Britain, France and the Arab Middle East, 1914-1920

Table of contents :
Preface
Contents
Abbreviations
I. Introduction: Britain and France in the Arab Middle East before the Outbreak of War in 1914
II. From the Outbreak of the War 1914 to the Partition of Asiatic Turkey 1916: End of the Policy of Conservation
III. From the Agreement of 1916 to the Armistice of 1918: Questioning the Sykes-Picot Partition
IV. The Situation in the Arab Middle East in November 1918
V. Preparation of British Peace Aims in December 1918
VI. Preliminaries to the Peace Conference
VII. The Arab Question Embroils the Conference
VIII. Deterioration in Anglo-French Relations regarding the Syrian Settlement
IX. Provisional Agreement of September 1919
X. Failure of Faisal
XI. Re-establishment of the Entente in the Arab Middle East
XII. San Remo and After
Appendices
Appendix A. The Anglo-French Agreement of 1916
Appendix B. The Anglo-French Declaration of 7 November 1918
Appendix C. Aide-Mémoire in regard to the Occupation of Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia pending the Decisionin regard to Mandates
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

University o f London H istorical Studies

XXIII

U N I V E R S I T Y O F L O N D O N H I S T O R I C A L S T U D IE S i. HUGH t in k e r .

T h e Foundations o f L oca l Self-G overnm ent in In d ia , P akistan and Burm a. 1954

il. avrom SALTMAN.

Theobald, Archbishop o f Canterbury.

1956

m . r . F. L e slie . P o lish P o litics and the R evolution o f Novem ber 18 3 0 . 1956 iv . w . n. MEDLicoTT. B ism arck, Gladstone, and the Concert o f Europe. 1956

v.

John l y n c h . Spanish

C olon ial A dm inistration 17 8 0 -18 10 : T h e In tendont System in the Viceroyalty o f the R io de la P la ta . 1958

vi. f. h. w . Sh e p p a r d . L oca l Government in

S t. M arylebone, 16 8 8 -18 3 5 .

*95» v u . R. L. greaves . P ersia and the D efence o f India, 18 8 4 -18 9 0 .1959 v in . M. j. Syd en h am . T h e G irondins. 1961 ix . Ma r g a r e t h o w e l l . R egolion R ig h t in M edieval E ngland. 1963 x.

n. M. svthh . ri . a k d . T h e French Secretaries o f Sta te in the A ge o f Catherine de M ed ici.

1963

x i. owYN a . w illia m s . M ed ieval London: from Commune to C a p ita l. 1963 x ii.

Ch a r le s d u o o a N. Tw elfth-century D ecretal C ollections and their Im port­ ance in E n g lish H istory. 1963

x iii. r . F. Leslie .

Reform and Insurrection in R ussian P ola n d 18 5 6 -18 6 5 .

*963 x iv . j. a . s. Gr e n v il l e . L ord Salisbury and Foreign P o lity . 1964 x v . p. w . j. Ril e y . T h e E n g lish M in isters and Scotland 17 0 7 -1 7 0 7 .1964 x v i. j. f. BOSHER. T h e Sin g le D u ty P ro ject: A Study o f the M ovem ent fo r a French Custom s U nion in the Eighteenth Century. 1964 x v ii. x v iii.

jO A tiu cn o iiA h T > .R o u sse a u a n d th e F r e n ch R e o o lu tio n i7 6 n -i7 9 i.

1965

IAN H. Nish .

T h e Anglo-Japanese A llia n ce: T h e D iplom acy q f Tw o Isla n d Em pires, 18 9 4 -19 0 7 .1966

x ix . w il l ia m URRY. Canterbury under the Angevin K in g s. 1967

x x . Ph y l l is m. HEMBRY.

T h e B ishops o f B a th and W ells 15 4 0 -16 4 0 . S ocia l and Econom ic Problem s. 1967

x x i. n. M. F A R R i s s .

Crown and Clergy in C olon ial M exico 1 7 5 9 -1 8 0 1 : T h e C risis o f E cclesia stica l P rivileg e. 1968

x x ii. DEMETRios i. polem is . Prosopograply. 1968 x x iii. Ju k k a NEVAKivi. 19 0 0 . 1969

T h e D o u ka i: A Contribution to B yzantine

B rita in , France and the A rab M id d le E a st 1 9 1 4 -

Britain, France and the Arab Middle East

1914-1920

This volume is published with the help o f a grant from the late Miss Isobel Thom ley’s Bequest to the University o f London

Britain, France and the

Arab Middle East 1914-192° by

JU K K A NEVAKIVI

U N IV E R SITY

OF

TH E A TH LO N E 1969

LONDON

PR ESS

THE ATHLONB PRESS UNIVERSITY OF LONDON a t a Gow er Street London w ci D istribu ted by Constable & Co L td io Orange Street London WC2 Canada O xford U niversity P ress Toronto U .S .A . O xford U niversity P ress In c N ew York

© Jukka Nevakivi, 1969 485 I 7I I 3 9

P rinted in G reat B rita in ly A lden & M ow bray L td at the A lden P ress, O xford

PREFACE are forgotten wars and forgotten peacemakings, the M iddle Eastern operations against Turkey, ending in 1918, and their diplom atic aftermath truly belong amongst them. Con­ sequently, the policies in this area o f the two great allied powers, Britain and France, are often neglected as a sideshow o f their relations in the European theatre o f peace, though events in Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia were not without influence on the main drama. For historians the subject remains to a great extent virgin soil. Though several books have been written on the peace settle­ ment in the Arab M iddle East in 1918-20, only one, Henry H. Cum ming’s The Franco-British Rivalry in the post-war Middle East (London, 1938), deals essentially with the Anglo-French relations in the area. Clear and sharp analysis though it was, this pioneer study has undoubtedly become out o f date. By now, nearly thirty years after its publication, although the official French archives o f the peace conference period and some promising private sources are still closed for research, a con­ siderable amount o f unpublished prim ary material from British and American sources is available, and a better documented interpretation o f the theme is possible. In addition to Cumming’s book there are four prominent monographs on the peace settlement in the M iddle East. The earliest, England and the Middle East (London, 1956) by Elie Kedourie, treats in an excellent w ay the development o f British policies as resulting from the ideas and activities o f brilliant political officers on the spot. But M r Kedourie does not push his analysis into the larger context o f Anglo-French relations as framed by the peace conference realities. Nor does D r Zeine, whose book The Struggle for Arab Independence (Beirut, i960), deals m ainly with the martyrdom o f the A rab government of Damascus. The valuable studies by Leonard Stein, The Balfour Declaration (London, 1961), and by H arry N . Howard, The I

f th ere

vüi

PREFACE

King-Crane Commission (Beirut, 1963), on their part, do not cover the entire subject under present consideration. The purpose o f the present work is to examine the back­ ground o f Anglo-French relations in the Arab M iddle East at the end o f the W ar o f 1914-18; the development o f AngloFrench relations as affected by a new British M iddle East policy during the peace settlement in 1919; and the conse­ quences o f this interaction— resulting from a re-appraisal o f the situation by the British government in bringing about a parti­ tion o f the A rab provinces o f the Ottom an empire, settled upon at the Conference o f San Remo in A pril 1920. This book is a revised version o f my thesis ‘British relations with France in 1919-1920, with special emphasis on the Arab M iddle East’ submitted for the degree o f Ph.D. to the U ni­ versity o f London in 1963. The opportunity has been taken to make the very few alterations necessitated by reference to the official British material o f the years 1916-20 made available in 1966, but in actual fact the bulk o f the relevant public records now opened was already to be found in the private and Cana­ dian archives to which I had access when writing my thesis. The translations o f French or German documents quoted in the text and in the footnotes are mine, if not otherwise specified. I acknowledge with gratitude the financial support o f the British Council which enabled me to carry out my research in Britain, and a grant from the Trustees o f the Isobel Thom ley Bequest to assist publication. I should like to express sincere thanks to the late Professor A rvi Korhonen, my former teacher at the University o f Helsinki, and to my supervisors at the London School o f Economics, the late D r W . W . Gottlieb and Professor W . N. M edlicott, for their friendly and scholarly guidance. The latter encouraged me to revise my thesis for publication and made many valuable suggestions during the preparation o f the manuscript. I wish to acknowledge the permission o f the Keeper o f Public Records to quote from unpublished m aterial in the Public Record Office and from documents published by H er M ajesty’s Stationery Office. I wish also to thank the Directors o f the Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris, and the National Archives, Washington D .G ., for the opportunity to

is

PREFACE

make use o f unpublished m aterial in their respective collections. In addition I am deeply indebted to the following for per­ mission to make use o f unpublished prim ary m aterial not available in official archives: M r O . Bonham-Carter for the Asquith Papers and Bodley’s Librarian, Oxford, for the Bryce Papers; the C h ief o f the M anuscript Division, Library o f Congress, Washington D .C . for the Bliss, Bristol, Lansing, and Woodrow Wilson Papers; the Canadian Dominion Archivist for the Borden and Foster Papers; the Librarian o f the Birmingham University Library for the Cham berlain Papers; M r W illiam Deedes, m . p . for the Deedes Papers; the Director o f the Bibliothèque de Documenta­ tion Contemporaine, Paris, for the Guichard mss and the K lotz Papers; Mrs Grace Allen Hogarth for the Hogarth Papers; the Librarian o f the Y ale University Library for the House, Polk, Wiseman, and Y ale Papers; the Librarian o f New College, Oxford, for the M ilner Papers; Sir Richard Sykes for the Sykes Papers, the Librarian o f the Hoover Library, U ni­ versity o f Stanford, Palo A lto, California, for the Westermann Papers; Sir Ronald W ingate for the W ingate Papers. Finally I extend my thanks to all the persons who gave me interviews (their names w ill be found in the Bibliography) and to the staffs o f the various libraries I have consulted for their material assistance and many courtesies. M r M artyn Summerhill has been an indispensable collaborator, helping me to write in a language which is not mine. And without my wife’s help at all stages this book would never have been published. January 1968

J.N .

CONTENTS Abbreviations

xiii

Introduction : Britain and France in the A rab M iddle East before the O utbreak o f W ar in 1914

1

n. From the Outbreak o f the W ar 1914 to the Partition o f Asiatic Turkey 1916: End o f the Policy o f Con­ servation

13

m. From the Agreement o f i9 i6 to th e Armistice o f 1918: Questioning the Sykes-Picot Partition

45

iv . The Situation in the A rab M iddle East in November 1918

68

v . Preparation o f British Peace Aims in December 1918

89

I.

v i. Preliminaries to the Peace Conference vn .

104

The A rab Question Embroils the Conference

126

vm . Deterioration in Anglo-French Relations regarding the Syrian Settlement

148

ix . Provisional Agreement o f September 1919 x . Failure o f Faisal x i. Re-establishment o f the Entente in the A rab M iddle East xn.

San Rem o and After

172 197 220 241

Appendices

261

a . The Anglo-French Agreement of 1916

261

B. The Anglo-French Declaration o f 7 November1918

264

c. Aide-Mémoire in regard to the Occupation o f Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia pending the Decision in re­ gard to Mandates

265

Bibliography

267

Index

279

XU

CO N TE N TS

M APS 1.

Four possible solutions for the settlement in Asiatic Turkey, presented by the Bunsen Committee in June 1915 20-1

2.

The railw ay network and the demarcation lines along the Sykes-Picot partition in the south o f Syria

3.

4.

Approxim ate boundaries o f the pre-war Turkish administrative districts and the Occupied enemy administrative zones in 1918-20 The Arab M iddle East after San Remo

38

75 251

A B B R E V IA T IO N S A.A. A.A.É.

Auswärtiges Amt Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris Arbor (telegraph address) Arab Bureau, Cairo Armiesfrançaises Ministère de Guerre . . . Service historique: Les Armiesfrançaises dans la Grande Guerre Documents on British Foreign Polity, ig 19-1939 B. D. CAB Cabinet Office Papers Committee of Imperial Defence C. I.D. Commander-in-Chief C.-in-C. Chief of the Imperial General Staff C.I.G.S. Chief Political Officer C. P.O. D. D.F. Documents Diplomatiques Français Ditachement Français en Palestine et en Syrie D. F.P.S. D M .1. Director of Military Intelligence E. E.F. Egyptian Expeditionary Force Foreign Office F.O. German Foreign Ministry (microfilms) G. F.M. N. A. National Archives, Washington, D.C. official off. Occupied Enemy Territory Administration O. E.T.A. P.A.C. Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa Pari. Debs. H. ofC. Parliamentary Debates, House ofCommons Peace Treaties David Lloyd George: The Truth about the Peace Treaties U.S. For. Rel. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations o f the United States War Memoirs David Lloyd George: The War Memoirs W .O. War Office Names in small capital letters (a s q u it h , etc.) indicate the private papers of the person specified: see Bibliography

CHAPTER I Introduction: Britain and France in the Arab Middle East before the Outbreak o f War in 1914

relations with France in the years 1914-20 were based on the rapprochement which was initiated by the Anglo-French agreement o f 1904, generally known as the Entente Cordiale. During the long years o f the Great W ar it was thought o f m ainly as an alliance against Germ any. For the British government it originally signified prim arily a colonial agreement. The aim was to free England from the embarrass­ ment o f splendid isolation by coming to terms with a continental power, the most suitable for the purpose being thought to be France. A n understanding with her necessitated the satisfaction o f the overseas interests o f both powers, and this led to the search for a modus vivendi in the Arab countries, on the outskirts o f the disintegrating Ottom an empire. The problem o f succession to that empire was to cast its shadow upon the new entente relations far into post-war years. The main bargain in 1904 was the securing o f British rule in Egypt in exchange for a kind o f laissez-faire for the French in M orocco. There were— at least officially— no discussions about w hat to do with the Ottom an empire itself. Few westerners, however, seriously believed that any reforms could save Turkey. ‘The agony o f these decadent Oriental States such as Turkey and Persia, is prolonged owing to the. discussions and rivalries amongst the possible heirs to the succession*, Lord Cromer, the man behind Lansdowne in entente negotiations, wrote in June 1903; ‘I think it would be found in practice that if once the R iT iS H

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B R ITA IN AND FRANCE IN THE

French succession were secured, the agony o f M orocco would not be o f long duration.*1 As far as Turkey was concerned, such a ‘practice* might, at that time, have proved a hazardous experiment. German power and influence in Constantinople were greater than ever. T h e threat o f Russia was still worrying the Indian government severely. Realizing the dangers o f the disintegration o f the old empire in the prevailing circumstances, Lansdowne, followed by Sir Edward G rey,2 continued the British government’s tradi­ tional line o f Turkish policy, preferring to avoid final partition and to confine themselves to safeguarding British interests.3 These interests, the Foreign Office often assured the powers, were limited to economic rights and to strategic needs regarding the defence o f the roads to India. Southern Mesopotamia was considered in London to be a British sphere o f interest. 'T h e situation o f Great Britain in the Persian G u lf has well been de­ scribed as unique*, Sir Edward G rey wrote in 1910, ‘ . . . She has for generations borne burdens there which no other nation has ever undertaken anywhere except in the capacity o f sovereign.*4 Britain’s position there had become directly menaced by the Baghdad railway, which the Germans had begun constructing in 1903 in spite o f the distrust o f the British and French govern­ ments.3 A t the same time, Russian naval activity in the Persian 1 Cromer, ist earl o f (Sir Evelyn Baring), consul general at Cairo, to the foreign secretary Lord Lansdowne, 17 July 1903, private letter; Correspondence Relating to the Anglo-French Agreement Signed at London, April 8, 1904\ part i, no. 3, F.O . 633/17. 2 Grey, Sir Edward (afterwards Viscount Fallodon), Foreign Secretary 1905-16. 3 The Turks later proposed an alliance to Britain, both during the Libyan W ar (1911) and again in 1913. Grey disapproved o f the second proposal, arguing that die safeguarding o f Turkey needed the co-operation o f all the powers and ‘particu­ larly those who, like Great Britain, have special interests in the Turkish empire, by reason o f their geographical position or o f commercial enterprises9. Grey to Tewfik Pasha, Turkish ambassador in London, 2 July 1913; British Documents on the Origins o f the War, ed. G . P. Gooch and H . W . V . Tem perley (henceforth referred to as ‘Gooch-Temperley9), x, i, 902. 4 Grey to Sir Gerard Lowther, British ambassador in Constantinople, 20 April 1910, letter no. 107; reprinted in a confidential paper: F.O . 371/991, no. 11933. For the British position in the Persian G ulf in general, see Report and Proceedings o f the Standing Sub-committee o f the Committee o f Imperial Defence, on the Persian Gulf, Nov. 1911; CAB. 16/15, and Persian Gulf, F.O . Handbook no. 76 (London, 1919). 9 The French government urged its citizens not to collaborate in financing the railw ay; the British government on its part refused, 24 April 1903, to accept the German invitation to participate. Herbert Feis: Europe, the World9s Banker 18701914 (New Haven, 1930), pp. 349-51.

ARAB M IDDLE EAST BEFORE THE W AR OF 1914

3

G u lf seemed to grow alarm ingly. In contrast to Germ any and Russia, France had practically no standing in this area. W hat­ ever projects Napoleon III may have contemplated around the Persian Gulf, a half-century later France had definitely with­ drawn from the sea which was dangerously near to the British Indian empire.1 The last noteworthy question o f friction, that o f the granting o f French flags to M uscat dhows, was settled in 1905.2 A fter the birth o f the entente, the French government was even more careful not to irritate the British in the Mesopota­ mian sphere. Y et it did not remain passive regarding German efforts to extend their enterprises towards the Persian Gulf. W hat the French claimed was equality o f economic rights in accordance with an open-door principle. Their foreign minister Pichon3 told the British ambassador in 1909, when insisting on the internationalization o f the Baghdad railway, that though he fully recognized the necessity for Great Britain to secure her political and commercial interests in the Persian Gulf, he had to reckon with French public opinion, which certainly wished France to receive a quid pro quo,4 Some Q uai d’Orsay officials, like Pichon himself, openly encouraged the efforts o f French private interests to penetrate Mesopotamia. Others, like the ambassador in London, Paul Gambon,3 were more reserved and seemed to oppose the entry o f French finances into what was considered to be a British sphere o f interest.6 The touchstone o f this policy was the attempt to build a French-dominated railw ay from Syria to M esopotamia.7 Tw o 1 A memorandum by M . Degrand, French vice-consul in Mosul, 6 April ig i 1 ; A .A .E ., Turquie; Politique intérieure, Mésopotamie, Golfe Persique iv, 54. The French consul in Baghdad to foreign minister Pichon, 12 June 1910; off. letter reprinted in a confidential paper: F .O . 371/1012, no. 29301. Stephen Longrigg: Iraq 1900 to /950 (London, 1952), p. 4. 2 Persian Gulf, p. 66. 3 Stéphen Pichon, French foreign minister in 1906-11, 1913, and 1917-20. 4 Memorandum respecting the Baghdad Railway (anonymous), 28 Jan. 1910, p. 18; F.O . 371/991, no. 3743. 9 Paul Cambon, French ambassador in London in 1898-1920.

* André Tardieu to Pichon, 24 Apr. 1910, private letter; F.O. 371/995, no. 144757 Sir W illiam Willcocks, who in 1909 had submitted a report on the prospects o f Mesopotamian economic development to the Ottoman government, favoured the idea o f constructing a direct line from Baghdad to the Mediterranean.— See

B

4

B R ITA IN AND FRAN CE IN THE

different French groups were interested in the project. O ne o f them, led by André Tardieu,1 the future French peace con­ ference delegate dealing with the Syrian question, was supported by the Parisian Régie Générale des Chemins defer which owned the Syrian network.2 Both groups requested British, and even Ger­ man, participation.3 As 'the most elegant solution*, Tardieu proposed a French share in the planned Persian G u lf railway, which the British wanted to secure for themselves.4 The French did not succeed, partly because o f German insistence on the Baghdad railway, partly owing to Turkish suspicions, but m ainly because o f understandable coolness on the part o f the British. However, the British government remained interested in the project and in their negotiations with the Turks in 191314 reserved the right to connect Syria with Mesopotamia at their convenience.9 Later, during discussions regarding the Sykes-Picot agreement in 1916 and its subsequent revision, this subject became an essential factor in Anglo-French relations in the M iddle East.

2 In Syria,6 the nature o f the two Powers* interests was quite 1 Then political editor o f L t Temps. 2 Bernard Maimoun, a confidant o f Tardieu, to Sir Louis M allet, under­ secretary o f State at the F .O ., 6 July 1910, private letter; F .O . 371/995, no. 24665. 3 Tardieu to Baron v. Lancken, German chargé d’affaires at Paris, 4 July 1910, private letter; idem, enclosure. Lancken to A .A ., 6 July 1910, letter no. 345; G .F.M . 10/417, bd. 50 A 13406. 4 Tardieu to Maimoun, 5 July 1910, private letter; F .O . 371/995, idem. This letter enclosed the mentioned message o f Tardieu to Lancken, in which he enum­ erated as advantages o f the Mesopotamia-Mediterranean project for France: (a) extension o f the Syrian railway net, (b) development o f her Mediterranean shipping. * Grey to Sir Louis M allet (British ambassador at Constantinople in 1913-14), 14 July 1914, tel. no. 308; Gooch-Temperley, x , ii, 416. * In subsequent discussion the name Syria, unless otherwise stated, is used as in Babylonia, a memorandum by Willcocks, 14 Feb. 1909, appendix no. 3 in a memo­ randum by Lt.-Col. Ramsay, consul general in Baghdad, enclosure in the letter: Lowther to Grey, 25 M ay 1909; F.O . 424/219, no. 113.— The British consul general in Baghdad proposed, in his memorandum, that the line should be built from Baghdad through the Euphrates V alley and Aleppo to Alexandretta.

ARAB M IDDLE EAST BEFORE THE W AR OF 1914

5

different. A t no time did G reat Britain claim rights there on grounds o f tradition. H er casual and partial presence in the Levant was never, during the last pre-war years, comparable to the extensive, continuous and determined French penetration in the area. ‘From a political and moral point o f view France holds in Syria a position grudged by the greatest powers’, concluded a report o f the French consulate general in Beirut, which François Georges-Picot— the future leader o f French diplom acy in the M iddle East— signed in O ctober 1914, less than a fortnight be­ fore the beginning o f the war with Tu rkey.1 The special charac­ ter o f France's position in the Levant before the war was indeed admitted, if not recognized, by the powers, and to some extent even by the Turks. The scope o f French cultural interests is exemplified by claims that the total pre-war number o f Syrian students attending French schools amounted to 50,000, while the total number o f students attending the schools o f all other nationalities was 23,ooo.2 The m ajority o f these establishments had been founded by French religious orders. In spite o f its anti­ clerical tendencies the government o f the Republic maintained France’s assumed role as protector o f Levantine Christians,3 1 Consulat Général de France en Syrie: Rapport commercial pour 1914, un­ numbered original copy, dated 24 O ct. 1914« 2 Cam ille Fidel: La Paix colonialefrançaise (Paris, 1918), p. 129; see also Correspon­ dance d'Orient, 16 Feb. 1914, and La Syrie et le Liban en /922, an official yearbook published by the Haut Commissariat de la République Française en Syrie et au Liban (Paris, 1922), p. 108. See also Adm iralty, Naval Staff, the Geographical Section o f the N aval Intelligence Division: A Handbook o f Syria (London, 1920), p. 200. 3 See e.g. France and the Levant, Handbooks prepared by the Historical Section o f the Foreign Office, no. 95 (London, M arch 1919), p. 27, and Documents Diplomatiques Français, 1871-1914— henceforth referred to as ‘D.D.F.*— 1, xiv, 662. 1914, in its broader meaning, comprising the Ottoman administrative units: the vilayet o f Aleppo south of the Amanus, the vilayet o f Syria, the autonomous province o f Lebanon, the vilayet of Beirut and the sanjak o f Jerusalem. The term Palestine, denoting the area later belonging to the British mandate of Palestine, is used specifically as it covers an entity treated separately from the rest of Syria by the allied powers. During the Ottoman administration Palestine did not form a distinct entity. The northern part extending from the 32nd parallel, Jaffa excluded, belonged to the vilayet of Beirut, the southern part as far as the middle of the Refah-Aqaba line formed the sanjak o f Jerusalem; the rest o f the Negev Desert was administered from M a’an as belonging to the vilayet o f Syria.

6

B R ITA IN AND FRANCE IN THE

and still regarded these minorities» above all the Maronites» as a stronghold o f the French presence in Syria.1 A spectacular indication o f the fact that by 1914 France’s standing had» nevertheless» declined from its heights o f h alf a century earlier was the waning o f her Syrian trade. ‘From the point o f view o f commerce the situation is far from being so brilliant»* the report o f the Beirut consulate general fairly admitted. It estimated that in the previous year» 1913» in the total value o f trade with Syria, imports and exports, France had fourth place after the United Kingdom , Germ any and Austria; the French held, however, the most important share in the foreign capital invested in Syria.12 The continuous indebtedness o f the Porte had favoured the expansion o f French investments. As most o f the Turkish state loans were sold on the Paris bourse, it became a rule that the French government made its approval conditional on larger economic concessions, which were obviously focused on Syria.3 Thus, the Régie Générale des Chemins defer had gained a complete monopoly over the Syrian railways as well as the leading har­ bours on the western coast o f the M editerranean.4 French con­ tractors had concessions on practically all the construction work on roads, ports and lighthouses in the area. The Banque Otto­ mane, the most im portant company among those ‘which, under the Ottom an label, represented French national interests in 1 Padcl, German consul in Beirut, to Chancellor v. Bethmann-Hollweg, 11 O ct. 1910; letter J no. 2535; G .F.M . 10/405, bd. 7, A 17471. Loytved-Hardegg, German consul in H aifa, to same, 26 Nov. 1913; letter no. 133; idem, bd. 10, A 20117. Syria and Lebanon, Handbooks prepared by the Historical Section o f the Foreign Office, no. 93 (London, April 1919), p. 67. 2 Rapport commercial pour 1914, idem. 3 Feis, pp. 356-7.— France held the most important share o f the Turkish state loans, internal and external: 2400 milliard francs in 1914, as compared to 900 m illiard francs by the Germans and 600 milliards by the British (idem, p. 320, note 8 — according to the source, the French share is somewhat overestimated at the expense o f the German). * This society was estimated to have invested, in all the main lines o f a total length of some 437 miles, the capital o f nearly 177 million francs. In addition to this, the SociiU de Chemin defer Ottoman de Jaffa à Jerusalem, with a French capital estimated at 14 million francs, owned in Palestine the 54 miles long narrow-gauge line, which had been the first railway enterprise in the Levant.— A . Ruppin, Syrien als Wirtschaftsgebiet (Berlin, 1916), pp. 485-6. See also The Times Commercial and Financial Supplement, 17 June 1910.

ARAB M IDDLE EAST BEFORE THE W AR OF 1914

7

Syria', played a key role in the economic life o f the country.1 The French financiers closely associated with this bank intended in the event o f a collapse o f the Ottom an empire, to preserve the economic privileges to which they considered themselves entitled by virtue o f their main share in the Ottom an debt. Syria, in fact, was one o f the most rewarding domains for those monopolies.2 In this region, however, the British government had to con­ sider the strategic needs o f the defence o f the Suez Canal, ‘the Clapham Junction o f Im perial Communications’, as Sir Henry Wilson once characterized its vital significance to the British empire. As a result Syria soon became a field o f tension in the newly-established Anglo-French entente. Since the Sinai border dispute with Turkey in 1906, the Committee o f Im perial Defence had accelerated its plans in fear o f an eventual attack against the weak eastern flank o f the Suez Canal area.3 In the following year a sub-committee was appointed under the presidency o f Lord M orley4 to consider the m ilitary require­ ments o f the empire as affected by the defence o f the Canal. ‘W e should be obliged, whether we like it or not, to adopt a more active policy and to find a theatre o f operations’, suggested a circular printed for the information o f the committee members ‘. . . such a theatre can, it is thought, be found in Syria’.3 The M orley committee decided in favour o f H aifa as the most suitable landing-place for the offensive defence o f the Canal. It was near enough to have a disturbing effect on any enemy lines o f communication, and provided a suitable bridge1 Paul H uvelin: Que vaut la Syrie (Paris, 1930), p. 3. Parliamentary Papers 1911 (Ixxxvii), Cmd. 5707: Report upon the Conditions and Prospects o f the British Trade in Syria (ed. E. W eakley), p. 32. 3 The revenue of die salt monopoly o f the Ottoman Public Debt in Syria was in the last pre-war year estimated at over 2 million francs. The total revenue of the concessions given to the creditors in Syria (and Lebanon) was estimated during the first fiscal year o f the French administration, in 1921-2, at 45 million francs. Besides the salt monopoly and the tobacco monopoly held by the Régie des Tabacs, the main items of taxation, the revenues o f which were later conceded to the Dette Publique Ottomane, were: the rights on spirits— e.g. locally produced strong liqueurs 30 per cent, wines and beers 15 per cent ad valorem— stamp duties, fishing and hunting licences, a tax on silk cocoons, etc.— La Syrie et le Liban en 1922, pp. 103-4. 3 92nd M eeting of the C .I.D ., 26 June 1906; W .O . 106/42, C3/21 a. * M orley, John (later Viscount Blackburn), secretary of state for India, 1905-10. 5 W .O . 106/42, C3/26.

8

B R ITA IN AND FRANCE IN THE

head for a possible advance by the H aifa-Dera*a line to the H ijaz railw ay and from there to the centre o f Syria. The com­ mittee also proposed to secure the safety o f the Canal by a better system o f intelligence.1 Consequently, British reconnaissance operations in Lebanon, Palestine and the Sinai-Negev area showed considerable activity during the following years. This was apt to arouse suspicions among the Turks and the French.2 A lter Lord Kitchener’s3 appointment as consul-general at Cairo it led to increasing rum­ ours that the British were making preparations for the seizure o f Syria. Indirectly, the Egyptian government probably poured fuel onto the fire by allowing its officials to make frequent holi­ day trips to Lebanon and by freely perm itting the publication o f anti-French writings in the Arabic newspapers o f Cairo. A t the end o f 1912, during the first Balkan war, these whispers, eagerly echoed by the nationalist and finance-dominated Paris press,4 caused a sudden French panic over Syria. Raymond Poincaré,9still in power with his cabinet o f ‘National Awakening', thus saw reason to question the Foreign O ffice through the French ambassador as to the British intentions in Syria. Sir Edward G rey then made to Paul Cambon on 5 December the much-discussed declaration that the British were not interested in Syria. Poincaré was delighted with the state­ ment, which he considered a personal victory, and subsequently 1 Report o f a Sub-committee o f the Committee o f Imperial Defence on the Military Require­ ments o f the Empire as affected by Egypt and the Sudan, 1 1 M arch 1909; CAB. 16/12, C .I.D . 107/B, p. ii.— The committee considered Alexandretta as being too distant, and Beirut unsuitable because o f its largely Christian population. 2 Perhaps the best known o f these operations was the mission led by Captain S. F. Newcombe to the Aqaba—Refah area and camouflaged as a Palestine Explor­ ation Fund expedition (see e.g.: ‘Memorandum on the British pledges to the Arabs* by G . Antonius, paragraph 4; Annex A in Cmd. 5974, 1939)* The future Colonel Lawrence took part in this mission: his personal notes concerning the expedition in The Letters o f T . E . Lawrence, ed. David Garnett (London, 1938), pp. 163-8, and in The Home Letters o f T . E . Lawrence and his Brothers (Oxford, 1954), p p .280-7. 3 Kitchener o f Khartoum , Field-Marshal Earl (Herbert Horatio), H.M.*s agent and consul-general in Egypt, 1911-14; secretary of state for war, 1914-Qune) 1916. * Eugène Jung: La rioolte arabe (Paris, 1924), vol. i, in particular pp. 48-73, gives an interesting description o f the development o f public opinion on the Syrian question in France in 1912. 3 Raymond Poincaré, French prime minister and foreign minister in 1912, president o f the Republic 1913-20.

ARAB M IDDLE EAST BEFORE THE W AR OF ig i«

g

made a speech in the French Senate announcing that as far as Syria and Lebanon were concerned, the British government had declared that it had ‘no intention o f taking any action— n o r. . . any design or political aspirations o f any kind*.1 G rey later explained to the German ambassador that his reference to British ‘ désinteréssement’ in Syria did not mean the recognition o f a sphere o f interest for France, and added: *1 observed to Gambon that what I said about Syria did not im ply a distur­ bance o f the status quo which it is our object to preserve.’ 2 The declaration had a salutary effect on Anglo-French official relations over Syria. There was still a great deal o f antiBritish turmoil in the French press and evidently not without cause, since even in French consular reports there was a tend­ ency to expect an early British satellization o f Syria. Thus in 1913 there were alarming rumours that the Egyptian khedive or some o f the princes— backed by the Residency, it was suggested— m ight prepare to extend his rule over Syria.3 The Q uai d’O rsay treated this effervescence rather coolly. In January 1913 the F rench ambassador to the Porte, in urging the consul in Damascus to be careful in his dealings with Arab nationalists, made it clear that France did not want the question o f Asiatic Turkey to be raised for the moment while the powers were in difficulties with the settlement in European Turkey.4 A t this stage the British and the French views on the policy to be adopted in Turkey appeared to be in harmony. The French had huge investments in the old empire, and in the final clearing o f the Ottom an estate they were not to be lightly dismissed. N or were they, with milliards o f francs at stake, likely to hasten 1 ‘ . . . ni intention d’agir, ni desseins, ni aspirations politiques d’aucune sorte*.— Raymond Poincaré: Au Service de la France (Paris, ig26), ii, 412.— Poincaré claimed that he had shown, beforehand, the text o f his Senate speech to Grey (idem, pp. 400-1). No British sources confirm this information. 3 G rey to Sir E. Goschen, British ambassador in Berlin, 24 Jan. ig ig , letter no. 32; Gooch-Temperley, ix, ii, 444. A summary o f the interview is given in the despatch: Prince v. Lichnowsky, German ambassador in London, to A .A . 22 Jan. 1913, tel. no. 38; Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 34, i, p. 236. 3 Defiance, French minister in Cairo, to foreign minister Doumergue, 26 M arch ig i4 ; A A L , Turquie, Politique étrangère, Dossier général: Question d’Orient, xxii, 212-13. 4 Bompard to O ttavi, 27 Jan. 1313, tel. unnumbered; reproduced in La Vérité sur la Question Syrienne, edited by the Headquarters o f the Fourth Ottoman Arm y (Stamboul, ig i6 ), pp. 133-40.

IO

B R ITA IN AND FRANCE IN THE

the political end o f the empire. Britain’s interests being confined to Mesopotamia and to Egypt (which country the French had been sagacious enough to abandon in 1904), there were no local grounds for rivalry with France. In the light o f this, the British declaration o f 1912 sounded like an acknowledgement o f the entente in the Arab M iddle East. 3 For all that, the assurance given to Poincaré in December 1912, did not mean to G rey that ‘we two stood there with never a third*. It appeared to be the first measure in a larger arrange­ ment that was being planned. Five weeks later he wrote to his ambassador in Rom e: ‘I f there is to be a partition, Germ any must be well in it, and I should not think to exclude her. Indeed, we could truthfully say the same thing to Germ any about Anatolia as we said to France about Syria, that we have no political designs there. Security as regards the Persian G u lf and its littoral is all that we want, and it can perfectly well be reconciled with the development o f German interests.’ 1 Though apparently outside the scope o f our study, the follow­ ing episode o f Anglo-Germ an rapprochement on the eve o f the war reveals how conditional a role, after all, the entente played in the British M iddle East policy before 1914. A n attempt at reconciling German and British economic interests in Turkey had already been made in November 1912 ; it had failed, accord­ ing to a German source, because o f antagonism between the Foreign Office and private financiers.2 W ith the private oil interests and the Adm iralty still pressing for an understanding, G rey replied positively to another German initiative, in September 1913, and the talks were resumed.3 1 Grey to Sir Rennell Rodd, 13 Jan. 1913, private letter printed by G . M . Trevelyan: Grey o f FaUodon (London, 1937), p. 219. 2 Memorandum o f the Deutsche Bank (signed: Helfferich and G winner), 5 Dec. 1913; G .F.M . 10/419, bd. 67, A 24169. 3 R . v. Kühlmann, German under-secretary o f state at the A .A ., to chancellor v. Bethmann-Hollweg, 18 Sept. 1914, letter no. 521 ; idem, bd. 64, A 19095. The Adm iralty, whose fuel needs connected it closely with the d’Arcy group (the AngloPersian Petroleum Co.), had supported the latter’s concession demands to the Turkish government as early as 1910. It is of interest to note that, besides the dis­ coveries of Mosul, the importance o f the Kirkuk oilfields was already recognized. (A note by Lord Ronaldshay, 20 June 1910; F.O . 371/1004, no. 21874.)

ARAB M IDDLE EAST BEFORE THE W AR OF 1914

11

O ne reason for the haste was the fear that American interests might succeed in penetrating Turkey, noted the Kaiser's ambas­ sador in London.1 The Germans logically assumed that the effect o f an Anglo-German understanding would be to keep the Americans and the French out o f the disputed oilfields.2 The French, it is true, do not seem to have had any assistance from London when negotiating a corresponding economic agreement with the Germans in 1913.3 O n the contrary, Lichnowsky reported that the Foreign Office had refused to accept their request to postpone the beginning o f the Anglo-Germ an talks until the Franco-German treaty was signed.4. The well-known Foreign Office agreement o f 19 M arch 19145 settled the Anglo-German controversy with respect to what were called economic interests in Turkey. France was excluded from this understanding. According to the text o f the treaty, her Syrian interests did not seem to be threatened, but there is evidence to the contrary. O nly five days after the signing o f the treaty, the German ambassador in Constantinople reported that he and his British colleague, Sir Louis M allet, had approached the Turkish government in order to extend the requested Anglo-Germ an oil concessions to cover Syria as well. The grand vizier had been in a good position to answer that this might lead 1 Lichnowsky to A .A ., 29 Jan. 1914, tel. no. 21; G .F.M . idem, bd. 70, A 1878. 1 A n anonymous A .A . memorandum, 27 June 1914; G .F.M . 10/420, bd. 77, A 12731. 3 The rapprochement with the Germans had been first initiated by the French (private interests) in M ay 1913. Subsequently, an official agreement dividing the French and German railway spheres in Syria was reached in February 1914, before the Anglo-German agreement. A German negotiator complained to his government that the French were constantly interfering with political implications (‘Diffcrenzpunkte in den Verhandlungen mit der französischen Delegation’, aide-mémoire by Herr Helfferich, director of Deutsche Bank, 24 Nov. 1913; G .F.M . 10/419, bd. 68, A 25457, pp. 7 and 9). In the final agreement, however, die Germans jealously safeguarded their sphere around the G ulf o f Alexandretta and succeeded in pushing the northern limit of the French railway zone south of Aleppo and Lattakia. The protocol of the agreement of 15 Feb. 1914 is in A .A .E ., Turquie, Pol. étr., Relations avec la France, Affaires particulières, Accordfinancierfranco-turc, 1914. * Lichnowsky to Bethmann-Hollweg, 18 Sept. 1913, tel. no. 37; Die Grosse Politik, 37, ii, p. 580.— According to Philippe Berthelot, chef de cabinet at the Quai d’Orsay, the British government had pledged not to give ‘a definite form to the negotiations with the German and Turkish governments’ before the French had reached an understanding with these governments (D .D.F.. 3, vii, p. 267). 9 The text of the agreement reproduced for instance in J. C . Hurewitz: Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East; a documentary record (New York, 1956), ii, 277-8.

ia B R ITA IN AND FRANCE IN THE ARAB M ID D LE E A ST

to a conflict with France.1 In any case, Mosul, another area in which France took an interest, belonged to the concession sphere covered by the agreement. But, o f course, even there the British government had no obligation to consult the French. Though apparently dealing with private interests, the agree­ ment was finally negotiated by the respective governments. M oreover, the eventual political partition o f Turkey was also discussed, though nothing o f that kind came into the agreement. Lichnowsky, who had suggested a partition— how seriously, no one knows2— later claimed that its ‘real object was to divide Asia M inor into spheres o f interest, although this expression was anxiously avoided in view o f the rights o f the Sultan’.3 R atifi­ cation o f the Foreign Office agreement remained dependent on the signing o f the 1913 Anglo-Turkish agreement and on the recently initiated German-Turkish understanding4 and there­ fore never became valid before the war broke out in August 1914. As France on her part had agreements with Germ any and Turkey,5 the set o f treaties delineating the partition o f the west­ ern interests in Turkey remained to be completed by a corre­ sponding agreement between England and France. This was to come later, but in such an exceptional situation and in so radical a w ay that it broke the whole system. 1

5846.

Wangcnhrim to A .A ., 34 M arch 1914, tel. no. 181 ; G .F.M . 10/420, bd. 72, A

3 Sir L . M allet in a memorandum dated 19 June 1914; Gooch-Temperley, x , i (Appendix), p. 901. 5 Fürst v. Lichnowsky: A uf dm Wege zum Abgrund (Dresden, 1927), i, 1 14. 4 Sir Edward Grey in the House o f Commons, 29 June 1914; Parliamentary Debates, 5th series, House o f Commons, Ixiv, 116 -17. References henceforth as ‘Pari. Debs.. H . o f C .\ 9 Signed 14 April 1914. It is worth noticing here that the British strongly objected to the French plans, revealed in the context o f this agreement, o f building a con­ nection line from Ramleh to the Egyptian border (see Gooch-Temperley, x , i, 373 and 385).

C H A P T E R II

From the Outbreak o f the War 1914 to the Partition o f Asiatic Turkey 1916: End o f the Policy o f Conservation the declaration o f London, 4 September 1914, G reat Britain, France and Russia undertook not to conclude a separate peace with their enemies and to agree beforehand on the conditions o f peace that would be accepted by all three. The declaration clearly applied also to Turkey after her entry into the w ar on 5 November. By this treaty Britain had thus promised to share with her allies the formulation o f her future Turkish policy. The dram atic events o f the autumn o f 1914 opened a new chapter in the history o f the M iddle East. In Paris a spectacular presscampaign was launched for thepartition o f Asiatic Turkey.1 In London, the prime minister, H . H . Asquith,2 prophesied on 9 November that as a result o f the w ar the Ottom an empire would be dismembered.3 O n the same day the future Lord Samuel4 introduced to the foreign secretary a proposal to create a Jewish national home in Palestine.3 A fortnight later on 2i November the French ambassador in Petrograd asked the opinion o f the tsar regarding French claims in Syria and Palestine.6 During the same weeks a significant change was

B

y

1 W . W . Gottlieb : Studies in the Secret Diplomacy during the First World War (London, *957). PP- 80-1.

2 Prime minister, igo8-(December) 1916.

3 Speech at the Lord M ayor’s banquet: The Times, 10 Nov. 1914. 4 Herbert Samuel, then president o f the Local Government Board. 3 Viscount Samuel: Memoirs (London, 1945), pp. 140-2. John Bowie: Viscount Samuel, A Biography (London, 1957), p. 70. * M aurice Paléologue: La Russie des Tsars pendant la Grande Guerre (Paris, 1991),

*4

O U TBREA K OF WAR 1914 TO

carried through in Egypt. In order to terminate the sovereignty o f the Turkish over this country, situated behind the British lines o f defence, London agreed with Paris on the declaration o f a British protectorate over Egypt. Annexation dejure was seriously considered (with a simultaneous French annexation o f Tunisia) but disregarded owing to fears o f antagonizing Moslem opinion.1 In other respects, however, the British government were far from having made up their minds as to what to do with Asiatic Turkey. O nly the Adm iralty and the W ar Office had developed any ideas in this respect. The moment to work them out came at the beginning o f 1915 when the allies launched a land offensive against Turkey. For political as well as m ilitary reasons, the first sea lord, Lord Fisher,2 and the new secretary o f state for war, Lord Kitchener, wanted this operation to be directed to H aifa and Alexandretta.3 French reluctance, because o f a lack o f troops, to accept Syria as a theatre o f operations, was one o f the reasons why this plan was turned down.4 The final decision to direct the expedition to the Dardanelles then compelled Britain and France to define their attitude towards the terri­ torial claims which the Russians had for centuries made in that area. The m ilitary position o f Russia was rapidly deteriorating, and the western powers had to venture everything in order to back her w ar efforts both m aterially and m orally.5 This was the reason why the British finally gave w ay to the demand o f the tsar expressed in a memorandum on 4 M arch 1915 and a week later accepted, at least in principle, his claims to Constantinople and the Dardanelles.6 The traditional strategic considerations 1 Poincaré, v, pp. 427 and 435; Sir Ronald Storrs: Orientations (London, 1947), pp. 136-7. (The declaration of the British protectorate was made in December 1914.) 2 Admiral o f the Fleet John A. Fisher, ist Baron Kilverstone, First sea lord, I914- 153 Fisher insisted on landing at Alexandretta in order to cover the way to the oil fields of Mesopotamia. T hope you are not losing any time in annexing the Euphra­ tes and Tigris’, he could still write to the prime minister on 5 November 1915, well after his resignation from the cabinet.— a s q u i t h ; Dep. Asquith, 15/124.— For the views o f Kitchener, see the following discussion on Alexandretta, and Philip Magnus: Kitchener, Portrait o f an Imperialist (London, 1957), pp. 313-14. 4 Gottlieb, pp. 79-62. 5 See e.g. Winston Churchill: The World Crisis, /9/5 (London, 1915) pp. 198-9. 6 On the condition, however, of ‘the war being carried on and brought to a successful conclusion, and the desiderata o f Great Britain and France in the Ottoman Empire and elsewhere being realized. • . ’• The text o f the Russian tele­ gram of 4 M arch as well as that of the British aide-mémoire of 12 March is reproduced

PA R T IT IO N OF A S IA T IC T U R K E Y 1916

15

were virtually swept aw ay: at the decisive cabinet meeting on 9 M arch, Kitchener and Winston Churchill1 stated that ‘neither on m ilitary nor on naval grounds did our interests require us to resist the Russian proposal*.2 It is significant that the main opposition to the tsar*s demands came from Paris. A t first the French tried to convince their old allies that the solution o f the Straits dilemma was to be found on the other side o f the Channel. ‘Delcassé directs us to London and G rey to Paris*, the tsar wrote on the margin o f a despatch from his ambassador in Paris, Iswolsky, 2 M arch 19 1s.3 The delaying o f the French consent seems to have been motivated less by fear o f Russia as a future M editerranean power than by a need to press her to recognize the French claims in the Levant.4 W hen Paris, pressed by London, agreed to the Russian proposal on 12 A pril, the language o f her note was very similar to that o f the British answer a month earlier.3 M eanwhile in London, at the war committee meeting o f 10 M arch, where the answer to be given to Petrograd was once more discussed, Kitchener and Churchill emphasized the need o f British acquisition o f Alexandretta, the best harbour on the Syrian coast.6 Churchill maintained that if England succeeded in shattering German naval power, she ought to be able to build 1 Churchill (later Sir) Winston, first lord o f the Adm iralty, ig i 1-15, minister o f munitions, 1917» and secretary of state for war, 1919-21. 2 Cabinet Meeting, 9 M arch 1915; Copies o f Asquith’s cabinet letters to the hing, 1915; A s q u i t h , Dep. Asquith. 3Die Internationalen Beziehungen im des Imperialismus (Berlin, 1934-6), ii, 7, part i, no. 284. 4 The instructions o f Poincaré in a personal letter to the ambassador Paléologue, 9 M arch 1915, Poincaré, vi, 94-6. 9 The French note reproduced in B .D ., idem, p. 638 and in Konstantinopel und die Meerengen, ii, no. 103. For the political background of the Dardanelles expedition and the Constantinople agreement, see Gottlieb, pp. 87-101. For the negotiations resulting in the Constantinople agreement in general, see A . J . P. Taylor: The Strugglefor Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918 (Oxford, 1954), pp. 540-2. 6 As to Kitchener’s views, see my article 'Lord Kitchener and the Partition o f the Ottoman Empire’ in Studies in International History; Essays Presented to Professor W. Norton Medlicott (London, 1967), pp. 316-29. in Documents on British Foreign Polity, 1919-1939 (London, 1952), first series, iv, pp. 635-6—henceforth this collection is referred to as 'JB.D.*— the former also in (E. A . Adamov :) Die Europäischen Mächte und die Türkei; Konstantinopel und die Meerengen (Dresden, 1932), ii, no. 53, the latter in (Adamov:) Die Europäischen Mächte und die Türkei; Die Aufteilung der Asiatischen Türkei (Dresden, 1932), no. 23.

i6

O U TBREA K OF WAR 1914 T O

a M editerranean fleet against the French and the Russians. In replying to a remark o f Lloyd George1 that the question o f Alexandretta might stir up a quarrel with France, Kitchener stressed that with Russia in Constantinople, France in Syria and Italy on Rhodes, the British position in Egypt would be unten­ able if any other power held Alexandretta.12 A t the next war committee meeting on 19 M arch the discus­ sion continued, somewhat better prepared.3 The situation too had changed: the prime minister opened the meeting by stating that in Petrograd the French had put forward very large desi­ derata including Cilicia, Syria and even Palestine, though ‘the Russians objected most strongly to the Christian H oly Places being in French hands'.4 Sir Edward G rey then presented two essential questions for discussion: (1) would the acquisition o f fresh territories make England weaker or stronger ; (2) should account be taken o f the strong feeling in the Moslem world that Islam ought to have political as well as religious existence? G rey him self clearly dis­ liked the idea o f further territorial expansion, but favoured the establishment o f a Moslem Arab empire which seemed necessary as a counter-weight to German-influenced Turkey. Tw o different views had been taken by the India O ffice: the m ilitary department, being in general agreement with the viceroy (Lord H ardinge), considered that after the w ar Turkey ought to be made as strong as possible in Asia; the political department thought that Turkey might be sacrificed and the caliphate returned to Arabia. 1 Lloyd-George, David (later Earl Lloyd-George o f Dwyfor), chancellor o f the exchequer, 1908-(May) 1915; minister o f munitions, 1915-16; prime minister, (December) 1916-22. 2 W ar council meeting, 10 M arch 1915; GAB. 22 1/2, and a s q u i t h , Minutes of the Committee of Imperial Defence, p. 256.— As to the harbour o f Alexandretta, see Cmd. 5707, idem, p. h i , and Ruppin, p. 468. 3 A long series o f notes from the Indian government, a paper on the caliphate question, memoranda by Kitchener and the Adm iralty on Alexandretta, and another memorandum by Herbert Samuel on the necessity o f British acquisition o f Palestine, had been circulating among the cabinet members. These papers are to be found in the Cabinet Papers, GAB. 24/1/G 12-17, and in a s q u i t h , Printed Government Papers, Feb.-M arch 1915.— Samuel’s memorandum has been pub­ lished by Bowie, op. cit., pp. 172-7; see also Samuel, pp. 142-5. 4 W ar council meeting, 19 M arch 1915; GAB. 22 1/2 and a s q u i t h , idem, pp. 260-1.

PA R T IT IO N OF A S IA T IC T U R K E Y 1916

17

Kitchener objected to the former view, because if Russia was to be in Constantinople the Turks would be submitted to her influence, and it was advisable to transfer the caliphate to Arabia, where it would remain to a great extent under British influence. As to territorial desiderata he admitted that, if Meso­ potamia was to be developed, it should not be left to the Arabs. ‘The possession o f Mesopotamia, as we already hold the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea and Egypt*, the field-marshal had written in a memorandum three days earlier, ‘would secure all approaches to the Mohammedan H oly Places*.1 Lord Crew e12 proposed that Basra, possibly also Baghdad, should be given to India.3 Churchill, though supporting the acquisition o f Mesopotamia,4 argued that the question was premature, and proposed that the partition talks with the French should be postponed. As far as Alexandretta and Mesopotamia were concerned, two other committee members, Lloyd George and A . J. Balfour,5 finally seemed to yield to the Adm iralty and W ar Office views, but the prime minister and foreign secretary remained reluc­ tant. Asquith, however, concluded significantly: 'I f for one reason or another . . . we were to leave the other nations to scramble for Turkey without taking anything for ourselves, we should not be doing our duty.*6*9 The question o f eventual territorial acquisition, however, remained undecided. The only conclusion that emerged from the discussion was that, as suggested by Grey, the British govern­ ment’s first desiderata should be the preservation o f a Moslem political entity and the maintenance o f the Mohammedan H oly 1 ‘Alexandretta and Mesopotamia*, a memorandum by Lord Kitchener, 16 M arch 1915, p. 2; idem. 3 Crewe-Milnes, R . O . A ., marquess o f Crewe, then secretary o f state for India. 3 It should be noted that the population of Basra and the rulers o f the surrounding sheikhdoms had been given, at the beginning o f war with Turkey, a promise by the viceroy o f India that Basra would never more be returned to Turkish rule (Report o f the Committee on Asiatic Turkey, June 1915, p. 4; CAB. 42/3). * H . H . Asquith: Memoirs and Reflections (London, 1928), ii, 69. 9 Balfour, Arthur James (later ist earl Balfour), foreign secretary December 1916-October 1919. * Asquith later wrote that, in the cabinet, Grey and himself were the only opponents o f territorial expansion.— Asquith, ii, 69. See also Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British ambassador in Paris, 23 M arch 1915; private letter reproduced in Grey o f Fallodon: Twenty-five Years, i8 g s-ig i6 (London, 1926), ii, 230.

i8

O U TBREA K OF W AR 1914 T O

Places. For the future arrangement in Asiatic Turkey this was, nevertheless, a historic decision.1 The exchange o f views in the war committee revealed a remarkable conflict o f opinion between the Indian government on one hand, and Lord Kitchener and his former staff in Cairo and Khartoum , on the other. W hile the former concentrated their attention on the Persian G u lf and set their hopes on a solid treaty system with local A rab rulers and chiefs, Kitchener had cherished for a long time the idea o f an Arab caliphate and a British-protected Arab state.12 ‘Should the partition o f Turkey take place’, he had written in a memorandum three days before the last-mentioned war committee meeting, ‘it is to our interests to see an Arab Kingdom established in Arabia under auspices o f England, bounded in the north by the valley o f the Tigris and the Euphrates and containing within it the chief Mahommedan H oly Places, M ecca, M edina and K erbala’.3 This programme was zealously continued after Kitchener’s death, although in a form more in harmony with the spirit o f the time, by the Arab Bureau in Cairo. Its opposite number, the British Mesopotamian administration in occupied Baghdad represented after 1917 the India Office line o f Arab policy, more conservative, less im aginative and solidly in keeping with old im perial interests. The lack o f co-operation, not to mention occasional rivalry, between these two poles o f the British pres­ ence in the A rab world, characterized at this time Britain’s M iddle East policy and significandy affected her relations with France.

2

As the cabinet was unable to find a proper opportunity o f study­ ing the British territorial desiderata in the area, an interdepart­ mental committee, named after its chairman, Sir M aurice de 1 It was communicated to Russia by a note, 19 M arch, and to France personally by the foreign secretary four days later. Grey, idem. 2 Sir George Arthur: Ltfe o f Lord Kitchener (London, 1920), iii, 153. 3 ‘Alexandretta and Mesopotamia’, a memorandum by Lord Kitchener, 16 M arch 1915, p. 2; GAB. 24/1/G. 12.

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19

Bunsen,1 was appointed in April. The committee completed its work in June 1915. In its final report it concluded that ‘zones o f interest are preferable to a partition’ : Turkey in Asia should, even in the case o f an allied victory, be given ‘some prospect o f permanent existence* provided that the empire be reorganized in a decentralized form .2 Even then, the committee pointed out, a line running from Acre to south o f Damascus, then via Tadm or (Palm yra)-Deir ez-Zor-Zakhu to Ruwandiz, formed the northern boundary o f the British sphere o f enterprise in the area and should be taken into consideration in the future peace settlement. In the event o f a partition, the committee recommended, the territories south o f that line should be placed under British sovereignty so that an all-British railway between Mesopotamia and the M editerranean might be built.3 The committee’s views were obviously influenced by Russia’s attitude. A t the end o f A pril Lord Kitchener had submitted to the cabinet a paper emphasizing that after the war England should carefully avoid any clash with Russia. The tsar’s empire should serve as a counter-balance against the central powers and against France, also a potential enemy in the future.4 That is why the Bunsen committee recommended the H oly Places to be internationalized— as Russia desired— and Alexandretta to be left to the French, who, consequently, were to have no pretext to claim the south o f Syria, and to concentrate their possessions to the north where they were likely to collide with Russia. In spite o f this, Kitchener in fact disapproved o f the abandoning o f Alexandretta and was reconciled to the alternative base, H aifa,9 with reluctance. 1 Formerly (until 1914) minister in the British embassy at Vienna. The other members of the committee were G . R . Clerk o f the Foreign Office, Sir T . W . Holdemess o f the India Office, Admiral Sir H. B. Jackson of the Adm iralty, M aj.-Gen. C . E. Callwell and Sir M . Sykes of the W ar Office, and Sir H . LI. Smith o f the Board of Trade. 2 Report o f the Committee on Asiatic Turkey, idem, June 1915, p. 27. Sec map 1 o f the present study. 3 Idem, p. 26. 4 The Future Relations o f the Great Powers, Observations on the Lord Chancellor's Note, A Memorandum by ‘K ’, 21 April 1915; a s q u i t h , Printed Government Papers, April-M ay 1915. 9 Sir M ark Sykes to Sir George Arthur, biographer of Kitchener, 12 Sept. 1916, private letter; Kitchener Papers, P.R .O . 30/57/91. C

20

O U TBREA K OF W AR 1914 T O

map i. Four possible solutions for the settlem ent in A siatic T u rk e y ,

presented b y the Bunsen C om m ittee in Ju n e 1915. (Based on m aps i-iii and v , enclosed in the R ep ort o f the Com m ittee on A siatic T u rkey, C A B . 42/3.)

PA R T IT IO N OF A SIATIO T U R K E Y 1916

i. a. 3. 4.

31

First schem e o f annexation including A lexan dretta in British territory, Second schem e o f annexation replacin g A lexan dretta b y H aifa. Schem e o f partition in zones o f interest. O ttom an D evolutionary schem e.

22

O U TBREA K OF WAR 1914 TO

O n the other hand, Palestine itself would be o f no value what­ soever for the British, he had commented in M arch.1 The Bun­ sen committee agreed with him. The British acquisition o f Palestine, it emphasized, would be unwise because the forces opposing it would be too strong. For the same reason the French claim was likely to be rejected, the committee assumed and recommended that Palestine’s destiny be decided ‘in special negotiations, in which both belligerents and neutrals are alike interested*.2 The ‘northern boundary o f the British sphere o f enterprise’ delineated on the report map covered the bulk o f British economic interests in the Arab M iddle East, such as markets o f commerce, rivers for navigation and irrigation projects, routes for planned railways. The oilfields o f Mosul and Kirkuk3 as well as the prospective petroleum reserves o f the Y armuk V alley4 and the potash beds o f the Dead Sea3 were marked as belonging to the British sphere. The importance o f Mesopotamia as a granary and as a possible field for Indian colonization was also noted by the committee.6 Strategic considerations, however, were decisive. ‘The main strategic preoccupation o f the Com­ mittee’, Sir Arthur H irtzel, secretary o f the political department in the Indian Office commented, ‘is the Mediterranean port with railw ay to Mesopotamia, for the purpose o f bringing reinforcements from Europe— which is regarded as a m ilitary necessity*.7 The choice o f the required British base and o f the 1 W ar council meeting, 10 M arch 1916, p. 5; CAB. 22 1/2. 2 Report o f the Committee on Asiatic Turkey, p. 26. 3 See above, p. 10, note 3. 4 A British Syrian exploration company had begun drilling near the Yarm uk River in 1912 (Ruppin, p. 366). The Foreign Office had prepared the grand vizier, in 1913, for an eventual British demand for larger concessions in Syria (Minute by A . Parker, assistant clerk at the F.O ., 19 Aug. 1914; Gooch-Temperley, x, ii, 213). In the draft of the Anglo-Turkish agreement o f 1914 was included annexe no. 2 in which there was a specific mention of the safeguarding of the concession rights to a British subject, Edward Thomas Boxall, in the gaza of Ajlun, vilayet of Syria (Otto­ man Draft, appendix no. 2, communicated to Hakki Pasha, 20 M ay 1914; G .F.M . 10/388, bd. I, A 1661 14— see also: Gooch-Temperley, idem, p. 396). 9 During the war the W ar Office seemed to show a keen interest in the potash o f the Dead Sea. See e.g. Richard Meinertzhagen: The Middle East Diary, 1917-56 (London, i960), pp. 10-11. 6 Report o f the Committee on Asiatic Turkey, idem, pp. 3 and 11. 7 ‘Turkey in Asia’, a note on the Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee, by ‘A . H .’, 14 July 1915; c h a m b e r l a i n , idem.

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23

terminus for the projected connection line fell on Haifa, a port which had been recommended for the same purpose by the M orley com mittee.1 The possibility o f a railway from the M ed­ iterranean to Mesopotamia— not to speak o f a canal, which Lord Fisher and Lord Kitchener had suggested2— had been regarded with doubt even before the war. The railw ay from Alexandrettawould have been very costly and, in any case, longer than the distance from H aifa to Mesopotamia, which figured as a definitive alternative in the report o f the Bunsen committee. The final argument against Alexandretta, however, was that a railway from there to Mesopotamia would have been incom­ patible with Kitchener’s idea o f leaving a French ‘buffer zone' between the future British and Russian territories.3 Indeed, as recently as in M arch 1915, the Board o f Trade had pointed out that the British commercial interests in Syria would not be secured even if Alexandretta were acquired, ‘so long as Aleppo, with its railway connections was under single (i.e. French) con­ trol’.4 The Bunsen committee later gave it a pertinent inter­ pretation when arguing: ‘No agreements or understandings are sufficient to break through the dead weight o f intrigue and incompetent pettiness which is characteristic o f their methods; if therefore, the French concessionary policy is to remain what it is, British enterprise would do well to make itself as self-contained as possible in its own sphere.’ 5 Composed in a hurry and in very general and summary terms, the Bunsen report was open to criticism.6 However, it was meant to be only a sketch o f British desiderata in the event o f an emergency partition o f Asiatic Turkey. The aim was to prepare the w ay for a 'first diplom atic clearing’ before launching a 1 See above, p. 7. 2 Magnus, p. 313. 3Report o f the Committee on Asiatic Turkey, p. 6. See also a memorandum by A . J . Balfour, 11 Aug. 1919; B .D ., 1, iv, 342. Such a buffer zone had been suggested as early as at the end o f 1914 by Sir Ronald Storrs, oriental secretary to the Residency at Cairo, in a private letter to the aide-de-camp o f Kitchener, M ajor FitzGerald, 22 Dec. 1914; Kitchener Papers, idem, 00/73. * A F.O . memorandum, Turkey in Europe andAsia, 22 O ct. 19 17,p. 10; w is e m a n , 91/127. 5 Report o f the Committee on Asiatic Turkey, p. 8. • See e.g. the comments by Sir M ark Sykes (a letter from Sykes, 20 June 1915, no. 5 secret; c h a m b e r l a i n , idem) and by Sir A . Hirtzel (note by ‘A . H .’, 14 July 1915; idem).

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m ilitary conquest.1 The partition was then considered above all as a wartime necessity. Sir M ark Sykes,12 who, beside Sir Henry M cM ahon,34had been one o f the first to stress the importance o f avoiding Anglo-French rivalry in the A rab M iddle East, later wrote in a memorandum: 'It was clear . . . that an Arab rising was sooner or later to take place, and that the French and our­ selves ought to be on better terms if the rising was not to be a curse instead o f blessing In the long run, the Bunsen committee pointed the w ay to a fundamental change in the British attitude towards the Ottoman empire. The report took, in general, a pessimistic view o f the future o f Turkey : it was probably no longer possible to preserve the empire; the Russians, the Greeks and the Italians needed a minimum, the French would be angered if not given anything, and international financial interests would take over the rest.5 It was clear that if the government wished to maintain their traditional line o f Turkish policy and to avoid the final disinte­ gration o f the Ottoman State, die first step would be to make peace with the Turks. Answering an intelligence officer who had suggested contacts with the Ottom an government to that end, the secretary o f the w ar cabinet warned that a separate peace with Turkey could endanger allied unity. Russia, for whom 'Constantinople is an economic, political, and sentimental desi­ deratum transcending every other', might withdraw from the w ar: 'T he result o f this would be that after the war Russia and Germany would move together, the financiers would re-estab­ lish their position in Constantinople, the German trade would recommence, and Turkey, once again safe, would go back to her incorrigible ways as she did in 1854, 1878, and 1908.'6 That the total change o f opinion as regards Turkey did not 1 Terms used by Sir M ark Sykes in the W ar Committee meeting 16 Dec. 1915 (CAB. 42/6). 2 Lt.-Col. Sir M ark Sykes, m.p . Attached to the W ar Office 1915-16, assistant secretary to the war cabinet 1916-19. 3 Sir H. McM ahon, British high commissioner in Egypt 1914-17, to Grey, 15 Feb. 1915, tel. no. 23; a s q u i t h , Printed Government Papers, Feb.-M arch 1915. 4 A Memorandum by Sir M . Sykes for M r Barnes on the Anglo-French Agree­ ment in regard to the Arab State, p. 4; s y k e s , doc. 83. 9 Report o f the Committee on Asiatic Turkey, idem, pp. 22-4. 6 Lt.-Col. (later Sir) M aurice Hankey to M ajor W . H . Deedes (then in Cairo), 27 Jan. 1916, private letter; d e e d e s . The foreign secretary had rejected, at the

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35

concern the entente powers alone, is reflected by a report from the German ambassador in Constantinople : 'T h e Austro-Hun­ garian Envoy here, who was for many years a friend o f the T u rk s. . . has altered his views in the course o f the war. He con­ siders that the costs o f this war w ill be paid m ainly by Turkey. During the war she w ill lose Mesopotamia and Arabia, and at the peacemaking the Straits must be opened.'1 This report was dated 28 January 1916, the day after Hankey had written the letter quoted above. The defeats suffered by Turkish armies in the precedingyear, the continuous misgovemment and repression exercised by the Turkish ruling element, the resounding protests which the maltreatment o f minorities— especially o f the Armenians— aroused all over the civilized w orld,2 and, above all, the fact that the great powers were no longer united in avoiding the disruption o f the Ottom an empire, contributed to the belief that the day o f the Sick M an was over.

3 The negotiations proposed by the British government on the partition o f Asiatic Turkey were started simultaneously, in the autumn o f 1915, with the Arabs and the French. The idea o f a kind o f Arab emancipation sponsored by the British had for some time been ripening in the minds o f leading men in Cairo and New Delhi. Its realization proceeded by improvisation, often completely outside the control o f London. In 1914 the Indian government which for several years had been in treaty relations with the sheiks o f Kuw eit and Mohammerah, initiated 1 Metternich to Bethmann-Hollweg, 28 Jan. 1916, letter no.35; G .F.M . 10/383, ‘Acta betreffend die Eventualität eines Zusammenbruchs der Türkei9, A S357.— The Austrian diplomat in question, Count Pallavicini, was one o f the most esteemed foreign representatives in Constantinople. 2 The powerful leader of the pro-Armenian campaign in Britain was Lord Bryce. The B r y c e Papers contain material relating to his activities in 1914-20. ‘Lord Bryce and many who think with him are quite determined in this matter9, Hankey wrote in his letter quoted above, ‘and their influence on British opinion is not to be underestimated9 (Hankey to Deedes, 27 Jan. 1916, idem). end of 1915, a Russian suggestion of withdrawing Turkey from the war by support­ ing an eventual coup d'itat (by Jemal Pasha) at Constantinople (see e.g. Grey to Buchanan, 30 Dec. 1916, tel. no. 209; CAB. 37/139/69; doc. 34).

36

O U TBREAK OF W AR 1914 T O

a treaty o f alliance with the emir o f Nejd, Ibn Sa’ud .1 O n the other hand, an adversary o f the wahabi o f Nejd, Sharif Husain o f M ecca, was approached by Kitchener, even before the over­ ture o f hostilities with Turkey, with a view to inciting him to revolt against the Constantinople government, remove the H oly Places o f Islam from enemy influence and draw the Arabs out o f the w ar.2 W hile the treaty with Ibn Sa’ud ensured the latter's bene­ volent neutrality during the w ar with Turkey, the revolt o f the sharif ignited a pan-Arab movement with far-reaching political consequences. The sharifian movement had been initiated, in fact, in the spring o f the preceding year, when Em ir Faisal, third son o f Husain, assured him self o f the backing o f an impor­ tant faction o f the Syrian nationalists.3 The question o f the reward to be paid to the Arabs for their eventual action against Turkey led in July 1915 to the well-known correspondence between the British high commissioner at Cairo, Sir Henry M cM ahon and Sharif Husain. In the course o f it the sharifians extended, as a consequence o f their Syrian relations, their terri­ torial claims to the regions which the French considered as belonging to their own zone. Directing attention to signs o f rising Anglo-French rivalry in the Arab M iddle East, M cM ahon had urged the Foreign Office in February to take steps for work­ ing out an agreement with the French, specifying both powers' respective spheres in the area. The high commissioner, however, favoured British intervention in Syria as a whole with the excep­ tion o f Lebanon.4 G rey immediately warned Cairo that any British aspirations to Syria would mean a break with France.5 M eanwhile the Foreign Office had opened conversations with the French. As the cabinet, in their meeting o f 19 M arch 1 Negotiated on the British side by Captain Shakespeare, and signed in December 1915. The text reproduced e.g. in Hurewitz, ii, 17-18. 2 See Storrs, pp. 14g and 152.— Elie Kedourie has dealt in detail with the diplomacy of the Arab revolt in his article ‘Cairo and Khartoum on the Arab Question 1915-18*, The Historical Journal, viii, 2 (1964). 3 For these events, see George Antonius: The Arab Awakening (London, 1947)» pp. 152-9. 4 M cM ahon to Grey, 15 Feb. 1915 (received 1 M arch), letter no. 23; a s q u i t h , Printed Government Papers, Feb.-M arch 1915. 9 Storrs to FitzGerald, 8 M arch 1915, personal letter; Kitchener Papers P.R .O .

