British Government's China Policy, 1945-1950 9781474496872

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The

British Government’s China Policy 1945-1950

To my wife, Hong Mei

The British Government’s China Policy 1945-1950

Zhong-ping Feng

Edinburgh University Press

© Zhong-ping Feng, 1994 Transferred to digital print 2013 First published in 1994 by Ryburn Publishing This edition published by Edinburgh University Press Ltd 22 George Square, Edinburgh EH8 9LF www.euppublishing.com Printed and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd Croydon, CR0 4YY A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978 1 85331 053 9 (hardback) ISBN 978 1 47449 687 2 (EPDF) The right of Zhong-ping Feng to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

Contents Abbreviations

7

Preface

9

Chapter One: Introduction

11

The Background The British Government’s Concerns in China Towards the End of the War Bevin and his China Advisers

11 14 25

Chapter Two: Britain’s Efforts to Restore her Business Interests in China

31

The Re-possession of British Properties and Bevin’s Post-War Trade Strategy in China The Re-occupation and Retention of Hong Kong The Issue of the Opening of the Yangtse River and Chinese Nationalism

32

Chapter Three: British Attitudes Towards the K M T-C om m unist Dispute

51

The Sympathy of British Officials for the Chinese Communists The British Decision for Non-Intervention in China and the Moscow Declaration of December 1945 The Foreign Office and the Marshall Mission

52

Chapter Four: T h e Cold War and the Chinese Civil War

73

The Foreign Office’s Reappraisal of the Nature of the Chinese Communists British Attitudes Towards Soviet and American Policies in China

73

5

36 43

57

63

78

Chapter Five: 1948, A Year o f Change

89

The KMT, the Lesser of the Two Evils Considering De Facto Relations with the Communists The Abandonment of Chiang Kai-shek and the Decision to Keep “A Foot in the Door”

89 94 98

Chapter Six: Establishing Relations with the C hinese Com m unists

111

The First Confrontation: Relations Between the Communists and Remaining British Official Representatives The Communist Threat: The Position of Hong Kong The Battle for Survival: The Position of British Trading Interests in China Recognizing the People’s Republic of China

111

117 122 127

Chapter Seven: A P olicy Unrealized

139

Peking’s Response British Reactions The Position of British Business Interests in China on the Eve of the Korean War

139 145 156

Chapter Eight: C onclusion

167

Bibliography

173

Index

183

6

Abbrellviations CAB

Cabinet Office Files

CAMC

China Association Minutes and Circulars

CCP

Chinese Communist Party

C-in-C

Commander-in-Chief

C.M.

Minutes of Cabinet Meeting

CO

Colonial Office

COS

Chiefs of Staff

C.P.

Cabinet Paper published for official use

CRO

Commonwealth Relations Office

F

Far Eastern files of the Foreign Office

F.E.

Far East Committee

FO

Foreign Office

FRUS

Foreign Relations of the United States

H. C. Debs

House of Commons Debates

H. L. Debs

House of Lords Debates

KMT

Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party)

PRC

People’s Republic of China

UNO

United Nations Organization

UNRRA

United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration

WO

W ar Office

7

Preface The post-war period 1945-1950 witnessed the rise and victory of the Chinese Communist Party and the downfall of the Nationalist regime of Chiang Kai-shek. Historians correctly focus on the role of the United States in this dramatic change in China and its subsequent reactions. However, British policy in China during this period deserves more attention than it has been given. It was Britain which had the major Western economic stake there. Moreover, Britain’s position in Hong Kong and in South-East Asia was peculiar. The British government’s response to the course of events in China and its determination to maintain its interests were both comprehensive and consistent. There are two very useful books for the study of post-1945 Sino-British relations. One is Evan Luard, B r ita in a n d C h in a (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1962), which provides a general account of the major issues affecting relations between the two countries. The other is Brian Porter, B r ita in a n d th e R ise o f C o m m u n is t C h in a : A S t u d y o f B r itis h A ttitu d e s 1 9 4 5 - 1 9 5 4 (Oxford University Press, 1967), which helps one to understand British public views on the emergence of Communist China as a great power. British recognition of the PRC has also been examined in Robert Boardman, B r ita in a n d th e P eople's R e p u b lic o f C h in a 1 9 4 9 - 1 9 7 4 (London, The Macmillan Press) and J. P. Jain’s C h in a in W o r ld P o litic s A S tu d y o f S in o - B r itis h R e la tio n s 1 9 4 9 - 1 9 7 5 (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers). Both were published in 1976. James Tang in his unpublished doctoral thesis ‘Diplomatic Relations with a Revolutionary Power: Britain’s Experience with China 1949-1954’ (London School of Economics and Political Science, 1987) made the first use of the unpublished British official documents on the recognition issue. M y study seeks to show how the British government viewed their interests following the dramatic political developments in China and acted accordingly in the period from the end of World War II to the outbreak of the Korean War. The principal documents used in this study are Foreign Office files, Foreign Secretary Bevin’s papers, the Far Eastern (Official) Committee papers and the Cabinet minutes and memoranda. I also consulted the China Association Archives (School of Oriental and African Studies of London University) for materials regarding British business establishments in China. No sources equivalent to the British Foreign Office documents have been released in China for the Chinese government’s foreign policy. The book starts with a brief historical background and then examines how the Foreign Office defined British interests in post-war China at the 9

late stage of the war. An introduction to the major policy-makers is also given in this opening chapter. Chapter 2 examines Britain’s trade strategy in China and its main efforts to restore British business position there. The British government’s attitudes towards the KMT-Communist conflict and the American mediation efforts are analyzed in Chapter 3. A special effort is made to explain how the Foreign Office officials formed the view that the Chinese Communists were not dedicated Communists but only agrarian reformers. Chapter 4 looks at the abandonment of illusion about the real nature of the Chinese Communist Party and its effect on the British attitudes to the Chinese civil war. The military, economic and political situation changed in 1948; so did the British policy. Chapter 5 focuses on the process of this change in the British government’s policy. Chapter 6 examines how London implemented the policy of “keeping a foot in the door” and made the decision to recognize the PRC. Finally Chapter 7 analyses important factors which led to the failure of London and Peking to establish normal diplomatic relations in 1950. This book was originally my doctoral thesis completed at the University of Lancaster in 1991. Many people helped me in its preparation. I shall always be grateful to Professor John Gooch and Dr. Ruth Henig for their skilled supervision and kind patience. I am also deeply grateful to Mr. Alan Wood and Dr. Michael Dockrill, my examiners, who read my thesis with care and made valuable comments upon it. Dr. Stephen Constantine has constantly provided support to me and most kindly recommended this work to Ryburn Publishing. I owe special thanks to him. I also wish to thank Professor Geoffery Holmes, Professor Michael Heale, Mr. Michael Winstanley, Mr. David Travers, and other staff in the History Department and the Politics and International Relations Department of the University of Lancaster, Robert Bickers of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, and Dr. David Barret of McMaster University, Canada, for their encouragement and help. Also to P. D. Coates for kindly answering my questions on the Foreign Office policy-making process. The Educational Charity of the George Fox School, Lancaster, under its Chairman Mr. Tim Clokey, provided me with a generous grant for my research. M y friend Ian Alston offered accommodation when I was working at the Public Record Office at Kew in London. Chen Zhun-min and Jie Yin very kindly typed the manuscript. To all these I should like to express my most sincere gratitude. M y wife, who was not able to join me in England, always gave me her full support. This work is dedicated to her with my deepest love.

10

C H A P T E R

ONE

Introduction The Background British diplomacy in China after the Second World War centred on maintaining Britain’s position there as much as possible but the struggle started long before 1945. It was Britain who first forced China to open the treaty ports to the trade of all the world during the mid-nineteenth century, a fact of which many Britons were proud. Since then the British had vigorously endeavoured to establish their leading political and trading positions in China. This was successfully achieved mainly due to the special privileges and rights Great Britain enjoyed under a series of unequal treaties with China.1 The most important treaties were the Treaty of Nanking, 1842, which provided for the cession of Hong Kong to Britain and opening of “treaty ports” to foreign trade and residence (British merchants enjoyed extraterritorial rights in all these opened coastal ports); and the Treaty of Tientsin, 1858, which permitted the creation of the Foreign Inspectorate of Chinese Maritime Customs and gave the British the right to navigate the coastal and inland waters of China with war ships as well as merchant ships. Rights of extraterritoriality, which were “the keystone of the treaty structure in China,”2 meant that British subjects in “treaty ports” were immune from Chinese laws and jurisdiction and also free from Chinese rates and taxes. In obtaining these special rights, British superior naval power was vital. In short, during the nineteenth century, the main aim of Britain’s China policy “was to bring about a general extension of that trade whilst maintaining for herself the predominant commercial position which she had established in the Far East.”3 To retain Britain’s leading interests was to become the dominant consideration in the formulation of British policy towards China in the twentieth century. The more significant feature in her policy was the method which Britain employed in attaining her goal. At the end of the nineteenth century, a dangerous problem for British interests arose from the development of foreign rivalries in and over China. So serious was the threat posed by the growth of Russian power in the Far East that London was forced, for the first time, to seek the cooperation of another power. The Anglo-Japanese alliance was then signed in 1902. Peter Lowe has authoritatively assessed the event, “the Anglo-Japanese alliance was 11

highly significant as a recognition on Britain's part that she was starting to decline and was no longer capable of defending her world wide interests without the assistance of another power.”4 Throughout the critical era (1902-1921), Japan's cooperation effectively helped Britain to resist Russian expansion and therefore defend her interests. Nevertheless, developments in China in the 1920s showed that the traditional British diplomacy of maintaining a proper balance of power was no longer valid. All the “foreign imperialists” were becoming the enemies of the Soviet-inspired nationalism in China. The Chinese Nationalist Party (or Kuomintang), under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen, aimed at freeing China from foreign control. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which was formed in 1921, joined with the Kuomintang at the suggestion of Soviet advisers, and this magically strengthened the power of nationalism. Great Britain, as the leading foreign power, became the major target of the anti-imperialist movement. In January 1927, the British concession at Hankow was taken over by the nationalists. The British government’s response to the Chinese revolution - a dual policy - was important. On the one hand, during the crisis of 1926-1927, it ordered 13,000 troops to be landed in Shanghai, the centre of British interests in China, to protect her position. On the other hand, London wisely developed a new “policy of patient conciliation” and “gradual surrender of special rights” in China. The object of the new line was to gain the goodwill of the newly-established Kuomintang government, which became hostile to the Communists and Moscow.5 When the anti-British feeling was just subsiding, Japan, ironically the former British ally, determined to take over the exclusive control of China. In 1931, Japan occupied the whole of Manchuria. W ith the fullscale Japanese invasion in China begun in July 1937, the fundamental conflict between Japan's expansion and Britain's existing interests seemed to be inevitable. The British Tokyo Embassy bluntly indicated that “Britain has got what Japan wants, and what no other country has, a dominating position in China.”6 In reality, Japan’s advance in China not only endangered Britain’s economic and political interests in China proper, but also threatened the British strategic position in the Far East.7 Nevertheless, Britain was hardly in a position at that time to take a strong line against Japan. The crisis of Japan’s invasion of China came at a time when threats of hostilities from Germany and Italy were mounting in Europe. Britain did not have the resources or power to fight wars concurrently in Europe and the Far East. “We cannot foresee the time”, the British Chiefs of Staff declared to Chamberlain’s Cabinet in November 1937, “when our defence forces will be strong enough to safeguard our territory, trade and vital interests against Germany, Italy and Japan simultaneously.”8 The European situation required that London move cautiously in the Far East. In practice, Britain’s diplomacy 12

between 1937 and 1941 contrived to avoid direct military hostility between Britain and Japan. Britain did not give much help to China’s resistance. Under Japan’s pressure, Britain made noticeable concessions in the cases of the Customs Agreement of M ay 1938, of the Tientsin crisis in 1939 and of the Burma road in 1940. However, nearly all the studies using the unpublished Cabinet and Foreign Office records come to the same conclusion: that Britain “did not pursue the policy of positive appease­ ment in East Asia adopted by Nevill Chamberlain in Europe between 1937 and 1939.”9 The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 eventually led the United States to enter into the war. W ith this, China had fallen into the “American sphere of influence” in the Pacific War. Henceforward, the United States took over responsibility for direct assistance to China against Japan. Britain remained largely passive throughout the Far East War in respect of China. Her limited assistance to China during the war included: £10 million advanced or guaranteed by His Majesty’s Government for Chinese currency stabilisation, two export credits granted in 1939 and 1940 for nearly £8 million, supplies and services furnished to Chinese troops in India to a value of more than £6 million supplies shipped mainly from Australia to a value of over £3 million, and finally the provision in 1944 of a credit of £50 million for war purposes, together with a Land-Lease Agreement for the supply of any arms, munitions and military equipment which His Majesty’s Government might be able to make available to the Chinese armies.10 During the war, British officials did give some thought to Britain’s position in China. On 11 January 1943, a new Anglo-Chinese Treaty was signed in which the UK government agreed to relinquish the extra­ territorial privileges and rights, for which Chiang Kai-shek’s government had pressed before the opening of Sino-Japanese hostilities. The agreement itself did not have much effect on Anglo-Chinese relations as long as the war was going on, as the old “treaty ports” were still in Japan’s hands but the new treaty was agreed by Britain in the hope that it would help her post-war interests. This motive could be found in the Foreign Office’s letter to its Embassy in Chungking on 18 March, 1942. The Foreign Office instructed Sir Horace Seymour, the ambassador, that they had a new treaty with China in mind to encourage the Chinese as a preparation for post-war cooperation, and as a counterpoise to a possible Chinese agreement with Russia. The Foreign Office considered, the letter went on, that the most promising subject for a treaty was the abrogation of British extra-territorial rights. The letter also emphasised the importance of letting the Chinese know that the initiative for the proposal came from the British government.11 Without great material help to 13

China, British policy-makers attached more importance to goodwill in the conduct of their diplomacy. The whole of Britain’s involvement in world affairs up to the 1940s underlined the fact that Great Britain was in a dilemma, “with a larger stake in the external world than it was in fact able to defend.”12 Probably, the case was nowhere more clear than in China. On the one hand Britain had a far greater economic stake there than any other Western power; but on the other, she had insufficient military and economic strength to defend her when she was under threat. The dilemma had a further meaning: as Britain was declining, her stake in her established overseas trade became more significant as her recovery depended upon it.

The British Government’s Concerns in China towards the End of the War Britain had economic, political and strategic interests in China but her economic interest was the most important. It included both Britain’s large investment in China and China’s potential as the greatest trade market in the world. The total British investment in 1931 was estimated at £244,200,000, i.e. 5.9 percent of Great Britain’s total foreign investment and exceeded in value that of any other foreign power in China.13 In 1937, the British Chamber of Commerce of Shanghai estimated it at £300,000,000. This sum, which has since been generally accepted by British officialdom,14 was mainly represented by import and export businesses, shipping, real estate, manufacturing, banking, public utilities, and insurance. Before Japan’s invasion of China, China took between one and two percent of Britain’s total exports per annum. But the value of the British commercial stake in China was not revealed by normal trade and financial statistics, which appeared to be almost insignificant. British merchant and industrial interests were established in such strength that British businessmen conducted a very large proportion of China’s trade with the rest of the world, and also operated a considerable share of her industrial enterprises. Most of the profits from all these activities ultimately returned to the United Kingdom. It became, in fact, a very important source of “invisible exports”, as the China Association emphatically indicated.15 Though British properties inevitably suffered from the war, the whole stake in China was still significant in 1945. That China was a large potential market had always been a very important factor in British policy-making. The attraction of the belief that “a very slight per capita increase in the productivity and purchasing power of China’s vast population could mean a very large increase in her imports” remained strong in the War Cabinet Far Eastern (Official) Committee in 1945.16 The Foreign Office was very much impressed by 14

“our great stake” in China. An important Far Eastern Department memorandum of 7 July 1945 eagerly indicated that the maintenance and development of these British economic interests in China would be “of obvious importance as a contribution to our invisible exports”. 17 Apart from her commercial interest, Great Britain had political and strategic interests in China also. In reality, these three factors were often closely interrelated. A friendly China, which looked towards the West, would be most desirable for Britain’s commercial stake in a time when the British were no longer capable of protecting it effectively. An unfriendly or hostile China, on the other hand, would certainly oppose existing British interests. Strategically, an unfriendly Chinese government could only be “a course of much trouble in our Far Eastern territories, like Malaya and Burma, where large Chinese populations reside”. 18 In fact, Britain’s position of influence in China was of great importance to the whole of her position in the Far East. British officials saw China from this point of view. Any threat from China proper would pose a strategic threat to Britain’s vast possessions and interests in South Asia and the Western Pacific. This danger had been clearly shown by Japanese expansion. Therefore the Foreign Office regarded a “stable and friendly China as an essential element in the stability of the Far East and as a bulwark of security of British Empire interests in that region”.19 Clearly, Great Britain’s economic, political and strategic advantage both in China and in the whole of the Far East lay in “the emergence after the war of a friendly, stable and united China.”20 A weak and unstable country anywhere, in the Foreign Office’s view, “is a standing temptation to aggressors and a potential menace to world peace. This is particularly true in the case of a huge agglomeration like China where all the major Powers have interests and Russia and Japan are neighbours.”21 Britain’s hopes, however, were by no means encouraged by the actual situation in China. In effect, China faced a resumption of civil war between the Communists and the Kuomintang government. In M ay 1945, Ambassador Sir Horace Seymour reported from China that “A renewal of civil war (or wars) has always been a post-war possibility”.22 Within the Foreign Office in London, a highly prophetic assessment of the likelihood of the Chinese civil war was made in 1943 by G. F. Hudson, an astute official of the Research Department.23 On 21 September 1943, he minuted that: China and Yugoslavia are at present the only countries outside the USSR wherein Communists have armed forces in control of areas of territory. In China, as in Yugoslavia, the Communists and their domestic adversaries are nominally leagued together in struggle against a foreign invasion, but even this measure of unity can hardly be expected to survive the removal of the external enemy. 15

There are four possible results of the Kuomintang-Communist conflict: (1) A compromise whereby the Communists would disband their army, but be guaranteed political rights as a party throughout China. (2) Forcible suppression of Communists by the Kuomintang. (3) Victory of the Communists, extension of their rule and over­ throw of the present “Chungking regim e”. (4) Partition of China, formally or de facto, into two separate States, the Kuomintang holding Central and South China and the Communists, North China and Manchuria. Of these four alternatives, Hudson thought the first solution would be the most desirable; nevertheless, it seemed too much to hope for in view of the extreme distrust entertained by each side for the other and the absence of any habit or tradition of real democracy in China. Hudson therefore thought that Kuomintang would probably attempt the suppression of the Communists and that civil war would be renewed. He also anticipated the difficulties in China if the Soviet Union entered the war and occupied Manchuria.24 Generally speaking, during most of the Sino-Japanese conflict London’s officialdom did not take the question of Chinese Commu­ nists seriously. A prevailing feeling in the 1930s was that Communism was peculiarly unsuited to China. One member of the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office in 1938, for instance, held the view that “whatever the spread of the Communism elements in China may lead to, one may be fairly sure that the result will be quite different to the regime produced in Russia.” This official, Sir John Brenan, thought that “The Chinese are racially strong and are tenacious of their own ancient civilisation. Among their more prominent characteristics are their easy going nature, their tolerance, their readiness to compromise and refusal to proceed to extremes. And above all, they are individualists and keen traders.” So he found it difficult to believe that “they will ever evolve the sort of Communist dictatorship which depends on a highly centralized government.”25 In fact, the Foreign Office did not have much information about the Chinese Communists, who were blockaded in Shensi, North China, by Chiang Kai-shek’s troops. Although Japanese expansion in 1937 forced the KMT government to agree to end the fighting with the Communists and to form a United Front with the latter against foreign aggression, this uneasy alliance did not last long. By 1939, when the war with Japan reached a stalemate after Japan’s forces had occupied the eastern half of China, Chiang Kai-shek had become more concerned about the rapid growth of Communist strength than of the Japanese. 16

As he told the American ambassador in 1940, “It is not the Japanese army which we fear, because our army is able to deal with it, but the defiant Communists.”26 In Chiang’s mind, Japan was merely “a disease of the skin”, while the Communist threat was “a disease of the heart”. 27 Consequently, by the summer of 1939, less than two years after the formation of the United Front against Japan, the KMT government had reestablished its blockade of the Communist regions. The Americans, having the main responsibility for direct war assistance to China, were most dissatisfied with the Chinese internal divisions. General Joseph Stillwell, the Commander of American forces in China, pressed Chiang Kai-shek to lift the blockade and make a joint effort with the Communist troops to attack the Japanese. Ostensibly, the immediate and primary consideration impelling Americans to make this decision was m ilitary in nature. In July 1944, the American observer mission, which included both officers and diplomats, arrived in Yenan, the capital of the Communists. One month later, President Roosevelt appointed Major-General Patrick Hurley, former Secretary of War, as his personal representative to China to bring the Communists and the KMT together. Hurley later became the American ambassador to China. In September 1944, under American pressure, the question of unification was fully discussed between Yenan and Chungking delegates at the meeting of the Chinese People’s Political Council in Chungking. On 7 November 1944, General Hurley went to Yenan to meet Mao Tse-tung and on his return arranged an meeting between Chou En-lai and KMT leaders. Talks, however, broke down when Chou returned to Yenan in December. The negotiations “have not attained the least result”, stated Mao Tse-tung.28 Political negotiations resumed in late January 1945 and again failed in mid-February. The fundamental difficulties in reaching an agreement between the KMT and the Communists were two-fold. First, the Communists demanded the immediate abandonment of the one-party system and establishment of a coalition government. The KMT government, fearing that the Communists’ entry into government would greatly strengthen the latter’s political position, rejected this proposal. Instead it promised that a National Assembly be convened in November 1946 for the purpose of adopting a constitution. By then a democratic government would supersede one-party rule by the KMT. The Communists, however, considered that the proposed National Assembly would be a mockery of democracy and would merely produce a perpetuation of K M T rule. The second and even more crucial and difficult issue was the question of control of the Communist army. Chiang Kai-shek wanted the Communist army to become an integral part of the National Army under National government control. But the Communists were not prepared to hand their troops over to a KMTdominated government and thus relinquish their only bargaining weapon 17

over the constitutional issue. Clearly, neither side would trust the other. As each side stuck to its guns in the negotiations, there seemed little chance of finding a peaceful solution to the problem. This view was indeed firmly held by Sir Horace Seymour. In an extremely pessimistic letter to the Foreign Office on 7 November 1944, the ambassador drew a rather gloomy picture of China. “It seems a long time now,” he wrote, “since the best time of Chinese resistance, it is sad to watch the gradual fading of the bright hopes which were then entertained for the unification of China as a reaction to Japanese pressure. Recent tendencies have all been the other way.” It would still be a long time, he said, before a strong, united and democratic China would emerge. Seymour accurately commented that the Communists, knowing the strength of their positions, were not willing to surrender any point which they regarded as vital to their continued existence. They had held control of their own army to be vital. As the Communists were deeply suspicious of the KMT, so they were likely to cling to their position. It was therefore very difficult for Chiang Kai-shek to offer a solution which would not produce a separation of the Communist area. As to the strength of the Communists, the ambassador believed that the Yenan administration could not be called a democracy, but seemed to have popular support. They were also well placed geographically. On the other hand, Seymour was very doubtful whether their system would work in more densely populated and richer parts of China. In other words, the ambassador did not think the Communists would be able to control the whole of China.29 The position of the Chinese Communists had been immensely strengthened during the war. From Seymour’s perception their power and capacity was such that they could no longer be ignored.30 A notable feature in the Foreign Office’s assessment in the later stages of the war was the rather sudden recognition of the Chinese Communists’ military and political might. A Foreign Office paper dated 28 March 1945 for Foreign Secretary Eden’s use indicated that “They (The Communists) are an autonomous faction capable of developing into a rival Government of China.”31 By 1945, there was, in fact, a population of between 70 and 90 million in the Communist-governed areas. The Communist forces were claimed to total 910,000 troops and about 2 million m ilitia.32 G. F. Hudson insisted that a civil war in China after the surrender of Japan was unavoidable. It was impossible, he commented on 16 January 1945, that an effective coalition could be formed by parties which had their own armed forces and distrusted each other so profoundly as the KMT and the Communists, there being no parliamentary body to which such a government could be responsible.33 In another paper, he minuted that what existed in China was the rivalry of two parties, neither of which had given China any education in genuine democratic practice. “For this reason it was difficult to see how China can ‘choose’ her government 18

except through civil war.”34 As for the outcome of the expected conflict, Hudson initially forecast a victory for Chiang Kai-shek, given the position of his government as the recognized, legitimate government of China with its superior military forces when the war ended.35 In February 1945, when a high-ranking official of the Chungking government asked the British Minister of the Embassy, G. A. Wallinger, what the attitude of the British Government would be if China were divided after the war, Hudson felt the situation had become very serious. “As far as I am aware,” he commented, “no Chinese of comparable standing has previously admitted to a British official the possibility of China being virtually partitioned after the war”. He also concluded that “such a development indeed appears to be very probable,” for it became more and more difficult to see how either of the two contestants could gain supremacy over the whole of China by force. Hudson then tended to think that a division of China, with the United States supporting the KMT and the Soviet Union the Communists, was more likely. British officials reacted to this “hypothetical” question raised by the KMT official very seriously. Sir Horace Seymour suggested that “There can only be one answer to such a question. The policy of His Majesty’s Government in such an eventuality must be that which it has always followed in the past in a China partitioned by civil war or other causes, namely, recognition and support of the Central Government of the day, while at the same time conducting de facto relations through His Majesty’s consuls with any regional administration.” Sir H. Prideaux-Brune at the Far Eastern Department agreed with the general principle stated by the ambassador, but he thought it might be difficult to determine when a “Central Government” was becoming regional, and vice versa. He there­ fore advised that “The safest guide seems to be a sympathetic interest in China’s development and close touch with the trend of Chinese national feeling.”36 What then was the effect on British interests of the emergence of a “divided China”, as The Economist described it? 37 Hudson seemed to be content that the Americans would have to continue to back the KMT, as Washington would not be willing to see Russian influence preponderent in China after the war. However, most other officials did not think that things would be so simple. G. A. Wallinger in the Chungking Embassy accurately pointed out that it was impossible that any partition of China would be by agreement between the Central government and the Communist regime. The only resulting situation would be “one of unstable equilibrium”. 38 What many British officials feared most was that an unstable China would invite Russian intervention from the north. A Russian-influenced China, through Soviet backing of the Communists, would be a serious menace to the British position in China and in the Far East. 19

Indeed, the concerns of the British Far Eastern strategists in 1945 focused on Russia’s intentions after the defeat of Japan. The aim of Britain’s China policy had for a long time been to minimize Soviet influence as much as possible but the participation of the Soviet army in the war with Japan would inevitably open up great possibilities for Soviet strategy in the region. The Foreign Office’s anxiety over the probable Russian intervention in the Chinese internal strife, and the impact of such an intervention on British interests, was explicitly expressed in a letter to Horace Seymour on 21 October 1944 from J. C. Sterndale-Bennett, the head of the Far Eastern Department. “If Russia decided to enter the war against Japan,” he wrote, “what with the special security arrangements which she might subsequently demand in Manchuria and her special relations with the Communists in Northwestern China might she not penetrate North China to such a degree as to make Chinese unity more or less permanently unrealisable?” Sterndale-Bennett stressed that it was in Britain’s “very great interest” that there should be a strong united China after the war. If this did not prove possible and the KMT and the Communists did not reach a settlement, the Communists might, he warned, “drift into the exclusive orbit of Soviet Russia”. 39 Clearly, the Foreign Office desired to have a stable, united China in the hope of preventing the expansion of Russian influence. The question of Russia’s policy in China was a very important topic within the Foreign Office. In April 1945, the British Moscow Embassy reported that the Soviet press was showing an increasing interest in China and was very critical of the KMT. An article condemned reactionary KMT leaders for attempting to thwart democratic unions for war and to hold up the economic, political and cultural development in China. Some KMT generals, it alleged, “have already entered on their duties as Chinese Mihailoviches” and fighting Yenan Partisans.40 In forwarding these reports, Frank Roberts, the British Minister in Moscow commented that though the Yugoslav parallel was not new, “the impression is given for the first time that the Kuomintang is so hopelessly corrupt and treacherous that its dictatorship must be liquidated altogether and replaced by a ‘democratic’ coalition government”. Noticeably, Roberts found that the struggle between the “democratic forces” and Kuomintang was now being described in the same terms employed by the Soviet press in fostering the installation of governments congenial to Soviet policy in Eastern Europe.41 The Foreign Office’s exchanged information from the American Embassy in London was inclined to emphasize the fact that the Russian press still admitted there were liberals in the KMT party and Chiang Kai-shek himself had not, at least for the present, been classified with the reactionary camp.42 This growing but somewhat restrained criticism of the Chungking government in the Russian press aroused much speculation about

20

Moscow’s policy in regard to China. A. L. Scott of the Foreign Office Far Eastern Department thought that the Soviet government were perhaps just feeling their way. They wanted “to see how the U.S. government and ourselves (and public opinions generally in the two countries) react”. Sir H. Prideaux-Brune was inclined to concur in this explanation. J. T. Henderson considered that it might be part of a softening up process, as in the case of Turkey, and a preliminary to demands over Manchuria, or possibly a smoke screen to divert attention from Soviet influence in Sinkiang and other outlying territories. Commenting on Moscow’s cautious tactics vis-à-vis Chiang Kai-shek as shown in its press, Hudson found that Russia’s attempt to split the Kuomintang closely followed the technique of the campaign against the Polish government. “For a long time”, he pointed out, “the Soviet press suggested that it was only the ‘reactionary element’ in the Mikolajezyk Cabinet which was unacceptable to Russia and refrained from attacking Mikolajezyk himself. But after the pressure had brought about a split in the London Government and the unity of the ‘four parties’ had been broken, Mikolajezyk was also classified with the reactionaries.” Similarly, Hudson felt that if Yenan attacked Chiang Kai-shek (as it now did), Moscow did not need to join in, but could in future reject him by the same method as in Poland.43 The uncertainty over what the Russian attitude towards the KMT and the Communists would be was inevitable. On the other hand, the Foreign Office policy-makers generally tended to agree with the American Moscow Embassy’s views about the main aims of Soviet Far Eastern policy. After the defeat of Japan, it was thought, Soviet efforts would be made: (a) (b) (c)

To recover all Far East territory which had belonged to Tsarist Russia. To secure a predominant influence in all areas such as Manchuria where Russia had exercised such an influence in Tsarist days... To ensure that the Chinese Government should be so composed that the Soviet Government had equal influence at Chungking with the Western democracies. If, however, this could not be achieved then the Soviet policy might work for a disunited China in which Soviet influence would at least predominate in Communist-controlled area and generally in Northern and Central China.44

On 8 August 1945, the Soviet Union proclaimed war with Japan. With the Red Army pouring across the Siberian frontier into Manchuria, Russia was now emerging as a great power in the Far East. The increase of Russian influence in the Far East remained a cause of great concern for Britain’s interests in the post-war period. 21

Apart from the prospect of Russian activities after the war, London faced a new great rival in China - the United States. This new rivalry, however, did not emerge suddenly on the Chinese scene. The Americans had, since the nineteenth century, devoted their activities (unlike the British) principally to education and philanthropy, which had conse­ quently produced an abundant harvest of goodwill in China. But the great expansion of American influence in China was the result of the war with Japan. Between March 1941 and the end of April 1945, the United States had supplied war material under Land-Lease to the value of $458,874,000, and a further large programme of the order of $500-$600 million, was, the Foreign Office knew, under consideration.45 By providing aid to fight the war, the Americans were convinced that they had a unique opportunity to exert a profound influence on the development of China and hence the whole of Asia. General Hurley’s single-handed efforts at mediation in the Chinese internal conflict evidently demonstrated America’s leading influence in China. The effect of the ascendency of the United States in China was directly experienced by Britons on the spot. In 1943, Sir Eric Teichman wrote in the Embassy that: Comparing China’s foreign policy in 1943 with her attitude of ten years earlier, nothing is more striking than her dependence on America and acceptance of American leadership. Signs of this meet one at every turn, alike in the cultural, diplomatic, economic, financial and military fields. China looks primarily to America, not Britain, to defeat Japan; to furnish her with materials and sinews of war; and to build up the great new China after the war is won.46 The American predominant position in China had caused much anxiety in London. A Foreign Office memorandum dated 2 March 1945 began by warning that “The Americans are today virtually monopolizing China.”47 The danger to British economic interests of the American monopoly position in China was obvious. Washington Embassy officials reported that in the United States there was “widespread conviction in both official and private circles ... that China must be an almost exclusive field for American investment and enterprise.”48 The Foreign Office also feared other troubles might be caused by the Americans in China. In view of the American tendency to adopt an overbearing attitude in her rather clumsy dealings with China, in due course America could have produced an anti-foreign reaction within China, as unfavourable to the British as to the Americans. The Foreign Office’s papers revealed its doubts about the American ability to exercise the leading influence in China. An exclusive American influence, officials also considered, would not be liked in Moscow.49

22

However, the greatest problem Britain would have after the war undoubtedly lay in her own economic weakness. The unfavourable effect of Britain’s financial position in 1945 on her foreign policy was serious. Up to 1945, London’s role in the Chinese war admittedly had been “that of passive spectator”.50 As a result of it, British prestige remained very low. When the war moved towards its end in Europe, the Foreign Office Far Eastern Department felt strongly that the British government could no longer afford to remain in such a position of passivity, given Britain’s own interests there. The Department drew up a lengthy memo­ randum on 2 March 1945 in which it urged that re-establishing Britain’s influence in China was a major British interest and that a more active policy was needed. The memorandum advised that the British government should display great interest in China and increase assistance to her. The Far Eastern Department’s main concern was to use the economic weapon for political purposes. After the war, China would desperately need foreign financial aid. China had already repeatedly requested that the unused balance of the £50 million war-time loan from Britain be transferred to a credit for post-war purposes. The Treasury, however, had never given way, although the Foreign Office was sympathetic to the Chinese request.51 Any financial credits to China would gain the Chinese government’s good will. Such good will would be vital for Britain’s diplomacy, especially in view of the widespread Chinese suspicion of British intentions after the war. The Chungking Embassy found that many Chinese thought that the British still had “imperialist” designs. Britain’s detached attitude towards China’s war with Japan only added to this suspicion. The distrust of Britain could easily be turned into nationalist feeling against British interests when the war was over. The War Cabinet Far Eastern (Official) Committee, in which SterndaleBennett represented the Foreign office, was in sympathy with the position of the Foreign Office Far Eastern Department. On 19 February 1945, it endorsed the view that it might be necessary to consider the granting of credits to China on political grounds if not justified on pure economic grounds. It also stressed that it was of great political necessity that Great Britain should recover as much as possible of her previous influence in China.52 The Far Eastern Department intended its memorandum for the War Cabinet, but before it could go there the agreement of other Foreign Office Departments was needed. However, the Economic Relations Department strongly disapproved of any positive line in China. Officials in the Economic Relations Department were perhaps the people who were most aware of Britain’s post-war financial difficulties. On 6 March, J. E. Coulson, the head of the Department, minuted that “the limitations on our ability to adopt a forward policy in China are obviously ninetenths economic. Our difficulties in doing anything at all for China in the 23

economic sphere, let alone anything which will have a real impact on Chinese conditions are very great indeed... [I]f we are assuming a responsibility which we cannot fulfil, our position may be made worse than it is now.” He suggested that after the war Britain should avoid giving the Chinese any impression that she was likely to be able to provide quantities of supplies for Chinese reconstruction.53 Coulson’s position was supported by E. L. Hall-Patch, the Foreign Office Assistant Under-Secretary for economic affairs. A strong, stable and friendly China, Hall-Patch pointed out, should be the long-term object of British policy. However, in the short run, “there is likely to be a period of confusion and perhaps chaos, in which we shall be unable to do very much to further our long-term objective.” W hat help Britain could offer must always be in relation to her available resources. Those resources, he explained, “are now desperately small for our great responsibilities, and must be husbanded for use where they can be most effective in the crucial post-war period on which our whole future depends.” The first and most important use of Britain’s resources was to provide food and work for the British people in the next few years, Hall-Patch stated. Tο make any substantial contribution towards recovering China after the war “was a luxury we shall not be able to afford”. As to the general post-war policy which Britain should follow in China, Hall-Patch advised that Britain should confine herself in the political field to “good offices”, and in the economic field to salvaging what she could of her pre­ war stake in China. In conclusion he stated that, “Our resources are exiguous and while they remain so. our policy in China cannot,... be anything but that of watchful passivity." 54 Faced with the objections of Hall-Patch and the Economic Relations Department, the Far Eastern Department’s memorandum did not get through to the War Cabinet. Any idea of “political” credits in China was also rejected by the Treasury. The Treasury’s stance was clear and firm: Britain’s financial position after the war would not justify the granting of credits other than on purely economic grounds, however strong might be the reasons of policy for which they were advocated. In the meeting on 24 July 1945, the Cabinet Overseas Reconstruction Committee decided that there could be no question in present circumstances of granting political credits to China.55 The “political” credits to China were designed by the Foreign Office as the “most valuable part of our diplomatic armoury”.56 Their rejection left the British with no powerful weapons to safeguard their interests there. Fundamentally, it was economic weakness which most seriously handicapped the post-war British government’s whole foreign policy and prevented Britain from playing an active role in post-war Chinese politics. So the approaching to the end of the Second World War did not really reduce the pressure on British interests in China. The problems the 24

British had to confront included the threatened Chinese civil war, Russian ambitions, American monopoly influence and Chinese suspicion of Britain. But Britain’s main concern was the probable harmful effect of her weakened position on British interests there.

Bevin and His China Advisers Historians have generally pointed out that the first British administration after the Second World War was, by any tests, “one of the most crucial in British history”.57 In July 1945, the British Labour Party led by Clement Attlee, after a sweeping victory in the general election, formed the first post-war British government.58 Ernest Bevin, at 64, became Foreign Secretary. For many Labour members in 1945, the party’s coming to power seemed to mean the beginning of a new Britain, domestically and internationally. They were, however, soon doomed to disappointment as far as the new government’s foreign policy was concerned. Despite strong left-wing demands within his own party for a break in the continuity of a conservative approach in foreign affairs, Bevin successfully carried out a bi-partisan policy.59 There were a few attempts to change this. In November 1946, 57 angry labour “rebels” in the House of Commons tabled an amendment to the Reply to the Throne Address, demanding that the Labour administration follow a “Third Force” policy, i.e. between American capitalism and Soviet Communism. In a further effort, in 1947, the New Statesman , the left-wing’s organ, published a pamphlet “Keep Left”. The well-known Labour left-wing critics included Professor Harold Laski, (the Chairman of the Labour Party National Executive, 1945-1946), Kingsley Martin, Michael Foot and Richard Crossman. Bevin, by nature a pragmatist, denied from the outset that ideology of any kind could serve as an adequate guide for the nation’s affairs.60 Experience of office in the war-time Churchill coalition government led both Bevin and the Prime Minister Attlee to believe that there were autonomous national interests. To demand that the nation’s foreign policy reflect a domestic party’s ideology was naive. In this conjunction, Sir Roderick Barclay, who acted as Bevin’s principal private secretary (since 1949) remarked that “He [Bevin] was not so much concerned with doctrines and ideologies as with getting things done. His socialism was of a very pragmatic kind, and though he followed certain basic principles and clung to certain ideals, his concern was to find fair and just solutions without worrying too much about their theoretical justification. He had never been a Marxist and had always regarded Communism as a vicious and dangerous creed.”61 As was expected therefore, Bevin’s major policies were generally supported by the Opposition leaders, Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden, in the House of Commons. 25

The continuity of the government’s foreign policy was highly praised by British officials in China. Ambassador (since m id-1946) Sir Ralph Stevenson wrote that “it was the continuity of our political, economic and social evolution which we want to emphasize as being the most solid element in world politics at the present time and that most suited to the Chinese character.” Stevenson thought it was this steady continuity that really appealed to the Chinese intellect and had, for instance, had a considerable influence in the drafting of the Constitution promulgated by the Chinese National Assembly in 1946.62 Bevin occupied a dominant position in the Cabinet. The Prime Minister gave the Foreign secretary a free hand and believed that it was not correct for him to intervene in foreign policy.63 With Bevin’s appointment, the Foreign Office became the real centre of British foreign policy-making. Bevin himself had little knowledge about China; in fact, until late 1948 when the victory of the Chinese Communists in the civil war became clear, he did not give much time to Chinese affairs. He was not unaware of the dramatic changes over there but he did not attach much importance to what happened - Europe and the Middle East remained the Foreign Secretary’s priorities. Inevitably, Bevin relied on the advice of his permanent officials. The most important figure throughout the period 1946-1950 was Esler (“Bill”) Dening, the Assistant Undersecretary for Far Eastern affairs. During the war, Dening was Lord Louis Mountbatten’s chief political adviser at South-East Asia Command. His experience and ability were highly respected by his W hitehall colleagues and he had Bevin’s confidence.64 Through the Cabinet Far Eastern (Official) Committee, of which Dening himself was the Chairman from 1946, and whose members were senior officials of the various government’s departments, Dening exercised considerable influence over the formulation of Britain’s Far Eastern policy. He would have been the first British ambassador to the People’s Republic of China, had normal diplomatic relations between London and Peking been established in 1950. Within the Foreign Office, it was the Far Eastern Department (or China Department 1946-1948) which was chiefly charged with Chinese affairs. The principal advisers in the Department were G. V. Kitson, A. L. Scott and P. D. Coates, who had all served in China (Scott was bom in China). Their substantial knowledge of Chinese history, culture and language was most valuable for their day to day handling of Chinese affairs. In the absence of similar experience, P. W. Scarlett, the head of the Far Eastern Department from late 1947 to 1949, clearly found it difficult to add his own voice. But Scarlett could be relied upon for a wellbalanced representation of the Department’s views. During 1949 and early 1950 (before he went to the Washington Embassy) Guy Burgess was also in the Far Eastern Department. The presence of this spy in the 26

Foreign Office leads one to speculate what information might have been passed to Moscow and its impact on Russian attitudes towards China and the West. Burgess appeared to be the expert on Marxism and the Soviet revolution. He also contributed to the Foreign Office’s debate on the nature of Chinese Communism and supported the dominant views in 1949 that Chinese Communists were real communists. On the whole, his minutes were sound and convincing. But as a junior member of staff and not a China specialist, he had little real influence in Foreign Office’s Chinese policy-making. As Chinese affairs remained a special field at the Foreign Office, the Far Eastern Department officials enjoyed relative freedom from outside intervention in their decision-making. In formulating the British government’s China policy, British representatives in China played a significant and active role. Not only did the London Office rely on the Embassy’s first-hand knowledge (for reports from unofficial channels to the Foreign Office, for instance, the Embassy’s confirmation was required), but also the importance of the Embassy also lay in the Foreign Office’s traditional respect for the man on the spot. The ambassador in China until m id-1946 was Sir Horace Seymour. Seymour was conscious of Britain’s weakness in China. He stressed the importance of a friendly Anglo-Chinese relationship in Britain’s long-term interests in the Far East (Seymour retired soon after he came back to London). As events turned out Sir Ralph Stevenson, Seymour’s successor, was to be the last British ambassador in China until 1972. Sir Ralph was a capable and dynamic diplomat. He was the ambassador in Yugoslavia before 1946. As a newcomer, Stevenson’s first impression about the Chinese people was quite interesting. “Their patience,” he recorded in his report to the Foreign secretary, Bevin, one month after he arrived in China, “their industry, their capacity for hard and continuous work, their craftsmanship and above all, their good humour are astonishing.” “It seems to the new comer inexplicable”, he went on to write, “that a people with such qualities should have been deemed by Providence deserving of so inefficient and corrupt an administration. The answer, I suppose, is that these qualities, admirable as they are, do not in themselves suffice. They are qualities which might well have been possessed by the idiotes, whose lack of public spirit was so strongly contemned in the early Greek republics. A leaven of constructive, even revolutionary, discontent is obviously necessary to awaken the people to a sense of their own power and responsibilities and to effect a change.”65 This report clearly displayed the new ambassador’s great sympathy for the people of China. By contrast, Stevenson had little sympathy for the Kuomintang government. W hen he saw that the Chinese Communists were to stay in China, he strongly urged the British government to establish diplomatic relations with the new Chinese government. Sir Ralph’s unusually close 27

relationship with his United States colleague, Dr. John Leighton Stuart, a China-born missionary educator, was of great value. In W hitehall, Stevenson’s often constructive opinions were highly thought of by Foreign Office and government officials and carried much weight in the decision-making process.

Notes 1.

2. 3. 4.

5.

6.

7. 8. 9.

10.

11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

Both British diplomats in China and officials in London resented the use o f the term unequal treaties, around which they unanimously inserted quotation marks in their reports or minutes. Irving S. Friedm an, British Relations w ith C hina 1 9 3 1 -1 9 3 9 (N ew York, 1940) p. 3. L. K. Young, B ritish Policy in C hina 1 8 9 5 -1 9 0 2 (Oxford, 1970), p. 2. Peter Lowe, G reat Britain and Ja p a n 1 9 1 1 -1 5 A S tudy o f B ritish F a r Eastern Policy (MacMillan, 1969) p. 1; for further discussion see Ian N ish, T he Anglo-Japanese Alliance (London, 1966). For an illum inating study of British attitude and response to the Chinese nationalist movement, see Richard Stremski, T he Shaping o f B ritish Policy during the N a tionalist Revolution in China (Taipei, 1979); see also J. P. Jain, China in W orld Politics (New Delhi, 1976), pp. 9-12. FO 371 F2286/2286/23. Sir R.Craigie to Foreign Office, annual rep o rt of 1937, 1 Jan 1938, quoted from Bradford A. Lee, B ritain a n d the S in o Japanese War, 1 9 3 7 -1 9 3 9 (London, 1973), p. 112. Ib id ., p. 17. Ibid ., p. 80. Peter Lowe, G reat B ritain a n d the Origins o f the Pacific War, A S tu d y o f B ritish Policy in E ast A sia 1 9 3 7-1 9 4 1 (Oxford, 1977), Preface. For the similar conclusion see also W. R. Louis, British S tra te g y in the F ar E a st 1 9 1 9 -1 9 3 9 (Oxford, 1971). FO 371/46211 F4171/186/10. F.O. Far E astern D epartm ent m emo. 7 July 1945. See also Aron Shai, B rita in and C hina Im p eria l M o m e n tu m (London, 1984), p. 82. FO 371 F2031/74/10, quoted from Sir L. W oodward, B ritish Foreign Policy in the Second W orld War, Vol. IV (London, 1975) p. 501. F. S. N orthedge, The Troubled G iant B rita in am ong the G reat Powers 1 9 1 6 -1 9 3 9 (London, 1966), p. 629. FO 371/46211 F 4171/186/10. F.O. Far E astern D epartm ent m emo. 7 July 1945. Ibid..

China Association Paper (CAMC) N o .4 9 /G /2 , 10 Jan. 1949 Aide m em oire for Sir W illiam Strang. T h e China Association formed in 1899 was one o f London’s m ost influential business organization. It represented all major British economic interests in China. It was described by the Foreign Office as “a high m ettled and powerful animal”. See note by P eter Scarlett, 24 March 1949, F O 371/75746, F4539/1015/10. N athan A. Pelcovits, O ld C hina

28

H ands and the Foreign Office (New York, 1969) has discussed the history of

16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23.

24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30.

31. 32.

33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43.

the China Association. CAB 96/5 F.E.(45)8 (also F.E.(E) (45) 10 (Final), 19 Feb. 1945. F O 371/46211 F 4171/186/10. Ibid..

F O 371/46232 F 1331/409/10. Far Eastern D epartm ent memo. 2 M arch 1945. F O 371/46211 F 4171/186/10. Far Eastern D epartm ent memo. 7 July 1945. Ibid..

F O 371/46232 F3603/409/10. Seymour to J.C .Sterndale-B ennett, 29 May 1945. G. F. H udson was an Oxford historian being employed by the Foreign Office then. H is publications included Europe a n d C hina A S tu d y o f T h eir Relations fr o m the E arliest T im e to 1 8 0 0 (London, 1931); The F ar East in W orld Politics (London, 1939). F O 371/35778 F4852/74/10. M inute by H udson, 21 Sept. 1943. F O 371 F9188/9157/10. M inute by Sir John Brenan, 24 Aug. 1938. Q uoted from M ichael Schaller, T he U S Crusade in C hina 1 9 3 8 -1 9 4 5 (New York, 1979), p. 42. F O 371/35838 F1893/1893/10. FO 371/46164 F324/35/10. Seymour to F.O. 27 D ec. 1944. F O 371 F5408/34/10. Seymour to Sterndale-Bennett, 7 Nov. 1944. Between 1943 and 1944, a few reports from foreign travellers and journalists on Yenan situation confirmed the Em bassy’s reports, see also Chapter 3. F O 371/46167 F2464/35/10. Brief for E den’s talk with Hurley, 28 Mar. 1944. See John K. Fairbank and Edwin O. Reischauer, China Tradition and Transform ation (Sydney, 1979), p.475. M ao T se-tung claimed that the Communists had 1 million troops. See M ao Tse-tung, Selected Works (Peking, 1963), IV, p. 1157. F O 371 F324/35/10. M inute by H udson, 16 Jan. 1945. F O 371 F 312/35/10. M inute by H udson, 7 Feb. 1945. F O 371/35778 F4852/74/10, 21 Sept. 1943. F O 371/46166 F 1690/35/10. Seymour to F.O.; m inute by Hudson, 12 April 1945; minute by Prideaux-Brune, 24 Mar. 1945. T he Economist , 13 Jan. 1945. F O 371/46166 F1690/35/10. W allinger to F.O., 23 Feb. 1945. F O 371 F4857/34/10. F O 371/46227 F2582/325/10. F. Roberts to Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, 27 April 1945; F 2 581/325/10, Roberts to F.O., 26 April 1945. Ibid..

