British Imperialism in Qajar Iran: Consuls, Agents and Influence in the Middle East 1784535028, 9781784535025

Table of contents :
Dedication
Contents
List of Maps and Figures
Maps
Acknowledgements
Transliteration and Dates
Introduction
Part I: Consuls and the Great Game, 1889–1907
1. Imperial Intelligence: Official British Images of Qajar Iran
2. Imperial Inroads: Commerce, Conflict and Cooperation
3. Imperial Partition: Forging the Anglo-Russian Convention
Part II: Consuls and Revolution, 1905–1915
4. The Revolutionary Vortex: Ideology, Faction and Empire
5. Divide et Impera: The Consolidation of British Control
Part III: Consuls at War, 1915 – 1921
6. Proxy Wars: The Battle for Southern Iran
7. The Road to Tehran: The End of British Imperialism in Southern Iran
Conclusion

Citation preview

H. Lyman Stebbins is Assistant Professor of History at La Salle University, Philadelphia. He holds a PhD from the University of Chicago.

‘This is an excellent study; comprehensive, clearly argued, and well written.’ Rudi Matthee, John and Dorothy Munroe Professor of History, University of Delaware ‘H. Lyman Stebbins’ British Imperialism in Qajar Iran: Consuls, Agents and Influence in the Middle East constitutes an important contribution both to the history of British indirect imperialism and to the history of Qajar Iran. While the use of trade concessions and military advisors, and later direct military force, by Britain in Iran have been studied, the use of a “softer” consular power in the provinces has not been investigated in detail. Stebbins’ work, which addresses this important issue, is both detailed and revealing – in fact it is something of a tour de force in its scope and ability to compose a compelling narrative from a huge assemblage of dispersed and at times seemingly minor data. Through it we see the complicated relations between policymakers in London and in British India, the ways that consular authority was used to develop unofficial military power in the provinces, Britain’s efforts at establishing and maintaining control over important routes of communication and trade, and the degree to which these efforts had the result of further undermining the actual effective authority of an already rather weak Iranian central government. This book should be of great interest to those interested in the history of nineteenth-century Iran, diplomacy, trade and British imperialism.’ A. Holly Shissler, Associate Professor of Middle Eastern History, Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, University of Chicago

BRITISH IMPERIALISM IN QAJAR IRAN Consuls, Agents and Influence in the Middle East

H. LYMAN STEBBINS

To my father and mother

Published in 2016 by I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd London • New York www.ibtauris.com Copyright q 2016 H. Lyman Stebbins The right of H. Lyman Stebbins to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by the author in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or any part thereof, may not be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. Every attempt has been made to gain permission for the use of the images in this book. Any omissions will be rectified in future editions. References to websites were correct at the time of writing. International Library of Iranian Studies 63 ISBN: 978 1 78453 502 5 eISBN: 978 1 78672 098 6 ePDF: 978 1 78673 098 5 A full CIP record for this book is available from the British Library A full CIP record is available from the Library of Congress Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: available Typeset in Garamond Three by OKS Prepress Services, Chennai, India Printed and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY

CONTENTS

List of Maps and Figures Maps Acknowledgements Transliteration and Dates Introduction Part I Consuls and the Great Game, 1889– 1907 1. Imperial Intelligence: Official British Images of Qajar Iran 2. Imperial Inroads: Commerce, Conflict and Cooperation 3. Imperial Partition: Forging the Anglo-Russian Convention Part II Consuls and Revolution, 1905–1915 4. The Revolutionary Vortex: Ideology, Faction and Empire 5. Divide et Impera: The Consolidation of British Control Part III Consuls at War, 1915– 1921 6. Proxy Wars: The Battle for Southern Iran 7. The Road to Tehran: The End of British Imperialism in Southern Iran Conclusion

vii ix xiii xv 1

11 42 71

103 134

165 197 228

vi

Notes Bibliography Index

BRITISH IMPERIALISM

IN QAJAR IRAN

237 286 297

LIST OF MAPS AND FIGURES

Maps Map 1 Late Qajar Iran

ix

Map 2 Arabistan

x

Map 3 Bushihr–Shiraz route

xi

Map 4 Sistan and Southern Qa’inat

xii

Figures Figure 1.1 Value (£) of the British Empire’s and Russia’s Trade with Iran, 1901–1912

37

Figure 1.2 Value (£) of the British Empire’s Trade with the Iranian Ports of the Persian Gulf, 1889–1913

39

MAPS

RUSSIAN EMPIRE CASPIAN SEA

Tabriz

.

Bandar-i Anzali

.

.

Qasr-i Shirin

.

Baghdad

.

Qum

.

.

Kirmanshah

.

. ..

Basra

.Ahvaz

Muhammarah

. Yazd

Late Qajar Iran

Nusratabad

NEUTRAL ZONE .

Shiraz

P

er

si

.Bushihr an

Bahrain

G

f

.

BRITISH SPHERE

Fars

. Bandar-i ‘Abbas

Laristan

ul

. Kirman

Sistan Zahidan .

Straits of Hormuz

chis

Makran

Bandar-i Lingah

.

Balu

.

Jask

Chabahar

.

Gulf of Oman

tan

BRITISH EMPIRE

.

Kuwait

.

Hirat

Birjand . Qa’inat

Shushtar

Arabistan

.

Turbat-i Haydari

RUSSIAN SPHERE

Kashan . Khurramabad . . Isfahan Dizful .

Luristan

LATE QAJAR IRAN

Map 1

KHURASAN

Tehran

Hamadan

.

Mashhad

. Qazvin

RB

AZE

AN AFGHANISTA

OTTOMAN EMPIRE

.

N AIJA

Dizful Shush

Shushtar

Ottoman

Lynch Road to Isfahan

Ahvaz

Al-Qurnah

Empire

Karun River Basra

Muhammarah Abadan

Shatt al-‘Arab al-Faw

Persian Gulf Kuwait

Map 2

Arabistan

Bihbihan

Kazirun

Khanah-i Zinian

Shiraz

Kamarij

Fars

Dalaki

Dashtistan Burazjan Chahkutah

Bushihr

Chaghadak Ahram

Tangistan

Dilvar

Persian Gulf

Map 3

Dashti

Bushihr–Shiraz route

Firuzabad

Birjand

Qa’inat

AFGHANISTAN

Nusratabad

Sistan Kirman



Zahidan Bam

Ro

ba

Quetta-Sistan Route

t

BR

Baluchistan

Map 4

Sistan and Southern Qa’inat

Dalbandian

ITIS

HE

MP

IRE

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to thank the members of my dissertation committee at the University of Chicago, Dr A. Holly Shissler and Dr John E. Woods, and especially my chairman, the late Dr Emmet J. Larkin, for their consideration and guidance. I am grateful also for grants provided by the History Department and the Nicholson Center for British Studies at the University of Chicago, the American Institute of Iranian Studies and La Salle University’s Leaves and Grants Committee and Provost’s office. I would like to thank the staffs at the National Archives (UK), the British Library, St Antony’s College, Oxford, Cambridge University Library, University of Chicago Library, La Salle University Library, Library of Congress and the Archives of the Iranian Foreign Ministry. Hosseinali Soudavar and Ghulam Reza Salami also assisted with Iranian documents in Tehran. I very much appreciate the guidance and encouragement afforded me by my colleagues at La Salle University; by conference audiences at the University of Maryland, Yale University, University of California Berkeley, University of Louisville, Iranian Studies, and Mid-Atlantic and Western Conferences of British Studies; by many colleagues, including Ahmad Karimi-Hakkak, Shaul Bakhash, Rudi Matthee, Abbas Amanat, Farzin Vejdani, Ranin Kazemi, James Gustafson, Mohamad Tavakoli-Targhi, Oliver Bast, Moritz Deutschmann, James Hevia, Benjamin Hopkins, as well as Lynn Lees, Seth Koven and the Delaware Valley British Studies Seminar. I wish to thank Virginia Myers for her excellent copy-editing work. Gail Rubini expertly prepared the maps with assistance from Conrad Gleber. The editors and staff at I.B.Tauris have also been very helpful. I am grateful

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that excerpts from my book chapter, ‘British Imperialism, Regionalism, and Nationalism in Iran’, in Abbas Amanat and Farzin Vejdani (eds), Iran Facing Others: Identity Boundaries in a Historical Perspective (2012) are reproduced here with permission of Palgrave Macmillan. The British Institute of Persian Studies kindly offered me accommodation in Tehran, as did Netherhall House and Alexia Adrianopoulos in London. The love and support of my parents, Timothy and Louise, and my brothers, Justin, Tim and Adrian, have been invaluable, as has that of my extended Stebbins, Wilmer and Lewis-Hatheway families and the many friends I have met along the way in Delray, Dallas, Chicago, Tehran, London, Arlington and Philadelphia. I leave my last thanks to Cecca for her love and friendship in finishing this work.

TRANSLITERATION AND DATES

This book uses the transliteration system of the International Journal of Middle East Studies. ‘Ayn (‘) and hamza (’) are marked but no diacriticals are used. Some well-known place names like Tehran, Azerbaijan and Kuwait use contemporary English spellings. Historical English spellings of Persian proper nouns have been left in quotations from archival documents. All Islamic dates are in Lunar Hijri with the exception of those dates marked ‘SH’, which are in Solar Hijri.

INTRODUCTION

Visitors to Persepolis from around the world today still enter the palace through the Gate of All Nations, as their predecessors did in Achaemenid times. This monumental portal reminds them that Iran has long been an imperial, economic and cultural crossroads. Tourists soon encounter more jarring evidence of this cosmopolitan yet fractured history: graffiti carved by foreign, mainly European, vandals from the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries. One study has counted 222 such names at Persepolis, 158 of which are on the Gate of All Nations alone.1 At one level, these graffiti reflect an orientalist hubris inscribing itself, quite literally, on Iran’s ancient past, while on another, it represents the desire of long-dead travellers to be remembered, if only by association with the Achaemenids. Beneath one of the massive bulls guarding the gate are closely clustered the names of ‘Cap John Malcolm, Envoy &c. &c. 1800’, ‘Lt Col Malcolm J Meade HBM Consul General 1898 & Mrs Meade’, ‘1911[– ] 1912 39th K. C. O. Central Indian Horse [CIH]’, and ‘S.U. Singh’ and ‘D.B. Singh’.2 Nearby are ‘J. Singh’ and ‘Bhaga T. Singh’, ‘39th CIH 1912’.3 This group of graffiti illuminates key moments in Anglo-Iranian relations during the Qajar period (1796– 1925). John Malcolm was an East India Company political officer who served as the first British representative to the court of Fath ‘Ali Shah, an appointment that presaged Anglo-India’s strategic interests in Iran down into the twentieth century. He also published an important History of Persia in 1815 that significantly influenced British efforts to comprehend Qajar Persia. Malcolm Meade served as consul general and India’s resident in

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the Persian Gulf at Bushihr between 1897 and 1900, and had to manage British interests in the Qajars’ southern borderlands in the complex circumstances following the assassination of Nasir al-Din Shah in 1896. Failing in this task by informal methods alone during the Iranian Constitutional Revolution (1905–1911), Britain despatched the 39th Central Indian Horse and the Singhs to Shiraz, inaugurating a pattern of military intervention in southern Persia that climaxed during World War I and contributed to the Qajars joining the Achaemenids among Iran’s fallen empires. Consuls and political officers were the key agents of British imperialism in late Qajar Iran. Scholars of Anglo-Iranian relations agree that Britain desired Iran as a buffer against a Russian advance on India, but they have generally restricted their narratives to the highest diplomatic circles in Tehran, London, Calcutta and St Petersburg or to isolated provincial studies.4 Chronologically, these studies also tend to end or begin with the outbreak of World War I, obscuring critical continuities and changes in the Anglo-Iranian encounter before and after 1914. These accounts, moreover, rarely consider British imperialism in Iran within the wider historiography of the British Empire.5 Focusing more comprehensively on southern Iran, this book reveals that British consuls and political officers made these vast and varied borderlands the real focus of British power and influence in the country between 1889 and 1921. Anxious about Russian ambitions and Qajar weakness, Britain established an extensive consular network in southern Iran. In 1888, there were four British consulates in the country; by 1921 there were 23. The sensitive southern consular posts were mainly held by political officers from the Government of India’s Foreign Department. These men pursued British political and economic interests by cultivating relationships with Qajar officials, tribal leaders, landowners and religious authorities. British officers exercised a tense condominium in southern Iran, at times cooperating with Qajar power and at others undermining it in favour of different local actors and interests. Eventually they sought to occupy Tehran’s arbitral position in the provinces and establish elements of a de facto state, managing communications, finances and natural resources, and in some areas, commanding military power. They bound Britain, India and Iran together through discourses of colonial knowledge and patterns of political, military and economic control. This imperial context is

INTRODUCTION

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essential for appreciating the emergence of Iranian nationalism as well as the failure and collapse of the Qajar state during the Iranian Constitutional Revolution and World War I. Iran was critical for British officials because it lay between three empires, Anglo-Indian, Ottoman and Russian. This position helps to explain a curious irony whereby Persia loomed large in Britain’s ‘official mind’ but has proved difficult for historians to incorporate into their accounts of the British Empire in the Middle East and South Asia.6 This problem is further illustrated by contemporaries’ and historians’ uses of terms such as Near East, Middle East, Great Game and Eastern Question, with which Iran is always associated, but only partially and peripherally. Placing Iran and British agents at the centre of the story bridges these geographical and historiographical divisions. India was in many ways an imperial hub of its own, with an imperial periphery arcing around its vast territorial and maritime frontiers extending from South Africa to Australia.7 Southern Iran was perhaps the keystone of this arch, and consuls and political officers deployed Indian imperial methods and models to incorporate the region into the Raj’s political frontier. India’s personnel, its sub-imperial ambitions and colonial discourses are crucial to appreciating the shape and scope of British imperialism in the Middle East. Britain’s imperial presence in Iran, however, was not uniform, but took on many forms, including alliances with local elites, spheres of influence, provincial state-building in cooperation with Tehran and military intervention. This comprehensive, comparative perspective reveals how local conditions and regional diversity shaped British policies. India’s political officers were the vital ‘men on the spot’ in Persia who mediated Britain’s global and local imperial interests. Political officers exported indirect rule from the native states of India to the Indian frontier and beyond, to Iran and the Middle East. Their roles in the Arab Trucial States and North-West Frontier Province have recently received attention, but no study has sufficiently examined their activities and networks in the intervening areas of southern Iran, which by the 1890s were viewed by many British officials as India’s most vulnerable borderlands.8 As consuls, political officers managed not only the Empire’s geostrategic interests but also its economic ones. They collected vast quantities of commercial intelligence, and in facilitating trade with the British Empire they helped to integrate Iran into the

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world economy. Yet their commercial considerations were inseparable from the strategic needs of Indian security, and political officers equated the expansion of British trade with the extension of British political influence. The importance of the Foreign Department’s political officers in southern Iran underscores the Indian origins of the British Empire in the Middle East. Political officers’ colonial knowledge vitally informed British policy in Iran and the wider region. Lawrence of Arabia and his acolytes, for example, have recently been described as aspiring, modernist literati who preferred intuition over empiricism as the means to know Arabs and their desert environment and to achieve both temporal fame and spiritual fulfilment.9 By contrast, the military officers of India’s Intelligence Branch deployed ostensibly scientific methods that ‘disciplined the space of Asia’ through regularized ‘military statistics’ useful to armies on the march.10 The political officers of the Indian Foreign Department active in Persia utilized a more traditional kind of colonial knowledge – political intelligence gleaned from indigenous elites. Political officers had relied on this method of penetrating the ‘information orders’ of India during the conquest and consolidation of British rule in the subcontinent.11 In Iran, men like Sir Percy Cox, the long-serving consul general/resident at Bushihr, engaged in sustained personal diplomacy with officials and notables and daily negotiated the boundaries of Qajar sovereignty on the ground. The limitations of this approach were eventually revealed in the inability of British officers to appreciate the emergence of popular urban politics and revolutionary ideologies. British knowledge about Qajar Iran remained incomplete, a fact that caused imperial administrators constant anxiety. Their efforts nevertheless did provide them with a reasonably accurate portrait of elite politics in late Qajar Iran. Cox and most of his subordinates, moreover, were recruited from the Indian Army, and while they did not necessarily possess the positivist, technocratic outlook of their colleagues in the Intelligence Branch, considerable information sharing took place between the two services. During World War I, political officers realized their latent military function, supporting British forces and raising local levies to defend British interests throughout Iran and also in Iraq, where Cox advised India’s expeditionary force and subsequently served as High Commissioner. Russia was the consuls and political officers’ primary concern, but Russian policy in Iran throughout this period was a more complicated

INTRODUCTION

5

affair than simply menacing the Raj or gaining access to warm-water ports. Russia’s vast Eurasian borderlands stretched from the Baltic to the Pacific, and Russian geostrategy reflected deep divisions within the tsarist bureaucracy as to how to balance its interests in Europe, Central Asia and the Far East.12 Unknown to the British, Russian planners had admitted by 1902 that an invasion of India was not logistically feasible, and after 1905 their attention swung to East Asia to redress the serious weaknesses revealed by Japan’s victory in Manchuria.13 Imperial Russia remained the biggest danger to Persian independence, but tsarist policy toward Iran was not, as many British officers would have had it, purely aggressive. Between the Treaty of Turkmanchay of 1828 and the RussoAnglo ultimatum of 1911, the Romanovs closely supported the Qajars, integrating them into the international state system, albeit with secondary status, and providing them with an attractive model of authoritarian state-building.14 The Qajars relied too on British backing, pragmatically positioning themselves to make the most of the AngloRussian rivalry. The dangers to Iran of Anglo-Russian cooperation were made clear by the Convention of 1907, which divided the Qajar realm into Russian, British and neutral spheres. Although the Qajars feared a Russian invasion more than a British one, Russian imperialism was based on more than military intimidation. Like the British and other empires, the Russians relied on various methods of indirect, informal rule, such as alliances with indigenous elites and prote´ge´s, economic penetration and civilizing missions, both in Enlightenment and Orthodox idioms.15 Like their Anglo-Indian counterparts, the officers of the Asiatic Department of the General Staff also collected and categorized colonial knowledge about their Muslim subjects and neighbours – notably tribal populations – and their lands.16 In practice, British and Russian imperialism in provincial Persia often bore striking similarities. British and Russian borderlands overlapped with Qajar ones. While historians have long maintained that Iran’s central government during the nineteenth century was relatively weak and that regional and tribal autonomy were common, they have only recently begun to study the provinces and take a view ‘from the edge’.17 British efforts to know and dominate southern Iran were matched by Qajar efforts to understand, map and control their own amorphous frontiers.18 These lands, therefore, were not yet integral parts of an Iranian nation state but spaces that lay beyond

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complete Qajar or British control, and this story is, therefore, about local communities negotiating their relationships with distant centres of power, Qajar and British, and in some cases Russian too. In different ways, Qajar and British officials viewed the south as a dangerous terra incognita that threatened their respective empires. Both sought to impose their rule over local peoples. Both used similar tactics – influence with provincial notables, arbitration of local disputes, rewards, punishment and promises of protection and profit. Iran’s southern borderlands were a site of competing empires, and the players in this Great Game were many and varied: Anglo-Indian, Russian, German and Ottoman diplomatic and intelligence agents; Qajar governors, officials, telegraph clerks and customs officers; and the local notables. This last group – landed magnates, wealthy urbanites, tribal leaders and religious authorities – was particularly important, because in the absence of a strong centralized bureaucracy their local knowledge and authority proved essential for governance. Local elites also integrated regional economies into the capitalist world economy and pushed for political change during the Constitutional Revolution.19 Qajar and foreign attempts to access and co-opt these men, combined with improved communications, resulted in the development of new, overlapping information networks that connected the Qajar borderlands not only with Tehran, but also with London, St Petersburg and Simla. Regional elites were, therefore, well positioned to take advantage of the opportunities afforded them by the rivalries of Qajar, British and other interests. British officers in Iran depended on the cooperation of these men, as they did in India, Africa and elsewhere. The point is not to deny the ideological power of Iranian monarchism, Persianate culture, or broader Islamic solidarities, but it does underscore that, in practice, Qajar authority was affected by other interests, loyalties and relationships operating in the shah’s far-flung territories. Many provincial notables regularly sought British intercession with the shah and his ministers. Many of them found British power conducive to their interests. By interceding between the Iranian centre and periphery, consuls and political officers altered the relationships between the shah and some of his most important subjects. When the Qajar reckoning came, the shah could not depend on these men to defend the old regime, and during the Constitutional Revolution and World War I they eagerly pursued their own political and economic interests, which in important cases aligned with those of Britain.

INTRODUCTION

7

In addition to damaging Qajar legitimacy, British imperialism in southern Iran provoked various kinds of resistance. While they succeeded in making some significant allies, British officers also alienated many other actors and interests. Such incidents initially sprang more from concrete local grievances than from the sense of Iranian nationalism emerging in this period. British involvement in the grain trade caused bread riots and British quarantine stations provoked plague revolts. Shi‘i ulama often led these popular protests. British efforts to suppress illegal transit duties (rahdari) on the trade routes aroused the hostility of the well-armed men who profited from such revenues. British attempts to subdue tribal populations triggered serious confrontations. By the end of World War I, British power in southern Iran had become dependent on military force, which many Iranians, not just self-conscious nationalists, were determined to fight. Provincial resistance to British imperialism nonetheless intersected with Iranian nationalism in key ways. Iranian nationalism was a modern project, not a primordial identity, and was articulated by intellectual and political elites as an expression of defensive modernization, reform and self-strengthening, beginning in the latter half of the nineteenth century.20 By the turn of the twentieth century, Iranian nationalism was a civic nationalism, in which membership in this ‘imagined community’ was based on shared commitments to constitutionalism, the rule of law, freedom and the defence of Iran’s borders against foreign aggression.21 British imperialism in the south during the Constitutional Revolution and World War I enabled important provincial actors to position themselves as defenders of the nation against foreign imperialists and domestic traitors, even as they pursued their own ambitions. Local Persian historians praised these men as heroic constitutionalists and anti-imperialists.22 Before the 1920s, a decentralized Iranian state allowed for a decentralized Iranian nationalism that was appropriated by Tabrizi revolutionaries, Azerbaijani and Fars Democrats, Gilani Jangalis, Bakhtiyari and Qashqa’i ilkhanis (leaders of tribal confederacies appointed by the shah), and ulama, merchants and petty headmen on the Bushihr–Shiraz road. While this nationalism was not a mass movement, regional leaders appreciated its growing political significance and deployed it to build alliances in the provinces and Tehran. With British rule a seemingly real possibility, early twentieth-century

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nationalists were more immediately concerned with protecting Iran’s sovereignty within its existing frontiers than with promoting a homogeneous vision of a Persian national community bound together by ties of language, race or religion. Localism and nationalism united, for a fleeting moment, against the common threat of British imperialism, and Iranian nationalism was sufficiently capacious to include anyone who might defy the British in the name of the nation, Islam, his own material interests, or some combination thereof. The coalition of local and national, however, proved fragile and in the 1920s Riza Khan crushed the borderlands.23 The ideological character of Pahlavi nationalism remains the focus of historical debate, with recent accounts alternatively stressing the emergence of an ancient pre-Islamic ‘authenticity’ in World War I, the ascendancy of a conservative, centralizing narrative emphasizing national continuities of ‘race, civilization, and religion’ under Riza Shah, or the celebration of ‘sacral monarchy’ as the mystical embodiment of the nation during his son’s rule.24 Whatever the case, Pahlavi state-builders cited British alliances with ambitious local elites and armed intervention in the late Qajar period as justification for their efforts to reduce regional autonomy, diminish ethno-linguistic diversity and construct a more homogeneous national community.25 Fears that Iran’s independence and territorial integrity were threatened by autonomous, potentially disloyal local elites was the reason many nationalists celebrated Pahlavi military campaigns in the periphery and promoted national unity at the expense of local differences. It was no coincidence that the Qajar political system, the power of local elites and Britain’s imperial network in southern Iran all fell together; their fates proved to be inextricably linked.

PART I CONSULS AND THE GREAT GAME, 1889—1907

CHAPTER 1 IMPERIAL INTELLIGENCE: OFFICIAL BRITISH IMAGES OF QAJAR IRAN

In a word, I shall endeavour to do here for Persia what abler writers have done for most other countries of equal importance, but what for two hundred years no single English writer has essayed to do for Iran, viz. to present a full-length and life-size portrait of that kingdom.1 Lord Curzon’s Persia and the Persian Question did indeed take up an immense canvas – two volumes and almost 1,300 pages describing his journey through Iran from late 1889 to early 1890 and analysing the country’s political and economic institutions through the prism of Indian security. Curzon was confident he had produced the definitive work on modern Iran, and this expertise contributed to his appointment as Viceroy of India (1899 – 1905). His volumes, nevertheless, proved rather more a beginning than an end of Britain’s quest to acquire knowledge about late Qajar Iran; he had sketched, not solved, the ‘Persian Question’. His encyclopaedic presentation revealed the scope as well as the limits of British knowledge about Qajar Iran, especially the geostrategic southern provinces that he only briefly visited. Over the next two decades, this ignorance caused Curzon and his colleagues much anxiety as they learned of the double menace of Russian efforts to advance towards the Persian Gulf and the growing inability of the Qajar state to govern its vast periphery. In response to such

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knowledge ‘panics’,2 Britain constructed political, commercial and intelligence networks in Iran manned by consuls and political officers. Curzon himself selected several of these political officers from India’s Foreign Department while he was viceroy. These men were the Raj’s diplomatic corps, serving as British representatives at the courts of India’s native princes as well as of foreign rulers beyond the frontier in Central Asia and the Middle East.3 In southern Iran, their mission was to check Russian influence and to collect and classify various kinds of imperial information, so as to render visible this extensive region and its inhabitants. Crossing the Iranian frontier meant entering another state and another ‘information order’,4 and British officials used three main methods to attempt to penetrate both. The first was political intelligence directed at comprehending the structure of the Qajar state and identifying and co-opting the individuals and networks through which it functioned. The second was mapping, which took two forms: first, a geostrategic discourse that located Iran in the shrinking space between Britain’s and Russia’s imperial borderlands and served to chart the British Empire’s political frontiers (as distinct from its territorial frontiers) by way of spheres of influence and schemes of partition; and, second, a cartographic description of that space through gazetteers, route books and trigonometric surveys that aspired to scientific veracity and military utility. The final method of knowing Qajar Iran was commercial statistics, which although plagued by inaccuracies, at least offered British officers a numerical measure of their economic and political influence vis-a`-vis their Russian rivals. These political, geographical and commercial modes overlapped to shape an image of Qajar Iran that was dominated by Indian security and a compulsion to assert, measure and verify British interests and influence. While economic penetration has long been viewed by historians as the hallmark of informal imperialism,5 information networks and intelligence gathering were also central to this project. These labours produced a prodigious, but by no means panoptic British archive of Qajar Iran. Victorian positivists may have believed that their vast collections of facts enabled imperial ‘control at a distance’,6 but knowing the borderlands was never free of epistemological doubt. British officials relied heavily on Iranian informants, although they distrusted native reporting as dishonest, exaggerated and

IMPERIAL INTELLIGENCE

13

biased. Diplomats, consuls and political officers professed the ability to judge the accuracy of such reporting and to register authentic information in the official record, but such confidence was belied by their susceptibility to rumours, manipulation and outright panic. Even when accurate, their data were paradoxically too limited to afford more than a fragmentary glimpse of these regions and peoples and too extensive and disparate to allow for ready analysis, categorization and utilization. The British archive of Qajar Iran, like British policy there, mirrored the fractured nature of the British imperial state, with authority and information divided between the Foreign Office, India Office, the Government of India, the War Office and their various subordinates around the world. Use of elite informants, moreover, left the British with a rather static, top-down view of Iranian society and an underdeveloped appreciation of important changes shaping late Qajar Iran from below. Although knowledge is inseparable from power, it is not a substitute for it, and British officials became acutely aware that their ability to project power in southern Iran ultimately depended on force, as World War I would reveal. For the man on the spot, consciousness of the dangers to British interests and of limited military means meant that protecting Britain’s informal empire in southern Iran was a nerve-wracking endeavour.

British Political Intelligence and the Qajar State The establishment of an Anglo-Indian intelligence network in Iran’s southern borderlands reflected British analysis of Russian ambitions, British conceptions of the Qajar state and British imperial practice in India. Throughout the nineteenth century, British interests in Qajar Iran were primarily geostrategic – the defence of India against Russia. By the 1890s, however, Russian power and influence in northern Iran had eclipsed Britain’s. With the conquest of Marv in 1884, Russia had finally made its frontiers coterminous with Iran’s. Russian armies could strike anywhere from Azerbaijan to the Caspian littoral and beyond to Khurasan. Russia seemed ascendant in Tehran in 1900 and 1902, when the prime minister, Mirza ‘Ali Asghar Khan Amin al-Sultan, concluded two Russian loans totalling £3.5 million, which also barred Iran from borrowing from other foreign sources.

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British officials accepted as axiomatic that Russia would exert its influence to secure a warm-water port in the Persian Gulf on India’s maritime frontier. Indian security, however, required an Iranian buffer state in its western borderlands. On this point, Curzon was uncompromising: ‘Whatever destiny befall her in the north, in the regions beyond the sphere of our possible interference’, he declared defiantly, ‘Persia shall retain inviolate the centre and south, and be able to say to an invader, “Thus far and no further”.’7 Other observers more candidly admitted that Iran could not escape the era of partition diplomacy. Writing to the prime minister, Lord Salisbury, in February 1899, Sir Mortimer Durand, the British minister in Tehran (1894– 1900), generalized freely that ‘Every Persian believes that sooner or later the country will be divided between England and Russia, and the southerner from Zil-es-Sultan8 downwards, looks to coming under the rule of England.’9 Russia’s ascendancy in the north prompted British officials to explore ways to consolidate their own sphere of influence in the south. Durand repeatedly recommended consular expansion as the solution. Significantly, he had spent most of his career in India, joining the Indian Civil Service in 1870 and serving as secretary in the Indian Foreign Department between 1885 and 1894.10 He was fluent in Persian but was fairly unpopular with Iranian officials, who resented the appointment of a Raj official as minister to the court of the ‘king of kings’. As one of his subordinates observed perspicuously, Durand for his part ‘had a good deal of contempt for the Persians and the impression got around that he wished to treat them as if he had been a Resident in India in a Native State’.11 In September 1895 he urged Salisbury to strengthen British influence among Iran’s tribal groups by means of political officers and consuls: The reports of English officers who travel among the Turkomans, Bakhtiaris, and other wild tribes show clearly that at present they entertain very friendly feelings towards us. If we show more interest in them we shall strengthen those feelings and throughout Persia we can win over men to our side if we choose to try [. . .] It will strengthen our influence materially [. . .] if our Representatives at Bushire and Ispahan and Khorassan are encouraged to travel and make friends among the Chiefs and

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tribesmen [. . .] but we must have picked officers, working with definite instructions and objects, not untried boys on leave wandering about and getting into mischief.12 Durand was apprehensive about the sensitive nature of these proposals. Writing confidentially to his friend, Lt General Sir E. F. Chapman, director of Military Intelligence, Durand hoped his memorandum ‘will see as little light as possible for it wd. play the devil here if the Persians got hold of it’.13 Durand waited until February 1899 before seriously elaborating. In another, longer memorandum he explained to Salisbury that although he favoured negotiating with Russia for a comprehensive settlement of their Asian rivalry, he conceded that the present prospects for such an agreement were not very good. In these circumstances, he was adamant that the Russians ‘ought not to be able to meet us on equal terms in our zone’.14 Newly arrived in India, Curzon enthusiastically endorsed Durand’s plan and in the coming years he devoted more Indian funds and personnel to the project.15 By the time that Britain and Russia agreed to divide Iran into spheres of influence in 1907, British consulates had been established in Mashhad (1889), Muhammarah (1890), Isfahan (1891), Yazd (1893), Kirman (1894), Sistan (1900), Bandar-i ‘Abbas (1900), Shiraz (1903), Ahvaz (1904) and Kirmanshah (1904), with additional temporary posts at Turbat-i Haydari, Bam and Kuh-i Malik-i Siah. The Russians followed suit. The political officers who frequently held these posts reported both to the secretary in the Indian Foreign Department and the minister in Tehran under the Foreign Office, an arrangement that perpetuated, at a local level, the dual control that would often embarrass British diplomacy in Iran.

Qajar decentralization The consular strategy indicated that while Oriental Despotism still loomed large in European visions of Persia, better-informed observers recognized that Qajar claims to absolute authority were undercut by the decentralized character of their regime. Sir John Malcolm’s History of Persia, first published in 1815, shaped British discourses about the Qajar state. Curzon himself called it ‘the standard English work on the subject’.16 ‘The King of Persia’, Malcolm maintained, ‘deems himself

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vested with an authority independent of the law; and considers that, from the prerogative of his high condition he can take away the life or the property of any one of his subjects: but it has been shewn that the exercise of this power is practically limited.’17 The constraints on royal power, he asserted, included the ulama and the shari‘a; provincial magnates; armed autonomous tribes; urban elites; and popular custom, usage and opinion.18 As the nineteenth century progressed, British and Russian imperialism further circumscribed Qajar freedom of action. Modern historians have generally confirmed Malcolm’s assessment.19 Citing pre-Islamic and Safavid precedents, Qajar shahs conceived of the state and its offices and perquisites as personal property, to be allotted to the royal family, courtiers and others as they saw fit.20 These extensive powers enabled the shah to fulfil his primary responsibilities: protection of the realm, defence of Islam and maintenance of justice (‘adl).21 Justice required the shah to maintain social equilibrium by balancing his subjects’ competing interests. Failure to perform this duty was, by definition, tyranny (zulm), which absolved subjects of their obedience. Qajar absolutism was ideologically restricted by the legitimacy of resistance to tyranny, and Qajar history is replete with rebellion, culminating in the Constitutional Revolution (1905 – 11). The Qajar realm, moreover, was vast and the Qajar state proportionally weak. The shahs lacked significant military or bureaucratic power and acknowledged considerable regional and tribal self-rule. Qajar rule necessarily functioned upon cooperation between the shah and local landholders, tribal chiefs, urban notables, ulama and prominent merchants.22 Such men performed vital state functions, notably revenue collection and military recruitment, and they mediated between the shah’s officials and his subjects. The persistence of local power structures loyal to the shah provided provincial stability, while the shah’s influence, in turn, was deployed in support of these local hierarchies. Royal endorsement in the form of offices, titles and honours enhanced the local notables’ prestige. In his capacity of supreme arbiter, the shah endeavoured to balance local interests and ensure public tranquillity. When it came to exerting some kind of control over these peripheral forces, he employed various methods befitting his arbitral position in political society: negotiation, reconciliation, manipulation, intrigue, as well as ‘symbolic punishments and rewards’.23

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Provincial elites were also important, because like the Qajar state, the Qajar information order was decentralized. Knowledge in Qajar Iran was concentrated neither in a modern bureaucracy with highly developed archival practices, nor in a public sphere of mass literacy and print media. Rather, it was widely diffused throughout society and embodied in persons, communities and networks. Elite families were crucial to organizing, maintaining and integrating these local information orders.24 Royal officials depended on local specialists who possessed, and often closely guarded, information vital to the state. Knowledge of land and revenue yields, for example, was scattered about in the hands of kalantars (town mayors or high-ranking tribal leaders), kadkhudas (village headmen), landholders, vaqf administrators, harvest surveyors, mustawfis (accountants), provincial tax collectors, tax farmers, tribal chiefs and local governors.25 Tribal levies remained important Qajar military resources, and the khans and lesser chiefs knew much about the state’s capacity to make war. Merchants, bazaris, guild masters and customs farmers similarly controlled information about trade, commerce and manufacturing. The Shi‘i ulama’s command of Islamic sciences was institutionalized in the mosques, madrassas, shari‘a courts and shrines that were an integral part of daily Iranian life. Sufi, Christian, Jewish and Zoroastrian communities similarly had their own religious experts. The local authority of notables was inseparable from their local knowledge, and for the Qajars, the cooperation of these elites was essential to understanding and ruling the provinces. Qajar Iran, nonetheless, was undergoing profound changes. Telegraphs, postal services, steamships, trade routes, banks, printing presses and other technologies made possible the integration not only of the Iranian state but also of regional economies and information orders, bringing together Iran’s various communities in new ways and new settings. British observers reported that Nasir al-Din Shah possessed more power over the periphery than his predecessors. Curzon noted that ‘provincial governors are thoroughly under control and quake at the vibrations of the telegraph wire from Tehran’.26 The appointment of foreign ministry agents (karguzars) to provincial towns to mediate disputes with foreign subjects and consuls gave Tehran another way to monitor the periphery and constrain governors and notables.27 One such karguzar, Muhammad ‘Ali Khan Sadid al-Saltanah, served in Bushihr during the reign of Muzaffar al-Din Shah. Travelling by steamship, he

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compiled massive studies of the Iranian ports, their populations, geographies and economies, in which he meticulously documented his myriad personal relationships and contacts, most of whom do not appear in British sources.28 Improved communications, however, were a two-way street, and these changes did not always benefit royal rule. After losing his post as a result of British pressure, Sadid al-Saltanah took up an appointment as Russian consular agent at Bandar-i ‘Abbas in 1904, thus connecting St Petersburg to his vast networks. Furthermore, as the Tobacco Protests of 1891– 2 revealed, local populations could now telegraph their grievances directly to the shah’s court and could coordinate their campaigns with other cities and towns. Governors and karguzars frequently and embarrassingly reminded Tehran of its inability to control events on the periphery and complained about a lack of precise instructions from the central government. While such correspondence was increasingly archived at various ministries in the capital, these records more often revealed political paralysis than the making of a strong bureaucratic state. For the British, the turbulent years of Nasir al-Din Shah’s later reign, his assassination in 1896 and the weakness of his son and successor, Muzaffar al-Din Shah, demonstrated that central authority was again in eclipse and that the borderlands were again in play. The political fragmentation of the late Qajar state encouraged the British to identify, map and exploit local political, economic and information networks. Regional elites became the key to shielding southern Iran against Russian expansion.

The British Empire, India and local elites Britain’s decision to join the ‘politics of notables’29 reflected not only the political realities of Qajar Iran, but also wider impulses emanating from the imperial metropole and the Indian Empire. Rank and status remained important markers of power in the United Kingdom, and imperial rulers deployed an ‘analogical sociology’ in their analysis of foreign and colonial hierarchies.30 Indirect rule was a hallmark of the British Empire (and others) in Asia, Africa and the Americas, and British dependence on local cooperation helps to explain the general pattern of Britain’s apparently unsystematic, ad hoc imperialism. A broad commitment to the politics of notables produced a great diversity of local political forms and imperial relationships. This practice found its

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fullest expression in India, where early political officers like Malcolm built alliances with regional rulers during the East India Company’s conquest. After the Indian Mutiny in 1857, Queen Victoria confirmed the dependence of ‘the stability of the Indian Empire’ on the preservation, cooperation and loyalty of the native princes, who ruled about a third of the territory of India and a quarter of its population.31 This special relationship between the crown and the princes was reaffirmed and rearticulated in the great Delhi durbars of 1877, 1903 and 1911. The quotidian management of this system of indirect rule fell to the political officers of India’s Foreign Department – the very same men who would export the British version of the politics of notables to southern Iran. During this period, the Foreign Department employed about 155 political officers, two thirds of whom were recruited from the Indian Army and the other third from the Indian Civil Service.32 The temptation to conflate Iran with India was a strong one. Describing the relationship between Tehran and Shaykh Khaz‘al Khan of Muhammarah, the most important Arab ruler in south-western Iran, Lt Arnold T. Wilson acknowledged ‘although it is dangerous and misleading to make comparisons it may be said of the Shaikh that, from an administrative point of view, his position is not unlike that of some rulers of native states in India’.33 Men like Wilson, whose father was an Anglican clergyman and headmaster of Clifton College, Bristol, were typically sons of minor gentry and the upper middle classes and were educated in English public schools, military academies and army regiments, where they cultivated the values of an English gentleman.34 An applicant to the service needed his recommending officer to comment on his ‘physique and general health’, as well as indicate whether he was ‘of active habits and proficient in field sports?’ and ‘a good, bad or indifferent horseman?’.35 Field sports were a classic indicator of those Victorian, gentlemanly virtues of strength, courage, competition and cooperation prized in public schools and public service. Horsemanship had similar associations and was of practical necessity for work on the frontier. Recruits and junior officers were not permitted to marry; they were to be imperial eunuchs ever ready for rugged frontier assignments. Even after the Foreign Department had accepted a candidate for political work, his superior officer assessed him in confidential reports as to his ‘Tact’, ‘Temper’, ‘Judgement’, ‘Accessibility’,

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‘Self-reliance’ and ‘Power of Commanding Respect’.36 The Foreign Department considered these qualities essential to the political officer’s foremost duty: the management of men in the interests of the British Empire. They also point to that ubiquitous but ill-defined imperial obsession – prestige. The political officer sought to embody British power in India’s borderlands and to persuade notables that their own interests were best served by cooperation with that power. The Foreign Department maintained that such diplomacy required the political officer to overcome the physical, emotional and mental strains of the frontier and to present a carefully controlled mask of imperial confidence, composure and dignity.37 Political officers’ command of Persian, and in some cases Arabic, was indispensable to this project. Knowledge of local languages, according to W. B. Wood, the resident at Hyderabad, writing in August 1882 to Sir Charles Grant, secretary in the Foreign Department, was the ‘secret of much of the personal influence and success of our predecessors’.38 Indian Army officers learned Hindustani-Urdu, which one scholar memorably dubbed ‘the British Language of Command’.39 Military candidates seeking admission to the Foreign Department also acquired Persian or Arabic. Persian had been the administrative language of Mughal India, and when the East India Company established its territorial empire in the late eighteenth century, it promoted the study of Persian among its employees as a necessary instrument of rule. Persian teachers and scholars in India were essential to this project. They also made significant, and often unacknowledged, contributions to the linguistic triumphs of British Orientalists like Sir William Jones.40 During the nineteenth century Persian lost its immediate function in India and in the 1830s the British abolished it as an official language of government. For the Raj, Persian then became a language of the frontier. As such, the importance of Persian, like Arabic, increased with the geographical expansion of India’s security interests in the later nineteenth century. Noting this development in 1890, the viceroy, Lord Lansdowne, explained to the secretary of state for India in London, Viscount Cross, that ‘It is to be borne in mind that there is a great number and variety of languages of which it is desirable to encourage in this country. An acquaintance with Arabic and Persian has of late days become of more importance to our temporary occupation of Egypt and the extension of our influence beyond the north-west boundary of India.’41

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The British hoped by learning native languages to become independent of untrustworthy, self-interested native interpreters and agents. Before consular expansion in the 1890s, Britain maintained native agents in Kirmanshah, Hamadan, Isfahan, Astarabad, Mashhad and Shiraz, who in turn managed networks of newswriters and informants. Some of these men possessed considerable local connections and influence. The agent in Kirmanshah in the 1880s, for example, was Aqa Muhammad Hasan, a wealthy merchant with close links to Zil al-Sultan, the virtual viceroy of southern Iran at Isfahan. A legation secretary described Aqa Muhammad Hasan’s local influence in 1886 as ‘extraordinary’.42 In Shiraz, the agency was held by successive members of the important Navvab family, Persianate-British subjects, whose ancestors had emigrated from Iran to India in the sixteenth century and returned 300 years later. Haydar ‘Ali Khan Navvab held the Shiraz agency from 1878 until 1903; two of his nephews, ‘Abbas Quli Khan and Husayn Quli Khan, were employees of the British Legation in Tehran. The latter also occupied various positions in the Iranian foreign ministry, eventually serving as foreign minister in 1910, and gaining a reputation as a constitutionalist, nationalist and Democrat.43 Durand had little confidence in ‘crafty, diplomatic natives’44 and deemed them illsuited to countering the Russians in southern Iran. Few of them possessed Aqa Muhammad Hasan’s local prestige. Haydar ‘Ali Khan Navvab in Shiraz, according to several British officers, pursued his considerable personal interests at the expense of British policy.45 Others, like S. P. Aganoor, an Armenian in Isfahan, were judged ‘unreliable and useless’ and their reports ‘not trustworthy’.46 British prestige demanded British officers, who could gauge the veracity of native reporting. Many of the new British consuls were accomplished Persian linguists, but they remained dependent on Iranians for political intelligence. What the British learned about Qajar Iran, they learned mainly from Persian informants. British consuls routinely discussed provincial affairs with governors like Amir ‘Ali Akbar Khan Hishmat al-Mulk, who ruled the vital south-eastern province of Sistan, bordering Afghanistan and British Baluchistan. Hishmat al-Mulk provided the British consul, Major G. Chenevix Trench, with copies of his correspondence with his nominal superior in Mashhad, Muhammad Taqi Mirza Rukn al-Dawlah, and with the Russian consul, Alexander Miller.47 In spring 1900, one of his mirzas (clerks) also granted Chenevix Trench’s secretary, Munshi Ahmad Din,

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access to his revenue accounts and other papers, which provided the British with a detailed view of village crop yields and tax assessments.48 This information became more important the following year when Curzon heard rumours that the Russians were attempting to lease Sistan’s revenues.49 Chenevix Trench and his successor, Captain R. A. E. Benn, routinely met with Hishmat al-Mulk’s sons, Amir Mas‘um Khan and Sartip Muhammad Riza Khan, and other notables and officials. At night, they received confidential informants, which as Benn’s wife, Edith, later recalled, increased her already intense social isolation in Sistan: The evenings too I was generally doomed to spend alone, as after dinner secret interviews took place, and Colonel Trench deemed it wiser to receive these gentlemen in the drawing-room, as it had a private exit through which they could pass without meeting the servants. When the informants appeared I had to retire to my bedroom, as they would not report freely if I were present.50 Captain Benn may not have shared his wife’s discomfort, but he and his colleagues were concerned about the quality of such information. ‘Truth and falsehood’, Sir Arthur Hardinge, minister at Tehran (1900– 1905), warned ‘are so mingled in Persian statements, a substratum of truth being overlaid with the products of the author’s imagination.’51 Hardinge’s breezy generalization of Persian character revealed anxiety about his ability to distinguish Persian myth from reality. ‘An Intelligence Officer’, the General Staff of the Indian Army maintained in 1911, ‘should never believe, and never trust a Persian, or rely on his promises in any way whatsoever.’52 The British stereotype of the dishonest Persian was partially a confession of British ignorance – an ignorance that left them vulnerable to rumours. Muzaffar al-Din Shah himself raised the issue personally with Lord Lansdowne, British foreign secretary (1900–05), during a visit to London in 1902. Lansdowne noted that the shah had pledged his friendship towards Britain but complained that ‘we were in the habit of attaching too much importance to mere rumours repeated to us by our Agents, and that we allowed such rumours to affect our attitude towards his Government.’53 Somewhat missing the hint, Lansdowne replied by asking the shah for reassurance of his regard for British interests in southern Iran. Muzaffar al-Din Shah concluded the audience by asking that the British consuls newly

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appointed to the frontiers exercise special tact and prudence. In his view, the proliferation of British intelligence networks in the borderlands had heightened rather than allayed their imperial paranoia and roiled AngloIranian relations.

‘Who’s Who in Persia’ One way British officials attempted to collect, store and reproduce knowledge about their Iranian interlocutors was in a series of confidential publications entitled ‘Biographical Notices’. First compiled in 1897 by Lt Colonel Henry Picot, it was revised by George Churchill in 1905 and 1909.54 Both men served as oriental secretary in Tehran, a position that brought them into close contact with Qajar officials, politicians and notables. Churchill’s encyclopaedic knowledge of Persian politics and personalities gave him considerable influence with successive British ministers and made him unpopular in some Persian circles, a situation that led to his eventual recall to Britain in 1918.55 The General Staff of the Indian Army updated and republished the ‘Biographical Notices’ as ‘Who’s Who in Persia’ in 1916, 1918 and 1923.56 The ‘Biographical Notices’ were organized alphabetically by name and included a summary of an individual’s genealogy and official career with occasional personal commentary as to character and abilities. Picot and Churchill obtained much of this information from Persian sources, as evidenced especially by the family histories, some of which dated back to the early Islamic period. There were Persian precedents for biographical dictionaries, including the Namah-i Danishvaran, supervised by Muhammad Hasan Khan I‘timad al-Saltanah during the reign of Nasir al-Din Shah.57 Provincial consuls also contributed to the notices. For example, in February 1909 Captain D. L. R. Lorimer, consul at Ahvaz, compiled a first-hand report on the leading Bakhtiyari khans.58 Churchill incorporated Lorimer’s character sketches into the 1909 edition of his ‘Biographical Notices’, including the latter’s observation that Najaf Quli Khan Samsam al-Saltanah, the Bakhtiyari ilkhani and future prime minister, was ‘violent in his passions, and generally speaking blunt in his manner’.59 This quotation subsequently appeared in other official British sources, such as Wilson’s military report on south-west Persia, on which Lorimer also collaborated, as well as India’s ‘Who’s Who in Persia’.60 In the case of Samsam al-Saltanah, British officials were confident that they knew their man.

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These biographical databases, however, also revealed changing British attitudes towards important Qajar notables. In the ‘Who’s Who in Persia’ of 1918, British authorities had not quite made up their minds about Isma‘il Khan Sawlat al-Dawlah, the ilkhani of the powerful Qashqa’i confederacy in Fars, who was ‘still sitting on the fence’ regarding Britain’s armed intervention during World War I.61 He did not wait much longer, and from May to July of that year led a determined, but ultimately unsuccessful, military campaign to expel the British. Accordingly, their judgement against him in 1923 was severe: Character: very avaricious, revengeful and unforgiving. A dissembler, especially in his pose of an ardent Nationalist, but astute, e.g., in dealing, and in his retention of a number of powerful friends at Tehran. As a leader of the Qashqai, though a coward in the field, more capable than his brothers, but his inability to unite them is a permanent weakness [. . .] At heart he bears no good will to the British for his defeat in 1918.62 Apparently, the British were similarly slow to forget a grievance. As these references to Bakhtiyari and Qashqa’i leaders indicate, diplomats, consuls and political officers devoted considerable study to Iran’s many and disparate tribal populations. No other group in late Qajar society received as much British attention. While in practice there was considerable socio-economic interaction and overlap between Iran’s nomadic and settled populations, both of which contained tribal elements, European as well as Irano-Islamic traditions tended to view the tribes as sui generis. Echoing Ibn Khaldun, Malcolm declared in his History of Persia that: The Eellyats [tribes], as a body, have the virtues and vices of their condition; are sincere, hospitable, and brave; but rude, violent, and rapacious. They are not in need of falsehood and deceit, and therefore not much in the habit of practicing them: but if they have fewer vices than the citizens, it is evidently the absence of temptation, and the ignorance of luxury, which give them their superiority; for it is remarked that they never settle in towns, or enter them as victors, without exceeding the inhabitants in every species of profligacy.63

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Such environmental determinism was still very much at work in 1900, when Captain G. S. F Napier reported to the Intelligence Branch in India that the ‘Population of Fars may be resolved into distinct elements – the settled and the nomad. The former are quite, cowardly, and inoffensive. The latter are mostly lawless and turbulent in character.’64 For the British, the tribes were martial races, a concept that deeply informed the Indian Empire’s security interests, military institutions and cultural anthropology.65 For example, in early 1904 Lt Colonel J. A. Douglas, military attache´ at Tehran and an Indian Army intelligence officer, described the Bakhtiyaris as follows: ‘Physically, they are excellent material for soldiers, of good physique, active, keen sportsmen, and accustomed to a life of hardship. Among the Persians they have a great reputation for bravery and as daring raiders.’66 British analysis of Iran’s tribal populations was mainly limited to leadership, structure, population, migration patterns and fighting capacity. Ethnological accounts of their customs were much less common, perhaps because officers considered such information secondary to their instrumental interest in tribal politics and economics. A report on the Qashqa’i confederacy by H. G. Chick, commercial adviser to the resident at Bushihr in 1912, is representative of the genre.67 Chick’s sources were largely the leading Qashqa’is themselves – the ilkhani, Sawlat al-Dawlah; his agent, Mu‘avin al-Mamalik; and kalantars of the various tirahs (subtribes/clans). Chick compared their information with a late nineteenth-century provincial history, Hasan Fasa’i’s Farsnamah-i Nasiri. On the critical question of how many fighting men the confederacy could field, he was agnostic. Sawlat al-Dawlah himself preferred ignorance on the matter. The revenues he owed Qajar authorities were based on a poll tax, and he naturally perceived little advantage in producing accurate population statistics. The best Chick could do was some rough calculations that the Qashqa’is might occupy anywhere from 40,000– 60,000 tents, each sheltering five persons. He speculated that every two tents might furnish three fighting men. Wilson then took up the matter and reckoned that the Qashqa’is might theoretically possess 60,000 fighters and 15,000 modern rifles.68 He maintained, however, that 3,000–4,000 armed men was the maximum Sawlat al-Dawlah could retain at any one time. As evidence, he cited battles in Shiraz in 1911 between Sawlat al-Dawlah and his great rival Habib Allah Khan Qavam al-Mulk, head of the Khamsah confederacy and hereditary kalantar of

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Shiraz, during which the Qashqa’i leader fielded some 2,000 men. Captain A. J. Christian confirmed Wilson’s general figures after hostilities had broken out between British and the Qashqa’is in 1918.69 The most important sections of Chick’s report, however, concerned the political organization of the Qashqa’i confederacy. The Qashqa’is, like the Bakhtiyaris, the Khamsahs, Shaykh Khaz‘al’s Arabs and the other great confederacies of Qajar Iran were notoriously fissiparous, and the maintenance of a unified confederacy under a single leader was a noteworthy accomplishment. Here lay the key to Qajar tribal management: divide and rule. The British were eager to exploit these same divisions. ‘In dealing with the Qashqais or following the sequence of events in the tribal politics’, Chick asserted, ‘it is most important to have a knowledge of their relationships, which are often connected with rivalries.’70 To this end, he drew up not only a detailed genealogical chart of Sawlat al-Dawlah’s family but also tables listing the Qashqa’i tirahs compiled largely from the Farsnamah-i Nasiri, with their sub-clans and kalantars.71 Russian officers undertook similar studies among the Turkman tribes.72 Keeping such information current required constant effort. ‘Much may be done’, Christian advised, ‘by any officer who may at any time find himself among the tribes reported upon. The Kalantars of the smaller tribes are constantly changing and such changes should be noted and reported upon whenever possible.’73 His report included blank pages probably for this purpose. British officers in Shiraz demonstrated the practical effectiveness of such research in the summer of 1918, when they, together with the governor general of Fars, ‘Abd al-Husayn Mirza Farman Farma, exploited Qashqa’i divisions to break up the siege of Shiraz. Divide and conquer, however, was only one side of the coin; the other was military and administrative co-optation. The Qajars were adept at this strategy. The office of ilkhani was in fact a royal appointment by which the shah selected a senior leader to administer a community, collect revenues and raise cavalry forces as needed. While they appreciated the Qajar model, the British had been working out their own one on the frontiers of India. Political officers were steeped in this tradition. After 1910 they were required to read Sir Herbert Edwardes’ Year on the Punjab Frontier 1848–49 (1851) and T. H. Thornton’s Colonel Sir Robert Sandeman: His Life and Work on our Indian Frontier (1895) as part of their training.74 Both accounts served as practical manuals for incorporating borderlands into the Indian system. They emphasized personal diplomacy and alliances

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with indigenous elites as the foundation of India’s control beyond the frontier. Diplomacy, however, was not always sufficient, and both men advised political officers how to recruit tribal levies to compel cooperation with British interests. Edwardes related how he raised, financed and led irregular units against Diwan Mulraj of Multan in the Second Anglo-Sikh War (1848–49) that resulted in the British annexation of Punjab.75 While serving in Baluchistan in the 1880s, Sandeman transformed the tribal levy from a purely military instrument into a tool of local administration. In the ‘Sandeman System’, political officers supported the authority of tribal leaders while paying subsidies for levies to protect the roads and maintain order.76 British officials in Iran saw similar opportunities everywhere. Tribal allies and levies could maintain order and protect trade in the absence of effective central administration or British troops. Writing to Durand in March 1900 after a tour of Sistan, the consul at Kirman, Captain Percy Sykes, confessed that he hoped that should circumstances arise, ‘I might be called upon to raise a body of Persian irregulars, or in any case to use my knowledge of the country, people, and language for military purposes.’77 In 1896, Durand proposed forming Arab and Bakhtiyari levies under British officers to guard the new trade routes from the Karun River to Isfahan.78 They could also serve as auxiliaries to British forces in the region. Citing lessons from the Boer War, Consul J. R. Preece recommended supporting Bakhtiyari guerilla operations against a Russian invasion of the south.79 Indeed, British and Indian armies were overstretched and needed allies, both global and local, and in November 1902 an interdepartmental committee concluded that Britain did not have enough troops to defend or occupy southern Iran without compromising its wider imperial commitments.80 In response, Arthur Hardinge and Douglas urged London to consider building alliances with the Bakhtiyaris and Arabs against the Russians.81 Such proposals were shelved for years, but political officers would get their chance during World War I, forging alliances and recruiting levies to defend British interests in southern and eastern Iran. Political intelligence would pay military dividends.

Mapping Qajar Iran Even after substantial territorial losses throughout the nineteenth century, Qajar Iran remained a vast domain, with a land area nearly five

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times that of the United Kingdom. Its huge mountains, vast deserts, few navigable rivers and poor roads posed challenges both to Qajar rule and foreign penetration. The Zagros mountains formed a great limestone wall running perpendicular to the southern trade routes. For the Qajars, mapping became more important as Iran’s shrinking frontiers were delimited and the country was territorially integrated into the international state system.82 Iranians still harboured imperial ambitions, and travel accounts like Riza Quli Khan Hidayat’s Sifaratnamah-i Khvarazm and Firuz Mirza Farman Farman’s Safarnamah-i Kirman va Baluchistan revealed Qajar dreams of recovering and developing borderland resources.83 Iranian geographical projects had a more immediate defensive purpose in the age of European expansion. In October 1902, for instance, the governor of Bushihr, Riza Quli Khan Mafi Salar Mu‘azzam, reminded Tehran of the necessity of raising the Qajars’ Lion and Sun flag at 40 to 50 locations along the gulf coast.84 Nasir al-Din Shah himself set an example, travelling through the northern provinces and publishing his accounts of the journeys, lands and peoples. In the south, Sadid al-Saltanah studied the Persian Gulf littoral, while Hasan Fasa’i published his Farsnamah-i Nasiri in 1896.85 Cultural, military and diplomatic encounters encouraged Iranians to adopt cartographical techniques associated with the ‘new geography’ of the nineteenth century.86 The Dar al-Funun, the Qajar technical academy, was a centre of such activities. Fasa’i situated his map of Fars on a grid of latitude and longitude.87 Such maps powerfully informed conceptions of the Iranian nation, and the defence of the Iranian vatan (homeland) became a key element of Iranian patriotism and civic nationalism during the Constitutional Revolution and World War I.88 British mapping of Qajar Persia involved delineating Iran’s geostrategic relationship with India and Russia and a cartographic effort to measure and plot that territory. These modes of understanding Iranian geography merged to inform Anglo-Russian partition diplomacy and Anglo-Indian military planning. Throughout the nineteenth century, Persia’s primary significance for Britain lay in its location between India and Europe. Britain, Malcolm maintained in 1815, could ‘only desire the strength and prosperity of a kingdom, which interposes as a barrier between Europe and its Asiatic dominions’.89 Later strategists echoed this assessment. In 1874 Malcolm’s prote´ge´, Sir Henry Rawlinson, prefaced his cautionary England and Russia in the East by pointing out that while the

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‘political affairs of a second-rate Oriental power like Persia’ were not likely very interesting to the British public, ‘it may be well to remember that the country is so placed geographically, midway between Europe and India, that it can hardly fail to play an important part in the future history of the East’.90 As Rawlinson’s title indicated, Russian expansion in the Caucasus and Central Asia combined with the Raj’s efforts to consolidate its northwest frontier increasingly positioned Iran not only between India and Europe but also, and more importantly, between the British and Russian empires. Here was the geopolitical foundation of the Persian buffer state. By the 1890s, however, Russian power and influence in northern Iran was undeniable. Curzon publicly conceded Russia’s ‘permanent superiority in the north’.91 In 1895, Durand privately assured Salisbury that Russian influence in Tehran was ‘predominant’.92 India’s Foreign Department accordingly recommended redeploying resources to the centre and south.93 In 1901, Hardinge justified British representations to the Iranian foreign ministry regarding Sistan on the grounds of Russia’s ‘special consideration’ in the northern provinces of Gilan, Mazandaran and Azerbaijan.94 Military intelligence at the War Office concurred in 1902: ‘Russia’s military position with regard to Northern Persia is one of overwhelming superiority.’95 Because the British acknowledged a de facto Russian sphere of influence in northern Iran, they revised their conceptions of Iranian political geography. Critically, they increasingly located southern Iran within an expanding Indian frontier. This shift provided the raison d’eˆtre for the Anglo-Indian consular network in southern Iran and laid the foundation for a partition of Persia more than a decade before the Convention of 1907 divided Iran into British, Russian and neutral spheres. Curzon had long been pressing this case but encountered stubborn opposition from his immediate superior at the India Office, Lord George Hamilton, who famously warned the viceroy in 1899 that Britain was ‘like an octopus with gigantic feelers stretching out all over the habitable world’.96 The foreign secretary, Lord Lansdowne, himself a former viceroy, ultimately backed Curzon. In January 1902 he cautioned the shah’s government that Britain would oppose ‘attempts on the part of other Powers to acquire political predominance in the south of Persia’ and would, in particular, resist any Russian efforts to secure ‘such an ascendancy in the south as she enjoys in the north’.97 Lansdowne publicly reiterated this policy in the House of Lords in May 1903.98 He did not on that occasion

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mention Russia, but few could have missed his intended audience. In issuing these warnings, Lansdowne tacitly argued that India’s political frontiers extended beyond its territorial frontiers and implicitly claimed suzerainty over southern Iran, a position he recognized as incompatible with Britain’s commitment to the ‘independence and integrity’ of Persia. This distinction between India’s territorial and political frontiers, between British sovereignty and suzerainty, had enjoyed a long tradition among Anglo-Indian officials, stretching back to the Forward School of Indian Defence in the 1820s and 1830s.99 Although opposed by Lord John Lawrence (viceroy, 1864–1869) and the proponents of Masterly Inactivity or Closed Border defence, the Forward School still informed institutional outlooks and imperial policy well into the twentieth century. Its continued relevance is evident in the reforms of Harcourt Butler, secretary in the Foreign Department. In 1909– 1910 he divided the department into frontier and internal branches, each with a different training syllabus.100 Hitherto, probationers in the department had only studied works on Indian subjects, which W. R. H. Merk, officiating chief commissioner of North-West Frontier Province, condemned in 1910 as anachronistically Indo-centric at a time when, by his count, 82 of the Foreign Department’s 151 political officers served in ‘localities where they are brought into contact [. . .] with [peoples] of the Central East [. . .] Afghans, Baluchis, Arabs, Persians, Turkistanis’.101 The most important work in Butler’s new frontier syllabus was the Rise and Expansion of the British Dominion in India, published in 1894 by Sir Alfred Lyall, secretary in the Foreign Department during the Second Afghan War (1878–1881) and a member of the Council of India upon his retirement to Britain. Lyall provided the frontier officer with historical and theoretical frameworks for the continued expansion of British power beyond India. He argued that India had a dual frontier: ‘We have always found it necessary to throw forward a kind of glacis in advance of our administrative border-line, so as to interpose a belt of protected States or tribes between British territory proper and the country of some turbulent or formidable neighbour.’102 He then sketched the far-flung frontiers of the Indian Empire, first ‘passing over the very complicated case of Egypt’ and then moving east from Aden to Masqat, the Persian Gulf littoral, Baluchistan, Afghanistan, Kashmir, the Himalayas, Nepal, and finally Burma.103 This expansive vision of India’s borderlands also informed

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another book on the Foreign Department’s frontier training syllabus: Valentine Chirol’s The Middle Eastern Question, Or Some Problems of Indian Defence (1903).104 Chirol, foreign editor of The Times, travelled extensively in Iran and dedicated this work to Curzon, opening with a quote from the viceroy that stressed the significance of India’s frontier and of the Indian Foreign Department as the ‘Asiatic Branch of the Foreign Office in England’.105 The term ‘the Middle East’ was only just entering the English lexicon and, as his title indicated, Chirol defined the region with reference to India’s security, including within it ‘Turkish Arabistan’ (Ottoman Iraq), Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet. Lyall and Chirol had not, however, demarcated what the precise geographical boundaries of Britain’s political frontier in Iran should be. Answering this question was essential to formulating a coherent strategy in the region and explained why the British so obsessively drew dividing lines across their Persian maps in the 1890s. Russian influence, Curzon pronounced in Persia and the Persian Question, should not be permitted south of a line moving west from Sistan to the Ottoman frontier via Kirman, Yazd, Isfahan, Burujird, Hamadan and Kirmanshah.106 Nearly a decade later, Durand expressed confidence that despite Russia’s considerable gains in the north, British commercial and political influence remained ascendant in the ‘southern zone’ below Curzon’s line.107 Both men favoured an agreement with Russia as to spheres of influence. Consuls and political officers, moreover, understood that they were a practical demonstration of Britain’s commitment to preventing Russian penetration of India’s political frontier. Writing to Lord Salisbury from Kirman in June 1900, Percy Sykes included a sketch map of southern Iran that he split east to west into red, yellow and blue sections, control over which corresponded respectively to India’s minimum, medium and maximum security requirements.108 Four years later, Major Percy Cox, Curzon’s prote´ge´ and the newly appointed resident/consul general at Bushihr, urged the appointment of an officer to Yazd, noting that a very slight study of the map speedily demonstrates the fact that the tract of country between Kerman and Ispahan constitutes a very attenuated section of the cordon of consular posts which we are endeavouring to make effective, and it can be hardly doubted that an intermediate post at Yezd would be a useful, as it is probably a needful, link in the chain.109

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The grounds for a Persian partition were thus well prepared when the British ambassador in St Petersburg, Sir Arthur Nicolson, and the Russian foreign minister, Alexander Izvolsky, began negotiating a settlement in 1906. When consulted by Lord Morley, the Indian secretary, that summer, the new viceroy, Lord Minto, desired a Curzonian line from Birjand in the east to the Ottoman frontier at Khanaqin.110 However, it was clear to the Liberal foreign secretary (1905– 1916), Sir Edward Grey, that the Russians would not accept this arrangement. Instead, he secured a smaller sphere south-east of a line drawn from the Afghan– Iranian frontier near Gazik to Bandar-i ‘Abbas on the Persian Gulf via Birjand and Kirman.111 This smaller sphere reflected the assessment of British military intelligence dating back to 1902, which held that Britain only had sufficient troops to occupy Sistan and Bandar-i ‘Abbas.112 Grey and Nicolson in turn accepted a larger Russian sphere north of a line stretching eastward from Qasr-i Shirin on the Ottoman frontier through Isfahan and Yazd to the junction of the Iranian, Russian and Afghan borders, with a broad neutral zone intervening between the Russian and British spheres. Both powers agreed to forgo future political and economic concessions in the other’s sphere and to abstain from opposition to each other’s concessions in the neutral zone. Although criticized by Anglo-Indian opinion, the agreement secured India’s frontiers. Russia acknowledged Britain’s protectorate over Afghanistan and the British sphere in Iran, although limited, controlled both the landward approach to India via Sistan and the seaward approach via Bandar-i ‘Abbas and the Straits of Hormuz. In a separate declaration, Russia recognized Britain’s special interests in the Persian Gulf. The Anglo-Russian Convention, as will be seen in Part II, would prove an unstable arrangement. Russia’s aim in pursuing the agreement had been to gain time to recover from its recent military and domestic crises. As Russia regained strength, its interest in maintaining the agreement accordingly diminished. Similarly, Anglo-Indian officials were determined to deny Russian access to the neutral zone, which covered most of southern Iran, and the network of consuls and political officers would continue to be the means of doing so. British strategists, however, demanded more than a grand geostrategic analysis of the Iranian landscape. They also required a detailed physical description of that space so as to appreciate the intimate relationships between land and people and to discover the best

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routes to advance British trade, influence and, when necessary, military power. The tools by which they sought to collect, store and deploy this knowledge were the gazetteer, the route book and the trigonometric survey.113 These instruments were foundational to British efforts to understand, protect and assert their interests on the ground. In 1813 John Macdonald Kinneir, an assistant to Malcolm, published A Geographical Memoir of the Persian Empire, which contained maps, physical descriptions of the provinces and route guides.114 Later in the nineteenth century the Intelligence Branch spearheaded this effort, building out from the famous work of the Survey of India to map the Raj’s frontiers and facilitate military operations across the region’s widely varying terrain. The Intelligence Branch frequently depended on consuls and political officers for new data and for assistance to its own officers. Consuls and political officers, meanwhile, made daily use of the Intelligence Branch’s confidential publications. Sykes, for example, and his ‘indefatigable surveyor’, Khan Bahadur Asghar ‘Ali Beg, mapped large parts of Sistan and Kirman in the 1890s, an area, Sykes declared presciently, that ‘practically includes the whole of inhabited Eastern Persia as far north as our sphere is likely to reach’.115 In Sistan, Sykes also worked with G. P. Tate of the Survey of India, who established several fixed positions for trigonometric plotting.116 Indian surveyors, as Sykes noted, were critical to this project. In 1894, Duffadar Fazaldad Khan, of the 17th Bengal Cavalry, surveyed Iran’s north-western frontier in company with Lt Colonel Picot, the military attache´. The Survey of India’s ‘Map of Persia’ (1897) drew on all these sources.117 By 1907, on the recommendation of the quartermaster general, the Government of India included a surveyor in each of its consular escorts at Bushihr, Mashhad, Ahvaz, Kirmanshah and Turbat-i Haydari.118 The Persian government was not officially informed. Wilson was another active surveyor. He first travelled through Iran on his way home on leave from India in 1907. Ambitious for a career beyond the frontier, he consulted the Intelligence Branch, which provided him with quarter-inch maps ‘full of blank spaces marked “high hills” or “unexplored”, lent us a plane table and some instruments, and told us that they would be grateful for any additions we could make; they also gave us reports as they had upon regions we proposed to traverse’.119 He soon returned to Iran to command a small detachment of Indian cavalry at William D’Arcy’s oil

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wells in the Bakhtiyari country, and in 1909 he became acting consul at Muhammarah. Working now both for the Foreign Department and the Intelligence Branch, he mapped large areas, eventually compiling his geographical, historical, ethnological and zoological data into a fivevolume report on south-western Persia by 1912.120 When in London, young officers like Wilson also publicized their explorations at the Royal Geographical Society; both Curzon and Sykes won the Founder’s Medal for their work in Persia.121 Britain’s central repository for geographical information about Iran was a series of Persian gazetteers. Lt Colonel Charles M. MacGregor, assistant quartermaster general, published India’s first gazetteer of Persia in 1871 as the fourth volume of a gazetteer of Central Asia.122 MacGregor’s gazetteer totalled 800 pages and included an alphabetical directory and descriptions of thousands of Iranian place names; a long, general account of the country, its inhabitants and manners, drawn heavily from Malcolm’s History; and finally, route guides divided into daily stages. Knowledge of the roads was critical, because roads were the channels of British commercial, political and military access to southern Iran. Further editions followed. By 1885 the Persian gazetteer had grown to four volumes, each covering roughly a quarter of the country.123 The 1910 edition also contained four volumes, but it was geographically reorganized to reflect the spheres of influence laid out in the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention; volumes I and II covered the Russian sphere, volume III the neutral zone and volume IV the British sphere in the south-east.124 A separate series of route books published that year mirrored this fourfold division.125 Thus, Britain’s geostrategic and cartographic images of Iran converged in the 1910 gazetteer as partition diplomacy structured British representations of Iranian space.

Commercial Statistics Commercial statistics were a final, fundamental way by which the British sought to comprehend Qajar Iran. Traditionally, historians have maintained an analytical distinction between the economic and geostrategic causes of modern imperialism.126 Most scholars of AngloIranian relations have argued that British commercial interests were subordinated to Indian security, but some maintain that British capitalism and its hunger for markets and resources was the driving force

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behind the pursuit of British hegemony.127 The latter claim is difficult to substantiate; from a global perspective, Britain’s economic interests in Iran were insignificant before the discovery of oil in 1908. Even proponents of Britain’s ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ admit that despite Foreign Office prodding, London’s financial circles declined substantial investment in Iran, and even after oil was found the government was obliged to take a controlling stake in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC)128 in 1914 to secure fuel for the Royal Navy.129 Indian defence was Britain’s dominant concern in Iran. At the same time, British commercial interests were not merely a rhetorical cover for political interference; they were a vital way of measuring and asserting power. Economic and political power was inseparable, as the Committee of Imperial Defence observed in 1909: The competition to which British trade in the Persian Gulf is exposed is not merely commercial, but has a distinctly political object. British claims to political predominance in the Gulf are based mainly upon the fact of our commercial interests having hitherto been predominant, and should our trade, as a result of a German forward commercial policy, be impaired, our political influence would proportionately diminish.130 The ‘official mind’ laboured mightily to expand and quantify British commerce in Iran, because in the uncertain world of the Great Game, statistical evidence of Britain’s commercial supremacy in southern Iran was an especially comforting, quantifiable index of political power. Between 1887 and 1916 British consuls in Iran produced some 170 commercial reports about their districts. The Foreign Office and the Board of Trade published these reports to support British trade and industry in an increasingly competitive global economy. They contained statistics about exports, imports, exchange rates, customs duties and procedures, shipping rates, animal transport, local prices for assorted goods, etc. Consuls gathered these figures from various informants including European, Iranian and other merchants as well as customs farmers and local officials. Despite their great efforts, the commercial reports and statistics contained many inaccuracies and are at best a rough guide for measuring Anglo-Iranian trade during this period. The farming out of customs duties powerfully illustrated Tehran’s inability

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to monitor and govern its vast frontiers. Iran’s foreign commerce greatly expanded in the late nineteenth century, but customs farming ensured that the central government had only a very dim view of this development and collected but a fraction of import and export duties. Customs farming was also inseparable from widespread smuggling, a whole world of commerce invisible to Tehran. Persian reformers in the Muzaffari period stressed the need for a more effective customs administration to monitor the country’s economic frontiers, boost state revenues and protect domestic manufacturing.131 Customs statistics also suffered from the problem – often intentional – of inaccurate valuation of goods. British officials acknowledged that gathering reliable trade data from diffuse local sources was very difficult, even after Tehran hired Belgian officers to manage a centralized customs department in 1900.132 Compiling these reports was doubtless a function of bureaucratic routine, but for British officials on India’s Middle Eastern frontier, this information, whatever its limitations, provided an accounting of their power and influence north of the Persian Gulf. In 1892 Curzon estimated that the British Empire’s trade with Iran was worth £3 million per annum.133 According to the British legation, the trade averaged £3.5 million between 1901 and 1913, peaking at £5 million in 1911.134 British officials, however, also noted the alarming growth of RussoIranian trade. After 1901, they admitted that Russia had displaced Britain as Iran’s primary trading partner and reckoned that Russo-Iranian trade grew from £4 million in that year to almost £11.5 million in 1912.135 British anxiety about Russian influence clearly extended to commerce. The tsar’s government actively encouraged Russian trade with Iran. Beginning in the 1880s, Russia erected tariffs against British and European goods in transit through the Caucasus to Iran, provided export and import bounties to encourage Russian trade and constructed railways to the Persian border. Russian goods dominated the markets of northern Iran. In 1903 Russia consolidated its position by negotiating a new commercial treaty with Iran, which automatically applied to Britain as a ‘most favoured nation’.136 The new tariff replaced the general 5 per cent ad valorem duty, which was confirmed in the Treaty of Turkmanchay of 1828, with specific duties by weight for each class of goods. Duties on sugar and petroleum, two of Russia’s main exports to Iran, were reduced to roughly 2 per cent and 4 per cent ad valorem

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respectively. Duty on heavy cotton textiles, a British staple, was raised to about 8 per cent and the duty on tea, exported from India and China by British merchants, skyrocketed to around 100 per cent.137 As Figure 1.1 indicates, the gap between Russian and British trade widened after the 1903 tariff. The situation, Cox noted with no little irony, would have been worse were it not for ‘wholesale smuggling’ of British and Indian goods by Arab and Iranian merchants, who colluded with littoral notables to avoid the new duties in the southern Persian ports.138 Despite this worrying trend, British officials were confident they retained commercial supremacy in the south. The East India Company had extended its operations to the Persian Gulf in the early seventeenth century, but the real growth of British and Indian maritime trade with southern Iran occurred in the 1860s and 1870s, following the advent of steam navigation and the opening of the Suez Canal. The most significant British export to the region was cotton textiles, which generally represented about half the total value of all British goods entering the gulf ports. Other British exports included hardware, liquor, metals, metalware and candles. India, too, was a major exporter of cotton textiles of both British and local manufacture, as well as of indigo (and other dyes) and tea, followed by drugs, rice, metals, yarns and

20,000,000 18,000,000 16,000,000 14,000,000 12,000,000 10,000,000 8,000,000 6,000,000 4,000,000 2,000,000 0 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 Brish Empire's Trade with Iran

Russia's Trade with Iran

Iran's Total Foreign Trade

Figure 1.1 Value (£) of the British Empire’s and Russia’s Trade with Iran, 1901 – 1912.139

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twists, and spices. In return, Iran exported opium, dates, grain, pearls, fruits and vegetables, gums, hides and skins, tobacco and carpets. Between 1889 and 1913, British exports to the ports of Muhammarah, Bushihr, Bandar-i Lingah and Bandar-i ‘Abbas averaged £700,500 per annum; Indian exports averaged £884,500 per annum; Iranian exports to Britain averaged £174,500 per annum; and Iranian exports to India averaged £491,750 per annum.140 Taken together, the gulf trade was worth an average £2.25 million per annum for the British Empire. Bushihr, the headquarters of the political resident in the Persian Gulf and the consul general of Fars and Khuzistan, was the most important port in terms of trade with both India and Britain.141 The port of Bandar-i Lingah was predominantly tied to India and did little business with Britain. It served Laristan and southern Fars and was an important hub for re-export and trans-shipment to the Arab coast of the gulf. Bandar-i ‘Abbas was the site of a prominent Hindu mercantile community with well-developed commercial ties with India. This port served the markets of eastern Iran: Yazd, Kirman and Mashhad. Muhammarah was first opened to international commerce by royal decree in October 1888. Located near the confluence of the Shatt al-‘Arab and the Karun River, Muhammarah was the gateway to the Karun valley, Arabistan, and beyond to Luristan and Isfahan. The ports themselves were not very large markets and served mainly as forwarding posts for overland transport. The political rivalry between Russia and Britain had left the country devoid of railroads, as both powers feared that railway construction by the other would jeopardize their own position. In November 1890 Russia extracted a pledge from Iran not to build or grant a concession to build any railways for the next ten years.142 This so-called ‘sterilizing’ agreement was renewed for another ten years in 1900. As a result, commerce was channelled into centuries-old caravan tracks, leading north from the gulf ports to the larger towns of the interior. From a purely economic perspective, the British Empire’s £2.25 million annual maritime trade with the Iranian gulf ports was insignificant. Britain’s total annual foreign trade averaged £925 million between 1889 and 1913,143 and India’s about Rs 250 crore (2.5 billion rupees) or £167 million during this period.144 Direct trade between Britain and India alone was worth an average £73 million per annum.145 When, however, the British Empire’s commercial interests in southern

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Iran are viewed in the context of Britain’s rivalry with Russia, the significance of British and Indian trade with Bushihr, Bandar-i Lingah, Bandar-i ‘Abbas and Muhammarah is clear. British and Indian goods comprised an average of 76 per cent of all exports to the four chief southern ports, and Britain and India absorbed an average of 53 per cent of Iranian exports from the region. Taken together, the British Empire accounted for 67 per cent of these ports’ foreign trade, as Figure 1.2 indicates. Britain’s predominance in southern Iran was reinforced by the Empire’s so-called ‘invisible’ exports: shipping, insurance, credit and financial services. British companies dominated steam shipping in the Persian Gulf. The British India Steam Navigation Company operated a weekly service from Bombay to the gulf ports, which was supplemented by vessels of the Bombay & Persia Steam Navigation Company and the Persian Gulf Steamship Company. Direct service from Europe was also provided by the Bucknall, West Hartlepool and Anglo-Algerian lines. Altogether, British steamers called at the four chief southern Iranian ports an average of 425 times per year between 1889 and 1913.146 Occasionally French, Ottoman and even Norwegian ships visited the gulf. In 1901 a Russian line began service from Odessa, and from 1906

5,000,000 4,500,000 4,000,000 3,500,000 3,000,000 2,500,000 2,000,000 1,500,000 1,000,000 500,000 0 1889 1891 1893 1895 1897 1899 1901 1903 1905 1907 1909 1911 1913 Brish Empire's Trade with the Iranian Ports of the Persian Gulf Total Foreign Trade of the Iranian Ports of the Persian Gulf

Figure 1.2 Value (£) of the British Empire’s Trade with the Iranian Ports of the Persian Gulf, 1889 –1913.147

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the Hamburg Amerika Line offered regular service to the gulf from Germany. Competition from the Hamburg Amerika Line forced the British companies to lower their European rates, but British shipping remained ascendant in terms of number of vessels and tonnage. Additionally, London-based companies provided insurance for goods in transit to, from and within Iran. British merchants in Bushihr and the other ports often served as the agents of these shipping and insurance companies, and along with the Imperial Bank of Persia (IBP), which was established in 1889, they managed an extensive local credit system. The opposition of smaller Iranian merchants to foreign competition is accurately cited as a cause of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution and the development of Iranian nationalism, but many larger Iranian merchants profited from trade with Britain and their connections with British firms.148 Iranian merchants usually purchased British goods on credit from the importing British firm. These credits were generally extended on a long-term basis, the accounts being settled periodically. Remittances could be made through the IBP, which had branches throughout Iran. The Government of India’s Indo-European Telegraph Department (IETD) also controlled a major north– south line from Bushihr to Tehran, allowing for fairly efficient telegraphic communication along the trade route. British officials found this evidence of their regional commercial superiority reassuring. In 1899, Durand explained to Salisbury that British commercial influence in southern and central Iran was quite strong: Altogether if one looks at the map of Persia, the position held by our trade is very remarkable. It is in full possession of the country up to and including a line drawn from Khanikin by Kermanshah, Hamadan, Ispahan, Yezd and Kerman to Seistan. Beyond that line it has begun to give ground both in the north-west and in Tehran and Khorassan, but, in spite of great geographical disadvantages, it has by no means been excluded.149 ‘The southern zone in fact’, he concluded somewhat optimistically, ‘is very much more in our hands, politically and commercially, than the northern zone is in Russian hands.’ Durand’s conflation of the commercial and the political was not unique. Commenting on this

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dispatch, Curzon explained that Britain should press Russia for a division of spheres of influence, ‘because although political influence is not expressly mentioned, yet in eastern countries commercial and industrial enterprises are the familiar agencies through which political influence is exercised by alien Powers’.150 In demarcating economic spheres of influence, the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 demonstrated that commerce was another way the British mapped Iran.

