British Enterprise in Nigeria [Reprint 2016 ed.] 9781512815306

Table of contents :
Preface
Contents
Introduction
I. The Genesis of British Interest in Nigeria
II. The Making of Southern Nigeria
III. The Royal Niger Company
IV. International Rivalry
V. The Pacification of Northern Nigeria
VI. Amalgamation and Unification
VII. Economic Development
VIII. Modern Nigeria
Conclusions
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

BRITISH ENTERPRISE IN NIGERIA

BRITISH ENTERPRISE IN NIGERIA By Arthur N o r t o n Cook Professor of History Temple University

Philadelphia UNIVERSITY OF P E N N S Y L V A N I A

PRESS

London: Humphrey Milford: Oxford University Press 1943

Copyright UNIVERSITY Manufactured

OF

1943

PENNSYLVANIA

in the United

States of

PRESS America

To the memory

of

ARTHUR H. NORTON

PREFACE It is somewhat difficult to explain the lack of interest in African history by American scholars. T h e recently published hist of Doctoral Dissertations now in progress at Universities in the United, States and the Dominion of Canada (December 1940) discloses the fact that there are only eight studies in this field being undertaken at the present time. This fact alone would seem to justify the publication of a study dealing with the history of one of England's great colonies. But, surprising as it may appear, there has been comparatively little interest displayed by British historians in the same field. It is only in very recent years that much writing has been done by scholars trained in scientific methods of research. Excellent books have been produced by former Administrative O f ficers which are valuable contributions to our knowledge of African developments, but such books have their limitations and do not approach the problem from a detached point of view. T h e r e is a need, also, for more case studies of imperialism. Until very recently most of the publications dealing with this most significant movement were concerned with the theory of imperialism or with imperialism in general. Studies of particular colonies were lacking. T h e present volume would appear to be justified by two considerations. First, it is the only study of British activities in Nigeria that has been written by a foreigner and, while the author cannot claim to have discovered many facts that were unknown, he does write from a detached point of view. Second, this study supplies in a small measure the need for more case studies of the imperialistic process. T h e study was originally undertaken as a doctoral dissertation, but it seemed wise to expand it beyond the scope of such a project. T h e generosity of the Social Science Research Council made it possible for the author to spend a summer abroad to carry on research at the Colonial Office, the Public Record Office, the Britvii

vili

PREFACE

ish Museum, and the offices of the Niger Company. Since many of the men who made Nigeria are still living, this grant made it feasible for the author to secure interviews which provided much of the evidence upon which this study is based. T h e author was especially fortunate to have the opportunity to meet Lord Lugard, who was kind enough to answer many questions concerning his part in the making of Nigeria. In addition to L o r d Lugard, who was most helpful, the author was privileged to interview M r . H . S. Goldsmith, Lieutenant Governor of Northern Nigeria ( 1 9 1 7 - 1 9 2 1 ) , Sir Charles Orr, Sir Richmond Palmer, Sir George Tomlinson, Sir William N . M . Geary, and M r . William Heywood, Secretary of the Niger Company. Their knowledge of Nigerian affairs and their courtesy and kindness were not only greatly appreciated but added much of inestimable value to this study. Funds provided by President Robert L . Johnson and the Committee on Research and Publication of Temple University facilitated the publication of this book. I am especially indebted to M r . H . S. Goldsmith, who was untiring in his efforts to place material at my disposal. H e made it possible for me to interview many individuals active in Nigerian affairs; and, in addition, was kind enough to read the manuscript and give me the benefit of his intimate acquaintance with Nigeria. Since my return from England, he has helped me in many ways by forwarding additional material that otherwise would have escaped my attention. M y obligation to him is heavy indeed. Sir Charles Orr did a great deal to facilitate my research by giving me access to private papers in his possession, and was also kind enough to read an early draft of the manuscript. H i s criticism has been most helpful. Sir George Tomlinson was instrumental in placing the facilities of the Colonial Office Library at my disposal. H e was never too busy to give help whenever called upon. T h e Librarian at the Colonial Office, M r . Hunter, together with his most competent staff, were untiring in their efforts to aid in my research. Unfortunately the Library of the Royal Empire Society was being moved to new quarters, but the Librarian, M r . Evans Lewin, did his utmost to assist me and to make available whatever material he could. I was fortunate, also, to have several confer-

PREFACE

ix

enees with Miss Margery Perham, a leading authority on indirect rule. She was most generous in assisting me and was kind enough to read a portion of the manuscript. M r . William Heywood gave me access to the records of the Royal Niger Company and facilitated my studies in many other ways. M y debt to American scholars is also a heavy one. Professor William E . Lingelbach of the University of Pennsylvania has been most helpful throughout the progress of this study and, were it not for his constant encouragement, it is doubtful if it would have been completed. It was begun under his direction, and I have had the benefit of his wise counsel and guidance at all times. The late Professor Henry R. Shipman of Princeton University first aroused my interest in African history and did much to facilitate this study in its early stages. I owe much to his inspiration both as a teacher and as a friend. M y former colleague, Professor Walter Hall of Princeton University, helped me in the initial stages of this investigation. Professor Lowell Ragatz of George Washington University has been a real friend. H e was especially helpful in putting me into contact with individuals in England who have assisted me in my research. Dr. Gordon Brown of Temple University read the final draft of the manuscript. His experience as Superintendent of Education in Tanganyika and later as Government Anthropologist made his criticism of especial value. M r . Thomas D. McCormick of Temple University and Professor C. B. Realey of the University of Kansas read an early draft of the manuscript. I am deeply indebted, also, to the staff of the Sullivan Memorial Library which has assisted me in securing pertinent material. M y wife, Barbara R . Cook, and my daughter, Jane Louise Cook, assisted me with the preparation of the manuscript and with the proof. I wish to acknowledge my debt to all of these individuals and to many others who helped me so much. I absolve them from all responsibility for errors of fact, judgment, and interpretation. ARTHUR N. COOK Glenside, Pennsylvania December 1942

CONTENTS Chúfter

Page

PREFACE

VU

INTRODUCTION I

THE

I

GENESIS

OF

BRITISH

INTEREST

NIGERIA

IN 18

II

THE

MAKING OF SOUTHERN NIGERIA

48

III

THE

ROYAL N I G E R C O M P A N Y

79

IV

INTERNATIONAL

V

VI VII VIII

RIVALRY

T H E PACIFICATION NIGERIA AMALGAMATION ECONOMIC MODERN

AND

OF

NORTHERN 149

UNIFICATION

DEVELOPMENT

NIGERIA

I I 5

IÇO 212 242

CONCLUSIONS

274

BIBLIOGRAPHY

291

INDEX

32I

INTRODUCTION I t is a rather remarkable fact that Africa was the last great continent to be drawn into the stream of world politics, since it had been the home of an ancient civilization, while its northern coast had been an integral part of the Roman Empire. It was well situated with respect to the other continental areas as well as to the more important bodies of water. But geographical influences have been unfavorable for the most part and, as a consequence, it was not until late in the nineteenth century that European influence became a dynamic factor in African development. T h e climate of Africa has a bad reputation that is not altogether deserved since the Mediterranean type of climate which prevails in the north and the extreme south is quite suitable for Europeans. But the great trade-wind deserts—the Sahara and the Kalihari—together with the steaming jungles of the equatorial and sub-equatorial regions, which are modified to some extent by great highland areas, make the continent as a whole unattractive to whites. Climatic conditions along much of the coast are especially vicious. A heavy toll of life and health was exacted in the early days, so it appeared to be a hopeless task to tame the wildest of the continents. T h e combination of towering mountains, burning deserts, and malarial swamps proved to be a formidable barrier, and it was difficult to gain a foothold on the coast. But the advent of improved means of travel, together with the discovery of effective methods to alleviate and control tropical disease, rendered the penetration of the interior feasible. 1 T h e regular coastline of the continent presented another formidable barrier. T h e West Coast in particular has not been fa1 L. C. A. Knowles, The Economic Development of the British Overseas Empire, (London, 1 9 2 8 ) , I, pp. 1 3 8 - 5 2 , 2 5 7 - 5 9 , gives an excellent analysis of these factors.

I

2

BRITISH ENTERPRISE IN NIGERIA

vored by geography and there are few natural harbors along its entire extent from Ceuta to Cape Town. Even the great rivers fail to provide good harbors and, with the possible exception of the Gambia and the Senegal, are blocked by sand bars or discharge into the sea through deltas which are almost impossible to penetrate. In proportion to its size, Africa has the shortest coastline of any of the continents. River systems have often served as the broad highways of imperialism and possess fundamental strategic value. African rivers have proved no exception but, because of their peculiar character, they have been of limited value. T h e Nile, of course, is navigable for hundreds of miles above the delta, but its upper course is blocked by a series of cataracts that impose a formidable barrier to expansion into the interior. T h e other great rivers of Africa—the Congo ; the Senegal ; the Niger ; the Orange; the Limpopo; and the Zambesi—are navigable only a short distance from the sea. Progress upstream is quickly interrupted by rapids and waterfalls where the stream leaves the high tableland—a prominent feature of African topography—so easy access to the rich drainage basin is blocked. Early exploration was greatly handicapped by this lack of easy access from the sea since travel, except by canoe, was impossible and many explorers lacked the hardihood to undertake the risks. It was not until light steamers were developed that African rivers became of much value as carriers of commerce, and even then the difficulties of navigating shallow streams, blocked frequently by shifting sand bars, placed serious limits upon their utility. Even so they were regarded as valuable prizes in the scramble to control Africa, and much of the history of the dark continent centers about the effort to seize and dominate its waterways. North Africa had intimate contact with Europe throughout historic time, but the wide Sahara barred the way to expansion southward. Caravan trails, it is true, furnished precarious contact with the Sudan and there is ample evidence to indicate that trading relations were established and maintained from very early times. Many commodities produced in Europe found their way into this interesting region while Negro slaves were always for

INTRODUCTION

3

sale in the markets of Algiers, Tripoli, and Tunis. The native culture of the Sudan borrowed many of its characteristic features from Europe, being carried along the caravan routes or seeping in by way of the Nile Valley. But however interesting these contacts may be historically, they meant little to Europe. The decline of the Roman Empire, together with the advent of the Mohammedan religion, broke the lines of contact extending across the Mediterranean, while the piratical states of North Africa waged almost constant warfare with Europe. The Crusades reawakened interest in the Mediterranean, helped to establish contacts with the East, and contributed indirectly to the eventual penetration of Africa. The rise of national states in western Europe ; the desire to tap the riches of the Indies ; the impulse given by scientific curiosity; and a yearning to strike a decisive blow in behalf of the "true faith" all combined to initiate a remarkable period of exploration, discovery, and trade which paved the way for political expansion into Africa. Portugal took the lead. Under the vigorous leadership of Prince Henry, progress was made toward the discovery of the sea route to the East, and even his death in 1460 did not halt the steady advance of Portuguese enterprise. The justly celebrated voyage of Vasco da Gama was the culmination of nearly a century of effort. The glamour of the Orient, plus the fact that da Gama's venture returned fabulous profits, acted as a magnet to attract Portuguese attention to the Indies, where a vast trading empire was speedily established. The decline of Portugal, together with the destruction of Spanish supremacy at sea, opened the way for other seafaring nations to follow in the wake of the Portuguese caravals. Although Africa was only a pawn in the game of world politics, it was not neglected altogether as adventurers from many lands skirted its inhospitable coast in search of gold and slaves. Gold was scarce, but slaves were plentiful and furnished the medium by which many a noble fortune was won. The plantations of the New World provided a ready market, and slavers drawn from many lands were eager to exploit it. The Dutch and the English took the lead in promoting this nefarious traffic and,

4

BRITISH ENTERPRISE IN NIGERIA

as a consequence, acquired many posts along the West African littoral. While the slave trade brought many Europeans into contact with Africa, it did not terminate in the annexation of territory. This business was entirely in private hands and, although rulers occasionally shared in the profits, governments were seldom called upon to protect the interests of their subjects. Forts were erected in many places to facilitate trade. European agents frequently spent years on the coast. But no country had a compelling interest in accepting political responsibility. Rivalry among the traders became intense during the seventeenth century ; trading posts frequently changed hands, but the contest remained within the realm of business and did not spring from a desire to control territory as such. T h e English, the French, and the Dutch were all heavily involved. Danes and Brandenburgers occasionally engaged in the competition and bear witness to the cosmopolitan character of the scramble. By the beginning of the eighteenth century several of the nations destined to participate in the fight for Africa were on the ground. They had tasted of the fruit of African adventure ; contacts had been made ; claims staked out ; knowledge had been gained; and appetites whetted. Africa was involved to some extent in the colonial wars of this bloody century when England took advantage of her sea power to seize the holdings of her rivals during the long struggle with Napoleon. In 1 8 1 5 , however, the tide of imperialism was ebbing, so the British were willing to return many of their conquests. Among these was the French base in Senegal, which served later as the springboard from which French enterprise in West Africa was launched. According to most authorities, interest in imperialism lagged throughout the greater part of the nineteenth century. This generalization may be true, but it should be noted in passing that wide areas were brought under the control of European states, especially England. The conquest of India was completed during this period ; Australia and New Zealand were settled ; many islands of the Pacific passed under the British flag j and, what is more important for our purpose, England extended her influence

INTRODUCTION

5

into many parts of Africa. T h i s may not have been the settled policy of the British Government, but it affords a splendid example of that "absence of m i n d " which has been so useful an instrument in the hands of empire builders. Interest in African exploration quickened after the close of the wars in 1 8 1 5 , and a cosmopolitan stream of explorers flowed through Africa. Scores of men from all nations risked their lives in the ardor of discovery to spread the contagion of the dark continent's fascination into many a land. Fat volumes, profusely illustrated in many cases, were among the fruits of their labors and served to stimulate the interest of rich and poor alike. Governments, scientific societies, business men, soldiers, diplomats, and missionaries began to catch the spirit of adventure, and Africa became the center of romantic and purposeful imagination. Not only did the work of these adventurers serve to arouse interest in Africa, but the horrors of the slave trade began to trouble the conscience of the European world. T h e Quakers were the first to protest against the traffic in human beings, and they did not protest in vain. B y 1 8 1 5 the civilized world was ready to outlaw the slave trade, so action was taken at the Congress of Vienna. It was one thing to prohibit but it was quite a different matter to enforce. T h e burden of enforcement fell to E n g l a n d and a tremendous effort was made to bring the slave trade to an end. It was difficult, however, to suppress the "bootleg" traffic in slaves by pursuing individual slavers on the high seas. T h e efforts at enforcement led finally to the establishment of political control over parts of the West Coast. T h e overseas trade was only one aspect of the problem. F r o m time immemorial A r a b slavers had raided central Africa for slaves, and the horrors of this practice were impressed upon the Christian world by the great Scotch missionary, D a v i d Livingstone. Cynical observers have doubted the genuineness of the revolt against the slave trade, but there seems little reason to question its effect in motivating the penetration of Africa. Armed force alone was equal to the task of suppressing the Arab raiders, but the use of force was certain to terminate in the establishment of political control.

6

BRITISH ENTERPRISE IN NIGERIA

Imperialism has attracted an increasing amount of attention in recent years, from historians who have become impressed with the fact that the ambitious effort of the great powers to bring Africa and Asia under their complete political, economic, and cultural control constitutes the most important movement of recent times. 2 T h e term itself is in bad repute. It has been used in so many ways that it has come to mean little to the careful scholar. Socialists, who have written voluminously on the subject, are inclined to associate it with almost everything which they dislike ; communists apply it to the historical epoch which they feel marks the last stage of a dying capitalism j patriots employ the terms as an epithet to describe the ambitions of rival states; and some associate the term with the concept of dictatorial power, arbitrary government, and a highly centralized administrative system. Imperialism to the historian is the process of empire building. It is limited in its application to cases where the conquered peoples are alien in race, language, and culture, or where overseas territory is acquired. 3 Imperialism cannot be divorced from territorial control, and any effort to do so results in confusion. T h e old imperialism had, as we have seen, made little impression on Africa. Colonial claims established in the early days were vague at best and were confined entirely to the coastal areas. Spain, France, Holland, Portugal, and England claimed sovereignty in Africa but had made little effort to extend political control into the interior and, as the overseas slave trade dwindled, such claims as existed, came to be regarded as of slight impor- The work of the English economist, Mr. J . A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study, (London, 1 9 0 2 ) , is fundamental to any discussion of this subject. He has been the source of inspiration for many writers, particularly those of the NeoMarxian School. See also W. L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, (New York, 1 9 3 5 ) , Vol. I, chapter 3, for an able discussion of his influence. An article by the same authority, " A Critique of Imperialism," Foreign Affairs, October 1935, is also valuable in this connection. Parker T . Moon, Imperialism and World Politics, (New York, 1 9 2 6 ) , chapters 3 and 4, provides a stimulating discussion of the causes which gave rise to the movement. 3

Frederick L . Schuman, International

i 9 3 7 ) i P· 301·

Politics,

(New York and London,

INTRODUCTION

7

tance. E n g l a n d exercised a nominal control over considerable areas in tropical Africa but never felt the need to establish any definite system of administration. Business men were becoming interested in developing trade with Africa j explorers continued to penetrate remote places; missionary enterprise was becoming a factor of increasing importance; but the official attitude was complacent and indifferent. But the British were due to experience a rude awakening. Belgium, of all countries, was the first to challenge E n g l a n d , thus precipitating the scramble for Africa. T h e Belgian people had little to do with the establishment of the Congo F r e e State but their King, Leopold I I , was a shrewd business man and his fancy had been caught by the commercial possibilities of Central Africa. 4 H e was eventually successful in securing the services of the famous journalist-explorer, M r . H e n r y Morton Stanley, who was commissioned to return to Africa and lay the foundations for a tropical empire. Stanley was shocked to discover, upon his return to the Congo, that the French had stolen a march on him by despatching an expedition under the aggressive leadership of de Brazza to the north bank of this mighty stream. Serious diplomatic complications ensued when E n g l a n d supported the claims of Portugal to the mouth of the Congo only to find France and Germany arrayed against her. Rivalry developed in other parts of Africa. France had begun the conquest of Algiers in 1 8 3 0 and had pursued in leisurely fashion the subjugation of that difficult country. Tunis had been added in 1 8 8 1 , an accomplishment which enraged the Italians and threw them into the arms of Germany and Austria. E n g l a n d intervened decisively in Egyptian affairs in 1882 and proceeded to administer the affairs of that bankrupt country. A three-cornered rivalry developed in East Africa between England, France, and Germany. Cecil Rhodes and his associates began to unfold their plans of empire and, yielding to the pressure of their propa4 T h e history of the Belgian Congo is too well known to necessitate elaboration here. An analysis of international complications involving West A f r i c a appears in chapter IV.

8

BRITISH ENTERPRISE IN NIGERIA

ganda, the British Government was persuaded to take a decisive step in 1885 with the proclamation of a protectorate over Bechuanaland. T h e African continent was almost entirely partitioned by the close of the nineteenth century. Morocco still retained a precarious independence, but was destined to come under French control. Tripoli was nominally a part of Turkey, but the Italians were bargaining successfully with the powers for its eventual conquest. Abyssinia had beaten the Italians at Adowa and, under the intelligent and forceful leadership of King Menelek, appeared likely to remain independent for years to come. T h e Boer Republics in South Africa were waging a losing fight in defense of their freedom. Little Liberia retained a nominal independence but in reality was an unofficial protectorate of the United States. History records no other instance where such extensive territory had within so short a time been brought under foreign control, and the surprising thing about it all is the fact that this intense rivalry did not involve the participants in war among themselves. Scholars are only beginning to appreciate the importance of Africa as a fruitful field of research. M a n y years of sustained effort will be required of social scientists before the many problems raised by imperialistic activity in this vast continent can be fully understood. A good start has been made in the serious study of certain regions in Africa, but tropical Africa has attracted relatively little attention. This point is well illustrated by the case of Nigeria where, until recently, no adequate study had been made of its interesting and many-sided development. 5 5 T h e late Professor Lillian C. A . Knowles was the first to appreciate the importance of the British tropical empire. Her study, The Economic Development of the British Overseas Empire, contains much pertinent information on the development of Nigeria together with the other tropical colonies of Great Britain. Sir Frederick (now L o r d ) Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical A frica, (London, 1 9 2 2 ) , is a classical treatment of colonial administration. He draws heavily upon his experience as Governor of Nigeria. M a r g e r y Perham, Native Administration in Nigeria, (London, 1 9 3 7 ) , is a definitive study of the problem of administration. There are two histories of Nigeria, both written by individuals who have had extensive experience in the country. Sir W i l l i a m N. M . Geary, Nigeria under British Rule, (London, 1 9 2 7 ) , is especially valuable for

INTRODUCTION

9

Modern Nigeria is one of England's most important colonies. It is four times the size of Great Britain, contains a population of nearly 20,000,000 people,® and produces many valuable products which are eagerly sought by business men from all countries. T h e study of British enterprise in Nigeria provides an excellent opportunity to study the processes of empire building. It is of especial interest since the Nigerian experiment indicates that imperialism is not necessarily vicious and that it is possible for an advanced country to extend its control over weaker peoples to their mutual advantage. T h e fact that British activity in Nigeria has been relatively free from scandal, that the native peoples have, been protected from ruthless exploitation, that they have been honestly administered, and have been disinclined to revolt, may explain why more scholars have not become interested in this important colony. A great historian once remarked, " H a p p y is the country that has no history." T h e same observation might well be applied to colonies. T h e traveler visiting Nigeria for the first time is likely to receive a bad impression. A barrier of sand stretches along the entire coastline, but is broken in a few places where the rivers cut through to the sea. Elsewhere it shelters the ever present mangrove swamp and protects the waters of shallow lagoons. A maze of small streams, difficult to navigate in most places, gives access to the unpromising interior. It is a land of mud and water. Little solid land is to be found, nothing is produced, the atmosphere is excessively humid, and human life is seldom in evidence. T h e tropical forest lies to the rear of this dismal region. It consists of a zone, varying in width from fifty to a hundred and fifty miles, and produces evergreen trees of many types. M a n y valuable furniture woods such as mahogany grow here and provide a valuable article of export. T h e oil palm flourishes and constitutes the principal economic asset of the country. T h e undergrowth is thick. Ferns and mosses, nourished by the rich, damp soil, grow in abundance and render it almost impossible the period prior to 1900. A. C. Burns, History of Nigeria, includes much useful information. 6 The Nigerian Census of 1931, 7 vols., (Lagos, 1 9 3 2 ) .

(London, 1 9 2 9 ) ,

IO

B R I T I S H E N T E R P R I S E IN

NIGERIA

to penetrate the dark rain forest. T h e country is intersected by numerous streams. Broad motor highways, constructed in recent years, render traveling less arduous than in the early days, but many parts of the country are accessible only by bush paths along which a party must travel in single file. T h e r e are few open spaces although there is some arable land in the forest zone. T h e forest gives way slowly as the traveler approaches the savanna country, the third geographical region of Nigeria. It is difficult to determine where the savanna country begins, but a line drawn through the towns of Abeokuta, Ondo, Onitsha, and Afikpo may serve as a tentative boundary. North of this line the forest becomes thinner, open spaces are more abundant and, as the traveler journeys on, he finds himself in an open, grassy country, marked here and there by numerous clumps of trees. In comparison with the coastal areas it is a pleasant country, broken in many places by hills. It presents an appearance quite different from what is commonly visualized as tropical country. T h e r e are two plateau areas in Nigeria. T h e Bauchi plateau, located in the central part of the country, is an important physiographic region. It has a general elevation of over 2,000 feet and in some parts is much higher. T h e important towns of J o s , Zaria, Kaduna, and Bauchi are located in the plateau, which is an important source of mineral wealth. T h e southern portion of the highlands is covered by a thin forest, but north of Zaria the country becomes more open. T o w a r d the northern frontier the soil is a loose, heavy sand and there is ample evidence that the desert is slowly encroaching. On the east the plateau gives way to the plains of Bornu which extend to Lake Chad. A second highland area stretches along the eastern frontier. Much of this territory was formerly under German control but was awarded to E n g l a n d as a mandate by the Treaty of Versailles. It is the highest region in Nigeria and varies in height from 2,000 to 8,000 feet. T h e Cameroon Mountain in the south, with an elevation of 1 3 , 3 5 0 feet, is the loftiest peak in Nigeria. T h e great river from which the country takes its name is another important physical feature of Nigeria. It is the third largest river in Africa, being some 2,600 miles long. Its source is in

INTRODUCTION French West Africa not far from the coast. It flows northeastward for several hundred miles, changes its direction in the vicinity of Timbuktu and, after sweeping around to the southeast, glides slowly on its way to the Gulf of Guinea. Approximately two-thirds of the Niger is in French territory, but it has never been of much value to the French as an outlet for their possessions in West Africa. It is a shallow stream and, like all African rivers, difficult to navigate. The rapids at Bussa are a formidable barrier, while great variation between high and low water has limited to a large degree its usefulness as an avenue of transportation. 7 The most important branch of the Niger is the Benue. It enters the Niger at Lokoja, extending several hundred miles in an easterly direction to the highland area on the eastern frontier. Like the Niger, it is subject to great variations in depth and, for this reason, it is limited in value as a means of transportation. Climate has been a factor of fundamental importance in the history of British enterprise in Nigeria. It has been suggested before that the climate of Africa was an important barrier to the penetration of Africa. The heavy loss of life incurred by Europeans anxious to learn the secrets of the dark continent discouraged efforts in this direction and at times appeared to be an obstacle impossible to overcome. The Guinea Coast and the Bight of Benin in particular enjoyed an unenviable reputation. This region was justly regarded for many years as a "white man's graveyard." The type of climate which predominates in Nigeria is the subequatorial, but in such a large country there is, of course, considerable variation. There are two well-defined seasons: the dry season which begins in October and ends in April, and the rainy season which prevails in the other months. Temperatures are uniformly high, but there is considerable diurnal variation which becomes greater in proportion to the distance from the coast. The precipitation along the coast is extremely heavy but diminishes rapidly in the interior so that in the extreme north it barely suf' There is a variation of thirty-five feet between high and low water in some years.

12

BRITISH ENTERPRISE IN NIGERIA

fices for the growing of crops. 8 A characteristic feature of the dry season is the "harmattan," a dry northeasterly wind blowing from the Sahara. It creates a thick haze composed of minute particles of sand and shell blown from the desert, which is very uncomfortable for both man and beast. Its influence is more marked in the interior, but it is felt even on the coast. In many parts of Nigeria the transition from the dry season to the rainy season is marked by the occurrence of violent tornadoes. These are heavy squalls followed by thunderstorms and heavy precipitation. T h e y are frequent at the beginning of the rains, occur occasionally after the season is well advanced, and are common at its close. T h e relative humidity is high at all times along the coast and is extremely trying to Europeans. This condition is relieved to a large extent in the north while the highland areas are, by comparison, quite comfortable. But allowing for all these variations, the climate of Nigeria cannot be described as healthful, and Europeans must exercise great care at all times lest they fall victims to its insidious influence. It would be misleading to generalize about the ethnology of the people of Nigeria. Classification on the basis of physical characteristics is difficult since there has been a great deal of racial mixture. Even the Bantu tribes show many aberrant types and their finer noses, thinner lips, higher foreheads, and lighter color suggest a non-Negro strain.® In other parts of Nigeria evidence of racial intermixture is even more pronounced. A classification based upon language is also quite unsatisfactory. Three linguistic families are represented by the peoples of Nigeria: the Hamitic, the Sudanic, and the Bantu. 1 0 T h e majority of the peoples of Southern Nigeria speak Sudanic; the most important language spoken in Northern Nigeria is Hausa, a Hamitic tongue; while a number of the eastern tribes speak Bantu or semi-Bantu. Neither the classification based upon physical traits, nor the grouping ac8 Nigeria Handbook, (Lagos, 1 9 3 3 ) , pp. 1 0 - 1 1 . The heaviest precipitation is recorded at Debundscha where the average is 356 inches. The lightest at Maiduguri, near Lake Chad, where the average for twenty-three years is 25 inches. 9 Perham, op. cit., p. 2. Nigeria Handbook, 1936, ch. 3, passim. 10 A. L . Kroeber, Anthropology, (New York, 1 9 2 3 ) , pp. 96-98.

INTRODUCTION

13

cording to language, means v e r y much to the administrator, w h o usually favors a classification based upon social organization. Such

a classification recognizes three groups: the

primitive

tribes, the advanced native communities, and Europeanized natives.11 T h e primitive tribes of Nigeria occupy two areas: the Bauchi Plateau, and the region which lies east of the N i g e r and south of the Benue. T h e Ibo, with a population estimated at over 3,000,000, is the most numerous and the most important of these peoples. T h e i r territory is the most densely populated area in N i g e r i a , but they have little in the way of a political organization with no important chiefs. T h e y profess a pagan religion and were once addicted to cannibalism. 1 2 Aside from the Ibos, the southeastern provinces contain many other primitive tribes such as the Ibibios, the Ekois, the Ijaws, the Jekris and several other lesser peoples. T h e i r political and social organization is extremely primitive and they still practise—despite the efforts that have been made to tame t h e m — m a n y barbarous customs. T w i n murder, human sacrifice, cannibalism, and fetish worship, may still be practised in the more inaccessible parts of the country. T h e mountainous region of the Bauchi Plateau gives shelter to other primitive tribes. T h e i r easily defended country defeated the best efforts of the Fulani to bring them under control and, although they were constantly raided for slaves, they were never conquered until the advent of the British early in the twentieth century. T h e y have failed to develop an advanced political and social system and still practise many unpleasant customs. Some are head hunters, some "eat anything f r o m rats, mice, and bats to their own deceased relatives." M a n y are animists; twin murder, human sacrifice, and cannibalism are frequently practised; 1 1 Lugard, The Dual Mandate, p. 72. Anthropological research has devoted increasing· attention to Nigeria. The valuable preliminary work of Meek and Talbot has been supplemented by the studies of R. C. Abraham, S. J. Hogan, F. Von Luschan, N. W . Thomas, and J. R. Wilson-Haffenden. 12 Nigeria Handbook, 1933, p. 17. The map opposite p. 18 shows the distribution of native peoples. N. W . Thomas, Anthropological Report on the ¡bespeaking Peoples of Nigeria, (London, 1 9 1 3 - 1 9 1 4 ) . Dr. P. Amaury Talbot is the leading authority on this important group.

14

BRITISH E N T E R P R I S E IN NIGERIA

whole tribes are given to excessive drinking} and altogether they bear an evil reputation.13 The most important of the advanced native peoples are the Hausas, the Fulani, and the Yorubas. The Hausas are the largest group and, according to the Census of 1931, possessed a population of 3,604,016. 14 They are not a distinct race. Their language is spoken by most of the population of Northern Nigeria and, as a matter of fact, constitutes the lingua franca of West Africa. It is the only native language which has been reduced to writing by the natives themselves and is easily acquired. Little is known concerning early Hausa history, since many of their records were destroyed by their Fulani conquerors.15 The Hausa states were established in very early times, long before the penetration of Islam in the thirteenth century. Most of these states maintained an independent existence, but there is evidence that they were frequently organized into loose confederations for mutual defense. Internecine warfare was common, while their territory was ravaged at times by conquerors from both east and west. These wars did not fundamentally affect the life of the people, and the Hausa traders continued their activity despite the turmoil of the times. Early in the nineteenth century the Fulani, under the leadership of Othman dan Fodio, established themselves as the overlords of Hausaland. The authorities disagree as to the origins of the Fulani, but a commonly accepted theory is that they came from Upper Egypt, migrated to North Africa, and crossed the desert to the western Sudan in the thirteenth century. Many of the Fulani settled in the Hausa villages, intermarried with the native population and, as a result, lost their racial identity. Others retained their pastoral habits, held aloof from the Hausas, kept 13 C. K . Meek, The Northern Tribes of Nigeria, 2 vols., (Oxford, 1 9 2 5 ) , I, pp. 40-42· 14 Nigeria Handbook, 1936, p. 22. S. J . Hogan, The Mohammedan Emirates of Nigeria, (Oxford, 1 9 3 0 ) . 15 The best study of early Hausa history is Mrs. O. L . Temple, Notes of the Tribes, Provinces, Emirates, and States of the Northern Provinces of Nigeria, (Lagos, 1 9 2 2 ) . Lady Lugard, A Tropical Dependency, (London, 1 9 0 5 ) , is also very valuable for the history of the native peoples of Northern Nigeria.

INTRODUCTION

15

their blood pure, and thus retained their characteristic racial traits—the fine features, straight hair, and narrow noses—which stamp them as belonging to the Caucasian primary stock. 16 Since the Fulani have for over a century been the ruling class in Northern Nigeria it is necessary to explain as briefly as possible how they attained this position. It has been suggested above that they appeared in Nigeria during medieval times where they apparently caused little trouble. M a n y of them retained their pastoral habits, while others settled in the towns, in some cases holding important political positions in the Habe ( H a u s a ) kingdoms. T h e Fulani Jihad, beginning in 1802, was an event of first importance in the history of the Fulani. It was a typical religious revival which developed later into a political movement. T h e leader, Othman dan Fodio, came from Gobir with the hope of reviving the religious enthusiasm of the Hausa after being driven out by the local king. H e gathered a party about him; defeated the King of Gobirj and attained the title, Sarkin Musulmiy Commander of the Faithful. H i s success stimulated a movement which spread over a wide area in the western Sudan and Othman, and his followers were successful in overthrowing the Habe dynasties. Within six years the change was accomplished, and the authority of Sokoto came to be acknowledged throughout most of the area which now comprises Northern Nigeria. T h e Fulani conquest was not complete, however, since several kingdoms remained independent until the time of the British occupation. A m o n g these was the ancient kingdom of Bornu. Here the Kanuri tribe, a mixture of Arab, Hamitic, and Negro peoples, resisted the best efforts of the Fulani to conquer them. Their sultan had been overthrown, but Muhammed el Kanemi, a new leader, defeated the invaders and restored the fugitive sultan. E l Kanemi was the real ruler, however, and assumed the tide of Shehu. H i s son, Omar, established the dynasty that was in power at the time of the British conquest. In addition to the Hausas, the Fulani, and the Kanuri, the 16 In addition to the studies of C. K . Meek; cf. J . R. Wilson-Hoffenden, The Red Men of Nigeria, (London, 1 9 3 0 ) .

i6

BRITISH ENTERPRISE IN NIGERIA

Yorubas are considered to be among the advanced native peoples. They occupy a triangular area bounded by the Niger, the frontier of Dahomey, and the coast. Like the other native peoples of Nigeria there is little information available concerning their origin, although numerous theories are advanced. It appears to be reasonably clear that they are not of Negro origin, but due to intermarriage have lost their identity. T h e Fulani Jihad was marked by an attempt to extend the boundaries of Islam southward, but it was only partially successful. The important city of Illorin fell before the Fulani, and a prolonged conflict followed which merged with the British advance at a later time. Both Christianity and Mohammedanism claim adherents among the Yorubas, but the majority remain pagan. They believe in the existence of a Supreme Being, but acknowledge many minor deities to whom sacrifice is frequently offered. The priests are very powerful and are skilful in keeping the people in subjection by playing upon their superstitions, but their power has weakened since the advent of British rule. No adequate anthropological study has been made of this important people, so it is difficult to generalize with respect to their culture. 17 Their language is difficult, but fortunately many of them have acquired English, which has made it easier for Europeans tu study them. They have developed an orderly society, have shown a marked preference for urban life and, to a remarkable degree, have mastered the art of living together in large groups. They are keenly interested in education, and many Yorubas are found in leading positions in both professional and commercial life. T h e Europeanized Africans comprise only a small proportion of the native population, but they sit on the Legislative Council, occupy positions of prominence in commercial and professional life and, through the medium of the native press, as well as by other means, make their voices and opinions heard. Some of them have become real leaders of their people and in the future 1 7 T h e best source for Yoruba history is Reverend S. Johnson, History of the Yorubas, (London, 1 9 2 1 ) . Perham, op. cit., ch. II, gives an excellent summary of the culture of this important people. Leo Frobenius, The Voice of Africa, (London, 1 9 1 3 ) , is perhaps the best study of the Yoruba culture.

INTRODUCTION

17

are quite likely to occupy positions of responsibility. U n f o r t u nately the greater number have only a rudimentary training and in many cases are barely literate. They represent no particular tribe or community but form a separate class in many of the cities of the West Coast. M a n y individuals completed their education in E n g l a n d and returned to pursue careers as clergymen, doctors, lawyers, and journalists. Since the W o r l d W a r some f r o m among this group have demanded political recognition, but aside f r o m giving them representation on the Legislative Council, the British Administration has not seen fit to grant their request. At a time when imperialism is being seriously challenged it is important to study the process by which it has established its control and administered its responsibilities in times past. It has not, as a rule, conferred many blessings upon the dependent societies that have been drawn within its scope. Neither have such societies been controlled solely in the interests of the natives themselves. T h e y have usually been the victims of ruthless exploitation despite all the fine sentiments that have been expressed concerning the "white man's burden." It is also true that no colonial government has ever been established with the deliberate purpose of hampering the commercial activities of business men. But it is a serious error to conclude that colonial governments are the complaisant tools of capitalistic interests, or that it is impossible to control economic forces and afford protection to native communities against the shattering impact of more advanced civilizations. British experience in Nigeria indicates very clearly that while imperialism has not developed out of any altruistic desire to "civilize" the native, it may contribute to an improvement of the conditions under which he lives.

Chapter I THE GENESIS OF BRITISH INTEREST IN NIGERIA In J u l y 1 4 1 5 the modern era of European expansion was inaugurated when a huge armada put out from Lisbon to undertake the conquest of Ceuta. T h e city fell after a day of severe fighting in which H e n r y , the third son of King John of Portugal, greatly distinguished himself. T h e twenty-one-year-old prince by his bravery won the governorship of the newly conquered province, and—what is more important—became imbued with a mighty purpose. F r o m the start, the expedition had been undertaken as a crusade; and Prince H e n r y , misled by the inadequate geographical knowledge of his time, dreamed that it would be possible to penetrate the East by way of the Senegal, establish contact with Prester J o h n , and so bring the Crusades to a triumphant conclusion. Missionary zeal, scientific curiosity, and a desire to tap the rich trade of the East were the motives that prompted Henry to a life of maritime endeavor. H e set up headquarters at Sagres and gathered about himself the best scientists of the time. Intrepid navigators were engaged to launch a systematic attack upon the forces of darkness that hitherto had so seriously circumscribed exploration. U n d e r his inspiring leadership men of transcendent courage pressed farther and farther down the African coast. A n d in 1 4 3 4 , when G i l Eannes rounded Cape Bojador, the serpent rocks and the spirit-haunted islands, the water unicorns and the terrible Bishop of the Seas, who towered above the storm clouds and drove mariners to destruction, all vanished before the reality of Portuguese enterprise. As the years passed and the knowledge of new lands accumulated, Prince Henry's idealism receded into the background. T h e 18

GENESIS OF BRITISH I N T E R E S T

19

islands off the African Coast were colonized ; the discovery of gold attracted the attention of hardy spirits ; and the trade in slaves was inaugurated in 1441 by Antonio Gonsalvez. Four years later a well-organized slave expedition brought back more than two hundred captives, and Portuguese enterprise was thus given a new twist. Prince Henry was not indifferent to this opportunity. Excusing himself with the belief that he was saving souls for the Kingdom, he obtained by charter a monopoly of the African slave trade, and in 1454 succeeded in having this right confirmed by the Pope. Licenses were soon issued to private traders, and it is estimated that within five years over a thousand slaves were imported. The newly won colonial empire expanded rapidly j fortresses were built, settlements founded, and trading posts set up; and its startling growth animated the promoters with the hopes and ambitions of a new society.1 The exploitation of these lands did not, however, turn the Portuguese from seeking the realization of their dream. Success in West Africa made Prince Henry more determined to press his design of reaching Asia by rounding the Dark Continent. H e did not live to see his great hope materialize, but his death in 1460 meant no interruption in the extension of geographical frontiers. New expeditions pressed on to Sierra Leone; soon the Gulf of Guinea was thoroughly explored; Fernando Po discovered the island that bears his name; other navigators succeeded in crossing the Equator. War with Castile and the difficulties of navigation in the southern hemisphere temporarily checked Portuguese progress, but under the leadership of John I I , peace was made with Castile, permitting the resumption of exploration and discovery. Scientists summoned from all Europe helped to overcome the physical obstacles in the way, and within six years of the new King's accession, Bartholomew Diaz rounded the southern extremity of Africa and sailed some five hundred miles beyond. It may seem unusual that the Portuguese should not have followed up the work of Diaz more promptly, and that ten years should have elapsed before Vasco da Gama embarked on his 1 John W . Blake, Eurofean 1957), passim.

Beginnings in West Africa,

1455—1578, (London,

BRITISH ENTERPRISE IN NIGERIA epochal voyage. T h i s interval, however, was not lacking in achievement. Important steps were taken to consolidate the gains already made. Spanish claims in West Africa were exchanged for Portuguese pretensions in the Canaries; pillars bearing the arms of Portugal were erected along the African Coast and protectorates were set up over native kingdoms; commercial development was pressed with renewed vigor; and the exclusive rights of the Portuguese were reaffirmed by the Pope. But while this seafaring nation was staking out an empire overseas, England, its island neighbor, displayed as yet none of the vigor that was later to mark the prosecution of her diverse maritime interests. There were many reasons for England's tardiness in setting out upon the game of empire building. From very early times English trade had been slowly broadening out, but the persistent efforts of British kings to maintain their claims in France, together with the turmoil and confusion arising from the W a r of the Roses, rendered it impossible for England to play a significant rôle in the drama of emerging world politics. It was only after the accession of Henry V I I in 1485 that there was any thought of expansion. By then, however, the Portuguese were already well entrenched in Africa, as we have seen. T h e first ventures under the Tudors were timid and abortive. T h e voyages of John Cabot, which gave England a claim to North America, were also responsible to a large degree for the long hopeless quest for the Northwest Passage. Under Henry V I I I and his successors, British activity accomplished little, paralyzed as it was by fear of Spanish strength. Though English rulers were diffident about challenging the power of Spain, and though they hesitated to encroach upon the Portuguese monopoly in Africa, the scanty records of the times nevertheless disclose the occasional penetration by an Englishman into African waters early in the sixteenth century. 2 It was not until 1553, however, that a direct attack was made upon the Portuguese position. In that year, "on the twelfth day of August sailed from Portsmouth two goodly ships, the Primerose and the Lion, with a pinnas called the Moone, being all 2

Blake, of. cit., p. 138.

GENESIS OF B R I T I S H I N T E R E S T

21

furnished with men of the lustiest sort, as also with ordinance and victuals requisite to such a voyage." Thomas Wyndham was in command. A Portuguese renegade, Antonio Pinteado, accompanied the expedition in the capacity of pilot. Two years before, Wyndham had made a successful voyage to Morocco, and the syndicate that had financed him now undertook a more venturesome project, and one that promised rich returns. The contact with Pinteado made accessible secret information that encouraged them in the belief that the attempt to tap the rich trade in gold and ivory, which had until now been monopolized by the Portuguese, might well be successful. Putting boldly out to sea the little squadron succeeded in running the gauntlet of Portuguese cruisers and made land near the Portuguese fortress of St. Jorge de la Mina, where they obtained enough gold to insure the triumph of their venture. Pinteado wished to turn back because of the lateness of the season, but his advice was disregarded and Wyndham pushed on into the Gulf of Guinea, dropping anchor eventually in the mouth of the Benin River. A group of merchants led by Pinteado ventured up the river and bargained successfully with the native king for pepper. Upon their return they found Wyndham dead and many of the crew down with fever. The panic-stricken survivors forced Pinteado to abandon the merchants who had remained up the river, scuttle the Lion, and sail for home in the Primrose. The return voyage was exceedingly arduous; Pinteado died soon after they set sail, and only forty survivors reached Plymouth. 3 Since the voyage was a commercial success, the hope of further profits prompted the promoters to dispatch a larger squadron in the autumn of 1554 under the command of John Lok. This enterprise was well managed, and cleared a profit of approximately 1,000%. The venture was especially noteworthy because only twenty-four men were lost through illness. Such a triumph greatly stimulated commerce with the Guinea Coast and for several years trade flourished, only to decline as Portuguese 3 James A . Williamson, A Short History of British 1 9 2 7 ) , pp. 8 3 - 8 4 . Blake, o f . cit., pp. 1 4 3 - 4 5 .

Expansion,

(London,

BRITISH ENTERPRISE IN NIGERIA vigilance increased and the price of native products rose steadily because of the intense competition.4 L o k and his successors had not attempted to visit Benin, being quite content to trade with the more accessible parts of the coast, and it was some thirty years after Wyndham's voyage before another Englishman, James Welsh of London, visited the city. H e made two successful trips in 1588 and 1590 and returned from his second venture with a cargo of "589 sacks of pepper, 150 elephants teeth, and 32 barrels of Oil of Palm trees." 5 This is the first reference to the trade in palm oil which later became of fundamental importance, and gave the name "Oil Rivers" to the locality from which it was exported.® British enterprise did not confine itself to trade in the natural products of the country, but also began to encroach upon the Portuguese monopoly in the slave trade. In 1562 John Hawkins embarked on the first of his three voyages which mark the beginning of English participation in this traffic.7 It was not until the demand for slaves had been stimulated by the development of sugar and tobacco plantations in America that the operations of the slavers were extended to Dahomey and the mouth of the Niger. 8 European traders rarely penetrated to the interior, but depended upon the chiefs of coastal tribes for their supply. These individuals played the rôle of middlemen. They conducted organized forays into the interior, devastated whole areas in their operations, and frequently raided even their own villages to keep the barracoons filled and the demands of impatient dealers satisfied. T h e defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588 which broke the power of Spain at sea led to a drastic change in British attitude toward expansion. Heretofore English efforts had been spasmodic and conditioned always by the haunting fear of Spanish power. T h e dramatic triumph of Drake and his fellow sea dogs was followed within a few years by systematic and sustained ef4

Williamson, of. cit., pp. 84-85 ; Burns, of. cit., pp. 74.-75. Nigeria Handbook, 1933, pp. 4-5. 6 Bums, of. cit., p. 75. 7 Williamson, of. cit., p. 100. 8 Nigeria Handbook, 1933, p. 5. 5

GENESIS OF BRITISH I N T E R E S T

23

forts that laid the foundation for the British Empire during the first decades of the seventeenth century. West Africa did not arouse the interest of the empire builders in the seventeenth century. Their attention was firmly fixed upon developments in North America and India where two distinct types of colonies began slowly to take shape—colonies of settlement and colonies of exploitation. Commercial companies were used extensively as agencies of expansion since the dearth of means of communication made it extremely difficult for the home country to maintain control in far distant areas. This method was particularly successful in India, a typical colony of exploitation. But it did not work well in West Africa. Several companies, organized on the model of the British East India Company were formed, but failed within a few years. The strong competition provided by the Dutch West India Company, the several wars with France and Holland, which had their repercussions in West Africa, the inroads of interlopers, and chronic dishonesty on the part of company officials all combined to render their efforts abortive. 9 Trade has always been the primary factor in British relations with West Africa. Settlements were merely a by-product. Although the deadly climate prohibited the establishment of colonies of settlement, several areas were claimed by England prior to the great revival of imperialism in the closing decades of the nineteenth century. They were useful as trading stations in the early days, but later, when England became involved in the suppression of the slave trade, they served either as homes for freed slaves or as bases of operation against the slavers. Sierre Leone was acquired at the close of the American Revolution to receive freed slaves of United Empire Loyalists who had settled in Canada. Later it provided a home for ex-slaves from the West Indies and for Negroes taken from captured slavers. 10 Since Lagos, the first town in Nigeria that was annexed by England, had been a notorious slave depot, annexation proved the only 8

Williamson, of. cit., pp. 3 1 2 - 1 3 ; Sir Harry Johnston, History of the Colonization of Africa, (Cambridge, 1 9 1 3 ) , pp. 123—24. 10 Williamson, of. cit., pp. 607-8. E . C. Martin, The British West African Settlements, ¡750-1821, (London, 1 9 2 7 ) , fassim.

24

BRITISH ENTERPRISE IN NIGERIA

method by which the activities of native rulers could be effectively curbed. T h i s brief résumé of British activities in W e s t A f r i c a should serve to make it clear that trading ventures attracted many E n g lishmen to the W e s t Coast. F r o m the time of W i l l i a m H a w k i n s contact was never entirely lost. T h e opportunity to make profits f r o m the slave trade, the lure of gold that could be found at certain places along the littoral, the abundance of ivory, and the many natural products of the tropics that found a market in E u r o p e p r o v e d stimulating to commercial enterprise. A l t h o u g h Europeans were in contact with W e s t Africa for over three hundred years, very little was learned concerning the interior. T h e obstacles imposed by African geography, the deadly climate, and the certain hostility of the natives discouraged exploration. Because ocean-going ships could penetrate only a short distance f r o m the coast, small expeditions were at the mercy of the savage tribes along the banks. In addition there was but little incentive to venture into the hinterland since the coast natives were always w i l l i n g and anxious to secure slaves f r o m the interior as w e l l as to gather other commodities for trading purposes. T h e formation of the African Association in 1788 was the first indication of interest in the scientific exploration of the African continent. T h i s association of scientists proposed "to promote the cause of science and humanity, to explore the mysterious geography, to ascertain the resources, and to improve the condition of that ill-fated continent." special attention. M a n y

11

T h e N i g e r R i v e r attracted their

vague ideas concerning this

mighty

stream had been current in the ancient world. It was held by some that it flowed f r o m west to east to lose itself in the sands of the desert. O t h e r s were of the opinion that it was a branch of the N i l e . A third group held that it flowed f r o m east to west into the Atlantic Ocean. T h e Association was determined to do more than study the opinions of ancient authorities, so they launched a series of exploring expeditions that culminated in the discovery of the sources of the N i g e r by the great Scotch explorer M u n g o Park. 11

Journal

of the African

Society,

I, p. 1 4 6 .

GENESIS

OF

BRITISH

INTEREST

25

T h e Association was not blessed with over-abundant resources ; the Government was indifferent; but men of courage were willing to undertake the arduous and dangerous task of discovery with little hope of material reward. Efforts to reach the Niger f r o m Egypt and Tripoli were unsuccessful, so in 1791 the Association sponsored an expedition led by M a j o r H o u g h t o n . H e had extensive experience in Morocco where he acquired considerable information concerning the customs and languages of the West African Negroes. H e started f r o m Bathurst, followed the course of the Gambia into the interior, and eventually was robbed of all his goods by a party of Moorish merchants, being left to wander into the desert where he died from starvation. 12 Four years later the first real progress toward discovering the Niger was made. T h e Association was fortunate to secure the services of M u n g o Park, a Scotch physician who had seen service with the East India Company. U p o n his return f r o m India he made the acquaintance of Sir Joseph Banks, a prominent member of the African Association. T h e latter, an enthusiast in the cause of exploration, succeeded in interesting Park who had a natural taste for adventure, and secured his appointment as a leader of a new expedition which the Association was planning. P a r k s t a r t e d f r o m E n g l a n d in M a y 1 7 9 5 , w i t h i n s t r u c t i o n s t o . . . pass on to the river N i g e r either by w a y of B a m b o u k , o r by such other route as should be f o u n d most convenient. T h a t I should ascertain the course, and, if possible the rise and termination of that river. T h a t I should use my utmost exertions to visit the principal t o w n s or cities in Houssa;

its neighborhood,

particularly

Timbuctoo

and that I should be at liberty a f t e r w a r d s to return

and to

E u r o p e , either by w a y of the G a m b i a , or by such other route, as, under all the then existing circumstances of m y situation a n d prospects, should appear to me to be most desirable. 1 3

H e reached the Gambia after a tedious voyage and proceeded upstream to Pinsania, where he was received by D r . Laidley, the agent in charge. Since he arrived during the rainy season, when 1 - M u n g o Park, Travels in the Interior Districts of Africa, delphia, 1800), pp. 1 1 3 - 1 4 . 13 Joseph Thomson, Mungo Park, (London, 1890), p. 47.

4th ed., (Phila-

26

B R I T I S H E N T E R P R I S E IN N I G E R I A

traveling was both hard and dangerous, he spent his time in questioning natives about possible routes to the interior, and in studying the Mandingo language. It was early in December before Park was ready to start from Pinsania. H i s original intention had been to accompany a caravan into the interior, but at the last moment he abandoned the idea and resolved to make the attempt alone. T w o natives accompanied him j a Negro servant who spoke both Mandingo and English, and a boy familiar with the languages of the Niger country. H i s baggage was surprisingly light, consisting only of "provisions for two days j a small assortment of beads, amber, and tobacco, for the purchase of fresh supplies, a few changes of linen, and other necessary apparel, an umbrella, a pocket sextant, a magnetic compass, and a thermometer; together with two fowling pieces, two pair of pistols, and some other small articles." 14 D r . Laidley accompanied him for two days. T h e n Park was left alone with his two native companions. For a time all went well, and nothing occurred to vary the ordinary incidents of travel. H e was kindly received by the natives and shared with them their simple fare. But as he made his way from the valley of the Gambia and approached the Senegal, he came in contact with a new people, the "foulahs" whom he described as being of "a tawny complexion, with small features, and soft silky hair." T h e y were known to him as the "possessors of many kingdoms," considered all Negroes to be their inferiors, and felt themselves to be the equals of the white races. T h e y impressed Park as being of a most fanatical type. 1 5 H e was now in a region dominated by Mohammedan tribes, a fact that accounts for most of the difficulties and ill treatment he was destined to experience. T h e fact that he was a Christian was enough to make him fair game for every petty, fanatical ruler who claimed sovereignty within this extensive area. In addition the numerous Moorish merchants, apprehensive of the results of European penetration, were not inclined to treat the traveler with much consideration. T h e fact that the whole area 14 15

M u n g o Park, of. cit., pp. 43-44. Ibid., ch. 3, fassim.

GENESIS OF BRITISH

INTEREST

27

was in a state of chronic warfare, did much to complicate his task. H e was captured eventually by the ruler of Ludamar, a petty kingdom located in the valley of the Senegal River, and held a close prisoner for many weeks. H e escaped after several unsuccessful efforts, but was attacked by a robber band which deprived him of all his possessions including his coat, which was his sole protection against the elements and the vicious insect pests of the jungle. H i s condition was truly desperate. Robbed of his belongings, deserted by his followers, weakened by fever and hunger, his chances of reaching the Niger seemed hopeless. But instead of attempting to escape to the coast he pressed on, since " t o return to England without accomplishing the object of my mission was worse than a l l . " As he struggled southward he found less with which to contend. H e had left the country of the Moors behind him to penetrate into the pagan areas where he was regarded as an object of wonder, and it became less difficult to secure food. H e had to part with portions of his attire and even locks of his hair, which were invested with value as a charm, were highly esteemed by the population, and proved especially useful in securing muchneeded supplies. But he did manage to survive. H e was greatly encouraged by frequent reports concerning the Niger and, after interminable delays, he finally learned that he might expect to behold it the next day. H i s excitement was so great and the mosquitoes so industrious that he was unable to sleep, but early the next morning he was on his way. At last, . . . as we rode together through some marshy ground, where, as I was anxiously looking around for the river, one of them called out geo afilli (see the water) ; and looking forward, I saw with infinite pleasure the great object of my mission; the long sought for, majestic Niger, as broad as the Thames at Westminster, and flowing slowly

to the

eastward.le

Although P a r k had inclined to the opinion that the Niger flowed to the west, he later had come to doubt this and he was not surprised, consequently, when he found the river 16

Ibid., p. 198.

flowing

28

BRITISH

ENTERPRISE

IN

NIGERIA

eastward. E v e n though there was now little doubt concerning the source of the stream, the mystery of its terminus still remained a secret. Y e a r s were to elapse before a final answer was disclosed. W h e n P a r k reached the N i g e r near Sego, an important river town, he was astonished at finding such a place in the heart of Africa. It possessed a population of 30,000 souls, and great activity and industry were everywhere in evidence. T h e discovery of the N i g e r was but one of the objectives of Park's mission. A f t e r many hardships he had attained his first objective, and now he sought, despite the warnings of the inhabitants of Sego, to achieve his second purpose, the discovery of T i m b u k t u . H e persisted in this quest for some time, working eastward along the N i g e r for a considerable distance. But his difficulties, instead of diminishing, increased as he again approached the country of the M o o r s . H e began to realize that it would be the height of f o l l y to push on. M a n y tales had come to him f r o m the peoples along the river concerning the mysterious city of T i m b u k t u . It was reported that the city was rich, inhabited by M o o r s of immense wealth, and g o v e r n e d by magnificent and splendid rulers. H e

was warned

also that the

popula-

tion was dangerous, and so he decided to turn back rather than incur the risk of having k n o w l e d g e of his valuable discoveries perish with him. It is difficult to resist the temptation to describe the adventures of this intrepid explorer on his return journey, because his experiences were f u l l y as thrilling as any which have been related. H i s situation is v i v i d l y described by one of his biographers, himself an African explorer of distinction : His hope of accomplishing this purpose in safety seemed almost as desperate as the task of g o i n g f o r w a r d . B e f o r e h i m lay a j o u r n e y on foot of eleven h u n d r e d miles in a straight line, to w h i c h must be added an additional five h u n d r e d for deviations a n d the w i n d i n g s of the road. H e had thus before him sixteen h u n d r e d miles on

foot

t h r o u g h a barbarous c o u n t r y , w h e r e the s t r a n g e r w a s considered fair prey, and the l a w s a f f o r d e d him no protection f r o m violence. H e w a s w i t h o u t the w h e r e - w i t h a l to buy food, and had only r a g s to shield him f r o m the violence of the w e a t h e r and the m a d d e n i n g onslaughts

GENESIS OF BRITISH I N T E R E S T

29

of mosquitoes. In addition, he had to face all the horrors of the tropic winter, tornadoes of wind, rain, with streams barring the way at every turn. 17 A f t e r almost a year of struggle to extricate himself from the African jungle, he emerged at last and soon returned safely to E n g l a n d . H e busied himself for a time writing about his experiences. T h e book that he produced had a good sale and, supplemented by a small consideration from the African Association, enabled him to live well for a short while. H e had hoped that the Government would provide him with employment, but he was forgotten in the tumult of the war with France. H i s fortunes were restored in 1802 at the conclusion of the Peace of Amiens when the African Association renewed its interest in exploration, and this time he was able to obtain Government support. It was not until 1803, however, that definite steps were taken toward dispatching an expedition. Toward the end of that year he received a letter from the Colonial Secretary asking him to come to London for an interview. H e was informed of the Government's plan to send an expedition to Africa, and when he was offered the command, he gladly accepted. 18 Park left the preparations for the expedition in the hands of the Government but, when he later returned to London, was disappointed to find that little had been done. Delay followed delay and it was not until January 30, 1804, that he was able to embark from Portsmouth. This tardy beginning was unfortunate, since it resulted in his being caught in the heart of Africa at the height of the rainy season. Doubtless it would have been wiser to have waited, but he was impatient of further delay and preferred to take that risk. H e planned to employ a detachment from the British garrison at Goree in order to penetrate the interior in force. This plan, as later events proved, was unfortunate and a smaller outfit selected with greater care would probably have accomplished more. Volunteers were readily obtained at Goree when it was announced that those who accepted were to receive double pay for the time 17 18

Thomson, of. cit., p. 220. Ibid., p. 2 3 1 .

30

BRITISH

ENTERPRISE

IN

NIGERIA

spent on the expedition, and a discharge from the service upon their return. Park followed his old route to the head waters of the Gambia and then struck across the upper valley of the Senegal to the watershed of the Niger. H i s troubles soon began. T h e men could not endure the climate. T h e y stood in constant fear of attack, and had to be continually on their guard against thieves. T h e rainy season, which broke in all its fury, contributed greatly to their discomfort. Nothing will better serve to illustrate the dangers and hardships of the journey than the following extract from Park's Journal : A b o u t three o'clock left Koombandi.

M r . Anderson and

Mr.

Scott were so sick that they wished to remain here for the night; with much entreating, persuaded them to mount their horses and go on. T h r e e miles east of the village, W i l l i a m Alsten, one of the seamen w h o m I received from His Majesty's ship Squirrel,

became so

faint that he fell from his ass. . . . Set him on my horse, but found he could not sit without holding him. Replaced him on the ass, but he tumbled o f f . Put him again on the horse, and he made no exertion to keep himself erect. I t was impossible to hold him on the horse, and after repeated tumbles he begged to be left in the woods till morning. I left a loaded pistol with him, put some cartridges into the crown of his h a t . 1 9

O n August 19 the shattered remnants of the expedition crossed the ridge which separated the valley of the Senegal from that of the Niger. From the summit of the ridge, Park was able to see the Niger "rolling its immense stream along the plain." But when he reflected that three-fourths of the soldiers had died on the march, that there were no carpenters to construct a boat, and that they were nearly a thousand miles in the interior of the continent, "the prospect seemed somewhat gloomy." H e did feel, however, that his journey had demonstrated two things: first, that with common prudence any quantity of merchandise might be transported from the Gambia to the Niger, and second, that if the 1 9 M u n g o Park, The Journal of a Mission to the Interior of Africa in the Year ι8οζ, by Mungo Park, together with other documents, Official and Private, relating to the same mission, (London, 1 8 1 5 ) , pp. 23-24.

GENESIS OF BRITISH INTEREST

31

journey were performed in the dry season the losses from sickness would be comparatively slight. 2 0 A third conclusion, that Europeans were unfitted for transporting goods and should be used as soldiers or leaders only, should have been clear but apparently was not. It has been pointed out above that there were conflicting notions about the exact course and terminus of the Niger, some people believing that it was a branch of the Nile, others that it flowed to the east and lost itself in the desert sands; and still others holding that the Congo and the Niger were one. Park, who was among those who assumed the latter theory to be true, was confident that eventually he would find himself on the broad Atlantic, off the mouth of the Congo. T h e real truth was suspected by only one geographer of prominence, the Scotchman James M ' Q u e e n , who believed that the Niger terminated in the Bight of Benin. 2 1 Park and his companions had been worried for some time over the attitude of Mansong, K i n g of Bambarra, who, it was reported, had declared that he would kill any white man who appeared in his dominion. Fortunately this proved untrue. Messengers from the king made their appearance, assured Park of protection, and offered him free passage through the country. T h e king did not, however, invite Park and his party to Sego, and they decided to stop at Sansanding in order to construct the boat that was to bear them to the Atlantic. Mansong had promised to furnish them with canoes, which, when they arrived, proved to be practically worthless. Better ones were not to be had, however, and Park was forced to make the best of the situation. From the poor material at his command, a crazy craft was constructed which was christened " H i s Majesty's schooner Joliba." 22 A t last all was in readiness for the start. Isaaco, the guide and interpreter, was paid off and sent to the Gambia with Park's Journal and letters, our only source of information concerning Ibid., p. 256. James M'Queen, A Geographical and Commercial View of Northern and Central Africa, containing a Particular Account of the Course and Termination of the Great River Niger in the Atlantic Ocean, (Edinburgh, 1 8 2 1 ) . 22 T . Banks MacLachlan, Mungo Park, (Edinburgh, 1898), pp. 1 1 6 - 1 9 . 20

21

32

BRITISH

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Park's second journey to the Niger country. In a letter to Camden, Park presents a vivid picture of his condition just prior to his voyage down the Niger: Y o u r Lordship will recollect that I always spoke of the rainy season with horror, as being fatal to Europeans; and our journey from the Gambia to the Niger will furnish melancholy proof of it. W e had no contest with the natives, nor was any of us killed by wild animals or other accident; and yet I am sorry to say that of fortyfour Europeans who left the Gambia in perfect health, five only are at present alive. 2 3

Nevertheless his terrible experiences had not shaken his courage, and he boldly proclaimed his intention of pushing on to discover the terminus of the Niger or perish in the attempt. T h e details of the remainder of Park's journey rest upon rather uncertain evidence, but the chief facts seem to be fairly well established. 24 After leaving Sansanding, the party floated slowly down the Niger. Repeated attempts to destroy the little group failed, although at one time it was attacked by some sixty canoes. T h e news that a party of white men was on the river served to arouse the cupidity of the natives and furnish motive for the attacks. As the party emerged from the country of the Moors, success seemed within their grasp. Ahead of them lay the land of the Negroes, a people who had always been friendly to Park. H e felt accordingly that all danger of attack was now past. But he committed a fatal blunder by not offering a gift to the King of Yauri. As this chieftain was angered by the omission, he sent his warriors down the Niger to Bussa in order to intercept the party at a place where the river left the broad plain and rushed through a 23

M u n g o P a r k , The Journal of a Mission to the interior of Africa, etc., p. 79. Camden was Colonial Secretary at the time. 24 Isaaco, the guide and interpreter who had been sent back to the Gambia before leaving Sansanding, arrived safely. When Park failed to return, vague rumors became current in E n g l a n d , and Isaaco was engaged to search f o r him. He was successful in reaching the Niger when he found an interpreter, A m a d i Fatouma, who had gone on with Park. T h e latter had learned the story of Park's death from a surviving member of the expedition and in turn related it to Isaaco. Subsequent investigation established the general truth of Isaaco's story.

GENESIS OF BRITISH INTEREST

33

narrow gorge, amid islands and dangerous rocks. H e r e the enemy lay in wait. As the party approached the rapids, ill luck directed the canoe into the most perilous of the three channels. Before Park could save himself, the canoe was hurled upon a rock where it stuck fast. E v e r y attempt to get free failed and, as the natives closed in, P a r k leaped into the stream and sank, never to reappear. 25 Thus perished M u n g o Park in the waters of the great river that he had discovered. Interest in his fate continued. H i s family never ceased to hope that he would one day return. 28 But England's renewed struggle with Napoleon caused public interest in Park's destiny to subside, and the necessities of the war prevented the Government f r o m capitalizing on his discoveries. T h e close of the wars witnessed a speedy revival of public interest in the N i g e r , and two expeditions were sent out in 1 8 1 6 . It will be recalled that Park had believed that the Niger and the Congo were identical, and it was upon this assumption that the plan formulated in 1 8 1 6 was based. T w o separate parties set out: one, led by M a j o r Peddie, was to follow Park's old route to the N i g e r ; the other, under the command of Captain Tuckey, was to proceed to the mouth of the Congo. It was believed that the two would meet somewhere in the interior and then return downstream to the Atlantic, but neither attempt met with success. Peddie's party proceeded only a short distance when the ravages of fever forced it to turn back. Tuckey was equally unfortunate. H e penetrated but a short distance up the Congo, when sickness and the difficulties of navigation forced him to abandon his attempt. 27 T h e failure of M a j o r Peddie and Captain Tuckey discouraged for a time the efforts of the British Government to reach the Niger from the west. Little attention was given to the theories of James M ' Q u e e n , who had published his views in 1 8 2 1 . H e held, as we ^ This is based upon Amadi Fatouma's account which is included in Park's Journal, pp. 3 24-3 1. 215 Park's son, Thomas, made an attempt to find his father, but was lost in Africa. Cf. Burns, of. cit., p. 92. 2 ' James Jameson, Discovery ani Adventure in Africa, (New York, 1 8 9 9 ) , pp. 154-60. Burns, of. cit., p. 92.

34

BRITISH

ENTERPRISE

IN

NIGERIA

have already noted, that the Niger entered the Atlantic in the Gulf of Guinea. Late in 1821 a well-equipped expedition sponsored by the British Government and led by M a j o r Dixon Denham, Captain H u g h Clapperton, and D r . Oudney started from Tripoli to follow the well-known caravan routes southward to the Niger country. 28 T h e friendly Basha of Tripoli provided an escort of two hundred Arabs which, with the addition of a party of Arab merchants, increased their numbers to approximately three hundred. T h e most interesting feature of the journey was the evidence of the horrors of Arab slave trade afforded by the countless skeletons of unfortunate Negroes lying along the trail. It was February 1823 before the party arrived at Lake Chad, which was finally sighted "glowing with the golden rays of the sun in its strength," and the first objective of the expedition was attained. T h e famous Shehu, Muhammed el Kanemi, who had recently expelled the Fulani conquerors from his country, accorded them a most cordial reception. T h e y were greatly impressed by the appearance of his horsemen, several thousand in number, who were clad in coats of chain armor which covered them from the throat to the knees.2 ¿ ¿ , p. 1 3 5 . A n account of the storming of L a g o s may be found in B u r n s , op. cit., pp.

1 2 9 - 3 3 . Geary, of. cit., pp. 2 5 - 1 7 . 7

Forces

1 8 5 2 , p. 40.

Burns, of. cit., Appendix C , for a copy of this treaty.

THE MAKING OF SOUTHERN NIGERIA

51

successor of Akitoye, proved unwilling to govern in accordance with British desires. In June 1861 the consul was instructed to annex Lagos because the Foreign Office had become convinced "that the permanent occupation of this important point in the Bight of Benin is indispensable to the complete suppression of the slave-trade." 8 Accordingly Docemo was summoned to a conference and the Government's intentions explained to him. H e was reluctant to sign, so it was necessary to make a show of force, to overcome his objections.9 Though the annexation of Lagos resulted in a curtailment of the slave trade, the new administration experienced difficulty in consolidating its authority. Docemo was dissatisfied with the changed order and complained that he had not understood the terms of the treaty he had been forced to sign ; some of the chiefs were fearful that annexation would involve the loss of their lands j and liberated Africans, many of them from Sierre Leone, intrigued against British rule. 1 0 The British merchants themselves were inclined to be critical when a slump in trade occurred soon after annexation. Missionaries mourned their loss of prestige. 1 1 The original intention of British policy had been to stop with the annexation of Lagos, but the subsequent development of trade made a forward policy necessary, so steps were taken to pacify the tribes in the hinterland of Lagos. T h e result, of course, was to bring additional territory under the control of the Lagos Government. T w o companies of the West India Regiment garrisoned the new colony until a force of Hausas could be raised by Captain Glover, and two small gunboats were made available by the Admiralty. In 1863 it became necessary to take action against Epe, where Possoo, a chief who had frequently shown hostility toward the British, had established himself. A l l attempts to induce him to submit to British authority were resisted. Force had to be employed to bring him to terms. 12 8

Papers Relating to the Occupation of Lagos, i 8 6 i , p. 5. Burns, op. cit., Appendix D. 10 Sir Richard Burton, Wanderings in West Africa, (London, 1 8 6 3 ) . 11 Burns, op. cit., p. 1 3 8 . Geary, of. cit., p. 44.

