert Hooke and even the occasional woman. 1

For an overview of early modern science, see John Henry, The Scientific Revolution and the Origins of Modern Science (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001) and Margaret J. Osler, Rethinking the Scientific Revolution (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

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Historians of science explain the emergence of modern science by reference to a combination of factors—social, institutional, religious, technological, theoretical. The purpose of this chapter is not to account for the rise of science, but to examine the natural philosophy from which it emerged and to describe some of the fundamental changes in the way people thought about the physical universe, and changes in their understanding of how knowledge of nature could be acquired. In what follows, I shall focus on the principal elements which transformed seventeenth-century natural philosophy: the mechanical philosophy, the revival of atomism, the impact of scepticism, and the rise of experimental philosophy, all of which had profound implications for matter theory and epistemology. In the following survey I shall consider a constellation of natural philosophers who exemplify these strands in the period before the foundation of the Royal Society. I shall then discuss Robert Boyle and his later contemporaries, with most attention given to Boyle, whose natural philosophy is in many ways their culmination. However, the apogee of the transformational developments in seventeenth-century natural philosophy is not Boyle but Isaac Newton, whose Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica finally achieved the mathematization of natural philosophy, thereby endowing the study of the physical universe with unprecedented accuracy in both calculation and prediction. Boyle is representative in other ways, for like so many of the men most closely associated with the development of the new natural philosophy he regarded his investigations of nature as just one aspect of wider philosophical pursuits. And like many investigators of nature, Boyle was deeply interested in the religious dimension of those pursuits. Since no account of seventeenth-century natural philosophy can ignore the role of religion, this overview therefore commences with a brief discussion of the relation between the two.

Science and Religion In the early modern period, religion was not seen as antithetical to what we would now call a ‘scientific world view’. On the contrary, religion was a powerful motivator to many natural philosophers and most sought some accommodation between natural philosophy and religious belief. Despite Bacon’s strictures on melding theology and natural philosophy, it is common to find interests in natural philosophy allied to interests in theology. Natural philosophy was treated by some as natural theology, even as philosophical theology. The seventeenth-century sense of the compatibility of religion and science was underpinned by the long-standing institutionalization of the relationship in the university curriculum, where philosophy had a role as the ‘handmaid of theology’ (ancilla theologiae). A powerful metaphor in religious apologetics was the ‘book of nature’, by which the natural world was imagined as a companion volume to the holy scriptures, expressing the idea that the physical world manifested the existence and will of God. Henry More’s Antidote against Atheism (1655) and Walter Charleton’s Darkness of Atheism:

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A Physico-Theological Treatise (1650) pioneered the use of the new philosophy in natural theology. Joseph Glanvill’s apology for the religious credentials of the new science (in works like Philosophia pia, 1671) owes something to this tradition. Two influential works which treat natural philosophy as natural theology are John Ray’s Wisdom of God Manifested in the Works of Creation (1691) and Nehemiah Grew’s Cosmologia sacra, or, A Discourse of the Universe as it is the Creature and Kingdom of God (1701). Some natural philosophers also wrote on metaphysical subjects (for example Walter Charleton in his Immortality of the Soul). The pious intentions of Robert Boyle are everywhere apparent: so much of his published output is devoted to theological matters that he is sometimes called a theologian. John Wilkins was both theologian and promoter of the new science whose posthumously published Rational Religion is an important source for his ideas on epistemology. For Isaac Newton, too, theological matters had a place in natural philosophy. ‘To treat of God, from phenomena’, he wrote in Principia mathematica, ‘is certainly part of natural philosophy’.2 With Newton, theology functions as a metaphysics of science, while he concealed his own deeply held heterodox religious convictions. Churchmen were increasingly ready to recruit the latest thinking in natural philosophy to the cause of religious faith. Edward Stillingfleet, who criticized Locke’s philosophy on religious grounds, extolled Newton’s mathematical natural philosophy as England’s answer to Descartes. A high-profile platform for aligning theology and natural philosophy was provided by the series of sermons endowed by the will of Robert Boyle, which were known as the Boyle Lectures. The premise of the Boyle Lectures was, in the words of William Wotton, ‘that the Invisible Things of the Godhead may be clearly proved by the Things that are seen in the World’.3 These lectures served to popularize so-called Physico-Theology, a scientifically up-to-date version of the argument from design, which was developed by natural philosophers like Charleton and Ray and promoted by Anglican clerics chosen to deliver the Boyle lectures—especially by Richard Bentley in his The Folly and Unreasonableness of Atheism (1692), Samuel Clarke in A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God (1704), and William Derham in Physico-Theology (1711–12).4

Aristotelianism/Scholasticism Scholastic Aristotelian natural philosophy supplied a comprehensive and internally coherent system for understanding all aspects of the physical world, which was well 2 General Scholium in The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, trans. I. Bernard Cohen (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), pp. 942–3. 3 Wotton, Reflections, Preface. 4 John Hedley Brooke, Science and Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Stephen Gaukroger, The Emergence of a Scientific Culture: Science and the Shaping of Modernity, 1210–1685 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006); Margaret C. Jacob, The Newtonians and the English Revolution, 1689–1720 (Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1976).

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entrenched in the early seventeenth century. Aristotelianism explained phenomena in terms of a fourfold system of causality: material, formal, efficient, and final causes. All things consisted of a combination of matter and form. It is the ‘form’ which differentiates things from the undifferentiated substrate (matter). This ‘substantial form’ is that which makes something what it is and accounts for change. Aristotelian physics identifies four types of change (substance, quality, quantity, place), which is explained in terms of potentiality actualized. For the Aristotelians, the universe was a finite plenum, in which bodies were constituted of four elements (earth, air, fire, and water), which corresponded to four qualities considered primary (dry, cool, hot, and moist). These were supplemented by a second group of observable or ‘manifest’ properties (e.g. heaviness or lightness, rarity or denseness) and other hidden or ‘occult’ properties, such as magnetic attraction. Aristotle accounted for change in terms of the acquisition or loss of such properties. Substantial forms are therefore a key explanatory concept in Aristotelian natural philosophy. Schematic versions of this system filled the textbooks of the period. An example is Robert Sanderson’s compendium of physics.5 Sanderson distinguishes two kinds of efficient cause, universal (i.e. God) and particular. For good measure he adds a number of ‘theorems’ about nature, commonplaces of scholasticism which tend to reify nature, such as, that nature does nothing in vain, lacks nothing necessary, always acts to its full potential. A number of factors contributed to the radical reconception of natural philosophy on non-Aristotelian lines. These included, firstly, direct critique of Aristotelianism such as that instituted by Bacon (see Chapter 4); secondly, the availability of alternative classical models, notably atomistic theories about the structure of matter; and thirdly, developments in mechanical physics, especially the work of Galileo Galilei. Aristotelian cosmology was discredited as new observations highlighted its incompatibility with the observed phenomena of the cosmos. Such findings stimulated search for theories which would ‘salve the phenomena’ of nature, and the development of inductive methods of enquiry through the development of experimental natural philosophy. The most important legacy of humanism in the reformulation of the philosophy of nature was the revival of Epicureanism, largely owing to the efforts of Pierre Gassendi (see Chapter 3). In the modified version produced by Gassendi, Epicureanism furnished the basis of a coherent philosophy of nature which dispensed with Aristotelian metaphysics, and offered an atomist account of the workings of nature. But probably the most influential alternative to Aristotelianism was the so-called ‘mechanical philosophy’ developed in different ways by Descartes and Gassendi, which was taken up by Hobbes, Boyle, and Locke and many others. Adopting the hypothetico-deductive patterns of thinking employed by Galileo and others, mechanical philosophers sought to account for all natural phenomena in

5

Robert Sanderson, Physicae scientiae compendium written in 1617, published posthumously in 1671.

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terms of bodies in motion. Although their a priori approach was the obverse of the inductive methodology advocated by Bacon and the experimentalists, its founding premise, that the phenomena of the universe can be explained in terms of a few principles, had enormous appeal to the later experimentalists, especially Boyle. Before the end of the sixteenth century Aristotelian natural philosophy was already under pressure from the destructive criticism of sceptics and reformers alike. Renaissance philosophers like Bernadino Telesio and Girolamo Cardano were already proposing alternatives. The seventeenth-century epistemological assault on Aristotelianism spearheaded by Bacon was completed by Pierre Gassendi’s sceptical demolition of Aristotle in his Exercitationes paradoxicae adversus Aristoteleos. Derogation of scholastic theories in general, and the doctrine of substantial forms and qualities in particular, echo like a mantra among seventeenth-century natural philosophers of all stripes, often taking their cue from Bacon’s critique of Aristotle. Joseph Glanvill, selfappointed spokesman of the Royal Society experimenters, derides scholastic Aristotelianism as nothing more than a collection of ‘useless Notions’,6 echoing Bacon’s criticism that Aristotelian natural philosophy had ‘no foundations in the nature of things’. There were, of course, thinkers like Digby and White, who, as we saw in Chapter 4, attempted to accommodate Aristotelianism to the new physics. And, as John Keill pointed out in 1700, scholastic terminology still maintained its hold— terms like ‘Matter and Forms, Privations, Elementary Virtues, occult Qualities, Sympathies and Antipathies, Faculties, Attractions and the like’.7 But their meanings were adjusted for new purposes. Echoing John Keill, John Harris confidently claimed that the only true natural philosophers were the experimenters and ‘the Mechanical Philosophers who . . . account for all Effects and Phaenomena by the known and established Laws of Motion and Mechanicks’.8

First Swallows From the late Elizabethan period, Aristotelians already had to contend with a number of new philosophies of nature proposed by Renaissance thinkers. Long before Gassendi and Descartes, there were several attempts to formulate non-Aristotelian natural philosophies, which proposed new theories of matter, and anticipate later developments in atomist and experimental natural philosophy. At the same time, they also bear the impress of some of the anti-Aristotelian natural philosophies of the late Renaissance. One of the most fully developed of the new natural 6 Joseph Glanvill, Plus ultra: or, The Progress and Advancement of Knowledge since the Days of Aristotle (London, 1668), pp. 100–2. 7 John Keill, An Introduction to Natural Philosophy (London, 1720). This is a translation of Keill’s Oxford lectures on physics which were published as Introductio ad veram physicam (Oxford, 1702). 8 John Harris, Lexicon technicum (London, 1708; first published 1702), s.v. ‘Physiology’. Harris draws on John Keill’s 1700 lectures; Marie Boas, ‘The Establishment of the Mechanical Philosophy’, Osiris, 10 (1952): 412–541.

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philosophies in England was William Gilbert’s so-called ‘magnetic philosophy’, which is based on his study of the phenomenon of magnetic attraction. One of the last Elizabethans, William Gilbert (1544–1603), was among the first Britons to offer an alternative to Aristotelian natural philosophy based on radically different premises and methodology. His magnetic philosophy is set out in two works, De magnete (1600) and De mundo (1651).9 De magnete employs experiments and applies a principle of analogy by means of which he extrapolated a new natural philosophy or ‘physiologia nova’ which explains the phenomena of the universe through magnetic principles. He believed magnetic powers to be effluvia, or soul-like substances, emitted from the Earth and heavenly bodies. He proposed that the earth itself is a giant magnet (terella) and explained its motion by its magnetism. Gilbert’s reputation as a natural philosopher was secured by De magnete. Despite Bacon’s criticisms, Gilbert was highly regarded by, among others, Kepler and Galileo. His work was appropriated and modified by Jesuit natural philosophers, notably by Niccolo Cabeo in his Philosophia magnetica (1628) which attempted to accommodate magnetism with Aristotelianism. Gilbert’s posthumously published De mundo considerably elaborates his magnetic philosophy, but in the post-Cartesian environment of the 1650s, the work had little impact. Francis Bacon shared Gilbert’s anti-Aristotelianism and many aspects of his natural philosophy but was critical of Gilbert for being too preoccupied with system building. Francis Bacon’s incomplete speculative philosophy of nature is another example of an early attempt to formulate a new philosophy of nature. This was an eclectic mix of Renaissance and new ideas, indebted, among others to Telesio and Campanella and Paracelsianism. Bacon posits three primary elements (tria prima), which make up tangible and pneumatic matter, and a quasi-Telesian cosmology of three zones, each containing a different distribution of tangible and pneumatic matter. He also entertained notions of atomism, though he rejected the existence of a void. The theoretical content of natural philosophy sketched in Bacon’s unpublished writings was largely unknown. Bacon’s impact on the development of seventeenth-century natural philosophy came through the changes which he advocated to methodology (based on induction from accumulated data) and his idea of natural history (see Chapter 5).

Mechanical Philosophy The most radical and influential new philosophy of nature produced in the seventeenth century was the so-called ‘mechanical’ philosophy, developed in different ways by Descartes, Gassendi, and Thomas Hobbes, all of whom took inspiration from Galilean mechanics. Descartes led the way, setting out his mechanical philosophy as a system in his Principia philosophiae (1644). The appeal of Cartesian natural 9

William Gilbert, De magnete, magnetisque corporibus, et de magnete tellure [On the Magnet, and Magnetic Bodies and the Magnetic Earth] (London, 1600) and De mundo [Of the World] (London, 1651).

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philosophy was that it offered a coherent and comprehensive account of the phenomena of nature, deduced from a few basic principles—the so-called ‘mathematical method’—and these principles were grounded according to clear rules for establishing certainty. The phenomena of the universe were to be explained in terms of matter and motion. Essential features of matter were that it was extended, moveable, and divisible. Descartes dispensed with the Aristotelian system of causes, retaining only efficient causality based on the laws of impact. Like the Aristotelians, Descartes envisaged the world as a plenum but unlike the Aristotelians, the Cartesian plenum is indefinite rather than finite in extent. On this point, his deference to religious authority led him to reject the logic of his deductions which pointed to an infinite universe. For the same reason he tried to reconcile the received doctrine of a geostatic universe with heliocentrism through his theory of vortical motion. Descartes’s repudiation of final causes was a sticking point for reconciling Cartesian natural causality with divine providence. Descartes linked his mechanical philosophy to a dualism of soul and body, conceiving of body in geometric terms as extended substance (res extensa) and mind or soul as thinking substance (res cogitans). It followed that animals, being devoid of soul, were sophisticated machines. The radical separation of soul and body created problems, not least for explaining the interaction of soul and body, life functions, and phenomena such as magnetism. Descartes’s solution was to posit animal spirits as operative agents in living beings, and he explained action at a distance by means of subtle matter diffused through the universe. In England, the major exponent of the mechanical philosophy was Thomas Hobbes, who subscribed to the strongest version of the philosophy, uncompromising in its materialism and rationalism. Hobbes regarded natural philosophy as the science of bodies, which is concerned with two principal topics, first the motion of bodies and secondly physics or the motion of parts. Hobbes’s main work of natural philosophy is De corpore, the third part of which discusses motion in geometric terms, and covers ‘Physiques, or the Phaenomena of Nature’, treating of the senses, meteorology, light and colour, and gravity. A major difference between Descartes and Hobbes was that, while agreeing with the mechanical principles of Cartesianism, Hobbes denied the existence of non-corporeal substance. Hobbes acknowledged few predecessors—Kepler, Galileo, Mersenne, Gassendi, and William Harvey are the only ones named in De corpore. Hobbes singled out Galileo for praise as ‘the first that opened to us the Natural Philosophy Universal, which is the knowledge of the Nature of Motion’.10 Hobbes continued to work on his natural philosophy long after he was obliged to refrain from airing his philosophical and political views. He nevertheless took issue with the gentlemen advocates of experimental methodologies in a number of short works which restated his mechanistic views. Dialogus physicus

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Hobbes, De corpore (1655), sect. 1.

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(1661) was an answer to Boyle’s experiments on air. This was followed by Problemata physica (1662) dealing with gravity, vacuum, heat, soft and hard, tides, etc., and his statement of ‘geometric principles’, De principiis & ratiocinatione geometrarum (1666). His Decameron physiologicum: or Ten Dialogues of Natural Philosophy (1678) was designed as a compendium for students.

Atomism A significant feature of the new natural philosophy was the revival of the atomist ideas about the structure of matter. The atomists proposed that all bodies were constituted of indivisible particles of matter (atoms) of varying shapes, and explained changes in terms of the rearrangement of the parts of a particular body. Although atomists accepted the principles of the mechanical philosophy, a major difference is that they explained the phenomena of nature in terms of the movement and collision of these particles in void space. Of major significance here was the revival of Epicureanism, which, as we saw in Chapter 3, was the achievement of Pierre Gassendi, and owed much to Walter Charleton for dissemination in Britain. Descartes, too, conceived of matter as particulate, but infinitely divisible. Thus, although Descartes was not an atomist, his matter theory was interpreted as corpuscularian, and he was sometimes considered to be the reviver of Democritean atomism. For example, Henry More and Ralph Cudworth regarded him as such. As we have already seen, another philosopher who took up atomistic ideas circulating in the Mersenne circle was Kenelm Digby, who interpreted Aristotelian minima naturalia as atoms (see Chapter 4). However, atomist theories were circulating in England independently of Gassendi. Thomas Harriot, Nicholas Hill, and Walter Warner were a cluster of English thinkers who combined early interest in atomism with interests in mathematics, mechanics, optics, and experiment.11 This combination of interests gives them an intellectual profile comparable to members of the Mersenne circle and the Cartesian generation of natural philosophers. This is especially true of Warner and Harriot who investigated such topics as infinity, infinite divisibility, and minima, from a mathematical point of view. However, they did not do so in mechanical terms, and it is striking that most of them attributed active power of some kind to bodies. Like the Renaissance Italian philosophers Patrizi, Bruno, and Telesio, Warner and Hill combined Neoplatonism and atomism. Both Harriot and Warner had links to the Percy 11 Stephen Clucas, ‘Corpuscular Matter Theory in the Northumberland Circle’, in Christoph H. Lüthy et al. (eds), Medieval and Early Modern Corpuscular Matter Theories (Leiden: Brill, 2001), pp. 179–207; Robert Fox (ed.), Thomas Harriot: An Elizabethan Man of Science (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000); John Henry, ‘Thomas Harriot and Atomism: A Reappraisal’, History of Science, 20 (1982): 267–96; John W. Shirley (ed.), Thomas Harriot: Renaissance Scientist (Oxford: Clarendon, 1974); Jean Jacquot, ‘Harriot, Hill, Warner and the New Philosophy’, in Shirley (ed.), Thomas Harriot, pp. 107–28; John W. Shirley, Thomas Harriot: A Biography (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983).

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circle. Harriot corresponded with Kepler on optics. Warner, along with his friend Robert Payne, was also associated with the Welbeck circle, of which Hobbes was also a member. Like Hobbes, Warner was held in high esteem by Marin Mersenne. Rumours persist that his cutting-edge theories were plagiarized by Harvey and Hobbes. Harriot is mainly remembered for his posthumously published Artis analyticae praxis (1631), which develops the algebra of Franc¸ois Vie`te and was held in high regard by the Savilian Professor of Geometry, John Wallis. He also proposed an atomist theory of matter—conceiving of atoms as eternally existing particles of varying size and shape, from which more solid bodies are formed. But he never published anything, and appears not to have attempted a synthesis of his natural philosophy. Where Harriot and Warner seemed to have relied on manuscript circulation of their ideas, Nicholas Hill was the only one of this group to publish on atomism. His Philosophia epicurea, which appeared in Paris in 1601 (reprinted in Geneva, 1619), consists of 509 aphorisms on a range of topics, including philosophy, politics, and religion. Hill was a Copernican, who explicitly acknowledged the influence of Bruno—a courageous gesture for a Catholic, only one year after Bruno’s execution as a heretic. Like Bruno, he held the plurality of worlds in an infinite universe. He regarded atoms as the seeds of nature. Hill’s atoms are solid indivisible, invisible, perpetually moving particles, from clusters of which the various phenomena are formed. Both Hill and Warner held there to be four principles or ‘tetrarchs’—space, time, matter, and an active principle governing change. The first three principles are the conditions of physical existence. According to Warner, since these are passive, they cannot of themselves explain all the changes and effects observable in the universe, so it is necessary to posit a fourth, active principle which is the cause of motion. For Warner and Hill space is infinite: space and time are co-essential and coeternal with God. Echoing Plato in the Timaeus, Warner held space to be the universal receptacle of things, eternal, immoveable, uniform, penetrable. Hill and Warner conceive the active principle as an incorporeal radiating force (vis radiativa) which they compare to light—another indicator of the Platonist origins of their ontologies. Hill’s light-metaphysics was indebted to Francesco Patrizi. In Warner’s case this active principle is simply ‘force’ or ‘power’. Hill holds God to be the source of energy and a formative power suffusing the universe.12

Experimentalism While the mechanical philosophers adopted an essentially a priori methodology, others, like Bacon and Boyle, pioneered a posteriori approaches based on observation Sandra Plastina, ‘ “Philosophia lucis proles verissima est”: Nicholas Hill lettore di Francesco Patrizi’, Bruniana & Campanelliana, 10 (2004): 175–82. 12

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and experiment. In Britain experimental natural philosophy largely developed outside the universities, though by the end of the century it was being incorporated in the curriculum. The development of experimental natural philosophy is most closely associated with the Royal Society for the Improving of Natural Knowledge (to give it its full title), founded in 1660. The aims and activities of the Royal Society were echoed in its sister society in Ireland, the Dublin Philosophical Society, founded in 1683 by William Molyneux. Their endeavours in experiments were shared and anticipated by other groups, such as the Welbeck Circle, the Hartlib Circle, and the Oxford Experimental Club. At the Royal Society observational methodologies were pursued by the likes of Robert Boyle and Robert Hooke. The beacon for most experimenters was Francis Bacon, whose vision and methodology was held up as an inspiration. The Royal Society presented itself as carrying forward Bacon’s programme for reforming natural philosophy (see Chapter 5). The new emphasis on experiment was not a monopoly of the Royal Society and is reflected in thinkers as diverse as John Ray and James Dalrymple. John Ray described his botanical studies as ‘a philosophy solidly built upon a foundation of experiment’ (1690). James Dalrymple, Viscount Stair, champions experimentalism in his Physiologia nova experimentalis, which was dedicated to the Royal Society. In this he maintains the Baconian thesis that progress in the sciences has been impeded by lack of experiments. However, with its focus on evaluating the relative merits of different theories the new ‘physiology’ or natural philosophy discussed in his book is arguably forensic, rather than experimental.

Natural Philosophy and the Response to Scepticism New thinking in natural philosophy threw up fundamental questions about the basic properties of matter, how we can obtain knowledge of nature, and how dependable that knowledge might be. The appeal of the atomist theory of the structure of matter and the mechanical philosophy was that it offered a way of accounting for the phenomena of nature more plausibly than the peripatetics. But these new philosophies of nature still faced the problem of whether and how it is possible to gain knowledge of the interior nature of things from the observable exterior. They relied on an assumption that there was correspondence between the observable effects and inner constitution of things, that the properties observable in sensible objects are also the properties of their constitutive parts. They were therefore vulnerable to the very charge which they themselves levelled at the scholastic doctrine of substantial forms, that they sought to explain the phenomena of nature by means of the hidden and therefore unknowable constitution of things. Gassendi having demonstrated the power of scepticism to destroy philosophical systems, new philosophies were highly conscious of the threat of scepticism—and many thought that Cartesian claims to certainty amounted to a new dogmatism. Conscious of the vulnerability of new theories to sceptical demolition, proponents of the new experimental philosophy confronted the problem of the impossibility of

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certain knowledge by developing theories of limited certainty which bear similarities to the answer to scepticism outlined by Sebastian Castellio and William Chillingworth. In The Vanity of Dogmatizing and, more fully, in Scepsis scientifica. Royal Society apologist Joseph Glanvill argued that we can attain limited certitude that our faculties don’t deceive us, even though we cannot be infallibly certain of this. We attain such limited certitude, because we have no reason to doubt our faculties, since we know of no evidence that they are unreliable. It is not impossible to doubt them, but it is unreasonable to doubt them in the absence of evidence that they might be deceiving us. Glanvill added a further principle based on the collective interest of human beings; ‘That Mankind cannot be supposed to combine to deceive, in things wherein they can have not design or interest to do it’.13 Another advocate of mitigated scepticism was John Wilkins, patron and popularizer of the new science through his Discovery of a New World in the Moone (1638). In his Of the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion (published posthumously in 1675) Wilkins addresses the problem of certainty in relation to dogmatism, on the one hand, and scepticism on the other. Wilkins outlined a theory of limited certainty, arguing that infallible or mathematical certainty, to which Descartes aspired, was humanly impossible and he was as critical of Descartes’s methodological doubt as he was of his claims to absolute certainty. Instead he put forward the idea that ‘moral certainty’ is all that it is humanly possible to attain, arguing that the existence of God, knowledge of his attributes, and the requirement of a suitable demeanour towards him could all be established by the use of reason. Wilkins outlines three lesser degrees of certainty: the highest of these is conditional infallibility, which requires that ‘our faculties be true, and that we do not neglect the exerting of them’.14 Since we cannot demonstrate the reliability of our faculties, we simply have to accept that they are, since without them knowledge is impossible. We do so as an act of faith. A second type of conditional infallibility is mathematical certainty, which depends on ‘the supposition there is a necessity that some things must be as we apprehend them, and they cannot possible be otherwise’. The third level is ‘moral’ or ‘indubitable’ certainty, which depends on there being no evidence of fallibility of our faculties. Indubitable certainty is certainty beyond reasonable doubt. This is the limited, or provisional certainty, which enables us to live our lives, and to accept claims about things beyond our experience (like the events of history).

Walter Charleton Walter Charleton was a pioneer of new ideas, who took up the new mechanical philosophy, and was a key figure in promoting awareness of Epicurean natural 13 Joseph Glanvill, ‘Of Scepticism and Certainty’, in Essays on Several Important Subjects (London, 1676), p. 49. 14 John Wilkins, Of the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion (1675), p. 9.

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philosophy in Britain (see Chapter 3).15 As a thinker attracted by new ideas, who looked to ancient philosophy for models, Walter Charleton was very much a representative figure for his time. Although he is best known for promoting Gassendi and atomism, the scope of his philosophical interests extends beyond natural philosophy to epistemology, ethics, and natural theology. He is thus comparable with Cudworth on the one hand and Boyle on the other. He regarded himself as an ‘electing’, or eclectic philosopher who selected the best theories from a variety of sources. A physician by profession, Charleton took up the new chemical philosophy of Jan Baptiste van Helmont, several of whose works he translated. He was closely connected with the new philosophy of the Mersenne circle: Sir Kenelm Digby was a friend, and he was familiar with the work of both Descartes and Gassendi. He had links to the exiled Newcastle circle and was acquainted with Margaret Cavendish. Although a founder member of the Royal Society, Charleton was also an early admirer of Hobbes. However, he rejected the materialism of both Hobbes and Epicurus, as is clear in his early, strongly anti-materialist Darkness of Atheism Dispelled by the Light of Nature (1650), in which he draws on Descartes’s Meditations to prove the existence of God. Nothwithstanding his endorsement of the mechanical philosophy, Charleton was also critical of Descartes: in his Natural History of the Passions (1674), for example, he criticized him for failing to account for the interaction between soul and body and he rejected Descartes’s view that the pineal gland is the principal seat of the soul, claiming that it revealed his imperfect understanding of anatomy. Charleton was interested in a wide spectrum of Epicurean philosophy, especially moral and natural philosophy. Throughout his works Charleton discusses the merits of Epicureanism, emphasizing its positive aspects, repudiating doctrines unacceptable to Christian readers. His Immortality of the Soul (1657) contains a dialogue between three interlocutors who discuss the Epicurean conception of the soul: Lucretius (a materialist representative of Hobbes), Athanasius (Charleton), and Isodicastes (a neutral third party). The argument for immortality of the soul rests on the immateriality of the rational soul, which he deduces from its mental capacities. Charleton argues, for example, that self-reflection cannot have a material basis. He then claims that since what is immaterial cannot be divided, it must be immortal. His Epicurus’s Morals (1656, reprinted 1670) contains translations of various Epicurean writings on ethics, along with his ‘Apologie for Epicurus’ which presents a positive image of Epicurus. He argues that happiness consists in freedom from physical pain and perturbation of mind. Happiness is a state of ‘indolency of body’ and tranquillity of mind and pleasure is necessary for achieving it. His own Natural History of the

15 Stephen Gaukroger and Emily Booth, A Subtle and Mysterious Machine: The Medical World of Walter Charleton (1619–1707) (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005). Also N. R. Gelbart, ‘The Intellectual Development of Walter Charleton’, Ambix, 18 (1971): 149–68; Lynn Sumida Joy, Gassendi, the Atomist: Advocate of History in an Age of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

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Passions (1674) draws on his knowledge of Epicurus, as well as Gassendi, Descartes, Hobbes, and Willis. The work was written with the therapeutic aim of curing distempers caused by the passions and owes much to Thomas Willis’s De anima brutorum. Charleton’s major work of natural philosophy, Physiologia Epicuro-GassendoCharltoniana (1654) is, as the title indicates, indebted to Gassendi, especially Gassendi’s commentary on Diogenes Laertius.16 Part 4 of Physiologia contains an account of Galileian science, drawn from Gassendi’s early defence of Galileo, De motu impresso (1642). In Physiologia Charleton argues that, contrary to the teaching of the Schools, the best way to account for the phenomena of the universe is in terms of the configuration and collision of atoms moving in vacuum. He conceived of atoms as solid minima, possessed of magnitude, gravity, and weight, which (contra Epicurus and like Gassendi) he claimed were created by God, ex nihilo. Furthermore, atoms are not inert, but, Charleton argues, they are ‘invigorated or impraegnated . . . with an Internal Energy or Faculty Motive’ and this ‘Faculty Motive’ is ‘the First Cause of all Natural Actions, or Motions, . . . performed in the World’.17 In his Darkness of Atheism, Charleton also argues that atoms have a ‘native Tendency’ to self-motion. Following Epicurus, Charleton regarded the senses as the source of knowledge of the natural world, and formulated the distinction taken up by Locke and Boyle between primary and secondary qualities.18 He argues that qualities, or ‘sensible effects’ (colour, taste, etc.) are not inherent properties of atoms, but arise from configurations of the ‘three congenial Proprieties’ of atoms, figure, order, and position, and the production of qualities is comparable to the production of words by arrangements of letters of the alphabet.

Robert Boyle (1627–1691) Besides Hobbes and Charleton, the most important British natural philosopher was Robert Boyle, whose corpuscular philosophy shares much with Charleton, combining both atomism with a measure of scepticism, in a targeted assault on scholastic natural philosophy. Today, Boyle is generally regarded as a scientist, who made major contributions to the development of experimental methods of enquiry and made important contributions to scientific theory, notably his work on hydrostatics and air. His contribution is commemorated in the eponymous ‘Boyle’s Law’ (according to which the volume of gas is inversely proportional to its pressure) which resulted from Boyle’s investigations of a phenomenon which he identified as the ‘spring’ of the air.

16

Walter Charleton, Physiologia Epicuro-Gassendo-Charltoniana or a Fabrick of Science Natural upon the Hypothesis of Atoms, founded by Epicurus, repaired by Petrus Gassendus (London, 1654); Animadversiones in decimum librum Diogenes Laerti (London, 1649). 17 Charleton, Physiologia, p. 126. 18 This distinction is derived via Gassendi from Democritus as cited in Galen (De elementis 1, cap. 2).

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He also made important contributions to the epistemology of the sciences through his considerations about the role of experiment, the status of hypotheses, and the criteria for formulating them. Boyle reflected often and at length on the nature of his enterprise as a natural philosopher, and on purpose and import of his enquiries. Nevertheless he eschewed system building: it was not my chief design to establish theories and principles, but to devise experiments, and to enrich the history of nature with observations faithfully made and delivered; that by these and the like contributions made by others, men may in time be furnished with a sufficient stock of experiments, to ground hypotheses and theories on.19

Nothwithstanding his reluctance to systematize, his reflections amount to a coherent philosophy of nature, with important insights into the epistemological issues raised by the experimental philosophy. Systematic or not, Boyle regarded his work as philosophy, and he saw his own ‘Corpuscularian or Mechanical Philosophy’ as ‘but a part of the more general Theory of things, knowable by the Light of Nature, improv’d by the Information of the Scriptures’.20 Furthermore, he believed philosophy to be deeply entwined with religion and that both theology and philosophy were parts of a larger intellectual framework. ‘Theology and Philosophy, seem to be but members of the Universal Hypothesis, whose Objects, I conceive, to be the Nature, Counsels, and Works of God, as far as they are discoverable by us . . . in this Life’.21 Many of Boyle’s publications are loosely organized accounts of the experiments which he conducted—for example, New Experiments Physico-Mechanical, Touching the Spring of the Air and its Effects (1660) and Certain Physiological Essays (1661). Boyle’s philosophical reflections are contained in writings from among two clusters of publications, one produced in the 1660s and the other from his advanced years. Most important among the first group are Some Considerations of the Usefulness of Experimentall Philosophy (1663) and The Origin of Forms and Qualities (1666). And among the second: A Free Enquiry into the Vulgarly Receiv’d Notion of Nature (1686), A Disquisition about the Final Causes of Natural Things (1688), and The Christian Virtuoso (1690). Boyle’s earliest interest in natural philosophy dates from his youth, while he was undertaking the tour of Europe on which he had been sent to complete his private education as the son of one of the richest landowners in Ireland. His interest was 19 Robert Boyle, A Defence of the Doctrine Touching the Spring and Weight of the Air, in The Works of Robert Boyle, ed. Michael Hunter and Edward B. Davis, 14 vols (London: Pickering and Chatto, 1999–2000), vol. 3, p. 12. On Boyle as a philosopher, Peter R. Anstey, The Philosophy of Robert Boyle (London: Routledge, 2000). See also Michael Hunter (ed.), Robert Boyle Reconsidered (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 20 Robert Boyle, The Excellency of Theology, Compared with Natural Philosophy (London, 1674), p. 51; Works, ed. Hunter and Davis, vol. 8, p. 33. 21 Boyle, Excellency of Theology, p. 52. See Michael Hunter, Boyle: Between God and Science (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2009); J. J. MacIntosh, ‘Boyle: Between God and Science’, British Journal for History of Philosophy, 19 (2011): 153–6.

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further shaped through contact with Samuel Hartlib and the study of Italian natural philosophers Campanella and Telesio, as well as the Flemish iatro-chemist J. B. van Helmont and ‘chemical philosophers’ like Frederic Clodius and the American George Starkey. It was, apparently, among ‘the Chymists’ that he first encountered atomist ideas. In 1655, although not formally a member of Oxford University, he took up residence in Oxford, where he pursued his investigations of nature as a member of the Oxford Experimental Club to which John Wilkins and the young John Locke were linked. Boyle’s contribution to the study of natural phenomena was eventually recognized by the university, which conferred on him an honorary degree of medicine (at this time all Sedleian Professors of natural philosophy were physicians). It was probably at this time that he gave fullest attention to the mechanical philosophy. As a natural philosopher Boyle saw himself as working within an established tradition of enquiry, in which his illustrious forbears included Galileo, Mersenne, Bacon, Descartes, Gassendi, and Digby.22 Like them, he rejected scholasticism and metaphysical speculation in natural philosophy. He was especially critical of the scholastic reification of the forms and qualities as explanatory principles used to explain a wide range of phenomena, from the cohesion of bodies to perception. He nevertheless retained respect for Aristotle as a natural historian, and saw the value of Aristotelian logic. Although he expressed admiration for Descartes, he was critical of Descartes’s dogmatic confidence in the certainty of his conclusions. He certainly owed much to Gassendi’s revival and revision of ancient atomism. He shared Bacon’s aspiration to develop new, productive methodologies for investigating nature. He adopted and developed Bacon’s methodological approach based on induction from experience, agreeing with Bacon on the need for clear accounts of observed phenomena. His reluctance to systematize owes much to Bacon, as does his view that the investigation of nature is a collective enterprise, which relied on ‘contributions made by others’. Boyle’s mature natural philosophy is a variant of the mechanical philosophy, and is distinctive for his emphasis on the corpuscular structure of bodies. Unlike Descartes and Hobbes, he placed emphasis on design and accepted final causality, which he understood as a manifestation of God’s providence. Furthermore, unlike them, and to a greater extent than Gassendi, his philosophical ‘considerations’ were underpinned by extensive experimental investigations. He preferred the mechanical philosophy because he believed that mechanical explanations were the simplest and most intelligible. By using a small number of principles, it was able to account for the largest range of phenomena, and therefore offered the most comprehensive account for natural phenomena.

22

Robert Boyle, An Examen of Mr T. Hobbes his Dialogus Physicus (1662), Works, ed. Hunter and Davis, vol. 3, p. 165.