FO 371/46227 F290/325/10. M em o o f US Em bassy in London, 2 May 1945. It is interesting to note the frequent comparison o f the Russian policy in East Europe w ith that of the Far East by W hitehall officials. F O 371/46277 F2901/305/10. M inutes by Scott, 15 May; H udson, 15 June, F2582/325/10, H enderson, 30 April 1945.

29

44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54.

55. 56. 57.

58. 59.

60. 61. 62. 63. 64.

65.

FO371/46210 F244/325/10. Roberts to F.O. from Moscow, 7 May 1945, m inute by Scott, 12 M ay 1945. F O 371/46211 F4171/186/10. M em o of the Far Eastern D epartm ent, 7 July 1945. T his note by Sir Eric Teichmen had been often quoted in the Foreign Office papers, see F O 371/46211 F4171/186/10. FO 371/46232 F1331/409/10. M emo by the Far Eastern Departm ent, 2 Mar. 1945. Q uoted from C hristopher T h o rn e, Allies o f A K in d (London, 1978), p. 553. FO 371/46232 F 1331/409/10. F.O. memo, 2 Mar. 1945. Ibid..

See F O 371/46211 F4171/186/10. F.O. memo, 7 July 1945. CAB 96/5 F.E. (45) 8, 19 Feb. 1945. FO 371/46232 F1331/409/10. M inute by Coulson, 6 Mar. 1945. Ibid., minute by H all-Patch, 11 Mar. 1945. Edmond H all-Patch was representative of the Treasury in China in 1935-36 and later became U K Representative to the O EEC. F O 371 F 4712/57/10, 24 July 1945, minute of the meeting o f the ORC. FO 371/46211 F4171/186/10. K enneth O. M organ, Labour in Power (Oxford, 1984), p. vii; Ritchie Ovendale (ed.), The Foreign Policy o f the B ritish Labour G overnm ents 1 9 4 5 -1 9 5 1 (Leicester, 1984). Preface. T his was the first time that L abour commanded a majority in Parliament: Labour held 393 seats, while the Conservatives and their allies held 213. For E rnest Bevin’s personal reaction to the left-wing criticism within his own party, see Sir Roderick Barclay, Bevin and the Foreign Office 1 9 3 2 -1 9 6 9 (London, 1975), p. 77; Alan Bullock, E rnest B evin Foreign Secretary 1 9 4 5 -1 9 5 1 (Oxford, 1985), pp. 66-80, pp. 327-328. See Micheal R. G ordon, Conflict and Consensus in Labour's Foreign Policy 1 9 1 4 -1 9 6 5 (California, 1969), p.105. Barclay, pp. 78-79. FO 371/63282 F 1169/28/10, Stevenson to Dening, personal, 31 Dec. 1946. K enneth H arris, A ttle e (London, 1982), p. 294; Bullock, p. 56. Barclay, p. 83, “...o th er senior officials whom Ernie always greeted with particular warm th included Bill D ening...”; Robin Edmonds, S ettin g the M ould: The U nited States a nd B ritain 1 9 4 5 -1 9 5 0 (Oxford, 1986). Robin Edmonds, form er civil servant at the Foreign Office himself, described D ening as “a much respected official”. FO 371/53568 F 13592/25/10, Stevenson to Bevin, 3 Sept. 1946.

30

C H A P T E R

TWO

Britain’s Efforts to Restore her Business Interests in China Following the end of the Second World War, the new Labour government in Britain was preoccupied with economic reconstruction and national security. Britain emerged as one of the “Big Three” in the world. Nevertheless, its economic position could hardly be compared with United States and even the Soviet Union. The war cost Britain a quarter of her national wealth. In 1945, London had accumulated debts around the world totalling £2,723,000,000.1 To recover British domestic economic strength, as the British representatives abroad were instructed in March 1945, “depends first and foremost” on the revival and expansion of Britain’s export trade.2 Trade between Britain and China during the immediate post-war period, however, was likely to be restricted by two factors. First, Britain’s own difficulties in supplying both capital equipment and consumption goods to China. The demands on Britain’s productive capacity from her own empire and from Europe naturally took precedence over the needs of China. Shortly after the war, Bevin told the Chinese Prime Minister, Dr. T. V. Soong in London that Britain would not be in a position to take her proper share in China’s market until about four year’s time.3 Secondly, as Britain was not able to give any long term credits to China, on which the latter’s imports mainly depended, China’s purchases in Britain were strictly limited. Inflation in China, which was already rampant during the Japanese War (the cost of living figures in Shanghai in October 1945, for example, rose 358 times after 1936) made Chinese exports uncompetitive.4 Meanwhile, the prospect of trade with China was believed to be promising. London therefore regarded it vital for Britain to re-establish and retain her commercial position in China, in order to take advantage of the opportunities when they came. In attempting to show the British government’s principal interests in China following the end of the war, this chapter focuses on the three major issues concerning Britain’s efforts to re-establish her commercial interests there: the restoration of pre-war British properties; the recapture of her colony of Hong Kong; and the re-establishment of the British shipping position.

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The Re-possession of British Properties and Bevin's Post-War Trade Strategy in China London’s most immediate and urgent concern at the conclusion of the Japanese war was to secure the restoration of all British property to its owners in China. Even before Japan’s surrender, the China Association expressed its special anxiety about British properties in Shanghai, where four large British utility companies were located: the Shanghai Water Company Ltd; the Shanghai Gas Company Ltd; the Shanghai Electric Construction Company Ltd. and the China General Omnibus Company Ltd. There were about 6,000 British residents interned or imprisoned in Shanghai. In a letter of 19 March, 1945, the China Association drew the Foreign Office’s attention to the predominant position of Shanghai in British interests in China. It hoped that all means would be found by the British government to secure adequate representation of the major British interests and especially to avoid a Chinese military body being put in immediate control of Shanghai.5 In a meeting with the Foreign Office on 25 June, G. E. Mitchell, the Vice-Chairman and the Secretary of the China Association further pressed the head of the Far Eastern Department, J. C. Sterndale-Bennett, for arrangements for the early return to Shanghai of key men to secure quick repossession of British properties.6 Clearly, what British merchants hoped for was a direct recapture of British interests at the outset of the liberation of China. On 3 July 1945, the. Executive Committee of the China Association again expressed their serious concern to the British government about the repossession of British property in China. The Committee was “most firmly” of the opinion, it stated, “that His Majesty’s Government should arrange that provision be made whereby a group of British subjects, representing British commercial interests, shall be available (preferably attached to the official group, and in uniform, if necessary) to enter Shanghai as soon as possible after the Allied Forces and that the Allied Force Commander shall be requested to arrange for and facilitate their entry and their re-occupation of properties with the minimum of delay.”7 The British government was, in fact, as anxious as British interests in China to ensure the restoration of their properties at the earliest possible moment. In replying to the China Association on 26 Ju ly 1945, SterndaleBennett asserted that it would be the government’s object to make the best arrangements it could to protect the rights of property owners and ensure re-possession, though he felt it might not be feasible for individual Shanghai firms to send in two or three key personnel at the outset of the re­ occupation. In order to help protect British firms affected by the withdrawal of extra-territorial rights, the Foreign Office had in June appointed Sir Allan Mossop as the legal adviser to the ambassador in Chungking. The appointment was naturally welcomed by the China Association.8 32

The plans of British businessmen for a direct repossession of their properties, however, failed to be carried out. The sudden collapse of Japan as a result of American atomic bombs and the Soviet Union’s entry into the war caught the British unprepared for such a task. After the Chinese forces entered into the liberated cities, the Chinese authorities took over all foreign properties from the Japanese. Meanwhile, they announced that these properties would pass on to their owners against proof of title. Although slow, this method adopted by the Chinese government was generally considered by British officials as workable, “given energy and goodwill on the part of the Chinese responsible for the transfers.”9 In practice the British Consul-General in Shanghai was initially satisfied with the progress. He reported in October 1945 that “There is no indication that the Chinese authorities propose to exercise indefinite control over such properties.” By then the British owned gas and waterworks companies had already been restored to their owners.10 Yet, in many other cases of regaining their properties, British businessmen suffered delays and other difficulties. In June 1946, nine months since the end of the war, George Kitson in the Foreign Office China Department complained that a large proportion of British-owned wharfs and ships had still not been recovered. There was evidence, he pointed out, not only of a lack of energy and goodwill on the part of the Chinese authorities, but also of a desire to obstruct, if not confiscate. In the case of shipping, he further indicated, there was a conspiracy of obstruction amongst the many bureaux which had a hand in rendition to their former owners. “Excuses for non-rendition are often malicious and frivolous.”11 Diplomatic representations to the highest quarters of the Chinese government were received with sympathy and understanding and assurances were obtained that the necessary instructions for the release of property or ships were handed down, but these were often ignored by the minor bureau or official responsible for the retention of the property. In November 1945, the British Ambassador Horace Seymour made a trip to Shanghai, Tientsin and other places to investigate the position of British interests there. He found that the “delays and obstructions are to a large extent attributable to the action of subordinate officials, particularly in army and navy units who often disregard orders issued by central government or municipal authorities, or pass the responsibility to another department.”12 The inefficiency of the Chinese government led to rapid disillusionment of British officials. The failure to make an order effective, in the Foreign Office’s opinion, “is endemic in the Chinese system of government, which is decentralised and regional, and in the system of ‘spoils’, which respects the immunity of the local official from interference by higher authority in his preserve.”13 Geoffrey Wallinger, the British Minister at the Embassy then in Nanking reported on 11 June

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1946 that the “widespread lack of respect for property rights and the high-handed action of underlings... are one of the more disturbing features of post-war China and have largely contributed to the general atmosphere of pessimism in foreign circles regarding the future in this country.” An interesting fact he found was that, despite America’s preponderant military, economic and political influence in China, the United States Embassy and Consulates were experiencing similar frustrations in their efforts to obtain the return of American property.14 Under such circumstances, officials in London felt there was little they could do except to “keep on pegging away at the Chinese government”. Kitson, the chief Foreign Office adviser on Chinese affairs, suggested publicity should also be given in Britain to this scandalous disregard of British interests. He felt that the Chinese were particularly sensitive to outside criticism, and “the weapon of publicity might help to awaken them to a realisation of their proper responsibilities where other means have failed.”15 On his advice, the Prime Minister expressed in Parliament the government’s dissatisfaction with the existing situation regarding British properties in China.16 The British parliamentary debates regarding China after the war had been, in fact, dominated by concern over the government’s measures to safeguard British interests there. W hen Captain Gammans raised the issue of re-possession of British property in China in November 1946, the Foreign Office understood that he was not dissatisfied with the government’s unremitting efforts to get those properties back, but only with the result. He hoped that a little publicity “might shame the Chinese into action”.17 Unremitting efforts on the part of the British representatives on the spot finally bore fruit. By April 1947, there had been a marked improve­ ment in respect of regaining British property possessed by the Chinese authorities. Most of it, though not all, had been returned to British owners. This progress was almost entirely due to the sustained pressure of British local consular representatives. Leo Lamb, the Chinese Secretary in the British Embassy, reported that in the Canton area, for instance, the Consul-General Gerald Tyrrell’s energy and good relations with the local military officers should take the credit for the progressive evaluation by Chinese official departments.18 Clearly, in securing the restoration of British properties in China the British government’s full diplomatic support played a most important role. This official support was provided through the close cooperation between the China Association and the Foreign Office in London and vigorous representation by British officials in China on behalf of British merchants. In making great efforts to restore British properties in China, the British government was encouraged by the prospect of the resumption of trade with China. Ernest Bevin’s main interests in China after the war lay in Britain’s trade with China. The new Foreign Secretary appeared to be 34

impressed by the prospect of the opening of China’s interior to foreign trade. Unhappy with the weak position of Britain’s consular posts in the interior of China, he asked the Far Eastern Department to prepare a memorandum on the subject for him. This was done by Kitson on 1 March, 1946.19 A few days later, Bevin told Sir Orme Sargent, the permanent Under-secretary of the Foreign Office, that he wanted the British ambassador in China to review and reorganize the consular set-up with a view to developing and strengthening Britain’s future trade connections with China. Bevin further indicated that Anglo-Chinese trade could be used to reinforce the British political position in China, which he felt, if taken by itself, was none too strong at the tim e.20 Three months later, on 13 June 1946, Bevin had a very important talk with Sir Ralph Stevenson, who had recently been appointed as the ambassador to China. Bevin told Stevenson that the Americans were out to capture the China market. They had great schemes for opening up and developing the country, particularly in the matter of communications. As soon as communications were improved, he felt, trade was bound to increase. He again stressed the importance of the British consular position in China. He advised that the British consular officers should keep their eyes open, should move about the country and report any chances they saw for British commerce as a result of the American development of China. Bevin went on to inform Stevenson that “We ourselves would not be in a position to take our proper share of the China market for another three or four years. Meanwhile, we must prepare the ground and increase and expand our consular representation where possible.” The Foreign Secretary anticipated that China would face Russian pressure from the north and American pressure from the Pacific. But he believed that there was room for Britain in between and that China might be likely to welcome Britain as a counter-weight.21 Bevin’s talk with Stevenson thus outlined Britain’s post-war trade strategy regarding China. Bevin was not alone in taking such an optimistic estimation of the prospect of British trade with China. All his Far Eastern advisers in the Foreign Office were, in fact, confident in Britain’s strength in the future China trade; a view frequently expressed in the Foreign Office papers during 1945 and 1946. British officials were well aware that Britain was not able to compete with the United States at that time but their confidence for the future was based on a number of considerations. In the first place, officials justifiably believed that there was room for everyone in the Chinese market. In the second place, the British had long experience in China, particularly in shipping, banking, insurance and distribution, which was not enjoyed by the Americans and which, in the Foreign office’s words, “should stand us in good stead and enable us to re-assert ourselves as soon as we are in a position to participate more fully 35

in world trade.”22 In the view of Hall-Patch, the economic expert in the Foreign Office, the British could take advantage of America’s lack of experience in the China trade. After the First World War, he indicated, the American bankers and merchants entered China’s market with no experience of its pitfalls and many of their assets subsequently passed to the established British enterprises. Similar cases, he thought, could occur again.23 Thirdly, the Foreign Office pointed out that there had been indications that China had no desire to place all her eggs in one basket and to incur the risk of political or financial domination, which could result from a monopoly by any one power in economic and commercial fields in China.24 History has shown however that the political development in China did not provide any chances for the British to justify their great confidence in a competition with the Americans in China’s market. Nevertheless, during the immediate post-war years, this planned trade strategy in China not only encouraged the British government to endeavour to restore its business position there, but also made the retention of Hong Kong most desirable.

The Re-occupation and Retention of Hong Kong Hong Kong, which consists of three areas, became a British colony through three different agreements. The islands of Hong Kong and Kowloon were ceded to Britain in 1842 and 1860 respectively. The New Territories, which constitute the largest part of the Colony, were, however, leased for ninety-nine years by the Peking Convention of 1898. In December 1941, Britain lost Hong Kong to Japan. In the course of Anglo-Chinese negotiations for the abolition of extraterritoriality during the war, the Chinese pressed for the return of the New Territories. The British government, however, refused to consider this demand on the grounds of extraterritoriality. Meanwhile, it indicated that the issue might be discussed after the war. It was then agreed in the new Anglo-Chinese Treaty in 1943 that the Chinese government reserved their right to raise the question of the New Territories later.25 The Chinese government undoubtedly wanted the whole colony back. The request for the New Territories, on which the whole colony’s main water supply depended, was obviously the first step. As the war was approaching its end, the question of the future of Hong Kong was again urgently considered in London. There were, broadly speaking, three different opinions amongst the British as to the future of the colony. The first, which was expressed by the British ambassador to China, was that Hong Kong should go back to China but on certain conditions. In early 1945, Seymour forecast that after the war the 36

Chinese would do everything they could to get rid of the remaining foreign colonies on the coast. It was also in their power, he indicated, when they considered the proper time had come, to make Hong Kong’s position most difficult. In a letter to the Foreign Office on 21 February 1945, asking for guidance about the future of the colony, the ambassador suggested that if the idea was to produce some scheme to make the British presence at Hong Kong more acceptable to the Chinese, “it would be advisable to have it ready to discuss with the Chinese at whatever time seemed to us appropriate”. Seymour also reported that the idea some Chinese had, which had been stated to the British officials, was that Britain should make the offer to return Hong Kong, subject to the proviso that British control should be retained for a certain period after the war.26 In May, the ambassador further calculated that any British efforts to retain Hong Kong could not count on American support. The Americans, he felt, “are likely to stoke up the Chinese appetite for Hong Kong rather than the reverse.”27 Seymour’s positive approach to the question of Hong Kong would certainly be most acceptable to the Chinese. But policy-makers in London felt that there were other important considerations to be taken into account before reaching a decision. The second view, held by certain die-hard British businessmen in China, was that Britain needed not only to retain the colony after the war, but to keep the New Territories for ever. A. B. Raworth, an old China hand who represented the General Electric Co. Ltd of England in Hong Kong and China, assured the British government that the future prospects for British trade in Hong Kong and with China were most favourable. The industrial awakening of China, he envisaged in a letter to the Foreign Office, would lead to the importation into China through Hong Kong of vast quantities of goods of practically every description. Because the existing lease did not offer encouragement for the expenditure of large amounts of capital on industrial enterprises, he suggested that the British government should therefore take the opportunity to “arrange for the tenure of the 'New Territories’ on a more permanent basis”. Raworth’s ignorance of Chinese nationalistic feeling after the relinquishing of foreign extraterritorial rights was also evident when he wrote that the victory over Japan would appear to offer a favourable background to the conclusion of those desirable and necessary treaties regarding the future of Hong Kong.28 Officials were convinced of the important role Hong Kong played in trade with China but did not think the suggestion of prolonging the tenure of the leased territories was practicable.29 The third opinion, put forward by Prime Minister Churchill was, in fact, the British government’s official attitude regarding the colony of Hong Kong. It insisted that the pre-war position of Hong Kong must be maintained. The feeling regarding this policy was shown in the 37

Prime Minister’s talk with General Hurley, the American ambassador to China, in London in April 1945. When the latter raised the question of the future of Hong Kong, Churchill at once pointed out that he would never yield an inch of territory that was under the British flag.30 The Foreign Office also dismissed Ambassador Seymour’s suggestion. The British attitude, the Foreign Office felt, should be “that Hong Kong is to remain exactly as before, and that there [is] nothing which needs discussion with the Chinese.” The British government’s best tactics therefore, in the Foreign Office’s view, would be to take no initiative in discussing Hong Kong’s future with the Chinese. “Our possessing of Hong Kong”, the Foreign Office summed up, “needs no apology or justification.”31 The British government’s intention of keeping Hong Kong was also consistently made public. In this context, Clement Attlee’s assurance of support for Churchill’s stance in the House of Commons on 8 November 1944 was perhaps most significant.32 It revealed that if Labour came to power, they would follow the Conservative line on the question of Hong Kong. London was aware of American resentment over its intentions towards post-war Hong Kong. The considerations and arguments prepared by Whitehall advisers to justify Britain’s policy in case of American challenges and Chinese demands were revealing. The Colonial Office suggested the need to stress the value of British administration in Hong Kong to all the Allied nations. W ith the return of British control after the war, it claimed, Hong Kong was able to play an important part in the restoration of the trade of China by providing a centre in which business could be conducted on a much more satisfactory basis than was likely to exist anywhere else in China in the immediate post-war period. This, it was believed, would have some appeal to the American and other foreign business communities.33 The Foreign Office wanted to emphasize that, having lost Hong Kong to the enemy, it was a point of national honour for Britain to recover it. It also indicated that Britain had a heavy responsibility in respect of Hong Kong towards all nations interested in the stability and welfare of the Far East. So the British government regarded it “as a national duty not only to recover the colony but to restore it to its state of order and prosperity.”34 The British government thus was not prepared to yield to any outside pressure over the issue of Hong Kong. From a political point of view, as far as Britain’s relations with China were concerned, Britain had every reason to return Hong Kong to China. To retain the colony against China’s will would certainly have harmed the British position in China. It was indeed this consideration which inclined Seymour in favour of returning Hong Kong to China, but the strategic position of Hong Kong in the Far East, and its value as a trade centre for Britain, weighed heavily in the British government’s 38

thinking on the future of the colony after the war. In January 1945, on the Colonial Office’s recommendation, two letters from the China Association were circulated for the consideration of the members of the War Cabinet Far Eastern Economic Sub-Committee. In the China Association’s view, it was important that Hong Kong should remain a British possession and be administered by the British because of the potential value to Britain of its future trade with China. To relinquish Hong Kong would “gravely jeopardise that trade”. It argued that the abolition of extraterritorial rights in China made it more necessary than ever that there was “a basis of law and order” where commerce could be carried on in accordance with recognized international standards and where the individual could feel that his possessions were safe. It would take years, the China Association felt, before Chinese law and the arrangements for its administration could be considered satisfactory. Hong Kong, therefore, was to rest firmly under the British Crown, “if our export trade with China is to flourish.” There were two other reasons why the Chinese Association felt the British government should keep Hong Kong after the war. To give up the colony, it indicated, the British would lose their valuable dock repair and shipbuilding industries, on which the re-establishment of British shipping interests in China and in East Asia depended. Hong Kong, the China Association further indicated, was an important centre for British insurance. It might well in future become an insurance centre for the whole of the Far East, thus maintaining a most valuable position in Britain’s invisible exports. On this point, the China Association’s view was remarkably prophetic.35 Clearly, the major importance of Hong Kong for the British lay in her position as the trade channel with China, the potential large market. To re-occupy Hong Kong was thus to be the important part of Britain’s overall efforts to re-establish her economic interests in the Far East after the war. The Chinese expected that Labour’s coming to power would pursue a more enlightened and liberal line, particularly in colonial policies. Ta Kong Pao, commenting on Labour’s victory in the general election, hoped for “a happy solution of such questions as Hong Kong”. 36 They were, however, disappointed. There was no indication at all of any change of policy regarding Hong Kong in the new government. On 11 August 1945, with the new Foreign Secretary’s approval, the Foreign Office instructed its Embassy in China that it was the British government’s policy to restore British sovereignty and administration immediately, and it was their purpose that for the initial period there should be military administration as soon as the duly authorised commander of the British or the Allied military or naval force could reach the Colony.37 When the Japanese suddenly laid down their arms on 14 August 1945, it was immediately decided that a British force should be sent to Hong Kong to 39

accept the surrender. Bevin, whose first concern regarding China when he became Foreign Secretary was the re-occupation of Hong Kong, agreed with Sterndale-Bennett that Chiang Kai-shek, the Supreme Commander in the China Theatre, should be informed, not consulted of this British action.38 Difficulties instantly arose. The Chinese government pointed out, with justification, that the British desire to re-occupy Hong Kong was not in accord with the general order of surrender which President Truman had sent to the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers. This stated that “the senior Japanese Commanders and all ground, sea and air auxiliary forces within China (excluding Manchuria), Formosa and French Indo-China north of 16 degrees north latitude shall surrender to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.” Hong Kong, the Chinese further indicated, was not included in the places to be surrendered to the Supreme Allied Commander of SEAC and it was in the area in which Japanese forces were to surrender to the Generalissimo of the China Theatre. The Chinese government declared that it respected all the legitimate British interests, and was prepared to accord them every necessary protection. But as a concerted plan of accepting the surrender of the Japanese force was essential to the restoration of peace of order in Asia, it was suggested that the British government should refrain from landing forces in any place in the China Theatre without getting the authority from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces.39 This Chinese obstruction on legal grounds forced the British to seek American support to overcome it. On 18 August 1945, the new Prime Minister urged President Truman to agree to the surrender of Hong Kong being accepted by the British. On the same day, Truman replied that he had no objection providing that full military co-ordination on operational matters was effected beforehand by the British with the Generalissimo. General MacArthur would be instructed to arrange for the surrender of Hong Kong to a British Commander whenever the co-ordination was effected. The United States President added that the Secretary of State had informed the Chinese Prime Minister Soong in Washington of this contemplated action, stating that it did not in any way represent United States’ views regarding the future status of Hong Kong.40 Truman’s reply therefore justified British landing of troops in Hong Kong. A further effect was that it greatly discouraged China’s efforts to resist the British retaking of Hong Kong. Two days later on 20 August, in his first speech as Foreign Secretary in the House of Commons, Bevin announced that steps had been taken on the British side to accept the surrender of Hong Kong.41 However, the problems had not been solved completely. Chiang Kai-shek now insisted that since he alone had legitimate rights to accept 40

the Japanese surrender in the China Theatre as the Supreme Commander, if the British wanted to accept the surrender in Hong Kong, he would delegate to a British officer the power to accept it. He would also nominate a Chinese and an American officer to participate. In telegraphing home Chiang’s message from Chungking, Sir Horace Seymour pointed out that it was a “typical face-saving compromise”. In his view, Chiang’s proposal did give London what it wanted without a dispute. London got British forces and the acceptance of surrender by a British officer. So the ambassador hoped the British government would accept it.42 Apparently, the British ambassador wished to minimize the adverse effect of British action in Hong Kong on Sino-British relations. The Chinese good will in returning British properties was essential. In London, General Ismay also felt that Chiang Kai-shek’s proposed compromise could be accepted. The Foreign Office, however, did not think Chiang’s suggestion was made only for “face” reasons. SterndaleBennett feared that “Chiang Kai-shek had put forward this compromise in order to put him in a good position for subsequent negotiations about Hong Kong.” If a British officer took over Hong Kong as the delegate of Chiang Kai-shek, Sterndale-Bennett told Bevin, Chiang might claim to go on exercising m ilitary authority over Hong Kong after the surrender. Bevin shared this fear.43 It is still difficult to access the real motives behind Chiang’s purpose but the Foreign Office certainly acted carefully. The Foreign Office replied to the Chinese government that the British government was not able to accept Chiang’s suggestion. But it would welcome the presence of a representative of Chiang Kai-shek in Hong Kong on the occasion of the surrender - a representative who would sign a surrender document “as witness”.44 Seymour met Chiang Kai-shek on 25 August but found that he was “unable to move him from his position”. Unwilling to give up, Chiang told the British ambassador that he regarded the issue concerning Hong Kong as “something of a test case”. He added that his proposal was appreciated by President Truman.45 Chiang’s obstinacy did have some effect on Sterndale-Bennett. He commented that “We should have good ground for proceeding with our arrangements to take the surrender in Hong Kong without regard for Chiang Kai-shek. But this would almost certainly land us into trouble with the Americans and it would embitter our relations with Chiang Kai-shek to an extent which might hinder us in the important task of re­ establishing our commercial interests in liberated China. We must therefore exhaust every possible means of reaching an agreement with Chiang Kai-shek.” The Foreign Office thus appeared to be willing to make some compromise. But meanwhile, Sterndale-Bennett advised that it was worth while making one more effort to get Chiang Kai-shek “to waive rather than to delegate the power” so as to accept surrender in Hong Kong.46 After consulting with Bevin, Sterndale-Bennett sent two 41

telegrams to Horace Seymour on 28 August 1945. The first expressed the view that it was the British government’s desire "to settle this question in complete agreement with Chiang Kai-shek”. It hoped that Chiang would not press his claim to delegate his authority in this matter. “It is fully within his power to waive it by unilateral action in favour of the Commander of the British force.”47 The second telegram outlined the Colonial Office’s suggested compromise on the British side if Chiang refused to waive his authority. It suggested that Rear-Admiral C. H. J. Harcourt, on behalf of the British government, should accept the surrender jointly with a British officer (preferably General L. C. Haynes, the General Officer commanding British troops in China) acting on behalf of Chiang Kai-shek. Any other Allied representatives present would then sign as witnesses.48 In a last effort to persuade Chiang Kaishek, Seymour, together with General Carton de Wiart, the British Prime Minister’s representative in China, followed the Generalissimo to his country home, but again found that he was “indignant” at what he regarded as British overriding of his rights as Commander-in-Chief of the China Theatre. Chiang refused to accept the Colonial Office’s proposal. In the opinion of these two senior British representatives in China, “the best course [for the British government] is to accept delegation of authority”. If Chiang Kai-shek was left feeling sore over Hong Kong, Seymour and General Carton de W iart warned, Britain must expect obstruction and ill-will not only during this crucial period, but also for a considerable time thereafter.49 A solution which satisfied both sides was finally found. On the Foreign Office’s advice, the British government decided that Admiral Harcourt would accept Japanese surrender not only on behalf of the British government, but equally on behalf of Chiang Kai-shek as China Theatre Commander. Chiang accepted this.50 A formal surrender ceremony in Hong Kong took place on 16 September 1945. With London’s subtle diplomatic skills, with the United States’s cooperation, and above all, with the British government’s determination, Hong Kong was again in British hands. The British determination to retake the colony, which they regarded as a symbol of their interests in the Far East, was indeed the important factor in achieving the goal. This attitude was maintained by the British Labour government throughout the post-war years. In 1946 there were some indications of the resurgence of Chinese national feelings over Hong Kong. At Sir Horace Seymour’s farewell luncheon on 20 June 1946, Chiang Kai-shek said that he wanted the British government to know that he hoped to see Hong Kong returned to China before long.51 One month later Dr. Wellington Koo, the Chinese ambassador in London, expressed similar concerns to the M inister of State, Philip Noel-Baker, in the absence of Bevin.52 Meanwhile, the Chinese press 42

became very active on the question of the colony. It seemed that these informal approaches would be followed by a formal request for the opening of negotiations on Hong Kong. The whole issue was, indeed, discussed again in London. In November 1946, both the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office reached the conclusion that the British government should “refrain from taking the initiative and offering to open negotiations with the Chinese” on the Hong Kong question.53 In the event, the Chinese government did not press the issue after civil war broke out in China in m id-1946. Chiang Kai-shek's efforts were then focused on the struggle for power with the Communists; therefore the question of Hong Kong had to be put to one side. Hong Kong’s most important value for Britain had always been trade. At the end of the Second World War, this importance was increased immensely. Both the British economic and financial position and the task of re-establishing British trading interests in the Far East made it most desirable for London to maintain the colony. In insisting on retaining Hong Kong, British officials, with the exception of Ambassador Sir Horace Seymour, ignored the growing Chinese nationalistic feelings. British interests in China, however, had to face them.

The Issue of the Opening of the Yangtse River and Chinese Nationalism British business interests in China after the war were faced with “the manifestation at every turn of an extreme form of nationalism”. 54 This was particularly demonstrated in respect of British shipping enterprise, which represented the most important part of British interests in China. In 1937, Britain’s shipping firms handled 36.5% of China’s foreign trade and 42.4% of its domestic trade.55 The British-controlled tonnage in the Chinese coastal, ocean and river trade was far greater than that of any other foreign power.56 British shipping experience was regarded by the British government as an important asset in the resumption of British competition in China’s market. Nevertheless, British shipping firms were probably most affected by the relinquishment of extraterritorial rights. Under the Sino-British Treaty of 1943, Britain surrendered all its navigation rights in Chinese waters and the British would no longer enjoy special rights in the treaty ports. In China’s eyes, the foreign flag on Chinese rivers was the symbol of Western imperialism in China. Such an intense nationalist sentiment caused great difficulties for British shipping firms in China. Immediately after the war was over, the Chinese refused to reopen the Yangtse River ports to British ships. British vessels were not allowed to operate in the Chinese rivers,57 although in October 1945, owing to a serious shortage of Chinese 43

shipping for distribution of relief supplies arriving under the auspices of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), the Chinese government agreed to allow 15 British coastal and river vessels (representing a total of some 45,500 tons) to carry supplies to the coastal ports of China. On 28 M ay 1946, on the eve of his departure from China, the British Ambassador Sir Horace Seymour delivered a memorandum to the Chinese Foreign Minister Dr. Wang Shih-chieh, requesting the Yangtse River be opened to British flag shipping.58 The Chinese Executive Yuan agreed with the British Embassy that large scale importation of material from abroad was really necessary in China’s present reconversion period. In June, it decided that four ports on the Yangtse River - Nanking, Wuhu, KiuKiang and Hankow - would be opened “for shipping coming from outside China to load and unload cargo”. While foreign shipping could be in transit through any Chinese port, no additional cargo might be loaded or passengers taken on, and when they left China they might not take on interport cargo or passengers. In addition, such shipping had to apply for registration and had to be registered two weeks before entering a port. The British Embassy in Chungking was informed that the period for these new conditions would be one year only. Even this temporary resolution, however, was actively opposed by the rival Chinese shipping interests. As a result of this opposition, British shipping was still refused on the Yangtse.59 W hen the new British Ambassador, Stevenson, arrived in China in August 1946, the position of British shipping became very difficult. He admitted that “there is no present basis for official negotiations”. Unable to suggest “any positive action” on the part of the British govern­ ment to assist British shipping interests, Stevenson concluded that “it is for the firms themselves to make what arrangements they can, with official support from time to time if desirable.” While pointing out the serious position of British shipping firms, the new ambassador appeared to be unable to make a sober estimation of the strong Chinese nationalism focused on the foreign shipping issues. He tended to feel that the shipping difficulties were due to “the idiosyncrasies of the Chinese ‘face’”. He could not understand why “the more enlightened” Chinese leaders, such as Dr. T. V. Soong, should insist on a Chinese post­ treaty concept of sovereignty which Stevenson described as based on “nonsensical arguments”. On the other hand, Stevenson did correctly recognize that in attempting to supplant British shipping enterprise, the Chinese wanted to establish themselves in a strong position for the time when trade was resumed.60 Chinese nationalism after the war arose largely from the abolition of the unequal treaties with the foreign powers during the war. For the first time since the opium wars, China attained her long-sought-for status of full equality amongst all nations. The era of the unequal treaties and of 44

foreign oppression and humiliation, in Chinese eyes, had ended once and for all. This feeling was given a considerable impetus by the war. After the defeat ofJapan, China, from being a third-rate power before the war, now sat in the United Nations with her war Allies as one of the five permanent members of the Security Council, having a leading voice in world affairs. The new China was naturally very sensitive to any signs of attempts by foreign powers to get back their old rights. The Foreign Office recognized that there existed in China a general nationalist feeling after the war. Kitson defined it as “a rigid insistence on the strict letter and spirit of China’s sovereign rights and national integrity”. Kitson pointed out that requests for help or cooperation, which Britain normally granted friendly powers and former allies without question, were rigidly scrutinized by the Chinese government, and, as likely as not, curtly rejected because they contravened China’s conception of her sovereign rights in some way. He claimed that China “is ‘leaning over backward’ ”.61 Kitson appeared to judge Chinese nationalism by old standards. The prescription he would give for the problem was the “traditional mixture of patience combined with firmness”. As to the proper blending of these two ingredients, he advised, much must be left to the man on the spot, with due consideration for the occasion which called for its application and the persons with whom he was dealing. As patience tended to become exhausted, a greater measure of firmness would probably be found necessary.62 On 28 January 1947, when Stevenson directly asked the Generalissimo about the opening of the Yangtse River, Chiang Kai-shek replied that if the policy was changed the Communists would immediately stir up public opinion as they had over the Sino- American commercial treaty. The government, Chiang said, could not in present circumstances risk taking a step which would lay them open to clamorous public criticism. Ironically therefore, Chiang Kai-shek used the Communists as a shield to resist the British demand. On the other hand, Chiang suggested that it might be possible to run the ships on a joint Sino-British basis even with British control but under China’s flag.63 Chiang’s suggestion was agreed by Stevenson and thus suited both British shipping interests and Chinese nationalism. In the meantime, the British government tried to meet Chinese demands on the issue of British warships in Chinese waters. After the surrender of Japan, British warships were sent to remove internees and prisoners of war. By the beginning of 1946, the work was coming to an end. According to the Sino-British Treaty of 1943, British war vessels no longer had a right to stay in Chinese ports. The Chinese government’s position was that foreign naval vessels wishing to enter a Chinese port must seek permission before doing so. On 16 January 1946, the British Embassy in Chungking received a memorandum from the Commander-in-Chief of the British Pacific Fleet 45

in Hong Kong, General Bruce Fraser, which advocated a permanent stay of British naval forces in China. In General Fraser’s view, the object of the British Pacific Fleet on China’s coast was “the furtherance of British trade”. There were various ways in which the British Pacific Fleet could assist, i.e., communications, anti-piracy, clearing mines, air-sea rescue, etc. To cover these requirements, the Commander-in-Chief suggested that one cruiser and two destroyers would need to be maintained at Shanghai. There was also likely to be a second cruiser from time to time, visiting only.64 Fraser’s views were echoed by the British Embassy Naval Attache in Shanghai, who likewise emphasized that the warship escort for British-owned vessels “would give us the opportunity to show the flag up-river and make contact with British interests”.65 These statements suggested that the Naval people were still operating psychologically in the days of unequal treaties and gunboats. Seymour showed much better understanding of Chinese sentiment than General Fraser. The Chinese, he commented, “are jealous of their new independence in these matters.” He, therefore, could not believe that the Chinese government “would acquiesce in permanent maintenance of British warships at Shanghai.”66 The Embassy was apparently not in favour of the Commander-in-Chief’s suggestions. On 16 January, he telegraphed Fraser’s whole memorandum with his own comments, marked top secret, to the Foreign Office, suggesting that “the whole matter requires examination in London from the political point of view.”67 Foreign Office officials were not in sympathy with General Fraser’s proposal either. Kitson indicated that “C-in-C evidently belongs to the old school.”68 In a letter to the Admiralty on 1 February 1946, he wrote, “we feel that Admiral Fraser does not make out a very convincing case for the continued presence of H.M. ships on the China coast, as distinct from courtesy visits to China coast ports. It is certainly not a case that we could argue convincingly with the Chinese.” Kitson further pointed out that, if the British government met Chinese feelings in this matter by acknow­ ledging, by formal withdrawal of British ships, that Britain no longer had a right to station ships on the China coast, the Chinese would very probably feel that “face” - and honour - had been satisfied, and “proceed to give us ungrudgingly the majority of the facilities we want, under the guise of courtesy visits.” Kitson concluded that “to insist on remaining indefinitely in Shanghai, as the Admiral proposes to do would ... be a serious mistake, and might well affect our relations with the Chinese in other matters”. He suggested that suitable instructions could soon be sent by the Admiralty to General Fraser.69 This Foreign Office approach to the whole issue was undoubtedly a wise one for long-term British interests in China. It also suggested that Britain was willing to treat China on the basis of equality. It was only the serious threat of the outbreak of the civil war in China which compelled the Foreign Office to modify its position on the 46

question of British naval forces there. In May 1946, the political situation in China greatly deteriorated with the report of a possible local Communist rising in Shanghai. On 22 May 1946, Kitson proposed British warships should be kept in Shanghai for as long as possible. At present, he explained, they irritated the Chinese. Yet this factor, which would operate in favour of withdrawal, “is at present outweighed by the potential danger to British life and property in the event of a local outbreak of disorder if the Kuomintang-Communist dispute came to a head in widespread civil war.” In the event of such an outbreak, he claimed, apart from the moral effect of the ships in the river, landing parties would be available for protection if British lives were endangered.70 Subsequently, London maintained its warships in China throughout the civil war until the clash with Communist forces on the Yangtse River in April 1949. The British effort to rehabilitate their business interests in China was, to a great extent, discouraged by the outbreak of the Chinese civil war in 1946. The general conditions for British firms became more difficult as Chinese inflation went out of control as a result of the war. The unstable situation also added to the existing difficulties for Anglo-Chinese trade. In October 1946, a British trade mission, after visiting China, reached the conclusion that so long as the civil war continued it would remain impossible to bring about a great expansion of trade between the two countries.71 The political situation in China also hampered the re­ establishment of British manufacturing industry there. After the war, the British Embassy Commercial Counsellor John Hutchison estimated that a further investment of £20,000,000 would suffice to rehabilitate British assets in China to the value of £170,000,000.72 But in view of the “gloomy outlook” in China and also Britain’s own balance of payments position, neither the Treasury nor the Board of Trade was in favour of investment there.73 Accordingly, an application from the General Electric Company, Ltd for £17,000 to restore its factory in China was refused.74 British firms who resumed activities were also reluctant to invest any further money and waited until the situation grew clearer. W hen the Second World War was over, London regarded its interests in China as “purely commercial”. 75 The aim of the British government’s policy towards China during the immediate post-war period was thus to re-establish its business position. By striving to regain their pre-war properties, to retain the colony of Hong Kong, and to maintain Britain’s shipping interests, both the British government and its businessmen in China felt that in a short time Britain would be in a position to re-enter the China market on an actively competitive scale. At this point, Britain’s policy was aptly described as one of “exploration and preparation”.76 However, when the Chinese political situation deteriorated in 1946, British interests in China became increasingly dependent upon the 47

outcome of the conflict between the Kuomintang and the Communists. The British government’s attitude towards the Chinese internal dispute will be discussed in the next chapter.

Notes 1. 2.

3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

Quoted from Ritchie Ovendale (ed.), T he Foreign Policy o f the B ritish L ab o u r G overnments, 1 9 4 5 -1 9 5 1 (Leicester Univ. Press, 1984), p. 3. FO 371/46263 U E813/813/53, 30 Mar. 1945. F.O. memo “T h e Effect o f O ur External Financial Position on O u r Foreign Policy” by J. E. Coulson, to the British representatives abroad. FO 371/46213 F7205/186/10. Record of Bevin’s talk with Soong, 17 Sept. 1945. Quoted from F O 371/53565 F8984/25/10. F.O. memo by G .V .K itso n , 17 June 1946. CH AS/M CP/45. Ibid., 27 June 1945. Ibid., China Association to F.O. 3 July 1945. CH A S/M C P/45. M inutes of General C om m ittee meeting o f 27 Ju n e 1945. See also agreed minutes of a meeting held at the F.O. with the C hina association on 16 Oct. 1945. F O 371/53565 F8984/25/10. M em o “China Policy” by Kitson, 17 June 1946; CAMC N o. 46/G /36, 23 M ay 1946. Quoted from C H A S/M C P/45, Sterndale-Bennett to the China Association, 13 Oct. 1945. F O 371/53565 F8984/25/10, 17 June, 1946. FO 371/F10095/ 917/10. F O 371/53565 F8984/25/10. M em o by Kitson, 17 June 1946. FO371/53609 F 11993/61/10. W allinger to F.O. 11 July 1946. T h e British Embassy moved with the Chinese governm ent back to N anking in June 1946. Ibid., minute by Kitson. H.C. Debs. V.418, C.230; H .C . Debs, V.423. C.2039. FO 371/63610 F 17059/61/10. M inutes by Kitson 22 Nov. 1946. FO371/63408 F6226/509/10. Lamb to A.L. Scott, 11 April 1947. FO 371/53565 F8999/25/10. M em o by Kitson, 1 Mar. 1946. F O 371/53565 F8999/25/10. M inute by Sargent, 4 M arch 1946. Ibid. M inute by Stevenson, 13 June 1946. F O 371/53672 F 15369/1384/10. M em o by the Foreign Office C hina Department, 18 Oct. 1946. F O 371/46232 F 1331/409/10. M inute by H all-Patch, 11 M arch 1945. F O 371/63282 F846/28/10 M em o by Kitson 21 Jan. 1947. CAB134/281 FE(0)(46)122. M em o 5 Dec. 1946. FO 371/46251 F 1543/1147/10. Seymour to Sterndale-Bennett, 21 Feb. 1945. FO 371/46251 F 3 171/1147/10. Top secret, Seymour to Sterndale-B ennett, 8 May 1945.

48

28. 29. 30.

FO 371/46251 F 3 111/1147/10. R aw orth to the F.O., 18 May 1945. Ibid. M inute by Brewis.

Q uoted from Sir Llewellyn W oodw ard, B ritish Foreign Policy in the Second W orld W ar, V.IV (1975), pp. 539-540.

31. 32. 33. 34. 35.

36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49.

50. 51. 52. 53.

54. 55. 56.

F O 371/46251 F1543/1147/10. M inute by Brewis, 14 May 1945. H .C . Debs. Vol.404, C.1352-1353. F O 371/46251 FE(45)20. Colonial Office memo, 28 Feb. 1945. FO 371/46251 F2382/1147/10. Brief by the F.O. for H urley’s visit. 3 April 1945; F.O. memo for British delegation o f San Francisco, 14 April 1945. CAB96/8 FE(E)(45)4 11 Jan. 1945. E.M . Gall, Secretary of the China Association to the Colonial Office, 27 M ay 1943; W.B. Kennett, Chairman of the Association to C.O., 23 Nov. 1944. Q uoted from F O 371/46232 F4649/409/10. Seymour to F.O. 30 July 1945. FO 371/46251 F5063/1147/10. F.O. to Seymour, 11 Aug. 1945. F O 371/46252 F5235/1147/10. M inutes by Sterndale-Bennett and Bevin, 14 August 1945; F.O. to Seymour, 14 August 1945. FO 371/46252 F5236/1147/10. Seym our to F.O. 16 August 1945. FO 371/46252 F5557. Trum an to Attlee, Personal and Top secret, 18 Aug. 1945. H .C . Debs. Vol.413, C.298. FO 371/46252 F5589/1147/10. Seym our to F.O. 23 Aug. 1945. FO 371/46252 F5941/1147/10. See minute by Sterndale-Bennett, 27 August 1945. Ibid. F.O. to Seymour, 25 August 1945. FO 371/46253 F5865/1147/10. Seym our to F.O. 27 Aug. 1945. FO 371/46253 F5865/1147/10. M inute by Sterndale-Bennett, 28 Aug. 1945. Ibid., F.O. to Seymour N o 1001, 28 Aug. 1945. Ibid. N o , 1002. F O 371/46253 F6046 F 6185/1147/10. Seymour and Carton de W iart to F.O. 30 Aug. 1945; F6185/1147/10 C arton de W iart to Ismay, personal, 30 Aug. 1945. FO 371/46254 F6189/1147/10. Seymour to F.O. 1 Sept. 1945. F O 371/53566 F10316/25/10. Seymour to Bevin, 20 June 1946. F O 371/53565 F10070/25/10. F.O. to Seymour, 27 June 1946. CAB134/281 FE(0)(46)122, 29 Nov. 1946. Joint memo by the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office for the Far Eastern (O) Committee, “T he Future of H ong Kong”; CAB134/279 FE (0)(46) M inutes of 14th meeting. F O 371/53565 F8984/25/10. M em o by Kitson, 17 June 1946. CAB96/8 FE(E)(45)18, m em o by the W ar Cabinet Far Eastern Economic Sub-com m ittee, 26 Feb 1945. Ibid. According to the British W ar C abinet Far Eastern Economic SubC om m ittee figures, in 1936 and 1937, British Commonwealth interests in coastal shipping between Chinese ports owned 305,000 tons against 300,000 tons Chinese, 213,000 Japanese and 12,000 U nited States. They further owned 139,000 tons of shipping based on China and trading with the O rient. W ith regard to river navigation the British had on the Yangtse 65,000 tons against 80,000 Chinese and Japanese 35,000; while on the C anton river, British controlled all 17,000 tons.

49

57.

F O 371/63275 F7458/26/10. See memo by Chungking Embassy, 12 M ay 1947.

58. 59.

Ibid. Ibid.

60.

F O 371/53582 F O 371/53564 F O 371/53565 F O 371/63274 F O 371/53577 F O 371/53577 F O 371/53577

61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76.

F 11887/34/10. Stevenson to F.O., 15 August 1946. F7701/25/10. Memo by Kitson, 23 May 1946. F8984/25/10. Memo by Kitson, 17 June 1946. F2646/26/10. Stevenson to Dening, 29 Jan. 1947. F971/34/10. Top secret, Seymour to F.O., 16 Jan. 1946. F1519/34/10. Seymour to F .O , 26 Jan. 1946. F971/34/10. Top secret, Seymour to F.O., 16 Jan. 1946.

Ibid. Ibid. M inute by Kitson, 29 Jan. 1946. Ibid. Kitson to Synnott, Admiralty, 1 Feb. 1946. Ibid. M inute by Kitson, 22 May 1946.

Q uoted from Evan Luard, p. 131. See F O 371/63413 F 11699/585/10. Scott to Lamb, 2 Sept. 1947. Ibid. Ibid.

F O 371/53672 F 15359/384/10. Memo by China D epartm ent of the Foreign Office, 18 O ct 1946. F O 371/53565 F8984/25/10. Memo by F.O. China D epartm ent, 17 June 1946.