9

52

B R I T I S H E N T E R P R I S E IN N I G E R I A

As the authorities in Lagos became more interested in fostering trade with the hinterland their relations with the native tribes grew in importance. The tribes with which they most frequently came into contact were the Egbas and the Yorubas, by far the most advanced of the coastal tribes. The Yorubas were important producers of palm oil, which was rapidly becoming the most important export of West Africa, and was eagerly sought by European merchants. The Yoruba town of Ibadan was the center of this trade, but access to it was through the country of the Egbas. T h e latter were bitter foes of the Yorubas and, in addition, had built up a prosperous business by acting as middlemen between European merchants located in Lagos and the producers in Yorubaland. T h e Egbas were a serious obstacle because they were in a position to close the trade routes connecting Ibadan and Lagos and, unless the roads could be opened, further development of trade was likely to be strangled. Captain Glover, who had become the Administrator of Lagos, decided upon action and, after addressing an appeal to the Egba chiefs without result, he led a company of the West India troops against them and forced them to open the roads. 13 T h e chastisement of the Egbas inaugurated a period of quiet, peaceful development under the able leadership of Glover. By the time of his retirement in 1873, he had gained the confidence of the native population, and had done much to establish the colony of Lagos on a firm foundation. 14 T h e tribes living in the interior resumed their quarrels, however, and by 1877 the situation again became serious. This time the Yorubas appear to have been the principal offenders, for they made an attack upon the Egbas and in turn found themselves beset by enemies on every side. Though they were successful in defending themselves, the war dragged on without decisive results. It soon degenerated into a series of raids which eventually brought trade to a complete standstill. T h e Lagos 13

Burns, of. cit., p. 143. For a more detailed account of these troubles see Rev. Samuel Johnson, History of the Yorubas, (London, 1 9 2 1 ) , pp. 3 6 2 S . 14 Ibid., p. 1 4 $ .

THE MAKING OF SOUTHERN NIGERIA

53

authorities finally felt called upon to intervene and were successful in bringing about a temporary truce in 1886. 1 5 This truce was obviously no solution to difficulties that had resulted in a state of chronic warfare. In 1891 Governor Carter inaugurated vigorous measures to end anarchy and bring Yorubaland under British control. Such a policy was deemed necessary if trade was ever to be developed. It was motivated, moreover, by the fear that France might intervene from Dahomey should the disturbances continue. Shortly before the arrival of Carter, Acting Governor Denton had toured the interior but had failed to accomplish much. As a matter of fact British prestige had become somewhat dimmed as a result of the treatment accorded him by the tribesmen. The root of the difficulty was, as we have seen, a commercial dispute. The tribes involved were dominated by native middlemen who feared that their business would be destroyed should European merchants succeed in establishing direct contact with the Yorubas. 1 ® In January 1893 Governor Carter signed a treaty with the Egbas at Abeokuta which recognized their independence, but included certain restrictions that definitely limited their sovereignty. A l l disputes between natives and British subjects were to be adjudicated by the Governor of Lagos; freedom of trade was established; the roads were not to be closed without the consent of the British ; human sacrifice was abolished. In short, Egbaland was to be made a British protectorate. 17 A similar treaty was concluded with the Yorubas, but with the significant stipulation that they were forbidden from ceding any territory or entering into relationships of any kind with any foreign power except by British consent.18 Not only had the Yorubas been involved in a chronic state of war with the Egbas, but they were also on bad terms with the Fulani Emir of Ilorin. T h e causes for this 16

Geary, of. cit., p. j o . Pari. Pap., 1893-94, West Africa (Lagos) c. 7227, pp. 1 - 2 . Also Sir G. E. Haddon-Smith, Interior Mission to Yorubaland, 1893, MS in Colonial Office Library. 17 Pari. Paf., 1893-94, West Africa (Lagos) c. 7227, p. 36. 18 Ibid., p. 37. 16

54

B R I T I S H E N T E R P R I S E IN N I G E R I A

quarrel are not very clear, but the resultant disorder rendered commercial development impossible and, in addition, clashed with the more aggressive policy of imperialism initiated by Governor Carter. Proceeding to llorín, Carter was successful in persuading the Fulani ruler to make a public declaration expressing his friendship for the British and his willingness to make peace with Ibadan. Taking up a position between the respective armed camps he negotiated with both sides and succeeded in persuading them to withdraw their armies. But when he attempted to follow up this advantage and establish a British resident at Ibadan he was rebuffed. 19 T h e King was apparently fearful lest the British insist upon the abolition of slavery. While he was reminded that this institution would eventually have to be abolished, the point was not pressed at the moment. The Emir of Ilorin, with whom friendly relations had been established, was killed later, and his successor, angered at British interference with his slave-raiding activities, was disposed to make trouble. Reluctant to resort to force, the Lagos Government imposed an embargo on the trade of Ilorin, but this policy had little effect. In March 1896 the Emir's warriors attacked a town garrisoned by troops from Lagos, but were beaten off without much difficulty. In the following year the army of the Royal Niger Company defeated the Emir, and Ilorin was brought definitely under British control. 20 Despite the fact that the British had established a protectorate over Lagos in 1 8 5 1 and had annexed the town ten years later, it was stoutly denied in official circles that any extension of responsibilities in West Africa was contemplated. The delusion still persisted that the sole purpose of intervention was the destruction of the slave trade, apparently unmindful of the fact that expanding commercial interests would ultimately force Government to adopt a more positive policy. T h e fact that rival nations were still largely indifferent to the possibilities of Africa undoubtedly did much to foster this anti-imperialistic sentiment. It reached 19 Pari. Paf., 1893—94, West Africa (Lagos) c. 7227, p. 33. But a few months later Captain R. L. Bowers was appointed Resident. 20 This affair will be explained in the next chapter.

THE MAKING OF SOUTHERN NIGERIA

55

a climax in 1865 when a committee of the House of Commons, appointed to make a survey of British holdings in West Africa, proposed a resolution seeking to bind the Government to a policy of non-intervention and proclaimed the eventual abandonment of all possessions in West Africa except Sierre L e o n e . 2 1 T h e report went on to explain that E n g l a n d had become involved in West Africa solely because of the slave trade. H a d it not been for this traffic "commercial enterprise would never have selected the Gold Coast 2 2 for its locality, nor would the British probably have undertaken any settlements whatever in West A f r i c a ; still less would the Crown have implicated itself in Government there or in treaties of protection." T h e evidence presented to the Committee seemed to indicate that the slave trade was rapidly diminishing. Hopes were expressed that it would soon be totally extinct. Not only did the Commissioners feel that the principal reason for the presence of the British on the Coast no longer existed, but also "the evidence of merchants is that it is better that their agents should feel the necessity of keeping on good terms with the native powers than that they should be backed by English Governments, or even by consuls, more than is necessary for a reference of disputes to constituted authorities." But the course of events in Lagos indicates that the policy actually followed was not that suggested by the Committee nor, in addition, did the members of the commercial community turn out to be the "rugged individualists" described in the report. It was not until June 1885 that steps were taken to bring territory other than Lagos under direct British control, and by that time important changes had taken place. A s the visits of the slave dealers to the Coast became less frequent, a more respectable commerce developed, though for a time there was little improvement in the type of European who came to these shores. Masters of sailing vessels, frequently anchored for an extended period in the rivers, loaded their ships with native produce (mostly oil), and sailed away. These "palm oil ruffians" had no permanent 21 Report of the Committee appointed to inquire into the condition of the British Settlements on the West Coast of Africa, ¡86¡, c. 5 299, p. iii. 22 T h i s did not mean the Gold Coast proper, but West A f r i c a in general.

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B R I T I S H E N T E R P R I S E IN N I G E R I A

establishments, and the conduct of both officers and crew was frequently outrageous, being tempered only by the protests of missionaries and the capacity of the natives to retaliate. 23 T h e advent of steam navigation ; the policy of establishing permanent warehouses on shore; the influence exerted by the consular service; and especially the realization that commercial interests would be promoted best by men of good manners and education all combined to bring about greatly improved conditions. W h e n the British eventually were ready to set up an administrative system a competent observer could write: A t e a c h of these t r a d i n g establishments I h a v e described, y o u find

will

all the l e a d i n g n e w s p a p e r s subscribed to, a n d a selection o f i n -

t e r e s t i n g books p l a c e d at the disposal of the i n m a t e s .

Billiard-tables,

pianos, l a w n - t e n n i s c o u r t s , a n d a variety of o t h e r m e a n s of a m u s e m e n t in t h e h o u r s of r e c r e a t i o n are p r o v i d e d , a n d it g o e s

without

s a y i n g t h a t to a passing E u r o p e a n the hospitality is u n b o u n d e d . 2 4

T h e houses occupied by agents of the trading companies were well built, well ventilated, and comfortably furnished. T h e y possessed the appearance of light, pleasant homes. A single establishment usually consisted of the agent in charge, who was a person of importance and generally well paid, several assistants, some Negro house servants, and native workers many of whom were skilled carpenters and coopers. Palm oil—which was the principal article of commerce—was obtained from the husk of the nut of the Elais Guineensis palm which, when ripe, was gathered by the natives. T h e oil was extracted by a crude process of boiling the husks in water and skimming the oil as it rose to the surface. Native women of the interior tribes extracted the oil and transported it to the local markets where it was purchased by native traders from the coast towns such as Benin, Brass, Bonny, Opobo, or O l d Calabar. T h e y paid for the oil with cheap European trade goods which they had in turn obtained from white traders established on the coast. T h e 2 3 Sir H. H. Johnston, Report on the Niger Delta and Oil Rivers District, 1888, pp. 3 1 3 - 1 4 . T h i s report is still confidential, but I was allowed to see portions of it through the courtesy of the British Foreign Office. " Ibid., p. 314.

THE MAKING OF SOUTHERN NIGERIA

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native traders usually made two trips to the interior each year to gather the oil, and made their payments by cheque or " b o o k , " as it was called locally. This consisted of a note of credit and could be cashed for European goods obtainable at the local stores. M o n e y transactions were rare. B y 1888 this trade had attained impressive proportions. F o r the first half of the year it was valued at £ 1 , 1 7 2 , 8 4 0 . About three-fifths of this trade was with E n g l a n d and the remainder was divided between Hamburg and H a v r e . T h e carrying trade was largely monopolized by British ships. 26 T h e principal imports consisted of Manchester cotton, silks, fancy goods, hardware, tobacco, gin, rum, salt, guns, powder, and sundries such as glass, crockery, hats, clothes, and furniture. These imports were paid for by the exportation of palm oil, palm kernels ( f r o m which a better grade oil was extracted in European refineries), rubber of good quality, ivory, ebony, camwood, gums, and timber. 28 Europeans had knocked about the Niger Delta for some three centuries, but they had exerted relatively little influence upon native institutions. N o w , however, the development of trade, the building of telegraph lines, and the growth of facilities for inland communication brought natives more closely into contact with white civilization. T h e old native culture began to reveal signs of change. T h e process was greatly accelerated by the efforts of missionaries to convert the natives and to suppress certain barbarous customs such as twin murder, human sacrifice, cannibalism, and fetish worship. 27 W h i l e the efforts of missionaries to win converts had yielded but meager results, their indirect influence was considerable. T h e y had succeeded surprisingly well, if one considers the handicaps under which they labored, in civilizing and humanizing the primitive tribes. T h e fact that many natives were able to speak and write English bears testimony as to the effectiveness of their labors. 28 25

Ibid., p. 312. Ibid. 27 Cf. W. P. Livingstone, Mary Sleisor of Old Calabar, (Garden City), 1 9 2 3 , •passim. This is a graphic description of the efforts of a missionary to abolish these practices. 38 Johnston, Report on the Niger Delta, etc., pp. 3 1 7 - 1 8 . 28

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It should be clear from this description of conditions that it was hopeless for any government to continue to pursue a policy of laissez faire in the Niger territories. The economic stake had become too great, and the propaganda put out by commercial houses and missionaries was too effective to be resisted. Notions about the value of colonial possessions were changing in all European countries, and it became increasingly evident that effective steps to establish an administrative system must soon be taken or the territory would pass under the control of England's rivals, Germany and France. During this period, also, British influence in Lagos and its hinterland had been steadily growing. M r . Goldie Taubman (later Sir George Goldie) had been active in laying the foundations of the Royal Niger Company. H e was present at the Berlin Conference, where he was able to claim, on the basis of treaties concluded by himself and Consul Hewett, that British influence was predominant on the lower Niger and its environs. 29 The Berlin Conference laid down the principle that formal notification was necessary if claims to African territory were to be made by the Powers. It was in obedience to this dictum that the following notification was inserted in the London Gazette on June 5, 1885: It is hereby notified for public information that under and by virtue of certain Treaties concluded between the month of J u l y last and the present date, and by other lawful means, their territories on the W e s t Coast of A f r i c a , hereinafter referred to as the N i g e r Districts, were placed under the Protectorate of Her Majesty the Queen from the date of the said Treaties respectively. T h e British Protectorate of the N i g e r Districts comprises the territories on the line of coast between the British Protectorate of L a g o s and the right or western bank of the mouth of the Rio del R e y . It further comprises the territories on both banks of the Niger, from its confluence with the Benue at L o k o j a to the sea, as well as the territories on both banks of the Benue from the confluence up to and including Ibi. 8 0 29 The activities of Consul Hewett and Sir George Goldie are described in greater detail in Chapters I I I and IV. so Hertslet, Map of África by Treaty, (London, 1 8 9 4 ) , I, p. 445.

T H E M A K I N G OF SOUTHERN NIGERIA

59

T h e establishment of the British Protectorate of the Niger Districts did not mean that it was the intention of the Government to establish strict administrative control over the areas claimed by the proclamation quoted above. T h e fact that authority was vested in a consul is a clear indication of the fact that the territories involved were regarded as foreign soil, hence control was to be exercised by the Foreign Office. Members of the commercial community had established informal Courts of Equity at important centers which attempted to deal with issues arising between traders. O n frequent occasions threats to call upon British warships to intervene in disputes between native producers and European merchants had been made. But in districts not readily accessible from the sea such threats carried little weight. 3 1 T h e British consul, M r . Ε . H . Hewett, found himself in a most difficult position. H i s powers were rather vaguely defined; he lacked the means to enforce his decisions; he could not remain constantly at his post, since the climate made it imperative that he return frequently to England to restore his health; and, what was most disconcerting of all, he was forced to be constantly on the move to forestall the agents of France and Germany, who were now actively engaged in the establishment of claims on the Coast. It was imperative, also, to give serious attention to the status of the numerous "kings" who claimed sovereignty in the territory that had been placed definitely under British protection. It has been explained already that the coastal chiefs had proved valuable agents of European commercial interests from the sixteenth century on. T h e y were depended upon in the days of the slave trade to secure captives from the interior, hold them in barracoons along the coast, and sell them to slave traders who did not wish to incur either the expense or the risk of procuring slaves themselves. Later, as the slave trade diminished, these coastal chiefs established themselves as middlemen between Eu31 Colonial Reports, Annual, Niger Coast Protectorate, ¡891-1895, p. z. T h e Foreign Office papers in the Public Record Office are valuable in showing the process by which the decision to establish effective control was reached.

6o

BRITISH ENTERPRISE IN NIGERIA

ropean traders visiting the coast and the producers of palm oil and other tropical products in the interior. While this arrangement was quite satisfactory in the early days, the increase in the volume of trade, together with the desire for larger profits, led rather naturally to the suggestion that the native middlemen be eliminated. Consul Hewett was so preoccupied with his efforts to thwart French and German activities that he was able to give but little attention to this pressing problem. There is slight evidence that the Foreign Office devoted serious thought to the situation, or that it gave their agents much guidance. It is quite clear, too, that a choice could be made between two policies: the native rulers could be crushed, or they could be used. Unfortunately the first alternative appealed more strongly to Vice-Consul H a r r y Johnston, who arrived on the scene late in 1885. H e was a man of strong personality, quick to make decisions, and persistent in carrying them into effect. Despite his unfortunate start in West Africa he was destined to become an outstanding figure in African history. H e had scarcely arrived in the Protectorate before he became involved in a dispute with King J a J a of the Opobo River. This affair did much to determine British policy in the Niger Districts and is an excellent illustration of the processes of imperialism. J a J a had been born a slave, but later he had secured his freedom and risen to a position of great influence. H e was a shrewd trader and quickly established himself as a middleman between the white traders of the coast and the tribes of the interior. His agents traveled widely in the interior gathering palm oil and palm kernels which he sold to traders on the coast. H e was very successful in fixing prices at a point which frequently threatened the profits of European commercial houses. H e was unwilling to be governed by the prices prevailing in the European market and thus became involved in constant bickerings and disputes. T h e traders were angered by his stubborn refusal to reduce prices, so they combined against him by organizing the Amalgamated Association. But when he detached the firm of Alexander Miller

THE

MAKING

OF

SOUTHERN

NIGERIA

61

& Bros, from the Association they realized that they had failed to force his hand. 32 Alexander Miller & Bros, agreed to pay J a J a his usual commission if he would grant them a monopoly of his business. While they would probably lose money for a time, they felt that the profits eventually would be large enough to make up for the loss, and they might thus clear their warehouses of old trade goods purchased at high prices and replenish their stock with new and cheaper commodities.33 The Association was prompt to carry its case to M r . Johnston, but when he attempted to bring the King to terms, the latter produced a treaty that he had made with the British in 1873 which recognized him as an independent ruler. His position had been further fortified by a special treaty concluded with Consul Hewett in 1884, at a time when the Consul had been desperately trying to prevent the encroachment of French and German rivals. J a J a had insisted upon a definition of the word "protectorate," and he was informed by Hewett . . . that the Queen does not w a n t to take your country, or your markets, but at the same time she is anxious that no other nation should take them. She undertakes to extend her gracious power and protection, which will leave your country still under your G o v e r n m e n t ; she has no wish to disturb your rule, although she is anxious to see your country get up, as well as the countries of the other tribes with w h o m her people have been for so long trading. 3 4

Hewett had had his troubles with J a J a and in 1881 tried to restrain him from inflicting punishment on the K w a Ibos, an independent tribe over which he claimed jurisdiction. This had drawn a sharp protest from the ruler, who appealed directly to 32

Pari. Pap. 1888, 74, (Africa No. 2 ) , c. 5365, pp. 3 1 - 3 2 . Sir H. H. Johnston, The Story of My Life, (Indianapolis, 1 9 2 3 ) , pp. 1 7 6 - 7 7 . 83 An Account of the Disfute at Ofobo between King Ja Ja and Consular Authority, (London, 1 8 8 8 ) , p. 14. Letter from Consul Hewett to King J a J a , 8 / 1 / 8 4 . These papers are documents, mostly correspondence, collected by Alexander Miller & Bros, of Glasgow and published at the time they were trying to prevent Johnston from being appointed as Consul-General. Cited below as "Ofobo Disfute." 34 Ibid., pp. 1 1 - 1 2 .

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the British authorities, protesting not only against the effort of Hewett to restrict his sovereignty over the K w a Ibos, but also against the efforts of a trader, George Watts, to trade directly with the interior. It was several months before he received a reply but in January 1882 Granville wrote to him: I have now to inform you that H e r Majesty's G o v e r n m e n t must decline to commit themselves to any recognition of your claims to this country, and I have at the same time to w a r n you that they can not permit the taking of any steps which would lead to the destruction of the lives and property of any British subjects who might see fit to establish themselves as traders in that c o u n t r y . 3 5

This declaration of policy was not followed by action and the bickering continued, with the traders bitterly protesting against a Government that failed to support them. Johnston was determined to force matters to an issue. H e made an unfortunate blunder, however, in taking sides in the controversy. H e supported the Amalgamated Association, going so far as to accept the hospitality of Messrs. Harrison and Company by establishing his headquarters at their factory. 3 6 Soon after his arrival he sent a vigorous despatch to Salisbury pointing out that trade was at a standstill, and that access to the interior markets was blocked by the agents of King J a J a . H e held the latter responsible for many acts of violence. Johnston made an extensive tour of the interior and predicted that "the extension of trade caused by freedom of intercourse between the coast and the rich interior would be enormous" if only the truculent King of the Opobo River were removed. T h e possibilities of the country so greatly excited his imagination that he wrote: F r o m the farthest point to which I penetrated inland I could see ground

rising

into gently

undulating hills. T h e

placid stream up

which w e were travelling became a mountain torrent. Here is the country where white men may hope to settle and enjoy good health, and it is from lands like these that runaway slaves and upstart K i n g s 35 88

Pari. Paf., 1888, 74, (Africa No. 2 ) , c. 536s, p. 1 3 . Opobo Dispute, p. 61.

T H E MAKING OF SOUTHERN NIGERIA

63

like Ja Ja are trying to keep us from penetrating, lest their ill-gotten gains as middlemen be diminished.37 Early in August 1887, in an effort to compel the King to abandon his alliance with Alexander Miller & Bros., Johnston persuaded Ja Ja to sign an agreement binding himself, under penalty of heavy fine, not to restrict the trade with the markets of the interior. H e promised, in addition, to send a "big Chief" to accompany the Vice-Consul to the interior and break the restrictions which prevented direct contact with the coast traders. 38 This, obviously, spelled ruin for Ja Ja. W h e n he hesitated to carry out the agreement, he was told that all trade with him had been prohibited until he saw fit to yield. 3 9 M r . Turnbull, the agent for Alexander Miller & Bros., protested to Johnston and presented a claim for damages. Johnston informed him that other firms were now trading directly with the interior and accused him of "lack of enterprise" if he failed to do the same. W h e n Turnbull informed the Vice-Consul that he proposed to ignore consular authority and trade with Ja Ja in defiance of Johnston, he was warned that such action would be punished by a fine of £500 and that, if necessary, the navy would be summoned to enforce the edict. 40 In the meantime Ja Ja, at the suggestion of Alexander Miller & Bros., had carried his case to London. A delegation of subordinate chiefs accompanied by M r . Farquhar, the predecessor of Turnbull, visited London seeking an interview with Salisbury. T h e y were given strong backing by the Glasgow office, which wrote to Salisbury, informing him of the proposed visit and urging him to receive the group personally. 41 T h e Foreign Secretary was informed, also, that the action taken by Johnston had tied up their fleet of steamers, resulting in serious losses. T h e Glasgow office inquired by what authority the embargo on 37 38 39 40

Pari. Paf. 1888, 74, ( A f r i c a No. 2 ) , c. 5365, p. J3. Ofobo Disfute, p. 54. Ibid. Ibid., cf. pp. 5 6 - 5 7 for correspondence between T u r n b u l l and Johnston. Ibid., p. 46.

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trade with Ja Ja had been imposed. But Salisbury gave them little satisfaction, refusing to receive the delegation personally. T h e y did learn through an under-secretary that the matter "is engaging his Lordship's serious attention." 42 W h i l e the delegation representing Ja Ja was attempting unsuccessfully to get the attention of Salisbury, Johnston decided to act. Realizing that the approval of the Foreign Office was necessary before he could take steps to remove Ja Ja, he visited Bonny and cabled for authority to deal with his opponent. In the course of a few hours he received the reply: " Y o u r action with regard to Ja Ja approved. Further instructions will be sent after communication with the Admiralty." 43 This cablegram was actually sent in reply to an earlier written despatch from the Vice-Consul, but Johnston assumed without question that he now possessed the authority he had sought and so he hastened back to summon Ja Ja to a conference. T h e King was given the choice of attending or being deposed as the enemy of the Queen. H e was, however, given a safe conduct : I have summoned you to attend in a friendly spirit. I hereby assure you that whether you accept or reject my proposals to-morrow no restraint whatever will be put on y o u — y o u will be free to go as soon as you have heard the message of the Government . . . I f you attend to-morrow I pledge you my word that you will be free to come and go, but if you do not attend I will conclude you to be guilty of the charges brought against you, and shall immediately proceed to carry out your punishment. 44

T h e r e was little for King Ja Ja to do but comply. H e appeared for the conference accompanied by many of his warriors, but found that he had been trapped. H e was informed that it was necessary for the peace of the river that he be removed and was 42

Ofobo

43

Pari.

gram

Disfute, Pap.

p. 48.

1888, 74, ( A f r i c a N o . 2 ) , c. 5 3 6 5 , p. 54. A p p a r e n t l y the cable-

w a s sent in r e p l y to an earlier despatch

f r o m Johnston. T h e

latter's

c a b l e g r a m w a s received at 3:55 p.m. w h i l e the t e l e g r a m quoted w a s sent at 3 : 4 5 p.m. o f the same day, September 12, 1 8 8 7 . N o c a b l e g r a m was sent in direct response to Johnston's message. T h i s is substantiated b y Johnston. C f . Story 44

of My Ofobo

Life, Dispute,

p. 1 8 1 . p. 2 1 .

The

T H E M A K I N G OF S O U T H E R N N I G E R I A

65

given only an hour to decide whether he would accompany Johnston to Accra and stand trial, or be treated as an enemy. Surrounded by unfriendly tribes and menaced by the guns of the Goshawk, he had no choice but to yield. So he went quietly aboard the warship and within a few days was landed at Accra. 45 T h e trial at Accra attracted much attention in both official and commercial circles, and the Government was careful to appoint a high-ranking officer, Admiral Sir Walter Hunt-Grubbe, to try King J a Ja. There was some doubt as to the power of the Governor of the Gold Coast to detain J a J a , so the Legislative Council was asked to suspend its rules in order to pass a special ordinance granting him this power. 46 The trial was a farce, of course. The deposed ruler was given but two days to prepare his case J witnesses in his behalf were not summoned; and much of the evidence presented against him was probably false. 47 In the circumstances it is not surprising that he was convicted and sentenced to exile for five years. The Court relented to the extent of giving him his choice of places to spend the years of exile. H e selected the West Indies. Four years later he was pardoned by Consul-General MacDonald but died before he could reach the West Coast. The deposition of King J a J a marks an important step in the establishment of British authority over the "Oil Rivers" since the protectorate had heretofore existed largely on paper. But the methods employed were questionable. There seems to be little doubt that Johnston allowed himself to become involved in a trade dispute and that he was unfair to J a Ja. T h e latter was in many respects a great African. H a d he been handled differently, he might have served British interests most effectively. It is probably true that he was guilty of many cruelties in defending, what he had every reason to believe were his rights, but in this respect he was no different from the emirs of Northern Nigeria who proved so useful to British administrators in later years. It was especially unfortunate that he was promised a safe con45 46 47

Johnston, of. cit., pp. 179-82. Burns, of. cit., p. 1 6 1 . Ofobo Disfute, pp. 4 1 - 4 3 . Burns, of. cit., p. 162.

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duct when invited to attend the conference with Johnston, only to find that the latter's pledge was worthless. T h e effect on the people of the Oil Rivers was bad since many were, for a long time, suspicious of the good faith of the British Government. 4 8 In J u n e 1889 M r . Johnston returned to London after having served for nearly three years on the coast, where he had done much to lay the foundation for British rule in the future. H e felt that the deposition of J a J a was his outstanding accomplishment and reported that " f i v e British firms are now building and trading in the Ibo markets of the interior . . . and the people received them with the most fervid welcome." 49 T h e power of the most important of the middlemen had been broken; friendly relations had been established with the Germans in the Cameroons; difficulties between the British traders in the Oil Rivers and the newly established Royal Niger Company had been adjusted; an understanding had been concluded with the Kingdom of Benin; and Nana, an important ruler of the Benin R i v e r , had been cultivated. H e had, in addition, studied many of the languages spoken by the peoples of the coast and interior districts, and had made many important contributions to botanical, zoological, and geographic science. 50 As Johnston reviewed these accomplishments, he felt that he would in all probability be selected as the first governor of the Niger Coast Protectorate. Sir Claude MacDonald was given the appointment, however. T h e high-handed manner in which he had coerced K i n g J a J a had created a bad impression in official circles, and the pressure which Alexander Miller & Bros, had been able to exert on the government officials resulted in the selection of another man to organize the new government. 5 1 48

For opinions of the J a J a affair cf. Alexander A. Cowen, "The Story of J a J a , " West Africa, November 12, 1 9 2 7 ; R . H. F. Bourne, "Our West African Possessions," Gentlemen's Magazine, October 1888: Sir William Geary, " J a J a , an African Merchant Prince," West A frica, January 14, 1922. 48 Pari. Paf., 1888, 74, (Africa No. 2 ) , c. 5365, p. 100. 50 The results of Johnston's researches were later published under the title The Comparative Study of the Bantu and Semi-Bantu Languages, (London, 1919). 51 " I had prevented Messrs. Miller Brothers of Glasgow from securing a monopoly of trade with J a J a on the Opobo River. Old Mr. Alexander Miller died

T H E MAKING OF SOUTHERN NIGERIA

67

M a c D o n a l d was a man of real ability and went out to the Oil Rivers in 1889 to make a comprehensive study of the situation. H e visited most of the districts ; conferred with many of the important chiefs ; negotiated treaties which placed them definitely under British protection; studied many problems of administration at first hand ; and returned to make a comprehensive report to the home authorities. 52 T h e r e had been considerable discussion as to the advisability of including the Oil Rivers within the sphere allotted to the R o y a l Niger Company, but MacDonald, with the enthusiastic support of the African T r a d e Section of the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce, had successfully opposed this plan. T h e latter body had been interested in the region for some time and had done much to prod the Foreign Office into taking possession in 1886. 5 3 Liverpool merchants were extremely hostile to the R o y a l Niger Company and anxious to establish free trade, which would prevent their rivals from gaining a monopoly. T h e y argued that the Oil Rivers had been made of value to the Nation by means of national expenditures upon the suppression of the Slave Trade and upon exploring expeditions to the River Niger . . . and it was only right, therefore, that the nation at large should reap the benefit of those efforts, and the efforts of the merchants and steamship owners at a great age the other day [ 1 9 2 2 ] leaving—I am told—£2,000,000 as his fortune. So my assertion of Free Trade on the Niger Delta cannot have seriously injured his commercial prospects; though it may have prevented his becoming four times a millionaire. Nevertheless his firm loomed large in the eyes of politicians who counted votes; and his influence dissuaded the Foreign Office from giving me the succession of Consul Hewett, and the task of establishing the Southern Nigerian Protectorate undertaken by Sir Claude MacDonald in 1 8 9 1 . " Johnston, op. cit., p. 200. 52 Col. Ref., Annual, Niger Coast Protectorate, '895, fassim. 53 Report of Proceedings at a Banquet given by the African Trade Section to Major Claude MacDonald, (Liverpool, 1 8 9 2 ) , p. 29. " T h e first thing we did was to point out to the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office that there were rumors of annexation by other Powers of parts of the Coast of Western Africa which we had been in the habit of considering were under the British Flag. . . . It was pointed out to the Foreign Office that difficulties would arise, and the Foreign Office was requested to watch proceedings." Quoted from speech of Mr. Henry Coke.

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of Liverpool, and that free trade should be established within the borders of the new colony. 84 M a j o r MacDonald felt that there were many reasons for setting up a separate administrative unit. 55 In the first place, it would prevent the establishment of a trade monopoly. H e argued that the coast middlemen would object to government by traders and testified that They will all welcome the direct government by Her Majesty's officers, because they believe that such rule is absolutely impartial in trade matters; but if, in spite of their protests, they are handed over to the government of traders, they will, so they assure me at Benin, Brass, New Calabar, Bonny, and Old Calabar, resist such change by force of arms and with all the strength at their disposal.58 Second, he held that relations with foreign powers could be conducted more efficiently than would be the case were the territory placed under the domination of a private company. T h i r d , he was of the opinion that it was easier to establish direct government than to attempt to rule by means of a chartered company. 57 W h i l e there might be some justification for continuing to govern through consuls, he felt that the results obtained under that system were not very satisfactory, for the practice of sending gunboats to the rivers to enforce their authority was bad. Much might be accomplished, he felt, by utilizing the power and prestige of the native middlemen in opening the country to trade and commerce, thus bringing it more effectively under British control. 5 8 64

Report of Proceedings at a Banquet given by the African Trade Section to Claude MacDonald, p. 6. C f . speech of Chairman, M r . A l f r e d L . Jones. 65 It had been proposed, also, to unite the Oil Rivers and Lagos. 56 Refort by Major Claude MacDonald of his visit as Her Majesty's Commissioner to the Niger and Oil Rivers, March 1890, p. 1 0 0 . Cited as "Refort of Major MacDonald." 67 Ibid., pp. 9 7 - 1 0 2 . 08 It is unfortunate that this policy was not followed out since it might have developed into a system of indirect administration which worked so successfully in Northern Nigeria. In fact, a start toward developing such a system had been made in the case of Nana, who had been given a staff of office in 1 8 8 5 and recognized as " G o v e r n o r " of Benin River.

Major

T H E M A K I N G OF S O U T H E R N N I G E R I A

69

The greater part of MacDonald's recommendations was accepted.59 On January 1, 1891, he was given the title of Commissioner and Consul-General, and was authorized to reorganize the administrative system. A force of armed constabulary was raised; armed launches were provided by means of which consular officials could easily visit the districts under their control; and British rule thus became a reality. eo The Consul-General had in mind a very comprehensive plan which would result, he felt, in the effective occupation of the country. In an address that he delivered before the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce he declared: The general plan, which is based on lines laid down by the Brussels Act, is to establish fortified posts at certain distances in the interior, to form between them lateral communications by means of roads well kept and guarded, and then advance another parallel, leaving nothing unfinished or unguarded behind, and by this means bringing the whole of the ground covered under the influence of civilization and Christianity. (Loud applause.) 6 1 The plan appealed strongly to his hosts. It was altogether too ambitious and expensive, however, and was never carried very far. H e did establish Centers of Administration on the more important rivers and in the larger towns, so far as circumstances permitted. With the consent of certain chiefs, an import duty was levied to meet the costs of administration. It yielded the respectable sum of £87,695 during the first year. 02 By 1893, the system of administration had become fairly well established and notification was given the Powers, through the usual channels of the London Gazette, that the territory was henceforth to be known as " T h e Niger Coast Protectorate" and not as the "Oil Rivers Protectorate." The chief administrator was 59 It is difficult to ascertain the views of the Foreign Office since their papers for this period are not available. 60 Burns, o f . cit., p. 1 7 7 . 01 Re-port of Proceedings at Banquet, etc., p. 10. 02 Pari. Pap., 1895, 7 1 , (Africa No. 1 ) , c. 7596, pp. 2-6. T h e description of the administrative system established by MacDonald is based upon this document.

•JO

BRITISH ENTERPRISE IN NIGERIA

given the title of "Consul-General." His authority extended to all parts of the Protectorate, and he was responsible to the Foreign Office. T h e r e were several districts, each under the direct authority of a Vice-Consul, who in turn was assisted by two junior officers, one of whom held a judicial warrant. This permitted the establishment of consular courts to deal with cases involving Europeans and natives. T h e vice-consul served as the backbone of the system. H e was expected to extend British rule in the district to which he had been assigned, cultivate and maintain friendly relations with the tribesmen of his district, preserve order, and look after the administration of the customs, postal, and treasury departments in so far as these concerned his particular district. T h e number of departments constitute an imposing list. In the early days, in fact, there were about as many departments as there were individuals in the service. T h e more important included the political, customs, postal, military, marine, treasury, and medical. A word about some of them is perhaps in order. T h e political department was the most important since it dealt with the natives and concerned itself with the problem of making British rule an effective instrument in bringing some semblance of order out of the prevailing chaos. It required a person possessed of great tact and courage to fulfill successfully the duties imposed by such a responsibility. On the whole, political officers attempted to secure cooperation of the natives in their effort to impose British authority and break down some of the more barbarous customs prevailing among these primitive people. While the use of force was frowned upon, it was realized that some fighting might perhaps be necessary before certain of the more powerful chiefs could be induced to accept the reality of British rule. Consequently, a native army of some two hundred Yorubas was raised by Vice-Consul Moor. Their number was later increased to about five hundred and, under British training, they became a formidable body of troops vastly superior to anything that might be brought against them by the local rulers. T h e customs department was also of great importance since it was by means of customs duties that most of the revenue necessary to support the administration was obtained. T h e methods

T H E M A K I N G OF SOUTHERN NIGERIA

71

of collection were similar to those in effect in E n g l a n d . Some fifty native clerks were employed in this service. 83 In 1894 the administration faced a crisis; for it became necessary to take steps to depose Nana, who earlier had been recognized as " G o v e r n o r " of the Benin River. H e was a native of much ability, and had used his position as " G o v e r n o r " to accumulate considerable wealth and strengthen his position as a middleman. H e had a rather unenviable reputation as a slave raider and consequently was disliked by the missionaries. H e was highly regarded by some, especially M r . Johnston, who considered him to be potentially useful to the British. 64 But his position as a middleman did not recommend him to MacDonald who, as we have seen, was very friendly to the commercial interests represented on the coast. M a c D o n a l d was quite willing to believe the tales that were told concerning Nana's activities as slave raider and his proclivities for indulging in human sacrifice. It is probable that there was a good deal of truth in the stories that were told about him, but the steps taken against him were questionable, without doubt. 65 MacDonald was not present when matters came to a climax. In August 1894, Acting Consul-General M o o r sent a despatch to the Foreign Office indicating that trade was at a standstill in the Benin River, that his authority had been defied, and that Nana's continued presence was a threat to the peace and prosperity of the Protectorate. 66 T h e home authorities were not anxious to use force. Peaceful coercion in the shape of a trade blockade was tried, but this proved ineffective. Nana made matters worse by taking the initiative in attacking a small town at the mouth of the river. It was now felt that British prestige could be sustained only by the use of force. Later in the month a reconnaissance was attempted, resulting in a sharp skirmish and several casualties. T h e British brought e3

¡bid. Johnston, of. cit., p. 198. 65 H. Bindloss, In the Niger Country, (Edinburgh and London, 1 8 9 8 ) , pp. 2 0 5 - 1 6 . He claims that Nana was deposed because he indulged in human sacrifice and defied the authority of MacDonald. 00 Pari. Paf., 1895, 7 1 , (Africa No. 3 ) , c. 7638, p. 1 . 64

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more pressure to bear, and the town was closely invested. T h e K i n g offered to make terms but was informed that nothing short of unconditional surrender would be accepted. T h e town fell the next month. T h e King escaped, but was captured in a few days and sent into exile. T h e deposition of Nana yielded important results. In the first place, it established the policy of removing native rulers who opposed British penetration of the country, instead of seeking their cooperation in governing it. It became quite clear that there was to be no experimentation in the direction of indirect rule, which had been hinted when Nana was established as "Governor" in 1884. Second, the prestige of the new administration had been greatly enhanced, and the way prepared for a decisive struggle with Benin, the most powerful native state within the Protectorate. Finally, a hard blow had been dealt the internal slave trade and ground had been gained in the effort to extinguish such barbarous practices as human sacrifice, which—it was alleged—was permitted, if not encouraged by Nana. T h e overthrow of Nana was followed by the conquest of the Kingdom of Benin. This Kingdom had been known to Europeans since the fifteenth century and, for many years had been an important center of the slave trade. T h e decline of the traffic had seriously affected the prosperity of the kingdom. Resentment expressed itself in the setting up of a prohibition of trade of any kind. Since by now it had become the settled policy of the Government of the Protectorate to open up trading opportunities to British merchants by force of arms, efforts were made to force Benin into line. In 1892 the vice-consul of the Benin River, Captain Galway, visited Benin and made a treaty with Overami, the king, which placed his country under British protection, bound him to suppress the slave trade, and abolish human sacrifice.87 A limited amount of trading was resumed, but it was soon stopped. E v e r y effort to induce the king to relent failed. In 1896 the act67

B u r n s , of.

cit.,

p. 1 8 1 . See a l s o : L t . C o l . Sir H. L . G a l w a y , " N i g e r i a in

the N i n e t i e s , " Journal his mission.

of the African

Society,

April

1930, f o r an account of

T H E MAKING OF SOUTHERN N I G E R I A

73

ing consul-general, M r . Phillips, decided to pay a personal visit to the King in the hope of persuading him to open up the trade routes and to cease the practice of human sacrifice. Conditions in Benin City were shocking. It was felt that "it was becoming a perfect disgrace that in the Protectorate, particularly in a part so close to one of our vice-consular districts, so terrible a state of affairs as that, in what was not very improperly called, the City of Blood, should continue." 98 Overami was not pleased at the prospect of a visit and informed Phillips that he could not receive him because he was celebrating the "custom," or anniversary of his father's death. H e did promise, however, to receive him in a few months' time, but such a delay was not acceptable to the administration. It was not possible to obtain an adequate military escort and, remembering the successful visit of Galway in 1892, M r . Phillips was determined to follow his example. H e accordingly notified the King that he was comingj that his party would be a small one; and, in order to gain the good will of the ruler, that it would be entirely unarmed. H e made this decision in the face of repeated warnings from experienced coasters and friendly natives that the venture was hazardous—a decision that reflects greater credit upon his courage than upon his judgment. 89 The results were disastrous. Despite the safe conduct given Phillips, the little party was attacked on its way to Benin. Only two of the British survived the attack. When news of the massacre reached the Foreign Office, immediate steps were taken to punish Benin. Troops and warships were speedily collected and in a short time an expedition commanded by Rear Admiral Rawson was on its way. T h e native troops were supported by several hundred seamen and marines. After much suffering, as a result of the debilitating effects of the climate, and after a good deal of hard fighting, the column entered Benin City on February 18, 1897. The King made good his 88 Captain Alan Boisragon, Τ he Benin Massacre, (London, 1 8 9 7 ) , p. 63. Captain Boisragon was one of the two Englishmen who survived the massacre of Phillips' party. He was the commander of the military forces of the Protectorate. 69 Commander R. H. Bacon, Benin the City of Blood, (London and New York, 1 8 9 7 ) , pp. 1 6 - 1 7 .

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IN

NIGERIA

escape, but the vengeance of the British was visited upon several of the lesser chiefs w h o had been implicated in the massacre of Phillips and his p a r t y . 7 0 T h e most revolting scenes were witnessed by the troops as they entered the city. T h e horrors of fetish worship were everywhere visible : T h e city presented a most appalling sight. . . . Sacrificial trees in the open spaces still held the corpses of the latest victims . . . and on every path a freshly killed victim was found lying, apparently placed there to prevent pursuit. O n e large open space was strewn with h u m a n bodies and bones in all stages of decomposition. Within the walls the sight was, if possible, more terrible. Seven large sacrificial compounds were found enclosed by walls. Against the end wall in each, under a roof, was raised a dais with an earthen sacrificial altar about 5 0 feet long close against the wall in which w e r e placed the gods to w h o m sacrifice is made—mostly being carved ivory tusks, standing upright, mounted at the base, in hideously constructed brass heads. I n front of each ivory god was a small earthen mound on which the victim's forehead would apparently be placed. T h e altars w e r e covered with streams of dried blood and the stench was too frightful. . . .

I n the various sacrificial compounds were

found open pits filled with bodies giving forth the most trying odors. T h e first night several cases of fainting and sickness occurred owing to the stench, which was equally bad e v e r y w h e r e . 7 1 N o t only the official reports, but also the testimony of other witnesses, g i v e details which made it quite evident that the fall of Benin put an end to a bloody tyranny of horrible dimensions. T h e condition of the people under such a system was appalling. N o man's life was ever safe for very long. T h e possession of wealth served as a constant temptation to the K i n g and his clique to rem o v e the owner by sacrifice or murder in order to confiscate his property.72 T h e K i n g and some of his principal supporters made their escape w h e n the town fell, but were captured later. M a n y of these 70 71 72

Pari. Pap., 1 8 9 7 , 60, ( A f r i c a No. 6 ) , c. 8677, pp. 2 8 - 3 0 . Ibid., p. 28. Col. Ref., Annual, The Niger Coast Protectorate, 1896-97,

p. 14.

THE

MAKING

OF SOUTHERN

NIGERIA

75

were executed, but the K i n g was exiled to Calabar, w h e r e he lived until his death in 1914. A council of some of the more influential chiefs was formed in order to assist the Resident in g o v e r n i n g the country. T h i s council showed much willingness to cooperate effectively with the authorities. 7 3 Lieutenant A . H . T u r n e r was placed in charge and accomplished much in p a c i f y i n g the country and in making British rule effective. T h e conquest of Benin yielded important economic results. A territory, estimated at approximately 3,000 square miles, was now opened to direct trade and commerce. In A p r i l 1899, the Foreign Office transferred control of the N i g e r Coast Protectorate to the Colonial Office, headed at this time by Joseph Chamberlain. Chamberlain had l o n g been interested in Nigeria. H e sent Captain Frederick L u g a r d to Nigeria early in 1896 to take command of the new organized W e s t A f r i can Frontier Force, which was being raised to deal with French aggression in Borgu. T h e Colonial Secretary had declared in a notable speech, soon after he assumed office, that there were great areas in the British E m p i r e that were " u n d e v e l o p e d estates," and that it was his purpose to spend large sums of money on their development. Nigeria offered exceptional opportunities for this experiment because it had a considerable trade already and was thought to possess great potentialities. It was accordingly decided to reorganize the territories under British control. T o this end, the charter of the R o y a l N i g e r C o m p a n y was abrogated, part of the possessions of the Company being included in the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, and part in the newly established Protectorate of Northern Nigeria. T h e titles of " C o n s u l - G e n e r a l " and " C o n s u l " were abolished and a H i g h Commissioner appointed for Southern Nigeria with Commissioners subordinate to him. 7 4 T h e newly organized administration soon interested itself in the problem of slavery when by the Slave-Dealing Proclamation of 1901 it was rendered a penal offense. T h i s was somewhat inconsistent with the recognition accorded the system of " H o u s e R u l e , " which differed f r o m slavery in name only. U n d e r this " 74

Ibid. Burns, of. cit., p. 220.

76

BRITISH ENTERPRISE IN NIGERIA

native law, every member of the " H o u s e " became subject to the chief, who was known as the " H e a d of the House." Runaway members might be arrested, and no one could employ a member without the consent of the H e a d of the House, who was charged with the responsibility of providing for the interests of its members. 75 In 1 9 1 4 the House Rule Proclamation was repealed when Southern Nigeria was merged with Northern Nigeria by Sir Frederick L u g a r d . T h e r e was no compromise with slave dealing, however, and in 1902 the A r o tribe was conquered and its influence over a large area between the N i g e r and the Cross River destroyed. It was a tribe of superior intelligence, but was not numerous, nor did it possess great military strength. T h e Aros had been very successful in playing off one tribe against another. T h e y maintained the famous A r o Chuku, an oracle located in a sacred grove in the heart of the Aro country. N o question could be settled within the territory under their control without reference to this oracle. Each party to a dispute was expected to present gifts to propitiate the oracle; mysterious rites were performed; and the unsuccessf u l litigant disappeared. Tradition had it that he was destroyed by a hidden power. H e had, as a matter of fact, either been killed by the priests, or was being held a prisoner. This institution was priceless, not merely as a source of revenue, but as a very formidable weapon for extending the political influence of the Aros. Any person foolish enough to resist their power was denounced as a rebel. Charges were preferred against him, and the case submitted to the arbitrament of the oracle. T h e verdict was a foregone conclusion. 76 T h e British were anxious to destroy this system, partly because it did not conform to their notion of justice, and partly because the Aros were one of the few groups of middlemen still active in the Protectorate. Military expeditions were organized to converge on A r o Chuku, where little difficulty was experienced 75

Burns, op. cit., p. 2 2 1 . Col. Ref., Annual, Southern Nigeria, 1904, No. 4.05, pp. 4-5. Gascoigne Lumley, Ju Ju and Justice in Nigeria, (London, 1 9 3 0 ) , fassim. This is an account of the experience of Frank Hives, a political officer in Nigeria. He felt that the whole affair was unimportant. 78

THE MAKING OF SOUTHERN NIGERIA

77

in overcoming the resistance of the tribesmen. T h e oracle was destroyed and the Aros compelled to acknowledge the supremacy of British control. T h e y accepted their defeat with good grace and were intelligent enough to benefit greatly f r o m the increased v o l u m e of trade which developed after their fall. T h e defeat of the Aros left no tribe of importance unconquered, but numerous small expeditions were from time to time necessary to maintain British authority and uphold the prestige of administrative officials. T h e merger of L a g o s with the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria in 1906 was a logical step in the development of a unified administrative system. U n d e r the able leadership of the first g o v e r n o r , Sir W a l t e r E g e r t o n , much progress was made in developing the Nigeria of the present d a y . 7 7 T h e harbor of L a g o s was deepened to make it accessible to ocean steamers ; good roads were built ·, a railroad was constructed f r o m L a g o s to Ibadan and was extended to connect with the N o r t h e r n Nigerian Railway at M i n n a ; telegraph lines were put u p ; and many other improvements were completed by a comprehensive program of public works. T h e effect of this program upon the native population was tremendous. T h e development of transport facilities offered easy access to the interior and brought Europeans directly into contact with hitherto remote peoples. T h o u s a n d s of natives were e m p l o y e d on public projects and were paid in English currency that circulated freely through the territories, making possible increased purchases of European commodities by the natives. T h e rise of a system of free labor did much to make slavery unpopular, thus p a v i n g the w a y for its eventual abolition. 7 8 T h r o u g h o u t the period under review, there had been much confusion with respect to the administrative set-up. T h e annexation of L a g o s in 1861 had been followed by the establishment of ân administrator responsible to the Colonial Office. In 1866 L a g o s was included in the W e s t African Settlements under a governorin-chief with headquarters at Sierre Leone. T h e colony retained a separate legislative council, however, and the administration was almost completely autonomous. A f t e r 1874 the governor 77 78

Foreign Office Handbook, Nigeria, Bums, of. cit., p. 223.

(London, 1 9 2 0 ) , p. 16.

78

B R I T I S H E N T E R P R I S E IN N I G E R I A

of the Gold Coast exercised authority over Lagos, but twelve years later Lagos became an independent colony. In 1906 it was merged with Southern Nigeria. There had been no intention, originally, of extending the jurisdiction of Lagos beyond the limits of the town. But expanding commerce with West Africa resulted, as has been shown, in a corresponding extension of control into the hinterland and in the establishment of a protectorate over the important Egba and Yoruba tribes. British influence was growing in other regions at the same time. By 1885 the policy of laissez faire had definitely broken down in the face of the pressure exerted by growing commercial interests plus the increasing danger of French or German intervention. At the same time several companies interested in trading on the Niger above the delta had been merged under the able and aggressive leadership of Sir George Taubman Goldie and eventually they received a royal charter. The result of all this confusion was to create three sets of officials in Nigeria, each responsible to a different authority. The administrator of Lagos was responsible to the Colonial Office j the Consul-General of the Protectorate, to the Foreign Office; and the Agents General of the Royal Niger Company, to the Board of Directors. The cancellation of the charter of the Royal Niger Company in 1900 and the establishment of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria in the same year, together with the appointment of a high commissioner, had simplified matters somewhat. All officials now became responsible to the Colonial Office. With the merger of Lagos and the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria in 1906 the number of administrative units was reduced to two and the advisability of eventually merging all into one administrative organization was recognized. 79 79

Burns, o f . cit., pp. 2 2 3 - 2 4 ; Nigeria

Handbook,

1 9 3 3 , pp. 7 - 8 .

Chapter III T H E ROYAL NIGER COMPANY T h e great rivers of Africa, despite their limitations, have always been the most convenient highways of imperialism, since they provided the easiest approach to the rich hinterland. T h e Niger, with the possible exception of the more famous Congo, was therefore the most dazzling prize in West Africa. It swept far down f r o m the interior, drained the western Sudan, furnished access to the important kingdom of Sokoto, and, by means of its great tributary, the Benue, made possible the penetration of the Lake Chad country. T h r e e great powers—England, France, and Germany—competed for the control of this highway. England's triumph can be largely attributed to the activity and vigilance of the Royal Niger Company. It has been explained already that Englishmen took the lead in the discovery and exploration of the Niger and that, under the leadership of Macgregor Laird, they were the first to trade directly with the tribes along its banks. A British consul, D r . W . B. Baikie, was appointed to Lokoja, but little was done to set up any definite administrative system. D r . Baikie carried on as best he could despite the fact that he received little or no support from the home authorities. H e managed to maintain a semblance of British authority in spite of the chieftains of the Niger Delta. 1 Baikie was fortunate, however, in winning the friendship of King Masaba of Nupe, who was anxious to trade directly with the agents of Macgregor Laird. L o r d Palmerston was willing to support Laird, so he gave orders that a proper escort be provided 1

T h e best account of the activities of D r . B a i k i e and his successors is g i v e n

by G e a r y , o f . cit., ch. 6. His account of B a i k i e ' s activities is based on s e v e r a l m a n u s c r i p t v o l u m e s " F o r e i g n Office, N i g e r E x p e d i t i o n ,

1858-66,"

which

he

w a s g i v e n special permission to e x a m i n e . B a i k i e ' s title w a s " I n C o m m a n d of the Niger Expedition."

79

8o

BRITISH ENTERPRISE IN NIGERIA

to convoy his agents up the Niger. T h e plan miscarried, however, and for eighteen months D r . Baikie was left alone at Lokoja. Except for the kindness of Masaba he would have perished. 2 T h e British Government did not favor the establishment of a permanent consulate at Lokoja. So in June 1860, Baikie was ordered to return to England. In the meantime he visited Masaba several times, surveyed the river from Boussa to the sea, opened factories, and rendered conditions more suitable for British merchants to take advantage of opportunities for trade. It was eighteen months before Baikie received the orders for his recall, but he refused to obey. In a despatch to Lord John Russell he pointed out that he had established a post at L o k o j a ; had opened communications with Nupe and Bornu; had preserved peace and order in the country; and had established a market to which the natives of the territory might resort, but he felt that his work was incomplete. 3 H e had penetrated to Kano, where he had been received kindly by the chiefs who were anxious to open trade. H e added that the name of England was well known in the interior but that the slave trade flourished on every hand. Failing health compelled him to retire in 1864, but his persistence was rewarded when the Foreign Office recalled its instructions and permitted a British agent to remain in charge at Lokoja. 4 It was not until June 1866 that a consulate was formally established at Lokoja. T h e limits of the Lokoja Consulate were not well defined and, with the exception of the Nun mouth of the Niger, the delta was not within its jurisdiction. Little effort was made to furnish adequate protection against possible attacks by the natives, although warships frequently visited the river to punish tribesmen who attacked vessels voyaging upstream. Great difficulty was experienced in maintaining British authority. Lokoja was besieged for some six months and was not relieved until July 1868, when the hostile natives were driven away by the native allies of the consul. T h e Lokoja Consulate was abandoned in 1869, but the friendly King of Bida, Masaba, was presented 2 3 4

Geary, of. cit., pp. 162-63. Pari. Pap., 1862, 61, Dr. Baikie, R. N., to Lord J. Russell, p. 177. Baikie died at Sierra Leone in 1864.

THE ROYAL NIGER COMPANY

81

with a sword of honor and asked to protect British traders on the river. 5 T h e period of twelve years, from the abandonment of the consulate in 1869 until the formation of the National African Company in 1 8 8 1 , is marked by confusion and neglect. 6 At times diplomatic agents ascended the river, or missionary stations were set up. Occasionally, too, punitive expeditions paid visits to the country and destroyed native villages. T h e British Government had no definite policy. It became increasingly evident, however, that if trade was to be carried on with success some form of organized government with a force of armed steamers and a permanent constabulary was absolutely indispensable. L a w and order had ceased to exist, and the rival traders, both French and E n g lish, engaged in cutthroat competition. Slave raids conducted by the Fulani emirs of the north continued to devastate the country. But what seemed worst of all ( f r o m the English point of view) was the fact that foreign merchants, German as well as French, had begun to penetrate a region which hitherto had been complacently regarded as a British sphere of interest. T h e British, in short, were in grave danger of losing everything that had been won by such pioneers as Macgregor L a i r d and D r . Baikie. Fortunately for British enterprise in Nigeria, there now appeared on the scene one of the dynamic personalities in African history— M r . Goldie Taubman. 7 Taubman, like Cecil Rhodes, possessed rare business ability that was combined with political and diplomatic skill of a high order. H e had seen service in the engineers, had traveled widely in Africa—especially in the eastern Sudan—and, through his family connections, had become interested in one of the companies engaged in trading on the Niger. T o this day Taubman has continued to be a man of mystery. A variety of opinions exist concerning his character. Some incline to the opinion that he was a "ruthless, grasping merchant" eager to squeeze the last penny of profit out of the helpless native} others regard him as an 5 8 7

Geary, of. cit., pp. 169-70. Ibid., pp. 1 7 0 - 7 6 . Later and better known as Sir George Taubman Goldie.

82

B R I T I S H E N T E R P R I S E IN

NIGERIA

idealist, interested solely in taking up "the White Man's burden" on the banks of the Niger. So far as can be judged, from the scanty evidence available, the latter view appears to be closer to the truth. 8 It cannot be denied that commercial enterprise played a large part in the development of British West Africa, but " a passion to make one corner of the earth happier and more prosperous was the driving force which sent out men like Goldie and L u g a r d and those who had the privilege of working with them, and inspired them to endure sickness, hardships, loneliness and other ills, regarding these things as nothing in comparison with the satisfaction of feeling that they were doing something, however small, to bring security of life and property to millions of black men who had never known what such things meant." 9 T h e commercial aspect of Goldie's work never appealed strongly to him. H e quickly severed his connection with the Company after the abrogation of its charter in 1899, in spite of the fact that the opportunity for making money became greater when the Company was freed of administrative responsibilities. T h e Royal Niger Company was a success commercially—this was not true of most chartered companies of the time—but in only one year were dividends in excess of six percent. 10 Any profits not needed to pay this modest dividend were used to strengthen the administrative machinery and advance the work of civilization. 1 1 8 Goldie was determined that his biography should never be written, and refused to a l l o w his f a m i l y to make his private papers available to any investigator. A brief sketch of his career, Sir George Goldie, Founder of Nigeria, by L a d y Dorothy Wellesley, (London, 1 9 3 4 ) , is available. It is largely personal reminiscence and of little value as a serious study of Goldie's career. I am indebted to Sir Charles Orr f o r g i v i n g ine access to private letters in his possession which shed much light on the motives of this interesting personality. T h e R t . Hon. L o r d L u g a r d , Sir Charles Orr, Sir Richmond Palmer, Sir William G e a r y , Sir George Tomlinson, and M r . H. S. Goldsmith were kind enough to answer many questions concerning Goldie and helped me to get a better understanding of his career and motives. But any opinions that I have expressed concerning the man and his accomplishments are, of course, my own. 8

Quoted from a private letter written to the author by Sir Charles Orr, August

8. 1 9 3 5 · 10 See balance sheets of the company, Pari. Pap., 1 899, 63, Royal Niger Company, c. 9 3 7 2 , pp. 3 7 - 4 8 . 11 N i g e r Company, Limited, Reports and Accounts and Notices to Stockholders

T H E R O Y A L NIGER COMPANY

83

Goldie visited the Niger in the late seventies and was quick to realize that amalgamation of the rival interests was necessary if a legitimate and profitable trade was to be built up. H e foresaw great possibilities if a merger could be effected. With patience and determination he addressed himself to the task. H e was successful, and in 1879 organized the United African Company with Lord Aberdare, a former member of Gladstone's first cabinet, as the first President. 12 The Company was capitalized at £125,000 and Goldie was made one of the directors. T w o years later the name was changed to the National African Company, and active operations were inaugurated in Nigeria. 1 3 Trade soon increased, expenses were reduced, and an effective organization perfected. The natives were kept under control, and permanent stations were established. This happy situation did not long endure, for the French, now well entrenched upon the Upper Niger, began to encroach on the English preserves. Under the patronage of Gambetta, two commercial associations were formed, the Compagnie française de l'Afrique equatorial of Paris, and the Compagnie du Senegal et de la Côte Occidentale d'Afrique of Marseilles. 14 Acting under the authority of Gambetta, these companies made treaties with the native chiefs and established some twenty trading stations on the Lower Niger. Not only did they seek to contest the commercial position of the British, but they also sought to make themselves masters of the country. But Goldie took them on, and with superior capital resources he won out. Prices were cut twentyfive percent in the districts where the French were established. The latter soon faced ruin. They appealed to their government for assistance, but no help was forthcoming. Gambetta had died, and his successors were not disposed to continue the struggle. The French companies, as a result, were merged with Goldie's 1883—1918, passim. I am indebted to M r . Hey wood, Secretary of the Niger Company Limited, f o r permission to use these papers. 12 G e a r y , op. cit., p. 178. 13 Articles of Agreement between the United African Company and National African Company Limited. 14 W . E . C. de Wiarte, Les grandes compagnies coloniales anglais au XIX Siècle, (Paris, 1 8 9 9 ) , p. 50.

84

BRITISH ENTERPRISE IN NIGERIA

concern in 1884. T h e British flag was now unchallenged on the Lower Niger.15 Encouraged by the successful absorption of the French companies, Goldie made haste to conclude further treaties with the tribes occupying the area between the delta and the confluence of the Niger and Benue. Difficulty was experienced in getting these agreements accepted by the Foreign Office, but eventually they were ratified and became the basis for British claims advanced at the Berlin Conference of 1 8 8 4 - 8 5 . 1 8 T h e recognition of these claims at Berlin, together with the subsequent proclamation of a protectorate, secured the British position between the confluence and the sea. Northern Nigeria was still open, and three powers challenged one another for control. France had been advancing steadily from the valley of the Senegal, and was now pushing down from the upper reaches of the Niger ; Germany, a newcomer in the colonial field, had established claims in the Cameroons, and was becoming increasingly interested in further expansion in West Africa ; and England, acting through the company organized by Goldie, was determined to defend her position on the lower river, and if possible extend her control over the Mohammedan emirates to the north. T h e German threat developed first. H e r r F l e g e l , a German merchant who had begun his career as a clerk in a trading house at Lagos, undertook a mission to the court of the Sultan of Sokoto, generally recognized as overlord of the Fulani states. H i s efforts might well have been crowned with success had he been dealing with the complacent and overconfident British authorities alone. Goldie was alert, however, and took immediate steps to check him. Joseph Thomson, who had recently returned from an expedition to Masailand, undertook a mission to the much-sought-after Sultan, and by the middle of March 1885 was on his way up the N i g e r . 1 7 15

J . Darcy, Cent années de rivalité coloniale, Daniel de Leon, Political Science Quarterly, 17 Edward Flegel, Vom Niger-Bemu, (Leipsig, written shortly after his return, " U p the Niger Words, 1886, pp. 2 4 f L ; 1 0 9 5 . ; 2490.; 323ff. 16

(Paris, 1 9 0 4 ) , pp. 335-40. March, 1886. 1 8 9 0 ) ; see Thomson's account to the Central Sudan," Good

T H E R O Y A L NIGER C O M P A N Y

85

H e reached W u r n u late in M a y , and on the first of June a treaty was signed which gave the Company "exclusive rights to the country on both sides of the River Benue and rivers flowing into it throughout my dominions for such distance from its and their banks as they may desire." Another provision granted the Company exclusive rights to trade in the territories of the Sultan and to exploit the mineral resources. A third article pledged the Sultan to hold no communication with foreigners except through the Company, and a final article guaranteed a yearly present of goods to the value of three thousand bags of cowries. 18 W i t h the treaty in his possession, Thomson began the return journey and reached Lokoja without serious difficulty. H e encountered Flegel on his return, laden with treaty forms and presents, and toiling up the river "all unconscious of the fact that not a yard of ground from Timbuktu to Akassa, or from Orna to Yoruba, had been left on which to plant the flag of the Fatherland." H e perhaps overestimated the importance of his achievement. Much of the territory included in the new treaty ultimately passed under the control of France, but the Germans were eliminated as serious competitors for the control of Northern Nigeria. T h e conclusion of the treaty with the Sultan of Sokoto raised serious questions that the Foreign Office could no longer evade. W h i l e the treaty gave England a substantial advantage in the struggle to control the lower valley of the Niger, such control could not be maintained through the device of a paper protectorate. T h e alternatives seemed to be clearly defined. T h e Government would have to assume direct responsibility by the establishment of a protectorate—a course that both the Germans and the French had assumed would be taken when British claims to the territory were allowed at the Berlin Conference—or it would be necessary for the British to withdraw in favor of their rivals. T h e Foreign Office was reluctant to accept either of these alternatives and on January 6, 1885, suggested to the Colonial Office that "the cheapest and most effective way" of meeting its 18

Burns, of.

of Africa

by

cit., a p p e n d i x G . T h i s treaty is not g i v e n in Hertslet, The Treaty.

Maf

86

BRITISH ENTERPRISE IN NIGERIA

obligations would be by the employment of the National African Company and that "it would be advisable to grant them the charter for which they have several times applied." 1 9 It is reasonably clear that neither the Liberal nor the Conservative leaders were opposed to this solution of the problem of maintaining British control on the Niger, but many complications arose to delay the taking of definite action. T h e years 1885 a n d 1886 were marked by great political uncertainty in England. T h e Salisbury Government, which had been formed after the resignation of Gladstone in 1885, was defeated in the ensuing general election but returned to power following the defeat of the H o m e Rule Bill. Amid the excitement of political change there had been little opportunity to reach a definite decision concerning the proposed charter to Goldie's company, but now, with a solid majority of Conservatives and Liberal Unionists, Salisbury could find time to study problems of imperial concern. In addition to the political uncertainty of the times, other complications more intimately concerned with West Africa combined to delay a decision. T h e Foreign Office was reluctant to assume additional colonial responsibilities; protests emanating from both France and Germany had to be given serious consideration, since both countries were fearful that the granting of a charter would seriously hamper the efforts of their citizens to build up trade with the Niger country; and local rivals of Goldie's group flooded the Foreign Office with protests against the commercial monopoly which the proposed charter seemed to contemplate. T h e opponents of the proposed charter were unanimous in pointing out that the establishment of a commercial monopoly was inconsistent with the restrictions imposed by the Berlin Act and, unless this objection could be overcome, it would be difficult to proceed. Under the circumstances it is not surprising that the grant of a charter hung fire. Acting under the provisions of the Berlin Act, which was signed on February 26, 1885, the Foreign Office proclaimed a protectorate on June 6 of the same year, but did nothing about the charter. Patience was not characteristic of 1 9 T h i s episode is best followed in Public Record Office documents, F . O. 84/ 1879. Geary, of. cit., pp. i 8 o - 8 j is very helpful.

THE ROYAL NIGER COMPANY

87

Goldie, so in September he attempted to force a decision by resorting to threats of a most extraordinary character. H e proposed to sell the Company and all its rights to a foreign power. In a letter to the Foreign Office he argued that the restrictions imposed by the Berlin Act applied only to the river, that the British Government possessed complete freedom of action over the land adjacent to the stream, and enclosed a copy of resolutions to be considered at the next meeting of the Company which proposed the transfer to a foreign power of the independent treaties negotiated with the native rulers. 20 L o r d Salisbury was not seriously frightened by Goldie's threats, which he recognized as pure bluff since the Company did not possess the right to transfer lands which had not been ceded to them, and cited the precedent of the missionaries of Ambas Bay in support of his position. T h e Prime Minister was not averse to the granting of the charter and, while he did not conceal his annoyance at the tactics employed by Goldie, assured him in a letter dated September 1 7 , 1 8 8 5 , that he hoped to facilitate his plans. T h e big obstacle was the commercial monopoly which the Company hoped to set up. Both Germany and France had been rather naive in assuming that their citizens would be permitted every opportunity to develop trade in the hinterland under the protection of the British Government. Such an arrangement was quite advantageous from their point of view, and it is not surprising that they were quick to protest when news of the proposed charter came to their attention. In December 1885 the Foreign Office warned the Company that complaints from the German Government had been received to the effect that German nationals had been forcibly prevented from access to markets on the N i g e r and Benue. Goldie did not deny these charges in his reply to Salisbury, but attempted to maintain his position by showing that the Company did not manufacture goods or show preference to any manufacturer, that shares in the Company were sold to the public including Germans and other foreigners, that 20 Royal Niger Company, Refort p. ι S ι .

of Proceedings,

9 / 2 3 / 8 5 ; Geary, of.

cit.,

88

B R I T I S H E N T E R P R I S E IN N I G E R I A

extension of trade depended upon undivided political influence over native tribes, and that competition among many small firms would result in the ruin of all. 2 1 L o r d Salisbury was not strongly impressed by Goldie's plea, and indicated that he felt the complaints from Germany, France, and independent British concerns were well founded. In January 1886 the Foreign Office definitely refused to grant Goldie's demands on the ground that it could not grant a monopoly against British subjects, that the Government was bound by the terms of the Berlin Act to maintain traffic on the Niger "open to all nations alike, subject to equal duties for services rendered to navigation," and that the British Government could not permit differential treatment of foreigners as to settlement or access to markets. It was firm in its contention that the charter must conform to the commercial policy of Great Britain and that the international obligations imposed by the Berlin Act be strictly observed. T h e Company would be permitted to raise revenue to defray the costs of administration but not by differential treatment. A vigorous protest was made by Goldie against what he considered the unjustifiable and uncompromising stand taken by the Foreign Office. H e demanded compensation for the Company in the form of an immediate payment of £150,000, but this peremptory demand was promptly refused. It was not until March 2, 1886, that the Foreign Office was prepared to furnish the Company with a draft of the charter which they were prepared to grant. Care was taken to prohibit any monopoly in deference to the protests outlined above, but the draft charter permitted the levying of duties to pay administrative expenses and to provide compensation for the expense incurred in obtaining treaty rights. W h i l e Goldie was doubtless disappointed with the terms offered, the directors of the Company were well satisfied and promptly accepted the revised charter. T h e r e was the inevitable delay occasioned by the discussion of technicalities which postponed final action until July 13, 1886, when the National African Company, 21

Geary of. cit., p. 184.

THE

ROYAL NIGER COMPANY

89

with the approval of Foreign Office, became the R o y a l Niger Company Chartered and Limited. 2 2 T h e powers of the Company were carefully but liberally defined.23 It was authorized to carry on business over wide areas by acting as "merchants, bankers, commission agents, shipowners, carriers, or in any other capacity in the United Kingdom, Africa, or elsewhere." It was empowered to acquire and operate trading stations, factories, stores, etc., in Africa and elsewhere. It was also given the right to "purchase, or otherwise acquire, open and work mines, forests, quarries, fisheries, and manufactories ; and to stock, cultivate and improve any of the lands of the company, erect buildings thereon, and sell the produce thereof." T h e reasons for granting the charter were set forth at considerable length. T h e kings, chiefs, and peoples of the Niger basin after several years' experience had come to recognize the benefits of intercourse with the Company and had therefore ceded to the Company their respective territories. In return for this the Company had agreed to refrain from interference with native laws or property. T h e Company had been actively engaged in furthering the objects defined above; had acquired by purchase the interests of all European traders in the country; and was now engaged in developing the resources of the region and extending trade into the interior. T h e Company and its predecessors had expended large sums and gone to great trouble in acquiring the confidence of the native rulers and people. This had resulted in the cession of large tracts, and " l a r g e expenditures will be incurred in carrying the same into effect and discharging the obligation arising thereunder." European penetration would greatly improve the condition of the natives inhabiting the territory embraced by the charter, and the cause of civilization would therefore be materially advanced. T h e grant of a charter would "render 22

Royal Niger Company, Report of Proceedings, 7/1 3/86. T h e text of the Charter is given in full in Pari. Pap. 1899, 63, c. 9 3 7 z , pp. 1 1 - 1 6 , under title of Royal Niger Company. Extracts of the more important provisions are given in Hertslet, I, pp. 44Ôff. T h e Company was chartered as the National A f r i c a n Company. T h e title, " R o y a l Niger C o m p a n y , " was assumed J u l y 1 3 , 1886. 23

go

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the dominions much service and advance the commercial prosperity of many subjects." T h e Company was authorized by the charter to administer the districts obtained by cession and to exercise sovereign rights over them. Its sovereignty, however, was limited by several provisions of the charter. The Company was subject to the control of any principal Secretary of State. The British character of the Company was secured by the provision that : "The Company shall always be and remain British in character and domicile-,and shall have its principal office in England ; and its principal representative in the territories aforesaid, and all Directors shall always be natural born British subjects." The Company was bound to accept the advice of the Secretary of State in any of its dealings with a foreign Power. It was placed under obligations to employ its power and use its influence against slavery. No interference was permitted with the religion of any class or tribe except "so far as may be necessary in the interests of humanity." Officers of the Company engaged in the administration of justice were enjoined to pay careful attention to the laws and customs of the natives, especially with respect to property rights and such matters as divorce, marriage, and legitimacy. The right of Government to dissent from or object to the proceedings of the Company in its dealings with the natives was specified. The general powers of the Company were carefully defined; it was bound to furnish ample facilities for British ships, and adopt a special flag denoting the British character of the Company. Disputes over titles to property were to be decided by the Foreign Office, and the Company was bound to accept the decision. A very important provision of the charter forbade the establishment of a monopoly. Differential treatment of the subjects of any power was expressly forbidden, and freedom of trade prescribed. Customs duties were authorized for the sole purpose of defraying administrative expenses, and annual reports were stipulated. The Company was bound by the General Act of the Powers at Berlin and by "any other Treaty, Agreement, or Arrangement made between England and any other State or Power." The Crown reserved the right to revoke the charter at will.