45» Q.Q/18.

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27

1915) had not decided to the contrary, G rey felt free to answer affirm atively when, four days later, the French ambassador proposed an 'unofficial discussion’ about what Britain and France desired in Asiatic Turkey.1 During these rather casual talks, the French were informed about British contacts with the Arabs— albeit 'in a vague and affable manner’, as Sir Harold Nicolson characterized it in a later study.2 The French never­ theless later complained that they had been kept in the dark as to the correspondence with the sharif.3 A ll the same, the m ilitary situation in the eastern theatre o f war scarcely justified such political hide and seek. O n 21 October, about the time when General Townshend4 was assumed to be finally marching on Baghdad, Grey proposed to Cambon that the French govern­ ment should appoint a special representative to discuss in detail, with a representative o f the British government, the problem o f the partition o f the regions concerned.5 M eanwhile, having learnt that a French representative in Cairo had also been in contact with Arab leaders, G rey instruc­ ted his ambassador in Paris to ask the French government to discourage such activity.6 The French were especially warned against touching on the purely Islamic question o f the caliphate, notwithstanding the fact that Kitchener had made a direct reference to it when inciting the sharif to move camp in O ctober 1914.7 Instead, M cM ahon was continuing his correspondence with Husain ‘without great wisdom’, as it was criticized by an India Office representative, hoping 'that when the hour o f settlement should arrive, France would not claim her pound o f flesh’.8 1 Grey to Bertie, 23 March 1915; private letter reproduced in Grey, ii, 230. 2 Harold Nicolson: Curzon: The Last Phase, ig ig -ig sß (New York, 1935), p. 105. According to Lloyd George the French had been informed immediately after the sharif had, in a letter dated 30 August, made clear his claims. (David Lloyd George: The Truth about the Peace Treaties (London, 1938), ii, 1019.) 3 See e.g. draft of a letter by Lord Crewe to Bertie, 17 Dec. 1915; g r e y , F.O . 800/58. 4 Townshend, M aj.-Gen. Sir Charles, commander o f the 6th Division in the expeditionary force in Mesopotamia, 1915-16. 9 Lloyd George to Clemenceau, 18 O ct. 1919, off. letter; B .D ., 1, iv, 481. 6 Grey to Bertie, 30 O ct. 1915, tel. no. 2464; F.O . 608/93. 7 Kitchener had promised that Husain could count on the British government’s recognition if he were proclaimed caliph— Storrs, p. 152. 8 Draft of a personal letter: Crewe to Bertie, 17 Dec. 1915; idem.

38

O U TBREAK OF WAR 1914 TO

O n 24 October he wrote to Husain that if the Arabs entered the war againstTurkey, the British promised them independence within the boundaries Husain had demanded, but with two notable exceptions: (1) the provinces o f Baghdad and Basra were to have a special administration with British assistance; (2) ‘The districts o f Mersina and Alexandretta and portions o f Syria lying to the west o f the districts o f Damascus, Hama, Homs, and Aleppo . . . should be excluded from the proposed lim its. . . in which G reat Britain is free to act without detriment to her ally, France*.1 O n 2 November, G rey cabled to Cairo inquiring whether the Arabs would accept, in their future territories, not only British but also French advisers. This was thought to be necessary in order to induce the French government to give up the four cities, Damascus, Hama, Homs and Aleppo. The foreign secre­ tary emphasized that Great Britain should not seek a new sphere o f interest for herself but should persuade her ally to settle her differences with the Arabs. T o this M cM ahon answered nega­ tively, stating that the Arabs did not welcome the idea o f French influence in their territories and were anxious to have British advisers only.12 Three weeks later Sir M ark Sykes, Kitchener’s W ar Office assistant on eastern affairs who was then in Cairo reported in quite contrary terms. The representative o f Husain in Cairo, Muhammed Sharif al-Faruqi,3 he cabled, agreed that the French should be granted the monopoly o f all concessionary enterprise, special recognition o f all their educa­ tional establishments, and absolute priority as European advisers and employees everywhere in Syria and Palestine, in the south-west as far as to M a’an. Identical treatment was promised to the British in the remainder o f ‘Greater A rabia’, in other words the territories o f the future independent Arab state. In a notable reservation Faruqi had pointed out that the Arabs would 1 The correspondence is reproduced as documents 1-8 in Cmd. 5957 (1939): Correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon . . . and the Shertf Hussein o f Mecca, July 1915-M arch 1916. 2 Grey to McM ahon, 2 Nov. 1915» tel. no. 860, and McM ahon to Grey, 7 Nov. 1915, unnumbered tel.; printed in Memorandum on the British Commitments to King Hussein, p. 10; CAB. 27/36, E.C . 2201, and w e s t e r m a n n . 3 As regards Faruqi, see Elie Kedourie: England and the Middle East— The De­ struction o f the Ottoman Empire 1914-1921 (London, 1956), pp. 36-7.

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not employ Europeans if they were able to do without them .1 The main obstacle to sharing the prospective booty seemed to be removed. The sharif, however, insisted obstinately that the coastal regions reserved for the French should be included in ‘Greater Arabia’. He renounced his claims only to the vilayets o f Mersina and Adana. The question was left open, Husain assert­ ing, in his letter o f 1 January 1916, that the regions now left to the French would be claimed ‘at the first opportunity after this war was finished’ .2 Otherwise the message was promising: the A rab revolt, after all, seemed to be on the point o f realization. M ajor (later Brigadier General Sir) W yndham Deedes, then serving as intelligence officer in the general headquarters at Cairo, noted in his diary, after dining with friends, amongst them T . E. Lawrence:3 ‘The letter received from the Shereef was very satisfactory . . . . I f now the French intransigeance can be overcome there is every reason to hope that things w ill run quietly and smoothly.’4 The comment was mistaken. The Foreign Office did not intend to try to force the French to abandon the coastal regions. W hile the sharif’s last communication was being received in Cairo and the hopeful officers feasted in honour o f the event, the matter had been settled in London. In his answer to Husain, M cM ahon was instructed to emphasize the determination o f the British government to respect the interests o f France. Hinting at the sharif’s declaration in the letter o f 1 January, he declared : It is, as you know, our fixed determination that nothing shall be permitted to interfere in the slightest degree with our united prosecution of the war to a victorious conclusion. Moreover, when the victory has been won, the friendship of Great Britain and France will become yet more firm and enduring, cemented by the blood of Englishmen and Frenchmen who had died side by side fighting for the cause of right and liberty.5 1 Report transmitted by McM ahon to Grey, 20 Nov. 1915, tel. no. 707; idem, Feb. 1916. 2 Cmd. 5957 (1939), idem. 3 Lawrence (Shaw), Thomas Edward, 9nd lieut. in 1914-16 in the G .H .Q ,., E .E .F.; major in 1917, attached to staff o f Gen. Sir R . W ingate, Hejaz Expedition­ ary Force; lt-col., 1918, on Gen. Allenby’s staff; in 1919, adviser on Arab Affairs to the British Peace Delegation at Paris. * W . H . Deedes’s Diary, 26-27-28 Jan. 1916; d e e d e s . 3 Cmd. 5957, idem. a sq u ith ,

30

O U TBREAK OF WAR 1914 TO 4

A career diplomat, François Georges-Picot, was appointed to be the French representative in the negotiations on Asiatic Turkey. First secretary at the French embassy in London in 1915, Picot had formerly served as consul-general in Beirut and was well acquainted with the various cultural and business interests which since the entry o f Turkey into the w ar had launched an all-out propaganda campaign for French acquisition o f Syria.1 O n 23 October, two days after G rey had proposed to Gambon that the partition talks should begin, Picot had travelled to Paris, where he spent a month preparing the French desiderata2 and was no doubt subjected to pressures from the ‘Syrian Party’, then feverishly active outside and inside cabinet and parliament. The Comité de VAsie Française had passed at its general meeting on 21 April 1915 a resolution ‘on the defence the o f French interests in Syria* proposed by Robert de C aix,3 a key figure o f French Syrian policy during the peace settlement. The resolu­ tion had then been handed over to the government.4 A t about the same time the French Syrian interests had been paraded before the Groupe sénatorial pour la défense des intérêts français à 1*étranger in a lecture given to his fellow-senators by PierreEtienne Flandin, an old colonialist whom Sir M ark Sykes later considered to be the leader o f the ‘Syrian Party’.5 Further, in June o f the same year, M M . Ennemond Isaac and Auguste 1 Sec above, p. 13. 2 A . Pingaud: ‘Partage de TAsie Mineure pendant la grande guerre (19141917): Étude de diplomatie secrète’, Revue d 'Histoire de la Guerre Mondiale, April 1939»P- 100. 3 Then head of the publication L'Asie Française, the organ of the said committee. 4 Asie Française, April-July 1915, pp. 40-1. The Comité de l'A sie Française took, besides another similar association, the Comité d 'Orient, an important function as a link between French official and private overseas interests: the list of members of both societies included, at this time, the names of such present and future ministers as Berthelot, Briand, Herriot, M illerand, Pichon, Ribot and Tardieu, as well as the names of publicists such as Count Cressaty, Auguste Gauvain and Victor Bérard, and those of financiers like Reinach, Rothschild and Schneider, Arsène Henry, director of the Compagnie du Port de Beyrouth, and Count Georges V itali, the leading stock-holder of the Régie Générale des Chemins de fer of Syria. The lists of members appear on the title pages of L'Asie Française, Jan.-M arch 1915, and of Correspondence d 'Orient, 16 June 1914. 5 The names given in the letter of 15 April 1917 from Sykes to Sir R . Graham (s y k e s ) suggest that, with the ‘Syrian Party’ Sykes rather meant the Comité d'action française ta which was founded in the summer of 1916 (SccLe Temps, iju ly 1916).

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31

M orel had handed to the foreign minister a letter on behalf o f the chamber o f commerce o f Lyons, advocating the French acquisition o f Syria. The chamber o f commerce o f Marseilles had soon sent a similar letter.1 No French material relative to the preparation o f the French desiderata being available, we do not know as yet what instruc­ tions Picot had from the newly formed Briand cabinet when leaving for London. In the overture to the negotiations, how­ ever, the representative o f the Q uai d’Orsay displayed such rashness that he seemed to be merely repeating the refrain o f the French extremists. ‘There is, on the western coast o f Asiatic Turkey, from the chain o f the Taurus to the Sinai Peninsula, a land*, Senator Flandin had declared in M ay, ‘which our coun­ try has marked for centuries with its im print to such a point that it can be called the France o f the Levant.’12 A t his first meeting at the Foreign Office on 23 November with the British repre­ sentative, Georges-Picot did indeed demand nothing less than the whole o f Syria from Taurus to the Egyptian border.3 Picot was first received by Sir Arthur Nicolson, permanent under-secretary o f state for foreign affairs. Nicolson was assisted by a committee composed o f representatives o f the Foreign Office, the India Office, and the W ar Office, set up to co-ordinate policy in the negotiations with the French. Picot had two meet­ ings with Nicolson, neither o f the two negotiators showing any willingness to compromise. The deadlock compelled the British government to change the negotiator and the method. The choice fell on Sir M ark Sykes, freshly back from his successful mission to Cairo.4 1 V Asie Française, April-July 1915, pp. 45-6 and January 1916, pp. 39-44. Dominique Chevallier: ‘Lyon et la Syrie en 1919; les bases d’une intervention’, Revue Historique, ccxxiv (O ct.-D ec. 1960), p. 306 and note 2 on same. This article gives an interesting account of the lobbying activity of the powerful Lyons silk interests— which before the war were vitally dependent on the raw silk and cocoons imported from Syria. 2 Pierre-Etienne Flandin : ‘Nos droits en Syrie et en Palestine’, Revue Hebdomadaire, 6 M ay 1915, p. 17. 3 W ith the exception of an enclave around the Holy Places.— For the background and course of negotiations, see Leonard Stein: The Balfour Declaration (London, 1966), pp. 250-63, and Ked'Jtrie, the article mentioned, pp. 286-7, as well as Pingaud, pp. 100-4. 4 See above, p. 28.

3*

O U TBREAK OF WAR 1914 TO

Sykes served during the war in the W ar Office with the rank o f lieutenant-colonel and, being an orientalist, was used by Lord Kitchener as adviser in eastern affairs. In this capacity he had been appointed a member o f the Bunsen committee at the per­ sonal request o f the secretary o f w ar.1 He was a member o f parliament but had never served at the Foreign Office. He had had no practice in negotiations o f the kind that he was now en­ trusted with, whereas Picot was a ‘diplomat o f the old school, accustomed to the intrigues o f the Orient’.2 As a Catholic and a francophile Sykes showed genuine understanding for France’s defence o f her traditional position in the Levant. His views in this respect seem to have been strongly influenced by a French Dominican from Jerusalem, Father Jaussen, who now served the British navy in the Red Sea and whom Sykes had met recently in C airo.3 O n the other hand, Sykes was particularly virulent in his animosity towards French bankers, whom he suspected o f push­ ing the French demands since the beginning o f the negotiations.4 W hen explaining his dealings with Picot to the war committee on 16 December, Sykes took the view that the French wanted to extend their territory up to the Persian border in order to give their railw ay interests an opportunity to link up the Syrian and Baghdad networks with a trans-Persian railway. He believed that some o f the French financiers, for instance Count V itali, were in touch with corresponding German interests in Switzer1 Sykes to Sir George Arthur, 26 Sept. 1916; Kitchener Papers, P .R .0 . 30,57/91* 2 An observation by Captain W illiam Yale, special agent o f the department of state in Cairo, 1917-18 (‘The Situation in Palestine’, a report by Y ale to the Department of State, 19 Sept. 1918; y a l e , Palestine, iii-19). 3 Shane Leslie: Sir Mark Sykes: His Life and Letters (London, 1924), pp. 242-3, 245. When reporting and being heard on Arab affairs, Sykes often referred to Jaussen as an authority (see e.g. Secretary’s Notes o f a Meeting of the W ar Com­ mittee held at 10 Downing Street, December 16, 1915, p. 1 ; CAB. 42/6). 4 In a leaflet published two years later Sykes denounced the notorious role of international finance behind Turkish politics, in the following words: T f the Levantine finance is to continue as a post-war factor in the Near East, then one of the root causes of future conflicts will have been left untouched.. . . International finance before the war, as organized in Stamboul, represented nothing less than organized corruption.. . . Finance interfered in policy, and diplomacy interfered in finance, nations were set by the ears, wars promoted, peoples oppressed, reforms delayed or rendered nugatory, in order that individual fortunes might be built up, or that profits should accrue to certain com bines.. . . ’ M ark Sykes: Future o f the Middle East (Armenian Bureau Publications, London, 1918), p. 5.

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land.1 Hankey's letter o f 27 January 1916, quoted above, indi­ cates that Sykes’s warning was taken seriously in government circles. Describing the disadvantages caused by a possible separate peace with Turkey, the secretary o f the war cabinet wrote: ‘W e should then be confronted with the pressure o f international financiers whose interests lie in pulling strings in Constantinople, and whose power is felt in every European ca p ita l.. . .’ 12 The fundamental principle in preparing the partition was, for Sykes, that the old system o f the Ottom an empire, which gave Germ any a chance to spread her influence to the M iddle East, had to be destroyed. Instead, Britain and France had to find in the M iddle East a new modus vivendi in which both allies had to have their legitim ate interests secured. In order to dis­ courage the more extreme claims o f the French, Sykes proposed to split their ‘Syrian Party’ by working on the Catholic element which was deeply moved by the Turkish terror against their co-religionists in the Levant. ‘W e require diplom acy which would be able to show great sympathy with clerical feeling in France’, he told the war committee, ‘and to point out that if matters are allowed to drift they w ill lose their real anchorage in Syria, owing to anticipated massacre o f the Syrian Christians in the same w ay that the Armenians were massacred.’ The French had to be made to understand that if the Arabs were left to the influence o f the Turkish Committee o f Union and Pro­ gress, they would be more dangerous than if placed under their own sharif, ‘when they w ill go quarrelling amongst themselves, as they always do’.3 These tactics were successful. O n 21 December, Picot finally informed Nicolson at the Foreign Office that he had ‘after great difficulties* obtained permission from Paris to agree that the disputed four inland towns o f Syria should be included in the territories administered by the Arabs under French influence. This was, according to a British document, because ‘his Govern­ ment realized the importance o f the Arab movement and wished 1 G .I.D . Paper G-46, p.3; CAB. 94 1/9. 3 Hankey to Deedes, 97 Jan. 1916, private letter; d e b d e s . 3 W ar committee meeting, 16 Dec. 1915, ’Evidence o f Lieut.-Col. Sir Mark Sykes on the Arab Question’, p. 3; C A B ., idem.

34

OUTBREAK OF WAR 1914 TO

to make any sacrifice possible in order to separate the Arabs from the Turks*.1 As far as the actual partition was concerned, Sykes’s proposal was, by and large, based on the recommendations o f the Bunsen committee. Lord Kitchener’s idea o f keeping the Arabs under British control influenced the proposal. This is shown by the following passage o f the minutes o f the war committee’s meeting on 16 December, at which Sykes gave evidence on the negotiations with Picot: Mr Balfour: What sort of agreement would you like to have with the French? Sykes: I would like to retain for ourselves such country south of Haifa as was not in the Jerusalem enclave which I gather the French themselves admit. I think it is important that we should have a belt of English-controlled country between the Sharif of Mecca and the French. . . .12 The cession to France o f an area near the Persian border had also been suggested originally by the Bunsen committee. T ran ce might be invited to extend her territory eastward so as to include the Nestorian region west o f Lake Urm ia, where she has missionary interests*,3 the committee had reported. ‘This would provide a buffer between British and Russian territory on that part o f the frontier, which is the least satisfactory from a strate­ gical point o f view.*4*In spite o f this, all the schemes drawn up by the committee included Mosul in the British sphere.9 O n 16 December, however, Sykes announced to the war committee in the presence o f Kitchener, that the French had requested Mosul 1 Lloyd George to Clemenceau, 18 O ct. 1919, off. letter; B .D ., 1, iv, 481. 2 C .I.D . Paper G -46; p. 5; CAB., idem. 3 The French were, in fact, probably less interested in the Nestorians than they were in the Chaldean catholics. These formed less than a half of all the 100,000 Christians of the Mosul area, but were known to have political influence among certain Moslem elements as well. Before the war the British vice-consul in Mosul suspected the local French Dominicans and the old Syrian Christians (Assyrians) under the Chaldean Patriarch, of anti-British agitation and emphasized that this movement formed ‘the sum and total o f French official interest in this part of the Ottoman Empire9 (Notes by vice-consul W ilkie Young on the Mosul District, Jan. 1910, pp. 6-7, enclosure no. 2 in the despatch: Lowther to Grey, letter no. 201, 5 April 1910, printed in a confidential paper: F.O . 368/470, no. 21145). 4 Report o f the Committee on Asiatic Turkey, June 19159 p. 9. 9 See M ap 1 o f the present study.

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35

and that he was ready to give it to them by drawing the partition line ‘from “ e” in the map name Acre to the last “ k” in Kirkuk*.1 This also meant that the French should be given a section around Ruwandiz bordering upon the Persian frontier, and an opportunity to link up their railw ay system in Syria with any future system o f theirs in Persia. In the south o f Syria, on the contrary, the French preferred to give up their original claims. W hen the French premier tried, after the signing o f the Sykes-Picot draft on 3 January, to secure some modifications into it, ambassador Gambon warned him that if too much were demanded o f Kitchener he might withdraw from the negotiations.2 The newly established Briand cabinet was obviously anxious not to strain relations with W hite­ hall at this particular moment, when Kitchener was irritated by the French-inspired expedition to Salonika.3 T hat is why they did not delay their acceptance o f the draft but endorsed it on 8 February, four days after its acceptance by the British government.4 According to the agreement o f London o f 1914, Russia had to be a party to the partition. The difficulties the French met with in Petrograd, when negotiating on Russian participation in the agreement, delayed its conclusion until the spring. Strengthened by their victories in the Caucasus, the Russians now desired the lion’s share in Asia M inor, especially in Armenia. They express­ ed fear o f the Sykes-Picot draft, because it conceded to the French a zone extending to the Persian border, and they requested the amputation o f this territory around Ruwandiz. As the French insisted on their gains in the north, the Russians did not back the French demands in the south. Thus, for Palestine, 1 C .I.D . Paper G-46, p. 5; CAB., idem. 3 Pingaud, p. 103. 3 See e.g. Grey, ii, 231, David Lloyd George: The War Memoirs (London, 1936), i, 314, and Georges Bonnefous: L'Histoire politique de la Troisième République (Paris, *957). “ , 108. 4 In London the draft was accepted at a meeting held at the Foreign Office on 4 Feb. 1916. Those present were Grey, Kitchener, Bonar Law (lord privy seal and leader o f the House of Commons), Crewe together with Holdemess and H irtzel (of the India Office) and Sir Arthur Nicolson (of the F .O .). According to note by die last named ('Arab Question’ ; CAB. 37/142/10 no. 248) 'a representative o f the Adm iralty was also present but without opinion*. D

36

O U TBR EA K OF W AR 1914 T O

the final decision was internationalization as planned in London.1

5 Because o f the essential role o f the agreement o f 1916 in the Anglo-French relations we are going to study, a short analysis o f its contents and its spirit seems appropriate at this point.12 For the Foreign Office the agreement was, G rey admitted, a wartime necessity.3 A lter the checkmate o f G allipoli at the end o f 1915 it became urgent for G reat Britain, from both m ilitary and political points o f view, to open a new offensive in the eastern theatre. Concentration o f a British arm y in Egypt drew French attention because it diverted forces otherwise available for the western front and because it was to be expected that, if successful, the planned operation would lead to a British occu­ pation o f Syria. As a witness present when the Sykes-Picot draft was finally accepted put it: 'French consent was therefore doubly necessary before the offensive could be begun, and the Sykes-Picot Agreement was the price we had to pay for it.'4 O n the other hand, in order to weaken the enemy by splitting its camp, the Foreign Office had revived Lord Kitchener's idea o f inciting the Arabs to revolt against the Turks. This second emergency measure, necessary or unnecessary, had to be paid for by the notorious 'M cM ahon pledge’,5 the substance o f which was also involved in the Sykes-Picot agreement. By the 1916 agreement the British government endeavoured to reconcile both their sets o f engagements, the one with the French and the other with the Arabs. 'T h e acceptance o f the whole project would entail the abdication o f considerable British interests', they admitted when giving their acceptance to the Sykes-Picot draft, 'but provided that the co-operation o f the Arabs is secured and that the Arabs fulfil the conditions and obtain the towns o f 1 Pingaud, p. 108. 3 The text o f the agreement appear* as appendix A below. 9 See above, p. 26. 4 Trench Claim* in Syria*, a memorandum by Sir A . H irtzel, 14 Feb. 1919; F .O . 608/107, no- 2256. 9 See Kedourie, the article mentioned, p. 281.

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37

Homs, Hama, Damascus and Aleppo, the British Government would not object to the arrangem ent/1 It is to be noted that this approval was based on the promise received from the representative o f the sharif at Cairo, accord­ ing to which the Arabs agreed to grant the French special rights in the latter’s sphere o f the proposed Arab territory. In fact, a copy o f M cM ahon’s telegram o f 20 November 1915 informing the Foreign Office o f this decisive concession was appended to the note that Nicolson had prepared for the meeting o f 4 Feb­ ruary.2 Consequently, it appears that while the first condition for acceptance o f the agreement by the British government was obviously the certainty that the Arabs should really do what was expected o f them and revolt against the Turks, the second was that they ‘fulfil the conditions* by granting the priority o f enterprise and advisership, as well as special status for cultural establishments, to the French in Syria and the British in Mesopotamia. Leaving Beirut under direct French administra­ tion and Basra under direct British control may also be interpreted as one o f the ‘conditions’ to be fulfilled by the Arabs. As far as the French were concerned, the prerequisite to the British accep­ tance was that they should really allow the four towns mentioned to be included in the projected Arab state. The Anglo-French-Russian correspondence relative to the confirmation o f the 1916 agreement indicates quite clearly that the British government was at that time indeed considering an independent and politically fully powered Arab element.3 It is also evident that the French— at least the ambassador in London— accepted the idea. In his reply to the foreign secre­ tary, who had suggested a change in the words used in article 1 o f the original protocol, Paul Cambon wrote on 25 August 1916: Because the words ‘protéger un Etat Arab indépendant’ and ‘protect an independent Arab State* . . . seemed to Your Lordship to be open to misinterpretations, in allowing it to be understood that it concerned a sort of protectorate, while we have simply meant to guarantee thefu ll independence ofthe newState, on my part I see no inconvenience 1 ‘Arab Question’, a confidential note to Sir Edward Grey by ‘A . N .’, a Feb. 1916; CAB. 37/143/10, no. 348. 1 Idem. * See B .D ., iv, 347-50.

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O U TBREA K OF WAR 1914 TO

2. T h e railw ay netw ork and the dem arcation lines along the SykesP icot p artition in the south o f S yria. (Based on a Foreign O ffice m ap delineating the Sykes-Picot p artition , ch a m b e r la in , ac 19/68.) map

PA R T IT IO N OF A S IA T IC T U R K E Y 1916

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in modifying these expressions following the desire which you have made known to me.1 It is feasible that the French were not only obliged to accept the British assurance, but that they also believed it necessary, at least provisionally, to reward the Arabs by recognizing their full independence.2 According to the agreement, the four main towns o f the Syrian inland remained Arab, but isolated by the French dominions. The three hundred miles o f Syrian coast which included the strategically im portant G u lf o f Alexandretta with a deep hinterland into Anatolia, was practically to be annexed to France. These were the ‘portions o f Syria lying to the west o f the districts o f Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo* which M cM ahon had excluded from the future inde­ pendent Arab dominions in 1915.3 M oreover, contrary to the promise given to Husain, the frontier between the Arab-adm ini­ stered area (A) and the blue zone was drawn, on the map an­ nexed to the Anglo-French agreement o f 1916, even farther to the east than the original border o f the Ottom an sanjak (district) o f Damascus. The zone directly controlled by the French thus included the region o f the Biqa’ (around Baalbek) which the Lebanese since the 1860s had demanded should be added to the autonomous province o f Lebanon. O n the other hand, through these four towns o f area (A) o f the Sykes-Picot map the French were in a position to exert their influence inside the future Islamic empire. In that area, as article 1 o f the agreement stated, France ‘shall alone supply advisers o f foreign functionaries at the request o f the Arab State or Confederation o f Arab States*. In short, the pre-war economic and cultural predominance o f France would have nothing to suffer; on the contrary, she would literally have no rivals in Syria, whether the future Arab rulers wanted it or not. By means o f area (A), finally, the French could extend their influence to the northern part o f Iraq, to the Mosul area. But here, as in their directly controlled blue area in Anatolia, they 1 Translated from the French letter, reproduced in B .D ., idem, pp. 24^-9 (the present writer’s italics). The French ambassador then proposed that the verbs used should be ‘soutenir’ and ‘uphold’ to which Sir Edward agreed. 2 Sir M ark Sykes believed this, at least one year afterwards. Sykes’s report ‘Arab situation’, 17 June 1917, p. 2; s y k e s . 3 See above, p. 28.

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O U TBREA K OF WAR 1914 TO

became neighbours with Russia, as Lord Kitchener had intended.1 Moreover, in abandoning Mosul the Foreign Office did not neglect securing the oil reserves o f the area. It made the final approval o f the agreement conditional on the assurance that any existing British concessions and rights in the regions dominated by the French would be m aintained.12 Areas (A) and (B) together formed, on the Sykes-Picot map, a kind o f Arab buffer-state between the two powers’ direct depend­ encies on the M editerranean coast and in Mesopotamia. The British ‘upheld’ part o f it, area (B), was destined to serve as a strategic bridge for im perial communications between Egypt and Iraq-Persia. The red zone that was to be under direct British control included Baghdad and all the other main centres o f Shiah Moslem pilgrimage. This is a fact worth noting, especi­ ally from the Indian point o f view— the blue zone under direct French control did not include any notable Mohammedan town. As Balfour three years later characterized these zones, they were after all thought to be more like protectorates: ‘The first should be French as Tunis is French, the other English as Egypt is English.*3 The importance o f the new protectorate which the English now acquired in exchange for a French expansion into Anatolia was considered invaluable for the defence o f India. In the bitterly disputed case o f Palestine it was decided to establish an international administration, but only after con­ sultation with Russia and the other allies (which meant especi­ ally Italy) and the representatives o f the sharif o f M ecca. The ports o f Haifa and Acre, however, were reserved for the British as a minimum necessity for the defence o f the Suez Canal and for the communications with Mesopotamia. But free port facili­ ties in Alexandretta and free transit to and from Mesopotamia 1 Sir A . H irtzel had also given a warning in M arch 1915, against taking over by the British o f the vilayet o f Mosul, because the British would be responsible for Armenia against ‘Kurdish depredations’ ( a s ^ u i t h , idem, Jan.-M arch 1915, p. 228). 3 Grey to Gambon and Cambon to Grey, 15 M ay 1916, B .D ., idem, pp. 244-5. André Tardieu, an influential member o f the second cabinet o f Clemenceau and a member o f the French peace delegation in 1919, later claimed that Cambon had acted beyond his competence; that is, Paris had not been consulted. ‘Mossoul et ses pétroles', published in L'Illustration, 19 June 1920. 3 Memorandum by A . J . Balfour, 11 August 1919, B .D ., idem, p. 342.

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were granted to British shipping and British goods, while the French were to enjoy free port rights in Haifa. Clause 6 would have been o f importance if Germ any had not been compelled to withdraw from Turkey. Both treaty powers reserved the right to build, subject to their mutual competition only, the railw ay from Aleppo, via the Euphrates V alley, to Baghdad. Thus they would have been in a position to realize a plan which, before the war, had been prevented by the Germandominated Baghdad railw ay company. The introduction o f this clause into the agreement shows the influence that the private interests concerned exerted upon the negotiations.1 O n the other hand the following clause (art. 7), which also dealt with communications, indicated a considerable concession from the French railw ay interests. Britain was to have the right *to build, administer, and be sole owner* o f a line connecting H aifa with area (B), which it was intended to extend, as a second trans-Syrian line, to Baghdad. A perpetual right to transport troops along this railw ay was agreed to. The line appeared a dangerous competitor to the H aifa-Dera*a railw ay which the French Régie Générale des Chemins defer wanted to control as an organic part o f its Syrian network. Far more precarious from a political point o f view was, for the French, the stipulation that the British, if hindered by engineering difficulties or excessive expenses from building this line through their own area, (B), would be entitled to request the right to direct it through area (A) in southern Hauran. As a counter-concession to Palestine, Briand had asked for the cession o f Cyprus to France.2 The request was not granted,3 and the French had to be satisfied with a promise that England would never enter into negotiations for the cession o f Cyprus to any third power without the previous consent o f the French government. The two powers also gave mutual assurances that they would at no time, without the previous consent o f the other 1 See above, p. 7. 9 Pingaud, p. 103. 9 Since the cession o f the island to Greece had been suggested in 1915, the naval and general staffs insisted, two years later, on the need to keep Cyprus British, and emphasized its increased value as a future air base (appendix to a memorandum by Lord Curzon, T h e Future o f Cyprus', 3 Jan. 1919, p. 3; CAB. 27/37, E*C. 3028, and rosTBR, folder 80).

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O U TBR EA K OF W AR 1914 TO

government concerned, enter into negotiations for ceding their rights in the designated areas to any third power except the A rab state or confederation. Lastly, by article 10, the French were given a kind o f assur­ ance that the British intentions were bonafide. In this article the two governments agreed that they would not acquire or allow a third power to acquire territorial possessions in the Arabian Peninsula, nor install naval bases on its coasts. The purpose was to keep the heartlands o f Islam intact from any foreign influence. By this assurance the British government lost nothing: treaty relations with the Arab princes assured its influence in the regions concerned even without territorial possessions. In its Arab policy it nevertheless acquired an extraordinarily advantageous position as compared with that o f France, who had to continue to negotiate with the Arabs on the boundaries o f their future dominions through the British Residency in Cairo. O n the part o f France, this last concession meant recognition o f the simple fact that Britain, with her hydraheaded political organism, with her additional brain centres in Cairo and in New Delhi— respectively specializing in western and eastern A rabia — could, in spite o f the war, not only maintain but even strengthen her presence in the M iddle East. O n the other hand, France had to withdraw her agents, her consuls, consuls-general and dragomans, with the exception o f a few in Egypt. Consequently, she was literally out o f place in the Orient, and Paris, her only head, was hypnotized by happenings in Europe. Some Englishmen were inclined to believe that Sykes had been roulé by Picot, as the ambassador in Paris put it.1 The responsibility for the 1916 agreement, however, cannot be laid on Sykes alone. Lloyd George’s opinion was that the agreement had been forced upon Sykes by the Foreign O ffice.12 The policy to be followed in the negotiations was discussed by a special committee, on which Lord Kitchener’s influence may have been considerable.3 M oreover, the most widely criticized blunder o f the Sykes-Picot agreement, the abandoning o f Mosul to the French, was committed, as we know, within the sphere o f the 1 Lord F. Bertie: The Diary i g i f - i g i ß (London, 1924), ii, 317. 2 War Memoirs, 1826. 3 See Kedourie, article mentioned, pp. 286-7«

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war committee's observation.1 According to Sykes himself, he worked out the whole agreement ‘on Lord Kitchener's lines' although he did not have a chance to see him personally more than about three times in all. The field-marshal's aide-de-camp, M ajor FitzG erald, acted as the go-between. ‘One worked a sort o f triangular equation', Sykes revealed to the biographer o f Kitchener, T acted, FitzGerald spoke, he inspired.'12 Consequently, one is not easily convinced by the argument that the whole misfortune o f the Sykes-Picot partition lay in the sudden loss o f Lord Kitchener at the moment when the agree­ ment was being concluded. In a subsequent letter to The Times, a close collaborator o f Kitchener in the W ar Office m ilitary operations department, Colonel Sir Edmund Gabriel, argued that the field-marshal did not have time to compare the agree­ ment with the previous pledges given to the sharif o f M ecca.3 He may certainly have been too busy to concentrate on the matter. But this only means that on his agenda the agreements with the Arabs and the French in the M iddle East were o f sec­ ondary importance, open to improvisation. He had more than h alf a year in which to find an hour to study the document. Once the French had agreed to a compromise which was roughly in accordance with the concessions made by al-Faruqi in Cairo, Kitchener obviously paid no attention to the sharif's warning that he would take up the matter after the war. Had he been interested in details, he would have had quite a few occasions to get to grips with them. He was present at the war committee meeting o f 16 December. He was there when the Sykes-Picot draft was finally agreed upon by the British government on 4 February.4 And he was still alive when the agreement came into being on 26 M ay 1916, eleven days before the loss o f the Hampshire. In a radically changing situation, British interests and local political aspirations called for a rapid revision o f the SykesPicot partition. This was never attempted during the war, and that is why, in less than a year's time, the agreement seems to 1 See above, p. 35. 2 Sykes to Arthur, 12 Sept. 1916; Kitchener Papers, idem. 9 The Times, 12 July 1922. 4 See above, p. 35, note 4.

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have become meaningless. This was the moment when every head o f the British M iddle East organism became interested in playing on its own account, when the Indian government with its connections with the emir o f the Nejd, the Arab Bureau in Cairo with its backing o f the sharif o f M ecca, and the new foreign secretary in London, A . J . Balfour, with his weakness for a Jewish national home in Palestine, created flagrantly clashing lines o f policy. These were to com plicate Britain’s relations with France at a time when shattering changes in the world were likely to overthrow old conceptions o f power policy in the east as well as elsewhere.

C H A P T E R III

From the Agreement o f 1916 to the Armistice o f 1918: Questioning the Sykes-Picot Partition the withdrawal o f the Allies from G allipoli and the Z A surrender o f General Townshend at K ut, much hope was 1 . A investedinthe sharif o f M eccawhen he raised thestandard o f revolt against the Turks on 6 June 1916. It was soon clear that this movement could not essentially improve the strategic situa­ tion for the allies. As no landing operation took place on the Syrian coast— though the sharifians had expressly wished it1— the A rab populations in the settled areas o f the north did not rise. The revolt was limited to the H ijaz, where the situation remained confused the whole year. Instead o f bringing m ilitary advantage to the allies, the sharif’s movement produced political complications.12 T . E. Lawrence, describing the opinion in Cairo in the autumn o f 1916, wrote: ‘The Arab revolt became dis­ credited, and the S taff Officers in Egypt gleefully prophesied to us its near failure and the stretching o f Sherif Hussein's neck on a Turkish scaffold.’3* The need to intensify the fight against Turkey led the British to prepare, during the following winter, an offensive through the a fte r

1 Muhammcd Sharif al-Faruqi’s statement to Sykes in Nov. 1915, in the despatch of McM ahon to Grey, 20 Nov. 1915, tel. no. 707; a s q u i t h , idem. 3 In spite of the reluctance o f many Arab nationalists Husain declared himself the king of the Arab nation, at the end of October 1916. The British Government decided with France and Russia to recognize the sharif de facto as ‘K ing of the H ijaz9, but did not agree to his title ‘K ing of the Arabs9 arguing that such an assumption would provoke disunion among the Arabs.— Memorandum on the British Commitments to King Hussein, p. 13; GAB. 27/36, E .C . 2201 and w e s t e r m a n n . 3 Seven Pillars o f Wisdom (London, Penguin Books Ltd, 1962), p. 62.

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AGREEM ENT OF 1916 TO A R M ISTIC E OF ig iô :

Sinai Desert into Palestine. For the moment, the Arab revolt was more or less forgotten. The political preparations o f the Palestine campaign centred upon winning over an important homogeneous element behind the Turkish lines— the Jews. By an exceptional coincidence these preparations were being made in London concurrently with steps taken under the leadership o f the prime minister, Lloyd George, to enlist Jewish world opinion in support o f an allied victory, so that the United States would enter the war and Russia, after the M arch revolution, would remain in it. This was the background to the dramatic changes o f British M iddle East policy in 1917. The possible withdrawal o f Russia from the war meant that she would also cease to be a party to the 1916 agreement. In that case the British government would be in a position to per­ suade Turkey to make a separate peace. The conditions to be enforced on the Porte would have to be reviewed in the light o f new circumstances. For carrying out this task, a special ‘Com­ mittee on Territorial Terms o f Peace’ was set up by the Imperial war cabinet on 12 A pril 1917. The committee, which was to work under the chairmanship o f Lord Curzon,1 included representatives o f the dominions and India.2 It is o f interest to note that one o f the dominion members, General Smuts3o f South Africa, strongly supported Lord Curzon when the latter, at the third meeting o f the committee on 19 A pril, proposed that Palestine should be made a British protec­ torate after the war. O ld strategic arguments were emphasized. The committee concluded that the 1916 agreement should be modified in such a w ay that Great Britain would have a definite and exclusive control over Palestine and Mesopotamia, and that the boundary between the respective French and British zones would run as far in the north as to include in the latter sphere the R iver Litani (Leontes) and the region o f the Hauran. The 1 Curzon, George Nathaniel (Marquess o f Kedleston) ; lord president o f the council, 1916-19; acting foreign secretary, January-October 1919» thereafter foreign secretary until 1924. 2 Imperial W ar Cabinet, Report o f the Committee on Terms o f Peace, 28 April 1917; CAB. 21/71, and c h a m b e r l a i n , A c . 20/78.— The following description is based on this document. 3 Smuts, Lt.-Gen. (later Field-Marshal) Jan Christiaan; minister for defence o f the Union of South Africa, and her representative in the imperial war cabinet, 1917-18; member of the British empire peace delegation in 1919.

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acquisition o f that part o f Syria was necessary, according to Smuts, because the railway connecting Egypt, Palestine, Meso­ potam ia and the Persian Gulf, ‘an object to be kept steadily in view ', would probably have to go by the northern side o f the Hauran. The committee was aware that these proposals would clash with the claims made by Paris. A t the meeting o f 19 A pril the secretary o f the committee, Captain Am ery, announced that the French parliam entary commission for foreign affairs had in a recent secret session unanimously voted that Palestine should belong to France, with the possible exception o f a small enclave including the H oly Places which might be entrusted to Belgium. A t the same meeting Lord Curzon pointed out the rivalry between France and Italy for a commanding position in the eastern M editerranean. Consequently, in their report the com­ mittee warned that Great Britain should not surrender Cyprus to France or to anybody else, and that in the Arabian Peninsula, another area in which the French and the Italians had shown increasing interest in recent times, no foreign power other than G reat Britain should exercise political influence. As w ill be seen, the recommendations o f the Curzon commit­ tee on Palestine and A rabia were in direct opposition to the stipulations o f the agreement o f Saint-Jean de M aurienne, which had been concluded at the very same time, 19 A pril 1917, between G reat Britain, France and Italy. M oreover, though General Smuts had emphasized the necessity o f maintaining the framework o f the Sykes-Picot agreement as a workable basis for an Anglo-French alliance against the German danger in the east,1 the report o f the committee as a whole revealed a change o f attitude towards France. Sykes bitterly criticized Curzon’s intransigent attitude and complained after his return from the east in July 1917: ‘O n my arrival I found that the Foreign Office had been carefully destroying everything I had done in the past two years, stimulating anti-French feeling and pushing separate negotia­ tions with Turkey id eas.. . .*2 Sykes’s standpoint, however, was 1 Report o f the Committee on Terms o f Peace, idem, p. 18. 2 Sykes to Colonel (later Brig.-Gen., Sir) Gilbert Clayton, chief political officer, Egyptian Expeditionary Force, 22 July 1917, private letter; s y k e s .

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now challenged by the opinion o f another expert on Arab affairs. The director o f the Arab Bureau in Cairo, Commander D . G . Hogarth, had already written a note to London urging the authorities there to press for the revision o f the 1916 agreement, in order to give Britain a stronger position in Palestine and in A rabia proper.1 Sykes was angered by Hogarth’s action,2 but was, barely four months later, himself acting along the same lines. In a letter to Lord Robert Cecil, 13 October 1917, he reported that the road to Mosul was m ilitarily open for General M aude’s Mesopotamian force, and proposed the establishment o f British political influence in the area.3 It is worth observing that at that time the bolsheviks had not yet taken over in Petrograd, and consequently the Russian withdrawal from the scene was not guaranteed. The October revolution confirmed the British government in her determination to try to get Turkey out o f the war. A t an inter-allied conference in Paris on 30 November, Lloyd George observed that whereas the Russian war aims had until then stood in the w ay o f any separate peace with Turkey, the validity o f the London agreement o f 1914 as regards Russia had now to be re-examined.4 O n 15 December the Soviet representatives signed an armistice with Germ any at Brest-Litovsk. Ten days later, on 25 December, the Foreign Office despatched orders to the minister in Berne to develop peace approaches with the Turks; according to the instructions, the British government was not prepared to guarantee the Turkish flag in Palestine after the war but would reconsider the possibility o f leaving Syria and Mesopotamia within the Ottom an empire.9 The m ilitary impasse in the east and the continued weakness o f the peace party in Constantinople delayed the Turkish armi­ stice up to October 1918. Russia’s withdrawal, nevertheless, had definite repercussions on the M iddle Eastern political map: she was no longer supporting the idea o f internationalization o f Palestine; her menace from Arm enia no longer necessitated the 1 Note on the ‘Anglo-Franco-Russian Agreement about the Near East9by D. G . Hogarth, 9 July 1917, quoted by Kedourie, article mentioned, p. 294. 2 Hogarth to Clayton, 11 July 1917, private letter; h o o a r t h . 3 Leslie, pp. 273-4. 4 Lloyd George, War Memoirs, v, 2572. 9 F .O . to Sir Horace Rumbold, 25 Dec. 1917, tel. no. 1294; m i l n e r A/2, p. 172.

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abandoning o f Mosul to the French; and as she was no longer a participant in the war-time secret agreements, the British government had a new reason for maintaining that these under­ standings were out o f date. There was, o f course, another consequence o f the O ctober revolution, namely the universal bolshevist danger. The allRussian conference o f soviets had drawn up, in the second month o f the new regime, a widely distributed manifesto to Moslem workers and peasants.1 M oreover, the publication in the course o f the same year, 1917, o f the secret agreements on Turkey deposited in the Foreign M inistry in Petrograd, showed that the Red government might try to exploit the discontent among the Turks and Arabs. A t odds with Moslem nationalist movements in Egypt and in India, the British government had to take into consideration future Soviet pressure in the east, and to re-examine the plans for a new order in Asiatic Turkey in the light o f the principle o f the self-determination o f peoples. Furthermore, besides Lenin, there was another prophet propagating this ideal from the opposite hemisphere, namely President Woodrow Wilson o f the United States. In the situation at the beginning o f the Am erican war effort, the British had to take him into consideration even more seriously than they did the Soviets. These outside pressures were the historical back­ ground to the notably liberal declaration o f the British war aims that Lloyd George made in his speech at Gaxton H all in London on 5 January 1918. Treating in detail the principal European and world territorial questions, the prime minister pronounced in favour o f the internationalization o f the T urkish Straits and for separation from the Ottom an empire— to be maintained 'in the homelands o f the Turkish race with its capital at Constantinople* — o f Arabia, Arm enia, Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine, which were entitled to ‘recognition o f their separate national condi­ tions’.2 In fact, this engagement was not irreconcilable with the stipu­ lations o f the Sykes-Picot agreement. Pichon soon made a declaration on very similar lines. 'T h e French Government seems to have given up their annexation plans as regards Turkish 1 Hurewitz, ii, 317-18. 3486.

2 War Manoirs, v,

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AGREEM ENT OF 1916 TO A R M ISTIC E OF 1918:

territories’, a German observer in Switzerland commented, ‘and according to the contents o f the last speech o f Pichon in the French Cham ber, w ill work only to support the aspirations o f the Syrians and Armenians.’ 1 The spirit o f the 1916 partition, however, was in flagrant contradiction with the ideal o f the new era. This was now admitted by Sykes and Picot themselves. O n 3 M arch, the day when the German-Russian peace treaty was finally concluded, Sykes wrote three letters, one to General W ingate,2 one to Colonel Clayton3 and one to Picot,45making it clear that he now regarded the Anglo-French agreement com­ pletely out o f date. ‘The consent o f the governed and the consent o f the world are essential to any form o f foreign influence or control over an emancipated people*, he pointed out to Picot. ‘Kerenski’s disappearance and the advent o f the bolsheviks have made a decided difference in the world affairs. President Wilson’s voice is now the im portant one and the ideas that do not fit in with his speeches won’t have much influence on the peace conference.. . . ’ 2

It would be tempting to attribute British policy in Palestine to ignorant Londoners who had no idea what was really going on in the Arab M iddle East at the end o f 1917. But there was Sir M ark Sykes, and his role in inducing the new post-1916 line o f policy in Palestine is significant if not decisive.3 Sykes may be considered an expert, a moderator, a man o f vision. Still, since he was— as in his report o f O ctober 19176— advocating side by 1 An anonymous report to Bethmann-Hollweg, dated at Berne, 21 Jan. 1918; G .F.M . 21/404, bd. 17, rep. 93. 2 Sykes to General Sir Reginald W ingate, high commissioner in Egypt 1917(January) 19, draft o f a personal letter dated 3 M arch; Papers of Sir M ark Sykes F.O . 800/208, no. 19 3 Same to Col. Clayton, copy o f a personal letter of the same date; idem, no. 6. 4 Same to Picot, draft o f a personal letter o f the same date; idem, no. 16. 5 ‘Had Sykes taken a different view, his advice might well have been fatal to the policy embodied in the Declaration9, Stein commented, ‘and it is at least doubtful whether obstacles in its way would have been surmounted if he had not worked actively and persistently in its favour9 (Stein, p. 272) ; more about the role of Sykes in preparing the way for the Balfour declaration, idem, pp. 270-88 and Leslie, pp. 270-1. 6 A letter to Lord Robert Cecil, 13 O ct. 1917; Leslie, pp. 273-4.

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side (a) a preparatory policy for a British protectorate in Palestine, (b) establishment o f British political influence in the M osul area, and (c) good post-war terms with France in order to continue the entente, as well as confidence in and friendship with the Arabs and practical development o f the Zionist plans in Palestine, was he asking too m uch? The trouble with Sykes indeed was that he wanted everything at the same time. Arabs, Zionists, Armenians alike he thought were useful as future ‘assets for a peace conference'.1 After all, though he was the clear-sighted author o f the proclamations for the solemn moments o f entry into Baghdad and Jerusalem,2 he was unable to conceive that, by the Zionist development, he was encouraging something which was practically irreconcilable with the nationalist agitation aroused by the invitations to A rab independence. ‘I am afraid our friend M ark is going the pace a bit strong’, the new high commissioner at Cairo rightly observed, ‘and taking rather a Parliam entary than a practical view o f the various problems.'3 W ithin less than a year o f the conclusion o f the agreement o f 1916, the British government set about preparing the French for a revision o f the status o f Palestine. Sykes introduced Nahum Sokolow, a member o f the Zionist inner circle active in London, to Georges-Picot on 8 February 1917. Sokolow informed Picot that the Zionists wanted a single-power protectorate in the Palestine o f the future instead o f an international adminis­ tration. Christopher Sykes has shown that since O ctober 1916 Sir M ark had been persuaded by the Zionists that, if Palestine were offered to the Jews, Am erican opinion would veer in favour o f the United States’ entry into the war on the allied side.4 By this time Sykes was resolutely acting for the Zionist cause. As Picot doubted whether the French would ever accede to the Sokolow desideratum, Sykes wrote to him, two weeks after the described interview, suggesting that the protectorate should be entrusted to the United States.9 1 Sykes to Lloyd George, 2 Sept. 1917, personal letter printed by Leslie, p. 283. 2 See below, p. 60. 3 W ingate to W . H. Deedes, 3 Jan. 1918, private letter; d e e d e s . 4 Christopher Sykes: Two Studies in Virtue (London, 1953), pp. 180-7. 5 Stein, p. 374 and pp. 386-7. £

52

AGREEM ENT OF 1916 TO A R M ISTIC E OF 1918:

The proposal had probably not yet been discussed seriously at cabinet level.1 In the light o f the heavy opposition to it, especially in the Adm iralty,2 it is possible that the suggestion was put forward only in the conviction that the French, as Stein concluded, would turn it down.3 Finally, on 6 April, Sykes met Picot in Paris and told him frankly that the French should be prepared to agree to a British protectorate in Palestine.4 The fact that Sykes reported this démarche to the Foreign Office indicates that he was no longer acting on his own.9 The French, o f course, would not consent to discuss such a change, least o f all at this moment, when the Italians had asked for negotiations to revise the 1916 partition and were likely to sup­ port the maintenance o f the international status o f Palestine. A ll the same, Paris was beginning to be suspicious o f British inten­ tions in the Arab M iddle East: Poincaré noted in his diary on 7 A pril that Georges-Picot was o f the opinion that the 1916 agree­ ment was now considered in London to be null and void, and that the British would occupy Syria and disperse the supporters o f France there.6 Though the Zionist aspirations in Palestine were not mention­ ed in the Curzon committee report, they were indirectly expressed in the context o f the desiderata for the northern boundary o f Palestine, which Smuts— an active supporter o f the Zionists— had suggested at the meeting o f 19 A pril. The extra­ ordinarily tenacious and skilful campaign o f the Zionists in persuading both the British and French governments to proceed towards a Jewish national home by deciding for the former’s suzerainty in Palestine, has been related in the extensive study by Leonard Stein.7 But it is essential to remind ourselves here o f French reaction to the declaration made by A . J. Balfour, successor o f G rey as foreign secretary, to the Zionists on 2 November 1917 that the British government would strive for the 1 According to Sykes himself, he had ‘not consulted anyone officially in London in this matter’ (Sykes to Picot, 28 Feb. 1917» private letter; s y k e s ). 2 See below, p. 102. 3 Stein, p. 388. 4 Idem, pp. 388-9. 9 Sykes to Sir R . Graham, head of the eastern department of the Foreign Office, draft of a despatch, 6 April 1917; s y k e s . 6 Poincaré, ix, 109. 7 See above, p. vii.

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‘establishment in Palestine o f a national home for the Jewish people’. It seems that the French did not take the Balfour declaration seriously, and that they minimized its significance in British M iddle East policy.1 They had never formulated a Jewish policy o f their own.2 W hile they officially endorsed, even twice,3 the contents o f the Balfour declaration, they did it in vague terms and probably in order not to break with the Zion­ ists, who were an important political force to reckon with, in Paris as elsewhere.4 The fact that during the course o f the peace settlement they denied that they had ever accepted the Balfour declaration meant that by then the situation had altered to the disadvantage o f the Zionists. ‘A t present the great mass o f Frenchmen inter­ ested in Syria’, Sykes observed in April 1917, ‘mean Palestine when they say Syria.’5 The leaders o f the Jewish community in France, mostly anti-Zionists, were intriguing against the project o f the national home. The Zionists themselves, with their demonstratively pro-British attitude, had disillusioned the French. Moreover, from the Arab nationalist point o f view, the future o f Palestine was inseparably bound up with the settlement o f Syria. Thus France, in seeking the sympathies o f the Arabs, could not afford to show friendship toward Jewish aspirations for the national home.6 1 According to Georges Wormser, Clemenceau’s private secretary in that time, as given by Stein, p. 590. 2 See Stein, pp. 5-9 and 11. 3 Idem, pp. 416-17 and pp. 590-1. 4 Even de Gontaut-Biron, one of the most uncomprising advocates of the French policy in Syria, admitted that the French statements in question were ‘vague promises which will not be kept’ (R. de Gontaut-Biron: Comment la France s'est-elle installée en Syrie (Paris, 1923), p. 155). To the Italian ambassador Pichon said that the French agreed to back Zionism in order to help the allied war effort (Bonin to Sonnino, 30 July 1918, as given in Frank E. Manuel: ‘The Palestine Question in Italian Diplomacy, 1917-1920’, Joum alof Modem History, xxvii (Sept. 1955), p. 273). 5 Sykes to F.O ., 8 April 1917; s y k e s . 6 Dr Chaim Weizmann, the president o f the Zionist organization, complained as early as January 1918 that the Syrians were actively incited against the Zionists by French propaganda: ‘The Syrians are a heterogenous group and they are worked— sometimes without themselves knowing it— by obscure French financiers desirous of clinging to the concessions which they obtained from Turkey. They are further worked by Jesuits (not the Vatican) and last but not least, by the antiZionists like Reinach and his friends. . . . They dare not work openly against Great Britain, but they preach a crusade against us9 (present writer’s italics). Weizmann to Justice Brandeis, a leading American Zionist, 14 Jan. 1917; the letter quoted by Stein, p. 630.

54

AGREEM ENT OF 1916 TO A R M ISTIC E OF 1918:

3 W hen proceeding to the Sykes-Picot partition plan in 1916 Britain and France had w illy-nilly ignored another important understanding in the series o f secret agreements between the allies, namely the treaty o f London o f 26 A pril 1915 by which Italy was entitled to an ‘equitable’ share in the w ar rewards in Turkey.1 O nce informed about the existence o f the 1916 agree­ ment, Italy had insisted on its revision, and this subsequently took place at the conference held at Saint-Jean de M aurienne in A pril 1917.2 Italy was granted a large zone carved out o f A natolia; she was to enjoy free-port rights in Mersina (attribu­ ted to the French), as well as in Alexandretta, H aifa and A cre; the form o f international administration in Palestine was to be decided in mutual agreement with Italy; finally, she was to be treated as an equal with Britain and France as regards the stipulations for the Arabian Peninsula and the Red Sea (articles 10, i i , and 12 in the Anglo-French agreement o f 1916). M oreover, the provisions agreed upon at this conference contain two points which particularly affected future AngloFrench relations and gave Italy a certain right to play a third role when the fate o f the Arab M iddle East was decided after the war. A rticle 6 o f the protocol o f Saint-Jean de M aurienne pro­ vided that the interests o f the other powers already established in the different zones were to be scrupulously respected, but that the powers concerned should not be allowed to use these interests as a means o f political action. Secondly, article 8 laid down that if the preceding arrangements could not be realized at the peace conference as regards one power or another, any new arrangement should be considered in accordance with the principle o f the M editerranean equilibrium as provided in article 9 o f the treaty o f London. W e have seen that on the very day, 19 April, when these clauses were finally agreed upon between Lloyd George, R ibot 1 The text o f the treaty o f London is published in Parliamentary Papers, 1920 (LI), Miscellaneous no. 7, Cmd. 671. 2 Pingaud, pp. 110-20; Manuel, pp. 263-4. The text o f the agreement resulting from the conference o f Saint-Jean de Maurienne is included in the letter of Balfour to the Italian ambassador in London, the Marquis Imperiali, 18 Aug. 1917; B .D ., 1, iv, 640.

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and Sonnino at a remote location in Savoie, near the Italian frontier, Curzon suggested in London that Palestine should be put under a British protectorate and that the Arabian Peninsula should remain exclusively under British influence. Disharmony between the British peace aims and the treaty engagements was avoided by the reservation that the British government would agree to the clauses o f Saint-Jean de M aurienne only on condi­ tion that Russia, the third party to the 1916 agreement, also gave her consent. Y et the new Russian government was not even represented at this conference, and it was unlikely that it would ever agree. Consequendy, this omission later served as a reason for announcing to the Italians that the agreement had never come into force.1 M eanwhile in Palestine the Italians demonstrated their eager­ ness to hold on to the very letter o f their rights as granted by the treaties o f 1915 and 1917. Following the example o f the French, who had sent a small detachment to the Palestinian front to show the tricolor, they also despatched there, in A pril 1917, a force o f some three hundred men ‘for representative purposes only*.2 In August o f the following year the Italians sent political representatives to Palestine. In British eyes their presence served, whatever complications it may have produced, to counter­ balance French ambitions. ‘As far as we are concerned, they would do little harm’, Clayton wrote, ‘and I expect that most o f their anger would be expended in fighting Picot.*3 Georges-Picot had arrived in Palestine at the beginning o f General Allenby’s4 offensive in November 1917, in order to take care o f French interests in the occupied Arab regions. The ambitions o f Italy seriously threatened the weakened position o f the French in the area. Even the small but important catholic segment o f the population o f Palestine5 was not exclusively in favour o f the French. A stronghold o f the Q uirinal’s influence 1 See below, p. 96. 3 Manuel, p. 265. 3 Clayton to Wingate, 2 Aug. 1918, private letter; w i n o a t e , box 149/3. 4 Allenby, General (later Field-Marshal Sir) Edmund (Viscount M egiddo), commander-in-chief Egyptian expeditionary force, 1917-19; high commissioner in Egypt, 1919-25. * The Turkish estimate o f the population o f Palestine in 1914 was 689,275, the British census o f 1922 gave 757,182, of which 73,024 were Christians. Some 75 per cent o f the Christians were Catholics.— H . C . Luke-E. Heith-Roach : Handbook o f Palestina and Transjordan (London, 1930), pp. 37-8.

56

AGREEM ENT OF 1916 T O A R M ISTIC E OF 1918:

appeared to be the Italian Franciscans, who had their convent attached to the H oly Sepulchre.1 The French representative, however, was allowed to enter Jerusalem on 6 December 1917, the day o f its occupation by the allies, cerem onially on the right hand o f the British commander-in-chief. M oreover, he was given the place o f honour in the Christmas mass at Bethlehem a fort­ night later.12 A result o f the overbearing attitude he assumed was that the Italian ambassador at St James’s drew attention to the situation, observing that Picot might have been unwarrantably discharging a diplom atic function.3 In the following February Sir M ark Sykes in his turn asked the ambassador Im periali to intervene at the V atican to ensure that a French prelate would be denied permission to go to Jerusalem during Lent and H oly W eek. In M arch 1918 it even seemed for a while as if the British-Italian diplom atic alliance would have persuaded the H oly See to change its traditional policy and withdraw its support o f a French protectorate o f the O riental Christians. For reasons still partly unknown, the sec­ retary o f state at the Vatican reversed his decision and endorsed the continuation o f a French protectorate, thus assuring the republic o f the support o f the Roman Catholic Church during the settlement o f the Palestine question after the war.4 The H oly Land was o f course the very part o f Syria in which the French could apply their assumed rights o f historical interests and protection. Y et, 80 per cent o f the population o f Palestine were Moslems, who like the 70,000 Palestinian Jews were to be regarded as an essentially pro-British element. The Germans reported that at the end o f 1914 the situation in Palestine had been extremely dangerous to the Turks because o f widely spread pro-British feeling among the population. 'Least pleasing was the atmosphere in northern Palestine, where in the centre o f the Muslim Arabs, in Nablus, friendship towards the 1 Syria and Lebanon (F.O . no. 93), p. 59. 2 Asie Française, M ay-Sept. 1918, p. 173. Storrs, pp. 279-83. 3 ‘The French “ Protectorate of the Latin Church” in Palestine’, an anonymous article, dated 1 M ay 1918, in the Arab Bulletin Supplementary Papers, no. 4, p. 3; wiNOATE, box 206/2. 4 Idem, p. 4. In an article written the same year Robert de Caix found that the Vatican wanted to force France to resume her diplomatic relations with the Holy See. Asie Française, M ay-Sept. 1918, p. 71.

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57

British was openly expressed.'1 Later, especially after the Turkish expedition to the Suez Canal had failed, Egyptian intelligence reports had joyfully confirmed the continuation o f the pro-British trend in Palestinian opinion.12 M oreover, after the Turkish with­ drawal Palestine was bound to the British with stronger ties than ever. Import orders from the southern part o f the country had been directed to Egypt since the end o f 1917. The Egyptian pound had become the only accepted currency. M ost important, the new railw ay connection through Sinai constructed by the British army in 1916-17 provided a long-desired highway for Palestinian products to the Nile V alley.3 After December 1917, Picot made desperate attempts to promote French political influence in occupied Palestine. He appealed to Allenby, trying to get permission for French business men and members o f religious orders to return to their pre-war domiciles in the area.4 He sought to interfere with the British m ilitary administration, demanding that French m ilitary governors be appointed in all towns to work in conjunction with corresponding British governors.5 He was suspected o f using the Arab Christians to influence their Moslem countrymen and to win them all for the French.6* 1 Memorandum ‘Der Nahe Orient9, ii, p. 8; G .F.M . 10/457, bd. 41, enclosure in A 7860. 2 Sir Herbert Samuel’s memorandum quoting an Egyptian intelligence de­ partment report from January 1916; Bowie, p. 172. 3 The influence of the railway was later felt even in Beirut: ‘The leading elements seem to have been vividly impressed by the force of the British penetration in Palestine9, the commander o f the détachement français en Palestine et en Syrie cabled to Clemenceau, 17 O ct. 1918, from Beirut, ‘especially by the creation o f a railway through the desert. • .9 (Ministère de la Guerre, Etat-M ajor de l9Armée, Service historique: Les Arméesfrançaises dans la Grande Guerre,, tome ix, ist vol. (Paris, 1935), annexe no. 735. 4 See e.g. Picot to A .E ., 13 M arch 1917, tel. no. 109; A .A .E ., Turquie, Chemins de fer, réseau asiatique, xvi (July 1914-April 1918), 97, and Gontaut-Biron, p. 142. 9 ‘The Situation in Palestine9, 19 Sept. 1918, p. 10; y a l e , Palestine 9. According to the report by Captain Yale, a French officer had tried to follow the British troops advancing on Es Salt, in April 1918, because Picot did not want the British to enter there without a French representative. ‘The French M ilitary Attaché was on his way from Jerusalem to Es Salt, when he was advised to return; the Attaché refused to do so, and General Shaw then ordered the chauffeur to drive back to HeadQuarters on the Mount of Olives.9 6 ‘The Situation in Palestine9, idem, pp. 9 and 13. ‘Growing discontent among the Arabs9 by Y ale, 4 M arch 1918, pp. 13-14; N A (RG 59) 763. 72 119/1740. Storrs, p. 277.

58

AGREEM ENT OF 1916 T O A R M IST IC E OF 1918:

Picot’s activities, harmless and ridiculous as they sometimes seemed, resulted in a conflict with Allenby. The British in fact objected even to his title o f T rench H igh Commissioner for Occupied Territories in Palestine and Syria*, and recognized it only when freely translated ‘Principal French M ember o f an Anglo-French Mission on Syrian Affairs’. According to them, all political activities were held to be suppressed under the m ilitary administration, and the French civil representative was no exception to this rule. This was not all : the French as well as other foreigners were deprived o f normal diplom atic protection. Even in maintaining that the principle followed the preservation o f the status quo ante bellum in Palestine, the instructions o f the m ilitary administration laid down that ‘every foreign national, whether Catholic or o f any other denomination, must have recourse to the British M ilitary Authority, which during the period o f our occupation carries on the functions previously exercised by his Consul’.1 The practice followed by the British in Palestine was a rehearsal for the role which the m ilitary administration was to play in occupied Syria. Foreseeing this, Georges-Picot took steps, as soon as he had returned to Paris in the early summer o f 1918, to bring about a definite agreement on the m ilitary administra­ tion to be set up in those parts o f Palestine and Syria occupied by Allenby’s forces. For that purpose he travelled to England and spent three weeks in July discussing the problem at Sykes’s country seat at Sledmere and later in London.12 M oreover, the position o f the French in the m ilitary administration was discussed by the eastern committee, which finally post­ poned the question pending a definite understanding with the French on the Arab questions in general.3 Subsequently, the proposed agreement was delayed until the end o f Septem­ ber, when Damascus and Beirut were conquered, but the French representative, whose presence was felt necessary for 1 ‘The French Protectorate in Palestine . . . *, Arab Bulletin, idem, p. 5. 2 An undated record (ofJune 1918) o f a teleprinter conversation between Sykes and Picot; The Papers of Sir M ark Sykes, F.O . 800/208.— Picot to Sykes, 11 Sept. 1918, a personal letter; idem. 3 Minutes o f a meeting o f the Eastern Committee, August 8, 1918; CAB.

27/24.

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59

administration purposes, still insisted: *1 can not set out again until the question is settled. . . ’ *

4 The Balfour declaration was made, accidentally, at nearly the same time as the bolsheviks in Petrograd made public the text o f the 1916 agreement.12 These events caused widespread dis­ illusionment in the Arab world. In spite o f new assurances given from London and Paris, there were signs o f distrust o f every­ thing western. As a result o f this, the allied-sponsored A rab movement was in the course o f the year 1918 in full disintegration. By their armed power and overflowing finances, the sharifians were still its most authoritative representatives. Despite its poor beginnings the Arab revolt had made rapid progress in 1917, and had pushed the Turks north o f Aqaba. British and French ‘advisers’, few but qualified— and not only the most illustrious o f them, T . E. Lawrence— had greatly contributed to the suc­ cess. But there was no doubt, even in the sharifian camp, that the success was decisively due to British gold. Ronald Storrs, oriental secretary o f the Residency in Cairo, later estimated that the total value o f the British aid to the sharif o f M ecca, including ‘the cavalry o f St George’ (as the gold subsidies were nicknamed in Arabia3), amounted during the whole revolt to £ 11 million.4 'T h e Arab question*, Louis Massignon rightly pointed out in a lecture in 1921, ‘surprisingly burst forth at the Peace Confer­ ence . . . France ignored the development o f Arab nationalism.’ 3 The French government indeed seems to have refused to take notice o f the new realities, as it did forty years later when dealing 1 Picot to Sykes, 6 Sept. 1918; Papers o f Sir M ark Sykes, F .O ., idem. Sykes had been away for one month on convalescent leave. Picot complained in the mentioned letter: ’During your absence it rather seems that nobody in the Foreign Office attends to our affairs.' 3 As to how the Turks spread the news o f the publication of the agreement text to the Arabs, see Antonius, p. 257. 3 Captain Yale's report, 3 Dec. 1917; N .A . (RG 59) 763, 72119/1710. 4 Storrs, p. 159. 9 L ’Arabie et U problème arabe (Paris, ig22), p. 2.

6o

AGREEM ENT OF 1916 TO A R M ISTIC E OF ig i8 :

with A rab nationalism in North Africa. In opposition to radical cadres o f young Arab nationalists gathering in Cairo»1 the French Foreign M inistry under the influence o f the ‘Syrian Party*» sponsored in Paris pseudo-national figure-heads like Shukri Ghanim, a flowery poet and emigrant o f thirty years in France.12 This is even more astonishing, as in 1913 the Q uai d’Orsay had encouraged the founding at Paris o f the Young A rab Party which, when transferred to Damascus in 1919, formed the nucleus o f the dominant political element behind Faisal’s Arab government.3 The inevitable alienation between the A rab nationalists and the French government offered the British fresh and stimulating political opportunities. The declarations made by the British government on the occasion o f the capture o f Baghdad in M arch 1917 and o f that o f Jerusalem in December the same year spoke in a language hitherto unknown in the M iddle East. Both dec­ larations— drafted by Sir M ark Sykes, the protagonist o f the new liberal policy4— prepared for an Arab national awakening and were given at moments o f the most spectacular demonstra­ tions o f British success in this theatre o f war. O n the same principle Sykes worked out in Jidda in M ay 1917 a compromise between Picot and Sharif Husain. A t the end o f the discussions there a representative o f Husain read out, in the presence o f Sykes, the following statement to Picot: ‘His M ajesty the K ing o f Hejaz learned with satisfaction that the French Government approved o f Arab aspirations;. . . as he had confidence in Great Britain, he would be content if the French Government pursued the same policy towards Arab aspirations on the Moslem Syrian littoral as the British did in Baghdad.’ 5* After his return to London Sykes submitted to the Foreign 1 A good description of the Arab nationalist groups in Cairo is given in a book by Frank M anuel: Realities o f American Palestine Relations (Washington» 1949). 2 See below» p. 113. 3 i.e. Al-Fatat aUArabiyya. For the development of the Arab nationalist movement before 1914» see Antonius» chs. iii and v-vi, and K . T . Khafrallah: Le Problème du Levant, Les Régions Arabes liberies. . . Lettre ouverte à la Société des Nations (Paris» 1919)» PP* 34“ 56, and the chapter ‘Lord Kitchener and the Arab National Movement9» Appendix iii, Gooch-Temperley, x, 2, pp. 824-932. 4 As it appears from the Sykes Papers. 9 Memorandum on the British Commitments to King Hussein, p. 8; CAB. 27/36, E .C . 2201. Moreover, see Kedourie, England and the Middle East, pp. 37-8 and 97-8.