Britain’s Persian archive In the two-and-a-half decades preceding World War I, the amount of information collected by British officials about Qajar Iran dwarfed Curzon’s ‘full-length and life-size portrait of that kingdom’. It is true that this effort paled in comparison with British colonial knowledge projects in India – limited imperial resources naturally dictated that the Indian subcontinent received more attention than its far-flung frontiers. Nonetheless, the British Empire combined strategies of colonial knowledge with tactics of indirect rule to extend India’s frontiers into the Middle East. British efforts to understand the Iranian state, geography and economy were central to shaping British institutional memory, which in turn informed how they played the Great Game in Iran. Consuls and political officers mobilized this political, geographical and commercial information to confront the challenges of Russian rivalry, Iranian revolution and world war. When that great struggle did come, the British deployed their information networks alongside their troops throughout the country. British colonial knowledge, nevertheless, was never complete, and the ‘official mind’ was never free of anxiety running to panic and of hubris running to fantasy. Following the war, Curzon, now at the Foreign Office, felt sure that he knew Iranians wanted British assistance in rebuilding their state and economy, but he was mistaken.151 His subordinates, long-trained to seek out the notables, failed to perceive the growing power of nationalism. British reliance on elite informants left them with a personalized, factionalized and almost institution-less image of Qajar politics, which was unable to account for ideological change and pressure from below. Curzon’s brainchild, the Anglo-Iranian Treaty of 1919, was doomed by this ignorance.

CHAPTER 2 IMPERIAL INROADS: COMMERCE, CONFLICT AND COOPERATION

British efforts to extend political and economic influence into southern Iran followed three main routes: 1) the Bushihr–Shiraz caravan route from the Persian Gulf; 2) the Karun River valley route from the Persian Gulf; and 3) the Quetta–Sistan overland route in the south-east subsidized by Curzon’s Indian administration. All three were channels of British penetration as well as sites of everyday encounters with Iranian actors and interests. British officials and merchants immediately faced a host of challenges: powerful vested interests opposed to foreign competition; insecurity, ironically exacerbated by British arms smugglers; popular opposition to British actions; declining Qajar authority, particularly after the assassination of Nasir al-Din Shah in 1896; long-standing factional and tribal conflicts, especially in Fars; and unsettling Russian competition. In response, British consuls and political officers built relationships with powerful figures such as Shaykh Khaz‘al in the south-west and the Khuzaymah ‘Alam family in the south-east. They deployed gunboats and troops along the gulf coast and pressed provincial governors to improve security for trade. They also drew up schemes for managing tribal populations through subsidies and military recruitment, and intrigued against their Russian counterparts. Iranian actors and conditions shaped British policy. The resulting patterns of imperial cooperation, resistance and conflict shaped the political, economic and even physical landscapes of southern Iran through the end of World War I.

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As corridors of power and influence, these routes organized British views of the Iranian borderlands in terms of ingress and egress. They were commercial links between the British Empire and Iran and also potential lines of communication for imperial forces. Keeping them open and secure was a top British priority, but not an easy task. The British obsession with maintaining order on the routes revealed that their notions of good governance and fears of anarchy were two sides of a coin. While the peripheral weakness of the Qajar state invited foreign penetration, this weakness often impaired British access to the trade routes. Qajar decentralization left the local notables, rather than the central government, in command of the roads. These men understood the roads as sources of wealth and power and appreciated that British interests were not always compatible with their own. They were, moreover, more than capable of determined resistance, both passive and active, independently of Tehran. The British needed their cooperation and the notables were keen to exact a quid pro quo. Imperial discourse tended to view the competition between British and Russian influence as a zero-sum game in which one power’s gain was the other’s loss, but the reality on the ground was much more complicated. The complex realities of local Persian politics undercut confident British assertions about controlling trade routes and extending their influence, often rendering the Great Game an exercise in bluff and bluster.

The Bushihr –Shiraz Route The most important route for British trade snaked north from Bushihr across the coastal plain, through the gorges and over the passes of the southern Zagros mountains to the Persian plateau and the commercial centres of Shiraz, Isfahan and Tehran. Like other routes in the south, it was not suitable for wheeled traffic and all merchandise had to be loaded on to mules, donkeys or camels for the journey up-country. The distances were long, the passage arduous and the rates expensive. Shipping a ton of cotton textiles from Manchester to Bushihr cost something over £2 and took 35 days by steamer via the Suez Canal.1 Bushihr’s shallow harbour forced steamers to anchor three to seven miles offshore and offload their cargo to small lighters for landing, a hazardous process. It then took 16 to 30 days to transport goods the 180 miles to Shiraz. The caravans and forwarding systems were of long-standing use and fairly well

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organized, allowing for some degree of predictability in terms of delivery of goods. Throughout this period, nevertheless, the caravan routes were increasingly plagued by a host of problems including insecurity, levy of rahdari (illegal tolls), exorbitant rates for fodder and a dearth of pack animals, which caused serious dislocations to the transport system. The cost of moving goods from Bushihr to Shiraz accordingly fluctuated considerably. In favourable circumstances, the rate could be as low as £4 per ton, but increases to as high as £10 and over, to the point of stopping trade altogether, were not uncommon.2 Security for trade was of high concern. Following the assassination of Nasir al-Din Shah in May 1896, the Bushihr–Shiraz route was hampered by highway robberies, tribal risings, urban riots and factional conflicts. For the British, these incidents were significant in three ways. First, because the protection of British subjects and property was among the consuls’ primary responsibilities, they were quick to advance claims on Persian authorities for stolen and damaged goods. These claims resulted in endless correspondence and tedious negotiations between British and Iranian officials and were a significant source of strain and frustration for both sides. Settlement, if achieved at all, often took years. Second, by hampering British commerce, insecurity on the southern roads invited Russian economic penetration from the north. Finally, the problem of order raised the larger issue of the decline of the Qajar state in the south. How to arrest this decline was a dilemma that vexed Iranian and British governments alike for the next quarter century. Lt Colonel F. A. Wilson, consul general at Bushihr, reported with relief that the inhabitants of the gulf ports had reacted calmly to the news of the shah’s assassination. The situation along the Bushihr–Shiraz road, however, was far less encouraging. Indo-European Telegraph Department (IETD) officials reported that groups of Kashkulis and Arabs had taken to the roads and wrecked the telegraph station at Dasht-i Arjan. Wilson feared ‘that very extensive plundering, violence and disorder have occurred, which may give rise to heavy claims for compensation’.3 Claims advanced by British firms for goods stolen on the Bushihr–Shiraz–Isfahan caravan route during these disturbances totalled 48,095 tumans (£9,075).4 Almost all of the major British companies in southern Iran, including the Persian Gulf Trading Co., Zeigler, Livingstone Muir, Ellenger, Charles Sassoon, David Sassoon, Dixon and the Anglo-Dutch firm of Hotz and Son had sustained losses. In October, Wilson noted that although five months had passed,

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provincial officials had done little to settle British claims. In June 1897 he forwarded to the charge´ d’affaires, Charles Hardinge, a synopsis of outstanding British claims at Bushihr and Bandar-i ‘Abbas since 1892, insisting that ‘if compensation is withheld, the property of British subjects will be without any security and the local authorities will continue to be apathetic in endeavouring to restore it when stolen’.5 On this occasion Hardinge obtained compensation for the Persian Gulf Trading Co., Dixon and Hotz claims, but Shaykh Muhsin Khan Mushir al-Dawlah, the foreign minister, declined to pay the largest claim, Zeigler’s, because the firm had already been reimbursed by an insurance company.6 These problems were inseparable from the thriving illegal arms trade in the gulf ports. In 1881 the shah had formally prohibited the importation of arms into the country, but his subordinates did not enforce the embargo. One British estimate put the value of the trade at almost £160,000 in 1897.7 In December 1896 Wilson estimated that 10,000 rifles were imported annually at Bushihr.8 Wilson explained that widespread violation of the arms prohibition was, not surprisingly, facilitated by the local authorities who gained large profits thereby. Wilson asserted that one of the leading Persian participants in the arms trade in Bushihr was Aqa Muhammad Mu‘in al-Tujjar, a prote´ge´ of Amin al-Sultan and a farmer of the southern customs.9 British companies such as Dixon, Ellenger, the Sassoons, and the Parsi firm, Fracis Times, were all active in the trade, as was the Armenian family firm A. and T. J. Malcolm, which enjoyed British protection.10 Ironically, these merchants facilitated the insecurity that they found so disruptive to commerce. Upon arrival in Bushihr, rifles like the British breach-loading Martini-Henry found a ready local market, with serious consequences for Qajar rule and British trade. Wilson observed that local populations ‘were better armed than the state troops’, causing the ‘utter helplessness of the Government’.11 Colonel Malcolm Meade, who succeeded Wilson as consul general in June 1897, explained that a rifle was a status symbol and source of livelihood. ‘The possession of a rifle, and the 200 cartridges, which accompanied it’, he pointed out, are considered essential possessions for a grown up man, and no one can hope to obtain a wife till he can produce them. The object for which these Arms are purchased is to assist the owners in

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obtaining plunder, and in taking part in tribal conflicts. Armed men have no difficulty in obtaining employment in the followings of important men [. . .] who know that their influence depends on the number of followers they can muster, and they have undoubtedly, with this object, encouraged the sale of Arms among their people.12 These facts, Meade reiterated, signified the ‘possibility of grave political peril to Persian rule’, which he elaborated ‘is very weak in the outlying parts of the empire’. Meade was adamant that British arms smugglers were in fact greatly injuring their long-term interests.13 The ‘trade routes’, he contended, ‘are delicate plants to foster, and easily destroyed, and, once those into Persia are forsaken, in consequence of want of suitable protection, it may be years before they can be re-opened’.14 Meade also noted mounting evidence that Afghan smugglers were moving weapons from Bandar-i ‘Abbas to India’s volatile frontier provinces.15 Meade’s insistence paid off in December 1897, when Bushihri authorities asked for his help seizing illegal arms from British subjects protected by extra-territoriality treaties.16 He was grateful for the freedom of action afforded him by Hardinge, who had the previous August, advised that ‘it is so much easier in this country to prevent troubles than to remedy them’.17 Vice consul J. Gaskin accompanied Bushihri officials to the warehouses of the firm of Fracis Times. Gaskin informed the company’s agent that if he refused to allow the premises to be inspected, the residency would issue a search warrant. Seizures at British firms netted almost 4,000 weapons and more than 900,000 cartridges. Bushihri and British authorities then moved against Iranian merchants including the Shabankara brothers and Haji Nasir Bihbihani, confiscating 1,200 arms and almost 200,000 rounds. Anglo-Persian cooperation was necessary to police the ports and trade routes. Meade, nevertheless, remained anxious about security in Bushihr. A year earlier in January 1897, sayyids induced a crowd to destroy the British tidal marks at nearby Rishihr, alleging that the tidal marks caused scanty winter rainfall and resulting food shortages.18 Iranian officials did not suppress the riot, fearing they would precipitate an attack on the Indian telegraph station. Chief among the agitators were Tangistanis from the coastal plain. Continued lack of rain in the winter

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of 1897– 1898 fostered further local discontent and encouraged many Tangistanis to come to Bushihr with their weapons, with a consequent surge in robberies and shootings. The outgoing governor, Habib Allah Khan I‘timad al-Sultan, son of the important Shirazi notable and head of the Khamsah tribal confederacy of Fars, Muhammad Riza Khan Qavam al-Mulk, took little action against the criminals.19 The Qavams would eventually become closely associated with the British, but their initial encounters were strained. In February 1898, Meade implicated Tangistanis in the murder of the nephew of an IETD officer. Fearing a general attack on the town, he landed ten marines on 8 March to reinforce the residency escort of 30 sepoys, 15 marines and 20 Iranian sarbaz (infantry).20 The following day, he ordered ashore 25 British sailors from HMS Sphinx to defend the telegraph station. Meade reported with evident satisfaction that he had been ‘assured by various people here that the landing of the party has had an excellent effect, and has restored confidence’.21 The marine and bluejacket contingents, however, could not remain ashore indefinitely, and in late April 55 sepoys arrived at Bushihr to relieve them and the old escort. On 25 May, Meade urged Durand to retain the escort at this enhanced strength until ‘we are quite sure that there is no prospect of a renewal of trouble, and until the Persian Govt. have made suitable reparation for the outrages on British Firms and Prote´ge´s, and for the attack on the Residency’.22 Obtaining redress for British claims was still beyond Meade’s power. Upon appointment, Meade had judged his predecessor, Wilson, too reliant on the legation to settle local issues. He declared to Hardinge in September 1897: It is ridiculous to have a highly paid British officer here if he cannot do his ordinary work without constant reference, and I quite understand how annoying it must be to be constantly pestered with references in regard to petty cases, which you must feel, the man on the spot ought, [with] his local information, to be able to settle better than anyone at a distance.23 A year’s experience in southern Iran, however, convinced Meade of the need to regularize the resolution of British claims. He recounted to Durand the various ways local officials like I‘timad al-Sultan and Qavam al-Mulk evaded their obligations.24 The system of contracting out

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public offices and the imposing personal influence of notables like the Qavams provided both motive and means to obstruct British demands. Governors usually bought their offices for one-year terms, recouping the purchase price through tax collection. Knowing their tenures were short, anxious to profit by their investment and well-versed in the arts of procrastination and obstruction, they could not be relied on to make good British claims or to prevent further losses. In these circumstances, Meade proposed holding the central government responsible for British claims, with the consul general and the karguzar working independently of the governor to submit joint reports on claims. There was little to be done, Durand replied, because of Tehran’s chronic financial troubles. ‘They are in serious straits’, he explained to Meade: their troops and civil establishments unpaid, their treasury empty, and their provincial revenues coming in very slowly. It is not surprising that they are just now more than usually evasive in the matter of our claims, and though I have lately succeeded in inducing them to pay me some thousands of pounds on various accounts it has needed the most severe and repeated pressure.25 Such importunity might have far-reaching consequences, including the fall of Amin al-Sultan. Durand agreed that responsibility for British claims ultimately lay with the central government and not with local officials. He baulked, however, at Meade’s proposal to forward claims to Tehran in the first instance. British power in Iran, Durand rightly recognized, was based not in Tehran but in the southern periphery, and a consul needed to exert himself in these matters because ‘the fact that he was never able to settle a claim himself would tell against himself locally’. He promised to consider new arrangements but was sceptical of a speedy settlement. Progress was elusive. In April 1900, shortly before his transfer from Bushihr, Meade compiled a detailed statement of outstanding British claims in Bushihr, Bandar-i ‘Abbas, Bandar-i Lingah, Shiraz and Persian Baluchistan and put the total at £27,500, representing more than 1 per cent of the annual value of Anglo-Indian trade with the southern ports.26 The document was a minute record of frustrating litigation and a testament to British persistence and Persian resistance.

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The politics of Shiraz These difficulties underlined the importance of appointing a consul at Shiraz, the political and commercial capital of Fars. Shirazi politics were contentious. Rivalries between Qashqa’is and Khamsahs and their respective ilkhanis, Sawlat al-Dawlat and Qavam al-Mulk, frequently led to violence, especially when the migrations took place between summer and winter quarters. During the revolution they would make Shiraz itself a battlefield. The city was also home to a powerful clerical establishment with important connections to the mercantile community and popular groups, who revealed their combined might in the Tobacco Protests of 1891 – 1892.27 Further complicating the situation, the governors general of Fars were often Qajar princes, like Malik Mansur Mirza Shu‘a‘ al-Saltanah, second son of Muzaffar al-Din Shah, who characteristically resented any attempt to limit their power and prerogatives. In March 1902 tensions flared between Shu‘a‘ al-Saltanah and Qavam al-Mulk, and rival protests paralysed the city.28 The British minister, Sir Arthur Hardinge, supported Shu‘a‘ al-Saltanah in the capital and ordered the British agent, Haydar ‘Ali Khan Navvab, who was an ally of Qavam al-Mulk, to do the same in Shiraz.29 The shah, however, recalled both men to Tehran and the tone of Atabak-i ‘Azam’s (formerly Amin al-Sultan) summons to Qavam al-Mulk was very conciliatory.30 Hardinge lamented that this outcome would only enhance Qavam al-Mulk’s prestige and further destabilize the province. A British consul at Shiraz, Hardinge concluded, was essential. Thomas Grahame eventually reached Shiraz in late November 1903. Unlike many of his Anglo-Indian colleagues in the south, Grahame was a Foreign Office diplomat and had served in Paris before being appointed vice consul in Tehran in 1898. Word of Shu‘a‘ al-Saltanah’s reappointment to Fars in early 1904 thrust Grahame into the centre of Shiraz’s turbulent politics. Qavam al-Mulk’s followers sought British protection. Grahame was sympathetic, but explained to them ‘that it was scarcely likely that the Prince would consider it consistent with his dignity to give a written pledge to the representative of a Foreign Power in regard to a Persian subject’.31 In April he advised Qavam al-Mulk’s sons, Muhammad ‘Ali Khan Nasr al-Dawlah and Habib Allah Khan Salar al-Sultan (formerly I‘timad al-Sultan), to act loyally and to assist Shu‘a‘ al-Saltanah.32 Hoping to allay Salar al-Sultan’s anxiety, Grahame

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claimed that the establishment of the British consulate had diminished the prince’s capacity for mischief: I pointed out that three years ago when the Shoa al-Saltaneh was Governor-General of Fars there were no representatives of Foreign Powers in Shiraz, whereas now the arrival of H.R.H would presumably coincide with that of several consular officers from Bushire, whose presence here, like my own, might perhaps cause the Prince to pause before he permitted his followers to indulge in actions, which, if reported through trustworthy channels to Tehran, might cause him inconvenience.33 In Tehran, the prince met with Hardinge and expressed his readiness to forget past quarrels with the Qavams.34 British mediation was successful on this occasion. Shu‘a‘ al-Saltanah entered Shiraz in late June 1904 and a week later presented khil‘ats (robes of honour) to Qavam al-Mulk and his sons, confirming them in their traditional offices. Qavam al-Mulk, for his part, reportedly paid Shu‘a‘ al-Saltanah 30,000 tumans (£5,770) over and above what he typically gave an incoming governor general.35 This fleeting reconciliation, however, was immediately overshadowed by the outbreak of cholera in Shiraz. The disease had first appeared in June between Bushihr and Shiraz, and at Grahame’s first audience Shu‘a‘ al-Saltanah announced quarantine measures to check its spread north.36 Grahame reported that the epidemic reached the city in mid-July, and Shu‘a‘ al-Saltanah retreated to the countryside. At Grahame’s request the residency surgeon, Captain de Vere Condon, Indian Medical Service (IMS), came up from Bushihr. He opened a dispensary at the consulate gate and wrote memoranda on the prevention and treatment of the disease, which were translated, printed and posted throughout the city. Although sincere in his concern for the Shirazis, Grahame hoped such assistance would raise Britain’s political prestige.37 By late July the epidemic had run its course, but the death toll was enormous. Persian authorities calculated that out of a population of 50,000– 60,000 in Shiraz, some 3,300 had died. Grahame put the number closer to 5,000, while a later British report estimated the figure at 7,000– 10,000.38 The cholera epidemic affected the vital question of trade. Shu‘a‘ al-Saltanah’s quarantine, combined with the disease itself, practically suspended commerce on the Bushihr– Shiraz road that summer.

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While recognizing the need for precautionary measures, Grahame criticized the indiscriminate enforcement of a general quarantine as inimical to trade and complained that local authorities had failed to provide sufficient notice of the sanitary cordon, leaving many caravans stranded on the road.39 He was especially concerned that the disruption of British trade from Bushihr would allow the Russians to gain an economic foothold in Shiraz. A Russian commercial agent had visited Shiraz in January 1904, exhibiting Russian cotton textiles, offering generous credit, describing Russian export bounties and hinting at protection for Persian merchants dealing in Russian goods.40 Two months later Grahame reported that large amounts of Russian glass and china were being sold in Shiraz at bargain prices.41 A representative of Russia’s Discount and Loan Bank soon arrived to investigate openings for branches in southern Iran.42 He was followed in May by a Russian commercial delegation, headed by members of the Society of Oriental Knowledge and charged with studying the roads and economic conditions before proceeding to Bushihr and Arabistan.43 Grahame argued that the best means of blocking Russian goods from the north was to enhance British access from the gulf.44 Despite progress in the Karun valley, Grahame stressed that the Bushihr–Shiraz –Isfahan route would remain the most important conduit for British trade. He recommended that a British transport company acquire a concession for improvement of the road and organization of transport upon it. Deprecating expensive schemes for making the road fit for wheeled traffic, Grahame suggested that British engineers, employing local workmen, repair and maintain the existing mule tracks. On the issue of transport, Grahame criticized the inefficiency and delays attending the current system of independent muleteers, and proposed that a British firm buy or lease the mules, import additional animals and organize a scheme of relays and forage depots to decrease the time and cost of conveying goods inland. Hardinge sympathized with Grahame’s desire to improve transportation between Bushihr and Isfahan, but predicted Tehran would resist a British road concession, fearing both domestic and Russian opposition.45 The improvement of the Bushihr–Shiraz road would have to await a more favourable political climate. The Bushihr–Shiraz road was a central concern for British consuls, who linked commerce with the touchy subject of imperial prestige and the grand strategy of advancing British influence against Russian expansion

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from the north. These incidents signified the beginning of a long period of instability, occasioned by an atrophying Qajar state, undermined by shrinking revenues and perhaps, more ominously, by the diminishing allegiance of its subjects. Indeed, disorder and instability threatened the viability of Iran as a buffer state. A weak buffer state, which invited Russian or British intervention, was of little value. The landings of British and Indian forces at Bushihr demonstrated the relative ease with which British naval power could be deployed along the southern coasts. In terms of establishing enduring order inland up the trade routes and pacifying wellarmed populations, however, such operations were of far more limited value. Occupation of vast tracts of southern Iran was far too costly both materially and diplomatically. British consuls and their superiors were thus faced with a dilemma of how to provide order and protect British commercial and political interests, while navigating between the Scylla of anarchy and the Charybdis of territorial expansion. A solution involving some strengthening of the Qajar state would not be easily or quickly reached, and for British consuls there seemed not much to be done for the time being but to forward statements of claims and to continue wrangling with local authorities in the forlorn hope of getting blood from a stone.

The Karun River Routes The story of the British, Khaz‘al and the Karun is the most famous imperial encounter in south Persia.46 Ultimately, it laid the foundations of the APOC, but more immediately it illustrated the many challenges to British commerce in the Qajar borderlands and the importance of consuls, political intelligence and cooperation with provincial magnates. The Karun enterprise, however, cannot be isolated from the larger context of the other southern roads. Given the challenges on the traditional Bushihr– Shiraz route, British officials and merchants eagerly looked to the Karun River, the only navigable waterway inland from the gulf, as an alternative channel for British commerce. Ocean-going steamers could reach Muhammarah at the mouth of the Karun from the Persian Gulf via the Shatt al-‘Arab. River steamers could proceed to Ahvaz, and after a portage around the rapids there, goods could be shipped to Shushtar. Land routes from Ahvaz and Shushtar across the Zagros to Isfahan averaged 300 miles compared with the 500-mile journey from Bushihr.

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Nasir al-Din Shah announced the opening of the Karun River to international traffic on 30 October 1888, after much pressure from the British minister, Henry Drummond Wolff.47 Thomas Ker Lynch, chairman of the Tigris and Euphrates Steam Navigation Company (Lynch Brothers) publicized his firm’s interest in expanding operations to the Karun in a letter to The Times in January 1889, noting that his local agent, A. B. Taylor, had ‘everywhere met with a friendly reception’.48 This optimism notwithstanding, the initiative brooked serious local opposition not easily overcome by the gentle prodding of laissez-faire’s invisible hand, and British merchants soon discovered that government assistance was indispensable to opening the Karun. In February, Taylor complained to P. J. C. Robertson, political agent and consul at Basra, about the inordinate demands of customs farmers, insufficient and expensive storage and wharfage facilities and the need for a tramway to move merchandise around the rapids at Ahvaz.49 The karguzar, Mirza Kazim Khan, meanwhile, threatened to detain the company’s Karun steamer, Blosse Lynch, for arrears of navigation and tonnage dues.50 Trading with Shushtar presented new problems. The shah had closed the river above Ahvaz to foreign vessels, and Lynch Brothers therefore transferred ownership of a small sternwheeler, Shushan, to the Iranian government, while retaining management of it.51 This awkward arrangement led to endless disputes about the Shushan’s expenses, but the British government compensated the firm with a subsidy for carrying mail on the Karun. It was also necessary to settle the question of where to pay customs duties. Lynch desired that customs be paid at Shushtar, because they feared lengthy customs inspections at Muhammarah would disrupt shipping arrangements on the Karun. The governor general of Arabistan, Husayn Quli Khan Mafi Nizam alSaltanah, however, claimed this proposal would render Muhammarah a commercial backwater.52 The consul general at Bushihr, Colonel Edward Ross, dismissed Nizam al-Saltanah’s argument as ‘rubbish’ and surmised that the ‘real reason must I think be some personal interests, perhaps some bargain made with the Arab Governor of Mohammerah’.53 Tehran sided with the British, and Nizam al-Saltanah indicated he would not oppose the establishment of customs at Shushtar.54 These difficulties revealed the need for a British consul in Arabistan. As early as March 1889 Ross reported that Lynch’s grievances

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underscored the ‘necessity for British official on spot to insure justice’.55 A year later, the firm had grown desperate. ‘Is there,’ Taylor implored Ross, ‘no news of the appointment of a consul at Muhammerah?’56 That summer, William McDouall was appointed vice consul at Muhammarah. Although he had no prior diplomatic or consular experience, he had served with the IETD in Iran since 1875 and spoke Persian. His tenure there would last until 1909. McDouall soon proved his worth. British contact with Persian officials had been hitherto limited mostly to the karguzar at Muhammarah and the governor general at Shushtar, both of whom were appointed by Tehran from outside the province. Less effort had been made to conciliate the Arab chief and hereditary governor of Muhammarah, Shaykh Miz‘al Khan Mu‘iz al-Saltanah. After visiting Muhammarah in the spring of 1890, Ross dismissed Shaykh Miz‘al as a spent force: ‘One thing is certain. He is not in a position to influence the course of events whatever his feelings – power has passed out of his hands and this he must know very well.’57 This assessment was incorrect; the shaykh was in fact responsible for many of Lynch’s difficulties. A shrewd and calculating politician, he carefully balanced his duties as Arab chief and Persian governor and developed a sophisticated capacity for political manoeuvre and intrigue. McDouall soon relayed bazaar rumours that Miz‘al was bribing Tehran to obtain his removal from Muhammarah.58 McDouall later encountered difficulties acquiring a site for the vice-consulate.59 As Ross had indistinctly grasped, Nizam alSaltanah resisted the Shushtar customs proposals because he had farmed the customs below Ahvaz to Miz‘al and feared that a reorganization of customs would require him to buy out the shaykh’s contract.60 The two men also agreed to build residential and commercial facilities for foreign merchants and Taylor grumbled that the rents offered were too high.61 Throughout 1891 McDouall described the shaykh’s well-orchestrated campaign to disrupt Lynch’s operations, push the British off the river and establish a monopoly for himself over the Karun trade.62 In early March he reported that the shaykh had forbidden his dependents from selling wheat to Lynch’s agent at Ahvaz.63 Miz‘al also acquired a stake in Mu‘in al-Tujjar’s Nasiri Company, which had begun construction on a horse-drawn tramway at Ahvaz. He purchased a steamer, the Iran, from the Bombay and Persia Steam Navigation Company, which, with his steam launch, the Karun, offered Lynch stiff competition. The Blosse

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Lynch often sailed with little cargo, and by June Lynch had suspended the steamer’s regular service, electing instead to run a smaller steam launch with barges in tow. ‘It is to be feared’, McDouall confessed, ‘that this may lead the Moez-es-Saltanah [Shaykh Miz‘al] to conclude that his opposition is telling and cause him to persevere in his endeavours to retain and control the whole trade of the Karun.’64 McDouall soon explained that the shaykh’s ultimate objective was not simply commercial supremacy on the Karun. Rather, he was primarily concerned to preserve his ‘semi-independence’, and worried the influx of foreigners accompanying the commercial development of his domains would encourage Tehran to exercise closer supervision over him.65 He hoped, therefore, to control the incipient Karun trade, squelch foreign rivals and preserve his autonomy. McDouall had initially been ‘inclined to be prejudiced in his favour’, but after some nine months at Muhammarah he concluded that the shaykh was responsible for many of the obstacles to British commerce on the Karun. ‘The whole policy of his Excellency and his agents I am convinced’, McDouall maintained to the consul general, Major A. C. Talbot, in July 1891, ‘is to prevent Mohammerah becoming a place of importance, on the grounds that, if it does, the Persians will assume the direct governorship and the Arab Sheikh would lose his power.’66 Having identified the major political obstacle to British trade in Arabistan, Talbot sketched out three possible solutions. The first was to accept the unsatisfactory status quo and await the shaykh’s death. The second was for Tehran to depose him. This proposal, Talbot argued, was also unpalatable, as the shaykh’s overthrow ‘might or might not be effected quietly and would be certainly attributed to British influence.’67 Finally, the British might mediate between Miz‘al and the Iranian government to secure his present position. Talbot admitted that reaching a compromise would be difficult. Miz‘al was not likely to accept assurances from Tehran regarding his autonomy without a British guarantee. Likewise, the shah and his ministers would hardly appreciate British meddling in Arabistan, and would need to be satisfied that a deal with Miz‘al would secure for them a greater share of Arabistan’s increasing prosperity than a more direct administration would. In other words, the British would have to persuade the shaykh that the shah could be trusted to respect his position and to convince the shah that it

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was in his interests to recognize the shaykh’s autonomy. The British would not resolve this dilemma, and worse was to come. Between 1895 and 1897 Britain’s incipient commercial interests almost collapsed entirely. Consuls complained that Shaykh Miz‘al was not taking sufficient measures to prevent piracy on the Shatt al-‘Arab and was probably protecting the perpetrators of an attack on an Indian sailing vessel in September 1895.68 Perhaps more serious was the growing resentment of many townspeople towards Lynch employees. A common flashpoint was British involvement in the grain trade. Under normal conditions a surplus of grain was available for export from the southern ports, but in times of scarcity, export further reduced local supplies and increased prices. Persian governors often imposed temporary embargoes on grain export, but the association of foreign merchants with dearth and distress naturally provoked popular resentment in a country that had experienced a devastating famine a generation earlier. In November 1895 Iranian soldiers, typically underpaid and underfed, assaulted Taylor and two colleagues in Ahvaz while searching one of Lynch’s steamers for contraband grain.69 In June 1896 the firm’s agent in Shushtar was seriously assaulted by his servant in a dispute over pay and taunted by a crowd as he was evacuated to the river.70 The British responded by securing both Nizam alSaltanah’s dismissal and a pledge not to appoint him to any official position for five years and never again to a southern governorship.71 The following January, Shushtaris protested against the export of foodstuffs, commandeered sesame seeds belonging to Lynch and looted offices of the Anglo-Dutch Firm of Hotz and Son.72 When the new governor general, Mirza Ahmad Khan ‘Ala’ al-Dawlah, tried to suppress these disturbances he provoked a full-scale rebellion that forced British merchants out of town.73 The Karun venture, inaugurated as a counterstroke to Russian influence in the north, was in parlous condition. There then occurred another act of violence with revolutionary consequences for British fortunes in south-western Iran. On the night of 2 June 1897, Shaykh Miz‘al Khan was assassinated at his palace near Muhammarah by followers of his brother, Shaykh Khaz‘al Khan.74 Khaz‘al’s role in the murder would become well-known in Iran; Sadid alSaltanah noted it matter-of-factly in 1913, pointing out that Khaz‘al had also taken the opportunity to seize his brother’s great wealth and estates.75

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For his part, McDouall evinced little surprise at the coup d’e´tat. He had been aware of the conspiracy for almost two years. In August 1895 he informed Wilson in Bushihr that Khaz‘al had asked for British assistance against his brother. Khaz‘al explained that he had attempted to convince his brother that opposition to British trade on the Karun might drive the shah to deprive the family of the hereditary governorship. He alleged that Miz‘al was much hated by his subjects for his tyranny and avarice and had alienated all but one of his dependent chiefs, who had confidentially pledged their support to Khaz‘al. ‘He will have to act sooner or later, at any rate within two years’, McDouall concluded presciently, ‘as Mizal is sure to find out something sooner or later, but if he, Khazal, has twenty four hours start he can raise the whole country against him.’76 On this occasion, Wilson instructed McDouall to eschew any encouragement of Khaz‘al’s intrigues and stressed that it was ‘most desirable that you should not allow him even to assume any cognizance on your part of such projects as he appears to profess’.77 With the coup d’e´tat an accomplished fact, Khaz‘al and McDouall established a working relationship that would transform Britain’s position on the Karun. The new ruler in Muhammarah ‘had given promise of being decidedly favourable to British interests, which the late Sheikh was not’.78 Khaz‘al desired British support vis-a`-vis Tehran and in return pledged to make Arabistan a well-ordered field for British influence and enterprise. In a clear break with his brother’s policy, he suspended the fortnightly sailings of his two river steamers, allowing Lynch a monopoly of steam shipping on the Karun. He also established and financed an effective system of 19 anti-piracy posts on the Shatt al‘Arab. British merchants seized this long-awaited opportunity. Muhammarah became an important centre for the distribution of British goods up the Karun and to Basra and Kuwait. In addition to the weekly service from Bombay, the number of larger steamers calling directly from Britain and Europe more than doubled from nine to 22 between 1897 and 1900. The British looked to expand their Karun bridgehead. Lynch Brothers opened negotiations with the Bakhtiyari khans for the construction of a road connecting Ahvaz with Isfahan, one of the main objectives of the Karun scheme. The contract, which was signed for Lynch Brothers by Charles Hardinge in Tehran in March 1898, provided for a loan of £5,500 from Lynch to the khans to pay for road, bridge and caravanserai construction to be carried out by Lynch.79

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The khans would collect tolls and protect the road. When the road was completed in December 1899, the British had at last secured a Karun route to Isfahan.80

Bakhtiyaris and Lurs These developments brought British political officers into closer contact with the Bakhtiyari and Lur peoples of the Zagros. The British were particularly interested in raising tribal levies to protect the new trade routes – the strategy pioneered by Sandeman in Baluchistan – and perhaps even to resist the Russians. In the late summer of 1903 Major E. B. Burton, a political officer acting as vice consul at Muhammarah while McDouall was on leave, discussed the idea with two prominent Bakhtiyaris, Muhammad Husayn Khan Sipahdar and Hajj ‘Ali Quli Khan (later Sardar As‘ad). Although interested, they would not move without authorization from Tehran.81 In November, Curzon conferred with Arthur Hardinge, Burton and Douglas, the military attache´, while touring the Persian Gulf. They agreed that ‘our future action in South-Western Persia must largely depend on the extent on which we could strengthen, and utilize both these tribes and the tribes of Arabistan, who under the Sheikh of Mohammerah are in much the same position’.82 Although it was too early to implement the levy scheme, new consuls would be appointed to Ahvaz and Kirmanshah to prepare the ground. The officer selected for Ahvaz, Lt D. L. R. Lorimer, arrived in January 1904.83 He had entered the Foreign Department the previous year and would go on to become an accomplished Persian linguist.84 His elder brother, J. G. Lorimer of the Indian Civil Service, compiled the Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, ‘Oman, and Central Arabia. In March 1904 India charged the younger Lorimer with developing a plan to reopen the 150-mile Luristan road to Khurramabad, which had been closed since 1899/1900, with Indian funds.85 In 1890 the Imperial Bank of Persia (IBP) had acquired a concession to construct a road from Ahvaz to Tehran by way of Dizful, Khurramabad and Qum, and completed the section between Qum and the capital the following year.86 Lynch Brothers, with their various commercial concerns on the Karun, were naturally interested in the development of the Luristan route. In 1902 Lynch formed the Persian Transport Company to exploit the Bakhtiyari road to Isfahan. In April 1904 the Persian Transport Company, after much wrangling, purchased the IBP’s road concession, thus acquiring a

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stake in both routes from the Karun.87 The British government advanced £20,000 to the new firm on condition of nominating its director. The great obstacle to the route was Lur raiding between Dizful and Khurramabad. In spring 1904 Lorimer met Khanjan Khan, a leading Sagavand (Lur) chief, near Dizful and proceeded with him to Khurramabad. Khanjan Khan explained that a levy would enable the Sagavand to dominate the road. On 15 May he arranged a meeting between Lorimer and several Dirrakvand and Judiki (Lur) chiefs in Khurramabad. Khanjan Khan and his colleagues offered 280 tufangchis (foot soldiers) and 200 cavalry at an annual cost of 35,000 tumans (£6,700), paid in monthly instalments by a British officer. Outlay for caravanserais and fortified guard houses would also be required. India wanted direct command of the guards, but the vice consul argued that the chiefs would be essential for the recruitment and management of the men. Employing the chiefs would also make it possible to hold them responsible for the safety of the road through the mechanism of withholding payment as deemed necessary by the supervising British officer. Such subsidies would serve the dual purpose of attaching the chiefs to British interests and strengthening their power relative to other leaders. As Lorimer observed perceptively: The truth is is that the chiefs of these tribes have no men whom they can command. Cash is scarce and the tribe is a confederacy for mutual interest rather than a disciplined organism. If a chief tries to be autocratic, or if he is for long unsuccessful or unlucky, his followers speedily desert him for a less exactive or more prosperous rival, who is never far to seek. These chiefs therefore rely on our money in order to raise bodies of men who will be tied to their interests by the strong bonds of regular pay.88 The erratic winds of Luristani politics shifted, however, and on 16 May Khanjan Khan and the Sagavand were driven from Khurramabad by his rival, Nazar ‘Ali Khan Fath-i Sultan.89 Lorimer explained that this turn of events would delay his plans. All the more reason, he pointed out, to afford him extensive discretionary power to make local arrangements as opportunities arose. Any hopes of progress were dashed that autumn.

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Lorimer and Douglas were attacked by their Dirrakvand escorts, wounded and robbed between Khurramabad and Dizful.90 After much delay and British pressure, ‘Abd al-Husayn Mirza Farman Farma, the formidable governor general of Kurdistan and Luristan, captured the culprits in July 1905, but he too proved unable to reduce Luristan to order.91 Lorimer wanted to revenge the Dirrakvand but was at a loss as to how. Returning to the proposal to subsidize Khanjan Khan, he explained in May 1906 that ‘it would put a whole tribe in our hands to do what we liked with’.92 He realized, however, that any improvement would require India to make a significant financial, military and political commitment: I must ask to be pardoned if this scheme appears absolutely absurd but I am asked to offer suggestions and the field of normal suggestions is so limited by practical facts and local conditions that it is impossible to put forward any. At present we are seeking to do what we have not the power or means to do. Were the scene the Indian Frontier, an expeditionary force would be dispatched, which would crush the Dirrakwands, the road and protected sarais would be built, and the troops would remain in charge for 2 or 3 years until it had become possible to raise and drill reliable levies. It is conceivable that with ample funds these proceedings in the present case might be dispensed with on our part but this could only become possible by following the development of events on the spot and buying any occasion that turned up. But Luristan was not North-West Frontier Province, and impressed by Lorimer’s circumspection India declined to take the plunge. In May 1906 the Foreign Department informed Cox at Bushihr that all plans to open the Luristan road through ‘independent action’, such as bankrolling Khanjan Khan or raising levies, were suspended.93 Lorimer remained adamant that the broader aim of pushing British trade into Luristan should not be abandoned. Russian trade, facilitated by the Qasvin– Hamadan road and the appointment of a commercial agent at Khurramabad, was expanding into western Iran. Lorimer now advocated working through local governors, but for the present India had put the operation on hold.

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A comparison of Britain’s relations with the Lurs, Bakhtiyaris and Arabs is useful for understanding the development of British influence in south-western Iran. The differing degrees of political unity in these groups affected their positions vis-a`-vis the Iranian and British governments. In Luristan, there were many competing tribal interests. Although they did not fully control Luristan, the shah’s governors could by judicious patronage and occasional punitive expeditions play one group off against another, exploit tribal divisions and maintain their own comparative ascendancy. In effect, India had directed Lorimer to investigate whether the British might usurp this arbitral role by means of subsidies, levies and commercial incentives. The Bakhtiyari leadership was more centralized, with the ilkhani (chief) and ilbaygi (deputy chief) being appointed by the shah and shared between the Ilkhani and Haji Ilkhani families.94 The Qajars sought to control the confederacy through these leaders. The British also capitalized on this arrangement, obtaining the khans’ cooperation for the Ahvaz– Isfahan road and the D’Arcy oil syndicate. Squabbles among the Bakhtiyaris and between the khans and their British business partners, however, were not uncommon, and the consuls strove to resolve these many and varied disputes. In southern Arabistan, Shaykh Khaz‘al enjoyed a basic monopoly of tribal authority and exercised more power and influence than Tehran or any other tribal combination. These assets, together with his proximity to British naval power in the gulf, allowed him to offer the British a degree of political and economic cooperation unmatched by the Lurs or the Bakhtiyaris, and the British therefore favoured the further consolidation of his position as conducive to the preservation of order and the development of their interests.

The Quetta –Sistan Route Successive governments in London and Calcutta considered Sistan, situated at the intersection of the frontiers of Iran, Afghanistan and British Baluchistan, crucial for maintaining Iran as a buffer state between Russia and India.95 Sistan became especially significant after Russia’s conquest of the Turkman tribes of Transcaspia in 1881 had brought Russian power and influence into Khurasan and eastern Iran. The British feared that Sistan would provide Russia with a base from which to attack India through British Baluchistan, or to turn the Afghan

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flank and march up the Hilmand River valley to Qandahar. Sistan was also key to denying Russia railway access to the Indian frontier or to a warm-water port in the Gulf of Oman. In the late 1890s, India constructed an overland trade route to Sistan via Baluchistan to protect British interests, and this project formed the basis for Britain’s claim to a sphere of influence in south-eastern Iran. In Persia and the Persian Question, Curzon had urged appointing a British consul in Sistan and establishing a trade route from Quetta to Sistan.96 In January 1894 the consul general in Mashhad, Colonel C. E. Yate, toured Qa’inat and Sistan.97 In Birjand, Yate’s attache´, Khan Bahadur Maula Bakhsh, met Amir Isma‘il Khan Shawkat al-Mulk and his half-brother, Amir ‘Ali Akbar Khan Hishmat al-Mulk, the rival heads of the powerful Khuzaymah ‘Alam family of eastern Iran and the semi-autonomous governors of Qa’inat and Sistan respectively.98 They expressed their anxiety about the intrigues of Russian newswriters. Yate, referring to Hishmat al-Mulk, noted that The Sistan Chief said that the intrigues of the present Russian Agent were directed against him personally, but beyond that the agent was telling people that the Russian Government would soon be coming, and that they would show favour to those who threw in their lot with the Russian Agent and assisted him in carrying out his wishes, and was thus inciting them against the Persian Government.99 Yate understood that both governors preferred to exclude foreign agents from their territories, but having failed to obtain the dismissal of the Russian newswriters, they pressed Yate to counterbalance them with British agents, a strategy at which Hishmat al-Mulk became very adept. Yate agreed and added that Sistan’s agricultural resources would support a good market for British goods. He advised that wells be dug and levy posts and postal services be established to facilitate caravan traffic with India.100 India, however, feared such measures might provoke increased Russian activity in Sistan and shelved the proposals, a decision deprecated by Durand.101 These discussions were revived in June 1896, when India and Afghanistan finished demarcating the ‘Durand line’ initially agreed upon in 1893. The British boundary commissioner, Captain Henry McMahon

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(later of McMahon–Husayn correspondence fame), informed the Foreign Department that by this settlement, India had acquired a 600-mile caravan route to Sistan and he recommended appointing a political officer to supervise its development.102 The India Office approved the plan in October. The following January Lt F. C. Webb-Ware set off from Quetta eastwards down the caravan track, reaching Sistan in late February.103 He used his budget of Rs 34,700 (£2,300) to build guard houses at Nushki, Dalbandian, Amirchah and Robat, employ clerks and guides to assist traders, and raise local levies under Indian non-commissioned officers to protect the caravans. The Foreign Department appreciated that these measures nullified the policy of non-interference. In May 1898 the department’s deputy secretary, Captain Hugh Daly, advised acquiring a ‘practical hold’ over the area, encouraging British commerce and investment and appointing consuls, particularly at Birjand and Nusratabad, the capital of Sistan.104 In endorsing this scheme, the viceroy, Lord Elgin, anticipated optimistically that the ‘development of trade, increase of British influence and the consolidation of Persian authority should then advance together’.105 But whether such measures would ensure real control of Sistan remained an open question. Russian action in eastern Iran hastened this decision. In early 1897, Russian Cossacks established quarantine posts between Birjand and Mashhad against disease entering from Afghanistan and India. Although Russian medical authorities had traced their devastating cholera outbreak of 1892 to Mashhad, the British immediately interpreted the quarantine as a plot against the incipient trade route.106 Rumours of the appointment of a Russian consul to Nusratabad prompted Durand to send Sykes on a long tour of Sistan and Qa’inat throughout 1899.107 Sykes sent reports directly to Lord Salisbury, the prime minister and foreign secretary – an indication both of his personal ambition and the importance of his mission. Sykes doubted the commercial value of the new Quetta– Sistan route, compared it unfavourably with the Bandar-i ‘Abbas– Mashhad road and argued that a resident consul in Sistan was only necessary if the Russians appointed one.108 He nevertheless acknowledged that if ‘it be decided that, for political reasons, the route must be opened up, and, in my humble opinion, our policy in Persia demands this, liberal measures, involving considerable expenditure will, in all probability be necessary, in order to attract caravans to this route’.109 Durand and Curzon supported this view. ‘We must,’ Durand

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implored Salisbury in February 1899, ‘keep Seistan in our zone. It is too valuable, and would be too dangerous in Russian hands, for us to let the Russians continue unchecked their efforts to close it to us and our trade.’110 Curzon agreed: if we do not continue to show an active interest in Seistan, Russia will. If we do not give the impression there of preponderant influence, Russian authority will soon supplant ours [. . .] If we do not desire Russia to advance to the Persian Gulf, the obvious method is to block the most direct of her paths. Looking to the future of Northern Khorassan, which is inevitably destined to pass under Russian control, it should be our object to draw the line of demarcation between the Russian and the British spheres at the point best suited to our interests, and not to hers.111 To this end, his administration provided a modest grant of Rs 93,000 (£6,200) to the Quetta– Sistan trade route over the next three years and offered customs and railway rebates on goods destined for Iran.112 By 1905 a railroad had been built from Quetta to Nushki, a distance of 90 miles, at an estimated cost of Rs 70 million (£467,000).113

Anglo-Russian rivalry in Sistan The struggle for Sistan began in earnest with the arrival of the longawaited Russian vice consul, Alexander Miller, on 14 February 1900. Fortunately for the British, Webb-Ware was visiting Nusratabad at the time.114 Before his departure in early March he arranged for the official reception for the incoming resident consul, Major G. F. Chenevix Trench, who was expected the following month.115 Chenevix Trench had begun his political work shortly after joining the Bombay Staff Corps in 1882 and later served in Baluchistan and Leh. He was an energetic and occasionally undisciplined frontier officer. Sandeman thought him ‘bumptious’,116 while another colleague more sympathetically called him an ‘Indian rubber ball and won’t be squashed’.117 As Chevenix Trench neared Sistan, he learned from hospital assistant ‘Abbas ‘Ali that Hishmat al-Mulk was wary of officially receiving him as consul without a copy of his exequatur and feared that Miller would make trouble on that score. Chevenix Trench had not yet received this authorization, but quickly rebounded:

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In my difficulty I concluded that though orders had not reached Seistan my appointment had been agreed to by the Persian Government and so I sent the Hashmat-ul-Mulk what professed to be a copy of my orders and which was in reality a partial copy of telegrams received from the Foreign [Department] such as ‘Viceroy has decided to send you as consul to Seistan. You will travel by Quetta accompanied by an escort of native cavalry.’ When this had been written and translated into Persian with the Viceroy’s full titles, etc., Abbas Ali left Warmal and proceeded to Nusratabad to give the letter and to make arrangements for my reception. This method quite satisfied the Hashmat-ul-Mulk who at once ordered everything that was possible for my reception.118 That British prestige in Sistan required forgery portended its fragility. Chenevix Trench’s reception was nonetheless impressive. An Iranian istiqbal (welcoming party) led by Sartip Muhammad Riza Khan, son of Hishmat al-Mulk, and Sardar Purdil Khan, the principal Sinjirani Baluch, met him outside Nusratabad. As they entered the city walls, 300 – 400 Iranian infantry were drawn up in formation, and as Chenevix Trench recalled, ‘I rode with my escort in full dress through the centre of the town within the fort with an outrider in front carrying a small Union Jack on a lance.’ The party then proceeded to a camp just outside the town where ‘two triumphal arches in red had been erected’. Whereas Sardar Purdil Khan had apparently warned the Russian consul to fly his flag only sparingly, Chenevix Trench noted that: my flag, which on occasions is a full sized Indian Government one, has floated on a 30 feet flag staff from the moment of my arrival, and the small flag has been carried in front of me within the streets everywhere I have been and not a dissent has been even hinted at. Chenevix Trench moved quickly to secure good relations with Hishmat al-Mulk, making the first ceremonial call at the governor’s residence, which was returned the following day. The appointment of foreign consuls altered Sistani politics, overlaying the family struggle between Hishmat al-Mulk and his brother, Shawkat al-Mulk, governor of Qa’inat, with the imperial rivalry

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between Russia and Britain. For Hishmat al-Mulk, this development at once brought new political pressures and possibilities. Miller had reported unfavourably about Hishmat al-Mulk’s independence from Mashhad to the Russian consul general there, who in turn urged the governor general of Khurasan, Muhammad Taqi Mirza Rukn al-Dawlah, to reign in his subordinate in Sistan. Rukn al-Dawlah was only too happy to oblige and took the opportunity afforded him by the Russians to press higher revenue demands on Hishmat al-Mulk. An alarmed Chenevix Trench declared that: The question of revenue tax or ‘Ijarah’ on Seistan is a sword of Damocles over this country, and it will be well to see that the weapon does not fall into the hands of our rivals, and so enable them to remove a friendly Amir for one bound more to their interests.119 Hishmat al-Mulk accordingly looked to the British for assistance. Chenevix Trench viewed strengthening Hishmat al-Mulk vis-a`-vis Mashhad as a means of thwarting Russian ambitions in Sistan, and requested Consul General Temple to press for the removal of Rukn alDawlah’s ma’mur (agent), who had been sent down to Sistan ‘to squeeze’ money from Hishmat al-Mulk. ‘If we could get him away’, Chenevix Trench predicted, ‘the Amir would be able to rule in peace again and continue doing what we want.’120 Inaugurated by Chenevix Trench, British support for Hishmat al-Mulk would continue for the next five years. In addition to these diplomatic efforts, Chenevix Trench embarked on a public relations campaign to spread British political, economic and cultural influence. He entertained kadkhudas, the village headmen who farmed taxes from Hishmat al-Mulk each year. He also cultivated connections with the Shi‘i ulama and built a mosque in his camp. He explained its very secular significance for him: The building of a mosque has been a great political move. All the local mullas are loud in its praises, and very few of them have not been to see it and have not praised me for the act of toleration as they call it. Munshi Ahmad Din and three native officers have taken charge of the mosque, and it has already received offers for

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embellishment from various sources. I find every evening many people come from outside to say their prayers there, and to sit in the shade of it. In fact, it has become a sort of political meeting place for all sorts and kinds of people. The Musjid has brought many people to see me.121 The construction of consulate buildings required the employment of labourers, some of whom travelled long distances from outlying villages. ‘The daily payment of the coolies for the buildings’, Chenevix Trench pointed out, unconsciously slipping into the language of Indian labour practices, ‘has been of great political value, while the local Persian official has always been attached by the work, and so through these means I have been able to make many acquaintances’. Public entertainment was another tool of empire. The British held weekly gymkhanas (athletic competitions) in which Chenevix Trench’s Indian escort sowars (cavalry) engaged in tent-pegging, tug-of-war competitions, horse racing and wrestling on horseback, while Sistanis enjoyed refreshments. Chenevix Trench worked to tighten the economic bonds between Sistan and India. Improvements to the trade route on the Iranian side of the frontier were a priority. Through the agency of Sardar Sayyid Khan, a Baluch and nominal Persian subject who received a monthly Indian subsidy, the British erected shelters, dug wells and built a guard house in Sistan, completing the chain of such facilities from Quetta.122 Persian officials were not consulted. Chenevix Trench arranged with Hishmat al-Mulk to build bridges over the many canals and ditches that crossed the main road as it approached Nusratabad.123 The British established postal services, again under the care of Sardar Sayyid Khan, between the frontier at Kuh-i Malik-i Siah and Nusratabad and eventually extended them north to Mashhad. Chenevix Trench wrote letters of introduction for Iranian merchants on their way to Nushki and Quetta and often provided small cash advances and other services. In October 1900, for example, a cleric and merchant named Mulla Muhammad Husayn asked Chenevix Trench for assistance with his forthcoming journey.124 Chenevix Trench exchanged his Iranian qirans on a barat (draft/cheque), for the equivalent amount of rupees at Quetta and promised him money for a railway ticket from Quetta to Cawnpur, courtesy of the Cawnpur Chamber of Commerce. He gave him a letter of introduction to the

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British authorities in Quetta, asking that Mulla Muhammad Husayn be granted a return train ticket gratis to Karachi. Such ties, Chenevix Trench hoped, would irresistibly draw Sistan into closer connection with the British Empire. For him, British imperialism was a modernizing, progressive force that could provide Persians with a model for national rejuvenation: If we are ever to hope for this awakening we must give her a hundredfold more object lessons of our good will towards her than we have done. Let us by peaceful establishments of British Colonies set her an example. Let us accustom Persia to British officers surrounded by well ordered and regularly paid servants, not living with that lavish expenditure and outward show which is an evil in their own life. Let us supply her with all the means in our power with commodities sold by honest traders at honest prices, and let there be plenty of these. Let us encourage the Indian merchant to establish himself everywhere in Persia. Let us show that mere interchange of presents is no friendship, that Mudakhil [a Persian word meaning income, which Chenevix Trench used to mean illgotten gains] and bribery are not healthy methods of profit and promotion, and we may yet hope to see the Persian rise superior to the fear of Russia which so numbs her life and thought. But if we are to give rise to this policy [. . .] we must not delay, our policy must be continuous and our officers and traders numerous.125 Chenevix Trench’s identification of basic British and Iranian interests, however, was not shared by Qajar officials in Tehran. Britain’s increasing visibility in Sistan alarmed Muzaffar al-Din Shah and his ministers and provided the Russians with a new lever against Hishmat al-Mulk, who they argued was subservient to British interests. In February 1901 a new British consul, Captain R. A. E. Benn, arrived in Sistan with an escort of 15 Indian cavalry. Chenevix Trench, who was to proceed to Mashhad as consul general, remained in Sistan for another month. Two weeks later, Webb-Ware turned up with 25 Indian infantry and entered Nusratabad with both Chenevix Trench’s and Benn’s escorts.126 The movements of 50 Indian soldiers and three British

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officers in Iranian territory did not go unnoticed by Tehran. Chenevix Trench reported ‘wild rumours’ – probably encouraged by Miller – that the British had brought in a large quantity of arms. In March, the karguzar, Mu‘azzam al-Mulk, informed Mirza Nasrallah Khan Na’ini Mushir al-Dawlah, the foreign minister, that Webb-Ware had arrived without first notifying him and that Chenevix Trench and Webb-Ware denied importing any weapons other than those carried by their escorts.127 Mu‘azzam al-Mulk indicated that he had received an interesting report from the Russian vice consul on the subject of British influence in Sistan and had forwarded a copy to Hishmat al-Mulk, in the hopes of alerting the governor to the dangers of the situation. Hishmat al-Mulk, the karguzar insisted, was incapable of defending Sistan and an artillery officer with guns should be sent to the province.128 Muzaffar ad-Din Shah was initially inclined to treat these reports with some scepticism, but by the end of spring 1901 he had apparently decided on the dismissal of Hishmat al-Mulk, who was soon ordered to Mashhad.129 Chenevix Trench’s hasty embrace of Hishmat al-Mulk had committed Britain to a policy that was opposed by not only the Russians, but also by the Persian authorities in Mashhad and Tehran. A more cautious, better informed opening move would have allowed him a better appreciation of Hishmat al-Mulk’s situation and left Britain more flexibility in choosing its local allies. The Persians and the Russians had called Chevenix Trench’s bluff, and London and India scrambled to muster the chips.

Trade routes and the notables The British hoped that by extending their commercial and political influence up the Bushihr–Shiraz, Karun and Quetta– Sistan routes, they could challenge Russia’s increasing influence in the north, prevent Russian expansion southward and maintain the Qajar borderlands as an imperial buffer zone. The consuls found themselves in a position analogous to the Qajar state itself. Possessing limited powers of compulsion, the Qajars maintained their rule by attracting the support of local notables, tribal chiefs, ulama and merchants. The consuls used similar methods, working within and exploiting the Persian political system. This work, as Meade, McDouall, Grahame, Lorimer and Chenevix Trench all quickly discovered, was difficult. The fragmented political structure of Qajar Iran multiplied the number of players to be

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conciliated. Britain’s power diminished with distance from its naval forces in the Persian Gulf. Even in the ports, military intervention, ostensibly to protect British lives and property, was only a temporary solution. That said, the new Karun and Sistan initiatives, together with efforts to shore up the old Bushihr–Shiraz route, revealed Britain’s determination to stake claims to Persia’s southern borderlands. The Karun case indicated that by combining the cooperation of a powerful local player, like Khaz‘al, with naval support in the gulf and diplomatic assistance in Tehran, Muhammarah and Bushihr, the British officials could exercise significant influence. Pushing that influence inland toward Luristan, Shiraz and Sistan was a much harder task, but these efforts laid the foundations for the partition diplomacy of the AngloRussian Convention of 1907.

CHAPTER 3 IMPERIAL PARTITION: FORGING THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN CONVENTION

On 31 August 1907 in St Petersburg, Sir Arthur Nicolson and Alexander Izvolsky signed the Anglo-Russian Convention in the hope of resolving the Great Game in Afghanistan, Tibet and Iran. Anxious to forestall Iranian and international censure, Britain and Russia pledged to respect ‘the integrity and independence of Persia’ and studiously avoided the phrase ‘spheres of influence’.1 Citing the porous, liminal character of the Qajar borderlands, however, the two powers declared that they possessed, for geographical and economic reasons, a special interest in the maintenance of peace and order in certain provinces of Persia adjoining, or in the neighborhood of, the Russian frontier on the one hand, and the frontiers of Afghanistan and Baluchistan on the other hand. Britain and Russia forswore future political or economic concessions in each other’s spheres and acknowledged an intervening neutral zone within which they could seek concessions on an equal footing. Russia admitted that Afghanistan was outside its sphere of influence and pledged to conduct its relations with that country through the British government. In Tibet, Britain and Russia affirmed Chinese sovereignty and endeavoured to respect the political and economic status quo.

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Sir Edward Grey’s motivation for the Russian entente reflected Britain’s European and Asian interests.2 The convention cannot be understood without reference to the long-standing threat that Russia had posed to India and consequently to Britain’s status as a Great Power. British statesmen had searched for a resolution since the 1890s.3 Additionally, the agreement was a natural corollary of the Anglo-French entente of 1904 and provided Britain leverage and flexibility in Europe vis-a`-vis Germany. Britain’s interests in Europe and Asia were inextricably linked. Isolation in Europe increased the likelihood and hazards of conflict on the imperial periphery, while at the same time vulnerability in Asia weakened Britain’s position in Europe. The agreement was a diplomatic watershed with profound consequences for the international balance of power, but its impact on southern Iran has been overlooked. The convention illuminates the complex interplay of global and local forces shaping imperial competition in the early twentieth century. The Anglo-Russian Convention reconfigured the political and economic landscape of Persia’s southern borderlands. Curzon and company had considered this vast region as a strategic whole, but it was now divided into British and neutral spheres. The British sphere consisted of Sistan and Bandar-i ‘Abbas, together with southern Qa’inat, Kirman, Persian Baluchistan and Makran. The neutral zone encompassed the Iranian coast of the Persian Gulf, as well as the country north to the border of the Russian zone at Isfahan. With the exception of Bandar-i ‘Abbas, Kirman and Makran, it incorporated almost all of the territory supervised by Consul General Cox at Bushihr, including Muhammarah, Arabistan and the Karun valley, southern Luristan, Shiraz and Fars, Bandar-i Lingah and Laristan. To the east, the neutral zone extended into the vast wastes of the Dasht-i Lut and Dasht-i Kavir and the highlands of northern Qa’inat. For many years Britain had tried to exclude Russian influence from what was now the neutral sphere, especially along the gulf coast. By admitting Russia into this region, Britain had, according to Curzon and other critics, sacrificed vital interests. On the contrary, Grey and his Liberal supporters claimed that Russian acknowledgement of British political supremacy in Afghanistan, Sistan, Bandar-i ‘Abbas and Makran finally guaranteed the strategic security of India’s western flank.4 In order to appreciate the significance of the convention for Britain’s position in Persia, the following discussion compares the development of

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British influence in the future neutral zone and British sphere between 1900 and 1907, as well as Britain’s relations with Shaykh Khaz‘al in the south-west and Hishmat al-Mulk in the south-east. It also explores British quarantine posts as sites of imperial surveillance, rivalry and resistance along the gulf coast and in Sistan. Before the agreement, Britain’s position was much stronger in the gulf littoral than it was in Sistan. The convention admitted Russia into the neutral zone on equal terms after 1907, but the British were already firmly entrenched there and were determined not to yield any ground. By contrast, Sistan, the strategic key to the British sphere, witnessed the fiercest Anglo-Russian contest in all of southern Iran before the convention. For the British, this struggle was at best a draw. By securing a monopoly of British influence in Sistan after 1907, British diplomats in St Petersburg and London had obtained what consuls and political officers had failed to achieve on the ground. With India’s frontier protected after 1907, the British were free to devote their resources to consolidating their hold on the neutral zone, which they had no intention of sharing with the Russians or anyone else, and were content to leave their south-eastern sphere an imperial backwater.5

The Russian Offensive Russian diplomacy in Tehran was very successful during the reign of Muzaffar al-Din Shah. In 1899 Durand emphasized to Salisbury the political importance of meeting Iran’s requests for financial assistance and criticized the Imperial Bank of Persia’s (IBP) stringency regarding security for such loans.6 Such was the case with the IBP’s advance of £50,000 to Hajj Mirza ‘Ali Khan Amin al-Dawlah’s government in 1898, repayment of which had been guaranteed through IBP management of the Bushihr customs. This condition generated considerable resentment among Iranian merchants and officials and led to Amin al-Dawlah’s downfall and the elevation of his rival, Amin al-Sultan. Durand’s pleas that Britain provide money on generous terms to the new administration fell on deaf ears, and in January 1900 Amin al-Sultan secured a loan from the Russian government’s Discount and Loan Bank of 22.5 million rubles (£2.4 million) at 5 per cent interest for 75 years.7 The agreement stipulated that until the loan was repaid, Iran could not borrow funds from any foreign country except Russia.

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An additional 10 million rubles (£1.1 million) was forthcoming in 1902.8 The Russians then negotiated a new tariff with Iran in 1903, which was widely thought to be more favourable to Russian goods than British ones. Arthur Hardinge managed to extract a Persian promise that future tariff revisions would require British assent. Britain did enjoy some diplomatic success, notably the D’Arcy Concession of 1901, which gave a British syndicate a monopoly over oil exploitation in Iran, excluding the four provinces bordering Russia. Oil would revolutionize Britain’s relationship with south-west Persia, but this development lay in the future. For the moment, the tariff of 1903, together with the Russian loans of 1900 and 1902, were proof positive that Russian influence was ascendant in Tehran. Curzon thought Russia’s aim was to make the Qajars and other rulers along its Asian frontiers its vassals.9 Following his return to London in 1905, Hardinge warned Grey that Qajar dependence on Russia threatened to make Iran a client state analogous to khedival Egypt.10 Russia also extended its efforts to southern Iran and the gulf littoral. To Britain’s ‘official mind’ the most logical conclusion was that Russia desired a port and ultimately a naval base, connected by a trans-Persian rail to Russia. In 1900 Russian surveyors explored possible railway routes across Iran to the gulf. In late 1903 British diplomats in St Petersburg secretly obtained copies of their reports, which seemed to confirm these suspicions.11 Captain P. A. Rittich, of the Russian General Staff, led the expedition to Chabahar on the Gulf of Oman and explained that a railway with this terminus possesses vast importance as it places under Russian interests the whole of Persia, and excludes the possibility of the division of Persia by England into two parts, north and south. This line once carried through by us, southern Persia is lost for England beyond recall, and the idea of an African-Indian state incapable of realization. We shall attain by this line our extreme limit on the south, and shall achieve our world’s task – our natural gravitation to the open ocean.12 A copy of this report soon reached Curzon’s desk in India.13 Although a trans-Persian railway remained a very distant prospect, Russian

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consuls, warships and merchants soon descended upon southern Iran. In June 1899 Prince Dabija, Russian consul at Isfahan, travelled to Bushihr and Muhammarah, where he warned Shaykh Khaz‘al of rumours of his collusion with Shaykh Mubarak al-Sabah of Kuwait and the British.14 Between 1900 and 1904 Russian consular officials took up posts in Sistan, Kirman, Bandar-i ‘Abbas, Bushihr and Kirmanshah. In January 1902 the karguzar at Bushihr, Muhtasham al-Vizarah, reported to Tehran that the British were ‘in ill humour and in reality afraid’ of these appointments.15 He went on to say that they did not dare take Khaz‘al under their protection for fear that the Russians would immediately protest. Russian warships, meanwhile, challenged Britain’s assertion that the Persian Gulf was a mare clausum. In 1901 the Russian Steam Navigation Company inaugurated direct trade with the gulf ports.16 The enterprise proved difficult, but the firm, bolstered by government subsidies, maintained an annual schedule of four to six sailings. Russian commercial missions visited Shiraz, Bushihr and Arabistan in 1904 and Kirman, Bam, Bandar-i ‘Abbas and Bushihr in 1906. In London and Calcutta British officials debated contingency plans.17 Curzon relentlessly pressed for explicit British commitments against further Russian encroachment. ‘As a student of Russian aspirations and methods for fifteen years’, he thundered from India, ‘I assert with confidence – what I do not think that any of her own statesmen would deny – that her ultimate ambition is the dominion of Asia.’18 An interdepartmental committee concluded in late 1902, however, that the Royal Navy could command the Persian Gulf in most conceivable circumstances, but if Russia invaded northern Iran, Britain had only sufficient troops to occupy Sistan, Bandar-i ‘Abbas and the islands dominating the Straits of Hormuz.19 The following May, Lansdowne announced in the House of Lords that although Britain was not hostile to the ‘legitimate trade of other Powers’, it would resist foreign political or military influence in the Persian Gulf.20 This distinction was disingenuous, as Lansdowne admitted that ‘It is impossible to my mind, to dissociate our commercial and our political interests.’ Such discussions and declarations, however, did little to affect the local balance of power in southern Iran. As long as Russia refused a Persian settlement, the task of protecting British interests there fell to consuls and political officers.

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‘The Uncrowned King of the Gulf’ For Curzon, the success of his project depended on putting men of the right stamp in Bushihr. In May 1899 he privately expressed his disappointment with the Foreign Department’s political officers, declaring that ‘I decline to appoint any one until I have seen him.’21 Seeking ‘a better class of man in the Persian Gulf’, Curzon replaced Meade with Colonel Charles Kemball in 1900 and four years later he tapped Cox, who would occupy the post with one brief interruption until 1918. As Curzon’s ‘Uncrowned King of the Gulf’,22 Cox now superintended an impressive imperial network, including India’s political officers at Bushihr, Bandar-i ‘Abbas, Ahvaz, Kirman, Kirmanshah and the consular agency at Bandar-i Lingah, as well as the Foreign Office posts at Shiraz and Muhammarah. He also supervised India’s representatives at Kuwait, Masqat, Bahrain and Sharjah. Baron Indrenius, the captain of a Russian gunboat, the Gilyak, was very impressed during a visit to the gulf in 1900, reporting that British power and influence was ‘shown by the fact that in all the ports it has agents, consuls, vice-consuls and secret agents. And above them all is the Consul-General in Bushehr, called the Persian Gulf Resident.’23 Managing this far-flung web was hard work. Between 1895 and 1907, the amount of correspondence passing through the consulate general increased from 2,650 to 10,750 letters sent and received each year.24 Similarly, telegraph traffic, most of which had to be tediously ciphered and deciphered, rose from 400 messages in 1903 to 2,700 in 1907. Much of this correspondence was mercantile in nature, and beginning in March 1904 the Foreign Office deputed a commercial adviser to Bushihr to assist in such matters.25 Incorporating local partners was crucial, and Shaykh Khaz‘al was becoming Britain’s greatest ally. He was well aware that his close friend, Shaykh Mubarak, had negotiated an agreement with Meade in early 1899 that virtually made Kuwait a British protectorate.26 Khaz‘al too was eager for security guarantees, and the British in turn desired his cooperation with their growing interests in the Karun valley. Muzaffar al-Din’s decision in 1898 to establish a centralized customs regime, eventually staffed by Belgian officials, caused Khaz‘al special concern as farmer of the Arabistan customs. Customs farming powerfully illustrated Tehran’s inability to monitor and govern its frontiers, and the new customs regime aimed to remedy this shortcoming and provide the shah with badly needed revenues. Khaz‘al naturally viewed this

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initiative as an infringement on his autonomy, but his repeated requests for assistance placed Britain’s representatives in an awkward position. On the one hand, they generally favoured any proposal that would regularize customs, limit corruption and assist trade, and the administration of customs was clearly the shah’s prerogative. On the other hand, the shaykh’s friendship was a valuable asset, especially as the British were losing confidence in the shah’s ability to govern the south. ‘After the fiasco at Shuster proving the inability of the Persians to govern in these parts’, McDouall observed to Meade in July 1897, ‘it seems a little questionable as to whether it is politic for us to support anything which would lessen the Shaikh’s power.’27 The expansion of the British consular network in the region increased the frequency of these dilemmas. Local notables were anxious to learn what the British might offer them and consuls were eager to play an active role in advancing imperial interests and their own careers. In November 1899, acting on instructions from Durand, Meade offered the shaykh support in the customs dispute. Negotiations with the Persian government dragged until May 1902.28 The shah confirmed the shaykh as head of the Arabistan customs, which was kept independent of the main southern customs administration at Bushihr. He was, however, obliged to accept a Belgian assistant and government secretary from the capital. Strenuous effort was made to assuage Arab concerns. Customs was debarred from any involvement in tribal affairs, and dates and other products remained exempt from export duty. Tehran claimed the tribes’ lands as royal property but guaranteed the Arabs’ usufruct so long as this right was not alienated to foreigners. Although generally satisfied, Khaz‘al persisted in his efforts to obtain explicit British assurances. As with so many problems of British policy in Iran, the Russian menace was the key factor. Russian consular officials had frequented Muhammarah since 1899, and Russian influence in Tehran could be as easily used to safeguard Khaz‘al’s autonomy as to jeopardize it. Kemball observed in July 1901 that recent events may have caused His Majesty’s Government to reconsider its policy in regard to Persia, more particularly with reference to British interests in the south, and the preservation of a friendly Power at Mohammerah might certainly be of importance to us.29

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Khaz‘al’s agent, Haji Ra’is al-Tujjar, informed Hardinge in Tehran that the shaykh feared a Russian attack on Muhammarah and enquired as to Britain’s response to such a contingency.30 The threat of Russian military action against Muhammarah was remote, but there was a real danger that if the British refused to grant the shaykh’s requests, he might turn to the Russians.31 Commenting on this situation in November 1902, Curzon observed: If there is a chief whose claims entitle him to our support it is the Sheikh of Mohammerah, while if there is any part of Persia where a special demand exists for the protection of British interests against foreign competition or intrigue, it is the mouth of the Karun River. A main cause of our weakness in Persia is our failure to support those chiefs and officials who are disposed to side with us.32 Lansdowne declined to provide Shaykh Khaz‘al with assurances against the Iranian government but was prepared to guarantee him against foreign naval attack. This undertaking was a logical extension of his instructions to Hardinge in January 1902 to inform the shah’s ministers that Britain would not countenance a Russian port in the gulf. McDouall communicated Hardinge’s assurances to the shaykh in January 1903. Although an unlikely scenario, Hardinge promised the shaykh unconditional naval protection and diplomatic support, ‘so long as you remain faithful to the Shah and act in accordance with our advice’.33 Hardinge visited Khaz‘al at Muhammarah a year later in December 1903. The shaykh complained that the customs administration was not abiding by the 1902 agreement and that Tehran was undermining his position.34 What would Britain do, the shaykh enquired, were he to oppose these efforts? After consultation with Lansdowne, Hardinge replied that as long as Khaz‘al kept to the terms of the customs agreement, he would be ‘justified in opposing’ any attempt by the Iranian government ‘to repudiate the arrangement’.35 These assurances were a clear infringement of Iranian sovereignty. In unilaterally declaring that it would defend Muhammarah from foreign warships, Britain had usurped one of the shah’s primary responsibilities. Encouraging Khaz‘al, moreover, to oppose his government should it renounce the customs agreement was hardly

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consistent with Britain’s professions of respect for Iranian ‘integrity and independence’. In addition, the shaykh’s armed resistance would afford Britain a handy pretext should it choose to intervene. Britain had indeed affirmed the shah’s de jure authority in southern Arabistan, but it had in effect asserted its own de facto power.36 The assurances provided Britain with a measure of control over Shaykh Khaz‘al as well. He had no way of compelling the British to meet their pledges. The proviso that he accept their counsel left the British in a dominant position and provided a convenient loophole if it became expedient to abandon him.37 Khaz‘al was not entirely pleased and British consular officers sympathized with him. In June 1904 Lorimer provided his impressions of the state of the relationship: ‘the services which we ask and expect of the Sheikh are out of proportion to the advantages which are guaranteed by our friendship as it exists at present’.38 The question of further assurances would await future developments. The Arabistan customs question was shelved for the present, but British consuls encountered the Belgian officers elsewhere in the Persian Gulf. After taking over at Bushihr in March 1900, customs administrators established principal bureaus at Bushihr, Bandar-i Lingah and Bandar-i ‘Abbas, as well as 45 subordinate offices and observation posts.39 The new tariff, replacing the general 5 per cent Turkmanchay duty with specific enumerated duties for various imports, came into force in February 1903.40 The following year Joseph Naus, a Belgian serving as Persian minister of customs, issued new customs regulations to be enforced by a new gunboat, the Muzaffar, and some steam launches.41 From a fiscal point of view the Belgians were very successful.42 In 1899, the last year of the old system, the shah had farmed the gulf customs for 250,000 tumans (£48,000). Under Belgian management, net customs receipts in the gulf averaged 634,000 tumans (£121,900) annually between 1900 and 1906. So impressive were these achievements that customs was made responsible for the postal system in 1902 and, even more significantly, for the treasury in 1904. While British consuls appreciated administrative rationalization, they soon clashed with customs over quarantine in the gulf ports. Since the 1860s, the residency surgeon had supervised quarantine arrangements at Bushihr against cholera and plague spreading from India.43 In 1897 Tehran delegated quarantine control in all the gulf ports to the

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residency surgeon, who appointed Anglo-Indian medical personnel to Muhammarah, Bandar-i Lingah, Bandar-i ‘Abbas and Jask, all at Iranian expense.44 Not surprisingly, British management of the quarantine met with hostility in several quarters. Iranian and Russian officials claimed that the British used the quarantine to control the movement of people, including foreign nationals, for political ends.45 Persians complained of preferential treatment towards European passengers.46 Local residents resented foreign supervision and the inspection of infected houses by British officers as well as the examination of corpses, which they deemed an affront to Islam.47 In July 1899 anti-quarantine demonstrators pelted the residency with stones, and Meade subsequently induced Mirza Ahmad Khan Darya Baygi, governor of the gulf ports, to bastinado the leaders in his presence.48 Meade, moreover, was determined to maintain a British monopoly over the gulf quarantine: another European Power nearly interested in the approach of plague, may endeavour to have a share in the Quarantine and Plague measures in the Persian Gulf. Any such co-operation, would I think, do us serious damage from a Political point of view, while the undivided control of all measures will undoubtedly enhance our prestige and increase our influence.49 In 1904 the Persian government tried to regain control of the quarantine. The British, as usual, suspected a Russian plot. Although the British had been entrusted with executive medical authority over quarantine measures, Tehran had vested financial oversight of these services in the customs. This arrangement was awkward, and Kemball noted that the Belgian officer at Bandar-i ‘Abbas had lately issued orders to the British assistant surgeon. Kemball also reported that the physician of the French vice-consulate in Bushihr, Dr Bussie`re, had been hired by the customs for the care of its staff and was investigating quarantine facilities throughout the Persian ports on its behalf.50 Shortly after taking over in Bushihr in May 1904, Cox complained that Darya Baygi had recently considered proposals by Dr Bussie`re for municipal sanitary measures in Bushihr, including the destruction of rats, street cleaning, and surveillance and isolation of infected persons.51 These proceedings, Cox insisted, were an attempt to restrict the duties of the residency surgeon to the inspection of ships, leaving customs to supervise all other

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sanitary arrangements. The Russian consul had also been demonstrating a keen interest in quarantine matters. During the Shiraz cholera epidemic that summer, the director of customs, E. Waffelaert, on his own authority ordered the destruction of the residency quarantine sheds on the isthmus connecting Bushihr with the mainland, suspended all caravan traffic and prohibited entry from the north.52 Cox demanded the immediate reconstruction of the quarantine sheds. Waffelaert complied, but argued that British quarantine measures on the isthmus were ‘defective’ and had left Bushihr vulnerable to the influx of cholera from the Shiraz road.53 Cox testily defended Dr de Vere Condon’s quarantine and sanitary arrangements and insisted that customs refrain from all interference. Cox declared heatedly to Waffelaert: Accordingly while animated by a sincere desire to express myself to you with utmost courtesy, the only reply which I am concerned to receive from you and which will satisfy me is a clear understanding [. . .] that you and your subordinates will for the future abstain altogether from intrusion upon the Chief Sanitary Officer’s functions and from the preventative arrangements of the port except to the extent of disbursing such monies or supplying such labour as the Residency Surgeon, in communication with the local Government may be authorized to require from you.54 The shah’s ministers argued compellingly to Hardinge that they might issue orders on sanitary matters through whatever agency they chose, but eventually capitulated in September 1904, instructing customs to comply in the manner required by Cox.55 Cox buttressed Britain’s medical influence by opening charitable dispensaries in the Persian ports, run by assistant surgeons engaged in quarantine duties.56 In December 1904 India agreed to supply the funds. Hardinge and Cox agreed that it was best to proceed without formal reference to the Iranian authorities, who might take the opportunity to protest the scheme.57 Dispensaries were accordingly opened in Muhammarah, Bandar-i Lingah and Bandar-i ‘Abbas. Between April 1905 and December 1907 the number of patients visiting the assistant surgeon at Bandar-i ‘Abbas rose from 80 to 400 per month.58 In Bandar-i Lingah, monthly attendance increased from 50 in

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September 1906 to 650 in January 1908, while at Muhammarah the figure expanded from 100 in October 1906 to 450 in November 1907. While such services were doubtless greatly appreciated by those who received them, British motives were not purely humanitarian. Curzon resigned the viceroyalty in 1905, but Cox’s continued presence at Bushihr ensured that the execution of British policy in southern Iran would still bear his imprint. Upon learning of Curzon’s departure from India, Cox thanked him for his encouragement and the confidence that he had placed in him.59 Curzon responded graciously: On the eve of my departure I have received your agreeable letter and cannot deny myself the pleasure of saying in reply that it has been the greatest satisfaction to me to befriend so able, high minded and devoted an officer as yourself, always to be trusted to do his best and that best of a very high order. I thank you for the splendid service that you have rendered to Govt. and to myself and I wish every good fortune to Mrs. Cox and yourself.60 Even out of office, Curzon exercised his powerful influence on behalf of Cox, intervening for example in 1908 with Lord Morley, secretary of state for India, to cancel Cox’s supersession by another officer.61 In the years between the Anglo-Russian Convention and World War I, Cox zealously guarded British interests in the neutral zone against the Russians and Germans. Backed by British naval and financial power, he strengthened relations with Shaykh Khaz‘al and worked to maintain Britain’s commercial ascendancy. The outbreak of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution, however, would complicate this task and pull Cox and the British deeper still into southern Iran, especially the dangerous politics of inland Fars.