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For that Hypothesis [the Corpuscularian Philosophy], supposing the whole Universe (the Soul of Man excepted) to be but a great Automaton, or self-moving Engine, wherein all things are perform’d by the bare motion (or rest) the size, the shape, and the scituation or texture of the parts of the Universal Matter it consists of; all the Phænomena result from those few Principles, single or combin’d.23

Boyle nevertheless insisted on the limited scope and explanatory power of the mechanical philosophy and of his experimental investigations. He was notably cautious about the conclusions which he drew, and professed agnosticism about causes, stressing that the scope of his enquiries did not extend beyond the limited aim of elucidating the properties of corporeal phenomena in terms of the basic principles of the mechanical philosophy. All that I have endeavoured to do . . . is to shew, that . . . the Phaenomena, I strive to explicate, may be solved Mechanically, that is by the Mechanical affections of Matter, without recourse to Nature’s abhorrence of a Vacuum, to Substantial Forms, or to other Incorporeal Creatures.24

Boyle’s Corpuscularianism Boyle first adumbrated his ‘Corpuscularian or Mechanical Philosophy’ in The Sceptical Chemist (1661) and it is most fully elaborated in The Origin of Forms and Qualities (1666), which contains one of the fullest and most detailed discussions of atomism in the seventeenth century. Boyle’s choice of the term ‘corpuscular’ rather than ‘atomist’ emphasizes the importance in his philosophy of configurations of particles. It also enabled him to sidestep the atheistic connotations of Democritean atomism, and to remain open-minded on whether atoms are ultimately indivisible and impenetrable. According to Boyle the basic, mechanical properties of undifferentiated matter, which he refers to as the ‘Primary and Catholick affections of Matter, Bulk, Shape, Motion or Rest’,25 are properties common to all bodies, by virtue of their being constituted of matter. Bodies also have determinate shape and size, which result from the motion of matter. A third property common to all bodies is what Boyle calls ‘texture’, which is an essential property of configurations of atoms, that is corpuscles, and which accounts for the qualities of particular bodies. Other properties, such as colour, taste, smell, are not inseparable qualities of matter, but effects arising from particular configurations of atoms: the physical world is constituted of ‘an innumerable multitude of very variously configur’d Corpuscles’.26

23

Boyle, Excellency of Theology, p. 169 in Works, ed. Hunter and Davis, vol. 8, p. 75. Robert Boyle, An Hydrostatical Discourse, in Works, ed. Hunter and Davis, vol. 7, p. 159. 25 Robert Boyle, Formes and Qualities, in Works, ed. Hunter and Davis, vol. 5, p. 324. 26 Robert Boyle, Some Considerations Touching the Usefulnesse of Experimental Natural Philosophy (Oxford, 1663), in Works, ed. Hunter and Davis, vol. 3, p. 278. 24

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Boyle and Scepticism Boyle had a profound sense of the limits of the capacities of human understanding. In his view ‘abstract reason’ is ‘almost always very deficient’ and ‘oftentimes very erroneous’. Abstracted reason is but a narrow thing, and reaches but to a very small share of the multitude of things knowable, whether human or divine, that may be obtained by the help of further experience, and supernatural revelation.27

Like Wilkins and Glanvill, Boyle settled for a lower level of certainty than absolute metaphysical certainty. He distinguished between the ‘Physical Certainty’ arrived at from the investigations of nature, which are only certain ‘upon supposition that the Principles of Physick be true’, and ‘Metaphysical Certainty, (wherein ’tis absolutely impossible that the thing believed should be other than true)’.28 He confronted the problem of limited certainty and the vulnerability of his investigations to sceptical demolition, by a careful account of hypotheses and the grounds on which they may be judged serviceable. A good hypothesis contains nothing that is not intelligible. It must be self-consistent and consistent with the known phenomena. An excellent hypothesis is distinguished by its simplicity, its grounding in evidence and the potential it has for predicting outcome of further investigations. Boyle’s corpuscular philosophy was itself presented as a hypothesis. And it met his own criteria for ‘excellency’, especially in the respect that it opened the way for further investigations of nature. He nevertheless accepted its limitations, that it could not explain all known phenomena and that there are phenomena for which no plausible explanation can be found (e.g. animal reproduction). By contrast the scholastic doctrine of substantial forms was an example of a hypothesis which failed to meet the criteria which he laid down for hypotheses, especially that of intelligibility. Boyle was especially reluctant to put forward explanations which smacked of scholastic occultism, for example denial of the void in terms of horror vacui (the scholastic doctrine that nature abhors a vacuum). Horror vacui is an example of an explanatory hypothesis based on a personification of nature and natural causes. He was opposed to using metaphysical hypotheses as explanations for the observable phenomena of nature. He eschewed positing intermediary causes, insisting on ‘the generally owned rule about hypotheses, that entia non sunt multiplicanda absque necessitate’ (entities shouldn’t be multiplied unnecessarily).29 He argued that not only are intermediate causes superfluous and obfuscating, but they obstruct the true

27

Robert Boyle, Christian Virtuoso, in Works, ed. Hunter and Davis, vol. 11, p. 326. Boyle, Excellency of Theology, in Works, ed. Hunter and Davis, vol. 8, p. 65. For Boyle on scepticism and hypotheses, see Jan W. Wojcik, Robert Boyle and the Limits of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 29 Robert Boyle, An Hydrostatical Discourse Occasioned by the Objections of the Learned Dr. Henry More (1672), in Works, ed. Hunter and Davis, vol. 7, p. 159. 28

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enterprise of the Christian virtuoso. In his A Free Enquiry into the Vulgarly Received Notion of Nature30 Boyle takes up these themes, attacking the ‘vulgar’ notion of nature as unproven, unnecessary, obscure and unchristian. The fourth section contains a critique of the Platonic doctrine of the world soul, which was probably aimed at Henry More’s Hylarchic Principle, although he doesn’t actually name More or his hypothesis of the Spirit of Nature. Despite his criticisms, Boyle was careful to state his agnosticism towards alternative explanations, saying that it was not his intention ‘to prove, that no angel or other immaterial creature could interpose in these cases’.31 Boyle preferred to stress compatibilities between hypotheses and rarely declared alternatives to the ‘mechanical hypothesis’ false. (An exception was the plenist theory advanced by the Aristotelian Francis Line (Linus), to explain the phenomena demonstrated in the Torricellian experiment—the appearance of a seemingly empty space above mercury suspended in a barometrical tube.32 Line posited an invisible ‘funiculus’ attached to the surface of the mercury.)

Boyle’s Natural Theology For Boyle philosophy of nature and natural theology are closely intertwined. He always emphasized the sound theological credentials of his investigations of nature, and the benefits to religion of the study of natural philosophy. So, for example, in the Preface of Some Considerations he emphasizes the apologetic value of the study of natural philosophy for combating atheism, and argues that natural philosophy promotes Christianity by cultivating both speculative and practical virtues.33 He subscribed to the generally accepted view that the attributes of God, especially His power, wisdom, and goodness, are displayed in the ‘Fabrick of the World’. The study of natural philosophy therefore leads us to an appreciation of God’s glory, so to forbid such study is to side with the enemies of religion.34 Boyle’s own view of divine design obviated the need for intermediary causal agents, since the ‘ordinary Concourse’ of God’s providence was sufficient to ensure that the innumerable configurations of corpuscles produced the phenomena which we observe: ‘Bodies necessarily acting according to those Impressions or Law . . . as if each of those Creatures had a Design of Self-Preservation, and were furnish’d with Knowledge and Industry to prosecute it’.35 30 A Free Enquiry into the Vulgarly Received Notion of Nature was first drafted in 1665, but not published until 1686. 31 Boyle, An Hydrostatical Discourse, in Works, ed. Hunter and Davis, vol. 7, p. 159. 32 A Defence of the Doctrine Touching the Spring and Weight of the Air, against the Objections of Franciscus Linus (London, 1662). The Torricellian experiment is also described in Charleton’s Physiologia, pp. 35 ff. 33 Boyle, Considerations Touching the Usefulnesse of Experimental Natural Philosophy, ‘Publisher to the Reader’, in Works, ed. Hunter and Davis, vol. 3, p. 192. 34 Boyle, Considerations Touching the Usefulnesse of Experimental Natural Philosophy, pp. 32, 60. 35 Boyle, Considerations Touching the Usefulnesse of Experimental Natural Philosophy, p. 248.

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Boyle’s Influence Boyle’s close association with the Royal Society ensured wide dissemination of his work in Britain and across Europe. He was lifelong patron of its secretary Henry Oldenburg, founding editor of the society’s Philosophical Transactions which carried frequent and often lengthy contributions by Boyle, as well as favourable reviews of his books. Boyle was influential as a promoter of experimentalism, and widely respected in the period for the contributions which he made in both methodology and theory. Through Oldenburg, he was party to a brief correspondence with Spinoza on experimental methodologies. At the instigation of the Royal Society, he responded to Blaise Pascal’s posthumously published Traite´z de l’e´quilibre des liqueurs et de la pesanteur de la masse de l’air (1663). The result was his Hydrostatical Paradoxes (1666). The Scottish former Jesuit philosopher David Abercromby included an appendix on Boyle’s corpuscularian philosophy in his Academia scientarium (1687). Subsequently, both Leibniz and Samuel Clarke claimed him for their cause in the dispute between Newton and Leibniz: Clarke asserted that Boyle had demonstrated the existence and properties of a vacuum, while Leibniz appealed to Boyle’s commitment to mechanical explanations in his attack on the Newtonian conception of attraction. Boyle’s experimental investigations and the distinctions he drew between different types of properties were of immense importance for Locke when formulating his distinction between sensible and mechanical properties of bodies, in terms of primary and secondary qualities. It was above all through John Locke that Boyle had his greatest impact on philosophy.

Alternative Hypotheses: Invisible Powers The mechanical model was a hugely popular hypothesis which was adapted to explain a wide range of natural phenomena. There were those who accepted a basically Cartesian model of the physical universe, like Richard Cumberland in his Law of Nature, grafting on to it the investigations of Francis Glisson. Others were more conscious of the shortcomings of the machine model of the universe for accounting for known phenomena of nature: the impact theory of causation could not convincingly explain magnetism, gravitation, and other types of ‘action at a distance’. A major objection—shared by Boyle and others—was that life could not be explained by the chance collision of matter in motion. The search for a satisfactory solution to these problems was given greater urgency because of Hobbes’s radically materialist version of the mechanical philosophy. A number of solutions were proposed, among them hylozoism (which imputed life to matter), active principles, immaterial forces. Boyle himself allowed for the possibility that phenomena not easily explicable in mechanical terms might be explained in terms of active matter,36 36 Tracts Written by the Honourable Robert Boyle: About the Cosmicall Qualities of Things (London, 1671).

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thereby laying himself open to the charge of reintroducing occult properties. Another line of explanation was indebted to the Platonic tradition, especially the critique of Cartesianism by More and Cudworth. More was one of the first to object to Descartes’s reduction of animals to machines—the so-called ‘beast-machine’ of Cartesianism.37 Both Henry More and Ralph Cudworth regarded Descartes as a reviver of Democritean atomism and adopted a variant of mechanical atomism. But cognizant of problems, they made a virtue of the mechanist’s conception of inert matter, arguing that matter so conceived required the further addition of active agents for its operations. This, they concluded, must be some form of immaterial substance or spirit. To explain movement and life in terms of the action of spirits did not preclude an interest in experimentalism. For example, the philosophically minded judge Sir Matthew Hale drew on Van Helmont for what he called a vis activa in matter, without which it would be inert and motionless. Although critical of aspects of Henry More, he posited a causal spirit not dissimilar to More’s Spirit of Nature. The appeal of ‘spiritual’ causality is particularly strong among those natural philosophers who had a special interest in what would now be called the life sciences. Many looked to explain life in terms of immaterial causes of one kind or another. Another physician who entertained ideas of spiritual forces operating in nature was Richard Burthogge, who accounted for the operations of nature in terms of a universal Plastic Spirit of the kind posited by Cudworth and More—More’s Spirit of Nature and Cudworth’s Plastic Nature. The early botanists John Ray (1627–1705) and Nehemiah Grew (1641–1712) were attracted by the Cambridge Platonists’ notion of active spirit in order to explain living processes. Ray’s Wisdome of God opposed both Aristotle and Descartes (especially the Cartesian theory of the beast machine). Instead he drew on More and Cudworth’s conception of a plastic spirit to explain the formation of animals according to the divine providence. The botanist and physician Nehemiah Grew is another Royal Society experimentalist who posits immaterial causes. Grew’s Cosmologia sacra, or, a Discourse of the Universe as it is the Creature and Kingdom of God (1701) is a work of natural theology, which sets out to demonstrate the existence of God on natural philosophical grounds. In it Grew adumbrates a theory of ‘plastic nature’, not unlike Cudworth’s, in order to explain vital processes, which he did not think could be accounted for by the mechanical philosophy. Grew drew on More and Cudworth’s conception of a plastic spirit to explain the formation of animals in line with divine providence.38

37 In More’s first letter to Descartes (1648), printed in his A Collection of Several Philosophical Writings (London, 1662), vol. 2. 38 Brian Garrett, ‘Vitalism and Teleology in the Natural Philosophy of Nehemiah Grew (1641–1712)’, British Journal for the History of Science, 36 (2003): 63–81.

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Material Powers There were those—a minority, admittedly—who opted for a materialist solution, but one which relied on the idea of active matter. One such was Margaret Cavendish. Even in her early atomism she accepted the principle of active matter—she abandoned atomism for the very reason that self-active particles are inconsistent with an ordered cosmos. Cavendish subsequently developed a plenist natural philosophy which is most fully set out in The Grounds of Natural Philosophy (1668), where she sought to explain all phenomena in terms of matter endowed variously with reason and life and motion. Cavendish was no friend of the Royal Society, whose experimentalism she critiques in her Observations on Experimental Philosophy (1666).39 Another materialist natural philosopher who posited active matter was Sir John Finch. Anatomist, diplomat, and virtuoso, Finch was acquainted with Boyle, but he lived most of his life abroad, in Italy (where he frequented the Accademia del Cimento) and in Turkey.40 The foundational premise of Finch’s natural philosophy is that the senses are the only source of knowledge, and experiment and observation of the external world are the means to acquire it. Finch posits a corpuscularian theory of matter founded on the essential unity of the insensible minima of which all things are aggregates. He explains the appearance and properties of all things in terms of these constituent particles. However, since these are not accessible to the senses, it is idle to speculate on their shape or size. Since incorporeal things are inaccessible to sense perception, he denies that we can have certain knowledge of them. However, he accepted that the knowledge yielded by experiments is limited. To overcome this, he proposes, like Bacon, that the pursuit of knowledge should be collaborative. Physicians seem to have been particularly willing to attribute vital properties to matter. Others had recourse to material spirits or active principles of some kind.41 Thomas Willis, John Mayow, and Richard Lower all proposed natural philosophies based on corpuscular matter theory which assumed active matter at work among the particles. The most philosophically minded of physicians associated with the Royal Society experimentalists was Francis Glisson, who planned to undertake a philosophical investigation of the notions of being, life, and matter, which would comprise epistemology, logic, ontology, and metaphysical physics. However, only part of his philosophical project was realized: two unfinished manuscripts (‘De inadaequatis rerum conceptibus’ and ‘Disquisitiones metaphysicae’) and the metaphysical treatise Tractatus de natura substantiae energetica, seu de vita naturae [Treatise of the 39

See Eileen O’Neill’s Introduction to her edition of Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of Newcastle. Observations upon Experimental Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Sarah Hutton, ‘In Dialogue with Thomas Hobbes: Margaret Cavendish’s Natural Philosophy’, Women’s Writing, 4 (1997): 421–32. 40 See Sarah Hutton, Anne Conway: A Woman Philosopher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), ch. 5. Finch’s treatise (Leicestershire County Record Office MS DG7 lit 9) was never printed. 41 John Henry, ‘Occult Qualities and the Experimental Philosophy: Active Principles in Pre-Newtonian Matter Theory’, History of Science, 24 (1986): 335–81.

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Energetic Nature of Substance, or the Life of Nature] (1672). In this he sets out his theory of the ‘universal Life of Nature’, which develops his notion of the ‘irritability’ of matter, which was derived from his anatomical studies of the abdomen. Glisson posits a conception of living substance, or biousia, which is a living principle of movement and natural perception, and which manifests itself as either being or energy. This is the basis of his theory of the inherent activity of matter, which, he argues, is endowed with perception and appetites, is capable of self-movement, and able to form itself into bodies. All bodies are constituted of clusters of self-organizing minima naturalia. Glisson’s theory owes something to Jan Baptiste van Helmont, and there are suggestive parallels in the philosophy of Anne Conway, who conceived of all bodies as living substance endowed with perception and capable of self-motion. Glisson’s theory was certainly known to other members of her circle, Henry More and Ralph Cudworth, whose commitment to the mechanical conception of body as inert extension meant that their reception of Glisson’s matter theory was less than enthusiastic. Cudworth objected that on Glisson’s theory ‘every Atom of Matter must needs be a Distinct Percipient, Animal, and Intelligent Person by it self ’.42 Consequently every individual man is ‘a Heap of Innumerable Animals and Percipients’. More saw dangerous parallels between Glisson’s hylozoism and the philosophy of Spinoza. The experimental philosopher Henry Power (1623–68), one-time associate of Francis Glisson and of Robert Boyle, set out in his Experimental Philosophy (1664) to demonstrate the ‘atomical hypothesis’ through experiments, from which he drew conclusions yielding some striking parallels with Boyle. His theory that the universe was suffused with ‘subtle particles’ of a material spirit which caused bodies to move may owe something to the doctrine of effluvia by which Descartes explained phenomena such as magnetism. Power argued that motion is an attribute of all bodies and his idea of vital activity was influenced by Francis Glisson’s conception of the ‘energetic nature of substance’.43

Isaac Newton (1642–1727) The apogee of seventeenth-century natural philosophy was the mathematical and experimental physics of Isaac Newton. Newton’s Philosophiæ naturalis principia mathematica (1687) achieved the mathematization of physics, while his Opticks (1704) would serve as the model for experimental method in the next century.44 Newton’s natural philosophy brings together the mechanical philosophy and 42

Ralph Cudworth, The True Intellectual System of the Universe (London, 1678), p. 73. Charles Webster, ‘Henry Power’s Experimental Philosophy’, Ambix, 14 (1967): 150–78. 44 Andrew Janiak, Newton as Philosopher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Richard S. Westfall, Never at Rest: A Biography of Isaac Newton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980). Also I. Bernard Cohen, Introduction to Newton’s ‘Principia’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), and A. R. Hall, All Was Light: An Introduction to Newton’s Opticks (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). 43

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experimental method, atomism, and a theory of active powers to provide a dynamic view of the universe. By explaining the phenomena of the universe in terms of matter and motion, and by the application of mathematics, Newton achieved the goal to which the mechanical philosophers aspired. However, his physics differs fundamentally, both in its experimental methodology and in key principles, notably his conception of force and his conceptions of space and time. A review of Newton’s education in natural philosophy amounts to a historical survey of seventeenth-century authorities. Starting with Johannes Magirus’ Physiologiae peripateticae, his reading covered Galileo, Descartes, Digby, Gassendi, Glanvill, and More. Newton made a close study of Charleton, and of Boyle, and also the works of mathematicians like William Oughtred, Franc¸ois Vie`te, and John Wallis. Newton’s most significant predecessor was Descartes, with whose natural philosophy he engages directly in his De gravitatione.45 Newton repudiated the a priori reasoning of the Cartesian approach to natural philosophy, adopting instead the a posteriori approach of experimental philosophy fostered by Boyle and the Royal Society. And, like Boyle, he eschewed speculation as to causes, adopting the principle that the proper domain of natural philosophy was phenomena that admitted explanation only on the basis of experiment. His rigorous agnosticism about causes left many questions unanswered, and his refusal to be drawn on possible explanations of causes was baffling to the traditional view that the purpose of philosophy was to find causal explanations. Gravity and attraction are cases in point: Newton refused to commit to an explanation of either, beyond affirming their observable effects. Gravity and attraction are ‘general Laws of Nature . . . their truth appearing to us by Phaenomena, though their Causes be not discover’d’.46 Instead of speculating as to causes, Newton was concerned to establish the general laws and properties governing the behaviour of bodies and the description of these in mathematical terms. Although he retained Descartes’s principle of the inertia of bodies as a fundamental law of nature, Newton broke with the principle that the operation of forces requires physical contact between bodies. He rejected the Cartesian plenum and view that space and body are coterminous. Like Henry More, he posited infinite spatial extension and impenetrable bodies within it. For Newton, as for Gassendi, Boyle, and Henry More, matter is particulate and impenetrable (solid). Its properties are the mechanical properties, size, shape, and motility: ‘God in the beginning formed Matter in solid, massy, hard, impenetrable, movable Particles’.47 However, recognizing (as More had done) the explanatory deficiencies of the mechanical philosophy, Newton conceived that these particles are also endowed with ‘such other properties and in such proportion to

45

See Andrew Janiak’s Introduction to his edition of Newton, Philosophical Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 46 Isaac Newton, Opticks: or, A Treatise of the Reflexions, Refractions, Inflexions and Colours of Light (London, 1704), Query 31. 47 Newton, Opticks, Query 31.

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space as most conduced to the end for which he [God] formed them’.48 He departed from the mechanistic natural philosophy of Boyle by imputing active principles (‘powers, virtues or forces’, ‘attractive and repelling powers’) to matter and highlighting non-mechanistic force as the fundamental.49 In point of fact it wasn’t until the second edition of Principia mathematica (1713) that Newton clarified the principles of his mathematical natural philosophy. The amendments he made included adding a third rule to the Regulae Philosophandi or rules governing the use of evidence in natural philosophy. He also added the General Scholium after Book 3, which articulates both his aims in natural philosophy and the relationship of God to the universe, God being conceived as ‘Pantokrator, or Universal Ruler’ who, being extended through space is present to all things. Newton was destined to be the great exemplar of the new science for centuries to come. Nevertheless, the displacement of Cartesianism by Newtonianism had not been fully accomplished even by the time of his death. Although he was celebrated in Britain as a national genius, the European reception was more tentative, for a combination of scientific, philosophical, and nationalist reasons. Much of Newton’s system remained to be verified, corrected, and demonstrated, a process which took decades. Many elements of his natural philosophy remained controversial, not least his concept of gravitation, which seemed to impute active powers to matter. Leibniz charged that he had reintroduced scholastic ‘occult qualities’. This was one of several criticisms which Leibniz made in a series of letters exchanged with Samuel Clarke between 1715 and 1716, in which Clarke answered Leibniz on Newton’s behalf. Relations with Leibniz had already been soured because of Newton’s belief that Leibniz had plagiarized his work on the calculus. Meanwhile, having finally been accepted by the Acade´mie Royale in Paris, Cartesianism remained firmly entrenched in France until the combined efforts of the French Newtonians Maupertuis, Clairaut, and Madame Du Chaˆtelet, supported by popularizing works like Voltaire’s recension of Newtonianism, Les E´le´mens de la philosophie de Newton (1738) finally helped establish Newtonianism in France. Newton’s standing was such in the eighteenth century that it was he, rather than Boyle, who was cited as the model of experimental natural philosophy. Behind both Newton and Boyle lie the non-empirical theories of their day (which drop from view in standard, positivist accounts of the origins of science). The publication of Newton’s Opticks in 1704 illustrates the fact that natural philosophy was no longer just a body 48

Newton, Opticks, Query 31. On the European reception of Newton see Henri Guerlac, Newton on the Continent (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981); Niccolo` Guicciardini, Reading the Principia: The Debate on Newton’s Mathematical Methods for Natural Philosophy from 1687 to 1736 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Franc¸ois de Gandt (ed.), Cirey dans la vie intellectual: la reception de Newton en France, Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century 11 (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 2001); I. B. Cohen, ‘The French Translation of Isaac Newton’s Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica 1756, 1759’, Archives Internationales d’Histoire des Sciences, 84–5 (1968): 261–90; J. B. Shank, The Newton Wars and the Beginning of the French Enlightenment (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 2008). 49

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of theory, but an agreed method of investigating the physical world. As a mode of enquiry centrally (and quite literally) concerned with the nature of things, science remains, fundamentally, a form of philosophy. In the eighteenth century the empirical methodology was held to guarantee the truth value of its findings. It became commonplace among those philosophers making claims for the reliability and solidity of their views to invoke Newton as their model, and claim for their theories the same objective certainty as Newtonian science. Hume is the obvious, but by no means the only example of a philosopher who does this. Another name which is frequently linked to Newton’s in the Enlightenment self-image of British natural philosophy is John Locke. Locke played a key role in analysing and articulating the epistemological principles underlying the new experimental approach developed by Boyle and applied by Newton. But, as we shall see in Chapter 9, Locke’s contribution to seventeenth-century philosophy extended much further than as the philosopher of experimental science. Indeed, it is doubtful if he saw himself as a philosopher of science.

9 John Locke ‘Locke | Who made the whole internal world his own’. (James Thomson, ‘Summer’, The Seasons)

The philosopher who dominated the last decades of the seventeenth century was John Locke (1632–1704), famous in his own day for his Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), and for his writings on religious toleration, education, and the relationship of reason to religion. He was also the author of an influential work of political philosophy, his Two Treatises of Government, published anonymously in 1689 (his authorship only became public knowledge after his death). The impact of Locke’s philosophy in both Britain and Europe was immediate, setting the agenda for philosophical discussion for years to come. Locke’s ground-breaking contributions to epistemology, political thought, education theory, theology, and natural philosophy register the developments in seventeenth-century philosophy in the wake of the Cartesian revolution. In many ways his philosophy reworks what were by then established themes in contemporary philosophy, but his treatment of these was distinctly his own. He engaged directly with Descartes and Malebranche, but he was also conversant with the work of Bacon, Gassendi, and Huygens, as well as Boyle, Newton (whom he acknowledged in the prefatory Epistle of the Essay), and Hobbes (whom he did not—in fact he played down his knowledge of Hobbes).1 Although firmly anti-Aristotelian, he did not repudiate ancient philosophy entirely, but exhibits a well-informed knowledge of it, most notably of Stoicism. He was also aware of Epicurean philosophy as mediated via Gassendi, with whose epistemology and matter theory he shared much, especially the 1 Locke owned the 1651 edition of Leviathan and Hobbes’s Problemata physica (1662). His library list does not include either the works of Gassendi (apart from his life of Peiresc) or Charleton’s Physiologia. By contrast he owned several of Descartes’s works including the 1658 Opera omnia, Passiones animae, the English translation of the Discours de la me´thode and two copies of Principia philosophiae. See John Harrison (ed.), The Library of John Locke (Oxford Bibliographical Society; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965). For differing views on Locke’s knowledge of Gassendi, see David Fate Norton, ‘The Myth of British Empiricism’, Journal of the History of European Ideas, 1 (1981): 331–6; R. W. F. Kroll, ‘The Question of Locke’s Relationship to Gassendi’, JHI, 45 (1984): 339–59; S. Michael and Emily Michael, ‘The Theory of Ideas in Gassendi and Locke’, JHI, 51 (1990): 379–99. But, as Mordechai Feingold points out, knowledge of Gassendi was pretty widespread in Oxford in Locke’s day: Feingold, ‘Mathematical Sciences’, in HUO, vol. 4, p. 412.

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view that all knowledge is sensory and that the make-up of the physical world is atomistic. According to his friend Damaris Masham, it was reading Descartes that inspired him to pursue philosophy. His debt to Descartes shows in his ideas-based philosophy and his adoption of an underlying mechanistic conception of bodies which he held to be aggregates of ‘constantly fleeting particles of Matter’. This is also a point of overlap with Hobbes, as is his denial of innate ideas, his empiricist epistemology, and his focus on semantics. Like Hobbes, he had recourse to the idea of the law of nature in his account of the formation of political society. But Locke’s conception of the law of nature differs in key respects from Hobbes’s, underlining the fact that his differences from Hobbes are marked. Locke’s determination to remove the impediments to understanding, and his commitment to observational methods for the pursuit of enquiry, place him in the line of Bacon. But, as we shall see, Locke’s treatment of these themes was more thorough, and his development of them original (for example the distinction in Book 3 of the Essay between real and nominal essences). Also distinctive was Locke’s simplified conception of philosophy and the modesty of his philosophical ambition. Since he took the view that, ‘Philosophy is nothing but the true Knowledge of Things’, a primary concern of the Essay was to clear the way to knowledge. In contrast to the ‘Master-Builders’ of his day with their ‘Mighty Designs in advancing the Sciences’, he presents himself as ‘an Under Labourer in clearing ground a little, and removing some of the Rubbish, that lies in the way of Knowledge’.2 This metaphor of the builder’s mate clearing a site for the grand architectural projects of others implies a new, more modest, view of the role of the philosopher, not as the builder of grand theories or the layer of metaphysical foundations, but as someone whose role is simply to clarify the nature and limits of human understanding. We might reflect, however, that in the light of the role of labour in Locke’s theory of property, his comparison of philosophical analysis to physical labour is also suggestive of a greater philosophical ambition than the modesty of the metaphor suggests. By contrast with the terminological obfuscation which he condemns in other philosophies, he deliberately adopted a plain, familiar style suitable for non-experts, and more appropriate to his self-presentation as ‘under-labourer’. Far from being a mere philosophical assistant, Locke set the agenda for philosophical discussion in Britain for the rest of the century and well into the eighteenth century. His philosophy was crucial to the development of the philosophy of the European Enlightenment. The debates and controversies occasioned by his philosophy exemplify a new dimension of philosophical debate—its public character.

2

John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 10. On Locke’s philosophy, see Michael Ayers, Locke: Epistemology and Ontology, 2 vols (London: Routledge, 1990); G. A. J. Rogers (ed.), Locke’s Philosophy: Content and Context (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); Sarah Hutton and Paul Schuurman (eds), Studies on Locke: Sources, Contemporaries, and Legacy (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008).

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Locke has been credited with much, with responsibility for Enlightenment rationalism, with being the father of modern liberalism, with setting the agenda for analytic philosophy, with providing the epistemological underpinning of Newtonian science. These and other modern assessments are partial views, owing in large part to the compartmentalization of his philosophical legacy according to the modern disciplinary categories to which individual writings are nowadays assigned. His reputation as a philosopher today suffers in consequence. The main classificatory faultline lies between his political and epistemological writings. His religious and educational writings tend to be discussed separately from both. However, Locke’s contributions to these various fields are the product of a unified philosophical outlook. Although he did not conceive his philosophical writings as components of a single scheme, they are philosophically interrelated. His concern with moral conduct connects with both his political thought and his epistemology. The latter, which is set out in the Essay, supports the political theory elaborated in Two Treatises, and there are political observations not just in the Essay, but in his writings on toleration and education. As with Hobbes, Locke’s scientific interests are directly relevant to his other philosophical enquiries, most obviously in his Essay.

Biographical Context The later seventeenth century was, like the decades which preceded it, a period of religious tensions which coloured contemporary politics. Locke was too young to have been an active participant in the English Civil War, but he was the son of a Parliamentarian soldier, and owed his education at Westminster School to a Cromwellian officer, Alexander Popham. He would live to see the political convulsions caused by the oscillating fortunes of the late Stuart monarchy. In the course of these he himself experienced a period of political exile, as well as a spell at the heart of government, as President of the Board of Trade during the Williamite administration. Religion was at the heart of political events. The Restoration political settlement having failed to agree a religious settlement acceptable to all parties, religious difference was a contentious issue, exacerbated by the fact that the Clarendon Code effectively nullified the promise of religious liberty made by the returning king. The topics on which Locke wrote, especially religious toleration and the nature of government, therefore address the religious and political issues of his time directly. Locke’s long interest in the new science puts him at the centre of the developments associated with the founding of the Royal Society. His interest was awakened early on while he was studying at Oxford, developing through his association with the Oxford Experimental club frequented by Robert Boyle and through his association with the physician Thomas Sydenham, with whom he became acquainted in 1667. Subsequently, his travels in France and the Netherlands brought him into contact with European medicine and scientific thought. He was also on friendly terms with Newton, to whom he sent a copy of his Essay.

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It was Locke’s association with the political magnate Anthony Ashley Cooper, first Earl of Shaftesbury, which thrust him into the political limelight, away from the relative tranquillity of university life in Restoration Oxford. His years as a member of the Shaftesbury household between 1667 and 1675 were philosophically productive—it was at this time that he published his Essay Concerning Toleration (written c.1667) and made the first drafts of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding. It was, apparently, during his association with Shaftesbury that he drafted the Two Treatises of Government. The subversive tone of this text chimed with the subversive turn of Shaftesbury’s political activities during the Exclusion Crisis of 1681–3, when attempts were made by Shaftesbury and his political associates to exclude the Duke of York from succession to the throne. The collapse of their efforts, which culminated in an abortive plot, made it prudent for Locke to seek refuge in the Netherlands. Locke’s exile from 1683 to 1689, spent mainly in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, placed him at the centre of the Republic of Letters. These too were philosophically productive years. Not only did they afford him time to complete the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, but the friends and acquaintances which he made, especially among the Protestant refugees, gave him a European perspective on political and religious affairs, and ensured a European readership for his views. During this time Locke made three significant friendships with people of profoundly tolerant religious views: first Philip van Limborch, professor of theology at the Amsterdam remonstrant seminary, secondly the Quaker merchant Benjamin Furly, in Rotterdam, and thirdly the Swiss scholar and theologian Jean Le Clerc, editor of the journal Bibliothe`que universelle et historique and its successor, Bibliothe`que choisie. Van Limborch was the addressee of Locke’s first published views on religious toleration, his Epistola de tolerantia written in 1685–6, shortly after the revocation of the edict of Nantes deprived French Protestants of religious liberty. In January 1688, Bibliothe`que universelle carried a substantial abridgement (Abrege´) of the as yet unpublished Essay, in Jean Le Clerc’s translation. Thus the first fruits of Locke’s main philosophical writings were published for European rather than British consumption. Thanks to the dissemination of his philosophy in the journals edited by Jean Le Clerc and reviews of it in other journals of the Republic of Letters, Locke’s philosophy reached the Francophone intellectual public before an Anglophone one. With the overthrow of James II, following the invasion of England by William of Orange (the so-called ‘Glorious Revolution’ of 1688), Locke returned from exile, to be celebrated as a leading light of the new Whig ascendancy, and as a major figure of the international republic of letters. (Leibniz was among those who sought to correspond with him). Locke now set about publishing his Essay and Two Treatises. He also published Some Thoughts Concerning Education (1693), The Reasonableness of Christianity (1695), and his bible commentary, Paraphrases and Notes on the Epistles of St Paul (1704). He also worked on revisions to the Essay, developing what were to be some of its most influential themes: the second edition (1694) contains a

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revised chapter ‘Of Power’ which deals with freedom, and a new chapter, ‘Of Identity and Diversity’, which develops his conception of personal identity and consciousness. The fourth edition (1700) incorporates new chapters on ‘Enthusiasm’ and ‘Of the Association of Ideas’. Locke’s The Conduct of the Understanding (1697) had originally been planned as a further addition to the Essay, but, because of its length, was published separately. Locke continued to publish in defence of religious toleration. His second and third Letters Concerning Toleration were written as a series of replies to the Oxford cleric Jonas Proast’s attacks on the English translation of Epistola de tolerantia.3

Two Treatises The published version of Locke’s Two Treatises of Government (1689) is presented as a justification of the events which brought William III to power. But they were probably originally written before 1683, at the time of the Exclusion Crisis. Whatever its date, or the original reason for its composition, Two Treatises marks a major shift of position from Locke’s earlier, unpublished Essays on the Law of Nature. Two Treatises argues for limits on the powers of the ruler, and asserts the right of resistance to unjust government. Two Treatises thus may be positioned broadly within the genre of resistance theory, but the justification of resistance to tyranny is made on new grounds. The major themes discussed are the grounds of legitimate government, the relationship of subjects to rulers, the authority of rulers.4 In the first treatise, Locke starts by disposing of the claims of absolute monarchy by attacking one of its favourite theorists, Robert Filmer (see Chapter 6), whose Patriarcha was published posthumously in 1680, and who had argued that monarchical power derives from Adam as father of his family. Locke denies that any such power was invested in Adam, differentiating between monarchical authority and the authority which parents have over their children, and by underlining duty of care for their children which parents have. He also makes a distinction between the kind of authority wielded by both monarchs and parents and despotic power of the kind that a master has over slaves, arguing that absolute monarchy is inconsistent with civil society. The second book deals with more general issues of governmental authority and responsibility, with the intention of showing that force and violence are not the basis of civil society. Here Locke argues that no individual has a natural right to rule because everyone is naturally equal, and he argues for constitutional limits on the powers of the ruler.