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Office a report in which he proposed a highly liberal line o f policy in the M iddle East, aiming to preserve the entente and, at the same time, to fulfil the promise o f Arab independence given to the Sharif H usain.1 General W ingate, successor to M cM ahon as high commissioner at Cairo, considered these suggestions pre­ mature and recommended a quick advance in Palestine. As we have seen, W ingate’s views, the desire to achieve m ilitary command o f the region before any political settlement,2 prevailed in the cabinet. By the end o f 1917 the publication o f the Balfour declaration and the 1916 agreement had severely tried the Arab temper. The Foreign Office, lacking a settled plan o f policy, had again had recourse to assurances o f a very general and ambiguous nature. In January 1918 D. G . Hogarth travelled from Cairo to Jidda carrying a solemn message to the upset sharif.3 The formal guarantee o f Arab independence given in this message was com­ pleted in June 1918 by another one addressed to an antagonistic group in Cairo, nationalists o f the Party o f Syrian U nity.4 The terms o f the latter statement deserve closer study since they were subsequently utilized by the sharifians for attaining political objectives. In this declaration the British government referred to four categories o f Arab territories: (i) those independent before 1914; (ii) those liberated from Turkish rule by the Arabs themselves; (iii) those liberated by the action o f the allied armies; (iv) those still under Turkish rule. T o the populations o f the territories comprising the first two categories, complete and sovereign independence was promised. W ith regard to the territories o f 1 ‘Observations on Arabian policy as a result o f a visit to the ports o f Jidda, etc./ 17 M ay 1917; Sy k e s . 2 W ingate to F .O ., io June 1917, tel. no. 605; idem. See above, p. 46. 3 The Hogarth message is reproduced in Parliamentary Papers, 1938-39 (xxvii), Miscellaneous no. 4, 1939, Cmd. 5964: Statements made on behalf o f His Majesty's Governments during the year 1918 in regard to the Future Status o f certain parts o f the Ottoman Empire. 4 This so-called ‘Declaration to the Seven9was given on 16 June 1918 as a reply to a petition addressed to the British government by seven anonymous nationalists, members of the Party of Syrian Unity. A senior civil service member attached to the Arab Bureau, M . S. O . Walrond, who was a man in the confidence o f the new secretary for war, Lord Milner, acted as an intermediary between the Arab group and the British government. See Kedourie, pp. 133-5. The text of the declaration is reproduced in Cmd. 5964 (1939), no. 2.

6a

AGREEM ENT OF 1916 T O A R M IST IC E OF 1918:

the third category, the declaration referred to the assurances given in the proclamations on the occasions o f the capture o f Baghdad and Jerusalem; according to these, ‘the future govern­ ment o f those territories should be based on the principle o f the consent o f the governed*. As to the fourth category, the declara­ tion expressed in rather unclear terms a readiness to support the liberation o f the territories concerned and to that end ‘to con­ sider any scheme o f co-operation which does not conflict with the m ilitary operations in hand or with the political principles proclaimed by His M ajesty’s Government and their allies*. As w ill be seen, the sharifians with Lawrence’s obvious conni­ vance ignored the fact that— at the time when the declaration was given, June 1917— the fourth category covered most o f Syria and Palestine. They only read what was said about the ‘territories liberated from the Turkish rule by the action o f the Arabs themselves’, and later took the document as a justification for their occupation o f Lebanese towns. 5 Territorial antagonism had not hindered Husain from enter­ taining cordial relations with the French in 1916-17. Though he mentioned to the British m ilitary representative at Jidda that ‘he would much prefer that no one helped him except the British Government’, the French also helped him with arms and money, although never to the same extent as the British.1 The Residency in Cairo was nervous at seeing the French increase their political influence in the area. In spring o f 1917 the Foreign Office had been pressed to ask for the withdrawal o f the French m ilitary mission in Jidda, probably as a result o f Sykes’s report on its anti-British activities.12 The chief o f the mission, Colonel Brémond, had in his turn complained to Paris that the British were not following the stipulations which forbade both powers to extend their influence to the Arabian Peninsula.3 As a matter o f fact the French m ilitary mission remained in Jidda even 1 Memorandum on the British Commitments to King Hussein, p. 11 ; CAB. 27/36, no. 2201. 2 Sykes to W ingate, 5 M ay 1917, tel. no. 23; s y k e s . 2 Edouard Brémond: Le Hedjaz dans la Guerre Mondiale (Paris, 1931), p. 137.

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after the cessation o f hostilities in 1918, serving as ‘a centre o f intelligence and French influence’. 1 Paris, however, was careful not to rouse any controversy between the allies in an area which did not properly belong to those under French influence. Subsequent to Brémond’s com­ plaint, A . Ribot, then prime minister and foreign minister, sent the following instructions to the French minister at Cairo: Far from placing the Hijaz in a 'zone where Great Britain should have absolute freedom of action', the French-English arrangement of 16 May 1916 has sanctioned the independence of the Arab State. . . . Even if our action in the Hijaz must not be submitted to that of England, it must be concerted with that of the British Government, to which it seems preferable to leave the initiative in all cases when the fundamental principle of the independence of the Hijaz or our Muslim interests is not at all questioned.12 Thus rivalry in the H ijaz never led to real conflict. Both powers were aware that the sharif was trying to exploit their discord. Understanding the resounding effect o f the revolt throughout the A rab and Islamic world, they were interested to give it just as much backing as was needed for the war effort against Turkey. T h at is why, the French M inistry o f W ar reported to Brémond, the allies were not eager to hasten the fall o f M edina, which in fact remained in Turkish hands for nearly four months after the armistice o f M udros.3 British diplom acy was directed throughout 1917 towards keeping the entente strong by avoiding suspicions o f rivalry in the east. In M ay, as we have noted, Sir M ark Sykes came with Georges-Picot to Jidda where, in the presence o f the sharif, they seem to have succeeded in reconciling their discordant views o f the two powers’ future position in Syria and in M esopotamia.4 O n their way home via Cairo Sykes introduced his French companion to a newly formed Syrian committee, and let the nationalists understand that the allies had decided to divide the A rab M iddle East into spheres o f interest, though a sovereign 1 Idem, p. 320. 3 Brémond, pp. 139-40. 3 C hief o f the African section in the Ministry of W ar to Brémond, 25 April 1917, reprinted in Brémond, p. 141. 4 See above, p. 60.

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A rab state was to be formed in the areas (A) and (B) o f the 1916 agreem ent.1 A t the end o f 1917 Sykes even appeared before the Comité Central Syrien, a new association formed the same year in Paris by some galiicized Syrians under the guidance o f the French ’Syrian Party’ (which included men such as Goût, Flandin, Franklin-Bouillon2). Sykes and Goût, the chief o f the Asiatic section o f the French Foreign M inistry, assured their audience that, as far as the 1916 agreement was concerned, Britain and France were still resolved to carry it out. Sykes even insisted that the Syrians ’must desire that France give . . . her indispensable assistance which a people for a long time oppressed has need of, before it can walk alone’.3 Whereas at London-Paris level the principle o f solidarity was thus followed throughout the war, the events in Palestine revealed that the Anglo-French rivalry was still as strong as if the 1916 agreement had never existed. Experience had shown in the course o f 1918 that the French were quite unprepared to face the approaching peace settlement in Asiatic Turkey. In com­ parison with the gigantic British armies in Palestine and in Mesopotamia, they had fragmentary though well qualified units in Arabia, a small detachment in Palestine, and a halftrained Syro-Armenian voluntary force in Cyprus, from where it was sent only at the last moment o f the war to the front in Palestine. Nevertheless, they played their part in a victory achieved mostly by sepoys from India, light horse from Australia and London territorials.4 The French m ilitary mission to Arabia bitterly resented the fact that their government, especially under Clem enceau,5 and the chief o f staff in Versailles underestimated 1 Sykes to Ptodrome (Sir G . Graham) London, 26 April 1917, tel. no. 18; s y k e s . 2 President of the parliamentary commission for foreign affairs. 3 Correspondance d90rienty 25 Jan. 1918, p. 57. Report no. 17 of Captain W illiam Yale, 4 M arch 1918: ‘The Growing Discontent among the Arabs’, pp. 3-6; N .A. (RG 59), 763.72119/1740. ‘Your officials, Messrs Goût and . . . are present at public meetings o f the so-called Syrian National Commission’, a critical observer charged in his letter to the French prime minister, 5 M ay 1917, ‘the committee of which has been formed by them, under their pressure, and you prevent people from giving any account of it.’ (Jung, ii, 45). 4 Allenby personally certified the success of the Syro-Armenian Légion d9Orient as well as that of the French detachment (Allenby to W ingate, 29 Sept. 1918, private letter; w i n g a t e , box 149/9). 5 Georges Clemenceau, French premier and minister o f war, November 1917January 1920.

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the significance o f this theatre o f w ar and by doing so created difficulties for the standing o f France in the peace settlement there.1 It is understandable that at least at the time o f the most critical German offensive in the west— from the end o f M arch to the middle o f July 1918— when the very existence o f France was at stake, but little interest could be found in Paris for oper­ ations in the M iddle East. The prevailing defeatism is partly explicable also by political instability. In the period from spring 1916 to autumn 1918 France experienced five different cabinets. M oreover, at the final moment o f the m ilitary effort and during the first phase o f political persuasion in Syria and Palestine, her government was led by Georges Clemenceau, an old antagonist o f Ferry,2 who was, by education, ideals and beliefs, much more inclined to occupy himself with national defence than colonial conquest.3 Still, France had her treaties, her promises and her engage­ ments ; it was up to her to ensure their fulfilment. It may be that she had no armies with which to establish her rights; but once the conquest was made, it would be for her diplomats and administrators to take over. W hat really happened was that until 1919 Picot remained the only man despatched from Paris for the precise purpose o f taking care o f French interests in the occupied areas. M any Englishmen found that even Picot was not the best possible man for such a difficult task. Captain Y ale reported that he made things difficult by ‘many petty acts which annoyed the Com mander-in-Chief’, and described him as ‘rather a vain and weak man, jealous o f his own position and o f the prestige o f France . . . (who is) cordially disliked by the British and does not command the respect o f the Syrian leaders in E gypt'.4 Sykes and Storrs, men o f the world as they were, got on more easily with him, but relations between the French com­ missioner and the British commander-in-chief were strained. ‘These two personalities’, the American observer wrote, ‘clashed 1 Brémond, pp. 86, 136, 221, 242. 2 Jules Ferry, French prime minister in 1880-1 and in 1883-5; occupied Tunisia and achieved the conquest of Indo-China. 3 See e.g. Brémond, p. 249. 4 ‘Political Situation in Syria*, a report by Yale, Nov. 1918, p. 3; y a l e , Syria vi-36.

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with the result o f bad feeling between the French and B ritish .. . The only permanent collaboration on which Picot could count was that o f officers o f the French detachment in Palestine and o f the units in A rabia; they were usually o f junior rank and administratively less than competent.2 They were poor com­ petitors o f a number o f élite officers— especially those o f the A rab Bureau in Cairo— whom the British were able to second to special duties from Egypt and the Sudan. Further, on both sides die ‘Fashoda spirit* was still alive.3 O ld suspicions and anti­ pathies were revived by the obvious lack o f co-operation which the French showed when negotiating the new status o f their cultural establishments in Egypt. Talks were resumed in accord­ ance with the agreement o f 1904 and lasted a good part o f the year 1918. W ingate, however, having discovered in Cairo that it was no longer a question only o f the Service des antiquités but o f French political aspirations in Egypt, could not restrain his irritation and wrote to Lord Hardinge to complain that the French were all out to maintain their former influence in Egypt in spite o f the agreement o f 1904; this attitude, he observed, was ‘a national characteristic’.4 Even though there was a good deal o f feeling in London that England should remain on good terms with France after the war the capital was often likely to lose effective control o f what happened overseas, as a result o f a separate lack o f co-ordina­ tion o f policies. Since M arch 1918, Eastern affairs had been concentrated at the cabinet level in a special eastern committee; 1 ‘The Situation in Palestine’, a report by Y ale, 19 Sept. 1918, p. 9; idem, Palestine iii-19. 2 There were one or two exceptions like Louis Massignon, the future great orientalist, to whom the British often paid tribute, as ‘capable, obliging, and agreeable’ (Storrs to Sykes, 17 July 1918, private letters; s y k e s ). — Moreover, see Brémond, pp. 169, 372, 304, 305. 3 General W ingate, the right arm o f Kitchener during the Anglo-French conflict in Fashoda in 1898, was considered by the French, sometimes with reason, to be the incarnation o f this spirit. Sykes for his part accused Colonel Brémond of being the main protagonist of anti-British policy in the other camp and rightly remarked that persons fostering this old feud were mostly former French or British colonial functionaries (‘Arabian Situation’, 17 June 1917; s y k e s ). 4 Wingate to Lord Hardinge, now permanent under-secretary of state at the Foreign Office, 25 Aug. 1918, private letter; m i l n e r , W ingate’s correspondence with the Foreign Office, 4th period, no. 8.

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its function, however, remained rather vague, as it had to deal with ‘the multifarious questions that arise between the Eastern shores o f the M editerranean and the frontiers o f India*.1 W hile Georges-Picot represented a kind o f unity o f action between Paris and its few representatives in the Arab M iddle East, Sir M ark Sykes was less well placed to act as a comparable gobetween.2 The eastern committee, whatever its significance as a co-ordinating body, was hardly able to maintain touch with the various areas under its supervision without such emissaries as Sykes was supposed to be. This was the main reason why the ‘hydra-headed’ policy-m aking still went on and finally.turned against the body itself. 1 N. B. Dearie: Dictionary o f Official War-time Organizations (London, 1928), p. 54. 2 Senior officials at the Foreign Office apparently objected to his frequent travels even to Paris, wanting to do everything through traditional diplomatic channels. See e.g. Sykes’s statement in the course o f the above-mentioned teleprint conversation Sykes-Picot (probably in June 1918), p. 1; The Papers o f Sir M ark Sykes, F.O . 800/1208, no. 16.

CHAPTER IV The Situation in the Arab Middle East in November 1918 invasion o f Syria raised the problem o f redeeming the wartime promises given to the French and the Arabs. General W ingate, writing to the chief political officer o f the Egyptian expeditionary force on the day o f the solemn entry into Damascus o f Emir Faisal, found it advantageous that the situation had ‘arisen quickly and without giving time to talk too much about it beforehand'.1 In London, nevertheless, it was soon understood that the disastrous end o f the Turkish armies in Syria would probably lead to an armistice, which would be an introduction to the peace and thus a matter too precarious to leave to improvisation. O n 5 October Robert C ecil12 informed the prime minister, then in Versailles at a conference with Clemenceau and Orlando, that the Turks had made approaches for an armistice. He warned Lloyd George that the Turks m ight continue to try to win time and might hope to be saved by quarrels among the allied powers. Therefore, as the allies were not in a position to destroy the Turkish forces rapidly, Cecil suggested that the only w ay to disarm Turkey quickly was to occupy the Straits and the Cilician Gates, and by so doing, to gain the necessary time for discussing terms o f peace if so desired.3 These principles evidently inspired the draft armistice terms for Turkey which he

1 W ingate to Clayton, 3 O ct. 1918, private letter; w i n o a t e , box 150/3. 3 Cecil, Lord Robert (afterwards Viscount Cecil of Chelwood), assistant secre­ tary o f state for foreign affairs, (in 1919) technical adviser on League o f Nations to the British peace delegation at Paris. 3 Cecil to Lord Derby, ambassador in Paris, 5 O ct. 1918, tel. no. 3089; u i l n e r , box A/3, p. 335.

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were approved by the war cabinet and which Lloyd George on 6 O ctober submitted to the allies at Versailles.1 The proposals established the most advantageous starting posi­ tions for British peace diplomacy, on the lines recommended by the Curzon committee— and, among its members, by Lord Cecil— eighteen months earlier.2 O n Cecil’s suggestion the Turks were advised to discuss the armistice with General Allenby only.3 This allowed the commander-in-chief, Syria, to delay the conclusion o f the armistice until Syria and Mesopotamia were occupied by British armies.4 By now the war had appar­ ently become a race to Constantinople. Fearing that the commander-in-chief, M acedonia, General Francet d’Esperay, was trying to make a push into the capital in order to dictate an armistice to the Turks as he had done to the Bulgarians, Lloyd George insisted that the command o f the allied naval forces operating in the direction o f Constantinople should be entrusted to a British adm iral.3 It was with this officer, Adm iral Calthorpe, that the Turks finally agreed upon an armistice.6 The French had bitterly opposed his nomination to the joint command, and had tried to send an admiral o f their own to take part in the talks at Mudros (on the Island o f Lemnos), where the Turks landed on 27 O ctober; Calthorpe categorically refused to deal with him. Clemenceau and Pichon, having heard that the British had two days afterwards signed the armistice without regard to the French representative, protested at an agitated meeting o f the supreme council on 30 October. W orried about their approaching harvest time on the Western front, however, the French wisely avoided a controversy with England and accepted the Mudros armistice as a fa it accompli. 'T h ey bandied words like fishwives', the American representative 1 David Lloyd George: War Memoirs, vi, 3266-7. 2 Imperial W ar Cabinet, Report o f Committee on Terms o f Peace, 28 April 1917, p. 6; CAB., idem. 3 Instructions sent to the British ambassador in Athens: F.O . to Derby, 8 O ct. 1918, tel. no. 1225; m i l n e r , idem. pp. 227 and 235. 4 Most significant was the British occupation of Mosul; an interesting description o fitisg iv e n b y Zeine N. Zeine: The Strugglefor Arab Independence: Western Diplomacy and Rise and Fall o f FaisaVs Kingdom in Syria, 1914-20 (Beirut, i960), p. 123. 5 War Memoirs, vi, pp. 3267 and 3309-10. 6 Attending armistice talks was General Townshend, the famous prisoner of war from Kut-el-Amar, whose role in directing the Turkish surrender to his countrymen instead o f the French may have been considerable.

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in the supreme council said o f the two premiers* dispute on 30 October, but he added; ‘at least George did, Clemenceau was more moderate.*1 M oreover, when four days after this meeting at Versailles General Ham elin2 proposed to Paris a landing in Mersina by units o f the Légion d’ Orient in order to reach the Taurus tunnels before the British forces o f Allenby, Clemenceau did not agree to the plan. Arguing that the opera­ tion would be allowed only if accepted by the British commander-in-chief, he ordered Hamelin to discuss the matter directly with Allenby. He refused to refer it to London because ‘such an intervention in the domain o f m ilitary measures, which belong to General Allenby, might rouse the latter’s susceptibilities’.3 ‘O ur whole attitude towards the French is hardening here’, H ogarth observed in London. ‘Robert Cecil has been excellent o f late, and both W .O . and Adm iralty have gone right ahead in the armistice business.’4 But, Lloyd George confessed later on, the Turkish Armistice ‘led to the only real unpleasantness I ever had with Clemenceau’.5 The events o f October stirred up Anglo-French rivalries, which in the following M ay inspired the audacious Greek intervention. They demonstrated to the Turks that the allied front was not indivisible. They encouraged nationalist resistance and indirectly prevented a rapid settlement, finally blocking the w ay to a total partition o f Turkey as designed by the allies. In the meantime, all Syria from Aqaba and G aza had been invaded by armies under W hitehall command. Side by side with them on their right flank the sharifian warriors had reached the Om ayade capital. They had done their task as T . £. Lawrence had foreseen6 and injected the heart o f Syria with the 1 The Diary o f Edward M . House, 30 O ct. 1918 (vol. xiv); h o u s e . 2 General Commandant o f the détachementfrançais en Palestine et en Syrie 2 Hamelin to Guerre, 3 Nov. 1918, and Clemenceau to Hamelin, 5 Nov. 1918, off. telegrams reproduced in the Annexes nos. 778 and 780 of the collection pub­ lished by Ministère de la Guerre, État-M ajor de l’Armée, Service historique: Les Arméesfrançaises dans la Grande Guerre, ix, ist vol. 4 Hogarth to Clayton, i Nov. 1918, private letter; h o o a r t h . 5 War Memoirs, vi, 3309. 6 ‘The success or failure o f the Sharifian invasion of Syria— a new operation and a new movement— is going to affect the other phase o f European rivalry in the Levant, by determining whose candidate is going to gain control of their trade routes and commercial centres of Western Arabia’ (‘Syrian Gross Currents’, 1 Feb* 1918, op. d t., p. 5).

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stimulant o f Arab nationalism, which at the time was still con­ sidered harmless enough to serve im perial interests. T o the sharifian cause, the decisive moment in the conquest o f Syria had indeed been the occupation o f Damascus. The story o f how Lawrence on 29-30 September managed to halt the Australian cavalry on the outskirts o f Damascus, letting the Arab arm y pass by to reap the glory o f entering the capital, has been told in detail by Elie K edourie.1 The consequences o f this coup de théâtre were immediate. It m ay be said that until then the A rab forces had been more glamorous than numerous. Now they quickly increased by rallying ex-Turkish soldiers and gen­ darmes and the revolting tribes. W ithin one month after the capture o f the capital sharifian rule was extended to the remotest Syrian locality, and the administrative machine, mostly staffed by former Ottom an civil servants, worked loyally according to the orders sent by the new masters in the Damascus serai. A n even more serious event, from the French point o f view, was that a sharifian commando o f a hundred men took the opportunity to cross the mountains o f Lebanon in record time and— encouraged by Lawrence2— descended on Beirut, thus extending Husain's rule to the shores o f the M editerranean as he had threatened in ig i6 .3 It was rather painful for Allenby to have to induce Faisal to order the withdrawal o f these men, and to explain to Damascus that the coastal zone was excluded from the A rab administration. Thus an open clash was avoided with the French, who had hurried to despatch a naval advanceguard to Beirut in the morning o f 6 October, the day after the sharifians had ridden there.4 In spite o f the withdrawal, the Beirut newspapers were able to publish, on 8 October, the proclamation o f Syrian independence 1 England and the Middle East, pp. 1 19-20. 2 Lawrence’s connivance was first revealed by the chief o f the sharifian expedition to Beirut, Shukri al-Ayyubi, to Capt. Yale. In a letter to Yale T . E. L. himself later denied it and accused the Syrians, especially the brothers Bakri, of instigating the episode (Lawrence to Yale, 22 O ct. 1922, private letter in the y a l e Papers, p. 154)* Nasib al-Bakri, the Arab liaison officer to Lawrence, maintained in a personal interview with the present writer in Damascus, on 6 January i960, that Lawrence definitely consented to the expedition. 3 See above, p. 29. 4 As to the details o f these events, see Zeine, pp. 77-85.

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as given by Faisal in Damascus.1 The French looked upon this declaration as well as upon the Arab interference in the coastal zone with indignation. Against the advice o f the British liaison officer in Damascus, the acting French commissioner, Captain Coulondre, not very tactfully protested to Faisal. By doing so, he let the emir know that the French still insisted on the 1916 partition. Faisal defended him self by claiming that the expedi­ tion had been sent to the coast for purely m ilitary reasons, and piously added: T f I have been mistaken, mercy be upon all our sins!’2 He had been right to the extent that, as Allenby later said at the peace conference in Paris, the Arabs had been allowed by the commander-in-chief himself to occupy Beirut and the minor ports, but on the condition that they would withdraw when the allied armies came along.3 This inexplicable and politically careless interpretation o f the ‘Declaration to the Seven', whether really authorized by Allenby or only by Lawrence,4 caused the first serious tension in Franco-Arab relations, a few weeks before Faisal was to leave for the peace conference. M oreover, it is probable that the very failure o f the sharifians' attempt to occupy the M editerranean coast stimulated a new kind o f activity, raids by irregulars from Syria into Lebanon, which later greatly irritated the French. Spreading from the south o f M ount Hermon to the north o f the R iver Oronte, the 1 Clayton to W .O ., io O ct. 1918, tel. no. 104; m i l n e r , Palestine in AprilOctober 1918, p. 90.— Faisal also approached the Lebanese with the view of inducing these to accept the sharif’s overlordship; see Zeine, pp. 92-4. 2 Brémond, p. 307. 2 Minutes of the meeting at 23 rue Nitot, 20 M arch 1919, in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations o f the United States: Paris Peace Conference (Washington, 1942-5) (henceforth referred to as U.S. For. Rel. Paris Peace C oif.), v, 11. According to the Memoirs o f a notable o f Damascus, Emir Muhammed Sa’id al-Jaza’eri who with his brother proclaimed an Arab government in Damascus the day the Turks left, Faisal had revealed that the French, English and Arabs had an agreement according to which in the Arab regions to be liberated ‘the one which precedes the others shall assume the government (Pour la Vérité de VHistoire: Extraits des Mémoires de S.A . U Émir Mahommed Saïd, Petit-Fils de l Émir Abd-el-Kader (Beirut, 1921), p. 2 i). This seems to have been an allusion to the ‘Declaration to the Seven* o f July 1918. Moreover, see the description of the declaration, above, pp. 61-2. 4 Capt. Yale reported as early as M arch 1918 that Lawrence had said to him: ‘The Arabs have no faith in the word of England and France, and they believe that only such territory as they are able to secure by force o f arms will belong to theita and that the Allies will not cede to the Arabs what is taken by the British and the Allied Armies.* Y ale’s report no. 18, ‘Discontent among the And»*, x1 M arch 1918, p. 5; N J i. (RG 59) 763.72119/1741.

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raids developed into real guerilla warfare on the borders o f the littoral zone.1 W hile Lawrence had let loose the Arab conquerors to Beirut, Allenby had driven them back. Faisal and his confidants perhaps understood the logic o f these encouragements and prohibitions. The street politicians, presently gathering in increasing numbers in the bazaars and coffee houses o f Damascus, did not comprehend or forget. As a consequence, while the new partition o f Syria seemed likely to continue, thus hampering the economic reconstruction and revival o f the country, the setback o f the expedition to the coast was inter­ preted as meaning that the Arabs had been duped and that neither o f the powers wanted anything but submission and exploitation o f die Arab countries.12

2

As a result o f the armistice, Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia were— as visualized by Lloyd George in his declaration o f British war aims, 5 January 1918— totally cut o ff from the Ottom an state, their administration being submitted to a special m ilitary authority under the British government.3 In this respect the armistice was intended to stabilize a defacto situation which was to be legalized in the future peace settlement. W e know that the form o f m ilitary administration in Syria had been discussed the preceding July by Sykes and Picot. The two men seem to have worked out an agreement to an advanced stage, but the eastern committee and the Foreign Office were reluc­ tant, the former wanting to package the arrangement with an eventual revision o f the 1916 agreement.4 ‘Since that time [July] two months have elapsed*, Picot wrote to Sykes on 11 September. ‘The [French] Embassy has made several démarches, urging the 1 The first o f these raids was made as early as the middle o f November; one group, fifty man strong, invaded Lebanon by Merjaoun and attacked Saida (Gontaut-Biron, p. 47). 2 A typical comment is that made to the present writer by a leading member o f the Nadi al-Arab of 1919-20 in Damascus : ‘The British isolated us from the northern coast in order to direct all our trade to their port at Haifa.* 9 F.O . to W ingate, 9 Nov. 1918, tel. no. 1341 ; w i n o a t e , box 150/7. 4 See above, p. 58, and minutes o f a meeting o f the eastern committee, O ct. 3 1918; GAB. 27/24

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sending o f the reply which we had planned beforehand. Nothing has com e.. . It is not d ear whether the invitation sent a fortnight later to the French was ‘the reply* referred to by Picot. The terms o f it, quoted as instructions to General A llenby,12 at any rate caused the chairman o f the eastern committee, Lord Curzon, to observe that ‘The Foreign Office appeared now to be relying upon the Sykes-Picot Agreement from which the Committee had hitherto been doing their best to escape.’3 The British government, the Foreign Office note made known, ‘adhere to their declared policy with regard to Syria, namely that should it fall into the sphere o f interest o f any European Power, that Power should be France*.4 T o this reassuring premise the French wanted, and the British agreed, to add another condition: although both Palestine and Syria were under the command o f a British general, it was agreed that the arrangement was provisional and referred only to matters rendered necessary by the entry o f Allenby’s forces into the region.5 It later appeared that the French were willing to include in the agreement a statement to the effect that m ilitary administration should not last up to the cessation o f hostilities, a claim which the W ar Office succeeded in having rejected.6* The question was consequently discussed in London at the end o f September during a series o f meetings at which the French were represented by Cambon and Picot and the British by Cecil and Sykes. Signed on 30 September, the agreement was finally 1 Picot to Sykes, 1 1 Sept. 1918, personal letter; The Papers o f Sir M ark Sykes, F .O ., idem. 2 D .M .I. to Allenby, 25 Sept. 1918, tel. unnumbered; m i l n e r , idem, p. 55. 3 Minutes of a meeting of the eastern committee, 26 Sept. 1918; CAB. 27/24.— Curzon later expressed his surprise ‘that the matter had apparently been settled by the Foreign Office without reference to the Committee9; minutes o f a meeting o f the eastern committee, 3 O ct. 1918; idem. 4 A memorandum dated in Paris 8 O ct. 1918, enclosure to the off. letter: Cecil to Pichon, 8 O ct. 1918; Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs, part 1, doc. 5; F.O . 406/40. 5 Lord Robert Cecil to the earl of Derby (now ambassador in Paris), 4 O ct. 1918, unnumbered tel.; copy in m i l n e r , p. 69. 6 Minutes o f a meeting of the eastern committee on 3 O ct. 1918, pp. 3-4; CAB. 27/24.

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m ap 3. A pproxim ate boundaries o f the pre-w ar T urkish adm inistrative

districts and the O ccupied enem y adm inistrative zones in 1918-20. (Based on G eograp h ical Section , G eneral S taff, L ondon: General M aps ig ig , Syria and Mesopotamia (Edition w ithout contours), 1:1,500,000, and History o f the Great W ar: M ilitary Operations— Egypt and Palestine, 1. Sketch 42: Adm inis­ tration o f O ccu p ied Enem y T erritory.)

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confirmed on 19 October 1918, by an exchange o f letters between the foreign secretary and the French ambassador.1 According to this arrangement the form o f m ilitary admini­ stration in Syria and Lebanon was to be similar to that which the British had practised in Palestine, but modified as provided for by the Sykes-Picot agreement. Thus Palestine, governed by General M oney as before, was to form O .E .T .A . (Occupied Enemy Territory Administration) south; the littoral north o f Palestine (roughly the blue area o f the 1916 agreement, for the moment excluding C ilicia)2 was to be administered by the French as O .E .T .A . west; the rest o f Syria (or, on the SykesPicot map, the Syrian portions o f areas (A) and (B) combined) was to form the Arab-administered O .E .T .A . east. The limits o f these zones were, nevertheless, drawn according to the lines imposed on Husain by M cM ahon rather than to those shaped by Sykes-Picot. Thus the regions o f Safed in the north-eastern com er o f Palestine, although according to the partition o f 1916 it belonged to the blue zone, was to remain within O .E .T .A . south. T o r m ilitary and administrative reasons', another part o f the blue zone, the gazas o f Ba’albek, Rashbeya and Hashbeya, was ‘provisionally’ rejoined to the O .E .T .A . east, which in fact covered the whole o f the old vilayet o f Syria.3 The Arab administered area included ‘for the time being’ the regions east o f the Jordan, which— according to the Anglo-French partition— belonged to the British-influenced area (B). Consequently, the British acquired the formal right to send to Damascus a liaison officer who was to be on the same footing there as the French liaison officer. In order to remove 1 A t the final meeting held at the Foreign Office on 30 Sept., the Foreign Office was represented also by Sir Eyre Crowe, assistant under secretary of state, the W ar Office by Major-General W . Thwaites, director o f military intelligence, and by Colonel G . A . Gribbon o f the imperial general staff, the French embassy also by the minister, M . de Fleuriau.— A F.O . Memorandum reprinted in the Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs, part 1, doc. 4; F.O . 406/40. 2 Cilicia was in the limits o f vilayet of Adana later to form the O .E .T .A . north, administered by the French. 3History o f the Great War: Military Operations— Egypt and Palestinefrom June igiy to the end o f the War, s.608,; ed. Cyril Falls (London, 1930).— After having described the promise given to Husain, and the rise o f Arab nationalism which was not to be ignored because of its pan-Islamic context, the official war historian concludes: *It was for these reasons that Great Britain was averse to a strict and immediate enforcement o f the provisions o f the Sykes-Picot agreement* (my italics).

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possible misunderstanding resulting from this arrangement the British liaison officer was instructed to maintain close contact with his French colleague and to impress on the Arabs the complete agreement existing between the two govern­ ments.1 The areas were governed by chief administrators directly responsible to the commander-in-chief, General Allenby, who communicated with them through his chief political officer. W hile the commander-in-chief was responsible to the W ar Office, his chief political officer received instructions from the Foreign Office as well. This double subordination later led to regrettable confusion. O n the other hand, the m ilitary admini­ stration was completely cut o ff from the command o f operations. It was to follow the old Turkish administrative patterns as fully as possible. It had to prohibit any political activities in the zone concerned, and, above all, to abstain from any demonstrations o f that kind. There is no doubt that these arrangements made the position o f the French extremely precarious. The French administrator o f the west was cut o ff from his government and placed under the orders o f the British general. The French 'commissioner', Georges-Picot, who returned to the east at the beginning o f November, was isolated from the leadership o f the affairs o f the western zone and was pushed, as Allenby’s chief political adviser, into a second-rank function also under W ar Office command. Every permission o f travel, o f transport, o f meeting or associa­ tion, licence o f publication and order o f censorship, even the most elementary personal liberties, were, during the whole following year, under the discretion o f the British m ilitary authority. This was not without significance, for at the same time, the very future o f the region was under consideration at the peace conference. The patterns o f m ilitary administration in Asiatic Turkey were supposed to follow international practice as prescribed in the Hague Convention. The w ay o f adapting these was very unsystematic. There were great differences in the rigidity with which the commander-in-chief suppressed political activities in 1 Clayton to W .O . 6 O ct. 1918, tel. no. 80; 1918, p. 74.

m iln er ,

Palestine, April-O ctôber

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the three zones.1 In the eastern zone, it was from the beginning agreed to tolerate, behind the façade o f m ilitary administration, the formation o f the nucleus o f an independent Arab govern­ m ent.12 As to the French right o f sending advisers to area (A), Allenby was instructed to take care that the need for civilian advisers would be minim al.3 A week before the issue o f these instructions, the director o f m ilitary intelligence had already assured Allenby that his supreme authority remained unimpaired and the discretion given him derived from the definition o f his civilian duties.4 O n the other hand, as pointed out above, the allies immediately disregarded the general rules on the occupied enemy territories as defined by the Hague Convention, which by articles 42-3 denied the authority de jure o f the occupying power: the capitulations, which had been abolished by a uni­ lateral act o f the Turkish government in 1914, were at once re-established in the blue area now administered by the French. In O .E .T .A . east the capitulations were regarded as null.5 In the British-administered south the most conspicuous o f them, such as the judicial immunity o f foreigners, were not main­ tained; but the fiscal immunity, o f obvious interest to British trade, was re-established.6 After all the years o f neglect, exploitation and destruction, however, the economic structure o f Syria and Lebanon was in a state o f collapse. As a result o f natural calamities since 1916, lack o f man-power, misuse o f fruit and olive trees and sequestration o f provisions, a terrible famine had spread over Syria; no fewer than 200,000 people were estimated to have starved to death.7 1 Capt. Y ale noticed this fact in his report 'Present Situation in Syria and Palestine*, 18 Dec. 1918 (y a l b , Syria vi-41). 2 Instructions sent by telegram: W .O . to G .H .Q .E gypt, 1 O ct. 1918; m i l n e r , idem, p. 64. 2 Idem.— The same practice was followed in area (B), so as 'not to give the French the pretext for any larger demands in area (A)*. 4 D .M .I. to Allenby, 35 Sept. 1918, tel. unnumbered ; m i l n e r , idem, p. 55. 9 When Faisal tried to assume control over the (French-owned) railways and telegraphs, he was informed by the British that these were to remain directly under m ilitary control.— Clayton to W .O ., 11 O ct. 1918, tel. no. n o ; idem, p. 95. 6 Habib Abi-Chahla: L'Extinction des Capitulations en Turquie et dans les Régions Arabes (Paris, 1934), pp. 138-40. 7 Gontaut-Biron, p. 87.

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Close on the heels o f passing armies came epidemics such as typhoid and influenza, causing death to thousands who had survived the famine. W ithout the swift relief measures o f the allies the catastrophe would have been irreparable.1 A t least in Lebanon, which had suffered the most, it was due solely to the fruitful co-operation o f the British and the French that the remnants o f the population were saved.2 Excellent and energetic as the organization o f the rescue o f Lebanon may have been, Paris as a matter o f fact made no serious effort to contribute to the Arab administration.3 In October-Novem ber there were hardly any French officials on the spot except officers o f the French detachment which suffered desperately from lack o f capable and suitable cadres.4 The small French detachment was also the only authority to provide the coast with m aterial for communications and transport, sanitary services and engineers.5 W ithout British help they would prob­ ably have been unable to cope with the gigantic task o f relief even in their blue zone. It therefore seems justifiable to ask how the French could then have carried out their role o f sole assistants and advisers o f area (A ).6 A serious cause o f friction during the relief was the substitu­ tion for the Turkish currency o f one more trusted and more easily available. Even General Hamelin admitted that the reform was urgent ;7 the maintenance o f the British armies and the revival o f the Syrian economy depended on the measure. After 1 According to the instructions given to a British liaison officer» the relief formed an essential part o f British-French co-operation in Syria: Clayton to W .O ., 6 O ct. 1918; Mi l n e r » idem» p. 74. 2 Commandant D .F.P.S. to Guerre» 15 O ct. 1918; Les Armies françaises, idem» annexe» no. 748. A good description of the French efforts during the relief in J . Em ily: 4Assistance française en Syrie; Haut Commissariat de la République Française en Syrie et au Liban» La Syrie et le Liban en ig s i, pp. 127-31. 3 Gontaut-Biron» p. 88. Adm. Vam ey to Leygues» 20 O ct. 1918» tel. no. 78; ouiGHARD» v» 774. 4 Commandant D .F.P.S. to Guerre» 31 O ct. 1918; Les Am ies françaises, idem» annexe» no. 771. 5 Jean Pichon: Sur la route des Indes (Paris» 1932)» pp. 161-2» 171-9. 6 The relief work also caused rivalries of a political character. Thus the British did not allow the French to undertake a relief mission to Mosul (political officer in Baghdad to Arbor— Arab Bureau» 15 O ct. 1918» tel. no. 9870; w i n o a t e , box 150/6). 7 Clayton to W.O.» 12 O ct. 1918» tel. nos. 80 and 114; m i l n e r » idem» pp. 76 and 96.

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the taking o f Damascus, Clayton had emphasized to the French the necessity o f monetary reform,1 but Paris had not reacted. The Egyptian pound was then introduced on 20 O ctober to replace Turkish notes in the whole occupied area. The Egyptianization o f the Syrian currency hurt French prestige, and darkened the prospects o f their Syrian trade.12 M oreover, as the Arabs later insisted on Egyptian money instead o f French francs, it greatly contributed to the French-Arab conflict, especially to its sad finale in July 1920. 3 The Anglo-French convention o f September had included a recommendation according to which both governments should take the first opportunity o f publishing a declaration making known their attitude as regards the territories liberated from Turkish domination. Sir M ark Sykes had requested on several occasions during the previous summer that the French make known their liberal intentions in the M iddle East and make a declaration corresponding to similar announcements by the British government in 1917-18. After the beginning o f Allenby’s invasion o f Syria, Sykes insisted again on a declaration 'calcu­ lated to defeat the ends o f Jem al’s famous speech which is based on the Anglo-French agreement*.3 He pointed especially to the clause o f the 1916 agreement affecting the blue area, which left it open to France 'to impose a regime without reference to the wishes o f the inhabitants*, reminding Picot that, with regard to the red area, the British had already shown their intentions by the Baghdad declaration and by their actual policy o f administration.4 1 Commandant D .F.P.S. to Guerre, 20 O ct. 1918; Les Armies françaises, idem, annexe, no. 755. 2 As a result o f the introduction o f the Egyptian pound, the French franc fell decisively on the Syrian market and had not recovered until December 1920.— Gontaut-Biron, p. 122. See also Chevallier, p. 311. 3 An undated record o f another teleprint conversation between Sykes and Picot (this having probably taken place in September 1918); The Papers of Sir M ark Sykes, F.O . 800/208, no. 18. In the quoted sentence Sykes referred to the Turkish commander’s speech at Beirut, 9 Dec. 1918, in which he revealed the existence of the Anglo-French agreement o f 1916. 4 Draft of the letter: Sykes to Picot, 16 Sept. 1918; idem.

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The demand was motivated by the need to give a ‘modern* interpretation to the Sykes-Picot partition, which the French were unwilling to revise. Picot certainly realized that this was urgent, because he had himself talked o f the necessity to ‘expose the great lines o f the agreements and the principles that have guided us to conclude them’, adding that ‘they are so consistent with war aims recognized by President Wilson that he could not raise any serious objections*.1 In fact, when acknowledging on 17 O ctober receipt o f the French draft o f the proposed declaration, the foreign secretary suggested that the final text be given to the United States as well as to the Italian government, before actually being pub­ lished. T o this Pichon agreed, adding that the French ambas­ sador in Washington would be instructed to transmit it, in concert with his British colleague, to President W ilson.2 Conse­ quently, the declaration was published on 8 November simultaneously in London, Paris, Cairo and New Y ork.3 The declaration was put into final form by Lord Robert Cecil and Georges-Picot and agreed upon, with minor alterations, by the respective foreign ministers.4 There is evidence o f its having been ready as early as 30 October. The reason it was not pub­ lished immediately lies probably in the fact that it was shown to Washington and Rome before being communicated to the press. W ithin a period o f twenty months the declaration o f Novem­ ber 8 was the fourth public announcement in which the British government had committed itself to the principle o f self-deter­ mination for the populations o f Asiatic Turkey. A ll the pre­ vious ones had been applauded equally by Arabs, Jews and 1 An undated (earlier, probably June 1918) record o f teleprint conversation between Sykes and Picot; idem, no. 17. 2 Balfour to Cambon, 17 O ct. 1918, off. letter; Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs, no. 11, p. 28; F.O . 406/40. French embassy’s note o f 19 O ct. 1918; idem. 3 In some official contexts the document is still referred to as the declaration o f November 7, owing to the fact that its publication was originally intended for that day (Cecil to W ingate, 4 O ct. 1918, tel. no. 323; w i n g a t e , box 170/2/1). Later, on 6 Nov., it was postponed by one day. The reasons are unknown. One of them, however, may have been that Picot, travelling from Paris to Palestine in order to observe the local reactions to the declaration, was not able to reach the G.H .Q,. in Palestine before the 7th (Allenby to Wingate, 8 Nov. 1918, private letter; w i n g a t e , box 150/8). 4 Leslie (p. 285) claims that Cecil and Picot decided the final form o f the declara­ tion before even lo w in g it to the prime ministers.

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Armenians, who, however, had lost faith in them and apparently forgotten them. Y et, the fourth declaration was discussed and formulated at a time when the outcome o f the war and the future peace settlement were already in sight. The British and French governments had to prepare themselves for the estab­ lishment o f a new order in the world. So as not to leave them­ selves unguarded against the doctrine which was likely to dominate the peace conference, they had to propagate Wilsonism in the M iddle East before Wilson himself. According to Gontaut-Biron the draft makers o f the declara­ tion were given in September the task o f making it clear that none o f the governments concerned intended to annex any part o f A rab territory, and, concurrently, that both the British and French governments conformed to the provisions o f the 1916 agreem ent.1 The result was a more or less happy version o f the paragraphs o f the 1916 agreement which dealt with the ‘full independence* o f the Arab state. The basic difference between the two texts was that whereas the Sykes-Picot treaty pronounced an ‘A rab State or Confederation o f A rab States . . . under the suzerainty o f an Arab chief*, the new declaration spoke about ‘national governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice o f indigenous populations*. This literally implied the doctrine o f self-deter­ mination; but it also hinted at an assurance that neither Husain nor any o f his sons were to be imposed as suzerains in Syria or in M esopotamia in defiance o f the popular w ill. The new declaration did not include any allusion whatsoever to the spheres o f interest in areas (A) and (B) as specified by Sykes-Picot, nor make it known that, e.g. in area (A) the Arabs, in need o f 'support and adequate assistance*, had no other choice but the French.12 Thus it did not contradict the SykesPicot agreement: it only concealed its most crucial details. The Arabs had created a fearful myth out o f the 1916 partition, o f whose detailed contents they were still ignorant.3 The declara­ tion o f November led them to believe that the cause o f their 1 Gontaut-Biron, p. 74. 3 H ie text o f the declaration appears below as appendix B. 3 See e.g. Clayton to W .O ., 12 O ct. 1918, tel. no. 115; m ilner , Palestine A p rilOctober 1918, p. 97.

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nightmares had definitely been rem oved.1 W e may quote M ajor Young, who relates that when the news o f the declaration o f November reached Damascus, ‘all the telegraph wires were cut, the tram services and electric-light installations put out o f action by the cutting o f the cables, and roughly 200,000 rounds o f ball ammunition fired into the air’ ;2 jo y was boundless indeed. There were Englishmen like Allenby who believed that the British government aimed at revising the Sykes-Picot agreement and who greeted the declaration o f November as definite proof o f it.3 There were some who considered the declaration insuffi­ cient.4 There were others more conservative, or should we say more realistic,-who warned against so radical an enunciation o f self-determination at this particular moment; they considered it would play into the hands o f all those who thought to strengthen their position by agitation against foreign control. A t the end o f November, Miss Gertrude Bell5 criticized the A rab policy o f the government as being confused, unclear and dishonest. She observed that the local authorities in Iraq had quite recently been approached to accept two sharifian princes to rule respectively over Upper and Lower M esopotamia; this, according to Miss Bell, indicated that the promises o f not impos­ ing any institutions were not being kept, and that the British government regarded the Anglo-French declaration as ‘a scrap o f paper* to be torn up if its contents prove inconvenient.6 Sir Percy Cox on his part had complained that the declaration did not take into consideration the possibility o f making a British 1 The Iraqi officers o f Faisal’s army addressed a memorial to the British Govern­ ment, in which it was made clear that they welcomed the Anglo-French declaration as a sign that no part o f Mesopotamia was to be under direct British rule.— Hubert Young: The Independent Arab (London, 1933), p. 282. 2 Idem, p. 280. 3 Allenby to W ingate, 29 O ct. 1918, private letter; w i n g a t e , box 150/4, and the answer o f the latter, 2 Nov. 1918; idem, box 150/8.— The same kind o f inter­ pretation o f the declaration was given by Lloyd George, for instance in an interview given to the Daily Telegraph, 11 Nov. 1919. See J . de V . Loder: The Truth about Mesopotamia, Palestine9 and Syria (London, 1923), p. 53. 4 D. G . Hogarth, for instance, commented that ‘it w ill not reassure them by any means9 (‘Memorandum on Certain Conditions o f Settlement o f Western Asia9, dated 11 Nov. 1918, by D. G . Hogarth; F.O . 406/40, no. 31, p. 52). 5 Oriental secretary to the civil commissioner of Mesopotamia. 6 ‘The Political Future o f Iraq9, a memorandum by Gertrude Bell, p. 4, enclosure in Bell to St John Philby, private letter, 22 Nov. 1 9 1 8 ; w i n g a t e , b o x 15 0 /5 . G

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protectorate o f M esopotamia.1 But it was at the Residency in Cairo particularly that it was received with pessimism. From the point o f view o f die Egyptian government the Cecil-Picot draft rather shockingly endorsed President Wilson’s principles, which had already caused W ingate a lot o f trouble.12 The November declaration was an unhappy end to allied w ar propaganda in the M iddle East. U ltim ately, it was intended to be an overture for the peace settlement. The French, however, did not keep the promises thus given to the populations con­ cerned for more thansix weeks. Inhis speech in the French senate, 29 December 1918, Pichon publicly demanded that the British government keep their pledge regarding the 1916 agreement.3 In February, when the news o f this spread in Syria, there were bloody anti-French demonstrations in Damascus and Aleppo. By then the November declaration was regarded by the Arabs as a dead letter. 4 Since the beginning o f 1918 the Arab Bureau in Cairo had been preoccupied with the spectacular expansion o f the wahabite power o f Ibn Sa’ud at the expense o f the Hashemites o f the H ijaz, with whom he was now in open conflict. The sharif, it was thought in Cairo, still had support for his candidature to the caliphate. The civil commissioner in Baghdad, Sir Percy Cox, however, had stated as early as in A pril that the wahabites would never accept any kind o f overlordship by Husain.4 These events provoked doubts as to whether the establish­ ment o f a large A rab state or confederation around a sole A rab 1 Young, pp. 179-80. Sir Percy was then civil commissioner o f Mesopotamia. * ‘O zzy’ alias O . S. Walrond to M ilner, 22 O ct. 1918; m i l n e r , Letters from Cairo in the autumn 1918, and W ingate to Cecil, 8 O ct. 1918, private telegram; wiNOATE, box 237/5. Lord M ilner’s mission to Egypt reported that the Egyptian nationalists had been greatly agitated by the declaration especially as independence had been promised also to the Arabs o f the H ijaz, ’which they had always regarded as far behind their own half-occidentalized country in civilization and development* {Report o f the Special Mission to Egypt, Cmd. 1131 (1921), p. 13). 3 Journal Officiel, 29 Dec. 1918 (iv, p. 3716, col. 1). 4 ‘Future of Arabia’, 1 April 1918, Arab Bulletin Supplementary Papers, no. 3, p. 1 ; w i n o a t e , box 206/2; and a memorandum by Sir Percy Cox, 22 April 1918, E. C . Paper 173; CAB. 27/35.

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ch ief was practical or even possible. M oreover, in view o f the growing national movements in India and Egypt, a coherent A rab empire would have provided a dangerous precedent. A belt o f form ally independent but well-controlled Arab domin­ ions from the M editerranean to the Persian G u lf was what the British empire needed. T . E. Lawrence, who came back from Syria to London about the beginning o f November, agreed in this with a number o f other experts on Arab affairs. In a memor­ andum dated 4 November he recommended to the cabinet that Syria and Upper and Lower Mesopotamia should each be given to one o f the sharif’s three sons; Basra and Baghdad were to be under effective British control (the second son o f Husain, Em ir Abdullah, as nominal ruler), Mosul in the sphere o f British influence (and ruled by Husain's youngest son, Emir Zaid), and Syria under Faisal’s government. W hether Syria was to be under British or French influence was not stated in the proposal.1 Lawrence's ‘extreme Arab point o f view '2 was a fortnight later backed by a paper by D . G . Hogarth, who was also in favour o f Syria, northern Mesopotamia and the H ijaz being treated as distinct A rab entities.3 A similar opinion, although for a different purpose, was expressed by the then Captain Arnold W ilson,4 acting civil commissioner in Mesopotamia, who, voicing his alarm at the Anglo-French declaration o f 8 Novem­ ber, urged that Mesopotamia should be treated separately from other A rab territories. Wilson wanted to exclude Iraq altogether from any settlement with the sharifian fam ily and advocated the declaration o f a British protectorate o f Mesopotamia. The India Office, however, did not support such an out-of-date measure at 1 ‘Reconstruction o f Arabia9, Note by Lt.-Col. Lawrence, 4 Nov. 1918, E .C ., 2207; CAB. 27/38. There were private views like those o f Miss Bell, that the triumvirate o f the Hashemite princes would give to the three Arab states a certain administrative unity ‘bringing Syrian administration into line with that of the other two9 (enclosure to the private letter o f Gertrude Bell to St John Philby, 20 Nov. 1918; w i N O A T E , box 150/5). 2 An expression used by Lord Curzon at a meeting o f the eastern committee, 27 Nov. 1918 (Minutes o f E .C . 39th meeting, p. 5; CAB. 27/24). 3 ‘Certain Conditions of Settlement o f Western Asia9, Note by Commander D. G . Hogarth, 11 Nov. 1918 (later printed as the E .C . Paper no. 2207) ; Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs, no. 31, p. 52 ; F.0 . 46/40. In this paper Hogarth— probably for the first time— raised the question whether the future Arab state of Syria should have a seaport, which he suggested should be Tripoli. 4 Later Colonel Sir Arnold Wilson.

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the opening o f the peace conference but, while favouring the principle o f treating Mesopotamia as a separate entity, recom­ mended British administration behind a façade o f native institutions.1 These different initiatives, discussed by the eastern committee atits m eetingof 27November, providedabasis forthe A rab policy o f the British government at the forthcoming peace conference. W hile in M esopotamia the eastern committee was developing a programme based on recommendations o f the India Office, with a view o f 'self-determining* it into a British satellite before an eventual intervention by the peace conference, in Syria the line first adopted seemed to be the one suggested by representatives o f the Arab Bureau. This led to a rather twofaced policy far from the principle 'the French in Syria like the British in M esopotamia'— suggested by Sykes and Picot in M ay 1917— and was to cause at Paris a serious controversy with France. From Lawrence's point o f view Faisal was the most suitable choice for the hard task o f governing Syria. He had the authority o f a Hashemite (which fam ily was known to be directly descended from the Prophet), the prestige o f a great war leader, and the sense o f compromise and flexibility o f a vassal who had learnt the art o f diplom acy in the school o f the unpredictable Turks.12 O n the other hand, Faisal was thought to be the man capable o f bringing the Arabs to accept the Zionist aspirations in Palestine.3* In the meantime, the tension in Syria grew through a remark­ able incident, the sharifians being for the first time the cause o f Anglo-French controversy. A t Lawrence's suggestion the Foreign Office recommended that Faisal should be sent as Husain’s 1 Lord Curzon’s reference to Wilson’s telegrams o f 17 and 20 Nov. 1918, and to the note ’Policy in Arabia9 by the India Office (E.C. 2454), Minutes o f die E .C . 39th meeting, pp. 5-6; idem. 2 In this context, see the views o f Sir Reginald W ingate on the personality o f Emir Faisal, in Sir Ronald W ingate: Wingate o f Sudan (London, 1955), pp. 196-7. 3 Dr Weizmann had had a meeting with Faisal at Aqaba in August 1918. After returning to London at the beginning of November, he announced to Clayton that he had reached complete understanding with Hogarth and Lawrence as to the policy to be followed in reconciling the Arabs with the Zionists (Weizmann to Clayton, 5 Nov. 1918, private letter; copy in w i n g a t e , box 150/8). See below, p. H I.

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representative to the peace conference. O n 18 November W ingate was able to inform London that the sharif had consented and had asked the British government to notify the French as well as the Americans and Italians that Faisal would represent him at Paris.1 A t that moment, Faisal was in Beirut where he had proceeded from Aleppo, on his triumphant tour o f Syria.12 The French had no reason to be pleased about his coming to Beirut, roughly five weeks after the attempted occupation o f this town by one o f his officers, particularly as the visit culminated in a banquet, at which Faisal for the first time was addressed as ‘R oyal Highness* and ‘Com m ander-in-Chief o f Arab forces*. M oreover, it is prob­ able that the French already at that time had information about his travel plans.3 Still, when the emir embarked, on 22 November, on board H .M .S. GloucesUrin order to leave for France, the French govern­ ment had no official information about his destination.4 W hen answering the consequent French protest, Derby was asked to remind the French that they had (in the 1916 agreement) recog­ nized the British government as the channel o f communications with Husain and to explain that now the French had not been informed in time because o f the delayed arrival o f the telegrams.5*9 Fortunately for Faisal, the French were unwilling, before the conference, to break with the sharifians. Colonel Brémond was 1 The delay in answering was partly due to the fact that W ingate did not forward the F .O . message immediately to Jidda, because he had heard that Husain was suspicious of Lawrence’s influence on Faisal and was likely to react negatively to the F .O .’s proposal (Wingate to Balfour, 12 Nov. 1918, unnumbered off. tel.; wiNOATE, box 150/5. 2 For the particulars o f the tour, see Zeine, pp. 48-52. 3 Brémond, p. 308. Faisal himself had received the order from his father to proceed to Europe when he was still in Aleppo, i.e. before 16 Nov. (Zeine, p. 48). 4 The French Foreign M inistry claimed on 26 November (the day Faisal was due at Marseilles) that a part o f the English telegram notifying them o f Husain’s intentions was undecipherable, and that the correction thereof had not been received until that day. F.O . to W ingate, 28 Nov. 1918, tel. no. 1444; w i n g a t e , box 150/6. 9 Idem. The Italian M inistry o f Foreign Affairs had been notified as early as 22 November, by a verbal note from the British ambassador. Memorandum o f the director general o f political affairs, M anzioni, to the foreign minister Sonnino, 28 Nov. 1918, N. 17/46; I DocumenH Diplomatici Italiani, Sesta sérié: 1918-22, i, 194: •With this note’, the memorandum concluded, ‘the British Government confronts the Allies with a fa it accompli’. Idem, p. 194.

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charged with the reception at Marseilles, with express instruc­ tions to treat Faisal correctly as a general and a distinguished person, but to let him know that he had been badly advised in coming without first consulting the French commissioner. In this w ay Faisal was allowed to spend a few days in a France still rejoicing in her victory, and his round trip culminated at Strasbourg, where (as a further ill omen) General Gouraud decorated him with the insignia o f Grand Officer o f the Legion o f H onour.1 1 Brémond, pp. 310-14.— As far as Colonel Lawrence was concerned, the Q uai d’Orsay advised Brémond that if Lawrence came along with Faisal’s party as a British officer, he would be welcome; but if he arrived playing Arab in dress and function— as he finally did— he was to be told that ‘he had no business to be here’. Lawrence was later to meet the emir at Lyons, and then to return to England.

CH APTER V

Preparation o f British Peace Aims in December 1918 December i Clemenceau arrived with M arshal Foch1 in London, for the first time since the armistice. Their drive through the capital with the king and the prime minister marked the peak o f the entente cordiale. Lloyd George, who— while the king took the marshal to Buckingham Palace — accompanied Clemenceau to the French embassy, remarked that the French were given such a reception as had never been accorded to any other foreign visitor. 'I have never seen this hardened old veteran so moved. He knew England and Englishmen well but he never thought they were capable o f displaying such emotional warmth. It was to him a genuine and an agreeable surprise which he expressed at every street through which we passed.’ 2 This was a spectacular opening for the discussions in which a decisive understanding was reached on the resettlement o f Anglo-French interests in the Arab M iddle East. Before leaving Paris, Clemenceau had called on Colonel House and assured him that no question o f importance would be discussed in London.3 Nevertheless he arrived in England with questions o f prim ary importance to be dealt with. Besides the general task o f seeking a basis for an Anglo-French common front at the peace conference, two vital problems occupied his mind: first, the question o f the future o f the left o f the Rhine, which had been

O

n

1 Foch, Ferdinand, marshal o f France, commander-in-chief of the allied armies in 1918-19. 3 Peace Treaties, i, 131-2. 3 House to the Secretary o f State, 30 Nov. 1918, tel. unnumbered U.S. For. Ret. Paris Peace Corf., idem, p. 334.

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the subject o f M arshal Foch’s memorandum two days earlier1 and which was brought up immediately on the day o f the Frenchmen’s arrival; second, the problem o f the French share o f M iddle Eastern petroleum. Security against future German invasion was for the French in general and for Clemenceau in particular a national necessity, on which they seemed, at least for the time being, to concentrate their attention at the expense o f more distant interests like those in the O rient. However, the catastrophic lack o f petro­ leum from which the French had suffered in the last two years o f the war was an essential problem o f her national economy.2 Its solution was directly connected with the settlement in Asiatic Turkey. The general commissioner for fuel, Henry Bérenger, a man in the confidence o f Clem enceau,3 was alarmed by the failure o f former governments to safeguard French oil interests in the M iddle East. The French had indeed displayed, through­ out the pre-war years, incredible passivity in dealing with the oil question. After the foundation o f the Turkish Petroleum Com pany in 1912, men like Paul Cambon and Philippe Berthelot had suggested in their reports an Anglo-French association regarding oil interests, but their proposals had been neglected.4 O n 2 November 1918, Bérenger had addressed to his govern­ ment a memorandum in which he emphasized the necessity o f securing part o f the oil concessions in Mosul for France.3 These proposals were clearly expressed in his speech at Lancaster House, 21 November, at a banquet o f the inter-allied petroleum conference : 'T h e ideal o f the League o f Nations is a sublime and 1 Jacques Chas tenet: Histoire de la troisième république, Les Annies dtillusions 19181931 (Paris, i960), p. 35. Peace Treaties, idem, pp. 132-6. 2 ‘Over three milliard francs will soon have to be sent out o f the country in order to obtain oil supplies9, the secretary-general o f the Q uai d’Orsay claimed still a year later, ‘if the French Govt, do not secure a direct share in die oil industry9. Memorandum by M r W eakley on M . Bérenger’s note to M . Clemenceau relative to petroleum; B .D ., 1, iv, 1112. 3 According to the evidence given by M . Georges Wormser in a personal inter­ view with the present writer, 18 April 1962. 4 s.v. Mossoul, Dictionnaire Diplomatique, ii, 165. 9 André Tardieu: ‘Mossoul et ses pétroles9, VIllustration, 19 June 1920, p. 381. The Armenian financier Gulbenkian seems to have been active in instigating the French government to demand the former German share of the oil concessions in Mesopotamia. Stephen Longrigg: Oil in the Middle East, its Discovery and Development (London, 1961), p. 44.

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just one, but I am one o f those who think it w ill only be realized by an interallied association o f raw materials.’ 1 The British Adm iralty too, let us mention, had resumed its campaign for oil by describing the Mesopotamian oilfields to the cabinet as the biggest in the world and by emphasizing the necessity o f acquiring British possession o f them after the w ar.2 There were vital grounds for this demand : it was estimated that the yearly consumption o f petroleum in the British empire would reach, in the near future, 10 million tons, and against this need the empire, together with Persia, was producing only 2.5 million tons.3 As counterclaims to the French demands Lloyd George had already shaped the British desiderata. In a conversation with Colonel House on 30 O ctober, Lloyd George stated that 'he thought G reat Britain would have to assume a protectorate over Mesopotamia and perhaps Palestine— Arabia he thought should become autonomous; France might be given a sphere o f influ­ ence in Syria’.4 The w ay in which he presented his wishes to Clemenceau on that memorable day o f 1 December is described by Lloyd George in a well-known passage o f the Peace Treaties : 'A fter we reached the [French] Embassy he asked me what it was I especially wanted from the French. I instantly replied that I wanted Mosul attached to Irak and Palestine from Dan to Beersheba under British control. W ithout any hesitation he agreed.’5 There was no witness o f the conversation. No protocol was made, not a paper was published even for confidential information. The parties concerned wished to have clean hands in front o f President Wilson. Nevertheless, the mysterious under­ standing was later appealed to on several occasions and, as Lloyd George admitted, his colleague 'adhered to it honourably in subsequent negotiations*.6 1 Henry Bérenger: Le PitroU et la France (Paris, 1930), p . 169. 2 Shorthand notes o f a meeting between the prime ministers o f the United Kingdom and the overseas dominions, and the British war cabinet . . . 13 Aug. 1918, at 11.30; b o r d e n , Memoir Notes, vol. 5 (M .G. 26, vol. 394). 3 Petroleum Position of the British Empire, a memorandum by the Petroleum execu­ tive, 9 Jan. 1919; f o s t e r , vol. 60/148 (M .G. 27/II/D7). 4 House to President Wilson, 30 O ct. 1918, tel.; U.S. For. Rel. Paris Peace Conf9 h 4079 Peace Treaties, ii, 1038. 6 Idem.

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But in the end it turned out that it was not so one-sided a transaction as Lloyd George suggests. The secret dialogue seems to have continued during the whole sojourn o f the French premier, who, for his part, certainly did not return empty-handed. First, though the British did not respond to the French request about safeguarding their security against Germ any on the lines desired by M arshal Foch, the British government seems to have given an assurance that France would not be left alone if attacked.1 Second, there were definite promises that France would have her share o f M iddle Eastern oil.2 There is a clear indication o f this aspect o f the London discussions in a French memorandum o f O ctober 1919 concerning Syria. ‘The discussions o f December 1918 between M . Lloyd George and M . Clemenceau have remained without effect because there could be eventual concessions on Mesopotamia and Palestine only if counterparts [(contreparties] were agreed to. The French government has indicated and confirmed that the essential counterpart claimed by the French industry and French parliam ent is strict equality in the exploitation o f the petroleum o f Mesopotamia and Kurdistan.’ 3 Finally, there was a third assurance which Clemenceau sought and probably acquired from Lloyd George. The revision regarding Palestine and Mosul once setded, the balanceof British and French interests in the M iddle East had to be based on the Sykes-Picot partition. But the form o f the foreign presence in Asiatic Turkey had to be modernized. T o that effect the concept o f mandates was already taking shape: the Foreign Office in its information to the Americans put it as ‘administrative help o f European and Am erican states under mandate o f the League o f Nations*.4 In an article published eighteen months after the meeting in 1 Lloyd George hinted at this during a meeting o f the Council o f Four, 21 M ay 1919. A . M antoux: Les Délibérations du Conseil des Quatre (Paris, 1955), ii, 140. 2 Here the understanding in London was followed by negotiations which resulted first in April 1919 and finally in April 1920 in an accord on the partition o f oil shares, better known as the Long-Bérenger agreement. 3 Communication by M . Clemenceau, 10 O ct. 1919, enclosure to the letter o f Sir Eyre Crowe, then head of the British peace delegation at Paris, to Curzon, 10 O ct. 1919, letter no. 1931 ; B .D ., 1, iv, 452 and 454. 4 Colonel Sochum, the American m ilitary attaché in London, to the C.-in-C., war department, 27 Nov. 1918, tel.; U S . For. Rel. Paris Peace Conf., i, 408.

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London, André Tardieu, who better than anyone else was acquainted with the whole range o f Clemenceau’s policy, threw some light on the essential aims o f the O ld M an in making this compromise. According to him, Clemenceau wanted to bring to an end the dangerous conflicts which during recent weeks had caused a deterioration in French-British relations in the M iddle East, and wished to assure the execution o f the agreement o f 1916 and avoid its modification in the event o f the application o f the mandates. Thus, apart from the partition o f the oil shares, the conditions demanded by the French prime minister had been British support o f a French mandate in Syria comprising Aleppo and Damascus (that is area (A) ) together with the coastal ‘blue zone’ now under French adm inistration.1 The decisions o f London, informal and personal as they were, marked the end o f a period o f Anglo-French war-time diplo­ m acy: they were the last and the most secret understandings on Asiatic Turkey. By disregarding the agreement o f Saint-Jean de M aurienne while treating the future o f Palestine between them­ selves only, Lloyd George and Clemenceau consciously excluded Italy and formed a kind o f basis for an entente approach when negotiating the eastern settlement. From the British point o f view it was still an uncomfortable basis because, though revis­ ing the 1916 agreement, it did not at all take Arab national aspirations into consideration. But from the French point o f view it was the farthest lim it o f concession. In San Rem o, sixteen months later, despite everything, the final settlement decided on for the Arab M iddle East was generally speaking the Lloyd George-Clemenceau arrangement o f December 1918. 1 Tardieu, p. 381. On the French side even official sources indicate that the future settlement in Asiatic Turkey was foreseen as taking place according to the decisions o f London. W e may quote the memorandum o f December 1918 of the naval general staff, which being well informed by Georges Leygues seemed to have held an up-to-the-minute conception o f the solution as follows: I. Maintenance in principle of the Anglo-French agreement of 1916. 3. Re-attachment of Aleppo and Damascus to the coastal zone under direct French administration. 3« Re-attachment o f Mosul to Baghdad and to the region under direct British administration. 4. In the French zone the creation o f the free port o f Alexandretta and in that o f the British the free port of Haifa. Extracts from the memorandum o f U État-Major Général de la Marine, in g u i c h a r d , v, 793-

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The bargain thus made by the two premiers was later to cause considerable trouble for the foreign secretary, A . J. Balfour. For him the decisions o f London had been, if not completely unfore­ seen, at least highly undesirable. A t the end o f November, not more than three days before the arrival o f Clemenceau and Foch in London, a report by the Am erican m ilitary attaché— based on confidential information given by the Foreign Office— had indicated 'differences in details between Lloyd George and Foreign Office* : the latter, still considering that Great Britain should stay in Mesopotamia and 'France probably in Syria*, proposed that the United States should assume the administra­ tion o f Constantinople, the Straits and Palestine.1 The foreign secretary, though strongly in favour o f acquiring the oilfields o f Mesopotamia, had not accepted the idea o f a British protectorate over Palestine. In August, before the final conquest o f Palestine, the question had been discussed at an im perial w ar cabinet (attended by the dominion prime mini­ sters), in the light o f a possible Am erican participation in con­ trol o f the area. Lord Reading,2 back from the United States, had suggested in the session o f 13 August that it should be pro­ posed that W ashington assume the protectorate over Palestine. Balfour, who thought that internationalization could not be avoided, welcomed the idea o f Am erica sharing a condominium with Britain. This was the only w ay to exclude the troublesome French and Italians. The prime minister, on the other hand, had expressed his fear o f any kind o f international administration. He was still in favour o f a one-power protectorate by the United States, especially as it would have placed the Americans between Egypt and the power in the north.3 In a session two days later, however, another influential mem­ ber o f the war cabinet, Lord Curzon, had shown suspicion o f the 1 Sochum to the C.-in-C., w ar department, 27 Nov. 1918, tel.; UJS. For. Rel. Peris Peace Cotff., idem, p. 408. 2 Reading, earl o f (afterwards marquess of), Rufus Daniel Isaacs, high com­ missioner and special ambassador to the United States, 1918. * Minutes o f a meeting o f the prime ministers o f the United Kingdom and the overseas dominions and British war cabinet, held in London at 10 Downing Street, S.W . ..A u g u st 13, 1918, at 11.30 a.m .; CAB. 23/43, and b o r d e n Memorial Notes, vol. 5 (M .G ., vol. 394).

