Britain and Norway in Europe Since 1945: Outsiders [1st ed.] 9783030614720, 9783030614737

Table of contents :
Front Matter ....Pages i-xii
Introduction (Geir K. Almlid)....Pages 1-15
Partners in the Cold War, 1945–1949 (Geir K. Almlid)....Pages 17-41
Fighting Supranationalism, 1950–1959 (Geir K. Almlid)....Pages 43-75
EEC Applications and EFTA Cooperation, 1960–1969 (Geir K. Almlid)....Pages 77-104
Successful EC Negotiations—Unsuccessful Referendum, 1970–1972 (Geir K. Almlid)....Pages 105-131
Forming New Relationships, 1973–1983 (Geir K. Almlid)....Pages 133-156
The Establishment of the EEA and the European Union, 1984–1994 (Geir K. Almlid)....Pages 157-183
Norwegian Europeanisation and British Opt-Outs, 1995–2009 (Geir K. Almlid)....Pages 185-209
Brexit and Future UK-Norwegian Relations, 2010–2020 (Geir K. Almlid)....Pages 211-243
Britain and Norway in Europe—Continuity and Changes (Geir K. Almlid)....Pages 245-256
Back Matter ....Pages 257-287

Citation preview

Britain and Norway in Europe Since 1945 Outsiders ge i r k . a l m l i d

Britain and Norway in Europe Since 1945

Geir K. Almlid

Britain and Norway in Europe Since 1945 Outsiders

Geir K. Almlid Nord University Levanger, Norway

ISBN 978-3-030-61472-0 ISBN 978-3-030-61473-7 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61473-7 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

To my daughter, Maria Alexandra

Preface

After I finished my Ph.D. in international politics at the University of East Anglia in 2009, I was clear on two things. First, I wanted some day to write more within the field of history. In my Ph.D. thesis, in which I analysed Britain’s and Norway’s negotiations for membership in the European Community in 1970–1972, I applied various political science theories. But much of the empirical data was based on documents found in government archives in London and Oslo. I found it rewarding to employ history methodology and sources. Second, I wanted to examine these countries’ European relations in a longer perspective. There is no book that covers Britain and Norway in Europe from the Second World War until today. The 2016 UK referendum on membership in the European Union (EU) sparked my desire to follow up on this. Brexit means that Britain and Norway are again together on the outside of the main European integration process that started with the European Coal and Steel Community and has come to be the EU. One of the questions that motivated me was why these two countries have appeared to struggle so deeply with this; throughout this period of 75 years they have, regardless of membership, been European outsiders. I soon realised that a story about how Britain and Norway have dealt with the main European integration process cannot be told without using a wide perspective. European integration is not isolated from other policy areas; it is rather closely intertwined with them. This book therefore also

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examines the two countries’ political, security and trade relations. It also discusses all these areas by employing a bilateral relationship perspective. This broader approach opens for a more comprehensive analysis that ultimately strives to explain their outsiderness. Writing this book has been hard work, but above all, it has been a joy. Hopefully, the reader will experience some joy reading it as well. Levanger, Norway

Geir K. Almlid

Contents

1

1

Introduction

2

Partners in the Cold War, 1945–1949

17

3

Fighting Supranationalism, 1950–1959

43

4

EEC Applications and EFTA Cooperation, 1960–1969

77

Successful EC Negotiations—Unsuccessful Referendum, 1970–1972

105

6

Forming New Relationships, 1973–1983

133

7

The Establishment of the EEA and the European Union, 1984–1994

157

Norwegian Europeanisation and British Opt-Outs, 1995–2009

185

Brexit and Future UK-Norwegian Relations, 2010–2020

211

5

8

9

ix

x

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CONTENTS

Britain and Norway in Europe—Continuity and Changes

245

Bibliography

257

Index

279

Abbreviations

CAP CFP CFSP CoE DUP EC ECJ ECSC EDC EEA EEC EFTA EPC ERM ESA EU FCO FTA GATT GDP GNP ICJ MAFF MP NATO NFM

Common Agricultural Policy Common Fisheries Policy Common Foreign and Security Policy Council of Europe Democratic Unionist Party European Community/ies European Court of Justice European Coal and Steel Community European Defence Community European Economic Area European Economic Community European Free Trade Association European Political Cooperation Exchange Rate Mechanism EFTA Surveillance Authority European Union Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK) Free Trade Area General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Gross Domestic Product Gross National Product International Court of Justice Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (UK) Member of Parliament North Atlantic Treaty Organization Norwegian Foreign Ministry xi

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ABBREVIATIONS

NORDEK OECD OEEC OPEC SDI SDP SEA SNP TUC UN WEU WTO

Nordic Economic Union Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Organization for European Economic Cooperation Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries Strategic Defense Initiative Social Democratic Party (UK) Single European Act Scottish Nationalist Party Trades Union Congress (UK) United Nations Western European Union World Trade Organization

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The Norwegians and the British are on the whole people of similar outlook. Both would be accounted non-European by General de Gaulle.1

This statement by a UK ambassador in 1965 describes Britain’s and Norway’s relations to European integration during the entire post-war period. Both countries are geographical, cultural and political outsiders of Europe. Situated on the European outskirts, they have traditionally had strong Atlantic ties and distinct national identities. Politically they have shared a fundamental view on the European integration project: a scepticism towards the different continental federalist approaches2 and extensive supranationalism.3 Certainly, there have been “true Europeans” in key positions in both countries who have genuinely believed in joining an integrated Europe. In broad terms, however, the chain of events from the forming of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), via the European Community (EC) to the European Union (EU) has effectively been a development they have been forced to respond to rather unwillingly. This has challenged the ingrained reluctance to surrender national sovereignty to international bodies. Despite shared fundamental attitudes to European integration, Britain and Norway have not always chosen the same paths. Indeed, British EC entry in 1973 represented a parting of ways, as Norwegians refused membership then and again in 1994. Norway subsequently adopted EU © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 G. K. Almlid, Britain and Norway in Europe Since 1945, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61473-7_1

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policy to such a degree that in some areas it surpassed Britain’s involvement. With Brexit they are again together on the outside of Europe, but their future European integration relationship will most likely not be as close as it was prior to 1973. A feeling of being a European outsider, however, has endured in both countries throughout the period from 1945 until today. Britain was described as the most reluctant member—an awkward partner,4 often obstructing further integration and opting out of various common European policies. Norway, its significant Europeanisation notwithstanding, has remained a formal outsider. Anti-membership sentiments have been strong among Britons and Norwegians. When governments in Oslo and London have sought close cooperation with and membership in the EC/EU, it has fuelled controversy in domestic politics. The European issue has been one of the most divisive of the entire post-war period on both sides of the North Sea. It has divided political parties, forced governments to resign and split people in ways that perhaps no other issue has. Britain and Norway had traditionally strong trading bonds and cultural ties, and after Norway became a fully sovereign state in 1905 royal relations and security alliances brought them even closer. After 1945, trade, security and political cooperation have been considerable, and the bilateral relationship has been cordial, robust and without serious conflicts, nonetheless with variations. On the whole, the relationship has gradually grown more distant and lost some significance. Today there is no “special relationship”.

Objectives and approaches The main aim of this book is to offer a comprehensive account and analysis of Britain and Norway in Europe since after the Second World War. No other work deals with this subject in an equally wide-ranging way in terms of policy areas, with such varied and extensive sources and with such a long-term perspective. There are two principal objectives behind the book. They are interconnected and mutually important. First, the book provides an in-depth account of British-Norwegian relations with particular focus on European integration from 1945 until today.5 It investigates and discusses the roles Britain and Norway have played for each other and how they have interacted. The book thus examines significant events and developments

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but also explores long-term perspectives. Important questions are: How did they interact as formal outsiders in the 1950s and 1960s; how did Britain’s EC accession in 1973 change the bilateral relationship; how did they cooperate on questions of European integration after the formation of the EU in the 1990s; and finally, how will Brexit influence their future relationship? Second, the book comparatively examines how two outsiders have struggled with the European question since it arose after the Second World War.6 It investigates national motives behind key foreign-policy choices, for example joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and seeking EC membership. What have been the main strategies and tactics of Britain and Norway, and have these changed over time? Another aspect is how these issues, in particular EC/EU membership, have played out in domestic politics. What have been the main similarities and differences and what can explain them? The book does not compare the political systems in general. It is still useful here to point out some differences. In Britain government ministers must be members of the parliament while in Norway an MP must leave parliament when becoming a member of cabinet.7 Norwegian ministers must of course attend the Storting regularly, but the UK government operates closer to parliament. The election method, on the other hand, creates closer links between government and parliament in Norway. The British first-past-the-post system often generates results where one party has a House of Commons majority, typically Labour or the Conservatives. The Norwegian method of multiple MP constituencies opens for more parties in parliament. No party has had a majority alone since 1961, and minority and coalition governments have therefore been common in Norway. Finally, politics in Norway is characterised more by consensus than in Westminster. This makes it easier to reach national compromises. On the other hand, some pundits argue, as the UK Oslo ambassador did about the Norwegians in 1978, that: “there is lack of bite in their political debate”.8 This has not been the case for many European issues, however. When dealing with these two countries, it is important to remember their considerable differences in terms of power. The British population is more than ten times larger and its economy is much bigger. There has also been a huge asymmetry in their military capacities. Historically, Britain has been a world power with its empire and global reach. Norway, conversely, achieved its independence late and has in no way had similar international ambitions.

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The process of European integration is an essential element of the book. Here it means European states’ efforts since the Second World War to seek close economic, trade, political and security cooperation, and the results of these processes. At the centre are the developments that began in the 1950s with the ECSC and led to the European Union of today. Other integration efforts that were connected to this are also important, such as the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) in the 1960s, and the European Economic Area (EEA) in the 1990s. However, we need to adopt a wider perspective to understand a country’s European integration policies. Security will always be a state’s highest priority and often influences its other foreign-policy areas. It is impossible to understand many developments in European integration if the importance of the Second World War and the Cold War is ignored. Specifically for Britain and Norway, the dependence on the USA and NATO is crucial for understanding their European outsiderness. Therefore, their security policies are an important part of the analysis. Cooperation in this field has also been a cornerstone of their bilateral relationship. Other policy areas are also included. The economy of Britain and Norway and their trade links with each other are significant because they offer explanations as to why they chose certain European policies. For example, Norway’s large exports to the UK in the 1960s were essential for its decisions to follow British applications for EC membership. Furthermore, the general political relations between the governments are often important when attempting to understand their foreign-policy considerations and actions. Naturally, this has varied for the British-Norwegian relationship during this three-quarters of a century. So security, trade and political relations are discussed for all periods covered in the book. These topics are interesting in themselves, but importantly, they also increase our ability to analyse the countries’ choices in European integration. In general, this broader approach strives to explain the countries’ outsiderness. The book also covers some specific foreign-policy issues of importance for their bilateral relationship and European relations. These are the fisheries dispute that culminated with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling in 1951, the division of the North Sea continental shelf in the 1960s and 1970s and the Arctic. These accounts also tell us something about their general bilateral relationship: at times it has been strained, but always friendly and with good communication.

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The main actors in the book are central British and Norwegian political decision makers. Both countries are parliamentary political systems, with governments having the main responsibility for foreign policy. At the top of government are the prime ministers and their cabinets, and their considerations and policies are essential in the analysis. However, as issues of European integration have been so controversial, the parliaments are also significant. In both Britain and Norway, cabinets have had considerable problems controlling their own party groups, for example John Major and the British Conservative Party on the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in the 1990s, and Trygve Bratteli and Norwegian Labour on EC membership in 1972. Opposition parties have also played important roles. Other actors are also included, such as the press, interest organisations and the general public, in particular their effect on the central decision makers. The book draws on a wide range of sources. Documents found in government archives in London and Oslo are essential for the period 1945–1990. Due to the 30-year rule, the period from then until 2020 is based on open sources, such as government reports, parliamentary debates, white papers and newspaper articles. These are plentiful, however, not least because publishing on the Internet has become a common government practice in both countries. Secondary sources, above all academic literature, are very important for the entire historical period covered by the book. The book has a chronological structure. The time periods of each chapter shadow main developments in Britain’s and Norway’s European integration relations. Chapter 2 deals with the years before the beginning of European integration, as defined here. Its main emphasis is on the two countries’ different paths towards a firm positioning in the West by 1950. This is important because it laid the foundation for their political and security relations during the entire Cold War and beyond, and it was a fundamental condition for their European integration policies. Thematically, the chapters are structured on the same pattern: political relations, security and defence, and economy and trade, before key European integration issues are discussed. Chapter 5 is an exception as it deals solely with European integration, namely the British and Norwegian negotiations over EC membership from 1970 to 1972. Some issues necessarily extend beyond the chronology of a chapter and are therefore included in the chapter where they have the most relevance. The issue of Svalbard and the Arctic, for instance, stretches over many decades but is discussed in

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Chapter 8. All chapters include important British and Norwegian aspects, but the balance is not equal in all of them. For example, Chapter 9, which covers the period 2010–2020, has more on Britain because of the Brexit process. However, seen as a whole, the book aims to put equal weight on the two countries. History has no starting point—the British-Norwegian relationship did not begin in 1945. Indeed, the countries’ individual experiences in the decades and centuries before shaped their views on international relations after the Second World War. To increase our understanding of events and developments discussed in this book, it is useful to examine, briefly, some main aspects from before 1945.

Norway and Britain before 1945 Relations between Britain and Norway extend back more than a thousand years.9 In 1260, when the Norwegian kingdom was at its strongest, it controlled areas in the northern British Isles. However, in subsequent centuries England, and later Britain, was the dominant actor in the bilateral relationship. Trade was always a central feature. In the late nineteenth century, Britain was probably the most powerful state in the world. It had considerable influence on the development of societies worldwide.10 The British Empire spanned the globe, its navy was dominant and the country was wealthy. Britain benefitted from a strategically good position compared to the European continental states. It enjoyed significant mineral wealth, not least coal, and the UK was a pioneer for financial institutions and traded successfully internationally. But already by 1900 the USA had overtaken Britain in terms of manufactured goods, and by 1914, UK steel production was behind the Americans and Germans.11 Despite considerable autonomy in the union with Sweden, Norway tried to force the Swedes to agree to a dissolution in 1905. The initial British reaction was negative because separately the two countries would not be as strong in standing up to Russia.12 However, the UK government avoided taking sides officially in the conflict. Informally though, Germany supported the Swedish position and Britain the Norwegian.13 The British government made it clear to Sweden that it would have to moderate its approach. Salmon argues that “admittedly Norwegian independence was achieved under British auspices”.14 An important motive for the great powers was to avoid a Norwegian-Swedish war, which very

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easily would have eventually involved themselves. In the autumn of 1905, Norway became a fully sovereign state in charge of its own foreign policy. Not surprisingly, the new sovereign Norway chose a policy of neutrality in international politics. The country wanted to stay out of the great power games of Britain, Germany, Russia and France.15 Norway was still a poor European country and its military was weak. Typical of a small state, Norway sought multinational treaties that would restrain the powerful countries and thereby secure its neutrality. In 1907, the great European powers and Norway signed the Integrity Treaty. The Norwegian government had wanted considerably stronger commitments from these European powers, an approach that Riste describes as “remarkable for its lack of realism”.16 The deal was in the end fairly weak with no real commitments. This demonstrated that neutrality was a risky approach. Norway therefore based its foreign policy on an additional pillar: UK support in the case of an imminent invasion from one of the other great powers. Britain was an obvious choice for several reasons. Its naval power could continue to protect Norwegian trade and commercial shipping as it had done for a long time.17 Norway also looked upon the British more favourably than the other great powers. A rising Germany was viewed with some suspicion and the Russians were “uncivilized, aggressive and not to be trusted”.18 Britain was seen as the least likely aggressor. In this picture, the choice of Prince Carl of Denmark as new Norwegian king was no coincidence; his wife was the daughter of the British king.19 This strengthened the bonds to the British people and state. However, Norway had to tread carefully so that its dependence on Britain did not become too blatant— that could challenge Norwegian neutrality. It was therefore an implicit security guarantee. Britain had its own interests in protecting Norway. If one of the other great powers controlled Norwegian waters and harbours, it would be in a vulnerable strategic situation. In the nineteenth century, this was a relevant threat particularly from Russia, against which the Scandinavian peninsula formed a natural barrier for Britain. For this reason, in 1855, the UK had, together with France, guaranteed the territorial integrity of the dual kingdom of Sweden and Norway.20 In the early twentieth century, Germany gradually emerged as a more dangerous threat to the British. The first significant test of these strategic considerations for Norway and Britain came with the advent of the First World War.

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The First World War Britain was a central player in the events leading up to the First World War. A fundamental aspect was that Germany’s desire for a greater role internationally challenged the UK.21 Key actors in British politics were concerned about its expansionist ambitions.22 Germany achieved massive growth in manufacturing, finance, shipping and defence, including efforts to match the mighty UK navy. The Germans entered alliances with Austria-Hungary and Italy. Britain formed an opposing alliance together with France and Russia, counter to the long preferred tradition of “splendid isolation”.23 These new-found allies were not natural companions in international politics, indeed they were previous enemies. Britain’s reluctance to commit fully to France and Russia has been seen as one of the reasons why the war broke out. The Germans may have been less aggressive had they been convinced that Britain would stand by its alliance commitments.24 In fact, when the German army advanced towards Belgium and France, Britain did indeed deliver on its promises. Avoiding military involvement in the war was a major Norwegian concern, but the country also wanted trade with Europe to continue as it provided high incomes, and Norway was dependent on imports of food and fuel. But trading is not neutral in war. The great Norwegian merchant fleet operated across the world, but predominantly it trafficked UK and American ports.25 This was strengthened when the Norwegian Shipowners’ Association signed an important tonnage agreement with the British government in 1917.26 Furthermore, the London government put pressure on Norway that challenged its neutrality. For example, in 1916 it immediately stopped the delivery of coal.27 This hiatus continued until Norway agreed to stop its exports of pyrites, essential for ammunition production, to Germany in February 1917. Salmon describes this as “probably the severest action undertaken by Britain against any neutral state during the First World War”.28 Neutrality was also tested when the UK tried to pressure the Norwegian authorities to allow fish to be sold through a secret agent.29 The Germans argued that Norway was no longer neutral due to its trade with Britain. It would have been disastrous to have Germany as an outright enemy, so Norway continued to sell pyrites and fish to the Germans in larger measures than what Britain demanded. Norway ended up in a game of threats and counter-threats between Germany and Britain. This demonstrated how difficult a situation can be for a small state caught in great power conflicts, not least

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for one with an important strategic position and sought-after natural resources. However, Norwegian neutrality remained intact throughout the war—the country had at least avoided being dragged directly into military conflict. But Norway had been Britain’s “neutral ally”, Riste correctly argues.30 While remaining neutral was tricky, the war boosted the Norwegian economy.31 Countries at war needed to have supplies shipped, and required metals and food for its civilian population. Neutral countries such as Norway were criticised for being war profiteers benefitting from the massive sufferings of the warring parties, some of them fighting for the same values as Norway itself believed in.32 Almost 900,000 British military personnel died in the war. For Norway, about 2000 were killed, primarily sailors on Norwegian civilian ships that fell victim to German torpedoes in the Atlantic.33

Interwar years Strong trade links continued between Britain and Norway after the First World War. As a group, Scandinavia became the UK’s largest trading partner in the 1930s, and the commercial relationship with Norway was stronger than warranted by its size.34 Norway in many ways became part of the British commercial sphere. In 1933, the krone was pegged to sterling and an Anglo-Norwegian trade agreement was signed. This strengthened further trade between the two countries. Britain’s share in Norwegian imports increased from 20.3 per cent in 1930 to 24.6 per cent in 1937; Britain’s share in Norwegian exports, 20.4 per cent in 1933, rose to 28.6 per cent in 1937.35 This fit well with British strategic interests—it was important to avoid Scandinavia falling into the sphere of interest of an increasingly expansionist Germany. Norway benefitted from the UK-German struggle over strategic market shares. After 1918, major efforts were made to establish structures that could prevent a new great war. The League of Nations was the most predominant institution, and Britain was a key participant in its foundation, in addition to American President Wilson. As a powerful state, the UK would expect to have a central role in the policing of international affairs.36 Britain also saw the League as useful for a shaping the post-war international community benefitting their own empire.37 From a Norwegian perspective, the League was ideal in several ways: it was, for example, based on international law and democratic ideals.38 But it was paramount

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for Norway that membership would allow for continued neutrality. The danger was that the sanctioning system, with both economic and military options, would pull the country into a new war between the great powers. Nonetheless, it was reassuring that the other Scandinavian countries and Britain joined.39 The British and Norwegian delegations worked hand in hand in the League.40 However, the League never became what many had hoped.41 It was unable to offer resolute reactions to military offensives as it was supposed to, such as Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia. But it was Hitler’s increasing aggression that proved its complete failure. The British appeasement policy was also a fiasco, seen in hindsight. Britain finally put its foot down in September 1939 when Germany invaded Poland.42 A new European war had started. In the 1920s and 30s, most Norwegians saw few security threats. Governments cut expenditures for the already modest military.43 In 1937, the Norwegian army chief said that his forces were beyond doubt the worst trained and equipped in Europe.44 But until April 1940 the Norwegian government considered an attack unlikely. Why change the strategy that had proven a success during the First World War: neutrality combined with an implicit British guarantee?

The Second World War The Second World War was a very different experience for Britain and Norway. The UK was the most important country fighting Hitler in the first years of the war. Victory in the Battle of Britain was critical.45 Britain had a global perspective and was essential in finally defeating the Axis powers. Nearly 400,000 UK military personnel and 70,000 civilians died in the war.46 For Norway, the main concern was liberation from German occupation, but it made a significant contribution via its merchant navy. About 10,000 Norwegians died in the war. Another difference was that Britain was much more important to Norway than the reverse. The UK played an essential part in Norwegian efforts to remain neutral after September 1939. A fundamental challenge was that Norway was of interest to both Britain and Germany due to its strategic position and natural resources.47 Both accused the other of breaking Norwegian neutrality. Similar to the First World War, Britain tried to tie Norway closer economically to itself, thereby excluding Germany, and hinted at stopping coal exports.48 Britain also objected to

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Norway allowing civilian ships carrying iron ore to sail from Narvik to Germany. There were some doubts in Norway as to whether Britain would come to their rescue in case of German aggression. This doubt could lead the Norwegians closer to the Germans politically, the UK government considered, so it assured Norway that a German attack would be regarded as an attack on itself.49 The view of the British Foreign Office was that “a glance at the map ought to show … that we could never allow so vital a strategic position for attack on Great Britain to fall into German hands without a fight”.50 However, the German invasion of Norway on 9 April 1940 demonstrated that the British guarantee was inadequate. The British government immediately reassured that their willingness to fight the war to its end together with Norway was genuine.51 Britain sent forces across the North Sea but far from enough to stop the Germans from securing control in southern Norway in less than a month. Better resistance was offered in the north, where British and French troops fought together with Norwegians around Narvik.52 But soon after Prime Minister Winston Churchill withdrew his troops to prepare for the fight on the Continent and the Battle of Britain, the Norwegian forces had to surrender. This created a “short spell of disillusionment” about Britain among Norwegians.53 In general, however, bonds between Norway and Britain grew considerably stronger during the war. In June 1940, the Norwegian royal family and cabinet escaped to London, where they were based until 1945.54 And with the help of the UK military, Norway built new armed forces in Britain that would be used on the allied side in the re-conquest of Norway. Moreover, Norway agreed to offer its large merchant fleet to the allies, administered by the Norwegian Shipping and Trade Mission (Nortraship). For example, in the spring of 1942 about 40 per cent of the oil and petrol brought to the British Isles was carried by Norwegian tankers.55 Bilateral relations between politicians, bureaucrats and military men lasted for many years after the war, and this contributed to a strong post-war British-Norwegian political relationship.

Conclusions Norway and Britain had a close relationship for decades before 1945. From Oslo it was regarded as a special relationship, from London it was one of several good relationships. This asymmetrical pattern would continue also after the war.

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Bilateral trade was substantial in the first four decades of the twentieth century. Both countries exported goods that were important to the other. In security policy, they shared a common strategic view on the Norwegian territory: it should never fall into the hands of one of the other great powers. The close security, trade and political links between Britain and Norway were all-important for their relationship after 1945. Their individual experiences from the Second World War also shaped them in different ways. These experiences were vital for their approach to the quickly emerging Cold War and the efforts to integrate Western Europe.

Notes 1. Ambassador Patrick Hancock’s valedictory despatch to Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart, 1 April 1965, the British National Archives (henceforth BNA), FO 491/31. 2. Federalism is defined in many different ways. By 1988, no less than 267 different definitions were recorded (Dimitris N. Chryssochoou, Theorizing European Integration (London: Sage, 2001), 43). Most commonly it means an organisational principle of a political system with a central unit and regions or states below this level. But federalism can also be a movement or a process towards such a system, often labelled a federation. Few argue that the European Union is a federation, but it has elements of it. After the Second World War, there were two main approaches to how to begin federalism in Europe: Spinelli’s “democratic radicalism”, which would start with an introduction of a European constitution, and Monet’s “federalism by instalments” (Michael Burgess, “Federalism,” in European Integration Theory, 2nd ed., eds. Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 31–33). The latter approach prevailed in the first decades of European integration. 3. Supranationalism “refers to the formal transfer of legal authority and decision-making power from member states to an institution or international body” (Iain McLean and Alistair McMillan, Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 527). The term is most often used in connection with power of European Union institutions, such as the Commission. Intergovernmentalism, on the other hand, means that the state has retained its former authority. Supranationalism is related to federalism and is sometimes used interchangeably. However, a distinction here is that for supranational bodies and institutions the states have voluntarily transferred authority in a certain field and have set the limits to this themselves.

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4. Stephen George, An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). 5. There are some books that cover aspects of the relationship and shorter periods, such as Helge Pharo and Patrick Salmon, eds., Britain and Norway: Special Relationships (Oslo: Akademika, 2012); Øivind Bratberg and Kristin M. Haugevik, eds., Det Glemte Partnerskapet: Norge og Storbritannia i et nytt Århundre (Oslo: Akademika, 2012); Tony Insall, Haakon Lie, Denis Healey and the Making of an Anglo-Norwegian Special Relationship 1945–1951 (Oslo: Fagbokforlaget, 2010); Geir K. Almlid, “Negotiating for EC Membership, 1970–1972: A Comparative Study of the Approach Taken by the British and Norwegian Governments” (PhD thesis, University of East Anglia, 2008). 6. There are many books that cover Britain and European integration, e.g. Stephen Wall, From Rejection to Referendum, 1963–1975, vol 2 of The Official History of Britain and the European Community (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013); John W. Young, Britain and European Unity, 1945– 1999, 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000); Oliver J. Daddow, Britain and Europe Since 1945: Historiographical Perspectives on Integration (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004); Alex May, Britain and Europe Since 1945 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013); David Gowland, Arthur Turner, and Alex Wright, Britain and European Integration Since 1945: On the Sidelines (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010); Anthony Geddes, Britain and the European Union (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). Examples on Norway: Clive Archer and Ingrid Sogner, Norway, European Integration and Atlantic Security (London: Sage, 1998); Lise Rye, Norge i Europa (Fagbokforlaget: 2019, Bergen). 7. Øivind Bratberg and Trond Nordby, “Britisk og Norsk Parlamentarisme: Grunnleggende Prinsipper, Likhetstrekk og Aktuelle Utfordringer,” in Det Glemte Partnerskapet, ed. Bratberg and Haugevik, 17. 8. “Norway: annual review for 1978”, UK Oslo ambassador Archie Lamb to Foreign Secretary David Owen, 2 January 1978, BNA, FCO 33/4284. 9. Knut Helle, Ståle Dyrvik, Edgar Hovland and Tore Grønlie, Grunnbok i Norges Historie: Fra Vikingtid til våre Dager (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2013), 36–39. 10. Niall Ferguson, Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World (London: Allen Lane, 2003). 11. Mark Garnett, Simon Mabon, and Robert Smith, British Foreign Policy Since 1945 (London: Routledge, 2018), 61–62. 12. Roald Berg, “Norwegian Attitudes towards the British, 1814–1914,” in Britain and Norway, eds. Pharo and Salmon, 35. 13. Ibid., 38. 14. Patrick Salmon, Scandinavia and the Great Powers 1890–1940 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 81.

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15. Rolf Hobson and Tom Kristiansen, Total Krig, Nøytralitet og Politisk splittelse: 1905–1940, vol. 3 of Norsk forsvarshistorie (Bergen: Eide, 2001), 16. 16. Olav Riste, Norway’s Foreign Relations—A History (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2001), 78. 17. Ibid., 76–78. 18. Berg, “Norwegian Attitudes,” 49. 19. Gro Hagemann, Det Moderne Gjennombrudd: 1870–1905, vol. 9 of Aschehougs Norgeshistorie (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1997), 293 20. Berg, “Norwegian Attitudes,” 30. 21. R. R. Palmer, Joel Colton, and Lloyd S. Kramer, A History of Europe in the Modern World, 11th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Education, 2014), 690. 22. Garnett, Mabon, and Smith, British Foreign Policy, 66. 23. Palmer, Colton, and Kramer, A History of Europe, 691. 24. Ibid. 25. Riste, Norway’s Foreign Relations, 91. 26. Berge Furre, Vårt Hundreår: Norsk Historie 1905–1990 (Oslo: Det Norske Samlaget, 1991), 56. 27. Ola Svein Stugu, Norsk Historie Etter 1905, 2nd ed. (Oslo: Samlaget, 2018), 53. 28. Salmon, Scandinavia, 139. 29. Riste, Norway’s Foreign Relations, 95–98. 30. Ibid., 95. 31. Furre, Vårt Hundreår, 52–58. 32. Riste, Norway’s Foreign Relations, 111. 33. Roy Andersen, I Britenes Klør: Norge og Første Verdenskrig (Oslo: Aschehoug, 2017). 34. Hans Otto Frøland and Lars Fredrik M. Øksendal, “A Strategic Resource? Norway’s Position in British Commercial Policy, 1931–1972,” in Britain and Norway, ed. Pharo and Salmon, 174. 35. Ibid., 181. 36. Garnett, Mabon, and Smith, British Foreign Policy, 74. 37. Susan Pedersen, The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 17–27. 38. Odd-Bjørn Fure, Mellomkrigstid: 1920–1940, vol. 3 of Norsk utenrikspolitisk historie (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1996), 181–184. 39. Marta Stachurska-Kounta, “‘Twisting the Lion’s Tail’? Norway, Great Britain and the League of Nations,” in Britain and Norway, ed. Pharo and Salmon, 160. 40. Erik Colban, Femti År (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1952), 121. 41. Palmer, Colton, and Kramer, A History of Europe, 733 and 847. 42. Garnett, Mabon, and Smith, British Foreign Policy, 89–91.

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43. Hobson and Kristiansen, Total Krig. 183–195. 44. Riste, Norway’s Foreign Relations, 140. 45. James Holland, The Battle of Britain: Five Months that Changed History; May–October 1940 (London: Corgi Books, 2011). 46. UK Parliament website, “The Fallen”, no date, https://www.parliament. uk/business/publications/research/olympic-britain/crime-and-defence/ the-fallen/. 47. Fure, Mellomkrigstid, 243–245; 337–343. 48. According to Foreign Minister Halvdan Koht (Riste, Norway’s Foreign Relations, 142–143). 49. Riste, Norway’s Foreign Relations, 141. 50. Report by ambassador Collier, 29 March 1939 (Salmon, Scandinavia, 345). 51. Colban, Femti År, 158. 52. Jakob Sverdrup, Inn i Storpolitikken: 1940–1949, vol. 6 of Norsk utenrikspolitisk historie (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1996), 51–53. 53. “Scandinavia and the Baltic states”, Collier to Foreign Secretary Bevin, 4 January 1946, BNA, FO 491/31. 54. The Crown Princess and children stayed in the USA for most of the war. 55. Estimated by British government sources (Riste, Norway’s Foreign Relations, 156).

CHAPTER 2

Partners in the Cold War, 1945–1949

Norway is not a very powerful state, and would not have been a state at all but for our exertions.1

Winston Churchill’s statement about Norway in the House of Commons in 1947 hurt Norwegians—but it was true. Britain was immensely more powerful and had been crucial to the liberation of Norway from German occupation. Churchill apologised to the Norwegian ambassador the weak after.2 His comment had no lasting effect on the bilateral relationship. The end of the Second World War brought relief and joy to people in Britain and Norway—but the immediate post-war period came with a new set of challenges. In domestic politics, the two countries needed to make tough priorities to rebuild their economies. Both also set out to construct a welfare state. The Labour parties were in power in London and Oslo during this period. How did this affect the British-Norwegian political relationship? In international politics war allies went their separate ways and Europe split into two camps: West and East. Some efforts were made to build peace-preserving institutions within Western Europe. But the main focus of this chapter is on the wider security developments: the establishment of institutions that laid the foundation for Britain’s and Norway’s security policies that are in place to this day. More specifically, it examines the two countries’ strategic and defence considerations during the first years after the war and ultimately the decisions to join NATO. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 G. K. Almlid, Britain and Norway in Europe Since 1945, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61473-7_2

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An important aspect here is how the UK and Norway related to each other on these matters. The chapter demonstrates that, while choosing different approaches, they ended up in the same boat by the end of the 1940s—they became “insiders” in the security sphere. Joining the American-dominated, intergovernmental NATO was found acceptable in both countries.

Political Relations It is difficult to determine how much emphasis should be placed on personalities and personal relationships in international politics. While this aspect is often exaggerated, in part due to the keen public and media focus, a state’s fundamental long-term interests are usually more important. On the other hand, this aspect is not insignificant and sometimes even has great consequences. There is reason to argue that interpersonal relations in this period had significant positive impact on the political relations between Britain and Norway. The shared experiences of the Second World War had forged close British-Norwegian ties. The UK had been the home of the exiled king and government and the principal base of the Norwegian armed forces, resulting in many personal contacts between Britons and Norwegians. Friendships were also formed between British troops in Norway and the civilian population after the liberation. In 1946, Laurence Collier, the UK ambassador to Norway, wrote to Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin: “the bonds of friendship with Great Britain are now stronger than ever before”.3 The two countries had, of course, very good relations with other nations as well. Britain had its Commonwealth connections and the “special relationship” with the Americans. Norway had close historical and cultural bonds to its two Scandinavian neighbours. Still, there was also a particularly good relationship between Norway and Britain. Importantly, this affected their political and economic relations in the coming decades. This relationship, however, was unbalanced. Norwegians admired Britain somewhat more and considered that they had a special relationship more than the UK did. Knowledge about Norway and Norwegian culture and history was also more limited in Britain than the reverse. There were some variations within Norway, nonetheless, as a small minority criticised British imperialism, particularly on the political left. However, a majority seemed to have a positive view of Britain and Britons, including the

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government, military officers and most of the press and public. Collier commented in 1947 that “it would be no exaggeration to say that most Norwegians look upon the British as the least foreign of all foreigners and as those with whom they have most in common”.4 There was a widespread positive view of Norway among the British as well. O’Hara claims that the country was admired in Britain and that the wartime links and shared sacrifice lasted long in the memory.5 A UK Oslo ambassador emphasised the likeness of the Briton and Norwegian: “from our point of view, there live at our door a people of similar race, religion and outlook”.6 In the first years after the war, the British government prioritised visits to Norway, such as Prime Minister Clement Attlee, Deputy Prime Minister Herbert Morrison, Economic Secretary Reginald Maudling, Minister of Defence Lord Alexander, the Chief of the Air Staff, the First Sea Lord and a host of others.7 Another was Minister of State Selwyn Lloyd, who wrote a long account to Prime Minister Churchill after a five-day visit to Norway in April 1953 about the “similarities of character which make one feel instinctively at home and at ease with Norwegians and able to discuss any problems frankly and directly”.8 These sentiments and views translated into concrete political relations. In Norway, the chairman of the Labour Party, Einar Gerhardsen, led an interim coalition government from June 1945 until the general election in October. From then, the Labour Party was in power until 1965.9 Although Gerhardsen was replaced by Oscar Torp as prime minister from 1951 to 1955, he was the dominant political figure in Norwegian politics, earning him the nickname “Landsfaderen”, Father of the Nation. In Britain, Attlee and the Labour Party rather surprisingly won the general election in July 1945 and formed the government until 1951.10 This meant that during the first six years after the war both countries had Labour governments. They had a common project domestically: rebuilding the countries and developing a welfare state based on a social democratic platform. A particularly strong relationship developed between the two governments both formally and on the personal level. In foreign policy, they worked very closely together. Insall describes the links between the British and Norwegian Labour parties during this period as “unusually close”.11 He is cautious about claiming that policies were directly affected by this, but maintains that there was a “climate of mutual understanding and confidence on both sides which made an important difference to both ministers and policy makers”.12 Insall also points out that the Norwegian Labour Party was briefed regularly by the

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British Foreign Office, and that the same close relations did not develop with the Swedish social democrats.

Security and Defence For centuries, Britain and Norway had had very different security and defence traditions and ambitions. The UK had been among a handful of great powers in the world, while Norway’s defence was modest and its main ambition in international relations was to avoid military conflict. These differences largely continued after the Second World War, but in several other areas they moved more closely towards each other. The war had brought Britain to the verge of bankruptcy,13 which would have huge foreign-policy implications. The country’s global outreach and responsibilities had to be cut down. The UK’s inability to continue to support the anti-communist government in Greece forced the USA to take over this role in March 1947.14 Britain also lost India in 1947, followed by independence for Ceylon and Burma. Nonetheless, the UK continued to have a global foreign-policy perspective. Bevin said in the House of Commons in 1947: “We regard ourselves as one of the Powers most vital to the peace of the world and we still have our historic part to play”.15 But Britain had for decades been losing its relative power position in international politics, not least to the USA. The liberation of Norway in 1945 was more straightforward than in any other enemy-occupied territory in Europe—and Britain played a vital role.16 The considerable German forces in the country, about 400,000 strong, surrendered on 8 May without firing a shot. Immediately after, a large part of Norway was occupied by British, American and Norwegian contingents under the command of a UK general. The allies’ principal tasks were the disarmament and evacuation of the German troops and repatriation of displaced persons of all nationalities. Moreover, they assisted in the apprehension, detention, trial and punishment of war criminals and the importing and delivery of food and other sorely needed supplies. Soviet troops had entered Norway in the north as early as October 1944 and were hailed as liberators there.17 The Soviets withdrew at the end of the summer of 1945, the Americans in October and British troops were progressively evacuated towards the end of the year. The remaining British personnel then consisted of a small military naval and air mission.

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Strong UK influence on Norwegian defence continued in many areas in the subsequent years. Archer argues that in the period 1945–1947 the main objective of British policy on Scandinavia was to tie Norway and Denmark as closely to its sphere of interest as possible.18 The British government put friendly but significant pressure on Norway to prioritise strengthening its defences. In 1946, for example, Sir Orme Sargent, the Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, pushed for a Norwegian decision to buy British defence equipment, and that Norway “as quickly as possible had to do something to rebuild its defences”.19 Britain could not accept that Norway might become like Denmark before 9 April 1940, unable to defend herself even for a limited period of time. The Norwegian government decided to buy UK equipment for two reduced infantry divisions, together with some defence artillery and other minor equipment.20 But defence investments had to be balanced with the money needed for rebuilding the country. Britain also played a large role in the training of Norwegian officers during this period. For example, during 1946 over 400 Norwegian students passed through schools of instruction in the UK, and about twenty officers attended the senior officers’ school.21 Furthermore, British military doctrine infiltrated into the Norwegian system of training. Not least there was close cooperation on the air forces.22 The UK air force mission to Norway from 1945 assisted in the training, organising and equipping of the Norwegian air force. The British considered that without their assistance, the Norwegian air force could hardly have been established at all.23 Another important manifestation of the close defence links was the Norwegian brigade under the command of the British Army of the Rhine from 1947 to 1953, consisting of 4000 troops and equipped with UK arms.24 This had perhaps a more symbolic than actual military effect. Norwegian Foreign Minister Halvard Lange told Ambassador Collier in February 1946 that his government realised that they had an honorary commitment to contribute as a continuation of the solidarity from the war years, which the British government agreed to.25 The Brigade contributed to consolidating Norway in the Western camp. This defence cooperation created functional ties between Britain and Norway, but it also demonstrated mutual strategic needs. Norway still relied on an implicit British security guarantee; it was at the least important to have a close security relationship with the UK. For Britain, the gradually souring relations with the Soviet Union made the defence of Norway as important as it had been in previous decades. What was

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different now was an increasing realisation that Norway would have to build a stronger defence on its own and not rely so much on Britain coming to its rescue; after all, this had failed miserably in 1940. However, there were also strong Norwegian voices opposing too close ties to the West, and the British feared that Norway would slip back into neutralism and take a middle position between East and West. Bridge-Building Before the war had ended, Britain, together with the other major victorious powers, had participated in talks on establishing the United Nations.26 The organisation became an important arena for the UK after it was established in 1945. The UN Charter’s protection of national sovereignty was appealing, and American commitment was more likely than it had been for the League of Nations. Moreover, Britain became one of the five permanent members of the Security Council. Norway also fully supported the formation of the UN.27 Indeed, the first Secretary General was its former foreign minister, Trygve Lie. But a realist view on the UN was prevalent in both countries. For example, Ambassador Collier wrote that the average Norwegian did not believe that the UN “will prove a panacea for all the ills of mankind… and he cannot wholly rid himself of a suspicion that the destinies of the world be controlled by the Big Three, collectively or severally, regardless of the wishes of other nations”.28 Norway was among the smaller states that most easily accepted the predominant position of the major powers in the UN, having learnt from the League of Nations experience.29 But typical for a small state, Norway was also a staunch supporter of the International Court of Justice and other institutions that could potentially constrain the powerful countries. The Norwegian government shared a concern that the world would be divided into two adversarial blocs, which from a purely geographical perspective would put the country in a very difficult position. In December 1947, Foreign Minister Lange told the Storting that there were still possibilities for the Nordic countries, as far as their having influence went, to counteract such a development, where the UN would be an important tool.30 This is what has been labelled as bridge-building. However, Riste claims that Norwegian foreign policy was largely characterised by disengagement from international affairs in the 1945–1948 period.31

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The Norwegian aversion to joining a bloc was partly based on the very real fear of provoking the Soviet Union. Stalin had agreed that Norway would be in the British sphere of influence.32 This was natural considering the close British-Norwegian relations since independence in 1905. However, in Norway, and in particular its northernmost county, there were some affectionate feelings towards the Soviets due to their role in the 1945 liberation. The early withdrawal of the Soviet forces had come as a pleasant surprise among Norwegians and was seen as an indication that Moscow had no imperialist ambitions for the country. In this respect, the war brought the Soviet Union closer to Norway, considering that Norwegians in the past often viewed it as a gigantic and mysterious neighbour. Moreover, the Soviet strategy was to woo Norway during this period. The UK Moscow embassy reported in 1946 that “there has been a steady stream of publicity favourable to Norway and close Soviet-Norwegian cultural relations are being encouraged”.33 However, as Collier correctly stated, “the century-old fear of Russia is still very much alive … the bear is being stroked in the hope that he will not bite”.34 This fear led the Norwegian government, pressured by the left side of the Labour Party, to cancel Winston Churchill’s visit to Norway in 1946. Right before the visit, he had made his famous iron-curtain speech at Fulton, Missouri, often said to mark the explicit start of the Cold War.35 The cancellation was embarrassing and was an indication of Norway being under Soviet pressure. Bearing this in mind, Churchill being invited again in 1948 was a signal of Norway more openly choosing the West. There were similar patterns of internal differences on security strategies in British politics. The left side of the Labour Party wanted a more conciliatory approach to the Russians, while the right side agreed largely with the Tories. For example, in a House of Commons debate in November 1945, statements by Bevin overlapped significantly with Churchill’s views. Consequently, a majority was in favour of standing firmly on the Western and American side, also after the war. In May 1947, Labour’s National Executive Committee published a pamphlet that rankled many party members.36 It explicitly blamed the Soviets for exacerbating the world situation and accused them of running an expansionist foreign policy with the objective of eliminating Britain’s power position in Europe and the Middle East. The UK government thought that the Norwegian and Scandinavian policy of bridge-building was unrealistic. Collier commented to Bevin in 1947 that the “government and people alike showed an increasing

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tendency to ‘bury their heads in the snow’ in the hope of avoiding entanglement in the struggle between the Great Powers”.37 Moreover, Bevin argued to Attlee about Norway being too focused on domestic reconstruction: “completely preoccupied with its own affairs and out of touch with the foreign affairs situation”.38 But soon more Norwegian focus on the international context would be required. Choosing Different Regional Defence Blocs The increasingly deteriorating East-West relations in 1947–1948 forced the Western European countries to discuss closer security cooperation. A key UK strategy was to tie the Americans to the defence of Western Europe.39 But there was hesitance in Washington. In January 1948, Foreign Secretary Bevin therefore proposed that a Western European defence bloc should be established, signalling a British ambition to continue to play a main role in Europe. Together with France and the Benelux countries, Britain signed a treaty in March 1948 in Brussels, thereby founding the Western Union.40 Based on previous agreements, such as the 1947 Dunkirk Treaty with France, it was a continuation of the Anglo-French cooperation that began in 1906 and existed through two world wars to counter German military aggression. The approach to Germany was changing now, however. In January 1947, the British and American zones were merged to address the need to establish a reunified Germany closely linked to the West.41 This culminated with the three Western zones becoming the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949. The Brussels Treaty was therefore primarily a measure against the rising threat from the East. Gradually, it also became clear to the Scandinavians that a bridgebuilding policy between the East and West was unrealistic. The February 1948 communist takeover in Czechoslovakia was an eye opener.42 Moreover, after the Soviet Union “offered” Finland a non-aggression pact, there were concerns that Norway would receive a similar proposition.43 When reporting to the Storting in October 1948, Foreign Minister Lange said “the UN has thus far not been able to meet the expectations we had for it as a security organisation”.44 There were also rumours of a Soviet invasion in northern Norway.45 The Norwegian government considered joining the Brussels Treaty, even though Norway had not been formally invited to join.46 However,

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the government preferred to investigate possibilities for a joint Scandinavian defence instead. But there was no strong desire to do this in Norway.47 Foreign Minister Lange signalled in confidential talks in May 1948 that he realised that a Scandinavian defence would not be strong enough on its own, but he considered an investigation of the initiative useful for domestic political purposes.48 It was important for the government to show the public and part of the Labour Party that the Scandinavian route was being explored. Moreover, a clause on mutual Scandinavian assistance in the event of an attack was seen as beneficial because, despite the goodwill, it was still unclear how soon Britain and the USA could come to Norway’s aid.49 Sweden’s forces were after all not insignificant. But the relationship to its closest neighbour was somewhat complicated. Sweden had been a sanctuary for its refugees during the war but had also allowed transit to Norway through its land of German supplies and personnel in 1940, which had fuelled ill feelings.50 Sweden remained unpopular also when the war ended.51 Relations to Denmark, however, had improved, in part due to Danish gifts and food to Norway during and after the war. Despite somewhat different temporary relationships, however, there were strong historical, cultural and political bonds between the Scandinavian countries. Exploring joint solutions in the security and economic spheres was natural. Discussions on coordinating defence plans, armed forces and production of military equipment in peacetime began in 1948. The main problem turned out to be opposing views on links to the West. Sweden wanted an unconditionally neutral bloc, while Norway in particular wanted some reassurances from the Western powers.52 The Norwegian government secretly sounded out the UK in May 1948.53 There was consensus in Whitehall that a Scandinavian defence bloc would be desirable because “it might act as some slight deterrent to [Russian aggression]”.54 But Bevin “strongly advised” Norway not to move any closer to the Swedish position on neutrality.55 The British government signalled that neutral countries could not expect to receive defence material since they got many such requests from allies.56 Scandinavian defence should therefore be linked to Western plans and armaments. The American government shared Britain’s views and regarded the Swedish neutrality policy as “removed from reality”.57 Indeed, President Harry Truman told Lange in December 1948 that a neutral Scandinavian defence union could not expect military supplies from the USA.58 The

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Norwegian government therefore stuck to its position, and in January 1949, the Scandinavian negotiations collapsed. Founding NATO Together The five Brussels Treaty signatories took the initiative to put together a wider regional security treaty. Gaining stronger commitments from the Americans was the main goal. Foreign Secretary Bevin was a “staunch anti-communist who fervently believed that the survival of the West depended on a union between Western Europe and the United States”.59 The coup in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin blockade intensified tensions in Europe. Norway’s position was also important. Bevin wrote to his US counterpart, George Marshall, that it was necessary to act fast “before Norway goes under”.60 The Soviet pressure on Norway and the generally worsening situation in Europe was the impetus for the Americans and Canadians agreeing to start negotiations in the summer of 1948, which eventually culminated with the formation of NATO the following year.61 Bevin has been hailed for his diplomatic skills leading to the founding of NATO.62 Britain’s belief in a special relationship with the USA was important. This was based on historical, cultural, strategic and economic ties. But the relationship was more special seen from London than from Washington. The US relationship has been extremely important to all post-war UK governments, although to varying degrees.63 For the Americans, Britain was a useful ally in Europe that safeguarded many of their interests. However, as all states in international politics do, the USA put its own interests first. For example, the Truman Administration abruptly cancelled the lend-lease arrangements and replaced them with post-war loans that were not particularly favourable.64 The Americans also criticised Britain for its colonies, and the special relationship with the USA would be further challenged by the Suez crisis in 1956. The British government wanted Norway to join the Atlantic Pact negotiations.65 Bevin told Lange in February 1949 that “it would be disastrous, and a victory for the Russians, if Norway renounces the Atlantic Pact and joins the Scandinavian Pact [on Swedish conditions]”.66 Norway’s strategic location was important. The British Chiefs of Staff Committee pointed out that “by virtue of their geographical position, the Scandinavian countries would assume great strategic importance in a war between the Western Powers and Russia”.67 Having advanced air

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bases in Norway would halve the distance to Moscow and greatly improve the Western early warning system. For the Soviets, control of the western seaboard of Norway was useful for operating naval forces to attack British coastal and north Atlantic communications and providing additional air bases from which to strike at the UK.68 The Americans shared the view that the whole coast of Norway was so important that in any future war the contending powers would inevitably race to control it.69 The Norwegian government confidentially signalled to the UK its scepticism about entering into close defence cooperation with the USA.70 It preferred some distance to American policy and traditions. Britain’s Oslo ambassador was correct: members of the Labour Party and most Norwegians had “no great liking for ‘the American way of life’, and Norwegians’ political and social ideals are much closer to Britain’s, at least of Left-wing Britain, than those of America”.71 The Western European countries had more in common when it came to political traditions and views on social and economic policies. Lange confided to Collier that, “very often America’s ability to understand our problems is very limited”.72 This was probably true, but the bottom line was that Western Europe, Norway and Britain included, looked increasingly to Washington in the emerging cold war. Ambassador Collier correctly retorted to Lange: “at the end of the day we are more than in one way dependent on the USA”.73 All the countries involved in the NATO negotiations were seeking an American commitment to come to their aid in the event of a security crisis and to provide material assistance to build up their armed forces.74 Halvard Lange played a vital role in the formation of Norway’s foreign and security policy in the post-war decades. A UK ambassador characterised him as “probably the ablest Foreign Minister in Norwegian history”.75 Despite his concerns about the USA, Lange was a realist. He rejected the pre-war ideal of neutrality and acknowledged Norway’s vulnerability. In line with an increasing number of Norwegians, he realised that on its own the country would never be strong enough to deter an attack from a great power or to retaliate in such an event. The question was rather how long its defence could hold before assistance was available. Whole-hearted collaboration with the West was the answer. In October 1948, he said to the Storting: “in terms of geography, economy and culture we naturally belong in Western Europe”.76 Crucially, the USA was the world’s biggest supplier of weapons and military equipment. Lange argued that the sooner Norway entered NATO the sooner it could

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expect to have access to supplies.77 This was important for Britain too. Bevin also focused on how NATO would allow a more rational build-up of arms and thus reduce defence costs.78 In March 1949, Norway joined Britain and the others calling for an Atlantic Alliance. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, “the one for all, all for one” principle, was essential. But there was European disappointment when they learnt that the Americans could not offer an automatic commitment of aid due to their constitution.79 Lange commented to Bevin that “nobody could be sure beforehand what would be the first move in an emergency and whether Norway could expect immediate help”.80 On the other hand, it was certain that, unless they integrated their defence with NATO and joined planning beforehand, no immediate assistance would be forthcoming. This reveals the uncertainty that has always been present in Norway and Britain about American commitments through NATO. How much would the USA be willing to sacrifice in a future European war? Seeking closer cooperation on security issues with the Americans risked alienating the Soviets further. This was particularly important for Norway, and signalling clearly that this was not an offensive move was crucial.81 The Soviets put pressure on Norway when NATO membership was being considered. They were especially concerned about whether Norway would allow allies to establish military air or naval bases on its territory. The Norwegian government clearly expressed that they would not do so in times of peace.82 This policy on military bases has been a Norwegian NATO reservation right up to this day. This assurance, though, did not mean that Norway would not prepare its own bases that the allied forces could use. The Soviets were fundamentally unhappy about Norway joining NATO. In 1955, the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev told the Norwegian government that if the Soviets had realised what Norway would do in 1949, they would certainly not have pulled out of northern Norway in 1945.83 NATO membership was ratified by overwhelming majorities in the House of Commons and the Storting.84 This was an important development for the Norwegian-British security relationship. Now, they were formally committed to defending each other and to developing integrated defences, weapon systems and practices. This was in fact the formalisation of the defence relationship that had existed implicitly since 1905.