3

A Letter Concerning Toleration, trans. William Popple (London, 1689); A Second Letter Concerning Toleration (London, 1689); A Third Letter Concerning Toleration (London, 1691). 4 John Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke: An Historical Account of the Argument of the ‘Two Treaties of Government’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969); Ian Harris, The Mind of John Locke: A Study of Political Theory in its Intellectual Setting (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

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There are suggestive parallels with Hobbes’s political theory in Locke’s appeal to natural law enshrining a natural right of self-preservation, his recognition of a prepolitical state of nature, and his contractarian theory of political society. However, the political systems which their respective theories support differed fundamentally. Where Hobbes invoked natural law theory to support absolute monarchy, for Locke the law of nature grounds limited monarchy. Hobbes’s political philosophy was, in his own term, a theory of subjection. Locke’s political philosophy defends resistance to political authority. Furthermore, for Locke, the Law of Nature is the law of reason which obliges us whether we are individuals living in a ‘state of nature’ or whether we are members of a civil society with its own system of government. The state of nature is the natural, pre-political condition of mankind, in which everyone is free and equal, and in which no individual has a natural right to rule. In the state of nature we are still subject to natural law, but the responsibility for observing the law rests with each person individually. As with Hobbes, self-preservation is a primary dictate of the law of nature. But, unlike Hobbes, Locke’s state of nature is a social or moral condition, and the freedom to which every individual has a natural right is freedom within the law. Liberty is not licence: there are limits on behaviour such that rights of nature (rights of life, liberty, and property) should not be exercised in a way which violates the rights of others. Thus even outside civil society, individualism is circumscribed by the law of nature. By contrast, the condition of unrestrained liberty—such as would obtain in Hobbes’s state of nature—is the condition of mere brutes. Anyone who breaches the law of nature by definition acts against the dictate of reason and having thereby rejected the fundamental attribute of human nature, reduces himself to the level of brute animals. However, the state of nature is not without its ‘inconveniences’, not least being that the rights of individuals are liable to conflict and there is no means of ensuring equity in the exercise of individual rights. To remedy this, individuals combine into communities or civil society designed for the good of mankind. The mechanism by which this is effected bears comparison with Hobbes, since the formation of civil society requires that individuals relinquish power to a civil authority by means of a contract. The purpose of doing so is to ensure the protection of all citizens. The purpose of civil society is the good of mankind. The function of the state is to enable citizens to exercise their natural rights freely and to provide protection that enables them so to do. The role of the ruler is therefore a guardian of the rights of the citizens. According to Locke, protection is not just of the lives of individuals, but of their health, liberty, and property. Failure to provide such protection constitutes grounds for removal of the ruler. A ruler who betrays the trust placed in him by the citizenry forfeits the duty of obedience of the citizenry. A ruler is bound by the law of nature, every bit as much as individual citizens are. A tyrannical ruler ‘is to be esteemed the common Enemy and Pest of mankind; and is to be treated accordingly’.5 5 Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009; first published 1960), 2.230, p. 418.

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Religious Toleration Two Treatises does not deal with religious toleration. But Locke’s arguments for toleration are linked to the political theory in which the scope of the power of the magistrate extended to the duty of the magistrate to preserve the interests of society, and defend life, liberty, health, and possessions. In his early, unpublished Two Tracts of Government (dating from 1660/1662), Locke allowed the magistrate wide discretion in religious affairs and insisted on the power of the magistrate to regulate religious practice for the sake of keeping the peace for all. His later writings on toleration take a markedly different stance: Essay Concerning Toleration, Epistola de tolerantia, and the three Letters restrict the power of the magistrate in religious affairs, proposing complete separation of religious and political affairs, and full toleration for religious groups provided their beliefs are compatible with civil society and do not involve allegiance to a foreign power. (This proviso effectively denied toleration to Roman Catholics whom Locke regarded as owing temporal allegiance to the Pope). Locke defines churches as voluntary organizations of like-minded believers. Religious beliefs are based on an inward persuasion of the mind, so they are a matter of private opinion about which others can have no certain knowledge. While the magistrate has a duty to preserve our civil interests, by force if necessary, he has no warrant to dictate in matters of individual salvation.

Essay Concerning Human Understanding Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding is often represented as a work concerned primarily with the epistemology of the new experimental science that was being developed by Boyle, Sydenham, and others. In fact its objectives were broader. What the Essay offers is a theory of mind and it aimed at combating dogmatism of several kinds—religious and moral—as well as clarifying the grounds of natural philosophy. The Essay originated as a response to difficulties encountered in discussions with ‘five or six Friends’ in 1671, during his London years with Shaftesbury. One of those present, Locke’s friend James Tyrell, later recalled that their discussion concerned the principles of morality and revealed religion. Locke concluded that the only way to get round the impasse in which they found themselves was first to ‘examine our own Abilities, and see, what Objects our Understandings were, or were not fitted to deal with’.6 He also concluded that a major impediment to useful philosophical discussion was the confusion arising from the terminology in use (the ‘frivolous use of uncouth, affected, or un-intelligible Terms, introduced into the Sciences’).7 In the first chapter Locke explains his epistemological purpose in writing it, namely ‘to enquire into the Original Certainty, and Extent of humane 6 7

Locke, Essay, ed. Nidditch, p. 7. Locke, Essay, ed. Nidditch, ‘The Epistle to the Reader’, p. 8.

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Knowledge; together, with the Grounds and Degrees of Belief, Opinion, and Assent’.8 Rather than setting out the metaphysical foundations of a new system, he adopts what he calls a ‘Historical, plain Method’, that is to say enquiry based on observed phenomena, in which he undertakes to ‘Take a Survey of our own Understandings, examine our own Powers, and see to what Things they were adapted’.9 The essay exemplifies a new approach to philosophy, which eschews system building (he calls it a ‘first Step’) and is cautious about philosophical ambition and about how much it is possible for us to know. This reflects the impact of scepticism, but (contrary to the charges of his critics) Locke was not a sceptic and did not see it necessary to spend time addressing the sceptics. While insisting on the limitations of human capacities and therefore of the knowledge which we can discover, he believed he could show how we arrive at knowledge and accept our knowledge as certain. The Essay would reveal ‘the Measures of the Certainty of our Knowledge, or the grounds of those Perswasions, Which are to be found amongst Men’.10 He was also confident that knowledge could be increased and that human capacities were adequate to the task: ‘the Candle, that is set up in us, shines bright enough for all our Purposes’.11 The Essay is divided into four books. The first is taken up with sceptical demolition of epistemological innatism. Book 2 discusses the nature and origin of ideas; Book 3 deals with semantics, how words serve as signs for ideas; Book 4 with knowledge and opinion. The specific targets of his critique of innatism in Book 1 are unclear. The only figure named is Lord Herbert of Cherbury, but none of Locke’s arguments can be linked specifically to Herbert’s. It is often suggested that the Cambridge Platonists were his target, but Cudworth and More’s versions of the theory are not vulnerable to Locke’s main objections. Besides, Cudworth’s main epistemological treatises had not yet been published. It seems more likely that he had in mind a fairly generalized and simplified version of the theory in common use—such as that espoused by Edward Stillingfleet (it was only later that he quarrelled with Stillingfleet). A more plausible possibility is that he had in mind arguments with which he would have been familiar from among the pious scientists of Oxford Experimental club, for example. Among these was John Wilkins, who in his Of the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion (1675) defends the idea that the mind is furnished with common notions or ‘seminal principles’ as the basis of universal consent, since these are ‘such kind of Notions as are general to mankind, and not confined to any particular Sect, or Nation, or Time’.12 In striking anticipation of Locke, he specifies three ‘acts of our minds’ by which we acquire knowledge: ‘simple Apprehension’, judgement (which involves ‘comparing of the agreement or disagreement betwixt them simple ideas’), and ‘Ratiocination or Discourse’, by which we note the ‘connexion or dependence which there is betwixt several Propositions’. These relations between propositions 8 10 12

9 Locke, Essay, ed. Nidditch, 1.1.2, p. 43. Locke, Essay, ed. Nidditch, 1.1.8, p. 47. 11 Locke, Essay, ed. Nidditch, 1.1.2, p. 44. Locke, Essay, ed. Nidditch, 1.1.5, p. 46. John Wilkins, Of the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion (London, 1675), p. 55.

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constitute common notions, and knowledge acquired by these means is, Wilkins claims, the same for everyone.13 Uncertainty about the precise target (if there was one) of Locke’s critique of innate ideas does not detract from the importance of Book 1 of the Essay for clearing the way for him to argue in Book 2 that the human mind is initially a tabula rasa, a ‘white Paper, void of all Characters’,14 and that all ideas originate from experience either directly or indirectly via the senses. This is, of course, consistent with the Aristotelian maxim nihil est in intellectu quod prius non erat in sensu (that there is nothing in the mind which was not first in sense). There follows an account of how the mind forms complex ideas of such things as substances, modes, relations, and particular ideas such as ideas of solidity, number, space, time, power, identity. Locke distinguishes two sources for ideas: those arising directly from sensation and those produced by the activity of mind or what he calls reflection. There are two types of ideas, corresponding broadly to the processes by which they were acquired; first, simple ideas, over which we have no control (the idea of coldness when we touch ice); and secondly, complex ideas, which are aggregates of simple ideas, and are produced by the mind’s comparing ideas during the process of reflection. There are strict limits on what can be known by these means. In particular, Locke denied that it is possible to know the essence of things. He rejected the Aristotelian notion of substance with its claim to yield knowledge of essences by means of substantial forms and qualities. Like the mechanical philosophers before him, especially Boyle, he distinguishes between the fundamental properties of things common to all bodies (such as size and shape) and those which produce particular effects in the observer (such as colour or malleability). Locke differentiates them as primary and secondary qualities. Primary qualities are the qualities essential to body, which Locke calls the ‘original’ qualities of matter: solidity, extension, figure, being in motion or at rest, bulk, number, size, situation. Secondary qualities are dispositional or relational qualities. These do not inhere in the bodies themselves, but constitute ‘powers’ to affect other bodies, including the power to cause sensations, such as the perception of colour, taste, or smell. According to Locke the essential properties of objects are inaccessible to human perception. Our knowledge of them is therefore at best only probable. These essential properties are what makes something what it is (its constitution) whence all its observable properties derive. Locke calls these the ‘real essence’ of something. Were we able to know them, we would be able to deduce all their properties. Instead we have to rely on a combination of ideas derived from experience which help us to see one thing distinctively from another. The complex idea of a thing is the ‘nominal’ essence of the thing. Since we are not able to grasp the causes of these ideas, or precisely how they relate to the real essence of things, our 13 Wilkins, Principles and Duties, p. 56. Wilkins’s book was edited for publication by Locke’s friend John Tillotson. Wilkins’s epistemology has several striking pre-echoes of Locke’s. 14 Locke, Essay, ed. Nidditch, 2.1.2, p. 104.

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knowledge of material things is probabilistic, a kind of informed guesswork—unlike our knowledge of mathematics or morality, or God. Locke, like many of his forward-looking contemporaries, subscribed to the view that morality is capable of demonstration in the same way as mathematics.15 He held, furthermore, that moral knowledge is more easily obtainable than knowledge of physical things. But he never made it his business to supply a science of ethics, despite William Molyneux’s attempt to persuade him to do so. Although he talks of ‘the unchangeable rule of Right and Wrong which the Law of God hath established’,16 Locke does not define the highest good or give an account of the correct standard of morality to which we should aspire. He did, however, hold that mankind is equipped ‘to search out their Summum Bonum’ and part of the business of Essay Concerning Human Understanding is to show how the mind generates moral ideas. Our ideas of good are learned from experience through the exercise of reason. Moral ideas are complex ideas of the kind he calls ‘mixed Modes’, produced by the action of the mind reflecting on experience. Our motivations to seek out the good derive from ‘natural tendencies imprinted in the Minds of Men’,17 namely the desire for pleasure and aversion from pain. His view that ‘Things are Good or Evil, only in reference to Pleasure or Pain’18 is reminiscent of Epicurean moral theory. The measure of good is the conformity of our wills to the will of the lawmaker—i.e. God, whose law imposes incentives and disincentives, rewards and punishments which guide our conduct in the practice of virtue in conformity with the will of God. In Locke’s educational writings education to virtue requires the inculcation of good habits to conform the will to the rule of good, prior to learning to recognize it by reason. Although he claims that all knowledge is ‘wholly passive’, Locke’s epistemology in fact requires considerably activity of mind: thinking includes reflecting, perceiving, willing, believing, doubting. Thought processes involve judgement, by which ideas are formed from the combination or separation of ideas. Perception of the connections between ideas is essential for grasping truth and acquiring knowledge. It is a central feature of Locke’s theory of mind that it is aware of its own operations. This echoes Antoine Arnauld, according to whom, ‘[O]ur thought or perception is essentially reflective upon itself: or, as it is said rather better in Latin, est sui conscia. For I do not think without knowing that I think. I do not know a square without knowing that I know it.’19 But it was also a view held by Ralph Cudworth, of whose True Intellectual System Locke made a study in 1682. John Wilkins too held that the mind is aware of its operations: Wilkins recognized three sources of knowledge—physical or sense based, mathematical, and moral—among which the highest knowledge of

15

16 Locke, Essay, ed. Nidditch, 3.11.16, p. 516. Locke, Essay, ed. Nidditch, 2.28.11, p. 356. 18 Locke, Essay, ed. Nidditch, 1.3.3, p. 67. Locke, Essay, ed. Nidditch, 2.20.2, p. 229. 19 Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole, Logic, or, The Art of Thinking, trans. Jill Vance Buroker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 71. 17

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which human beings are capable is sense knowledge. There are both external and internal senses, and our inward senses are conscious of our thought processes.20 Locke’s conception of the mind as conscious of its operations is central to one of his most original theories: his theory of personal identity contained in the chapter ‘Of Identity and Diversity’.21 This chapter was apparently written at the suggestion of William Molyneux after the first appearance of the Essay, and inserted into the second edition of the Essay. Locke has more to say on personhood in Some Thoughts Concerning Education and his controversy with Stillingfleet. The novelty of Locke’s theory is that he locates personal identity not in continuity of substance (the soul) but in continuity of consciousness.22 Where, for Descartes, the self was identified with cogitation, with the idea of man as thinking subject, for Locke man is not just a ‘thinking thing or rational Being alone’ but a composite of res cogitans and a particular body. For Locke it is not the soul but the man that thinks. This composite conception of human beings is essential for his sense-based epistemology, and the foundation of his idea that it is consciousness which distinguishes the individual man, or person, from others, as well as, crucially, providing continuity across time. For Locke the ‘person’ is the individual self distinguished by his (or her) having a consciousness of particular experiences at different times and different places. It is consciousness of these which differentiates a particular individual from all other human beings, and unites them. Selfhood is constituted of the awareness of the unity of one’s experiences. Personhood is therefore united not by continuity of immaterial substance, but by continuity of consciousness. A person is a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it self as it self, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking, and as it seems to me essential to it: It being impossible for any one to perceive, without perceiving, that he does perceive.23

Locke’s idea of a ‘person’ is more than just a matter of individual identity, but connects to his moral philosophy. The idea of a person is not just the idea of a man, but the idea of a moral man: a person is not simply rational, and intelligent, but self-reflective, cognizant of moral objectives, able to discern rules which govern our behaviour and to conduct him in conformity with them. The person is the foundation of ‘all the Right and Justice of Reward and Punishment’.24 Persons as free, rational beings are responsible for their actions, ‘Person . . . is a Forensick Term appropriating Actions and their Merit; and so belongs only to intelligent Agents capable of Law, and Happiness and Misery’.25 The person is someone who can take responsibility for his or her actions, is concerned with his or her own self-worth, and 20

21 Wilkins, Principles and Duties, pp. 2–3. Locke, Essay, ed. Nidditch, 2.27. See Udo Thiel, The Early Modern Subject: Self-Consciousness and Personal Identity from Descartes to Hume (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 23 24 Essay, ed. Nidditch, 2.27.9, p. 335. Essay, ed. Nidditch, 2.27.18, p. 341. 25 Essay, ed. Nidditch, 2.27.26, p. 346. 22

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capable of self-direction. As Locke explains further in Some Thoughts Concerning Education, moral personhood is developed through education, by inculcating habits of virtue, and, crucially, by developing the rational control and understanding that is essential to virtuous action. Locke’s theory of personal identity is one of the most enduring aspects of his philosophical legacy in modern times. However, in his own time, it was highly controversial, because it was interpreted as rendering the soul superfluous. By disconnecting the person from the soul, it apparently destroyed the basis of salvation and moral responsibility. Furthermore, this confirmed the suspicions of those who detected materialism and attendant mortalism in Locke’s hint of the possibility that God could endow matter with the power of thought, and in his denial that proof of the soul’s immateriality was essential to salvation.26 Accusations of materialism, and even Spinozism, are a theme of the controversies surrounding the Essay in Locke’s lifetime. The same passages were seized on by others (mainly anticlerical thinkers) to support a thoroughly materialist interpretation of Locke—which was the prevailing view of the French Enlightenment.

Contemporary Reception The reception of Locke’s philosophy would make a volume in its own right and far exceeds the scope of this chapter.27 The sheer volume of contemporary responses, both positive and negative, may in part be ascribed to the lapse of the Licensing Act in 1695. The contemporary reaction was one of the most strident debates in the history of seventeenth-century intellectual history, fuelled by religious and political interests, against a backdrop of bitter controversies within the theological establishment. In most cases, Locke abstained from responding to objections—exceptions being Edwards, Lowde, Burnet, and Stillingfleet.28 But initial responses were by no means all negative.

26

Essay, ed. Nidditch, 4.3.6, p. 542. G. A. J. Rogers, ‘The Influence of Locke’s Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century: Epistemology and Politics’, in S.-J. Savonius-Wroth, Paul Schuurman, and J. Walmsley (eds), The Continuum Companion to Locke (London & New York: Continuum, 2010), pp. 281–91; Tim Stanton, ‘The Reception of Locke in England in the Early Eighteenth Century: Metaphysics, Religion and the State’, in Savonius-Wroth, Schuurman, and Walmsley (eds), The Continuum Companion to Locke, pp. 292–302; Peter Korkman, ‘Locke’s Civil Philosophy in the Early Eighteenth Century Republic of Letters’, in Savonius-Wroth, Schuurman, and Walmsley (eds), The Continuum Companion to Locke, pp. 302–13; Hans Aarsleff, ‘Locke’s Influence’, in Vere Chappell (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Locke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 252–89; M. P. Thompson, ‘The Reception of Locke’s Two Treatises of Government 1690–1705’, Political Studies, 24 (1976): 184–91; John Yolton, John Locke and the Way of Ideas (London: Oxford University Press, 1956). 28 Locke’s An Answer to Remarks [by Burnet] is appended to his second letter to Stillingfleet. He responded to Lowde in the Epistle to the Reader of the second edition of the Essay (1694) (now printed at Essay, 2.28.11, note: Essay ed. Nidditch, p. 354), correcting Lowde’s reading of the passages he cites from the Essay and drawing attention to the common ground between them on the fixity of moral principles. In 27

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There was almost immediate take-up of the Essay, which was initially received favourably. It was the talk of the London coffee houses in 1690. Henry Wotton cited it in his Reflections on Ancient and Modern Learning (1691). Tyrell reported discussing it with ‘some thinking men’ in Oxford in 1690. It was taken up swiftly by the universities in Britain and Ireland (see Chapter 2). An English translation of Jean Le Clerc’s summary appeared in the Athenian Mercury. The celebrity which it brought Locke is registered in various ways. Richard Burthogge dedicated two books to Locke: An Essay upon Reason, and the Nature of Spirits (1694) which is also indebted to him, and Of the Soul of the World, and of Particular Souls (1699). Another admirer of the Essay was the Irish natural philosopher William Molyneux (1656–98), founder of the Dublin Philosophical Society. Molyneux has the distinction of having influenced successive revisions of the Essay. His positive response to the Essay led to a correspondence with Locke, resulting in friendship, though they met only once. As a result of their epistolary discussions, Locke drafted the chapters on the ‘Association of Ideas’, ‘Enthusiasm’, and ‘Of Identity and Diversity’ which were included in the fourth edition of the Essay.29 Molyneux tried to persuade Locke to publish his riposte to Malebranche (‘P Malebranche’s Opinion concerning seeing all things in god’) but without success. Nor did he not succeed in persuading him to write ‘A Treatise of Morals’. Molyneux also forwarded to Locke a copy of Leibniz’s Remarques on his Essay sent him by Thomas Burnet of Kemnay. Locke’s acquaintance with Molyneux originated when the latter raised a question about perception, which has become known as the ‘Molyneux problem’: this was the question of whether a blind man restored to sight would recognize the difference between a cube and a sphere. Molyneux first posed it in 1688 in a letter to Bibliothe`que universelle. Locke agreed with Molyneux that he would not, until he had more experience. The problem became a topos of philosophical discussion from Berkeley through Leibniz, La Mettrie, and Diderot in the eighteenth century. Another admirer was a woman: his friend Damaris Masham, daughter of the Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth, in whose household Locke spent his last years. Her Discourse Concerning the Love of God (1696) and Occasional Thoughts in Reference to a Vertuous or Christian Life (1705) (see Chapter 10) contain clear echoes of Locke: for example her definition of love as ‘complaisance’, and in her account of the formation of ideas through the exercise of reason. Unlike Catharine Trotter Cockburn, Lady Masham did not participate directly in the debates that followed the publication of Locke’s Essay. However, it is clear from his correspondence that Locke considered her an intellectual peer, whom he held in the highest esteem. The reception of Locke’s political philosophy is complicated by the fact that Locke’s authorship of Two Treatises was unknown. William Molyneux was the first the work in question, A Treatise on the Nature of Man (1694), Lowde was notably civil to Locke— something which Locke acknowledges and returns. 29

Locke, Essay, ed. Nidditch, 2.33, 4.19, 2. 27.

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to hint at Locke’s authorship of Two Treatises, to Locke’s displeasure. The book was understood to be a defence of the 1688 revolution and therefore responses divided on political lines. Among supporters of the Williamite invasion, it was regarded as a handbook for political education which would correct pre-revolutionary doctrines instilled by clergy and imbibed by gentry. In his Fundamental Constitution of the English Government (1690) William Attwood urged it as a daily read. Extracts appeared in Toland’s Anglia libera 1701. By contrast the political opponents of the Whig ascendancy, among them Mary Astell, were critical of the contractarianism of the book. And The Reasonableness of Christianity proved controversial. It was interpreted as Socinian, and attacked accordingly, for example by John Edwards. In 1697 it was proscribed as an anti-Trinitarian book by a Grand Jury in Middlesex.

Critics Hostility to Locke’s Essay soon gathered momentum, especially among the clergy. Part of the background to this were challenges to received doctrine especially concerning the Trinity and the immateriality of the soul. The Trinitarian or Unitarian controversy was a long-running dispute originally sparked by Stephen Nye’s Brief History of the Unitarians (1687).30 The radical view that the soul is material was not so hotly debated. Nevertheless, it is a topic which was given a serious airing by Henry Layton’s Search after Souls (1688), written in response to Richard Bentley’s antiLockean second Boyle lecture, which had defended the proposition that ‘matter and motion cannot think’. Layton critiques Henry More, Kenelm Digby, and Descartes. His thinking about the soul was influenced by medical ideas, especially the views of Thomas Willis. Another defender of the material soul, William Coward, was a physician by profession who found support for his defence of the material soul in writings of Francis Glisson. Coward’s Second Thoughts Concerning Human Soul (1702) also critiques Henry More.31 Heterodox views like these, together with anticlerical pamphleteering, alarmed members of the clergy. The publication of Reasonableness of Christianity and John Toland’s use of Locke in Christianity not Mysterious (1696) gave their concerns about heterodoxy a Lockean aspect. Clerical disquiet inflamed intra-clerical quarrels within the Church of England. Locke’s epistemology was attacked as sceptical. He was accused of undermining the principles of morality. Objections to Locke focused particularly on his ideasbased account of knowledge, his doctrine of real and nominal essences, and his claim that the true nature of substance cannot be known. These were all points which in the

30 See John Marshall, John Locke: Resistance, Religion and Responsibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 31 Layton and Coward are discussed by Ann Thomson in Bodies of Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

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view of his opponents exposed a sceptical drift in his philosophy. These concerns were overlaid by doubts about Locke’s account of material and immaterial substance, which was perceived as undermining the tenets of Christian belief in fundamental ways. On Locke’s principles, the immateriality of the soul appeared to be merely probable, rather than certain, while his tentative suggestion that God might superadd the power of thinking to matter was regarded as covert materialism, and therefore atheistic. Many critics decried his attack on innate ideas. Some, like Sherlock, declared Platonic credentials. Others condemned him as a materialist, or worse, a Spinozist on the strength of controversy about the thinking matter. He was lambasted as a Socinian, and the succour of deists and radicals. The worries of the more orthodox clergymen about the unorthodox, if not atheistical, tendencies of his thinking were confirmed when they saw the favourable reception of his ideas among the dissenting and deistical opponents of the established church. Subsequently Matthew Tindal’s inflammatory Rights of the Christian Church (1706) confirmed the worst fears of Locke’s clerical adversaries that Locke’s philosophy was a threat to Christianity. Most of the clerical reaction against Locke was philosophically shallow. His credal minimalism and the dispute about thinking matter were enough to tar him with the brush of Hobbism, even of Spinozism in the eyes of some—despite Locke’s emphatic denials and his claim not to be well read in either. For example one anonymous critic of Locke cited passages in Hobbes asserting parallels with Locke.32 John Edwards claimed that Locke’s ‘New Testament’ was The Leviathan and he added the accusation of Socinianism to the charge sheet. But some of Locke’s most able philosophical critics were also clerics—and they did not always focus on religious implications of the Essay. One such was John Norris of Bemerton (see Chapter 10) who had at one time been on friendly terms with Locke, and actually had a high opinion of The Essay. Norris was also, like Locke, favourable to the idea that reason has a role in religious belief—but not to the extent of Toland! In his Cursory Reflections on Locke’s Essay, which he appended to his Christian Blessedness (1690) the principal focus of his critique is Locke’s rejection of innate ideas. Although he takes issue with the arguments which Locke uses against innate ideas, his Malebranchianism means that he can in fact agree with Locke to the extent that he too denies that there are ideas that are embedded in the mind, like ‘Characters written upon or interwoven with the Mind in the very first Moment of its Being’.33 He also agrees with Locke that knowledge results from the agreement and disagreement of ideas. However, he is bound to reject Locke’s claims that all knowledge originates from the senses. For his part, Norris explains ideas by his theory that God is present to our minds (‘the Presentialness of the Divine [logos] or Ideal World to our Souls, whereby we see and Animadversions on a Late Book Entitled ‘The Reasonableness of Christianity’ (1697). John Norris, Cursory Reflections upon a Book Call’d, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (London, 1690), p. 20. 32 33

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perceive all things’).34 He rebuts Locke’s attack on innate knowledge, arguing that Locke had failed to prove his claims, and charging him with self-contradiction. He claimed that Locke’s attack on universal consent in Essay Book 1 is undermined later on by his admission that there are self-evident propositions, to which all men would consent. The examples Locke uses to deny universal consent merely demonstrate the absence of actual consent by certain individuals, not that the principles in question are not innate. Norris was the first to pick up on the sceptical implications of Locke’s epistemology. He also discusses Locke in his Essay towards the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World (1701–4), in which he takes issue with Locke on the sensory origins of knowledge and over the possibility of thinking matter. James Lowde, a disciple of Cudworth, was another who criticized Locke for rejecting innate ideas, in effect charging Locke with inconsistency. In his A Discourse Concerning the Nature of Man (1694), Lowde argued that there is metaphysical knowledge in addition to ‘experimental knowledge’, and that there is more knowledge than that derived from experience: ‘Knowledge is of a larger extent than that which relates strictly to natural Philosophy, or what is the object of sensible Experiment. There is also a Metaphysical Knowledge, a truth of Propositions, which no ways depends upon Observation.’35 He denied that Platonists held that all knowledge is innate, claiming that their ‘resolving Science into its first Principles’ only applied to ‘such Knowledge as was capable of such Resolutions’. He claimed that Locke admits innatism to the extent that, out of the three types of knowledge, ‘intuition’, whereby we ‘have knowledge of our being’ and which provides us with ‘universal Truths or general Maxims’, is innatist.36

Edward Stillingfleet Many of the objections to Locke were grounded in anxiety about the implications of his philosophy for religious belief. The most serious and long-lasting being those of Edward Stillingfleet.37 A latitudinarian divine, appointed Bishop of Worcester in 1689, Stillingfleet was one of the most philosophical of English churchmen. Widely read in contemporary philosophy, he was familiar with the work of Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Henry More, and Isaac Newton. Stillingfleet was one of the ablest opponents of Locke, and the clerical opponent whom Locke took most seriously. His Cambridge education is reflected in his acceptance that religion and reason are

34

Norris, Cursory Reflections, p. 20. James Lowde, A Discourse Concerning the Nature of Man . . . as he is a Rational Creature (London, 1694), p. 54. 36 Lowde, A Discourse Concerning the Nature of Man, p. 312, p. 80. Lowde also criticized Samuel Parker for rejecting innatism. 37 On Stillingfleet’s philosophy, see Robert Todd Carroll, The Common-Sense Philosophy of Religion of Bishop Edward Stillingfleet, 1635–1699 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1975); R. H. Popkin, ‘The Philosophy of Bishop Stillingfleet’, JHP, 9 (1971): 303–19. 35

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compatible—though not, of course, in a Socinian or Deist sense. Stillingfleet’s dispute with Locke took the form of a series of published letters and replies which appeared between 1697 and 1699, only ending when Stillingfleet died. Stillingfleet does not appear to have had any concerns about the implications of Locke’s Essay when it first appeared. But he changed his view following the publication of Toland’s Christianity not Mysterious in 1695, which makes explicit use of Locke in support of his deist arguments. Stillingfleet was, at this time, deeply concerned with the threat of Socinianism. The controversy with Locke was sparked by Stillingfleet’s Discourse in Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity (1696), which was an intervention in the long-running Unitarian controversy. In his Vindication Stillingfleet attacks as dangerous for religious belief ‘the way of ideas’ espoused by Locke and his follower, Toland. Stillingfleet took issue over the sceptical implications of Locke’s epistemology and Locke’s account of substance, which he believed endangered the doctrine of the Trinity. In the course of their exchange he tried to draw Locke out on his position on the Trinity. Locke steadfastly refused to be drawn. Stillingfleet argued from the broadly Aristotelian position that substance is the substratum of all things and that individual entities comprise substance differentiated by ‘accidents’, or the knowable properties which distinguish one thing from another. In essentials this is not far removed from Locke’s theory. Where he differed from Locke was in holding that knowledge of the accidents of something yields knowledge of the essence of that thing. Stillingfleet argued, against Locke’s notion of real and nominal essences, that real essences do exist, and that they are known from their accidents. If we cannot be certain of this, we can be certain of nothing. Stillingfleet objected that on Locke’s own principles, it was impossible to have an idea of substance, because the only knowledge which we can derive via sensation and reflection is of a collection of simple qualities. Locke’s idea of substance is therefore at best a mental construction constituted of an aggregate of ideas abstracted from every particular idea of substance. Locke’s failure to anchor the certainty of ideas outside the mind was open to the charge of epistemological and religious scepticism. Without knowledge of fundamental concepts for our religious beliefs—substance and person—we have no conceptual foundation of the doctrine of the Trinity. Having failed to provide certain knowledge of the nature of substance, Locke could not exclude the possibility that matter might be endowed with the power of thought. Without assurance regarding the immateriality of the soul, there would be no assurance of its immortality. Although the philosophical consensus nowadays is that Locke won the argument, the controversy probably did more damage to Locke’s reputation because of Stillingfleet’s authoritative position as a senior cleric, and because he insistently called attention to aspects of Locke’s views which were suggestive of theological heterodoxy. Riding on the back of Stillingfleet’s attack on Locke’s epistemology were the fundamentals of Christian belief at issue in the Socinian controversy. After Stillingfleet’s intervention, reaction to the Essay divides sharply between churchmen and Locke’s

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mainly Whig lay admirers. However, notwithstanding the philosophical limitations of Stillingfleet’s own position, and the fact that he was motivated by largely theological considerations, his criticisms carried weight. They were taken up by others, both in both Britain and in Europe, where the controversy was reported in journals of the Republic of Letters—Histoire des ouvrages des sc¸avans and Nouvelles de la re´publique des lettres. Among those who followed the controversy closely was Pierre Bayle, who took up Stillingfleet’s concerns over the issue of ‘thinking matter’ in the Dictionnaire and came to treat Locke as a sceptic in his Re´ponses aux questions d’un provincial (1704–7).38

Anti-scepticism: Sergeant and Lee A more thoroughgoing Aristotelian critique of Locke came from the Blackloist, John Sergeant, who, as a Catholic, stood outside the clerical assaults emanating from the established church. Sergeant’s critique of Locke was part of a more wide-ranging critique of what he called ‘ideists’, a category which yokes Descartes and Locke together. He targets Locke in his The Method to Science (1696) and Solid Philosophy Asserted, against the Fancies of the Ideists (1697).39 Sergeant agreed with Locke that knowledge derives from ‘things without us’ rather than innate ideas. He also accepted that self-evidence was the foundation of knowledge. But for Sergeant, this involved the self-evidence of identical propositions, by which he arrived at the metaphysical verities to which all truths reduce. He believed that in this way he could ground knowledge in certainty. His principal objection to Locke’s epistemology was its implicit scepticism. He charged Locke that his natural philosophy failed to provide universal conclusions or maxims. At best Lockean epistemology yielded particulars, but in the absence of a metaphysical framework, universal conclusions from particulars could not be drawn from these. By grounding knowledge in ideas based on mere appearances, Lockean epistemology could not arrive at certain knowledge which by definition was knowledge of the true essence of things, or what Sergeant called the ‘true Spiritual notion’ of everything. He saw Lockean ideas as an unnecessary third element introduced into the process of cognition coming between mind and objects. In effect ideas structure scepticism into Locke’s epistemology. Disregarding the 38 Todd Ryan, ‘Bayle’s Critique of Lockean Superaddition’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 36 (2006): 511–34; P. J. S. Whitmore, ‘Bayle’s Criticism of Locke’, in P. Dibon (ed.), Pierre Bayle, Philosophe (Amsterdam & Paris: Elsevir and Vrin, 1959), pp. 81–95; Jørn Schøsler, John Locke et les philosophes franc¸ais: la critique des ide´es inne´es en France au dix-huitie`me sie`cle (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 1997). 39 J[ohn] S[ergeant], The Method to Science (London, 1696); J[ohn] S[ergeant], Solid Philosophy Asserted, against the Fancies of the Ideists: or, the Method to Science Farther Illustrated. With Reflexions on Mr Locke’s ‘Essay Concerning Human Understanding’ (London, 1697); J[ohn] S[ergeant], Transnatural Philosophy, or Metaphysics: Demonstrating the Essences and Operations of all Beings whatever, which gives the Principles to all other Sciences (London, 1700). On Locke and Sergeant, see John W. Yolton, ‘Locke’s Unpublished Marginal Replies to John Sergeant’, JHI, 12 (1951): 528–59; Dmitri Levitin, ‘Reconsidering John Sergeant’s Attacks on Locke’s Essay’, Intellectual History Review, 20 (2010): 457–77.

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vulnerability of his own arguments, which were not immune from charges of obfuscation and confusion, and disregarding that he did not fully grasp Locke’s epistemology, we can see that Sergeant identified a genuine difficulty, namely that, whatever the nature of ideas, if knowledge is dependent on ideas, how can the reality of knowledge be established? How can we be sure that ideas are correct representations of reality? Furthermore, Sergeant’s Aristotelian view of substance led him to reject Locke’s grounding of personal identity in consciousness, since for Sergeant the self from which consciousness originates is a substance. He charged Locke with circularity, because a person must be an individual prior to becoming conscious. ‘Our Person or Individual Self . . . is the Object of the Consciousness; and Objects must be antecedent and presupposed to the Acts which they are employ’d about them, because the Objects are the Cause of those Acts.’40 Although Sergeant’s charge of circularity misrepresents Locke’s distinction between person and identity, it was one which was repeated by many others. Henry Lee (c.1644–1713) was also concerned by the sceptical implications of Locke’s Essay. His Anti-Scepticism, or Notes upon each chapter of Mr Lock’s ‘Essay Concerning Humane Understanding’ (1702), which goes through the book chapter by chapter, is probably the most thorough critique in terms of coverage of the book. In anticipation of arguments later levelled by Berkeley, Lee argued that Locke’s epistemology could not produce knowledge of the world outside the mind because the interposition of ideas between mind and world means that we can never know anything about the world which lies beyond ideas. Thus we can never ‘prove the real existence of things without us’. Locke’s simple ideas on their own are an impossibility: ideas always came together and not singly. There is no such thing as general abstract ideas. Notwithstanding the criticisms which the Essay attracted, it is a measure of the hold of Locke’s ideas, that a number of clerical critics of Locke nevertheless adopted aspects of his philosophy in their attack on a greater enemy, John Toland. For example, William Payne, in his The Mystery of the Christian Faith (1697), accepts Locke’s views on substance and the limitations of human knowledge, and adopts his terminology of ideas. Another who absorbed much of Locke’s epistemology was Francis Gastrell, whose Some Considerations Concerning the Trinity (1696) targeted Toland. Gastrell’s Boyle lectures, The Certainty and Necessity of Religion in General (1697), accepts Locke’s corpuscular theory of perception, and the indirect knowledge of substance, while arguing against thinking matter. William Sherlock, too, was a critic of Locke, who nevertheless adopted a number of Lockean positions. In A Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity (1690), Sherlock takes a professedly Platonist position when he attacks Locke for repudiating innate ideas. He nevertheless agreed with Locke that our knowledge of substance is limited and he used this as

40

Sergeant, Solid Philosophy, p. 93.