50

C H A P T E R

THREE

British Attitudes Towards the Kuomintang-Communist Dispute The dispute between the Communists and the KMT government became more acute when the war with Japan ended. In August 1945, General Chu Teh, the Commander-in-Chief of all Communist forces, ordered his army to accept the surrender of the Japanese and puppet forces and to seize all towns, cities, and communication centres occupied by the enemy. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek immediately issued a counter-order to the Communists, demanding their forces “to remain in their posts and wait for farther instruction”. 1 In the meantime, the United States set out to assist in transporting Chiang’s troops by air and sea to strategic points in East and North China. About 53,000 American marines landed directly in Peking, Tientsin and other key ports to facilitate the movement of the KMT forces. Washington also ordered the Japanese army to surrender only to Chiang Kai-shek. With American assistance, the KMT government re-established its authority in Central, East and South China and occupied most important cities and lines of communication in North China. The Communists then concentrated in the countryside of North China. It was at this time that the Communists made the critical decision to move their troops into Manchuria, which was under Soviet occupation. Clearly, it was the United States and the Soviet Union who were able to play the most important role in Chinese politics. The British government played little role in the KM TCommunist negotiations for a political settlement of their differences from the end of the war to mid-1946 when the civil war broke out. Its policy was strictly non-interventionist. This policy was, in fact, formulated in the late Second World War period. This chapter seeks to examine the British government’s attitudes towards the Chinese Communists in the first post-war years and the sources of misunder­ standing of the nature and intentions of the Chinese Communist Party. It further attempts to analyze London’s attitudes towards both the K M T-CCP strife and American mediation efforts.

51

The Sympathy of British Officials for the Chinese Communists The views of British officials regarding the Chinese Communists were deeply rooted in the Second World War years. Despite the KMT government’s blockade, there were a few foreigners who visited or lived in the Communist controlled areas and from whom both the British Chungking Embassy and the Foreign Office learnt about the regime. Significantly, all their reports, without exception, were favourable to the Communist leaders and their policies. These interesting reports included one from M. C. A. M. Broudgeest, a Netherlands national; one from two European travellers, Rene D’Anjon and George Uhlmann, who visited Yenan; one from William Band, a British academic, who lived with his wife in the Communist base areas from the outbreak of the Pacific W ar till March 1944; one from Gunther Stein, the only Briton among a group of five foreign journalists who visited Yenan in summer 1944 after their long campaign for permission; and more than one from Michael Lindsay, press attaché to Britain’s Embassy in 1940 and who worked for Yenan radio for more than three years during the war.2 Ambassador Sir Horace Seymour and other members of the Embassy were very much impressed by what they were told. On the two European travellers’ reports, Seymour commented that “There seems little doubt that the agrarian policy of the Communists had proved superior to that of the Kuomintang in the economic security and social well being it has brought to the masses of the population.”3 Having talked with William Band, former professor of Physics at Yenching University in Peking, Sir Horace commented that: Mr. Band confirms that favourable view which all previous foreign observers have expressed regarding the Chinese Communists and their administration. He agrees with the general opinion regarding the success of the Communist policy in regard to such matters, in particular, as the enlistment of the support of the peasants for the 8th Route Army [The Communist army]; the reduction of taxes and abolition of illegal levies; the limitation of rentals; the elimination of corruption; freedom of speech and belief; promotion of universal education; and an effective system of democratic government. He emphasizes, as others have done, that the very success of this policy has won for the Communist leaders the enthusiastic support of all classes of the people. One cannot but be impressed by the unanimity of those observers who have reported upon the Communist adminis­ tration, and it is worthy of note that the majority of them have been people of long experience of China.4

52

These reports on the Chinese Communists were regarded by the Foreign Office as very important. Together with the Embassy’s observations, they created a very good impression of the Chinese Communists in the minds of the officials. In September 1945, SterndaleBennett, head of the Far Eastern Department, briefed Ernest Bevin that the Chinese Communists were capable of developing into a rival government in China. “They have their own administration and army and in contrast to the old ‘warlords’, they have a policy [that] appeals to great numbers of Chinese and has made an appeal to a number of foreign observers also.”5Thus upon becoming the Foreign Secretary Bevin’s first knowledge about the Communists in China was, significantly, favourable. These views were further strengthened by G. V. Kitson, who took over the Far Eastern Department when Sterndale-Bennett left in early 1946. The policy which the Communists carried out in their areas, wrote the former Chinese Secretary of the Embassy, “proved a complete success in winning the support of the people”. Without this full support, he indicated, the Communists could scarcely have survived against both the Japanese and the Chungking government during the past nine years.6 British officials tended to compare the conditions they saw in Kuomintang China with those in the Communist region. Seymour was convinced that the peasants, who formed the great majority of the Chinese population, “enjoy in most Communist areas a degree of security, both social and economic, such as would hardly be possible under existing Kuomintang auspices.”7 Apparently, the Communists won the sympathy of the British by their moderate policies and great achievement in their areas. Sympathy for the Yenan administration was also a consequence of the misunderstanding of the nature and intentions of the Chinese Communist Party. Through the war period and until almost the end of 1946, senior officials in London held the view that the Chinese Communists were not orthodox Communists. Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr (later Lord Inverchapel), Britain’s ambassador in China until 1942, thought of the Chinese Communists as “agrarian reformers”. 8 Clark-Kerr’s view was shared by other Embassy officials in Chungking. In a memorandum of July 1943, Sir Eric Teichman, the Embassy Counsellor, wrote: The Chinese Communists represent a rival Chinese National party group rather than a communist Party interested in class war and world revolution of the type of the formers days. They claim to be the party representing democracy and reform in China, and advertise the fact that, far from being 100 percent communist, their administration is based on principles of popular representations in which members of the Communists Party may not occupy more than one-third of the total seats in their elected bodies and popular assemblies.9 53

In the Foreign Office, Ashley Clarke, the head of the Far Eastern Department until October 1944, agreed with this Embassy assessment of the nature and intentions of the Chinese Communists. When he was asked by the Foreign Office Research Department to comment on a Handbook paper on China in April 1943, Clarke expressed his disagreement with the author’s view that the Chinese Communists “were adherents to the Marxist programme of world proletarian revolution”. T heir principal purpose, he minuted, was to bring about an agrarian revolution inside China and the Yenan movement was different from Communism as practised in the Soviet Union. On 30 April, he wrote to G. F. Hudson arguing that “Chinese Communism is a brand sui generis ... its adherents are more interested in an agrarian new deal in China than in a world revolution”. 10 There were some officials in the Foreign Office, however, who believed that the Chinese Communists were dedicated Communists. Hudson believed that however moderate their immediate programme might be, the Chinese Communists were not fundamentally different from Soviet Russians. On 1 May, in a most perceptive letter to Ashley Clarke, he declared: I know that the view that Chinese Communism is quite different from Russian is widely held, but it seems to me to arise from a misunder­ standing of the theory of communist tactics. It is essential to communist theory that the immediate short-term programme in any country must be adapted to the particular circumstances and political situation, but this does not imply any difference in the fundamental doctrine. An authoritative expression of communist ideas, Hudson pointed out, was the pamphlet by Mao Tse-tung entitled “The New Democracy”, written in 1940. This pamphlet, in Hudson’s view, made it quite clear that Mao at any rate regarded Chinese Communism as part of the world proletarian revolution and that its aim was to establish in China the same economic and political system which existed in the USSR, though owing to the backwardness of China there must be a transitional period in which the Communists would be ready to cooperate with the Kuomintang, provided they were given a share in the government, until such time as they were ready to push out the Kuomintang and suppress them.11 Hudson’s perception of the intentions of the Communists in China was remarkable, and was endorsed by A. L. Scott of the Far Eastern Department.12 Opinion, nevertheless, was still divided amongst British Far Eastern experts in London. Hudson and Scott were in the minority at the time. The majority, and particularly senior members of the Foreign Office and high-ranking politicians in the government, maintained that the Chinese 54

Communists were not genuine Communists. In March 1945, SterndaleBennett informed Anthony Eden that the Chinese Communists “are not Communists in the usual sense of the word nor are they a political party in the usual sense”. 13 In September, exactly the same things were said to the new Foreign Secretary Bevin, also by Bennett.14 During 1946 the view that the Chinese Communists were not Communists in the Marxist-Leninist sense was widely spread in Whitehall through Kitson’s many minutes and memoranda.15 The misconception of the nature of the Chinese Communist movement was due to a number of assumptions and factors. In the first place, it was believed that there had been a fundamental change in the Communist policy after the Long March. Kitson held that the Chinese Communists were Marxist-Leninists after the split of 1927, which resulted in the setting-up of the Kiangsi Soviet. After the Long March, however, and the re-establishment of the Communist headquarters in Yenan, in Shensi province, the Communists had developed a policy of agrarian reform which, in its application to a rural or peasant economy, “we should probably regard as not incompatible with social democracy”.16 Kitson’s recognition of the difference of the present communist programmes in Yenan from those in their former days was certainly correct, but he tended to confuse the Communists’ realistic adjustment to the Chinese environment with the abandonment of their ultimate goals, and to identify tactical moves with permanent change. Mao Tse-tung had defined the Chinese society as “a colonial, semi­ colonial and semi-feudal society”.17The Communist revolution in such a society, in his view, had to go through two stages: first, the bourgeoisdemocratic revolution and, second, the socialist revolution. Socialism was many years away.18 The communists therefore claimed that they supported Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s “Three People’s Principles”, the objectives of the Kuomintang revolution.19 What Mao insisted on in his writings and what Kitson overlooked was that the three principles of the people were only the minimum programme for the Communist revolution. The Communists differed from the KMT in their ultimate goals. Kitson, however, failed to distinguish this fundamental difference between the two parties. In a memorandum of 23 May 1946, he wrote that the Chinese Communists supported in their public statements Dr. Sun Yatsen’s “Three People’s Principles”; they differed, however, from the KMT “in the manner of implementing his ‘Principle of Democracy’”. The Communists, he claimed, differed from the KMT in their conception and practice of democracy mainly to the extent that the KMT sought to impose democracy from above and hoped that, by precept and example, it would gradually seep through to the masses; whereas the Communists began by educating the masses individually in self-government, and then encouraged the leaven of political consciousness thus created to do its 55

own work in building up a structure of self-government ascending through the villages, districts, and provinces to the top.20 Kitson might not have been completely ignorant of the Communist theory, but it was certain that he underestimated the importance of ideology within the Chinese Communist revolution. The Foreign Office Research Department’s sober perception was, to a great extent, based on their knowledge of the Communist theory and the long bitter ideological struggle between the Communist party and the Kuomintang. This was demonstrated by their memorandum of M ay 20, 1944, entitled “The Ideological Conflict between the Kuomintang and Communist Parties”. It argued that the misconception about the Chinese Communists which existed was not the fault of the Communists, who stoutly maintained that their ultimate aim was the realization in China of the fall MarxistCommunist programme. The achievement of Dr Sun’s “Three People’s Principles”, it rightly pointed out, was to the Communists “only the beginning of the revolutionary process and not its final purpose.”21 Officials in the Research Department believed that the Chinese Communists were genuine Communists also because they did not consider the Yenan administration as a democracy. Hudson thought that the Communists did not think of “democracy” as a system which gave a chance to opposition parties. “W hat is really meant by the ‘democracy’ of the Communists”, he minuted, “is that they are strongly supported by the poorer peasantry who are the ‘masses’ in rural China.”22 The misjudgment of the Chinese Communists was also due to the fact that there was no formal connection between Yenan and Moscow at that time. There had been no official relations between the Chinese Communists and Moscow during the Sino-Japanese War. This fact was confirmed by all foreign observers who visited Yenan. The Soviet war assistance for China went to the Chungking government alone. The signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty in 1945 further displayed the lack of interest of the Soviet authority in Yenan. On the relations between Yenan and Moscow, Seymour observed that, “The extent to which the socalled Communist Party in China is inspired by or associated with Moscow or other political headquarters in the USSR is a matter of frequent discussion. It would probably be safe to say that it is at present a movement sui generis, having sprung from orthodox Soviet Communist seeds, and aiming eventually at orthodox end, but having in its present phase matured into a hardy Chinese product, unreceptive to outside and particularly foreign, interference.” The Communists in China might therefore, in his view, be classified rather in the light of an opposition or rebel element in the internal life of China than as a subordinate or associated group in a wider field under the captaincy of a nominee from Moscow.23 As it was generally assumed at that time that any dedicated Communist party would have support from or be subordinate to Soviet 56

Russia, Yenan’s independent position easily led observers to think that the Chinese Communists were not truly Communists. The misinterpretation of the Chinese Communists arose also from the Foreign Office’s traditional criteria of the nature of a political party. In their judgement of a political party, officials in the Foreign Office tended to emphasize the policies presently being carried out by the party. Kitson minuted on 25 November 1945 that “I usually understand a 'Communist’ to mean a person adhering to and practising Marx-Leninist doctrines. The Chinese Communists are far from that”.24 This judgement reflected the traditional pragmatism of British civil servants. The press in Britain in the first post-war years was, on the whole, in sympathy with the Chinese Communists.25 The views expressed by Michael Lindsay, who returned to London with his unrivalled experience in and knowledge about Yenan, in The Times and by Gunther Stein in the News Chronicle in 1945 were most influential.26 The Times's leader, for instance, commented on 25 January 1945 that “The Yenan system is not communism; it resembles an agrarian democracy.”27 The same view was expressed by other newspapers.28 To sum up, the British sympathetic attitude towards the Chinese Communists in 1945 and 1946 was largely a response to the remarkable achievement by the Communists in their controlled areas and a misunderstanding about the nature of the Yenan revolution. This attitude inevitably influenced British policy vis-à-vis the dispute between the Communists and the Kuomintang government.

The British Decision for Non-intervention in China and the Moscow Declaration of December 1945 One of the earliest expressions of the British Foreign Office’s attitude visà-vis the KMT-Communist dispute could be found in the minutes of the head of the Far Eastern Department of 19 October 1943. Disquieted by the prospect of the resumption of civil war in China, Ashley Clarke minuted that Britain must use its influence when the time came in favour of a peaceful unification of China, however difficult it might now seem: “it would avoid a prolonged period of disorder disadvantageous to the peace of the F. E. and the Communists might leaven the fascist tendencies of the KMT lump.”29 This suggestion was important as it evidently showed that the British government had both the interest and the willing­ ness to bring the KMT and the Communists together. Nevertheless, so far during the war, British policy towards Chinese domestic conflict had been chiefly governed by concern over Chiang Kai-shek’s intervention in Indian affairs. In a personal message to Chiang in August 1942, Prime M inister Churchill declared that “the best rule for Allies to follow is not 57

to interfere in each other’s internal affairs”. He asserted that “we are resolved in everything to respect the sovereign right of China, and we have abstained from even the slightest comment when CommunistKuomintang differences were most acute.”30 Indeed, the British govern­ ment maintained a policy of non-interference in China during the Second World War. The question of British mediation for Chinese unification was not seriously raised in the Foreign Office until October 1944. On 21 October, Sterndale-Bennett asked ambassador Seymour’s advice on British policy towards the Chinese internal dispute, proposing British intervention. He told Seymour that, for the purpose of peaceful unification in China, it was necessary for Britain to exercise her influence both on the central government and on the Communists. The British government might be able, he suggested, to add pressure on Chiang Kai-shek and say that if his government wanted to be treated as a government of China and as one of the Big Four, they must come to an understanding with the Communists. As to the Communists, he asked the ambassador whether it was, in his view, feasible to establish direct contacts with the Yenan regime, in order to “cultivate the Chinese Communists and to do what we can to bring about a reconciliation between them and the KMT for the sake of Chinese independence and unity”. 31 The aim of British intervention in China was thus to keep China away from Russian influence. This was the first important suggestion by the British government to take an active part in promoting Chinese unity. However, the Foreign Office did not fully realize the British position in China. From Chungking, Sir Horace Seymour expressed the view that he could not see how Britain could bring about an agreement between the KMT and the Communists. In replying to the Foreign Office on 7 November, Seymour indicated that there was little chance for British involvement. British intervention would be resented by the Chinese government, and Chiang Kai-shek would certainly refuse the British request to establish direct relations with Yenan. Britain’s position in China, he pointed out, was quite different from America’s. Owing to American operations in the Chinese theatre, the United States govern­ ment, he said, had a better locus standi than London. Moreover, the Chinese looked to the United States far more than to Britain for post-war help. In his view, Britain could not intervene unless the Americans asked her to do so; even in that event, he felt, combined pressure would very likely defeat its own object. The ambassador concluded, “I only wish I could recommend an ideal cure for the present situation, but I do not think there is one.”32 Clearly, as the British government was not in a position to provide large military and economic assistance to China, it lacked a sufficient influence on the Chinese government. By the beginning of 1945, a new consideration had emerged in British 58

decision-making. The K M T-CCP negotiations in Chungking had just broken down and the harmful effect of American intervention seemed to have become clear. This development gave grounds for doubts about the wisdom of foreign intervention in the Chinese Communist problem. Scott, whose views were strongly and consistently influenced by his conviction that the Chinese Communists were orthodox Communists, was not in favour of foreign intervention. The Americans, he pointed out, tried to bring pressure to bear on Chiang Kai-shek over the KMT and Communist negotiations, and experienced a serious check. In his view, Chiang Kai-shek was admitted, even by the Communists, to be the only person to whom all Chinese would still rally, and he would not tolerate foreign pressure to make him agree to what he considered intolerable conditions. The Communists for their part, elated by American backing, appeared to be stepping up their demands to an extent which might render agreement impossible. Scott also warned of the dangers of Russian involvement. He did not believe that the Chinese Communists were not acting under Soviet guidance, but if they were acting independently of the USSR, he felt American intervention would be likely to stimulate the Russians to follow suit. Scott therefore believed that “interference on our part can only do more harm than good.” 33 At Malta in February 1945, American Secretary of State Edward Stettinius made the suggestion that the British, Soviet and United States governments should make every effort to bring about agreement between Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists. He also told Eden that President Roosevelt doubted whether the British wanted Chinese unity. The British Foreign Secretary immediately replied that the British government was most anxious that unity should be secured in China.34The Foreign Office discussed the American Secretary of State’s plea. Sir H. Prideaux-Brune stressed the need for the foreign powers’ influence in promoting the unification of China. If left to themselves, the Chinese might take years to reach a compromise, he thought. He also felt that it seemed quite unlikely that the Americans could succeed single-handedly on the basis of their present monopoly of the affairs of China. If America’s present single-handed endeavours to aid China were placed on an Allied basis, he suggested, it would be another matter. “I feel sure that our influence could help”, he wrote.35 Prideaux-Brune’s optimism seemed to have been based on the belief that the British had much longer experiences in China than the Americans and therefore Britain’s participation would secure a better chance for Chinese unity. Sterndale-Bennett, on the other hand, was doubtful whether the Americans would agree to work closely with London in China. He minuted: Our intervention in this matter would obviously have the best chance of success, as Sir H. Prideaux-Brune points out, if it were concurrent 59

with our greater identification with the present American drive to aid China. But the material assistance which we can give in the foreseeable future seems unlikely to be large or spectacular and it is by no means certain that the Americans will be prepared to place the matter of assistance to China on an Allied basis. We are driven there­ fore to consider whether there is any action which we can take under existing conditions to influence matters in the direction for an agreement between Chiag Kai-shek and the Communists. Sterndale-Bennett suggested that the Chungking Embassy’s view on the Stettinus-Eden talk should be sought.36 Seymour did not believe that the United States really wanted British support. Meanwhile, he warned that a joint demarche of the United States, Britain and Soviet Union to China would be both impracticable and dangerous. The Chinese government, he indicated, would be extre­ mely suspicious of any Soviet participation in the Communist problem. Moreover, it would be almost impossible to put forward a plan which would be acceptable both to the Russians and the Americans. He warned that the result might be to transfer “the Kuomintang/Communist dispute into an argument between the major Allies”. As regards Britain herself, the ambassador felt that it would be difficult to refuse to give support to the United States if they really wanted it, which he doubted; but British participation would not affect the result.37 The danger of an AmericanSoviet conflict in China thus gave further reason for the British government to adopt a prudent approach to the Chinese internal conflict. Sir Horace Seymour’s discouraging response had an important effect on the Foreign Office’s attitudes towards the Kuomintang-Communist dispute. The dominant opinion within the Foreign Office now became distinctly cautious. This was clearly shown in the Foreign Office memo­ randum of 28 March 1945, prepared for Foreign Secretary Eden’s meeting with American ambassador to China, Hurley. Eden was advised as follows: General Hurley has himself been so deeply involved in recent negotiations on this subject that it is not clear that he would welcome assistance from ourselves even if we were to offer it. If, on the other hand, he makes suggestions for such assistance, we should naturally promise to give most careful consideration to them. But it would be well to enter into no commitment, for the question is extremely complicated. It would be a matter for very careful consideration whether foreign influence could be brought to bear with a reasonable prospect of success, and, if so, what form it should take.38 Indeed, from this Foreign Office paper, it seemed quite clear that, by the end of March 1945, officials had abandoned the idea of an active 60

involvement of the British government in the KMT-Communist negotiations. It also suggested that the Foreign Office’s mind was already made up before Hurley’s visit and that it was determined to stay out of the Chinese civil dispute. Hurley’s visit to London on his way from Washington to Chungking in early April was a test as to whether the Americans genuinely wanted British assistance in Chinese unification. The American ambassador saw the Prime M inister once and Eden twice but did not show any wish for British help. Hurley himself was, in fact, strongly suspicious of British motives in China and believed that Britain wanted a weakened and disunited China.39 The relations between Sir Horace Seymour and Hurley were poor. In his resignation speech, Hurley claimed that America’s China policy “definitely did not have the support of the imperialist civil servants of Britain in Asia”.40 This distrust of London’s China policy seemed to have come from Britain’s minor role in the Far East war, the fact that British leaders found themselves unable to share America’s view that China was one of the world’s great powers, and also Britain’s intentions about the future of its colony of Hong Kong.41 Foreign Office officials were perturbed by American suspicions. On 3 January 1945, Sterndale-Bennett told Eden that he could not think of any action on the part of the British government which could justify it.42 Owing to their suspicion about British policy, American officials in China no doubt wanted to keep everything under their control. America’s monopolistic attitude was undoubtedly one of the most important factors which prevented Britain’s initial involvement in China, but it was soon overtaken by the Foreign Office’s own prudent approach. On 23 February, J. Thyne Henderson of the Far Eastern Department calculated that “In trying to promote Chungking-Communist recon­ ciliation, we are between Scylla and Charybdis, i.e. to fail in collaboration with the Americans or to let them succeed alone. The chances of other alternatives seem slight at present and I should have thought the second was the less dangerous for the future.”43 The Foreign Office became very cautious and perhaps rather cool. After the KM T and the Communists failed to reach an agreement in February 1945, the talks between the two sides remained in complete deadlock until 28 August, when Mao Tse-tung arrived in Chungking. On 10 August, Seymour had a talk with Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang asked the British ambassador’s views on the Communists. Seymour replied that their agrarian system seemed to appeal to many people. The Generalissimo, according to Seymour’s report, rather fired up at this, and said that the peasants in the Communist area had to accept the Communist system because they had no choice: no Chinese would say that the Communists had done anything good whatsoever. This generalization, Seymour reported to the Foreign Office, was “far from the truth”, but illustrated 61

the Generalissimo’s attitude towards the Communist question.44 Chiang’s attitude reinforced Seymour’s pessimistic view on a genuine peaceful settlement of the Communist problem. On the Chungking negotiation following Mao’s arrival, Seymour informed the Foreign Office that Chiang Kai-shek was unyielding on important matters of military control.45 In the end, the Chungking discussion also failed to bring about a settlement. The situation rapidly worsened over the following months with reports of heavy fighting between both sides in north China.46 By the time Ernest Bevin entered the Foreign Office, the decision of non-interference had been made by his Far Eastern advisers. On 12 September 1945, Sterndale-Bennett explained Britain’s attitude towards Chinese internal conflict to the new Foreign Secretary. The official attitude of the Soviet Union, he indicated, had been correct so far. He further told Bevin that the British government had been reluctant to intervene in the dispute between the KMT and the CCP because of the fear that internal Chinese affairs might thereby become an international problem with members of the Big Three (USA and Britain, and USSR) on different sides. Chiang Kai-shek’s attitude, he added, had been uncompromising.47 Bevin agreed with the Foreign Office’s suggested approach. On 28 November, in replying to the question in the House of Commons as to what “active steps” the British government was taking towards the Chinese civil conflict, he declared that the British govern­ ment “regard this as an internal problem for the Chinese themselves to resolve”, though he was most anxious to see a settlement.48 So by the time of the Moscow Conference of the foreign ministers of the “Big Three” in December 1945, the British government’s position on the Chinese internal affairs was already clear. When the Russian delegation proposed the need in China “for the broad participation of democratic elements in the National government and other organs of authority” in the Protocol Committee, Sir R. Campbell and SterndaleBennett, who represented the British delegation, objected to this proposal. After consulting with Bevin, Sterndale-Bennett announced that it was not that Britain was opposed to the participation of democratic elements in the National government; rather that she felt it was not right for the three powers to give joint advice in this sense, since that was in effect interference in the internal affairs of China.49 On 26 December, Bevin reiterated Britain’s arguments but neither the Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov nor James Byrnes, American Secretary of State, agreed with him. The agreement was only made, according to Bevin’s report to the Cabinet on New Year’s Day 1946, after Molotov made a concession that the Communists “would be represented only in the Central Government”. 50 On the following day, 27 December 1945, the three foreign ministers signed a communiqué in Moscow. It was declared in Part IV of the communiqué that “The Three Foreign Secretaries 62

exchanged views with regard to the situation in China. They were in agreement as to the need for a unified and democratic China under the National Government, for broad participation by democratic elements in all branches of the National Government and for a cessation of civil strife. They reaffirmed their adherence to the policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of China.”51 The Moscow Declaration of non­ interference in China had, in effect, been maintained by the British government throughout the Chinese civil war. London certainly wished to make an active contribution to ending the KMT-CCP dispute, but lacked the power and influence to do so. Neither the Chinese nor the Americans would welcome Britain’s participation. Ambassador Seymour, whose views were very influential, saw little chance for a peaceful agreement between Yenan and Chungking. The British Foreign Office became prudent when American intervention failed. It was also alarmed by the possibility of Russo-American conflict in China. After careful deliberation, British policy-makers reached the conclusion that it was wise for Britain to take no part in China. This decision, of course, did not mean that the British government would stand entirely aloof from the Chinese internal conflict, as we shall see.

The Foreign Office and the Marshall Mission A stable and united China was the declared object of British policy after the war. As to the means of achieving it, the British government was in favour of the establishment of a coalition government including the Communists. The Foreign Office did not like the present KMT oneparty government. They derived their power and support from the landlords and rich merchants - the “squirearchy” - and the labour unions in the big cities, under the control of racketeers loyal to the party and Chiang Kai-shek. The Foreign Office considered that the KMT, deriving their power and authority from such sources, tended inevitably to become “reactionary and static, maintaining their hold on the status quo by wealth, influence and, in the last resort, force (exercised through the army and the secret police)”. 52 Chiang Kai-shek himself, in the Foreign Office’s opinion, was “sympathetic to western democratic ideals”. The reactionary forces around him in the administration, however, were hostile to foreign interests. This, the Foreign Office thought, could only be overcome by securing “the introduction of sufficient Communist and other democratic representation” in the government, pending the establishment of full constitutional government.53 Thus the Foreign Office wished that the settlement of the dispute between the KMT and the Communists would lead to the establishment of a genuine democratic government under Western influence. 63

London disagreed with the United States policy after the war which was accurately described as one of “all-out support for the Chungking Government”. 54 H. D. Bryan of the Foreign Office Far Eastern Depart­ ment commented on 22 November 1945 that both American and Russian policy in China was in effect nourishing the civil war, yet both sides continued to allow the situation to drift in spite of the disastrous result which it might have in the long run. “It is clear,” he minuted, “that American support is encouraging Chiang Kai-shek to attempt to crush the Communists by force.” Russian support of the latter, he indicated, was not so obvious.55 On 27 November, American Ambassador Hurley resigned. On the same day, President Truman appointed General George C. Marshall, Chief of the Army Staff in the war, as his special representative to China to continue to bring the KMT and the Communists together. The initial reaction to the announcement of General Marshall’s mission was, surprisingly, unfavourable in the Foreign Office. Sir Horace Seymour, who was in London, at once expressed doubts about the success of the mission.56 President Truman’s public statement on United States policy towards China on the eve of General Marshall’s departure was regarded by Kitson as “an ingenious apologia [sic]” for the policy already pursued by the United States in China in supporting the national government, coupled with a promise of a loan which had already been made but was now served up as an inducement to national unity under an administration favoured by American interests. He thought that the American troops in China were already being used to intervene in the Chinese civil conflict. It was thus nonsense to say that “United States support will not extend to United States military intervention to influence the course of any Chinese internal strife.” American support of the KMT, Kitson indicated, had already had such an effect by depriving the Communists of the virtual certainty of taking control of North China.57 The increasing discontent with Washington’s policy regarding China could also be found in Britain’s press. An article entitled “Kuomintang and Communist suspicions” in The Times on 2 January 1946 remarked that American policy after the surrender of Japan was “contradictory”. Their declared policies of eliminating the Japanese and of neutrality in Chinese internal conflicts were incompatible with their policy of co­ operating only with the Kuomintang.58 Admitting America’s immense power and influence in the Far East, The Times' editorial stated on New Year’s Day of 1946 that in China “much will depend during the next few weeks upon the manner in which the influence of the United States is exerted.”59 The success of General Marshall’s active mediation in January and February quickly changed British opinions on American China policy. On January 10, 1946, an armistice agreement between the KMT and the Communists was signed. An All Party Political Consultative Conference 64

also met in Chungking on the same day to discuss the establishment of a coalition government before enforcement of constitutionalism. The political horizon, reported the Embassy from China, had suddenly been cleared. The credit for this favourable turn of events, in the British Embassy’s view, “must undoubtedly be given to General Marshall, whose personality and reputation eminently qualified him for the difficult task”.60 Ambassador Seymour, now back in Chungking, praised General Marshall as “far better qualified than General Hurley - himself rather fond of generalities - to see that any agreement is properly tied up and means the same thing to all concerned.” The chances of an agreement between the KMT and the CCP, Seymour felt, were better than they had yet been.61 In mid-1946, the Foreign Office China Department therefore recommended that, in light of the fact that Britain could do little to secure implementation of the Moscow agreement, she should “follow the lead of the United States of America, who alone possess the necessary influence and authority to bring the two factions together, and to give such moral support we can, in speeches and publicity, to the efforts of General Marshall at mediation.”62 This suggestion marked the change of the British government’s attitude towards American policy in China, and the recognition of British policy-makers that the object of the Marshall mission was largely compatible with the aim of British policy in the region. In 1946, Britain’s fear of the Russian threat in the Far East was far less than in Europe. Following the defeat of Japan, the Russians allowed the Chinese Communist army to penetrate into Manchuria and captured Japanese arms and ammunitions to fall into their hands. In explaining the motives of such Soviet behaviour in Manchuria, Kitson stated that Soviet encouragement of Communist infiltration into Manchuria might have had other objectives, e.g. the creation of an administration in that area amenable to Soviet influence, but it had also had the effect - “which Moscow no doubt intended - of putting the Communists in a strong bargaining position for acceptance of their demands on the constitutional question, leading to the broadening of the base of the Chinese Govern­ ment”.63 Kitson’s perception of Moscow’s intention to want a coalition Chinese government at this time seemed to be correct. The Soviet Union’s policy in China, as elsewhere, following the end of the war seemed to be dictated by its security considerations and immediate national interests. Through seven days war with Japan, “Russia has now more than regained the position in the Far East which she held in 1904”.64 A Sino-Soviet Treaty was signed in Moscow on the last day of the Japanese war. The Soviet Union obtained the independence of Outer Mongolia, use of Port Arthur as a naval base, special rights in the ice-free port of Dairen and the control of the railway administration of Manchuria. 65

Moscow in turn pledged itself “to render to China moral support and aid in military supplies and other material resources, such support and aid to be e n tire ly g i v e n to th e N a t i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t as th e c e n tr a l g o v e r n m e n t o f C h i n a ” 65 Before they withdrew in April 1946, Soviet troops removed large quantities of industrial equipment from Manchuria as “war booty” at a replacement cost of $2,000,000,000.66 The Russians then seemed to be content with what they had gained. Moreover, at the end of the war, Stalin did not believe that the Chinese Communists could defeat the KMT on the battleground. In 1948 he told Eduard Kardelj, a chief aide of Marshall Tito: After the war we invited the Chinese comrades to come to Moscow and we discussed the situation in China. We told them bluntly that we considered the development of uprising in China had no prospect and that the Chinese comrades should join the Chiang Kai-shek government and dissolve their army.67 This Soviet calculation thus ruled out a policy of offensive intervention. The Kremlin probably also feared that overt support of the Communists would provoke direct American armed intervention on the side of the Nationalists. In October, the Foreign Office concluded that Russia was content to “play a waiting gam e” in China.68 Britain’s task in China at this time was therefore not so much to counter Russian activities, for these had not developed, but to encourage a growth that would prevent them from doing so. Much therefore would still depend on the settlement of the KMT-Communist dispute. Following the Soviet withdrawal, a crisis developed in Manchuria. W ith the cease-fire agreement of 10 January 1946, the KMT government troops rapidly advanced into Manchuria. As the Soviet forces completed their evacuation of the area, violent fighting broke out between the government and the Communist forces. General Marshall again stepped in and managed to negotiate a fortnight’s truce in June. Nevertheless, the two sides could not reach an agreement before the expiration of the truce on June 30 1946, and the fighting spread from Manchuria to the rest of China. Though the negotiations in Nanking continued until the end of the year, m id-1946 marked “a turning point in the development of China’s internal problem”.69 Total civil war broke out. The British Embassy’s reports from Nanking shed important light on the mood of the two parties at this point. G. A. Wallinger, Britain’s Chargé d’affaires, reported to the Foreign Office on 8 July that it was certain there were elements among President Chiang Kai-shek’s advisors who took the view that the only solution possible was one imposed by force of arms.70 Sir Ralph Stevenson confirmed that Chiang himself shared this view. When he saw the Generalissimo for the first time on August 7, 1946, 66

Chiang told Britain’s new ambassador that he was convinced the Communists had no real intention of reaching a satisfactory compromise with the central government. On the contrary, they sought to dominate it. He had therefore come to the conclusion that the only course was to defeat them militarily. Stevenson then suggested that this might be a long and arduous task which would leave China in complete economic chaos. Chiang replied that defeat of the main Communist forces should not take long and that once this had been achieved he hoped the Communist leaders would be in a more accommodating frame of mind, and that some compromise with them might be possible.71 After talking with Chou Enlai, the Communist representative in Nangking, the Embassy felt that the Communists genuinely wanted to have a compromise settlement.72 It appeared, therefore, to British officials in China, that the failure to reach an agreement in m id-1946 was largely attributable to the KMT government’s hardened attitudes. This observation was in accordance with General Marshall’s statement made later when he returned to Washington.73 In 1946, the KMT government enjoyed a 3:1 military superiority and was confident that it could defeat the Communists in eight to ten months.74 In embarking on such a course, Chiang Kai-shek not only under-estimated the Communist strength but also miscalculated the United States’ policy. He believed that the Americans would not let him be overthrown by the Communists.75 The Communists, on their part, endeavoured to expand their strength and evidently wanted to avoid an early confrontation. Despite the widespread fighting in the country, Chou En-lai remained in Nanking to continue negotiations. Officials in London were considerably worried about the consequences of this outbreak of war in China. The effect of the Chinese civil war on British interests there both in the long term and in the short term, the Foreign Office pointed out, would be disastrous. Officials feared that fighting might involve the principal ports, where British interests were concentrated, and an indefinite period of chaos would ensue in which British interests would inevitably suffer damage. Hong Kong, by virtue of its proximity to China, was likely to be particularly affected. Whatever the final outcome of such a period of disorder, its short-term effect on Britain’s position in China and the Far East generally could not fail to be serious. Its long-term effect would be equally serious, “if from the chaos there emerges a Moscow-supported Communist government hostile to Western interests.”76 The Foreign Office speculated on the possibility of the emergence from the chaos of civil war of a Communist government under the leadership of someone like Mao Tse-tung, loyal less to Marxist-Leninist ideology than to the native precepts of agrarian reform and social democracy practised by the Yenan regime, and bringing to China a 67

relatively efficient and honest administration. Officials thought such a government could hardly achieve ascendancy in present circumstances except after a clash with the Moscow-sponsored Communists, and the chances of the agrarian reformers surviving such a split within the Communist Party and emerging strong enough to rule China were too slender to be seriously relied upon. Furthermore, the Foreign Office thought there was no assurance that such an administration would not, in the long run, prove at least as hostile to western interests as the extreme nationalists of the Kuomintang or a Moscow-sponsored administration. Therefore it concluded that a peaceful settlement providing for the establishment of a coalition would still be “the best solution” for Britain.77 To help to achieve this aim, London was moving closer to the United States. On 18 September, the British government received a request from General Kwei Yung-ching, on the instructions of Chiang Kai-shek, for Britain to supply arms and ammunition to the KMT. In passing on this request, Ralph Stevenson observed that this approach suggested that, first, the central government had completely abandoned any idea of reaching a compromise with the Communists and was only paying lip service to American efforts to halt the civil war, and second, the United States was in fact cutting down supplies of war material in an attempt to ensure that the central government would be more amenable.78 Commenting on this Chinese request, Esler Dening, the Foreign Office Assistant Undersecretary for Far Eastern affairs, indicated that whatever Britain decided to do should be done with the knowledge and concurrence of the United States. He suggested to Sir Orme Sargent on 23 September that “we must walk in step with the Americans upon whom we rely at present for security in the main ports of China. If they have no objection to our supplying arms, then there seems no reason why we should not agree”. 79 Bevin, however, insisted that “We ought not to show any desire to the US that we want to supply.”80 Subsequently, Stevenson was instructed to give a negative reply to General Kwei. The Foreign Office’s instruction stated that Chiang Kai-shek’s request for arms raised the question to one of high policy. The supply of arms by Britain could not remain secret from either the Americans or the Russians. Moreover, the Foreign Office stressed, it was clearly not in British interests to supply arms to Chiang if it was the considered policy of the United States to deny supplies as a means of bringing pressure to bear so as to reach a compromise with the Communists.81 At the Paris Peace Conference on 13 October, Bevin found the United States Secretary of State Byrnes “very perturbed” about the whole position in China. The latter expressed gratitude when Bevin informed him that the British government had decided not to supply arms to Chiang Kai-shek. By then the Foreign Office had already learned from 68

the State Department that the United States government, on the suggestion of General Marshall, had stopped arms supplies to China in August without announcement.82 Bevin’s decision not to supply weapons to Chiang Kai-shek was clearly taken for the purpose of supporting American efforts to secure a peaceful unification of China. On 14 October 1946, the Attlee Cabinet agreed that Britain should not supply military equipment to the Chinese government.83 Four days after the cabinet meeting, a Foreign Office memorandum declared that the policy of the British government towards China was to “keep in step with U.S. policy in China in so far as it is affording moral support to the National Government of China and encouraging to the greatest possible extent the development of a strong and stable government on a broad democratic basis”. The memorandum suggested that if the question of the United States troops in China was put to the United Nations, Britain should vigorously oppose it and “give the United States any support we properly can”. 84 Thus, in late 1946, there had emerged an increasing willingness on the part of the British to support the American policy in China. In short, the British government’s attitude towards the Chinese internal dispute was one of non-intervention whilst supporting the American mediation efforts. In pursuing such a policy, London had been influenced by a number of factors: its sympathetic attitude towards the Chinese Communists; its dislike of the KMT one-party dictatorship; its recognition of the American key position and, above all, its desire to see a peaceful settlement of the KMT-Communist differences. It was in Britain’s interests that the civil war should be avoided. Hopes for a political solution to the Communist problem were, however, destroyed by the widespread fighting in m id-1946. Britain’s hope of a stable and united China after the war proved unattainable.

Notes 1. 2.

3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Q uoted from Tang Tsou, pp. 304—305. F O 371/35777 F644/74/10 Seym our to F.O. 29 Dec. 1942; FO371/35801 F3895/254/10 11 M ay 1943; F O 371/41612 F1546/159/10 Seymour to F.O. 6 Mar. 1944; F O 371/41615 F5126/159/10 Seymour to F.O. 17 Oct. 1944. FO371/35801 F3895/254/10 Seym our to F.O., 13 July 1943. F O 371/41612 F1546/159/10 Seym our to F.O., 27 M ar 1944. F O 371/46213 F7471/186/10 M em o by Sterndale-Bennett, 12 Sept. 1945. F O 371/46215 F10436/186/10 M inute by Kitson, Nov. 25, 1945; F O 371/53564 F7701/25/10 M em o by Kitson, 23. May, 1946. FO371/35801 F3895/254/10 Seym our to F.O. 13 July 1943. See C hristopher T horne, A llies o f a K ind , The U nited States , B ritain a n d the W ar A g a in st Ja p a n 1 9 4 1 -1 9 4 5 (London, 1978), p. 184. Lord Inverchapel maintained this view when he was transferred to be ambassador in

9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41.

W ashington in 1946. In a news conference, he called the Com m unists in Yenan “radical Agrarian Reformers whose main purpose appeared to be to split up big estates”. FO 371/53565 F9826/25/10 Lord Inverchapel to F.O. 2 July 1946. FO371/35780 F 5611/74/10 M emo by Teichman, 26 July 1943. F O 371/35838, F 2 3 15/1893/10 M inute by Clarke; letter to H udson, 30 April 1943. Ibid., H udson to Clarke, 1 May 1943. Ibid. , m inute by Scott. FO 371/46167 F2464/35/10 28 M arch 1945. FO 371/46213 F7471/186/10 12 Sept. 1945. F O 371/53564 F7701/25/10 23 May 1946, memo by Kitson. Ibid..

M ao Tse-tung, Selected Works, V III (London, 1954), p. 108. Ib id ., p . 111.

T h e T h ree People’s Principles included the principle of democracy, the principle of the people’s livelihood and the principle of nationalism. F O 371/53564 F7701/25/10, Memo by Kitson, 23 M ay 1946. F O 371/41613 F2375/159/10, Far East memo N o. 12, by Research D epartm ent, 10 M ay 1944. FO371/35801 F 3895/254/10 M inute by Hudson, 16 Sept. 1943. FO 371/46216 N 15123/10674/38 Seymour to F.O. 25 Oct. 1945. FO 371/46215 F10436/186/10 M inute by Kitson, 25 Nov. 1945. See Brian Porter, B ritain and the Rise o f C om m unist China A study o f British A ttitu d e s 1 9 4 5 -1 9 5 4 (London, 1967), p. 2; pp. 5-6. The T im es , 21 Jan. 1945; 3 Jan. 1945; 17 Jan. 1946; N ew s Chronicle, 2 Jan. 1945; 3 Jan. 1945; Stein, The Challenge o f R ed C hina (New York, 1945); Claire & W illiam Band, Dragon Fangs: Two Years w ith Chinese C om m unists (New Haven, 1948). The Tim es, 25 Jan. 1945. For details see Porter, pp. 5-6. F O 371/35778 F4852/74/10 M inute by Clarke, 19 Oct. 1943. Q uote from T h orne, p. 184; see also L. W oodward, B ritish Foreign Policy in the Second W orld W ar, IV, (London, 1975), pp. 491-497. FO 371 F4857/34/10; see also Woodward, pp. 528-530. F O 371 F5408/34/10 Seymour to Sterndale-Bennett, 7 Nov. 1944. See also C hapter one. FO 371/46164 F102/35/10 Minute by Scott, 6 Jan. 1945. W oodward, p. 538. FO 371/46209 F804/186/10 M inute by Prideaux-Brune, 9 Feb. 1945. Ibid., m inute by Sterndale-Bennett, 16 Feb. 1945. FO 371/46167 F2464/35/10 F.O. paper, 28 Mar. 1945; see also W oodward, pp. 538-9. Ibid..

See T horne, p. 547. F O 371/46172 F 11528/36/10 Kitson in his minutes indicated th at H urley was referring to Seymour. In London, Churchill described the American long range policy in regard

42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65.

66. 67.

68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76.

to China as “the greatest American illusion”. FRUS V. VII. Hurley to Byrnes, 14 April 1945, p. 330. F O 371/46164 F564/35/10 Bennett to Eden. F O 371/46165 F873/35/10 M inute by H enderson, 23 Feb. 1945. FO 371/46212 F6241/186/10 Embassy to Stern dale-Bennett, 17 August 1945. F O 371/46213 F6648/186/10 Seymour to Government of India, 10 Sept. 1945. F O 371/46214 Seymour to F.O. 31 Oct. 1945. F O 371/46213 F7471/186/10 12 Sept. 1945. H .C .D ebs. V.416 c.1306-7. F O 371/53567 F53/25/10 Memo by Sterndale-Bennett, 27 Dec. 1945. CAB 128/5 C.M. 1 (46), 1 Jan. 1946. CAB 134/279 FE (0) 45 (10) Report on Moscow Conference December 1945. F O 371/53564 F7701/25/10 Memo by Kitson, 23 May 1946. F O 371/53672 F 13295/384/10 F.O. memo, 1 Sept. 1946. F O 371/53564 F7701/25/10 M emo by Kitson, 23 May 1946. F O 371/46214 F9909/186/10 M inute by Bryan, 22 Nov. 1945. F O 371/53564 F6165/25/10 M inute by Nevil Butler, F.O. Assistant Undersecretary, 6 M ay 1946. F O 371/46172 F 11861/36/10 Lord Halifax to F.O. 15 Dec. 1945; minute by K itson, 21 Dec. 1945. T he T im es , 2 Jan. 1946. T h e T im es , 1 Jan. 1946. F O 371/53562 F2919/25/10 Embassy m onthly report for January 1946. FO 371/53670 F1364/384/10 Seymour to F.O., 7 Jan. 1946. F O 371/53565 F8984/25/10 China D epartm ent memo. 17 June 1946. F O 371/53564 F6165/25/10 M inute by Kitson, 3 May 1946. CAB 134/280 FE(0)(46)52, 31 Dec. 1945. T h e exchange of N otes relating to the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945, quoted from Tang Tsou, Am erica's Failure in China (Chicago, 1963), p. 284, emphasis added. See Keiji Furuya, Chiang Kai-shek H is L ife a n d Times (New York, 1981) p. 873. V ladim ir Dedijer, Tito Speaks (London, 1953) p.331, quoted from G .H udson, “T he Rise of the Com m inst Pow er in the Far East”, in Evan L uard (ed.), The Cold W ar A Reappraisal (London: Thames and Hudson, 1964) p. 67. See also Tang Tsou, p.325; Jam es Reardon-Anderson, Yenan a n d the G reat Powers, (New York, 1980) pp. 71; 91. F O 371/53672 F 15359/384/10 F.O. m emo 18 Oct. 1946. F O 371/53671 F10956/384/10 W allinger to F.O. 8 July 1946. Ibid..

F O 371/53566 F 11588/25/10 Stevenson to F .O , 8 August 1946. F O 371/53671 F10956/384/10 M emo by W allinger on his talk with Chou En-lai and Dr. W ang Ping-nan, 8 July 1946. See U n ited States Relations w ith C hina (the W hite Paper) by the State D epartm ent (1949) pp.686-89. Ibid., p. 212. Tang Tsou, pp. 436-37. F O 371/53672 F 13295/384/10 F.O. memo. 1 Sept. 1946.

77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84.

Ibid ..

FO 371/53652 F13895/119/10 Stevenson to F.O. 17 Sept. 1946. Ibid., minute by Dening, 10 Sept.; D ening to Sargent, 23 Sept. 1946. Ibid., minute by Bevin. Ibid., F.O. to Stevenson, Sept. 1946. Ibid., F.O. to Stevenson, 16 Oct. 1946. CAB 128/8 C.M.(46)86, 14 O ctober 1946. FO 371/53672 F 15359/384/10 F.O.m em orandum , 18 Oct. 1946.

72

C H A P T E R

FOUR

The Cold War and the Chinese Civil War The break-out of civil war in China coincided with the growing conflict between the Soviet Union and the West. In March 1946, Frank Roberts, in the British Moscow Embassy, observed that the world seemed to be faced with “the danger of a modern equivalent of the religious wars of the sixteenth century, in which Soviet Communism will struggle with Western social democracy and the American version of Capitalism for domination of the world”. 1 By the summer of 1946, Whitehall policyadvisers had already abandoned the hope for a continuation of the normal war-ally relations with the Soviet Union.2 The fear of the threat of Soviet expansion to British interests was not confined to Europe. In October, the Foreign Office declared that: “There is at present no reason to suppose that Soviet policy in the Far East is motivated by aggressive as opposed to defensive designs. But her action must be carefully watched.”3 In this world context, during the period from late 1946 to early 1947 considerable re-assessment of the nature and intentions of the Chinese Communist Party occurred in Britain’s Nanking Embassy and in the Foreign Office. This chapter seeks to analyse how these changed views on the Communists affected the British government’s attitude towards the Chinese civil war.