Stalemate in Sistan British efforts to secure Sistan against the Russians before 1907 were far less successful. Soon after his arrival in April 1900, Chenevix Trench had hastily identified Hishmat al-Mulk as the key to British influence in the province, but British support had only turned the Russians against their prote´ge´ and provoked the shah to order him to Mashhad in spring 1901.

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Hishmat al-Mulk had not yet complied. Chenevix Trench recommended bolstering him with a British decoration and money to purchase the khalisah (crown lands) of Sistan should they be put up for sale.62 Lansdowne, Hamilton and Curzon all rejected this proposal but were willing to back the governor in Tehran.63 In language closely prefiguring the Anglo-Russian Convention, Hardinge explained to Mushir al-Dawlah and Atabak-i ‘Azam in June 1901 that Britain acknowledged Russian pre-eminence in the north and claimed the same in Sistan.64 Hishmat al-Mulk was not a perfect governor, but his removal would be attributed locally to Russian complaints about his assistance to British consuls and Anglo-Indian commerce. Atabak-i ‘Azam denied that Russian criticism of Hishmat al-Mulk was the cause of his being called to Mashhad, but deferring to British wishes, he informed Hardinge that the summons would be suspended. Tehran’s representatives nevertheless steadily undermined Hishmat al-Mulk’s authority. In May 1901 Belgian officers took over the provincial customs from him – a political and a pecuniary blow. They soon established posts on the frontier to prevent smuggling and ensure that the legal duties were paid. British consuls suspected the Belgians of conspiring with the Russians to obstruct British trade and discourage use of the overland route. By early 1904 relations between customs and consuls in Sistan were so strained that Hardinge and Curzon reprimanded their subordinates, lecturing them on the importance of diplomatic protocol and civility.65 Karguzars’ reports of Hishmat al-Mulk’s inability to defend Sistan and the British officers and soldiers near the frontier and in Sistan itself, as well as a developing border dispute with Afghanistan, prompted the dispatch to Sistan of a sarhaddar (frontier officer), ‘Abd al-Hamid Khan Ghaffari Kashi Yamin-i Nizam, who arrived in May 1902 with a small force of cavalry and artillery. Yamin-i Nizam not only took over Hishmat al-Mulk’s key functions as march-ward, but also stirred up intrigues in the hope of wresting the governorship from him. The British, meanwhile, pressed ahead with an imposing new consulate in Sistan and a branch of the Imperial Bank of Persia. The consulate eventually covered an area roughly 400 yards long and 300 yards wide, surrounded by a wall eight feet high and two feet thick.66 The compound included an impressive entrance gate, consulate buildings, treasury, hospital, observatory, guest house, caravanserai, warehouses, shop, stables,

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and quarters for the hospital staff, clerks and for the married men of the escort.67 A public dispensary was erected nearby and was soon treating more than 12,000 patients a year. The number of Indian firms established in Sistan increased from one to eight and were grouped together in a British bazaar. After receiving reports from Chenevix Trench that the Russian bank might expand into Sistan, Hardinge approached the IBP’s manager about opening a branch there. Noting the IBP’s opinion that the venture would not be profitable, Hardinge claimed that the British government must ‘either (1) acquiesce in the economic control of Seistan by Russia, or (2) be prepared to make it worth the while of the English Bank to open there by subsidizing its local agency’.68 In May 1903 the IBP agreed to proceed upon receipt of an annual government subsidy of £1,500 for five years. The branch opened in late 1903 at a temporary location in the British consulate and a year later moved to its new premises, which Consul A. D. Macpherson described as ‘the first substantial building in Seistan to be constructed on modern scientific principles and with beams for the roof instead of domes’.69 The Irano-Afghan border dispute in Sistan occasioned further British intervention. The Treaty of Paris (1857), which had ended the Second Anglo-Persian War, recognized Britain as arbiter in frontier questions between Iran and Afganistan. In 1872 a British Commission led by Colonel Frederic Goldsmid designated the Hilmand River as the boundary between the two countries in Sistan, but in the succeeding 30 years the river had split into two branches, causing new controversies as to the location of the frontier and irrigation rights.70 In 1902 the Iranians requested British arbitration, and a mission under Colonel Henry McMahon reached Sistan in February 1903, remaining until May 1905.71 In addition to delimiting the frontier, the commission actively advanced British influence. Its size was huge: 1,450 men, including 11 British officers, 250 infantry and cavalry, carpenters, blacksmiths, masons and other support personnel, as well as 150 horses and 2,200 camels.72 The large escort caused the Iranians much anxiety and the British made use of this leverage. For more than two years the commission criss-crossed Sistan, surveying, measuring water levels, collecting statistics about agricultural production and land use and finally erecting boundary pillars. Supplying such a large number of men and animals required considerable involvement in local affairs, which from McMahon’s point of view represented

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a blow to Russian prestige in these parts, for we are very inconveniently en evidence here in every way, and not in one part of Seistan only, but all over it and round it. Our officers wander promiscuously about [. . .] while our officials and men are more or less in quiet occupation of all important Seistan villages, collecting grain, grinding flour, directing labour, controlling firms, and to all outward appearance running the country. The country, too, seems to like it, which must annoy Miller.73 On the eve of his departure in May 1903 Consul Benn, like McMahon, was confident. Reflecting on two years in Sistan, he maintained that ‘the situation may be looked on as a satisfactory one. Our trade, small though it may be, has increased, our prestige is at its highest, we enjoy the confidence of the people, and the superiority of our interests is admitted.’74 This optimism, however, was misplaced. Curzon himself was sceptical about these glowing reports, and immediately after taking over from Benn, Henry Dobbs, a political officer recruited from the Indian Civil Service, offered a radically different assessment of the situation: I have not cared to say in an official letter, so soon after assuming charge, how extraordinarily weak, and even humiliating, our position here seems to be, in spite of the imposing new Consulate and the Arbitration Camp. Our prestige may seem bright. But the application of the touchstone of results shows that it is nothing but alloy.75 Seldom does one find imperial fantasy so unceremoniously exploded. ‘The fact is’, Dobbs continued, ‘that Miller has become an absolute obsession to every one in the country, both Native and European: and before any one does anything, his first thought is “what will Miller do?”.’ A practical demonstration of Miller’s methods was soon forthcoming. On 26 June 1903 an anti-British riot broke out in Nusratabad.76 About 100 agitators, incited by rumours, allegedly disseminated by Russian agents, that McMahon’s commission was buying up and burning grain in order to raise prices, threatened Indian merchants against further purchases and proceeded to Hishmat al-Mulk’s residence. They insisted on the expulsion of the commission and all Indian troops from Sistan.

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Dobbs rode through the crowd and demanded the summary beating of the ringleaders, warning Hishmat al-Mulk that if he did not comply, McMahon’s escort would occupy Nusratabad to protect British lives and property. Fearing more violence and Russian criticism, Hishmat alMulk vacillated, but soon capitulated, flogging six of the accused and deploying his troops to guard the British consulate and bazaar. Dobbs claimed that Miller had promised to protect the agitators from punishment and, after failing to do so, announced that he would secure the governor’s removal from Sistan. Dobbs countered by personally guaranteeing to Hishmat al-Mulk that Britain would not allow him to be deposed for carrying out his duties and defending British lives and property. When, therefore, in November 1903, the charge´ d’affaires, Evelyn Grant Duff, learned that the Iranian government would soon dismiss Hishmat al-Mulk, Lansdowne instructed him to caution Mushir al-Dawlah that Hishmat al-Mulk’s removal might make it difficult to withdraw the boundary commission and its sizeable escort from Sistan.77 Mushir al-Dawlah regretted that the British would interfere in the selection of shah’s governors but yielded in January 1904.78 The British had apparently saved Hishmat al-Mulk yet again. The new premier, ‘Abd al-Majid Mirza ‘Ayn al-Dawlah, soon summoned the governors, including Hishmat al-Mulk, to Tehran to discuss provincial reforms. Hishmat al-Mulk left Sistan for the capital in March 1904. By late September rumours were again circulating that he would be deposed and his family deprived of their governorship.79 From India, Curzon fumed: In the event of the present anti-British policy in Seistan being persisted in by the Persian Government, it might with advantage be intimated to them that we would not be disposed in the future to take active measures as we have done in the past, with a view to increasing, on behalf of the Persian Government, our influence with the maritime and frontier chiefs, over whom the Persian Government have even now found the maintenance of their direct control a matter of difficulty.80 The Iranian government resisted British bullying on this occasion. But by January 1905 the situation had reached an impasse and the British began considering alternative arrangements in Sistan. Grant Duff and

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McMahon observed that even if they secured Hishmat al-Mulk’s continuance in office, his ability to aid them had now been severely compromised. ‘If, therefore, we can get a quid pro quo’, Hardinge confided to Lansdowne, ‘I would sacrifice Hashmat as Governor of Seistan, but I think’, he noted casuistically, ‘we ought to make an effort, in view of Dobbs’ promises to him, to prevent him being a personal loser.’81 Curzon, too, was willing to abandon the amir if Tehran appointed him to another governorship and offered a written pledge that the selection of his successor would be subject to British approval.82 Lansdowne complained that this volte-face by the pro-Hishmat lobby placed the British government in an awkward position and referred the matter to the prime minister, Arthur Balfour, for possible discussion by the Committee of Imperial Defence.83 Hishmat al-Mulk, however, was determined to retain power and took matters into his own hands. He readily understood the importance of pishkish (cash presents) to the shah and his ministers. Lacking funds, he asked the IBP for a short-term loan of £2,000 in January 1905.84 The bank required a legation guarantee for repayment and Hishmat al-Mulk accordingly approached Hardinge. The amir, however, was not content to wait upon British deliberations. Hardinge was astonished to learn several days later that Hishmat al-Mulk no longer required the money and was subsequently less surprised to discover that the loan had been provided by the Russian bank.85 Upon receiving this news, a Foreign Office official remarked incredulously: ‘Is the Hashmat now to become a Russian prote´ge´? If so we shall be expected to oppose his return to Seistan. It is rather bewildering.’86 The Committee of Imperial Defence took up the issue and, in March, Lansdowne indicated that Britain would not persist in its demand for Hishmat al-Mulk to be governor of Sistan and disclaimed any ‘responsibility for the appointment of his successor’.87 It is not clear whether Hishmat al-Mulk was aware of the withdrawal of British support. He nonetheless possessed considerable political skills and sufficiently deep pockets to procure his position in April 1905.88 Considering the annual tax revenue of Sistan amounted to some £25,000, Hardinge explained that Hishmat al-Mulk’s payment of £20,000 to the shah and his ministers was not a bad investment. Following the death of his half-brother, Amir Isma‘il Khan Shawkat al-Mulk (I), in March 1905, Hishmat al-Mulk set his sights on the

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governorship of Qa’inat, as had his youngest half-brother, Amir Muhammad Ibrahim Khan Shawkat al-Mulk (II).89 Hishmat al-Mulk asked the legation to guarantee an IBP loan of £900.90 Hardinge now condemned the applicant as ‘treacherous, weak, and besotted by excessive indulgence in opium’, but he supported the proposal, hoping it would prevent Hishmat al-Mulk from again soliciting the Russians.91 Hishmat al-Mulk would soon return to Sistan ‘whether we give him further help or not’, the minister commented dryly, ‘and we may as well get the credit of his restoration’. If he failed to cooperate, the British would have little trouble encouraging his local enemies ‘to denounce him to the Shah, [and] paralyze much of his ability for mischief’. Ironically, it was precisely this policy that the Russians had pursued with so much success in Sistan since 1900. The guarantee was immediately approved.92 In fact, Hishmat al-Mulk never returned to Sistan. His campaign to obtain Qa’inat from Shawkat al-Mulk (II) kept him in Tehran for another three years. In November 1908 he arrived in Birjand, the capital of Qa’inat, to continue the struggle and governed Sistan by proxy through his sons, Amir Ma‘sum Khan and Sartip Muhammad Riza Khan.

Banks, telegraphs and quarantines Victorious in the Hishmat al-Mulk affair, the Russians kept up the pressure in Sistan. Miller’s successor, G. V. Ovseyenko, was an experienced officer who had previously served in Bushihr. The Russian bank’s considerably more liberal lending policies provided him with significant financial influence. He used Hishmat al-Mulk’s loans as leverage with his sons.93 The Russian bank also operated a commercial retail business. Its agents advanced Russian goods on credit, putting many Sistanis in its debt.94 In addition, Russian officials gained control of the Mashhad–Sistan telegraph line. The Iranians had constructed the line in 1903 as a condition of the Russian loan of 1902 and allowed Russian and British signallers to use it.95 In November 1905 Consul Macpherson reported that a Persian telegraph official in Mashhad had given funds to a Russian inspector to repair the line.96 A month later he discovered that the funds had been disbursed not by Iranian authorities, but by the Russian consul general in Mashhad.97 Russian officials were thereafter responsible for the maintenance of the line and issued orders to the Persian signallers.98 In September 1906 the Russians cut and

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diverted the line through their new telegraph office in Sistan, thus providing them access to all messages sent or received at the Iranian telegraph office at Nusratabad, including British traffic.99 British consular telegrams were encrypted, but the situation was far from ideal. To make matters worse, the 1902 loan agreement obliged the shah not to permit the British to link Sistan with India via the IETD Central Persian Line or the Indian telegraph terminus at Robat, only 70 miles away in British Baluchistan.100 In these circumstances, the outbreak of plague in Sistan in January 1906 could not fail to take on significance for the Anglo-Russian rivalry. Quarantines invariably involved control over the movement of people and goods as well as over local administration, and the British were anxious to minimize Russian involvement.101 The source of the plague was not immediately clear, but the first cases were reported in isolated villages in the swamps of the Hilmand River around Nusratabad. A local sanitary council quickly formed.102 Its members included Ihtisham alVizarah, who had arrived in December 1905 to investigate charges that Yamin-i Nizam had accepted British bribes; British and Russian consuls; L. Molitor, the Belgian customs director; Dr Zaplotynski, the Russian consulate physician; and Shaykh Ahmad, the British consulate hospital assistant. The council established a military cordon around the infected villages and sent Shaykh Ahmad to distribute prophylactics and supervise the disinfection of persons and property.103 That the sanitary council included several foreigners and officials from Tehran, but not a single member of Hishmat al-Mulk’s family, was indicative of the changes that had occurred in Sistan in the last decade. The ulama were also unrepresented. Macpherson argued presciently that their support would be necessary for the successful implementation of the sanitary procedures, but this proposal was rejected by Persian officials, who maintained that the ulama’s inclusion would only encourage their interference. The British and Russians, meanwhile, battled for control of the anti-plague measures. Zaplotynski was the only European physician in Sistan, and Macpherson created an executive subcommittee to prevent him from assuming sole charge of medical arrangements.104 Molitor also became frustrated with Zaplotynski’s grandstanding at council meetings and cooperated with Macpherson to marginalize the Russian doctor by limiting the body’s sittings. In addition to this local politicking, Macpherson secured the services of

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Dr Clemenger from the IETD and Captain J. B. Kelly and several hospital assistants from the Indian Medical Service, who assumed the administration of the posts on three main roads leading east, west and north from Sistan.105 By March, nevertheless, the disease had spread to Nusratabad itself, and Molitor erected shelters for the segregation of the sick next to the British consulate hospital outside the city.106 The ulama criticized this measure and the examination of female patients. Several days later, on 27 March 1906, a large crowd protested an attempt by a Persian customs official to examine a sick woman.107 When he tried to force her into quarantine, the crowd burned down the quarantine sheds. Macpherson and Kelly proceeded to the scene and were unceremoniously pelted with mud before retreating to the walled consulate. The demonstrators then stormed and ransacked the adjacent British hospital. Quarantine and sanitary measures were suspended.108 The deputy governor, Amir Ma‘sum Khan, remained outside the city. British traders were assaulted, shops closed and trade suspended. Macpherson likened Nusratabad to a ‘city of the dead’.109 Fearing more disturbances, Macpherson reinforced the consulate guard and in May he proposed to occupy Nusratabad with Indian troops. Grey, however, rejected the idea, insisting that the ‘the odium for punishing riots’ should fall on Iranian, not British, authorities.110 On the night of 10 July several Sistanis scaled the consulate walls, assaulted British employees and then fled as the escort assembled.111 India urged that the British escort in Sistan be increased from 20 to 30 cavalry to match the Russians, and recommended that the consulate be supplied with 30 more rifles and 28,000 rounds of ammunition.112 Grey directed that the arms be transported discreetly to Nusratabad by the escort reinforcement.113 On 5 August 1906 Indian soldiers crossed the frontier with the weapons, ignoring customs’ demands to halt for inspection. Lt C. T. Daukes, who had taken over from Macpherson in June, admitted that the troops had ‘deliberately forced’ the customs.114 When the Iranians protested in London, the Foreign Office noted dismissively that ‘neither the impotence of the Persian Government to afford protection, nor their refusal to allow the importation of a small number of rifles, should be allowed to endanger the Consulate, and the arms were consequently brought in’.115 The British also sought to identify and punish the leaders of the attack on the hospital. Local sources asserted that the riot was principally

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aimed against the Belgians, and Macpherson speculated that Amir Ma‘sum Khan might have encouraged the agitation against customs, which had for several years steadily encroached on his family’s power and prerogatives. The incident also demonstrated how closely the British had become associated with the unpopular quarantine. Macpherson acknowledged that the sanitary procedures, as often happened in India, angered the Sistanis. But his strongest suspicions fell on the Russians, who, he argued, had directed popular dissatisfaction against the British to ‘lessen our influence and deprive us of the virtual control of the antiplague measures which, previous to the disturbances, bade fair to pass into our hands’.116 He claimed that four of the six ringleaders were well-known agents of the Russian bank, and in August the British sought their banishment for life from Sistan.117 The Persian authorities, however, were reluctant to punish men of such considerable local influence and popularity.118 Daukes himself was sceptical about Russian complicity and understood that Iranians often took advantage of the Anglo-Russian rivalry for their own ends. One of the accused, Mulla Muhammad Taqi, had publicly declared that the Russians would defend him, and it was crucial for the British to demonstrate that a Russian connection did not confer immunity.119 The Russians, on the other hand, although anxious to refute allegations of their involvement in the March disturbances, were not prepared to allow the British to secure the deportation of individuals who were widely considered to be under Russian protection. The deadlock in Sistan was broken in early December 1906, but not in the manner in which local actors anticipated. British and Russian diplomats had begun negotiations for settlement of their Asian rivalry in June in St Petersburg, and on 3 October 1906 the legation instructed all consular officers to maintain good relations with their Russian colleagues.120 In December, Daukes acknowledged that it was no longer prudent to press for the punishment of the rioters. Referring to the four ringleaders, he observed that ‘there can be little doubt that their deportation if secured by us would not tend to improve the relations existing between the two Consulates, moreover, the punishment of an offence of this nature months after the event can have little effect and would probably excite local ill-feeling’.121 In February 1907 the legation agreed to drop the demand for punishment in lieu of £100 compensation and an apology and, in April, Consul R. L. Kennion reached a settlement

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along these lines.122 The Anglo-Russian Convention ended the AngloRussian rivalry in Sistan.

The Anglo-Russian Convention and Southern Iran The debate as to who gained the most from this arrangement began even before the convention was signed. It was immediately clear that the Persians were the principal losers. The Anglo-Russian rapprochement undermined a cornerstone of Iranian diplomacy, which was to play British and Russian interests against each other. That this new-found imperial cooperation would have dire consequences for Iran was demonstrated by the contents of the convention itself, and worse was yet to come. By confirming their ascendancy in the north, the convention made the Qajar alliance less important to the Russians, especially as the dynasty’s authority was unravelling during the Constitutional Revolution.123 Russia’s interest in preserving order in its sphere soon provided the pretext for military intervention and threats to occupy Tehran. The Russian sphere, as Curzon noted in the House of Lords, also encompassed the most populated and economically developed regions of the country.124 The convention nevertheless acknowledged publicly what British strategists had conceded privately since the 1890s: Britain could not compete politically, militarily or economically with Russia in the north. The division of southern Iran into neutral and British spheres appeared to be a radical departure from traditional British policy. India had wanted a larger British sphere. In summer 1906 the viceroy, Lord Minto, had pressed for a Curzonian line from Birjand to the Ottoman frontier at Khanaqin.125 However, that November Grey instructed Nicolson to pursue the smaller sphere covering the western approaches to India. This decision accorded with the resolutions of the interdepartmental committee of 1902 that Britain only had enough troops to hold Sistan, Bandar-i ‘Abbas and some gulf islands, should Russia occupy the north. Yet such realism was not the whole story. Ironically, Grey and his colleagues did not realize that before 1907, British influence was far better established in the south-west than the south-east in terms of commerce, communications, consuls, military power, Russian competition and the cooperation of local notables. The neutral zone was actually more British than was the British sphere.

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British consuls used commerce as a measuring stick of British influence and although their statistics were problematic, the nominal value of trade between the three main ports of the neutral sphere, Bushihr, Muhammarah and Bandar-i Lingah, and the British Empire was almost three-and-a-half times greater than that of Bandar-i ‘Abbas and Sistan. Between 1889 and 1907 this figure for the neutral sphere was £34.4 million, averaging £1.8 million annually, while for the British sphere it was £9.7 million, averaging £511,000 annually.126 Curzon’s political officers had devoted much effort to developing the new caravan route from Quetta to Nusratabad, but the results were not impressive. Between 1898 and 1907, the value of total overland trade with Sistan averaged a paltry £42,000 per annum, which was only one-tenth of that with Bandar-i ‘Abbas over the same period.127 Indeed, the weakness of Britain’s economic position in Sistan was underscored by the fact that the local branch of the IBP, even with its annual subsidy, continued to operate at a net loss until 1908.128 British officers at Bushihr also enjoyed far superior communications than did their colleagues in Sistan. There was a British-Indian post office at the port, and the subsidized mail steamers that sailed weekly to and from Bombay were much more efficient than overland postal services between Quetta and Sistan. In terms of telegraphs, Bushihr was far better situated than Sistan. It was not only linked by the IETD landline with Tehran, but also by British submarine cables to India and to the Ottoman network at al-Faw, near the entrance of the Shatt al-‘Arab. Sistan, by contrast, was only connected by a single telegraph line north to Mashhad, which was under Russian control after 1906. With Russian backing, Iranian authorities refused several British requests to link Sistan with India. Consequently, British consuls at Nusratabad were obliged to send couriers to Robat to deliver and receive messages to and from India. This awkward arrangement continued even after 1907. Anxious to exclude Russia from Britain’s sphere, Nicolson proposed to exchange the IETD’s Tehran– Mashhad line for the Sistan– Mashhad line. The British subsequently restricted their demand to a shorter section from Sistan to Khvaf, in the neutral zone, and in late August 1907 Nicolson and Izvolsky agreed to approach Tehran regarding the transfer.129 Anglo-Russian suspicions in eastern Iran, however, proved difficult to overcome and the exchange never took place, leaving British consuls in the heart of the British sphere in the embarrassing position of

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being dependent on a Russian telegraph line.130 The Nusratabad –Robat telegraph was constructed only in November 1914, because of World War I.131 Britain was also far more capable of military intervention at Bushihr than at Sistan. British naval forces dominated the Persian Gulf and could quickly deploy troops anywhere on the Iranian coastline, under cover of the ships’ guns. British warships could also go up the Shatt al-‘Arab to Muhammarah and shallow-draught gunboats could reach Ahvaz. To be sure, landing parties could not remain ashore indefinitely nor press inland without reinforcements and supplies, but gunboat diplomacy provided the consul general at Bushihr with considerable power towards local governors. In Sistan, British military assets were less formidable. The proximity of the Indian frontier caused Muzaffar al-Din Shah and his officials great concern about Britain’s intentions in Sistan, which the Russians skilfully manipulated. The reality was, however, that Sistan was separated from the closest major Indian Army base at Quetta by a 600-mile desert caravan route. The guard houses protecting the caravan route were garrisoned by small numbers of Baluchi levies. Food, forage and water for these posts were difficult to obtain. The 200 Indian infantry stationed at Robat in February 1906 were dependent on Sistan for grain, and by July 30 per cent of the men were reported ‘hors de combat’ on account of dysentery and fever caused by contaminated water supplies.132 These logistical difficulties made it difficult to maintain a permanent frontier garrison in British Baluchistan large enough to intimidate the Iranians or Russians in Sistan. An expeditionary force could certainly be supplied locally in Sistan, but occupation posed its own problems. In addition to these commercial, telegraphic and military advantages, Britain’s consular establishment in Bushihr and the neutral zone was of longer standing and better developed than in Sistan and the British sphere. British representation in Bushihr dated back to 1778, whereas the permanent British consulate in Sistan was not opened until April 1900, more than a decade after the establishment of the vice-consulate at Muhammarah. By August 1907 there were four British consulates in the neutral zone compared to three posts in the British sphere.133 The neutral sphere was also better integrated than its neighbour, with the officers at Muhammarah, Ahvaz and Shiraz all reporting to the consul general at Bushihr. Consular jurisdiction in the British sphere, by

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contrast, was divided, with Bandar-i ‘Abbas, Kirman and the Makran coast still under Bushihr, leaving Sistan in official communication with these three posts via Tehran or India. In addition, British officers at Bushihr were more senior, experienced and typically enjoyed longer tenures than their colleagues in Sistan, where the turnover of consular personnel was rapid. Before the convention, Russian political competition had been far more intense in Sistan and the south-east than in Bushihr and the southwest. In the whole of what would become the neutral sphere, Russia was represented by a single consul general at Bushihr, established in September 1901, more than 120 years after his British counterpart. As Captain Indrenius attested, Russia would have to work hard to overcome Britain’s entrenched position along the gulf littoral. By contrast, there were three Russian consulates in the British sphere, at Sistan, Kirman and Bandar-i ‘Abbas. The most important of these posts, Sistan, was opened two months before the first permanent British officer arrived in Nusratabad, ensuring a sharp Anglo-Russian contest there. Working with karguzars and other officials, Russian consuls rendered British activities in south-eastern Persia visible to the shah and his ministers in Tehran. Relying on effective support in Mashhad and Tehran, Vice Consul Miller proved a formidable adversary. British allegations against him were numerous: encouraging Perso-Afghan irrigation and frontier disputes, facilitating the Russian bank’s attempted purchase of Sistan’s revenue grain, pressing customs to obstruct British trade and inciting anti-British riots. Ascertaining the truth of these charges is difficult, but British officers in Sistan were clearly far more anxious about Russian intrigues than their colleagues in Bushihr and far less confident about their ability to counter them. Indeed, the tone of many a British report from Sistan was shrill in denouncing Russian plots against Britain’s asserted, but as yet unproven, claims to political ascendancy in the region. Popular opposition to British activity in Sistan was immediately explained away as Russian conspiracies. Clashes over the Sistan– Mashhad telegraph and the quarantine indicated that from the British perspective, the situation had reached a stalemate by late 1906. Important Russian officials were opposed to abandoning Sistan to the British in the convention.134 ‘I imagine that the views of the military party, and of other Chauvins’, Nicolson explained to Grey after a meeting with Izvolsky in November

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1906, ‘is that Russia has secured a preliminary footing in Seistan, which she hopes to render firmer as time goes on, and that she is thereby obtaining an admirable strategic position from which she should not recede.’135 Finally, British connections with local notables were closer and more profitable in the neutral zone than in the British zone. The most interesting comparison in this respect is between Shaykh Khaz‘al and Hishmat al-Mulk. Both men were hereditary governors of important frontier provinces, with whom the British desired friendly relations. Nevertheless, Britain increasingly valued and strengthened its friendship with Khaz‘al, while British estimation of and support for Hishmat al-Mulk progressively deteriorated. This situation was caused by two main factors. First, the shaykh’s stronger local position made him a more attractive prote´ge´ than the amir. As the uncontested chief of the Arab tribes of south-western Iran, Khaz‘al possessed considerable political and military resources. In 1908 the residency claimed the shaykh had mustered 30,000 men to suppress a tribal revolt, a figure that is too high, but nonetheless indicative of his authority.136 As Consul L. Haworth remarked in 1913, ‘The Shaikh though an autocratic ruler rules on patriarchal lines and his power lies in the support and approval of his people.’137 As long as he commanded their allegiance, his dependants allowed Khaz‘al considerable autonomy from Tehran, which had little choice but to acknowledge him as governor of Muhammarah. Hishmat al-Mulk, by contrast, was not a tribal leader. The power of the Khuzaymah ‘Alam family in Sistan and Qa’inat was based upon centuries-old ‘historical entitlement to the amirdom recognized by the central power’, which was enhanced by local political acumen and Baluchi marriage alliances, buttressed by land and irrigation ownership.138 Indeed, Hishmat al-Mulk enjoyed more autonomy than most other governors, but unlike Khaz‘al, his authority remained a function of the shah’s favour, and as such was subject to forces beyond his control. The British frequently compared the two men; in 1905, Hardinge summed up their relative weight and utility as follows: The Hashmat ul Mulk’s importance to us has always appeared to me to have been overrated by our successive Consuls in Seistan, for apart from the fact that he is personally a weak ruler, the maintenance of his authority depends so entirely upon the good

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will of the British Government that he is incapable of pursuing a really independent policy to our advantage. A Chief like the Sheikh of Mohammerah is a valuable ally, and I would go any lengths in supporting him, because locally he is stronger than the Shah, and cannot easily be unseated by him. But no finger would be raised in Seistan or Kain to prevent the deposition by a Tehran official of either the Hashmat or the Shaukat ul Mulk.139 The second factor affecting relations with these notables was Britain’s local standing in Arabistan and Sistan, which determined what British officers could offer or demand from their potential prote´ge´s. The British provided the shaykh with substantial benefits, including naval protection and its political concomitant, autonomy from Tehran, as well as a share of the financial rewards arising from the economic development of the Karun. In return, they asked for a privileged place in the political and commercial life of southern Arabistan and basic security for trade. Hishmat al-Mulk’s aims were similar to Khaz‘al’s, namely, the retention of his governorship, the consolidation of his local influence and the extension of his authority into Qa’inat, at the expense of his halfbrothers. The major threat to Hishmat al-Mulk’s position was his deposition by the shah in favour of one of his brothers. Britain’s most valuable service in this regard would be effective diplomatic assistance in Tehran, facilitated by consular mediation, the quid pro quo being, as in Arabistan, local political and commercial pre-eminence. The problem for British consuls and diplomats was that they did not have a monopoly of foreign influence either in Sistan or Tehran. Miller’s charges that Hishmat al-Mulk was aiding and abetting British encroachment in Sistan, delivered with the full weight of the Russian legation, undermined Muzaffar al-Din Shah’s confidence in the amir. Although relatively new to the Great Game, Hishmat al-Mulk learned quickly, and understood, like the Qajars themselves, that the key to survival was to avoid absolute identification with either power and to use his position to play off the interests of Britain and Russia against each other. Borrowing money from the Russian bank was a prudent tactic. Not only did it generate immediate funds needed to keep hold of Sistan, but it also softened Russia’s attitude toward him, helped to diminish his damaging pro-British reputation, and at the same time pushed Hardinge to guarantee an IBP loan to him, lest he turn completely to the Russians.

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Hishmat al-Mulk’s political artistry did not endear him to British officials, who henceforth viewed him with suspicion. Shaykh Khaz‘al, by contrast, continued a firm British friend. This outcome, however, was less a product of greater mutual trust and more the result of a different political environment. Khaz‘al possessed an independent tribal power base, which Hishmat al-Mulk did not. Russian political influence, moreover, was practically non-existent in Arabistan, and while the shaykh alluded to a potential Russian threat, he was effectively denied the opportunity afforded to Hishmat al-Mulk of manipulating AngloRussian antagonisms for his own benefit. British officials appreciated that their assistance offered the shaykh the best means of attaining his ends, and consequently provided assurances sufficient to secure his cooperation but not enough to satisfy him fully.

The British sphere of influence Given the relative fragility of British influence on the ground in Sistan compared with Bushihr, the recognition of the former as the focal point of the British sphere in south-eastern Iran was a significant accomplishment. The Anglo-Russian Convention was a British victory, providing strategic security for India and diplomatic flexibility in Europe. The arrangement was not, however, a stable one. As Russia regained its strength after disaster in the Far East and revolution at home, its interest in maintaining the agreement accordingly diminished.140 What both Grey and Curzon failed to appreciate was that in Sistan, Britain had gained what its consuls had failed to secure locally, and further, that because the neutral zone was the real centre of British influence in southern Iran, Russia stood little chance of making significant new inroads there. With the south-east secured against the Russians, the British Empire could turn its full attention to shoring up its already robust political and economic position in Arabistan, Fars and the Persian Gulf coast. After 1907, the British would devote their resources to consolidating the neutral zone, with Sistan safely isolated and ignored in the British sphere. Political developments within Iran, however, made the publication of the convention very problematic. Disillusionment with Qajar abuses and the widespread conviction that the shah was selling Iran to foreigners and imperilling Islam had led, by August 1906, to a revolution and the establishment of a constitutional monarchy and a national parliament,

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the Majlis. The revolutionaries looked to Britain for support and several thousand of them had taken bast (sanctuary) in the British legation in July 1906, to press their demands for a constitution. The revolution was accompanied by the rapid development of political consciousness, a vibrant and prolific Persian-language press and, ultimately, the making of modern Iranian nationalism. In April 1907 Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, the British minister in Tehran, who had not been consulted as to the terms of the agreement, warned Grey of the resentment that the convention was likely to produce among the increasingly politicized Iranian population: I consider it my duty to point out to you what, indeed, is evident, and has already been repeatedly brought to your notice, that public opinion in Persia will be deeply stirred by what will be regarded as a partition of the Empire, and a claim to exercise control over the sovereign rights of the State, and that a great impetus will at once be given to the already existing anti-foreign sentiment, which has hitherto been kept in control, though with constantly increasing difficulty; and I also beg to add that there is reason to fear that this feeling will be all the more bitter against England in proportion to the hopes which have been centred in her, and the belief in her friendly sentiments and sympathy, which have so long prevailed, especially among the popular classes, who have looked to the Liberal Government of England to protect them against the encroachments of Russian autocracy.141 Spring-Rice’s assessment was correct. Persian newspapers denounced the Anglo-Russian Convention as a violation of national sovereignty and independence, and for many Iranians the agreement was a British betrayal.142 Thenceforth, the British made strenuous efforts to try and manage the forces of revolution within the new AngloRussian framework.

PART II CONSULS AND REVOLUTION, 1905—1915

CHAPTER 4 THE REVOLUTIONARY VORTEX: IDEOLOGY, FACTION AND EMPIRE

Even after the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, consuls and political officers in the south remained suspicious of the Russians and were determined to secure the neutral zone for Britain. The Iranian Constitutional Revolution greatly complicated these efforts. British officers became surprised and alarmed by an ‘oriental’ land undergoing revolutionary transformations. Not only did the revolution intensify elite conflicts in the Qajar borderlands, but it also unleashed new political forces that the British, bound to an older information order, found it very difficult to comprehend or control. They felt a deep ambivalence towards the revolution and had a growing sense that its resulting disorders threatened British interests. Although they had hoped to remain neutral in the clash between constitutionalists and royalists, their imperial anxieties drew them inexorably deeper into the complex and changing politics of southern Iran. Most accounts of the Constitutional Revolution focus on events in Tehran, Tabriz and northern Iran. Less attention has been paid to revolutionary movements and political developments in the south or to British intervention there. In 1905, however, constitutional movements emerged in Bushihr and Shiraz and unrest continued until the overthrow of Muhammad ‘Ali Shah in July 1909. Merchants in Bushihr protested new customs regulations and demonstrators in Shiraz demanded the dismissal of Shu‘a‘ al-Saltanah, governor general of Fars, and took bast in

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the British consulate to force Tehran’s hand. The ensuing struggle between the royalists and constitutionalists troubled Consul General Cox, who increasingly feared revolutionary instability, and in April 1909 he ordered British troops to seize control of Bushihr from Tangastani militias. These difficulties help to explain why Cox and his colleagues were especially keen to strengthen ties with Shaykh Khaz‘al. The shaykh offered the British an oasis of political stability and economic opportunity in the Karun valley in return for protection against interference, either constitutionalist or royalist, with his autonomy. Given their growing concerns in the neutral zone, British officials were understandably relieved by the suspension of their rivalry with the Russians in Sistan after 1907, and did little to consolidate their south-eastern sphere of influence. However, continuing disorder on the Bushihr– Shiraz road and in Fars drew the British into the violent, personal and tribal conflicts between Qavam al-Mulk’s Khamsah and Sawlat al-Dawlah’s Qashqa’i confederacies. Keeping the road open was vital to maintaining Britain’s position in the neutral zone and preventing Russian penetration. Indian cavalry entered Shiraz in late 1911, and British officials in Iran, London and India nervously struggled to find a policy that would ensure their ascendancy in the neutral zone without incurring the burdens of territorial empire.

Revolution in Bushihr and Shiraz The constitutional movement in Bushihr began in 1905 as a commercial agitation against new customs regulations, the Re`glement Douanier, promulgated by Joseph Naus the previous August.1 These rules set forth procedures for determining and paying duty on imports and exports, handling and storing goods at customs warehouses, as well as prosecuting and punishing fraud and smuggling. Persian and British merchants considered some of these regulations utterly unsuitable for the gulf trade. Especially irksome were the heavy fines laid down in Article 99 for incorrect declaration of cargo landed from ocean-going steamers. Landing goods at Bushihr from distant offshore anchorages was complicated by storms, lack of lighters and tight sailing schedules and, as a result, cargo was commonly carried on to the next port, a violation resulting in penalties for inaccurate customs declarations. In late April 1905, 43 leading Bushihri merchants signed an agreement

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pledging to oppose the Re`glement Douanier and if necessary to boycott customs by refusing to clear their goods – a direct challenge to the state and its financial stability.2 After consulting their Persian colleagues, British merchants approached Cox.3 They criticized the Belgian director general’s discretionary power in levying fines and called for the formation of a committee, composed of the director general, the consul general, and a European and an Iranian merchant, to decide such cases. The Persian merchants meanwhile made good on their threat, boycotting customs in the second week of May.4 They appealed directly to Muzaffar al-Din Shah and ‘Ayn al-Dawlah and telegraphed their associates in Shiraz, Isfahan and Yazd for assistance. The Shirazis replied two weeks later that they had also suspended business and that their colleagues in Tehran had taken bast in the Shah ‘Abd al-‘Azim shrine. In June, customs agreed to suspend the Re`glement Douanier and to investigate the Bushihris’ complaints. In Shiraz, meanwhile, a broader and more serious popular agitation, which Consul Grahame later referred to as a ‘premonitory signal’ of the Constitutional Revolution, was directed against Shu‘a‘ al-Saltanah, the governor general of Fars, and his vizier, Sardar Akram. The prince’s domineering style and his penchant for appropriating various properties, including the Bazaar-i Vakil, had, as in 1902, provoked opposition among many elements in Fars, including landowners, ulama, merchants and shop owners.5 Although briefly reconciled with Shu‘a‘ al-Saltanah in 1904, Qavam al-Mulk soon took charge of the campaign, and by October 1905 both he and the prince had again been summoned to the capital. Shu‘a‘ al-Saltanah, however, was still governor general and left Sardar Akram as his deputy during his absence. The agitations continued throughout November and December, fuelled by nightly meetings of mullas and merchants at the house of the leading Shirazi mujtahid, Mirza Ibrahim. The bazaars closed and thousands of demonstrators took bast at the Shah Chiragh shrine. They telegraphed numerous petitions to Tehran, including one in late December addressed to foreign representatives there protesting the prince’s ‘youthful pride, love of authority and extraordinary greed’, demanding his dismissal and threatening to abandon Shiraz and move elsewhere.6 According to Grahame, attacks on the Jewish quarter were expressions of communal antagonism and a strategy to force Tehran to address these grievances.7 The new karguzar, Nabil al-Saltanah, warned the foreign ministry that

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the disorders had spread from Shiraz to the countryside and the roads were closed.8 In early 1906, Bushihri merchants joined their colleagues in Shiraz by again refusing to clear goods from customs.9 In January 1906 Mirza Ibrahim asked Grahame if the British would protect the protestors if they took bast in the consulate.10 Grahame replied that he would respect the custom of bast, but he deprecated the step as rash and likely to anger the shah.11 While approving of Grahame’s language, Grey minuted incredulously about bast, ‘It is a most inconvenient practice – is it impossible to stop it?’12 The heads of 33 guilds then approached Grahame with the same objective and again he urged restraint. Four months later, on 9 June, their patience exhausted, some 300 to 400 leading Shirazis took sanctuary at the consulate and presented ten grievances to Grahame.13 It is not exactly clear what precipitated this move, but Salar al-Sultan, son of Qavam alMulk, had just been summoned to the capital, where his father’s position was perilous. The Qavams’ partisans telegraphed Tehran urging their return as the only way to spare Fars from British military intervention.14 Grahame intercepted a telegram, through the IETD, from one of Shu‘a‘ al-Saltanah’s agents alleging that the Qavams were behind the bast.15 Despite Grahame’s repeated requests, the protestors did not leave the consulate until 21 June, after securing the dismissal of Shu‘a‘ al-Saltanah and the appointment of ‘Ala’ al-Dawlah. British officials understood that the Shirazis had used Grahame, bast and the consulate to force concessions from their own government.16 The scene would, of course, be repeated on a grander scale at the British legation in Tehran that summer. These incidents prompted London to instruct its representatives in Iran that ‘while maintaining the principle of asylum, [it] object[ed] to abuse of custom by making it [a] lever in political agitation in which Legation and Consulates should take no part’.17 The victory over the Re`glement Douanier in 1905, the protests in Shiraz and the shah’s granting of a Majlis in August 1906, demonstrated the effectiveness of organized popular opposition and loosed more volatile political forces in Bushihr. On 15 August 1906, a mulla named Sayyid Murtaza Ahrami started another agitation against customs. Sayyid Murtaza challenged the decree that coasting boats, including many Tangistani vessels, must be inspected at the customs wharf before proceeding to consignees’ warehouses. He led a general strike by the boatmen, pressing their demands and threatening to call armed

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Tangistanis to Bushihr. Roused by his rhetoric, crowds threw stones at the Belgian director general. The striking boatmen refused to man their lighters and British firms were unable to land cargo. Messrs Gray Paul and Company filed an official complaint with Cox. He took up the matter with the governor, Darya Baygi, who promised to obtain the necessary boats. Cox also worried about order in the town and security for British and foreign subjects. He warned Sayyid Murtaza to control his supporters and advised him to present his grievances to customs in a more decorous and constitutional manner. To the legation, Cox explained that the demonstration was ‘really an organised movement by the Mullah element against the Customs Administration generally, and the Tangastani matter was hardly more than a convenient pretext’.18 He was also apprehensive that the movement might spread throughout the gulf. Persian officials recognized that Britain might intervene. In September, the karguzar, Mirza ‘Ali Muhammad Khan Muvaqqar al-Dawlah, urged Darya Baygi to suppress any demonstration against customs and warned him that failure to do so might provoke the British to land sailors and marines from their warships in the harbour.19 The advent of constitutional government altered Bushihri politics. On 29 November 1906 Darya Baygi announced the formation of an anjuman (council) of merchants, mullas and artisans to conduct elections to the Majlis in Tehran and adjudicate local grievances.20 The anjuman was a focus of political life in constitutional Bushihr, but from the outset it was paralysed by factional disagreements over its composition, legitimacy and functions. Its proceedings were vigorous but rarely productive. It fell foul both of the governor and the ulama, who felt that the committee was usurping their respective executive and judicial prerogatives, and it was repeatedly prorogued. The anjuman’s internal disputes frequently spilled over into public quarrels. Abusive placards and broadsheets were posted on coffee shops and threatening anonymous letters thrown in windows. Meanwhile, local volunteer militias drilled, and what Cox termed ‘mushroom anjomans’ of various ideological and political complexions sprang up in Bushihr and all along the gulf coast.21 Many of these bodies, he noted, refused membership to anyone employed in a foreign consulate, thereby obstructing British access to the burgeoning constitutional information order. The inauguration of a free press further quickened the pace of local politics, extending the boundaries of political discourse and freely

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criticizing the governor and his officials, the Belgians, the ulama and rival parties. A reading room was opened in Bushihr in 1906– 7, and in 1913 Sadid al-Saltanah reported that it contained 280 Persian, 40 Arabic, 70 English and 60 French volumes.22 The press also targeted the British, particularly the Bushihri paper, Muzaffari, but Cox’s attempt in May 1908 to induce Darya Baygi to expel its editor was unsuccessful.23 One contentious issue was British protection of Bahrainis. Cox noted that although before the revolution Iranian officials had claimed Bahrainis as Persian subjects, they had accepted informal British representations on their behalf. He complained that: Since [the] institution of Parliament and [a] free Press, ignorant local officials inflated with nationalist sentiments and anti-foreign newspaper articles and often directly prompted by members of [the] Young Persian party and foreign agents lay themselves out to dispute our right to protect subjects of Bahrein and the Trucial Chiefs in Persia.24 Shirazi politics were even more contentious and violent. On 1 March 1907 Qavam al-Mulk returned from Tehran to a hero’s welcome.25 With the threat of Shu‘a‘ al-Saltanah no longer a major unifying force, Qavam al-Mulk’s coalition quickly disintegrated. By April, Grahame explained that three main factions had emerged in Shiraz: conservatives and landed proprietors under Qavam al-Mulk; moderates centred on the local assembly and supported by senior Shirazi clerics; and the more radical Anjuman-i Islami, composed of religious students and others who had pledged to defend freedom ‘with their lives and property’.26 The latter two groups doubted Qavam al-Mulk’s commitment to the constitution and suspected him of collaborating with Muhammad ‘Ali Shah, whose reactionary tendencies were becoming daily more manifest.27 Qavam alMulk confided to Grahame ‘his opinion that the whole of the popular movement in Persia is premature and in Fars it will lead to serious trouble’.28 On 30 March he was criticized in the Majlis for hampering elections in Shiraz.29 By June, he had abandoned the city for his estates and eventually Tehran. Tensions were further exacerbated by the arrival of Sayyid ‘Abd al-Husayn Lari, who together with Sawlat al-Dawlah, the Qashqa’i ilkhani, was committed to the destruction of the Qavams.30 By November 1907 skirmishes between the various parties were a

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nightly occurrence, and Grahame warned local authorities that they would be held responsible for any injury to British subjects.31 Shirazi merchants pressed their colleagues at Bushihr to suspend forwarding goods because of insecurity on the roads, and in February Cox reported that ‘the state of the trade-route to Shiraz and the interior is deplorable’.32 A brief truce was negotiated in mid-January and Qavam al-Mulk returned to Shiraz a month later.33 He was, however, assassinated on 7 March 1908, and Salar al-Sultan was then wounded at his father’s funeral.

Imperial anxieties British liberals may have publicly supported Persian constitutionalists, but Cox and other officials increasingly viewed the revolution as undermining good government and endangering imperial interests, an assessment with which Russian officials concurred.34 Following Muhammad ‘Ali Shah’s failed coup against the Majlis in December 1907, Cox quoted a leading Persian merchant, who lamented: I wanted a liberal government, but now I see that it is a failure for two reasons: firstly it has brought disrespect on myself and other merchants whereas formerly I was respected by all. Now every low class man in the town is free to lampoon me; secondly, this form of government has been in existence two years and it has become a cause of insecurity for our trade and of ruination of commerce.35 First Assistant Resident J. H. Bill agreed: The outburst of free criticism, in the form of Newspapers and pamphlets, which has been one of the principal results of the Constitutional agitation, is tending in the remoter districts of the Persian Coast to weaken the only centralising force still remaining, namely, the prestige of the Central Government.36 Tribal leaders did not fear an authority that allowed ‘such statements about itself to be scattered broadcast with impunity.’ The Government of India, which had much to fear from politics from below, offered an even more damning assessment, claiming in a military report on Iran that the ‘Revolution in Persia affords an excellent object-lesson on the

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character of the people, and shows up the lamentable lack, or at any rate the feebleness, of the popular spirit.’37 The Indian Army General Staff further maintained: Persians are an emotional people, quick to seize upon a new idea or doctrine and their subtle active brains render them peculiarly susceptible to the influence of any kind of sentimental or abstract teaching; hence a Persian crowd is easily manipulated by a demagogue. Such comments revealed not only a superficial appreciation of the complex changes occurring in revolutionary Persia, but also a growing imperial unease about being able to control events there. Meanwhile, insecurity along the Bushihr – Shiraz route was approaching a crisis, and Cox feared that Russian traders would take advantage of these problems to push their goods into the neutral zone from the north. What British and Persian interests required, Cox insisted, was not freedom but order. He and his colleagues did not necessarily equate ‘anarchy’ with a weak central state or with ‘tribalism’ as such, but with the breakdown of traditional patterns of local governance. It was important, therefore, to maintain elites of proven administrative ability and friendship with Britain. Shortly after Qavam al-Mulk’s assassination in March 1908, Cox explained privately to Charles Marling, the charge´ d’affaires, that if nothing is contemplated at an early date in the direction of guarding communications and taking extra measures for the protection of our interests in the Gulf and in our sphere, I shall have to lift up my voice, and endeavour to bring home to our people the absolutely parlous situation, greatly to the prejudice of our interests and prestige among the peoples of the Gulf, which has resulted from 2 years of flux and chaos in Tehran and 3 or 4 years of vile misgovernment and strife in Shiraz and Fars. At Tehran, where the Majlis has naturally loomed large and its struggle with the reactionary party occupies the centre of the stage, it is impossible for you to realise what is going on in the wings, down here. No lay resident in the Gulf Ports cares tuppence about the Majlis or the Shah, or what the Govt is as long as there is

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reasonable security on the trade routes and tolerable willingness and capacity on the part of the local officials, to keep order and dispose of current disputes, – although it be in their own corrupt way.38 To Harcourt Butler, secretary of the Foreign Department, Cox observed that although he had been initially predisposed toward the constitution, ‘In the South I confess I have seen no result from the national movement and the attempt at constitutional government which has been otherwise than subversive of law and order and generally paralysing both to the administration and to commerce.’39 To his friend Lovat Fraser, former editor of the Times of India, Cox was less guarded. Writing shortly after Muhammad ‘Ali Shah’s destruction of the Majlis and Darya Baygi’s consequent dissolution of the Bushihri anjumans in June 1908, Cox declared: Down here south of Ispahan the liberal movement has never had any deep hold on the people. There was a good deal of talk [of] the miracles that the ‘mashrooteh’ or constitutional government was going to effect and some temporary enthusiasm on the part of busy bodies who wanted to come before the public, but at Bushire and Shiraz people were hopelessly bored with it long before the smash came [. . .] I was personally very glad to see the end of the farce, and if the Shah was anything but a vicious blockhead and were to make up his mind to rule on reasonably just and liberal lines I am sure it would suit the majority of the people better than the constitution, for which they are clearly not ripe.40 The constitutionalist movement in the south, however, soon demonstrated a resiliency not anticipated by Cox. On 17 March 1909 he reported that ‘Nationalists’ had seized Bandar-i ‘Abbas at the encouragement of the mujtahids of Najaf and Sayyid ‘Abd al-Husayn Lari.41 Five days later Sayyid Murtaza and a thousand Tangastani riflemen occupied Bushihr, claiming that the shah’s tyranny had contravened the ‘religious cannons of the Persian Nation’.42 The constitution was restored in Shiraz and Bandar-i Lingah on 25 March.43 Cox quickly extended de facto recognition to the new regimes. Sayyid Murtaza’s men promptly looted the bazaar, however, and he seized the

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customs house and appropriated 20,000 tumans (£3,900), monies that were pledged to the interest of British loans, prompting a protest from the provincial anjuman.44 Britain’s prestige vis-a`-vis other powers was also at stake. Cox received urgent representations from Russian, Ottoman and German consuls. The German vice consul, Wilhelm Wassmuss, who would cause the British so much embarrassment during World War I, was apparently encouraging Sayyid Murtaza. Cox explained that these intrigues were more than ‘merely fishing in troubled waters’ and were ‘part of a larger policy’ of advancing Germany’s interest by posing as a champion of Iranian national aspirations in opposition to British and Russian imperialism.45 By 9 April the situation was critical. Cox warned some of the Tangistani headmen of the ‘folly of pursuing conduct calculated to result in bringing them in contact with mailed fist of British Govt. which has hitherto been their good friend’.46 When Sayyid Murtaza and the nationalist committee disclaimed responsibility for keeping order, Cox ordered ashore 100 men and four maxim guns from the cruiser, HMS Fox. Half the men took up position at the British residency and the others occupied the customs house. Although the revolutionaries were the nominal government of Bushihr, Cox controlled customs, the most important source of revenue available to the local administration, and he soon began negotiations with them regarding these funds. This position, however, soon presented its own challenges. On 11 April Cox learned that Muhammad ‘Ali Shah had dispatched Darya Baygi, who had been reappointed governor of the gulf ports since his dismissal in September 1908, from Tehran to Bushihr via Baghdad and Basra.47 Cox realized that should Britain’s intervention aid the restoration of royal power in Bushihr, British professions of neutrality in the struggle between shah and Majlis would appear hollow. To make matters worse, he intercepted a telegram from the royalist government in Tehran ordering the Iranian warship Persepolis to rendezvous with Darya Baygi in Basra.48 Cox also feared that the shah might use the Persepolis to seize customs funds in Muhammarah, which Khaz‘al had frozen in early April with the consul general’s consent. The head of customs at Bushihr, M. Zwinne, had expended 1,200 tumans to coal the vessel. Cox demanded the money be replaced and the Persepolis remain in Bushihr; Zwinne complied. In the end, the solution came from Darya Baygi, who, proving a consummate trimmer, declared

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himself an ardent constitutionalist to the mujtahids at Najaf and landed at Bushihr without incident on 10 May 1909.49 Darya Baygi was, in Cox’s estimation, a relatively competent official of the old school, adept at manipulating local factions.50 He soon provided Cox guarantees for public tranquillity, enabling the British to withdraw on 19 May after occupying Bushihr for almost six weeks.51 Cox induced him to send Sayyid Murtaza into exile at Najaf and granted him a modest per diem for local administration from customs, which had in effect gone into British receivership. The re-establishment of the constitution in Shiraz in March 1909 did little to ease local tensions there. Sawlat al-Dawlah finally decided to play his hand and threatened to occupy the city with his Qashqa’is on behalf of the governor general, Hajj Ghulam Riza Khan Asaf al-Dawlah, who remained loyal to the shah. J. H. Bill, who had taken over from Grahame in April 1908, endeavoured to induce Salar al-Sultan, who had assumed his late father’s title of Qavam al-Mulk, to cooperate with Sawlat al-Dawlah in the interests of order. ‘It is very much to be hoped’, Bill remarked, ‘that the Soulet and Kawam may come together, and there is no real obstacle, as both have made it plain enough that they have no real convictions on the constitutional question, and will readily follow any Government that can maintain itself’.52 Bill, however, failed to appreciate the deep personal animosity between the two men and their rivalry for supremacy in Fars, which was only exacerbated by the political instability attending the struggle between the shah and the constitutionalists. Popular hostility against the Qavams was heightened in May by reports, which later proved false, that Nasr al-Dawlah, brother of the new Qavam al-Mulk, had sacked Lar and killed Sayyid ‘Abd alHusayn.53 The agitation against Qavam al-Mulk intensified in June and he fortified his quarter of the city.54 Nasr al-Dawlah, meanwhile, sought Russian protection and was appointed consular agent, but he soon resigned under British pressure.55 Despite this awkward incident, Bill worked closely with the Russian consul general, Kadlubusky, who arrived from Bushihr in late June. On 3 July 1909 leading Shirazis submitted a petition to the British and Russian consulates, blaming the turmoil on Asaf al-Dawlah’s incompetence. The ‘entire regular garrison of Shiraz’ then took bast, demanding arrears of pay.56 Bill and Kadlubusky reminded Asaf alDawlah of his responsibility for foreign lives and property and exacted

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orders from him banning Qavam al-Mulk or Sawlat al-Dawlah from bringing men into the city. When the latter learned that ‘Ala’ al-Dawlah would replace Asaf al-Dawlah, he began moving on Shiraz. Bill consulted George Barclay, British minister (1908– 1912), and Cox, and on 25 July 1909 a reinforcement of 50 sepoys, sowars and marines with a maxim gun started up the Bushihr– Shiraz road to strengthen the consular guard.57 This force reached Shiraz on 2 August, but only after two of the Indian infantry died of heatstroke. Bill, meanwhile, visited Sawlat al-Dawlah and persuaded him to suspend his advance. Sawlat alDawlah did subsequently enter the city with a sizeable bodyguard to telegraph Tehran, but upon being informed on 12 August that ‘Ala’ alDawlah’s appointment had been cancelled in favour of Ja‘far Quli Khan Jalilvand Saham al-Dawlah, he left the immediate vicinity of Shiraz. This crisis was averted, but only for the moment.

Revolutionary Dilemmas: Khaz‘al, Cox and Oil In contrast to the instability in Fars and the gulf ports, Arabistan remained, much to Britain’s relief, under the firm control of Shaykh Khaz‘al. Vice Consul Chick at Bushihr remarked in January 1910: As regards the province of Arabistan, the Customs figures and the quiet prevalent during this stormy period seem to be a vindication of the excellence of the Sheikh’s tribal government as compared with the conspicuous failure of the Tehran authorities to maintain their influence in Fars both after and before the deposition of Mohammad Ali Shah.58 Khaz‘al’s Arabs exhibited little revolutionary fervour, and his local ascendancy was not impaired by the collapse of central authority. Still, the shaykh feared the revolution. The desire of Iranian nationalists to create a more integrated state better capable of resisting foreign influence naturally placed an Arab chief enjoying close relations with the British in a difficult position. He was soon a target of the unmuzzled Persian press. Bill reported that in June 1907, Habl al-Matin published a petition warning the Majlis of the ‘unlimited friendship’ of Khaz‘al and Kuwait’s Shaykh Mubarak and their meetings with British agents.59 The port of Muhammarah and the Karun River, the petitioner asserted,

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were vital to Iranian progress, and ‘We, who hope to populate Persia, must firstly guard the great gate-ways of Persia, lest the robbers of land and sea may close those gate-ways against Persia; and deal with the Persians as they like.’ Khaz‘al worried that the Majlis would curtail his autonomy and grumbled that Tehran had not reimbursed him for expenses incurred guarding the Ottoman frontier and the Shatt al-‘Arab. Khaz‘al elaborated his concerns to Cox in January 1908. In the looming showdown between Muhammad ‘Ali Shah and the Majlis, three outcomes were possible. If the shah won, the shaykh’s position would continue to be guaranteed by the royal firman of 1902, but a victorious Majlis might rescind these pledges. Alternatively, the conflict between royalists and constitutionalists might provoke foreign intervention, again with damaging consequences to his interests. In these circumstances and cognizant of a recent British dynastic undertaking to Mubarak, Khaz‘al desired written assurances ‘that he and his children would be maintained in the enjoyment of their patrimony’ against Majlis encroachment or foreign interference.60 Further, he asked that Britain increase its military commitment to him to include defence against foreign attack by land as well as by sea. Cox noted that the Bakhtiyari khans shared these anxieties, and in April 1908 they concluded a pact with the shaykh to resist any encroachment by Tehran on their privileges or any attempt to raise their taxes.61 For Cox, the tribes were good instruments for consolidating British influence in the neutral zone. He explained to Butler in the Foreign Department, that having by the terms of our convention with Russia left the region affected in the neutral zone and exposed to German enterprise, it is of the utmost importance to our interests to counteract the disadvantage of that circumstance as far as possible and without delay by strengthening our hold as much as we can upon the Chiefs of South Western Persia before the opportunity to do so passes out of our control.62 While Cox and Grey did not think that specific assurances beyond ‘an expression of friendly sympathy’ should be given the Bakhtiyaris, they were ready to meet Shaykh Khaz‘al’s request.63 As a senior Foreign Office official explained to the India Office, the shaykh,

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by reason of the geographical situation of his possessions and his considerable local influence, is in a position to hinder and even to prevent the prosecution of any foreign enterprise in the country watered by the Karun, it is very desirable to secure his absolute adherence to British interests in order to insure that his power may always be exercised in their favour by opposing any schemes which may be distasteful to His Majesty’s Government.64 On 1 December 1908 Cox met Khaz‘al, and after recapitulating the assurances of 1902, extended them to the shaykh’s ‘successors’.65 Cox further explained that Anglo-Russian commitments to respect the ‘independence and integrity of Persia’ included the maintenance of the shaykh’s autonomy against foreign attack. Shaykh Khaz‘al’s peace of mind, however, was short-lived. The rebellions against Muhammad ‘Ali Shah throughout the south in March 1909 and the Bakhtiyari march on Tehran to restore the constitution placed him in a dilemma. The mujtahids in Najaf exhorted him to suspend payment of revenues and customs receipts to Tehran, while the shah pressed him to act against the constitutionalist Bakhtiyaris led by Samsam al-Saltanah.66 The shaykh again turned to the British for advice. On 8 March, Barclay informed Cox that British neutrality between the shah and the constitutionalists ‘precludes you from advising on such questions’.67 Cox was not pleased. The shaykh, he stressed, was dissatisfied with his latest assurances, pointing out that his autonomous status under the ‘integrity and independence of Persia’ clause would be invalidated should Iran cease to be a sovereign state. As to the question of British advice, Cox noted that the shaykh argued perceptively that Britain’s assurances to him were contingent upon his loyalty to the Iranian government and that should he ‘choose [the] wrong horse we might seize excuse to withdraw our guarantee’.68 The shaykh also requested a British loan, hinting that he was prepared to look elsewhere for money if necessary. Grey was unmoved and indicated that Khaz‘al should remain neutral between the shah and the constitutionalists and that the British government did not plan to loan him funds at present.69 Given the critical situation at Bushihr and the shaykh’s cooperation in sequestering customs receipts at Muhammarah, Cox begged Barclay to back him with London.70 Barclay obliged, observing to Grey:

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Whether or not we give Sheikh assurances as to financial assistance, we shall, I presume, be compelled to find him money if he really needs it in order to prevent his applying elsewhere, a danger which must clearly be avoided: and in view of the importance of retaining the Sheikh’s good will and our influence over him at so crucial a moment in our struggle for the exclusion of German influence from the Gulf, I venture to support H. M. Consul-General’s suggestion as regards the reply.71 Viceroy Minto also supported Cox.72 Grey acquiesced and on 17 April authorized new assurances to Khaz‘al.73 A month later, Cox reiterated British promises to the shaykh, ‘whatever change might take place in the form of government in Persia’.74 This pledge, Cox noted, encompassed the improbable abolition of Iranian sovereignty. Finally, at the shaykh’s request, Britain granted these assurances to his ‘heirs and successors’. The loan question soon revived in connection with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company’s (APOC) proposal to lease Abadan Island from the shaykh for a refinery and pipeline terminal. The firm needed these facilities after discovering significant oil deposits in Bakhtiyari territory in May 1908.75 The oil syndicate had already sounded out Vice Consul Lorimer at Ahvaz about approaching Khaz‘al through the IBP, in order to conceal the ‘identity of the real purchaser’ and thereby secure a lower price.76 Cox scoffed at the suggestion, declaring, ‘The Sheikh is on the qui-vive, and would be quick enough to discern the body of the ostrich however deeply the bird’s head were buried.’77 Instead, it was Cox himself who led the negotiations. To conciliate Khaz‘al, the APOC was willing to lend him £5,000 to £6,000, in conjunction with the rent for Abadan.78 Cox countered that the shaykh needed a loan of at least £10,000, repayable over ten years.79 The APOC replied that in addition to a loan of £6,000, it was willing to pay £6,500 upfront for the first ten years rent, making a total of £12,500 to be handed over to the shaykh upon signature of the lease.80 Khaz‘al rejected this offer as well, and Cox again recommended the APOC lend £10,000.81 The APOC probably did not appreciate Cox’s support for the shaykh, but in mid-June it acquiesced both to the £10,000 loan and the £6,500 advance rent.82 In July 1909 Cox reported that Khaz‘al had signed the Abadan lease and he added that the shaykh, fearing criticism from nationalists and the ulama, asked it be kept secret for the present.83

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British Sphere, Imperial Backwater The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 designated Sistan and Qa’inat as the centre of a British sphere of influence in south-eastern Iran. Satisfied with this strategic security and facing more serious problems in the neutral zone, the British exercised only a loose ascendancy in their sphere and did little to enhance their political or economic predominance. Imperialism is often associated with military occupation, economic exploitation, or some combination of both, but in this case, the convention relegated Sistan and Qa’inat to an isolated imperial backwater. With the Anglo-Russian rivalry suspended, local politics in Sistan and Qa’inat were shaped mostly by internal developments, namely the Constitutional Revolution and family disputes between Amir ‘Ali Akbar Khan Hishmat al-Mulk and Amir Muhammad Ibrahim Khan Shawkat al-Mulk (II). As Consul Kennion discovered to his embarrassment, these issues were now of little concern to his superiors. Despite repeated consular appeals, Britain did nothing to strengthen its commercial interests in this sphere, blocking proposals for a Trans-Persian railway as a threat to India. Clearly, the ‘official mind of imperialism’ preferred a politically insulated and economically undeveloped sphere of influence on India’s western flank. Between 1907 and 1909, local politics still revolved around the Khuzaymah ‘Alam family and the governorships of Sistan and Qa’inat, but the convention greatly reduced the imperial urgency of these controversies. In 1905 the British had withdrawn support from Hishmat al-Mulk, and after the convention they settled on a new prote´ge´ in the person of his younger half-brother, Shawkat al-Mulk (II), who had inherited both the majority of the family fortune and the governorship of Qa’inat from his other half-brother, Amir Isma‘il Khan Shawkat al-Mulk (I), who died in 1904.84 Hishmat al-Mulk was determined to rule Qa’inat as well as Sistan, and in April 1907 he reportedly bought the governorship of Qa’inat for 100,000–130,000 tumans (£19,250– 25,000), borrowed from the Russian bank.85 In Tehran, the Majlis took a dim view of these debts, and after public protests in Qa’inat the appointment was rescinded.86 During the summer, Shawkat al-Mulk’s hold on Qa’inat seemed secure, and on at least two occasions the legation informed Kennion that Atabak-i ‘Azam had confirmed the governor in his post.87

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This family rivalry was further complicated by the revolution. In July 1907, Vice Consul J. B. Kelly announced that the ‘wave of national discontent appears to have reached Seistan at last’.88 As elsewhere in the country, constitutionalist anjumans challenged gubernatorial authority. Kelly and Kennion encouraged the Khuzaymahs to co-opt and control these assemblies. Kelly advised Sartip Muhammad Riza Khan, Hishmat al-Mulk’s son and deputy in Sistan, to establish an anjuman ‘which would contain a majority of his friends, so turning the tables on his opponents’. Kennion approved, noting cynically that ‘neither Seistan nor Kain are ripe for [an] independent majlis’, which would only be ‘instruments of one or another set of wire pullers’.89 A council nevertheless formed in September, and when its secretary complained to Kennion of Muhammad Riza’s passive resistance he counselled restraint, advising the anjuman ‘not to attempt to revolutionize Seistan in a day’, which ‘would only throw the administrative machinery out of gear’.90 By late October, the anjuman and nearly one thousand supporters had taken bast at the Russian consulate in protest – an action almost incomprehensible to constitutionalists in Tehran.91 Kennion slammed his Russian colleague for breaching the convention and a compromise was soon reached to end the bast. In Birjand, Shawkat al-Mulk was more successful, explaining jocularly to Kennion that the purpose of such councils was to curb ‘the tyrannies of persons like himself’.92 Kennion explained approvingly that the governor had placed his own man at the head of the council and would send the same individual to Tehran as the parliamentary representative of Qa’inat, thus remaining ‘master in his own house’. Over the next year, Shawkat al-Mulk survived several challenges from Hishmat al-Mulk. British diplomatic support and IBP loans for pishkish proved effective on these occasions. In August 1908 Shawkat al-Mulk confidently informed Tehran, at Kennion’s urging, that he had served loyally and would not subject himself to further extortion.93 Scarcely a week later, however, there were more rumblings against Shawkat al-Mulk and he was again sending money to the capital.94 The shah elevated Hishmat al-Mulk to the title of Husam al-Dawlah and awarded Amir Mas‘um Khan his father’s old title of Hishmat al-Mulk.95 An alarmed Kennion then learned that Husam al-Dawlah had offered 59,000 tumans (£11,350), loaned by the Russian bank, and that Shawkat al-Mulk needed to pay 30,000 tumans immediately to keep his post.96

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Kennion recommended an IBP loan, with a British government guarantee, but Marling, the charge´ d’affairs, declined.97 On 8 September credible information was received in Birjand that Husam al-Dawlah had secured Qa’inat.98 Kennion was stunned and made an impassioned plea for Shawkat al-Mulk’s retention. ‘If for no obvious reason Shaukat is now dismissed’, he declared to Marling: we not only lose all the advantages to be derived from friendship of local Government but it will be widely regarded as a proof of our inability to look after our own interests and help our friends even in our own sphere. It will further be regarded as a triumph for the Shah, reactionaries and Russians for it was only last year the latter were prevented by the Assembly from securing the appointment of Hashmat-ul-Mulk by means of a loan. Whether they desire it or not Russians will thus obtain influence and corresponding advantages in Kain that we have now.99 Marling cautioned that British prestige would only be jeopardized if Kennion had overcommitted himself to Shawkat al-Mulk.100 Kennion rejected this imputation and asserted that Britain’s reputation was very much at stake. Russian money had made possible Husam al-Dawlah’s triumph.101 Britain, he added, was committed in so far as Marling had instructed him most recently in June to inform Shawkat al-Mulk that British support in Tehran had secured his position.102 For Marling, Kennion’s continued reference to Russian ambitions betrayed a ‘failure to comprehend the radical change which the conclusion of the Anglo[-] Russian Convention of last year has necessarily effected in our attitude [towards] Persian affairs.’103 The truth was, Marling reported to Grey, that ‘since the signature of the Anglo-Russian Convention of last year the conflict of political interests has practically ceased in those regions’.104 Kennion soon took the matter up with the new minister in Tehran, Sir George Barclay, but he too was unsympathetic, observing dismissively that ‘Major Kennion sees things with such anti-Russian spectacles that he is very hard to deal with.’105 Husam al-Dawlah arrived in Birjand in November 1908, but he had paid a heavy price for an uncertain tenure. The Russians pressed him for speedy repayment, while the shah demanded money, allegiance and men

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to put down constitutionalist risings in March 1909.106 At the same time, the Mashhad anjuman exhorted the ulama and people of Sistan and Qa’inat to withhold taxes from Husam al-Dawlah.107 Confident his fortunes were on the rise, Shawkat al-Mulk gave little or no support to the ‘popular party’, and played tennis with Kennion. News of the shah’s deposition arrived on 21 July 1909 and Birjand was illuminated in celebration for two nights. On 20 September Shawkat al-Mulk regained Qa’inat and would hold the post for the next seven years. Kennion, however, was unable to congratulate him, having handed over to Major W. F. T. O’Connor two weeks earlier. British apathy about politics within their sphere was matched by indifference to its economic development. India’s Quetta–Sistan overland trade route had not been a success. Between 1898 and 1907, the annual value of trade on the route had averaged a trifling £42,000.108 According to Persian customs figures, between 1907 and 1911 the annual value of trade averaged £47,000, and between 1911 and 1914, £87,540.109 Indian customs figures put the total about 70 per cent higher, due to discrepancies in valuation, but even so the prospects of significant development, investment and profit remained poor. With characteristic myopia, Kennion repeatedly pressed the IBP to expand its business by becoming a trade agency, ordering and forwarding goods for Persian merchants on credit direct from British and Indian manufacturers.110 The bank refused, indicating that its Russian competitor’s experiment in this kind of business had been a disaster.111 One solution to Sistan’s economic isolation was a Trans-Persian railway, linking India with the Russian Caucasus and Europe. Russia, fearful of German penetration of Iranian markets, had clear economic reasons for pursuing the project.112 Although his colleagues were less enthusiastic, Grey was determined to participate in the scheme to strengthen the Russian entente.113 He appreciated India’s strategic anxieties and stipulated that the railway enter the British sphere at Bandar-i ‘Abbas, and after a gauge change there, proceed to Karachi along the Makran coast, under the guns of the Royal Navy and far from Sistan.114 In 1912 he and Sergei Sazonov, the Russian foreign minister, agreed that work could begin in the Russian zone, so long as Britain determined the alignment in the neutral and British spheres.115 Russian officials were astonished at Britain’s continuing concerns about a Russian invasion of India, but Sir Arthur Hirtzel at the India Office was unapologetic:

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I cannot help feeling that Russia is still relentlessly pursuing under cover of the convention the same ends that she was pursuing before it – i.e. the development of a fresh line of advance on the key of our position – Seistan (via Kerman) – and the acquisition of a port on the open sea. [. . .] If we accept the Kerman alignment we admit Russia to Seistan, and it seems to me that in pressing for it Russia is trying to get back what she lost by the convention.116 With little hope of breaking the impasse, the two powers decided in November 1913 to wait until construction in the Russian sphere was complete, at which time a joint commission would consider the alignment in the neutral and British spheres.117 Sistan’s low priority did not escape the notice of one of the more perceptive political officers, Major O’Connor. In 1909, the Indian Foreign Department, at Grey’s prodding, directed O’Connor to propose substantial cuts to the consulate budget.118 Based on his recommendations, India abolished the vice-consulates at Kuh-i Malik-i Siah and Sistan, the latter becoming an ex officio post held by the medical officer, and slashed Sistan expenditures by half.119 O’Connor realized his appointment was a professional dead end. In January 1912 he privately explained to Barclay that he had requested the Foreign Department to transfer him from Sistan to Shiraz, ‘should the employment of political officer with military expedition be desirable at Shiraz, or in the South of Persia my services could be more usefully employed there than in Seistan where all is quiet and will, I hope, remain so’.120 Five months later, while on leave in India, O’Connor approached Sir James Du Boulay, private secretary to Viceroy Hardinge, with the same object: ‘I regard with dismay the prospect of returning to such a place as Seistan, where there is absolutely nothing to do.’121 O’Connor was spared another sojourn in Sistan, and his tenure in Shiraz would, in the coming years, more than satisfy his thirst for adventure. Indeed, with the British sphere secured, the neutral zone was where the action was.