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the basis of his defence of the existence of spirit. He argued that although we lack knowledge of the spiritual substance, we can grasp ‘that it is a thinking substance, with the Faculties of Understanding and Will’. However ‘what the substance of a Spirit is, we know not more than what the substance of matter is’.41 But Locke’s church opponents did not present a united front, even when they could find points of agreement. The high-church controversialist, Robert South, for instance, sometime schoolmate and later correspondent of Locke’s, disagreed with him on religious toleration, but agreed that human capacity for knowledge is limited. A final irony in the clerical reaction to Locke is that he was appropriated for the anti-Deist cause by the hammer of Herbert of Cherbury, Thomas Halyburton.

Catharine Trotter Cockburn In the climate of clerical hostility which met Locke’s Essay it is particularly striking that the first person to defend his Essay in print was a woman—Catharine Cockburn, ne´e Trotter (1674?–1749), whose positive evaluation of the Essay is in marked contrast to the hostility it attracted from Anglican clerics. Of Scottish descent, Catharine Cockburn had some success as a playwright before she published her A Defence of the ‘Essay of Human Understanding’, Written by Mr. Lock in 1702. She also expresses Lockean political ideas in her plays. Her defence of Locke’s essay was occasioned by Thomas Burnet’s criticisms in three sets of Remarks on the Essay, published between 1697 and 1699. She would defend Locke on two further occasions, A Letter to Dr. Holdsworth of 1727 (against Winch Holdsworth’s charges of heresy) and A Vindication of Mr. Locke’s Principles included in her posthumous Works in 1751. She returns to themes of her original Defence in Remarks upon Some Writers (1749). Her intervention is remarkable for focusing on exactly the areas of highest contention among Locke’s detractors—the supposed ‘dangerous consequences for religion’ of the Essay and its moral scepticism. Her endorsement of Locke’s value as a moral thinker was explicit: ‘I know no philosopher before him that has mixed morality upon so solid a foundation’. She was not distracted by the imputations of his critics, insisting that ‘the question is not what Mr. Locke thinks, but what may be proved upon his principles’.42 Although she set high value on human reason, she was, like Locke, cautious about its scope. She agreed with Locke that the rational process by which we arrive at our ideas of right and wrong involves ideas of sensation and reflection, and argued, against Burnet, that we obtain secure knowledge of moral ideas, by reflecting on our natures and the operation of our minds. In this way we come to understand the notion of goodness, whence we are able to arrive at

41

William Sherlock, A Vindication of the Doctrine of . . . the Trinity (London, 1690). Catharine Trotter Cockburn, A Defence of the ‘Essay of Human Understanding’, Written by Mr. Lock (London, 1702), pp. 48 and 60. 42

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knowledge of the goodness of the divine nature. She also argues that we can reasonably conclude that the soul is immaterial on the basis of Locke’s principles.

European Reception Further afield, Locke’s good connections with the Republic of Letters in the Netherlands ensured his writings circulated there.43 The early reception of Locke’s Essay in Europe was distorted by the fact that the Abrege´, translated and published by Jean Le Clerc in 1688, did not include the attack on innate ideas. The next work of Locke’s to appear in French was a translation of Two Treatises published in Amsterdam in 1691 (reprinted 1700). Pierre Coste’s translations of Some Thoughts Concerning Education (1695) and The Reasonableness of Christianity (1696) and the Essay (1700) were all published in the Netherlands. Ezekiel Burridge’s Latin translation of Essay in 1701 (undertaken in Ireland, and overseen by Locke), also helped to make his philosophy more widely available internationally. It was reprinted in Leipzig (1709, 1741, 1758), Naples (1788–91), and Krakow (1784). A German translation of the second Treatise (Le Gouvernement Civil, oder die Kunst Whol zu Regieren) appeared in 1718, a Dutch translation in 1728. The Essay saw translations into Dutch (1736), German (1757), and Italian (1773). An Essay was received enthusiastically by Jean Le Clerc and his circle in the Republic of Letters. Le Clerc draws on it in his Ontologia (1692), which he dedicated to Locke—which perhaps explains its use as a textbook in Britain. Its reception elsewhere was more mixed. The perceived materialism of Locke’s thought was criticized for example by Basnage de Beauval in Histoire des ouvrages des savants (1700) and in the review of the Essay in Memoirs de Trevoux in 1701.44 And Locke’s anti-innatism came in for critique, for example by Jean-Pierre Crousaz in his Syste`me de re´flexions (1712). However the attack on innatism was well received by others, such as Pierre Bayle in his Pense´es diverses sur la come`te, and also in Continuation des Pense´es diverses (1705) and Lettres d’un provenc¸al. Bayle also discussed Locke’s philosophy in several articles in his Dictionnaire. His article ‘Dice´arque’, gives a favourable account of Locke’s discussion of whether thought might be attributed to matter, but he subsequently regarded Locke as sceptical about the nature of substance. The natural law theorists, Barbeyrac and Pufendorf held Locke in high regard. Barbeyrac utilized the Essay to counter Bayle and other sceptics. The French philosophes, like the English radicals, were attracted by Locke’s epistemology, and interpreted him as a materialist. Voltaire and La Mettrie also welcomed Locke’s rejection of innate ideas. Voltaire enthused about Locke’s epistemology in Letters Concerning

43 See Jean S. Yolton (ed.), A Locke Miscellany (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1990) for a collection of texts and studies of Locke’s reception. 44 For the Francophone response to Locke, see Jørn Schøsler, John Locke et les philosophes franc¸ais: la critique des ide´es inne´es en France au dix-huitie`me sie`cle (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 1997).

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the English Nation (London, 1733, published in French as Lettres philosophiques in 1733) and discussed the question of thinking matter in his Principes de la philosophie de Neuton. Perhaps the most influential eighteenth-century French admirer and critic of Locke was the Abbe´ de Condillac, who declared Locke to be the greatest philosopher since Aristotle in his ‘Essai sur l’origine des connaissances humaines’ (1746). Although critical of aspects of his epistemology, particularly his rejection of innate ideas, Condillac argued for the sensory foundation of knowledge. Locke’s most heavyweight European philosophical critic was Leibniz, who read some parts of Essay Concerning Human Understanding within a few years of its publication, and later reviewed it in Monätlicher Auszug (1700). Shortly afterwards in 1703 he read the Essay in full in Coste’s French translation. In 1697 he tried to engage Locke in correspondence by sending him his comments on what he had read at that point through the good offices of Burnet. The following year, he commented on the Locke–Stillingfleet controversy. He also wrote a full-blown, chapter by chapter critique of Locke’s Essay based on the French translation, which was later published as Nouveaux essays sur l’entendement humain [New Essays Concerning Human Understanding]. Despite the shortcomings which he perceived in the Essay and the personal offence caused him by Locke’s having publicly aired his adverse opinion of him in contravention of the conventions of intellectual exchange, Leibniz had a high opinion of Essay as one of the finest philosophical books of his time. The main points at issue were Locke’s epistemology, his views on the nature of ideas, the idea of substance, innate ideas, and his views on the soul. Although in his remarks on Locke’s controvery with Stillingfleet, Leibniz had recognized that Toland’s use of the Essay was an abuse for which Locke could not be held to account, he nevertheless detected a materialist drift in Locke’s epistemology and metaphysics. He was particularly troubled by Locke’ s agnosticism about the immateriality of the soul, and his denial of its natural immortality. They disagreed fundamentally on the nature of the mind and on innate ideas. For Leibniz, genuine knowledge of the real essences of things is possible on the basis of a more complex epistemology which, while according a role to sense perception, rests on a distinction between ideas as present in the human mind and the mind of God—the latter being the foundation of the reality of ideas and eternal truths. He attributed the failings of the Essay, as he perceived them, to Locke’s insufficient understanding of the nature of mathematics. The Nouveaux Essais was completed just before Locke died, but apparently out of respect for a thinker who could now no longer respond, he shelved publication plans, and the work did not appear in print until 1765.45 Locke was the pre-eminent philosopher of the late seventeenth century, and his new perspectives set the agenda of future philosophical debates. As the reference point, if not initiator of debates on materialism, empiricism, scepticism, religious 45

Maria-Rosa Antognazza, Leibniz: An Intellectual Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

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toleration, the foundations of political society, Locke may be considered an Enlightenment philosophe avant la lettre. But Locke did not philosophize in isolation. Although he dominated philosophical debate from the 1690s onwards, he was only one of a number of British philosophers active at this time. The philosophical culture into which his Essay was received in Britain was much richer than at any time previously. In order to better understand the context within which it was received and the multifaceted legacy of British philosophy to the eighteenth century Chapter 10 will give some attention to Locke’s contemporaries.

10 Freethinkers, Idealists, and Women Philosophers Philosophy from 1690 to 1710—and after

Within a few years of the death of Locke in 1704, the appearance of an unassuming book on the mechanics of perception signalled a decisive departure from Locke’s philosophy. This was An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision (1709), by the young George Berkeley (1685–1753). The radical implications of Berkeley’s theory were spelled out in the following year in A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710), in which he drew the startling conclusion that we can know nothing outside our minds. Berkeley’s theory marks a radical new departure in epistemology and metaphysics, but it does not signal the end of an era. For one thing the debates generated by Locke’s philosophy were set to continue well into the eighteenth century. And some of the most original new thinking of the early Enlightenment was a direct response to Locke: in very different ways, Shaftesbury and Berkeley, and many freethinkers all reacted to Locke. Furthermore, while it is certainly true that Locke dominated philosophical debates after publication of the Essay, his was not the only philosophical voice of his lifetime. Among the other strands in the philosophical debates which antedate Locke and shaped responses to his philosophy, one of the most significant was the philosophy of Malebranche (promoted by John Norris). Another was the eclectic philosophy of the libertines, men like Charles Blount, who came to be called deists or freethinkers. The perceived threat of freethinking to religious belief stimulated an apologetic mode of philosophical theology, by the likes of Samuel Clarke. A different group of independent-minded philosophers active in this period was the small band of women philosophers—Astell, Cockburn, and Masham—who entered the lists of philosophical debate. Yet another strand of philosophy, this time one to which Locke contributed, is the jurisprudential tradition, of which Richard Cumberland was the main English spokesman prior to Locke, and Gershom Carmichael one of the earliest exponents in Scotland. Discussion of Newtonian natural philosophy was also ongoing.1 Thus, if Locke was a key figure 1

A work which illustrates the currency of most of these strands of this philosophical tapestry is Reason an Essay (1690) by Sir George Mackenzie of Rosehaugh, who defends innate ideas, is positive about the new science, and critiques Hobbes, Locke, and Cumberland.

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in raising the profile of British philosophy in eighteenth-century Britain and Europe, his philosophy must also be seen as one component of the rich tapestry of thought which was produced in these islands in the closing years of the seventeenth century. The continuities between seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophy were many and multifaceted. But the death of Locke in 1704 is a convenient point at which to close this historical survey of seventeenth-century British philosophy. By way of conclusion, I shall offer a brief review of the state of philosophy in Britain on the threshold of the Enlightenment. I shall confine my survey principally to those philosophers whose intellectual formation belongs to the seventeenth century and who published in the last decade of the seventeenth century up to 1704. To pursue all the paths which run through this philosophical landscape would take us far into the eighteenth century, so here I shall do no more than signpost the subsequent fortunes of their contributions.

Freethinkers The so-called ‘freethinkers’ were a new kind of philosopher, beholden neither to the churches nor the universities—either men of independent means (aristocrats like Shaftesbury or gentry like Blount and Collins) or men who found employment as servants of the new political class (e.g. Toland). The ‘freethinkers’ were stridently anticlerical, and for the most part proponents of religious toleration. Most of them exemplify the corrosive and subversive potential of new ideas, especially, but not exclusively, of the philosophy of Locke. Although many of the freethinkers took inspiration from Locke (Samuel Bold and Anthony Collins counted him as a friend), philosophical libertinism, often characterized as deism, antedates Locke. For example Charles Blount’s Anima mundi, which launches a rational critique of religion which was to be the burden of all his writings, was published in 1679. Although he was no ‘deist’, arguably the first British ‘libertine’ philosopher was Hobbes, since his uncompromising materialism and anticlericalism anticipates the drift of later libertine philosophy. However, by no means all freethinkers were materialists. Most of them were eclectic thinkers, who exercised their freedom to philosophize by drawing on a variety of sources, guided by the authority of reason. According to one of the few selfdeclared freethinkers, Anthony Collins, freethinking is ‘the Use of the Understanding, in endeavouring to find out the Meaning of any Proposition whatsoever, in considering the nature and Evidence for or against it, and in judging of it according to the seeming Force or Weakness of the Evidence’.2 This echoes Walter Charleton’s account of ‘Assertors of Philosophical Liberty’, half a century earlier, as philosophers who respect no particular tradition, ‘ponder the Reasons of all, but the Reputation of none, and then conform their assent when the Arguments are nervous and

2

Anthony Collins, A Discourse of Freethinking (London, 1713), p. 5.

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convincing’.3 A significant difference between Collins and Charleton was that Collins proclaimed the freedom to philosophize as a right, the exercise of which constituted liberty. The freethinkers were at best a loose collection of thinkers whose ranks included materialists (e.g. Tindal), a pantheist (Toland), and Epicurean moralists (e.g. Tyrell); some had a political agenda (Tyrell), others were anti-materialist (Tyrell and Shaftesbury). They were usually eclectic in their sources: Blount, for example, drew freely on Herbert of Cherbury and Spinoza, while Matthew Tindal’s later Christianity as Old as the Creation (1730) was a synthesis of arguments deployed by Herbert of Cherbury, Blount, Toland, Shaftesbury, and Collins. The freethinkers were not atheists, although they were seen as such by their detractors. They shocked because of their preparedness to treat Christianity as natural religion—Tindal went so far as to outline a religion of nature on the basis of ‘a Law of Nature, or Reason’.4 They were all preoccupied with religion to some extent, if in unorthodox ways. In his Preface to Brief Disquisition on the Law of Nature (1692) James Tyrell conceives of the universe as divinely ordered. Collins penned A Vindication of the Divine Attributes (1710). Tindal held that religious belief was innate and defends religious toleration using Lockean arguments in his anti-ecclesiastical The Rights of the Christian Church Asserted (1706).5 Even Toland’s Christianity not Mysterious (1697), in which he reduced all religious belief to rational explanation, did not attack religious belief per se. In the eyes of their detractors the materialist and sceptical tendencies of the freethinkers confirmed the dangers of the philosophical sources on which they drew—be these the religious rationalism of Herbert of Cherbury or the implicit scepticism of Locke. Collins, for example, went beyond Locke by advancing a materialist account of consciousness. Between 1706 and 1708, in an exchange of letters ostensibly in defence of Henry Dodwell, he debated Lockean themes with Samuel Clarke. These focused on the immateriality of the soul, and most contentiously, the questions raised in Essay Book 4, ‘whether “matter can think”’ and in Essay Book 2 about personal identity.6 By no means all of those freethinkers associated with Locke were materialists: Toland and Shaftesbury were antimaterialist.

John Toland (1670–1722) The Glasgow-educated Irishman John Toland was the most colourful and controversial of the freethinkers. Sometime associate of Locke and Shaftesbury, Toland met 3

Walter Charleton, Physiologia (1654), p. 3. Charleton’s definition derives from Gassendi. Matthew Tindal, Christianity as Old as the Creation, 2 vols (London, 1730), vol. 1, p. 8. 5 Tindal’s book, together with his Defence of it, was burned by the Common Hangman order of the House of Commons in 1710. 6 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 4.3.6 and 2.27.3. 4

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Leibniz and his princely philosophical interlocutors, Electress Sophia of Hanover and Queen Sophie-Charlotte of Prussia (dedicatee of Toland’s Letters to Serena), during his visit to Germany in 1701. Toland first achieved notoriety when he published Christianity not Mysterious, a book which earned the dubious distinction of being burned in Dublin by order of the Irish Parliament in 1697. It was his use of the Lockean conception of reason in this book which instigated Stillingfleet’s controversy with Locke. The applications to which Toland put philosophical and historical ideas had the effect of highlighting their subversive potential, something which disconcerted his patrons, Locke and Shaftesbury. But Toland’s philosophical libertinism did not stop there. His wide-ranging philosophical curiosity extended to Giordano Bruno and Spinoza. He was not shy of proposing theologically and intellectually heterodox ideas, as evidenced by his positing active matter and his interest in pantheism.7 These topics are adumbrated in Letters to Serena (1704) and would be developed in future writings, especially in Pantheisticon (1720) where he rejects as unintelligible any distinction between the material and immaterial and argues that pantheists hold divine omnipresence. These ideas bear comparison with Anne Conway (whose Principia philosophiae was available in Leibniz’s circle) and Joseph Raphson, from whose De spatio reali, seu, ente infinito (1697) Toland apparently appropriated the term ‘pantheism’. Toland’s pantheistic reading of Spinoza, too, is not unlike Conway’s. Toland contributed to republican political thought through his editions of republican thinkers like Sidney, Ludlow, Milton, and Harrington, all opponents of arbitrary power.

Shaftesbury One of the most intriguing of philosophical relationships was that between Locke and Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury. This originated as a pupil–teacher relationship when Locke was tutor to the young Lord Ashley. However, Shaftesbury came to repudiate Locke, regarding his own philosophy as diametrically opposed to Locke’s. His objections to Locke were both moral and metaphysical. He bracketed Locke with Hobbes as Epicurean materialists, and accused Locke of destroying the foundations of morality, by rejecting innate ideas. Locke, he declared, ‘threw all Order and Virtue out of the World, and made the very Ideas of these . . . unnatural, and without Foundation in our minds’.8 Hobbes and Locke were ‘the same Genius at the Bottom’, namely Epicurean advocates of the politics of self-interest, who made pleasure the criterion of morality. Hobbes and Locke were, to Shaftesbury, 7 Stuart Brown, ‘The Sovereignty of the People’, in Sarah Hutton and Paul Schuurman (eds), Studies on Locke: Sources, Contemporaries, and Legacy (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008), 45–57; Stephen Daniel, John Toland: His Methods, Manners, and Mind (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 1984). 8 Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury, Complete Works, Selected Letters and Posthumous Writings, ed., trans., and commented by Gerd Hemmerich and Wolfram Benda, 6 vols (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1981–), part 2, vol. 4, p. 402.

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‘Anti-Virtuosi’, even ‘Barbarians’, devoid of any sense of virtue, or beauty.9 He reasserted innate ideas and innate moral principles, and repudiated the machine model of the universe, finding more congenial philosophical models among the Cambridge Platonists, particularly Benjamin Whichcote (a collection of whose sermons he edited) and Ralph Cudworth (see Chapter 7). Shaftesbury’s first philosophical work, his Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit (1699), was published by Toland—Shaftesbury claimed that Toland published it without his authority. This work contains the most systematic presentation of his moral theory, which would be elaborated further in Characteristicks (1711). In the Inquiry he argued for the naturality of goodness, and conceived of the universe as a harmonious whole every part of which is interconnected with the rest, such that the well-being of any part is conducive to the well-being of the whole. He also argued that knowledge of the good is acquired not merely by exercising reason, but affectively by reference to feeling. This ‘sentimentalist’ notion of ethics comports with his view that the practice of virtue is intrinsically pleasurable. Shaftesbury takes the affections (desires, motives, pleasures) to be inherently good. He identifies three kinds of affections: social, which result in public good; self-love, which concerns private good; and unnatural or vicious affections. Against Hobbes he held that self-love obliges us to virtue. The role of the affections in moral perception and moral conduct is further developed in Characteristicks where he proposed a specialist faculty— moral sense—which plays a central role in evaluating our moral reflections and directing our actions towards the good. Shaftesbury’s sentimentalism had a long after-life in the eighteenth century. It was taken up by stalwarts of the Scottish, French, and American Enlightenments. In Scotland Francis Hutcheson drew on Shaftesbury, as did, after him, William Wishart, George Turnbull, David Fordyce, and James Burnett, Lord Monboddo. North American enthusiasts for Shaftesbury included Jonathan Edwards, Samuel Johnson, Thomas Jefferson, and Ezra Stiles. In France, his admirers among the philosophes included Denis Diderot and Montesquieu.

Samuel Clarke The term ‘deism’ as a classificatory term for the freethinkers was given currency by their clerical opponents. Their critics were, in the main, theologians who conceded to reason a role in religious matters and were in consequence more concerned than most by the libertines’ rationalization of religious belief. Their most coherent response to libertinism was in terms of philosophical theology. The Boyle lectures provided them with a platform for their apologetics in which lecturers like Bentley, Derham, and Clarke brought philosophy and science to the defence of religion. Shaftesbury, ‘Second Characters’, in Complete Works, ed. Hemmerich and Benda, part 1, vol. 5, pp. 233–4. 9

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Philosophically, the most important of these was Samuel Clarke (1675–1729), who had studied at Cambridge, where his interest in natural philosophy brought him to the attention of the Newtonian William Whiston. Clarke was to become, in effect, Newton’s philosophical and theological spokesman, by defending him against Leibniz, in a series of letters written 1715–16.10 Their controversy covered a wide range of topics, from the existence of God to gravitation and space, as well as key topics of Leibniz’s metaphysics, including his hypothesis of pre-established harmony, and the principles of sufficient reason and of the identity of indiscernibles. Clarke was consulted by Roger Cotes when he was drafting the Preface to the second edition of Principia mathematica (1713) and may have influenced the drafting of the scholium generale of the 1706 edition. Clarke also translated Newton’s Opticks into Latin in the same year. He employed a Newtonian version of the argument from design in his first Boyle lecture (delivered in 1704, and published in 1705 as Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God). This lecture provides a detailed taxonomy of deism, and deploys his superior understanding of Newton against Toland’s critique of Newton. Clarke’s most enduring legacy was not, however, his philosophical theology, but his ethics. His second Boyle lecture, Discourse Concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion (1706), which targets Hobbes, sets out a strongly rationalist, anti-voluntarist ethics, in which, like Cudworth, he defended freedom of the will and argued that immutability of moral distinctions as absolute relations is enshrined in the nature of things. Like Cudworth, he conceived of a moral universe, analogous to the physical universe, and consisting of moral relations. He developed the idea that moral actions are actions ‘fit to be done’, since they are grounded in the rationally discernible relations between things in nature. Clarke’s theory was taken up by, among others, William Wollaston in his Religion of Nature Delineated (1722) and John Balguy in The Foundation of Moral Goodness (1727–8). Along with Cudworth, Clarke came to be regarded (e.g. by Hume and Dugald Stewart) as the chief proponent of ethical rationalism in the eighteenth century.

English Malebranchians As the examples of Shaftesbury and Clarke show, a major strand of thought in the early eighteenth century owes something to the Platonist tradition as developed by the Cambridge Platonists. Another influential branch of the Platonist philosophical heritage was the work of Nicolas Malebranche, whose philosophy seems to have enjoyed something of a vogue in England in the 1690s (see Chapter 3). Malebranche also provided the touchstone for the most original and radical of new directions in philosophy—immaterialism—which denies knowledge of the world outside the 10

These letters were published as A Collection of Papers which passed between the late learned Mr Leibnitz and Dr Clarke in the years 1715 and 1716 (London, 1717).

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mind, and which was proposed by Arthur Collier and George Berkeley. However, this development was not altogether unconnected with Locke. On the one hand Locke’s idealist critics were receptive to Malebranche—this is true of both Berkeley and, John Norris. On the other hand Locke was himself a critic of Malebranche. For his part, Malebranche knew Locke’s Essay, which he read in Coste’s translation, and which he regarded as sceptical. Locke was in fact well acquainted with Malebranche’s philosophy, having become aware of it at a relatively early date. He owned several copies of the Recherche (including the first edition, Paris, 1674), as well as Traite´ de la nature et de la grace (Amsterdam, 1680). He also knew Arnauld’s attack on Malebranche’s theory of ideas, Des vraies et fausses ide´es (Cologne, 1683), which sparked a lively debate in France. Locke regarded Malebranche’s epistemological principle that we see all things in God as ‘perfectly unintelligible’,11 and discussed with Molyneux the possibility of adding some critical comments on Malebranche to the second or third edition of The Essay. He did in fact draft a critique of Malebranche’s vision of all things in God, but decided against publication (it appeared posthumously as Examination of Pe`re Malebranche’s Opinion of Seeing all Things in God in 1706).

John Norris (1657–1712) Locke’s objections to Malebranche may also have had the leading English Malebranchian, John Norris, in his sights. Norris’s receptiveness to Malebranche may owe something to his admiration of Henry More (see Chapter 7). The Augustinian strands in Norris’s theology are another factor which helped to predispose him towards the philosophy of Malebranche. Norris evidently thought that Malebranche’s occasionalist thesis, which made God the true cause of all change in the world, provided a satisfactory answer to the problem of how such distinct substances as mind and body can interact—a problem which had contributed to the Cambridge Platonists’ reservations about Cartesianism. Before encountering Malebranche, Norris had already, in his Metaphysical Essay towards the Demonstration of God, from the Steady and Immutable Nature of Truth (1687), advanced the Augustinian thesis that God is the source of all truth because ideas and eternal truths are present in the divine nature, and not because eternal truths are dependent on divine will. Since God is identified with truth, necessary truths are known directly in God and, conversely, to know eternal and necessary truth is to know God. In The Theory and Regulation of Love (1688), Norris proposes an occasionalist account of the relationship between divine and earthly love, between the love of God (which is irresistible) and the love of created things (which can be

11

John Locke, The Correspondence of John Locke, ed. E. S. de Beer, 8 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976–89), vol. 4, p. 668.

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directed by the will). He identifies the good with God, and defines love as ‘a motion of the soul towards the good’,12 arguing that it is through our love of God that we come to love created things. God being the only causally efficacious being, God and not material things or creatures is the proper and immediate object of both human knowledge and human love. This thesis connects with occasionalist themes in other writings, such as his Practical Discourses (1698), in which Norris explained mind–body interaction in occasionalist terms. Bodies are no more than the ‘occasions’ of sensations which arise in us. Sense impressions, he argued, are not experienced directly, but are caused by God. Likewise, feelings of pleasure arising from love, are caused by God. Norris first propounds a version of Malebranche’s epistemological theory of seeing all things in God in Reason and Religion (1689), developing this most fully in his most systematic work, An Essay towards the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World (1701–4), a work which is suffused with a metaphysical Platonism. The ‘ideal world’ of the title is ‘a system of Ideas’, an archetypal realm of immutable and intelligible truth contained in God, through which the material world is rendered intelligible to us by ‘Intellectual or Ideal Perception’.13 Thus it is that, as with Malebranche, we ‘see all things in God’. It is this idealism which is at the root of Norris’s objections to Locke in his Cursory Reflections, appended to his Christian Blessedness (1690) (see Chapter 9). Norris also took issue with Henry Dodwell and those materialists and atheists who cast doubt on the soul’s immortality.14 Norris is usually dismissed as a minor figure, and he is not regarded as influential. However, by writing accessibly on philosophical themes in his books and through his association with the journal The Athenian Mercury, Norris played an important role as a mediator of philosophy to a growing lay readership. Thus, although its diffuse nature makes it difficult to document, Norris’s impact as a disseminator of philosophy was considerable. Norris’s ‘lay’ readers included non-philosophers like John Wesley and Samuel Richardson, the heroine of whose novel Clarissa is a reader of Norris. He also gave encouragement to Malebranche’s translator, Thomas Taylor (1669–1735), whose Two Covenants of God with Mankind (1704) draws on Malebranche’s Treatise of Nature and of Grace. Malebranche’s other English translator Richard Sault (1660?–1702) models his Conference betwixt a Modern Atheist and his Friend (1693) on Malebranche. Importantly, as the example of Clarissa indicates, Norris’s readership included women, and he had an honourable role in encouraging women thinkers like Mary Astell and Mary Chudleigh to participate in intellectual life.

12 13 14

John Norris, The Theory and Regulation of Love (Oxford, 1688), p. 30. John Norris, An Essay towards the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World (1701–4), vol. 2, p. 194. John Norris, A Letter to Mr Dodwell Concerning the Immortality of the Soul of Man (London, 1709).

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Women Philosophers: Mary Astell, Damaris Masham, and Catharine Trotter Discussion of Malebranche’s philosophy was one of the topics which drew women into philosophical debate: Mary Astell discussed Malebranchian views in an exchange of letters with Norris, while the first critique of Malebranche to emanate from Locke’s circle was Damaris Masham’s Discourse Concerning the Love of God (1696) written in response to the Astell–Norris letters. Astell and Masham were two of the small but nonetheless significant group of philosophical women who make up the complexion of late Stuart philosophy. These were the first women to acquire a discernible measure of philosophical visibility in public philosophical debate. Most of them came to notice in the 1690s, beginning with the posthumous publication of Anne Conway’s only work of philosophy: Principia philosophiae antiquissima et recentissima was printed in 1690 in Holland, followed by an English translation in 1692. Although both versions were published anonymously, the preface makes clear that the author was a woman. There is some question as to whether Anne Conway intended that her treatise be published. But its appearance, in the same decade as the first publications of Mary Astell and Damaris Masham, suggests that even if they did publish anonymously, the conditions for publishing philosophical works by women were more favourable than previously. There was certainly no such thing as a school of ‘women’s philosophy’ in a systematic sense, but several female philosophers (Cavendish, Astell, and Masham), addressed issues of particular relevance to women, such as sexual inequality and the position of women within marriage. But they were also fully engaged with current philosophical debates, and they were all abreast with the new philosophy of their day. They can also be said to be beneficiaries of the seventeenth-century philosophy ‘Cartesian turn’, which generated confidence in human reason, philosophical selfreliance, and made the vernacular the language of philosophy. No British woman philosopher was a Cartesian in the strict sense, but Cartesianism had a propaedeutic role for several of them. So too did the writings of the Cambridge Platonists.15 Another feature of their philosophy is its strong emphasis on moral issues—though this is not true of Cavendish who was, for a woman, unusually broad in her scope. All of them, bar Conway, engaged publicly in philosophical debate. However, all except for Cavendish published very little. Despite the political setbacks for her own and her husband’s family during the Civil War, Margaret Cavendish was in a position to publish her writings in several folio volumes. As we have seen, she was associated with Hobbes’s circle in exile. Although she imputed powers to matter (she conceived some matter to be animate, and therefore endowed with the power of thinking), Cavendish never attracted the kind of criticism which both Locke and his more 15

Jacqueline Broad, Women Philosophers of the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 11.

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radical admirers did. The reason for this may be that as the work of a ‘man in petticoats’ her writings were disregarded or ridiculed as absurd. However, of all British women philosophers she is closer to the freethinkers or libertines of the last part of the period. By contrast with Margaret Cavendish, the published work of the other women philosophers has explicitly religious overtones—a precondition, perhaps, of women’s philosophizing.

Mary Astell Mary Astell (1666–1731) has been hailed as the first English feminist for her passionate advocacy of women’s education and defence of the intellectual equality of women with men. Astell lived an independent, politically engaged life as a single woman. As a ‘high Tory’ and ‘high’ Anglican, she contributed to the religio-political debates of Queen Anne’s reign. Her thought displays a strong religious moralism and political conservatism, but also a perceptive knowledge of philosophy which underpins her championship of women. She was most likely self-taught as a philosopher, through reading Cartesian works available in English, and also the writings of Henry More.16 Astell’s first entry into philosophical debate was in 1693, when she started a correspondence with Norris which was published as Letters Concerning the Love of God in 1695. Against Norris’s claim that we love God as the cause of the pleasure we feel, she objects that Norris’s argument leads to the absurdity that, as the cause of pain as well as pleasure, God is also deserving of love as the cause of our pain. She argues, furthermore, that to reduce creatures to mere ‘occasional causes’ is to render most of God’s creation ‘Vain and Useless’. She draws explicitly on the Cambridge Platonist accounts of the interrelation of body and soul, notably Henry More’s idea of a congruity of immaterial and material substances which he calls ‘vital congruity’. Contra Norris, she proposes, that we love God for the good which he intends to promote by endowing us with the capacity to feel pain and pleasure, which he designed ‘in order to our Happiness’.17 Thus, while generally in sympathy with Norris’s Malebranchian disposition, Astell’s metaphysics in fact owes more to the Cambridge Platonists than Malebranche. Astell takes up feminist themes in two other works: A Serious Proposal to the Ladies (1694–7) and Reflections upon Marriage (1700). In the first of these she put forward proposals for the education of women as rational human beings, including an academy or college for women, and ideas for the cultivation of female reason based on Descartes’s Discours de la me´thode and the Port Royal logic.18 A possible 16

Broad, Women Philosophers, ch. 4. Mary Astell, Letters Concerning the Love of God (London, 1695), pp. 33, 34. 18 Mary Astell, A Serious Proposal to the Ladies for the Advancement of their True and Greatest Interest (London, 1694) and A Serious Proposal to the Ladies, Part II: wherein a method is offer’d for the improvement of their minds (London, 1697). Evidently popular, both part 1 and part 2 were republished several times. 17

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inspiration for this work was Poulain de la Barre’s De l’e´galite´ des deux sexes [The Equality of the Two Sexes] (1673) which uses the Cartesian egalitarian conception of mind and reason as the basis of arguments in favour of the equality and education of women. (An English translation of Poulain’s book, The Woman as Good as the Man, was published in 1677.) In A Serious Proposal to the Ladies Astell sought to secure female autonomy by means of an independent female community where women might retain their single status, without any obligation to marry. Nevertheless, in Reflections upon Marriage, she defended the institution of marriage and supported sexual inequality within marriage, notwithstanding her view that women and men were equal. She was, however, scathing about the double standard implicit in contractarianism. In the Preface to the 1703 edition of Some Reflections she skilfully invokes the political rhetoric of her Whig enemies, to underscore the deleterious consequences of basing power relations in natural rights. The best remedy for this state of affairs is the education of women. Not only will an educated woman be better able to make an informed decision about whether to marry, but an educated woman is better able to fulfil her duty to direct the moral education of her children.19 For the woman unfortunate enough to marry a tyrannical husband, education has consolatory value. At the same time Astell upholds a woman’s right to refuse marriage. The significance of Astell’s proposal for a separate female community is, first that it was a means to realize her desire for improved women’s education. Secondly the community would be a place where a single woman might retain her autonomy. In this sense it is the means to enhance the personal freedom of individual women, free from the pressures of social expectation, from disturbances caused by unruly passions, and from subordination within marriage.

Damaris Masham The Astell–Norris correspondence occasioned the entry of another woman philosopher into public philosophical debate. This was Ralph Cudworth’s daughter, Lady Damaris Masham, a close friend of John Locke. As we have seen she published (anonymously) two works with Locke’s encouragement, A Discourse Concerning the Love of God (1696) and Occasional Thoughts in Reference to a Vertuous or Christian Life (1705). In the first of these she takes issue with the occasionalism of the Norris– Astell Letters Concerning the Love of God. Against the occasionalist position articulated by Norris, Masham argues that, ‘if we lov’d not the Creatures, it is not conceivable how we should love God’.20 Masham objects that, by denigrating God’s works, Norris’s occasionalism undermines the basis of morality and hence 19

Astell, A Serious Proposal (1694), pp. 155–6. Damaris Masham, A Discourse Concerning the Love of God (London, 1696), p. 62. See Broad, Women Philosophers, ch. 5. 20

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the bonds of human society and the foundation of religion itself. Subsequently, in her brief correspondence with Leibniz (between 1704 and 1708) Masham raises the objection to occasionalism that it renders bodies redundant and their structure and organization of bodies otiose. This was the basis of her objection to Leibniz’s theory of pre-established harmony. A Discourse attracted interest as a contribution to the debates about divine love sparked by Malebranche. It was translated into French by Pierre Coste (French translator of Locke’s Essay) and published in Amsterdam in 1705. It was reviewed in Jean Le Clerc’s journal, Bibliothe`que choisie.21 Both Norris and Astell took the author to be Locke, Norris in his Practical Discourses (1698) and Astell in her The Christian Religion as Professed by a Daughter of the Church (1705), which takes aim at the materialist drift of Locke’s thinking, implicit in his sensebased theory of knowledge and especially the idea that matter might think. Masham’s second book, Occasional Thoughts in Reference to a Vertuous or Christian Life (1705) discusses the role of reason in religion and in ethics, as well as practical morality, and the education of women. She argues that the exercise of virtue is grounded in civil and religious liberty, that human beings are rational and social beings for whom the love of happiness is ‘the earliest, and strongest principle’.22 She defines happiness in Lockean terms as the enjoyment of pleasure, and the pursuit of pleasure regulated by exercise of reason which directs us to the greatest happiness. Her argument for women’s education arises logically from the emphasis which she places on the key role of mothers in the early education of their children, especially in laying the foundations of morality through what they teach them. The strong echoes of Locke in Occasional Thoughts explain why it too was attributed to Locke when it was republished in 1647 with the title Thoughts on a Christian Life.