The Foreign Office’s Reappraisal of the Nature of the Chinese Communists By October 1946, it was apparent that the American mission in China had failed and on October 4, General Marshall forwarded to Washington a request for his recall. Fearful of the American refusal to provide aid as a result of placing the major share of the blame for the failure of Marshall’s mediation on the Kuomintang government side, Chiang Kaishek, after a series of sweeping military advances, announced that the National Assembly would be convened on November 12, and would agree to establish a democratic coalition government. The Communists, however, were no longer in a mood to reach an agreement with the government. They boycotted the National Assembly when it formally 73

met on November 15 and rejected the government’s new offer of terms, which, in the British Embassy’s view, were “not unreasonable”.4 The refusal of Yenan to accept the central government’s “very reasonable offers” precipitated a serious reconsideration of Communist policy motives in the Nanking Embassy Sir Ralph Stevenson believed that the Chinese Communists were true Communists. In a lengthy dispatch to the Foreign Office written on 23 November 1946, Stevenson remarked, “Personally, I have always thought that arguments along the line that the Chinese Communists are more Chinese than Communist and more agrarian reformers than Communist are misleading.” They were, in his opinion, possibly only a fair description of the rank and file of the party’s supporters in China. “I am convinced”, he argued, “that here as elsewhere, the leaders of the party are Communists first, last and all the time. They can thus be trusted not only to follow the ‘Party Line’ in all circumstances, but automatically to serve the best interests of the Soviet Union.” The decision of the Chinese Communists not to enter into the coalition government, in the ambassador’s view, illuminated this. At first sight, he pointed out, it seemed puzzling that Yenan should have passed up opportunities for the penetration of the government by means of a democratic coalition, which was a standard example of Communist tactics. “Can the decision to do so be reconciled with purely Chinese interests?” he asked. In his opinion, it could not. The reason for it, according to him, must be sought in what the Communist leaders considered to be the best interests of their creed, which coincided so conveniently, here as elsewhere, with the interests of the Soviet Union. It was true, he argued, that in any coalition now offered the Communists would be in a minority, and that, as a rule, Communist party leaders prefer to have at least a fairly dominating position in any coalition entered; it was also true that the Kuomintang would certainly try to double-cross their Communist colleagues, and that, in the present atmo­ sphere of bitterness and hatred, the coalition would be an uncomfortable and gimcrack affair. However, he felt that, from the point of view of China and the Chinese people, there were certainly not sufficient grounds to justify a policy which would indefinitely prolong civil strife and discord and proportionately delay reconstruction and rehabilitation. It seemed to him, therefore, that “the true explanation is that the advantages of ‘penetration’ in China are considered by the party both in Yenan and in Moscow to be outweighed, at present, by those to be won by the continuance of the present state of political and economic chaos and by the continued maintenance by the Communist Party of an independent armed force, based on the border regions which lie so conveniently on a large sector of the Sino-Soviet frontier.” Moreover, the ambassador thought, the negative policy of Yenan had also been dictated by the 74

considerations that firstly a coalition in China would have been obtained under American auspices; secondly it would probably only be maintained so long as the need for American economic aid could be used by General Marshall (and/or his successors) to enforce “democratic” practices upon the fundamentally authoritarian Kuomintang, and finally, the creation of such a coalition would have the effect of consolidating American influence in an area where such influence could hardly be appreciated in Moscow. “I believe”, Stevenson emphatically concluded, “these to be the real reasons for the Communists’ attitude and that these are no valid ' Chinese' reasons for it.”5 Stevenson’s argument was therefore clear. As the Chinese Communists put their party interests above Chinese national interests, they were undoubtedly genuine Communists and were acting on Russia’s advice. In retrospect, there can be no doubt that at that time the Chinese Communists were willing to establish a close alliance with Moscow owing to the common ideology and, more importantly, American support of the KMT. In probing the motives behind Yenan’s decision against coalition, the British ambassador, however, overestimated Soviet influence on the Communists. The decision taken by the Communist leaders was mainly because they had lost all faith in the American mediation following the KMT all-out military offensive. Yenan, in fact, began violent attacks on the United States policy in China. In an interview with Anna Louise Strong, an American journalist, in August, Mao Tse-tung charged that “the United States reactionaries” were assisting Chiang Kaishek to fight a civil war.6 By the time this despatch was received by the Foreign Office, the Communists had virtually turned down General Marshall’s offer of further mediation. As the conditions for a re-opening of negotiations, they demanded the dissolution of the National Assembly and restoration of troop positions held as ofJanuary 13, 1946 - conditions they must have known Chiang Kai-shek could not possibly accept. Chou En-lai departed for Yenan on November 19, thus bringing to an end the long period of negotiation. Kitson commented on Stevenson’s despatch on 13 December 1946 and pointed out that recent developments confirmed the view expressed by the ambassador. He minuted, “the suggestion that the communists are reluctant to enter a coalition functioning under American sponsorship is, I think, the right explanation of their attitude, and reinforces the conclusion that they were acting under Moscow’s guidance.”7 Yenan’s rejection of Marshall’s further mediation suggested, Kitson wrote to the Embassy, that the Communists had burned their boats and had gone over to the Russians.8 Meanwhile there were indeed increasing indications of Russian influence in Yenan. In December 1946, Colonel Gardon Harmon, the British news correspondent in Peking, visited Yenan. Harmon had 75

established friendly relations with Chou En-lai and other Communist representatives in Chungking. W hile in Yenan from 4 December to 11 December, he had had several conversations with Mao Tse-tung and the editor of the Yenan Liberation Daily. The talks, according to Harmon, who was regarded by both Wallinger and Kitson as an “old friend”, “show the dogmatism, fervour, partisanship and limited knowledge of the Chinese Communists” of international affairs. Many of the Moscow theme-songs emerged, i.e. Britain had sold body and soul to Yankee imperialism and was about to be dragged down with it to a gory grave; Britain’s misdeeds in Greece and India and so on. Harmon had a strong impression that not only were wireless broadcasts from Moscow the Communist leaders’ sole source of information about world events, but that anything coming from that source was accepted as the truth.9 Kitson, whose view had been that the Chinese Communists were Chinese first and Communist second, felt that the fact that Yenan had swallowed Moscow propaganda hook, line and sinker was “significant and disturbing”. He suggested that arrangements could be made to get British publicity to Yenan, though, he admitted, the extent to which it would serve to counteract Moscow’s “blare” was problematical. The Far Eastern Information Department of the Foreign Office pointed out that unofficially they had been supplying Chou En-lai’s representatives in Shanghai with daily press releases and they had recently made an arrangement whereby British Council books were also to be supplied.10 Kitson did not want to ignore the Chinese Communists. When the Kuomintang government ordered the Communist delegations in Shanghai, Nanking and Chungking to leave in March 1947, he further consulted with the Far Eastern Information Department about alternative means of getting British newspapers through. Scott, on the other hand, thought that it was impossible to try and “convert the inconvertible!”11 It seemed inevitable that the Chinese Communists would look for Russian support when the world was being divided into two hostile camps and the Americans were assisting the Kuomintang. The Russians, as the Foreign Office were aware, publicly showed their dislike of any compromise between the Communists and the Kuomintang as relations between Moscow and Washington generally deteriorated. The Bolshevik, “the most important serious Russian Communist Party periodical”, in March 1947, alleged that the Americans aimed not only at the political and economic enslavement of China but at transforming the country into a strategic base directed against the Soviet Union.12 Thus, the increasing Soviet influence in Yenan decisively changed the view of the British officials about the Chinese Communist Party. The Chinese Communists’ abandonment of their moderate agrarian policy in 1946 also had a significant effect on the Foreign Office’s attitude towards Yenan. Since M ay 1946, the Communists had changed their 76

policy of reducing rent and interest to that of confiscating the land of landlords and distributing it among the peasants, aiming at enlisting the latter’s support against the KMT military attacks.13The only information the Foreign Office had about conditions in the Communist areas were from the reports furnished by a British staff member of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) in China. According to his report received on 6 December 1946, in the Communistheld Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan border area the will of the people was regarded as the supreme law. Middle and upper class Chinese were brought before “People’s Courts”. The houses of wealthy farmers were destroyed, foreign missionary property was taken over and churches were used as assembly halls or for other party purposes. Officials found this an extremely interesting and objective report. Scott gloomily commented that it disclosed a sorry state of affairs. In its “People’s Courts” reminiscent of Nazi Germany, and in its reference to the free rein given to the lower classes against the middle and upper classes [it is] reminiscent of the early days of the Soviet regime in Russia, before the Communist Party, having liquidated the upper and middle classes, clamped down on the peasantry also.14 The hostile attitude taken by the Communists towards all foreigners aroused considerable concern in London. In March, 1947, the same staff of UNRRA reported that the most significant feature in the Communist territory was the great increase which had taken place in the hostility of the people towards the Americans and foreigners in general during the last two or three months. The Communist officials who had previously been well disposed towards foreigners now displayed great hostility towards all foreigners, including UNRRA officials. The foreigners, according to the report, “are portrayed to the people through the highlyorganized Communist propaganda organs as the despoilers of China”. This growing anti-foreignism resulted in great difficulties for foreign missionaries.15 Kitson indicated that in a recent press interview Chou Enlai had admitted the persecution of foreign missions in Communist territory. “This”, he succinctly remarked, “is a new trend or rather a return to the old one of Kiangsi Soviet days.”16 No longer was there any illusion in officials’ minds about the real nature of the Communists in China. Thus evidence that Yenan was “in collusion with Moscow”, in Kitson’s words, and had returned to the old Kiangsi Soviet policy, played a significant part in the Foreign Office’s reappraisal of the Chinese Communist Party. The long-time controversy amongst Britain’s Far Eastern experts over the real significance of Chinese Communism ended. W hen The Times's editorial of 29 March 1947 still considered the Yenan 77

Communists as a “reformist movement”, Kitson declared that the writer was ill informed on the true nature of communism in China and therefore “ill-qualified” to write an article on China.17 This overall re-assessment of the Chinese Communists formed the basis of the British attitude towards the Chinese civil war and towards Soviet and American policies in China.

British Attitude towards Soviet and American Policies in China The effect of the Cold War in China was such that the civil war “ceased to be a purely domestic one”. 18 Neither the United States nor Soviet Russia wanted China to fall into the other’s sphere of influence, though neither was prepared to undertake direct armed intervention. Britain’s position was summed up by Sir Ralph Stevenson in November 1946 as follows, “Great Britain comes less directly into the picture but broadly speaking our interests are regarded as similar to those of the United States, as far as the Soviet Union is concerned.” 19 It was on the basis of this assumption that the Foreign Office memorandum claimed that if the Soviet Union actively entered into the Chinese area, e.g. by lending material support to the Chinese Communists, Britain would call for a reconsideration of her policy in consultation with the United States’ government.20 Meanwhile, the British government resolutely opposed any proposals for Russian interference in the Chinese civil war. When the American effort to stop the civil war failed, it was suggested both in the United States and in Britain that Britain and the Soviet Union should join with America in an effort to restore peace in China. In December 1946, two senators and four well-known students of Chinese affairs in America issued a statement, proposing the calling of a fresh conference of all parties in China under the chairmanship of the United States, with the collaboration of representatives of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. The Foreign Office dismissed the suggestion. Kitson regarded these people as “the U.S. counterpart of our labour ‘rebels’”. Scott commented on 9 January that the proposal was indeed “distressingly naive”. He did not believe there was any chance of success for such a joint conference. In any case, he thought, such a conference had not the remotest chance of being accepted by the Chinese government.21 China today, Scott observed in regard to a similar suggestion by the United States Representative Mike Mansfield, “is not the China of 1921/22. She is no longer in a state of foreign ‘tutelage’ and is hardly likely to sit at a conference where she would be outnumbered by 3 to 1.”22 This assessment of the Chinese government’s attitude towards foreign intervention was entirely correct. Stevenson informed the Foreign Office 78

that, according to the American Ambassador Dr. John Leighton Stuart, in the course of the last interview between General Marshall and Chiang Kai-shek the latter stated flatly that he would tolerate no interference by the Soviet Union in China’s affairs, and that if the three Great Powers were to decide on any form of intervention, he would immediately resign.23 Stevenson also reported the resentment expressed by the government-inspired Chinese press at Lord Lindsay’s suggestion in the House of Lords debate on 23 January. He advocated consultation by foreign powers, including the Soviet Union, about the situation in China. The attitude of Lord Lindsay of Birker towards Chinese affairs was largely influenced by his son, Michael Lindsay, who was now regarded by officials as the Chinese Communists’ “fellow-traveller”. 24 Attention now turned to the forthcoming conference of foreign ministers in Moscow. The Foreign Office advisers thought it possible that Russia would want to discuss China. Kitson advised the Foreign Secretary on 28 January 1947 that if Russia did raise the question of China, “our attitude must therefore continue to be against any inter­ ference, and particularly against interference in which Russia had a hand.” Bevin agreed, and subsequently assured the Chinese ambassador in London, that he would decline to discuss questions relating to China in Moscow on the grounds that China was not represented.25 As expected, at the Moscow conference on 11 March 1947, Molotov asked for the situation in China to be put on the agenda, claiming that, since the Moscow agreement of December 1945, it had deteriorated and that it was time for the council to hear reports from the signatories as to how they had implemented these agreements. On hearing this, the Foreign Office sent a telegram to the Foreign Secretary Bevin, suggesting that it was to be hoped “either that China will not be placed on the agenda or that if China is discussed we and the Americans insist upon Chinese participation”. This telegram also indicated that Molotov’s argument that as China was not represented at the Moscow Conference in December 1945 there was no need for her to be represented now - was “no longer valid”. In 1945, it pointed out, China was still engaged in recovering her territories and in rounding up the Japanese.26 In the second plenary meeting of the foreign ministers Bevin declared that there could be no objection to ministers exchanging views privately outside the conference on any subject whatever, but Chinese affairs should not be brought within the framework of the council; no decision should be recorded, and no mention should be made in any communiqué from the council that the subject had been discussed. The Russian Foreign Minister then agreed to discuss China informally but he wanted a communiqué published. Bevin, however, emphasized his view that the circumstances of the meeting in 1945 had been very exceptional. Such a communiqué, he stated, might affect the internal position of a sovereign 79

power like China and would also place him in a very difficult position, especially towards other members of the Commonwealth. This argument carried some weight. George C. Marshall, now the United States Secretary of State, and Georges Bidault, the French Foreign Minister, both agreed with Bevin and refused to discuss China in the council. Molotov then dropped his proposal. This, however, did not end the matter. After the meeting, Molotov wrote to Bevin saying that he intended to call an “informal meeting” to discuss China in the near future. A similar letter was also sent to Marshall. Bevin replied on 17 March, claiming that his government could supply no information of value except to say that they had adhered strictly to the policy of non­ interference in China as laid down in the Moscow decision of 1945. “It would therefore seem unnecessary to hold any meeting on the subject.” The effect of the reply, Bevin hoped, would be to indicate to the Russians that he recognized an obligation on his part to carry out the Moscow agreement of 1945 so far as it concerned the British government. At the same time, he also hoped to keep in step with the attitude both of the United States and the Chinese “while maintaining our stake in Far Eastern affairs”.27 Though the Moscow conference of March 1947 completely failed to reach an agreement on the major issue concerning German unification, Bevin and Marshall successfully prevented the Russians from interfering in China’s internal affairs. The British Foreign Secretary, indeed, played a very important role in this. London’s attitude towards American policy in China was far more complex than towards Russia’s. It was not clear what the Americans would propose after they abandoned their efforts at mediation in China. The British did not want to give the Americans encouragement for a policy of all-out support for Chiang Kai-shek’s government. Sir Ralph Stevenson informed the Foreign Office in November 1946 that the American ambassador was in favour of coming out flatly in support of the Chinese government, conditioning American aid on the reform of the Chinese government. The Foreign Office realized the difficulties for the Americans in pursuing such a policy. Kitson expressed the view that the conditions laid down by the United States ambassador would involve a degree of United States’ political and economic control “which no government in China could submit to and remain in power for long”. Dening, on his part, doubted whether the Americans were capable of pursuing such a course of action successfully. Both Kitson and Dening also feared that it would be difficult to give the Americans unqualified support in Parliament.28 The subject of China had, indeed, for some time been “boiling up” for early discussion in both houses. Labour MP D. Rees-Williams secured an adjournment debate in the Commons on November 5, when he proposed to raise the subject of foreign inter­ vention in China. Bevin asked him to postpone this and said he wanted to 80

discuss China with Byrnes in New York in December.29 In the House of Lords, Lord Lindsay proposed a motion on the situation in China and the “terrible American policy” there.30 Obviously, American policy towards China was a very sensitive issue in Parliament. The British government hoped the Americans would still maintain their interests in China. The officials feared a complete withdrawal of the United States from China following the failure of the Marshall mission. If the United States government decided to pull out of China altogether, Kitson was concerned that the protection of British properties might be jeopardized by any state of disorder or chaos resulting from American withdrawal. Moreover, he felt that the withdrawal of the U.S. would create a void which the Soviet Union would try to fill, to the likely detriment of British interests, not only in China, but also further afield. On Kitson’s suggestion, on 5 February, the Foreign Office instructed Lord Inverchapel, British ambassador in Washington, to secure from the American government an authoritative indication of the real significance of the abandonment of United States mediation efforts. On 15 February, John Carter Vincent, director of Far Eastern affairs of the State Depart­ ment assured Lord Inverchapel that there was no fundamental change in America’s Chinese policy.31 In China, during early 1947, long-standing economic difficulties reached crisis point, much to the alarm of the Nanking government. Ambassador Stevenson had for a considerable period of time warned of the perilous economic situation facing the KMT authorities. Since the beginning of 1947 his reports to the Foreign Office had been dominated by references to China’s economic problems. On 6 February, he confid­ entially told the Foreign Office that, according to the British adviser to the Chinese government central bank, the Chinese government could not hold out till the end of the year. Dr. T. V. Soong, China’s Prime Minister, sought to persuade Secretary Marshall and the American President to “come out at once definitely” in support of Nanking. The Chinese, Stevenson said, did not expect financial assistance from Britain, but hoped that if the U.S. government agreed to provide necessary help, the British government would cooperate by giving their moral support.32 On 13 February, Soong asked Sir Ralph Stevenson to urge London to discuss China’s economic crisis with the American State Department.33 The Foreign Office officials held the view that only the ending of the civil war could solve the Nanking government’s economic problems. Recognizing that reports from Nanking presented “a gloomy picture”, they suggested that the British government should allow the present situation of China to “ride” for a while in the hope that the KMT and the Communists would be induced to come to a compromise. To justify this policy, Kitson indicated, the American officials did not think the 81

Communists were ready to usurp power at the moment and might not want to force a complete collapse of the administration. Therefore, he thought, it would not do any harm to let the situation “ride” for a time in the hope that both sides would be forced by their own interests to see the wisdom of reaching a compromise which would lead to a cessation of the civil war “which alone can provide a basis for a solution of China’s economic difficulties.”34 The Foreign Office consequently still hoped that some sort of agreement could be found between the warring KMT and the Communists. Officials in London did not fully realise the serious situation confronting the Nanking regime. Stevenson warned from Nanking that the Nationalist government might collapse and that the present situation in China provided the best soil for the spreading of communism. On 7 March 1947, the ambassador wrote a lengthy letter to Dening. He pointed out that the self-sufficiency of the Chinese peasantry (85% of the population) was a thing of the past. Scarcity of essential commodities, disruption of communications, currency inflation with sky-rocketting prices and military exactions by both the KMT and the Communists made the peasant’s life almost unendurably hard. He indicated that a new element had appeared on the scene in the shape of the agrarian policy of the Chinese Communist Party which had undoubtedly appealed to the cupidity of many millions of peasants. Thus not only economic but political factors exerted an increasingly direct influence on the peasants. The continuance of the economic crisis in China, Stevenson further pointed out, would inevitably lead to the disintegration of the central government. In normal circumstances, he said, a return to semi-autonomous administrative areas might not greatly disturb British and other foreign interests but, with the general economic and financial debacle and the ideological struggle, regional governments would themselves be in as bad a position as the central government, and “it is clear that such a disintegration would be to the advantage of no country in the world with the exception of Soviet Russia.” In Stevenson’s view, while it might well be beyond the Communists’ power to take complete and immediate advantage of a state of chaos in China, they would obviously set about extending their power wherever they could and, in time, might be as successful as the Kuomintang when faced with a more or less similar situation in the early years of the Chinese Republic. This would doubtless take a considerable period of time, and, meanwhile, the sufferings of the Chinese people would be indefinitely and horrifically prolonged. At the end of the period such foreign interests as survived would be faced with the unpleasant prospect of dealing with a Communist government on the Soviet satellite model and the whole situation in the Pacific would be radically altered to the grave disadvantage of Britain and America. On the other hand, the British ambassador did not like the Kuomintang. He expressed the view that 82

it would not be to Britain’s advantage that the Kuomintang should hold undisputed sway over China. “Fundamentally”, he wrote, “they are just as hostile to foreign interests as the Communists are to the Western democracy.” Based on this perception of the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang, Stevenson concluded that the best Britain could hope for, both from the point of view of the Chinese people and of Britain’s own interests, “is to secure in China the same kind of balance between Communists and non-Communists that we hope to maintain in the rest of the world, i.e. an armed peace - if nothing better can be achieved with neither side in the ascendant.”35 Officials in London did not see eye to eye with Ambassador Stevenson in his views on the Kuomintang. Scott minuted that the programme of the Chinese government allowed a far greater latitude to foreign interests for participation in Chinese reconstruction and trade than did the Communist programme. Even if for the sake of argument one conceded that the KMT and the Communists were equally hostile to foreign interests, he stated, it would still be better “for us to have a government in China whose concept of the word ‘democracy’ resembles in some measure at least our own, and which is not under the sole influence of Soviet Russia.”36 Meanwhile, though both Stevenson and policy-makers in London underestimated the m ilitary capabilities of the Communists and did not believe that they would be able to conquer the whole of China within a short time, the Foreign Office shared the views of the ambassador about the dangerous consequences of a collapse of the Kuomintang authorities. The Foreign Office, in fact, considered that active American assistance would be necessary to bolster the Nanking regime. On 27 March, Dening minuted on Stevenson’s letter: “Mr. Drumright [of the American Embassy in London], who obviously believes in Americans being tough, told me that he would not be surprised if the United States were to change their policy for one of all-out support for ChiangKai-shek.” On the other hand, Dening thought that there was no doubt that the Americans were very disillusioned as a result of Chinese behaviour toward them. So the outcome remained to be seen.37 On the whole, the Foreign Office was sanguine. The proclamation of the Truman Doctrine on March 12 held out the prospect that large-scale assistance fromthe United States would be forthcoming to China. F.B.A. Rundall of the North American Department of the Foreign Office believed that George Marshall would be reviewing America’s China policy in the light of the failure of the Moscow conference.38 In late May, when Lord Inverchapel reported from Washington that the U.S. government had decided to lift the arms embargo to China, Scott at once acknowledged that this was no doubt the beginning of an American “all-out” support for Chiang Kai-shek. Kitson accurately 83

observed that “the resumption of shipment of arms would by itself be ‘too little and too late’ to avert the disintegration which threatens China, and large scale financial and economic support will in addition be necessary to avert a crash.”39 The announcement of the dispatch of General Wedemeyer on a “fact­ finding” mission to China by President Truman in July was, in the eyes of the Foreign Office officials, a definite preparation for the long expected all-out American support of Chiang Kai-shek. Kitson wrote a lengthy minute on 28 July, declaring that “the Chinese problem has ceased to be a political one, with any possibility of reconciliation between the Communists and the Kuomintang, and has become a military one.” Large-scale American military and economic assistance, he emphasized, was now the only hope of pulling Nationalist China together and enabling her to effectively resist the tide of Communist and Soviet infiltration. Manchuria, in his view, could probably be written off owing to the certainty of active Soviet opposition but he believed that America still had hopes of saving China proper. The Wedemeyer mission, he pointed out, had no doubt been sent out to assess the practical poss­ ibilities of some such plan of assistance and its probable effectiveness in making Chiang Kai-shek’s demoralized armies a reasonable fighting force and in bolstering China’s tottering economy. Wedemeyer, Kitson, added, would have to produce a strong case to convince Congress. Unfortunately, Congress did not reassemble until January 1, 1948, but China’s need was an urgent one, he stressed again. Dening worried that unless concrete evidence of Soviet assistance to the Communists was forthcoming, Congress would oppose the allocation of further vast sums to bolster Chiang’s regime. The United States administration, he said, was in an unenviable position. Sir Orme Sargent, head of the Foreign Office, minuted: “a gloomy outlook”; Bevin added “very bad”.40 London’s Far Eastern experts would have been very surprised if they had known that General Wedemeyer’s recommendations for large-scale military and economic assistance to China in September were, in fact, rejected by the State Department. The United States government wanted to see a non-Communist regime in China but Secretary of State Marshall was firmly convinced by his recent experience in China that the problem posed by the Chinese Communists could not be settled by military means. He was thus determined not to sanction any military aid which would lead to American military intervention.41 The American State Department felt that the problem of China was “practically insoluble”.42 In the meantime, the Americans did not withdraw completely from China. Throughout 1947 and 1948, the adoption of a policy of granting limited assistance to China by the administration was, in fact, a series of concessions to win the support of the opposition Republicans, who controlled Congress, for the government’s European recovery 84

programme.43 The continued hope of American active support for Chiang Kai-shek’s regime reflected the Foreign Office’s overestimation of the importance of China to the United States. Nevile Butler, the Foreign Office Assistant Undersecretary, assured Dening in January 1947, “North American Department and I find it difficult to believe that any American idea of disinteresting themselves in the maintenance of a non-Communist regime in China was more than a transient mood of frustration and irritation with the reactionaries in the Kuomintang.” There were, he stressed, very strong commercial, strategic and political reasons compelling the maintenance of her interests and there was no sign at all of public opinion or pressure groups working the other way.44 During the first half of 1947, the KMT forces still gained success in fighting, but in the second half of the year the tide turned in favour of the Communists. The nationalists overextended their battle lines and increased number of soldiers had to switch over to garrison duties in reconquered areas, while the Communist army had been expanding steadily, reaching 1.95 million in June 1947 as compared with KMT’s 3.73 million.45 By late 1947, the lack of a clear-cut policy by the United States regarding China caused deep concern in Whitehall. “W here does the U.S. stand in relation to China?” Dening asked, “We do not know and I doubt whether the Americans know themselves.” He did not believe that the $300 million of economic aid to China proposed by Secretary Marshall in November would have much effect. The present tendency of America to let Far Eastern affairs drift, he warned, was likely to have the most deplorable consequences.46 The Foreign Office China Department officials urged Bevin, who was preoccupied with securing an American commitment to Europe, to take the opportunity with meetings of foreign ministers in London in November 1947 to discuss China informally and confidentially with General Marshall. It was indicated in a memorandum for the Foreign Secretary by Scott in November that, both militarily and economically, the position of the Chinese government was critical. The Nationalists, the memorandum pointed out, had gained some successes in Shantung, but only at the cost of gains for the Communists in Manchuria, where the situation of the government forces at Changchun and Kirin was precarious, and Communist forces had broken into central China and constituted a potential threat to the Yangtse valley. Inflation, with all its demoralizing effects, continued to gather pace. The memorandum warned, “It seems probable that without outside assistance the present Chinese government will not be able to last much longer.” It was hoped, therefore, that the Foreign Secretary could obtain from the American Secretary of State himself an authoritative statement on United States policy in regard to China.47 On 17 December, during Marshall’s farewell call on Bevin at the Foreign Office, the British Foreign Secretary expressed his desire that the two 85

countries should hold official talks on Far Eastern policy including the situation in China. Marshall said he saw no objection.48 In effect, the agreed Anglo-American official talks on China did not begin until August 1948. The Americans appeared to be sensitive to conversations about China as their policy there had obviously failed. The major difficulty for the British government in pressing the matter with the Americans lay in the fact that Britain herself was “in no position to give any material aid to China”, as Scott explained in his letter to J. V. T. Perowne of the British Legation to the H oly See on 10 November 1947.49 For Britain therefore China was, essentially, America’s responsibility. British policy remained passive in China. At a time when the British were forced to relinquish their obligations in Greece, a policy of active assis­ tance to the Chinese government had never even been considered by Whitehall policy-makers. Apart from her weak position, Britain had other problems. W hen the United States decided to resume arms exports to China in M ay 1947, Kitson advised against the lifting of the arms embargo in Britain on the grounds that this action would be likely to become the subject of criticism in Parliament as intervention in China’s internal affairs. He recalled that, in reply to Lord Lindsay in the debate on the question of supply of arms to China on 23 January 1947, Lord Jowitt, the Lord Chancellor, announced that “it is certainly the fact that we were sending nothing”. Secondly and more seriously, in Kitson’s view, there was a risk of Russian active support for the Communists in the civil war. Britain might find herself dragged on the coat-tails of a United States policy which might lead to another Spanish Civil War-type situation.50This Foreign Office advice further showed the British govern­ ment’s cautious attitude towards the Chinese domestic conflict. Indeed, London’s policy of complete embargo was maintained until the end of 1947. By then Kitson, who had exerted a leading influence on Britain’s China policy since the end of the war, had left the Foreign Office to become the British deputy high commissioner general in Bombay. On 23 December, P. W. Scarlett, the new head of the Chinese Department, suggested, on Scott’s advice, a reconsideration of Britain’s attitude on the question of arms supply in the light of the situation in China and the United States and the Canadian governments’ policy of selling war materials to China. On 1 January 1948, Sir Orme Sargent proposed to the Prime Minister, while Bevin was away, that the Chinese request for the supply of Hispano-Suize guns for aircraft should be met “and that future requests by the Chinese for war materials be considered on their merits as they reach us.” Attlee approved the suggestion.51 The decision to remove the arms embargo was an important indication of the change in London’s attitude towards the Chinese civil war. The Cold War engulfed China as British officials acknowledged that the Chinese Communists were acting on Soviet advice. The Chinese civil 86

war thus exhibited in localized form the worldwide tension between Russia and the West. London’s Far Eastern experts recognized that it was in British interests that a non-Communist government should be sustained in China. They expected the Americans to give effective assistance to the Chinese Nationalists to prevent a Communist victory and resist Russian expansion in the region. The United States was, indeed, the only country with the power to do this, but was reluctant to act. In such circumstances, the British position in China had to remain one of “wait and see”.

Notes 1. 2.

3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

Roberts to F.O., 18 Mar. 1946, F O 56763/4157, quoted from Victor Rothwell, B rita in a n d the Cold W ar 1 9 4 1 -1 9 4 7 (London, 1982), p. 251. See D. C. W att, “Britain, the United States and the Opening of the Cold W ar”, in Ritchie Overdale (ed.), The Foreign Policy o f the British Labour G overnm ents, 1 9 4 5 -1 9 5 1 (Leicester, 1984), p.58. F.O. memo. 18 Oct. 1946, F 15359/384/10, F O 371/53672. Stevenson to F.O., 23 Nov. 1946, F 17620/25/10, F O 371/53571. Ibid., emphasis mine. Mao, Selected Works, V.IV, (Peking, 1969), pp. 97-101. M inute by Kitson, 13, Dec. 1946, ibid.. Kitson to Wallinger, 12 Dec. 1946, F 17425/384/10, F O 371/53673. W allinger to Kitson, 10 Jan. 1947, containing the despatch by acting consul in Peking, J.R. Boyce, F1520/76/10, F O 371/63318. M inute by Kitson, 18 Feb. 1947; Far Eastern Information Departm ent, 24 Feb. 1947, ibid.. M inutes by Kitson, Scott, 5 Mar. 1947, ibid.. Moscow to F.O. F6485/76/10, FO 371/63323. M ao Tse-tung, Selected W orks , IV, (Peking, 1961), pp.116, 118. Report based on information from Gardon of UNRRA, received from Export Prom otion D epartm ent of Board of Trade; minute by Scott, 10 Dec. 1946, F 17506/384/10, F O 371/53673. Stevenson to F.O., 5 May 1947, F6899/76/10, F O 371/63323. Report from M .C. G illett, Consul in Peking, 19 Feb. 1947; minute by Kitson, 21 Apr. 1947, F4803/76/10, F O 371/63321. The Times, 29, M arch 1947; minute by Kitson, 18 April 1947, F4544/76/10, F O 371/63321. “Far Eastern Survey: C hina” by Fitzroy MaClean, M.P., Sunday Observer, 3 Nov. 1946. Stevenson to F.O., 23 Nov. 1946, F 17620/25/10, F O 371/53571. F.O. memo, 18 Oct. 1946, F 15359/384/10, F O 371/53672. Sir G. B. Sansom, W ashington to F.O., 27 Dec. 1946; M inutes by Kitson, Scott, 9 Jan. 1947, F85/85/10, F)371/63331. Sansom to Dening, 7 Feb. 1947; minute by Scott, 3 Mar. 1947, F2715/76/10, F O 371/63319.

87

23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28.

29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48.

49. 50. 51.

Stevenson to F.O., 25 Jan. 1947, F1018/76/10, F O 371/63317. Stevenson to F.O., 6 Feb. 1947; F2455/76/10, F O 371/63318; minute by Kitson, Jan. 1947, F76/76/10 FO 371/63317, see also Brian Porter, p. 14. M inute by Kitson, 28 Jan. 1947, F 1018/76/10; m inutes by Dening, 1 Feb.; Sargent; Bevin, 4 Feb. 1947. F1019/76/10, F O 371/63317. Bevin to F.O., 11 M ar.; F.O. to Moscow, 11 M ar. 1947, F 3211/76/10, F O 371/63319. Bevin to F.O., 11 M ar. 1947, F3292/76/10, ibid.; letter from M olotov to Bevin, 11 Mar.; Bevin to F .O , 17 Mar. 1947, F3675/76/10, FO371/63320. Stevenson to F .O , F16565/384/10; m inute by D ening, 17 Dec. 1946, F17901/384/10, F O 371/53673; m inute by Kitson, 19 Nov. 1946, F16592/25/10, FO371/53570. See minute by Kitson, 2 Jan. 1947, F76/76/10, F O 371/63317. Ibid.

M inute by Kitson, 30 Jan. 1947; F.O. to Lord Inverchapel, 5 Feb. 1947; F1209/76/10; Inverchapel to F.O , 15 Feb. 1947, F2089/76/10, F O 371/63318. Stevenson to F .O , top secret, 6 Feb. 1947, F1674/37/10, FO 371/63302. Stevenson to F.O. 13 Feb. 1947, F2014/37/10, FO 371/63303. M inute by Kitson, 15 Feb. 1947, F2007/37/10, FO 371/63302. Stevenson to Dening, 7 Mar. 1947, F4120/76/10, F O 371/63321. M inute by Scott, 27 M ar. 1947, ibid. M inute by Dening, 27 Mar. 1947, ibid. M inute by Rundall, 19 April, 1947, F4822/76/10, ibid. Lord Inverchapel to F .O , 27 May; minutes by Scott and Kitson, 29, 30 May; F.O. to Inverchapel, 30 M ay 1947, F 7 185/13/10, F O 371/63272. John Balfour, W ashington, to F.O. 16 July; m inutes by Kitson, Dening, Sargent, Bevin, 28 July, 1947, F9956/76/10, F10121/76//10, F O 371/63325. See Tang Tsou, p. 456. Ibid., p.446. Ibid., p.453. M inute by Butler, 31 Jan. 1947, F1209/76/10, F O 371/63318. Q uoted from I. C. H su. The Rise o f M o d e m C hina, (second edition) (New York, Oxford Univ. Press), p. 759. M inute by Dening, 17 Nov. 1947, F14773/76/10, F O 371/63378. M em o. by Scott, Nov. 1947, F14418/76/10, F O 371/63328. M inute on Anglo-American conversations by F. K. Roberts, who left the Moscow Embassy and became Bevin’s principal personal secretary, 18 Dec. 1947, FE/47/33, Bevin’s paper F O 800/462. Scott to Perowne, 10 Nov. 1947, F14858/76/10, F O 371/63329. M inute by Kitson, 30 M ay 1947, F7185/13/10, F O 371/63272. M inute by Scarlett, 23 Dec. 1947; F16483/13/10 FO 3 7 1/63273; Sargent to Attlee, 1 Jan. 1948, FE /48/1, FO 800/462.

88

C H A P T E R

FIVE

1948, A Year of Change

During 1948, the final outcome of the Chinese civil war became clear. From winter 1947 to mid-March 1948, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) launched its largest offensive in Manchuria up to that time. The position of the Nanking regime in north China was shaken. Mao Tse-tung was confident of winning the war, as he believed he enjoyed the widespread popular support which Chiang Kai-shek had lost. In a report to the Central Committee of the CCP on December 25, 1947, he declared that China stood at “a turning point in history”, “the turning point from growth to extinction for Chiang Kai-shek’s twenty-year counter-revolutionary rule.”1Mao’s confidence was justified. The Communist autumn offensive was remarkably successful. By the end of 1948, the fall of the Chiang regime was inevitable. On December 9, the Foreign Secretary, Bevin, told the British Parliament that the government’s attitude towards the Chinese civil war was still governed by the Moscow Declaration of 1945. Britain’s financial and economic position, he said, precluded her from doing anything material for China. On the other hand, Bevin assured the House that the British government “are watching the matter very carefully” and was not indifferent to the fate of either British nationals or her extensive trading interests in China.2 The aim of this chapter is to examine how the British government responded to the increasingly victorious Communist troops and the collapse of KMT control throughout this fateful year.

The KMT, the Lesser of Two Evils At the beginning of 1948, a group of Labour left-wingers in the Parliament demanded that the Attlee administration establish official relations with the Communists and open up trade with the territory controlled by them. The American policy of supporting Chiang Kai-shek was under strong attack. This active campaign began when Labour MP Major W. Vernon delivered a strongly pro-CCP speech in the House of Commons on January 23. The Chinese Communist Party, Vernon declared, “are efficient, humane and democratic compared with the Government Party which 89

is tyrannical, inefficient and thoroughly corrupt,” and which was suppressing “the ordinary liberties”. He attacked the Americans for having intervened with vigour and absolute shamelessness in the affairs of China to bolster the wrong side in the civil war. The British government, he suggested, should not blindly follow the Americans but “adopt a policy of friendliness and trade with the Liberated Areas” under Communist control.3 Lord Lindsay, a Labour peer whose views on the Chinese Communists have been mentioned before, was the leader of the campaign for a pro-Communist policy. His son Michael Lindsay was the chairman of the Chinese Campaign Committee, the most active pro-CCP lobby in Britain. The Committee, obtaining many prominent persons’ support, passed a resolution in January 1948, urging the government to establish economic and cultural relations with the Chinese Communists.4 In the Lords debates on foreign affairs in March, Lord Lindsay urged the government to stop supporting the KMT dictatorship, otherwise “there is no hope of finding that the new victorious government will be at least friendly to this country.” He apparently believed that the CCP would win the civil war.5 Lord Lindsay had met Prime Minister Attlee and had also called on the Minister of State, Hector MacNeil, suggesting an official investigation into the merits of the Chinese Communists.6 These pro-CCP activities were undoubtedly encouraged by the increasing success of the Communist forces in China during the first half of 1948. In March, the Communist troops had isolated huge KMT forces in three strongholds in Manchuria: Mukden, Changchun and Chinchou. The government forces in north China were also effectively isolated by a wide belt of Communist held territory stretching from the south of the Shansi border to the sea. The Nanking government’s military situation rapidly deteriorated. The pro-Communist campaign was inconceivable at first glance at a time when the West was shocked by the Communist coup of March 1948 in Czechoslovakia. Yet, the view of British public opinion that Chinese Communism was agrarian-democrat and different from European Communism was as yet not much affected by European developments.7 W hitehall officials tended to emphasize that the campaign was inspired by the CCP “fellow-travellers”. The Foreign Office, at Hector M cNeil’s instruction, made enquiries and found that Major Vernon’s view was simply a retailing of information gathered from Anne Louise Strong, a well-known pro-CCP American journalist, whom he had recently met. Vernon himself was an electrical and aeronautical engineer who rarely concerned himself with foreign affairs but had a long-standing fascination with China.8 The Foreign Office also wrongly regarded the China Campaign Committee to be “a Left-Wing organization under Communist influence”; they felt that it was important to persuade the MPs to withdraw their support from it. Lord Listowel, President of the 90

Committee, indeed resigned, at the Foreign Office’s suggestion.9 The British government could not afford to accept the demands of their critics in Parliament at this stage. Despite experiencing military failure in Manchuria and north China, and also a continued economic crisis, the KMT at the time still held control of most of China and the Nanking government was formally recognized by Britain and other powers. Apart from the legal reasons, Britain’s Far Eastern experts in London were strongly of the opinion that the KMT was a better alternative than the Communists. In a memorandum dated 17 February, 1948, apparently prepared by Scott, whose strong pro-KMT sentiments was consistently displayed in his minutes, the China Department of the Foreign Office reviewed thirty years’ history of Chinese Communism and its present position. It claimed that the Communists in China were orthodox Marxists and their triumph would mean an extension of Soviet influence in China. The memorandum pointed out that it was evident that the Chinese Communists were growing more ruthless with increasing success and that there seemed every logical reason to expect that the land would not be allowed to remain indefinitely in private ownership but would be collectivized and that all classes except the proletariat would be liquidated. W hat alternative then was there to a Chinese Communist government, the author of the memorandum asked. The only alternative was a government dominated as at present by the KMT. The KMT no doubt had its faults, and corruption was rife among both party and government, but that was an inherent defect in the Chinese character only greatly magnified by the demoralizing inflation now in progress, it was argued. The memorandum also stressed that the KMT did remain open to Western influence, that it was sensitive to public opinion in Western countries and that it had a socialist policy, albeit imperfectly applied and above all, that individual freedom was much greater in the Nationalist controlled areas than in those controlled by the Communists. “Imperfect instrument therefore though the Kuomintang may be,” it concluded, “it offers the one hope that China ... will not become a ‘police state’ on the model of say Bulgaria and that her future path of development will be along social democratic lines.” Scott insisted that “the present government of China, like the present government of Greece, may not be all that it should be, but it is at least preferable to a Communist government”. 10 There were more practical and compelling reasons for the British government to adhere to the policy of backing the KMT. First of all, the bulk of British interests in China still lay in territory controlled by the Chinese central government and “expediency alone makes it desirable to maintain friendly relations with that government.”11 Anglo-American solidarity was another important factor which the British government had to consider. The Foreign Office insisted that it was most desirable “to 91

align ourselves as far as possible with United States policy in this aspect”, since nothing in that policy was inconsistent with Britain’s own policy and principles.12 In April, the U.S. Congress approved a further $400 million aid to China, hoping to provide a breathing space for Chiang’s government. A policy of “friendliness and trade” with the Communists would obviously give mortal offence to the Chinese government and also seriously affect British relations with the United States government. Finally, it was also to Britain’s advantage in the UN to adhere to the KMT since China’s support was often valuable at the Security Council.13 Coinciding with the slashing attack on the KMT government by the Labour critics in Parliament, British officials’ on the spot lack of sympathy with the Nanking government aroused some concern in the Foreign Office. From about the end of 1946, the Embassy, Scott noticed, became rather embittered towards the KMT.14 The bitter feeling of officials in China about the KMT authorities stemmed partly from their deep disillusionment with the government and partly from the difficulties experienced by British merchants in re-establishing their economic position in post-war China. Leo Lamb, an experienced Minister in the Nanking Embassy who started his diplomatic career as student interpreter in China in the early 1920s, stated that “our reports and criticisms of Kuomintang activities are based on what we see and know first hand, which does not happen to be conducive to hopes of better things to come.” On the contrary, he said, events such as the practical repudiation of the 1943 Treaty obligations, the burning of the British consulate-general in Canton by demonstrators in January 1948 and various discriminatory or damaging restrictions or activities against British interests, clearly constituted a continued deter­ ioration in conditions from Britain’s point of view.15 Officials in London realized that the action taken against British interests in China by the Nanking government must make it hard for anyone to treat their side of the case with sympathy, but they felt that, important as they were, British interests in China were not the only ones to be considered; there were also British interests throughout the world.16 The Foreign Office were rather puzzled when they received Nanking despatch No.83 of February 2, enclosing copies of President Chiang Kai-shek’s New Year Message and of Mao Tse-tung’s report to the Central Committee of the CCP on Christmas Day 1947. In the report, the Embassy speculated as to the effect on Britain’s interests of Communist control over part of China. It stated that there was no reason to suppose that there was any more hostility towards Britain among the Chinese Communists than towards any other foreign country, leaving aside the United States of America. The report, in effect, implied that British interests would receive better treatment in Communist regions than in those still loyal to the Kuomintang.17 Scott reacted strongly. He could not agree with the views expressed by the Embassy on the likely 92

Chinese Communists’ attitude towards Western interests. It was more probable, he believed, that the CCP might be expected to treat all Western countries alike, and that in these matters they would be guided by Russian advice. Mao’s report on 25 December 1947, he felt, was evidence enough to justify such an expectation. “What I have found particularly surprising in this despatch”, he minuted, “is the contrast between the views now expressed and those expressed about the Chinese Communists generally” by the Embassy before. He speculated that “the Embassy are so obsessed with defects of the Kuomintang that they feel that any change, even the Communist, is for the better.” It was important, he thought, that the Embassy should be reminded of where the British government stood in regard to Communism, both in external policy and in internal affairs. The head of the Foreign Office China Department, Peter Scarlett, agreed with Scott that the report was oddly out of tune with the views previously expressed by Sir Ralph Stevenson on the Chinese Communists.18 Dening’s comments were more pertinent. He considered that Stevenson’s despatch was perhaps, unconsciously, confusing the issue of the respective merits of the KMT and the Communists on the one hand and what Britain’s attitude towards them should be on the other. The two issues, he suggested, should be considered separately. It was in this connection that this Foreign Office Assistant Undersecretary made the first and significant indication of the later British attitude towards the Chinese Communists regime. “It may well be”, he said, “if this should occur [i.e. the Communists succeed in seizing power] we should wish to maintain our contacts with China through our Embassy and Consulates as long as we can, and that if British merchants can contrive to trade with Communist China we should at any rate not discourage them from doing so.” However, he underlined that it would be wrong to try to re-insure now and it would gravely complicate British relations not only with the Chinese government, but also with the United States.19 Upon receiving a letter from London Ralph Stevenson hastened to assure the Foreign Office that the Nanking Embassy had not changed its views on the intentions of the Communists. The Embassy also completely shared the Foreign Office’s preference for non-Communist organizations. The only doubt they had was over the degree of success which the Communists might have in carrying out their intentions “in this immense and intractable country”.20 The ambassador admitted that the KMT, when compared to the Communists, “is the lesser evil of the two.”21 Continued adherence to the policy of backing the KMT government therefore suited British political and economic interests in China. Rejection of the option of recognizing the Communists further illum­ inated the determination of the post-war Labour administration to resist 93

world Communism. Bevin told the Commons that the British govern­ ment must adhere to the Moscow declaration of 1945 and would continue to recognize the KMT government as the government of China.22 In contrast to what Nancy Tucker has suggested, Britain, like America, supported the KMT regime during the Chinese civil war.23

Considering De Facto Relations with the Communists Meanwhile, the military situation of the KMT government continued to deteriorate in the first half of 1948. The position of the whole of north China became critical as almost all the region, with the exception of the isolated cities in Manchuria and the Peking-Tientsin corridor, fell under Communist control. The British authority in Nanking had advised British subjects and organizations of the desirability of withdrawing nonessential personnel from places in the interior - north of Yangtze and east of Sian.24 Reports from China all indicated the inevitable collapse of the Nanking government’s authority in north China, though it was not certain when this would take place. On 19 March 1948, the British Consul in Tientsin, A. A. E. Franklin, a shrewd observer whose reports were highly regarded by officials in London, suggested that there were two possibilities which might save north China from falling completely under Communist control: effective and constructive measures by the KMT government and direct and large-scale external intervention by the United States. However, the financial weakness, military and administrative incapacity of the government were such that the first possibility had to be ruled out. He also doubted that American financial (and even military) aid could be given on a scale adequate to meet the KMT government’s needs, particularly in view of American commit­ ments elsewhere. Such aid would also easily lead to increased help indirectly or more openly to the Communists from the U.S.S.R.. Franklin was inclined to believe that direct American intervention by forces on the ground would probably prove far more effective in bolstering the Nationalist regime. The difficulties, however, including American public opinion and the strategically vulnerable position for such an occupation force (wedged in the narrow Peking-Tientsin corridor between Communists to the South and in Manchuria) made this possibility unlikely, he thought. The downfall of the KMT control in northern China was, therefore, a foregone conclusion.25 In retrospect, one is inclined to doubt whether a direct military intervention at this stage could have been successful in sustaining a regime which refused to make necessary reforms and had lost the confidence of its own troops and its own people. 94

British officials on the spot, in fact, believed that Chiang Kai-shek’s government had lost popular confidence and support in north China, while the Communists were winning over the peasants’ support in the region. From a tour of north China in January Lamb derived the impression that the central government was becoming increasingly unpopular.26 According to intelligent foreign observers, the Embassy reported, there was a tendency on the part of the men in the street, especially in the north, to regard the prospects of life under a communist administration as a possible improvement. Officials in the British Embassy further felt that certain of the known attributes of Communist governments in other countries might not be as repugnant to the average Chinese as they would be to the inhabitants of countries where the principle of personal liberty had been established. Arbitrary exactions and impositions, disregard of habeas corpus, and the operations of secret police, for instance, were no novelty in China where such totalitarian practices had survived, despite the replacement of the supreme Emperor by a republican government. This, of course, did not mean that Communist philosophy was inherently attractive to the average Chinese mind. On the contrary, the Embassy suggested some aspects of the orthodox Communist creed, such as collectivism of land cultivation, were in conflict with the peasant’s deep-rooted desire to own the soil he cultivated, this being the best security for the livelihood of his family no less than himself. But the Communists recognized this important factor and in their agrarian reform platform insisted upon the distribution of land to the individual peasant. In the Embassy’s view, the failure of the KMT to improve the lot of the masses could not but render the common people more susceptible to Communist propaganda.27 Franklin reported from Tientsin that the war of nerves had gone far to undermine the will to resist communism in China, a will which for the great majority was never particularly strong. Peasants’ interests, he rightly stated, focussed on land not politics. A bellyful of rice was more important to peasants than political liberties which they had in any case never enjoyed.28 In assessing the general gravity of the situation in China, British official representatives clearly recognized the fundamental weakness of the KM T regime. They thus realized that the cause of the KMT in north China had definitely been lost. These officials began for the first time to consider what form Chinese Communism might assume and the effect it would have on foreign interests in the area. Most of them were pessimistic. There was only one official on the spot who entertained the illusion that China was peculiarly unsuited to communism. S. L. Burdett, Consul-General in Tientsin, held that Chinese Communism would not be able to follow the pattern normally associated with countries controlled by Moscow. In a letter to Lamb on 19 March, he wrote that in attempting to assess the probable 95

outcome of an extension of Communist control over north China, “we must not lose sight of the historical background against which Communist ideology, as preached by Moscow, has been developed.” Barely a century had elapsed, he said, since the emancipation of the serfs in the old Russian Empire, whose inhabitants were long accustomed to an autocratic and often ferocious form of government. In Eastern Europe, the peoples of Poland, Hungary and Bohemia, though less ignorant and docile than their Russian neighbours, were nevertheless subjected to authoritarian regimes of largely foreign origin which afforded them little participation in government, and in the Balkans such freedom as might have existed was for centuries obliterated by the Turks. In China, on the other hand, Burdett felt, the control hitherto exercised by successive dynasties and governments had been loose and regional and the sturdy individualism of the people had usually made itself felt in times of stress. It therefore seemed probable, he concluded, that the Communists would find it difficult, if not impossible, to exercise firm and highly centralized control over the whole of north China and that the line on which Communist ideology might develop in China would differ considerably from those adopted in Europe.29 This was mere wishful thinking. Through what happened in Eastern Europe, most officials were, in fact, expecting the worst. Sir Ralph Stevenson commented that it would be a mistake to imagine that in the long run Chinese Communism would not result in subservience to Moscow and the growth of evils and oppression which were the natural concomitant of communism wherever it occurred.30 The Nanking Embassy thus was not hopeful for the long-term effect on British interests in north China with Communist control over the region. There were no clear ideas about the Communist treatment of foreign interests in their initial period of control. The British Embassy in Nanking generally assumed that if the Communists should desire to take large commercial centres such as Tientsin, they might have to depend on foreign trade and enterprise to keep the population alive. This would obviously be impossible without goodwill on the part of foreign interests. In this connection Lamb found it was significant that, with a view to discussing the future transaction of import and export business, informal approaches had been made by Communist sources to various British and American business concerns in Tientsin.31 As the Communists had given no indication of their intentions, British officials both in China and in London tended to consider that, as a matter of political and economic expediency, the Communists might be wise enough at the beginning of their control to respect foreign property and business interests. On the question of what steps the British government should take to protect British interests in the event of a Communist take-over of north China, Lamb made the first suggestion that it was important to maintain 96

consular representation in these areas. He discussed the question with consular officers in Mukden, Peking and Tientsin in January when he visited these three important centres. They agreed that premature with­ drawal might only serve to antagonize the Communists as a sign of lack of confidence and that, in any case, once a withdrawal had taken place, it would be unlikely that the Communists would facilitate the re­ establishment of consular posts later on. They also recognized the value of maintaining reporting centres in Communist territory in view of the paucity of sources of information at present available. As to the safety of consular officers, Lamb believed justifiably that the Communists would be wise enough to respect foreign representatives.32 In the agreement with Lamb’s suggestion, Ambassador Ralph Stevenson recommended to the Foreign Office in February that Britain’s consular officer in Mukden should remain in the event of the capture of that city by Communists. The Foreign Office concurred with this suggestion.33 In May, the Nanking Embassy further suggested that “while there is no question of making overtures to the Communists, we must nonetheless recognize the practical necessity of dealing with them de facto in areas under their control whether now or later.” In forwarding such a suggestion, Sir Ralph Stevenson attached great importance to the maintenance of British trade interests in China. “However impotent we may be to stem the progress of the Communist hordes in China,” he said, “we can not afford to abandon our struggle to protect British interests. And if there should happen to be chance to promote British trade etc., we should surely not fail to take it up through over squeamishness about reddening our hands.” But he emphasized that there was no question of recognition of the Chinese Communists.34 There was, perhaps surprisingly, no objection in the Foreign Office to the Embassy’s suggestions. The pragmatic considerations as expressed by the Ambassador seemed sufficient to temper the shock of considering de facto dealings with the Communists. In addition, the British Embassy’s advice differed from official recognition of the Communists as demanded by the pro-CCP lobby in Britain. Moreover, policy-makers in London were now also sensitive to the precarious position of the KMT regime. In June, commenting on the report that even Chiang Kai-shek himself admitted that there was no final military solution to the Communist problem and that he agreed to make some kind of arrangement with the Communists, Patrick Coates of the Foreign Office China Department indicated this was the first time the Generalissimo had shown signs of being willing to come to some accommodation with the Communists. As things were, Coates further indicated, any accommodation would have to include recognition by the Central government of Communist rule over certain parts of China.35 London also learnt that the United States ambassador in Nanking was now of the belief that the KMT would not be 97

able to re-establish control over the whole of China.36 It therefore seemed that the Americans were ready to accept a disintegration of China as the outcome of civil war. At this stage, the British government’s assessment of the eventual outcome of the Chinese civil war was that provincial KMT commanders, particularly in the north, would make local arrangements with Communists. There would then be a relapse into a situation akin to that existing in the early 1920s, when there was a shadowy central government recognized by the Powers as the government of China with semi­ independent war-lords holding effective authority, except in the immediate neighbourhood of the capital.37This prediction of developments in China was soon outdated by the success of the Communist autumn offensive. In the event the British government did not need to deal with the Communists in the north and the KM T and other forces in other parts of China, but discussions on the likely attitudes of the Communists to foreign interests in north China, and the response of the government to it amongst British officials, were to be most important and served as the beginning of a policy-making process which led to the final decision to keep “a foot in the door” in China.