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Economy and Trade During the first post-war years, austerity and state control were common features in both countries. The Labour governments in London and Oslo shared a fundamental economic policy perspective: Keynesianism, with a strong commitment to full employment and the development of a comprehensive welfare state. The Storting gave increased power to the government to regulate and control the country’s economic and commercial activities in great detail, for example the right to fix all prices and to forbid manufacture of any new products.85 The British government also implemented price control measures, rationing and subsidising of central foodstuffs. The Attlee government instructed the trade unions to selfimpose a strict wage moderation policy, which was highly controversial among workers.86 In Norway, on the other hand, the socialist approach was taken further. Britain and Norway resumed and strengthened their comprehensive trade after the war ended. In November 1945, an Anglo-Norwegian bilateral-payments agreement was signed. This reflected Norway’s desire to restore Britain as her primary commercial partner.87 The trade agreement from 1933 continued after the war, and establishing a new one was not a priority in the short run. One reason was the scarcity of trading goods, another was the emerging trend that trade liberalisation would occur multilaterally within the context of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Organization of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). Nonetheless, in December 1950, Norway and Britain signed a new commercial agreement that opened for reduced taxes and regulations for business agents. However, there was also significant friction in their trade relations. A general topic of dispute was how much the UK, the much larger economy, should assist Norway. In the autumn of 1945, the Norwegian government criticised Britain for impeding its economic development, for example by obstructing its export of fish to Germany. Foreign Minister Lange said that Norway “expected quite different concessions from the British side than they had seen thus far in order for the future relationship between our two countries to be as good as during the war”.88 The Norwegian government clearly anticipated more concrete payoffs as a result of fighting with Britain. Lange said that he had hoped that Norway would get “some preference over neutral states and occupied countries whose efforts in the actual fight had been relatively small compared to

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Norway’s”.89 Norwegian trade struggled after the war. Shipping was particularly important. But almost 500 Norwegians ships of the Nortraship fleet had been sunk and needed to be replaced.90 Moreover, much of the European markets had disappeared, not least the German; Norway needed new markets fast for its exports. But the UK government characterised this as the Norwegians’ “hard luck story”, arguing that Norway was a good deal better off than Britain or any other of her former allies in Europe.91 Even though there were shortages of many types of goods in Norway, food and general living conditions were much better than in many other European countries. And the country did recover rather well soon after the war, in terms of employment, production and national income—the pre-war GDP level was reached after two years.92 Norway benefitted from relatively small losses of manpower during the war, and the demand for shipping grew. The UK economy, on the other hand, was more severely hurt; the war efforts had in practice bankrupted the country.93 The debt to other countries, not least the USA, was enormous. In this perspective, Britain’s relatively tough line was perhaps not unreasonable. Nevertheless, economic relations across the North Sea in the early post-war years were characterised by “remarkable interdependence”.94 The UK benefitted the most. Britain’s balance of trade with Norway improved from a deficit of £3.1 million in 1938 to a surplus of nearly £11 million by 1953.95 It was a great advantage for Britain that Germany was virtually obliterated as an exporter to Norway. Improving the balance of payments was a high priority in London and the Norwegians needed investments in its war-ravaged economy. It was also decided that Norway’s £30 million savings of wartime pounds sterling in London were to be expended by buying UK goods and re-equipping Norwegian industry. Marshall Aid In 1947, the American government introduced a European Recovery Program—the Marshall Plan. Loans and grants would be given to rebuild the European economies after the destruction of the war. A key motivating factor for the Americans was the fear of communism spreading in Western Europe due to hunger and poverty.96 Moreover, the plan would benefit American export businesses once the Europeans started

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spending their new funds.97 The Marshall Aid was thus very much based on American self-interest.98 The OEEC was established in 1948 to administer the Marshall Aid. The Americans wanted this to be used as a tool for closer European economic integration.99 But there were problematic aspects for Britain and Norway. One was London’s fear that European trade preferences would hurt its Commonwealth trade—a feature that would also prove to be problematic in negotiations on joining the European Community in the 1960s. Moreover, accepting Marshall Aid also involved accepting fundamental elements of American capitalism, which was problematic for both Labour governments. In 1946, Bevin had argued for a third way between “the red tooth and claw of American capitalism and the Communist dictatorship of Soviet Russia”.100 This approach overlapped with Norwegian views. Economically, the Marshall plan challenged Labour’s planned economy, and liberalising trade too quickly could threaten important economic sectors that the government wanted to protect. Norway dragged its feet longer before agreeing to join the OEEC. In June 1947, a UK-French delegation came to Oslo to persuade the Norwegians.101 Britain and Norway had fundamentally shared interests on OEEC matters, and they worked closely in the shaping of the organisation. They were among the countries opposing the US objective of a customs union within the OEEC framework. Moreover, together they pursued intergovernmental unanimous decision-making as opposed to supranationalism. Indeed, Norway even had reservations about the idea of making the OEEC a permanent organisation, preferring it instead to be administered by a UN body.102 After the organisation was established, Britain and Norway worked closely inside the OEEC; Norwegian and UK delegates “frequently found themselves working together in opposition to the ‘Latin bloc’”.103 Accepting Marshall Aid and joining the OEEC entailed that Britain and Norway would clearly position themselves in the Western camp in the emerging Cold War. Not doing so would have been a peculiar choice in view of their traditional commercial, political and security relations with the West, in addition to the shared ideological and cultural connections. Widespread support for this move also developed among the public, with the exception of the communists. It represented an important step in the direction of an economic, and eventually political, bloc formation in Europe. Britain and Norway had by 1949 decided to stand firmly on

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the Western side, in terms of both security, within NATO, and economic policy, in the OEEC. Regional Economic Cooperation The Americans failed to establish a customs union for the entire OEEC, but then pressed for regional treaties between groups of Western European countries. In August 1947, the Nordic foreign ministers decided to investigate possibilities for a partial or complete tariff union. However, Riste argues that Norway’s apparent willingness to discuss a customs union with its neighbours was “a sham” and that Foreign Minister Lange agreed to study the proposal because it would reveal how unrealistic such a scheme was.104 The non-socialist parties, industrialists and farmers in Norway also objected to the proposal. The main problem was that the Norwegians felt unable to face the consequences of unrestricted competition from Danish farmers and industrial competition from Sweden.105 Nothing therefore materialised from these efforts, but the issue of a Nordic economic union would return in the next decades—and Norwegian scepticism would continue. Britain and Norway established an Anglo-Norwegian Economic Committee for regular bilateral discussions, which convened for the first time in 1949. One aim was to achieve more efficient utilisation of their resources. Norway had many raw materials and undeveloped hydro-power resources while the UK had a strong machine-tool industry and a technically trained and skilled labour force.106 But meetings were not at cabinet level and little concrete emerged from this committee. UNISCAN, consisting of Britain and the three Scandinavian countries, however, was somewhat more substantial. It had been formed to help introduce internal current-account convertibility, to lift some restrictions on capital mobility and generally foster trade among the members.107 The UK government had initiated it in December 1949 as a response to France, Italy and the Benelux countries discussing the formation of a preferential commercial area—so that this would not be a favourite of the Americans.108 Oslo was much more positive to a northern bloc including Britain than Scandinavia alone; it would be much stronger and provide opportunities for more help from London in the economic recovery after the war.109 However, when the French government dismissed further talks on their preferential area, UNISCAN became less important for

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Britain. This was evidence of a common UK approach to European integration after the war. When the continental states moved towards closer economic or political cooperation, the UK looked for ways to reduce its effect. Often this involved other types of integration with Norway and the other states outside the core of Europe. The importance of UNISCAN was limited. Frøland and Øksendal argue that, in addition to some minor concessions on foreign exchange, in the end it turned out to be a joint discussion forum for the four countries.110 Views on it in Oslo were more positive than in London. There were voices within the British government arguing that UNISCAN meetings were a waste of time. But some also argued for the benefits, such as the UK Copenhagen ambassador, who saw “considerable value in them in the education of Scandinavian opinion”, especially since “the Norwegians seem to attach so much importance” to it.111 UNISCAN was terminated when the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) was established in 1960.

The Council of Europe The European federalist movement had its “heyday” in the early post-war years.112 Many advocated the formation of some kind of federal structure to avoid a new devastating war. They hoped that the Council of Europe (CoE), founded by Britain and Norway and eight other states in May 1949, would be the manifestation of this.113 This did not materialise—in part due to British and Norwegian reluctance over federalism. The British and Norwegian governments supported the establishment of the CoE within the context of the Cold War, but they also shared the view that it should be a purely intergovernmental organisation.114 The British were divided, however, as the Conservative Party representatives at the Strasbourg Assembly in the summer of 1948, in addition to the Latins and most of the Benelux representatives, favoured what might be termed the constitutional, or federal, approach. They wanted to start with a draft constitution for the United States of Europe. The Scandinavians, with hardly any exceptions and irrespective of party, and most of the British Labour representatives, favoured what might be termed the functional approach.115 This entailed adopting concrete and limited schemes of practical inter-European cooperation. The Scandinavians were therefore useful allies for the UK Foreign Office. They shared the view that the organisation should not be too strong and that more power should

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be given to the intergovernmental Committee of Ministers, and less to the Assembly.116 This was the approach decided in the end. The Scandinavians enabled Bevin to push through a structure that was less federalist and political. Deighton argues that Norway was the most helpful ally, and that on issues relating to powers of the Assembly, the Norwegians appeared far more hard-line than even the British.117 Thus, after it was founded, Britain and Norway counteracted the CoE’s movement in a supranational direction. They were sceptical of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), signed in 1950, as the rules were considered too intrusive.118 That individuals would be conferred the right to take their own state to an international court for breaches of the ECHR was in practice a form of supranationalism. A 1951 meeting between Lange and British Foreign Office officials revealed how the two countries shared a concern about the federal drift in the organisation. Lange complained that it was urgently necessary to move the CoE in a more satisfactory direction and to halt the “extreme federalist” influences, whereupon Roger Makins, the Deputy Under-Secretary of State, agreed and said that the Council “was still regarded with the greatest reserve in London”.119 The negotiations on the formation of the Council of Europe demonstrated the shared British and Norwegian scepticism to European federalism. What the UK Oslo ambassador wrote in 1950 about the Norwegian could just as easily have been about the Briton: “though consciously a European, he is not a European federalist in the Strasbourg sense; on the contrary, he instinctively distrusts the Franco-Italian approach to European problems”.120 Furthermore, the CoE was of less importance than NATO and the OEEC; collective defence and the economic reconstruction after the war were crucial issues.

Conclusions In the first half decade after the war, Britain and Norway chose remarkably similar paths. In brief, this can be summed up by term “the West”. Britain realised quite early the implications of the increasing Cold War and sought security cooperation with its former Western European partners, not least France. But it was vital to ensure US commitment as well, which was achieved by establishing NATO. Norway held on longer to an unrealistic desire to take a neutral approach with Scandinavia, through the UN, acting as a bridge-builder between the two sides. Eventually,

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this approach, and a possible Scandinavian defence union, was abandoned—the country’s strategic position was so challenging that Western promises of assistance trumped the Norwegian primary policy. Norway had experienced foreign occupation and wanted no more of it. Moreover, Norway and Britain wanted economic support to help build up their defences. In this context, accepting Marshall Aid became the natural option for both countries, even though it challenged strong state control of the economy and the protection of important economic national sectors. The OEEC became the first important step towards liberalisation of Western European trade. The bilateral relationship was at its peak during this period. The shared experiences from the war had brought them closer together, and with Labour governments in both capitals, political relations grew even stronger. This was demonstrated by a series of visits and contacts between leading personalities across the North Sea. Distrust of Germany and lack of confidence in political and economic trends in France were prevalent sentiments in both countries. Norway in particular sought a special connection with Britain. A UK ambassador wrote of “a growing tendency for Norway, when beset by acute and fundamental difficulties, to look hopefully in the direction of Britain”.121 Sweden wanted to remain neutral, and while American foreign policy inspired gratitude, it engendered neither whole-hearted confidence nor trust. It would take time before the partnership with the Americans replaced the traditional Anglo-Norwegian association. But Norway was also important to Britain, primarily in security matters. Furthermore, bilateral trade increased to a much higher degree, and the UK benefitted from the absence of competition with Germany. Based on common support for intergovernmentalism, Britain and Norway worked closely in establishing the OEEC and the Council of Europe. Both ended up as organisations that did not infringe directly on national sovereignty. This revealed a shared strong anti-federalist attitude among Norwegians and Britons, and it was an important precursor of how Britain and Norway would be different from the continental European states. Together they would be outsiders when the Europeans in the next two decades established their Community.

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Notes 1. Parliament Debates (UK), Commons, vol. 444, col. 210, 11 November 1947. 2. Norwegian London ambassador Per Prebensen to Foreign Ministry, 21 November 1947, Norwegian National Archives (henceforth NNA), Foreign Office archives (henceforth FOA) 1940–1949, 25.1/4/viii. 3. UK Oslo ambassador Laurence Collier to Foreign Secretary Bevin, 4 January 1946, British National Archives (henceforth BNA), FO 491/31. 4. “Norway: Annual Review for 1946”, Collier to Bevin, 24 April 1947, BNA, FO 491/31. 5. Glen O’Hara, “Anglo-Norwegian Trade and Commercial Relations After the Second World War,” in Britain and Norway: Special Relationships, ed. Helge Ø. Pharo and Patrick Salmon (Oslo: Akademika, 2012), 254. 6. Ambassador Michael Wright to Foreign Secretary Eden, BNA, FO 491/8, 13 December 1954. 7. Ibid. 8. Selwyn Lloyd to Churchill, BNA, FO 491/7, 15 April 1953. 9. In 1963, four non-socialist parties formed a government for 28 days. It had virtually no practical effect on Norwegian politics. See also Chapter 4. 10. Andrew Marr, A History of Modern Britain (London: Pan Macmillan, 2008), 6–7. 11. Tony Insall, “Haakon Lie, Denis Healey and the Making of an AngloNorwegian Special Relationship, 1945–1951,” in Britain and Norway: Special Relationships, ed. Helge Ø. Pharo and Patrick Salmon (Oslo: Akademika, 2012), 201. 12. Ibid., 202. 13. William I. Hitchcock, The Struggle for Europe: The History of the Continent Since 1945 (London: Profile Books, 2004), 47–49. 14. Mark Garnett, Simon Mabon, and Robert Smith, British Foreign Policy Since 1945 (London: Routledge, 2018), 100–102. 15. Parliament Debates (UK), Commons, vol. 437, col. 1965, 16 May 1947. 16. Collier to Bevin, 4 January 1946, BNA, FO 491/31. 17. Jakob Sverdrup, Inn i Storpolitikken: 1940–1949, vol. 6 of Norsk utenrikspolitisk historie (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1996), 134–135. 18. Clive Archer, “Norway and the United Kingdom in the High North,” in Britain and Norway: Special Relationships, ed. Helge Ø. Pharo and Patrick Salmon (Oslo: Akademika, 2012), 314. Archer refers to Howard Turner, “Britain, the United States and Scandinavian Security Problems, 1945–1949” (PhD thesis, University of Aberdeen, 1982), 89. 19. Minutes of Foreign Minister Lange’s conversation with Orme Sargent 24 January 1946, 24 January 1946, NNA, FOA 1940–1949, 25.5/x. My translation.

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20. “Norway: Annual Review for 1946”, Collier to Bevin, 24 April 1947, BNA, FO 491/31. 21. Ibid. 22. Svein Duvsete, Kalde Krigere og Barmhjertige Samaritaner: 1945–1990, vol. 3 of Luftforsvarets historie (Oslo: Aschehoug, 2004), 41–75. 23. “Norway: Annual Review for 1946”, Collier to Bevin, 24 April 1947, BNA, FO 491/31. 24. From 1947 to 1953, 50,000 Norwegians Participated in the German Brigade (Even Lange, Samling om Felles Mål, 1935–70, vol. 11 of Aschehougs Norgeshistorie [Oslo: Aschehoug, 1998], 185). 25. Record of conversation between Lange and Collier, 6 February 1946, NNA, FOA 1940–1949, 25.5/x. My translation. 26. Garnett, Mabon, and Smith, British Foreign Policy, 117. 27. Olav Riste, Norway’s Foreign Relations —A History (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2001), 184. 28. Collier to Bevin, 4 January 1946, BNA, FO 491/31. 29. Riste, Norway’s Foreign Relations, 184. 30. Parliament Debates (Norway), 11 December 1947, 2088–2100. 31. Riste, Norway’s Foreign Relations, 185–186. This view is supported by Sverdrup, Inn i Storpolitikken, 201–203. 32. Anthony Eden (Earl of Avon), The Reckoning: The Eden Memoirs (London: Cassell, 1964), 289–290. 33. Telegram from UK Moscow Embassy to Foreign Office, 5 February 1946, BNA, FO 371/56222. 34. Collier to Bevin, 4 January 1946, BNA, FO 491/31. 35. Garnett, Mabon, and Smith, British Foreign Policy, 108. 36. Prebensen to Oslo Foreign Ministry, 24 May 1947, NNA, FOA 1940– 1949, 25.1/4/viii. 37. “Norway: Annual Review for 1946”, Collier to Bevin, 24 April 1947, BNA, FO 491/31. 38. Bevin to Attlee, 12 June 1946, BNA, FO 800/500. 39. Garnett, Mabon, and Smith, British Foreign Policy, 109. 40. Hitchcock, The Struggle for Europe, 65. 41. Garnett, Mabon, and Smith, British Foreign Policy, 110. 42. Insall, “Haakon Lie, Denis Healey,” 213. 43. Later Norway received such a request. This was firmly denied by the Norwegian government (Utenriksmelding 20/1949, 8 February 1949, NNA, FOA 1940–1949, 25.1/4/xi). 44. Parliament Debates (Norway), 30 October 1948, 1985. My translation. 45. Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NRK), Kald Krig, episode 1, 2019. 46. Sverdrup, Inn i Storpolitikken, 287–291.

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47. Knut E. Eriksen and Helge Ø. Pharo, “Norway and the Early Cold War: Conditional Atlantic Cooperation”, IFS Info no. 5, Institutt for forsvarsstuider, 1993, 13–15, http://hdl.handle.net/11250/99517. 48. Minutes of conversation between Lange and US Ambassador Charles U. Bay, 18 May 1948, NNA, FOA 1940–1949, 25.5/x. 49. Minutes of conversation between Lange and Huston (US Embassy), 9 June 1948, NNA, FOA 1940–1949, 38.3.3/i. 50. Sverdrup, Inn i Storpolitikken, 149–154. 51. Collier to Bevin, 4 January 1946, BNA, FO 491/31. 52. Minutes of conversation between Lange and US Ambassador Bay, 18 May 1948, NNA, FOA 1940–1949, 25.5/x. 53. State Secretary Dag Bryn’s account of his meetings in London, 15 May 1948, NNA, FOA 1940–1949, 38.3.3/i. 54. UK Chiefs of Staff Committee Joint Planning Staff (J.P. [47] 56), 4 June 1947, BNA, FO 371/65971. 55. State Secretary Dag Bryn’s account of his meetings in London, 15 May 1948, NNA, FOA 1940–1949, 38.3.3/i. My translation. 56. Prebensen to Oslo, referring to meeting with Orme Sargent 22 June 1948, 23 June 1948, NNA, FOA 1940–1949, 38.3.3/i. 57. Norwegian US ambassador Wilhelm Morgenstierne to Oslo, 19 May 1948, NNA, FOA 1940–1949, 38.3.3/i. My translation. 58. Lange (writing from Norway’s UN permanent delegation) to Oslo about meeting 11 December 1948, 12 December 1948, NNA, FOA 1940– 1949, 25.2.73/798B. 59. North Atlantic Treaty Organization website, “The United Kingdom and NATO”, no date, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_ 162351.htm?selectedLocale=en. 60. Even Lange, Samling, 190. My translation. 61. Saki Ruth Dockrill, “A Bipolar World,” in A Companion to International History 1900–2001, ed. Gordon Martel (Malden: Blackwell, 2007), 303. 62. Garnett, Mabon, and Smith, British Foreign Policy, 113. 63. Guy Arnold, America and Britain: Was There Ever a Special Relationship? (London: C. Hurst, 2014). Edward Heath, 1970–1974, is possibly an exception, since he had Europe as a cornerstone of his foreign policy (see Chapter 5). 64. Garnett, Mabon, and Smith, British Foreign Policy, 114–115. 65. The British Foreign Office said this in meeting with Prebensen, Prebensen to Lange, 17 January 1949, NNA, FOA 1940–1949, 38.3.3/iii. 66. Record of conversation between Bevin, Gladwyn Jebb and Lange, 14 February 1949, NNA, FOA 1940–1949, 25.2.73/798B. My translation. 67. UK Chiefs of Staff Committee Joint Planning Staff (J.P. (47) 56), 4 June 1947, BNA, FO 371/65971.

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68. Ibid. 69. Record of conversation between Bevin and Lange on 14 February 1949, referring to Lange’s conversation with Dean Acheson and Truman in Washington, Bevin to Collier, 14 February 1949, BNA, FO 491/3. 70. Minute of conversation between Lange and Collier, 12 January 1948, NNA, FOA 1940–1949, 25.5/x. 71. Collier to Bevin, 22 November 1950, BNA, 491/4. 72. Minute of conversation between Lange and Collier, 12 January 1948, NNA, FOA 1940–1949, 25.5/x. My translation. 73. Ibid. 74. Discussed in meeting between Lange and British and American ambassadors to Oslo 1 February, Collier to Bevin, 1 February 1949, BNA, FO 491/3. 75. Collier to Bevin, 22 November 1950, BNA, FO 491/4. 76. Parliament Debates (Norway), 30 October 1948, 1986. My translation. 77. Record of conversation between Bevin and Lange on 14 February 1949, Bevin to Collier, 14 February 1949, BNA, FO 491/3. 78. Parliament Debates (UK), Commons, vol. 464, col. 2018, 12 May 1949. 79. Record of conversation between Bevin and Lange on 14 February 1949, Bevin to Collier, 14 February 1949, BNA, FO 491/3. 80. Ibid. 81. Sverdrup, Inn i Storpolitikken, 337–341. 82. In meeting between Lange and British and American ambassadors to Oslo 1 February, Collier to Bevin, 1 February 1949, FO 491/3. 83. Khrushchev said this in meeting with Prime Minister Gerhardsen and Minister of Commerce Arne Skaug during their visit to Moscow 10– 16 November 1955, Ambassador Peter Scarlett to Foreign Secretary Macmillan, 22 September 1955, BNA, FO 491/9. 84. House of Commons: 333 to 6; the Storting: 150 to 13. 85. Edvard Bull, Norge i den Rike Verden, 1945–75, vol. 11 of Norges historie (Oslo: Cappelen, 1979), 89–90. 86. Minutes of meeting between George Woodcock, General Secretary of the Trade Union Congress, and Gerhardsen 4 February 1965, Ambassador Arne Skaug to Oslo, 2 March 1965, NNA, FOA 1960–1969, 11.7.22. 87. Hans Otto Frøland and Lars Fredrik M. Øksendal, “A Strategic Resource? Norway’s Position in British Commercial Policy, 1931–1972,” in Britain and Norway: Special Relationships, ed. Helge Ø. Pharo and Patrick Salmon (Oslo: Akademika, 2012), 184. 88. Minutes of conversation between Lange and Collier 15 November 1945, Norwegian Foreign Ministry, 15 November 1945, NNA, FOA 1940– 1949, 25.5/x. My translation. 89. Ibid. 90. Collier to Bevin, 4 January 1946, BNA, FO 491/31.

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91. Collier to R.M. Hankey (Northern Department of the Foreign Office), 15 February 1946, BNA, FO 371/66047. 92. Nicholas Crafts and Gianni Toniolo, “Postwar Growth: An Overview,” in Economic Growth in Europe Since 1945, ed. Nicholas Crafts and Gianni Toniolo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 4. 93. Marr, A History, 11–13. 94. O’Hara, “Anglo-Norwegian,” 257. 95. Ibid., 253. 96. John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: The Deals. The Spies. The Lies. The Truth (London: Penguin, 2005), 31–32. 97. Walter La Feber, America, Russia and the Cold War, 1945–1996, 8th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1997), 59–61. 98. See also Pharo’s account of the histography on American motives behind the Marshall Plan in Helge Ø. Pharo, “Norge og Marshallplanen” (Oslo: Den norske atlanterhavskomite’s skriftserie, no 198, 1997), 5–7. 99. Frøland and Øksendal, “A Strategic Resource?”. 100. Bevin memorandum to Defence Committee, 13 March 1946, BNA, CAB 131/2. 101. Gidske Anderson, Halvard Lange: Portrett av en Nordmann (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1981), 195. 102. Minute by Paus at legation at Bern to Oslo, 26 April 1949, NNA, FOA 1940–1949, 44.4.13/i. 103. “Norway: annual review for 1949”, Collier to Bevin, 3 March 1950, BNA, FO 491/31. 104. Riste, Norway’s Foreign Relations, 237–239. 105. Clive Archer and Ingrid Sogner, Norway, European Integration and Atlantic Security (London: Sage, 1998), 14–15. 106. Letter from the Storting President, on behalf of Gerhardsen, to Attlee, summer of 1948, NNA, FOA 1940–1949, 44.4.13/i. 107. Frøland and Øksendal, “A Strategic Resource?,” 185. 108. Alan Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945–51 (Milton Park: Taylor and Francis, 2005), 316. 109. Norwegian Government, White Paper (St.meld.) no. 25 (1950), 10 March 1950. 110. Frøland and Øksendal, “A Strategic Resource?,” 186. 111. Alec Randall (Copenhagen Embassy) to Roger Makins (Foreign Office), 12 July 1951, BNA, FO 371/9444. 112. Michael Burgess, “Federalism,” in European Integration Theory, 2nd ed., ed. Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 31. 113. Birte Wassenberg, History of the Council of Europe (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2013).

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114. Knut E. Eriksen and Helge Ø. Pharo, Kald Krig og Internasjonalisering: 1949–1965, vol. 5 of Norsk utenrikspolitisk historie (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1997), 129–130. 115. Record of Lange’s speech to Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1 December 1949, NNA, FOA 1940–1949, 25.1/4/xii. 116. Anne Deighton, “‘Our Scandinavian Allies’. Britain, Norway and the Council of Europe, 1948–1950,” in Britain and Norway: Special Relationships, eds. Helge Ø. Pharo and Patrick Salmon (Oslo: Akademika, 2012), 233. 117. Ibid., 239. 118. Ibid., 243. 119. Record of conversation between Lange, Wright and Makins, 25 June 1951, BNA, FO 371/9444. 120. Collier to Bevin, 22 November 1950, BNA, 491/4. 121. “Norway: Annual Review for 1953”, Wright to Eden, 25 January 1954, BNA, FO 491/31.

CHAPTER 3

Fighting Supranationalism, 1950–1959

In all matters of common concern Norway continued to range herself alongside the United Kingdom, repeatedly emphasizing the great store she set on her special relationship with Britain.1

Britain’s ambassador to Norway wrote the above observation early in the 1950s. One of the questions discussed in this chapter is whether this pattern continued during the whole decade. In the previous chapter, we saw that the two Labour governments from 1945 shared main political objectives and had close interpersonal contact. In the 1950s, there was no such sister party overlap. How did this affect the political relations between the two countries? By 1950, Britain and Norway were firmly placed in the Western camp in the Cold War. NATO membership with American security commitments was the cornerstone of both countries’ foreign policies. How did NATO membership affect their defences and security relationship? The most important subject matter in this chapter, however, is their European relations. The 1950s turned out to be one of the most important decades in the history of European integration. Six of the continental states established important institutions, such as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Economic Community (EEC). How did Britain and Norway react to these developments? And how did they relate to each other when forming their European integration policies? © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 G. K. Almlid, Britain and Norway in Europe Since 1945, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61473-7_3

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Political Relations After six years of Labour governments in Britain and Norway, the Tories returned to power in the UK in October 1951. Winston Churchill was struggling with poor health, and there were doubts about his capacity in his second tenure.2 The Conservatives, with four different prime ministers, would now occupy 10 Downing Street until 1964, while Norwegian Labour remained in office throughout this period. We have seen that the two Labour parties worked closely together in the first post-war years. Now it was expected that the governments would drift somewhat apart from each other. In Norway, “there was some indication of an undercurrent of anxiety” over the change in Britain.3 One of the main concerns was that a Tory government would be more inclined to favour a system under which important decisions would in practice be made by the greater powers in NATO.4 However, the change of ruling party did not significantly alter BritishNorwegian relations. The UK Oslo ambassador wrote to Anthony Eden, the new foreign secretary, in March 1952: “the Norwegians are our staunchest friends and supporters outside the Commonwealth and they set great store on their special relationship with us”.5 The ambassador pushed for a ministerial visit to Norway to underline that the strong relations also existed with a Conservative government.6 This was followed up by Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Selwyn Lloyd, who was “very keen to go”.7 Eden himself did not, however, and the number of ministerial visits from Britain was reduced overall after the change of government. The ambassador later suggested that, instead of just accepting a reduced role in Norway, Britain should strengthen the relationship. He even argued that it should progress to the point where Norway’s association with the UK “is not very far different from that between the older members of the Commonwealth”.8 However, he realised that actual membership was unlikely. One problem would be having a second monarchy within the Commonwealth. In Norway, the idea of equality in a Commonwealth partnership with countries like Britain and Canada would possibly have had strong appeal. But a majority of Norwegians would most likely have cherished independence more. Nevertheless, the ambassador suggested that the UK should “be prepared to do with Norway what we do not necessarily do with other foreign countries”.9 Harold Macmillan, as foreign secretary, agreed in general, and concluded that Britain should “still further this very close and special relationship with

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Norway”.10 He emphasised the similarity in the constitutional and political structures of the two states, the widespread proficiency in the English language in Norway and the simple fact of geographical propinquity. Churchill, long overdue argued some, handed the reins over to Eden in April 1955. He soon called a general election and increased the Tory majority to 60. But his premiership was stained by his poor handling of the Suez crisis in 1956. Together with French Prime Minister Guy Mollet, he decided to support an Israeli invasion of Egypt after Nasser’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal.11 The canal was vital for British trade, both for providing access to the Far East and, increasingly, for shipping oil from the Middle East. However, Eden miscalculated the American and Soviet reactions badly.12 Britain had to make a humiliating withdrawal. This had several effects. In the short term, it was the beginning of Eden’s downfall. He was replaced by Macmillan in January 1957. But the long-term effects were more important. While Macmillan believed that British prestige could be maintained and its prosperity could be restored, the crisis accentuated for many, also within Whitehall, that the country no longer belonged at the ‘top table’ of international politics. Suez became a word to describe Britain’s demise. The main UK concern regarding Suez was of course not Norwegian reactions. However, it is useful to look at this in our context here. Prime Minister Gerhardsen was visiting London at the time of the crisis and had to return home sooner than planned.13 The Norwegians understood this. However, there were strong reactions to the British Suez decision itself. Norway’s reactions were “compounded by fear, incredulity and dismay” and foreign minister Lange was apparently “deeply hurt” because Britain and France did not consult NATO on Suez.14 At the same time, the UK ambassador concluded that the critics were no more hostile than what was to be expected “having regard to the dislike of Norwegians for violence in any form, their somewhat naïve faith in the UN and the regard of the Norwegian socialists for the British Labour Party”.15 Moreover, the Russian incursion into Hungary on 4 November was seen as much worse. After all, while Britain had made a mistake with Suez, it was still one of Norway’s most important allies and its best friend in international politics. In January 1958, the British ambassador reported that “our mutual relations have resumed their normal frank and friendly course”.16 There was a similar pattern regarding decolonisation. Britain, with its empirical legacy, was very different from Norway, which had not been a colonial power in modern times. Unsurprisingly, this affected their views

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on the decolonisation process and created some friction between them. This was played out in particular on the UN stage. The UK government was internally critical of Norway’s approach: it was “influenced by the idealistic but uninformed views on the subject widely held at home”.17 In Britain, decolonisation was largely accepted, but there were difficult questions relating to the practicalities of the liberation process. It was easier for Norwegians to unambiguously take the side of the people who sought freedom. The British Oslo ambassador complained that “Norway is apt to sympathise unreflectingly with any movement or proposal couched in terms of self-determination and independence in any part of the world and in any circumstance”.18 Nevertheless, Norway’s position was often markedly more sympathetic to the UK’s standpoint compared to many other countries, for example in the case of Cyprus in 1954.19 Throughout the 1950s the Norwegian government criticised other colonial powers harshly while turning more of a blind eye to Britain, despite its declared support for an immediate end to colonialism.20 This practice demonstrates that the issue was not of vital national interest to Norway, and not important enough to cause significant damage to its UK relations.

Security and Defence Becoming NATO members affected Britain and Norway profoundly— this “represented a revolution in foreign and defence policy”.21 The American commitment was vital in terms of strategic policy, and NATO would be crucial for the development of national defence capacities and the integration of these with other members. The Labour Party had taken Britain into NATO in 1949, but it was expected that the Conservatives would be no less committed. In a House of Commons debate in December 1953 Foreign Secretary Eden said that NATO was “a remarkably successful international experiment”.22 Selwyn Lloyd, a subsequent foreign secretary, confirmed the positive view in 1956, arguing that it had “successfully achieved its main purpose … it has saved Western Europe”.23 There was similar satisfaction with NATO in Norway. A large majority of the Storting still supported membership. Britain and Norway were pleased that NATO was intergovernmental. All major decisions had to be made unanimously in the Atlantic Council. However, one could argue that NATO also had supranational features. One was the crucial article 5 of the Atlantic Treaty, but this was never invoked during the Cold War. A more relevant aspect was the pressure

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a member was put under in case most or all other nations pushed for a certain policy, particularly the USA. An example was when the Americans wanted West Germany to join NATO, which was not a primary preference for Norway. But such pressure was easier to accept for Britain and Norway than when it came to European integration—giving up some sovereignty in practice was an acceptable price to pay for the survival of the state, seen in the light of the Cold War. In the early 1950s, the Norwegian government argued that NATO should develop its activities in the economic, social, cultural and foreignpolicy fields.24 This would counter pressure for federalist sentiments in the Council of Europe context. Some British politicians also advocated a strengthening of NATO in these areas.25 Similarly, Britain and Norway agreed that the OEEC should voluntarily limit the scope of its work to avoid coming into conflict with NATO’s considerations of future nonmilitary development.26 But nothing significant materialised from these efforts. There was too little interest in Washington and among a majority in London.27 NATO remained a purely security and defence organisation. Britain and Norway played different roles in NATO. From the beginning, the UK was one of the most influential actors, “setting the tone both politically and militarily”.28 American leaders recognised the UK as a uniquely important ally in the defence field.29 Britain was also, from 1952, the world’s third nuclear weapons power. Norway was vastly inferior in virtually all respects relating to defence; its “extreme weakness on land, sea and in the air” was a major problem, according to the UK government.30 Moreover, although “Norwegians can be counted on individually to acquit themselves well in war”, the British Foreign Office considered, Norway “has in fact no military traditions, and her inclinations are rather pacifist and humanitarian”.31 The defence of the British Isles was of course an important part of NATO’s rationale. But this area was unlikely to be the first attacked in the event of Eastern aggression. Norway was different. Its common border with the Soviet Union and strategically important ports put it under much more direct pressure. The Soviets were unhappy about Norwegian NATO membership because its land would be used by the big Western powers in a war. Furthermore, the waters around northern Norway constituted the Soviets’ main access to the Atlantic.32 Seen from a British perspective, it was imperative to “deny to the enemy submarine bases on the coast of Norway and air-fields in Norwegian territory for use against the UK”.33 Consequently, a fundamental aspect of the bilateral security relationship

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was that Norwegian territory was more important to the British than vice versa. A key question in this context was whether foreign bases with allied aircrafts should be stationed in Norway. The Norwegian government had promised the Soviet Union in 1949 that this would not happen in peace time. But such bases would improve the British and American strategic position considerably. Several cabinet members, for example Foreign Minister Lange, a majority of the opposition and the military wanted an easing of this policy.34 The UK government, based partly on its own interests, characterised these actors as “more experienced and far-sighted”.35 Nonetheless, the British and US approach was to let the Norwegians decide this themselves. But some pressure was applied, and more so by the Americans.36 This had little effect—there have been no permanent foreign bases on Norwegian soil right up to today. A similar Norwegian reservation was that no nuclear weapons were to be placed on Norwegian soil. After the Eisenhower administration shifted to the “massive retaliation” doctrine for the USA in 1954 and NATO thus included nuclear weapons in its arsenal, pressure on Norway grew.37 The issue was divisive in the Labour Party. In 1957, the party conference decided not to accept nuclear warheads or missile bases in Norway. The military and a majority of the Storting opposition opposed this decision.38 But a cabinet majority upheld the nuclear ban. Nonetheless, the government made it clear that this could change if the situation warranted it. This decision would have been even more problematic had the allies pushed more. The British government considered that the question was best left alone in public discussion because Norwegians were so sensitive about foreigners, even allies, putting pressure on them.39 However, the Norwegian government assuaged foreign concerns through a number of measures that hollowed out its non-nuclear policy. For example, Norwegian pilots secretly trained in dropping bombs that could carry nuclear warheads.40 The relationship with the USA was important and challenging for both countries. Turner shows how Britain cooperated closely with the Americans on defence developments, and the USA contributed to the building of new bases and supplied weapons.41 Britain’s armed forces were expanded by such measures as the introduction of conscription in 1949. The government realised that a larger army was necessary if they were to tie the USA to Europe and be the main European contributor in NATO.42 Another significant boost was the development of the UK

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nuclear bomb. This was important to the Attlee government since the country would then be promoted to the top tier in international security policy and thus be taken more seriously in Washington.43 However, the UK thought the Americans had a “selfish attitude” regarding the development of atomic weapons and therefore developed its own bomb in 1952, and hydrogen bombs later in the decade.44 The US relationship was also problematic for Norway. The ideal security partner was Britain, and there was an expectation in Norway of virtually a bilateral partnership in NATO.45 The UK viewed the Norwegian government as a good partner—the British ambassador said in 1951 that “they may be able, as they are certainly willing, to be of considerable help to HMG”.46 In 1954, Britain and Norway made bilateral agreements for their air forces within the NATO framework, which provided for closer cooperation. One example was linking the air-warning systems of the two countries; in the event of an attack on the British Isles from the north, UK defences would have an extra hour’s warning.47 However, the USA was the world’s biggest weapons supplier and increasingly the dominant force in NATO. In 1950, the Norwegians submitted a request to the US authorities for supplies under the Mutual Defence Assistance Program. In the 1950s, huge amounts of equipment and arms came to Norway through this programme, and considerable funds were allocated to the construction of airfields and other installations. The condition for the assistance was that Norway would accept integration of their defence with the Americans.48 Joining NATO, therefore, involved a significant rise in US influence on Norwegian security and a relative undercutting of UK influence.49 But this was problematic. Selwyn Lloyd was correct that “feelings towards the Americans are rather negative”, both when it came to US policy and the fear of rashness on the part of the new Eisenhower Administration.50 The U2 incident in July 1960, a serious US blunder, contributed to Norwegian scepticism. It was especially problematic that the Americans had not informed Norwegian officials.51 The Soviets accused Norway of complicity and threatened to take direct action against foreign bases used by American planes for such flights.52 The incident was an example of how small states sometimes become entangled in the affairs of the great powers, and it gave backing to those who thought Norway should be neutral like Sweden.

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The question as to whether Norway would drift back into neutrality lurked in the background during the first decades of NATO membership. For example, London worried that Norway’s negotiations with the other Scandinavian countries to establish an economic union in the mid1950s “could mean that the northern flank of NATO would crumble away”.53 Foreign Secretary Macmillan therefore wanted to discourage Norway from seeking such an alternative.54 The primary concern was not that Norway would leave the alliance but rather “become content to be a passenger in NATO, whereas now, despite her small size, she supplies a valuable part of its motive power”.55 Related to this was Moscow’s friendlier policy towards Scandinavia after Stalin’s death. The Soviet objective was to weaken these countries’ links with the West, and there was some anxiety in Whitehall that Gerhardsen would be too enthusiastic about this.56 Nonetheless, these attempts were resisted.

Economy and Trade We have seen that the British and Norwegian governments worked hard to regain economic growth after the war. However, from the 1950s the two economies developed differently. The next decades would be a period of strong growth for Norway, while the UK economy would develop slower and increasingly struggle with a negative balance of payments. These developments were also reflected in their bilateral trade relations. The year 1951 offered an indication of what lay ahead for Norway. The British Oslo ambassador characterised developments this year as “a remarkable economic phenomenon”.57 Two factors were important. The first was increased earnings for the large Norwegian merchant navy due to a sharp rise in freight rates as a result of the Korean War. This is not the only time the Norwegian economy has benefitted from international conflict and war. The First World War was similar, as the Suez crisis would be in 1956. The other factor was the abnormal boom in the market for wood products, demonstrating Norway’s position as primarily a raw material exporter. In an international context the country had few attractive natural resources, apart from hydropower, timber and fish. But these resources were harnessed and developed sensibly, and they were geared largely for export. Hydropower, for example, lay the foundation for the increasingly flourishing electro-chemical and electro-metallurgical industries in Norway. Underlining the same point, 1958 was a disappointing year economically for Norway, partly due to poor results from the herring

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fisheries and reduced yield in forestry.58 Importantly, the Norwegian economy has since 1905 until today been very open and highly dependent on international economic developments. The UK economy suffered severely from the war efforts, much more than the Norwegian economy. The country was virtually bankrupt. In 1949, the Attlee government decided to devalue the pound by as much as 30%.59 This came as a shock to the British public, and also to international interests since sterling was one of the major currencies in the world. But the UK economy grew in the 1950s as well. There was a rapid rise in consumer goods. Prime Minister Macmillan commented in July 1957 that “most of our people have never had it so good”.60 However, economic growth in the UK was slow compared to the EEC, especially West Germany. Productivity was lower and the balance of payments developed negatively.61 Trade and economic relations between Britain and Norway remained close in this decade. One example was the good relationship in the European Payments Union (EPU).62 In 1953, there were even talks about a possible Norwegian entry into the sterling area. The UK Chancellor of the Exchequer, Rab Butler, was positive initially.63 However, when only Norway of the Scandinavian countries was interested, the weakest economy of the three, the benefits for Britain were too modest to pursue this avenue any further. There were some minor trade disputes. Norway was hit when Britain reintroduced quotas on wooden materials and wood pulp during the Korean War. This was characterised as “the first serious disharmony in Anglo-Norwegian relations since the war”.64 The British realised that this had harsh economic consequences for Norway. Yet the main negative Norwegian reaction was disappointment that the UK government had not discussed the matter with them beforehand.65 More was expected from its “special friend” Britain. This was a typical expression of different expectations between a small and a big state. In the 1950s, Norwegian foreign policy was still characterised by a feeling of inferiority and anxiety about being seen as politically equal. The resurgence of West Germany in international trade caused significant changes in British-Norwegian trade relations. In 1945, Britain was in a highly favourable position pertaining to exports to Norway. Not only had German competition practically been eliminated, but Norway increased imports considerably for its post-war reconstruction. This dominance was difficult to retain in the 1950s. The British embassy warned

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that “the natural friendship of the Norwegian people for our own, and the deep resentment they still feel for the German invasion of 1940, should never be taken for granted”.66 Indeed, Norwegians remained apprehensive about a revived Germany for a long time. However, in 1951 the state of war between Germany and Norway was officially terminated, and a German Minister to Oslo was nominated. More important was the sharp increase in trade. In 1949, Britain’s percentage of Norway’s total imports was 21.3 while West Germany’s was 3.1, whereas only three years later the respective percentages were 19.4 and 11.3.67 This trend would increase in the future. There was a pattern that when German shares of Norwegian imports increased, Britain’s were reduced. “The Germans are doing their utmost to penetrate the Norwegian market, largely at our expense”, the UK Oslo ambassador commented.68 The British government considered this a natural consequence of the German economic revival, which was accepted as inevitable for broader political and military reasons. The Cold War necessitated bringing West Germany into the Western camp by easing economic restrictions and allowing militarisation. However, the British government also tried to offset German economic expansion. The Northern Department in the Foreign Office offered a solution: “to make our own exports as competitive as possible and our own cultural activities as attractive as possible”.69 But an increasing problem was that UK products were becoming less competitive. Production costs were higher in Britain relative to Germany and Sweden.70 In 1958, West Germany displaced the UK as the major supplier of goods to the Norwegian market.71 Sweden was also surpassing Britain in important areas. Changes in trade patterns also had potential implications for the strategic relationship. Britain struggled to deliver as much coal, steel and non-ferrous metals as the Scandinavian countries needed. A higher Foreign Office official argued in 1951 that securing the northern flank of the Atlantic community depended on Britain’s ability to supply coal and steel in adequate quantities to the three Scandinavian countries, and “put even more simply, coal and steel exports are the key to the possibility of effective British diplomatic action in Europe in 1952”.72 Similarly, from the British Oslo embassy it was reported that “our present inability to supply Norway’s minimum needs [of coal] is shaking Norway’s faith both in our relationship and in Britain herself”.73 A consequence of losing market shares to West Germany was a shift in the British-Norwegian balance of trade. The UK market was the most

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significant for Norwegian exports.74 In 1959, trade between them was nearly in balance. In the subsequent decades Norway exported more to Britain than the reverse. By 1973, the UK deficit had increased to as much as £85 million. What were the reasons for this transition? Traditionally, Norway had exported raw materials to Britain, most notably wood pulp, timber, iron ore and fish, and the UK exported manufactured goods the other way, such as cars and textiles, in addition to steel and coal. But British manufacturing exports to Norway dropped considerably over these decades. For example, the number of cars exported from the UK was almost the same in 1974 as in 1952, while the total number of purchased cars in Norway had increased enormously.75 Sales of ships are perhaps the best illustration. In the first post-war years, this was the largest single item of UK export to Norway, partly due to large orders financed by money Britain owed Norway for its lost tonnage during the war. However, from the 1950s deliveries of ships from the UK to Norway declined.76 Norwegians looked increasingly to other markets. As Foreign Secretary Macmillan commented: “the Norwegians are hard-headed business men and their shipowners have not hesitated to divert their orders for new ships from traditional builders in Britain in return for better terms from our rivals on the continent”.77 Moreover, Norwegian shipbuilding increased, and by the early 1970s, Britain imported more ships from Norway than vice versa.78 Of course, changing British-Norwegian trade patterns had a relatively modest effect on the overall UK balance of payment. For example in 1973, both Norwegian imports from and exports to Britain were about two per cent of the UK’s respective world totals.79 The changes were perhaps just as important as symbols of Britain’s and Norway’s different economic growth in the 1950s and 60s. The Fishery Limit Dispute The most important area of dispute between the UK and Norway in the post-war decades was over fishery limits. This had lasted for centuries and would continue beyond UK membership in the European Community. But 1951 marked a highpoint. In the early seventeenth century, Norwegians had complained about British fishermen making incursions into their waters.80 British vessels had then abstained from doing so until 1906 when they again appeared due to reduced stocks in domestic waters. These were trawlers equipped with

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powerful gear, while Norwegian fishermen mainly used nets and lines from simple boats.81 The local population was perturbed, and Norway specified the limits beyond which fishing was prohibited to foreigners. In the 1920s and 1930s, a number of British trawlers fishing inside the Norwegian zone were arrested. A UK naval vessel was secretly sent to Norway in 1934, instructed to use force if necessary to prevent further arrests in what the British government considered international waters.82 But importantly, no major incident occurred. This was evidently not important enough to justify the use of force against Norway. Nevertheless, the question was not resolved but was naturally put on hold during the war. The dispute resurfaced after the war. In 1948, the Norwegian government decided to enforce a royal decree from 1935 which entailed that large areas of its waters were closed off to foreigners. Britain argued that these were high seas areas and, as such, should be open to all nations.83 In 1948–1949, Norwegian gunboats continued to arrest British trawlers discovered inside the “decree line”, and the Norwegian courts tended to increase the fines imposed on those convicted.84 When a bilateral agreement could still not be reached, Britain decided to bring the case before the ICJ. Two main questions had to be settled. The first was the breadth of coastal states’ territorial waters, more concretely whether Norway could maintain the unilaterally set limit of four nautical miles, as opposed to the internationally accepted line of three miles. The second was how the limit should be drawn. Norwegian governments had for decades argued that it should go across the outer line of the coastal formations, while Britain and some other states argued that it should follow them. The Norwegian coast is unique since it does not constitute a clear division between land and sea due to the countless islands, islets, fjords and bays. The method of delineation would have large consequences for the size of Norway’s national waters. In relative terms, fisheries were significantly more important to Norway than to Britain. This industry constituted about one quarter of the total value of Norwegian exports. The government argued to the UK: “virtually the whole population of the north of Norway lived off fishing, whereas in great Britain only ‘a handful of trawler owners’ were affected”.85 Norwegian fishermen’s techniques and boats were simple compared to other countries, and they looked upon foreign fishermen

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as scavengers threatening their livelihood. Importantly, these groups had strong political support in the Storting and they were well organised. However, the issue was not unimportant to Britain. The country had a significant trawler fleet which had considerable political leverage in some parliament constituencies. The Trawler Owners Association informed the government that they were hostile to anything other than the threemile limit.86 The issue was also important since the government was concerned that it would create a precedent in other areas where Britain had fishery interests. Moreover, any extension of national economic zones also involved a certain delimitation of the British navy’s ability to exert power and influence. Norway thus became a test case. In December 1951, the ICJ settled the issue. Skogvang defines the court decision as “one of the most important judgements in international law”.87 The court’s findings awarded a complete victory to Norway. The four-mile national zone would continue, and the straightbase-lines method of configuring the Norwegian coastal zones was to be applied. The principles underpinning the ruling would be decisive for the extensions of national economic zones in the coming decades. The reactions to the ICJ’s ruling are indicative of the UK-Norwegian relationship. Britain chose to take a conciliatory approach to the unfavourable outcome, which was widely applauded in Norway. The London government had decided prior to the decision that if they won, they should be cautious and helpful to the Norwegians, and make “comments as friendly in tone to Norway as possible”.88 This seems to have been the Norwegian intent as well. In Norway, the British ambassador reported, “scarcely any rancour was displayed and pleasure at the result never degenerated into gloating or bombast”.89 The Norwegian government decided not to pursue any claims against Britain for fishery damages in the past as a result of the verdict.90 This was an ideal example of the proper method of settling international differences. It underlined Norway’s and Britain’s belief in international law as well as their good bilateral relations.