Catharine Trotter Cockburn (1679–1749) Catharine Trotter Cockburn23 was the first Scottish woman philosopher—Leibniz’s patron Sophia of Hanover called her ‘Sappho Ecossoise’. Like most philosophical women of her time, Catharine Trotter Cockburn’s published output was restricted. Most of it consists of anonymous interventions in the philosophical and theological debates of her day. These included the controversies surrounding the reception

21 Damaris Masham, Discours sur l’amour divin, où l’on explique ce que c’est, & où l’on fait voir les mauvaises conse´quences des explications trop subtiles que l’on en donne (Amsterdam, 1705). See Bibliothe`que choisie (1705), vol. 4, item 10, pp. 383–90. 22 Damaris Masham, Occasional Thoughts in Reference to a Vertuous or Christian Life (London, 1705), p. 71. 23 Cockburn is her married name, and the name by which she first became known as a philosopher. However, she is known to literary scholars by her maiden name. It therefore makes sense to use both the names by which she was known. For her philosophy, see Martha Bolton, ‘Some Aspects of the Philosophy of Catharine Trotter’, JHP, 31 (1993): 565–8; Broad, Women Philosophers, ch. 6. Patricia Sheridan, Introduction to Catharine Trotter Cockburn, Philosophical Writings (1702–1747) (Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 2006).

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of Locke (see Chapter 9) and the debates on rational ethics sparked by Samuel Clarke’s Boyle lectures (1704–5). Her first foray into philosophy was her A Defence of Mr Locke’s Essay of Human Understanding (1702), which earned her the respect and gratitude of Locke, commendation from Leibniz, and surprisingly, perhaps, the approval of John Norris.24 A pattern of philosophizing through engagement on particular points would continue throughout her life. Later, in Remarks upon some Writers (1749), she would return to themes of her Defence, defend Samuel Clarke on moral obligation, and take issue with Edmund Law, Bishop of Carlisle, and Isaac Watts, on the nature of space. Others whom she critiqued would include, besides Rutherforth, George Berkeley, William Warburton, Francis Hutcheson, and Lord Shaftesbury. An edition of her writings, both published and unpublished, was subsequently produced by Thomas Birch in 1751, from which it is clear that she wrote from a consistent and non-dogmatic philosophical position. In ‘Cursory Thoughts’, prefixed to Remarks, she discusses topics such as necessary existence, infinite space, the idea of substance, and the nature of spirit, but the main focus of her interest is ethical, in particular the nature of virtue and of moral obligation. She held that since human beings are rational and social beings, it is natural for them to act both rationally and for the good of all and that it is most fit for a reasonable being to act in conformity with God’s moral perfections. Like the Cambridge Platonists Trotter-Cockburn held that the principles of morality are fixed and immutable, although she did not regard them as innate. And she echoes Samuel Clarke when she argues that the principles of morality may be deduced from the ‘reason, nature and fitness of things’.25 Against the ethical relativism of Hobbes she argued that morality is neither arbitrary nor conventional in foundation. She also raised objections to Shaftesbury’s sentimentalism, denying that the obligation to virtue is founded in moral sense.

Arthur Collier (1680–1732) and George Berkeley (1685–1753) Berkeley was not the first to propose an immaterialist account of the mind-dependence of all things. By coincidence, a similar theory was advanced by Arthur Collier, who encountered the philosophy of Malebranche when he was studying at Oxford. By the age of 23, independently of Berkeley, Collier arrived at the conclusion that there is no such thing as an external world existing independently of the mind. Collier also shared with Berkeley concerns about materialism and scepticism which were sharpened, in both cases, by their encounter with Malebranche. Unlike Berkeley, however, it seems to have been Aristotle rather than Locke who prompted

24 25

Broad, Women Philosophers, p. 157. Trotter-Cockburn, Philosophical Writings, p. 111.

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Collier’s concerns about materialism, particularly the Aristotelian view that matter subsists eternally. Collier set out his views in Clavis universalis, drafted in 1708 and published in 1713.26 Not only was Collier influenced by his reading of Malebranche, but his book also reflects the influence of John Norris, to whom he sent a copy. Despite commendation from Norris, and Collier’s correspondence about it with Samuel Clarke, and a summary in Acta eruditorum (1717), the book was ignored, and soon overshadowed by Berkeley. But it attracted attention after Collier’s death, when it was translated into German in 1756, by J. C. Eschenbach who made the connection with Berkeley by publishing it with his translation of Berkeley’s Three Dialogues (Rostock 1756). It was also held in esteem by Sir James Mackintosh and Dugald Stewart. Collier was not in fact the first to propose that we have no direct experience of the physical world. Richard Burthogge, for example, had argued in his Organum vetus et novum that both our ‘sentiments’ and ‘notions’ are mental entities, and that the objects of cognition—whether derived from the senses, imagination, or reason—are ‘Phaenomena’ or ‘Appearances’ with no existence beyond our faculties.27 Anthony Collins, too, argued that we never get beyond our perceptions and that perceptions are the only criterion of truth (Essay Concerning Reason, 1707). However, both Burthogge and Collins stopped short of denying all knowledge, or the existence, of things outside the mind. Although Berkeley, like Collier, read Malebranche at a formative age, Berkeley was in fact unpersuaded by Malebranche’s arguments. Like several of Locke’s critics, Berkeley had high regard for Locke, whom he studied closely as a young man. Locke is the philosopher most frequently cited in his early notebooks, his Philosophical Commentaries. Although he repudiated Locke’s philosophy, he held him in high esteem and acknowledged his debt to him. ‘Wonderful in Locke’, he wrote, ‘that he could . . . see at all thro a mist that had been so long a gathering & was consequently thick. This more to be admir’d than that he didn’t see farther.’28 Berkeley’s New Theory of Vision took up the question posed by William Molyneux to Locke, of whether a blind man restored to sight could recognize the difference between a cube and a sphere. Although Berkeley came to the same conclusion as Locke, he did so on very different grounds. This led him to repudiate Locke’s epistemology and to formulate the immaterialist hypothesis set out in The Principles of Human Knowledge. With its sustained critique of Locke’s empiricism, and its concern with 26 Arthur Collier, Clavis universalis: or, a New Inquiry after Truth. Being a Demonstration of the Nonexistence, or Impossibility, of an External World (London, 1713). See Charles J. McCracken, ‘Stages on a Cartesian Road to Immaterialism’, JHP, 24 (1986): 19–40; Charles J. McCracken, Malebranche and British Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983). 27 Michael Ayers, ‘Richard Burthogge and the Origins of Modern Conceptualisation’, in Tom Sorell and G. A. J. Rogers (eds), Analytic Philosophy and the History of Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 179–200. 28 Berkeley, Notebook A, Philosophical Commentaries, item 567, in The Works of George Berkeley Bishop of Cloyne, ed. A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop, 9 vols (London: T. Nelson, 1948–51), vol. 1, p. 71.

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scepticism, Berkeley’s response to Locke can be situated alongside the clerical reaction to Locke (see Chapter 9). Berkeley evidently had concerns similar to those of many of Locke’s clerical critics—particularly scepticism arising from his perceived failure to ground knowledge in things. Berkeley’s critique of Locke’s epistemology went far further, and transformed the terms of the debate, which had been focused largely on anxieties about the theological implications of Lockean empiricism. In its place Berkeley proposed an epistemological and metaphysical philosophy of his own. Where most of Locke’s critics worried over his agnosticism about essences, Berkeley targeted the primary–secondary quality distinction, and denied that we can know even the secondary properties of things. The qualities which we attribute to things outside the mind only exist in the mind. The target of Berkeley’s critique was not just Locke, but all forms of what he called ‘abstractionism’, that is theories which claim to identify the essential properties of matter, whether these be materialist theories, like Hobbes’s, or philosophies, like Cartesianism, which admit the existence of immaterial things. His concerns regarding empiricism and materialism and his theory of the mind-dependence of all things echo Malebranche. There are aspects of Berkeley’s epistemology which have suggestive parallels with Cudworth, for example in his view that corporeal qualities do not exist outside the mind, and that the world is intelligible by virtue of the God-given order of relations within it and within our own minds. However, since Cudworth’s Treatise was as yet unpublished, Cudworth is unlikely to have been an influence. Berkeley was far and away the most original philosopher post Locke, but he also illustrates the historical truth that originality and influence do not go hand in hand. He was almost universally treated as a sceptic who denied the existence of material reality, as more sceptical than the empirical philosophies which he critiqued.29

Prospect: The Eighteenth Century The nature and extent of the intellectual and cultural movement known as the European Enlightenment, and indeed the very question of what constitutes ‘Enlightenment’ is currently the subject of heated historical debate.30 No longer viewed as ‘the age of reason’, the Enlightenment is discussed as ‘radical’, ‘high’, ‘low’, and its religious dimension is recognized.31 No longer regarded as Franco-centric, or as a 29

‘I am the furthest from Scepticism of any Man’, Philosophical Commentaries, vol. 1, p. 70. For a brief survey, see Ann Thomson, Bodies of Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). The classic view of the Enlightenment is Peter Gay, The Enlightenment, an Interpretation (London: Allen & Unwin, 1970). 31 Margaret Jacob, The Radical Enlightenment: Pantheists, Freemasons and Republicans (London: Allen & Unwin, 1981); Jonathan Israel, The Radical Enlightenment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). For religion in the Enlightenment, see J. G. A. Pocock, Barbarism and Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Knud Haakonssen, Enlightenment and Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Brian W. Young, Religion and Enlightenment in Eighteenth Century England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Roy Porter, Flesh in the Age of Reason (London: Allen Lane, 2003); 30

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single pan-European movement, the Enlightenment is now usually discussed as a multiplicity of regional enlightenments each with its own characteristic preoccupations—German, Dutch, Neapolitan, Scottish, as well as French.32 Notwithstanding this diversity of locations, these different enlightenments are generally taken to exhibit a common set of characteristics, among which a ferment of new ideas is considered a defining feature. The idea that ‘enlightenment’ has something to do with reason and philosophy persists, even in the eyes of its detractors, and proponents of its ‘dark side’. Equally important is the communication of those ideas, thanks to the new media of the century. This was the age of the encyclopedia and philosophical journal, a period when the preferred language of intellectual exchange was French, which had taken the place of Latin. On the pages of these publications, British philosophy was cited as never before, setting the agenda for discussion across Europe. England was celebrated by Voltaire as a ‘nation of philosophers’ and esteemed by Diderot for the honour (as he saw it) accorded to philosophers by comparison with France. By 1700 British philosophy exhibits many of the features classically associated with eighteenth-century philosophy: increasing secularism, a widespread emphasis on rational religion (deism to its enemies), the rejection of metaphysics, confidence in Newtonian natural philosophy, and the methodology of Newtonian science. In these respects British philosophy at the turn of the eighteenth century typifies Enlightenment thought, in most of the forms that we might choose to understand that contested term. Furthermore, the intellectual life of the period was supported by a strong philosophical laity and new media (such as philosophical journals and the recent advent of the philosophical dictionary). British philosophers themselves express the idea that the time in which they lived was an enlightened age. One of the most remarkable developments of the eighteenth century is the resurgence of Scottish philosophy, at the heart of what has come to be called the ‘Scottish Enlightenment’. However much the intellectual and cultural vibrancy of the Enlightenment is associated with ‘new ideas’, it is important not to overlook the continuities with the past, and the shaping influence of the seventeenth century. The contribution of seventeenth-century British philosophy to eighteenth-century philosophy is widely acknowledged by Enlightenment thinkers. Indeed, the Enlightenment view of what mattered in British philosophy has done much to shape the canon we have inherited today, and historically it is a useful measure of the prestige which British philosophy had obtained by this time. Taking their cue from the philosophes, historians of the Enlightenment have tended to emphasize one strand or another of the legacy of seventeenth-century

Roy Porter and M. Teich, The Enlightenment in National Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Thomson, Bodies of Thought. 32

See, for example, John Robertson, The Case for Enlightenment: Scotland and Naples 1680–1760 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Porter and Teich, The Enlightenment in National Context.

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philosophy. On one view Locke is the seventeenth-century philosopher for the Enlightenment, the philosophical spokesman of empiricism and representative of the natural law tradition, bringing in his train the natural philosophers Boyle and Newton as well as Bacon and Cumberland. In terms of the esteem expressed by the philosophes and the quantity of Locke editions in the period, this view has much to support it. Voltaire promoted the association of Locke with Newton and Bacon in his Letters Concerning the English Nation (1733, published in French as Lettres philosophiques ou lettres sur les Anglais). Voltaire’s championship of Newtonianism played an important role in securing the acceptance of Newton’s natural philosophy in Europe. His account of Bacon contributed greatly to the esteem in which Bacon was held by the French philosophes in the eighteenth century, by whom he was celebrated as the harbinger of Enlightenment science. On another view it is Shaftesbury who forms the bridge between seventeenth-century British philosophy and the Enlightenment—Shaftesbury as anticlerical heir of Herbert of Cherbury, and father of eighteenth-century sentimentalism. The response of the philosophes Diderot and Montesquieu would seem to support this view. Diderot translated Shaftesbury’s Inquiry Concerning Virtue in 1745, and drew heavily on Characteristicks for his Pense´es philosophiques (1746). He celebrated Shaftesbury and Locke in counterpoint in the Encyclope´die. Montesquieu ranked Shaftesbury with Plato, Montaigne, and Malebranche, as one of the four great poetic philosophers. Shaftesbury was also taken up by the German romantics Johann Gottfried von Herder and Gotthold Lessing, while Moses Mendelssohn modelled his own philosophical dialogue on The Moralists. While there is a plausible case to be made that Enlightenment thinkers drew inspiration from one or other of these two strands (if not both), neither view captures the complexities and scope of the eighteenth-century philosophy or does justice to the traditions which the Lockean or Shaftesburian legacies putatively represent. In point of fact the coverage of British philosophy by the encyclope´distes was wider than received narratives suggest. Cudworth’s philosophical theories, for example, circulated in Enlightenment Europe. Diderot included an account of Cudworth’s hypothesis of Plastic Nature in the Encyclope´die along with Bayle’s critique.33 The Latin translation of Cudworth’s works by the German scholar Johan Lorenz Mosheim (1733, reprinted 1773) includes a translation of the 1731 first printing of A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality. Received accounts of the Enlightenment tend to overlook the fact that British seventeenth-century philosophy had a reception at home, as well as in Europe. One of the most important outcomes for seventeenth-century British philosophy was its impact on philosophy in eighteenth-century Britain, most especially the Scottish Enlightenment, where the philosophy of Locke, Newton, and Shaftesbury, but also of 33

The poets, Alexander Pope (in ‘An Essay on Man’) and Samuel Taylor Coleridge (in his early poems) make creative use of Cudworth’s conception of ‘plastic nature’.

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Clarke and Cudworth, contributed to the emergence of the powerful new schools of Scottish philosophy. However, the full extent of continuities between the philosophies of seventeenth-century Britain and eighteenth-century Scotland still remains to be explored.34 Eighteenth-century philosophy was no less of a continuous conversation than the philosophy of the preceding century. The fortunes of British philosophy in the eighteenth century show that thinkers of that period were in dialogue with their seventeenth-century predecessors, every bit as much as the latter had, in their turn, been with sixteenth-century thought. As the preoccupations of the eighteenth-century interlocutors changed, so did what they found interesting and important among their predecessors. Of course, many of the latter dropped out of the conversation. So, for example, and for different reasons, the voices of Henry More, Walter Charleton, and the women philosophers are no longer heard. This reflects the fact that, as in previous centuries, eighteenth-century philosophical readers reinterpreted the philosophy of the past in the light of their own priorities. And like their predecessors, philosophers conversed not just with their contemporaries but also across chronological and geographical boundaries. A major difference between the eighteenth-century philosophical conversations as compared with the time when Herbert, Bacon, and Hobbes philosophized, is that British philosophy was recognized as central to those conversations. It was the achievement of seventeenth-century British philosophy to put it there. This is one important sense in which the seventeenth century is the defining period in the history of British philosophy.

34 Existing histories of Scottish philosophy (e.g. Broadie) either overlook or minimize the continuities. So too does the older historiography. But it is interesting that the figures whom Dugald Stewart acknowledges include figures who don’t feature in the modern canon, namely Clarke and Cudworth. See also Michael B. Gill, ‘From Cambridge Platonism to Scottish Sentimentalism’, Journal of Scottish Philosophy, 8 (2010): 13–31, and Sarah Hutton, ‘From Cudworth to Hume: Cambridge Platonism and the Scottish Enlightenment’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 42 (2014): 1–19.

Biographical Appendix ABERCROMBY, David (d. c.1701). Born into a Catholic family in north-east Scotland. Jesuit education in France, graduating MD. Lived and taught abroad for twenty years practising as a physician and publishing medical works. Converted to Protestantism after return to Britain, where he was a member of Robert Boyle’s circle. Philosophical writings: A Discourse of Wit, Academia scientarium (1687), and A Moral Discourse of the Power of Interest (1690). AMES, William (1576–1633). Ramist philosopher. Born Ipswich. Studied at Christ’s College, Cambridge, where he taught until dismissed in 1609 for religious nonconformity. After serving as city lecturer in Colchester, moved to the Netherlands, where he made his name as a Calvinist anti-Remonstrant in publications such as his widely read contribution to the Synod of Dort controversies, Coronis ad collationem Hagiensem (1628). Taught at the University of Franeker (1622) and subsequently at the University of Rotterdam. Invited to Harvard but died before he could take it up. Writings include Medulla S.S. theologiae e sacris literis, earumque interpretibus, extracta et methodice disposita (1623—expanded version 1627); De conscientia, et eius jure, vel casibus (1630); Technometria (1633); Demonstratio logicæ veræ (1646). ASTELL, Mary (1666–1731). Born Newcastle upon Tyne. Educated by her uncle. Lived in London, with financial support from the Archbishop of Canterbury, in the circle of Lady Catherine Jones. Correspondence with John Norris published as Letters Concerning the Love of God (1695). Engaged in political debate with works like A Fair Way with Dissenters (1704). Main philosophical writings: A Serious Proposal to the Ladies (pt. 1, 1694; pt. 2 1697); Reflections upon Marriage (1700); The Christian Religion as Professed by a Daughter of the Church. BACON, Francis (1561–1626), Baron Verulam of Verulam, Viscount St Alban. Born in London. Studied at St John’s College, Cambridge. After period in France, trained as lawyer, qualifying as barrister. Served as MP 1584. After entering crown service he was appointed to a succession of legal offices: solicitor general (1607), attorney general (1612), Lord Keeper (1617), Lord Chancellor (1618). Knighted in 1603, and elevated to peerage, as his political career advanced. Impeached for bribery 1621. Published writings: The Essayes or Counsels, Civill and Morall (1597); Of the Proficience and Aduancement of Learning (1605); Novum Organum (1620); De dignitate et augmentis scientiarum (1623); Sylva sylvarum (1627). BARON, Robert (1596–1639). Born Kinnaird, Perthshire. Studied at St Andrews University, where he taught philosophy, until 1619 when he was ordained and became minister at Keith, Banffshire. Appointed first professor of theology at Marischal College, Aberdeen 1625. One of the six so-called ‘Aberdeen doctors’, who supported religious policies of the crown. Writings: Philosophia theologiae ancillans (1621); Metaphysica generalis (published in Leiden 1654, and London in 1657). BERKELEY, George (1685–1753). Born Kilkenny, Ireland. Studied at Trinity College, Dublin, where he was elected fellow in 1707. Ordained deacon 1709. Travelled in Europe as chaplain and as tutor. Appointed Dean of Derry 1724. Frequented London cultural circles, including the circle of Queen Caroline. 1728–31 travelled to Newport, Rhode Island, with a view to founding a college in Bermuda, a project which foundered. Made Bishop of Cloyne

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1734. Main works: An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision (1709); A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710); Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (1713); Alciphron (1732); Siris (1744). Also edited The Ladies Library (1714). BLOUNT, Charles (1654–93). Gentleman of letters and freethinker. Born in Upper Holloway, Islington. Home educated. Member of the Green Ribbon Club, a political group of Whig activists and propagandists. Connected to leading political figures like Shaftesbury. Drew on heterodox thinkers, notably Spinoza, Hobbes, and Herbert of Cherbury to challenge what he saw as corruption in the church and distortions of religious doctrine. Writings: Anima mundi (1679); Great is Diana of the Ephesians (1680); Miracles, No Violations of the Laws of Nature (1683); Religio Laici (1683). BOYLE, Robert (1627–91). Born Lismore, Ireland, the youngest son of the Earl of Cork. Educated at Eton College. After an educational tour of Europe, accompanied by his brother Francis and tutor Isaac Marcombes, he pursued his scientific interests at his estate at Stallbridge and in the 1650s and 1660s in Oxford, subsequently moving to London to live with his sister, Lady Ranelagh. An active participant in the activities of the Royal Society, London, of which he was a founding fellow. Deeply pious, he was a governor of the Society for Spread of the Gospel in New England, and financed translations of the Bible. Principal works: New Experiments Physico-Mechanical, Touching the Spring of the Air and its Effects (1660); Certain Physiological Essays (1661); Some Considerations of the Usefulness of Experimentall Philosophy (1663), The Origin of Forms and Qualities (1666); A Free Enquiry into the Vulgarly Receiv’d Notion of Nature (1686); A Disquisition about the Final Causes of Natural Things (1688); and The Christian Virtuoso (1690). Also wrote treatise on love: Seraphick Love, written 1648, published 1659. BRAMHALL, John (1594–1663). Born Pontefract. Studied at Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge. After ordination pursued a career in the Church of Ireland where he was appointed Bishop of Derry and after the Restoration Archbishop of Armagh, primate of all Ireland. During the Civil War he was associated with Hobbes’s patron, the Marquess of Newcastle, whom he followed into exile in 1644. His controversy with Hobbes on free will was published as A Defence of True Liberty from Antecedent and Extrinsecall Necessity (1655); Castigations of Mr Hobbes (1658). BURTHOGGE, Richard (1638–1703). Baptized at Plympton St Maurice, Devon. Studied at Oxford, initially at All Souls College, and subsequently at Lincoln College. Studied medicine at Leiden. Practised as physician in Devon, where he served as a Justice of the Peace. Corresponded with Locke. Works: Tagathon, or Divine Goodness Explicated (1672); Organum vetus & novum (1678); An Essay upon Reason, and the Nature of Spirits (1694); Of the Soul of the World, and of Particular Souls (1699). CARMICHAEL, Gershom (1672–1729). Born in London. Studied at University of Edinburgh. Taught at St Andrews 1693, and at Glasgow from 1694, where he was appointed the first professor of moral philosophy in 1727 after the end of the regenting system. Although his publications related to his teaching, they evince a modernizing outlook: the most original and influential being his edition and critical commentary on Pufendorf: S[amuelis] Pufendorfii de officio hominis et civis juxta legem naturalem, libri duo. Supplementis et observationibus in academicae juventutis usum auxit et illustravit Gerschomus Carmichael (1718); Breviuscula introductio ad logicam (1720); Synopsis theologiae naturalis (1729).

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CARPENTER, Nathanael (1589–1628), Born Northleigh, Devon. Studied at St Edmund Hall, Oxford; elected fellow of Exeter College, graduating BD 1620. Appointed chaplain to James Ussher, Archbishop of Armagh, and worked as schoolmaster in Dublin. Main philosophical work: Philosophia libera (Frankfurt, 1621; Oxford, 1622). Also wrote a treatise on optics. Geographie Delineated (Oxford, 1625) influenced by William Gilbert. CASE, John (1540/1?–1600). Born at Woodstock, Oxfordshire. Chorister at New College and Christ Church College, Oxford, he transferred to St John’s College, a scholar then fellow. Having resigned his fellowship to marry, he continued to teach extra-murally. His writings are all commentaries on Aristotle, and related to his pedagogy: Summa veterum interpretum in universam dialecticam Aristotelis (1584); Speculum moralium quaestionum in universam ethicen Aristotelis (1585); Reflexus speculi moralis; ABCedarium moralis philosophiae; Sphaera civitatis (1588); Thesaurus oeconomiae (1597); Lapis philosophicus (1599); Ancilla philosophiae (1600); also Apologia musices (1588), and The Praise of Musicke (1586). CAVENDISH, Margaret, Duchess of Newcastle, ne´e Lucas (1623–73). Born in Colchester. Maid of honour at court. Exile in France and Netherlands during Civil War and Interregnum. Married William, Earl of Newcastle, patron of Hobbes. A prolific authoress, she wrote plays, poetry, and essays as well as philosophy. Her main philosophical writings are Philosophicall Fancies (1653); Philosophical and Physical Opinions (1655); The World’s Olio (1655); Orations (1662); Observations on Experimental Philosophy (1666); Grounds of Natural Philosophy (1668); Philosophical Letters (1664). CHARLETON, Walter (1620–1707), physician and natural philosopher. Born in Shepton Mallet, Somerset. Studied at Magdalen Hall, Oxford, where John Wilkins (1614–72) was a tutor. MD 1643, he was associated with William Harvey and appointed physician-in-ordinary to Charles I and subsequently to the exiled Charles II. Monarchist sympathizer, friend of Digby and Hobbes. In Paris in 1650s. Fellow of the Royal Society, 1661. Honorary fellow of the Royal College of Physicians, 1664, where he was very active, serving as president, 1689–91. Fell on hard times and died in poverty. Philosophical writings: The Darknes of Atheism Dispelled by the Light of Nature (1652); Physiologia Epicuro-Gassendo-Charltoniana (1654); The Immortality of the Human Soul Demonstrated by the Light of Nature (1657); Natural History of the Passions (1674); The Harmony of Natural and Positive Divine Laws (1682). Also published medical writings and an antiquarian work on Stonehenge, Chorea gigantica (1663). CLARKE, Samuel (1675–1729). Born Norwich. Studied at Gonville and Cauius College, Cambridge, where he was associated with a circle of Newtonians, which included John Ellis and William Whiston. Appointed Boyle lecturer 1704 and 1705, and Royal chaplain in 1706. A member of Queen Caroline’s circle, he defended Newton against Leibniz 1715–16 (published 1717); engaged in controversy with Henry Dodwell (1706) and Anthony Collins (1707–8) over immortality of the soul, and Trinity. His own less than orthodox Trinitarianism halted his ecclesiastical career. Writings: A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God (1705); A Discourse Concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion (1706); Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity (1712); A Collection of Papers which passed between the late learned Mr Leibnitz and Dr Clarke in the years 1715 and 1716 (1717). Also a translation of Newton’s Opticks into Latin (1706) and Newtonian notes for the Latin translation of Rohault’s Traite´ de physique by his brother, John Clarke (1697). COCKBURN, Catharine. See TROTTER, Catharine.

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COLLIER, Arthur (1680–1732). Born Langford Magna, Wiltshire. Studied at Oxford, initially at Pembroke College and then at Balliol College. After ordination (1704) succeeded his father as rector. A friend of Bishop Gilbert Burnet, and a theological controversialist. Financial problems obliged him to sell the advowson of Langford Magna. Philosophical writings: Clavis universalis: or, a New Inquiry after Truth. Being a Demonstration of the Non-existence, or Impossibility, of an External World (1713), was ignored. Also wrote A Specimen of True Philosophy . . . not Improper to be Bound up with the ‘Clavis universalis’ (1730). COLLINS, Anthony (1676–1729), freethinker. Born Isleworth, Middlesex. Studied at King’s College, Cambridge, without taking a degree, after which embarked on legal training at the Middle Temple, London. A close friend of John Locke whom he met in 1703. Gave financial support to Toland and aided Tindal and befriended Pierre Des Maizeaux. Engaged in controversy on the mortality of the soul sparked by Henry Dodwell. Provoked controversy through his views on reason by his attacks on the church establishment. Writings: A Letter to the Learned Mr Henry Dodwell (1706); An Essay Concerning the Use of Reason in Propositions (1707); Priestcraft in Perfection (1710); An Historical and Critical Essay, on the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England (1724); A Vindication of the Divine Attributes (1710); A Discourse of Free-Thinking (1713); A Philosophical Enquiry Concerning Human Liberty (1717); A Collection of Several Pieces of Mr John Locke (1720). Other writings were lost or destroyed. COMPTON [Compton Carleton], Thomas (1592–1666), SJ. Born in Cambridgeshire. Studied at the English Jesuit colleges at St Omer, Madrid, College of St Alban, Valladolid. Joined the Society of Jesus. Taught at St Omer until appointed professor of philosophy and theology at the English Jesuit College in Lie`ge, where he remained for the rest of his life. His writings were published in the Low Countries, and reprinted many times: Philosophia universa (Antwerp, 1649), Prometheus Christianus (1652), Cursus theologici (1659–64). Also two posthumous Aristotelian works, Disputationes physicae (1676), Disputationes in universam Aristotelis Logicam (1716). CONWAY, Anne (1630–79). Born in London. Tutored in Cartesian philosophy by Henry More, who became a lifelong friend and correspondent. Lived mainly at Ragley Hall, Warwickshire, where she pursued her philosophical interests, with encouragement from More and her half-brother, Sir John Finch. Chronic debilitating illness led her to consult, among others, Francis Mercury van Helmont, who introduced her to Knorr von Rosenroth’s work on the Jewish cabbala, and to Quakerism, to which she eventually converted. Her only work of philosophy was published posthumously: Principia philosophiae antiquissimae ac recentissimae, 1690 (translated as The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy, 1692). COOPER, Anthony Ashley, third Earl of Shaftesbury (1671–1713). Born London. Tutored by Locke. Attended Winchester College, undertaking a tour of Europe 1687–9, during which he met members of Locke’s circle, Benjamin Furly, Jean Le Clerc, and Philip van Limborch, as well as Pierre Bayle and Pierre Des Maizeaux. A friend of Robert Molesworth, he pursued a political career as Whig from 1695. Patron to among others, John Toland and Pierre Coste. In declining health, travelled to the Netherlands, spending last years in Italy. Writings: An Inquiry Concerning Virtue and Merit (1699); Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times (1711). He also edited the sermons of Benjamin Whichcote. CUDWORTH, Ralph (1617–88). Born Aller, Somerset. Studied at Emmanuel College, Cambridge. Appointed Master of Clare Hall and Regius Professor of Hebrew in 1645, and

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Master of Christ’s College in 1650, a post he held until his death, despite attempts at the Restoration to remove him. Preached before the House of Commons in 1647. Consulted by Cromwell about the readmission of the Jews to England in 1655. A member of the group known as the Cambridge Platonists, he was a friend of Henry More and father of Damaris, Lady Masham. Works: The True Intellectual System of the Universe, 1678. Also wrote three treatises ‘Of Liberty and Necessity’, one of which was published in 1731. CULVERWELL, Nathaniel (1619–51). Born in London. Studied at Emmanuel College, Cambridge, where he was elected fellow in 1642. His contemporaries among the fellowship of Emmanuel College included the Cambridge Platonists Benjamin Whichcote, Ralph Cudworth, and John Smith. Little is known of his life prior to his premature death from illness. Main publication: An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature (1652). Also The White Stone (1654) and Spirituall Opticks (1651). CUMBERLAND, Richard (1632–1718). Born in London, and educated at Magdalene College, Cambridge, where he was elected fellow in 1653. Ordained 1658. DD 1680. In 1667 appointed chaplain to the lawyer Sir Orlando Bridgeman, through whose patronage he held a number of church livings, before being appointed Bishop of Peterborough in 1691. A scholar with interests in natural philosophy and medicine, Cumberland translated and edited Sanchoniato’s Phœnician History (1720). His only philosophical work, De legibus naturae disquisitio philosophica (1672), was epitomized in English by James Tyrell (1692) and translated in 1727. DALRYMPLE, James, first Viscount Stair (1619–95), legal theorist, politician, and natural philosopher born 1619 at Drummurchie, Ayrshire. Studied at the University of Glasgow. After army service 1638–41, appointed regent at Glasgow. Admitted to Scottish Bar (1648). Served as advocate, judge of the Court of Session and MP Wigtownshire 1672–4. Voluntary exile 1682 in the Netherlands, returning in 1688 as William of Orange’s principal adviser on Scottish affairs in London. Writings: Institutions of the Law of Scotland (1681); Physiologia nova experimentalis (1686); A Vindication of the Divine Perfections (1695). DAVENPORT, Christopher [alias Franciscus a` Sancta Clara] (c.1595–1680). Born in Coventry. Studied at Merton College, Oxford, and after conversion to Catholicism at the English College at Douai. Joined the Franciscan order. Taught theology and philosophy at Douai, aiming to reconcile Scotism and contemporary natural philosophy. Returned to England as confessor to Queen Henrietta Maria; worked for the reconciliation of the English and Roman churches. Sought toleration of Catholics from Cromwell. After the Restoration was appointed chaplain to Queen Catherine of Braganza. Writings include Deus, natura, gratia (1634); Systema fidei (1648); Paralipomena de mundo peripatetico (1652). DIGBY, Sir Kenelm (1603–65). Born at Gayhurst, Buckinghamshire, to a recusant family. Studied at Gloucester Hall, Oxford. Travelled in France, Italy, and Spain. After spell as privateer, and Commissioner for the Navy, based himself at Gresham College, to pursue study of natural philosophy and alchemy. Moved to Paris where he became Chancellor to the exiled queen’s court and was associated with the intellectual circle of Marin Mersenne. Lifelong association with ‘Blackloist’ philosopher Thomas White, and friend of Hobbes; travelled to the Netherlands to meet Descartes. Returned to England 1650s. Pressed for toleration of Catholics by the English Parliament and the restored monarch. One of earliest members of Royal Society. Writings: Two Treatises. In the one of which, the nature of bodies; in the other, the Nature of mans soule; is looked into (1644). Also Discours . . . touchant la gue´rison des playes par la poudre de sympathie (1658).