The Abandonment of Chiang Kai-Shek and the Decision to Keep “A Foot in the Door” With the beginning of the Communist autumn offensive, the Chinese civil war entered its decisive stage. Fierce fighting took place simultaneously in Manchuria and central China in October. W ith the fall of Mukden on November 2, the whole of Manchuria was completely in Communist’s hands. The Manchurian campaign cost Chiang Kai-shek 470,000 of his best troops and dealt a mortal blow to the morale of the entire government army. In the words of General David Barr, head of the American Army Advisory Group in China, it “spelled the beginning of the end” for the KM T cause.38 The Times said it was a heavy blow for Chiang’s government.39 On 8 November, the leader of The Times claimed that all sections of the population except the great landlords and financiers, who were able to make their private profit from corrupt dealings, had now lost confidence in the ability of the Nanking government to maintain political and economic stability even in the area it still controlled.40 In the battle of Huai-hai on the plains of central China, the People’s Liberation Army destroyed no less than 200,000 government troops.41 The capture of Peking and Tientsin by the Communists was merely a matter of time. The military debacles of the Nanking regime paralleled economic collapse. The m ilitary expenditure impelled the government to issue 98

bank-notes for astronomical figures. From 1946 to 1948 the deficit in the government budget amounted to 70 percent of its revenue. Prices continued to rise at an ever-increasing rate: in June 1946 the wholesale price index of Shanghai was 378,217; in August 1948 558,900,000.42 On 19 August, in an attempt to check the ruinous inflation, the Nanking government proclaimed a program of currency reform and price and wage control, but by the end of October, these controls had to be abandoned. Prices rose again. In August 1948, one U.S. dollar was worth four Gold Yuan, the new currency, but by early M ay 1949, it had became worth five to ten million Gold Yuan.43 The military defeat and economic collapse of the Chinese government led to an important policy re-examination in London in November. Officials in charge of Far Eastern affairs felt that after taking over Manchuria, the Communists now had the initiative either to complete their control over north China or to overthrow the central government before it could recover its balance. Minister Lamb, who was in charge of the Embassy during the time when Sir Ralph Stevenson was home on leave, reported from Nanking on 18 November that “The inescapable conclusion is that eventual Communist domination of the whole of China cannot be prevented.” On the British government’s response to such an event, the Chargé d’Affaires suggested that “it might be politic to accept this however unpalatable in hopes of being able later on to exploit internal strains which are sure to develop rather than to try to bolster up the remnants of the present hopelessly decayed regime or to attempt to establish a new one by force of arms in the south”.44 Clearly the Embassy was proposing a change in British policy in China - withdrawal of support for the KMT and making contact with the Communists. It was up to London to make this vital decision. An extensive review of policy in China was, indeed, underway following the fall of Mukden, at Foreign Secretary Bevin’s instruction. Scarlett, the head of the Far Eastern Department, did not share the Embassy’s hope that when the Communists came to power, the Western powers might be able to exploit internal strains. The lesson learned from Yugoslavia, he indicated, suggested that Communists, whether orthodox or heterodox, were equally hostile to non-Communist powers, so “let us not set our hopes too high.” As to the K M T’s future, the head of the Department thought it depended on whether or not the Americans were prepared to back it more fully.45 It was thus vital for London to know the American attitude towards the development of the Chinese civil war before making any change in its policy. There was no clear idea in the Foreign Office on Washington’s intentions regarding the Chinese situation. In June 1948, the State Department director of the division of Far Eastern affairs told Dening in Washington that the American government wished to avoid entering into commitments in China. But the urging of the British 99

Foreign Office Assistant Undersecretary for close Anglo-American consultation had had little effect. The State Department was not moved by the deep concern expressed by the British government about the possibility of an eventual communist control of China.46 Coates complained that “the State Department have been very secretive about U.S. policy (or lack of it) towards China.”47 During November, in seeking to crystalize the United States government’s reaction to the collapsing KMT, the Washington Embassy was instructed to urge the State Department to take Britain into their confidence. On 17 November, the British Ambassador in Washington, Sir Oliver Franks, reported that Acting Secretary of State Robert Lovett was generally in agreement with the British appraisal of the Chinese situation, and that feeling in the State Department was that the task of restoring or even sustaining the Nanking regime would be so great that matters would have to be allowed to take their course.48 The Minister of State, Hector McNeil, who was in Paris on UN business, was also asked by the Foreign Office to see General Marshall urgently. In their talks on 19 November, McNeil mentioned the difficulties in extracting information from Washington. The American Secretary of State promised to take steps to see that this situation was rectified. Through the Minister of State’s conversation with Marshall, the Foreign Office drew the conclusion that as long as General Marshall remained Secretary of State, the present United States policy of limited commitments in China would be continued. In the opinion of British officials both in China and in London, such limited commitments would not be sufficient to prop up Chiang Kai-shek’s regime.49 The American government had, in effect, written off the whole of China.50 On 23 November, Dening took the decisive step in the Foreign Office. He stated bluntly that “I do not think that any useful purpose will be served by bolstering up Chiang Kai-shek’s regime, because it has grown too rotten. Nor do I believe that the American would have the technique even if such a course were feasible.”51 Dening’s statement, agreed by Sir Orme Sargent and Ernest Bevin, marked the turning point in British government’s policy in post-war China. Since the end of the Second World War, the British government had consistently followed a policy of supporting the Nationalist government of China. November 1948 withnessed the virtual abandonment of Chiang’s government by London. Clearly, the decision to abandon the KMT was prompted by the military defeat of the government and the refusal of the American government to rescue Chiang Kai-shek. The decision also seemed to be influenced by history. Dening felt strongly that on previous occasions in China Britain had sometimes lingered too long in her support of a tottering regime and thus complicated British relations with the new one when it came into power. He indicated that this had notably been the case when Chiang Kai-shek himself came to power.52 100

In early November, Bevin asked the Whitehall departments to prepare a paper for the Cabinet examining the broad implications of the Communists taking over China, especially its immediate threat to Britain’s colony of Hong Kong and the general effect upon the British position in Southeast Asia. The direct and most immediate concern was existing British interests in China. In 1948, Britain had twelve consular offices in that country, representing the largest foreign business community and there were about 4,000 Britons in Shanghai.53 British commercial property and investments in China were worth less than £300 million.54 W ith such a large stake in China British merchants naturally wished to remain, as the British Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai reported to the China Association.55 They were well aware that if they threw in their hand and left precipitately, their properties and business stocks would be arbitrarily seized by the Communists. The position of the British business­ men in China was that “the only chance of British interests surviving under a Communist regime was to try to hold on”.56 For the British government, the abandonment of their interests had to be weighed against an assessment of what the position would be like for Western interests in a communist-governed China. So far there were few firm indications of likely communist attitudes towards foreign interests. During the autumn offensive against the major cities of Manchuria - the first centres with large foreign populations to come under Communist administration - Communist broadcasts proclaimed that “Foreign consulates, missions and their property will be given protection without discrimination”.57 Though the Communist policy was far from clear, the British Embassy in Nanking were content to think that conditions for British business operations in China could scarcely have been worse than under the post-war KMT government. Lamb was optimistic because he believed the Chinese Communists were also Nationalists. If their present “moderate” policy was successful they were likely to maintain it, for the time being at least, as a matter of political expediency. If the Kremlin tried to force a decision upon them, he suggested that “we should expect to see similar happenings here to those in Yugoslavia.”58 The Titoist hypothesis was certainly not groundless, at least with hindsight, in the light of the fundamental conflict of interests between Russia and China in the past and the stronger position Mao Tse-tung would be in when he controlled the whole of China. But in a cold war climate, when the world was divided into two hostile camps, the Chinese Communists would not be likely to challenge Moscow immediately. The Foreign Office was not impressed by Lamb’s analysis and was not prepared to base its policy on such hopes. Scott, who was soon to be transferred to the home civil service, emphasized that “It does not after all seem to matter much whether Communism remains united or there is a schism - it will remain Communism”. Coates thought it would be 101

dangerous not to expect the worst.59 Officials in charge of Far Eastern affairs in London particularly regarded as misleading the notion expressed by the new Consul-General in Shanghai, Robert Urquhart, that the Communist leaders would be weaned away from their doctrines and become good middle-of-the-road socialists.60 The Foreign Office insisted that the leaders of the Chinese Communists were MarxistLeninists. They considered that Mao Tse-tung’s article “Revolutionary Forces of the World Rally to Combat Imperialist Aggression” in the Comintern Journal published in Bucharest on November 1 showed clearly the CCP’s attitude to Soviet international Communism, and should discourage people from wishful thinking. In his article, Mao stated that “the revolutionary forces in every country must daily strengthen the united anti-imperialist front headed by the Soviet Union, they must pursue a correct international policy, for otherwise they can never be victorious.” The Chinese revolution under the leadership of the CCP, Mao said, “is an integral part of the international anti-imperialist campaign”. Both Scarlett and Coates insisted on telegraphing extracts of Mao’s article to the Embassy and consulates in China.61 The Foreign Office thus had no illusions about British interests in a Communist China. On the other hand, these hard-headed officials in London were inclined to the view that British interests might be able to carry on for a time under Communist control. This “honeymoon” theory, as it became known, was based on a number of important considerations. Faced with the ambiguity of the CCP’s policy, Whitehall officials firstly looked to the experience in Eastern Europe. They indicated in a telegram to the Nanking Embassy on 22 November that events in Eastern Europe had shown that foreign business operations might continue for a certain time, and that agreements covering some compensation would often be negotiated. The telegram implied that the intention of the British government was to retain consulates in Communist areas if possible, “in the hope of preserving the considerable British commercial and property interests involved.”62 In formulating the new “staying put” policy, officials attached perhaps inevitably - great importance to the experiences of the first foreign company, the British American Tobacco Company (BAT) under CCP control at Yingkou in Manchuria. The two British employees were still permitted to operate the cigarette factory after the Communists captured the town in late February 1948. They remained there until 22 October. Franklin reported his interview with them soon after they arrived in Tientsin. Guy Burgess in the Foreign Office China Department regarded the two men’s report as reliable and noted that the Communists wished to be “recognized” by British consuls and wished British firms to remain open. Burgess also noted that the Communists tried to get factories working, but were short of technicians.63 102

This experience greatly influenced the way of the officials’ thinking. British policy-makers then considered that the difficulties facing the Communists might force the new rulers to tolerate foreign interests. There were two kinds of daunting problems Mao would have, Dening anticipated. Mao would become heir to all the economic ills of the Nationalist government, “which are of no mean order”, and he would be hard put to improve the lot of the populace and to provide the necessary administration. The second problem facing the new administration, Dening predicted, was that the 100% orthodox Communists would be thin on the ground by the time once spread all over China, and the natural resistance of the Chinese to regimentation would not be as easy to overcome in such a vast area as it had been in Poland or Yugoslavia. In such circumstances, Dening felt certain that the Chinese Communist leaders would find no difficulty in moderating their tone to suit the occasion, and it might well be that “British interests in China will not for some time be subjected to full force and fury of Communist theory and practice”. However, he emphasized that there should be no illusion as to the ultimate intention of the CCP.64 This line of argument was strengthened by the Board of Trade and the British Embassy’s acting financial Minister in Shanghai, who both reached the conclusion that the Communists would be forced, for a time at least, to trade with non-Communist countries.65 The view that British interests could continue to do business with the CCP dominated the British government’s thinking; as Coates summed things up, “The honeymoon period may be short, but there is no reason why British merchants should not benefit from it as long as they can”.66 In expressing these views, British policy-makers seemed to fail to distinguish the need for foreign interests of the Communist regime and the dependence of the new government on foreign business and trade. There is, however, a very important difference between the two cases. It was correct to recognize the Communists’ immediate need of foreign business for economic rehabilitation and therefore fair to assume that British interest could continue for a “honeymoon” period. But the Chinese Communists were also Nationalists and were striving to be self-reliant. There would thus be no improvement of Western interests, as the “honeymoon” term also implied. Furthermore, the Chinese Communists’ need for foreign trade with China did not necessarily mean that their toleration of the persis­ tence of Western business in China. The British government’s views proved to be optimistic. In the event, the Communists on the one hand resumed trade with the West, whilst on the other their reaction against Western imperialism and their commitment to establishing a socialist society left little room for British interests in China. The British government, while precisely identifying the nature of Chinese Communism, did not sufficiently recognize the significance of 103

Nationalism in the Chinese Communist revolution. London also dismissed the notion that the Soviet Union might fill the need for outside assistance of the CCP. Dening told the American Embassy in London that there were so many holes in the Chinese economy that even Soviet help could not be enough.67 The Foreign Office therefore also over­ estimated the Communists’ difficulties in their early control. The British might have saved some money by withdrawing commercial investment from China though it was also true that most of the property could not be taken out. But the strong argument in 1948 in the British government and in British business houses in China was that Britain must try to stay on. There were therefore hardly any serious talks about withdrawing. On 27 November, the Foreign Office endorsed the British ConsulGeneral in Shanghai Robert Urquhart’s advice that it was wise for the British merchants to remain in order to safeguard their interests and property. It also approved the line Ambassador Ralph Stevenson suggested in his private conversations with the Committee of the British Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai. Stevenson had reminded the Committee of the fact that elsewhere Britain continued to trade with countries in the Soviet orbit, implying that British businessmen could trade with the Communists.68 On 9 December, Foreign Secretary Bevin presented a Cabinet paper to his colleagues. Paper (48)299 was the product of an extensive assessment of the situation in China by various Whitehall departments since early November, and represented the first and most important response of the British government to the Communist victory in China. It was also the first paper on China policy which had reached ministerial levels since the end of war. It claimed that Communist domination of China was simply a matter of time and that the only power which could contribute financial, material and military resources to counter the Chinese Communists was the United States which was not expected to take such action, and was unlikely to succeed even if tried. The paper studied separately the political effects of the spread of Communism in China on adjacent areas, i.e. Hong Kong, Japan, the Federation of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak and North Borneo, foreign territories in South-East Asia, India and Pakistan. The general conclusion was that Communist activities in all these areas would be increased and contacts between Communists in these countries would be facilitated. The economic effects on these areas were likely to be an increase in labour troubles and disturbances in the production of vital commodities. It was therefore advised that the British main line of action be directed towards building up resistance in surrounding countries and to this end every effort should be made to resolve political disputes, e.g. Kashmir, Indonesia, Indo-China, and to improve the economic position of South-East Asia as a whole. The cooperation of other interested Powers in this policy was emphasised as essential. 104

In China, the paper assumed that there would be an immediate period of dislocation when foreign commerce generally would be at a low ebb. It indicated however that this would not be a very much worse state of affairs than that already existing in China, with the lack of easy and safe internal communications, extremely inflated prices, the restrictive attitude of the KMT government towards foreign trade, shipping and business, and the prevalent corruption. During this period the economies of Hong Kong and South-East Asian countries generally would be affected mainly (and in the case of Hong Kong, seriously) by labour disturbances and refugees. The Cabinet paper assumed that there would follow a period in which the economic difficulties of the Communists would dispose them to be tolerant towards foreign interest. It also suggested that the Chinese Communists “if ever they succeed in surmounting their economic difficulties” would adopt the policies of orthodox Communism. So “British interests in China might be able to carry on at least for a time and we should encourage this”, the paper concluded. The Cabinet paper recommended a positive policy in China. “Our best hope”, it said, “properly lies in keeping a foot in the door. That is to say, provided there is not actual danger to life, we should endeavor to stay where we are, to have de facto relations with Chinese Communists in so far as these are unavoidable, and to investigate the possibilities of continued trade in China.”69 British Cabinet ministers regarded a Communist-dominated China as a grave threat to the position of the non-Communist governments throughout Asia. In the Cabinet discussion on 13 December, they asked the Foreign Secretary to consult with the United States government in the first instance, and then with Commonwealth governments on means of containing the Communist threat in the Far East. As far as British interests in China were concerned, the Labour leaders were inclined to feel that at this stage, no firm conclusions could be reached on the ultimate nature of Chinese Communism. The Cabinet agreed that there was a prospect that, at least in the initial stage, a Communist regime might be prepared to “adopt a liberal policy towards foreign interests” and fully endorsed the policy of “keeping a foot in the door”. The ministers further suggested that it would be unwise to pursue a policy which might have the effect of gratuitously driving a Chinese Communist government into the arms of the Soviet Union. The importance of this policy consideration was obvious in view of the Cold War and the effect on the West if Communist China became a satellite of Russia. This was to become the main political aim of British recognition policy.70 The significance of this newly approved policy was far-reaching and it served henceforward as the corner-stone of British policy towards the Chinese Communists and their later established regime. As far as their interests in that country were concerned, the British Labour government’s overall 105

response to the emergence of a Communist China was thus pessimistic for the long term and cautiously optimistic for the short term. With the decision to come to terms with the Communists, the British government tried to dissociate itself from the KMT regime. In December, Bevin refused the Chinese government’s request to use his influence in persuading Washington to adopt a positive policy in China and would not give open support of Chiang Kai-shek in his statement in the House of Commons on 9 December, as requested by the Chinese ambassador in London.71 On 12 January 1949, the British Cabinet rejected President Chiang Kai-shek’s appeal for intervention in favour of a cease-fire in the civil w ar.72 The United States, France and the Soviet Union also declined Chiang’s same request. On 21 January, Chiang Kai-shek announced his retirement. There was no moral issue to trouble British officials, for as one senior Foreign Office official wrote, “he [Chiang Kaishek] and his associates are so completely discredited in the eyes of the Chinese people.”73 Consequently, 1948 was a decisive year for the civil war in China and also a critical year for British policy towards the warring KMT govern­ ment and the Communists. The British government’s position that the KMT was superior to the Communists was based on the recognition of the real nature of Chinese Communism and further strengthened by the development of the cold war, which was intensified by the Communist coup of M arch 1948 in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin crisis in June. However, as she had no power to restore peace in China when the K M T-CCP negotiations collapsed in 1946, Britain could do little to counter the spread of Communism. This was so in spite of the fact that her preference for the non-Communist position was virtually unchanged until November of that year. When the Communist victory became certain, the British government was prompted by the existence of considerable British commercial investments and properties in China to adopt a policy of staying for a “honeymoon” period. The nature of this reaction to the Communist domination in China was both pragmatic and positive. The only thing left for Britain to do now was to wait for the arrival of her “bride”.

Notes 1. 2. 3. 4.

M ao Tse-tung, Selected Works (Peking, 1961) VIV, pp. 157-73. H . C. D ebs., V.459, C.566-7. H . C. D ebs., V 446, C.580-2, 23 Jan. 1948. In 1948, Officers of the Com m ittee including Lord Listowel, President; J. Reevels, M P; H arold Laski. See F.O. minute, 28 June, 1948, F8925/6687/10. A short history of the China Campaign Committee can be found in Brian Porter, Appendix I, p. 154.

106

5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

10.

11.

12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.

26. 27. 28 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35.

H .L.Debs., V .145,C .110-24, 23 Jan. 1948; V. 154, C .375-8, 3 Mar. 1948. See letter from Dening to Stevenson, 8 April, 1948, F253 5/33/10, F O 371/69527. See Brian Porter, B ritain and the Rise o f C om m unist China (London, Oxford Univ. Press, 1967), pp. 5, 9; The Times leader, 6 Jan. 1948. M inute by Davis, 14 Feb. 1948, F1731/33/10 F O 371/69527. M inute by F.O. China Department, F6687 and 6688/6687/10. 1948, see also m inute by Coates 29 March 1949. F4779/1015/10, F O 371/75747; M inute by Scott, 22 June 1948, F8641/6687/10 FO 371/69638. China D epartm ent memo, 17 Feb. 1948, F2757/33/10, F O 371/69527; minute by Scott, 11 Nov. 1947, F14773/76/10, F O 371/63328, see also his minute, 2 Feb. 1948, F1638/33/10, F O 371/69527. F.O. memo “Situation in China”, 24 June 1948, prepared for a m eeting of the Far Eastern Committee of the Parliamentary Labour Party, F8945/33/10, F O 371/69537. Ibid.

L etter from D ening to Lamb, 19 June 1948, F8032/33/10, F O 371/69534. M inute by Scott, 19 June, 1948, F8032/33/10, F O 371/69534. L etter from Lamb to Dening, 25 May 1948, F8032/33/10, F O 371/69534. Letter from Dening, drafted by Scott, to Lamb, 19 June 1948, F8032/33/10, F O 371/69534. Stevenson to F.O., 2 Feb. 1948, F2535/33/10 F O 371/69527. Minutes by Scott, 24 Feb. 1948; Scarlett, 27 Feb. 1948, ibid. M inute by Dening, 9 Mar. 1948, signed by Bevin, ibid. Stevenson to Scarlett, 20 April, F6505/33/10; Stevenson to Dening, 25 May, F8032/33/10, F O 371/69532. Stevenson to F.O., 14 July 1948, F9876/33/10, F O 371/69536. H. C. Debs. V.448, C.1207, 10 Mar. 1948. Nancy Tucker, Patterns in the Dust: Chinese-Am erican Relations a n d the Recognition Controversy , 1 9 4 9 -1 9 5 0 (New York, 1983), p. 22. Stevenson to F.O., 19 Jan. 1948, F1045/33/10, F O 371/69527. M emo by Franklin, 19 Mar. 1948, F6117/33/10, F O 371/69571. Franklin was one of a few consuls who were not “old China hands”. H e came to China only in 1947. Memo by Lamb, 12 Feb. 1948, F3295/33/10, F O 371/69528. Stevenson to F .O , 25 May 1948, F8050/33/10, F O 371/69534. Franklin to Scott, 22 April 1948, F6761/33/10, F O 371/69532; M em o by Franklin to Stevenson, 19 Mar. 1948, F6117/33/10 F O 371/69531. Burdett to Lamb, 19 March 1948, F6117/33/10, FO 371/69531. Stevenson to F.O. 7 April 1948, ibid. M emo by Lamb, 12 Feb. 1948, F3295/33/10, F O 371/69528; N anking Embassy to F.O. 27 April 1948, F6762/33/10 F O 371/69532. Ibid.

Stevenson to F.O. 12 Feb. 1948; minute by Scott, 5 Mar. 1948, ibid. Stevenson to Dening, 25 May 1948, F8032/33/10, F O 371/69534. In m id-1948, Li Chi-Shen, a rebel K M T leader in H ong Kong w rote to the American Ambassador Stuart to the effect that he was attem pting to establish a coalition government with the Communists in southwestern

107

36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41.

42.

43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48.

49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54.

55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60.

China. Dr. Stuart showed the letter to C hiang, who had agreed that the former should handle the matter. Stevenson to F.O., 7, 8, June 1948; minute by Coates, 9 June, F 8 158/33/10 F O 371/69534. Stevenson to F.O., 14 July 1948, F9833/33/10, F O 371/69536. M inute by Scott, 19 July 1948, ibid; m em o by the F.O., 11 October 1948, F14397/33/10, FO371/69540. Quoted from Im m anuel C. Y. Hsu, T he Rise o f M o d e m C hina (New York, 1970), p. 730. The Tim es Leader, 2 Nov. 1948. Ibid, 8 Nov. 1948. Hsu, p. 730. A full description o f the C hinese civil war can be found in Chassin, Lionel Max, The C om m unist C onquest o f China: A H istory o f the C iv il War, 1 9 4 5 -1 9 4 9 , trans. (London, 1966) and Melby, John F , The M a n d a te o f Heaven: Record o f a C ivil W ar China 1 9 4 5 - 4 9 (New York, 1971) Melby was then in the American embassy in N anking. Jerom e Chen, M a o and the Chinese R evolution (London, 1965) pp. 294-295; see also L ucien Bianco, O rigins o f the Chinese Revolution 1 9 1 5 -1 9 4 9 (California, 1971). Tang Tsou, p. 486. Lamb to F.O., 18 Nov. 1948, F 16258/33/10, F O 371/69542. M inute by Scarlett, 23 Nov. 1948, ibid. FRUS, 1948, Vol. VIII, pp. 77-79. M inute by Coates, 25 Nov. 1948, F16438/33/10, F O 371/69542. F.O. to W ashington, 11 Nov. 1948; Franks to F.O., 17 Nov. 1948; m inute by Scarlett, 19 Nov. 1948, F15971, F16203/33/10 FO 371/69542, See also FRUS 1948 Vol. III, pp. 221-222, 29 Nov. 1948. U.K. delegation to U N General Assembly, Paris to F.O., 19 Nov. 1948; minute by Coates, 23 Nov. 1948, F16331/190/10, F O 371/69587. See Tang Tsou, pp. 487-489. In O ctober, the State D epartm ent flatly rejected S tuart’s recom m endation to rescue the N anking government. M inute by D ening, 23 Nov. 1948, signed by Sargent and Bevin, F16258/33/10, F O 371/69527. M inute by D ening, 9 Mar. 1948, F2535/33/10 F O 371/69527. Beverley H ooper, China Stands Up (Sydney, 1986), p. 23. T he British governm ent had no accurate estim ation o f British interests in 1948 in China bu t in 1941 they were assessed at £300 million. See C abinet paper (48) 299, 9 Dec. 1948, CAB 129/31. H o o p er only gives British invest­ ment, i.e. US$715.5 million, which was one half of the total foreign investment in C hina on the eve of the C om m unist victory, see Hooper, p. 10. Shanghai to China Association, 10 Nov. 1948, N o.48/F/17, China Association M inute and Circulars (CAMC). Lamb to F.O., 21 Nov. 1948, F16505/33/10, F O 371/69543. FRUS, 1948, Vol. VIII, p. 844. Lamb to Scott, 10 Sept. 1948, F 13826/33/10, F O 371/69539. M inute by Scott, 8 Oct. 1948, F 13826/33/10, F O 371/69539; minute by Coates, 8 Dec. 1948, F17094/33/10 F O 371/69545. N ote by U rquhart, 29 Nov. 1948, F 17436/33/10 FO 371/69545; minute by Coates, 15 Dec. 1948; in a personal letter to U rquhart, Scarlett on

108

61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71.

72.

73.

10 D ecem ber wrote: “our eyes should be wide open to the situation for the sinister possibilities”. F 17436/33/10, F O 371/69545. M inutes by Scarlett and Coates, 2 Dec. 1948, F 16917/33/10, FO 371/69544. F.O. to N anking, 22 Nov. 1948, F 17436/33/10, F O 371/69545. Franklin to F.O., 1 Nov. 1948; minute by Burgess, 13 Nov. 1948, F 15907/33/10, F O 371/69541. M inutes by D ening, 23 Nov. 1948, F16258/33/10, FO 371/69542; 26 Nov. 1948, F 16917/33/10, FO 371/69544. M em o by Ian MacKenzie, Shanghai, 17 Nov. 1948; see also minute by Coates, 22 Dec. 1948, F16877/33/10, ibid. M inute by Coates, 15 Dec. 1948, F17436/33/10, F O 371/69545. M em o on D ening’s conversation with the U.S. Embassy, 9 Dec. 1948, FRUS, 1948, Vol III, p. 683. Stevenson to F.O. 26 Nov.; F.O. to Nanking, 27 Nov. 1948, F16650/33/10, FO 371/69543. C abinet paper, C.P.(48)299, 9 Dec. 1948, CAB129/31. C abinet minutes, C.M.80(48), 13 Dec. 1948, CAB128/13. Brief by Scarlett, 6 Decem ber 1948, F 17445/33/10, FO 371/69546; brief by D ening, 7 Dec. 1948, F 17722/33/10, F O 371/69547; H . C . Debs. Vol.459, Cs 566-567, 9 Dec. 1948. Aide m em oire o f the Chinese government to U K ambassador in Nanking, F476/1075/10, F O 371/75736. Cabinet m inute C.M.1(49)3, 12 Jan. 1949, CAB128/15). Coates to W ar Office, 16 Dec. 1948, F15641/33/10, F O 371/69541.

109

CHAP TER

SIX

Establishing Relations with the Chinese Communists Following the Cabinet’s approval of the policy of “keeping a foot in the door” in China, the British government directed all its efforts to initiate a working relationship with China’s new authorities. Both British officials and merchants in China hoped that by adhering to this policy they would be able to maintain important British trading interests in the country. However, there were many confusing events in China and Chinese Communist policy was unpredictable. The American decision to withdraw from China also came as a surprise to London. These unanticipated developments challenged the British decision to stay in China. The Communist victory in China further posed a threat to the security of Britain’s colony, Hong Kong. This chapter will show the determination of the British government to implement the policy of “keeping a foot in the door” and examine under what circumstances Britain decided to accord diplomatic recognition to the Chinese Communist government. A new feature of China policy-making in London in 1949 was the growing involvement of government ministers. A ministerial committee which reflected the importance of Far Eastern affairs in the British government’s eyes was appointed in March by Prime Minister Attlee to consider the problems of China and South-East Asia. The members of the new committee included the Foreign Secretary Bevin, the Chancellor of the Exchequer Sir Stafford Cripps, the Minister of Defence A. V. Alexander, the Colonial Secretary Arthur Creech-Jones and the Commonwealth Secretary Philip Noel-Baker. The Prime Minister chaired the committee himself.1 However, the Foreign Office remained the centre of policy-making.

The First Confrontation: Relations between the Communists and Remaining British Official Representatives The British government had lost contact with its consulate in Mukden on November 18, 1948, three weeks after the Communist forces took over the city. Two months later Tientsin was also cut off from the outside 111

world following its capture. Foreign consulates in these two cities were not allowed to use radio transmitters. In Peking, they were still able to maintain their communication with both their respective governments and with their embassies in Nanking. But in all three cities, the new authorities refused to recognize foreign consular officers’ legal status and regarded them as ordinary foreign nationals. All official communications were accordingly ignored. On the basis of a report that junior Communist officials in Tientsin were justifying the refusal to recognize foreign consuls officially on the grounds that diplomatic relations had not yet been established, officials in the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office recognized that the Communist attitude was “a form of pressure designed to force the governments concerned ... to accord recognition to the Communist regime.”2 The Chinese Communist attitude towards the remaining official foreign representatives came as a surprise to the British government. The interruption of communications between the consulates and the outside world caused grave concern in London. Sir Orme Sargent, permanent Undersecretary of the Foreign Office, considered the re­ establishment of communications with the Consuls-General in Mukden and Tientsin to be most important. “We should be severely criticized”, he minuted, “if anything happened to them because we had failed to look after them adequately.”3 The Foreign Office legal adviser, Sir E. Beckett, strongly recommended that recognition of the Communist government, which effectively controlled a large portion of territory, was the only effective step to remedy the present situation. In his view, it was both legally right and practically necessary to recognize the Communist government as at any rate being the de facto government of that part of China which it controlled. At the same time, Britain could continue to recognize the Nationalist government as being the dejure government of the whole of China. By so doing, Beckett suggested, Britain should be adopting a similar attitude to that taken towards Spain during its civil war and would then have a basis on which to talk to the Communist authorities. Otherwise, he felt, the British government would have no strong legal ground for complaint if the Communists treated its consuls as private persons.4 The Foreign Office Far Eastern Department also saw the necessity to recognize Communist China, but felt that the time was not yet ripe. In its view, a delay in according any form of recognition was desirable because the situation in China was still uncertain. Unlike the Spanish civil war, in which the opposing factions were in control of relatively clearly-defined areas, the frontiers of the Chinese Communist-administered territory were still fluid. The North China People’s government (proclaimed in August 1948) was only an interim regime and there was the possibility of a coalition between the Communists and the KMT government under 112

the new acting President Li Tsung-jen, who initiated peace talks in Peking. The Far Eastern Department officials also considered that Britain should not accord recognition to the Communist regime without consulting other friendly countries. “We are anxious to proceed to recognition only on the basis of full consultation with the other powers concerned.”5 Obviously, Britain’s wider interests in the world and her relations with other countries had to be considered. Dening pointed out that both the United States and France would be outraged if Britain were to make up her mind about recognition without consulting them.6 Thus officials in charge of Far Eastern affairs were against a premature recognition of the North China People’s government. The Foreign Secretary Bevin, who had shown great concern over the potential Communist strategic threat to South East Asia, was cautious about the question of recognition. He minuted that “I must go into this with great care”. After discussion with Dening and Scarlett on 23 February, the Foreign Secretary agreed with the Far Eastern Department’s views.7 In March, the Cabinet reviewed developments in China and in South East Asia. By then it was known that foreign consuls in Mukden and Tientsin were safe but still unable to exercise their normal consular functions. Regarding the question of recognition, Bevin expressed the view that the Communist administration in North China was provisional and “at the moment even de facto recognition would be premature.” In any case, he told his colleagues, the British government would have to consult with Commonwealth and other friendly governments before considering recognition. Bevin also informed the Cabinet that a police raid on the house of a leading Chinese Communist in Hong Kong had produced a diary and a series of notes which made it clear that the CCP was just as orthodox in its ideology and just as highly organized as any of its European counterparts.8 Unprepared to use recognition as a means to alleviate the position of British consuls, the British government was anxious to explore other paths, hoping to persuade the Chinese Communists to allow its consulates as full an exercise of their functions as hitherto, including free commun­ ication with London. Peter Scarlett recommended on February 17 that the British position on the question of recognition should be outlined to the Chinese Communist representatives in Hong Kong, and they should be asked for consular functions to be allowed to continue irrespective of the local authority in control. This proposal was approved by Bevin.9 The Governor of Hong Kong, Sir Alexander Grantham was, however, very reluctant to take up the issue with the Communists in Hong Kong, who had no official status vis-à-vis the Colonial authorities. It would cause embarrassment when it might be necessary later to take action against the Communists concerned for activities hostile to the interests of the Colony. In addition, an American approach in Hong Kong on the 113

position of their consulates in Communist China had met with a rebuff. Grantham feared that “approach by us would encounter similar snub.” 10 The Governor’s hesitation was shared not only by the Colonial Office officials but also by Dening and Strang in the Foreign Office. The idea of using Hong Kong to pass on the British government’s views on recognition, and its desire to resume British consular facilities to the high-ranking Communist leaders, was subsequently abandoned. On April 4, Buxton, the British Vice-Consul-in-charge in Peking, on Sir Ralph Stevenson’s instructions, made a formal representation to the Alien Affairs Bureau of the Peking M ilitary Control Commission requesting an interview with an appropriate official. The communication was returned half an hour later with the remark that as there were no relations between the Consulate and the Commission they were unable to receive it. When Buxton pointed out that he had come to discuss the resumption of the relations, the official replied that her supervisor had noted all he wished to say and would communicate with a higher authority.11 On April 13, all the foreign consulates in Peking together sent a joint letter by post to the Mayor of Peking. The letter was returned to the French consul a few days later opened but without comment.12 Thus all efforts to establish official contact were fruitless. It was, however, quite clear that high-ranking Communist officials were not unaware of British aims. The Communist authorities had no intention of maintaining official relations with the foreign representatives “recognized by the Kuomintang”. Their attitude of non-recognition towards the remaining foreign officials was a calculated policy officially laid down by Mao Tse-tung in his speech at the second plenary session of the Seventh Central Committee of the CCP on 5 March 1949, which was not published at that time. Mao declared that old China was a semi-colonial country under imperialist domination. This imperialist domination manifested itself in the political, economic and cultural fields. In each city or place where the Kuomintang govern­ ment was overthrown, imperialist political domination was overthrown with it, and so was imperialist economic and cultural domination. But the economic and cultural establishments run directly by the imperialists were still there, as were the diplomatic personnel and the journalists recognized by the Kuomintang. “We must”, Mao stated, “deal with all these properly in their order of urgency. Refuse to recognize the legal status of any foreign diplomatic establishments and personnel of the Kuomintang period, refuse to recognize all the treasonable treaties of the Kuomintang period, abolish all imperialist propaganda agencies in China, take immediate control of foreign trade and reform the customs system - these are the first steps we must take upon entering the big cities.” Anti-imperialism was, apparently, the watchword of Chinese Communist policy towards the Western presence in China. Mao believed 114

that when they had taken the above steps, “the Chinese people will have stood up in the face of imperialism”. 13 Mao was not refusing to establish diplomatic relations with foreign countries, but he was deeply suspicious of the intentions of the “imperialist” powers. In the same report, he announced that “We are willing to establish diplomatic relations with all countries on the principle of equality, but the imperialists, who have always been hostile to the Chinese people, will definitely not be in a hurry to treat us as equals. As long as the imperialist countries do not change their hostile attitude, we shall not grant them legal status in China.” 14 In spite of the Chinese Communist attitude, the British government was not prepared to close its consular posts and withdraw the officers altogether. Concerns were expressed in the Foreign Office that the United States government might decide to close its consular post in Mukden.15 Nanking was still in Nationalist hands at this time. The decision as to whether or not the Nanking Embassy should remain was critical. On January 26, Ambassador Stevenson and other diplomatic mission chiefs in Nanking received a formal note from the Nationalist Ministry of Foreign Affairs informing them of the removal of the Chinese government to Canton and requesting the foreign missions to follow the government there.16 The Foreign Office agreed with Stevenson that the British Embassy should remain. In early April, peace talks in Peking collapsed and the Communist troops were soon to cross the Yangtse River. The question of whether Britain should keep Sir Ralph Stevenson in Nanking was raised afresh and in an acute form. On April 8, Sir William Strang, the successor to Sir Orme Sargent, submitted a memo­ randum to the Prime Minister recommending that the British Embassy should be maintained in Nanking, even if the United States decided to withdraw theirs either for consultation, or to join the Nationalist government at Canton. This was the first sign that London’s officialdom was preparing to follow a different course in China than that followed by America. On the one hand, Strang pointed out, “there are many and cogent reasons why we should not wish to take a different attitude from that of the United States”. On the other, he emphasized the different position of the two countries in China. “Our commercial interests which are at stake are far greater than those of the United States ... We have therefore to weigh very carefully the probable result of any action we may take and must feel free to make our own decision.” 17 On the same day, Attlee approved Strang’s recommendation. The decision to keep Ambassador Stevenson in Nanking and not to follow the Chinese Nationalist government to Canton was taken on the premise that some sort of working relationship could still be established with the Chinese Communists. If Britain was now to leave the capital the inevitable return would be difficult and possibly undignified, and a formal recognition of 115

the Communist regime would certainly be demanded. Consequently the Foreign Office concluded that Stevenson should not follow the Nationalists “at the risk of our having to purchase his return to the capital at the cost of formal recognition of a Communist government”. This decision, in the Foreign Office legal adviser’s view, was legally justifiable as diplomatic representatives did not have to be physically present in order to be formally accredited to a foreign government.18 The fact that Britain had larger interests in China than any other foreign power at that time was the most important consideration which influenced not only her decision to maintain the Embassy, but also other significant policy issues with regard to China. In the event, the American Ambassador Stuart also stayed in Nanking when it was captured by the Communists in later April. W hile the British government was attempting to establish relations with the Chinese Communists, the Amethyst incident occurred. On April 20, when the British frigate Amethyst was sailing on the Yangtse River from Shanghai to Nanking to relieve the destroyer Consort there, Communist batteries on the north bank, believing that the frigate was obstructing their crossing of the Yangtse, opened fire. Three naval vessels went to the assistance of the Amethyst but without success. The exchange of fire caused considerable casualties on both sides.19 Efforts to contact the highest Communist authorities in Peking for the release of the Amethyst failed. Negotiations on the spot reached a deadlock as the British refused to admit responsibility for the incident.20 Before the Amethyst escaped on the night of July 30, the Foreign Office had considered making an appeal to the United Nations, while the Admiralty was ready to instruct the Commander-in-Chief of the British Far East Fleet Sir Patrick Brind to meet the Communist area Commander for the release of the ship.21 The Yangtse incident had an unfortunate effect on the Communist attitude towards Britain. On April 30, the PLA’s spokesman issued a strong statement drafted by Mao Tse-tung himself, condemning the British imperialist aggression. The statement announced that: “A foreign govern­ ment which wishes to consider establishing diplomatic relations with us must sever relations with the remnant of Kuomintang forces and withdraw its armed forces from China.” The British warship was alleged to have interfered with the crossing of the River in the interests of the KMT.22 In London, the Parliamentary debate on the Yangtse incident requested by the opposition Conservatives led to a demand by the Commons for the government to establish diplomatic relations with the new rulers of China.23 The first decision made by the British government after the Communist attack on the Amethyst was to order all British warships to withdraw from China. The incident did not, however, affect the British government’s position on the question of recognition of the Chinese 116

Communist regime. While it was widely felt in the Foreign Office that “it would seem more than ever necessary to try to establish contacts with the Communists”, Bevin informed the China and South East Asia Committee on M ay 12 that until a central Communist government was formed there was nothing for Britain to recognize.24 The policy of the British government to try to establish a de facto relationship with China’s new rulers was thus not successful. The Communists demanded formal recognition of their regime by foreign powers. Such a recognition, in the British government’s view, would be premature at that time since no Communist government with national character yet existed. Furthermore, a concerted action with other friendly governments towards the Chinese Communists was considered desirable in London. At the same time, with the Communist sweep across the Yangtse River, Britain’s interests not only in China but also in Hong Kong were at stake.