European Integration European integration accelerated in the 1950s. The decade revealed the different approaches to closer cooperation of the Western European continental states as opposed to those on the outskirts. The problem for the outsiders was that the insiders benefitted from their integration, and that

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new plans for further cooperation continually cropped up. Britain and Norway had to deal with this question whether they wanted to or not. The European Coal and Steel Community The organisations that were established in Western Europe in the late 1940s were not enough for several of the continental states. Britain and Norway had been among those successfully advocating weak political commitments in the Council of Europe and for the OEEC not to include a customs union. In the talks leading up to the formation of the Western Union in 1948, the Benelux countries had fruitlessly argued for a coordination of the signatories’ politics, finances and economies. The Benelux countries did, however, decide to establish a customs union among themselves.91 But it was the announcement of the Schuman Plan in May 1950 and the subsequent founding of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) that most regard as the birth of today’s European Union. This entailed pooling the sovereignty of the coal and steel production of France, West Germany, Benelux and Italy (the Six). The French government viewed this as a method of controlling German access to these essential industrial commodities, or as expressed by Foreign Minister Robert Schuman: to ensure that a Franco-German war would be “not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible”.92 The supranational High Authority was established to administer the ECSC. The ECSC was largely dismissed in Britain. Churchill had supported the idea of a united Europe in the 1940s, but not necessarily with the UK. To the House of Commons in 1953 he said that Britain did not intend to be merged in a federal European system—“we are with them, but not of them”.93 A European federation would be too narrow politically—the notion that Britain was a global power, different from the other European states, prevailed in the 1950s. The experiences of the Second World War also mattered—the UK was a victor, as opposed to the defeated and failed nations on the continent.94 Another objection to joining the ECSC was that the Labour government had just nationalised the coal and steel industry as part of building the welfare state. Harold Macmillan, member of the Tory shadow cabinet, said in 1950: “our people will not hand over to a supranational authority the right to close down our pits and our steelworks”.95 There was thus little difference between the Attlee and Churchill governments in the approach to the ECSC. Britain preferred a

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loose, functional, intergovernmental approach to the legalistic, supranational approach of the continent, a difference which has remained until today. Norway’s attitude towards the ECSC was reserved, and the question of potential membership was not seriously discussed. Norwegians shared Britain’s scepticism over the High Authority, “which seemed to be independent of all democratic control”.96 There were also similarities related to a self-image of being different from the continental Europeans. Even when comparing with its Danish neighbours, Norwegians seemed less European. The Copenhagen government spent more time on considerations before dismissing the ECSC. Norwegian Foreign Minister Lange commented confidentially on this: “that is one of the differences between the two countries—Denmark is a part of Europe, Norway is not”.97 Norwegian views and policies on the ESCS and later European integration were coloured by mistrust and apprehension of a resurgent Germany and a distrust of French motives. Not only did they dismiss membership, Britain and Norway viewed the formation of the ECSC as a negative development for themselves. One thing was the direct economic consequences. The Norwegian government was anxious about the effect upon the country’s steel industry, even though its exports of steel and coal to the Six were modest.98 However, the potential political effects were more important; for Britain the ECSC was “deeply unwelcome”.99 It did not help that the Americans warmly supported European unity and put pressure on the UK not to oppose the Schuman Plan.100 It was important for Britain that Washington did not treat them as just another European state, “none of whom have the advantages of the Channel and who were consequently conquered”, Churchill argued.101 But the UK government was cautious not to put forward rival proposals in the eyes of the French.102 Both Britain and Norway established permanent delegations to the ECSC. The British and Norwegian policies of not pursuing membership in the ECSC did not represent a decision to ignore other European integration efforts that would develop later. It was merely a choice not to participate in the talks on the Schuman Plan. In Whitehall, it was thought that if the GATT would develop as hoped, staying outside the ECSC would not be too problematic as they would have access to the benefits anyway.103 Moreover, the government doubted that the Six would be able to put their ideas into practice without Britain playing a role. For its part, Norway was primarily satisfied that the UK did not join. But Britain

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and Norway would soon have to deal with new integration plans from the Six. European Defence Community In October 1950, the French government introduced the Pleven plan for a European Defence Community (EDC). The main idea was to pool the defences of the Six to improve security in a Cold War perspective. But the EDC was primarily proposed as a method to meet American demands for a rearmed West Germany, which had intensified after the outbreak of the Korean War.104 A revived German army was problematic for the French, and were this to happen, it would have to be subject to supranational control. The Six signed a treaty on the EDC in 1952. There were slightly different reactions to the question of German rearmament and the EDC in Britain and Norway. Norwegians were sceptical to allowing Germany into the Western defence camp. Foreign Minister Lange told the Storting that for those who have experienced German occupation “the mere idea of German rearmament brings back terrible memories and anxieties about what it may lead to”.105 However, the realist Lange understood that American pressure was so strong that this had to be accepted. He also saw benefits since he considered that West Germany would be the first land to be attacked if war broke out in Europe, and then it would help the Western camp if the West Germans could play their part in the defence against the Soviet Union.106 The Norwegian government supported the EDC publicly but in confidential meetings with the British government, Lange said that he would much rather have preferred to see Germany included in NATO.107 A Norwegian fear was that Germany would, as time went by, “almost inevitably dominate any purely European association of which she became a member”.108 Seen in a perspective of the European Community and European Union that developed in the subsequent decades, the Norwegian foreign minister demonstrated excellent analytical skills here. The British government shared concerns of a future strong Germany, but insisted that the EDC should be placed under the Council of Europe were it to be established. This was politically more viable, considering French scepticism to allowing Germany into NATO. But essentially Britain thought that there were easier ways of achieving West German rearmament than the EDC.109 In this perspective, the EDC plan was fundamentally a struggle between the French government’s desire to

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expand the European Coal and Steel Community with a defence community and those on the outside who wanted this to have looser forms. Churchill and Eden never committed to participation in the EDC.110 In the end, the French parliament refused to ratify the EDC plan. But the issue of German rearmament was unresolved. The Western European Union (WEU), a succession of the Western Union from 1954, was the proposed answer. British Foreign Secretary Eden was the main architect behind this.111 The WEU, unlike the planned EDC, was not supranational. But it became fairly insignificant when West Germany shortly after joined NATO. The Treaty of Rome Most Western Europeans, including Norwegians and Britons, realised that it was necessary to dismantle the economic barriers between them if they were to compete with the USA and Japan. But they disagreed on how far and wide further integration should go. The OEEC, the most important arena for European trade diplomacy in the 1950s, contributed to gradually removing quantitative restrictions, while the EPU facilitated intra-OEEC payments.112 As the 1950s progressed, interest among the Six, and in part also the British, in the Council of Europe, and to a certain extent the OEEC, was increasingly lacking.113 Achieving closer economic and political integration among the Western European states would be difficult. One aspect was the perpetual gap between the supranationalists and the intergovernmentalists. But there were other challenges, such as the wide differences in living standards between the poorer states in the south and the richer in the north. Moreover, Britain and Scandinavia had a more planned economy and put great emphasis on full employment and higher levels of social security. Foreign Minister Lange said in 1949 that “we have grave doubts as to whether the group of nations that today are members of the OEEC or of the Council of Europe form a natural unit economically and politically”.114 This was a view shared by the other Scandinavians and the British. It was more natural to look to the Atlantic region. In a conversation with Chancellor of the Exchequer, Stafford Cripps, Lange said that his best scenario for economic integration was of the North Sea countries, possibly including West Germany.115 In 1952, Britain proposed the Eden Plan, which was a broad-ranging rationalisation of European organisations. The main UK incentive was

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a fear that the Six would expand their integration, and a desire to lead Europe through intergovernmental institutions.116 Britain wanted Europe to be united without committing to supranational solutions, and envisaged the cooperation of the Six included in the Council of Europe. Such a structure would perhaps have made more sense in terms of Western European unity because of its wider geographic scope. But this proved difficult: the more countries involved, the harder to achieve new substantial cooperation. The bottom line was that the Six wanted something else. Already in 1952 Foreign Minister Schuman raised the issue of setting up a political federation of the Six.117 A fundamental idea behind the ECSC was the principle of spillover—to begin with one limited economic area and gradually expand to others.118 But the establishment of new supranational institutions was no easy task; there were differing views among the Six on how to proceed. As we have seen, the Six failed to establish the EDC. But the desire to strengthen cooperation remained strong, and in July 1955, the foreign ministers met at Messina, Italy. Their goal was to reach a deal on removing all customs duties and quantitative restrictions—thereby creating a common market. The Messina process resulted in the establishment of Euratom, a nuclear-energy community, and the considerably more important and wide-ranging European Economic Community. The EEC was primarily related to economic areas, but the architects of The Treaty of Rome also envisaged a political union.119 What Should the Answer to the EEC Be? Britain and Norway did not look favourably on the Six’s plans for the EEC. But how should they react to this? The Six stated that they were open to other states joining them, above all Britain. However, it soon became clear that the UK did not want to attend the Messina talks, other than with a delegation of civil servants that played an insignificant role.120 This important decision has been characterised differently by historians: as a missed opportunity to shape Europe; as a failure to understand the situation and international context; or as a conscious strategic decision to pursue an alternative path.121 Kaiser dismisses the “missed opportunities” thesis,122 but it undoubtedly has merit.123 Forster and Blair, for example, argue that Britain was the strongest power in Europe after the end of the war and thus had the ability to shape the new institutions of

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Europe.124 When the UK decided to seek membership in the EEC even just a few years after Messina, it would be very difficult since the French in particular increasingly shaped the Community in ways that were unfortunate for Britain. Wall sums up in 2020: “Britain joined late, and paid a price, both political and economic”.125 Regarding the second thesis, many in Whitehall did not believe that the Six, after failing with the EDC, would be able to develop a common market.126 Relating to the third thesis, we have seen above that committing so much to the European continent was a too narrow foreign-policy perspective for the majority in British politics, both economically and politically. The psychological and economic ties with the Empire/Commonwealth were important—Britain was already the leading member of an international bloc.127 The Foreign Office considered it best to reject the EEC, as it viewed this institution as primarily an economic cooperation. Ludlow describes this well: for the Foreign Office, going from “[plotting] the future of large portions of the world at the wartime conferences…[to]…discussing cereal prices in Brussels…was a difficult fate to accept”.128 For Norway, attending the Messina process did not seem natural as Britain was not there. The Oslo government never considered participating.129 The two countries also shared a profound scepticism of surrendering sovereignty to supranational European bodies. But something had to be done. The Six moved ahead and would most likely benefit economically and politically in relative terms compared to those on the outside. A common Norwegian reflex when new continental European integration loomed was to look to its closest neighbours. But the efforts to create Scandinavian defence and economic unions in the late 1940s had failed largely due to Norway’s foot-dragging. Some progress was made in the early 1950s, such as the establishment of the Nordic Council, but Norwegians reached this decision “with some reluctance and with the tacit intention of preventing the Council from having any influence on foreign policy”.130 Moreover, passport requirements for Scandinavian citizens travelling within the area were abolished in 1952 and a common labour market was created. However, in 1954 the Scandinavians resumed discussions about a customs union and a common Scandinavian market. Sweden in particular was eager. The Norwegian government considered that its economy needed to be strengthened before it could compete with all of Western Europe.131 Scandinavia could be a sensible first step.132 But they moved cautiously. The general public was sceptical,

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and Norwegian industry and fishery organisations strongly opposed the idea.133 Norway’s industry was expected to lose in the competition with Sweden and Denmark. Indeed, the British government considered that the immediate disadvantages were “so obvious that it was surprising at first sight that the Norwegian Labour Party and Government had opened for full-scale investigation of the proposal”.134 Many in Norway preferred closer economic integration with Britain rather than the Scandinavians. A Danish ambassador commented that “the Norwegians are curious people. They would prefer to find themselves in company with Britain and the Commonwealth rather than with us Danes and Swedes”.135 The Norwegian reluctance contributed to slow progress in the Scandinavian negotiations in 1955. A Scandinavian common market would have had a significant effect on Britain. Its exports would suffer as the market would benefit domestic manufacturers. And Scandinavia represented an outlet for nearly £250 million of UK goods each year.136 This scheme “must therefore interest us closely indeed”, Whitehall concluded.137 It was also thought that Norway in 1956 was “rather more willing than hitherto to be led to the altar” by the other Scandinavians.138 The prospect of Britain on the outside of two preferential trade areas in Europe was an economic problem but also had political and strategic challenges in a longer perspective. However, Whitehall never produced a clear policy on the establishment of a Scandinavian Union, despite requests from Britain’s ambassadors in the area.139 The main UK focus was on the continent. France was seen as the strongest advocate of increased integration. Britain warned the other ESCS members that establishing a common market only for the Six was a mistake.140 But UK warnings and efforts at persuasion had little effect. The primary British strategy subsequently was to create something new that would reduce the effect of the Six’s progress. One such attempt was Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd’s Grand Design in December 1956, a proposal to establish a parliamentary assembly for European and Atlantic cooperation “to debate publicly all important aspects of Western cooperation”.141 It would be intergovernmental, meet once a year and be open to any interested country. Norway supported this in principle.142 The Norwegians agreed with the UK that organising Western Europe as an independent power between the USA and the Soviet Union was a bad idea—maintaining unity within the Atlantic alliance was preferable. The Grand Design proposal was made shortly after the Suez crisis. Britain was

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on the defensive, and the Six saw this as a UK attempt at breaking up their group. In the end, the proposal found little interest and nothing materialised. The UK government’s main attempt to neutralise the Six’s Messina plans, however, was the so-called Plan G, proposed by the Eden Government in October 1956. It involved a free trade area (FTA) for industrial goods in Europe, without a common external tariff wall. This would give British business tariff-free access to European markets. Agriculture would not be included due to opposition among the Tory farming lobby.143 It would be open to all members of the OEEC. A year later the OEEC Council convened the Maudling Committee to negotiate the FTA. However, by then the discussions on the Treaty of Rome were nearly finalised. It was too late to stop the EEC process, which probably would have been impossible anyway. The FTA negotiations, from April 1957 to November 1958, were therefore an attempt to complement the Common Market. The Scandinavian countries joined the FTA negotiations, but planning and negotiations for their own common market continued at the same time.144 But for many it was clear that if a UK-led free trade area manifested itself, the Scandinavians would abandon their regional efforts and join it. Norwegian business and industry still opposed a Scandinavian common market, and the government signalled informally to the British that it was virtually impossible to reach a deal.145 In the Maudling negotiations UK and Norwegian objectives broadly overlapped. Britain viewed the Norwegians in a future free trade area as “potentially very strong allies”, particularly in combating French and Italian attempts to secure high tariffs.146 UNISCAN was used to coordinate views in the negotiations. The British government in particular found this useful.147 The Scandinavians complained about the UK’s dismissal of them negotiating bilaterally with the French on the main outstanding problems towards the end.148 The British government did not want to relinquish in any way the attempt to find a multilateral solution. Crucially, many among the Six resented Plan G. They saw it as a British attempt to sabotage their efforts to establish a common market.149 The FTA was tailored to suit British interests, and for the Six it was important that it would be no replacement for the EEC. This made the negotiations difficult. In the end, it was the French government, now with Charles de Gaulle as president, that stopped the FTA in December 1958.150 For the low tariff countries in the EEC—West Germany and the Benelux

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countries—the FTA was appealing.151 But German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer eventually chose to follow the lead of de Gaulle. Jeopardising the Treaty of Rome was too risky. French resistance to Britain and dominance over its EEC partners would remain typical patterns in European integration over the next fifteen years. The Maudling negotiations were a battle between different national interests. Fundamentally it was also based on conflicting views on the surrender of sovereignty. The failure of the negotiations undermined relations within Western Europe. The European Free Trade Area With the EEC uninterested in a wide free trade area, the “outer Seven” quickly formed the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1960.152 They were “already in broad agreement” as to what they wanted when the FTA negotiations collapsed, particularly within UNISCAN.153 Nonetheless, the EFTA negotiations had their challenges as a heterogeneous group of countries was involved. Four were NATO members, three were neutral. Portugal was ruled by an authoritarian dictatorship. But this was acceptable since EFTA would not be a political cooperation. The Seven were also different in economic terms. Most evident was the extent of the UK economy. Its GNP was nearly twice the size of the others combined. But they also had very different tariffs and quota regimes, which they wanted to harmonise. The main economic purpose of EFTA was to reduce and eventually eliminate tariffs on industrial trade. Britain and Norway had many shared interests in the EFTA negotiations. They expected to benefit much from free trade in industry but both wanted agriculture and horticulture to be excluded. They also agreed that EFTA should be much less institutionally ambitious than the Treaty of Rome. The Council of Ministers would meet two or three times a year; permanent national representatives would meet more frequently, about once a week. There would also be a small secretariat, which, unlike the EEC Commission, would not have any executive functions. Importantly, decisions in EFTA would be based on unanimity. Each member also retained their freedom of trade with third countries since EFTA would have no common external tariff. For the British government, it was important to establish EFTA quickly, and Prime Minister Macmillan realised that much would have to be offered to the others.154 One important concession was imports

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of Danish bacon. But there was concern that this would hurt British producers so much that the Tories would lose farming constituencies in the next general election.155 Britain also had to accept the most important point for Norway: that frozen fish fillets were categorised as industrial goods.156 Fish and fish products constituted twenty per cent of Norway’s exports to Britain. The UK government accepted in the end a tariff quota of 24,000 tonnes yearly of frozen fish from EFTA, de facto Norway, which would be subject to the tariff dismantling schedule.157 This was important for finalising the treaty. For Norway, EFTA was close to an ideal solution to the European market question. It was an excellent opportunity to obtain tariff-free access to its main trading partners, of which Britain was the most important. There had been general political agreement since before the war that the agrarian sector should not be subjected to the international liberalisation efforts.158 EFTA would create difficulties for Norwegian industry that catered to the domestic market, often small-scale and burdened by high costs. This was why Norway was reluctant to agree to proposed accelerations of duty reductions.159 However, the main picture was that Norwegian industry as a whole, so dominated by exports, would benefit. The Storting therefore strongly supported EFTA membership.160 Although Britain played an essential role in the creation of EFTA, it was not based on a strong desire to form closer links with this constellation. True, according to Macmillan, the EFTA deal was “vital” to British industry.161 But the main problem with EFTA, many British MPs argued, was that it was too small to compete with the EEC or the USA.162 It was more favourable to the other members since Britain had the largest market and the highest tariffs. So while the others were primarily motivated by the economic benefits, Britain was more concerned with the political implications. Camps argues that the UK government’s objective was that EFTA would become a bridge-builder between the outer Seven and the inner Six.163 Moreover, Britain wanted to prevent the small countries from entering into free-trade treaties with the EEC independent of themselves, and stop the Scandinavians from establishing a customs union.164 If that were to happen, Britain would be isolated in a Europe of several trade blocs. In other words, the UK did not consider EFTA a permanent solution. It was neither economically nor politically sufficient. Nonetheless, it turned out to be a success when it came to the removal of trade barriers and import quotas, and it generated significant benefits for

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the UK economy. It was also important in symbolic terms, since it was Britain’s first step towards Europe, away from the Empire.

Conclusions After a conversation in 1951 with the Norwegian foreign minister, the UK Oslo ambassador concluded that when it came to European and Atlantic integration there were “remarkable similarities between the Norwegian and British approach”.165 This is effectively a good summary of the entire 1950s. Norway and Britain, although very different countries, had many common foreign-policy perspectives. They both had three circles of interest. The first was the shared view that Atlantic integration was essential. In the 1950s, Britain and Norway settled in as NATO members, with some different objectives and roles, but a common dependency on the Americans. The defence of Norway was very important for Britain, and a close bilateral security relationship continued. The second circle was not identical, but the same in character: their traditional preferential areas, based on common language, culture and history—the Commonwealth for Britain and Scandinavia for Norway. Britain was the main power for its area, while Norway was afraid of being dominated by its former union partners politically and economically. This circle would gradually mean less in terms of political cooperation and economic strength, respectively. The third circle, Europe, was of increasing importance for both, not least since trade with the Six grew. But the British and Norwegians fundamentally disliked any form of federalism and loss of self-rule, and the ECSC and the EEC had formal supranational elements. As such, the looser, intergovernmental EFTA was a better type of European integration. For Britain, the European circle was also too narrow for its continued global perspective. Being the major undefeated European country in the war added to this view. Committing more to Europe would mean weakening links with the Commonwealth and indirectly with the Americans. The problem was that British perspectives and ambitions did not match their actual economic or political position. In the words of West German Chancellor Adenauer, Britain was “like a rich man who has lost all his property but does not realize it”.166 British foreign policy in the 1950s was at a crossroads in European history. The creation of the ECSC and the EEC involved a radically improved Franco-German relationship. Britain, on the other hand, emphasised its political distance to the continent and

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positioned itself on the side-lines of the development of a new Western Europe. Both Britain and Norway were reactive. London reacted to the Six, and then Norway responded to British moves. The main aspect of Norwegian European integration policy in the 1950s was hoping that it would not happen and supporting Britain in largely whatever they did. This demonstrated how much stock Norway put in this relationship. In his annual report for 1959 the British ambassador concluded that despite some minor problems “no country enjoyed better relations with Norway” than the UK.167 The 1950s cemented a clear division in Western Europe, between those who wanted tightly-woven integration with supranational elements and those who wanted more limited structures with purely intergovernmental decision-making. Despite various discussions and negotiations for a decade, the countries retained their main positions in this divide. But soon this would change—when Britain tried to join the other side.

Notes 1. “Norway: annual review for 1951”, Ambassador Michael Wright to Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, 25 April 1952, British National Archives (henceforth BNA), FO 491/31. 2. Andrew Marr, A History of Modern Britain (London: Pan Macmillan, 2008), 125–126. 3. “Norway: annual review for 1951”, Wright to Eden, 25 April 1952, BNA, FO 491/31. 4. “Anglo-Norwegian relations”, Wright to Eden, 11 March 1952, referring to discussions between himself and Lange, BNA, FO 491/6. 5. Ibid. 6. Northern Department (FCO) to Eden, 6 December 1952, BNA, FO 371/100651. 7. Ibid. 8. Wright to Eden, 13 December 1954, BNA, FO 491/8. 9. Ibid. 10. Foreign Secretary Macmillan to Ambassador Peter Scarlett (Oslo), 27 May 1955, BNA, FO 491/9. 11. Alan Milward, The Rise and Fall of a National Strategy 1945–1963, vol. 1 of The United Kingdom and the European Community, Government Official History Series (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 251. 12. Mark Garnett, Simon Mabon, and Robert Smith, British Foreign Policy Since 1945 (London: Routledge, 2018).

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13. Scarlett to Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, 26 November 1956, BNA, FO 491/10. 14. “Norway: annual review for 1956”, Scarlett to Selwyn Lloyd, 22 January 1957, BNA, FO 491/31. 15. Ibid. 16. “Norway: annual review for 1957”, Scarlett to Selwyn Lloyd, 10 January 1958, BNA, FO 491/31. 17. “Norway: annual review for 1953”, Wright to Eden, 25 January 1954, BNA, FO 491/31. 18. Wright to Eden, 13 December 1954, BNA, FO 491/8. 19. “Norway: annual review for 1954”, Crawford to Eden, 14 January 1955, BNA, FO 491/31. 20. “Norway: annual review for 1961”, Ambassador John Walker to Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas-Home, 12 January 1962, BNA, FO 491/31. 21. Garnett, Mabon, and Smith, British Foreign Policy, 112. 22. Parliament Debates (UK), Commons, vol. 522, col. 696, 17 December 1953. 23. Norwegian London ambassador Per Prebensen to Oslo, copy of speech by Selwyn Lloyd at Newark 21 May 1956, Norwegian National Archives (henceforth NNA), Foreign Office Archives (henceforth FOA) 1950– 1959, 25.4.13/26. 24. “Norway and the Western European Community”, Wright to Eden, 31 October 1951, BNA, FO 491/5. 25. Report by Norwegian Foreign Ministry, 7 October 1952, NNA, FOA 1950–1959, 25.2/804. 26. Minutes of conversation between Eden and Lange, Eden to Wright, 11 February 1952, BNA FO 491/6. 27. Knut E. Eriksen and Helge Ø. Pharo, Kald Krig og Internasjonalisering 1949–1965, vol. 5 of Norsk utenrikspolitisk historie (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1997), 38–40. 28. Nina Græger and Kristin M. Haugevik, “The Revival of Atlanticism in NATO: Changing Security Identities in Britain, Norway and Denmark,” Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, research report to the Norwegian Ministry of Defence (2008). 18. https://nupi.brage.unit. no/nupi-xmlui/handle/11250/2373692. 29. Michael J. Turner, British Power and International Relations During the 1950s: A Tenable Position? (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2009), 29. 30. Record of Selwyn Lloyd’s impressions of Norwegian affairs and AngloNorwegian relations after visit to Oslo 8–12 April 1953, Wright to Churchill, 15 April 1953, BNA, FO 491/7. 31. “Norway: annual review for 1954”, Crawford to Eden, 14 January 1955, BNA, FO 491/31.

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32. Olav Riste, Norway’s Foreign Relations —A History (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2001), 211. 33. Wright to Eden, 13 December 1954, BNA, FO 491/8. 34. UK Oslo embassy to Paul Mason (Northern Department, Foreign Office), 6 August 1952, BNA, FO 371/100343. 35. “Norway: annual review for 1952”, Wright to Eden, 24 March 1953, BNA, FO 491/31. 36. Report by Roger Makins, Deputy Under-Secretary of State, on his dinner with Lange and Wright, 16 July 1952, BNA, FO 371/100651. 37. Eriksen and Pharo, Kald Krig, 231–233. 38. “Norway: annual review for 1959”, Scarlett to Selwyn Lloyd, 28 January 1960, BNA FO 491/31. 39. Brief made for Macmillan’s visit to Norway, UK Oslo embassy to Mason, 25 May 1960, BNA, FO 371/151721. 40. Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NRK), Kald Krig, episode 1, 2019. 41. Turner, British Power, 27. 42. Ibid., 28. 43. Garnett, Mabon, and Smith, British Foreign Policy, 114. 44. Turner, British Power, 26. 45. Kjetil Skogrand, “Allianser i Alliansen, 1949–89,” in Selvstendig og Beskyttet: Det Stormaktsgaranterte Norge fra Krimkrigen til NATO, ed. Roald Berg (Bergen: Fagbokforlaget, 2008), 99. See also Eriksen and Pharo, Kald Krig, 33. 46. Wright to Morrison, 25 June 1951, referring to conversation with Lange on 22 June 1951, BNA, FO 491/5. 47. Wright to Eden, 13 December 1954, BNA, FO 491/8. 48. Riste, Norway’s Foreign Relations, 207. 49. Rolf Tamnes, “Norway Faces the New Cold War, 1949–1952,” FHFS notat, no. 7 (1983). 50. Record of Selwyn Lloyd’s impressions of Norwegian affairs and AngloNorwegian relations after visit to Oslo, 8–12 April 1953, Wright to Churchill, 15 April 1953, BNA, FO 491/7. 51. “Norway: annual review for 1960”, Walker to Douglas-Home, 16 February 1961, BNA, FO 491/31. 52. Brief by Mason prepared for the Norwegian ambassador’s call on Minister of State John Profumo, 25 May 1960, BNA, FO 371/151722. 53. Wright to Eden, 13 December 1954, BNA, FO 491/8. 54. “British policy towards Norway”, Macmillan to Scarlett, 27 May 1955, BNA, FO 491/9. 55. “Norway: annual review for 1954”, Crawford to Eden, 14 January 1955, BNA, FO 491/31.

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56. “Soviet policy towards Norway”, Scarlett to Selwyn Lloyd, 10 August 1956, BNA, FO 491/10. 57. “Norway: annual review for 1952”, Wright to Eden, 24 March 1953, BNA, FO 491/31. 58. Minutes of UNISCAN meeting 19–20 February 1959, NNA, FOA 1950–1959, 44.3.5. 59. Alec Cairncross and Barry Eichengreen, Sterling in Decline: The Devaluations of 1931, 1949 and 1967 , 2nd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 111–155. 60. Garnett, Mabon, and Smith, British Foreign Policy, 5. 61. Derek W. Urwin, The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration Since 1945 (London and New York: Longman, 1991), 93. 62. Hans Otto Frøland and Lars Fredrik M. Øksendal, “A Strategic Resource? Norway’s Position in British Commercial Policy, 1931–1972,” in Britain and Norway: Special Relationships, ed. Helge Ø. Pharo and Patrick Salmon (Oslo: Akademika, 2012), 188. 63. Glen O’Hara, “Anglo-Norwegian Trade and Commercial Relations After the Second World War,” in Britain and Norway: Special Relationships, ed. Helge Ø. Pharo and Patrick Salmon (Oslo: Akademika, 2012), 189. 64. “Norway: annual review for 1952”, Wright to Eden, 24 March 1953, BNA, FO 491/31. 65. Ibid. 66. UK Oslo embassy to Bryant (Board of Trade), 25 October 1952, BNA, FO 371/100656. 67. Ibid. The numbers for 1952 were for the six first months. 68. Wright to Eden, 13 December 1954, BNA, FO 491/8. 69. Foster (Foreign Office) to Oslo, 14 April 1954, BNA, FO 491/106089. 70. O’Hara, “Anglo-Norwegian,” 262. 71. “Norway: annual review for 1958”, Scarlett to Selwyn Lloyd, 8 January 1959, BNA, FO 491/31. 72. Record of Roger Makins’ tour of Scandinavia 17–25 June 1951, 28 June 1951, BNA, FO 371/9444. 73. Wright to Morrison, referring to conversation with Lange on 22 June 1951, 25 June 1951, BNA, FO 491/5. 74. UK: 20%, West Germany 12%, Sweden 10% (brief prepared for the President of the Board of Trade before meeting Norwegian minister of commerce, 6 March 1958, BNA, FO 371/135042). 75. O’Hara, “Anglo-Norwegian,” 262. 76. “Norway: annual review for 1959”, Scarlett to Selwyn Lloyd, 28 January 1960, BNA, FO 491/31. 77. “British policy towards Norway”, Macmillan to Scarlett, 27 May 1955, BNA, FO 491/9. 78. O’Hara, “Anglo-Norwegian,” 262.

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79. Board of Trade, Overseas Trade for 1973, Table 1, 2 (O’Hara, “AngloNorwegian,” 264). 80. Summary of the judgement made by the International Court of Justice 18 December 1951, P. Nichols to Eden, 21 December 1951, BNA, FO 491/5. 81. Susann Funderud Skogvang, “Fiskerigrensesaken Mellom Norge og Storbritannia og Sakens Betydning for Norsk Rett 60 År Senere,” Arctic Review on Law and Politics 3, no. 1 (2012): 83. https://www.nordic openaccess.no/index.php/arctic/article/view/26. 82. Riste, Norway’s Foreign Relations, 126. 83. “Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Dispute: Summarising Memorandum”, UK Foreign Office, 15 December 1948, BNA, 491/2. 84. “Norway: annual review for 1949”, Collier to Bevin, 3 March 1950, BNA, FO 491/31. 85. Minutes of conversation between Bevin and the Norwegian London ambassador Prebensen, Bevin to Collier, 15 July 1949, BNA, FO 491/3. 86. “Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Dispute: Summarising Memorandum”, UK Foreign Office, 15 December 1948, BNA, 491/2. 87. Skogvang, “Fiskerigrensesaken,” 81. My translation. 88. “Norwegian Fisheries Case”, Hohler (Head of Northern Department, Foreign Office), 17 December 1951, BNA, FO 371/94694. 89. “Norway: annual review for 1951”, Wright to Eden, 25 April 1952, BNA, FO 491/31. 90. UK Oslo embassy to Foreign Office, 2 February 1952, BNA, FO 371/100664. 91. F. Gunther Eyck, “Benelux in the Common Market,” Current History 45, November 1963. 92. Pascal Fontaine, Europe—A Fresh Start: The Schuman Declaration 1950– 90 (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1990), 44. 93. Parliament Debates (UK), Commons, vol. 515, col. 891, 11 May 1953. 94. Christopher Hill, The Future of British Foreign Policy: Security and Diplomacy in a World After Brexit (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2019), 28. 95. Christopher Booker and Richard North, The Great Deception: A Secret History of the European Union (London and New York: Continuum, 2005), 57. 96. Minutes of conversation between UK Minister of State and Norwegian London ambassador Prebensen, Younger to Collier, 8 June 1950, BNA, FO 491/4. 97. “Possible Danish Accession to the European Coal and Steel Community”, Wright to Eden, 28 January 1953, BNA, FO 491/7.

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98. Minutes of conversation between UK Minister of State and Prebensen, Younger to Collier, 8 June 1950, BNA, FO 491/4. 99. Garnett, Mabon, and Smith, British Foreign Policy, 122. 100. Christopher Lord, “The United Kingdom, a Once and Future (?) Nonmember State,” in The European Union’s Non-members: Independence Under Hegemony?, ed. Erik Oddvar Eriksen and John Erik Fossum (London: Routledge, 2012), 218–219. 101. Memorandum by Churchill to the Cabinet, 29 November 1951, BNA, CAB 129/48/32. 102. Minutes of conversation between the UK Minister of State and Prebensen, Younger to Collier, 8 June 1950, BNA, FO 491/4. 103. Concluded by a Whitehall interdepartmental working party, 31 December 1951 (Lord, “The United Kingdom,” 216). 104. Jae-Seung Lee, “The French Road to European Community: From the ECSC to the EEC (1945–1957),” Journal of International and Area Studies 11, no. 2 (2004): 113–114. 105. Parliament debates (Norway), 22 September 1950, 1973. My translation. 106. Ibid. 107. Minutes of conversation between Eden and Lange 11 February 1952, Eden to Wright, 12 February 1952, BNA, FO 491/6. 108. Minutes of conversation between Wright and Lange, Wright to Eden, 31 October 1951, BNA, FO 491/5. 109. Urwin, The Community, 90. 110. Jonathan Hollowell, “From Commonwealth to European Integration,” in Britain Since 1945, ed. Jonathan Hollowell (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 66. 111. Garnett, Mabon, and Smith, British Foreign Policy, 124. 112. Frøland and Øksendal, “A Strategic Resource?,” 186. 113. Norwegian Foreign Ministry to London, 19 March 1957, NNA, FOA 1950–1959, 25.2/124. 114. Lange’s speech to Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1 December 1949, NNA, FOA 1940–1949, 25.1/4/xii. 115. Minutes of conversation between Cripps, Lange and Norwegian Minister of Commerce and Shipping, Erik Brofoss, at UK Oslo Embassy 1 November 1949, 4 November 1949, NNA, FOA 1940–1949, 44.3/5. 116. Anne Deighton, “The Last Piece of the Jigsaw: Britain and the Creation of the Western European Union,” Contemporary European History 7, no. 2 (1998). 117. Lee, “The French Road”, 114. 118. Ben Rosamund, Theories of European Integration (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 59–63. 119. Urwin, The Community, 75–76.

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120. Alistair Horne: Macmillan 1957 –1986. Volume II of the Official Biography (London: Macmillan, 1989), 370–371. 121. N. J. Crowson, Britain and Europe: A Political History Since 1918 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), 75. 122. Wolfram Kaiser, Using Europe, Abusing the Europeans: Britain and European Integration, 1945–63 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996). 123. See Chapter 2 of Oliver J. Daddow, Britain and Europe Since 1945: Historiographical Perspectives on Integration (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004). 124. Alasdair Blair and Anthony Forster, The Making of Britain’s European Foreign Policy: Political Dynamics of the European Union (Harlow: Longman, 2002), 14. 125. Stephen Wall, Reluctant European: Britain and the European Union from 1945 to Brexit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 6. 126. Urwin, The Community, 92; Garnett, Mabon, and Smith, British Foreign Policy, 143. 127. In 1948, Britain sent 40% of its exports and re-exports to the Commonwealth (Stephen George, An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community, 3rd ed. [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994], 15). 128. N. Piers Ludlow, “Paying the Price of Victory? Postwar Britain and the Ideas of National Independence,” in The Postwar Challenge: Cultural, Social and Political Change in Western Europe, 1945–58, ed. Dominik Geppert (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 270. 129. Eriksen and Pharo, Kald Krig, 287. 130. “Norway: annual review for 1951”, Wright to Eden, 25 April 1952, BNA, FO 491/31. 131. “Norway: annual review for 1954”, Crawford to Eden, 14 January 1955, BNA, FO 491/31. 132. Eriksen and Pharo, Kald Krig, 287–291. 133. “Norway: annual review for 1956”, Scarlett to Selwyn Lloyd, 22 January 1957, BNA, FO 491/31. 134. UK Oslo embassy to Selwyn Lloyd, 13 July 1956, BNA, FO 371/122093. 135. Wright to Eden, 13 December 1954, BNA, FO 491/8. 136. “Whitehall views on Scandinavian/Nordic common market, customs union”, Hooper (Board of Trade) to Coulson (Foreign Office), 25 February 1956, BNA, FO 371/122093. 137. Ibid. 138. Ibid. 139. UK Copenhagen embassy to Denis Wright (Foreign Office), 24 September 1958, BNA, FO 371/134572. 140. In letter to West Germany in November 1955 (Urwin, The European Community, 92).

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141. Memorandum dated 3 April 1957, Norwegian Copenhagen embassy to Oslo, 5 April 1957, NNA, FOA 1950–1959, 25.2/124. My translation. 142. Brief by Norwegian Foreign Ministry , referring to Council of Minister meeting in Strasbourg 29 April 1957, 8 June 1957, NNA, FOA 1950– 1959, 25.2/124. 143. Crowson, Britain and Europe, 73. 144. Finland had joined the negotiations in 1956. 145. UK Oslo embassy to Denis Wright (Foreign Office), 2 January 1958, BNA, FO 371/134572. 146. Brief prepared for the President of the Board of Trade’s meeting with Norwegian minister of commerce, 6 March 1958, BNA, FO 371/135042. 147. Norwegian London embassy to Sommerfelt (Foreign Ministry), 4 October 1958, NNA, FOA 1950–1959, 44.3.5. 148. Minutes of UNISCAN meeting, 19/20 February 1959, NNA, FOA 1950–1959, 44.3.5. 149. James R. V. Ellison, “Perfidious Albion? Britain, Plan G and European integration, 1955–1956,” Contemporary British History 10, no. 4 (1996). 150. Laurent Warlouzet, “De Gaulle as Father of Europe: The Unpredictability of the FTA’s Failure and the EEC’s Success (1956–58),” Contemporary European History 20, no. 4 (2011). 151. Sieglinde Gstöhl, Reluctant Europeans: Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland in the Process of Integration (London: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 64. 152. The Stockholm Convention was signed in January 1960 and the Association came into action in May the same year. Members were Britain, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Portugal, Switzerland and Austria. Often the EEC members were referred to as the “(inner) Six” and EFTA as the “(outer) Seven”. 153. Urwin, The Community, 97. 154. Harold Macmillan, Prime Minister and After, 1957 –66. Edited and with introduction by Peter Catterall, vol. 2 of The Macmillan Diaries (London: Macmillan, 2011), 213–214. 155. Ibid., 229. 156. Gstöhl, Reluctant Europeans, 77. 157. Frøland and Øksendal, “A Strategic Resource?,” 193. 158. Hans Otto Frøland, “Choosing the Periphery: The Political Economy of Norway’s European Integration Policy, 1948–73,” Journal of European Integration History 7, no. 1 (2001): 90. 159. “Norway: annual review for 1960”, Walker to Douglas-Home, 16 February 1961, BNA, FO 491/31.

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160. Berge Furre, Norsk Historie 1914–2000: Industrisamfunnet —fra Vokstervisse til Framtidstvil (Oslo: Det Norske Samlaget, 2000), 202–203. 161. Macmillan, Prime Minister, 229. 162. Crowson, Britain and Europe, 76. 163. Miriam Camps, Britain and the European Community: 1955–1963 (London: Oxford University Press, 1964). 164. John W. Young, “Britain and the EEC, 1956–73: An Overview,” in From Reconstruction to Integration: Britain and Europe Since 1945, ed. Brian Brivati and Harriet Jones (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1993), 104. 165. Wright to Morrison, 25 June 1951, referring to conversation with Lange on 22 June 1951, BNA, FO 491/5. 166. Cited (in German) in Konrad Adenauer, Erinnerungen 1955–1959, vol. 3 of Erinnerungen (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1967), 428. 167. “Norway: annual review for 1959”, Scarlett to Selwyn Lloyd, 28 January 1960, BNA, FO 491/31.

CHAPTER 4

EEC Applications and EFTA Cooperation, 1960–1969

I think this man has gone crazy—absolutely crazy.1

This was Prime Minister Macmillan’s reaction after Charles de Gaulle vetoed British membership of the EEC in 1963. The French president’s approach had huge impact on both Britain’s and Norway’s European policies in the 1960s. The previous decade had divided Western Europe in terms of economic and political integration. Britain and Norway were part of the outer Seven, a path chosen due to an unwillingness to surrender sovereignty and a feeling of being less European. The inner Six, led by France and West Germany, pushed forward with their integration plans. Shortly after co-founding EFTA, Britain decided to apply for EEC membership. This was a surprise since none of the fundamental reasons for opposing the Treaty of Rome in the 1950s had disappeared. Why did the Macmillan government apparently change its mind so quickly? For Norway, this U-turn created a problematic situation. Norwegians considered EFTA, with Britain, a near-perfect solution. Should Norway continue to follow in the UK’s footsteps or were the arguments against joining the EEC too strong? After de Gaulle’s veto, Britain needed to plan the best way forward. Could EFTA after all provide the necessary long-term solution to European integration for Britain? Wilson instead made another EEC membership attempt in 1967—once more stopped by de Gaulle. Were two vetoes © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 G. K. Almlid, Britain and Norway in Europe Since 1945, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61473-7_4

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humiliation enough for the British and should they rather pursue other avenues? And should Norway develop closer economic cooperation with its Nordic neighbours?

Political Relations Similar to the previous decade, the 1960s had only one year with sister parties in power in Britain and Norway. A year after British Labour returned to power, after 14 years of Conservative rule, a non-socialist coalition formed a new Norwegian government. It is difficult to measure the importance of this. We have seen that in 1945–1951 the two Labour parties had particularly close relations, which affected national policies visà-vis each other. But the bilateral relationship had also been very good after that. In the 1959 general election, Harold Macmillan managed to increase the Tory Party’s majority. He sought close cooperation with the USA in several important policy areas.2 Macmillan was also, as we will see below, perhaps the first UK prime minister who accepted, reluctantly, that Britain’s role as a great world power had declined to such an extent that significant changes were necessary. Due to illness he was replaced by Alec Douglas Home in 1963. A year later Labour won the general election and Harold Wilson occupied 10 Downing Street for the remainder of the decade. For the dominant Einar Gerhardsen and the Norwegian Labour Party the 1960s were not as successful as the previous decade. The party lost its parliamentary majority in 1961, and the government was voted out of office in 1965, thus bringing to an end its 30-year reign.3 Labour had been in control for so long that some observers had labelled Norway a one-party state.4 The country had become a social democratic nation with an extensive welfare state and a population largely accepting heavy taxation and the principle of social and economic equality. Important for Labour’s success was its positioning towards the centre of Norwegian politics. Therefore, the new government, consisting of the four nonsocialistic parties and led by Per Borten, did not represent considerable change. The British ambassador summed up at the end of the Borten government’s first Storting session: “in foreign affairs, the government began like an elephant crossing a bridge, examining every plank from every angle before putting a foot down”.5

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At the beginning of the 1960s, the British-Norwegian relationship was still very strong. The countries worked well together in international organisations such as NATO and the Council of Europe. Moreover, they had a strong position in each other’s capital, particularly Britain in Oslo. The UK ambassador concluded in 1960 after his five-year tenure that the UK had a special position concerning Norwegian ministers and departments—“all doors are open to us”.6 However, the British government was concerned that the Norwegians “tended lately to feel that we take their friendship too much for granted”, and therefore more visits should be planned.7 This was the reasoning behind Macmillan going to Norway in 1960, one of only two formal visits by a UK prime minister in the twentieth century and thus an important event, not least for the Norwegians. Indeed, this visit seems to have been a success. The UK Oslo embassy summarised the bilateral relationship: “the PM’s visit has raised it to a pitch of warmth reminiscent of the immediately post-war days”.8 In his speech to Macmillan, Gerhardsen focused on the war—on the importance of “British achievement, British courage, and the unlimited readiness for sacrifice of the British people” for Norway’s independence and freedom.9 Clearly, speeches in such settings are predominantly positive, with flowery language. Yet this does underline how already strong bonds had been strengthened during the war and how these lasted for decades after. This affected political, cultural and economic relations. However, the war moved further away in people’s minds and became increasingly less important as a basis for bilateral relationships. The Americans had already replaced the UK as Norway’s main security provider. American culture and values gradually spread to Europe. A 1963 Gallup poll showed that when asked which country they counted on as a friend and ally, Norwegians equalled the USA (66%) to Britain (67%), while France (22%) and Germany (22%) predictably lagged far behind.10 The British realised that a natural change was developing. The Norwegians who had been in London during the war were “a wasting asset”.11 The UK ambassador was hence somewhat worried about the future: “The young in Norway now look more than their parents to continental Europe and America. They think England is old-fashioned but quite nice”.12 This development would strengthen in the subsequent decades.

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Security and Defence Despite the humiliating and partially eye-opening Suez crisis of 1956, the Macmillan government continued with a wide international security perspective. Its statements and white papers in the early 1960s outlined extensive British ambitions and responsibilities, including in many of its former and existing colonies in Africa and Asia.13 Nuclear weapons continued to play an important part in the UK’s desire to retain a world role. But British development of new technology in this area still depended on the USA. In December 1962, Macmillan and President Kennedy met in Nassau, Bermuda, and agreed that the UK would continue to have an “independent” nuclear capacity, under British control in cases of “supreme national interest” and not placed directly under NATO.14 Macmillan regarded this as a success, but it probably did not improve the country strategically—based on the classic international relations security dilemma, it could render Britain a more likely target. Moreover, it probably made the UK even more dependent on the USA. The Labour Party was sceptical of investing more in nuclear capabilities and opposed the Nassau deal and the Polaris programme. But as often happens in politics, considerations and priorities change when in power; the Wilson government decided to go ahead with Polaris.15 The continued high ambitions meant that the UK defence burden remained larger than for any other NATO member, besides the USA.16 With the struggling British economy, huge defence expenditures became gradually more problematic. Britain simply did not have the resources to maintain its global commitments.17 After a few years in office it appears that Britain’s true role internationally dawned on the Labour government. The party’s 1966 election manifesto said “this is not the nineteenth century when Britain ruled one-quarter of mankind. We have to see ourselves realistically in the right proportions”.18 The Wilson government introduced heavy cuts in naval expenditures, and it cancelled the order for American-built F-111 fighter-bombers. Furthermore, a reduction of the 55,000 troops in West Germany was considered, unless the Germans contributed more.19 However, the most evident change was the reduced military presence in Asia—east of Suez—culminating with the complete withdrawal of the British base in Aden in late 1967.20 This decision had negative implications for Britain. The Americans opposed the abandonment of this base, and subsequently viewed the UK more like another

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regional European power.21 It also had a wider symbolic cost—it hurt Britain’s global image. Norwegian strategic thinking continued to be narrow—the defence of its land and sea territory was the heart of the matter. The northernmost county in Norway was the most vulnerable part of the NATO front. It was a large and rather empty area, bordering Russia and only lightly defended.22 The Norwegians deemed this a problem they could not solve alone, but rather one for NATO as a whole. Indeed, the defence of Norway largely depended on support from its allies. But they demanded that Norway contribute more. In the first decade after the war the country’s defence expenditures were relatively small.23 In the 1960s, its armed forces embarked on a major re-equipment programme. This included a government decision to strengthen the defence of northern Norway at the expense of the south.24 Norwegian defence budgets increased in the 1960s, but this was challenging politically because the general public was used to low spending in this field. And, as the UK Oslo ambassador pointed out, it was “against the pacifist ideals which lie at the back of many Norwegian minds”.25 This was related to the modest British concern that Norway would return to neutrality. Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart raised the issue of the Soviets’ desire for further neutralisation of the Nordic region with Gerhardsen.26 Moreover, the change of government in 1965 caused speculation within NATO about future attitudes to the alliance.27 Although the new cabinet publicly expressed firm support, some British worries remained.28 British-Norwegian defence relations remained good and there was “very close contact” between civil service representatives in NATO.29 Some 2500 British servicemen visited Norway annually for ski training and survival courses.30 In the 1960s, the UK was more actively involved in exercises pertaining to the defence of Norway, a trend that would continue until the end of the Cold War.31 However, Britain was not the main provider of Norwegian security anymore, and the sales of arms to Norway had declined considerably. Both countries were very dependent on the USA for their security. British defence strength gradually dwindled and the Americans replaced the UK’s role globally. The USA was also crucially important for the defence of Western Europe and thus the British Isles. For Norway, the USA provided the greater part of its arms and made handsome contributions to a number of defence projects. But the Europeans’ relationship to

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the USA was ambiguous. Washington demanded that they shoulder more of the NATO financial burdens.32 There were also challenges relating to how they interacted. For example, “American-Norwegian relations continued to be lacking in warmth”, the UK Oslo ambassador wrote about the situation in 1961.33 And the relationship between Wilson and President Johnson was at best lukewarm.34 Among the general public in both countries, indeed much of the world, the 1960s became a decade of anti-Americanism. Use of force around the world, in an increasing hegemonic manner, made the USA unpopular. Clearly Britain also had its problems in terms of its international reputation, still a colonial power and an important arms supplier globally, including to South Africa. But the Vietnam War contributed especially to American unpopularity, and the British government was reluctant to devote many resources there despite US pressure.35 Wilson also tried to broker the conflict unsuccessfully.36 Crucially, both Norway and Britain still had to balance their dismay with the Americans against their dependence on them. This came at a cost in domestic politics. The British Labour Party lost much support due to its backing of the USA.37 In Norway, the anti-American and anti-NATO Socialist People’s Party split from the Labour Party. The European NATO members’ desire to be treated as equal to the Americans was impeded by their struggles to agree among themselves. Britain and Norway were loyal allies to the USA and only offered mild criticism. President de Gaulle, however, took France out of the integrated NATO defence in 1966. This was a blow to the alliance and caused some concern that others would follow. Britain was among those members reacting most strongly initially.38 De Gaulle’s move was a demonstration of his opposition to Anglo-American dominance of Europe—similar to questions of European integration.

Economy and Trade The Norwegian economy improved significantly in the 1950s and grew even more in the 1960s to the point that it was characterised as having “striking growth”.39 Fisheries and shipping were still important sectors, and industry based on hydroelectric power had also become an important source of revenue. The country was now the largest aluminium producer in Europe and the world’s biggest supplier of iron alloys.40 Before a drop of oil was found, Norway was already among the dozen or so most prosperous countries per capita in the world.

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The much larger British economy, on the other hand, was struggling. Right after the war Norwegian productivity was below the British, but by the 1960s Norway’s GNP per capita was significantly higher.41 The UK economy also developed slower than in the EEC countries, not least West Germany. The economic problems were a major issue in the 1964 general election campaign, and improving the economy was an important priority for the Labour government.42 Foreign policy was not Wilson’s strongest suit, but he was “by far the best-qualified academic economist to ever have served as Prime Minister”, according to Garnett, Mabon and Smith.43 The new government set up an economic planning department, as well as a technology department to stimulate research and technical development in its industries. The different economic growth rates affected the bilateral balance of payments. In 1968, the UK was still Norway’s largest export market, and the country had one of the highest per capita rates of purchase of British goods in the world.44 But Norwegians increasingly bought more from other countries than the UK. New ships, for example, were predominately purchased from Sweden and Japan, not from Britain as before. In 1959, Anglo-Norwegian trade was nearly in balance, but in the 1960s Britain moved into the red, and by 1973 the deficit had “ballooned”.45 The British Oslo ambassador commented that in Norway Britain received “perhaps rather more information than others would get when we ask for it, but that is all—nowadays the rules of the market-place apply”.46 This indicates a further shift away from somewhat more sentiment- and tradition-based Norwegian imports. Of course, it did not help that Britain had an increasing “reputation for late delivery and strikes”.47 Britain struggled with a general balance-of-payments problem, causing the Wilson government reluctantly to devalue the pound in November 1967 by 14.3% to the dollar.48 The measure was a powerful expression of a struggling UK economy. Bale discusses why this was such a difficult decision for Wilson and his cabinet.49 One important consideration was that they expected that it would hurt them in the next election. The devaluation hurt the Norwegian economy and “caused bitter disappointment in Oslo”.50 This also meant that the krone might have to follow suit. The Norwegian government had been forced to shadow Attlee’s devaluation in 1949. Unlike Denmark, Norway decided not to follow London this time, illustrating the growing strength of the Norwegian economy and reduced dependence on Britain. Despite the negative

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effects, the British government was satisfied with reactions to the devaluation: it “was accepted in Norway in a spirit of stoicism and solidarity: there was scarcely any complaint about the difficulties”.51

European Integration The First Application Already in the same year as Britain formed EFTA with the other “outer” Western Europeans, some Whitehall actors argued that joining the EEC was a better solution. In the spring of 1960, government departments were instructed to report in detail on the likely implications of membership.52 The Macmillan government formally decided to apply in the summer of 1961. Why they changed their minds has been widely discussed.53 Two things seem clear: there was no one single factor but a number of reasons, and Macmillan did not have a clear plan behind this move. One factor was the role of the USA. Washington disliked the division of Western Europe in a Cold War perspective. The Americans attempted to strengthen and restructure the OEEC, but this contributed little to increasing European unity. The US preferred the EEC to EFTA, and they urged Britain to change sides.54 President Kennedy declared: “above all, with British membership, [the EEC] could become the basis for a true political federation of Europe”.55 In addition, it was useful for the Americans to have Britain in the EEC to steer and influence it in the right direction.56 US pressure undoubtedly affected British considerations. Kaiser discusses how the application was thought to appease the Americans.57 Indeed, Macmillan wrote in his diary of the danger that Britain would be standing against a less friendly America and an increasingly powerful Europe.58 However, Britain’s independent views on its international position and future were more important. As we saw in the previous chapter, the Foreign Office had in the 1950s been highly sceptical of the UK joining the Six. It was too narrow politically. But after the Suez crisis Foreign Office mandarins increasingly realised that the country was no longer the dominant international player it had been, and they changed their opinion on EEC membership. This could be a way to maintain Britain’s role in international politics; Europe was “an empire on our doorstep”.59 Since Macmillan had serious doubts about membership, strong pressure from

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the Foreign Office was substantially important.60 Macmillan eventually adopted their views. Although the political arguments dominated, there were also economic motives. While the growth of the British economy was fairly positive in a historic perspective, the EEC was experiencing more growth.61 Furthermore, trade with the Six increased in importance. It was concluded in Whitehall that “from a purely economic point of view, joining the EEC would ‘almost certainly’ be the best solution”.62 But both the positive and negative economic consequences were difficult to predict. In this picture, EFTA was economically and politically too small. The EEC had plans for deeper and wider integration, which would probably strengthen their position further vis-à-vis Britain. An important part of the UK government’s strategy behind the establishment of EFTA was for it to serve as a bridge-building measure towards the EEC, or even a possible merger of the two organisations. The latter would effectively have entailed that the EEC would join EFTA—the old Plan G. But this did not interest the Six.63 Joining the EEC had many negative aspects as well. Macmillan concluded: “it’s a grim choice”.64 Within the Conservative Party scepticism was prevalent.65 There were concerns about securing satisfactory arrangements for British farmers, who largely opposed membership. Another reason was that entering the Common Market would involve cutting many ties to the Commonwealth, both politically and economically. Finally, seeking membership was risky as it could alienate the EFTA partners if it failed. Many Labour Party members shared these concerns. Left-leaning MPs, in addition, viewed the EEC as a “capitalist club”.66 Predictably, the opposition party chose the toughest rhetoric. Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell stated in 1961 that joining the EEC would mean “the end of Britain as an independent nation state … the end of a thousand years of history”.67 The party conference in September 1962 set five conditions for entry that in practice amounted to a rejection of membership. But many in the party also saw EEC membership as a way of reducing Britain’s dependence on the USA. Consequently, Macmillan’s decision changed British party politics on European integration. Both major parties were divided on the question of membership, and divisions have remained ever since. Macmillan’s EEC application caused concern in Norway. The historical and political ties across the North Sea were strong, and importantly,

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Britain had similar views on the nature of European integration. Moreover, Britain was still Norway’s most important export market. The Common Market with the UK, Denmark and Ireland would take three quarters of Norwegian exports.68 As one of the most open economies in Europe, this was vital to Norway. In the 1950s and 1960s, foreign trade constituted approximately 40% of its GNP.69 EEC membership was the natural way forward for many Norwegians. Ikonomou demonstrates how a handful of top foreign office diplomats were important for the development of a pro-membership approach.70 Few feared that it would jeopardise the country’s security as Britain and the USA supported it. It was the economic concerns that played the chief role for membership supporters.71 Shipping, banking and the export industries wanted Norway to join the Common Market. Unsurprisingly then, the Conservatives were the first party to flag a pro-EEC position. Labour Foreign Minister Lange also favoured membership. He argued that the EEC was likely to be stronger than EFTA economically, and that Norway would benefit from avoiding the common tariff wall. He also dismissed association only, because it would involve the same economic commitments as membership but without the political clout.72 However, the issue became very difficult for the Labour Party. Prime Minister Gerhardsen hesitated to make a decision because members of his party were divided on the issue.73 After ten months of thorough consideration within the party, the government decided to follow Britain and apply for membership. But the PM had to promise a referendum on the negotiation result, as Gerhardsen himself said, “to save the party from a politically impossible situation”.74 This promise has been all-important for Norway’s European integration policy ever since. The Storting laid the groundwork for Norwegian membership in 1962. It adopted a new paragraph in the Constitution that permitted delegation of certain aspects of sovereignty to international bodies by a three-quarters majority.75 Later it supported the membership application. Both votes had significant majorities, only 35 and 37 representatives of 150, respectively, voted against. Nonetheless, the majority of Norwegian MPs were not fundamentally attracted to EEC membership. The decision to apply was certainly not made as a result of a strong public will. Had it not been for Britain’s application, Norway would have remained passive. A comment made by an MP in 1970 underlines the view held by many Norwegians: “the best solution to the Norwegian EEC issue is that Britain decides to stay out”.76

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Many in Britain and Norway shared the view that the EEC was creating a problematic situation that the country would have to deal with whether it wanted to or not. Trade for all Western European countries was influenced by the big Common Market, and the Six’s long-term political goals would also affect those on the outside. Put differently, the fear of being left outside was stronger than the desire to be inside. Many therefore thought that it would have been better if the Six had not sought such close integration. For example, in 1958 the Norwegian minister of trade and shipping, Arne Skaug, stated: “the best alternative for us would be that the Six never reached an agreement [on the tariff union]”.77 If Britain joined, this problem would increase significantly for Norway. The First Negotiations The British EEC membership negotiations were tough, intricate and laborious.78 The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was perhaps the most difficult issue, partly because the EEC had not finished negotiating it among themselves. UK farming interests stood in stark opposition to those in the Six. The way the CAP was designed, Britain would be subsidising farmers on the continent.79 Another major obstacle was the Commonwealth. Its other members complained that British EEC membership would damage their economies. The strong support among Britons for the Commonwealth moved public opinion against membership in 1962, which made the negotiations even more difficult for the Macmillan government. Despite French President de Gaulle’s rather unfriendly attitude, the British felt they entered the negotiations in 1961 with a fairly strong hand. It turned out that the cards they were playing with were not good enough. Ludlow argues that the French government’s hostility to UK membership was due to its fear that it would undermine their leadership within the Community and to its dislike of Britain’s special relationship with the Americans.80 France insisted that Britain should downgrade their US dependency, as such the Nassau deal did not help. De Gaulle was not enthusiastic about the UK’s commitments to the Commonwealth either. The Six began the accession negotiations with Britain first. The Norwegian government agreed that this was sensible.81 UK membership was the key for the other candidates; they would not have applied had it not been for the Macmillan government’s move. It was also more comfortable to delay the tricky issues as long as possible—and perhaps avoid

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them altogether if the British negotiations broke down. In the end, no EEC-Norwegian ministerial meetings of substance took place before the negotiations were terminated. Establishment rights were considered to comprise the most difficult Norwegian issue prior to the negotiations.82 Norway allowed in some cases preference for domestic over foreign businesses. This would not be allowed by the Treaty of Rome. However, special arrangements for Norwegian farming were the pivotal point in the government’s opening negotiation statement in July 1962. This was based on Norway’s challenging geographical position and economic structure. The initial reaction among the Six was negative. As we will see in the next chapter, obtaining permanent exemptions from EEC rules was difficult, if not impossible. Norway argued for close contact between EFTA members during the negotiations. One aspect was fear of further splits between the Scandinavian countries.83 Crucial for all the six smaller EFTA states was that Britain would not forget about its partners. EFTA members as a whole therefore agreed on consulting closely with each other, and the British did so in practice, which was “clearly appreciated by the Norwegian government”.84 Furthermore, at the London ministerial meeting in June 1961 EFTA agreed on a declaration that committed members to work for a satisfactory solution with the EEC for all members before any of them would join.85 Although this was based on a UK proposal, the declaration became an irritant and an obstacle for the British, but their government accepted it because until EEC membership was secured, they needed EFTA. And there was uncertainty hanging over the outcome of the negotiations. Nevertheless, EFTA loyalty had its limits. Both the British and the Norwegian governments feared that Sweden in an association deal would obtain the same economic benefits as members, without having to pay the full price.86 However, the Six assured that full membership would lead to better economic terms than association. Generally, there was no significant rift between Norway and Britain during these negotiations. When the negotiations moved towards their conclusion in January 1963, de Gaulle vetoed British membership. Pro-Europeans like Foreign Minister Lange were disappointed. For other Norwegian politicians, however, including the prime minister, the veto was more of a relief.87 The really strong reactions came in Britain. To some it was like a bolt from the blue. Just three days prior to the veto the French foreign minister had assured Edward Heath, the leader of the British negotiations, that “de

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Gaulle has not either the power or wish to oppose British membership in the EEC”.88 The Macmillan government felt betrayed. In his diary, the prime minister characterised de Gaulle’s reasons for the veto as “ridiculous”.89 Evidently, it was in the French national interest, as defined by de Gaulle, to keep Britain out of the EEC. This is a good example of how European integration has always been driven primarily by national interests. Although the veto made de Gaulle unpopular in many European and American quarters, it was just as much a blow to the prestige of the Macmillan government. Perhaps the famous words by US Secretary of State Dean Acheson were no longer suitable: “Great Britain has lost an empire and has not yet found a role”.90 Now Britain had found its role, or at least decided what role it wanted. The special relationship with America was weakened and the Commonwealth was gradually losing significance: the European circle was the solution. Unfortunately for Britain, by the time they realised this, they were not allowed to take part. Still in EFTA So it was clear that Britain and Norway would continue as EFTA members. This was a good solution seen from Oslo; it was not supranational, agriculture was not included and EFTA comprised countries they knew well. For the Norwegians, the British Oslo ambassador wrote, “it is cosy to be associated with Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom”.91 The character of EFTA, not least its intergovernmental structure, was also appealing to the UK. Yet the association was less important for the British government and public. In 1963, Britain’s exports to the EFTA area amounted to just 13.6% and imports only 12.5% of the total, and importantly, exports to the EEC in the period 1959–1963 increased by 75% and only 43 % to EFTA.92 Nevertheless, making the best of EFTA became an important objective for both countries after the veto. The members agreed to accelerate the dismantling of intra-trade tariffs and quota restrictions. Britain led this work, and it was considered essential if EFTA were to hold together.93 For Norway, however, this acceleration was problematic. It would hurt the large number of small-scale units producing for the domestic market. The UK Oslo ambassador probably had a point: a “cold shower” via EFTA would be good for Norway.94 Similar to the formation negotiations, the Norwegian government suggested larger tariff-free quotas for its fish

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exports to the UK in return for accepting the new timetable.95 This time Britain did not concede. Norway had less negotiation leverage now—a Norwegian exit from the association was highly unlikely since it undoubtedly had a net positive economic effect. The acceleration provided for a free-trade area of 100 million people in industrial products by the end of 1966, four years prior to the original schedule. And members remained independent in commercial relations with non-members. All the seven economies benefitted from EFTA since they were very open; per capita they were far more engaged in foreign trade than both the EEC and the USA.96 But there were clouds on the EFTA horizon as well. In October 1964, the Wilson government introduced a 15% surcharge on all manufactured imports, including from the EFTA countries. The reason was the massive deficit balance it inherited from its predecessors.97 The surcharge led to an outcry. The Norwegian government argued, as did other members, that this move was not in accordance with EFTA and GATT rules.98 Norway was not the hardest hit of the members as the surcharge affected about one-third of its exports to Britain.99 Yet it was problematic that many, particularly in smaller industries, had invested considerably to get into the UK market; now they risked losing their footing there. Britain’s Oslo ambassador commented that “the conclusion of many business men here is that Norway had become too dependent on Britain, that this dependence had proved unsafe, and that Norway’s economic connections ought to be diversified”.100 As such, this surcharge added to the trend of trading more with other countries, not least West Germany. The main problem for most Norwegians, however, was not the economic implications, but the feeling of being let down by the UK, seeing this as a violation of trust. The decision was made without any prior consultations. Later Wilson wrote that he regretted not conferring with the EFTA partners beforehand.101 The Wilson government considered that they had to signal a reduction and eventual removal of the surcharge to keep EFTA together.102 In particular, the Swiss and Austrians were angry. The attitude of the Norwegian government was milder as it also sympathised with Britain’s difficult economic situation. The surcharge also helped to avoid a devaluation of the pound, which would have had negative effects on Norwegian exports and shipping.103 Nor did the other EFTA members do much more than protest. The UK government signalled that it would not allow a reduction of the surcharge to be seen as a result of threats and counter measures.104

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This demonstrated how dependent the others were on the UK and how much they benefitted from EFTA membership in general. Moreover, in Norway an admiration for Britain and an expectation of sound leadership remained. This made Norwegians feel uncomfortable with the violation of trust; in the words of the British ambassador: “it is rather as a fourth form boy who has caught the cricket captain cheating”.105 Britain’s complete removal of the surcharge in 1966 improved EFTA relations. Nonetheless, it had demonstrated that the UK, when in a difficult spot economically, put national interests before commitments to fellow members. It reduced the trust between them. A few years later the British Oslo ambassador observed that “Norway has been acutely suspicious that Britain would, if necessary, or even if merely convenient, be ready to depart from her EFTA obligations to solve or attempt to solve her economic problems”.106 The economic implications were not the main issue, but rather the feeling that the big brother in EFTA had been throwing its weight about with apparent indifference. The Norwegian government realised that Britain’s attitude to EFTA was more reserved than their own—it was the crisis solution they chose when the Maudling negotiations collapsed in 1958. EFTA had from the beginning agreed that it should not make later membership negotiations with the EEC more difficult.107 And by 1966 the Wilson government apparently began to change its mind on membership. The Second Application European integration was not among Harold Wilson’s top priorities when he became prime minister.108 He had campaigned on a reinvigoration of political and trade links with the Commonwealth. Voicing similar concerns as Gaitskell, Wilson expressed that a supranational European state was unthinkable for Britain. It was also important that European cooperation should not impede national planning of the economy. During his first years in Downing Street Wilson even toyed with the old idea of creating a loose free trade area covering all of Western Europe.109 This was no more realistic then than it had been in the late 1950s. In November 1966, Wilson announced that the government intended to investigate the possibilities of British EEC membership. He and Foreign Secretary George Brown toured European capitals in the first months of 1967 to sound out the views of the Six.110 Reactions

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were largely positive. But de Gaulle was still French president and still unenthusiastic. Many reasons have been given to explain why Wilson changed his mind. Few accounts disregard the economic arguments.111 The importance of trade with the Six grew, and Whitehall considered the alternatives to the Common Market inadequate. EFTA was too small and the role of the Commonwealth continued to decline throughout the 1960s.112 Some explanations also focus on tactical intra-party politics. Many of the new MPs entering parliament after the 1966 general election were proEuropeans and pushed for membership.113 There is also the question of whether Wilson really believed that a second application at that point would be successful. Others, like Parr, emphasise the strong influence of the Foreign Office.114 The Labour government at least argued similarly to how the Foreign Office had done for years—by joining the EEC Britain would take the lead in Europe. Brown told Brandt, his West German counterpart: “Willy, you must get us in so we can take the lead”.115 An application to the EEC divided the Labour Party. Parr shows how Wilson rather cleverly operated to convince his government.116 In May 1967, the cabinet voted 13 to eight in favour of announcing to parliament that it intended to apply. Prominent cabinet members who opposed for varying reasons were Douglas Jay, Barbara Castle, Roy Jenkins and Richard Crossman. A majority of 486 to 62 votes in the House of Commons supported the application. One aspect which made membership easier to swallow for some of the Labour Eurosceptics was the 1966 Luxembourg Compromise in which de Gaulle had secured national veto rights in vital policy matters. This showed that the EEC was not a supranational institution, many argued.117 Wilson’s application again forced Norway to deal with the question of membership. And again it took a long time to decide whether to follow suit. The four government parties had differing views on many issues, not least the EEC. It eventually led to the coalition’s downfall in 1971. The Conservative Party had been a strong supporter of Norwegian membership since 1961. The Christian Democrats and the Liberals were divided but leaning towards a negative attitude. The Centre Party, however, led by Prime Minister Borten, was highly sceptical based on its close agricultural links. Indeed, when de Gaulle later vetoed Britain for the second time, Borten “heaved a sigh of relief”.118 Why then did the government decide to apply? It would have collapsed had it not. This was less than two years after the Labour hegemony in Norwegian politics finally had

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been broken, and stepping down so soon for a case which was not very important in the public eye, yet, would not have been well received.119 A Storting majority of 137 to 13 supported a Norwegian application. The Second Negotiations In March 1967, Foreign Secretary Brown told his Norwegian colleague, John Lyng, that he did not think that de Gaulle would once more veto UK membership, but he could possibly slow negotiations down.120 These started in July 1967 and made swift progress. The Wilson government had fewer conditions compared to 1961–1963. Callaghan argues that Wilson and Brown had realised during their “tour of Europe” that this was necessary to be taken seriously.121 For instance, the CAP was accepted in full. Nonetheless, de Gaulle’s resistance was evident from the outset. As before, he maintained that Britain was a “Trojan horse” for the Americans and that its economy was so weak that it would hurt the EEC. Wilson and Brown thought that the friendly “Five” (all EEC members except France) could successfully pressure the president to let them in.122 However, this was a miscalculation. They neither had the will nor power enough to change the French view. The Norwegian government was in no rush to open their negotiations. Settling the British problem first was preferable.123 Clearly, there was a tactical consideration behind this—the longer they could wait, the longer they could avoid internal cabinet disputes. The approach was successful; the Borten government never had to deal with any substantial issues before the negotiations ended. Norwegian membership was out of the question without Britain. Should EFTA negotiate as a bloc? The Danish government had suggested such a solution to the EEC, but Britain refused. One reason was that Danish interests were “much more akin to those of the EEC than to ours”.124 Norway, too, considered its own interests so different from the other applicants that joint negotiations were not preferred. But particularly Britain had a strong preference for bilateral negotiations with the Community. The Wilson government was careful not to be tied down by EFTA commitments as Britain had been with the 1961 London Declaration. Such a move could reduce their chances of entering the EEC. But this was a balancing act. De Gaulle’s 1963 veto had shown that EFTA was a useful fallback position.