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whole scheme. According to his private information, President W ilson was not likely to allow the Americans to participate in the administration o f any new territories, except under inter­ national control.1 As the Americans rightly suspected, the invi­ tations on Palestine were a trap to commit Wilson to support the British desiderata. Reading had openly declared to the im perial w ar cabinet that it could provide an opportunity o f claim ing Am erican recognition o f a British trusteeship elsewhere, 'for instance in M esopotamia’. Balfour had emphasized the point o f insisting on the vital importance o f Mesopotamia as an oil country, which fact had recently been reported to the w ar cabinet members by an Adm iralty memorandum.2 The foreign secretary specifically referred to the oilfields o f M osul.3 The question o f Mesopotamia had been taken up again on the 15th, when Curzon sternly said that there was no other country in the world capable o f dealing with Mesopotamia but Britain, adding that he was not at all disturbed if in this case the British were accused o f being 'capitalistic, monopolistic or im perialistic'.4 W hen the relation o f the Anglo-French agreement to the form o f m ilitary administration in Syria was discussed in the eastern committee, Curzon urged the Foreign Office to package the rati­ fication o f the agreement with a claim that the French abandon Mosul and accept rectification o f the frontiers o f Palestine. The representative o f the Foreign Office at the meeting, Robert Cecil, rejected the proposal as such but consented to suggest a revision o f the 1916 agreement to the French when covering the ratification o f the O .E .T .A . arrangement.9 This was consequently done in a memorandum which Cecil sent to the French foreign minister on 8 O ctober: the British government suggested that 'fresh conversations' on the territories covered by the 1916 agreement should be carried out not only between Great 1 Minutes o f 15 August, 1918, at 11.30 a.m ., pp. 4-5; idem. It is interesting to note that the only member o f the war cabinet who openly opposed the idea o f the American participation, was the Labour representative, M r George Barnes, who feared that public opinion would not like the handing-over to the Americans of something which had been conquered by British sacrifices. Idem, p. 7. 2 See above, p. 91. 2 Minutes o f 13 August, p. 10; idem. 4 Minutes o f 15 August, p. 4; idem. 5 Minutes o f a meeting o f the eastern committee on 3 O ct. 1918,p .6 ; CAB. 27/24.

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Britain and France but by those countries together with Italy and the United States.1 A fortnight later Pichon rather unexpectedly accepted the initiative, admitting the necessity o f adapting the Sykes-Picot partition to new circumstances. He, however, proposed that the French and British governments agree beforehand upon the policy to be' followed in interallied conversations.12 T o this Balfour could not consent.3 Instead, on 30 October, notes were addressed to all the governments concerned, France, Italy and the United States, in which the British government proposed discussions on the revision o f the war-time agreements.4*The French were obviously irritated by the unilateral initiatives o f the Foreign Office, particularly as they were now receiving alarming reports according to which the British seemed to be checking everywhere the French efforts to re-establish their former position in Syria as well as in M esopotamia.9 In addition, there is no doubt that after the armistice in the west (1 1 November) the French felt themselves politically as well as m ilitarily less dependent on Britain. This might explain why, in a new note communicated on 18 November by Gambon, the French government reverted to their former positions and insisted that the understanding o f 1916 still stood.6 Before this ‘thoroughly impudent* note, as Cecil characterized it, the British government had already received a negative answer from Italy, claim ing its rights as based on the agreement o f Saint-Jean de M aurienne;7 the British rejected the validity o f the agreement arguing that the condition o f the consent o f Russia had never been fulfilled.8 1 A memorandum dated 8 O ct. 1918, enclosure to the off. letter: C edi to Pichon, o f the same date; Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs, part 1, no. 5; F.O . 406/40. 2 A memorandum by Cambon, 22 O ct. 1918; idem, no. 15. 3 Balfour to Cambon, 24 O ct. 1918, off. letter; idem, no. 17. 4 It appears from the letter of Imperiali to Balfour, 16 Nov. 1918, no. 4511 ; B .D ., I, vii, 259, note 4, and from the answer of the latter to Imperiali, 26 Nov. 1918; idem, p. 260. 9 See e.g. Cambon to Balfour, off. letter, 16 Nov. 1918; Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs, no. 29; idem. 6 Note communicated by Cambon, 18 Nov. 1918; idem, no. 28. 7 See above, pp. 54-5. 8 Balfour to Imperiali, 26 Nov. 1918; B J )., idem. M anuel, article mentioned, p. 274.

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During Septem ber-October, perhaps in no small measure as a result o f the splendid victory o f Allenby’s arm y in Palestine, Lloyd George had re-estimated the wisdom o f inviting the Americans into the area. It would have meant, as he explained later in defending his change o f mind, introducing a new and ideologically dangerous power into the middle o f the vital and com plicated British interests. The Americans would probably not have been able to resist the temptation to meddle in ques­ tions between Britain and the local populations, and the British government would before long have found itself in a serious quarrel with the United States.1 Curzon, on his part, supported the prime minister's point o f view, referring to strategic considerations.12 Though Lawrence had insisted that Arab-Zionist reconcilia­ tion would be possible only under the auspices o f G reat Britain, and though W eizmann had called on Lord C ecil and Balfour energetically to advocate a British mandate, the foreign secre­ tary was still reluctant to agree to the acquisition o f Palestine. A t the moment when the prime minister, him self convinced by the arguments presented by the Zionists and the A rab Bureau, was w aiting for Clemenceau in order to urge the French consent during a tête-à -tête, Balfour was still holding the gate open for an Am erican protectorate o f the H oly Land. M eanwhile, the eastern committee had acquainted them­ selves with the reports o f Lawrence and Sir Percy Cox, who both advocated British rule in Mosul, though in quite different terms. The eastern committee also considered on 27 November a pro­ posal by Colonel Arnold Wilson according to which an A rab Mesopotamian state under British tutelage was to include the northern part o f the country, though attached to area (A) o f the 1916 partition. Instructions were sent to Wilson to arrange a kind o f consultation with the local population on the advisa­ bility o f the scheme. This was, o f course, happy news for the political officers in Baghdad. In spite o f the fact that at the im perial war cabinet meeting on 13 August the prime minister had declared him self 1 Minutes o f the 44th meeting o f the imperial war cabinet on December 20, 1918, at i i a.m .; GAB. 23/43, and b o r d e n , idem. 2 Peace Treaties, ii, 1153.

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in favour o f marching to Mosul before the w ar was over,1 even the Mesopotamian administration had been uncertain o f the future o f the area until the end o f November. After the meeting o f the eastern committee on 27 November the hesitation was dispelled: 'I am doubtful whether the French w ill regard with favour the extension o f our influence to M osul', Miss Bell admitted, ‘but it is a m atter to be settled by Self-D eterm ination.. . .'2 3 The British desiderata, intended to serve at Paris as a basis for the British government's M iddle East policy, were discussed and agreed upon in the course o f a series o f special meetings o f the war cabinet eastern committee ‘during the weeks im mediately before the Peace Conference'.3 The deliberations were preceded by the publication o f a number o f cabinet papers relating to questions under consideration. The most interesting o f them appear to be the memoranda o f the general staff and the Foreign Office, the probable authors o f which, Sir Henry Wilson and Lord Curzon, were attending the committee meetings concerned. In his memorandum o f 9 December,4 Field-M arshal Sir Henry Wilson, the chief o f the imperial general staff, vigorously objected to abandoning Syria to any foreign power simultane­ ously holding Anatolia or Arm enia. By being able to concen­ trate troops in the region o f Aleppo, such a power would be in a position to contain and to threaten British forces in Egypt and in Mesopotamia by a single army. This meant that the c.i.o.s. was reluctant to see France— as the Sykes-Picot agreement envisaged— or the United States, in simultaneous possession o f Syria and Arm enia. From a strategic point o f view the best 1 Minutes . . . o f 13 August, p. 10; CAB. 23/43, b o r d e n , idem. * Bell to St John Philby, 20 Nov. 1918, private letter; a copy in w i n g a t e , box

150/5-

3 H ie time as specified by Lord Curzon in his note on Eastern Committee Resolu­ tions Regarding the Disposal of Middle Eastern Territories, 16 Jan. 1919, p. 1 ; foster , vol. 60/138 (M .G. 27/Ü/D7). 4 Memorandum by the c.i.o.s. on the strategic importance o f Syria to the British Empire, 9 Dec. 1918, reprinted in a Memorandum Respecting Syria (p. 17) by Sir Earle Richards; CAB. 27/38, doc. no. 2642, w i s e m a n , 91/124, and f o s t e r , idem.

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solution was a ‘politically detached* Syria under British influ­ ence, provided that this did not disturb Moslem goodwill. Under the same condition Sir H enry Wilson welcomed the creation o f a Jewish state in Palestine, if controlled by a power potentially not hostile to Britain. The Foreign Office memorandum o f 19 December, apparently in the style o f Lord Curzon, referred to the W ar Office paper and seriously questioned the advisability o f allowing the French into Syria.1 The writer emphasized the political advantage to British policy o f the Arab movement, which ‘outweighed its com parative m ilitary ineffectiveness and the diplom atic embar­ rassment it may cause*. After the collapse o f Turkish rule in the A rab provinces the only alternative to the British-sponsored A rab movement would have been partition between ‘India and France*. The agreement o f 1916 had been an attempt to com­ promise between the Arab solution and partition, but, the Foreign Office spokesman pointed out, the balance had been overweighted on the side o f partition. Proceeding on the lines o f the Sykes-Picot agreement appeared to him to present two embarrassing disadvantages. First, at the side o f France, Britain would face the animosity not only o f all the Arabs but o f the whole Islamic world as w ell; second, the French would secure a foothold not only in the north and the middle o f Syria but also in the south, because the SykesPicot defined area (B) would be economically and politically dependent on its commercial and administrative centre, which was Damascus. Thus, French influence would find its w ay into the very heart o f A rabia itself. It is no exaggeration, the writer stresses, to say that the presence o f the French in Syria would be as detrimental to British interests as the Russian presence was in Persia before the war. The paper referred to the foreign secretary’s recent memo­ randum according to which Faisal was determined to resist by force any French attempt to enter area (A). I f this happened, Britain would be regarded as consenting to the French action and she would consequently suffer in her relations with her Moslem subjects by ‘at least as severe a strain as the outbreak 1 F.O . memorandum, French and Arab claims in the Middle East, 19 Dec. 1918; GAB. 27/38. and f o s t e r , vol. 46/81 (M .G. 27/II/D7). H

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o f war between G reat Britain and Turkey in 1914*. Another danger would be the administrative division o f Syria between areas (A) and (B), correspondingly controlled by French and British ‘advisers', which (as General Clayton had some time before warned) would inevitably have led to friction with France. As the only possible solution the writer proposed unification o f the areas under an independent A rab state. H e did not find it impossible that the French would accede to it; he believed he could see several signs to that effect and con­ cluded that the French were 'not purely taking up the selfdetermination platonically'. As far as Palestine and Syria were concerned, the eastern committee had prepared its resolutions even before the publi­ cation o f the Foreign Office memorandum o f 19 Decem ber.1 As regards Palestine, they can be summarized as follows: (1) to favour, instead o f internationalization, a single-power mandate (either under the League o f Nations or otherwise), which should not be given to France or Italy but either to the U .S.A. or to Great Britain;12 (2) not to object to the selection o f the U .S .A ., but if the offer was made to Britain, not to decline either; (3) to take into consideration the express desires as to the choice o f the mandatory power, o f both the Arab population and the Zionist community o f Palestine; (4) to make every effort at the peace conference to secure an 'equitable' re-adjustment o f the boundaries o f Palestine; (5) to ensure that the pledges concerning the care o f the H oly Places should be effectively fulfilled.3 O nce France was ready, for certain contreparties, to agree to a British protectorate in Palestine, the only im portant point in these resolutions was, as far as our study is concerned, (4), 1 As it appears from p. 7 o f the minutes o f the 44th meeting o f the imperial war cabinet, Dec. 20, at 11 a.m .; b o r d e n , idem, and from the F.O . memorandum o f 19 Dec., p. 3; CAB. 23/42, and f o s t e r , idem. 2 M y italics. 3 Memorandum Respecting Palestine, January 1919, by Sir Earle Richards o f the India Office, p. 4; CAB. 27/38 and f o s t e r , vol. 60/138 (M .G . 27/II/D7). Moreover, see the description o f the meeting on the question in Peace Treaties, ii, pp. 1 142-4.

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which caused tension in the entente even at San Remo and after. In contrast, the resolutions relating to Syria all collided with French interests. It was proposed: (1) to cancel, by negotiation with the allies, the Sykes-Picot agreement, especially the clauses concerning the French rights in area (A) and in the Syrian portion o f the blue zone; (2) to support the French claims to a special political position in Lebanon, Beirut and at Alexandretta, though with no rights to fortify any ports concerned; (3) to support Faisal and the Syrians in the creation o f an autonomous A rab state, with capital at Damascus and access to the sea;1 (4) to make, in accordance with the declaration o f November 1918, the principle o f self-determination, as far as possible, the basis o f settlement o f the Syrian question; (5) to hold as essential that no foreign influence except that o f Britain should he predominant in areas (A) and (B) ;2 (6) to take into account the claims o f Italy in any readjustment in Syria.3 In Mesopotamia, the protection o f a ‘great European power* was thought to be indispensable, a formula obviously excluding the possibility o f the United States as a mandatory. Instead, no British advance was recommended in Arm enia; the mandate was proposed for Am erica or preferably for France. This was understood to facilitate the revision o f the Sykes-Picot agreement.4 In the presence o f the Italian delegates o f the interallied conference which opened 1 December there seems to have been no more discussion about Palestine or the A rab M iddle East in general.9 According to what the prime minister later disclosed to the w ar cabinet, the Italians were simply informed that the British intended to stay in Palestine as well as in Mesopotamia.6 1 This was probably to be at Tripoli. In addition, it was proposed that Faisal be given free-port rights at Alexandretta and at H aifa if these ports were assigned to France and Great Britain. 3 M y italics. 3 Memorandum Respecting Syria, by Richards, p. 4; idem. * Eastern Committee Resolutions, Note by Lord Curzon, 16 Jan. 1919; idem. 9 Peace Treaties, i, 136-47. * Minutes o f December ao, 1918, at 11 a.m ., p. 7; CAB 33/72.

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N or were these topics seriously discussed when President Wilson came to London after Christmas. A few days before this visit a notable proportion o f the war cabinet had still insisted on the desirability o f an Am erican protectorate o f Palestine. A . J. Balfour, Lord M ilner,1 and Austin Chamberlain, backed by the Canadian prime minister, Sir Robert Borden, had— despite the strong contrary opinions o f Lloyd George, Lord Curzon and Winston Churchill— spoken for Am erican participation and minimized the fear o f the presence o f a big Am erican fleet in the M editerranean, which had become the latest nightmare o f the Adm iralty. Churchill had indeed argued that the introduction o f the Americans anywhere in the M editerranean region would stimulate them to build up the greatest naval power in the world. The opinions expressed by the president himself during his sojourn in London weakened hopes o f the Americans accepting any administrative responsibilities in the M iddle East.2 Lloyd George on his part saw no reason to impose on the cabinet his views about excluding the United States from the Arab countries. The Am erican participation figured only as a theoretical possibility in the British desiderata as formulated by the eastern committee. In fact these resolutions o f the eastern committee aimed at, and succeeded in, adapting the British desiderata to the needs o f a system o f mandates under the League o f Nations which was suggested by General Jan Smuts in the middle o f Decem ber.3 In dealing with the territories o f Asiatic Turkey, Smuts noted: Tn all these cases the peoples governed are perhaps sufficiently homogeneous and developed to govern themselves subject to some degree or other o f external assistance and control*, he then remarked: ‘It must be understood that there is a great deal o f variation among them in this respect. A t one end a territory m ay be found barely capable o f autonom y; at the other the approach to complete statehood is very close. Mesopotamia would 1 M ilner, Sir Alfred (later Viscount M ilner), secretary o f state for war 1918-19; for colonies 1919-21. 3 As it appears from the minutes o f a meeting o f the imperial war cabinet. . . on December 30, 1918, at 3.30 p.m ., p. 4; GAB. 33/43, and b o r d e n , idem. 3 'League o f Nations: Practical Suggestions': the following quotations as re* printed in David Hunter M iller: Drafting the Covenant, New York, 1938, ii, 39.

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probably be a case o f the former kind; Syria o f the other*.1 Smuts pointed out cases in which ‘owing chiefly to the heterogeneous character o f the population and their incapacity for admini­ strative co-operation, autonomy in any real sense would be out o f the question, and the administration would have to be under­ taken to a very large extent by some external authority*. Such would be the caset ‘at my redefor some time to come*, in Palestine.2 T o understand the origins o f this analysis which so well suited the aims o f British policy in the M iddle East, it is useful to remember that General Smuts, who had him self attended the recent meetings o f the eastern committee, had emphasized the strategic necessity for the empire o f the acquisition o f Palestine.3 In preparing his Practical Suggestions, Smuts was actively assisted by Philip K err, Lloyd George’s private secretary and his right hand in foreign affairs.4 W hen at the end o f December the prime minister offered the Am erican president a copy o f this paper at Buckingham Palace, he in a w ay proposed to marry the realities o f the empire to the ideas o f President Wilson. M ore­ over, the mandates plan was a step towards an Anglo-Am erican front to bar French ambitions in Syria. The question was no longer about the leading principle o f British-French co-existence in the M iddle East, ‘the French in Syria like the British in Mesopotamia*. The proposal to abandon the basis confirmed by Lloyd George and Clemenceau served to meet, in a convenient w ay with the help o f Wilson, the promises given to the Arabs. But it autom atically provoked an open rupture5 with France and caused, in the course o f the Paris conference, controversies which were o f no avail for anyone. 1 M y italics. 3 M y italics. 3 See e.g. Report o f Committee on Terms o f Peace, p. 18; CAB. 21/71. 4 H . W . V . Tem perley: History of the Peace Conference, vi (Paris, 1924), 501. O n the role o f K err (later Lord Lothian), the editor o f The Round Table, as a link between 10 Downing Street and the Foreign Office, see Peace Treaties, i, pp. 263-5. 3 The term used by Lloyd George himself in Peace Treaties, ii, 1023.

CH APTER V I

Preliminaries to the Peace Conference o w over-optimistic most o f the responsible statesmen were in regard to the problem o f peace-making is indicated by the opinion which Lloyd George had expressed when talking to Colonel House in Paris at the end o f O ctober 1918. ‘He believed the Peace Conference itself need not last longer than one week*, the Am erican reported. ‘The prelim inary con­ ference he thought could be finished in three or four weeks.*1 The prelim inary conference as advocated by the allied Euro­ pean powers never took place, thanks to President W ilson, who ‘considered that the general Peace Conference would be a sham if definite conclusions were simply arrived at beforehand.. . .*2 T h at is why the Paris peace conference, itself called a prelim­ inary one, was given the ungrateful task o f redressing the whole world’s grievances. In the prevailing circumstances, the eastern settlement was inevitably overshadowed by the gigantic prob­ lems o f Europe. Probably, any suggestion that the Turkish settlement should have a priority in the conference agenda, would have been unthinkable.3 The people were im patient to have the men back from the front, to get war reparations paid, the kaiser hanged. N ot one o f the persons at the summit had an opportunity to study properly the Arab issue which strained Anglo-French rela­ tions at die conference. They remained ignorant o f its real

H

1 House to Wilson, 30 O ct. 1918, tel.; UJS. P el. Paris Peace Conf, i, 407. 3 Lord H ankey: The Supreme Control at the Paris Peace Conference tg ig (London, 1963), p. 17. 3 In the British delegation for instance Lord Hardinge had suggested that all territorial adjustments be decided en bloc after they had been considered by six different subcommittees, one of them being for Asiatic Turkey (F.O . Memorandum on Peace Negotiations by Lord Hardinge, 10 O ct. 1918, p. 4; w i s e m a n , 90/21). President Wilson still insisted in M arch 1919 that all the peace treaties should be made at the same time (House D iary, entry o f 24 M arch 1919 (xv) ; h o u s e ) .

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proportions. In November 1918 W ickham Steed, editor-in-chief o f The Times, had warned Lord Derby, the ambassador in Paris, o f the dangers o f the Syrian question: 'Unless a small Anglo-French Commission were set to work upon it before the Peace Conference met, it might poison the whole Conference'; D erby replied that this could not be done because 'such work was too im portant for junior officials, and senior officials had no tim e'.1 The vague procedure o f the London meeting o f December 1918 reflects the reluctance o f both Lloyd George and Clemenceau to disquiet the Americans. This, probably as much as the lack o f time, was why the British and French did not engage in any detailed discussions before the opening o f the peace con­ ference. Both had been uncertain about the role o f President W ilson; both had made their own discreet approaches to him. The first contacts with the Apostle o f Peace, however, were sufficient to reassure the British and French. After the visit o f President Wilson to London, Lord Curzon even suggested, and Lloyd George agreed, that he should not be accepted as sole arbiter in the peace settlement but as 'a party amongst the others round the conference table'.2 The great leader o f British peace diplom acy, subtle, alert and inconsistent, Lloyd George had only a vague personal interest in the M iddle East. He had a biblical vision o f the return o f G od's people to the promised land, the ancient boundaries o f which, he often repeated, went from Dan to Beersheba (nobody knew where Dan was until Lloyd George had studied a book by a Scottish theologian3). H e had noble feelings towards the Arabs who had fulfilled their 'vitally im portant' part in the war, he admired Lawrence,4 and had the deepest respect for A llenby.5 Still, he was critical o f their advice, even to the extent o f desert­ ing (though with bad conscience) Faisal and Arab indepen­ dence, when they appeared to harm more than to serve British interests in the M iddle East. The politician in him was always 1 Henry Wickham Steed: Through Thirty Tears (London, 1934), ii, 300. 3 Minutes o f a meeting o f the imperial war cabinet . . . 30 Dec. 1918, p. 4; CAB. 33/42. 3 Meinertzhagen, p. 63; see also below, p. 236. 4 War Memoirs, iv, 18 10 -it. * House D iary; entry o f 15 Sept. 1919 (vol. xvi).

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awake, anxious to bring something home in turn for English blood and sterling spent in abundance in the sandy lands o f the Orient. As a statesman he was aware o f the fact that good AngloFrench relations were vital to the peace conference and the very prerequisite o f the success o f the world settlement. The subordination o f the British M iddle East policy to the prime minister’s resulted from the general tendency o f Lloyd George to intrude into matters properly belonging to die Foreign Office. It resulted also from the inability o f that ministry to keep in its hands the reins o f eastern affairs while the India Office controlled M esopotamia and eastern Arabia, and while the W ar Office was able to influence the policies in Syria and Palestine. A further reason was the dismembering o f the Foreign O ffice; a substantial part o f its personnel and archives had been moved with Balfour to Paris, while the remainder o f the office under the direction o f Curzon remained in London. Balfour seriously disagreed with Lloyd George and with many cabinet members on some essential issues concerning the M iddle East. Since 1915 he had tenaciously opposed any territorial expansion o f the empire and, though favouring oil and the Zionists, did not like the idea o f British acquisition o f Mesopo­ tam ia and Palestine. Again, though favouring Am erican partici­ pation in M iddle Eastern affairs, he did not later like Wilson’s initiative in sending an inquiry commission to Syria, to which Lloyd George finally consented. Balfour was misinformed and pushed aside with his French colleague,1 while the two premiers estranged themselves over Syria, and it was not until the crisis o f the summer o f 1919 that Lloyd George seems to have remem­ bered his advice to adopt an Anglo-French entente as a lead­ ing principle o f his M iddle East policy. In London, the acting foreign secretary, Lord Curzon, was in a position to follow the proceedings o f the peace conference from 1 Paul Cambon, old diplomatist that he was, felt extremely unhappy about the situation: ‘The interallied meetings between prime ministers and foreign ministers with President Wilson were lamentable9, he reported from Paris on the eve of the Conference. ‘Lloyd George without preparation and without consultation with Balfour, said many stupid things. Clemenceau did not interfere and Pichon remained quiet, as usual, in the presence o f his master.9 Cambon to de Fleriau, 17 O ct. 1919, private letter; reproduced in Paul Cambon: Correspondance, i8 jo 1924 (Paris, 1946), iii, 297.

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the reports which he received each day by air from Paris.1 By a number o f memoranda and two personal visits to Paris he tried to bring his knowledge to the notice o f the prime minister, but without much result.2 Through the eastern committee in London he kept close supervision over affairs in M esopotamia but had, as we shall see, increasing difficulties when directing the activities o f the political officers o f the Egyptian expeditionary force. Whereas the political activities o f the British forces were directed in Syria and Palestine by the Foreign Office and in Mesopotamia by the India O ffice, the administrative control o f all these countries was exercised by the occupied enemy territories administrations under the authority o f the W ar Office. M ajor (later Sir) Hubert Young, who joined the Foreign Office in January 1919, described the desperate dualism to the political and administrative control o f the occupied areas: ‘The Foreign Office were gravely embarrassed by the fact that the British m ilitary authorities were acting as proxies for the French not only in Syria but also in the Mosul vilayet.’ 3 This, as it were, pro-consulship which British subordinate officers had assumed in Syria— and against which W alrond had warned Lord M ilner as early as in O ctober4— often led the French to complain o f British disloyalty in Syria, and often in a somewhat exaggerated manner. Since the first month o f the conference Lord M ilner had been in charge o f Syrian affairs. A n old imperialist, not prejudiced against the French, but experienced in his dealings with them since his W ar Office days, he was capable o f getting on well with his difficult task. M ilner, however, failed to give the lagging negotiations the necessary tempo, according to Lloyd George because o f his lack o f concentration and his extreme fatigue.5 He and Sir Louis M allet, then head o f the Near Eastern section o f the delegation, belonged to the overworked old guard which at 1 Nicolson, Curzon, p. 71. 2 See e.g. Further correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs, nos. 30 and 37; F.O . 406/41. 3 Young, p. 281. 4 *Ozzy’ to M ilner, 6 O ct. 1918, private letter; m i l n e r , letters from Cairo in the autumn 1918. 9 Peace Treaties, ii, 1045.

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this decisive moment could not be replaced or even assisted by more vigorous competent senior officials. Lawrence, dressed as an Arab but called a technical adviser to the British peace delegation,1 continued, during the three subsequent months, his lone fight for Faisal’s cause. Lord Hardinge later said that Lawrence used to come and go quite independently o f any authority from him self or the political section o f the delegation.12 The Foreign Office was embarrassed by his private diplom acy and advised him after his first sojourn in Paris not to return: ‘W e and the W ar Office feel strongly that he is to a large extent responsible for our troubles with the French over Syria.’ 3Vansittart,4 who worked in the Near Eastern section, had tiresome memories o f Lawrence (‘awkward company’) ; he reported the Colonel’s conflict with Lord M ilner, who opposed Lawrence’s *big idea to “ diddle” or “ b iff” the French out o f the N ear East despite our pledges'.5 D uring the first weeks o f the conference Lawrence did his utmost to get the Americans interested in the A rab question. His campaign was pursued in two ways, by close contacts with the Am erican delegation, and by an all-out effort to cultivate public opinion through press and radio.4 He was greatly aided 1 Composition and Organization o f the Preliminary Peace Conference, April t, 1919; UJS. For. Ret. Paris Peace Con/., iii, 9. Balfour to Curzon, 13 Aug. 1919, tel. no. 1605; B .D . i, iv, 315, note 1. Lord Curzon did not know whether Lawrence was a member o f the delegation or not. 2 Clark-Kerr (member o f the eastern department o f the F.O .) to Vansittart, 2t Aug. 1919, letter no. 116059/ME. 44A; B .D ., idem, pp. 354-5. 2 Idem, and 'T he French Claims in Syria', a memorandum by Sir A . H irtzel, 14 Feb. 1919; F .O . 608/107, no>2256. In the latter document H irtzel warned the Foreign Office that Lawrence’s ambiguous position as technical adviser to the British delegation and as political adviser to Faisal would not make a favourable impression upon the French. He went so far as to recommend that Lawrence should resign his commission and never more be employed in the Arab M iddle East in any capacity. 4 Vansittart (later Lord), Robert Gilbert. 9 Lord Vansittart: The M ist Procession (London, 1958), p. 205. G . Kidston in the eastern department o f the F.O . minuted 9 Sept. 1919 on a letter o f Vansittart who recommended Lawrence's return to Paris: ‘The trouble is that it is always Col. Lawrence who does the “ handling” . H e has told me quite frankly that he has no belief in an Anglo-French understanding in the East, that he regards France as our natural enemy in these parts & that he has always shaped his action accordingly’, B .D ., idem, pp. 370-1, note 2 (to no. 259). * See e.g. Lawrence's Peace Conference Diary (January 1919), Garnett, p. 274. and Manuel, Realities o f American Palestine Relations, p. 220.

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by his own fame and apparent expertise in A rab affairs. He aroused curiosity and respect, and soon became, together with Faisal, a favoured guest at conference dinner parties.1 Like Lloyd George, Clemenceau had left the Syrian question in other hands, and him self had little time for and even less interest in supervising its development closely. The delegate entrusted with this question— among many other tasks— was André Tardieu. Like Pichon, he had special pre-war acquain­ tance with the area but seemed to be ignorant o f the new reali­ ties o f the Arab national awakening. The presence o f the French ‘Syrian Party’ at the conference was accentuated by Robert de Caix, who worked behind the scenes in the capacity o f special adviser to the French delegation. M oreover, Jean Goût, a stubborn supporter o f Shukri Ghanim ’s Comité Central Syrien, was in charge o f Arab affairs at the Q uai d’O rsay.12 The French enjoyed a considerable advantage in taking part in the confer­ ence while remaining based in their own offices. O n the other hand, there was less cohesion among them than among the British delegation; at the beginning, the co-operation between Clemenceau and the Q uai d’Orsay was practically nil, and, at least until A pril, the five delegates had not had a private meeting o f their own.3 2

In spite o f the courteous reception reserved for Faisal in England and France,4 recognition o f the delegation o f the H ijaz remained uncertain until the very opening day o f the conference. Lawrence even recorded that Balfour had com pletely forgotten the H ijaz 1 A t the time he jealously guarded the privilege o f being the only spokesman for the Arabs, and forbade those of the H ijaz delegation who spoke western lan­ guages to discuss politics with the Americans (as it appears for instance from James T . ShotwelTs diary At the Paris Peace Conference (New York, 1937), p. 197). 2 U.S. For. Rel. Paris Peace Conf., idem, p. 17. 3 Paul Cambon to de Fleuriau, 10 Apr. 1919, private letter; Correspondance, iii,

320. 4 After the arrival of Faisal in France, Pichon had assured the sharif of M ecca (in a note sent through the F .O .’s mediation) that ‘H .M . the K ing Husain can be assured that the French Government will recommend that their allies recognize the Kingdom o f the H ijaz’ (Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs, no. a, p. 3; F.O . 406/41).

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representation. I f this is true— the only evidence o f it is the Colonel's diary1— there is reason to believe that Faisal had been deliberately forgotten. The foreign secretary did not want to start the conference by rubbing the French the wrong w ay with the candidature o f a delegate whose state o f mind, he noted, 'was violently anti-French as it was undisguisedly pro-British'. Ever since a conversation with Faisal in London, after which this comment was made, Balfour had reason to fear that the emir would cause considerable harm to Anglo-French relations.12 After Lawrence had reminded the Foreign Office representa­ tives and the prime minister o f the omission o f the H ijaz dele­ gation the French were approached, but at first accepted only one delegate, Faisal.3 According to an official French source the emir had written to Pichon on 13 January demanding that he be entitled to represent at the peace conference all the Arab tribes and the Arab forces that had fought under his orders and that originated ‘in the areas situated between the latitudes o f Alexandretta and the Yem en’. The Q uai d’Orsay rejected this demand, arguing that Faisal had already been admitted as delegate o f the kingdom o f the H ijaz.45 *The French were obvi­ ously afraid to recognize him as delegate o f all the Arabs, even o f the Syrians. O n 17 January, when the question was discussed in the allied supreme council, Pichon still wished to lim it the number o f H ijaz delegates to one; but as the other members approved o f two delegates Pichon did not offer any opposition.9 The now recognized delegation o f the H ijaz was rivalled by more or less official delegations, spokesmen or private partisans, who queued for interview and bombarded the conference secretariat with memoranda and petitions. A t the beginning o f 1 ‘Diary o f the Paris Peace Conference* in Garnett, p. 373. 3 As the emir threatened to attack the French if they had aggressive designs, Balfour ‘pointed out that M . Clemenceau’s letter, in to-days Times [ n Dec.], indicated with unmistakable clearness that he was in error as to the true character o f the French designs’— A . J . Balfour’s memorandum, n Dec. 1918, on the visit o f Faisal, with Lawrence as interpreter; Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs, no. 48, p. 71 ; F.O . 406/40). 3 Garnett, idem. 4 Anonymous and undated note in k l o t z , dossier 13/A: Asie M ineure; Ques­ tions orientales, page A. 5 Procès-verbaux de la sixième séance du Conseil Supérieur des Alliés, p. 4; idem, dossier

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January, a formidable lobby o f French interests concentrated their efforts on a ‘congress’ in Marseilles and launched a publi­ city campaign to stir up French public opinion in favour o f the acquisition o f Syria.1 O n the other hand, a Zionist delegation led by D r W eizmann advocated a British mandate in Palestine and the expansion o f its borders. Then there were delegations o f Armenians, spokesmen o f the Kurds, partisans o f the Assyrians, each seeking support in turn from the British, the French and the Americans, presenting maps o f their own on which the chimerical national frontiers extended far into Mesopotamia and Syria. O n the eve o f the conference the British had made an unsuc­ cessful effort to reconcile the Zionists and the Arabs, as their co-operation seemed to be a prerequisite o f the new policy planned by the eastern com mittee.12 W hen the emir had come to London in December the talks initiated between him and W eizmann in Aqaba had been resumed. A month later they resulted in a formal agreement. But it was rather tenuous and did not meet the British expectations. The emir did not show particular haste in pronouncing for the ‘closest collaboration* between the Arabs and the Jews. M oreover, he revealed his sense o f the forced character o f his engagement by adding in his own hand to the protocol a famous reservation by which he made his acceptance conditional on the fulfilment o f the demands for Arab independence as presented in his memoran­ dum to the Foreign Office o f 4 January 1919.3 According to Antonius, Lawrence, serving as mediator, ‘was showing uncom­ mon zeal in persuading him [Faisal] that there was no harm in his concluding the proposed Agreement*.4 It is characteristic o f 1 Correspondance d'Orient, 30 J a n . 19 19 , contains abu n d an t m aterial con cern in g th e Congrèsfrançais de la Syrie o f M arseilles. 2 A n o th er reason w h y th e F oreign O ffice hastened th e u n derstanding, w as its exp ectation o f b ein g a b le to arran ge fin an cial h elp from th e Zion ists to th e A ra b governm ent. W eizm an n to C la y to n , 5 N o v. 1918 , p riva te le tte r; w i n o a t b , bo x 150/8.

3 H ie main terms o f the agreement provided for the encouragement of large* scale Jewish immigration, for the protection o f Arab peasants and tenant farmers, for Arab custody o f the Moslem H oly Places, for Zionist help in Arab economic development and, most important as far as this study is concerned, for complete Zionist-Arab co-operation at the peace conference. The text in Antonius, pp. 437-9. 4 A n ton iu s, p . 384.

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Lawrence’s fallacious diplom acy that, embarrassed by Faisal’s reservation, he gave a milder version o f it in his translation included in the treaty protocol.1 The Zionists apparently expected much from Faisal.2 He him self seems at first to have adopted a cautious attitude. In order not to irritate his countrymen, he avoided any flirtation with the Zionists, but was careful not to break with them either. There is a much-quoted letter, dated as late as i M arch, from Faisal to Felix Frankfurter, member o f the Am erican Zionist delegation at Paris, in which the emir repeats— evidently with the purpose o f securing the support o f the Am erican Jews for an intervention o f the United States in Syria— his willingness to accept the Zionist claims at the peace conference.3 This, how­ ever, was never done openly, nor did the Arabs have much help from the Zionists.4 The old dream o f a British-sponsored com­ mon front o f the eastern nationalities at the peace conference, an Arab-Jewish-Armenian entente, never came about. Faisal’s demands at Paris were initially in conflict with the resolution on the mandates. The emir demonstratively based his claims on the M ount Vernon address o f President Wilson. W hat he requested, in his memorandum o f 29 January to the peace conference, was the independence o f all the Arabs south o f the line Alexandretta-Diarbekr-Persian G ulf.5 There was no question o f the need o f foreign assistance or advice. In his speech o f 6 February in the Council o f Ten, the emir clarified his demands.6 Lebanon was to be allowed to opt for federal union 1 Stein, p. 642 and note 5 therein. 3 The western Asian department o f the intelligence o f the American peace delegation had ‘captured9 a letter by ‘H arry9 (Harry Sacher, one of Weizmann’s intimate advisers— Stein, p. 302) to Norman Bentwich, then at the Jerusalem High Court, dated 5 Jan. 1919. ‘Curiously enough we get on very well with Feisul9, the letter reported; ‘ . the French whom he loathes, have got him by the throat. He can’t make out what the British mean; and he looks upon us as almost his only friends.9 Copy o f the letter in y a l e , Palestine, i-2. 3 Stein, p. 643 and note 53. H ie Arabs have later claimed that the letter is not authentic but a piece o f Zionist propaganda. 4 See below, p. 134, note 5. 5 O nly the H ijaz— already a sovereign state— and Aden were excluded from the demand.— The whole memorandum in k l o t z , dossier 13/A, Asie M ineure; Questions orientales, page p. 6 Résumé of the speech in U.S. For. Rel. Paris Peace Conf.> iii, 889-94. For a British impression o f Faisal’s appearance in the Council of Ten, see Lord Hardinge: Old Diplomacy (London, 1942), p. 232.

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with Syria or not. Palestine, because o f her universal character, was to be left aside ‘for consideration o f all parties concerned'. Syria was to have the right to decide for independence, and for the choice o f the mandatory power if necessary. Consequently, in order to find out the wishes o f the populations concerned, the emir now proposed an international inquiry. The protégés o f the French had their turn to speak on 13 and 15 February. O n the former day, Shukri Ghanim attacked the pan-Arab thesis according to which language formed the basis o f national unity, and protested against the interference o f the sharifians in the internal affairs o f Syria. In conclusion, Ghanim claim ed an integral, independent, federated Syria under a French mandate. In spite o f all his eloquence he was not able to produce any concrete proposal for the realization o f these ideas.1 Tw o days later, the Council o f Ten heard a delegation o f the administrative council o f M ount Lebanon plead for the trans­ formation o f the autonomous province into an independent Greater Lebanon, with French 'collaboration'.2 M eanwhile in Syria hopes o f an Arab-Arm enian under­ standing had suffered a most serious setback. A n anti-French demonstration organized by Arabs in Aleppo on 28 February 1919 ended in the massacre o f nearly fifty Arm enians.3 This was a sad end to the conciliatory policy which Sir M ark Sykes and Georges-Picot had initiated, as the last phase o f their co-opera­ tion, in the capital o f northern Syria. The French commissioner was ignorant o f what had happened between Lloyd George and Clemenceau. He was personally convinced that it was necessary to get rid o f the bad blood aroused in Syria by Pichon’s speech o f 29 December 1918, and was in favour o f the action proposed by Sykes. O n 15 January 1919 Picot, together with Sir M ark Sykes, attended a meeting at the Arab Club o f Aleppo, and delivered a speech which was strikingly different from those made during die same month in Paris and in Marseilles. ‘Syrians', Picot was reported to have said, ‘. . . you are encircled by enemies with 1 The text o f the speech in U.S. For. Rel. Paris Peace Conf., idem, pp. 1024-38.

2 Idem, iv, 2-5. Embarked at Beirut without the permission o f General AJlenby, the delegation had been arrested in Port Said and released only after the French had angrily protested ( o u ic h a r d , v , 758-9). 3 These events are described by Pichon, pp. 236-69.

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whom Sir M ark and I have had to deal when defending your rights before Europe. Turned into friends o f Syria as they were, those enemies tried to make our efforts abortive, but did not succeed, for the Allies are resolved to recognize a great indepen­ dent Arab State.' These words must have seemed highly suspicious to the elements o f the French ‘Syrian Party*. They were badly received by Lebanese Christians as well— the latter thought that the speech was directed chiefly against them .1 N or did its magnificent new spirit live long in the minds o f the Moslems. T hey understood that the promises o f Picot were mere words while Faisal’s delegation in Paris was experiencing disappointment. T hey were right. As a m atter o f fact, Picot, as well as Sykes, had for a long time been considered too liberal by his own government. ‘Picot is accused in Paris o f having given everything to England’, Sykes had written in 1917, ‘just as Curzon never ceases twitting me with having given every­ thing to F ra n ce.. . .'12 After Picot, Sir M ark exhorted the Arabs to strive for unity and reconciliation. His speech in Aleppo was the last he made. In C ilicia there were already signs o f a gathering storm which was to shake the very basis o f the Sykes-Picot construction o f a western-patronized M iddle East. The danger was noticed by the two companions when visiting Aleppo. ‘The ridiculous armistice terms had been taken by the Turks as a great victory for themselves’, Sykes is said to have remarked before his death.3 He expressed his anxiety over the growing Turkish menace in Cilicia, which region he regarded as the roof o f Syria. Returning by Damascus and Palestine he grasped the extent to which the whole o f Syria was perturbed: any agitation infiltrated from the north through ‘the roof’ signified incalculable risks, not least for the British positions in the area. In Damascus, Sykes apparently had personal experience o f the new turn o f events. According to Brémond, his reception in the capital was rather cool if not 1 The text of Picot’s speech was transmitted by the French intelligence service and reproduced in S.R . (Service des Renseignements), note 219, 22 Feb. 1919; G U I C H A R D , V, 7 6 1 .

2 Sykes to Sir Eric Drummond, Balfour’s private secretary, 20 July 1917» private letter; s y k e s . 2 Leslie, p. 291, according to a record by his friend, Edmund Sanders, 10 Feb. 1919. Sykes died o f influenza in Paris six days later.

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inim ical : ‘He was told in a speech. . . that the Arabs would not tolerate the British meddling in Baghdad and in Jerusalem, that they would not even accept British counsellors.'1 Sykes hastened to Paris evidently convinced o f the need to quiet the Arabs by avoiding the most extreme claims o f the French and Zionists alike.12 Tired, estranged from the confer­ ence realities, somewhat abused for the ‘egregious'3 agreement o f 1916, Sykes would probably have been unable to influence significantly the course o f events. By his unique experience o f the east and by his close relations with the Arabs, he offered, nevertheless, much that the peace-making needed. Consequently, his death at a critical stage o f the eastern settlement was a serious loss not only for the British delegation but for the conference as a whole. 3 During the first weeks, the practically unprepared conference offers a picture o f a groping organism incapable o f mastering its gigantic task. A ll progress depended on the heads o f delega­ tions, and they were not able to concentrate on the matters before them, m ainly because o f Wilson's reluctance to engage in secret talks. The first part o f the conference is clearly defined; form ally opened on 18 January 1919 it reached a standstill one month later, because the Big Three for the time being retired from the scene, Lloyd George leaving for London on 8 February, Wilson for Am erica on 15 February, and Clemenceau to hospital, four days later, to recover from an attempted assassination. As far as the M iddle East is concerned there was still in January an epoch-making achievem ent: the final resolutions on the mandates. The French had introduced a draft o f their own, proposed by the minister o f colonies, M . Simon. He tried to get a clause adopted according to which the future mandated areas, 1 Brémond, p. 325. 2 Leslie, p. 284. 3 An expression of Lloyd George’s in Peace Treaties, ii, 1023. The description of Sykes’s last interview with 'the Mandarins’, Sir Louis M allet and Lawrence, g February 1919, in Leslie, p. 282. See also Christopher Sykes, p. 230.

I

ii

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though administered and emancipated on the lines suggested by Smuts, would be under the definite sovereignty o f the powers concerned, instead o f the trusteeship o f the League o f Nations. It was rejected in favour o f a resolution, made on 30 January, which was basically the same as that suggested by General Sm uts.1 Article 6 o f this im portant document was later to form the very starting point o f the Syrian settlement: They consider that certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized, subject to rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory power until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in selection of the mandatory power.2 A t the beginning o f February all the signs still pointed to a quick solution on Syria. O n 6 February, Paul Gambon recorded the news that Lloyd George and Clemenceau had had an amicable conversation during which the former had promised to support French claims in Syria and in M orocco.3 Probably on the same occasion, in any case on 6 February, shortly before Emir Faisal's case was heard at the Council o f Ten, Clemenceau handed the British prime minister a French proposal for a 'new ' understanding on Syria, which was then studied by the Foreign Office section.4 The new draft m ainly repeated what Pichon had said in his speech o f 29 December, that the treaty o f 1916 was the only basis o f settlement; its adjustment in Mosul was conditional on strict equality for the French in oil exploitation, on a political balance o f interests in Kurdistan, and on preserva­ tion o f the French position in Syria as granted by the SykesPicot agreement. The memorandum also reminded the British that the vilayet o f Zor, which the agreement included in the 1 See, for instance David Hunter M iller: My Diary at A t Paris Peace Conference, sg i8 -ig ig (New York, 1924) i, 109. * 17.5 . For. Pel. Paris Peace Conf., idem, p. 796. 3 Paul Gambon to Jules Cambon, 6 Feb. 1919, private letter; Correspondance, iii,

304-

* 'Accord franco-anglais sur la Syrie'; the French document as well as the corresponding 'English translation o f the French draft o f a proposed new Anglo* French agreement on Syria' are to be found in F.O . 608/97, no* 1562. The date (7 Feb.) when it was handed to the prime minister appears from a hand-written minute by 'L . M .' (Louis M allet).

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French zone, was ‘necessary to that zone for the railw ay which w ill strike the Euphrates at Deir es-Zor from Tripoli via Homs and Tadm or (ancient Palm yra)'. There was, nevertheless, a remarkable change o f attitude in that the French declared themselves ready to suppress ‘the zone o f direct sovereignty' (blue area) and ‘to accept at Damascus a regime approximate to that laid down for zone A in 1916 which would ensure for the Emir Faisal the situation in which the Allies desire to place him '. The Foreign Office section greeted the liberal-looking French offer with unveiled suspicion. Interpreting the proposed recogni­ tion o f Faisal to be that 'one o f their [the French] reasons for desiring political control at Damascus is to maintain friendly contact with the Sherif o f M ecca', M allet and Arnold Toynbee1 — to whom the prime minister had given the task o f analysing the draft2— concluded: 'This is a frank admission that their proposed southern boundary would be purely theoretical, and conflicts with previous assurances . . . that they are opposed to the exercise o f political influence in the H edjaz by any outside power whatsoever.’ 3 Nor was Lloyd George convinced o f French goodwill. He had agreed, on 30 January, to leave to the allied m ilitary representa­ tives the examination o f the possibilities o f evacuating British occupation troops from Syria, the Caucasus, Arm enia and Kurdistan. G reat Britain had at that time in Asiatic Turkey and Transcaucasia, fourteen infantry and five cavalry divisions, about 700,000 men (340,000 combatants). The m ilitary repre­ sentatives having considered the proposal o f the British with­ drawal, suggested that the prime minister should economize by withdrawing ten infantry and four cavalry divisions, a total o f h alf a million men, the remainder o f the British troops to be concentrated in Palestine and Mesopotamia including M osul.4 The report o f the m ilitary representatives presumed that the 1 Technical expert on Eastern Affairs attached to the British peace delegation. 2 See the minute by 4L . M .’, 7 Feb. on the F.O . document no. 1562; idem. 3 4Comments by the Foreign Office section on the French memorandum’, dated 7 Feb. 1919; F.O . idem.

4 A Report of the Military Occupation of the Turkish Territories and Transcaucasia,from the Military Representatives to the Supreme War Council, 5 Feb. 1919, W ar Cabinet Paper no. 63; CAB. 21/129, and

fo ster,

vol. 60/158 (M .G. 27/Ü/D7).

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French would take over in Syria and in C ilicia with a force twice as big as they had actually in the O .E .T .A . west (which was equivalent to one infantry division and one cavalry regi­ ment). However, it did not reveal whether this weak force was supposed to occupy the interior, i.e. area (A), as well. As a m atter o f fact, it appears from the diary o f the Am erican mili­ tary representative, General Bliss, that the French were supposed to stay in their coastal zone only.1 The prime minister seized upon this question as pretext. A t a meeting o f the British empire peace delegation the day after Faisal’s speech in the Council o f Ten he expressed the belief that if Allenby’s troops were withdrawn from Syria the French would enter area (A) and the Arabs would fight; the only w ay to preserve peace, in his opinion, was to leave the British troops in Syria until the commission o f inquiry proposed by Faisal had reported. T o a warning o f General Smuts that it would be a mistake for Britain herself to take over in Syria, the prime minister answered evasively, saying that the British had their promise to the Arabs and ought not to leave Syria until the pledge was fulfilled. It was consequently agreed that the promise given to Husain should be adhered to, and that the British troops would not be withdrawn until after the proposed commission o f inquiry had reported.2 This decision o f far-reaching import was publicly motivated by the pledge given to the Arabs. But to the prime minister it signified a skilful move to induce the French to agree to a solu­ tion in Syria on the lines visualized by him and his nearest advisers. These tactics Lloyd George had in fact conceived m any months before adapting them at the peace conference, as appears from the following record by Lord Robert C ecil: ‘I found the P.M . in a very exalté frame o f mind’, he wrote o f an episode at Versailles on 6 O ctober 1918. ‘. . . His plan was to pretend to the French that we should give all Syria including Palestine to the Americans that then they in fear o f losing Syria would give us Palestine.. . .’3 1 'Peace Conference D iary', entry o f 4 Feb. 1919; b l is s acc. 506g, box 65. 3 Minutes o f a meeting of members of the British empire delegation, 7 Feb. 1919; f o s t e r 62/143 (M .G. 27/Ü/D7). 3 'R . C .' to Balfour, 7 O ct. 1918, personal letter; The Papers o f A . J . Balfour, F .O . 800/201.

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ng

The French naturally disliked the idea o f sending an inquiry commission to Syria, at least so long as Syria remained under foreign occupation other than that o f the French themselves. Henceforth, Lloyd George had two levers in imposing his desiderata on Clem enceau: (i) actively, by supporting the carrying out o f the inquiry, and (2) passively, by continuing the British occupation o f Syria. 4 O n 8 February, when Lloyd George left for London, the French government was presented with a map memorandum in which the British proposed a modification o f the southern borders o f the French-dominated blue and (A) areas. This was done with the purpose o f extending the boundaries o f Palestine and o f creating a straight connection between Mosul and H aifa; but also the aim o f counteracting the suggested French intention1 and o f isolating the eventual French sphere from the Arab heartlands was evident. The territory required from the French zone comprised almost ‘a third o f Syria*, as Tardieu later reported in the French cham ber.12 From British documents relating to the second h alf o f 1g ig 3 it appears that the proposed border modifications were as follows. Palm yra (Tadm or), a locality situated in the desert m idway along the line Dam ascus-Deir ez-Zor, marked the direction in which the British government planned to construct the railway (and possibly pipeline) connection between H aifa and M osul. According to the agreement o f 1916 (art. 7), it was open to the British government, if the construction o f the connection line south o f area (A) appeared im practicable, to opt for the right to build the railw ay through the southern portion o f area (A), as far north as to Mesmiye.4 The new direction proposed to the 1 See above, p. 117. 2 Journal Officiel, 25 June 1920. 9 See e.g. the note of M . Berthelot o f 12 Dec. 1919, with comments o f the political section o f the British delegation; B .D ., 1, iv, pp. 579-60, 583, and the notes o f an Anglo-French meeting held at the Foreign Office, 23 Dec. 1919; idem, p. 602. 4 The transit area mentioned in the protocol was 'the polygon Banias-Rais M arib-Salkhad T ell Otshda-Mesmie’.

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French on 8 February was supposed to run up to a few miles north o f the southern lim it o f area (A), and it was moreover asked that the area south o f the line be attached to the Britishdominated area (B). In their reply o f 9 February the French government cate­ gorically refused to consider the revision proposal. It seems obvious that it would have been difficult for Clemenceau, even if he had wanted it, to get such a change accepted. 'It would be absolutely indefensible in the Cham ber', Pichon later explained in the Council o f Four. 'I t was enough for the Cham ­ ber to know that the Government were in negotiation with G reat Britain for the handing over o f Mosul to create a move­ ment that had resulted in a proposal in the Budget Committee for a diminuation o f credits for Syria.’ 1 Politically, the Jebel ed-Druz, proposed to be joined to the zone o f British influence, was one o f the main centres o f the Druzes, a particularly im portant population element in Lebanon. Econom ically, the plain o f the H auran, south o f the proposed demarcation line, was the principal granary o f the whole area south o f H am a. From the point o f view o f the French railw ay interests there was another danger: the purely British railw ay H aifa-Baghdad 'would become a railw ay H aifa-Dam ascus-M osul and in fact eliminate our own lines'.12 M oreover, Clemenceau might have supposed that the new claim had been enforced upon Lloyd George by some outside influences. There seems to have been no question o f revision o f the southern boundary o f area (A) during the December talks, and Clemenceau must have been highly disappointed at these sudden requirements. According to what Pichon said five weeks later in the Council o f Four, the cession o f the two areas to G reat Britain had been confirmed, in spite o f all, by the French government on 15 February.3 A further note on 17 M arch, however, rejected the new British claim more violently: 'T he French Government cannot for a moment accept any such diminution. It does not care for a suggestion in which it can only 1 U.S. For. Rel. Paris Peau Corf., v, 5. 2 Note of Berthelot, 13 Dec. 1919; B .D ., idem, pp. 579-80. 9 Minutes o f a meeting at 33 rue N itot (residence o f Lloyd George during the conference), 30 M arch 1919; U.S. For. Rel. Paris Peau Corf., idem, 3.

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see the expression o f views o f British colonialists. I f such views were attributed to him by the British Government, M . Clemenceau would prefer to hold to the agreements o f 1916’. 1 It would certainly seem that the prime minister had not been fully briefed before taking up the question o f border adjustment. The proposed direction o f the railw ay line had not yet been examined12 (it finally appeared that it was even less practicable than a route entirely in the British-dominated area (B) ).34 *N or does there seem to have been any more reason in 1919 than there had been in 1916 for the railw ay not to cross the French zone, as its construction, ownership and administration were in any case allowed to remain with the British, and their right to transport troops was officially guaranteed. As a m atter o f fact, Lloyd George was now trying to obtain what Sykes had obviously failed to secure from Picot in 1916. As we know, the Bunsen committee had considered that the line H aifa-Tadm or-Sinj a rZakhu-R uw andiz constituted the northern lim it o f the British spheres o f interest in the region. This, consequendy, meant that the French claims to the areas south o f it should be rejected.4. The reason why the committee had recommended this bound­ ary was to guard British trade against possible discrimination by French port and railw ay concessionnaires.9 In a new memoran­ dum on territorial questions dated 19 February 1919 the general staff stressed the significance o f these demands to empire interests. I f G reat Britain did not get the mandate over Syria, the northern frontiers o f Palestine should be pushed north­ eastwards in the direction o f the Euphrates. The paper concluded that the expanded boundary o f Palestine should protect the railw ay routes from the M editerranean to Mesopotamia as far 1 Tardieu, idem, p. 381. 3 Comments of die political section o f the British peace delegation on the note o f Berthelot (signed: Forbes Adams-Vansittart) ; B.D., idem, p. 583. 3 Lt.-Col. Stewart F. Newcombe, leader o f the railway survey, to W ingate, 1 Dec. 1919, private letter; w i n o a t e , box 237/4. 4 Report o f the Committee on Asiatic Turkey, idem, p. 9. See map 3 o f the present study. 9 It is worth mentioning that in January 1919 the Anglo-Syrian Trading Company had appealed direct to the British peace delegation to safeguard British commercial interests around Alexandretta. (By a letter dated 16 Jan. 1919; Peace conference, British empire delegation, daily summary o f correspondence, 20 Jan. 1918, p. 7; f o s t e r , vol. 62/44 (M .G . 27/Ü/D7).)

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as possible, and cross the H ijaz railw ay zone— ‘somewhere north o f D era’. 1 A straight line through the Hauran and the Jezireh would have been commercially more profitable than a diverted railway through the southern desert. This point had been emphasized by a paper presenting the Adm iralty desiderata in relation to the peace settlement. Dated 22 January 1919, it must have been lying on the prime minister’s table around the turn o f the m onth.2 The Adm iralty moreover drew attention to the vital importance o f a corridor as an outlet to the M editerranean for Mosul petroleum. In a memorandum communicated on 9 January by the petroleum executive such rights o f w ay had been regarded as essential desiderata in the future territorial adjustments in Syria.3 The new British demands coincided with a campaign for the extension o f the boundaries o f Palestine which the Zionists had launched in Paris. They had distributed, since the beginning o f February, a statement in which they expressed far-reaching territorial claims to the north and west o f the boundaries o f Palestine as drawn by the Sykes-Picot agreement. The new frontiers proposed were to follow approxim ately the line in the north from the sea a little south o f Saida (Sidon), following the watersheds o f the foothills o f Lebanon, thence eastwards follow­ ing the northern watersheds o f the Nahr M ughaniye and through M ount Hermon to the west o f the H ijaz railw ay; in the east, a line close to and west o f the H ijaz railw ay, terminating in the G u lf o f A qaba.4 There was reason to expect that the Zionist boundary programme would appeal to sympathies outside the British delegation, especially among the Americans. The territorial claims seemed justified in view o f the need to make Palestine 1 General Staff Desiderata Regarding Territorial Adjustments, 19 Feb. 1919; f o s t e r , vol. 60/80 (M .G. idem). As to the needs of the Arab state in formation, the paper went as far as to recommend that the whole coast between Tripoli and Tartus should be included within it in order to give it access to the Mediterranean (p. 3). 2 Summary o f Admiralty Policy in Relation to the Peace Settlement, 22 Jan. 1919, p. 17; fo ster,

idem.

3 Petroleum Position o f the British E ntire by the petroleum executive, 9 Jan. 1919, F.O . Secret P.C./024; f o s t e r , vol. 60/148 (M .G ., idem). 4 Statement of the Zionist delegation regarding Palestine, 3 Feb. 1919, M iller Diary, v, 17.

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economically viable and capable o f feeding a population which was likely to increase greatly as a result o f Jewish immigration. W ith these considerations in mind it was thought possible that the French could be induced to accept the border adjustment. It can be seen on the map that the territory claimed extended in the northwest to Kiswe, in other words indeed to ‘the suburbs o f Damascus* as the French later claim ed.1 I f the Zionists were allowed to have their w ay, the French would lose the most essen­ tial part o f the Hauran and would probably be little interested in keeping the remaining area o f the Jebel ed-Druz, mostly populated by Druzes and Bedouins. The reiterated new requests and territorial demands made to Clemenceau explain his coolness towards the idea o f giving access to the M editerranean to the Arab state now in formation around Damascus. Lord M ilner raised this question when talk­ ing to the French premier in the middle o f February.2 The necessity o f a sea harbour for the Arabs had been repeatedly taken up by Faisal; his demands were obviously inspired by Syrians who were afraid o f remaining at the m ercy o f foreign monopolies. W hen speaking in Aleppo in January, the French commissioner had publicly promised to settle the question,3 but this promise had not been endorsed by his government. Aband­ oning Tripoli— the harbour pointed out by M ilner— meant, to Clemenceau, another surrender. It was conceivable that the proposal was mere camouflage for a future bridgehead o f a British trans-Syrian railw ay from the M editerranean via Homs to Baghdad. After all, the French Régie Général des Chemins defer had in 1909-12 frustrated a similar plan by acquiring the con­ cession o f the line Tripoli-H om s.4 And already at that time Pichon had been at the Q uai d’O rsay.5 Facing parliam ent and the Parisian press, Clemenceau realized that he had to think o f his political future and not 1 Note o f M . Berthelot, 13 Dec. 1919; B .D ., idem, p. 579. 3 Peace Treaties, ii, 1048. 3 S.R . note no. 319, 33 Feb. 1919; g u i c h a r d , idem. 4 Vice-Adm iral Sir Chr. Cam bell, the merchant bankers Erlanger and Co. and the contractors Pauling and Co. had formed a group for constructing and financing the Tripoli-H om s railway and the port without any overt encouragement by the Foreign Office. The railway was planned to be continued to Mesopotamia (F.O . 434/318, nos 9, 13, 34). * See above, p. 3.

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compromise in the Orient. The French position was analysed with remarkable clarity in a paper which Sir A . H irtzel sub­ mitted to the Foreign Office section at Paris around the middle o f February.1 The writer referred to the fears o f the French Catholics that 'an atheist Government may give Syria away*, and hinted at the political difficulties resulting from Clemenceau’s eventual surrender to British exigencies. The 'disaster o f Clemenceau’s fall’ might, in fact, have occurred a year earlier than it did, with consequences far more fatal to the peace conference.12 H irtzel claimed to present only his personal opinion but he naturally represented the views o f the India Office, in opposition to the Arab Bureau line o f policy. His main argument was that, tomorrow as well as yesterday, die British had to be neighbours with the French all over the world. It would be perilous to construct the future on illusions o f a co-operation with the Americans. 'I t is quite conceivable', he prophesied, 'that the U .S.A . m ay withdraw into their shell again leaving us to bear the odium o f disappointed hopes.' Consequently, he warned against exaggerating 'the purely parochial importance o f the A rab question at the expense o f the ecumenical importance o f the maintenance o f cordial relations with France', and concluded by recommending that the British should seek a modus vivendi with France on the basis o f Clemenceau’s proposal o f 6 February. Despite mounting tension in Anglo-French relations, there were still, in the Foreign Office section, signs o f optimism as to the possibilities o f marrying the Sykes-Picot arrangement to the mandates system. Reverting to Pichon’s speech o f 29 December, which was still considered to be a key statement on French M iddle East policy, an im portant memorandum prepared for eventual submission to the peace conference emphasized that Pichon had admitted that Britain’s and France's 'acquired rights’ o f the 1916 agreement 'w ill be submitted for discussion o f the [Peace] Conference and the Conference w ill have to pronounce on them as a whole*.3 According to the memorandum Pichon 1 'T he French Claims in Syria', a memorandum by Sir A . H irtzel, 14 Feb. 1919; F.O . 608/107, no. 3356. 2 See below, p. 333. 2 My italics.

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seemed to have accepted the fact that the conference could ‘give the agreement previously arrived at such conclusions as may be fitting in each case*. In preparing this statement as late as 18 February the Foreign Office was in fact ready to meet the even­ tuality o f declaring to the conference that ‘Pichon has suggested a solution which entirely commends itself to His M ajesty’s Government*.1 1 Statement o f British Foreign Policy in the Middle East for Submission to the Peace Conference (iif required), 18 Feb. 1919» p. 3 (allegedly prepared by Arnold Toynbee, see the bibliography below); w e s t e r n a n .

C H A P T E R V II

T h e Arab Question Embroils the Conference h e French had been ready, at least since the beginning o f February, to accept Faisal as head o f the Arab government at Damascus. Even after the relatively moderate Arab memorandum o f 29 January they seem to have been willing to foster the goodwill o f the em ir.1 Relations cooled after Faisal’s speech o f 6 February. Violent attacks upon the emir were made both inside and outside the French government. The minister o f marine, Georges Leygues, warned Pichon against treating o f'th e question o f Damascus' directly or indirectly with Faisal because he was the agent o f England and was known to play a constant double gam e.12 The British government learnt o f the bitter change o f French attitude in a roughly worded note the tune and substance o f which gave Curzon reason to make protests to the French ambassador.3 The new note was received unexpectedly but evidently after Faisal’s hearing in the Council o f Ten, and in any case in the course o f the same day on which the French had, in a very conciliatory note, seemed to accord to Faisal the position o f ruler at Damascus. It m ainly consisted o f a long list o f accusa­ tions about the alleged intrigues o f officers o f the British m ilitary administration in Asiatic Turkey— gathered by Picot in the 1 Tw o days before his appearance in the Council o f Ten, Faisal received his second French decoration, the Croix de Guerre ; Le Temps gave on 6 February a good place to an interview with the secretary of the H ijaz delegation. 2 Leygues to Pichon, 13 Feb. 1919, off. letter, quoted in g u i c h a r d , v , 785. W hat Leygues referred to here as ‘the question of Damascus’ was obviously the reunification of Damascus (and Homs, Hama and Aleppo) with the coastal zone. 3 See e.g. the letter of Curzon to Cambon, 19 M arch 1919; Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs, no. 25, F.O . 406/41.

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course o f his recent round trip with Sir M ark Sykes. But it did not spare the emir by any means. Among other things, a direct allusion was made to Faisal’s claims to the coastal zone, which the French now opposed : ‘Emir Faisal, chief o f nomades, trans­ formed into a mandatory o f all the Arab speaking peoples, is terrorizing a population which by its culture and historic tradi­ tions should oppose a domination by Bedouins’.1 In his memorandum o f 14 February the secretary o f the polit­ ical department o f the India Office took note o f the growing French bitterness and questioned whether the British intended to carry out their support o f Arab claims to the point o f conflict with France. As he suggested that the British should play ‘the honest broker' between Faisal and the French and urge the former, in return for certain concessions on the part o f the latter,12 to accept the sovereignty o f Syria and Lebanon under a French mandate, M allet made known that, at the instance o f Balfour, an effort was already being made to bring the emir and Clemenceau together.3 The first concrete proposal for a French reconciliation with Faisal was made during a conversation between Lord M ilner and Clemenceau, a few days after that crucial 6th o f February. M ilner had given an assurance that the British had no desire to oust the French from Syria and had pointed out that the only possibility o f finding a w ay out o f the deadlock was for the French to settle the matter directly with Faisal. W ith a view to accomplishing this, M ilner appealed to the O ld M an, ‘who took a much more liberal view on this question than the bureaucrats behind him '.4 The premier answered that it was no use for him to see the emir alone, while the British stood aside and possibly 1 Enclosure in Derby to Curzon, 7 Feb. 1919, off. letter no. 144; Further Corre­ spondence . . . , idem, no. 12, p. 18. 2 Hirtzel suggested as the most essential requirements: (1) withdrawal of French reservations regarding Kurdistan east of the Tigris; (2) modification of the north« east frontier o f Syria making the Euphrates the frontier down to Raqqa (giving to the French Deir es-Zor, if necessary) and from there southwards, taking into consideration the tribal spheres; (3) delineating the southern boundary of Syria as required by the general staff. 3 A hand-written minute made by ‘L. M .’ on Sir A . H irtzel's memorandum ‘The French Claims in Syria’, dated 14 Feb. ig ig ; idem. 4 The description of the conversation follows the report given by M ilner in his letter to Lloyd George, 8 M arch ig ig , as reproduced in Peace Treaties, ii, 1046-50.

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advised Faisal against him, but that he agreed to talk to Faisal, if some responsible British representative were present at the interview. M ilner, who was on the point o f leaving for England, promised to arrange the desired rendezvous after his return to Paris in a few days' time. Unfortunately Clemenceau had been shot at on the day that M ilner returned from London, 19 February, and the meeting had to be postponed. W hen the matter was taken up on 7 M arch at a private meeting between Lloyd George and the convalescent Clemen­ ceau, Colonel House being present, the situation in Syria had been dram atically worsened by the killings o f French-protected Armenians in Aleppo on 28 February. Clemenceau insisted that he was no longer in a position to negotiate with Faisal. Accord­ ing to Lloyd George he predicted that the French would have to fight the em ir.1 The prime minister warned his colleague that the campaign would be a disaster and that the British ‘did not want another A bd-el-K ader'2— in other words a hero who could arouse bellicose pan-Arab enthusiasm. In order to get a clear picture o f what was going on in Syria, Lloyd George proposed to his colleague that Allenby be invited to Paris. Clemenceau, probably without further thought, gave his appro­ val. He was to regret his complaisance afterwards as the general fought the French with the mightiest arguments at a stormy conference session a fortnight later. Clemenceau had been assured at this meeting that France would be the mandatory power for Syria and ‘such part o f Cilicia as would be agreed upon between the Americans and the French’.3 In spite o f this, three days later, at a similiar meeting with Clemenceau and House, Lloyd George produced a map which proposed a partition o f Syria, leaving Lebanon to the French but allowing G reat Britain and the Arabs to have an outlet to the M editerranean. M oreover, as Clemenceau angrily noticed, the partition line excluded from the French sphere the railw ay line ‘running north and south' (e.g. the line A leppoR ayak).4 The map was allegedly prepared by Lord M ilner, and 1 Peace Treaties, i, 289.— For the meeting o f 7 M arch, see also House Diary, entry o f 7 M arch 1919 (xv); h o u s e . 2 Leader of the Algerian revolt in the 1840s. 3 Peace Treaties, idem. 4 House Diary, entry o f 10 M arch 1919 (xv); h o u s e .