The Communist Threat: The Position of Hong Kong With the rapid advance of the People’s Liberation Army southwards, tensions in the British government over the possible threat from the Communists to the security of Hong Kong grew considerably. The question of Hong Kong became the priority of Cabinet ministers in mid-1949.25 The possible threats to the colony, as seen by the British authorities in Hong Kong, included internal unrest sponsored by the Communist-dominated Trade Union; a large-scale influx of refugees; and external aggression by guerrilla bands probably Communist-inspired.26 The British government had no great difficulties in addressing these threats. On 28 April, the Cabinet approved the Defence Committee’s decision that one infantry battalion and a brigade headquarters should be sent to Hong Kong at once and that preparations should be made for the despatch of the remainder of a brigade group as soon as practicable. This reinforcement, in the Chief of Staff’s view, would enable the garrison at Hong Kong to deal with the immediate dangers.27 The decision to strengthen the Hong Kong forces was announced by the Minister of Defence, A. V. Alexander, in the House of Commons on M ay 5.28 The possibility of a large-scale attack on Hong Kong by Chinese Communist forces, and the prospect of its capture, caused the British government many problems. The likelihood of such an organized military offensive by the Communist forces was regarded as only a “remote possibility”, but the Chief of Staff Committee insisted that such a possibility should not be ignored and that the first aim of British policy should be to deter the Communist forces in China from launching an attack upon Hong Kong. The best way to discourage such a threat, 117

in their view, was to prepare to meet it. The Chief of Staff’s views were presented to the Cabinet by Alexander on M ay 24. In his memorandum, the Defence Minister warned his colleagues that if the Chinese Communists were able to force British withdrawal from the colony, “not only would the blow to our prestige throughout the world be irreparable, but the immediate repercussions in South-East Asia would add immeasurably to our defence burdens in that area.” He proposed therefore that, should this materialize, further reinforcements should now be sent to Hong Kong to meet a large-scale Chinese Communist attack. The ministers were informed that the arrival of the proposed reinforcements would bring the garrison of Hong Kong up to the following strength: Army:

Air Force:

Navy:

4 48 54 16 24 36 58

Brigades (9 battalions, 3 commandos) Anti-tank guns Field guns Medium guns Heavy A. A. guns Light A. A. guns Tanks together with ancillary units

2 Fighter squadrons 1 Long range fighter squadrons 1 Flying boat squadron Fighter control and early warning radar 3 15 1 1 1 24

Cruisers Destroyers (or frigates) Light fleet carrier Replenishment carrier Hospital ship Local patrol craft for Hong Kong

In addition, it was proposed that a further infantry brigade should be earmarked for despatch if a serious threat to Hong Kong materialized. The above forces in Hong Kong, which represented the maximum effort that the United Kingdom could reasonably make to secure the defence of Hong Kong, would, in the Minister of Defence’s view, be capable of holding the colony provided adequate measures were taken by the civilian government to deal with the threat to internal security. It was, of course, not possible for Alexander to give a realistic numerical estimate of the strength that the Communists might concentrate against Hong Kong. He estimated, however, that “not more than about 400,000 Chinese Communist troops could be deployed at any 118

one time in a land offensive.” It was also thought that they might be supported by an initial air effort of some 50-60 aircraft (eg. fighters and bombers). In order to deal successfully with a threat on this scale, the Minister of Defence urged that the proposed further reinforcements must be ready by early September.29 Two days later, on 26 May, the Cabinet held an urgent meeting to consider Alexander’s proposal. The discussion was chiefly centred on the question as to whether the British government should defend Hong Kong if a direct offensive was launched by the Communist forces from the mainland. Two conflicting considerations emerged in the Cabinet discussion. Some ministers felt that British policy should seek an accommodation with the Chinese Communists for the retention of the colony. Hong Kong, it was pointed out, was valuable to Britain mainly as a centre of trade. In the short term, trade would be seriously interrupted, if not entirely brought to an end, if preparations for the military defence of the colony were countered by measures of blockade from the mainland. In the long term, if a strong Communist government established itself in control over the whole of China, it would be impossible for Britain to maintain Hong Kong as a trading centre unless that government acquiesced in a continued British presence. It seemed therefore that “the aim of our policy should be to find a basis on which a communist government could acquiesce in our remaining in Hong Kong.” However, ministers who were in favour of sending reinforcements to Hong Kong emphasized the importance of showing British determination to defend the colony. Practical evidence of British resolution to defend Hong Kong, they pointed out, would have important effects. Firstly, it might well deter the Communist forces from making a direct attack on the colony. Secondly, it would rally to the British side the wavering elements among the local population and would substantially reduce the threat to internal security. Thirdly, it would strengthen the antiCommunist front throughout South-East Asia. It was argued that “The maintenance of our trading position in Hong Kong was doubtless important; but even more important at the present time was the political question whether we must not somewhere make a stand against Communist encroachment in the Far East.”30 The importance of preventing the Communist flood from pouring into South-East Asia and maintaining British prestige in the region outweighed the doubts about the defence of Hong Kong. Both Attlee and Bevin advocated a firm stand in Hong Kong as a key position in the defence against Communism in Southeast Asia. After consulting with the UK Commissioner-General for South-East Asia Malcolm MacDonald, and the Commanders-in-Chief of the Land and Air forces in the Far East, the Prime Minister was convinced that failure to meet the Communist military threat to the security of Hong Kong “would damage very 119

seriously British prestige throughout the Far East and South-east Asia”. Moreover, he strongly felt that “the whole common front against Communism in Siam, Burma and Malaya was likely to crumble unless the peoples of those countries were convinced of our determination and ability to resist this threat to Hong Kong.”31 Ernest Bevin, sharing the views of his advisers in the Foreign Office that Hong Kong would “become the symbol of the resistance of the rest of Asia to the Communist advance”, had told Dean Acheson in April that if necessary his govern­ ment would make Hong Kong “a Berlin of the East”.32 Bevin believed that the determination of the British government to hold Hong Kong would, as in the case of Berlin in the West, lead the Communists to hesitate the adoption of a solution by force of arms. He also undoubtedly attached the same importance to the key role of Hong Kong in the cold war in Asia as to that of Berlin in the West. In both cases the threat of Russian and Communist expansionism necessitated the retention of all Britain held. The Cabinet finally agreed to send further reinforcements to Hong Kong but decided not to announce it publicly. They feared their unilateral action would provoke the Chinese Communists and be interepreted as a relic of “colonialism”. 33 The Cabinet meeting of 26 May was most important in relation to formulating a policy for the defence of Hong Kong. The British were now prepared to fight for the maintenance of the colony if a military threat from the mainland developed. The provision of further reinforcements to Hong Kong from United Kingdom forces presented Britain with “formidable difficulties” and had serious implications elsewhere. A serious reduction in strength of British forces in the strategic reserve in Britain as well as in Germany and the Mediterranean was involved.34 Dening and his Far Eastern (Official) Committee attached great importance to the moral and material support of the Commonwealth countries and the United States in the defence of Hong Kong. In Dening’s view, the publicly expressed support of these countries would not only strengthen the British position in Hong Kong but also have an effect on Chinese Communist intentions about the colony. India’s support, in particular, would have a powerful effect on public opinion throughout Asia. The Cabinet Far Eastern (Official) Committee insisted that material assistance from the Commonwealth governments should be sought.35 The question of how to approach the United States and the Commonwealth countries, particularly the new Asiatic members, for their support of British policy was delicate and required careful handling. At the meeting of the China and South East Asia Committee, Bevin suggested that the defence of Hong Kong should be presented as a decision to resist aggression. If the Communists staged an attack on Hong Kong, he said, Britain should, while putting up the best 120

resistance possible, bring the matter before the United Nations as an act of aggression. By laying stress on resistance to aggression Bevin felt that Britain would have the best chance of obtaining the support of the Indian Prime Minister Nehru, and also of mobilizing United States opinion. There was general support in the Committee for Bevin’s suggestion that British policy in Hong Kong should be based on the principle of resistance to aggression.36 The Foreign Office advised that the Asiatic countries should be assured that this was not a question of colonial policy, rather of making a stand against the advance of Communism.37 It was on the above lines that Attlee telegraphed the Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth countries on May 27, expressing the deep anxiety and concern of his colleagues and himself over the situation in Hong Kong and asking for their support for the British decision to defend it. The U.K. Commissioners in the Commonwealth countries were instructed to explain Britain’s position fully to the governments to which they were accredited. In the cases of Australia and New Zealand, the high Commissioners were instructed to emphasize that the reinforcements to Hong Kong were placing a considerable strain on Britain’s forces and were to ask whether there was any way in which the two governments could help.38 The responses of the governments of the Commonwealth and the United States were disappointing. New Zealand was the only country willing to give whole-hearted support, moral as well as material. The other Commonwealth countries except for South Africa, which gave a firm promise of moral support, were reluctant to commit themselves in advance, and evidently entertained misgivings about the long-term prospects of the British position in Hong Kong. The first exclamation of the Canadian Prime Minister St. Laurent to Britain’s approach was “It is a different world”. 39 London was particularly disappointed that the Australian government was unwilling to commit itself to send material support. Australia feared that it would become involved in a full-scale war with the Chinese Communists.40 The United States government’s reaction to the British request was also unsatisfactory. During the Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Paris in June, Bevin told the American Secretary of State that he hoped Britain could count on American moral support in Hong Kong. But Acheson did not commit himself to a public declaration in support of British policy.41 America’s attitude was perhaps to be expected, given its long-standing anti-colonialism and sympathy with the Chinese view that Hong Kong should be returned to China. The cool response of the Commonwealth and the United States governments to the British decision to defend Hong Kong against a major attack by Chinese Communist forces had an important effect on the British government’s approach to the colony. While the policy of resisting aggression was continued and the Cabinet was reassured by 121

Alexander after his visit to the colony in early June that the circumstances in 1949 were wholly different from those of 1941 and“a military defence of Hong Kong can be successfully made,”42 ministers tried to formulate a positive long-term policy in respect of the colony. Bevin and the Colonial Secretary Creech-Jones reached the conclusion in August that the United Kingdom government should be prepared to discuss the future of Hong Kong with “a friendly, democratic and stable government of a united China”. It was felt that the conditions under which such discussions could be undertaken did not exist at present and were unlikely to exist in the foreseeable future. Until conditions changed, the United Kingdom government intended to retain its position in Hong Kong. The Cabinet on August 29 endorsed this new line of policy, subject to the omission of the words “democratic” since it would preclude Britain from discussing the matter with a Communist government of China.43 The Cabinet decision of August 29, 1949 became the basis of British policy towards Hong Kong for the next 30 years. The British authorities both in Hong Kong and in London took the possible Communist threats to the security of Hong Kong in 1949 extremely seriously and endeavoured to resist them. The substantial reinforcement of the forces in the colony was essentially a precautionary measure, which was partly motivated by the desire to discourage any Communist attacks on Hong Kong. Apart from British trading interests, the need of a firm position in Hong Kong also arose from the fact that it was the first point in the East, as was Berlin in the West, where Western determination to resist Communist expansion had to be demonstrated. Further, Britain’s interests in South-East Asia were dependent upon her maintenance of Hong Kong. However, the policy of military defence of the colony was only short-term, though Britain might be able to hold it successfully against an attack from the mainland due to British control of the sea. The future of Hong Kong was uncertain in 1949, but it was certainly in Britain’s long-term interests to establish friendly relations with the Chinese Communist government. W hile visiting Hong Kong on June 8, the Defence Minister Alexander declared that the British government was anxious to establish “the friendliest possible relations with whatever government the Chinese people might choose”.44

The Battle for Survival: The Position of British Trading Interests in China Apart from the serious situation facing the British government in Hong Kong, Britain’s trading interests in China were another major source of concern in London. At the beginning the Communist authorities’ attitude towards foreign businesses was similar to their attitude towards

122

the foreign official representatives. Their existence was likewise ignored. British firms remained in operation. But soon they were faced with a serious labour problem. Labour, as Stevenson reported in July, adopted “an unruly attitude” towards foreign employers and backed up demands for wage increases with violence. Labour unrest did not seem to be the deliberate policy of the new authorities, but it was, in Stevenson’s view, partly encouraged by the “official manifestation of xenophobia”. He reported that the local Communist authorities, far from intervening to maintain law and order, had clearly indicated their sympathy with the rowdy conduct of the Chinese employees and there had been several disturbing cases of foreigners being exposed to arrogance and brutal treatment at the hands of the police for trivial or even trumped up offences.45 The difficulties of protecting British interests further arose from the heavy taxation imposed by China’s new rulers. Soon after they took over the big centres of foreign business, the Communists resorted to arbitrary taxation levies as a means of raising revenue - regardless of the crippling effect upon foreign interests. In both Tientsin and Hankow, the levy was retrospective.46 According to a Cabinet paper dated 23 August, “The threat of crippling taxation is already causing British trading interests to wonder whether they will be able to continue in such circumstances.”47 Though high taxation at the time was largely the result of the difficult economic situation facing the Chinese Communists when they came to power, deliberate discrimination against foreigners was already evident. Taxation later became the major method utilized by the Communists to squeeze Western interests in China. The new authorities’ treatment of foreign economic establishments in China in their early period of control was influenced partly by pragmatic considerations and partly by their strong anti-imperialist sentiment. Differing in his approach from that towards the foreign diplomatic establishments and propaganda agencies, Mao Tse-tung claimed in March 1949 that “as for the remaining imperialist economic and cultural establishments, they can be allowed to exist for the time being.”48 The continuing foreign business activities played an important role in the large cities in the earliest control of the Communists. In Shanghai, British and American-run public utilities were vital and, indeed, Communist officials encouraged British businesses to carry on. On August 26, for the first time, Robert Urquhart, the British Consul-General in Shanghai, had an unofficial meeting with Chang Han-fu, the head of the Foreign Affairs Bureau in Shanghai. Urquhart was told that the authority wished for normal relations with foreign business communities despite non­ recognition of foreign diplomatic and consular officers and that it was not the Communist policy to injure them.49 Two days later, John Keswick, the Chairman of the British Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, 123

also met Chang. On August 30, Chang brought Keswick to see the Mayor Chen Yi. The Mayor reiterated that it was entirely mistaken to assume that the people’s government wished to squeeze the foreign communities out.50 During his visit to Shanghai in September, Ambassador Stevenson discussed the obvious problems confronting British communities, i.e., taxation and labour with Chang Han-fu on a private and unofficial basis. Stevenson told Chang that British policy towards China was based on the promotion of trade. Zhang impressed Britain’s ambassador as “a practical and intelligent man” and his manner was pleasant.51 These contacts raised some hopes in both British official and mercantile circles in China. However, it soon became clear that the authorities were not prepared to take any concrete measures to improve the situation. The Embassy reported that so far these protestations of goodwill lacked “convincing practical proof’ and were “belied by Communist performance”. Stevenson lost hope of any improvement for British interests in Communist China. He observed that “so long as the ideological and anti-foreign bias continues to predominate... they will be in no hurry to take concrete steps to relieve British and other foreign business from disabilities which they are now suffering.”52 For British businessmen in China, this comment sadly proved to be accurate. The British government was not willing at the time to use economic sanctions as a lever to bring about a moderation of Communist policy towards foreign interests since it feared that the China-based categories of economic enterprise such as banking, coastal shipping, spinning, and other productive enterprises in which the British were heavily involved would be most susceptible to heavy losses or ruin as a result of sanctions and Communist retaliation.53 The chief and immediate cause for the serious situation confronting British firms in China had been the Nationalist blockade of Communistheld ports. On June 20, the Chinese Nationalist government suddenly proclaimed that it had decided to close the ports no longer under its control along with adjacent territorial waters and that ships were forbidden to enter them. The British government claimed the Nationalist action to be illegal on the grounds that the Chinese government, having never admitted that a state of war existed in China, had no claim to belligerent rights.54 Nevertheless, the KMT navy and air forces effectively maintained a blockade of Shanghai. The effect of the blockade on British interests was disastrous. The immediate victims were shipping, banking and merchant houses and factories were cut off from raw materials and fuel supplies. London was conscious of the acute situation in Shanghai and was actively considering ways of safeguarding British interests. On July 19, the Admiralty suggested that the government should try to get relief ships through to Shanghai with essential supplies such as rice and fuel. 124

The Foreign Office held the view that Britain should not take unilateral action to do this and instructed the British Embassy in Washington to ask the State Department as a matter of urgency for their view and whether the US would agree to cooperate in this action. The reply from the American government, which also regarded the Nationalist blockade as illegal, was unfavourable.55 Sir Ralph Stevenson in China, while agreeing fully with the need for relief supplies for Shanghai, was opposed to attempting to use the Royal Navy for such a purpose. He warned that Britain should be particularly careful to avoid exposing herself to charges by either the Nationalists or the Communists of forcibly entering China’s territorial waters. Both Communists and Nationalists, he said, would be equally ready to make political capital out of any incident which might ensue.56 On July 22, the Cabinet Committee concerned with China and South East Asia agreed with the Ambassador that Britain should not force a way through the Nationalist blockade under naval escort. Ministers suggested that the American government be asked again to participate in a joint approach to get the KMT to allow relief ships through to Shanghai on humanitarian grounds.57 In the meantime, the situation in Shanghai had further deteriorated. The representations of the China Association to the Minister of State, Hector McNeil, on July 28 aroused the British government’s further concern. The China Association informed him that, as a result of the blockade and the Communist policy of tieing wages to the price of rice, British firms in Shanghai had to remit £350,000 per month in sterling from London. This charge, he was told, could not continue and many firms would be forced to close down soon, if the situation did not improve.58 The Nationalist blockade thus posed a serious challenge to Britain’s “stay put” policy in China. In a letter to Attlee on July 29, Strang pointed out that the government had always thought the Communists would eventually try to force out foreign trading interests when they were ready to conduct state trading on the recognized Communist pattern. However, if British interests were to be forced out now by the blockade, the British government would have nothing in hand with which to bargain.59 The Foreign Office thus decided to urge upon the United States government the importance of the provision of the relief ships for Shanghai. The Washington Embassy was asked to point out to the State Department that it was not a question of sending any supplies which would ease the position of the Communists, but of enabling foreign trading interests to survive.60 Unfortunately, at that time the American government suddenly reversed its China policy and advocated a withdrawal from China. Until then the United States government, like the British government, had followed a policy of remaining in China. However, in August it decided to close most of its consulates and was anxious to evacuate its 125

nationals from China as soon as possible. With a view to withdrawing the American community in Shanghai, the State Department agreed to join the British government in requesting the Chinese Nationalist government to permit ships to enter Shanghai without interference.61 The Chinese government, while granting the American request for evacuation, failed to meet Britain’s demand to enter Shanghai with sufficient numbers of ships to provide the necessary relief.62 Clearly, the KM T had no sympathy with the foreign firms who continued to do business with the Communists. It was equally clear that the British government could count on little help from the United States to cope with the blockade. The British government therefore faced a choice, either to agree to differ and to pursue its own policy in China of “keeping a foot in the door” or to abandon the whole of its interests in order to follow in the American wake. This question was raised in the Cabinet on 23 August, when Bevin informed his colleagues of the different views and interests between the US and Britain regarding China. It was difficult, he said, to understand what the present trend of American policy denoted, but it was understood that one school of thought considered that Communist China should be allowed to relapse into complete chaos, thereby encouraging the Chinese people to overthrow the Communist regime. “T his”, Bevin indicated, “is diametrically opposite to our own view ... namely, that if we are not to drive Communist China into the arms of Moscow we must do our utmost to maintain Western contacts.” Bevin also pointed out that Britain’s business interests in China differed from those of the United States. It was easier for America to cut its losses in China than for Britain to do so. Its trading interests, he said, were fewer and not so deep-rooted and its communities were smaller. Moreover, the total loss of its interests meant less to the US than a similar loss meant to the United Kingdom in her present economic and financial condition. American reaction to a different British policy in China was also considered by Bevin. He told the Cabinet that the fact that the United States government had asked British consuls to take charge of its interests in China suggested that it was not unwilling for Britain to adopt a different course from its own. In the circumstances, the Foreign Secretary recommended that “we should adhere to the policy of remaining in China as long as we can.”63 Bevin had thus come to the decision that Britain should act alone and break the Shanghai blockade. At the last moment, however, his legal adviser, F. A. Vallat, raised doubts as to the legality of any attempt on Britain’s part to escort ships past the Nationalist blockade. On 29 August, the Cabinet invited Bevin to seek the views of the Law Officers on the question and decided that if their answer was affirmative, arrangement 126

should immediately be made to escort British merchant vessels into Shanghai.64 On September 7 the Foreign Office telegraphed Bevin, who was then in Washington, that the Law Officers had expressed a negative opinion. The plan of forcibly challenging the Nationalist blockade was subsequently given up. The Commander-in-Chief of the Far Eastern Station was accordingly ordered to protect British merchant ships in running the blockade up to the limits of Chinese territorial waters. HMS could only enter Chinese territorial waters for humanitarian reasons.65 The position of British interests in China was thus a serious one. The earlier calculations about the Chinese Communist attitude toward foreign interests were inaccurate. The new authorities, while being ready to admit the need for foreign businesses, were not induced, as expected, to adopt a moderate policy. On the contrary, Chinese nationalistic feelings fundamentally threatened the survival of foreign interests. The position of British businesses in China was further weakened by the Nationalist blockade, though the situation did not worsen as rapidly as initially feared. At the time, hope in the British government still existed. The Cabinet paper of August 23, while admitting that foreign economic interests in China were likely sooner or later to be faced with the threat of expropriation, optimistically indicated that “provided that the normal channels of commerce are still open the Communists’ desire for trade with the West may conceivably be strong enough for some sort of trade and compensation agreement to be secured eventually.”66 London thus continued to encourage its mercantile communities in China to stay on for as long as possible. British businessmen, for their part, hoped that recognition of the Communist regime would strengthen their position.

Recognizing the People’s Republic of China On October 1, 1949, the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was proclaimed in Peking. On the same day, the British Consul-General in Peking, Walter G. Graham, received a letter from Chou En-lai, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Central People’s government, which expressed the wish of the new government to establish diplomatic relations with the British government.67 Other foreign consuls in Peking also received similar letters. On the following day, the Soviet Union promptly accorded recognition to the new government of China. This lead was followed by East European countries. The establishment of the Chinese Communist government raised the question of recognition in an acute form in Whitehall. The Foreign Office had maintained its pro-recognition position. In a report to the Cabinet a few days before the proclamation of the PRC it advised that, at the worst, the relations of the British Commonwealth and North 127

Atlantic powers with a Communist Chinese government after recognition might follow the pattern of their relations with Soviet satellite states in Eastern Europe. There was, however, the possibility that the pattern would eventually develop along the lines of Britain’s recent relationship with Yugoslavia, and the Western powers should therefore be careful not to prejudice future possibilities by developing an openly hostile attitude towards a Communist regime from the outset.68 This, indeed, became the major consideration governing the British government’s response to the establishment of the new government in China. On the day of the establishment of the PRC, Sir Ralph Stevenson had proposed, before he knew of the Chou letter, that the British government should make an official communication to the new Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Peking. He suggested that it should point out that friendly and mutually “profitable” relations both commercial and political had existed between Britain and China for many generations. It was hoped that these would continue in the future. “His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom therefore suggest that pending completion of their study of the situation, informal relations should be established between His Majesty’s Consular Officers and the appropriate authorities in the territory under the control of the Central People’s Government for greater conven­ ience of both governments and promotion of trade between the two countries.”69 W hile Bevin was in Ottawa, the Ambassador’s proposal was approved by Attlee on October 3 with the substitution of the word “advantageous” for “profitable” in Stevenson’s draft text of the message.70 On October 5, Graham handed the message to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the new government. This communication was, in effect, according de facto recognition to the Chinese Communist government, though neither the officials in the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office nor Ambassador Stevenson were aware of this when the action was taken. It was first pointed out by the French government and then confirmed by the Foreign Office’s legal advisers. The Cabinet was accordingly informed that this action could be interpreted as according recognition to the Communist government as the de facto government of China.71 But no reply was received from the Communist government. Clearly, the new government would be satisfied with nothing less than dejure recognition. On October 24, Bevin informed the Cabinet of the Foreign Office’s position on the recognition of the Communist government of China. The Foreign Office made it clear that, in its view, it was in British interests that Britain should decide to recognize the new regime and to establish formal relations. In reaching this conclusion, officials in the Foreign Office were influenced by the following important considerations. Firstly, the Communist control of China was an inescapable fact. By October the new government had established its rule in the whole of 128

the Chinese mainland except for only a few places in the Southwest. Chiang Kai-shek now retreated to the island of Formosa, whose falling into Communist hands was also believed to be inevitable.72 British interests lay almost entirely within Communist control. The question of recognition of the regime must therefore, as Stevenson urged from Nanking, “be decided on practical and not on ideological grounds”. 73 Moreover, the Foreign Office insisted that the recognition would merely acknowledge the fact and would not signify approval of its ideology or outlook. Secondly, recognition of the PRC was a legally correct action. The Legal Advisers Department in the Foreign Office maintained that, in view of the hopeless position of the Nationalist government and its control of such a small portion of Chinese territory, dejure recognition of the Communist government was “legally justifiable”. Thirdly, as regards British trading interests, the Foreign Office pointed out, the government had advocated the policy of “keeping a foot in the door”. If this policy was to bear fruit, “it can only be done by according full and early recognition”. It was hoped that the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Chinese Communist government would help to maintain trade relations with China and to protect Britain’s immovable stake in China. Finally, and most importantly from the political point of view, China should be prevented from being driven into the arms of Moscow. Though the Chinese Communists claimed that they were orthodox MarxistLeninists, how “orthodox” their methods would be was yet to be seen. Bevin told the United States Ambassador Lewis Douglas in London on August 26 that the Chinese Communists were first and foremost Chinese and that they were not capable of becoming Russians overnight.74 When he met Acheson in Washington in September, the British Foreign Secretary insisted that it was important to avoid doing anything which would discourage the Chinese Communists from being Chinese first and foremost. If the Western powers remained too obdurate there was a risk, he said to Acheson, that the Chinese would be driven further into the arms of Moscow.75 In the Foreign Office’s view, the only counter to Russian influence was that Communist China should have contacts with the West. In 1949, Britain’s Far Eastern experts estimated that it was possible that in due course friction might develop between the Russians and the Chinese, but “we cannot take advantage of this unless we are in relations with the Communist government.”76It was also believed that there was a conflict within the Chinese Communist Party. In August, the Foreign Office received a message from Chou En-lai to the British government which had been passed by C. P. Fitzgerald, former British Council repres­ entative in Peking and also a historian. Chou claimed that there was a conflict between those Communists who were fanatical supporters of the Soviet Union (and who, believing in the imminence of a third world war, did not consider it worth while to seek an arrangement with the 129

Western Powers); and those who, while 100 per cent Communist, considered that the consolidation of their position must be a slow process and that it was necessary to enter into relations and trade with the West. Bevin initially dismissed the Chou message as a plant. This move of Chou En-lai’s, he said, reminded him very much of the attitude adopted at one time or another by various less extremist politicians in Soviet satellite states, but later he told the Cabinet that a conflict within the CCP “is believed to be a fact”. 77 The need to counter Russian influence in China carried much weight in Bevin’s mind - he told the House of Commons after recognition; “I believe that we were right at that time to recognize the People’s government and not to leave the Russians to assume th at... they were the only country which would do anything at all for China. That is a very important factor to be kept in sight.”78 The Prime Minister entirely shared this view.79 The Foreign Office, however, did not advocate an immediate recognition of the Peking administration. There were many other factors the British government had to take into account before reaching a final decision. These included the effect of recognition in the world and Britain’s relations with other friendly powers. The Foreign Office therefore advised that before according recognition, the British government should consult with the Commonwealth countries, the US and other friendly powers. It also advised that it was obviously desirable “to obtain the largest measure of agreement possible and in particular the agreement of other Commonwealth countries”. At the same time, it emphasized that the British government should not necessarily feel bound by the views of other powers, since British interests in China were very much greater than those of the other powers.80 Another important factor the Foreign Office felt should be considered before reaching a decision was the impact of recognition upon British interests in South-East Asia. The Commissioner-General in South East Asia, MacDonald, had twice written to Sir William Strang suggesting that recognition of the PRC should be postponed as long as possible. He feared Chinese Communist consular representatives in M alaya and Singapore would try to stimulate anti-British Chinese nationalism amongst the local Chinese after recognition.81 Sir W illiam did not share MacDonald’s views. If Britain persisted in refusing to recognize the new government of China, he felt, she must expect that China would become wholly and overtly hostile to her. In that event the danger to South-East Asia would be greatly increased. But he assured MacDonald that the question of the effect of recognition on South-East Asia would be given due weight in the deliberations.82 On October 27, the Cabinet discussed the Foreign office’s advice on recognition of the PRC and agreed that before taking a decision, the Commonwealth, the United States and other friendly countries should 130

be consulted. It also agreed that it was very important to know the outcome of the forthcoming conference in Singapore of British repres­ entatives in the Far East.83Ministers largely accepted the Foreign Office’s pro-recognition arguments. While it began actively consulting with other powers, the British government came under increasing pressure to grant early recognition to the new regime in China. Frustrated by the Nationalist blockade of Shanghai and also by Communist action, British business communities in China expected that after recognition the British government would be able to deal with the blockade more effectively. They also considered that recognition was essential if British businesses “are to expect any sympathy from local authorities” regarding taxation and labour problems.84 The most important lobby for recognition in Britain was the China Association. On 14 October, it forwarded to the Foreign Office a telegram from the British Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, which urged “the quickest possible recognition” of the new government in China.85 A few days later, it wrote to the Foreign Office again, pointing out that it would be most desirable, from the point of view of British commercial interests in China, and of the British community established in China, that the earliest possible recognition be given to the PRC.86 In the House of Commons both Labour and the Opposition agreed that recognition was inevitable.87 Five MPs put a parliamentary motion in October, asking for a debate on the issue of recognition. They demanded that in the interests of world peace and of the resumption and development of trade, “immediate and full recognition should be given the recently formed government at Peking”.88 Winston Churchill, the leader of the Opposition, had originally been opposed to recognition, but in the House of Commons on November 17, he remarked, “Recognizing a person is not necessarily an act of approval... One has to recognize lots of things and people in this world of sin and woe that one does not like. The reason for having diplomatic relations is not to confer a compliment but to secure a convenience.”89 The view of British political party leaders on the question of recognition was thus entirely pragmatic. British public opinion was still influenced by the recent Amethyst incident and a poll taken in November suggested that a majority of both Labour and Conservative voters were at that time against recognition of the Peking regime.90 But the press in Britain increasingly took a pragmatic view. On 5 November, the Manchester Guardian pointed out that “the obvious interest of Great Britain in the Far East was to explore”, with her allies, the possibility of peace and conciliation with the new China.91 As London was pushed towards recognition of China, the recom­ mendation from British representatives and governors in South-East Asia and in the Far East at the Bukit Serene Conference in Singapore was 131

decisive. The Bukit Serene Conference was held under the chairmanship of Malcolm MacDonald between November 2 and 4. Dening and D. R. Rees-Williams, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for the Colonies also attended the meeting. The conference agreed with Sir Ralph Stevenson, who left China soon after the establishment of the new government in Peking, and Sir Alexander Grantham, the Governor of Hong Kong, that British interests in China and in Hong Kong demanded the earliest possible de jure recognition of the Communist government. It was also of the opinion, as MacDonald reported to London on 4 November, that from the point of view of the situation in South East Asia and the Far East generally “such recognition is desirable as early as possible and in any case by the end of the year.” At the Conference itself fear of adverse reaction in the Chinese communities if Britain withheld recognition appeared to overcome fears of what Chinese consuls might do in these communities. It was emphasized that recognition of a Communist government in China and increased resistance to Communism in South East Asia were not necessarily incompatible.92 The advice of British representatives in the Far East greatly strengthened the position of the British government in consulting with other powers on the recognition question. The British government considered that it was very important for the West to form a common front in its relations with Communist China. Obviously Western solidarity would have a significant effect on the Communist as well as the non-Communist world. In mid-September, Bevin, accompanied by Dening, held talks in Washington with Acheson on China. In November, the British Foreign Secretary discussed the question of recognition with his colleagues of the Brussels Treaty in Paris, and with the Commonwealth Relations Secretary Philip Noel-Baker who met the Commonwealth High Commissioners in London.93 However, by early December, it became clear that the objective of co-ordinated action amongst the Commonwealth and the Atlantic governments was impossible to attain. The United States’ attitude was the most important for London to consider. Washington, whose views were influenced more by internal American politics than by the realities of the situation in China, was against early recognition. It felt strongly that as long as there was any opposition to the Communist regime it would be a stab in the back if recognition were to be accorded. The United States also attached great importance to obtaining an assurance that the Communist government was prepared to accept China’s international obligations. Acheson outlined in a news conference on October 12 three main tests to be applied in recognizing a new goverment: (1) that it control the country it claimed to control; (2) that it recognize its international obligations; and (3) that it rule with the acquiescence of the people who were ruled.94 The British government did not think it wise to attach any conditions to 132

recognition since this might cause indefinite delay before diplomatic intercourse was resumed but the American Secretary of State was in sympathy with Britain’s peculiar position in China and Hong Kong and considered that the Anglo-American divergence was a difference in tactics rather than a difference in policy.95 The Secretary’s attitude, no doubt, gave London much relief. Acheson also expressed the hope to Britian’s Ambassador Sir Oliver Franks that there would be “a large-ish time gap between a decision on the date and that act of recognition” in order that public opinion in the United States might be properly prepared.96 The French government’s view on recognition was prejudiced by its position in Indo-China. France feared that de jure recognition of Communist China without any corresponding gesture of approval towards the Bao Dai administration would jeopardize the prospects for the latter. Commonwealth attitudes towards recognition were also divergent. W hile Australia and New Zealand were not in favour of early recognition, India, which was also concerned that failing to recognise Peking would drive it into Russia’s arms, was anxious to grant recognition as soon as the present Session of the UN General Assembly was over in December. The views of Australia and New Zealand seemed influenced by the general elections in both countries.97 The Common­ wealth countries thus seem to have differed over the timing, rather than the principle, of recognition. On the whole, all friendly powers showed their understanding of British position. It was therefore time for the British government to make up its mind. Bevin and his advisers in the Foreign Office felt that Britain could no longer afford to delay. On 12 December, he warned the Cabinet that there was an obvious danger if recognition was delayed too long, that the authorities would begin to put pressure upon British interests in China, and even demand the withdrawal of British officials. Britain should then be compelled, he said, either to accord recognition under duress or to withhold it indefinitely as a gesture against coercion. To adopt the first alternative would be to weaken “our whole position and prestige in the Far East”. To adopt the second would be “to sacrifice our interests in China which we have been at such pains to maintain.” Therefore, he recommended that although Britain could not carry all the friendly governments with her, the government should now decide in principle to grant formal recognition to the new government of China at an early date.98 On 15 December, the Cabinet made the final decision to accord dejure recognition to the PRC. Meanwhile it authorized the Foreign Secretary to determine the precise date on which such recognition should be accorded. Bevin targeted a date early in 1950. There were several factors affecting this timing. Firstly and most importantly, Bevin was anxious to move as closely as possible in step with India, whose support in 133

South East Asia was considered as vital. He shared the Indian Prime Minister Nehru’s views on recognition.99 Secondly, the Australian and New Zealand elections would be over and the new governments might be willing to follow the British lead. Thirdly, the Netherlands government by then should have transferred sovereignty to Indonesia and the French government should have ratified its agreement with Bao D ai.100 On January 6 1950, a week after India’s recognition, the United Kingdom government announced its decision to recognize the Central People’s government as the de jure government of China. Ceylon and Norway acted on the same day. Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, Israel and Afghanistan followed Britain’s lead within the next two weeks. On the day before the recognition of the People’s government, the Chinese Ambassador in London Dr. Cheng Tian-hsi was informed that the British government withdrew recognition from his government. Britain became the first Western power to recognize the People’s Republic of China. It was clear that Britain decided to recognize the Peking Administration not because she was in sympathy with the Chinese Communists but because she wanted to safeguard her great interests in China, in Hong Kong and in the Far East. British officials in China were unable to protect British interests unless diplomatic relations were established between the two countries. As Britain wished to hold on to Hong Kong, she could not afford to adopt a hostile attitude towards the powerful government on the mainland. The political aim of recognition was to cultivate contacts with Communist leaders, and to make it possible for the new China to avoid close dependence upon the Soviet Union. Britain recognized China also because it was a fact. A concerted policy towards Communist China with other Western powers was desirable but policy-makers in London held that the far larger interests of Britain over those of any other foreign country justified independent action. In taking the decision to recognize China, the Foreign Office’s views were decisive.

Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

8. 9. 10.

CAB 129/34 C. P. (49)71, 24 Mar. 1949. M em o by Scarlett, 17 Feb. 1949, F 3305/1023/10, FO371/75810. T h e Communists took over both Tientsin and Peking in January 1949. M inute by Sargent, 18 Feb. 1949, ibid. See Memo by Scarlett, ibid. Ibid.

M inute by Dening, 17 Feb. 1949, ibid. Minutes by Bevin (undated) and Scarlett, 23 Feb. 1949, ibid. CAB129/32, C.P.(49)39, 4 Mar.; CAB128/15, C.M.18(49), 8 Mar. 1949. M emo by Scarlett, 17 Feb. 1949, F 3 305/1023/10, FO371/75810. G rantham to Colonial Office, 24, 25 M arch 1949, F4351/1023/10, FO371/75810.

134

11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

18.

19.

20. 21. 22.

23. 24. 25.

26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31.

Stevenson to F.O., 27 April 1949, F5971/1023/10, FO371/75810. Commonwealth Relations Office to U.K. H igh Commissioners, 4 May 1949, F6467/1023/10, F O 371/75811. Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works o f M ao Tse-tung , Vol. IV, (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1969), p. 370. Ibid., p. 371. M inute by Coates, 21 Feb. 1949, F2608/1019/10, F O 371/75785; minute by Coates, 19 Mar. 1949, F4005/1015/10, F O 371/75745. Stevenson to F.O., 26 Jan. 1949, F1452, F O 371/75794. Strang to Attlee, 8 April 1949, FE /49/4, F O 800/462. U pon becoming the head o f the Foreign Office in February 1949, Strang made an extensive tour of South and East Asia, including C hina and H o n g K ong “to acquaint m yself’, in his own words, “at first-hand with the problem s of a part of the world which was unknown to m e”. H e had been the Assistant U nder­ secretary in charge of the Germ an Section o f the Foreign Office. See Lord Strang, H om e a nd A b ro a d (London: Andre Deutsch, 1956), p. 239. Ibid. Bevin was then in W ashington to sign the N A T O treaty; see also Stevenson to F.O., 30 Nov. 1948, F16821/33/10, F O 371/69543; memo by Vallat, 4 Dec. 1948, ibid. Two British officers and forty ratings were killed, including the Captain of the A m eth yst, 252 Chinese soldiers lost their lives. See R enw u (a Chinese journal) 3, 1989, p. 66. See also, Evan Luard, B rita in a n d C hina (London: C hatto & W indus, 1962), p. 70. CAB128/15 C.M.42(49), 23 June 1949. F.O. to Stevenson, 13 July 1949, F10022/1219/10 F O 371/75894; F.O. memo, F 10973, ibid. Mao Tse-tung, “O n the Outrages by British W arships” Selected Works, Vol. IV, pp. 401-402. C hina’s anger appeared to be based on the fact that it was the A m e th y st that opened fire. It was only in 1989, for the first time, that Yei Fei, a form er commander o f the PLA, adm itted in his M em oirs that it was he who ordered Com m unist artillery to open fire on the frigate. H e concealed the truth in 1949, n o t wanting to bear the responsibility for his precipitate action. See R enw u, 3, 1989, p. 66. H .C . Debs, Vol.464, Cs.34-38, 26 April 1949; Cs.1258-66, 5 May 1949. M inute by Coates, 22 April 1949, F5623/1015/10, F O 371/75742; CAB/34/669 SAC(49)4, 12 M ay 1949. In May, for instance, three meetings were held by the C abinet to discuss the defence of the colony. However, a num ber o f British C abinet papers regarding the position of H ong K ong have been withheld by the Government, possibly due to the sensitive nature o f the subject. Drafts of some of these papers can still be found in the Foreign Office file: F O 371/75872. M em o by Creech-Jones, 5 Mar. 1949, CAB 129/33 C.P.(49)52. CAB128/15, C.M.30(49), 28 April 1949. H . C. Debs. Vol. 464, C.1251. CAB 129/35, C.P.(49)118, 24 M ay 1949. CAB128/15, C.M. 38(49), 26 M ay 1949. Ibid.

135

32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42.

43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61.

F O 800/448/C O N F /49 /3 . CAB128/15 C.M.(38)49, 26 M ay 1949. Attlee to Bevin, Paris, Top Secret, 28 May 1949, FO 371/75873. D ening to Bevin, 4 May 1949, F O 371/75871; CAB134/286 FE(0)(49)5, 12 M ay 1949. CAB 134/669 SAC(49)5, 19 May 1949. D ening to Bevin, 4 M ay 1949, F O 371/75871. Com m onwealth Relations Office to U K High Commissioners, 27 May, F7961/1192/10, F O 371/75873. U.K. Acting H igh Commissioner in Ottawa to CRO, 28 May 1949, F7962/1192/10, F O 371/75873. CAB128/15, C.M.42(49), 23 June 1949. Bevin, Paris, to Attlee, 1 June 1949, FE/49/10 FO 800/462. CAB 129/35, C.P.(49)134,17 June 1949, “Visit to H ong Kong, 6-9 Ju n e” by Alexander; T h e M inister of Defence was indeed confident of Britain’s ability to hold H ong Kong as long as her hands were free elsewhere and further reinforcements were sent to the colony. In his reports to the Cabinet on his visit to H ong K ong he said the high mountains on the Chinese side of the new Territories, which dominated the frontier itself, undoubtedly imposed handicaps on the defenders, but these were more than offset by the difficulties which would confront a Communist China army against prepared positions and guns sited, trained and ranged. Alexander further pointed out that there was no doubt of British control of the sea; Britain had an integrated scheme of land defence including air support on an adequate scale; and it had fighter defences backed by an early warning system. U nder these conditions, he considered that the defence could succeed against the probable scale of attack. CAB 128/16, C.M.54(49)2, 29 August 1949. Attlee to Alexander, H ong Kong, 7 June 1949, F8538/1192/10, F O 371/75875; see also Evan Luard, p. 75. Stevenson to F.O., July, F10543/1013/10, FO 371/75733. Beverley Hooper, C hina Stands Up (Sydney, 1986), p. 87. CAB 129/36, C.P.(49)180, 23 August 1949. M ao Tse-tung, Selected Works , Vol. IV, p. 370. U rquhart to Nanking; F.O., 29 August 1949, F12960 F O 371/75768. U rquhart to Nanking; F.O., 30 August. F12961, ibid. Stevenson to F.O., 19 Sept. 1949, F14268/1023/10, FO 371/75815. Stevenson to F.O., F12952 FO 371/75768. CAB 134/286 F E (O )(49) 9, 27 July 1949. See M em o by F.O. legal adviser to the Attorney-General, 2 Sept. 1949, F 13549/1261/10, FO371/75908. Brief for Bevin by Scarlett, 22 July 1949, F 11060/1261/10, FO371/75903. Stevenson to F.O., 21 July 1949, F10820/1261/10, ibid. See F.O. to W ashington, 23 July 1949, F10861/1261/10, ibid. F.O. to W ashington, 30 July 1949, FE/49/16, FO 800/462. Strang to Attlee, 29 July 1949, FE /49/15, ibid. F.O. to W ashington, 29 July 1949, FE/49/16, ibid. Sir F. Millar, Washington, to F.O., 1 August, F 11338/1261/10, FO371/75904.

136

62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69 70. 71. 72. 73. 74 75.

76. 77.

78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92.

John Coghill, Canton, to F.O., 24 August 1949, F 12649/1261/10, FO 371/75906. CAB129/36 C.P.(49)180, 23 Aug. 1949. CAB 128/16, C.M.54(49)1, 29 Aug. 1949. F.O. to Bevin, 7 Sept. 1949, F 13283/1261/10, FO371/75907; F.O. memo “Shanghai Blockade”, Nov. 1949, F17774, F O 371/75914. CAB 129/36, C.P.(49)180, 23 Aug. 1949. F O 371/75774 F16085/1015/10. CAB 129/36, C.P.(49)180, Annex A “China: Report by Officials”, 15 Aug. 1949. Stevenson to F.O., 1 Oct. 1949, F14782/1023/10, F O 371/75816. M inute by Strang, 3 Oct. 1949, F14782/1023/10, ibid. F.O. to Paris, 10 Oct. 1949; CAB129/37, C.P.(49)214, 24 Oct. 1949. Letter from Dening to Air Marshall Sir William Elliott, Ministry of Defence, 18 Oct. 1949, F 15856/10127/10, FO371/75804. Stevenson to Dening, 1 Sept. 1949, F 13102/1023/10, F O 371/75814. Bevin to O. Franks, U K Ambassador in W ashington, 26 Aug. 1949, F12843/1023/10, F O 371/75814. Record of Bevin-Acheson meeting, 13 Sept. 1949, FE/49/21 FO 800/462. See also Dean Acheson, Present a t the Creation M y Years in the S ta te D epartm ent (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1970), p. 328. CAB 129/37 C.P(49), 24 Oct. 1949. T he text of the Chou message can be found in FO 371/75766, F12075/1015/10. CAB129/36, C.P.(49)180, 23 Aug. 1949. A similar letter was also received by the U nited States. H.C. Debs., Vol.475, C.2083, 24 May 1950. See H arry S.Truman, Years o f Trial and Hope 1 9 4 6 -1 9 5 3 (New York, 1956), p. 427. Ibid.

M acDonald to Strang, 19; 22 Aug. 1949, F 13405/1023/10, F O 371/25814. Strang to MacDonald, Singapore, 2 Sept. 1949, F 13405/1023/10, F O 371/75814. CAB128/16, C.M.62(49)7, 27 Oct. 1949. Shanghai British Chamber of Commerce to China Association, 7 Oct. 1949, 49/G /69, China Association Paper. China Association to F.O., 14 Oct. 1949, F 15516/1023/10, F O 371/75817. China Association to F.O., 26 Oct. 1949, 49/G /69, ibid. See R obert Boardman, B ritain and the People's Republic o f C hina 1 9 4 9 -1 9 7 4 (London: Macmillan, 1976), p. 29. See F16027/1023/10, F O 371/75878, 20 Oct. 1949. M artin Gilbert, N ever Despair: W inston Churchill 1 9 4 5 -1 9 6 5 (London, 1988) p. 918; H. C. Debs, V.469, Col.2225. See Brian Porter, Britain a nd the Rise o f C om m unist C hina (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967), p. 26. Q uoted from Evan Luard, B ritain and C hina (London, 1962), p. 78. M acDonald to F.O., 4 Nov. 1949, F16589/1023/10, F O 371/75819; for the minutes of the Bukit Serene Conference, see CAB134/288, FE(0)(49)82, 8 Dec. 1949.

137

93. 94.

See F.O. to W ashington, 23 N o . 1949, F 17330/1023/10, F O 371/75822. Q uoted from Tang Tsou, A m e ric a 's F ailure in China 1 9 4 1 -1 9 5 0 (University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 516. 95. Record of Bevin-Acheson conversations, 13 Sept. 1949, FE/49/21, FO 800/462; for Acheson’s attitude towards recognition see also N ancy Tucker, P a ttern s in the D ust: C hinese-A m erican relations an d the Recognition Controversy 1 9 4 9 -1 9 5 0 (New York, 1983), pp. 193-194. 96. See CAB 129/37, C.P. (49) 248, 12 Dec. 1949. 97. CAB129/37, C.P.(49)248, 12 D ecem ber 1949. For the views of the Indian government on the recognition o f Com m unist China, see also Dean Acheson, pp. 335-336. 98. CAB 129/37, C.P.(49)248, 12 D ecem ber 1949. 99. H . C. Debs, Vol.475, C.2082, 24 M ay 1950. 100. CAB 128/16, C.M . 72(49)3, 15 D ecem ber 1949.

138

C HA P T E R

SEVEN

A Policy Unrealized

After extending dejure recognition to the Chinese People’s Republic the British government expected normal diplomatic relations with the new Chinese government to be automatically established. However, this expectation did not materialize. The Chinese insisted on preliminary discussions before the establishment of relations. London, however, found extreme difficulty in meeting Chinese demands. The international environment became especially unfavourable with a further deterioration of Sino-American relations in 1950. By June 1950, six months had elapsed since British recognition, yet the two countries still could not reach an agreement on the exchange of diplomatic representatives. Following the outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, the Sino-British negotiations in Peking were abruptly suspended. With the entry of Chinese troops into Korea in October, any real prospect of Sino-British normalization in the foreseeable future ended. It is the purpose of this chapter to examine the factors which contributed to the failure of these critical negotiations and to analyse the attitudes of both the Chinese and British governments towards the establishment of diplomatic relations. This chapter also examines the general position of British commercial interests in China after recognition.