Crisis on the Bushihr –Shiraz Road Although the resurgent constitutionalists deposed Muhammad ‘Ali Shah in July 1909, their new regime failed to exert authority over large parts of the south. In contrast to the south-west, where Shaykh Khaz‘al

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and the Bakhtiyari khans exercised a relatively uncontested supremacy in their respective domains, Fars was fractured by numerous and wellarmed contending political and tribal interests. Since the 1860s the shahs had exploited the rivalry between the Khamsah and the Qashqa’i tribal confederacies, but as its authority in Fars declined, the Qajar state no longer exercised this essential arbitral function. The result was a period of sustained competition and conflict between Qavam al-Mulk and Sawlat al-Dawlah, which in turn diminished both men’s control over their confederacies and exacerbated internal tensions within the Khamsahs and Qashqa’is.122 Consul W. A. Smart acutely described this situation: ‘The waning authority of the Government has been entirely broken up. Even more serious has been the dissolution of tribal authority. The control of the Chiefs over their tribesmen has become largely ineffectual as a restraining influence.’123 As with the disturbances following the death of Nasir al-Din Shah in 1896, the collapse of local security threatened British interests at their most vulnerable point: communications between the coast and the inland market towns. Provincial leaders and their well-armed men seized control of the southern roads, threatening to cut off British access to the neutral zone and causing great concern to British officials, who considered commercial supremacy integral to regional political ascendancy. The Russians were consolidating their authority in the north, while the Germans were endeavouring to extend their influence from Ottoman Iraq into western Iran and the Persian Gulf. For the British, restoring order to the southern roads was critical, but finding the appropriate means to do so proved very difficult. A host of interrelated problems plagued the Bushihr– Shiraz route. Tribal raiding of caravans was only the most spectacular.124 Just as disruptive was the illegal, extortionate levy of rahdari (road guard tolls) on muleteers between Bushihr and Shiraz by various khans, such as Shaykh Husayn Khan of Chahkutah, Ghazanfar al-Saltanah of Burazjan, Nur Muhammad Bayg of Dalaki and Khurshid Bayg of Kamarij. Under considerable British pressure, Muzaffar al-Din Shah’s government had prohibited rahdari and all other internal tolls in 1903, but the practice remained entrenched.125 Between 1907 and 1913 it developed into a complicated system of blackmail and conflict, in which local khans vied for control of various sections of the route, often auctioning off subsections to their dependents. H. G. Chick estimated that rahdari charges

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had risen from 1s 4d per mule between Bushihr and Shiraz in 1907 to 5s 4d by June 1909. Between January 1910 and January 1912 rahdari averaged roughly 4s 5d per mule, but in early 1912 the rates increased to nearly 10s, about the same cost as shipping half a ton of merchandise from Manchester to Bushihr. These problems dislocated commercial life in Fars and the gulf littoral. Many muleteers abandoned the road for safer alternatives in the north. In 1907 Chick reckoned there were 5,000 to 6,000 mules working between Bushihr and Shiraz, but by 1909 this number had been reduced by more than half.126 Those muleteers who remained passed rahdari on to the merchants, which combined with the scarcity of animals caused the cost of transport to skyrocket. In 1905 the cost of carrying 100 Bushihr mans (737 lb) from Bushihr to Shiraz had averaged £1 13s. Between 1906 and 1910 rates rose to £2 9s, at times climbing as high as £4. By 1912 they had reached £8 4s.127 Insurance rates had doubled by 1907, and by 1909 most firms declined to insure goods on the Bushihr– Shiraz road, except at a ‘war risks’ rate of 10 per cent of the value of the merchandise.128 Insecurity also hampered the regional economy, as petty traders could not distribute goods from the market centres to the villages. Trade stagnated and goods piled up in warehouses in Bushihr and Shiraz, or in caravanserais along the route. Many smaller Iranian merchants went bankrupt, causing considerable losses to British firms that had advanced them goods and credit. Chick calculated British claims against defaulting Iranian merchants at more than £19,000 in 1910.129 Two years later, Cox put British claims in Iran at more than £200,000.130 Considering the overwhelming difficulties experienced by the central government and local authorities in financing basic administration, it was clear that they could not settle these claims any time soon. As Barclay explained to Cox in June 1909, the only solution was ‘to await the day of reckoning’ and deduct these claims from a future loan to the Iranian government.131 From the perspective of British interests in the neutral zone, the situation was very unsatisfactory. The obstruction of the southern routes afforded Russia an opportunity to extend its influence south. As Chick surmised, ‘It is evident that the continuance of disturbance along those arteries of trade, while diminishing trade in goods of British origin, tends to open markets like Yezd, Shiraz, Kerman, and Ispahan to the descent of Russian trade from the north.’132 Russian commercial

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expansion had profound political consequences. Prefacing a report on the mule shortages between Bushihr and Shiraz in October 1913, Chick noted uneasily that the legation recently gave prominence to the increase of Russian influence in the Isfahan province resulting from the increase of Russian trade by reason of the deplorable condition of the Southern Trade Routes, and added that in proportion as Russian influence is given time to extend southwards, so will the justifiable pretensions of Russia to a larger share of the neutral zone become greater. Starting therefore with this axiom, we are confronted with the proposition how to prevent a further increase of Russian Trade in the Isfahan province and southwards, and how to win back, if possible, what Russian Trade has recently captured in that province.133 When the Manchester Chamber of Commerce demanded protection for British trade, the Foreign Office replied that various political circumstances and considerations militated against an immediate solution.134 British occupation of the roads in the neutral zone, besides being very costly and logistically difficult, would upset the AngloRussian Convention and very likely occasion an outright partition of Iran, which might disturb the European balance of power, further alienate British Liberals and increase animosity toward Britain, not only in Iran but also in India, Egypt and throughout the Muslim world. For the ‘official mind’, purely private economic interests were inseparable from, but ultimately subordinate to the Empire’s broader strategic needs. Securing the southern roads was necessary to keep Russian influence at bay and preserve Britain’s ascendancy in the neutral zone, but this end had to be achieved without imperilling Anglo-Russian relations and occasioning a scramble for Iran. Any scheme for policing the trade routes therefore required Russian acquiescence and Iranian collaboration. Reaching such a compromise would not be easy, and in the meantime British merchants continued to lose money. Cox appreciated these constraints and expressed his hope to Grey in July 1909 that the British government would soon be ‘in a position to give their representatives some idea of the extent and general lines of co-operation or disguised intervention which their present policy renders feasible’.135

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British pressure Between 1906 and 1911, the consuls at Bushihr and Shiraz put forward several proposals for recruiting road guards under British supervision. In 1906, Grahame suggested placing such a force under three Indian non-commissioned officers.136 Three years later, Consul Bill and J. C. Smith of the IETD proposed expanding the number of telegraph ghulams (line guards/messengers) to 230 to enable them to patrol the line and the road, at a cost of £7,000 per annum.137 Cox was unhappy with this plan, arguing that the employment of IETD ghulams to suppress raiding and rahdari might provoke retaliatory attacks on the telegraph line. In November 1909 Cox met Barclay in Tehran. They recommended that the IETD second six British officers to the Iranian Ministry of Interior to raise 600 guards for the Bushihr– Shiraz road.138 They estimated the project’s cost at £15,000 per annum for three years, to be financed by a 10 per cent customs surcharge at the gulf ports. Barclay advised approaching the Persian cabinet unofficially so as to forestall Majlis opposition. St Petersburg endorsed the proposal and urged that British and Russian consuls control the funds.139 After further consultation with Cox, Barclay observed that ongoing negotiations for a joint Anglo-Russian loan to Iran might involve the establishment of a national gendarmerie.140 If he demanded that British officers be employed by the gendarmerie in southern Iran, Russia would probably claim identical rights in the north, causing the loan talks to collapse. Instead, he recommended that Tehran choose its own foreign officers for the south, subject to British approval. The situation in Fars offered little hope for a local solution. The new governor general, Saham al-Dawlah, arrived in September 1909, but destitute of funds, unable either to co-opt or subdue Sawlat al-Dawlah and facing determined opposition from the ulama and populace of Shiraz, he resigned the following January. His departure left Sawlat al-Dawlah the ‘true master of more than half of Fars’.141 The Qashqa’i chief opportunistically diverted traffic from the traditional ‘imperial’ route along the telegraph line, which was preferred by the British, to a longer, easterly route through his own territory via Jirrah.142 His relations with the central government were strained, because he accused the minister of interior, Sardar As‘ad, of using his official position to advance his Bakhtiyari interests. Shaykh Khaz‘al and Ghulam Riza Khan Sardar-i Ashraf Vali of Pusht-i-Kuh shared these suspicions, and in early

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1910 they joined Sawlat al-Dawlah in the so-called ‘southern league’, which while ostensibly pledging staunch loyalty to constitutional government was in fact aimed against the Bakhtiyaris.143 In these circumstances, it was doubtful that Sawlat al-Dawlah would assist Tehran to exert its authority over the southern roads. For the moment, moreover, the supersession of the ‘imperial’ route by the Jirrah alignment had rendered the Cox-Barclay road-guard plan obsolete.144 British forbearance, however, did little to improve security, and on 15 April Consul Bill was attacked between Shiraz and Isfahan and two of his Indian escort were killed.145 Barclay asked Cox to recommend measures ‘to stimulate P[ersian] G[overnment] to make serious effort to restore order’, but he pointed out that it was ‘very desirable to avoid appearance of anything like occupation or punitive expedition’.146 Cox replied that only an ‘occupation of whole road’ would prevent future attacks, but suggested deploying 35 Indian cavalry with two British officers both at Shiraz and Isfahan as an ‘overt protest and stimulant to the Persian Government’.147 By July 1910, even traffic on the hitherto safe Ahvaz – Isfahan road was obstructed by rival Bakhtiyari and Qashqa’i raiders.148 In August, the inhabitants of Shiraz complained bitterly to their deputy in the Majlis about tribal depredations and the resulting economic distress and begged for help.149 The often exasperated charge´ d’affaires, Charles Marling, also demanded action. His representations had no effect on the Iranian government, which was bankrupt and paralysed by divisions among the Majlis and the ministers. He requested authority to inform Tehran that if by September it had not restored order in the south, the British would do so unilaterally. An ultimatum of this kind, he contended in scarcely diplomatic language, would serve to bring the Persians to a sense of the deplorable failure which has hitherto attended the experiment of self-government. It would stimulate the few who realise that, until European assistance, in the shape of advisers and instructors, is enlisted, no progress towards reform and reorganization is possible to enforce their views; it would bring the Government and Medjliss face to face with their deplorable financial position, to which at present they appear resolved to shut their eyes.150

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The Foreign Office, however, feared that the introduction of British troops would delay the withdrawal of Russian troops from Tabriz and Azerbaijan.151 Barclay, on leave in England, instead proposed a more robust road-guard scheme of 1,000– 1,200 men under British officers from India at a cost of £40,000 per annum, financed by a customs surcharge and Fars revenues. Upon returning to Tehran, Barclay was authorized to warn the Persians that if in three months they had failed to assert their authority, Britain would demand the revised road-guard plan on the Bushihr– Isfahan road.152 He delivered this ultimatum on 14 October 1910.153 Husayn Quli Khan, the foreign minister (and member of the Navvab family), rejected the note as a direct challenge to Persian sovereignty, and it drew criticism in the German, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman press as being a prelude to British occupation.154 Chastened, Grey charged Barclay with exceeding his instructions by committing Britain to implementing the road-guard scheme after three months, with an implied threat of force, instead of merely insisting on it diplomatically upon the expiry of the ultimatum.155 Barclay acknowledged his error, confessing to Cox, ‘In drafting my note I relied too much on my memory. It is a most unfortunate business and will leave in my mind a scar which if I live to be a hundred will always remain.’156 For his part, Cox maintained that the ultimatum did not go far enough. ‘Three months more of such lively anarchy cannot be contemplated with equanimity’, he declared, ‘and in any case I am of opinion that one thousand or twelve hundred men suggested for policing Bushire– Isfahan road will no longer suffice while it is certain that the longer we delay measures the more difficult and expensive they will become’.157 The Iranian government keenly appreciated the importance of resolving the crisis. On 11 November Sardar As‘ad informed Barclay that his colleagues were considering Swedish officers for a national gendarmerie. Barclay refused Sardar As‘ad’s request for a further three months, but encouraged him that ‘the engagement of officers from minor Powers offered the best hope of attaining a satisfactory result’.158 On 26 December 1910 the Iranian government presented its plan to restore order in Fars, which included the appointment of a competent governor general; the employment of Sawlat al-Dawlah to secure the ‘imperial’ route; the dispatch of several hundred infantry with artillery to Shiraz; the allocation of funds from an IBP loan to

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reorganize the Fars administration; and finally, the establishment of a gendarmerie under foreign officers.159 Less than a week later, the new foreign minister, Hajj Mirza Hasan Khan Isfandiyari Muhtasham alSaltanah, apprised the Majlis of negotiations for the engagement of Swedish officers.160 The Foreign Office was satisfied, and Barclay announced on 21 January 1911 that Britain would postpone its demands for the road-guard scheme adumbrated in the October note, but that it reserved the right to intervene as necessary to protect its interests.161

War and intervention in Fars The appointment to Fars of Riza Quli Khan Mafi, who had succeeded to his deceased uncle’s title, Nizam al-Saltanah, in 1908, was encouraging. His tenure in Arabistan and Luristan had prompted Vice Consul Lorimer to describe him as ‘one of the most capable of the present day Persian officials’.162 In addition to his estates in Arabistan he was also a major landholder in southern Fars. Landing at Bushihr on 10 January 1911 he was met by Sawlat al-Dawlah, who promised his assistance on the ‘imperial’ route. Nizam al-Saltanah appreciated the offer and accepted it until such time as he could raise his own local levies. As to the feud between Sawlat al-Dawlah and Qavam al-Mulk, Cox reported that the governor general ‘expressed the view that the only chance of peace for the province was the achievement of reconciliation of interests between the two parties and said that he intended to lay himself out to effect that end and in the process to render himself independent of and neutral to both’.163 ‘His Excellency’, Cox concluded, ‘is plausible and sanguine – over sanguine I think – but he is at any rate a serious person and the policy which he aspires to put into practice is no doubt the right one, so that one can but wish him good fortune in the difficult task before him.’ Nizam al-Saltanah’s tenure, however, was a disaster. Despite his professions of impartiality between the great provincial factions, he threw his support behind Sawlat al-Dawlah against Qavam al-Mulk, and by extension against the latter’s backers, Sardar As‘ad and the Bakhtiyaris. Qavam al-Mulk and his brother, Nasr al-Dawlah, were briefly arrested in early April 1911, and upon release left Shiraz for Europe.164 En route to Bushihr on the night of 6 May, they were ambushed by Sawlat al-Dawlah’s men. Nasr al-Dawlah was killed and

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Qavam al-Mulk fled to the British consulate in Shiraz. Cox advised Qavam al-Mulk to remain under British protection, despite the possibility of an attack on the consulate, and urged Tehran to negotiate a solution.165 In Shiraz, Consul S. G. Knox publicized his neutrality and censored Qavam al-Mulk’s correspondence to ensure he was not conspiring against Nizam al-Saltanah and Sawlat al-Dawlah.166 Privately, he urged Barclay to support Qavam al-Mulk.167 Cox, by contrast, argued Nizam al-Saltanah should be retained in office as his resignation would occasion further disturbances and constitute ‘the final failure of the Central Govt’ in Fars.168 Cox’s views were also informed by Sawlat al-Dawlah’s friendship with Shaykh Khaz‘al and their hostility toward the Bakhtiyaris. Qavam al-Mulk continued in bast throughout the summer of 1911, while his wife, Liqa’ alDawlah, who was also a Qashqa’i kinswoman of Sawlat al-Dawlah, organized resistance. Distracted by the invasions of the ex-shah and his brother Salar al-Dawlah, the government in Tehran failed to mediate the crisis, and in August and September Shiraz was the scene of serious fighting between the rival parties, in which hundreds were killed and wounded.169 In response, Cox proposed raising the consulate escorts at Bushihr and Isfahan by 100 Indian cavalry and sending an additional 200 men to Shiraz.170 India held the troops in readiness, but Viceroy Hardinge, himself an old Persia hand, presciently warned that sending troops inland was a significant departure from the traditional policy of policing the ports and was likely to result in extended military operations and possibly even occupation.171 In late September Qavam alDawlah’s Khamsahs scored decisive victories over the Qashqa’is, who began defecting from Sawlat al-Dawlah. Liqa’ al-Dawlah proved instrumental to Qavam al-Mulk’s victory. Smart left this remarkable pen portrait of her: Of mutable connections in her sexual life, she was yet devoted to her husband’s interests. She acted as his bailiff and political adviser, and even fought for him. In the summer of 1911, with her brother-in-law murdered and her husband in refuge at the Consulate, she succeeded in bringing the Khamseh tribesmen into town, and by the energy of her direction caused the defeat of Nizam-es-Saltaneh and Sowlet-ed-Dowleh. She is said during the

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hostilities in the town, to have gone to the barricades and used a rifle as competently as any of the fighting men.172 Afraid that the retreating Qashqa’is would loot the bazaar and endanger European lives, Knox obtained authorization to demand that Sawlat alDawlah and Nizam al-Saltanah leave the city or face British action.173 They departed on 4 October, citing the British ultimatum. Although Knox astutely noted that the real reason for their retreat was their defeat in Shiraz, Cox took their announcement at face value: ‘Soulet and Nizam have retired a few miles solely as the result of our definite threat and reports of our preparations to make it good.’174 In these circumstances, he concluded, ‘failure on our part to carry out intentions now generally known will greatly encourage forces of disorder and revival of the damaging impression that there is no fear of our putting our intentions into execution’. Still, Cox was not happy about the outcome of the Shiraz crisis and its consequences for the balance of power in the south. Qavam al-Mulk’s bast had made British policy hostage to fortune and tilted the balance of power in the south not only against Sawlat al-Dawlah but also against his ally, Shaykh Khaz‘al. Sawlat al-Dawlah, Cox predicted, would never accept the ascendancy of Qavam al-Mulk or his Bakhtiyari allies.175 Faced with the prospect of sustained local conflict, Cox became convinced that only British power could produce provincial stability and protect British interests. On 10 October 1911 Barclay informed Tehran that Britain would reinforce its consular escorts at Shiraz, and probably also at Bushihr and Isfahan.176 The foreign minister, Mirza Hasan Khan Vusuq al-Dawlah, repeatedly requested the British to reconsider.177 Grey, with the India Office’s concurrence, stipulated that these troops not serve as road guards or caravan escorts.178 Cox disagreed, arguing that the defence of the consulate at Shiraz required the maintenance of communications with the coast, which could only be accomplished by means of increased escorts. His frustration growing, the consul general was adamant that Britain’s prestige demanded resolute action. Referring to Barclay’s note of October 1910, Cox asserted that ‘Our failure to put into execution our former ultimatum was most inconveniently misinterpreted and similar action in the present case would be doubly so.’179 Cox was to be disappointed again. The following day, Barclay promised Vusuq alDawlah that the troops would be used strictly as consulate escorts and

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would be withdrawn when the Iranian government regained control of the road.180 Between 27 October and 10 November 1911 the 39th Central Indian Horse, totalling 300 cavalry, landed at Bushihr.181 An Indian infantry regiment arrived in Bushihr in early January.182 Half the cavalry went to Shiraz and the rest were split between Bushihr and Isfahan. They immediately encountered opposition. From Najaf, Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Kazim Tabataba’i Yazdi urged Islamic resistance against the British, linking their incursion to the Russian occupation of northern Iran and the Italian invasion of Libya.183 Bushihri mullas induced the boatmen to boycott the transports.184 Shirazis boycotted the troopers under the command of Colonel J. A. Douglas, the former military attache´ in Tehran, who had been attacked and wounded in Luristan with Lorimer in 1904. They carried out a run on the IBP branch, necessitating emergency shipments of specie, and telegraphed their complaints directly to Grey in London.185 Douglas was only able to obtain supplies after an officer led 20 sowars into the bazaar. When Barclay remonstrated with Vusuq al-Dawlah on the matter, the latter replied with no little irony that his government could not control public opinion. Violent resistance followed. On 26 December several hundred Kashkulis (of the Qashqa’i confederacy) under Muhammad ‘Ali Khan attacked Consul Smart and a large escort between Bushihr and Shiraz.186 Smart was wounded and briefly taken prisoner, and seven sowars were killed. Although intended to bolster Britain’s flagging prestige in Fars, the expedition was causing London serious anxiety and embarrassment. There was much futile discussion between the Foreign Office, the India Office and the Foreign Department in India as to what conditions would permit withdrawal. Cox’s consternation grew as the Indian cavalry became virtual prisoners in Shiraz, the tribes remained unpunished and Britain floundered without a policy.

Revolution and empire In Tehran, meanwhile, the Shuster crisis and the Russian ultimatum precipitated the dissolution of the Majlis on 24 December 1911, an event many historians view as the end of the Constitutional Revolution. The revolutionaries, nonetheless, had succeeding in fusing older conceptions of Iranian uniqueness with a modern, nationalist, political programme. The general adoption and development of these views was a

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gradual process, but the first revolutionary activists were among the most politically conscious, vocal and active members of Iranian society, who were also especially hostile toward foreign influence. Although cognizant of this transformation, Britain wished to maintain its traditional and informal pre-eminence in southern Iran. Revolutionary disorder in the south, however, threatened to make a mockery of British pretensions to supremacy. Although initially reluctant to interfere, Britain’s interests in maintaining security for trade and its position as the predominant foreign power in the neutral zone drew it, almost irresistibly, into the revolutionary vortex. Cox undoubtedly aided the constitutionalists by recognizing them as the de facto government in Bushihr in 1909 and by denying the shah use of the Persepolis and southern customs receipts. But as a committed imperialist, Cox considered the hallmark of good governance not so much individual freedom as a stable social order. In these circumstances, Shaykh Khaz‘al’s continued friendship and capable government proved very attractive to the British, as was Sistan’s somnolescence. However, the crisis of the Bushihr– Shiraz road revealed that British power was limited by political, diplomatic, geographical and logistical factors, and Cox became increasingly frustrated as his proposals for local action were amended or rejected in London. The effect of these strains was evident in his precipitate demand for the Indian expedition, which was, as the Tehran correspondent for The Times noted, ‘in fact, either too small or too large, for its purpose; too large not to suggest a military demonstration, too small to be immune from considerable risk’.187 After 1907 British officials clearly wanted to exclude Russia and other powers from the neutral zone, but the problem of Fars would require a more comprehensive plan and more imperial resources.

CHAPTER 5

DIVIDE ET IMPERA :THE CONSOLIDATION OF BRITISH CONTROL

Despite the limitations of the Anglo-Russian Convention and the problems of Fars, the British strengthened their position throughout southern Iran, in both neutral and British spheres, in the years immediately preceding World War I. These borderlands were politically diverse and fragmented, and the British employed different strategies in Sistan and Qa’inat, Arabistan, the Persian Gulf littoral and Fars. British imperialism in Iran, as elsewhere, took many forms. The resulting ad hoc imperial framework may have lacked ideological coherence, but was well suited to practical solutions for local conditions. The British were relatively indifferent to local political and economic questions in Sistan and Qa’inat after 1907. They would not, however, tolerate open defiance. Having exposed Amir Mas‘um Khan Hishmat al-Mulk’s complicity in Baluchi raiding, they demonstrated that, in their sphere at least, they could rule the notables Qajar-style, securing his detention in Tehran and confiscating his estates for restitution of damages. In the south-west, Cox and company protected their prote´ge´, Shaykh Khaz‘al, from his Ottoman and Bakhtiyari neighbours while firmly entrenching nascent British naval interests in Persian oil. By contrast, British supremacy in the gulf ports was increasingly based not on the politics of notables, but on the power of the Royal Navy and the Indian Army. The opposition encountered by the 39th Central Indian Horse in Shiraz made it clear that a different approach was

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necessary in Fars. In a dramatic departure, the British cooperated with Tehran in an ambitious programme of provincial state-building, spending substantial sums to subsidize the local administration and finance a gendamerie to overawe the tribes and protect the trade routes. This project aimed at modernizing the Fars government and freeing it from its traditional dependence on the notables, and it relied on a strange, and strained, cooperation between Persian officials, British consuls, Belgian treasury agents and Swedish gendarmerie officers. The decade between the Constitutional Revolution and the rise of Riza Khan (1911– 1921) has long been interpreted as ‘period of disintegration’ in Iran, which could be conveniently contrasted with modern state-building under the Pahlavis.1 This experiment in Fars, however, demonstrated that even with limited resources, Iranian statesmen remained committed to extending central authority and that these ambitions were not always incompatible with increasing British influence. A case in point was the gendarmerie, which despite its imperial patron provided an important institutional basis for subsequent military reforms and popular nationalist politics.2 So long as British funds were forthcoming, the scheme stood a chance of success, but it generated considerable opposition from diverse local interests, including the notables, ulama, nationalists and tribes, which would have weighty consequences for the future. Finally, British intervention in the neutral sphere combined with Russian pressure from the north steadily undermined the imperial settlement of 1907. By 1914, British officials were in general agreement that their pre-eminence in the neutral zone was more important than the maintenance of the Anglo-Russian truce in Iran, and a full partition of Persia between Britain and Russia seemed almost inevitable.

Imperial Discipline in Sistan and Qa’inat Although the British preferred to ignore their south-eastern sphere, persistent Khuzaymah ‘Alam feuding and tribal raiding greatly tested their prestige and patience between 1910 and 1914. Shawkat al-Mulk had regained the governorship of Qa’inat in September 1909. Husam alDawlah lived in semi-retirement in Birjand, leaving the administration of Sistan to his son, Amir Mas‘um Khan Hishmat al-Mulk. The latter’s campaign to unseat his uncle, Shawkat al-Mulk, from Qa’inat earned

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him Britain’s lasting hostility. Beginning in September 1910, he encouraged his Baluchi kinsmen to raid Qa’inat to demonstrate Shawkat al-Mulk’s inability to govern and to secure his own appointment.3 After a party of some 350 Baluch sacked a village in southern Qa’inat, Consul O’Connor reported that Hishmat al-Mulk was allotted a fifth share of the booty and declared that ‘the Hashmat ul Mulk is the prime mover in these outrages’.4 In June 1911 he urged replacing the ‘members of the present hereditary ruling family who are either incapable or rogues and who are constantly divided by family feuds and jealousy’ with a ‘competent man’ from outside the province.5 Given the many other crises besetting the country that summer, such a radical solution was wholly unlikely. Instead, O’Connor settled for a formal request for the dismissal of Hishmat al-Mulk and his removal from Sistan and Qa’inat.6 It would be another two years before the British could bring Hishmat al-Mulk to book. In June 1913 the minister of the interior, ‘Ayn alDawlah, summoned the three Khuzaymah amirs to Tehran to resolve their differences and arrange revenues with the treasurer general, Joseph Mornard.7 They were reluctant to proceed to the capital. Major F. B. Prideaux, consul in Sistan between 1912 and 1918, took a hard line, insisting that Hishmat al-Mulk report to Tehran or leave the country and that if his ageing father was too ill to do the same, he must retire to his estates outside Birjand. If they refused, Prideaux recommended increasing the Indian garrison at Robat and, if necessary, sending a force across the frontier to arrest Hishmat al-Mulk, a proposal that prompted Walter Townley, who replaced Barclay as minister in Tehran in 1912, to remark ‘these Indian gentlemen have large ideas’.8 Prideaux also convinced Shawkat al-Mulk that his presence in Tehran was essential for placing Qa’inat’s administration on a firm financial foundation and provided him written assurances for his life and property and a speedy return to Birjand.9 Before departing in September, Hishmat al-Mulk enquired of Prideaux if he might also enjoy the legation’s support.10 Prideaux’s response was unequivocal: In reply, I beg to repeat what I have told you verbally, that you have undoubtedly been summoned to Teheran at the instance of the British Legation to answer for the losses which have occurred to British subjects at the hands of Baluch, Afghan and Sistani

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robbers during your incumbency of the Government of Sistan as the Deputy of your father, His Excellency Hissam ed Dowleh. The extent of our claims is about Tomans 26,500, and in addition as a sign of the displeasure of His Britannic Majesty’s Government at your neglect and disregard for British interests, the Persian Government have been requested to prohibit you from returning to the vicinity of Kainat and Sistan for some time to come.11 Given this explicit warning, it may be surprising that Hishmat al-Mulk did not choose resistance or exile. There is evidence that he expected support from the Russians, but none was forthcoming. In these circumstances, he likely calculated that a swift submission was the best hope for a rapid rehabilitation. Shawkat al-Mulk arrived in Tehran in early October 1913 and his three-month stay was a great success.12 With assistance from Townley, he secured the governorships of both Qa’inat and Sistan, with Sartip Muhammad Riza Khan as his deputy in Nusratabad. The provinces, moreover, were formally separated from the jurisdiction of the governor general of Khurasan. Arrangements were made for a regular military force under Shawkat al-Mulk, numbering over a thousand men with artillery, supervised by instructors from Tehran and financed by the revenue department.13 Britain supplied him with 700 rifles in June 1914.14 Two months later Prideaux attended a military review, which he considered ‘most credible’.15 The obvious targets of this force were the Baluch. Sensing the inevitable, two prominent raiders tendered their submission to Shawkat al-Mulk in writing and received traditional promises of leniency. In December he began his long-awaited tour of Sistan.16 The leading Baluchi sardars respectfully proceeded on istiqbal to greet him, including Khudadad Khan, Hishmat al-Mulk’s cousin.17 Their Sarhaddi Baluchi kinsmen, however, evaded Shawkat al-Mulk’s summons and his troops, and he returned, frustrated, to Birjand in May 1915.18 Hishmat al-Mulk received a decidedly different reception in the capital. Townley had instructed Prideaux to publicize that Hishmat alMulk would be exiled from Sistan for the foreseeable future, declaring, ‘Now that he is in our power, I have every intention of proving to him and his Baluchi admirers that we cannot be trifled with.’19 Townley

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demanded he pay 27,000 tumans (£5,200) in 20 days, and on 12 February 1914 Hishmat al-Mulk was arrested and detained for over a month at the Ministry of Interior.20 Upon release, he explained he lacked ready cash but agreed to hand over some of his and his father’s estates to the British. Townley was now inclined to clemency, informing Prideaux that ‘I do not intend to be too severe on him as it has always been found that it pays to be lenient and make friends after we made ourselves felt.’21 Prideaux and Webb-Ware, who had served in British Baluchistan for almost two decades, did not share this view. Webb-Ware feared that mercy would only encourage the Baluch, while Prideaux argued that ‘we are entitled to adopt much stronger measures against local Governors in British sphere than even those in neutral sphere.’22 Townley reluctantly yielded. After receiving confirmation that Hishmat al-Mulk and Husam al-Dawlah’s assets were sufficient to meet British claims, he authorized Prideaux to make preparations for sequestering their properties.23 During summer 1914 some abortive efforts were made to settle the matter through an IBP loan or annual cash payments.24 Shawkat al-Mulk even tried to negotiate a modus vivendi between the British and his relatives, but to no avail. On 13 October 1914 Prideaux baldly informed Husam al-Dawlah that he had four days to make satisfactory arrangements, after which confiscations would commence. ‘If any resistance is made by you to my seizing your properties’, the consul threatened, ‘your son in Tehran as well as yourself will be ruined.’25 Prideaux left Birjand for Sistan a week later, accompanied by one of Shawkat al-Mulk’s agents, and en route he seized the villages of Sahlabad and Firuzabad.26 Vice Consul New took possession of a third village. The kadkhudas were dismissed and replaced by the consul’s ghulams, while the inhabitants were effectively placed under British protection. Prideaux collected information on the villages’ land and cultivation. Upwards of 50,000 pounds of stored grain belonging to Husam al-Dawlah and Hishmat al-Mulk was weighed, certified and placed under consulate seal for later sale. A herd of camels found grazing nearby was also confiscated. The proceeds from these operations, however, were still insufficient to cover the claims, and Prideaux desired to seize five more villages in Sistan. Before approval could be obtained from Tehran, Husam al-Dawlah died in Birjand on 22 January 1915 of heart failure. Further seizures were suspended while the division of his estate was adjudicated and

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settlement reached for his debts to the Russian bank. The outbreak of the war in Europe and the entry of the Ottoman Empire on the side of the Central Powers made Hishmat al-Mulk’s punishment a low priority. Townley pressed for a compromise. The legation minuted that although other British claims were being deferred until a large loan to the Iranian government, for political reasons we saw fit to punish Hashmat ul Mulk. We brought him to Tehran, imprisoned him and kept him here over a year. His punishment seems to be sufficient. To continue it now would be to ruin him utterly especially now his father is dead and Shaukat is so firmly established in Seistan and Kain.27 Townley proposed that Hishmat al-Mulk sign a bond to pay half the total claim, 13,000 tumans (£2,500), in two annual instalments of 6,500 tumans, and then be permitted to return to Sistan. Britain had demonstrated its power, and Grey approved the plan.28 Although Shawkat al-Mulk was doubtless a more attractive character than either of his relatives, it was ultimately inconsequential to the British who held the governorships of Sistan and Qa’inat, as long as the incumbent displayed due deference. Amir Mas‘um Khan Hishmat alMulk posed no real threat to British interests, because he could not offer the Russians any real foothold in Sistan. He failed to realize that the convention had left Britain firmly in control in Sistan and that the Russians would not help him, and that without Russian support Tehran could not help him either. Like the Qajars, the British used exemplary punishment to rule the borderlands. Detained in Tehran at the time of his father’s death, Hishmat al-Mulk forfeited the chief part of his patrimony: the governorship of Sistan. It would still be another year before he reached Qa’inat, but by then, the war had considerably altered the affairs of eastern Iran.

Politics, Profit and Power in Arabistan and the Gulf Ports Southern Arabistan, meanwhile, remained under the firm control of Shaykh Khaz‘al, but he did face outside threats. He was especially unpopular with the governor of Basra, Suleyman Nazif Bey, who accused him of encouraging lawlessness among his dependents in Ottoman

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territory. In April 1910 the Ottomans sent a gunboat to arrest the shaykh’s brother-in-law at a village on the western bank of the Shatt al‘Arab.29 When the man resisted, the warship opened fire. Khaz‘al’s mother’s house was damaged, and one of his wives allegedly died of fright shortly thereafter. The British consul at Basra, F. E. Crow, backed the Ottomans.30 Cox admitted that Khaz‘al was not blameless, but urged that Britain resist Young Turk pressure on the rulers of Muhammarah and Kuwait: it is our interest and our policy to maintain the Sheikh of Mohammerah in his position as a powerful Arab ruler at the head of the Gulf. So sure as we do not, our own position will suffer with his and damage to his influence and well-being will react upon the prosperity of our commercial stake in his territory.31 With these considerations in mind, Cox convinced London that this occasion presented a favourable opportunity to extend its guarantees to the shaykh’s ‘male descendants’ and make him a Knight Commander of the Indian Empire (KCIE) in October 1910.32 Tehran was not pleased and pressed Barclay as to whether the shaykh was now under British protection.33 A letter, which Cox believed was written by the karguzar in Muhammarah, to the editor of the Persian-language newspaper Najaf, published in Ottoman Iraq, summed up Iranian fears: After taking possession of a half of Baluchistan and the Coast of Oman and after excluding Bahrein and dependencies from the Persian Government the Southern fox has thought of swallowing the whole of the South and has, to an extent, converted Arabistan, the foundation of the South, into a feudatory principality.34 Above the word ‘fox’ in this translation, a legation official scribbled ‘?Cox!’. Not for the last time had the Ottomans pushed the shaykh closer to the British. Khaz‘al’s relations with his Bakhtiyari neighbours were also a source of considerable trouble. As a member of the ‘southern league’, he was wary of Bakhtiyari power in Tehran. More immediately, he competed with them for predominance in northern Arabistan, especially in the town of Shushtar, which in the spring of 1912 was the scene of a serious stand-off.35

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Although willing to defend the shaykh against the central government and foreign states, the British were not inclined to guarantee him against the Bakhtiyaris.36 Despite protestations of neutrality, Cox and his subordinates generally considered the Bakhtiyaris to be the aggressors and mediated in the shaykh’s interests.37 In Tehran, Townley was less favourably disposed to Khaz‘al, on one occasion referring to him as a ‘spoilt child’.38 In the margins of yet another exculpatory telegram from Bushihr in August 1913, Townley noted acerbically, ‘The “Sheikh” can do no wrong and is an angel. My belief is that he is a rascal.’39 He warned Cox that overt partiality toward Khaz‘al would damage British relations with the Bakhtiyaris and thrust the khans ‘into Russia’s open arms, which would constitute a formidable pro-Russian wedge southwards into the neutral zone.’40 Cox appreciated this concern and proposed soothing the Bakhtiyaris with assurances similar to those recently conveyed to Khaz‘al.41 Townley instead encouraged both sides to come to a settlement.42 By 1912 it had become clear that inter-Bakhtiyari squabbles between the Ilkhani and Haji Ilkhani families were a major obstacle to any agreement with the shaykh. To this traditional rivalry was added a new, generational struggle between the senior khans in Tehran and the younger chiefs, whose fathers and uncles reaped the profits and honours of high office, while their own services in the tribal territories went unrecognized and unrewarded.43 These disputes disrupted traffic on the Bakhtiyari road, which in light of the difficulties on the Bushihr–Isfahan route, was especially vital to British commerce. Townley pressed Samsam al-Saltanah, the Bakhtiyari prime minister, and the elder khans in Tehran for an agreement for better government of the Bakhtiyari confederation, which was eventually signed on 10 July 1912, under ‘British Legation supervision’.44 Nasir Khan Sardar Jang, of the Haji Ilkhani family, became ilkhani for five years instead of the previous annual tenures, and he selected a representative of the Ilkhani family, Murtaza Quli Khan, eldest son of Samsam al-Saltanah, as his ilbaygi. Sardar Jang possessed full authority to appoint, dismiss and punish the lesser chiefs and to collect all revenues. Townley also assisted in obtaining a loan of £8,000 from the IBP for his mission, secured on the Bakhtiyari khans’ oil shares.45 Vice Consul Grey, with an escort of 20 Indian cavalry, accompanied Sardar Jang from Isfahan to the Bakhtiyari country. On 8 April 1913 Sardar Jang met Shaykh Khaz‘al halfway between Shushtar and Ahvaz at Band-i Qir, where they settled their grievances and pledged to live in friendship.46

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British officials did not take on these arbitral responsibilities altruistically. The Middle East was becoming a crowded place on the eve of World War I and they were determined to secure a monopoly of influence in south-western Iran, even though the region was part of the neutral zone laid down in the Anglo-Russian Convention. Commerce was key, and Shaykh Khaz‘al had held up his end of the bargain. ‘Owing to the good Government of the Shaykh of Muhammarah’, Consul L. Haworth remarked in 1911, ‘Arabistan is one of the only, if not the only Province of Persia where quiet is maintained and there is security of life and property.’47 Merchants often found it safer to send their goods to Isfahan via Ahvaz rather than via Bushihr and Shiraz. The IBP established branches in Muhammarah in 1910 and Ahvaz in 1911.48 After years of British pressure, the Iranian government transferred operation of its long-neglected telegraph lines between Muhammarah, Ahvaz and Burazjan to the IETD in late 1912. In 1911, representatives of the IBP, APOC, Persian Transport Company, Gray Paul and Co. and the British India Steam Navigation Company launched the Persian Railways Syndicate in the hope of acquiring a concession for a Muhammarah– Khurramabad railway, which, in keeping with the terms of the 1907 convention, would terminate south of the Russian sphere.49 British officials supported the venture, especially after Russia and Germany agreed at Potsdam in November 1910 to build a Russian line between Tehran and the Baghdad railway, a scheme that would place British trade in western and northern Iran at a severe disadvantage.50 This anxiety was eased somewhat by Germany’s announcement that the southernmost section of the Baghdad railroad to Basra would be open to British participation. The British government, nevertheless, pressed ahead with the Muhammarah–Khurramabad scheme. Promises for free land grants were obtained from Shaykh Khaz‘al and Nizam al-Saltanah, who despite conflict with the British at Shiraz in 1911 had been appeased by an IBP loan. Supported by the shaykh and Cox, it allowed him to pay off his debts to the Russian bank.51 In the spring of 1911 A. T. Wilson, consul at Muhammarah, carried out a preliminary survey north to Khurramabad, and Barclay approached the Iranian government for an option on the line. Tehran rejected the proposal, because the railway, by terminating at Khurramabad, would be an implicit recognition of the Anglo-Russian spheres of influence.52 In July Wilson concluded that the

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project was technically feasible, but could not compete commercially with the Baghdad railway.53 Cox shared Wilson’s scepticism, but noted that Russian and German opposition to the scheme demonstrated its value ‘as a lever for obtaining satisfactory terms in regard to the Gulf section of the Baghdad Railway’.54 It also provided an opportunity for asserting Britain’s special position in Arabistan and for claiming independently of any Anglo-Russian Convention, that Mohammerah territory is a sphere of British influence, in the development of which we are entitled to have a predominant voice, and which we are under no obligation either to regard as neutral ground except vis a` vis Russia, or to admit the intrusion therein of any foreign element except under conditions conducive to our own interests and those of the Shaikh. The Persian Railways Syndicate was more optimistic about the commercial potential of the line, and in April 1912 applied to the Iranian government for a two-year option, which was eventually granted in March 1913.55 A survey party under W. Whitelaw studied the Muhammarah–Dizful section and returned in the autumn, planning to complete the Dizful – Khurramabad segment. In September and October Wilson again journeyed to Khurramabad and made arrangements with several Lur leaders for Whitelaw’s safe conduct.56 He agreed to disburse more than £1,000 in subsidies for guards and estimated that the total payments to the Lurs for the first six months of survey work would be £3,150. Wilson was then deputed to the Perso-Ottoman frontier commission, but his successor, Captain J. S. Crosthwaite, criticized the plan.57 He had little faith in the Lur chiefs and believed Whitelaw possessed none of Wilson’s experience and little of his tact. This admission highlighted the limits of Britain’s consular politics of notables. They were grounded in personal, not institutional relationships, and in this case everything depended on Wilson. Wilson himself later acknowledged that he had made a mistake in making agreements that another officer would have to carry out.58 For his part, Whitelaw freely generalized that ‘all history of the Persians’ and Lurs’ agreements show they are made to be broken’.59 No progress was made towards making more satisfactory arrangements and the survey party abandoned the field in January 1914.60 Luristan had once again proved beyond Britain’s reach.

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In contrast to the struggles of the Persian Railways Syndicate, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company emerged as the most important British enterprise in the region. In May 1911 the consul at Ahvaz, Lt J. G. Ranking, negotiated the APOC’s purchase of exclusive rights to additional oil fields at Maydan-i Nafthik and Maydan-i Naftun as well as a strip of land for the pipeline from the Bakhtiyari khans for the remainder of its 60-year concession.61 A year later, Shaykh Khaz‘al agreed to allow the APOC to drill for oil in his territories in return for a 2 per cent share of the net profits.62 Company officials, resentful of what they considered the inordinate financial demands of the Bakhtiyaris, had originally intended to drill without reference to the shaykh, relying on the original D’Arcy Concession of 1901, which limited their royalty payments to the Iranian government alone. Cox successfully opposed this proposal as sure to damage relations with Khaz‘al, whose good will was essential to the success of the APOC’s projects, and suggested the terms on which the agreement was ultimately concluded.63 Visiting Arabistan in 1913, Sadid al-Saltanah noted that, flush with oil wealth, the shaykh had illuminated his palace at Fayliah with electric lights.64 Sadid al-Saltanah also indicated that this prosperity had not facilitated constitutional rule and that the shaykh’s vizier, Haji Ra’is al-Tujjar, was the despotic ruler (malik-i raqab) of Muhammarah and Ahvaz.65 The APOC brought in large amounts of equipment, material and men. By December 1912 the firm employed about 45 Europeans, 700 Indians, 35 Chinese and 1,500 Persians at its various facilities in Iran.66 The newspaper Iranshahr criticized the great number of foreign labourers, lamenting that ‘Today more than 900 Iranian workmen do not work in the mines.’67 Abadan was linked to the oil fields by pipeline in June and the refinery was completed in 1912.68 The APOC was still a small enterprise compared with Royal Dutch Shell and Standard Oil, and faced technical, financial and distribution difficulties.69 It was clear, however, that the oil fields were very rich. Between 1912– 1913 and 1914– 1915 production of crude oil increased from 80,000 to 376,000 tons, while that of refined petrochemicals such as benzene, kerosene and fuel oil rose from 33,000 to 255,000 tons.70 The rest of the story is relatively well known. In 1912 the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, began the transition of the Royal Navy from coal to oil power. Britain had as yet discovered little oil within the Empire and was forced to purchase it from abroad.

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The Admiralty was anxious to secure dependable, cost-effective and long-term supplies. Charles Greenway, chairman of the APOC, warned that without government assistance the firm would probably be bought out by Shell, which was likely to bring German capital into Arabistan.71 In November 1913 Rear Admiral Edmond Slade, who as Commanderin-Chief, East Indies Squadron (1909– 1912), worked closely with Cox in the gulf, visited the oil fields on behalf of the Admiralty. An agreement was reached the following March, whereby the British government acquired a majority share in the APOC for £2,200,000 and appointed two ex officio members to the company board. The APOC was awarded a 20-year contract to supply 6 million tons of fuel oil to the Admiralty at the price of £30 a ton. Arabistan, hitherto significant for Britain’s regional position, had now by its connection with the Royal Navy, assumed a vital strategic significance for the entire British Empire.

‘Policing the Gulf’ In the Iranian ports and the gulf coast, Cox and the southern consuls relied upon the Royal Navy, the Indian Army and gunboat diplomacy to defend British interests. The 79th Carnatic Infantry had landed at Bushihr following the Kashkuli attack on the 39th Central Indian Horse in late 1911. A year later, they were relieved by the 2nd Queen Victoria’s Own Rajput Light Infantry, whose headquarters were transferred from Jask to Bushihr in the spring of 1913, after the murder of the wife of the customs director. More significant British forces battled arms smugglers on the Makran coast to prevent rifles from reaching Afghanistan and North-West Frontier Province.72 Beginning in January 1910, six British warships under Rear Admiral Slade established a blockade in the Gulf of Oman and the Straits of Hormuz against shipments from Masqat. The following year, Slade twice deployed the thousand men of the ‘Makran Field Force’ against arms traffickers on Iranian territory.73 These operations disrupted the arms traffic on the Makran coast, but the smugglers soon shifted their business into the Persian Gulf near Bandar-i Lingah. In October 1910, at the request of the deputy governor, 150 British sailors landed to defend the town against a large party of Varavi and Turakama raiders.74 In March 1912 some 2,400 of these men again threatened to descend on the port to avenge the capture by British warships of a large consignment of their weapons en route from the Arab coast.75

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They were reportedly supported by adherents of Sayyid ‘Abd al-Husayn Lari, who opposed British intervention of any kind. Two hundred Rajput infantry landed and remained ashore for a month until the raiders disbanded. This unit then briefly defended Bandar-i ‘Abbas in May, and again in March of the following year.76 These problems also impinged on the ‘Maritime Truce’ of the Persian Gulf, which the Royal Navy had enforced since 1820. In August 1911 a group of Tangistani gunrunners attacked a Dubai pearling boat off the Arab coast, killed four of the crew and escaped with the valuable cargo.77 Cox appealed to the local Persian authorities, but they demonstrated little ability to deal with the pirates. Dubai was under British protection, and Britain’s prestige in the gulf demanded that the culprits be punished. Immediate action was ruled out, but in February 1913 Cox was asked officially to define the term ‘Policing the Gulf’, as it pertained to Iran. He responded sweepingly: These duties are chiefly exercised in the suppression of piracy, the slave trade, and traffic in arms; in maintaining order amongst boats engaged in the pearl fishery and the protection of dhows employed in the exportation of dates from the Shatt al-Arab and its vicinity; also the prevention of breaches of the maritime truce by the passage by sea of armed dhows in connection with intertribal warfare on land. When necessity arises these duties carry us into territorial waters, and even to terra firma. Vis-a`-vis the Persian Government, we have already claimed to exercise our discretion in this direction and on repeated occasions have given effect to it. The right is thus one which is habitually exercised by us with or without the previous concurrence of the Persian Government, but without disregarding Persian sovereignty unnecessarily, and our requirement at the present moment is merely specific and general recognition by Persia, as one of the maritime powers of the Gulf, of this right, with a view to consolidating our juridical position in regard thereto vis-a`-vis outside Powers.78 In June, Cox and Rear Admiral R. H. Peirse moved against the Tangistani coast.79 The village of Madumari, just south of Bushihr, was bombarded and briefly occupied. A week later 500 Indian sepoys and

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British sailors burnt to the ground Dilvar, an arms-smuggling base and home of the troublesome Ra’is ‘Ali, destroying at least 20 dhows and ransoming another 11 vessels. For the governor of the gulf ports, Muvaqqar al-Dawlah, British operations against Tangistan underscored his deplorable lack of money and military resources and the lamentable decline of Iranian authority in the gulf littoral.80

Provincial State-building in Fars British officers in Shiraz did not enjoy the luxury of naval support. The dispatch of British cavalry to Shiraz marked an important turning point in local perceptions of British involvement in southern Iran. Nationalists had long criticized Britain’s ambitions and methods in the region. That this expedition came in the midst of the Shuster crisis in Tehran was widely viewed as proof of Anglo-Russian collusion to impose foreign control. The expedition was also a direct threat to tribal and other local interests, especially to those men who controlled the Bushihr– Shiraz road. Tribal populations would later have much to fear in the centralizing tendencies of Iranian nationalism, but for the moment, the presence of foreign troops united nationalists, ulama, the tribes and the road khans against a common foe. British imperialism in the south before World War I encouraged a broader discourse of Iranian nationalism, which by focusing on shared resistance to foreign aggression, encompassed considerable ethno-linguistic and sociological diversity among Iranians. Tribal populations did not identify as members of an imagined Iranian political community, but Iranian nationalists could embrace tribal resistance against the British as defence of homeland and nation. If, furthermore, the incursion of Indian cavalry in late 1911 had earned the British the tribes’ hostility, its failure earned them contempt. For Consul Smart in Shiraz, the episode had produced the impression that the British emperor had no clothes: Our troops have come and been attacked twice with impunity. His Majesty’s consulate cannot hope to retain long the respect which the tribesmen, vaguely apprehensive of the unknown possibilities of England’s displeasure, still entertained for it. The ignorant tribesman naturally argues that England, dissatisfied with his depredations, has sent a military force to Fars. He has been able to

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attack this force with impunity, and, as he thinks, with success. He can only attribute our subsequent inaction to impotence or fear.81 Indeed, an isolated inland garrison of Indian cavalry was more a liability than an asset. Grey initially thought it best to evacuate the troops, along with Smart and the entire British community from Shiraz.82 Viceroy Hardinge opposed this plan, claiming that the situation was improving; that a larger relief force would be necessary, which would complicate relations with Russia and alienate international Muslim opinion; and that the withdrawal of consulates from the neutral zone would ‘create a vacuum in Central Persia which is likely to be taken advantage of by others to our detriment’.83 Instead, India preferred a Sandeman-style solution, negotiating directly with the local khans and offering them regular subsidies for the protection of the road, under Cox’s supervision. Intent on bargaining from a position of strength, Hardinge advised that Indian infantry regiments be sent to Bushihr and Qishm and that the navy establish a blockade of the Persian coast. After consulting Cox, the viceroy added that these measures should be supplemented by a public relations campaign aimed at assuaging Iranian and Muslim sensibilities.84 Britain would publicize its long-standing grievances and friendly intentions through the press and ask Tehran, Shi‘i mujtahids in Iraq and the headmen on the road to use their influence toward securing local cooperation. There were important Indian dimensions to this issue. The All-India Muslim League urged British support for Persian independence, and both Shi‘i and Sunni Muslims in Lucknow protested Russia’s bombardment of the shrine of Imam Riza in Mashhad.85 To Cox’s dismay, the Foreign Office appeared in no hurry to address the issue. He exclaimed to Sir Henry McMahon, now secretary in India’s Foreign Department: if it is really decided to take no active measures locally to protect our interests, I strongly recommend that we announce the fact both to [the] House of Commons, in the Viceroy’s Council, and thro’ the Press, without further delay and generally make as much capital out of it as we can. By merely drifting into a climax of inaction we shall lose all the fruits of our forbearance vis a´ vis the

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Mahomedan world whilst locally suffering an unnecessary loss of prestige.86 ‘Time,’ he protested to Barclay, ‘is slipping away,’ and he urged that Britain choose between a punitive and a conciliatory policy in Fars.87 In April 1912 London adopted the latter course, and Barclay explained to the Iranian government that if it secured punishment of the culprits, ensured a friendly attitude on the part of the tribes along the road and supported the gendarmerie effectively, Britain would withdraw its forces from Shiraz and Bushihr.88 When in July it became clear that Persian authorities would not soon meet these conditions, Cox suggested extending the deadline for punishment of the Kashkulis to September, failing which British troops should occupy the Kazirun plain to secure communications between Bushihr and Shiraz.89 Walter Townley, newly arrived in Tehran, appreciated Cox’s difficulties but was anxious to avoid a British occupation, which would likely ‘mean the end of Persian independence’.90 But if India were intent on a relief expedition, he insisted, it should not be defensive but punitive in character. Such an adventure would doubtless have serious consequences, but so too would mere ‘half measures’.91 Hardinge baulked at this prospect, which ‘could have only one result, viz. prolonged guerilla warfare, very probably ending with the occupation of Southern Persia’.92 London decided, therefore, to leave the troops in Shiraz, until such time as they could safely be got away.93

A new strategy The solution to the dilemma in Fars came not from British arms but British gold.94 Between August 1912 and July 1914, Britain and India advanced £490,000 to the Iranian government. Of this sum, £220,000 was specifically allocated to the new governor general of Fars, Hajj Mahdi Quli Khan Hidayat Mukhbir al-Saltanah, and the provincial gendarmerie officered by Swedes. Using these funds, British and Persian authorities attempted to fashion a modern, European-style administration in Fars. As such, the plan was an admission that neither Tehran nor the British could manage the politics of notables in Fars, contain the rivalry between Qavam al-Mulk and Sawlat al-Dawlah, or depend on local cooperation for revenue collection and protection of commerce. As Smart succinctly put it in October 1912, ‘The old policy of using

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tribe against tribe is played out.’95 Cox himself had anticipated this strategy two years earlier: no permanent amelioration of conditions can be hoped for from any programme which does not include the location in Fars of a large body of regular troops, sufficiently strong and imposing to enable local Governors to enforce authority without humiliating appeals for assistance or sufferance of the notables, small and great, of the province, who are themselves the foci of all the elements of anarchy now prevailing.96 This radical departure from past Persian policy represented a much more robust and modernizing kind of British imperialism. The use of British money and European officers to strengthen Tehran’s authority in Fars increased foreign control over the state’s basic fiscal and military functions, but on the eve of World War I it appeared to bring some stability to the province and the Bushihr–Shiraz trade route. Foreign financial assistance was necessary, because neither the central government nor the provincial authorities possessed sufficient funds to raise and equip a force capable of collecting revenue or enforcing security. In May 1911 the Majlis approved an IBP loan of £1,250,000, secured on the southern customs, which was floated in July and subscribed to by nine London banking houses.97 During his brief tenure as treasurer general, Morgan Shuster made some progress towards recouping Persia’s finances, but his efforts were hampered by the expenditure required to defeat the ex-shah, Muhammad ‘Ali Mirza, in the summer of 1911, and ultimately foundered on the rocks of Russian opposition that December. The Iranian treasury was then placed under the control of the Belgian head of customs, Joseph Mornard. Money was urgently needed, and the British and Russian governments each advanced £100,000 in March 1912, conditional on Iran’s acknowledgement of the AngloRussian Convention of 1907.98 Some of these funds were spent on the gendarmerie. The Swedish commandant, Colonel H. O. Hjalmarson, had the previous month presented to Barclay and his Russian colleague, S. Poklevsky-Kozell, a budget of 700,000 tumans (£134,500) for the first 21 months. Some 245,000 tumans (£47,000) would be expended on a force of 1,450 gendarmes for the Bushihr–Isfahan road.99 Three

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Swedish officers soon arrived in Shiraz to begin recruitment. Hjalmarson hoped the gendarmes would be patrolling as far south as Kunar-i Takhtah, 75 miles from Bushihr, within a year.100 Cox was sceptical. He observed that the Swedes had not yet investigated the most difficult section between Bushihr and Kazirun, where rahdari was entrenched most deeply, and insisted that the Bushihr– Shiraz road be addressed as a whole, with the gendarmes advancing from both ends.101 From Shiraz, Smart maintained that the Swedes were ill-suited to a nearly impossible task. He explained categorically to Townley on 15 July: I doubt whether Englishmen or Russians possessing the invaluable advantage of an intimate knowledge of the language, of local conditions and politics, of Oriental character[,] of being personally acquainted with and respected by, the tribal chiefs, nobles and officials of the country, of being able to rely on the often obsequious cooperation of the local authorities, could successfully replace the present tribal domination by a locally raised gendarmerie, without long and gradual preparation, without, perhaps the support of foreign troops.102 Conditions on the road continued to deteriorate, with caravans and travellers subjected to robbery, maltreatment and extortion.103 Rahdari rates more than doubled from 18 qirans per mule in September 1911 to almost 45 qirans in July 1912.104 The Swedes, moreover, were disinclined to tackle the rahdari problem immediately. Cox argued that settlement of this issue was ‘a sine qua non to the inception of any scheme for policing the road which does not include its military occupation’.105 Unless compensated for the loss of their rahdari, the khans would be sure to fight the gendarmerie or, at very least, would prevent their own men from enlisting. The gendarmerie finally took to the field in Fars in early August 1912, but its debut was a disaster. Two Swedish officers, with a force of 80 cavalry, 180 infantry and a mountain gun, engaged some of Sawlat al-Dawlah’s Qashqa’is about 20 miles south-west of Shiraz.106 Most of the gendarmerie panicked, ran and surrendered. Despite this setback, British and Persian authorities worked to rebuild the administration of Fars. The task was daunting. Following the dismissal of Nizam al-Saltanah in October 1911, the province had been

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left without a governor general, without money and without men. ‘Ala’ al-Dawlah was nominated for a third term but was assassinated while still in Tehran, and the appointment fell temporarily to Qavam alMulk.107 Although Cox appreciated Qavam al-Mulk’s ‘friendly attitude’ and ‘sense of obligation toward us’, he maintained that the Khamsah leader was not the man for the job, because he ‘represents one of the two belligerent elements in Fars whose rivalries are mainly responsible for the chronic disorder in the province.’108 It was essential to have an impartial and strong man, and Cox would have preferred the redoubtable Zil al-Sultan, son of Nasir al-Din Shah.109 Neither Cox nor Townley was especially confident about Mukhbir al-Saltanah, whose appointment was announced in July, but they pledged to support him.110 The financial situation of Fars was acute. Through the first nine months of the Persian financial year 1912– 1913, only 25,000 tumans (£4,500) of a projected annual provincial revenue of some 700,000– 800,000 tumans (£127,000–£145,500) had been collected.111 In May 1912 Smart had suggested direct loans to the local authorities.112 Townley supported the proposal, and when in August the British and Russian governments made another joint advance of £50,000 to Tehran, the British earmarked their half (£25,000) for use solely in Fars.113 Of this latter sum, £10,000 was immediately spent to meet arrears due to the local garrison and to put Mukhbir al-Saltanah and Qavam al-Mulk, who was now acting as his deputy, in funds.114 The remaining £15,000 was allocated to the Fars gendarmerie. Mukhbir al-Saltanah arrived in Shiraz in the middle of October, bringing with him as military commander Darya Baygi, an old friend and veteran governor of the gulf ports. Mukhbir al-Saltanah quickly announced his intention of recruiting a force of 1,800 men to chastise the tribes and collect their long overdue taxes and requested money for this purpose, and at about that time Britain loaned a further £15,000 specifically for his administration. Smart endorsed the plan, but cautioned ‘that much of the money will be wasted unless there be European control’.115 Townley was also concerned about ‘pilfering ministers’ and decided to detain this latest £15,000 until the arrival of a Belgian treasury official, A. Stas, and a new British consul, Major O’Connor, at Shiraz.116 During O’Connor’s first week, the intolerable position of the 39th Central Indian Horse at Shiraz was again made plain when, on 11 December, one of the regiment’s officers, Captain A. B. Eckford, was

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shot and killed while hunting about 30 miles from Shiraz.117 Neither the culprits nor the motive was immediately clear. Counselling restraint, O’Connor maintained the attackers were out merely for plunder and had not intentionally targeted British troops.118 Cox, however, stressed that the incident only underscored the need for an expedition in the spring to occupy Kazirun.119 This view found powerful expression with the publication in The Times of a private letter from an unnamed British officer in Shiraz, who declared that he and his colleagues had been fired at numerous times and that Eckford’s murder was ‘deliberate’.120 ‘Of course’, the exasperated officer exclaimed, the promises and undertakings of the Persian Government are pure farce. There has got to be an expedition, and the sooner Government realize it the better. At present the sole outcome of their policy has been the lowering of the moral[e] of a fine regiment, the destruction of all respect that Persians used to have for Englishmen, and the notification to all that officers and troops can be shot at without any fear of punishment or retaliation [. . .] How can I answer my men when they ask if the Sirkar is afraid of the Persians? It is only too obvious that we are. Commenting privately on the above, the journalist Lovat Fraser wrote to Cox that military intervention would only further alienate radicals in the Liberal Party, anger Indian Muslims and, more importantly, threaten the Anglo-Russian Convention, the maintenance of which was Grey’s primary concern.121 Grey sided with O’Connor and Townley and decided to await the outcome of Mukhbir al-Saltanah’s efforts. To ensure the proper use of the £15,000 earmarked for Fars, O’Connor recommended that British officers be appointed as financial and military advisers to the governor general.122 Townley demurred, pointing out that such a step would ‘fatally discredit’ the Belgians and Swedes and encourage Russia to take similar action in the north.123 In early January the provincial revenue inspector, Mirza Mustafa Khan, presented a budget to O’Connor for the expenditure of the British advance.124 The £15,000 was enough for the Fars administration, the beginnings of the governor’s new military force, police and road guards for the remainder of the fiscal year ending in March 1913. It would not, however, cover expenditure for punitive expeditions against the tribes. Treasurer

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General Mornard sanctioned the plan and the funds were credited through the IBP to O’Connor, who transferred them to the recently arrived Belgian treasury agent, A. Stas. It was clear that more British money would be required. Mukhbir alSaltanah was unable to collect taxes at least until July. O’Connor urged that Britain provide another £40,000 to £50,000 for the first four to six months of the financial year 1913– 1914. ‘Having once began to finance the administration of Fars’, he maintained, it would seem impossible to withdraw from the task until the Governor-General finds himself in a position to collect his own taxes and to maintain public security. When he is strong enough to do this, his revenue should suffice to meet his normal requirements. In the meantime, however, we should, I venture to think, be prepared to continue to provide the sinews of war if we wish the province not to lapse into a state even worse than that in which it now is.125 Townley agreed in principle but indicated that £30,000 would suffice.126 This sum was provided from a further British advance of £200,000 in conjunction with an equal amount from Russia in April 1913.127 During 1913, O’Connor and Stas disbursed the funds in monthly subsidies to local authorities. More British money was forthcoming to the gendarmerie in Fars. Following the attack on Eckford, the foreign minister, ‘Ala’ al-Saltanah, presented a revised gendarmerie plan to Townley and requested £350,000 to pay for it.128 Colonel Hjalmarson subsequently reduced this estimate to £264,000 over two years, and negotiations were begun for an initial instalment of £100,000. Cox wanted to use this opportunity to solidify Britain’s special position in the south, and insisted on the receipt of formal Iranian recognition of Britain’s ‘prescriptive rights to control lighting, buoying, and policing of Gulf’ that would include a pledge to obtain British consent before granting any lease or concession to any third party in either the British or neutral zones, allowing access to the upper Karun, the abnegation of Iranian claims to Bahrain and acknowledgment of British protection of Bahrainis and Trucial Arabs in Iran.129 Although Grey dropped the request regarding the neutral zone, the new foreign minister, Vusuq al-

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Dawlah, stiffly resisted these sweeping demands, in the end agreeing only to follow British guidance regarding expenditure of the funds, which were made available in May 1913.130 Although suffering periodic reversals, the Swedes managed over the next year to exert some kind of control over the Bushihr–Shiraz road. On 31 March 1913, 450 gendarmes under Hjalmarson arrived at Shiraz.131 Elements of this force marched to Bushihr to escort a shipment of German arms and ammunition purchased for their use. The presence of the gendarmerie made possible the departure of the long-suffering 39th Central Indian Horse from Shiraz, which reached Bushihr safely on 16 April after a sojourn of a year and a half.132 In late May another 600 gendarmes reached Shiraz under Major Uggla, who assumed command of the regiment, which by July had swelled to 1,700 men.133 Unwilling to subject their men to summer heat on the southern sections, the Swedes elected to delay occupying the road until autumn. In the meantime, Persian authorities made arrangements with the road khans for the abolition of rahdari in return for the payment of subsidies and the employment of local road guards. In mid-November Uggla led a force of 700 gendarmes down the road and established a chain of posts to Bushihr. During the operation local militias overwhelmed the gendarmerie garrison at Kazirun, but a relief column recaptured the town on 1 December 1913. The situation at Kazirun remained unsatisfactory for some time and was the subject of much adverse local comment, but in the residency’s annual report for 1914 Major A. P. Trevor recorded that: the year under report, though it commenced very badly, has ended well and that the last six months of the year have shown the province to be in a state of tranquillity, unparalleled any time these past five years. On the Bushire-Shiraz road, Rahdari has ceased, caravans and travellers have passed practically unmolested and credit must be given to the Gendarmerie for having brought about, for the moment, this satisfactory state of affairs.134 Grahame and O’Connor concurred that the gendarmerie had been mainly successful in Isfahan and Shiraz by the end of 1914.135 Persian and British officials also made progress towards reestablishing state authority and increasing revenue in Fars. Mukhbir al-Saltanah supplied Qavam al-Mulk with British funds to subdue

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rebellious Khamsahs in 1913.136 From April to August, Qavam al-Mulk ranged across eastern Fars at the head of 7,000 to 8,000 Arab cavalry, summarily executing two of the most notorious brigands in the province and even remitting long overdue tribal taxes. In the autumn he became governor of Lar, and after making financial arrangements with Stas, he defeated his old enemy Sayyid ‘Abd al-Husayn Lari in January 1914. Throughout the summer of 1913 Stas had proved successful in collecting some revenue from the districts closer to Shiraz, enlisting a detachment of 200 horsemen for the purpose. Even more important for the tranquillity of Fars was the reconciliation of Qavam al-Mulk and Sawlat al-Dawlah in the spring of 1914. Townley noted to Grey that the cause of this rapprochement was probably fear of the gendarmerie, which the two chiefs preferred to see disbanded.137 Hoping to reconcile them to the new state of affairs, the British promised to support Qavam al-Mulk and Sawlat al-Dawlah as the respective ilkhanis of the Khamsahs and Qashqa’is so long as they maintained their truce, kept order within their confederacies, remained on good terms with British representatives, paid their taxes and cooperated with the local administration, including the gendarmerie.138 This agreement notwithstanding, the British were committed to a modern regime in Fars that – anticipating Riza Shah – would substitute centralized, European-style military control of the tribes in place of the traditional Qajar office of ilkhani. O’Connor observed to Townley in November 1913: In a word, the Sowlet-ed-Dowleh, like a good many other institutions in Fars, is a relic of an old-fashioned re´gime, and as his general character and up-bringing seem to render him incapable of adopting himself to modern ideas and requirements, he must sooner or later disappear and be replaced by some substitute more satisfactory and amenable.139

A long-term commitment These improvements in Fars notwithstanding, the more fundamental task of fashioning a provincial government capable of sustaining itself and the gendarmerie had yet to be achieved. In March 1913 Stas estimated that in addition to the forthcoming British subsidy of £30,000 (165,000 tumans), he would be able to collect about 200,000

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tumans (£36,500) in Fars during the fiscal year 1913–1914.140 This combined sum, however, was well below annual expenditure, which Stas projected at 550,000 tumans (£100,000). Mukhbir al-Saltanah, moreover, resented the close supervision of his accounts by Stas as well as Swedish interference in his administration, threatening on several occasions to resign. By May 1914 it was clear that although revenues had exceeded Stas’s original estimates, so too had expenditures. O’Connor noted that expenses were running about 732,000 tumans (£133,000) per annum. The provincial treasury was insolvent and had outstandings of 94,000 tumans (£17,000). The annual cost of the gendarmerie in Fars, although heavily subsidized by Britain, was about 825,000 tumans (£150,000), a sum well in excess of provincial revenues. With the Swedes threatening to resign because of arrears of pay, the British and Indian governments made yet another advance of £50,000 in August 1914, of which £40,000 was set aside for the Fars gendarmerie.141 The money, however, did not last to the end of the year, and Knox confessed that ‘Exactly how the force continues to subsist is not clear.’142 By October the pay of the Swedish officers was again in arrears, and Hjalmarson warned that if satisfactory arrangements were not made soon, he and his men would resign.143 While even more money was required in Fars, the use of the southern customs receipts as security for these advances was undercutting the civil administration of the gulf ports and, more importantly, was inadequate to meet present obligations, much less any further Anglo-Indian advances. Although the governor of the gulf ports, Muvaqqar al-Dawlah, was technically subordinate to Shiraz, he did not receive any funds from the stipends provided to Mukhbir al-Saltanah. Cox in vain asked for money for Bushihr.144 In the fiscal year 1912–1913 the net revenue of the southern customs after administrative expenses was about £141,000.145 Of this sum, £93,000 was reserved for the repayment of the Anglo-Indian loan of 1903– 1904 and the IBP loan of 1911. Cox contended that the ability to meet these obligations out of customs receipts depended on effective local government, which in turn required money.146 In this connection, he reminded Townley that the present weakness of the local authorities occasioned the ‘great expense’ of maintaining Britain’s current enhanced naval and military forces in the Persian Gulf.147 Cox demanded greater British supervision over the finances of both Muvaqqar al-Dawlah and customs.148 The governor

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agreed to cooperate with the Belgian treasury and customs officer at Bushihr in drawing up budgets, but the financial problems of the gulf ports remained unresolved. Further complicating the situation was the fact that after July 1915, any customs surplus over and above £93,000 was pledged to the British advances of 1912– 1913, which were to be repaid off in six-monthly instalments of £50,000.149 The difficulty was that after subtracting the aforementioned £93,000, the net customs revenues of £141,000 (1912– 1913) afforded an annual surplus of only £48,000, which was far below the £100,000 due in 1915– 1916 from the southern customs to the British and Indian governments. These figures, moreover, did not account for the additional £50,000 advanced in June 1914. Townley emphasized that the viability of the Iranian government in the south now largely depended on the Belgian financial administration and the Swedish-officered gendarmerie. That both institutions would soon require more British aid was certain, but how such advances would be secured was unknown. Britain had secured a modicum of order in Fars, but only by committing itself to subsidizing the provincial administration for the foreseeable future and, in so doing, alienating key elements of the old order.

The Anglo-Russian Convention under Strain In the years between the Anglo-Russian Convention and World War I, Britain was much more active in the neutral zone than in its own sphere. The agreement never accurately reflected the geographical distribution of British interests and influence in the region, and Anglo-Indian consuls and political officers never relinquished their ambitions in the neutral zone. After 1907, Britain had considerably expanded its influence in Arabistan, Fars and the gulf ports. It was natural, therefore, when reviewing the situation, that British officials seriously considered extending Britain’s sphere to include parts of the neutral zone.150 Russia’s increasingly obvious domination of northern Iran significantly informed this debate. The incursions of 1909 and 1911 had brought the total number of Russian troops in northern Iran to over 16,000 by 1913.151 After violently suppressing sporadic Iranian resistance, these forces had settled into what Townley described as an ‘almost practical occupation’.152 Russian consuls like A. Miller in

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Tabriz, who a decade earlier had caused the British so much trouble in Sistan, exercised wide administrative powers and controlled local officials to a greater extent even than the British did in the south. The conduct of Russian consuls put tremendous strain on Anglo-Russian relations, which was only partially mitigated by Britain’s desperate hopes that such behaviour was not sanctioned by the Russian legation.153 Russian settlers arrived in the northern provinces in great numbers and acquired landed estates in violation of the Treaty of Turkmanchay. Many Persians accepted Russian protection to secure their property. Russian consuls directed that taxes due on properties owned by Russian subjects or prote´ge´s be handed over for deposit at the Russian bank against claims on the Iranian government, a practice that further undermined the state’s already tenuous finances.154 The Iranian treasury protested against this patent infringement of Persian sovereignty, to no avail. The Russians also opposed the deployment of the gendarmerie in Azerbaijan, preferring instead the Russian-officered Cossack Brigade. These proceedings embarrassed Britain, especially Sir Edward Grey, who was denounced at home as an accomplice to Russian aggression in Iran.155 More importantly, the expansion of Russian influence into the neutral zone from Isfahan posed risks to British interests, which still defined the exclusion of Russia from southern Iran as essential to the security of India. Townley viewed these developments with growing misgiving. In March 1913 he reluctantly recommended the division of the neutral zone and the partition of Iran into northern and southern states in the event of the ex-shah’s return.156 Grey was not impressed, and still considered the convention the best means of preserving the ‘independence and integrity of Persia’ and of limiting Britain and India’s responsibilities there to a strategic minimum. Cox also criticized the idea, noting to Townley that it ‘would seem to mean incidentally the partition of Persia, the consequent migration of your Mission southwards, and a complete recasting of all arrangements in the South’.157 The consul general, whose nearly decade-long tenure in Bushihr was drawing to a close, was relatively confident about Britain’s standing in the neutral zone. ‘I think it will be generally admitted’, Cox maintained, that ‘in proportion as the predominant position of Russia in Northern Persia is tending to increase and inure towards permanence, so in the South the “Persian Question” and our interests in

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Southern Persia are gradually assuming a more definite and concrete aspect.’ ‘Our policy in the Central Zone and the South’, he concluded, ‘generally should be one of deliberate and constructive consolidation of the position we now enjoy rather than of summary disintegration among the component parts.’ The India Office also opposed a formal partition of the neutral zone. Sir Thomas Holderness explained to the Foreign Office in June 1914: ‘British commercial and political interests are so distributed over the neutral sphere as to make relinquishing any portion of it to Russia difficult and hazardous.’158 Regarding Arabistan, Holderness advocated that Britain obtain guarantees from Shaykh Khaz‘al similar to those secured from Shaykh Mubarak of Kuwait in 1899, against the alienation or lease of any his territory to a foreign power or subject. As for troublesome Fars, the Swedes were not ideal, but because they had been moderately successful and the employment of British officers was impossible, they should continue to receive British financial aid and moral support. The Iranian government, furthermore, should be induced to remind the Swedes ‘that inasmuch as the gendarmerie owes its continued existence solely to British money and support, British interests and commerce have a claim upon its services, second only to its obligation of loyalty to Persia’. Holderness admitted, however, that these measures would not stop Russian encroachment on the neutral zone, which must be resisted even at the risk of abrogating the Anglo-Russian Convention. Grey’s seemingly inexhaustible patience with Russia was wearing thin. On 10 June 1914 he communicated to the Russian ambassador, Count Benckendorff, a formal memorandum roundly condemning Russian conduct in northern Iran and Russian penetration of the neutral zone. Such a situation, the Foreign Office insisted, constituted a breach of the status quo confirmed in the Anglo-Russian Convention. A revision of this agreement was likely needed ‘to restore the relative interests of Russia and Great Britain to the position which they occupied respectively in 1907’.159 These protests against Russian activity south of Isfahan revealed that British officials did not regard this region as ‘neutral’ at all, a fact Sir George Buchanan, the British ambassador at St Petersburg, appreciated when he remarked that Hardinge’s recent declaration about safeguarding Britain’s ‘commercial and political predominance’ in the neutral sphere was hardly consistent with the terms of the convention.160 The Russian foreign minister, Sazonov, also

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rightly pointed out that the neutral zone was open to both powers and that the British had certainly not confined their efforts to their own sphere.161 When Tsar Nicholas II himself offered to divide the neutral zone, the proposal only underscored the untenable nature of Britain’s diplomatic position, which denounced Russian encroachment in the neutral zone while seeking to retain its own informal supremacy there.162 By the summer of 1914 the Anglo-Russian Convention was falling apart all along the line, from Iran to Afghanistan and Tibet; it was saved only by the outbreak of war in Europe.163

Calm before the storm All things considered, Britain’s position in southern Iran appeared quite strong in the last months of peace. The British had humiliated Hishmat al-Mulk in Sistan and Qa’inat. Shaykh Khaz‘al was a British prote´ge´ in all but name and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was firmly entrenched in Arabistan. The Royal Navy and India Army acted with impunity all along the Iranian coast, tracking down gun runners, punishing pirates and ensuring the security of the ports. Even Fars, which had so vexed British officials, seemed to be settling down into relative peace and order. The gendarmerie patrolled the Bushihr – Shiraz road, and although the financial situation left much to be desired, there were reasonable grounds for hoping that with continued British aid, the administration of Fars would eventually become self-reliant. There was even consensus among officials in London, India and Iran that Britain’s basic monopoly of influence in the neutral zone should be defended, even at the cost of damaging Anglo-Russian relations. Consuls in the British sphere may have desired more active and adventurous employment, but the British Empire’s interests on the ‘glacis of India’ were better served by peace and quiet. More than that, Sistan afforded Britain an offensive strategic posture in the Middle East. It was a pivot on which the Indian Empire might swing north into the neutral zone and if necessary beyond. Russia, it could be argued, might have easily abrogated the convention and renewed its campaign in Sistan. Thinly stretched at home and abroad, the tsar’s government was also experiencing difficulties in its own northern sphere. The Russian occupation there was growing tedious, more unpopular and more expensive, tying up political and financial resources that might have been deployed in the neutral zone. The British, however, did not suffer

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under these disabilities in their sphere and could devote most of their available resources to consolidating their position in Arabistan, Fars and the gulf. Nevertheless, the real problem of Britain’s position in Sistan and Qa’inat was that it was not based on any real strength on the ground. If Russia or another power had sufficient reason and means to meddle there, very extensive measures would immediately be required to defend what remained India’s most vulnerable flank. The outbreak of World War I would create just such a situation and require such measures to check German infiltration. The British, moreover, had underestimated the resentment, both national and local, towards their actions. The employment of different tactics in Arabistan, the gulf ports and Fars may have been practical, but to Iranians of progressive or nationalist views it was clear that the strategy had perpetuated regional differences and reinforced the power of traditional autocratic elites, such as Shaykh Khaz‘al or Shawkat alMulk.164 In this connection, it is interesting to note the general decline of constitutional institutions in the south after 1909. And yet, the British frequently failed to conciliate the notables, Fars being a case in point. Road khans and tribal magnates sullenly begrudged Britain the curtailment of their power and revenue. Many nationalists, officials and ulama also objected to Britain’s increasing financial and political control in the south. The Persian image of grasping and perfidious Albion had hardened.

PART III CONSULS AT WAR, 1915—1921

CHAPTER 6 PROXY WARS:THE BATTLE FOR SOUTHERN IRAN

World War I was the high-water mark of British consular imperialism in Iran. The threat to India posed by the entry of the Ottoman Empire into the war on Germany’s side ensured Iran a prominent place in Britain’s strategic appreciation of the conflict. Consuls and political officers had long been the mainstay of British influence in southern Iran, and the restrictions on the use of military force imposed by troop shortages and Iranian neutrality made certain they would continue to play a central role in British policy during the war. Their significance was understood by their German, Ottoman and Iranian adversaries, who were eager to supplant British influence in the region. Throughout 1915, British consuls were in danger of being completely overwhelmed. After an Indian expeditionary force occupied Basra, Shaykh Khaz‘al and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company were menaced by an Ottoman invasion of Arabistan and a tribal revolt, which were repulsed only by redeploying British troops from Iraq. Iranian nationalists, politically active ulama and discontented tribes, encouraged by German agents, moved against the British and ejected them from most of the inland towns, while a German diplomatic mission made its way east through Qa’inat in the hope of inducing Afghanistan to invade India. Synchronized British occupations of Bushihr and Sistan failed to stem the tide. Nevertheless, in 1916– 1917 the political officers activated their latent military capabilities and counter-attacked with local Iranian forces, arming local prote´ge´s – the Bakhtiyari khans and Qavam al-Mulk – and raising levy

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forces, the Sistan Levy Corps and the South Persia Rifles, under British command. These proxies enabled British officials to initiate a broader imperial strategy of incorporating the neutral zone defined by the Anglo-Russian Convention into a comprehensive British sphere of influence over all of southern Iran, which with the conquest of Ottoman Iraq, now occupied the vital territorial link between India and Britain’s new empire in the Arab Middle East.

Iranian Neutrality, Consuls and World War I Iranian neutrality was unlikely to be respected by the belligerents or defended by the government in Tehran, which could not protect its broad frontiers against Ottoman, German, Russian or British incursions. Persia, moreover, still relied on British and Russian financial aid. The entente was determined to maintain this dependency, while the Central Powers sought to loosen the Anglo-Russian stranglehold. Although Russia was traditionally Britain’s rival in Iran and the Middle East, German and Ottoman ambitions in the region since the turn of the century had not escaped British suspicions. The Ottoman Empire presented a more immediate menace to British interests. Both the Suez Canal and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company’s installations were vulnerable to Ottoman attack. Ottoman jihad propaganda encouraging pan-Islamic uprisings against the entente was also dangerous. German agents fanned out across Iran to support these efforts, which they hoped would significantly undermine allied resistance in Europe. Iranian nationalists freely appropriated the language of jihad for their own, more secular purposes.1 Nominally neutral, Iran’s borderlands became battlefields.2 The ensuing contest, like the Anglo-Russian rivalry before it, occurred at two levels: the diplomatic level in Tehran and the local level in southern and eastern Iran. Throughout 1915 the German minister at Tehran, Prince Heinrich of Reuss, together with his Ottoman and Austrian colleagues, pressured several short-lived Iranian cabinets to declare war against the Allies, while their British and Russian counterparts strove to keep Iran neutral by offers of financial support and threats of military intervention.3 Tehran’s inability to control its officials and subjects in the provinces ensured that Iranian neutrality would be contested not only at the centre, but also on the periphery.

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The Anglo-Russian Convention had severely limited the ability of local men to play off the two powers against each other, but the war allowed Persian notables to offer their support once again to the highest bidder. In addition, British policy since 1907 had alienated many Iranians, who were only too eager to take advantage of German aid and British vulnerability. Political officers struggled mightily to distinguish friend from foe. They often described hostile Iranians as ‘pro-German’ or ‘proTurk’, but some of their more thoughtful colleagues understood that many Iranians were motivated less by a desire to serve the kaiser or sultan than to secure their own independence and interests by capitalizing on the European war. British military options in Iran were limited. Grey and others were anxious lest British military action should push Iran into the enemy camp. Grey also appreciated that Britain’s vigorous defence of Belgian neutrality required at least an outward respect for Persia’s.4 British and imperial forces, moreover, were already engaged in Europe, Egypt and East Africa and few troops could be spared for service in Iran. By early 1915 India had sent much of its army to other theatres. Viceroy Hardinge worried that his denuded forces could not defend the Raj against external attack or internal rebellion. Campaigns against the Ottomans in Mesopotamia and the Dardanelles further strained imperial resources. In 1915– 1916, Indian troops were deployed in Arabistan, Fars, the gulf ports and Baluchistan, as well as in Sistan and Qa’inat, but with the exception of Arabistan they were inadequate to protect British interests in these scattered regions. They were, therefore, supplemented by that long-discussed expedient: Iranian levies under British officers. The Sistan Levy Corps (SLC) assisted British forces in guarding the Afghan– Iranian frontier against German infiltration. The South Persia Rifles (SPR) attempted to pacify Fars and was commanded by none other than the now brigadier general, Sir Percy Sykes, who had dreamed of such a mission since his consular days. British consuls exercised broad overlapping military, diplomatic, financial and intelligence powers. At the outbreak of the war the consuls at Muhammarah, Ahvaz, Bushihr, Shiraz, Bandar-i ‘Abbas, Kirman, and Sistan and Qa’inat were all Anglo-Indian political officers holding military rank. Beginning in 1914, they mobilized the imperial archive for war. They had long studied their districts with a view to military contingencies. Consular reports were replete with analyses of roads,

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transport, water supplies, forage, accessibility of artillery, potential ambush and defensive locations and other intelligence required by any large force operating in this difficult terrain. They possessed extensive information about the political organization of the tribes, their leaders, feuds and fighting capacities. They advised military authorities as to the local political situation, collected intelligence, conducted relations with notables and officials, recruited levies and arranged for transport and supply. They monitored the effectiveness and political dispositions of provincial governors and their subordinates, pressing them to act vigorously against German violations of Iranian neutrality, while at the same time dismissing British breaches as a consequence of local officials’ inability to uphold that neutrality. Money had long been a key instrument of British policy in Iran, and between 1915 and 1921 British representatives disbursed large sums to finance the central and provincial governments, which in turn gave them some control over local revenues, budgets and spending. In May 1919 Cox, then serving as Special Commissioner in Tehran, put this total figure at almost £1.9 million since 1915.5 The British viewed these payments as advances to the Iranian government and kept them distinct from another category of consular expenditure – the Secret Service. The Indian government provided these funds for political and intelligence purposes. Before the war, consuls in Iran received very little Secret Service monies. Between 1909 and early 1915, Sistan had the highest such expenditure, averaging some Rs 4,350 (£290) per year, while Bushihr spent a trifling Rs 200 (£13) per year.6 Beginning in March 1915 Hardinge authorized the southern consuls ‘to incur expenditure on Secret Service without sanction in excess of their allotments’.7 Post-war estimates put Secret Service outlay in Iran at about Rs 35,00,000 (£265,000) between 1915 and 1920, but the amount actually disbursed was certainly larger.8 Tribal chiefs and government officials received subsidies to secure their good will and support. The consuls erected an extensive intelligence network of spies, news agents and messengers and subsidized pro-British propaganda. Perhaps the greatest testimony to this scheme is to be found in a captured German document outlining operations in Iran: One of the greatest advantages which our enemies have over us is their excellent system of observation and (communication).