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A similar British approach was evident more specifically in the bilateral relations with Norway. Norwegian ministers sought support for their demands on agriculture and fisheries, and Whitehall acknowledged that membership would “cause genuine and considerable problems for her agriculture”.125 Norway therefore deserved a good deal, it was thought— as long as it did not complicate good British terms. The UK government considered that they should be “extremely careful” not to give any open or implied support for such requests since the Norwegians were “very good at holding on to a statement about, or even a possibility of consideration for something which they want”.126 Norway was a good ally and EFTA partner, but in such negotiations national interests trump relations to other countries. De Gaulle’s second veto in November 1967 was less shocking than his first. Reactions were negative, though. Foreign Secretary Stewart expressed that “I think in the history of Europe it will be seen as an unnecessary, profitless and harmful pause on the road towards the goal of unity”.127 Perhaps it has been for some. What was important then, was that British membership seemed impossible as long as de Gaulle was president. Most Norwegians had no problems with that. After the Second Veto In line with his civil service, Foreign Secretary Brown acknowledged Britain’s declining international position. In an internal memo he wrote: “the EEC is enormously much more powerful than we are and even the individual countries of the Six, e.g. Germany and France, are in some respects stronger than we are”.128 This assessment formed the basis for the UK European integration strategy after the second veto. And membership of the European Community (EC)129 was still the answer to its problems. Influencing the Five to force France to initiate negotiations became the Wilson government’s main approach. But this was difficult, Brown considered: “we shall have to press them hard, for some of them will go to great lengths to avoid a showdown with the French”.130 Indeed, the UK was unable to make significant progress with the Five. As feared, there would be no change before de Gaulle was gone. Britain was therefore still stuck with EFTA. The other members suggested various ways of strengthening the Association. But Whitehall thought this was a dead-end politically and economically.131 EFTA was

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viewed as a second-rate option and treated half-heartedly. One example was the Wilson government’s new 10% tariff on frozen fish fillets in 1968, which caused “full fury” in Norway.132 This was settled the next year, but it showed that, as opposed to when EFTA was established in 1959, the UK now had less patience for Norwegian demands. Yet Whitehall wanted to maintain the economic advantages of EFTA, even though the smaller members benefitted more than themselves.133 The Association should remain intact until Britain could join the Six, and the other members should not seek individual solutions with the EC. Consequently, unhappiness and suspicion within EFTA should be avoided. President of the Board of Trade, Anthony Crosland, considered that “we are therefore deluding ourselves if we think that EFTA can be held together for long if we wholly ignore the interests of the other members”.134 The UK government kept their EFTA partners informed of their efforts with the Five to avoid being seen playing a double game. But key actors in Whitehall disliked EFTA. John Robinson, leader of the important European Integration Department in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO),135 wrote internally after an EFTA ministerial meeting where the others had pressured Britain: “We do not need to say we like EFTA, when it is plain that we do not like the way our partners us it to pinprick us”.136 The Nordic countries’ reaction after de Gaulle’s second veto was to resurrect the idea of a common market (NORDEK). This would involve a tariff union as the first step towards a comprehensive co-ordination of their economies. Politically the Nordic, and especially the Scandinavian countries, were close. But Norway chose a cautious approach, and public attitudes were divided.137 Norwegians in general supported functional cooperation with its neighbours but opposed deeper integration.138 The same concerns as in the attempts in two previous decades emerged: Norway’s domestic industries would suffer in competition with Sweden, and its agriculture could hardly survive in open competition with Danish farmers. Some also feared such a union could lead to a break with the Atlantic security tradition of Norway since Sweden and Finland were neutral.139 Negotiations began in 1968 and lasted for almost two years. Once more it proved difficult to agree. The British FCO aptly commented: “in general the Scandinavians have found it easier to unite against others than among themselves”.140 However, external events eventually sealed NORDEK’s fate: Finland was put under so much pressure by the Soviets not to participate that it pulled out.141

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The UK’s approach towards NORDEK was similar to its EFTA policy. A positive attitude was conveyed.142 But they did not really want concrete results from the negotiations. The FCO considered that “there can be little doubt that, if the Nordic union were to become a reality, there would be some consequent disadvantage to us”.143 In such a case, it would be easier for the Nordics to take the EC step in the future— without Britain, thereby strengthening its isolation in Europe. The UK government was worried about the Six driving wedges between Scandinavia and themselves. For example, the Oslo embassy reported that the leader of a delegation of French parliamentarians visiting Norway in 1968 had told Norwegian MPs that “the Scandinavian countries could come into the Community with very little difficulty… Britain on the other hand was profoundly ‘sick’ and could not enter without a very long probationary period”.144 However, such British concerns vanished in 1969. De Gaulle left office in April. Wilson was clear: “the architect of the roadblock has gone”.145 The new French president, Georges Pompidou, was less hostile to the UK, and at an EC summit meeting in The Hague in December 1969 the EC agreed on several key issues, among others enlargement.

Conclusions In the 1960s, Britain’s relative demise continued. The economy developed slower than its main competition on the European continent and the pound was devalued in 1967. Defence expenditures had to be cut, and the withdrawal from the east of Suez further demonstrated that the UK was no longer a global power. Joining the EEC was increasingly seen as the solution to many of its problems. The Macmillan government’s decision to apply for EEC membership in 1961 changed the dynamics of European integration. The two rounds of accession negotiations dominated the affairs of the Six, it slowed down their planning and implementation of further integration. It was a waste of effort for Britain too. But what was worse, seeking membership as a measure to strengthen the UK had by the end of 1967 weakened the country. Relations with the Six, and particularly the French, had deteriorated. And Britain’s reputation and standing took a hit when de Gaulle could so easily thwart a key UK strategic objective. Finally, the other EFTA members had become suspicious of British motives and its policy vis-à-vis the association.

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The British membership applications also created problems for Norway. Trade with the future EEC would be so extensive that the Norwegian economy would be hurt more and more by being on the outside. Norway therefore reluctantly applied. In other words, Norway continued to follow in the footsteps of Britain in terms of European integration. Indeed, this contention is further supported by the fact that Norway withdrew its applications after both of de Gaulle’s vetoes, even though the French president never showed significant antagonism towards applicants other than Britain. Macmillan’s application also changed the nature of the European integration question in Britain and Norway—it became significantly more a contentious issue domestically. In the UK, it divided the two main parties. The Conservatives became the party of Europe while Labour opposed membership for several years. However, the application also opened up internal party differences on what type of relationship Britain wanted to have with Europe—a feature that has plagued the parties ever since. There were pro- and anti-Europeans inside both parties. Particularly Harold Wilson struggled with this as Labour leader. In Norway, Labour was in government in 1961 and the leadership feared that the issue would split the party. A future referendum on a final negotiation treaty was the answer. On the other side of the Norwegian political scale, the four parties that formed the government in 1965 were deeply divided on Europe . The bilateral relationship was also strong in the 1960s, but there were signs that it was waning. The war moved further into the background, and Norway traded increasingly more with other countries than Britain. They were still important defence partners in NATO, but American dominance reduced the role of Britain in Norwegian security policy. Moreover, the two British EEC applications revealed important differences on primary viewpoints. In the 1950s, they had stood firmly together in dismissing the supranational solutions of the continent. They cooperated closely in EFTA, but this was clearly at best a second best option for Britain. And by the end of the decade de Gaulle was gone and it looked as if the close European relationship of Norway and Britain would face its ultimate challenge.

Notes 1. Cited in Christopher Sandford, Union Jack: JFK’s Special Relationship with Great Britain (Lebanon [New Hampshire]: ForeEdge, 2017), 228.

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2. Mark Garnett, Simon Mabon, and Robert Smith, British Foreign Policy Since 1945 (London: Routledge, 2018), 147–156. 3. Labour was out of office for 28 days in 1963. 4. Jens A. Seip, Fra Embedsmannsstat til Ettpartistat og andre Essays (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1963), 1–42. 5. UK Oslo ambassador Ian Scott to Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart, 4 August 1966, British National Archives (henceforth BNA), FO 491/13. 6. UK Oslo ambassador Peter Scarlett to Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home, 19 October 1960, BNA, FO 491/13. 7. Foreign Office to P.F. Zulueta, Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs to the Prime Minister, 16 February 1960, BNA, FO 371/151720. 8. Report on Macmillan’s visit to Norway 7–10 June 1960, Scarlett to Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, 13 June 1960, BNA, FO 491/13. 9. Gerhardsen’s speech during Macmillan’s visit to Oslo 7 June 1960, Norwegian National Archives (henceforth NNA), Foreign Office Archives (henceforth FOA) 1960–1969, 11.8/21. 10. UK Oslo embassy to Northern Department of Foreign Office, 9 July 1963, BNA, FO 371/171803. 11. “Anglo-Norwegian relations”, UK Oslo ambassador Patrick Hancock to Foreign Secretary R.A. Butler, 13 March 1963, BNA, FO 491/13. 12. Hancock to Stewart, 1 April 1965, BNA, FO 491/31. 13. For example UK Government, “Report on Defence”, White Paper February 1960, Cmnd 952, London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office. and “Statement on Defence 1962: the Next Five Years”, 1962, White Paper, Cmnd 1639, London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office. 14. Garnett, Mabon, and Smith, British Foreign Policy, 152. 15. John Callaghan, The Labour Party and Foreign Policy: A History (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), 256. 16. Our World in Data, website, “Military Expenditure by country, 1914 to 2007”, https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/military-expend iture-by-country-in-thousands-of-2000-us-dollars?time=1914..2007. 17. David Gowland, Arthur Turner, and Alex Wright, Britain and European Integration Since 1945: On the Sidelines (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), 67. 18. Iain Dale (ed.), Labour Party General Election Manifestos 1900–1997 (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 148. 19. Brief for Foreign Minister Lyng’s visit to London 8–9 March 1967, Foreign Ministry, 3 March 1967, NNA, FOA 1960–1969, 11.7.31. 20. Pham discusses the Wilson government’s gradual reduction of British defence commitments east of Suez, in Pham, P. L., Ending “East of Suez”: The British Decision to Withdraw from Malaysia and Singapore 1964–1968 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

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21. Saki Dockrill, Britain’s Retreat from East of Suez: The Choice Between Europe and the World? (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). 22. “Norway: annual review for 1963”, Hancock to Butler, 7 January 1964, BNA, FO 491/31. 23. “Norway: annual review for 1960”, UK Oslo ambassador John Walker to Douglas-Home, 16 February 1961, BNA, FO 491/31. 24. “Norway: annual review for 1961”, Walker to Douglas-Home, 12 January 1962, BNA, FO 491/31. 25. “Norway: annual review for 1960”, Walker to Douglas-Home, 16 February 1961, BNA, FO 491/31. 26. Minutes of meeting between Stewart, Lord Chalfont and Gerhardsen 3 February 1965, Norwegian London embassy to Foreign Ministry, 2 March 1965, NNA, FOA 1960–1969, 11.7.22. 27. Norwegian Washington ambassador Hans Engen to Foreign Ministry, 19 October 1965, NNA, FOA 1960–1969, 34.1/2. 28. “Norway: annual review for 1967”, Scott to Foreign Secretary George Brown, 5 January 1968, BNA, FO 491/31. 29. Record of conversation between Douglas-Home and Lange at the Waldorf Astoria on 28 September 1960, Douglas-Home to Scarlett, 3 October 1960, BNA, FO 491/13. 30. Hancock to Stewart, 1 April 1965, BNA, FO 491/13. 31. Clive Archer, “Norway and the United Kingdom in the High North,” in Britain and Norway: Special Relationships, ed. Helge Ø. Pharo and Patrick Salmon (Oslo: Akademika, 2012), 315. 32. The USA has consistently been spending more on defence than all other NATO members combined since its beginning. See, for example, Todd Sandler and Justin George, “Military Expenditure Trends for 1960–2014 and What They Reveal,” Global Policy 7, no. 2 (2016): 180–182. 33. “Norway: annual review for 1961”, Walker to Douglas-Home, 12 January 1962, BNA, FO 491/31. 34. Gowland, Turner, and Wright, Britain and European Integration, 67. 35. Andrew Thorpe, A History of the British Labour Party, 4th ed. (London: Red Globe Press, 2015), 174–175. 36. Garnett, Mabon, and Smith, British Foreign Policy, 167. 37. Callaghan, The Labour Party, 282. 38. Brief for Foreign Minister Lyng’s visit to London 8–9 March 1967, Foreign Ministry, 3 March 1967, NNA, FOA 1960–1969, 11.7.31. 39. “Norway: annual review for 1967”, Scott to Brown, 5 January 1968, BNA, FO 491/31. 40. Glen O’Hara, “Anglo-Norwegian Trade and Commercial Relations After the Second World War,” in Britain and Norway: Special Relationships, ed. Helge Ø. Pharo and Patrick Salmon (Oslo: Akademika, 2012), 263.

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41. “Norway: annual review for 1965”, Scott to Stewart, 7 January 1966, BNA, FO 491/31. 42. Dale, Labour Party, 106–114. 43. Garnett, Mabon, and Smith, British Foreign Policy, 164. 44. “Norway: annual review for 1968”, UK Oslo ambassador Frank Brenchley to Stewart, 6 January 1969, BNA, FO 491/31. 45. O’Hara, “Anglo-Norwegian,” 257. 46. “Anglo-Norwegian relations”, Hancock to Butler, 13 March 1963, BNA, FO 491/13. 47. “Norway: annual review for 1970”, Brenchley to Douglas-Home, 1 January 1971, BNA, FCO 33/1656. 48. Cabinet Conclusions, 16 November 1967, BNA, CAB 128/42. 49. Tim Bale, “Dynamics of a Non-Decision: The ‘Failure’ to Devalue the Pound, 1964–7,” Twentieth Century British History 10, no. 2 (1999). 50. Hans Otto Frøland and Lars Fredrik M. Øksendal, “A Strategic Resource? Norway’s Position in British Commercial Policy, 1931–1972,” in Britain and Norway: Special Relationships, ed. Helge Ø. Pharo and Patrick Salmon (Oslo: Akademika, 2012), 195. 51. “Norway: annual review for 1967”, Scott to Brown, 5 January 1968, BNA, FO 491/31. 52. N. J. Crowson, Britain and Europe: A Political History Since 1918 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), 77. 53. Gowland, Turner, and Wright, Britain and European Integration, 50– 61. 54. Geir Lundestad, “Empire” by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945–1997 (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 89–92. 55. Arthur M. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston [MA, USA]: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 720. 56. Alistair Horne: Macmillan 1957 –1986. Volume II of the Official Biography (London: Macmillan, 1989), 295. 57. Wolfram Kaiser, Using Europe, Abusing the Europeans: Britain and European Integration, 1945–63 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996). 58. Harold Macmillan, Prime Minister and After, 1957 –66, ed. and with introduction by Peter Catterall, vol. 2 of The Macmillan Diaries (London: Macmillan, 2011), 313 (9 July 1960). 59. Douglas Evans, While Britain Slept: The Selling of the Common Market (London: Gollancz, 1975), 81. 60. Gowland, Turner, and Wright, Britain and European Integration, 53. 61. John W. Young, Britain and European Unity, 1945–1992 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 58. 62. According to Wolfram Kaiser, “To join or Not to Join: The ‘Appeasement’ policy of Britain’s First EEC Application,” in From Reconstruction

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63.

64. 65. 66. 67. 68.

69.

70.

71. 72. 73. 74. 75.

76. 77.

78.

79. 80.

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to Integration: Britain and Europe Since 1945, ed. Brian Brivati and Harriet Jones (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1993), 145. Lise Rye, “Integration from the Outside: The EC and EFTA from 1960 to 1995,” in European Enlargement Across Rounds and Beyond Borders, ed. Haakon A. Ikonomou, Aurélie Andry, and Rebekka Byberg (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), 4–7. Harold Macmillan, Prime Minister, 313. John Ramsden, The Winds of Change: Macmillan to Heath, 1957 –75: A History of the Conservative Party (London: Longman, 1996), 146–152. Garnett, Mabon, and Smith, British Foreign Policy, 144. Stephen Wall, Reluctant European: Britain and the European Union from 1945 to Brexit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 9. Sieglinde Gstöhl, Reluctant Europeans: Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland in the Process of Integration (London: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 97. Hans Otto Frøland, “Choosing the Periphery: The Political Economy of Norway’s European integration Policy, 1948–73,” Journal of European Integration History 7, no. 1 (2001): 87. Haakon A. Ikonomou, “Europeans. Norwegian Diplomats and the Enlargement of the European Community, 1960–1972” (PhD thesis, European University Institute, 2016). Berge Furre, Vårt Hundreår: Norsk Historie 1905–1990 (Oslo: Det Norske Samlaget, 1991), 322–325. Foreign Minister Lange’s account to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Storting, 27 April 1961, NNA, FOA 1960–1969, 34.1/5. Clive Archer and Ingrid Sogner, Norway, European Integration and Atlantic Security (London: Sage, 1998), 26–27. Finn Olstad, Einar Gerhardsen: En Politisk Biografi (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1999), 371. My translation. Knut E. Eriksen and Helge Ø. Pharo, Kald Krig og Internasjonalisering 1949–1965, vol. 5 of Norsk utenrikspolitisk historie (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1997), 334. Comment by Karl Brommeland (The Christian Democrats), Arbeiderbladet, 19 August 1970. My translation. The Parliamentary Archives, The Parliament’s Extended Foreign Policy and Constitutional Committee, minutes of 14 February 1958, 19 (Frøland, “Choosing,” 92). For an excellent analysis of the negotiations, see N. Piers Ludlow, Dealing with Britain: The Six and the First UK Application to the EEC (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Alex May, Britain and Europe Since 1945 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), 34–36. Ludlow, Dealing with Britain, 208–209.

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81. Record of conversation between the Lord Privy Seal, Edward Heath, and State Secretary Hans Engen 8 September 1961, Douglas-Home to Walker, 14 September 1961, BNA, FO 491/13. 82. Foreign Minister Lange’s account to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Storting 27 April 1961, NNA, FOA 1960–1969, 34.1/5. 83. Parliamentary Debates (Norway), 5 June 1961, several speakers. 84. “Norway: annual review for 1961”, Walker to Douglas-Home, 12 January 1962, BNA, FO 491/31. 85. Communique published after EFTA Ministerial Meeting of the Council and Joint Council, meeting in London 27–28 June 1961 (Parliament debates [UK], Commons, vol. 644, col. 190–192, 11 July 1961.) 86. Record of conversation between Heath and Engen 8 September 1961, Douglas-Home to Walker, 14 September 1961, BNA, FO 491/13. 87. Eriksen and Pharo, Kald Krig og Internasjonalisering, 349–350. 88. Heath informed the Cabinet on this, Cabinet Conclusions 5 1963, BNA, CAB 128/37. 89. Harold Macmillan, Prime Minister, 536 (28 January 1963). 90. Acheson stated this when addressing a student conference at USMA, West Point in 1962 (Douglas Brinkley, “Dean Acheson and the ‘Special Relationship’: The West Point Speech of December 1962,” The Historical Journal 33, no. 3 [1990]). 91. “Norway: annual review for 1963”, Hancock to Butler, 7 January 1964, BNA, FO 491/31. 92. Note by Holland (Norwegian Foreign Ministry ), 3 January 1966, NNA, FOA 1960–1969, 44.33/1. 93. Report on Heath’s visit to Oslo, K.B.A. Scott, 10 June 1963, BNA, FO 371/171809. 94. Walker to Douglas-Home, 18 January 1963, BNA, FO 491/13. 95. Frøland and Øksendal, “A Strategic Resource?,” 195. 96. Address by EFTA Secretary General Frank Figgures to the General Assembly of the German National Committee of the International Chamber of Commerce in Munich 20 May 1965, NNA, FOA 1960– 1969, 44.33/1. 97. Gowland, Turner, and Wright, Britain and European Integration, 63. 98. Minutes of meeting between Chancellor James Callaghan, Minister of trade Douglas Jay and Gerhardsen 3 February 1965, Norway London embassy to Foreign Ministry, 2 March 1965, NNA, FOA 1960–1969, 11.7.22. 99. “Norway: annual review for 1964”, Hancock to Walker, 8 January 1965, BNA, FO 491/31. 100. Ibid. 101. Harold Wilson, The Labour Government 1964–1970: A Personal Record (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971), 171.

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102. Background briefs before Gerhardsen’s visit to Britain 2–5 February 1965, 25 January 1965, NNA, FOA 1960–1969, 11.7.22. 103. Ibid. 104. Minutes of meeting between Callaghan, Jay and Gerhardsen 3 February 1965, Norwegian London embassy to Foreign Ministry, 2 March 1965, NNA, FOA 1960–1969, 11.7.22. 105. Scott to Stewart, 14 April 1966, BNA, FO 491/13. 106. “Norway: annual review for 1968”, Brenchley to Stewart, 6 January 1969, BNA, FO 491/31. 107. Lange’s account to the Storting’s Contact Committee for market questions, 4 February 1963, NNA, FOA 1960–1969, 36.6.84. 108. Gowland, Turner, and Wright, Britain and European Integration, 63– 66. 109. Lynton J. Robins, The Reluctant Party: Labour and the EEC, 1961–1975 (Ormskirk: Hesketh, 1979), 58. 110. Callaghan, The Labour Party, 269. 111. Gowland, Turner, and Wright, Britain and European Integration, 65. 112. Jonathan Hollowell, “From Commonwealth to European Integration,” in Britain Since 1945, ed. Jonathan Hollowell (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 74–75. 113. Callaghan, The Labour Party, 269. 114. Helen Parr, “Gone Native: The Foreign Office and Harold Wilson’s Policy Towards the EEC, 1964–67,” in Harold Wilson and European Integration. Britain’s Second Application to Join the EEC, ed. Oliver J. Daddow (London and New York: Routledge, 2016). 115. Willy Brandt, My Life in Politics (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1992), 420. 116. Helen Parr, Britain’s Policy Towards the European Community: Harold Wilson and Britain’s World Role, 1964–1967 (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 7–8. 117. May, Britain and Europe, 41. 118. Olav Garnvik, “EF-stridens Ensomme Vandrer,” in Per Borten: Omdiskutert og Avholdt, ed. Torbjørn Greipsland (Oslo: Cultura, 1984), 110. My translation. 119. Bjørn Unneberg, Per Borten: Bonde og Statsmann, 2nd ed. (Oslo: Cappelen, 1998), 135. 120. Minutes of meeting in London 8 March 1967, Norwegian London embassy to Foreign Ministry, 13 March 1967, NNA, FOA 1960–1969, 11.7.22. 121. Callaghan, The Labour Party, 269. 122. Gowland, Turner, and Wright, Britain and European Integration, 69. 123. Stated by Minister of Commerce Kåre Willoch, records of meeting with Brown and Lyng, 15 August 1967, BNA, FCO 9/698.

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124. “Europe”, Foreign Office brief made for Secretary of State’s visit to Oslo 14–16 August 1967, BNA, FCO 9/697. 125. Ibid. 126. UK Bonn embassy to Brown, 1 August 1967, BNA, FCO 9/692. 127. “European integration”, speech by Michael Stewart in Copenhagen 14 May 1968, BNA, FCO 9/276. 128. Memorandum by Brown, 23 February 1968, BNA, CAB 129/136. 129. In 1967, the EEC, Euratom and the ECSC were merged into the European Community, sometimes referred to as the European Communities. 130. “The Approach to Europe”, memorandum by Brown, 28 November 1967, BNA, CAB 129/134. 131. “United Kingdom Policy towards EFTA”, brief by the European Integration Department (FCO), 29 November 1968, BNA, FCO 30/7345. 132. “Norway: annual review for 1969”, Brenchley to Stewart, 16 January 1970, BNA, FCO 33/1259. 133. Stewart to the President of the Board of Trade, 11 December 1968, BNA, PREM 13/2627. 134. President of the Board of Trade to Stewart, 18 December 1968, BNA, PREM 13/2627. 135. The Foreign Office merged with the Commonwealth Office in October 1968. 136. “Britain in EFTA”, brief by John Robinson, 4 December 1968, BNA, FCO 30/345. 137. “Norway: annual review for 1968”, Brenchley to Stewart, 6 January 1969, BNA, FO 491/31. 138. Olav Riste, Norway’s Foreign Relations —A History (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2001), 243. 139. Norway’s Paris ambassador to Foreign Ministry, 14 February 1969; and Norway’s ambassador to NATO, 11 February 1969, NNA, FOA 1960– 1969, 34.1/2. 140. “Nordic Union”, minute by the FCO, 7 February 1969, BNA, BT 11/6968. 141. Alistair H. Thomas, “The Concept of the Nordic Region and the Parameters of Nordic Cooperation,” in The European Union and the Nordic Countries, ed. Lee Miles (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 22. On reasons for the failure of Nordek see also Lasse Sonne, “NORDEK: A Plan for Increased Nordic Economic Co-operation and Integration 1968–1970” (PhD thesis, University of Helsinki, 2007). 142. Minutes of talks between Stewart and Lyng in London 10 April 1969, BNA, FCO 33/827. 143. FCO to UK Oslo Embassy, 16 January 1969, BNA, FCO 30/257. 144. FCO to UK Oslo Embassy, 19 January 1968, BNA, FCO 9/702. 145. Wilson said this to the Swedish prime minister in Stockholm 5 July 1969, BNA, PREM 13/2974.

CHAPTER 5

Successful EC Negotiations—Unsuccessful Referendum, 1970–1972

Will the French spin out the negotiations and see them break down or not?1

This question, posed by a West German foreign office civil servant, was frequently asked before and during the 1970–1972 European Community accession negotiations. Even though de Gaulle had been replaced as French President and the Community as a whole had signalled a positive attitude to enlargement, it was uncertain whether Britain and Norway, together with Denmark and Ireland, could reach agreement with the Six. Similarly, domestic ratification could turn out to be an even higher hurdle to climb for the British and Norwegian governments. This chapter has a narrower focus than the others: it covers a shorter time span and deals solely with European integration.2 First it examines the negotiation motives of the three cabinets involved, the Heath government in London and two different Oslo governments. What were their main reasons for applying, finalising the negotiations and advocating accession? Then the strategies and tactics of the governments are discussed. How did the UK-Norwegian power asymmetry affect their approaches? Subsequently, the most important negotiation issues for each of the countries are explained and discussed. On one of them, fisheries, Britain and Norway had conflicting interests. Finally, the chapter will analyse the domestic debates, both among political parties and the general © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 G. K. Almlid, Britain and Norway in Europe Since 1945, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61473-7_5

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public. There were many similarities but also vital differences that directly impacted the fate of the countries’ membership attempts.

Motives for Applying Britain A few months after the EC’s Hague summit in December 1969, at which a positive attitude towards enlargement was conveyed, UK Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart informed the House of Commons on the British application: “it stands, we press it, we desire that negotiations should be opened, we are anxious that they should succeed”.3 The Wilson government made the preparations, but right before negotiations were to begin in the summer of 1970, Edward Heath and the Tories surprisingly won the general election. Heath was a fundamental supporter of the idea of a closely integrated Europe with Britain playing a central role. He had wanted the UK to join the ECSC in the 1950s and had eagerly headed the EEC negotiations in 1961–1963. After de Gaulle’s first veto he was determined that “we must not turn our backs on Europe”.4 Indeed, he did not; leading the UK into the EC was one of his highest priorities. With Heath in Downing Street the drive to join became much stronger than had been the case for the more ambivalent Wilson. Roy Denman, a member of the British negotiation delegation, is categorical: “had Wilson won the election, negotiations for entry would have failed”.5 Wilson increasingly criticised Heath for being too enthusiastic about Europe, comparing him to “a submissive spaniel”.6 An exaggeration of course, but realising Heath’s personal eagerness is important in order to understand the UK negotiations. The Heath government’s key argument for EC membership was political. Heath had long realised Britain’s loss of power and deemed that the only way to play a principal role internationally was to join the EC and contribute to it developing into a global actor. In May 1971, for example, he argued to the Commons that he envisaged “a Europe which, by its unity, will be of a size and nature and in an equal position with the United States, Japan or the Soviet Union”.7 Heath thus put less emphasis on the two other traditional circles of British foreign policy. The importance of the Commonwealth had been rapidly decreasing, and he even regarded it as “an irritant”.8 Regarding the USA and the Atlantic circle,

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Heath’s “lukewarm attitude towards the ‘special relationship’ was greater than any prime minister after the war”.9 Yet the Heath government did not intend to create a third security policy option by entering the EC—the main emphasis was still put on the Americans in this area. The government also saw benefits in economic terms. UK economic growth had been slower than the EC since the introduction of the Common Market.10 Membership would provide exporters duty-free access to the large European market. A White Paper of July 1971 said about the EC: “there is no alternative grouping which could offer us the same opportunities to improve our economic performance”.11 The prospect of not joining was presented in grim terms: “within a single generation we should have renounced our imperial past and rejected a European future”.12 Norway In June 1970 the Storting once again decided to follow Britain’s lead on European integration. Similar to 1962 and 1967, the application was not a result of a strong public desire or a fundamental attraction to the European project among many MPs. Had it not been for the UK application, Norway would have remained passive. The first part of the negotiations was carried out by a four party conservative/centre coalition government, who had been in power since 1965. But the parties had conflicting views on European integration. Only the Conservative Party matched Heath’s enthusiasm. As many as 85% of the parties’ voters were positive in the 1972 referendum.13 Benefits for the large export industry sector comprised the main argument. The Norwegian economy was highly dependent on exports; in 1969 exports constituted about 40% of the GNP.14 Prime Minister Borten and his Centre Party were the most unenthusiastic, and after the government resigned in February 1971, that party soon became the political core of the anti-EC movement. As many as 94% of its voters said “no” in the referendum, more than any other political party.15 Their key concern was the role of the primary sectors. The two smaller government parties were more divided but for the most part reluctant. Borten agreed to apply for membership to avoid a government collapse, as discussed in the previous chapter. The EC issue effectively broke the Borten government, which was replaced by Labour and Trygve Bratteli as prime minister. The new

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government was in charge of the most important segments of the negotiations. Bratteli is characterised as a “strongly pro-European prime minister”.16 The leadership view was clear: neither NORDEK nor EFTA without Britain was enough politically or economically, and the party programme explicitly stated that Norway should join the EC.17 Labour had the same arguments for membership as the Conservative Party. Dutyfree access to the extended EC, which would take approximately 75% of Norway’s exports, was highly beneficial.18 There were also political arguments. EC membership was a logical consequence of Norway’s existing Western links.19 The 1970 Davignon Report demonstrated that the EC had ambitions to unite politically,20 and some worried that Norway would be cut off from important political consultations and that it would negatively affect Norwegian NATO membership. But security policy turned out to be of marginal importance in the referendum campaign; it was not mentioned in the White Paper of 1972 in which the government proposed Norwegian EC membership.21 The Views of the Six The Five favoured British membership in principle.22 The four least powerful members, Italy and the Benelux, often felt neglected and poorly treated, especially by the French. They hoped that the UK would be a counterweight to the leadership of Paris and Bonn.23 West Germany wanted Britain inside the community to strengthen Western unity against the Soviet Union, and as for all Six, it was an important trading partner and could help them pay for the costly CAP.24 The Germans thus tried to assist Britain’s accession efforts, but this was played down when it threatened to jeopardise their relations with France or challenge important Community principles. Pompidou’s France was more favourable towards UK membership than de Gaulle’s. Fears of a future strong Germany, both economically and politically, were a key concern. Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann was “disturbed by the position of preponderance which the German Government was acquiring in the EEC”.25 Moreover, Chancellor Brandt’s Ostpolitik demonstrated increasing international political aspirations. Pompidou considered that UK membership would offer “a healthy counterweight to increasing German dominance”.26 Nevertheless, negative attitudes towards British membership remained in France. Christopher Soames, the UK Paris ambassador, commented

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about Pompidou that he “has never been—and is not now—enthusiastic about our entry”.27 And France held the key to UK membership. There are numerous examples of how the French chose the most rigid stance against Britain in the negotiations. They wanted to maximise national interests by squeezing as much as possible out of the eager-to-join British. But the tough approach was also based on a more underlying attitude. William Nield, Cabinet Secretary and head of the official Euro Committee in Whitehall, argued in 1971: “all the evidence show that the Élysée and the Quai d’Orsay still retain the Gaullist feeling, almost neurosis, that we are not sufficiently European, and will seek to anglicise and weaken the Community from inside it”.28 Whether this French feeling was a fair assessment, in the light of Britain’s 47 years of membership, must be up to the reader to decide. Opinions about Norwegian membership varied within the EC—mainly between West Germany and France. Brandt had close personal relations to Norway, from living there for many years and being married to a Norwegian woman. He was a strong supporter of the country joining and argued that the Community should offer Norway special arrangements.29 Thorvald Stoltenberg, the Foreign Ministry State Secretary in the Bratteli government, claims that France did not really want Norway as a member.30 This was based on a fear that it would tilt the balance within the EC towards the north, and it was expected that Norway would align more with West Germany and Britain than France. However, this view has been characterised as a conspiracy theory.31 What certainly is a fact, though, is that France as a principle did not allow permanent special exemptions from EC rules, which was a key element of Norway’s negotiation strategies. There was some concern among NATO countries that failure to join the EC could lead Norway towards neutrality. In Whitehall it was considered that “there would be a danger that Norway might be drawn into some new orbit”.32 Brandt feared that Norway “would move in a neutralist direction on the Finnish model”, and argued that Norwegians “needed encouragement from London”.33 The FCO agreed that the risk could not be totally ignored, “unlikely as it seems to us”.34 It suggested an invitation to Norway’s foreign minister, which “might do something to get it across to the Norwegians that, whether or not their application for membership in the Common Market succeeded, they have friends in this country”.35 However, these fears had little foothold in the actual views and considerations that dominated Norwegian politics. None of the major parties wanted to drift away from NATO membership, regardless of EC membership.

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Negotiation Tactics Britain The Heath government wanted to avoid the negotiations getting bogged down in details as in 1961–1963. Nield wrote to Heath: “the longer the negotiations drag on, the less their prospect of success; the will to succeed is eroded, positions harden, differences multiply and the whole process is brought into public disrepute”.36 The government was eager to get started as soon as possible in the light of the next general election. The European issue was controversial both within the parties and among the public, and it would be useful to remove it as a future election campaign topic.37 The government therefore wanted to “break the back of the negotiations” before the summer of 1971.38 This tactic involved significant risks. The Six could think that Britain was willing to join at virtually any price. The central UK negotiation ministers pointed out that they should “dispel any impression that, because the British Government saw no alternative to entering the EEC, they were likely to be prepared to accept any terms that might be demanded of them”.39 However, there was a realisation in Whitehall that pushing for fast negotiations would possibly mean a higher price for joining.40 The French were aware of the Heath government’s problems with public and parliamentary opinion and the pressure this generated for a quick settlement. They often presented tough demands and slowed down the progress in order to put further pressure on Britain.41 The quick negotiations tactic was also risky with respect to domestic politics. The public could get the impression that the government was too eager to join the EC and would thus be willing to accept unsatisfactory terms. In the Cabinet it was agreed that they needed to strike a balance between demonstrating goodwill towards the EC and “the need to avoid allowing domestic public opinion to suppose that we were adopting an approach to the negotiations which was too enthusiastic and insufficiently hard-headed”.42 As a measure to reach a quick solution, the UK government unconditionally accepted all existing EC polices and treaties, the acquis communautaire. Heath acknowledged that this was the price they had to pay in order to avail themselves of the benefits of joining the Community, and that making unreasonable demands would only undermine their negotiating position.43 The UK negotiations were therefore about special

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arrangements in a transition phase, not permanently. Heath’s most important objective was to gain entry, on the assumption that he could then deal with problems from the inside.44 Nonetheless, progress in the negotiations was slow for a long time. But after Heath met with Pompidou in May 1971, the main UK issues were agreed upon in the following month. May describes this as “arguably Heath’s greatest diplomatic triumph”.45 What was clarified at the meeting, in Pompidou’s eyes anyway, was that the British were “true Europeans” and that they did not intend to work as an agent for the Americans. This had been the crucial point for the French president, and ensuring him on exactly this had been Heath’s main objective.46 Norway The basic approach of the Borten government was to go slow—a method to shove their internal differences under the carpet as long as possible. This government took a long time formulating their negotiation proposals and did not get into substantial negotiations before stepping down. This hesitant approach also made sense in a larger perspective. The EC, Britain and Norway agreed that the UK should begin first this time as well.47 If British negotiations failed again, Norwegian membership was highly unlikely. Norway also hoped that going after the UK could give better terms since the EC then could more easily offer special arrangements without creating a precedence for the others.48 But this could also have the reverse effect if the EC used the British terms as an excuse not to offer Norway a better deal. In addition to stalling, the Borten government had a reluctant attitude during the months it negotiated. Its opening statement for the negotiations on 30 June 1970 irritated many EC representatives; it did not unconditionally state that Norway accepted the Treaty of Rome and listed several strict demands for special treatment. The foreign minister of the Netherlands, Joseph Luns, for instance, expressed that he liked all the opening statements, except the Norwegian one.49 A prominent Dutch official said that “if the British had given such a statement, we would not even have opened the negotiations”.50 This tough, and unrealistic approach, left the successor with little room to manoeuvre.51 The Bratteli government was stuck between a rock and hard place—between the EC and domestic pressure. It had to propose solutions that could form a basis for further negotiations or it would

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alienate the Six and make membership impossible. But the Norwegian primary sectors pushed for tough demands. The government thus needed to fight hard in Brussels, or at least create the impression domestically that they were doing so. In the cabinet it was commented that “one should manoeuvre oneself into a situation which involves drama, in order to give the Norwegian people an impression that this is something one has fought for”.52 On the whole, the Norwegian tactic was not particularly successful. Norway received no significant special arrangements for its agriculture or fisheries, at least not in the eyes of the electorate. Then again, finding a more successful tactic was difficult, if not impossible. Arguably, the distance between the Six and the Norwegian primary sectors was unbridgeable.

Negotiation Issues Britain The leader of the British civil service negotiation delegation, Con O’Neill, identified four issues as the most important.53 Caribbean sugar and New Zealand dairy products were problematic because EC membership involved a phasing out of Commonwealth preferences. Fisheries, rather surprisingly, became the most controversial issue in domestic politics (this will be discussed below in connection with Norway and fisheries). The fourth and most vital issue was UK contributions to the EC budget. When this was settled it represented a breakthrough in the negotiations. But budget contributions would continue to be controversial over Britain’s entire membership period. It was important when Wilson renegotiated the entry terms in 1974, Thatcher fought hard in the 1980s to get the country’s “money back” and it played a role in the Brexit debate. This issue will be discussed in-depth here. The main purpose of the EC budget was to fund the CAP and protect European farmers—and the regulations were unfavourable to Britain, which looked to become the largest net contributor. The UK would receive less from the budget than other member states. The Six had decided that about 90% of the EC’s funds were to be allocated to agriculture, and the majority of this to the exporting sector. Importantly, Britain had modest agriculture exports compared to France and the Netherlands. The UK contributions would be high due to extensive agricultural imports from outside the EC; importing from the Commonwealth was

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cheaper. But products imported from outside the Common Market would be met by tariffs, and about 90% of these would be transferred to the EC budget.54 This would further damage the already negative British balance of payments. Despite the 1967 devaluation, its exports were in 1970 almost £1 billion lower than imports.55 The Treasury was particularly concerned inside Whitehall.56 If the UK managed to get its balances in order before joining the EC, the Treasury considered, “it would be disheartening, to say the least, if we had once again to go ‘into the red’”.57 Since altering the rules of the Common Market had been ruled out, the main objective for the Heath government was to establish as low contributions as possible in a transition phase.58 All the intricacies, tough rhetoric and different methods of calculating the contributions and receipts were essentially about one simple matter: the Six wanted to squeeze as much money out of Britain as possible, and conversely, London wanted to hand over as little as possible. Indeed, during the transition period, whatever amount the UK contributed would reduce proportionately what the Six had to pay into the budget. The FCO concluded that even the friendliest among the Six were “determined to extract the maximum economic advantage”.59 The budget issue was settled in June 1971. UK net contributions would be much larger than proposed in the Heath government’s opening bid of December 1970. Britain failed to convince the Six that it needed much time to adapt to membership. The Heath government’s conciliatory approach in Brussels was criticised. The Labour Party argued that the government “knuckled under completely” in the crucial months of the negotiations.60 Also neutral observers have been critical. Moravcsik and Vachudova, for example, label the UK entry terms as “strikingly unfavorable”.61 Still, it would have been difficult to strike a better deal. The CAP and its funding via the Community budget was regarded as the EC’s greatest success, and there was little interest in changing it for new members. Importantly, Britain needed the Common Market more than the Six needed Britain. Norway Agriculture and fisheries were the most important Norwegian negotiation issues. Norway’s agriculture system clashed head-on with the CAP. It had for decades been protected from foreign competition and was highly dependent on state subsidies and price regulation.62 The small and

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inefficient farms, operating in harsh climatic conditions, would lose to EC competition. The farmers’ organisations insisted that Norway should have permanent special arrangements. This mattered politically because the Norwegian primary sector had a strong position in domestic politics. Archer claims that it “held a sway among voters and politicians out of all proportion to their importance in the country’s economic life”.63 Consequently, both Norwegian governments demanded exemptions from the CAP rules, in particular Borten. The Bratteli government wanted to make the export industry the main topic in the domestic debates, rather than agriculture and fisheries.64 This failed. The EC refused to give Norway permanent exemptions on agriculture. The question was hence how much the Norwegian government ultimately would compromise. When the terms were settled in December 1971, Bratteli stated that they were much better than he had expected.65 The most influential farmers’ organisation, on the other hand, argued that it “will erase the last twenty years of development in Norwegian agriculture”.66 It would probably have been impossible to get a deal that would have been satisfactory for the Norwegian farmers. The British Oslo ambassador considered that they “would reject whatever terms emerged— even if allowed to write the settlement themselves, they would still have denounced it”.67 Fisheries were even more difficult. Britain and Denmark were also considerable fisheries nations, but Norway was the biggest—catching more fish than the EC combined.68 Tariff-free access to the undersupplied European markets was an attractive prospect. However, when the Six introduced their Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) on the same day as the accession negotiations began, it stirred negative reactions—Borten described it as a “cold shower”.69 In the CFP, fishermen from all member states would have equal access to all Community waters. This would mean that Norwegian fishermen would lose their exclusive rights in the fish-rich waters within 12 miles of the coast. Norway’s fleet was also less modern and efficient than foreign vessels, and its fishermen were subsidised in ways that would not be allowed in the EC. Many Norwegians shared the view of a West German newspaper that the Six’s rush to set up the CFP was like a “gang of boys who want to share between them the marbles that someone else is bringing”.70 The Borten government argued that Norwegian waters should be exempted from the CFP. Going for anything less, a cabinet minister

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considered, was “deadly dangerous …, not least due to increasing resistance against EC membership”.71 This proved futile, the Six would not accept such an opt-out. But the Bratteli government could easily be seen as soft among Norwegian voters if they sought solutions more within the main principles of the EC.72 It added to the problem that most fishermen, particularly in the north, were Labour voters. In northern Norway, about 40% of the population depended upon coastal fisheries for their incomes.73 The Bratteli government made several attempts at finding solutions that in effect would secure Norwegian fishermen’s exclusive rights, but the Six refused. And domestic pressure increased— The National Fishermen’s Association unanimously voted in October 1971 to terminate the negotiations.74 The situation became even more difficult since Britain and Norway increasingly were at odds with each other over the fisheries issue. In November 1971 it was clear that the EC would allow a ten-year transition phase with continued national sovereignty in coastal waters. The Five were even open to a solution proposed by the UK government, that this should continue beyond ten years unless the enlarged EC decided to change or end the arrangement.75 That would effectively entail a veto right for each member against losing its exclusive rights to fish. But this was unacceptable for France. The UK government realised that this was a dead-end, and the overriding concern now was “not to suffer serious delay to our whole timetable for signature”.76 The British government put pressure on Norway to settle. In a letter to Bratteli, Heath expressed that if the Norwegian government did not give up its strict demands, he feared that pressure on the UK and the other candidates to try to reach agreement independently without Norway, “will become very strong”.77 However, this had little effect, other than creating some resistance to Britain among Norwegians after the letter was leaked to the press. The Heath government, together with Denmark and Ireland, therefore, settled with the Six. They accepted that the special arrangements would continue only if all members agreed that they would. This effectively concluded their entire negotiations. In the month that the Bratteli government negotiated alone, Whitehall was faced with a dilemma. Norwegian EC membership was generally regarded as desirable, and Britain did not want to risk having the main responsibility for a termination of Norway’s negotiations.78 On the other hand, they could not be seen to have negotiated a worse deal than Norway. Certainly, the fisheries industry was of minor importance to

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the UK economy.79 But its inshore fishermen, who also disliked the CFP, were well organised, popular among the public and thus carried increasing political weight.80 They would not accept inferior solutions to their Norwegian colleagues. O’Neill considered that “the question of fisheries was economic peanuts but political dynamite”.81 Heath expressed to his negotiation minister that “it would be intolerable in terms of public opinion here if Norway were to achieve a better result than we had achieved”.82 This was also related to the fact that British trawlers had lost access to Norwegian waters in the previous decades, as discussed in previous chapters. The UK government therefore informed the EC that it would not accept Norway being given special protection while EC fishermen were allowed to fish in British waters.83 In the end, Norway received an exclusive “political guarantee” in the form of a special protocol that outlined that the Community would in 1982 take particular account of the special situation for Norway in the area of fisheries.84 So it all boiled down to a matter of trust. How much should they believe in a political statement of intent on an issue ten years in the future? The head of the Norwegian negotiation delegation argued: “this is in our opinion a watertight guarantee”.85 Prime Minister Bratteli contended that “the morally binding statement which is given goes longer than any other political document in the EC”.86 However, the fisheries minister, Knut Hoem, was apparently unable to put much trust in the Europeans. He argued in the cabinet that “even if one should show confidence in other countries, due to the French attitude one should not be too blue-eyed”.87 A few days later Hoem resigned from the cabinet. This hurt the Labour government as well as the entire pro-EC movement in the referendum campaign. Jacobsen sums it up aptly: “Hoem was the hero along the coast, and the crook in the Labour Party”.88 The FCO concluded that in essence the Norwegian review clause was not significantly better than what the British had achieved.89 But they acknowledged that it would cause them some presentational difficulties domestically. What was a fact, no matter how the candidate governments tried to portray it, was that the exemptions from the CFP were only temporary: after ten years there would be a revision, and unless all ten members voted for a new transition period, the CFP had to be implemented completely by all members. Probably the most accurate assessment was made unofficially by a French diplomat to a UK minister: “The offer to the Norwegians was in essence no more than had

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been agreed for the other applicants. But it offered them the feeling of something extra”.90

Public Opinion and Ratification Britain A referendum on EC accession would have been counter to UK tradition and was categorically dismissed by both Heath and Wilson.91 Lord points to prime minister Heath’s elitist beliefs: foreign policy should be based on expert opinion, not on the uninformed public’s notion of the national interest.92 Heath did, however, state in a speech in May 1970 that entry would not happen “without the full-hearted consent of parliament and the people”.93 It is debatable whether he received this from the British voters. Nonetheless, the matter was to be decided in the House of Commons. There was significant opposition among the British public. An opinion poll in 1970 revealed that only 19% favoured EC entry, and 63% opposed.94 A White Paper on membership in February 1970 contributed to this negative attitude, particularly the expected rise in food prices. Personal economic ramifications comprised the strongest argument among Britons.95 Negative effects for the Commonwealth and loss of sovereignty were also important. Yet public opposition was not deep-rooted. EC membership was not rated among the most important political issues; in April 1971 only four per cent of voters considered the Common Market as the most urgent problem facing the country.96 It was also difficult to get a grasp on the economic effects membership would have for Britain. The issue simply “seemed remote from the daily lives of the average British citizen”.97 This made it easier to swing the public. By late autumn 1971 a majority supported membership. The breakthrough in the negotiations and the subsequent government information campaign probably influenced the general public. Moreover, the Labour Party was unable to muster a strong force against membership. It also mattered that the British press were primarily pro-membership. Only the Daily Express among the larger dailies opposed. It did, however, provide headlines that would become typical of the UK press in later decades, such as: “Pompidou may call this a marriage. The British people call it a life sentence”.98 Moreover, the vast majority of businesses eagerly

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supported membership. In a Guardian survey in July 1971 among the 500 largest UK companies, 87% replied that EC membership was good for the country.99 The Trade Union Congress (TUC), on the other hand, had gone from support in the 1960s to dismissing the terms negotiated by the Heath government. However, it was divided on this issue, so there was also a Trade Union Committee for Europe. The most wide-ranging opposition interest group was the Common Market Safeguards Campaign, which was founded in 1969. Keep Britain Out, another anti-movement, was not taken as seriously due to its many publicity stunts. The European Movement was active on the pro-side. The balance of the campaigns was unequal: the anti-side consisted of considerably smaller and economically weaker bodies. Kitzinger argues that if it had been any more unequal, it “would have thrown grave doubt on the vitality of the British democracy”.100 However, the primary objective for these groups was not to persuade the public, although naturally important, but to secure support in the House of Commons.101 Heath used dramatic words when he concluded in the EC Commons debate in October 1971: “… tonight when this House endorses this Motion many millions of people right across the world will rejoice that we have taken our rightful place in a truly United Europe”.102 Many Conservatives liked the free-market principles of the EC and many also supported the view of Heath and the FCO that joining had important political benefits. One Tory MP expressed: “I believe that it would be in the interests of this country to join the EEC whatever the terms”.103 Moreover, when Labour increasingly moved towards an anti-stance, it made the issue one of party politics and party loyalties. Among the Conservatives rank and file, however, there was significant opposition. In February 1971 an opinion poll revealed that 54% of Tory supporters opposed entry and only 34% were in favour.104 The most visible and outspoken of the Conservative anti-MPs was Enoch Powell, but he and his circle were marginalised due to their rather extreme views and accusations of racist tendencies. Nonetheless, many of the mainstream party members shared their anti-EC views, typically older people who were concerned about British loss of sovereignty. The Tories had also traditionally been the party of the Empire, and a segment of the party frowned upon a reorientation towards Europe.105 The Commons vote on UK entry in October 1971 demonstrated the party divisions. The government won relatively comfortably by 356 to 244 votes. But as many as 41 Tory MPs (two of whom abstained) opposed their own government.