Peking’s Response On 9 January, three days after British Consul-General Walter Graham presented the formal British notification of recognition to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En-lai replied that the Central People’s government was willing to establish diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom government on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for the territory and sovereignty. It also accepted J. C. Hutchison as the representative of the government of the U.K. “to carry on negotiations on the question of establishment of diplomatic relations”. The Chinese government, Chou added, would give all necessary facilities for the transfer of the British embassy from Nanking to Peking.1 139

British policy-makers had not anticipated that the Chinese would demand prior negotiations before agreeing to the establishment of diplomatic relations. However, Chou’s reply did not come as a complete surprise in London. By then the Foreign Office had learnt that in response to Burmese recognition on December 16 1949, the Chinese government had indicated the necessity for discussion on the establishment of relations.2 Officials in the Far Eastern Department were greatly disturbed by the Chinese attitude towards Burma, the first non-Soviet satellite country to extend recognition to Peking. It was feared that the same line taken by Peking in Burma’s case would be followed when dealing with all non-Communist powers. A. A. E. Franklin, who had returned to the Foreign Office after the Communists took over Tientsin, indicated that “It may prove the beginning of an attempt by the Communists to make recognition ‘conditional'." As far as Britain was concerned, Franklin feared that the Communists might want to clarify various questions concerning Britain’s position and interests in China before agreeing to establish diplomatic relations.3 The Foreign Office’s initial reaction to the Chinese demand was that the British government should refuse to enter into any discussions on wider political issues. The government should insist that recognition constituted the establishment of diplomatic relations and that Hutchison could only proceed to Peking in his official capacity as Chargé d’Affaires. Any questions the Chinese wished to raise could only satisfactorily be discussed after diplomatic relations had been established and not in advance. Bevin, who was then chairing the Commonwealth Conference in Colombo, instructed Graham to seek elucidation of the Chinese reply and explain the British government’s views on the establishment of diplomatic relations.4 Accordingly, on January 16, the British ConsulGeneral in Peking made an oral communication to the M inistry of Foreign Affairs. The Chinese government, however, maintained its position. On January 28, it announced that Hutchison could come to Peking in the capacity of the British government’s Chargé d’Affaires “to discuss preliminary and procedural matters relating to establishment of diplomatic relations.”5 But it did not answer the most important question - whether it considered that diplomatic relations were now established or not. Apparently the Chinese disagreed with the British on this vital issue. In fact, as Graham had pointed out, the Chinese authorities did not consider diplomatic relations were automatically established by the exchange of notes between the two governments.6 The British Foreign Office was still unclear what kind of issues the Chinese might want to raise in the discussions; nevertheless, it decided to send Hutchison to Peking to begin the talks. The British government, therefore, modified its original stand on the question. There were some 140

hopes, as expressed by John Hutchison, that the negotiation might only cover a limited field such as rank and identity of envoys, dates of appointment, location of embassies, etc., although the Chargé d’Affaires did not entirely rule out the possibility of discussions in the wider field.7 Moreover, in response to Chinese demands for negotiation, the Indian government agreed to instruct its representative in Nanking, A. K. Sen, to go to Peking for such discussions. In these circumstances, Hutchison suggested that Britain meet the Chinese over this demand.8The Foreign Office’s view was that the Russians did not want Communist China to have contacts with the Western world. To counter this Russian move, Britain should try to establish relations with Peking as soon as possible. So the Foreign Office agreed with Hutchison that he should meet the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Peking without further delay. Meanwhile, the Chargé d’Affaires was instructed to oppose any attempts by the Chinese “to impose conditions unfavourable to us as the price for the establishment of normal relations”. This issue was considered to be of particular delicacy in view of the general election campaign about to begin in Britain.9 Indeed, officials in London did not feel Hutchison’s mission would be easy. On the basis of his own experience in Communist China, Franklin emphasized that the Chinese Communists were different from the Chinese people. The latter, he said, were tolerant and would always compromise but the Chinese Communist Party had none of the charac­ teristics of the people. A common Chinese reaction to the “liberators” when they first arrived in Tientsin, he said, was embodied in the comment “they are not Chinese.” He thus warned that to judge the Peking government by Chinese rather than by Communist standards would be to run the risk of grave misrepresentation.10 It was anticipated by the Foreign Office that Russian influence in Peking would also create difficulties for Britain in establishing diplomatic relations with China. At the time when Britain extended its recognition to the PRC, Mao Tse-tung was in Moscow to negotiate a new treaty with the Soviet Union. Though the Sino-Soviet negotiation prompted a great deal of speculation in the West on the possibility of Sino-Russian friction, the British Foreign Office put its faith in its Moscow Embassy’s analysis: though the seeds of disagreement existed and might even have germinated, it was likely to be “a long time before anything is visible above ground.”11 The Foreign Office felt that Moscow would probably use its influence to hinder the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the Western powers, and if unsuccessful, it would try to render them as difficult as possible. The action of the Peking authorities in seizing United States consular property in Peking and in according recognition to the Ho Chi Minh regime in Vietnam was seen as indicative of a pull in the direction of making the establishment of relations with the West as 141

difficult as possible. The French, the Foreign Office pointed out, would probably have recognized the Peking government as soon as they had ratified their agreement with Bao Dai; now they were in a quandary as Peking accorded recognition to the Ho Chi Minh regim e.12 On 13 February, the British Chargé d’Affaires John Hutchison arrived in Peking. The first meeting between him and the Chinese Vice-Minister for foreign affairs and former head of the Foreign Affairs Bureau in Shanghai, Chang Han-fu, was held on 2 March. At the meeting, Chang raised the question of British relations with the KMT government, which now took refuge in Formosa. “Of questions concerning the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United Kingdom,” the Vice-Minister pointed out, “the most important, which must be settled first, is question of the severance of relations between His Majesty’s Government and the Kuomintang remnant of reactionaries.” As Chang explained, the Chinese government’s position was that as the British government had announced the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Chinese People’s Republic, it should not continue to maintain any diplomatic intercourse with the Kuomintang. On 10 January, however, the British delegate to the United Nations Security Council had concurred with the American delegate’s opinion that a decision to unseat the Nationalists’ representative to the Security Council, as proposed by the Soviet delegate, would be premature and when the Soviet delegate’s proposal was put to a vote on 13 January, the British delegate abstained. In effect, Chang indicated, this action meant that the British government continued to recognize the legality of the so-called “delegate of the Kuomintang remnant of the reactionary clique” and refused to accept the delegate of the legal government of Chinese people. Similar action, Chang claimed, had subsequently been taken by British delegates in other organizations of the UN, eg. the Economic and Social Council. The Chinese government therefore considered that the British government should clarify their attitude to this question and “demonstrate by actual deeds their complete severance of diplomatic intercourse with the Kuomintang ... and their sincerity in desiring to establish diplomatic relations with the Chinese People’s Republic.” Chang emphasized that the Central People’s government regarded the practical settlement of this quetion as essential for the establishment of relations between China and Britain. The second question raised by Chang at this meeting concerned Britain’s attitude to various organisations of the KMT in Hong Kong and to all Chinese national property there. Chang expressed the hope that the British government would be able to make an early statement of its attitude towards both these questions.13 London, as we have seen, had withdrawn its recognition from the KMT government when it announced the decision to recognize Peking as the de jure government of China on January 6, 1950. There were, 142

however, deep suspicions in China about this British claim. The Chinese press was not impressed by the British act of recognition. A few days after Britain announced its recognition, the New China News Agency complained that the London Press Service “rudely misrepresented” the Central People’s government of the PRC as “the Chinese Communist Government”. It remarked that the statement issued by the London Press Service - that recognition of a government in no way implied approval of the government itself - had shown the “inherent hostility” of the British imperialist element towards the People’s Republic. Britain’s strong anti-communist stance in Malaya, as publicly claimed by the London Press Service, and the statement that British recognition of the Peking government did not imply the slightest weakening of their resolve to continue to fight Communist terrorism in Malaya, was also likely to create misgivings in the minds of the Chinese leaders. The Central People’s government, the New China News Agency claimed, would determine its steps in accordance with the actual deeds of the British government towards China and not its proclamations.14 The Chinese government thus chose the two questions - China’s representation in the UN and Chinese state property in Hong Kong - through which to test the truth of the British claim to have broken off relations with the KMT. The two issues raised by the Chinese government were not unacceptable, however. Indeed, there was a curious parallel between the British and Chinese government’s views on the effect of recognition. While London expected recognition to automatically lead to the establishment of diplo­ matic relations, the Chinese government anticipated that its legal right to represent China in the UN would stem automatically from British recognition. W ithout doubt, China’s new leadership was anxious to speak for China in international bodies. Following the establishment of the Central People’s government, Chou En-lai formally sent a message to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on November 11, 1949, asking the UN organization to deprive the delegation of the Chinese Nationalist government of all rights to represent the Chinese people in the UN. Similar notes were sent to the UN by Chou on 8 and 10 January 1950.15 Clearly, the Peking government attached great importance to the question of its representation in the UN. As London had acknowledged the Communist rule in China as a fact, Peking’s expectation that it would be recognized by the British government in the United Nations seemed to be a logical one. With regard to the Chinese national property in Hong Kong, the new government, as the legitimate government, had the legal right to inherit it. Meanwhile, the new Chinese government was not in a hurry to establish relations with Britain, owing to its distrust of the West and also its alliance with the Soviet Union. Mao Tse-tung did not expect the Western imperialist powers to change their hostile attitudes towards the new 143

China quickly. He had already alleged in early 1949 that the imperialists, who had always been hostile to the Chinese people, “will definitely not be in a hurry to treat us as equals”; China therefore should not be in a hurry to establish diplomatic relations with them .16 In Chinese eyes, Britain’s recognition was different from the acts of the Soviet and East European countries. The World Affairs of January 13 commented that the British request for relations was one hundred per cent commercial and was different from the offering of genuine good will and the establishment of relations by the Soviet Union and the East European democratic countries. Therefore, it concluded, the British act should not lead China to entertain illusions about imperialism and thereby to deviate from the path of “leaning to one side.”17 Without doubt, the Sino-Soviet alliance was the most important element of Peking’s overall foreign policy. As Mao Tse-tung did not believe Britain and the United States would be willing to help a Communist state, the Chinese government turned to the Soviet Union for support. Mao was convinced at the time, as he announced on June 30 1949, that “in order to win victory and consolidate it we must lean to one side.” “The imperialists”, he observed, “reckon that we will not be able to manage our economy; they are standing by and looking on, awaiting our failure.”18 Shortly after the establishment of the Central People’s govern­ ment, Mao made his first ever journey abroad - to Moscow aiming to win Stalin’s material assistance and his trust in the face of wide talk of M ao’s becoming another Tito.19 On February 14, a new Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty and other agreements were signed in Moscow. Bevin speculated that the announcement of British recognition while Sino-Soviet negotiation were in progress might have strengthened the hands of the Chinese.20 Nevertheless, if the assumption that Moscow did not want China to have contacts with the West was correct, it seemed that the British act was more likely to cause some embarrassment for the Chinese leaders. Though the Chinese government had reasons not to act in haste, it did want diplomatic relations with Britain. In mid-January 1950, the Chinese authorities took over the United States, French and Dutch military compounds in Peking. Both the British and the Russians, however, main­ tained theirs. In February, the Soviet Union surrendered its compound in an agreement with China. It seemed that China would also want to solve the problem with Britain after formal relations were established.21 The Chinese government also gave the British Chargé d’Affaires and his staff every facility in Peking. In his report to the Foreign Office, Hutchison described the tone of his meeting with the Foreign Vice-Minister as courteous and friendly.22 In fact, Hutchison was convinced that the Chinese wanted to have normal relations with Britain, as we shall see. In sum, the Chinese government did not consider diplomatic relations between Britain and the PRC as automatically established after the 144

British announcement of recognition. It was only willing to establish diplomatic relations with the British government when the latter severed its connections with the KMT government by firstly voting for Peking to replace the KMT in the UN and secondly handing over Chinese national properties and assets in Hong Kong to the new China. So long as London failed to meet these two conditions, Peking would wait.

British Reactions The two issues raised by Peking on China’s representation in the United Nations and Chinese national properties in Hong Kong presented a dilemma for London. On the one hand, the British government certainly wanted to establish normal relations with China; on the other, as Sino-American relations further deteriorated after January 1950, it faced strong pressure from the American government not to meet the Chinese demands. British policy-makers had not fully anticipated the difficulties in the UN arising from the recognition of the new Chinese government. In asking the Cabinet to accord recognition to the PRC in December 1949, the Foreign Secretary pointed out that while there seemed to be no reason why Britain should take any initiative in the replacement of Chinese representatives in the UN organizations, “we must accept the position that after recognition we shall have to c ast our vote for the admission of the Communist representative.” The British government’s attitude towards the whole issue should be, Bevin felt, that the replacement of the various KMT representatives by Chinese Communists was a matter for the United Nations and concerned the United K ingdom only as an individual member of that organization.23 Nevertheless, after the announcement of recognition, the British government had to modify its position on this question. The change of British attitude was mainly due to the desirability of minimizing the Anglo-American divergence in China. The reaction of the American public to British recognition of the PRC, which had caused considerable concern in the British Embassy in Washington, was found to be “surprisingly favourable”. One day after London declared its recognition, President Truman announced the hands-off-Formosa policy. The coincidence, the Washington Embassy reported, “drew the fire away from the recognition announcement.” Meanwhile, it was also believed that the favourable reaction of the US press and radio to the British act was partly due to “some excellent educational work on the part of the State Department”.24 As a matter of fact, owing to the American administration’s understanding attitude on British policy, the Anglo-American differences on recognition did not have an adverse effect on the relations between the two countries. 145

The Foreign Office even expected that the Truman administration might also have followed the British lead in recognition when Formosa was taken over by the Communists on the mainland.25 The seizure of the American barracks property in Peking by the authorities in mid-January caused a set-back in the American attitude towards China. Following the Communist action, the State Department ordered the withdrawal of all its officials from China. The United States now had virtually no official relations with the PRC. Furthermore, China continued to be an issue for internal politics in Washington, as British officials recognized. Pro-KMT Republican members in the Congress continued to take every opportunity to attack the administration’s China policy. This, in the Foreign Office’s view, was likely to remain so until after the November election. Under such circumstances, Foreign Office officials felt that it would be extremely difficult for the United States government to make any overtly friendly gesture towards the new government in China.26 This unfortunately meant that London could no longer count on the American administration’s support for Britain’s new moves in China. The difficulties arose first in the United Nations. From Washington, Ambassador Sir Oliver Franks pointed out that to vote against the Nationalist representative Dr. Tsiang Ting-fu and align Britain with Soviet Russia in the United Nations would play into the hands of the critics in the United States, make the Truman administration’s position considerably more difficult, and worsen Britain’s own position in America. Judging from the angle of Anglo-American relations, Franks suggested to the Foreign Office that Britain should not vote openly in opposition to the United States members, especially at a time when the Congressional interest was focused on the Far East.27 Clearly, the British decision to abstain in voting for the admission of Communist China to the United Nations was taken in order to avoid a situation where the British delegation might find itself constantly voting on the side of the Soviet Union against the Americans. Russia’s walking out of the UN following its failure to bring in the Peking representative on January 13 made the British voting position even more difficult. Any support for Peking’s seat in the UN would appear to appease the Russians and the Chinese.28 The British government, however, was prepared to vote in favour of the change-over in the Security Council and other competent organs of the UN when an effective majority emerged. In March, five members of the Security Council, including the Soviet Union, India, Yugoslavia, Norway and the United Kingdom, had recognized the Chinese People’s government, and therefore would be sure to vote for the change-over. Two more votes were needed for a majority. An effort made by London behind the scenes to persuade France, Egypt, Ecuador and Cuba to vote in favour was, however, unsuccessful.29 The Foreign 146

Office then concluded that unless the United States changed its attitude and indicated to the four powers concerned its readiness to accept a representative of the Chinese People’s government in the Security Council, even though it itself would not feel able to vote for him, it would be difficult to find a solution to the China problem in the United Nations . 30 The question of Chinese national property mainly referred to some seventy civil aircraft based in Hong Kong. Before Peking raised this problem, London had already been under direct and constant pressure from the United States government not to hand them over to the new government in Peking for several months. These aircraft, originally about eighty, belonged to two Chinese organizations - the China National Aviation Corporation (CNAC) and the Central Air Transport Corporation (CATC) - and had arrived in Hong Kong in 1949 when Communist troops were nearing Shanghai. CNAC was a company located in Hong Kong incorporated under Chinese law: the KMT government held eighty percent of its shares, and Pan-American Airways held the remaining twenty percent. The CATC was an official agency directly under the control of the KMT government. On November 9, the managing directors of the CATC and CNAC flew to Peking with eleven aircraft. After the defection of their managing directors, four thousand employees of the two airlines promptly claimed that the seventy airplanes remaining in the colony were the property of the new Chinese government. Shortly afterwards, the Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En-lai declared that the aircraft were held in Hong Kong as “a sacred property right” of the Chinese People’s government, and that the British authorities bore full responsibility for their safety. 31 The issue was complicated after the KMT authorities sold all the assets of CNAC and CATC to American interests. On December 1 2 , General Claire Chennault, a prominent pro-KMT military figure in the China lobby in the United States, signed a contract with the Nationalist government purchasing all the aircraft remaining in Hong Kong. Shortly afterwards Chennault sold them under this contract to the American Civil Air Transport (CAT), in which he had a controlling interest. 32 Hence very strong pressure was being brought to bear on the British government and the government of Hong Kong by CAT to influence the legal proceedings and to take executive action in its favour. In an interview on January 4 with the Governor of Hong Kong, General Donovan, CAT’s representative in Hong Kong, accompanied by the U.S. Consul-General, threatened the withdrawal of Marshall aid and advised the Hong Kong authorities to be “practical”. The United States government, while having so far not associated itself formally with CAT demands that pressure should not be brought to bear on the Hong Kong courts, was clearly nervous of the influence of the directors of CAT in American internal politics and expressed its concerns 147

at the fate of the aircraft. On December 30, the United States Chargé d’Affaires in London asked the British government to take effective measures to prevent the aeroplanes from falling into the hands of the Chinese Communists. Following a consideration by the Cabinet ministers of this approach, the United States London Embassy was informed on January 3 that the British government sympathised with the anxiety of the United States government but felt that the outcome of the ownership of the aircraft should be decided by the courts in Hong Kong. 33 On February 23, the Chief Justice of Hong Kong ruled that the planes were property belonging to the government of the PRC and the injunctions on the aircraft were removed. The United States’ interests subsequently appealed against the judgment. The final decision as to the ownership of the aircraft was thus postponed. 34 Apparently, London was not likely to be able to satisfy the Chinese government on either of the two questions. On March 17, British Chargé d’Affaires Hutchison delivered an oral reply to the Chinese Vice-Minister, giving an explanation of the British position on the two issues. The reply stated that no diplomatic relations had existed between the United Kingdom and the former Nationalist government since January 6 , 1950. The Chinese embassy in London was closed and the former ambassador no longer enjoyed diplomatic status. Regarding the British voting position in the United Nations, Hutchison announced that the decision to abstain was taken because there was at that time no likelihood of a majority decision and it was consequently premature for the question to be raised. When the British government abstained from voting in the Security Council on the issue of the expulsion of the former Nationalist representative, this did not constitute an expression of view in favour of the Nationalist representative or against the People’s government representative. In general, the Chargé d’Affaires claimed, the British government would, of course, welcome the appearance of representatives of the People’s government in all organs of the United Nations as soon as the majority of members of those organs were disposed to vote in favour of that govern­ ment’s admission. It would itself vote in favour of such admission as soon as it was assured that the taking of a vote would not simply result in the rejection of the People’s government’s candidates. The question of Chinese national property prompted Hutchison to state that the recognition by the British government of the Central People’s government produced in British law the effect that the right to exercise control over Chinese state property now fell to the Central People’s government. If, however, the People’s government could not obtain actual possession and control of any such property because other persons were holding it and refused to give it up on demand, the executive could not settle such disputes, and it would be necessary for the Central People’s government to have recourse to the courts.35 148

Throughout April, British officials were uncertain about the Chinese government’s reaction to the British reply. In the meanwhile, the Labour administration had a very difficult time. By then more than three months had passed since Britain had recognized the Peking government, but diplomatic relations were still not established. The government’s China policy was regarded by the opposition as a failure. The British press had reacted to the announcement of the government’s decision to recognize the new Chinese government favourably. Indeed, it almost unanimously approved the action, as Evan Luard has indicated. 36 The Times editorial on 7 January pointed out that “there could be no doubt the Government have acted wisely.” The proper policy for the Western powers towards a Communist regime, it said, was clearly to be ready to accept it, as they had done in Russia, to do business with it, and to treat it on a basis of equality. 37 The majority in the country, the Manchester Guardian noted, considered that the Peking government should be recognised. 38 The understanding of the government’s position by the British public, according to the Foreign Office’s report to Bevin in Colombo, was greatly helped by a letter by Professor Hersch Lauterpacht, a leading expert on international law, to The Times on the same day that Britain recognized China . 39 Professor Lauterpacht, whose letter was written at the request of the Foreign Office, stated concisely the rule of international law in the matter of recognition of governments.40 W hen recognition was announced, Parliament was in recess, but the Opposition benches had shown their support for recognition, as we have seen. However, by early March when Parliament reassembled after a general election in which Labour had retained power by a majority of only six, the Conservatives asserted that the government had been wrong to recognize the Chinese Communist regime. Air-Commodore Harvey claimed on March 7 that recognition had invited “a virtual snub for Britain”, and that Labour was responsible for the lowering of British prestige in China. Grammans asked “what have we got out of the wreck of all this business except discredit in the world and antagonism between our allies and the Commonwealth?” 41 Captain Duncan went so far as to demand the withdrawal of recognition . 42 The criticism of the Opposition clearly arose from the fact that recognition had achieved far less than had been hoped. “The truth is”, as Anthony Eden summed up Opposition feeling, “that recognition has in fact brought out no advantage at all today.” 43 The Attlee Cabinet agreed that the delay in securing agreement on the establishment of diplomatic relations was most unsatisfactory, but insisted that the general China policy which the government had been pursuing was the correct one. Giving colleagues an account of the situation in China after recognition in a memorandum of 20 April, Bevin indicated that the British position was “profoundly unsatisfactory”. British policy, 149

Bevin said, had not so far evoked any satisfactory response from the Chinese People’s government. It had not yet agreed to an exchange of diplomatic representatives; its general attitude towards Britain continued to be unfriendly; and the prospects for British commercial interests in China were deteriorating. The reason for the Chinese delay in consenting to establish normal diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom, Bevin seemed to believe, was that the Chinese leaders were under Russian influence on this question. He told the Cabinet that to the extent that Britain was undeniably associated with the United States in its opposition to Russian imperialism, and in that Britain had agreed to take charge of American interests in China “there can hardly fail to be an adverse reaction upon our own relations with the Chinese People’s government.” It must be supposed, Bevin pointed out, that the Russians were using all their influence to persuade the Chinese that as the British were handin-glove with the Americans they should have nothing to do with either of them . 44 Nevertheless, Bevin asserted that the government should continue the present policy towards China and should not break off relations with the new government in Peking. Britain’s China policy, Bevin said, had been aimed at countering Russian influence in the country. If this course was pursued, “it will be a hard one from which we must expect to derive no early or material benefits”. But the stake was a big one, he went on to point out, since the alternative would be to write China off as irretrievably lost from Western democracy and to invite her open hostility. The effect of such an alternative on the British position in Hong Kong and South-East Asia would be far-reaching. The pressure from Chinese Communism would increase both overtly and covertly, and with its limited resources Britain would find it difficult to hold its position against any considerable intensification of that pressure. In addition Britain’s position with her friends would be in no way improved were the government at this stage to take the initiative in breaking off relations with Peking. Britain, Bevin said, would gain no particular credit from the United States, who had asked her to look after its interests in China. The British government would also be reproached by India, Pakistan and Ceylon and by other foreign governments who had followed its example. It was of course possible, Bevin further indicated, that the Chinese People’s government would ultimately decline to establish normal diplomatic relations and that Britain would be forced into the position of breaking off relations. But in his view, it was of importance that if there was a break Britain should be demonstrably able to place the responsibility fairly upon the Chinese government. In that event, he thought, it would be far easier to rally world opinion to Britain’s side, and particularly public opinion both in South-East Asia and in India, Pakistan and Ceylon. Conversely, if the British government could be held in any way 150

to be responsible for a break, this would be exploited in order to alienate Asian opinion from Britain and, he said, “we shall be correspondingly in a weaker position to meet the menace with which we should then be confronted. ” 45 From Bevin’s memorandum, it is clear that the British government, despite hardship, maintained that the policy of entering into diplomatic relations with China was the right approach to the Chinese Communists. On April 24, the British Cabinet examined the possibility of resolving the difficulties in the negotiations with Peking. Ministers (Bevin, whose health deteriorated in 1950, was represented by the new Minister of State, Kenneth Younger) recognized that the Chinese government could find “a plausible excuse” for the delay in agreeing on the exchange of diplomatic representatives in the fact that Britain had abstained from voting in favour of its representation in the United Nations. It would therefore be advantageous if the United States government could be persuaded to modify its present attitude towards this question so as to break the exisiting deadlock. Meanwhile, the Cabinet generally agreed that it would be unwise to press the United States government to proceed with the modification of U.S. policy towards China at a faster pace than that which it regarded as acceptable to American opinion. The Cabinet then approved that in the forthcoming talks with the United States Secretary of State Dean Acheson, the Foreign Secretary should discuss the whole field of the relations of both Britain and the United States with China, but would not press the views of the British government on policy toward China “to such an extent as to risk alienating the sympathy and support of the United States Government.” 46 On May 8 , one day before the start of the London meetings of the three Foreign Ministers of Britain, the United States and France, John Hutchison in Peking received the Chinese reply, which expressed their dissatisfaction with the British government’s communication of March 17. Chang Han-fu, Chinese Vice-Minister, told the British Chargé d’Affaires that the Central People’s government stressed not the number of favourable votes but rather the need to see in the process of voting whether the countries which had formally broken off relations with the KMT and were willing to establish diplomatic relations “have in fact really severed diplomatic relations with remnants of Kuomintang reactionaries and are really taking a friendly attitude towards the Central People’s government”. Chang emphasized that the British government should show “with actual deeds” that it had definitely severed diplomatic relations with the KMT and that it was “truly sincere” in its wish to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC. The Chinese government also considered that Britain had not yet shown full respect for the national property rights and the right to administer these properties of the People’s government because she had impeded aircraft from taking 151

off and returning to China. The Chinese government therefore hoped, Chang declared, that the British government would give further clarification in regard to the questions of China’s right of representation in the UN and China’s property rights in Hong Kong. 47 The Chinese were thus unwilling to give up their position on the establishment of diplomatic relations. Hopes of persuading the American government to change its attitude towards China’s representation in the United Nations proved to be unattainable. During talks with Acheson and Schuman in London in May, Bevin, while expressing his doubts about the likelihood of significant change in the Chinese government for several years, emphasized that British policy was not reversible and felt the future might prove it to have been wise. The present position was, the British Foreign Minister explained, that the Chinese Communists were using the question of voting on admission as a test of the British government’s sincerity in recognition. Though the situation was unsatisfactory, he felt that Peking had a good case over the seating question: it was difficult for him to acknowledge that Chiang Kai-shek could claim to represent China in the United Nations. Acheson, however, disagreed and claimed that the United States did not regard this question as just a legal question involving the United Nations. In the United States’ view, he said, the Soviet Union possessed a position of domination in China which it was using to threaten the whole of Asia. The admission of the Chinese Communist representative might be more dangerous than the continued impasse in the UN. On the other hand, the two Foreign Ministers completely agreed on the long-term aims of the two countries “of preventing the permanent alienation of China from the West”.48 The disagreement of the two governments therefore still rested on the question of how to achieve their common aims. The Foreign Ministers’ talks in London, as the British Foreign Office summed up, “did not lead to any more closely unified and vigorous policy in respect of China ” . 49 The Anglo-American differences over tactics in China stemmed partly from the differing estimations of the relations between Peking and Moscow at that time. The Americans seemed to believe that China had become a Soviet satellite. The British government, on the other hand, considered that though the Kremlin faction in Chinese politics had the upper hand, its domination was far from complete. Dening indicated to the American delegation at the preparatory talks on M ay 3 that Peking might turn more and more to Russia in order to sustain her position, but there were other possibilities: Titoism might develop as a result of Russian attempts to dominate the People’s government; the Communist government could fail and the people could overthrow it; or the People’s government could make China a great power by their own efforts. It would take time for the situation to develop in any one of these directions.50 152

The Sino-British negotiations in Peking on the establishment of relations now reached a deadlock. There was growing mutual dis­ satisfaction. In April, the Chinese government unilaterally took over the British m ilitary compound in Peking . 51 On M ay 19, The World Affairs called British policy “two-faced”. 52 Hutchison in Peking was worried that the Chinese government might break off negotiations and even sever all its relations with Britain if London maintained its position. 53 Within the Foreign Office, officials in the Far Eastern Department were sceptical. Franklin felt that the Chinese were certainly trying to make the establish­ ment of relations a difficult and possibly humiliating process and that their attitude “is essentially insincere”. Franklin advised the government to take a tough line and not to make concessions; otherwise, he felt, it would probably be faced with immediate requests for further concessions. 54 Bevin publicly expressed his dissatisfaction about the Chinese attitude. In the House of Commons on 24 May, he described the two questions raised by the Peking government as “annoying and irritating” side issues. To that, he said, the government had no intention of submitting . 55 Bevin’s speech provoked strong response from Peking. The New China News Agency of 28 May indicated that Bevin had adopted an extremely lax attitude towards establishing diplomatic relations between Britain and China. An editorial of the People's Daily on the same day portrayed Bevin’s statement in the Commons as very unfriendly. Kwang M ing Jih Pao on 29 M ay blamed the delay in establishing formal relations on the “insufficiently sincere, insufficiently honest, double-faced policy” adopted by the British government towards the new China . 56 The Labour government was in a quandary. The protracted negotiations in Peking had already caused the Opposition Party’s criticism at home and would certainly lead to deeper suspicions of the Chinese government about British intentions. From Peking, John Hutchison tried to assure the Foreign Office that the Chinese government did want to have diplomatic relations with Britain but was suspicious of the motives of all governments (other, perhaps, than the Soviet Union and its satellites). In Hutchison’s view, the consistently friendly manner, and the extension to himself in Peking of all normal diplomatic privileges, suggested that the Chinese government did have some desire to have diplomatic relations with the British government. This view was shared by all Embassy officials in Peking . 57 As Britain certainly wanted full diplomatic relations established, Hutchison suggested, the government should attempt to “bridge the g u lf’ and avoid any action that would further antagonize the Chinese .58 In this connection, it was significant that the Chinese government had agreed to exchange ambassadors with India in March when the Indian government had started to vote in support of Peking’s representation in the Security Council. 59 153

It seemed that only a move by London could break the deadlock in Peking’s negotiations. On the question of the aircraft in Hong Kong, however, the American attitude had presented a serious obstacle. In March, Acheson told British Ambassador Franks that the seventy aircraft in Hong Kong were “a source of great anxiety” to him. Indeed, Franks feared that in view of the fact that members of Congress were being provoked to attack aid to Britain under the European Recovery Programme and the Military Defence Assistance Programme, any major development of the Hong Kong affair favourable to the Chinese Communists would have wide and highly explosive repercussions in Washington. Anglo-American interests and understanding elsewhere would also be affected. 60 In April the United States Embassy in London, on the instruction of the State Department, put further pressure on the British Foreign Office. 61 On 24 April, the British Cabinet was informed that the United States government considered that if the aeroplanes fell into Communist hands, it would not feel able to defend the policy which the British government had followed. Washington further indicated that during recent months it had been seeking to persuade American opinion to accept a more realistic policy towards China and attempting to secure a bi-partisan approach to Chinese matters in Congress. All its work would be destroyed if these aircraft now fell into the hands of the Communists. Finally, the Americans expressed the view that they intended to adopt a vigorous policy towards South-East Asia, but would be unable to do this if the divergence of British and American policies, already marked by differences in respect of recognition, was accentuated by a favourable outcome for Peking regarding these aircraft. After considering this attitude, British ministers accepted the Attorney General H artley Shawcross’ proposal and decided to obtain an Order-in-Council “enabling the Courts to determine the ownership of these aircraft and ensuring their safe custody pending this determination ”. 62 The Order-in-Council went into effect on 10 May. 63 The decision of the British government to keep the aircraft in Hong Kong was obviously taken in the interests of Anglo-American relations. The importance of maintaining close Anglo-American alliance relations can, of course, be better understood in the context of the whole British position after the war. The British not only needed American assistance to hold their interests in South-East Asia but depended on American financial aid for economic recovery and military support for national security at home in facing the Russian threat. Without doubt, the last thing London wanted to do was to jeopardise this vital alliance relationship with the United States. Minister of State Younger, who in effect took over the Foreign Office as Bevin spent more and more time in hospital, proposed to revise British attitudes towards the issue of Chinese representation in the UN. After consulting with Bevin, he wrote to the Prime Minister on 12 June, 154

suggesting that the government should cast its vote in favour of the admission of the People’s government to the UN International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) on 19 June and in the Economic and Social Council which met on 3 July, irrespective of the number of affirmative votes cast. On the same day Attlee approved Younger’s proposal. 64 The approval of this suggestion indicated the British government’s genuine desire to see full diplomatic relations established with Peking soon. At the same time, the Foreign Office was anxious that the Chinese should not gain the impression that this modification in British voting tactics was an attempt to appease or run after them, so in its instruction to reply to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 17 June, Hutchison was asked not to disclose this change in British voting policy. 65 The American State Department interfered and asked London not to vote for seating Peking’s representative in UNICEF, but mean­ while indicated that it would not take grave objection if Britain was to vote affirmatively in the Economic and Social Council in July . 66 Unfortunately, the situation was completely changed by the sudden attack on South Korea on 25 June. In a letter to Attlee, a few days after the outbreak of the Korean War, Kenneth Younger gloomily observed that “recent events in Korea must inevitably produce emotional public reactions both in the United States and in this country which would make it extremely difficult for us to go on record for the first time next Monday [July 3] as having voted for the admission of the Communist Government of China to a United Nations body.” 67 Peking’s attitude towards Britain hardened following the Western reaction to the Korean war and particularly American neutralization of Formosa by dispatching the United States Seventh Fleet into the Straits. In September, the British government started to cast its vote for Peking’s admission to the UN . 68 The Chinese government did not respond, however. One month later, Esler Dening, the ambassador-designate to the PRC, was assigned to a secret mission to visit Peking for talks with Chinese leaders. In the end, he could not get a visa. 69 All British efforts were thus overshadowed by the Korean W ar and China’s entry into the war later. The negotiations in Peking were now suspended. Thus, the Sino-British discussions in Peking were conducted in an extremely unfavourable international environment. Both the American government’s attitude and the world situation contributed to the failure of the establishment of diplomatic relations between London and Peking. The Chinese made their agreement to exchange official representatives conditional; but their demands were not unreasonable. They asked Britain to vote in favour of their representation in the UN. They also wanted to take over Chinese national property in Hong Kong. Moreover, they wanted to test the sincerity of the British promise that they had broken off relations with the KMT. London, for its part, though 155

unsatisfied with the Chinese requirement for negotiation before the establishment of relations, was seeking to meet Chinese demands. On the other hand, it did not want to make any moves affecting the Anglo-American special relationship. In the event, the British govern­ ment yielded to American pressure on the question of the aircraft in Hong Kong. The guns which exploded into action along Korea’s 38th parallel on June 25, 1950 shattered more than just the morning calm. Any hopes in London of a change in the United States attitude to Chinese representation in the UN were now dimmed. Furthermore, with a British military presence in Korea and China’s entry into the war, Britain and China became enemies. In retrospect, the Korean war had the most serious effect on relations between China and the Western world. The Sino-British negotiations were not resumed until 1954, when the Chinese government agreed to send its Chargé d’Affaires to London. Full diplomatic relations up to ambassadorial level between the two countries were not established until 1972. British diplomacy in China in 1950 suggests that the American government’s understanding and cooperation was essential for London to pursue successfully an independent policy.

The Position of British Business Interests in China on the Eve of the Korean War The conditions for British commercial interests in China had continued to deteriorate after London extended recognition to the new Chinese government. Apart from the Nationalist blockade of Shanghai, British firms were subjected to increasing pressures from the Communist government authorities, which included high levels of taxation and the refusal to permit the dismissal of labour even where industries were idle, and the restriction of movement of foreign nationals in and out of China, as well as inside China. The absence of trade, and consequently of income, as a result of the blockade had meant the remittance of large sums from the United Kingdom in order to meet taxation and wages. The remittances, according to W .J. Keswick, Chairman of the China Association, ran at the rate of £500,000 a month at one time; then at £360,000; and in March 1950 about £150,000 a month. 70 The failure to establish formal diplomatic relations with the new regime following recognition meant that the British authorities both in China and in London were unable to make official representations to the Chinese government about the difficulties facing British communities. This was particularly disappointing to British commercial communities in China. On February 2 , a China Association delegation called on Esler Dening in the Foreign Office. The Chairman, Keswick, remarked that 156

although the situation had been very bad for several months, most firms in China had held on in the hope that there would be a distinct improve­ ment after the British government recognized the new regime, but unhappily this had proved to be a false hope. 71 Indeed, although British consular offices had remained open, consular officers were still not recognized by the People’s government in their official capacity. Official communications continued to be ignored or returned with a statement to the effect that diplomatic relations between the two countries had not been established. The position of the British consulate thus remained the same as before recognition. British official representatives did, however, benefit in one aspect through recognition - communication facilities. On March 20, the Chinese authorities issued an order to the effect that all foreign nationals must dismantle and hand over within seven days any wireless equipment used for the transmission or receipt of messages. This order had not, however, been applied to British transmitters. The British ConsulGeneral in Shanghai, Urquart, reported that his transmitter was the only foreign set known to be working in the city. 72 Commenting on the Shanghai British Chamber of Commerce’s report of February that “the authorities refuse to discuss difficulties and give blank refusals to simple requests”, Franklin in the Foreign Office pointed out that this was a “deliberate policy”. He minuted, “we are very much closer to the unpleasant fact that there is probably no room in communist China for our resident commercial communities.” 73 In fact, without any hope of overcoming their difficulties, British businessmen in China were forced to close down their firms and cut their losses. In a telegram to the China Association on April 4, the British Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai declared that many firms in Shanghai representing important interests and investments in China, who until recently were prepared to continue the struggle in this country in the hope that conditions would improve, had now come to the conclusion “that their ability to continue in business is at an end.” They faced bankruptcy by the extraction of the last penny by their workers and the government combined, and their period of usefulness as members of the British community, they believed, was over. Their efforts therefore must be directed at finding ways and means to cut their losses. British interests came to this conclusion, the British Chamber of Commerce claimed, because they believed that the People’s government was a Communist government and it intended to “govern China both politically and economically on Communist lines .” 74 It was, indeed, the Chinese government’s policy to eradicate Western economic interests in China. Both Communist ideology and Chinese nationalism had left little room for British trade and industry enterprises to stay in the country. Controls on private capital instituted by the new 157

authorities and the growing role of the trade and industry state monopoly ruled out the continuing role of British business in China. The state trade companies, for instance, took control of both the supply of raw materials to industry and the market for its products. In 1950, Kailan Mining Administration, the largest British industry in China, cut its losses and withdrew from the country. Chinese nationalism or anti-imperialism also demanded the eradication of British business enterprises in China in Chinese eyes, the symbols of a century’s unequal treatment. As A. A. E. Franklin in the Foreign Office remarked in March 1950, “The whole policy of the liberation of the Treaty ports from their semi­ colonial status implies and involves the elimination of foreign trading communities.” 75 In retrospect, it is clear that the policy of rapidly eliminating the foreign economic establishment adopted by the new regime was very harmful for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the Chinese economy but people, as John Hutchison put it, “are guided by sentiment and not by reason when deeply moved.” In describing the strength of nationalistic feeling in China at the time, Hutchison, who was born in China, wrote, “Frustration, through a long period of foreign domination, of Chinese self-esteem (“face”, conceit, pride or patriotism) has accentuated in them Xenophobia common to all mankind. The White Ensign is still to the Chinaman a red rag to a bull: it symbolizes for him 1 0 0 years of personal and national humiliation ”. 76 The disillusionment of British merchants with the new authorities in China was quite understandable. They had for a long time taken the view that the establishment of a Communist regime in China was just another change of government, which would not be likely to affect their business. In their view, the Chinese character and Communism were mutually exclusive.77 British government officials were not surprised by the coming end of British commercial establishments in China. However, they did not expect the day would some so quickly. They were greatly worried about the effect of the total loss of British investment. “The disappearance at so early a stage of major British interests from the China scene,” Bevin told the Cabinet on 20 April, “is bound adversely to affect our prestige, and to encourage the Chinese to hasten the process.” 78 The British government then decided to take some steps in an attempt to alleviate the position of British economic interests in China. Initially, officials in the Foreign Office were reluctant to ask the Chargé d’Affaires Hutchison to take up the plight of British firms with the Chinese authorities as they feared that the British government might run the risk of further complicating the issue of establishing normal diplomatic relations . 79 Hutchison, on the spot, did not believe that any represen­ tations at this stage would prove effective. 80 Nevertheless, Bevin insisted that inaction would expose the government to justifiable criticism, and that since the matter was so urgent the British Chargé d’Affaires should 158

be instructed to make early representations to the Chinese government about the seriousness of the plight of British business interests in China. W ith the ministers’ approval, on M ay 18, the Foreign Office instructed Hutchison to inform the Chinese government that as their reserves of funds and materials had become exhausted by their efforts to meet financial burdens, British enterprises in China had increasingly to call on funds outside China in order to meet their obligations, and very substantial remittances had been sent from London. There were limits to the endurance and also to the resources of firms both inside and outside China, and many concerns were being driven to the conclusion that the position was hopeless. Their funds were coming to an end, there appeared to be no hope in the near future of conditions improving, and they saw no alternative to closing down. Hutchison was also to tell the Chinese government that the British Exchange Control authorities, who were required to satisfy themselves of the benefits to the British economy of any remittances sent abroad, could not, having regard to present circumstances, continue indefinitely to approve requests for permission to send remittances to China. On the other hand, the Foreign office wanted to emphasize that the British government assumed that it was the wish and intention of the Chinese government that friendly and mutually advantageous trade relations should exist between the two countries and that the Chinese government would agree that British enterprises operating in China could continue in the future as in the past to make a valuable contribution to this common objective. The British government therefore asked that the Central People’s government should consider in what ways it could “mitigate the effects of the present circumstances on these enterprises”. London further offered some suggestion for the Chinese authorities to consider. First, loans might be made available locally at reasonable rates of interest to firms whose liquid financial resources were exhausted but who wished to continue their operations. Secondly, firms should be permitted to discharge workers and clerks not required for the efficient execution of the volume of work in hand. Thirdly, in circumstances where there were no orders or no materials for production, firms should be permitted to close down and place the plant on a care and maintenance basis until such time as conditions enabled them to resume production on a scale which justified the operation of the plant. The “personal position of British subjects in China” was another question London wanted to raise with the Chinese authorities. In particular, Hutchison was asked to request that British subjects in China should be allowed freedom of movement within the country, and those who wished to leave China should be allowed to do so without delay. British nationals wishing to enter China in order to relieve staff in the country should also be permitted to do so. British subjects at present charged with the 159

management and operation of British enterprises should be assured of full protection for their persons and property. 81 In seeking to prevent the imminent collapse of British business interest in China, the British authorities were reluctant to provide direct financial assistance to their firms, though officials on the spot indicated that the government had incurred “a moral obligation” to British traders by encouraging them to stay put. 82 In April, the China Association requested the Treasury to finance with suitable mortgages any key British companies which were unable to carry on because of the dissipation of their reserves. Though the sum mentioned initially was some £300,000, it had since become clear that any subvention of the kind suggested would more probably need to be in the neighbourhood of £1 million. After discussions between the Foreign Office, the Treasury and the Board of Trade, the conclusion was reached that such a subvention could only be justified on political grounds. Bevin expressed his misgiving. He said, “I would be prepared to recommend such a course were it not for the fact that, though we should be assisting British firms, we would in a sense be financing public utilities in a Communist state without any guarantee that that state will not eventually expropriate the particular utilities concerned.” Bevin also felt that it would be difficult to justify such action in Parliament, and the action might serve only to encourage the Chinese authorities to continue their pressure on British interests . 83 Meanwhile, serious efforts had been made by London to break the Nationalist blockade. The difficulties of British interests in Shanghai were certainly also caused by the Nationalist-maintained blockade. According to the China Association monthly Bulletin of March 1950, “trade and industry are almost completely at a standstill” in Shanghai. 84 KMT aircraft also bombed the city, which resulted in extensive damage to property and heavy Chinese civilian casualties. 85 The British govern­ ment had been, in fact, consistently under pressure from British business interests to take measures to ensure that ships could enter Shanghai. The matter had been brought to a head by a meeting between the Foreign Secretary Bevin and the China Association on March 16, in which the latter demanded that “greater and more determined efforts” be made by the government than hitherto to break the blockade. 86 After the withdrawal of recognition from the KM T government, London no longer had legal difficulties in respect of the blockade. The crux of the matter now was the United States attitude on the issue. The desire to obtain United States’ support led the British government to feel the necessity to proceed carefully. This was clearly expressed by Bevin to the China Association. It was United States public opinion, Bevin pointed out, which the government had to consider. The State Department, he felt, was of much the same mind as the British government but if the British alone acted to break the blockade without 160

US support, Bevin feared “we would provoke the opponents of the administration and tie its hands.” Bevin emphasized the fact that “the United States had only recently become Asia-minded and particularly conscious of South-East Asia in the last three months.” Their policy was previously based on sentiment; now it was becoming more constructive. So the British government, Bevin explained, did not wish to take precipitate action which would retard this constructive trend, because the Far East must be held with United States assistance. In the meantime, the Foreign Secretary told the China Association delegation that the blockade had now reached a stage where the government might be able to take a more definite line with the KMT than hitherto. In response to the Chairman’s final word that the China Association wished to make sure that there was no misunderstanding on the part of the government regarding the danger of collapse of British interests in China, Bevin remarked, “we must just hope that a few strands will still hold .” 87 The Foreign Office was in favour of taking government action to resolve the blockade. It was worried, not only by financial constraints on British firms caused by the blockade, but also by the large British community in Shanghai (by March 1950, there were still 2,200 British and Common­ wealth residents in the city), who had been virtually cut off from the outside world for several months and had also had to endure KMT air-raids on the city. Failing positive action to end or break the blockade, the Foreign Office feared British interests would find it impossible to stay put. It was felt that their withdrawal would involve “a severe blow to our whole China policy” of “keeping a foot in the door”. Thus, in the Foreign Office’s opinion, British interests had a strong case for expecting assistance from the government in their plight. 88 British officials did not expect the Chinese People’s government, which possessed neither navy nor air force capable of breaking the blockade, to show its gratitude to Britain when the British government made efforts to let merchant vessels enter Shanghai; they felt, however, that successful action by the British naval force would remove the possibility of Peking’s inviting the Russians at some future date to assist it in breaking the blockade. There were rumours that this might be contemplated. 89 In the hope that a resumption of normal trade with Shanghai would avoid the immediate and grave possibility of the withdrawal of the British commercial community from China and the consequent failure of a major part of Britain’s China policy, the Foreign Office instructed its Washington Embassy on 22 March to inquire whether the United States government would be prepared to take any action with the Nationalists to bring about the effective discontinuation of attacks, whether by sea or by air, upon foreign shipping and interests in Shanghai and elsewhere in China. The Foreign Office also wanted to know the possible reaction of the United States if the British government were to use force to break the blockade. 90 161

W hen Sir Oliver Franks saw Acheson on 28 March, the latter was greatly concerned by the Hong Kong aircraft affair. The British ambassador was told that the question of the blockade could not be dealt with in isolation. The Secretary of State expressed the wish for his people to sit down with the British and examine the whole situation, and see what steps each could take which would be complementary and not antagonistic. 91 Any further discussions with the Americans on the Chinese blockade would therefore have to await the Anglo-American talks in London in May. In the event, like the question of Chinese representation in the UN, the London meetings also failed to bring about an agreement between Britain and the United States on the question of the Nationalist blockade. During the preparatory discussions in the British Foreign Office on May 3, Philip Jessup, head of the United States delegation, pointed out that Anglo-American views on the Shanghai blockade were another instance of the disagreement on tactics between the two countries towards China. The United States government, he claimed, while recognizing the distorted propaganda value of the blockade by the Chinese Communists, considered the effect on the Communist regime, including the multiplication of its economic and administrative difficulties, should not be discounted. Dening, on the other hand, expressed the British government’s doubts of whether the blockade was having a material effect on Communists who, he felt, had little regard for popular suffering. China, Dening said, could continue to subsist under conditions of total blockade as it did during the war with Japan. Meanwhile, the American support of Formosa, the Nationalist blockade and bombing of the Chinese cities had been largely responsible for the extension of the Soviet military influence south . 92 Bevin did not raise the problem of the Shanghai blockade in his talks with Acheson, although he had told the Cabinet he wished to. The reason seemed to be that he did not want to push the State Department on the issue. Acheson told Bevin that the United States was less likely now than six months ago to change its views on China .93 In view of the lessening flexibility in United States’ policy towards China, the British proposal of breaking the Nationalist blockade was never put into action. London’s hands were obviously tied by the Americans. Chiang Kai-shek had maintained the blockade of Shanghai until late June 1950, when Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet to neutralize the Formosa Straits. On M ay 24, Bevin informed the House of Commons that “British interests in China have been hurt more by that [Nationalist blockade] than by what the Communists have done. ” 94 The China Association bulletin of May indicated that the number of business concerns who were left with no alternative but to close down, “is now increasing rapidly” .95 So, on the eve of the Korean War, British commercial interests in China were already on the verge of collapse. This position was due to the 162

Chinese Communist authorities’ taxation and control policy and also the Nationalist blockade. Nevertheless, the British government could do little to alleviate their problems. The failure to establish diplomatic relations with Peking denied the British official channels through which to discuss the problems facing their business community in China. The blockade problem remained unsolved as London felt unable to act in view of the American attitude. It was already clear by m id-1950 that the “stay put” policy pursued by the British government had failed. Between 1950 and 1952, many British firms were struggling to pull out of China . 96 Finally, on 19 May 1952, British Chargé d’Affaires in Peking Sir Lionel Lamb officially informed the Chinese government that because of the difficulties they were faced with, the major British companies operating in China had decided to wind up their businesses in China . 97 Officials in London had anticipated that British interests would secure compensation when the Chinese authorities decided to take over their assets. This expectation, however, failed to be justified. In the event, few British properties had been directly expropriated and confiscated by the Chinese government. British firms were forced into debt by taxes, restrictions and regulations, so that they had been unable to carry on, and in order to be able to liquidate and leave China they had had “voluntarily” to hand over their assets to the authorities. The British thus lost their large investments and properties in China (ranging between £200 to £250 million) after over a century of commercial activities in the country. The “stay put” policy was, indeed, “a costly one”. 98

Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

F o r the whole text of C hou’s reply, see CAB 129/39, C.P.(50)73, 20 April 1950, Annex A. H utchison to F.O., 28 D ecember 1949, F19434/1023/10, F O 371/75829. M in u te by Franklin, 30 Dec. 1949, ibid. Bevin, Colom bo, to F.O., 12 Jan. 1950, FC1022/89, F O 371/83281. F.O. to Bevin, Cario, 29 Jan., F O 371/83281. Peking to Nanking, 13 Jan. 1950, FC1022/99, ibid. H utchison to F.O. 30 Dec., 1949, F19434/1023/10, F O 371/75829. H utchison to F.O., 25 Jan. 1050, No.230, FO 371/83283, Hutchison to F.O., 30 Jan. 1950, No.279, ibid. F.O. to Nanking, 1 Feb. 1950, FC1022/175, F O 371/83283. M inute by Franklin, 3 Feb. 1950, FC1022/196, F O 371/83284. M .J. N ichollas, Moscow, to Dening, 9 Feb. 1950, FC10338/50, F O 371/83314. F.O. to N anking, 9 Feb. 1950, FC1022/212, F O 371/83285. CAB 129/39, C.P.(50)73, Annex B. N ew C hina News Agency, 10 Jan. 1950, see also, F.O. to Bevin, Colombo, 11 Jan. 1950, FC1022/86, F O 371/63281.