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91

Encouraged by the grant of the charter, the Company began a program of rapid expansion. Treaties were made with the tribes along the lower river ; missions were dispatched to Yola and Adamawa near the borders of the Cameroons; Borgu in the hinterland of Lagos was declared to be under the rule of the Company, and relations were improved with the emirates of Sokoto and Gando. These enterprises were carried on at great personal risk to the negotiators, because the uncertainties of African travel and the disturbed conditions arising from the incessant tribal wars and slave raids made such ventures hazardous indeed. In March 1887 the fruits of these endeavors were presented to the Foreign Office. The treaties were formally approved, and in October notification was made to the Powers, through the London Gazette, of the establishment of a protectorate over the "Niger Districts." These districts included the coast between Lagos and Rio del Rey and the "territories in the Basin of the Niger and affluents, which are or may for the time being be subject to the government of the National African Company." Treatymaking activity was continued with unabated zeal. By 1892 some 360 treaties had been negotiated. All of these were subsequently approved by the Foreign Office. The methods employed in African treaty making are notorious. The Company was no exception to the rule, though there is little evidence that it did more than take shrewd advantage of the ignorance of the chiefs. The gin bottle played no part in their diplomacy. The usual method was to send political agents armed with blank treaty forms to the various kings, chiefs, and headmen. The provisions were explained to the ruler by an interpreter before obtaining his "signature." The treaties were then declared before a British consul and certified by the interpreter, whose signature appeared on the treaty. 24 The entire proceeding was quite ridiculous, of course, but in comparison with the methods followed elsewhere in Africa it was highly ethical. Several types of treaty forms were used, but Form Number Five was most commonly employed. Since there is no fundamental difference between the treaty forms, an analysis of Form 24

Pari. Paf., 1899, 63, Royal Niger Company, c. 9372, pp. 17-35.

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Five will suffice to illustrate the other types. The first provision read as follows : " W e the undersigned Chiefs of with the view to the bettering of the conditions of our country and people, do this day cede to the Royal Niger Company, forever, the whole of our territory extending from to ." In the second section full powers were given to the Company to settle all native disputes, and a pledge was given not to enter into any war with other tribes without the consent of the Company. In the third section the Company was given full power to mine, farm, and build in any part of the country. By a fourth provision the chiefs bound themselves to have no intercourse with foreigners except through the Company. In return for the concessions mentioned above, the Company bound itself to refrain from interference in any of the native customs or laws, except to maintain order. It promised to pay the natives a fair price for any land they might require, to afford them protection from neighboring tribes, and to make a cash payment of an amount specified in each separate agreement. 25 While its agents were busily engaged in the task of peaceful penetration, the Company's organization was being perfected. A Governing Council, subject to control of the Foreign Office, was set up to manage the commercial and political activities of the corporation.26 The seat of administration in Africa was established at Asaba, a town on the Niger about 150 miles inland, where the supreme court, the central prison, a hospital, and botanical gardens were located. The territories under the jurisdiction of the Company were divided into districts controlled by European agents. Akassa, at the mouth of the Niger, became the principal port at which transshipment to ocean steamers took place. T w o steamers of considerable size, together with a large number of smaller craft, provided means of contact with the interior. Telegraphic communication with England was established, and regular steamship service to Liverpool was inaugurated. 2T 25

Pari. Pap., 1899, 63, Royal Niger Company, c. 9372, p. 28. See National African Company, Ltd., Special Report of the 7/26/86. 27 De Wiarte, op. cit., pp. 7 8 - 8 1 . 26

Directors,

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93

In the meantime Goldie had been developing a policy which could be put into operation, now that a charter had been granted. T h i s policy included effective occupation of the pagan regions in which the tribes were almost constantly at war, and in which "fetish horrors were of daily occurrence." Secondly, it was imperative that the advance of Moslem slave raiders over an ever increasing area of pagan countries should be checked. Finally, Goldie was determined to establish diplomatic control over the Emirates of the Sokoto Empire "backed by sufficient military force to hit hard blows, whenever military action became necessary." 28 T h i s policy clearly demanded the establishment of an administrative system and the creation of an army. T h e position of Agent-General was therefore created. T h e Agent-General, who was empowered to act as the supreme executive authority in Nigeria, was responsible to the Governor and Council of the Company in London. H e was commander of the a r m y ; all servants of the Company in Africa were subordinated to him; and he was likewise responsible for the development of a commercial policy. 29 A regulation issued in J u l y 1886 created the position of Supreme Judicial Officer for the administration of justice to the natives living under the Company's authority. This officer was given wide powers, but was instructed to proceed carefully. H e was to respect native custom and law "especially with respect to the holding and possession, transfer and disposition of lands and goods, and testate or intestate succession thereto, and marriage, divorce and legitimacy, and other rights of property and personal rights." 3 0 A private army was created with the establishment of the Royal Niger Constabulary. Officers from the regular army were detailed for service in Nigeria, and the rank and file recruited from the native Hausa and Yoruba tribes. T h e force numbered ap28 Sir George Taubman Goldie to Captain Orr, February 2, 1 9 1 1 . I am indebted to Sir Charles Orr for his kind permission to use this letter. See also Gazeteer of Muri Province, p. 5. 29 Royal Niger Company, Regulations, VIII, 1886, pp. 1 - 2 . See also Royal Niger Company, Refort of Proceedings, 6 / 1 6 / 8 7 . 30 Royal Niger Company, Regulations, X, 1886, p. 3.

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proximately one thousand, and was divided into three companies. T h e Commandant was under the Agent-General or the senior executive officer of the region in which the force might be stationed. 3 1 T h e r e is little evidence available concerning the activities of the R o y a l Niger Constabulary, but it may be assumed that there was plenty of work to be done. Aside from the major operation undertaken against Bida and Illorin in 1897 they fought no wars, but many little affairs demanded constant attention. 32 Some foreign observers, however, were inclined to be extremely critical of Company policy in this regard, and one went so far as to write: T h e C o m p a n y is but the screen behind which E n g l a n d hides herself. . . . T o the great detriment of the shareholders, the C o m p a n y tries to create an E m p i r e , and in view of its acquisition of territory, to make head against the revolts caused by its rapacity, it is obliged to maintain an a r m y relatively large. T h i s necessity causes a mischievous friction between the military and civilian officers in the service of the Q u e e n . T h e y and the trading agents sometimes carrying their animosity to each other so f a r as to come to b l o w s . 3 3

While the Company was never successful in extending its power very far from the rivers, considerable progress was made in pacifying the country, especially along the lower Niger and the south side of the Benue. 3 4 It is difficult to arrive at satisfactory conclusions regarding the many activities of the R o y a l Niger Company. Reliable evidence is difficult to secure, since each official of the Company was required to give a bond of £ 1 , 0 0 0 that he would not divulge to the press, domestic or foreign, or to any outside person any facts concerning the affairs of the Company, and would not publish information in any form of book, pamphlet, or paper. 3 5 T h e affairs of the Company attracted little attention in Parliament aside from occasional questions, to which vague and unsatisfactory 31

Royal Niger Constabulary, Standing Orders, passim. Gazeteer of Muri Province, pp. 1 1 — 16. 88 Lieutenant Hourst, Exploration of the Niger, (London, 1 8 9 8 ) , p. 487. (Translation by B e l l ) . 84 Royal Niger Company, Report of Proceedings, 7/16/91. 85 Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, 4 series, 58, p. 4 0 1 . 82

T H E R O Y A L NIGER COMPANY

95

answers were returned. T h e unpopularity of the Company with certain commercial groups is reflected in frequent articles in the press, but little real information can be gleaned from a study of these controversies. T h e private papers of the Company are very disappointing; the officiai reports of investigations authorized by the Foreign Office disclose very little concerning the real situation in Nigeria during the days of Company control; and, as has been indicated before, Goldie took extraordinary precautions to render his private papers inaccessible. T h e best evidence concerning the activities of the Company is doubtless the Foreign Office papers, but they are not available. This lack of satisfactory evidence renders it difficult to write with assurance concerning the varied activities of the chartered Company. But with these reservations in mind, it is possible to examine certain aspects of Company policy and to glean some information with respect to its operations. It is important to realize, first of all, that the Company was acting in a dual capacity in that it was charged with responsibility for administering the territory under its control and, at the same time, was engaged in business and had a definite responsibility to its stockholders. Second, the Company was never popular and was subjected to scathing criticism by foreign business men who were anxious to share in the trade of the Niger, and by independent British merchants who complained that the Company had established a monopoly, an act expressly forbidden by its charter. This criticism was supplemented by complaints from natives, particularly the Brass tribesmen, who found the restrictions imposed by the Company irksome, and who carried their opposition to the point of open rebellion. T h i r d , it is important to remember that Goldie had justified his policy on the ground that he was "taking up the White Man's Burden," and it is necessary to examine his policy in regard to the suppression of slavery and the restriction of the liquor traffic. Finally, the Company conquered Bida and Ilorin and played a vital part in preventing French occupation of much of Nigeria. It has already been pointed out that an administrative system backed by a private army of about one thousand men had been set up. T h e administration planned to levy a customs tax on goods

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imported into the Company domain in order to raise the funds necessary to support this system. T h e income from customs was supplemented by license fees collected from concerns and individuals desiring to trade in the region under Company control. With the exception of the year 1893, this revenue was never sufficient to cover expenses incurred by the maintenance of the a r m y , trading stations, steamers, special missions, and the payment of salaries f o r staff members. This deficit was made up by an annual grant-in-aid from the British Treasury. 3 8 In 1888, f o r example, a sum of £250,000, designated as the " N i g e r Territories F u n d , " was spent. It was used by the Company to acquire and maintain concessions. T h e annual interest charges on this fund were assumed by the corporation and constituted an annual charge on profits. 3 7 A very important feature of Company rule was the administration of justice, a responsibility which rested primarily with the Supreme Judicial Officer, but frequently was exercised by other political agents of the Company. T h e powers and duties pertaining to this office have already been described, but it should be pointed out that the Agent-General as well as subordinate executive officers were called upon to serve in this capacity. District agents were empowered to hear and decide all administrative cases; to hear and settle civil suits between the Company and any foreigner involving any amount exceeding £ 5 0 ; and to hear and investigate any criminal charges that might be brought before them. T h e y might hold for trial before the Supreme Judicial Officer any person so charged. T h e Supreme Judicial Officer might sentence any foreigner to any term of penal servitude or term of imprisonment without right of appeal, or pass sentence of death subject to approval of the Governor and Council of the Company. 3 8 It was the opinion of M a j o r MacDonald, who investigated the Company in 1889, that this system was open to abuse and that it should be altered. H e wrote : 39

Pari. Pap., 1899, 63, Royal Niger Company, c. 9372, pp. 37-48. De Wiarte, op. cit., pp. 74-75. 38 Report of Major Claude MacDonald, 1 890, pp. 78-80. Major MacDonald investigated the Company in 1889, and his report is an especially valuable source. It was not published at the time. 37

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I am of opinion that the time has arrived when this state of affairs should be altered, and the very extensive judicial powers given to employees of the Niger Company should be curtailed. For it must be remembered that the majority of these gentlemen are young and inexperienced, and that they have with few exceptions received no more than a commercial education, and consequently know nothing of l a w . 3 9

T h e character of the business transacted by the Company differed little from that engaged in by Macgregor Laird and other pioneers. Metals of various kinds, beads, salt, and cotton cloth were exchanged for the products of the country. Numerous factories were established in the regions along the lower Niger and Benue to which these native products might be brought and exchanged for trade goods provided by agents of the Company. Ivory, an important article of trade, was collected by Hausa merchants who brought it from Adamawa, a district lying between the upper Benue and the Cameroons. They traveled by caravan to Kano, where a portion was traded for Kano cloth, tobes, and other commodities, and the remainder was carried to a market such as Egga, where it was exchanged for salt. Salt was in great demand in the hinterland, and the Hausas were able to dispose of it at a good profit to themselves. 40 Egga was a typical commercial center. H e r e traders from the upper rivers and from many of the Fulani towns of Northern Nigeria gathered to meet the agents of the Company. T h e factory was located on high ground overlooking the stream and enclosed by a wall. It contained excellent quarters for the agents of the Company. On either side of the residential quarters stood rows of iron store sheds. The yard inside the walls pulsated with life: "Strings of women pour through the narrow gateway with their earth ware pots of palm oil and shea butter on their heads; groups of laborers are busy filling casks with these articles for the English market; native blacksmiths are at work under a shed, blowing their charcoal fires with their quaint bellows." 4 1 In the more Ibid., p. 80. A . F . Mockler-Ferryman, Up the Niger, (London, 1 9 0 2 ) , p. 1 23. He served as secretary to MacDonald in 1889. 41 Ibid., p. 149. 39

40

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important centers, such as Lokoja, conditions of life were quite pleasant, in marked contrast to the days of the pioneers, if the testimony of a well-known French visitor, Lieutenant Hourst, can be accepted. H e w r o t e : T h e next day we had breakfast with M a j o r Festig, and were most cordially received. O u r host was then Commander-in-Chief of the troops in the service of the Niger Company. Lokoja was his headquarters, and his soldiers, who were Hausas, were well lodged. T h e i r cantonments are charming, and the M a j o r ' s home had every English comfort that could possibly be expected. Big, airy rooms adorned with weapons, looking-glasses and hunting pictures, etc., native mats on the ground, flowers growing in the copper pots manufactured in the country. Everything very simple and suitable. Music was going on whilst we were at breakfast, as if we were on board the admiral's flagship or at the Grand Hotel in Paris. Children played to us on the flute. W e had printed menus, dainty salt cellars, caviare, whisky-andsodas, good stout, etc. O h , what a delight to eat a well served meal on a table cloth decked with fresh flowers! If only we had had a few ladies in light summer costume to share it with us, it would have been complete. 4 2 It has been suggested above that the Company was v e r y unpopular and that it found it necessary to devote much time and energy to defending its policies against hostile critics both at home and abroad. M a n y letters were written to the London Times by L o r d Aberdare and Sir George Goldie in defense of the Company. 4 3 T h e issue was raised at every meeting of the Council. French and German merchants complained that the commercial policy of the Company was contrary to the restrictions imposed by the Berlin Act. T h e y were successful in getting their respective governments to press their case at the British Foreign Office. 44 Germany, at this time, was more aggressive than France. 42

Hourst, op. cit., p. 482. See London Times of December 19 and 29, 1888, and January 3, 1890, for typical examples of this controversy. Royal Niger Company, Report of Proceedings, 1886-1899, passim. 44 See London Times, November 25, 1 889, for statement of German grievances. The case for France is given by Ε. M. Dubois et A. Terrier, Un Siècle d'expansion coloniale, (Paris, 1902), pp. s ô j f f . 43

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In 1887 a German merchant, H e r r Hoenigsberg, entered the Company territory with the deliberate purpose of stirring up trouble and "bursting up their Charter." H e was arrested by Company officials and, after a trial conducted by Sir James Marshall, was ordered to leave the country. A protest was made by Bismarck. T h e latter's nephew, H e r r von Puttkamer, the German Consul at Lagos, was ordered to investigate. H e did so in a manner highly irritating to the Company officials. 45 T h e issue in question was the familiar charge that a trade monopoly had been created. At the time the charter was granted, the Foreign Office had specifically declined to grant the request of the petitioners for a trade monopoly, because such a provision was contrary to the Berlin Act of 1885. T h e Company's opponents nevertheless maintained that the rules in operation in Nigeria did set up a monopoly in practice. A study of the regulations governing trade substantiates this claim. 46 T h e Company held, however, that such was not the case, and it went on record as favoring the policy of extending the privileges gained as a result of Thomson's treaty with Sokoto and Gango "to all who may desire to enter this vast field opened up by the enterprise of the Company alone." 47 While this declaration of policy might seem to open the field for all competitors, it must be pointed out that no merchants outside of the Company ever succeeded in establishing a profitable business in the region claimed under the charter. T h e pressure exerted upon the Foreign Office by Bismarck, together with representations made to Parliament by British merchants (especially the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce), led in 1889 to a careful investigation of the Company by M a j o r Claude MacDonald, an agent of the Foreign Office. H e was a man of marked ability and, as we have seen, became the first ConsulGeneral of Southern Nigeria. H e was no friend of the Company but, on the contrary, was especially close to the Liverpool group. His report, which was presented in 1890 (and for many years considered a confidential document), is therefore a particularly 45 48 47

Burns, of. cit., p. 166. Royal Niger Company, Regulations, X V , 1886, pp. 1 - 3 . Nation African Company, Limited, Report of Directors,

12/8/89.

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valuable source of information concerning the affairs of the Company. The Hoenigsberg case was especially important, and MacDonald investigated the circumstances with scrupulous care. It was claimed by Bismarck, in a note addressed to the British Foreign Office in September 1887, that the German firm of Hoenigsberg was "apparently without reason, forbidden to transport their goods in canoes to E g g a . " This protest had been followed by more correspondence in which the Germans claimed that duties were exacted both by the Company and the Emir of Nupe, and they cited the protest which Hoenigsberg had addressed to the Emir. MacDonald was especially diligent in obtaining testimony from persons who were unfriendly to the Company, but the weight of evidence pointed clearly to the fact that Hoenigsberg had gone out of his way to make trouble, that he had tried to stir the Emir of Nupe to revolt against the Company, and that on the whole he had acted very badly. In this important case, his report upheld the Company. 48 With respect to the claims of the Liverpool merchants, the investigation revealed the fact that the regulations of the Company, particularly those which dealt with ports of entry, were severe and inelastic. Under Company regulations persons licensed to trade were not allowed the use of land for any purpose, except at these specially designated ports—a restriction which imposed a distinct hardship on all outsiders. MacDonald was of the opinion that these restrictions should either be abolished or drastically modified. 49 There is no evidence to indicate that this recommendation was ever carried out. There had been complaints, too, from native sources which alleged that the monopoly established by the Company inflicted serious injury. This protest was based upon the argument that native merchants had built up trade with the interior prior to the advent of the Company and that the prohibitive duties imposed by the Company excluded them from their former mar48 The Re-port of Major MacDonald, ley, of. cit., pp. 3 9 - 4 1 . 49 The Report of Major MacDonald,

1890, pp. 2 2 - 2 5 . Lady Dorothy Welles1890, p. 90.

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kets. T h e y claimed, also, that Goldie had not bought out the native traders when he formed his Company, and that the treaties obtained with the chiefs of the interior had been obtained by fraud and misrepresentation. 50 A typical complaint came from the Brass tribe of the lower Niger and the natives of N e w Calabar. Investigation of the facts led to the suggestion that the grievances of these traders be remedied without delay. 5 1 This unfortunately was not done, and bore fruit six years later in the attack upon Akassa. Though MacDonald found evidence to substantiate some of the charges, his report on the whole praised Company rule. H e devoted considerable space to the political activities of the Company and pointed out that while its influence did not extend far beyond the river, law and order did prevail in territory definitely under its control, and Europeans might travel here in absolute safety. License fees charged by the Company excluded native traders and imposed definite hardships upon them, but " f o r the majority of the complaints that have been laid before me," he stated in conclusion, "there are no grounds." 52 Agitation continued despite the fact that MacDonald had upheld the policy of the Company. A n attempt was made by the African Association to break down the monopoly that had been established. This plan, if pursued with vigor, might have developed into a commercial war on the Niger, but when the Association was merged with the Company this possibility was removed. Messrs. Alexander Miller & Bros, of Glasgow became shareholders in the Company, and Alexander M i l l e r was made a director. 53 But the Liverpool group continued its attack. In 1893 they petitioned the Gladstone Government to take steps to bring the Company more directly under imperial control. 54 T h e y suggested 50 Memorial of Inhabitants of Lagos to Major C. W. MacDonald, (Lagos, 1889), fassim. 51 The Re fort of Major MacDonald, 1890, p. 97. 52 Ibid., p. 9 5. 5 3 Royal Niger Company, Refort of Council, 7 / 1 3 / 9 3 , p. 2. 54 A fairs of the Oil Rivers Protectorate and Niger Territories, (Liverpool, 1893)* pp. 4 - 9 .

B R I T I S H E N T E R P R I S E IN N I G E R I A the appointment of a Crown Commissioner to supervise the administrative activities of the Company; that the accounts of the Company be laid before Parliament; that the customs duties be reduced; that steps be taken to establish an administrative system independent of the Company; and that they be given representation in such a system. N o action was taken by the Government in response to this demand. Although attacks upon the Company continued, an understanding was eventually reached between the Company and its rivals in Liverpool. 3 5 Native tribes suffered more from the practical monopoly established by the Company than did Europeans. This was especially true in the case of the people of Brass, who occupied a district at the mouth of the Niger just outside of the territory allotted to the Company. Like many of the other coast tribes, they had been active in the slave trade and, after its decline, had turned their attention to trading in palm oil. T h e y soon established their status as middlemen in this growing business. Like other middlemen they found their position one of increasing difficulty as white traders encroached more and more upon the areas they had exploited. Consul Hewett had experienced difficulty with them when they objected to renewing the treaty of 1856 by which the English had granted them a commission on all produce they brought down from the interior. T h e y felt that their rights under this treaty had not been observed in practice, and that repeated protests to British Consuls had been ineffective. But in 1884 Hewett was able to extend the treaty for six months, persuading them by promises to refuse an offer from the French to conclude an agreement. 56 It was not until 1886, however, that Hewett returned with a permanent treaty. This contained provisions that they considered a very poor reward for their loyalty, 5 5 Royal Niger Company, Special Notice, 3 / 1 6 / 9 5 , fassim. Goldie in the course of a speech delivered on the occasion of his accession to the presidency of the Company referred to the attacks on the Company through the columns of the Liverpool Journal of Commerce, but pointed out that this was not the organ of the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce. T h e attacks were the w o r k of individuals w h o were careful to keep their identity secret. 56 Pari. Paf., 1896, 59, ( A f r i c a No. 3 ) , c. 7977, p. 7. T h i s is the report of Sir John K i r k , a special commissioner appointed to investigate the Company after the attack on Akassa.

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since it deprived them of control over their former markets. But having rejected the overtures of the French, they had no choice but to sign. The grant of a charter to the Royal Niger Company rendered their position still more difficult, for they were now excluded from their former markets, unless they paid a license fee—and that was impossible for a poor native trader. They felt that they had been treated badly, and complained bitterly: " W e are not allowed to go and trade freely at villages the people of which we, our fathers, and grandfathers, have traded with in times past." They did not submit without a struggle, and in defiance of the Company regulations attempted to trade in their former markets. This brought them into collision with the armed forces of the Company. Their canoes were fired on by Company launches, their goods were seized, and several natives were killed. Certain women testified that they had been outraged by native agents of the Company, stripped of their clothing, and tarred. 57 The climax was reached in January 1895, when Akassa, the principal station of the Company, was attacked and burned with serious loss of life. T h e inevitable punitive expedition followed and the Brass tribe was severely punished. 58 The attack on Akassa drew a vigorous protest from Sir Claude MacDonald, now the administrative head of the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, since the Brass tribesmen were inhabitants of the area under his jurisdiction. No action had been taken in response to his recommendation that the Brassmen be permitted to trade with their former markets, now under Company control, and he went on to complain that while native monopolists such as J a J a and Nana had been deposed, nothing had been done to curb the greatest monopolist of all, the Royal Niger Company. The Company, he charged, was able to open and shut any given market at will, could offer any price it liked and the producer must take it or starve, and had failed to open a sufficient number of ports of entry to satisfy the potential demands of the Niger 57

Ibid., p. 1 3 . These charges were minimized by the Kirk Commission. Geary, of. cit., pp. 1 9 3 - 9 6 ; Burns, of. cit., pp. 1 7 0 - 7 2 ; Bindloss, o f , cit., pp. 9 1 - 1 0 3 , gives a graphic account of the raid. 58

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trade. Further pressure was brought to bear upon the Foreign Office by enemies of the Company in E n g l a n d which terminated in the dispatch of Sir J o h n Kirk as Commissioner to investigate. 59 T h e report of the Kirk Commission sustained the charges of Sir Claude MacDonald that a practical monopoly was maintained by the Company. 6 0 " T h e rules in force are practically prohibitory to Native trade and the Brassmen are right in saying this is so. T h e y are for all intents and purposes excluded from the Niger if they are to respect these regulations." T h e charges concerning the conduct of native agents of the company were dismissed by the investigators. T h e Foreign Office was held to be largely responsible for the unfortunate state of affairs at Brass, since the Commissioner showed that gross carelessness had been evident in fixing the boundaries of the Company's domain. This boundary had been drawn in 1 8 9 1 in a most arbitrary fashion and unfortunately had failed to include the Brass tribe within the territory awarded to the Company. T h u s they were bound to be injured by the monopolistic policy of the Company, which would not have been the case if they had been included. T h e subsequent difficulties could thus have been avoided. Goldie always claimed that he was more interested in the improvement of conditions on the Niger than in the development of commerce. T h e present writer is of the opinion that in this he was quite sincere. A good test of his sincerity is afforded by an analysis of his policy with respect to the liquor traffic—a problem which the Berlin Conference neatly avoided, being content to adopt pious resolutions without any thought of putting them into effect. Goldie had pressed for a definite policy at the Conference and had obtained the support of the United States, E n g l a n d , and Italy. T h e opposition of France and Germany had prevented any effective policy from being adopted. 8 1 Despite the lack of international support, Goldie was firm in his determination to limit the liquor trade, and urged the Foreign Office to do everything possible to secure the cooperation of France and Germany. 6 2 5U 00 61 62

Geary, op. cit., p. 197. Pari. Pap., 1896, 59, (Africa No. 3 ) , c. 7977. Royal Niger Company, Report of Council, 6 / 1 6 / 8 7 . Ibid., see especially letter from Goldie to Salisbury.

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T h r e e weeks after the granting of the Charter a heavy duty was l e v i e d on spirits. In the following year the sale of spirits in the C o m p a n y domain was prohibited. T h i s action was taken three years before the restrictions on the liquor traffic were imposed by the Brussels Act of 1890. Efforts were made to persuade the G o v e r n m e n t to restrict the importation of liquor into L a g o s and the O i l Rivers, since the Company otherwise could not enforce its policy. Goldie felt that the time was ripe for definite international action, and proposed that joint steps be taken to prohibit the importation of liquor from the southern boundary of M o rocco to the frontier of Cape C o l o n y . In answer to the objection that trade would be injured by such a policy he w r o t e : But it might be also asked whether in many parts of West Africa commerce, as a whole, would not greatly suffer from a prohibition of the sale of spirits. No doubt the aggregate of trade would diminish temporarily, but the question which merchants have to put to themselves, and which the Powers have to ask, is that which the Council of the Royal Niger Company put before the shareholders. Is it not better to suffer a temporary diminution of trade with the prospect of reaping permanent benefit which must accrue from putting commerce on a sounder foundation? Unless this question is answered in the affirmative, as it was once answered by the shareholders of the Company, all hopes of developing Africa and raising it to the standard of Europe must be abandoned. 63 T h e response to his plea was not very encouraging. T h e Brussels Conference did little to solve the problem except to l e v y a small duty on spirits and adjourn to study the problem at greater length. Neither did he get much cooperation f r o m the authorities in the O i l Rivers Protectorate. But he went ahead, despite this lack of support, and the f o l l o w i n g regulation was adopted by the Company : After the Thirty-first day of December, one thousand eight hundred and ninety, no spirituous liquor shall be imported by land or by water into the Inland Regions, except as provided in Clause F. 6 4 63 64

Sir George Goldie, The West African Liquor Trade, (London, 1 8 9 5 ) , p. 8. Royal Niger Company, Regulations, X X X V , 1890, E .

io6

BRITISH ENTERPRISE IN NIGERIA

The exception indicated limited importation to non-natives and was for personal consumption only. It is difficult to determine the extent to which the Company was able to enforce its policy, but the records of the Council disclose the fact that increased sums of money were appropriated for the purpose of guarding the frontier and keeping peace among the natives. Many of the latter were aroused over a policy which made it impossible for them to obtain liquor as cheaply as their neighbors in the Protectorate.® 5 The problem of slavery affords another opportunity to test the humanitarian pronouncements of Goldie. The problem was twofold in character, since it involved the institution of domestic slavery and the practice of slave raiding by the powerful Fulani emirs of Northern Nigeria. There is no question as to Goldie's desire to end slavery and slave raiding, but circumstances compelled him to proceed with caution. H e was enough of a realist to know that any sudden abolition of domestic slavery would produce chaos. With the slender resources at his command he was in no position to undertake a war with the Mohammedan states of the north. The Company was never in a position to enforce its policy in the back country, but along the rivers it did curtail the activities of the raiders and did end many barbarous customs repugnant to Europeans. 66 It became increasingly clear, however, that unless vigorous steps were taken to check the activities of certain Fulani rulers, little could be accomplished toward bringing these slave raids to an end. The Company had been subjected to much criticism and had become involved in a controversy with the Aborigines Protection Society when the latter body attacked the Company by criticizing many phases of its policy. 87 An aggressive policy aimed at the abolition of slave raiding would do much to enhance the reputation of the Company. It would, moreover, gain the support of British public opinion, which was aggressively opposed to the practice. Such a policy was in full accord with the ideals of Goldie. 85

Royal Niger Company, Report of Council, 7 / 1 6 / 9 1 . Report of Major MacDonald, 1890, pp. 9 3 - 9 5 ; Royal Niger Company, Report of Proceedings, 8/26/88. See testimony of Rev. J . A . Robinson. 67 See letter from M r . Morley, Secretary of the Company, to Lord Kimberley, 4 / 1 6 / 9 5 , in which he defends the Company against this attack. ee

THE ROYAL NIGER COMPANY

107

T h e desire to check slave raiding was not the most compelling reason for the attack on the Emirs of Nupe and llorín. T h e Agreement of 1890 between France and England had established a tentative boundary between French territory and the region claimed by the Company. This agreement was definitely advantageous to the British. But unless steps were taken to establish effective occupation over the territory awarded to the Company, there would have to be some revision in favor of France. T h e Company would thus lose much of the region which it had marked for its own. Since Goldie was an enthusiastic empire-builder he could not contemplate such an outcome. T h e Sudan, it must be remembered, had been swept by a wave of fanaticism after the defeat of Gordon at Khartoum, and there is evidence to indicate that the Mohammedans of the western Sudan were contemplating an assault upon the British in the Niger Valley. In 1896 the Company officials were informed by the ruler of Bussa that the Emirs of Nupe and llorín were gathering their forces for the purpose of driving the British into the Atlantic. This was substantiated by the discovery of a letter addressed to these rulers by the K h a l i f a at Omdurman, urging the faithful to expel the Christians from their country. Confronted by these dangers, and anxious to curb slave raiding, the Company now proceeded with the utmost vigor. 9 8 An expeditionary force of one thousand Hausas started from L o k o j a on January 5, 1897. T h e command was given to M a j o r Arnold, who was fortunate to have the assistance of some twenty officers from the regular army who had volunteered for the expedition. Sir George Goldie was an active participant in the campaign, while the naval forces of the Company, acting under the orders of M r . William Wallace, the Agent-General, played an effective part in bringing the operations to a successful conclusion. T h e natural difficulties attending military operations in the tropics—the annoying problem of transport by head porters, the difficult na88

Lady Lugard, (Flora L. Shaw) A Tropical Dependency, (London, 1 9 0 5 ) , ch. 38; De Wiarte, of. cit., p. 4 2 ; Geary, of. cit., pp. 2 0 2 - 3 ; Burns, of. cit., pp. 1 7 2 - 7 3 . The best source for the Nupe-Illorin War is Seymour Vandeleur, Campaigning on the Uff er Nile ani Niger, (London, 1 8 9 8 ) . He was an officer attached to the expedition.

io8

BRITISH ENTERPRISE IN NIGERIA

ture of the country, the oppressive heat—all combined to make the march on Bida a trying one. Little resistance was encountered until the column reached the neighborhood of Bida. H e r e the enemy cavalry appeared in large numbers and before long the little army found itself hotly engaged. Wave after wave of Fulani cavalry dashed recklessly against the British square, while the sniping fire of Nupe riflemen was most annoying. At last, after the guns had been brought up and the town subjected to heavy bombardment, Bida fell. Despite the sturdy resistance of the Fulani, the British casualties were light, due largely it seems to the excellent discipline of the Hausas and the skill of the officers. This battle, suggestive in many respects of Plassey, proved a turning point in the history of Nigeria. T h e prestige of the Company was definitely established; the slave trade was dealt a severe blow; and the way was paved for the subsequent occupation of Northern Nigeria by Sir Frederick Lugard. A few days later Goldie addressed a great gathering outside of the walls of Bida. Natives from all parts of the Sudan were in attendance. There were merchants from Kano, " t h e Manchester of the Sudan," from Kuka on the shores of Lake Chad, the perennial Arab slave dealer with his "spotless white garments, red fez, and black, flowing beard," together with traders from the towns of the Mediterranean, Tripoli, Algiers, and Tunis. During the course of his address Goldie told the gathering that " t h e Nupe rule was at an end, and that the Company's aim was to promote order and, by preventing raids and warfare in this part of the Sudan, to enable them to go from one part of the country to another in peace and quiet." Formerly they had been compelled to pay heavy duties to the Fulani overlords but now they were free to trade with Lokoja without being taxed. T h e newly appointed Emir concluded a treaty which recognized the sovereignty of the Company, placed Nupe under the British flag, and permitted him to rule the country under the supervision of the Company. 69 69

Niger

Vandeleur, o f . cit., fassim. Sudan Expedition, /8çy,

See also Sir George T . Goldie, Kef ort of fassim.

the

T H E R O Y A L NIGER C O M P A N Y

109

T h e situation at llorín next engaged the attention of Goldie, and a small force was sent out to deal with it. llorín was a Mohammedan town, subject to Sokoto. It was surrounded by pagan tribes with whom it was constantly at war. T h e Lagos Administration had met with little success when it sought to end this condition. Although the Emir was secretly a friend of the British, he was dominated by his "baloguns" or generals, who were spoiling for a fight. Goldie was ready to accommodate them, and the discipline and superior equipment of the Company forces made the outcome certain. T w o days after their defeat at the hands of the British, the E m i r and his "baloguns" submitted and signed a treaty. This treaty is of particular interest because it dealt definitely with the problems of slavery and the liquor traffic. Slavery was now suppressed. T h e implications of this policy were carefully explained to the Emir in the course of two long interviews. T h e Emir, Suliman, agreed also "to take every step in his power to prevent further introduction of gin and rum that may be found in the country." 7 0 Goldie had reason to be pleased with his success and was quite confident that slave raiding was definitely at an end in both Nupe and llorín. H e was especially delighted to learn that " T h e r e is scarcely one tribe in the whole of the Yoruba and Nupe Country that is not exceedingly grateful and thankful to you for this good and liberal work which you have been enabled to carry out." 7 1 A further step toward destroying slavery was taken in 1897 when the Company proclaimed the abolition of the legal status of slavery in the Niger Territories. W h i l e this policy could not be enforced in regions still remote from Company control, it was definitely a forward step and in line with the position later adopted by Lugard. This policy was wise in that it did not dislocate social relationships, but provided a means by which slaves might ultimately gain their freedom. H i g h praise was accorded Goldie by the British and Foreign Antislavery Society, which ex70

T h e text o f the treaty is given by V a n d e l e u r , p p . 291—92.

71

G o l d i e , of. cit., p. 8. Extract

tians of Lokoja,

2/28/97.

from letter imiten

to Goldie

by Native

Chris-

no

BRITISH E N T E R P R I S E IN N I G E R I A

pressed its great pleasure and satisfaction over "the great service rendered to humanity by the promptitude of your action in setting free the enslaved populations of the regions under your command." 7 2 T h e successful campaign against Nupe and Ilorin gave the Company great prestige. It became increasingly clear, however, that the Government would soon take over its administrative responsibilities. The Company did not possess resources sufficient to conquer and hold the vast region over which it claimed sovereignty. The situation, especially in Borgu, was becoming very critical where the French were increasingly aggressive, and war loomed as a distinct possibility. T h e dynamic Joseph Chamberlain had recently become Secretary of State for the Colonies. Soon after he took office, Chamberlain had declared in a memorable speech that he intended spending large sums of money for the development of the unexploited areas within the Empire. H e fixed his attention on Nigeria in particular. This region had great potentialities and, moreover, already had a well-developed trade. H e authorized the creation of a native army of two thousand men, summoned Colonel Lugard from South Africa to take command, and instructed him to occupy Borgu, where French expeditions had been operating since 1895.™ Goldie realized now that the period of Company control was drawing rapidly to a close. In a notable speech delivered before the London Chamber of Commerce he reviewed the progress made by the Company and explained in considerable detail his views regarding the future of Nigeria. 74 H e felt that the policy outlined in the famous resolution of 1865 had been responsible for French success in penetrating the interior of West Africa. H e was very dubious about the possibility of parliamentary support if a more aggressive policy was adopted. H e was strongly of the opinion that Nigeria should be governed by a permanent council 72

Royal Niger Company, Refort of Proceedings, 7 / 1 6 / 9 7 , pp. 5-8. See report of speeches by Sir Frederick Lugard and Sir James Willcocks at inaugural dinner of the West African Frontier Force, 7 / 5 / 2 1 . West Africa 7/15/22. 74 T h e London Chamber of Commerce, Pamphlet Series No. 25, pp. 3 - 1 0 . 78

THE

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HI

made up of men experienced in African affairs, but free from parliamentary interference. H e recognized the fact that the Company might have to abandon its dual position of administrator and trader. Revocation of the charter would certainly permit the Company to continue as a limited concern, but he favored a policy that would allow the Company to divest itself of its trading function to continue the labor of administering and developing its vast estate for the benefit of the empire. T h e conclusion of the Borgu Convention of 1898 with France made the decision certain. There had been a growing feeling that "it was undesirable that territories, of which the defence was provided at public expense, should be administered at private discretion." 7 5 This was especially true since the establishment of the West African Frontier Force. The Government felt, too, that rather than appropriate money to support the Company it would be preferable to relieve the latter of its administrative responsibilities and thus secure control over expenditures as well as policies. It is claimed by some that the repudiation of Goldie and the revocation of the charter were part of the price paid for the withdrawal of France from Fashoda. 76 In June 1899 L o r d Salisbury, in a letter to the Treasury, expressed the intention of the Government to assume the Company's administrative powers and to revoke its charter. The most important consideration was the situation created by the conclusion of the convention with France. H e declared : T h e possibility of the early claim by the French G o v e r n m e n t to profit by the advantages in the lower N i g e r which are secured them by the Convention, makes it essential that an Imperial Authority should be on the spot to control the development of the policy which a c tuated her Majesty's G o v e r n m e n t in granting those advantages, and to prevent the difficulties which would be sure to arise were

the

C o m p a n y ' s officials alone to represent British interests. 77 75

Lady Lugard, of. cit., pp. 3 6 1 - 6 3 . Lady Dorothy Wellesley, of. cit., pp. 68-69. This opinion was also expressed by Mary Kingsley, a good friend of Goldie's. 77 Pari. Paf., 1899, 63, Royal Niger Company, c. 7 3 9 1 , p. 3. T h e reference is to the provision of the Convention of 1898 which gave France access to the Niger at Bussa. 7β

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BRITISH ENTERPRISE IN NIGERIA

In response to this request the Treasury prepared a minute setting forth the terms of settlement. 78 First, the Company was to be relieved of all its administrative powers and duties. All its treaties and mining and mineral rights were to be made over to the Government. The Company was to retain its plant, trading assets, stations, warehouses, and other property necessary to conduct its business. Second, upon the transfer of administrative rights, the Government was to assume the payment of the annual charge of £ 1 2 , 5 0 0 interest on the public debt of the Niger Territories. Third, the Government was given the right to redeem stock at £ 1 2 0 per £ 1 0 0 on January ist or J u l y ist of any year, provided three months' notice were given. Fourth, the Government was bound to pay, one month after the revocation of the charter, the sum of £150,000 as the price of the administrative and treaty rights acquired and as compensation for the interruption and dislocation of the Company's business. This was supplemented by the Government's agreement to pay one-half of any royalties that might be received for private mining and land rights taken over for a period of ninety-nine years. Fifth, the Company was compensated to the amount of £300,000 in repayment of sums advanced for the development and extension of territories in excess of income from duties and fees. Sixth, the sum of £ 1 1 5 , 0 0 0 was to be paid to the Company for war materials, administrative buildings, steamers, and other property taken over by the Government. A bill embodying the details outlined above was introduced and debated at some length. 79 The principal objection centered about certain of the financial items, particularly about the payments to the Company for administrative rights, treaty rights, good will, buildings, and equipment. T h e old charge of commercial monopoly was revived and used as the basis of attack. While the Company had no official spokesman in Parliament, the Chancellor of the Exchequer was forced to defend his bargain, which 78 Pari. Paf., 1899, 63, Royal Niger Comfany, c. 7391, pp. 3-8. See also Royal Niger Company, Sf erial Notice, July, 1899. ™ 62—63 Victoria, c. 4.3. For debate see Hansard, 4th ser., Vol. 75, pp. 370424.

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he did successfully. T h e measure was passed in J u l y 1899, and the R o y a l N i g e r Company became a private concern. Goldie was greatly disappointed over the outcome and expressed the desire to "never hear the word ' N i g e r ' again." H e felt that the compensation was quite inadequate and declared that "either Germany, or France, or both, would have paid a very different sum." 80 T h i s view was shared by other officials of the Company, but they realized that there was little that could be done. M a n y public officials who were intimately acquainted with the work of the Company were dead, and treasury officials had had little contact with Company affairs. 8 1 T h e Company officials felt that they had done a splendid piece of work, and except for them Nigeria might have been lost to England. This feeling was well expressed in a speech by Goldie at the last meeting of the old Company. A f t e r reviewing their past achievements, he went on to declare: T o bring about a revulsion in public opinion so far as W e s t A f r i c a was concerned, it w a s necessary to find an instrument outside direct Parliamentary control, and unaffected by the control of parties. T h i s could only be achieved by obtaining a complete reversal of the policy which shortly before extinguished the Honorable E a s t India

Com-

pany and the Chartered Hudson's Bay C o m p a n y , and which led many publicists to declare that the era of Chartered Companies w a s closed forever. L e t us never forget that it was the success of our C o m p a n y in this new departure and the emulation aroused by its successful enterprise, which not only gave security to the Oil Rivers and L a g o s , but also gave fresh life and energy to the other W e s t African possessions which had previously stagnated on the seaboard. T o m y mind, these incidental results of the C o m p a n y ' s earlier operations—between

1 8 7 8 and 1 8 8 6 — a r e , perhaps, its claim to be r e -

membered, for a time, in connection with the modern history of Africa.82

T h e disappointment of Goldie and his associates was natural, but it is quite clear to the historian that the Company had made 80 81 82

Lady Dorothy Wellesley, of. cit., p. 70. Royal Niger Company, Sfecial Notice, July, 1899. Royal Niger Company, Refort of Proceedings, 8/23/99,

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a good bargain and so had the Government. It had acquired at a cost of £865,000 title to an area nearly 500,000 square miles in extent, a territory which would never have been held but for the energy and vigilance of Sir George Goldie and his colleagues. Public opinion in England was not sufficiently imperialistic nor was the Government in the mood to undertake the responsibilities, or assume the risks inherent in the task. The winning of Nigeria was the achievement of the Royal Niger Company, and its guiding spirit, Sir George Taubman Goldie, richly earned the title of "Founder of Nigeria."

Chapter IV INTERNATIONAL RIVALRY T h e closing years of the nineteenth century were marked by a mighty struggle among the powers for the control of Africa. Issues born of this conflict dominated the diplomatic history of the period and, on more than one occasion, brought the contestants to the verge of war. Anglo-French rivalry over E g y p t , the dramatic clash between Kitchener and Marchand at Fashoda, as well as the repercussions of the Boer W a r , all bear witness to the truth of this observation. Imperialistic rivalry in North Africa, especially in Morocco, developed early in the twentieth century and played an important part in producing the international situation that culminated in war in 1914. W h i l e diplomatic historians have devoted increasing attention to these issues, they have failed to appraise at full value the rivalry which developed in West Africa, particularly in connection with Nigeria. 1 T h e attempt of France to encircle the possessions of England and to control the Niger Valley produced much friction, which culminated in the Borgu crisis of 1897-98. T h e successful adjustment of this issue helped to pave the way for a pacific settlement of the Fashoda affair that arose a few months later. T h e negotiations that led to the Entente of 1904 involved Nigeria, and their successful outcome brought to a close a rivalry of long standing. International rivalry in West Africa involved three great powers—England, France, and Germany. A l l three had acquired extensive commercial interests on the West Coast, and all three became convinced of the necessity of protecting these commercial interests by the establishment of political control. T h e y shared the belief that rival powers could not be trusted to afford adequate protection to the business groups which consistently sought to gain the support of government for their varied activities. 1

Langer, The Diplomacy

of Imperialism, IIS

II, pp. 538, 550.

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England had committed herself to a greater degree than either France or Germany, but Liberal opposition to imperialistic adventures had resulted in a policy which might be described as one of non-administration designed to result in profits without expenditures. Economy was the watchword in Whitehall, where every suggestion that an adequate administrative staff be established in West Africa was stifled by the inertia of officialdom. In the absence of serious threats from rival powers, the British were quite content to allow matters to drift. This attitude on the part of the British authorities is well illustrated by their refusal to accept offers repeatedly made by native chiefs in the Cameroons to place their territories under English protection. British explorers, missionaries, and traders had been active in the district of the Cameroon River for decades, but the only authority exercised by the British Government over this region was through a consul supported by occasional visits by gunboats from the Royal Navy. 2 A Court of Equity had been set up at Duala. This court was created by agreement between foreign traders (largely British and German) and local rulers for the worthy purpose of promoting peace, without which trade was impossible. A considerable amount of authority was exercised by this court which frequently referred difficult issues to the British consul who, in turn, occasionally called upon British warships to enforce law and order. It was inevitable that British traders should come to desire a more effective control over coastal areas in West Africa as the pressure to exploit new markets for the industrial powers of Europe became more intense. English and German traders seldom clashed, but French competition, especially in the vicinity of Lagos, was viewed with increasing alarm. T h e chronic state of war among native tribes threatened serious complications since many trading companies had made loans to rival chieftains, thus involving themselves in their quarrels. Native rulers had frequently indicated their desire to place themselves under British protection, but the Foreign Office had treated their offers with 2 Harry R. Rudin, Germans in the Cameroons, (New Haven, 1 9 3 8 ) , p. 19. This is the best account available of Anglo-German rivalry in the Cameroons.

INTERNATIONAL RIVALRY

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3

indifference. In March 1 8 8 1 , King Bell of Duala wrote to Consul Hewett definitely requesting the establishment of a British protectorate, but received no answer until early in the following year. Even then he was informed that although the British Government appreciated his expression of friendship, there was no intention to establish a protectorate. While the official attitude of the Foreign Office was still one of indifference, certain officials, notably M r . T . V. Lister, were strongly of the opinion that the offer of King Bell should be accepted. Lister was given strong support by the British Consul in West Africa, M r . E . H . Hewett, who favored annexation of the entire coast from a point south of the Cameroon River northward to Benin. H e attempted to appeal to the economically minded Gladstone Government by suggesting that the annexed territory be turned over to a chartered company of British merchants.4 This difference of opinion led to a long debate among officials of both the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office but, in the meantime, Hewett was secretly instructed by Lord Granville and M r . Lister to endeavor to persuade the native kings by friendly messages and vague promises to abstain from making offers to either France or Portugal. There was as yet no indication that the Foreign Office feared German intervention. Bismarck's decision to enter the race for colonies has been the occasion for considerable speculation by historians interested in the German colonial empire.® T h e most recent study of Bismarck's colonial policy presents conclusive evidence that his sudden interest in colonies was more than a mere change of mind. It was a purposeful policy, deliberate in design, and executed with the rare diplomatic skill so clearly exemplified by the Iron Chancellor.® The rise of Germany as a great industrial power, * Evans L«win, The Germans and Africa, (New York, 1 9 1 $ ) , p. 138; J . S. Keltie, The Partition of Africa, (London, 1895), p. 199. 4 Rudin, of. cit., p. 21. s See Mary Townsend, Origins of Modern German Colonialism, (New York, 1 9 2 1 ) , also her Rise and Fall of the German Colonial Emfire, (New York, 1930). M. von Hagen, Bismarcks Kolonialpolitik, (Berlin, 1923), is important in this connection. • A . J. P. Taylor, Germany's First Bid for Colonies, (New York, 1938).

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B R I T I S H E N T E R P R I S E IN N I G E R I A

together with the surge of German patriotism emerging from the successful movement for unification, rendered imperialistic ventures certain in the natural course of events. Evidence of this developing trend is afforded by the growing interest expressed by German scientists, traders, missionaries, and chauvinists in acquiring control over unclaimed regions in Africa. Numerous societies were organized to give voice to this rising tide of sentiment and, by acting as pressure groups, they forced a seemingly reluctant government to take positive action. It is reasonably clear that Bismarck had decided to seek colonies as early as November 1880, when he politely inquired if England would be willing to protect German missionaries in the vicinity of Walfish Bay. Anxious to avoid further colonial commitments, the Foreign Office returned an evasive answer. In the meantime a German merchant, H e r r Luderitz, had purchased land on which to erect a warehouse at Angra Pequeña. W h e n Bismarck raised the question with London whether they had claims in this region, the Gladstone Government replied that any German claims to the coastline between Portuguese Angola and Cape Colony would be a violation of British rights. Alarmed over this turn of events, Lord Derby attempted to persuade the Cape to take over the region, but it was not until the summer of 1884 that the Cape Parliament was prepared to take action. T h e y were three months too late since Bismarck had taken Luderitz under Germany's protection in April. 7 German agents were active in other parts of West Africa and, at about the same time that Bismarck was outwitting the British at Angra Pequeña, a German explorer of distinction, Gustav Nachtigal, was on his way to the West Coast. Acting under careful instructions from Bismarck to avoid areas claimed by France, he sailed to Africa ostensibly to investigate "the state of German commerce on that coast." Due notice was given the British Foreign Office concerning Nachtigal's mission, but the suggestion that he was "authorized to conduct, on behalf of the Imperial Government, negotiations connected with certain questions" apparently 7

British Foreign and State Papers, 75, pp. 528-53, passim.

INTERNATIONAL RIVALRY

119

meant little to Granville and his colleagues. 8 It was difficult for them to realize that Germany was about to launch herself upon a career of empire building, so for days they continued to debate the question of assuming active control over the Cameroons and to quibble over the additional expense that might be involved. T h e question whether there should be four vice-consuls or only two, and the question whether it would be wise to save expenses by allowing agents of the National African Company to serve as vice-consuls in their spare time, thus saving the salaries of a few officers, all loomed up as major issues in the minds of the key men in the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office, and the Treasury. It was not until M a y that Consul Hewett was finally instructed to return to West Africa despite the fact that British traders, together with the commanding officers of British warships stationed on the coast, had given repeated warnings that quick action was imperative. In the meantime Nachtigal had raised the German flag over Togoland, after which he proceeded to the Cameroon River where German traders, assisted by the German consul from Gabun, had already promised native rulers, who for years had sought the protection of the British Government in vain, that the German Government would take them under its protection. 9 Disappointment over repeated failure to interest the British, coupled with the necessity of securing support against local rivals, made the task of negotiating a treaty of protection relatively easy. Captain Moore of H . M . S. Goshawk tried to save the situation but, since he lacked authority to make treaties, he could only implore King Bell to wait until the arrival of Hewett. K i n g Bell had waited for years but promised to wait a week longer, probably because of opposition encountered from many of the native headmen who were still hopeful of securing British protection and who were, at the same time, profoundly distrustful of the Germans. But bribery was resorted to with good effect, so that on July 8 Lord E. G. Fitzmaurice, Life of the Second Earl Granville, (London, 1905), II, p. 340. 9 Rudin, of. cit., p. 39.

BRITISH ENTERPRISE IN NIGERIA 14,1884, the occupation of the Cameroons became official with the raising of the German flag in several towns of the new protectorate. One week later M r . Hewett arrived, too late to forestall the Germans, but in time to earn the title " T o o L a t e " Hewett. T h e fault, however, was not his. T h e extreme reluctance of British officials to come to conclusions concerning the future of West Africa, the complacent assumption that Africa was theirs for the taking, the failure to appraise the real significance of Bismarck's note concerning the dispatch of the Nachtigal mission, the desire to economize on consular salaries, all combined to cost them their opportunity in the Cameroons. It has been suggested already that the British were far more apprehensive concerning French penetration of West Africa than they were over any possible threat from Germany. Such a view of the situation was quite natural since France had been active in this area from very early times. 10 French enterprise had centered about the mouth of the Senegal River where merchants from Dieppe had traded for many years. A permanent French colony had been established in the sixteenth century but was seized by the British during the Napoleonic Wars, only to be returned to France by the Vienna Settlement in 18x5. Little attention was given this settlement until the arrival of Governor Faidherbe in 1854. H e inaugurated a "forward policy" which carried French influence back into the hinterland. By 1870 he had won for France a compact block of organized territory in the Senegal Valley as far inland as Medina. Other posts had been established along the coast as far south as Porto Novo, and from these vantage points French influence had spread inland. 1 1 By this move it was hoped to give France control of the interior trade, the possibilities of which had been revealed by the expeditions 1 0 Blake, of. cit., ch. 6. Professor Blake does not regard French claims to priority in West A f r i c a as valid, p. 3. 1 1 T h e better books on French Expansion in Africa include: Jean Darcy, Cent Annés de Rivalité coloniale, (Paris, 1904.); E. M . Dubois et A . Terrier, Un Siècle d'expansion coloniale, (Paris, 1 9 0 1 ) ; M . Petit, Les Colonies françaises, 2 vols., (Paris, 1902; Stephen H. Roberts, History of French Colonial Policy i8yo—iç25, 1 vols., (London, 1 9 2 9 ) . Herbert I. Priestley, France Overseas, (New York, 1938).

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of M a g e and Binger. H o w this prospect appealed to the French has been w e l l expressed by a recent historian, w h o writes: France was going beyond the steamy mists of the river mouths, unveiling the mystery of Timbuktu, and planning to connect all of the Niger lands with the coast. . . . T h e posts which had been contemptuously left to France as a kind of booby's prize in the international game were revealed as the threshold of a mighty economic empire; and, the Sudan, Timbuktu, the Niger, all clad in a kind of mysterious uncertainty, entered the orbit of French politics, and appealed the more to the Latin temperament by their very romance and suggestion of things unknown. A field of commerce at a time when Africa was beckoning to younger military leaders in France, and a huge emporium for trade and production at a moment when it was more than ever imperative that colonies should pay, all of these were offered by the African hinterland; and so France moved gaily to the task. 12 D u r i n g this period the economic motive was thrust into the background by a thirst for prestige based on military conquest. A s the French pressed on, they came into contact with various native kingdoms which had arisen in the territories formerly controlled by the Songhai E m p i r e . 1 3 Severe resistance was encountered. E l H a d j O m a r , the ruler of an empire between T i m b u k t u and the Guinea Coast, united the tribes in a H o l y W a r . A f t e r his overthrow an even more formidable opponent, Samory, arose to gain the distinction of being " t h e most difficult opponent France ever encountered in the colonial field."

14

In 1884 the movement into the N i g e r basin began with the occupation of Bamako, and during the next ten years steady progress was made. In the meantime, the holdings on the I v o r y Coast and D a h o m e y were enlarged, and contact was established with the territories won to the northeast. B y 1900 a solid block of the Sudan had been acquired. T h i s comprised a prolongation of Senegal and the Guinea Coast to the bend of the N i g e r , with Roberts, of. cit., I, p. 303. A good account of these campaigns is given by Petit, of. cit., chs. 4 - 7 . T h e best description of the Songhai Empire is by Lady Lugard, of. cit., chs. 1 9 - 1 3 . 1 4 Roberts, of. cit., I, p. 304. 12 13

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offshoots to the Ivory Coast, Dahomey, and Lake Chad. In the process three of England's colonies—Gambia, Sierra Leone, and the Gold Coast—had been cut off from further expansion inland, and England's hopes of securing the greater part of Nigeria were seriously endangered. This short résumé of international rivalry in West Africa should serve to make it quite clear that a serious conflict of interest had developed in this long-neglected region, a conflict that might seriously threaten the continuance of European peace. The situation was brought sharply into focus by developments on the Congo. In January 1878, Henry M . Stanley landed at Marseilles where news of his discovery of the Congo basin had traveled before him. A delegation from King Leopold I I of Belgium was there to meet him in the hope of enlisting his services for their royal master. T h e Belgian King had been interested in Africa for several years, having founded the International Association for the Discovery and Civilization of Central Africa at a conference held in Brussels in 1876. 1 5 The Belgians were not immediately successful in their effort to enlist the services of M r . Stanley. H e was in no condition to attempt an immediate return to the African jungle and, moreover, was anxious to solicit British support. T h e lack of interest displayed by British authorities discouraged Stanley, so eventually he took service with King Leopold and his group of promoters. A secret mission under his leadership was sent to Africa in 1879, but when, after much maneuvering to disguise his real objective, he finally began the ascent of the Congo he found to his consternation that a French explorer, de Brazza, had already planted the tri-color on the northern bank of Stanley Pool. The Gladstone Government was not easily aroused, but Lord Granville was becoming suspicious of the humanitarianism of Leopold and his associates and was reluctant to have the Congo come under his control. Granville did not protest directly to King Leopold, neither did he display any interest in establishing a British protectorate, but preferred to act indirectly through Por15

See A. J . Wauters, Histoire politique du Congo beige, (Brussels, 1 9 1 1 ) , for an authoritative account of Leopold's scheme.

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tugal, a country which had been a satellite of Great Britain for many years. In February 1884 a treaty was signed which extended recognition to Portuguese sovereignty over the mouth of the Congo. It provided for an Anglo-Portuguese commission to control navigation on the river, assuring England of free navigation and most-favored-nation treatment. 16 It was quite clear that the ambitious King of the Belgians was neatly checkmated. But this move by the British was not allowed to pass unchallenged. Leopold sought the assistance of Jules Ferry to counter the effort to control the mouth of the Congo and, by promising France the first opportunity to buy the claims of the Association in case they wished to sell their holdings, won his support. The French Foreign Office accordingly protested with vigor against the proposed Anglo-Portuguese Treaty and was joined in its protest by Bismarck. Here was a chance to improve relations with France and to place her under obligation to support the colonial schemes which Germany was about to initiate. Rather than permit the situation to become critical, Ferry made the suggestion that an international conference be convened to deal with the problem. This suggestion was acceptable to the British, who announced that the Treaty would not be ratified. The Conference met in the palace of the German Chancellor where, six years before, the famous Congress of Berlin had convened. 1 7 Most of the nations of Europe were represented and, for the first time in history, delegates from the United States took their seats with those of the European powers at a diplomatic conference. Bismarck was made chairman and presided at most of the sessions. Although the Berlin Conference was not called for the express purpose of settling Nigerian issues, its decisions did affect Nigeria in several important respects. In the first place, the British 16

Hertslet, of. cit., II, pp. 7 1 3 - 1 4 . In addition to the books by Keltie and Lewin, see the important article by Daniel De Leon, Political Science Quarterly, I, pp. i o j f f . Also, Howard E. Yarnall, The Great Powers and the Congo Conference in the Years 1884 and i88¡, (Göttingen, 1 9 3 4 ) . Pari. Pap., 1886, 47, Protocol and General Act of the West African Conference, (Africa No. 4 ) , c. 4 3 6 1 . The key document for the Berlin Conference. 17

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NIGERIA

made it clear when they accepted the invitation that the rights acquired by Goldie on the Niger were to be respected. 18 Goldie had been successful, as we have already seen, in thwarting the efforts of French rivals by forcing them to sell out to his Company. This triumph had been followed by the negotiation of treaties with the chiefs of the lower river which, according to the interpretation given them by the Foreign Office, had placed their territories under British protection. Second, the application of the principle of freedom of navigation, which had first been defined at the Congress of Vienna, was extended to the Niger as well as to the Congo. And finally, certain principles intended to control the acquisition of African territory were evolved at the Berlin Conference which became of fundamental importance in delimiting the frontiers of Nigeria. 19 An important provision of the General Act of Berlin dealt with the navigation of the Niger. Here the principle first defined at Vienna in 1 8 1 5 was adopted, and freedom of navigation was proclaimed on the Niger: T h e navigation of the N i g e r , without excepting any of its branches and outlets, is and shall remain entirely free for the m e r c h a n t ships of all nations equally, w h e t h e r in c a r g o or in ballast, f o r the transportation of goods and passengers. I t shall be regulated by the provision of this A c t of N a v i g a t i o n , and by the R u l e s to be made in pursuance of this A c t . 2 0

Further articles defined the manner in which the above provision should be applied. No transit duties were to be charged. Roads, waterways, railways, or lateral canals constructed with a view to supplement navigation, were to be considered as dependencies of the river and open to the traffic of all nations. Tolls collected for the purpose of defraying the necessary expenses of construc18 Pari. Paf., 1 8 8 5 , 55, ( A f r i c a No. 1 ) , c. 4360, p. 1 . See also Pari. Paf., 1884, J 5 , ( A f r i c a No. 7 ) , Correspondence respecting the West African Conference, c. 4 3 6 0 ; 1886, 47, ( A f r i c a No. 3 ) General Act of the Conference of Berlin, c. 4739 ; 1 8 8 5 , 55, ( A f r i c a No. 4 ) Protocol and General Act of the West African Conference, c. 4 3 6 1 . 18

Hertslet, op. cit., I, pp. 2 0 - 4 7 ; P"ri·

4739· *· Ibid., p. 39·

P"t·,

l8

8 6 , 47, ( A f r i c a No. 3 ) , c.

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tion and operation were permitted, and a reasonable profit for the promoters was to be allowed. It was also agreed that England should be responsible for the application of the act on the portion of the river under her control, and France accepted a similar responsibility on the upper river. T h e establishment of a set of principles by which conflicting claims could be adjusted was of real importance. Since these principles were invoked frequently by the powers interested in Nigeria, it is important to indicate here some of their more important features. Probably the most important principle adopted at Berlin was that of effective occupation. This principle, which forbade the establishment of paper protectorates, was based upon Article 34 of the General Act : Any

P o w e r w h i c h h e n c e f o r t h takes possession of a tract of land

on the coasts of the A f r i c a n C o n t i n e n t outside of its present

pos-

sessions, or w h i c h , being hitherto w i t h o u t such possessions, shall a c c o m p a n y the respective act w i t h a notification thereof, addressed to the other signatory

P o w e r s of the present A c t , in o r d e r to enable

t h e m , if need be, to make good a n y claims of their o w n .

. . .

T h e signatory P o w e r s of the Present A c t recognize the obligation to insure the establishment of authority in the regions occupied them

on the coasts of the A f r i c a n

existing

rights,

a n d , as the case m a y be, f r e e d o m of trade and

transit u n d e r the conditions a g r e e d

by

C o n t i n e n t sufficient to protect of

upon.21

The provisions quoted above were designed to prevent excessive land grabbing. They were limited in their application to certain regions, though it was urged at the time by a number of delegates that they be applied throughout Africa. It is difficult to define with accuracy the expression "effective occupation," but Salisbury had declared that claims to sovereignty would be recognized only where it was evident that there was sufficient military strength "to maintain order, protect foreigners, and control the natives." Later we shall see that a sharp difference of opinion arose between England and France over the meaning of the term ; England holding to the view expressed above, and France claim21

Hertslet, of. cit., I, p. 4 3 .

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ing that the establishment of a fort or the hoisting of the flag was sufficient. In addition to the test of "effective occupation," there was the so-called "hinterland theory," which was invoked frequently by France, and which was discussed at the Berlin Conference. T h e concept, however, was not a new one. It goes back to the time of English settlement in America when, under the original charters, grants were made extending from coast to coast. According to this theory, a power occupying the coast is entitled to claim sovereignty for an indefinite distance inland. T h e attempt to apply this concept in America had led to grave complications. A similar attempt in Africa was productive of much friction. T h e English, for example, were not willing to allow France to restrict British advance in Nigeria on the ground that Nigeria was in the hinterland of Algiers. 2 2 Treaties made with African rulers were frequently invoked and, it was urged by some at Berlin, were a perfectly valid title of sovereignty. Although it may be admitted that the existence of a treaty gave a particular power an advantage over a rival that held no treaty, it is necessary to remember that these treaties were often obtained in a questionable manner. Native rulers were accustomed to making treaties without understanding their import. In many cases the tribal chiefs had no power to dispose of communal rights, and the legal verbiage of the approved treaty forms could not be translated by ill-educated interpreters. T h e signature of the chiefs was usually a cross. T h e gift of a pair of boots, a few bottles of gin or, in one case, an opera hat that worked with a spring, was often sufficient to persuade a Negro potentate to sign away his rights and the rights of his people. T h e American delegation supported another principle which may be described as the principle of "voluntary consent." 23 Although the powers, out of courtesy, accepted this doctrine, they never took it seriously. Consequently it is of relatively slight importance and was seldom, if ever, invoked by the nations in the settlement of their African difficulties. 22 23

L u g a r d , The Dual Mandate, p. 12. Pari. Pap., 1885, 55, ( A f r i c a No. 4 ) , c. 4361, Protocol No. 8, 209.

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In the last analysis the position of every power in Africa rested upon "effective occupation" backed by force. W h i l e the diplomats were always successful in eventually adjusting conflicting claims in Africa, a threat to use armed force lurked in the background and, on more than one occasion, proved the decisive factor. Force was the method employed to establish the rights of the powers, to administer justice, to collect taxes, to restrict the slave trade, and to dispose of unused lands and mineral rights. It is idle to contend that the chiefs had voluntarily surrendered such rights. N o government really derived its powers from the chiefs but became sovereign through the employment of superior force. England got Nigeria because she was the first power to occupy the country effectively, because she was strong enough to conquer the natives, and because her diplomacy, backed by the threat to resort to war, was successful in defending her possessions against her rivals. T h e success of the Berlin Conference did much to clear the diplomatic skies of the storm clouds that had gathered over West Africa. But the final adjustment of a boundary between Nigeria and the new German colony in the Cameroons was delayed until 1893. In the meantime both countries were active in their efforts to control as much of the hinterland as possible by sending agents scurrying throughout the interior districts on treaty-making expeditions. T h e British, because they had been granted control over the navigation on the Niger and because of the activities of the aggressive National African Company, possessed an advantage over Germany which they were quick to exploit. British agents, the most famous of which was the notorious Rogozinski, operated for several years near M t . Cameroon, in the hope that it would be possible to restrict the Germans to the coast. T h e latter were not disposed to remain on the defensive, so they countered by sending their agents into regions already claimed by the Royal Niger Company where, as has already been explained, they gave Sir George Goldie many anxious moments. 24 T h e activities of rival agents, determined to establish claims 2 4 Rudin, of. cit., ch. ι , passim. T h e records of the Royal Niger Company do not shed much light on this phase of Company history.

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over villages in the hinterland of coastal possessions, was not the only factor involved in the increasingly serious situation that involved Germany and England. There were still many areas along the coast where definite claims had not been established ; British traders were carrying on business in areas claimed by Germany ; British missionaries were still active at Victoria and other Cameroon towns and were apprehensive as to the future if they remained under German control; and many native rulers did not consider themselves bound by treaties concluded by Herr Nachtigal. This situation seriously strained relations between the countries, so much so, that there was some talk of war by responsible leaders in Germany. Lord Granville was inclined to adopt a stiff attitude with Bismarck, but the advent of a crisis arising over a rebellion in the Cameroons influenced him to assure Bismarck that England desired nothing but friendly relations with Germany. 26 T h e situation was further relieved by the arrival of Count Herbert Bismarck early in March 1885, to conduct negotiations looking forward to a comprehensive adjustment of Anglo-German difficulties. T h e whole atmosphere had changed. Instead of attempting to escape responsibility for the activities of their agent Rogozinski by denying that he was in their employ, the British Government dismissed him from the consular service. Orders were issued to British ships in West African waters to salute the German flag. M r . Buchan, who had been appointed British vice-consul at Duala and had given repeated offense to the Germans, was removed. T h e Government moreover indicated its willingness to discuss issues concerning trade and the claims of British missionaries in a friendly spirit, while Bismarck relaxed the restrictions previously imposed on British ships entering the Cameroon River. This changed attitude made it possible to take up the difficult question of the boundary with a real chance of success. T h e discussions between the British and the Germans which were necessary to delimit the frontier between Nigeria and the Cameroons were difficult and involved. 26 Several issues arising 25 26

Rudin, of. cit., p. 58. Pari. Paf., 1 8 8 4 - 8 5 , X I , Africa No. 1 ( 1 8 8 5 ) . Corresfondence

resfecting

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from the scramble to establish claims in the Cameroons and Nigeria arose to prolong the negotiations. Trading companies, British and German alike, had attempted, by means of treaties with native rulers, to encroach upon territory which their rivals hoped to exploit. The restrictions concerning the establishment of commercial monopolies imposed by the Berlin Conference were disregarded in many instances. Many claims for damages were urged upon their respective governments by individuals who had lost property during the course of the fighting that had been necessary to the establishment of foreign control over native areas. A particularly troublesome issue concerned the rights of the Baptist Mission at Victoria. This group of British missionaries had begun their work in 1845 but had been unable to persuade the Government to take them under its protection. The prospect of being obliged to continue their work under the German flag was not appealing, but there appeared to be slight chance that the action of Consul Hewett in proclaiming Victoria a British colony would be supported by the Gladstone Government. It was up to them to make the best bargain possible, and in the ensuing negotiations they were not backward in pressing their claims. Eventually the matter was settled by the sale of their property to the Basier Mission, but at a price far below their original claims. T h e negotiations conducted by Herbert Bismarck were characterized by the willingness of both governments to make reasonable concessions. The English were prepared to repudiate any rights they might claim by virtue of the treaties concluded by Rogozinski, while Bismarck agreed, after some hesitation, to abandon German claims to Mahin Beach which was close to Lagos. On March 20, 1885, the English suggested that the right bank of the Rio del Rey be made the starting point for a boundary that was to extend in a straight line to a point on the Cross River marked "Rapids" on an Admiralty map. After some discussion this line was agreed upon, but the question as to rights in the hinterland north and east of the Cross River was still undecided. The British were not eager to extend the boundary until the Affairs in the Cameroons, c. 4279. For details concerning the settlement of Anglo-German claims cf. Rudin, of. cit., ehs. ι , 2, passim.