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was apparently drawn on the lines o f the British proposal o f 8 February, or some variation o f it. In order to make the French demand for occupation o f the Rhineland unnecessary, Lloyd George and Wilson proposed on 14 M arch, the day o f the latter’s return to Paris, some AngloAm erican guarantees to France in the case o f a German attack.1 O n the afternoon o f 20 M arch, Clemenceau was to receive from Colonel House a draft o f the suggested treaty.2 Germ any signi­ fied to the ‘Tiger’ a more essential 'eastern question* than did Syria. Thus, it is understandable that, at this juncture, he preferred to avoid any controversy with the allies. W hen the delicate question came under discussion at the first meeting o f the Council o f Four, in the morning o f the same day, Clemen­ ceau wisely kept silent and left it to his foreign minister to cross swords with the British premier. Because the minutes o f this meeting offer an extraordinary panorama o f the conflicting British and French views on the question, it may be justifiable to describe the discussion in greater detail.3 Pichon’s main theme was the validity o f the 1916 agreement. W ith a peculiar logic, he argued that because England and France had displayed a 'disinterested* attitude towards the Arabs by the declaration o f 8 November 1918, the Syrian ques­ tion was a matter to be arranged between the two governments. But, he sternly declared, there was no question o f France aban­ doning her cultural and economic interests in Syria nor o f her accepting the idea o f a partition o f that country. T h at is why the French government asked that the whole Syrian region should be treated as a unit and that France should become the mandatory o f the League o f Nations for it. Pichon had deliberately forgotten what had happened between the two premiers in London. He took the line that the French had threatened in their note to the Foreign Office three 1 Peace Treaties, i, 403, and André Tardieu: La Paix (Paris, 1921)9 p. 195* 2 House Diary, idem. House wrote in his diary, after the visit of Clemenceau that day: ‘I have my doubts as to the Senate accepting such a treaty, but that is to be seen. Meanwhile it satisfied Clemenceau and we can get on with the real business of the Conference.9 3 Minutes o f the meeting at 23 rue Nitot, 20 M arch 1919, in U.S.For. Rel. Paris Peace Can/., v, 2-12. The minutes as printed in this collection were kept by Sir M aurice Hankey (see Mantoux, i, preface; the notes o f Prof. Mantoux do not cover this meeting).

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days earlier: *M. Clemenceau would prefer to hold to the agree­ ments o f 1916.*1 He indeed let it be understood that the French volte-face was due to the recent British territorial claims on the southern border o f area (A) and to the friction which had appeared in the m ilitary administration o f Syria. Indiscreetly, Pichon dared to expose, in the presence o f President Wilson, the latest Anglo-French exchange o f notes on their respective spheres o f interest. Answering the attack, Lloyd George denied that the question o f the mandate over Syria was one between Britain and France. The extent to which the two powers were concerned had been cleared up during the interview in London, when he had told Clemenceau that he wanted ‘Mosul with adjacent regions and Palestine*.12*In regard to Syria proper, the prime minister continued, ‘we could examine the question in as disin­ terested a spirit as we would a Carpathian boundary to be decided . . . by the Conference*. Here Lloyd George made the solemn declaration, repeated m any times later on by the British Government, that Britain would not, in any case, accept mandatory responsibilities in Syria. But, he added significantly, there existed a British public opinion as there did a French one; that is why something was needed as a reward for one million troops maintained in Turkey and in the Caucasus, for 125,000 casualties, for the hundreds o f millions o f pounds o f campaign expenses. The dialogue then went to the very heart o f the BritishFrench controversy. The undertaking with Husain concerned England alone, Pichon said bluntly. France had promised to uphold ‘an independent Arab State or Confederation . . . but not the K in g o f the Hejaz*. W ith the good offices o f Britain, however, Pichon believed France could reach an understanding with Faisal. In other words, the French would agree to seek a modus vivendi with a Syrian state headed by Faisal, provided that this state was not under the overlordship o f Husain. Hereupon President Wilson, growing tired o f the discussion, 1 See above, p. 121. 2 The ‘adjacent regions9 probably meant the territories covered by the British claims as presented in the note of 8 Feb. 1919 and in the map prepared by M ilner.

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intervened, saying that ‘he would now seek to establish his place in the conference*. He expressed his wish that the two European powers would assume the responsibility o f the mandate in Asiatic Turkey and promised to approach his own people in order to get Am erica to do the same, although he feared that he would not succeed. He then asked General Allenby, who had arrived in Paris on the inivitation o f both premiers, what would happen in Syria if France were called to occupy the whole country before the permanent settlement was decided. The commander-in-chief answered that the French occupation would meet ‘the strongest possible opposition by the whole o f the Moslems and especially by the Arabs’. He added that there was danger o f a huge w ar covering the whole area and possibly involving the British in Palestine and even in Egypt. This was a well-chosen moment for Wilson to enunciate his proposal that an inter-allied commission o f inquiry should be sent to Syria. Expected as it had been at one time, the possibility o f an Am erican intervention in the M iddle East appears to have been discarded among the allies as the conference weeks rolled by. The meeting was interrupted in a curious manner. The discussion went on spasmodically. The only person present to dare to offer some resistance to the proposal was Balfour who expressed his fear that the sending o f the commission might delay the conclusion o f the peace.1 Lloyd George, on the other hand, urged that the commission should get to work at once. Clemenceau prudently accepted the inquiry in principle, but on the condition that it should be extended to all parts o f Asiatic Turkey, Palestine and M esopotamia included. 2

Since the beginning o f 1917 there had been discussion in the British government as to whether the United States should be invited to participate in the control o f the post-war Asiatic 1 Dr Bliss’s claim at the meeting o f 26 February o f the American commis­ sioners plenipotentiary, according to which Balfour was in favour o f sending the commission (U .S. For. Rel. Paris Peace Conf.$xi, 77), seems to be in contradiction to the foreign secretary’s strong objections to the inquiry. K

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Turkey. After the enunciation o f the Fourteen Points even the French seem to have resigned themselves to that possibility. In the spring o f 1918 Georges-Picot had apparently planned a voyage to the United States, possibly with Sir M ark Sykes, in order to discuss 'general policy in regard to this theatre* w ith President W ilson.1 Towards the end o f 1918 support o f the idea o f Am erican participation had been prevalent in London and in Paris, but, as we have seen, it was still rem arkably influential. M eanwhile in Washington, the idea o f accepting responsibil­ ities in the former Turkish territories was being discussed generally, and was quite widely accepted— notwithstanding that the United States had never been at w ar w ith Turkey. H ow strong the reasons were for expecting Am erican intervention is shown by the fact that even Henry Cabot Lodge, the ch ief opponent o f W ilson in Congress, seems to have accepted the idea at the end o f the war. 'Constantinople must pass into control o f the Allies including the United S tates.. .*, he wrote to Lord Bryce four weeks before the Turkish armistice. 'W e must protect those stricken peoples o f Asia M inor, and particu­ larly die Southern Part which has been so brilliandy conquered by your army.*12 Contrary to this, there were even in the closest proxim ity to the president doubts as to whether the invitation to Am erica to share the responsibilities in the former enemy territories might not be a trap by which the im perialist European powers would commit Wilson in the eyes o f world opinion.3 W hen w riting about Turkey seven months earlier, the young W alter Lippmann had pointed out the com plexity o f the task Wilson was 1 Clayton to W .O., g M ay 1918, tel. no. 74; m i l n e r , Palestine April-O ctober 1918, p. 12.— Picot hoped that Weizmann would help him and Sykes to explain to Wilson the situation in the M iddle East. The plan did not find support in London, according to Sykes, because the foreign secretary was away at the time and the assistant secretary o f state (Lord Robert Cecil) ‘was put out about the message [of Clayton] because he has a special view about never sending a mission to any country but to do everything through the Embassy’— undated record (probably of June 1918) o f a teleprint conversation between Sykes and Picot; p. 1 ; The Papers o f Sir M ark Sykes, idem. 2 Lodge to Bryce, 28 Sept. 1918, private letter; b r y c e , U .S.A . 7, p. 151. 3 See e.g. the despatches: House to Wilson, 30 O ct. 1918, tel.; U.S. For. Rel. Paris Peace Conf.yi, 407, and Secretary o f State Lansing to General Tasker H . Bliss, C h ief of Staff of the U .S. Arm y, 16 Dec. 1918, private letter; idem, p. 296.

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facing in the M iddle East: ‘The real application o f the Presi­ dent's idea to those countries requires inventiveness and resourcefulness which is scarcer than anything.'1 Regarding the Syrian question, the Am erican delegation at Paris did not lack inventiveness but was unfortunately deficient in resources. Even here, President Wilson seems to have arrived at the conference with a rather limited grasp o f the com plexity o f the problems to be solved. He might have been misled over M iddle Eastern realities by the persistent idea held later by his commissioners in Syria, that ‘there is probably no region where the allies are freer to decide their course in accordance with the principle they have pronounced'.12 The president and his staff had no real picture o f the situation in the A rab M iddle East. The wartime reports o f Captain Y ale, the well-informed but solitary Am erican representative in the region, were getting out o f date. In spite o f this the long-discussed Am erican intelligence mission to Syria never came about.3 And when the Am erican section o f the inter-allied inquiry commission finally found its lone w ay into the unkown jungle o f Syrian politics, the co­ operation between its uninformed members and the accom­ panying advisers left much to be desired. After what President W ilson had said when in London in December, there was justified scepticism as to Am erican w illing­ ness to accept the burden proposed in the M iddle East. As far as Lloyd George is concerned, he had left for Paris convinced that from the point o f view o f im perial interests, a mandate held by the United States would be intolerable in the M edi­ terranean region except in Arm enia.4 A t the conference, how­ ever, some prominent Englishmen were actively soliciting the Americans to intervene all over the Ottom an empire. Besides Lord Bryce, who tried to influence those surrounding Wilson in favour o f Arm enia, and Lord Cecil, who advocated a United 1 Lippmann to Newton D . Baker, the secretary o f war, 16 M ay 1918, private letter, idem, p. 97. 2 Report o f the American Section o f the International Commission on Mandates in Turkey (henceforth referred to as 'King-Crane Report') ; idem, xii, 785. 3 As regards the plans for sending such a mission, see the minutes of die meetings o f the commissioners plenipotentiary, 1, 13, 22 and 24 Feb., and 6, 13, 18 and 27 M arch; idem, ix, pp. 8, 35,66, 7 2 ,9 9 ,1 1 6 -1 7 ,130 and 133. 4 See above, p. 97.

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States mandate in Constantinople and the Straits, Lawrence was doing his best to get the Americans interested in Syria.1 In allowing, if not encouraging British lobbies and especially Lawrence to continue their efforts for an Am erican intervention in Syria, the prime minister thought less o f establishing the United States there than o f m obilizing Am erican opinion against French ambitions in the Levant. Lawrence had made it clear, since his first interview with Am erican representatives, that his aim was to induce the United States to take over in Syria. He proclaimed this objective at every opportunity in public no less than in private. A statement o f his was read, for instance, by Radio Lyons in its broadcast on 19 January : (The Arabs, who are one o f the oldest races on the earth, wish to build up the youngest independent state in Asia and therefore turn to Am erica as the mightiest o f protectors o f the liberty o f man.’ 2 Tw o days after the opening o f the conference, the Colonel had taken Emir Faisal to meet Professor W . L. Westermann, chief o f the western Asian section o f the intelligence division o f the Am erican delegation. Faisal had explained to the latter that his programme was now to ask the conference to send an inter­ national commission to study the situation in Syria and that to succeed in this he wanted Am erican backing.3 In their report to the president, on the following day, 21 January, Westermann’s section had reported that the proposal should be supported.4 Finally, on the 23rd Faisal and the inseparable Lawrence had been given an opportunity to repeat their wish personally to Wilson himself.3 1 See e.g. M iller’s record of an Anglo-American meeting attended by Cecil and Lawrence on 1 1 Jan. 1918; M iller Diary, i, 74. 2 Note addressed to A. A ., 22 Jan. 1919; G. F. M . 10/457, bd. 43, A 2268. See also Garnett, p. 274. A t that time the French press too gave favourable publicity to the exotic figures of Lawrence and Faisal: see e.g. Le Temps, 11 Dec. 1918 or even Correspondance i ' Orient, 15 Jan. 1918, p. 15. 3 Note ‘Westermann-Faisal Conversation, Jan. 20, 1919*; y a l e , Syria v-7. 4 ‘Outline o f Tentative Report and Recommendations Prepared by the Intelli­ gence Section’, 21 Jan. 1919; M iller, iv, 267. 9 The audience was arranged by Rabbi Stephen F. Wise (chairman o f the American provisional committee for general Zionist affairs— Stein, p. 594)— evidence that Faisal’s co-operation with the Zionists did not remain altogether fruitless. Wise to Wilson, 15 Jan. 1919, personal letter, and M r Close, Wilson’s private secretary, to Lawrence, 21 Jan. 1919, idem; w il s o n , viii A .

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O n the same day the president had been requested to arrange an appointment with D r Howard S. Bliss, president o f the Syrian Protestant College o f Beirut, whom the Am erican dele­ gation had invited to bring evidence on the Syrian question.1 As appears from the well-documented monograph by Professor Howard, it was finally due to Bliss’s tireless persistence that the initiative o f Faisal and Lawrence for making an inquiry in Syria was taken seriously by President W ilson.12 3 Both in Paris and Washington there was notable pessimism regarding the possibility o f an Am erican intervention in the M iddle East. Henry W hite, second o f the commissioners plenipotentiary by whom D r Bliss was heard on 26 February, seemed rather unconvinced o f the possibility o f getting an Am erican mandate accepted by Congress.3 Henry Cabot Lodge too wrote to Lord Bryce on 4 M arch that it was no longer possible to accept a mandate even in Constantinople or in Arm enia.45 Wilson, nevertheless, returned from W ashington convinced o f the appropriateness o f the idea o f an inquiry and had it approved at the meetings o f 20 and 25 M arch o f the supreme council, in spite o f the lukewarm attitude o f the allies.3 1 ‘Memorandum for the President*, probably by Close, 23 Jan. 1919; w i l s o n , idem. 2 H arry N. Howard: The King-Crane Commission (Beirut, 1963), pp. 25-6. A campaign for American intervention was launched simultaneously in the Orient. From Damascus a Mesopotamian committee, headed by General Yasin Pasha al-Hashimi, had as early as 15 January addressed a petition to President Wilson demanding a purely American or mixed commission of inquiry to be sent to the Arab countries. (Petition to be found in y a l e , Arabia vii-5.) From Cairo, a number of Syrians sent to the president a despatch, on 6 February, asking for an American protectorate over Syria (Adm. Varney to Leygues, 15 Feb. 1919, tel. no. 410; o u i G H A R D , v, 762). A t the end o f the month the editor o f the Mokattam in Cairo, Dr Faris Nimr, exerted his authority in an active campaign in favour o f the United States {Journal du Caire, 6 M arch, as quoted in Correspondance d 'Orient, 30 M arch 1919, p. 280, and Nimr to M r Gary, American diplomatic agent in Cairo, undated letter (1919); N .A. 181. 91/79, 1/2). 3 W hite to Bryce, 14 Feb. 1919, private letter; b r y c e , U .S.A . 2 i. 4 Lodge to Bryce, 4 M arch 1919, private letter; idem, U .S.A . 7. 5 Bliss had reminded Wilson o f the necessity o f the commission on the eve of the latter’s return to Paris: Bliss to Wilson, 10 M arch 1919, personal letter; w i l s o n , vm A .

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W hile the French opinion o f the proposed commission was clear, they never liked the project although they were not in a position to oppose it— out o f fear o f hurting the Americans, the British attitude appeared to be rather inconsistent. The foreign secretary, though sympathetic towards an Am erican mandate o f Palestine, resisted the proposal from the very beginning, but did so for reasons more specific than those stated at the meeting o f 20 M arch.1 He opposed the application o f the principle o f self-determination in Palestine because it endangered his pro­ gramme o f the Jewish national home, the Arabs being numeri­ cally an absolute m ajority in Palestine.12 For the prime minister, we know, the possibility o f an Am erican intervention was an ideal trump card against the French, but when the question arose o f putting it into practice he became reluctant. O n 27 M arch, two days after Wilson’s draft o f the 'Instruc­ tions for the Inter-Allied Commission’ had been accepted by the Council o f Four,3 Lloyd George suddenly tried, at another meeting o f the Big Four, to persuade the Am erican president o f the futility o f sending the commission4*. He referred to a conver­ sation with 'an administrator o f ours in M esopotamia whose views are rather different from those o f General Allenby as far as the feeling o f the Arabs towards France is concerned’.9 He disclosed that the British government had received a petition from the population o f Iraq, which politely declined the British offer o f government by an A rab emir, and gave their preference to a direct European administration. In spite o f this President W ilson insisted that the commission should be sent, though with instructions to lim it their task in order to save time. Clemenceau diplom atically supported this plan, then asked: 'Could we not now discuss the question o f the left bank o f the Rhine.’6* 1 See above, p. 131. 2 See 'Memorandum by M r Frankfurter o f an Interview in M r Balfour’s Apartment, 33 rue Nitot, Paris . . . June 34th, 1919’ ; B .D ., 1, iv, 1377. 3 Howard, p. 34. * Notes o f a meeting o f the Council o f Four 37 M arch 1919; M antoux, ii, 49. There are no corresponding minutes by Hankey printed in the U.S. For. Bel. records. 9 Obviously referring to C ol. Arnold Wilson who had arrived in Paris on so M arch. A . T . W ilson: Mesopotamia ig ij-tg x o , A Clash o f Loyalties (London, 1931), pp. 115-16. 9 M antoux, idem, 50.

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Alarm ed by President W ilson’s determined intervention, the British now appeared to seek an understanding with the French for a rapid solution o f the Syrian question. Various im perial interests m ilitated against the sending o f the commission o f inquiry. There was the development in Mesopotamia, broadly alluded to by Lloyd George in the Council o f Four on 27 M arch. Then there was the explosive situation in Egypt where the nationalists were angry because o f the courtesies paid by the peace conference to sharifian aspirations.1 Finally, the Zionists were nervous about the plan to send the commission to Palestine and m ay have alarmed the prime minister as they did Colonel House.12 A temporary but significant change in British policy had become apparent in the course o f an informal conversation which took place on 25 M arch on the initiative o f W ickham Steed, in his apartment at 55 Avenue M arceau. The editor o f The Times, who played a rem arkable backstairs role at the conference, had invited a number o f British and French advisers and observers o f Arab affairs to exchange views on the Syrian question.3 Steed’s memoirs, as well as a memorandum o f 26 M arch submitted very probably by him to the Am erican dele­ gation, give im portant details o f the conclusions reached at this six hours* meeting. The memorandum states that all those present generally recognized that ‘the effect o f sending an inter­ national commission to Syria would be to unsettle the country, to make it appear that the conference had been unable to reach any decision and to open the door to intrigues and manifestations o f all kinds’.4 Strangely enough even T . E. Lawrence appeared to agree on 1 E.g. Report o f the Special Mission to Egypt, Parliamentary Papers, 1931 (xlii), Cmd. 1131, p. 13. 2 Felix Frankfurter went to see Colonel House on this question on 36 M arch.— House Diary, entry o f 36 M arch 1919; (xv) h o u s e . 3 The British present were: Gertrude Bell, T . E. Lawrence, and Sir Valentin Chirol from the Foreign Office; the French: Robert de Caix, Henri Brénier, secretary-general o f the chamber o f commerce o f Marseilles, Philippe M illet and Auguste Gouvain, respectively senior editors o f Le Temps and Le Journal des Dibats, and as a representative of the Q uai d'O rsay M . Sabatier d'Espeyran; Philippe Berthelot had been invited, but he refused to come to discuss a decision made by the Council o f Four (viz. about sending the international commission to Syria). * Anonymous 'Memorandum on Syria*, 36 M arch 1919; M iller Diary, vii, 169.

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this point. According to the memorandum he ‘made clear that the movement for Arab unity possesses no serious political value for the present or, indeed, for the future*. For the future o f Syria, he added, there should be no political connection between Faisal and his father. In order to arrange an opportunity for the French to settle the matter directly with the emir and to avoid the necessity o f sending out the commission, Lawrence promised to advise Faisal to remain in Paris.1 The Frenchmen present, although mostly fervent partisans o f Syrie Française,2 seem to have agreed that it was necessary to settle the matter with Faisal, and promised to bring this to the notice o f their government. It is not easy to analyse— or to psychoanalyse— the astonish­ ing change in the attitude o f Lawrence. As it appears, he did not believe in the future o f A rab unity. Nor did he, in fact, highly value self-determination, ‘a foolish idea in many ways’, he had stated to the eastern committee.3 He was a zealous anta­ gonist o f the French acquisition o f Syria, but had evidently been advised by his own government that the British did not want, at any price, to assume responsibility for Syria, and that Faisal had no chance other than to compromise with the French. W hen one month earlier a claim had been made that Lawrence should resign his position as technical adviser to the British delegation, the head o f the N ear Eastern section had stated that he was needed to promote the foreign secretary’s new policy o f bringing Faisal to a friendly settlement with the French.4 Despite his promising attitude at the experts* meeting on 25 1 Steed, ii, 323.— A record o f this meeting by Miss Bell is reproduced in her biography: Elizabeth Burgoyne: Gertrude Bell from her personal papers, 1914-1926. (London 1961), p. 110. Two days later, at the meeting of 27 M arch of the Council o f Four, Lloyd George said that the emir seemed to be changing his mind (Man­ toux, ii, 49). On the 29th, however, he was to call on House and, announcing his intention to leave immediately for Syria, to refer hopefully to the plan of sending a commission to Syria (‘Notes of a Conversation between Colonel House and Emir Faisal, held at Hotel de Crillon, on 29 M arch, 6 p.m.-h Colonel Lawrence being interpreter*, reproduced in Garnett, p. 275. The interview was recorded by House in his Diary, entry 29 M arch 1919 (xv) ; h o u s e .) 2 Gouvain, for instance, had written as late as 20 M arch in Le Journal des Dibats a particularly vehement article against emir Faisal. 3 Minutes of the meeting of 5 Dec. 1918, p. 16; CAB. 27/24. 4 A handwritten comment by ‘L. M .’ (Louis M allet) on the memorandum ‘The French Claims in Syria’ by Sir A . H irtzel, 14 Feb. 1919; F.O . 608/107, no. 2256.

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M arch, Lawrence did not fulfil the Foreign Office’s expectations. U nwilling to induce Faisal to conclude an agreement with the French, which he him self disliked, Lawrence advised the emir to w ait until the projected commission o f inquiry had made its report on Syria, and to win time by trickery.1 In the light o f w hat later happened between Faisal and Clemenceau the colonel’s sudden departure from the conference, a ‘flight into Egypt’,2 is quite understandable. W hen trying to nip the inquiry plan in the bud on 27 M arch, Lloyd George had made reference to Mesopotamia. Besides Colonel Wilson, the highly esteemed and energetic Miss Bell, another leading figure o f the Mesopotamian administration, was active in the conference at that time. She had been working closely with Lawrence since her arrival in Paris on 7 M arch:3 ‘I am deep in propaganda!* she wrote home on 16 M arch, ‘though I don’t know that it does much good.*4. W hile trying to counterbalance the A rab Bureau’s influence on the British delegation,9 she did her best to show the Am eri­ cans that the sending o f a commission would be useless, at least as far as M esopotamia was concerned. Referring to an inquiry made recently by the British adminstration there, she wrote, probably 24 M arch,6 to M ajor Bonsai, a member o f the personal staff o f Colonel House: ‘No Commission, I feel convinced, w ill be in a better, or indeed as advantageous a position for finding out their real opinion as we were, for the Oriental does not speak freely to people whom he does not know. And the net result is that there is no real opinion.’7 Together with Lawrence, 1 Sec below, p. 143. 2 Lawrence left for Egypt in a R .A .F . plane in A pril; Garnett, p. 110. 3 Burgoyne, pp. 108-10; Sir Austen Chamberlain to Lady Chamberlain, 8 M arch 1919, private letter; c h a m b e r l a i n . 4 Gertrude Bell to Lady Florence Bell, 16 M arch, private letter reproduced in Letters of Gertrude Bell, ed. Lady F. Bell (London, 1927). 9 Sir Arnold Wilson had later to admit that ‘Miss Bell and I found it impossible to convince either the M ilitary or the Foreign Office Delegations • •. that our problems could not be disposed o f on the same lines as those advanced for Syria by the enthusiasts of the Arab Bureau’ (Wilson, op. cit., p. 116). 6 The letter being dated as ‘M onday’ and having obviously been written after the Council of Four of Thursday, 20 M arch, and before the meeting of the ‘experts’ on Tuesday, 25 M arch. 7 Stephen Bonsai: Suitors and Suppliants: the Little Nations at Versailles (Washing­ ton, 1944), p. 47.

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$he also drew up a note in which she pointed out to the Am eri­ cans that if the commission were to proceed to Mesopotamia, it should go there ‘before the middle o f June when the heat begins to be formidable’. 1 As the departure o f the commission was then delayed, the clim atic considerations were likely to offer an additional argument to those who wanted to shorten the itinerary originally planned. 4 In spite o f what the prime minister had said in the Council o f Four on 27 M arch,2 Faisal still seems to have insisted on his objections to the French and to have threatened to leave for Syria. Thus, for instance, coming two days later to ask Colonel House whether there was any chance o f the United States accepting the mandate for Syria, he once again declared that the decision to give the mandate to France would mean w ar.3 The position o f Faisal, aware o f the imminence o f the muchanticipated inquiry, now seemed stronger than, say, in February, when M ilner had proposed discussions with him to Clemenceau. O n the other hand, Lloyd George still appeared to wish to force Clemenceau’s hand oh the Syrian question, according to House’s view. ‘He is determined to have this settled before he lets the French get what they want*, the Colonel recorded after the meeting o f the Four on 4 A pril.4 W ere these then the reasons why for two weeks the French premier continued to slight Faisal, who was w aiting for an audience with him ? When visiting Paris, Paul Cambon wrote on 10 A pril that Georges-Picot was desperate about the state o f affairs. Tw o or three times Faisal had asked to see Clemenceau, but had not received an answer. Then he had again addressed him self to Lloyd George, who im mediately arranged an appoint­ ment between the two.3 Three days later Pichon and Picot had 1 Bell to Westermann, undated ('Monday*— evidently the same day as the date o f the letter to Bonsai, i.e. 25 M arch 1919) private letter; N .A. 181.91/25. 2 See above, p. 138, note 1. 9 House Diary, entry o f 29 M arch, 1919; h o u s e . * Idem, entry o f 4 April. 9 Cambon to de Fleuriau, 10 April 1919, private letter; Correspondance, iii, 320. T o Colonel House, Clemenceau said on 14 April that he had conferred with Lloyd George on the Syrian question 'yesterday or the day before* (House Diary, entry o f 14 April, 1919, (xv), h o u s e ) .

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a talk about the emir with Clemenceau, but Cambon reported to his counsellor in an exasperated mood: T am afraid they w ill dash against his [Clemenceau’s] hopeless indifference to reali­ ties.*1 Paul Cambon w asa convinced defenderof French interests in Syria, but at his post in London he was naturally alarmed by the repercussions o f the Arab question on Anglo-French rela­ tions. He understood that the key to the solution was now Faisal, and therefore ‘whether the Emir was o f good faith or not, it was good to come to terms with him’.2 Finally, on that same 13 April, Faisal was received at the Hôtel de M atignon. According to the notes o f Faisal himself, Clemenceau told him that he would like French troops to replace the British forces which would be withdrawn from Damascus and Aleppo. As the emir did not like the idea, Clemenceau warned him that for France the question was one o f national honour and that he was himself pressed by French public opinion; therefore he wanted to send there at least a represen­ tative contingent with a French flag.3 Clemenceau himself later confirmed this to House and added that they had also discussed the French subsidies to be paid to Faisal.4 The premier said that they had agreed that France should pay the sum which the British had formerly paid to the royal house (of Faisal), and which at one time had amounted to 2.5 million francs a year. There are no further sources available for finding out what really occurred during this interview o f 13 April. W e m ay presume that the problems pending between the French and Faisal were discussed in broader terms than those o f m ilitary occupation. A t the meeting in Avenue M arceau on 25 M arch some recommendations had been prepared with the assistance o f Lawrence.5 According to these: (1) France was to receive the mandate for Syria; 1 Cambon to de Fleuriau, 13 April 1919, private letter; Correspondance, iii, 332. 2 Idem, 10 April 1919, p. 320. 3 ‘Al-Huari: Yawn Maisalm, p. 101, quoted by Zeine, pp. 80-1. Sati ‘al-Husri was Faisal’s adviser and future minister o f education in the government o f Damas­ cus. As the date o f the meeting Zeine gives 16 April. From the subsequent FaisalClemenceau correspondence it appears that the conversation took place on Sunday, 13 April. 4 House Diary, entry o f 14 April, 1919 (xv), h o u s e . 9 ’Memorandum on Syria’, 26 M arch 1919. M iller Diary, vii, 169-70.

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(2) the Syrians were to elect their own prince in a national assembly; (3) the position o f France in regard to him was to be analo­ gous with that o f the British in regard to the khedive in Egypt; (4) Lebanon and possibly the Druze country were to enjoy autonomy under the suzerainty o f France and the mandatory authority o f France.1 The discussions o f 13 A pril were supposed to be formalized by an exchange o f letters between Clemenceau and the emir. For many weeks the result remained a mystery not only to the Foreign Office but to the Q uai d’Orsay itself. When Curzon inquired about it on 8 M ay the French ambassador was unaware o f what had happened. Even Georges-Picot seems to have left for the M iddle East in ignorance o f the outcome o f this vital meeting.12 Asking Paris if there was any truth in the rumours o f a correspondence between Faisal and Clemenceau, Cambon had first been answered ‘with polite incredulity’. Then on a visit to Paris he was informed o f what had happened : Clemen­ ceau had on 17 A pril sent a draft letter to Faisal, which letter he would write to the emir if the latter would give him a satis­ factory answer. W hen Faisal replied with a draft in which he frankly stated his conditions for the settlement, Robert de Caix— acting for the premier— rejected it and, consequently, no final letter from Clemenceau was ever delivered.3 In his draft Clemenceau first declared that France was ready 'to recognize the right o f Syria to independence in the form o f a federation o f local autonomies according to the traditions and wishes o f the populations*. He then promised the 'm aterial and moral* help which, he stated, the emir had accepted from France. He emphasized that future detailed arrangements must conform with the spirit o f these discussions.4 The draft o f Faisal’s answer is not available. Instead we have another letter 1 Notice that Lebanon was still considered to remain, not under the mandate but the suzerainty o f France. 2 Paul Cambon to Jules Cambon, 9 M ay 1918, private letter; Correspondance, iü. 33 *3 Curzon to Balfour, 26 M ay 1919, tel. no. 3475; B .D . 1, iv, p. 253. 4 Clemenceau to Faisal, 17 April 1919, enclosure 2 in the despatch: Balfour to Curzon; 30 April 1919, letter no. 628, p. 252.

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by the emir, sent 20 April, before his departure from Paris.1 This appears to have been unacceptable to Clemenceau. Never­ theless, Faisal asked for a continuation o f the discussion, suggesting that someone should be accredited to hold it with him, and gave a vague promise that he would do his best to assure the Syrians o f the kind feelings o f Clemenceau. This reflects the verbal assurance which Faisal had given to the premier. Am ong the French it was generally believed that the negotiations between the two men had definitely resulted in a treaty.2 No reliable sources indicate this as probable. Instead there is a weighty confidential report by General Clayton revealing that one month later the emir him self had confessed to him the existence o f an unwritten agreement: 'H e informed me that on the advice o f Lawrence he had agreed verbally with Clemenceau to use his efforts with the people to secure a French mandate for Syria on the understanding that France recognized Syrian independence.’ 3 House noted that Clemenceau on his part had said that he and Faisal had come to an agreement on 15 April, 'but after Faisal talked with Lawrence . . . he with­ drew from what he had said to Clem enceau’.4 Lawrence was later reported to have described Faisal as 'cautious, moderate, usually honest but capable o f treachery if it suited him*.5 The deceptive strategy o f Faisal obviously aimed at gaining time until the promised inquiry commission arrived to save Syria from the hands o f the French, as the emir im ag­ ined.6 The possibility o f an Am erican mandate o f course existed in theory, but at least Lawrence must have been aware how slight was its chance o f being accepted by congress or even by the president. Therefore, if Faisal’s confession to Clayton was sincere, and not an awkward attem pt to please the British, the 1 Faisal to Clemenceau, 20 April 1919, enclosure 3; idem, pp. 252-3. 3 See e.g. de Gontaut-Biron, p. 231, and Y ale's note on his conversation with Picot at Paris, 17 April 1919; y a l e , Syria viii-2. 3 Clayton to F .O ., 21 M ay 1919, tel. no. E.A . 2447; B .D ., idem, p. 265, note 3. 4 House Diary, entry o f 14 April 1919, h o u s e . 9 Lawrence's interview with a member o f the American peace commission, 3 Sept. 1919, enclosure in the despatch: Polk to the secretary o f state, 19 Sept. 1919, tel. unnumbered; N .A. 867. 00/1041 (R .G . 59) and p o l k , 78/68. 6 Before leaving, on the 20th, Faisal once again made an appeal to the Americans, with the result that President Wilson ordered his representatives in the interallied inquiry commission to be ready to leave (Howard, pp. 50-1).

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following remark shows that in A pril he had acted with desperate short-sightedness or had been unpardonably misled: ‘Faisal stated frankly that he never had any intention o f carrying out his arrangement and that Syria was bitterly opposed to French penetration in any form w hatever.'1 5 The meeting o f 13 A pril seems to have remained the only one between Faisal and Clemenceau. O n 23 A pril, Faisal left Paris accompanied by a French liaison officer, Colonel Toulat. A French warship came to fetch him from Tarento for the crossing o f the M editerranean.12 W hen landing in Beirut on 30 A pril, Faisal did not fail to cable his thanks to Clemenceau and to repeat his assurances o f friendship in somewhat more affection­ ate terms than in his letter o f 20 A p ril.3 There was a general impression o f a new turn in Franco-Arab relations. The spectac­ ular reception o f the emir arranged by the French authorities encouraged the pan-Arab element in Beirut itself; propaganda in favour o f the integration o f Lebanon with Syria was carried on openly. The M aronite-dominated party for the independence o f Lebanon was surprised and deceived by the change o f French diplom acy and launched an active campaign for the indepen­ dence o f Lebanon under the mandate o f France.4* In Damascus, the emir had immediately to face the pressure 1 Clayton to F .O ., 21 M ay 1919; B .D ., idem. 2 The minister of marine nevertheless cabled to the command in Toulon: ‘Pray forewarn the Commandant of the Julien de la Gravüre that the Emir Faisal is an adversary o f French influence in Syria and that it is better to maintain towards him and his suite the greatest discretion, while giving him the best possible recep­ tion9 (Leygues to commandant-en-chef, Toulon, 19 April 1919, tel. no. 9646; reprinted in g u i c h a r d , v , 853). During the landing the m ilitary honours were to be restricted to a minimum (Leygues to Varney, 29 April 1919, tel. no. 10177; idem). The acting French commissioner in Beirut, M . Feer, interfered with these orders, demanding in accordance with instructions from the Q uai d’Orsay that the French naval authorities should receive the emir in the roadstead and give him the honours ‘due to the son of an allied sovereign9. Consequently, during the landing in Beirut 30 April, the French warship carrying the emir and his escort saluted the sharifian flag, g u i c h a r d , v , 806. 3 g u i c h a r d , idem, p. 854. 4 Report by Col. Copin, chief administrator, O .E .T .A . west, 4 June 1919, to Clayton, appendix to no. 199, B .D ., idem, p. 293.

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o f new nationalist forces which had pervaded Syrian political life during his absence. There were rumours to the effect that he had concluded an agreement behind the backs o f the Syrians. Colonel (later Sir) Kinahan Cornwallis, the British liaison officer in Damascus, reported on 16 M ay that it was very doubtful whether the emir would be permitted to bring about better relations with France even if he wanted to .1 This is why his public speeches, especially one he made at the meeting o f Syrian notables in Damascus Tow n H all on 9 M ay included no references to the specific role o f the French in the region. O n the contrary, the emir still conceived o f the future independent Syria in a commonwealth o f independent Arab states. Accord­ ing to British reports, he let it be understood that there was no necessity for Syria to fall under a foreign mandate, and that the future o f Syria would be decided by the peace conference in accordance with the demands made to the commission o f inquiry: 'It now remains to you to choose to be either slaves or masters o f your destiny.’ 12 Being sure o f popular support he seems even to have contem­ plated a kind o f coup d’état, which he accomplished ten months later by allowing the selected Syrian representatives to declare the independence o f the country. W hen he confided this pro­ posal to Allenby on 12 M ay, the general strictly forbade such action.3 This measure seeming inopportune, Faisal had to have fresh recourse to the French in order not to arouse their suspic­ ions as to his manœuvres. As yet a strange optimism seemed to prevail at Paris; at the meeting o f the Council o f Four on 14 M ay, Clemenceau even praised Faisal, who he said had 'behaved very w ell’ since his arrival in Syria.4* Following Allenby’s wishes, Faisal proposed9 a meeting to Georges-Picot, who meanwhile had returned to Damascus. 1 Report by British liaison officer on political situation in Arabia, 16 M ay 1919; enclosure 1 in no. 182; B .D ., idem, p. 265. 3 Emir Faisal’s address to the notables of Syria in the Town H all o f Damascus, 9 M ay 1919; appendix A , enclosure 2 in no. 182; idem, pp. 267-8. 3 Clayton to Curzon, 23 April 1919, tel. no. C .O .P . 311; idem, p. 287. 4 Minutes o f the Council o f Four, 14 M ay 1919; U.S. Ret. Paris Peace Corf., v, p. 616. 9 According to de Gontaut-Biron the initiative was made ’avec insistance* by Faisal. Gontaut-Biron, p. 236.

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Unfortunately there is no source other than that o f de GontautBiron for this interesting conference. Apparently Faisal himself had not wanted it to be mere camouflage, but an attempt to provide a safety-valve in case o f a British and American refusal to assume the mandate or to support the full independence o f Syria. The French writer, who is known to have had the inform­ ation from Georges-Picot himself, notes that Faisal had asked for the abrogation o f the Sykes-Picot agreement and the with­ drawal o f the m ilitary administration, which was to be replaced by a Syrian administration both in the coastal zone and inland. M oreover, Faisal rejected a French mandate o f the protectorate type akin to those in M orocco and Tunisia; what was wanted was a light mandate or, in his words, a ‘collaboration* con­ fining itself to financial help and to advisers and technicians. As a third desideratum he wanted French support for the uni­ fication o f Palestine, Cilicia and Mosul with Syria, and, most significant, French support for the independence o f the Arabs o f Iraq .1 Faisal also demanded a formal declaration o f French good intentions but Picot tried to argue that the declaration o f November 8 had already expressed what the emir wanted; Faisal answered that it had been too broad and imprecise. Picot, however, was afraid o f making such a statement at that particular time, when the Christian elements were nervous because o f the French rapprochement with Faisal, and asked for a delay in order to have instructions from Paris. The two days* meeting did not result in an understanding, de Gontaut-Biron concludes. But it provided ‘an indisputable basis for the negotiations*. This basis appeared so real that Clemenceau seemed inclined to consent to the most crucial o f Faisal’s conditions. After the American members o f the Syrian commission had decided to start their inquiry, he certainly felt forced to bring the difficult emir back onto the right track. According to our authority, Picot announced to Faisal on 18June that the French government was ready to give the declaration he had asked for a month earlier, and to agree to the nomination o f Syrian officials in the coastal zone as well as inland.2 But by 1 Gontaut-Biron, pp. 236-7. 2 Idem, p. 237.

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now, the emir was no longer prepared to accept less than ‘what he had asked for and failed to g e t . . . a recognition o f complete and unfettered independence'.1 1 Memorandum by Colonel Cornwallis, undated (of June 1919), letter no. 52; B.D ., idem, 279.

L

CH APTER V III

Deterioration in Anglo-French Relations regarding the Syrian Settlement had become obvious in the course o f the conference that the cornerstone o f the eastern settlement, the Syrian ques­ tion, was connected with the problem o f the security o f France as regards Germ any, the extension o f her eastern bound­ aries included. Colonel House had indeed explained to Clemenceau that ‘Lloyd George did not want to settle the purely French questions which relate to the Treaty with Germ any until after the Syrian question had been settled'.1 Thus, the mysterious reluctance o f Clemenceau to receive Faisal can evidently not be explained without taking into consideration his simultaneous fight for the French claims on the Rhineland and the Saar. During the month o f A pril the chronologies o f the two ques­ tions correspond in a significant w ay. A n agreement on the Saar was reached on 1 1 A pril. The following day Lloyd George and Clemenceau in common understanding explained to Wilson that they preferred to come to terms on the question o f mandates before sending the suggested commission to the M iddle East.2 O n the 13th, finally, Clemenceau agreed to meet Faisal as a result o f the intervention o f Lloyd George; but the outcome o f this interview must have been disappointing for the mediator. During the I4th -i5th , when Lloyd George was away in London, Clemenceau reached a compromise with Wilson on the occupation o f the Rhineland. The prime minister accepted it a

I

t

1 House Diary, entry of 20 M arch ig ig (xv); h o u s e . 2 Conversation between Wilson, Clemenceau, Lloyd George and Orlando, ii April igig, at ii a.m. Mantoux, ii, 228.

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week later in the Council o f Four, allegedly very reluctantly.1 A t the same meeting o f 22 A pril Lloyd George again opened the Syrian dossier and called for an immediate departure o f the commission o f inquiry.2 W e do not have enough evidence to indicate a direct causality between the two series o f events. The remarks made in the diary notes o f Colonel House, a particularly well-informed observer, and the striking simultaneity o f the developments o f these two questions suggest at any rate some correlations. Besides the possible psychological effect o f the set-back in the Rhineland question, the main reason for the volte-face o f Lloyd George on 22 A pril seems naturally to be the unsatisfactory state o f the Syrian question itself. Was Lloyd George aware o f the mental reservation which Faisal, on die advice o f Lawrence, had made upon his verbal promise to Clem enceau? T h at we do not know. In any case, it is very probable that he was already informed that the French had tried to impose their conditions on Faisal and had failed.3 Even therefore the sending o f the commission seemed justified. The prime minister was presumably influenced also by a recent cable from Allenby, in which the commander-in-chief vehementiy called for die departure o f the commission.4 Further, his new approach to Wilson’s initiative m ay have been con­ nected with the recognition o f the British protectorate o f Egypt by the United States, which meant that Egypt would definitely be kept o ff the Peace Conference agenda.5 1 For the negotiations on the Rhineland and Saar questions, see for instance Seth P. Tillm an : Anglo-American Relations at the Paris Peace Conference (Oxford, 1961), pp. 184-93. 2 Minutes o f the meeting of the Council o f Four, 22 April 1919; U.S. For. Rel. Paris Peace Conf.f v, 112. 3 On 18 April, the day after Faisal had addressed his unsuccessful draft reply to Clemenceau (see above, p. 142), Lloyd George approached Wilson, who, after having learnt that the prime minister wanted to discuss Syria, advised him to speak with House. The prime minister again expressed his fear that the French and the Arabs would clash in Syria, and advised House to take up the matter with the French. House Diary, entry o f 18 April 1919 (xv); h o u s e . 4 Howard, p. 51. 5 Jean Goût had told the Americans, on 10 April, that Lloyd George was opposed to sending the commission because of the unrest in Egypt (Howard, p. 43). The American recognition of the British protectorate was suggested in a letter from Sir W illiam Wiseman, chief adviser on American affairs of the British peace delegation, to House, 18 April 1919 (a draft of it in w i s e m a n 90/45).

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T o prove that the decision had been taken in earnest, two men o f standing, Sir Henry M cM ahon and D . G . Hogarth, were nominated as British members o f the interallied commis­ sion.1 It is significant that both had been dealing with the correspondence with Husain in 1915-16, and probably felt in honour bound to keep to the promises given to the sharif— at least so far as the Arab administration o f Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo was concerned. Both the nominees were ready to leave im mediately for Syria; Hogarth even put up the proposal o f going without the French, if necessary, but this was — in his own words— ‘turned down on the ground o f the ill feeling it would cause9.12 M eanwhile from the Hôtel de M atignon, Clemenceau too had begun to play court to Wilson. O n 14 A pril he had told House that he was now w illing to send the commission suggested by the president, though he still advised against its going.3 A telephone call from the Q uai d’Orsay to the emir on the following day had seemed to confirm that the French were ready to agree to the commission’s departure.4 As we have seen, Clemenceau had met Faisal two days earlier. M oreover, the 14th and 15th were the crucial days when Clemenceau, in the absence o f Lloyd George, worked out a compromise with Wilson on the occupa­ tion o f the Rhineland. Endeavouring to attract the president’s goodwill, he was anxious to show his upright intentions in Syria.5* Lloyd George’s policy during the following weeks proves that 1 Arnold J. Toynbee was nominated as secretary of the British section; Howard, p. 47, note 3; p. 51, note 3; and p. 54. 2 Hogarth to Clayton, 19 M ay 1919, private letter; h o g a r t h . 3 House Diary, entry o f 14 M arch 1919 (xv); h o u s e . 4 Albert H. Lybyer to Grew, secretary o f the American peace delegation, 16 April 1919; off. letter; N .A ., 181.91/79/1/2. 9 The intelligence section o f the American delegation had, during the same week, good reasons to doubt Clemenceau’s sincerity. A French memorandum left behind by Robert de Caix, ‘possibly on purpose but more probably by accident’ (reproduced by M anuel, Realities o f American Palestine Relations, p. 240), seemed to show them that the French intended to approach the British— who were obviously embarrassed about the possible extension of the inquiry to Mesopotamia— and to secure the partition o f mandates regardless of the final result of the inquiry. On the evidence o f this the American commissioners plenipotentiary took on 18 April the decision not to send American representatives to Syria. President Wilson, however, decided otherwise (Howard, pp. 48-51).

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he had overcome the fear that the establishment o f the United States in any com er o f the M iddle East would threaten the British position in the area. He moreover perceived the advan­ tage o f a controversy between the United States, willing to have a mandate in Arm enia (if anywhere), and France which— since the Sykes-Picot agreement— took her rights to C ilicia for granted.1 ‘O ur difficulty is the Americans*, Paul Cam bon wrote on 15 A pril, ‘the English do not present any difficulty over Syria and Cilicia, but they advise us to seek an under­ standing with the Americans on the latter province.*12 The controversy became a difficult one when, in addition to Mersin and Adana, France was asked to abandon Alexandretta, which in fact was the only harbour in the Aleppo region.3 2

As a participant in the treaties o f 1915 and 1917 Italy had been likely to aspire to a role for herself when the Syrian question was discussed in Paris. Instead, she did not cause any real diffi­ culty for Anglo-French relations in the M iddle East. Since the beginning o f the conference, Lloyd George and Clemenceau had withstood Italy’s claims in Asia M inor with remarkable accord. The British held to the opinion that the basis o f the Italian demands— the agreement o f Saint-Jean de M aurienne — was not valid. The French shared this point o f view with a singular inconsistency, their opinion always being that the Sykes-Picot agreement was still valid.4 A t the end o f A pril, in view o f the deadlock on the Adriatic question, Lloyd George and Clemenceau adopted a more posi­ tive approach to the Italian desiderata in Turkey.5 In the 1 Peace Treaties, i, 288. 2 Cambon to his son, 15 April 1919, private letter; Correspondance, iii, 323. 3 H . Morgenthau (the former U .S. ambassador in Constantinople) wrote 28 April 1919, to House, commenting on the enclosed statement of Prof. Westermann as to the importance o f Alexandretta: if this harbour remained in outside hands, ‘economically it would mean that we had a Mississippi V alley without New Orleans; the m ilitary effect would be that it would create at Alexandretta a new G ibraltar’. M iller Diary, ix, 179. 4 See M anuel, article mentioned, p. 275 and, generally, pp. 277-9. 9 Description of this phase o f negotiations in René Albrecht-Carrié: Italy at the Peace Conference (New York, 1938), pp. 217-24.

15 3

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so-called Nicolson plan, presented in the Council o f Four on 14 M ay, a large zone around A dalia was proposed for Italy. The French seem to have accepted it with certain reservations; they obviously speculated as to whether the Italians thereafter would withdraw their claims to French Somaliland. O nly one day later the situation in Asia M inor radically changed and necessitated a new plan o f settlement in which the share o f the Italians had to be dropped altogether. Lloyd George then once again thought to placate the Italians by forcing the French to give something in compensation. T h at is w hy on 22 M ay, after his dispute with the French premier at the Council o f Four, he still menacingly hinted that the Syrian question should be taken into consideration together with the Italian colonial claims.1 Considering the alarm ing deterioration o f the situation in the M iddle East, Lloyd George proposed, 5 M ay, a temporary partition o f responsibilities, under which the United States would occupy Constantinople and Arm enia, the French a portion o f Syria and the British, Palestine and Mesopotamia. President Wilson rejected the proposal on the pretext that the United States was not at war with Turkey and was not in a position to send its armed forces there.2 Nine days later Lloyd George presented two resolutions to the Council o f Four, pro­ posing again a partition o f Asia M inor in which Am erica would assume the mandate over Arm enia. Now the response o f Wilson seemed positive but he immediately raised the question o f the boundaries o f the proposed mandate. W hile the m atter was being discussed by the specialists in the next room, the president said that he preferred France to exercise the 'super­ vision’ over the new Turkish state to be established in northern Anatolia.3 The question was then postponed for a few days. The land­ ing o f Greek troops in Smyrna the next day alarmed the India Office, and on 17 M ay Edwin M ontagu4 led to the Council 1 Lloyd George gave the French a scare by hinting that in order to satisfy the Italians, M ilner had proposed even the cession of Cyprus. Minutes of the Council of Four, 22 M ay 1919, at 11 a.m .; U.S.For. Rel. Paris Peace Conf., v, 812. 2 Minutes of the Council of Four, 5 M ay 1919; idem, p. 466. 3 Minutes of the Council o f Four, 14 M ay 1919; idem, p. 618. 4 The secretary of state for India.

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the Indian delegation, which gravely protested against the partition o f Asiatic Turkey among non-Muslim governments.1 By now the discussion o f the question o f mandates was develop­ ing unfavourably to French ambitions in the north. Following the suggestion on 14 M ay as to the defining o f the boundaries o f Arm enia, Clemenceau had proposed to Lloyd George a rearrangement in Syria.12 The prime minister had answered that ‘the best plan would be to draw a map o f occu­ pation, showing what territories would be occupied by the various powers concerned*. The French had always considered the m ilitary occupation to be m ainly a political m atter, and they assumed that the redistribution o f the occupation zones would mean a de facto allocation o f the future mandates. Clemenceau therefore agreed that a two-man committee, formed by Field-M arshal Sir H enry W ilson3 and André Tardieu, should start discussing the problem. The W ar Office, prompted by its demobilization tim e-table and the need o f more troops in Egypt and on the north­ western frontier o f India,45 *was certainly anxious to withdraw the British divisions immobilized in the Syrian region. The French government, on the other hand, welcomed the idea o f the British evacuation o f Syria because they feared the planned interallied inquiry as long as the inland towns o f Syria remained outside their m ilitary control. In order to induce the W ar Office to accept the withdrawal, the French appear to have gone even as far as to propose that Allenby should remain in command o f their troops.9 Nevertheless, the WilsonTardieu discussions led to nothing but an incident which seriously tried the personal relations between their respective heads o f government. After three days o f talks, Clemenceau 1 Stenographer’s notes o f the meeting o f the Council o f Four, 17 M ay 1919; idem, pp. 690-8. 2 Minutes o f the Council of Four, 14 M ay 1919; idem, p. 618. 3 ‘When I asked why I was put on to do Foreign Office work’, Sir Henry wrote in his diary for 15 M ay 1919, ‘Lloyd George told me that Tiger had refiised his first selection of M ilner, because M ilner shut eyes like a liza rd .. . . ’. C . E. Callw ell, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson : His Life and Letters (London, 1927), ii, 193. Clemen­ ceau was to attack M ilner in the Council o f Four, 21 M ay. See below, p. 157. 4 Because o f the third Afghan W ar. 5 As appears from a private letter by D. G . Hogarth to General Clayton, dated at Paris, 19 M ay 1919; h o o a r t h .

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claimed later in the Council o f Four/ W ilson brought the French minister a map o f Syria on which the demarcation line between the British and French zones was drawn apparently in the same w ay as Lord M ilner had proposed in M arch. The British wanted this line to be the northern boundary o f their occupation area. It is very probable that this is what was later described by the political section o f the British peace delegation as the first line behind which British troops were proposed to be withdrawn: line ran roughly from a point south o f Sidon, round the Nahr Hasbani basin to Jebel Jenin, thence east o f Rasheya to a point south-east o f Hermon, and thence . . . to a point about 40 miles south-east o f Damascus . . . and thence in a north-easterly direction . . . across the desert as to include Tadm ore (Palmyra) in the British zone.*12 According to Lloyd George, Tardieu 'replied he knew about the subject*, but declared that, as the matter concerned the limits o f Syria proper, he had no instructions for discussing it; he therefore referred it to the Council o f Four.3 W hen the map was subsequendy shown to Clemenceau at the meeting o f 21 M ay he flew into a rage and, in the presence o f President Wilson, accused the British premier o f having broken faith. Lloyd George, insulted, answered in the same vein. There was a 'first-class dog-fight’, to use the expression o f Sir Henry, during which the premiers nearly came to blows.4 The embittered prime minister announced that the discus­ sion on Syria would be cut short, that the British occupation would be maintained more firmly, and that the Long-Bérenger oil agreement, already concluded in London, would be called off. Here for the first time during the diplom atic negotiations on the Syrian question there emerged a mysterious parallel affair, the Anglo-French arrangement over M iddle Eastern petroleum. Strangely enough, the prime minister claimed to have had no 1 Minutes o f the Council o f Four, 21 M ay 1919, idem, p. 761. 2 The comments of the political section o f the British peace delegation on the second part o f M r Berthelot's note of the 12th December (1919) ; B.D ., 1, iv, 578-9. 3 Minutes o f the Council o f Four, 21 M ay 1919; idem, p. 763. 4 Callwell, ii, 194. Georges Suarez tells o f what was claimed to be Clemenceau’s personal confession that he had already given Lloyd George the choice between the pistol and the sword. Suarez: Clemenceau (Paris, 1930), p. 287, note.

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idea o f what was going on over the oil.1 There had been, since January, a lively controversy on this question inside the British cabinet itself.2 The petroleum executive, urged on by the Adm iralty, had hurried to make independent proposals to the French general commissioner for fuel, Bérenger, for an under­ standing on the partition o f Mosul oil. Curzon in the Foreign Office tried to break o ff the discussions. He was justifiably apprehensive lest the oil negotiations with the French should irritate the Americans and endanger their acceptance o f the British mandate over Mesopotamia. Indeed, as early as M ay, the Americans began to inquire officially about what was happening between the British and French petroleum executives.3 Balfour, nonetheless, had silently given his approval to the talks carried on by Sir W alter Long, minister in charge o f petroleum affairs, with the French commissioner. Curzon had finally been informed that the understanding with the French was an im portant part o f the simultaneous negotiations by which the British government were trying to secure control o f the R oyal Dutch Shell combine.4 Subsequently, on 8 M ay, the war cabinet had decided to approve the main lines o f the LongBérenger agreement initiated in Paris one month earlier. For the French this proposal o f partition was a very advan­ tageous one. Suggesting a reciprocity in sharing the oil interests in Roum ania, Asia M inor, the French colonies and protec­ torates and in the British crown colonies, as well as— if the circumstances allowed— in G alicia and Russia, the agreement proposed for France 25 per cent participation in the petroleum o f M esopotamia.5 W hen writing to Pichon on 20 June, Paul 1 Sir G . Clark, private secretary to Lord Curzon, to Philip K err, 17 April 1919, unnumbered off. letter; B.D., idem, p. 1092. 2 F.O . statement, TTie Long-Bérenger Oil Agreement (undated, obviously 1 June 1919), enclosure in no. 684, B.D., idem, pp. 1093-5. The following description o f the events leading to the agreement concerned is based mainly on this document. Moreover, see F.O . 608/97, no. 4385. 3 See the despatch: Balfour to Curzon, 26 April 1919, tel. no. 1097, with note 1 and the enclosure therein; B.D.y idem, pp. 1095-6. 4 The Royal Dutch Shell had meanwhile initiated a co-operation agreement with the French government, 25 M arch.— Bérenger, op. cit., p. 289, and P. Lespagnol de la Tram erye: La lutte mondiale pour le pétrole (Paris, 1921), p. 185. 5 The text o f the agreement reprinted in B.D., idem, pp. 1089-92. The French share was formally 20 per cent, the British share being 70 per cent and the native

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Gambon pointed out that the arrangement had been heavily criticized in London and that many o f the British wanted to modify it in order to reduce the French share. ‘It follows that, to delay French acceptance o f the petroleum agreement, and to link acceptance with the negotiations on Asia M inor, would be to offer English opponents o f the agreement an opportunity o f getting it revised in a manner unfavourable to French interests.*1

3 W hen receiving Paul Gambon after the stormy meeting o f 20 M ay, Clemenceau admitted that he himself had gone too far.2 He was nervous and tired o f the oriental question, in which Lloyd George’s policies underwent the most unpredictable changes. O n two occasions, 4 and 11 M ay, Clemenceau had expressed his exasperation to W ickham Steed. He had asked him to use his influence in Britain to make his countrymen understand the untenable position o f the Clemenceau cabinet under the pressure o f the partisans o f an expansionist foreign policy.3 I f the final settlement in Turkey was decided against French interests, he warned the Council o f Four on 21 M ay, he ‘would not do what our Italian colleagues have done . . . (he) would not leave the conference, but would leave the Govern­ ment*.4, A n attempt to pave the w ay for an arrangement o f the Syrian question had thus failed. It w ill be seen that both Britain and France had to pay for the delay o f the next four months during which they were incapable o f fighting in har­ mony the dangers which menaced their position in the M iddle East. A t the clim ax o f the controversy, at the meetings o f the Council o f Four on 21 and 22 M ay, these dangers were ignored. This was the case especially during the discussions o f the 21st, 1 Tardieu, p. 381. 3 Cambon to his son, 24 M ay 1919, private letter; Correspondance, iii, p. 333. 3 Steed, ii, 323-5. 4 Mantoux, ii, 139. government share 10 per cent; it was, however, agreed that ‘if the Native Govern­ ment do not desire to participate to the extent o f 10 per cent, the balance w ill be divided equally between the British and French holdings' (idem, p. 1090).

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when the national aspirations o f the populations o f the region concerned were never taken into consideration. Although the background o f the subjects discussed has been described above, it seems essential to analyse the course o f these important debates, all the more as they have been recorded separately by Sir M aurice Hankey and Professor M antoux.1 A t the former meeting, held at President Wilson’s residence on Wednesday morning, Lloyd George had submitted a new paper called ‘Scheme for Settlement in the Turkish Empire’.12 The unexpected proposal irritated Clemenceau. O n M on­ day, he complained to Cambon, the British premier had offered France the mandate over Anatolia and Syria, and two days later this was in question again.3 A t first Clemenceau was able to curb his anger. But after President Wilson had announced that his representatives in the inquiry commission would leave for Syria the following week, and Lloyd George had said that he would give his delegates the same orders, Clemenceau exploded. The French would drop the plan, he bluntly declared. The promises made to him had not been kept, the British troops had not been withdrawn from Syria, false maps as to the boundaries o f Syria had been presented to him, the sug­ gestion for a French mandate in Anatolia had been thrust aside, he confusedly burst out, attacking M ilner and Curzon4 and repeating his accusation against Lloyd George o f breaking faith. 1 Minutes of the Council of Four, 21 M ay 1919, U.S. For. Rel. Paris Peace Con/.f v, 760-6. Mantoux, pp. 137-43. Those present were only Lloyd George, Clemen­ ceau and Wilson, Orlando having left the Conference, 26 April. 2 Reproduced in U.S. For. Rel. Paris Peace Con/ 1, idem, p. 770. This plan proposed inter alia that the U .S. would take a ‘full mandate’ over Constantinople and the Straits and a ‘light mandate’ over Anatolia (which, if the Americans would not accept this responsibility, would remain subject to the sovereignty o f the sultan o f Turkey), that the U .S. would take a ‘full mandate’ over Armenia and Cilicia, that France would have *a provisional mandate over Syria pending the report of the Commission which is proceeding to the Near East\ that Great Britain would have *a provisional mandate over Palestine and Mesopotamia on the same conditions, and that the H oly Places o f Islam and the Caliphate would remain under Mohammedan guardianship and decision*. M y italics. 3 Paul Cambon to his son, 24 M ay 1919, private letter, Correspondance, iii, 333. 4 ‘Curzon to whom Clemenceau attributed quite wrongly the attitude which Lloyd George had on Syria.* Paul Cambon to his son, 2 June 1919, private letter, Correspondance, iii, 337.

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Prima facte Clemenceau had been offended by the failure to mention the French mandate in Anatolia (which he saw had not been promised but only proposed to him in the course o f his conversations with Wilson and Lloyd G eorge).1 He warned the prime minister against what he called ‘the ideas o f Curzon’ : (a) to let the Turks govern themselves, and (b) to let the Am eri­ cans interfere in the entente by giving them a mandate in Asia M inor. He agreed that Moslem opinion should be taken into consideration. Still worse was it to allow the Americans to ‘introduce ideas o f men who did not understand the repercus­ sions in the European world’. However resentful o f the loss o f prestige, Clemenceau let his companions know that he was ready to compromise in such a w ay that Mesopotamia and Palestine should go to Great Britain and Asia M inor to Am erica.2 Thus his attention was concentrated m ainly on Syria. Lloyd George solemnly said that France had no right to com­ plain o f the loyalty o f Great Britain, ‘which has given substan­ tial guarantees for France’s security*. In his present scheme he had himself proposed the mandate over Syria for France. He went on to say that in spite o f the decision to send the inquiry commission to Syria, the French government had not let its delegates join the other commission members. The withdrawal o f the British troops from Syria was not possible without delim iting the spheres o f occupation, hence the map presented to Tardieu. The railw ay line through Hauran was bound up with the oil agreement negotiated by Long and Bérenger and had not been a bargain but merely a proposal. As regards Asia M inor, Lloyd George continued, he had not heard about the French claim until the previous day; nor did he see any signs that French public opinion was urging it. Great Britain having now more Moslem subjects than any other Power, did not like the idea o f France establishing herself in the Turkish homelands in Anatolia, because o f the possible Moslem discontent; she therefore proposed the mandate for the United States.3 President Wilson, wanting to pour oil on troubled 1 Minutes o f the Council of Four, 21 M ay 1919; U.S. For. Ret. Paris Peace Corf., v, 761. 2 Idem, p. 672, Mantoux, ii, 139. 2 Minutes o f the Council o f Four, idem, pp. 763-4, M antoux, ii, 142.

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waters, suggested that the complicated question o f Anatolia should be postponed. He said that it would be ‘very difficult . . . he feared . . . impossible for the United States to take a mandate for Asia Minor*. He was convinced that at present it was better to keep Anatolia undivided and to leave die sultan at Constantinople.1 In his opinion France was best qualified to take the position o f adviser in the Turkey o f the future. Passing on to Syria, Wilson said that he had ‘misunderstood* Clemenceau’s proposal that the Am erican delegates o f the Syrian commission should leave before their colleagues. They were men o f such position12 that if they did not proceed to Syria it was in their interest to go back to the United States.3 Clemenceau answered that he would send his delegates as soon as the British troops in Syria had been replaced by the French. Lloyd George, offended at the tone o f Clemenceau’s malicious allusion to the British m ilitary administration,4 cut the discus­ sion short. The meeting was then adjourned in an atmosphere o f mounting tension and caustic remarks.5 As the first outcome o f the dispute, Lloyd George, after having informed him self on the Long-Bérenger oil agreement, wrote to Clemenceau proposing its cancellation.6 The French premier returned to this topic on the following day, claim ing that he had ‘this very morning’ heard about the proposal to build a pipeline to Tripoli, that it was a private interest, and 1 Minutes of the Council of Four, 21 M ay 1919, idem, p. 765; M antoux, idem. 2 M r Charles R . Crane and Dr Henry C . King. 3 Minutes o f the Council o f Four, 21 M ay 1919; idem, p. 766. A week earlier, the president had overcome the last difficulty in his own camp by reassuring M r Frankfurter that his adherence to the Balfour declaration was still valid (Howard, pp .

72-3).

4 T think it is needless to send a commission to Syria to make an inquiry under the dictatorship o f General Allenby.’ 5 M antoux, ii, 143. 6 Lloyd George to Clemenceau, 2 M ay 1919; B.D ., idem, p. 1092, note 2. In the letter he also spoke about a proposal to construct a pipeline from Mosul to Tripoli, which, according to both minutes, was not mentioned during the discus­ sion o f the day. The Long-Bérenger agreement o f 8 April had provided for the construction o f two separate pipelines from Mesopotamia and Persia to the Mediterranean, but according to the text ‘the port or ports shall be chosen in agreement between the two Governments’ (agreement reprinted in B.D .; idem, p. 1091).

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that he was not interested in the m atter as it was a completely different question from that o f the railw ay plan.1 Lloyd George denied he had known anything o f the pipeline. Instead, he again took up the railw ay question, explaining that once Mosul had been conceded to the British the upper line shown on the map was the only possible line. Unless the modi­ fications he had presented on his map were agreed to, he must repeat what he had said the previous day, namely that he would not withdraw the British troops until the commission had given their report.2 Clemenceau, again losing his temper, made a remarkable statement to President Wilson. As Lloyd George had asked if the 1916 agreement was still valid, Clemenceau declared upon his honour that in London (in December) his colleague had repeatedly proclaimed ‘that this was the treaty to which he intended to remain faithful and that the word o f the British Government had been given*.3 He categorically refused to accept any new alteration o f the Sykes-Picot map and on his part threatened that if Lloyd George sent the commissioners and did not withdraw the troops, ‘he would no longer associate with the British in this part o f the world because the harm done to his country was too great*. Lloyd George now obviously realized that the discussion was again approaching an unhappy end ; he came h alf w ay to meet his rival and announced that he would not send his commissioners. The Americans would have to go it alone.4 1 Minutes of the Council of Four, 22 M ay 1919, in Rue Nitot at 11 p.m. U.S. For. Rel. Paris Peace Conf. idem, p. 807; Mantoux, ii, 159. 2 Minutes of the Council o f Four, 22 M ay 1919; U.S. For. Rel. Paris Peace Conf., idem, p. 809. According to the minutes of Hankey, Lloyd George said that if Tadm or was not included in the British zone the railway would be ‘entirely at the mercy of the French oil interests’ (ii, 162) : M antoux’s version was: ‘Mosul would be at the mercy of the Power whose authority extended over the nearest oases.’ 3 Minutes of the Council of Four, 22 M ay 1919; idem, p. 810. Mantoux, idem. 4 Minutes of the Council of Four, 22 M ay 1919; idem, pp. 810-11. On 22 M ay, Wilson had a letter from Faisal stating that everybody was anxiously awaiting the arrival of the commission. The letter had been originally sent on 4 M ay through Clayton who had transmitted it by a telegram on 6 M ay (enclosure in an off. letter: Grew to Close, 22 M ay 1919; w i l s o n , viii-A ). There is reason to believe that after receiving the telegram the Foreign Office delayed forwarding the message, because at this particular moment they were reluctant to hasten the departure o f the commission. The following developments may throw light on their probable motives. On 5 M ay the F.O . received another despatch from Clayton reporting

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4 Sir Henry Wilson, whom Lloyd George had informed after the meeting o f 20 M ay o f the controversy with Clemenceau, had tried during the same afternoon and the next day to contact Tardieu again, but without success. Clemenceau was still in a bad temper, and Tardieu was reluctant to discuss the proposed boundaries. The next day Sir Henry wrote: T then said that as no agreement had been reached, Allenby remained in supreme command, and I asked T iger not to send out any more troops unless Allenby asked for them. The T iger did not answer. So I wrote him a letter to this effect, and sent Allenby two wires giving him full powers.’1 O n the other hand, having doubts as to the Am erican inter­ vention and probably wanting to force the French into a compromise on the railw ay question, Sir Henry launched a campaign for sending out to Syria a mixed commission instead o f the Am erican one. M ilner and Balfour agreed to it, he wrote, but Lloyd George, though uncertain, adhered to his former decision.2 M eanwhile he had a new argument in a letter from Allenby reporting again that the replacement o f the British troops by the French would cause serious trouble in Syria.3 The latter then repeated his warning more em phatically in his despatch o f 30 M ay to Balfour,4 stating that there was a danger o f an all-out rising which might spread even to Egypt and the Sudan. 1 Entry in his diary, 22 M ay 1919; Callwell, ii, 194. 2 Idem. ‘I pressed this upon Lloyd George, but he rather favoured the Americans going alone. I think this is frankly stupid, but I met him at dinner and he had changed his mind and was now going to press for the commission.9 3 Private letter o f 17 M ay from Allenby to Sir Henry Wilson mentioned by Lloyd George in the Council o f Four, 31 M ay 1919; at 5.30 p.m. B.D ., 1, iv, 258. 4 Allenby to Balfour, 30 M ay 1919, tel. no. N .A . 2484; idem, pp. 256-7. that anti-Zionist feeling in Palestine was deepening, and warning that the popula­ tion would choose the United States or France unless the British government gave ‘an authoritative announcement that the Zionist programme w ill not be enforced in opposition to the wishes of the majority9 (Clayton to Curzon, received 5 M ay 1919, tel. no. C . 155; B .D ., 1, iv, 272, note 1). The F.O . preferred to see first the attitude o f Wilson (to whom Frankfurter had appealed on 8 M ay, with Balfour’s apparent knowledge— see B.D ., idem, no. 182). O nly after this was Clayton answered that there was no question o f making such an announcement (Balfour to Curzon, 19 M ay 1919, tel. no. 760; idem, p. 281, note 4).