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The Labour Party had been ambivalent and divided on Europe during the 1960s. The centre and right of the party was predominantly pro-membership. The left side regarded the EC as fundamentally capitalistic, established to contain the spread of socialism.106 Nevertheless, the Labour government had renewed Britain’s membership application twice. During most of the accession negotiations, it was problematic for Wilson to categorically oppose the Heath government’s strategies because they were initiated by his own government. But Wilson’s criticism grew stronger in the final stages, and from the summer of 1971 the Labour leadership opposed entry and called for a general election. An overriding concern for Wilson was to keep the party together, and whatever view that eventually was chosen was not necessarily that important. Ultimately, it was regarded as the safest option to oppose their primary political opponent. However, Wilson’s rather passive attitude in the first year of opposition provided room for those who supported membership. In May 1971 one hundred Labour MPs signed a pro-EC advertisement in The Guardian, including the two leading figures Roy Jenkins and Anthony Crosland. Bitterness and deep rifts plagued the Labour Party. In the end, as many as 69 members voted in favour of the government’s terms (and 20 abstained). Pro-Europeans risked being physically assaulted, and “fascist bastard” was shouted at Jenkins.107 The European question had become a controversial issue for both parties. One in five MPs voted against their leaders in October 1971, a Common’s rebellion not seen since the war. The issue transcended traditional party lines—and has ever since. Norway In 1962 the Labour Party had decided that membership should be put to a national referendum, which would be the fifth held in Norway since 1905. For any government after that, not allowing the voters a direct say on the issue was out of the question. The referendum was in principle only advisory, but it was expected that MPs would respect the result. In September 1972, 53% of Norwegians voted “no”, and the matter was settled. The anti-Europeans often described the supporters of EC membership as “the establishment”. The majority of business organisations within industry, trade, craftsmanship, forestry, banks, insurance and shipping

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wanted Norway to join. These groups highlighted the expected benefits for the export industry.108 A large majority of government officials also supported membership.109 Ikonomou discusses how officials in the Foreign Ministry took an active role in the referendum debate.110 But this convinced few, and probably antagonised many more. Moreover, about 80–90% of the national press were in the yes camp.111 Gleditsch and Hellevik comment that “the distance between the press and public opinion was enormous on the EC issue”.112 While the rank and file of the Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions was divided,113 the leadership wanted membership, emphasising in particular the export industry. However, albeit crucial to the national income, this sector did not contribute much to employment compared to low productive sectors such as agriculture and labour-intensive industry and services producing for the domestic markets.114 Moreover, the economic arguments, which were the most prominent for yes-voters, were less effective since the Norwegian economy was so strong. Economic growth had been among the highest in Europe in the 1960s and unemployment was low. In 1970 Norway was “a prosperous industrial economy with one of the world’s highest per capita incomes”.115 The “establishment” thesis is further supported by the fact that the two major parties, Labour and the Conservatives, advocated membership. But the issue was difficult for Labour. The majority of the party leaders and parliamentarians were pro-membership (in the 1970 Storting vote 67 out of 74 MPs supported EC negotiations). But the grass-roots level was split. Forty-four per cent of Labour voters said “no” in the referendum.116 They feared that membership would entail surrendering national control over budgets and taxation policy and threaten the welfare state. And as we have seen, the fisheries issue was important for many Labour voters. These internal divisions forced Labour leaders to adopt a passive approach in opposition, out of concern for alienating large parts of their voters. This gave the anti-side room to build support without much interruption. The leaders did not come out fully in favour of membership until they had finalised the Brussels negotiations in January 1972. These tactical considerations, together with Bratteli’s somewhat reserved personality, made the party less of a driving force towards Europe than many EC supporters had hoped. The anti-Europeans were a diverse group that had little in common apart from their dislike of the EC. For some this stand was related

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to general sentiments in the Western World at that time, such as antiestablishmentarianism, pro-Marxism and international solidarity. They regarded the EC as a capitalistic force that would increase social differences. It was thus no surprise that 92% of the Socialist Party’s voters voted “no”.117 Another pattern was young people’s “no” preference. Only one of the six political parties’ youth organisations supported membership (Young Conservatives). However, opposition was also common among older people with higher education, such as a majority of university professors. Hence, the British ambassador was correct when arguing, confidentially, that “it was not as The Times said, that every thinking Norwegian voted ‘yes’”.118 Nevertheless, the clearest pattern was that the Norwegian EC issue was a centre-periphery conflict.119 Among people in sparsely populated areas only 28% voted “yes” in the referendum and 59% in urban areas.120 Norway was traditionally a rural-oriented country. For example, since 1945 the Storting had agreed that farmers’ incomes should be pegged with the average wage of industrial workers. So despite urbanisation, in 1970 slightly more than a third of Norwegians lived in communities with less than 200 inhabitants.121 A main anti-EC argument for the rural population was the perceived threat to fisheries and agriculture.122 The challenges for the primary sectors were part of the all-important issue of sovereignty. This was essential in all social classes and regions of Norway.123 Handing over national sovereignty was anathema to many in light of the country’s short history of independence and the memory of German occupation. Key anti-EC slogans were “Stop the sale of Norway” and “No to Union”. EC supporters dismissed this as an extreme exaggeration and fear-mongering by the anti-side. They pointed out that representatives from small EC nations expressed that their interests were not ignored by the Community, and that the 1966 Luxembourg compromise showed that the national level trumped the supranational. The government also argued that Norway should join to be part of shaping the new Europe. But these arguments held little sway. Most Norwegians thought that the views of “little Norway” would not make much difference and the country would be better off alone. Britain’s Oslo ambassador had a point when comparing Norwegians to Danes: they “are just not as European… and more nationalistic, more self-reliant, more introspective and more suspicious of foreigners at large”.124

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Domestic Pressure and the Different Paths Chosen Why did Britain and Norway go separate European ways in 1973? In both countries the establishment supported membership: the bulk of parliament, the central administration civil service, business and trade unions, financial interests, the press and, initially, the biggest political parties. The first answer is stronger opposition in Norway, the second is that the UK political landscape at this particular time was shaped for EC entry. For a foreign-policy matter, the EC issue put unusually strong domestic pressure on the governments. Membership would affect many aspects of citizens’ lives and to an extent that probably had not been experienced before. This therefore opened for the participation of interest groups and the general public—the European issue is a typical example of pluralistic foreign policy-making. Membership also had so many consequences that it naturally divided larger political parties. The opposition to membership in Norway was significantly more vocal, visible and deep-rooted, and the EC debate stirred up the entire country in a more extreme fashion than in the UK. The anti-EC groups in Britain did not match the mobilisation of support and influence on public debate achieved by their Norwegian counterparts. The pro-marketeers had more money, and the information campaigns of the British European Movement and the government overwhelmed the efforts of the anti-EC side. The Norwegian anti-EC movement was much better organised, more pro-active and possessed substantial financial resources. It received considerable funds from the primary sector unions, for example. The People’s Movement against EC membership, with their 130,000 members and 500 local committees dominated in getting their arguments across on the grass-roots level. They constantly put pressure on the governments and demanded on several occasions that the Brussels negotiations should be terminated. The different ratification methods had an effect on the accession negotiations and subsequently the decision on whether or not to join. The referendum lurked in the background for the Oslo governments throughout the negotiations, creating an almost impossible situation. Public interest increased because people could vote directly on the issue, and the no-side consistently remained strongest in Gallup polls. In Britain, public opposition mattered less because the main battles would take place in parliament. The British government had more room to manoeuvre in Brussels since the final judgement on the negotiation result was

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more likely to be positive. Despite opposition among Conservative backbenchers, the vote eventually turned out to be fairly plain sailing. From the summer of 1971 there was a swing among Tory MPs towards a more pro-EC stand, not least as a result of strong pressure from the government. It was arguably easier to persuade a small group of MPs compared to a hostile general Norwegian public. The MPs could be pressured more directly with both sticks and carrots, based on party loyalty and future political positions. In the end Heath allowed a free vote, purely as a tactical move as he expected to gain more votes from Labour MPs than the Tory votes lost.125 Had there been a UK referendum, the government would probably have struggled more. Opinion polls were negative during most of 1971. However, one could argue against this supposition by pointing to the 1975 referendum, where as many as 67.2% voted to remain members of the EC. Then again, the British public was by then tired of the whole issue, and people have a tendency to favour the status quo rather than change (a seriously weakened thesis after the 2016 Brexit referendum, of course). What if there had been no referendum in Norway? Its constitution states that a three-quarters parliamentary majority is required to transfer sovereignty to international bodies, as in the case of joining the EC. In June 1971 the Storting rejected the proposal to terminate the negotiations by a majority (only just) larger than that. So, based solely on this fact, Norway would have joined, too, were it not for the referendum. Was stronger public involvement and pressure a result of Norwegians being fundamentally more anti-European than Britons? While it is impossible to give a definitive answer, what was clear in 1970–1972 was that the EC issue was much more important to Norwegians. It surpassed all other political deliberations and was the most divisive issue of the twentieth century. British voters regarded several other political issues as more important. It also seems that Norwegians were more informed on the EC than Britons, possibly as a result of their stronger interest. For example, one UK survey revealed that only 13% of the populace could correctly name all six members of the Community.126 Conversely, as the British Oslo ambassador commented, Norwegian farmers were often “singularly articulate” on the issue, and the level of argument in the distant districts of Norway was a “great deal more sophisticated than the public debate that went on in the UK”.127 This point does not, nonetheless,

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really determine who were the more anti-European. The British newspaper The Times characterised Norwegians in 1972 as “a stubborn and suspicious people separated from other member states [of the EC] by custom and certain ways of life as well as by geography”.128 Perhaps this was correct—and perhaps it was just as applicable to Britons?

Conclusions Two important factors explain why these British negotiations succeeded. First, the EC, more precisely the French, were more open to UK membership. The Community would change fundamentally with Britain inside. With 56 million people, a strong defence and, despite its problems, its large economy, the UK would join France and West Germany at the steering wheel of Western Europe policy-making. Second, the Heath government chose a relatively conciliatory negotiating line in Brussels. The strong desire of the prime minister and the FCO facilitated a deal with the Six. Their main strategy was to accept the Community’s central treaties and obtain satisfactory transitional arrangements. Britain stretched an especially long way on the budget issue. Norway, with a population of four million, modest military capabilities and a smaller economy would change the EC much less. Yet the Norwegian government adopted a tougher negotiation approach than Britain. According to the head of the Norwegian deputy delegation, “delegates from the EC asked whether it was Norway who was entering the EC or the reverse”.129 It was thus not the relative power of these applicants that determined their negotiating approaches and what terms they achieved— big Britain was more relaxed than stubborn and inflexible little Norway. The reasons were rather rooted in domestic politics. The most important was the ratification process. Despite significant public opposition, British negotiators had more leeway in the international negotiations.130 The Norwegian governments were given practically no room for compromise with the EC. There was also a difference in the character of their most problematic issues. It was in the Heath government’s favour that the budget contributions were such a complicated matter that it was unclear what were good or bad terms. The Norwegian governments had a more difficult task convincing voters because the farmers and fishermen would suffer in more obvious ways. Eventually, when the Bratteli government failed to achieve formal permanent exemptions, this failure had critical consequences for Norway’s future in Europe.

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The domestic debate about EC membership in 1970–1972 was fierce in both countries, but more so in Norway. The issue mattered more to Norwegians, at a similar level as Britons’ involvement in the Brexit referendum in 2016. It divided Norway in a number of ways. Retaining sovereignty was the most important argument for the no-voters, whether over farming and fishing or a general national right to self-governance. Sovereignty was also an important issue for Britons, but it played a smaller role. Perhaps it was expected that the UK as a big country would be able to have its way much more than the significantly smaller Norway. Since the 1980s, however, sovereignty has been a critical issue for many British Eurosceptics. September 1972 marked the end of Norway following in Britain’s European footsteps. For the UK it was unfortunate that Norway did not enter the EC, but it was not fundamentally important. For many in Norway parting ways with Britain created insecurity about the country’s future foreign-policy position. Regardless, the two countries now had to build a new European integration relationship.

Notes 1. Von Stein, Michael Jenkins (UK Bonn embassy) to Con O’Neill, 1 April 1971, British National Archives (henceforth BNA), FCO 30/1092. 2. This chapter is partly based on my PhD thesis (Geir K. Almlid, “Negotiating for EC membership, 1970–72: A Comparative Study of the Approach Taken by the British and Norwegian Governments” [PhD thesis, University of East Anglia, 2008]). 3. Parliament Debates (UK), Commons, vol. 796, col. 997, 24 February 1970. 4. Miriam Camps, Britain and the European Community: 1955–1963 (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), 108. 5. Roy Denman, Missed Chances: Britain and Europe in the Twentieth Century (London: Cassel, 1996), 231. 6. Hugo Young, This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair (London: Macmillan, 1998), 221. 7. Parliament Debates (UK), Commons, vol. 818, col. 38, 24 May 1971. 8. Alex May, Britain and Europe Since 1945 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), 47. 9. Sean Greenwood, Britain and European Cooperation Since 1945 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 95. 10. Average GNP increase per year in the period 1960–1970: the Six: 4.2%; the UK: 2.3%(May, Britain and Europe, 41).

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11. UK Government, “The UK and the European Communities,” White Paper, Cmnd 4715, July 1971 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1971), introduction. 12. Ibid. 13. Statistics Norway, The Advisory Referendum on Norway’s Accession to the EC, vol. 2 (Oslo: Statistisk sentralbyrå, 1973), Table 16. 14. Norwegian Government, “Om Norges forhold til de europeiske fellesskap,” White Paper (St.meld.) no. 90, 1970–1971 (Oslo: regjeringen, 1971). 15. Statistics Norway, The Advisory Referendum, Table 16. 16. Olav Riste, Norway’s Foreign Relations —A History (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2001), 244. 17. Rolf Tamnes, Oljealder 1965–1995, vol. 6 of Norsk utenrikspolitisk historie (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1997), 174. 18. “Norway and the European Economic Community”, UK Oslo ambassador Frank Brenchley to Foreign Secretary Stewart, 16 March 1970, BNA, FO 491/11. 19. “Norway’s candidature for membership of the EEC”, Brenchley to Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home, 13 December 1971, BNA, FO 491/11. 20. This report, made by a working group consisting of political advisers of the foreign ministers of the Six, proposed for consultation among EC members on foreign policy matters and the implementation of joint decisions. See also Chapter 6. 21. Norwegian Government, “Om Norges tilslutning til De Europeiske Fellesskap,” White Paper (St.meld.) no. 50 (1971–1972), 10 March 1972. 22. N. Piers Ludlow, “A Short-Term Defeat: The Community Institutions and the Second British Application to Join the EEC,” in Harold Wilson and European Integration: Britain’s Second Application to Join the EEC, ed. Oliver J. Daddow (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 142. 23. Helen Wallace, “Bilateral, Trilateral and Multilateral Negotiations in the European Community,” in Partners and Rivals in Western Europe: Britain, France and Germany, ed. Caroline Bray and Roger Moran (Brookfield: Gower, 1986), 157. 24. N. Piers Ludlow, “Constancy and Flirtation: Germany, Britain, and the EEC, 1956–1972,” in Britain and Germany in Europe 1949–1990, ed. Jeremy Noakes, Peter Wende, and Jonathan Wright (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 95–100. 25. According to Douglas-Home, Cabinet Minutes, 16 July 1970, BNA, CAB 128/47. 26. According to Ambassador Soames in a minute to Denis Greenhill, 21 April 1971, BNA, FCO 33/1576.

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27. Soames to Greenhill, 21 April 1971, BNA, FCO 33/1576. 28. “Meeting on the EEC Negotiations”, Nield, 22 April 1971, BNA, PREM 15/370. 29. Norwegian Foreign Ministry Archive (henceforth NFMA), 44 36/6.84, vol 41. Søren Sommerfelt (Norwegian head negotiator and Bonn ambassador) to Oslo, 21 July 1971. 30. Thorvald Stoltenberg, Det Handler om Mennesker (Oslo: Gyldendal, 2001), 236. 31. David Hannay, Britain’s Entry into the European Community: Report by Sir Con O’Neill on the Negotiations of 1970–70 (Abingdon: Frank Cass, 2000), foreword (xiv). 32. Tickel to Armstrong, 30 June 1971, BNA, PREM 15/356. 33. Unwin (Western European Department, FCO) to UK Oslo embassy, 17 December 1971, referring to UK Bonn embassy talks with Brandt, BNA, FCO 33/1661. 34. Ibid. 35. Ibid. 36. Nield to the Heath, 23 October 1970, BNA, PREM 15/62. 37. Interview with Con O’Neill in The Seventies (Christopher Lord, British Entry to the European Community Under the Heath Government of 1970– 4 (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1993), 65). 38. O’Neill to Geoffrey Rippon (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and minister in charge of the negotiations), 19 October 1970, BNA, FCO 30/732. 39. Minutes of informal discussions on 31 January 1971 between DouglasHome, Rippon, Heath and Chancellor of the Exchequer Anthony Barber, BNA, PREM 15/368. 40. Nield to Heath, 5 March 1971, BNA, PREM 15/368. 41. O’Neill to Soames, 18 March 1971, BNA, FCO 30/1105. 42. Cabinet Minutes, 29 June 1970, BNA, CAB 128/47. 43. Edward Heath, Old World, New Horizons: Britain, the Common Market and the Atlantic Alliance (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 30. 44. Stephen George, Britain and European Integration Since 1945 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), 22. 45. May, Britain and Europe, 50. 46. As advised by Soames in minute to Greenhill, 21 April 1971, BNA, FCO 33/1576. 47. Confirmed Sommerfelt on several occasions to cabinet, e.g. Norwegian National Archives (henceforth NNA), Prime Minister’s Office (henceforth PMO), Cabinet minutes, 15 April 1971. 48. The Norwegian ambassador to the EC (Jahn Halvorsen) received signals about such a solution from his French counterpart, Halvorsen to Foreign Ministry, 30 June 1971, NFMA, 44 36/6.84/40.

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49. In International Herald Tribune (Paris edition), 1 July 1970, quoted in Dagbladet, 2. July 1970. My translation. 50. In Le Monde, 2. July 1970, translated by the Norwegian Paris embassy, Paris to Foreign Ministry, 4 July 1970, NFMA, 44 36/6.84/33. 51. Geir K. Almlid, “Splittelse og Dobbeltspill—Borten- og Bratteliregjeringenes Forhandlinger om EF-medlemskap i 1970–72,” Historisk Tidsskrift 92, no. 2 (2013). 52. Minster of Church and Education Bjartmar Gjerde, Cabinet Minutes, 26 October 1971, NNA, PMO. My translation. 53. Hannay, Britain’s Entry. 54. Alan Milward, “The Hague Conference of 1969 and the United Kingdom’s Accession to the European Economic Community,” Journal of European Integration History 9, no. 2 (2003). 55. Uwe Kitzinger, Diplomacy and Persuasion: How Britain joined the Common Market (London: Thames and Hudson, 1973), 29. 56. Geir K. Almlid, “Bureaucratic Politics on Europe: Inside Whitehall 1970 to 1972,” British Politics. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41293-019-001 28-1. 57. Slater to Owen, 25 February 1971, BNA, T 312/2870, 1971. 58. Decided at the meeting of the Cabinet committee on Europe (AE) on 3 July 1970, BNA, CAB 134/2596. 59. Background brief for Rippon before the Dutch Minister of Agriculture’s visit on 15–16 November 1970, BNA, FCO 30/791. 60. Parliament Debates (UK), Commons, vol. 823, col. 931 (Denis Healey), 21 October 1971. 61. Andrew Moravcsik and Milada Anna Vachudova, “National Interest, State Power and EU Enlargement,” EastEuropean Politics and Society 17, no. 1, 53. 62. Almlid, “Negotiating”, 184–187. 63. Clive Archer, Norway Outside the European Union. Norway and European Integration From 1994 to 2004 (London: Routledge, 2005), 43–44. 64. Cabinet Minutes, 15 April 1971, NNA, PMO. 65. Aftenposten, 17 December 1971. 66. Gudbrandsdølen, 26 April 1972. 67. “Norway’s candidature for membership of the EEC”, Brenchley to Douglas-Home, 3 December 1971, BNA, FO 491/11. 68. Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN, Yearbook of Fishery Statistics, vol. 28, catches and landings 1969, 1970. In 1969: Norway 2804 tonnes, the Six: 2229, UK: 1040; Denmark: 1633; Ireland: 53. 69. Dagbladet, 2 November 1971. My translation. 70. Rhein-Zeitung, 28 September 1970. My translation. 71. Cabinet Minutes, 26 August 1970, NNA, PMO. My translation.

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72. Geir K. Almlid, “Splittelse og Dobbeltspill”. 73. Hans Otto Frøland, “Choosing the Periphery: The political Economy of Norway’s European Integration Policy, 1948–73,” Journal of European Integration History 7, no. 1 (2001): 90. 74. Letter from The Norwegian Fishermen’s Association to the government, 9 October 1971, NNA, PMO F01-0010. 75. Cabinet Minutes, 2 December 1971, NNA, PMO. 76. Brief by the P.E. Thornton (Cabinet Office) for the AE meeting on 24 November 1971, 23 November 1971, BNA, PREM 15/356. 77. Letter from Heath to Bratteli, 29 November 1971, NNA, PMO F010010. 78. “Steering brief no 1, for call by the Norwegian Prime Minister on the PM at Chequers: 9 January”, Cabinet Office 8 January 1972, BNA, FCO 30/1504. 79. Value of output of fisheries sector as percentage of GDP at factor cost in 1970: 0.1% (Hannay, Britain’s Entry, 245). 80. “Heath knew policy would kill fish fleet”, The Scotsman, 1 January 2003. 81. Hannay, Britain’s Entry, 245. 82. Heath to Rippon, 30 June 1971, BNA, PREM 15/356. 83. “Points to make to the French Ambassador”, Cabinet Office to Rippon, 14 January 1972, BNA, CAB 170/66. 84. The Treaty of Accession to the European Communities, protocol no. 21. 85. Verdens Gang, 15 January 1972. My translation. 86. Verdens Gang, 20 January 1972. My translation. 87. Cabinet Minutes, 8 January 1972, NNA, PMO. My translation. 88. Roy Jacobsen, Trygve Bratteli: En Fortelling, 3rd ed. (Oslo: Cappelen, 1995), 524. My translation. 89. FCO to the UK Delegation to the EC, 12 January 1972, BNA, FCO 30/1420. 90. The French ambassador to Britain, in conversation with Rippon, FCO to the UK Delegation to the EC, 12 January 1972, BNA, FCO 30/1420. 91. The House of Commons voted in April 1972 on a proposal for a referendum on EC membership: 301 against, 272 in favour. Many Labour MPs voted in favour. 92. Lord, British Entry, 120. 93. Speech by Heath on 6 May 1970, RIIA Press Collection (Lord, British Entry, 65). 94. According to an opinion poll carried out by the EC (Kitzinger, Diplomacy, 33). 95. In July 1971, 67% said that price increases was the most important disadvantage of joining the EC (Lord, British Entry, 119). 96. Kitzinger, Diplomacy, 356.

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97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110.

111. 112. 113. 114.

115. 116. 117. 118. 119.

120.

Greenwood, Britain and European Cooperation, 94. Daily Express, 22 May 1971 (Kitzinger, Diplomacy, 344). The Guardian, 16 July 1971 (Lord, British Entry, 122). Kitzinger, Diplomacy, 250. Minutes of a meeting of the European Movement’s Executive Committee, 22 July 1970, BNA, FCO 30/712. Parliament Debates (UK), Commons, vol. 823, col. 2212, 28 October 1971. Anthony Meyer, Parliament Debates (UK), Commons, vol. 809, col. 1201, 20 January 1971. Opinion Research Centre opinion polls from February 1971 to September 1972 (Kitzinger, Diplomacy, 366–367). N. J. Crowson, The Conservative Party and European Integration Since 1945: At the Heart of Europe? (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), 27. Lynton J. Robins, The Reluctant Party: Labour and the EEC, 1961–1975 (Ormskirk: Hesketh, 1979), 16. Denman, Missed Chances, 241. Norwegian Government, “Om Norges Tilslutning”, white paper no. 90 1971–72, attachment 4, statements from organisations. Nils P. Gleditsch, Øyvind Østerud, and Jon Elster, De Utro Tjenere: Embetsverket i EF -kampen (Oslo: Pax, 1974). Haakon A. Ikonomou, “Europeans. Norwegian Diplomats and the Enlargement of the European Community, 1960–1972” (PhD thesis, European University Institute, 2016). Berge Furre, Norsk Historie 1914–2000: Industrisamfunnet: Frå Vokstervisse til Framtidstvil (Oslo: Det Norske Samlaget, 2000), 210. Nils P. Gleditsch and Ottar Hellevik, Kampen om EF (Oslo: NAVF, 1977), 230. My translation. Statistics Norway, The Advisory, Table 17. Frøland, Hans Otto, “The Second Norwegian EEC Application, 1967: Was There a Policy at All?,” in Crises and Compromises: The European Project 1963–1969, ed. Wilfred Loth (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2001), 446. Henry Valen, “Norway: ‘No’ to EEC,” Scandinavian Political Studies 8, no. a8 (1973), 221. Frøland, “Choosing the Periphery,” 81. Statistics Norway, The Advisory, Table 16. Report 455/72 by UK Oslo ambassador Ralph Selby, 4 October 1972, BNA, FCO 33/1913. Nils P. Gleditsch, Ottar Hellevik, and Kristen Ringdal, “The Common Market Issue in Norway: A Conflict between Center and Periphery,” Journal of Peace Research 12, no. 1, 1975. Statistics Norway, The Advisory, Table 11.2.

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121. Hillary Allen, Norway and Europe in the 1970s (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1979), 15. 122. Geir K. Almlid, “Nei fra Nord—Sentrum-Periferi i EF/EU-spørsmålet,” in Nord og Verden, eds. Per Bjarne Ravnå and Miriam Tveit (Stamsund: Orkana, 2020) 123. Tor Bjørklund, Mot Strømmen: Kampen mot EF 1961–1972 (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1982), 178. 124. “Prospects Following the Norwegian Referendum”, Selby to DouglasHome, 4 October 1972, BNA, FO 491/11. 125. John Ramsden, The Winds of Change: Macmillan to Heath 1957 –75: A History of the Conservative Party (London: Longman, 1996), 337. 126. Lord: op. cit., p 118. 127. Report by Selby (445/72), 4 October 1972, BNA, FCO 33/1913. 128. “Norwegians have EEC heads but are their hearts in it?”, The Times , 23 June 1972. 129. Søren Sommerfelt, Sendemann: Utenrikspolitisk Seilas —Minner og Betraktninger (Oslo: Schibsted, 1997), 147. My translation. 130. These negotiations were typical examples of two-level games in international politics (see, e.g., Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42, no. 3 [1988]). In order to understand the behaviour of a government at the international stage, in some policy areas and certain conditions, it is necessary to analyse the national stage. The limitations set domestically often determines its international negotiation strategies and actions. (See also Almlid, “Negotiating”.)

CHAPTER 6

Forming New Relationships, 1973–1983

With the best will in the world, there is a grave risk that ties between the two countries at Government level will become weakened.1

This concern was raised in an appeal to the British and Norwegian governments by the Anglo-Norse Society in the aftermath of the EC referendum. It underlined how the two countries would have to reorient themselves in the European context—Britain as a member of the EC and Norway as a formal outsider. And it demonstrated that bilateral relations necessarily would be affected. It soon emerged that Britain was struggling with adjusting to EC membership. There was friction already in 1973, and the entry terms were renegotiated the year after accession. Why did this happen and why did the unequivocal referendum result not settle the case once and for all for Britain? The issue continued to plague UK politics in the 1980s. Margaret Thatcher’s tough approach towards Europe hardened EC opposition in Britain. Membership was off the table in Norway. After the bitter referendum campaign, few suggested a rematch in the near future. But the Common Market received about three-quarters of Norwegian exports, and negotiations for a free trade deal on industrial goods were soon initiated. But how should Norway relate to the Community in the longer term? Some thought that a free trade deal was enough, while others argued for cooperation in other areas. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 G. K. Almlid, Britain and Norway in Europe Since 1945, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61473-7_6

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The two countries also had to reformulate their bilateral relationship. Britain’s Oslo ambassador wrote in 1972 that Norway’s “no” was “of the very greatest importance not only to the country’s own future but the future of Anglo-Norwegian relations”.2 With Britain on the inside and Norway on the outside, they would naturally interact less on European integration issues than before. How did this influence their European relationship and did it affect other policy areas?

Political Relations During most of this period, the sister parties were in power at the same time in Norway and Britain. The Norwegian Labour government of Trygve Bratteli resigned as a result of the 1972 referendum, but returned after a year, and Labour stayed in power until 1981. But the party depended on support from the left-wing anti-EC and anti-NATO Socialist People’s Party for a Storting majority. In Britain, Harold Wilson and Labour formed a new government in 1974. Wilson rather unexpectedly announced his resignation in 1976 and was replaced by James Callaghan.3 The two labour parties cooperated relatively closely from 1974. But in the 1980s British Labour moved more to the left on important issues. Historically, the two conservative parties had had limited fruitful cooperation, in part because they never governed simultaneously.4 But this was the case in the 1980s. Margaret Thatcher’s 1979 election victory marked the beginning of eighteen years of Tory rule. In Norway, Kåre Willoch became prime minister in 1981, leading a minority Conservative government. The Centre Party and the Christian Democrats joined the government in 1983. Both conservative parties came to power after economic problems in the 1970s and increasing belief among voters in deregulations and reduced state involvement to bolster economic growth. However, there were considerable differences between Willoch’s and Thatcher’s projects. The former only made adjustments to social democracy while the latter was more radical.5 For example, Willoch did not set out to battle the unions as Thatcher did, and Norway thus remained a strong corporate pluralist state. The British Oslo ambassador correctly argued that the Willoch government’s economic ideas were in some respects closer to those of the German Social Democrats than the Tories.6 The differences were rooted in the fact that the British economy and system had more profound problems than the Norwegian ones. But generally the Norwegian Conservatives were simply more to the centre

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than Thatcher. Indeed, the chairman, Jo Benkow, did not really want to be connected with her.7 Bilateral relations were good overall during this period. The new British Oslo ambassador wrote in December 1972 that the UK embassy “gets quite special treatment” in Norway.8 For example, he did not have to wait as ambassadors of other countries did before presenting his credentials to the king. The Norwegian government was satisfied with Britain’s treatment of Norway as well. For instance, a permanent undersecretary of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry (NFM) considered in 1979 that their London embassy enjoyed a “very high level of openness and goodwill” from the FCO.9 However, the British-Norwegian relationship had begun to change in the 1960s, and this trend intensified during this period. The Norwegian instinct to look to Britain for political leadership and trade diminished. One reason was that politicians and military officers who had been part of the close bilateral relations during the war were retiring. Another was that news from Britain was frequently dominated by “stories of strikes and colour prejudice, drugs and student unrest”, and, as the British ambassador reported to London: “there is a prevalent feeling here, strongest among the young but also saddening many of our war-time hero-worshippers, that Britain is not quite what she was, not only as a Great Power but also as a model to the democratic world”.10 Norway developed stronger relations to West Germany when Willy Brandt became chancellor. His strong links to Norway played a role in this, and many also supported his Ostpolitik. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that Britain still, barely, retained the role as Norway’s greatest friend. Norway seen from London was a different matter. Despite a general impression of a good ally and friend, the knowledge about and interest in the country were more limited. This was important also at the highest political level. On several occasions from 1973, the Norwegian foreign minister, Knut Frydenlund, called for more bilateral ministerial visits. Britain’s Oslo ambassador shared the Norwegian government’s concern: “I have never really been able to understand quite why we feel able largely to ignore a country which is just about to acquire more money to spend abroad than almost any other country in Europe”.11 The ambassador was undoubtedly referring to the expected revenues from oil and gas in the North Sea. There were a few more visits from Britain after Wilson returned to Downing Street. But the Norwegian concern about international isolation because of the 1972 “no” remained. The British

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Oslo embassy commented that Frydenlund “was beginning to feel that Norway’s decision not to join the EEC was for all sorts of practical reasons reducing the former closeness of her relations with Great Britain”.12 A pattern of UK neglect of Norway continued in the 1980s, at least compared to the 1940s and 1950s. The Head of the FCO Western European Department said in 1983: “There is a slight tendency to take Norway for granted, politically and economically. We should not assume her support”.13 Paradoxically perhaps, in all bilateral meetings of a general nature Norwegian affairs were discussed more than British. Questions such as Northern Ireland and Britain in NATO were virtually never covered. One reason, as discussed below, was that Norway’s security was directly more important to Britain than the reverse. But this could also be a matter of the difference in typical perspectives of small and big states. The smaller naturally seeks support from the more powerful and feels less inclined to meddle in the big state’s affairs. An exception to this pattern emerged during this period, however. Norway engaged more actively in third-world affairs and often took the side of colonies seeking their freedom. This was based on increased international self-confidence and a growing value-based foreign policy. In the 1970s, the British Labour Party also advocated an “ethical foreign policy”, in particular Foreign Secretaries Callaghan and David Owen focused more on human rights.14 However, the Norwegian approach was partly frowned upon in Britain. For example, Norway did not sufficiently support UK policies in Rhodesia.15 More irritating was the Norwegians’ “penchant for telling others what to do in areas of which they themselves often have little knowledge”.16 Some in Whitehall suggested a tougher attitude to Norway on such matters, but the Head of the FCO Western European Department thought that this had to be accepted: “for better or worse, they are important allies and their importance to us is if anything likely to grow with the passage of time”.17 Moreover, as the British government acknowledged, the Norwegians were not the only allies who expressed criticism.

Security and Defence Security and East-West relations were crucial in the British-Norwegian relationship in the 1970s and 1980s too. These issues were on the agenda at all political and civil-service meetings of a general nature during this period. And there was agreement on major lines.

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An important feature of the bilateral security relationship was its principal focus on the Norwegian sphere. The common main enemy—the Soviet Union—shared a border with Norway, and this area was crucial for British defence. The British Isles were further away from the frontline. Of course, had they come under enemy control, it would have been a massive crisis for Norway. The Western European Department of the FCO, which dealt with bilateral relations with most Western European countries, maintained that Norway required the most attention due to the security situation in the north.18 The power asymmetry between Norway and the Soviet Union was colossal. An all-out invasion was considered unlikely, but overtaking part of the country was a more realistic scenario. It would have been of great strategic value for the Soviet navy to control ice-free harbours in northern Norway. The British and Norwegian authorities realised the vulnerability of these areas.19 The Soviets had built immense military capabilities on the Kola Peninsula, close to the Norwegian border. Norway’s relatively small armed forces, on the other hand, were thinly stretched over a large territory. A perpetual Cold War Norwegian concern was therefore whether their allies would really come to their rescue in case of a Soviet invasion in the north. To guarantee this, Norway continued to seek a level of NATO activity sufficient to make its defence credible to potential Soviet aggression but not so great as to risk provoking a counter-strike. While the British government acknowledged Norway’s challenging strategic position, it thought that too much emphasis was being put on appeasing the Soviets. Norway had in the previous decades clearly stated that it would not permit foreign troops or nuclear weapons to be stationed on its soil in peacetime. This made allied reinforcement in time of need more difficult. In the 1970s, the UK government was unhappy about the Norwegians being “increasingly anxious to do nothing to provoke the Russians in the North or Barents Sea”.20 But criticism of Norway was muted while Labour was in power in London. The party wanted to distance the country more from the USA, for example the February 1974 election manifesto proposed to remove American Polaris bases from British soil.21 In the 1960s and 1970s, there was a thaw in the Cold War that probably made it easier to argue for a more relaxed defence policy. Some Labour members even wanted a British withdrawal from NATO.22 But NATO remained integral for Norwegian and British defence until the end of the Cold War.

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The Thatcher government was slightly more critical to Norway’s approach. It disliked the Norwegian Labour government’s reluctance in the talks on Theatre Nuclear Force in 1979; it was “a worrying indication of Norway’s less than total identification with Western objectives”.23 Moreover, in his New Year’s broadcast for 1981 Prime Minister Odvar Nordli advocated the concept of a treaty on a Nordic nuclear weaponfree zone, a concept that the British had “grave doubts about” because it would undermine NATO’s deterrence strategy.24 The UK government’s general concern was that “the Norwegians will never be as robust in standing up to the Soviet Union as we should like them to be”.25 These growing concerns were part of the changing Cold War climate. The Soviet Afghanistan invasion in December 1979 fuelled strong Western reactions, including in Norway and Britain, and contributed to more tense East-West relations. The USA in particular, with hawkish President Ronald Reagan, chose a tough line. Thatcher shared Reagan’s perspective on the Soviet Union and applied similar rhetoric: the country resembled “a modern version of the early tyrannies of history”.26 Yet UK policy towards the Soviets did not change significantly with Thatcher.27 And the Americans often kept Britain out of the loop on important security matters—another indication of its demise as a superpower. Thatcher welcomed a new Norwegian Conservative government in a NATO perspective.28 But there was distrust of Reagan and his tough approach among Norwegians.29 For this reason, the shift of government did not represent a significant change of security policy. The UK government thus continued its criticism of Norway’s failure to contribute enough to Western defence. Internally, it was commented that Norway as “the wealthiest member per capita of NATO, still makes an inadequate effort”,30 and that the Norwegians continued to rest “on the facile assumption that in times of crisis the mobilisation of several hundred thousand angry Norwegians will give the Soviets pause, however ill-equipped those reserves may be”.31 Nevertheless, British (and American) criticism was mostly subdued and voiced internally. Norway was essential to NATO’s northern flank. The FCO considered that “given Norway’s crucial strategic importance to the West”, they should be careful pressurising the Norwegians too much.32 Soviet control of the Norwegian coast was a terrible scenario. This was related to worries that Norway would move in a neutral direction. After the 1972 referendum, the UK Oslo ambassador warned that the EC as a whole should not give Norway the cold shoulder and “punish her for

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being a disappointing nuisance”—it could drive the country into isolation and out of NATO.33 However, the major Norwegian parties were at pains to emphasise that the “no” did not involve a rejection of its links with Western Europe and NATO. Yet the allies were aware of Soviet attempts during the whole Cold War to bully or entice Norway back towards her traditional neutral status. The British approach thus continued in the 1980s: one should guard against the Norwegians being driven “down the road towards Moscow”, the FCO maintained.34 These concerns gave Norway more room for its NATO reservations and increased the allies’ desire to provide help. This mutual dependence contributed to a close UK-Norwegian defence relationship. Norway was more prepared to grant Britain facilities for the training of soldiers than to any other country. UK troops were in Norway in strength throughout most of the year as they were allowed to train there. No such privilege was granted to American forces for fear of provoking the Soviets unduly.35 This made sense, moreover, because in case of an attack from the East, immediate aid would have to come from Britain. Potential US reinforcements to Norway were much larger in scale but would take longer to reach the area.36

Trade and Economy The 1970s were problematic for the international economy. War in the Middle East led to oil crises, and industrialised countries such as Norway and Britain introduced fuel rationing.37 Subsequent recessions with rising unemployment and high inflation stood in stark contrast to the decades of economic growth in Western Europe that had followed the Second World War. The Heath government struggled immensely with managing the economy and was constantly in conflict with the trade unions.38 Heath imposed a three-day workweek and price and wage control. The new Wilson government inherited a challenging situation: inflation was raging, unemployment rising and the pound was under pressure.39 The number of strikes dropped significantly with a Labour government and the economy improved somewhat. However, conditions worsened again towards the end of the decade, with the 1978–1979 “winter of discontent” as a symbol of the economic problems and trade union strikes that returned in full measure.40

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The 1970s were difficult for Norway as well. The UK Oslo ambassador expressed it aptly: “the halcyon days of ‘little Norway’ selling all it wished to export, and profiting handsomely from its merchant shipping fleet” were over.41 The Norwegian Labour government unsuccessfully introduced a counter-cyclical policy in 1975–1977 to fight unemployment and further economic decline. In 1977, it devalued the krone twice, a move forced on the country by Swedish devaluations. But this had a limited effect on Norwegian industry’s competitiveness.42 One of the main problems was still the high Norwegian labour costs. In the 1980s, the British and Norwegian economies recovered.43 Their exports benefitted from the improved international economy, and oil revenues had by now become substantial for both countries. In relative terms, this was particularly important for Norway. Oil and gas represented close to 20 per cent of its economy in 1985.44 The developing pattern in the UK-Norwegian trade relationship from the 1960s continued during this period. Britain was still the number one market for Norwegian goods and its second or third most important supplier.45 Norway was Britain’s fourteenth biggest export market, above, for example, Australia, Canada, Japan and the Soviet Union.46 However, Norwegian businesspeople were increasingly reluctant to order UK goods because “deliveries are always late on account of strikes” and, according to the UK ambassador, “because lazy managers, who never get to work until two hours after their employees, cannot even be bothered to let their Norwegian partners know when they are going to be late with deliveries”.47 The era of giving extra preferences to British business was over. West Germany had become Norway’s most important trade partner, and Sweden was also bigger than Britain. The Division of the Continental Shelf Oil and gas production in the North Sea became essential for both Britain and Norway from the 1970s. Not only did it make them self-sufficient in these important commodities, but it also developed to be a great source of revenue for the two states and boosted the creation of new jobs. Moreover, it was an important bilateral issue, which also would matter in other policy areas. There had been commercial extraction of oil in the North Sea since the nineteenth century but only to a modest degree until the 1960s. In May 1963, the Storting made a unilateral decision that the continental shelf

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off the mainland belonged to Norway when it came to exploring and exploiting natural resources.48 However, the outer limits of this national zone had to be settled with the other North Sea countries, of which Britain was the most important. Bilateral negotiations commenced in the spring of 1964 and a deal was signed in March the next year. The limits would be based on the middle line principle settled at the Geneva Convention of 1958, meaning that each point of the border was equally far from the nearest points on the baselines of each of the states’ sea territory. These negotiations could have been much more complicated. The Norwegian Trench, a 700-metre-deep undersea ditch, lay between the mainland and many of the fields that eventually became Norwegian. Britain could have argued more strongly that this represented a natural cut-off of the continuous continental shelf between the Norwegian and British sea territory. However, the London government adopted a conciliatory line due to the urgent desire to develop their fields to improve the balance of payments.49 Britain got 46 per cent of the North Sea south of latitude 62 degrees, while Norway got 27 per cent. This was also satisfactory for the Norwegians because the dividing principle opened for future extensive claims further north in the Atlantic and the Arctic. The settlement was based on the good bilateral British-Norwegian relationship, and very different to Norway’s problems related to the delineation of the Barents Sea with the Soviet Union.50 Another factor here was that in 1965 few understood the magnitude of the North Sea oil resources. In December 1969, the American Phillips Company reported the first substantial find, the highly profitable Ekofisk field, just inside the Norwegian zone. In 1974, the UK government said internally that when the deal was made they “had no reason to doubt that the median line served our interests”.51 Nonetheless, both countries benefitted considerably from North Sea oil. There were significant differences in how Britain and Norway managed their new petroleum sectors. One question was how quickly resources should be exploited. Britain, with its economic problems, wanted revenues and reduced oil dependence on other countries as quickly as possible.52 Norway adopted a slower tempo. It had high self-sufficiency of energy and a tradition for managing natural resources in a cautious and long-term perspective. There were also concerns that too much oil revenues would cause economic and social problems in such a small economy as the Norwegian one.53 Norway thus had fewer licence rounds

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than Britain and awarded fewer oil fields each time. A second question was the level of state involvement. Compared to other economic sectors, both had strong state control—but Norway had more.54 The state-owned Statoil company occupied a dominant position in the entire production process from extraction through refining and marketing. It would retain at least 50 per cent ownership in all concessions. Unlike the UK equivalent, BNOC, Norwegian ministers sat on the Statoil board. Norway’s model also involved higher net taxation than the British. The UK Oslo ambassador reported that in Norway “all classes of society seem to be agreed that the new wealth must accrue largely to the people and not to private enterprise in general or the oil majors in particular”.55 The amicable divide of the continental shelf lay the ground for substantial cooperation in the North Sea; in 1975, it was “working excellently”.56 Oil from the first Norwegian fields was piped to Britain, as it was closer and represented a large market. Considerable UK tax concessions also encouraged this. There was a strong Norwegian lobby for landing and refining oil in Norway, but the Norwegian Trench posed a difficult physical barrier to the laying of a pipeline for this purpose.57 The two countries also managed and cooperated on fields that straddled the median line. Moreover, UK companies invested on the other side of the shelf and provided high technology that Norway as a newcomer did not possess. Britain benefitted substantially economically.58 Bilateral petroleum trade became increasingly more important. In 1984, Norway’s oil and gas production was about half of Britain’s, but since Norwegian consumption was much lower, Britain became an important customer.59 About 20 per cent of British gas supplies came from the Norwegian sector. For Western European countries, Norwegian deliveries were preferred over the more politically sensitive Middle East for oil, and North Africa and the Soviet Union for gas.60 This put Norway in a strong bargaining position, which would only become stronger in the subsequent decades.

European Integration On 1 January 1973, Britain and Norway went their separate ways in terms of European integration. Yet both countries needed to establish a new relationship with continental Western Europe. Britain had to settle in as a new EC member. Norway wanted a trade agreement and closer political ties—how would this be received in the extended EC?

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New Negotiations After the EC referendum, there was wide agreement in Norway that the issue of membership would remain closed for a long time. The country should rather negotiate the best possible trade agreement with the Community. This became the most important task for the government that took office in October 1972.61 Led by Lars Korvald, it consisted of the three parties from the previous government that had been negative to EC membership. The negotiations were relatively straightforward since much groundwork had been laid in the membership negotiations. The free trade agreement was much less ambitious than the Treaty of Rome and covered primarily industrial goods, thus avoiding the most problematic areas for Norway. Furthermore, the Six were fairly constructive and not, as a British ambassador had feared, relieved that they were spared “such an awkward partner that Norway should be left to ‘stew in its own juices’ for the time being”.62 Britain was the most helpful of the enlarged EC.63 The UK also offered duty-free treatment of Norwegian frozen fish fillets in early 1973 until the agreement was in place, a measure necessary because duties between the two countries were formally re-imposed when Britain joined the EC. The agreement was signed in April 1973. The EC made similar deals with other EFTA countries. They provided for duty-free treatment in gradual steps for all industrial exports in 11 years. There was widespread satisfaction among Norwegian industrialists, with some exceptions in shipping.64 In May, the Storting ratified the treaty unanimously, and the British government considered that it formed a “satisfactory basis” for the bilateral trading relationship.65 In the following years, Norway concluded a series of other bilateral agreements with the EC, not least in the fisheries industry, as we will see below. Soon after Britain joined the EC, it became clear that membership would not be uncomplicated. The contributions to the Community budgets were costly, and the European Regional Development Fund, which was supposed to channel money to poorer British areas, had little effect.66 1973 was a challenging year for Britain: food prices rose, oil prices spiked and strikes were prevalent. Brussels, fairly or not, received much of the blame for the difficult situation. In the general election campaign in February 1974, the Labour Party exploited the dissatisfaction with the EC and promised a renegotiation of the entry terms. Wilson also

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pledged that there would be a referendum, the first such in the UK ever. The primary motivation was to keep the party together.67 Labour was divided on the issue; Callaghan argues that “every conceivable opinion about the Common Market was expressed” in the party.68 The renegotiations were finalised early in 1975. However, there were no fundamental changes. Britain remained the second largest net contributor; it would amount to £800 million by 1979.69 Greenwood characterises the negotiations as “a sham”,70 and May argues that on some points they were a “charade”.71 The UK was promised a refund for its budget contribution and vague promises on CAP reform, which would be contentious issues between Britain and its European partners in the coming decades. Wilson unsurprisingly backed the renegotiated deal in the June 1975 referendum. But he granted Cabinet members a free position on the issue.72 A majority of them supported membership. But the Labour Movement in general was in the “no” camp. The Tories were far more united in their support for membership, including new leader Margaret Thatcher. In early 1971, support for EC membership among Britons was only 20 per cent—but in the 1975 referendum two-thirds voted yes.73 Unlike the 2016 Brexit referendum, all UK regions were in agreement. However, support for membership was wide but not deep. Greenwood argues that the public were bored with the subject and voted for the status quo.74 Similarly, May points out that opponents of membership in the next decades have claimed that the British public was “hoodwinked” because the fundamental issue of national sovereignty was not discussed.75 Regardless, the referendum verdict was indisputable, and Britain would now need to find its real role in the Community. In general, Britons were sceptical to closer European integration than what they had agreed to in 1975. This would become problematic in the 1980s when new initiatives emerged from the Continent. The British renegotiations were not discussed widely in Norway. Opinions followed patterns of views on Norwegian membership. The Conservative Party wanted Britain to remain a member, and the Labour government received the referendum result “with relief”.76 Others hoped that Britain would leave the EC and gravitate back towards a close association with the Nordic group.77 Many Norwegians, however, focused mainly on how a potential British exit should not threaten the terms of the free trade agreement and Anglo-Norwegian trade. These different

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perspectives were remarkably similar to Norwegian views on Brexit in the second decade of the twenty-first century. Awkward Partner and “Active” European Policy Shortly after the British referendum, Foreign Secretary James Callaghan told his Norwegian counterpart that “the referendum had finally disposed of any doubt about Britain’s membership of the Community”.78 This was correct in the very short term, but in a longer-term perspective he was well off the mark. Britain soon became an awkward partner in the EC.79 Domestic pressure had made Heath block progress in matters important to other members. And asking for renegotiations right after accession generated significant frustration with the UK among the Six. An FCO Permanent Under-Secretary later considered that Britain “figuratively had held a gun to the Community”.80 After the referendum, the EC grew more unpopular in Britain. And throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Britain’s relationship to the EC remained strained. This was one of the reasons why the integration process slowed to a crawl—often labelled Eurosclerosis. There was considerable Euro-scepticism in both major UK parties. The Labour governments of the 1970s dragged their feet on many issues where France and Germany pushed for further integration.81 For most of the 1980s, Labour was formally committed to withdrawing from the EC. The Tories, on the other hand, were still considered the “party of Europe”—but things were changing. Thatcher did not share Heath’s strong enthusiasm for Europe. As prime minister, she sought to restore the special relationship with the USA, and she was sceptical of deeper European integration. Already from her first year in office, she fought vigorously for a rebate in the budget contributions, to “get Britain’s money back”.82 This caused bitterness between Britain and the EC partners. A compromise was reached in 1984, but the issue cropped up again later in the 1980s and was also often used as an argument for leaving Europe in the subsequent decades. The Thatcher government also pushed for fundamental changes of the CAP.83 She managed to balance the more pro-European parliamentary party with the more anti-European grass roots of the party well in the first half of the decade. This would become considerably more difficult later. In Norway, the Labour government adopted a so-called active European policy from 1973.84 This involved seeking a close relationship with

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the EC compatible with continuing non-membership. All Norwegian governments until today have, to varying degrees, followed this approach. But this has had to be balanced with the public resistance to European integration. After the referendum, a majority of Norwegians did not worry about being an outsider; a trade agreement was in place, security was guaranteed by NATO and increasing oil revenues were in the pipeline. Moreover, Eurosclerosis pushed the prospect of closer cooperation with the difficult northern rebel further down the EC agenda. Rye argues that until 1977 there were few traces of this “active” policy, and that finding results is even harder.85 Other EFTA members were more active. However, mainly driven by the fear of being isolated, the “active” Norwegian European policy continued. The NFM was concerned about the tendency that EC countries met in international bodies “with mutually agreed positions on all issues of any importance”.86 Such coordination would increase, it was feared, if the EC were to be enlarged; Mediterranean countries were membership candidates. Of particular importance was the fear that transatlantic consultations increasingly developed into a US-EC dialogue.87 An important element of Norway’s strategy was to align itself as closely as possible to the European Political Community (EPC). Based on the 1970 Davignon Report, the EPC was created to serve as an intergovernmental consultation mechanism on foreign policy. As an applicant to join the EC, the Norwegians had taken part in the EPC for about a year before the referendum, but had to leave after the “no”. Thorvald Stoltenberg, the State Secretary at the NMF, was clear: “any development in Europe is a development for Norway, therefore cooperation on a political level is essential”.88 The British government was lukewarm about developing the political side of the EC. Minister of State Roy Hattersley did not believe in the practicability of institutionalisation in this field and that the government “could not, for example, accept the idea of operating on the basis of a majority vote”.89 The EPC became a success only in limited areas such as in the making of the Lomé Convention and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.90 Yet the mere habit of working closely together facilitated a harmonisation of polices. Britain became an important partner for Norway in relation to the ECP. One aspect was information. Hattersley arranged in 1976 for the Norwegian London ambassador to be briefed regularly by the FCO on this area. This gave Norway broad knowledge about the EC political

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consultations.91 Information at an early stage increased possibilities to present Norwegian views before decisions were made. Another aspect was the actual policy content. The NFM considered that of the leading EC countries, Britain was the one that Norway could primarily put its faith in “to avoid that political EC consultations become far too introverted and that the Atlantic aspect and dependency is taken into consideration”.92 Consequently, it was in Norway’s interest to strengthen consultations with Britain. Both countries opposed deep European integration and feared that Europe would turn away from the USA, or the reverse. In other words, they shared fundamental foreign-policy perspectives, EC member or not. The Community was reluctant to agree on a formal framework for political relations with Norway, partly due to concerns about setting a precedent.93 In 1980, Prime Minister Nordli succeeded in establishing an informal agreement with the EPC, including semi-annual meetings with the presidency. However, Norway did not participate in EPC meetings and did not have any formal influence. It seemed impossible to come any further in formalising ties in the field of political cooperation without applying for actual membership. Significantly, Britain’s assistance to Norway had its limits. The UK government considered that it was “a clear British interest to keep Norwegian foreign policy closely in line with that of the Ten, without giving Norway the benefits of membership for which they are not paying”.94 Therefore, it would not allow anything resembling associate membership of the EPC. The FCO warned that “caution may be needed to prevent the Norwegians from establishing a gradual institutionalisation of their links with” the EPC.95 However, a Norwegian role at EPC meetings was formalised in 1988. This relates to the question of how much Britain and Norway drifted apart after 1972. For Britain, it was a balancing act. The NATO bonds and the special geopolitical position of Norway were just as important as before. Trade with Norway was also quite important. Moreover, it was in Britain’s interest that Norway should try to make another EC membership attempt.96 But until that happened, the UK was not prepared to act as an agent for Norwegian interests inside the EC. A report tabled by the FCO Western European Department in 1973 turned out to be accurate for Britain’s approach in the next decade: “while Norway must clearly accept the consequences of their decision to stay out of the Community, we do not want to cold shoulder them”.97 For Norway, the pattern of looking to the UK for assistance in European integration matters

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continued after 1972 as well. Norwegians hoped that Britain would act as a brake on further EC integration—this succeeded. But since Britain did not advocate Norwegian interests inside the EC very much, other members such as Denmark and West Germany became equally important. Overall then, compared to the closer relations as outsiders in EFTA, the two countries drifted apart after Britain joined the EC. Fisheries The fisheries industry is a good illustration of changes in the BritishNorwegian relationship—this increasingly became an EC-Norway issue. The two countries often had conflicting interests, and they were significant for each other. The UK government was clear: “British fishing interests in Norwegian waters are considerable”.98 Yet fisheries were more important to Norway. The UK Oslo ambassador hit the nail on the head: “it is a truism that in Norway, fish is not food or fish-oil or fertiliser, but politics”.99 This was also reflected in relative economic terms; fishing contributed 1 per cent to the Norwegian GDP and 0.1 per cent to the British.100 In the EC accession negotiations in 1970–1972, the 12 nautical miles exclusive national zone had been vital for Norway. Soon after the referendum, there was considerable pressure in Norway to extend this zone to 50 miles.101 Norwegian fishermen argued that it was only fair that they were given a similar national monopoly as their Icelandic colleagues. Iceland’s unilateral 50-mile decision in 1972 was, of course, not uncontroversial; Britain opposed it strongly and a new “Cod War” developed. Therefore, the Norwegian government was initially reluctant. Such a move would also most likely affect EC tariff concessions on Norwegian fishery products.102 Fish had been a bargaining issue in the 1973 trade agreement negotiations. EC concessions had been tied to the maintenance of existing fishery limits. Furthermore, making a unilateral move would be a breach of Norway’s general support for settling issues multilaterally within the framework of international law. Having said that, the country had taken a similar step in 1961 when extending the national border to 12 miles. The question of national economic zones was a key issue in the third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) that opened in late 1973. Its mandate was very broad: “to adopt a Convention dealing with all matters relating to the law of the sea”.103 With nearly 150 participating

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states, it was one of the largest conferences ever called. Norway advocated a 200-mile zone where coastal states would enjoy sovereign rights to the natural resources of the sea, the sea bed and the ocean floor.104 Nevertheless, when little materialised the first years, Norwegians grew increasingly impatient. The FCO feared that “it would have a disastrous effect on the excellent relations between our two countries if Norway were to proceed to a unilateral extension”.105 Eventually, when no progress was made by the summer of 1976, the Norwegian government declared a 200-mile zone to take effect on 1 January 1977. In the early 1980s, this became the agreed UNCLOS principle. After the extension, Norway’s economic zones in the seas were seven times the size of the mainland territory. In this policy area, Norway had more independence than the EC member Britain. The Commission and increasingly other EC countries argued that any UK bilateral talks with the Norwegians would affect their rights under the CFP and that it was thus a Community matter. EC membership constrained Britain on fisheries. The positive aspect was that together with other members, the UK was in a stronger position. The FCO considered that “our membership of the Community is our ultimate big stick with the Norwegians, who need a market”.106 The Norway-EC negotiations for a “framework agreement” on fisheries were delayed due to UK opposition in CFP matters. Britain argued for a reappraisal of the policy when 200-mile limits became a realistic option.107 But no significant changes emerged. And in 1978 Norway and the Commission, which negotiated on behalf of the EC, reached an agreement on annual reciprocal fishery arrangements. This included joint management of shared stocks in the North Sea and mutual access to exclusive stocks in the other party’s zone. For the UK, the agreement with Norway was considered the most advantageous of the EC’s external agreements on fisheries.108 It provided some of the few remaining fishing opportunities for its hard-pressed deep-sea fleet and increasingly its middle-water fleet operating from Eastern England. This demonstrates that the CFP had its pros and cons regarding Britain’s fishery relations to Norway. Among UK coastal fishermen, however, the CFP was largely disliked—they never liked sharing their 200-mile zone with other members’ fishermen.