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DONALDSON, Walter (c.1570–1630). Born at Aberdeen, studying there and at Heidelberg. Appointed professor of natural and moral philosophy at the Protestant academy at Sedan, where he also served as principal. Appointed principal of the new Protestant academy proposed at Charenton and then served as principal at the academy of La Rochelle. Works: Moralis disciplinae summa (1610); Synopsis oeconomia (1620); Synopsis philosophiae moralis (1622). DUNCAN, Mark (d. 1640). Of Scottish parentage, birthplace (probably London) and education not known, but he appears to have graduated MD. Professor of Protestant academy at Saumur 1616. Duncan’s Institutiones logicae was printed in Saumur in 1612, and reprinted in 1655. FINCH, Sir John (1626–82). Born in London. Studied at Balliol College, Oxford, and at Christ’s College, Cambridge, where he met Henry More and put him in contact with his sister Anne Conway. Studied medicine at Padua, with Antonio Molinetti. Professor of anatomy at Pisa for a few years. Frequented the scientific circle of Prince Leopoldo de’ Medici, patron of the Accademia del Cimento. Fellow of the Royal Society. Appointed English resident at Florence and subsequently served as ambassador to the Ottoman court. Writings: a large unpublished manuscript treatise containing his philosophy of nature and society. FLUDD, Robert (1574–1637). Born Bearsted, Kent. Studied at St John’s College, Oxford, then medicine at Christ Church (MD 1605). Travelled in Europe before practising medicine in London, where he became a friend of William Harvey, supporting his conclusions on circulation of the blood. Defended the Rosicrucians and was criticized by Mersenne, Kepler, Gassendi. His medical and philosophical writings reflect his anti-Aristotelianism, his debt to Hermeticism and Paracelsianism, and his insistence on the religious character of philosophy: Utriusque Cosmi majora scilicet et minoris metaphysica, physica atque technica historia (1617–21); Medicina catholica (1629–31); Quaestiones celeberrimae in Genesim (1623); Philosophia sacra et vere Christiana, seu Meteorologica Cosmica (1626); Philosophia Moysaica (1638). GILBERT, William (1544–1603). Born in Colchester. Studied at St John’s College, Cambridge, where he was fellow and mathematical examiner, until he moved to London to practice medicine. Fellow (1577) and president (1600) of the Royal College of Physicians. Works: De Magnete, magneticisque corporibus, et de magno magnete tellure; physiologia nova (1600); De mundo nostro sublunari philosophia nova (1651). GLANVILL [Glanville], Joseph (1636–80). Born Plymouth. Studied at Oxford, MA 1658. Ordained clergyman. Held a series of livings, ending up in Bath. Attacked scholasticism and defended the new science of the Royal Society, to which he was elected fellow. An admirer of Henry More, whose Origenist sympathies and interest in witchcraft he shared. Writings include Lux orientalis (1662); The Vanity of Dogmatizing (1661), which he reworked as Scepsis scientifica (1665); Plus ultra (1668); and A Blow at Modern Sadducism (1668), which was expanded and published by Henry More as Saducismus triumphatus (1682). GLISSON, Francis (c.1599–1677). Born in Bristol. Studied at Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge, graduating MD. Served as lecturer in Greek, and dean at his college. Appointed Regius Professor of Physic at Cambridge; fellow of the Royal College of Physicians, becoming president 1667. His patients included Matthew Hale and Anthony Ashley Cooper, first Baron Ashley and first Earl of Shaftesbury. Member of a group interested in natural philosophy whose members included George Ent, Jonathan Goddard, Christopher Merrett, Charles Scarborough,

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John Wallis, and John Wilkins, and which was a precursor of the Royal Society of which Glisson was one of the original fellows. Main writings: De rachitide sive morbo puerili (1650); De natura substantiae energetica, seu, De vita naturae (1672). GOWAN, Thomas (1631–83). Born at Caldermuir in western Edinburghshire. Studied at Edinburgh. Ordained Presbyterian minister to the parish of Donnagh, County Monaghan; and later minister at Glaslough. With the support of Viscount Massarene established an academy for dissenters at Antrim in 1666, for which he produced his philosophical writings Ars sciendi (1681); Logica elenctica (1683). GREVILLE, Robert, second Baron Brooke of Beauchamps Court (1607–43). Birthplace and education not recorded. Heir of father’s cousin, Fulke Greville, first Baron Brooke. MP for Warwick. Involved in puritan colonizing entreprises. A critic of both the ecclesiastical and political policies of Charles I, contributing A Discourse Opening the Nature of that Episcopacie (1641) to debates on episcopacy. Served as a parliamentarian commander in the Civil War, during which he was killed in action. Philosophical work: The Nature of Truth its Union and Unity with the Soule (1640). GREW, Nehemiah (1641–1712). Baptized at Mancetter, near Coventry. Studied at Pembroke College, Cambridge, and at Leiden. Encouraged by Wilkins and Brouncker to publish his work on botany; elected FRS and honorary fellow of the Royal College of Physicians. Employed as deputy to Jonathan Goddard, professor of physic at Gresham College, he was supported by the Royal Society, of which he was appointed joint secretary with Robert Hooke, whose ideas on microscopy he applied in his researches. Writings: The Anatomy of Vegetables Begun: with a General Account of Vegetation Founded Thereon (1672); Idea of a Phytological History Propounded (1673). Discourse Concerning the Nature, Causes and Power of Mixture (1675); Cosmologia sacra, or, A Discourse of the Universe as it is the Creature and Kingdom of God (1701). HALE, Sir Mathew (1609–76), judge and writer, born on 1 November 1609 at Alderley, Gloucestershire. Studied at Magdalen Hall, Oxford, and at Lincoln’s Inn. Pursued a successful career as a lawyer and judge, unaffected by changes of regime, culminating in appointment as Chief Justice of the King’s Bench. Latitudinarian, sympathetic to dissenters. Aside from his jurisprudential and constitutional writings, published on religious matters and took an active part in natural philosophy, contributing to contemporary debates. Writings: Contemplations Moral and Divine (1676); An Essay, Touching the Gravitation and Non-gravitation of Fluid Bodies, and the Reasons thereof (1673); Difficiles nugae, or, Observations Touching the Torricellian Experiment (1674); Observations Touching the Principles of Natural Motion (1677); The Primitive Origination of Mankind, Considered and Examined According to the Light of Nature (1677); A Discourse of the Knowledge of God and of Ourselves (1688); History and Analysis of the Common Laws of England (1713); unfinished treatise ‘De Deo’. HARRINGTON, James (1611–77), Born at Upton, Northamptonshire. Studies at Trinity College, Oxford. Volunteer soldier in the Netherlands. Travelled in Germany, France, and Italy. A royalist who nevertheless, dedicated Oceana to Oliver Cromwell and became advocate of ‘popular government’. Member of ‘Rota’ club. Imprisoned at the Restoration, to the detriment of his physical and mental health. Retired from public life after release. Writings: The Common-wealth of Oceana (1656); The Prerogative of Popular Government (1657); Brief directions, showing how a fit and perfect model of popular government may be made, found or understood (1659); Aphorisms Political (1659); The Rota, or, A Model of a Free State or Equall

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Commonwealth (1660); Political Discourses: tending to the introduction of a free and equal commonwealth in England (1660). HARRIOT, Thomas (c.1560–1621). Born in the city or county of Oxford. Studied at St Mary Hall, Oxford. Aptitude for the mathematical and instrumental skills necessary for astronomical navigation, entered service of Sir Walter Raleigh, taking part in expedition to establish the Virginia colony. Subsequent patronage from Henry Percy, Earl of Northumberland. Imprisoned during events surrounding arrest and trial of Northumberland. Corresponded with Kepler. But did not publish in his lifetime. Walter Warner edited and published posthumously a limited selection of Harriot’s papers with the title Artis analyticae praxis (1631). HERBERT, Edward (1582?–1648), first Baron Herbert of Cherbury and first Baron Herbert of Castle Island. Born Eyton-on-Severn, brother of the poet, George Herbert. Studied at University College, Oxford. Travelled in Europe. Served as a private soldier under the Prince of Orange. Ambassador to Paris (1619–24) where he was associated with the Mersenne circle, and published De veritate (1624). Disagreement over policy and a dispute over finances incurred while ambassador led to breach between Herbert and the English court. Granted title of Lord Herbert of Cherbury in part settlement. Also published De causis errorum (1645), De religione laici (1645), and De religione gentilium (1663). Herbert was a lutanist and poet, and wrote an autobiography. HILL, Nicholas (c.1570–1610). Born London. Studied at St John’s College, Oxford, where he was elected fellow, but was deprived of his fellowship following conversion to Catholicism. Associated with the Northumberland circle, and apparently also with the royal pretender Sir Robert Basset, whose activities led Hill to seek exile abroad, where his only book Philosophia epicurea (1619) was published. HOBBES, Thomas (1588–1679). Born in Malmesbury, Wiltshire. Studied at Magdalen Hall, Oxford. Entered service of the Cavendish family, whom he served all his life in various capacities. Travelled to Europe on three occasions, as tutor to sons of his patrons. Also acted as assistant to Bacon and was associated with the Welbeck Circle. During exile in France (1640–51), he frequented the circle of Marin Mersenne and the Acade´mie de Montmor. Wrote a refutation of Thomas White’s De mundo. Debated freedom and necessity with Bishop Bramhall (1645). Returned to London in 1652 after publication of Leviathan. After the Restoration, received a royal pension, but faced enmity of the ecclesiastical establishment which inhibited publication of his works in England. Philosophical writings: Elementorum philosophiae sectio tertia de cive (1642; English translation Philosophicall Rudiments Concerning Government and Society, 1651); Leviathan (1651; Latin translation 1668); Of Liberty and Necessity (1654); The Questions Concerning Liberty, Necessity and Chance (1655); Elementorum philosophiæ sectio prima de corpore (1655; English translation, Elements of Philosophy, the third section, concerning Body, 1656); Elementorum philosophiae sectio secunda de homine (1658); Problemata physica (1662); De principiis & ratiocinatione geometrarum (London, 1666); Decameron physiologicum: or Ten Dialogues of Natural Philosophy (London, 1678); Opera philosophica (1668). JACK [Jacchaeus], Gilbert (c.1577–1628), philosopher and physician, baptized in Aberdeen. Studied at Marischal College, then at the universities of Helmstedt, Herborn, and Leiden. Appointed professor extraordinarius at Herborn. Lectured on logic at Leiden and subsequently on ethics and physics. Removed from post 1619 but reinstated 1623. 1621 declined offer of White Professorship of Moral Philosophy at Oxford. Main works: Institutiones physicae (1614); Primæ philosophiæ sive Institutionum metaphysicarum libri sex (1616).

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LEE, Henry (c.1644–1713). Born in Huntingdonshire. Studied at Emmanuel College, Cambridge, where he was appointed fellow. Clergyman by profession. Only known philosophical work, Anti-Scepticism, or, Notes upon each Chapter of Mr Lock’s ‘Essay Concerning Humane Understanding’ (1702). Also a poem, Idea positiva substantiæ immaterialis æque` intelligibilis est ac materialis (1671), and wrote against Tindal in The General Use and Perspicuity of the Gospel Asserted (1730). LE GRAND, Antoine (1627/8–99), Franciscan friar and philosopher, born in the neighbourhood of Douai, in the Spanish Netherlands. Franciscan Recollects at St Bonaventure’s, Douai, in 1647; took his vows in 1648. Ordained priest in 1653, sent to teach philosophy in London, where it seems that his courses were followed by sons of the Roman Catholic gentry. Held various offices among the Franciscans in England. Defended Descartes against Parker and Sergeant. Supplied notes to Bonet’s Latin translation of Rohault’s Traite´ de physique. Philosophical writings: Divine Epicurus, or, The Empire of Pleasure over the Virtues (1676); Philosophia veterum, e mente Renati Descartes more scholastico breviter digesta (1671); Institutio philosophiae secundum principia Renati Descartes, nova methodo adornata et explicata, ad usum juventutis academicae (1672, English translation An Entire Body of Philosophy, 1694); Sage des stoiques (1662, English translation Man without Passion: or, the Wise Stoick (1675); Apologia pro Renato Descartes, contra Samuelem Parkerum (1679); Dissertatio de ratione cognoscendi (1698). LOCKE, John (1632–1704). Born at Wrington, Somerset. Studied at Christ Church, Oxford, where he also taught a range of subjects (Greek, rhetoric, moral philosophy). Appointed secretary to a diplomatic mission to Cleves in 1665. Joined the London household of the chancellor of the exchequer Lord Ashley (subsequently Earl of Shaftesbury) for whom he worked on administrative matters, drafted the ‘Fundamental constitutions of Carolina’ and served as secretary to the council for trade and plantations. His developing interest in medicine brought him into contact with Thomas Sydenham. Travelled in France 1675–9, part of the time as tutor to Caleb Banks. After returning to England, and following the arrest and then flight of his patron, Shaftesbury, and an ensuing plot against the crown (the Rye House plot), retired to the Netherlands, returning to England after the Williamite invasion. Served on Board of Trade. Controversy with Bishop Stillingfleet, befriended Collins and Newton. Retired to live in the household of his friend Lady Damaris Masham at Oates. Writings: Two Tracts on Government (dating from 1660/2); Essays on the Law of Nature (dating from 1664); An Essay Concerning Toleration (1667); Epistola de tolerantia (1689); An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689); A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689); A Second Letter Concerning Toleration (1689); A Third Letter Concerning Toleration (1689); Two Treatises of Government (1690); The Reasonableness of Christianity (1695); Some Thoughts Concerning Education (1693); The Conduct of the Understanding (1697); A Letter to Edward Ld Bishop of Worcester, Concerning some Passages Relating to Mr. Locke’s Essay of Humane Understanding (1697); Mr. Locke’s Reply to the Right Reverend the Lord Bishop of Worcester’s Answer to his Letter (1697); Mr. Locke’s Reply to the Right Reverend the Lord Bishop of Worcester’s Answer to his Second Letter (1699). MACAUGHWELL [MacCaghwell], Hugh [Latin Hugo Cavellus, Irish Aodh Mac Aingil] (c.1571–1626). Born at Sall, County Down. Joined the Franciscans. A leading figure in the Irish e´migre´ community, he was appointed definitor-general of the Franciscan order. Moved to Paris and then Rome, where he read theology at the convent of Ara Coeli. Edited commentaries

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on Scotus, In Tertium et Quartum Sententiarum Quaestiones Subtillisimae (1620) and De anima (1625). His Doctoris subtilis J. Duns Scoti quaestiones super libros Aristotelis de anima (Lyons) was incorporated in Wadding’s 1639 edition of Scotus. MACKENZIE of Rosehaugh, Sir George (1636/8–1691). Born in Dundee. Studied at King’s College, Aberdeen, and St Leonard’s College, St Andrews, and law at the University of Bourges. Career as lawyer, serving as advocate for Dundee and later lord advocate. MP for Rossshire 1669–73. As supporter of the Earl (later Duke) of Lauderdale, earned sobriquet ‘Bluidy Mackenzie’ for his prosecution of prominent covenanters. Strong supporter of Stuart Monarchy, but resigned post because of disagreement with policies of James II. Retired to Oxford. Publications include jurisprudence, moral philosophy, and political theory: systematic exposition of Scots criminal law, Laws and Customs of Scotland in Matters Criminal (1678); defence of monarchy against resistance theory, Jus regium, or, The just and solid foundations of monarchy in general, and more especially of the monarchy of Scotland (1684). Philosophical writings: Religio Stoici (1663); Moral Essays Preferring Solitude to Publick Employment (1665); Morall Gallantry (1667); A Moral Paradox: Maintaining that it is much Easier to be Virtuous than Vitious (1667); Reason: An Essay (1690); The Moral History of Frugality and its Opposite Vices (1691); Essays upon Several Moral Subjects (1713). MAKDOWELL (MacDowell), William. Born in October 1590 in Makerstoun, Roxburghshire, died in or before 1666. Education: St Andrews University, where he was philosophy master at St Leonard’s College before taking his degree. Appointed professor of philosophy at Groningen University 1614. A leading Presbyterian, he was involved in negotiations with the exiled Charles II and succeeded Sir William Boswell as the king’s agent at The Hague. Failed to achieve preferment at the Restoration. MASHAM, Damaris, ne´e Cudworth (1658–1708). Born in Cambridge. Married Sir Francis Masham (c.1646–1723), a gentleman widower with nine children. Close friend of John Locke, whom she met in 1682, and with whom she corresponded until he came to live at her home in Oates, Essex, during his final years. Corresponded with Le Clerc and Leibniz. Wrote a memoir of Locke which was used as a source by Locke’s earliest biographers. With Locke’s encouragement she published A Discourse Concerning the Love of God (1696); Occasional Thoughts in Reference to a Vertuous or Christian Life (1705). MOOR (Morus), Michael (1640–1726). Born in Dublin. Studied in at the College of the Oratorians in Nantes, and philosophy and theology at the University of Paris. Ordained priest by Luke Wadding; chaplain to Richard Talbot, Earl of Tyrconnell. Appointed provost of Trinity College, Dublin, by James II, but forced out by Jesuits. Spent time in Paris and Rome. Appointed rector of the University of Paris; then rector and royal professor of philosophy, Greek, and Hebrew at the Colle`ge de Navarre. Philosophical writings: De existentia Dei, et humanae mentis immortalitate, secundum Cartesii et Aristotelis doctrinam (1691); Vera sciendi methodus (1716). MORE, Henry (1614–87). Born in Grantham, Lincolnshire. Studied at Christ’s College, Cambridge, where he was elected fellow in 1641. He remained at the college for the rest of his life, despite attacks on him as a latitudinarian at the Restoration. Corresponded with Descartes 1648–9. Controversy with the alchemist Thomas Vaughan (alias Eugenius Philalethes) 1650–1. More’s pupils included John Finch and Anne Conway, with whom he maintained a lifelong correspondence (published as Conway Letters, 1930). Fellow of the Royal Society 1664. More first published philosophical poems which express his Neoplatonism and early Cartesianism

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(Psychodia Platonica, Democritus Platonissans), developed further in An Antidote against Atheism (1653), Conjectura Cabbalistica (1655), Of the Immortality of the Soul (1659); An Explanation of the Grand Mystery of Godliness (1660), A Collection of Several Philosophical Writings (1662), Divine Dialogues (1668), Enchiridion ethicum (1668, translated as An Account of Virtue 1690); Enchiridion metaphysicum (1671); Opera Omnia (1678–9). An admirer of the heterodox theologian Origen, More also wrote extensively on biblical prophecy, and contributed commentaries to the edition and translation of cabbalist texts by Knorr von Rosenroth, Kabbalah Denudata. MURDISON, John. Birthplace and education unknown. Taught at Leiden 1603–5, taught philosophy at Middleburg 1607, where one of his pupils was Antonius Walaeus; delegate at the Synod of Dort; and author of Compendium ethicae Aristotelicae ad normam veritatis Christianae revocatum (1620). NEWTON, Sir Isaac (1642–1727). Born at Woolsthorpe near Grantham, Lincolnshire. Studied at Trinity College, Cambridge, where he was elected fellow. Pursued interests in mathematics, optics, and astronomy, as well as biblical theology and chemistry. Appointed Lucasian Chair of Mathematics in 1669. Elected Fellow of the Royal Society 1672. Persuaded to publish Principia by Edmond Halley. Elected MP for the University of Cambridge 1688 and 1701. Appointed Warden and then Master of the Mint, in 1700. President of the Royal Society from 1703. Widely acclaimed for his ground-breaking work in mathematics and cosmology, elected foreign Associate of the Acade´mie Royale, Paris, 1699, and the subject of a posthumous E´loge by Fontenelle, 1727. Nevertheless, involved in a number of bitter disputes, most notably with Robert Hooke (1686–8), John Flamsteed (1694–5), and Leibniz (1713–15). Major publications: Philosophiæ naturalis principia mathematica (1687, translated by Andrew Motte as The Philosophical Principles of Natural Philosophy 1729), and Opticks: or, A treatise of the reflexions, refractions, inflexions and colours of Light (1704). Newton also wrote on alchemy, biblical prophecy, biblical chronology, and religious history: these writings were not published, apart from his work on biblical chronology. NORRIS, John (1657–1712). Born Collingbourne Kingston, Wiltshire. Studied at Winchester College and Exeter College, Oxford, elected fellow at All Souls College. Corresponded with Henry More (1685–6). Appointed vicar of Bemerton, Salisbury, Wiltshire, on the recommendation of John Locke, with whom he subsequently quarrelled. Encouraged several women’s intellectual pursuits, among them Mary Chudleigh, Damaris Masham, and Mary Astell. Writings: A Collection of Miscellanies (1687); The Theory and Regulation of Love (1688); Reason and Religion (1689); Practical Discourses upon Several Divine Subjects (1691); Letters Concerning the Love of God (with Mary Astell) (1695); An Essay towards the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World (1701); Cursory Reflections upon a Book call’d, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690); Christian Blessedness (1690); A Letter to Mr Dodwell Concerning the Immortality of the Soul of Man (1709). PARKER, Samuel (1640–88). Born at Northampton. Studied at Wadham College, Oxford, transferring to Trinity College. Pursued career in Restoration Church rising from chaplain to Archbishop Sheldon to appointment as Bishop of Oxford by James II. Fellow of the Royal Society but never an active member. Attacked Epicureanism, Hobbes, Descartes, and the Origenism of Henry More. His views on ecclesiastical government generated controversy, attacked by e.g. Andrew Marvell in his Rehearsal Transpros’d, but regarded favourably by James II who nominated him President of Magdalen College in 1686 against the wishes of the

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college. Main works: Tentamina de Deo (1665); A Free and Impartial Censure of the Platonic Philosophy (1666); An Account of the Nature and Extent of the Divine Dominion and Goodness (1666); A Discourse of Ecclesiastical Polity, Disputationes de Deo et providentia divina (1678); A Demonstration of the Divine Authority of the Law of Nature (1681). PAYNE, Robert (1596–1651). Born in Abingdon, Berkshire. Studied at Christ Church, Oxford. Fellowship at Pembroke College. Appointed chaplain to William, successively Earl, Marquess, and Duke of Newcastle. Member of the so-called Welbeck circle, the intellectual and scientific circle around William and Charles Cavendish which included Walter Warner, John Pell, and his close friend Thomas Hobbes. Appointed Canon of Christ Church, Oxford, and royal chaplain. Expelled from Oxford in 1648. None of his papers were published. POWER, Henry (c.1626–68). Born in Annesley, Nottinghamshire. Studied at Christ’s College, Cambridge, graduating MD 1655. Practised in Halifax and subsequently Wakefield, Yorkshire. Belonged to a group interested in new natural philosophy and in performing experiments. Elected fellow of the Royal Society. Principal publication: Experimental Philosophy (1664 [1663]). PUNCH [Ponce; Poncius], John (1599–1672/3). Born in Cork. Studied at the Irish college at Louvain, where he entered the Franciscan order. Studied philosophy at Cologne and the Irish college St Isidore’s, Rome, where he taught philosophy, and served as rector. Assisted Wadding in editing the works of John Duns Scotus. Moved to Paris 1648. Published mainly Scotist theology and philosophy: Philosophiae cursus integer (1642–3), Scotus Hibernae restitutus (Paris, 1660), Commentarii theologici (1661). RAY, John [Wray] (1627–1705). Born at Black Notley, near Braintree, Essex. Studied at Trinity College, Cambridge, where he was elected to a minor fellowship. Held a succession of college positions. Although a loyal member of the Church of England, forfeited his fellowship at Trinity for conscientious reasons. At Trinity met patron and collaborator Francis Willughby, and Peter Courthope. Encouraged in his botanical studies by Nidd, Willughby, Courthope, and John Worthington. Made botanical tours of England, Scotland, and Wales, as well as Europe, recorded in The Observations Topographical, Moral, and Physiological (1673). Intervened in contemporary natural philosophical debates, such as that about fossil shells generated by Steno’s Prodromus (1669). Corresponded with Edward Lhwyd and others about the nature of fossils. Main writings: Discourse Concerning the Nature, Causes and Power of Mixture (1675); Historia plantarum (1686, 1688); Wisdom of God Manifested in the Works of Creation (1691). RICHARDSON, Alexander (d. in or before 1621). Native of Surrey. Studied at Queens’ College, Cambridge. Set up school in Barking, Essex, where he offered preparation for MA and where his students included William Ames, John Barlow, Daniel Cawdrey, Charles Chauncy, John Greenham, Thomas Hooker, George Walker, and John Yates. Main publication: The Logicians School-Master, or, A Comment upon Ramus ‘Logicke’ (1629). RITSCHEL, Georg (1616–83). Born in Deutschkahn (Neˇmacke´ Chvojno), in Lutheran northern Bohemia. Studied at Strasbourg University. Forced into exile by anti-Protestant persecution. Travelled to Oxford, Leiden, The Hague, Amsterdam, and Sorø in Denmark. Worked with the Danish professor of logic Johann Rave, and then with the exiled Moravian educationist J. A. Comenius, on whose behalf he travelled to Sweden, Hamburg, the Netherlands, and England, where he became an associate of Samuel Hartlib. After a spell as headmaster of Newcastle upon Tyne grammar school, became an Anglican clergyman in

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Hexham, Northumberland. Only philosophical work is his Contemplationes metaphysicæ ex naturaˆ rerum & rectæ rationis lumine deductae, Oxford, 1648. RUST, George (d. 1670). Natural philosopher. Born in Cambridge. Studied at St Catharine’s Hall, Cambridge. Elected fellow of Christ’s College, 1649, where he was close to Henry More, whose influence with Lord Conway probably led to Rust’s appointment, in 1660 as Dean of Connor, in Ireland. Succeeded Jeremy Taylor, Bishop of Dromore. Works: Letter of Resolution Concerning Origen (1661, published anonymously); A Discourse of Truth (1677); A Discourse of the Use of Reason in Matters of Religion, printed in Two Discourses (1683). RUTHERFORD, Samuel (c.1600–61). Born at Nisbet, near Crailing, in south-east Scotland. Educated at University of Edinburgh. Appointed professor of divinity at New College, St Andrews, 1639, declining subsequent calls from the universities of Edinburgh and Harderwyck. Influential in interregnum ecclesiastical and political affairs, as leading covenanter and opponent of monarchy. Appointed Scottish commissioner to Westminster assembly 1643–7. Deprived of professorship at the Restoration when it was ordered that his main political work, Rex Lex or, The Law and the Prince, be burned. SALL, Andrew (c.1620–1682), Born in Cashel, County Tipperary. Probably educated by Jesuits in Spain, where he taught philosophy for seventeen years at various Jesuit colleges including Pamplona, Palencia, Tudela, and Salamanca, and served as the rector of the Irish College in Salamanca in 1652. Converted to Protestantism after return to Ireland. Involved with project to publish an Irish translation of the Old Testament. Published one philosophical work, Ethica, sive Moralis philosophia ex veterum, & recentiorum sententiis (1680). SANDERSON, Robert (1587–1663). Born in Sheffield. Studied at Lincoln College, Oxford, where he was fellow. From 1619 embarked on an ecclesiastical career till appointed Regius Professor of Divinity, 1646, but deprived by Parliament. Supported by Boyle until Restoration when consecrated Bishop of Lincoln. Work: Logicæ artis compendium (1615); Physicae scientiae compendium (1671, dates from before 1619); De juramenti promissorii obligatione (1646); De obligatione conscientiae (1646). SCOUGAL, Henry (1650–78). Born probably at Leuchars, Fife. Studied at King’s College, Aberdeen, where he was appointed regent and, in 1674, professor of divinity, after serving as minister of Auchterless, Aberdeenshire. Writings: The Life of God in the Soul of Man (1677) and Essays Moral and Divine (published in 1740); and an unpublished manuscript on moral philosophy,‘Philosophia moralis tractatus’. SERGEANT, John (1623–1707). Born in Barrow upon Humber, Lincolnshire. Studied at St John’s College, Cambridge. After conversion to Catholicism and studies at the English College, Lisbon, he was appointed secretary to the English chapter in London, where he became a noted controversialist, taking on churchmen like John Bramhall, Jeremy Taylor, John Tillotson, and Edward Stillingfleet as well as the new philosophies of Descartes and Locke. Leader of ‘Blackloists’ following death of Thomas White. Philosophical works: The Method to Science (1696); Solid Philosophy Asserted, against the Fancies of the Ideists: or, the Method to Science Farther Illustrated. With Reflexions on Mr Locke’s ‘Essay Concerning Human Understanding’ (1697); Transnatural Philosophy, or Metaphysics (1700). SHAFTESBURY. See COOPER, Anthony Ashley. SIDNEY [Sydney], Algernon (1623–83). Born at Baynard’s Castle, London. Son of Robert Sidney, second Earl of Leicester (1595–1677), great-nephew of Sir Philip Sidney. Educated at home and then in France, possibly at the Huguenot academy at Saumur. Fought for Parliament

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in Civil War. Defended regicide but disillusioned by Cromwell. Self-exile in Europe after Restoration. Returned to England 1678. Implicated in Rye House plot. Executed for treason. Principal writings: ‘Court Maxims’ (written 1665–6), Discourses Concerning Government (1698). SMITH, John (1618–52). Born in Achurch, near Oundle in Northamptonshire. Studied at Emmanuel College, Cambridge, where he came under the influence of Benjamin Whichcote. Appointed fellow and mathematical lecturer at Queens’ College in 1644, following ejection of dons during the Civil War. His only writings were published posthumously as Select Discourses, edited by Simon Patrick in 1660. STERRY, Peter (1613–72). Born in St Olave, Southwark. Studied at Emmanuel College, Cambridge, where he was elected fellow and came under the influence of Benjamin Whichcote. Chaplain to Robert Greville, Lord Brooke. Nominated to Westminster Assembly of Divines. Preached before Parliament 1645; appointed preacher to the council of state and to Oliver Cromwell. Appointed to negotiate with Menasseh ben Israel over the readmission of the Jews to England. Retired from public life at Restoration to live in the community, the Lovely Society, which he founded in West Sheen. Main publication: Discourse of the Freedom of the Will published posthumously (1675). STEUART, Adam (1591–1654). Birthplace and education unknown. Professor of philosophy at Saumur (successor to Franco Burgersdijk) and at Sedan. Professor of physics and of metaphysics at Leiden. A militant covenanter who attended the Westminster Assembly of Divines 1644, engaged in scholastic-style debate with those who did not share his beliefs. Took anti-Cartesian stand in the debates surrounding Cartesianism at Leiden alongside Jacobus Revius and Gisbert Voet. No philosophical writings apart from disputation theses published in Leiden in 1646 and 1648 and De Deo (not extant). STILLINGFLEET, Edward (1635–99). Born at Cranborne, Dorset. Studied at St John’s College, Cambridge, where he was elected fellow and graduated DD. Embarked on clerical career, coming to prominence at the Restoration for championing church unity. Appointed royal chaplain and Dean of St Paul’s. Opposed James II’s religious policies. Bishop of Worcester 1689. Disputed with Locke. Relevant publications: Irenicum: A Weapon-salve for the Churches Wounds (1661); Origines sacræ, or A Rational Account of the Grounds of Christian Faith (1662); Discourse in Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity (1696); A Discourse in Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity (1696); The Bishop of Worcester’s Answer to Mr. Locke’s Second letter (1698). TINDAL, Matthew (1657–1733), freethinker and lawyer. Baptized at Bere Ferrers, Devon. Studied at Oxford, at Lincoln College and at Exeter College, then held a law fellowship at All Souls College. Converted to Catholicism but became strong critic of Catholicism and of the church establishment after reversion to Protestantism. Gave legal justification for the Williamite revolution of 1688, and defended liberty of conscience. Writings: An Essay Concerning Obedience to Supreme Powers (1694); An Essay Concerning the Laws of Nations and the Rights of Sovereigns (1694); An Essay Concerning the Power of the Magistrate, and the Rights of Mankind in Matters of Religion (1697); The Rights of the Christian Church asserted, against the Romish, and all other priests who claim an independent power over it (1706); Christianity as Old as the Creation (1731). TOLAND, John (1670–1722). Born on Inishowen peninsula, County Donegal, Ireland (probably baptized Sea´n Eoghain, i.e. Sean Owen). Converted to Protestantism, studied at

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the Universities of Glasgow and Edinburgh and at the Universities of Leiden and Utrecht. Associated with Locke’s inner circle in the Netherlands. Patronized by prominent Whigs (including Anthony Collins). Sometime political propagandist for Robert Harley, later first Earl of Oxford, through whom he was appointed secretary to the embassy of Hanover where he met the Electress Sophia, her daughter, Sophie Charlotte, Queen of Prussia (the ‘Serena’ of Letters to Serena), and Leibniz. Also met Pierre Bayle. Edited writings of prominent Commonwealthmen. Writings: Christianity not Mysterious (1695, with a 1696 imprint); Letters to Serena (1704); Origines judaicae (1709); Adeisidaemon (1709); Reasons for Naturalizing the Jews (1714); The Art of Restoring (1714); Nazarenus or Jewish, Gentile and Mahometan Christianity (1718); Tetradymus (1720); and Pantheisticon (1720) . TROTTER, Catharine, married name Cockburn (1679–1749). Playwright and philosopher. Born in High Holborn, London. Little is known of her education, but she apparently studied Latin and logic. First published works: an epistolary novella, The Adventures of a Young Lady, and five plays. Married the Revd Patrick Cockburn. Friend of Elizabeth Burnet. Defended Locke’s Essay in print. (Locke expressed his gratitude through gifts of money and books.) Philosophical writings: A Letter to Dr. Holdsworth (1726); A Defence of the ‘Essay of Human Understanding’, Written by Mr. Lock (1702); A Discourse Concerning a Guide in Controversies (1707). Collected writings published by Thomas Birch: The Works of Mrs. Catharine Cockburn (1751). TYRELL, James (1642–1718). Born at St Giles in the Fields, London. Studied at Queen’s College, Oxford. Qualified as barrister at Inner Temple, but does not appear to have practised as a lawyer. Close friend and collaborator of Locke, whose political views he shared. Writings: Patriarcha non monarcha (1681); Bibliotheca politica: or a Brief Discourse . . . whether Monarchy be Jure Divino (1692); A Brief Disquisition of the Laws of Nature (1692); A General History of England (1697–1704). WADDING, Luke [name in religion Francis] (1588–1657). Born in Waterford, Ireland. Joined Franciscans, and was ordained priest. Studied at Leiria, Lisbon, and the University of Coimbra where he was taught by the Jesuit philosopher Francisco Sua´rez. Studied Hebrew in Alba de Tormes, and taught theology at Leo´n and at the University of Salamanca while he was director of the Franciscan students and chaplain to the Poor Clares. Founded Irish College at Rome (St Isidore’s). Worked for Irish Catholic cause and edited the works of John Duns Scotus, Joannis Duns Scoti, opera Omnia (1639). WHICHCOTE, Benjamin (1609–83). Born in Stoke, Shropshire, 1609. Studied at Emmanuel College, Cambridge, where he was elected fellow in 1633 and where he was a formative influence on other fellows who were later identified as the Cambridge Platonists: Cudworth, Culverwell, Smith, and Sterry. Appointed Provost of King’s College in 1645, and vice-chancellor of the University of Cambridge in 1650. Advised Cromwell on the readmission of the Jews to England, 1655. Ejected from King’s College at the Restoration. Subsequently lived as a clergyman in London, succeeding Wilkins as vicar of St Lawrence Jewry in 1668. Writings published posthumously: Theophoroumena dogmata, or Some Select Notions (1685); Select Sermons (1698, edited by Shaftesbury); Several Discourses (1701–7); Eight Letters of Dr Antony Tuckney and Dr Benjamin Whichcote (1703); Moral and Religious Aphorisms (1703). WHITBY, Daniel (1637/8–1726), Church of England clergyman and author. Born at Rushden, Northamptonshire. Studied at Trinity College, Oxford, where he was elected fellow. Chaplain to Seth Ward, Bishop of Salisbury; ultimately held various livings in the diocese.

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Latitudinarian, associated with Gilbert Burnet. Later defended Samuel Clarke’s Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity. Author of Ethices Compendium (1684). WHITE, Thomas (1593–1676). Born into a Catholic family in Hutton, Essex. He was educated at the Catholic colleges on the continent: Douai, St Omer, Valladolid, Seville, Louvain, Lisbon. Ordained priest in 1617. Leader of the ‘Blackloist’ group of Catholics which included Kenelm Digby and John Sergeant. Campaigned for toleration of Catholics. Publications: De mundo (1642); Institutionum peripateticarum (1647, translated as Peripateticall Institutions, 1656); Euclides physicus, sive De principiis naturæ stœcheidea (1657); Institutionum ethicarum, sive Stateræ morum (1660); Sciri, sive sceptices & scepticorum a` jure disputationis exclusio (1663, translated as An exclusion of scepticks from all title to dispute, 1665). WILKINS, John (1614–72). Born in Northamptonshire, probably at Canons Ashby. Studied at New Inn Hall and Magdalen Hall, Oxford. Embarked on career as clergyman, while pursuing interests in natural philosophy through association with same group interested in natural philosophy as Francis Glisson. Interests also in cryptography and linguistic theory. Close to the Cromwellian regime (Cromwell was his brother-in-law). Appointed Warden of Wadham College, Oxford (1648–59), and Master of Trinity College, Cambridge (1659). Resumed clerical role at Restoration, helped to found Royal Society. Vicar of St Lawrence Jewry, London (1662); Bishop of Chester (1668). Principal writings: The Discovery of a New World in the Moone (1638); Mercury, or the Secret and Swift Messenger (1641); Mathematical Magick, or, The Wonders that may be Performed by Mechanical Geometry (1648); An Essay towards a Real Character and a Philosophical Language (1668); Of the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion (1675).

Bibliography of Books and Articles Consulted Reference Works Anstey, Peter (ed.). Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Philosophy, ed. Knud Haakonssen. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. The Cambridge History of Political Thought, 1450–1700, ed. J. H. Burns and Mark Goldie. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, ed. Charles Schmitt, Quentin Skinner, and Eckhard Kessler. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, ed. Dan Garber and Michael Ayers. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Clarke, Desmond and Catherine Wilson (eds). The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy in Early Modern Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. The Columbia History of Western Philosophy, ed. Richard H. Popkin. New York: Columbia University Press, c.1999. The Dictionary of Seventeenth-Century British Philosophers, general editor Andrew Pyle. 2 vols. Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 2000. Early English Books Online (EEBO). Jisc Historic Books. . English Short Title Catalogue (ESTC). . Nadler, Stephen (ed.). A Companion to Early Modern Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell, 2002. Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, ed. Colin Matthew et al. Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Sept. 2010 . Rutherford, Donald (ed.). The Cambridge Companion to Early Modern Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Schobinger, J. P. (ed.). Die Philosophie des 17. Jahrhunderts. Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, Bd. 3 (1–2). Basel: Schwabe and Co., 1988. Shaaber, M. Check-list of Works of British Authors printed abroad, in languages other than English, to 1641. Bibliographical Society of America, 1978. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, principal editor Edward N. Zalta. . Primary Sources Abercromby, David. Academia scientiarum. London, 1687. Ames, William. Technometry, trans., with introduction and commentary, by Lee W. Gibbs. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1979. Anon. The Life of Benedict de Spinosa. London, 1706.

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Anon. Theologia Germanica, or Mysticall Divinity: A little golden manuall, trans. Giles Randall. London, 1646. Arnauld, Antoine and Pierre Nicole. Logic, or, The Art of Thinking: Containing, besides Common rules, Several New Observations Appropriate for Forming Judgement, trans. and ed. Jill Vance Buroker. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Astell, Mary. Letters Concerning the Love of God. London, 1695. Astell, Mary. A Serious Proposal to the Ladies for the Advancement of their True and Greatest Interest. Part 1. London, 1694. Astell, Mary. A Serious Proposal to the Ladies, part II: wherein a method is offer’d for the improvement of their minds. London, 1697. Astell, Mary. Some Reflections upon Marriage. London, 1700. Astell, Mary and John Norris. Letters Concerning the Love of God, ed. E. Derek Taylor and Melvyn New. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005. Aubrey, John. Brief Lives, ed. Andrew Clark. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1898. Aubrey, John. Aubrey on Education: A Hitherto Unpublished Manuscript by the Author of Brief Lives, ed. J. E. Stephens. London: Routledge and K. Paul, 1972. Bacon, Francis. The Advancement of Learning, ed. with an introduction, notes, and commentary by Michael Kiernan. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000. Bacon, Francis. The Advancement of Learning, ed. with an introduction, notes, and commentary by Michael Kiernan. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002. Bacon, Francis. The Essayes or Counsels, Civill and Morall. London, 1625 (1597). Bacon, Francis, New Atlantis. Printed with Sylva sylvarum 1627. Bacon, Francis. The New Organon, ed. Lisa Jardine and Michael Silverthorne. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Bacon, Francis, The Novum Organum of Sir Francis Bacon, Baron of Verulam, Viscount St. Albans epitomiz’d, for a clearer understanding of his natural history. London, 1676. Bacon, Francis. Of the Proficience and Aduancement of Learning, Diuine and Humane. London, 1605. Bacon, Francis. The Oxford Francis Bacon, general editor Graham Rees. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996–. Bacon, Francis. Resuscitatio, or, Bringing into publick light severall pieces of the works, ed. William Rawley. London, 1657. Bacon, Francis. Sylva sylvarum. London, 1627. Barclay, William. De regno et regali potestate. Paris, 1600. Barlow, Thomas. Autoschediasmata, de studio theologiae, or Directions for the choice of books in the study of divinity. Oxford, 1699. Barlow, Thomas. Exercitationes aliquot metaphysicæ, de Deo: quo`d sit objectum metaphysicæ, quo`d sit naturaliter cognoscibilis, quousque, & quibus mediis. Oxford, 1637, reprinted 1658. Barlow, Thomas. The Genuine Remains of that Learned Prelate Dr. Thomas Barlow, Late Lord Bishop of Lincoln. London, 1693. Barlow, Thomas. A Library for Younger Schollers, ed. with bibliographical index, by Alma De Jordy and Harris Francis Fletcher. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1961. Baron, Robert. Metaphysica generalis. Leiden, 1654; London, 1657.