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To cripple it and to create a new one of our own must be our next care. The English work the best, they have their Consulates, at smaller places native consular agents, officials of the Imperial Bank of Persia, the Anglo-Indian Telegraph, employees of Lynch Bros., partly also of Zeigler as well as other firms, their missions as well as a host of avaricious Persians. In addition to the abovementioned services, they have also influential Chiefs, for instance, of the Bakhtiaris, Governors, and Karguzars.9 The German –Ottoman threat to India forced the British to reconsider their position in southern and eastern Iran. The war confirmed the artificiality of the distinction between the British and neutral spheres. Indian security could no more tolerate enemy intrigue in Bushihr, Fars, or Arabistan than in Sistan and Qa’inat; it was essential once again to treat southern Iran as a geopolitical whole. This strategic reintegration was explicitly recognized in a series of allied provisional diplomatic exchanges in early 1915, collectively known as the Constantinople Agreement.10 Looking forward to the successful conclusion of the conflict, Britain accepted Russian claims on Istanbul and the straits in return for control of unspecified parts of the Ottoman Empire and ‘revision of the Persian portion of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 so as to recognise the present neutral sphere as a British sphere’.11 Considering that the Indian Army had occupied Basra since November 1914 and was marching north on Baghdad, it was obvious that Britain was aiming at Iraq, which would then be linked to India by an expanded British sphere of influence across the whole of southern Iran. As Leopold Amery, secretary to the cabinet’s Territorial Changes Committee, explained in 1916, what Britain wanted was ‘continuity of territory or of control between Egypt and India’.12 Southern Iran was no longer simply part of the glacis of India, but an integral part of Britain’s imperial ambitions in the Middle East.

Crisis The British Empire invaded Ottoman Iraq in November 1914 because of Iranian oil. Even before hostilities began, Indian Expeditionary Force D (IEFD) had sailed to the head of the Persian Gulf to establish a ‘forward

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defence’ of the Iranian oil fields against an Ottoman attack. The IEFD landed at al-Faw on 6 November, the day after the British declaration of war, and began advancing on Basra. Sir Percy Cox acted as the force’s chief political officer. He had left Bushihr in December 1913, unlikely to return, and became acting secretary in the Indian Foreign Department.13 On the outbreak of war he asked Hardinge if he could join the IEFD. In addition to these duties, Hardinge also reappointed him resident in the Persian Gulf and consul general for southern Iran so that, as the viceroy put it, ‘you may have all the strings in your hand at the same time’.14 Cox’s headquarters were now in Basra, not Bushihr, but he again managed the execution of British policy and supervision of the extensive consular network in the Persian Gulf and southern Iran. Although the British quickly secured Basra, the strategy provoked the very crisis it was meant to prevent: an Ottoman invasion of Arabistan. In January 1915, 700 Ottoman regulars with two guns and 1,000 of Shaykh Gazban’s Bani Lam auxiliaries crossed the frontier, reaching the Kharka River, 24 miles west of Ahvaz, on 10 February.15 Consul Ranking reported that mullas in Ahvaz were ‘actively preaching holy war’ and he feared that Khaz‘al’s men would revolt against him.16 The shaykh may have been one of the strongest tribal leaders in Iran, but he was not immune to periodic rebellions. Many lesser chiefs chafed under his authoritarian rule and stiff tax regime and resented his close relations with the British, from which they had profited little. The Ottomans provided them with an unprecedented opportunity. The Bani Turuf and the Bawi soon revolted, the latter attacking the oil pipeline in February.17 Refinery production slowed to a halt.18 Elements of the Ka‘b Arabs, inspired by the preaching of Mulla Sayyid Jabar, also declared hostilities against Khaz‘al and began to advance north toward Ahvaz.19 Khaz‘al feared his confederacy might break up entirely and urged Cox to send British forces up river to bolster his men between Ahvaz and Muhammarah. The shaykh, Cox claimed, ‘is always prone to panic and I have done my best to steady him, but the situation is undoubtedly disquieting’.20 British and Ottoman forces converged on Ahvaz. In early March, Cox warned India that defeat at Ahvaz would have serious consequences: I regret to appear as an alarmist but it is impossible to neglect consideration that a seizure of Ahvaz by an hostile force, apart from

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providing the enemy with an excellent and well supplied base from which to threaten our flank [at Basra], would mean isolating the Oil Fields settlement and indefinite cessation of work at Abadan, and loss of some millions of money. It would envolve [sic] enormous loss of prestige to us and greatly stimulate native rising in ‘Arabistan and extend its scope.21 The British considerably strengthened their position at Ahvaz. By the end of the month Cox was confident that the danger had passed, but British reinforcements still poured into the town.22 By 1 May 1915 General G. F. Gorringe’s 12th Indian Division at Ahvaz totaled three brigades and 12,500 men.23 This force then moved against the east flank of the Ottoman line north of Basra in concert with British attacks further to the west. As he advanced, Gorringe carried out punitive measures against the Bani Turuf, capturing livestock and destroying grain and supplies.24 Gorringe’s division paralysed Ottoman resistance at al-Amara, which fell on 3 June 1915. The British expedition to Iraq and military intervention at Ahvaz had profound political consequences for Arabistan. Britain had indeed made good the promises dating back to 1902 to defend Khaz‘al against external aggression, and in this sense their assistance against the Ottomans vindicated the wisdom of the shaykh’s policy. Lacking regular infantry and artillery, he could hardly have expected to resist Ottoman forces unaided, but the crisis of 1915 revealed something quite unexpected: British military power was required to preserve Khaz‘al’s authority over his tribal confederation. Pledged to preserve the shaykh against external threats, the British found themselves obliged to maintain him against internal rebellion as well. After the revolt, consuls and political officers were consequently tempted to intervene in tribal affairs, especially for the protection of the oil pipeline.25 In June 1915 the new consul at Muhammarah, R. L. Kennion, whose trying experiences in Sistan were related earlier, observed to Cox that: The Sheikh’s attitude is quite unreasonable though very natural. He would like to have the support of our troops to keep his tribes in order – either by the threat conveyed in their presence or actively – but he demurs in the corollary that we should have a voice in their treatment.

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I am personally of opinion that it is inevitable that we should be forced into the position of the ‘paramount power’ as between the Shaikh and his tribes. But at present time, I do not think anything at all should be done that might have the result of weakening the Shaikh’s authority or shake his belief in our intentions as regards himself.26 Kennion’s allusion to the ‘paramount power’ was an explicit reference to the relationship between the Raj and the Indian princes, and it was clear that Khaz‘al now depended on the British to an unprecedented degree.

The anti-British coalition Arabistan, Shaykh Khaz‘al and the APOC were safe, but enemy agents and propaganda remained serious problems for British interests in southern Iran, Afghanistan and India. In April 1915 Captain Oskar von Niedermayer led a German diplomatic mission across the Persian frontier to Isfahan, where he established an advance base for the perilous 700-mile journey to Afghanistan.27 Wilhelm Wassmuss, meanwhile, who had already demonstrated a penchant for twisting the British lion’s tail while vice consul in Bushihr before the war, reached Shiraz in March 1915. His journey had not been without incident. Cox induced a friendly coastal chief, Haydar Khan of Hayat Dawd, to detain Wassmuss near Bandar-i Rig.28 Wassmuss, however, escaped but not before the British seized his baggage, which contained a diplomatic codebook that later proved critical to British cryptologists, as well as jihad propaganda in Persian, Arabic and Hindustani-Urdu.29 Cox also ordered the arrest of the German consul at Bushihr, Dr H. Listemann, and his deportation to India.30 The British brushed aside Persian protests, because captured German documents provided proof of a conspiracy to attack British interests in Iran and Afghanistan.31 The danger now clear, Cox declared that Wassmuss was ‘nothing more than a pirate’ and that ‘if he should start from Shiraz eastward, I suggest O’Connor should be authorised to spend Rs 10,000 to get him shot on the way’.32 This blunt proposal shocked officials in London, and the India Office instructed Viceroy Hardinge that no mention of Cox’s proposal should be ‘allowed to remain on record in any form’.33 Undaunted, Wassmuss began mobilizing anti-British elements in Fars.

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He was undoubtedly a man of great daring and considerable charisma, and has loomed large in accounts of the resistance to the British in Fars during the war.34 The British certainly blamed him for their difficulties. By 1915, however, many people in Fars resented Britain. British efforts to control the Bushihr– Shiraz road and stamp out rahdari and arms trafficking had aroused the hostility of men like Ghazanfar al-Saltanah of Burazjan, Shaykh Husayn Khan of Chahkutah and Za’ir Khizir of Tangistan, the last of whom the Iranian Interior Ministry had referred to in 1911 as a notorious brigand and arms smuggler.35 To these grievances were added the passage of British troops between Bushihr and Shiraz before the war, and in the case of Tangistan, naval bombardment and amphibious assault in 1913 against another of Wassmuss’s future associates, Ra’is ‘Ali of Dilvar, whose village the British had sacked. It was these men who fought the British during the war. Pahlavi accounts praised them as national heroes, and after 1979 they earned approbation as champions of Islam.36 The presence of British and Indian troops certainly enabled them to appeal to a wider Persian audience in the valiant idiom of ‘Islam and Iran’, but it must also be remembered that they were defending their own political and pecuniary interests along the Bushihr–Shiraz road and the gulf littoral. Finally, the British had estranged the powerful ilkhani of the Qashqa’is, Sawlat al-Dawlah, who was thus unlikely to provide much meaningful assistance against the Germans. The British also faced a broader nationalist and religious opposition in Shiraz. British ideas about Persian society and reliance on elites for information had left them with an underdeveloped appreciation of Iran’s increasingly politicized urban population. The consuls’ influence with the Shi‘i ulama, moreover, had always been tenuous and they failed to overcome the growing anti-foreign sentiments of much of the clergy, for whom ‘Islam in danger’ was a potent, popular rallying cry. Britain’s tacit collusion with Russian aggression after 1907, moreover, had also alienated nationalist opinion. The Democrat Party, which won a majority of seats in the Majlis in the election of 1914, established committees in Shiraz and other cities. The party was a key focus of nationalist political activity and its foreign policy was virulently antiRussian, and by association, anti-British. The Shiraz committee was headed by Fakhr al-Saltanah and Haji ‘Ali Aqa Mujtahid and included prominent local leaders such as Mirza Abu Fazl, the son of Mirza

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Ibrahim Mujtahid, and Sayyid Hasan, brother of the editor of Habl alMatin.37 The Democrats campaigned to turn public opinion in Shiraz against the British, organizing popular demonstrations with important cooperation from the ulama and publishing a newspaper called Jam-i Jam.38 Another anti-allied paper, Tazianah, also appeared in Shiraz. The British suspected the governor general, Mukhbir al-Saltanah, of encouraging these activities, although in his memoirs years later he carefully claimed to have observed neutrality in the conflict.39 The Democrats also developed close political relations with the other major focus of nationalist activity in the province, the gendarmerie.40 This situation was ironic, especially since the gendarmerie had been established under substantial British pressure, was sustained only by significant British financial support and was commanded by Swedes. Persian gendarmerie officers, however, were very politically conscious and wanted the force to play a central role in modernizing the nation and strengthening it against foreign influence.41 These men were largely of northern extraction, and many, including the ranking Iranian officer in Shiraz in 1915, Major ‘Ali Quli Khan Pasyan, had served in Morgan Shuster’s treasury gendarmerie in 1911, where they had developed ties with the Democrats. The gendarmerie officer schools promoted Democrat Party and nationalist ideals. O’Connor remarked in his memoirs that many of the officers ‘belonged to the Governor-General’s so-called “democratic” party’.42 The Swedish officers were linguistically dependent on their Persian subordinates and generally came to sympathize with them, especially as they shared an historical aversion to Russia and an enthusiasm for German military expertise. In the spring of 1915, therefore, British influence in Fars was at a low ebb. Despairing of assistance from Tehran, Cox prepared for the outbreak of war.43 He proposed making agreements with the great southern tribal leaders: the Bakhtiyari khans, Qavam al-Mulk, Sawlat al-Dawlah, Shaykh Khaz‘al and the Vali of Pusht-i Kuh. The basic formula was assistance to Britain during the war in return for autonomy under British protection after its successful conclusion.44 Viceroy Hardinge, however, deprecated such sweeping commitments and argued on 29 May that in the event of war with Iran it would be better to assume a much more limited posture, withdrawing the consuls from the interior, concentrating on the gulf ports and the oil fields and bribing the tribes.45

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As had happened so often before the war, local events outpaced the cumbersome machinery of Britain’s imperial decision-making.46 In late May Wassmuss arrived in the Bushihr hinterland, where he met Za’ir Khizir, Ghazanfar al-Saltanah, Shaykh Husayn Khan and Ra’is ‘Ali, and freely distributed arms, gold and promises.47 In June, Persian authorities secured orders from the German embassy for Wassmuss to return to Tehran via Shiraz, but he ignored the summons.48 On 6 July 1915 Shaykh Husayn Khan and Za’ir Khizir issued an ultimatum to the governor of the gulf ports, Muvaqqar al-Dawlah, which Major Trevor claimed was handwritten by the munshi of none other than Sayyid Murtaza Ahrami: All the people of Bushire and the suburbs, who are under Islam and who are the followers of Islam, are warned that as the highhanded and oppressive actions of the British in this frontier of Islam are daily increasing, and as however much we have waited that perhaps these actions would be removed by the everlasting Government, we have seen no result, we the people of Dashti, Tangistan, Chahkutah and Dashtistan, in view of the decrees of the Proofs of Islam, who have specified Jahad [sic] and Defence as the duty of every Muslim, have become ready, both regards our lives and out [sic] properties, to defend ourselves, and are now ready in the neighbourhood of Bushire with all our forces.49 They would, moreover, eject the British from Bushihr for having ‘violated the neutrality of the Government and the honour of the Nation’. A confrontation was not long in coming, and on 12 July the khans’ men surprised a British patrol, killing two officers including Captain Ranking, long the consul at Ahvaz.50 British imperialism in southern Iran was approaching a crisis.

Military operations in Sistan and Bushihr Although Tehran resisted being drawn into the war against the Allies, Britain’s consular network was in danger of total collapse between July and December 1915. While Wassmuss and the hinterland khans besieged Bushihr, other German officers and their Iranian allies expelled British consuls from Hamadan, Isfahan, Shiraz, Sultanabad, Kirman and Yazd. To make matters worse, Niedermayer and Werner von Hentig

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were nearing the Afghan frontier en route to the court of the amir. Clearly, Britain’s long-term imperial strategy of informal local political and economic influence in southern Iran was incapable of meeting crucial wartime challenges. Although Britain’s military resources were stretched thin by the demands of global conflict, it was obvious that reconstructing British influence in this region would require some use of force. Beginning with the nearly simultaneous occupations of Bushihr and Sistan, the British were determined to re-exert control in southern Iran. The German mission to Kabul left Isfahan on 1 July 1915, hoping to cross the frontier east of Birjand.51 Shawkat al-Mulk was wary of acting against the Germans without explicit instructions from Tehran. Consul Prideaux thought him ‘terrified of appearing unneutral’ and suggested recruiting 30 to 40 armed British subjects to intercept the Germans.52 Charles Marling, minister in Tehran for much of the war, initially opposed attacking the Germans in Iran for fear of further enflaming Persian public opinion against the Allies.53 His restraint evaporated upon hearing of the attack on Bushihr: Attack on Residency at Bushire appears to me to justify despatch of any force that may be considered requisite to prevent German missions from reaching Afghanistan, and I submit now that German intrigues have resulted in the death of two British officers, we are entirely justified in adopting similar means ourselves, and employ steady tribesmen to attack their emissaries.54 Grey approved, and India authorized Prideaux to raise a body of mounted Afghans and offer substantial rewards for the capture or death of the German agents. India also directed Consul General Haig in Mashhad to recruit 100 Hazaras, who had formerly served in the Indian Army, for Prideaux’s use.55 On 20 July Prideaux reported that several German parties were converging on Sistan and Qa’inat and repeatedly urged the dispatch of Indian troops.56 India counselled him to rely on local men and Russian Cossacks from Mashhad and Turbat-i Haydari until reinforcements arrived at the frontier.57 In traditional Great Game language, Prideaux countered that the use of Russian forces to protect Birjand from the Germans would imperil British prestige in its own sphere.58 Bowing to the inevitable, India authorized Major G. A. Dale to

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lead 300 infantry with two machine guns into Sistan on 29 July 1915.59 Indian cavalry followed.60 On 20 August Dale moved north towards Birjand in the hope of a rendezvous with the Russians and completed what became known as the East Persia Cordon against the Germans. It was too little and too late; Niedermayer and Hentig had slipped passed Russian patrols north of Birjand on the night of 19–20 August and entered Afghanistan.61 India would have to depend on the amir.62 The Sistan operation was coordinated with the occupation of Bushihr.63 On the morning of 8 August 1915, British troops under the command of Lt Colonel H. P. Lane seized the governor’s residence, the customs, the Persian telegraph office and the barracks of the gendarmerie.64 They ordered the gendarmes to leave Bushihr for Burazjan. Lane became military governor, with Cox’s deputy, Major Trevor, as his civil administrator.65 The Persian governor, Muvaqqar alDawlah, complained to Trevor that ‘my friends always told me something of this sort would happen if I worked with the English’,66 and within a week he had been sent to Bombay, where he remained until the war’s end. British forces then attacked Dilvar, which fell on 15 August after stiff resistance.67 The hostile khans, however, were not easily intimidated and made several daring night raids through British lines at Bushihr, during one of which Ra’is ‘Ali Dilvari was killed. In early September the British repulsed a more general attack on the port.68 Lacking sufficient troops to occupy the hinterland, they fortified Bushihr and suspended trade with Shiraz to blockade the chiefs and pressure Tehran, which relied on the southern customs revenues.69 The occupation had fateful consequences. The newly reappointed premier, Mustawfi al-Mamalik, capitulated to Marling’s demands and replaced Mukhbir al-Saltanah with Qavam al-Mulk in September.70 On 16 October the British handed back Bushihr to the experienced and amenable Darya Baygi, but British forces remained to defend the town against the defiant khans.71 The occupation had induced Tehran to be more cooperative, but it had only further outraged anti-British sentiment in the south. The Shirazi Democrat’s newspaper Jam-i Jam published sensational accounts of alleged British excesses at Bushihr, including the pitiful spectacle of Persian prisoners being deported to India while their grieving wives were rifle-butted by sepoys. ‘Oh God!,’ Jam-i Jam’s Bushihr correspondent exclaimed, ‘give us either death or independence!’72 The Democrats organized anti-British agitations in Shiraz, and a prominent

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local leader called Shaykh Muhammad Ja‘far collected a body of volunteers, who, styling themselves as Mujahidin, set out towards Bushihr to expel the oppressors of Islam.73 The British vice consul in Shiraz, Ghulam ‘Ali Navvab, was assassinated on 8 September 1915, and the following month another consulate employee was killed and a second wounded. O’Connor, however, had not been idle. By late October he had spent more than 130,000 tumans (£24,500) financing the Fars administration, including 3,000 tumans (£550) per month for anti-German propaganda in the local press and additional consulate guards.74 He repeatedly advocated buying off the gendarmes, but learned that they were in receipt of German funds and that the Persian officers were hostile.75 Little assistance could be expected from Bushihr, and more discomforting news was received from Isfahan, where Consul Grahame had been wounded, prompting the evacuation of the British community down the Lynch road in September. For the time being, O’Connor admitted that he was dependent on Qavam al-Mulk’s protection.76 The danger in Shiraz was in turn increased by the serious crisis developing in Tehran during early November 1915. Fearful of a coup d’e´tat by the Democrats and enemy legations that would carry Iran into the war, Marling and his Russian colleague, Etter, obtained permission for the advance of a Russian force from Qazvin on the capital.77 The approach of Russian troops caused great anxiety in Tehran, and many, including Mustawfi al-Mamalik, Moderate Party and Democrat deputies to the Majlis, government officials and even Ahmad Shah himself were preparing to flee and move the government south to Qum or Isfahan. In the end, it was Marling and Etter who accomplished the coup. On 12 November 1915 many of the nationalist officials, politicians and gendarmes as well as the German, Austrian and Ottoman legations abandoned Tehran for Qum, where they established an opposition government known as the Kumitah-i Difa‘-yi Milli (Committee of National Defence). At the last minute the shah chose to remain in Tehran, as did a number of prominent Persian statesmen, including Mustawfi al-Mamalik, Farman Farma and ‘Ayn al-Dawlah, who decided to work with the Allies.78

The fall of Shiraz This successful denouement in Tehran, however, had come too late to help O’Connor and the British community in Shiraz. Various

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gendarmerie officers, led by Major ‘Ali Quli Khan Pasyan, together with local Democrat leaders, formed their own Committee of the Protectors of Independence of the Country of Iran, and on 10 November they seized control of the city, including the IBP and the IETD branches.79 The gendarmes told Qavam al-Mulk, the acting governor, that Iran had joined the Central Powers.80 This was not true of course, but Qavam al-Mulk was unable to obtain more reliable information because the gendarmes had cut the telegraph lines to Tehran. An officer named Sultan Mas‘ud Khan Puladin, who like ‘Ali Quli Khan Pasyan had served in Shuster’s treasury gendarmerie, presented O’Connor with an ultimatum from the committee: The provisional arrest of yourself and of the English Colony has been decided on by the Persian patriots [. . .] If after thirty minutes – you will be so good as to sign the hour and minute of the arrival of this letter on the envelope – you do not surrender, the English Consulate and English houses will be bombarded, and the Committee expressly denies the responsibility for all the consequences which might result from your refusal for your subjects and especially for the women.81 After surrendering, O’Connor noted with no little irony that he ‘saw up the road one of the two Armstrong guns, which I had ordered for them from England some months before and paid for with money provided by the British Government, trained on to the Consulate gateway’.82 The gendarmes shouted ‘Down with England! Long live Persia!’ He was soon joined by the staff of the IBP and IETD and their families. The women were released to British authorities at Bushihr, but Za’ir Khizir interned O’Connor and the other men at his stronghold at Ahram, 30 miles east of Bushihr. Speaking on behalf of the ‘noble Persian Nation’, Za’ir Khizir and Shaykh Husayn demanded the release of all German and Persian prisoners; the return of all funds sequestered from their IBP accounts at Bushihr, and Wassmuss’s seized property; and the withdrawal of all British forces, except for 16 consular escorts.83 The new Democrat-Gendarmerie regime in Shiraz immediately set about attracting local support. On 6 December 1915 the Fars Democrats issued a manifesto pledging resistance to Russian and British aggression and declaring: ‘You cannot count life equal in comparison with defence

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of independence and national honor and the protection of the nation and religion [. . .] Advance with strong hearts until you embrace the martyrdom of victory.’84 To this end, they instituted daily military drills in front of the Masjid-i Naw, called for volunteers, requested financial and material aid and organized public speeches and demonstrations. The Committee of the Protectors of Independence also understood that cooperation from Qavam al-Mulk, the acting governor, and Sawlat alDawlah was crucial. The committee soon announced that Qavam alMulk had agreed to dismiss his armed men from Shiraz and send cavalry to the provisional government in Qum.85 This arrangement, however, was short-lived, and in the ensuing conflict the gendarmes appealed directly to ‘our Arab brothers’ of Qavam’s Khamsah confederacy, urging them to avenge his tyranny and avarice and warning them that he would surrender their lands to the British.86 ‘We are brothers,’ the gendarmes exclaimed, ‘and we have no intention of firing upon you because we know you are brave and dear sons of Iran [. . .] Surely you know you are Iranian and Muslim.’ How effective this rhetoric was remains unclear, but the gendarmes obliged Qavam to flee Shiraz and make his way south to meet the British. The Committee appeared to have more success with Sawlat al-Dawlat, whom they praised as a patriot (vatankhahi) and a friend of Islam. In January he promised Captain Ahmad Akhgar of the gendarmerie to send his Qashqa’is to support operations against the British at Bushihr.87 Expelling the British encouraged Iranian nationalists to articulate wider solidarities that transcended a narrow ethno-linguistic conception of the nation. For the British, the humiliation along the Bushihr–Shiraz corridor was compounded by other serious setbacks to the war effort in the Middle East. In December 1915 local opposition – with German and Ottoman encouragement – forced the withdrawal of consuls from Sultanabad, Kirman and Yazd.88 Gendarmes, Democrats and German agents seized IBP branches and their funds. Niedermayer and Hentig lobbied the amir for an Afghan invasion of India. Meanwhile, the extent of the disaster at Gallipoli could no longer be denied. Another catastrophe now loomed in Iraq, where Ottoman forces surrounded General Townshend’s 6th Division at Kut al-Amara. These circumstances rendered the provision of troops for service in Iran even more difficult. The British already relied on Russian forces to control Tehran

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and northern Iran and to protect the northern end of the East Persia Cordon in Khurasan. In early 1916 the Russians pursued the Iranian nationalist opposition, now led by Nizam al-Saltanah, to the Ottoman frontier, but the fall of Kut al-Amara in April freed Ottoman forces to mount a counter-attack, pushing the Russians back east of Kirmanshah by July.

Counter-attack Despite these setbacks, British consuls regained southern Iran during 1916–1917, using a minimum number of regular troops. The occupations of Bushihr and Sistan had demonstrated that small-scale military operations alone were ineffective. O’Connor repeatedly asserted that British action at Bushihr had in fact provoked his incarceration,89 while intervention in Sistan had failed to stop the German mission to Afghanistan. Lacking overwhelming force, the British once again needed active local political and military cooperation. This strategy had informed the expansion of the consular service in the region since 1890 and reflected the deeply imbued traditions of the Indian Foreign Department. The war and new ambitions in Iraq encouraged British authorities to offer even greater financial, political and military incentives to southern notables and officials like the Bakhtiyari khans and Qavam al-Mulk. The other, closely related focus of this effort was the recruitment of levy forces under British officers. Sykes organized the South Persia Rifles to replace the gendarmerie, bring order to the cities and the trade routes and suppress anti-British movements in Kirman and Fars. Prideaux raised the Sistan Levy Corps to act as auxiliaries to the overstretched British and Indian forces maintaining the southern sections of the East Persia Cordon. Both the South Persia Rifles and the Sistan Levy Corps required the assistance of local leaders, for it was they who provided the levies, while the consuls played vital roles in coordinating these various, and at times conflicting initiatives. With regard to the great tribal confederacies, it was first essential to strengthen relations with the Bakthiyari khans. Cox’s negotiations with the ilkhani, Sardar Jang, in May 1915 had proved disappointing. The latter’s unpopularity with his tribesmen led to the appointment of his kinsman, Ghulam Husayn Khan Sardar Muhtasham, that summer. In December Dr M. Y. Young of the APOC, who had long experience of

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the khans, concluded a new arrangement on behalf of the British government with new ilkhani.90 Sardar Muhtasham undertook to maintain order, enforce Iranian neutrality in the Bakhtiyari territories and preserve good relations with Khaz‘al. If Iran entered the war, the khans pledged to defend British subjects and property, notably the oil fields, on pain of having their APOC shares confiscated by the British government. Should Iran join the Allies, the Bakhtiyaris were to render all possible assistance. For its part, Britain promised its good offices in resolving disputes with Tehran or among the khans themselves and pledged its support for the appointment of Bakhtiyaris as governors to ‘provinces where British interests are paramount’.91 After the senior khans approved the agreement the following February in Tehran, the British gave Sardar Muhtasham and his ilbaygi £1,500 and £1,000 respectively. According to one historian, this rather one-sided agreement was the ‘culmination of British– Bakhtiyari relations’.92 Although strained in the years to come by the actions of discontented younger khans, this pact continued to bind the Bakhtiyari leadership to the British, especially as their valuable oil shares were at stake. In Fars, the British turned to Qavam al-Mulk, whom the gendarmes had ejected from Shiraz in December 1915.93 Farman Farma, then prime minister, ordered Qavam al-Mulk to retake Shiraz and instructed Sawlat al-Dawlah to assist him, warning both men that if they did not comply, Russian forces en route to Isfahan would proceed to Fars. Qavam al-Mulk immediately appealed to the British for assistance and was advised by both the Iranian and Indian governments to go to Bushihr to confer with Cox in late February.94 Meanwhile, the War Committee, chaired by Prime Minister H. H. Asquith, decided that irregular forces led by British officers were the best means of combating German agents and intrigue in Iran.95 Cox provided Qavam al-Mulk with Rs 2,25,000 (£15,000) in cash, three captured Ottoman guns, 550 rifles, machine guns and ammunition.96 After the war, the Foreign Department in India reckoned that advances to Qavam al-Mulk totalled more than £50,000.97 The Persian government, meanwhile, proclaimed Shaykh Husayn Khan Chahkutahi and Za’ir Khizir rebels and instructed all loyal subjects to assist Qavam al-Mulk.98 Shaykh Husayn and Za’ir Khizir lamented that their enemies multiplied with British gold.99 Qavam al-Mulk sailed to Bandar-i Lingah and then marched north into Laristan, gathering forces along the way. Sawlat al-Dawlah’s

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attitude was vital, but ambivalent. He had earlier pledged his support to the anti-British coalition, but detected that its position was weakening. In early March, Major Trevor learned from Shaykh Khaz‘al’s representative to Sawlat al-Dawlah that the Qashqa’i leader would cooperate with Qavam al-Mulk and the British if assured that he and his descendants would retain the ilkhaniship.100 No such guarantee was forthcoming, but Qavam al-Mulk soon reported that Sawlat al-Dawlah had joined him.101 Collaboration between the two great rivals of Fars may appear surprising. Sawlat al-Dawlah would probably have preferred to remain neutral, but he was apparently convinced of Qavam al-Mulk’s ultimate victory and shared his aversion to the gendarmerie, which constituted a standing menace to tribal power. Qavam al-Mulk financed Sawlat alDawlat and requested more British money. The German agent at Kirman, Seiler, commented succinctly that ‘as the organization of the Persian tribes is impossible owing to our political failure, the complexity of conditions, the Russian advance and English gold we shall probably after this have to give up our latest position in Shiraz and Kerman.’102 When his forces approached the town of Lar, Qavam al-Mulk persuaded many of the rebellious Khamsah leaders to desert the gendarmes. Disheartened by these defections, the gendarmes abandoned Lar and were quickly rounded up by Qavam al-Mulk’s 26-year-old son, Hajj Ibrahim Khan Nasr al-Dawlah. The latter entered the town on 1 April 1916. This defeat occasioned an internal struggle among the gendarmerie in Shiraz, and a week later a faction led by an officer named Muhammad Hasan Khan Fath al-Mulk seized the city for Qavam al-Mulk, arresting several Germans and his colleagues involved in the November coup.103 Qavam al-Mulk, however, would not live to see Shiraz again. While hunting on 20 April he fell from his horse and died.104 The Persian government quickly confirmed Nasr al-Dawlah in his father’s office and title and he occupied Shiraz on 24 April 1916.105 Sawlat al-Dawlah announced that he and the new Qavam would protect and provision the city pending the arrival of a new governor general.106 Although Qavam al-Mulk immediately pledged his friendship to British officials, they initially viewed him with scepticism. Trevor noted that he was an impetuous young man who had not enjoyed very good relations with his father, a situation which, Marling observed, had brought him

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under the dubious influence of Sawlat al-Dawlah.107 Fath al-Mulk’s control over the nearly 2,000 unpaid gendarmes still in Shiraz was also very uncertain. In these circumstances, the presence of a strong, friendly governor general in Fars took on even greater significance. An opportunity presented itself when Farman Farma resigned the premiership in early March 1916 and was subsequently appointed governor general of Kirman. Marling orchestrated his transfer to Fars in May, later explaining to Grey that ‘There was indeed but one man, Farman Farma, who on account of his experience and interested attachment to ourselves appeared suitable for this, the most difficult Governorship in Persia, at this critical time’.108 Farman Farma arrived in Isfahan in August, where he was met by the new British consul for Shiraz, Lt Colonel Hugh Gough, an Indian political officer who had served in Kirmanshah in 1905– 6. Together they waited for Sykes and the South Persia Rifles.

The Sistan Levy Corps Before discussing this final and boldest British effort to solve their decade-long troubles in Fars, it is first necessary to return to Sistan. When Shawkat al-Mulk insisted on remaining neutral towards German emissaries, the British lost little time in reminding him of his dependence on their favour, and in so doing they moved from the politics of Khuzaymah ‘Alam rivalries to the logistics of military control. In July 1915 the legation secretary, G. P. Churchill, peremptorily warned the amir that ‘If you do not change your policy and follow instructions we shall lose all confidence in you, our ancient good relations with you will be broken and we shall take our own measures to protect our interests.’109 Churchill later learned that Shawkat al-Mulk had protested these strictures to Tehran, boasting ‘he is not the Sheikh of Mohammerah to take orders from the British’.110 Ironically, there was some truth in this assessment. Shaykh Khaz‘al’s friendship was very important to the British, but Shawkat al-Mulk was quite disposable. ‘The fact is that Shaukat had become too big for his boots’, Churchill commented derisively, ‘and being a weak man is very stubborn.’ The legation had a ready instrument for exerting pressure on Shawkat alMulk: his nephew, Hishmat al-Mulk, who had assumed his late father’s title, Husam al-Dawlah, and was eager to return to Qa’inat and Sistan. Although Prideaux still considered Husam al-Dawlah a threat to British

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interests, Marling had made up his mind, declaring in January 1916 that if within a month Shawkat al-Mulk ‘has not proved he deserves my support I will have him replaced by Hisam’.111 Marling gave Shawkat al-Mulk only two weeks, and his downfall sheds light on Britain’s wartime relations with the notables and the Russians. Consul General Haig reported from Mashhad that Colonel Gushchin, the commander of Russian forces in Khurasan, claimed he had proof of outright collusion between Shawkat al-Mulk and the Germans and urged his arrest.112 Marling immediately obtained the latter’s dismissal and his replacement by Husam al-Dawlah.113 Prideaux protested that Gushchin’s accusations were unsubstantiated and that Marling had acted precipitously without reference to him.114 Marling did not share Prideaux’s concerns about Russian interference in the British sphere and understood that Russian troops were critical for Allied interests in Iran. While there was undoubtedly some friction between the two powers, the maintenance of a ‘united front’ was, as India reminded Prideaux, of paramount importance.115 With regard to the politics of notables, Shawkat al-Mulk and Husam al-Dawlah possessed far less power and influence than Qavam al-Mulk, Shaykh Khaz‘al, or Sawlat al-Dawlah. Indeed, Sawlat al-Dawlah’s attitude towards the German intrigues in Fars was equivocal; but for the moment, Qashqa’i power rendered him immune from British retribution. Shawkat al-Mulk enjoyed no such luxury and his family troubles gave the British an easy way to punish him. Once removed from office, however, he could be confident that the British would use him to keep Husam al-Dawlah in line, and it came as a surprise to no one when he was reappointed to Sistan and Qa’inat the following January. Shawkat al-Mulk’s failure to protect British interests and India’s shortage of troops led directly to the formation of the Sistan Levy Corps. Prideaux had already gathered 120 men by September 1915, including 80 Hazaras from Khurasan enlisted by Haig.116 He now proposed to recruit large numbers of Baluchi tribesmen. In the past, many of these men had raided Sistan and Qa’inat, and in 1914 India provided rifles to Shawkat al-Mulk to resist them. Prideaux worried that the Germans might purchase their allegiance and recommended that the British make the first offer. Several Sarhaddi Baluchi leaders had already made overtures, and Prideaux noted that ‘they would require a big subsidy but could probably supply 1000 men with which we could overrun Sistan

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and Kainat in conjunction with our troops and by this course we wd. nullify attempt of Germans to seduce them.’117 It was clear that money alone would not induce the Baluchi sardars to participate; British protection after the war would also be necessary.118 When there were indications that a German party at Kirman might move on Sistan that winter, Hardinge ordered Indian forces in the province to be increased to 350 cavalry and 600 infantry with six machine guns.119 These reinforcements were still inadequate to defend the vastness of Sistan and Qa’inat, underscoring the need for local auxiliaries to undertake reconnaissance and the guarding of communication lines, which would allow the small British units to be used in mobile striking columns against enemy agents or tribal raiding parties. India accordingly instructed Prideaux to recruit 200 men and, in typical British diplomatic phraseology, to ‘assure them that British Government will protect them so far as possible from anger of Persian Government’.120 Further expansion of the SLC followed. In mid-January 1916 India directed Prideaux to raise an additional 200 men, bringing the total to 400.121 In its decision to enlist irregular forces the War Committee had specifically mentioned Sistan.122 Prideaux accordingly increased the force to about a thousand levies by June 1916.123 Recruitment was carried out with the close cooperation of the Baluchi sardars of Sistan, notably Sardar Khudadad Khan Narui, who was paid 10,000 qirans (£180) in March 1916, and Sardar Purdil Khan. 124 The organization of the force, furthermore, reflected patterns of tribal affiliation and leadership. As a postwar report on the SLC recalled: The cavalry and camelry were levies in the true sense. The men came in batches of 20 or 30, with their own chosen leaders, bringing their own horses, camels, saddles, rifles, and equipment. Provided a man’s cartridges more or less fitted his fire arm, and that he and his mount were reasonably fit, he was taken on in the troop or horde of his own selection, provided he passed the most important test of all – that some one we could trust and influence such as Sardar Khudadad Khan, or a tried servant of the Consulate, was ready to vouch for the fidelity of the leader of each horde, and that the leader vouched for each of his men.125

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Men joined for money and weapons. Camelmen received 100 qirans (£1 16s) per month, while cavalrymen earned 120 qirans (£2 4s) per month. Although the levies were originally expected to provide their own weapons, they frequently requested better rifles and were eventually armed with British .303 Lee Enfields. A history of marauding was not an obstacle to employment. In fact, ‘It was considered a red letter day if a notorious ex-raider came in with his following to take service. A converted raider counted two on a division and such men could confidently be exposed in isolated posts.’ Initially, Prideaux exercised sole authority over the SLC, but in 1916 the Government of India placed the levy troops under the operational control of the recently formed Sistan Field Force, which by September included 1,600 men. It was commanded by Brigadier General Reginald Dyer, later of Amritsar infamy.126 Prideaux retained administrative and political control over the SLC, and as political officer to the Sistan Field Force, he performed a wide range of functions connected with British operations and was responsible for calibrating military operations in a neutral country with local diplomacy. Of special significance were the collection of military and political intelligence and the provision of supplies, transport and labour, the consulate becoming ‘more and more to be associated in military matters’.127 The arrangement, unsurprisingly, generated friction between Prideaux and Dyer. Beginning in December, Prideaux reported grain shortages in Sistan caused by speculation and hoarding.128 The dearth produced great hardship for the inhabitants, and by April it was disrupting Dyer’s campaign.129 Dyer insisted on authorization to negotiate contracts for wheat and barley. Prideaux countered by questioning how the general could have the expertise and information needed to obtain nearly one-third of Sistan’s revenue grain from provincial officials.130 Dyer, he suggested, was likely to offer too high a price, which would in turn cause further speculation, resulting in famine conditions for which the local population would blame Britain. In these circumstances, the consul argued that on the grounds of efficiency, economy and policy the matter should remain in his hands. The India Office apparently agreed with Prideaux, who was able to resolve the issue with provincial officials.131 British supply and transport difficulties in eastern Iran reopened the old question of building a railroad from India to Sistan. In July 1916 the commander-in-chief of the Indian Army, General Sir Beauchamp Duff,

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urged the extension of the railroad beyond Nushki as a ‘cogent military necessity’.132 The new viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, opposed the proposal, objecting to ‘so grave an expenditure for what we consider so small political or commercial results’, and adding, in what would become a familiar refrain, that India had no desire to increase its commitments in Iran.133 Chelmsford’s resistance was bolstered by the fact that Amir Habib Allah of Afghanistan had definitively rejected German overtures for an alliance, prompting the German mission to quit Kabul in May 1916. British and Russian forces of the East Persia Cordon, together with the SLC, worked to block their re-entry into Iran, but the immediate danger to India was over. The railway proposal nevertheless gained support from key officials at the India Office, notably Sir Arthur Hirtzel. Hirtzel had previously advocated a bolder policy in Iran, and looking towards the end of the war, he considered the railway a valuable instrument for strengthening Britain’s position throughout the south. ‘Seistan’, he maintained, ‘is admittedly within our sphere, and will become still more so if, after the war, the neutral sphere disappears.’134 He cautioned perspicaciously: A sphere is not yours unless you use it. Failure to use our sphere is largely responsible for the present situation, in which a position built up precariously during 20 years, but never really consolidated, collapsed in almost as many days when the Germans appeared on the scene. No lines drawn on the map can alter the political and strategical importance of Seistan: and its commercial possibilities – which it is our business to help the Persian Govt. to convert into actualities – are very great. Curzon, who was Lord Privy Seal in Asquith’s coalition cabinet, echoed these arguments.135 His voice in Persian affairs increased steadily in the coming years. In August 1916 the War Committee sanctioned the construction of a railway to Dalbandian, 120 miles west of Nushki.136 The line was completed in late January 1917, and by then British officials in Baluchistan had already recommended its further extension toward the Iranian frontier.137 Sistan and Qa’inat had been virtually ignored since 1907, but war had driven the British to tighten their political and military grip on the provinces.

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The South Persia Rifles Returning to Fars, to many Iranians the most galling instrument of British control during World War I was the South Persia Rifles, formed in 1916.138 British officials hoped that this levy force would accomplish what had been proposed in the Constantinople Agreement of 1915 between Russia and Britain: the inclusion of the neutral zone into an expanded British sphere covering all of southern Iran. Thus, from its outset, the SPR had a dual function of meeting Britain’s immediate wartime needs as well as its post-war imperial interests. In March 1916 Sykes and his staff landed at Bandar-i ‘Abbas and received an official welcome from Darya Baygi, again governor of the gulf ports, and a representative of Qavam al-Mulk.139 Recruitment began immediately, and as in Sistan, local notables provided men they deemed reliable.140 India soon approved Sykes’s request for a reinforcement of 500 Indian infantry, cavalry and artillery, and he reached Kirman in June en route to Shiraz.141 Despite this encouraging start, the SPR’s relationship to the Iranian government remained troublesome. In August 1916 Muhammad Vali Khan Tunikabuni Sipahsalar and his cabinet agreed to the expansion of the Cossack Brigade and the South Persia Rifles to 11,000 men each, to be subsidized by their respective patrons, and the establishment of a Mixed Financial Commission to oversee the funds.142 ‘The agreement itself’, Marling admitted three weeks later, ‘is virtually one for the administrative partition of the country.’143 Ahmad Shah did not often assert his authority, but the Sipahsalar Agreement was too much even for him. He dismissed the cabinet within a week. The new premier, Vusuq al-Dawlah, claimed that he had no record of the agreement, and although this contention soon proved untenable, the Allied ministers acknowledged that the arrangement was, for the time being at least, a dead letter and with it any Iranian recognition of Sykes and the SPR. British authorities nevertheless pressed ahead with their plans for southern Iran, manoeuvring, as Marling summarized for Sykes, ‘to get real power into our hands behind a carefully prepared fac ade of Persian Authority’.144 The principal elements of that fac ade, Marling hoped, were the new governor general of Fars, Farman Farma, who was now Knight Grand Cross of the Order of St Michael and St George (GCMG), and the SPR, which despite the collapse of the Sipahsalar Agreement, continued to pose as a Persian force. Consul Gough would provide political and

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pecuniary support to Farman Farma, while General Sykes would supply military power. As during 1912–1915, the British directly financed the administration of Fars, advancing more than £17,000 for that purpose between July and October 1916.145 Money was urgently needed for Farman Farma’s men, for the gendarmerie in Shiraz, which had not received any pay in months, and for Qavam al-Mulk.146 Gough also had unlimited access to Secret Service funds, and such expenditures totalled between £130,000 and £200,000 between 1915 and 1921, depending on the exchange rate at the time of disbursement.147 Local opposition appeared immediately. In September Gough and Farman Farma were forced to suspend their journey from Isfahan to Shiraz, after Sawlat al-Dawlah, Qavam al-Mulk and Fath al-Mulk announced that they would not allow the governor general to enter Shiraz on account of his extortionate acting deputy and his own rapacious reputation.148 The young Qavam al-Mulk asked Darya Baygi to explain to Trevor in Bushihr that his action was purely a protest against Farman Farma and was in no way anti-British, adding that he would welcome Gough and would protect British interests.149 British authorities took a different view. They identified Sawlat al-Dawlah as ringleader and considered hostility to Farman Farma a cover for opposition to British troops and the SPR.150 Qavam al-Mulk, however, was not willing for long to defy both Tehran and the British for Sawlat al-Dawlah, whose own commitment was, as usual, being undermined by divisions among his Qashqa’i tribesmen.151 Both chiefs accordingly made their submissions to Farman Farma in return for assurances for their ilkaniships.152 Gough played an important role in mediating the crisis and extended British protection to both men on condition they remained loyal to the Iranian government. Farman Farma and Gough entered Shiraz on 15 October 1916 without incident. Sykes and the SPR arrived a month later. The new regime in Shiraz faced several challenges. Food shortages caused popular discontent.153 Gough subsidized the city’s bakers to lower bread prices and made arrangements for free shipments from India. These measures were politically necessary, for ‘Presuming it is desired to keep our hold on Southern Persia’, he declared, ‘it is essential at all costs to keep people with us.’154 There were also nearly 2,000 unpaid gendarmes in Shiraz. Badly in need of trained men, Sykes announced the absorption of the Fars gendarmerie into the SPR in November.155 Marling, meanwhile, was negotiating with Vusuq al-Dawlah regarding

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the status of the SPR and cautioned Sykes to leave Farman Farma in charge of the Persian officers.156 Gough began the trying work of negotiating a budget with the governor general.157 Qavam al-Mulk’s finances were another matter requiring the consul’s attention. Despite the Khamsah ilkhani’s questionable recent conduct, Gough secured the balance of payments promised to his late father and obtained authorization to advance him additional funds for use against his rebellious Baharlus in eastern Fars.158 There was also the question of what to do with the German and other European prisoners in Shiraz. Transporting them to the coast meant dealing with the perennial problem of the Bushihr–Shiraz road and the rebel khans who controlled it. Za’ir Khizir and his colleagues had besieged the British garrison at Bushihr since 1915 and he still held O’Connor in Ahram. At this point the British preferred negotiation to an expedition, and Trevor and Za’ir Khizir agreed to a prisoner exchange in late August 1916, an extra condition being the opening of the road to trade, which would, however, still be subject to the khans’ exactions.159 The settlement added to the chiefs’ prestige; they had defied the British Empire and escaped unpunished. When in November India advocated further negotiations, Cox wondered ‘how, if we wish to retain a shred of prestige in Fars, we can contemplate embarking on further humiliating overtures to these khans who have committed acts of hostility against us unparalleled in the past’.160 As military operations in Persia were not possible because of the Baghdad campaign, Cox supported Farman Farma’s recommendation that the SPR seize the road in January 1917.161 The looming descent of Farman Farma and Sykes, however, failed to overawe the road khans. In December Ghazanfar al-Saltanah of Burazjan declared that unless the IBP returned his confiscated monies, he would interdict British goods, subjects and mail on the trade route.162 Gough, whose confidence in Farman Farma’s projected campaign was already waning, advised meeting Ghazanfar al-Saltanah’s demands on condition that he surrender Wassmuss. Already opposed to India’s policy of ‘weakness’, Marling feared Farman Farma was likewise inclined to concession rather than intimidation.163 Even more serious news was then received from Kazirun, where on 17 December the kalantar, Nasir-i Divan, had arrested the local gendarmes – now part of the South Persia Rifles – and occupied the town. He then moved north and briefly seized Dasht-i Arjan.164 Sykes dispatched a column of Indian and Iranian

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troops, but they were repulsed in an attack on the Pir-i Zan pass and fell back on Shiraz.165 ‘Praise be to God’, a Kaziruni supporter exclaimed, ‘the good fortune of the nationalists and the high aims of the Zargham-iIslam, Nasir Diwan has brought about a great victory for the splendid Islamic army.’166 The British suspected a broad conspiracy, which allegedly included the rebel khans, ex-gendarmerie officers, Sawlat al-Dawlah and others. Even Sykes admitted that ‘All information received strengthens the view that we are opposed by tribes in Fars and strong party in Shiraz hostile to introduction [of] law and order by “infidels” and especially hostile to Indian troops.’167 British officials later acknowledged that the revolt had an anti-Farman Farma character as well, but for the second time in five years a British force had been sent to Shiraz, which had proved both too large to be ignored and too small to be feared. The reverses at Pir-i Zan had important consequences for British policy in Fars. It raised doubts about Sykes’s competency as a military commander, and the chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Sir William Robertson, advised that he be replaced by a regular military officer who would be explicitly under British, not Persian, control.168 Viceroy Chelmsford similarly advocated that the SPR be incorporated into the Indian Army, with a British general as ‘the supreme British authority [. . .] up to the borders of Baluchistan’.169 Marling and Lloyd George’s War Cabinet demurred on the grounds that the maintenance of the SPR as a nominally Iranian force was important both for the present situation and for Britain’s post-war policy.170 Despite his limitations, Sykes’s knowledge of the country and his good relations with Farman Farma were vital. Marling’s concern for Persian sensibilities in this matter eventually produced results, and in mid-March 1917 Vusuq alDawlah, who was apparently also encouraged by the recent British capture of Baghdad, recognized Sykes and the SPR for the duration of the war.171 The Pir-i Zan episode also revealed that for the present at least, the SPR alone could not pacify Fars. Sykes and Marling urgently requested reinforcements in January and received an additional 1,000 Indian troops in early 1917.172 By July the SPR totaled 5,800 Iranians and 1,700 Indians. Even then, Sykes’s senior staff officer, Lt Colonel E. F. Orton, admitted that ‘At least 50% of these numbers of S. P. R. are not yet sufficiently trained nor disciplined, to take the field in serious

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operations, although the majority are fit for road guard duties.’173 The SPR’s continued weakness obliged Gough and Sykes to make embarrassing overtures to Sawlat al-Dawlah for assistance in the first half of 1917. British authorities did not trust the Qashqa’i leader, but until the SPR were ready, they had little choice but to bribe him and hope for the best.174 The Foreign Office authorized Gough to pay Sawlat al-Dawlah up to 30,000 tumans per month. On 24 May 1917 Gough, Sykes and Sawlat al-Dawlah signed a formal agreement in which the latter consented to exile Nasir-i Divan from Kazirun for six months, patrol the road north to Shiraz, control his Qashqa’is and pay his revenues in return for renewed assurances for the maintenance of his ilkhaniship.175 The settlement was not a success. Farman Farma was unhappy at being sidelined and the Persian government considered the agreement null and void.176 Sawlat al-Dawlah, moreover, cooperated only when it was convenient for him to do so. Having no means to compel him at present, the British could only wait in the hope that the SPR might one day be able to perform the task. The SPR’s difficulties revealed a fundamental contradiction at the heart of British policy in Fars. The British generally worked through local notables, but their concern about instability in Fars, dating back to the Constitutional Revolution, had prompted a more interventionist policy aimed at establishing a strong provincial administration capable of managing conflicting local interests. This effort, whether carried out through Mukhbir al-Saltanah and the gendarmerie before the war, or presently through Farman Farma and the SPR, alienated local elites, especially Sawlat al-Dawlah, whose own power and influence was thus marginalized. That the SPR was commanded by British officers and contained a sizeable contingent of Indian troops further complicated the situation and ensured a prominent anti-British dimension to the struggle for supremacy in Fars.

Rebuilding Britain’s sphere of influence World War I was the greatest challenge to Britain’s position in southern Iran since the period of consular consolidation began in 1890. German and Ottoman efforts to bring Afghanistan and Iran into the war vindicated Britain’s long-standing anxiety that a European enemy would seek to exploit India’s strategic vulnerabilities and weaken the British

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Empire’s ability to wage global war. The Indian campaign in Iraq limited Ottoman military options in Iran, but it also restricted Britain’s ability to contain enemy intrigue there. Ottoman incursions, German agents and Iranians of various political and tribal allegiances nearly collapsed the British consular network in the south. They forced the evacuation of the consuls from Ahvaz, Isfahan, Sultanabad, Kirman and Yazd, captured O’Connor in Shiraz, and marched clear across Iran to reach Kabul in the hopes of inciting an Afghan invasion of India. Isolated far from military assistance, the consuls were by themselves clearly incapable of preserving British interests during wartime. German agents, moreover, skilfully exploited Britain’s growing unpopularity in Iran by appealing to nationalist and religious sentiments as well as to specific local grievances. Despite their initial failures, the British managed to restore, and even enhance, their power and influence in southern Iran from 1916 to early 1917. This success was partly a function of German weakness, including poor cooperation with the Ottomans, the long and exposed supply lines and the sheer enormity of mobilizing a pan-Islamic campaign against the British Empire. It was partly also a function of Russian military action, which paralysed enemy activities in Tehran and northern Iran. While the British had indeed deployed an entire Indian Army division to repulse the Ottoman foray into Arabistan in spring 1915, such forces were unavailable for the rest of the south. In consequence, consuls were obliged to obtain local political and military cooperation, which assumed various forms: agreements with the Bakhtiyaris; money and weapons to Qavam al-Mulk; assistance to Farman Farma; and the formation of the Sistan Levy Corps and the South Persia Rifles, both of which required extensive local collaboration in terms of recruitment, supply and transport. Political officers played a crucial role in facilitating these operations, identifying and negotiating with friendly local notables, collecting intelligence, disbursing Secret Service and other monies and advising British military officers. In November 1917 India announced the completion of a ‘chain’ of intelligence posts across Persia and urged paying Iranian officials for information.177 As was the case before the war, consuls and political officers enabled the British Empire to protect its interests in Iran without large military commitments. The strategy generally worked well but encountered difficulties in Fars, where it was incongruously harnessed to a campaign

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of state building around the SPR, which jeopardized the power of local elites. The result of these efforts was the establishment of a British sphere of influence encompassing all of southern Iran, not just the small rump carved out by the Anglo-Russian Convention. The Constantinople Agreement in 1915 and the establishment of SPR the following year accomplished this new partition. As British ambitions in the Middle East crystallized during the war, the importance of this enlarged sphere became clearer. Writing privately to Cox in October 1916, Hirtzel presciently maintained that in the future, Iraq would not be governed by India, but instead by a system of indirect rule, through local leaders under a British High Commissioner, who might supervise a wide arc of Arab territory from Egypt to the Iranian frontier. Turning to Iran, he explained that southern Persia is the proper sphere for the G. of I.’s activity. It has been [and] will continue to be neglected by the F. O.; [and] the G. of I. (both Hardinge and Chelmsford) are always saying that they do not want to enlarge their responsibilities. But they must; and with Mesopotamia off their hands, they can [. . .] The whole of the neutral sphere will presumably fall to us (I wish I saw any prospect of getting Ispahan – but I doubt if we shall get the F. O. to ask for it); [and] if it is to be saved from German [and] even Russian penetration (since it cannot be sterilized or left a vacuum), real hard work must be put into it; that cannot be done by a diplomat at Tehran or an office of diplomats in Whitehall [and] the G. of I. are the natural people to undertake it.178 The subsequent capture of Baghdad by General Maude in March 1917 therefore not only ended the Ottoman– German threat to British interests in southern Iran, but also necessitated the consolidation of an enlarged British sphere in the area, connecting these new territories with India. Cox proposed making the Persian Gulf a ‘mare clausum’ and monopolizing its ‘grain, oil, and cotton’, so as to render the British Empire ‘independent in future of foreign supplies’.179 In this context, it is important to note that Sistan Levy Corps and South Persia Rifles were primarily deployed not against German filibusters, but against raiders, gunrunners, refractory tribesmen and Persian nationalists who refused to

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cooperate with Britain’s imperial project. No sooner had this plan become a reality, however, than it was disrupted by momentous events in Russia. The Russian Revolution and the collapse of the tsarist state obliged British authorities to address the dangerous power vacuum developing in northern Iran and rendered obsolete the British sphere containing only the south.

CHAPTER 7 THE ROAD TO TEHRAN:THE END OF BRITISH IMPERIALISM IN SOUTHERN IRAN

The Russian Revolution in 1917 and the defeat of the Ottoman Empire and Germany in 1918 left Britain as the dominant foreign power in Iran and the broader Middle East.1 Lord Curzon, chairman of the cabinet’s Eastern Committee and from January 1919 acting foreign secretary, supervised British policy in Iran. He was determined to secure the wartime gains in the region and to ensure permanent protection for India. His instrument was the Anglo-Iranian Treaty, negotiated by his old prote´ge´, Percy Cox, and Vusuq al-Dawlah in August 1919, which provided for British supervision of the financial and military reform of the Qajar state. These events overtook the system of local consular imperialism that Britain had exercised in southern Iran since the 1890s. As World War I came to a close, consuls were very active, especially as political officers to British forces, which were now also operating in the north. The Anglo-Iranian Treaty of 1919, however, signalled a radical reorientation of British policy from the Persian periphery to the Persian centre. Although it represented a culmination of Curzon’s efforts to secure the western flank of the Indian Empire, the treaty, in aiming at British control of the central Iranian state, was also a significant departure from the consular model, which was premised on control of the Qajar borderlands by means of relationships with local notables. Moreover, after the failure of the agreement in 1921, the British did not revert to the southern strategy. The main reason for this decision was

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Riza Khan’s increasing control of the central state and the provinces by means of the army. Also important was clear evidence that the political officers’ local ascendancy was increasingly dependent on expensive military operations, which neither London nor Delhi was willing to finance. Consular imperialism had ceased to be inexpensive. The war had added greatly to the consuls’ military, political and financial responsibilities, and post-war retrenchment was injurious to their local prestige. The Russian Revolution shifted Britain’s focus away from the south towards Tehran as the key to its interests. Beginning in 1917, British officials sought to extend political and military control over northern Iran. The south, however, still posed its own challenges, and in mid1918 Sawlat al-Dawlah led a major Qashqa’i rising against the South Persia Rifles around Shiraz. While Sawlat al-Dawlah failed to dislodge the British, his campaign demonstrated that continued British control of Fars would be both difficult and costly. The episode also gave an impetus to Curzon’s new policy of overseeing the reorganization of the Iranian state. The progress of the treaty negotiations between October 1918 and August 1919, combined with Britain and India’s desire to reduce troops and expenditure, relegated the southern sphere to secondary status. The Anglo-Iranian Treaty of 1919 proved a failure, and Riza Khan and his colleagues seized power in 1921. Their ambition to create a strong, independent and centralized regime was premised on the exclusion of British influence from the southern periphery. The consuls might have lamented this development, but their superiors came to regard Riza Khan’s project as compatible with Britain’s traditional interest in maintaining Persia as a buffer state against Russian/Soviet expansion and the continued development of the oil industry in the south-west.

The Impact of the Russian Revolution in Iran Since 1890, Russian ascendancy in northern Iran had induced British officials to consolidate their consular influence in the south, to shield their Indian Empire. During the war, Russian cooperation was ironically essential to the defence of India, blocking the Ottoman army, protecting Afghanistan, thwarting enemy agents and intrigue, suppressing Iranian nationalists and enabling the British to deploy their limited military resources in Iraq and avoid large-scale engagement in Iran. The Russian

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Revolution, however, swept away the old balance between the two powers in Iran. In January 1918 the Soviet commissar for external affairs, Leon Trotsky, terminated the Russian military mission in Iran and unilaterally abrogated the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907.2 The Russian withdrawal seriously compromised British interests.3 The threat of an Ottoman advance on the Caucasus prompted the famous, and haphazard, Dunsterville mission, which was bound for Tiflis but never reached it.4 Ottoman armies were also poised to march on Azerbaijan, northern Iran and perhaps even Central Asia. A more immediate scenario was renewed intrigue and propaganda by enemy agents in Iran and Afghanistan. The British discovered that their traditional policy of concentrating resources and power in the south no longer conformed to strategic reality and that they needed a comprehensive plan for the whole of Persia. Many Iranians viewed the Russian Revolution as a golden opportunity to liberate their country from foreign influence. Exiled Democrat Party and other nationalist leaders returned from abroad during 1917 to renew the struggle. As Marling explained to the Foreign Office at the end of May 1917: ‘Now that Russian influence is paralysed, the political capital of the democrats and nationalists consists in Anglophobia.’5 Even ‘pro-British’ figures like Samsam al-Saltanah and Vusuq al-Dawlah understood that without Russian cooperation, Britain had far less leverage in Tehran. They realized that the rising tide of nationalism in the press and political classes provided them with a useful instrument for resisting British demands and seeking British concessions. Although Iranian cabinets during the war were typically short-lived and ineffective, they were, especially after the fall of the Sipahsalar cabinet in August 1916, remarkably consistent in their diplomatic desiderata: the replacement of British and Russian officers in the SPR and Persian Cossack Brigade respectively after the war by neutrals and the creation of a single unified Iranian army; the departure of all foreign troops after the war; Allied undertakings to respect Iranian independence and to refrain in the future from any agreements, such as the Anglo-Russian Convention, which impaired that independence; firm promises to avoid any further agreements with Persian prote´ge´s, especially tribal leaders; a renegotiation of Iran’s disadvantageous customs agreements; representation at the post-war peace conference; and the abandonment of any British claims for wartime damages.6 For the moment at least, if British statesmen desired a comprehensive agreement

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for securing Tehran’s cooperation, they would have to abandon some key elements of the southern system. British authorities were divided about what Persian policy to pursue. Some favoured conciliation in order to rebuild Iranian goodwill, which had so seriously been eroded in the years since the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907.7 This was to make a virtue of necessity. Charles Marling first proposed this departure in early June 1917, but it found its most articulate advocates in Viceroy Chelmsford and the Government of India. They claimed that the future of the British Empire depended on its ability to reconcile itself to national self-determination. ‘It is obvious’, Chelmsford explained to the secretary of state for India, Austen Chamberlain, in mid-1917, ‘that any attempt to continue old reactionary policy is doomed to failure in Persia and can only discredit us elsewhere.’8 Curzon took a harder line. Having joined Lloyd George’s coalition in December 1916, he had accomplished an astonishing comeback after more than a decade in the political wilderness. As a member of the prime minister’s streamlined, five-man War Cabinet, he pursued a more forceful policy in Iran, chairing first the Persia Committee and then the Eastern Committee, which brought together distinguished representatives of the Foreign, India and War Offices, including Balfour, Hardinge and Hirtzel.9 The Russian withdrawal and impasse in Tehran prompted the British to extend military operations into northern Iran in early 1918. They financed whatever Russian troops remained and sent small British detachments north, including the Dunsterville mission. In late 1917 the Russian sector of the cordon in Khurasan and northern Qa’inat was ‘literally melting away’.10 With uncharacteristic haste, the War and India Offices decided to repair the breach.11 India immediately dispatched reinforcements and prepared to improve the roads for motor transport. Signifying its new mission, the Sistan Field Force was renamed the East Persia Cordon Field Force and headquartered at Birjand. British units reached Turbat-i Haydari on 16 February and Mashhad a month later.12 Consul Prideaux deployed his intelligence network north,13 and the British soon took control of the Russian-operated Mashhad – Sistan telegraph.14 The strength of British forces along the cordon soon stood at over 1,500, of which some 275 were stationed in the now defunct Russian sphere of influence.15

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The extension of the British cordon into Khurasan necessitated an augmentation of the Sistan Levy Corps from 1,000 to 1,700 men, with ten British officers.16 The new contingent included 300 Sistani camelry, but British officials were eager to recruit the remainder of the men from Khurasan to ensure that the force would have local standing there. This project, however, ran into unexpected difficulties. Consul General Grey was not enthusiastic about the prospect of Prideaux exercising authority in Khurasan.17 Grey desired his own force, and a smaller Khurasan Levy Corps was established in the summer of 1918. British officials experienced real difficulties recruiting in Khurasan. The chiefs of the Qara’i, Turshiz, and all but one of the Taymuri leaders rebuffed British overtures, leaving them dependent on the Hazaras. Even with the increased manpower, the duties of the Sistan and Khurasan levy corps remained arduous, being distributed in ‘more than 100 posts, large and small, over a line 600 miles long and a perimeter of 1,700 miles, embracing an area of 20,000 square miles’.18 The levies were expanded again during the Third Anglo-Afghan War between May and August 1919, the Sistan corps increasing to 2,100 men and the Khurasan corps to 650 men. Long supply lines and bad roads had always created logistical and operational problems for British forces in eastern Iran. The difficulties of maintaining sufficient camel caravans with the Indian railhead at Nushki, about 500 miles east of Sistan, had been the occasion in August 1916 for a 100-mile railway extension west to Dalbandian. In June 1917 Viceroy Chelmsford acknowledged that the Russian Revolution was likely to increase India’s military involvement in Persia and requested permission to continue the railway from Dalbandian to Mirjavah on the Indo-Iranian frontier.19 Construction began in September, and in April 1918 the railway reached Mirjavah. The British connected this railhead with Mashhad by motor roads built by Indian and local labour. By February 1919 they had, without Tehran’s permission, built the railway to Duzdap (Zahidan).20 After decades of discussion and hesitation, a British railway had now finally reached Iran, having required only a world war and the collapse of the Russian Empire to achieve this. It is significant that Chelmsford was the moving force behind the project. His continued advocacy of accommodation with Iranian nationalists and his support for the railway were inspired by the same motive: Indian security. He preferred conciliation but wanted the option, provided by the railway, to use force if necessary.

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In early February 1918 Marling argued that British troops were needed to break the diplomatic deadlock in Tehran: As matters now stand we appear in a very ambiguous light; on the one hand we are protesting our desire to respect Persia’s integrity and independence, and on the other by such actions as the extension of our cordon along Afghanistan frontier, sending armoured cars in conjunction with General Dunsterville [. . .] and (? [sic] financing) Russian troops so as to keep them in Persia we are showing a complete disregard for Persian neutrality. It appears to me that as circumstances are likely to compel us to use force sooner or later it would be better to act at once rather than drag on negotiations entailing ever increasing concessions.21 There was mounting pressure in Tehran to sever relations with Britain.22 The new non-interventionist stance of the Soviet Union, the growing confidence in Germany and the Ottoman advances in the Caucasus, Marling explained, had convinced many Iranians that expulsion of the British was imminent. Some of the more radical nationalists, including returning members of the provisional government, were arming their own forces and had also apparently gained support from Kuchik Khan’s Jangali movement, which already controlled large parts of Gilan and threatened to descend on the capital from the north. Marling’s influence was negligible with Iranian officials, who were reportedly anxious to avoid contact with him. It was November 1915 all over again. On this occasion, however, there was no Russian column to save the day. Marling therefore urgently requested the immediate deployment of 10,000 British troops up the Caspian road and the occupation of Kirmanshah, Hamadan and Qazvin. Dunsterville, then in Hamadan, was of a similar mind. The plan would effectively create a north-west cordon shielding Tehran from the Ottomans and providing British access to the Caspian Sea and the Caucasus. Curzon needed little prodding. At stake were not only British interests in northern Iran, but also Britain’s entire position in Asia.23 The Ottoman advance in the Caucasus and a probable German thrust into Ukraine would open the Caspian Sea, Trans-Caspia and Central Asia to the enemy. British officials also maintained that the disorder attending local nationalist and communist movements would facilitate

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German expansion. Iran, which for nearly a century had been the westward glacis of India, was now an integral link not only to the Middle East and Africa, but also to the Caucasus, Central Asia and beyond. Curzon drafted the note that Marling presented to the Iranian government on 11 March 1918, which justified British action on the grounds of Iran’s alleged inability to preserve internal order or neutrality.24 What Curzon and the Persia Committee did not admit, however, was that even if Tehran effectively exercised its authority, Britain would undoubtedly still have insisted on the transit of British forces and supplies to the Caucasus and Central Asia, precisely the facilities that the British wanted denied to the Germans and Ottomans. Iranian ‘neutrality’ continued to be a British definition. Ironically, what Curzon and company did not appreciate was that their own policies contributed significantly to Persian instability, in that British intransigence severely limited the ability of Iranian cabinets to attract public support and thereby to govern more effectively. This British declaration, however, failed to impress. Tehran responded by condemning the presence of British troops and the SPR and reiterating its previous demands.25 The Persian cabinet’s resolve reflected not only the influence of nationalist opinion both inside and outside the government, but also the realization that the British could not undertake the military action contemplated. The military attache´ in Tehran, Colonel C. B. Stokes, confirmed that the shah and his officials had judged that the British would in fact need 20,000 men to occupy the road and that they knew such forces were unavailable.26 Still facing substantial Ottoman units in northern Iraq, General W. R. Marshall was reluctant to divert forces to Iran, despite repeated urging by the War Office. While British forces gradually occupied the road throughout 1918, any immediate gain hoped from an overwhelming show of force declared in the 11 March note had miscarried, because the Iranians better understood Britain’s logistical problems than did the British themselves. Curzon was losing his grip on reality.

The Failure of British Military Imperialism Britain’s troubles were hardly confined to northern Iran and were multiplying rapidly. Britain’s failure to intimidate the Iranians contributed to a major military confrontation in Fars between Sawlat al-Dawlah’s

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Qashqa’i confederacy and the SPR from May to July 1918.27 Just as British imperial interests demanded a more comprehensive Persian policy beyond the conventional parameters of the south, so too were significant national and local issues overlapping for Iranians. Britain’s ability to intervene in the north was premised on control of the south. The SPR were central to this effort, which explains Britain’s repeated requests for recognition of the force and for the continued employment of Sykes and other British officers. That successive cabinets in Tehran could not bring the force under Iranian control provided opposition groups with an opportunity to criticize and weaken the government. Sykes subsequently claimed that the British declaration of 11 March was important in provoking the crisis. While he was probably trying to shift some of the blame away from himself, his explanation was probably also true.28 Sawlat al-Dawlah, moreover, viewed the SPR, like the gendarmerie before it, as a direct challenge to his interests and tribal power base. He resented British efforts to police the Bushihr– Shiraz trade route and stamp out rahdari. He begrudged British support for Qavam al-Mulk and Farman Farma. He had at times been on the British payroll, but neither party had any illusions that these agreements were anything more than temporary conveniences. In 1918 he sought to mobilize these various national and local grievances to expel the British from Fars, and although he was eventually defeated, his campaign powerfully demonstrated the SPR’s unpopularity, its ineffectiveness and the great cost of maintaining Britain’s military imperialism in the south. The immediate cause of the crisis was an altercation on 9 May between the SPR garrison at Khanah-i Zinian, some 30 miles west of Shiraz, and the Darrashuri Qashqa’is, who were moving north for the hot season.29 The SPR detained several Darrashuris, whereupon the kalantar, Ayaz Kikha Khan, demanded their release. The SPR refused and Ayaz Kikha Khan ordered his men to open fire. Sykes sent a column from Shiraz, which attacked the Darrashuris four days later. The Darrashuris then approached Sawlat al-Dawlah demanding vengeance and, according to Gough, they were said ‘to have thrown the bodies of the women and children on the ground in front of his tent. The Soulat was forced by public opinion to take up the affair.’30 He rallied about 2,000 men and was soon joined by fighters from Dashti and Dashtistan and a contingent led by Nasir-i Divan of Kazirun, all of whom had long sought to drive out the British. They surrounded the post at Khanah-i Zinian and engaged a relief column of Indian troops in a bloody battle

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on 25 May. The beleaguered SPR garrison mutinied, killed their British officers and surrendered. By mid-June Sawlat al-Dawlah had collected 7,000 men and besieged the SPR and 2,500 British and Indian troops in Shiraz. Some British officials considered the Qashqa’i campaign a nationalist insurrection. At the height of the conflict in early June, Chelmsford warned London from India that ‘the situation is the more serious in that Soulet’s rising appears to be definite expression of general nationalist resentment of our interference in Central Persia.’31 The following month, Gough argued that the crisis resulted from ‘a genuine desire on the part of large numbers of Persians to see their country free from all foreign interference. However much the Persian patriot may be derided, still it is a fact that patriotism does exist in Persia.’32 These remarks require further explanation. Some Qashqa’i elites clearly understood their struggle to be part of a broader national cause. Gough cited a letter from Ayaz Kikha Khan to the deputy governor of Liravi in January 1918, in which he celebrated the Russian withdrawal from the north and the ‘welcome news of the freedom of our country from the aggression of foreigners. We should wait and see what will be the wish of God.’33 The average Qashqa’i warrior who took arms against the South Persia Rifles, however, did not likely frame his actions as part of a national struggle. He surely considered himself a ‘patriot’, but his patriotism was local – a feeling of loyalty to clan, tribe and place. If he possessed an identity that transcended these concerns, it was not a national one but a religious one. The traditional duty to defend Islam could readily mobilize popular resistance against the British, and the Shi‘i ulama, who had long played a central role in anti-foreign demonstrations, were prominent once again in the fighting near Shiraz in 1918. The desire to expel a foreign, oppressive ‘other’ did not necessitate the formation of a national consciousness. The rapidity, furthermore, with which the Qashqa’i rising disintegrated following the exploitation of factions within its leadership confirmed that even a sense of Qashqa’i identity, much less some incipient national solidarity, was not a dominant consideration among the majority of the tribesmen. In this regard, the case of Sawlat al-Dawlah is very interesting. A member of the Iranian elite, Sawlat al-Daulat was cognizant of broader contemporary political and ideological developments. Sykes had claimed in April that the Qashqa’i ilkhani was conspiring with Mukhbir

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al-Saltanah, now interior minister, against the SPR.34 Acting on this conviction, Sykes hastily ordered the punitive attacks on the Darrashuris following the initial Khanah-i Zinian incident, which precipitated the wider Qashqa’i crisis.35 Sawlat al-Dawlah publicly, and conveniently, defended his actions as ordered by Tehran, as his proclamation of 22 May made clear: I give notice to all that the army of the South Persia Rifles, that is unauthorized by the Persian Government, has caused all the Kashgais, the inhabitants of Kazerun, the Dashtis, Dashtistanis, and others to take action for the defence of Islam in accordance with the orders of the Persian Government.36 Sykes took him at his word. In reality, however, Samsam al-Saltanah’s cabinet in Tehran had issued no such instructions and was instead drifting with events and vaguely and vainly calling on all parties to work toward a settlement. Greatly disappointed, Sawlat al-Dawlah insisted to the prime minister in early June that all of Fars, not just the Qashqa’i, was united against the SPR’s tyranny and prepared to protect the homeland, and he begged for clear instructions as to his responsibilities.37 He simultaneoulsy informed Farman Farma that he would stand down on condition of receiving a guarantee from Marling that neither the Indian troops nor the SPR would interfere in his territory, but the window for negotiations was closing.38 As his forces tightened the siege of Shiraz in June, Sawlat al-Dawlah openly positioned his campaign as one of national resistance. He understood that acting in the name of nationalism provided him with the means of relation to other local communities – dissident merchants, religious authorities, landowners, urbanites, and the intelligentsia – with whom he needed ties in order to secure and maintain regional (as compared with the more narrow tribal) power.39 Gough reported that Sawlat al-Dawlah taunted Qavam al-Mulk, demanding that he choose between the ‘English’ and the ‘national party’ and made similar overtures to Farman Farma.40 His Shirazi supporters posted placards exhorting the populace to assist his ‘national’

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army. The Qashqa’i leader communicated with the Democrats, who organized demonstrations in the city and together with the ulama closed the bazaar on his behalf on 15 June.41 Sawlat al-Dawlah’s public espousal of the ‘national cause’ signified a strategy of obtaining not only local or regional extra-tribal support against a foreign occupier, but also wider backing from the national elite in Tehran and across the country. Nationalism was not yet a mass ideology, but Sawlat al-Dawlah’s appeal demonstrates that it was gradually becoming entrenched among the country’s elite and in the developing public sphere of urban, literate Iran. He understood that the Iranian ‘nation’ was becoming a source of political legitimacy that was compatible with his interests and provided justification for his defence of them. It is vital to recognize, however, that the decision of other Qashqa’i leaders to collaborate with the British against Sawlat al-Dawlah indicated that even if they were aware of a broader national identity, they subordinated it to other, more immediate interests. Faction, nation and empire collided to shape conflict in the Qajar borderlands in 1918. Farman Farma too played a pivotal role in this crisis. He had expressed doubts that British forces could control Fars, pointing out to his son, Firuz Mirza Nusrat al-Dawlah, that the population of Fars possessed 100,000 rifles and would not fear 2,000 Indian soldiers.42 Despite his reputation as an Anglophile, Farman Farma sought to maintain the authority of the Persian government and his own position as governor general and to limit Britain’s growing power in Fars, a strategy that damaged his old friendship with Sykes.43 He also strongly opposed Sawlat al-Dawlah’s ambitions. In the opening phases of the crisis, Farman Farma viewed a negotiated solution as the best possible outcome and maintained communication with the British and Sawlat al-Dawlah to that end.44 But during the siege in June, it became clear to him that a British victory was preferable to a Qashqa’i one. It was a potentially dangerous step, and Farman Farma sought British guarantees for his life, property and future income, including if he were in exile in British territory, and even floated the idea of being recognized as the autonomous prince of southern Persia.45 Marling rejected this last request out of hand, but the Eastern Committee did approve financial assistance.46 Farman Farma agreed with Sykes and Gough that Indian reinforcements and a British expedition from Bushihr were necessary.