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National African Company had been given opportunity to extend its operations into the country in the vicinity of Yola. Bismarck, on the other hand, was impatient, since he feared grave complications if a decision was postponed until rival traders, both English and German, had built up a maze of conflicting claims. A simple solution would then be difficult indeed. B y November 1885, British traders were well entrenched on the Upper Benue, so the British authorities expressed their desire to discuss an extension of the line to Yola. The policy of discriminatory treatment of "interlopers" by the officials of the National African Company occasioned protests from the Chancellor and prompted the Government to sound a note of warning to M r . Goldie. T h e latter vigorously denied the charges but, as we have pointed out before, his defense was not convincing. T h e discussion of other issues, already referred to, served to prolong negotiations so that it was not until the spring of 1886 that a settlement appeared likely. There was considerable correspondence during the summer of this year between Rosebery and Hatzfeldt until finally an agreement was reached through an exchange of notes which extended the boundary to Yola. 2 7 Reciprocal guarantees with respect to trading rights were exchanged at the same time. The Germans were destined to disappointment in their efforts to exploit the area of which Yola was the center, since they soon made the discovery that the Moslem rulers were vassals of the Sultan of Sokoto who, in turn, was bound by treaty to England. 2 8 But chagrin over the hollowness of their success soon disappeared as the importance of gaining a foothold on Lake Chad became apparent. This body of water in the Western Sudan was a great attraction to colonial rivals, and the Germans, like the French and British, made every effort to secure a footing along its marshy shores. Negotiations with Great Britain concerning the extension of the frontier to Lake Chad became entangled with the discussion of conflicting claims in other parts of Africa. 29 Some of the 27

Hertslet, of. cit., II, pp. 6 1 2 - 1 4 . This treaty was made by Joseph Thomson in 1885. 29 Die Grosse Politik, IV, pp. 3 9 9 - 4 1 9 . The Cameroons are scarcely mentioned in this correspondence. 28

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more ardent imperialists in England urged a policy which contemplated expansion across Central Africa to unite Uganda with Nigeria, but there is little evidence that their views were taken seriously in official circles.30 Such a policy would effectively block the plans of France and Germany, but it was certain to lead to grave complications with both powers. By this time the British had come to realize that France was the more dangerous rival and, while they were certainly in no mood to allow Germany a free hand in the hinterland of Nigeria, they were inclined to show favor to the less dangerous opponent. T h e so-called Heligoland Treaty of 1890, which liquidated Anglo-German claims throughout Africa, defined in general terms the boundary between Nigeria and the Cameroons. 31 T h e boundary of 1886 was clarified in certain details, and it was further provided that " N o Treaty or Agreement, made by or on behalf of either power to the north of the River Benue, shall interfere with the free passage of goods of the other power, without payment of transit dues to and from the shores of Lake Chad," and that knowledge of all treaties having to do with territory between the Benue and Lake Chad should be exchanged reciprocally. While the Treaty of 1890 served to settle in principle the issues between England and Germany, a further agreement signed in 1893 established the final boundary. T h e careful delimitation of the frontier from Yola to Lake Chad was the essential feature of this agreement. 32 An adequate frontage on the lake was assured to each power, Yola and its outlying area was awarded to England, and limits were placed upon German expansion to the eastward. The Germans agreed to stay out of the basin of the Shari River, nor were they to occupy Darfur, Kordofan, or the Bahr-el-Ghazel. Each power bound itself to respect the others' spheres of influence by refraining from making treaties, accepting sovereign rights, establishing protectorates, or challenging the position of the other in the regions assigned to each. T h e con30

Stephen Gwynn, Life of Mary Kingsley, London, 1 9 3 2 , pp. 1 8 2 - 8 3 . Langer, op· cit.y II, p. 538· 31 Hertslet, op. cit., II, pp. 647-48. 32 Ibid., pp. 6 5 4 - 5 5 . The reaction of the Royal Niger Company to this agreement is made clear in Report of Proceedings, J u l y 1 4 , 1894.

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elusion of this agreement established the boundary of Nigeria until the close of the World War of 1914. Mention has been made above of the advance of the French in West Africa. This drive had already cut off three of England's colonies from the interior, and now seriously threatened to limit British holdings in the Niger Valley. French expansion had been accompanied by attempts to penetrate into Nigeria by means of commercial companies but had been frustrated by their merger with the Royal Niger Company. It was apparent, therefore, that Nigeria was not to be French. It was still a question in 1890 just how much of the region claimed by the Company could actually be held. The influence of the Company did not extend very far from the river. Unless it were possible to strengthen its claims by diplomacy, there was a very good chance that much of the territory won at Berlin might eventually be lost. Consequently the arrangements which were made with the French in 1890 are of first importance because they greatly strengthened England's position in Northern Nigeria and effected in principle a settlement of the northern frontier. The negotiations were conducted by Lord Salisbury, and in August 1890 an agreement was reached. According to its text, the Mediterranean possessions of France extended southward to a line drawn from the town of Say on the Niger to Barrua on Lake Chad. It was also agreed that the Royal Niger Company could claim all of the territory that fell within the Kingdom of Sokoto, the exact limits of which were to be established by a joint commission.33 The French were not pleased with this arrangement since they had obtained only a narrow strip of territory which could be described as promising. "Instead of fragments which our Government has just wrested from English rapacity, we should have ruled as masters on the Lower Niger and Benue, which are worth all the trans-Saharan railways in the world," declared the République Française in an article quoted by the London Times.3* " Hertslet, of. cit., II, p. $ηι\ Pari, taf., 1892, 56, (Africa No. 7 ) , c. 6701, p. i j ; Royal Niger Company, Refort of Proceedings, July 16, 1891. M London Times, August 9, 1890. For official French attitude see speech of M. Ribot, Dubois et Terrier, of. cit., pp. 535—36. Journal Officiel, 1894, Débats

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There were two reasons for French dissatisfaction. In the first place, the Say-Barrua line followed the southern limits of the Sahara, thus depriving the French of a bridge leading to their holdings on the Congo; and second, the location of Say on the west bank of the Niger strengthened the English claim to Borgu in the hinterland of Lagos and Dahomey. The fact that the line crossed the river made it more difficult for the French to contend that the Niger was the western boundary of the domain of the Company and, in addition, prompted the officials of the Company to negotiate treaties with the chiefs who claimed sovereign rights along the right bank of the stream. 35 This activity on the part of the Company was followed by official action at home. Lord Rosebery contended that the line extended directly southward from Say to the coast. This claim was further supported by a notification addressed to the German Government in October 1894, which sought to establish a British protectorate over all of the territory described above. 38 Early in the following year a similar notification was given the French authorities, who, as we shall see, were not inclined to accept the situation. Their challenge to the British was followed by a sharp crisis that culminated in 1898. But Borgu was not the only region where England and France clashed. In 1890, only a few days after the Say-Barrua line had been agreed upon, an energetic Frenchman, Monteil by name, started out upon a most interesting journey. Leaving St. Louis on the Senegal, he traveled by steamer as far as Kayes and then marched overland to Segu on the Niger. From there he plunged into the wilderness near the great bend of the river, a region hitherto unexplored by Europeans. Eventually he emerged at Say. H e next visited Sokoto, Kano, and Kuka on Lake Chad and fari, chambre, pp. 930-40. This debate covered the whole range of French colonial policy in Africa and indicates French disappointment concerning the Convention of 1890. 35 Royal Niger Company, Refort of Proceedings, August 29, 1890. Aberdare expressed his concern over French advance in Dahomey and explained that it had been thought advisable to conclude a treaty with Borgu. 36 Annual Register, 1897, pp. 382-84.

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from there struck northward to Tripoli, traveling by the way of Bilma and Murzuk. 3 7 It is not clear from the account of his travels just what he was instructed to attempt. But he received a promotion soon after his return, so it is safe to assume that he completed the objects of his mission. H e apparently was vested with authority to conclude treaties and reconnoiter the Say-Barrua line, because his travels carried him along its entire extent from west to east. It may be assumed, also, that his purpose was to establish French claims to as much of the territory in question as possible, as well as to fix the northern limits of the Kingdom of Sokoto far within the region claimed by the Company. His exploits aroused the resentment of the British, who accused him of concluding treaties with rulers already under their protection, with abusing and "sneering" at British officials, and with attempting to detach the Sultan of Sokoto from his allegiance to the Company. 38 T h e Monteil Expedition was not the only indication that France was inclined to challenge the British position on the Niger. In the same year, 1890, Lieutenant Mizon entered the Lower Niger, where he was attacked by native tribesmen—an attack which later formed the basis of a charge that it had been instigated by officials of the Company. This charge was denied by Aberdare, who pointed out that the Company had known nothing of his plan to travel in its territory. Had the Company been asked, he asserted, it would gladly have provided him with a proper escort. H e claimed that Mizon's relations with Company officials had been most pleasant, and explained his charges on the ground that he desired to impress de Brazza (the Governor of French Equatorial Africa) with his exploits. 39 T w o years later Mizon appeared again, this time with the support of the French Foreign Office. T h e Quai d'Orsay demanded 37 Major P. L. Monteil, De Saint Louis a Tripoli, far le lac Tchad, (Paris, 1894), passim. 38 A . F. Mockler-Ferryman, British Nigeria, (London, 1902), p. 200; Jean Darcy, of. cit., p. 167-68. The Company was not alarmed. Cf. Royal Niger Company, Refort of Proceedings, July 20, 1892, especially speech of Aberdare. 39 Royal Niger Company, Refort of Proceedings, July 20, 1892, pp. 3-8. Journal Officiel, pp. 936-38 for French view of this affair.

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that he be allowed to conduct an armed force through the territory of the Company. The Company yielded under protest, and Mizon was allowed to proceed up the Benue to Yola, where his presence led to further difficulties. T h e Company, in pursuit of its policy of suppressing slave raiders, had encountered considerable difficulty with the Emir of Muri. M r . Wallace, the Agent-General, had just concluded a satisfactory arrangement with Muri when Mizon appeared and allied himself with the Emir and, what was more serious, joined with him in an attack upon the pagan town of Kwona. 40 When this was followed by the proclamation of " T h e French Protectorate of the Central Sudan" the affair assumed more serious proportions. T h e Company did not care to undertake the responsibility of expelling Mizon and when, after an exchange of notes he was withdrawn, it was quite content to allow the matter to rest. 41 It may well be doubted whether the French had any real hope of shaking the hold of the Company on the lower river. They were pursuing a policy of "pin-pricks," born of the resentment of the Colonial Party over the unsatisfactory settlement of 1890. This view is further established by a brief survey of two other episodes; the raid conducted by Captain Toutée, and the expedition of Lieutenant Hourst. In 1895 Captain Toutée applied for permission to travel as a private individual to Bussa on the Niger, from which point he intended to proceed to the French outposts in the neighborhood of Timbuktu. After his arrival at Bussa he suddenly dropped the role of private individual and appeared as a French political agent. In this capacity he attempted to build a fort on the right bank of the river, claiming that he was operating in French territory. This brought forth a protest from the British, and eventually Captain Toutée was ordered to withdraw. 42 10

Gazetteer of Muri Province, pp. 6 - 7 . Cf. London Times, September 14, 1893, for a review of Mizon affair. Royal Niger Company, Report of Proceedings, J u l y 1 3 , 1 8 9 3 ; Dubois et T e r rier, of. cit., pp. 2 5 2 ff. ; Lieutenant Colonel Salmon, Le Massacre de la Mission Mizon far les anglais, (Paris, no date). 42 Captain Toutée, Dahome-Niger-Toureg, fassim; Mockler-Ferryman, of. cit., p. 206; F. D. Lugard, The Nineteenth Century, 37, p. 898; Dubois et T e r rier, of. cit., pp. 5 5 i f f . 41

i36

BRITISH ENTERPRISE IN NIGERIA

In the following year Lieutenant Hourst descended the river from Timbuktu and penetrated to a point three hundred miles below Say at Leaba, where he found the Company flag flying. Some difficulties were experienced with Company officials though his relations with the British officers in command of the Company forces were most cordial. H i s force too was ultimately withdrawn and, aside from arousing the wrath of the Company, no particular damage was done. 43 Considerable friction developed in connection with the events described above, but these were of minor consequence as compared to the clash that occurred in Borgu. T h e French venture into this region grew out of the conquest of Dahomey. Having secured an additional base between the German colony of Togoland and the British possessions in Nigeria, the French attempted to repeat the tactics employed in Senegal by sweeping into the hinterland, thus restricting their rivals to enclaves along the coast. By invoking the hinterland theory, the French attempted to strengthen their case and clinch the victory by effective occupation. 44 This forward movement brought them into collision with their old enemy Samory, and several expeditions were sent against him. T h e attack, launched from Senegal and the newly won base in Dahomey, alarmed both the English and the Germans. T h e difficulties with the Germans were easily adjusted by a treaty signed in Paris on July 23, 1897, which definitely fixed the limits of Togoland. 4 5 But when the French disclosed one of their objectives to be the conquest of Borgu, the British were determined to resist. Their claim to Borgu was based upon two treaties. The Treaty of 1890, according to the English interpretation, had given them title to the region. It will be recalled that the Say43

H o u r s t , op. cit.,

44

T h e best source f o r the B o r g u Crisis is J . L . G a r v i n , Life

berlain,

passim. of Joseph

Cham-

( L o n d o n , 1 9 3 4 ) , I I I , ch. L V . G a r v i n reveals f o r the first time the de-

cisive part p l a y e d by C h a m b e r l a i n in this critical a f f a i r . T h e e x p l a i n e d by A n d r e L e b o n , La Politique

de la France

en Afrique,

French side is 1896-1898,

( P a r i s , 1 9 0 1 ) . L o r d L u g a r d g a v e me v e r y v a l u a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n r e g a r d i n g his part in the a f f a i r , but cannot be quoted. 45

D u b o i s et T e r r i e r , op. cit., pp. 5 5 3 - 5 + .

INTERNATIONAL RIVALRY

137

Barrua line crossed the Niger and that the British had at that time claimed the country west of the river. This contention had been fortified by notifications addressed to both the Germans and the French, which declared that this region lay within the territory claimed by the Royal Niger Company. Second, the British had in the same year concluded a treaty with the ruler of Borgu. Consequently they were in a position to argue that their rights rested upon a treaty concluded with France, upon the notification which followed the conclusion of the treaty, and upon a supplementary treaty with the ruler of Borgu. On the other hand the French contended that they had never accepted the British interpretation of the Treaty of 1890, that the Company had not effectively occupied the region claimed, and, furthermore, that the English had not made a treaty with the real sovereign of Borgu. The officials of the Company were not inclined to sit idly by while the control of the right bank of the Niger fell into the hands of a powerful and aggressive rival, especially when that rival had been endeavoring to penetrate into other territories held by the Company. Company officials feared that French success would destroy its monopoly of the trade on the lower Niger. Basing their case upon the treaties mentioned above, they challenged the French, who replied by denouncing the treaty which the Company had concluded with Bussa, the leading town of Borgu, and by asserting that the ruler of Nikki was the real sovereign. This move attracted the support of the French press, which contended that the first power to conclude a treaty with Nikki should be recognized as the real sovereign of Borgu. 48 " I t is," declared the Politique Coloniale, "a veritable steeplechase to which France, England, and Germany are devoting themselves to gain that part of the buckle of the Niger which impinges on the lower river." Little time was lost by the contestants. A French expedition under the able leadership of Captain Decoeur left France on July 24, 1894, and the French newspapers were confident that 10

Lugard, " A n Expedition to Borgu," Proceedings of the Royal Geograf hie Society, September, 1 8 9 5 ; Dubois et Terrier, of. cit., pp. 5 j i f f .

138

B R I T I S H E N T E R P R I S E IN N I G E R I A

the "steeplechase" would result in a victory for their champion. They underestimated the capacity of the British contender, Captain Lugard, who started four days later. Borgu, the prize, was one of the few regions in Africa which was still unexplored. The people of the region were especially warlike and had been successful in resisting the Fulani as well as the very capable and energetic Samory. The Hausa proverb "ten Borgu horsemen are enough to defeat one hundred Foula horsemen," is indicative of their reputation. Europeans who had attempted to penetrate the region had been killed or compelled to turn back. It required, then, no little courage on the part of both Decoeur and Lugard to venture into this inhospitable country. The latter lost little time. Despite the fact that the rainy season added to the dangers and difficulties of travel, he pushed on. H e traveled by steamer as far as Jebba, where the overland journey was begun on September 15. It was not until November 10 that Lugard reached Nikki, where a treaty was concluded.47 Five days later the French arrived. The fact that the English had made a treaty did not prevent the French from doing likewise. Apparently the ruler was in a treaty-making mood, though the British claimed that he yielded only to a threat of force. As soon as possible Decoeur announced his success by a telegram to the home authorities, an announcement which was followed by publicity in the press, no reference being made to the treaty which Lugard had concluded before the arrival of Decoeur. Later, when the news of Lugard's treaty was made public, it was stigmatized as false. 48 The flurry occasioned by the race for Nikki subsided for a time. Aside from a newspaper war, the two rivals were content to rest. No immediate effort was made to occupy the region within the bend of the Niger. The trouble with Nupe and llorín engaged the attention of the Company and, although it scored a brilliant success in the campaign conducted by Goldie, it was not in a posi47 L u g a r d , o f . cit., fassim. Also his article " J o u r n e y in West A f r i c a and Some Points of Contrast," Scottish Geografhical Magazine, December, 1 8 9 5 . 48 Dubois et T e r r i e r , o f . cit., p. 5 5 1 .

INTERNATIONAL RIVALRY

139

tion to follow up the work of Lugard by undertaking additional conquests. The French, on their part, withdrew the expeditions that had threatened to penetrate into Borgu, and agreed to the suggestion put forth early in 1896 to establish a joint commission to sit at Paris and endeavor to liquidate the issues that had been raised, not only in West Africa but in Indo-China as well. In 1897 the storm broke.49 Joseph Chamberlain became Colonial Secretary with the establishment of the Unionist Government in 1895, and in France Gabriel Hanotaux began to press with vigor his schemes for French aggrandizement in Africa. T h e establishment of the Meline Cabinet in April 1896 was the signal for a renewed effort on the part of France to realize her dream of a vast North African Empire, and a forward movement was launched which brought matters to a crisis on both the Niger and the Nile. The scheme was worthy of a Dupleix. It contemplated the establishment of an empire stretching from the Mediterranean to the Congo, and from the Atlantic to the Red Sea. Abyssinia was to be swept within the orbit of French policy, the upper Nile Valley to be seized by expeditions operating from Abyssinia and French Equatorial Africa, and British possessions in West Africa limited to narrow enclaves along the coast. With a less resolute Government established at Downing Street this plan might have succeeded, but in the person of Joseph Chamberlain the French encountered an antagonist who was determined to oppose them with every weapon at his command—with war if necessary. These were indeed critical years for England. The storm clouds which rolled up from the valley of the Niger formed only a part of the dark picture that greeted Chamberlain on his accession to office. The controversy in South Africa that terminated in the Jameson Raid and brought in its train a serious controversy with Germany, the critical situation that developed in Armenia, the reports of the arrival of Marchand in the basin of the Bahr el Ghazal, the irritation aroused by the growing commercial rivalry with Germany, the development of a crisis in the Far East pre40 Garvin, op. cit., III, p. 204. See also, Documents Diplomatiques : Correspondence et Documents relatifs à la Convention Franco-Anglaise du 14 juin,

1898.

I40

BRITISH ENTERPRISE IN NIGERIA

cipitated b y the G e r m a n seizure of Kiao-chau, and the Russian descent on P o r t A r t h u r , all combined to expose the weakness of t h e British policy of isolation in f o r e i g n affairs and to increase the anxieties of t h e G o v e r n m e n t . It w a s not until the a u t u m n of

1 8 9 7 that C h a m b e r l a i n f o u n d sufficient leisure to acquaint

himself w i t h the details of the W e s t A f r i c a n situation. It w a s then that a s t u d y of t h e papers led him to the conviction that there w a s little t i m e to lose if F r a n c e w a s to be forestalled on the l o w e r Niger.50 L o r d S a l i s b u r y w a s inclined to be conciliatory, but C h a m b e r l a i n w a s d e t e r m i n e d not to y i e l d and was successful in persuading his chief to adopt a stiff attitude in W e s t A f r i c a b y authorizing the f o r m a t i o n of the W e s t A f r i c a n F r o n t i e r F o r c e , designed to counteract the F r e n c h policy of presenting E n g l a n d w i t h accomplished facts. C o l o n e l L u g a r d w a s hastily s u m m o n e d f r o m South A f r i c a to take c o m m a n d . I n him " C h a m b e r l a i n saw his C l i v e , and w h o , in t u r n , w a s as p r o u d of a political chief in w h o m he f o u n d the stirring qualities of a C h a t h a m . "

51

H e w a s clearly the man f o r

the j o b , a n d his previous services in U g a n d a and W e s t A f r i c a c o m m e n d e d h i m to C h a m b e r l a i n . C o l o n e l J a m e s W i l l c o c k s of the I n d i a n A r m y w a s selected to s e r v e as second in c o m m a n d , a n d the w o r k of o r g a n i z i n g the " W a f f s " w a s pushed

forward

w i t h e n e r g y and determination. T h e C o l o n i a l Office had been anxious to make use of the services of S i r G e o r g e G o l d i e , but he w a s u n w i l l i n g to undertake the responsibility unless assurance w a s g i v e n as to the future of the C o m p a n y . C h a m b e r l a i n r e f u s e d to bargain with G o l d i e a n d in a f o r c e f u l letter to L o r d Selborne r e f u s e d to sanction the expenditure of " h u n d r e d s of thousands or possibly millions in securing his claims against the F r e n c h and that he is then to step in and e n j o y w i t h o u t cost a l l the security that w e have gained for h i m . "

52

G o l d i e w a s g i v e n the choice of accepting the terms defined by C h a m b e r l a i n or of stepping aside. H e chose the latter alternative. B y M a r c h 1 8 9 8 the organization of the W e s t A f r i c a n F r o n t i e r - 5 0 Garvin, of. cit., p. 203. 51 Ibid., p. 209. e2 Ibid., p. 110.

INTERNATIONAL

RIVALRY

141

Force had been carried to a point where L u g a r d was ready to take the field. Headquarters were established at Jebba and Colonel Willcocks was ordered into Borgu. T h e French, in the meantime, thrust armed forces into the disputed area. T h e danger of a clash was imminent. Willcocks was ordered to avoid villages where the tricolor was flying, but every other point was to be placed under the British flag and held at all costs. As he pushed into Borgu in accordance with his instructions, he came closely into contact with the French, particularly at Betikuta, where, under cover of the night, the French moved up a Senegalese detachment and hoisted the flag a scant four hundred yards from the English camp. 53 When one reflects that the rank and file on both sides was composed of native levies, each anxious to prove its mettle, it is remarkable that "the guns did not go off of themselves" with disastrous consequences to both E n g l a n d and France. T h e commission which had been established to harmonize Anglo-French differences in West Africa had been at work for many months but had accomplished very little. Public opinion on both sides of the Channel was becoming aroused to a dangerous pitch. Both the English press and Government officials denounced French policy and declared that there could be no surrender of well-established British rights. Especially threatening was the declaration of L o r d Selborne, parliamentary Under-Secretary for the Colonies, who declared in a speech at B r a d f o r d , " W e wish for peace, but not at any price. W e did not fight about Madagascar, because out interests there were so small ; but can we say the same of West A f r i c a ? " 54 Joseph Chamberlain voiced his determination before the public, in Parliament, and in his relations with Salisbury, to insist upon British rights. " T h e cabinet is absolutely united," he said, "in the determination that they will exhibit 53 Ibid., p. 2 1 6 ; Col. Ref. Annual, 1889, No. 260, West African Frontier Force, i8çy—i8ç8, p. 8. This report deals very briefly with events in Borgu. Lugard's confidential despatches to Chamberlain are not available. 54 Gooch, History of Modern Europe, (New York, 1 9 2 3 ) , p. 286; For French opinion see, Darcy, of. cit., p. 3 16 ; L . V. Maxse, La Question FrancoAnglais dans la Bouche du Niger, (Paris, 1898). This is an article written by a famous chauvinist and translated from the National Review. Marcel Paisant, Les Droits de la France au Niger, (Paris, 1 8 9 8 ) .

142

BRITISH ENTERPRISE IN NIGERIA

the most conciliatory disposition in dealing with disputed matters, and will be ready even to make concessions of what they think to be their rights . . . but they will not allow the important interests of this country to be sacrificed." 5 5 T h e press ardently supported the Government, and the Pall Mall Gazette in particular went to the length of accusing the French of being " v u l g a r brigands" and charged them with burning and pillaging native villages within British territory. 5 6 T h e temper of the French public was no less dangerous, and the dispatches of the British ambassador repeatedly called attention to the possibility of an explosion. There was a great deal of apprehension over the attitude of Russia; the army appeared to be in a state of excitement; and hysteria over the Dreyfus Case was reaching a climax. It was feared that "it might be a relief to France to pick a quarrel with the one Great European P o w e r who cannot invade her, perennial jealousy of whom supplies almost as ample ground for vindictiveness as is furnished against Germany by the last international struggle." 5 7 This feeling was not relieved by the reports from West Africa, which charged the French with repeated invasions of Niger Company territory, and which were met by countercharges by Hanotaux, who accused the Company of similar tactics and insinuated that the British were not anxious to reach a reasonable settlement. 58 Fortunately f o r the cause of international peace, it was possible to compromise and thus avoid the humiliation of unconditional surrender. Both sides were out to retain as much as possible, although the French appeared more anxious to reach a settlement. Each f e l l back upon certain principles which had been enunciated at the Berlin Conference of 1 8 8 4 - 8 5 , especially that of effective occupation. 59 T h e French advanced the claim that Borgu had not 55

Hansard, 4th ser., 53, cols. 1620-28 for attitude of parliament. Darcy, of. cit., pp. 310—11. 57 British Documents on the Origins of the War, I, No. 172. Garvin, of. cit., p. 2 1 3 . Gabriel Hanotaux, Fachoda, (Paris, 1909). Lebon, of. cit., pp. 43ff. 58 British Documents, I, No. 1 7 3 . 59 John Westlake, "England and France in West Africa," Contcmforary Review, April, 1898, F. A . Edwards, " T h e French on the Niger," Fortnightly Review, April, 1898. 66

INTERNATIONAL

RIVALRY

143

been effectively occupied until their expeditionary forces had appeared and that this gave them title despite the counter argument advanced by the British that they had prior treaty rights. Argument and discussion continued along this line until early in 1898, when direct negotiations between Monson, the British ambassador, and Hanotaux indicated a desire to reach a settlement. Realizing that it was impossible to confine the British to limited areas on the coast, as had been done in the case of Gambia and Sierra L e o n e , the French were willing to make concessions, but held out for the possession of Ilo, a town on the N i g e r , which Chamberlain was not willing to yield to France. L o r d Salisbury was not in favor of making Ilo an issue and expressed his views to Chamberlain in a letter that is worth quoting here: I a m wholly unconvinced of the value of I l o ; and I cannot disc o v e r on w h a t our claim to it rests. B u t I should prefer giving up B o n a to giving up Ilo because our title to B o n a seems to me positively bad. I t will be a pity if w e break off the negotiations, for it will add to our difficulties in the Nile V a l l e y .

. . .

I f w e are to send British

or Indian troops in the hope of fighting another Plassey with L u g a r d as our C l i v e and Sokoto as our B e n g a l , the prospect becomes very m u c h more serious. O u r Clive will be in no d a n g e r of being astonished at his o w n

moderation.

There

is no loot to get

except

in

G o l d i e ' s dreams. I f you wish to come to terms it w o u l d be prudent to do so before w e take K h a r t o u m . W e shall get nothing out of the F r e n c h A s s e m b l y after that e v e n t . 8 0

In February the British proposed definite terms, which included the withdrawal of the French from territory which the British claimed to be under their protection, an adjustment of the frontier of the Gold Coast with important concessions to France, and the adoption of an identical fiscal policy. T h e French had demanded access to the Niger below Bussa. T h e British were willing to concede this by agreeing to remove any restrictions that were detrimental to French interests; to grant France the right to lease land below the rapids (upon which they might erect buildings of a strictly commercial character) ; and to permit the negotiation of a short-term agreement to allow French invalids to pass through 60

Garvin, of. cit., I I I , p. 220.

144

B R I T I S H E N T E R P R I S E IN N I G E R I A

British territory to the Niger. 6 1 These terms provided a basis for discussion. A f t e r the negotiations had continued for a month, Hanotaux submitted counter proposals. Agreement was reached on a number of points. T h e French were granted the entrepot on the Niger for which they had fought; conditions of navigation on the lower river were agreed upon; an adjustment in which the northern boundary was to be deflected in such a manner as "to comprise within the British sphere all that fairly belongs to the Kingdom of Sokoto" was made; and it was further agreed that the delimitation of West African territory should be entrusted to a joint commission.®2 H a v i n g agreed in principle upon the basis of settlement, the task of adjusting details was turned over to the Niger Commission. Discussion continued with every prospect of an amicable settlement until the issue in regard to Ilo was raised. This, as we have seen, threatened for a time to bring negotiations to an end. W h i l e Salisbury was not inclined to hold out on this point, he was persuaded to do so by Chamberlain. T h e final settlement awarded Ilo to England. T h e Anglo-French Convention of 1898 was signed June 14, and its terms approximate those outlined above. T h e frontiers of Dahomey were extended to the Niger above I l o ; the Kingdom of Sokoto was awarded to England with the exact location of the boundary to be determined later; the lease of ground below Bussa was approved; and equality of treatment in all matters of navigation, commerce, tariffs, and the like was provided for. 6 3 T h e Convention was a reasonable settlement, and it is a tribute to the statesmen who were successful in reaching a peaceful solution of issues complicated and embittered by appeals to national honor and national interest. Both sides could draw solace from the Convention because both had made substantial gains. England had held most of the territory under dispute, and most of the objectives contended for by the Colonial Secretary had been attained. France British Documents, I, No. 165. Ibid., No. 176. 63 The Convention is given in British and Foreign State Pafers, 91, pp. 3854; Hertslet, of, cit., II, pp. 785-96. 61

62

INTERNATIONAL RIVALRY

145

could point with pride to the fact that the agreement united three great regions—Algeria and Tunis, Senegal and Niger, Lake Chad and the Congo—and ensured the union of a vast African domain which extended from the Mediterranean to the Congo and from the Atlantic to the watershed of the Nile. Ratification of the Convention was postponed for nearly a year, partly because of the opposition of the French press, which was inspired by the Colonial party, but chiefly because the controversy over the Nile became acute during the summer of 1898. This was a more serious crisis because, from the British point of view, there could be no compromise. France must either withdraw or fight. W h i l e the controversy culminating in Fashoda does not pertain to this study, it should be indicated that it was closely related to the events just described. It was the opinion in both England and France that the limit of concessions had been reached, and the anger aroused by the controversy on the Niger had not as yet died down. England felt that France was not to be trusted, and was fearful lest the French "try to play the same trick as she did in West Africa, and before in Madagascar, Tunis and Siam. T h e time has come when England and France have to settle their differences once and for all." 64 T h e ratification of the Convention did not completely satisfy both parties though subsequent disputes never assumed serious proportions. Considerable difficulty arose in connection with the activities of Fad-el-Allah, the successor of Rabah, because of the fact that Monteil had acquired certain treaty rights in the Lake Chad country. 65 Some delay was experienced in setting up the commission for the delimitation of the northern frontier and, after the commission had been constituted, it was necessary to await the conquest of Sokoto before it could proceed with its task. T h e arrangements for leasing ground on the Niger were not entirely satisfactory, and certain adjustments were necessary in this connection. These issues were dealt with during the negotiations leading to the Entente of 1904. It is unnecessary to describe here the events which led up to 64 65

Die Grosse Politik, IV, pp. 387-88. T h i s episode is explained in the following· Chapter.

14Ó

B R I T I S H E N T E R P R I S E IN N I G E R I A

the Entente, and it is proposed to deal only with those issues that involved Nigeria. Early in 1903 the French opened the question of a rectification of the frontier in the vicinity of Sokoto. Through ignorance of the country, the line had been drawn in such a fashion that caravans traveling through French territory were forced to go far to the north where water was not available along the route. 88 Lansdowne did not object to opening the question for discussion, but indicated that he would expect concessions from France in some other region. Lord Cromer was of the opinion that some concession in regard to Sokoto might be made and suggested that abandonment of French fishing rights in Newfoundland be considered in exchange. Later in the same year the suggestion was made that the enclaves on the Niger, granted in 1898, be reconsidered since they were scarcely used. 67 In reply to these suggestions, Cambon proposed that the British colony of Gambia be exchanged for French rights in Newfoundland and expressed his willingness to reconsider the matter of the Niger enclaves when the French railroad from the Niger to Dahomey was complete. 68 T h e French suggestion with respect to the Gambia found little favor with the British, who shifted their ground somewhat and offered to grant concessions in Sokoto in return for surrender of the enclaves. Negotiations on these points and some others continued from December 1903 to April 1904. T h e outstanding issues were the question of Sokoto and the suggestion of the French that a tract on the right bank of the Niger be ceded. There was some danger that the negotiations might break down over these demands. Fortunately they did not, and the agreement was finally effected. T h e question of the Gambia was settled by giving the French access to the navigable portion of the river. W i t h respect to the rectification of the frontier of Sokoto, the original suggestion of Cromer was accepted and the French request granted in return for abandonment of the rights acquired in Newfoundland by the 66

British

67

Ibid.,

N o . 369.

Documents,

68

Ibid.,

No. 373.

I I , N o . 356.

INTERNATIONAL RIVALRY

147

Treaty of Utrecht. A treaty embodying these decisions was drafted and signed at London, April 8, 1904. a9 T h e struggle for control in West Africa ended with the ratification of this treaty. If we consider West Africa as a whole, the French appear the victors. T h e y gained possession of the hinterland of Gambia, Sierra Leone, and the Gold Coast, and succeeded in connecting their possessions in the western Sudan with their holdings in the Congo region and with their North African colonies through the Sahara. But this accomplishment was largely offset by their lack of success in Nigeria. H e r e they failed to establish themselves below the rapids, and they failed to acquire complete control of the shores of Lake Chad. In addition—if we can assume that it has been one of the purposes of French imperialism to acquire regions in Africa as troop reservoirs—they were singularly unfortunate, for the lower valley of the Niger is the most densely populated region in West Africa. From an economic point of view, they missed a splendid opportunity to acquire a region possessed of real promise for the future. International rivalry in Nigeria did more to shape European alignments than most diplomatic historians have suspected. Anglo-German difficulties were, with considerable difficulty, adjusted by compromise, but the controversy with France was extremely dangerous in character and brought both countries close to war. T h e bitter struggle for control of the Nile that reached a dramatic climax at Fashoda has obscured the real significance of the conflict in Nigeria. T h e efforts of the French to snatch regions supposedly under British control, the frequent raids into territory claimed by the Royal Niger Company, and the thrust at Borgu all combined to rouse deep resentment in England. T h e militant attitude of Joseph Chamberlain was matched by equal belligerence on the part of French statesmen. W h y then did a peaceful solution result? Fortunately no incident occurred in West Africa to raise any serious question of national honor. Consequently it was possible to adjust conflicting claims by discussion and compromise. L o r d 69

Ibid., N o . 4 1 7 .

148

BRITISH ENTERPRISE IN NIGERIA

Salisbury, while unrelenting in pressing British claims to the Nile, was more inclined to compromise in West Africa and exerted a restraining influence on the fiery Chamberlain who did not shrink from the prospect of war. French statesmen were not willing, in the last analysis, to risk a war with Great Britain. Internal difficulties centering about the Dreyfus Affair, the ever present threat from Germany, the uncertainty of Russian support in a colonial war, together with the weakness of the French navy, made such a conflict impossible. The settlement of June 1898 cleared the air in West Africa, helped to point the way toward an adjustment of the issues raised by Marchand's descent on the White Nile, and forged an important link in the chain of circumstances that led to the Entente of 1904.

Chapter V THE PACIFICATION OF NORTHERN NIGERIA The coming of Joseph Chamberlain to the Colonial Office in 1895 was a clear indication of the fact that England had definitely reembarked upon a policy of aggressive imperialism. Skepticism with respect to the value of colonies was swept aside ; vigorous measures were taken to strengthen England's hold on regions already a part of the Empire j and peripheral territories like the Niger Valley were organized under a more definite form of control. This region had been administered by the Royal Niger Company but, as we have seen, the Company had not extended its control far into the hinterland. It had waged successful war with the Emir of Nupe but did not possess sufficient strength to try conclusions with the Sultan of Sokoto, the overlord of the Fulani states. T h e delimitation of the frontier by the Convention of 1898 did much to relieve the tension between England and France, but it was quite clear that unless the areas awarded the British were effectively controlled, further trouble might be expected. The possibility of building up the "undeveloped estates" appealed strongly to M r . Chamberlain, who was very definitely of the opinion that Nigeria was a most suitable place to try out his theories of colonial development. 1 It was the most accessible British colony in Africa and appeared to possess marked advantages over regions like Uganda, British East Africa, Rhodesia, and Nyasaland. Sir Frederick Lugard was close to Chamberlain; he had done notable work in winning Uganda for England and, as we have seen, had been recalled from South Africa in 1895 to raise the West African Frontier Force to deal with French aggression in Borgu. H e was appointed High Commissioner by the 1

I am indebted to Lord Lugard for information with respect to the plans of M r . Chamberlain for Nigeria.

149

150

BRITISH ENTERPRISE IN NIGERIA

new Colonial Secretary, who was prepared to invest heavily in the development of Nigeria, but the crisis in South Africa compelled him to abandon his comprehensive scheme of development. It was now up to the H i g h Commissioner to do his best with the slender resources at his command. T h e situation was not encouraging. Money was scarce, an administrative staff existed only on paper, housing facilities were pitiful, local rulers were defiant, slave raiding was chronic, and alarming reports frequently reached headquarters concerning French aggression in the Lake Chad country. A large detachment from the West African Frontier Force had been ordered to the Gold Coast to participate in the Ashanti campaign, so the H i g h Commissioner's hands were tied until they returned. A defeat by a native ruler would be a disaster of the first magnitude. T h e close of the Ashanti campaign made it possible to deal with some of the more notorious trouble makers, of which the Emir of Kontogora was the most annoying. H e had an evil reputation, being known locally as Gwamachi (the destroyer). His attitude is well illustrated by the remark, frequently quoted: "Can you stop a cat from mousing? W h e n I die it will be with a slave in my mouth." Such an attitude was certain to bring him into collision with the British, but when his propensity for slave raiding was supplemented by a threat to attack them at Wushishi, it was imperative that his challenge be accepted. Colonel Kemball was sent against him in 1901. T h e Emir, together with his neighbor, the E m i r of Nupe, who, it will be recalled, had suffered defeat at the hands of the Royal Niger Company in 1897 was easily defeated. T h e E m i r of Kontogora was allowed to continue as ruler but was forced to accept guidance at the hands of a British resident. T h e ruler of Nupe was deposed and a new emir installed under a letter of appointment that commanded him to rule justly in accordance with the laws of the Protectorate, to obey the H i g h Commissioner, and to be guided by the advice of the Resident. A l l waste lands and minerals were declared the possession of the Crown. 2 2 Col. Ref., Annual, No. 377, p. 7. T h i s report, together with No. 409, is the best source for the conquest of Northern Nigeria.

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151

T h e difficulties with Kontogora and Nupe were trivial in comparison with the crisis that developed in the Lake Chad country. Several local rulers proved unwilling to accept the fact of British control j numerous mahdis had appeared to arouse the religious fanaticism of the Mohammedan tribesmen; but even more serious was the war in progress between the French and Rabah, a lieutenant of the famous Zubehr Pasha. H e had conquered the country between Darfur and Wadai, resisted every effort made by Mohammed A h m e d (the Mahdi) and his successor Abdulla (the Khalifa) to overthrow him, and eventually he came into collision with the French. T h e Anglo-French Convention of 1899 had awarded his country to France with the understanding that the latter power was free to consolidate her power in the central and western Sudan and the Sahara. 3 This objective was speedily carried out by the launching of converging military expeditions from Algeria, the upper Niger Valley, and the French Congo. T h e result was to force Rabah westward into the valley of the Shari River, which flows into Lake Chad. Evenutally he established himself at Kuka, the capital of Bornu, a city within the territory awarded to the Royal Niger Company by the Berlin conference. T h e Company had not been powerful enough to occupy Bornu, so Rabah was left free to extend his influence from Kuka into territory claimed by France as well as into the German Cameroons. H e was decisively defeated by the French in 1900, his forces scattered, and he himself killed. 4 H i s son, Fad-el-Allah, succeeded him, rallied the scattered army, and continued the struggle against the French. Since the Nigerian frontier had not been surveyed, little attention was given to international boundaries. Several skirmishes occurred within British territory with the reState Papers, 91, p. 55. T h i s occasion is memorable in the annals of French colonial expansion since it meant the effective occupation of the region necessary to connect their possessions in West A f r i c a with French Equatorial A f r i c a . C f . E . Gentil, La chute âe l'Emfire de Rabah, (Paris, 1 9 0 2 ) , an account written by the officer who overthrew him. Also A . Schultze, The Sultanate of Bornu, London, 1913, (Translation by P. A . Benton), pp. 2 9 - 3 6 ; Gazetteer of Bornu Province, pp. 22-27. 3 i

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suit that Fad-el-Allah was forced to flee into the interior of Bornu. H a r d pressed by the French, he appealed to Lugard for protection. Definite action must be taken if the British claims to the Lake Chad region were to be sustained. T h e wisdom of allowing a capable military leader with an army of seasoned veterans at his command to settle within British territory was seriously questioned by the H i g h Commissioner, who hesitated to return a definite answer to Fad-el-Allah's appeal for protection. T h e issue came to a climax when the latter again attacked the French at Gubba, where Fad-el-Allah was killed and his army dispersed. But the problem of intervention could no longer be evaded. Colonel Morland, who had dealt effectively with the troublesome Emir of Y o l a in September 1901, was sent with a strong detachment to investigate the situation in Bornu. His line of march led through Bauchi, a region that had never been brought under effective control. T h e Emir of Bauchi had shown his hostility on more than one occasion, so Colonel Morland was ordered to deal with him. Since the Emir fled upon the approach of the British, it proved a simple matter to install his successor, who agreed readily to the conditions imposed by the British. Further trouble was encountered when the column was attacked by the Mallam Jibrella—a typical holy man who had proclaimed himself a mahdi. His considerable following of religious fanatics was defeated after a hard fight, with the Mallam himself being made prisoner two days later.® There was no further resistance, and early in March Colonel Morland reached Maidugari. T h e Shehu of Bornu, Abubekr Garbai, was at Dikwa engaged in the collection of an indemnity demanded by the French as the price of protecting him from Rabah and his son. Colonel Morland took the position that such an indemnity was illegal, so he promised the Shehu recognition as the British ruler of Bornu if he stopped collection. This offer was accepted with enthusiasm by the Shehu, but it was only natural to expect the French to object. A lively exchange of notes followed 5

Col. Ref., Annual,

No. 409, pp. 7 - 1 0 .

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χ53

but eventually the French gave way, and British sovereignty over Bornu became an accomplished fact. 6 Lugard had made a good beginning despite the lack of men and money. H e had deposed the slave-raiding Emirs of Kontogora and Nupe ; he had pacified the territory on the upper Benue from which the Royal Niger Company had been compelled to retire ; he had invaded the difficult country of the Bautshi Plateau; he had met with decision the threat of French penetration in Bornu. In addition to this assertion of British authority, a good start had been made toward laying the basis of an administrative system. In the majority of cases it had been necessary to depose recalcitrant Emirs, but the conditions under which their successors took office clearly foreshadowed the system of indirect rule that was destined to become Lugard's greatest contribution. But the sullen attitude of the powerful Fulani Emirs of Sokoto and Kano left little doubt as to the ultimate necessity of using force to compel acceptance of British rule. T h e two most important peoples in Northern Nigeria were the native Hausas and the Fulani who conquered them in the latter part of the eighteenth century.7 This conquest, carried out under the leadership of Dan Fodio, was accompanied by a distinct religious revival. H e led them to victory over the Hausas and established a dynasty which endured until the time of the British conquest. But the Fulani conquest was not complete, and many pagan tribes living in the Bauchi plateau remained unsubdued. They were raided constantly and retaliated by attacking the caravans of the Fulani, precipitating a chronic state of war that depopulated the country and stifled trade. Large numbers of people were carried away as slaves, many more were slain, some died of starvation, while the counter raids of the hill tribes made the roads unsafe except for caravans accompanied by armed guards. Ibid., p. ι o. The best account of the Fulani conquest is given by Lady Lugard. See also C. K . Meek, The Northern Tribes of Nigeria, ζ vols., (London, 1 9 2 5 ) ; H. F . Blackwell, The Occupation of Hausaland, (Lagos, 1 9 2 7 ) , gives the native point of view of the British conquest. E . J . Arnett, The Rise of the Sokoto Fulani, (London, 1 9 2 9 ) , is an important study of Fulani history. 6

7

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Taxes were high and served as an added cause for the process of decay which had already begun to weaken the hold of the Fulani upon the population. T a x after tax was enforced upon the people, so that at the present day there is no conceivable trade and no profession which has not its o w n special tax. E v e r y form of handicraft . . . was taxed. E v e n the collectors of honey in the woods paid their dole to the chiefs, and there exists, I believe, a complete system of death duties. T h o u g h only some eighty or ninety years have passed since the Fulani conquest, the decadence which was already apparent in the time of Barth had reached its extreme before the end of the nineteenth century. Bribery, corruption, and extortion marked the so-called administration of justice, whilst multiplication of harems and the growth of a large class of idle "princes" led to nepotism and the imposition of tax after tax to meet the necessities of the rulers and their idle sons and relatives. N o man's life was safe; common people were killed without compunction; notables were removed by poison or secret murder. T r a d e was paralyzed by extortionate levies and rendered difficult by the insecurity of the roads. 8

T h e advent of the Royal Niger Company had served to hasten the process of decay and to loosen still more the hold of the Fulani overlords upon their subject peoples. Slaves left their masters to take refuge in the territories of the Company; others refused to pay taxes; signs of revolt multiplied with the success of the Company against Nupe. T h e inhabitants needed only the assistance of a strong power to encourage them to throw off their allegiance to the ruler of Sokoto. This condition of disorder and misrule was sufficient in itself to tempt the British to conquer the country. Moreover it was commonly believed that once brought under imperial control, the country would prove attractive to commercial and financial enterprise. But when these considerations were supplemented by such actualities as the quasi-legal rights obtained by Thomson's treaty of 1885, the recognition of a British sphere of influence that was 8 Col. Ref., Annual, No. 409, p. 20. I have drawn heavily upon this report in my description of the conquest of Sokoto. See also Geary, of. cit., pp. 2 1 2 26; Burns, of. cit., chs. x v , x v i ; Captain (now Sir) Charles Orr, The Making of Northern Nigeria, (London, 1 9 1 1 ) ; Lady Lugard, of. cit., ch. 7.

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gained at the Berlin Conference, and the constant fear of French occupation, there could be only one outcome—speedy and effective occupation by the British. It is difficult to make out a convincing case for the legality of the British occupation and conquest. Such a case would have to be based upon the Thomson treaty together with later treaties concluded by the agents of the Company with the various chiefs and headmen who were dependents of Sokoto. By the former treaty the Company had acquired "exclusive rights to the country on both sides of the River Benue and the rivers flowing into it throughout my dominions for such distance from its and their banks as they may desire." This provision, supplemented by certain others of a like character, granted only trading rights—or at any rate that was the claim of the Sultan. Another article pledged the Sultan to hold no communication with foreigners, except through the Company, and this might possibly be construed as the recognition of a British protectorate. But this claim was denied by the Sultan too, and his view is sustained by a former solicitor of the Supreme Court of Lagos. 9 Later treaties go much farther and possibly could be interpreted as conferring sovereign rights upon the Company, but it must be remembered that the chiefs did not possess the right to transfer sovereignty. Then, too, the process by which African treaties were negotiated will not always bear the closest scrutiny. A fair conclusion is that the British took Northern Nigeria because they wanted it, because they believed it of value, and because they were certain that France would intervene if they hesitated much longer. T h e tide of imperialism was running high and there was no lack of propagandists who urged an aggressive policy in West Africa. T h e following extract from a book, popular at the time, may be taken as a typical example of the utterances of this group : Are we . . . to follow the finger of the Little Englander, invest all our moneys in electric railways, schools, scientific experiments, and leave the real work of the world to be done by nations who can breed men like those who made Great Britain the leader in civiliza9

Geary, of. cit., p. 213. The Treaty of 1885 with Sokoto appears in Burns, of. cit., Appendix G.

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tion? W e are the leading nation amongst the peoples, and it is o u r clear duty to take the place of the leading nation. I t is not a question of charity. T h o s e w h o ask for money for t h e civilization of N o r t h e r n Nigeria do not w a n t it for tilting at w i n d mills, and do not consider they are asking a favor. T h e y are a d vising an investment. . . . T h e Hausas, w h o are sending their goods to L o n d o n by way of the desert, Tripoli, and Marseilles, will shortly ship them d o w n the Niger direct to M a n c h e s t e r ; Manchester a n d other goods will go the same way in r e t u r n ; and that the land which n o w , with no cultivation beyond a little scratching, produces several heavy crops a year, may be made to produce abundance for our markets a f t e r satisfying all its own people. 1 0

It Was essential to the peace and security of the regions already won that the power of Sokoto be reduced, for exaggerated notions of the strength of Sokoto were entertained by many of the chiefs, and fear of Fulani prowess lingered in every heart. T h e great bulk of the country, knowing the enormous strength of the walls of K a n o , and exaggerating the n u m b e r and fighting capacity of the E m i r ' s army of horsemen, doubted whether the British could in reality conquer him, or occupy Sokoto, whose armies had overrun a vast territory. Intrigue, therefore, was rife in every province, and every chief feared to burn his boats and accept as final the British rule. 1 1

They believed that the British had not come to stay and feared that they might be left to the vengeance of the Sultan Alieu of Sokoto. Not only did the Sultan inspire fear in the minds of the subordinate chiefs, thus rendering the position of the British uncomfortable, but he was also actively engaged in preparations for war. H e strengthened his walled towns, imported arms in large quantities from Tripoli, and smuggled additional supplies from Lagos. Bribes were offered to any soldier who would desert the British and bring his rifle with him, and an organization had been built up at Lokoja for the purpose of stealing rifles and ammunition. Kano became the rallying place for every deserter and outlaw in 10

G . D. Hazzledine, The White Man in Nigeria,

11

Col. Ref., Annual, No. 409, pp. 16-17.

(London, 1 9 0 4 ) , pp. 4 - 5 .

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N i g e r i a and, as it lay but eighty-two miles f r o m Zaria, it constituted a constant menace to the administration. In the s u m m e r of 1902 Captain M o l o n e y , the British Resident at Zaria, was killed. T h e assassin escaped to K a n o , where he was protected and a demand for his surrender was refused. T h e British felt that such an affront could not pass unchallenged if their prestige was to be maintained in a country in which millions were ruled by a f e w score. T h i s , in the opinion of the H i g h Commissioner, constituted ample justification for intervention, and he wrote : In my opinion Government owes it to every British officer called upon to serve in distant districts among turbulent peoples to take prompt and effective measures in such a case. . . . This has ever been a cardinal principal with the Indian Government, and a frontier tribe shielding the murderer of a British officer has been held to have declared war against the State. 12 O t h e r offenses against administrative officers f o l l o w e d and rendered still more inevitable the e m p l o y m e n t of force against the Fulani. B y the end of N o v e m b e r well-authenticated reports reached headquarters that A l i c u , the Sultan of Sokoto, was on his way to attack the garrison at Zaria. L a t e r reports showed this news to be false, but believing it to be true at the time, L u g a r d strengthened the garrison and began to m o v e supplies. Since a conflict appeared to be certain, it was felt wise to attack as soon as possible, for delay w o u l d render the struggle only more widespread and sanguinary. B y D e c e m b e r 1902 the situation had become serious enough to command the attention of the h o m e authorities, w h o had telegraphed : Reuter states that it has been decided to undertake hostile operations against Kano, but I presume that you are only taking necessary precautions for safety of Boundary Commissions. Telegraph outline of proposed arrangements and strength of force to be employed. 13 12 13

Ibid., p. 18. Pari. Pap., 1903, 45, Corresfondence

Relating

to Kano, Cd. 1433, p. 1.

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T h r e e days later L u g a r d replied, summarizing his reasons for undertaking the expedition against Kano. H e estimated the number of troops necessary for success at one thousand. A later dispatch reviewed the situation at greater length and suggested that Kano might be in close touch with Turkey. In addition, it was feared that the Senussi were becoming active and, if this were true, it would be all the more imperative to take steps at once in order to pacify the country. T h e home authorities finally were urged to facilitate the delimitation of the frontier by granting permission for the Nigerian administration to afford protection to the commission already selected for the task. 14 Considerable apprehension was expressed by the Government over the size of the force to be employed. Orders were telegraphed to the Governor of Southern Nigeria requesting him to keep a reserve force in readiness for service in Northern Nigeria, should this be required. Similar instructions were issued to the Government of the Gold Coast. This anxiety was not shared by L u g a r d , who felt secure with the force at his disposal and, in addition, counted on the disaffection of the Hausa population and the unpopularity of the E m i r with native traders to render his task less difficult. Additional dispatches took occasion to impress upon Lugard the fact that public opinion at home was opposed to active military operations. Relations with Sokoto had been broken for some time. Two disputes, one over the continuance of the annual subsidies formerly paid by the Company, and the other over the selection of a successor to the E m i r of Kontogora, had precipitated the break. T h e administration offered to continue the subsidy, but the messenger sent to convey this information to the Sultan was treated with gross indignity, and no answer was returned. Later, when an attempt to improve relations by recognizing the authority of the Sultan to nominate a successor to Kontogora was made, the following reply was received: F r o m us to you. I do not consent that any one from you should ever dwell with us. I will never agree with you. I will have nothing whatever to do with you. Between us and you there are no dealings 14

Pari. Paf.y 1903, 45, Correspondence Relating to Kano, Cd. 1433, p. 1.

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except as between Musselmen and Unbelievers W a r , as G o d

159 Al-

mighty has enjoined on us. T h e r e is no power or strength save in G o d on high. T h i s with salutations. 15

There could be no misinterpretation of this answer. In January 1 9 0 3 , when everything was in readiness, the campaign began. 1 6 T h e army, under the command of Colonel Morland, started from Zaria and encountered the first resistance at Bebeji, eight miles beyond the frontier. A lucky shot demolished the principal gate of the town and killed the leaders. Resistance ceased at once. T h e town was occupied, and the advance continued. Although there was a string of fortified towns along the road to Kano, the news of the success at Bebeji paralyzed opposition. T h e defenders of each town fled, having no desire to test British prowess. T h e civil population, contrary to its usual custom, did not flee to the bush but remained quietly within the towns and eagerly supplied the troops with food and water. This afforded striking testimony to the discipline of the native troops under British leadership and confirmed Lugard's opinion of the universal unpopularity of the Fulani overlords. N o serious opposition was encountered until the column reached Kano. T h e appearance of this town surprised even the best informed of the officers. T h e y had seen nothing like it in all of their experience in Africa. T h e wall was some eleven miles in circumference, from thirty to fifty feet high, and over forty feet thick at the base. T h e gates were flimsily constructed of cowhide, but were commanded by towers. A direct assault was not possible, but a small breach was soon effected and a storming party under Lieutenant D y e r encountered little resistance as it made its way into the town. T h e capture of Kano did not close the campaign. T h e Sultan had fled to Sokoto several days before the arrival of the British, and, early in February, was reported on his way to attack the British at Kano. T h e r e was no advantage to be gained in awaiting 15

Col. Ref., Annual, No. 409, appendix No. 4. Lugard began hostilities without orders from the Goverhment and before General Kemball, who had been instructed to take command, had arrived. Burns, of. cit., p. 196. 18

i6o

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the assault within the town, so a force of six hundred men was sent against him. T h e Fulani army was encountered near the village of Chamberawa where a small detachment of forty-five mounted infantry under the command of Captain Wright beat off several savage attacks. Despite the heavy casualties inflicted by the British, the Fulani retired to the village in good order but, caught unprepared by another detachment commanded by Captain Porter, they were routed. 1 7 T h e easy victory won by the British was due largely to the demoralization of the Fulani, many of whom had lost confidence in their Sultan. H i s chiefs were not anxious to fight ; many had deserted on the eve of the battle; and the Sultan himself had fled before the fighting commenced. T h e army had been commanded by the Waziri, who was killed in the attack on the British lines. T h e Sultan escaped to Gobir, where he was subsequently made prisoner and later retired on a small subsistence allowance. Part of the army was not engaged at Chamberawa, having deserted on the eve of the fight. It had taken a different route to Kano and early in March appeared before the town. A l l resistance had been taken out of the men by the news of the defeat at Chamberawa, and they requested permission of L u g a r d , who had remained at Kano, to enter the town. Permission having been granted, they were relieved of their arms and admitted within the walls. Meanwhile the expeditionary force, now under the command of General Kemball, continued its advance toward Sokoto. It was the season of the harmattan, and the troops suffered severely from the excessive heat although the nights were uncomfortably cold. A s they approached Sokoto, they were confronted by a force estimated at 4,500, of which a third were cavalry. Despite its formidable appearance, this army offered little resistance and, aside from scattered groups of fanatics who charged the British, it was easily swept aside. On March 19, 1 9 0 3 , L u g a r d arrived from Kano to receive the submission of the chiefs who had come to Sokoto. It was necessary 17

Col. Ref., Annual, No. 409, pp. 2 6 - 3 8 ; Lady Lugard, of. cit., ch. 4 7 ; Orr, of. cit., ch. 6; Burns, of. cit., pp. 198-99.

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to chose a successor to the Sultan, w h o had fled before the arrival of the British. T h i s was done after consultation with the leading chiefs. Atahiru, who had declined to take part in the struggle against the British, was nominated for the honor. T h e H i g h C o m missioner was very favorably impressed by the nominee, so he fixed the next morning f o r his formal installation. T h e f o l l o w i n g day the elders, headed by the W a z i r i , assembled at the British camp, where the conditions under which they were to govern in the future w e r e carefully explained to them by an interpreter. H e r e u p o n the formal installation took place. T h e troops were drawn up in a hollow square for this most impressive ceremony. T h e new ruler was presented with a g o w n and a turban which, according to native custom, constituted a recognition of sovereignty. T h e people appeared w e l l pleased with the new régime and were especially delighted when they were assured that no attempt was to be made to interfere with their religion. T h e fall of Sokoto definitely established the British as the masters of Northern Nigeria, but it was necessary to visit certain other districts for the purpose of properly establishing imperial authority. N o further fighting was expected, and the army returned to Jebba while L u g a r d with a small force remained in the north. Katsena was the first town visited. L u g a r d arrived late in M a r c h . T h e E m i r had remained neutral during the troubles just described, and messages had been sent to explain the conditions under which he could continue to g o v e r n his people. Despite the assurance that had been g i v e n , the town was in a state of panic when L u g a r d ' s party arrived. It was only after considerable difficulty that they were persuaded to lead the British into the town, according to their ancient custom. O n the f o l l o w i n g day the formal ceremony of installation took place and the British departed. B e f o r e taking leave, however, the E m i r was informed that the Boundary Commission was coming v e r y soon, and he was enjoined to render them every assistance within his power. W h i l e they were at Katsena a delegation was received from the inhabitants of Tessawa, a frontier town, with the complaint that they had been driven out by the French. T h e y w e r e encamped in

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the bush at the time and requested permission to live within British territory. Investigation revealed that their town was exactly on the boundary line, and they were advised to await the decision of the Boundary Commission. If their town was adjudged to be within the French sphere they were to be accorded permission to build a new town on the British side of the line. T h e French administrator at Zinder was informed of the complaints which had been lodged against his government and, while he denied that the people of Tessawa had been threatened while in their camp, he did admit that the town had been destroyed because its population had rebelled. 1 8 Before returning to Zungeru Lugard visited Kano, where he was present at the formal installation of the Emir. This ruler, it will be recalled, had received a temporary appointment. T h e ceremony took place on the second of April and was carried out with strict observance of native custom. T h e symbols of sovereignty—an umbrella, a sword, and a dagger—were presented to the ruler and at the conclusion of the rites the party was properly escorted from the town by the newly enthroned potentate and his horsemen. L u g a r d had now practically concluded the work of pacification. T h e defeat of Sokoto broke the only native power that was capable of giving the British any serious difficulty, thus paving the way for the establishment of British rule upon a firm and substantial basis. T h e r e were, however, two affairs which deserve brief mention—the difficulties with the ex-Emir of Kontogora, and the fight at Burmi. W h i l e L u g a r d had been engaged at Sokoto, the ex-Emir of Kontogora had gathered a force and was threatening Zaria. T h o u g h he had a considerable following, the British easily effected his capture and brought him a prisoner to Lokoja. Later he was exiled at Y o l a but was eventually restored as ruler. This was done in spite of his reputation as a slave catcher, because he was a man of strong personality, a nephew of the new Sultan of Sokoto, and an individual of great influence throughout the country. 18

Col. Ref.,

Annual,

No. 409, p. 43.

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163

Trouble had meanwhile been developing in the east. Here many discontented groups had joined forces in opposition to the British. Among them were the ex-Emir of Bida, the Magaji of Keffi, who had killed Captain Moloney, a son of the Mallam Jibrella, and several leaders who had escaped after the fall of Sokoto. The movement rapidly assumed a religious aspect and, unless speedily crushed, might easily have gathered all the dissatisfied fanatics of the western Sudan under its wing. 1 9 Lugard was aware of the danger inherent in the situation and dispatched a force from Kano to crush the movement. No trouble was experienced until Burmi was reached, where sharp resistance was encountered. After suffering heavy casualties, the British were forced to retreat. Upon receiving reënforcements from Lokoja, the advance was renewed late in July. Burmi was taken after a hard fight in which the commanding officer of the expedition lost his life. The two and a half years that had passed since the British Government took over the administration of Northern Nigeria had been marked by definite progress. T h e districts about Lake Chad had been pacified, slave raids suppressed, the power of Sokoto finally broken, and the foundations laid for a successful system of administration. The latter problem was destined to absorb most of the attention of the High Commissioner until his retirement in 1906. But before concluding this account of the pacification of Northern Nigeria and passing on to a closer analysis of the administrative system, it is necessary to describe briefly a final attempt on the part of the natives to overthrow British authority. This uprising occurred in 1906 at Satiru, a town located about fourteen miles north of Sokoto. 20 It seems that a refugee from French West Africa had succeeded in stirring up trouble and had been joined by the local chief. When the British attempted to arrest the leaders, they were attacked by a considerable body of natives. T h e small company of 19

Orr, of. cit., pp. 1 3 0 - 3 2 . Col. Ref., Annual, No. 5 1 6 , pp. 1 4 - 2 3 . See also the works of Geary, Orr, and Burns, cited. I am indebted to Sir Richmond Palmer and M r . H. S. Goldsmith for information concerning this affair. 20

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mounted infantry sent to support the political officers was wiped out. T h e disturbance was promptly reported by telegraph to headquarters. Action was taken at once. T h e affair came at a particularly bad time because many of the troops were absent. Some had been sent up the Benue to punish natives who had attacked a Company post at Abinsi j others had been dispatched to Hadeija, where trouble had been expected. There were no experienced men available at Sokoto j M a j o r Burdon had left on leave of absence; the Acting Resident, M r . Hillary, had been killed at Satiruj and political officers from near-by towns were either sick or absent. It was definitely up to headquarters to act. There was no time to be lost, for there was ample evidence that other regions might be affected. T h e news from Bauchi was particularly disturbing. Several Mahdis had appeared but were promptly suppressed by the arrest of two of the more important leaders. One was deported and the other, after a trial, was executed for sedition by the local Emir. These measures had their effect, and the remaining Mahdis disappeared. In addition to this demonstration, reports from French territory indicated that the movement was widespread throughout the western Sudan. Early in March a strong force was collected to make the advance. Fortunately for the British, the Mahdi who had defeated them in February had remained at Satiru instead of endeavoring to obtain support from neighboring towns. Had he made the attempt, it is possible that he would have gained many adherents because of the tremendous prestige that he had acquired as a result of his victory. As it was, he commanded a force of some two thousand badly armed men. T h e fight between the forces of M a j o r Goodwin and the Mahdi is rather humorously described by a Sokoto chief who had been present at the previous engagement. After relating the manner in which the mounted infantry advanced to draw the enemy on, and after describing how they cleared the front of the square to allow the infantry fire to take effect on the charging mass, he said : T h e y came on, and the horsemen gave way and went back; no one took any notice. I thought we were all going to be killed as be-

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fore. Someone gave an order, everyone fired, then a whistle blew, everyone stopped, and there was no one left alive in front. 21

There were survivors, in spite of the testimony of the chief, and they were severely punished. The leader was killed in the battle, but five others were arrested and later executed. The village of Satiru was razed and the Sarktn Musulmi was required to pronounce a curse upon anyone who should rebuild it or till its fields. The British were few in number and there had been a very pronounced feeling among the natives that British prestige was definitely at stake, so not only an overwhelming military success, but also exemplary punishment for the guilty parties must be meted out if British influence in Sokoto was to be maintained. T h e most significant aspect of the Satiru affair was the loyalty shown by many of the rulers who had so recently been at war with the British. Several of them sent troops or offered their services, and in a number of cases troublesome Mahdis were seized and executed by the native authorities.22 T w o rulers, however, seized upon the embarrassment of the authorities to make trouble. These were the Emir of Gando and the Emir of Hadeija. The former was removed, but the latter chose to fight instead. Little difficulty was experienced in defeating him. H e was killed resisting the British troops, and a successor was speedily chosen and installed in his place. 23 Some years before, while serving in East Africa, Captain Lugard had begun to work out his ideas on native administration and had advocated principles which were later developed in Nigeria. 24 The most essential principle was "rule through and by the chiefs" and, as will be explained shortly, it became the foundation for a new school of colonial administration. The pacification of Northern Nigeria, therefore, was more than the mere extension of an existing régime ; it was a new enterprise in the 21

Col. Ref., Annual, No. 516, pp. 1 7 - 1 8 . Burns, of. cit., pp. 2 0 4 - j . 23 Ibid., p. 205. 24 Captain F. D. Lugard (now L o r d ) , The Rise of Our East African 2 vols., (London, 1 8 9 3 ) . Cf. especially Vol. 2. 22

Emfire,

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hands of a new man, and the fourteen years of its separate existence as a government were destined to be of far-reaching significance. T h e new H i g h Commissioner was inclined from the start to place confidence in political methods of pacification and was reluctant to employ military measures. H e expressed the conviction that "capable officers can do much more by getting into touch with the people than can be effected by punitive expeditions and bloodshed." 25 It is true, of course, that the latter method was employed, but it is extremely doubtful if a conflict with the overconfident Emirs, inflamed by religious hostility, could have been avoided. T h e conflict was sharp and decisive, and Lugard was shrewd enough to avoid prolonging the struggle after his objectives had been attained. T h e civil population was not hostile to the British and, as we have seen, frequently welcomed them as deliverers from a grinding tyranny. T h e Fulani rulers were not deposed, except in a few isolated cases, and extreme care was taken to observe the niceties of native etiquette. This moderate policy had an excellent effect, and there was little desire to return to the anarchy of the old days. T h e H i g h Commissioner had succeeded surprisingly well in bringing the country under military control, but the necessary curtailment of Chamberlain's plans because of the exigencies of the South African W a r made a policy of strict economy imperative. A n y attempt to administer the territory by means of a large staff of British officials was out of the question, but such a policy did not appeal to Lugard even if it had been possible. It was quite clear from the beginning, therefore, that extensive use would be made of the native rulers. Precedent for such a policy had been established by the British in many parts of their Empire—notably in the case of Fiji and the Native States of India. It was quite apparent, however, that a small administrative organization was necessary to supervise, train, and guide native rulers who were to be retained as a vital factor in British control. Several departments were provided for in the modest budget of £86,000. T h e personnel for these departments—the political, secretariate, treasury, judicial, police, medical, postal, and trans25

Collected

Annual

Reforts

of Northern

Nigeria,

I Ç O O - I Ç I I ,

p. 17.

PACIFICATION OF NORTHERN NIGERIA

167

port—had to be selected, their duties defined, salaries fixed, and departmental budgets set up. T h e problem of reorganizing the recently conquered native states fell upon the Political Department staffed by only nine officials who were designated as "Residents" since the term "Commissioner" implied a more direct form of control. For the time being, at least, this department was faced with a tremendous burden. 26 T h e mere establishment of an administrative organization did not solve other pressing problems faced by the H i g h Commissioner. T h e maintenance of health was vitally important. Discoveries in the field of tropical medicine did much to reduce casualties from disease, the establishment of more adequate housing facilities was helpful, frequent and extensive leaves of absence were imperative, and the provision of ample facilities for recreation in the form of tennis courts and polo fields did much to make life in Nigeria endurable. Lokoja was notoriously unhealthful, so a site for a new capital was sought. T h e town of Zungeru on the Kaduna River was finally selected, but the choice proved unfortunate. T h e big problem, however, was the reorganization of the Fulani emirates, so a description of conditions existent within the Fulani Empire prior to the arrival of the British is definitely in order. T h e rise of this empire at the close of the eighteenth century has been noted and some of its varied activities discussed in other connections. But little has been said concerning its system of government. This is a matter of first importance since it provided the foundation upon which Lugard's system of indirect rule was erected. 27 Fulani rule was essentially feudal, and the right to all land was vested in the Emir. T h e fief-holder paid rent or tribute to 2 6 In addition to Lady Lugard's A Trofical Dependency and A . C. Burns's History of Nigeria, I have drawn heavily upon Captain Charles Orr, The Making of Northern Nigeria, and C. L. Temple, Native Races ani Their Rulers, (Cape T o w n , 1 9 1 8 ) . Both Captain Orr and M r . Temple were political officers under Sir Frederick L u g a r d and played prominent parts in the development of indirect rule. T h e annual reports written by Lugard are of especial importance, particularly No. 346 of 1902. 27

Col. Ref.,

Annual, No. 409, pp. 2 1 - 2 6 .