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Conclusions Britain’s and Norway’s individual relationships to the EC were reshaped from 1973. Central patterns that soon emerged would last until 2020. Inside the Community, Britain was often the most reluctant when it came to intensifying integration efforts. Indeed, the UK spent this entire period trying to change the terms of its membership, first in Wilson’s renegotiations and later with Thatcher’s demands for budget contribution rebates. Norway, despite its “no” to membership, started to move closer to the EC. It increased contact in the sphere of political cooperation, obtained deals on fisheries and, above all, entered a free trade agreement on industrial products with the Community. Commission President Roy Jenkins summed up after his meeting with the Norwegian prime minister in 1980: “they want to be in the Community without being in the Community”.109 These approaches meant that Britain’s and Norway’s positions vis-à-vis the EC did not change as much as would have been the case for an eager EC member and an isolationist outsider. They both needed close links to the EC, but were always afraid of becoming too close. Which of them was the most “awkward European” is difficult to answer, but many Britons and Norwegians continued to share the view that they were different from the continental Europeans. The British-Norwegian relationship also changed in this period. Weakening trade relations, despite increasing trade in oil and gas, was one aspect; another was the continuous fading of the wartime bonds. But most important was their different affiliations to the EC. Just the fact that they now operated in different European integration organisations created less contact points. But it also meant that Norway became less important for Britain; it had more than enough with sorting out its differences with the EC partners. Norway continued to look to Britain for leadership and support in Europe, but often did not get more of this from London than Berlin.

Notes 1. “Britain and Norway—appeal from the Anglo-Norse Society,” no date, British National Archives (henceforth BNA), FCO 33/2591. 2. “Norway and the EEC,” UK Oslo ambassador Frank Brenchley to Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home, 11 April 1972, BNA, FO 491/11.

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3. Wilson had long before indicated privately about his retirement (Andrew Marr, A History of Modern Britain [London: Pan Macmillan, 2008], 345). 4. Øivind Bratberg, “Politikk og Ideologi: Båndene mellom Norske og Britiske Partier,” in Det Glemte Partnerskapet: Norge og Storbritannia i et Nytt Århundre, ed. Øivind Bratberg and Kristin M. Haugevik (Oslo: Akademika, 2012). 5. Hallvard Notaker, “Moderate Affection: The Norwegian Conservative Party Between Macmillan and Thatcher,” in Britain and Norway: Special Relationship, ed. Helge Ø. Pharo and Patrick Salmon (Oslo: Akademika, 2012), 288. 6. Record of Anglo-Norwegian summit, 10 March 1982, UK Oslo ambassador Gillian Brown to Foreign Secretary Carrington, BNA, FCO 33/6264. 7. Notaker, “Moderate Affection,” 290–291. 8. “First Impressions of Norway,” UK Oslo ambassador Ralph Selby to Douglas-Home, 15 December 1972, BNA, FO 491/11. 9. Record of conversation between Permanent Under-Secretary Georg Kristiansen and Permanent Under-Secretary Michael Palliser, 4 October 1979, Norwegian Foreign Ministry (henceforth NFM), 5 October 1979, Norwegian Foreign Ministry Archives (henceforth NFMA) 1970–1979, 34 4/13/32. 10. Brenchley to Foreign Secretary Stewart, 19 February 1969, BNA, FO 491/13. 11. Selby to C.M. James (Western European Department (henceforth WED), Foreign and Commonwealth Office (henceforth FCO), 10 October 1974, BNA, FCO 33/2591. 12. Record of Minister of State Roy Hattersley’s visit to Norway, 20–23 April 1976, UK Oslo embassy, 3 May 1976, BNA, FCO 33/3069. 13. Wood (Head of WED) to Brown, 28 February 1983, FCO 33/7106. 14. John Callaghan, The Labour Party and Foreign Policy: A History (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), 283. 15. Gladstone (Head of WED) to UK Oslo ambassador Archie Lamb, 22 February 1980, BNA, FCO 28/4280. 16. “Norway: Annual Review for 1980,” UK Oslo embassy, 9 January 1981, BNA, FCO 33/5294. 17. Gladstone to Lamb, 22 February 1980, BNA, FCO 28/4280. 18. “Norge-Storbritannia, de tosidige politiske forbindelser,” report by Politisk kontor at NFM, 1 October 1979, NFMA 1970–1979, 34/13/32. 19. “Norwegian-Soviet Relations,” Brenchley to Douglas-Home, 11 February 1970, BNA, FO 491/11. 20. Selby to Foreign Secretary Callaghan, 17 March 1975, BNA, FCO 33/2816.

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21. Iain Dale (ed.), Labour Party General Election Manifestos 1900–1997 (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 191. 22. Ian Gordon and Paul Whiteley, “Social Class and Political Attitudes: The Case of Labour Councillors,” Political Studies 27, no. 1 (1979): 105. 23. “Norway: Annual Review for 1979,” Lamb to Foreign Secretary Peter Carrington, 7 January 1980, BNA, FCO 33/4564. 24. “Secretary of State’s Working Lunch with Stray: Points to Make,” FCO, 10 November 1981, BNA, FCO 33/5322. 25. “Anglo-Norwegian Politico-Military Talks in London, 24–25 November,” Fergusson to Bullard, 25 November 1980, BNA, FCO 28/4280. 26. Margaret Thatcher, speech at Winston Churchill Foundation Award dinner, British Embassy, Washington, DC, 29 September 1983. https:// www.margaretthatcher.org/document/105450. 27. Mark Garnett, Simon Mabon, and Robert Smith, British Foreign Policy Since 1945 (London: Routledge, 2018), 212. 28. “Secretary of State’s Working Lunch with Stray. Points to Make,” FCO, 10 November 1981, FCO 33/5322. 29. Berge Furre, Vårt Hundreår: Norsk Historie 1905–1990 (Oslo: Det Norske Samlaget, 1991), 432. 30. “Norway: Annual Review for 1984,” UK Oslo ambassador William Bentley to Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe, 2 January 1985, BNA, FCO 33/8336. 31. “Norway: Annual Review for 1985,” Bentley to Howe, 21 January 1986, BNA, FCO 33/8892. 32. Gladstone to Lamb, 22 February 1980, BNA, FCO 28/4280. 33. “Prospects Following the Norwegian Referendum,” Selby to DouglasHome, 4 October 1972, BNA, FO 491/11. 34. Gladstone to Lamb, 22 February 1980, BNA, FCO 28/4280. 35. “Norwegian-Soviet relations”, Brenchley to Douglas-Home, 11 February 1970, BNA, FO 491/11. 36. Record of talks between officials of the FCO and Ministry of Defence and the Norwegian ministries of foreign affairs and defence, FCO, Oslo 16 December 1977, BNA, FCO 33/3830. 37. On Britain, see, e.g., David Coates, “Britain in the 1970s: Economic Crisis and the Resurgence of Radicalism,” in Politics, Policy and the European Recession, ed. Andrew Cook (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1982). On Norway, see, e.g., Lars Mjøset, “Nordic Economic Policies in the 1970s and 1980s,” International Organization 41, no. 3 (1987). 38. William I. Hitchcock, The Struggle for Europe: The History of the Continent Since 1945 (London: Profile Books, 2004), 314. 39. Marr, A History of Modern Britain, 343–345.

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40. Hitchcock, The Struggle for Europe, 315. 41. “Norway: Annual Review for 1978,” Lamb to Foreign Secretary David Owen, 2 January 1979, BNA, FCO 33/4284. 42. “Norway: Annual Review for 1977,” UK Oslo Ambassador Peter Scott to Owen, 29 December 1977, BNA, FCO 33/3819. 43. Hitchcock, The Struggle for Europe, 329. 44. “Norway: Annual Review for 1985,” Bentley to FCO, 21 January 1986, BNA, FCO 33/8892. 45. Selby to Douglas-Home, 15 December 1972, BNA, FO 491/11. 46. “Norway: Annual Review for 1982,” Brown to Foreign Secretary Francis Pym, BNA, FCO 33/7106. 47. Selby to Callaghan, 17 March 1975, BNA, FCO 33/2816. 48. Knut E. Eriksen and Helge Ø. Pharo, Kald Krig og Internasjonalisering 1949–1965, vol. 5 of Norsk utenrikspolitisk historie (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1997), 370. 49. Øystein Noreng, The Oil Industry and Government Strategy in the North Sea (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016). 50. Furre, Vårt Hundreår, 366–367. 51. “Anglo-Norwegian Continental Shelf,” brief for Roy Hattersley’s lunch with Jens Evensen, FCO, 8 July 1974, BNA, FCO 33/2591. 52. Christina Solli, “Energipolitisk samarbeid: ‘Nykommeren’ i det Norskbritiske forholdet,” in Det Glemte Partnerskapet? Norge og Storbritannia i et Nytt Århundre, ed. Øivind Bratberg and Kristin M. Haugevik (Oslo: Akademika, 2012), 101. 53. “Norway: Annual Review for 1974,” Selby to Callaghan, 13 January 1975, BNA, FCO 33/2815. 54. Solli, “Energipolitisk samarbeid,” 100. 55. “Norway: Annual Review for 1974,” Selby to Callaghan, 13 January 1975, BNA, FCO 33/2815. 56. “North Sea Oil,” brief made for visit of Norwegian Foreign Minister, FCO 18 June 1975, BNA, FCO 33/2817. 57. When Norwegian engineers found ways of crossing the Trench, the general rule became to land oil in Norway. This happened for the first time in 1985. 58. UK Oslo ambassador John Robson to Secretary of State Douglas Hurd, 10 April 1990, BNA, FCO 160/283/15. 59. “Norway: Annual Review for 1984,” Bentley to Howe, 2 January 1985, BNA, FCO 33/8336. 60. Olav Riste, Norway’s Foreign Relations —A History (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2001), 246. 61. Ibid., 245. 62. “Prospects Following the Norwegian Referendum”, Selby to DouglasHome, 4 October 1972, BNA, FO 491/11.

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63. Record of conversation between Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Baroness Tweedsmuir and Norwegian Foreign Minister Vårvik at the FCO on 25 April 1973, FCO, 2 May 1973, BNA, FCO 33/2285. 64. “Ratification by the Norwegian Parliament of the Free Trade Agreement Between Norway and the EEC,” Selby to Douglas Home, 5 June 1973, BNA, FO 491/11. 65. FCO brief before Frydenlund’s visit to FCO 18 June 1975, BNA, FCO 33/2818. 66. Garnett, Mabon, and Smith, British Foreign Policy, 181. 67. Alex May, Britain and Europe Since 1945 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), 57–58. 68. Callaghan, The Labour Party, 275. 69. Christopher Lord, “The United Kingdom, a Once and Future (?) Nonmember State,” in The European Union’s Non-members: Independence Under Hegemony? ed. Erik Oddvar Eriksen and John Erik Fossum (London: Routledge, 2012), 222. 70. Sean Greenwood, Britain and European Cooperation Since 1945 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 100. 71. May, Britain and Europe, 59. 72. Marr, A History of Modern Britain, 348. 73. Lord, “The United Kingdom,” 222. 74. Greenwood, Britain and European Cooperation, 102. 75. May, Britain and Europe, 63. 76. “Norway: annual review of 1975,” Scott to Callaghan, 12 January 1976, BNA, FCO 33/3063. 77. Selby to Callaghan, 17 March 1975, BNA, FCO 33/2816. 78. Record of meeting between Callaghan and Frydenlund at FCO, 18 June 1975, BNA, FCO 33/2818. 79. Stephen George, An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). 80. Record of conversation between Kristiansen and Palliser 4 October 1979, NFM, 5 October 1979, NFMA 1970–1979, 34.4/13/32. 81. May, Britain and Europe, 64–65. 82. Garnett, Mabon, and Smith, British Foreign Policy, 192. Prime Minister Callaghan had also worked hard seeking a recalculation of Britain’s net contributions to the EC budgets (Jonathan Hollowell, “From Commonwealth to European Integration,” in Britain Since 1945, ed. Jonathan Hollowell [Oxford: Blackwell, 2003], 83). 83. Stephen Wall, A Stranger in Europe: Britain and the EU from Thatcher to Blair (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 9–11. 84. Riste, Norway’s Foreign Relations, 245. 85. Lise Rye, Norge i Europa (Bergen: Fagbokforlaget, 2019), 87.

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86. “Utviklingen i det Europeiske Fellesskap—Politiske Spørsmål”, NFM Brief, 1 October 1979, NFMA 1970–1979, 34.4/13. My translation. 87. Record of conversation between Tweedsmuir and Vårvik at the FCO on 25 April 1973, FCO, 2 May 1973, BNA, FCO 33/2285. 88. Record of conversation between Roy Hattersley and Thorvald Stoltenberg (State Secretary at NFM), 21 April 1976, BNA, FCO 33/3069. 89. Ibid. 90. Peter Van Ham, “EU-OSCE Relations: Partners or Rivals in Security,” in The European Union and International Organizations, ed. Knud Erik Jørgensen (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), 134. 91. Confirmed in NFM brief, 1 October 1979, NFMA 1970–1979, 34.4/13. Sources from the NMFA also show that the Danish government provided copies of minutes from EC meetings. 92. “Norge-Europa,” NFM brief, 5 July 1978, NFMA 1970–1979, 34.4/13. My translation. 93. “Norwegian Relations with the European Community,” FCO brief made for visit by Norwegian Foreign Minister to UK 27 June 1980, BNA, FCO 33/4581. 94. “Country Assessment Paper: Norway,” brief made for Minister of State for Europe Douglas Hurd’s visit to Norway, 27–28 September 1982, BNA, FCO 33/6767. With the Greek accession in 1981, the EC consisted of ten members. 95. “Norwegian Relations with Political Cooperation,” brief made for Willoch’s visit to London 10 March 1982, FCO, 3 March 1982, BNA, FCO 33/6265. 96. Gladstone to Lamb, 22 February 1980, BNA, FCO 28/4280. 97. Brief by C.M. James (WED), 22 February 1973, BNA, FCO 33/2285. 98. “Defensive Brief on Fisheries (Including Iceland) and Law of the Sea,” FCO brief for Hattersley’s visit to Norway, 20–23 April 1976, BNA, FCO 33/3068. 99. “Norway: Annual Review for 1976,” Scott to Foreign Secretary Anthony Crosland, 11 January 1977, BNA, FCO 33/3345. 100. “Fisheries,” brief by Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (henceforth MAFF) before Willoch’s visit to London 10 March 1982, 4 March 1982, BNA, FCO 33/6265. 101. Record of meeting between Callaghan and Frydenlund at NATO headquarter in Brussels, 13 December 1974, BNA, FCO 33/2592. 102. “Norway: Annual Review for 1973,” Selby to Douglas-Home, 3 January 1974, BNA, FCO 33/2587. 103. United Nations General Assembly, twenty-eighth session, 16 November 1973, resolution no 3067. https://legal.un.org/diplomaticconferences/ 1973_los/docs/english/res/a_res_3067_xxviii.pdf.

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104. “Anglo-Norwegian Continental Shelf,” FCO brief for Roy Hattersley’s lunch with Jens Evensen, 8 July 1974, BNA, FCO 33/2591. 105. “Defensive Brief on Fisheries (Including Iceland) and Law of the Sea,” FCO brief for Hattersley’s visit to Norway, 20–23 April 1976, BNA, FCO 33/3068. 106. “North Sea Fishing Limits. Line to Take,” brief made for visit of Norwegian Foreign Minister, 18 June 1975, BNA, FCO 33/2817. 107. Ibid. 108. “Fisheries,” brief by MAFF made for Willoch’s visit to London, 10 March 1982, 4 March 1982, BNA, FCO 33/6265. 109. Report on visit of Roy Jenkins to Norway, 3–4 July 1980, UK Oslo embassy, 8 July 1980, BNA, FCO 33/4590.

CHAPTER 7

The Establishment of the EEA and the European Union, 1984–1994

There is little of substance that divides us and much that unites: the Norwegian view of Europe may not yet be clearly focussed but it is certainly not federalist.1

British ambassador John Robson made this statement in 1990, but it could just as easily have been made in any post-war year. However, the decade from the mid-1980s was particularly eventful and displayed vividly how Norway and Britain struggled with each their relationship to an increasingly supranational Europe. After the 1973 member enlargement, the European integration process slowed down. But many saw the need for a more competitive Europe visà-vis other parts of the world. The answer became the EC’s agreement on the Single European Act in 1986, which effectively established the Single Market. This spurred further economic and political integration, subsequently leading to the formation of the European Union in 1993. These developments forced UK political parties to make a number of difficult and controversial decisions. Margaret Thatcher and the Tories were fairly positive to the principal ideas of the Single Market. However, when their European partners pushed for further integration, things became complicated, and this contributed to Thatcher’s downfall. Why did European integration turn out to be so toxic internally in the Conservative party? © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 G. K. Almlid, Britain and Norway in Europe Since 1945, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61473-7_7

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Norway, the perpetual reactive European integrationist, was also deeply affected by these EC developments. Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland feared that they would lead to further isolation in Europe, and she soon sought a link for Norway with the Single Market. This led to the EFTA-EC European Economic Area (EEA). But why did Brundtland shortly after decide to apply for EU membership? And how did this new run at membership compare to the one in 1972? The British-Norwegian relationship in the 1980s continued on the same trajectory as in the previous decade: relations were generally good, but the countries drifted somewhat further apart. A key question here is how they reacted to each other’s movements regarding the Single Market and the European Union.

Political Relations The British Conservative Party remained in power throughout this period. Margaret Thatcher was decisively re-elected in 1983 and achieved her third consecutive election victory in 1987 with a majority of 102 MPs. She also became a global political figure, unlike UK prime ministers for a long time before her. However, she was also controversial and often disliked among Britons.2 Largely due to disagreements on European policy, she was replaced by John Major in November 1990. He was a different kind of politician and person. May describes him as “relatively inexperienced and by no means charismatic”.3 In Norway, there was more instability. Conservative Prime Minister Kåre Willoch’s coalition government was replaced in 1986 by Labour and Gro Harlem Brundtland. She led a one-party minority government until 1996, except for one year from October 1989.4 Brundtland was a distinctive prime minister.5 With as many as eight female cabinet ministers, her government added to the already progressive image of the country. She was more outward-looking than her predecessors, Gerhardsen, Bratteli and Nordli. The latter, for instance, was described by a British ambassador as “obstinately disinterested in foreign affairs”.6 The two Labour parties drifted apart in this period. Charles D. Powell, who was both Thatcher’s and Major’s private secretary, commented that Brundtland, despite years as leader, “by persuasion seems more of a Social Democrat”.7 Clearly, the Norwegian Labour Party had been social democratic for many decades. This comment perhaps revealed a lack of knowledge about Norwegian politics within Whitehall, but it was

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probably also based on the image of the British Labour Party in the 1980s. While Brundtland was a moderate centre-leaning social democrat, Michael Foot moved British Labour to the left. The 1983 election manifesto has been described as the “longest suicide note in history”.8 The devastating election result for Labour demonstrated that British voters were not ready to move so far left. Foot and Labour also committed to taking Britain out of the EC. This significant move led a faction of the party to break away in 1981 and create the pro-European Social Democratic Party (SDP), with key figures like Roy Jenkins and David Owen.9 Later in the decade Labour moved more towards the centre with Neil Kinnock, and even further with Tony Blair in the 1990s. The party’s platform position to remove Britain from the EC was dropped in 1987. The British-Norwegian relationship was in general well-functioning during these years too. The two countries shared important interests: trade and North Sea cooperation was still substantial, and security cooperation was paramount. Good interpersonal relations also mattered. For example, the UK Oslo ambassador wrote about the year 1985: “once more we had a very full exchange of high level visits in both directions and, as always, these took place in the best of atmospheres”.10 However, Thatcher and Brundtland, who governed simultaneously for about three and a half years, did not get on well. The abovementioned Powell described their relationship as “prickly”.11 Representing different party families was one thing, but their strong personalities played an important part. For example, Powell warned Major before his first meeting with Brundtland: “she is a formidable lady of a nononsense type—so you had better pay attention, otherwise you will get the sharp edge of her ruler over the knuckles”.12 Many Norwegians disliked Thatcher, and her visit in September 1986 was met with loud and violent protests. Small but efficiently organised demonstrations captured media attention in both countries. At the same time, there were waves of Norwegian public sympathy and dismay that a close ally such as Britain was treated this way. The conservative national newspaper Aftenposten wrote that the response to the visit was “detrimental and shameful to ourselves”, and pointed its criticism at Brundtland, arguing that she was “repeatedly reeling off to her guests the issues on which Norway and Britain disagree; only Thatcher’s consistent politeness covered over the awkwardness”.13 The Thatcher-Brundtland period was a low point in personal relations between the two countries’ prime ministers in the period covered in this book.

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This relationship did nothing to reduce the gradual drifting apart of Norway and Britain politically and economically that had started in the previous decades. Britain was relatively more occupied with its EC partners compared to when they were together with Norway on the outside. And Oslo’s relationship to West-Germany grew stronger. For example, as the British ambassador reported to London, Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg, with his “near-perfect German” had a close friendship with his West German counterpart.14 The FCO considered that this “carries some threat to our traditional position in Norway”.15 The Norwegian government had also increased gas sales to France. This underlines how Norway continued to spread its foreign policy interests wider than it had in the first few decades after the war. For Britain, it was yet another sign of its diminishing role in international politics since 1945. Environmental issues were the principal irritant in the AngloNorwegian relationship during the 1980s. The main problem was acid rain. Already in 1974 the Norwegian government raised the issue with Britain, arguing that “the time has come … to fight emissions at their source”.16 The problem was polluted rain in southern Norway, carried by wind from coal-fired power stations in northern England. The Norwegians were also concerned about nuclear waste from Britain transported by the Gulf Stream to their fishing areas in the north. The UK government argued that these were not very important problems and not Britain’s fault. Willoch raised the issue with Thatcher, regretting that Britain would not take more responsibility for the acidification of lakes and rivers in Norway, and that it “threatened to affect our bilateral relations”.17 He was clearly influenced by Norwegian public opinion. The UK ambassador wrote that “Norwegians just cannot understand how one of their closest friends, probably the closest of all, can go on poisoning their countryside, as virtually all of them are convinced is the case”.18 Brundtland pressed the issue even harder.19 Her appointment of Sissel Rønbeck as Norway’s Minister for the Environment did not help solve the dispute. Seen from a British perspective, she was “a left-wing activist who seeks political mileage from the issue”.20 In the end, Brundtland and Thatcher agreed on a joint study that basically accepted the Norwegian position. The Tory government’s move from coal to gas and nuclear power as the primary sources for British energy also greatly reduced acid rain. Norwegian criticism of UK nuclear waste, however, continued into the new century.21

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These environmental issues were serious enough, but the way they were dealt with showed how two close friends work in international politics. Dialogue was positive, information flowed freely and there was much trust on the diplomatic level. There was never any real chance that these issues would significantly hurt the strong security and trade relations that existed between them.

Security and Defence The Cold War had for decades defined British and Norwegian security policy, but the 1980s brought about huge changes. US President Ronald Reagan adopted a tough approach towards the Soviet Union. His Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), often labelled “Star Wars”, was disliked by most European NATO members.22 Many of them also struggled with the Alliance’s decision to install new mid-range nuclear missiles in Europe. Thatcher and Willoch were reserved in their criticism for fear of damaging US relations. The former unequivocally chose the American side in internal NATO discussions. Thatcher and Reagan developed a good relationship with new Soviet leader Michael Gorbachev from 1985.23 But it was the US-Soviet connection that was all-important; the dialogue between their leaders led to disarmament treaties and eventually the fall of the Berlin Wall. Brundtland followed the American lead somewhat less than Thatcher did.24 The British government thought that her administration did not, for example, show enough firmness in resisting left-wing pressure to promote a Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone.25 The Socialist Left Party, which the government depended on for a majority in parliament, and a left wing inside Labour pressed Brundtland away from the moderate line she preferred. Strong opposition to nuclear weapons had developed since the early 1980s in many European countries. In Norway, the organisation No to Nuclear Weapons had over 100,000 members. Similarly, in Britain anti-nuclear demonstrations gathered several hundreds of thousands of protesters. The British Labour Party insisted, in opposition, that NATO adopt a “no first use” policy on nuclear weapons.26 Brundtland made Norway one of the “footnote nations”, contributing the first Norwegian footnote ever to a NATO communique in May 1986, about SDI.27 However, this did not last long. In 1988, the Norwegian government was “careful not to rock the NATO boat; no more NATO footnotes, no progress on a Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone, no problems about

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nuclear ships”.28 Thus, overall the first Brundtland years did not break significantly with the impression of Norway as a cooperative ally seen from Washington and London. A close British-Norwegian security partnership remained throughout the 1980s. A main UK objective was to “continue to encourage Norway to be a responsible and constructive member of the Alliance”.29 For the Norwegians, it was important to keep Britain committed to the defence of NATO’s northern flank. This was rather successful. Archer argues that by the end of the Cold War “the UK was quite closely engaged in plans for the defence of Norway should it be attacked”.30 Britain’s military role was second only to the USA. Importantly, it was in the UK’s interest to protect Norway for its own defences. As we have seen, the Soviets had reinforced their military naval strength in the north considerably. In addition, Soviet air power increased in the region.31 The British view was that “it is hard to see how our sea lanes could be defended in time of war if Norway’s vast coastline were in hostile hands”.32 The NATO northern flank had been strengthened to some degree in the 1970s, such as preparing Norwegian air bases for allied operations and earmarked US air force units. This continued in the 1980s when the heavy equipment needed for a US Marine Amphibious Brigade was pre-positioned in central Norway.33 Nonetheless, the British government had concerns about the quality of the Norwegian armed forces: “professional enthusiasm and excellent collaboration should not blind us to the fact that Norway’s defence capability is falling to critical levels”.34 The process that led to the Cold War ending highlighted some strategic differences between the USA and Western Europe. The European NATO members naturally welcomed better East-West relations, but they feared that Reagan would sacrifice European nuclear security in his efforts to make deals with Gorbachev.35 Moreover, the UK government, similar to the French, was sceptical of German reunification. One reason was that a strong Germany could further diminish Britain’s special relationship with the USA, another was a more distant fear that a unified Germany again would turn to the Russians.36 What was certain was that a stronger Germany would dominate the European Community even more. The EC had started the development towards what later would be its own foreign and security policy, which would potentially affect both Britain’s and Norway’s security balancing-point between Europe and America. The US relationship would remain more important, but neither wanted to be left out of EC developments in this area, member or not.

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Trade and Economy The 1980s were economically tumultuous. For example, the value of the London stock market fell by 22% in two days in October 1987. Britain and Norway followed some similar patterns, such as sharply rising house prices and solid economic growth during the so-called Yuppie years, the latter more extravagant in the UK. They also shared some economic downturns. But there were also differences. One was how state involvement in the economy remained stronger in Norway than in Britain.37 Moreover, the dramatic collapse in international oil prices particularly affected the Norwegian economy. It led to a massive deterioration of the balance of payments and indirectly to the downfall of the Willoch government in 1986. Brundtland’s Labour administration implemented an austerity programme that among other things reduced the inflation rate. But it was difficult to implement such policies because Norway’s economy was so open—practically half of what it produced was exported, and nearly half of what was consumed was imported. This increased Norwegian vulnerability in terms of international economic crises. However, in the longer perspective the Norwegian economy grew more than the British. By the early 1990s, it had recovered and inflation was 3.6%, the lowest in 20 years, and the balance of payments was positive again.38 In the period 1973–1992, Norway had an economic growth of 2.9%average increase in GDP per year, the highest of all Western European countries. Britain was in 12th place of the 16 measured, with a 1.5% average growth, despite a higher economic upturn towards the end of the 1980s.39 Britain’s position in the Norwegian market had declined for decades. Sweden and West Germany continued in the 1980s to be neck and neck as leading exporters to Norway, well ahead of Britain and the USA.40 The UK-Norwegian balance of trade was therefore mostly in Norway’s favour, for example, in 1990 it was £2.6 billion. Capital goods for Norway’s offshore industry made up the bulk of British exports. Norway ranked seventeenth in the UK’s export league. In 1990 two-thirds of Norway’s exports to the UK comprised oil and gas.41 It is therefore safe to say that cooperation and trade related to the North Sea was essential in British-Norwegian economic relations.

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European Integration We have seen that parting ways in 1972 in terms of EC membership caused a certain drift in the British-Norwegian relationship. This was not an intended objective for either of them but a natural consequence of their different organisational connections. At the same time, Britain became the awkward partner inside the EC, often obstructing further integration. Norway, on the other hand, adopted its “active” but vague European policy. Norway and the EFTA countries in particular were eager to supplement the EFTA-EC free-trade agreements. In 1977, the two organisations agreed on additional cooperation, resulting in extended exchange of information on sea and air transport, the environment, energy and economic and monetary policy, as well as scientific and technical research. But this was not substantial—EFTA wanted more. At a ministerial meeting in April 1979, the Association signalled a positive attitude to an EC Council approved report of December 1978, which included ways of developing further their common free-trade system. Key issues were rules of origin, agricultural trade, non-tariff trade restrictions, economic and monetary policy and transport.42 For members of both organisations, the increasing globalisation of trade and markets was important: to strengthen competitiveness it was necessary to cooperate closer. But there were several obstacles to more extensive EC-EFTA cooperation. The most important was the EC’s reserved attitude. They wanted to focus primarily on developing the Community within, and many members thought that there was a limit to how much they should sacrifice for countries that did not want to pay the price for full membership. The EC principally opposed an a-la-carte approach for outsiders. There was also the danger that this could tempt members to leave and get similar deals.43 This has always been an important EC/EU principle: third countries cannot significantly influence its policies and they simply have to take what is on offer. But Norway and the other EFTA members did not want to be treated as any third state. The Norwegian Foreign Ministry considered that the Community tended to neglect EFTA’s importance as a trading partner for the EC.44 It was pointed out that EFTA bought more from the EC than the USA, Japan and the Soviet Union combined. But a major problem, nonetheless, was that the EC-EFTA trade relationship was asymmetrical. Trade with the EC for EFTA countries was in 1977 46.6% of total exports and 54.1% of total imports; of the EC’s total

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exports 11.4% were to EFTA, and 8.5% of their total imports came from EFTA.45 Another obstacle was EFTA members’ different views on how to negotiate with the EC. Norway supported extended European cooperation but wanted it to develop on a pragmatic case by case basis. Institutionalisation or the development of additional formal links was not required.46 Moreover, the Norwegian government preferred bilateral Norway/EEC negotiations on most issues rather than a joint EFTA approach.47 Norway also differed from the other EFTA members since it wanted closest consultations with the EC on economic policy, while the others argued for such cooperation and consultation within the framework of the OECD.48 In April 1984, there was a summit in Luxembourg between all EFTA and EC member states, the first of its kind. It marked the abolition of the last remaining tariff barriers and quantitative restrictions in their industrial trade—thereby fully attaining the goal set more than ten years earlier. They had established the largest free-trade system in the world, with over 300 million consumers. The Norwegian government was “very satisfied” with the result of the Luxembourg meeting and considered that the joint declaration “brings forebodings of a new phase in the cooperation between EC and EFTA”.49 The organisations agreed to develop a European Economic Space with the abolishment of technical trade barriers, harmonising of standards and simplification of border formalities. Cooperation in research and development would also be expanded, similarly in fields such as transport, energy and environmental protection. The Luxembourg process was a step towards increased interdependence and an institutionally-based multilateral relationship containing the EC and EFTA. This looked good in principle. But it came with limited commitment. For many in EFTA, it fell far short of expectations.50 The heart of the matter was that if real progress were to be made in creating a common market covering all of Western Europe, the EC would have to push for it. However, Community members had to agree on their Single Market first. The Single European Act A fundamental part of the Treaty of Rome was a well-functioning internal European market. The customs union had been established in the late 1960s, but finding solutions for the internal market was very complex.

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Eurosclerosis in the 1970s halted the process, but it accelerated again from the mid-1980s. The important Single European Act (SEA), which took effect on 1 July 1987, became the first major revision of the Treaty of Rome. It lay the ground for the implementation of the Single Market by 1992. What were the main impulses behind the development of the SEA? It was a mix of transnational, supranational and national forces that overlapped in a way that made this development possible. Some point to the European Round Table of Industrialists.51 Founded in 1983 by multinational corporations, such as Volvo and Nestlé, this group advocated more free trade within Europe. It presented proposals on how to reduce trade barriers, which is thought to have influenced European Commission thinking on the SEA. From January 1985, the Commission was led by Jacques Delors, who undoubtedly was crucial for setting the wheels of European integration in motion again. In June, the Commission presented its White Paper on the completion of the internal market. It was a comprehensive document that demonstrated the complexity of establishing a common market of 12 sovereign European states. The big EC member states supported the development of the Single Market, and importantly, this included Britain. Perhaps out of character, in 1984 the Thatcher government presented to its Community partners a document outlining some solutions. For Britain, this was a way to avoid being side-lined in a “two-speed” Europe.52 The changes envisaged in the SEA also overlapped significantly with the Tories’ views on deregulation and a freer market. The changes opened for a common market in services and goods, removal of “non-tariff” barriers, and free movement of labour and capital. Thatcher argued that it was a “treaty for economic liberty”.53 It was also important that British businesses were expected to do well in the competition with Europe. However, there were negative effects related to the SEA, many of which were not clear to the British government when it promoted the plan in the early stages. Indeed, Thatcher later regretted signing the SEA.54 One aspect was that the Single Market did not entail “free” trade in the traditional sense of the word, which had benefitted Britain so much in previous centuries. This new market involved accepting a number of common standards, regulations and restrictions—which soon, despite having many benefits for the UK economy, would often be ridiculed and fuel Euroscepticism in Britain. Furthermore, it was problematic that the

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other EC members wanted far-reaching institutional changes to accompany the internal market.55 Britain therefore had to accept qualified majority decision-making in areas related to the market, except for the provisions relating to fiscal matters and the free movement of people. In effect, the Thatcher government accepted a more supranational Community. The SEA process also involved a certain UK commitment to moving towards economic and monetary union. This area, however, would prove to be too problematic. The European Economic Area When returning as prime minister in 1986, Gro Harlem Brundtland had a clear idea that Norway should seek closer cooperation with the European Community. The country soon joined EC organisations for scientific and technological cooperation.56 The government also worked to obtain consultative status within the European Political Cooperation. However, the SEA was the watershed development. Concerns about being excluded from the EC internal market were noticeable in all EFTA states, but particularly strong in Norway. Brundtland and Foreign Minister Frydenlund visited Brussels in January 1987 and returned persuaded that the momentum towards the completion of the internal market was irreversible.57 In May 1987, Norway became the first EFTA country to produce a White Paper on Europe and the internal market.58 It concluded that existing agreements with the EC, whose share of Norwegian exports was 70%, were insufficient—Norway should therefore adapt to the Community’s internal market to avoid new trade barriers. The government wanted a new relationship with the EC to develop in parallel with the implementation of the Single Market.59 Brundtland realised that Norway had to take a pro-active position to achieve this. Together with the Swedish government, she informally approached Delors, who was a fellow social democrat. He liked the Nordic states and hit it off with the Norwegian prime minister. Brundtland and Delors met several times in the autumn of 1988 and winter of 1989, and together they hatched the main ideas of what would be the EEA.60 Officially, it would come from Delors, though. In a speech to the European Parliament in January 1989, he outlined “a more structured partnership with common decision-making and administrative institutions” between the two organisations.61 EFTA governments welcomed

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the initiative. But as often was the case earlier, they had problems operating in a coordinated manner. At the March 1989 EFTA summit in Oslo, it proved difficult to find a common way forward. Observers agreed that the meeting would have ended fruitlessly had it not been for “Brundtland’s insisting, sometimes downright threatening leadership”.62 After taking office in October 1989, the Syse government continued Norway’s lead role within EFTA in discussions with the EC.63 This government began the EEA negotiations for Norway in June 1990, but it was so divided on this issue that it eventually collapsed. The Conservative Party had since the 1960s wanted Norway to join the EC. The Centre Party was highly sceptical in general and refused to accept the Conservatives’ willingness to consider the discontinuation of the Norwegian concession laws. Brundtland was back at the helm in the autumn of 1990 and concluded the negotiations a year later. The EEA negotiations were demanding. The EFTA countries were eager to obtain access to the Single Market from its planned completion, on 1 January 1993, to avoid any interim trade discrimination. But the EC was the dominant party in all respects. EFTA had to give more, and accepting the Community acquis on matters pertaining to the internal market was only the beginning. Delors and the EC rejected a joint decision-making mechanism, effectively refusing to give EFTA influence over EC policymaking.64 And since the EEA would be dynamic, all new EU rules and regulations for the internal market would automatically be implemented without new negotiations. The British government sought to play a helpful role vis-à-vis Norway and other EFTA members in the EEA process. At a meeting with Brundtland in September 1986, Thatcher said that Britain, holding the presidency of the EC, “would do all it could to promote wider agreement between the EC and EFTA”.65 And it seems that the Norwegians generally valued the British support for the EEA. For the northern EC states such as Britain and Denmark the new members, Greece, Spain and Portugal, had moved the centre of gravity in the Community towards the south. This was an argument for closer EC relations with the more northerly-oriented and richer EFTA. But British help had its limits. It was important that no country could cherry-pick from the EC; the FCO considered: “the Norwegians must not be allowed to imagine that they could enjoy too many of the fruits of membership without actually joining”.66 Indeed, this was arguably the approach Britain itself often preferred in its entire period as EC/EU member.

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A domestic Norwegian ratification debate followed the May 1992 signing of the EEA Treaty. It was a contentious issue but nowhere near the heat and passion of the EC/EU membership battles. Most Norwegian voters and parties did not have the EEA as their primary position—it was a national compromise. Still, an opinion poll revealed that more Norwegians supported the Treaty over EC membership or the option of not entering the EEA.67 National control over agriculture and fisheries made the treaty acceptable to many, and it had a clause opening for national reservations of new directives. Yet the question of whether there should be a referendum soon emerged, supported by some of the smaller parties.68 They argued that the EEA infringed on national self-governance just as much as the EC would have in 1972. However, the Storting majority maintained that the treaty did not involve ceding substantial sovereignty to a supranational institution. This was despite the fact that, as a consequence of the EEA agreement, EFTA established two supranational bodies: the Surveillance Authority (ESA) and the Court. Their mission was effectively to ensure that EFTA countries followed the same rules as the EC. Although a referendum was ruled out, it was acknowledged that entering the EEA involved abandoning some national sovereignty. Consequently, according to the Constitution, a three-quarters Storting majority was required.69 The Centre Party and the Socialist Left Party opposed the EEA, the former focusing on national self-rule and the latter on social dumping and exploitation of workers. But apart from seven representatives, all the other parties were in favour. On 16 October 1992, the Storting adopted the agreement by a majority of 130 to 35. Norway has been a member of the EEA since it became active in January 1994. Maastricht and the European Union Not only did the SEA establish the provisions for the internal market, it also propelled the momentum towards the Maastricht Treaty and the transformation of the EC into the European Union.70 Important new areas were a common currency, common social policies and a common foreign and security policy. For Margaret Thatcher, the freetrade elements of the SEA had been appealing, but many of these further steps were problematic. One problem was Commission President Delors’ promotion of common European tax and social legislation, which was very different

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from fundamental Tory thinking. He argued to the British Trade Union Congress in 1988 for a “social Europe” to complement the creation of the Single Market, and that the EC should be the guarantor of workers’ rights in Europe.71 Another difficulty was French and German support for a foreign and security policy included in the EC. Britain, among other members, opposed this. It was feared that it would undermine NATO.72 This view was shared by the Americans. The plans for a common European currency were particularly difficult. Already before Britain joined, the Werner report of 1970 had explored an economic and monetary union for the EC.73 It stressed the need to coordinate policies, narrow exchange rate margins, integrate capital markets and not least establish a common currency with a central European bank. Although a natural component of an internal market, Thatcher opposed this move. Germany and France went ahead nonetheless. She also would not have Britain join the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), which was established in 1979 to reduce exchange rate fluctuations. Thatcher argued that sterling was far more vulnerable to variations in the dollar than other European currencies—basically wanting to maintain independence in this area.74 Other key members of her cabinet, however, promoted joining the ERM, not least Chancellor Nigel Lawson and Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe. Their successors, John Major and Douglas Hurd respectively, “at last forced Thatcher to concede the inevitable and join the ERM in October 1990”.75 The extensive developments in the EC contributed to growing British opposition to Europe. In the 1970s, a large majority of UK newspapers had supported EC membership. By the late 1980s, the national press had become predominantly Eurosceptic. Indeed, Thatcher moved in a similar direction in her premiership. She strongly opposed a European union. In her famous Bruges speech in September 1988, she even compared the ideas of a more federal, centralised Europe with the traditional system of the Soviet Union.76 Thatcher grew outright anti-European, often signalling that there was a fundamental conflict between continental and British interests. Her rhetoric aroused enthusiasm in the growing number of Eurosceptics. However, many senior Cabinet members disliked Thatcher’s approach. Howe said that it was a danger to Britain, “minimising our influence and maximising our chance of being once again shut out”.77 The Cabinet discord reflected how divided the Tory Party had become on Europe. The resignations of Michael Heseltine, Lawson

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and finally Howe were serious blows to Thatcher’s government. Eventually Cabinet opposition was so strong that she was ousted from office in November 1990. The removal of Thatcher generated hopes among those who wanted deeper European integration. Signals from Major were initially positive. He soon declared that his aim for Britain in the EC was to be “at the very heart of Europe, working with our partners in building the future”.78 Yet Major’s government followed a line which was little different from Thatcher’s.79 It decided not to join the common currency, which was agreed at the European Council in December 1991. This was criticised domestically. Pro-Europeans wanted Britain to join the euro, as this currency later would be called. The anti-side argued that the opt-out did not protect Britain from paying for poorer members. For many, it was also symbolically difficult to give up the pound. This illustrates how controversial this question was for Britain. It would also trouble the subsequent Blair government. Britain also opted out of the common social policies, as the Social Chapter was omitted from the Maastricht Treaty and replaced by a protocol where the other eleven members implemented a common policy in this area. The heart of the matter was that Major led a fundamentally divided party on Europe. The prime minister was a pragmatist, but handling the Maastricht process domestically turned out to be extremely difficult. This was not an exceptionally British phenomenon though. There was significant opposition to European integration across the EC. In a French referendum, only 51% voted “yes” to Maastricht. Indeed, Danish voters rejected the Treaty by a slim majority, but accepted it in a second referendum in 1993 after Denmark was offered some opt-outs in the Edinburgh Agreement.80 However, this does not necessarily reflect completely a negative attitude to European integration. Like Franklin, van der Eijk and Marsh argue, voting in these referendums was closely linked to the popularity of the government in power.81 British Eurosceptics demanded a referendum, but Major refused. The battle would take place in the House of Commons. Major managed to secure a fourth successive win for the Tories in the 1992 general election, but the majority was reduced to 21 and would subsequently shrink after several by-election defeats. Later in 1992, Major suffered a stinging defeat as Britain had to withdraw from the ERM when speculation forced the government to spend some £8 million pounds in vain to try to maintain the value of the pound—later labelled as

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Black Wednesday.82 For the continental states, a full monetary union was the answer to similar problems, but for Britain this setback rather contributed to more anti-Europeanness. Major was undermined politically and portrayed as a British prime minister who “allowed other European leaders to use him as a doormat”.83 The ERM fiasco made Maastricht ratification even more difficult. Major lost control over his own party. Eurosceptic backbenchers voted with the opposition so that the House dismissed government motions. But the prime minister survived a vote of confidence. Eventually 324 to 316 voted in favour of the Maastricht Treaty. However, as Marr comments, “it came at appalling personal and political cost”.84 This in no way ended Euroscepticism in the Conservative Party. Labour and the Tories were gradually switching positions on Europe. The European Union would be far from a complete federal state. A three-pillar structure was established: the EC with the internal market and customs union was largely supranational, while the other two, justice and home affairs and foreign and security policy, were intergovernmental. Regarding the latter, John Major predicted in 1991 that “it was more likely to be a question of a little more co-ordination”.85 This was largely correct. Moreover, the subsidiarity principle, that solutions would first be sought at a national level before becoming a Community matter, was further emphasised in the EU. Nevertheless, the Maastricht Treaty entailed several steps in a supranational direction, such as more majority voting in the Council of Ministers and new powers passed to the European Parliament. In this light, it was perhaps a little odd that Norway decided to apply for EU membership. Norway and EU Membership Many consider that for Brundtland and Labour EEA membership was meant to be a way of easing Norway into full EC membership.86 If Norwegians could get used to being part of the Single Market, the idea of joining would be easier to sell later. Hansson and Teigene, however, maintain that at the time when the EEA talks began Brundtland saw it as an independent alternative.87 Yet there is little doubt that she hinted that it would make EC membership more easily accessible in the future. For the Conservative Party, the EEA was undoubtedly a step towards EC membership.

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In February 1989, David Dain, the Head of the Western European Department in the FCO, wrote internally: “even on the most adventurous assumptions, a Norwegian application would be unlikely before the mid1990s”.88 This was a sound analysis at the time, based on Brundtland’s thinking—but we know now that it was wrong. The game-changer was other EFTA members’ preferences for full EC membership. Austria applied as early as 1989. More important for Norway, in 1990 Sweden rather surprisingly announced it would apply. Norway’s closest neighbour had serious economic problems.89 And the end of the Cold War made membership more appealing to the neutral Swedes. This mattered even more to the Finns, who applied in 1992.90 Norwegian fears of being isolated subsequently grew stronger. Brundtland was convinced that membership was the right option. Again, as with Britain in the 1960s, Norway moved towards Europe as a result of other countries’ initial moves. However, pursuing membership was politically risky for the Labour Party, which was divided among its rank and file.91 The Brundtland government thus proceeded with caution. The first hurdle was to obtain Storting support for an application: 104 to 55 voted in favour in November 1992, only a month after it had ratified the EEA agreement. Fifteen of the opponents were Labour MPs. Inside the party, the antiside established an ad hoc organisation called Social Democrats against EU. This was a blow for Brundtland and the party leadership. Two parties came out strongly against membership: the Centre Party and the Socialist Left Party. They had a huge spike in their support in the polls, cleverly maximising public fears over membership. In the 1993 Storting election EU membership was the all-important issue, and the Centre Party grew from 11 to 33 seats. The party was led by the charismatic, and “fanatically anti-EC”,92 Anne Enger Lahnstein, who took the lead in the “no” campaign. The Labour leadership, as well as the Conservative Party, emphasised several benefits of membership: closer cooperation on foreign policy, decline in unemployment and environmental challenges. A fundamental argument for the “yes” side was that membership would give the country a “seat at the table” when decisions that would affect Norway regardless of membership were made. Sovereignty was the core argument for the “no” parties and organisations. In the decades after the Second World War, Norway had increasingly been accustomed to more international cooperation, economic

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integration and travel abroad. Most Norwegians also knew that the EC had not erased nation states in Europe. However, the fear of losing sovereignty remained deep among Norwegian voters and manifested itself in different policy areas.93 As in 1970–1972, national control over agriculture and fisheries became the virtually insoluble issues for Norwegian negotiators.94 Brundtland told John Major before the negotiations commenced that fish “had lost the referendum in 1972”, and the issue was still so sensitive for Norway that a good deal was necessary.95 However, the EU, now with Britain as a member, chose the same line as in 1972: permanent exemptions from the common rules were unacceptable. The deal on fisheries became a tough sell for the Norwegian “yes” camp. Norway would not have to share its waters with other EU members in the first decade, but arrangements beyond that rested on their goodwill in new negotiations. Norwegian fishermen feared that foreigners eventually would come and fish out the national waters. Similar concerns related to agriculture: Norwegian farmers would lose in the competition with European farmers if the massive protections they benefitted from were removed. Sovereignty mattered also on the issue of petroleum, the most important source of national revenue. Just before the negotiations commenced the EU presented a draft directive that challenged members’ self-rule of oil and gas resources.96 This could mean that national preferences when granting licences for exploration and exploitation would no longer be possible. The Norwegian government argued strongly against this. In the end, the EU changed the final version of the directive to accommodate Norway’s position.97 Nevertheless, it fuelled the Norwegians’ suspicion that EU membership involved surrendering national sovereignty. Perhaps the most important aspect connected to sovereignty was the general fear of supranationalism and federalism. The anti-side argued that membership entailed surrendering power from the Storting to foreigners, many of whom were not even elected. The no-side also used the word “union” consciously, since it had negative connotations in a country that had been the little brother in unions for centuries until 1905. Opponents in rural areas often said “it is far to Oslo, and even further to Brussels”. This was why Brundtland based her chief negotiator, Eivinn Berg, in Oslo, “to ensure that he kept his feet on the ground”.98 Moreover, quite a few Norwegians were sceptical of foreigners’ intentions and cultures, similar to the anti-side in the UK. In his resignation speech, Foreign Secretary Howe said of Margaret Thatcher and her likes,

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that they had an image of Europe as “a Continent that is possibly teeming with ill-intentioned people scheming to extinguish democracy, to dissolve our national identities, to lead us through the back door into a federal Europe”.99 When examining the EU debate in the 1990s, this could also have been a characterisation of many on the Norwegian anti-side. Similar to 1972, the Norwegian EU membership issue became an elite-grass-roots battle. The “yes” campaign struggled to connect with ordinary voters, possibly because their arguments appealed more to the senses. The “no”-side played more on feelings, but it was also better organised. Nei til EU , the national anti-EU organisation, had 145,000 members, more than any Norwegian political party. The European Movement had only 35,000 members. The “yes” campaign was therefore fighting a defensive battle. The government waited until the negotiation results were clear before coming out completely for membership. By then, the anti-movements had a firm grip on the Norwegian public. Yet in the final weeks before the referendum “yes” was catching up and there was a tie in an opinion poll the day before the vote. In the end, 52.2% voted “no”.100 The turnout of more than 89% was a good illustration of how important this issue was. Voting patterns were remarkably similar to 1972: the higher the education, the higher the income and the higher the occupational status, the more likely one was to vote “yes”.101 The most important voting indicator though, was the further away from Oslo and the big cities, the higher was the share of “no” votes.102 Membership was a hard sell in Norway. One aspect was the attitude of the people. For many, it was a point not to follow the establishment. A British ambassador expressed it aptly: “Norwegian opinion is a mulish thing, that will neither be led nor driven”.103 But there were other more concrete reasons. The economy had recovered after struggling for some years. Increasing oil revenues had made Norway one of the world’s wealthiest countries per capita. And oil and gas were not threatened by EU tariffs or quantitative restrictions of any importance. This made the economic arguments for joining less effective. Related to this was the EEA. Originally thought to grease the wheels for membership, it probably had the opposite effect. Having ensured access to the Single Market, EU membership became less important for many. Finally, security policy was not really at stake. Certainly, the EU had ambitions in this area, but NATO, the cornerstone of Norwegian foreign policy, looked to continue beyond the end of the Cold War.