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Sykes was adamant: ‘Affairs have reached a stage where we can only remain in Fars by immediate application of sufficient force inland from Bushire.’47 The Indian General Staff replied the following day promising immediate reinforcements via Bandar-i ‘Abbas and a British advance up the Bushihr road to Kazirun in the autumn.48 The mutiny at Khanah-i Zinian signalled that the allegiance of the SPR was very uncertain and that they might attack the Indian soldiers in Shiraz. As a precaution, British officers took custody of SPR artillery and machine guns.49 The threat of an SPR mutiny severely limited the mobility of the Indian troops and, as Gough explained, ‘paralysed our striking force’.50 Lt Colonel Orton led several sorties against Qashqa’i positions in midJune. On each occasion, however, the liability of the SPR to his rear obliged him to return to Shiraz, whereupon Sawlat al-Dawlah’s men regained the ground. Pro-Sawlat demonstrations prompted Farman Farma to urge the British to occupy strategic points of Shiraz on the night of 17 June to guard against a general rising. The key, however, was the political situation in Fars. Farman Farma and Gough cooperated closely to retain the loyalty of Qavam al-Mulk and then to break up the hostile force by manipulating internal Qashqa’i rivalries. Sawlat al-Dawlah’s half-brother, Ahmad Khan Sardar Ihtisham, a former ilkhani, was in Shiraz at the time. In early 1917 Gough had paid him 200 tumans a month ‘as a sort of retaining fee’.51 These payments were terminated when Gough concluded the agreement with Sawlat alDawlah in May 1917, but a year later, with the Qashqa’is approaching the city, Gough, with Sykes’s vocal encouragement, again approached Sardar Ihtisham. Farman Farma advised Gough not only to resume the monthly subvention but also to pay arrears for the period since May 1917. On 6 June 1918 Gough recommended that Tehran depose Sawlat al-Dawlah from the ilkhaniship and appoint Sardar Ihtisham in his place, and conveyed to the latter a series of personal assurances.52 Armed with British money and promises, Sardar Ihtisham began negotiations with another brother, ‘Ali Khan Salar-i Hishmat, who was an important leader of the besieging forces.53 These efforts were not initially successful, but acting on instructions from Farman Farma, Qavam alMulk contacted Muhammad ‘Ali Khan, the chief of the Kashkulis (one of the Qashqa’i tribes) and another of Sawlat al-Dawlah’s adversaries. Gough again provided the necessary funds. Together Qavam al-Mulk and Muhammad ‘Ali Khan then approached Salar-i Hishmat and

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arranged a meeting between him and Sardar Ihtisham on 2 July, where it was agreed that Sardar Ihtisham would be made ilkhani and Salar-i Hishmat, ilbaygi. These machinations had the desired effect and Sawlat al-Dawlah’s force rapidly disintegrated. Orton attacked again on 7 July, and Sawlat al-Dawlah fled with about 500 men to his home in Firuzabad with his rivals in pursuit. Sawlat al-Dawlah’s defeat was the result not of Britain’s military power, but of astute political management by Farman Farma and Gough. He was a victim of an Anglo-Qajar alliance that utilized colonial knowledge to effect divide and rule. This result had been made possible by the long familiarity of British consuls with politics in Fars and the desire of Farman Farma and local notables to deny Sawlat al-Dawlah his aspirations to dominate the province. With British money and arms, Qavam al-Mulk and Sardar Ihtisham obtained the means to pursue their own ambitions, and their exertions did not come cheaply. Gough estimated that between May and August 1918, payments to these two men amounted to 150,000 tumans (£50,000).54 While this expenditure secured the downfall of Sawlat al-Dawlah, it did not provide the British with any real control over the Qashqa’is or bring about the order they had long sought in Fars. In fact, the terms Gough offered Qavam alMulk and Sardar Ihtisham in July 1918 were precisely those demanded by Sawlat al-Dawlah: non-interference by the British in tribal affairs. At the meeting of 2 July, Qavam al-Mulk and Sardar Ihtisham exchanged notes in which both acknowledged that the former would, through the mediation of Farman Farma, obtain an amnesty from the British for all Qashqa’is who would now follow Sardar Ihtisham.55 Similarly, Qavam al-Mulk declared that the British would not intervene in Khamsah affairs. The new Qashqa’i leaders acknowledged responsibility for suppressing any disturbances or robberies and pledged that in the event of their inability to do so, they would appeal to the governor general, who would only call on British military assistance with the ‘cognizance’ of the ilkhani. The British project of military government in Fars had failed; the politics of notables was again ascendant. Ironically, while order had been the aim of British intervention in Fars, the influx of British arms and money had further destabilized the province.56 The British, unlike the shah, were a source of power but not of legitimacy, and the result was intensified local political competition and costly military confrontation.

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The rising confirmed the SPR’s lack of local and national legitimacy as well as its military unreliability and ineffectiveness. It was also very expensive; in September 1917 Marling estimated that it cost £100,000 a week, which as an annual figure, he noted, was greater than the value of pre-war British trade with southern Iran.57 In May 1918, Sykes himself admitted that without recognition from Tehran, the SPR in Fars might have to be abandoned.58 Marling and Gough were even more dubious about the force. The Indian government was of a similar mind, and in early August ordered the SPR to cease patrolling the roads north and south of Shiraz, the task being left to Farman Farma with Gough’s financial assistance.59 They re-established the old system of agreements with tribes and road khans for security of the road. Sykes, whose relations with Gough and Farman Farma had deteriorated badly, was furious. On the eve of Gough’s departure from Fars in late September, the consul unequivocally condemned the SPR: my opinion is that so long as the South Persia Rifles are maintained, they will not only be useless in a military sense and an extravagant waste of English money, while they will not perform the duties of maintenance of order on trade routes better than local levies, but they will also be a serious menace to ourselves and to law and order unless overawed by a strong force of Indian troops.60 The final failure of the SPR prompted the long awaited British expedition to southern Iran. During the summer of 1918 India assembled the Bushire Field Force of more than 1,000 men with artillery, and later aircraft, under the command of Brigadier General J. A. Douglas, with the acting consul general, J. H. Bill, as his political officer.61 Douglas had long experience in Iran, serving as military attache´ in Tehran in 1904 and leading the 39th Central Indian Horse during its ill-fated sojourn in Shiraz between 1911 and 1913. Douglas’s original instructions included the pacification of the coastal districts, and he made it clear in August 1918 that the only terms offered to Za’ir Khizir Tangistani and his associates should be ‘complete submission and include reparation’.62 By late September, however, India was less eager for hostilities in southern Iran and restricted Douglas’s objectives to securing Dalaki in anticipation of a joint advance on Kazirun with Sykes’s Indian troops from Shiraz.63 Douglas was reminded that because

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Iran was a neutral country, political considerations should be discussed with Bill and referred to Cox and India as necessary. ‘We must,’ Sir A. H. Grant, secretary in the Indian Foreign Department, warned Bill ‘avoid a campaign of Khan hunting at all costs’.64 The idea, however, of a British expeditionary force opening the Bushihr – Shiraz road without opposition was pure fantasy. In late September Za’ir Khizir Tangistani, Shaykh Husayn Khan Chahkutahi and Ghazanfar al-Saltanah Burazjani gathered their men at Chaghadak across the Bushihr isthmus. They ignored an ultimatum to disperse, and on 29 September the British attacked, overwhelming the defenders who fled to the hills.65 During October the Bushire Field Force advanced up the road to Dalaki, occupying en route the rebel strongholds at Chahkutah, Ahram and Burazjan.66 In December the important Kamarij pass was taken, and the following month British troops entered Kazirun, where they met contingents from Shiraz. The British improved the road, constructed a light railway from Bushihr to Daliki and built several airfields.

Cox and the Anglo-Iranian Treaty Meanwhile, Sir Percy Cox arrived in Tehran as charge´ d’affaires and special commissioner in September 1918. His transfer powerfully illustrated the shift of Britain’s Persian policy from the borderlands to the capital. While in Tehran, he retained his offices in Iraq, the gulf and southern Iran. The uniting of these posts in Cox’s hands denoted a comprehensive approach to consolidating Britain’s imperial interests throughout the region. The war, moreover, had considerably broadened his imperial experience and perspective. In addition to his conventional duties, he established a provisional administration in occupied Iraq, supervising finances, public works, a civil service and the administration of justice.67 He was assisted by other officers of the Indian Foreign Department, several of whom, such as A. T. Wilson, S. G. Knox and H. R. C. Dobbs, had served in Iran before the war. In early 1918 Cox discussed British policy in the post-war Middle East with Sir Reginald Wingate, the British High Commissioner in Egypt.68 After Cairo he returned to England, where he met King George V at Windsor, stayed with Curzon at Hackwood House and appeared before the Eastern Committee in London. He supported establishing a local Arab regime in Baghdad, but urged that Britain retain financial and

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administrative control by means of high-level officials and advisers. The mandate system of indirect control, with its roots in India, Egypt and most recently Fars, was emerging as Britain’s imperial model in the Middle East and Cox now took it with him to Tehran. Cox found Britain’s position in Iran, despite the several missteps and setbacks, to be improving in late 1918. British forces were finally gaining control of the main north– south roads and were moving into northern Iran. The Bushire Field Force was advancing on Shiraz. General Marshall finally established a line of communications from Baghdad to the Caspian Sea at Bandar-i Anzali via Khanaqin, Hamadan, Qazvin and Rasht. In August, a truce with Kuchik Khan and the Jangalis allowed the British access through Gilan to the Caspian Sea, which they soon patrolled with an improvised flotilla. Placed under the command of Major General W. M. Thomson, North Persia Force numbered almost 4,000 men and provided supplies and logistical support for British forces operating in Baku, the Caucasus, the Caspian littoral and Trans-Caspia, while guarding against an Ottoman advance on Tehran from Azerbaijan.69 In Sistan and Khurasan the East Persia Cordon Force served similar functions for Major General W. Malleson’s mission to Turkistan, which although originally intended to protect Central Asia from the Germans and Ottomans was, to the consternation of his superiors, engaged in running battles with the Bolsheviks between August and October 1918. Military control of the roads also had a latent commercial function, as the British hoped that their trade and capital would fill the vacuum attending the collapse of Russian economic interests in northern Iran. There were clear indications that British trade was already dominating Khurasan, which hitherto had been a Russian commercial monopoly. Imports from India to Khurasan, for example, amounted in the period October– December 1917 to about £38,000, but with the completion of the railway to Zahidan and intense road building north to Mashhad, the total had risen to almost £520,000 between October and December 1918.70 Over the same period Russian imports had declined from £223,000 to £59,000. Military operations had made possible the commercial promise of overland Indo-Iranian trade envisioned by Curzon nearly two decades earlier. Affairs in south-western Iran were also relatively satisfactory. In December 1917 Shaykh Khaz‘al was made Grand Commander of the

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Indian Empire (GCIE). The APOC continued to develop its oil infrastructure. British military ‘Convalescent Depots’ and a naval dry dock were in operation near Muhammarah. Political officers in Shushtar and Dizful, supported by Indian cavalry and local levies, practically governed northern Arabistan, where Arab, Lur and Bakthiyari interests overlapped. They financed the local administration, supervised revenue departments and managed the Lur chiefs with subsidies. Cox praised their efforts in very paternalistic imperial terms, citing improving security, agriculture and trade.71 This intervention, however, upset the Bakhtiyari ilkhani, Sardar Muhtasham, who resigned in protest.72 The vice consul at Ahvaz, Captain E. W. C. Noel, secured the appointment of Sardar Zafar as ilkhani in mid-1917. He reciprocated by renewing Bakhtiyari promises to defend APOC installations. With strong support from Cox, Noel provided money and artillery to Sardar Zafar to suppress the Kuhgalus, who were blocking the Lynch Road in summer 1918, and to raise 500 Bakhtiyari cavalry, which proved useful in Isfahan and as a counterweight to Sawlat al-Dawlah further south. Cox also enjoyed a new and relatively cooperative Iranian cabinet headed by Vusuq al-Dawlah. Marling had been pressing Ahmad Shah to appoint Vusuq al-Dawlah for months and the monarch finally relented in early August 1918, after Samsam al-Saltanah’s cabinet unilaterally revoked all treaties and concessions with Russia, including the extraterritoriality provisions of the Treaty of Turkmanchay.73 In September Vusuq al-Dawlah explained to Cox that he needed British concessions, especially regarding the Anglo-Russian Convention and the SPR, to demonstrate his independence and to secure public support.74 Cox acknowledged that Britain’s prestige in Iran had declined greatly since 1907, but maintained that by a conciliatory policy Britain could repair its public image.75 He was even sympathetic to Iranian demands towards the SPR: ‘Latter name is simply Anathema among Persians and our attitude in regard thereto is the crucial test for them of our intention to pursue really friendly policy in near future. Among our own officers I know no-one who has good word to say for them.’76 But Curzon remained uncompromising. On 24 October the Eastern Committee directed Cox to pursue the ‘permanent maintenance of British influence’ in Iran.77 Seeking a via media between Curzon and the Iranians, Cox maintained that Persian public opinion was opposed to ‘British tutelage’, but was amenable to ‘international assistance’.78

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He advocated legitimating British hegemony by obtaining a mandate over Iran at the peace conference and having the League of Nations dictate this arrangement to the Persians in the following terms: For the last ten years you have demonstrated your inability to govern yourselves and walk alone, with the result that your country is in a perpetual state of chaos and famine and threatened by Bolshevism. In the interests of humanity and civilization it is necessary that some competent power should take you in hand. We therefore give mandate to Great Britain who is most competent to do it, safeguarded by international guarantees. This remarkable proposal astonished the Indian government, but Cox explained that his views had been modified by the Allied victory and by his growing concern about instability and communist propaganda in Iran. Encouraged by Curzon, he urged grasping the ‘Persian nettle’.79 Building on the kind of oversight exercised by consuls and political officers in southern Iran and Iraq, Cox proposed ‘a trained Administrator in control of every provincial Government and in every department of State’ who would train a cadre of 1,500 Persian officials to succeed them in the future. He also stressed the importance of improving communications, especially railroads and motor roads linking the central Iranian plateau with the Persian Gulf, the Caspian Sea and Iraq. In November the Iranian government announced that it would be sending a delegation to the peace conference, and Cox observed it would probably seek full political and economic independence, compensation for war damages and international aid.80 As these demands might embarrass the British, the Eastern Committee decided to oppose Iranian representation at the Conference on the grounds that Iran was not a belligerent in the conflict.81 On 11 January 1919 Curzon outlined for Cox the basic provisions of an Anglo-Persian treaty, which included a restatement of Britain’s commitment to Iran’s independence and integrity; the future cancellation of the Anglo-Russian Convention; the combination of the Cossack Brigade and the SPR into a single Iranian army; the eventual removal of British troops; and the employment of a British financial adviser.82 Despite his earlier misgivings about Persian reactions to ‘British tutelage’, Cox moved energetically and loyally to carry out Curzon’s

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instructions. Replying on 13 January he explained that he had discussed the issue with Vusuq al-Dawlah, Firuz Mirza Nusrat al-Dawlah, son of Farman Farma, and Akbar Mas‘ud Sarim al-Dawlah, son of Zil al-Sultan, the so-called ‘triumvirate’, who communicated their desire for British assistance. Cox recommended a British financial supervisor, a British military mission, British advisers to the ministries of public works, agriculture, justice, education and the interior, as well to the provincial governors.83 These supervisory appointments would provide direct British access to the central Iranian state and its information order. A loan of £2– £3 million would also be necessary. The triumvirate presented their own demands, including the abrogation of the Treaty of Turkmanchay, tariff revisions, war damages from the Ottomans and Russians, territorial compensation in the Caucasus and British assistance in developing railways, transport and public works.84 That these demands closely matched those presented by the Persian delegation to the peace conference suggests that Vusuq al-Dawlah, far from being a British tool, was in fact engaged in a ‘diplomatic pincer movement’ to force Curzon to negotiate along these lines.85 These discussions in Tehran signified the end of Britain’s regional policy in southern Iran. Consular officers, too, supported a thoroughgoing reform of the Iranian state. In late December 1918 J. H. Bill, who was officiating for Cox in Bushihr, reported that many landholders feared that Farman Farma would take advantage of the opening of the road by British troops to make extortionate revenue demands on them.86 Bill recommended informing Farman Farma that British support depended on good governance and western financial oversight of a new revenue assessment, audit of provincial accounts and the elimination of the practice of tuyul by which the central government allowed officials to collect land taxes in return for military or other services. Bill stressed that corruption in the Iranian military could only be resolved by the employment of British officers, who could be trusted to pay the soldiers their wages. Consul E. B. Hotson, who had taken over from Gough in Shiraz in September 1918, agreed with Bill. He declared to Cox in January 1919: If we leave country as a whole to bad old ways it will be useless to tinker with one province. Is there any prospect with consent and approval of Persian public opinion, of ourselves, Americans, or

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other westerners taking whole country in hand? By way of propaganda to create desire for genuine reform can anything be done? To South Persia Rifles the same applies. If neighbouring provinces remain in anarchy I cannot conceive any lasting advantage even if the British officer[s] and the levies work up an efficient force in Fars. The only scheme which seems to offer any hope of success is one for all Persia under supreme control of Tehran.87 Echoing Bill’s concern that British military power might be used to perpetuate traditional abuses, Hotson concluded: ‘Force will without reform of Persian administration be an instrument of oppression and to every British officer connection therewith in any capacity will be repugnant.’ Cox repeatedly emphasized that British troops should remain until these reforms were accomplished and Tehran had established its authority throughout the country. He wanted British forces to control the roads for at least another year.88 This recommendation, however, was unpopular with many officials in Britain and India, for whom post-war financial retrenchment and military demobilization were top priorities. In December 1918 John Maynard Keynes, the treasury representative on the Eastern Committee, estimated that Anglo-Indian military expenditure in Iran amounted to almost £2.3 million a month, or about £27.6 million a year, which included monthly outlays of £1.5 million for the North Persia Force, £290,000 each for the Bushire Field Force and the South Persia Rifles and £140,000 for the Sistan Levy Corps.89 The War Office, India Office and especially the Government of India were determined to reduce these costs. India was particularly eager to recall the Bushire Field Force, which by late January had completed its stated objective of opening the Bushihr– Shiraz road. Curzon, Cox and the southern consuls resisted. Cox claimed that a precipitate British withdrawal would both undo the recent progress on the road and undermine his negotiations in Tehran. Reiterating the need for a comprehensive policy, he asserted that it was ‘impossible to treat the several factors of situation in water-tight compartments at this juncture and that they need to be considered from the point of [the] whole’.90

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Further complicating the situation in Fars was the fact that the major rebel leaders, Shaykh Husayn Khan, Ghazanfar al-Saltanah, Za’ir Khizir, Nasir-i Divan and Sawlat al-Dawlah, all remained at large. In December 1919 Trevor announced that villages providing aid or refuge to Shaykh Husayn or Za’ir Khizir would be punished collectively by air bombardment.91 The Royal Air Force was becoming a favoured method for controlling tribal populations, especially in Iraq, and the British also carried out bombing operations in Fars in 1919 and 1920.92 London and Delhi nevertheless recoiled at the prospect of prolonged guerilla warfare to hunt down fugitives in the hills, especially as they were preparing to withdraw the troops in the spring of 1919. In these circumstances, Bill and Hotson agreed that negotiated settlements should be concluded while they still possessed the threat of compulsion afforded by the troops. The rebels commanded considerable local prestige and were likely to return to power after the British withdrawal. Such was especially true for Sawlat al-Dawlah. Sardar Ihtisham’s disappointing leadership prompted Hotson to observe to Cox in early January 1919 that ‘as long as he lives Soulat is the only Ilkhani the tribe will follow’.93 Hotson advised that Sawlat al-Dawlah be pardoned and possibly reinstated on condition of going into temporary exile, nominally a pilgrimage, in Iraq or India. India agreed and generally favoured a quick settlement on easier terms to facilitate a rapid withdrawal.94 Cox, however, took a harder line, urging that in addition to a temporary exile from Fars, Sawlat al-Dawlah should pay revenue arrears and a fine of £10,000 and that the Bushire Field Force be retained to ensure punitive settlements with the other khans as well.95 Bill met with Sawlat al-Dawlah on 1 March 1919 at Nakhl-i Taqi on the coast south of Bushihr. Sawlat al-Dawlah insisted that he had acted under government orders the previous year, but was willing to make his submission in Tehran, leaving a brother to protect his property in Fars.96 At the end of March Bill visited Shaykh Khaz‘al, who offered to mediate between Sawlat al-Dawlah and the British. He proposed that Sawlat alDawlah be sent to Muhammarah rather than Tehran, on condition of his eventual reinstatement as Qashqa’i ilkhani. The shaykh had long enjoyed good relations with Sawlat al-Dawlah, going back to their ‘southern league’ in 1910, and he hoped his good offices would improve his own dubious reputation in Persian public opinion. Khaz‘al also did not want Sawlat al-Dawlah to make his submission to the central government in

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Tehran, ‘on [the] general principle of discouraging direct intervention of it in Southern Persian affairs’.97 Cox supported the plan, observing that Sawlat al-Dawlah’s attitude would benefit from his experience of British power in Arabistan and Iraq.98 By this time, however, Cox’s attention was firmly focused on the treaty negotiations with the triumvirate in Tehran. On April 1919 he forwarded to Curzon drafts of the agreement, which substantially embodied the final treaty signed in August.99 Britain agreed to affirm again the ‘independence and integrity of Persia’; to support Iran’s membership in the League of Nations; to provide Iran with financial advisers, military officers, equipment, a substantial loan and assistance in developing roads and railroads; and to consider the revision of commercial treaties and tariffs. Vusuq al-Dawlah and his colleagues placed great importance on a subsidiary agreement in which Britain pledged its support for Iranian claims for war damages and territorial adjustments. It was also on this occasion that Cox revealed the triumvirate’s request for 500,000 tumans (£131,000) with ‘no questions asked’, to carry out pro-treaty propaganda and ‘to square’ the rest of the cabinet, the press and the Majlis.100 This payment has been the subject of much controversy, but set against the longer history of Britain’s money diplomacy in Persia, it appears quite modest. The Iranian constitution stipulated that treaties required Majlis ratification, but Cox was confident that the elections were ‘being well managed and we hope to get in friendly assembly which will accept position’. The close Anglo-Iranian ‘partnership’ envisioned by this proposal rendered secondary the settlement of the questions surrounding Sawlat al-Dawlah and the withdrawal of British troops from the south. As Cox remarked in April, ‘From view point of Legation Fars question becomes less important if there is reasonable prospect of early settlement with Persian Government on lines suggested.’101 He was accordingly now prepared to acquiesce in the immediate reduction of British troops on the Bushihr– Shiraz road. India disbanded the Bushire Field Force in April 1919, but left small garrisons at Bushihr, Kazirun and Shiraz.102 These troops patrolled the road for another year, when they were relieved by the SPR. In the meantime, Britain approved Khaz‘al’s offer to Sawlat al-Dawlah.103 The Qashqa’i chief, however, had also been negotiating directly with Farman Farma.104 Farman Farma suggested to Hotson that Sawlat al-Dawlah remain in Fars, leaving his son, Nasr Khan, as hostage

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and a deposit of £5,000 for good behaviour. While Cox had earlier demanded Sawlat al-Dawlah’s exile, he now agreed to Farman Farma’s proposal, adding only that the guarantee be increased to £10,000, which was duly deposited at the Imperial Bank of Persia. Similar leniency was also shown towards Nasir-i Divan and Ghazanfar al-Saltanah when they surrendered in Shiraz in April and June respectively.105 This left only Shaykh Husayn Khan Chahkutahi and Za’ir Khizir Tangistani still in the field, and although their defiance was irksome to the British, their capture, like southern affairs generally, had become insignificant compared to the pursuit of the Anglo-Iranian Treaty. Shaykh Husayn was eventually killed in a skirmish with the SPR in 1920 and Za’ir Khizir was murdered by a fellow Tangistani soon thereafter.106

Aftermath The Anglo-Iranian Treaty was signed on 9 August 1919. In a covering memorandum of the same date, Curzon summarized for his cabinet colleagues why Iran and the treaty were essential for the protection of Britain’s imperial interests in Asia: If it be asked why we should undertake the task at all, and why Persia should not be left to herself and allowed to rot into picturesque decay, the answer is that her geographical position, the magnitude of our interests in the country, and the future safety of our Eastern Empire render it impossible for us now – just as it would have been impossible for us any time during the past fifty years – to disinterest ourselves from what happens in Persia. Moreover, now that we are about to assume the mandate for Mesopotamia, which will make us coterminous with the western frontiers of Persia, we cannot permit the existence, between the frontiers of our Indian Empire in Baluchistan and our new Protectorate, of a hotbed of misrule, enemy intrigue, financial chaos, and political disorder. Further, if Persia were to be left alone, there is every reason to fear that she would be overrun by Bolshevik influences from the north. Lastly, we possess in the south-western corner of Persia great assets in the shape of the oilfields, which are worked for the British Navy and which give us commanding interests in that part of the world.107

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From Curzon’s perspective, the treaty was the fulfilment of his lifelong project to incorporate Iran fully into the glacis of India. As he boasted to his wife, Grace, it was ‘a great triumph [. . .] and I have done it all alone’.108 It was soon clear, however, that Curzon and Cox had seriously underestimated the strength both of Iranian and international opposition to the treaty. From Tehran, Cox generalized freely that the ‘bulk of public have received it favourably as in provinces’.109 He acknowledged the hostility of Vusuq al-Dawlah’s political enemies, the White Russian officers of the Cossack Brigade, as well as the French and American legations. In reality, the treaty provided a focus for many Iranians of various political allegiances and viewpoints: ‘not only the modern nationalists, but the ulama and religious community, Democrats and popular constitutionalists [. . .] the Gendarmerie and some of the Cossack officers were united in the belief that Iran had become a British protectorate.’110 They criticized the agreement in the press, sermons, delegations and even in poetry and received encouragement from America and France. Vusuq al-Dawlah’s policy of intimidation, arrest and exile only strengthened their case and did little to weaken their resolve. Ultimate responsibility for the impending debacle must lie with Curzon. The Anglo-Iranian Treaty was his great undertaking, for which he had overcome considerable opposition from the War and India Offices and the Government of India. It has often been remarked that Curzon had failed to comprehend the enormous changes that had occurred in Iran in the 30 years since his journey there.111 Tempted into overconfidence by the enormity of Britain’s victory in World War I, the collapse of its rivals and the strategic logic of imperial expansion, he had overlooked the development of Iranian nationalism and other kinds of Iranian resistance to British imperialism.112 In this regard he was not well served by Cox, who was more aware than most of the resentment toward British policy since 1907, and who had repeatedly urged concessions upon his own government in order to improve Britain’s reputation with Iranian public opinion.113 Once Curzon had directed him to negotiate the treaty, however, Cox – the ideal imperial bureaucrat – displayed no hesitation in loyally carrying out his old patron’s policy. Worse, he provided overly optimistic assessments as to the triumvirate’s ability to secure the treaty’s

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ratification in the face of considerable opposition. Curzon and Cox’s reliance on the triumvirate, as the Government of India remarked, was imprudent, as was the secrecy of the negotiations and payments, which was soon exposed and rendered public support impossible.114 These tactics had worked well at the local level with the southern notables, but they were now an anachronism in Tehran, where public opinion was vocal, politically significant and suspicious of and hostile to the British. Curzon also failed to recognize that opposition within the British government might hinder his ability to execute the treaty.115 Both he and Cox repeatedly insisted on the retention of British troops, especially in the north, until such time as the remodelled Iranian army could control the country. India’s determination to withdraw its forces from Fars should have raised doubts about the War Office’s commitment to Iran, especially as Winston Churchill, the new secretary of state for war, had been charged with making drastic reductions in military expenditure. The last British and Indian troops were finally withdrawn from the south in the spring of 1920 and from the east that summer, leaving only the North Persia Force along the Khanaqin– Bandar-i Anzali road. Unlike the Russians in 1911 and 1915, British officials between 1919 and 1921 were not prepared to use troops to intimidate Tehran and were instead looking for the earliest opportunity to evacuate them to Iraq, where a serious anti-British revolt broke out in 1920. Violence in Egypt, Palestine, India and Ireland made the use of force in Iran to impose the treaty very unappealing.116 Curzon also failed to appreciate Soviet reactions to the treaty. That Bolshevism was opposed to British imperial interests in Asia seemed obvious. The new Soviet regime was preaching world revolution against the British Empire and inciting the ‘Peoples of the East’ to expel their colonial masters and take their place in a new communist world order.117 At Cox’s insistence Vusuq al-Dawlah had rejected Soviet diplomatic overtures, which included the abrogation of all tsarist treaties and concessions.118 In January 1920 Vusuq al-Dawlah asked for British reinforcements, rifles, aircraft and £1 million to resist a possible Soviet invasion, but no such aid was forthcoming.119 On 18 May 1920 the Soviets moved against the fleet of the White Russian general, Anton Denikin, which had taken refuge at Bandar-i Anzali after fleeing Baku. The small British force there was obliged to surrender, but was then allowed to retreat south. The Soviet Republic of Gilan was soon

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proclaimed under the presidency of the Jangali leader, Kuchik Khan. Curzon resisted his cabinet colleagues’ demands for the immediate withdrawal of North Persia Force, but Britain’s failure to repulse the Soviet invasion illustrated the dubious value of the Anglo-Iranian Treaty to Iran. In early June 1920 Cox was appointed High Commissioner in Iraq to deal with the crisis there. The Soviet invasion and Cox’s departure did not help Vusuq al-Dawlah, who after two tense years in office was exhausted and eager to resign. The new prime minister, Mirza Hasan Khan Pirnia Mushir al-Dawlah, suspended the treaty until the Majlis could assemble and vote on it. Pending Majlis approval, he also declined to employ the recently arrived British financial advisers or to draw upon the British loan. In the British cabinet, Curzon held out against Churchill’s repeated attempts to withdraw the North Persia Force. The appointment of General Edmund Ironside to Iran in October 1920, however, foreshadowed the foreign secretary’s eventual defeat. Having served in northern Russia and Turkey, Ironside later described himself ‘as an expert in risky withdrawals [. . .] of unpopular military forces in widely separated parts of the world’.120 In December 1920, the British cabinet decided that the withdrawal of the North Persia Force would begin the following April.121 The prospect of northern Iran succumbing to Bolshevism, revolution or anarchy encouraged some British officials to revisit the traditional southern strategy. When British forces left in the spring of 1921, the former oriental secretary in Tehran and compiler of the ‘Biographical Notices’, G. P. Churchill, advised the Foreign Office that the shah’s government might very well collapse.122 He criticized the India Office’s growing indifference about Iran. A hostile Iran would become a centre for anti-British propaganda directed against India and Iraq, and while the APOC installations would remain secure in the south-west, the IBP would likely ‘be crippled’ and the Iranian debt to the British government cancelled. Should Tehran fall, Churchill urged Britain to establish a new state in central and southern Iran with its capital in Isfahan. It would be governed not by a Majlis, or other democratic institutions, but instead by traditional ruling elites of the old landholding class, such as ‘Ayn al-Dawlah and the Bakhtiyari khans. Commenting on this memorandum from Baghdad, Cox proved more optimistic about the situation in Tehran.123 He acknowledged that the

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treaty was effectively dead, but encouraged approaching the Majlis with another, less controversial agreement. Should this attempt fail, the British could then retreat to a revised southern strategy, which Cox asserted should be established upon a confederacy of independent Arab, Bakhtiyari, Lur and Qashqa’i states. The need to leave a viable central government in Tehran after the British evacuation had also absorbed much of General Ironside’s attention. Strengthening the Cossack Brigade was necessary, and Ironside set about looking for a capable Iranian officer to undertake the task. He soon found the right man in the person of Colonel Riza Khan, who had distinguished himself as commander of the Tabriz battalion.124 Immediately after their initial meeting in late 1920, Ironside made Riza Khan the deputy commander of the Cossack Brigade and charged him with supervising its training and reorganization. In January 1921, Riza Khan assumed de facto command of the force. Ironside remarked in his diary in February, ‘I had only seen one man in the country, who was capable of leading the nation. He was Reza Khan, the man who would be in charge of the only efficient force in the country. Would the Shah have the sense to put his trust in this man?’125 Ironside’s last meeting with Riza Khan took place on 17 February, the eve of his departure from Iran. He did not record whether he and Riza Khan explicitly discussed the coup d’e´tat, but he noted that Riza Khan pledged not to attack British troops as they withdrew, or to depose the young, weak Ahmad Shah.126 Four days later, on 21 February 1921, Riza Khan led the Cossack Brigade into Tehran and together with Sayyid Ziya al-Din Tabataba’i and two gendarmerie officers toppled Sipahdar’s government and took over power themselves. British military officers and diplomats facilitated the movement of Riza Khan’s troops from Qazvin and their entry into Tehran, without authorization from London.127 Riza Khan’s ambitions proved far greater than even Ironside had anticipated. In 1925 he seized the imperial crown for himself, and brought the long Qajar century to an end. Beginning with the army and extending to the government and society, Riza Khan and his allies embarked on a broad policy of centralization and modernization. Political subjugation and forced sedentarization of the tribes came to be considered essential to this project. In terms of foreign policy, Riza Khan’s primary goal was independence from the kinds of foreign influence that had marked the

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Qajar period. Immediately after seizing power, the new regime cancelled the Anglo-Iranian Treaty and then signed an agreement with the Soviet Union, normalizing relations between the two countries and formally revoking all tsarist treaties and concessions. Although these decisions were setbacks for the British, they soon realized that Riza Khan was a stabilizing force in this quarter of the world, and that in acting as a buffer against Soviet Russia and generally cooperating with the APOC he would meet Britain’s foremost needs in Iran. For the southern consuls, Riza Khan’s supremacy confirmed the end of their own local ascendancy. The SPR were summarily disbanded in November 1921, after Tehran declined to assume their financial maintenance. Iranian army detachments began advancing south and taking control of the roads. ‘The history of Bushire for the year 1922’, Consul General Trevor observed in his annual report, ‘is largely the history of the increasing influence exerted over local affairs by the Central Government and particularly by the Ministry of War.’128 Riza Khan visited Bushihr in November 1922 and according to Trevor: By word and deed he brought home to the people in Bushire and the tribes in the South the hitherto little understood fact that the Central Government in Tehran proposed to govern; and that he proposed to control the Central Government. Commenting on the situation in Bandar-i ‘Abbas that same year, Consul A. W. Fagan remarked: Our prestige continues to decline. The impression created by the anti-British Press campaign (from Berlin and Egypt as well as from the interior of Persia), by the attitude adopted by the Kemalist Party and by the machinations of Bolshevik agents in North of Persia are strengthened by our policy of retrenchment, withdrawal and non-interference. The policy now pursued by the Consulate is contrasted with its omnipotence during the War and in the days when the South Persia Rifles flourished and money was plentiful; and unflattering conclusions are drawn. Overt hostility appears however to be confined almost entirely to officials who are not natives of the

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district and who come to fill their pockets at the expense of the local inhabitants. The latter seem to recognize the fact of our changed status and in most cases to regret it, though they may not admit as much. Gratitude for past benefits is not a virtue common among Persians.129 Similar changes were occurring in eastern Iran. The Sistan Levy Corps was disbanded in December 1920 and the extent of the decline of British local influence vis-a`-vis Tehran was emphasized in the spring of 1925, when the British consul awarded war medals to ex-levies. On learning this news, Riza Khan declared to Mushir al-Mulk, the foreign minister, ‘I must say that the Consul has no right to present medals to Persian subjects. The matter must be pressed and you should ask for the return of the medals and report result to me.’130 The ultimate demise of Britain’s local imperialism in southern Iran was confirmed in late 1924, when Riza Khan moved against Shaykh Khaz‘al. Mindful of previous assurances to the shaykh, the British minister, Sir Percy Loraine, attempted to mediate the conflict, but he eventually acquiesced in the inevitable. Riza’s forces occupied Arabistan and placed the shaykh under house arrest in Tehran, where he died, probably not from natural causes, in 1936. Sawlat al-Dawlah had met a similar fate three years earlier.

The end of an era The Russian Revolution transformed Britain’s position in Iran. For Curzon, imperial interests in the Middle East, India and Asia generally dictated that Britain move north to fill the void. Consuls and political officers facilitated this expansion, but it was soon evident that, in these unprecedented circumstances, British influence in Tehran would be the crucial factor. Growing nationalist opposition and the intransigence of successive Iranian cabinets nevertheless blocked Curzon’s efforts at comprehensive arrangements until Britain’s victory in the war was assured in the autumn of 1918. Meanwhile, although the condition of much of southern Iran was satisfactory, Sawlat al-Dawlah’s uprising against the South Persia Rifles in Shiraz was a very serious challenge. Consul Gough, Farman Farma and Qavam al-Mulk skilfully diffused the crisis by playing off Qashqa’i factions against one another, but Sawlat

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al-Dawlah’s siege of Shiraz underscored the limits of British power away from the coast, even within the south. Even Cox, who for years had supervised Britain’s borderland networks, recognized that British control of the central Iranian state had become the primary concern. If successful, Curzon’s Anglo-Iranian Treaty of 1919 would have been the culmination of a long and arduous process of piecemeal imperialism adapted to changing circumstances. In his zeal to capitalize on this unique post-war opportunity, however, Curzon overlooked the suspicion shared by both Iranian nationalists and foreign powers about British ambitions and, additionally, he failed to mobilize the military force needed to overcome this resistance. In the end, Curzon lost control of the whole situation, which was instead determined by a maverick British general and an ambitious Iranian colonel – a final, ironic triumph for the ‘men on the spot’. During World War I the consuls and political officers enjoyed unprecedented power and influence in southern Iran, but their local imperialism did not long survive the conflict. The geostrategic changes wrought to Britain’s interests in Iran by the collapse of the Ottoman and Russian empires have been discussed above, but it should be noted by way of conclusion that the very expansion of consular control was an important cause of its ultimate undoing. For much of the period before the war, the consuls’ influence generally depended on their ability to mediate and exploit the Qajar political system, negotiating among local notables and between them and the relatively weak central government in Tehran. Beginning in Fars in 1912, however, British political officers took on increasing fiscal and military functions, becoming administrators of a de facto Anglo-Persian state in southern Iran. The war greatly intensified and accelerated this imperial project. While some Qajar subjects, notably Shaykh Khaz‘al and Qavam al-Mulk, welcomed this development, others, like Sawlat al-Dawlah, ultimately resisted the expansion of British power. His opposition found common cause with the developing nationalism of many literate, urban Iranians. It was thus apparent by 1918 that if the British were to maintain their hegemony after the war, they would probably have to fight for it, and this they were unwilling to do. Deprived of their financial and military assets, the consuls were reduced to the unenviable position of endeavouring to preserve British influence among an increasingly hostile population without the sanction of power. Political officers’

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prestige had long been grounded in their status as representatives of a distant, yet formidable force. The hasty withdrawal of British and Indian troops revealed that the giant had only feet of clay. As Riza Khan and his supporters embarked on their campaign to remake the Iranian state, it came as little surprise that it was to him and not to the British that southern notables fixed their attention as the real source of power and influence.

CONCLUSION

Consuls and political officers were the most important instruments of British imperialism in late Qajar Iran. They brought Indian and Qajar frontiers into dynamic relationship with each other across the vast borderlands of southern Iran. Backed by British naval power in the Persian Gulf, they came to exercise extensive administrative, financial, political and military control over key areas of southern Iran between 1889 and 1921. The rapid expansion of the consular service in the years before the AngloRussian Convention of 1907 was a response to the undeniable growth of Russian power and influence in northern Iran, which British statesmen viewed as a threat to Indian security and to Britain’s status as a world power. Consuls and political officers gathered extensive intelligence from Persian sources about Iranian politics, geography and commerce. Although the extensive British archive about Qajar Iran was an impressive achievement, it was never complete, a fact that continually tested imperial self-confidence. Britain strengthened its long-standing presence in Bushihr and extended representation to the other gulf ports and inland, up the trade route to Shiraz. Important new initiatives were undertaken in Arabistan and Sistan. Although at times the British supported Tehran’s authority in the provinces, establishing relationships with local notables was the key to the consuls’ influence. In developing these connections, Anglo-Indian political officers gained access to the Persian political system, mediating between periphery and centre and damaging Qajar legitimacy. As the Anglo-Russian rivalry intensified, the network of consuls significantly strengthened British claims to special status in southern Iran.

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Britain’s position in Iran during the period 1907– 1915 was basically shaped by the Anglo-Russian Convention and the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. The effect of both was to reinforce British officials’ inclination to adopt distinct regional strategies tailored to local conditions; at the heart of each was an imperial concern for order. Regionalism was an explicit and fundamental element of the AngloRussian Convention, which recognized a Russian sphere of influence in northern Iran and divided the south into British and neutral spheres. British officials quickly adjusted their priorities and policies to this new geostrategic environment. Because the neutral zone remained open to foreign political and economic influence it received most of their attention, and Sistan, which had formerly been the scene of intense Anglo-Russian competition, was now reduced to political and economic isolation within the British sphere. The revolution, however, complicated these efforts. Increasingly fearful that the revolution was causing ‘anarchy’ in the neutral zone, consuls attempted, in their own interest, to consolidate the authority of traditional elites as bulwarks of order and stability. In Arabistan, Cox considerably strengthened Britain’s bonds with Shaykh Khaz‘al. Political officers also worked to preserve good relations between the shaykh and his Bakhtiyari neighbours, whose cooperation was essential both to the success of the APOC and the security of British trade along the Ahvaz– Isfahan road. When this model proved unworkable in Fars, the British cooperated with Tehran in an ambitious military and fiscal programme of provincial state-building, which increasingly provoked armed local resistance. Despite this opposition, political officers effectively extended their control over vital parts of the neutral zone as well as the British sphere on the eve of World War I. Regionalism had long been implicit in Britain’s southern strategy, but it reached its zenith between 1907 and 1915, guided by that classic political maxim, divide et impera. World War I was the great test and the last triumph of the British consular system in Iran. The initial success of Germany and the Ottoman Empire in rousing religious, tribal and nationalist enmity against the British illustrated the global nature of the conflict. Although the British defeated the Ottomans in Arabistan in 1915, enemy agents successfully exploited local resentment and expelled the consuls from many southern towns. British occupation of Bushihr and Sistan forestalled a total

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collapse, but were insufficient to re-establish British ascendancy. In these circumstances, political officers mustered local military support by subsidizing local notables, notably Qavam al-Mulk, and by raising levy forces. The Sistan Levy Corps organized by Consul Prideaux secured the south-east and the Afghan frontier, and the South Persia Rifles under Sir Percy Sykes recaptured Fars. These operations depended on the consuls’ local knowledge and experience as well as on their diplomatic, intelligence, administrative and military skills. By early 1917 they had largely contained enemy activities in southern Iran and were poised to bring the neutral zone within an enlarged British sphere, recognized by Russia in the Constantinople Agreement of 1915, which would serve as the vital link in the imperial chain connecting India with Iraq. The Russian Revolution, however, upset all these calculations. No longer able to depend on Russian troops, British officials, led by Curzon, understood that the traditional southern strategy was now inadequate. They decided to expand north and to exert greater control over the central government in Tehran. As Sawlat al-Dawlah’s rebellion in 1918 demonstrated, this ambitious project required greater military and financial resources than either Britain or India could provide after four years of total war. Curzon attempted to resolve this dilemma by directing Cox to negotiate the Anglo-Iranian Treaty of 1919 with Vusuq al-Dawlah. By promoting a strong, friendly, central government in Tehran, this agreement abandoned the consular system of local control and subordinated southern affairs to a central, pan-Persian strategy. The treaty failed, and Riza Khan and his nationalist allies achieved a relatively independent and centralized state, based on a modern army and bureaucracy. The new regime severely limited provincial autonomy and, with the notable exception of the APOC, successfully curtailed British interference in its southern borderlands. This outcome greatly diminished the consuls’ local standing, but the British were generally satisfied that Pahlavi Iran fulfilled the essential function of shielding India and the Middle East from the Soviet Union.

The imperial legacy The local imperialism practised by British consuls and political officers between 1889 and 1921 had long-term significance for Iran and the British Empire. British imperialism contributed mightily to the

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formation of modern Iranian nationalism. British imperial practice, however, varied across southern Iran depending on local conditions. These different modes of imperial control in turn help to explain diverse patterns of resistance and identity formation before, during and after World War I. Persian grievances against Britain were many and varied, but they tended to be most intense where British methods were most intrusive, notably along the Bushihr– Shiraz road. Opposition to the British was not necessarily identical with a sense of membership in a national community. These two positions, however, increasingly converged during this period, as local actors discovered that embracing a national cause was a useful way of attracting broader support against a common, foreign enemy, as Sawlat al-Dawlah demonstrated in 1918. Local resistance by Iran’s diverse populations also encouraged a more inclusive civic nationalism, which measured national belonging more in terms of political loyalty and defence of the homeland than in ethnolinguistic homogeneity. By war’s end, Britain had defeated all of its imperial rivals in Iran, but this victory proved to be very short-lived. Post-war retrenchment and demobilization made it impossible for Britain to compel Iranian ratification of the 1919 treaty, which confirmed many Persians’ growing sense of British betrayal since 1907. The Russian Revolution and the defeat of Germany and the Ottoman Empire had removed Britain’s traditional justifications for further violations of Iranian sovereignty. British officials had always needed a foreign rival to legitimate their own involvement in the Persian question. When this threat was removed, the British could no longer claim that their security arrangements in southern Iran were purely defensive against other powers. Their many protestations of respecting Iranian integrity and independence rendered untenable any overt imperial claims to the Persian periphery. The implicit ‘civilizing’ argument contained in the treaty of 1919 was illcalculated to sooth nationalist pride and was belied by British objections to the employment of third-party foreign advisers in Iran. Deprived of their diplomatic fig-leaves, British ambitions were clear. Once British influence became the dominant issue in Persian politics, the old model of local British influence could no longer be effective. Popular Anglophobia and an abiding suspicion of collusion between British agents and Persian puppets became an important cultural legacy of this encounter.1 These fears have given life to extraordinary conspiracy

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theories about Britain’s nefarious role in Iranian history. Anxiety about British subversion is alive and well even today. In this connection, it is interesting that the Russians are not regarded with the same kind of mass suspicion and anxiety. Iran lost much territory in the Caucasus to Russia in the wars of the early nineteenth century, and in the early twentieth century thousands of Russian troops occupied whole provinces of northern Iran. While Russian aggression was resented, it was at least understandable as the behaviour of a strong, bellicose power toward a weaker neighbour.2 British power and influence and the relationships upon which it was built were, by contrast, less visible, less tangible and less explicable, but seemingly more enduring. This ambiguity has encouraged Iranian apprehensions about the hidden hand of the English. Furthermore, despite their stated concerns for Iranian security and prosperity and for the interests of their local prote´ge´s, British officials repeatedly discovered that their own interests ultimately lay elsewhere. Feigned friendship and double-dealing were, in the long term, more damaging to Britain’s reputation than blatant brutality was to Russia’s. The period under review also witnessed the demise of the Qajar state and the creation of the Pahlavi state. With its decentralized networks of local power, the Qajar political system relied on a loose consensus among the notables and with the shah. By contrast, Riza Shah and the Pahlavi state achieved a degree of centralized power of which the Qajars could have scarcely dreamed. The creation of a modern conscript army and a vast bureaucracy, staffed by new university-educated cadres, revolutionized the structure of the Iranian state and political system. Traditional elites increasingly confronted the stark choice of cooperation or annihilation. With political power progressively consolidated in Tehran, the central state also undertook ambitious economic modernization projects, including national railway and road networks and industrial development in the form of state factories. Muhammad Riza Shah built upon his father’s bold efforts to remake Iranian society top-down. Although the revolutionaries of 1979 violently castigated royal authoritarianism, the Islamic Republic has in no way abandoned the Pahlavi legacy of centralization.3 British consuls and political officers played a crucial role in this transformation. Local imperialism helped to make political and economic centralization a basic objective of Iranian nationalism. Consular relations with southern notables disrupted the delicate balance between the Iranian

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centre and the periphery, destabilizing the Qajar state and diminishing its capacity to respond to its many internal and external challenges. Many Iranian nationalists became convinced that regional autonomy was a distinct liability and that a strong central government was the only means of preserving the country’s independence. As Riza Khan immediately demonstrated, military control of the borderlands and political subjugation and forced sedentarization of the tribes were considered essential to this project. British and Russian imperialism in Iran also severely weakened the prestige of constitutional models of government, which prepared many nationalists to cooperate in Riza’s authoritarian modernization. Similarly, in the economic sphere, the Qajar legacy of foreign concessions prompted nationalists to favour modernization by the state, rather than by private enterprise. Modernizers in many countries during the twentieth century looked to the state as the only institution capable of overseeing a rapid, comprehensive programme of economic development. In Iran, state planning and economic centralization were also viewed as essential to the maintenance of national sovereignty. The centrepiece of the early Pahlavi economic plan, the railway, was built by the state and financed entirely without recourse to foreign loans. The great exception was the petroleum industry, which continued to be dominated by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (renamed as the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, AIOC, after 1935). In 1951, however, Muhammad Musaddiq’s popular National Front led a successful campaign to nationalize the AIOC, claiming that control of the country’s oil resources was necessary for the preservation of its political independence and socio-economic advancement.

Britain, Iran and the Middle East Britain took two roads to empire in the Middle East: one passed through the Suez Canal to Egypt and later to Palestine, the other ran through the Persian Gulf and Iran from India to Iraq. Britain’s main interest in southern Iran was the external defence of the Indian Empire against its European rivals, first Russia and then Germany. While strategic concerns about the security of India raise fundamental questions about India’s economic value to the British Empire, it is important to note, first, that these economic interests required ‘strategic protection’4 and second, that imperial statesmen typically conceived India’s importance in strategic terms as the basis for Britain’s claims to be a world power. British officials repeatedly reaffirmed their dedication to Persian independence. They often

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asserted that British interests were purely defensive and that they had no territorial ambitions in southern Iran. In an important sense this was true. The diplomatic and geostrategic consequences of annexation would have been extremely serious. British officials also appreciated that governing this vast and well-armed region would be a very difficult and expensive, if not impossible, task. There was nevertheless a general consensus that the political frontiers of India extended beyond its territorial borders, and that Britain should possess a monopoly of political and economic influence vis-a`-vis European powers in these borderlands. This was the logic of spheres of influence and it gave British India’s strategic outlook an inherent expansionism. By the outbreak of World War I, British consuls and political officers operated an interlocking system of various forms and degrees of local control, which included both sides of the Persian Gulf and significant areas of the Iranian interior. The discovery of oil added substantially to Britain’s interests in Iran. Contemporary observers rightly understood that the APOC would become Britain’s foremost economic interest in the region. That the venture had a vital strategic dimension, however, was quickly confirmed by the British government’s purchase of a majority share in the firm after the Royal Navy’s transition to oil. The capture of Ottoman Basra in November 1914 by Indian troops was intended to protect the oil fields in south-western Iran, but it was this military force that ultimately achieved British control of Iraq. While Britain’s Empire in the Middle East was undoubtedly a consequence of World War I, the fact that Britain would fight this war in the Middle East was, to an important degree, a consequence of its strategic interests in Iran. Iran remained independent in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but British consuls and political officers exercised shifting levels of control, both informal and formal, in the Qajar borderlands. For much of the period British consular ascendancy was maintained by informal means, namely influence with local notables and officials and economic penetration. This situation was still largely the case even after the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 divided southern Iran into British and neutral spheres. Russian acknowledgement of the British sphere, combined with consular control of the neutral zone, provided Britain with an imperial parity vis-a`-vis Russian ascendancy in northern Iran. As military officers, however, these British consuls possessed a

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latent capacity to transform their informal networks of influence into more formal mechanisms of rule. This transformation began in the gulf ports and Fars in late 1911, when Cox obtained the dispatch of large consular escorts for Bushihr and Shiraz. British consuls then financed and supervised the expenditures of the provincial administration and the gendarmerie in Fars. The German and Ottoman threat during World War I prompted the British to rely almost entirely on the military option, whether in the form of local allies, levies, or British troops, and after 1915 British authority in southern Iran depended on military might, a fact Curzon overlooked in 1919. Although the power and influence of the consuls in southern Iran undoubtedly declined after 1921, collaboration with indigenous elites and informal economic control remained the preferred model of British imperialism in the Middle East. The consular system in southern Iran functioned as a half-way house between the Indian Raj and the mandate system. Co-opting elites had several advantages, not least of which was administrative economy and a claim to respect what the British deemed to be traditional indigenous institutions. The system was exported from India to Iran and then to Iraq. Cox played a central role in this process, serving as High Commissioner in Iraq between 1920 and 1923. His deputy, Sir Arnold Wilson, and his successor, Sir Henry Dobbs, were both Indian political officers who had served as consuls in Iran. After securing the throne for Faysal of Mecca in 1921, Cox negotiated an Anglo-Iraqi alliance that pledged the new king to accept the ‘advice’ of the High Commissioner. A second treaty in 1930 stipulated that Iraq would become independent in 1932, but it still included a defensive pact; reserved British control over Iraqi communications and transport facilities in time of war; and provided for British training of the Iraqi military. Cox died in 1937, having achieved in Baghdad what he had failed to do in Tehran. The ultimate dissolution of British influence in Iran occurred during the Musaddiq period. His most notable accomplishment was, of course, the nationalization of the AIOC in 1951 and, as is well known, he was eventually overthrown by a coup d’e´tat in August 1953, facilitated by the Central Intelligence Agency aided by British Secret Intelligence. This American intervention secured the autocracy of Muhammad Riza Shah and positioned the United States, not Britain, as the pre-eminent foreign power in Iran. What is less well known, however, is that in 1952

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Musaddiq also obtained the closure of the remaining nine British consulates outside Tehran. In making this demand, the Iranian government asserted that ‘British consular officials in various parts of Persia have exceeded their proper duties and have interfered in Persian internal affairs in a way that threatens the independence of this country’.5 In vain the British ambassador, Sir Francis Shepherd, denied these accusations, meekly pointing out that Britain’s right to maintain consulates in Iran was guaranteed in the Anglo-Persian Treaty of Paris of 1857.6 The consuls were soon withdrawn. Although they did not exercise influence anything like that of their predecessors 40 years earlier, it is clear that Musaddiq, who had serious reasons to be anxious about foreign meddling, remembered those days well.

NOTES

Abbreviations BL: Mss.Eur.: BIPP: FO: IFMA: IO: IOR: IPD: PGAR:

European Manuscripts, British Library, London A. J. Farrington (ed.), British Intelligence and Policy in Persia c. 1900– 1949, 515 microfiches (Leiden, 2004) Foreign Office, London. Records held at the National Archives (UK) Iranian Foreign Ministry Archives, Tehran India Office, London India Office Records, British Library, London R. M. Burrell, and R. L. Jarman (eds), Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965, 14 vols (Slough, 1997) Persian Gulf Administration Reports, 10 vols (Gerrards Cross, 1986)

Introduction 1. St John Simpson, ‘Making their mark: Foreign travellers at Persepolis’, ARTA 2005.01. Available at https://archive.org/details/MakingTheirMarksForeignTravelerAtPersepolis (accessed 19 June 2015). 2. Author’s photograph, January 2005. 3. Simpson, ‘Making their mark’, p. 58. 4. Firuz Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864– 1914: A Study in Imperialism (New Haven, CT, 1968). Kazemzadeh’s classic account has an important chapter on southern Iran, but its scope is chronologically limited to significant events around 1900. See also David McLean, Britain and Her Buffer

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5. 6.

7.

8.

9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

14.

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State: The Collapse of the Persian Empire, 1890– 1914 (London, 1979); William J. Olson, Anglo-Iranian Relations during World War I (London, 1984). For examples of provincial studies, see Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh, Small Players in the Great Game: The Settlement of Iran’s Borderlands and the Creation of Afghanistan (New York, 2004); Shahbaz Shahnavaz, Britain and the Opening up of South-West Persia, 1890–1914: A Study of Imperialism and Economic Dependence (New York, 2005); Pierre Oberling, The Qashqa’i Nomads of Fars (The Hague, 1974). For a useful corrective, see James Onley, ‘Britain’s informal empire in the gulf, 1820– 1971’, Journal of Social Affairs 22/87 (2005), pp. 29– 45. John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson with Alice Denny, Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism (New York, 1961); The Oxford History of the British Empire, 5 vols (Oxford, 1998– 1999), for example, makes little reference to Qajar Iran. Thomas Metcalf, Imperial Connections: India and the Indian Ocean Arena, 1860 – 1920 (Berkeley, CA, 2007); Robert J. Blyth, Empire of the Raj: India, Eastern Africa and the Middle East 1858 – 1947 (London, 2003); James Onley, The Arabian Frontier of the British Raj: Merchants, Rulers, and the British in the Nineteenth-Century Gulf (Oxford, 2007); Onley, ‘The British Raj reconsidered: Britain’s informal empire and spheres of influence in Asia and Africa’, Asian Affairs 40/1 (2009), pp. 44 – 62; James Hevia, The Imperial Security State: British Colonial Knowledge and Empire-Building in Asia (Cambridge, UK, 2012). Onley, The Arabian Frontier of the British Raj; Christian Tripodi, Edge of Empire: The British Political Officer and Tribal Administration on the North-West Frontier 1877– 1947 (Farnham, 2011); Denis Wright, The English Amongst the Persians: Imperial Lives in Nineteenth-Century Iran ([1977], repr. London, 2001), pp. 75 – 93. Wright includes a chapter on the consuls. Priya Satia, Spies in Arabia: The Great War and the Cultural Foundations of Britain’s Covert Empire in the Middle East (Oxford, 2008). James Hevia, The Imperial Security State, pp. 4, 15 and 73 – 151. Christopher Bayly, Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 1780– 1870 (Cambridge, UK, 1996). Alex Marshall, The Russian General Staff and Asia, 1800– 1917 (New York, 2006). Moritz Deutschmann, ‘Empire and Statehood in the Russo-Iranian Encounter 1880s–1911’ (PhD Diss., European University Institute, 2013), pp. 98 – 107, 159. Ibid., pp. 13 – 58; for Russia’s influence on Iranian ‘techno-militaristic conception of modernity’, see Afshin Matin-Asgari, ‘The impact of Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union on Qajar and Pahlavi Iran: notes towards revisionist historiography’, in Stephanie Cronin (ed.), IranianRussian Encounters: Empires and Revolutions since 1800 (New York, 2013), pp. 12 – 16.

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15. Deutschmann, ‘Empire and Statehood in the Russo-Iranian Encounter’, pp. 8, 111 – 60; Marvin L. Entner, Russo-Persian Commercial Relations, 1828– 1914 (Gainesville, FL, 1965); Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia. 16. Marshall, The Russian General Staff and Asia; Daniel R. Brower, ‘Islam and ethnicity: Russian colonial policy in Turkestan’, in Brower and Edward J. Lazzerini (eds), Russia’s Orient: Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700– 1917 (Bloomington, IN, 1997), pp. 115– 37; Deutschmann, ‘Empire and Statehood in the Russo-Iranian Encounter’, pp. 59–110. 17. Arash Khazeni, Tribes and Empire on the Margins of Nineteenth-Century Iran (Seattle, 2010), p. 7; see also Heidi A. Walcher, In the Shadow of the King: Zill al-Sultan and Isfahan under the Qajars (London, 2008); Gene Garthwaite, Khans and Shahs: A History of the Bakhtiyari Tribe in Iran (London, 2009); MojtahedZadeh, Small Players in the Great Game; Shahnavaz, Britain and the Opening up of South-West Persia, 1880– 1914. 18. Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet, Frontier Fictions: Shaping the Iranian Nation, 1804– 1946 (Princeton, NJ, 1999); Arash Khazeni, ‘Across the black sands and red: Travel writing, nature, and the reclamation of the Eurasian steppe circa 1850’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 42/4 (2010), pp. 591 – 614; Khazeni, ‘On the eastern borderlands of Iran: The Baluch in nineteenth-century Persian travel books’, History Compass 5/4 (2007), pp. 1399– 411. 19. James M. Gustafson, Kirman and the Qajar Empire: Local Dimensions of Modernity in Iran, 1794– 1914 (New York, 2015). 20. For a summary of this debate, see Afshin Matin-Asgari, ‘The academic debate on Iranian identity: Nation and empire entangled’, in Abbas Amanat and Farzin Vejdani (eds), Iran Facing Others: Identity Boundaries in a Historical Perspective (New York, 2012), pp. 171– 90; Afshin Marashi, Nationalizing Iran: Culture, Power, and the State, 1870– 1940 (Seattle, 2008), pp. 4– 14; Ervand Abrahamian, ‘Kasravi: The integrative nationalist of Iran’, Middle Eastern Studies 9/3 (October 1973), pp. 271– 95. 21. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism ([1983], 2nd edn, London, 1991); Kashani-Sabet, Frontier Fictions, pp. 101 – 43; Touraj Atabaki, ‘Pan-Turkism and Iranian nationalism’, in Atabaki (ed.), Iran and the First World War: Battleground of the Great Powers (London, 2006), pp. 121– 36; Marashi, Nationalizing Iran, p. 85; Ali M. Ansari, The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran (Cambridge, UK, 2012), pp. 36 – 109; Farzin Vejdani, Making History in Iran: Education, Nationalism, and Print Culture (Stanford, CA, 2015), pp. 35– 58, 117 – 44. 22. Vejdani, Making History in Iran, pp. 117–44; Arash Khazeni, ‘Tribes of the homeland: The Bakhtiyari in the revolutionary press’, in H. E. Chehabi and Vanessa Martin (eds), Iran’s Constitutional Revolution: Popular Politics, Cultural Transformations and Transnational Connections (London, 2010), pp. 131 – 42. 23. Stephanie Cronin, Tribal Politics in Iran: Rural Conflict and the New State, 1921– 41 (New York, 2007).

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24. Marashi, Nationalizing Iran, pp. 49– 85; Vejdani, Making History in Iran, p. 82; Ansari, The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran, pp. 172 – 97. 25. Atabaki, ‘Pan-Turkism and Iranian nationalism’, in Atabaki (ed.), Iran and the First World War, pp. 121– 2, 132– 6; Kashani-Sabet, Frontier Fictions, p. 158.

Chapter 1

Imperial Intelligence: Official British Images of Qajar Iran

1. George N. Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question ([1892], repr. London, 1966), vol. 1, p. 5. 2. Bayly, Empire and Information, p. 1. 3. Tripodi, Edge of Empire; Onley, The Arabian Frontier of the British Raj; Blyth, The Empire of the Raj; Barbara N. Ramusack, The Indian Princes and Their States (Cambridge, UK, 2004); Ian Copeland, ‘The other guardians: Ideology and performance in the Indian political service’, in Robin Jeffrey (ed.), People, Princes and Paramount Power: Society and Politics in the Indian Princely States (Delhi, 1978), pp. 275– 305; W. Murray Hogben, ‘The Foreign and Political Department of the Government of India, 1876– 1919: A Study in Imperial Careers and Attitudes’ (PhD Diss., University of Toronto, 1973); Terence Creagh Coen, The Indian Political Service: A Study in Indirect Rule (London, 1971). 4. Bayly, Empire and Information, pp. 3 – 6. 5. John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, ‘The imperialism of free trade’, Economic History Review, 2nd ser., 6/1 (1953), pp. 1 – 15. 6. Thomas Richards, The Imperial Archive: Knowledge and the Fantasy of Empire (London, 1993), pp. 1– 5. 7. Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question, vol. 2, p. 620. 8. (Sultan) Mas‘ud Mirza Zil al-Sultan, son of Nasir al-Din Shah, was many times governor general of Isfahan, Shiraz and other southern posts. 9. Durand to Salisbury, 12 February 1899, FO 60/608. 10. H. V. Lovett, ‘Durand, Sir (Henry) Mortimer (1850 – 1924)’, rev. S. Gopal, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. Available at http://www.oxforddnb. com/view/article/32941 (accessed 2 June 2014). 11. Horace Rumbold, Mss. Diary, 1895, as quoted in Wright, English Amongst the Persians, p. 30. 12. ‘Memorandum by Sir M. Durand on the Situation in Persia’, 27 September 1895, FO 60/581. 13. Durand to Chapman, 19 October 1895, BL: Mss. Eur. D. 727/5. 14. Durand to Salisbury, 12 February 1899, FO 60/608. 15. India to IO, 21 September 1899, FO 60/615. 16. Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question, vol. 1, p. 20; see also Malcolm Yapp, ‘Two British historians of Persia’, in Bernard Lewis and P. M. Holt (eds), Historians of the Middle East (Oxford, 1962), pp. 343 – 56.

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17. John Malcolm, History of Persia: From the Most Early Period to the Present Time ([1815], new rev. ed. London, 1829), vol. 2, p. 320. 18. Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 348– 52. 19. Ervand Abrahamian, ‘Oriental despotism: the case of Qajar Iran’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 5/1 (January 1974), pp. 3 –31; Abbas Amanat, Pivot of the Universe: Nasir al-Din Shah Qajar and the Iranian Monarchy 1831– 96 (Berkeley, CA, 1997). 20. A. Reza Sheikholeslami, Structure of Central Authority in Qajar Iran, 1871– 1896 (Atlanta, GA, 1997), p. ix. 21. Ibid., pp. 3 –6; Vanessa Martin, The Qajar Pact: Bargaining, Protest and the State in 19th-Century Persia (London, 2005), pp. 8– 13; Ann Lambton, Qajar Persia: Eleven Studies (Austin, TX, 1987), pp. 319– 29; Lois Beck, ‘Tribes and state in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Iran’, in Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner (eds), Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East (Berkeley, CA, 1990), pp. 185 – 225. 22. Martin, The Qajar Pact, p. 13; Amanat, Pivot of the Universe, pp. 5– 6, 13. 23. Amanat, Pivot of the Universe, p. 13. 24. Gustafson, Kirman and the Qajar Empire. 25. Willem Floor, ‘Fiscal System IV: Safavid and Qajar Periods’, Encyclopædia Iranica, vol. IX/6, pp. 646– 51. Available at http://www.iranicaonline.org/ articles/fiscal-system-iv-safavid-and-qajar-periods (accessed 16 April 2013); Sheikholeslami, Structure of Central Authority in Qajar Iran, pp. 186 – 98. 26. Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question, vol. 1, p. 406; for the importance of the telegraph in shaping Qajar state and society, see Michael Rubin, ‘The Formation of Modern Iran 1858– 1909: Communications, telegraph and society’ (PhD Diss., Yale University, 1999). 27. Morteza Nouraei and Vanessa Martin, ‘The role of the “karguzar” in the foreign relations of state and society of Iran from the mid-nineteenth century to 1921. Part I: Diplomatic relations’, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 3rd ser., 15/3 (November 2005), pp. 261–77; Nouraei and Martin, ‘The role of the “karguzar” in the foreign relations of state and society of Iran from the mid-nineteenth century to 1921. Part II: The “karguzar” and security, the trade routes of Iran and foreign subjects 1900–1921’, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 3rd ser., 16/1 (April 2006), pp. 29–41; Nouraei and Martin, ‘The role of the “karguzar” in the foreign relations of state and society of Iran from the mid-nineteenth century to 1921. Part III: the “karguzar” and disputes over foreign trade’, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 3rd ser., 16/2 (July 2006), pp. 151–63. 28. Muhammad ‘Ali Khan Sadid al-Saltanah, Bandar-i ‘Abbas va Khalij-i Fars, ed. Ahmad Iqtidari (Tehran, 1363 SH/ 1984– 5); Sadid al-Saltanah, Sarzaminha-yi Shumal: Piruman-i Khalij-i Fars va Darya-yi ‘Uman Dar Sad Sal-i Pish, 1324– 1332 H.Q., ed. Ahmad Iqtidari (Tehran, 1371 SH/ 1992). 29. Albert Hourani, ‘Ottoman reform and the politics of notables’, in William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers (eds), Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East: The Nineteenth Century (Chicago, 1968), pp. 41 – 68.

242

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18 –21

30. David Cannadine, Ornamentalism: How the British Saw their Empire (Oxford, 2001), p. 43. 31. Viceroy Lytton to Queen Victoria, 4 May 1876, as quoted in Bernard S. Cohn, ‘Representing authority in Victorian India’, in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds), The Invention of Tradition ([1983], repr. Cambridge, UK, 1992), p. 188; Robin J. Moore, ‘Imperial India, 1858– 1914’, in The Oxford History of the British Empire, vol. 3, The Nineteenth Century, Andrew Porter (ed.) (Oxford, 1999), pp. 431 and 437; Cannadine, Ornamentalism, pp. 43 – 57. 32. Foreign Department, no. 1573-G., 13 July 1906, Proceedings General – A, August 1906, IOR: P/7391. 33. Wilson, ‘Military Report on S. W. Persia, vol. II, Arabistan. Compiled in the Division of the Chief of Staff, Army Headquarters, India’ (1910), p. 6, IOR: L/ Mil/17/15/10/2. 34. A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, Britain’s Imperial Administrators, 1858– 1966 (New York, 2000), pp. 14– 18. 35. ‘Information to be supplied by the Officer Commanding ___ Regiment respecting Lieutenant ____, as an applicant for Political Employ’, in Foreign Department, No. 3103-Est. A., 6 October 1910, Proceeding no. 10, IOR: P/8515; reprinted in Manual of Instructions to Officers of the Political Department of India (1924), IOR: L/P&S/20/H113. 36. ‘Form for confidential report on officers of the Political Department below the substantive grade of Political Agent of the 3rd Class’. Other versions of the report exist. These reports appear in the personnel files of the political officers, IOR: R/1/4/. For example, A. H. McMahon reported on Lt R. L. Kennion, later consul in Sistan, on 11 September 1898, and H. A. Deane compiled another report on Kennion on 4 January 1904, IOR: R/1/4/1128. 37. Ronald Hyam, Britain’s Imperial Century 1815 – 1914: A Study of Empire and Expansion (London, 1976), pp. 156– 62. 38. Wood to Grant, 16 August 1882, Proceeding no. 6, IOR: P/2115. 39. ‘Rules to provide for the Examination of Military Officers in Oriental Languages’, 8 January 1864, IOR: L/Mil/7/7300; India List and India Office List for 1902 (London, 1902); Bernard S. Cohn, Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India (Princeton, NJ, 1996), p. 33. 40. Mohamad Tavakoli-Targhi, Refashioning Iran: Orientalism, Occidentalism, and Historiography (New York, 2001), pp. 18–34. 41. Lansdowne to Cross, 17 December 1890, IOR: L/Mil/7/7302. 42. Herbert, ‘Report on the Agencies, &c., in Persia, under the Tehran Legation’, 8 December 1886, FO 881/5391. 43. Churchill, ‘Biographical Notices: Persian Statesmen and Notables’, September 1909, FO 881/9748x. 44. Durand to Salisbury, 12 February 1899, FO 60/608. 45. Ibid.; Kemball to Barnes, 22 July 1901, FO 60/643; Kemball to Barnes, 8 July 1902, FO 248/761.

NOTES

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21 – 25

243

46. Herbert, ‘Report on the Agencies, &c., in Persia, under the Tehran Legation’, 8 December 1886, FO 881/5391. 47. Chenevix Trench, Sistan Diary, 1 – 13 May, 1900, FO 60/623. 48. Ahmad Din, ‘Report by Munshi Ahmad Din on the Revenue Statistics and Produce, etc. of Sistan’, 12 May 1900, FO 60/623. 49. Curzon telegram to Hamilton, 28 April 1901, FO 60/647. 50. Edith Benn, An Overland Trek from India, by Side-saddle, Camel, and Rail: The Record of a Journey from Baluchistan to Europe (London, 1909), pp. 64 – 5. 51. Hardinge to Lansdowne, 26 September 1901, FO 60/637. 52. ‘Military Report on Persia. Compiled by the General Staff, Army Headquarters, India. 1911’, p. 272, IOR: L/Mil/15/5/5. 53. Lansdowne to Balfour, 21 August 1902, FO 60/649. 54. Picot, ‘Persia: Biographical Notices of Members of the Royal Family, Notables, Merchants, and the Clergy’, December 1897, FO 60/595; Churchill, ‘Biographical Notices: Persian Statesmen and Notables’, August 1905, FO 881/8777x; Churchill, ‘Biographical Notices’, 1909, FO 881/9748x. 55. Cox telegram to FO, 31 August 1918, FO 371/3274. 56. General Staff, ‘Who’s Who in Persia’ (1916/1918), IOR: L/P&S/20/C137/1; General Staff, ‘Who’s Who in Persia’, 4 vols. (1923), IOR: L/MIL/15/17/11/1 and IOR: L/P&S/20/C137/3, 5 and 7. 57. Vejdani, Making History in Iran, p. 17. 58. Lorimer to Cox, 24 February 1909, FO 248/960. 59. Churchill, ‘Biographical Notices’, 1909, FO 881/9748x. 60. Wilson, ‘Military Report on S.W. Persia, vol. I. Bakhtiari Garmsir. Compiled in the Division of the Chief of Staff, Army Headquarters, India’ (1909), p. 15, IOR: L/Mil/17/15/10/1; General Staff, India, ‘Who’s Who in Persia’ (1918), p. 132, IOR L/P&S/20/C137/1. 61. General Staff, ‘Who’s Who in Persia’ (1918), p. 149, IOR L/P&S/20/C137/1. 62. General Staff, ‘Who’s Who in Persia’, vol. IV. ‘Persian Baluchistan, Kerman, Bandar Abbas, Fars, Yezd and Laristan’ (1923), pp. 138 – 9, IOR L/P&S/20/ C137/7. 63. Malcolm, History of Persia, vol. 2, p. 463. 64. ‘Military Report on Southern Persia compiled in the Intelligence Branch, Department of the Quarter Master General in India by Captain G. S. F. Napier, 2nd Battalion, Oxfordshire Light Infantry, Staff Captain’ (1900), p. 55, IOR: L/Mil/17/15/8. 65. See for example P. D. Bonarjee, Handbook of the Fighting Races of India (Calcutta, 1899). 66. ‘Memorandum by Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas on the Bakhtiaris and other tribes of South-West Persia’, 27 January 1904, FO 60/690. 67. Chick, ‘The Qashqai Tribes’ [1912], FO 248/1047. Chick also translated and published A Chronicle of the Carmelites in Persia: The Safavids and the Papal Mission of the 17th and 18th Centuries, with an introduction by Rudi Matthee ([1939], repr. London, 2012).

244

NOTES

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25 –29

68. ‘Report on Fars by Captain A. T. Wilson, CMG Indian Political Department’ (1916), p. 52, IOR: L/P&S/20/7. 69. ‘A Report on the Tribes of Fars by Captain A. J. Christian, General Staff, Shiraz. Shiraz, 1918’ (1919), p. 21, IOR: L/P&S/20/C185. 70. Chick, ‘The Qashqai Tribes’, FO 248/1047. 71. See also Hasan Fasa’i, Farsnamah-i Nasiri, ed. Mansur Rustagar Fasa’i ([1896], new edn. Tehran, 1367 SH/ 1988), vol. 2, p. 1572. 72. Deutschmann, ‘Empire and Statehood in the Russo-Iranian Encounter’, p. 67. 73. ‘A Report on the Tribes of Fars by Captain A. J. Christian, General Staff, Shiraz. Shiraz, 1918’ (1919), IOR L/P&S/20/C185. 74. Indian Foreign Department, No. 3103-Est. A., 6 October 1910, Proceeding no. 10, Establishment Branch, IOR: P/8515. 75. Herbert Edwardes, A Year on the Punjab Frontier, in 1848– 49 (London, 1851), vol. 2, pp. 721– 9. 76. Thomas Henry Thornton, Colonel Robert Sandeman: His Life and Work on Our Indian Frontier (London, 1895), pp. 187– 90, 304– 5. 77. Sykes to Durand, 9 March 1900, FO 60/648, in Foreign Office Documents on Persia, 1899– 1913, microfilm University of Chicago (London, 1970s), reel 7. 78. Durand to Salisbury, 14 August 1896, in IPD, vol. 1, p. 349. 79. Preece private to Hardinge, 22 May 1901, FO 60/636. 80. Notes on an interdepartmental committee on ‘The Persian Question’, 19 November 1902, FO 60/657. 81. Douglas to Hardinge, 13 June 1903, FO 60/665. 82. Kashani-Sabet, Frontier Fictions, pp. 15– 74. 83. Ibid., pp. 34 – 5; Arash Khazeni, ‘Across the black sands and red’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 42/4 (2010), pp. 591 – 614; Khazeni, ‘On the eastern borderlands of Iran’, History Compass 5/4 (2007), pp. 1399– 411. 84. Salar Mu‘azzam to Tehran, 21 Rajab 1320/24 October 1902, in Khadijah Nizam Mafi (ed.), Hukumat-i Bushihr: Asnad va Makatabat-i Riza Quli Khan (Salar Mu‘azzam) Nizam al-Saltanah Mafi (Tehran, 1391 SH/ 2012), vol. 1, pp. 299–300. 85. Sadid al-Saltanah, Bandar-i ‘Abbas va Khalij-i Fars and Piruman-i Khalij-i Fars; Fasa’i, Farsnamah-i Nasiri. 86. Kashani-Sabet, Frontier Fictions, pp. 48– 74. 87. Fasa’i, Farsnamah-i Nasiri, vol. 2, pp. 896– 7. 88. Kashani-Sabet, Frontier Fictions, pp. 74, 102. 89. Malcolm, History of Persia, vol. 2, p. 317. 90. Sir Henry Rawlinson, England and Russia in the East: A Series of Papers on the Political and Geographical Condition of Central Asia (London, 1875), p. xii. For Rawlinson’s relationship with Malcolm, see George Rawlinson, A Memoir of Major-General Sir Henry Creswicke Rawlinson (London, 1898), pp. 11 –24. 91. Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question, vol. 2, p. 620. 92. Durand to Salisbury, 27 September 1895, FO 60/581. 93. Barnes to Mashhad, 12 October 1899, FO 60/623. 94. Hardinge to Lansdowne, 26 June 1901, FO 60/647.

NOTES

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29 –34

245

95. Robertson, ‘Strategical Relations between England and Russia with regard to Persia’, 4 October 1902, FO 60/657. 96. Hamilton to Curzon, 2 November 1899, BL: Mss. Eur. F. 111/158. 97. Lansdowne to Hardinge, 6 January 1902, FO 60/649. 98. The Times, 6 May 1903, p. 8, col. A-C. 99. Benjamin Hopkins, The Making of Modern Afghanistan (New York, 2008), pp. 39 – 41. 100. Indian Foreign Department, No. 3103-Est. A., 6 October 1910, Proceeding no. 10, Establishment Branch, IOR: P/8515; Butler, Memorandum, 15 November 1910, BL: Mss. Eur. F. 116/67. 101. Merk to Butler, 6 June 1910, Proceeding no. 4, Establishment Branch, IOR: P/8515. 102. Alfred Lyall, Rise and Expansion of the British Dominion in India (London, 1894), p. 266. 103. Ibid., p. 329. 104. Valentine Chirol, The Middle Eastern Question, Or Some Problems of Indian Defence (London, 1903). 105. Ibid., p. 3. 106. Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question, vol. 2, p. 621. 107. Durand to Salisbury, 12 February 1899, FO 60/608. 108. Sykes to Salisbury, 29 June 1900, FO 60/621, in Foreign Office Documents on Persia, reel 6. 109. Cox to Dane, 13 August 1904, FO 248/818. 110. Grey to King Edward VII, 24 September 1906, in G. M. Trevelyan, Grey of Fallodon, the Life and Letters of Sir Edward Grey, afterwards Viscount Grey of Fallodon (Boston, 1937), p. 209. 111. Grey to Nicolson, 17 November 1906, IOR: L/P&S/10/122; ‘Anglo-Russian Convention, August 1907’, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (New York, 1943-), vol. 125, cmd. 3750. 112. Robertson, ‘Strategical Relations between England and Russia with regard to Persia’, 4 October 1902, FO 60/657. 113. Hevia, Imperial Security State, pp. 73– 106. 114. John Macdonald Kinneir, A Geographical Memoir of the Persian Empire (London, 1813). 115. Sykes to Salisbury, 6 December 1900, FO 60/621, in Foreign Office Documents on Persia, reel 6. 116. Sykes to Salisbury, 1 February 1899, FO 60/612, in Foreign Office Documents on Persia, reel 5. 117. Survey of India, ‘Map of Persia’ (1897), FO 925/4640. 118. IO to FO, 4 September 1907, FO 371/311. 119. Arnold Wilson, S. W. Persia: Letters and Diary of a Young Political Officer, 1907– 1914 (London, 1942), p. 2. 120. Wilson, ‘Military Report on S. W. Persia’, 5 vols., IOR L/Mil/17/15/10; Wilson’s maps were also provided to the Foreign Office, FO 925/36012.

246

NOTES

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34 –36

121. Wilson, ‘Notes on a Journey from Bandar Abbas to Shiraz viaˆ Lar, in February and March, 1907’, The Geographical Journal 31/2 (1908), pp. 152 –69. List of Gold Medal recipients available at http://www.rgs.org/NR/rdonlyres/ C5962519 – 882A-4C67 – 803D-0037308C756D/0/GoldMedalrecipents.pdf (accessed 25 October 2015). 122. ‘Central Asia. Part IV. A contribution towards the better knowledge of the topography, ethnology, resources and history of Persia. Compiled (for Political and Military reference) by Lieutenant-Colonel C. M. MacGregor, Assistant Quarter-Master-General’ (1871), IOR: L/MIL/17/14/72/4. 123. ‘Gazetteer of Persia: Part III, including Fars, Luristan, Arabistan, Khuzistan, Yazd, Karmanshah, Ardala, Kurdistan’ (1885), IOR: L/MIL/17/15/1. 124. ‘Gazetteer of Persia. vol. III. Compiled in the Division of the Chief of Staff, Army Headquarters, India’ (1910), IOR: L/Mil/17/15/2/2; ‘Gazetteer of Persia, vol. IV. Prepared by the General Staff, Army Headquarters, India’ (1910), IOR: L/Mil/17/15/2/3. 125. ‘Routes in Persia, vol. I. Compiled by the Division of the Chief of Staff, Army Headquarters, India’, (1910), IOR: L/P&S/20/C101/1. 126. There is a vast literature on this topic. Among the more famous contributions to this debate are Gallagher and Robinson, ‘The imperialism of free trade’, Economic History Review, 2nd ser., 6/1 (1953), pp. 1 – 15, and Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism, as well as P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion, 1688 – 1914 (New York, 1993). 127. For the former view, see Rose L. Greaves, Persia and the Defence of India 1884– 1892: A Study in the Foreign Policy of the Third Marquis of Salisbury (London, 1959) and McLean, Britain and Her Buffer State, pp. 11 – 12, 49– 50 and 71 – 2; for the latter view, Shahnavaz, Britain and the Opening up of South-West Persia, pp. 13 – 14, 182– 7. 128. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company was formed in April 1909 from the Oil Concessions Syndicate Ltd, headed by William D’Arcy, who had been granted the original concession in 1901. 129. Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, pp. 351– 6. 130. ‘Report of a Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence appointed by the Prime Minister to consider questions relating to the Persian Gulf and Baghdad Railway’, 26 January 1909, FO 371/716. 131. Kashani-Sabet, Frontier Fictions, pp. 75– 100. 132. For the Belgian officers, see Annette Destre´e, Les Fonctionnaires Belges au Service de la Perse, 1898– 1915 (Leiden/Tehran, 1976). 133. Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question, vol. 2, pp. 580 – 1. 134. ‘Report for Year 1909–1910 on the Trade of Persia’, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (Proquest [Electronic], 2005– 2013); ‘Report for Year 1912– 1913 on the Trade of Persia’, Parliamentary Papers. 135. Ibid.