168

BRITISH ENTERPRISE IN NIGERIA

the overlord for the use of the land, usually a tithe of the produce. This was generally true where the holder of the fief was a Fulah, but in the case of conquered pagans the amount was arbitrarily assessed and frequently was doubled as a punishment for rebellion. T h e principal task of the Government was the collection of the taxes, so that the tax gathering machinery was in reality the Government. Over each district there was an ajele, who assessed and collected the taxes. H e lived on the peasants and headed a staff of messengers who were also furnished a living. These officials, all of whom were appointed by the Emir and were responsible to him, were supplemented by a host of local rulers. Each district was ruled by a headman who in turn governed the village headmen. T h e local rulers were responsible for gathering the taxes. The revenue was turned over to the subordinate ajeles and was divided as follows: fifty percent went to the Emir, twenty-five percent to the fief-holder, twelve and a half percent to the senior ajele, six and a quarter percent to the junior ajelet and the same amount to the headman of the district. According to this distribution the village headman received nothing, but he was usually capable of taking care of himself. Thus the alien Fulani received over ninety-three percent of the taxes, for which they rendered no real service in return. The junior ajeles were the real rulers of the country and experienced little difficulty in controlling the local headmen. They were universally unpopular and were speedily driven from the country when the Fulani were conquered by the British. Captain Abadie, the resident of Zaria, reported that "it was the custom of the 'ajeles' to extort money by a gate tax and by payments for hearing cases, also by seizing slaves, in addition to their extortions in the collection of tribute. They paid for nothing, raped women, and if a town demurred to such treatment it was reported to the Emir as rebellious and raided." 28 Not only did the Fulani inflict extortionate taxes upon the subject peoples, but they constantly raided them for slaves. These slaves were gathered from all parts of the country, concentrated 28

Col. Rep., Annual,

No. 409, pp. 1 9 - 2 0 .

PACIFICATION

OF

NORTHERN

NIGERIA

169

at the great towns of the north—Kano, Sokoto, Katsena, and Gando—and driven in caravans across the desert to the great slave markets of the north. Evidences of this traffic were seen by Denham, who tells us that at one well at which his party stopped there "were lying more than a hundred skeletons, some of them with the skin still remaining attached to the bone." Later the same traveler was startled by his horse trampling upon the skeletons of human beings, obviously those of Negroes who had died on the journey across the desert. Great as were the horrors of the desert passage, they were no greater than those occasioned by the organized slave raids of the Fulani against the pagan tribes. This had been the practice for many years and is vividly described by Barth. 2 9 In the course of his travels, Barth attached himself to the army of the ruler of Bornu and accompanied it on a slave hunt. H e describes in a graphic manner the devastation which followed in its wake. A t one village in particular, where a large number of slaves were caught, nearly two hundred natives were slaughtered in cold blood. M a n y of the Negroes taken in these raids were kept as domestic slaves. Their fate was a happier one. Most observers agree that they were well treated and were quite content. Barth, for example, declared that "the quiet course of domestic slavery has very little to offend the mind of the traveler; the slave is generally well treated, is not over-worked and is often considered a member of the family." 30 Later writers, notably L o r d Lugard, confirm this opinion. H e writes: T h e household slave . . . w o u l d rarely desire to assert his freed o m , unless he w e r e a loafer or a bad character. . . . H e is generally apathetic, tolerant of control by nature, and prefers even to endure m u c h ill-treatment rather than make a c h a n g e , the consequences of w h i c h he cannot foresee. M o r e o v e r , master and slave are often m u c h attached to each other, and the slave k n o w s that in case of sickness, his w i f e and children will be cared f o r . 3 1 29 30 31

Barth, of. cit., II, pp. 3695. Barth, of. cit., I, p. 527. Lugard, The Dual Mandate, p. 373.

I70

BRITISH

ENTERPRISE

IN

NIGERIA

A n o t h e r authority relates the story of a domestic slave who, w h e n offered his f r e e d o m , refused to accept it except on the condition that his master take payment from the court. T h i s satisfied his conscience and he was willing to become a free man.·' 2 Despite the fact that domestic slavery as an institution had its g o o d points, there can be no doubt that the constant raids required to support it created a condition of anarchy that was ended only by the British conquest. T h e pagans did not submit without striking back, and w h e n e v e r a good chance of success presented itself they attacked the Fulani. Inhabitants of border towns tilled their fields with weapons slung on their backs; caravans were constantly exposed to attack ; and travel was possible only under the protection of a heavily armed escort. A population estimated by Barth to be nearly fifty millions

33

in the middle of the nine-

teenth century had d w i n d l e d to about one-fifth, or to approximately ten millions, by 1900. T h e judicial system established at the time of the Fulani conquest had decayed. T h e Alkalis, or native judges, w h o under M o h a m m e d a n law should have presided over the courts, had been replaced by favorites of the emirs. T h e y often decreed the most inhuman of punishments. F o r the nails to be torn out with red-hot pincers, for the limbs to be p o u n d e d one by one in a m o r t a r while the victims w e r e still alive, for i m p o r t a n t people w h o had o f f e n d e d to be built up alive g r a d u a l l y in w a l l s , till, a f t e r a period of a g o n y , the head of the dying m a n w a s finally

w a l l e d up, w e r e a m o n g the punishments w e l l attested to have

been inflicted in the d e c a d e n c e of F u l a n i p o w e r . I t is said that a considerable n u m b e r of the w a l l s of Hausa t o w n s are k n o w n by the people to have been so built up, and are even n o w called by the n a m e of the most distinguished victims whose corpses they contain.

Impalement

a n d mutilation w e r e a m o n g the penalties for lesser offenses. 3 4

T h e public prisons were places of torment, and v e r y

few

prisoners e m e r g e d alive. Perhaps the best description of these 32

T e m p l e , of. cit., p p . 2 2 8 - 2 9 .

33

T h e r e is little doubt that B a r t h was much too high in his estimate.

34

L a d y L u g a r d , of.

cit.,

p. 4 0 1 ; A . C . G . Hastings, Nigerian

Days,

(Lon-

d o n , 1 9 3 5 ) ) ch. I I I , g i v e s a g o o d description of conditions at the time of the conquest.

PACIFICATION

OF

NORTHERN

NIGERIA

p r i s o n s is g i v e n i n t h e o f f i c i a l r e p o r t o f t h e H i g h of N o r t h e r n

171

Commissioner

Nigeria.

I visited the d u n g e o n m y s e l f . A s m a l l d o o r w a y , 2 f e e t 6 i n c h e s by ι f o o t 6 inches, g i v e s access into it. T h e interior is d i v i d e d t w o c o m p a r t m e n t s , each

17

feet by 7 f e e t a n d

w a l l w a s pierced w i t h h o l e s at its base t h r o u g h

11

. . . into

feet high.

This

w h i c h t h e l e g s of

those s e n t e n c e d to die w e r e thrust up to the t h i g h , a n d w e r e l e f t to be t r o d d e n on by the mass of o t h e r prisoners till t h e y died of thirst a n d s t a r v a t i o n . T h e place is e n t i r e l y a i r - t i g h t a n d u n v e n t i l a t e d , e x c e p t f o r the o n e small d o o r w a y , o r r a t h e r hole, in the w a l l t h r o u g h w h i c h y o u creep. T h e total space inside is 2 , 6 1 8 cubic f e e t , a n d at the t i m e took K a n o

135 h u m a n beings w e r e confined here each night.

we

. . .

R e c e n t l y as m a n y as 2 0 0 h a v e been i n t e r n e d at o n e t i m e . A s t h e s u p e r ficial g r o u n d a r e a w a s o n l y 2 3 8 square feet t h e r e w a s n o t , of c o u r s e , e v e n s t a n d i n g r o o m . V i c t i m s w e r e c r u s h e d to d e a t h e v e r y n i g h t , a n d their corpses w e r e h a u l e d o u t each m o r n i n g . T h e s t e n c h , I a m t o l d , inside the place w h e n

Colonel

Morland

visited it w a s

intolerable,

t h o u g h it w a s e m p t y , a n d w h e n I m y s e l f w e n t inside t h r e e w e e k s l a t e r the e f f l u v i u m w a s u n b e a r a b l e for m o r e than a f e w s e c o n d s . A

putrid

corpse e v e n then lay n e a r the d o o r . 3 0 I n t h e l i g h t o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s d e s c r i b e d a b o v e it m a y

appear

surprising that the F u l a n i were not deposed and that the British did not take o v e r c o m p l e t e l y the administration of N o r t h e r n

Ni-

g e r i a . T h e t e m p t a t i o n t o d o so w a s u n q u e s t i o n a b l y s t r o n g ,

and

t h e r e w e r e m a n y in E n g l a n d w h o w o u l d h a v e a p p l a u d e d

such

action. F o r t u n a t e l y this policy d i d not p r e v a i l a n d L u g a r d

was

s u c c e s s f u l in r e t a i n i n g t h e b e t t e r f e a t u r e s o f F u l a n i r u l e . H i s reasons f o r this decision c a n best be p r e s e n t e d in his o w n w o r d s : . . . t h e r e c a n be n o d o u b t t h a t such races [ t h e F u l a n i ] f o r m an i n v a l u a b l e m e d i u m b e t w e e n the British staff a n d t h e n a t i v e p e a s a n t r y . N o r c a n the difficulty of

finding

a n y o n e c a p a b l e of t a k i n g their p l a c e ,

or the d a n g e r t h e y w o u l d constitute to the State if o u s t e d f r o m t h e i r positions be i g n o r e d . T h e i r traditions of r u l e , their m o n o t h e i s t i c ligion, a n d their i n t e l l i g e n c e enable t h e m to appreciate m o r e

re-

readily

than the n e g r o population t h e w i d e r o b j e c t s of British p o l i c y , w h i l e their close t o u c h w i t h the m a s s e s — w i t h w h o m t h e y live in daily i n t e r 35

Col. Ref., Annual, No. 409, pp. 30-31.

172

BRITISH ENTERPRISE IN NIGERIA

course—mark them out as destined to play an important part in the future, as they have done in the past, in the development of the tropics. 3 9

H e felt that the retention of the Fulani was absolutely essential to the immediate success of British rule and, looking ahead to the time when the guiding hand of Britain might be removed, felt that his plan offered the best prospect for both native and white. T o remove the Fulani, destroy their institutions, and replace them with institutions transplanted from England and enforced by a staff of Europeans with the natives serving merely as clerks, was not only expensive but, in his opinion, certain to lead to disaster. H e did not close his eyes to the obvious fact that the Fulani would have to be closely watched. They were notorious liars ; they were shrewd and tricky; and only recently they had been in open rebellion against British authority. But they were capable, and because of their capacity for governing, they were useful. It is now necessary to describe in some detail the conditions under which the Fulani were restored as rulers. It is not essential, however, to deal with each province. Sokoto may well serve as an illustration of the procedure which was carried out in all the important centers of Northern Nigeria. Although Sokoto was not the largest city in Northern Nigeria, it was the most important because it was the religious center of the western Sudan. Its Sultan enjoyed more prestige than other rulers, being regarded as the political chief of all the emirs, though he had not always been capable of enforcing his authority. Soon after the occupation of Sokoto, the High Commissioner called the leaders of the town together. There was no intention, he explained to them, of punishing those who had resisted. There was to be no interference with the Mohammedan religion, the one desire of the British being the establishment of peaceful relations with the head of the state, whom they were now to choose. The meeting then adjourned, and the elders were left free to select a successor to the deposed emir. 36

Lugard, The Dual Mandate, p. 210.

PACIFICATION

OF

NORTHERN

NIGERIA

173

A second meeting was held the following day with the newly elected Sultan, Atahiru, present. L u g a r d then delivered a caref u l l y prepared address in which he defined the future relationship between the Fulani and the British. T h e old treaties are dead, you have killed them. N o w these are the words which I , the High Commissioner, have to say for the future. T h e Fulani in old times under D a n Fodio conquered this country. T h e y took the right to rule over it, to levy taxes, to depose kings and to create kings. T h e y in turn have by defeat lost their rule which has come into the hands of the British. A l l these things which I have said the Fulani by conquest took the right to do now pass to the British. E v e r y Sultan and E m i r and the principal officers of State will be appointed by the High Commissioner throughout all this country. T h e High Commissioner will be guided by the usual laws of succession and the wishes of the people and chiefs, but will set them aside if he desires for good cause to do so. T h e Emirs and Chiefs who are appointed will rule over the people as of old time and take such taxes as are approved by the High Commissioner, but will obey the laws of the G o v e r n o r and will act in accordance with the advice of the Resident. Buying and selling slaves and enslaving people are forbidden. It is forbidden to import firearms (except flintlocks), and there are other minor matters which the Resident will explain. T h e Alkalis and the E m i r s will hold the l a w courts as of old, but bribes are forbidden, and mutilation and confinement of men in inhuman prisons are not l a w f u l . T h e powers of each court will be contained in a warrant appointing it. Sentences of death will not be carried out without the consent of the Resident. 3 7 I t was also made clear that all mineral rights were to be vested in the new Government, but that the natives might dig for iron, subject to the approval of the authorities. A l l taxes on trade were to be fixed by the Government and not by the emirs or chiefs. Vacancies were to be filled by consent of the H i g h Commissioner, who would usually confirm the choice of the native councils. Appointees were to follow strictly the conditions of their appointment and obey at all times the laws of the protectorate. T h e intention of the conquerors to refrain from interference with religion was again emphasized. T h o u g h slaves were to have the 37

Col. Ref., Annual, No. 409, p. 106.

174

BRITISH

ENTERPRISE

IN

NIGERIA

right of appeal to the Resident, the latter was instructed to deal with those appeals in accordance with native law and custom. T h e r e was to be no interference for the time being with domestic slavery. W a r f a r e between local rulers was to cease. Differences among them must be submitted to proper courts for settlement, for it was the intention of the British to promote prosperity and to restore the ruined towns. In conclusion Lugard declared: I hope that you will find our rule sympathetic and that the country will prosper and be contented. Y o u need have no fear regarding British rule, it is our wish to learn your customs and fashions, just as you must learn ours. I have little fear but that we shall agree, for you have always heard that British rule is just and fair, and people under our K i n g are satisfied. Y o u must not fear to tell the Resident everything and he will help and advise y o u . 3 8

As indicated above, visits were made to the other principal towns of Northern Nigeria, where similar speeches were made. Among the pagan tribes it was necessary to rely more upon direct rule through British officers, but so far as possible responsibility was entrusted to the local chiefs. As they developed a greater capacity for administration, they were given more freedom. T h e responsible head of the administrative system established in Nigeria was the H i g h Commissioner, who in turn was responsible to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. T h e High Commissioner determined policies and assumed the blame in case of failure. H e was not hampered by detailed instructions from the Colonial Office because it was believed best to allow "the man on the spot" full discretion in administering his responsibilities. Parliament rarely questioned the Government with respect to its policy in Nigeria. Although the High Commissioner had a free hand, he was overburdened with routine, which prevented him at times from devoting his best attention to matters of fundamental importance. H e was constantly on the move, visiting provinces, inspecting quarters, conferring with residents, and maintaining contact with native rulers. T h e burden was a heavy one. Only a man possessed of unusual energy could hope to bear it successfully. •8 Col. Ref., Annual, No. 409, p. 107.

PACIFICATION OF NORTHERN NIGERIA

175

T h e Resident was the most important of the subordinate officials in the service. As indicated before, residents with assistant residents under them were appointed at most of the important towns. They began work immediately after the conquest. Each had a small native police force at his disposal, but could, of course, call upon headquarters for troops in case of an emergency. This practice, however, was discouraged and the Resident was expected to carry on alone. Communication with headquarters was uncertain and the opportunities for consulting the chief rare. 3 9 A small staff, consisting only of one or two junior officers, a half-dozen native agents and interpreters, and one or two clerks, was provided. This staff was inadequate for the purpose and it is surprising that so much was accomplished. T h e Resident was responsible for law and order. This made it necessary for him to keep constantly in touch with the emirs, chiefs, and native officials in order to know whether they carried out their duties justly and without resort to oppression. His office must be open at all hours so that complaints could be heard and promptly investigated. H e kept the accounts of the province. H e was responsible for a monthly report to the headquarters treasury, in which every item had to be supported by vouchers in duplicate and allocated to its proper head and sub-head under the Protectorate Estimates. H e was expected to supply local labor to build government stationsj to supervise the construction of roads; to direct the postal system, collect revenue, compile statistics with respect to population, crime, trade; and to write reports on native organization, tribal customs, languages, and taxation. Apparently these duties were not regarded as too onerous, since he was expected to traverse his province and to make a survey for the purpose of preparing a map which was to show the various natural features, towns, villages, and tribal boundaries. H e was expected to encourage trade, develop agriculture, and prevent deforestation. 4 0 T h e great danger inherent in such a system was obviously the 39 For a graphic description of the work of the residents see the works of Orr and Temple. Also, Hastings, Nigerian Days, passim. 40 Orr, of. cit., pp. 1 3 8 - 3 9 .

176

BRITISH

ENTERPRISE

IN

NIGERIA

tremendous amount of routine required by governmental red tape. One former Resident remarked that it was doubtful whether the Spanish conquistadors could have conquered Mexico and Peru had the typewriter been invented in the sixteenth century. T h e y would have been so busy with reports that there would have been no time left for fighting. Another, Captain Orr, declared : T h e great difficulty was to prevent the Resident being tied to his office by routine w o r k , and official correspondence. N o one w h o has not experienced it can form any idea of the time and labor which are necessarily consumed by the minute and exact system of accounting in a Government Office. . . . M a n y a Resident w h o had spent a busy day from sunrise to sunset in arranging for supplies and transport, and attending to multifarious duties which pressed upon him, found himself obliged to w o r k far into the night in the endeavor to extricate his accounts from some tangle, or to trace some petty error in addition which had thrown out the month's balance.

Contact between the H i g h Commissioner and the Residents in the provinces was maintained by a system of runners who made periodical trips from headquarters to the provinces. They carried copies of each new proclamation, together with other information printed in the Gazette. In addition to the Gazette, series of political memoranda were sent from time to time. These memoranda dealt with subjects such as slavery, taxation, punitive expeditions, and native courts, and were designed to familiarize the residents with the views of the H i g h Commissioner. 41 It was difficult to secure the type of men required for the service. T h e appointments were made by the Colonial Office. Extreme care was exercised at all times to inquire carefully into the applicant's record and to investigate his qualifications. Whenever possible the H i g h Commissioner, during his leave of absence, interviewed the candidates in order to satisfy himself as to their fitness. T h e Boer W a r made it difficult to secure good men. Afterward, however, many individuals who had had ex4 1 Lord Lugard, Revision of Instructions of Political Officers, (Lagos, 1 9 1 8 ) . Cited as Political Memoranda. It was first published in 1906 and is the best source for a study of indirect rule.

PACIFICATION

OF

N O R T H E R N

NIGERIA

177

perience in South Africa were available and were appointed to the Nigerian service. T h e appointment of military men occasioned much criticism and drew forth a strong statement from L u g a r d . O b j e c t i o n has . . . been taken to the appointment of military o f ficers as civil Residents. F a i l i n g the supply of m e n with A f r i c a n a d ministrative experience, I have f o u n d that selected A r m y officers are an admirable class of men for this w o r k . T h e y are g e n t l e m e n ; their training teaches them prompt decision, their education in military l a w gives them a k n o w l e d g e of the rules of evidence and judicial

pro-

c e d u r e sufficient w h e n supplemented by a little special study to meet the requirements of a not too technical system of court w o r k , and their training in t o p o g r a p h y enables them to c a r r y out the surveys on all their j o u r n e y s . O f f i c e r s , m o r e especially

those w h o have served in

I n d i a , have d o n e excellent w o r k in N o r t h e r n N i g e r i a , and their s y m pathy with

. . . the people is certainly not less than that of the civil-

ian, and he is m o r e opposed to punitive expeditions. 4 2

T h e British universities cooperated to train candidates who were eager to qualify for appointment. T h e O x f o r d Circular of December 1 9 0 2 declared that no "suitable opportunity should be lost for drawing closer the relationship between the educational centers and the empire." Cambridge arranged courses in tropical medicine and hygiene and established a Hausa scholarship. 43 T h i s movement in the universities was similar to the prevailing practice in France and Germany, where definite instruction was given in the training of men for service in the colonies. In the case of France the instruction was very thorough and included a study of Arabic, the religious tenets of Mohammedanism, and the law and policy of the Western Mohammedans. T h e system of "indirect r u l e " is regarded by some authorities as a unique contribution to the art of colonial administration. It is pertinent, therefore, to inquire into its origins in Nigeria. According to L o r d L u g a r d , T h e cardinal principle upon w h i c h the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n of N o r t h e r n N i g e r i a w a s based w a s w h a t has been c o m m o n l y

called

"Indirect

R u l e , " v i z . , rule t h r o u g h the N a t i v e chiefs, w h o are r e g a r d e d as an 42 43

Col. Ref., Ibid.

Annual, No. 409, pp. 4 9 - 5 0 ,

178

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integral part of the machinery of Government, with well defined powers and functions recognized by Government and law, and not dependent on the caprice of an Executive Officer. 44 T h i s implied the establishment of a system of government which retained the essential features of native administrative machinery but with the more glaring abuses removed. T h e emirs, chiefs, native councils, native courts, and native police were built up as active forces in the life of the people. European influence was brought to bear on the native through his chiefs, and not through a European staff. Great care had to be exercised to make clear to the native that he was being governed by these rulers and that they were not simply a screen designed to conceal the real government. Such a policy placed a great burden on the individual political officer, who must be a person of great tact, infinite patience, and unusual discernment. T h e fundamental purpose was " t o maintain and develop all that is best in indigenous methods and institutions of native rule, to avoid as far as possible everything that has a denationalizing tendency, and to inculcate respect for authority, self respect, and fair treatment of the lower classes, the weak and the ignorant." 4 5 T h e question as to the origin of indirect rule is interesting, but rather difficult to answer. T h e r e is considerable evidence to support the view that such a system had been contemplated before the days of L u g a r d . W e have already seen that the plan of using the more powerful of the coast middlemen had been given some consideration. Sir Claude MacDonald had hinted at the possibilities of indirect rule when he declared in 1890: I would also respectfully submit that the very great power and influence that the native middlemen chiefs possess should be utilized in opening up the country, which power and influence they would, in my opinion, readily accord were they taken into the confidence of the Administration, and the great advantages which would accrue to themselves by the opening up of the country were pointed out and explained to them. 48 **Political Memoranda, No. 9, p. 1 1 . « Ibid., p. 2 1 . *e Report of Major Claude MacDonald, 1890, p. 1 0 1 .

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His suggestion was not carried out, however, and instead of making use of chiefs such as Nana and J a J a , they were removed, and a system of direct administration set up. There is also good reason to believe that Sir George Goldie favored the policy of ruling through the chiefs. His successor, L o r d Scarborough, declared that Lugard's system was based on Goldie's original scheme.47 Unfortunately there is little evidence upon which an account of the administrative policy of the Royal Niger Company can be based. But in 1899 Goldie had declared: I n regions w h e r e E u r o p e a n s can colonize, in the proper sense of the w o r d , there can be little doubt that the proper system is to establish a E u r o p e a n system of l a w and administration with due regard to N a t i v e customs and N a t i v e prejudices. T h e same system m a y also apply in sparsely populated regions even w h e n these cannot be properly colonized by E u r o p e a n s , but can derive their wealth either as pasturage lands or as mining districts. Such a system, h o w e v e r , is quite inapplicable to densely populated regions w h e r e the white man must a l w a y s be in an absolute considerable minority, w h e r e he can never hope to rule by force alone, and where his ideas, if they could be enforced upon N a t i v e populations, w o u l d create endless discomfort and misery. I n such regions the only true policy is to adopt the local N a t i v e g o v e r n ments already existing, and to be content with controlling their e x cesses and with maintaining peace amongst themselves. 4 8

H e pointed out also that while African peoples had little of the sentiment of patriotism as understood in Europe, they were very insistent that their local customs and systems of government be respected. H e was quite certain that an imperfect and even tyrannical native administration would be productive of far less discontent than "well-intentioned but ill-directed efforts of European magistrates, often young and headstrong, and not invariably gifted with sympathy and introspective powers." If the welfare of the native races was to be considered and discontent avoided "the general policy of ruling on African principles through native 47

Lady Dorothy Wellesley, o f . cit., p. 1 5 6 . M a j o r Leonard Darwin, " S i r George Goldie on Government in Africa, from shorthand notes of an interview with Sir George Goldie in March, 1 8 9 9 , " Journal of the African Society, April, 1 9 3 3 . 48

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rulers must be followed for the present." 49 Goldie was inclined to follow the example set in the case of India and rule indirectly through native feudatory princes. H e was strongly of the opinion that no other form was possible in the case of Nigeria. 50 A great deal had been accomplished in the days of Company rule. D u e credit should be given to Goldie and his subordinates, many of whom spent years in Nigeria and did much to lay the foundations for British rule. Some of Goldie's men continued to serve under Lugard and helped to make his administration a success. T h e late Sir John Burdon is typical of this group. H e rendered distinguished service, both in the days of the Company and after the arrival of Lugard. His successor to the Governorship of Honduras pays him the following tribute: W h e n I first went to Nigeria, in 1 9 1 2 , Burdon had already left the country, but he and his work are remembered there by the people and by his former colleagues. In Sokoto, where he did some of his best w o r k , his name is still one to conjure with. W h e n , a few months ago, a tablet to his memory was unveiled at Sokoto, the ceremony was attended by the Sultan and a large number of his chiefs, who were glad to pay one more tribute to the memory of the man they loved and admired. 6 1

W h i l e it is doubtless true that many of the basic ideas of indirect rule had been expressed by others, and while notable progress was made toward bringing order out of chaos, it remained for Lugard and his associates to work out the details of the system and apply it throughout all of Northern Nigeria. Indirect rule was not entirely new and original. In some degree it had been practised by the Romans and in many respects is similar to the system applied in the Native States in India and other parts of the Empire. Lugard had been to India as a young soldier, but was not intimately acquainted with the operation of the Native State system. 52 H e had held the view for some time * a Vandeleur, of. cit., Preface, p. xxi. T h e preface was written by Goldie. 6 0 Sir G . T . Goldie, Report on the Niger Sudan Campaign, p. 390. 51 West India Committee Circular, September 26, 1935, p. 390. 5 2 He knew what any intelligent and well-informed man would know, but did not consciously copy the Indian system.

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that direct administration by British officials in a vast country with millions of inhabitants could not be really effective, and he had declared as early as 1893 that "the Resident should rule through and by the chiefs." 5 3 Circumstances allowed but little choice since the small grant-in-aid from the Imperial Treasury provided for the maintenance of the West African Frontier Force, and little was available for the support of a civil administration. Consequently there was nothing to do except to make use of existing machinery for administrative purposes. 54 L u g a r d did not arrive in Nigeria with plans worked out in advance. With the able assistance of his colleagues, and by working diligently during the years of his first administration, he laid the foundation of indirect rule. Little was known about native institutions and, since too much responsibility could not be given to rulers who had misgoverned for years, much of the burden of detail fell upon the small staff that worked with L u g a r d in the early days. T h e necessity for finding some method of relieving this burden led to the suggestion that more of the detail be entrusted to the Native Administration. This is well illustrated by a study of correspondence between L u g a r d and Captain (now Sir) Charles Orr, which shows very clearly the way in which the present system evolved. I n February 1905, M r . Resident Orr in his report from Zaria Province wrote as follows: . . . the congestion of work is appalling, and I do not think that the strain can be continued indefinitely. . . . I think it right to lay these facts frankly before your Excellency and submit that if the European Staff cannot be increased or casualties filled, some change in system is unavoidable; the change I would indicate is to leave more work in the hands of the Native Administration, and to watch and guide it rather than to take the details out of its hands. 55 54

Lugard, The Rise of Our East African Empire, II, p. 6 j i . Political Memoranda, No. 9, op. 2 0 3 ; Legislative Council, Address by the Governor, (Lagos, 1 9 2 5 ) , p. 33. This is confirmed, also, by all of the individuals who served under Lugard whom I had the privilege of interviewing. 68 Extract from Refort of Zaria Province, February, 1905. I am indebted to Sir Charles Orr for permission to use correspondence in his possession between himself and Lord Lugard which sheds much light on the process by which indirect rule evolved. 54

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This suggestion was kindly received by the H i g h Commissioner, who expressed a desire to have a fuller report on the possibility of leaving more responsibility in the hands of the native rulers. It was several months before the idea was again taken up, but in September 1906 Lugard requested a fuller explanation of possible methods of utilizing to a greater degree the existing Native Administration. Three days later Captain Orr wrote at some length and urged that it might be a practical policy to administer the Hausa States as "protected Native States where a Resident should merely act as a final Court of Appeal and stand in the background behind the Emir who would collect his taxes and administer his dominions under the advice and veto of the British Government as represented by High Commissioner and Residents." Lugard was pleased with the suggestion, but appeared a bit skeptical as to the extent to which the principle might be developed. I am all for utilizing the Native Administration to the utmost degree possible as you know, but we found it in a rotten state, and until Slave raiding and trading had been suppressed, and the Native Courts trained to better work, neither rulers nor judges were of much use. Again, we have to do the police work and the fighting, and as we have no great military power behind us (as in the case of the Residents at Indian Native Courts) it is necessary that for our own protection the country should be disarmed, and we could not tolerate large armies at the disposal of Native Chiefs as in Gwalior & Indore etc. . . . T h e Staff of Residents has from time to time been increased since 1 9 0 0 and should now be fairly adequate I think for some little time, especially with the increase of elasticity given by the double Province system. Moreover these last years have been abnormal, for all our difficulties bore on us at once, and the Assessment and the accumulation of knowledge and experience all demanded abnormal efforts which should decrease as time goes on.

There were many practical problems that pressed for solution. T h e efforts of Lugard and his colleagues to find answers constitute the process by which the system was built up. The objective of his administration was "to bring to the country all the gains of civilization . . . with as little interference as possible

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58

with native customs and modes of thought." H i s policy has been rather neatly summarized as "the three P ' s : Patience, Politeness, and Persistence." Patience in the sense that when new ideas were to be presented to the native mind they were to be accompanied by careful explanation of the objectives in view and clothed, if possible, in familiar garb; Politeness, in the care to observe scrupulously the requirements of native etiquette and to be at all times courteous and considerate of the native point of view; Persistence in the determination to obtain results, and by tactful handling of difficult problems, accompanied by continued and sustained pressure, to bring about a better order of things. It is not necessary to deal here with all the problems which the Nigerian Administration attempted to solve through the application of indirect rule. Its workings can be adequately illustrated by a discussion of two issues of fundamental significance, domestic slavery and the establishment of an equitable system of taxation. During the debate over the estimates for Northern Nigeria, frequent questions were raised regarding the status of slavery in the new possession and the steps to be taken to eradicate it. 57 There were few in Parliament who really understood the problem or were in a position to appreciate the African point of view which regarded slavery as a natural condition, and the idea of property in slaves to be the same as the possession of a horse or an ox. Among the Mohammedans slavery was the very basis of social organization. Practically all labor was performed by slaves and bargains were made in terms of slaves, who served in a sense as the currency of the country. T h e law governing the holding of slaves was, as we have seen, quite humane, and severe punishment was prescribed for those who were guilty of mistreatment. 58 It was clear, therefore, that great caution must be exercised in dealing with domestic slaves. Notwithstanding the critics, a moderate program was adopted. This point of view is well expressed by T e m p l e , who writes: 56

Political Memoranda, No. i , p. 5. Hansard, 4th ser., L X X V , pp. 94.5—51. 58 Orr, of. cit., pp. 1 9 5 - 9 6 ; C. K . Meek, The Northern Tribes of Nigeria, I, pp. 289-94. 57

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. . . there a r e a thousand and one difficulties in the w a y of the G o v e r n m e n t of a n y E u r o p e a n institution taking o v e r direct responsibilities on a l a r g e scale in connection with the A f r i c a n Domestic slave. I say without hesitancy that they are f a r better off as they are in their households, a n d that w e should be w e l l advised to turn our e f f o r t s rather to keeping t h e m there than in e n c o u r a g i n g them to claim their f r e e d o m . If the native l a w and custom, which invariably, I think, c e r tainly in every case which I have studied personally, extends g r e a t protection to those of this class, and punishes masters f o r abuse of authority or c r u e l t y , is e n f o r c e d , w e need not legislate ourselves in a direction w h e r e w e m i g h t lay ourselves open to the invidious c h a r g e of l e g a l i z i n g s l a v e r y , and at the same time fail to e f f e c t our o b j e c t . 5 8

During the period of Company control, the policy of abrogating the legal status of slavery had been inaugurated. This really meant gradual emancipation since no one could be enslaved subsequent to the passage of the law. All the children of slaves were, of course, to be free. This policy was continued by the new administration and was supplemented by a proclamation issued in April 1901. This proclamation reasserted in slightly different language the law of the Company. Later, in 1904, another proclamation was issued which reaffirmed the provisions of 1901 and, in addition, declared slave trading to be an offense. A final proclamation, issued in 1907, was even more specific. It forbade transactions in slaves by non-natives; it defined slave dealing and provided penalties for those guilty of the practice; and it declared that there would be "no compensation from the Government to persons claiming to be owners . . . in respect of slaves who may acquire their freedom by virtue of this Proclamation." 60 By thus working gradually toward its objective, the Administration had succeeded in getting rid of domestic slavery, but not at the cost of fatally dislocating the established order. Much of the legislation enacted during the period ending in 1907 had been based on Mohammedan law and was enforced, for the most part, through the native courts. Many slaves were able to purchase their freedom by taking advantage of the opportunity to 69 80

Temple, of. cit., p. 217. Orr, of. cit., pp. 201-4.

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w o r k for the G o v e r n m e n t , which provided funds enabling them in many cases to purchase liberty. Frequently the masters allowed slaves to work for wages, and in this manner many became free. T h e administration of the laws relating to domestic slavery naturally fell to the Residents, and it required much tact and patience on their part to please the owners and at the same time g i v e justice to the slaves. It was customary to discuss each case with the emirs and alkalis before turning it over to the Native Court for a decision. In many cases differences between masters and slaves were adjusted in the presence of the Resident by informal discussion between the parties. Cases i n v o l v i n g cruelty were usually handled by the N a t i v e Courts. Care was exercised to prevent slaves from inflicting loss upon masters by running away to work for the G o v e r n m e n t . If they were detected, it was the practice to compel the slave to compensate his master before he was recognized as being free. T h i s method of procedure proved its wisdom, and the transition f r o m slavery to free contract was made with but little difficulty. 6 1 In his report for 1902, the H i g h Commissioner laid down certain principles with respect to taxation which he wished to put into operation in Northern Nigeria. A d m i t t i n g that the ideal tax was an indirect one levied on imports, he argued in favor of a direct tax, since that was the only kind which could be applied in Northern Nigeria. T h e situation is clear. T h e r e was no sea coast; goods had to be imported through Southern N i g e r i a ; the cost of transport was well-nigh prohibitive; and any addition to these costs would be ruinous for the trade of N o r t h e r n Nigeria. Impressed by the force of this reasoning, the Colonial Office gave its approval to L u g a r d ' s ideas and decided in f a v o r of a system of direct taxation. 62 T h i s decision was consistent with another principle of indirect rule in which every attempt was made to preserve, so far as possible, those native institutions that possessed vitality. T h e people of N o r t h e r n Nigeria had become accustomed to direct taxation 81

Political

62

Ibid., N o . 5, fassim;

I. PP· 3 9 4 - 9 9 ·

Memoranda,

N o . 6, p p . 6-9. Col. Ref.,

Annual,

N o . 409, p p . 5 3 - 5 4 ; M e e k , of.

cit.,

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under the Fulani, and the system proposed by Lugard involved no fundamental changes. The Fulani system was sound in principle but had broken down in practice. Methods of collection were expensive and opened the way for widespread oppression and extortion. If the expense could be reduced and the abuses removed, there was no reason to doubt its effectiveness. The task imposed upon the political officers was enormous, however. Since the levy was to be made on the income of each individual, a strict inquiry into the material circumstances of each community had to be made. Only the closest inquisition, often carried out by the political officers themselves, in counting up the heads, male and female, adults and children, huts, compounds, sheep, goats, cattle, beehives, etc., could reveal the actual wealth of a town or village. W h e n it is remembered that there might perhaps be one officer only for one hundred to three hundred thousand inhabitants, it will be realized that the task of personal inspection would often lie immeasurably beyond his powers, and that he would have to rely in the main on statements given to him by the native village headmen. Even the British citizen has been known to resist exactions made in the interests of the Treasury, and we can hardly blame the native if he too did not always realize the necessity of sacrificing his own to the public interest. 63

In addition, the area to be surveyed was tremendous. Many of the provinces were as large as Ireland, were unmapped, and in many instances unexplored. T h e original staff was not adequate to the task. The Colonial Office yielded to the urgent demands of the High Commissioner by securing an addition to the Grantin-Aid, increasing it to £405,OOO.84 Acting under instructions outlined by the High Commissioner, the Residents were required to insure the collection of all the customary dues by the chiefs and to render any necessary assistance in the collection. The more advanced pagan districts were to be required to pay a small direct tax to the government, the amount being assessed by the Resident after consultation with the people. T h e wilder districts were to be brought more gradually under 63 64

Temple, of. cit., pp. 104-5. Orr, of. cit., p. 150.

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control, and a purely nominal sum was to be imposed as a symbol of British supremacy and protection. Later it was planned to assess them on the basis of population and wealth. 85 T h e system was legalized by two important legislative proclamations, the Land Revenue Proclamation of 1904, and the Native Revenue Proclamation of ΐ9θ6. ββ Under the former, the Government claimed the right to a certain proportion of the tribute paid by the agricultural and pastoral population. This tax was to be collected by the native rulers and, since they were now relieved of the expense incident to any army and police force, they were to pay over a share to the administration. The Proclamation of 1906 superseded that of 1904 and made legal a complete system of taxation based upon the original Fulani system but greatly improved in form. It authorized the collection of such sums as the Resident of each province, with the approval of the High Commissioner, should fix and assess. The basis was to be "the annual value of the lands and produce, of the profits of trade and manufactures, of the flocks and herds of nomad shepherds, and of certain other existing sources of revenue." 67 The machinery for collection was outlined and the duties of the district and village headmen defined. Penalties were prescribed for offenses detailed in the Proclamation, such as extortion, giving of false information, collection of unauthorized taxes, or taxes collected by unauthorized persons. Enforcement of the system was placed in the hands of the Provincial Courts.®8 An illustration of the methods employed by the Residents in putting the new system into operation is afforded by a report of Dr. Cargill, the Resident at Kano. H e writes as follows: I left Kano for Gaiya on the 24th, taking the Waziri of Kano with me. . . . On arrival I interviewed the Sariki . . . and informed him that we had come to assess Gaiya. . . . The Sariki is an intelligent man and rendered me every assistance. I then called together all the Mainungas who collect the taxes from the people. Each Mai65 66 87 88

Col. Ref., Annual, No. 476, pp. 8-95 Political Memoranda, No. 5, fassim. Orr, of. cit., p. 164. Ibid. Ibid., pp. i64ff.

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η unga brought with him the farmers belonging to his quarter. I first asked the M a i n u n g a h o w much he collected f r o m his quarter under each head. . . .

I also asked him his trade and the n u m b e r of people

in his house. In this w a y I complete the assessment and census of G a i y a within t w o days. 8 9

Further examination of the reports received from the Residents indicate that the system of taxation was approved in most of the provinces. T h e Resident of Nupe reported that "there is absolutely no friction or hardship in collecting the taxes. T h e land tax has been most willingly paid and is recognized by all classes as necessary and due for the maintenance of the administration." T h e Resident of Bautchi reported a greatly improved attitude on the part of the people, adding that information with respect to the income of the population was now readily given and often volunteered. T h e Emir of Y o l a was represented as favorable to the system, and "the people welcome it from the point of view that they will know exactly what they will have to pay, and it will do away with the possibility of unfair dealing or individual oppression on the part of the collectors." 70 In 1906 Sir Frederick Lugard completed his first term of office. H e had served as H i g h Commissioner for a period of six years and in this short time had accomplished great things. His capacity for action had been expressed in the rapid and decisive occupation of the country j his ability to formulate general principles of Government and express them in action had resulted in the establishment of a unique system of administration ; his tremendous energy and capacity for hard work was a source of inspiration to his officers; and, above all, his patience in dealing with the conquered emirs won their friendship and enlisted the cooperation of these capable rulers. T h e establishment of the Northern Nigerian system of indirect rule was not the work of one man, however, and L o r d Lugard would be the first to protest the validity of such a statement. H e was fortunate in his subordinates, and such men as Burdon, Temple, Palmer, Orr, Goldsmith, and many others contributed heavily to the success of his experiment. Lugard never 89 70

Col. Ref., Annual, No. 476, p. 18. Ibid., pp. 19-21.

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forgot that the head of any administrative system must not only give responsibility and proper direction to those under his orders, but must be quick to adopt the best of their work into a wellcoördinated system. H e left behind him such a clear formulation of policy and such a degree of enthusiasm among the officers that any change of policy on the part of his successors would have been most difficult if not impossible. Fortunately Sir Percy Girouard, who came out in 1907, had no such idea in mind and was quite content to follow the lines of advance laid down by his distinguished predecessor, and not only accepted, but confirmed and developed in the most able fashion what he found.

! ¡

Chapter VI AMALGAMATION A N D UNIFICATION T h e eight years that elapsed from the retirement of Sir Frederick L u g a r d in 1906 to the union of Northern and Southern Nigeria in 1 9 1 4 were years of peaceful, steady development. T h e successors of L u g a r d in Northern Nigeria adhered rather closely to the administrative policy he had outlined. There were few changes, though efforts were made to improve the system of indirect rule which had proved to be very successful in practice. Communication and transport facilities were developed; the natural resources of the country were exploited; the system of taxation was rendered more efficient ; and there were substantial additions to the political staff. T h e work of pacification had been accomplished in a thorough fashion; slave-raiding was ended; cannibalism, witchcraft, and trial by ordeal—practices common among the pagan tribes in Northern Nigeria—became things of the past; traders were freed from the constant threat of attack; and European business men who had hesitated to venture far from the rivers now felt safe in traveling freely throughout the country. T h e rulers in the Mohammedan states were brought into closer harmony with the British administration, and the abuses which in the past had characterized their rule were largely removed. T h e confidence of the pagan tribes was won by patience, diplomacy, and tact, rather than by resort to force. Internal trade steadily increased as roads were opened. T h e main caravan routes were thronged with natives pursuing their way in safety, unhampered by trade restrictions or local imposts. Complications with the French and German neighbors were minor in character, and conferences between political officers of adjoining territories were frequently held. T h e 190

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delimitation of the frontier between the Niger and Lake Chad was completed with little friction, and a project to unite the telegraph system of Northern Nigeria and French West Africa was approved. 1 Other changes in the administrative system of Northern Nigeria might be mentioned, such as the reduction of the number of provinces from fourteen to eight, resulting in a worthwhile simplification of administration. Furthermore, a definite attempt was made to discourage the use of interpreters by encouraging the study of Hausa. Promotions were made conditional upon a mastery of this language, and political officers were encouraged to devote a portion of their leave to a study of the native languages. T h e University of London, where many officers attended courses, offered the best facilities in this field. Others visited Tripoli, where exceptional facilities for study were available. T h e problem of administration in Southern Nigeria, however, was distinct from that encountered in the north. Here the people were more primitive and had not developed their political institutions to a point where it was easy to establish a system of indirect rule. Moreover, the method by which the British Crown had established its authority had been quite different, and little effort had been made to make use of native rulers. T h e administrators of Southern Nigeria had been busily engaged exploring the dense forests bordering the coast, in suppressing fetish worship and human sacrifice, and in developing more adequate facilities for transportation. T h e latter task had involved almost constant dredging of the waterways as well as the building of roads through the tropical forests. 2 Despite the difficulties that were certain to arise because of the situation outlined above, it was decided, late in 1911, to unify the two Nigerias. T h e first step in the process of unification had been taken in 1906, when Lagos and Southern Nigeria, hitherto separate colonies, were merged under the name of " T h e Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria." T h e result had been highly Col. Ref., Annual, No. 594, pp. j f f . Pari. Pap., 1919, 36, Report on the Amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria, Cmd. 468, p. 6. Cited hereafter as Report on Amalgamation. 1

2

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gratifying since it was accompanied by a significant increase in material prosperity. Income from various sources—principally the import tax on liquor—had been more than ample to cover the costs of administration, and a respectable surplus had been shown for several years. The reverse was true of Northern Nigeria. Here there was no income from a liquor tax since the sale of liquor was forbidden in the Mohammedan states. The income derived from direct taxation had never been sufficient to meet expenses. Consequently, each year it had been necessary for the Treasury to make up the deficit by means of an imperial grant-inaid. Attempts to reduce this deficit by making levies upon traders had not been successful and, in addition, it was felt that this tax was bad in principle. From the financial point of view, then, amalgamation had much in its favor. The revenue from Southern Nigeria would provide funds sufficient to make sorely needed additions to the staff. Moreover it would relieve the Imperial Treasury of the necessity for making the annual grant, which, for the eleven years ending in March 1 9 1 2 , had averaged £314,500. 3 Amalgamation seemed warranted for other reasons as well. Railroad building, which had been inaugurated under Governor Girouard with the construction of the Baro to Kano line, was handicapped by the fact that the two Nigerias did not constitute a political unit. While Southern Nigeria had participated in the program of railroad construction to the extent of building a road from Lagos to the frontier, there arose a considerable difference of opinion as to the best route to be followed, and no agreement could be reached on the location of the bridge across the Niger. In an effort to settle the dispute, a commission had been set up to study the problem and to endeavor to establish some form of joint control. T h e commission, during the course of its investigation, discovered that the line in Southern Nigeria had been constructed in a faulty manner and that the cost had been excessive. This influenced the commissioners to urge unification of control. 3 Report on Amalgamation, p. and Problems, (London, 1912).

7; see also, E. D. Morel, Nigeria:

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I t also served to bring matters to a head by hastening the decision in favor of amalgamation. 4 T h e proposal to merge the two Nigerias was presented to the House of Commons in June 1912 by the Colonial Secretary, M r . Harcourt. During the course of his speech, he paid high tribute to Sir Frederick Lugard who, he announced, had been recalled from the governorship of H o n g Kong to undertake the work. 5 " I frankly admit," he declared, "that I would not have thought the moment opportune unless I had happened to know and been able to command the services of the one man marked out of this work, Sir Frederick L u g a r d . " Northern Nigeria, which he had reclaimed from the unknown, had been the product of his "foresight and genius" and might, so Harcourt felt, serve "as a model and inspiration to the other Protectorates." H e went on to explain that L u g a r d was commissioned to make a study of the situation that had developed during his absence and later was to propose a definite scheme of amalgamation. This report, based on a careful survey of the problem, was ready in March 1913 and was submitted to Parliament for approval. Definite action was taken the following September and Lugard left for Africa where, on January 1, 1914, the new Government of Nigeria was proclaimed.® Later in the same year a great Durbar was held at Kano which afforded evidence of the popularity of British rule with the rulers of Northern Nigeria. It was attended by all the Moslem rulers, many of whom met for the first time on terms of common friendship to swear allegiance to George V. Representatives from the principal pagan tribes were also in attendance. It was estimated that not fewer than 30,000 horsemen took part in the picturesque display. Each in turn marched past and then gave the salute of the desert, charging at full gallop with brandished weapons. Nor w a s the gathering merely ceremonial. Hereditary enemies met as friends. T h e Shehu of Bornu was the honored quest of his quondam * Report on Amalgamation, pp. 7-8. Morel, of. cit., ch. 18, passim. 5 Hansard, 1 9 1 2 , 40, p. 512. 6 Report on Amalgamation, p. 8.

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enemy, the Fulani Emir of Kano, and no friction or dispute for precedence among their somewhat turbulent following disturbed the harmony of this remarkable gathering. 7 T h e administrative system established f o r the a m a l g a m a t e d N i g e r i a was f e d e r a l in character. T h i s t y p e of g o v e r n m e n t was w e l l adapted to t h e needs of the situation since each part of N i g e r i a was a l l o w e d considerable f r e e d o m in the solution of its problems, and since this i n v o l v e d but a slight dislocation of the existing systems of administration. T w o lieutenant governorships w e r e established, one with its center at K a d u n a in N o r t h e r n N i g e r i a and the other f o r Southern N i g e r i a , located at L a g o s . T h e G o v e r n o r ' s headquarters was established at L a g o s , t h o u g h by 1928 plans had been m a d e to r e m o v e the headquarters of the L i e u t e n a n t G o v e r n o r to E n u g u . 8 L u g a r d was convinced that the system of indirect rule which he had w o r k e d out in N o r t h e r n N i g e r i a was sound and capable of application in S o u t h e r n N i g e r i a . T h i s was difficult, h o w e v e r , because the people w e r e pagans and had not, as w e have seen, d e v e l o p e d their political institutions to the same d e g r e e as had the F u l a n i in the n o r t h . B u t with an e n l a r g e d staff at his comm a n d he felt that a b e g i n n i n g was possible. Southern N i g e r i a had been under British rule for some time, but little had been accomplished in the w a y of d e v e l o p i n g an effective system of native administration. A s i d e f r o m a f f o r d i n g protection to the E u r o p e a n traders and suppressing some of the grosser f o r m s of fetish worship, the administration had pursued a hands-off policy. C o n s e q u e n t l y native g o v e r n m e n t s were not w e l l d e v e l o p e d . N o r u l e r exercised authority o v e r a large area so that it was necessary in m a n y cases to build a new system rather than repair one a l r e a d y in existence. T h e first task to e n g a g e L u g a r d ' s attention was the relationship between the C r o w n and the t w o most advanced native peoples in Southern N i g e r i a — t h e E g b a s and Y o r u b a s . In 1893

a

treaty had been m a d e w i t h the E g b a s which guaranteed their independence on condition that they encourage trade and tolerate " Re fort on Amalgamation, 8

p. 8.

R. L . Buell, The Native Problem in Africa,

(New Y o r k , 1 9 2 8 ) , I, p. 64.6.

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Christian missions.9 Treaties made with the Yorubas were less explicit, but seemed to give them some degree of independence also. Despite these treaties a British Protectorate had been declared over the Lagos hinterland in 1901 and, under the authority of the Native Councils Ordinance, several councils were set up. Government officials had exercised more than a nominal supervision over these councils and, inasmuch as the natives had acquiesced in the procedure, jurisdiction was exercised over the regions inhabited by these peoples. It was important that this question be cleared up for several very good reasons. In the first place, some definition of British authority was necessary before a system of native administration could be established, and second, the railroad to Kano penetrated these regions. 10 It was of fundamental importance also to apply indirect rule in the most advanced native communities in Southern Nigeria before an effort could be made to extend the principle to the primitive tribes of the Niger delta. T h e Chief Justice of Nigeria was asked to investigate. His report, quite naturally, was favorable to the abrogation of the treaties. T h e Chief Justice admitted that the whole question of jurisdiction was chaotic and full of anomalies, but that " H i s Majesty had now acquired such complete jurisdiction throughout the Protectorate, with the possible exception of Egbaland, as to be able to legislate in any direction, not only for Europeans and resident non-natives, but for the natives themselves." 1 1 Another investigator appointed by Lugard reported the existence of widespread conditions of misrule and disorder accompanied by much bribery and extortion. T h e responsibility for these conditions was not placed upon the natives, but upon those officers who had failed to support the native rulers in their efforts to suppress disorder, and who had exercised little supervision of conditions in the native states, aside from the occasional dispatch of punitive expeditions. Practically nothing had been done to make the rule of the native sovereigns effective. T h e y were governments in name only. C f . pp. 52-54, above. Refort on Amalgamation, 11 Ibid. See also Proceedings

9

10

p. 12. of the Nigerian Council,

1920, pp. 32-33.

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BRITISH ENTERPRISE IN NIGERIA

L u g a r d was determined to end this situation. Taking advantage of trouble at Abeokuta, he succeeded in getting the Egbas to accept indirect rule. W h e n the chief of the Egbas, the Alaki, appealed for a force to suppress the disturbance at Abeokuta he was informed that the Government could no longer consent to furnish troops if the causes were "outside of British control." This paved the way for a suggestion by the Governor that the system applied in Northern Nigeria might be acceptable to the Alaki. T h e latter, favorably impressed by the suggestion, was quite willing to consider the abrogation of the Treaty of Independence and to submit to the guidance and control of the British. Accordingly the old treaty was denounced and a new one, signed in September 1914, took its place. 12 U n d e r the terms of the new agreement the entire Egba Kingdom was placed under the jurisdiction of the courts of the Protectorate of Nigeria and was made subject to its laws. A l l future legislation was to emanate from the Alaki and his Council, subject to the express approval of the Governor of Nigeria. T h e Alaki and his successors, recognized as " H e a d of the Egba people," were to carry on the native administration, while the British undertook to maintain order and furnish troops and police. A resident was installed at Abeokuta, and Egbaland became a province. 13 Another problem that demanded speedy settlement was that of " H o u s e R u l e . " T h e coastal chiefs, acting as middlemen between the European traders and the tribes of the interior, had initiated the practice of advancing goods to members of their House, usually slaves, which the latter carried to the hinterland to exchange for goods sought by the traders. This system had been reinforced by the House Rule Ordinance of Southern Nigeria which had empowered the Supreme Court to inflict a year's imprisonment together with a fine upon any member who refused to submit to the authority of the Head of the House. His oath was sufficient to secure conviction, and any vagrant not attached to a 1 2 T h i s treaty is printed as appendix ii. of the Report on Amalgamation. For the native point of view see A . Folarin, The Demise of the Independence of Egbaland, (Lagos, 1 9 1 6 ) . It is hostile to the British. 13

Report on Amalgamation,

p. 14. Buell, of. cit., I, pp. 6 7 2 - 7 6 .

AMALGAMATION AND UNIFICATION

197

House was liable to arrest without warrant and imprisonment for a year. No European could employ a member of any House without the consent of the Head under penalty of imprisonment or fine.14 The obvious objection to the system was that it supported and fostered a system of slavery that was felt to be contrary to the traditions of British rule. A beginning had been made in the direction of its abolition in 1 9 1 2 by the passage of an amending ordinance that established a system of self-ransom. In January 1 9 1 5 the House Rule Ordinance was repealed. This struck a deathblow to the system. House Rule was not abolished, but since the courts no longer upheld the authority of the Head of the House, it could be only a question of time until the system expired. A unified system of administration similar in principle to that of Northern Nigeria was organized in 1914. T h e Governor, as the representative of the Crown, assumed full responsibility for the conduct of affairs. His duties were numerous and heavy. H e was the director of policy with respect to the native administration ; he carried on the official correspondence with the Colonial Secretary; he initiated all legislation by means of ordinances, regulations, or orders in council in conjunction with the executive council; he decided all matters respecting promotions; and he exercised the power of granting pardons and remitting penalties. H e appointed and dismissed public servants, approved bills passed by the Legislative Council, and issued warrants for the expenditure of money required in the public service. His powers were limited only by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, whose approval had to be secured, not only in matters of importance, but in many that were trivial as well. T h e Council had no power to command the Governor, but it was entitled to give advice. As a matter of fact it exerted considerable influence. T h e normal term of service for the Governor was fixed at six years, and frequent leaves of absence were obligatory. 15 14 Report on Amalgamation, p. 14. Buell, of. cit., I, p. 6 7 7 ; Proceedings 0} the Nigerian Council, 1920, p. 39. 15 Lugard, The Dual Mandate, p. 124.

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BRITISH ENTERPRISE IN NIGERIA

Provision was made for a Deputy Governor to serve in the absence of the Governor while on leave. Since this occurred frequently, it was necessary to define his duties carefully. T h e Deputy Governor was granted the legal right to make or repeal laws and regulations, to inaugurate or abandon important works, and to render rulings or give pledges to native chiefs in the name of the Government. H e was not permitted to make radical changes in, or to reverse the policy of, the Governor when on leave. T h e Chief Secretary was intimately acquainted with administrative routine, so he was usually selected to serve as Deputy Governor. 1 6 Mention has already been made of the decision to establish lieutenant governorships in the old divisions of Nigeria rather than attempt to establish new divisions. As explained above, this was done in order to avoid too great a dislocation of the existing governments, each of which was under a different system of law and each of which had been developed under a different type of administration. It was felt, too, that the creation of new administrative divisions would involve unnecessary duplication of departments and unwarranted increase in expenditure. Another objection to establishing more than two lieutenant governorships was the belief that such a policy would serve to diminish the importance of the office and result in an increased amount of work for the Governor. This work, largely routine in character, would result in his being tied to his post and would prevent his giving attention to matters of more fundamental importance. T h e creation of new divisions would involve also the transfer of records, the erection of new buildings for official use, and the training of many additional men for the positions thus created. 17 T h e Lieutenant Governor was charged with the direct administration of the area to which he was appointed. H e was expected to consult the Governor on any issue which affected Nigeria as a whole, or involved a ruling as to general policy or legislative action. H e was expected to keep the Governor informed at all times, and to prepare and submit a budget for approvai and incorporation in the general budget. H i s powers were 18 17

Lugard, of. cit., p. 125. Report on Amalgamation, p. 9.

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199

carefully defined in the Gazette in order that there might be no misunderstanding on his part or on the part of the people over whom he exercised authority. Each Lieutenant Governor had a Secretariate, together with departments necessary for the efficient administration of his duties. 18 Some departments were designated as "central departments" and remained under the direct control of the Governor. These were common to both administrative divisions and included the following: railway, military, audit, treasury, posts and telegraphs, judicial and legal, and the survey. 1 9 This plan led to too great a centralization of business at Lagos and was changed in 1920 by Governor Clifford, who declared: It will be the business of the Lieutenant-Governor to overlook the entire administrative machinery and to supervise in the interests of the G o v e r n m e n t and of the public, every branch of political or departmental activity in the group of Provinces under their administration . . . and save in purely departmental or technical matters they will be at liberty should the necessity arise, to give direct orders to officers belonging to the Non-Political Department, w h o for the time being are serving in these Provinces. 2 0

This order was designed to relieve the congestion at headquarters and was necessary because at times non-political officers resented interference from members of the political staff, and conflict of authority frequently arose. 21 F e w changes were made with respect to the position of the Resident. H e continued to be the "backbone of the administration," and served as judge, councilor, and adviser to the natives of the province to which he was assigned. W i t h the additions to staff which had been made fnom time to time, the Resident found it less necessary to make the frequent tours which in the early days had been so burdensome. H e was now enabled to devote more attention to the supervision of the administration of his Ibid. Also Lugard, The Dual Mandate, p. 127. Lugard, of. cit., pp. 128-29. 2 0 Buell, op. cit., p. 647-48. Quotation from Nigeria Gazette, Extraordinary, March 12, 1925. 21 Ibid. Also Proceedings of the Nigerian Council, 1920, pp. 1 1 - 1 5 . 18

19

B R I T I S H E N T E R P R I S E IN N I G E R I A province. It became possible to delegate many matters of routine to subordinates. F u r t h e r relief was afforded when a yearly report was substituted for the monthly report which had been the cause of so much complaint in former years. These reports, which dealt with a variety of subjects, afforded the Governor the opportunity of keeping in touch with the affairs of the province, and this made possible a continuity of policy, which was regarded as being of prime importance in administering native affairs. 22 A f t e r amalgamation, the District Officers took over much of the work f o r m e r l y performed by the Residents. There were usually three or four District Officers in each province. For the most part they were drawn f r o m the middle class and, in addition to their university training, they were given special training in administration. U p o n their arrival in Africa they were required to pass examinations in law, judicial procedure, the ordinances, regulations, and general orders of the local government. Officers assigned to Moslem districts were required to know something of Koranic law, together with the native customs and laws which in many regions supplemented it. T h e y were required to pass an examination, within a reasonable time, in one of the more widely used native languages, generally Hausa. Promotion in the service was made conditional upon the mastery of at least one native language. 2 3 T h e duties of each of these District Officers were varied. In isolated regions each one was required to discharge the functions of all the departments—postal, customs, marine, police, engineering, etc.—in addition to his normal duties. H e was the medium of communication between the military or departmental officer and the native chiefs in matters of labor and supply. H e was expected to render assistance to the missionary, the miner, the trader. T h e enforcement of ordinances, the issuing of licenses, the keeping of records, were all in his hands. Perhaps the most important d u t y of the District Officer was the work of assessment. T h i s brought him into close touch with the natives and enabled him to gain an intimate knowledge of them as well as of the 23 23

Refort on Amalgamation, Lugard, o f . cit., p. 133.

p. 11. Lugard, o f . cit., p. 128.

AMALGAMATION AND UNIFICATION

201

personality and character of the chiefs and headmen in every village. Regular tours were undertaken by these officers to administer justice, adjust disputes, detect oppression and extortion wherever it existed, and build up among the villagers a sense of loyalty to their chiefs. 24 It is obvious—and this point has been stressed before—that the policy of the Government with respect to the native races was paramount in importance. In the case of Northern Nigeria the policy had involved the application of the principle of trusteeship ; that is to say, the basic principle of administration had been to purge the indigenous system of government and to endeavor to develop capacity for self-government by encouraging the native actually to govern. This principle had not taken root in the south because of the influence of the traders, who were primarily interested in commercial development. T h e Government had preserved order, but it had done little to encourage friendly relationships. Consequently it became necessary in many cases to create native political institutions by an artificial process. 25 T h e application of indirect rule to the Egbas and Yorubas was relatively simple after the abrogation of the Treaties of Independence. T h e situation here was quite analogous to that which Lugard had encountered in the pagan communities in the north. H i s success in dealing with these pagans convinced him that the task was not altogether hopeless. T h e usual procedure, in the case of pagans, had been to find a man of influence in the community, establish him as the paramount chief, group under him as many villages as possible, and then educate him in the methods of self-government, supported at all times by the British authorities. T h i s procedure was adopted and applied in the case of the primitive peoples of the south. T h e system depended in a considerable degree upon the imposition of direct taxes, which offered two advantages; first, the fact that it provided funds for the payment of salaries to the 24 Ibid. See also, W . R. Crocker, Nigeria, A Critique of British Colonial Administration, (London, 1 9 3 6 ) . C f . especially Part I. 2 5 Exception should be made in the case of Yorubas, Egbas, and Benis. T h e y had developed strong organizations under paramount chiefs but were still addicted to many barbarous customs.

202

BRITISH ENTERPRISE IN NIGERIA

native officials, and second, the fact that it impressed upon the natives a sense of obligation owed to the Government. It was L u g a r d ' s intention to introduce direct taxation at once, but the project was vetoed by the Secretary of State. Such a drastic change might cause serious trouble at a time when the Nigeria Regiment was engaged in the campaign in the Cameroons, so permission was withheld until 1 9 1 6 , when direct taxation was imposed in the more advanced native states—Yorubaland, Egbaland, and Benin. Some difficulty was experienced at first, but by 1918 the people apparently were convinced of the advantages of direct taxation. B y 1920 indirect rule had been successfully established in the more advanced districts in Southern Nigeria, and the Administration was ready to extend it further whenever the consent of the Colonial Office could be secured. 2 6 W i t h o u t doubt, the most important feature of the system of indirect rule was the administration of justice. H e r e again it was decided to proceed along lines marked out by experience in Northern Nigeria. It is necessary, therefore, to review the main feature of the judicial system initiated by L u g a r d and developed by his successors in the Northern Provinces. Native Courts had been set up under British supervision, but after a brief and unsuccessful attempt to use E n g l i s h common law as the basis of the legal code, it had been supplanted by native law. 2 7 Courts had been set up in each province over which the Resident presided, with power to pass sentence of death or imprisonment. Sentence was not carried out, however, until f u l l minutes of the case had been sent to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. In the case of a death sentence, the consent of the G o v e r n o r was required. T h e Resident's judicial powers were limited to his particular province, and he shared them with other political officers w h o held court simultaneously with the Resident. T h e r e was considerable objection raised in some quarters to the practice of combining executive and judicial functions since the case would be tried by the man w h o had gathered the evidence and prepared the case. It was felt, however, that the advantage of close contact with political 26

Report

27

O r r , of. cit., p. 230.

on Amalgamation,

p. ι 5.

AMALGAMATION AND UNIFICATION

203

problems which this arrangement fostered, together with the added prestige which the judicial position gave, outweighed many disadvantages incident to combining these two branches of the government. 2 8 In addition to the British courts mentioned above, there were the Native Courts, which became of fundamental importance. These courts had been established early in L u g a r d ' s administration and marked a departure from hitherto accepted practice. In some protectorates, as well as in certain districts administered by France, the practice had been inaugurated of setting up Native Courts presided over by Europeans. But in Nigeria the principle had been carried still further by setting up courts composed entirely of natives. 20 In 1906 two types of courts were established: Alkalis' courts in the Mohammedan districts, and Judicial Councils in the pagan regions. 30 T h e Resident exercised a certain degree of supervision over the Native Courts and might transfer cases to the Provincial Courts if the facts of the case warranted. There was no formal right of appeal from a Native Court. T h e Resident did not formally confirm or approve sentences, though he might suspend or reduce a sentence, if, in his judgment, such action seemed justified. As has already been suggested, it was comparatively easy to establish a system of Native Courts in a Mohammedan community, because all that was necessary was the eradication of certain abuses and the adjustment of an already existing system to the fact of British control. But in a region where a legal tradition had not been established, such a task was most difficult. Disaster was certain to accompany any attempt to introduce the English legal system in a district inhabited by savages. It was also out of the question to allow the many bad features of the tribal law to remain unchecked. T h e establishment of Judicial Councils provided a possible solution. Under these councils the chief of the tribe dealt with all cases both civil and criminal in accordance with tribal law and custom. This amounted to a legalization of the old 28 29 30

Col. Ref., Annual, No. 3+6, p. 16. Orr, of. cit., pp. 2 3 2 - 3 5 . Orr, of. cit., p. 2 3 5 . Ibid.

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patriarchical system, under which the chief was the source of justice and his decisions accepted as law. But limitations were now imposed upon the chief. H e was forbidden to inflict unnecessarily severe and unjust penalties5 his leading men were associated with him in the Council j and he was under obligation to report all cases to the Resident. 3 1 In some communities the population was mixed, so naturally the question arose as to which system of law would apply. All were of course subject to the law of the protectorate, but much confusion arose in connection with cases to be tried in Native Courts. Various schemes were attempted in an endeavor to escape from the dilemma. At times a Judicial Council was set up with a Mohammedan officiai as the presiding officer, who was assisted by leading elders of the tribe. At other times a mixed court was established with the chief as president and both groups represented. This did not work well in practice, so it was abandoned. Eventually it was decided to adjust the judicial system to the recognized type of government existing in the region in question. I f a Mohammedan community existed in a district governed by a pagan chief, and if his authority had been recognized by the Government, then any Mohammedans living in the district were obliged to obey the laws of the tribe as interpreted by the chief and elders sitting as a Judicial Council. Cases might be referred to the resident and then taken to the Provincial Court at the option of the Resident. In the case of pagans living in a district where the recognized government was Mohammedan, Judicial Councils were established with right of appeal to the Alkalis' court at the capital of the province. A very important outcome of the judicial system was the support given the authority of the native rulers. Since the basic objective of indirect rule was the development of the capacity of the native to govern himself, it was vital that the prestige of the native ruler be built up and maintained. This prestige had been great in the early days because of the belief that the British occupation was to be only temporary. Consequently the people had feared the vengeance of the rulers should the expected with81

Col. Ref., Annual, No. 346, p. 16. Orr, op. cit., pp. 235-40.

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drawal take place. Moreover, the emirs were permanent. T h e y understood the country and the people while the Residents were frequently changed and were rather easily hoodwinked. 3 2 But as it became more and more evident that the British were going to stay, the natives came more often to the Residents and other political officers with their problems, and the prestige of the native rulers waned. T o combat this development it became the practice to refer disputes to the Native Courts, or, if the Resident chose to hear complaints, he did so in the presence of the E m i r . B y 1 9 0 7 , however, it was felt that more must be done to restore the authority of the native rulers, and the Enforcement of Native Authority Proclamation was issued. B y its provisions, provincial courts w e r e authorized to e n f o r c e orders or j u d g m e n t s given w h e t h e r by native courts or by r e c o g n i z e d native authorities, and to inflict punishment on any person w h o m i g h t h a v e disregarded or disobeyed such o r d e r s ; similarly, in cases w h e r e orders g i v e n by N a t i v e C o u r t s or recognized native authorities w e r e , in the opinion of a provincial courts, improper, illegal, or unjust,

it

was

entitled to set aside such orders, a n d to take such action w i t h respect to the native authorities as, in its discretion, appeared best suited to meet the circumstances of the c a s e . 3 3

T h e judicial system of Southern Nigeria as it was constituted in 1 9 1 4 is difficult to describe because, to quote Chief Justice Sir E d w i n Speed, " I t is difficult to describe a system where in fact no system existed." 3 4 T h e jurisdiction of the Supreme Court for all practical purposes extended throughout the entire Protectorate, but within certain districts its powers were limited by treaties. 35 T h e Chief Justice and Puisne Judges sat at certain places and visited on assize the District Courts held by the political officers. T h e latter sat as Commissioners of the Supreme Court and submitted their list of cases to the judges each month. These lists constituted appeals and the right to make an independent appeal was recognized. 32

Temple, of. cit., passim. Orr, of. cit., pp. 224.-25. See also Buell, of. cit., I, pp. 688-89. 34 See Memorandum prepared by Chief Justice Sir Edwin Speed. Report on Amalgamation, pp. 77-82. Also, Political Memoranda, No. 8, pp. 2-4. 35 Cf. Egba treaty of 1893. 33

2o6

B R I T I S H E N T E R P R I S E IN N I G E R I A

In addition to the courts presided over by British judges, there were Native Courts which exercised jurisdiction concurrent with that of the Supreme Court. These courts had power to inflict penalties to the extent of six months imprisonment or fines to the amount of £25. District Officers sat as president of these courts and passed sentence. The judgment was, in theory, regarded as that of the chief in whose name it was recorded. A number of chiefs were attached to these courts, but they exercised little authority. T h e native clerks of the courts were entrusted with considerable responsibility, and their position was regarded as most important. Unfortunately they often exercised undue influence over the native chiefs and, since salaries were low, often accepted bribes. Altogether, the judicial system of Southern Nigeria had degenerated, and it was felt that sweeping changes were necessary. Sir Edwin Speed, the Chief Justice of Northern Nigeria, was commissioned to reorganize the system. Under his direction the necessary legislation was prepared in order to introduce the judicial system of Northern Nigeria into the Southern Provinces. An ordinance was issued which established three classes of courts: the Supreme Court, the Provincial Courts, and the Native Courts. 36 The Supreme Court consisted of the chief justice and four Puisne Judges. Its jurisdiction, with few exceptions, was limited to the Colony and certain important trading centers in the Protectorate. This court took various forms. The full Court consisted of the Chief Justice and two or more judges, constituting a court of appeal from the decisions of the Divisional Courts. Its jurisdiction was final in criminal matters, but appeals in civil cases could be taken to the Privy Council. The Supreme Court was divided into two Divisional Courts, one for the provinces lying east of the Niger and south of the Benue, and one for the provinces to the west. Assizes were held by different judges twice a year in each division—a device which relieved political officers of many duties that had slight connection with native affairs. Station magistrates were Commissioners of the Supreme Court and could try 38 Political Memoranda, No. 8, passim. Geary, of. cit., pp. 268-71 is also very valuable as well as the Report on Amalgamation, cited. See also Buell, 1 , pp. 6 4 9 - 5 2 ; Burns, of. cit., ch. X X I I .