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Bayle, Pierre. Continuation des pense´es diverses sur la come`te, republished in his Œuvres diverses. Rotterdam, 1721. Bayle, Pierre. Dictionnaire historique et critique. 3rd edn. 4 vols. Rotterdam, 1720. Bayle, Pierre. Pense´es diverses sur la come`te. Rotterdam, 1683. Bayle, Pierre. Re´ponses aux questions d’un provincial. Rotterdam, 1704–7. Bentley, Richard. The Folly and Unreasonableness of Atheism. London, 1692. Berkeley, George. The Works of George Berkeley Bishop of Cloyne, ed. A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop. 9 vols. London: T. Nelson, 1948–51. Berns, Michael. Alter der Atheı¨sten, der Heyden, und der Christen. Hamburg, 1692. Bibliothe`que choisie, ed. Jean Le Clerc. Amsterdam, 1703–13. Blount, Charles. Great is Diana of the Ephesians. London, 1680. Blount, Charles. Miracles, No Violations of the Laws of Nature. London, 1683. Blount, Charles. Religio laici. London, 1683. Bodin, Jean. Les Six Livres de la re´publique. Paris, 1576. Bossuet, Jacques Be´nigne. Politique tire´e de l’ecriture sainte. Paris, 1682. Boyle, Robert. Certain Physiological Essays. London, 1661. Boyle, Robert. The Christian Virtuoso. London, 1690. Boyle, Robert. A Defence of the Doctrine Touching the Spring and Weight of the Air, against the Objections of Franciscus Linus. London, 1662. Boyle, Robert. Disquisition about the Final Causes of Natural Things. London, 1688. Boyle, Robert. An Examen of Mr T. Hobbes his Dialogus physicus. Printed in second edition of New Experiments. London, 1662. Boyle, Robert. The Excellency of Theology, Compar’ed with Natural Philosophy. London, 1674. Boyle, Robert. A Free Enquiry into the Vulgarly Receiv’d Notion of Nature. London, 1686. Boyle, Robert. An Hydrostatical Discourse Occasioned by the Objections of the Learned Dr. Henry More. London, 1672. Boyle, Robert. Hydrostatical Paradoxes. Oxford, 1666. Boyle, Robert. New Experiments Physico-Mechanical, Touching the Spring of the Air and its Effects. Oxford, 1660. Boyle, Robert. The Origin of Forms and Qualities. Oxford, 1666. Boyle, Robert. Tracts Written by the Honourable Robert Boyle: About the Cosmicall Qualities of Things. Oxford, 1671. Boyle, Robert. The Works of Robert Boyle, ed. Michael Hunter and Edward B. Davis. 14 vols. London: Pickering and Chatto, 1999–2000. Bradwardine, Thomas. De causa Dei, contra Pelagium, et de virtute causarum, ad suos Mertonenses, libri tres, ed. Henry Savile. London, 1618. Bramhall, John. Castigations of Mr Hobbes. London, 1658. Bramhall, John. A Defence of True Liberty from Antecedent and Extrinsecall Necessity. London, 1655. Bramhall, John. The Works of Archbishop Bramhall. 5 vols. Oxford: John Henry Parker, 1842–5. Buchanan, George. De jure regno apud Scotos. Edinburgh, 1579. Burgersdijk, Franco. Institutionum metaphysicarum libri duo. Leiden, 1640. Burthogge, Richard. Essay upon Reason and the Nature of Spirits. London, 1694. Burthogge, Richard. Of the Soul of the World, and of Particular Souls. London, 1699.

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Burthogge, Richard. Organum vetus & novum, or, A discourse of reason and truth wherein the natural logick common to mankinde is briefly and plainly described. London, 1678. Carmichael, Gershom. Natural Rights on the Threshold of the Scottish Enlightenment: The Writings of Gershom Carmichael, ed. James Moore and Michael Silverthorne; texts translated from the Latin by Michael Silverthorne. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2002. Carpenter, Nathaniel. Philosophia libera. Frankfurt, 1621; Oxford, 1622. Carroll, William. A Dissertation upon the Tenth Chapter of the Fourth Book of Mr. Locke’s Essay, Concerning Humane Understanding. Wherein that author’s endeavours to establish Spinoza’s atheistical hypothesis, more especially in that tenth chapter, are discover’d and confuted. London, 1706. Cavendish, Margaret, Political Writings, ed. Susan James. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Cavendish, Margaret, Duchess of Newcastle. Grounds of Natural Philosophy. London, 1668. Cavendish, Margaret, Duchess of Newcastle. Observations on Experimental Philosophy. London, 1666. Cavendish, Margaret, Duchess of Newcastle. Observations upon Experimental Philosophy, ed. E. O’Neill. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Cavendish, Margaret, Duchess of Newcastle. Orations. London, 1662. Cavendish, Margaret, Duchess of Newcastle. Philosophical and Physical Opinions. London, 1655. Cavendish, Margaret, Duchess of Newcastle. Philosophical Letters. London, 1664. Cavendish, Margaret, Duchess of Newcastle. Philosophicall Fancies. London, 1653. Cavendish, Margaret, Duchess of Newcastle. Sociable Letters. London, 1664. Cavendish, Margaret, Duchess of Newcastle. The World’s Olio. London, 1655. Charleton, Walter. Darkness of Atheism: A Physico-Theological Treatise. London, 1650. Charleton, Walter. Immortality of the Human Soul. London, 1657. Charleton, Walter. Natural History of the Passions. London, 1674. Charleton, Walter. Physiologia Epicuro-Gassendo-Charltoniana: or A fabrick of science natural, upon the hypothesis of atoms, founded Epicurus. London, 1654. Charron, Pierre. Of Wisedome, trans. Samson Lennard. London, 1608. Clarke, Samuel. A Collection of Papers which passed between the late learned Mr Leibnitz and Dr Clarke in the years 1715 and 1716. London, 1717. Clarke, Samuel. A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, ed. Ezio Vailati. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Clerke, Gilbert. De plenitudine mundi. London, 1660. Cockburn, Catharine. See Trotter-Cockburn, Catharine. Colerus, Jean. The Life of Benedict de Spinosa. London, 1706. Collier, Arthur, Clavis universalis: or, a New Inquiry after Truth. Being a Demonstration of the Non-existence, or Impossibility, of an External World. London, 1713. Collins, Anthony. A Discourse of Freethinking. London, 1713. Conway, Anne. Principia philosophiae antiquissimae et recentissimae. Amsterdam, 1690. Conway, Anne. The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy, trans. Allison P. Coudert and Taylor Corse. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Cooper, Anthony Ashley, third Earl of Shaftesbury. Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, ed. Lawrence E. Klein. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

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Name Index Abercromby, David 12, 15, 19, 34, 39, 178, 227 Adam 116, 117, 125, 189 Aegidio Romano 41 Akehurst, Alexander 41 Albertus Magnus 18 Alexander of Hales 36 Alsted, Johann Heinrich 89 Ames, William 33, 49, 55, 88–9, 228 Amyraut, Moı¨se 55 Angers, university 53 Anne, Queen 217 Aristotle 5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 19, 20, 22, 58, 61, 62, 63, 72–7, 80–2, 84–91, 97, 102, 105, 106, 110, 117, 123, 124, 137, 162–3, 165, 163, 164, 174, 179, 206, 220, 229 and curriculum 14, 28, 29, 33–8, 42, 43, 44, 45, 73–4, 76, 77 Categories 33, 43, 77, 85, 89, 106 Nichomachean ethics 38 Organon 11, 28, 33, 36, 37, 76 Rhetoric 77 Physics 10, 14, 40, 41 See also Aristotelianism Arnauld, Antoine 12, 37, 68, 194, 214 Arriaga, Jorge Herna´ndez 34 Ashe, St George 46 Astell, Mary 21, 22, 56, 198, 115, 216, 217–18, 219, 227, 237 Atterbury, Francis 22, 45, 69 Attwood, William 198 Aubrey, John 70, 74, 76, 102, 120, 129 Augustine of Hippo 58, 127 Ayleworth, William 43 Bacon, Francis, Viscount St Albans 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 11, 15, 16, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 28, 30, 32, 33, 36, 40, 41, 51, 52, 54, 56, 58, 62, 66, 72, 73, 74–5, 76, 85, 87, 89–91, 92–104, 105, 111, 112–13, 119, 120, 129, 142, 160, 161, 163, 164, 165, 169, 174, 180, 181, 186, 224, 225, 227, 234 classification of knowledge 98–9 critique of Aristotle 89–91, 163, 164 epistemology 85, 94–5, 98–102 ‘idols’ 97, 101 induction 98, 100, 103, 130, 165, 174 intellectual milieu 94–5 metaphysics 16, 99–100 method 18, 99–100, 103, 112–13, 164, 174

moral philosophy 90, 93, 96, 98, 100–2 natural philosophy 93, 94–5, 97, 99, 102, 112, 120, 164, 165, 169 reception and influence 17, 18, 23, 34, 36, 61, 73, 93, 101–13, 109, 160, 174, 180, 185, 186, 224, 225, 227, 234 reform of philosophy 95–8 Advancement of Learning 20, 33, 96, 97, 98, 100, 101 Essayes 40, 94, 97, 101, 102, 119, 129 New Atlantis 23, 97, 101, 102 Novum organum 11–12, 36, 94, 95, 96, 97, 99, 100, 102, 104 Sylva sylvarum 36, 51, 62, 95, 97, 102 Bagshaw, Edward 45, 129 Baillie, Robert 45, 68, 128 Balfour, Robert 87 Balguy, John 153, 213 Ban˜ez, Domingo (Dominicus) 40 Banks, Caleb 54, 235 Barbeyrac, Jean 158, 205 Barclay, William 115, 117 Barlow, Thomas 22, 24, 32, 33, 39, 41, 45, 62, 74, 76, 85, 129 Barnes, Joshua 44 Baron, Robert 42, 46, 48, 75, 76, 77, 227 Basnage de Beauval, Henri 57, 150, 205 Basset, Sir Robert 234 Bathurst, Ralph 45, 129 Baudoin, Jean 101 Bayle, Pierre 134, 150, 202, 206, 224, 230, 241 Beeckman, Isaac 103 Bentley, Richard 162, 198, 212, Berkeley, George 4, 46, 49, 69, 89, 197, 203, 208, 214, 202, 220–2, 227 Bernard, Edward 45 Bernier, Franc¸ois 54 Berns, Michael 109 Beurhaus, Friedrich 36 Be`ze (Beza), The´odore de 55 Birch, Thomas 141, 220 Blacklo, see White Blaeu, Joan 133 Blair, William 42, 46 Blome, Richard 67 Blount, Charles 14, 69, 71, 109, 112, 130, 208, 209, 210, 228 Bodin, Jean 115, 117, 121 Boethius 33 Bohun, Ralph 77

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272

NAME INDEX

Boileau-Despreaux, Nicolas 57 Boldero, Edward 43 Bonet, The´ophile 67n, 235 Bonville, Anthony 54 Bossuet, Jacques Be´nigne 134 Boswell, Sir William 53, 110, 236 Boyle, Robert 3, 5, 14, 19, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 28, 41, 45, 54, 57, 62, 63, 70, 103, 126, 158, 160–1, 164, 167, 169, 171, 172–8, 180, 181, 182, 184, 187, 191, 193, 227, 228, 229, 239 corpuscular philosophy 172–3, 174–7, 178 mechanical philosophy 163, 173, 174, 183, 185 response to Hobbes 129, 135 reception and influence 142, 145, 150, 178, 182–4, 185, 193, 224 religious interests/natural theology 161–2, 172, 173–4, 177 on hypothesis 176–7 see also Boyle Lectures Brandenburg, Elector of 53 Bradwardine, Thomas 74 Bramhall, John 25, 91, 148 , 228, 234, 239; debate with Hobbes 127–8 Brerewood, Edward, 35 Browne, Peter 69 Bruno, Giordano 17, 167, 168, 211 Buchanan, George 115, 117 Burgersdijk, Franco 35, 36, 37, 38, 42, 43, 45, 46, 75, 79, 80, 110, 111, 240 Buridan, Jean 18, 39, 74 Burghley, see Cecil Burley, Walter 73 Burnet, Elizabeth 241 Burnet, Gilbert 128, 151, 230, 242 Burnet, Thomas 54, 196, 204 Burnet of Kemnay, Thomas 197, 206 Burnett, James, Lord Monboddo 212 Burridge, Ezekiel 205 Burthogge, Richard 2, 19, 21, 53, 69, 70, 112, 152, 179, 197, 221, 228 Burton, Hezekiah 140 Cajetan, Thomas 39, 76 Cameron, John 55 Campanella, Tommaso 17, 22, 41, 111, 165, 174 Cardano, Girolamo 164 Carmichael, Gershom 14, 37, 38, 41, 44, 46, 47, 64, 208, 228 Carneades 64 Caroline, Queen 227, 229 Carpenter, Nathaniel 20, 41, 229 Carroll, William 71 Case, John 8–10, 39, 73–5, 78, 229 Cassiano dal Pozzo 103 Castellio, Sebastian 170 Catherine of Braganza, Queen 231 Cavellus, see Macaughwell

Cavendish, Sir Charles 55, 62, 120, 238 Cavendish, Margaret, Duchess of Newcastle 21, 22, 51–2, 68, 130, 171, 180, 216–17, 229; and Hobbes 130–1, 171 Cavendish, William, Duke of Newcastle 120, 130, 228, 238 Cecil, William, Lord Burghley 95 Chaderton, Laurence 88 Charles I, King 117, 118, 229, 233 Charles II, King 229, 236 Charleton, Walter 5, 14, 20, 21, 22, 25, 61–2, 130, 146, 161–2, 167, 170–2, 182, 209–10, 225, 229 and Epicureanism 171 and Gassendi 171–2 and Hobbes 128 Charpentier (Carpentarius), Jacques 137 Charron, Pierre 60, 105 Chaˆtelet, Gabrielle Emilie Le Tonnier de Breteuil, Marquise du 193 Chillingworth, William 170 Chouet, Petrus and Jacobus 60 Chudleigh, Mary 215, 237 Cicero 11, 30, 39, 40, 60, 63, 64, 72, 155 Clairaut, Alexis Claude 183 Clarke, John 66, 229 Clarke, Samuel 66, 70, 153, 159, 162, 178, 183, 208, 210, 212–13, 220, 221, 225, 229, 242 and Newton 183, 213 and Leibniz 183, 213, 229 Clauberg, Johannes 35, 41, 42, 45, 46, 80 Clement of Alexandra, St 58, 142 Clerke, Gilbert 66 Clodius, Frederick 174 Cockburn, Alexander 70 Cockburn, Catharine, see Trotter-Cockburn, Catharine Cockburn, Patrick 241 Codrington, Christopher 69 Coimbra Commentators 37, 39, 41, 45, 73, 76, 78 Colerus, Jean 71 Collier, Arthur 21, 69, 91, 214, 220–1, 230 Collier, William 69 Collins, Anthony 209–10, 221, 229, 230, 235, 241 Combachius, Johannes 42 Comenius, Johannes (Jan Amos Komensky) 102, 111, 238 Compton, Thomas Carleton 42, 46, 54, 230 Condillac, E´tienne Bonnot, Abbe´ de 206 Conway, Lady Anne, Viscountess 21, 22, 56, 68, 70, 131, 138, 151, 152–3, 181, 211, 216, 230, 232, 236 Conway, Edward, Viscount 22, 23, 29, 239 Cooper, Anthony Ashley, first Earl of Shaftesbury 55, 188, 191, 201, 232, 235

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NAME INDEX

Cooper, Anthony Ashley, third Earl of Shaftesbury 4, 8–10, 14, 16, 21, 59, 140, 141, 151, 153, 159, 188, 208, 209–10, 211–12, 213, 220, 224, 228, 230, 235, 241 and Cambridge Platonists 140, 141, 150, 153, 159, 212, 241 and Locke 211–12 moral sense 14, 212, 220 Copernicus, Nicolaus 17, 20 Coste, Pierre 205, 206, 214, 219, 230 Cotes, Roger 30, 213 Cotton, Charles 60 Cotton, John 89 Coward, William 198 Cowley, Abraham 114 Craig, John 53 Crakanthorpe 38, 42 Creighton, Robert 47 Crell, Johannes 39, 40 Cromwell, Oliver 47, 117, 140, 231, 233, 240, 241, 242 Crousaz, Jean Pierre 205 Cudworth, Damaris, see Masham, Damaris Cudworth, Ralph 2, 12, 14, 17, 22, 24, 47, 49, 59, 70, 139, 140–58, 154, 167, 171, 179, 181, 192, 194, 197, 200, 212, 213, 218, 222, 224, 225, 230–1, 236, 241 and Hobbes 131–3 and Cumberland 154, 156–7 and Locke 153–4 and Shaftesbury 153–4 plastic nature 148–50, 179, 224 reception 151–4 True Intellectual System 19, 49, 57, 108, 132, 141, 143, 145, 150, 151, 154, 158, 194 A Treatise 133, 141, 143, 145, 146, 151, 154, 156, 158, 224 Culverwell, Nathaniel 22, 112, 137, 138, 140–2, 150, 154, 156n, 231, 241 Cumberland, Richard 5, 13, 40, 131, 133, 136, 154–9, 178, 208, 224, 231 Cureau de la Chambre 40, 57 Dalgarno, George 77 Dalrymple, James, Viscount Stair 14, 20, 21, 55, 70, 146, 169, 231 Davenport, Christopher (Franciscus a` Sancta Clara) 81, 231 Davies, John, of Kidwelly 57, 127 De Dominis, Marc’Antonio 101, 115, 117, 119 De la Court, Johan Pieter 134 De Serres, Jean (Serranus) 59 Democritus 19, 172n, 175; see also Democritean atomism Derham, William 162, 212 Descartes, Rene´ 1, 4, 18, 22, 23, 29, 36, 51, 52, 56, 58, 62–3, 73, 76, 79, 81, 82, 83, 84, 86,

273

91, 102, 103, 104, 107, 130–1, 135, 139, 142, 143–4, 147, 149, 152, 157, 159, 162, 163, 164–7, 170, 171–2, 174, 179, 181, 182, 198, 202, 217, 231, 235, 237, 239 reception in Britain 11–13, 16–19, 64–8 and Herbert 110–11, 112, 113 and Hobbes 120–2 and More 65–6, 141–2, 148, 236 and Newton 182 and Locke 185, 186, 195 in universities 29, 36, 40–7, 65 Discours 51, 65, 215 Meditations 16, 43, 52, 65, 120, 171 Principia philosophiae 74, 165 see also Cartesianism Des Maizeaux, Pierre 230 Dibon, Paul 80 Diodati, E´lie 94, 110 Diogenes Laertius 61, 172 Diderot, Denis 150, 197, 212, 223, 224 Diepenbeck, Abraham van 51 Digby, Everard 52, 88, 137 Digby, Kenelm 22, 41, 44, 52, 62, 65, 66, 72, 80, 81, 82, 83–5, 86, 102, 120, 128, 157, 164, 167, 171, 174, 182, 198, 229, 231, 232 Dionysius the Areopagite (Pseudo-Dionysius) 59, 138 Dodwell, Henry 210, 215, 229, 230 Donaldson, Walter 54, 55, 75, 78, 232 Doni, Agostino 94 Downame, George 88 Drebbel, Cornelius 94 Du Hamel, Jean Baptiste 19, 41 Dun, Patrick 53 Duns Scotus, John 80–1, 236, 238, 241 Duncan, Mark (Marc) 54, 78, 79, 80, 232 Du Trieu 35, 36, 62 Duport, James 47 Duppa, Brian 45 Durandus de St Pourc¸ain 76 Dury (Durie), John 28 Du Vair, Guillaume 60 Earbery, Matthias 71 Edwards, John 196, 198, 199 Edwards, Jonathan 47, 212 Elisabeth, Princess 1n Ent, George 233 Epicurus 19, 61, 62, 67, 132, 171, 172 Epictetus 33, 39, 57, 162 Eschenbach, J.C. 221 Estienne, Henri (Stephanus) 59, 60 Euclid 106, 120, 122, 129 Eustachio a Sancto Paulo (Eustachius of Sancto Paolo) 39, 43, 46, 81 Evelyn, John 61n, 77, 102

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274

NAME INDEX

Fairfax, Nathaniel 53 Fall, James 71 Fernel, Jean 20 Filmer, Robert 77, 116–18, 125, 130, 189 Finch, Sir John 53, 180, 230, 232, 236 FitzSimon, Henry 54 Flamsteed, John 237 Fleming, George 37, 40, 41 Fleming, Henry 41 Fludd, Robert 98, 232 Fonseca, Pedro da 37, 76 Fontenelle, Bernard Le Bovier de 237 Forbes, Robert 43, 67 Fordyce, David 242 Fortin de la Hoguette 94 Fowler, Edward 151 Franciscus a` Sancta Clara, see Davenport Frommenius, Andreas 42 Furly, Benjamin 22, 26, 70, 188, 230 Gale, Theophilus 48, 49 Gale, Thomas 140 Galen 60 Galileo Galilei 17, 44, 81, 83, 94, 102, 103, 119, 163, 165, 166, 172, 174, 182 Gassendi, Pierre 1, 4, 17, 20, 22, 35, 52, 54, 56, 61–2, 71, 82, 87, 93, 102, 103, 104, 107, 110, 111, 113, 120, 122, 143, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 169, 171–2, 174, 182, 185, 210n, 232 and Charleton 20, 167, 171–2 and Epicurus 61–2, 171–2 and universities 41, 44–6 Gastrell, Francis 203 George Elector of Hanover, and King of Britain 7 Geulincx, Arnold 152 Gilbert, William 14, 17, 84, 94, 97, 165, 229, 232 Glanvill (Glanville), Joseph 23, 30, 61, 83, 90, 91, 129, 145, 152, 162, 164, 170, 176, 182, 232 Glisson, Francis 21, 22, 41, 178, 180–1, 198, 232–3, 232 Goclenius, Rudoph 18 Goddard, Jonathan 232, 233 Goodwin, Thomas 48 Gowan, Thomas 35, 233 Gregory, James 30 Gregory, David 41, 42, 48 Gregory of Valencia 39 Greville, Fulke 233 Greville, Robert, Lord Brooke 27, 137, 140, 233, 240 Grew, Nehemiah 150, 162, 179, 233 Groningen 54, 78, 236 Grotius (de Groot), Hugo 4, 23, 40, 56, 59, 63–4, 71, 76, 77, 79, 104, 108, 116, 117, 123, 125, 154, 155, 158 Gruter, Isaac 102

Gruter, Jacob 102 Guienne, Provincial College de Guienne 88 Guilleminot, Jean 34 Hale, Sir Matthew 21, 150, 179, 232, 233 Hall, John 73 Hall, John, of Richmond 129 Hallywell, Henry 112 Halyburton, Thomas 109, 204 Harley, Robert, Earl of Oxford 241 Harrington, James 21, 116, 118, 129, 211, 233–4 Harriot, Thomas 167–8, 234 Harris, John 14, 19, 164 Hartlib, Samuel 55, 56, 66, 111, 174, 238; see also Hartlib circle Harvey, Gabriel 88 Harvey, William 17, 74, 83, 84, 94, 120, 166, 168, 229, 232 Heereboord, Adrian 19, 40, 41, 55, 65, 79, 80, 81, 102, 134 Heidanus, Abraham 79 Heinsius, Daniel 111 Helmont, Francis Mercurius 138, 153, 230 Helmont, Jan Baptiste 131, 171, 174, 179, 181 Henrietta Maria, Queen 231 Henry IV, King of France 107 Herbert of Cherbury, Edward, Lord 2, 3, 4, 5, 20, 21, 22, 26, 38, 40, 52, 53, 56, 59, 62, 63, 65, 71, 92–3, 94, 103–13, 120, 137, 146, 192, 204, 210, 224, 225, 228, 234 reception and influence 109–13, 210, 224, 225, 228 and Descartes 104, 107, 110, 113 and Gassendi 104, 107, 110, 111, 113 and Locke 111, 113, 192 and religious toleration 107–8, 113 De veritate 103–7, 110, 111, 137, 234 Herbert, George 93, 234 Herder, Johann Gottfried 224 Hermes Trismegistus, Hermetic philosophy 19, 138, 232 Hervet, Gentian 60 Hill, Nicholas 18, 167–8, 234 Hobbes, Thomas 1 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 11, 13, 16, 19, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 30, 32, 45, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 70, 71, 74, 80, 82, 85, 91, 92, 95, 102, 109, 111, 113, 114, 116, 118–35, 136, 139, 142, 143, 144, 154–6, 157, 158, 159, 160, 163, 165, 165–6, 168, 171, 172, 174, 178, 185, 185, 187, 190, 199, 200, 209, 216, 228, 229, 231, 234, 237, 238 and Bramhall 127–8 and Cavendish 130–1 and Cudworth 131–3, 155–8 and Cumberland 131, 133, 154–6

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NAME INDEX

moral philosophy 121–2, 125–6, 129, 132, 135, 139, 141, 147–8 natural philosophy 114, 118, 120, 121, 122, 126, 132, 133, 134, 166–7 political philosophy 121–2, 123–5, 132, 134–5 reception and influence 126–35, 142–4, 171, 185–6, 199, 210, 211–12, 213, 220, 222, 225 De Cive 119, 121, 122, 130, 132, 134, 234 De homine 119, 121, 234 Elements of Law 121, 133, 141 Elements of Philosophy 121, 122, 123, 132 Leviathan 23, 57, 111, 113, 115, 118, 121, 122, 123, 126, 129, 130, 132, 133, 134, 135, 199, 234 Holbach, Paul-Henri Thiry, Baron d’Holbach 134 Holdsworth, Richard 37, 44, 76, 154n Holdsworth, Winch 204 Homer 33, 119 Hooke, Robert 28, 66, 150, 161, 160, 169, 233, 237 Hooker, Richard 74, 123 Hooker, Thomas 88, 238 Hotman, Franc¸ois 115 Howie, Robert 87–8 Hübner, Joachim 111 Huet, Pierre Daniel 66 Hume, David 184, 213 Hutcheson, Francis 159, 212, 220 Hutchinson, Lucy 61n Huygens , Christiaan 102, 134, 185 Huygens, Constantijn 94, 103 Hyde, Edward, Earl of Clarendon 34 Iamblichus 33 Ingelo, Nathaniel 23, 140 Jack (Jaccheus), Gilbert 22, 42, 54, 75, 78–80, 87, 234 Jackson, Thomas, 137 James VI & I, King 7, 8, 55, 115 James VII & II, King 1, 7, 55, 236, 237, 240 James, Duke of York 188 James, Thomas 60 Janet, Paul 150 Jeanes, Henry 49 Jefferson, Thomas 212 John Scottus Eriugena 59 Johnson, Samuel 89, 212 Jungius, Joachim 16n, 55, 103, 106n, 137n Keckerman, Bartholomaeus 35, 36, 37, 45, 46, 89 Kepler, Johannes 94, 165, 167, 168, 232, 234 Keill, John 14, 41, 69, 164 Knolles, Richard 115 Knorr von Rosenroth 138, 230, 237 Korholt, Christian 71, 109

275

La Mettrie, Julien Offray de 197, 205 La Mothe, Le Vayer, Franc¸ois de 105 La Pillonie`re, Franc¸ois 55 La Rame´e, see Ramus Launay, Gilles de 54 Law, William 138 Layton, Henry 198 Le Clerc, Jean 41, 42, 44, 46, 49, 57, 150, 151, 188, 197, 205, 219, 230, 236 Lead, Jane 138 Lee, Henry 202–3 Leeuwenhoek, Antonie van 45 Le Grand, Antoine 12n, 44, 45, 46, 61, 67, 81, 235 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm 1, 8, 18, 56, 103, 134, 151, 153, 178, 183, 188, 197, 206, 211, 213, 219, 220, 229, 236, 237, 241 Leighton, Robert 53, 60n, 151 Lennard, Samson 60 Le Vasseur, Michel 55, 68 Lessing, Gotthold 224 Lewis, William 109 Lhwyd (Lhuyd), Edward 238 Liceti, Fortunio 104 Liddel, Duncan 53, 54 Limborch, Philip van 188, 230 Line, Francis (Franciscus Linus) 177 Lips, Joost (Justus Lipsius) 60 Locke, John 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 13, 14, 16, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 32, 34, 35, 37, 38, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 62, 63, 64, 67, 69, 70, 71, 77, 86, 87, 91, 111, 112, 117, 118, 140, 146, 150, 153, 154, 158–9, 162, 163, 172, 174, 178, 182, 184, 185–207, 208–9, 210–11, 214, 215, 216, 218, 219, 220, 221–2, 224, 228, 230, 235, 236, 237, 239, 240, 241 and religious toleration 185, 187, 188, 189, 191, 204, 206–7 and Stillingfleet 195, 106, 201–12 and universities 28, 30, 32, 36, 41, 46–7, 196 charge of scepticism 25, 86, 214, 198–203, 205, 206, 221–2 moral philosophy 187, 190, 191, 194, 195–6, 197, 198, 199, 204 political philosophy 189–91 reception and influence 46–7, 56, 57, 86–7, 91, 101, 112, 146, 158–9, 162, 178, 196–206, 208–15, 219, 220, 221–2, 224 Epistola de tolerantia 188, 189 Essay concerning Human Understanding 12, 16, 37, 47, 56, 111, 153, 159, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 191–6, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 210, 214, 219, 220 Essay Concerning Toleration 188, 191 Reasonableness of Christianity 188, 198, 205

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276

NAME INDEX

Locke, John (cont.) Thoughts concerning Education 188, 195, 196, 205 Two Treatises 47, 117, 185, 187, 188, 189–90, 191, 197, 198, 205 Lockey, Thomas 22 Loftus, Dudley 35 Lowde, James 69, 157, 196, 200 Lower, Richard 133, 180 Lucretius Carus 16, 171 Ludlow, Edmund 118, 211 Lull, Ramon 36, 111 Macaughwell, Hugh (Hugo Cavellus) 54, 80, 235 Machiavelli, Niccolo 74, 116, 118, 121 Mackintosh, Sir James 221 MacIlmaine, Roland 87 Mackenzie, Sir George, of Rosehaugh 21, 53, 60, 236 Magirus, Johannes 37, 182 Magnen, Jean 41 Makdowel (Macdowell), William 54, 78, 236 Malebranche, Nicholas 16, 46, 55, 67, 68–9, 103, 152, 185, 197, 208, 213–17, 219, 220–2, 224 Marcombes, Isaac 54, 228 Marcus Aurelius 33, 39 Mariana, Juan de 125 Marsh, Narcissus 22, 35, 48 Marsilius of Inghen 18 Martin, James (Jacobus Martinus, Jacques Martin) 41, 87 Martinez, Gregorius 39 Mary II, Queen 151 Mary, Queen of Scots 117 Masham, Damaris, Lady (ne´e Cudworth) 21, 22, 56, 57, 150, 153, 186, 197, 208, 216, 218–19, 231, 235, 236, 237 Mather, Cotton and Increase 89 Matthew, Tobie 101 Maupertuis, Pierre-Louis Moreau de 183 Maurice of Nassau 107 Maxwell, John 158 Mayow, John 180 Medici, Leopoldo de 53, 232 Medina, Bartolome´ 39 Melanchthon, Philip 106, 136 Melville, Andrew 28, 43, 55, 87, 88 Mendoza, Pedro Hurtado de 40 Merrett, Christopher 232 Mersenne, Marin 26n, 44, 52, 76n, 81, 85, 93, 103, 104, 110, 120, 137n, 166, 168, 174, 232; see also Mersenne circle Milton, John 40, 88, 116, 118, 211 Molina, Luis de 76, 78, 125, 127 Molinetti, Antonio 232

Molyneux, William 42, 46, 47, 49, 55, 65, 69, 169, 194, 195, 197, 214, 221 Monboddo, see Burnett, James Monck, General George, Duke of Albermarle 29 Montaigne, Michel de 60, 105, 224 Montesquieu, Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de la Bre`de et de Montesquieu, 212, 224 Montmor, Acade´mie de 120, 234 Moor, Michael (Morus) 54, 80, 236 More, Henry 2, 13, 16, 22, 23, 37, 40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 47, 52, 56, 57, 60, 65–6, 91, 129, 131–2, 147n, 139, 140–53, 141, 145, 154, 155, 157, 158, 159, 161, 167, 177, 179, 181, 182, 192, 198, 200, 214, 217, 225, 230, 231, 232, 236–7, 239 and Descartes 13, 22, 37, 52, 56, 65–6, 67, 141, 179 and Hobbes, 129, 131–2 and Spinoza 70–1 and universities 40, 41, 43, 42, 65–6 boniform faculty 14, 148 metaphysics 16, 42, 143, 148–50 moral philosophy 13–14, 40, 43, 45, 46, 147–8, 158 spirit of nature (Hylarchic Spirit) 148–50, 177, 179 reception and influence 150–2, 157–9, 177, 179, 198, 200, 214, 217, 225 Antidote against Atheism 141, 146, 161, 236 Immortality of the Soul 46, 132, 141, 145, 146 Enchiridion ethicum 13, 40, 43, 141, 145, 151, 154, 158, 237 Enchiridion metaphysicum 16, 42, 148, 237 Mornay, Philippe du Plessis 108 Mosheim, Johan Lorenz 151, 224 Murdison, John 54, 78, 237 Mydorge, Claude 52, 55 Nairn, James 22, 70, 151 Naude´, Gabriel 112 Nedham, Marchmont 118 Needham, Walter 41 Neville, Henry 116, 118 Newton, Isaac 7, 14, 19, 28, 30, 41, 45, 48, 66, 75, 92, 136, 148, 153, 160, 161, 162, 178, 181–4, 185, 186, 187, 200, 213, 224, 229, 235, 237 reception and influence 183–4, 213 and Leibniz 178, 183, 229 Nicholas of Cusa 59 Nicole, Pierre 12, 37, 40, 54 Nidd, John 41, 238 Norris, John 2, 21, 56, 59, 69, 151, 152, 199–200, 208, 214–9, 220, 221, 227, 237 North, John 59

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NAME INDEX

North, Roger 34 Nye, Stephen 198 Oldenburg, Henry 53, 70, 178 Oratorians 54, 236 Origen (Origenes Adamantius) 58, 138, 142, 153, 232, 237 Oughtred, William 182 Overton, Richard 118 Owen, John 48, 128 Pace (Pacius), Giulio 73 Paracelsus 98; see also Parker, Samuel 45, 67, 130, 138, 158, 235, 237 Parma, University of 54 Pascal, Blaise 178 Patrick, Simon 141, 151, 240 Patrizi, Francesco 17, 167, 168 Pavonius, Franciscus 39 Payne, Robert 111, 120, 168, 238 Payne, William 203 Percy, Henry, Earl of Northumberland (‘wizard earl’) 234; see also Northumberland Circle Peirera, Benedictus 41 Peiresc, Nicolas-Claude Fabri di 103, 104 Perkins, William 88 Peter of Spain (Petrus Hispanus) 36 Petty, Sir William 62, 120 Pinck, Robert 77 Piscator, Johannes 36, 78, 87, 88 Plato 19, 22, 33, 39, 40, 58, 59, 89, 97, 105, 133, 142, 147, 149, 152, 159, 168, 224 Plot, Robert 41 Plotinus 17, 22, 59, 142, 148, 150, 159 Plutarch 39 Pomponazzi, Pietro 91 Popham, Alexander 187 Popple, William 65 Pordage, John 138 Porphyry 28, 33, 36, 37 Poulain de la Barre, Franc¸ois 218 Powel, Griffith 74 Power, Henry 181, 238 Preston, John 88 Prideaux, John 38 Price, Richard 153–4, 159 Proast, Jonas 189 Protagoras 132, 133 Pufendorf, Samuel 46, 47, 49, 64, 77, 114, 129, 134, 154, 158, 205, 228 Punch (Ponce, Poncius), John 54, 80, 238 Pyrrho 60, 61, 72, 105 Raey, Johannes de 102, 134 Rainolds, John 74