NOTES

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247

136. ‘Report received from Mr. H. W. Maclean the Special Commissioner appointed by the Commercial Intelligence Committee of the Board of Trade on the Conditions and Prospects of British Trade in Persia, 20 December 1903’, BL: Mss. Eur. F. 111/357. 137. Entner, Russo-Persian Commercial Relations, p. 53. 138. Cox to Dane, 17 August 1907, FO 371/313. 139. ‘Report for Year 1909– 1910 on the Trade of Persia’, Parliamentary Papers; ‘Report for Year 1912– 1913 on the Trade of Persia’, Parliamentary Papers. 140. ‘Diplomatic and Consular Reports’, 1889 – 1913, Parliamentary Papers. No figures for Muhammarah in 1889 were available. There are no reports available after 1913, probably because of World War I. 141. Willem Floor, ‘Bushehr: Southern gateway to Iran’, in Lawrence G. Potter (ed.), The Persian Gulf in Modern Times: People, Ports, and History (New York, 2014), pp. 173– 97. 142. Charles Issawi, The Economic History of Iran 1800–1914 (Chicago, 1971), p. 156. 143. B. R. Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: Europe, 1750– 2000 (New York, 2003), pp. 575, 580. This figure does not include invisible exports related to finance and services. 144. B. R. Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: Africa, Asia, and Oceania, 1750– 2000 (New York, 2003), pp. 537– 40. Mitchell’s figures for India’s trade are in Rupees (Rs), which have been calculated at Rs 15 per £1. 145. Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: Europe, pp. 662– 3. 146. ‘Diplomatic and Consular Reports’, 1889– 1913, Parliamentary Papers. 147. Ibid. 148. Nikki Keddie, Roots of Revolution: An Interpretive History of Modern Iran (New Haven, CT, 1981), pp. 45, 58 and 66 – 7; Janet Afary, The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906 –11: Grassroots Democracy, Social Democracy and the Origins of Feminism (New York, 1996), p. 35. 149. Durand to Salisbury, 12 February 1899, FO 60/608. 150. India to IO, 21 September 1899, FO 60/615. 151. Christopher N. B. Ross, ‘Lord Curzon and E. G. Browne confront the “Persian Question”’, The Historical Journal 52/2 (2009), pp. 385– 411.

Chapter 2

Imperial Inroads: Commerce, Conflict and Cooperation

1. H. W. Maclean, ‘Report on the Conditions and Prospects of British Trade in Persia’ [20 December 1903] in Issawi, Economic History of Iran, p. 198. 2. Ibid.; see also PGAR, vols. 3 – 5; ‘Diplomatic and Consular Reports’, 1889– 1913, Parliamentary Papers. 3. Wilson to Durand, 15 May 1896, FO 248/630. 4. Wilson to Durand, 14 October 1896, FO 248/631. 5. Wilson to Hardinge, 12 June 1897, FO 248/650. 6. Hardinge to Meade, 5 August 1897, FO 248/650.

248

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45 –51

7. Meade, ‘Report on the Traffic in Arms and the steps recently taken for its suppression’, 22 March 1898, FO 248/672. 8. Wilson to Hardinge, 12 December 1897, FO 248/650; see also Gordon, ‘Export of Arms to Persia’, 24 January 1896, FO 248/631. 9. Wilson to Hardinge, 12 December 1896, FO 248/631; Sheikholeslami, Structure of Central Authority in Qajar Iran, p. 141. 10. Wilson to Hardinge, 12 December 1896, FO 248/631. 11. Ibid. 12. Meade, ‘Report on Traffic in Arms’, 22 March 1898, FO 248/672. 13. Meade to Hardinge, 4 September 1897, FO 248/651. 14. Meade, ‘Report on Traffic in Arms’, 22 March 1898, FO 248/672. 15. Ibid.; see also R. M. Burrell, ‘Arms and Afghans in Makran: An episode in Anglo-Persian relations, 1905– 1912’, in Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 49/1 (1986), pp. 8 – 24. 16. Meade, ‘Report on Traffic in Arms’, 22 March 1898, FO 248/672. 17. Hardinge to Meade, 4 August 1897, Hardinge Mss. 2/410; Meade to Hardinge, 6 September 1897, Hardinge Mss. 2/422. 18. Wilson to Durand, 10 January 1897, FO 248/650. 19. Meade to Hardinge, 19 February 1898, FO 248/672. 20. Meade to Hardinge, 14 March 1898, FO 248/672. 21. Ibid. 22. Meade to Durand, 25 May 1898, FO 248/672. 23. Meade to Hardinge, 6 September 1897, Hardinge Mss. 2/422. 24. Meade to Durand, 14 October 1898, FO 248/673. 25. Durand to Meade, 16 January 1899, FO 248/672. 26. Davis to Durand, 7 April 1900, FO 248/717. 27. Ranin Kazemi, ‘The Tobacco Protest in nineteenth-century Iran: The view from a provincial town’, Journal of Persianate Studies 7/2 (2014), pp. 251– 95. 28. Mu‘iz Lashkar to Salar Mu‘azzam [nd], in Nizam Mafi (ed.), Hukumat-i Bushihr, vol. 1, pp. 98 – 100. 29. Hardinge to Lansdowne, 19 March 1902, FO 60/650. 30. Atabak-i A‘zam telegram to Qavam al-Mulk [nd], in Nizam Mafi (ed.), Hukumat-i Bushihr, vol. 1, p. 100. 31. Grahame to Hardinge, 19 February 1904, FO 248/817. 32. Grahame to Hardinge, 21 April 1904, FO 248/817; Grahame to Hardinge, 25 April 1904, FO 248/817. 33. Grahame to Hardinge, 25 April 1904, FO 248/817. 34. Hardinge to Grahame, 29 April 1904, FO 248/819. 35. Shiraz News, July 1904, FO 248/818. 36. Grahame to Hardinge, 29 June 1904, FO 248/818. 37. Grahame to Hardinge, 27 July 1904, FO 248/818. 38. Shiraz News, August 1904, FO 248/818; ‘Administration Report on the Persian Gulf Political Residency for the year 1904 –5’, in PGAR, vol. 5. 39. Grahame to Hardinge, 25 June 1904, FO 248/818.

NOTES 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46.

47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68.

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Shiraz News, 25 December 1903– 25 January 1904, FO 248/817. Shiraz News, 20 February – 7 March 1904, FO 248/817. Shiraz News, 8 – 16 March 1904, FO 248/817. Grahame to Hardinge, 18 May 1904, FO 248/817; Knox, Memorandum, 13 June 1904, FO 248/818; The Times, 10 February 1904, p. 6, col. C. Grahame to Hardinge, 19 May 1904, FO 248/817. Hardinge to Grahame, 30 May 1904, FO 248/819. Mostafa Ansari, ‘A History of Khuzistan, 1878– 1925: A Study in Provincial Autonomy and Change’ (PhD Diss., University of Chicago, 1974); William T. Strunk, ‘The Reign of Shaykh Khaz‘al ibn Jabir and the Suppression of the Principality of ‘Arabistan: A Study in British Imperialism in Southwestern Iran, 1897– 1925’ (PhD Diss., University of Indiana, 1977); Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia, pp. 428– 34; Shahnavaz, Britain and the Opening up of South-West Persia and ‘Khaz‘al Khan’, Encyclopædia Iranica, vol. XVI/2, pp. 188 – 97. Available at http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/kazal-khan (accessed 10 November 2014). ‘Persian Circular announcing the opening of the Karun River from Muhammerah to Ahwaz, 30 October 1888’ (trans.), FO 248/990. The Times, 10 January 1889, p. 7. col. F. Taylor to Robertson, 1 February 1889, FO 248/484. Robertson to Ross, 2 July 1889, FO 248/484; Ross telegram to Kennedy, 4 July 1889, FO 248/484. Ansari, ‘A History of Khuzistan’, p. 125. Nizam al-Saltanah to Sa‘d al-Mulk (trans.), 10 Zi al-Qa‘dah 1307/28 June 1890, FO 248/502. Ross to Wolff, 10 July 1890, FO 248/502. Dicey to Ross, 24 July 1890, FO 248/502. Ross telegram to Wolff, 5 March 1889, FO 248/484. Taylor to Ross, 20 March 1890, FO 248/502. Ross to Wolff, 3 May 1890, FO 248/502. ‘Political Intelligence from Mohammerah for week ending 31 October 1890’, FO 248/502. McDouall to Ross, 20 March 1891, FO 248/523. Taylor to Ross, 18 September 1890, FO 248/502. Taylor to Ross, 14 March 1891, FO 248/523. Ansari, ‘A History of Khuzistan’, pp. 121– 32. McDouall to Ross, 4 March 1891, FO 248/523. McDouall to Talbot, 30 June 1891, FO 248/524. McDouall to Talbot, 1 May 1891, FO 248/523. McDouall to Talbot, 3 July 1891, FO 248/524. Talbot to Kennedy, 11 July 1891, FO 248/524. Wilson to Durand, 7 March 1896, FO 248/630; Wilson to Durand, 7 November 1896, FO 248/631; Butcher, Muhammarah Diary, 20–26 November 1896, FO 248/631; Hardinge to Wilson, 12 March 1897, FO 248/650.

250

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56 – 61

69. McDouall to Wilson, 14 November 1895, FO 248/610; Vanessa Martin, The Qajar Pact, pp. 133– 49. 70. Whyte to Wilson, 25 June 1896, FO 248/630. 71. Mushir al-Dawlah telegram to Mirza Muhammad ‘Ali Khan ‘Ala’ al-Saltanah (trans.) [nd, probably 24 September 1898], FO 60/598, in Foreign Office Documents on Persia, reel 4. 72. Butcher to Wilson, 29 January 1897, FO 248/650; Butcher to Wilson, 12 February 1897, FO 248/650. 73. Butcher to Wilson, 22 February 1897, FO 248/650. 74. McDouall to Wilson, 3 June 1897, FO 248/650. 75. Sadid al-Saltanah, Piramun-i Khalij-i Fars, p. 153. 76. McDouall to Wilson, 1 August 1895, FO 248/610. 77. Wilson to McDouall, 6 August 1895, FO 248/610. 78. Baker to Meade, 17 June 1897, FO 248/651. 79. Gene R. Garthwaite, ‘The Bakhtiyari khans, the government of Iran, and the British, 1846– 1915’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 3/1 (January 1972), p. 31. 80. McDouall to Meade, 27 January 1900, FO 248/717. 81. Burton to Dane, 1 September 1903 and 2 October 1903, FO 60/678. 82. India to IO, 31 December 1903, FO 60/690. 83. Bushihr Diary Extracts, week ending 12 February 1904, FO 248/817. 84. Peter Sluglett, ‘Lorimer, David Lockhart Robertson (1876– 1962)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. Available at http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/ article/58306 (accessed 10 November 2014); see for example Lorimer, The Phonology of the Bakhtiari, Badakhshani, and Madaglashti Dialects of Modern Persian (London, 1922). 85. Lorimer to Cox, 29 June 1904, FO 248/819. 86. Issawi, Economic History of Iran, p. 201; McLean, Britain and Her Buffer State, pp. 63 – 70. 87. Persian Transport Company to FO, 9 April 1904, FO 60/690. 88. Lorimer, ‘Proposals for the opening and guarding of a road between Dizful and Khurramabad’, 4 July 1904, FO 248/819. 89. Lorimer, ‘Narrative of a journey from Ahwaz to Khurremabad and back’, 29 June 1904, FO 248/819. 90. Douglas to Grant Duff, 8 November 1904, FO 60/683. 91. Hardinge to Lansdowne, 15 August 1905, FO 60/699; ‘Administration Report on the Persian Gulf Political Residency for the year 1904– 5’, in PGAR, vol. 5. 92. Lorimer to Cox, 5 May 1906, FO 248/875. 93. Lorimer to Cox, 11 February 1907, FO 248/901. 94. Garthwaite, ‘The Bakhtiyari khans, the government of Iran, and the British, 1846– 1915’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 3/1 (January 1972), pp. 27 – 8, 43.

NOTES

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61 – 66

251

95. Kazemzadeh, Britain and Russia in Persia, pp. 407– 27; Rose L. Greaves, ‘Sistan in British Indian foreign policy’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 49/1 (1986), pp. 90 – 102. 96. Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question, vol. 1, pp. 215– 16. 97. Yate, Diary, 11 December 1893– 18 April 1894, FO 60/563, in Foreign Office Documents on Persia, reel 2. 98. For a history of this family, see Mojtahed-Zadeh, Small Players of the Great Game. 99. Yate, Diary, 11 December 1893– 18 April 1904, FO 60/563, in Foreign Office Documents on Persia, reel 2. 100. ‘Minute by the Viceroy on Seistan’, 4 September 1899, BL: Mss. Eur. F. 111/350. 101. ‘Memorandum by Sir M. Durand on the Situation in Persia’, 27 September 1895, FO 60/581. 102. McMahon, ‘Memorandum on the country south of the Baluch-Afghan boundary between Nushki and Persia, recently brought within limits of British territory’, 21 June 1896, BL: Mss. Eur. F. 111/350. 103. Webb-Ware, ‘Report on the Baluch-Persian Caravan Route and Nushki, Chagai and Western Sinjerani District, 1897’, BL: Mss. Eur. F. 111/350. 104. Daly, Minute, 10 May 1898, Foreign Department, Secret-E., Proceedings, Sept. 1898, Nos. 40 – 58, BL: Mss Eur. F. 111/350. 105. India to Hamilton, 10 August 1898, BL: Mss. Eur. F. 111/350. 106. Deutschmann, ‘Empire and Statehood in the Russo-Iranian Encounter’, pp. 87 – 94; Durand to Salisbury, 14 March 1897, FO 60/584. 107. Temple to India, 4 August 1899, BL: Mss. Eur. F. 111/352. 108. Sykes to Salisbury, 17 January 1899 and 14 February 1899, FO 60/612, in Foreign Office Documents on Persia, reel 5. 109. Sykes to Salisbury, 1 February 1899, FO 60/612, in Foreign Office Documents on Persia, reel 5. 110. Durand to Salisbury, 12 February 1899, FO 60/608. 111. ‘Minute by the Viceroy on Seistan’, 4 September 1899, BL: Mss. Eur. F. 111/350. 112. Webb-Ware, ‘Trade Returns of the Quetta – Seistan Trade Route for the year 1900– 01’, BL: Mss. Eur. F. 111/357. 113. Brodrick in answer to Schwann in House of Commons, 7 July 1905, FO 60/729; Greaves, ‘Sistan in British Indian Foreign Policy’, in Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 49/1 (1986), p. 96. 114. Chagai Diary, for the week ending 16 February 1900, BL: Mss. Eur. F. 111/352. 115. Chenevix Trench, Sistan Diary, 9 – 16 April 1900, FO 60/623. 116. Sandeman to Barnes, 23 April 1890, IOR: R/1/4/1059. 117. Gaisford to Barnes, 22 May 1890, IOR: R/1/4/1059. 118. Chenevix Trench, Sistan Diary, 9 – 16 April 1900, FO 60/623. 119. Chenevix Trench, Sistan Diary, 26 May– 10 June 1900, FO 60/624. 120. Chenevix Trench, Sistan Diary, 14 – 25 May 1900, BL: Mss. Eur. F. 111/352.

252

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67 – 75

121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126.

Chenevix Trench, Sistan Diary, 24 June –12 July 1900, FO 60/624. Chenevix Trench, Sistan Diary, 14 – 25 March 1900, BL: Mss. Eur. F. 111/352. Chenevix Trench, Sistan Diary, 24 June –12 July 1900, FO 60/624. Chenevix Trench, Sistan Diary, 1 – 15 October 1900, BL: Mss. Eur. F. 111/352. Chenevix Trench, Sistan Diary, 22 – 30 April 1900, FO 60/623. Chenevix Trench, Sistan Diary, 8 – 28 February 1901, FO 60/647, in Foreign Office Documents on Persia, reel 6. 127. Mu‘azzam al-Mulk to Mushir al-Dawlah, 14 Zi al-Qa‘dah 1318/5 March 1901, IFMA, 1318– 14-4– 176. 128. Mu‘azzam al-Mulk to Mushir al-Dawlah, 19 Zi al-Hijjah 1318/9 April 1901, IFMA, 1318– 16-12 – 8. 129. Muzaffar al-Din Shah to Atabak-i ‘Azam, Muharram 1319/April– May 1901, IFMA, 1318– 18-15 – 20;19.

Chapter 3 Imperial Partition: Forging the Anglo-Russian Convention 1. ‘Anglo-Russian Convention, August 1907’, Parliamentary Papers, vol. 125, cmd. 3750. 2. Trevelyan, Grey of Fallodon, pp. 204–5; Jennifer Siegel, Endgame: Britain, Russia, and the Final Struggle for Central Asia (New York, 2002), pp. 1–20; Mansour Bonakdarian, Britain and the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1906–1911: Foreign Policy, Imperialism, and Dissent (Syracuse, NY, 2006), p. 82. Siegel downplays European concerns, while Bonakdarian mainly overlooks India’s security. 3. Keith Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar: British Policy and Russia, 1894– 1917 (Oxford, 1995). 4. Rogers Platt Churchill, The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 (Cedar Rapids, IA, 1939), p. 337. 5. General William Dickson later described this region in this way during his service there in World War I. See Dickson, East Persia, A Backwater of the Great War (London, 1924). 6. Durand to Salisbury, 12 February 1899, FO 60/608. 7. Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia, pp. 324– 9. 8. Ibid., pp. 374– 84. 9. Curzon to Brodrick, 4 February 1904, FO 60/687. 10. Hardinge to Grey, 23 December 1905, FO 371/102. 11. Spring-Rice to Lansdowne, 23 November 1903, FO 60/678. 12. Rittich, ‘General Considerations of the Author in the necessity and best direction of a Railway Route through Persia’ (trans.), 1901, FO 60/678. 13. See BL: Mss. Eur. F. 111/359. 14. Meade, ‘Memorandum on a Visit of Prince Dabija, Russian Consul at Ispahan, to Bushire and Khuzistan’, 10 July 1899, FO 258/694; Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia, pp. 434– 6.

NOTES

TO PAGES

75 –79

253

15. Muhtasham al-Vizarah to Mushir al-Dawlah, 14 Shavval 1319/24 January 1902, in Nizam Mafi (ed.) Hukumat-i Bushihr, vol. 1, pp. 121– 2. 16. Kemball to Hardinge, 1 April 1901, FO 248/740; ‘A dispatch by Russian Steamship and Trade Company (RSTC) commercial agent Classing on a Persian Gulf maiden cruise by the steamship Kornilov from 3 February to 1 May, 1901’, in Efim Rezvan (ed), Russian Ships in the Gulf (Reading, 1993), pp. 48–60. 17. Briton Cooper Busch, Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1894– 1914 (Berkeley, CA, 1967), pp. 114– 32, 234– 69; McLean, Britain and Her Buffer State, pp. 29 – 50; Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia, pp. 440–4. 18. ‘Minute by His Excellency the Viceroy on Russian Ambitions in Eastern Persia’, enclosed in India to IO, 7 November 1901, BL: Mss. Eur. F. 111/352. 19. Notes on an interdepartmental committee on ‘The Persian Question’, 19 November 1902, FO 60/657. 20. The Times, 6 May 1903, p. 8, col. A– C. 21. Curzon to Godley, 24 May 1899, BL: Mss. Eur. F. 111/158. 22. Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question, vol. 2, p. 451. 23. ‘Report by Captain Indrenius of the Gilyak on a tour of the Gulf Ports’, in Rezvan (ed.), Russian Ships in the Gulf, p. 44. 24. ‘Memorandum setting forth the scope and working arrangements of the British Residency – Bushire, January 1908’, 8 February 1908, FO 248/932. 25. FO to Richards, 8 March 1904, FO 60/686, in Foreign Documents on Persia, reel 10; Cox to Marling, 8 February 1908, FO 248/932. 26. Busch, Britain and the Persian Gulf, p. 110. 27. McDouall to Meade [nd], enclosed in Meade to Hardinge, 24 July 1897, FO 248/651. 28. Strunk, ‘The Reign of Shaykh Khaz‘al’, pp. 32, 60; Muzaffar al-Din Shah, Firman of Shaykh Khaz‘al Khan (trans.), Rabi‘ II 1320/July–August 1902, FO 248/994. 29. Kemball to Hardinge, 2 July 1901, FO 248/740; also quoted in Strunk, ‘The Reign of Shaykh Khaz‘al’, p. 49. 30. Hardinge to Lansdowne, 17 April 1902, FO 60/650. 31. Hardinge telegram to Lansdowne, 23 November 1902, FO 60/652. 32. Curzon to Hamilton, 26 November 1902, FO 60/693, as quoted in Strunk, ‘The Reign of Shaykh Khaz‘al’, p. 76. 33. Hardinge to Khaz‘al, 7 December 1902, FO 60/693, as quoted in Ansari, ‘A History of Khuzistan’, pp. 387– 9. 34. Hardinge to Lansdowne, 11 December 1903, IOR: L/P&S/10/132. 35. Hardinge to Khaz‘al, 24 December 1903, IOR: L/P&S/10/132. 36. Strunk, ‘The Reign of Shaykh Khaz‘al’, pp. 79 – 81. 37. Kazemzadeh, Britain and Russia in Persia, p. 432. 38. Lorimer to Cox, 21 June 1904, FO 248/818. 39. J. G. Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman, and Central Arabia (Calcutta, 1915), vol. 1, pt. 2, p. 2604. 40. Bushihr Diary Extracts, week ending 23 February 1903, FO 248/786.

254

NOTES

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79 –84

41. ‘Code of Regulations for the Levying of Customs Duties on Goods entering or leaving the Empire of Persia, drawn up by the Customs Board, in agreement with the British Legation at Tehran, in pursuance of Art. 5 of the Anglo-Persian Declaration of February 9, 1903’, FO 368/37. 42. Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, vol. 1, pt. 2, pp. 2608– 9. 43. Ibid., vol. 1, pt. 2, p. 2547. 44. ‘Memorandum on quarantine and plague in the Persian Gulf by Lieut-Colonel M. J. Meade’, 2 July 1899, FO 248/694. 45. Cox to Hardinge, 16 September 1904, FO 248/818. 46. Wickham Hore, ‘Memorandum on the Accommodation in the Detention Camp at Bushire’, 17 September 1902, FO 248/761; Kemball to Hardinge, 6 December 1902, FO 248/761; Cox to Hardinge, 5 May 1905, FO 248/842. 47. ‘Memorandum on quarantine and plague in the Persian Gulf by Lieut-Colonel M. J. Meade’, 2 July 1899, FO 248/694; Meade to Durand, 22 July 1899, FO 248/694. 48. Bushihr Diary Extracts, week ending 20 October 1899, FO 248/695. 49. Meade to India, 10 July 1899, FO 248/694. 50. Kemball to Hardinge, 3 February 1904, FO 248/817. 51. Cox to Hardinge, 27 May 1904, FO 248/818. 52. Cox to Waffelaert, 3 August 1904, FO 248/818. 53. Waffelaert to Cox, 11 August 1904, FO 248/818. 54. Cox to Waffelaert, 13 August 1904, FO 248/818. 55. Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, vol. 1, pt. 2, p. 2550. 56. Cox to Hardinge, 13 July 1904, FO 248/818. 57. Cox to Hardinge, 30 January 1905, FO 248/842; Hardinge to Cox, 14 March 1905, FO 248/844. 58. Cox to Butler, 8 March 1908, FO 248/933. 59. Busch, Britain and the Persian Gulf, p. 269. 60. Curzon private to Cox, 17 November 1905, Cox Mss., 1/8. 61. Fraser private to Cox, 18 June 1908, Cox Mss., 2/22. 62. Chenevix Trench, Sistan Diary, 1 – 15 March 1901, FO 60/647. 63. Landsowne telegram to Hardinge, 18 May 1901, FO 60/647. 64. Hardinge to Lansdowne, 30 June 1901, FO 60/647. 65. Dane to Macpherson, 23 April 1904, FO 60/726; Hardinge to Macpherson, 7 April 1904, FO 60/727. 66. Daukes, ‘Scheme of Defence of the Seistan Consulate’, [nd], FO 248/941. 67. Benn, Sistan Diary, 16 – 30 September 1901, FO 60/647; Benn, ‘Note on the political Situation in Seistan and the working of the Seistan Consulate during 1901– 1903’, 31 May 1903, FO 60/725. 68. Hardinge, ‘Memorandum on Banks in Seistan’, 1 August 1902, FO 60/663. 69. Ramsay, Sistan Diary, for period ending 4 December 1903, FO 60/726; Macpherson, Sistan Diary, 23 – 30 November 1904, FO 60/728.

NOTES TO PAGES 84 –88

255

70. Benjamin Hopkins, ‘The bounds of identity: The Goldsmid mission and the delineation of the Perso-Afghan border in the nineteenth century’, Journal of Global History 2 (2007), pp. 233–54. 71. Des Graz telegram to Lansdowne, 3 July 1902, FO 60/652; Des Graz telegram to Lansdowne, 10 November 1902, FO 60/652. 72. McMahon, [‘Report on Sistan Arbitration Mission’], 1 July 1905, FO 60/729. 73. McMahon to Dane, 25 May 1903, BL: Mss. Eur. F. 111/359. 74. Benn, ‘Note on the political situation in Seistan and the working of the Seistan Consulate during 1901– 1903’, 31 May 1903, FO 60/725. 75. Dobbs to Dane, 20 June 1903, FO 60/725. 76. Dobbs, ‘Note on the Anti-British Agitation in Seistan’, 7 July 1903, FO 60/727. 77. Grant Duff telegram to Lansdowne, 7 November 1903, FO 60/725; Lansdowne telegram to Grant Duff, 10 November 1903, FO 60/725; Grant Duff telegram to Lansdowne, 18 November 1903, FO 60/725; Lansdowne telegram to Grant Duff, 20 November 1905, FO 60/725. 78. Mushir al-Dawlah to Grant Duff (trans.), 1 December 1903, FO 60/725; Grant Duff to Mushir al-Dawlah, 6 December 1903, FO 60/725; Hardinge private to Mushir al-Dawlah, 26 November 1903, FO 60/726; ‘Memorandum communicated to the Iranian Minister in London [‘Ala’ al-Saltanah]’, 25 January 1904, FO 60/726. 79. Grant Duff telegram to Lansdowne, 28 September 1904, FO 60/727. 80. Curzon telegram to Brodrick, 28 October 1904, FO 60/727. 81. Hardinge telegram to Lansdowne, 5 January 1905, FO 60/728. 82. Curzon telegram to Brodrick, 3 January 1905, FO 60/728. 83. Lansdowne to Balfour, 6 January 1905, FO 60/728. 84. Hardinge telegram to Lansdowne, 28 January 1905, FO 60/728. 85. Hardinge to Lansdowne, 8 February 1905, FO 60/728; Hardinge telegram to Lansdowne, 12 February 1905, FO 60/728; Hardinge telegram to Lansdowne, 6 March 1905, FO 60/728; Macpherson, Sistan Diary, 13 – 19 April 1905, FO 248/847. 86. FO Minute on Hardinge telegram to Lansdowne, 12 February 1905, FO 60/728. 87. Lansdowne telegram to Hardinge, 23 March 1905, FO 60/727. 88. Hardinge telegram to Lansdowne, 17 April 1905, FO 60/728; Hardinge to Lansdowne, 18 April 1905, FO 60/728. 89. Macpherson, Sistan Diary, 8 – 15 March 1905, FO 248/847. 90. Hardinge telegram to Lansdowne, 17 April 1905, FO 60/728. 91. Hardinge to Lansdowne, 18 April 1905, FO 60/728. 92. Sanderson telegram to Hardinge, 18 April 1905, FO 60/728. 93. Macpherson, Sistan Diary, 16 – 22 February 1905, FO 248/847. 94. Dobbs, Sistan Diary, 16 June – 9 July 1903, FO 60/725. 95. Rubin, ‘The Formation of Modern Iran’, pp. 480– 81. 96. Macpherson, Sistan Diary, 16 – 22 November 1905, FO 248/847.

256

NOTES

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88 – 93

97. Macpherson to Grant Duff, 24 December 1905, FO 248/847. 98. Macpherson to Grant Duff, 18 February 1906, FO 248/883; Macpherson to Grant Duff, 8 March 1906, FO 248/883. 99. Daukes, Sistan Diary, 12 – 23 September 1906, FO 248/883. 100. Rubin, ‘The Formation of Modern Iran’, p. 481. 101. Grant Duff to Lansdowne, 13 January 1906, FO 371/104; Minto telegram to Morley, 19 January 1906, FO 371/104. 102. Macpherson, Sistan Diary, 16 – 24 January 1906, FO 248/883. 103. Shaykh Ahmad, ‘Report on the Plague in Seistan from the commencement till the end of February 1906’, 7 March 1906, FO 248/883. 104. Macpherson to Dane, 27 January 1906, FO 248/883; Macpherson, Sistan Diary, 16 – 24 January 1906, FO 248/883. 105. Daukes to Dane, 16 June 1906, FO 248/883. 106. Macpherson, Sistan Diary, 11 – 18 March 1906, FO 248/883. 107. Macpherson to Dane, 29 March 1906, FO 248/883. 108. Macpherson, Sistan Diaries, 15 – 21 April 1906, 29 April – 5 May 1906, 6 – 12 May 1906, FO 248/883; Macpherson to Dane, 10 May 1906, FO 248/883. 109. Macpherson, Sistan Diary, 15 – 21 April 1906, FO 248/883. 110. Grey telegram to Grant Duff, 19 May 1906, IOR: L/P&S/10/100. 111. Daukes, Sistan Diary, 9 –15 July 1906, FO 248/883; Daukes to Dane, 21 July 1906, FO 248/883. 112. Dane telegram to Macpherson, 2 May 1906, IOR: L/P&S/10/100; Minto telegram to Morley, 18 July 1906, IOR: L/P&S/10/100. 113. Gorst to Godley, 24 July 1906, IOR: L/P&S/10/100. 114. Daukes to Dane, 10 August 1906, FO 248/883. 115. FO Memorandum to Mirza Mahdi Khan, 30 October 1906, IOR: L/ P&S/10/100. 116. Macpherson to Dane, 28 May 1906, FO 248/883. 117. Daukes, Sistan Diary, 6 – 12 August 1906, FO 248/883. 118. Daukes, Sistan Diary, 24 – 30 September 1906, FO 248/883. 119. Daukes, Sistan Diary, 6 – 12 August 1906, FO 248/883. 120. Cox telegram to Spring-Rice, 5 January 1907, FO 248/901. 121. Daukes, Sistan Diary, 3 – 9 December 1906, FO 248/883. 122. Marling telegram to Kennion, 18 February 1907, FO 248/909; Kennion telegram to Legation, 2 April 1907, FO 248/909. 123. Deutschmann, ‘Empire and Statehood in the Russo-Iranian Encounter’, pp. 53 – 4. 124. The Times, 7 February 1908, p. 8, col. C. 125. Grey to King Edward VII, 24 September 1906, in Trevelyan, Grey of Fallodon, 209. 126. ‘Diplomatic and Consular Reports’, 1889– 1913, Parliamentary Papers. 127. ‘Report on the External Land Trade of the Province of Sind and of British Baluchistan’, 1898–99 to 1907– 08, IOR: V/24/4151.

NOTES

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93 –105

257

128. Newell to Godley, 2 January 1908, IOR: L/P&S/10/176; Newell to Godley, 30 December 1908, IOR: L/P&S/10/176. 129. Nicolson to Grey, 26 August 1907, FO 371/372 in British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898– 1914 (London, 1929), vol. 4, p. 500; Nicolson to Grey, 29 August 1907, FO 371/372, in ibid., vol. 4, p. 501. 130. On the basis of the Anglo-Russian correspondence from August 1907, both Churchill and Rubin assumed that the exchange of telegraph lines took place. Churchill, The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, p. 265; Rubin, ‘The Formation of Modern Iran’, pp. 506– 8. Later documents, however, indicate this supposition is incorrect. See for example, Barclay, ‘Annual Report on Persia for the year 1910’, in BIPP, fiche 166/324 – 46. 131. Prideaux, Sistan Diary, week ending 14 November 1914, IOR: L/ P&S/10/210. 132. Daukes, Sistan Diary, 2 – 8 July 1906, FO 248/883. 133. A temporary consulate at Bam, under the consul general at Bushihr, was periodically maintained between 1906 and 1907. 134. Marshall, The Russian General Staff and Asia, pp. 187 –8. 135. Nicolson private to Grey, 7 November 1906, Grey Mss. vol. 33, in British Documents on the Origins of the War, vol. 4, p. 250. 136. Cox, Bushihr Residency Diary, week ending 15 November 1908, FO 248/935. 137. Haworth to Cox, 23 August 1913, FO 248/1068. 138. Mojtahed-Zadeh, Small Players of the Great Game, p. 51. 139. Hardinge to Lansdowne, 5 January 1905, FO 60/728. 140. Churchill, The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, p. 344; see also Siegel, Endgame, p. 197. 141. Spring-Rice to Grey, 11 April 1907, IOR: L/P&S/10/122. 142. Bonakdarian, Britain and the Iranian Constitutional Revolution, pp. 77 – 80.

Chapter 4 The Revolutionary Vortex: Ideology, Faction and Empire 1. ‘Code of Regulations for the Levying of Customs Duties on Goods entering or leaving the Empire of Persia’, FO 368/37. 2. ‘Bond executed by the Persian Merchants’ (trans.) c. 22 April 1905, FO 248/842. 3. ‘Memorandum of meetings of European firms held at the office of Messrs. Gray Paul and Company on the 14th and 18th May, 1905 to discuss the “Re`glement Douanier”’, FO 248/842. 4. Cox, Bushihr Residency Diary, week ending 23 April 1905, FO 248/842; Cox, Bushihr Residency Diary, week ending 30 April 1905, FO 248/842; Cox, Bushihr Residency Diary, week ending 7 May 1905, FO 248/842; Cox, Bushihr Residency Diary, week ending 14 May 1905, FO 248/842; Trevor, Bushihr Residency Diary, week ending 21 May 1905, FO 248/842; Cox, Bushihr Residency Diary, week ending 18 June 1905, FO 248/843.

258

NOTES

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105 –109

5. Trevor, Bushihr Residency Diary, week ending 15 October 1905, FO 248/844. 6. Inhabitants of Shiraz to foreign representatives in Tehran, 29 Shavval 1323/27 December 1905, in Muhammad ‘Ali Ranjbar (ed.), Fars az Mashrutiyat ta Jang-i Jahani-i Avval (Tehran, 1389 SH/ 2010), pp. 10 –11; Grant Duff to Grey, 30 December 1905, FO 371/103. 7. Shiraz News, 26 October –18 November 1905, FO 248/850. 8. [Nabil al-Saltanah] to Foreign Ministry, 26 Shavval 1323/24 December 1905, in Ranjbar (ed.), Fars az Mashrutiyat ta Jang-i Jahani-i Avval, pp. 17 – 18. 9. Cox, Bushihr Residency Diary, week ending 7 January 1906, FO 248/875. 10. Grant Duff telegram to Grey, 25 January 1906, FO 371/103. 11. Grahame to Mirza Ibrahim, 26 January 1906, FO 248/881. 12. Grey minute on Grant Duff to Grey, 25 January 1906, FO 371/103. 13. Grahame to Grant Duff, 9, 13 and 22 June 1906, FO 248/881. 14. Anonymous telegram from Shiraz to Tehran, 20 Rabi‘ II 1324/13 June 1906, in Ranjbar (ed.), Fars az Mashrutiyat ta Jang-i Jahani-i Avval, pp. 32 – 3. 15. Mu‘tamid al-Divan to Shu‘a‘ al-Saltanah (trans.), June 1906, FO 248/881. 16. Grant Duff to Grey, 20 June 1906, FO 371/111. 17. Morley telegram to Minto, 27 September 1906, FO 371/112. 18. Cox to Grant Duff, 26 August 1906, FO 248/876. 19. Cox, Bushihr Residency Diary, week ending 23 September 1906, FO 248/876. 20. Cox, Bushihr Residency Diary, week ending 2 December 1906, FO 248/876. 21. Cox, Bushihr Residency Diary, week ending 12 January 1908, FO 248/932. 22. Sadid al-Saltanah, Piramun-i Khalij-i Fars, p. 111. 23. Cox telegram to Legation, 29 May 1908, FO 248/934. 24. Cox telegram to Legation, 28 March 1908, FO 248/933. 25. Cox, Bushihr Residency Diary, week ending 24 March 1907, FO 248/901; Cox, Bushihr Residency Diary, week ending 28 April 1907, FO 248/902. 26. Grahame, Shiraz Diary, 28 February – 9 March 1907, FO 248/911; Grahame, Shiraz Diary, 6 – 17 April 1907, FO 248/911. 27. Riza Quli al-Qari to [Tehran], 2 Rabi‘ I 1325/15 April 1907, in Ranjbar (ed.), Fars az Mashrutiyat ta Jang-i Jahani-i Avval, pp. 45 – 6. 28. Grahame, Shiraz Diary, 10 – 16 March 1907, FO 248/911. 29. Majlis Proceedings Summary, 30 March– 23 April 1907, FO 371/301. 30. Grahame, Shiraz Diary, week ending 16 October 1907, FO 248/912. 31. Grahame, Shiraz Diary, week ending 6 November 1907, FO 248/912. 32. Cox, Bushihr Residency Diary, week ending 10 November 1907, FO 248/903; Cox, Bushihr Residency Diary, week ending 2 February 1908, FO 248/932. 33. Cox, Bushihr Residency Diary, week ending 8 March 1908, FO 248/933; Cox, Bushihr Residency Diary, week ending 13 March 1908, FO 248/933.

NOTES

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109 –115

259

34. For British public opinion and the Constitutional Revolution, see E. G. Browne, The Persian Revolution of 1905–1909 (Cambridge, UK, 1910); Bonakdarian, Britain and the Constitutional Revolution; For Russian views, see Deutschmann, ‘Empire and Statehood in the Russo-Iranian Encounter’, p. 153. 35. As quoted in Cox, Bushihr Residency Diary, week ending 22 December 1907, FO 248/903. 36. Bill, Bushihr Residency Diary, week ending 2 June 1907, FO 248/902. 37. ‘Military Report on Persia. Compiled by the General Staff, Army Headquarters, India. 1911’, p. 129, IOR: L/MIL/17/15/5. 38. Cox private to Marling, 23 March 1908, FO 248/934. 39. Cox to Butler, 6 June 1908, FO 248/934. 40. Cox to Lovat Fraser, 11 August 1908, Cox Mss., 2/23. 41. Cox telegram to Barclay, 17 March 1909, FO 248/960. 42. Cox, Bushihr Residency Diary, week ending 28 March 1909, FO 248/961. 43. Cox, Bushihr News Abstract, week ending 4 April 1909, FO 248/961. 44. Cox, Bushihr News Abstract, week ending 11 April 1909, FO 248/962; see also Anjuman-i Vilayati (Bushihr) to Mujtahids and Council of Ministers, 5 Jumadi I 1327/25 May 1909, in Ranjbar (ed.), Fars az Mashrutiyat ta Jang-i Jahani-i Avval, p. 93. 45. Cox telegram to Barclay, 6 May 1909, FO 248/961. 46. Cox telegram to Barclay, 9 April 1909, FO 248/960. 47. Cox telegram to Barclay, 11 April 1909, FO 248/960. 48. Cox telegram to Barclay, 23 April 1909, FO 248/960. 49. Cox, Bushihr Residency Diary, week ending 9 May 1909, FO 248/961; Trevor, Bushihr Residency Diary, week ending 16 May 1909, FO 248/961. 50. Cox telegram to Townley, 9 May 1913, FO 248/1067. 51. Cox to Barclay, 23 May 1909, FO 248/962. 52. Cox, Bushihr Residency Diary, week ending 9 May 1909, FO 248/961. 53. Cox, Bushihr Residency Diary, week ending 30 May 1909, FO 248/962. 54. ‘Administration Report of the Persian Gulf Residency for the year ending 31 December 1909’, in PGAR, vol. 6. 55. Cox telegram to Barclay, 29 June 1909, FO 248/962. 56. Cox, Bushihr Residency Diary, month ending 31 July 1909, FO 248/962. 57. Cox telegram to Barclay, 18 July 1909, FO 248/962; Cox telegram to Barclay, 26 July 1909, FO 248/962; Cox telegram to Barclay, 30 July 1909, FO 248/962; Trevor, Bushihr Residency Diary, month ending 31 August 1909, FO 248/963; Barclay telegram to Cox, 25 July 1909, FO 248/964. 58. Chick, ‘Memorandum on the Customs Revenue for Southern Persia, 1909 –1910’, FO 248/990. 59. Habl al-Matin no. 41 (trans.), 10 June 1907, as quoted in Bill, Bushihr Residency Diary, week ending 14 July 1907, FO 248/902. 60. Cox, ‘Note regarding an interview which took place between the Sheikh Khazal of Mohammerah and the Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf’, 7 January 1908, FO 248/933.

260

NOTES

TO PAGES

115 –119

61. McDouall to Marling, 24 April 1908, FO 248/934. 62. Cox to Butler, 22 March 1908, FO 248/934. 63. Minto telegram to Morley, 10 July 1908, IOR: L/P&S/10/132; FO to IO, 20 May 1908, IOR: L/P&S/10/132; Marling telegram to Cox, 22 August 1908, FO 248/936. 64. FO to IO, 20 May 1908, IOR: L/P&S/10/132. 65. Cox to Khaz‘al, 1 December 1908, FO 248/935. 66. McDouall secret to Trevor, 29 January 1909, FO 248/960; Cox telegram to Barclay, 5 March 1909, FO 248/960; Cox telegram to Barclay, 10 March 1909, FO 248/960. 67. Barclay telegram to Cox, 8 March 1909, FO 248/964. 68. Cox telegram to Barclay, 15 March 1909, FO 248/960. 69. Grey telegram to Barclay, 25 March 1909, IOR: L/P&S/10/132. 70. Cox telegram private to Barclay, 5 April 1909, FO 248/960. 71. Barclay telegram to Grey, 7 April 1909, IOR: L/P&S/10/132. 72. Minto telegram to Morley, 19 March 1909, IOR: L/P&S/10/132; Minto telegram to Morley, 9 April 1909, IOR: L/P&S/10/132. 73. Grey telegram to Barclay, 17 April 1909, IOR: L/P&S/10/132. 74. Cox to Khaz‘al, 16 May 1909, FO 248/962. 75. Trevor, Bushihr News Abstract, week ending 14 June 1908, FO 248/934; Geoffrey Jones, The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry (London, 1981), pp. 128– 59. 76. Lorimer to Cox, 8 July 1908, FO 248/960; Reynolds to Lorimer, 14 February 1909, FO 248/960; Lorimer to Cox, 15 February 1909, FO 248/960; Reynolds to IBP, 22 February 1909, FO 248/960. 77. Cox to Lorimer, 9 March 1909, FO 248/960. 78. Grey telegram to Barclay/Cox, 28 April 1909, IOR: L/P&S/10/144. 79. Cox telegram to Grey, 18 May 1909, FO 248/961. 80. Grey telegram to Barclay, 2 June 1909, IOR: L/P&S/10/144. 81. Cox telegram to Barclay, 9 June 1909, FO 248/961. 82. Grey telegram to Barclay, 12 June 1909, FO 371/715 83. Cox telegram to Barclay, 17 July 1909, FO 248/962. 84. Mahdi Bamdad, Sharh-i Hal-i Rijal-i Iran dar Qarn-i 12 va 13 va 14 Hijri (Tehran, 1347- SH/ 1968-), vol. 4, pp. 204– 6; Mojtahed-Zadeh, Small Players of the Great Game, pp. 75 – 82. 85. Kennion telegram to Spring-Rice, 4 April 1907, FO 248/909; Kennion telegram to Spring-Rice, 5 April 1907, FO 248/909. 86. Spring-Rice telegram to Kennion, 8 April 1907, FO 248/909. 87. Spring-Rice telegram to Kennion, 18 June 1907, FO 248/909; Spring-Rice telegram to Kennion, 6 July 1909, FO 248/909. 88. Kelly, Sistan Supplement, week ending 13 July 1907, FO 248/910. 89. Kennion telegram to Dane, 29 August 1907, FO 248/910. 90. Kennion, Sistan Diary, week ending 12 October 1907, FO 248/910. 91. Kennion telegram to Marling, 27 October 1907, FO 248/910.

NOTES 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109.

110.

111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123.

TO PAGES

119 –123

261

Kennion, Sistan Diary, week ending 31 August 1907, FO 248/910. Kennion telegram to Marling, 7 August 1908, FO 248/941. Kennion telegram to Marling, 30 August 1908, FO 248/941. Kennion, Sistan Diary, week ending 15 August 1908, FO 248/941. Kennion telegram to Marling, 5 September 1908, FO 248/941. Marling telegram to Kennion, 9 September 1908, FO 248/941. Kennion telegram to Marling, 8 September 1908, FO 248/941. Kennion telegram to Marling, 11 September 1908, FO 248/941. Marling telegram to Kennion, 21 September 1908, FO 248/941. Kennion telegram to Marling, 22 September 1908, FO 248/941. Kennion telegram to Marling, 23 September 1908, FO 248/941. Marling to Kennion, 22 September 1908, FO 248/941. Marling to Grey, 11 September 1908, FO 371/503. Barclay marginalia on Kennion telegram to Barclay, 8 November 1908, FO 248/941. Kennion, Sistan Diary, week ending 27 March 1909, FO 248/971. Kennion, Sistan Diary, week ending 20 March 1909, FO 248/971. ‘Report on the External Land Trade of the Province of Sind and of British Baluchistan’, 1898–9 to 1905– 6, IOR: V/24/4151. McConaghey, ‘Trade Report of the Provinces of Seistan and Kain for the year 1909– 1910’, FO 248/1002; Hunter, ‘Trade Report for the Sistan and Kain Consulate for the Year 1911– 1912’, FO 248/1056; Prideaux, ‘Trade Report for the Districts of Sistan and Kain for the year 1913– 1914’, FO 248/1116. Kennion, ‘Report on the Trade of the Province of Seistan and Kain for the year ending 19 February 1907’, FO 248/910; Kennion to Dane, 24 August 1907, FO 248/910; Kennion to Marling, 30 March 1908, FO 248/941. Hawkins to Marling, 8 June 1908, IOR: L/P&S/10/176. Siegel, Endgame, pp. 84– 5. Ibid., p. 161. Ibid., pp. 99 –100; Townley, ‘Annual Report on Persia for the year 1912’, in IPD, vol. 5, p. 470. Siegel, Endgame, pp. 139–40. Note by Hirtzel, 27 May 1913, IOR: L/P&S/10/122, as quoted in Siegel, Endgame, p. 163. Siegel, Endgame, p. 165. IO to FO, 21 December 1910, FO 371/951. O’Connor to Butler, 4 January 1910, FO 371/951; Butler to McConaghey, 10 October 1910, FO 371/951. O’Connor telegram private to Barclay, 3 January 1912, FO 248/1056. O’Connor private to Du Boulay, 26 April 1912, Hardinge Mss., 53/63. Lois Beck, The Qashqa’i of Iran (New Haven, CT, 1986), pp. 124– 8; Oberling, The Qashqa’i Nomads of Fars, pp. 83 – 111. Smart to Townley, 30 October 1912, FO 248/1057.

262

NOTES

TO PAGES

123 –127

124. Chick, ‘Memorandum respecting the Disorders on the Trade Routes of Southern Persia’, 1909, FO 248/962; Muleteers of Bushihr to the Merchants of Bushihr (trans.), 3 Rabi‘ II 1329/3 April 1911, FO 248/1024; Chick, [‘Memorandum on Fars and Gulf Coast’], 1912, FO 248/1048; Chick, ‘Memorandum on the Bushire – Shiraz Road from August to October, 1912’, FO 248/1048. 125. Chick, ‘Memorandum on the Rahdari Question’, 1912, FO 248/1047. 126. Chick, ‘Memorandum respecting the Disorders on the Trade Routes of Southern Persia’, 1909, FO 248/962. 127. Chick, [‘Memorandum on the Transport Question’], 1913, FO 248/1068. 128. Chick, ‘Memorandum respecting the Disorders on the Trade Routes of Southern Persia’, 1909, FO 248/962. 129. Chick, [‘Report on Bushihr Trade, for year ending 21 March 1910’], FO 248/993. 130. Cox to Grey, 30 November 1912, FO 248/1048. 131. Barclay telegram to Cox, 4 June 1909, FO 248/964. 132. Chick, ‘Memorandum respecting the Disorders on the Trade Routes of Southern Persia’, 1909, FO 248/962. 133. Chick, [‘Memorandum on the Transport Question’], 1913, FO 248/1068. 134. Speakman to FO, 14 September 1909, IOR: L/P&S/10/163; Speakman to FO, 28 January 1910, IOR: L/P&S/10/163; FO to Manchester Chamber of Commerce, 5 February 1910, IOR: L/P&S/10/163. 135. Cox to Grey, 18 July 1909, FO 248/962. 136. Ferard, ‘Memorandum on the Situation in Southern Persia’, 16 February 1912, IOR: L/P&S/10/197. 137. Bill to Barclay, 21 April 1909, IOR: L/P&S/10/163. 138. Barclay telegram to Grey, 6 November 1909, FO 371/718. 139. Nicolson telegram to Grey, 12 January 1910, IOR: L/P&S/10/163. 140. Barclay telegram to Grey, 26 December 1909, FO 371/718. 141. Trevor, Bushihr Residency Diary, month of February 1910, FO 248/990; see also Smart to Barclay, 6 May 1910, FO 371/946. 142. Trevor, Bushihr News, week ending 18 December 1909, FO 248/963; Trevor, Bushihr News, week ending 29 January 1910, FO 248/990; Karguzar of Fars to Foreign Ministry, 19 Ramazan 1328/24 September 1910, in Ranjbar (ed.), Fars az Mashrutiyat ta Jang-i Jahani-i Avval, pp. 119– 20. 143. Cox telegram to Barclay, 18 April 1910, FO 248/990; Ranking, ‘Ahvaz, Administration Report for the Year 1910’, FO 248/1022. 144. Cox telegram to Barclay, 4 April 1910, FO 248/990. 145. Barclay telegram to Grey, 17 April 1910, IOR: L/P&S/10/163. 146. Barclay telegram to Cox, 19 April 1910, FO 248/995. 147. Cox telegram to Barclay, 20 April 1910, FO 248/990. 148. Marling telegram to Grey, 10 July 1910, IOR: L/P&S/10/163. 149. Inhabitants of Shiraz telegram to Majlis, 30 Rajab 1328/7 August 1910, in Ranjbar (ed.), Fars az Mashrutiyat ta Jang-i Jahani-i Avval, pp. 145– 6. 150. Marling telegram to Grey, 2 July 1910, IOR: L/P&S/10/163.

NOTES TO PAGES 128 –132

263

151. FO to IO, 26 July 1910, IOR: L/P&S/10/163. 152. Barclay telegram to Grey, 14 October 1910, IOR: L/P&S/10/163; Barclay telegram to Cox, 15 October 1910, FO 248/989. 153. Barclay to Iranian government, 14 October 1910, FO 371/958. 154. Husayn Quli Khan to Barclay, 21 October 1910, FO 371/958; Ferard, ‘Memorandum on the Situation in Southern Persia’, 16 February 1912, IOR: L/P&S/10/197. 155. Grey telegram to Barclay, 7 November 1911, FO 371/958. 156. Barclay private to Cox, 24 November 1910, Cox Mss., 2/35. 157. Cox telegram to Barclay, 30 October 1910, FO 248/993. 158. Barclay telegram to Grey, 12 November 1910, FO 371/958. 159. Vazir-i Zadah to Barclay (trans.), 26 December 1910, FO 371/1180. 160. Barclay telegram to Grey, 4 January 1911, FO 371/1180. 161. Barclay to Muhtasham al-Saltanah, 21 January 1911, FO 371/1180. 162. Lorimer to Cox, 11 February 1907, FO 248/901. 163. Cox to Wood, 22 January 1911, FO 248/1021. 164. Cox, Bushihr Residency Diary, month of May 1911, FO 248/1024. 165. Cox telegram to Barclay, 19 May 1911, FO 248/1022. 166. Knox to Barclay, 18 May 1911, FO 371/1189. 167. Knox telegram private to Barclay, 18 May 1911, FO 371/1189. 168. Cox telegram to Barclay, 4 June 1911, FO 248/1023. 169. Knox to Barclay, 7 September 1911, FO 371/1190; Knox to Barclay, 20 October 1911, FO 371/1191; Oberling, The Qashqa’i Nomads of Fars, pp. 102 –11. 170. Barclay telegram to Cox, 11 September 1911, FO 248/1027; Cox to Barclay, 13 September 1911, FO 248/1024. 171. Hardinge telegram to Crewe, 30 September 1911, FO 371/1181. 172. Smart to Townley, 30 October 1912, FO 248/1057. 173. Cox telegram to Barclay, 2 October 1911, FO 248/1025. 174. Cox telegram to Barclay, 7 October 1911, FO 248/1025. 175. Cox telegram to Barclay, 19 October 1911, FO 248/1025; Cox telegram to Barclay, 22 October 1911, FO 248/1025. 176. Barclay to Vusuq al-Dawlah, 10 October 1911, FO 371/1181. 177. Grey telegram to Barclay, 9 October 1911, FO 371/1181; Vusuq al-Dawlah to Barclay (trans.), 11 October 1911, FO 371/1181. 178. Barclay telegram to Cox, 10 October 1911, FO 248/1027. 179. Cox telegram to Barclay, 23 October 1911, FO 248/1025. 180. Barclay to Vusuq al-Dawlah, 24 October 1911, FO 371/1181. 181. ‘Annual Report of the Persian Gulf Residency for the year 1911’, in PGAR, vol. 6. 182. Bill, Bushihr News, period ending 14 January 1912, FO 248/1045. 183. Fatva of Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Kazim Tabataba’i Yazdi, Zi al-Hijjah 1329/November – December 1911, in Muhammad Hasan Kavusi ‘Iraqi and

264

184. 185.

186. 187.

NOTES

TO PAGES

132 –137

Nasr Allah Salihi (eds), Jihadiyah: Fatava-i Jihadiyah-i ʻUlama va Marajiʻ-i ʻIzam dar Jang-i Jahani-i Avval (Tehran, 1375 SH/ 1997), pp. 41– 2. Cox telegram to Barclay, 28 October 1911, FO 248/1025. Knox telegrams to Barclay, 14 December 1911, FO 248/1036; Knox telegram to Barclay, 16 December 1911, FO 248/1036; Barclay telegram to Grey, 14 December 1911, FO 371/1181; Nizami Company et al. telegram to Grey, 16 December 1911, FO 371/1181. ‘Summary of Events in Persia for the four weeks ending 22 January 1912’, in IPD, vol. 5, p. 412. The Times, 6 August 1912, p. 5, col. C.

Chapter 5 Divide et Impera: The Consolidation of British Control 1. Oliver Bast, ‘Disintegrating the “discourse of disintegration”: Some reflections on the historiography of the late Qajar period and Iranian cultural memory’, in Touraj Atabaki (ed.), Iran in the 20th Century: Historiography and Political Culture (London, 2009), pp. 55 – 68. 2. Stephanie Cronin, ‘The Constitutional Revolution, popular politics, and statebuilding in Iran’, in Chehabi and Martin (eds), Iran’s Constitutional Revolution, pp. 81 – 97. 3. McConaghey, Sistan Diary, week ending 24 September 1910, FO 248/1002; McConaghey, Sistan Diary, week ending 15 October 1910, FO 248/1002; McConaghey, Sistan Diary, week ending 22 October 1910, FO 248/1002. 4. O’Connor, Sistan Diary, week ending 4 February 1911, FO 248/1034; O’Connor, Sistan Diary, week ending 11 February 1911, FO 248/1034. 5. O’Connor telegram to Barclay, 13 June 1911, FO 248/1034. 6. O’Connor to Barclay, 8 July 1911, FO 248/1034. 7. Prideaux to McMahon, 16 June 1913, IOR: L/P&S/10/277; Prideaux, Sistan Diary, week ending 28 June 1913, FO 248/1076; Prideaux telegram to Townley, 28 June 1913, FO 248/1076; Prideaux, Sistan Diary, week ending 5 July 1913, FO 248/1076. 8. Prideaux telegram to Townley, 18 August 1913, and Townley minute on the same, FO 248/1076. 9. Shawkat al-Mulk to Prideaux (trans.), 28 Ramazan 1331/31 August 1913, FO 248/1076; Prideaux to Shawkat al-Mulk, 1 September 1913, FO 248/1076. 10. Hishmat al-Mulk to Prideaux (trans.), 5 Shavval 1331/7 September 1913, FO 248/1076 11. Prideaux to Hishmat al-Mulk, 9 September 1913, FO 248/1076. 12. Townley telegram to Prideaux, 25 January 1914, IOR: L/P&S/10/277. 13. Prideaux, Sistan Diary, week ending 24 January 1914, IOR: L/P&S/10/210; Prideaux, Sistan Diary, week ending 28 March 1914, IOR: L/P&S/10/210. 14. Prideaux, Sistan Diary, week ending 4 July 1914, IOR: L/P&S/10/210. 15. Prideaux, Sistan Diary, week ending 26 September 1914, IOR: L/P&S/10/210.

NOTES

TO PAGES

137 –141

265

16. Prideaux, Sistan Diary, week ending 5 December 1914, IOR: L/P&S/10/210. 17. Prideaux, Sistan Diary, week ending 19 December 1914, IOR: L/P&S/10/210. 18. Shawkat al-Mulk telegram to Interior Ministry, 14 Jumadi I 1333/30 March 1915, in Kavih Bayat (ed.), Iran va Jang-i Jahani-i Avval: Asnad-i Vizarat-i Dakhilah (Tehran, 1369 SH/ 1990), pp. 177– 8; Shawkat al-Mulk telegram to Interior Ministry, 14 Jumadi II 1333/29 April 1915, in Bayat (ed.), Iran va Jang-i Jahani-i Avval, pp. 181– 2; Prideaux, Sistan Diary, week ending 15 May 1915, FO 248/1116. 19. Townley telegram to Prideaux [nd], repeated in Prideaux telegram to McMahon, 31 December 1913, IOR: L/P&S/10/277. 20. Townley telegram to Grey, 25 January 1914, IOR: L/P&S/10/277; Townley telegram to Grey, 18 February 1914, IOR: L/P&S/10/277; Townley telegram to Prideaux, 23 March 1914, IOR: L/P&S/10/277. 21. Townley telegram to Prideaux [nd], repeated in Prideaux telegram to Wood, 27 April 1914, IOR: L/P&S/10/277. 22. Prideaux telegram to Townley, 25 May 1914, IOR: L/P&S/10/277. 23. Townley telegram to Prideaux, 14 July 1914, repeated in Prideaux telegram to Wood, 27 July 1914, IOR: L/P&S/10/277. 24. Prideaux telegram to Townley, 16 July 1914, IOR: L/P&S/10/277; Prideaux, Sistan Diaries, weeks ending 15 August and 17 October 1914, IOR: L/P&S/10/210. 25. Prideaux to Husam al-Dawlah, 13 October 1914, IOR: L/P&S/10/277. 26. Prideaux, Sistan Diary, week ending 24 October 1914, IOR: L/P&S/10/210; Prideaux telegram to Townley, 30 October 1914, IOR: L/P&S/10/277. 27. Legation minute (original emphasis), 9 February 1915, FO 248/1116. 28. Prideaux, Sistan Diary, week ending 27 February 1915, FO 248/1116. 29. Cox telegram to Marling, 30 April 1910, FO 248/991. 30. Crow to Wilson, 27 April 1910, FO 248/991. 31. Cox to Marling, 16 June 1910, FO 248/992. 32. Cox telegram to Marling, 10 June 1910, FO 248/992; Cox to Khaz‘al, 15 October 1910, FO 248/994. 33. Barclay telegram to Grey, 9 December 1910, IOR: L/P&S/10/133. 34. Najaf (trans.), 26 May 1911, enclosed in Cox to McMahon, 25 June 1911, FO 248/1024. 35. Cox telegram to Barclay, 4 April 1912, FO 248/1045; Haworth telegram to [Townley], 20 April 1912, FO 248/1045; Haworth telegram to Townley, 1 May 1912, FO 248/1045; Haworth telegram to Townley, 9 May 1912, FO 248/1045; Haworth telegram to Townley, 14 May 1912, FO 248/1045. 36. Marling telegram to Cox, 3 May 1910, FO 248/995. 37. Haworth telegram to Townley, 23 April 1912, FO 248/1045. 38. Townley telegram to Cox, 3 August 1912, FO 248/1048. 39. Townley minute on Birdwood telegram to Townley, 25 August 1913, FO 248/1067.

266 40. 41. 42. 43. 44.

45. 46. 47. 48.

49.

50. 51.

52. 53. 54. 55. 56.

57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65.

NOTES

TO PAGES

141 –144

Townley telegram to Cox, 23 May 1912, FO 248/1048. Cox telegram to Townley, 7 June 1912, FO 248/1046. Townley telegram to Cox, 12 June 1912, FO 248/1048. Vice Consul Grey to Townley, 13 July 1912, FO 248/1046. Garthwaite, ‘The Bakhtiyari khans, the government of Iran, and the British, 1846– 1915’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 3/1 (January 1972), p. 38; ‘Agreement Given to Sardar-i Jang’ (trans.), 24 Rajab 1330/9 July 1912, FO 248/1047. [Bakhtiyari loan agreement (trans.)], 13 July 1912, FO 248/1047. Agreement between Sardar Jang and Shaykh Khaz‘al Khan (trans.), 8 April 1913, FO 248/1067. Haworth, ‘Report for the Year ending 20 March 1911 on the Trade and Commerce of the Province of Arabistan’, FO 248/1026. ‘Administrative Report of His Majesty’s Consulate for Arabistan for the year 1909’, and ‘Administration Report of His Majesty’s Consulate for Arabistan for the year 1910’, in PGAR, vol. 6. Barclay, ‘Annual Report on Persia for the year 1911’, in IPD, vol. 5, pp. 379– 80; Geoffrey Jones, Banking and Empire in Iran (Cambridge, UK, 1986), pp. 129– 31. Siegel, Endgame, pp. 97– 8. Haworth telegram to Barclay, 16 January 1912, FO 248/1045; Cox telegram to Barclay, 11 March 1912, FO 248/1045; Cox to McMahon, 31 March 1912, FO 248/1045; Cox to McMahon, 12 September 1912, FO 248/1047. ‘Administrative Report for the Persian Gulf Residency for the year 1911’, in PGAR, vol. 6. Wilson to Cox, 25 July 1911, FO 248/1024. Cox to McMahon, 25 July 1911, FO 248/1024. ‘Administrative Report for the Persian Gulf Residency for the year 1912’, in PGAR, vol. 7; The Times, 7 March 1913, p. 7, col. G. Wilson, Luristan Diary, 25 September – 4 October 1913, FO 248/1068; Wilson to Cox, 21 October 1913, FO 248/1068; Wilson, Luristan Diary, 22 October – 4 November 1913, FO 248/1068. Crosthwaite to Cox, 4 November 1913, FO 248/1068; Wilson, S. W. Persia, pp. 261– 2. Whitelaw to Crosthwaite, 12 November 1913, FO 248/1068. Birdwood, Bushihr Residency Diary, month of January 1914, in Political Diaries of the Persian Gulf (Farnham Common, 1990), vol. 5, p. 387. Ranking to Barclay, 7 May 1911, IOR: L/P&S/10/144. APOC to Khaz‘al, 10 June 1913, FO 248/1068. Cox telegram to Townley, 13 May 1913, FO 248/1067; Cox telegram to Townley, 17 June 1913, FO 248/1067. Sadid al-Saltanah, Piramun-i Khalij-i Fars, pp. 149 and 158. Ibid., p. 154.

NOTES

TO PAGES

144 –149

267

66. ‘Administration Report for the Arabistan Conslate for the Year 1912’, in PGAR, vol. 7. 67. As quoted in Sadid al-Saltanah, Piramun-i Khalij-i Fars, p. 163. 68. ‘Administration Report for the Arabistan Conslate for the Year 1911’, in PGAR, vol. 6; Haworth, Arabistan Diary, week ending 29 June 1912, FO 248/1046. 69. Jones, The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry, pp. 155– 6. 70. R. W. Ferrier, The History of the British Petroleum Company, vol. 1, The Developing Years, 1901– 1932 (Cambridge, UK, 1982), pp. 271 and 278. 71. Jones, The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry, p. 151. 72. Burrell, ‘Arms and Afghans in Makran: an episode in Anglo-Persian Relations, 1905– 1912’, in Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 49/1 (1986), pp. 8 – 24. 73. Ibid., p. 21; Cox telegram to Barclay, 15 April 1911, FO 248/1022; Cox telegram to Barclay, 23 April 1911, FO 248/1022; Cox telegram to Barclay, 26 April 1911, FO 248/1022; Cox telegram to Barclay, 30 April 1911, FO 248/1022. 74. New, Lingah News, weeks ending 26 October – 16 November 1910, FO 248/994. 75. Cox telegram to Barclay, 8 March 1912, FO 248/1045; Cox telegram to Barclay, 18 March 1912, FO 248/1045; New, Lingah News, week ending 11 March 1912, FO 248/1045; New, Lingah News, week ending 18 March 1912, FO 248/1045; New, Lingah News, 2– 8 April 1912, FO 248/1045; Bill, Bushihr Residency Diary, month of April 1912, FO 248/1046. 76. Cox telegram to Townley, 13 May 1912, FO 248/1045; Cox telegram to India, 18 May 1912, FO 248/1045; Bandar-i ‘Abbas News, week ending 23 May 1912, FO 248/1046; Cox, Bushihr Residency Diary, month of March 1913, FO 248/1067; Biscoe to Cox, 1 April 1913, FO 248/1067. 77. Cox telegram to Barclay, 31 August 1911, FO 248/1024; Cox telegram to Barclay, 10 September 1911, FO 248/1024; Cox to McMahon, 1 October 1911, FO 248/1025. 78. Cox telegram to Townley, 28 February 1913, FO 371/1729. 79. Cox telegram to Townley, 1 July 1913, FO 248/1067; Birdwood to Cox, 1 July 1913, FO 371/1726. 80. Muvaqqar al-Dawlah to Interior Ministry, 12 Rajab 1331/17 June 1913, in Bayat (ed.), Iran va Jang-i Jahani-i Avval, pp. 128– 30. 81. Smart to Townley, 23 May 1912, IOR: L/P&S/10/197. 82. Ferard, ‘Memorandum on the Situation in Southern Persia’, 16 February 1912, IOR: L/P&S/10/197; ‘Administrative Report on the Persian Gulf Residency for the year 1912’, in PGAR, vol. 7. 83. Hardinge telegram to Crewe, 23 January 1911, IOR: L/P&S/10/197. 84. Hardinge telegram to Crewe, 5 February 1912, IOR: L/P&S/10/197. 85. Burns to Wheeler, 16 July 1912, IOR: L/P&S/11/45. 86. Cox telegram to McMahon, 10 March 1912, FO 248/1045. 87. Cox telegram to Barclay, 4 April 1912, FO 248/1045.

268 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97.

98.

99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110.

NOTES

TO PAGES

149 –152

Barclay to Iranian government, 4 April 1912, IOR: L/P&S/10/197. Cox telegram to McMahon/Townley, 5 July 1912, FO 248/1046. Townley telegram to Cox, 8 July 1912, FO 248/1048. Townley telegram to Grey, 30 August 1912, IOR: L/P&S/10/197. Hardinge telegram to Crewe, 7 September 1912, IOR: L/P&S/10/197. Grey telegram to Townley, 16 September 1912, IOR: L/P&S/10/197. See also McLean, Britain and Her Buffer State, pp. 108– 10; Oberling, The Qashqa’i Nomads of Fars, pp. 113– 25. Smart to Townley, 30 October 1912, FO 248/1057. Cox to Wood, 27 November 1910, FO 248/994. Jacques Thobie, ‘European Banks in the Middle East’, in Rondo Cameron and V. I. Bovykin (eds), International Banking 1870– 1914 (Oxford, 1991), p. 420; The Times, 2 May 1911, p. 8 col. E; The Times, 12 July 1911, p. 20, col. G. Townley, ‘Annual Report on Persia for the year 1912’, in IPD, vol. 5, pp. 469– 70; Ferard, ‘Secret Memorandum as to Persian Government Loans’, 27 November 1912, IOR: L/P&S/10/220. ‘Administration Report for Fars and Bushire for the year 1912’, in PGAR, vol. 7. Barclay telegram to Cox, 26 March 1912, FO 248/1048. Cox telegram to Barclay, 28 March 1912, FO 248/1045; Cox telegram to Barclay, 29 March 1912, FO 248/1045. Smart to Townley, 15 July 1912, IOR: L/P&S/10/197. Bill telegram to Barclay, 8 June 1912, FO 248/1046. Chick, ‘Bushire Trade Report for the year ending March 1913’, FO 248/1068; Chick, ‘Memorandum on the Rahdari Question’, 1912, FO 248/1047. Cox to McMahon, 28 July 1912, FO 248/1046. Smart telegram to Townley, 6 August 1912, FO 248/1057. ‘Administration Report for Bushire and Fars for the year 1911’, in PGAR, vol. 6. Cox telegram to Barclay, 7 April 1912, FO 248/1045. Cox telegram to Townley, 9 July 1912, FO 248/1046. Cox telegram to Townley, 20 July 1912, FO 248/1046; Townley telegram to Cox, 23 July 1912, FO 248/1048. Mukhbir al-Saltanah was an impressive figure. Born in 1864, he had been educated in Berlin and spoke German and and some French and English. In 1904 he had accompanied the former premier, Amin al-Sultan, on his tour of Europe, the United States, Japan, China and India. He subsequently held several cabinet positions, twice served as governor general of Azerbaijan, and later was prime minister for six years between 1927 and 1933, See Bamdad, Sharh-i Hal-i Rijal-i Iran, vol. 4, pp. 184– 7, and Mukhbir al-Saltanah’s memoirs, Khatirat va Khatarat: Tushah’i az Tarikh-i Shish Padishah va Gushah’i az Dawrah-i Zindagi-i Man (Tehran, 1375 SH/ 1996).

NOTES

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269

111. Birdwood, Bushihr Residency Diary, month of January 1913, in Political Diaries of the Persian Gulf, vol. 5, p. 9. 112. Smart to Townley, 23 May 1912, IOR: L/P&S/10/197. 113. Townley, ‘Annual Report on Persia for the year 1912’, in IPD, vol. 5, pp. 471– 2; Ferard, ‘Secret Memorandum as to Persian Government Loans’, 27 November 1912, IOR: L/P&S/10/220. 114. ‘Administration Report for Fars and Bushire for the year 1912’, in PGAR, vol. 7; Townley telegram to Smart, 1 September 1912, IOR: L/P&S/10/197. 115. Smart telegram to Townley, 28 October 1912, IOR: L/P&S/10/197. 116. Townley telegram to Grey, 30 August 1912, IOR: L/P&S/10/197. 117. ‘Administration Report for Fars and Bushire for the year 1912’, in PGAR, vol. 7. 118. O’Connor telegram to Townley, 17 December 1912, IOR: L/P&S/10/336. 119. Cox telegram to Townley, 15 December 1912, FO 248/1047. 120. The Times, 31 January 1913, p. 5, col. C. 121. Lovat Fraser private to Cox, 31 January 1913, Cox Mss., 3/7. 122. O’Connor telegram to Townley, 16 December 1912, IOR: L/P&S/10/336. 123. Townley telegram to Cox, 23 December 1912, FO 248/1048. 124. O’Connor telegram to Townley, 5 January 1913, FO 371/1707. 125. O’Connor telegram to Townley, 14 January 1913, IOR: L/P&S/10/336. 126. Townley telegram to O’Connor, 15 January 1913, IOR: L/P&S/10/336. 127. Townley telegram to Grey, 30 April 1913, IOR: L/P&S/10/353; Ferard, ‘Persian Government Loans’, 1 September 1913, FO 371/1727; 128. ‘Pre´cis of verbal communication made by ‘Ala’ al-Saltanah to Townley’, 11 January 1913, IOR: L/P&S/10/357. 129. Cox to Grey, 19 January 1913, FO 371/1707. 130. Vusuq al-Dawlah to Townley, 1 May 1913, IOR: L/P&S/10/353; Vusuq al-Dawlah to Townley, 7 May 1913, IOR: L/P&S/10/353. 131. Cox, Bushihr Residency Diary, month of April 1913, in Political Diaries of the Persian Gulf, vol. 5, p. 96. 132. ‘Administration Report for Fars and Bushire for the year 1913’, in PGAR, vol. 7. 133. Cox, Bushihr Residency Diary, month of June 1913, in Political Diaries of the Persian Gulf, vol. 5, pp. 156– 57; Birdwood, Bushihr Residency Diary, month of July 1913, in Political Diaries of the Persian Gulf, vol. 5, p. 195. 134. ‘Administration Report for Fars and Bushire for the year 1914’, in PGAR, vol. 7. 135. O’Connor to Townley, 10 December 1914, FO 371/2421; Grahame to Townley, 25 December 1914, FO 371/2421. 136. ‘Administration Report for Fars and Bushire for the year 1913’, in PGAR, vol. 7. 137. Townley to Grey, 6 July 1914, FO 371/2059. 138. Townley to Qavam al-Mulk, 18 July 1914, FO 371/2070; Townley to Sawlat al-Dawlah, 18 July 1914, FO 371/2070.

270

NOTES

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156 –162

139. O’Connor to Townley, 8 November 1913, IOR: L/P&S/10/404. 140. Cox, Bushihr Residency Diary, month of March 1913, FO 248/1067. 141. Townley telegram to Grey, 27 July 1914, FO 371/2067; Townley telegram to Grey, 30 July 1914, IOR: L/P&S/10/354. 142. ‘Administration Report for Fars and Bushire for the year 1914’, in PGAR, vol. 7. 143. Churchill, ‘Brief summary of events from October 24, 1914 to January 16, 1915’, in IPD, vol. 5, p. 662. 144. Cox telegram to Townley, 22 August 1912, FO 248/1046. 145. Chick, ‘Customs Revenue from the Gulf Ports (Including Arabistan) for 1912– 13’, FO 248/1068. Chick calculated this figure at the nominal value of 50 qirans to £1. He pointed out that 55:1 was the actual exchange rate, and the actual net value of the customs receipts was therefore closer to £128,000. 146. Cox telegram to Townley, 30 September 1912, FO 248/1046. 147. Cox telegram to Townley, 24 May 1913, FO 248/1067. 148. Cox to McMahon, 15 September 1912, FO 248/1047; Cox telegram to Townley, 30 September 1912, FO 248/1046; Cox telegram to Townley, 24 May 1913, FO 248/1067. 149. Townley, ‘Annual Report on Persia for 1913’, in IPD, vol. 5, p. 584. 150. Siegel, Endgame, pp. 154–7, 165– 9, 177– 8, and 185– 94. 151. Townley to Grey, 9 July 1913, FO 371/1717. 152. Townley, ‘Annual Report on Persian for the year 1913’, in IPD, vol. 5, p. 571. 153. Townley telegram to Grey, 5 May 1913, FO 371/1720. 154. Morteza Nouraei and Vanessa Martin, ‘Russian land acquistion in Iran from 1828 to 1911’, in Stephanie Cronin (ed.), Iranian-Russian Encounters: Empires and Revolutions since 1800 (New York, 2013), pp. 101–5; Elena Andreeva and Morteza Nouraie, ‘Russian Settlements in Iran in the early twentieth century: initial phase of colonization’, Iranian Studies 46/3 (2013), pp. 415– 42. 155. Bonakdarian, Britain and the Constitutional Revolution, pp. 275– 352. 156. Townley to Grey, 17 March 1913, FO 371/1706. 157. Cox to Townley, 8 June 1913, FO 248/1067. 158. Holderness to FO, 29 June 1914, IOR: L/P&S/10/133. 159. ‘Memorandum communicated to the Russian Ambassador, June 10, 1914’, FO 371/2076. 160. Buchanan to Grey, 21 June 1914, in British Documents on the Origins of the War, (London, 1936–8), vol. 10, pp. 804– 5. 161. ‘Memorandum communicated to Sir G. Buchanan by M. Sazonov’, in British Documents on the Origins of the War, vol. 10, pp. 815– 20. 162. Buchanan to Grey, 25 June 1914, FO 371/2076. 163. Siegel, Endgame, pp. 194–6. 164. Ann Lambton also makes this observation about the retention of power by Iranian notables. Qajar Persia: Eleven Studies (Austin, TX, 1987), pp. 319– 29.

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271

Chapter 6 Proxy Wars: The Battle for Southern Iran 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28.

Kashani-Sabet, Frontier Fictions, pp. 144– 8. Atabaki (ed.), Iran and the First World War. Olson, Anglo-Iranian Relations during World War I, pp. 24 – 117. Ibid., p. 41. Cox telegram to FO, 14 May 1919, FO 371/3861. ‘Statement[s] of actual expenditure of the Government of India on Diplomatic and Consular service in Persia’, 1909 – 1910 to 1914 – 15, IOR: L/P&S/10/130. Hardinge telegram to Crewe, 19 March 1915, IOR: L/P&S/10/548. ‘Statement of Secret Service Expenditure in Persia 1915– 1920’, IOR: L/P&S/10/548. ‘Arrangement for the organization of the expedition in Persia’ (trans.), 6 June 1916, IOR: L/P&S/10/477. J. C. Hurewitz (ed.), Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record (Princeton, NJ, 1956), vol. 2, pp. 7 – 11. British Memorandum to the Russian government, 27 February/12 March 1915, in ibid., vol. 2, pp. 8 – 9. As quoted in A. P. Thornton, The Imperial Idea and its Enemies: A Study in British Power (London, 1959), pp. 165– 7. Lorimer, Bushihr News, period ending 15 December 1913, FO 248/1068. Hardinge private to Cox, 4 October 1914, Cox Mss., 3/11. Fred J. Moberly, Campaign in Mesopotamia 1914– 18 (London, 1923 –7), vol. 1, p. 174. Ranking telegrams to Trevor, 26 January 1915, FO 248/1101. Cox telegram to Grant, 24 January 1915, FO 248/1101; Cox telegram to Grant, 6 February 1915, FO 248/1101. ‘Administration Report for the Ahvaz Vice-Consulate for the year 1915’, in PGAR, vol. 7. ‘Administration Report for the Arabistan Consulate, for the year 1915’, in PGAR, vol. 7; Trevor, Arabistan Diary, week ending 27 February 1915, FO 248/1101. Cox telegram to Grant, 27 January 1915, FO 248/1101. Cox telegram to Grant, 3 March 1915, FO 248/1101. Cox telegram to Bushihr, 31 March 1915, FO 248/1101; Cox telegram to Townley, 2 April 1915, FO 248/1101. Moberly, Campaign in Mesopotamia, vol. 1, p. 351. Cox telegram to Bushihr, 18 May 1915, FO 248/1102. Strunk, ‘The Reign of Shaykh Khaz‘al’, pp. 300– 4. Kennion to Cox, 29 June 1915, FO 460/3, as quoted in ibid., pp. 301– 2. Peter Hopkirk, On Secret Service East of Constantinople: The Plot to Bring Down the British Empire (London, 1994), pp. 86 – 94 and 98 – 101. Cox telegram to Townley, 6 March 1915, FO 248/1101; Mukhbir al-Saltanah telegram to Interior Ministry, 22 Rabi‘ II 1333/9 March 1915, in Bayat (ed.),

272

29. 30.

31.

32. 33. 34. 35. 36.

37. 38.

39. 40. 41.

42. 43. 44. 45. 46.