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This despatch was read by Lloyd George at the meeting o f the Council o f Four on 31 M ay. Now a last attempt was made to convince Clemenceau o f the necessity o f sending his delegates with the commission.1 But he once more refused and asked that Allenby should also be informed that the French were not w illing to send their commissioners until the relief o f the British troops by French forces had been arranged. M eanwhile Clemenceau promised that he would not send more French forces to the coast o f Syria unless requested to do so. Conse­ quently Lloyd George said that he would not send his dele­ gates. Orlando, now back at the conference, also agreed not to send his delegates. The Am erican representatives on the commission had already left Syria five days earlier.2 Clemenceau had obviously not taken seriously the warning given by General Allenby. The name o f the British commanderin-chief had already been blackened by French reports sent from Syria. From previous remarks made by Clemenceau about the general, it is clear that he had lost confidence in him. O n the other hand the O ld M an was still under the illusion that he could expect something from Faisal himself. Tardieu, when speaking with the British ambassador on 2 June, confided to him that Clemenceau ‘seemed inclined to begin negotiations with Faisal and apparently thinks that he could come to some arrangement with him*. Tardieu hinted that the consequence o f such a secret dialogue, though satisfactory to the French and to Faisal, would be very much the reverse to the British, and would ‘bring England and France into even more direct con­ flict than they are at the present moment’.3 Clemenceau also refused any further discussion on the rail­ w ay question— about which Derby had inquired, probably on the previous day.4 Tardieu sought to lessen the effect o f this fruitless obstinacy by proposing postponement o f the matter until the allies had forced Germ any to sign her treaty. This was easier said than done. Thus the question was postponed from day to day, then from one week to another. M atters lingered as 1 Notes o f a meeting held in M . Pichon’s room at Quai d’Orsay, 31 M ay 1919; idem, p. 258. 2 Howard, p. 132. 3 Record of Derby of a conversation with Tardieu, 2 June 1919; idem, p. 1275. 4 As appears from the context of the record quoted.

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Gambon had foreseen since the beginning o f June: *En Orient nous sommes dans une impasse*1 Though distressed by the prime ministers* duel in the Coun­ cil o f Four, the Foreign O ffice had deliberately avoided exaggerating the importance o f the British-French controversy over Syria. ‘The incident, which rested upon some misunder­ standing or mis-report o f what had actually happened’, Lord Curzon commented, 21 M ay, on the outburst o f Clemenceau, ‘is only o f value as indicating the passionate intensity with which France . . . means to adhere to her Syrian pretentions.’2 Curzon was notoriously unaware o f what was really happening between Lloyd George and Clem enceau.3 In opposition to him and to Balfour the W ar Office as represented by Sir Henry Wilson kept actively insisting on what m ay be called the H erm on-Tadm or line. Hesitating between them was the prime minister, who obviously had not made up his mind as to the best policy to be pursued over Syria. M eanwhile the British m ilitary authorities in Syria felt con­ siderable uneasiness in dealing with the complicated situation in which England was ‘giving the impression that she has sold the Arabs to suit the exigencies o f politics in Europe*.4 A llenby had warned Faisal that he was determined to oppose by force any unilateral attempt to change the status quo. 'A ny hasty action that would bring you into conflict with m y troops would put an end to all your national aspirations at once*, he cabled to the emir on 30 M ay.9 A t first it was difficult for Allenby and his officers to reassure Faisal, as the instructions from Balfour in Paris did not seem to provide any grounds for doing so. The foreign secretary had emphasized to Allenby that the inquiry commission had no power to decide the future o f the 1 Paul Cambon to his son, 2 June 1919, private letter; Correspondance, iii, 357. 2 Curzon to Derby, 30 M ay 1919, tel. no. 842; idem, p. 254. 3 See inter alia the letters of Cambon, Correspondance, iii, pp. 329 and 337. 4 Quotation from report o f the British political officer at Aleppo (June 1919); appendix B to no. 199, B.D ., idem, p. 291. 5 Referred to in the C.-in-C. despatch: Allenby to Balfour, 31 M ay 1919, no. E.A. 2487; idem. p. 260. The same warning had been given to Faisal the previous day by Cornwallis and Joyce, who informed the emir that should the feared up­ rising spread to Palestine it would ‘finally and irreparably destroy all friendship between us9 (Report by the British Political Officer at Damascus (June 1919)9 appendix A to no. 199; idem, p. 290). M

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territories concerned, but could only advise the council o f the principal allied powers, which was to make the final decision.1 Moreover, Balfour had declared that the British government was determined not to accept any mandate in Syria.12 Embar­ rassed by the instructions o f die Foreign Office, General Clayton requested that he might announce to the Syrians that the peace conference would attach prim ary importance to the advice which the Am erican commission would give as a result o f their inquiry in the area.3 T o that Balfour could not consent, arguing that the French might disagree with it. Faisal, how­ ever, was satisfied with the promise transmitted by Balfour in his instructions (29 M ay) that although the British government was unwilling to accept a mandate for Syria, it would ‘give the fullest weight to the advice which the Council o f the Principal Allied and Associated Powers w ill receive from the Am erican Commissioners’.45The formula recommended appears to have still been misunderstood. The emir, in thanking Clayton for his advice, replied that it was ‘cheerfully understood by us all*, and promised that ‘the Syrians w ill be unanimous in expressing to the Commission their wish to have Britain and no other.. . .’s Consequently, the foreign secretary had once again to correct the obstinate misunderstanding o f Faisal, to whom the sub­ ordinate political officers had not dared to make clear what Balfour now repeated, namely that *whateoer else happens, Great Britain must refuse to take any leading part in guidance or control o f Syrian affairs\6 Notwithstanding the fact that it had been pushed aside for the time being the Foreign Office was to set the trend for 1 Balfour to Allenby, 31 M ay 1919» tel. no. 49; idem, p. 259. 2 Balfour to Clayton, 29 M ay 1919, tel. no. 16; idem, p. 298 and note 3. 3 Clayton to F .O ., 7 June 1919, tel. no. E.A. 2504; idem, p. 273, note 3. 4 Balfour to Allenby, 31 M ay 1919; tel. no. 48; idem, p. 259. When Faisal two weeks later again inquired about the attitude of the British government, Allenby transmitted to him as an answer the terms given to Balfour. (Allenby to Curzon, 12 June 1919, tel. no. R .A . 2529; idem, pp. 275-8.) 5 Clayton to Curzon, 15 June 1919, tel. no. E.A. 2536, idem, p. 277. 6 Balfour to Allenby, 26 June 1919, tel. no. 59; idem, p. 298 (my italics). The contents o f this telegram were described by Lloyd George at the meeting of the Supreme Council, 25 June, in the presence o f President Wilson and Clemenceau. Notes of meeting held at President Wilson’s house, 25 June 1919, at 4 p.m .; idem, p. 298.

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British Syrian policy during the following months. The Foreign Office line was represented in the memorandum o f Balfour to the prime minister, dated the same day as his final instructions to Allenby, 26 June.1 It returned to the proposal that France should be the mandatory for Syria including Alexandretta, the British for Mesopotamia, the Americans or British for Palestine, the frontiers between these countries being better determined according to economic rather than strategic considerations.12 Tw o significant remarks are to be made on this memorandum. First, as a fundamental principle it proposed that ‘all Arab­ speaking parts o f the Ottom an Empire should be permanently severed from it, and should be put under M andatories’. In Balfour’s opinion there was no question o f any degree o f restora­ tion o f the Ottom an empire, which, in certain discussions, had still been advanced as a possible compromise. Nor was any place left for the totally independent state which the young Arabs wanted Syria to be. There was also no allusion to the Am erican commission which was now touring Syria, or to its influence on future decision-making. The only reference to the Americans was a minute by Curzon, at the end o f the memoran­ dum : 'M uch turns on whether the Am erican Congress w ill allow President Wilson to accept a mandate for anything.’ But this referred m ainly to Asia M inor, and the writer added: 'I rather doubt it.*3

5 Introducing, on 20 M arch, his proposal o f the interallied commission o f inquiry, Wilson had suggested that all the four powers select an equal number o f delegates; they should be 'm en with no previous contact with Syria’, he stressed, ' . . . it would, at any rate, convince the world that the Conference had tried to do all it could to find the most scientific basis possible 1 Reprinted in enclosure to no. 211 ; idem, pp. 301-3. 2 Further: the Americans for Armenia and the Straits (Constantinople), Italy perhaps for the Caucasus; the new Turkish state in Anatolia should not be under a mandate and should be treated rather like a European state (in order to draw its attention from its old Asiatic possessions). 3 The minute was dated 5 July. Idem, p. 303, note I.

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for a settlement*.1 In putting into practice this principle charac­ teristic o f his thinking, President Wilson chose two men who were far from being able to find the most scientific basis possible for the settlement.2 D r Henry G. K ing, president o f Oberlin College and director o f religious work for the Y .M .C .A ., proved to be inclined to pay excessive attention to the opinions o f D r Bliss3 and interests the latter represented. Biased statements such as ‘the Am erican training and the Anglo-Saxon literature and civilization, are regarded as m orally superior to the French*,4 reveal the voice o f the Am erican Protestant College o f Beirut. The second member was Charles R . Crane, a m illionaire from Chicago, confessed friend o f Islam ,5 and a partisan o f the self-determination o f peoples, expressing openly his resentment towards old-style British diplom acy.6 The two men*s approach to the problems fundamental in the area appears to have been incredibly over-simplified. A good part o f their first report from Syria o f io July consisted o f rather amusing observations such as: 'Em ir Faisal despite limitation o f education has become unique outstanding figure capable o f rendering greatest service for world peace. He is heart o f Moslem world, with enormous prestige and popularity, confirmed be­ liever in Anglo-Saxon race; real great lover o f Christians. Could do more than any other to reconcile the Christians and Islam and longs to do so. Even talks seriously o f Am erican college for women at M ecca.*7 1 Minutes o f the meeting o f the Council of Four, 20 M arch 1919, idem, v, 12. 2 O n the appointment of the American commissioners and on their personalities, see Howard, pp. 36-41, and 55. 3 Capt. Y ale’s observation in the despatch: Y ale to Westermann, 8 July 1919; YALE, Syria vi-43; ’The French view American efforts here as being directed against themselves. Bliss activities lend weight to their view . . . Moreover, see M anuel, Realities of American Palestine Relations, p. 239. 4 Confidential appendix to the Report upon Syria; U.S. For. Rel. Paris Peace Conf., xii, 855. 9 See Sylvia G . Haim : * “ The Arab Awakening” , a source for the Historian?*; Die Welt des Islams, ii (1953), no. 4, p. 246 and note 2 therein. 6 T feel that a great deal of the disorder and unhappiness of the Balkans has been due to your blundering diplomacy*, he wrote 10 March 1919 to A . G. Gardiner, editor o f the London Daily News. Copy o f this private letter in b r y c e , U .S.A . 12, P- 2547 Crane and K ing to the commission to negotiate peace, 10 July 1919, U.S. For. Rel. Paris Peace Conf., xii, 750.

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The commissioners claimed that, immediately before their arrival at Damascus, the emir tried to convince certain councils to pronounce for a British mandate, and that he had failed.1 This is im probable; more than a fortnight before the arrival o f the commission at Damascus the emir had asked about the attitude o f Britain, arguing: 'I t is only fair to Syria that it should know what is possible and what is im possible. . . I f they knew England was not going to accept a mandate and League would not allow complete independence Syria would ask for Am erica in preference to France.*12 This was exactly what happened. Evidently misled in its knowledge o f 'w hat is possible and what is impossible*, the Syrian Congress decided in favour o f the United States. The attitude o f the Congress decided the trend o f the popular petitions received by the commission3, which in their turn gave K ing and Crane a some­ what exaggerated impression o f the popularity o f Am erica in Syria.4 For the French, the results were not so negative as one might presume on firstimpression.5*9Worse were the complaints directed against the French administration and its methods, especially 1 Confidential appendix to the King-Crane Report, idem, p. 850. * Quoted in the despatch: Allenby to Curzon, 12 June 1919, tel. no. E.A . 2529; B.D., i, iv, 275-6. 3 The commissioners noticed that only three o f the petitions submitted prior to the declaration o f the Syrian Congress contained the main lines o f the Damascus programme; after 2 July, 1047 out o f 1473 petitions included this programme. King-Crane Report, idem, p. 765. 4 The public in the O .E .T .A . east voted in 996 petitions out o f 1157, in other words 86.1 per cent for America as their first choice (and in 962 petitions, that is 82.2 per cent, for British mandate or assistance as their second choice). In the west zone the petitions for America as first choice represented 28 per cent, in the south zone only 3 per cent. The average for the whole of Syria was 60.5 per cent in favour o f an American mandate, which the commissioners consequently recommended. King-Crane Report, idem, p. 761. 9 The doubtful arithmetic o f the inquiry is demonstrated by the fact that the west zone, whose population numbered roughly two-thirds that o f the east zone, was represented by less than half the amount o f petitions o f the east zone. The O .E .T .A . south, having some two-fifths of the latter’s population, provided less than a quarter o f the number o f petitions of the east zone. In the west, France was the first choice with 48.1 per cent, British mandate or assistance being asked as second choice with 15.7 per cent. In the south, where the inquiry was made before the meeting of that Congress, Britain was proposed as the first choice by 18.4 per cent, France by 6.5 per cent, Am erica by 3 per cent o f the petitions, the remainder voting for independence. King-Crane Report, idem, pp. 760-1.

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in the east zone (where, o f course, there had never been any real experience o f French administration). The criticism was obviously inspired by the rejection by the Syrian Congress o f French claims and co-operation.1 The French naturally re­ garded the resolution as a breach o f the promise given by Faisal in the preceding April. The commissioners fairly observed that Am erica, by showing interest in the M iddle East, seemed to the French to be ‘an accomplice o f England in despoiling France’.12 In the commission's itinerary there was a spectacular omis­ sion: it never went to Mesopotamia. For Captain Y ale, who as an expert member played an antagonistic role in the activi­ ties o f the commission, it was the influence o f British advisers like Gertrude Bell which decided the Americans against ex­ tending their inquiry to Mesopotamia. Henry W hite had assured Sir Arnold Wilson that, although he believed Meso­ potamia was ready for self-determination, it was only 'a m atter o f form '. Finally, the decision not to proceed to Baghdad, Y ale later wrote, was the result o f‘Charles R . Crane’s ukase based on the assumption that the Arabs o f Mesopotamia wanted the British to have the mandate in Iraq’.3 In Aleppo, the commissioners had received an im portant Iraqi delegation, which complained o f the lack o f the freedom o f speech, movement and political action under the British m ilitary administration. This group presented basically the same pro­ gramme for Mesopotamia as the Syrian Congress had drafted, calling for a Hashemite king (Emir Abdullah or Emir Zaid), Am erican assistance, interdiction o f Jewish or Hindu immigra­ tion and extension o f Iraqi boundaries to D eir ez-Zor, Diarbekr and Mohammerah.4 In their final conclusions the commis­ sioners recommended roughly the same treatment for Mesopo­ tam ia as for Syria, i.e. unity (Basra, Baghdad and M osul), 1 Paragraph 6 of the Program o f the Syrian Congress; reproduced in the King-Crane Report, idem, p. 780. 2 Idem, p. 856. As to outside pressures on the petitioners, see Howard, pp. 94, 122-3, 128-9 and 135-6. 3 W illiam Y ale: The Near East, A Modem History (Ann Arbor, 1953), pp. 316 and 336. The final decision to drop Mesopotamia was taken, according to Howard, as late as the end o f July (Howard, p. 163). * King-Crane Report, U.S. For. Eel. Paris Peace Conf., idem, p. 782.

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constitutional monarchy (the people to choose the prince), and one mandatory under the League o f Nations; but instead o f the United States, G reat Britain was proposed as this m andatory.1 K in g and Crane had obviously set themselves a task which was something more than the purpose specified by their in­ structions o f 25 M arch: they wanted to procure evidence demonstrating the necessity o f an Am erican mandate in the M iddle East when the question came to Congress.2 In their report they insisted on the w ill and the right o f the Arabs to self-determination, and their capacity for it. By doing so they presented a courageous and sincere, historically wellinformed but politically short-sighted programme. Encour­ aged by Am erican moral support, the emir dared to take the step which was theoretically forbidden by the O .E .T .A . regulations: he established a government. The Syrian Congress, a representative body o f the pan-Syrian populations, perhaps the only possible parliam ent in the actual circumstances— though its composition has been criticized3— was the same assembly as that which eight months later on 8 M arch 1920, was to declare independence. The statement o f the Congress o f 2 July 1919, called the Damascus programme, has no less memorable a place in modem Arab history. Its main lines indicate what A rab aspirations were to be for the next quarter o f a century; at two particular points it even included a viable political programme for today.4 1 Idem, pp. 799-800. The commissioners admitted that the Iraqi delegation had made an appeal to the United States to be the mandatory power. But because they felt that Am erica ‘could or would’ not take a mandate for Mesopotamia, they recommended Great Britain because she was probably the fittest for the task involved. 3 According to the instructions agreed on by the Council o f Four, the commis­ sioners had to acquaint themselves with the conditions of the regions concerned, ‘a knowledge o f which might serve to guide the judgment o f the Conference’ (U.S. Far. Rel. Paris Peace Conf., xii, 745-7). 3 The Congress was selected by the old Ottoman electorate, which had chosen, in 1909, the representatives to the Constantinople parliament. O nly 66 o f 88 representatives were able to meet in Damascus. Most o f those absent were from the French-dominated west and north zones. A remarkable omission: there were no Jewish deputies despite the strong Jewish minority in all-Syria. See the despatch Allenby to Curzon, 2 M arch 1920, tel. no 197: B.D.> 1, xiii, 220-1. 4 Namely in art. 7 which opposed the plans o f Jewish commonwealth and Zionist immigration, and in art. 8 which called for the unity o f the country and opposed the separation o f Palestine and Lebanon from Syria.

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The outstanding feature o f the Damascus programme was the demand for ‘absolutely complete political independence*. The Syrian Congress had indignantly protested against article 22 o f the covenant o f the League o f Nations, according to which the Syrians were to be placed under a mandate. The instructions o f the commission o f inquiry, however, were based on the pre­ supposition that Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia would be placed under mandatories. Consequently, there was no place for complete independence. This was a fact which Faisal well knew and which he tried to make the Damascus politicians understand.1 He found that Am erican protection was the only acceptable solution for him, and he embraced it without a glance behind. It is understandable w hy for the emir, for Syria, for the whole M iddle East, the Am erican intervention, a policy without means, was to be what Gertrude Bell called ‘a criminal deception*.2 The French policy at the time had indeed been to minimize as much as possible the importance o f the Am erican inquiry. Georges-Picot was reported to be the source o f the rumours according to which the fate o f Syria had already been decided at Paris and that the commission was merely to keep Faisal in the dark while partition on Syria was being arranged.3 As it happened, however, a number o f incidents which followed in the wake o f the Am erican commission’s progress through Syria deepened French resentment and directed it more openly against the British m ilitary authorities.4 In Paris the council o f heads o f delegations had decided on 30 June to postpone further discussions on the Turkish settle­ ment until the Am erican government was in a position to say whether it would be able to undertake any mandate or not. The president had warned the council, on 18 July, that the decision 1 See e.g. the report by Capt. Y ale: ‘Recommendations as to the future disposi­ tion of Syria, Palestine and M ount Lebanon9, 26 July 1919, p. 5; N .A. 181.9102/5. 2 In a memorandum on ‘Syria in October 19199, quoted by Kedourie, p. 147. 3 Clayton to Curzon, 1 June 1918, tel. no. E.A . 2491 ; B.D ., 1, iv, 263. See also: Balfour to Curzon, 16 M ay 1919, tel. no. 1053; idem, p. 277. 4 For details of the most serious o f these incidents, the arrest o f the pro-French Mujim Bey, a reputed chief of the Aneizeh Bedouins, see g u i c h a r d (v , 770), report o f Yale, 26 July 1919 (p. 9), and the despatch Curzon to Cambon, 6 Sept. 1919» letter 121038 (B.D., idem, pp. 317-2); a French version in Gontaut-Biron. pp. 284-8.

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involved a 'very considerable delay*.1 It was suspected in Paris that K in g and Crane might try unreservedly to commit the United States to Syria. This feeling was strengthened by the reports sent to the delegation by members attached to the com­ mission, D r M ontgomery and Captain Y a le.12 O f the delegates Crane at least seems to have realized from the beginning o f the inquiry the futility o f their task. ‘M r Crane doubts*, the secretary o f the commission noted as early as 16 A pril, ‘whether considering the existing attitude o f the occupy­ ing Powers in Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia, and the state o f feeling o f the population there, the appearance o f an American Commission o f inquiry might not arouse hopes which it would not be possible tofu ß .’3 M oreover, when back in Constantinople, Crane admitted to M . Defrance, the French high commissioner, that he personally had no illusions as to the possibility o f the United States accepting any mandates in the former Turkish terri­ tories.4 Sending a summary o f the commission’s report to the president on 30 August, Crane still proposed its publication and use in the campaign for Am erican mandates.5 Not a trace o f it, however, was thereafter seen in the conference minutes, except in a meeting o f the Am erican delegation on 24 September where the head o f delegation was still opposed to its official delivery to the British.6 In Washington the burial o f the em­ barrassing document was completed in one month.7 President Wilson fell seriously ill at the end o f September and by that time the King-Crape dossier was finally closed. 1 Despatch of Wilson read by W hite in the meeting of the Council o f Delegations, 18 July 1919, at 10 a.m .; U.S. For. Rel. Paris Peace Conf.9 vii, 193, and B.D.9 1, i, W-

2 Yale to Westermann, 8July 1919, private letter; y a l e , Syria, vi-43. ‘Recom­ mendations as to the future disposition o f Syria, Palestine, and Mount Lebanon’ by Captain Yale and ‘Report on Syria* by G . R . Montgomery in y a l e , Syria vi-42. In their memoranda dated 26 July both omitted reference to American mandates and for the time being advocated the partition of Syria into British and French mandates. 3 Howard, p. 78. M y italics. 4 g u i c h a r d , v , 769, note i. 5 Crane to Wilson, by M r Polk, 30 Aug. 1919, tel. no. 3976; N .A. i 8 i . 9102/10A. The King-Crane Report was dated at Paris, 28 August 1919. 6 Minutes o f a meeting of the commissioners and technical advisers, 24 Sept. 1919, at 2.30 p.m .; U.S. For. Rel. Paris Peace Conf.9xi, 432-3. 7 The Report was not published until 1922 (in The Editor and Publisher, New York, 2 Dec. 1922). Moreover, see Howard, pp. 258-60.

CH APTER IX

Provisional Agreement o f September 1919 the end o f July a series o f anti-British articles in the Paris press began with an editorial by Robert de C aix in V Asie Française, and continued for a couple o f weeks in influential papers such as Le Temps, Le Journal, and La Démocratie Nouvelle. The Foreign O fflce saw reason to conclude that the campaign was, if not organized, at least encouraged by the French governm ent.1 ‘The old picture o f “ perfide Albion” has never quite faded from the French mind’, the British repre­ sentative in Paris, Sir George Grahame, thoughtfully com­ mented, ‘and though new and strong ties between the two countries have been forged during the common struggle just terminated, it has not yet been proved what powers o f resistance those ties would have, should a sharp strain be put upon them.*12 O n the part o f the Q uai d’Orsay, during this uneasy summer, there was little initiative, nothing but protests. O n 28 July Pichon in Parisand Cam bonin London simultaneously handed a note to the British government, once again stigm atizing British policy in the M iddle East.3 Both notes paid attention to the alleged augmentation o f occupation troops in Syria and the delivery o f war m aterial to the Arabs, noticed by French officials in Syria.4 1 Curzon to Sir G . Grahame, the chargé d’affaires a.i. in Paris, 8 Aug. 1919, td . no. 1041 ; B .D ., 1, iv, 335-7. 2 Grahame to Curzon, 27 July 1919, tel. no. 738; idem, p. 321. 3 The text joined to the despatches: Balfour to Curzon, 28 July 1919, tel. no. 1208; B .D ., idem, pp. 321-2, and Curzon to Balfour, 1 Aug. 1919, tel. no 5148; idem, pp. 327-8. In fact the contents of both notes were the same, though Curzon observed that the version handed over in London was couched in somewhat stronger terms. * H ie French reports mentioned were: Picot to Pichon, 19 July 1919, tel. no. 1036; Gu i c h a r d , v, 755, and Hamelin to Guerre, 26 July 1919, tel. no. 169; idem, p. 755.

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The Q uai d'O rsay had reacted im mediately and considered the question an urgent one. The British representative had the impression that the French foreign minister as well as the ambassador in London firm ly believed that the reports sent by their countrymen on the spot were basically true.1 General Hamelin had revealed that in December 1919 the British had made an agreement with the Arabs on armament deliveries.12 The W ar Office admitted that such an agreement existed, but stated that no equipment except for police forces had been delivered to the east zone so far. M oreover, W hitehall explained that the only British troop movements in Syria had been two cavalry regiments sent over there to replace demobilized units.3 Pichon had suggested to Graham e that some o f the difficulties in Syria were really produced by local British officers. Balfour himself, though proposing a ‘stiff’ answer to the French note, had just learnt that some subordinate officers in Syria had been ignoring his instructions regarding the refusal to accept the mandate over Syria. O n the other hand, whereas Clemenceau, at the end o f July, had once again made a personal attack on A llenby in the Supreme Council, Pichon significantly assured Graham e that he believed in the good faith o f the fieldmarshal.4* Unfortunately, on the very same day that this promising inter­ view took place at the Q uai d’Orsay, 12 August, the French em­ bassy in London delivered the reply by Pichon to a rather old letter o f Curzon's (of 22 June) which had confirmed the still older news that the British government were withdrawing from the Long-Bérenger agreement o f A pril 1919.9 The bitter tone o f Pichon’s note seemed somewhat out o f date. As an epitaph on a closing period o f Anglo-French relations it is worth quoting: ‘Thus disappears the last vestige o f the conversations o f the 1 Grahame to Curzon, 12 Aug. 1919, off. letter no. 791 ; B .D ., idem, p. 351. 2 Hamelin to Guerre, 26 July, idem. 9 W .O . to F .O ., 12 Aug. 1919, off. letter, enclosure in no. 250, B .D ., idem, P- 3574 Grahame to Curzon, 12 Aug. 1919, no. 791 ; idem, p. 349. Allenby had been promoted to field-marshal and given a peerage at the beginning of August. 9 In fact this decision had already been announced to Clemenceau on 21 M ay by Lloyd George.

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English and French prime ministers on the subject o f the zones and the interests o f France and England in Syria and in Meso­ potam ia as regulated by the Anglo-French Agreement o f 1916, which subsists as the only possible basis o f all settlement between the two countries on the affairs o f Asia M inor’. 1 The note quoted above deserves attention because it finally caused the rupture o f the Anglo-French oil negotiations which had been going on in June and July despite Lloyd George’s letter o f 21 M ay; they were not resumed before the following Decem ber.12 The crisis o f the summer o f 1919 affected a con­ siderable number o f other questions pending between England and France. The problem o f Tangier, a remnant o f the arrange­ ment initiated in 1904, still awaited a solution which the fifteen-year-old entente seemed unable to contrive.3 A more dangerous field o f rivalry opened in Persia, where the British diplom atic success o f the Anglo-Persian agreement o f 9 August hardened the French attitude into a naked animosity.4 Curzon again called de Fleuriau to the Foreign Office and complained o f the French attitude in Teheran, observing that certain ‘ad­ vanced sections o f French colonial and public opinion’ were in­ clined to pick causes o f quarrel with Britain nearly anywhere: ‘O ne day it was Syria, another day it was Tangier, again it was some other part o f the Eastern world.’ 5 In Turkey, where the rise o f the Kem alist revolution appeared as a direct danger for both powers, the situation called for a firm Anglo-French common front which did not exist. Curzon, in an interview with Paul Cambon on 4 July, complained o f the revival o f the spirit o f rivalry between the British and the French in Constantinople.6 By the end o f July the situation in Anatolia had deteriorated to the extent that the British high commis1 Communication o f the French embassy in London; enclosure in the letter: The French chargé d’affaires to Curzon, 12 Aug. 1919; idem, p. m i . 2 The editor’s note; idem, p. 1111, note 4. 3 The long-conducted negotiations for concluding an Anglo-French convention on the application in Morocco and Egypt of the agreement of 1904, had resulted in M ay 1919 in a draft treaty. Further discussions were suspended in June. Note 10, no. 55; B.D ., i, ii. Moreover, see U.S. For. Rel. Paris Peace Conf.9 iv, 127-37. 4 Cox, now H .M . representative in Teheran, to Curzon, 13 Aug. 1919» tel. no. 541; B.D ., idem, p. 1127. 9 Curzon to Grahame, 13 Aug. 1919, tel. no. 1061; idem, p. 1129. 6 Curzon to Derby, 4 July 1919, tel. no. 956; idem, pp. 661-2.

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sioner began to foresee the possibility o f the ‘establishment o f an independent, and probably intensely fanatical and antiEuropean government in Asia M inor rejecting authority o f Constantinople and sovereignty o f Sultan’.1 Finally, by in­ vading Arm enia the Turkish nationalists pushed the British and French into resuming their negotiations, which resulted in the provisional agreement on Syria, and thus hastened their under­ standing in the Arab M iddle East. 2 Reporting to the Foreign Office the beginnings o f the antiBritish campaign in the Paris press, Lord Derby summarized an article by ‘Pertinax’ in the Echo de Paris o f 7 Ju ly: * . . . he concludes that Arab power which induced Great Britain to annul her previous engagements with France, is now in danger o f complete collapse, and the hour has come for definite con­ clusion with Messrs Lloyd George and Balfour o f those negotiations which have already lasted too long’.2 This prophesy was somewhat premature, but it certainly foresaw the crucial point which two months later forced the British Government to settle the Syrian question. The wahabite campaign had broken the back o f sharifian power. Probably only the diplom atic intervention o f British officers at the camp o f Ibn Sa’ud had saved the Hashemite from complete collapse.3 The sharif nevertheless refused, even for­ bade, all attempts to bring him to terms with Ibn Sa’ud. Though well aware that the fate o f Husain depended on his capacity to recruit and pay troops, the British government announced to him that the monthly subsidies would be reduced from the beginning o f the year 1920.4 There was no longer any question o f supporting Husain’s aspirations to the caliphate. The old king had lost his prestige and was nothing but the wreck o f the vehicle intended to carry out the pan-Arab idea as conceived by a Kitchener or a Lawrence. M oreover, the British had to realize that in the excited 1 Calthorpc to Curzon, 37 July 1919, tel. no. 1548; idem, p. 704. 3 Derby to Curzon, 7 July 1919, tel. no. 858; B .D ., 1, iv, 309-10. 3 Philip Graves’s comment on Memoirs o f King Abdullah (London, 1949), p. 484, note i. 4 For the events in the H ijaz, in the summer o f 1919, see Brémond, pp. 330-3.

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atmosphere o f unsettled peace the wahabite agitation might well spread to Syria as well as to Palestine and Mesopotamia. Despite its heretical character, such an agitation m ight cause the long feared pan-Islamic uprising, which it would be difficult to confine to the countries o f the Fertile Crescent.1 ‘There are indications o f a spread o f anti-British and anti-foreign feeling in the Mohammedan populations o f Syria and M esopotamia’, a senior member o f the Foreign Office confidentially wrote to W ingate at the beginning o f Ju ly.2 W ith Egypt still in a state o f agitation and Anatolia in full uproar, Syria was a precarious centre in which the prolongation o f the actual vacuum — as the powers were likely to see it— constituted a latent menace to the peace, whatever die final settlement. In this context one should mention a potential danger which never made an entry on the Arab scene during the years under present study, but which at that time still exercised a powerful influence on the policy-makers at cabinet level. The emergence o f Bolshevism, though not imminent, must have acted as a longrange factor in the situation which inspired the British to settle their differences in Syria. The approach o f the Soviets at the time to the problems o f the region seems to have been puerile, but the fact that they were using Islam as a tool o f their propa­ ganda must have caused anxiety.3 1 There were signs o f such agitation: in Beirut the newspaper Al Barq repro­ duced a leaflet which was said to have been distributed in Damascus on the very day of the arrival o f the eldest son of Husain, Emir A li, to the Syrian capital (in July 1919): ‘The Emir [of Mecca] has made conventions and engagements by which he has precipitated the ruin of all Arab countries. These countries are as you know the home of Islam. He has sold them as one sells bric-à-brac. . . .’ Quoted by Le Temps, 26 Aug. 1919. See also a later report of Col. Sir A . Wilson to Edwin M ontagu, 12 Feb. 1920, tel. no. 1867; B .D ., 1, xiii, 217. 2 Sir W illiam Tyrrell, assistant secretary at the F .O ., to W ingate, 2 July 1919» official letter; w i n o a t e , box 151/5. 3 The following abstract o f a message from Tashkent, read by Radio Moscow, 29 August 1919, seems significant: ‘There is in the Muslim World a great current in formation, having as aim to draw attention to the H oly Places which are under English domination. Influential Muslims point out that Islam is today in the same situation as in the time when Mohammed was compelled to leave M ecca which then remained in the hands of unbelievers. For ten years Mohammed stayed out o f M ecca and his followers did not enter there until he had taken possession of it again. Mecca is today in English hands and Islamfinds itself in the same situation.’ Notice sent to G . L. R . Göppert, A .A ., 30 Aug. 1919; G .F.M . 10/457, bd. 43 A 23536 (my italics).— See also the editorial ‘Lenin’s Eastern Dream’ in The Near East, 30 April 9 *9 -

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The Foreign Office had reason to consider Syria a dangerous storm-centre even if isolated from foreign ideologies. The pre­ dominance o f pan-Arab elements in Damascus roused suspi­ cions that G reat Britain would not be able to safeguard her positions anywhere in the Arab world as long as Damascus was not effectively under anti-nationalist control. The first to feel this were the officials in Baghdad, who were now given the task o f building up an administration with an Arab façade and British substance in M esopotam ia.1 W hen returning in M ay from the inter-departmental conference on eastern affairs in London, the civil commissioner o f M esopotamia, Colonel Arnold W ilson, had travelled via Damascus and had requested the co-operation o f the Iraqi officers still in Faisal’s service. These had asked permission to send to Baghdad a representative ‘to make suggestions’, which W ilson had agreed to.2 The inno­ cent-looking contacts which now followed marked a turningpoint in British-Arab relations. It is conceivable that the proposal to send a nationalist observer to Mesopotamia was made by the pan-Arabs o f Damascus in view o f the expected arrival o f the inquiry com­ mission in the region. A t the beginning o f June Faisal suddenly wrote to the chief political officer in Cairo, warning him that the affections o f the Mesopotamian people were turning aw ay from the British, and suggesting the constitution in Baghdad o f a free national government on the lines promised in the declaration o f Novem ber.3 O n 20 June, Clayton despatched to the Foreign Office a similar petition by the Baghdad officers o f the sharifian arm y.4 Finally, four days later, the delegation o f the H ijaz in Paris transmitted to Lloyd George a memorandum by N uri as-Sa’id, then chief aide-de-camp to Faisal, advocating the independence o f M esopotamia in unity with Syria. The text was couched in rather strong terms and was likely to anger a man o f Lord Curzon’s nature, as it indeed did.9 1 Wilson, Loyalties, pp. 228-30. 2 Young, p. 286. 3 The letter was written in such excellent English that M ajor Young concluded it had been drafted by T .E . Lawrence; idem, p. 286. 4 Idem, pp. 286-7. 5 €. . . The desire to separate Syria and Mesopotamia is based in part on im­ perialistic policy of certain parties in Europe. It is neither just, nor wise, to sacrifice the vital interests o f any country or any nation merely for the sake o f imperialistic ideas and colonizing policies. . Extracts in B .D ., 1, iv, 297, note 2.

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O n receiving the last-mentioned memorandum Curzon sent two significant cables to Clayton. The first informed him that Wilson had suggested from Baghdad that pressure be brought upon Faisal to restrict his and his officers* activities to Syria.1 l l i e second added more clearly: The spread into Mesopotamia of Faisal’s propaganda for the com­ plete independence of Arabia is causing considerable apprehension here and at Baghdad. India Office fear that agitation may be deriving encouragement from British officers in Syria acting under the mistaken belief that aspirations for the immediate establishment of an uncon­ trolled Arab Government in Mesopotamia enjoy the support of His Majesty’s Government.12 Thus the India Office, still in control o f the administration o f Mesopotamia, was unintentionally acting as an invisible ally o f France in trying to fight— through the Foreign Office— the pan-Arab agitation which prevailed in Damascus during the visit o f the King-Crane Commission. O n the other hand, when Colonel Wilson pressed the Foreign Office to make an official announcement that the Mosul vilayet would be integrated with the territory under Mesopotamian administration, Curzon found such a measure impossible until a definite agreement on Mosul could be reached with France.3 Thus, as a result o f the discord with France, Mosul had to remain outside the new civil administration under construction in Baghdad. Finally, at the end o f August, the India Office was greatly worried by a six-weeks-old police report from Baghdad which stated that every educated Arab was a member o f a pan-Arab and anti-foreign association which aimed at the expulsion o f the British. The society was said to be active in all important Iraqi towns. M ontagu, alarmed by these developments, proposed a new liberal-spirited announcement on British aims in Mesopo­ tam ia. But die British delegation in Paris, when consulted, considered it inadvisable because o f the prevailing state o f affairs at the peace conference.4 1 Curzon to Clayton, 24 June 1919, tel. no. 205; idem, p. 296. 2 Same to Same, 24 June 1919, tel. no. 207, idem, p. 296 (my italics). 9 Wilson, Loyalties, p. 124. The answer o f Curzon arrived in Baghdad on 9 July. Young, p. 288. 4 Idem, pp. 294-5.

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In Palestine the deadlock in Anglo-French relations affected the furtherance o f the national home policy. Jewish immigra­ tion, even the preparation o f it by land transactions and in­ dustrial development, was difficult as long as government stayed only in m ilitary .occupation o f Palestine. Most strenuous efforts to re-establish their concessions were made by the French, particularly by the Jaffa-Jerusalem R ailw ay Com pany.1 Cam bon in London backed these demands by continuous démarches: *Ambassador retaliated to my artillery by once again firing o ff his machine-gun concerning the Haifa-Jerusalem Railway.*2 A ll these approaches, as Balfour noted, were re­ jected as impossible until the conclusion o f the Conference.3 A t the end o f M ay the Zionists became seriously troubled by the postponement o f the decision on the boundaries o f Palestine and by the despatch o f the King-Crane commission. Herbert Sam uel4 warned the Foreign Office about the delay, and pro­ posed that instructions be sent to the local administration to the effect that the British Government really did anticipate the concession o f the mandate over Palestine to G reat Britain. Instructions to that effect, drafted nearly word by word in accordance with Samuel’s plan,5 were then indeed cabled to the acting chief political officer, Colonel J. L . French, but only on 4 August, after the Am erican commission had safely left Syria. General Clayton estimated that a clear statement o f policy and the declaration o f the fa it accompli would probably be accepted by at least 75 per cent o f the Arab population.6 But when W eizmann later asked for the publication o f the instruc1 The Zionists too requested the acquisition o f this railway.— Weizmann to M allet, 18 June 1919, official letter, enclosure 1 in no. 212; B.D. idem, p. 304. 2 Curzon to Derby, 4 July 1919, letter no. 956; idem, p. 662. Curzon obviously means the Jaffa-}erusalem railway. 3 Balfour to Curzon, 7 M ay 1919, letter no. 678; idem, p. 311, note 2. 4 Then chairman of the advisory committee on the economic development of Palestine. 5 ‘His Majesty’s Government’s policy contemplates concession to Great Britain o f Mandate for Palestine. . . American and French Governments are equally pledged to support establishment in Palestine o f Jewish national home. This should be emphasized to Arab leaders at every opportunity and it should be im­ pressed on them that the matter is a chosejugie and continued agitation would be useless and detrimental.’ Curzon to French, 4 Aug. 1919, tel. no. 245; idem, p. 329. 6 Minutes of meeting with General Clayton at the office o f the Zionist Organiza­ tion . • .J u ly 9, 1919; enclosure in no. 238, idem, p. 333. N

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tions o f 4 August, Balfour, *111 view o f the present frame o f mind in this country [France]*, refused.1 M eanwhile, in Syria, British diplom acy was hard put to keep the Arabs in check. In the middle o f Ju ly Faisal had intended to leave again for Europe within a fortnight, asking for the necessary arrangements to be made regarding his sea transit.2 Georges-Picot had told him that the French govern­ ment suggested that he should postpone his departure. The emir took offence at this statement and threatened the British political officer that if his departure was unduly postponed he would settle the issue by decreeing m obilization.3 Then Lawrence and Clayton, both now in London, also advised Faisal to stay in Damascus, where his presence was actually more needed than in Paris.4 The Foreign Office on its part instructed Cairo to inform Faisal that general Turkish settle­ ment . . . stands postponed pending United States decision*.5 The emir was quieted only for the moment. W hen he learned o f the instructions according to which the British policy now anticipated the concession to G reat Britain o f the mandate for Palestine, he protested to Allenby and pointed out that the decision to accept a mandate for Palestine involved partition o f Syria and a return to the ‘unjust Agreement o f 1916’, this being contrary to the results o f the King-Crane inquiry.6 This was a warning that Faisal, pressed by the pan-Arabs o f Damascus, m ight even challenge Britain.

3 In the Foreign Office the direction o f eastern affairs was in fact, during the summer o f 1918, concentrated in the hands o f Lord Curzon. A . J . Balfour was gradually retiring from the scene7 and never had an opportunity to exert a direct influence on the 1 Balfour to Curzon, 11 Sept. 1919, letter no. 1797; idem, pp. 381-2. Weizmann had requested permission for publication on 13 August. 2 French to F .O ., 14 July 1919, tel. no. 383; idem, p. 314, note to no. 241. 3 French to Curzon, 17 July 1919, tel. no. 385; idem, pp. 314-15. 4 Balfour to Allenby, 15 July 1919, tel. no. 66; idem, p. 314. Curzon to Balfour, 21 July 1919, tel. no. 1001; idem, p. 316. 3 F .O . to French, 30 July 1919, tel. no. 238; idem, p. 317, note 3 to no. 226. 6 French to Curzon, 29 Aug. 1919, tel. no. 414; idem, pp. 365-6. 7 Balfour finally resigned as foreign secretary on 24 October 1919.

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course o f events. Before his withdrawal, however, he devoted two important memoranda to the Syrian question. The first o f them especially, dated 11 August, an extraordinarily perceptive analysis o f the problem as a whole, deserves discussion as a con­ temporary and authoritative inside view o f the Anglo-French controversy over Syria.1 The starting point accepted by Balfour was *the unhappy truth . . . that France, England and Am erica have got themselves into a position over the Syrian problem so inextricably confused that no really neat and satisfactory issue is now possible for any o f them*. The situation, he observed, was affected by five inconsistent documents: on one hand, the promise given to Husain in 1915, the Sykes-Picot agreement and the Anglo-French declaration o f November 1918; on the other, the covenant o f the League and the instructions given to the King-Crane commission. Not one o f them had w holly lost its validity, and each o f them could be quoted by the parties concerned when it happened to suit their purpose. The main conflict existed between the old agreements and the later documents enunciating the principle o f selfdetermination, amongst them the November declaration. Balfour found striking contradictions between the covenant and its only possible application in the region concerned. First, by an ‘adviser’ the mandatory system ultim ately meant the same as the 1916 agreement, ‘though they do not say so— an adviser whose advice must be follow ed'.123Secondly, the freedom o f the Syrians— as the covenant presupposed— freely to choose their mandatory, was a ‘Hobson’s choice’ : o f the three possible candidates, England had refused and Am erica would refuse, so that the only choice would be France. In Palestine the non­ application o f the letter o f the covenant was to be even more flagrant, as there the form ality o f consulting the population was not even proposed, though the Am erican commission had carried out their inquiry. The frontiers, Balfour repeated, should be determined by economic and ethnographic rather than strategic considerations 1 The sources o f this sub-chapter, if not specified, refer to the memorandum o f M r Balfour respecting Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia, t i Aug. 1919; B .D ., t, iv, 340-8. 3 Cf. the memorandum by Balfour, 9 Sept. 1919; idem, p. 374.

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(‘needless safeguards against so remote a possibility as a war with France’). The economic principle applied especially to Palestine, he observed. The country had to be made viable for the largest number o f Jewish emigrants. For the necessities o f its development, it had to obtain command o f the waterpower which naturally belonged to it, whether by extending its borders by a treaty with the mandatory o f Syria or by acquiring the right to use the water o f the R iver Jordan. The land between theJordan and the H ijaz railw ay should be included in that o f Palestine. The paper concentrated close attention on the question o f access to Mesopotamia, which, it admitted, ‘has so far been very im perfectly studied'. Arguments against a British protec­ torate depending in part on a foreign-owned railway, he wrote, were sentimental and m ilitary, and he was not inclined to accept their validity in determining a foreign policy. M oreover, the covenant expressly embodied the ‘open door’ clause for all the mandated territories, which meant that all nations were to enjoy equal economic opportunities there. ‘This w ill prove an inconvenient argument’, he remarked in his memorandum o f 9 September, ‘when we are urging our inherent rights to an all-British pipe-line to carry all-British oil to the British navy and the British M ercantile M arine.’ 1 If, after all, a connecting line between Mesopotamia and the M editerranean by rail and by pipe-line through all-British territories was possible, it should certainly be considered. The mere fact that the deviation o f the line to the south was seriously thought o f ‘would keep the appetites o f the French conces­ sionaires at Alexandretta within reasonable lim its'. The route through Palm yra, moreover, would not be possible, he feared. It would irritate the French and cause more trouble than it was worth. Furthermore, it would be easily handicapped by a more economic short French line to Tripoli. As uneconomic would be a straight desert line through all-British territory south o f the actual Sykes-Picot line. T would neither allow it to drive us into wasting millions on unprofitable projects, nor into an interm inable series o f petty squabbles with our neighbours', Balfour concluded, thus rejecting the case for a M esopotam iaM editerranean connection line under British sovereignty. 1 Memorandum o f 9 September, idem, p. 374.

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By the middle o f August the Foreign Office had gathered information suggesting that the likelihood o f Am erican com­ mitment in the M iddle East was diminishing even further. O n 15 August Lord Curzon cabled to the chargé d’affaires at Washington and to Balfour in Paris requesting news o f the Am erican attitude and announcing that before its summer recess the cabinet wanted to discuss their Turkish policy.1 The replies from both Washington and Paris were disappointing. Lindsay reported that the ratification o f the peace treaty with Germ any would not be considered earlier than in O ctober and the question o f mandates could not be introduced in Congress before that matter was settled.12 From a conversation with Frank L . Polk, then head o f the Am erican peace delegation in Paris, Balfour had understood that the chances o f the United States accepting a mandate for any part o f the former Turkish empire were becoming even less evident.3 As the situation in Anatolia was rapidly deteriorating, the allies had to agree on some settlement o f the Turkish question in the immediate future. The Americans being now out o f the running, the British government had to determine its own policy. Paul Cambon observed with regard to the policy o f the Foreign Office, that however busy it had been with eastern problems during the previous weeks, none existed: ‘Balfour de­ lights in philosophical considerations and Curzon, who is kept in touch with nothing, still has in his head a thousand projects on P ersia.. . ,’4 ‘A . J . B. is in Paris pursuing one policy, I am here pursuing another’, Curzon on his part admitted, when writing to his wife: ‘No one knows what ought to be done, and meanwhile, o f course, nothing is done, and we go deeper and deeper into the m ire.. . .*5 As most o f the ministers were to leave for holidays during the following weeks, the cabinet made strenuous efforts to find some line o f policy on Turkey. O n 19 August Curzon wrote that the 1 Curzon to Lindsay, 15 Aug. 1919, tel. no. 1585; idem, p. 729. 2 Lindsay to Curzon, 16 Aug. 1919, tel. no. 1275; idem, p. 730. Sir R . Grahame minuted on the despatch that a special copy o f it had been transmitted to the prime minister. 3 Balfour to Curzon, 18 Aug. 1919, tel. no. 1277, idem, p. 734. 4 Paul Cambon to his son, 20 Aug. 1919, private letter; Correspondance, iii, 252. 9 Private letter to Lady Curzon, 19 Aug. 1919; quoted in Ronaldshay, iii, 203.

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cabinet had conferred for five hours ‘about Turkey and the East*.1 O n the following day, he noted, they had their third meeting within twenty-four hours; it lasted three and a h alf hours and resulted in the resolve that Curzon should go to Paris and take care o f the eastern questions in which he would have ‘authority for any settlement that I might like to effect*.2 The resolutions, however, had no immediate sequel. ‘I said at once that I would not go out now*, Curzon added, ‘I was tired and needed my holiday and must insist on taking it.’3 Thus the reasons for the astonishing inaction o f British diplo­ macy, during the fortnight following the feverish cabinets o f 19-20 August, were as understandable as they were human. Lloyd George had left for a holiday in France that very day, 20 August, suffering from exhaustion.4 Balfour in Paris com­ plained o f overwork and requested that somebody come to replace him .5 Curzon in London, strained and nervous, be­ moaned the thankless position in which he had been left by the cabinet: T am heartily sick o f this indeterminate position, full power in one set o f things, but powerless in oth ers.. . .’6 4 Lloyd George, resting at Deauville near Boulogne, spent the first days o f his holiday without thinking any more about the tiresome dilemma o f Syria. W hen on 23 August Philip K err arrived from Paris, convinced that the time was ripe to come to terms with the French, the prime minister once more vented his anger at their attitude on Syria and spoke menacingly o f making a public statement.7 Such a countermeasure had been under consideration at least three weeks earlier and the French embassy had been given notice o f it.8 The reason w hy Lloyd 1 Idem. 2 Private letter to Lady Curzon, 20 Aug. 1919; idem, p. 204. 3 Idem.

4 Lori Riddell's Intimate Diary of the Peace Conference and After (London, 1933), pp. in - 1 3 . 9 Ronaldshay, iii, 205. 6 Private letter to Lady Curzon, 9 Sept. 1919; quoted by idem, p. 204. See also the letter o f Paul Cambon to his son, 4 Sept. 1919; Correspondance, iii, 354. 7 Riddell, p. 112. Lord Riddell stayed with the P.M . in Deauville. 8 Curzon to Grahame, 8 Aug. 1919, letter no. 1041; B .D ., 1, iv, 337.

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George brought it up again was probably the malevolent publicity given in Paris to the arrest o f Em ir Sa’id .1 A more im portant aspect o f the Syrian situation captured the prime minister’s mind. W ith the public finances deteriorating, the cabinet had pressed during the previous weeks for reduction o f expenditure on the armed forces. Consequently the W ar Office had to accelerate dem obilization. The lack o f troops, it was feared, would become insupportable, considering that a good many parts o f the empire were in a state o f semi-war. 'I am preparing a paper', Sir Henry W ilson wrote in his diary in the middle o f August, ‘o f what troops we require to keep our four storm-centres quiet— Ireland, Egypt, Mesopotamia, India.’ 2 In this situation it was quite natural to begin to regard the con­ tinuous garrisoning by British divisions o f different parts o f the Ottom an empire (in which G reat Britain was not seriously interested) as a luxury which the government could not afford. This was probably emphasized in the rather strong letter which the prime minister drafted on the cutting down o f the costs o f the arm y, 30 August, for Winston Churchill.3 A new series o f events stimulated the arrangement for the withdrawal o f British troops from Syria and C ilicia. The Am erican Colonel Haskell, interallied commissioner in Arm enia, had cabled to the Supreme Council on 29 August stating that in order to save the population from destruction it was ‘absolutely necessary' to replace the British troops who were being evacuated. Clemenceau im m ediately proposed send­ ing 12,000 French troops to the place and produced a note from 1 W ithout the knowledge o f the French high commissioner, Allenby had his m ilitary police arrest, in the middle o f August, the famous emir who was considered by certain French circles as a possible protégé to replace Faisal (see e.g. Curzon to Grahame, 28 July 1920, letter no. 2615; B .D ., 1, xiii, 321-2, and record by Sir Eyre Crowe o f a conversation with the French chargé d'affaires, 10 Aug. 1920; idem, p. 336). Allenby later explained that the emir had been taken into custody because he was a focus o f political agitation in Beirut. Besides, the French m ilitary administrator of the O .E .T .A . west had acquiesced in the measure even if he had not approved of it (Curzon to Cambon, 6 Sept. 1919, letter no. 121038; idem, 1, iv, 288-91). 2 Callw ell, ii, 208. 3 Riddell, p. 118. 'T h e Prime minister expects everything to be done in a week and has issued a fresh ukase from D eauville.' Austin Chamberlain, then chancellor o f the exchequer, to Sir W alter Long, 30 Aug. 1919, private letter; c h a m b e r l a in , A c. 25.

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the French general staff outlining a scheme for carrying out the project.1 The Foreign Office was convinced that the French move was connected with the situation in Syria. Though concluding that there was nothing for it but to accept the offer, Balfour under­ stood that the French were 'delighted to put us in a difficulty over our m ilitary arrangements in Syria and in Cilicia*.2 Sir Henry Wilson even thought that the real aim o f the French was to march to Nuseybin and Mosul to secure the original SykesPicot line in that direction.3 The cabinet meeting o f 2 Septem­ ber, under the influence o f W ilson and Curzon, regarded Clemenceau’s scheme as fantastic and dangerous, and decided that it be proposed that the French send their expedition 'b y only practicable route, namely Black Sea, to only suitable ports, namely Batoum or Trebizond*.4 The British government had to take into consideration public opinion at home as well as abroad and could not reject the French plan altogether.9 Talks were begun between the chief o f the im perial general staff, suffering from a cold and confined indoors, and Colonel Fagalde, the French assistant m ilitary attaché in London.6 It seems that these discussions were soon expanded to cover the possibility o f the French replacing the British occupation troops in all C ilicia and possibly Syria. Consequently the plan for an expedition to Arm enia was allowed to drop, as Curzon on 8 September foresaw: 'French w ill get C ilicia anyhow and have no need o f troops there now.*7 M eanwhile, possibly after the cabinet meetings o f 19-20 August, Allenby had been called to Europe.8 Landing at Marseilles, 8 September, the field-marshal gave to the reporters 1 Balfour to Curzon, 29 Aug. 1919, tel. no. 1309; B .D ., idem, pp. 743-4. 2 Balfour to Curzon, 31 Aug. 1919, tel. no. 1312; idem, p. 746. 3 Telephone message from London to the British Peace Delegation 2 S ep t 1919, file 342/1/6/18473; idem, p. 746, note 1. 4 Curzon to Balfour, 2 Sept. 1919, tel. no. 1128, idem, p. 747. Also, the quotation from the diary of Sir Henry Wilson in C allwell, p. 209. 3 Balfour to Curzon, 3 Sept. 1919, tel. no. 1319; B .D ., idem, p. 748. 6 Clemenceau to Lloyd George, 11 Sept. 1919, unnumbered personal letter; idem, p. 380, and Callw ell, pp. 210-11. 7 Curzon to Campbell, his private secretary, 8 S ep t 1919, tel. unnumbered; idem, B.D ., 1, iv, 756. * It appears from a despatch of Col. French to Lord Curzon, ag Aug. 1919 (idem, p. 366) that Allenby intended to leave for Europe before that date.

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present a remarkable interview, in which he tried to smooth over the ill feeling produced in France by the arrest o f Emir Sa’id al-Jaza’eri in Beirut.1 The statement was favourably re­ ceived by most o f the French press, which in the editions o f g and 10 September wrote about Britain in quite different terms from those o f the preceding weeks.2 Further, the French embassy in London took note o f the change in the attitude o f governmental circles: ‘There is quasi­ unanim ity in London in the desire to relieve the worries o f the French regarding the so-called British “ visées on Syria" ', de Fleuriau reported 13 September. ‘M any o f the Lords o f the Adm iralty have expressed themselves strongly on this subject to Adm iral G rasset.. . .3 Field-M arshal Wilson said that if M arshal Foch and him self were authorized to discuss an agree­ ment regulating the separate zones o f m ilitary occupation, they would conclude the arrangement in a few hours.' The moment was opportune to reach some understanding on Syria, de Fleuriau concluded, but stressed: ‘It would only be an agree­ ment on m ilitary occupation; the basic question would be decided together with the fate o f the Ottom an Em pire.'4 The report on the Anglo-French proceedings during the following days reveals that m ilitary questions had been in the foreground since the preparatory stage o f the negotiation.5 However, as the question o f the withdrawal o f the British troops from Syria had been bound up since February with the terri­ torial adjustments to be made on the northern boundary o f area (A), it is understandable that the September negotiations were o f fundamental political significance. Before Allenby's arrival at D eauville, Balfour, together with K err, had spent two days with the prime minister, 6-7 September.6 Hence, although no 1 ‘W e are in Syria only from the m ilitary point o f view. • • . From the political point of view we will give way to you • . • You can be sure that England w ill make the task easier for France in Syria.* Correspondance d 'Orient^ 8 Sept. 1919, p. 134. 2 Grahame to F .O ., 9 Sept. 1919, tel. no. 1003 in B .D .f idem, p. 377, note 1, and Grahame to Curzon, 10 Sept. 1919, letter no. 888; idem, p. 337. 3 French naval attaché in London. 4 De Fleuriau to Pichon, 13 Sept. 1919, tel. no. 537; o u i c h a r d , v , 791. 5 Summary of proceedings in Paris in regard to the m ilitary occupation in Syria, Cilicia, Palestine and Mesopotamia, September 1919, dated 17 Sept. 1919, doc. no. 18; B .D ., idem, pp. 384-5. 6 Riddell, p. 123.

188 PR O V ISIO N A L AGREEM ENT OF SEPTEM BER 1919

Foreign Office representatives were present during the subse­ quent meetings with Allenby, Lloyd George had obviously had an opportunity to become acquainted with the views o f the retiring foreign secretary. The decisions reached on the evening o f 9 September, when the prime minister had his first meeting with Allenby, indicate that Lloyd George intended to cut the Gordian knot taking little notice o f the ‘philosophical considerations’ o f Balfour. According to a draft prepared by Sir M aurice Hankey, the basis o f the proposed settlement in Syria was to be the following : Since by mutual agreement the letter of the Sykes-Picot Agreement no longer applies, the British Government will have met its obliga­ tions, both to the French Government and to the Arab State, if it hands over Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo to the Arabs, and if, at the same time, it hands over Syria west of that line, to the French Government, leaving the arrangements between the Arabs and the French for the supply of advisers, &c., for subsequent negotiation between the French Government and the Arab State.1 As it appears, no reference was made to the covenant (as im­ portant as it was to Balfour). Though the arrangement was later presented as a provisional one, the demarcation lines between the future British, French and Arab zones were proposed to be drawn so as to secure the British political and territorial desiderata in the region.2 The discussion was continued on the 10th in conference form, another member o f the British peace delegation, Bonar Law ,3 and three W ar Office representatives being present.4 Lloyd George stated that Clemenceau had promised that the British should have the mandate for Palestine and he wanted to know what actually constituted Palestine. The secretary was instructed to telephone to London and ask for the necessary maps to be sent to the prime minister before his meeting with the French 1 Appendix II in the document: ‘Notes o f a Meeting held at Prime Minister’s house, M anoir de Clairfontaine, Hennequeville, Trouville, on Wednesday, September io, 1919, at 10.30 a.m .’ ; CAB. 21/153. 2 Idem, and appendix I (draft by Lloyd George on the decisions of 9 Sept. 1919) to the same document. 3 Lord privy seal and leader of the House of Commons. 4 The description o f the meeting follows the above-mentioned notes by Sir M aurice Hankey (CAB. 21/153) and included appendix II.

PR O V ISIO N A L AGREEM ENT OF SEPTEMBER 1919 189

in Paris. It was however agreed that Palestine should be defined in accordance with its ‘ancient boundaries',1 securing defence positions against eventual land or air attacks on the Suez Canal as well as water supply sources for the mandate area. A t the following morning's (11 September) meeting, the attendance was increased by Sir Frederick Black, the managing director o f the Anglo-Persian O il Com pany, who had been hurriedly called from London to give an expert opinion.2 H e stated that his company contemplated a pipeline from Persia to the M editerranean but that its construction would be condi­ tional on the results o f a survey which he expected would take six months. Lloyd George would have liked to know the pro­ posed route immediately, in order to ensure that it remained within the British zone o f occupation. His views as to the significance o f the proposed railw ay contrasted strikingly with the opinion expressed by Balfour in his memorandum o f 13 August. For him it was above all a strategic necessity: 'It was essential to cover the needs o f w ar’, he said, 'and to enable us not only to carry troops but also to develop the railw ay as the hostilities might necessitate.'3 However, as the limits within which the railw ay could be constructed were still unknown, it was decided that the French should be asked the right for a British railw ay and pipeline in accordance with article 7 o f the Sykes-Picot agreement. A survey would be carried out with the object o f finding a route preferably more to the south within the British zone. The construction o f the railw ay there, Lloyd George commented, ‘might mean spending two or three millions extra, but this would be worth while to avoid quarrel with the French’ .4 As it became obvious that it would be politically impossible to cover the chimerical railw ay route from British outposts, Allenby was authorized to evacuate Syria entirely and to fix 1 It was pointed out that the Zionist idea of the ancient boundaries coincided with those of Solomon’s empire (expanding Palestine to the north as far as in­ cluding Hama), but Lloyd George found that the inclusion of Mount Hermon as well would be ‘rather excessive*. 2 Copy of a letter (probably by Sir M aurice Hankey) to T . Jones, acting secre­ tary o f the W ar cabinet, g Sept. 1919; CAB. 21/153. 3 Notes of a meeting held at the prime minister’s house • .. Sept. 11, 1919, at i i a.m .; CAB. idem, p. 4. 4 Idem, p. 6.

190 PR O V ISIO N A L AGREEM ENT OF SEPTEM BER ig ig

the new demarcation line ‘from a purely m ilitary point o f view always keeping in mind the “ ancient*’ boundaries’ o f Palestine. The field-marshal consequently proposed the occupa­ tion o f the line Busra-D era'-Q uneitra in the north-east, the line covering Banias, Safed and Acre in the north, thus including the valleys o f Yarm uk and the Jordan north o f Lake Tiberias in the British sphere.1 By now Lloyd George was ready to give notice both to the Arabs and to the French o f the British intention to withdraw their forces from Syria. A t the insistence o f Allenby a corres­ ponding declaration was made to Emir Faisal in person; he was invited by the prime minister on 1 1 September to come to Paris at once.2 In Paris two days later Allenby again expressed his fear that British withdrawal would result in anarchy and war between the French and the Arabs in Syria. The secretary o f war then suggested that, in case the Arabs should fight the French, Emir Faisal might be held as hostage. Frank L . Polk, the Am erican representative attending the discussion, recorded that Allenby was ‘very indignant* at this suggestion o f Chur­ chill’s, which in any case met with no one else’s support.3 As a result o f the discussions at Deauville an aide-mémoire was drawn up for the prime minister to be handed to Clem enceau.4 This document revealed a remarkable change in British policy as compared to Lloyd George’s stand four months earlier. The French, the Arabs and the peace conference were now faced with the almost inevitable fact that the evacuation by the British o f Syria and C ilicia (the Taurus tunnel system included) would commence on i November, in other words in six weeks (arts. 1-2) ; after the withdrawal the British government would have no responsibility whatsoever in the zones evacuated (art. 5). The British troops would be regrouped in Palestine within ‘its ancient boundaries o f Dan and Beersheba* and in Mesopo­ tamia including Mosul (art. 6). Correspondingly, it was pro­ posed that the French confine their occupation to the blue zone, 1 Idem, p. 7. 2 The 'Summary of Proceedings9 dates the sending of the despatch to Faisal as 10 September; in reality it took place a day later. 3 A note written by hand by Frank L . Polk concerning a table-talk with the British prime minister and his retinue, n Sept. 1919; p o l k 78/53. 4 Appendix C in the present study.

PR O V ISIO N A L AGREEM ENT OF SEPTEM BER 1919 191

C ilicia included, and allow the Arab forces to replace the British garrisons in area (A) (arts. 3-4). M oreover, the aide-mémoire stated that the British government was prepared to discuss the boundaries between Palestine, Syria and Mesopotamia (art. 7), but reserved— until the frontiers were determined— the right to let its commander-in-chief *occupy outposts in accordance with the boundary claimed by the British Government*1 (art. 10). Lloyd George was now ready to arrange the matter o f the H aifa-Tadm or-M osul railw ay without change o f sovereignty. The French were asked not to object to the Arab state granting to the British the concession o f a connecting line (rail- and pipe-line) as far north as the latitude o f Deir ez-Zor. Otherwise the contents o f the article concerned (art. 8) were the same as those o f art. 7 o f the 1916 agreement with the exception that it was now specified that these rights should be exercisable even in time o f war. The French government and Emir Faisal were notified that a survey would im mediately be carried out to find, if possible, a direction for the mentioned lines entirely within the British mandated area (art. 9). The aide-mémoire o f 13 September was a frank and realistic programme, influenced broadly by the lines o f Balfour’s memorandum o f 8 August. But it was also a bold presentation o f a case, considering that it regarded the British and the French already as defacto mandatories o f Palestine, Mesopotamia and Syria, and that it completely disregarded the possibility o f an Am erican mandate in the area, a feature that clashed with Balfour’s conceptions. The document indeed pointed out that the new plan o f occupation zones would be ‘in harmony with arrangements concluded in December 1918, between M . Clemenceau and Lloyd George* (art. 6). Rather as a mark o f courtesy President Wilson was called as arbitrator to settle future Anglo-French disputes concerning the Syrian boundaries and the M esopotam ia-M editerranean communication lines (arts. 7-8). This seemed a poor recompense for the fact that the advice o f Wilson’s commissioners to Syria was not even mentioned.12 1 M y italics. 2 It is not certain whether the contents o f the King-Crane report were known to the British government at the time the aide-mémoire was composed. As late as 6

192 PR O V ISIO N A L AGREEM ENT OF SEPTEMBER 1919

In spite o f this Lloyd George brought a copy o f the aidemémoire to Frank Polk, who dined with the prime minister and his retinue on the very evening o f 12 September when the British arrived in Paris. ‘It should be observed’, Hankey noted, ‘that M r Polk made no adverse statement.’ 1 The Am erican, however, recorded that he had expressed his suspicion that the British wanted to agree with the French on Syria and Palestine before­ hand and then to present this, as their join t proposal for settle­ ment, to the peace conference.2 As a matter o f fact, some mem­ bers o f the American delegation had feared this kind o f fa it accompli since the beginning o f August.3 Lloyd George did not deny this possibility, but said that it would be only a proposal o f settlement.4 T o the president, Polk reported the following con­ clusion: ‘The British think that Clemenceau is unwilling to go into a serious discussion o f the Syrian matter until after the election’.5 The day before, Lloyd George had written to Clemenceau proposing discussions on the Syrian and Armenian questions for the next week-end, seeing that the British government wished to lay ‘certain proposals’ before the supreme council when the Syrian question came under discussion. Apparently Clemenceau too, had taken Syrian affairs into his own hands. Georges-Picot had been called to Paris, and at the beginning o f September he spent long hours téte-à-tête with the premier.6 Consequently, 1 Summary of Proceedings . . . 17 Sept. 1919; B .D ., idem p. 384. 2 Note written by hand, by Frank Polk, concerning a table-talk with the British prime minister and his retinue, 11 Sept. 1919; p o l k , 78/53. 3 See for instance a memorandum by General Bliss and Henry W hite, 6 Aug. 1919; l a n s i n o , xx, 416-19. The report refers to the French parliamentary election in November 1919. 6 Général M ordacq: La Ministère de Clemenceau (Paris, 1930), iv, 99. September, Polk had refused its communication to the British (Grew to Buckler, special agent at the American Embassy in London, 6 Sept. 1919, off. letter; N .A. 181.9102/11). But already on the 15th Philip K err returned a copy of it to Polk and thanked him for the loan with a rather sad comment, apparendy hinting at the simultaneous provisional agreement on Syria: ‘When the Commission arrived in the Near East, an official statement was issued by the British in London, to the Press stating that they would give full weight to the recommendations of the Com­ mission before making up their minds in regard to the future of the territories concerned.9 K err to Polk, 15 O ct. 1919, private letter, p o l k , 78/52.