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cases where the claim did not exceed £ 5 0 or in criminal cases where the penalty was not more than six months imprisonment, a fine of £ 5 0 , or twelve strokes. Appeals could be taken from Commissioners' Courts to Divisional Courts. Monthly lists of criminal cases were sent to the Chief Justice. T h e Provincial Courts, except within the limits of the Supreme Court, had complete jurisdiction over all natives and non-natives. T h e President of the Court was the Resident, and the District Officers served as Commissioners. Penalties not in excess of £ 1 0 0 fine, five years imprisonment, and flogging were imposed by courts of this class. Sessions were held at any place within the province, except in Supreme Court areas. 37 A practice which aroused considerable criticism was that of refusing to allow legal practitioners to appear before these Provincial Courts without the specific consent of the Chief Justice. 3 8 L u g a r d , however, defended the practice on the grounds that it would result in restricting the "fomenting of litigation by lawyer's touts which, by a consensus of opinion, has become a public scandal in the Southern Provinces, with the natural corollary of rendering litigation extremely costly, to the detriment of litigants and the benefit of lawyers." H e believed that the native was better protected by the administrative officers than might have been the case under the less novel system of representation by counsel. In any case, death sentence could be imposed only after review by the Chief Justice and the Governor. Should the defendant wish it, the case could also be carried to the Supreme Court, where he was free to employ counsel. As a matter of fact very few natives took advantage of this option but prefered to trust their fate to the fairness and knowledge of administrative officers. 30 T h e system of Native Courts was established by the Native Courts Ordinance of 1 9 1 4 . 4 0 U n d e r its terms, four grades of 37

Buell, o f . cit., I, p. 650. Geary, o f . cit., pp. 269—70. See also his article in West Africa, March 1 9 2 0 . Several members of Parliament criticized this practice, but the controversy was lost sight of because of the more pressing matters arising in connection with the World W a r . 39 Buell, o f . cit., I, p. 6 5 1 . T e m p l e , o f . cit., pp. 1 9 3 f f . T h e latter feels that the political officer is better able to get the native point of view than a judge. 40 Buell, o f . cit., pp. 6 8 9 - 9 3 . 38

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BRITISH

ENTERPRISE

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NIGERIA

courts were set up, the judges of which were to be entirely native. In the case of Mohammedan tribes, the judges were independent of the Emir. A m o n g the pagan tribes, however, executive and judicial powers were concentrated in the hands of chiefs and headmen. Native law was to be administered in these courts, but certain rules drawn up by the Court or chief and approved by the Governor might be added. T h e courts were described as Grade A , B, C, or D , and important distinctions with respect to their powers and jurisdiction were defined in the ordinance. Grade A courts were given full judicial power in civil and criminal cases but were not allowed to impose sentence of death without the approval of the governor. Grade Β courts were restricted to cases in which the debt or demand did not exceed £50, and in criminal cases were not allowed to impose penalties in excess of two years imprisonment, twentyfour lashes, or a fine of £50. Courts of the C grade in the northern provinces had civil jurisdiction in cases where the claim did not exceed £20 while those in the southern provinces were restricted to cases not exceeding £10. In criminal cases they were allowed to impose six months imprisonment or fines not in excess of £10. Grade D courts had civil jurisdiction in the Northern Provinces up to £10 and £5 in the south. T h e restrictions in the case of criminal jurisdiction were three months imprisonment, twelve lashes, or a fine of £10. Opinion differs with respect to the effectiveness of the Native Courts. Some have felt that it was a mistake to employ native judges at all and that it would have been much better had Europeans, well trained in the law, been placed at the head of the system. 4 1 T h e other point of view is well expressed by Temple, who writes : T h e s e men are placed in conditions quite different from those surrounding the European officers. T h e y are living in normal circumstances among their o w n people, just as a judge is situated in E n g l a n d . In their case it is quite right and proper, and highly expedient, that 41

G e a r y , of.

cit., p . 270. T h i s w r i t e r does not entirely condemn the system

but clearly inclines to the point of v i e w expressed a b o v e .

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UNIFICATION

the executive and judicial functions should be separated. I n fact, at all events amongst Muslims, they w e r e so separated before the arrival of the Europeans. A native j u d g e of intelligence and capacity thoroughly understands h o w to elicit the truth f r o m native witnesses. N o E u r o p e a n , h o w e v e r experienced, and even if fairly conversant with the native language used, can for a m o m e n t be compared to the native in this respect. T h e native is, therefore, infinitely the better qualified to administer justice to other natives, but for one very important factor, I mean v e n a l i t v . 4 2

T h e last sentence suggests another criticism of the system. It may be pointed out, however, that Native Courts are not the only ones which may be criticized on this point. T o some extent this can be overcome by the payment of more liberal salaries. T h e practice of keeping court records in English resulted in the employment of semi-educated native clerks who, in some cases, usurped the authority of the chiefs. 43 This did not apply in the north, where records are kept in Hausa, a language in which administrative officials are proficient. In the south, on the other hand, a great variety of native languages are spoken. E v e n though it would doubtless be more in keeping with the idea of native authority to keep records in the native language, it must be remembered that many of these languages are not written, and that it would not be practicable to require political officers to master several languages. A reorganized system of administration and a reformed judicial system was not the only method used to secure greater unity. A Nigerian Council was set up in order to secure as wide an expression of opinion as possible. W e have already seen that a Legislative Council had been established in Lagos, but this body had never functioned successfully. It was dominated by Europeans and had shown itself of little value as an expression of public opinion and original criticism. In 1 9 1 4 it was merged with the T o w n Council of L a g o s and its membership was limited to six officials and four unofficial members. A n Order in Council of November 22, 1 9 1 3 , created the Ni42 43

Temple, of. cit., pp. 1 9 2 - 9 3 . Report on A malgamation, p. ζ ι.

210

BRITISH ENTERPRISE IN NIGERIA

gerian Council composed of the G o v e r n o r , members of the E x e cutive Council, Residents of the First Class, the Secretaries to the G o v e r n o r , and Lieutenant Governors, and "such other persons holding office in N i g e r i a as the G o v e r n o r may appoint."

44

The

group indicated above constituted the official membership, while the unofficial members included persons representative of the commercial community and six native members nominated by the G o v e r n o r and representative of the native population both f r o m the coast and the interior. T h e powers of the Council were quite restricted. W h i l e its members were allowed to propose for debate any question that related to the affairs of N i g e r i a , they were required to give ten days notice. If the G o v e r n o r felt that the proposed question was likely to foment race or class prejudice, he might set it aside. 45 N o resolution passed by the Council was to have legislative or executive authority, and the Governor was privileged to exercise his discretion as to whether the proposition should be considered at all. It is not surprising, therefore, that a body so constituted should have had little vitality. It was soon abandoned. L u g a r d hoped that it would serve to develop an intelligent public opinion, but was of the opinion that the native could be represented best by officers most closely in contact with them. 4 8 M e e t i n g s were held annually for a period of three days and were featured by the address of the Governor. In this address he reviewed the outstanding accomplishments of the year and explained matters of policy which seemed to require particular emphasis. T h e address was f o l l o w e d by debate, both on the subject of the address and on questions raised by individual members. T h e meetings were w e l l attended at first, but interest waned, and the f o l l o w i n g resolution is indicative of the opinion of the unofficial membership: " T h a t this Council be either reconstructed so as to make it a serious factor in the governing of this Colony and Protectorate, or else be abolished." 44 45

47

L u g a r d ' s successor, Sir H u g h C l i f f o r d , favored the

Order in Council,

¡ 9 1 0 - 1 9 1 3 , 9, N o . 165.

Ibid.

46

Proceedings

47

Ibid.,

of the Nigerian

1 9 1 9 , p. 12.

Council,

1 9 1 4 , pp. 2 - 3 .

AMALGAMATION

AND

UNIFICATION

211

sentiment expressed above and abolished the Nigerian Council in favor of a Legislative Council for the Colony and Southern Provinces.48 When Lugard retired in 1 9 1 9 , the work of unification was well advanced. The difficulties inherent in the problem of applying the principles of indirect rule in an environment not especially suitable for their development had been complicated by the fact that the Empire was at war. This had placed a greater burden on the administrative staff since many experienced officers left Nigeria to serve in Europe and elsewhere. The native troops had been called for service in the Cameroons, Togoland, and East Africa. While the native population was quiet, any blunder on the part of Lugard and his associates might have resulted in disaster. But despite these obstacles he was able to report in 1918 that : T h e task of amalgamating Southern and Northern Nigeria which was entrusted to me, may now be said to have been accomplished. W i t h the completion of the re-enactment of the L a w s and Regulations, Nigeria n o w has a single Statute Book. T h e General Orders and M e m o r a n d a of Instructions on which the policy of the Administration in regard to the Natives is based have been revised and brought up to date, including the inauguration of direct taxation in the Southern Provinces and the creation of Townships. T h e Judicial System has been unified and finally the boundary between North and South has been rectified. 4 9

H e had again rendered distinguished service and, while numerous changes have been made in the administrative system of Nigeria since 1 9 1 9 , there has been relatively little departure from the broad lines of policy as they were defined by the man who had done so much to make Nigeria what it is today. 48 49

A more detailed account of Clifford's action is given below, pp. 247-48. Proceedings of the Nigerian Council, 1 9 1 8 , p. 2.

Chapter VII ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT T h e retirement of Sir Frederick Lugard as High Commissioner for Northern Nigeria in 1906 marked the termination of the pioneering phase of Nigerian history. T h e explorations of Mungo Park, Hugh Clapperton, the Lander brothers, and Henry Barth had attracted the attention of the British public to the Niger Valley and led to the initiation of commercial enterprise under the leadership of Macgregor Laird. Later Sir George Goldie organized the Royal Niger Company, thus compelling British diplomacy to undertake the task of defending its domain against French and German aggression. The conclusion of the Convention of 1898 with France left England in control of the lower Niger with a claim to a vast region which the Company had not been strong enough to occupy effectively. It was this consideration that led Chamberlain to relieve the Company of its administrative responsibilities and to send Lugard to Northern Nigeria to complete the pacification of the territory. We have seen that Chamberlain had in mind an ambitious program for the economic development of Nigeria, but was forced to lay these plans aside because of the advent of the Boer War. Lugard succeeded in reducing the power of the Fulani emirs and established the system of indirect rule, but was unable to do much in the way of developing the economic resources of the conquered territory. In the meantime the coastal territories were pacified, the power of the native middlemen was broken, and the way was cleared for the further development of trade. B y 1906 many questions that had arisen in connection with British activities in Nigeria had been answered. The frontiers were defined; the Fulani overlords of Northern Nigeria were 213

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

213

compelled to accept the fact of British control; the foundations of an administrative system were established. It becomes necessary, therefore, to shift our attention from the political aspects of Nigerian development to consider the economic and social problems that arose in connection with the further exploitation of the vast African domain that had now come under British control. It is not possible to consider within the limits of this study all of the many problems that forced their attention upon British administrators, but such issues as the control of the liquor traffic, the development of a transportation system, the exploitation of Nigerian resources, the evolution of an equitable system of land holding, and the further development of trade and commerce were fundamental and deserve attention. T h e Berlin Conference of 1884 recognized the fact that the traffic in liquor was an evil, and a serious menace to the future well-being of the natives. 1 It suggested that the powers take concerted action, but beyond the adoption of a few pious resolutions it did nothing effective. Sir George Goldie was deeply concerned, however, and took steps to control the distribution of liquor within the domain of the Niger Company, but found his efforts thwarted by the failure to control the sale of liquor in adjacent territories. T h e first real international effort to deal with the liquor problem was made in 1890, when a conference was called at Brussels. 2 Since the occupation of Africa had been justified in part on humanitarian grounds, it was felt necessary to do something in the way of safeguarding the moral and material well-being of the Negro. Since the Mohammedan peoples of the Western Sudan were not consumers, it was felt particularly important that they be given protection. L o r d Vivian, the British plenipotentiary, indicated that E n g l a n d was prepared to do her share when he declared : 1 For an able presentation of opposing views on this issue see J . A. MacDonald, Trade, Politics and Christianity in Africa and the Far East, (London, 1 9 1 6 ) , and E. D. Morel, Nigeria, Its Peoples and Problems, 2d. ed., (London, 1912). 2 Pari. Pap., 1890, 30, General Act of the Brussels Conference, c. 6048.

214

BRITISH

ENTERPRISE

IN

NIGERIA

G r e a t Britain, w h o holds one of the keys of these regions, by her Protectorate over the l o w e r N i g e r , w o u l d undertake to prohibit absolutely all trade in spirits in the countries situated beyond the junction of the N i g e r and B e n u e (the point of access to M u s s e l m a n t e r r i t o r y ) , on condition that the signatory powers of the G e n e r a l A c t of Berlin assist her by sanctioning the suppression of the transit of spirituous liquors on the N i g e r , and that F r a n c e , w h o holds the other key of these regions, by her colony of Senegambia, takes the same e n g a g e m e n t on similar conditions for the U p p e r N i g e r , w h e r e the F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t exercise their influence. 3

Action was delayed until the representatives of the other Powers had secured instructions. France expressed a willingness to cooperate, but Germany did not. T h e Conference could do little, therefore, except to levy a small duty on spirits and agree to study the problem at a later time. In March 1896 the question was reopened by Joseph Chamberlain in an inquiry addressed to the chambers of commerce of London, Liverpool, and Glasgow. H e was anxious to acquire a more intimate view of the facts of the case since his attention had been directed to the problem by questions in Parliament and by numerous articles in the press. " I t cannot but be a matter for serious consideration," he commented, "that so large a proportion of the trade and revenue of the West African coast should be entirely dependent upon importation and sale of liquor, the effect of which, if consumed in excessive quantities by the native population, must be most prejudicial to their health and welfare, and in the long run detrimental to the interest of commerce." 4 H e reviewed the history of the problem and pointed out that the light duties which had been levied at the Brussels Conference had had no apparent effect upon the trade. H e also took occasion to intimate that foreign governments were not likely to consent to any considerable increase in the duties, in which case it would be difficult for England to act independently, because trade would, in all probability, fall into the hands of foreign rivals, should they continue to sell liquor to the natives. 3

Pari. Pap., 1890, 30, General Act of the Brussels Conference, c. 6048, p. 34. * Pari. Paf., 1 8 9 7 , 62, Liquor Trade in West Africa, c. 8480, p. 1.

ECONOMIC D E V E L O P M E N T

215

Six days later, further pressure was brought to bear upon the Colonial Office by the Native Races and Liquor Traffic United Committee, who addressed a long communication to the Secretary. T h e y favored absolute prohibition, but conceded that difficulties lay in the path of such legislation. T h e y did feel, however, that a constantly increasing duty might be charged to replace the inadequate levies of the Brussels Conference. This program, admittedly, called for joint action by the interested powers. In the absence of cooperation they urged independent action by E n g land and supported this demand by the presentation of a mass of evidence designed to show the extent of the evil. T h e replies which Chamberlain received from the respective chambers of commerce differed widely in their point of view. Liverpool took the view that the trade was small in proportion to the population and denied that there was widespread drunkenness on the coast. It also bitterly opposed any change in the existing system in the absence of international agreement. Manchester took a different view of the matter, citing an earlier resolution of its body which had urged that every effort be made to check the growth of the traffic in the African possessions of Great Britain, either by the imposition of higher duties, or by other methods that might be devised. It opposed any sudden change, expressing the opinion that the best results might be secured by a gradual increase of the duties, in cooperation with the other powers. Glasgow favored even more drastic action in the direction of limitation and control. It argued that the trade in spirits with West Africa was unimportant to the distillers and that little or no profit accrued to the British trader. T h e only justification for continuing the liquor trade on the present basis was the danger that British traders might find it difficult to compete with the merchants of other nations who included liquor in their stocks. 5 Partly as a result of the opinions expressed by the chambers of commerce, partly as a result of pressure brought to bear on the Colonial Office by members of Parliament, the press, and the Native Races and Liquor Traffic United Committee, the Government took up with France and Germany the question of a joint in5

Ibid., pp. 39-60.

216

B R I T I S H E N T E R P R I S E IN

NIGERIA

crease in duties. L a t e in M a y a communication addressed to Berlin inquired whether the Imperial Government would consent to raise the duties on spirits to the same level as the British in its possessions on the West Coast. It was also suggested that each government make a substantial increase. Later a similar note was addressed to Hanotaux. T h e negotiations continued throughout the summer, but with no tangible results. Consequently the project was abandoned. Although a conference of the interested parties was proposed, no action was taken.® Several years elapsed before further steps were taken, and it was not until 1909 that the question was reopened. At this time a committee was appointed to investigate conditions in Southern Nigeria. 7 T h e investigation led the committee to the conclusion that drink was an insignificant evil in Southern Nigeria and that the high mortality rate and widespread prevalence of disease must be attributed to other factors. It asserted that there was little drinking among the natives and made no recommendations so far as the liquor problem was concerned. 8 N o change occurred prior to 1 9 1 4 because it proved impossible to win the support of France and Germany to the imposition of prohibitive duties. T h e colonial authorities were opposed to assuming the burden themselves. T h e war eliminated Germany as a colonial power, and since Germany had been the principal opponent of either prohibition or regulation, it proved easier now to secure international action. Doubtless the wave of moral fervor which swept the world at the conclusion of the war was in part responsible f o r the Convention of St. Germain which was signed in September 1 9 1 9 by the United States, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Portugal, and the British Empire. It prohibited throughout the territories of tropical Africa "the importation, distribution, sale, and possession of trade spirits of every kind, and of beverages mixed with these spirits." 9 6

Pari. Pap., 1897, 62, Liquor Trade in West Africa, c. 8480, pp. 58-60. Pari. Paf., 1909, 6o, Southern Nigeria, Cd. 4906, 4907. The testimony taken runs to 467 pages. It has been analyzed by MacDonald who dissents from the conclusions reached by the committee. s Ibid., Part I, p. 18. 8 The text of the Convention is printed as Annex F. in G. L. Beer, African 7

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

217

T h e policy initiated by this Convention has worked with apparent success. M r . Ormsby-Gore testified that " I certainly never saw a drunken native during my tour. . . . I was f u r t h e r informed that very few cases of crime could be put down either directly or indirectly to excessive drinking." 10 T h e restriction imposed on " t r a d e " spirits resulted in eliminating the importation of liquor of poor quality, and the high prices commanded by the better grades resulted in a decrease in consumption. Some difficulty was experienced in preventing the smuggling of liquor across the French frontier, particularly after the depreciation of the franc had resulted in a lowering of prices on liquor obtained f r o m this source. T h e r e was an increase in the consumption of palm wine manufactured by the natives but, generally speaking, there seemed to be no evidence to indicate that the West African native was prone to intemperance, or that his moral progress was being retarded by addiction to spirits. 11 It has been said that the first thing a German builds in a colony is a barracks, a Frenchman a café, and an Englishman a road. W h e t h e r this generalization is borne out by the facts is perhaps beside the point, but serious attention was given to the problem of road building immediately after the conquest of N o r t h e r n Nigeria had been completed. T h e choice of Sir Percy Girouard as the successor to L u g a r d was a clear indication of the fact that the Colonial Office was vitally interested in transportation since he was a trained engineer and had made an enviable reputation as a railroad builder in East Africa. T h e difficulties confronting the Nigerian Administration were serious. H a r b o r facilities were quite inadequate since Lagos was the only port that offered facilities for ocean-going steamers, and even here it was necessary to resort to constant dredging to keep the channel open. T h e hinterland could be reached by using the rivers, but light-draught steamers could operate with safety only Problems at the Peace Conference, (New Y o r k , 1 9 2 3 ) . See also L u g a r d , The Dual Mandate, p. 599. 10 Report by the Hon. W. G. A. Ormsby-Gore on his Visit to West Africa during the Year 1Q26, p. 1 7 9 . Cited as "Report of Ormsby-Gore." 11 Ibid., p. 1 8 1 .

218

BRITISH

ENTERPRISE

IN

NIGERIA

during the rainy season. Although canoes were used on the smaller streams, they proved quite inadequate to meet the needs of an expanding economy. Transportation by porters, the timehonored method of tropical Africa, was quite obviously out because the expense involved rendered this system obsolete. Camels and horses were used extensively in the savanna country of Northern Nigeria. T h e solution of the transport problem involved, therefore, the construction of railways and the building of roads suitable for motor traffic. Considerable discussion arose with respect to the relative advantages of roads as compared with railroads, especially with the introduction of the light Ford car after the war. While opinion at first was definitely in favor of the railroad, the trend now appears to be in the direction of motor roads. T h e argument in favor of improved highways is obvious, since the cost of construction is less, and a highway that is unproductive may be easily abandoned. 12 T h e problem of construction both for railroads and highways presented special obstacles. T h e difficulties with respect to labor were especially acute. A solution was found in the so-called "Departmental System." This system has been described by Sir Percy Girouard, a former governor of Northern Nigeria, as one under which T h e G o v e r n m e n t itself builds the railway, selecting its o w n consulting engineers for any large bridge, appoints its o w n construction staff, and makes its o w n survey, lets out any portion of the c o n t r a c t , utilizes the whole machinery of G o v e r n m e n t

to recruit or train labour,

and

adopts any standard of construction it may see fit in order to reach its objective, leaving non-essential works, even ballasting where possible to be added later as traffic justified improvements.

T h e argument in favor of this system as opposed to construction by private companies was that political officers were better fitted to handle native labor than would presumably be the case under 12

Allan McPhee, The Economic Revolution in British West Africa, (London, 1 9 2 6 ) , ch. III, gives a valuable account of transportation development in West Africa. See also, L . C. A. Knowles, of. cit., I, pp. 1 3 8 - 5 2 for pertinent suggestions.

ECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENT

219

m a n a g e m e n t interested primarily in m a k i n g profits. T h e r e was less chance of exploiting the native u n d e r this system. It was f e l t that he w o u l d h a v e g r e a t e r confidence and w o u l d w o r k m o r e efficiently if he were directly u n d e r G o v e r n m e n t supervision. 1 3 T h e physical difficulties w e r e numerous. T h e climate was not t h e least of these since it necessitated short tours of service and frequent changes in personnel. T h e h e a v y rains o f t e n resulted in the complete destruction of roads and made the w o r k exceedi n g l y arduous. M u c h of the material f o r railroads had to be b r o u g h t f r o m a distance, since rock for ballast was not obtainable a l o n g the coast and, because of ants, it p r o v e d impracticable to e m p l o y w o o d f o r sleepers. T h i s m a d e it necessary to use steel, all of which had to be imported f r o m E n g l a n d . T h e f u n d a m e n t a l p r o b l e m of r a i l w a y construction was financial. Since there was slight prospect of attracting private investment in an enterprise surrounded by so much uncertainty, if railroads w e r e to be built it was clearly u p to G o v e r n m e n t to build t h e m . T h e first railroads in N i g e r i a w e r e financed t h r o u g h G o v ernment loans, but later the N i g e r i a n administration was able to secure f u n d s in the L o n d o n m o n e y market with slight difficulty. T h e large amount of construction since the close of the w a r in 1 9 1 8 , particularly the building of the B e n u e B r i d g e , has g i v e n rise to continuous deficits which h a v e been difficult for the railroads to bear. 1 4 B u t it should be r e m e m b e r e d that the m o n e y spent on r a i l w a y construction went out to the natives as w a g e s w h e r e it d i d much to stimulate a taste f o r British g o o d s w h i l e , at t h e same time, it increased purchasing p o w e r and m a d e it possible f o r the native to i n d u l g e his n e w l y acquired desires. G o v e r n o r C a r t e r of L a g o s should be g i v e n credit for initiating railroad b u i l d i n g in N i g e r i a . A s the result of his j o u r n e y into the hinterland of L a g o s ( w h i c h has been m e n t i o n e d in another connection) he u r g e d that a beginning be m a d e in railroad construct i o n . 1 5 H i s recommendation resulted in surveys, and in. October 1895 a road f r o m L a g o s to O t t a was authorized. B y A p r i l 1899 13 14 15

McPhee, of. cit., p. n z . S. Herbert Frankel, Capital Investment in Africa, (London, Pari. Pap. 1905, ¡6, West Africa, C d . 132J, pp. 5ff.

1938),

p.

315.

220

BRITISH ENTERPRISE IN NIGERIA

the line was extended to Abeokuta, and in the following year the Lagos-Ibadan line became an accomplished fact. Soon after the Government took over Northern Nigeria from the R o y a l N i g e r Company, suggestions were made to the Colonial Office that the railroad from Lagos be built inland and that eventually it be extended to Kano. This plan was favored by L u g a r d , who endeavored to persuade M r . Chamberlain of the advisability of formulating a definite railroad policy. H e urged that this step be taken at once since it would undoubtedly result in the stimulation of trade. In addition, the construction of railroads and highways by the French and Germans threatened to divert trade from the British to their rivals. 1 6 Little difficulty was experienced in converting M r . Chamberlain. In August 1 9 0 1 the Treasury was authorized to provide funds for the extension of the Lagos line to the Niger and later to push on "as rapidly as circumstances will permit toward Kano, which is the chief commercial center of the populous Hausa States." 1 7 Chamberlain's reasons for urging this program coincided with those of L u g a r d . H e was anxious that Nigeria become self-supporting as quickly as possible, and felt that the policy best suited to advance the commercial development necessary for additional revenue was railroad construction. Once communications were established with the coast, the trade of Hausaland could be secured to England. In the second place, he agreed with L u g a r d as to the threat implied in the French program of railroad building, and feared that this might result in the diversion of the Hausa trade to French ports. Finally, he urged political and strategic considerations and the necessity of maintaining an "efficient system of defense upon the frontiers of Northern Nigeria." Certain objections were raised by the Treasury in its reply to the request of the Colonial Office, though preliminary surveys were authorized. T h e objections were to the undertaking of surveys beyond the Niger and to the extension of the railroad to Kano. This they did not want to undertake until the finances of Northern Nigeria had been improved, either by increased reve16 17

Pari. Pap. 1906, 78, Nigeria, Cd. 2787, pp. 2 1 - 2 2 . Ibid., pp. 48-50.

ECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENT

221

nue or by greatly increased contributions from L a g o s and Southern Nigeria. A f t e r 1902 there was considerable discussion with respect to the various schemes advanced for the development of the railway system of Nigeria. T h e proposal to link the Lagos-Ibadan line with the projected road from Kano to Baro met with less approval as time went on and L u g a r d more and more came to favor a system designed to supplement the traffic on the N i g e r . T h e r e was some talk of a line from Calabar designed to tap the trade of eastern Nigeria. Preliminary surveys for such a project were actually made. It was also decided to extend the L a g o s railroad to Z u n g e r u , where it would connect with the Baro-Kano road. It has already been indicated that the necessity of a definite policy with respect to railroads was an important consideration in influencing the authorities to decide in favor of amalgamation in 1914. Consequently it is not surprising to find renewed activity in construction after the merger had been effected. T h e principal advance after 1 9 1 4 was in the east. H e r e the only means of transportation was by river, either the Benue or the Cross. T h e latter, although navigable for a distance of one hundred miles at all times, was otherwise of slight value except w h e n in flood. Between the rivers lay a large, densely populated territory that had no decent outlet and could be reached only by a road of some sort, motor or rail. W h e n the discovery of a port on Bonny Creek, later named P o r t Harcourt, was followed by the discovery of coal at U d i , all objections to a railroad in this region vanished. Despite the fact that the war intervened, the project was completed by M a y 1916.18 D u r i n g the post-war period much attention has been given to the development

of transport

facilities. T h e

report of

Mr.

O r m s b y - G o r e in 1926 laid great stress upon the importance of increasing railroad mileage, and upon the development of more hard-surface roads. 1 9 M r . Ormsby-Gore was convinced of the importance of buildReport on Amalgamation, p. 49. Re-port of Ormsby-Gore, pp. 24-48 ; Address to Nigerian Council, 118-43· 18

10

1920, pp.

BRITISH ENTERPRISE IN NIGERIA ing railroads of standard gauge suitable for heavy traffic, and he pointed out that the revenue from the system was quite adequate to insure its success f r o m a financial point of view. P a r t l y as a result of his recommendations, and partly through the efforts of the Nigerian Administration, construction was pushed and by 1940 there were 2,203 miles of track in the Colony. 2 0 T h e system has been constructed entirely by the G o v e r n m e n t and is und e r the control of a Communications Board, which includes the Chief Secretary, the Lieutenant G o v e r n o r of the Southern P r o v inces, and the Chief Commissioner of the N o r t h e r n Provinces, together with the heads of the M a r i n e , R a i l w a y , and Public W o r k s Departments. T h e development of transport facilities has had important economic and social results and has been of definite advantage f r o m an administrative point of view. O n the economic side it can be claimed that the increase in the export trade in tin, coal, cotton, ground nuts, and palm oil has been greatly increased because of the creation of more adequate transport facilities. T h e railroad has lessened the demand for carriers, with the result that slavery has been entirely extinguished and its revival rendered impossible. Administrative

difficulties have been relieved

and

the

railroad has proved an effective agent of civilization and an important weapon in the sapping of race prejudice and the dissolution of fanaticism. 21 Economic development in Nigeria has been unique in that the efforts of private capital to exploit the resources of Nigeria have been held in check and a policy of economic self-determination adhered to. T o w a r d the close of the nineteenth century there was a decided reaction against exploitation by private capital, particularly in India. L u g a r d and his immediate successors were influenced by this trend in the direction of state development. 2 2 W h i l e it may be granted that the plantation system can produce more, acre for acre, than a system of peasant proprietorship, it is doubt20

Statesman's Yearbook,

21

M c P h e e , o f . cit.,

22

Ibid., p. 2 7 S .

19+1, p. 249.

p. 1 1 1 .

.

ECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENT

223

f u l if it is the better system in the long run and from the broader social point of view. Economic freedom contributes much to the development of a people, yields important results in the f o r m of internal peace and prosperity, and increases greatly the capacity 1 of the native to buy manufactured products. T h i s is proved by. the fact that the imports per capita in Nigeria, and especially ini' the G o l d Coast, greatly exceed the imports per capita in regions! where the plantation system has been established.

•

T h e question of land tenure is of fundamental importance in v this connection. Fortunately, in the case of Nigeria, steps were taken early in its development to insure native ownership. T h e fact that the climate of Nigeria discouraged European settlement made the problem relatively simple and eliminated many of the difficulties that have appeared in K e n y a and South Africa, where the better lands have been occupied by white settlers and the natives have been forced to vacate. Some land had been acquired by the R o y a l N i g e r C o m p a n y , but by the C r o w n L a n d s Proclamation of 1902, this land was vested in the H i g h Commissioner to be held in trust for the C r o w n . 2 3 Another proclamation issued in the same year set up a distinction between C r o w n lands and public lands, both of which were declared to be under the control of the H i g h Commissioner. T h e r e was little time, during L u g a r d ' s first administration, to study the land problem. It remained for his successor, Sir Percy Girouard, to clarify the question of land tenure. It was due in a large measure to his insistence that a committee was appointed in 1910 to investigate the w h o l e question of land tenure and to report definite recommendations. T h e work of this committee is of fundamental importance. It laid the foundation for the present system of land tenure in N o r t h e r n Nigeria. Included in its membership were two officers of the Nigerian A d ministration, Captain Charles O r r and M r . C . L . T e m p l e , both of w h o m contributed greatly to the work of the committee. It was the opinion of this committee that the system of land tenure "must be as far as possible consonant with the ideas and customs prevailing in the country, and that legal conceptions borrowed 23

Report

of the Northern

Nigeria

Lands Committee,

1 9 1 0 , C d . 5 1 0 2 , p. v i i .

224

BRITISH

ENTERPRISE

IN

NIGERIA

from foreign systems of law, whether E n g l i s h or other, which are unsuitable to the conditions of the Protectorate, should, as far as possible, be excluded." T h e adoption of this principle led the committee to the conclusion that the paramount power over the land be vested in the Government and that native customs with regard to the use and occupation of the land be respected.- 4 T h i s definitely excluded the English conception of private ownership of land. A n effort was made to ascertain the views of persons or corporate bodies desiring to invest capital in the development of the resources of the Protectorate. T o this end the cooperation of the Niger Company, the British Cotton Growing Association, and the firm of J o h n H o l t and Company of Liverpool was invited. T h e Niger Company did not participate in the deliberations of the committee, but the other groups did. T h e i r point of view is important. T h e British Cotton Growing Association was not interested in acquiring large tracts of land but was interested in security of tenure for "ginneries" which it proposed to establish. I t felt that it should either receive free grants of land or be enabled to purchase land at a nominal rate. M r . J o h n H o l t expressed the opinion that the law should recognize the power of acquiring a freehold title from natives for commercial purposes with official supervision to "see that the native is not being imposed on or defrauded." H e was not, however, opposed to the idea of Government control of the land and expressed the hope that use of the land might be granted on liberal terms to business groups desiring to make active use of it.- 5 T h e committee studied the question of leases, revenue, taxation, development of mineral resources, and a variety of subjects pertinent to the fundamental question of land. Its recommendations were comprehensive in character and were in substance accepted by the Colonial Office and the Governor. It suggested that the whole of the land of the Protectorate be placed under the control and dominion of the G o v e r n m e n t ; that no title to the occupation, use, or enjoyment of any land be valid without the approval 24 25

Report of the Northern Ibid., p. xix.

Nigeria

Lands Committee,

1910, Cd. 5102, p. viii.

ECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENT

225

of the Governor. It recommended further that the control of the Government be exercised with due regard to lawful customs proved to exist in the province or district where the land was located.2® There were a number of further recommendations which dealt with the rights of the occupier, the acquisition of land for public purposes, and the devolution of the rights of the occupier upon his decease. It is important to note that the principle of government trusteeship and respect for the native system of land tenure was laid down by the committee and that it became the foundation of the Nigerian system. Governor Girouard endorsed the committee's proposals when he declared: T h e principles which are thus laid d o w n by the C o m m i t t e e are in substance a declaration in f a v o r of the nationalization of the lands of the Protectorate. T h e s e principles have my whole-hearted acceptance, a n d will, I feel sure, prove of unique and incalculable benefit to present and f u t u r e generations of Nigerians, if they are adequately and legally protected in the occupation of such lands as are necessary f o r their w e l l - b e i n g and expansion. B y securing f o r e v e r the rentals on land f o r the upkeep of central and native g o v e r n m e n t s , the principles, if applied, will prove to be the greatest developing factor in the future moral and material w e l f a r e and progress of the country and its inhabitants, w h e t h e r native or i m m i g r a n t . 2 7

T h e Governor was greatly interested in the principle of trusteeship outlined in the committee report and expressed his particular concern with respect to its application in the development of sylvan produce. H e pointed out that traders interested in the exploitation of the products of oil palms, shea butter trees, rubber vines, etc., had never sought to obtain rights to these sylvan products, but preferred to leave their collection to the natives themselves. H e felt that adequate measures should be taken to protect the rights of the natives, and he cited the situation created on the Congo to prove the utter lack of wisdom in a policy that permitted control to pass out of native hands by the seizure of so-called "vacant lands." " I am strongly of opinion," he declared, "that the 20

Ibid.,

p. xxiii.

27

Ibid.,

p. xxvii.

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BRITISH ENTERPRISE

IN

NIGERIA

sylvan produce should be reserved for exploitation by natives of Northern Nigeria." T h e recommendations of the committee were enacted into law by the L a n d and Native Rights Proclamation of 1910, which declared the lands of N o r t h e r n Nigeria to be native lands, placed them under the control of the G o v e r n o r , enjoined the G o v e r n o r to exercise his powers of administration with due regard to native custom, and g a v e him power to grant land to natives or persons other than natives. 28 W h i l e the system established by the Proclamation of 1910 and reënacted in 1 9 1 6 has revealed defects, it has, on the whole, adequately protected the native interest. In addition, it has protected the natives of Northern Nigeria f r o m the land litigation which has been the curse of the Southern Provinces. 2 9 It is difficult to summarize in a few paragraphs the many issues that have arisen in connection with the land problem in Southern Nigeria, particularly in Lagos. T h e w h o l e question is a maze of legal technicalities, and it is not necessary here to supplement what has already been written on the subject. 3 0 Governmental policy in the matter of land tenure during the early days of British control may be fairly described as one of inaction. N o effort was made to investigate the character of the native system, or to determine the extent to which this system should be maintained and strengthened. In L a g o s the native system was thrust aside to a large extent by E n g l i s h concepts, with the result that a state of chaos was created, in which African lawyers d r e w titles without regard to the real owners of property and frequently deeded away land which they knew belonged to other parties. In many cases wealthy individuals, both native and foreign, have been able by sharp practice to acquire native lands, with the result that many farms are held by absentee landlords. 3 1 28 Laws of Northern Nigeria, ch. 45 ; R. F. Irving, Titles in Land in Nigeria, Collective Enactments, (London, 1 9 1 6 ) , pp. 1 5 4 - 5 5 . 2 8 McPhee, of. cit., p. 183. 80 T h e best studies of the problem include: Buell, of. cit., I, ch. 46; McPhee, of. cit., ch. 4 ; Lugard, The Dual Maniate in British Tro ficai Africa, chs. 1 4 - 1 6 ; C. W . Alexander, Native Land Tenure in Southern Nigeria, L e g a l Pamphlet No. 26. 31

Buell, of. cit., I, p. 754.

ECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENT

227

W i t h the exception of L a g o s , as noted above, all land in Southern Nigeria belongs to the natives, with the exception of land expropriated by the G o v e r n m e n t for public purposes and for which compensation has been paid. T h i s system stands in marked contrast to the policy of nationalization established in the north and appears to be the result of control in Southern Nigeria being acquired by means of treaties rather than by conquest. Since the country is, moreover, thickly settled, there is comparatively little waste land. Apart f r o m some land acquired from the R o y a l N i g e r C o m p a n y , together with land that has been expropriated, there is little land that the C r o w n can use for itself or cede to Europeans in the f o r m of concessions. 32 Outside of the limits of the Colony of L a g o s absolute ownership of land by non-natives has been recognized in some cases but, broadly speaking, the only title that is accepted by G o v e r n m e n t is a leasehold limited to ninety-nine years. 3 3 Steps were also taken to protect the native by restricting the sale of land made in violation of native law or in ignorance of it. In 1917 by the N a t i v e L a n d s Acquisition A c t , any person not a native of Nigeria was forbidden to acquire any interest in land without the Governor's approval. 3 4 If any alien wished to lease native land it was neccssary to furnish f u l l particulars to the District Officer, w h o was expected to make an investigation both as to the title of the native and the reputation of the alien. U p o n a favorable recommendation, the papers were transmitted to the Resident and eventually to the G o v e r n o r for approval. T h e g r o w t h of trade and the cultivation of economic crops has led to some modifications of the native conception of communal ownership. Some natives have claimed individual ownership in the soil. 3 5 T h i s tendency has been marked by the increased sale of land a m o n g natives, which has led to a great deal of confusion, since in many cases the title of the native is clouded by the fact that it is vested in the f a m i l y rather than in the individual. T h e courts have usually held that family land cannot be alienated 32 33 34

35

ibid., pp. 756-57· Nigeria Handbook, 1933, p. 195. Law of Nigeria, 1923, ch. 89.

Buell, of. cit., I, p. 761.

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BRITISH ENTERPRISE IN NIGERIA

without the consent of the family, but frequently the court does not become aware of the real status of the land. There has been some sentiment in favor of the establishment of a system of individual ownership, but thus far it has been successfully opposed on the grounds that it would greatly weaken, if not destroy, the system of native administration. 36 Closely related to the question of ownership is the problem of administering the forest reserves. T h e Nigerian Administration does not claim the forests as public property but has negotiated many agreements with native communities in which the Governor has been granted the right to establish a forest reserve on its lands. In case forest produce is taken from the reserve, great care must be exercised to insure the payment of royalties to any individual or family who may have title to the land. Any European desiring to exploit forest reserves must make an agreement with the community concerned covering the royalties to be paid. Some difficulty has been experienced in persuading native communities to consent to the establishment of Government reserves, and this has led to the establishment of native administration reserves. This policy has given the native a feeling of security since the reserve remains the property of the people and under the management of its chiefs. ST T h e chief mineral wealth of Nigeria is coal and tin, though traces of other minerals are found. T h e only coalfield worked in Nigeria is located at Enugu, some one hundred and fifty miles from Port Harcourt. T h e mines are worked by the Government and, since they are capable of producing more than the demand, no effort has been made to open new supplies. T h e Nigerian Railway and Marine Department draw their supplies of coal from this source; a considerable amount is shipped to the Gold Coast; and some is used by steamers that make Port Harcourt a port of call. This field, which covers an area of approximately two thousand square miles, is the only known coalfield on the west coast of Africa. 3 8 36 37 38

Buell, of. cit., I, pp. 762-63. Ibid., pp. 758-60. Nigeria Handbook, 1 9 3 3 , p. 92; Foreign

Office Handbook,

No. 94, p. 57.

ECONOMIC D E V E L O P M E N T

229

Much more important than coal is tin. The Nigerian tinfields have in recent years produced from 10 percent to 13 percent of the world's tin supply. Sir William Wallace discovered in 1884 that the metal used by natives for tinning their brassware was produced locally and not imported, as had at first been assumed. T h e Royal Niger Company was interested in developing these resources, but the hostile attitude of the Bauchi pagans made this impossible. It was not until 1902 that Wallace, then an officer under Lugard, was successful in forcing the pagans to open their country to British penetration. H e secured some samples of tinconcentrate which he submitted to officials of the Niger Company. They were sufficiently impressed to take out a prospecting license.39 Tin ore was discovered in a number of places, and in 1905 the Niger Company applied for mining leases and began to work a number of areas. For several years the Niger Company had the field to itself. In 1909, however, a mining company, the Champion Gold Reefs of West Africa, Limited, abandoned its operations in the Gold Coast and began to exploit the Nigerian tin resources. In October 1909 it was reorganized as the Tinfields of Northern Nigeria, Limited, and was incorporated with a capital of £100,000. Other companies entered the field, and during the next three years boom conditions prevailed. It was a period of wild speculation. T h e country was flooded with prospectors; there was much swindling and much fraud ; "tin was located in districts where there was no tin"; imaginary bore holes were sunk; and companies were organized on the basis of utterly fraudulent reports. The boom reached its crest in 1 9 1 2 , when there were no less than eighty-two companies in the field with a total capital of £3,792,132. The excitement subsided after this and many of the companies failed, even though some of the mines were of great value. By 1 9 1 5 the number of companies had been reduced to sixty-eight but with a total capital of £6,359,907. In that year 6,910 tons of tin were produced with an export value of £773,700. se A. F. Calvert, Nigeria and Its Tinfields, (London, 1 9 1 2 ) , p. 1 3 0 ; J. D. Falconer, Geology and Geografhy of Northern Nigeria, (London, 1 9 1 1 ) , gives valuable information on the technical side.

230

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IN

NIGERIA

T h e average cost of working was £90 per ton, and the prices on which royalties were paid varied f r o m £149 to £ 1 7 1 per ton. T h e war naturally resulted in increased prices, and by 1919 the price had risen to £400 per ton. 4 0 T h e post-war slump in 1921 drastically reduced prices, and it was not until M a r c h 1923 that normal conditions were restored. T h e w o r l d depression adversely affected Nigerian interests, and the price of tin had fallen so l o w by the close of 1930 that the T i n Producer's Association requested the G o v e r n m e n t to cooperate in a quadrilateral scheme with Bolivia, Netherlands East Indies, and M a l a y a in restricting the production of tin with the hope of increasing the price level. T h i s policy, born of the depression, greatly curtailed production, but substantial recovery had set in by 1936 when the total amount of tin ore exported f r o m Nigeria was 13,100 tons, an amount surpassed only in the boom year of 1929. 4 1 T h e control of all minerals in Nigeria is vested in the C r o w n . Regulations covering operation of mines, royalties, leases, and mining rights are embodied in the Minerals Ordinance. 4 2 A lease is granted to the holder of a prospecting right over such land as may be selected by him for mining purposes for a term not exceeding twenty-one years, or for less than five years. A l e a s e may be renewed for a further period, provided that the lessee is carrying on operations in a normal and businesslike manner and has complied with all his obligations with respect to the employment of native labor. T h e rights of labor are subject to the provisions of the Master and Servant Ordinance which apply in all British colonies. 43 T h e s e regulations provide that hours of labor be limited to ten, that a two-hour break be provided in the middle of the day, and that adequate time be allowed to obtain fuel and cook food in the evening. L a b o r is voluntary, and the contract system practised in other colonies is foreign to Nigeria. 4 4 40

Nigeria

Handbook,

1933, p. 9 8 ; Foreign

57-58. 41

Frankel, of. cit., p. 314.

42

Laws of Nigeria,

43

Buell, of. cit., I, p. 763.

44

Ibid.

1923, ch. 93.

Office Handbook,

N o . 94, pp.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

231

Nigeria has not been industrialized. Agriculture remains the principal economic pursuit of the native. In this sphere there have been two important changes which have been characterized as an "economic revolution" by some authorities. T h i s " r e v o l u t i o n " has been confined largely to the field of agriculture and has been marked by the transition from the production of subsistence crops to the cultivation of exchange crops, which in turn has involved the development of a monetary economy with all its implications. Second, the " r e v o l u t i o n " has involved the problem of creating wants in a native population accustomed for centuries to rely largely upon the products of its own fields and forests to supply its needs. 4 5 L i f e in Nigeria was very simple, and the fundamental needs of food, clothing, and shelter were readily supplied by the cultivation of simple crops, and by dwellings erected from wood, grass, or mud collected on the spot. As for clothing, homegrown cotton, skins, and grass amply supplied their modest requirements. H o w could they be encouraged to produce products for the European market? T h i s question raises a fundamental problem which has confronted empire builders in all tropical countries. In general two methods have been used to provide a solution. All too frequently force has been employed, either directly or indirectly, compelling the native to work for European masters against his will with unfortunate results. T h e process has involved the establishment of a European administrative system, the imposition of taxes which made it necessary for the native to work in order to raise funds to pay these taxes, the introduction of forced labor, and the granting o f concessions to private concerns. T h i s system has been followed in many parts of Africa, and while it has yielded a profit to favored individuals, it has worked to the distinct disadvantage of the native and has raised serious problems for future generations. T h e alternative to such a system has been the slower process of natural development which has protected native institutions; has allowed the native to retain control of the land; has developed his capacity to produce; has allowed the native producer to sell his produce at a reasonable profit; and has implied the very 45

McPhee, o f . cit., p. 9.

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BRITISH ENTERPRISE IN NIGERIA

gradual awakening of a desire for a higher standard of living which will supply the incentive necessary for increased activity. T h e establishment of a system of indirect rule, which aimed at the preservation of native institutions and the development of native life under British supervision, made the choice of the second alternative logical. Lugard and his associates were quick to appreciate the latent capacity of the Negro and rejected the idea that he was a person whose "beau ideal of life is to do nothing for six days in the week and to rest on the seventh." While they appreciated the fact that the Negro is different from the European, they did not assume that he is necessarily inferior, and proceeded on the assumption that he could be stimulated to activity if provided with the proper incentive. 46 Such a policy did not mean that the Nigerian Administration was hostile to the operations of European business men, but it did involve the application of the principle of trusteeship. T h i s principle was first defined by Lugard and was restated and ably defended by his successor, Sir Hugh Clifford. 4 7 T h e latter, in an address to the Nigerian Council, declared that "every effort should be made to foster local enterprise and prevent any industry, which, given care and expert guidance, is capable of being developed by natives, from passing under the control of European capitalists." H e cited the experience of cocoa production in the Gold Coast in support of this policy, pointing out that more than one-third of the world output of cocoa was grown without the aid of foreign capital but with assistance such as Government departments could give. This type of development should be fostered, he argued, because the major portion of the profit is retained by the native population, and "the general prosperity which results rests upon the widest foundation and makes itself felt in every direction throughout the area where such industries have grown up." Later in his administration he was forced to defend his policy from a vigorous assault led by Lord Lever46 47

2-3.

Lugard, op. cit., ch. io, passim. Proceedings of the Nigerian Council,

1919, Address by the Governor, pp.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

233

hulme, who was determined to upset the Nigerian economic system in favor of the plantation system which he had developed in other parts of Africa. 48 W h i l e the Nigerian system aimed to develop the native as a small producer, it also provided means by which he could be guided and helped to work more efficiently through the assistance offered through the government departments, especially the Departments of Forestry and Agriculture. T h e Department of Forestry administers the forest reserves, controls the cutting of timber on these reserves, undertakes anti-erosion work, and engages in extensive research projects designed to increase the value of Nigerian timber resources. T h e Department of Agriculture renders important assistance to the native producer and works constantly to improve native methods. Its function can best be illustrated by considering its work in connection with two important native crops. T h e production of palm oil and palm kernels, an old industry in West Africa, is of fundamental importance in the economy of Nigeria. Palm oil has been an article of export from very early times. T h e coming of the Industrial Revolution greatly enhanced its importance since it was in great demand as a lubricant. T h e quantity of oil exported grew steadily until the discovery of petroleum in the 1860's gave the industry a temporary setback. But the development of other uses for the product did much to restore the demand, and by the end of the nineteenth century the annual output was approximately 50,000 tons. 49 T h e discovery by F . W . Loder of a method for making vegetable margarine provided a market for palm kernels. Thousands of tons were exported annually to Germany, where the oil was extracted for margarine and the residue used as cattle meal. 50 By the end of the century the exports of palm kernels were about 100,000 tons. T h e y increased steadily until 1924, when roughly 125,000 tons C f . ch. 8 below. Nigeria Handbook, 1933, p. 118. T h e best account of the development of trade in Nigeria is given by McPhee, of. cit., ch. 2. See also Capt. H. O. N e w land, West Africa, (London, 1 9 1 2 ) , Part III, and Part I V , ch. v. 5 0 McPhee, of. cit., p. 35. 48 49

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BRITISH ENTERPRISE IN NIGERIA

of palm oil and 250,000 tons of palm kernels were exported. Since then the exports have fluctuated around these amounts with no indication of a further consistent increase. In 1 9 2 2 the Agricultural Department was expanded sufficiently to undertake serious work. It began a policy of cooperation with the native producer that was designed to help him in the solution of certain very pressing problems. Competition from the Dutch East Indies, Malaya, and the Congo was becoming increasingly severe because of the fact that the oil produced under the plantation system was of better quality than the oil obtained from Nigerian natives, where more primitive methods of extraction were practised. T h e problem, which is serious, is by no means solved as yet. M a n y regard it as a distinct threat to the future prosperity of Nigeria. Since the Nigerian system was fundamentally hostile to the establishment of European-owned plantations, some way of assisting the native producer to improve the quality of his oil was imperative. Governor Thomson favored the establishment of modern oil refineries by European capital and the development of model plantations let out on lease to private capital, not with the idea of upsetting the established system, but in the hope that such plantations would serve to educate the native in improved methods of production. 51 T h e Agricultural Department, which attacked the problem with vigor, has been partially successful in finding a solution. A system of produce inspection was set up, and the natives were encouraged to use a small screw press which has made it possible to extract more oil of a higher quality from the same quantity of fruit. This press, however, was of small capacity, was relatively expensive and, when the price of oil dropped in 1930, its use became almost prohibitive. 52 A larger, stronger, and cheaper machine, which was developed subsequently, is now available. M o d e l plantations have been set up, but are small in size and under native owners, since the native was extremely sensitive and suspicious of 51

Graeme Thomson, "Administrative Development in Nigeria," Journal of the African Society, July, 1927, p. 3 1 2 ; F. M . Dyke, Oil Palm Industry in British West Africa, West African Pamphlet, No. 1 7 2 ; Report of Ormsby-Gore, pp. 100—109. 52 Nigeria Handbook, 1933, pp. 1 1 8 - 1 9 .

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

235

"interference by the white man with land or palms." In 1 9 3 2 small loans were advanced to natives who desired to establish plantations, in the hope that better methods might be developed. E x periments were also undertaken to "improve the breed" of palm trees, but it will necessarily be some years before the results of this experiment will be conclusive. T h e British have for many years been concerned with the problem of producing cotton within the Empire. Nigeria attracted its share of attention since cotton had been cultivated here for hundreds of years. But it is only within the last century that the crop has been exported to Europe. L a r g e quantities were consumed at home, where Kano cloth has been famous for centuries. T h e cutting off of the supply of American cotton during the Civil W a r stimulated the export of cotton from West Africa, but with the recovery of the market by the American producers production fell off rapidly and has ceased to be of much importance. T h e ravages of the boll weevil in the 1890's produced another cotton famine and led to the formation of the British CottonGrowing Association in 1902. 5 3 T h e president was a West African shipping magnate, Sir A l f r e d Jones, and it was largely due to his influence that the Association began its experiments in West Africa, where an attempt was made to establish plantations worked by native labor. This broke down because there were no vacant lands to allot to the Association, and natives would not work for wages. 54 T h e Association, therefore, was forced to adopt a program of cooperation with the native cultivator and to embark on a policy of price fixing which yielded dubious results. T h e establishment of the Agricultural Department in 1 9 1 2 made it possible to transfer many problems of supervision to departmental officers. A f t e r the war the Association was absorbed by the newly organized E m p i r e Cotton-Growing Corporation. Experiments conducted by the Department of Agriculture, attempted to develop a clean, white cotton of a somewhat longer staple than American cotton. T h e introduction of American cotton acclimatized to African conditions proved to be the answer, 53 54

McPhee, of. cit., pp. 4 5 - 4 6 ; Knowles, of. cit., I, p. 132. McPhee, of. cit., p. 46.

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B R I T I S H E N T E R P R I S E IN N I G E R I A

and the figures for cotton production in Northern Nigeria showed a steady increase. 55 T h e problem in Southern Nigeria was somewhat more difficult, because of the existence of serious diseases and insect pests. A f t e r twenty years of experimentation finally yielded important results, the introduction of a superior strain of native cotton produced a new type which met market requirements. While the amount of cotton exported from Nigeria is a comparatively small item in the total volume of exports, the methods used to develop it serve to illustrate the cooperation which has developed between the native producer, the Nigerian Administration, and the European merchant. T h e commercial history of Nigeria may be conveniently divided into three periods: the first period, which lasted until 1807, w a s dominated by the trade in slaves ; the second period was marked by the predominant influence of the private trader, with government very definitely in the background} and the third period began with the establishment of a regular administrative system in the Eighties and was definitely under way with the revocation of the charter of the Royal Niger Company in 1899. No effort was made by Europeans to penetrate inland during the period dominated by the slave trade, for it was soon discovered that the Negro was more adept at slave hunting than his white brother. T h e death of the slave trade made imperative the development of other commodities for export and, as we have seen, the palm oil industry, supplemented by trade in other natural products of the country, took the place of slave trading as a most important activity. This led to the penetration of the interior, a process made relatively easy by the comparative peace and quiet which followed the abolition of the slave trade. At first Europeans were reluctant to go into the interior themselves and depended on the native middlemen to make contact with the markets of the hinterland, but a desire for larger profits led to the elimination of the native trader and the introduction of direct contact with interior markets, a process greatly accelerated by the establishment of the Royal Niger Company. 55

Nigeria Handbook, 1933, p. 123.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

237

T h e final period of commercial development, which has been called the period of continental expansion, 58 was preceded by important administrative developments which substituted political control for administration by commercial concerns. T h e advent of law, order, security, and justice into an area where chaos had reigned supreme, made penetration by Europeans relatively easy. T h e development of transportation, the discovery of the causes of tropical fevers, and the general improvement in the amenities of life contributed vitally to the development of a healthful commercial life. T h e changes outlined above exerted a profound influence upon the character of goods imported into Nigeria. During the early days the Negro was tempted by mere trinkets, such as beads, glass, brass pans, cheap ornaments, and colored cloth. Later trade in such articles was supplemented by rum, tobacco, cheap muskets, gunpowder, and antiquated weapons long since discarded by Europeans. During most of the nineteenth century gin was the principal article of import. It found its way into the far interior, where it was highly valued and served to vary the deadly monotony of life and to stimulate production and trade. Efforts to control the liquor trade, while not marked by startling success, did serve, together with the evolution of more refined tastes which accompanied the advance of civilization, to influence the native to buy articles of more value rather than to squander his wealth on spirits. 57 This led to the development of an important market for British-made goods as well as contributing to the improvement of the native standard of living—a point which may be illustrated by reciting the leading articles of import into Nigeria. T h e leading commodities now imported into Nigeria include arms and ammunition, bags, boats, brushes, beer, builders' supplies, drugs, disinfectants, china, glassware, coopers' stores, enamelware, fancy goods, furniture, hardware, jewelry and watches, leather goods, machinery including motor cars, paints, oils, soaps, provisions, rubber goods, spirits, stationery, sporting goods, tar, textiles, tobacco, twine and cord, vehicles, wines, and 56 57

McPhee, of. cit., p. 6. Ibid., pp. 65-69.

238

B R I T I S H E N T E R P R I S E IN

NIGERIA

58

yarns. T h i s list provides ample testimony to the way in which native wants have increased under a policy that has attempted to protect and foster native institutions and thus prevent exploitation by private capital. It is true that some of the imports listed above, particularly spirits, are designed for consumption by E u ropeans. But since the number of Europeans living in Nigeria is comparatively small, it may be assumed that the bulk of the imports go to satisfy native wants, which have been developed by a slow, steady process of education. T h e r e have been important changes, too, in the internal commerce of Nigeria, particularly in the north, where the enlargement of transportation facilities has diverted trade to L a g o s and other seaports. This region has always been a center of commercial activity. E a r l y visitors, especially H e n r y Barth, were greatly impressed. T h e most important article of commerce in the early days was Kano cloth. This is woven on hand looms and possesses much beauty of design and workmanship. It was distributed throughout the Sudan by Hausa merchants and is still an important article of commerce in that region. Goods from Europe were carried by caravan across the desert by Arab merchants, and the market at Kano supplied such articles as bleached and unbleached calicos, cotton prints from Manchester, common paper with the sign of three moons, looking-glasses, needles, small ware from Nuremburg, and sword blades and razors from Styria. 5 9 T h e officers of the Royal Niger Company fully appreciated the commercial possibilities of Northern Nigeria. T h e y were never in a position, however, to exploit the country f u l l y . T h e large population, estimated at ten million in 1 9 0 3 , offered a fine potential market for European goods. T h e Hausa and Fulani people needed little stimulus to purchase fine clothes and luxuries, but there was difficulty in finding means of payment from the scanty resources of the country. T r a d e had to await development. T h e first task of the administration was to secure peace and to establish settled government. When this was accomplished, 58

Nigeria Handbook, 1936, pp. 46-53" Barth, of. cit., I, p. 5 1 3 .

ECONOMIC D E V E L O P M E N T

239

attention could be given to the development of the country. Surveys were undertaken, roads built, and with the coming of the railroad the products of the country were made available at lower prices in the European market while the native producer secured a better price for his goods. Imported articles were cheaper, of course, than when transportation depended on caravan and head porters. T h e most important result of railroad building was the drying up of the ancient desert trade routes which crossed the Sahara to emerge at Sokoto, Timbuktu, and Kano at the edge of the savanna country. Instead of flowing along north and south lines, trade now follows the railroad to the coast. T h e commercial importance of Kano has been greatly enhanced since its development as a railroad center. It became necessary, also, to provide for closer supervision of marketing conditions in Northern Nigeria, where, according to the testimony of Sir Frederick L u g a r d , the advent of the groundnut season at Kano was marked by the appearance of a swarm of aliens from the south who established themselves along the roads leading to the city, seized the produce from the peasant, forced their own price upon him, and made exorbitant profits by resale to the merchants. T h e complaint of the latter that the groundnuts were mixed with sand, that cotton was mixed with sand and watered, and that hides and skins were treated in similar fashion, appears to be well founded. 8 0 As a result of these conditions the Department of Agriculture in September 1928 established a system of produce inspection that has done much to improve the situation. 61 T h e Nigerian Administration has accomplished a great deal by means of demonstration farms, the free distribution of seed, the extension of credit, supervision of the market, and other devices to improve the capacity of the native to produce. But it would be taking an altogether too optimistic view of the situation to say that the fundamental problem of developing the capacity of the natives of Northern Nigeria to a point where they can purchase significant quantities of European goods has approached a solu60

Report on Amalgamation, pp. 4 1 - 4 2 . Nigeria Handbook, 1 9 3 3 , p. 1 2 4 .

61

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tion. T h e great bulk of the commerce in this region is internal, although much ground has doubtless been gained toward increasing the economic security of the peasant. A study of the exports of Nigeria reveals the fact that among the articles of export only hides and skins, some groundnuts, and tin are produced in the Northern Territories. Tin production is controlled by foreign capital and, aside from the money paid in wages, contributes little to native purchasing power. Information is not available as to the quantity of groundnuts produced in the Northern Territories, but the value of groundnuts exported in 1937 stood at £4,057,893. H o w much of this total went to swell the purchasing power of the peoples of the north, it is impossible to state. T h e production of skins and hides remains the principal economic pursuit of the region. In 1937 the export value of these products was but £876,24ο. 82 Obviously there is much work to be done before Northern Nigeria can be developed into an important market for British goods. There is, of course, the real possibility that the development of cotton growing in the Northern Territories will increase the importance of this area in years to come. A great deal more could be added to this brief survey of economic history in Nigeria. An entire volume might well be devoted to this interesting and important phase of Nigerian development. It has been the purpose of this chapter to present only the more important features, in the hope that the enlightened policies pursued by the makers of Nigeria might be emphasized. This policy, expressed in a few words, has been to develop native resources for the natives, by the natives, but under British administrative supervision. Instead of building railroads with private capital for profit to the foreign investor, the task has been undertaken by the Nigerian Administration. The income received from the operation of the system has been used for improvements or has been added to the revenue of the colony to be spent on other developments. T h e native has been further protected by the 62

Col. Ref., Annual, Nigeria, 1938, p. 57. This was a bad year. In 1930 the total was £874,822. The next year, 1938, showed a sharp decline.

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prohibition of forced labor under private control. Second, steps have been taken to preserve the native's rights to the land, either by the policy of nationalization put into effect in Northern Nigeria, or by preservation of the communal system of landholding which was indigenous to the south. This policy was not unchallenged and, as we shall explain in the succeeding chapter, the Nigerian Administration was forced to wage a stiff battle to prevent L o r d Leverhulme from introducing the plantation system. T h i r d , the Administration has attempted to develop the productive capacity of the native by giving him expert advice in the best methods of producing export crops for the world market, and has tried to build native purchasing power by making it possible for him to sell at a profit to himself, rather than allow him to be reduced to the status of an ill-paid agricultural worker. Finally, native rights in the mineral resources of the country have been protected by insuring the payment of royalties to the native owner, even though it has been necessary to allow foreign capital to develop the mines. Altogether it has been a unique experiment in the development of backward countries and, together with the development of the system of indirect rule, has been a contribution of outstanding significance in the history of imperialism.

Chapter V i l i MODERN NIGERIA Modern Nigeria was created by Letters Patent and Order in Council issued January i , 1 9 1 4 , which provided for the merger of the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria with Northern Nigeria into a single administrative unit under the authority of Sir Frederick L u g a r d , who assumed the title of Governor General. 1 This change, as we have previously shown, had been contemplated for some time, but amalgamation, difficult at best, was especially preplexing under war conditions. T h e administrative staff was depleted; the fighting in the Cameroons demanded constant attention; officers were compelled to forego customary leaves of absence; replacements were difficult to secure; and there was some danger of a native revolt. T h e primitive character of many of the peoples of Southern Nigeria, together with -the lack of knowledge concerning the political and social structure of many of the tribes, demanded careful anthropological studies before the introduction of indirect rule could be attempted. T h e r e was, of course, little opportunity for such studies during the war years. L u g a r d was able to do much, despite these difficulties and, as has already been shown, was able to retire in 1 9 1 9 with a splendid record of achievement. H e had made an excellent beginning, but the problem of organizing a successful system of Native Administration was baffling. It has taxed the best efforts of his successors.2 T h e advent of the W o r l d W a r not only complicated the task of amalgamation, but raised a number of difficult issues which merit brief attention here. T h e presence of a considerable number of aliens representing German business houses was an em1 2

L o r d L u g a r d was the only Governor to hold this title. C f . Perham, o f . cit., Part I I , passim.

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barrassing p r o b l e m which was solved by confining t h e m to a concentration camp at Ibadan, f r o m w h i c h t h e y w e r e

eventually

d e p o r t e d to E n g l a n d . T h e price of imports soared, and it became necessary to establish a C o m m i t t e e of C o n t r o l to attempt regulation. Serious losses w e r e incurred t h r o u g h the dislocation of the export trade and the shortage of shipping. T h e r e was an a l a r m i n g loss of revenue w h e n the importation of trade spirits was cut off. T h e disruption of the administrative staff was the most critical, h o w e v e r , since m a n y able officers l e f t to serve in the a r m y , and o v e r one h u n d r e d w e r e k i l l e d by the sinking of mail steamers by G e r m a n submarines. 3 T h e r e was some concern o v e r the l o y a l t y of the natives, especially a f t e r T u r k e y entered the w a r and a h o l y w a r against the infidel was proclaimed. N i g e r i a was stripped of troops f o r service in the C a m e r o o n s and East A f r i c a , so a native uprising w o u l d h a v e been a serious matter. B u t aside f r o m one or t w o unimportant disturbances N i g e r i a was quiet a n d , w h a t is m o r e , g a v e substantial evidence of l o y a l t y by important contributions to w a r expenses. T h e N i g e r i a n Administration assumed £6,000,000 of the British W a r D e b t , and the N a t i v e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the N o r t h e r n P r o v i n c e s v o t e d an annual contribution of £50,000 t o w a r d interest and sinking f u n d . T h i s contribution appears to h a v e been v o l u n t a r y . M r . H . S. G o l d s m i t h pointed out that: Before making this offer the position was placed clearly before our Emirs, the Independent Chiefs and their Councils. . . . T h e Emirs and Independent Chiefs at once responded and have written letters to Y o u r Excellency offering various amounts so far as funds in their N a tive Treasuries will permit and they have promised to perpetuate these contributions to assist the Nigerian Government to meet the annual interest payable by the Imperial Government on the W a r Loan of six million sterling. 4 N o t o n l y did native rulers authorize contributions f r o m t h e N a t i v e T r e a s u r i e s , but in some cases t h e y m a d e personal contributions to w a r expenses. T h e efforts to appeal to religious prejudice w e r e Bums, of. cit., p. i38ff. * Proceedings of the Nigerian Council, 1916, p. 1 o. s

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uniformly unsuccessful when many of the Mohammedan Emirs openly repudiated the Sultan and expressed their deep loyalty to George V. This expression of loyalty was not only a tribute to the success of British rule but appeared to grow out of distrust for German rule as practised in the Cameroons. In addition, it was greatly strengthened by the prosperity which the war brought to Nigeria. 5 Except for two or three unimportant border raids, Nigerian territory was not invaded during the course of the war. It is unnecessary, therefore, to describe in any great detail the African campaigns in which Nigerian troops were employed.® The West African Frontier Force, which had been raised by Lugard and Colonel Willcocks to deal with French aggression in Borgu, had been reorganized as the Nigeria Regiment. It was a fine body of troops and was employed effectively in the conquest of the German African colonies. A small detachment was sent to Togoland early in the war, but before it arrived the Germans were beaten by the French supported by troops from the Gold Coast. German resistance in the Cameroons was more stubborn. The country was difficult to traverse, and the native troops from Northern Nigeria suffered severely from the effects of the climate and the attacks of insects. The Germans had able leadership, and it was not until February 1916 that the conquest of the Cameroons was complete. The campaign in East Africa was a long-drawn-out affair. By skilful tactics the German commander, Von LettowVorbeck, was able with an army of only a few hundred Germans, aided by 1,500 native troops, to maintain resistance until after the conclusion of the armistice in November 1918. The British army was composed largely of South Africans, but contingents were sent from Rhodesia, Kenya, India, and England to assist in rounding up this elusive German. The Nigeria Regiment participated in this campaign but was withdrawn early in 1918 for service in Palestine. The war ended before they embarked.7 5 A . C. G. Hastings, Nigerian Days, p. 1 1 8 . The price of groundnuts, for example, rose from £4. per ton to £40 per ton. 6 Cf. Ε . H. Gorges, The War in West Africa, (London, 1 9 3 0 ) , -passim; Burns, o f . cit., pp. 2 3 1 - 3 7 ; Col. Ref., Annual, especially Nos. 1008 and 1030. 7 Col. Ref., Annual, No. 1008, p. 20.

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One of the knottiest problems faced by the Paris Peace Conference was that of the German colonies. In anticipation of the final victory the Allied Powers, through an exchange of notes, had arranged for the partition of Germany's colonial holdings. A.t the conclusion of the struggle, however, the situation became complicated because of the rise of opposition to imperialism, accompanied by the growing popularity of native self-determination and of internationalism. W o o d r o w Wilson had given expression to this point of view in his famous Fourteen Points and had declared that he was in favor of "an impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined." T h e mandate system that emerged from the Peace Conference was a compromise between the idealism of President Wilson and the realism of the secret treaties. In spite of the promises to Italy contained in the secret Treaty of London (April 26, 1 9 1 5 ) , England and France succeeded in obtaining the greater portion of the German colonies in Africa. German East Africa went to England as a " B " mandate, though Belgium persuaded the British to award the northwestern corner to her. German Southwest Africa was absorbed by the Union of South Africa as a " C " mandate. Togoland and the Cameroons were divided between England and France. Since England had gained so much elsewhere in Africa, France was awarded the greater part of Germany's W e s t African possessions. Out of an area slightly in excess of 200,000 square miles in the Cameroons, England received some 34,000 square miles with a total population of 797,312.® With some slight modifications, the line established by the Milner-Simon Declaration of July 10, 1919, constitutes the present boundary. Under the terms of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Cameroons were defined as a " B " mandate. This required the transmission of an annual report to the League of 8 Nigeria Handbook, iç$$, p. 3z. F o r a discussion of the Mandate System in A f r i c a cf. Beer, of. cit., fassim.