NOTES

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172 –175

Iran va Jang-i Jahani-i Avval, pp. 111– 12; ‘Administration Report for Fars and Bushihr for the year 1915’, in PGAR, vol. 7; Hopkirk, On Secret Service East of Constantinople, pp. 108– 9. Hopkirk, On Secret Service East of Constantinople, pp. 240– 6. Cox telegram to Townley, 9 March 1915, FO 248/1101; Neale, Bushihr Diary, period ending 15 March 1915, FO 248/1102; Cox to Marling, 15 July 1915, FO 248/1103. Mu‘avin al-Dawlah telegram to Iranian ambassador in London (trans.), 10 March 1915, IOR: L/P&S/10/482; ‘Administration Report for Fars and Bushihr for the year 1915’, in PGAR, vol. 7; Cox to Marling, 15 July 1915, FO 248/1103. Cox telegram to Grant, 13 March 1915, FO 248/1101 and IOR: L/P&S/10/482. Crewe telegram to Hardinge, 15 March 1915, IOR: L/P&S/10/482. See also Hopkirk, On Secret Service East of Constantinople, p. 112. Hopkirk, On Secret Service East of Constantinople, pp. 105– 20; Christopher Sykes, Wassmuss (London, 1936). Interior Ministry to Foreign Ministry, 11 Safar 1329/11 February 1911, in Ranjbar (ed.), Fars az Mashrutiyat ta Jang-i Jahani-i Avval, pp. 156– 7. Muhammad Husayn Ruknzadah Adamiyat, Fars va Jang-i Bayn Milal (Tehran, 1312 SH/ 1933), vol. 1, pp. 3 – 4; Haybat Allah Maliki, ‘Ulama va Mashahir-i Fars dar Jang-i Jahani-i Avval (Shiraz, 1389 SH/ 2010). For Ra’is ‘Ali’s shifting twentieth-century historiographical reputation from local hero, to national icon, to Islamic martyr, see Oliver Bast, ‘Disintegrating the “discourse of disintegration”’, in Atabaki (ed.), Iran in the 20th Century, pp. 62 – 3. ‘Administration Report for Fars and Bushihr for the year 1915’, in PGAR, vol. 7; Mukhbir al-Saltanah, Khatirat va Khatarat, p. 271. The Democrat Party of Fars called Jam-i Jam the ‘organ of the party’ in a letter to Ahmad Akhgar, 9 Safar 1334/17 December 1915, in Ruknzadah Adamiyat, Fars va Jang-i Bayn Milal (Tehran, 1327SH/ 1948), vol. 2, p. 210. Mukhbir al-Saltanah, Khatirat va Khatarat, pp. 270– 82. Parviz Afsar, Tarikh-i Zhandarmari-i Iran (Qum, 1333 SH/ 1954), pp. 96 – 8. Stephanie Cronin, ‘The government gendarmerie and the Great War in Iran’, in Oliver Bast (ed.), La Perse et la Grande Guerre (Tehran, 2002), pp. 196– 203; and Cronin, ‘Iranian nationalism and the government gendarmerie’, in Atabaki (ed.), Iran and the First World War, pp. 43 – 68. O’Connor, On the Frontier and Beyond, p. 224. Cox telegram to Grant, 8 May 1915, FO 248/1102. Cox telegrams to Grant, 10 and 12 May 1915, FO 248/1102. Harding telegram to IO, 29 May 1915, FO 371/2432; Olson, Anglo-Iranian Relations during World War I, p. 86. Olson, Anglo-Iranian Relations during World War I, pp. 25 – 7.

NOTES

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175 –177

273

47. Haydar Khan telegram to Interior Ministry, 20 Sha‘ban 1333/3 July 1915, in Bayat (ed.), Iran va Jang-i Jahani-i Avval, p. 135; Trevor telegram to Marling, 1 June 1915, FO 248/1102; Trevor telegram to Marling, 21 June 1915, FO 248/1102; Trevor telegram to Marling, 26 June 1915, FO 248/1102; Trevor, Bushihr Diary, week ending 10 July 1915, FO 248/1102. 48. Mukhbir al-Saltanah telegrams to Interior Ministry, 15 Sha‘ban 1333/28 June 1915, and 17 Sha‘ban 1333/30 June 1915, in Bayat (ed.), Iran va Jang-i Jahani-i Avval, pp. 131– 2 and 133– 4. 49. Shaykh Husayn Khan and Za’ir Khizir to ‘all military officers of the Persian Government’ (trans.), received 6 July 1915, FO 248/1102. 50. Trevor telegram to Marling, 12 July 1915, FO 248/1102; Trevor telegram to Marling, 13 July 1915, FO 248/1102; Trevor telegram to Marling, 14 July 1915, FO 248/1102; Trevor telegram to Marling, 19 July 1915, FO 248/1102; Statement sealed by Shaykh Husayn Khan and Za’ir Khizir, 10 Sha‘ban 1334/12 June 1916, in Ruknzadah Adamiyat, Fars va Jang-i Bayn Milal, vol. 2, pp. 212– 13. 51. Fred J. Moberly, Operations in Persia (London, 1929), pp. 89 – 90; see also Paul Luft, ‘British policy in eastern Iran during World War I’, in Bast (ed.), La Perse et la Grande Guerre, pp. 45 – 79; Marling telegram to Grant, 15 July 1915, IOR: L/P&S/10/473. 52. Prideaux telegram to Marling, 1 July 1915, FO 248/1116. 53. Marling telegram to Grey, 4 July 1915, IOR: L/P&S/10/473. 54. Marling telegram to Grey, 13 July 1915, IOR: L/P&S/10/473. 55. Grey telegram to Marling, 15 July 1915, FO 371/2430; Hardinge telegram to Chamberlain, 20 July 1915, IOR: L/P&S/10/473. 56. Prideaux telegram to Grant, 20 July 1915, FO 248/1116; Prideaux telegram to Grant, 24 July 1915, IOR: L/P&S/10/473. 57. Grant telegram to Prideaux, 24 July 1915, IOR: L/P&S/10/473; Grant telegram to Prideaux, 26 July 1915, IOR: L/P&S/10/473. 58. Prideaux telegram to Grant, 27 July 1915, FO 248/1116. 59. Grant telegram to Prideaux, 29 July 1915, IOR: L/P&S/10/473; Prideaux telegram to Marling, 5 August 1915, FO 248/1116. 60. Prideaux telegram to Marling, 20 August 1915, FO 248/1116; Prideaux telegram to Marling, 22 August 1915, FO 248/1116; Prideaux, Sistan Diary, week ending 21 August 1915, FO 248/1116. 61. Moberly, Operations in Persia, p. 96. 62. Amir Habib Allah to Hardinge (trans.), 18 Ramazan 1333/30 July 1915, IOR: L/P&S/10/473. 63. Hardinge telegram to Chamberlain, 29 July 1915, IOR: L/P&S/10/473; Grant telegram to Cox, 30 July 1915, IOR: L/P&S/10/473. 64. Trevor telegram to Marling, 8 August 1915, FO 248/1102; Trevor to Grant, 9 August 1915, FO 248/1103. 65. ‘Administration Report for Fars and Bushire for the year 1915’, in PGAR, vol. 7.

274

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177 –180

66. Trevor to Grant, 9 August 1915, FO 248/1103. 67. Trevor telegram to Marling, 15 August 1915, FO 248/1102; Moberly, Operations in Persia, pp. 98 –101. 68. Trevor telegram to Marling, 9 September 1915, FO 248/1103; Moberly, Operations in Persia, pp. 108– 11. 69. Trevor telegram to Marling, 23 August 1915, FO 248/1102; Cox telegram to Grant, 28 August 1915, FO 248/1102. 70. Olson, Anglo-Iranian Relations during World War I, pp. 103– 4; ‘Administration Report for Fars and Bushire for the year 1915’, in PGAR, vol. 7; Mukhbir al-Saltanah, Khatirat va Khatarat, p. 282. 71. Trevor telegram to Marling, 16 October 1915, FO 248/1103. 72. Extract from Jam-i Jam (trans.) [nd], FO 248/1104. 73. Mukhbir al-Saltanah, Khatirat va Khatarat, p. 271; Shaykh Muhammad Ja‘far to Ahmad Khan of Angali (trans.), received 22 November 1915, FO 248/1104; ‘Administration Report for Fars and Bushihr for the year 1915’, in PGAR, vol. 7. 74. Trevor telegram to Grant, 24 October 1915, IOR: L/P&S/10/473. 75. O’Connor, On the Frontier and Beyond, pp. 224– 9. 76. Marling telegram to India, 7 October 1915, FO 371/2435. 77. Olson, Anglo-Iranian Relations during World War I, pp. 111– 17; Cronin, ‘The government gendarmerie and the Great War in Iran’, in Bast (ed.), La Perse et la Grande Guerre, pp. 203– 7. 78. Marling telegram to Grant, 15 November 1915, IOR: L/P&S/10/473; Farman Farma to Darya Baygi (trans.), 22 November 1915, FO 248/1104. 79. Fergusson, ‘Report on the Seizure of the Shiraz Colony’, 25 November 1915, FO 248/1104; Afsar, Tarikh-i Zhandarmari-i Iran, pp. 97 –8; Ahmad Akhgar, Zindagi-i Man Dar Tul-i Haftad Sal-i Tarikh-i Mu‘asir-i Iran (Tehran, 1366 SH/ 1987), p. 170; Cronin, ‘The government gendarmerie and the Great War in Iran’, in Bast (ed.), La Perse et la Grande Guerre, pp. 204– 5. 80. Qavam al-Mulk telegram to Salar-i Nusrat (trans.), 2 Muharram 1334/10 November 1915, FO 248/1104. 81. ‘Le Comite´ National Pour La Protection de l’Independence Persane’ to O’Connor, 10 November 1915, FO 248/1104; English translation quoted from O’Connor, On the Frontier and Beyond, p. 232. 82. O’Connor, On the Frontier and Beyond, p. 235. 83. Shaykh Husayn Khan and Za’ir Khizir to Trevor (trans.), 12 Muharram 1334/20 November 1915, FO 248/1104. 84. Manifesto of the Democrat Party of Iran, third session of the Provincial Committee of Fars, 28 Muharram 1334/6 December 1915, in Ruknzadah Adamiyat, Fars va Jang-i Bayn Milal, vol. 2, p. 180. 85. Manifesto of the Committee of the Protectors of Independence of the Country of Iran, 18 Qaws 1334/10 December 1915, in Ruknzadah Adamiyat, Fars va Jang-i Bayn Milal, vol. 2, pp. 171– 2.

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275

86. Announcement by the Gendarmerie [December 1915], in Ruknzadah Adamiyat, Fars va Jang-i Bayn Milal, vol. 2, pp. 186– 7. 87. Ruznamah-i Hafiz Istiqlal [nd], in Ruknzadah Adamiyat, Fars va Jang-i Bayn Milal, vol. 2, pp. 192–3; Agreement between Sawlat al-Dawlah and Gendarmerie, 11 Rabi‘ I 1334/17 January 1916, FO 371/2989. 88. Marling to Grey, 24 March 1916, in IPD, vol. 5, pp. 727– 31. 89. Trevor telegram to Marling, 23 November 1915, FO 248/1104. 90. Garthwaite, ‘The Bakhtiyari khans, the government of Iran, and the British, 1846–1915’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 3/1 (January 1972), pp. 41–2; ‘Agreement with Bahktiari Khans’, 11 Rabi‘ II 1334/16 February 1916, FO 371/2728. 91. Cox to Grant, 15 December 1915, as quoted in Garthwaite, ‘The Bakhtiyari khans’, p. 42. 92. Garthwaite, ‘The Bakhtiyari khans’, p. 42. 93. Trevor, Bushihr Diary, week ending 31 December 1915, FO 248/1104; Trevor, Bushihr Diary, week ending 7 January 1916, FO 248/1128; Trevor, Bushihr Diary, week ending 14 January 1916, FO 248/1128; Trevor, Bushihr Diary, week ending 21 January 1916, FO 248/1128. 94. Trevor, Bushihr Diary, week ending 26 February 1916, FO 248/1128; Trevor, Bushihr Diary, week ending 4 March 1916, FO 248/1128; Trevor, Bushihr Diary, week ending 11 March 1916, FO 248/1128. 95. Grant telegram to Prideaux, 5 March 1916, IOR: L/P&S/10/474; Moberly, Operations in Persia, pp. 150– 1. 96. Hardinge telegram to IO, 10 March 1916, FO 371/2725; Trevor telegram to Gough, 20 November 1916, FO 371/2985. 97. Loch to Wakely, 14 December 1922, IOR: L/P&S/10/548; Prideaux to India, 13/14 February 1924, IOR: L/P&S/10/548. 98. Trevor, Bushihr Diary, week ending 26 February 1916, FO 248/1128; Trevor, Bushihr Residency Diary, month of March 1916, FO 248/1128. 99. Statement sealed by Shaykh Husayn Khan and Za’ir Khizir, 10 Sha‘ban 1334/12 June 1916, in Ruknzadah Adamiyat, Fars va Jang-i Bayn Milal, vol. 2, pp. 212– 13. 100. Trevor, Bushihr Diary, week ending 11 March 1916, FO 248/1128; Trevor telegram to Grant, 13 March 1916, IOR: L/P&S/10/474. 101. Trevor, Bushihr Diary, week ending 1 April 1916, FO 248/1128; Trevor, Bushihr Diary, week ending 8 April 1916, FO 248/1128. 102. Seiler to Niedermayer (trans.), 26 March 1916, FO 371/2727. 103. Fath al-Mulk, Announcement [nd] in Ruknzadah Adamiyat, Fars va Jang-i Bayn Milal, vol. 2, p. 196; Fath al-Mulk, et al., Announcement, 18 Jumadi II 1334/22 April 1916, in Ruknzadah Adamiyat, Fars va Jang-i Bayn Milal, vol. 2, p. 198; ‘Annual Report of the Persian Gulf Residency for the year 1916’, FO 371/3269. 104. Trevor, Bushihr Diary, week ending 29 April 1916, FO 248/1128.

276

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183 –187

105. Nusrat al-Saltanah telegrams to Nasr al-Dawlah, [nd], in Ruknzadah Adamiyat, Fars va Jang-i Bayn Milal, vol. 2, p. 178– 9. 106. Sawlat al-Dawlah, Announcement to the inhabitants of Shiraz, 28 Rabi‘ II 1334/4 March 1916, in Ruknzadah Adamiyat, Fars va Jang-i Bayn Milal, vol. 2, p. 174. 107. Trevor, Bushihr Diary, week ending 29 April 1916, FO 248/1128; Marling to Grey, 11 October 1916, FO 371/2733. 108. Marling to Grey, 11 October 1916, FO 371/2733. 109. Marginal note by Churchill on Prideaux telegram to Marling, 27 July 1915, FO 248/1116; Marling telegram to Prideaux, 29 July 1915, FO 248/1117. 110. Marginal note by Churchill on Prideaux telegram to Marling, 19 August 1915, FO 248/1116. 111. Prideaux telegram to Marling, 4 January 1916, IOR: L/P&S/10/474; Marling telegram to Prideaux, 12 January 1916, IOR: L/P&S/10/474. 112. Haig telegram to Grant, 25 January 1916, IOR: L/P&S/10/474. 113. Marling telegram to Prideaux, 24 January 1916, IOR: L/P&S/10/474. 114. Prideaux telegram to Marling, 27 January 1916, IOR: L/P&S/10/474. 115. IO Minute on India to IO, 3 March 1916, IOR: L/P&S/10/474. 116. Prideaux telegram to [Grant], 16 August 1915, FO 248/1116; Prideaux telegram to Marling, 29 September 1915, FO 248/1116. 117. Prideaux telegram to Grant, 27 July 1915, FO 248/1116. 118. Prideaux telegram to Grant, 29 October 1915, FO 248/1116; Prideaux telegram to Grant, 4 November 1915, IOR: L/P&S/10/473. 119. Hardinge telegram to Chamberlain, 4 November 1915, IOR: L/P&S/10/473. 120. Prideaux telegram to Grant, 11 November 1915, FO 248/1116; Hardinge telegram to Chamberlain, 16 November 1915, IOR: L/P&S/10/473. 121. Grant telegram to Prideaux, 10 January 1916, IOR: L/P&S/10/474. 122. Grant telegram to Prideaux, 5 March 1916, IOR: L/P&S/10/474; Moberly, Operations in Persia, pp. 150– 1. 123. Moberly, Operations in Persia, p. 183; Gould to India, 7 October 1920, IOR: L/ P&S/10/748. 124. Gould to India, 7 June 1924, IOR: L/P&S/10/548. 125. Gould to India, 7 October 1920, IOR: L/P&S/10/748. 126. Ibid.; Prideaux, Sistan Diary, week ending 18 March 1916, IOR: L/ P&S/10/210; Moberly, Operations in Persia, pp. 155– 8, 162– 8 and 183; Dyer telegram to chief of General Staff, 3 September 1916, FO 371/2727; Reginald E. H. Dyer, The Raiders of the Sarhad, being an account of a campaign of arms and bluff against the brigands of the Persian-Baluchi border during the Great War (London, 1921). 127. Gould to India, 7 June 1924, IOR: L/P&S/10/548. 128. Prideaux telegram to Marling, 28 December 1915, FO 248/1116; Prideaux, Sistan Diary, week ending 1 January 1916, IOR: L/P&S/10/210; Prideaux, Sistan Diary, week ending 8 January 1916, IOR: L/P&S/10/210.

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187 –190

277

129. Prideaux telegram to Marling, 3 April 1916, IOR: L/P&S/10/474; Dyer telegram to chief of General Staff, 4 April 1916, IOR: L/P&S/10/475. 130. Prideaux telegram to Grant, 25 April 1916, IOR: L/P&S/10/475. 131. IO Minute on India to IO, 28 July 1916, IOR: L/P&S/10/475; Prideaux, Sistan Diary, week ending 3 June 1916, IOR: L/P&S/10/210. 132. Chelmsford telegram to Chamberlain, 26 July 1916, IOR: L/P&S/10/595. 133. Chelmsford telegram private to Chamberlain, 25 July 1916, IOR: L/P&S/10/595. 134. Hirtzel, Minute, 27 July 1916, IOR: L/P&S/10/595. 135. Curzon, ‘Nushki-Seistan Railway’, 17 August 1916, IOR: L/P&S/10/595. 136. Greaves, ‘Sistan in British Indian Foreign Policy’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 49/1 (1986), pp. 100–1; Duff telegram to Robertson, 19 August 1916, IOR: L/P&S/10/595; Chamberlain to Chelmsford, 22 August 1916, IOR: L/P&S/10/595. 137. Ramsay to Grant, 24 October 1916, IOR: L/P&S/10/595. 138. Percy Sykes, A History of Persia ([1915], 2nd ed. London, 1921), vol. 2, pp. 451 – 540; Floreeda Safiri, ‘The South Persian Rifles’ (PhD Diss., University of Edinburgh,1976) and ‘South Persia Rifles’, Encyclopædia Iranica. Available at http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/south-persia-rifles-militia (Accessed 27 October 2015); Olson, Anglo-Iranian Relations during World War I, pp. 153 – 213. 139. Trevor, Bushihr Residency Diary, month of March 1916, FO 248/1128. 140. Floreeda Safiri, ‘South Persia Rifles’, Encyclopædia Iranica. 141. Trevor, Bushihr Residency Diary, month of June 1916, FO 248/1128. 142. Olson, Anglo-Iranian Relations during World War I, pp. 143 – 9. 143. Marling to Grey, 26 August 1916, FO 371/2733. 144. Marling telegram to Sykes, 11 December 1916, FO 371/2985. 145. FO Minute, ‘Advances to Farman Farma’, 10 November 1916, FO 371/2735. 146. Gough telegram to Marling, 11 August 1916, FO 371/2727. 147. Grant telegram to Cox, 17 September 1916, FO 371/2727; Prideaux to India, 14/15 February 1925, IOR: L/P&S/10/548. 148. Marling telegram to Grey, 7 September 1916, FO 371/2727; Trevor, Bushihr Diary, week ending 9 September 1916, FO 248/1128; Trevor, Bushihr Diary, week ending 16 September 1916, FO 248/1128; Trevor, Bushihr Diary, week ending 23 September 1916, FO 248/1128. 149. Qavam al-Mulk to Darya Baygi (trans.), 8 Zi Qa‘dah, 1334/6 September 1916, IOR: L/P&S/10/612 in BIPP, fiche 109, part X, no. 47. 150. Marling telegram to Grey, 20 September 1916, FO 371/2727; Marling to Grey, 11 October 1916, FO 371/2733; Trevor, Bushihr Diary, week ending 23 September 1916, FO 248/1128. 151. Trevor, Bushihr Diary, week ending 30 September 1916, FO 248/1128; Trevor, Bushihr Diary, week ending 7 October 1916, FO 248/1128; Marling telegram to Cox, 23 September 1916, FO 371/2727; ‘Administration Report for Fars and Bushire for the year 1916’, in PGAR, vol. 7.

278 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158.

159.

160. 161. 162. 163. 164.

165.

166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171.

NOTES

TO PAGES

190 –192

Gough telegram to Marling, 27 September 1916, FO 371/2727. Gough telegram to Grant, 11 December 1916, FO 371/2985. Gough telegram to Marling, 27 December 1916, FO 371/2985. Sykes telegram to Marling, 15 November 1916, FO 371/2985. Marling telegram to Sykes, 11 December 1916, FO 371/2985. Trevor, Bushihr Residency Diary, month of November 1916, FO 248/1128; Gough telegram to Marling, 8 November 1916, FO 371/2727. Gough telegram to Marling, 31 October 1916, FO 371/2727; Gough telegram to Marling, 3 November 1916, FO 371/2727; Gough telegram to Marling, 18 November 1916, FO 371/2985; Trevor telegram to Gough, 20 November 1916, FO 371/2985; Marling telegram to Grant, 20 November 1916, FO 371/2985; Trevor to Cox, 26 November 1916, FO 371/2985; Gough telegram to Marling, 26 November 1916, FO 371/2985; Grant telegram to Gough, 5 December 1916, FO 371/2985; Gough telegram to Grant, 28 December 1916, FO 371/2985; Gough telegram to Marling, 31 December 1916, FO 371/2985. Trevor, Bushihr Residency Diary, month of August 1916, FO 248/1128; ‘Administration Report for Fars and Bushire for the Year 1916’, in PGAR, vol. 7. Chelmsford telegram to IO, 24 November 1916, FO 371/2729; Cox telegram to Marling, 28 November 1916, FO 248/1128. Sykes telegram to Marling, 23 November 1916, FO 248/1128. Gough telegram to Grant, 13 December 1916, FO 248/1128. Marling telegram to Gough, 14 December 1916, FO 248/1128. Farman Farma telegram to Vusuq al-Dawlah, 26 Safar 1335/22 December 1916 in Mansur Nasiri Tayyibi (ed.), Nabard-i Qashqa’iha ba Ingilisiha dar Jang-i Jahani-i Avval bih Rivayat-i Asnad (Shiraz, 1389 SH/ 2010), p. 49; Trevor, Bushihr Residency Diary, month of December 1916, FO 248/1128. Farman Farma telegram to Interior Ministry, 1 Rabi‘ I 1335/26 December 1916, in Nasiri Tayyibi (ed.), Nabard-i Qashqa’iha ba Ingilisiha, pp. 50 – 1; Sykes telegram to Grant, 26 December 1916, FO 371/2985; Gough telegram to Marling, 27 December 1916, FO 371/2985. ‘Islah’ (Muhammad Riza Dirisi), Kazirun Communique´ (trans.), 2 Rabi‘ I 1335/27 December 1916, FO 371/2987. Sykes telegram to Grant, 31 December 1916, FO 371/2985. Robertson to IO, 25 December 1916, FO 371/2981. Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 20 January 1917, FO 248/1162. Marling telegram to Balfour, 23 January 1917, FO 248/1162; Balfour telegram to Marling, 29 January 1917, FO 248/1162. Vusuq al-Dawlah to Marling (trans.), 1 March 1917, FO 371/2983; Vusuq alDawlah telegram to Farman Farma (trans.), 15 March 1917, FO 371/2983; Marling telegram to Balfour, 20 March 1917, FO 371/2985; Olson, AngloIranian Relations during World War I, pp. 176– 7.

NOTES

TO PAGES

192 –200

279

172. Sykes telegram to chief of General Staff, 10 January 1917, FO 371/2985; Marling telegram to Balfour, 11 January 1917, FO 371/2985. 173. Orton, ‘Memorandum on the Military Situation in Southern Persia’, 17 July 1917, FO 371/2987. 174. Gough telegram to Marling, 20 January 1917, FO 371/2985; Trevor telegram to Cox, 14 March 1917, FO 371/2985. 175. ‘Agreement with His Excellency Sardar Ashair Soulet-ud-Dauleh by Brigadier-General Sir P. M. Sykes K.C.I.E., C.M.G. and Colonel Gough, His Majesty’s Consul, Shiraz, on the 24 May 1917’, FO 371/2986. 176. Safiri, ‘The South Persian Rifles’, p. 246; Foreign Ministry to Iranian Embassy in London, 18 Sha‘ban 1335/9 June 1917, in Nasiri Tayyibi (ed.), Nabard-i Qashqa’iha ba Ingilisiha, pp. 62 – 3. 177. Chelmsford to IO, 19 November 1917, FO 371/2988. 178. Hirztel private to Cox, 1 October 1916, Cox Mss., 4/3. 179. Cox telegram to Balfour, 1 March 1917, FO 371/2979.

Chapter 7 The Road to Tehran: The End of British Imperialism in Southern Iran 1. Olson, Anglo-Iranian Relations during World War I, pp. 177 – 256; Houshang Sabahi, British Policy in Persia, 1918– 1925 (London, 1990); Sirus Ghani, Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah: from Qajar Collapse to Pahlavi Rule (London, 1998); Frederick Stanwood, War, Revolution and British Imperialism in Central Asia (London, 1983); Nasrollah Saifpour Fatemi, Diplomatic History of Persia 1917– 1923: Anglo-Russian Power Politics in Iran (New York, 1952); Homa Katouzian, ‘The campaign against the Anglo-Iranian agreement of 1919’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 25/1 (May 1998), pp. 5 – 46. 2. Trotsky to [Iranian] Minister Plenipotentiary, 14 January 1918, in Fatemi, Diplomatic History of Persia 1917– 1923, pp. 325– 6; Marling telegram to FO, 23 January 1918, FO 371/3266. 3. Stanwood, War, Revolution and British Imperialism in Central Asia, pp. 31 –2. 4. L. C. Dunsterville, The Adventures of Dunsterforce (London, 1920). 5. Marling telegram to Balfour, 31 May 1917, FO 371/2986. 6. Olson, Anglo-Iranian Relations during World War I, pp. 66, 171. 7. Stanwood, War, Revolution and British Imperialism in Central Asia, pp. 18 – 37; Olson, Anglo-Iranian Relations during World War I, pp. 180– 6. 8. Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 25 June 1917, FO 371/2983, as quoted in Olson, Anglo-Iranian Relations during World War I, p. 181. 9. Stanwood, War, Revolution and British Imperialism in Central Asia, pp. 28 – 40. 10. FO telegram to Marling, 23 October 1917, IOR: L/P&S/10/725; Marling telegram to FO, 26 December 1917, IOR: L/P&S/10/725. 11. Montagu telegram to Chelmsford, 1 January 1918, IOR: L/P&S/10/725; Chelmsford telegram to Montagu, 4 January 1918, IOR: L/P&S/10/725.

280

NOTES

TO PAGES

200 –206

12. Gould to India, 7 October 1920, IOR: L/P&S/10/748; Chelmsford telegram to Montagu, 1 March 1918, IOR: L/P&S/10/748; Marling telegram to FO, 15 March 1918, IOR: L/P&S/10/725. 13. Prideaux telegram to Grant, 3 January 1918, FO 371/3266. 14. Marling telegram to Grant, 13 March 1918, IOR: L/P&S/10/725; Luft, ‘British policy in eastern Iran during World War I’, in Bast (ed.), La Perse et la Grande Guerre, p. 73. 15. Moberly, Operations in Persia, p. 478. 16. Gould to India, 7 October 1920, IOR: L/P&S/10/748. 17. Luft, ‘British policy in eastern Iran during World War I’, in Bast (ed.), La Perse et la Grande Guerre, pp. 73 – 4; Grey to Grant, 19 July 1918, IOR: L/P&S/10/748. 18. Gould to India, 7 October 1920, IOR: L/P&S/10/748. 19. Chelmsford telegram to Montagu, 29 June 1917, IOR: L/P&S/10/595. 20. Gould, Sistan Diary, week ending 15 February 1919, IOR: L/P&S/10/211. 21. Marling telegram to Balfour, 12 February 1918, FO 371/3258. 22. Marling telegram to FO, 26 February 1918, FO 371/3266; see also Olson, Anglo-Iranian Relations during World War I, pp. 197–9. 23. Stanwood, War, Revolution and British Imperialism in Central Asia, pp. 93 – 103. 24. Balfour telegram to Marling, 7 March 1918, FO 371/3259. 25. Marling telegram to FO, 21 March 1918, FO 371/3266. 26. Stokes telegram to director of Military Intelligence, 25 March 1918, FO 371/3266. 27. Moberly, Operations in Persia, pp. 303– 43; Beck, Qashqa’i of Iran, pp. 117– 20; Pierre Oberling, The Qashqa’i Nomads of Fars, pp. 138 – 47; Sykes, History of Persia, vol. 2, pp. 499– 518; Safiri, ‘The South Persian Rifles’, pp. 235 –300. 28. Sykes telegram to chief of General Staff, 29 May 1918, FO 371/3266. 29. Gough, ‘Report on the recent trouble with Soulat-ed-Douleh and the Kashqais’ [22 July 1918], FO 371/3263; Farman Farma to Interior Ministry, 8 Sha‘ban 1336/19 May 1918, in Nasiri Tayyibi (ed.), Nabard-i Qashqa’iha ba Ingilisiha, p. 72. 30. Gough, ‘Report on the recent trouble with Soulat-ed-Douleh and the Kashqais’ [22 July 1918], FO 371/3263. 31. Chelmsford telegram to IO, 6 June 1918, FO 371/3260. 32. Gough to Grant, 22 July 1918, FO 371/3263. 33. Ayaz Kikha Khan to the deputy governor of Liravi (trans.), 8 Rabi‘ II 1336/21 January 1918, FO 371/3263. 34. Sykes telegram to Marling, 6 April 1918, IOR: L/P&S/10/613 in BIPP, fiche 118, part XIX, no. 67; Sykes telegram to Marling, 14 April 1918, IOR: L/ P&S/10/613 in BIPP, fiche 118, part XIX, no. 84. 35. Safiri, ‘The South Persian Rifles’, pp. 241– 3 and 258– 9. 36. As quoted in Sykes, History of Persia, vol. 2, p. 502.

NOTES

TO PAGES

206 –210

281

37. Sawlat al-Dawlah telegram to Samsam al-Saltanah, 22 Sha‘ban 1336/2 June 1918, in Nasiri Tayyibi (ed.), Nabard-i Qashqa’iha ba Ingilisiha, pp. 100 –2. 38. Gough telegram to Marling, 3 June 1918, FO 371/3266. 39. Beck, Qashqa’is of Iran, pp. 102– 3. 40. Gough telegram to Marling, 9 June 1918, FO 371/3266; Gough, ‘Report on the recent trouble with Soulat-ed-Douleh and the Kashqais’ [22 July 1918], FO 371/3263. 41. Provincial Committee of the Democrat Party of Fars two letters to Sawlat alDawlah, 5 Ramazan 1336/14 June 1918, in Nasiri Tayyibi (ed.), Nabard-i Qashqa’iha ba Ingilisiha, pp. 119– 20. 42. Mansoureh Ettehadieh, Ghulam Riza Salami and Isma‘il Shams, ‘Abd al-Husayn Mirza Farman Farma: Zamanah va Karnamah-i Siyasi va Ijtima‘i (Tehran, 1383 SH/ 2004), vol. 2, p. 396. 43. Ibid., pp. 350, 384– 5 and 390– 1. 44. Farman Farma telegram to the Interior Ministry, 25 Sha‘ban 1336/5 June 1918, in Nasiri Tayyibi (ed.), Nabard-i Qashqa’iha ba Ingilisiha, p. 108. 45. Marling telegram to FO, 6 June 1918, FO 371/3260; Marling telegram to FO, 16 June 1918, FO 371/3260. 46. FO telegram to Marling, 23 June 1918, FO 371/3260. 47. Sykes telegram to chief of General Staff, 3 June 1918, FO 371/3266. 48. Chief of General Staff telegram to Sykes, 4 June 1918, FO 371/3266. 49. Gough, ‘Report on the recent trouble with Soulat-ed-Douleh and the Kashqais’ [22 July 1918], FO 371/3263. 50. Gough to Grant, 22 July 1918, FO 371/3263. 51. Gough, ‘Report on the recent trouble with Soulat-ed-Douleh and the Kashqais’ [22 July 1918], FO 371/3263; see also Ettehadieh et al., ‘Abd alHusayn Mirza Farman Farma, vol. 2, p. 396. 52. Gough telegram to Marling, 6 June 1918, FO 371/3266. 53. Gough, ‘Report on the recent trouble with Soulat-ed-Douleh and the Kashqais’ [22 July 1918], FO 371/3263. 54. Gough telegram to Grant, 12 August 1918, FO 371/3263. 55. Qavam al-Mulk to Sardar Ihtisham and Salar-i Hishmat (trans.), 2 July 1918, FO 371/3263; Sardar Ihtisham and Salar-i Hishmat [to Qavam al-Mulk] (trans.), 2 July 1918, FO 371/3263. 56. Beck, Qashqa’is of Iran, p. 128. 57. Olson, Anglo-Iranian Relations during World War I, p. 186. This estimate is probably a little high. In December 1918, a treasury estimate put the figure at £290,000 per month, or almost £3.5 million per year; Sabahi, British Policy in Persia, p. 41. 58. Sykes telegram to chief of General Staff, 29 May 1918, FO 371/3266. 59. Sykes telegram to chief of General Staff, 7 August 1918, FO 371/3263. 60. Gough, ‘Note on the Future of the South Persia Rifles’, 24 September 1918, IOR: L/P&S/10/614 in BIPP, fiche 121, part XXII, no. 169.

282

NOTES

TO PAGES

210 –216

61. For the composition of the Bushire Field Force, see Moberly, Operations in Persia, pp. 377, 480. 62. Chief of General Staff telegram to Douglas, 25 July 1918, IOR: L/P&S/10/613 in BIPP, fiche 121, part XXI, no. 145; Douglas telegram to chief of General Staff, 14 August 1918, FO 371/3263. 63. Chief of General Staff telegram Douglas, 25 September 1918, FO 371/3263. 64. Grant telegram to Bill, 23 September 1918, FO 371/3263. 65. Douglas telegram to chief of General Staff, 28 September 1918, FO 371/3263. 66. ‘Administration Report for Fars and Bushire for the Year 1918’, and ‘Administration Report for Fars and Bushire for the Year 1919’, in PGAR, vol. 7. 67. Philip Graves, Life of Sir Percy Cox (London, 1941), pp. 207– 9. 68. Ibid., pp. 237– 41. 69. Sabahi, British Policy in Persia, p. 40. 70. Temple, ‘Report of a Commercial Survey of the East Persia Trade Route between Quetta and Meshed, 1919’, IOR: L/P&S/10/892. 71. Cox to India, 11 September 1917, FO 371/2989. 72. Noel telegram to Marling, 23 March 1917, IOR: L/P&S/10/612 in BIPP, fiche 113, part XIII, no. 130; ‘Administration Report for the Ahwaz Vice-Consulate for the Year 1917’, and ‘Administration Report for the Ahwaz Vice-Consulate for the Year 1918’, in PGAR, vol. 7. 73. Marling telegram to Balfour, 3 August 1918, FO 371/3263. 74. Cox telegram to FO, 23 September 1918, FO 371/3263. 75. Cox telegram to FO, 14 October 1918, FO 371/3263. 76. Cox telegram to FO, 29 October 1918, FO 371/3262. 77. Olson, Anglo-Iranian Relations during World War I, p. 211; see also Moberly, Operations in Persia, pp. 382– 3. 78. Cox telegram to FO, 14 November 1918, FO 371/3858. 79. Cox telegram to FO, 27 November 1918, FO 371/3858. 80. Cox telegram to FO, 26 November 1918, FO 371/3858. 81. Olson, Anglo-Iranian Relations during World War I, pp. 220– 4. 82. FO telegram to Cox, 11 January, 1919, FO 371/3858 83. Cox telegram to FO, 13 January 1919, FO 371/3858. 84. Cox telegram to Chelmsford (addressed FO), 25 February 1919, IOR: L/P&S/10/614 in BIPP, fiche 124, part XXIV, no.133. 85. Oliver Bast, ‘Putting the record straight: Vosuq al-Dowleh’s foreign policy in 1918/19’, in Touraj Atabaki and Erik J. Zu¨rcher (eds), Men of Order: Authoritarian Modernization under Atatu¨rk and Reza Shah (London, 2004), p. 271. 86. Bill telegram to Cox, 26 December 1919, FO 371/3859. 87. Hotson telegram to Cox, 4 January 1919, FO 371/3859. 88. Cox telegram to FO, 16 January 1919, FO 371/3858.

NOTES

TO PAGES

216 –220

283

89. Keynes, ‘The Cost of Existing Policy in Persia’, [December 1918], FO 371/3263. 90. Cox telegram to FO, 19 January 1919, FO 371/3858. 91. Trevor, Announcement, 1 Rabi‘ II 1338/24 December 1919, in Ruknzadah Adamiyat, Fars va Jang-i Bayn Milal, vol. 2, pp. 183– 4. 92. Satia, Spies in Arabia, pp. 239– 62. 93. Hotson telegram to Cox, 5 January 1919, FO 371/3859. 94. Grant telegram to Montagu, 10 January 1919, FO 248/1228; Bill telegram to Cox, 1 February 1919, FO 371/3860; Grant telegram to Douglas, 22 February 1919, IOR: L/P&S/10/614 in BIPP, fiche 124, part XXIV, no. 122. 95. Cox telegram to FO, 19 January 1919, FO 371/3858; Cox telegram to FO, 14 March 1919, FO 371/3861. 96. Bill telegram to Grant, 3 March 1919, FO 371/3861. 97. Bill telegram to Grant (addressed Douglas), 29 March 1919, IOR: L/P&S/10/614 in BIPP, fiche 124, part XXV, no. 14. 98. Cox telegram to Grant, 6 April 1919, FO 371/3861. 99. Cox telegrams to FO, 10 April 1919, FO 371/3861. 100. Cox telegram to Curzon, 11 April 1919, FO 371/3860. 101. Cox to Grant, 17 April 1919, FO 371/3861. 102. ‘Administration Report for Fars and Bushire for the Year 1919’ and ‘Administration Report for Fars and Bushire for the Year 1920’, in PGAR, vol. 7. 103. Imperial General Staff telegram to Douglas, 25 April 1919, IOR: L/P&S/10/614 in BIPP, fiche 125, part XXV, no. 99. 104. Bill telegram to Grant, 4 May 1919, IOR: L/P&S/10/614 in BIPP, fiche 125, part XXV, no. 120; Cox telegram to FO, 10 May 1919, FO 371/3860; Elsmie telegram to Grant, 1 June 1919, FO 371/3861. 105. Hotson telegram to Grant, 13 April 1919, IOR: L/P&S/10/614 in BIPP, fiche 125, part XXV, no. 56; Hotson telegram to Cox, 3 June 1919, FO 371/3861. 106. ‘Administration Report for Fars and Bushire for the Year 1920’, and ‘Administration Report for Fars and Bushire for the Year 1921’, in PGAR, vol. 7. 107. Curzon, Memorandum, 9 August 1919, FO 371/3862. 108. As quoted in Harold Nicolson, Curzon: The Last Phase 1919– 1925, a Study in Post-War Diplomacy (Boston, MA, 1934), p. 138; David Gilmour, Curzon: Imperial Statesman ([London 1994], repr. New York, 2003), pp. 516, 645. Gilmour indicates that this letter was dated 17 August 1919. 109. Cox telegram to Curzon, 22 August 1919, FO 371/3863. 110. Katouzian, ‘The campaign against the Anglo-Iranian agreement of 1919’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 25/1 (May 1998), p. 8. 111. Ross, ‘Lord Curzon and E. G. Browne confront the “Persian Question”’, The Historical Journal 52/2 (2009), pp. 385– 411.

284

NOTES

TO PAGES

220 –231

112. Gilmour, Curzon: Imperial Statesman, pp. 518– 19; Olson, Anglo-Iranian Relations during World War I, pp. 248– 9, 256. 113. Ghani, Iran and the Rise of Reza Khan, p. 51. 114. Olson, Anglo-Iranian Relations during World War I, pp. 248 – 9. 115. Ibid., pp. 246– 7. 116. John Gallagher, ‘Nationalisms and the Crisis of Empire, 1919– 1922’, in Modern Asian Studies 15/3, ‘Power, Profit and Politics: Essays on Imperialism, Nationalism and Change in Twentieth Century India’ (1981), pp. 355 – 68; David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace (New York, 1989), pp. 415 –62. 117. Fatemi, Diplomatic History of Persia, pp. 150– 90. 118. Sabahi, British Policy in Persia, pp. 71–82; Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, pp. 458 –9. 119. Cox telegram to Chelmsford (addressed FO), 17 January 1920, IOR: L/P&S/10/614 in BIPP, fiche 127, part XXVII, no. 114. 120. Ironside, High Road to Command: the Diaries of Major-General Sir Edmund Ironside 1920– 22 (London, 1972), pp. 155 and 163; see also John C. Cairns, ‘Ironside (William) Edmund, first Baron Ironside (1880 –1959)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. Available at http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/ article/34113 (accessed 24 July 2009); Sabahi, British Policy in Persia, p. 50. 121. Sabahi, British Policy in Persia, pp. 53–5. 122. ‘Memorandum by G. P. Churchill, Foreign Office, 20 December 1920’, in Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919– 1939 (London, 1946– ), vol. 13, no. 616. 123. Cox telegram to Montagu, 29 January 1921, in Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919– 1939, vol. 13, no. 668. 124. Ironside, High Road to Command, p. 149; Ghani, Iran and the Rise of Reza Khan, p. 147. 125. Ironside, High Road to Command, p. 178. 126. Ghani, Iran and the Rise of Reza Khan, pp. 154–5. 127. Michael P. Zirinsky, ‘Imperial Power and Dictatorship: Britain and the Rise of Riza Shah, 1921– 1926’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 24/4 (November 1992), pp. 645– 6; Stephanie Cronin, ‘Britain, the Iranian military and the rise of Reza Khan’, in Vanessa Martin (ed.), Anglo-Iranian Relations since 1800 (London, 2005), pp. 119– 24. 128. ‘Administration Report for Fars and Bushire for 1922’, in PGAR, vol. 7. 129. Ibid. 130. Riza Khan to Mushir al-Mulk (trans.), 12 March 1925, IOR: L/ P&S/10/748.

Conclusion 1. Ahmad Ashraf, ‘Conspiracy Theories’, Encyclopædia Iranica, vol. VI/2, pp. 137– 48. Available at http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/conspiracy-theories

NOTES

2.

3. 4. 5. 6.

TO PAGES

231 – 236

285

(accessed 13 September 2015); Houchang Chehabi, ‘The paranoid style in Iranian politics’, in Atabaki (ed.), Iran in the 20th Century, pp. 155–76; Abbas Amanat, ‘Through the Persian eye: Anglophilia and Anglophobia in modern Iranian history’, in Amanat and Vejdani (eds), Iran Facing Others, pp. 125–49. Rudi Matthee, ‘Between sympathy and enmity: Nineteenth-century Iranian views of the British and Russians’, in Beate Eschment and Hans Harder (eds), Looking at the Coloniser: Cross-Cultural Perceptions in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Bengal, and Related Areas (Wurzburg, 2004), pp. 327– 33; Matthee, ‘Facing a rude and barbarous neighbor: Iranian perceptions of Russia and the Russians from the Safavids to the Qajars’, in Amanat and Vejdani (eds), Iran Facing Others, pp. 99 – 123. Said Amir Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran (Oxford, 1988), pp. 173– 4. John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, ‘The imperialism of free trade’, Economic History Review, 2nd ser., 6/1 (1953), p. 6. Iranian Note (trans.), January 12/13, 1952, in The Times, 14 January 1952, p. 4, col. D. The Times, 17 January 1952, p. 5, col. C.

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Saunders, David, Russia in the Age of Reaction and Reform 1801– 1881 (New York, 1992). Shahnavaz, Shahbaz, Britain and the Opening up of South-West Persia, 1890– 1914: A Study of Imperialism and Economic Dependence (New York, 2005). Sheikholeslami, A. Reza, Structure of Central Authority in Qajar Iran, 1871– 1896 (Atlanta, GA, 1997). Siegel, Jennifer, Endgame: Britain, Russia, and the Final Struggle for Central Asia (London, 2002). Simpson, St John, ‘Making their mark: Foreign travellers at Persepolis’, ARTA 2005.01 Available at https://archive.org/details/MakingTheirMarksForeign TravelerAtPersepolis (accessed 19 June 2015). Stanwood, Frederick, War, Revolution and British Imperialism in Central Asia (London, 1983). Strunk, William T., ‘The Reign of Shaykh Khaz‘al ibn Jabir and the Suppression of the Principality of ‘Arabistan: A Study in British Imperialism in Southwestern Iran, 1897– 1925’ (PhD Diss., University of Indiana, 1977). Sulaymani, Karim, Alqab-i Rijal-i Dawrah-i Qajariyah (Tehran, 1379 SH /2000). Sykes, Christopher, Wassmuss (London, 1936). Tavakoli-Targhi, Mohamad, Refashioning Iran: Orientalism, Occidentalism, and Historiography (New York, 2001). Thornton, A. P., The Imperial Idea and its Enemies: A Study in British Power (London, 1959). Townsend, John, Proconsul to the Middle East: Sir Percy Cox and the End of Empire (London, 2010). Trevelyan, G. M., Grey of Fallodon: The Life and Letters of Sir Edward Grey, afterwards Viscount Grey of Fallodon (Boston, 1937). Tripodi, Christian, Edge of Empire: The British Political Officer and Tribal Administration on the North-West Frontier 1877– 1947 (Farnham, 2011). Tsadik, Daniel, ‘Jews in the Pre-Constitutional Years: The Shiraz Incident of 1905’, Iranian Studies 43/2 (2010), pp. 239–63. Ullman, Richard H., Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917– 1921, 3 vols (Princeton, NJ, 1961– 1972). Vejdani, Farzin, Making History in Iran: Education, Nationalism, and Print Culture (Stanford, CA, 2015). Walcher, Heidi A., In the Shadow of the King: Zill Al-Sultan and Isfahan Under the Qajars (London, 2008). Wienroth, Howard S., ‘British Radicals and the Balance of Power, 1902– 1914’, Historical Journal 13/4 (December 1970), pp. 653– 82. Wright, Denis, The English Amongst the Persians: Imperial Lives in Nineteenth-Century Iran ([1977], repr. London, 2001). Wynn, Antony, Persia in the Great Game: Sir Percy Sykes – Explorer, Consul, Soldier, Spy (London, 2003). Yapp, Malcolm, Strategies of British India: Britain, Iran, and Afghanistan 1798– 1850 (Oxford, 1980). Zetland, Lawrence J. L. D. (Earl of Ronaldshay), The Life of Lord Curzon: Being the Authorized Biography of George Nathaniel, Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, K.G., 3 vols (London, 1928).

INDEX

Abadan, 117, 144, 171 ‘Abbas ‘Ali, 64 Afghanistan, 21, 30 –1, 61 –2, 63, 145 Anglo-Russian Convention, 32, 71 –2, 161 German agents, 165, 172, 176 – 7, 181, 188, 193, 198 – 9, 202 Ahmad Akhgar, 180 Ahmad Shah, 178, 189, 213, 223 Ahram, 179, 191, 211 Ahvaz, 56, 141 consuls, 15, 23, 33, 58, 76, 94, 117, 144 World War I, 167, 170 – 1, 175, 194, 213 ‘Ala’ al-Dawlah, Mirza Ahmad Khan, 56, 106, 114, 152 ‘Ali Quli Khan Pasyan, 174, 179 Amery, Leopold, 169 Amin al-Sultan, Mirza ‘Ali Asghar Khan, 13, 45, 48, 73 Atabak-i ‘Azam, as, 49, 83, 118 Anglo-Iranian Treaty (1919), 41, 197 –8, 211 –24, 225 –6, 230, 235

Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC), 142, 161, 222, 224, 229, 230, 233, 235 Bakhtiyaris, 144, 181 –2, 213 facilities, 117, 144, 213 Royal Navy, 35, 144 –5, 234 Shaykh Khaz‘al, 52, 117, 144 World War I, 165 –6, 170 – 1, 234 Anglo-Russian Convention (1907), 5, 29, 41, 83, 150, 228 assessment, 34, 71 –3, 92 – 9, 118 –20, 139, 200, 229, 234 instability, 32, 82, 103, 115, 122, 125, 142 –3, 153, 158 –62 negotiation, 32, 70, 71 –3, 83 revision, 166, 169, 195, 199, 213 –14 anjumans (councils), 107 –8, 111 –12, 119, 121 Arabistan, 58, 79, 97 –9, 114, 129, 134, 135 – 9, 160 –2, 225, 228, 229 consuls, 53, 72

customs, 53, 76 –79, 114 oil, 117, 144 –5, 161 trade, 38, 51, 55, 57, 75, 97, 114, 145 World War I, 165, 167, 169 – 72, 194, 213, 218 see also Ahvaz, Muhammarah, Shaykh Khaz‘al Khan arms trafficking, 42, 60, 45 –6, 145 –7, 173 Asaf al-Dawlah, Hajj Ghulam Riza Khan, 113 –14 Asquith, H. H., 182, 188 Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Kazim Tabataba’i Yazdi, 132 Ayaz Kikha Khan, 204 –5 ‘Ayn al-Dawlah, ‘Abd al-Majid Mirza, 86, 105, 136, 178, 222 Azerbaijan, 7, 13, 29, 128, 159, 199, 212 Baghdad, 112, 212, 222 British campaign, 161, 191, 192, 195 British occupation, 211, 235 Railway, 142 –3 Baharlus, 191 Bakhtiyaris, 25, 27, 58

298

BRITISH IMPERIALISM

Ahvaz –Isfahan road, 57, 58, 127 Constitutional Revolution, 7, 115, 116, 126 –7, 129 – 31 leadership, 7, 23, 24, 26, 58, 61, 123, 140 –1, 222 – 3 levies, 25, 27, 165 oil, 34, 117, 144, 229 World War I, 165, 174, 181 – 2, 194, 213 Balfour, Arthur, 87, 200 Baluch, 30, 65, 67, 94, 96, 134, 136 –8, 185 –6 Baluchistan, 30, 192 British, 21, 27, 58, 61 – 2, 64, 71, 89, 94, 138, 188, 219 Persian, 28, 48, 72, 140, 167 Bandar-i ‘Abbas, 45, 79, 189, 208 consuls, 15, 18, 75, 76, 95, 167 medical services, 80 –1 politics, 111, 146, 224 sphere of influence, 32, 72, 75, 92, 121 trade, 38 –9, 45, 46, 48, 63, 75, 93 Bandar-i Anzali, 212, 221 Bandar-i Lingah, 38 –9, 48, 72, 76, 79 –81, 93, 111, 145, 182 Bani Turuf, 170 –1 Barclay, George, 114, 116, 120, 122, 136, 140, 142 southern roads, 124, 126 – 32, 149, 150 Basra, 53, 57, 112, 139 –40, 142 British occupation, 165, 169 – 71, 234 bast (sanctuary), 99, 104 –6, 113, 119, 130 – 1 Bawi, 170 Belgian officers, see customs Benckendorff, Count, 160

IN QAJAR IRAN

Benn, Edith, 22 Benn, R. A. E., 22, 68, 85 Bill, J. H., 109, 113 –14, 126 –7, 210 –11, 215 –17 Birjand, 32, 92 politics, 62 –3, 88, 119 – 21,135– 8 World War I, 176 –7, 200 Burazjan, 123, 142, 173, 177, 191, 211 Bushihr, 17, 28, 95, 98, 129, 155, 169, 217, 224, 228, 229, 235 arms trafficking, 45 –6 British claims, 44 –5, 48 British troops, 47, 52, 94, 112 – 13, 130 –2, 145 – 6, 148 –9, 165, 173, 175 –6, 177 – 8, 180, 181, 191, 207 –8, 210 – 11, 218 Constitutional Revolution, 103 – 14, 116, 133 consuls, 2, 4, 25, 31, 33, 53, 72, 75, 76, 82, 88, 94 – 5, 159, 167, 168, 170, 172, 175 customs, 73, 77, 79, 157 – 8, 112 –13 quarantines, 50 – 1, 79 –81 trade, 38 –40, 43 –4, 50 – 1, 69 –70, 93, 124 – 5, 142 see also trade routes Bushire Field Force, 210 –12, 216 –18 Butler, Harcourt, 30, 111, 115 Caspian Sea, 13, 202, 212, 214 Caucasus, 29, 36, 121, 215, 232 World War I, 199, 202 – 3, 212 Chaghadak, 211 Chelmsford, Viscount of, 188, 192, 195, 200, 201, 205 Chenevix Trench, G., 21 –2, 64 –9, 82 –4

Chick, H. G., 25 –6, 114, 123 –5 Chirol, Valentine, 31 cholera, 50, 63, 79, 81 see also quarantines Churchill, George, 23, 184, 222 Churchill, Winston, 144, 221 –2 claims: British for damages, 44 – 5, 47 – 8, 52, 124, 134, 137 – 9, 199 Iranian for damages, 214 – 15, 218 Committee of National Defence, 178 conspiracy theories, Iranian, 231 –2 Constitutional Revolution, 2, 3, 6, 16, 92, 98 – 9, 103 –4, 132 –3, 162, 229, 233 Arabistan, 114 –17, 144 Bushihr –Shiraz route, 122 – 32, 193 Fars, 82, 105 –6, 113 –14, 122 – 32, 193 Gulf ports, 104 – 5, 107 – 13 nationalism, 7, 28, 40 Sistan, 118 –22 Cossack Brigade, Iranian, 159, 189, 199, 214, 220, 223 Cox, Percy: Anglo-Iranian Treaty, 197, 211 – 23, 226, 230 Bushihr customs, 37, 80 – 1, 112 –13, 157 constitutional Bushihr, 104 – 113, 133 Iraq, 4, 170, 195, 235 medical services, 80 –2 ‘Policing the Gulf’, 145 – 7, 154 political resident/consul general, 4, 31, 60, 72, 76, 82, 159, 195

INDEX Shaykh Khaz‘al, 82, 114 – 17, 133, 134, 140 – 5, 170 –2, 229 southern roads, 82, 109, 114, 124 –31, 133, 148 – 9, 150 –4, 211, 235 World War I, 159, 170 – 2, 174, 177, 181 –2, 191, 211 Curzon, Lord George: Anglo-Iranian Treaty, 41, 197 – 8, 211 –22, 225, 230, 235 Anglo-Russian Convention, 29, 32, 41, 72, 92, 98 consuls and political officers, 12, 15, 31, 58, 76, 82 Eastern Committee, 197 – 8, 200, 202 – 3, 207, 211, 213 –14, 216 Persia and the Persian Question, 11, 14, 15, 17, 29, 31, 34, 36, 41 Sistan, 22, 42, 62, 63 –4, 83, 85 –7, 93, 188 tribal policy, 58, 78 customs: Arabistan, 53 –4, 76 –9, 114, 116, 121 Belgian officers, 36, 76 –7, 79 – 80, 83, 89, 91, 105, 107 – 8, 150, 153, 158 duties, 35, 36 –7, 53, 64 farming, 17, 35 – 6, 45, 53, 76 Gulf ports, 73, 79, 80 –1, 112 – 13, 126, 128, 133, 145, 150, 157 –8, 177 regulations, 79, 90, 95, 103, 104 –7 revenues, 79, 116, 121, 150, 157 –8, 177 statistics, 36 tariffs, 36 –7, 74, 79, 199, 215, 218

Dalbandian, 63, 188, 201 Dale, G. A., 176 –7 D’Arcy, William, 33, 61, 74, 144 see also Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) Darrashuris, 204, 206 see also Ayaz Kikha Khan, Qashqa’is Darya Baygi, Mirza Ahmad Khan, 80, 107 –8, 111 –13, 152, 177, 189 –90 Dashti, 175, 204, 206 Dasht-i Arjan, 44, 191 Dashtistan, 175, 204, 206 Daukes, C. T., 90 –1 Democrat Party, 7, 21, 173–4, 177–80, 199, 207, 220 Discount and Loan Bank (Russian), 51, 73, 142, 159 Sistan, 84, 87 –8, 91, 95, 97, 118 –19, 139 Dizful, 58 –60, 143, 213 Dobbs, Henry, 85 – 7, 211, 235 Douglas, J. A., 25, 27, 58, 60, 132, 210 Dunsterville mission, 199 –200, 202 Durand, Mortimer, 29, 31, 40, 47 –8, 73, 77 consular proposals, 14 –15, 21 levy proposals, 27 Sistan, 62 –3 Dyer, Reginald, 187 Eastern Committee, see Curzon East Persia Cordon, 177, 181, 188 East Persia Cordon Field Force, 200, 212, 216 Edwardes, Herbert, 26 –7 Farman Farma, ‘Abd alHusayn Mirza, 60, 178, 182

299 Fars, 26, 184, 189 –93, 194, 204, 215 Qashqa’i rising (1918), 206 – 10, 215, 218 – 19, 225 Farman Farma, Firuz Mirza, 28 Fars 7, 98, 134 –5, 160 –2, 226, 229, 235 consuls, 38, 72 politics, 42, 49 –52, 82, 103 – 6, 108, 110, 113, 114, 123, 126, 128 – 33, 147 – 58 trade, 38, 124 tribes, 24 –5, 42, 47, 50 – 2, 123 World War I, 26, 167, 169, 172 – 4, 178 –9, 181 –4, 185, 189 –93, 194, 198, 203 – 10, 212, 216, 217 – 18, 221, 230 see also Khamsahs, Qashqa’is, Shiraz, trade routes Farsnamah-i Nasiri, 25 –6, 28 Fath al-Mulk, Muhammad Hasan Khan, 183 –4, 190 Fazaldad Khan, Duffadar, 33 Foreign Department, India, 14, 29, 30, 60, 63, 111, 115, 122, 132, 148, 170, 182, 211 political officers, 2, 4, 12, 15, 19 –20, 30 –1, 34, 58, 76, 181, 211 Foreign Office, Britain, 13, 31, 87, 90, 199, 222 consuls, 15, 49, 76 policy, 35, 41, 115, 125, 128, 129, 132, 139, 148, 160, 193 gendarmerie: formation, 126, 128 –9 southern roads, 135, 149 – 52, 154 –61, 193, 204, 235

300

BRITISH IMPERIALISM

World War I, 174, 177, 179 – 80, 181, 183, 190, 192, 220, 223 Germany, 6, 72, 82, 121, 123, 128, 142, 143, 155, 162, 233 Arabistan, 115, 117, 145 Baghdad Railway, 123, 143 Persian Gulf, 35, 40, 112, 117, 123 World War I, 165 –9, 172 – 86, 188, 191, 193 – 5, 197, 202 – 3, 212, 229, 231, 235 Ghazanfar al-Saltanah, Muhammad Khan Burazjani, 123, 173, 175, 191, 211, 217, 219 Gilan, 7, 29, 202, 212, 221 Gorringe, G. F., 171 Gough, Hugh, 184, 189 –91, 193, 204 –10, 215, 225 Grahame, Thomas, 49 –51, 69, 105 –6, 108 –9, 113, 126, 155, 178 Grant, A. H., 211 Grant Duff, Evelyn, 86 Grey, Edward, 74, 90, 106, 115 –17, 139 Anglo-Russian Convention, 32, 72, 92, 95, 98 – 9, 120, 121 –2, 153, 154, 159, 160 southern roads, 125, 128, 131 – 2, 148, 153, 156 World War I, 167, 176, 184 Haji Ra’is al-Tujjar, 78, 144 Hamadan, 21, 31, 40, 60, 175, 202, 212 Hamilton, Lord George, 29, 83 Hardinge, Arthur, 22, 49 –51, 74, 81 Sistan, 29, 83 –4, 87 –8, 96 – 7 tribal policy, 27, 58, 78, 96 – 7

IN QAJAR IRAN

Hardinge, Charles: charge´ d’affaires, 45 –7, 57 Eastern Committee, 200 Viceroy of India, 122, 130, 148 – 9, 160, 167 – 8, 170, 172, 174, 186, 195 Hasan Fasa’i, 25, 28 Hazaras, 176, 185, 201 Hirtzel, Arthur, 121, 188, 195, 200 Hishmat al-Mulk, Amir ‘Ali Akbar Khan: Anglo-Russian rivalry, 21 – 2, 62 –9, 73, 82 – 9, 96 –8 family rivalries, 62, 118 – 21, 135 –9 Husam al-Dawlah, as, 119, 135, 138 Hishmat al-Mulk, Amir Ma‘sum Khan, 22, 88, 90 –1, 119, 135 –9 Husam al-Dawlah, as, 184 – 5 Hotson, E. B., 215 –18 Ihtisham al-Vizarah, 89 Imperial Bank of Persia (IBP), 40, 58, 142, 169, 191, 219, 222 branches, 83 –4, 93, 121, 132, 142, 154, 179 –80 loans, 73, 87 – 8, 97, 119 – 20, 128, 141, 150, 157 Indian Expeditionary Force D (IEFD), 4, 165, 169 –71 Indian Medical Service (IMS), 50, 90 India Office, London, 13, 29, 63, 115, 121, 131 –2, 160, 172, 187, 188, 200, 216, 220, 222 Indo-European Telegraph Department (IETD), 40, 44, 47, 54, 89 –90, 93, 106, 126, 142, 179

Intelligence Branch, India, 4, 25, 33 –4 Iraq, 31, 123, 140, 148, 214, 217 –18 British invasion, 4, 165 – 6, 180, 181, 194, 198, 203, 211, 214 postwar British ambitions, 169, 171, 195, 211, 217, 221 – 2, 230, 233 – 5 see also Baghdad, Basra, Mesopotamia, Ottoman Empire Ironside, Edmund, 222 –3 Isfahan, 15, 21, 75, 127, 141 British troops, 127, 130 – 2 politics, 105 spheres of influence, 31 –2, 72, 125, 159 –60, 222 trade, 27, 38, 43 – 4, 51, 52, 57 – 8, 61, 125, 127, 128, 141 –2, 150, 155, 229 World War I, 172, 175 – 6, 178, 182, 184, 190, 194, 213 Islam, 6, 16, 17, 23, 24, 232 anti-imperialism, 8, 80, 98, 108, 132, 166, 173, 175, 178, 180, 192, 194, 205–6 Izvolsky, Alexander, 32, 71, 93, 95 Jangalis, 7, 202, 212, 222 karguzars, 17 –18, 169 Bushihr, 17, 48, 75, 107 Muhammarah, 53, 54, 140 Nusratabad, 69, 83, 95 Shiraz, 105 –6 Karun River, 27, 42, 51, 52 –9, 69 –70, 72, 76 –9, 114, 116, 154 see also Arabistan, Muhammarah, trade routes

INDEX Kashkulis, 44, 132, 145, 149, 208 see also Muhammad ‘Ali Khan Kashkuli, Qashqa’is Kazirun, 149, 151, 153, 155, 191 –3, 204, 208, 210 –11, 218 see also Nasir-i Divan Kelly, J. B., 90, 119 Kemball, Charles, 76 –7, 80 Kennion, R. L., 91, 118 –21, 171 –2 Keynes, John Maynard, 216 Khamsahs, 25 –6, 47, 156, 180, 183, 191, 209 Qashqa’i rivalry, 49, 104, 123, 130 –2, 152 see also Fars, Qavam al-Mulk, Shiraz Khanah-i Zinian, 204, 206, 208 Khanaqin, 32, 92, 212, 221 Khurasan, 13, 61, 66, 137, 181, 185, 200 – 1, 212 Khurramabad, 58–60, 142–3 Khuzaymah ‘Alam family, 42, 62, 96, 118 –19, 135 – 6, 184 see also Hishmat al-Mulk, Shawkat al-Mulk Kirman, 15, 27 – 8, 31 –3, 38,72, 75 –6, 95, 167, 175, 180 –1, 183 –4, 186, 189, 194 Kirmanshah, 15, 21, 31, 33, 58, 75 –6, 181, 184, 202 Knox, S. G., 130 –1, 157, 211 Kuchik Khan, 202, 212, 222 see also Jangalis Kuh-i Malik-i Siah, 15, 67, 122 Lane, H. P., 177 Lansdowne, Marquess of, 20, 22, 29 –30, 75, 78, 83, 86 –7 Lar, 113, 183 Laristan, 38, 72, 182

Lloyd George, David, 192, 200 Loans, 124, 139, 233 Anglo-Russian, 126, 149 – 58 British, 57, 73, 97, 112, 116 – 17, 119 –20, 128, 141, 142, 149 –58, 215, 218, 222 Russian, 13, 73 –4, 87 –9, 119 Loraine, Percy, 225 Lorimer, D. L. R., 23, 58 – 61, 69, 79, 117, 129, 132 Luristan, 38, 58 –61, 70, 72, 129, 132, 143 Lurs, see Luristan Lyall, Alfred, 30 –1 Lynch Brothers, 53 –8, 169, 178, 213 Macpherson, A. D., 84, 88 –91 Makran, 72, 95, 121, 145 Malcolm, John, 1, 15 –16, 19, 24, 28, 33 –4 Malleson, W., 212 maps, 12, 27–34, 40–1, 188 see also Survey of India Marling, Charles: charge´ d’affaires 110, 120, 127 minister, 176 –8, 183 –5, 189 – 92, 199 –200, 202 – 3, 206 –7, 210, 213 Mashhad, 63, 82, 83, 121, 148 consuls, 15, 21, 33, 62, 68 governor general, 21, 66, 69, 95 telegraph, 88 – 9, 93, 95, 200 trade, 38, 67, 212 World War I, 176, 185, 200, 201 see also Khurasan, trade routes Masqat, 30, 76, 145

301 Mas‘ud Khan Puladin, 179 McDouall, William, 54 –5, 57 –8, 69, 77 –8 McMahon, Henry, 62 –3, 84 –7, 148 Meade, Malcolm, 1, 45 –8, 69, 76 –7, 80 merchants, 35, 56, 103, 104, 124, 142 British, 37, 40, 42, 44 – 7, 52 – 4, 56 –7, 105, 107, 124 – 5, 169 Indian, 38, 68, 84, 85 Iranian, 7, 16 –17, 21, 37, 40, 46, 49, 51, 67, 69, 73, 104 –9, 121, 124, 206 Russian, 75 Mesopotamia, 167, 195, 219 Miller, Alexander, 21, 64 –6, 69, 85 –6, 88, 95, 97, 158 Minto, Earl of, 32, 92, 117 Mirjavah, 201 Mirza Ibrahim (Mujtahid), 105 –6, 174 Molitor, L., 89 –90 Morley, Lord John, 32, 82 Mornard, Joseph, 136, 150, 154 Muhammad ‘Ali Khan Kashkuli, 132, 208 Muhammad ‘Ali Shah, 103, 108 –9, 111 –12, 115 – 16, 122 Muhammad Riza Shah, 8, 232, 235 Muhammarah, 70, 80 –2, 94, 140, 144, 213 consuls, 15, 34, 54, 58, 72, 75 – 7, 94, 167, 171 trade, 38 –9, 52 –5, 57, 93, 114 –15, 142 – 3 see also Arabistan, Shaykh Khaz‘al Khan Muhtasham al-Saltanah, Hajj Mirza Hasan Khan Isfandiyari, 129 Muhtasham al-Vizarah, 75

302

BRITISH IMPERIALISM

mujtahids, 105, 111, 113, 148 Mukhbir al-Saltanah, Hajj Mahdi Quli Khan Hidayat, 149, 152 – 5, 157, 174, 177, 193, 205 Musaddiq, Muhammad, 233, 235 –6 Mushir al-Dawlah Mirza Hasan Khan Pirnia, 222 Mushir al-Dawlah, Mirza Nasrallah Khan Na’ini, 69, 83, 86 Mushir al-Dawlah, Shaykh Muhsin Khan, 45 Mustawfi al-Mamalik, Mirza Hasan, 177 –8 Muvaqqar al-Dawlah, Mirza ‘Ali Muhammad Khan, 107, 147, 157, 175, 177 Muzaffar al-Din Shah, 17 – 18, 22, 49, 68, 73, 94, 97, 105, 123 Nasir al-Din Shah, 2, 17 – 18, 23, 28, 42, 44, 53, 123, 152 Nasir-i Divan, 191, 193, 204, 217, 219 Nasr al-Dawlah, Muhammad ‘Ali Khan, 49, 113, 129 nationalism, Iranian, 99, 231 – 2 early, 3, 7–8, 28, 40, 41, 147, 199, 205 –7, 220, 226, 231 Pahlavi, 8, 147 Naus, Joseph, 79, 104 Navvab family, 21, 49, 128, 178 Newspapers, 99, 107 –9 Habl al-Matin, 114, 174 Iranshahr, 144 Jam-i Jam, 174, 177 Muzaffari, 108 press, 178, 199, 218, 220, 224 Tazianah, 174 The Times, 31, 53, 133, 153 The Times of India, 111

IN QAJAR IRAN

Niedermayer, Oskar von, 172, 175, 177, 180 Nizam al-Saltanah, Husayn Quli Khan Mafi, 53 –4, 56 Nizam al-Saltanah, Riza Quli Khan Mafi, 129 –31, 142, 151, 181 Salar Mu‘azzam, as, 28 Noel, E. W. C., 213 North Persia Force, 212, 216, 221 –2 Nushki, 63 –4, 67, 188, 201 Nusratabad, 63 –5, 67 –8, 93 –4, 95, 137 anti-British riot, 85 –6, 89 plague, 89 –91 see also Sistan Nusrat al-Dawlah, Firuz Mirza, 207, 215 O’Connor, W. F. T.: Sistan, 121, 122, 136 Shiraz, 152 –7, 172, 174, 178 – 9, 181, 191, 194 oil, see Anglo-Persian Oil Company Orton, E. F., 192, 208 –9 Ottoman Empire, 3, 6, 39, 93, 112, 123, 128, 134 frontiers, 31 –2, 92, 115, 139 – 40, 143 World War I, 139, 166 – 7, 169 – 71, 178, 180 – 1, 182, 193 –5, 197, 198 – 9, 202 –3, 212, 215, 226, 229, 231, 234, 235 Pahlavis, 8, 135, 173, 230, 232 –3 see also Riza Khan/Shah, Muhammad Riza Shah Persepolis, 1 Persepolis (warship), 112, 133 Persia Committee, 200, 203 Persian Transport Company, 58, 142

Picot, Henry, 23, 33 piracy, 56 –7, 146, 161 Pir-i Zan pass, 192 Plague, 7, 79 –81, 89 –91 Poklevsky-Kozell, S., 150 Prideaux, F. B.: Khuzaymah ‘Alam family, 136 – 9, 176, 184 – 5 Sistan Levy Corps, 181, 185 – 7, 200 –1, 230 Qa’inat: politics, 62 –3, 88, 119 – 21, 135 –8, 184 – 5 spheres of influence, 72, 139, 161 –2, 169, 188 World War I,165, 167, 176, 184 –6, 188 see also Birjand, Hishmat alMulk, Shawkat al-Mulk Qashqa’is, 7, 113, 126, 127, 156, 173, 180, 185, 193, 217, 218, 223 British intelligence, 24 –6 Khamsah rivalry, 49, 104, 123, 130 –2, 152 rising (1918), 24, 26, 198, 203 – 9, 225 see also Fars, Shiraz, Sawlat al-Dawlah, Qasr-i Shirin, 32 Qavam al-Mulk, Habib Allah Khan: Fars politics, 25, 104, 113 – 14, 123, 129 – 31, 150, 152 I‘timad al-Sultan, as, 47, 49 Salar al-Sultan, as, 49, 106, 109, 113 World War I, 165, 174, 177 – 83, 185, 189, 194, 226, 230 Qavam al-Mulk, Hajj Ibrahim Khan, 183, 190 –1, 194, 206, 208 –9, 225, 230 Nasr al-Dawlah, as, 183 Qavam al-Mulk, Muhammad Riza Khan, 47 –50, 105 –9, 110

INDEX Qazvin, 178, 202, 212, 223 quarantines, 50 –1, 63, 73 Persian Gulf, 79 –81 riots, 7, 90 –1 Sistan, 88 –91 Qum, 58, 178, 180 rahdari (transit duties), 7, 44, 123 –4, 126, 151, 155, 173, 204 Railways, 36, 38, 214 –15, 218, 232 –3 Baghdad, 142 –3 Bushihr –Daliki, 211 Indian, 64, 67, 187 –8, 201, 212 Luristan, 142 –4 Trans –Persian, 62, 74, 118, 121 Ra’is ‘Ali Dilvari, 147, 173, 175, 177 Ranking, J. G., 144, 170, 175 riots, 7, 44, 46, 80, 85 –6, 90 –1, 95 Riza Khan/Shah, 8, 135, 156, 227, 230, 232 – 3 coup d’e´tat, 198, 223 –5 Robat, 63, 89, 93 –4, 136 Ross, Edward, 53 –4 Royal Navy, 147 oil, 35, 134, 144 –5, 219, 234 Persian Gulf, 52, 61, 70, 75, 78, 82, 94, 97, 121, 134, 145 –7, 148, 157, 161, 173, 213, 228 Sadid al-Saltanah, Muhammad ‘Ali Khan, 17 –18, 28, 56, 108, 144 Salar-i Hishmat, ‘Ali Khan, 208 –9 Salisbury, Marquess of, 14 – 15, 29, 31, 40, 63 – 4, 73 Samsam al-Saltanah, Najaf Quli Khan, 23, 116, 141, 199, 206, 213 Sandeman, Robert, 26 –7, 58, 64, 148

Sardar As‘ad, Hajj ‘Ali Quli Khan, 58, 126, 128 –9 Sardar Ihtisham, Ahmad Khan, 208 –9, 217 Sardar Jang, Nasir Khan, 141, 181 Sardar Khudadad Khan, 137, 186 Sardar Muhtasham, Ghulam Husayn Khan, 181 –2, 213 Sardar Purdil Khan, 65, 186 Sardar Zafar, 213 Sarim al-Dawlah, Akbar Mas‘ud, 215 Sartip Muhammad Riza Khan, 22, 65, 88, 119, 137 Sawlat al-Dawlah, Isma‘il Khan: Fars politics, 25, 49, 104, 108, 113 –14, 123, 126 – 31, 149, 151, 156 ilkhani, 24, 25 –6 Qashqa’i rising (1918), 198, 203 –9, 213, 217 – 19, 225 –6, 230 – 1 World War I, 24, 173, 174, 180, 182 –4, 185, 190, 192 – 3 see also Qashqa’is Sayyid ‘Abd al-Husayn Lari, 108, 111, 146, 156 Sayyid Murtaza Ahrami, 106 –7, 111 –13, 175 Sayyid Ziya al-Din Tabataba’i, 223 Sazanov, Sergei, 121, 160 Shatt al-‘Arab, 38, 52, 56 –7, 93 –4, 115, 140, 146 Shawkat al-Mulk, Amir Isma‘il Khan, 62, 65, 87, 118 Shawkat al-Mulk, Amir Muhammad Ibrahim Khan, 88, 118 –21, 135 –9, 162, 176, 184 –5 Shaykh Ahmad, 89

303 Shaykh Husayn Khan Chahkutahi, 123, 173, 175, 182, 211, 217, 219 Shaykh Khaz‘al Khan, 19, 52, 56 –7, 70, 73, 75, 133, 134, 139 –42, 225, 226, 229 British assurances, 76 –9, 82, 96 –8, 114 –17, 161 Constitutional Revolution, 104, 112, 114 –17, 126 – 7, 131, 162 oil, 117, 144, 161 tribal power, 26, 61, 96 – 8, 122 – 3 World War I, 165, 169 – 72, 174, 182, 183, 184 – 5, 212, 217, 218 Shaykh Miz‘al Khan, 54 – 7 Shaykh Mubarak al-Sabah, 75 –6, 114 –15, 160 Shiraz, 2, 21, 228 British troops, 114, 131–2, 134, 147–9, 235 consuls, 15, 49, 72, 76, 122, 127 politics, 25 – 6, 47, 49 – 50, 103 – 6, 108 –9, 110 – 11, 113 –14, 126 – 32, 147 –57 trade, 43 –4, 48, 50 – 2, 75, 123 – 5, 142 World War I, 26, 167, 172 – 5, 177 –80, 183 – 4, 189 –93, 194, 198, 203 – 11, 212, 215, 218 – 19, 225 –6 see also Fars, trade routes Shu‘a‘ al-Saltanah, Malik Mansur Mirza, 49 –50, 103, 105 –6, 108 Shushtar, 52 –4, 56, 140 –1, 213 Shuster, Morgan, 132, 147, 150, 174, 179 Sipahsalar, Muhammad Vali Khan Tunikabuni, 189, 199

304

BRITISH IMPERIALISM

Sistan: Anglo-Russian Convention, 72 – 3, 92 –98, 133, 161 – 2, 229 Anglo-Russian rivalry, 22, 61 – 9, 73, 82 –92, 159, 229 Constitutional Revolution, 104, 118 –21 consuls, 15, 21, 27, 33, 75, 135 – 9, 228 strategic importance, 21, 29, 31 –2, 70, 73 trade, 42, 93, 121 – 2 World War I, 165 –9, 175 – 7, 181, 184 – 8, 194, 195, 200 –1, 212, 225, 229 –30 see also Hishmat al-Mulk Sistan Levy Corps (SLC), 166 –7, 181, 184 –8, 194, 195, 201, 225, 230 Slade, Edmond, 145 Smart, W. A., 123, 130, 132, 147 –9, 151 –2 southern league, 127, 140, 217 South Persia Rifles (SPR), 166 –7, 181, 184, 189 –93, 204 –11, 230 Soviet Union, 198, 199, 202, 221 –2, 224, 230 spheres of influence, see Anglo-Russian Convention Stas, A., 152, 154, 156 –7 Stokes, C. B., 203 Straits of Hormuz, 32, 75, 145 Survey of India, 33 Swedish officers, see gendarmerie

IN QAJAR IRAN

Sykes, Percy, 27, 31, 33 –4, 63 see also South Persia Rifles

Fars, 105, 126, 135, 147, 174, 205, 207 Sistan, 66, 89 –90

Talbot, A. C., 55 Tangistanis, 46 –7, 219 Constitutional Revolution, 106 – 7, 112 smuggling, 146 –7, 173 World War I, 173, 175, 210 see also Za’ir Khizir Tangistani Thomson, W. M., 212 Townley, Walter, 136–9, 141, 149, 151–4, 156–9 trade, 34 –41 see also trade routes and individual provinces and cities trade routes: Ahvaz –Isfahan, 52 –4, 57, 61, 127, 142, 229 Bandar-i ‘Abbas –Mashhad, Bushihr –Shiraz( –Isfahan), 7, 42, 43 –52, 69 –70, 104, 110, 114, 122 – 32, 133, 147 –58, 161, 173, 180, 191, 204, 210 – 11, 216, 218, 231 Quetta –Sistan( –Mashhad), 63, 93 Trevor, A. P., 155, 175, 177, 183, 190 –1, 217, 224 Trotsky, Leon, 199 Turbat-i Haydari, 15, 33, 176 Turkmanchay, Treaty of, 5, 36, 79, 159, 213, 215

Vali of Pusht-i Kuh, Ghulam Riza Khan Sardar-i Ashraf, 126, 174 Vusuq al-Dawlah, Mirza Hasan Khan: Anglo-Iranian Treaty, 197, 199, 213, 215, 218, 220 – 2, 230 southern roads, 131–2, 154 South Persia Rifles, 189 – 90, 192

ulama, 7, 16 –17, 69, 117, 121, 162, 165, 173, 220 Bushihr, 107 –8,

War Office, London, 13, 29, 200, 203, 216, 221 Wassmuss, Wilhelm: constitutional Bushihr, 112 World War I, 172 –3, 175, 179, 191 Webb-Ware, F. C., 63, 64, 68 –9, 138 Wilson, Arnold, 19, 23, 25 –6, 211, 235 surveying, 33 –4, 142 –3 Wilson, F. A., 44 –5, 47, 57 Yamin-i Nizam, ‘Abd alHamid Khan Ghaffari Kashi, 83, 89 Yate, C. E., 62 Yazd, 15, 31 –2, 38, 105, 175, 180 Zahidan, 201, 212 Za’ir Khizir Tangistani, 173, 175, 179, 182, 191, 210 –11, 217, 219 Zil al-Sultan, (Sultan) Mas‘ud Mirza, 21, 152, 215