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Views Across the North Sea Despite different starting points, in the early 1990s both Britain and Norway decided whether or not to join the European Union. In a bilateral perspective, there was a certain imbalance in how important the other country’s conclusion was. In Norway, there was some interest in the politics surrounding the UK Maastricht ratification process. However, it was not the same as in the 1950s and 1960s—when whatever Britain decided would have vital impact on Norway’s European policy. Now it was largely a matter of general interest in British and European politics and not how the outcome would affect Norway. Among those who had views on what was a preferable outcome, opinions shadowed views on Norwegian membership: supporters considered it beneficial that Britain was closely integrated in the EU, while the anti-side cherished more problems for further European integration. EU membership was after all a more fundamental question for Norway, which perhaps made it more natural for Britain to have an opinion about it. The UK government officially stated a positive attitude. After being handed the Norwegian formal letter of application for membership in November 1992, Major told Brundtland that “this was one of the nicest letters he had received this year”.104 He emphasised that Norway’s natural place was in the EU, and that Britain “would do everything possible to facilitate Norwegian membership”.105 Britain had economic and political self-interest in promoting Norwegian membership. It was expected that Norway would adapt easily and be a “substantial net contributor to the budget”.106 Politically, Britain wanted the EU’s balance skewed less to the south. As early as 1979 the FCO considered: “with the accession of the three Mediterranean applicants we shall be in need of a stiffening of the northern tier”.107 Furthermore, as we have seen, there was a shared UK-Norwegian view about the importance of retaining national power. It was also expected that Norway as a NATO ally would play a constructive part in EU political cooperation.108 However, there were also some concerns. Major’s Private Secretary, Charles Powell, considered that, “they are basically socialist in orientation and believers in high public spending”, so he advised not to “lean over backwards to get them in”.109 Still, the general view within Whitehall was that it was in the UK’s interest to have Norway inside. But Britain played a reserved role in the Norwegian process. The FCO permanent under-secretary, John Fretwell, concluded: “I doubt whether

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we can influence the evolution of Norwegian opinion about EC membership very far in either direction”.110 This was a sensible consideration. Experiences from both referendum battles in Norway have shown that the public do not care much for foreign meddling—similar to how Britons have felt when deciding their relations to Europe.

Conclusions This period involved huge developments for British and Norwegian foreign policy. The most important was the termination of the Cold War. It was essentially a positive development seen from Oslo and London. In the next chapter, we will see how they dealt with the new security situation from 1990. Bilateral relations were predominantly good, but the pattern of drifting apart continued. Being on different sides in European integration mattered, as did Norway’s increasingly wider foreign policy focus, including more trade with Germany than Britain. The countries also developed differently in terms of economic and social policy—Thatcher’s changes in the British society were more radical than developments in Norway. Britain strengthened its role as an awkward European. It chose to opt out of important new types of EU cooperation, and domestic Euroscepticism grew rapidly. The SEA was for many Britons seen as the end point of European integration for the UK, and even too much for some. When continental EU members pushed for more, it created considerable internal problems for Britain, and the Conservative Party in particular. More integration would move its foreign policy balance even more towards Europe, and importantly, it challenged the core British belief in intergovernmentalism. Ceding power from the House of Commons to the European Parliament, the bureaucratic Commission and other national governments was hard to accept. On the other hand, by not committing fully to the new Europe, Britain risked becoming a second-grade member. The changes in the EC/EU represented great challenges for Norway as well, prompting the need for a renewed European policy. Prime Minister Brundtland led the way in establishing the EEA, and subsequently, towards a new Norwegian membership application. Her efforts had mixed success.

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Although different in important respects, Britain’s Maastricht process and Norway’s EU membership battle had important similarities. It was a question of whether or not to join the European Union. There were similar dividing lines: those afraid of losing sovereignty and national character on the one side, and those more open to free competition and international commitments on the other. In Britain, the main battles took place in Westminster, in Norway across the country between the people. This generated different national debates. The Norwegian referendum campaign mobilised and divided the society to a larger degree. The EC/EU membership question has been the most controversial in Norway since 1945. It demonstrated how the use of a referendum approach to a problem can fuel considerable political divisions, much like what was seen in the 2016 Brexit referendum.

Notes 1. UK Oslo ambassador John Robson to Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, 10 April 1990, British National Archives (henceforth BNA), FCO 160/283. 2. Andrew Marr, A History of Modern Britain (London: Pan Macmillan, 2008), 405–406. 3. Alex May, Britain and Europe Since 1945 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), 79. 4. Jan P. Syse (Conservatives) was prime minister for about a year in a coalition government with the Centre Party and the Christian Democrats. 5. See for example Steinar Hansson and Ingolf Håkon Teigene, Makt og Mannefall: Historien om Gro Harlem Brundtland (Oslo: Cappelen, 1992). 6. Despatch on the Secretary of State’s visit to Norway 26–28 October 1979, UK Oslo ambassador Archie Lamb, 30 October 1979, BNA, FCO 33/4291. 7. Brief by Charles Powell for Major’s meeting with Brundtland 13 February 1991, 12 February 1991, BNA, PREM 19/3867. 8. Mark Garnett, Simon Mabon, and Robert Smith, British Foreign Policy Since 1945 (London: Routledge, 2018), 208. 9. John Callaghan, The Labour Party and Foreign Policy: A History (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), 282. In 1988 the majority of SDP merged into what is today known as the Liberal Democrats. 10. “Norway: annual review for 1985”, UK Oslo ambassador William Bentley to Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe, 21 January 1985, BNA, FCO 33/8892.

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11. Powell brief 13 February 1991, 12 February 1991, BNA, PREM 19/3867. 12. Ibid. 13. Editorial, Aftenposten, 15 September 1986. My translation. 14. “Norway: annual review for 1988”, Robson to Howe, 19 January 1989, BNA, FCO 33/10641. 15. “About Norway: annual review 1988”, Guy (Western European Department [henceforth WED]), Foreign and Commonwealth Office (henceforth FCO) to Robson, 13 March 1989, BNA, FCO 33/10641. 16. Record of meeting with Tor Halvorsen (Norwegian minister of environment) and his officials and UK officials, FCO, 8 July 1974, BNA, FCO 33/2591. 17. Minutes of Thatcher’s meeting with Willoch in the House of Commons 27 November 1985, Thatcher’s private secretary, BNA, FCO 33/8345. 18. “Norway: annual review for 1985”, Bentley to Howe, 21 January 1985, BNA, FCO 33/8892. 19. Report on Thatcher’s talks with Brundtland, Oslo 12 September 1986, Powell, BNA, FCO 33/8901. 20. “Norway: annual review for 1986, and valedictory despatch”, Bentley to Howe, 9 February 1987, BNA, FCO 33/9427. 21. Clive Archer, “Norway and the United Kingdom in the High North,” in Britain and Norway: Special Relationships, ed. Helge Ø. Pharo and Patrick Salmon (Oslo: Akademika, 2012), 330. 22. Clive Archer and Ingrid Sogner, Norway, European Integration and Atlantic Security (London: Sage, 1998), 100. 23. Garnett, Mabon, and Smith, British Foreign Policy, 214; 217. 24. Olav Riste, Norway’s Foreign Relations —A History (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2001), 231. 25. “Norway 1986”, David Dain (Head of WED) commenting on UK Oslo ambassador’s annual review for Norway, 13 March 1987, BNA, FCO 33/9427. 26. Len Scott, “Labour and the Bomb: The First 80 Years,” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944–) 82, no. 4 (2006): 692–693. 27. Robert C. Hughes, SDI: A View from Europe (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1990), 226–227. 28. “Norway: annual review for 1988”, Robson to Howe, 19 January 1989, BNA, FCO 33/10641. 29. Ibid. 30. Archer, “Norway and the United Kingdom,” 316. 31. Rolf Tamnes, The United States and the Cold War in the High North (London: Dartmouth, 1991), 287.

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32. “Norway: annual review for 1986, and valedictory despatch”, Bentley to Howe, 9 February 1987, BNA, FCO 33/9427. 33. Riste, Norway’s Foreign Relations, 225–226. 34. “Norway: annual review for 1987”, Robson to Howe, 11 January 1988, BNA, FCO 33/10060. 35. Garnett, Mabon, and Smith, British Foreign Policy, 217–218. 36. Ibid., 221–222. 37. Dag Harald Claes, “Norsk Olje- og Gasspolitikk,” in Norges Utenrikspolitikk, ed. Torbjørn L. Knutsen, Gunnar Sørbø, and Svein Gjerdåker (Oslo: Cappelen, 1997). See also Chapter 6. 38. FCO brief for Major’s meeting with Brundtland in London 25 November 1992, 23 November 1992, BNA, PREM 19/3867. 39. Nicholas Crafts and Gianni Toniolo, “Postwar Growth: An Overview,” in Economic Growth in Europe Since 1945, ed. Nicholas Crafts and Gianni Toniolo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 40. “Norway: annual review for 1986, and valedictory despatch”, Bentley to Howe, 9 February 1987, BNA, FCO 33/9427. 41. Powell’s brief for Major’s meeting with Brundtland 13 February 1991, 12 February 1991, BNA, PREM 19/3867. 42. “EF/EFTA. Erklæring fra Ministerrådet i Bodø om utviklingen av samarbeidsrelasjonene”, Norwegian Foreign Ministry (henceforth NFM) to Ministry of Commerce and Shipping, 30 April 1979, Norwegian Foreign Ministry Archive (henceforth NFMA) 1970–1979, 44.36/5. 43. Lise Rye, Norge i Europa (Bergen: Fagbokforlaget, 2019), 94. 44. “Norge/EF/EFTA”, background brief for the Foreign Minister, NFM to Norway’s EC embassy in Brussels, 28 April 1983, NFMA 1970–1979, 44.36/5/37. 45. Rye, Norge i Europa, 99. 46. “EF/EFTA. Erklæring fra Ministerrådet i Bodø om utviklingen av samarbeidsrelasjonene”, NFM to Ministry of Commerce and Shipping, 30 April 1979, NFMA 1970–1979, 44.36/5. 47. “EF/EFTA-samarbeid”, NFM brief made for the Nordic foreign ministers meeting in Copenhagen 29–30 March 1979, 16 March 1979, NFMA 1970–1979, 44.36/5. 48. Record of EFTA ministerial meeting in Bodø 21–22 May 1979, Norwegian EFTA delegation in Geneva, 13 June 1979, NFMA 1970–1979, 44.36/2. 49. “EF, EFTA. Økonomisk samarbeid”, NMF brief for Willoch’s talk with Chancellor Kohl 6 September 1984, 24 August 1984, NFMA 1970– 1979, 44.36/5/38. My translation. 50. Sieglinde Gstöhl, Reluctant Europeans: Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland in the Process of Integration (London: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 148.

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51. Rye, Norge i Europa, 111–112. 52. May, Britain and Europe, 71. 53. Margaret Thatcher, Statecraft: Strategies for a Changing World (New York: Harper Collins, 2002), 372. 54. May, Britain and Europe, 74. 55. Ibid., 72. 56. Riste, Norway’s Foreign Relations, 249. 57. “Norway: annual review for 1987”, Robson to Howe, 11 January 1988, BNA, FCO 33/10060. 58. Norwegian Government, “Norge, EF og europeisk samarbeid”, White Paper (St.meld.) 61 (1986–87), 22 May 1987. 59. Ibid., 33. 60. Hansson and Teigene, Makt og Mannefall, 255–256. 61. Jacques Delors, address to the members of the European Parliament 17 January 1989, Bulletin of the European Communities (Luxembourg: Office for official publications of the European Communities, 1989), 1/89. 62. Hansson and Teigene, Makt og Mannefall, 258. My translation. 63. FCO brief for Thatcher’s meeting with Syse 23 March 1990, 20 March 1990, BNA, PREM 3867. 64. Sigliende Gstöhl, “EFTA and the European Economic Area or the Politics of Frustration”, in Cooperation and Conflict 29, no. 4 (1994): 340. 65. Report on Thatcher’s talks with Brundtland, Oslo 12 September 1986, Powell, BNA, FCO 33/8901. 66. “Norway 1986”, Dain commenting on UK Oslo ambassador’s annual review for Norway, 13 March 1987, BNA, FCO 33/9427. 67. Christine Ingebrigtsen, The Nordic States and European Unity (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 179–180. 68. Archer and Sogner, Norway, European Integration, 48. 69. This was based on paragraph 93 in the Norwegian Constitution, added in 1963. See Chapter 4. 70. The end of the Cold War was also a driver behind the Maastricht Treaty (Desmond Dinan, Europe Recast: A History of European Union, 2nd ed. [Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2014], chapter 7). 71. Garnett, Mabon, and Smith, British Foreign Policy, 225. 72. May, Britain and Europe, 81. 73. European Communities, “Report to the Council and Commission on the Realisation by stages of Economic and Monetary Union in the Community”, “Werner Report”, supplement to Bulletin 11-1970 of the European Communities, Luxembourg 8 October 1970, https://ec.eur opa.eu/economy_finance/publications/pages/publication6142_en.pdf.

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74. Matthew Smith, Policy-Making in the Treasury: Explaining Britain’s Chosen Path on European Economic and Monetary Union (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 66–83. 75. May, Britain and Europe, 76. 76. Margaret Thatcher, speech to the College of Europe, Bruges, 20 September 1988. https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/ 107332. 77. Parliament Debates (UK), Commons, vol. 180, col. 465, 13 November 1990. 78. Robert Taylor, Major (London: Haus Publishing, 2006), 45. 79. May, Britain and Europe, 80. 80. Worre, Torben, “First No, Then Yes: The Danish Referendums on the Maastricht Treaty 1992 and 1993,” Journal of Common Market Studies 33, no. 2 (1995). 81. Mark N. Franklin, Cees van der Eijk and Michael Marsh, “Referendum Outcomes and Trust in Government: Public Support for Europe in the Wake of Maastricht,” West European Politics 18, no. 3 (1995). 82. May, Britain and Europe, 83. 83. Garnett, Mabon, and Smith, British Foreign Policy, 242. 84. Andrew Marr, A History of Modern Britain, 494. 85. Minutes of Major’s meeting with Brundtland 13 February 1991, Powell, 13 February 1991, BNA, PREM 19/3867. 86. Archer and Sogner, Norway, European Integration, 49. 87. Hansson and Teigene, Makt og Mannefall, 260. 88. Dain commenting on Robson’s “Norway: annual review of 1988”, 6 February 1989, BNA, FCO 33/10641. 89. Rye, Norge i Europa, 153. 90. Tapio Raunio and Teija Tiilikainen, Finland in the European Union (London and Portland: Frank Cass, 2003), 21–24. 91. Rolf Tamnes, Oljealder 1965–1995, vol. 6 of Norsk utenrikspolitisk historie (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1997), 239. 92. “Norway: annual review for 1991”, UK Oslo ambassador David Ratford to Hurd 17 January 1992, BNA, FCO 160/308/13. 93. Self-rule and sovereignty was by far the most important argument for “no” voters. See Marianne Ryghaug and Anders Todal Jenssen, Den store Styrkeprøven: Om EU -avstemningen i Norsk Politikk: Sluttrapport fra Folkeavstemningsprosjektet (Trondheim: Tapir, 1999), 19. 94. Tamnes, Oljealder, 242–246. 95. Minutes of Major’s meeting with Brundtland in London 25 November 1992, Stephen Wall (Major’s Private Secretary), 25 November 1992, BNA, PREM 19/3867. 96. Tamnes, Oljealder, 241. 97. Riste, Norway’s Foreign Relations, 251.

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98. Minutes of Major’s meeting with Brundtland in London 25 November 1992, Wall, 25 November 1992, BNA, PREM 19/3867. 99. Grant Jordan, The British Administrative System: Principles Versus Practice (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), 208. 100. Referendums in the three other EFTA states had “yes” majorities: Austria 66.6%, Finland 56.9% and Sweden 52.2%. 101. Hilde Rudlang, “EU-undersøkelsen 1994: Dokumentasjonsrapport,” Statistics Norway, Notat 96/21, 1996, https://www.ssb.no/a/histstat/ not/not_9621.pdf. 102. Ryghaug and Todal Jenssen, Den store Styrkeprøven, 37–41. 103. “Norway: annual review for 1991”, Ratford to Hurd, 17 January 1991, BNA, FCO 160/308/13. 104. Minutes of Major’s meeting with Brundtland in London 25 November 1992, Wall, 25 November 1992, BNA, PREM 19/3867. 105. Ibid. 106. FCO brief for Thatcher’s meeting with Syse 23 March 1990, 20 March 1990, BNA, PREM 3867. 107. “Scandinavia/EEC”, Gladstone (Western European Department, FCO) to Bullard, 30 July 1979, BNA, FCO 33/4290. 108. FCO brief for Thatcher’s meeting with Syse 23 March 1990, 20 March 1990, BNA, PREM 3867. 109. Powell brief for Major’s meeting with Brundtland 13 February 1991, 12 February 1991, BNA, PREM 19/3867. 110. Ratford to Chalker, 29 January 1988. Fretwell commented at the bottom of the letter, 2 February 1988, BNA, FCO 33/10060.

CHAPTER 8

Norwegian Europeanisation and British Opt-Outs, 1995–2009

And any country which stays outside the EU but wants access to its markets, such as Norway, still has to accept all the single market legislation, the decisions of the European Commission and the rulings of the European Court of Justice.1

Tony Blair’s words from 2001 illustrate a fundamental challenge for both Britain and Norway. Their economies relied heavily on access to the Single Market—but it came with a democratic price that put their relationships with Europe under pressure domestically. In 1995, it was evident that Britain and Norway would remain on different sides in Europe. The House of Commons had narrowly ratified the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, while the Norwegian electorate had turned down EU membership a year later. The main question for Britain was whether its role as awkward partner with opt-outs and strained relationships with other EU members would continue. Or would a more positive and pro-active British European approach emerge? For Norway, the membership issue would be dead for a long time. But it was uncertain how the EEA would work in practice and whether the country would integrate with the EU in other areas. A mutual British-Norwegian challenge was that the Union continued to develop in depth and width, and consequently their relationship with it had to change as well. The end of the Cold War brought about huge changes in global security and European integration. The fall of the Soviet Union meant that © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 G. K. Almlid, Britain and Norway in Europe Since 1945, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61473-7_8

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the original reason for establishing NATO had disappeared. But rather than dissolving the Alliance as a consequence, it reinvented itself. This chapter also discusses how Norway and Britain adapted differently to the new security situation.

Political Relations The usual pattern of shifts in the number governments continued during this period: Norway had five different government constellations, while Britain was more stable. The bilateral relationship developed somewhat positively. John Major scraped by in the final years of his premiership. He had been seriously emasculated by the Maastricht process and continued to struggle with other European issues.2 His position inside the Tory Party was weak, but he managed to stay on as prime minister until the 1997 general election. From then until 2010 Labour was in power, dominated by Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. They renewed the party in terms of ideology and organisation. New Labour moved towards the centre. It accepted many of the changes that had come with Thatcher’s neo-liberalism, in education and social security for example.3 Marr argues that the party was taken “far further to the right than anyone expected”.4 This reduced the perceived difference between the two major parties. Voters liked New Labour: in 1997, it won its largest number of MPs ever and a modern record majority. Tony Blair’s command of the media was also important. After a decade as Chancellor of the Exchequer Brown replaced Blair as prime minister in 2007. British Labour had some influence on its Norwegian sister party. Gro Harlem Brundtland’s government continued after the 1994 referendum defeat, unlike Trygve Bratteli had done in 1972. She stepped down in 1996 and was replaced briefly by the more or less unsuccessful Thorbjørn Jagland.5 Jens Stoltenberg would become Brundtland’s great successor. He led a Labour minority government for 19 months from March 2000. This government was ideologically inspired by Blair and Brown.6 Focus was on renewal of the public sector, including opening for more competition. Indeed, Blair was a declared role model for many in the Norwegian Conservative Party as well, underlining his centrist approach. Parts of his foreign policy were an exception, as we will see.7 However, when Stoltenberg returned in 2005, as prime minister of a coalition government with the Centre Party and the Socialist Left Party, he moved slightly more to the left; he strengthened the relationship to the labour unions

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and increased taxes. As such, British Labour’s swing towards the left from 2010 moved the two parties’ closer together again. Bilateral political relations were good and largely uncontroversial in this period. In 1990, the outgoing British Oslo ambassador wrote: “the relationship is long-standing, stable, a trifle cosy and no longer quite so glamorous”.8 These words could also be applied to the subsequent decades. Regardless of the parties in power, Britain and Norway have shared fundamental values for their societies, such as freedom, rule of law and democracy. In foreign policy and international affairs, they have emphasised human rights and providing support to multilateral organisations and solutions, not least the United Nations. Jonas Gahr Støre, the Norwegian foreign minister, said in 2007 that “Britain is the country we have most meeting points with globally”, highlighting international development.9 But different personal relationships created variations. While Blair showed limited interest in Norway, this changed somewhat with Brown in Downing Street. Half a year into his premiership the Norwegian foreign minister said that “the relationship to the British government is now closer and better than in a very long time”.10 The close relationship between Brown and Stoltenberg played a large role in this; it “sends important signals in the system”, Gahr Støre argued.11 Nonetheless, this friendship did not bring about any substantial changes in BritishNorwegian relations. Interest among the Norwegian public and media also decreased when Brown took over after Blair,12 but this probably says more about the different personalities of the two men than the bilateral relationship.

Security and Defence Lord Ismay, the first Secretary General of NATO, said that the main rationale for the Alliance was to “keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down”.13 In the 1990s, Russia was significantly weakened and seemingly more friendly towards the West.14 The Americans moved many of its troops out of Europe. The Germans had united but were firmly locked in European structures and lacked ambitions for aggressive expansion. The end of the Cold War clearly had huge implications for European security, and each country’s sense of security. What should now be the main strategic considerations for Britain and Norway?

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The two countries developed similarly in several areas. Both reduced their defence spending, and there were changes in the size, structure and capabilities of their militaries. Furthermore, Norway and Britain agreed on the broad lines for the future of NATO. The Alliance should remain the basis for their defence.15 But there were also significant differences. Norway maintained Cold War influenced strategic thinking longer than other NATO members. The Kola peninsula, bordering Norway, had by 1990 become “the area of the highest concentration of military and especially naval hardware in the world”.16 This was transferred to Russia after the break-up of the Soviet Union. While the Russians developed a relatively good relationship with the West in the 1990s, it was volatile politically. Russia was therefore identified as Norway’s main security threat.17 This assessment meant that the Norwegians adapted slowly to the changing attitudes in NATO. A main Norwegian problem was that NATO paid less attention to the northern flank.18 Despite the changing circumstances, Norway still wanted its allies, such as Britain, to maintain interest and offer reinforcement in case of an emergency—in other words, a continuation of its main strategy since 1949.19 Related to this was Norway’s cautious attitude to allowing new members into NATO.20 That, too, was thought to move the Alliances’ focus away from the northern areas. Norway’s role in British strategic thinking changed after the Cold War. The UK Oslo ambassador argued in 1987 that it was “worth, within reason” to accommodate the Norwegians in areas important to them, not least due to the “strategic assets, on which, somewhat precariously, they sit”.21 Keeping the Soviets away from Norwegian waters and land had been vital for Britain at the time. The ambassador concluded that “their importance can only grow in the decades to come”.22 This was incorrect—the termination of the Cold War changed things fundamentally. Norwegian territory simply became less important for UK security since Russia was seen less as a threat than the Soviet Union. This diminished Norway’s favourable Cold War position, when its territory and concerns mattered a great deal to the allies. The UK Oslo ambassador wrote in 1990: “in the reshaping of Europe there will, to put it mildly, be higher priorities than ensuring that Norwegian interests march with British”.23 While Norway was stuck in old Cold War thinking, Britain and other NATO countries opened more for out-of-area engagements.24 With the deadlock in the UN Security Council broken, there was more room for international military operations. Britain contributed 50,000 troops to the

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multilateral coalition to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1991.25 As in most international military operations after the Cold War, this action was dominated by the USA. One lesson from Kuwait was that victory was possible without significant casualties due to advanced Western technology. This made future interventions more appealing. Many of these would be based on expressed ethical motivations. When the UK government, after receiving criticism for dragging its feet, decided to intervene in Bosnia, Major argued that it was important to “save as many lives as we could”.26 But states rarely act on such rationale alone in international politics. This was also a measure aimed at securing a good reputation for Britain and keeping good relations with the Americans.27 The Labour government, with foreign secretary Robin Cook leading the way, put even more emphasis on the ethical dimension of foreign policy.28 Blair was eager to intervene in Kosovo to stop the Serbian genocide.29 NATO prevailed in the conflict with Milosevic after it initiated air strikes in March 1999. This motivated Blair to undertake further interventions, as we will see below. Norway eventually went “out of area” as well.30 The Kosovo War was the first important participation on the international military scene; Norway participated with some F16 fighter planes. Nonetheless, this was a fairly small contribution and revealed a substantial lack of preparation and equipment for such operations. Norway’s capacity to act out of area before 2000 was very limited.31 This brought about a transformation, from a traditional invasion defence to smaller, more flexible units suited for international operations.32 The US-led “war on terror”, however, led to splits in the NATO alliance. Participation in the NATO operation to secure and rebuild Afghanistan was relatively uncontroversial. For Norway, it must be said, this involved the dropping of the first bombs since the Second World War, and represented as such a changing Norwegian mentality.33 Britain contributed significantly more personnel and firepower than Norway. UK troops also operated in the more dangerous southern Afghan provinces34 —Norwegians were in the north. This illustrated the two countries’ different warfare traditions. It was thus perhaps no surprise that they landed on different sides in the most serious rift in NATO’s history: the Iraq invasion in March 2003. There was massive public opposition to the invasion, not least in Britain. Tony Blair was widely criticised for following US President George W. Bush without evidence of a real threat.35 This support was also controversial inside the Labour Party;

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Foreign Secretary Cook resigned. The prime minister’s personal authority was “seriously and permanently damaged”.36 Nonetheless, Blair has never admitted at any later time that this was a mistake. The Norwegian government decided not to participate, emphasising that the invasion did not have a UN mandate. Security became a wider concept after the Cold War. Now the national security strategies of Britain and Norway included such concepts as international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, rebuilding failed states and pandemics. Human security, in addition to state security, mattered. These changes contributed to a more fragmented and wide-ranging Anglo-Norwegian security relationship. This probably also made it more equal. Norway took an active role as peacemaker from the 1990s, such as the Oslo Agreement between Palestine and Israel. This strengthened a long tradition that was part of the Norwegian national identity. Riste describes this as “the conviction that Norway has a special role to play in leading the world up the straight and narrow path towards a peace based on international justice and humanitarian values”.37 Svalbard and the Arctic Now we turn to a another policy area that is discussed a bit more— the Arctic. This has been an important geographical area during the whole period covered in this book, both bilaterally and for the countries individually. The significance of the Arctic changed in this period. The area naturally mattered more to Norway than Britain traditionally since a large part of its territory is inside the Arctic.38 The archipelago of Svalbard, situated some 400 miles north of the North Cape, has been of particular importance. According to a 1920 international treaty, the islands are under Norwegian sovereignty. But all 41 contracting states, of which Britain is one, have equal rights to exploit natural resources there. Norway claims that this does not pertain to the large economic zone beyond the territorial waters. Britain and other countries have long disagreed with this interpretation. During the Cold War Soviet interest in the Svalbard region gave Norway better negotiation leverage. The islands had an important strategic position because the Barents Sea was the sole link between the Atlantic and naval ports in northern Soviet Union. The British Chiefs of Staff concluded in 1947 that “what matters most is that no military installations should be erected by the Soviet Government” on Svalbard.39

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During the 1970s, the Soviet Union established a large civilian presence there. The Norwegians used Soviet pressure to argue that it was in Western interests to let them have sole responsibility for the administration of any economic activity on the Svalbard seabed and waters.40 This made it easier for Norway to establish a 200-mile fishery protection zone around the islands in 1977. But the UK and other signatories have never have formally accepted this. After the Cold War, strategic military concerns have mattered less in the Arctic, but struggles over economic interests have escalated. The contentious fishery zone has caused tension with the Russians in particular. The Elektron incident in 2005, for example, which developed into a tense bilateral situation when a Russian trawler refused to be arrested by the Norwegian coast guard, demonstrated that there is a fine line between economic interests and the use of military means.41 Moreover, the increase in ice melting has generated new possibilities and thus potential for conflict. This is expected to lead to new sea routes from Asia to Europe and easier access to oil and gas resources. Powers such as China and the USA have thus shown more interest in the area, and the European Union has developed an Arctic policy.42 Britain, too, has entered this race for the Arctic.43 Potential exploration of oil and gas has remained the key issue for Britain on the Svalbard issue.44 In 2006, the Blair government invited a number of countries to discuss the future of the islands—Norway was not invited. A key issue was Norway’s established economic zone and other countries’ rights to equal treatment.45 The zone is large, about the same size as the one surrounding the UK, and oil-bearing geological formations have been discovered. But the 1920 treaty does not refer to the continental shelf of Svalbard since this did not exist as a politicolegal conception at the time. Norway has argued for decades that the archipelago has no individual continental shelf and that the sea bed around it is a continuation of the Norwegian shelf. Already in the 1970s, the UK government considered this “questionable in international law: islands do generate continental shelves and it is in our interest to keep it so”.46 The Stoltenberg government increased Norway’s focus on the Arctic from 2005, based on important security objectives and economic interests.47 A more assertive Russia in the north was an important reason. But the interest in the area of Britain and other states has added to the pressure on Norway. However, with respect to oil and gas resources, so far

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there have mainly been preliminary skirmishes. More conflict is likely if these resources can be exploited more easily in the future. A UK ambassador, commenting after a British-Norwegian dispute over natural gas in the North Sea in the 1980s, was correct when pointing to “the truism that when really large sums are involved, maintaining good relations comes well down the list of priorities”.48

Economy and Trade The international economy thrived for most of this period. This was also the case for the open economies of Britain and Norway. In Britain, unemployment was significantly lower in the first decade of the twentyfirst century than the two previous ones, and inflation was moderate. But economic growth was slightly lower, only two per cent average per year.49 Norway became a wealthy oil nation in this period. But also GDP for mainland Norway increased by almost 60% in the period 1992–2011.50 This was more than in the other Nordic countries. Unemployment stabilised at a low level and fish farming developed as the second biggest export industry, after oil and gas.51 The global financial crisis that started in the USA in 2007–2008 hit Britain harder than Norway. The UK economy contracted by 4.2% in 2009, and in the EU as a whole 4.3%, while the Norwegian economy shrank by only 1.7%.52 One reason was that the Norwegian economy was based more on commodities than consumables to the European market. Another was the large public sector in Norway, which could provide employment for some of the workers who lost their jobs. The Norwegian government also implemented a number of counter-conjuncture measures. An Official Norwegian Report concluded that Norway did so well in the crisis as a result of “a mix of luck, skill and caution”.53 Energy policy and trade became the most important elements in the British-Norwegian relationship in this period.54 Economic relations were dominated by oil and gas already in the 1980s. Britain’s decision not to buy Sleipner gas in 1985 angered Norwegians, but the UK ambassador considered that they “believe we will be back in their gas market before the century is out”.55 This was an accurate prediction. From the 1990s, Norway became an important and stable provider of natural gas to the British market. The balance in energy moved even more in Norway’s favour in the first decade of the twenty-first century. In 2004, Britain became a net importer of energy, and the gap between imports

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and exports has increased since then. Norway became self-sufficient in oil already in 1975 and uses very little natural gas. In 2011, 67% of crude oil imported to Britain came from Norway.56 Britain’s dependence on Norway is even greater when it comes to natural gas. The energy cooperation is not due to coincidences or market forces alone—it has been shaped by government strategies. Britain and Norway have entered into a number of bilateral agreements, and several pipelines across the North Sea have secured a long-lasting relationship in oil and gas trade. Norway welcomed a stable buyer and long-term contracts. Britain needed increasingly more gas and oil, and an important advantage of dealing with Norway is that the sales of these products are not politicised. From the 1960s, until today the energy cooperation between Britain and Norway has been characterised by a “high degree of trust and good dialogue”, and as a “unique partnership” in an international setting.57 In most policy areas, there was an asymmetry between Norway, the small state, and big Britain, but in oil and gas they were more equal. And gradually Norway became the stronger actor. The Norwegians were in a very good bargaining position as Britain and the other markets were desperate for more. Oil wealth has been a defining feature of Norway in the twenty-first century. One of the many consequences of this is that this national wealth has made EU membership even more unlikely.

European Integration After the Norwegian “no” in November 1994, it was evident that Britain and Norway would continue with different relationships to the main European integration actor for a long time. And the next one and a half decades would involve huge changes for the EU; it would carry out in practice its transformation from community to union and develop from 12 to 27 members. This brought new challenges upon Norway and Britain—two countries that were already struggling with their relationship to Europe. Tony Blair and Europe Europe continued to be problematic for John Major after the Maastricht ratification. He fell out with other members and was largely unsuccessful when dealing with the EU. Domestically, his party was still divided on

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Europe. The pro-European Conservatives emphasised that the UK optouts had created a two-speed Europe. Chancellor Kenneth Clarke and deputy Prime Minister Michael Heseltine argued that Britain should join the planned European single currency.58 On the other side of the party, there was strong scepticism about further integration. Some Tories supported a referendum on whether the UK should leave the EU. The Conservatives would remain the most anti-European of the main parties for the remainder of Britain’s time as EU member. Tony Blair strengthened the impression of Labour as largely a proEuropean party. The UK’s role in the EU was of major importance to him; he was “instinctively pro-European”.59 He argued that Britain should be at the heart of Europe, based on the realisation of the country’s diminished international power.60 Blair wanted the UK to take a lead in Europe, rather than be on the side-lines. The EU affected Britain so much anyway that it made sense to influence it as much as possible. The Blair government signed up for the Social Charter in June 1997, thus immediately surrendering one of Major’s EU opt-outs. Supporting the main ideas of a “social Europe”, such as the protection of employment, trade unions and welfare rights, was natural for a labour party.61 Perhaps more surprising was Blair’s agreement on European defence with French President Chirac at St. Malo in December 1998. They agreed that the EU should develop a military capability that would operate in circumstances where NATO intervention was inappropriate. Lord argues that this was a “quiet revolution in British security policy”.62 Considering what Roy Hattersley, UK Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, told the Norwegian government in 1976, this is correct: “Britain would not have defence in the EEC under any circumstance”.63 But since the end of the Cold War calls for strengthened European security and defence cooperation had intensified. New Labour realised that the American presence in Europe was no longer guaranteed.64 The EU had introduced its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as one of the three pillars of the Maastricht Treaty. The St. Malo declaration paved the way for a more concrete expression of the defence aspect of the CFSP. Nevertheless, in practice British scepticism and feet-dragging continued with Blair. His speeches were often arguing convincingly for Britain at the centre of a stronger EU. But he largely shared the experience of other UK prime ministers since 1973: he struggled with European integration in domestic politics and ended up in disputes with the continental EU partners.

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The question about joining the euro was primarily a domestic battle. Partly rooted in Britain’s history as a former world power, the Tories had decided to opt out of this policy in the Maastricht Treaty. Tony Blair, however, considered that euro membership was necessary to achieve British leadership of Europe.65 It was a means to an end. He explored the idea soon after taking office in 1997 but was stopped by Gordon Brown and the Treasury. Brown listed five “economic tests” that had to be met for Britain to consider joining the euro. This gave him and the Treasury a virtual veto over the issue. “Each time Blair blows hot, Brown blows cold—it is a shambles”, a pro-European Liberal Democrat MP complained.66 Furthermore, the British public and press disliked the idea of giving up the pound. Blair continued to argue the case though; to the 2002 Labour Conference he said that the euro was “Britain’s destiny”.67 Daddow also shows how the Murdoch-owned press that supported Blair’s premiership, opposed Britain joining the euro, and that there perhaps existed an “unwritten understanding” not to make any significant move on Europe without a referendum.68 The country never joined. This was significant since the UK then integrated less with Europe economically and financially than the other two major EU powers, France and Germany. It was also important symbolically. Although not the only member retaining its national currency, it demonstrated Britain’s inability to commit completely to the idea of European unity. Security policy was another area where Blair’s Britain was different, despite the St. Malo pledges. US relations mattered more to Blair. He wanted the UK positioned between the USA and the EU, arguing that “there is no greater error in international politics than to believe that strong in Europe means weaker with the US. The roles reinforce each other”.69 Perhaps correct, but many on the continent did not buy into this. Indeed, it had been the major sticking point for de Gaulle regarding the British EC membership bids in the 1960s. Blair’s decision to join the Americans in Iraq, unlike France and Germany, “dealt a further major blow to Britain’s attachment to the EU”, Hill correctly contends.70 This decision demonstrated that good American relations trumped forging stronger bonds of significance with its European partners. Blair was more in line with other members on the issue of an EU constitution. Motivated by the need for more efficient decision-making since ten new countries would soon be joining, a treaty was agreed in October 2004. It involved an EU “foreign minister” and Council president, as well as more qualified majority voting—thus increasing the

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supranational character of the EU. A UK referendum on the constitution was scheduled for May 2006. Blair decided that government ministers who did not support it would have to resign.71 However, before push came to shove in London, the French and Dutch electorates turned down the deal, thereby terminating it. The rejections were motivated by discontent with their respective governments.72 But they were also evidence of significant opposition to the tempo and depth of European integration on the continent as well. Many in the British government were happy to avoid a referendum that they could easily have lost.73 The Constitutional Treaty was replaced by the Treaty of Lisbon, which contained many of the same elements. This was ratified in Britain in 2008—without a referendum. Tony Blair had been among the most passionate supporters of the most extensive enlargement of the European Union ever in 2004.74 This enlargement process had started in the 1990s after the end of the Cold War.75 The EU treaties of Amsterdam and Nice, signed in 1997 and 2001 respectively, were important for formalising this. Including the new democracies of central and eastern Europe was expected to have a politically stabilising effect in the area. The EU has used enlargement as a measure to spread democracy, human rights and peaceful relations.76 Britain has often been a driving force for new members entering the EC/EU. The Tory government had been positive in the previous decades, particularly towards the northern European states. This UK approach has been rooted in the view that enlargements could slow down federalism. The words of Roy Hattersley in 1976, on more countries joining the EC, are illustrative: “…inevitably this Community would be less and less coordinated and integrated. It would be more therefore of a Community of states than an actual state”.77 This corresponds with Poole’s argument about the intergovernmentalist leaders of Europe, such as Margaret Thatcher, who has been accused of wanting to delay or block the process of integration.78 Hollowell also argues that behind Blair’s policy to expand the EU was a desire to make moves towards more supranationalism more difficult.79 However, Blair’s eagerness to enlarge the Union came at a cost. First, other EU members argued that since the Eastern European countries would need much financial support, Britain should contribute more to the Union budget—as a price for its enthusiasm for new members.80 Blair was put under pressure to relinquish some of the rebate that Thatcher had achieved in 1984, which the French had always strongly disliked.

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As British prime ministers before him, Blair countered that the CAP needed reforming. He said it was “absurd” that the EU spent 40% of its budget on the CAP when agriculture produced less the two per cent of the output.81 Blair decided in the end to agree to a reduction of the rebate of £1 billion a year, about one-third of the total. He was promised future reviews of farm subsidies.82 However, no major changes materialised. Daddow comments that Blair ended up “disillusioned” with the nature and pace of European reform.83 Second, the British government underestimated the effects of free movement of labour from the new Eastern European members. This had significant ramifications for domestic politics, and it would eventually matter in the Brexit referendum. Active and Passive Norwegian Europeanisation The question of Norwegian EU membership has largely been dormant since 1994. Coalition governments have consisted of pro- and antimembership parties, underlining how the issue has cut across traditional political party lines. They have therefore decided from the outset that the question is not to be discussed. European matters have not been a major issue in any Norwegian election campaign since 1993. Yet all governments have adopted an “active” European policy. As a consequence, Norway has increased its integration with Europe extensively. In 2010–2012, a government appointed committee undertook a comprehensive evaluation of the country’s relationship to the EU. Their 900-page-long report, Europautredningen, concluded that Norway is far more closely connected to the EU than what most people realise, including those who work with it on a daily basis, such as politicians, civil servants, journalists and researchers.84 All Norwegian government ministries work with EU/EEA matters. The EU influence ranges from matters affecting citizens to all aspects related to the common labour market and fundamental power distribution between the three branches of government. Through various treaties Norway has adopted approximately three-quarters of EU law, according to the Europautredningen,85 although, it must be said, this is an estimate and does not problematise what kinds of legal acts are included in this. Still, the Europeanisation has been comprehensive. Some observers argue that the “no” side won in 1994, but has lost every day since.

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The EEA agreement has been the cornerstone of Norway’s relationship with Europe since 1994. The EU is by far the most important trading partner; it takes about two-thirds of its exports.86 Allowing for participation in the EU Single Market, the EEA has strengthened Norway’s economic growth. Two main elements contribute to this. The first is tariff-free access for Norwegian exports. This increases competitiveness in the European market. But not all products are tariff-free, as they would be if Norway were an EU member. For example, most white fish exported from Norway to the EU has no tariffs, while salmon, in various forms, is met by different levels of tariffs.87 The second element has increasingly developed into the more important: the Single Market is constantly expanding with new common standards, rules and regulations. When Norway adopts all these equally to EU member states, its products and services obtain instant access to the European market. For example, Norwegian seafood is produced under the Single Market rules for food safety and veterinary concerns. This means it can travel into the EU without border controls. For a product like fresh salmon, which accounts for 70% of Norwegian seafood exports, this has huge consequences. According to the Federation of Norwegian Industries “nothing is in such a hurry as a dead salmon”.88 Moreover, the EEA provides Norwegians access to the whole European labour market, and by the same token, Norwegian businesses and farmers benefit from easy access to European workers. The EEA agreement has been fairly popular among the Norwegian public until this day.89 There has consistently been a majority in the Storting for maintaining it. However, the EEA comes with considerable democratic challenges. Norway adopts policies and rules from the EU in many areas without having formal decision-making rights. This democratic deficit grows constantly since the EEA agreement is dynamic—new EU regulations are added without new negotiations. When the Storting ratified the EEA agreement in 1992, Norway had to adopt some 1800 EU acts; by 2020 this total had increased to more than 12,000. Moreover, the country is known as one of the most eager of the entire EU-EFTA group to implement new directives efficiently.90 Norway is a policy taker not a policy maker. It does not help that EFTA has become so much weaker than the EU. Although dominated by the EU also initially, the EEA was established with two equal blocs. This changed when Sweden, Finland and Austria left EFTA for the EU, and the Swiss turned down the EEA agreement

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in a 1992 referendum. It left Norway together with Liechtenstein and Iceland as EFTA members in the EEA—hardly a dominant force in European integration. The EEA was soon seen as “relatively unimportant” by EU members.91 In theory, EFTA regulations can influence EU states, but this has no practical effect. Had the EFTA side of the EEA been stronger, it would have had more political weight in terms of influencing EU decisions informally. There are still ways that Norway can influence EU decision-making. National experts can participate in committees that give advice on new legislation. Norway also works bilaterally with EU members via informal contacts on the political and official level.92 For example, in its efforts to stop the EU’s gas directive in the late 1990s, Norway had allies within the Council of Ministers, not least the UK and Denmark—but their support had its limits.93 Furthermore, Norwegian regions have established European offices in Brussels to have access to information and to be heard.94 The same applies for the Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry and the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions. No wonder that Norway often is labelled “lobbyland”.95 All Norwegian parties acknowledge the democratic deficit. The Centre Party has been the staunchest critic, complaining that the “greater part of Norwegian legislation, through the EEA, has moved out of the country” and the agreement is “highly problematic for Norwegian democracy”.96 Their solution is to take Norway out of the EEA and establish a freetrade agreement or an arrangement similar to what Switzerland has. The Conservatives, who also see the problems, prefer another solution: EU membership.97 But the EEA has remained a national compromise with public support. Most EU acts are passed without any debate whatsoever in Norway. In the period 1992–2011, the Storting voted on 287 of the most important ones—265 were unanimously decided and the last 22 predominantly agreed with a wide majority.98 This tells us that most EU acts have fundamental support in Norway. They often include regulations and solutions to problems that Norway would have implemented regardless of the EEA. Nonetheless, some EU directives have been controversial in Norway. EFTA countries can choose not to incorporate an EEA-relevant EU law. But this reservation right has never been exercised. Some complain that Norwegian governments have been too compliant. For example, the Centre Party wanted a reservation from the food additives and children’s food directives. And the Stoltenberg government signalled a reservation

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on the postal directive in 2012, against the prime minister’s wishes.99 Why then has this right not been used? The short answer is fear of repercussions. According to the EEA treaty, the EU can in response to a reservation suspend the whole area that the directive refers to. Possibly more important, such an EU suspension could jeopardise the whole agreement. There is a limit to how much time and effort the EU wants to devote to little EFTA, many Norwegians fear. In short, Norway needs the EEA more than the EU does. The Europautredningen was expected to be a starting point for a major debate on Norway’s relationship with Europe—this failed. The Norwegian press coverage of European affairs has been nowhere near the situation in Britain, neither in scope nor Euroscepticism. There have been small peaks of coverage when demands for a Norwegian reservation have emerged, or when an EU law has led to an especially noticeable, but never big, change in Norwegian society. This reflects the absence of interest among the Norwegian public. The democratic deficit is a price that most Norwegians seem willing to accept quite easily due to the benefits. It must also be considered that EEA decision-making is complicated to grasp. When you do not really know who has made a decision, it is difficult to hold authorities accountable. Moreover, the EEA is, after all, different from EU membership. Norway has retained formal autonomy in important areas such as economic and monetary policy, agriculture, fisheries and tax policy. Nonetheless, the EEA has increasingly affected these areas too. For example, Norwegian farming is influenced by the EEA’s general goal of trade liberalisation, worker migration, common technical standards and food safety and veterinary concerns. All Norwegian governments since 1994 have agreed that the EEA should form the basis for Norway’s relationship with the EU. But it is a paradox and rather an unusual arrangement in international politics for a country to accept so much that is decided by others without being a member. The EEA was a compromise in 1992 and continues to be a compromise: it is a middle ground between pro- and anti-membership groupings; and between democratic challenges and economic and political benefits. Norway has also entered into a number of other treaties with the EU, in areas such as research, education, police, prosecution, asylum seekers, drugs surveillance and fisheries. Here we will investigate in-depth two of the most important areas: Schengen and foreign and defence cooperation.

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Schengen is the most important cooperation that Norway has with the EU within the area of justice and home affairs.100 In 1985, France, Germany and the Benelux countries signed the Schengen Agreement, which later became a part of the EU. The main idea was to end border checks and thus facilitate for the free movement of people in Europe. In addition, a Schengen Information System was established, which allows authorities to exchange passport information and fight international crime in a number of ways. The Nordic countries had set up a common labour market in 1954. But when Finland, Sweden and Denmark decided to join Schengen in 1995, this would involve future passport controls between them and Norway.101 The Storting thus accepted the EU’s invitation for non-members to join. It was yet another example of how the continental states’ initial movement in European integration forced Norway to make changes. And similar to the EEA, Norway had to accept both the Schengen aquis and, in practice, future rules formulated by the EU without formally taking part in the decision-making process.102 There has been opposition to Schengen, particularly from the Centre Party, especially in periods of high EEA immigration or when criminals have entered Norway without border control. After 2005, Norway has been among the countries with the highest number of labour immigrants from Eastern Europe per capita.103 EEA and Schengen have given less control over who enters the country—not all Norwegians are happy with this. Britain did not join Schengen. In the negotiations leading up to the SEA, the Thatcher government refused to remove frontier controls, in effect opting-out of the free movement of people. Moreover, based on the Treaty of Amsterdam, the UK decided to stay out of further justice policy cooperation, but can “opt in” for acts they prefer.104 Justice matters and Schengen constitute perhaps the best example of a political area where the level of Britain’s and Norway’s integration with the EU was not so different. British opt-outs and Norwegian opt-ins balanced out the fact that only one of them was a member. Norway has also sought cooperation with the EU in the field of foreign and security policy. The EU’s establishment of the CFSP was both an opportunity and a challenge for Norway. It could be the answer if the Americans withdrew further from Europe. In the 1994 referendum, campaign Prime Minister Brundtland argued that Norway should join the EU to avoid becoming “a second-rank security policy nation in Europe”.105 This argument convinced few Norwegians. But Norway has formed closer security relations based on this thinking after

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1994. Governments have been anxious to be closely associated with the CFSP.106 Norway has participated in some EU operations, such as Concordia in 2003. And when Britain, France and Germany in 2004 took the initiative to form EU military battle groups—national forces that are lent to the EU—Norway chose to join the Nordic Battle Group. Norwegian governments have also aligned themselves with practically all the EU’s declarations on foreign policy.107 There have been a few exceptions though, which underlines the independent role Norway, after all, enjoys in this area. It has possibly given Norway a bit more room to manoeuvre as peacemaker around the world. Having said that, the CFSP is intergovernmental in nature, and allows EU members to maintain an independent foreign policy. Britain was never constrained by this, Hill argues.108 A stronger EU in the security area could be problematic in a NATO perspective in two ways. First, Norway has shared Britain’s view that the transatlantic security connection is crucial, and that NATO should still be the main instrument for dealing with serious crises in Europe. A European defence organisation that is too strong could damage the US-European relationship. Nevertheless, Norway, and the other nonEU NATO members officially welcomed the CFSP initiative.109 Perhaps they realised that it would not turn out to be a serious challenge to the Alliance. Indeed, the EU has been clear that NATO is responsible for the security of the whole of Europe. Second, Norwegian governments have been concerned that NATO cooperation would become a dialogue between Brussels and Washington—thus marginalising Norwegian interests. With more NATO countries becoming EU members, Norway’s fear of being isolated has increased further.

Conclusions The termination of the Cold War had enormous impact on European security. This was important for Britain and Norway individually and for their bilateral relationship. Britain advocated NATO’s out-of-area approach, Norway was more hesitant. Another effect of the reduced threat from Russia was that Britain and other allies lost much interest in the defence of Norway—this undermined the traditionally strong BritishNorwegian security relationship. The period after 1990 was therefore the final stage of the downward trajectory of their bilateral relationship since its high point in the first years after the Second World War. It was still

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good, based on a high level of trust and many shared values. It was wideranging, and particularly important was their trade in energy. However, it was not as special as it had been. The two countries mattered less to each other. The end of the Cold War also affected European integration. The European Union came into being and more than doubled the number of member states. Britain and Norway continued on separate sides of the EU fence. But in many ways there was not much difference between them regarding their integration with Europe. Norway became the most integrated non-member and Britain the least integrated member. This was a result of the active Norwegian European approach that all governments have pursued since 1994. Adopting three quarters of EU law without any significant influence is evidence of a highly Europeanised country. The EEA and Schengen have blurred the difference between foreign and domestic policy. Laws that apply to Norwegian citizens, businesses, farmers and fishermen, public authorities and the government are made in Brussels. The Storting rubber-stamps them. Moreover, Norway’s trade with EU countries has accounted for a greater share of its foreign trade than Britain’s. Norway has also contributed financially to the EU via the EEA grants, effectively a fee for access to the Single Market. This increased highly after the Eastern EU enlargements so that Norwegian contributions have become on a par with those of comparable EU member states. Tony Blair, one of the most pro-European UK prime ministers, still did not manage to significantly alter the country’s relationship to Europe. He failed to take Britain into the eurozone, and his government was often at odds with the continental EU members. Blair’s close relations to American presidents Clinton and Bush did him no favours in his EU dealings. Blair and Brown did not manage to decrease the widespread domestic dissatisfaction with Europe. If anything it strengthened, thereby further laying the ground for a referendum on British EU membership in the second decade of the twenty-first century.

Notes 1. The Guardian, 23 November 2001. 2. Jonathan Hollowell, “From Commonwealth to European Integration,” in Britain Since 1945, ed. Jonathan Hollowell (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 91–92.

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3. Phil Cocker and Alistair Jones, Contemporary British Politics and Government, 4th ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge Academic, 2015), 31. 4. Andrew Marr, A History of Modern Britain (London: Pan Macmillan, 2008), 509. 5. Jagland was prime minister for a year. Kjell Magne Bondevik of the Christian Democrats was prime minister of two different coalition governments from 1997 to 2000 and 2001 to 2005. 6. Øivind Bratberg, “Politikk og Ideologi: Båndene mellom Norske og Britiske Partier,” in Det Glemte Partnerskapet: Norge og Storbritannia i et Nytt Århundre, ed. Øivind Bratberg and Kristin M. Haugevik (Oslo: Akademika, 2012), 56. 7. Ibid., 46. 8. Report on the Anglo-Norwegian relationship, UK Oslo ambassador John Robson to Foreign Secretary Hurd, 10 April 1990, British National Archives (henceforth BNA), FCO 160/283. 9. Aftenposten, 12 December 2007. My translation. 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid. 12. Jan Erik Mustad, “Blikket på Storbritannia: Det Britiske Samfunnet i Norsk Offentlighet,” in Det Glemte Partnerskapet: Norge og Storbritannia i et Nytt Århundre, ed. Øivind Bratberg and Kristin M. Haugevik (Oslo: Akademika, 2012), 144. 13. North Atlantic Treaty Organization website, “Lord Ismay”, no date. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_137930.htm. 14. Jeffrey Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), 11;19. 15. Brief by Powell for Major’s meeting with Brundtland 13 February 1991, 12 February 1991, BNA, PREM 19/3867. 16. Olav Riste, Norway’s Foreign Relations —A History (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2001), 278–278. 17. Norwegian Government, “Hovedretningslinjer for Forsvarets virksomhet i tiden 1994–98”, White Paper (St.meld.) 16 (1992–93), 8 January 1993, 13. 18. Rolf Tamnes, Oljealder 1965–1995, vol. 6 of Norsk utenrikspolitisk historie (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1997), 139–145. 19. Powell brief 13 February 1991, 12 February 1991, BNA, PREM 19/3867. 20. Riste, Norway’s Foreign Relations, 280. 21. “Norway: annual review for 1986, and valedictory despatch”, UK Oslo ambassador William Bentley to Foreign Secretary Howe, 9 February 1987, BNA, FCO 33/9427. 22. Ibid.

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23. Report on the Anglo-Norwegian relationship, Robson to Hurd, 10 April 1990, BNA, FCO 160/283. 24. Sten Rynning, “Geopolitics and the Atlantic Alliance,” in European Security Since the Fall of the Berlin Wall, ed. Frederik Merand, Martial Foucault, and Bastian Irondelle (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), 182–183. 25. Mark Garnett, Simon Mabon, and Robert Smith, British Foreign Policy Since 1945 (London: Routledge, 2018), 232–233. 26. John Major, The Autobiography (London: Harper Collins, 1999), 535. 27. Garnett, Mabon, and Smith, British Foreign Policy, 246–249. 28. Jamie Gaskarth, British Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), 96. 29. Marr, A History of Modern Britain, 549. 30. Janne Haaland Matlary, “Internasjonale Styrkebidrag og Allianseavhengighet,” in Norge i Internasjonale Operasjoner: Militærmakt mellom Idealer og Realpolitikk, ed. Tormod Heier, Anders Kjølberg, and Carstein F. Rønnfeldt (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2014), 67–68. 31. Clive Archer, “Norway and the United Kingdom in the High North,” in Britain and Norway: Special Relationships, ed. Helge Ø. Pharo and Patrick Salmon (Oslo: Akademika, 2012), 325. 32. Nina Græger, “Norway Between Europe and the US,” New Security Issues in Northern Europe: The Nordic and Baltic States and the ESDP (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 97. 33. Dag Henriksen, “Suksess Uten Innflytelse? Norges Erfaringer fra Operasjonene over Libya,” International Politikk 71, no. 1 (2013). 34. Gaskarth, British Foreign Policy, 138. 35. Garnett, Mabon, and Smith, British Foreign Policy, 276–285. 36. David Gowland, Arthur Turner, and Alex Wright, Britain and European Integration Since 1945: On the Sidelines (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), 220. 37. Riste, Norway’s Foreign Relations, 255. 38. There is no universally agreed definition of the Arctic. Most common definitions are the area within the Arctic circle, the area within the July 10 degrees isotherm or the area within the Arctic tree line. Definitions matter much. For example, based on the first, Iceland is not part of the Arctic. 39. “Arctic bases”, brief by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (henceforth FCO), 20 March 1947, BNA, FO 371/65972. 40. “Spitsbergen/Barents Sea”, FCO brief for visit of Norwegian Foreign Minister to London 18 June 1975, BNA, FCO 33/2817. 41. Gunnar Fermann and Tor Håkon Inderberg, “Norway and the 2005 Elektron Affair: Conflict of Competencies and Competent Realpolitik,” in War: An introduction to Theories and Research on Collective Violence, 2nd ed. (New York: Nova, 2015).