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Nations and imposed restrictions on the mandatory power. T h e mandatory power was forbidden to organize any native military force except for local police purposes; was required to suppress slavery and all forms of the slave trade; to prohibit forced labor; to protect the native from abuse and fraud by the supervision of labor contracts; and to establish strict control over traffic in arms, ammunition, and the sale of liquor. It was furthermore required that laws relating to the land respect native rights and protect the interests of the native population. Finally, the mandatory undertook to secure to all nationals of States members of the League of Nations "the same rights as are enjoyed by his own nationals" and to extend complete economic, commercial, and industrial equality. 9 The obligations imposed by the mandate system were not antagonistic to established policy in Nigeria, so little difficulty was experienced in taking over the new territory. The German code of law was replaced by Nigerian law with the adoption of the British Cameroons Administrative Ordinance in February 1934, and the work of installing a system of indirect rule was initiated. The territory was divided into three parts for administrative purposes; a new province known as Cameroons Province was created, and the other divisions were merged with the existing provinces of Adamawa and Bornu. In Dikwa, a part of the ancient empire of Bornu, the Germans had not established an administrative system of their own, so the ancient feudal system remained. It was therefore an easy matter to introduce indirect rule here by following the methods previously employed in Northern Nigeria. In Cameroons Province, however, a system of direct rule had been set up, which made the establishment of a new system of administration more difficult. Much of the land had been sequestered by European plantation owners, and the Germans, in addition, had sanctioned a policy of forced labor. A system of free labor was prescribed under the mandate system, but economic chaos would have been the result of any sudden and abrupt transition. 10 It was necessary therefore to proceed 9 10

Sir Hugh Clifford, Address to Nigerian Council, 1923, pp. 39-40. Buell, of. cit., I, p. 685, Nigeria Handbook, 1933, pp. 3 3 - 3 5 .

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with extreme caution in complying with the standards established by the Mandates Commission. As a result of the terms of the mandate, which provided that the territory be administered as an integral part of Nigeria, difficulties arose in connection with deficits incurred in administering the British Cameroons. T h e British Government did not provide assistance through grants, so it became necessary for the Nigerian Administration to assume the burden. It was not a particularly heavy one since at no time did the deficit rise above £50,000, but it did provoke adverse comment by certain unofficial members of the Legislative Council, who insisted that the Imperial Government provide for compensation through a grant-in-aid. Eventually the issue became entangled with the larger question of the Imperial W a r Debt and disappeared when the Cameroons became self-supporting in 1 9 2 7 . 1 1 Sir H u g h Clifford was appointed Governor at the close of the W o r l d War. H e must be ranked among the outstanding individuals in Nigerian history, for he was a man of wide experience, strong personality, and possessed great energy and determination. H e was not entirely in sympathy with many of Lugard's policies, especially those of an administrative nature, and introduced several innovations. T h e new Governor had no desire to change the basic structure of indirect rule, but he was very critical of the central organization and was unfavorably impressed by the Nigerian Council, which his predecessor had created. "Personally," he declared, " I like a thing to be real and effective or not to have it at a l l . " H e expressed the opinion that the Nigerian Council had never been "in any sense a real or effective institution." 1 2 Accordingly he decided to extend the scope of the Legislative Council of Lagos to include Southern Nigeria, and to abolish the Nigerian Council, which had been organized in 1 9 1 4 . This step, taken in 1 9 2 2 , was a return to the set-up that had prevailed prior to amalgamation, when the Legislative Council had embraced all of Southern Nigeria. T h e new constitution provided for twenty-six official members, three elected members from Lagos and one elected member 11

Ibid., I, pp. 6 8 6 - 8 7 .

12

Proceedings

of the Nigerian

Council,

1 9 1 3 , p. 4 .

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from Calabar, together with fifteen nominated members, a total of forty-five members in all. The restoration of the Legislative Council found favor with both the native population of Lagos and the members of the commercial community, while the Governor expressed the optimistic opinion that it would "afford ample scope for the energies and abilities of men of all races who have at heart the best interests of Nigeria and its heterogeneous population." 1 3 T h e Legislative Council has not measured up to the expectations of its creator. It has grown in importance, however, and has played an increasingly effective part in the affairs of Nigeria. T h e Council could not control policy, but it did discuss a great variety of subjects. A study of the debates leaves the impression that the support of the unofficial members was constantly sought and their opinion highly valued. 14 Not only did the new Governor abolish the Nigerian Council and set up a Legislative Council, but he also subjected the administrative system to a thorough overhauling. In a lengthy address to the Nigerian Council delivered shortly after his arrival, he outlined the new procedure. 15 In the interest of administrative continuity, he reorganized the Nigerian Secretariate and elevated the Chief Secretary to a rank just below that of the Governor. This officer was empowered to act for the Governor when the latter was absent; to supervise the entire administrative machinery; to develop a record office; to collect and collate all decisions of the Governor; and to act as that official's principal adviser. A special officer of the Secretariate was designated as Secretary for Native Affairs and was authorized to coordinate all decisions of the Governor relating to native affairs, to advise concerning them, and to create a set of records relating to native administration. Steps were taken also to clarify the position of the Lieutenant Governors. Their responsibility to the Governor was redefined, 13

Address to the Nigerian Council, 1923, p. 7. For a copy stitution cf. pp. 9 - 1 4 . 14 Legislative Council Debates, passim,· Perham, of. cit., pp. 15 Nigerian Council, Address by the Governor, 1920, pp. Gazette Extraordinary, March 2, 1 9 2 1 ; Perham, of. cit., pp.

of the new con260-62. 4 - 1 6 ; Nigerian 300-301.

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and the Secretariate for N a t i v e Affairs was made the clearing house for suggestions, proposals, promotions, etc., coming f r o m the Lieutenant Governors. W h i l e these officials m i g h t address the G o v e r n o r directly, the implication was that they should function through the Secretary. T h e position and administrative responsibility of the Residents was restated. Difficulty had been experienced with respect to the non-political departments, and an effort was now made to clarify the relationship between these officers and the Residents. A l t h o u g h the authority of the Resident was final in case of emergency, the hope was expressed that Residents w o u l d seek to cooperate with non-political departments and that differences would be adjusted by direct correspondence with the heads of the departments concerned. A p p e a l s were a l l o w e d to the Lieutenant G o v e r n o r or even to the G o v e r n o r , but they were to be discouraged. It is quite clear f r o m the tone of the Governor's address that he deplored the g r o w i n g tendency toward bureaucracy, which so frequently is the besetting sin of colonial administrations. T h i s difficulty had been anticipated by L u g a r d , w h o had established the principle that the Resident was the senior officer in the Province and that all Departmental Officers were subject to his orders unless incompatible with instructions received f r o m their Director, in which case the difficulty must be reported to the latter. 1 6 D e p a r t m e n t a l Officers were forbidden direct contact with the N a t i v e Administration and, while they were e m p o w e r e d to carry out the details of a project without interference, they were required to keep the Resident f u l l y informed at all times. L u g a r d had been particularly careful to stress the importance of proper delegation of authority, and much of his success may be attributed to his ability to select able men and to allow them to make their own decisions. But despite these precautions, it was necessary for C l i f f o r d to protest vigorously against the practice of departmental chiefs exercising rigid control over officers in the field. E a r l y in his administration C l i f f o r d published a minute which reasserted the principles laid down by L u g a r d . In 1926 he added 10

P e r h a m , of. cit., p. 300.

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a footnote which has been the source of much difficulty.17 This placed Departmental Officers under the orders of Administrative Officers and occasioned deep resentment in the departments. Nothing was done to clarify the situation under Clifford's successor, but Sir Donald Cameron attempted to solve the difficulty in 1934 when he issued his own memorandum on Native Administration.18 In this memorandum he gave general approval to Clifford's policy, but did delete the footnote which had given offense. While he complimented the departmental officers upon their contributions toward strengthening and improving the quality of the administrative work, he insisted upon their subordination to the Resident. "The Resident," he declared, "as the trustee of the general interests of the Native Administration must be regarded as the judge of the effect of any activity on the conditions of the province, political or otherwise, from the native point of view." 1 9 Governor Cameron made other contributions of fundamental importance to the development of the present system in Nigeria which, though they cannot be discussed in detail within the limits of this study, nevertheless command attention. He came to the Governorship with a rich background of experience in the colonial service, many years of which had been spent in Nigeria, where he had served as Chief Secretary. He had been entrusted with the task of reforming the administrative system of Tanganyika along indirect lines, a responsibility which he discharged with marked success. Soon after taking office he delivered an important speech to the Legislative Council which later (1934) was published under the title The Principles of Native Administration and Their Application.20 It is impossible to do full justice to this important statement of policy in any brief summary, but a brief review of its more essential aspects may be attempted. In many respects it 17

Sir Donald Cameron, The Principles of Native A ¡¡ministration and their Application, (Lagos, 1934), p. 44. 18 Ibid., pp. 36-43 ; Perham, op. cit., p. 301. 19 Cameron, op. cit., p. 4 1 . 20 For an excellent digest of its contents see Margery Perham, op. cit., pp. 334-37·

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was a restatement of the principles laid down by Lord Lugard in his Political Memoranda, but sought to go farther where experience had demonstrated the need for a clarification of policy. Particular emphasis was given the principle that the native authority which was recognized by the Government must be the one that was acceptable to the people, even though research might demonstrate that some other tribal system had been in effect at some remote time. Administrative Officers were encouraged to take a more active part in the work of the Native Administrations, and the objection that this would lessen the prestige of native rulers was minimized.21 The tendency, especially in the Northern Provinces, to regard with complacency certain evil practices of the native rulers was deplored, and officers were reminded that "the primary duty and object of the Administrative Officers to educate the Native Authorities in their duties as rulers of their people according to civilized standards" should not be neglected.22 The Governor was particularly outspoken concerning the value of open criticism of administrative procedure. He felt that it might serve a useful purpose in preventing stagnation, and he expressed his desire to enlist educated African opinion in support of his policies.23 The Governor was of the opinion that Native Administrations had been maintained which were reactionary and repressive in their tendencies and, in many instances, depended for their authority upon fetish and superstition. There had been a tendency to adopt the notion that a feudal autocracy of this kind was "the be-all and end-all of Indirect Administration." 24 The policy of attempting to shelter the Moslem Administrations from contact with the outside was not likely to succeed in a world which was more and more coming to be an economic and physical unit. The curtain which had been drawn between western civilization and the medievalism of Northern Nigera should, he felt, be completely lifted within a comparatively short time. 25 The brief summary given above does not do full justice to 21

Cameron, of. cit., p. 9. Ibid., p. 8. 23 Ibid., pp. 1 2 - 1 3 . 24 Ibid., p. 13. « Ibid.

22

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NIGERIA

Cameron's important memorandum but will serve to indicate in a very general way his conviction that fundamental changes would be necessary to give reality and vitality to the Nigerian system. This memorandum was important also in the sense that it sought to interpret and give application to the Native Authority Ordinance of 1 9 3 3 · 2 β T h e policy of the Government was to control the natives by means of the tribal institutions that were in effect before the advent of the British. These tribes were of different sizes and, as has been pointed out before, were of infinite variety. Although each was in charge of an authority known to the people as their tribal head, it was understood that such an authority was not constitutionally an autocrat and that both he and his advisers knew the degree to which his powers were restricted by native tradition and custom. 27 T h e power of constituting native authority was vested in the Governor, who also was empowered to limit the domain of native authorities, to make exceptions with respect to persons over whom authority might be exercised, and to revoke orders and make appointments. 28 T h e Governor was careful to emphasize the fact that important limitations were imposed on the native authorities, and that they were not independent rulers but merely the delegates of the Governor, whose representative was the Resident. T h e Government reserved the right to impose taxes, to make laws, to control the exercise of subsidiary legislative powers delegated to the native authorities, and to raise and control armed forces. Furthermore, it was expressly stated that no chief who was not a properly constituted native authority could enforce orders under the cloak of native law and custom, and no provision was made for chiefs who were not designated as native authorities. 29 This review of Cameron's memorandum may possibly create the impression that he sought to minimize the importance of the native rulers in the Nigerian administrative system. This was not the case. H e was careful to explain at considerable length the 2

® Ordinances of Nigeria, No. 43 of 1933. Cf. Perham, of. cit., appendix, pp. 2 8 1 - 9 3 . 27 Cameron, of. cit., pp. 15—16. 28 Native Authority Ordinance of rçjj, par. 3. 29 Cameron, of. cit., p. 18.

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relationship between Administrative Officers and every type of N a t i v e Authority. 3 0 T h e Ordinance of 1933 g a v e Native Authority power to enact subsidiary legislation upon a wide variety of subjects. 3 1 It was hoped that this would enable native law and custom to crystallize in the form of recorded rules and permit the development of such law to meet the needs of a changing native civilization. T h e prestige and influence of the Native A u thorities could best be upheld by exercising care to let the peasantry see that the G o v e r n m e n t itself treated the native rulers "as an integral part of the machinery of the Administration." T h e administration of G o v e r n o r Cameron was also noteworthy because of the sweeping changes which were effected in the judicial system. Attention has been given already to the development of this system in N o r t h e r n Nigeria and its extension into Southern Nigeria at the time of amalgamation. It has been suggested that two unique features of the Nigerian judicial system were the establishment of the principle that justice be administered in accordance with native law and custom, and the exclusion of E n g l i s h law, legalism, and lawyers. M u c h of the judicial work in Nigeria was handled in the Native Courts, but that portion which lay outside the competence of these courts was entrusted to Administrative Officers w h o staffed the Provincial Courts. E n g l i s h legalists had been critical of this procedure, but L o r d L u g a r d had defended his creation on the ground that officers w h o were close to the people were better able to j u d g e in cases inv o l v i n g natives than E n g l i s h trained lawyers, and were more likely, in the l o n g run, to provide the best machinery for the administration of justice. 32 Sir D o n a l d soon challenged this position and in a speech delivered before the Legislative Council indicated his intention to substitute trained magistrates for Administrative Officers and to abolish the Provincial Courts. 3 3 T h i s attitude of the G o v e r n o r commanded the enthusiastic support of many E n g l i s h lawyers 30 31 32

Ibid., pp. 18-23. Native Authority Ordinance of / 953, par. 16. Perham, of. cit., p. 337.

Address to Legislative of. cit., p. 338. 33

Council,

1933, p. 3 5 ; Quoted in part by Perham,

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resident in Nigeria, who had been resentful of the limitations imposed upon them, and was heartily applauded by professional legal societies in England who were critical of a system that elevated Administrative Officers to the status of judge. It is also interesting to note that certain African members of the Legislative Council—particularly Dr. C. C. Adenyi-Jones—were strongly in favor of abolishing the Provincial Courts which had been the target of repeated attacks.34 In October 1933 the Native Courts Ordinance was laid before the Legislative Council and was made the occasion for an extended debate. 35 It was charged that the courts were executiveridden, that they were not properly coordinated, that they were not subject to review by a superior court, and that complete judicial appeal from the Provincial Courts was not provided. T h e fact that legal practitioners were barred from these courts attracted much unfavorable comment. Altogether, it was made quite clear that the majority of the members were in favor of change. In April 1934 the Governor announced his judicial reforms, which resulted in the limitation of the powers of the Native Courts and the abolition of the Provincial Courts. It had originally been his intention to extend the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to include the field previously occupied by the Provincial Courts, but he decided to set up a new body—the High Court of the Protectorate, with subordinate Magistrates' Courts in which the procedure was simpler than in the Supreme Court. 36 H e compromised still further with the old order by adopting the policy of appointing as new judges and magistrates many individuals from the administrative offices if they had shown themselves to be well qualified in the legal field. The Supreme Court retained its jurisdiction in the Colony but lost it in the Protectorate. T h e High Court differed from the Provincial Court in two important respects: in the complete separation of judicial and executive powers, and in permitting legal practitioners to appear before the court at all times except in appeals from Native Courts. 34 35 36

Legislative Council Debates, 1930, p. 93. Ibid., 1933, pp. 2 7 - 4 1 . Native Courts Ordinance, 1933.

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It is much too early, of course, to attempt to pass judgment on the merits of the new system, but it may be indicated that Cameron's reforms aroused considerable criticism, particularly among the officers of the Northern Provinces. It was clearly a sharp break with the traditions of the past. Some critics pointed out that the Governor had had little experience in Nigeria outside the Secretariate, that he had but slight contact with the natives, and therefore had considered but one side of the problem. They questioned the wisdom of allowing the penetration "of legalism and lawyers into the administration of justice" which, it was felt, would jettison a promising social experiment. 37 T h e immediate effect was not great since most of the new judges were former Administrative Officers, but April 1934 may well prove to be "the watershed between the old and the new." The post-war period has witnessed a growing demand on the part of the educated native for a larger share in government. An inevitable result of the impact of western civilization has been the development of an aristocracy of education, particularly in Lagos, where a group of several hundred Europeanized Africans comprise a social class of real distinction.38 Many of these are wealthy traders ; some are native lawyers j and some are editors, newspaper owners, journalists, bishops, and archdeacons. In addition to these groups of the social élite, there is a much larger group of educated Africans such as clerks, small professional men, traders, merchants, skilled technical workers, surveyors, compositors, and contractors, who have attained a European standard of living and take an intelligent interest in affairs. T h e native press, consisting of several newspapers, plays an active part in molding public opinion and keeps well abreast of European and African developments. It does much to foster racial solidarity by publishing articles dealing with lynchings in America, the treatment of Liberia by the Powers, or with native affairs throughout Africa generally. 39 Although there was some agitation in favor of political recogni37

Crocker, of. cit., p. 2 3 1 . Perham, of. cit., pp. 256-57. "Ibid., p. 257.

38

256

B R I T I S H E N T E R P R I S E IN

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tion prior to the W o r l d W a r , it was not until the close of the war that the movement attained significant proportions. T h e wave of self-determination which swept the colonial world had its repercussions in Nigeria, where it found expression in the activities of the National Congress of British West Africa. This group, composed of educated West Africans resident in England petitioned the King, in October 1920 for a grant of the franchise and representative government. 4 0 It pressed for the establishment of a Legislative Council with half of the membership chosen by election and—very significantly—demanded the power of the purse. This petition included the other West African colonies as well as Nigeria. It aroused the ire of Governor Clifford who, in an address to the Nigerian Council, characterized the group as "self-elected and self-appointed West African gentlemen" who in no way constituted a nation under the commonly accepted definition of the term. 4 1 H e went on to point out that though this group had been taken seriously by certain people in E n g l a n d , it was not representative of African opinion even in Lagos, to say nothing of Nigeria as a whole. T h e Governor was convinced also that it should be the policy of the Administration to maintain and support the local tribal institutions and the indigenous forms of government which the people had evolved for themselves, which he regarded as the natural expression of their innate political genius. T h e many native states which composed Nigeria were so totally different from one another in structure that any attempt to merge them into a united West African state would be quite impossible. While the National Congress of British West Africa apparently attracted little support outside of the League of Nations Union and soon faded from view, it did serve to stimulate the growing demand of the native community in Lagos for representation on the revived Legislative Council. This demand was eventually granted by Clifford, and it marks the first recognition of the elective principle in British Tropical Africa. 4 2 T h e suffrage was 40 41 42

West Africa, pamphlet, 1 0 7 ® . Nigerian Council, Address of the Governor, Buell, of. cit., I, p. 7 4 1 .

1 9 2 0 , pp. 1 8 - 2 4 .

MODERN NIGERIA

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exercised by a comparatively small number of natives only, and the native members of the Legislative Council constituted a small minority of the total membership, but they were very active in debate and took an intelligent part in the deliberations of the Council. In October 1 9 3 4 a resolution was introduced by D r . Adenyi-Jones seeking an increase in native representation on the L a g o s T o w n Council. H e argued that the time had come for a further extension of local self-government, that it was in line with British policy as defined by Governor Clifford, and that the African community should be invested with more responsibility. T h e r e was little opposition, and after some discussion the resolution was adopted. 43 T h e establishment of the elective principle led naturally to the appearance of several political parties, but the Democratic party attained the greatest significance and, at the present time, is the only party of any importance in the field. This party was pledged to remain loyal to England, to favor compulsory education, municipal self-government, and to work for the abolition of segregation. T h e r e was a natural tendency to imitate the political example set by the British, and the native politician was quick to adopt the language of British and American political democracy —a point which can be well illustrated by the following statement of the aims of the Democratic party—which sought to "secure the safety or welfare of the people of the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria as an integral part of the British Imperial Commonwealth and to carry the banner of 'Right, T r u t h , Liberty, and Justice,' to the empyrean heights of Democracy until the realization of its ambitious goal of 'a Government of the People, by the People, for the People.' " 44 This agitation for a greater degree of self-government was not carried outside Lagos, though some of the native politicane were quite willing to assume responsibility for all of Nigeria. T h e Mohammedan emirates apparently were quite content with the status quo; and while it is impossible to speak with assurance concerning the attitude of the masses, there is little evidence of active 43

44

Legislative Council Debates, 1 9 3 4 , pp. 9 5 - 9 7 .

Buell, of. cit., I, p. 743.

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discontent. The emirs had been invited to the sessions of the old Nigerian Council and had participated actively in its deliberations, but its demise in 1922 had left them without representation in any legislative body or council. In 1 9 1 2 the ruling chiefs of Northern Nigeria had been summoned to a Durbar by Sir Frederick Lugard, and in 1925 a second Durbar had been held on the occasion of a visit by the Prince of Wales. There had been some anxiety over the possibility of trouble arising from a meeting of ancient enemies, but no untoward incidents occurred. This happy outcome encouraged the convocation of six regional conferences in 1930, which were attended by the emirs, the more important Administrative Officers, and representatives of business groups. 45 Government officials were careful to keep themselves in the background and to allow the native rulers full opportunity to discuss important issues concerning native education, joint police action, road building, and certain procedures in Mohammedan law. 46 The regional meetings were followed by a joint conference in December that was attended by native rulers from every province of Northern Nigeria, as well as many rulers from the less highly organized pagan states. The meeting was of fundamental significance and, in the opinion of Sir Richmond Palmer, was truly democratic in character. The rulers were chosen by the people under customary usages of long standing, and their advisers were selected in accordance with certain unwritten laws of custom which no emir was free to override or ignore. This was decidedly superior to selection by ballot, a procedure which was quite foreign to African custom or experience, and possessed the merit of "building up rather than disintegrating African society as it still exists under immemorial law and custom." 47 On the whole the post-war enthusiasm for self-determination made little impression on Nigeria. Outside of the little group of educated natives resident in Lagos, there was little desire for 45

PerhaiT); op. cit., p. 1 2 7 . Report of the Meeting of Advisory passim. 47 Ibid., p. 27. w

Council

of Emirs,

(Kano,

1930),

MODERN NIGERIA

259

change. It is true that the old Nigerian Council was replaced by a partially elective Legislative Council, but the impetus came as much from the members of the European commercial community as from the natives. The elective principle was recognized, which is significant, but the elected members were in no position to determine policy even though they were active in debate, and their point of view carried some weight with the Governor. T h e establishment of the Advisory Council in the Northern Provinces was, in a way, a concession to the increased sentiment for greater democracy, but it was a democracy of an African, not a European type. Already there is evidence of a reaction, for in 1934 Sir Donald Cameron discontinued the Advisory Council in favor of a smaller and less formal conference.48 This would seem to be in accord with his policy of resisting the tendency of allowing the north to develop on different lines from the south and to work toward the establishment of a more homogeneous Nigeria. In marked contrast with their experience in many of the colonies, the British have had little difficulty with the natives in Nigeria during recent years. T h e notable exception to this generalization is the Aba riots which occurred late in 1921j. 4e This outburst was a complete surprise to the Nigerian authorities and arose as a result of a serious misunderstanding of the purpose of the Government in taking a census of the male population. Later, when it became necessary to reassess the taxable wealth of the natives, a warrant chief, Okungo, acting on the orders of the District Officer, attempted to count the women, children, and domestic animals. This alarmed the women, who assumed, despite the assurances of Okungo, that direct taxation, recently imposed upon the men, was to be extended to them. Despite every effort 48

Perham, of. cit., p. 1 3 1 . For a detailed analysis of this episode cf. Perham, of. cit., ch. X I V . There is a wealth of documentary evidence in the following official reports: Aba Commission of Inquiry, Nigeria Sessional Pafer, No. 9 of 1 9 3 1 5 Refort of the Commission of Inquiry affointed to inquire into the disturbances in the Calabar and Ovjerri Provinces, December, 1929, Sessional Pafer, No. 28 of 1 9 3 0 ; Comments by Lieutenant Governor, Southern Provinces, 1931; Desfatch . . . regarding the Refort of the Commission of Enquiry into the Disturbances at Aba, etc., Cmd. 3784, 1 9 3 1 . 49

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of the local authorities, the rumor spread and soon several thousand women in a highly emotional state were marching on Okungo's compound where, despite the efforts of his people to defend him, they broke in and subjected him to violent treatment. Other areas became affected, and the demonstration reached its climax at Opobo where a mob attacked the District Officer and was fired upon by the troops, resulting in serious loss of life. There were casualties in connection with disturbances at other centers. Altogether it was by far the most serious native rising since the establishment of the Pax Britannica many years before. So serious a disturbance demanded prompt and thorough investigation. Early in January 1930 a Commission was appointed by the Nigerian Administration that promptly exonerated the officers responsible for firing on the women.50 But there was a feeling that a larger and more representative group should be constituted to probe deeply into the fundamental causes for the riots. In February a second Commission was created. It included in its membership two African barristers and the Agent-General of a leading firm of European merchants. The Commission made a most careful study of the affected areas, examined 485 witnesses, including many of the rioters, and all of the officers and soldiers concerned in the affair who were available.51 A study of the mass of evidence presented to this second Commission shows very clearly that the women were not regarded as an unruly mob deserving of severe punishment, while the fact that Africans were included as members was indicative of a desire to attain a sympathetic handling of the case. With the exception of two minor reservations the findings of the Commission were unanimous upon all points—a remarkable occurrence when the diverse points of view represented by the personnel of the Commission is considered. The fundamental cause of the riots was placed squarely upon the Administration in its failure to deal frankly with the people when, in 1926, direct taxation was imposed upon the men. A census had been taken at that time but its real purpose had been concealed, so it was only 50

61

Sessional Paper, No. 28 of 1930, p. 20.

Perham, of. cit., p. 2ij.

MODERN

NIGERIA

261

natural for the women to conclude that the second census meant the imposition of direct taxation on them, despite all assurance to the contrary. In addition, the economic situation had taken a turn for the worse, and the women felt they faced absolute ruin. T h e Native Court system had aroused much discontent, and there was ample evidence of the animus felt toward the courts, the Warrant Chiefs, and many of the officials of the Native Administration. 5 2 T h e affair was the subject of a serious debate in the Legislative Council upon a motion offered by an African member expressing regret for the loss of life. It also called for punishment of the officers concerned. T h e Government was willing to accept the first part of the motion, but the second part was lost by a vote of thirty-five to two, with five of the African members voting to support the Government. 5 3 No action was taken against the officers concerned in the disturbances, and a dispatch from the Secretary of State brought the entire affair to a close. 54 H e accepted, in general, the conclusions of the second Commission, but criticized the attempt to impose direct taxation upon a people whose social organization had not been made the subject of careful preliminary study. H e was willing to recognize the fact that the problem of the southeastern provinces was difficult, that the language presented a serious obstacle to administrative efficiency, but suggested an attempt be made to establish more intimate contact with the people and to stimulate thorough anthropological research. T h e land system of Nigeria has been studied in a previous chapter. Its most significant feature was, as we have seen, the application of the principle of trusteeship. W h i l e there were profound differences between the north and the south, and while the situation within the Colony was hopelessly confused, it can be said that the system in the main aimed to protect native rights to the land. As a consequence there was little land held by Eu52

Perhain, o f . cit., p. 2 1 6 ; Sessional Pafer, No. 9 of 1 9 3 1 , fassim. Ibid., p. 2 1 7 ; Legislative Council Debates, 1 9 3 1 , pp. 36-57. 64 Despatch . . . regarding the Refort of the Commission of Enquiry the Disturbances at A ba, etc., fassim. 53

into

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ENTERPRISE

IN

NIGERIA

ropeans throughout the Protectorate, except for small trading sites in the principal towns. This condition was due partly to the desire of the Nigerian Administration to protect native institutions, together with the unfavorable climatic conditions that discouraged settlement. After the land system had become established, the Administration was impressed with its advantages and successfully resisted every effort to break it down by outside pressure. Sir Frederick Lugard was determined to avoid the mistakes of the Belgian Government in the Congo, and his successor, Sir H u g h Clifford, vigorously resisted an ambitious effort of L e v e r Brothers to establish the plantation system in Nigeria. Members of the commercial community had complained from time to time about the system of short-term leases and the conditions under which they were granted, but it was not until 1924 that a serious effort was made to destroy the system. T h e most powerful business group operating in West Africa was L e v e r Brothers, who had extensive holdings throughout all of West Africa. T h e old Niger Company had merged with this firm, and an extensive business in the natural products of Africa had been built up. T h e company was headed by Lord Leverhulme, an able and aggressive business leader, who was very anxious to extend the plantation system to Nigeria. In July 1924 a dinner was held in Liverpool in honor of Sir Hugh Clifford, and on this occasion L o r d Leverhulme made a notable speech suggesting certain changes in the land policy of Nigeria. His address is a most interesting example of the methods often employed by vested interests, and as such deserves careful attention. H e paid Clifford many compliments, extolled his virtues as a great Governor, and was especially careful to pay tribute to his excellent business qualities. H e then went on to say: W e recognize that the British Empire is an empire of immense possibilities; but the business world is an empire of immense uncertainties. If w e can only have complete certainty in the empire of business combined with the immense possibilities of the British Empire, then I think our path would be one strewn with roses, but unfortunately there are more thorns than roses. . . . Quite obviously in the cultivation of plantations there must be some security of tenure on land . . . but

MODERN

NIGERIA

263

s o m e h o w o r o t h e r o u r p o l i t i c i a n s — a n d c e r t a i n l y n o n e of o u r

gov-

e r n o r s are responsible f o r the p o l i c y — h a v e f o r m a n y y e a r s n o w v i e w e d t h e A f r i c a n n a t i v e f r o m an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t s t a n d p o i n t .

. . .

You

c a n n o t h a v e p r o s p e r o u s business w i t h o u t s o m e s e c u r i t y f o r t h e capital invested in it. . . . N o t so in t h e B e l g i a n C o n g o , w h e r e w e

always

f e l t that u n d e r t h e t e r m s of the concessions as w e c o m p l y w i t h t h e t e r m s w e g e t the f r e e h o l d of the l a n d , a n d , c o m p l y i n g w i t h the t e r m s a n d conditions, w e c a n be l e f t in e n j o y m e n t of t h e p a l m

cultivation

w e are c a r r y i n g o n . . . . A l l this m o n e y is i n v e s t e d o n s o u n d lines. . . . T h e m a i n difficulty f a c i n g us in the d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e E m p i r e is the policy a d o p t e d in the M i d - V i c t o r i a n p e r i o d .

. . .

I a m c e r t a i n t h a t the W e s t A f r i c a n races h a v e t o be t r e a t e d v e r y m u c h as o n e w o u l d treat c h i l d r e n w h e n t h e y are i m m a t u r e a n d u n developed. W e have excellent materials. I don't k n o w of better m a terial a n y w h e r e f o r l a b o u r in the tropics t h a n t h e n a t i v e s of A f r i c a , but t h e y are n o t o r g a n i z e d .

West

. . . N o w the o r g a n i z i n g ability

is the p a r t i c u l a r trait a n d characteristic of the w h i t e m a n .

. . .

Do

y o u think w e shall be a l l o w e d to keep o u r p r e s e n t position of responsibility to the c o u n t r i e s w i t h i n the E m p i r e if w e d o n o t m a k e s o m e o r g a n i z e d e f f o r t t o d e v e l o p t h e m o n s o u n d lines? d o n e w i t h capital, but capital w i l l n o t

flow

T h a t can only

without security.

be

. . .

T h e r e m e d y f o r t r a d e s t a g n a t i o n is to restore c o n f i d e n c e . L e a v e o u r business m e n a l o n e , but g i v e t h e m security in all t h a t is r e a s o n a b l e a n d right.

. . .

I say this w i t h m y little e x p e r i e n c e , t h a t the A f r i c a n n a -

tive w i l l be h a p p i e r , p r o d u c e the best, a n d live u n d e r the l a r g e r c o n d i tions of prosperity w h e n his l a b o u r is d i r e c t e d a n d o r g a n i z e d by his w h i t e b r o t h e r w h o has had all these million y e a r s start of h i m . 5 5

T h e speech quoted was all too clear an indication of the intent of the interests centered at Liverpool to overthrow the economic system of Nigeria in favor of the plantation system in effect in other parts of Africa, but they received little encouragement from Clifford. H e did not mince words in pointing out to them the bad effects of such a policy on native relations and indicated very clearly his determination to resist their efforts. H e was supported by a strong editorial in West Africa, which pointed out that Leverhulme was asking for nothing less than a freehold of the lands now held by the African tribes living in West Africa: 55

West Africa, J u l y 26, 1924.

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ENTERPRISE

IN

NIGERIA

If Lord Leverhulme were only given security for putting d o w n m o n e y , security in the shape of title to the lands, he could "organize" the Africans into G o d knows what state of happiness, far transcending w h a t comes to t h e m from the "rights" which the Colonial Office leaves to t h e m under the old-fashioned notion that trustees ought not to hand over to somebody else ( t o w h o m they do not happen to bel o n g ) the titles to their ward's property. 5 6

T h e rebuff administered by Clifford on the occasion of the Liverpool dinner did not discourage Leverhulme, and he continued his attack by advancing the argument that the encouragement of trade and commerce was the first concern of good administration. But Clifford replied in an address to the Legislative Council that, on the contrary, from the time of Warren Hastings on, the first concern had been to establish the rule of law and peace. 57 H e expressed his doubt of the ability of Europeans to compete successfully with the native producer and cited the case of the failure of the cocoa planters of Trinidad to compete with the native producers in the Gold Coast. 58 Finally he pointed out that land in the Southern Provinces was inalienable communal land, that native custom did not permit individual property in land, that this principle had been recognized by the Government, and that he expected to adhere to it regardless of pressure from outside which suggested that he violate the principle and grant concessions.59 T h e attempt to open the way for concessions by direct pressure on the Governor having failed, other tactics were tried. Lord Raglan made a spirited attack on the principles of indirect rule in a speech before the House of Lords, but his argument had little effect. Another point of attack was the alleged inefficiency of the Nigerian Administration. The fact that a deficit had been incurred provided ammunition for the critics, who carefully refrained from pointing out that the loss of revenue incurred by lowering the tax on spirits was an important contributing factor. 60 Lever56

West Africa, July 26, 1924. Legislative Council Debates, Address by the Governor, 1925, pp. 220-21. ™Ibid. 58 Ibid. 60 West Africa, August 11, 1925. 57

MODERN NIGERIA

265

hulme made a final effort to influence the Governor in his favor by visiting Lagos. H e invited him to take dinner aboard his yacht, but the invitation was bluntly declined. Later he did visit Clifford at Government House where a stormy interview occurred, but the Governor remained firm.81 The death of Lord Leverhulme deprived those who wished to establish the plantation system in Nigeria of their most vigorous advocate, and the agitation in favor of a change quieted down. T h e affair, however, greatly disturbed many of the natives, and the redoubtable Dr. Adenyi-Jones expressed the growing concern of the native community. 62 While Clifford tried to reassure native opinion that native rights to the land would be protected, it was difficult to remove fear completely from the native mind. T h e attack made on the Nigerian Administration was partly responsible for the investigation of West African conditions undertaken by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for the Colonies, the Hon. W . G. A. Ormsby-Gore. While this investigation had a much wider scope than a mere inquiry into the charges brought by Leverhulme, it is interesting to note that the final report upheld the position taken by Clifford. It was perfectly clear, the report declared, that the type of concession enjoyed by L o r d Leverhulme in the Congo was out of the question in Nigeria. T h e principal objection was the fact that the Government would be compelled in one form or another to provide compulsory labor for private profit, a policy which could not be tolerated. "Consequently, I rule out any schemes for the development of the palm industry which involve ( 1 ) compulsory labor in any form, ( 2 ) compulsion to sell fruit at a particular price, ( 3 ) compulsion to sell to a particular individual or concessionaire." 63 T h e report went on to demolish the hopes of obtaining a freehold title to land, which was one of the objectives of Lever Brothers. This demand, the report declared, was impossible to grant because it was asking for something which the Government did not possess. " T h e one thing which the native of Nigeria . . . is afraid of 61 02 63

T h i s is based on the testimony of persons present who cannot be quoted. Speech reported in West Africa, September i , 1 9 2 8 . Report of Ormsby-Gore, pp. 1 0 7 - 8 .

266

B R I T I S H E N T E R P R I S E IN N I G E R I A

is losing the tribal or family rights over land he and his ancestors have used or are using." While the native was inclined to be reasonable about leasing it, to part with it forever was an offense to his profoundest convictions. The whole conception of freehold was quite foreign to the African mind. It some areas it had crept in, due to the penetration of English law and ideas, but it had not worked with success.94 While the Nigerian authorities, supported by the Colonial Office, had been successful in resisting the efforts to deprive the native of his rights in the land, a menace appeared from another quarter which seemed to indicate that some modification of the existing system was perhaps imperative. Governor Clifford had been quite sure that plantation methods with their heavy overhead would never be able to compete successfully with the small native producer, but his optimism on this score was hardly warranted. The monopoly in palm oil which Nigeria had enjoyed was menaced by the production of a superior grade of oil in Sumatra that threatened to drive Nigerian oil from the market. We have already referred to the efforts made to meet this danger by educating the native to employ better methods of production. It was also suggested that European capital be allowed to lease relatively large areas for the establishment of plantations. Though this was a quite different proposal from that of Lord Leverhulme, it was a matter of concern to the natives and aroused considerable apprehension. Sir Graeme Thomson, who had succeeded Governor Clifford in 1925, was not unfriendly to the proposal and expressed the opinion that although the land policy in the past had been sound, a change in policy might be imperative and even wise. 65 Acting on his recommendation, the Land Department endeavored to systematize land tenure, encourage scientific methods, and secure the fullest possible development of the oil resources. H e was careful to point out that this proposal was not designed to effect any revolutionary change in the system of land tenure and would 84 65

Refort of Ormsby-Gore, p. 108. Legislative Council Debates, address by the Governor, 1 9 2 7 , p. 3 i f f .

MODERN NIGERIA

267

pave the way for gradual evolutionary development in the future. e e Later it was proposed to subsidize plants for the extraction of palm oil, but European capital was not interested and the Agricultural Department had to do what it could to encourage and educate the native to better methods of production. T h e outcome is still far from certain and, in the opinion of many observers, it is the most serious problem Nigeria must face. Unfortunately the fear, suspicion, and distrust aroused by L e v e r hulme's effort to destroy native rights in land makes it difficult to introduce any change, however sound, since the native is inclined to fear that it is only a fresh attempt to deprive him of that which he holds most precious. W h i l e this study is not primarily concerned with the problem of colonial administration, indirect rule has been the subject of frequent discussion and properly so, since it is an important contribution to the art of colonial government. In recent years it has attracted more attention, and there is a growing literature on the subject. 87 T h e concept is not particularly new, as we have seen, but the special methods practised by L o r d L u g a r d and his associates in Northern Nigeria possessed features which were unique. T h e principles underlying the system were first defined in his Political Memoranda

and were worked out in practice dur-

ing his two terms as Governor. Soon after his retirement from the colonial service, L o r d L u g a r d published his famous work, The Dual Mandate

in British Tropical

Africa, which attracted wide

attention as the first adequate description of British achievement in tropical Africa. It appeared at a time when there was great interest in the problem of backward peoples and, to a world still stirred by the emotions aroused by the W o r l d W a r , it seemed to point the way to better things for the African. So far as its effect is concerned, it may take rank in time with L o r d Durham's Report, and indeed its immediate influence was felt even sooner. Nigeria and its system of indirect rule became w e l l advertised Ibid., 1928, p. 36. F o r example, Rupert Emerson, Malaysia, Rule, ( N e w Y o r k , 1 9 3 7 ) . ββ

67

A Study in Direct and

Indirect

268

B R I T I S H E N T E R P R I S E IN N I G E R I A

since L o r d Lugard drew heavily upon his experience for illustrations of the proper method of trusteeship. It was only natural for those associated with Lugard to feel well pleased, and they had every right to. Unfortunately some who were still in the service came to feel that not only were they the makers of history, but also the chosen guardians of a new gospel. 68 Indirect rule was established upon too firm a foundation to permit many fundamental changes. While Lugard may not have been well served by some of his successors, there is little evidence to indicate a disposition on the part of later governors to alter its basic structure. T h e r e has been a tendency, however, toward formalization, and while this is probably inevitable under any system, the results have on the whole been rather unfortunate and may well act as a barrier to further creative development. T h e administrative reforms introduced by Governor Clifford served to enhance the power and prestige of the Secretariate, to sterilize the system and rob it of its vitality. T h e circulars and orders emanating from this body were loud in their praise of indirect rule but not very enlightening to junior officers who, it was felt, could never quite understand the mysteries they were expected to administer. Initiative on the part of the younger men was not encouraged} questioning was clearly out of order; and, while they were encouraged to be "indirect," they frequently observed the very officers who had admonished them acting in the most " d i r e c t " manner possible. 69 Not only has there been this tendency during the post-war years to formalize indirect rule, but there appears to have been a distinct lowering of the tone of the service. This, again, was probably inevitable. In the "good old days" things were different: the job was new; the spirit of adventure was in the air; there were dangers to be faced and obstacles to be overcome; and, above all, there was the presence and inspiration of a great leader who possessed qualities which his successors could not match. W i t h the coming of law and order the atmosphere was certain 6 8 Crocker, o f . cit., p. 215. T h e author had considerable experience in Nigeria as a District Officer. He is a well-informed but hostile critic. 69 Ibid., p. 217.

MODERN NIGERIA

269

to change as administration became more and more a matter of routine. It is impossible within the limits of this study to probe deeply into the causes for this decline, but a few suggestions may be in order. 7 0 Personnel is obviously a most important factor, and it is both interesting and instructive to review the process by which the present administrative organization has been built up. M a n y of the men who had been associated with L u g a r d in the early days remained in the service for a short time after the W o r l d W a r , but most of them retired soon or were promoted to responsible positions in other parts of the Empire. Consequently they exerted but little influence during the period under review. T h e r e were many additions to the service in the years immediately before the war. T h e new appointees in many instances were trained at O x f o r d and Cambridge, but there is reason to believe that Nigeria did not attract the best talent. T h e r e were many posts in the colonial service which were more attractive, and the competition for positions in these days was not too keen. T h e natural operation of the machinery of promotion elevated many from this group to positions of responsibility at the close of the war. A second group, appointed in 1 9 1 5 , are frequently described as the "fiftccners." Toward the end of the war another group of much the same type was appointed. According to some critics these appointments were decidedly inferior, as might well be the case under war conditions, and it is claimed that these appointees have accentuated the trend toward bureaucracy and "clerkliness." 7 1 T h e r e is evidence, however, that a decided improvement in personnel has taken place since 1 9 2 5 . This is due to a more careful system of selection, to more thorough training, and to the effect of the bad economic situation in England which has increased the number of competent candidates for positions in the service. Not only has there been a deterioration in personnel and an increasing tendency toward bureaucracy with all its evils, but several other factors have combined to weaken the administrative service. Not the least of these is the climate which, by no stretch 70 71

I have drawn heavily upon Crocker at this point. Crocker, o f . cit., p. 200.

270

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of the imagination, can be regarded as anything but bad. T h e rainy season is hot and humid, the dry season hot and featured by the harmattan, which at times is almost unendurable. Much of the landscape is monotonous and dreary, and the insects, snakes, and other pests are at all times extremely annoying. Work under these conditions is difficult. Only the exceptional person can endure the strain without paying the price. It is quite true, of course, that a great deal has been accomplished to render the climate less dangerous and to make life in Nigeria more endurable and less destructive to health, but fundamentally there is nothing that can be done. 72 Unquestionably the lengthening of the term of service from twelve to eighteen months was a mistake and has contributed much to lower morale. While it is difficult to suggest any very effective remedy for the bad effects of the climate, aside from a shorter term of service, there are other abuses which can conceivably be corrected in some degree. The system of promotions, the secret efficiency reports, and the growing lack of continuity are all matters that can be dealt with by an improved system of administration. The problem of establishing an acceptable system of promotions in any organization is difficult. Any system will stimulate rivalry and precipitate a scramble for the better paid jobs, and simply to fall back on seniority is not a happy solution. But in the case of the Nigerian Administration the difference in salary between the various grades was considerable and, since promotion beyond the rank of District Officer was based on merit, there was a merry fight to put up a good front in order to create a favorable impression on one's superiors. Voluminous reports on trivial items constituted a favorite method of securing preferment, especially if the reports dealt with subjects deemed important by the Governor. Hence the flood of reports on "mahdism," which was largely a myth, "paganism," which was a favorite with one Governor, or "conciliar authority," which tickled the fancy of still another. 73 Under the circumstances there was a constant temptation to slight 72 Crocker, of. cit., Part I, passim. This part consists of the author's daily journal and paints a vivid picture of the difficulties of the Nigerian climate. 73 Ibid., p. i 4 2 f f . This practice is not unknown in the academic world.

MODERN NIGERIA

271

the real work of administration in favor of fancy reports and expert wire pulling. Closely related to the question of promotions was the matter of the secret efficiency reports. This was a vicious system and in the hands of an unscrupulous superior officer might be open to serious abuse.74 Frequently the hardworking junior officer was punished by unfavorable reports to headquarters when no criticism had been openly made. T h e superior was immune from detection, and only by accident would the-subordinate be informed of adverse comment. Even then there was no redress except by appeal to the Secretary of State, and few officers had the temerity to make such appeal. Often an unfavorable report would arise from causes trivial and absurd in character, such as overzealous polo playing, defeat at tennis, or pure cussedness. Such a system encouraged bootlicking, and evidence is not lacking that this had its reward. Again it is not too easy to suggest a remedy, and any system of promotion based on merit is bound to have its defects since personality is such an imponderable quality. Secrecy is not essential, however, and any subordinate is entitled to know of unjust criticism and to be afforded an opportunity for redress short of appeal to the Colonial Office. T h e advent of bureaucracy in Nigeria had still other results, most of them unfortunate. Lord Lugard had emphasized both in his Political Memoranda and his Dual Mandate the importance of continuity, but continuity both in personnel and policy has not been characteristic of recent trends in Nigeria. T h e problem is not easy to solve, particularly when the climate makes frequent leaves of absence necessary, but there is little evidence to show that any real effort has been made to solve it. District Officers are moved with bewildering rapidity; residents are frequently changed; and there have been many changes in the top ranks during the last fifteen years. 75 Policies have been devised but left to others to be put into effect, often by men unfamiliar with the situation and frequently unsympathetic with the policy itself. In order to create an impression at headquarters, newly 74 75

For examples cf. Crocker, of. cit., pp. 245-47. Nigeria Handbook, 1933, Appendix, I, passim.

272

BRITISH ENTERPRISE IN NIGERIA

appointed officers feel it necessary to "reform" the practices of their predecessors and initiate new ideas and new methods, often to the complete mystification and bewilderment of the native. While this condition again is not confined to Nigeria alone, it has had a most unfortunate effect. Finally there has been a tendency, and this is not new by any means, to require the Administrative Officers to spend an undue amount of time on clerical work. This situation has not been rendered easier by the tendency toward centralization which has been characteristic of the system since the close of the war. T h e exaltation of the Secretariate has doubtless been responsible to a large degree, and all too frequently the hard-pressed Administrative Officer has been compelled to devote the bulk of his time to the preparation of reports, the filling out of endless forms, and other routine tasks which rob him of the time he is supposed to spend in guiding and training the native authorities in better administrative procedure. The remedy here is quite obvious: simply hire clerks to do clerical work and free the Administrative Officers for work which they are in theory expected to perform. This criticism of the Nigerian Administrative Service should serve to offset to some degree the charge of complacency which possibly might be made of the present writer, who may have been unduly influenced by his sources that are largely official in character. The merits of indirect rule are still the subject of much controversy at the present time, and no careful student of the system is likely to claim that it is a panacea for the many ills of contemporary imperialism. Observers are of the opinion, however, that it offers more hope for the future of the African peoples than any system now in operation. The day is far distant when the peoples of Africa will be capable of organizing independent states, but past experience has shown that there will come a time when even the most liberal rulers can neither help nor hold a dependent people. Nationalism has been diffused throughout the modern world, and Africa has begun to experience its effects. The Dark Continent is not, to be sure, the most promising field for the development of native nationalism, but can one say that it is less so than India with its great diversity of race, language,

MODERN NIGERIA

273

and historical tradition? In the long run there is a very real possibility that Nigeria will evolve into a national state. T h e system of indirect rule offers the best chance of encouraging this development along reasonable and sane lines.

CONCLUSIONS T h e study of the history of a particular colony, however important that colony may be, does not furnish sufficient evidence to establish elaborate theories concerning the philosophy of imperialism. It is too complex to permit analysis by some neat formula, nor can it be disposed of by an easy phrase. No objective criteria have been devised by which its diverse aspects can be accurately appraised. But certain broad questions concerning imperialism demand consideration, and it is hoped that the experience of the British in Nigeria may be of some value in arriving at a better understanding of such vital issues as the motives that prompted the great powers to seek additional colonies, the methods by which these colonies were acquired, the most effective system by which these colonies can be administered, the native problem, and the perplexing question of the value of colonies. I It is reasonably safe to assume that the revival of interest in colonial possessions which became evident in the closing decades of the nineteenth century came as a result of the widespread diffusion of the industrial revolution, the resurgence of nationalism emerging f r o m the successful attempt to unify Germany and Italy, and the continuing interest in humanitarianism surviving from the early nineteenth century. Such pressing economic problems as the overproduction of goods, the necessity of finding new fields for the investment of capital, the imperative necessity of controlling the sources of raw materials so vital to an expanding industrial system, and the difficulty involved in finding homes for surplus population forced responsible statesmen in all countries to seek a solution. E m p i r e building did not appeal to many leaders as a happy solution of these difficulties, but whether reluctant or enthusiastic, they were forced by the logic of the situation to take action. 274

CONCLUSIONS

275

A program of colonial expansion proved to be popular with the public because of the emotional appeal inherent in nationalism and a sentimental desire to improve the condition of the colored races. M a n y persons who would in no way benefit from the acquisition of colonies supported a policy of expansion because it was an indication of national greatness. Prestige, national honor, economic self-sufficiency, and pride in the achievements of their cultural group rendered the patriotic citizen unaware of the fact that he was expected to pay the costs and do the fighting. T h e desire to help people less fortunate than themselves appears to be a basic human impulse in western society, especially if the beneficiaries inhabit distant regions and are of a different race. It was easy, therefore, to attract popular support for a program that promised to put an end to the slave trade, wipe out cannibalism, fetish worship, and human sacrifice, and above all to bring the blessings of civilization to millions of benighted human beings. T h e urge to assume the "white man's burden" was a powerful emotional factor in most imperialistic nations. 1 T h e partition of Africa was inevitable. Control over African territory came to be considered vital to the economic interests of the expanding industrial states of Europe. It was obviously impossible to keep such a vast region, possessed of valuable resources of many kinds, isolated from the rest of the world. T h e progress of the technological revolution together with the development of tropical medicine removed many of the difficulties and dangers that had heretofore made the penetration of the interior impracticable. But even so, and before science had done much to point the way, agents of commercial houses were actively engaged in exploiting the wealth of Africa. T h e absence of political control, therefore, would not have made Africa immune but, on the contrary, would have enhanced the condition of anarchy that was the rule rather than the exception in so many parts of the continent. Slave raiding was rampant j internal warfare was chronic j relations between the native population and white traders were vicious and tempered only by the power of the natives 1

T h e Germans, however, were inclined to take a more detached, scientific

view of the colonial problem.

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NIGERIA

to retaliate. Cutthroat competition rendered profits uncertain, and there was a growing danger that conflicting interests in Africa might be transferred to a wider area. T h e ideal solution, of course, would have been to set up a system of international control over tropical Africa. Such a system might have made it possible to give all industrial nations access to vital raw materials, to allow all countries to participate in the advantages of the African trade, and to have eliminated much of the friction which proved so dangerous an element in the relations between competing states. U n d e r such a system it is conceivable that the natives might have been protected and many vicious practices brought under control. But this was an impossible ideal. T h e current of nationalism ran too strong and too deep to permit the establishment of any system of international government necessary to the realization of such a solution. T h e partition of Africa was an inevitable compromise between anarchy and international control. British enterprise in Nigeria was motivated to a large degree by the economic forces that gave rise to imperialism. T h e desire to open new markets for the products of British industry, and the importance of controlling the important raw materials available in Nigeria were of much greater significance than the investment of capital or the desire to find new homes for England's surplus population under the British flag. Population pressure, especially, was of slight importance since the climate of Nigeria rendered settlement impossible. Aside from administrative officials and the agents of European commercial houses, there are few Caucasians living in Nigeria. T h e total white population of Nigeria reported in the last census was only 5,442, of which 3,691 were British. 2 T h e significance of British investments in Nigeria is more difficult to appraise. Very little British capital has been invested in Nigeria outside of the tin mines where, it is estimated, a total of over £2,000,000 has been placed. 3 T h e practice of making loans 2 Col. Ref., Annual, Nigeria, 1938, p. 16. Foreigners estimated at 8,223 in 1938. 3 Frankel, of. cit., p. 314. It is difficult to get a reliable estimate of the amount

CONCLUSIONS

277

to native rulers and eventually intervening to protect these loans, which has happened so frequently in the case of other areas in Africa, has not prevailed in Nigeria. Public improvements in the form of railroad building, harbor improvements, telegraph lines, and exploitation of mineral resources have been undertaken by the Nigerian Administration. Very little British capital has been invested in plantations, and while competition from other tropical regions may ultimately force the abandonment of the system of peasant proprietorship, such a development is not imminent. T h e important export crops such as palm oil, palm kernels, cocoa, cotton, and groundnuts are produced by the natives on farms which they own themselves, and any attempt to alter this system would be productive of the most serious results. It is quite clear, therefore, that British control over Nigeria is not a by-product of capital investment. But it should be remembered that large investments have been made in companies trading with Nigeria, and that these concerns have exerted a vital influence in shaping the history of British enterprise in Nigeria. It is impossible to ascertain the amount of capital investment of this sort in Nigeria, since companies trading in tropical Africa do not confine their activities to a particular region. N o r is it easy to discover the extent to which commercial interests have influenced policy. But it should be clear from this study of Nigerian experience that commercial interests have been active at all times in shaping the course of events. Political control was established over the coastal areas to protect and facilitate trade. T h e power of the native middlemen was broken to insure larger profits by making direct contact with the interior. Military force was frequently employed to preserve law and order and to promote commerce. Punitive expeditions were launched against native communities guilty of attacks on trading posts. T h e R o y a l Niger Company was chartered and given authority to conquer and administer wide areas in the Niger Valley. Reluctant officials were persuaded to establish protectorates over territory in which British traders were active rather than to permit France or Germany to get conof capital invested in Nigerian tin mines alone since the Anglo-Oriental M i n i n g Corporation has also invested heavily in mines in M a l a y a , B u r m a , and C o r n w a l l .

278

BRITISH

ENTERPRISE

IN

NIGERIA

trol, and while in many instances British statesmen favored a do nothing policy, the threat of foreign intervention, imaginary or real, proved a decisive factor. T h e desire to secure a market for British-made goods has been a factor of major importance. Lord Lugard was a strong advocate of the theory that it was absolutely imperative to acquire markets in tropical Africa in the interests of British industry. Early in his career he expressed the view . . . that as l o n g as o u r policy is o n e of f r e e t r a d e , w e a r e c o m p e l l e d to seek n e w m a r k e t s ; f o r o l d ones a r e b e i n g closed to us by hostile t a r i f f s , a n d o u r g r e a t d e p e n d e n c i e s , w h i c h f o r m e r l y w e r e the

con-

s u m e r s of o u r g o o d s , are n o w b e c o m i n g o u r c o m m e r c i a l

. . .

rivals.

W e o w e to the instincts of colonial e x p a n s i o n of o u r ancestors, those vast a n d noble d e p e n d e n c i e s w h i c h are o u r pride a n d the outlets of o u r t r a d e t o d a y ; a n d w e are a c c o u n t a b l e to posterity that o p p o r t u n i ties w h i c h n o w present t h e m s e l v e s of e x t e n d i n g the sphere of o u r industrial enterprise a r e n o t n e g l e c t e d , f o r the opportunities n o w o f f e r e d will never recur again.4

This view of the problem was shared by other leaders, notably Lord Rosebery and Joseph Chamberlain. T h e former declared, in a speech which has frequently been quoted: W e are e n g a g e d in " p e g g i n g out c l a i m s " f o r the f u t u r e . W e

have

t o c o n s i d e r , n o t w h a t w e w a n t n o w , but w h a t w e shall w a n t in the f u t u r e . W e h a v e to consider w h a t c o u n t r i e s m u s t be d e v e l o p e d either by o u r s e l v e s o r s o m e o t h e r n a t i o n .

. . . R e m e m b e r that the task of

the statesman is n o t m e r e l y w i t h the p r e s e n t , but w i t h the f u t u r e . W e h a v e to look f o r w a r d , b e y o n d t h e c h a t t e r of p l a t f o r m s a n d t h e passions of p a r t y , to the f u t u r e of the race of w h i c h w e are at p r e s e n t the trustees, a n d w e s h o u l d , in m y opinion, grossly fail in the task t h a t has b e e n laid u p o n us did w e s h r i n k f r o m responsibilities, a n d d e c l i n e to take o u r share in a partition of the w o r l d w h i c h w e h a v e n o t f o r c e d o n , but w h i c h has b e e n f o r c e d o n u s . 5

Such a statement from an important leader of the Liberal party, traditionally opposed to imperialism, is significant and shows 4 Lugard, The Rise of Our East African Empire, II, p. 585. His views on this point are expressed at greater length in chapters X V and X V I of this same work. 5 London Times, March 2, 1893.

CONCLUSIONS

279

clearly the growing trend in British public opinion. Whatever doubts still existed as to the urgency of a program of empire building were completely swept aside with the appearance of Joseph Chamberlain at Downing Street. " I t is not enough," he declared, "to occupy certain great spaces of the world's surface unless you can make the best of them—unless you are willing to develop them. . . . I regard many of our colonies as being in the condition of undeveloped estates, and estates which can never be developed without imperial assistance. . . . It is only in such a policy of development that I can see any solution of those great social problems by which we are surrounded." 6 These sentiments were applauded in leading articles and in the utterances of public men. Liberal opposition to imperialism faded, and men of all shades of opinion became converts of the new gospel. T h e r e is little reason to doubt that Nigeria, together with the other regions acquired by England in tropical Africa, were looked upon as a great potential market for British goods. Occasionally a note of pessimism was expressed whether England would be able to hold these markets against her rivals. In this connection it is interesting to note that even L o r d Lugard, who played so effective a rôle in establishing British control in Africa, was at times somewhat skeptical. W h i l e misery and want exist in "Darkest E n g l a n d , " we must find food and scope for industry for our people, even if we create

wants in

A f r i c a to do it. But the absurdity of it is, that the cloth we bring to E . Africa is mostly not English

at all, but A tuertean

and Indian.

Some

cloth is imported from England to Nyasaland, but it is proverbial for short measurements, and for being plastered with " s i z e " to make weight and deceive by appearance as Livingstone pointed out long ago. T h e biscuits are German ; the oil, I believe, Russian ; the matches Swedish ; yet we talk of opening up English markets by our African Companies!

7

T h i s illustrates one of the major difficulties of the imperialistic process. I n many cases the powers have gone to great expense and even run the danger of a major war to open backward areas to 6 7

Garvin, o f . cit., III, pp. 19-20. Lugard, o f . cit., II, pp. 140-41.

2 8O

B R I T I S H E N T E R P R I S E IN

NIGERIA

commercial penetration, only to find their rivals reaping many of the benefits. Advocates of colonial expansion have clung tenaciously to the belief that the possession of colonies is essential to the development of profitable trade, Quit recent studies indicate that this doctrine may be seriously questioned. 8 It is impossible to state in precise terms how much additional trade is secured because of possession, but the available evidence seems to indicate that possession may make some difference. H o w much of a difference it is quite impossible to ascertain. 9 It is feasible, through the manipulation of tariff schedules, to control the trade of colonies to some degree and, too, a country that puts its money into the economic development of a backward area has an increased advantage in getting the initial trade which follows development. Throughout the entire period of British control in Nigeria, citizens of other countries have shared in its development while the British taxpayer has paid the costs, but British business men have, beyond a doubt, obtained a larger share of Nigerian trade than would have been the case if the territory had been a possession of France or Germany. In 1 9 3 7 they supplied approximately sixty percent of Nigeria's imports. 1 0 T h i s study of British policy in Nigeria should afford a clear demonstration of the significant part played by trading interests in the establishment of political control. British merchants were in constant contact with the region from very early times, and it was largely because of the pressure that they put upon officials in Downing Street the latter were influenced to take decisive action. Great expectations were entertained of the value of the trade that would develop as a result of their efforts. This optimistic view of the situation was encouraged by the increasing value of the Nigerian trade, but the advent of war in 1 9 1 4 led to a 8

S e e especially Grover Clark, A Place in the Sun, (New York, 1 9 3 6 ) , part fassim. 9 Ibid. 10 The total imports for ¡937 were £14.,624,000, of which £9,020,000 came from the British Empire. Statistical Abstract for the British Empire, 1939, p. 1 3 4 . This was the last good year. In 1938 imports declined to a total of £8,632,000. III,

CONCLUSIONS

281

sharp decline. T h e close of the war witnessed a startling revival of British trade with Nigeria, which prompted L o r d L u g a r d to declare, " I t s trade—already £42,000,000—the greater part of which is with the United Kingdom, is of the kind which is the most valuable possible to the workers of this country—raw materials and foodstuffs in exchange for textiles and hardware." 1 1 It was confidently expected that trade with Nigeria would continue to grow and that further development would increase the value of Nigeria as an outlet for British goods. A study of Nigerian trade statistics during the post-war period indicates that this expectation was doomed to disappointment. But it would be a great mistake to assume that Nigeria is unimportant as an outlet for the products of British industry or that raw materials imported from Nigeria are of little importance to English business men. Only two of England's tropical colonies, India and Ceylon, had a greater volume of trade in 1938 than Nigeria, and, moreover, only the Union of South Africa and E g y p t ranked ahead of Nigeria so far as the African trade was concerned. T h e British did more business with Nigeria in 1 9 3 7 than with Spain, Italy, Austria, Czechoslovakia, T u r k e y , or China (exclusive of H o n g K o n g ) . Japan and Persia were the only countries in Asia whose trade with E n g l a n d surpassed that of N i g e r i a . 1 2 It should be remembered, too, that many of the products imported from Nigeria, palm oil for example, are used in the production of articles possessed of considerable value. It is evident that Nigeria has been, and in all probability will continue to be, an important factor in the economy of the British Empire. While it is clear that Nigeria is a valuable economic unit of the British Empire, it should be remembered that considerable sums were spent to establish British control, to develop its resources, to protect the colony f r o m attack by other powers, and upon administration. It is impossible to determine the amount spent for the purposes suggested above since many of the items are in11 Lugard, The Dual Mandate, p. 609. This year, 1920, was an abnormal year since the trade of Nigeria declined to a total of ¿20,206,202 in 192 1, and has not exceeded the total for 1920 since. 12 Statesman's Yearbook, 1 9 4 1 , pp. 5 9 - 6 1 .

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B R I T I S H E N T E R P R I S E IN N I G E R I A

tangible. There are no statistics available that show how much it cost to acquire the territory included within modern Nigeria. It is impossible to decide what portion of the cost of maintaining a navy to protect the Empire should be charged to Nigeria. There is no doubt, of course, that England would have maintained a navy even if she did not have Nigeria, but since Nigeria is a part of the Empire that the navy is supposed to defend, a share of the expense should be assumed. It costs the British taxpayer a tidy sum each year to maintain the Colonial Office which, in turn, controls the administration of Nigeria. A portion of this expense should be charged against Nigeria, but how much it is again impossible to say with assurance. It was necessary, moreover, to subsidize the Nigerian Administration for many years although administrative expenses have been paid out of revenue since amalgamation. Deficits were incurred during the depression years— 1929 to 1932—but it was unnecessary to appeal for a subsidy since there had been a substantial balance during the preceding years. If the period since the close of the World War is taken as the criterion, and if the cost of administration is balanced against the profits of the Nigerian trade it might be possible to show that Nigeria has paid. But if the intangible items suggested above be added to the cost of administration, the conclusion appears to be inescapable that however much private business may have profited the taxpayer has lost. Any well-informed student of imperialism knows that idealism has frequently been used as a smoke screen to conceal situations which are sinister in their implications. Leopold's schemes in the Congo, for example, were surrounded by an atmosphere of scientific and humanitarian appeal. But it is possible for critics of imperialism to go too far in assuming that common greed was the sole motive force of the movement. T h e view that Africa was partitioned because important groups of financiers and capitalists sought to secure profits at the expense of the native population, while important, falls short of a completely satisfactory explanation. It is clear, of course, that business groups were interested in

CONCLUSIONS

283

securing profits, but it is important to recognize the fact that idealism was a factor of equal importance. T h e r e were no profits to be gained in suppressing the slave trade, yet a sustained effort was put forth over a long period of time to bring this traffic to an end. M a n y stations were acquired in West Africa for the purpose of suppressing the slavers; expeditions were sent into the interior of Africa in the hope of attacking the problem at its source; and the British officers took quick action in breaking up the practice of slave raiding after political control had been acquired. Missionary enterprise was not interested in profits, but it played a large part in the penetration of Africa. It is quite true that in some instances missionaries were used for ulterior purposes, but these cases are the exception, not the rule. T h e men who made Nigeria were not primarily concerned with' profits. T h e y did not acquire personal wealth, nor were they the paid agents of British capitalists. F o r the most part they were attracted into the Colonial Service because it appealed strongly to them. Nigeria was especially attractive because it was a new country, and the opportunities for promotion were better than in older colonies. T h e motives in some cases have little connection with the theoretical aims and objectives of imperialism, as can be illustrated by the following instance. " W h y did you go out to Nigeria?" I inquired of one officer who had served in Nigeria for many years. "Because I wanted to shoot an elephant," he replied. " D i d you get your elephant?" I asked. " N o , " he answered, " w e were too busy." Conditions in Nigeria were chaotic in the early days, and the primary concern of the British Administration was to establish law and order. Naturally they were interested in promoting commerce. T h e r e is nothing that is inherently vicious about commerce unless it is accompanied by ruthless exploitation. It was the purpose of the Administration to shield the native from the impact of the capitalist system, and although this policy has been successful on the whole, the native has not always received a fair return on his labor. 1 3 But there can be no denial of the fact that the coming of the 13

C f . pp. 2 8 5 - 8 6 , below f o r details.

284

BRITISH ENTERPRISE IN NIGERIA

Pax Britannica has resulted in a definite improvement of conditions of life in Nigeria. Vicious practices such as cannibalism, twin murder, human sacrifice, slave raiding, and fetish worship contributed little to the happiness of the native population of Nigeria. These customs were long-standing abuses and were speedily suppressed. Internal warfare systematically devastated wide areas and brought suffering and insecurity to hundreds of native communities. Conditions in the Mohammedan Emirates were utterly bad from every point of view. Vigorous action was taken to correct this situation but not because profits were involved. T h e British attitude toward colonies is quite different from that of the French. T h e French Empire is a closely knit organization and to the colonial administrator unity means uniformity. Centralization is the key note of French administrative policy which aims to make each colony a département as soon as possible.14 The British Empire, on the other hand, is highly decentralized, and each colony is a separate society with a life and spirit distinctly its own. British policy has usually aimed to foster the economic interest of the individual colony rather than subordinate the colony to the economic interest of England. Frequently, however, the economic interests of the colony do not mean concern for the interest of the native African. This has been the case in colonies where climatic conditions have been favorable for white settlers. Kenya provides an excellent example. The highland areas are attractive, and the opinion was frequently expressed at the time Kenya was acquired that a large number of Europeans would establish their homes here. A few thousand did come, but they are still outnumbered by the natives about two hundred to one. Kenya, however, has been governed in their interest. The problem of the land is serious since the native has been forced off the best land onto reserves which are relatively worthless. The land provided for the natives was so poor in quality that it was necessary to work for a part of the year on the plantations in order to earn enough to supply the necessities of life for native families. Taxation was imposed to pay administrative expenses and to 14

Lord Hailey, An African

Survey,

(London, 1 9 3 8 ) , pp. 185-206,

fasttm.

CONCLUSIONS

285

force the native to work. This is a vicious practice and has been the subject of criticism by impartial and objective observers. 1 5 M u c h of the money raised by taxing the natives has been spent to provide an education for the children of white settlers and to make available medical and agricultural advice. T h e natives have been denied a voice in the administration of the colony and the authorities were guilty of a serious breach of faith when parts of the Kavirondo Reserve were thrown open to white concessionaries prospecting for gold. W a g e scales on farms of Europeans were shockingly low. T h e Nigerian system is refreshingly different Fortunately f o r the well-being of the native, the country was unattractive to white settlers, so the situation was not complicated by the presence of Europeans seeking control of the land. L o r d L u g a r d was well acquainted with the policies pursued in other parts of Tropical Africa, especially the Congo, and was determined to avoid the evils of K i n g Leopold's system. H e was not opposed to commercial penetration but, on the contrary, was convinced that trade between European merchants and native Africans could be mutually beneficial if surrounded with the proper safeguards. T h e control of the land was the essence of the problem and, as we have seen, effective steps were taken to protect the native in his rights to the soil. T h e Nigerian land system was not seriously challenged for many years, and the efforts of the late L o r d L e v e r h u l m e to substitute the plantation system were defeated by L u g a r d ' s successor. T h e result has been the maintenance of a system of peasant proprietorship which has prevented the native from being depressed into a landless proletarian. H e is relatively prosperous, is able to buy a considerable quantity of European-made goods and, for the most part, appears content under British rule. While it is doubtless true that the native of Nigeria has greater economic security than the native in other parts of tropical Africa, it should be pointed out that foreign capitalists hold a strategic economic position and frequently fix agricultural prices to suit themselves. T h e prices of native products are determined by world 15

Cf. Buell, of. cit., I, chs. 19, 20, passim. Norman Leys, Kenya, 1 9 2 4 ) . Macgregor Ross, Kenya front Within, (London, 1 9 2 7 ) .

(London,

286

B R I T I S H E N T E R P R I S E IN

NIGERIA

conditions and, during the depression years, declined to a point where it became unprofitable to produce for the export trade. This condition was world-wide, however, and the Nigerian agriculturist found himself in the same unhappy situation as the farmer in the United States and the Argentine. In some respects he was better off since his land was not heavily mortgaged; he was not so dependent upon his ability to buy in the world markets ; and his standard of living did not have so far to fall. But the native producer is dependent upon European trading companies to market his goods. T h e great firm of Unilevers holds a monopoly of the trade of West Africa and, through the Niger Company (now a subsidiary), controls the trade of Nigeria. Rivalry has been eliminated, prices have been controlled, independent avenues of trade have been closed, efforts to form producers' cooperatives have been stifled, and exorbitant freight rates have been charged. 1 8 T h e spread of prices paid the producer in Africa and the prices received for the same product in Liverpool is considerable. A few examples will make this situation clear. In a typical year, 1 9 3 0 , the native producer was paid £29 16s per ton for cocoa while the price in Liverpool was £ 3 5 12s. In the same year the price of groundnuts in Lagos was £8 18s per ton as compared to £ 1 7 19s in Liverpool. Palm oil sold for £ 1 6 per ton at Lagos in 1930, but in Liverpool the price was £ 2 5 18s. 1 7 This condition would appear to be quite unfair and doubtless it is, but again it should be kept in mind that it is not unique. T h e root of the difficulty would seem to be with the capitalistic system rather than with the particular policy employed in Nigeria. 1 8 T h e vital issue, however, is the control of the land. T h e African economic system has experienced difficulty in adjusting itself to modern world conditions, and the British authorities must be responsible for many years to come for the difficult task of seeing to it that this system becomes adapted to the economic life of the 18 George Padmore, How Britain Rules Africa, (London, 1 9 3 6 ) , pp. 21 3 - 1 4 . While this book is not particularly reliable, the author does call attention to a situation that is worthy of consideration. 17 Ibid. More recent statistics confirm this. 18 A study of the price spread in agricultural products in the United States reveals a similar condition.