277

Ramus, Petrus (Pierre de la Rame´e) 11, 12, 28, 32, 36, 37, 38, 45, 72, 87, 88, 89, 91, 238; see also Ramism Raphson, Joseph 211 Rawley, William 95, 101 Rave, Johann 238 Ray, John 41, 150, 162, 169, 179, 238 Regis, Pierre-Sylvan 44, 68 Reneri, Henricus 79 Revius, Jacobus 55, 79, 240 Reynolds, Edward 40 Richardson, Alexander 88, 89, 238 Richardson, Samuel 215 Ritschel, George 16, 42, 102, 137, 238 Rohault, Jacques 42, 44, 45, 66–7, 229, 235 Rollock, Robert 28, 88 Ross, Alexander 80, 87 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 64 Rubio (Ruvius, Ruvio), Antonio 34, 35, 40, 41, 76 Rust, George 112, 140, 142, 145, 239 Rutherford, Donald 1 Rutherford, Samuel 117, 239 Rutherforth, Thomas 220 Ruvio, Ruvius see Rubio Sadler, John 137n, 140 Sall, Andrew 54, 239 Sanchez, Francisco 111 Sand, Christoph 57 Sanderson, Robert 31, 35, 36, 38, 39, 41, 43, 47, 80, 163, 239 Saravia, Hadrian 115 Sarpi, Paolo 17, 120 Sault, Richard 68, 215 Saumaise, Claude 104, 111 Savile, Henry 74 Scarborough, Charles 232 Scheibler, Christoph 37, 42, 43, 45, 75, 76 Schmitt, Charles 73, 74, 75 Schuler, Johannes 67 Scotus, see Duns Scotus, John Scottus, see John Scottus Scougal, Henry 45, 128, 151, 239 Scribonius, Wilhelm 37 Seneca 30, 33, 39, 60, 67 Selden, John 30, 64, 65, 128, 154 Sennert, Daniel 20, 41 Sergeant, John 15, 67, 69, 81, 82, 85–7, 91, 202–3, 235, 239, 242 Serranus, see De Serres, Jean Severinus, Petrus 27 Sextus Empiricus 22, 60, 61 Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl, see Cooper, Anthony Ashley Sherlock, William 146, 199, 203–4 Sherman, John 140

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278

NAME INDEX

Shipton, James 69 Sibbald, Robert 53, 85 Sidney, Algernon 118, 211, 239 Silhon, Jean de 105 Sixsmith, Thomas 40 Skelton, Philip 109 Smiglecki, Martin (Marcin Smiglecius) 35, 37, 38 Smith, John 140, 141, 144, 240, 241 Smith, Samuel 35 Soerensen, Peder, see Severinus Sophia von Brunswick Lüneberg, Electress of Hanover 8, 211, 241 Sophie-Charlotte, Queen of Prussia 8n., 211, 241 Sorbie`re, Samuel 52, 120, 133 South, Robert 204 Southwell, Robert 34 Spinoza, Baruch de 1, 22, 69–71, 80, 109, 126, 131, 135, 139, 142, 144, 178, 181, 200, 210, 211, 228 Stahl, Peter 28 Stair, Viscount, see Dalrymple Stanley, Thomas 10, 14, 17, 18, 62 Starkey, George 174 Steele, Richard 69 Stephanus, see Estienne, Henri Sterry, Nathaniel 39 Sterry, Peter 39, 137, 138, 140, 141, 240, 241 Steuart, Adam 54, 78, 79, 240 Stewart, Dugald 213, 221, 225n Stier, Johann 40, 42 Stiles, Ezra 212 Stillingfleet, Edward 22, 25, 48, 70, 71, 91, 130, 162, 192, 195, 196, 200–2, 206, 211, 235, 239, 240 Stobaeus 33 Strato 19 Stubbe, Henry 45, 128 Sturm, Johann Christoph 150, 151 Suarez, Francisco 12, 15, 39, 42, 46, 49, 75, 76, 78, 79, 80, 116, 117, 127, 154n Sydenham, Thomas 21, 28, 41, 187, 191, 235 Tacitus 30 Talbot, Peter 54 Talbot, Richard, Earl of Tyrconnell 236 Taylor, Jeremy 239 Taylor, Thomas 68, 69 Telesio, Bernadino 41, 94, 97, 164, 165, 167, 174 Temple, Sir William 46, 88 Tenison, Thomas 17–18, 93 Theognis of Megara 33 Thuycidides 30 Tilenus, Daniel 104 Tillotson, John 22, 151, 239 Tindal, Matthew 199, 210, 230, 235, 240 Thomas Aquinas 18, 39, 63, 73, 75, 76

Toland, John 2, 71, 87, 118, 198, 199, 201, 203, 206, 209–11, 212, 213, 230, 240–1 Toletus, Franciscus 41, 45 Towers, John 158 Tran, John 52, 77 Trotter Cockburn, Catharine 21, 22, 197, 204–5, 208, 219–20, 241 Troughton, John 47 Tschirnhaus, Ehrenfied Walther von 12 Tuckney, Anthony 130 Turnbull, George 212 Turne`be, Adrien 87 Tyrell, James 117, 135, 158–9, 191, 197, 210, 231, 241 Urban VIII, Pope 111 Valentia, Gregory of 15 Vasquez, Gabriel 15, 39, 42, 46, 76 Vie`te, Franc¸ois (Franciscus Vieta) 106n, 168, 182 Vitoria, Francisco 125 Voltaire, Franc¸ois-Marie Arouet, dit 103, 183, 205, 223, 224 Voetius, Gisbertus (Gisbert Voet) 45, 79, 240 Vorst, Conrad (Vorstius) 76, 78 Vossius (Vos), Gerard and Isaac 104 Vries, Gerhard de 46, 102 Wadding, Luke 54, 80, 236, 238, 241 Walaeus, Antonius 237 Wallis, John 31, 40, 41, 44, 45, 47, 126, 137, 168, 182, 233 Ward, Seth 28, 45, 66, 129, 241 Warner, Walter 120, 167–8, 234, 238 Waterhouse, Edward 23, 140 Webster, John 28, 34, 38, 42, 66, 77, 85, 102 Weigel, Erhard 134 Wesley, John 215 Whichcote, Benjamin 44, 47, 139, 140, 141, 144, 151, 153, 155, 212, 230, 231, 240, 241 Whiston, William 30, 213, 229 Whitby, Daniel 39, 241 White, Thomas (alias Blacklo) 41, 52, 62, 72, 79, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 91, 120–1, 164, 231, 234, 239, 242 Wilkins, John 25, 41, 45, 59, 77, 140, 146, 151, 158, 162, 170, 174, 176, 192–3, 194–5, 229, 233, 241, 242 William III, King (William of Orange) 7, 48, 151, 187, 188, 189, 198, 231, 240 William of Ockham 18, 35, 75, 143 Willis, Francis 41 Willis, Thomas 28, 132, 172, 180, 199 Willughby, Francis 41, 238 Wise, Thomas 151 Wishart, John 43 Wishart, William 212

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NAME INDEX

Wittich, Christoph 43 Wollaston, William 213 Worthington, John 47, 140, 238 Wood, Anthony 45, 47, 49 Wotton, Anthony 88 Wotton, Sir Henry 94, 197

Wotton, William 12, 15, 16, 18, 34, 38, 88, 162 Wynne, John 37, 43, 46, 47 Zabarella, Jacopo 37, 40, 45, 73, 76, 78 Zwinger, Theodor 88

279

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Subject Index Aberdeen, University of 53, 54 King’s College 27, 43, 45, 53, 55, 67, 236, 239 Marischal College 27, 48, 75, 78, 87, 227, 232, 234 Accademia dei Lincei 103 Accademia del Cimento 180, 232 Acts of Parliament Act of Settlement 7 Act of Uniformity 47 Act of Union 8 Clarendon Code 49, 187 Licensing Act 8, 24, 196 Test Act 48 Toleration Act 7, 48 aesthetics 9, 10 animals animal generation and formation 83, 176, 178 animal spirits 13, 166 Cartesian view of 13, 166, 179 relationship to 85 ,122, 190 appearance 180, 202, 221 truth of 105, 107 see also nature, phenomena of appetite 101, 108, 122, 128, 129, 143, 181 archetype 89, 146, 215 Aristotelianism, Aristotelians 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 23, 25, 42, 43, 58, 59, 61, 68, 72–91, 93, 94, 103, 104, 113, 114 , 116, 119, 121, 123, 149, 163, 167, 177, 201, 202–3, 221, 230, see also Aristotle anti-Aristotelianism 19, 61–2, 71–2, 87–91, 185, 232 eclectic Aristotelianism 91–7, 121; logic 11, 34, 35, 36, 38, 99, 103, 106 ethics 12, 39, 40, 46 expatriate Aristotelianism 78–87 metaphysics 32, 42, 46, 75–7, 79, 81, 89, 135, 193, 221 natural philosophy 14, 82, 73, 152, 162–3, 160–3, 164, 167 political philosophy 116, 123, 124 scholastic Aristotelianism 63, 75–8, 113, 141, see also Scholasticism atheism 62, 71, 91, 109, 199, 132, 143–5, 171, 175, 177, 199, 215 Cartesianism and 43, 45, 67, 68, 157 Epicureanism and 61–2 Hobbes and 126, 128, 131–2, 135, 144

Spinoza and 70, 144 see also Boyle lectures atomism 14, 18, 30, 62, 81, 82, 84, 133, 143, 156, 161, 163, 164, 165, 167–8, 169, 171, 172, 174, 175, 179, 180, 182, 186 Democritean atomism 97, 143, 167, 175, 179 Epicurean atomism 14, 62 benevolence 133, 155, 156, 159 body 66, 82, 84, 84, 97, 110, 132, 142, 150, 157, 181 as extension 83, 142, 166 Cartesian 66, 142, 166, 183 Hobbes on 120, 121–3, 129, 132, 133 knowledge of 120, 147 Locke 193, 194 see also materialism; matter theory; mechanical philosophy; soul, and body; power, material; substance, corporeal Bourges, University of 53, 246 Boyle Lectures 70, 198, 203, 212, 213, 220, 224 Breslau, University of 53 Cambridge, University 5, 27, 29, 30, 32, 40, 41, 43, 47, 48, 49, 54, 55, 76, 77, 88, 89, 94, 106, 136, 141, 152, 154, 200, 213, 241 Christ’s College 47, 140, 227, 230, 231, 232, 236, 238, 239 Clare Hall 230 Emmanuel College 31, 44, 137, 140, 227, 230, 231, 235, 240, 241 Gonville and Caius 229, 232 Jesus College 47 King’s College 47, 140, 230, 241, 242, 252 Magdalene College 231 Pembroke College 233 Queens’ College 238, 240 St John’s College 94, 227, 239, 240 Sydney Sussex College 228 Trinity College 41, 48, 237, 238, 242 Cambridge Platonism, Cambridge Platonist 3, 5, 23, 44, 59, 91, 112, 131, 135, 136, 179, 92, 97, 213, 214, 220, 231, 241 and Cartesianism 7, 26, 18, 23, 142, 144, 146, 147, 149, 151, 157, 179, 214, 216, 230, 236 and Cumberland 154–9 and Shaftesbury 140, 141, 150, 153–4, 159, 212 reception 64–8, 71, 79–80, 134, 139, 142, 144, 147, 150–4, 152, 157, 166, 179, 183, 114, 116, 216–17, 220, 222, 225

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SUBJECT INDEX

see also Cudworth; Descartes; More; Smith; Sterry; Whichcote Cartesianism 7, 12, 13, 16, 18, 23, 113, 146, 147, 166, 167, 185, 222, 230, 236, 240 and Cambridge Platonism 7, 26, 18, 23, 142, 144, 146, 147, 149, 151, 157, 179, 214, 216, 230, 236 and Newton 182–3 and women philosophers 23, 216–18 in universities 29, 35, 36–8, 43, 44, 45, 55, 65, 240 reception and influence 65–9, 71, 79–80, 82–3, 85, 182–3 see also animals; atheism; body; Descartes; mechanical philosophy; metaphysics; method; mind; natural philosophy; Port Royal logic; reason; substance causality 85–6, 106, 149, 127–8, 155, 156, 157, 163, 168, 175, 176, 179, 182, 193 active causal principle 168, 172 Aristotelian 20, 82, 163, 166 efficient cause 20, 77, 82, 157, 163, 166 final causes 66, 77, 82, 106, 149, 163, 166, 173, 174 immaterial 140, 143, 178, 179 material 181 mechanical 158, 178 spirit as cause 140, 149–50, 177, 179 natural 86, 172 philosophy as knowledge of 11, 122 see also God, divine causality; occasionalism Cavendish circle/family 53, 119, 120, 171, 234 certainty 169, 170, 174, 176, 184 criterion of truth 110, 146, 221 grounds of 15, 66, 93, 106–8, 166 limited 170, 176 Locke on 191, 192, 201, 202 mathematical 155, 170 moral, provisional or probable 47, 180, 193–4, 199 see also scepticism Charenton, Academy 55, 232 Chelsea College 27 cognition 113, 123, 144, 146, 201, 221 Coimbra, University of 54, 241 Cologne, University of 54, 238 common good 133, 155 common notions 59, 64, 106–7, 110, 111, 112, 146, 157, 192, 193 of religion 64, 93, 108–9 seminal principles 59, 192 consciousness/ unconsciousness 16, 143, 148, 149–50, 153, 159, 189, 195, 203, 210 consent, universal (consensus gentium) 106, 110, 146, 192, 200 Copernicanism 81, 168 corpuscularianism 82, 83, 167, 180, 203

281

and Boyle 172–3, 174–7, 178 cosmology 82, 133, 163, 167, 237 deism 71, 86, 87, 109, 112, 112, 130, 144, 199, 201, 204, 208, 209, 213, 223 design argument 162, 177, 213 desire 123–4, 126, 127, 128, 148, 194, 212 desire for happiness 106, 108 determinism 79, 128, 139, 144, 148 Deventer, University 79 dissenting academies Barking 88, 238 Bethnal Green Academy 49 Connor, County Antrim 44, 49, 233 Newington Green Academy 49 Douai, English College 54, 231, 235, 242 Dry Club 21 Dublin, Trinity College 27, 28, 35, 42, 46, 47, 48, 50, 54, 69, 88, 227, 236 Dublin Philosophical Society 42, 169, 188, 197 Durham, proposed college 27 Edinburgh, University of 27, 28, 30, 35, 37, 38, 42, 47, 48, 85, 88, 228, 233, 239, 241 Enlightenment 92, 103, 113, 159, 184, 186, 187, 196, 208, 209, 212, 222–4; see also Scottish Enlightenment empiricism 15, 41, 93, 100, 152, 186, 206, 221–2, 224; see also experimental philosophy; experience; sense-knowledge; Sextus Empiricus Epicureanism, Epicurean 14, 58, 59–61, 62, 67, 71, 132, 147, 155, 156, 157, 159, 163, 167, 170, 171, 185, 194, 210, 211, 237 epistemology 16, 59, 87, 89, 93, 99–100, 116–17, 110, 112, 113, 122, 132, 137, 139, 144, 147, 152, 153, 161, 162, 164, 171, 173, 180, 185, 186, 208 Bacon 85, 94–5, 98–102 of science 93, 161, 173, 184 Berkeley 218, 232 Cambridge Platonists 145–7, 153 Herbert 105–7, 112, 113 Hobbes 122–3, 132 innatist 93, 106, 145–7, 152, 153 Locke 87, 184, 185, 186, 191, 194–5, 198, 200, 201, 202–3, 205, 206, 221, 222 Malebranche 69, 214, 215 Wilkins 146, 162 see also empiricism; sense knowledge equality 117, 189, 190 equality of sexes 217, 218 essence 15, 122, 125, 202 Baconian forms 99–100 of soul 137, 149, 84 real and nominal 186, 198, 201, 206 Locke on 193–4, 201, 222

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282

SUBJECT INDEX

existence 15, 82, 86, 213, 220 of God 25, 43, 46, 66, 73, 76, 139, 141, 145, 161, 170, 171, 179, 213; see also God of soul 66, 152; see also soul of incorporeal substance/beings 85, 142, 145, 166, 204, 222 eternal truths 206, 214 ethics, see moral philosophy experimental philosophy 10, 12, 15, 18, 28, 30, 42–3, 50, 90, 100, 103, 131, 135, 161, 163, 164, 168–70, 173, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182–4, 191, 200 experience, as basis of knowledge 89, 90–1, 97, 98, 100, 102, 112, 174, 176, 193, 194, 195, 200, 221; see also empiricism; experimental philosophy external world 202, 203, 208, 213, 220, 221–2, 232 faculties of the mind 31, 34, 98, 105–6, 108, 112, 124, 127, 137, 146, 164, 170, 172, 204, 212, 221 faculty of reason 34, 98, 106, 128, 148 faculty of will 127, 148, 148, 204 faculty psychology 127, 148 Franeker University 33, 55, 88, 227 Frankfurt University 53, 54 freethinking, see deism; libertinism free will 25, 78–9, 127–8, 135, 139, 141, 143, 147–8, 195, 203, 228 freedom, see liberty geometric/mathematical mode of argument 121, 122, 166, 167; see also mechanical philosophy Glasgow, University of 14, 17, 28, 30, 42, 46, 47, 55, 68, 77, 87, 210, 228, 231, 241 Professorship of moral philosophy 228 God 16, 32, 33, 37, 43, 46, 57, 69, 70, 79, 86, 105, 121, 125, 129, 130, 131, 141–5, 146, 147, 149, 151, 153, 155, 156, 157, 158, 162, 168, 172, 182–3, 194, 196, 197, 199, 206, 214–20, 222 attributes of 32, 46, 106, 143, 148, 153, 170, 177 as res extensa 66, 70, 148, 181 goodness of 46, 126, 129, 130, 134, 137, 141, 143, 144, 152, 153, 156, 177, 205 perfection of 68, 129, 153, 220 divine providence 156, 157, 174, 177, 179 divine causality 69, 137, 153, 155–6, 158, 163, 182–3, 214, 215, 217 God as first cause 137, 155–6, 158 see also occasionalism existence of 25, 43, 46, 66, 73, 139, 141, 145, 161, 170, 171, 177, 179, 213 idea of 32, 145, 146, 186 knowledge of 32, 106, 122, 170, 194, 199, 215 law of 194; see also natural law

mind of 89, 146, 206 right of 134, 132 will of 130, 141, 143, 156, 161, 163, 194, 214, 215; see also voluntarism see also deism goodness 101, 141, 147, 154, 156, 157, 168, 204 natural 132, 158, 212 see also God; moral principles; virtue Green Ribbon Club 130, 228 Gresham College 27, 88, 231, 233 Hanoverian Succession 7, 8 happiness 37, 39, 63, 106, 108, 133, 148, 155, 156, 171, 194, 217, 219 Hartlib Circle 16, 102, 111, 142, 169; see also Hartlib, Samuel Harderwyck 239 Harvard College 47, 49, 88, 89, 227 Helmstedt, University of 53, 54, 78 Heidelberg, University of 53, 54, 55, 232 human nature 83, 100, 101, 129, 155 benevolent 140, 143 image of God 105 Hobbes’ view 121–3, 124, 126, 129, 132, 133, 134 Locke’s view 190 moral 101, 140 passionate 123, 126 rational 63, 106, 108, 111, 144–5, 148, 195, 212, 219, 223 sociable 64, 117, 124, 133, 140, 190, 219 relationship to animals 85, 122, 190 see also soul; reason hylozoism 150, 154, 178, 181 hypothesis 143, 148, 149–50, 152, 163, 173, 175, 176–7, 178, 181, 213, 221, 224 idealism, see Malebranche; Norris ideas 37, 38, 67, 69, 86, 106, 186, 192–4, 201, 202–3, 204, 214–15 ideas of sensation and reflection 193, 204 innate ideas or principles 12, 47, 89, 93, 110, 111, 112, 139, 144, 145–6, 152, 156, 157, 186, 192–3, 199–200, 202, 203, 205–6, 210, 211–12, 220 Lockean 193–4 see also God ideism 67, 202 immaterial, see incorporeal immateriality 143, 210 immaterialism 213–14, 221–2 incorporeal beings 15, 142, 145, 175, 180 extension 66, 132, 148, 149 force 168 substance 16, 85, 66, 132, 148 see also soul

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SUBJECT INDEX

induction 36, 98, 100, 103, 130, 165, 174 infinity 167 divine infinity 153 knowledge of 89 infinite divisibility 166, 167 infinite space 148, 168, 192, 220 infinite extension of God 148 infinite universe 66, 148, 166, 168 instinct, natural 105–6, 110, 112 intellect 89, 96, 105, 122, 127, 193 intellectual powers 148 see also mind La Rochelle, Academy 55, 232 language of philosophy 10, 13, 32, 49, 56–8, 159, 216, 223 philosophy of 77, 121 law of nature, see natural law Leiden, University of 33, 53, 54, 55, 78, 79, 80, 152, 158, 228, 233, 234, 237, 238, 240, 241 libertines, libertinism 20, 94, 144, 208, 209, 211, 212, 217; see also deism liberty 117, 118, 121, 123–5, 129, 131, 132, 134, 148, 190–1, 210 religious liberty, see toleration and necessity 25, 127–8, 129, 132, 135, 148, 231, 234 liberty of philosophizing (libertas philosophandi) 20, 209 libraries 22–3, 36, 44, 48, 51, 70, 92–3, 102, 104 Lie`ge, Jesuit College 54, 238 Lisbon, University 54, 241 English College 239, 242 logic 5, 8, 11–12, 19, 62, 84, 85, 99, 102, 103, 106, 111, 129, 241 in universities 28, 30, 31, 33–8, 43, 46, 49, 50, 53, 54, 73, 74, 76, 77, 78, 79, 92 Port Royal logic 12, 34, 35, 37–8, 217 see also Arnauld, Antoine; Nicole, Pierre; Ramism Louvain, Irish College 54, 238 Madrid, University of 54, 230 materialism 61, 71, 113, 118, 122, 126, 131, 132, 135, 156, 159, 166, 171, 181, 196, 199, 205, 206, 209, 220, 221, 222; see also Epicureanism matter theory active principles 167, 178, 180–1, 183, 211 thinking matter 196, 199, 201, 216 see also atomism; body; Epicureanism; mechanical philosophy; substance mechanical Philosophy 13, 14, 19, 68, 82, 113, 114, 118, 120, 122, 132, 135, 142, 148, 149, 157, 161, 163, 164, 165–7, 168, 169, 170, 171, 173, 174–7, 178–9, 181, 182, 193 Mersenne circle 52, 55, 65, 81, 104, 113, 120, 167, 171, 231, 234

283

metaphysics 15–17, 19, 59, 61, 84, 99, 105, 106, 162, 162, 178, 206, 208, 213, 223 Aristotelian 42, 79, 81, 89, 135, 163, 193, 221 Cambridge Platonists 139, 142, 143, 148–50, 151 Cartesian 19, 46, 120 Hobbes 121, 122 Platonist 16, 59, 105, 112, 137, 143, 217 Ramism 28, 89 Sergeant 85, 86, 89 Suarez 15, 39, 42, 46, 49, 75–6, 84–6, 79 in universities 31, 42, 43, 44, 45, 49, 50, 54, 75, 76, 78, 81, 240 method 12, 34, 44, 61, 77, 82, 83, 85, 90 105, 108, 114, 118, 120, 121, 122, 129, 133, 145, 160, 165, 168, 178, 186 Baconian 18, 99–100, 103, 112–13, 164, 174 Cartesian 19, 37, 65, 170 experimental, empirical 14, 90, 103, 126, 169, 172, 178, 181, 182, 184, 186 Euclidian 122, 129 inductive 163, 164 logical 50, 77 mathematical 13, 114, 118, 120, 157, 166 Newtonian 181–2, 184, 223 Ramist 11, 36, 38, 94 Middleburg, University of 237 mind 37, 51, 86, 89, 93, 98, 99, 101, 105–6, 111, 139, 156 Mind-body interaction/union 13, 68, 159, 214–15 mind as active 146–7, 193–4, 204 powers of mind, intellect or soul 89, 105, 109, 112, 123, 146, 148, 157, 192, 201 tabula rasa 110, 146, 193 Berkeley 209, 222 Cambridge Platonist 139, 146–7, 159 Cartesian 68, 166 (egalitarian) 218 Collier 220–1 Cumberland 156–8 Epicurean 171 Locke 191, 193–4 see also God; innate ideas; common notions; soul; thinking substance mimima naturalia 82, 84, 167, 181 monad 153 monism 68, 70, 135, 152–3 moral philosophy 8, 9, 10, 12, 13–14, 25, 55, 79, 81, 90, 146, 155, 160, 213, 217, 218 in universities 28, 30, 31, 33, 38–40, 43, 46, 50, 53, 54, 55, 74, 76, 78, 79, 81, 136, 228, 232, 234, 235, 236 Aristotelian 19, 22, 39, 40, 62, 76, 81, 88, 90 Baconian 90, 93, 96, 98, 100–1 Cambridge Platonist 139, 141, 143, 145, 147–8, 153, 156, 158, 159

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284

SUBJECT INDEX

moral philosophy (cont.) Charleton 171–2 Clarke, Samuel 213, 220 Cudworth 133, 141, 147–8, 156 Cumberland 133, 153, 155–6, 157–8, 159 Epicurean 61, 62, 67, 171–2, 210, 211 Grotius 63–4, 116 Hobbes 121–2, 125–6, 129, 132, 135, 139, 141, 147–8 Locke 187, 190, 191, 194, 195–6, 197, 198, 199, 204 Malebranche 68–9 Masham 216, 219 scholastic 78, 79 Shaftesburian 153, 211–22, 220 Stoic 59, 60, 67 Trotter Cockburn 203, 211, 220 White professorship of, Oxford 30, 79, 234 as demonstrable science of 13, 147, 155–7, 194 see also natural law moral obligation 13, 39, 156, 159, 220 moral principles 63–4, 139, 147, 153, 157, 191 absolute 12, 139, 147–8, 154, 156, 158 immutable/fixed 155, 213, 215, 220 innate 12, 111, 139, 145, 146, 212 morality, rationally demonstrable 73–4, 133, 147, 155–6, 157, 194 Nantes College of Oratorians 236 Edict of Nantes 188 natural law 12–13, 14, 30, 39, 40, 46, 59, 63–4, 76, 77, 78, 108, 115, 116, 123–5, 129, 132–5, 147, 154–6, 156–9, 182, 186, 189, 190, 205, 224 natural philosophy 9, 10, 12, 13, 14–15, 16, 25, 28, 36, 40–2, 44, 45, 46, 47, 55, 57, 61, 62, 63, 66, 73, 77, 79, 81, 83, 84, 85, 88, 89, 90, 93, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100–1, 103, 113, 131, 135, 136, 150, 160–84, 185, 197, 200, 213, 229, 231, 232, 233, 238, 239, 242 in universities 28, 30, 31, 32, 36, 40–3, 46, 50 Aristotelian 152, 162–3, 164, 167 Bacon 94–5, 97 102, 112, 120, 165, 169 Boyle 173–8 Cartesian 14, 35, 44, 133, 142, 166, 178 Hobbes 114, 118, 120, 121, 122, 126, 132, 133, 134, 166 Locke 191, 202 Newton 181–4, 223, 224 see also experimental philosophy; Epicureanism; mechanical philosophy nature 103, 149, 156. 160–1, 163, 166, 167, 173–4, 175–6 living 178–9, 180–1

phenomena of 14, 15, 45, 67, 83, 91, 96, 98, 100, 119, 163–6, 167, 169, 172, 174–5, 176, 178, 182, 192 plastic nature 148–50, 152, 179, 224 spirit of nature (Hylarchic Spirit) 149–50, 177, 179 state of nature 116, 121, 123, 124–5, 134, 190 see also natural philosophy; natural law; God Navarre, Colle`ge de 236 necessity 25, 128, 167, 179, 234 Neoplatonism, see Platonism New York, King’s College 89 Newtonianism 7, 14, 30, 41, 42, 45, 48, 178, 183, 184, 187, 213, 223, 224, 208, 229, 232, 235; see also Newton, Isaac Nıˆmes, Academy 53 Northumberland Circle 21, 167, 234 occasionalism 69, 149, 214–15, 217, 218–19 Oxford, University of 8, 14, 24, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 35, 38, 41, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 53, 62, 69, 73, 74, 76, 77, 79, 106, 119, 137, 152, 172, 187, 188, 189, 197, 220, 228, 234, 238 All Souls College 228 Balliol College 232 Christ Church College 32, 229, 232, 235, 238 Exeter College 229, 237, 240 Gloucester Hall 231 Jesus College 93 Laudian Statutes 31 Lincoln College 239, 240 Magdalen College 48, 231, 237 Magdalen Hall 229, 233, 234, 232, 242 Merton College 39, 231 Pembroke College 230 Queen’s College 241 St Edmund Hall 229 St John’s College 232 Trinity College 233 University College 104, 234 Wadham College 237, 242 Oxford Philosophical Society 41 Oxford Club of Experimenters 51, 169, 174, 187, 192 pantheism 70, 211 Paracelsianism 74, 165, 232 Paris, Acade´mie Royale 183, 237 Colle`ge de France 87 University of 53, 54, 87, 236 see also Mersenne Circle passions 13, 59, 65, 67, 106, 121, 123–4, 126, 147, 157, 171–2, 218 perception 13, 36, 69, 105–6, 122, 174, 181, 194, 208, 212, 215, 221 moral perception 212 sense perception 180, 193, 197, 203, 206

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SUBJECT INDEX

person 153, 181, 189, 195–6, 201, 203, 210 pleasure 14, 62, 124, 127, 171, 194, 211, 212, 215, 217, 219 Platonic tradition 59, 142, 152, 179, 213, 223 Platonism 10, 12, 13, 16, 22, 49, 58–9, 105, 112, 129, 130, 136–8, 141–3, 146, 151, 153, 168, 177, 199, 200, 203, 213, 215, 236, 237 see also Cambridge Platonism; Plato; Plotinus pneumatology 15, 16, 42, 148 Poitiers law school 87 power 82, 83, 109, 148 active powers 167, 168, 180, 182, 183 material powers 180, 182 , 183, 216 divine power 130, 143, 177 sovereign power 125, 189 Locke’s conception of 153, 189, 192, 193 see also mind, powers of predestination 16, 74, 78, 79, 140 progress in the sciences 17, 18, 96, 169 psychology 9, 16, 101, 121, 123, 147 faculty psychology 127, 148 Pyrrhonism 60, 61, 72, 105 qualities 132, 163, 210, 222 Aristotelian/scholastic 89, 174, 183 Digby 83–4 forms and qualities 142, 164, 174, 193 primary and secondary 172, 178, 193 sensible 82 Ramism 19, 28, 33, 36, 38, 42, 46, 72, 74, 78, 87–9, 94, 227 reason 11, 13, 51, 86, 100, 106, 122, 123, 152, 176 182, 197, 216, 220, 221, 217 Age of 102, 222, 223 and faith 143, 144–5, 148 and freewill 148 and knowledge of God/natural theology 32, 170, 215 deism 209, 209–10, 211, 212, 223 and natural law 13, 33, 39, 124, 154–6, 158, 190 and religion 25, 63, 107, 108, 109, 112, 113, 129, 139, 142, 144, 145–6, 185, 199, 200, 212, 219, 223 and soul 137, 143 171 art of 13, 35, 38, 43, 73 Cartesian 65, 216 deductive 13, 100, 121–2, 133, 167 faculty of 34, 98, 106, 128, 148 in ethics 12–13, 39, 116, 145, 147, 153, 155–6, 158, 159, 194, 196, 204, 212, 213, 223, 219, 220 limitation/weakness of 97, 145; see also scepticism logical 29, 34, 43, 85 material basis of 132, 180 natural 13, 33, 52, 76, 97, 122, 139, 143, 144–5, 155, 158, 204

285

right reason 12, 112, 130, 137, 144, 147, 157 seminal reasons, see common notions sufficient reason, principle of 213 see also logic, Port Royal logic religion, philosophy of 145 religion, natural 109 Republic of Letters 134, 188, 202, 205, 211 republicanism 116, 118, 129 resistance theory 115, 117, 189–90, 236 right, rights 115, 116, 121, 130, 133, 134, 189, 190, 210, 218 divine authority of law-making/ruler 117, 125, 132, 134 divine right of kings 115–16 right of nature 123, 124, 125 rule of right 109, 194 Rome, Irish College (St Isidore’s) 238, 241 Rostock, University of 53 Rota Club 21, 233 Rotterdam, University of 227 Royal Society 7, 18, 31, 41, 53, 56, 57, 76, 90, 93, 103, 126, 129, 131, 135, 137, 142, 152, 160, 161, 164, 169, 170, 171, 178, 179, 180, 182, 187, 228, 229, 231, 232, 233, 236, 237, 238, 242 St Andrews, University of 27, 30, 42, 43, 227, 228, 236, 239 Regius professorship 30 St Leonard’s College 26, 45, 236 St Salvator’s College 27 St Omer, Jesuit College 54, 55, 238, 242 Salamanca, University of 54, 239, 241 Saumur, Academy 54, 55, 78, 232, 239, 240 scepticism 10, 20n, 25, 30, 58, 59–64, 67, 71, 72, 82, 83, 86, 87, 91, 93, 100, 104–5, 110, 144, 145, 152, 159, 161, 164, 169–70, 172, 176, 192, 198–203, 205, 206, 210, 214, 220, 221–2; see also Gassendi, Pierre; Herbert, Edward, Baron Herbert of Cherbury; Locke, John; Sextus Empiricus scholasticism 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 22, 30, 33–4, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43–6, 47, 58, 59, 63, 66, 67, 72, 73, 75–6, 77, 78, 79, 80–1, 82, 84, 86, 90, 99, 102, 103, 116, 117, 122, 123, 125, 127–8, 136, 141, 142, 143, 148, 162–3, 164, 169, 172, 174, 176, 183, 232, 240 science, see natural philosophy Scotism 59–60, 80–1, 231 Scottish Enlightenment 2, 48, 50, 212, 223, 224–5 Sedan, Academy 54, 55, 78, 232, 240 self 151, 195, 203 self-activity (soul) 149, (matter) 180, 181 self-determination 127, 139, 148, 159

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286

SUBJECT INDEX

self-determination (cont.) self-direction 196 see also person self-interest 116, 122, 155, 211 self-love 129, 152, 212, 126 self-motion 82, 172, 175, 181 self-power 148 self-preservation 63, 106, 108, 116, 124, 133, 177, 190 senses 14, 37, 106, 107, 122–3, 143, 157, 166 internal 106, 195 consense (synaisthesis) 150 sense-knowledge 14, 37, 82, 85, 86, 99, 102, 122–3, 139, 144, 147, 152, 157, 169, 172, 180, 193, 194–5, 199, 200, 206, 219, 221; see also Empiricism sense-perception 180, 206, 215 soul 85, 143, 173, 199 existence of 66, 84, 142, 203, 222 immateriality of 82, 85, 171, 196, 198, 199, 201, 205, 206, 210 immortality of 25, 62, 83, 139, 171, 152, 201, 206, 215, 230 More’s argument for 132, 146, 217 pre-existence of 142, 152 relationship to body 13, 68, 149, 159, 171, 214–15, 217 see also mind space 148, 167, 168, 177, 182–3, 213, 220 Spinozism 71, 196, 199 spirit 132, 142, 145, 148, 153, 204, 220 animal spirits 13, 166 causal spirits 139, 149–50, 152, 177, 179 spirit of nature (Hylarchic Spirit) 148–50, 177, 179 extended 66, 132, 149 material 180 More’s definition of 132 spirits, spiritual beings 15–16, 122 vital spirit 16, 152 substance 68, 180–1, 220 Aristotelian 201, 203 Cartesian 66 thinking substance (res cogitans) 120, 166, 204, 219 extended substance (res extensa) 166 corporeal, see body idea of 201, 220 immaterial/incorporeal 16, 122, 132, 135, 179, 195, 199, 217

substance monism 70, 152, 153 substantial forms 15, 79, 82, 86, 122, 173, 164, 169, 175, 176, 193 unknowable 198, 201, 204, 205 see also matter theory; spirit time 168, 182, 193 toleration, religious 7, 47, 48, 56, 107–8, 113, 117, 140, 185, 187, 188, 189, 191, 204, 206–7, 209, 210, 231, 242 truth criterion of 110, 146, 221 eternal 206, 214 immutable 142, 155 object of philosophy 15, 31, 45, 53, 89–90, 99, 142 philosophical 49, 77, 105–7, 104, 110–12 universal 142, 200 Tübingen, University 88 universities, colleges, and academies, see under individual name Valladolid, College of St Alban 230 virtue and benevolence 155 and pleasure 14, 147, 212 as habit 39, 194, 196 as mean 63 as power of soul 147 life and practice of 13, 16, 38, 107, 147 philanthropy and 101 virtues 125, 155, 177 see also goodness; moral principles vitalism 16, 150, 152; see also hylozoism void, vacuum 42, 66, 118, 167, 172, 175, 176, 177, 178 voluntarism 142, 143, 144, 154, 155, 156, 159, 213 anti-voluntarism 142, 143 Welbeck Circle 21, 120, 130, 168, 169, 234, 238 will 83, 91, 106, 127–8, 141, 143, 148, 194, 204 divine will 143, 156, 163, 214, 215 faculty of 127, 148, 148, 204 see also free will; voluntarism Yale College 89