PR O V ISIO N A L AGREEM ENT OF SEPTEMBER 1919 193

Clemenceau was hardly unprepared when on 11 September Lloyd George sent him an invitation to settle matters on the British withdrawal from Syria. He replied affirm atively the very same day, presuming that the rearrangement o f the occupation zones would not prejudice the final settlement o f the mandates, which, he stressed, was connected with the liquidation o f the Ottom an em pire.1 O n Saturday 13 September the premiers finally met at Paris. Lloyd George delivered the aide-mémoire. As to the discussions in this meeting, he assured Polk afterwards that it had been ‘a pleasant interview* but had not led to any conclusion.2 The French, nevertheless, did not need a long time to come to a de­ cision. O n M onday morning (15 September) in the meeting o f the supreme council a communiqué was read according to which the French government accepted the withdrawal o f the British army and their replacement by French troops 'in C ilicia and in Syria west o f the Sykes-Picot line’, but on the understand­ ing that France was not committed to acceptance o f any other part o f the proposals included in the aide-mémoire o f 13 Septem­ ber.3 Explaining the background o f his proposals, Lloyd George once more took up the question whether the Sykes-Picot agree­ ment was based on the engagements made by the British government with the Arabs. Clemenceau said on this occasion that he was prepared to discuss even the other part o f Lloyd George’s proposals (regarding the railw ay question) if he could have an answer 'as to whether the occupation by French troops o f Syria and C ilicia would be considered as not merely a part o f the agreement suggested in the Aide-M ém oire (viz: SykesPicot agreement) but as a definite acceptance o f the agree­ ment*.4 Lloyd George consequently answered that there was no 1 Clemenceau to Lloyd George, 11 Sept. 1919, unnumbered communication; B .D ., idem, p. 380. 2 Polk to Wilson and the secretary o f state, 16 Sept. 1919, tel., M iller Diary, xx, 418. 3 Summary o f Proceedings. . . 17 Sept. 1919; B .D ., idem, p. 385. Minutes o f the meeting o f the Supreme Council, 15 Sept. 1919, at 10.30 a.m in M iller Diary, xvi, 513, and B .D ., 1, i, 63a. 4 Clemenceau also refused to agree that the French offer to send an expedition to Armenia should constitute any part in this agreement. In the aide-mémoire it formed a paragraph o f its own— art. 11.

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question o f acceptance o f the whole agreement. By this reply the September negotiations were definitely restricted to m ilitary arrangements. 5 The carrying out o f the September agreement proceeded according to the fixed tim e-table. The evacuation o f the British troops began on 1 November and by the end o f the year they had been withdrawn behind the demarcation lines agreed on in Paris. The situation which had been feared by the commanderin-chief now ensued. A t the moment o f the withdrawal the French did not have enough troops to take over even the coastal zone and C ilicia: compared to 34 infantry battalions, 15I cavalry regiments, 5k battalions o f engineers and 13 batteries o f artillery o f British troops in the whole o f Syria, the French were at the beginning o f November able to produce 13 infantry battalions (3 Arm enian and 1 Syrian), 3 cavalry squadrons, and 4 batteries o f artillery.1 The 'massive effort’ in the Levant conceived o f by M arshal Foch in O ctober 1919 was impeded by the simultaneous demobilization and the need for troops in M orocco, the Ruhr and the Balkans, so that the couple o f regiments sent to Beirut in the course o f the autumn, more or less for the sake o f prestige, had no reinforcements until the following spring.12 The French were to regret this lack o f effort when at odds with the Turks in C ilicia the next winter. It is obvious that the replacement o f the British troops by insufficient French forces constituted, for the Turks, an invitation to attack, and, for the Arabs, a temptation to feel stronger than they were.3 The evacuation itself was performed without noteworthy incident. There occurred, however, a grave controversy in the 1 Lt.-Col. Goudot: ‘Les Opérations de l’Armée Française au Levant*, La Syrie et le Liban en ig s i, p. 78. 2 Idem, pp. 76-7. 3 The American consul in Beirut, M r Knabenshue, reported on 19 September that the British believed that Mustafa Kem al would try, either with or without consent of the Arabs, to march upon Aleppo and Damascus once the British had withdrawn— W allace (American Mission, Constantinople) to the secretary o f state, 21 O ct. 1919, tel. 1537; N .A. 867,000/968 (R .G . 59).

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Ba’albek-Rashbeya-Hashbeya area, the specific character o f which never seems to have been seriously considered by the negotiators in Paris. These three gazas belonged to the old Ottom an vilayet o f Syria, and were therefore, according to the promise given to Husain, part o f the purely A rab portion o f Syria. In the Sykes-Picot partition they had been included in the ‘blue* zone. According to article 3 o f the aide-mémoire o f 13 September the garrisoning o f these gazas should naturally have been left to the Arab forces, especially as this part had belonged to the O .E .T .A . east.1 In spite o f this, the Sykes-Picot line was now adopted as the eastern lim it o f the French occupation zone. Here was another reason for the Arabs to conclude that the temporary arrangement o f occupation zones camouflaged the final partition o f Syria. From the aide-mémoire o f 13 September it clearly appears that the British government had proposed something which was intended to be a permanent arrangement, only later to be sanctioned by the peace conference.2 The results o f the nego­ tiations o f 12-16 September did not fulfil these expectations. The w ay in which the English press commented at the end o f September on the provisional agreement indicates that the Syrian question was considered settled.3 In France, on the contrary, hardly one editorial greeted it as an acceptable settle­ ment. A n im portant motive o f certain representatives o f the Paris press was probably to deny the apparent diplom atic victory o f Clemenceau in view o f the coming elections. It is significant, however, that the attack against what was called the ‘ Clem enceau-Allenby’ arrangement was once again led by Robert de C aix who none the less secured a few weeks later the position o f secretary general to the French high commissioner in Syria. The cause o f this discontent, de Gontaut-Biron stated, was that the agreement confined the French troops to the zone west o f the Sykes-Picot line, which was contrary to expectations.4 The exclusion o f the French troops from the inland was 1 See Maps 3 and 4. 3 Compare, e.g. its art. 8. 3 See, for instance, the leading articles o f The Tuner, 19 S ep t 1919, and The Near East, 19 Sept. 1919, p. 305. 4 Gontaut-Biron, p. 311.

O

ig6 PR O V ISIO N A L AGREEM ENT OF SEPTEM BER 1919

considered even more unpardonable as the British were given the right to remain in occupation o f M osul, which in the 1916 agree­ ment constituted part o f the same French-dominated area (A ).1 There were a few rejoicing voices but this did not mean that anti-British feeling because o f Syria was diminishing. ‘The manner in which it (the recent agreement) has been received by the Paris press in general scarcely warrants such a hope*, Grahame concluded his report on 18 September, ‘and it is to be feared that the leader-writers . . . w ill find fresh material for their attacks on British policy on the score that the new arrange­ ment is not fully in harmony with the Anglo-French agreement o f 1916.*2 M oreover, Clemenceau in his reply to the British aidemémoire o f 13 September, had changed his tune in an un­ mistakably rigid w ay. His memorandum, handed to the head o f the British peace delegation on 10 O ctober,3 was apparently sincere in desiring to preserve an entente in the east as well as in the west, but on the basis o f absolute equality. The settlement as a whole signified for him exclusively an Anglo-French dialogue. For him there was ‘the necessity recognized by the Conference o f confiding to a European power “ a mandate over the Arabs** judged still incapable o f governing themselves in Syria as well as Mesopotamia*. But there was no necessity to follow the letter o f the covenant which stipulated that the choice o f the man­ datory was up to the mandated populations themselves. O nce more the British government had learnt that, on the Syrian question, it had to deal with an old autocrat, who, though moderate in his anti-colonialist tendencies and never a voice in the imperialist chorus o f Partant pour la Syrie,4 was archaic and blind in his incomprehension o f the force o f the new nationalisms in the east. 1 Le Journal des Débats, 17 Sept. 1919; Le Temps, 18 Sept 1919. 18 Sept., letter no. 909; B.D ., 1, iv, 394. 3 Enclosure in despatch: Crowe to Curzon, 10 O ct. 1919, letter no. 1931, idem, pp. 452-4. (Sir E. Crowe was the successor o f A . J . Balfour as the head o f the British peace delegation.) 4 Partant pom la Syrie was an old m ilitary song originating from the French Syrian expedition o f the 1860s.

2 Grahame to Curzon,

CH APTER X

Failure o f Faisal less than ten weeks the prospect o f an American mandate, lightly assumed by Faisal to be a firm possibility, had led him to a blind alley. The mistake caused him an irreparable loss o f prestige both at home and abroad. By now the emir was facing a stark dilemma: whether to accept the impasse, to make a complete break with the peace conference and, following the example o f M ustafa Kem al, lead an open revolt at the head o f his pan-Arab ‘maximalists' clamouring for independence or death;1 or to return to the bosom o f the French, an inevitable choice if he accepted the necessity o f foreign assistance. His wavering between these two alternatives forms the sad history o f the Arab government o f Damascus, at which the British thenceforth attended rather as spectators. During his first trip to Damascus at the beginning o f Septem­ ber, the new chief political officer, Colonel Richard M einertzhagen, tried to mediate between Faisal and the French, but without result.12 Instead, the Colonel observed, Faisal now seemed to have accepted a Jewish national home within an Arab federation, if it was all to be under a British mandate: ‘He is inclined to ignore British refusal o f Syrian mandate and intends to force the hand o f His M ajesty's Government in this respect.’3 Faisal's loyalty to Great Britain was again expressed in the n

I

1 As to the spirit o f the Damascus politics at that time, see an undated letter (August 1919) of Faisal to Lloyd George, appendix I to no. 278, B.D .y 1, iv, 386. 2 The successor of Clayton with his pronouncedly pro-Zionist tendencies took a rather cool view of the government of Damascus. To Balfour he gave the following advice, 30 July, the day he was called for his new nomination in Syria: T explained that without British gold, arms and ammunition, the Arab bubble must burst in a few weeks, and that by withdrawing our material support from Faisal, the Arabs have no means wherewith to oppose the French.’ Meinertzhagen, pp. 26-7. 3 Meinertzhagen to Curzon, 12 Sept. 1919, tel. no. 443; B .D ., idem, p. 383.

198

FAILU R E OF FAISAL

letter he sent to the prime minister at the end o f August. It was both a warning and an emotional appeal, not without clear­ sightedness and prophetic vision as to the future o f the M iddle East: ‘The future Government o f the Arab provinces w ill be the last lesson to be given by Europe to the East.’ 1 Faisal above all requested that he might im mediately leave for London to ex­ pound his views to the British government. W hen Lloyd George received this message on 9 September at Deauville, he had already accepted a suggestion o f Colonel M einertzhagen’s that the emir should be asked to come to Europe.2 It is significant that though Allenby also had stressed the importance o f the m atter,3 the cable inviting Faisal was not sent until 11 Septem­ ber, when it was virtually certain that he would not be able to reach Paris before the talks were over.4 W hen Clemenceau learnt that the emir had been invited to come to Paris without his knowledge, he gave a warning that the journey did not have 'any definite object in view ’.9 Faisal, however, taking the quickest possible means o f sea transport, arrived at Marseilles on a British torpedo destroyer, on the afternoon o f the 17th. He refused to receive the press and the same evening continued his w ay to Calais and over to England.6 The day after his arrival in London, the 19th, Faisal and his retinue, General H addad Pasha7 and Fu'ad al-K hatib, the emir's political adviser, met the prime minister with Bonar Law , Curzon and Allenby, at 10 Downing Street. There, Faisal was informed o f the temporary agreement reached with France and presented with the aide-mémoire o f 13 September. W ith obvious embarrassment, Lloyd George explained to him that in 'the 1 Faisal to Lloyd George, appendix 1 to no. 278, idem, p. 387. 3 Curzon to Balfour, g Sept, ig ig , tel. no. 1140; idem, p. 373. As appears from the previous chapter the French had reason to claim that they had not been in­ formed until the message was sent. 3 Balfour to Curzon, 11 S ep t 1919, tel. unnumbered; idem, p. 379. 4 Lloyd George had told the French that he could only stay until the 16th. 5 Clemenceau to Lloyd George (Deauville), 11 S ep t 1919, unnumbered com­ munication; idem, p. 380. 6 According to the British liaison officer Col. Stirling who was accompanying the emir, the French took, during the journey through France, great care to isolate him from contact with the local population. W . F. Stirling: Safety Last (London, 1952), p. 100. 7 Director General o f Public Security, O .E .T .A . east, acted also as interpreter for Faisal.

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areas opposite the zone, tem porarily and provisionally occupied by the French*, the Arabs should ask only for French assistance. Faisal was also told that h alf the subsidy to the A rab govern­ ment was henceforth to be paid by the French government. As the emir remarked that this arrangement was the same as that o f 1916, the prime minister replied that, ‘under this agreement, the Em ir Faisal was not bound to ask for assistance unless he wished it*!1 In his letter o f 21 September to Lloyd George, Faisal firm ly rejected the arrangement suggested by the prime minister. ‘It is’, he commented on the agreement o f 15 September, ‘an unjust return to the policy o f ambitious imperialism which after this war should be swept aw ay for ever.’ 12 The day afterwards he refused to discuss the question o f the relief o f the British forces with Allenby. Recalling that it had been the commander-inchief who had forced the sharifian troops to withdraw from Beirut in the preceding October, he now claimed that if the status quo was no longer maintained, the A rab forces should be allowed to return to the places occupied on the sea-coast.3 Despite his resentment, the emir was cautious enough not to accuse the British Government directly. Colonel G. E. Wilson (on a consultation trip to London from Jidda) described Faisal’s bitterness as being directed against the French and as being stronger than ever.4*The emir, nevertheless, took up the ques­ tion o f the pledges given to Sharif Husain and claimed that his father had in fact concluded an agreement with M cM ahon in 1915, whereby the whole Syrian coast should belong to the 1 Notes of a meeting held at io Downing Street, ig Sept. 1919, at 4 p.m .; idem, pp. 397 and 401. 2 Faisal to Lloyd George, 21 Sept. 1919, unnumbered communication; idem, p. 409. 9 Faisal to Lloyd George, 23 Sept. 1919, unnumbered communication; idem, p. 413. For the particulars o f the Allenby-Faisal conversation, see Stirling, pp. 102-3. 4 C . E. Wilson to W ingate, 25 Sept. 1919, private letter; w i n g a t e , box 237/3. Capt. Yale in London at the end o f September observed that the Arabs were growing bitter towards the British as well. Reporting a conversation with Rustum Haidar, the second delegate o f the H ijaz at the Peace Conference, 30 September, he wrote that ‘Rustum Haidar in a burst o f confidence told me that he at times was obsessed with a violent desire to throw bombs at Lloyd George and other British imperialists9, ‘Report in detail o f Interview in London9 by W illiam Yale, p. 3; b l i s s , box 242— Arab State, and y a l e , Syria, vi-42.

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future Arab state.1 A t another meeting at Downing Street, 23 September, Curzon answered that the so-called agreement Faisal had referred to was in reality only a draft o f the A rab claims which the king o f the H ijaz had sent to the Cairo Resi­ dency in August 1918, and which the British had never accepted.2 The cabinet now grew im patient to rid itself o f this compli­ cation as soon as possible. H eavy pressure was exerted on Faisal to bring him to accept the provisional agreement and the necessity o f a reconciliation with the French. The political officers at Damascus, Colonels Cornwallis and Stirling, who stayed with him at the Carlton H otel,3 took part in all the meetings arranged for Faisal in Downing Street, and had numerous reported unofficial interviews with him. A t the end o f Faisal's sojourn in London, the foreign secretary expressly thanked Cornwallis for his efforts to persuade Faisal to accept a compromise.4 T . £. Lawrence too was called by the Foreign Office to help convince the emir o f the necessity o f accepting the fa it accompli o f 15 September. In response to the invitation he wrote a letter to Lord Curzon suggesting a new liberal line for British Arab policy in accordance with his famous affirmation: ‘M y own ambition is that the Arabs should be our first brown dominion and not our last brown colony.'3 As in the near future Damascus would still be the main gathering point o f the A rab W orld, 1 Notes o f a meeting held at 10 Downing Street, 19 Sept. 1919, at 4 p.m .; B .D ., idem, pp. 399-400. 2 Notes of a meeting held at 10 Downing Street, 23 Sept. 1919, at 12 noon; idem, pp. 413-15. 3 C . E. Wilson to W ingate, 25 Sept. 1919; w i n o a t e , idem. Stirling, p. 100. 4 Curzon to Cornwallis, 23 Sept. 1919, unnumbered official letter; B .D ., idem, p. 457, note 3. Note by Col. Cornwallis o f conversations with the Emir Faisal, 25 S ep t 1919; idem, pp. 421-2. 3 Lawrence to Curzon, 25 Sept. 1919; unnumbered private letter; idem, pp. 422-4. As for Syria, Lawrence suggested as the main immediate measures, that an assembly elect«! from areas (A) and (B) together would ratify the provisional agreement o f 15 September and Faisal's position (presumably as chief o f state); that a free port, either at H aifa, Tripoli or Alexandretta would be conceded to the Arab administration; that advisers would be provided, as agreed, by the French for area (A) and by the British for area (B), but that the British liaison officer would still be entitled to stay at Damascus. Lawrence’s letter emphasized the im­ portance o f Iraq which, to his mind, with its increasing population would later assume leadership o f the Arab countries.

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French influence should be fought by continued subsidies to the H ijaz and by imposing such a settlement in Syria as would im­ pede the effective take-over o f that country by the French.1 Lawrence's suggestions had to w ait for eighteen months before they were discussed and actually formulated into a policy at the conference o f Cairo in M arch 1921. The influence o f the British liberal line o f policy on the French attitude in Syria remained slighter than expected. It came too late to save Faisal’s government in Damascus, but it secured a kind o f resurrection o f the Hashemite régime in Baghdad. Another unsuccessful intervention was made by W illiam Y ale, who, at the end o f September, was sent to London in order to follow the progress o f negotiations between the British government and Faisal.123Before leaving Paris, Y ale had met Berthelot, Goût, and Robert de C aix, and arrived in London convinced that he knew what the French considered as mini­ mum claims in Syria. In London he met, besides Faisal and his advisers, a number o f British connected with A rab affairs, and then formulated a new proposal for a basis o f settlement, which — on the suggestion o f Wickham Steed— was published anony­ mously in The Times* W hether the cabinet ever approved, as Garnett claims,4 or even considered this plan, is unlikely. Because o f the private character o f his mission, Y ale did not consider it possible to ask to meet Lloyd George. Nor did he see Curzon, the only 1 Lawrence presented his differing views on the British M iddle East policy in a memorandum received in the Foreign Office 15 September. See Garnett, pp. 388-91. 2 Report in Detail o f Interview in London (37 Sept. 1919-14 O c t 1919), p. 1.; b l i s s , box 242/‘Arab State’ and y a l e , Syria vi-42. Yale had criticized the Anglo-French agreement of September as ‘a most pernicious one’ and prophesied that the Arabs would never accept it. Garnett, pp. 283-4. 3 Y ale suggested the formation of an independent Syrian state extending from Aqaba to Aleppo, with access to the sea at Tripoli and Latakia, the separation o f Mount Lebanon as a political unity o f its own, and the submission of both under the mandate of France. Palestine he proposed should be placed under the mandate of Great Britain, with the programme o f the Jewish national home. Northern Mesopotamia he suggested should form an independent state with an Arab government and under the mandate o f Great Britain, southern Mesopotamia being a separate political unit with local self-government under the same man­ datory power. Garnett, pp. 286-7. 4 Idem, p. 387.

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representative o f the Foreign Office whom he met being Lord Robert Cecil, who said he had been out o f touch with these questions recently. The main reason why Y ale believed that his plan would not be accepted by the British government, was that he had insisted that Arab self-determination in northern Meso­ potam ia should be on the same scale as in Syria.1 Y a le’s continuous allusions, during his stay in London, to the egoistic aims o f the British policy in Mosul and to the pressure exercised in this respect by the Adm iralty and private oil interests, certainly aroused suspicion that he principally intended to keep the door open for Am erican oil interests in northern M esopotamia.12 This m ay be an im portant reason why even the Am erican representative in the Supreme Council did not give Y ale support for introducing his scheme to Clem enceau.3 2

The Y ale plan was finally pushed aside as a result o f the new situation created by Faisal. In a message to Lloyd George on 9 O ctober he proposed that the Anglo-French arrangement o f September should be cancelled or transferred for the considera­ tion o f the peace conference or o f a commission consisting o f British, French and Arab representatives under Am erican chairmanship.4*Lloyd George refused to accept any delay in the evacuation tim e-table, but agreed to the idea o f a meeting to consider the problems involved in the British withdrawal.9 1 Reporting a discussion 3 October with Gob. Cornwallis and Stirling about the possibility o f Britain giving up her direct control of northern Mesopotamia and establishing there an Arab government, Y ale noted that 'they expressed some doubts as to whether their Foreign Office would be willing to do so*. 1 It must be remembered that the Foreign Office had reason to consider him as a representative o f Standard O il since he had been employed by thb company in the M iddle East in 1914-17 (see: Clayton to Lord Hardinge, 17 June, 1919, tel. no. 605; B .D ., i , iv, 978). Obviously the oil question was an important object o f his mission to London. Both to Cornwallis and Stirling, and to D. G . Hogarth (with whom he had an interview on 6 October), Y ale gave the warning that it was useless for British oil interests to insist on direct British control over Upper Mesopotamia, because the United States would not tolerate any monopoly o f the Mesopotamian oil fields. 3 According to Garnett, p. 988. 4 Faisal to Lloyd George, 9 O ct. 1919, unnumbered letter; idem, p. 443. 3 Lloyd George to Faisal, 10 O ct. 1919; idem, pp. 451-9.

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Clemenceau, however, rejected the plan altogether arguing that the emir was only trying once more to get the Americans involved in the Syrian question. He refused General G ouraud1 permission to come to London to the suggested meeting and denied Faisal the right to propose that an Am erican delegate participate in the discussions on Syria.12 The haughty and autocratic tone o f his answer made Lloyd George very irate, and inspired him to send Clemenceau a most bitter and lengthy letter.3 But by now the British government was ready to take the deliberate step o f directing Faisal to Paris as the French premier had suggested. The day after the arrival o f Clemenceau’s letter, Curzon called the emir to the Foreign Office and induced him to accept the invitation 'to go to Paris without delay, unaccompanied by any Englishman, and with no evi­ dence o f British inspiration or backing, to see Clemenceau personally*.4*In order to emphasize his determination to get rid o f the embarrassing emir, the foreign secretary wrote to the ambassador in Paris that if he tried to come back to London, he should be discouraged.9 H aving failed in his hope to have the Americans intervene once again in the Syrian question,6 Faisal had to resign him self to investigating the sombre-looking prospects o f a reconciliation with the French. His second stay in Paris began in very different circumstances from his first arrival there less than eleven months earlier. 'A fter having covered him with flowers and sung his praises in all tones*, General M ordacq, the m ilitary chef de cabinet o f Clemenceau, observed, 'the French press has virtually dragged him through the mud.*7 The British ambassador noticed that one o f the best-known publicists o f the 1 The newly appointed French high commissioner in Syria and Lebanon. 2 Clemenceau to Derby. 14 O ct. 1919; enclosure to despatch: Derby to Curzon, 14 O ct. 1919, letter no. 996; idem, p. 4168. 3 See below, p. 230. 4 Curzon to Derby, 16 O c t 1919, personal letter; B .D ., idem, p. 475. 3 Minutes by Curzon, 19 O ct. 1919, on the farewell message addressed to him by Faisal, 16 O ct. 1919; idem, p. 476. 4 Faisal had called personally, on 17 October, on the American ambassador in London (Davis to the secretary of state, 18 O ct., tel. no. 3264; w i l s o n , acc. 9712, box 20) and, five days later, on Polk in Paris (Polk to the secretary o f state, 24 O c t 1919, tel. no. 4867; w i l s o n , idem). 7 M ordacq, iv, 134.

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‘Syrian Party*, M aurice Barrés, welcomed Faisal’s arrival in France by calling on his fellow-writers to exercise pressure on the government while it was negotiating with the em ir.1 Furthermore, Faisal happened to arrive in Paris at a time when the government was pre-occupied with home politics. O n the very day o f his arrival, 19 O ctober, the ordinary 1919 session o f the Cham ber was adjourned and the election cam­ paign begun.2 After an interview with Clemenceau on 22 O ctober,3 Faisal seems indeed to have had to deal m ainly with Berthelot and Goût o f the Q uai d’Orsay. In a letter to the British prime minister, 6 November, he complained that the French were uncomprehending and wanted him to accept their Syrian mandate as a fa it accompli.4 Faisal enclosed a letter sent him by Clemenceau, who had explained that under the actual pro­ visional arrangement the French were prepared to let the emir preserve order in area (A), and were ready to come to help him at the first call, if he was troubled by any ‘agitators’.5 Robert de C aix in an unofficial conversation at the beginning o f November denied that the French had any intention o f seeking to penetrate into the interior o f Syria. The presence o f the French arm y in the neighbouring zone would, however, he suggested, make it easier for the emir to save face with the Arabs and accept the French m andate.6 Forbes-Adam, who reported this interview, gathered the impression that the French regarded a mandate ‘as something very like a protectorate or an annexionist form o f a protectorate’ ; they evidently hoped that the pan-Arab policies o f Faisal would trouble the British conception o f a mandate in Syria. M oreover, Forbes-Adam concluded, the French were anxious to co-operate with the British, and in order to be able to do this were not likely to ‘use Faisal badly’.7 About the same time Clemenceau 1 Derby to Curzon, 20 O c t 1919, letter no. 1018; B .D ., idem, pp. 490-3. The article by Barrés was published in Écho dt Paris, 30 O c t 1919. 3 Bonnefous, iii, 63. 3 M ordacq, iv, 141. 4 Faisal to Lloyd George, 6 Nov. 1919, unnumbered letter; enclosure 1 in no. 355 (rcc- to Nov.) in B.D .', idem, pp. 510 -11. 9 Clemenceau to Faisal, 3 Nov. 1919, unnumbered letter; enclosure 3 in no. 355; idem, p. 513. 6 M inute by M r Forbes Adam ; enclosure in no. 360 (rec. 13 O ct. 1919), idem, p. 5297 Idem.

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wrote a letter to Lloyd George in which he intentionally drew attention to Mosul, which had been included in area (A) in the 1916 agreement and was now— he stated— ‘claimed by our A rab allies under the same conditions*.1 A despatch sent by Curzon to Sir Percy C ox in Teheran on 14 November, reveals that the foreign secretary regarded the information received from Paris as significant. He emphasized that the French insisted upon the absolute parallelism o f Mesopotamia and Syria, and that Faisal was likely to follow the same tactics.2 This particular fact strengthened the decision o f the British to avoid intervening in the dispute between Faisal and the French. W hen in December General Haddad Pasha requested British support in the quarrel over the Biqa* area, he was turned down by the Foreign Office spokesman for the following reasons: ‘W e should very strongly resent any French protest as to our action in Mesopotamia or even in the vilayet o f Mosul or on its borders and the French position with regard to the Bekaa is somewhat analogous.’ 3 3 H ad it not been for British good offices, the Biqa’ incident would probably have led to a catastrophe as far as Faisal was concerned.4 The replacement o f the British by French troops in the gazas in question, Baalbek, Rashbeya and Hashbeya, was originally fixed for 22 Novem ber.5 A few days earlier Haddad Pasha had arrived in London from Paris, asking for postpone­ ment o f the relief o f the British troops.6*9As a result o f this, on 20 November, the W ar Office informed the French m ilitary attaché in London that Allenby had received orders to establish direct communication with Gouraud in order to lim it the 1 Clemenceau to Lloyd George, 9 Nov. 1919, unnumbered letter; idem, p. 522. The letter was communicated to the Foreign Office, 12 Nov. 2 Curzon to Cox, 14 Nov. 1919, unnumbered telegram; idem, p. 531. Curzon succeeded Balfour 24 October. 3 Note of M r Kidston, 24 Dec. 1919, on his verbal communication to Haddad Pasha; idem, p. 592, note 1 (in no. 401). * For the background o f the incident, see above pp. 75-6 and 195. 9 Goudot, p. 80. * Col. Joyce (then in Paris) to Col. Gribbon, W ar Office, 18 Nov. 1919, unnum­ bered letter; B .D ., idem, p. 544, note 2.

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French occupation to the O .E .T .A . west (as mentioned above, the three gazas o f the Biqa* area belonged to the m ilitary administration o f the east zone). ‘The Foreign Office and the W ar Office consider indeed*, the attaché wrote to Paris, ‘that the occupation o f the blue zone in the whole part west o f the Dam ascus-Aleppo railw ay w ill present grave risks.’ 1 Conse­ quently, General Congrave, now general officer commanding British forces in Egypt, met General Gouraud in Beirut and induced him to agree to postpone the change-over until 28 November,2 then— after certain difficulties— until 30 Novem­ ber.3 During the delay an understanding was fortunately reached in Paris between the emir and the French government.4 The compromise on the Biqa* was an important prelude to the agreement to which Faisal was ultim ately forced in Paris. Obviously discouraged by British indifference, he had taken the initiative o f proposing to the French a provisional agreement on a simple and unpretentious basis: British, French and Arab troops should remain in O .E .T .A . south, west and east accord­ ing to their distribution in September 1918, and a tripartite commission should be established to settle differences between the zones and to maintain contact between the corresponding administrations.9 The French accepted the proposal on the significant condition that the commission should have its seat in Beirut, under the chairmanship o f General Gouraud.6 Faisal on his part made his acceptance conditional on withdrawal o f the French artillery detachment from Damascus.7 Because o f inability to compromise, or rather because the French wanted to achieve something more definite, the agreement was not concluded, and the matter lingered on. 1 La Parouse, French m ilitary attaché in London, to Guerre, 21 Nov. 1919, official letter no. 1571; o u i c h a r d , v , 795. 2 Goudot, p. 80. 9 Curzon to Derby, 28 Nov. 1919, tel. no. 1284; B.D ., idem, p. 554. 4 The Franco-Arab exchange of letters concerning this agreement, idem, pp. 555-7. According to it both Gouraud’s army and the Arab troops would abstain from entering the Biqa’ and let public order be maintained by an Arab gendarmerie under French supervision. As it w ill be seen, the British helped probably decisively in fulfilling the arrangement by breaking the nationalist resistance in Damascus. 9 Derby to Curzon, 21 Nov. 1919, tel. no. 1187; idem, pp. 543-4. 6 Berthelot to Gouraud, 25 Nov. 1919, copy of an unnumbered telegram trans­ mitted to Faisal by Berthelot himself; idem, pp. 555-6. 7 Faisal to Berthelot, 28 Nov. 1919, copy o f an unnumbered letter; idem, p. 557.

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In the middle o f December a new incident in Baalbek, one o f the three gazas o f the Biqa’ area, prompted Faisal to appeal to the British once again.1 The real cause o f this latest cry o f distress was the French proposal for a permanent Syrian settlement which Faisal had now received, and which, as D erby interpreted it, would have established Syria ‘as a French protectorate*.12 Fatigued by his long and virtually fruitless stay in Paris, the emir had once again fixed a date o f departure, this time for the 2 ist. The British ambassador, him self suspecting the ultimatum-like character o f the French treaty proposal, strongly advised him to leave unless the foreign secretary recommended the contrary.3 By this time Curzon was evidently acquainted with Berthelot’s memorandum o f 12 December, in which the new head o f the Q uai d’Orsay gave an assurance o f the French deter­ mination to come to terms with Faisal: T n order to reach an entente with Faisal, France has greatly modified her original views.’4 M oreover, Faisal’s last message reached the Foreign Office on 22 December, the day on which a promising Anglo-French conference started at 10 Downing Street.5 It is not surprising that the emir’s letter remained unanswered. Faisal stayed, however, and had to negotiate with his back to the wall. A t his last stage o f negotiations Faisal seems to have offered but little resistance to the French. His counter-proposal, prepared at the time when Berthelot in London was proclaim­ ing French moderation vis-à-vis the Arabs,6 followed the lines o f the French draft to a surprising extent. Consequently, the agreement reached at the beginning o f January could not depart in any essential points from the French proposal.7 The emir had 1 Faisal to Curzon, 19 Dec. 1919, unnumbered letter; idem, pp. 591-2. 2 Derby to Curzon, 20 Dec. 1919, tel. no. 1237; idem, p. 592. 3 Idem, p. 593. 4 Note o f M . Berthelot, 12 Dec. 1919; idem, p. 578. 9 See below, p. 229. 9 Both the French and the Arab drafts were received at the Foreign Office on 24 December; they are reproduced in B .D ., idem, pp. 592-5. Faisal handed his draft to Clemenceau on M onday 22 December when he was reported as having met the premier {Correspondance d'Orient, 15 Jan. 1920, p. 18). 7 U te text o f the agreement as communicated to Colonel Gribbon, 16 January 1920, by General Haddad Pasha, is reprinted in B .D ., idem, pp. 625-7.

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yielded to the French on several important points such as acceptance o f French ‘advisers’ and monopoly o f contracts and financing, in consenting to at least a partial occupation o f the country by a French ‘protective force’, and in allowing the extension o f the boundaries o f Lebanon, politically separated from Syria. M oreover, a dangerous number o f basic questions as regards the future government in Syria still remained to be solved. These included such problems as the establishment o f local autonomies which Faisal opposed, and the setting up o f a Syrian parliam ent which the French were not able to accept.1 The agreement being apparently unacceptable to the national­ ists in Damascus, Faisal stated on several occasions that he had not signed any treaty and emphasized that the acceptance o f any engagement on his part was dependent on the w ill o f his people. The French Foreign M inistry, fearing the reactions o f the ‘Syrian Party’ on the brink o f the presidential elections, also expressly denied the existence o f the treaty.12 Thus it was kept secret and never put into effect. Though the French-Arab agreement never came about, the incident constitutes an essential chapter in the history o f AngloFrench relations. By avoiding any interference in the negotia­ tions in Paris, the Foreign Office had made clear that it wanted to re-establish the old line o f Sir Edward Grey o f 1912, that o f disinterest in Syria. Faisal openly referred to this as the main reason o f his defeat: the agreement was ‘largely distasteful to him’, he complained to Colonel W aters-Taylor3 in Beirut, ‘b u t . . . attitude o f British authorities gave him no choice and . . . he had been handed over tied by feet and hands to the French*.4 1 According to a statement by Berthelot— British Secretary’s Notes o f an Allied Conference held at 10 Downing Street, February 1 8 ,1 9 3 0 , at 1 1 .3 0 a.m .; B .D .,

I, vii,

1 18 .

3 Derby to Curzon, 8 Jan. 19 3 0 , letter no. 3 3 ; idem, 1 , iv, 6 3 3 . Interview o f Faisal by Fernand Hauser in Le Journal, 8 Jan. 19 3 0 , reprinted in Correspondance d 'Orient, 30 Jan. 19 3 0 , p. 6 6 . See also despatch: Vansittart to Curzon, 1 7 Jan. 19 3 0 , tel. no. 3 ; B .D ., idem, p. 6 3 7 . 3 Financial adviser to the Palestine m ilitary administration. 4 Meinertzhagen to Curzon, 3 6 Jan. 19 3 0 , tel. no. 5 3 1 ; idem, p. 6 3 0 .

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4 W hen he returned on 14 January aboard the battleship Waldeck Rousseau Faisal found the situation in Syria very different from that which he had left four months earlier. General Gouraud, the vigorous new high commissioner o f the French republic, had arrived on the same ship two months earlier at his bridge-head, Beirut, ‘to march in the tracks o f his ancestors'.1 The British arm y o f Allenby had left Damascus and let the Arab administration and the turbulent officers and politicians around the Nadi al-Arabi enjoy the false illusion o f freedom sans lendemain. Agitated by these elements, a good part o f what may be called Syrian public opinion resented Faisal's ineffectiveness and his submissiveness to the idea o f a foreign mandate. ‘The Arab National Movement feeds on opposition and would fall to pieces in six months without it; hence the French are probably helping it', Lawrence commented on the politics o f Damascus in a private conversation.12 The young Emir Zaid, left alone to deal with the embarrassing situation, would probably have been unable in Septem ber-Novem ber to contain the most zealous o f his officers from launching an adventure against the French or even to save the sharifian Government from a coup d'état, had the British commander-in-chief not kept a firm hand on the Arab command. From the British point o f view the reports from Damascus had been o f a most alarm ing nature. There were serious signs that the dominant pan-Arab Muslim politicians were turning the nationalist movement into an Islamic movement.3 Curzon, much pre-occupied with the anti-British activities o f Iraqi officers in Syria, learnt the unpleasant news that the ‘Baghdadi party' was taking a leading part in the transformation o f Arab 1 Autographical note by General Gouraud, 12 Nov. 1919, in Livre du Céré­ monial de la Chambre de Commerce de M arseilles, p. 254.

2 Note on an interview of T. E. Lawrence, 3 Nov. 1919, with a member of the American peace delegation, enclosure in the despatch: Polk to the secretary of state, 19 Nov. 1919, tel. unnumbered; N.A. 867.00/1041 (R.G. 59) and p o l k , 78/68. 3 Besides the British, the French reported the same phenomenon: Adm. Momet to Leygues, 28 Aug. 1919, unnumbered telegram; g u i c h a r d , v, 772.

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nationalism.1 M ajor J. N. Clayton, the British liaison officer in Damascus, reported that the movement represented only an agitated m inority; many influential elements, like the upperclass families in general and the merchants, various bedouin tribes and the Druzes o f the H auran, were in favour o f a stable and im partial government, whether or not established by the foreigners and even by the French.12 But the fact that the representatives o f the extreme nationalists dominated the Arab armed forces and occupied im portant positions in the ad­ ministration deserved careful attention, especially as it was rumoured that they were prepared for an alliance with M ustafa K em al.3 The leading spirit o f this movement was Yasin Pasha al-Hashimi, an ambitious Iraqi-born ex-Turkish general. M einertzhagen reported on io November that Yasin had ‘replaced for the bad the more moderate and reasonable influence o f Faisal’.4 Immediately after the emir’s departure from Paris, Yasin Pasha, now chief o f the general staff o f the A rab army, proclaimed mobilization, and was therefore called to Cairo by Allenby. Soon afterwards he was allowed to return in spite o f protests by the acting French high commis­ sioner.5 O n 24 November, the day before the last British troops left Damascus, the general was arrested again, on the order o f Allenby.6 According to a communication by the director o f m ilitary intelligence, Yasin was arrested because ‘he was conducting active anti-French propaganda and making m ilitary preparations to resist French occupation o f the Blue A rea'.7 The dateoftheeventsuggests that Allenby wanted to prevent Yasin's 1 The contents of the mentioned telegram of 15 Oct. of Major Clayton were summarized in a despatch by Meinertzhagen, 21 Nov. 1919, tel. no. 480, which was received in the Foreign Office the same day. B .D ., 1, iv, 495. 2 Report of Clayton, 15 Oct. 1919; idem, pp. 565-6. 3 Meinertzhagen to Curzon, 22 Sept. 1919; tel. no. 450; idem, pp. 409-10. 4 Meinertzhagen to Curzon, 10 Nov. 1919, tel. no. C.O.P. 311; idem, p. 523. S. F. Newcombe to Wingate, 1 Dec. 1919, private letter; w i n g a t e , box 237/4; see also Gontaut-Biron, pp. 325-7. 9 Meinertzhagen to Curzon, 22 Sept. 1919; B .D ., idem, p. 410. 6 According to Col. Newcombe who at this time was in Syria, the arrest was ‘engineered’ by Major Clayton. S. F. Newcombe to Wingate, 1 Dec. 1919; w i n g a t e , idem. 7 Note 2 to no. 389, B .D ., idem, p. 564.

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opposing the withdrawal o f the Arab forces from the Biqa* area.1 In Damascus the incident naturally caused bad blood. Yasin’s partisans were reported as having attempted to kidnap M ajor Clayton in order to hold him as hostage for the Arab general. Four British officers arriving from Mesopotamia were arrested for a while in Damascus and were liberated only with difficulty.2 Tw o weeks after the evacuation o f area (A) by the British forces, the town o f D eir ez-Zor— which was still con­ sidered to depend on the British Mesopotamian administration — was attacked by an Arab party led by a sharifian officer arrived from Aleppo.3 M einertzhagen reported to London that Emir Zaid under the influence o f Yasin Pasha had been aware o f the expedition, if not directly guilty o f giving orders for it.4 The day after the attack on Deir, 12 December, demonstrations took place in Damascus. According to M einertzhagen (who no longer had his liaison officer on the spot), they were directed against Faisal and Z a id ;5 but a private news agency reported from Cairo that they were arranged m ainly in protest against the continued detention o f Yasin Pasha.6 1 The dates of the arrest o f Yasin Pasha and the evacuation o f Damascus by the British are confirmed in the report of the American consul Young from Damascus, 26 Nov. 1919; N .A. 867.00/1028 (R .G . 59). Moreover, the American consul in Beirut, Knabenshue, in his report to Admiral Bristol, 26 Nov. 1919, gave an account of rumours according to which Yasin was arrested because he refused to withdraw his troops from the Biqa9; b r i s t o l , box 27 (‘General situation in Syria and V icinity9). 2 Newcombe to W ingate, 1 Dec. 1919; w i n o a t e , idem. It appears from Newcombe’s letter that the incident happened after the arrest o f Yasin Pasha. Official account in: Meinertzhagen to Curzon, 13 Jan. 1920, tel. no. F .O . 10 (C .P.O . 3 11 /6) ; B.D ., idem, p. 613. 3 Details of the incident in Wilson, ii, pp. 231-3. The sharifians had already a year earlier, in December 1918, made an attempt to send their representatives from Aleppo to Deir ez-Zor and to Abu Kem al, but they had been called back on the order o f Allenby (Clayton to political officer in Baghdad, 2 Jan. 1919, tel. no. 265; w i n o a t e , box 151 /1). On 11 December 1919, they probably acted on the assump­ tion that the peace conference had just decided that Deir ez-Zor was not to belong to the British mandate, as in fact a week later was announced to Baghdad (by a W ar Office telegram dated November 21!). But the way which the sharifian officers entered the town, preceded by its sacking by tribesmen and the arrest of the local British political officer, deeply hurt British prestige in the area. 4 Meinertzhagen to Curzon, 13 Jan. 1920, tel. no. F.O . 10 (C .P.O . 311/6); B .D ., idem, p. 614. 5 Idem. 6 Report of Agence Radio, 14 Dec. 1919; Correspondance d 'Orient, 15 Jan. 1920, p. 16. P

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The events in Syria again strained relations between the British Syrian and Mesopotamian administrations. Sir Hubert Young went so far as to claim that 'the Deir ez-Zor incident widened beyond all hope o f repair the already yawning gu lf between the Wilsonian and the Lawrentian schools o f thought, and led inevitably to the final catastrophe’.1 M oreover, in the actual circumstances it became quite obvious to the Foreign Office that the change in Damascus was to affect the situation in Palestine and Mesopotamia. 'A rab feeling has been changed from anti-French to anti-European’, M einertzhagen had observed in a despatch to Curzon as early as the beginning o f November. 'This is noticeable in propaganda where hostile allusions are made to the English andfriendly overtures made to Turks and even to Germans. Unarmed demonstrations, previously o f rare occurrence and with good-natured intent, have now given place to armed demonstrations o f almost daily occurrence.’12 The British in their turn had now to taste the anti-western effervescence, the roots o f which went deeply into war and pre-war years, and which previously had been directed mainly against the French. By the withdrawal o f Allenby’s troops from Syria, the British government had lost control over future events in Damascus. This was felt with great embarrassment in the critical weeks which followed the departure o f M ajor Clayton. In order to preserve at least an observation post in Damascus the British asked Gouraud to allow the return o f a liaison officer to the Syrian capital— on the grounds that area (B) depended upon the A rab administration o f Damascus. It is significant that the French would not agree to this until five weeks after the with­ drawal o f the British arm y; consequently, the new liaison officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Easton, was unable to reach Damascus before 21 January.3 1 Young, p. 300. (‘Wilsonian* here referring to Col. Arnold Wilson o f the Mesopotamian administration.) 2 Meinertzhagen to Curzon, io Nov. 1919, tel. no. C .P.O . 3 11; B .D ., idem, p. 524. M y italics. 3 Meinertzhagen to Curzon, 13 Jan. 1920; F.0 . 10 (C.P.0 . 311 /6) ; idem, p. 613. The date of Col. Easton’s arrival in Damascus was confirmed by a report of 24 Jan. of the American consul in Damascus; Admiral Bristol to the secretary of state, undated tel. no. 93; N .A. 867.00/1102 (R .G . 59).

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There are signs that the British were also preparing to main­ tain their influence on the bedouins and Druzes in the southern part o f area (A), where the Damascus government had little follow ing.1 The French, on their part, did their best to remove all British influence within the boundaries o f their future mandate. W hen Lieutenant-Colonel W aters-Taylor visited Beirut on behalf o f the chief political officer at the beginning o f January, Robert de C aix stated to him that he had given orders for all French agents to cease their activities in the British zones — obviously in expectation o f a similar gesture from the British side;2 M einertzhagen reported as early as November that in Palestine the French had received instructions to the same effect.3 In spite o f this the administration o f Palestine was still not quite happy with the French behaviour in the area.4 5 In Beirut meanwhile a strong resoluteness and optimism prevailed in French circles following the replacement o f Georges-Picot by General Gouraud, which was announced on 9 October. The appointment was especially well received by the eastern Catholics, Gouraud being known for his devotion to the Church.5 A t the same time the visit o f the M aronite Patriarch 1 e.g. Meinertzhagen to Curzon, 10 Nov. 1919; B.D ., idem, p. 523. 2 Report of Lt.-Col. W aters-Taylor dealing with a recent interview with Gen. Gouraud» 5 Jan. 1920, enclosure in no. 415; idem, p. 621. 2 Meinertzhagen to Curzon, 10 Nov. 1919, letter no. C .P.O . 311 ; idem, p. 526. 4 See, e.g. the letter by Col. E. A . Staunton, m ilitary governor of Haifa, to W ingate, 1 Jan. 1920; w i n o a t e , box 238/1, the report of Meinertzhagen to Curzon, 2 M arch 1920, tel. no. 15; B .D ., 1, xiii, 220, and the subsequent letter of Curzon to Cambon, 5 M arch 1920, no. E 1103/1103/44; idem, p. 12.— The French Cardinal Dupuis made in December 1919 a visit to the Holy Land ‘to counter-balance the influence exercised by the visit which Cardinal Bourne made in Jerusalem in the spring o f 1919*. Admiral Mornet, who accompanied the prelate to Palestine, reported that he had numerous interviews with local notables in groups and individually: T did not fail to make it understood that our interest in Palestine corresponded fully to the attachment which the people there kept alive as regards our country9 (Mornet to Leygues, 1 Jan. 1920, tel. no. 1 ; o u i c h a r d , v, 782-3). 9 Gouraud arrived at Beirut on 2 1 November. Mornet reported that at the reception demonstrations took the character of a genuine national day, but that part o f the Muslim population was absent ‘in order not to underline the impor­ tance of thefaitaccompli* (Mornet to Leygues, 1 Dec. 1 9 1 9 , tel. no. 3 2 2 0 ; o u i c h a r d , v, 780).

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o f Antioch to Paris had stimulated the hopes o f the partisans o f Greater Lebanon.1 A certain agitation resulted amidst the Christian population o f the Biqa’, leading to a number o f serious clashes with the sharifian forces and sympathizers; M einertzhagen emphasized that the first act o f agression in the Biqa* immediately after the British evacuation was committed by Lebanese Christians.2 O n the other hand the French position in Beirut and Lebanon was endangered by the rapid deterioration o f the economic situation. Lebanese traders had been suffering from the war­ time sequestration o f their funds in Egyptian banks, while funds belonging to the Palestinians had already been freed.3 W ith great bitterness they were able to perceive that, while com­ mercial relations between Beirut and Damascus were almost broken, the Palestinians, being in the British sphere o f interest, had the advantage o f dominating the Syrian market.4 M any prominent businessmen were closing down in Beirut and moving to H aifa to re-establish themselves there. The Lebanese, however, speculating on the possibilities o f selling to the interior o f Syria after the French had overcome the sharifian resistance, had imported on credit huge amounts o f manufactured goods which were now lying idle in stock in Beirut.5 Instead o f decrea­ sing, the isolation o f Beirut was completed by the stopping o f cereal transports from Syria on 14 November. T o the discontent o f the urban merchants was added that o f the country population o f M ount Lebanon, where French maladministration and con­ tinuous interference in local affairs resulted on 29 November in a vigorous protest by the Conseil Adm inistratif du Liban.6 1 The British report about an interview with the patriarch and his retinue at Paris in a minute by Forbes Adam, 26 Sept. 1919, enclosure in no. 300, B.D ., 1, iv, pp. 439-40. The patriarch was received, not by the head of the British peace delegation, but by Forbes Adam, who advised him to put his wishes forward to the French government. 2 Meinertzhagen to Curzon, 10 O ct. 1919, tel. no. F.0 . 10 (G.O .P. 311 /6), idem, p. 613. 3 Article in Revue Phénicienne, ‘Les conditions commerciales en Syrie9, reprinted in Correspondance d’Orient, 15 Jan. 1919, p. 313. 4 An intelligence report (by U .S.S. Cole) to the American embassy in Constanti­ nople, 19 Dec. 1919, p. 3; N .A. 867.00/1090 (R .G . 59). 9 M . G illy: ‘L ’Evolution économique et commerciale de la Syrie9, La Syrie et le Liban en /92/, p. 121. 6Correspondance d’Orient, 15 Feb. 1919, p. 117. For the situation in Lebanon in

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It was obvious that in order to save the situation in Lebanon, which was considered to be the bastion o f French influence in the Levant, Gouraud had to act quickly by extending his control to Damascus and thus putting an end to the awkward inter­ regnum. W aters-Taylor observed in Beirut that the French occupation o f the interior was commonly expected to take place as soon as Gouraud had enough troops at his disposal.1 In January, none the less, the general was embarrassed by the dangerous situation in Cilicia, where the Turks had gone over to the offensive against the weak French occupation troops and threatened to break through to Aleppo. He consequently had to remove every available soldier from the west zone to reinforce the C ilid an front. The situation in Lebanon itself, harassed by sharifian irregulars, became extrem ely critical: at the end o f January, a French source reveals, Beirut had not a single unit for the garrison.2 In these circumstances Gouraud certainly welcomed the opportunity o f a peaceful arrangement with Faisal when the emir, followed by the over-optimistic expectations o f the French government, returned from Paris. But this time hopes o f Faisal’s submission to French stipulations were dissipated even more rapidly than in M ay-June. A t the end o f January M ount Lebanon was under snow and all communications between Beirut and Damascus were broken for three weeks.3 This was a m aterial as well as a symbolic staging for the coup de théâtre which was now produced at Damascus. As reports to the Foreign Office had predicted,4 Faisal very soon realized that it was impossible to make his people accept the agreement prepared in Paris. A t the Arab Club o f Damascus a week after his return he delivered an important speech, in 1 Report ofLt.-CoI. W aters-Taylor. . 1 5 Jan. 1920; B .D ., idem, p. 623. 2 Goudot, p. 85. News o f disturbances on the Syro-Lebancse frontiers, in The Near East, 12 Feb. 1920, p. 210. 9 Monconduit : ‘L ’Action française en Syrie et en Cilicie’, Revue Maritim, nouvelle série nro 9, Sept. 1920, p. 346. Berthe Georges-Gaulis: La Question Arabe (Paru, *93°). P- 1 *8. * Meinertzhagen to Curzon, 13 Jan. 1920, tel. no. F .O . 10 (C.P.O . 311/6); B .D ., idem, p. 615. general see The Near East, 4 M arch 1920, p. 317; 1 1 M arch 1920, p. 352; and 25 M arch 1920, p. 424.

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which he once more warned against the perils o f non-acceptance o f foreign ‘assistance*.1 A t Aleppo on 4 February he was already speaking a different language: independence, he was reported to have exclaimed, would be acquired ‘if not by word, then by the sword*.12 O n 14 February general m obilization was declared by the Arab government. After that date the emir, carried by the men o f the Nadi al-Arabi, rapidly proceeded to prepare the change o f government which he had already planned in the previous M ay, but which at that time had been baulked by Allenby.3 M eanwhile, the success o f d’Annunzio in Fiume had given an encouraging example to the activists in Damascus.4 Faisal, however, well versed for more than a year in the principles o f President W ilson, produced his coup in a w ay which was less open to question. The Syrian Congress, which had been accepted by the Am erican inquiry commission more or less as the parliam ent o f the country, was convened again in Damascus at the beginning o f M arch. This assembly passed a resolution on 7 M arch according to which Syria was proclaimed com pletely independent in its natural boundaries, Lebanon and Palestine included, and Faisal was proclaimed constitutional king, whose government was to replace the present m ilitary governments o f the three zones.5 In Paris and London the news fell like a thunderbolt. This is not to say that the French and British governments were totally unprepared for such an eventuality. Faisal, who still thought o f returning to the peace conference, had asked as early as the middle o f February for a statement o f allied policy as regards A rab aspirations, so as to be able to reassure public opinion in Damascus before leaving for Europe. M einertzhagen, who was freshly informed by the British liaison officer just arrived from 1 V Asie Française, April 1920, p. 107. As to the events of February and M arch in Damascus and Aleppo, see also: David, pp. 55-86; Zeine, pp. 134-7. 2 Correspondance d 'Orient, 30 M arch 1920, p. 265. 3 See the despatches: Meinertzhagen to Curzon, 19 Feb. 1920, tel. no. E.A . 2994; B.D ., i, xiii, 218, and Allenby to Curzon, 7 M arch 1920, tel. no. E.A. 3004; idem, p. 221. 4 See Young, p. 305. 5 Correspondance d 'Orient, 30 M arch 1920, p. 307. The details of the decision and its immediate reactions in David, pp. 99-103 and Zeine, pp. 137-41. For the explanations sent from Damascus to London, see: Allenby to Curzon, 14 M arch 1920, tel. no. E.A. 3023; B.D ., idem, pp. 229-30. Faisal’s rather moderate corona­ tion address is reproduced in The Near East, 1 April 1920, pp. 460-1.

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Damascus, sent an alarm ing message to London and urged that such a statement be sent to Faisal at once ; otherwise, he warned, the extremist elements would gain complete control in Syria and drag the country into xenophobia and anarchy. Lord M ilner, then in Egypt with his special mission, was reported to recom­ mend the measure suggested.1 The message, however, did not convince the British and French ministers gathering at that time at the first interallied conference in London. Answering Cairo on 22 February, three days after the arrival ofM einertzhagen’s cable, Curzon stated that he had discussed the matter with the French representatives at the conference, but that ‘neither they nor I feel confident as to the expediency o f yet another declaration’.12 The two governments were still not fully convinced o f the seriousness o f the situation when Allenby cabled on 7 M arch stating that the Syrian Congress in Damascus was on the point o f declaring the complete independence o f the country and crowning Faisal as king.3 H aving consulted the French repre­ sentative, Berthelot,4 the foreign secretary instructed Allenby on the following day to give Faisal a special message. The emir was invited to attend the peace conference in which the ques­ tion o f Syria would soon be examined ‘with a view to arriving at a settlement which shall be in accord with the declarations that have been exchanged between the British and French and Arab Governments’ ; but there was no question o f giving any new declaration o f that kind. O n the contrary, Faisal was cautioned that ‘a grave responsibility w ill rest upon him and the future o f Syria may be seriously compromised, if any irresponsible action is taken by the Congress that would place the case o f the Syrian people in opposition to the friendly and liberal intentions to which the British and French Governments have given repeated expression’.5 As Curzon later observed, this communi­ cation had arrived in Damascus too late or it had been ignored.6 1 Meinertzhagen to Curzon, 19 Feb. 1990, tel. no. E.A . 9994; B .D ., idem, 918.

3 Curzon to Allenby, 99 Feb. 1990, tel. no. 156; idem, p. 919. 3 Allenby to Curzon, 7 M arch 1990, tel. no. E.A. 3004; idem, p. 991. 4 See the letter o f Curzon to Derby, 13 M arch 1990, off. letter, no. 901 ; idem, p. 996. 9 Curzon to Allenby, 8 M arch 1990, tel. no. 900; idem, p. 999. * Curzon to Derby, 13 M arch 1990; idem, p. 996.

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In the evening o f 12 M arch the Foreign Office received by w ay o f the W ar Office the news o f Faisal's fa it accompli.* The French were particularly offended by the claims o f the Damascus government to Lebanon, although the Congress had promised this country autonomy within its former frontiers. For the British the resolution was even more stupefying. Another congress in Damascus composed o f Mesopotamian officers had assumed at the same time the right to proclaim the full inde­ pendence o f Iraq and a political and economic union between Syria and Mesopotamia, as well as the opportunity to declare the British m ilitary occupation o f Mesopotamia to be at an end.12 M ajor Young recorded the extraordinary nervousness o f Lord Curzon on the morning after the news o f the proclamation reached London. The French ambassador had asked for an interview in order to discuss the common measures to be taken by the British and French governments; the foreign secretary had a moment o f panic and did not want to see him, arguing: T don't know what to say to him .' W hat he actually said was many angry words about French policy in Syria. Finally a join t protest was agreed upon and sent to Damascus to denounce the illegal character o f the proclamations.3 Sir Henry Wilson noted in his diary that Lloyd George rather favoured the act o f Faisal’s ‘proclaiming himself K ing o f Arabia, Syria, Palestine and M esopotamia'.4 The prime minister’s impulsive reaction was possibly motivated by sym­ pathy or by an illusion that the action o f the Syrian Congress 1 Idem; G .H .Q . Egypt had cabled the news to W .O . the same day 12 M arch (tel. no. E.A. 3016)— see B .D ., idem, p. 226, note 6. 2 The text (in Italian) o f the proclamation o f the Iraqi Congress at Damascus, published by Ettore Rossi: Documenti svW origine e gli sviluppi della questione araba (Rome, 1944), no. 36. See also: Meinertzhagen to Curzon, 26 M arch 1920, tel. no. Pol. 1607; B.D ., idem, p. 236. 3 Young, pp. 305-7.— Cf. Curzon’s expression at a meeting o f the Supreme Council, 25 April 1919, at 11 a.m. ' . . . Emir Faisal has recently taken illicit action9 (B.D., 1, viii, p. 173. For the protest sent to Faisal, see Pari. Debs. 5. H. o/C.9 vol. 126, cols. 2359-60). ‘These operations9, Curzon commented on the declara­ tions of Damascus to Derby, ‘. • . were an unwarranted and intolerable exercise of authority by this unknown body in Damascus.9— Curzon to Derby, 13 M arch 1920, letter no. 901 ; B.D ., 1, xiii. 226. Curzon to Derby, 13 M arch 1920, idem. Curzon to Allenby, 13 M arch, tel. 223, idem, p. 225. 4 Callwell, ii, 230; entry in Sir Henry’s Diary, 23 M arch 1920.

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would offer a welcome escape from the embarrassment caused to him by the conflicting pledges given by his predecessor. Sir Henry, however, together with the foreign secretary, thought prim arily o f what would happen to Palestine and Mesopotamia and commented: ‘England could not really be asked to take a mandate from Faisal for these countries.’ 1 Curzon, having received a proposal o f Allenby’s that Faisal should be recog­ nized as head o f an Arab confederation embracing Syria, Palestine and M esopotamia,2 answered Cairo in nearly the same words: ‘Do you propose. . . that Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia should be regarded as already assigned, without Treaty sanction, to Faisal, and that we should accept a mandate from him ? How would this procedure be applied to Palestine and how would recognition o f Faisal as K in g be reconcilable with Zionist claim s?’ 3 These words spelled the repudiation o f Faisal. W hile there was no question o f taking the mandate from him, the British government had to take the future mandate regardless o f him. As a result, after the proclam ation o f Damascus, the British and the Arabs found themselves in opposing camps. 1 Idem. 2 Allenby to Curzon, 18 M arch 1920, tel. no. 271; B .D ., 1, xiii, 231. 3 Curzon to Allenby, 19 M arch 1920, tel. no. 251 ; idem, 232.

CH APTER X I

Re-establishment o f the Entente in the Arab Middle East letter o f 14 O ctober was the last and probably the most biting outburst with which Clemenceau strained relations with Britain. Cambon, scandalized by the vehement personal diplom acy o f his premier, complained a few days later: ‘In Syria we have ourselves created an inextricable situation. Clemenceau wanted to settle things directly with Lloyd George and an impossible situation has arisen. Clemenceau is vexed, writes violent telegrams to his partner who answers in the same to n e .. . .’ * The Foreign Office was frightened by the 'high explosive shells* exchanged between the premiers,2 and therefore began to speed up the solution o f the Syrian question. It was important that the spirit o f the entente, at that time, was not limited to Downing Street. In m ilitary circles especially, since the early autumn, there had been a significant current favouring rapprochement with France. In addition to the reports by Fleuriau in September,3 he

T

1 Paul Cambon to his son, 19 O ct. 1919, private letter; Correspondance, iii, 361.— ‘The Ambassador, speaking from the standpoint of the old diplomacy’, Curzon wrote of an interview with Cambon, ‘deeply deplored that these matters should be taken out of the hands of the respective Foreign Offices, and that language should be employed which did not strictly conform to the old traditions. He greatly disliked this form of fusillade, which, he thought, excited tempers and rendered settlement difficult.’ Curzon to Derby, 22 O ct. 1919, letter no. 1266; B.D ., 1, iv, 496.

2 Expression by Curzon in the above-mentioned despatch. It should be noticed that the Foreign Office had declined, on 14 October, to receive a ‘very insulting message', which Cambon admitted had been written by Clemenceau himself. The text of the note, which alleged that in preparing to evacuate Syria, British officers were leaving arms to the Arabs with which to fight the French, is in enclosure in no. 342; idem, pp. 498-9. 3 See above, p. 187.

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we m ay mention the note by W illiam Y ale who, a month later, observed that among the high officers ‘the attitude towards the French had become far more sympathetic*.1 In the meantime, the Foreign Office was still trying to sound out the attitude o f the United States government. O n 16 October, Curzon, probably on the occasion o f the proposals made by Emir Faisal, intim ated to the Am erican ambassador that the cabinet was asking whether the United States was w illing to participate at once in considering the setdement o f non-Turkish portions o f the Ottom an empire at a conference to be held in Paris or London.12 Polk cabled from Paris that, as the French would probably be unwilling to treat the question o f Syria separately from the Turkish setdement, there was but little hope o f reaching a satisfactory understanding on the lines the British had suggested, and concluded: ‘There is a good chance o f our having all three powers dissatisfied with us if we attempt to setde this issue and dangerous question o f m ilitary occupation.’3 Since the beginning o f President Wilson’s illness, however, W ashington had been paralysed. As the Am erican answer was delayed, Sir Edward Grey, now ambassador on a special mission in the United States,4 repeated his démarches at the state depart­ ment. The secretary o f state consequendy made an effort once again to reach the W hite House with the dossier o f Turkish setdement, but three days later received a significant reply: ‘The President says it is impossible for him to take up such matters until he is stronger and can study them. So if an answer must be made— the Sec. o f State can say he (the Sec.) cannot act without the President’s consent.. . .*5 O n 23 November G rey cabled again to London to say that he was still without any definite answer respecting the negotiations with Turkey and that he could not ‘see any course open to other Governments 1 'Report in detail o f Interview in London’ by W illiam Y ale, p. 19. Syria, vi-42. YALB and b l i s s , box 24s/'Arab State’.

3 Davis to secretary of state, 16 O ct. 1919, at 2 p.m ., tel.-no. 3254; w il s o n , ac. 9712, box 20. 3 Polk to secretary o f state, 19 O ct. 1919, 8.20 p.m ., tel. no. 4732; idem. 4 From September to December 1919. 3 A handwritten anonymous note headed 'W hite House, Washington’, enclosure to a letter: Lansing to Wilson, 12 O ct. 1919; w i l s o n , acc. 9712, box 20.

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except to proceed with negotiations*.1 ‘It is almost certain that he won*t take a mandate at any price’, Polk observed in Paris, 18 November, 'and if the Senate rejects the Treaty, as looks more than likely, then we have no excuse for mixing up in the Turkish business.*2 The peace treaty with Germ any, which Polk was referring to, was indeed rejected by the Senate the following day, 19 November. M eanwhile, though expressing their desire to resume nego­ tiations on the Syrian setdement, the French remained intransigent in their view that the Syrian question could not be dealt with independently o f the Turkish peace settlement. Their opinion had been continually repeated in French communica­ tions in October and November.3 This consistent obstinacy aroused suspicions in London that Clemenceau aimed at pre­ serving the unity o f the Ottom an empire in order to please financial interests. 'T h e French want to be mandatory for Turkey under the suspicious and dangerous disguise o f inter­ national finance’, Curzon minuted 25 O ctober.4 The Americans interpreted the trend o f French M iddle East policy in the same w ay.9 Colonel House warned Justice Brandeis about its effect upon Zionist plans as early as the end o f August;6 consequently, during the following weeks the Zionists appear to have been in fear o f a rather extensive resuscitation o f the Ottom an empire.7 A t the beginning o f December, when Georges-Picot was reported 1 Grey to Curzon, 23 Nov. 1919, tel. no. 1593; B .D .y idem, p. 901. 2 Polk to Bristol, 18 Nov. 1919, private letter; p o l k , 78/70. 3 Reply to English memorandum o f September 13, 1919, enclosure in no. 314; B.D ., idem, p. 452. Clemenceau to Derby, 14 O ct. 1919, unnumbered note, enclosure in no. 326; idem, p. 468. Note from the French peace delegation to the Supreme Council, 13 Nov. 1919; idem, p. 530. 4 Minutes of Curzon, 25/10 on the despatch: Crowe to Curzon, 17 O ct. 1919, tel. no. 1972 and enclosure in it; B .D ., idem, p. 819. 9 Polk to Bristol, 14 O ct. 1919, personal letter; p o l k , 78/69. Bristol to Polk, 21 O ct. 1919; idem. Polk to secretary o f state, 19 O ct. 1919, tel. no. 4736; w i l s o n c. 9712/box 20. 4 House Diary, entry o f 27 August, 1919 (xvi); h o u s e . 7 For instance W. Ormsby-Gore (Later Lord Harlech) reflected this feeling when proposing to Bryce a meeting with Weizmann in October 1919, one week before the latter’s departure for Palestine: ‘No Turk East of the Taurus and a real Armenia must be our real objective. The C .U .P . (Young-Turk Committee for Union and Progress) are very strong + the influences of international finance+ Anglo-India are giving them great support. . . I know the Zionists will be with you’ Ormsby-Gore to Bryce, undated O ct. 1919, letter; b r y c e A R . 6.

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to have visited Mustafa Kem al at Sivas on his way home via Asia M inor, the suspicions seemed justified.1 But towards the end o f the year it was discovered that the meeting had been without result.2 By then the French were already w illing to discuss the Syrian question without reference to the all-Ottom an context. Fears o f French-Turkish collusion could now dissipate themselves and give w ay to a reborn confidence. The key question o f the Anglo-French entente in the Arab M iddle East, the problem o f the Syrian boundaries, came up again through the rearrangement o f the zones o f occupation. This had been discussed since 27 November 1919 when Allenby met Gouraud in Beirut.3 Clemenceau, it may be remembered, had demanded in his memorandum o f 9 October that the Palestine-Syrian frontier should run along the Sykes-Picot line as fixed in the agreement o f 1916. The British commander-inchief having asked that his troops should occupy the southern portion o f the blue zone, especially the region o f Tyre which had belonged to O .E .T .A . south, Clemenceau answered that it had already been agreed in September that this territory should be occupied by French troops and that consequently there was no reason to raise the question.4 In December Curzon insisted that the British should have the right to remain in occupation o f the southern portion o f the blue zone as far north as the ‘ancient boundary’ at Dan (Banias) ; he added that the British govern­ ment had decided to withdraw from ‘that portion o f occupied enemy territory administration east, which lies opposite to occupied enemy administration south’, apparently meaning Transjordan.3 1 Meinertzhagen to Curzon, 29 Nov. 1919 (received 2 Dec.) tel. no. 504; B .D ., idem, p. 560. 2 Minutes by Kidston, 31 December, on the despatch: Admiral de Robeck, the new British high commissioner in Constantinople, to Curzon, 12 Dec. 1919 (re­ ceived 29 Dec.), tel. no. 2321 ; idem, p. 588. 3,W ar Office to Foreign Office, 8 Dec. 1919, communication no. 0152/5283 (M .I.2.) ; enclosure in no. 400, idem, p. 590. Allenby to Churchill, undated tel. E.A. 2894; enclosure 3 in no. 400, idem, p. 591. Curzon to Cambon, 22 Nov. 1919; idem, p. 550. 4 Additional note by Lord Hardinge on a conversation with Paul Cambon, 29 Nov. 1919; idem, p. 560. 5 Curzon to Derby, 17 Dec. 1919, tel. no. 1479; idem, p. 689. The reasons o f this move were, as appears from the despatch mentioned, to quiet the Syrians and to induce the French to refrain from occupying the Biqa'.

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Clemenceau had, however, changed his tune after Faisal’s arrival in France. In his letter to Lloyd George on 9 November he recognized that the advice given to the emir by the Foreign Office to seek an understanding with France was proof o f British goodw ill.1 His conciliatory message preceded the anniversary o f the armistice and the state visit o f the president o f the French republic to London, 10-14 November, which were characterized by rem arkably warm speeches about the continuation o f the entente. The initial step towards resuming the British-French dialogue was taken on the first day o f this visit, when the foreign minister, Pichon, who was in President Poincaré’s party, came to the Foreign Office within one hour o f his arrival in London. ‘Am erica having disappeared from the scene as a factor in the settlement o f the East’, he argued, echoing what Clemenceau had written the previous day, ‘there remained only two parties whose interests had seriously to be considered and reconciled, namely, Great Britain and France.’ He then disclosed that his government was prepared to enter into confidential discussions with Britain as soon as possible.12 Curzon answered by pro­ posing that, to deal with the Turkish question, the peace conference o f Paris should be followed by another meeting, ‘perhaps in another form and another place', say, during the following month and in London. Before approaching the larger problems connected with Turkey itself, Curzon agreed, a prelim inary Anglo-French understanding on Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia, reached in the way Pichon had suggested, was most desirable.3 The French interpreted the question o f the site o f the future meetings as a matter o f prestige, and insisted that the conference should remain in Paris.4 The British ministers felt it unjust that they should spend another month or two in France. Thus the 1 Clemenceau to Lloyd George, g O ct. 1919» unnumbered letter; idem, pp. 520-1. 2 Record by Curzon, 12 Dec. 1919; idem, p. 87g. 3 Curzon’s account of his discussions with Cambon 25 Nov. in the despatch: Curzon to Derby, 25 Nov. 1919, tel. no. 1391; idem, pp. 902-3. 4 Idem. Curzon to Derby, 4 Dec. 1919, unnumbered telegram; idem, p.