CONCLUSIONS

287

outside w o r l d with as little damage as possible to the interests of the native inhabitants. Native use and e n j o y m e n t of the land means that the native continues to work on his own land to produce his own food and to produce for the w o r l d market. If the native is dispossessed in favor of Europeans, w h o in the A f r i c a n climate cannot do the work of cultivation, a serious labor problem immediately arises, which too often has been solved by resort to a vicious system of taxation and forced labor. T w o policies have been developed in connection with the economic d e v e l o p m e n t of the African tropics. T h e first, which is based upon the original land system, and aims at developing the native use of the land, has been called the " A f r i c a n P o l i c y " j the second, which is based upon capitalistic exploitation or ownership of the land, has been called the "Capitalistic P o l i c y . "

19

T h e r e can be little doubt which policy is preferable. T h e A f r i can Policy was developed in Northern Nigeria, extended to Southern N i g e r i a by L u g a r d as a part of the policy of amalgamation, and since then it has spread to T a n g a n y i k a and Basutoland. W h i l e it aims to protect the native producer, to promote the development of native communities, and to foster the g r o w t h of native industry, it is not fundamentally hostile to European enterprise and capital. It encourages the merchant, issues licenses to traders, but does consult the native community with respect to the conditions under which such licenses are granted, and turns in a portion of the fees to the Native Treasuries. 2 0 T h e evolution of the system of indirect rule is, perhaps, the most important contribution which can be credited to British policy in Nigeria. T h i s had been emphasized repeatedly during the course of this study, but some further observations may be permitted in closing. It w o u l d be presumptuous for the present writer to attempt to formulate any j u d g m e n t as to the respective merits of direct rule and indirect rule. N o r can the experience gained by the study of the operation of indirect rule in a single colony provide the basis 19 20

T h e Labor Party, Policy Refort Ibid.

No. 6., The Colonies,

(London, 1 9 3 3 ) , p. 8.

288

BRITISH ENTERPRISE IN NIGERIA

for such an inquiry. It is very doubtful if the advantages and disadvantages of the respective systems can be accurately measured since, in the final analysis, each is a product of a different philosophy of colonial government. It is evident that the system did not originate with Lord Lugard, nor did it receive its first application in Northern Nigeria. Most colonial governments have been faced with the initial difficulty of attempting to administer a large area with an inadequate staff, usually ignorant concerning native custom and language. T h i s made it necessary to make extensive use of every available agency through which their policy might be implemented. T h e fact that the Moslem emirs of Northern Nigeria possessed unusual capacity for administration provided the basis for further experimentation in establishing a rather elaborate system of rule "through and by the chiefs." It is also evident that Lord Lugard did not proceed from any preconceived ideas or theories concerning the best method of solving the difficult problems that forced themselves on his attention. H e drew heavily upon his experience in East Africa and beyond a doubt was influenced by his knowledge of the system in vogue in India. Two of his distinguished predecessors in Nigeria, Sir Claude Macdonald and Sir George Goldie, had advocated methods similar to those employed by Lugard and, as we have shown, several of Lugard's colleagues had served under them. It is difficult, also, to define accurately just what is meant by indirect rule, nor is the dividing line between indirect and direct methods clearly marked. There is little point in stating again the principles of indirect rule since they have been analyzed in some detail in preceding chapters. T h e essential aim of the system is, of course, the conservation of the best in native culture and the utilization to the fullest extent of the native system in administering the affairs of the colony. Extensive anthropological research has been undertaken in the effort to disclose the essential elements of native culture, thus providing a firm foundation upon which to build. Indirect rule has been in accord with the trend toward more progressive and enlightened methods of governing backward areas which became evident at the close of the World W a r

CONCLUSIONS

289

in 1918. It has given implicit recognition to the idea that eventually the African peoples will assert themselves and demand their freedom from imperialistic control. It is claimed by its advocates that indirect rule provides the best means yet devised to further these ends. It must be remembered, however, that whatever theoretical differences may exist, the human element is the essential factor in the last analysis. It is here that many of the distinctions drawn by the theorists disappear in practice. The efficient operation of the indirect system places a heavy burden upon the intelligence and capacity of the Administrative Officer. In many cases the latter is not altogether clear in his own mind as to what is required under indirect rule and, tempted to get quick results, may employ tactics that have every appearance of being direct. The publication of Lugard's Political Memoranda, which has served as the constitution of indirect rule, together with revision undertaken by Sir Donald Cameron, has helped somewhat to relieve confusion, but the personal element cannot be controlled sufficiently to eliminate the twilight zone between the opposing systems. Throughout the course of this study considerable stress has been put upon the maintenance of native institutions, but to regard this objective as the main aim and purpose of indirect rule would be a serious error. In the long run it is more than likely that native institutions will undergo a radical alteration in their traditional character, since to an increasing degree they will become subjected to the influence of new social and economic forces. The use of native authorities has placed a heavy burden upon native institutions which may be found too great to bear, and it may prove necessary to bring about basic alterations in their structure. If this proves to be the case—and there is some reason to suspect that such will be the outcome—it is quite probable that a change toward a more direct form of administration will be inevitable. The Nigerian experiment, whatever the final outcome may be, has proved of inestimable value in pointing the way toward a better order of things in Africa. The British have wisely refrained from establishing a quasi-democratic system of colonial govern-

290

BRITISH ENTERPRISE IN NIGERIA

ment by recognizing native parliaments which, given the right to criticize without accepting responsibility, have often proved a focus of discontent. It has proved to be far sounder policy to give the native administrative responsibilities, to train him in the art of government by giving him administrative experience, and thus by easy stages to bring him to a state in which he may be strong enough to stand alone. The foundation upon which this structure rests is traditional, not artificial. The philosophy that underlies this system is that every type of government, if it is to be permanent and progressive, must have its roots planted firmly in the soil of indigenous society.

BIBLIOGRAPHY GUIDES (1)

Dominions Office and Colonial Office L'ut, 1862—1941. T h e title varies before 1 9 2 6 . It contains a good bibliography, together with a complete list of the Parliamentary Papers relating to West Africa. ( 2 ) Lewin, Evans, Subject Catalogue of the Library of the Royal Empire Society, The British Empire Generally, and Africa, Vol. I, (London, 1 9 3 0 ) . This is by far the most valuable guide to the materials on Nigeria. It is complete to 1 9 3 0 . ( 3 ) Moon, Parker T . , Syllabus on International Relations, ( N e w York, 1929). Some of the more important books are suggested in the bibliography. ( 4 ) Nigeria Handbook, (Lagos, 1 9 1 7 - 1 9 3 6 ) . A useful but incomplete bibliography is included. It does not cite documentary sources. GENERAL

WORKS

T h e titles given below include works of a general character that contribute to an understanding of Nigerian History. ( 1 ) Baillaud, Emile, La Politique indigene de l'Angleterre en Afrique occidentale, (Paris, 1 9 1 2 ) . A valuable history of British West Africa with several chapters devoted to Nigeria. It is favorable to England. ( 2 ) Beer, George Louis, African Problems at the Peace Conference, ( N e w Y o r k , 1 9 2 3 ) . Includes many valuable documents. ( 3 ) Buell, R . L . , The Native Problem in Africa, 2 Vols., ( N e w York, 1928). Indispensable. ( 4 ) Coupland, R . , The Empire in These Days, (London, 1 9 3 5 ) A collection of essays and lectures. 391

292

BRITISH

ENTERPRISE

IN

NIGERIA

( 5 ) Darcy, J e a n , Cent années de rivalité coloniale, (Paris, 1 9 0 4 ) . A useful study of Anglo-French rivalry in Africa. Many important documents are included. ( 6 ) Dubois, E . M . and Terrier, Α . , Un Siècle d'expansion coloniale, (Paris, 1 9 0 2 ) . A valuable survey of French empire building. ( 7 ) Egerton, H. E . , British Colonial Policy in the Twentieth Century, (London, 1 9 2 2 ) . Valuable. T h e author has made extensive use of the Parliamentary Papers in his account of British policy in Nigeria. ( 8 ) Garvin, J . L . , The Lije of Joseph Chamberlain, Vol. I l l , (London, 1 9 3 4 ) . Valuable for Chamberlain's views on imperialism. Chapter L V contains important information concerning the Borgu Crisis of 1 8 9 7 - 9 8 . ( 9 ) Gibbons, Herbert Adams, The New Map of Africa, ( N e w York, 1 9 1 6 ) . A n interesting account, but inaccurate in many details. ( 1 0 ) Hailey, L o r d , An African Survey, (London, 1 9 3 8 ) . A comprehensive study of problems arising in Africa south of the Sahara by the Committee of the African Research Survey. ( 1 1 ) Harris, John H., Dawn in Darkest Africa, ( N e w Y o r k , 1 9 1 2 ) . A missionary's criticism of European policy in Africa. ( 1 2 ) Harris, N . D . , Intervention and Colonization in Africa, (Boston, 1 9 1 4 ) . A good general treatment. (13) , Europe and Africa, (Boston, 1 9 2 7 ) . A revision of the title listed above. ( 1 4 ) Johnston, Sir Harry H., The Colonization of Africa by Alien Races, (Cambridge, 1 8 9 9 ) . A general review of the outstanding events in early African History. (15) , The Opening up of Africa, ( N e w Y o r k , 1 9 1 1 ). T h e author's connections with Africa render his books of particular value. ( 1 6 ) Jones, T h o m a s J . , ( E d . ) Education in Africa, ( N e w Y o r k , 1922). T h e report of the African Education Commission. Fundamental for a study of British educational policy in Nigeria.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

293

( 1 7 ) Keltic, J . S., The Partition of Africa, (London, 1 8 9 5 ) . Old but still valuable. ( 1 8 ) Knowles, Lillian C . Α., The Economic Development of the British Overseas Empire, Vol. I, (London, 1 9 2 8 ) . The standard work on the economic development of the E m pire. It is especially valuable for its analysis of tropical problems. ( 1 9 ) Lebon, André, La Politique de la France en Afrique, (Paris, 1901). An excellent account of French policy in Africa. ( 2 0 ) Lewin, Evans, The Germans and Africa, (New York, 1 9 1 5 ) . Important for German policy in West Africa. ( 2 1 ) Lucas, C. P., A Historical Geography of the British Colonies. (Oxford, 1 8 9 4 ) , Revised edition, 1900. Volume I I I deals with West Africa. Authoritative. (22) , The Partition and Colonization of Africa, (Oxford, 1922). Brief but authoritative. ( 2 3 ) Lugard, Captain Frederick D., (Now Lord) The Rise of Our East African Empire, 2 vols., (London, 1 8 9 3 ) . Valuable for the views of the author on imperialism in general and colonial administration in particular. (24) , The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, (London, 1 9 2 2 ) . Indispensable. ( 2 5 ) MacDonald, A . J . , Trade Politics and Christianity in Africa and the East, (London, 1 9 1 6 ) . A valuable analysis of economic and social problems. ( 2 6 ) Moon, Parker T . , Imperialism and World Politics, (New York, 1 9 2 6 ) . A brilliant study of imperialism. The chapter on West Africa, however, is inadequate. ( 2 7 ) Padmore, George, How Britain Governs Africa, (London, 1936). A bitter attack on British policy in Africa. Superficial and inaccurate. ( 2 8 ) Petit, Maxime and others, Les Colonies françaises, (Paris, 1902). Useful. ( 2 9 ) Priestley, Herbert I., France Overseas, (New York, 1 9 3 8 ) .

294

B R I T I S H E N T E R P R I S E IN

NIGERIA

An authoritative survey of the French Colonial Empire. Helpful for French point of view with respect to West African issues. ( 3 0 ) Roberts, Stephen H., History of French Colonial Policy ι8γοI Ç 2 5 , 2 vols., (London, 1 9 2 5 ) . T h e best account available in English. ( 3 1 ) Townsend, Mary, Origins of Modern German Colonialism, (New York, 1 9 2 1 ) . An important study dealing authoritatively with the beginnings of German empire building. (32) , The Rise and Fall of the German Colonial Empire, (New York, 1 9 3 0 ) . T h e first adequate study of the whole range of Germany's colonial experiences. SPECIAL

(1) (2)

(3)

(4) (5)

(6)

WORKS

T h e titles given below include books dealing with Nigeria in particular. Abraham, R . C . , The Tive People, (Kaduna, 1 9 3 3 ) . A study of the Munshi tribe. Ajisafe, Η. K . , Laws and Customs of the Yoruba People, (London, 1 9 2 4 ) . A short summary of Yoruba customs by a native. Slight value for this study. Arnett, E . J . , The Rise of the Sokoto Fulani, (London, 1 9 2 9 ) . Important for native history, especially the rise of the Fulani Empire. A translation of Arabic manuscripts. Basden, G . T . , Among the Ibos of Nigeria, (London, 1 9 2 0 ) . Useful for its description of the palm oil industry. Blackwell, H. F . , ( E d . ) The Occupation of Hausaland 19001904, (Lagos, 1 9 2 7 ) . A translation of Arabic letters which gives the native point of view with respect to the British conquest of Northern Nigeria. Burdon, Major J . Α., Historical Notes on Certain Emirates and Tribes, (London, 1 9 0 9 ) . Important for history of certain native states. Major Burdon served for many years in Nigeria and was one of the most influential of Lugard's early associates.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

295

( 7 ) Burns, A . C., History of Nigeria, (London, 1 9 2 9 ) . A valuable history of Nigeria written by a former member of the Secretariate. ( 8 ) Calvert, A . F., Nigeria and Its Tinfields, (London, 1 9 1 2 ) . Useful for this phase of Nigerian economic history. ( 9 ) Crocker, W . R., Nigeria, A Critique of British Colonial Administration, (London, 1 9 3 6 ) . Part I is the author's diary, valuable for its description of administrative routine. Part I I sets forth the author's personal opinion of the defects of the Nigerian administrative system. ( 1 0 ) Dennett, R . E . , At the Back of the Black Man's Mind, (London, 1906). A useful account of Yoruba culture. (11) , Nigerian Studies, (London, 1 9 1 0 ) . Valuable for the anthropologist. ( 1 2 ) Desplagnes, L . , he Plateau central nigérien, (Paris, 1 9 0 7 ) . A study of the pagan tribes of the Bauchi Plateau. ( 1 3 ) Downes, R . M., The Tive Tribe, (Kaduna, 1 9 3 3 ) . A companion study to Abraham cited above. ( 1 4 ) Ellis, A. B., The Yoruba Speaking Peo fies, (London, 1 8 9 4 ) . An early study of the Yoruba people that still has merit. ( 1 5 ) Falconer, John D., Geology and Geografhy of Northern Nigeria, (London, 1 9 1 1 ) . Useful. (16) , Nigeria, Oxford Survey of the British Empire, Herbertson, A . J . , and Howarth, O. J . R., eds., (London, 1 9 1 4 ) , vol. 3, pp. 4 2 3 - 4 6 1 . A general description of the history and geography of Nigeria. ( 1 7 ) Folarin, Adebesin, The Demise of the Indefendence of Egbaland, (Lagos, 1 9 1 6 ) . Deals with the Ijemo uprising from the native point of view. Exceedingly hostile to the British. ( 1 8 ) Foreign Office Handbook, No. 90, British West Africa, (London, 1 9 2 0 ) . Prepared by the historical section of the British Foreign Office. (19) , No. 94, Nigeria, (London, 1 9 2 0 ) . Useful.

296

B R I T I S H ENTERPRISE IN NIGERIA

(20) Frobenius, Leo, The Voice of Africa, 2 vols., (London, 1913)· An account of the travels of the German Inner African Expedition in the year 1910—12. An extremely valuable and authoritative study of the peoples of West Africa. ( 2 1 ) Gaunt, Mary, Alone in West Africa, (New York, 1 9 1 2 ) . A travel book that attempts some comparisons between German and British colonial policy. (22) Geary, Sir William Ν. M., Nigeria Under British Rule, (Lond o n , 1927).

Contains a great deal of information not easily obtained elsewhere. The author spent many years in Nigeria and had access to confidential papers in the Foreign Office. ( 2 3 ) Gentil, E., La Chute de VEmfire de Rabah, (Paris, 1 9 0 2 ) . The best account of this important episode in the history of French West Africa. ( 2 4 ) Gower, W . P., Gaxeteer of Kano Province, (London, 1 9 2 1 ) . Contains detailed information with reference to this particular province. (25) Hazzledine, G. D., The White Man in Nigeria, (London, 1904).

(26) (27)

(28)

(29)

(3°) (31)

Written in an effort to get public support for a grant-in-aid to Northern Nigeria. Imperialistic propaganda. Hogan, S. J . , The Mohammedan Emirates of Nigeria, (Oxford, 1 9 3 0 ) . A useful study of the peoples of Northern Nigeria. Johnson, Samuel, History of the Yorubas, (London, 1921 ). A comprehensive history of the Yorubas from the earliest times to the establishment of the British Protectorate. It is valuable for any study of Yoruba culture. Kingsley, Mary H., West African Studies, (London, 1 8 9 9 ) . An interesting book by a famous lady imperialist who was a close friend of Sir George Goldie. The titles below are of secondary importance. , The Story of West Africa, (London, 1 8 9 9 ) . » Travels in West Africa, (London, 1 9 0 0 ) . Lanoye, Tugnot de, Le Niger et les Explorations, (Paris, 1853)· An account of early exploration in Nigeria.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

297

( 3 2 ) Leonard, Major Arthur Glyn, The Lower Niger and Its Tribes, (London, 1 9 0 6 ) . A description of native culture. ( 3 3 ) Lethbridge, Alan, West Africa the Elusive, (London, 1 9 2 1 ) . A book of travel dealing with West Africa. Critical of the tendency toward centralization and bureaucracy. ( 3 4 ) Lugard, Lady, (Flora Shaw) A Tro ficai Dependency, (London, 1 9 0 5 ) . A valuable study by the wife of the first Governor, especially the early history of the native states of the Western Sudan. ( 3 5 ) Luschan, F . von, Die Altertümer von Benin, 3 vols., (Berlin, 1919). A study of the cultural history of Benin. ( 3 6 ) McPhee, Allan, The Economic Revolution in West Africa, (London, 1 9 2 6 ) . A valuable study of the economic development of British West Africa. ( 3 7 ) M'Queen, James, A Geographical and Commercial View of Northern and Central Africa, containing a Particular Account of the Course and Termination of the Great River Niger in the Atlantic Ocean, (Edinburgh, 1 8 2 1 ) . A treatise on the termination of the Niger which reflects the popular interest of the time in the exploration of the river. ( 3 8 ) Meek, C. K . , The Northern Tribes of Nigeria, 2 vols., (London, 1 9 2 5 ) . Based on the Census Reports of the Northern Provinces of Nigeria for the year 1 9 2 1 . (39) , Tribal Studies in Northern Nigeria, 2 vols., (London, 1 9 3 1 ) . An authoritative study by the government anthropologist for Nigeria. (40) , A Sudanese Kingdom, (London, 1 9 3 1 ) . An account of the culture of the Jukun. (41) , Law and Authority in a Nigerian Tribe, (Oxford, 1937)· This study deals with the Ibo people of Southern Nigeria. ( 4 2 ) Mockler-Ferryman, A. F., Up the Niger, (London, 1 8 9 2 ) . The author was a member of the McDonald Commission.

298

B R I T I S H E N T E R P R I S E IN NIGERIA It contains useful information relative to the history of the Royal Niger Company.

(43) (44) (45) (46)

(47) (48) (49)

(50)

(51)

(52) (53) (54)

(55)

(56)

, Imferial Africa, (London, 1898). Valuable for its description of economic life in West Africa. , British Nigeria, (London, 1902). This early study of British activity in Nigeria is of value because of the author's contacts in the region. Morel, E. D., Affairs of West Africa, (London, 1902). An important book by a well known publicist dealing with West Africa. , Nigeria, Its Peofle and its Problems, (London, 1912). Approves the work of Lugard. Newland, Capt. H. O., West Africa, (London, 1922). The economic development of West Africa. Niven, C. R., A Short History of Nigeria, (London, 1937). Brief and elementary. Orr, Captain C. W . J . (Now Sir), The Making of Northern Nigeria, (London, 1911). A valuable account of the process by which British authority was established in Northern Nigeria. Paisant, Marcel, Les Droits de la France au Niger, (Paris, 1898). A defense of French rights on the Niger. Typical of French political tracts written at this time. Perham, Margery, Native Administration in Nigeria, (London, 1937). A definitive study of indirect rule in Nigeria. Pinnock, James, Benin, (Liverpool, 1897). A description of Benin and conditions on the coast. Price, H. L. W . , In the Yoruba Province, (Lagos, 1933)· A careful study of the system of land tenure in Yorubaland. Robinson, C. H., Nigeria: Our Latest Protectorate, (London, 1890). Inaccurate. Raphael, John R., Through Unknown Nigeria, (London, 1914). A travel book of slight importance. Salmon, Lieut. Col., Le Massacre de la Mission Mizon far les Anglais, (Paris, no date).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

299

A bitter attack on the policy of the Royal Niger Company. ( 5 7 ) Schultze, D. Α., The Sultanate of Bomu, (London, 1 9 1 3 ) . A translation by P. A . Benton. A description of the climate, fauna, flora, and population. ( 5 8 ) Talbot, Dr. P. Amaury, Life in Southern Nigeria, (London,

(59)

(60) (61 )

(62)

(63)

(64)

(65)

(66)

(67) (68)

1923)· T h e magic, beliefs, and customs of the Ibibio tribes. , The Peoples of Southern Nigeria, 4 vols., (Oxford, 1926). An excellent study of the history, ethnology, and languages of the peoples of Southern Nigeria. , Tribes of the Niger Delta, (London, 1 9 3 2 ) . Ethnology and culture of the Delta peoples. Temple, C . L . , Native Races and Their Rulers, (Cape T o w n , 1918). An analysis of the problem of native administration. T h e author was very influential with Lugard and contributed to the development of the principles and practices of indirect rule. Temple, Mrs. C . L . , Notes on the Tribes, Provinces, Emirates, and States of the Northern Provinces of Nigeria, (Cape T o w n , 1 9 1 9 ) . A second edition was prepared by M r . C. L . Temple, (Lagos, 1 9 2 2 ) . A detailed and valuable study of the history and ethnology of the natives of Northern Nigeria. Thomas, N. W . , Anthropological Report on the I bo-speaking Peoples of Nigeria, (London, 1 9 1 3 — 1 4 ) . An exhaustive study of this important culture group. , Anthropological Report on the Edo-speaking People of Nigeria, 1 vols., (London, 1 9 1 0 ) . This study deals with Benin. Tremearne, Major A . J . N., The Tailed Head Hunters of Nigeria, (Philadelphia, 1 9 1 2 ) . Largely personal but of some value for the anthropologist. , The Niger and the Western Sudan, (London, 1 9 1 0 ) . A guide book which includes a brief historical sketch together with information useful to the anthropologist. , Hausa Superstitions and Customs, (London, 1 9 1 3 ) . Useful for a study of Hausa culture. Vandeleur, Seymour, Campaigning on the Upper Nile and Niger, (London, 1 8 9 8 ) .

300

BRITISH E N T E R P R I S E IN

NIGERIA

An account of the Campaign of 1897 by an officer attached to the expedition. There is a valuable introduction by Sir George Goldie. ( 6 9 ) Wallis, C . B., The Advance of Our West African Empire, (London, 1 9 0 3 ) . Unimportant. ( 7 0 ) Wellesley, Dorothy Lady, Sir George Goldie Founder of Nigeria, (London, 1 9 3 4 ) . An appreciation of Sir George Goldie. While it includes extracts from some of Goldie's letters it is largely personal and of slight value as a serious study of the man. ( 7 1 ) Wiarte, W . E . C. de, Les grandes compagnies coloniales anglaises au XIV Siècle, (Paris, 1 8 9 9 ) . Valuable for the Royal Niger Company. ( 7 2 ) Wilson-Haffenden, J . R., The Red Men of Nigeria, (London, 193°)· A useful study of the Fulani.

AUTOBIOGRAPHIES, AND

BIOGRAPHIES,

JOURNALS,

MEMOIRS

There is a wealth of material on Nigeria available in the form of biographies, journals, and memoirs. T h e author has been fortunate in that he was able to supplement this source of information by personal contacts with many of the men who played a prominent part in the making of Nigeria. ( 1 ) Alexander, Herbert, Boyd Alexander's Last Journey, (London, 1 9 1 2 ) . Impressions of Nigeria gleaned on a journey to Darfur. It is of slight value for a study of Nigeria. ( 2 ) Allen, Capt. William and Thomson, T . R . H., A Narrative of the Expedition to the Niger River in 1841, 2 vols., (London, 1 8 4 8 ) . An account of the Niger Expedition of 1 8 4 1 , written by the Commander of the Wilberforce and one of the medical officers. It is the best source for this famous attempt to suppress the slave trade. ( 3 ) Bailcie, W . B., Exploring Voyage up the River Kworra and Benue, (London, 1 8 5 6 ) .

BIBLIOGRAPHY

301

A n account of the voyage of the Pleiad in 1 8 5 4 by the officer in command of the Expedition. (4)

Bacon, C o m m a n d e r H . , Benin, and N e w Y o r k , 1 8 9 7 ) .

The City of Blood,

(London

A n account of the punitive expedition to Benin in 1897 written by the intelligence officer of the expedition. It is the best account available. (5)

Barth, Henry, Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa, 3 vols., ( N e w Y o r k , 1 8 5 7 ; English edition published by L o n g m a n s and Company, 5 vols., L o n d o n , 1 8 5 7 ) . A n indispensable source for conditions in the Sudan in the mid-nineteenth century.

(6)

Bindloss, H., In the Niger don, 1 8 9 8 ) .

Country,

(Edinburgh and L o n -

(7)

Binger, Captain Louis Gustave, Du Niger au Golfe de far le fays de Kong et le Mossi, (Paris, 1 8 9 2 ) .

Valuable for its excellent description of the N i g e r trade. Guinée,

T h e journal of a well known French explorer and empire builder. (8)

Boisragon, Captain A l a n , 1897).

The

Benin

Massacre,

(London,

(9)

Burdo, Adolphe, A Voyage uf the Niger and Benueh, don, 1 8 8 0 ) . Translation by Mrs. G e o r g e Strange. Unimportant.

A n account of the Benin Massacre by one of the survivors.

(10)

Burton, Sir Richard F . , Wanderings in West Liverfool to Fernando Po, ( L o n d o n , 1 8 6 3 ) .

(Lon-

Africa:

from

A n account of conditions in W e s t A f r i c a by a well k n o w n traveler and explorer. (11)

Caillé, R e n é , Travels Through Central Africa to Timbuctoo and Across the Great Desert to Morocco, 2 vols., ( L o n d o n , 1830). _

(12)

Carnegie, David W . , Letters from Nigeria of the David Wynford Carnegie, I8ÇÇ-IÇOO, (Brechin,

(13)

Clapperton, Captain H u g h , Journal of a Second Exfedition into the Interior of Africa from the Bight of Benin to Soccatoo, (London, 1829).

T h e journal of an important French explorer. Honorable 1902).

Useful account of conditions in Nigeria in the early days.

A valuable account of early exploration in W e s t A f r i c a .

302

BRITISH ENTERPRISE

IN

NIGERIA

( 1 4 ) Cook, William, Journal of W. William Cook, Manuscript in the Colonial Office Library. A member of the expedition of 1 8 4 1 . Graphic description of effects of fever. (15)

Denham, M a j o r Dixon, Clapperton, Captain Hugh, and Dr. Oudney, A Narrative of Travels and Discoveries in Northern and Central Africa in the years of 1822, 1823, and 1824, (London, 1 8 2 6 ) . T h e journal of an important exploring expedition to the Western Sudan.

( 1 6 ) Falconer, J . D., On Horseback Through 1911). A travel book of little importance.

Nigeria,

(London,

( 1 7 ) Flegel, E d w a r d , Vom Niger-Bennue, (Leipsig, 1 8 9 0 ) . Letters from a well-known German agent to his brother describing relations between the Germans and the Royal Niger Company. ( 1 8 ) Fraser, Douglas C . , Impressions—Nigeria 1926). A travel book of little importance. ( 1 9 ) Gibbon, Lewis, Niger, burgh, 1 9 3 4 ) · Limited value. ( 2 0 ) Glover, Lady, Life

The

Life

of Sir John

1925,

of Mungo

Hawley

Park,

Glover,

(London,

(Edin-

(London,

1897)· T h e biography of an important Nigerian pioneer. ( 2 1 ) G w y n n , Steven L . , Life of Mary Kingsley, (London, 1 9 3 2 ) . T h e biography of a famous woman imperialist who exerted through her writings and speeches a large influence on events of the 1 8 9 0 ' s in West Africa. ( 2 2 ) Haddon-Smith, Sir G . B . , Interior Mission to Yorubaland, i8q3, Manuscript in the Colonial Office Library. A n account by an officer attached to Governor Carter's Staff in 1 8 9 3 . ( 2 3 ) Hastings, A . C . G . , Nigerian Days, (London, 1 9 2 5 ) . A n interesting and informing account of the experiences of an administrative officer. (24) Journal

, ( E d . ) , The Voyage of the Daysfring, Being the of the late Sir John Hawley Glover, R. Ν C . M. G.,

BIBLIOGRAPHY

303

together with some accounts of the Expedition up the Niger River in 185J, (London, 1 9 2 6 ) . A n important source for early Nigerian History. ( 2 5 ) Hourst, Lieutenant, Sur le Niger et au pays des Touaregs, (Paris, 1 8 9 8 ) . Translated by Mrs. Arthur Bell, The Exploration of the Niger, (London, 1 8 9 8 ) . A n account of a voyage down the Niger from Timbuktu. T h e author is very critical of the English whom he continually refers to as "our rivals." ( 2 6 ) Hutchinson, T . J . , Narrative of the Niger, Tchadda and Benue Exploration, (London, 1 8 5 5 ) . A n account of the voyage of the Pleiad. T h e expedition was financed by Macgregor Laird. ( 2 7 ) Johnston, Sir Harry, The Story of My Life, (Indianapolis,

(28)

(29)

(30)

(31)

(32)

1923)· T h e memoirs of a famous personality in African history. It is an important source for the early history of Nigeria. Kisch, Martin S., Letters and Sketches from Northern Nigeria, with an introduction by Sir Percy Girouard, (London, 1 9 1 0 ) . Valuable for conditions in Nigeria during Girouard's administration. Laird, Macgregor and Oldfield, R . S. K . , Narrative of an Expedition into the Interior of Africa in 1832, 1833, and 1834, 2 vols., (London, 1 8 3 7 ) . Laird's plan for the development of commerce with Africa. Lander, Richard and John, Journal of an Expedition to Explore the Course and Termination of the Niger, 2 vols., ( L o n don, 1 8 3 8 ) . A n important source for the history of Nigerian exploration. Larymore, Constance, A Resident's Wife in Nigeria, ( L o n don, 1 9 0 8 ) . A very interesting account of the personal experiences of a white woman in Nigeria, 1902—6. Livingston, W . P., Mary Slessor of Calabar, (Garden City,

1923)· T h e biography of a famous missionary to Nigeria. ( 3 3 ) Lumley, Gascoigne, Juju and Justice in Nigeria, (London, 1930)· T h e experiences of Frank Hives, a political officer in Nigeria.

304

BRITISH

ENTERPRISE

IN

NIGERIA

(34) M a c L a c h l a n , T . Banks, Mungo Park, ( E d i n b u r g h , 1898). A brief a n d relatively u n i m p o r t a n t biography of Park.

Mungo

M c W ü l i a m s , J . O . , The Niger Expedition, ( L o n d o n , 1934). A medical history of the Expedition of 1 8 4 1 . Reveals c o n t e m p o r a r y k n o w l e d g e of tropical medicine. (36) M i g e o d , F . W . H . , Through Nigeria to Lake Chad, ( L o n d o n , 1924). A travel book dealing with ethnology. (35)

M o n t e f l , M a j o r P . L . , De Saint-Louis à Tripoli, far le lac Tchad, ( P a r i s , 1894). Reveals very little with respect to the plans of the F r e n c h Foreign Office. (38) P a l m e r , Sir H . R i c h m o n d , Sudanese Memoirs, 3 vols., ( L a gos, 1923). A translation of a n u m b e r of Arabic manuscripts relating to the C e n t r a l a n d W e s t e r n S u d a n . Valuable for a study of native history a n d c u l t u r e . (39) P a r k , M u n g o , Travels in the Interior Districts of Africa, (Philadelphia, 1800). T h e source for M u n g o P a r k ' s first expedition to the N i g e r . (37)

(40)

, The Journal of a Mission to the Interior of Africa in the year 1805, ( L o n d o n , 1815). T h e source f o r M u n g o P a r k ' s second expedition to the N i g e r . (41) Richardson, J a m e s , Narrative of a Mission to Central Africa Performed in the Years 1850—51 under the orders and at the expense of Her Majesty's Government, 2 vols., ( L o n d o n , J a m e s R i c h a r d s o n died in A f r i c a but his journal w a s preserved by H e n r y B a r t h w h o continued his w o r k . (42) Schön, R e v e r e n d J a m e s F . a n d C r o w t h e r , Samuel, Journals of the Reverend James Frederick Schön and Mr. Samuel Crowther, ( L o n d o n , 1842). T h e a u t h o r s w e r e sent by the C h u r c h Missionary Society to a c c o m p a n y the N i g e r Expedition of 1841. (43) Simpson, W i l l i a m , A Private Journal kept during the Niger Expedition, ( L o n d o n , 1843). Personal a n d of little value. (44) T a l b o t , P . A m a u r y , In the Shadow of the Bush, ( G a r d e n City, 1913).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

305

T h e autobiography of an administrative officer interested in anthropology. He is the best authority on the people of Southern Nigeria. ( 4 5 ) Thomson, Joseph, Mungo Park and the Niger, (London, 1890). T h e best biography of Mungo Park written by an African explorer of distinction. ( 4 6 ) Whitford, J . , Trading Lije in West and Central Africa, (Liverpool, 1 8 7 7 ) . A good account of trading conditions on the Niger in the 1870's. PAMPHLETS T h e Colonial Office Library contains a large number of pamphlets of great value. N o attempt has been made to list all of this material, but the more significant items have been included. This list includes several pamphlets available at the British Museum. ( I ) A ffcnrs of the Oil Rivers Protectorate and Niger Territories, (Liverpool, 1 8 9 3 ) . C . O . An example of the numerous attempts to discredit the Royal Niger Company. ( 2 ) African Association Ltd., Application for a Charter for the Oil Rivers. Nigeria Pamphlet No. 3. C . O . Describes an effort made to set up a trading company in the domain of the Royal Niger Company. ( 3 ) Alexander, C . W . , Native Land Tenure in Southern Nigeria. Memo. 1 9 1 0 , Legal Pamphlet No. 26. C . O . A very concise and able summary of the native land system in Southern Nigeria together with recommendations as to the future policy of Government. ( 4 ) Cameron, Sir Donald, A Note on Land Tenure in the Yoruba Province, (Lagos, 1 9 3 3 ) . C . O . A brief statement by a former governor. (5) The Colonial Office and Southern Nigeria African Leaders. West Africa Pamphlet No. 1 5 0 . C . O . A n account of a conference between W . G . A . OrmsbyGore and Southern Nigerian African Leaders. Gives the point of view of the native leaders on economic problems, especially the problem of palm oil production.

3o6

BRITISH

ENTERPRISE

IN

NIGERIA

( 6 ) Dyke, F . M . , Oil Palm Industry in British West Africa. West Africa Pamphlet No. 1 7 2 , ( 1 9 2 7 ) . C . O . Report comparing methods of oil production in British West Africa with other oil producing regions. ( 7 ) Geary, Sir W . M . N . , The Development of Lagos in Fifty Years. Nigeria Pamphlet No. 1 3 , ( 1 9 2 4 ) . C . O . Valuable for the description of the attack on Lagos by the British in 1 8 5 1 . ( 8 ) Goldie, Sir George, Letters Native Christians of Lokoja, Important evidence with Nigeria. (9) , The West African

c. o.

Written to Sir George Goldie by ( 1 8 9 7 ) . C . O. respect to Goldie's social policy in Liquor

Trade,

(London, 1 8 9 5 ) .

A statement by Sir George Goldie to Native Races and Liquor T r a f f i c United Committee with respect to the policy of the Royal Niger Company. ( 1 0 ) Healey, J . J . C . and Rayner, T . C . , Land Tenure in West Africa. West Africa Pamphlet No. 1 9 . C . O . A valuable analysis of a difficult and important subject. ( 1 1 ) Jamieson, Robert, An Appeal Against the Proposed Niger Expedition, (London, 1 8 4 0 ) . Β. M . A letter to L o r d John Russell in which the author opposes the plans of Thomas Folwell Buxton to suppress the slave trade. (12) , A Further Appeal Against the Proposed Niger Expedition, (London, 1 8 4 1 ) . Β. M . Another letter on the same subject. (13) , Sequel to A ppeals A gainst the Niger Expedition, (London, 1 8 4 3 ) . B- M · T h e author comments on failure of Expedition of 1841—42 which he had vigorously opposed. (14) , Commerce with Africa, (London, 1 8 5 9 ) . Β . M . A pamphlet in which author argues that treaties for the suppression of African Slave Trade are ineffective. ( 1 5 ) Lagos Auxiliary of the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society, Land Policy of His Majesty's Government. West Africa Pamphet No. 74. C . O . It is concerned with the rights of the White Cap Chiefs and private landowners in Lagos.

BIBLIOGRAPHY (16)

Maxse, L . J., La Question du Niger.

307

Franco-Anglais

dans la

Bouche

(Paris, 1 8 9 8 ) . C . O .

Translation of an article published in the National

Review

by a well known English writer with extreme nationalistic leanings. Typical of opinion at time of Borgu crisis. (17)

Nigeria: Its History and Products,

(London, 1924). C . O .

Published by the Nigerian Government in connection with the W e m b l e y Exposition. Descriptive and statistical. (18)

O r m s b y - G o r e , R t . Hon. W . G . Α . , Some geria: A Survey of Present-Day

Problems.

Contrasts

in

Ni-

Nigeria Pamphlet

N o . 24. ( 1 9 2 7 ) . C . O . (19)

A n account of native history and culture. Read, Paul, The Niger Expedition, ( L o n d o n , 1 8 4 0 ) . Β . M . A plan to end the slave trade in Africa. Critical of the plans of Buxton.

(20)

, Permanent Africa,

Settlements

on the

Niger

in

Western

( L o n d o n , 1 8 4 0 ) . Β. M .

In which the author urges the establishment of permanent settlements on the Niger to combat the slave trade. (21)

Re-port of Proceedings Section

c. o. (22)

to Major

at a Banquet given by the African

Claude

MacDonald,

(Liverpool,

Trade 1892).

A n excellent illustration of an attempt by a business group to influence colonial policy. The Royal Niger Company's Charter. Nigeria Pamphlet N o . 6, ( 1 8 9 3 ) . C . O . A memorial of the Liverpool C h a m b e r of C o m m e r c e attacking the Company.

(23)

Stephen, Sir George, A Letter to Lord John Russell Niger Expedition, ( L o n d o n , 1 8 4 0 ) . Β . M .

on the

A letter attacking Jamieson w h o had objected to N i g e r E x pedition on grounds that it would hamper trade. (24)

West

c. o.

African

Monopoly.

Nigeria Pamphlet N o . 7,

(1894).

A protest against the policy and tactics of the Royal N i g e r Company. PERIODICALS Numerous articles published in British periodicals constitute an important source of information concerning Nigeria. The Journal of the

3O8

BRITISH E N T E R P R I S E IN

NIGERIA

African Society} West Africa, and Africa are the most valuable. T h e fact that much of this material is contributed by individuals actively engaged in Nigerian affairs renders it of particular importance. T h e listing below should be supplemented by reference to Poole's index to feriodical literature, The Readers' guide to periodical literature, and Subject index to -periodicals since some items of secondary importance have been omitted. ( 1 ) Bourne, R . H. F., " O u r West African Possessions," Gentleman's M agazine, October, 1889. A plea for the further development of British holdings in West Africa. ( 2 ) Clifford, Sir Hugh, "United Nigeria," Journal of the African Society y October, 1 9 2 1 . Does not contribute much to our knowledge of Nigeria. ( 3 ) Cowen, Alexander Α., " T h e story of J a J a , " West Africa, November, 1 9 2 7 . A valuable article dealing with an important episode in the early history of Nigeria. ( 4 ) Darwin, Major Leonard, "Sir George Goldie on Government in Africa," Journal of the African Society, April, 1 9 3 3 . An article based on shorthand notes of an interview with Sir George Goldie in March, 1899. It contains valuable information with respect to this important, but elusive personality. ( 5 ) De Leon, Daniel, " T h e Conference at Berlin on the West African Question," Political Science Quarterly, March, 1886. An article of fundamental importance. ( 6 ) R . E . Dennett, "British and German Trade in Nigeria," United Empire, December, 1 9 1 4 . Contains a considerable amount of pertinent information. ( 7 ) Dudgeon, G . C., "Agriculture and Forest Products of British West Africa," Imperial Institute Handbook, London, 1 9 1 1 . Relatively unimportant. ( 8 ) Fitzpatrick, J . F . L . "Nigeria's Curse, the Native Administration," National Review, December, 1924. An attack on the Nigerian System of Native Administration by a former political officer. ( 9 ) Galway, L t . Col. Sir Henry, "Nigeria in the Nineties," Journal of the African Society. April, 1 9 3 0 . An interesting description of conditions in Southern Nigeria in the 1890's by a well-known political officer.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

309

(10)

, " T h e Rising of the Brassmen," Journal of the African Society, April, 1 9 3 5 . An authoritative article based to some extent on the records as on of Sir John Kirk (Africa No. 3, 1 8 9 3 ) a s personal contact. Galway was the spokesman for the Brass people when Kirk conducted his investigation. ( 1 1 ) Geary, Sir W . Ν. M., "Black Man's Land; the Old and the New Land Policy," National Review, January, 1 9 1 3 . An attack on system of land holding introduced into Northern Nigeria after 1 9 1 0 . (12) , " J a J a , an African Merchant Prince," West Africa, January, 1 9 2 2 . A valuable article which deals with a well-known episode in the early history of Nigeria. O3)

» "Land Tenure and Legislation in British West A f rica," Journal of the African Society, April, 1 9 1 3 . A hostile appraisal of Lugard's land policy. (14) , " T h e Royal Niger Company, Chartered and Limited," West Africa, October, 1920. Similar in content to Chapter V I I of his Nigeria Under British Rule. (15) , "Sir Frederick Lugard and Tropical Africa," West Africa, March, 1922. A review of Lugard's Dual Mandate in British Tro ficai Africa. (16) , " T h e Upper Niger Till 1 8 8 6 , " West Africa, June, July, 1 9 2 3 . Similar in content to Chapter V I of his Nigeria under British Rule. (17)

, " T h e Rule of the Royal Niger Company from 1886 to 1 8 8 9 , " Elder Demfster Magazine, July, 1928. This article deals with the methods of administration in effect during the period of Company rule.

( 1 8 ) Goldsmith, H. S., " T h e Conquest of Sokoto," Elder Demfster Magagne, October, 1928. An important article which deals with the Satiru Affair. (19)

, " T h e River Niger—Macgregor Laird and Those Who Inspired Him," Journal of the African Society, October, 1932.

310

(20)

(21)

(22)

(23)

(24)

(25)

(26)

(27)

(28)

(29) '"(3°)

(31)

BRITISH ENTERPRISE IN NIGERIA An interesting and authoritative account of a Nigerian pioneer and business man. , "Nigeria, Past, Present—and Future," West Africa, November, 1930. Some points of contrast in Nigeria old and new. , "The Agricultural Patch," Elder Demfster Magazme, March, 1928. Deals with the problem of agricultural labor. , "Wanted for Nigeria—A Governor with an Agricultural Bent," privately printed. Stresses the need for practical training in agriculture. Hammond, Capt. F. N., "The Completion of the Baro-Kano Railway," Royal Engineers' Journal, October, 1911. Highly technical. Lugard, F. D., Sir, (Now Lord), "British West African Possessions," Blackwood's Magazine, June, 1895. A general account of British holdings in West Africa by the founder of modern Nigeria. , "An Expedition to Borgu," Proceedings of the Royal Geograf hie Society, September, 1895. Lugard's own account of the race to Nikki. , "Journey in West Africa and Some Points of Contrast," Scottish Geographical Magazine, December, 1895. An article which sheds considerable light on Anglo-French rivalry in Borgu. , "The Struggle for Borgu," Blackwood's Magazine, March, 1898. An important article dealing with the Borgu Crisis of 1897. Mance, Captain Harry O., "Baro-Kano Railway Construction," Royal Engineers' Journal, April, 1911. Technical. Perham, Margery, "Census of Nigeria, 1 9 3 1 A f r i c a , October, 1933. A digest of the Nigerian Census of 1931. > "A Re-Statement of Indirect Rule," Africa, July, 1934· A defense of the system of indirect rule by an outstanding authority. ) "Some Problems of Indirect Rule in Africa," Journal of the Royal Society of Arts, May, 1934.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

(32)

(33)

(34)

(35)

(36)

(37)

(38)

311

A general discussion of indirect rule in Africa and some of its problems. Robinson, Rev. Charles H., "Hausaland," The Geographical Journal, September, 1 8 9 6 . A description of the geography of Northern Nigeria. Salmon, C . S., "British Settlements in W e s t Africa," Contemporary Review, September, 1 8 8 5 . Useful. Tomlinson, Sir George J . F . , " T h e Native Administration in Nigeria," Elder Demfster Magazine, October, 1 9 2 8 . Excellent. Thomson, Sir Graeme, "Administrative Development in Nigeria," Journal of the African Society, July, 1 9 2 7 . An article written by a former governor of Nigeria. Thomson, Joseph, "Downing Street Versus Chartered Companies in Africa," Fortnightly Review, August, 1 8 8 9 . This article deals with the British East Africa Company and the British South Africa Company as well as the Royal Niger Company. , " U p the Niger to the Central Soudan," Good Words, 1 8 8 6 , passim. T h e account of Thomson's treaty making expedition undertaken in 1 8 8 5 . An important source of information. Vandeleur, Seymour, "Nupe and Illorin," Journal of the Royal Geographical Society, October, 1 8 9 7 . An article dealing with the Campaign of 1 8 9 7 conducted by the Royal Niger Company against Nupe and llorín written by an officer attached to the army.

( 3 9 ) Wallace, William, "Notes on a Journey Through the Sokoto Empire and Borgu in 1 8 9 4 , " The Geographical Journal, September, 1 8 9 6 . Wallace was Agent General of the Royal Niger Company. T h e article is descriptive of the country and the people but unfortunately contains little important information. ( 4 0 ) Westlake, John, "England and France in West Africa," Contemporary Review, April, 1 8 9 8 . An authoritative article dealing with conflicting claims in West Africa.

312

BRITISH E N T E R P R I S E IN DOCUMENTARY

NIGERIA

SOURCES

T h e more important documentary sources include the Parliamentary Papers (Blue Books), the Publications of the Nigerian Government, the Colonial Reports, Annual, and the Records of the Royal Niger Comfany. There are important documentary materials in the possession of the British Foreign Office but only a few of them are accessible to scholars. T h e list of Parliamentary Pafers includes only those that have been used extensively in this study. It should be supplemented by the Dominions Office and Colonial Office List, 1862 to date and the Subject Catalogue of the Library of the Royal Empire Society. ( I ) Aba Disturbances, Comments by Lieutenant Governor, Southem Provinces, (Lagos, 1 9 3 1 ) . Lengthy statement by Lieutenant Governor of Southern Provinces in which he takes issues with many findings of Aba Commission of Inquiry. Hostile to work of Commission. (2) , Aba Commission of Inquiry, Notes of Evidence taken by the Commission of Inquiry appointed to inquire into the Disturbances at Calabar and Owerri Provinces, December, 1929. Nigeria Sessional Paper, No. 9 of 1 9 3 1 , (Lagos, 1 9 3 1 ) . There are 992 pages of testimony in this important document. (3) , Despatch dated 2jth January, 1931, from the Secretary of State to the Officer administrating the Government of Nigeria regarding the Report of the Commission of Inquiry. (Cmd. 3784, 1 9 3 1 ) . Opinion of Secretary of State for the colonies regarding the work of the Aba Commission of Inquiry. (4) , Report of the Commission of Inquiry appointed to inquire into the Disturbances in the Calabar and Owerri Provinces, December, 1929. Nigeria Sessional Paper, No. 28 of 1930, (Lagos, 1 9 3 0 ) . The report of the first commission appointed to investigate the Aba Disturbances. (5) An Account of the Dispute at Opobo between King Ja Ja and Consular Authority, (London, 1 8 8 8 ) . Important correspondence relating to the deposition of King J a J a by Vice Consul Johnston, especially correspondence between Lord Salisbury and Miller Brothers. This was pre-

BIBLIOGRAPHY

313

pared by Alexander Miller & Brothers and was used in Parliament to discredit Johnston. ( 6 ) British Documents on the Origins of the War, Gooch, George P. and Temperley, Harold, ( E d s . ) , Vol. I , ch. 1 5 , Vol. I I , ch. 4. (London, 1 9 2 7 ) . Foreign Office documents dealing with the Borgu Crisis of 1897—98 together with the formation of the Entente of 1 9 0 4 . ( 7 ) Cameron, Sir Donald, The Principles of Native Administration and Their /ifplication, (Lagos, 1 9 3 4 ) . A document of fundamental importance. It was designed to be a guide to administrative officials and supplements Lugard's Political Memoranda. ( 8 ) Colonial Office, Re-port of Colonel OrdThe Commission appointed to inquire into the condition of the British Settlements on the West Coast of Africa, 1865. Report of the committee together with proceedings and minutes of Evidence. ( 9 ) Colonial Reports, Annual, Niger Coast Protectorate, 1891— 1899. , —, Northern Nigeria, 1900—1914. , —, Southern Nigeria, 1900—1914. , —, Nigeria, 1914 to date. These reports constitute one of the most valuable sources of information available. ( 1 0 ) Departmental Reports. Annual reports from the several administrative departments in Nigeria. Summarized in the Colonial Reports cited above. ( 1 1 ) Goldie, Sir George, Report on the Niger-Sudan Campaign, 1897. Official Report by Sir George Goldie to the Earl of Scarbrough, Deputy Governor, Royal Niger Company, of the Niger-Sudan Campaign of 1 8 9 7 . Treaties with Bida and llorín are included. ( 1 2 ) Hertslet, Sir E d w a r d , The Map of Africa by Treaty, 3 vols., (London, 1 8 9 4 ) . This important collection of African treaties is indispensable. ( 1 3 ) Hodges, Frances E . , ( E d . ) Consular Jurisdiction in Her Majesty's Protectorate of the Niger Coast, (London, 1 8 9 5 ) . A n analytical index of the African Orders in Council of

3H

BRITISH

ENTERPRISE

IN

NIGERIA

1 8 8 9 , 1 8 9 2 , and 1 8 9 3 , which form basis for the British a d ministrative system established in Southern Nigeria. L e g a l and technical. (14)

I r v i n g , R . F . , Titles ments,

(London,

in Land

in Nigeria,

Collective

Enact-

1916).

A collection of Nigerian L a n d L a w s produced to facilitate investigation of titles to land. G o o d summary of land l a w s to 1916. (15)

Johnston, Sir H . H . , Report Rivers District,

on the Niger

Delta

and the

Oil

1888.

C o n f i d e n t i a l report by Consul Johnston. G e o g r a p h y of region, description of natives, customs, history, trade, etc. (16)

L a w s of N i g e r i a . (A)

Annual

volumes

of Ordinances,

Orders,

Rules,

Regu-

lations. F o r 1 9 2 3 and subsequently. (B)

Laws

of the

Colony

of Southern

Nigeria,

2 vols.,

( L o n d o n , 1 9 0 8 ) , Superseded by C . A codification of the laws of Southern Nigeria a n d L a g o s compiled by E d w i n A . Speed and James E . Green. (C)

Laws of Nigeria,

Vols. I - I V , ( L a g o s , 1 9 2 3 ) .

Contains all laws of Nigeria in force in 1 9 2 2 , but not l a w s which have been repealed. (D)

Laws

of Northern

Nigeria

1910,

(London,

1910),

Superseded by C . Codification of laws of N o r t h e r n Nigeria by E d w i n A . Speed. Contains l a w s in force to end of 1 9 1 0 . (E)

Nigeria

General

Orders,

(Lagos,

1931).

Rules and regulations g o v e r n i n g and

controlling

administrative officials. (F)

Nigeria Law Reforts,

IQ08—31.

Selections f r o m the cases decided in the F r e e C o u r t s of the C o l o n y and Protectorate of Nigeria. (G)

Nigeria.

Orders

ment Notices,

in Council,

Regulations,

Rules,

Gov-

etc.

T h i s is V o l . I V of C above. (H)

Northern

Nigerian

Laws, in Force

ist October

1Ç04.

Superseded by D . Codification of l a w s of N o r t h e r n Nigeria to 1 9 0 4 .

BIBLIOGRAPHY

3»5

( I ) Northern Nigeria, Proclamations, içoo—iqi3, 3 vols. Contains early proclamations and ordinances. It may have been superseded or amended by subsequent legislation. Arranged chronologically. ( J ) Southern Nigeria, Proclamations and Ordinances. 18Ç4—1913, 6 vols. Arranged chronologically. ( K ) Southern Nigeria, Proclamations. 1900—1904, 2 vols. Collection of proclamations issued during these years. Arranged chronologically. (L) Southern Nigeria, Proclamations, Orders, Rules, Native Council Rules and Orders in Council. 1904— /905, 2 vols. Arranged chronologically. (M) Supplement to Laws of Nigeria, 1924—1933. Discontinued in 1 9 3 3 . ( 1 7 ) Lugard, Sir Frederick D., (Now Lord), Revision of Instructions to Political Officers. (Lagos, 1 9 1 8 ) . Memoranda originally written by Lugard and published in book form in September 1906. After amalgamation they were revised and published in August 1 9 1 8 . These memoranda were for confidential circulation among political officers and were designed to promote continuity and uniformity of policy and to serve as a guide in the interpretation and application of ordinances and regulations. ( 1 8 ) MacDonald, Major Claude M . Report by Major MacDonald of his visit as Her Majesty's Commissioner to the Niger and Oil Rivers, March, 1890. MacDonald was authorized by the Foreign Office to investigate the Royal Niger Company, partly as a result of pressure by rival concerns and partly as a result of a protest from Bismarck. (19) , Memorial of Inhabitants of Lagos to Major Claude M. MacDonald, (Lagos, 1 8 8 9 ) . Reflects the attitude of certain Europeanized natives toward the Royal Niger Company. ( 2 0 ) Niger Company, Limited, Reports and Accounts and Notices to Shareholders, 1888—1918. T h e most important source for the history of the Niger Company. T h e Report of Proceedings, featured by the address of the Governor is most valuable.

316

BRITISH ENTERPRISE

IN

NIGERIA

(21)

, Royal Niger Constabulary, Standing Orden with Constabulary Amendment Regulations, (London, 1 8 9 7 ) . An important source for Company history. ( 2 2 ) Official Publications of the Nigerian Government. ( A ) Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria, Minutes of Legislative Council, (Lagos, annual). Records of the Legislative Council of Lagos which, in 1 9 2 3 , was enlarged to include the representatives from the Southern Provinces. Includes address by the Governor which frequently is printed separately. ( B ) Legislative Council Debates, (Lagos, Annual). T h e Colonial Office Library is in possession of the debates from 1 9 1 4 . ( C ) Nigeria Blue Book. Statistical. It begins in 1900 for Northern Nigeria, in 1862 for Lagos, and in 1900 for Southern Nigeria. ( D ) The Nigerian Census of 1931, 7 volumes, (Lagos,

(E)

(F)

(G)

(H) (I)

1932). Fundamental. Nigeria Handbook, (Lagos, 1 9 1 7 to date). Published at intervals of three to four years. A valuable source. The Nigeria Gazette. (1) Lagos Government Gazette, 1 8 8 1 - 1 9 0 0 . ( 1 ) Northern Nigeria Gazette, 1 9 0 0 - 1 9 1 3 . ( 2 ) Southern Nigeria Gazette, 1902— 1 9 1 3 . ( 4 ) Nigeria Gazette, 1 9 1 4 to date. The Nigeria Gazette Extraordinary, (Lagos, 1 9 2 0 ) . Published by Gov. Clifford in which he outlined his new administrative system. Nigeria Sessional Papers, (Lagos, 1 9 1 2 to date). Papers laid before Legislative Council. Proceedings of the Nigerian Council, (Lagos, 1914— 23)·

T h e Records of the Nigerian Council established by Governor Lugard in 1 9 1 4 and abolished by Governor Clifford in 1 9 2 3 . ( 2 3 ) Ormsby-Gore, T h e Hon. W . G . Α., Refort by the Hon. W. G. A. Ormsby-Gore on His Visit to West Africa During the Year 1926, (London, 1 9 2 6 ) .

BIBLIOGRAPHY

317

An extremely useful survey of conditions in British West Africa. ( 2 4 ) Parliamentary Papers. 1 8 5 2 , Vol. 54, Papers relative to the Reduction of Imagos by Her Majesty's Forces on the West Coast of Africa. T h e best source for a study of the British attack on Lagos in 1 8 5 1 . 1 8 6 1 , Vol. 4 1 , Papers relative to the Occupation of Lagos. T h e documents concerned with the annexation of Lagos in 1 8 6 1 . 1 8 6 2 , Vol. 6 1 , Dr. Baikie, R.N. to Lord J.Russell. Indispensable for study of early British activities in the Niger Valley. 1 8 8 5 , Vol. 55, Correspondence with Her Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin Respecting West Africa Conference. (Africa No. 2 ) , c. 4284. Concerned mostly with the Congo. 1 8 8 5 , Vol. 55, Correspondence respecting the West African Conference at Berlin. (Africa No. 7 ) , c. 4284. Papers relating to calls of Berlin Conference after powers had protested the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty. 1 8 8 5 , Vol. 55, Further Correspondence respecting the West African Conference. (Africa No. 2 ) , c. 4360. Slight importance. 1 8 8 5 , Vol. 55, Protocol and General Act of the West African Conference. (Africa No. 4 ) , c. 4 3 6 1 . This is the key document for the Berlin Conference. 1886, Vol. 47, General Act of the Conference of Berlin. (Africa No. 3 ) , c. 4739. This treaty is also printed in Hertslet. 1888, Vol. 74, (Africa No. 2 ) , Papers relative to King Ja Ja of Opobo, and to the opening of the West African Markets to British trade. Cmd. 5365. The correspondence dealing with the case of King J a J a . Fundamental. 1890, Vol. 50, General Act of the Brussels Conference. c. 6048. A valuable collection of papers concerned with the Brussels Conference of 1890 called to study the problem of the liquor trade in Africa.

B R I T I S H E N T E R P R I S E IN N I G E R I A 1892, Vol. 56, (Africa No. 7 ) , c. 6701. The text of the Treaty of 1890 which delimited the northern frontier of Nigeria. 1893, Vol. 62, West Africa (Lagos) Despatch from Sir Gilbert Carter, K. C. M. G., furnishing a general report of the Lagos interior Expedition, 1893; with reply from the Secretary of State, c. 7227. This report is the principal source for Carter's operations in the hinterland of Lagos. 1895, Vol. 7 1 , (Africa No. 1 ) , Refort on the Administration of the Niger Coast Protectorate, August 1891 to August 1894. c· 7596. This report also appears in the Colonial Reforts, Annual. 1895, Vol. 7 1 , (Africa No. 3 ) , Correspondence respecting the disturbances in Benin and the operations against the Chief Nana, 1894. c. 7638. The principal source for the operations against Nana. 1896, Vol. 59, (Africa No. 3 ) , Report by Sir John Kirk on disturbances at Brass, c. 7977. This is the report of Sir John Kirk who headed a commission appointed to investigate the Royal Niger Company. 1897, Vol. 6o, (Africa No. 6), Correspondence relating to the war with Benin, c. 8677. The best source for the campaign against Benin. 1897, Vol. 62, Liquor Trade in West Africa, c. 8480. Correspondence between Joseph Chamberlain and the chambers of commerce in several English cities. 1899, Vol. 63, Royal Niger Company, c. 9372. This is a very important document for any study of the Royal Niger Company. It contains the correspondence relative to the revocation of the charter, the balance sheets of the Company during the period 1887-98, and an account of revenue and expenditures. 1899, Vol. 63, (Africa No. 7 ) , Correspondence respecting African Liquor Traffic Convention, signed at Brussels, June 8,1899. c. 9335. Important source for study of the liquor problem. 1899, Vol. 63, Correspondence relating to the Benin Territory expedition, 1899. c. 9529.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

319

Important documents relative to conquest of Benin. 1899, Vol. 1 0 9 , Convention between the United. Kingdom and France for the delimitation of their respective possessions to the West of the Niger, c. 9334. T h e text of the Convention of 1898. 1906, Vol. 78, Correspondence relating to the Railroad Construction in Nigeria. Cd. 2787. Important source for the economic history of Nigeria. 1909, Vol. 60, Further correspondence relating to the Railroad Construction in Nigeria. Cd. 4 5 2 3 . This supplements the item listed above. 1909, Vol. 60, Report of a Committee of Inquiry into the Liquor Trade in Southern Nigeria. Cd. 4906 and Cd. 4907. Fundamental for study of this social problem. 1 9 1 0 , Vol. 44, Report of the Northern Nigeria Lands Committee. Cd. 5 1 0 2 - 5 1 0 3 . T h e report of this committee laid the basis for the Nigerian system of land tenure. 1 9 1 9 , Vol. 36, Report on the Amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria. Cmd. 468. Fundamental for study of the reorganization initiated in 1914.

INDEX Aba Riots, 259ff. Abadie, Captain, ι 68 Abdulla, (the K h a l i f a ) , 107, 1 5 1 Abeokuta, 196 Aberdare, Lord, defense of Royal Niger Company, 98; Mizon A f fair, 1 3 4 ; President of Royal Niger Company, 83 Aborigines Protection Society, 106 Abubekr Garbai, 1 5 1 Accra, trial of J a J a at, 65 Adenyi-Jones, Dr. C. C., 254, 2 5 7 ; land tenure, 265 Administration, costs of, 2 8 i f . Advisory Council, 259 Africa, as a field of research, 8 ; reasons for partition of, 47, 2 9 5 ^ ; rivers of, 2 African Association, interest in exploration, 24, 29; the Royal Niger Company, 101 "African Policy," 287 Agent General, 93, 96 Agreement of 1890, 107 Agriculture, control of prices, 2 8 5 ^ ; importance of, 231 Agriculture, Department of, 2 3 3 ; experiments in cotton growing, 2 3 5t. Ajele, 168 Akassa, 92; attack on, 1 0 1 , 103 Akitoye, restoration of, 50 Alaki, 196 Alexander Miller & Brothers, and the J a J a A f f a i r , 6off. ; relations with Royal Niger Company, 1 0 1 Alieu, Sultan of Sokoto, i j ô f . Alkalis, 170 Alkalis courts, 203f. Allen, Captain William, association with Macgregor Laird, 39; Expedition of 1 8 4 1 , 41 f.

Amalgamated Association, with J a J a , 6off. Amalgamation, reasons for, Ambas Bay, 87 Anglo-French Agreement I32f. Anglo-French Convention 14+f. Anglo-Portuguese Treaty

relations 191 fF. of

1890,

of

1898,

of

1884,

123 Angra Pequeña, 1 1 8 Anthropology, and indirect rule, 242, 288 Arab slave trade, 5, 34 Arnold, Major, 107 Aro, suppression of, 76f. Aro Chuko, 76 Asaba, 92; the Landers at, 39 Ashanti Campaign, 1 5 0 Atahiru, 1 6 1 , 173

Badagry, Clapperton at, 3 7 ; Richard Lander at, 38 Baikie, Dr. W. B., consul at Lokoja, 44 J extension of British influence in Nigeria, 79 fF. ; Pleiad Expedition, 43 ; voyage of the Daysf ring, 44 Baloguns, 109 Banks, Sir Joseph, 25 Bantu, 1 2 Baro-Kano Railroad, 221 Barth, Dr. Henry, 3 5 ; exploration of the Sudan, 42ÎÏ. ; 169, 238 Basler Mission, 129 Bauchi, Emir of, 1 5 2 Bauchi Plateau, 10 ; peoples of, 13 Bebeji, 159 Beecroft, John, Consul at Fernando Po, 43 ; intervention at Lagos, 49f. Bello, Sultan of Sokoto, 3 6f.

322

INDEX

Benin, conquest of, 72ÍÍ. j Kingdom of, 72 Benin River, English contacts with, 1 1 Benue River, description of, 1 1 ; discovery of, 4 i f . Berlin Act of 1885, 86, 88, 99, i i ^ f f . Berlin Conference of 1 8 8 4 - 8 5 , 58, 85, 1 4 z ; British claims at, 84} description of, ι » 3flF.; and liquor traffic, 104, 2 1 3 ; success of, 1 2 7 Betikuta, 1 4 1 Bida, Emir of, 163 ; battle at, 108 Bight of Benin, climate of, 1 1 Binger, 1 2 1 Bismarck, Count Herbert, i 2 8 f . Bismarck, Otto von, acquisition of German Southwest Africa, 1 1 8 ; Anglo-Portuguese treaty of 1884, 1 2 3 ; attitude toward colonies, 1 1 7 ; complaints against Royal Niger Company, 9 9 0 . ; negotiations concerning Cameroons, i 2 8 f f . Borgu, Anglo-French rivalry in, i 3 6 f f . ; Convention of 1898, i n ; Crisis of 1 8 9 7 - 9 8 , 1 1 5 j diplomatic negotiations concerning, i43ff. ; public opinion concerning, 1 4 1 f. Bornu, Kingdom of, 1 5 ; pacification OÍ, I 5 2 Í . Brass, people of, 1 0 1 5 relations with British, I0 2Í. ; relations with French, 102 Brass River, 39 Brazza, Savorgnan de, 7, 1 2 2 , 1 3 4 British Cameroons, deficits in, 247 British Cameroons Administrative Ordinance, 246 British and Foreign Antislavery Society, 109 British Cotton Growing Association, 224, 235 British East India Company, 23 Brussels Act of 1890, 105 Brussels Conference of 1890, 1 0 5 , 213ÎÏ. Buchan, Mr., 128 Burdon, Major J . Α . , 1 6 4 ; and indirect rule, 180, 188

Bureaucracy, 249, 269fr. Burmi, affair at, 163 Bussa, death of Mungo Park at, 321 Emir of, 1 0 7 ; Landers at, 38 Buxton, Thomas Folwell, agitation against slave trade, 4of., 49 Cabot, John, 20 Cambon, Paul, 146 Cameron, Sir Donald, 289; criticism of his judicial reforms, 255 ; Governor of Nigeria, 2 j o ; Memorandum on Native Administration, 2 5 0 ; policies in Nigeria, 2 5 0 ® . ¡ position of Residents, 2 5 0 ¡ reform of judicial system, i s j ß . Cameroon Mountain, 10 Cameroons, as a mandate, 245 fr. ¡ British activities in, i i 6 f f . ; conquest of, 2 4 4 ; delimitation of frontier, 1 2 7 , 1 2 9 f f . , 13 i f . ¡ international rivalry in, i i 6 f f . ¡ occupation of by Germans, i i g f f . Cameroons Province, 246 "Capitalistic Policy," 287 Cargill, Dr., 187 Carter, Sir Gilbert, pacification of Yorubas, J 3 f . ¡ railroad construction, 2 i 9 f . ; relations with llorín, Sif-

Castlereagh, Lord, 48 Centers of Administration, 69 Central Departments, 199 Centralization, 272 Chamberawa, 160 Chamberlain, Joseph, French claims in Borgu, I 3 9 Í L ; liquor traffic, 2 i 4 f . ¡ Nigerian policy, 75, 1 1 0 ; railroad construction, 2 2 0 ; theories of colonial development, 1 4 9 ; views on imperialism, 278f. Champion Gold Reefs of West Africa, Limited, 229 Chief Justice, 206 Chief Secretary, 1 9 8 ; duties of, 248 Clapperton, Captain Hugh, first expedition to Sudan, 34.iT. ; second expedition to Sudan, 36f.

INDEX Clarendon, Lord, suppression of slave trade, 49 Clifford, Sir Hugh, administrative changes, 2 4 8 f r . ; attitude toward Lugard, 2 4 7 ; centralization, 199 ; controversy with Leverhulme, 262fr.; Nigerian Council, 2 i o f . ; principles of administration, 2 4 9 ^ ; trusteeship, 2 3 2 ; views on educated Africans, 256 Climate, description o f , i f f . ; and efficiency, 2 6 9 ^ ; precautions against, 44

Coal, 228 Colonial Office, attitude toward Cameroons chiefs, 1 1 7 ; railroad construction, 220 Commerce, stages in development of, 236ff. Commercial interests, influence o f , 277ff. Committee of Control, 243 Committee of 1 8 6 5 , report of, 5 j f . Compagnie du Senegal et de la Côte Occidentale d' Afrique, 83 Compagnie française de l ' A f r i q u e equatorial, 83 Communications Board, 222 Conciliar Authority, 270 Congress of Vienna, prohibition of slave trade, 48 Consul General, abolition in Southern Nigeria, 75 Continuity, 2 7 i f . Cotton, production o f , 2 3 5 ^ Court of Equity, 59, 1 1 6 Cromer, Lord, 146 Cross River, 1 2 9 Crown Lands, 223 Crown Lands Proclamation of

1902,

" 3

323

Denton, Captain G . C., pacification of Yorubas, 5 3 Departments, as organized by M a c Donald, 70 Departmental Officers, 249 ; relations with administrative officers, 2 j o Departmental system, i i 8 f . Deputy Governor, 198 Derby, Lord, 1 1 8 Diaz, Bartholomew, 19 Dieppe, 1 20 D i k w a , 246 District Agents, 96 District officers, duties of, 2oof. ; relationship to courts, 207 Docemo, British relations with, 5 c f . Domestic slavery, tee slavery Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, influence o f , 2 6 7 ^ , 2 7 1 Durbar, 258 Dutch West India Company, 23 Dyer, Lieutenant, 159 East A f r i c a , campaign in, 244 Economic development, summary o f , 24of. Economic revolution, in West A f r i c a , *3