163

15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

25. 26. 27.

28.

29.

Documents on Foreign Relations o f the P R C (1 9 4 9 -1 9 5 0 ), I, (Peking, 1959),

pp. 85-86. M ao’s Selected W orks, Vol. IV, p. 371, see also C hapter 6. The World A ffa irs, 13 Jan. 1950. M ao’s Selected W orks , pp. 415, 416, 422. W u Xiuquan, E ig h t Years in the M in is tr y o f Foreign A ffa irs (Ja nuary 1950-O ctober 1958): M em oirs o f a D ip lo m a t, Peking N ew W orld Press, 1985, Chinese Edition, p. 10. W u was a m em ber of the Chinese delegation in the Moscow negotiations of 1950. M em o by Bevin, 20 April 1950, C.P.(50)73, CAB 129/39. Ibid. T he military compounds were originally obtained by eleven foreign powers after the Boxer rising to station their own garrison in Peking. M emo by Bevin, 20 April 1950, C.P.(50)73, CAB 129/39. M emo by Bevin, 12 Dec. 1949, C .P .(49)248, CAB129/37. L etter from Franks to F.O., 7 Jan. 1950, FC1022/72, F O 371/83281. Tel. H. A. Graves, Washington, to Scarlett, 9 Jan. 1950, FC 1022/108, F O 371/83282. F.O. to Nanking, 9 Feb. 1950, FC1022/212 F O 371/83285. Ibid.

Franks to F.O., 3 Jan. 1950, FC1022/27, F O 371/83279. F.O. to Peking, 8 M arch 1950, FC 1022/228, F O 371/83285; see also Bevin’s speech in the H ouse of Commons on M ay 24, 1950, H . C. Debs, Vol. 475, Col. 2084. M emo by Bevin to the Cabinet, 20 April 1950, C.P.(50)73, CAB129/39; record of Conversation between Bevin and the French Foreign M inister Schuman in London, 7 March 1950. FE /50/13, F O 800/462.

30. 31.

Ibid.

32. 33. 34. 35.

Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.

36. 37. 38. 39. 40.

41. 42. 43. 44.

F. O. circular telegram to British representatives abroad, 21 M arch 1950, see CAB 129/39, C.P.(50)61, Annex A.

FO to H utchison, Peking, 8 M arch 1950, FC1022/228, F O 371/83285; see also CAB 129/39 C. P.(50)73, Annex B(ii). Evan Luard, B r itain and China, p. 79 The Times, 7, Jan. 1950. M anchester G uardian, quoted from Evan Luard, p. 79. Ridsdale to Bevin, Colombo, 7 Jan. 1950, FC1022/67, F O 371/83280. N ote from Strang to H ector M cNeil, F C 1022.87, FO 371/83281; T h e Tim es, 7 January 1950. Professor H. L auterpacht of the U niversity of C am bridge was widely recognized as an authority on recognition. H is book, Recognition in International L a w (Cambridge, 1948) had been quoted by the Foreign Office legal adviser to strengthen the legal position o f the recognition. H . C. Debs, Vol.471, C.215, 226, 7 M arch 1950. H . C. Debs, Vol.474, C.598, 24 April 1950. H . C. Debs, Vol.475, C.2071. Memo by Bevin, 20 April 1950, CAB 129/39, C.P.(50)73. In the Parliamentary debates on recognition one m onth later, the Foreign Secretary declared

164

that on C hina’s relations with Britain, “M ao Tse-tung has been receiving advice from Moscow.” See H . C. Debs. Vol.475, C.2084, 24 M ay 1950. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50.

51. 52.

53. 54. 55. 56. 57.

58. 59.

60. 61.

62. 63.

64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69.

Ibid.

CAB 128/17, C.M.24(50)5, 24 April 1950. H utchison to F.O., 9 M ay 1950, FC 1022/319, F O 371/83288. FRU S 1950 III, p.1023, 1037-38, 1062, 1065. M em o by J. S. H . Shattock, new head o f the F. O. Far Eastern D epartm ent in 1950, 23 June 1950, FC1022/423, F O 371/83292. FRUS, 1950 III, pp. 992-3. For the British view on the possible develop­ ments in China, see also CAB129/39, C. P. (50)73,20 April 1950. T h e British view that China was not completely in th e hands of Russia, and therefore the aim ought to be to divide the Russians and the Chinese, was also clearly expressed by the Prim e M inister Attlee to President Trum an during the form er’s visit to W ashington following the outbreak of the Korean War. See Trum an, H arry S. Years o f T ria l a n d Hope 1 9 4 6 -1 9 5 3 (New York; H odder & Stoughton, 1956), p. 427. Ibid. The W orld A ffairs, editorial, 19 M ay 1950.

H utchison to F.O. 11 M ay 1950, FC 1022/336, F O 371/82289. M inute by Franklin, 19 M ay 1950, FC 1022/341, F O 371/83289. H . C. Debs, Vol. 475, C.2084, 24 M ay 1950. See H utchison to F.O., 30 M ay 1950, FC 1022/372, F O 371/83291. It was confirmed later in 1951 by G raham , who had been at present at H utchison-C hang negotiations in Peking. See letter from Shattock to Lamb, Peking, 20 N o. 1951, FC1027/230, FO371/92240. H utchison to F.O., FC1022/368, FO 371/83290. Sardar K. M . Panikkar, who had been India’s ambassador to Nationalist China, became N ew D elhi’s first am bassador to the PRC, see his memoirs, In Two Chinas: M em oirs o f a D iplom at (London, 1955). Franks to Bevin, 28 M arch 1950, FC1022/263, F O 371/83286. M inutes of interviews between K enneth Younger and the US ambassador on 14 April and the US M inister on 19 April, CAB129/39, C.P.(50)74, 21 April 1950, Annex B, C. CAB128/17, C.C.(24)50,6, 24 April 1950, see also a joint memorandum by Younger and the Colonies Secretary, CAB 129/39, C.P.(50)74, 21 April 1950. In 1952, the Privy Council decided th at these aircraft in H ong Kong should be transferred to the American company. T h e Chinese retaliated by requisitioning some properties o f British firms in Shanghai. See J. P. Jain, C hina in W orld Politics A S tu d y o f S in o -B ritish Relations , 1 9 4 9 -1 9 7 5 (New Delhi: Radiant, 1976), p. 219. M em o by Younger to Attlee, 12 June 1950, FE/50/2, FO 800/462. F.O. to Hutchison, 6 June 1950, the text of the communication to the Chinese People’s government, FC 1200/381, F O 371/83291. M em o by Younger to Attlee, 29 June 1950, FE/50/4, F O 800/462. Ibid.

CAB 128/18, C. M. 55(50), 4 Sept. 1950. FO 371/84520, FX1026/28; F O 371/84521 FX1026/37. For a full account of Sir Esler D ening’s secret mission to Peking, see unpublished Ph.D thesis

165

by James Tang, Diplomatic Relations with a Revolutionary Power: Britain’s Experience with China 1949-54, London School of Economics, 1987. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86.

The Foreign Office record of Bevin’s meeting with the China Association, 16 March 1950, FC1106/30 FO371/83344. CAMS, 50/G/10,6 Feb. 1950. Memo. by Bevin, 20 April 1950, CAB129/39, C.P.(50)73. Minute by Franklin, 17 March 1950, FC1106/26, FO371/83344. CAMS, 50/G/29,4 April 1950. Minute by Franklin, 24 March 1950, FC1106/28. FO371/83344. Hutchison to F.O., 10 Nov. 1949, F17349 FO371/75914. F. O. memo, FC1022/528, mid 1950, FO371/83295. CAB139/29, C.P.(50)73, 20 April 1950. F.O. to Hutchison, 15 April 1950, FC1106/52/10, FO371/83345. Peking to F.O., No.391, ibid. F.O. to Hutchison, 18 May 1950, FC1106/115, FO371/83347. Hutchison to F.O., 22 March 1950, FC1106/31, FO371/83345. Memo by Bevin, 20 April 1950, CAB129/39, C.P.(50)73, Cabinet minute 24 April 950, CAB128/17, C.M. 24(50)5. CAMC, 50/M/3, bulletin No.46, 20 March 1950. See F.O. memo “Chinese Nationalist Blockade and Bombing”, 17 March 1950, FE(0)50, 5, CAB134/290. F.O. record of the meeting, 16 March 1950, FC1106/30, FO371/83344, see also China Association record CAMC, 50/G/25, 17 March 1950.

87. 88.

Ibid.

89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96.

Ibid.

97. 98.

F.O. memo to Cabinet Far Eastern(0) Committee, 17 March 1950, FE(0)50, 5 revived, CAB134/290. F.O. to Washington, 22 March 1950, FC1261/88, CAB134/290 Franks to Bevin, 28 March, 1950, FC1022/263, FO371/83286. FRUS, Vol.1950 III, p. 993. P.1023, ibid. H.C. Debs. V.475, C.2086. CAMS, 50/M/6, 20 May 1950. Robert Boardman, Britain and the People’s Republic of China 1949-74 (London, Macmillan, 1976), p. 82. See Evan Luard, p. 139. B. Hooper, China Stands Up (Sydney: Allen and Unwin (Australia) 1986), p. 108.

166

CHAP TER

EI GHT

Conclusion

Britain’s interests in China had always been economic. This was as true after the Second World War as earlier. In the first post-war years, the British government’s China policy was aimed at restoring British economic interests there. Britain’s trade and industrial enterprises in China served two purposes. They were not only important invisible exports for the United Kingdom, but also a valuable asset in London’s trade strategy. Although in the beginning of the post-war years Britain could not take her proper share in the Chinese market due to her own difficulties of supply and China’s inability to buy with cash payments, it was confidently believed by British officials that in a period of three or four years Britain’s trade with China could be increasingly expanded. This optimistic belief seemed to be justified. Britain had maintained the predominant commercial position in China until the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937. It thus had a long-standing trade position and particular experience there. There were many difficulties confronting the British business communities in China after the war. Their firms and properties were occupied or taken over by Chinese troops and authorities when Japan suddenly surrendered. The Chinese government seemed to be willing to return them to their owners, but its official system was inefficient and its authority was ineffective - reflecting its fundamental weakness in the post­ war years. Inevitably, there was a great deal of dissatisfaction with the KMT authorities on the part of the British government. Losing the protection of extraterritorial rights under the Sino-British Treaty of 1943, British merchants looked for diplomatic support. Great efforts were made by British officials on the spot to help them to regain their properties. The Treaty of 1943 had further effects. The immediate question arising from it was the future of the British colony of Hong Kong. The lease of the New Territories to Britain was considered by the Chinese as the result of unequal treaties; they therefore demanded that they should be returned to China. The British were aware that the Chinese demand for the New Territories was just the first step in asking for the return of the whole colony. There was a good reason for London to meet this Chinese request, namely, the need for Chinese good-will in Britain’s task of 167

reestablishing its economic position in China. Furthermore, a friendly Sino-British relationship after the war was undoubtedly in Britain’s long­ term interests in the region. Nevertheless, economic interests outweighed political advantages in London. Hong Kong was most valuable for Britain as a trade centre in the Far East; so Churchill’s war-time coalition government was strongly against any changes in the status of the colony. Labour’s coming to power did not produce any change in British attitudes toward Hong Kong. Attlee successfully persuaded Truman to agree to the acceptance of Japan’s surrender in the colony by British forces. London achieved its goals in Hong Kong. The abolition of extraterritorial rights also meant that British shipping firms no longer had navigation rights in Chinese rivers and inland waters. British ship­ ping represented the most important part of British interests in China before the war. However, the reappearance of the foreign flag in China’s inland waters was incompatible with rising Chinese nationalistic feelings, which seemed to be encouraged by the abolition of the unequal treaties with the foreign powers and the defeat of Japan. Continued attempts were made to persuade the Chinese government to open the Yangtse River to British shipping. London’s first concern about the outbreak of full-scale civil war between the Chinese government and the Communists was still focussed on its economic interests. In the short-term, officials worried that fighting might involve the principal ports, where British interests were concentrated, and an indefinite period of chaos would ensue, in which British businesses would inevitably suffer damage. The long-term effect of the civil war on British interests was felt to be equally serious. If the Communists won the war, they would probably bring to China a relatively efficient and honest administration. The Comm­ unists in Yenan led by Mao Tse-tung were considered as only agrarian reformers and not genuine Marxist-Leninists. On the other hand, there was no assurance that such an administration would not be hostile to Western interests. The misjudgement of the nature of Chinese Communism by British officials was not surprising. London had no official representatives in the Communist-controlled areas. All reports from a few foreign visitors and journalists were favourable to the regime. There was no evidence of direct and official connections between Yenan and Moscow. Furthermore, the Foreign Office misinterpreted the Communist moderate agrarian programme as representing a fundamental change in its ultimate aims. The other alternative outcome of the civil strife was the victory of the KMT government. Yet British officials did not like the KMT. The extreme nationalists in the Party were believed to be equally hostile to foreign interests. Though Chiang Kai-shek himself was regarded as the only leader likely to command universal respect and obedience in China, inefficiency and corruption were endemic in the whole government. 168

Britain herself was no longer in a strong position to influence Chinese political issues and the British attitude towards the Chinese internal conflict was one of non-interference. British influence in China was already declining before the war, which hastened the process. London’s attitude towards the Chinese domestic dispute was also cautious in the hopes of avoiding entanglement with Soviet Russia. The Kremlin had so far refrained from active intervention in China, but the Foreign Office did not believe that they would be indifferent to political developments there. The danger of a Russo-American conflict in China through each backing a different faction always existed. In addition, the British Embassy in China was very pessimistic about any peaceful agreement between the KMT and the Communists. In its view, neither trusted the other. Chiang Kai-shek was unwilling to make any compromises; so there was no real basis for a permanent political settlement. In these circumstances, London was reluctant to be involved in China and was cool to American mediation efforts. As the British did not want a civil war in China, the Foreign Office was compelled to lean more on the United States to safeguard British interests there. The United States was, indeed, the only nation which possessed the power to promote unification in China. Moreover, General Marshall was far better qualified than his predecessor, General Hurley, for the job. Britain’s decision not to supply any arms to Chiang Kai-shek following the outbreak of the civil war was made for the purpose of helping the State Department to put pressure on Chiang to come to an accommodation with the Communists. From the end of 1948 when the Communist victory became certain, the importance of the British commercial and industrial presence within China prompted the British government to adopt the policy of “keeping a foot in the door”. British determination to remain in Communist China was quite understandable. Britain’s property and investments were considerable and far larger than those of any other foreign power in China. They had been established for a long time and, once abandoned, could never be restored. The Foreign Office no longer held illusions about the genuine nature of the Chinese Communist Party. It was strongly felt that the Chinese Communists would certainly follow the recognized orthodox Communist patterns in their dealings with Western interests. British interests would thus eventually be expropriated and British businessmen forced out. On the other hand, officials both in the Embassy and in the Foreign Office agreed that things might be different at the beginning. During their initial control, it was thought, the Communists would have to make some compromise as economic and financial difficulties confronting them would be very great. The foreign businesses might therefore be able to continue for some time and their position might even be improved. The Foreign Office’s estimation of the 169

likely Chinese Communist attitude towards foreign interests at the start of their rule was, however, over-optimistic. In the event, British firms were forced to close down due to difficulties arising from Communist policy. British merchants had to hand over their assets in order to pay tax. The anti-imperialist sentiment amongst the Communist leadership was very high at that time. After the establishment of the Communist government in Peking, the need to protect British business interests was one of the major reasons for London to accord recognition to it. In the absence of diplomatic relations, the new authorities refused to deal with the remaining British repres­ entatives in their official capacity. All attempts made by the British government to establish informal relations, including de facto recognition of Peking, were in vain. While economic considerations remained central in the British government’s China policy throughout the post-war period, from 1946 Britain’s political interests in China became increasingly important. This was largely the result of Cold War developments in the world. The deterioration of East-West relations in Europe inevitably influenced London’s views on the power struggle in China. The Foreign Office no longer believed that the Russians would be willing to have a Chinese coalition government under American influence. The Chinese Communists’ refusal to enter into a coalition government offered by the KMT in November 1946 was, in British eyes, clear evidence that they were receiving Soviet instructions. The Chinese Communists were therefore definitely orthodox communists and were serving Russian interests. Viewed in retrospect, it is clear that the Foreign Office corrected its misconception of the real nature of the CCP, but ignored the strength of nationalistic feeling in the Party. In fact, the Communists in China were and still are both Communists and Nationalists. The change in officials’ views on the Chinese Communists and the increasing fear for Soviet expansion had an important impact on Britain’s overall China policy. As the Communists were unacceptable, the KM T became the only alternative in China and therefore must be supported. British diplomacy was directed to oppose any Russian intentions to interfere in China. Yet Stalin, on his part, did not seem to want to provide material support to his Chinese comrades. He probably feared a m ilitary conflict with the Americans. He may also have distrusted Mao’s loyalty and therefore been doubtful whether the emergence of a strong Communist neighbour was in Soviet interests. The Russians were thus cautious. To prevent the Communists from coming to power in China was, however, far beyond Britain’s capacity. At that time, the British were, in fact, pulling out of Greece and Turkey. They became dependent, and placed their hopes on the United States maintaining their interests in China. 170

Arguably, during the post-war period, London had the least influence on American China policy. The Americans were particularly sensitive over discussing their policy in China with Britain. The Foreign Office, on its part, exaggerated American interests there and mistakenly believed that Washington would not be willing to see a Russian-influenced China. In 1949, the importance of Hong Kong’s political position increased. More significant than its role as a trade centre, it was now regarded as a symbol of the resistance of the rest of Asia to Communist encroachment. Unless British determination and ability to resist the threat to the colony was displayed, the whole common front against Communism in the region was likely to crumble. This consideration led the British government’s decision to defend the colony in face of the Communist threat. Britain sent substantial military reinforcements there during the summer of 1949. With the complete conquest of the whole country by the Communist army and the establishment of the central Communist government in Peking on 1 October 1949, London’s political interests in China became as significant as the economic ones. A communist China dominated by Moscow would seriously threaten Britain’s position in the whole of the Far East. British policy aimed therefore at preventing a Russian domination of China. Mao Tse-tung had openly proclaimed the policy of “leaning to one side”, but officials in the Foreign Office predicted that in due course friction might develop between the Russians and the Chinese, so every attempt should be made to encourage developments in this direction. Recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations with Peking, in Bevin’s view, offered the only hope to achieve this goal. This argument, without doubt, was sound but the British action of recognition had little effect on the Chinese Communist leadership. Britain’s policy of seeking to establish diplomatic relations with the new Communist regime would have been feasible if Washington and Peking had not become hostile. Sino-American estrangement deepened in 1950, when the United States government ordered the withdrawal of all its officials from China. As they retreated, the Americans appeared to be unwilling to see relations between Britain and China established. There seemed to be real differences between the two allies in their response to the Chinese Communist victory. A careful study of the British Foreign Office records on discussions with State Department officials shows that the White House itself was the victim of the strong proChiang Kai-shek Congress controlled by the opposition Republican Party, who demanded that the administration should take a hard line with Peking. For the above reasons, as conditions for its agreement to establish diplomatic relations with China during the first half of 1950, the United States government put constant pressure on London not to meet Peking’s demands over the issue of 70 aircraft in Hong Kong and the question of the Chinese representation in the United Nations. 171

Britain could not risk alienating the United States, on which its economic well-being and national security depended. The Korean War intensified the Cold War. In the event, it took twenty-two years for Britain and China to establish full diplomatic relations. To conclude, the Chinese policy of the British government in the period 1945 to 1950 was formulated on the basis of the need to maintain its long-standing commercial interests in the country. In the first post­ war years, Britain relied on the traditional methods to try to restore its trading position. The outbreak of the civil war in China and the Cold W ar developments in the world in 1946 prompted the Foreign Office to change its old mentality. From 1946 to 1948, Britain wanted the United States to protect its interests. In 1949 and 1950, British diplomacy aimed at reaching an accommodation with China’s new authorities, hoping to maintain their interests as long as possible. Behind these major policy­ shaping factors - the vital British economic interests, the increasing Cold W ar polarisation and the influence of the United States - there was another underlying factor which left its mark on British actions throughout this period - the irreversible decline of British power. Britain had clear aims in China but had no power to achieve them.

172

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Barnet, A. Doak, Communist China: The Early Years 1949-55. London, 1964. — China on the Eve of Communist Takeover. New York, 1968. Bartlett, C. J., British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century. London, 1989. Beloff, Max., Soviet Policy in the Far East, 1944-1951. London, 1953. Bianco, L., Origins o f the Chinese Revolution, 1915-1949. Stanford, 1971. Blum, R. M., Drawing the Line: The Origins of the American Containment Policy in East Asia. New York, 1982. Boardman, R., Britain and the People's Republic of China 1949-74. London, 1976. Boardman, R. and Groom, A. J. R., The Management o f Britain's External Relations. London, 1973. Bonavia, D., Hong Kong 1997: The Final Settlement. Bromley, 1985. Borg, D. and Heinrich, W., Uncertain Year: Chinese-American Relations 1947-50. New York, 1980. Brandt, Conrad, Stalin's Failure in China 1924-1927. Cambridge, 1958. Brook, David, The U.N. and the China Dilemma. New York, 1956. Cairncross, A., Years o f Recovery: British Economic Policy 1945-51. London, 1985. Calvocoressi, P., Survey o f International Affairs 1949-1950. Oxford, 1953. Chassin, L. M., The Communist Conquest of China. Cambridge. Mass., 1965. Ch’en J., Mao and the Chinese Revolution. Oxford, 1965. — China and the West: Society and Culture 1815-1937. London, 1979. Clifford, N. R., Retreat from China British Foreign Policy in the Far East. London, 1967. Clubb, O. E., China and Russia: The “Great Game". New York, 1971. — 20th Century China. New York, 1964. Coates, P. D., The China Consuls. Oxford, 1988. Cohen, W. I., America's Response to China: A n Interpretative History o f Sino-American Relations. New York, 1971. Cole, G. D. E., The Post-War Condition of Britain. London, 1956. Connell, J., The 'Office', A Study of British Foreign Policy and its Makers. London, 1958. Crozier, Brian, The M an Who Lost China. London, 1976. Davies, J. P., Dragon by the Tail: American, British, Japanese and Russian Encounters with China and One Another. New York, 1972. Dilks, D. ed., Retreat from Power: Studies in Britain's Foreign Policy o f the Twentieth Century. Vol I & II. London, 1981. Earl, L., Yangtse Incident, London, 1950, 1980. Eatwell, R., The 1945-1951 Labour Governments. London, 1979. Edmonds, R., Setting the Mould: The United States and Britain 1945-1950. Oxford, 1986. Endacott, G. B., A History of Hong Kong. Hong Kong, 1964. 176

Endicoff, S. L., Diplomacy and Enterprise: British China Policy, 1933-1937. Manchester, 1975. Fairbank. J. K., The United States and China. London, 1976. Fairbank, J. K. and Reischauer, E., China: Tradition and Transformation. Sydney, 1979. Fang, P.J. and L. G.J., Zhou Enlai - A Profile. Peking, 1986. Feis, Herbert, From Trust to Terror: The Outset of the Cold War 1945-1950. New York, 1970. Feuerwerker, Alert, The Chinese Economy 1912-1949. New York, 1968. Fisher, W. R., The End of Extraterritoriality in China. Berkeley, 1962. Fitzsimons, Ma. A., The Foreign Policy o f the British Labour Government 1945-1951. Indiana, 1953. Foot, R., The Wrong War: American policy and the dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 1950-53. Ithaca, 1986. Forman, Harrison, Report from Red China. New York, 1945. Frankel, Joseph, British Foreign Policy 1945-73. London, 1975. — The Making of Foreign Policy. London, 1963. Franks, Sir Oliver, Britain and the Tide o f World Affairs. London, 1955. Friedman, I. S., British Relations with China 1931-39. New York, 1940. Gaddis, J. L., The United Sates and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947. New York, 1972. Garver, J. W., Chinese-Soviet Relations 1937-1945. London, 1988. Gillen, Donald, History of the Chinese Civil War 1945-50. New York, 1972. Gittings, J., The World and China 1922-72. London, 1974. Goldsworthy, D., Colonial Issues in British Politics 1945-1961: From ‘Colonial Development' to 'W ind o f Change'. London, 1971. Guillermaz, J., A History of the Chinese Communist Parly 1921-1949. trans. London, 1972. Gull, E. M., British Economic Interests in the Far East. London, 1943. Harrison, J. P., The Long March to Power: A History of the Chinese Communist Party 1921-72. London, 1972. Hathaway, R. W., Ambiguous Partnership: Britain and America 1944-1947. New York, 1981. Hooper, B., China Stands Up: Ending The Western Pressure, 1948-1950. Sydney, 1986. Hou, C., Foreign Investment and Economic Development in China 1840-1937. Cambridge. Mass., 1965. Hsu, I. C. Y ., The Rise of Modem China. New York, 1975. Hu, Chiao-mo, The Thirty Years of the Chinese Communist Party. Peking, 1951. Hu, S., Imperialism and Chinese Politics. Peking, 1981. Hudson, G. F., Questions of East and West. London, 1953. Hughes, T. J. and Luard, D. E. T ., The Economic Development of Communist China 1949-1960. London, 1966. 177

Iriye, A., The Cold War in Asia: a historical introduction. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1974. Jain, J. P., China in World Politics A Study of Sino-British Relations 1949-1975. New Delhi, 1976. Jiang, A. X., The United States and China. Chicago, 1988. Kennedy, P., The Realities Behind Diplomacy Background Influences on British External Policy 1865-1980. London, 1981. Kiernan, E. Victor, British Diplomacy in China 1885-1970. London, 1970. Kubek, Anthony, How the Far East was Lost. Chicago, 1963. Lafeber, W., America, Russia and the Cold War, 1945-1966. New York, 1976. Lauterpacht, H., Recognition in International Law. London, 1947. Lee, B. A., Britain and the Sino-Japanese War 1937-1939 A Study in the Dilemmas o f British Decline. Oxford, 1973. Leifer, Michael ed., Constraints and Adjustments in British Foreign Policy. London, 1972. Li, Shi-an, Anglo-Chinese Relations During Sir Horace Seymour Embassy in China 1942-7. Ph.D thesis, Birmingham University, 1989. Lieberthal, K. G., Revolution and Tradition in Tientsin 1949-1952. Stanford, 1980. Lindsay, M., China and the Cold War. Melbourne, 1955. Loh, P. ed., The Kuomintang Debacle o f 1949: Conquest or Collapse? Boston, 1965. Louis, Wm. R., British Strategy in the Far East 1919-1939. New York, 1971. — Imperialism at Bay. Oxford, 1977. Lowe, Peter, Great Britain and Japan 1911-15. London, 1969. — Britain in the Far East: a survey from 1819 to the present. London, 1981. — The Origins o f the Korean War. London, 1986. Luard, Evan, Britain and China. London, 1962. — ed., Cold War A Reappraisal. London, 1964. McLane, C. B., Soviet Policy and the Chinese Communists 1931-1946. New York, 1958. Martin, Edwin W., Divided Counsel. Kentucky, 1986. May, Ernest, The Truman Administration and China 1945-4 9. New York, 1975. Meddicott, W. N., British Foreign Policy Since Versailles, 1919-1963. London, 1968. Moore, Harriet, L., Soviet Far Eastern Policy 1931-1945. Princeton, 1945. Morgan, Kenneth, Labour in Power 1945-1951. Oxford, 1984. Nagai, Y. and Iriye, A. eds., The Origins of the Cold War in Asia. New York, 1977. Newman, R. P ., Recognition of Communist China? A Study in Argument. London, 1961. 178

Nicholas, H. G., Britain and the United States. Chicago, 1975. North, Robert, Moscow and Chinese Communists. Stanford, 1953. Northege, F. S., Descent from Power: British Foreign Policy 1945-1973. London, 1974. Oliver, A. S. B., Outline o f British Policy in East and Southeast Asia 1945 May 1950. London, 1950. Overdale, R., The English-Speaking Alliance: Britain, the US, the Dominions and the Cold War, 1945-51. London, 1985. — The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Governments, 1945-1951. Leicester, 1984. Pelcorits, N. A., Old China Hands and the Foreign Office. New York, 1948. Pelling, H., The Labour Governments, 1945-51. London, 1984. Pepper, S., Civil War in China: The Political Struggle, 1945-1949. Berkeley, 1978. Porter, B., Britain and the Rise of Communist China, A Study of British Attitudes 1945-54. London, 1967. Pratt, S ir J. T., War and Politics in China. London, 1943, 1971. — China and Britain. London, 1946. Purcell, V., The Chinese in Southeast Asia. (2nd ed.) London, 1965. Quested, R. K. I., Sino-Russian Relations A Short History. Sydney, 1984. Reardon-Anderson, J., Yenan and the Great Powers: the Origin of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, 1944-46. New York, 1979. Rothwell, V H., Britain and the Cold War 1941-1947. London, 1982. Schaller, M., The U.S. Crusade in China 1938-1945. New York, 1979. Schram, S., Mao Tse-tung. Harmondsworth, 1967. Schwartz, B. L, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao. Cambridge, Mass., 1979. Shai, A., Britain and China 1941-47: Imperial Momentum. London, 1984. Shaw, M., International Law. London, 1977. Shed, A. and Cook, C., Post-War Britain: A Political History. Brighton, Sussex, 1979. Shewmaker, K. E., Americans and Chinese Communists 1927-1945. New York, 1971. Shlaim, A., Jones, P., and Sainsbury, K., British Foreign Secretaries Since 1945. Newton Abbot, 1977. Snow, Edgar, Red Star Over China. New York, 1944. Stein, Gunther, The Challenge of Red China. New York, 1945. Strang, Lord, The Foreign Office. London, 1955. — The Diplomatic Career. London, 1962. Stremski, R., The Shaping of British Policy During the Nationalist Revolution in China. Taibei, 1979. Taylor, A. J. P ., English History 1914-1945. Oxford, 1965. Teichman, Sir Eric, Affairs of China. London, 1938. Thorne, C., Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain and the War against 179

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II.

ARTICLES A N D ESSAYS

Adamthwaite, Anthony, ‘Britain and the World, 1945-49, the View from the Foreign Office’, International Affairs, Vol. 61. 1985, pp. 223-235. Attlee, C. R., ‘Britain and America’, Foreign Affairs, Jan 1954. Chen, T , Hsi-en, ‘Relations between Britain and Communist China’, Current History, 23, 1952, pp. 295-303. Collar, H. J., ‘British Commercial Relations with China’, International Affairs, Oct. 1953, pp. 418-428. Dewar, George A. B., ‘Britain’s Recognition of the Soviet Government’, Foreign Affairs, Dec. 1924, pp. 313-319. Gherson, Randolph, ‘British Recognition of China: Some Issues Examined’ The New Commonwealth, Mar. 1950, pp. 262-263. Gibson, Tony, ‘Second Thoughts on the British Recognition of China’, Eastern World, August-September 1950, pp. 20-21. Hudson, G. F., ‘W ill Britain and America Split in Asia?’, Foreign Affairs, July 1953. 180

Murthy, W. V. F , ‘U.S., G.B., India, Recognition of China’, Indian Journal of Political Science 20, Apr-June 1959. Ovendale, R., ‘Britain, the United States and the Recognition of Communist China’, Historical Journal, Vol. 261, 1983, pp. 139-158. — ‘Britain, the United States, and the Cold W ar in Southeast Asia, 1949-1950’ International Affairs, Vol. 58, 1982. Smith, R. and Zametica J., ‘The Cold War Warrior, Clement Attlee reconsidered 1945-47’, International Affairs, Vol. 61, Spring 1985. Wolf, David C., “‘To Secure a Convenience’: Britain Recognizes China - 1950”, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 18, 1983, pp. 299-328.

181

Index on American China policy 126 on the C C P 129,130 talks with Acheson on recognition 132, 133, 140, 144, 149-50, 152,158 on nationalist blockade 127-128, 160-162 on recognition 113,133-134 on question o f Chinese representative in U N 145 on policy towards PRC 149-153 Bidault, Georges 80 Board of Trade 4 7 ,1 0 3 ,1 6 0 Bohemia 96 Bolshevik , The 76 Brenan, Sir John 16 Brind, Sir Patrick 116 Britain war help to China 13 decline 14 interests in China 14—15, 167, 170 post-war situation in 31 shipping interests 42-43, 49n attitudes towards the Chinese civil war 9 4 ,1 6 9 ,1 0 1 ,1 1 5 ,1 2 5 British American Tobacco Company (BAT) 102 British Chamber of Commerce, Shanghai 101, 104, 123, 131, 157 British Chungking (later Nanking) Embassy 19, 44, 45, 46, 48n on Marshall 65 on Chinese Communism 74, 95 discontent with the K M T 92 on the likely attitudes of the CCP to foreign interests 96,101,115 British Council 76 British government 9, 19, 27, 31, 34 attitudes towards H ong K ong 36, 37,38, 39, 43, 117-122,44 China policy 47,1 0 0 ,1 6 7 attitudes towards K M T -C C P conflict 60-63, 69, 91

Acheson, Dean 121,129 attitude towards recognition of China 134-135, 151, 152, 154, 162 Admiralty 46 ,1 1 6 ,1 2 4 Afghanistan 134 Alexander, A. V. on the defence of H ong Kong 117-119 visiting H ong Kong 122, 136n American London Embassy 20 American Moscow Embassy on Soviet Far Eastern policy 21 A m e th y s t incident 116-117, 131 A nglo-Chinese Treaty, 1943 13, 36, 4 3 ,4 5 ,9 2 , 167 Anglo-Japanese alliance 11-12 A rthur 65 Attlee, Clem ent 25, 38, 86, 90, 111, 115 o n H o n g Kong 119,121,125,130, 1 5 5 ,165n Australia 121, 133 Band, W illiam 52 B a o Dai 133,134 Barclay, Sir Roderick on Bevin 25 Barr, Gen. David 98 Beckett, Sir E. on recognition 112 Bevin, E rnest 25-26 on trade with China 31, 34-3 5 on H ong Kong 39, 40, 53,55 at Moscow Conference, 1945 62 against supplying weapons to the K M T 68-69 at Moscow Conference, 1947 79-80, 84 talks with M arshall 86 attitudes towards the Chinese civil war 8 9 ,1 0 1 ,1 0 6 ,1 1 3 ,1 1 7 on defence of H ong Kong 119-122

183

attitudes towards American policy 65,68, 69,81,126, 86, 90 response to the Com m unist victory 105-106, 117, 148, 153 attitudes towards the K M T 167 British Moscow Embassy on Soviet press 20 on Sino-Russian friction 141 British Pacific Fleet 46 Britain’s Tokyo Embassy 12 British W ashington Embassy 22, 125, 145, 161 Bryan, H . D. on American policy in China 64 Bukit Serene Conference 131-132 Bulgaria 91 Burdett, S. L. 95-96 Burgess, Guy, at Foreign Office 26-27, 102 Burma 120, 140 Butler, Neville 85 Byrnes, James 62, 68, 81

Chang H an-fu meets foreign business representatives 123-124 negotiation w ith H utchison 142, 151-152 Chen Yi 124 C heng Tian-hsi 134 Chennault, Claire 147 Chiang K ai-shek 13 on the C om m unists 16-19,61, 66-67, 97 on H ong K ong 40-42 against British interests 45, 51, 57, 58, 63, 64, 68, 73 against Soviet intervention 79, 84, 89, 97, 98, 106, 129, 162, 168, 169 Chiefs of Staff 12, 117 China Association 14 and British properties 32 on H ong K ong 39; on N ationalist blockade 125, 101, 131, 156, 160 Chinese Cam paign C om m ittee 90 Chinese C om m unist P arty 9, 10, 12, 15, 16 favourable reports about 52, 65, 67, 73, 74, 76, 82 army 85, 89 attitudes towards form er British representatives 112 policy towards foreign interests 123, 129, 141, 170 Chinese N ationalist governm ent 9, 1 2 ,2 7 ,3 3 attitudes towards H o n g K ong 36, 40, 4 3 ,5 2 ,5 3 military force 67 economic difficulties 81 military situation 94, 92, 99, 115 attitudes towards British interests 167 Chinese People’s Political Council 17 Chou En-lai 17, 67, 76, 77, 127, 129, 139, 143, 147 Chungking 17, 6 1 ,6 5 , 76 Churchill, Sir W in sto n 25 on H ong K ong 37-38

Cabinet 26, 69, 101 on policy towards Com m unist China 105 on policy towards H o n g Kong 119-120, 122, 135n on recognition 113,130,133,106, 111, 118, 126, 127, 128, 148, 149, 154 on negotiations with Peking 151 China and South E ast Asia Com m ittee 117, 125 Defence Com mittee 117 Far Eastern (Official) Com m ittee 26, 120 Overseas Reconstruction Committee 24 Campbell, Sir R. 62 Canton 34,92,115 Central Peoples government, PRC response to British recognition 139-140, 142 policy towards foreign interests 157 Ceylon 134, 150 Chamberlain, Neville 13

184

Finland 134 Fitzgerald, C. P. 129 Foot, Michael 25 Foreign Office on British interests in China 15 on the strength of the C C P 18,21 concerns about US monopoly influence in China 22 debate about China policy 23-24 role in making policy 26, 111 on the K M T governm ent 33, 32, 3 5 ,3 6 ,3 7 on Chinese nationalism 45 misunderstanding o f the nature of the C C P 53,57 discussion on British attitudes towards the Chinese internal conflict 59-61, 81-82 criticizing the K M T 63, 168 reaction to M arshall’s mission 64-65 on Soviet China policy 66 on the effect of the Chinese civil war on British interests 67-68 supporting the US China policy 69, 83 against Soviet intervention in China 78-80 on the position o f the K M T regime 85 and pro-C C P activities in Parliam ent 90-91 comparing the K M T with the C C P 91 suggesting de facto relations with the C C P 97 on the C C P 102,168 making “stay pu t” policy 102-104 on recognition 112-13,127-129, 130 Formosa 129 France 106, 113, 133,146 Franklin, A. A. E. on the position o f the K M T 94 on Chinese peasant’s interests 95,

against China’s intervention in India 57-58 on America’s China policy 70n on recognition 131, 168 C hu Teh 51 Clark-K err, Sir Archibald (Lord Inverchapel) on the C C P 53, 69n, 81, 83 Clarke, Ashley on Chinese Com m unism 54 proposing British m ediation for Chinese unification 57 Coates, P. D. 26, 97, 100 on trade with the Communists 103 Colonial Office on the role of H ong K ong 38 on accepting Japanese surrender in H o n g Kong 4 2 ,3 9 ,4 3 C oulson,J. E. 23 Creech-Jones, A rthur 111, 122 Cripps, Sir Stafford 111 Crossman, Richard 25 Cuba 146 Czechoslovakia 90, 106

D airen 65 D ening, Esler 26, 69, 80 on US policy in China 84, 85 on Britain’s attitudes towards the Communists 93 suggesting withdrawal of support from the K M T 100 on Com m unists’ difficulties 103-104 on recognition 113,120,132 on Peking’s relations with M oscow 152, 155, 162 D enm ark 134 Douglas, Lewis 129

Econom ist , The

19 Ecuador 146 Eden, Anthony 18, 25 at M alta Conference 59 on recognition 149 E gypt 146

102 on Peking’s attitudes towards Britain 140

185

about Chinese attitudes 153, 157, 158 Franks, Sir Oliver 100, 133 on voting in U N 146 on Anglo-American relations 154, 162 Fraser, G en. Bruce 46

India 76, 104, 120, 133, 134, 146, 150, 153 Ismay, Gen. H . L. 41 Israel 134 Japan 1 2 ,3 3 ,4 5 ,5 1 ,6 5 , 104, 167 Jessup, Philip 162

G erm any 120 Graham, W. G. 121,128,139,140 G rantham , Sir Alexander 113-114, 132, 147 Greece 76, 86, 91

Kitson, G. V. 2 6 ,3 3 ,3 4 on the C C P 4 5 -4 7 ,5 7 ,7 5 praising the C C P 53 on the difference between the C C P and the K M T 55-56 criticizing the US policy 64 on Soviet intentions in C hina 65, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 84 against selling arms to C hina 86 Koo, Dr. W ellington 42 Korean W ar 139, 155, 162 Kuomintang 12, 15, 16, 17, 52, 54, 64, 82, 85, 142 Kwei Yung-ching 68

H all-Patch, E. L. 24, 30n on US businessmen in China 36 H ankow 12,44,123 H arcourt, C. H .J. 42 H arm on, G ardon 75 H enderson, J. T. 21,61 H o C h i M inh 141 H ong K ong 9 ,1 1 ,3 1 history o f 36, 38, 39, 40,42, 47, 6 1 ,6 7 ,1 0 1 , 104, 105, 111, 113, 114 defence of 117-122, 136n , 132, 133, 134, 142, 143, 147, 150, 154,167,168, 171 H ouse o f Commons 2 5,40,6 2 , 80, 89, 9 4 ,1 0 6 ,1 1 6 , 117,130, 131, 153, 162 H ouse of Lords 79, 81 H udson, G. F on Chinese civil conflict 15, 16, 18-19 on Soviet intentions in China 21, 29n on Chinese Com m unism 54, 56 H ungary 96 Hurley, Patrick J. 17,22 visit to L ondon 38, 61, 64,169 Hutchison, John 47, 139, 142 on negotiation with Peking 141, 144 talks with Chang H an-fu 148 on Peking’s attitude 153 on Chinese nationalism 158

Labour Party 25, 30n, 38, 39 Lamb, Leo 34 discontent with the K M T 92 report on a tour of north China 95 on measures for protecting British interests 96-97 suggesting a new China policy 99 on the likely Com m unist policy towards foreign interests 101, 163 Laski, H arold 25 Liberation D aily

76

Li Chi-shen 107n Lindsay, Lord 79, 81, 86, 90 Lindsay, Michael 52, 57, 90 L i Tsung-jen 113 Lovett, R obert 100 MacArthur, Gen. Douglas 40 M acDonald, Malcolm 119 against recognition of C hina 130, 132 Malaya 120, 143 M anchester G uardian 131, 149

186

People’s Republic o f China 26, 127, 128 Poland 96,103 P o rt A rthur 65 Prideaux-Brune, Sir H . 19 on British m ediation in C hina 59

M anchuria 16, 20, 21, 51, 65, 66, 84, 85, 89, 94, 98, 101 Mansfield, Mike 78 Mao Tse-tung 17, 29n, 54, 55, 61, 67 on US policy in China 75, 76, 114 on A m eth yst incident 116,123,141 on the W estern imperialists 143-144,168, 171 Marshall, George C. 64, 66, 67, 79, 80, 81, 83, 85 on the Chinese Communist problem 84 talks with Bevin 86, 100, 169 M artin, Kingsley 25 McNeil, H ector 90 talks with Marshall 100, 125 Mitchell, G. E. 32 Molotov, V. M. at Moscow Conference, 1945 62 at Moscow Conference, 1947 79-80 Moscow Declaration of December 1945 62-63 Mossop, Sir Allan 32 M ountbatten, Lord Louis 26 Mukden 9 7 ,9 9 ,1 1 1 ,1 1 2 ,1 1 5

Raworth, A. B. 37 Rees-Williams, D . R. 132 Roberts, Frank on Soviet attitudes towards C hina 20

on Soviet C om m unism 73 Roosevelt, Franklin D . 1 7,59 Rundall, F. B. A. 83 Russia (USSR) 15 criticism o f the K M T 2 0 -2 1 ,3 3 China policy 56, 65-66 attitudes towards the K M T -C C P conflict 62, 76, 79-80, 54, 73, 78, 87 recognising the PR C 127, 105, 134,144,146 Sargent, Sir O rm e 35, 84, 86, 112 Scarlett, P.W . 26, 86, 99, 113 Schuman, R obert 152 Scott, A. L. 2 1 ,2 6 ,5 4 against foreign intervention in China 59, 76 on the C C P 77 on the Chinese governm ent 78, 83, 84, 85, 86, 91, 92 on Embassy’s views of the C C P 93 on Com m unism 101 Sen, A. K. 141 Seymour, Sir H orace 13,15 on the unification o f China 18-19, 27 trip to Shanghai 33 on H ong K ong 36-37, 41, 38,42, 44 on the C C P 52,53 on Chinese C om m unism 57 on the British position in China 58 on foreign intervention 60 relations w ith H urley 61 talks with C hiang Kai-shek 61,63 on M arshall’s mission 64, 65

N ationalist blockade 124-126, 156, 160 N ehru, Jawaharlal 121, 134 New China News Agency on British recognition 143 on Bevin’s speech in the Commons 153 N ews Chronicle N ew Statesm an

57

25 New Zealand 121,133 Noel-Baker, Philip 42, 111, 132 Norway 134, 146 O uter Mongolia

65

Pakistan 104, 150 Paris Peace Conference, 1946 68 Peking 5 1 ,7 5 ,9 4 ,9 7 ,9 8 ,1 1 2 ,1 1 5 , 116, 127 People's D aily 153 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 89, 98, 116, 117 187

Strong, Anne Louise 75,90 Stuart, Dr. Jo h n Leighton 28, 79, 80, 98, 116 Sun Yat-sen 12, 55, 56 Sweden, 134 Switzerland, 134

Shanghai 12, 33, 47, 76, 99, 101, 103, 116,123 blockade 124—125, 160 Siam 94, 120 Singapore 131 Sino-Am erican C om m ercial Treaty 45 Sino-Soviet Treaty, 1945 56,65 Soong, Dr. T. V. 31, 44, 81 South Africa 121 Spain 112 Stalin, Joseph and the C hinese Com m unists 66 policy towards the C C P 170 Stein, G unther 52, 57 Sterndale-Bennett, J. C. on Russian intentions in China 20,32 on C hina’s intentions in H ong Kong 41 and the C C P 5 1 ,5 5 suggesting British intervention in China 58, 60, 59, 61 at Decem ber 1945 M oscow Conference 62 Stettinius, Edward, at M alta Conference 59 Stevenson, Sir R alph 26 first impression o f the Chinese people 2 7 ,3 5 ,4 4 first talk with C hiang Kai-shek 66 , 68 on the C C P 7 4 - 7 5, 82-83, 78, 79, 80, 81 comparing the K M T with the C C P 93 proposing de fa c to relations with the C C P 9 7 ,9 6 on trade with th e Com m unists 104, 115, 123, 125,132 meets C hang H an -fu 124 on recognition 128, 129 Stillwell, Joseph 17 Strang, Sir W illiam on A nglo-A m erican different interests in C hina 115 and N ationalist blockade 125 on recognition 130

T a K o n g Pao 39 Teichman, Sir Eric on C hina’s foreign policy 22 about the C C P 53 T h re e Peoples Principles 70n T ientsin 33, 51, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 102, 111, 112, 123, 140 Tim es, The 57, 64, 77, 98, 149 T ito , M arshal 144 Treasury 23, 24, 47, 160 Trum an, H arry S. and H ong K ong 40, 41, 64, 84, 145, 162 Tsiang T ing-fu 146 Tyrrell, G erald 34

U nited N ations 45, 92, 100, 116, 121, 133, 142, 143, 146 U nited N ations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) 44,77 U nited States attitudes towards the Chinese civil divisions 17 as a rival o f Britain in China 22 transporting K M T ’s troops 51 C hina policy 64, 84, 125-126, 35, 60, 78, 87 policy towards the Chinese civil war 6 9 ,8 3 ,9 2 ,9 9 ,1 0 0 ,1 0 4 , 106, 113, 120 attitudes towards Hong Kong 121 and the K M T blockade 125 attitudes towards the PRC 132 and 70 aircraft in H ong Kong 147-148, 162,169 U rquhart, Sir Robert 102 meets C hang Han-fu 123, 157 Vallat, F. A. 126 Vernon,W. praising the C C P

188

89

Vietnam 141 Vincent, John C arter

Wedemeyer, Gen. Albert C. 81

84

Yenan 17, 52, 55, 56, 74, 75, 168 Yingkou 102 Younger, K enneth 151 on voting policy in U N 154—155 on the effect o f the Korean W ar 155 Yugoslavia 15, 27, 99, 101, 103, 146

Wallinger, Geoffrey 19,33-34 on the Chinese civil war 66 W ang Shih-Chieh 44 W ar Cabinet Far Eastern (O) Com m ittee 14, 23, 39

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