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decision hung time until Clemenceau and Berthelot agreed to come to London at the beginning o f Decem ber.1 The Anglo-French meetings in London, 11-14 December, although general and preparatory, formed an im portant stage in the development o f an entente on the A rab M iddle East. The settlements in Turkey and the A rab countries, as well as the practical question o f the future o f the peace conference, were dealt with in four o f the seven plenary meetings.2 The cordial and conciliatory atmosphere calmed minds excited by the recent tempestuous exchange o f letters between the two premiers. ‘The English have been perfect with Clemenceau and the conversations have resulted in im portant understandings*, Cam bon affirmed on the last day o f the conference.3 The first point o f significance in these talks was that the French no longer insisted on considering the settlement in the A rab M iddle East an inseparable part o f the Turkish peace treaty.4 Second, Lloyd George suggested that the negotiations on the oil question should be resumed im m ediately; it was con­ sequently agreed that the French experts would come to London on 17 December in order to discuss the matter with their British colleagues. Third, it was decided that, after the end o f the present session o f the peace conference, broader questions o f policy would be dealt with by direct communication between the governments themselves, and questions o f detail by a special conference o f ambassadors at Paris. Before the meeting o f the final conference on the Turkish settlement, however, pre­ lim inary discussions would be carried out by the heads o f delegations. 2

O n i i December R . G . Vansittart and E. G . Forbes Adam 3 o f the political section o f the British peace delegation were called 1 Clemenceau appears to have been induced to come to London by Louis Loucheur, minister of armaments who met the prime minister and the war secre­ tary on 3 December (note o f the conversation in CAB. 21/158). 2 Minutes of the Anglo-French meetings in London 11-13 Dec. 1919, in B .D ., 1, PP- 727“®5* 3 Cambon to his son, 14 Dec. 1919, private letter, Correspondance, iii, 367. 4 B .D ., idem, p. 727. 9 Technical expert on eastern affairs, British peace delegation.

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back to London with all necessary papers relating to the Turkish question. From that date on, the focus o f the peace negotiations moved from Paris to the British capital. Sir Eyre Crowe, then in London in connection with the visit o f Clemenceau, cabled that the French premier had promised to produce at once a complete scheme for the Turkish settlement, and that it had now been agreed that both sides work out in detail the plans to be put forward.1 Consequently, Vansittart and Forbes Adam arrived in London and undertook a study o f a memorandum o f 12 December from Berthelot, which set out the French views on the whole Turkish question as well as on the settlement in the Arab M iddle East. The comments o f the political section, 18 December, on their part obviously supply extensive British views on the settlement-to-be. Berthelot’s note made it clear that the French now consented to the removal o f the sultan from Constantinople and to the restriction o f Turkish power to Anatolia proper. As one o f the fundamental points it repeated that the ‘Arab and Syrian* populations could not be submitted again to Turkish domina­ tion. Here, as well as in the other three main conclusions o f the memorandum, the British agreed.123 Further, the French government now found it indispensable that Faisal should constitute a homogeneous Syrian kingdom: ‘The French Government, taking account o f common interest and o f the desire so often and so strongly manifested by the English Government, has decided to make the sacrifices necessary for the establishment o f a loyal and complete entente.** None the less, Berthelot added, the French government could not ‘alone make all the concessions’. It was not able to agree, for political purposes, to change the direction o f the projected railway line 1 Crowe to Vansittart, n Dec. 1919, unnumbered telegram, B .D ., 1, iv, pp. 9 3 0 -1.

2 First part of M . Berthelot’s note o f the 12 Dec. 1919, with comments o f the political section of British peace delegation, idem, pp. 943-4. The other three points were: (a) suppression of Turkish militarism; (b) maintaining of the Straits under an international authority; (c) deliverance of the Armenians from Turkish domination. 3 Second part o f M . Berthelot’s note o f 12 December with comments o f the political section of the British peace delegation; idem, p. 578. (The comments of Vansittart and Forbes Adam concerning the second part o f the memorandum were not communicated to Berthelot.) M y italics.

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from H aifa to Mesopotamia. Nor could it agree to a radical extension o f the northern part o f Palestine, because by such a reduction o f the territory o f area (A) there would be no viable and independent Syrian state under French mandate, and any agreement with Faisal would be impossible.1 As regards the boundaries o f Palestine, Vansittart and Forbes Adam remarked that ‘the French memorandum apparently accepts a rectification o f the Sykes-Picot frontier’.12 They discussed at length a recent proposal by the chief political officer at Cairo which stressed the need to guarantee the water sources o f M ount Hermon for the future Jewish Palestine.3 The m ilitary and air arguments were in favour o f including the area in the British mandate, they remarked, M ount Hermon domina­ ting Damascus as well as northern Palestine. But they warned that it was difficult to discuss the matter on purely m ilitary grounds, as the only possible hostilities on this frontier must be between France and Great Britain.4* Therefore they recom­ mended that the economic arguments as put forward by the Zionists should be emphasized. The political section allowed that the Zionist aims in the north-eastern direction could be substantially met by means o f a boundary running along the bend o f the R iver Litani and east to the southern slopes o f M ount Hermon, leaving to Syria the coast north o f Acre and the Arab districts o f Hashbeya and Rashbeya on the northern side o f Hermon. This solution seemed ‘a very fair compromise*.3 As to Mosul, Berthelot had repeated that its cession depended upon equal French participation in the oil resources o f Kurdistan and Mesopotamia. Here his exposé followed to a marked extent the memorandum prepared by Bérenger for Clemenceau, which Berthelot had communicated to Lord Curzon a day before (11 December). According to an abstract o f it drawn up by £ . W eakley,6 the French commissioner for 1 Idem, p. 579. The note was dated 12 December when the French were finally prepared for an understanding with Faisal. 2 Idem, p. 578. 3 Idem, p. 580. 4 The suggestion of the chief political officer in the despatch: Meinertzhagen to Curzon, 17 Nov. 1919 (received 15 D ec.); letter no. C .P.O . 181 ; idem, pp. 533-5. 9 Second part of M . Berthelot’s note of 12 December; idem, p. 582. 6 Acting as liaison officer between the Petroleum executive and die Foreign Office.

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fuel interpreted the British policy in Asia M inor, in Mesopo­ tamia and Persia, as essentially a petroleum policy. Curzon commented on Bérenger’s remarks by minuting: ‘This is great nonsense.*1 W eakley remarked that on two points the French claims exceeded what France had got in the Long-Bérenger agreement in the previous A pril: first, concessions were required in Persia as w ell; second, Bérenger seemed to be asking for more than the 20 per cent share in the Mesopotamian oil granted to them in A pril.12 As a new oil agreement was reached only a few days later, this part o f the comments o f the political section did not affect the subsequent Anglo-French talks on Syria.3 Berthelot repeated the promise that the French were prepared to support the British action in Palestine, if a definite agreement were realized. Otherwise, as a counter argument he made allusion to the claims o f ‘the partisans o f internationalization, to the demands o f Italy, and the protests o f the Arabs’. O n the last point the political section commented: ‘W e must hope that close Anglo-French co-operation in the treatment o f the Arab problem w ill suffice to reassure the Arabs and to satisfy their legitim ate aspirations.* This was hinting at an essential objective o f the re-formed British M iddle East policy: France, kept in close collaboration with Britain, was to act in her future man­ dated territory more or less as police for Syria, containing the anti-Zionist elements o f Damascus and keeping guard over the security o f the Jewish national home. Fears that France in rivalry with Britain would act in the contrary sense, were as acute as they were justified. Colonel Waters Taylor informed Faisal in January 1919 that 'while fully recognizing that his only chance o f success was to represent to his own people that a French mandate meant an undivided Syria’, the British 1 Memorandum by M r W eakley on M . Bérenger’s note, 13 Dec. 1919, unnum­ bered; idem, p. 1111 and note 4 therein. 3 Comments by Vansittart and Forbes Adam ; idem, p. 582. 3 As bait to induce the French to restrict their oil demands, the commentators suggested extension of the French mandate to Transj'ordan. In spite o f obvious disadvantages— breaking o f the all-British land bridge from Palestine to Mesopo­ tamia, and end of a ‘monopoly of political influence’ in the Arabian Peninsula— Vansittart and Forbes Adam supported the idea also as a lever for obtaining modification of the northern frontier o f Palestine. Idem, p. 583.

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government still relied on his alliance to prevent any propaganda which m ight result in unrest in Palestine.1 3 By December Philippe Berthelot, secretary-general for foreign affairs, who during the whole peace conference had been the real leader o f the Q uai d’Orsay, had practically taken over the duties o f Pichon, now seriously ill.12 After the long period o f submission to the irksome rule o f the premier, the French M inistry o f Foreign Affairs at last acquired a certain degree o f independence. Berthelot seems, indeed, to have gained the respect and confidence o f Clemenceau. Diplomats o f the old generation, like the ambassador in London, envied and mis­ trusted his energy: ‘Berthelot, with a bag o f papers and well informed, has a surprising memory and capacity for work, but he speaks at too great a length and is a little diffuse.’3 Some o f the British regarded Berthelot as slightly anglophobe. But Lloyd George, who noticed this, declared that Berthelot ‘possessed a suppleness and subdety which made him distrusted by the blunter and more rigid British bureaucrat’.4* Berthelot was the principal French representative at the Anglo-French conference which started on 22 December at the Foreign Office in London. The discussions took place on the basis o f his note o f 12 December. During the first day o f meetings the talks dealt with the Turkish settlement, both sides agreeing upon the main lines.9 A remarkable harmony o f views was recorded on the second day, even on the question o f oil. Bérenger and Sir H am ar Greenwood, minister in charge o f petroleum 1 Meinertzhagen to Curzon, 26 Jan. 1920, tel. no. 531 ; idem, p. 630. 2 Pichon was pardy paralysed by a stroke. Cambon to his son, 14 Dec. 1919, private letter; Correspondance, iii, 362. 3 Same to same, 18 Feb. 1920, private letter; idem, p. 375. 4 Peace Treaties, ii, pp. 1103-4. See Harold Nicolson’s favourable impression o f him in Curzon, p. 112, note 1. 9 i.e. international administration o f the Straits, independent Turkish State around the sultan in Anatolia, independent Armenia, semi-independent Kurdistan under some form of foreign control. Minutes o f the first meeting o f an AngloFrench conference in the secretary of state’s Room at 11.45 on 22 December; B.D ., I, iv, pp. 938-42. Second meeting, idem, pp. 956-62. Third meeting, idem, pp. 966-9.

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affairs had on 21 December resumed their talks, as proposed by Lloyd George a week earlier. The agreement concluded did not differ substantially from the Long-Bérenger draft o f 8 A p ril,1 withdrawn in M ay because o f the quarrel between the two premiers. There was, nevertheless, a significant addition in accordance with the indecisive results o f the British railway survey made in Syria. Greenwood, on the initiative o f Lloyd George,2 had inserted into the draft (clause 11), a stipulation according to which the French agreed to the construction not only o f two separate pipelines but also o f railways ’necessary for their maintenance and for the transport o f o il',3 running from Mesopotamia and Persia to a port or ports on the eastern M editerranean. H aving accepted this, Berthelot stated that the matter relating to the question o f oil, the question o f Mosul, was practically settled.4 Another im portant subject o f disagreement, that o f the Palestinian frontiers, remained. The French minister announced that his government was prepared to allow the Zionists 33 per cent o f the waters flowing from M ount Hermon southwards. But he could not accept the frontiers suggested by M einertzhagen,5 and insisted on the line laid down by the Sykes-Picot agreement. M oreover, at the afternoon meeting o f the 23rd Berthelot proposed a technical inquiry on the needs o f the existing Zionist colonies in Palestine and on the best adjustment o f the projected railw ay from H aifa to Baghdad. The British considered the suggested investigation unnecessary and timewasting. As the French would not accept the arbitration o f the American government (suggested by Lloyd George on the initiative o f Bonar Law 6) and as the British government was not likely to agree to the possibility o f a bargain over Tangier, 1 See above, pp. 155-6. 2 Greenwood to Curzon, 23 Dec. 1919, official letter; B .D ., idem, p. 1114, note I to no. 705. 3 Memorandum o f agreement between Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Hamar Green­ wood . . . and Senator Henry Bérenger, 21 Dec. 1919; idem, p. 1115. * The description of this meeting follows the notes o f an Anglo-French meeting held at the Foreign Office at 11.30 on 23 Dec. 1919; idem, pp. 595-8. 3 See above, p. 227. 6 Notes o f a meeting at the prime minister’s house. . . Trouville, on 10 Sept. 1919, at 10.30 a.m .; p. 3; CAB. 21/153.

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G am bia1 or Transjordan (which were the probable French desiderata) the only chance o f reaching an understanding, Forbes Adam commented, was to appeal again directly to Clem enceau.12 The political section o f the British peace dele­ gation, as well indeed as the prime minister, had become convinced that the old premier was the only man in the French government who would lend an ear to this kind o f argument and understand the needs and aspirations o f the Zionists if properly explained.3 In the meantime a duel o f notes took place between the two foreign offices on the question o f the British occupation o f the ‘O ld Palestine’, the part o f the blue zone belonging to the O .E .T .A . south. The French understood that their allies wanted to create there a de facto situation in order to get at least partial satisfaction o f their desiderata as regards the northern frontiers o f Palestine. The foreign secretary on his part quite correctly pointed out that in the provisional agree­ ment o f September, the British government had reserved the right to occupy outposts north o f the Sykes-Picot line opposite the French blue zone (‘in accordance with the boundary claimed by the British Government’, as paragraph 10 o f the aide-mémoire o f 13 September put it.)4 Though never so con­ vinced a partisan o f the Jewish national home as his precursor, Curzon, in his willingness to fight for the Palestinian frontiers, certainly went further than Balfour had dared or cared to go. ‘It is worth remembering', he minuted on Forbes Adam ’s memorandum o f 30 December, ‘that in the suspension o f the Anglo-American guarantee o f the E. frontiers o f France we have a powerful lever.'5 W hether this weapon was ever used in the Palestinian context is not known. Probably it was not. A t that time Lloyd George was already well aware that relations with Paris would change as a result o f the fact that France would elect a new president 1 A British colony proposed to be annexed to French Senegal. 2 Vansittart agreed to the proposal. Memorandum by M r Forbes Adam on France and the northern frontier o f Palestine, 30 Dec. 1919; idem, p. 609, and note 4 therein. 3 B .D ., i, vii, 105. 4 Curzon to Derby, 8 Jan. 1920, letter no. 67; idem, p. 610. 3 Idem, p. 609, note 4.

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o f the republic on 17 January. Whether Clemenceau was to be elected president or not, his premiership could no longer continue unless he was invited to form another cabinet. Since his return from London in December however, Clemenceau had decided to stand for election.1 It was not likely, o f course, that he would continue his political career if defeated. This might have stimulated the willingness o f the British prime minister to term inate everything in this conference* when he left on 8 January for Paris with Curzon, Balfour, Bonar Law and *a lot o f secretaries*.12 M uch to the annoyance o f Lloyd George and the Foreign Office the majority o f the cabinet had been persuaded by Lord M ontagu to turn down on 6 January the plan for the Turkish settlement as agreed with the French in Decem ber.3 Despite hopes o f liquidating this subject at once in Paris, a mass o f other urgent items, including German affairs, Adriatic problems, questions arising from the advance o f the bolsheviks and from the future o f Caucasus, crowded the agenda and deflected the attention o f the conference from the M iddle East. ‘So far as Turkey is concerned*, Forbes Adam reported confidentially to a member o f the Foreign Office, ‘our time here has not yet been spent on any discussions with the French or Italians . . . but on attempts by the Cabinet to make up their own minds on Turkish policy (still unsuccessful!)’.4 W hen this letter was sent the change o f French government had already taken place. O n the 17th, Paul Deschanel, not Clemenceau, was elected president o f the republic, largely with clerical backing.5 Consequently, before withdrawing into a bitter retirement, on 21 January Clemenceau presided for the last time over the Supreme Council. His farewell speech at the meeting o f the previous day was m ainly addressed to Lloyd George. ‘W e are both o f us Celts’, he joked sadly, ‘and yet we have not controlled our language.*6 Lloyd George resented the 1 Wormser, p. 394. 2 Cambon to his son, 7 Jan. 1920, private letter; Correspondance, iii, 368. 9 Nicolson: Curzon, pp. 112-14. 4 Forbes Adam to M r Phipps, assistant secretary at the F .O ., 19 Jan. 1919, private letter; B.D., 1, iv, 1037. 9 Wormser, pp. 421-3. See also Francesco N itti: Rivelaziom, Dramatis personae (Napoli, 1948), p. 92. 6 Minutes o f die meeting o f the Supreme Council, 20 Jan. 1920; B.D., 1, ii, 953.

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departure o f Clemenceau probably as bitterly as the latter him self did. In a passage o f his book entitled ‘Disaster o f Clemenceau’s fall*, he affirmed his conviction that had Clemenceau remained in office another twelve months the work o f the peace conference would have been brought to a successful end.1 Instead, after the election Lloyd George read in some Paris papers that, in voting against Clemenceau, the electorate o f Versailles had wished to protest against ‘too English a treaty*.2 M oreover, the prime minister was offended by a hysterically anti-British speech with which the president-elect greeted him when he came on a visit o f congratulation.3 O n the same afternoon Lloyd George told Alexandre M illerand, the new French premier, that he had to leave urgendy for London. Clemenceau and his entourage concluded that he intended to use this incident as a pretext for not returning to Paris in the immediate future, and thus to force the peace conference to move over to the other side o f the Channel.4 4 Before retiring from the Supreme Council, Clemenceau still took an active part in the discussion concerning the future o f the peace conference. It was decided that M illerand should come to London as soon as possible and have prelim inary talks with Lloyd George before the final conference met to consider the Turkish settlement. The severe-looking M illerand, his short-sightedness em­ phasized by his thick glasses, was not slow to initiate his policy o f ‘France seule*. Not until the beginning o f February did he give his consent to the British proposal that all the negotiations on the Turkish settlement necessitating the personal attention 1 Peace Treaties, ii, n o t. On occasion, Lloyd George had expressed different opinions. Frank Polk recorded the following table-talk, 12 Sept. 1919: ‘Bonar Law seemed to think Lloyd George should not press Clemenceau too hard as he was best man to settle question with. Lloyd George said Briand would be better.’ Hand­ written note by Polk; p o l k 78/53. (M y italics.) See also N itti, p. 89. 2 Wormser, p. 415. 2 M ordacq, iv, 298-9. 4 Wormser, pp. 415-16.

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o f the prime minister should be conducted in London. But when the preparatory meetings, later known as the First Conference o f London, did meet on 12 February, Paul Cambon com­ plained: ‘W e are here at the Conference moved to London to treat o f Turkish affairs. Curzon has reached the end o f his tether and Lloyd George too. T o save face we have retained at Paris the negotiations with the Turkish Plenipotentiaries and the signing o f the T re a ty .. . .'* Lloyd George, when opening the discussions o f the conference said that the setdement o f the Turkish question was being held up because President Wilson had led the conference to expect that the United States government would be in a position to decide very shortly whether it would accept a mandate.12 Wilson later presented the conference with his views on Turkey in a letter couched in rather irate terms.3 The United States ambassador in London did not accept the invitation to attend the meetings on behalf o f his government,4 and the settlement o f the Turkish and connected questions was discussed without any American participation. Instead, an Italian delegation led by the new prime minister N itti, took an active part in the meetings. The hunger o f the Italians for expansion had been but scantily satisfied in Africa, where, by an agreement in September 1919, the French had granted them some privileges in Tunisia.5 In Asia M inor they still intended to hold to their 'rights' on the principle o f quidpro quo, according to the treaty o f London 1915. The Italian insistence on the Adriatic question as well as happenings in Germ any and Russia again handicapped the discussion on Turkey. These subjects absorbed most o f the conference's time. Y et the worsening o f the situation in the east had forced the British and French governments to reconsider their attitude towards Turkey itself. Thus some decisions agreed 1 Gambon to his son, 18 Feb. 1920, private letter; Correspondance, iii, 275. 2 British secretary’s (M . Hankey) notes on an allied conference held at 10 Downing Street, 12 Feb. 1920, at 11 a.m. B .D ., 1, vii, p. 1. 3 Printed in The Times, 6 March 1920. 4 Preface by Rohan Butler in B .D ., 1, vii, p. iii. The secretary o f state’s instruc­ tions to ambassador Davis, 9 Feb. 1920; U.S. For. Rel., 1920, i, p. 1. 9 For the background and the main lines o f this agreement see Albrecht-Carrié, p. 312.

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on in December when Clemenceau was in London, but rejected by the cabinet on 6 January, had to be discussed afresh.1 Opening the discussion on the Arab countries on 17 February, Berthelot2 observed generally that the two governments had already reached agreement on Syria.3 By this he probably meant the provisional agreement o f September, which the French themselves had concluded by arrangement with Faisal.4 Y et, three difficult problems— those o f the northern frontier o f Palestine, o f the H aifa-M esopotamia railway, and o f Mosul remained to be settled. The return o f the last item to the agenda may appear surprising, considering that Berthelot had previously stated that the question o f Mosul was closed. But the accord on Mosul had been dependent on the fulfilling o f the Greenwood-Bérenger oil agreement o f 21 Decem ber; and this had ultim ately not been signed by Lloyd George, presumably because the British suspected that it did not guarantee their equality o f rights in North A frica.9 The vilayet o f Mosul, Berthelot now argued somewhat cynically, belonged to area (A) o f the 1916 partition and could be included in a final arrange­ ment only in accord with the Arabs, which meant with Emir Faisal.6 This volte-face was a sign o f the stiffening o f the French attitude since the change o f cabinet. It indicated the desire of M illerand to have the oil agreement accepted in a form which would secure 50 per cent o f the shares for the French.7 Answering Berthelot, Lloyd George asked the French to show 1 Thus Lloyd George had to repeat that the British government no longer thought it advisable to move the sultan from Constantinople. B .D ., idem, pp. 45-6. Berthelot stated that the French government— obviously embarrassed by the Turkish resistance in Cilicia— was ready to allow this part o f their blue zone of the Sykes-Picot agreement to remain under effective Turkish sovereignty. B .D ., idem, p. 89. 2 M illerand had been compelled to return to France because o f strikes. 3 British secretary’s notes . • . , 17 Feb. 1919,3.30 p.m .; idem, p. 103. 4 Curzon reminded Berthelot o f the fact that the emir had merely accepted an agreement subject to submission to his countrymen, and had never attempted to commit the latter to its acceptance. Curzon to Derby, 13 M arch 1920, letter no. 901 ; B .D .y i, xiii, 228. 9 According to what appears from the despatch: Curzon to Derby, 15 Jan. 1920, tel. no. 185; B.D.y 1, iv, 1118. Moreover, for a French view, see Lespagnol de la Tramerye, p. 195. 6 British secretary’s notes 17 Feb. 1920, at 3.30 p.m. B .D ., 1, vii, 103. 7 Notes o f a conversation between the prime minister and M . M illerand 18 April 1920, at 9.30 a.m ., idem, 1, viii, 9.

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understanding o f the needs o f future Jewish colonies in Palestine and agree to the frontier the Zionists wanted. He also asked them to give up special claims concerning the H oly Places. As to the future administration o f Mosul, the prime minister said, the details would be settled directly between the British and Arab governments, ‘in the same w ay as the French were doing in regard to Damascus and certain parts o f S yria'.1 The French were cautioned that, if they insisted on too big a share in the Mosul oil, they would be asked to contribute to the costs o f the Mesopotamian administration. The discussions on Palestine had to be postponed when five days later the conference proceeded to consider the draft lines o f a peace treaty with Turkey. In defining the frontiers o f the future mandate o f Syria,2 the conference failed to fix any frontiers other than the northern boundary with Turkey (decided as proposed by the French) and the western boundary (which was to be the M editerranean). O n the east it was agreed that the boundary should be settled between Curzon and Berthelot, on the south it was said ‘to be defined by Palestine', the frontiers o f which, in their turn, were 'to be defined in accordance with its ancient limits o f Dan to Beersheba'.3 In the event o f disagreement on the boundaries, a referee for arbitra­ tion was to be appointed by the president o f the United States.4 Berthelot, nevertheless, doubting the acceptance by his premier o f the Am erican arbitration, asked for the omission o f this proposal pending M illerand’s return to London. After the meeting o f 21 February there are no signs in the conference records that the question o f Palestine or that o f Mosul was discussed, although the French premier came to London for the three following days. M illerand, in any case, declared to the commission o f external affairs o f the Cham ber 1 British secretary’s notes 17 Feb. 1920, at 3.30 p.m .; idem, 1, vii, pp. 104-6. 2 In the treaty draft mentioned, part iv, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (a), reproduced in appendix 2 to no. 14, idem, p. 126. 3 Idem, sub-paragraph (b). Berthelot having asked the meaning of the biblical frontiers of Palestine, Lloyd George suggested he read a book written by a Scottish professor of theology, Adam Smith. The Frenchman thanked him saying that he would be delighted to read it ‘as he was partial both to the Scottish and to theolo­ gians’. 4 Idem, sub-paragraph (c). A British secretary’s notes 21 Feb. 1920, at 11 a.m .; idem, p. 182.

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after his return to Paris that the question o f the Arab countries remained entirely unsettled and that ‘the French Government had a free hand [avait les mains libres]’. 1 The premiers seem to have left the m atter to their foreign ministers. The discussions then progressed slowly, Berthelot awaiting cable instructions from M illerand. France’s lack o f interest— as well as that o f Italy later12— in the Turkish territories north o f Syria did not mean more than surrender o f the administrative and m ilitary responsibilities in the zones apportioned to them by the secret treaties o f 19 15-17. The Italian prime minister had prepared a ‘Draft o f a T ri­ partite Agreement’ for regulating the economic interests o f the three allied powers in the former Ottom an empire. In this draft, special attention had been attached to the principle o f ‘selfdenying ordinances’— meaning that the powers concerned would engage not to demand or to support any initiative for contracts or concessions in the zones reserved for the interests o f the two other treaty parties. The French w illingly supported this arrangement,3 but soon disagreed with the Italians on their respective zones o f interest, both requesting radical extension o f their spheres in Anatolia. The quarrel gave an Am erican observer reason to note bitterly: ‘The conquerors were carving Turkey to suit their own appetites, while 100 yards aw ay the “ League” Council, under the sage and brilliant Bourgeois was discussing the Schleswig plebiscite!’45 The new French claims for extension o f their sphere in Asia M inor were urged by some colonialists to the extreme right.3 The British categorically opposed them because they reached towards the border o f Persia and Kurdistan.6 Besides, Lloyd 1 Tardieu, article mentioned, p. 381. The date given by him for the meeting o f the commission, 25 February, must be wrong, because M illerand did not return to Paris until the 26th. 2 N itti declared 30 M arch in the Italian Parliament that his country had no longer any territorial claims in Asia Minor. Amedeo Giannini: *La questione orientale alla conferenza della pace’, Oriente Modemo, i (June-Dee. 1921), p. 12. 3 British secretary’s notes of a conversation held at 10 Downing Street, 20 Feb. 1920, at 4 p.m. B.D ., 1, vii, pp. 164-5 and note 1 therein. 4 W illiam H . Buckler, special agent at the U .S. Embassy in London, to Polk, 22 Feb. 1920, private letter; p o l k , 78/73. 5 Chevallier, article mentioned, pp. 315-16. 6 British secretary’s notes 26 Feb. 1920, at 4 p.m .; B .D ., idem, pp. 257-8.

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George foresaw that the ‘self-denying ordinances* originally suggested by Lord Curzon1 would irritate the Americans. However, he accepted the plan with a few reservations.12 O n his initiative the principle o f economic priority was extended to cover the mandatory territories as well, but this question was left to be discussed between Curzon and Berthelot.3 The discussion o f the financial clauses o f the peace treaty with Turkey still led on 2 M arch to the painiul question o f who should pay the occupation expenses in the former Ottom an empire. France, together with Italy, stressed that the Ottom an government should not be charged with expenses in the territories not remaining Turkish. Lloyd George im mediately brought up the point o f what should be done with the occupa­ tion costs regarding Syria, which would neither remain Turkish nor become British.4 Paris having finally after many discussions yielded to a compromise, the financial commission reached an agreement according to which the expenses o f the occupation o f Syria were charged to Turkey.5 They were finally to be paid out o f the Turkish resources under control o f the financial commis­ sion, which the French wanted to be used in restoration o f Turkey’s economy and, consequently, o f her ability to pay her debts.6 O n the other hand, the fact that Syria was not speci­ fically mentioned in the Turkish draft adopted, means that the British did not succeed in their apparent attempt at the eleventh hour to tie the Syrian question to the peace treaty with Turkey.7 The somewhat hasty and improvised manner in which the London conference carried out its main task, the drafting o f the peace treaty with Turkey— which never came about— may be explained by the stress caused by prevailing political turmoil in Europe and the east. The victorious bolsheviks had broken up 1 British secretary’s notes 90 Feb. 1920, at 4 p.m ., idem, pp. 164 and 168. 9 Idem, pp. 167-9. 9 British secretary's notes o f an allied conference held at 10 Downing Street, 3 M arch 1920, at 3.30 p.m .; idem, p. 383. 4 British secretary’s notes of an allied conference held at 10 Downing Street, 3 M arch 1920, at 11 a.m .; idem, p. 345. 5 Idem, 31 M arch 1920, at 4 p.m .; idem, p. 701. * Idem, 2 M arch 1920, at 11 a.m .; idem, pp. 344-5. 7 Idem, 4 M arch 1920, at 11 a.m .; pp. 401-2.

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the white army o f Denikin, almost achieved the occupation o f southern Russia, and launched their columns on the conquest o f the Caucasus. News o f these events was received in London and Paris with even greater embarrassment because— owing to continuous industrial unrest in both Britain and France— the cabinets were haunted by the threat o f bolshevik subversion.1 In Germany, the anti-Versailles reaction culminated on 12 M arch in the K app putsch in Berlin. In Turkey, finally, the operations o f Mustafa Kem al in C ilicia had alarmed the Conference, where Lloyd George at the end o f February criticized the inability o f the French to control the situation and safeguard the Armenians.2 In order to cope with the nationalist revolt, the Supreme Council then decided to occupy Constantinople; the decision was carried out on 16 M arch.3 It was during these feverish days that the news came that Syria and Mesopotamia had been simultaneously pro­ claimed independent. The minutes o f the conference do not contain any trace o f discussion o f this question. The AngloFrench contacts as well as Curzon’s correspondence with Cairo on this matter have been described in the previous chapter in accordance with evidence provided by Foreign Office documents. Clearly the main task after the Syrian coup was to get Faisal back to the conference table. O n 30 M arch Curzon suggested to Cambon that Faisal or one o f his brothers should be invited to attend, but that Nuri al-Sa’id— who had come to London bringing conciliatory messages to Curzon and Berthelot4— would not be the right man to represent the Arabs.5 When Curzon described him as ‘a politician holding extreme views’ he was obviously thinking o f Nuri’s campaign for Mesopotamian independence.6 The French ambassador accepted the proposal but insisted that Faisal should come in 1 See e.g. the words o f M illerand at the opening meeting of the conference, 12 February, at n a.m .; idem, p. 5. 2 British secretary’s notes of an allied conference held at 10 Downing Street. . . , 28 Feb. 1920, at 4 p.m .; idem, pp. 300-2. 3 The communiqué by Loni Curzon at the conference o f ambassadors and foreign ministers, 16 M arch 1920, at 4 p.m .; idem, p. 507. 4 Correspondance d*Orient, 15 M ay 1920, p. 411. 9 Record by Curzon o f a conversation with the French ambassador on the Syrian question, 30 M arch 1920, no. E 2522/2/44; B .D ., 1, xiii, 238. 4 See above, p. 177.

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person, not in the capacity o f a sovereign but as a representa­ tive o f the Syrian populations.1 As it happened, Faisal made his attendance conditional on a declaration, official or private, that the British government would recognize Syrian independence.2 In the prevailing situation when an Anglo-French understanding on the eastern settlement was about to be born, such a unilateral declaration was naturally out o f the question. T h at is why the fate o f the Arab countries was finally decided with no Arab representatives present— notwithstanding the clear promise, given to Faisal on 8 M arch, that ‘this could not be concluded without. . . con­ sultation with him’.3 Am ong the questions which remained unsettled and out­ standing at the London conference, the foreign secretary mentioned, as late as 31 M arch, those o f Palestine, Syria and Cilicia, Kurdistan and Mesopotamia, emphasizing that these items ought to be agreed on before the Turkish treaty was released in its final form.4 Berthelot insisted that they should be decided only in the presence o f the premiers.5 Thus the inability o f the French representatives to draft the resolutions on man­ dates without referring continuously to Paris (the very reason w hy the conference o f London finally took twice the time expected) caused, at the beginning o f A pril, the outstanding problems o f the A rab M iddle East to be postponed by a further fortnight, in order to be decided at San Rem o. 1 Memorandum by the French ambassador, 1 April 1920, no. E 3523/2/44; idem, p. 240. 3 Meinertzhagen to Curzon, 4 April 1920, tel. no. 51 ; idem, p. 246. 3 Curzon to Allenby, 8 M arch 1920, tel. no. 200; idem, p. 222. 4 British secretary’s notes, 31 M arch 1920; idem, vii, 692. 9 Idem, 25 M ardi 1920, at 4 p.m .; idem, p. 634.

CHAPTER X I I San Remo and After 18 A pril the Supreme Council met again, this time in San Rem o. Lord Curzon had travelled with Bonar Law via Paris, and proceeded to San Remo together with the French representatives, which obviously offered them a good occasion for a prelim inary exchange o f views. Lloyd George, on the contrary, travelled by sea via Marseilles and met M illerand only for a short while on the morning o f the opening day, having apparently no time or no need to discuss matters concerning the A rab countries, except for the question o f o il.1 Unsolved problems connected with the mandates seem to have been practically settled in the series o f unrecorded meetings between Curzon and Berthelot while in London, so that the discussion on the subject in San Rem o became rather a form ality, perhaps with the exception o f Palestine. From the beginning the San Rem o conference was a small one; there were only two delegates from each o f the four allied powers: Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan. The first three countries were represented by their premiers and foreign ministers.12 As an invisible participant there was still President Wilson, who by a communication had tried to influence the decision the Supreme Council might take on Turkey.3*Discussing n

1 Correspondance d 'Orient, 15 April 1920, p. 311. Notes o f a conversation between the prime minister and M . M illerand, 18 April 1920, at 9.30 a.m .; B .D ., 1, viii, 5-10. 2 Lloyd George opposed the admittance to the conference o f the French am­ bassador in Rome, Barrère, arguing that ‘the smaller the conference was, the better9. Notes of a meeting of the heads of the British, French and Italian delega­ tions, held at V illa Devachan, San Remo, on Sunday, 18 Apr. 1920, at 11 a.m ., B.D .y idem, pp. 1-2. 3 The American text o f the note: secretary o f state Bainbridge Colby to the French ambassador, Jusserand, 24 M arch 1920; U.S. For. Rel. /920, iii, 750-1. Reproduced with some variations in Peace Treaties, ii, 1296-1300.

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the answer to be sent to W ashington, Berthelot said drily that the question did not concern the United States at all, since that country had not been at w ar with the Ottom an empire. Lloyd George agreed that the conference could not continue the correspondence with the United States government indefinitely.1 Consequently, in its reply to Wilson the conference pointed out apologetically that the conclusion o f the Turkish settlement had been deferred to the limits o f expediency,2 and decided to go forward without Am erica. In spite o f their efforts to proceed with their meetings in an intim ate atmosphere, the delegations found it irksome to be invaded by a crowd o f lobbyists, especially oriental ones, who here— unlike Paris— had rem arkably easy access to the con­ ference rooms. Lord Curzon, unhappy with the milieu, com­ plained bitterly o f their presence: 'Syrians, Zionists, Armenians . . . They take rooms in the same hotel as we are in and they dog our footsteps wherever we go.’3 As a m atter o f fact, contrary to the practice in Paris, no representatives o f eastern nationalities except Armenians were invited for hearing before the Supreme Council. The Zionists had powerful agents around the British delegation,4 but the Arabs were somewhat in the background.3 During the conference Lord Curzon himself once again made the suggestion that Faisal, in spite o f the fact that he 'had recently taken illicit action', should be invited to attend the council. This does not mean that he thought Faisal could be present when the mandates over Syria, Palestine and Mesopopotam ia were decided, for these mandates were in fact decided at the very same meeting o f 25 April, some minutes after Curzon 1 British Secretary’s notes o f a meeting of the Supreme Council, 19 April 1920, at i l a.m .; B.D ., idem, pp. 20-1. 2 ‘In the hope and expectation o f American participation they (the allied Governments) had delayed the negotiations with Turkey at the risk o f gravely imperilling the prospect o f any satisfactory settlement being affected without a fresh recourse to arms.’ Draft answer to American note; idem, p. 31. 3 Letter to Lady Curzon, reproduced in Ronaldshay, iii, p. 229. 4 See Stein, p. 659, and Chaim W eizmann: Trial and Error (London, 1949), PP- 3* 4- 79 Nuri al-Sa’id was in San Remo in that time (Correspondance d*Orient, 30 April 1920, p. 549) ‘Feisal was n o t . •. represented at the San Remo Conference by Nuri Pasha’, Lord Curzon noted later (31 July 1920). ‘He turned up uninvited at a San Remo Hotel but that did not constitute him a representative at the Con­ ference.’ (B.D ., I, xiii, 318, note 2.)

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had suggested the invitation. Curzon wanted the emir to be present chiefly when the boundaries o f Syria and Palestine were decided. He thought that this decision, if made without consulting the Arabs, would produce difficulties for the mandatory powers in the future.1 Berthelot accepted Curzon’s proposal but argued that it was inadvisable to admit Faisal even when the frontiers between the mandates were being discussed, until Great Britain and France were in complete agreement.2 Consequently, after Curzon had sophistically concluded that Faisal 'either would or could not attend the meeting o f the Supreme Council at San Remo*, the emir was invited to attend, towards the end o f M ay, a meeting in Paris where the Turkish peace delegation also was expected.3 O w ing to the delay o f the Turkish reply the Paris meeting never took place. For this reason or for another particular one Faisal never appeared again before the Supreme Council. The surroundings o f the smart Riviera town, it is true, some­ times made the delegates feel like a holiday party.4 But the seriousness o f the international situation darkly clouded the conference agenda. Once again the settlement in Turkey, earnestly taken up at San Remo, fell for some days into neglect, while grave questions o f expediency— arising from the situation in Germany, Russia and the Caucasus, or from a more 'local* problem, that o f the Adriatic question— captured the attention o f the council. The position o f Britain as regards France seemed a most favourable one during these negotiations. First o f all, FrancoItalian relations being rather strained,5 the British did not have the slightest fear o f a possible united Latin front when dis1 British secretary’s notes of a meeting o f the Supreme Council, 25 April 1920, at i i a.m .; idem, viii, 173. 2 Idem, p. 174. 3 British secretary’s notes o f a meeting o f the Supreme Council, 26 April 1920, at 4 p.m .; idem, pp. 214-15. See also the despatch of Curzon (San Remo) to Lord Hardinge, 26 April 1920, tel. no. 38; idem, 1, xiii, 251-2. 4 Ronaldshay, iii, 230. 9 See Camille Barrère: ’La Conférence de San Remo’, Revue des Deux Mondes, cviii (Aug. 1938), p. 510. The then Italian prime minister denied, twenty-five years later, that there had been any change in Franco-Italian relations before the San Remo conference (Nitti, p. 6). There was, however, a remarkable increase in anti-French feeling in the Italian press at that time, see e.g. the evidence given by Jacques Bardoux: De Paris à Spa (Paris, 1921), pp. 210-11.

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discussing Palestine and Anatolia. M oreover, by the unilateral occupation o f the Rhineland (6 April) M illerand had committed a political blunder. M orally a creditor, G reat Britain1 was in a position to use the occasion o f France’s commitments in the west to force some solutions in the east which had seemed unattainable after the departure o f Clemenceau. The hardening o f the French attitude in the east may be explained first as a need to prepare some points for pressure on Britain in order to force her to endorse the Versailles policy towards Germany. M illerand— uninformed and lacking a petroleum policy in any real sense— wanted to meet the catastrophic shortage o f oil o f his country by making the British cede 50 per cent o f the petroleum shares in M osul.12 O n the other hand, in Palestine he had to satisfy his clerical supporters. After the resumption o f diplom atic relations with the H oly See, France was in a position to expect V atican sup­ port when insisting on her centuries-old traditions as protec­ tor o f the Eastern Catholics and the H oly Places. Paul Cambon, to whom the significance o f France as a Catholic power had always been a matter o f prim ary im portance,3 had already tried at the conference o f London to re-establish the role o f his country in Palestine.4 M eanwhile, notable support from the Church had been received in a statement given to the press by the V atican secretary o f state, Cardinal Gasparri, who called attention to French rights in Palestine.5 It is thus not without significance that the news o f the nomination o f Jonnart for a mission extraordinaire to the V atican was published in the French press only two days before the beginning o f the discussions on Palestine in San Rem o.6 1 The British government had reacted extraordinarily strongly to the French move. Paul Cambon stated that the communication he received from Lord Curzon was the ‘most painful and serious9which he had ever faced during his twenty-two years as ambassador in London. Nicolson, Curzon, p. 200. 2 For the state o f the French petroleum administration and oil needs in M arch 1920, see Lespagnol de la Tramerye, p. 189. 3 As appears from his letters published in Correspondance. 4 British secretary’s notes of an allied conference held at 10 Downing Street, 17 Feb. 1920, at 3.30; B .D ., 1, vii, 109-10. 9 British secretary’s notes of a meeting of the Supreme Council, 24 April 1920, at 4 p.m .; idem, 1, viii, p. 163. 6 Correspondance d*Orient930 April 1920, p. 408.

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3 The first o f the questions concerning the Arab M iddle East which were settled in San Remo was the division o f the oil resources. This matter, originally bound up with the question o f Mosul, was discussed between the British and French prime ministers on the morning o f 18 A pril. As the French requested not less than 50 per cent instead o f 25 per cent share in the oil revenues, Lloyd George brought up his older counter claim that they should participate in the costs o f Mesopotamian admini­ stration.1 His firmness probably made an impression on the French, and they yielded sooner than was expected. Six days later, 24 A pril, Berthelot and Sir John Cadm an, successor o f General Greenwood as head o f petroleum affairs, reached a new oil agreement which was largely similar to earlier drafts o f A pril and December 1919,2 except that the French share was now put 5 per cent higher. The paragraph relating to Mesopo­ tam ia now read as follows: The British Government undertake to grant to the French Govern­ ment or its nominee twenty-five per cent of the net output of crude oil at current market rates which His Majesty’s Government may secure from the Mesopotamian oilfields in the event of their being developed by Government action; or in the event of a private petroleum company being used to develop the Mesopotamian oil­ fields the British Government will place at the disposal of the French Government a share of twenty-five per cent in such company. The price to be paid for such participation to be no more than that paid by any or other participants to said petroleum company. It is also understood that the said petroleum company shall be under permanent British control.3 As regards the remaining questions o f Asiatic Turkey, the conference discussed little and decided a lot. A t their tête-à-tête on the morning o f 24 A pril, Lloyd George and M illerand 1 Notes of a conversation between the prime minister and M. Millerand. . . 18 Sept. 1920, at g.30 a.m.; B .D .9 i, viii, io. 2 See above, pp. 229-30. 3 Cf. the text of this agreement in Memorandum o f Agreement between M . Philippe Berthelot, Directeur des Affaires Politiques et Commerciales au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères9 and Professor Sir John Cadman9 Director in Charge o f His Majesty's Petroleum Department in Cmd. 675 of 1920, and in U.S. For. Rel. 1920, ii, 655-8.

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observed that after one week o f meetings their understanding on the Turkish treaty appeared almost total.1 Consequently, when the question o f mandates over Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia appeared on the agenda o f the plenary session on the same afternoon, other delegations, including the American observers present,12 had to face a kind o ffa it accompli. Arguing that in the course o f the past months the situation in each o f the territories mentioned had changed, Lord Curzon stated that the British and French governments agreed that ‘at this stage it was impossible to introduce into the treaty any clauses defining the exact form o f the said mandates, if the treaty was to be presented to the Turks by the 10th M ay*.3 As the French were pressing for the decision,4 the other delegations were compelled on the following day, the 25th, to take part in the formal decision according to which Syria was placed under a French mandate and Mesopotamia under a British one. W ithout knowing the exact forms o f the mandates, they agreed to Curzon’s proposal that the text be ‘drawn by the French and British Governments in mutual consultation and co-operation* and be submitted to the Council o f the League o f Nations.5 The only point that evoked a discussion— a rather excited one— was the mandate over Palestine. The French tried at the eleventh hour to save their influence in the H oly Land.6 Opposing mention o f the Balfour Declaration as a leading principle o f the Palestinian mandate, Berthelot argued that the declaration ‘had long been a dead letter*. A t the final stage o f this remarkable discussion on the afternoon o f 24 April, Curzon remarked that the French not only opposed the British origin but also the contents o f the disputed document. Berthelot indeed had pointed out that the Balfour declaration did not 1 Notes of a conversation held at the Hotel Royal, San Remo, 24 April 1920, at 10.30 a.m .; B .D ., idem, p. 144. 3 H ie Am erican ambassador in Rome, Robert Underwood Johnson, attended, with two secretaries, the meetings on 24-26 A pril; M eeting o f the Supreme C ou n cil. . . 24 April 1920, at 4 p.m ., idem, p. 164. The secretary o f state’s in­ structions to Johnson, 20 April 1920, tel.; U S . For. Rel. 1920, i, 2. 3 B .D ., idem, p. 159. 4 M eeting o f the Supreme Council, 25 April 1920, at 11 a.m .; idem, p. *75. 9 Idem, 24 April 1920, at 4 p.m .; p. 159. 9 This part o f the discussion is recorded also in Peace Treaties, ii, 1182-90 and 1167-75.

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guarantee the political rights o f the non-Jewish populations, though there was a specific reservation that nothing should be done which might prejudice their civil and religious rights. The French fought tooth and nail but finally failed to insert altera­ tions in the original terms o f the declaration. They had to be content with Curzon’s explanation that the concept o f ‘civil rights* included political rights, and with N itti’s1 dry remark that the ‘difference was one o f form and not o f substance’ .12 O n the question o f Palestine, the British delegation enjoyed whole-hearted support from the Italians. W ith a surprising promptitude, which gives reason to suspect that the matter had been discussed beforehand with the British, N itti brushed aside the controversy on the Balfour declaration as a mere pretext for French interference, and raised the question o f the religious protection o f Catholics in Palestine, which was obviously the actual aim o f M illerand and Berthelot in taking up the matter. He vehemently attacked the French tactics o f seeking V atican support in the matter, and exclaimed that ‘the Roman Catholic Church was not a signatory o f the treaty’.3 The final result o f the discussion was that the French had to resign themselves to the conclusion put forward by the Italian prime minister: ‘The historical necessity in the past o f protect­ ing Christian bodies under the Turkish régime had now come to an end, as the European religious communities were now represented by a civilized nation which would guarantee to the world the safeguarding o f the interests o f those communities.’4 W hat the French got from this unpleasant intermezzo in the mandates discussion was that, with the discreet backing o f the British delegation, no mention o f the abandonment o f the religious privileges o f France was form ally included in the treaty, as proposed by the Italians. Instead, the French had to accept it in practice and to endorse N itti’s additional resolution 1 N itti, Francesco, Italian prime minister in 1920. 2 British secretary’s notes o f a meeting of the Supreme C ou n cil. . . 34 April 1930, at 4 p.m .; B .D ., idem, pp. 159-70. 3 Barrère later wrote that N itti already at the conference o f London V en t over suddenly to the side o f the British* (Barrère, p. 510). N itti defended himself against this accusation: * ... in London, as in Paris formerly, we always acted in accord with Lloyd George and Lord Curzon’ (Nitti, p. 5). Idem, pp. 163-5. 4 Idem, p. 163.

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according to which a special commission was established to take care o f questions concerning the religious communities in Palestine.1 As a complement to the decision on the mandates, the Council finally adopted2 the tripartite agreement according to which the self-denying ordinance with regard to economic opportunities would apply to the mandated territories as well as to the spheres agreed on in the future Turkey itself. The American observer was, o f course, not yet present at the dis­ cussion. Lloyd George said— quite surprisingly after what he had expressed in London3— that he did not think ‘the United States or any other Power could reasonably complain* if such an agreement were concluded.4 His prediction was a wrong one, as the future was soon to show. 3 ‘W e have had a conference o f extreme importance’, M illerand declared to French journalists before leaving San Remo. ‘The deliberations o f San Remo w ill have made history. W e have arrived at results which I consider infinitely useful for all.’ 5 Lloyd George echoed him in the House o f Commons three days later: ‘The Conference was undoubtedly in many respects one o f the most remarkable that has been held since the Arm istice.’6 The reunification o f the allied front towards Germany, though only apparent, naturally meant a lot, especially to the French prime minister. The achievement o f a Turkish peace treaty seemed for the moment to be a historic outcome, even if it never came into effect.7 T h at is why Lloyd George felt justified in declaring that the entente sky was once more clear.8 1 Idem, pp. 170-1. 2 It did so in fact on the day before the final discussion on the mandates. 3 See above, p. 238. 4 British secretary’s notes o f a meeting o f the Supreme Council, 23 April 1920, at 4 p.m .; idem, pp. 132-3. 9 Correspondance d*Orient, 30 April 1920, p. 408. 6Pari. Debs., H. of C., 5, cxxviii, 29 April 1920, col. 1459. 7 Some influential French publicists commented that Millerand had given way in the eastern setdement in order to save the Anglo-French alliance against Germany: 'M illerand buys the re-establishment of an Allied front on the Rhine by an oriental transaction’ (Bardoux, p. 219). See also Lespagnol de la Tramerye, p. 196, and the editorial by Saint-Brice in Correspondance d$Orient o f 30 April 1920. 8Pari. Debs., H. of C., idem.

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So far as Anglo-French relations in the Arab M iddle East are concerned, San Remo was not a decisive turning point. The decisions sanctioned there were mostly prepared in the four or five months preceding the conference, or achieved some time after the closing o f its meetings. A number o f understandings o f great consequence, such as those on oil shares and on the future o f Mosul, not to speak o f the status o f G reat Britain in Palestine or o f a free hand for France in Syria, were ripening long before San Remo. O n the other hand the details about the application o f the mandates and the frontiers between the British and French territories had been solved in the course o f discussions in London. Jezireh in the south-east and Jebel ed-Druz in the south-west had been left within the French mandate. The idea o f extending the British mandate up to D eir ez-Zor if not to Tadm or had been dropped as a consequence o f the oil agree­ ment. The treaty did in fact guarantee to Britain the right to build a second connecting line from Mesopotamia to the M editerranean— to attain which end it had once envisaged that the H aifa-M esopotam ia railw ay might be turned as far north as to Tadm or. O n the northern frontier o f Palestine the French had consented to the principle o f ‘historical boundaries* and ceded the area o f Dan-Banias to the British m andate.1 The boundaries between the British and French mandates were finally arranged by the convention concluded by the two governments on 23 December 1920.2 A special boundary commission established in accordance with this agreement then undertook the definition o f the frontier between Palestine and Syria, and finished its work by February 1922. Thus, when the League o f Nations on 24 July 1922 sanctioned the decision o f San Rem o on the distribution o f the mandates, the territorial questions pending between the two mandatory powers had already been settled.3 1 British secretary’s notes o f an allied conference held at io Downing S treet. . 21 Feb. 1920, at i i a.m .; i, vii, 182. 2 The text in Parliamentary Papers9 1921 (xlvii), Cmd. 1195: Franco-British Gm-

vention o f 23rd December 1920 on certain points connected with the Mandatesfor Syria and the Lebanon9 Palestine and Mesopotamia. It should be added that the convention arranged also the question of the pipe-lines going through the French mandate territory. 3 Minutes o f the nineteenth session o f the council o f the League o f Nations, thirteenth meeting held at St James’s Palace, London, . . 24 July 1922, at 3 p.m.—

350

SAN REM O AND AFTER

Still, in the relations o f Britain and France in the M iddle Eastern theatre the San Remo conference is an important landmark. In the series o f post-war conferences, it was the last one at which problems regarding the Arab countries came under discussion. Aji eighteen-month period o f negotiations on the application o f the entente in this part o f the world, a time full o f setbacks and pernicious cross-currents, came to a close. The spirit o f rivalry, call it the spirit o f Fashoda or o f Damascus, certainly did not disappear, at least on the M iddle Eastern scene itself; the events o f 1941-44 in Syria appear like the aftermath o f a play begun much earlier. True, the success o f the arrangement on the Arab countries remained dependent on a practicable setdement with Turkey itself. But the very principle o f the entente in the Arab M iddle East, expressed originally by the agreement o f 1916, was explicidy put into effect by the San Remo decision: ‘Each country had left the other a free hand to proceed with these mandates*, to quote the words o f Lord Curzon at Lympne in the following August, 'and this decision had been pursued with equal loyalty by both sides.*1 W ith the San Remo conference, American participation in M iddle Eastern affairs, once so full o f promise, ended in notable disagreement between the United States on one side and the British and French governments on the other. The oil agree­ ment signed by the two powers on 24 April deeply irritated the Americans, because they thought it was not consistent with the principles o f trusteeship inherent in the mandatory idea.2 This caused tension between the British and the United States governments but did not hinder the United States from recognizing in 1923 the British mandate o f Palestine. O n Syria, a similar recognition was made in the Franco-American treaty o f 1924. 1 British secretary’s notes o f an Anglo-French conference, held at Lympne, 8 Aug. 1920, at 10.45; B .D ., i, viii, 716-17. See also the semi-official communica­ tion by Berthdot to Vansittart, 29 June 1920; idem, p. 298, note 2. 2 Ambassador Davis in his protest note to Curzon, 12 M ay 1920, letter no. 317; U S. For. Rel. /920, ii, 654. League o f Nations Official Journal, iii, 8 (August 1922), part ii, pp. 823-5. The text for the mandates reproduced in idem, Annexes for British mandate for Palestine, in pp. 1007-12, and for French mandate for Syria and the Lebanon, in pp. 1013-17.

SAN REM O AND AFTER

*5 *

4 In the history o f the Arab M iddle East, San Remo opened an epoch. It legalized the situation that had existed since at least the fulfilment o f the agreement o f September 1919, and trans­ formed the demarcation lines between the British and the French occupation zones into political boundaries o f future mandates. In general, the map o f the A rab M iddle East today, with its tortuous frontiers, complicated land communications,

and innumerable customs stations, is that sanctioned in San Remo. The psychological damage it caused in the Arab world was beyond repair, the classic Arab Awakening commented, and concluded: T t foreshadows the subsequent transition from disappointment to despair, and in it lies the key to the upheavals that followed.*1 Reviewing the immediate repercussions o f the conference in the M iddle East we m ay stop first at Syria, where the newly 1 Antonius, p. 305.

252

SAN REM O AND AFTER

established Anglo-French solidarity was immediately put to the test. The French government had its own interpretation o f the mandates article agreed on in San Rem o: 'T h e high contracting parties agree that Syria and Mesopotamia sh a ll. . . be pro­ visionally recognized as independent States, subject to the rendering o f administrative advice and assistance by a man­ datory until such time as they are able to stand alone.*1 Announcing the decision o f the Supreme Council to Emir Faisal, M illerand emphasized in his letter that the French government 'confirms its recognition o f the right o f the Arab populations o f all confessions dwelling in Syrian territory to govern themselves as an independent nation*.12 Thus the French policy o f divide and rule was made clear, and there was no longer any question o f the national unity proclaimed by Faisal and his congress and im plicitly expressed in the decision o f San Remo. The British government, on its part, sent a message to Faisal inviting him to come without further delay to Europe to settle his claim to kingship at the peace conference.3 The conditions on which the British and French governments were prepared to recognize Faisal as king o f Syria had been agreed upon in London a month earlier. The first o f them was that the election to kingship should be confirmed by a constitutional procedure;4 the second was that Faisal had to be prepared to make separate arrangements with the French about the special status o f the Lebanon and about the French advisers in Syria, and with the British about Palestine with the view to securing the fulfilment o f the pledges given to the Jews in that country.5 The abovementioned British message having referred to the special case o f Palestine, the emir strongly defended the view that Palestine 1 British secretary’s notes o f a meeting o f the Supreme Council, 25 April 1920, at i l a.m .; B .D ., idem, p. 176. 2 Official text given in a memorandum by the French ambassador (in London), 7 April 1920; idem, xiii, 248, and in Correspondance d 'Orient, 30 M ay 1920, pp. 502-3. See also the despatch: Allenby to Curzon, 9 June 1920, tel. 559; idem, p. 285. 3 The text repeated in despatch: Allenby to Curzon, 27 April 1920, tel. un­ numbered; B .D ., viii, 253. 4 Record by Curzon of a conversation with the French ambassador, 1 A pril; idem, p. 240. 9 The text repeated in the despatch: Allenby to Curzon, 13 M ay 1920, tel. no. 470; idem, p. 257.

SAN REM O AND AFTER

«53

formed an inseparable part o f Syria. He claimed that in the M cM ahon-Husain correspondence it had been understood that Palestine was included within the Arab dominions, and added that even according to the Sykes-Picot agreement the ad­ ministration o f Palestine was to be decided upon after consulta­ tion with allies and the representatives o f the sharif o f M ecca. T hat is why, Faisal concluded, before coming to Europe he wanted to have a positive declaration stating that Palestine would not be separated from Syria.1 Such a declaration was o f course never made. M oreover, Faisal’s journey to Europe was hindered by political difficulties that had arisen in Syria.2 In Damascus the announcement o f the San Remo decision provoked a cabinet crisis at the beginning o f M ay. In his message to the new ministers a week later the emir still affirmed his desire for reconciliation with France. But the new cabinet presented Congress with a programme (claiming inter alia diplom atic representation abroad, unity, and rejection o f the Zionist project in Palestine3) which was not in conformity with the Faisal-Clemenceau agreement and the decision o f San Remo. By now the emir was obviously at the mercy o f extremist elements. And these apparently encouraged the continuous raids o f tribesmen and m ilitary irregulars into the French zone and handicapped the slender chances o f Faisal’s keeping peace with Gouraud.4 M eanwhile in Beirut, the economic situation had become untenable for the French. The Egyptian pound had remained everywhere the only acceptable currency. A t a rate o f exchange o f more than 50 francs,5 French trade found it impossible to recover its pre-war markets, nor could the French government face the extraordinarily high occupation expenses. As long as this situation continued, not only area (A) but also the coastal 1 The emir referred here to a r t 3 o f the 1916 agreement. 2 Nuri al-Sa’id, when returning from San Remo, categorically denied, ig M ay, in Cairo that the emir would have refused to go to Paris, if the powers would not recognize the independence o f Syria and his tide of king. The real reason of his refusal had been, Nuri said, the situation in Syria, which did not permit him leaving the country ( 113* 115-20, 128,130 -1,133,136,140 ,148-54, 156-65» *73 » *75 » *77 . *85-6, 188-92, 198-9, 202-3, 224-5, 229-38, 241-2, 245, 248, 258 London, Declaration on 4 Septem* ber 1914 of, 13-14, 35, 48; Con­ ference in February 1920 of, 2245 » 233-40, 247 Long, Sir W alter, 155 Long-Bérenger oil agreement, 92, *54 - 6 , 158-9» *73 - 4 » 228, 230 Lyons, 31 McMahon, Sir Henry, 24, 26-9, 36-7, 61, 76, 150, 199, 253 M allet, Sir Louis, 11, 107, 115, 117, *24

Marseilles, 31, i n Massignon, Louis, 59, 66 Mediterranean: British interests in, 7, 14-21, 41, 54; French interests in, 41, 54; MediterraneanMesopotamia railway, 3-4, 19, «2- 3 , 32 , 40-1, 4 7 , **9 - 23 » *58 , 160, 182, 226-7, 230, 235, 249; -pipelines, 122, 159-60, 182, 230, 249

Meinertzhagen, Richard, 197, 211, 216-17, 257 Mesopotamia: British interests in, 2- 4, 10-12, 14, 17-23, 28, 37-40, 46-9* 9 *» 98, 117* 205; British administration of, 18, 83-5, 97, 202, 2 11, 236; British protecto­ rate, mandate of, 46,8 5,91,94-5, 101-2, 152, 165, 168, 177, 242, 244, 257-8; French interests in, 3 - 4 »34 - 5 , 40, 90, 92, 258; Meso­ potamia-Mediterranean railway, pipelines, see Mediterranean; oil interests, 10-12, 14, 22, 40, 90-2, 94 - 5 » **6, 154- 5 » *59 » *88, 202, 225, 227-8, 235-6, 244-5, 249, and s u Long-Bérenger, Greenwood-Bérenger, and Cadman-Berthelot oil agreements; self-determination of, 49, 83-5, 97-8, 136, 168, 177, 201, 209, 218-19, 239, 257-8 Millerand, Alexandre, 30, 233, 2356, 239, 241, 244-5, 247-8, 252, «5 5

Milner, Lord, 61, 84, 102, 107, 123, *27-8, 130, 152-4, *57» *6*, 217 Montagu, Edwin, 152, 232 Mordacq, General, 203 Mornet, Admiral, 213 Morley Committee, 7-8, 23 Morocco, i, 1 16, 174 Mosul, 10, 22, 34-5, 39, 40, 48-9, 5*, 79 »90,9 *» 9 «, 9 5 »9 7 » *07, **6, 117, 119, 120, 122, 130, 146, 155, 168, 178, 186, 191, 202, 205, 227, 230, 235-6, 244-5, »49

IN D E X Nicolson, Sir Arthur, 31, 33, 35 Nicolson, Harold, 27, 37, 152 Nimr, Fans, 135 Nitti, Francesco, 234, 237, 243, 247 O .E .T .A . (Occupied Enemy Terri­ tory Administration), 58-9, 73Bo, 95, 107, 159, 169, 173, 195 O il, see Mesopotamia, Long-Bérenger, Greenwood-Bérenger, and Cadman-Berthelot oil agreements Palestine: British interests in, 7-8, *9 - 83 » 34 » 4 6 - 8 , 56-7, 98, 117» 130, 163; British protectorate, mandate of, 46, 49, 51, 55, 91, 94, 100, i n , 130, 152, 165, 179, 182,188,191,201,242,246-8,252, 257; French interests in, 13, 19, 35 - 8 » 4 7 » 53 » 54 - 7 » *4 6 , 8 *3 » 244 » 257; frontiers of, 46, 52, 95, 100, i n , 121-2, 189-91, 223, 227, 230-1, 235-6, 243, 249; Jewish National Home policy, 13, 16, 48» 5°-3> 86, 98, in - 1 2 , 122-3, 136, 228, 231, 236, 252, 257; question of internationalisation of, 36, 40, 49, 54, 94) question of a protectorate by the United States, 51, 94, 100, 102, 165 Palmyra, see Tadmor Paris Peace Conference, 104-65 Persia, 1, 32, 34 -5,9 1,159 , 174, 237 Petroleum, see Mesopotamia, oil interests Pichon, Stephen, 3, 30, 49-50, 69, 81, 96, 106, 109, 1 16, 120, 123-6, *29-30, 140, 155, 172-3, 224 Picot, see Georges-Picot, François Poincaré, Raymond, 8-9, 52, 224 Polk, Frank L., 183, 190, 192, 2212, 233 Reading, Lord, 94-5 Ribot, A ., 30, 54, 63 Rhineland question, 89-90, *38, *48-9» 844

129,

283

Russia : Anglo-Russian relations, *3~*8,19, 23,40; Franco-Russian relations, 13, 15-16; interests in the Middle East, 14-15, 19, 24, 35; and the 1916 agreement, 48-9; and the agreement of Saint-Jean de Maurienne, 55, 96; war effort of, 13-14; withdrawal from the war of, 46, 48-50; bolshevism, bolsheviks, 48-50,59, 178, 238-9 Ruwandiz, 19, 35, 121 Safed, 75-6, 190 as-Sa'id, Nuri, 177, 239, 242, 253 Samuel, Sir Herbert, 13, 16, 179, 256- 7 San Remo Conference, 93, 240-54, 257- 8 Smuts, Jan Christiaan, 46-7, 52, 102-3, **6> 118 Sokolow, Nahum, 51 Steed, Wickham, 105, 137, 156, 201 Stirling, W. F., 198, 200 Storrs, Sir Ronald, 23, 59-65 Suez Canal, 7-8, 40, 189 Sykes, Sir Mark, 19, 24, 28, 30-5, 39» 42-3» 47-8,50-2,56,60,62-7, 73, 80, 86, 113-14, 121, 132 Sykes-Picot agreement, 35-44, 4 750, 52, 54» 59» 76, 80-3, 92, 95-6, 98-9, 101, 114-16, 119, 122, 124, 151, 160, 174, 180-1, 186, 189, *93. *95-8, 227, 235, 253 Syria: British interests in, 5-9, 11, 15 -16 ,19 ,8 5 ,9 8 -9 ,10 1,121,209; British occupation of, 69, 107, **7“ *9> *26, 130, 164, 172-3, 237-8; British evacuation of, 152-4, 158-60, 162, 185-95, 1989, 205-6, 223; French interests in, 4-9» **-*3» *5“ *6, *9» 26, 28-30, 33» 37» 39» *03» ***, **9-ao, 182, 206-7, 226; French mandate of, 101, 113, 129, 141-2, 146, 152, *57-8, 165, 181, 191, 204-5, 207, 208, 223, 228, 236, 242-3, 246,

284

IN D E X

250, 252, 255; declaration o f independence of, 61, 71-3, 11213» *45» *69»l8 l>216-19,239-40, 252; Government of Faisal in, 71-3, 78 ,8 5-6 ,10 1,115,126, 130, 142, 164-5, *69» 209, 212-13, 216-17, 252-6; currency reform in, 79-80, 214, 253-4, 255; inter­ allied commission o f inquiry in, see King-Crane Commission; Ottoman administration of, 3-4; railways of, 3-4, 6, 12, 32, 35, 41, 119-21, 123; Syrian Congress, 167-9, 216-19, 253; Syrian ques­ tion at the peace conference, 105, 112-13, 116, 123-4, *40, 148-9» *52 , *57 - 8 , 163-5, 167-9, *75 - 6 » 181,184,192,217-19,220-4,226, 235» 236-8, 240, 255-7, 260 Tadmor (Palmyra), 19, 117, 119, 121, 154, 160, 163, 182, 191, 249 Tangier, 174, 230 Tardieu, André, 4, 30, 40, 93, 109, 119, 153-4» *58, 161, 162 Townshend, Sir Charles, 27, 45, 69 Toynbee, Arnold, 117, 150 Transjordan, 76,213, 223,228,2303* Tripoli (Lebanon), 85, 101, 117, 123, 159, 182, 200, 201 Tunisia, 14, 146, 234 Turkey, Anglo-Turkish relations, 2, 3, 11-12, 235, 258; FrancoTurldsh relations, 6, 9, 11-12, 114» 222-3, 226, 235, 258; in the World War, 13, 45-7; armistice, 46-8, 68-70, 114; partition of, 1, 12 -14 ,19 -21,2 4-5,32 ,4 8 -9,152, 165, 222, 226, 237-8; revival of, *74-5» *94» 222-3, «39» 258 United States: American oil inter­ ests in the Middle East, 11,8 1,155, 238; entering the war of, 47, 49,

51 ; question of an American pro­ tectorate in Palestine, 51-2, 94, 101-2; and the Syrian question, 101, 108, 131, 133-5, 143, 167, 170-1, 202-3, 236, 246, 250, 260; and the Turkish settlement in general, 94-6, 100-3, **4» *3*~5» *52 » *57 - 9 » *65» *69, *83» *85» 195, 202, 221-2, 230, 234, 241-2, 246, 248, 250 Vansittart, Robert Gilbert, 225-8, 231 Vatican, 56, 244 Vitali, Georges, 30, 32

108,

Walrond, M . O . S., 61, 107 Waters-Taylor, Colonel, 208, 213, 215, 228 Weizmann, Chaim, 53, 86,97, 111— 12, 132, 179-80 Westermann, W. L ., 134, 151, 222 White, Henry, 135, 168 Willcocks, Sir William, 3-4 Wilson, Arnold, 85, 97, 136, 139, *68, 177 Wilson, C. E., 199 Wilson, Sir Henry, 7, 98-9, 153-4, 161, 163, 185-7, 318 Wilson, Woodrow, 49-50, 81-2, 91, 95 » *02 - 5 » **2» **5 » *2 9 - 37 » *4 3 » 14&-50, 152, 154, 157-60, 164-6, 191, 216, 221, 234, 241-2 Wingate, Sir Reginald, 50, 61, 66, 68 Yale, W illiam, 65, 133, 168, 171, 201- 2 , 221

Young, Hubert, 83, 107, 218 Zaid, Emir, 85, 168, 209, 211 Zionism, Zionists, 5 1-3 ,8 6 ,9 7 ,11112, 122-3, *34-5» *6*—2, 169, 179-80, 182, 197, 219, 222, 227, 230-1, 236, 242, 253