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42. European Union External Action webpage. https://eeas.europa.eu/arc tic-policy/eu-arctic-policy_en. 43. In 2013, the first public UK government strategy for the Arctic was published (UK Government, “Adapting to Change: UK policy towards the Arctic”, Polar Regions Department, FCO, 2013). 44. Brit Fløistad, “Controversy over the Legal Regime outside Svalbard’s Territorial Waters,” Focus North 6, Den norske Atlanterhavskomité, 2008. 45. NOU 2012: 2, Official Norwegian Reports, “Outside and inside: Norway’s agreements with the European Union” (henceforth Europautredningen), 2012, 747. 46. “Anglo-Norwegian Continental Shelf”, brief for Roy Hattersley’s lunch with Jens Evensen, FCO, 8 July 1974, BNA, FCO 33/2591. 47. Norwegian Government, “Interesser, Ansvar og Muligheter: Hovedlinjer i Norsk Utenrikspolitikk,” White Paper (St.meld.) no. 15 (2008–2009, 2009): 44–50. 48. “Norway: annual review for 1985”, Bentley to Howe, 21 January 1985, BNA, FCO 33/8892. 49. Cocker and Jones, Contemporary British Politics, 31. 50. NOU 2012: 2, Europautredningen, 19. 51. Ola Svein Stugu, Norsk Historie Etter 1905, 2nd ed. (Oslo: Samlaget, 2018), 327. 52. OECD website, “GDP, volume—annual growth rates in percentage”, https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=60703#. 53. NOU 2011: 1, Official Norwegian Reports, “Bedre rustet mot finanskriser”, 2011, 9. 54. Christina Solli, “Energipolitisk Samarbeid: ‘Nykommeren’ i Det Norskbritiske Forholdet,” in Det Glemte Partnerskapet: Norge og Storbritannia i et Nytt Århundre, ed. Øivind Bratberg and Kristin M. Haugevik (Oslo: Akademika, 2012), 108. 55. “Norway: annual review for 1985”, Bentley to Howe, 21 January 1985, BNA, FCO 33/8892. 56. Paul Bolton, “Energy Imports and Exports,” House of Commons Library, briefing paper no. 4046, 19 October 2018. https://common slibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn04046/. 57. Solli, “Energipolitisk Samarbeid,” 108. My translation. 58. Garnett, Mabon, and Smith, British Foreign Policy, 244. 59. Ibid., 258. 60. Anthony Seldon, Blair Unbound (New York: Pocket Books, 2008), 122. 61. Alex May, Britain and Europe Since 1945 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), 69. 62. Christopher Lord, “The United Kingdom, a Once and Future (?) Nonmember State,” in The European Union’s Non-members: Independence

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64.

65. 66. 67. 68.

69.

70.

71. 72.

73. 74. 75.

76.

77. 78. 79.

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Under Hegemony? ed. Erik Oddvar Eriksen and John Erik Fossum (London: Routledge, 2012), 213. Record of conversation between Roy Hattersley and Thorvald Stoltenberg (Norwegian Foreign Ministry), 21 April 1976, BNA, FCO 33/3069. Simon Bulmer, “New Labour, New European Policy? Blair, Brown and Utilitarian Supranationalism,” Parliamentary Affairs 61, no. 4 (2008): 609–610. Seldon, Blair, 204–214. The Guardian, 23 November 2001. The Telegraph, 2 October 2002. Oliver Daddow, “Margaret Thatcher, Tony Blair and the Eurosceptic Tradition in Britain,” The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 15, no. 2 (2013): 219. Tony Blair’s address to ambassadors in London, The Guardian website, 7 January 2003. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2003/jan/ 07/foreignpolicy.speeches. Christopher Hill, The Future of British Foreign Policy: Security and Diplomacy in a World After Brexit (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2019), 45. Seldon, Blair, 352. See, for example, Paul Taggart, “Keynote Article: Questions of Europe— The Domestic Politics of the 2005 French and Dutch Referendums and their Challenges for the Study of European Integration,” Journal of Common Market Studies 44, no. s. 1 (2006); and Gilles Ivaldi, “Beyond France’s 2005 Referendum on the European Constitutional Treaty: Second-Order Model, Anti-Establishment Attitudes and the End of the Alternative European Utopia,” Western European Politics 29, no. 1 (2006). Seldon shows that opinion polls were negative (Seldon, Blair, 352–354). Roger Liddle, The Europe Dilemma: Britain and the Drama of EU Integration (London: I.B. Tauris, 2014), 49. Frank Schimmelfennig, “The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union,” International Organization 55, no. 1 (2001). Frank Schimmelfennig, “EU Political Accession Conditionality After the 2004 Enlargement: Consistency and Effectiveness,” Journal of European Public Policy 15, no. 6 (2008). Record of conversation between Hattersley and Stoltenberg, 21 April 1976, BNA, FCO 33/3069. Peter A. Poole, Europe Unites: The EU’s Eastern Enlargement (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2003), 3–4. Hollowell, From Commonwealth, 94–95.

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80. Seldon, Blair, 354–355. 81. Ibid., 357. 82. Geoffrey Evans and Anand Menon, Brexit and British Politics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2019), 13. 83. Daddow, “Margaret Thatcher,” 223. 84. NOU 2012: 2, Europautredningen, 18. 85. Ibid. 86. Leaving out oil, gas, ships and oil rigs, Norwegian exports to the EU in 2019 accounted for 65% of all mainland exports (Statistics Norway, “Norges viktigste handelspartnere”, last changed 2 March 2020. https://www.ssb.no/utenriksokonomi/artikler-og-publikasjoner/ norges-viktigste-handelspartnere). 87. Norwegian Seafood Council website, “Tollsats- og Tolloversikt til EU 2020”, 20 January 2020, https://sfd-seafood-prod.azureedge.net/490 238/globalassets/markedsadgang/tolltariff-til-eu/2020/tolltariffen-tileu-2020. 88. Federation of Norwegian Industries website, “Ingenting har det så travelt som en død laks!”, no date. https://www.norskindustri.no/ dette-jobber-vi-med/internasjonalt/eos---noe-langt-mer-enn-en-handel savtale/tekniske-handelsbarrierer/ingenting-har-det-sa-travelt-som-endod-laks/. My translation. 89. Ulf Sverdrup, Øyvind Svendsen and Åsmund Weltzien, “Holdninger til EØS-avtalen etter 25 år: Stor Oppslutning, men Liten Kunnskap,” Internasjonal Politikk 77, no. 4 (2019). 90. NOU 2012: 2, Europautredningen, 18. 91. Clive Archer, Norway Outside the European Union: Norway and European Integration From 1994 to 2004 (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 76. 92. NOU 2012: 2, Europautredningen, 167–168. 93. Archer, Norway outside, 129–130. 94. The Birmingham region in Britain was the first to do so in the 1980s. 95. Jarle Trondal and Anne Elizabeth Stie, “Blir Handlingsrommet Større med Egen Europaminister?,” Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift 32, no. 2 (2015): 123. 96. Parliament Debates (Norway), 2000–2001, 22 May 2001, John Dale. My translation. 97. Parliament Debates (Norway), 2000–2001, 22 May 2001. 98. NOU 2012: 2, Europautredningen, 20. 99. Aftenposten, 11 April 2011. 100. Norwegian Government website, “Schengen- og justissamarbeid”, 2018. https://www.regjeringen.no/no/tema/europapolitikk/tema-norge-eu/ schengen-justis-samarbeid/id684929/. 101. Archer, Norway outside, 155.

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102. Initially Norway’s Schengen arrangements were based on slightly more intergovernmental principles, but this soon disappeared in practice (Archer, Norway outside, 187). See also Michael Emerson, Marius Wahl and Stephen Woolcock, Navigating by the Stars: Norway, the European Economic Area and the European Union (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2002), 76–77. 103. NOU 2012: 2, Europautredningen, 19. 104. Andrew Geddes, “Getting the Best of Both Worlds? Britain, the EU and Migration Policy,” International Affairs 81, no. 4 (2005). 105. Gro Harlem Brundtland, speech at Måløy, 15 August 1994. https:// www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/smk/vedlegg/taler-og-art ikler-av-tidligere-statsministre/gro-harlem-brundtland/1994/eu-talemaloy.pdf. My translation. 106. Norwegian Government, “Om Norge og Europa ved inngangen til et nytt århundre”, White paper (St.meld.) 12 (2000–2001), 2000, 6. 107. NOU 2012: 2, Europautredningen, 81. 108. Hill, The Future of British Foreign Policy, 9. 109. Riste, Norway’s Foreign Relations, 282.

CHAPTER 9

Brexit and Future UK-Norwegian Relations, 2010–2020

We will be joining Norway in leaving the EU and in forging ever closer relations.1

Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson said this in December 2017 during a ceremony to light the Christmas tree at Trafalgar Square, an annual gift since 1947 from Norwegians to Londoners as a token of gratitude for Britain’s help during the Second World War. The statement sums up the main themes of this chapter: Britain’s decision to leave the European Union and the future British-Norwegian relationship. On 23 June 2016, a majority of British voters dismissed continued EU membership, and on 31 January 2020 the UK left the Union. This chapter examines why there was a referendum and discusses why so many voted for Brexit. Moreover, it tries to explain why it took so long to leave even though a large majority of MPs expressed that the referendum result had to be respected. Although not of major importance, Norway played a role in the British referendum debate. Both the Remain and Leave sides used the Norwegian model of association to the European Union in their campaigns. How could Norway be an argument for and against British membership? And what did Norwegians think about Brexit? The final part of the chapter deals with the British-Norwegian relationship after Brexit, a relationship that needs to be reshaped in a number of ways. Will they again work closely from the outside like they did in EFTA © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 G. K. Almlid, Britain and Norway in Europe Since 1945, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61473-7_9

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in the 1960s, and how will Brexit affect their bilateral relations in other areas?

Political Relations The second decade of the twenty-first century was a volatile period in British politics, with four general elections and two hung parliaments. Nonetheless, the Conservative Party was in power throughout the period. David Cameron formed a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats in 2010, but they parted ways after the Tories won a majority alone in 2015. The Brexit issue shaped UK politics from that point forward. Cameron announced his resignation only hours after the referendum result was clear in June 2016.2 The entire premiership of his successor, Theresa May, was dominated by Brexit and in particular the search for an interim exit deal that could be accepted in Europe and at home.3 She failed. It did not help that she lost her Commons’ majority in 2017 and had to depend on support from the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). But pressure from inside her own party was enough in itself— eventually she resigned in the summer of 2019. In December the same year, the gamble to launch a general election paid off for the new prime minister, Boris Johnson; the Tories won with a surprisingly big margin. Brexit was the principal election campaign issue in 2019; it significantly changed the political map of Britain. Labour had its worst election result since 1935. Particularly painful was losing party strongholds in northern England to the Tories. Labour MPs who lost their seats blamed the leadership’s Brexit policy.4 Indeed, choosing a middle, and rather unclear, way on the heated Brexit question could hardly be a vote winner. Moreover, Jeremy Corbyn was not a popular prime minister candidate. Tony Blair characterised Labour’s election campaign as a “combination of misguided ideology and terminal ineptitude”, and claimed that it was a “cardinal error” of Corbyn to have agreed to the election.5 Clearly, Blair disliked Corbyn moving the party to the left, in the opposite direction of where he himself had taken it. In Norway, the “red-green” coalition led by Jens Stoltenberg continued until the September 2013 Storting election. Since then Erna Solberg of the Conservatives has been prime minister for varying coalitions of non-socialist parties. For the first time ever the Progress Party, positioned on the right of the political scale in Norway, was part of a

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government. Neither European integration, nor any other foreign policy area played a vital role in any of the elections in this period. In public, David Cameron expressed that “Britain and Norway have an extremely strong relationship; we are very old friends, very close friends”.6 Haugevik claims that political attention around the bilateral cooperation increased after Cameron became prime minister.7 This was a paradox considering the good relationship Jens Stoltenberg had with Gordon Brown. One factor that may have played a role here is that since he became leader of the Conservative Party in 2005, Cameron had the Scandinavian countries as an obvious reference for his emphasis on family policy, research, education and the environment.8 Moreover, Haugevik argues that the Cameron government was concerned with strengthening Britain’s relations outside the Union and other established institutions.9 In 2011, Stoltenberg and Cameron signed a deal on bilateral and global partnership.10 Albeit fairly loose, it identified eight areas of cooperation, such as trade, research, environment and security. Probably not a coincidence, the first on the list was energy. Nonetheless, similar to the previous two decades, political relations between Norway and Britain were good—but not special anymore. For Britain, it was not among the most important. And when Cameron in 2012 became the first British PM to visit Norway since 1986, it generated little attention compared to previous visits. This demonstrated the reduced role of Britain in Norwegian politics and among the public.

Security and Defence Britain and Norway have continued to share many security perspectives, where the UN and NATO have remained the two cornerstones. During this period, there was also no significant dividing feature as the 2003 Iraq war had been among European NATO members. The 2011 Libya intervention was a prominent example of Britain’s and Norway’s emphasis on the UN and NATO. When the Arab spring spread to Libya, Colonel Gaddafi violently hit back at insurgents.11 The human rights abuses put the world’s democracies under pressure to help. In February 2011, the UN Security Council opened for the protection of the Libyan population from Gaddafi forces using all available means. Britain and France took the lead politically in the UN, and in the NATO intervention that followed the next month.12 Norway was also among the first countries to participate in the Libya operation. The Norwegian use

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of force was unlike anything seen before. Norway dropped no bombs in Kosovo in 1999, seven in Afghanistan in the 2001–07 period, and almost 600 in Libya.13 In the short term, the intervention was a success. By the end of October, Gaddafi had been killed, and Sarkozy and Cameron were hailed as Libyan liberators.14 But in a longer perspective considerable problems have arisen. In 2016, the British Foreign Affairs Committee concluded that the decision to intervene was not based on accurate intelligence; the threat to civilians was overstated.15 More problematic perhaps was the coalition’s lack of a post-operation strategy. Libya today is a failed state with sectarian violence.16 This underlines how difficult decisions about international military operations are. Western democracies such as Norway and Britain are under pressure to act in cases of substantial breaches of human rights inside states, but the cost is often high and the long-term effects uncertain. The appetite for such interventions has abated in the UK and Norway after Libya. In 2013, for example, Cameron’s coalition government was voted down by the House of Commons on attacking Syria.17 NATO has operated less out of area in this decade in part due to Russian self-assertiveness, particularly evident in Georgia in 2008 and even more so on the Crimean Peninsula in 2014. Russian military activities close to Norwegian areas escalated as well.18 Norway therefore argued for a return to the focus on the core area in NATO’s new Strategic Concept in 2010.19 Some other members were sceptical—and Britain among the most.20 The UK preferred a continuation of global NATO. This demonstrated two points. First, Norway experienced Russian bellicosity more directly, similar to during the Cold War. Second, the two countries still had different views on its international role. Britain has retained a more global security perspective while Norway will be mostly satisfied as long as its corner of the world is safe. In the end, the new Strategic Concept was a balance between the out-of-area approach and protection of NATO territory.21 The British-Norwegian security relationship seems to have strengthened somewhat in this decade. Liam Fox, the Tory defence secretary, characterised Norway as “one of our key strategic partners”.22 Indeed, in 2012 Britain and Norway signed a bilateral agreement on closer defence cooperation, including training and exchange of military personnel.23 The Norwegian defence minister then said that “Norway and the Nordic were back on Britain’s agenda”.24 Nonetheless, this certainly had its limits.

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Trade and Economy David Cameron inherited a difficult economic situation due to the financial crisis. It was “even worse than we thought”, he claimed.25 The coalition government’s answer was to introduce a number of austerity measures.26 These were controversial politically, but not enough for the Labour Party to capitalise on substantially. Norway was not hit as hard by the financial crisis, and unemployment remained low in the second decade of the twenty-first century. The GDP per capita has been among the highest in the world, significantly higher than Britain’s. Oil and gas have continued as the most important sources of revenue; energy constitutes over half of Norway’s total exports of goods.27 However, in the spring of 2020 a sudden fall in oil prices and, above all, the coronavirus hit the economy hard. Similar to Britain and other economies unemployment spiked. The bilateral trade patterns from the previous decade continued. Norway exports more to the UK than it imports. Britain is the number one export country for Norway. A small country like Norway is much less significant for British exporters; in 2016, it was the 26th most important market.28 In the first two post-war decades, Britain was the biggest exporter to Norway, but it was gradually overtaken by other countries. In 2018, the UK was in fourth place, behind Sweden, Germany and Denmark.29 Bilateral trade of energy has remained particularly important. Britain has a high dependency on Norway. In 2017, 57% of crude oil and 75% of gas imported to the UK came from its neighbour across the North Sea.30 Norway’s very fortunate position in this area is of course essential to this pattern. Of all the OECD countries it is by far the largest net exporter of energy in percentage terms, as it sold almost six times as much energy as it used itself.31 Importantly, almost all of Norway’s electricity production comes from hydropower. Britain was often Norway’s best insider ally when the EU tried to meddle in Norwegian management of oil and gas resources.32 Britain, as a petroleum producer, has shared interests with Norway. Espen Barth Eide, a former Norwegian foreign minister, considers that this is one reason why Brexit is something to worry about.33 After Britain left, only big importers of oil and gas remain around the EU table. On a number of occasions, the EU, directly or indirectly, has proposed laws that could encroach on Norwegian sovereignty over oil and gas resources.34 Norway

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has constantly argued that activities on the continental shelf should not be affected by the EEA. Brexit could mean that the EU will look for ways to challenge this more.

Norway and European Integration The previous chapter examined the main features of Norway’s relationship with the EU after 1994. Most of this applies to the period covered in this chapter as well. Here some specific developments in the second decade of the twenty-first century are discussed. Opposition to EU membership among Norwegians in this decade has been nothing but stronger than ever. Opinion polls stabilised around 70% “no”.35 One reason was the euro crisis. Many thought it exposed problematic aspects of the EU. It made it harder to argue that rich Norwegians would be better off inside the Union. Furthermore, being on the outside saved Norway from contributing to the bailouts of southern European members. The valid point made by EU supporters that the crisis was not a result of the euro itself but of national governments overspending, convinced few. Prime Minister Solberg supports Norwegian EU membership, but the issue has remained off the table for all her governments. The smaller nonsocialist parties that she has relied on in the coalition are fundamentally lukewarm. And in 2016 the Progress Party announced its opposition. Supranationalist bureaucracy was given as one reason.36 Another key concern for the party was the EU’s handling of migration and the refugee crisis. Moreover, Solberg, always the realist, understands that the strong public opposition most likely makes this a lost cause for some years still. “Not a good idea”, was her response in June 2020 to a proposal made by the Young Conservatives that the party should actively pursue EU membership in the coming years.37 The Solberg government has continued Norway’s traditional “active” European policy. It has strengthened cooperation with the EU in many areas.38 One example is security and defence, where the government works primarily bilaterally to reach its goals vis-à-vis the EU. In a 2017 White Paper, it listed the EU members that it intended to increase its foreign and security dialogue with. Britain was among these, but did not stand out as particularly important, as it would have been in the first post-war decades.39

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The democratic challenges arising from Norway’s European relations have continued. The country has now some 70 treaties with the EU. According to the European Commission, Norway “is as integrated in European policy and economy as any non-member state can be”.40 The EEA is the most important pillar, and as we have seen, it involves the EU de facto deciding a wide range of new Norwegian laws. “Five a day” has become an expression used in the domestic debate, referring to the number of EU acts adopted by Norway every day the Storting is in session.41 Indeed, Norway’s ability to influence EU policy making has diminished. With an increasing number of member states, the views of third countries like Norway were necessarily pushed further down the list of priorities for the Union. Furthermore, EU decision-making has become more complicated. More decisions are made by agencies and directorates, and new laws often come in packages of which only parts are relevant to Norway via the EEA.42 The EU also passes some laws quickly before Norway has time to act. Moreover, the European Parliament has gradually increased its power. In a 2016 interview Prime Minister Solberg said “we used to talk to the Commission and we could call up the countries. It is much more difficult to get the European Parliament to understand that Norway… should have special favours”.43 The Solberg government tried to deal with these challenges by establishing a Minister of EEA and EU affairs in 2015. It also established a European committee led by this minister to coordinate all ministries’ contacts with the EU. Another motive for these initiatives was to regain some political control over the management of Norway’s European policy from experts and the civil service.44 The Centre Party, the most ardent anti-European party, argued that this ministerial position should be removed since Norway is not a member of the EU. The party leader, Trygve Slagsvold Vedum, also claimed that the ministers that held the position appeared to be acting as spokespersons for Brussels in the domestic debate.45 In 2018, the prime minister reluctantly decided to scrap this post, not as a response to the criticism but to allow room for new ministerial posts when the Liberal Party joined the government coalition. Yet a majority of Norwegians still favour EEA membership. The euro crisis made the arguments stronger for the EEA, the Conservatives and the Labour Party argued.46 According to the Solberg government, it is Norway’s “lifeline to the European market”.47 But left-leaning trade

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unions have increasingly criticised it, arguing that it ruins the Norwegian model and labour rights. One of the most powerful unions, Fellesforbundet , has demanded that the government reviews the effects of the EEA on Norway. This view reverberates to some extent into the Labour Party, which has traditionally been a staunch EEA supporter. Such reviews do not often materialise into significant changes. However, if Labour were to change its stance, it would mean that all parties of the only credible alternative to the Solberg government in the 2021 Storting election would be anti-EEA. Such a scenario could have a dramatic effect on Norway’s European policy.

Brexit Britain’s relationship with Europe as an EC/EU member was always strained, from Wilson’s renegotiations, Thatcher’s Europhobic rhetoric, Major’s Maastricht ratification problems, Blair’s inability to move the UK closer to Europe and to increasing calls for a referendum on membership in the twenty-first century. In this perspective, it was no surprise that the British public voted to leave in 2016. Britain has consistently been the most Eurosceptic member since accession in 1973.48 Of course, dissatisfaction about an EU democratic deficiency has been widespread in Europe for decades. The northern European states have generally been more reluctant to accept greater integration than the southern. And the eastern and central European countries applied for membership as soon as they fulfilled the conditions; they needed support for their young democracies and weak economies.49 In 2017 about half of the British people thought their country could better face the future outside the EU, more than in any other member country.50 It is likely that British newspapers have played an important role in shaping EU opposition. A large section of the press has been strongly Eurosceptic, often depicting a Europe trying to cheat Britain. “Tabloid discourse especially, … engages in crude stereotyping and xenophobic outbursts, distorts issues, omits information and is heavy with ideological force”, Gowland et al. argue.51 A well-known example is The Sun’s “Up yours Delors”,52 another is the same newspaper’s characterisation of Gordon Brown signing the Lisbon Treaty: “Surrender signature”.53 Europe was the most difficult issue in the negotiations for the coalition government platform in 2010.54 The Liberal Democrats have since their

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formation in 1988 been the most enthusiastic EU supporter of the three major parties.55 The Tories had for decades been divided on European matters and UK membership. The European Research Group, working within the party since the 1990s, pressed for an in/out referendum. The coalition parties agreed that Britain would not join the euro, and if further transfer of powers to the EU was proposed in the future, the people would have their say.56 A petition calling for a referendum on British EU membership quickly achieved so much support that the Parliament had to debate it in October 2011.57 Although as many as 81 Tory MPs voted in favour, and 20 abstained, the House rejected a referendum by 483 to 111 votes. But the issue would not go away. Pressure continued on Cameron from within and outside the party. An important part of this pressure was the increased popularity of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP).58 It did well in European Parliament elections: it came second in 2009 and was the most popular in 2014, the first time in modern history that neither of the two main parties won a national election. UKIP was also beating Conservative MPs in by-elections. Evans and Menon point to the many British voters who had become disenchanted and distrustful of the political class, due to, for example, the parliament-expenses scandal.59 This group of voters was clearly open to a populism movement. Another factor was that Labour and the Tories had become more similar. This created a climate for rebellion. Many in the Tory Party argued that something had to be done to counter these developments. David Laws, a Liberal Democrat MP, writes that senior Conservatives told him privately in late 2012 that “We need to come out for an EU referendum, or we will be destroyed by UKIP in the 2014 referendum, and maybe lose a lot of votes in 2015 too”.60 On many occasions, Cameron chose a confrontational style regarding Europe. When the EU received the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo in December 2012, he sent his coalition partner Nick Clegg to the ceremony, which he labelled a “jamboree”.61 Yet there was always a group inside the party that was even more negative. Boris Johnson, London mayor at the time, characterised the EU Nobel Prize as “preposterous”.62 Cameron also chose a relatively tough approach on policy. At the European Council in December 2011, he vetoed a treaty amendment about new rules for the eurozone. This enraged many in Europe but was hailed by Eurosceptics in Britain.63 It caused strains in the coalition government because the Liberal Democrats opposed the veto. Whether it was pressure

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from within his own party or government, or Cameron’s own beliefs, he did little to improve Britain’s European relations. He was unable to form a good relationship with his EU partners and was repeatedly “wrong-footed”.64 In January 2013, Cameron announced his support for a referendum on whether Britain should remain an EU member. Pressure from within his own party was crucial for the decision.65 Cameron wanted first to renegotiate UK membership terms as well as reforms of the EU, thereby making membership more attractive to British voters. The 2015 Tory election manifesto promised an EU referendum. Implicitly, it argued that with renegotiated terms membership was the best option. In February 2016, Cameron finished the negotiations on the EU reform deal. He obtained some changes, such as a guarantee that non-euro states such as Britain would not fund bailouts, and a commitment to exempt the UK from “ever closer union” to be written into new treaties. But many thought that this was not significant. The Referendum Campaign Unsurprisingly, Cameron came out in favour of Remain after the reform negotiations. However, the strong divisions in the party made him suspend the convention of collective cabinet responsibility so that ministers could campaign as they pleased. A majority of them supported Remain. But it was a blow when seniors such as Michael Gove and Boris Johnson announced their opposition. A popular media figure, Johnson became the political leader of the Leave side. This was important as he was “capable of matching the Prime Minister for sheer star quality, as well as influence”.66 The role of the opposition parties contributed to Brexit. Labour was formally committed to membership, but the leadership, with Jeremy Corbyn at the top, was criticised for making a half-hearted effort for the Remain side.67 Corbyn, traditionally a Eurosceptic, was even accused of sabotaging the Remain campaign.68 The Liberal Democrats were significantly weakened after the 2015 general election, and their Remain arguments had limited impact. The referendum campaign was extreme in many ways, and one of the most divisive in modern British political history.69 Well-considered arguments and balanced views took a backseat to the turmoil. The press contributed its fair share to this. Its coverage of the referendum “was

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at times both hyperbolic and misleading”.70 A majority of the press supported Leave.71 The campaigns themselves were hardly any better. Boris Johnson warned that the EU shared the “same flawed ambition to unite Europe that Hitler pursued”.72 He did acknowledge, however, that the EU adopted other means than the Nazi Germans. A crucial Brexit argument, and probably the most important for Leavers, was immigration.73 This had some nasty sides, but it was also a valid issue. In 2015 net immigration to Britain was 333,000—the second highest figure on record.74 Britain was a popular destination for those seeking a safer and more prosperous future for themselves and their families—in other words, the country’s soft power was still among the greatest in the world. Due to the rules of the Single Market, the huge bulk of immigrants came from the European Union and in particular Eastern Europe. The British government, underestimating how many would come, had not imposed restrictions on immigration from these countries when they became members in 2005/2007, unlike most other EU states.75 This resulted in Britain receiving “a historically unique inflow of migrants from the EU accession countries”.76 Despite making significant contributions to the British economy, many argued that these people came to exploit the country’s welfare system. The hard-line Leavers and the press also portrayed them as a threat to British culture and way of life. Another vital point for many Leavers was the question of sovereignty.77 While this was related to immigration, it was also a much wider questions that had existed since the start of European integration. After the Second World War, the principle of complete sovereignty was almost sacred for the UK. The supranational elements of European integration had always been problematic to a majority of the British public and politicians. That so much of British law, normally made by the House of Commons, was now coming from Brussels disturbed many Britons. It undermined the traditionally strong sovereignty of the British parliament. Of course, Britain was a part of “Brussels” through its EU membership and could thereby influence decisions—but that was apparently often disregarded by many sceptics. Money was a third issue. Many thought Britain paid too much to the EU. Contributions to the EC/EU budget had been controversial ever since Britain had negotiated for membership in 1971.78 Britain had always been a net contributor, despite rebates achieved in the 1980s, partly because the regulations had been made by the EC before Britain joined.

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The Eurozone crisis, with massive bailouts of Greece, coincided with the referendum campaign. This did not help the Remain side. The Vote Leave organisation was very important in the Brexit debate. It distanced itself from UKIP and leader Nigel Farage since he was seen to be off-putting to undecided voters.79 Vote Leave had MPs as members but proclaimed itself an anti-establishment uprising. Boris Johnson portrayed Brexit as “a bit of a David and Goliath story”.80 The organisation focused on dissatisfaction about immigration. “Take back control” became a persuasive slogan, encapsulating the public’s emphasis on sovereignty. Also, the issue of contributions to the EU budget was important. Most people remember the red double-decker bus painted with the message that Britain was sending £350 million a week to the EU, which could be spent on the NHS instead. This claim was hotly disputed, and many Leavers later admitted that the figures were inflated.81 But it had an effect on voters.82 The main argument for the Remain campaign centred on the economic dangers of leaving, including increased unemployment. In April 2016, the UK civil service sent a booklet to every home in Britain setting out the case for remaining in the EU. It was primarily based on economic arguments. The Treasury later the same month warned that leaving would involve serious negative economic consequences. It presented concrete sums on how much worse off each household would be with the various non-membership options in the future. But this was not credible and only hurt the Remain side.83 The government and Remain side were accused of scaremongering. A major problem for pro-Europeans ever since the question of membership arose in the 1960s has been that it is virtually impossible to calculate exactly how much membership improves the economy. Britain Stronger in Europe was the key Remain organisation. It struggled to achieve similar clarity as the Leave side.84 A general problem was that Remainers had to be more nuanced than their opponents. Very few in Britain, or anywhere else for that matter, thought that the EU was perfect, so it was necessary to acknowledge its weaknesses to be seen as credible. Leave supporters could be more categorical. But perhaps the Remain side should have connected more with the hearts of the people? Its campaign was perhaps dry and lacked emotion. The Leave side adopted a more visceral approach. Goodwin, Hix and Pickup claim that “arguments regarding the positive effects of EU membership were far less prominent as they received a fraction of the media attention” compared

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to the Leave arguments.85 The dynamics of a referendum differ from the usual parliament debate. Winning the support of the people often requires different skills than winning in parliament. MPs can be persuaded by party carrots and whips. And, importantly, the level of knowledge about the subject naturally varies more among a whole population than for MPs who are more used to dealing with large amounts of information and, ideally, considering different sides of a complex matter. The Result “A wave of shock is reverberating around Europe”, the BBC reported the day after the Brexit referendum.86 Most experts had not predicted the result.87 However, Evans and Menon argue that some 80% of the votes matched the responses to a poll on the EU in 2010.88 Shock or not, it was a fact that 51.9% had voted to leave, and the turnout was 72.2%, higher than any general election since 1992. Andrew Marr described it as the “biggest democratic rebellion in modern British history”.89 Why a majority of British voters turned down EU membership has been discussed widely. How could the government and establishment, including the major parties, with such huge resources lose? Why did the electorate not prefer the status quo, which is normal in referendums.90 There are a number of explanations. Remain politicians made several mistakes. One factor was that Cameron and other cabinet members could not campaign for British membership until the reform negotiations were finalised. This left them at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the Brexiteers; Remainers were fighting a defensive battle. Moreover, most Britons observed no substantial changes in Cameron’s reform deal on such important matters as British sovereignty and measures for limiting EU immigration. The negotiations did not match the expectations that Cameron had created. As such it could be asked whether they were in the end detrimental to the Remain side. It would arguably have been better to hold the referendum as soon as possible after it was promised in 2013. Finding solutions that would please British Eurosceptics and at the same time be acceptable to the EU partners was virtually impossible. Why then try? A distrust of the political elite played a role for many Leave voters.91 The major parties misjudged how strong this feeling was among the people. A growing part of the electorate had felt overlooked by the centrist elite, and the referendum finally gave them an opportunity to

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oppose to them directly.92 The mainstream parties were more socially liberal than the public on questions of order, morality and freedom. And the socially conservative voters preferred the Leave option. Voting patterns therefore cut across the traditional left–right party lines. But not completely: the Tory voters were the most anti-EU—61% voted Leave, while the percentage for Labour voters was only 35. Even 32% of the Liberal Democrats voted for Brexit.93 The discontent with the elite was related to another explanation for Brexit: the voting pattern of the working class, even though some researchers warn against oversimplification on this.94 Particularly in central and northern England, this segment of the electorate was more likely to vote Leave. This was typically in the former manufacturing areas where unemployment was higher and wages lower than the national average. David Goodheart labels this group as the “somewheres”, as they are more rooted in geographical identity, not cosmopolitanism.95 They are often older and less educated. Over 40% of Leave voters were aged over 55.96 They feel they have lost in the globalised economy. Importantly, they have been marginalised politically by the “anywheres”, who also dominate culture, society and business life.97 All four UK capitals voted Remain, underlining that urbanites with higher education and better paid jobs were more comfortable with and benefitted more economically from globalisation and immigration. Goodheart argues that the “somewheres” are more disposed to populism. Traditionally, the working-class and less-educated people had given up voting more than other groups, hence the trend of decreasing voter turnout in the national elections. They had grown disillusioned and disinterested. Many of the three million more people who voted in the referendum, compared to the 2015 general election, belonged to this group—and a majority of them were Eurosceptics.98 The Remain side’s main argument was fear of economic downturn, but many of these people felt that they had lost economically already for decades. Immigration was closely related to this. More people in areas with high immigration from Eastern Europe voted leave.99 And it was in these regions that people struggled more economically, and felt, correctly or not, that foreigners came and took their jobs. Moreover, Virdee and McGeever claim that the Leave campaign was racially charged.100 It won by focusing on a restoration of Britain’s greatness, back to the Empire, where Britain was above its colonial subjects. In this perspective, globalisation should be rejected because it threatens Britishness. Leaving the

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question of racism aside, we have seen that the idea of Britain as a greater nation than it is in reality has endured among many Britons throughout the post-war period. This has often constrained British politicians when dealing with Europe, but also made the EU a useful scapegoat at times. It also mattered for the Brexit voting that the Leave campaign rather cleverly managed to switch the argument about the status quo. The campaign argued that the important issues of sovereignty, immigration and economic and cultural demotion connected with globalisation would only continue and strengthen with EU membership. In other words, the political status quo option, if Britain were to remain a member, would really mean a gradual change towards an even worse situation. Finally, Cameron has been widely criticised for his political manoeuvring. Smith passes a harsh verdict. It was a huge gamble to open for a referendum, and he failed.101 He lost in three ways: Britain would now, most likely, leave the European Union; his party would be just as divided in the subsequent years; and he lost his job. How to Brexit? Theresa May won the leadership battle and took over as prime minister, a position described as a “poisoned chalice”.102 Similar to Norway, referendums in Britain have no formal constitutional status, they are only consultative. It would be up to the House of Commons to decide whether to Brexit or not. Other EU countries had in previous decades held referendums that resulted in the people turning down a European treaty that a government or parliament majority supported, and the electorate had to vote again to get the “right” result after some modifications of the treaty. The Conservative Party’s 2015 election manifesto had promised to respect the result of the referendum, and it was expected that the House of Commons would honour it. Undeniably, May did. “Brexit means Brexit” became a mantra for her, despite being a Remainer in the referendum campaign. She triggered article 50 of the Treaty on European Union in March 2017. But it would turn out to be extremely difficult to find an interim withdrawal agreement that could be accepted in London and Brussels. Moreover, Seldon passes a hard verdict on May as a prime minister.103 It is hard not to agree at least when it comes to her handling of Brexit. It added to May’s difficulties that she lost the Tory majority in the June 2017 election. She had had a comfortable lead in the opinion

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polls all year, but ran a disastrous campaign. Brexit played a small part in the election though; both major parties had promised to respect the referendum result. It was rather dominated by traditional issues like the economy and social care policy. The personal abilities of the contenders for prime minister, May and Corbyn, also mattered.104 The election seriously damaged May’s authority in parliament and inside her own party. Importantly, she now had to govern at the mercy of the DUP. The fundamental question was how “hard” the Brexit deal should be. Or to put it another way, how should Britain be connected with the EU in the transition phase before more permanent arrangements were settled at a later stage. A majority of MPs preferred a soft Brexit, which would involve close alignment with the EU’s customs union and Single Market. That would secure trade links and reduce significantly negative economic effects. But importantly, it would mean that Britain had little say in the making of new rules pertaining to these important areas. Brexiteers refused to accept such a solution, arguing that it betrayed what people had voted for in the referendum.105 A hard Brexit would involve cutting completely the institutional ties with the EU and focusing on free-trade arrangements. This, however, would involve much uncertainty, probably economic downturn and the need for customs checks at the Irish border. But it would mean that Britain no longer had to accept so many laws made by the EU. Fundamentally, it was problematic that it was so unclear what the people had really voted for in 2016. Norwegian prime minister Erna Solberg was correct when she said that it was obvious that Britain did not have a well-thought out plan for what should be done if the people voted to leave the EU.106 Negotiations with the EU on the withdrawal agreement were tough. Important matters were the amount of money to pay into EU budgets, the rights of EU citizens living in Britain and not least the Northern Irish border. The UK government and the EU played a game of chicken— none of them wanted no deal at all. But May often said that “no deal for Britain is better than a bad deal”.107 The prime minister and most of her cabinet colleagues were extremely keen on reaching an agreement. But the EU had the better hand. May’s deal of November 2018 was largely a soft Brexit: in the transition phase Britain would have to abide by EU law, also new laws, continue its payments to the budget and be under the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Negotiations in Brussels were almost trivial compared to the battleground in Westminster. The Tories were so divided that May was unable

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to get her deal through parliament. A group of hardliner Brexiteers thought she had accepted far too EU-friendly terms. Moreover, the Labour Party often played party politics and thus rejected May’s deal. Meanwhile, the DUP refused to accept that Northern Ireland would have different status from the rest of Britain. The Irish government, and consequently the entire EU27, were concerned that there would be a hard border between Ireland and Northern Ireland.108 This could threaten the Good Friday Treaty of 1998. May’s leadership was challenged from inside the party, but she managed to scrape by after a vote of confidence among her own MPs. In the end, she decided to quit. It was just not possible to get her deal through with the frozen situation in parliament. Boris Johnson’s initial move as prime minister was to suspend parliament in order to hinder MPs from stopping a “no deal” Brexit.109 This largely failed, and in October 2019 Johnson’s government negotiated a new withdrawal agreement with the EU. The terms were primarily similar to those May had achieved, but there were important changes on the issue of the Northern Irish border. In the general election in December, the Tories capitalised on the dominance of Brexit in the campaign. The Liberal Democrats argued for a new referendum, which was not well received, and the Labour position was unclear.110 Johnson’s catchphrase “get Brexit done” resonated with many voters who had grown tired of the whole issue. By the end of January Britain left the EU, with a transition regime not very dissimilar to membership—but with less influence. Brexit and Norway Norway was not of high importance in the Brexit debate but attracted more interest in British politics than in a long time. We probably have to go all the way back to the “Norway debate” in the House of Commons in May 1940 to find a period where it played a more significant role.111 The Norwegian relationship with the EU was used by both sides in the Brexit debate. Remainers argued that while Norway was rich, it was politically dominated by Brussels. David Cameron dismissed a Norwegian model for Britain, in effect EFTA and EEA membership. He categorised such a solution as “government by fax”, since Britain would be unable to influence EU laws that would affect the country.112 As we have seen, this description was not far off the mark. Cameron also emphasised that Norway is the tenth largest contributor to the EU.113 The think tank Open Europe found that a Norway option for Britain would

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involve contributing 94% of what Britain contributed as a member.114 The government therefore saw little future for Britain in companionship with non-EU members. Among Eurosceptics Norway had long been seen as a model for Britain to follow.115 It demonstrated how a country could be prosperous and well-functioning without being an EU member. The people had dismissed membership twice and Norway therefore retained full sovereignty, they argued. However, a majority of Brexiteers gradually dismissed a Norwegian solution when they realised what it really entailed. The Vote Leave campaign director, Dominic Cummings, wanted a looser arrangement in order to “end the supremacy of EU law”.116 But at times when the deadlock in the House of Commons made a “no deal” Brexit more likely, several MPs regarded the “Norway solution” as a safe option. One was Labour’s Stephen Kinnock, who argued: “We are navigating straight towards the ice berg now, like Titanic,… it may be Norway that provides a safe harbour at the well-established EEA”.117 Moreover, “Norway plus”, which would also include remaining in the EU customs union, gathered more support as the exit date approached, for example, from cabinet minister Amber Rudd.118 It was argued that this option would mean going back to the sort of economic relationship that Britain had with the EC in the 1970s and 80 s. In the chaos of the House of Commons’ debates on Brexit on 27 March 2019, there were eight indicative votes. The Norwegian model received the lowest support of all proposals, 65 for and 377 against. “Norway plus” fared better, 188 in favour and 307 against. It was supported by both Labour and Tory MPs. Fundamentally, many argued, any Norwegian-based solution, in particular the “plus” model, would be a Brexit only in name. It would mean accepting EU laws and, indirectly, being under ECJ rule,119 as well as accepting the principle of free movement of people. What then did Norwegians think about Brexit? A majority of national politicians preferred that Britain would remain in the EU. Norway’s foreign minister, Børge Brende, argued that it was better for the UK since it would have more influence on the inside.120 Many also considered that it was a better option for Norway if there was no Brexit. Prime Minister Solberg emphasised that it would provide more orderly relations for her country.121 In the light of its considerable dependency on the EU27 and Britain, instability in Europe is always seen as negative in Norway. Furthermore, Britain shares Norwegian transatlantic and anti-federalist

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instincts. Brexit could involve having less ways of putting the brakes on further EU integration that would inevitably affect Norway. Accepting that Brexit was a fact, the Norwegian voices that were heard in Britain generally advised against a Norwegian model. Espen Barth Eide, former Labour foreign minister, warned that access to the Single Market from outside the EU also means “retaining all the EU’s product standards, financial regulations, employment regulations and substantial contributions to the EU budget”—Britain would continue to be “run by Brussels”.122 He also emphasised that the UK would have to follow the EU’s rules on the movement of people. Prime Minister Solberg had a similar message to the Eurosceptics in Britain who hoped to adopt the Norway solution: “they won’t like it”.123 Of course, these voices came from the pro-European Norwegian Labour Party and Conservatives. The Norwegian anti-Europeans, on the other hand, celebrated Brexit as a “victory for democracy”.124 The Centre Party argued that it will provide opportunities for Norway to strengthen cooperation with an important ally.125 While this may be true, the future bilateral relationship holds many uncertainties.

The British-Norwegian Relationship After Brexit Brexit has many possible ramifications. A main question during the transition period in 2020 was whether Britain and the EU would reach a deal on their future relationship by the end of the year, as Boris Johnson promised in the 2019 election campaign. Both the EU and Britain realised that failure meant a “no deal” Brexit unless an extension was agreed. Nonetheless, more interesting here are the more fundamental long-term issues for Britain. One is the shape and nature of the permanent relationship to the EU. Will Britain become like any other third country, such as Canada, or will it end up with closer links, for example to the Single Market? Another is the UK’s international position. Will Brexit improve this by allowing opportunities to deal freely with whomever Britain wants while enjoying full national sovereignty, as the Remainers have contended? Or will the UK be weakened economically and politically, which was the Leave side’s major concern? A third important question is whether the UK will dissolve. In the Brexit referendum, Remain was the preferred option in Northern Ireland (56%) and Scotland (62%). Nicola Sturgeon, first minister of Scotland, has thus demanded that Westminster must allow a new referendum on Scottish independence.126 In Northern

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Ireland, Brexit has increased calls for a United Ireland.127 These are all issues of great political importance to Britain, but our focus now moves to how Brexit may affect various aspects of the UK-Norwegian relationship. It is in Britain’s interest to maintain and develop further good relations with Norway. The security links will still be important, and the UK depends on Norway for much of its energy needs. More than half of Norway’s petroleum resources are still not produced, so the country will be an important energy power also in the future.128 Boris Johnson’s abovementioned prediction about forging closer relations with Norway may very well come true. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that there will be substantial changes in their relationship. The security and energy cooperation already works very well, and it is hard to identify areas with great potential for improvement. Moreover, it is doubtful that there is enough political will in Oslo and London combined to prioritise an extensive change of the relationship. Norway will never be the most important European country to Britain. In his discussion on British foreign policy after Brexit, Hill contends that the UK may retain its good bilateral relations with states such as the Netherlands, Belgium and Norway, but what really matters in European relations is the future relationship to France and Germany.129 This is correct. But on some issues, Britain and Norway will as non-EU members naturally take a joint position. And Britain will generally need all the friends it can hang on to. Norway will seek close relations to Britain after Brexit. Security partnership and trade in energy and fish are important factors. But it is unlikely that Norway will try to jump back into the arms of Britain as in the post-war years. Since 1999 Norway has had a special strategy for Germany. When this was renewed in June 2019, the Norwegian foreign minister, Ine Eriksen Søreide, stated that “Germany is a central EU country and Norway’s most important partner in Europe”.130 This very good bilateral relationship is based on the countries’ shared fundamental views on foreign policy, not least the emphasis on multilateral cooperation and a rule-governed world. Norway also share many of these values with Britain, but as we have seen in previous chapters the bilateral relationship has faded. Haugevik correctly comments that, before the Brexit decision, Britain was “rarely singled out as a chief bilateral partner for Norway in the EU”.131 In the 1950s and 1960s, Britain had feared that the Nordic countries would move towards the European Community without them. This is what has happened with Brexit: Sweden, Denmark and Finland will

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remain members, and Norway seems to choose the EU over Britain overall. A slightly closer British-Norwegian security relationship could develop. Both countries will continue to be firmly committed to NATO and will want a strong US role in Europe. But if EU members increase their defence coordination, it will add to Britain’s and Norway’s outsiderness. Whitman argues that in such a situation the two countries will have a common interest to coordinate within NATO.132 Since the 1990s, Norway has feared that the Alliance will be dominated by negotiations between Brussels and Washington. Foreign and defence ministers meet far more often in the EU context than in NATO. This could now be a common Norwegian and British concern. There is also some unease related to a more active EU outside NATO. The former Norwegian EU affairs minister, Vidar Helgesen, said about being outside the Union on security and defence: “Norway is experiencing in a concrete way [what it means] not to be at the table when the EU is making decisions on policies towards our biggest neighbour, Russia”.133 This could be a problem for Britain too, although it allows more room for an independent approach. Moreover, if Britain decides to participate in EU military and civilian operations under the CFSP, as Norway has done since 2003, the two countries could work together to get non-EU countries more say in planning and implementation.134 We can also expect to see some strengthening of bilateral defence cooperation. In June 2020, the Norwegian defence minister announced that Britain will be allowed to pre-position more military equipment in Norway.135 This makes sense in a practical perspective as it will be used for UK troops’ winter training. But it could also be interpreted as a sign of Britain’s increasing role as Norway’s most important European security ally. The most significant changes from Brexit on this bilateral relationship are expected within trade. The prospect of a “no deal” Brexit increased awareness of how tightly integrated both countries are with the EU and with each other. Right after the 2016 referendum, the Norwegian government began to work eagerly to prepare as much as possible for Brexit. The EU affairs minister, Frank Bakke-Jensen, told the Storting in 2017: “hardly any countries have had more government-level meetings with the UK” than Norway.136 Despite making a whole range of preparations for a “no deal” Brexit, the Norwegian government was relieved when the House of Commons finally passed the withdrawal agreement in January 2020. As an EEA member Norway could follow this EU-UK deal.

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However, after the transition phase Oslo and London must agree on new arrangements because Brexit means that Britain will also be leaving the EEA, which has been essential for regulating their bilateral trade. Without the EEA and the common four freedoms, tariffs will increase, and probably more important, other trade barriers will arise. Prime Minister Solberg characterises trading on only WTO rules as “extremely demanding”.137 Nevertheless, both countries have an interest in securing good arrangements, so this is unlikely. But Brexit certainly complicates the future trade relationship. For example, there is a risk that there will be one set of rules with the EU and another for their bilateral trade. The extent of this is determined by how much Britain in the future chooses to adopt Single Market regulations, because it appears as given that Norway will continue to adapt to the EU in this area. For Norway, it is problematic that Britain preferred to finalise a deal with the EU before moving on to other countries. It makes sense considering that the EU in 2019 accounted for 47% of Britain’s total trade.138 Trade with Norway was 2.2%.139 This had been a problem also before the interim agreement was in place. The Norwegian government maintained that it was “very well prepared, but the danger in such situations is that you can only prepare for what you know”.140 A new long-term British-Norwegian deal would have to cover a wide range of areas, from air traffic to the sale of fish and the use of mobile phones. Normally it takes years to negotiate comprehensive bilateral trade agreements. In one sense, this is easier as oil and gas, which comprise about 80% of Norway’s export to Britain, are transported in pipes and thus not dependent on border controls. These resources are already regulated by bilateral treaties. Regarding fisheries, traditionally an issue of dispute between Norway and Britain, it is likely that competition will increase. Both want to sell fish to the EU, but Britain will lose its advantage vis-à-vis Norway since it will most likely no longer have entirely free access to the EU market. Moreover, the joint management of fish stocks in the North Sea will become more complicated with three rather than two main actors. A simple way forward would be that the UK joins EFTA and thereby the EEA. Then it would obtain important trade agreements with as many as 38 countries in an instance. Moreover, Britain would almost automatically adopt new Single Market rules, making trade with the EU seamless. Seen from the Union this would have been an ideal solution.141

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Nevertheless, as we have discussed above, there are some major British objections to such a solution. Moreover, the Norwegian government and business preferred that Britain remained in the Single Market—but not that it joins EFTA or the EEA.142 The Conservative MP Heidi Nordby Lunde said outright: “I do not believe it is in Norway’s interest to invite the UK into the EFTA bloc”.143 One thing is that British membership would radically change Norway’s role as the unquestionable dominant power on the EFTA side of the EEA. Another is that if Britain joins EFTA but not the EEA, it would seriously undermine the role of the EEA inside the Association. Conversely, if the UK remains in the EEA, but does not join EFTA, it will be such an important outsider that the EFTA members’ opinions on the formulation of new EU directives will matter even less than today. In general, Norwegians are concerned that some kind of British participation in the EEA would be detrimental to Norway. It would make the arrangement more open to disputes due to the traditionally strained UK relationship with the EU. The Secretary General of the Norwegian European Movement stated in 2019 that Britain is “an obstructive nation and now with a dark blue nationalism in half the Tory party”.144 Regardless of the party in power in London, it seems likely that it would be hard for a big state like Britain to accept EU laws as easily as Norway has done since 1994. And a reservation from one country would affect the other nonEU EEA members. The main strategy in Oslo is to avoid jeopardising the EEA; despite its flaws, there is a fundamental interest in safeguarding it.145 Prime Minister Solberg in her usual diplomatic terms emphasises that Britain inside the EEA is a hypothetical question. And that if the British want to join, Norway will welcome them.146 Clearly, if Norway were put on the spot, it would be very difficult to refuse outright UK membership. Nonetheless, the Norwegian considerations about Britain’s role in this connection demonstrate how much has changed since the early decades of European integration. Then most Norwegians would have cheered at the thought of the UK together with Norway in EFTA. Now the EU27 is more important than Britain.

Conclusions Brexit was a shock to experts, politicians and many ordinary Britons, indeed to most observers outside the UK as well. How could Britain choose to leave when it was so integrated with the EU and so many

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strong forces in British society emphasised the benefits of membership? Moreover, for many Europeans it was hard to fathom that integration could be seriously reversed like this. They had grown up thinking that it was virtually a natural law that Europe would always integrate wider and deeper. Could this be the beginning of the unravelling of the whole European Union? That is a question for another book. But it is important to remember that Britain had been a somewhat odd and unusual member since its accession in 1973. It had continued its Atlantic and global orientation more than other members. It had opted out of important EU policies. And Euroscepticism among Britons had been stronger than in any other member state. As such, Brexit was the culmination of decades of British awkwardness, reluctance and outsiderness in European integration. Brexit dominated the British-Norwegian relationship in much of the second decade of the twenty-first century and will do so in the next one. Their trade relationship in particular needs to be reshaped so that their extensive trading can continue as before as much as possible. Whether this will revolve around the EU Single Market or only directly between the two remains to be seen—the former would certainly make matters easier. Furthermore, the political relationship will remain good. They share much in terms of history and values and, above all, they have many common interests. Relations may be strengthened to a degree as a result of their common outsiderness. We may see a slightly greater security cooperation since they both now are non-EU NATO members. They will at least have a common interest in the EU not gaining a dominant position within NATO. What is certain, is that Britain and Norway will be outsiders for a long time. A new Norwegian membership bid seems far away, and those who hoped that Britain might not leave the EU despite the referendum, or somehow re-join soon after Brexit, seem to have given up.

Notes 1. Boris Johnson, speech 4 December 2017 at Trafalgar Square, The Daily Mail website. https://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/pa/article-5143939/ In-video-Norway-gives-Boris-Johnson-giant-Christmas-tree.html. 2. Virginia Blackburn, Theresa May: The Downing Street Revolution (London: John Blake, 2016), 2–4. 3. Anthony Seldon, May at 10: The Verdict (London: Biteback, 2019).

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4. For example former MP Gareth Snell, Sky News website. https://news. sky.com/story/terminal-ineptitude-tony-blair-savages-labours-electioncampaign-11889602. 5. Ibid. 6. Royal Norwegian Embassy in London, press clippings 20 January 2011 (Kristin Haugevik, “Fra Storpolitisk Allianse til Lavmælt Vennskap: Norge og Storbritannia i Utenrikspolitikken,” in Det Glemte Partnerskapet: Norge og Storbritannia i et Nytt Århundre, eds. Øivind Bratberg and Kristin M. Haugevik [Oslo: Akademika, 2012], 61. My translation. 7. Ibid., 74. 8. Øivind Bratberg, “Politikk og Ideologi: Båndene mellom Norske og Britiske Partier,” in Det Glemte Partnerskapet: Norge og Storbritannia i et Nytt Århundre, ed. Øivind Bratberg and Kristin M. Haugevik (Oslo: Akademika, 2012), 49. 9. Haugevik, “Fra Storpolitisk Allianse,” 74. 10. UK Government website, “Norway and the United Kingdom: A Bilateral and Global Partnership,” 20 January 2011. https://www.gov.uk/ government/news/norway-and-the-united-kingdom-a-bilateral-and-glo bal-partnership. 11. Mark Garnett, Simon Mabon, and Robert Smith, British Foreign Policy Since 1945 (London: Routledge, 2018), 309–311. 12. Jason W. Davidson, “France, Britain and the Intervention in Libya: An Integrated Analysis,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 26, no. 2 (2013). 13. Dag Henriksen, “Suksess Uten Innflytelse? Norges Erfaringer Fra Operasjonene over Libya,” International Politikk 71, no. 1 (2013): 30. 14. The Telegraph website, 15 September 2011, https://www.telegraph. co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8766542/LibyaDavid-Cameron-and-Nicolas-Sarkozy-receive-heroes-welcome-in-Tripoli. html. 15. House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, “Libya: Examination of Intervention and Collapse and the UK’s Future Policy Options”, 2016. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmf aff/119/11902.htm?utm_source=119&utm_medium=fullbullet&utm_ campaign=modulereports. 16. British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC henceforth) website, 23 January 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24472322. 17. The Guardian website, 29 August 2013. https://www.theguardian. com/commentisfree/2013/aug/29/syria-debate-parliament-editorial. 18. Speech by Grete Faremo, Norwegian Minister of Defence, at Oslo Military Society 4 January 2010 (Clive Archer, “Norway and the United

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19.

20. 21.

22. 23.

24. 25. 26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36.

Kingdom in the High North,” in Britain and Norway: Special Relationships, ed. Helge Ø. Pharo and Patrick Salmon [Oslo: Akademika, 2012]). On the Norwegian government’s thinking behind this, see its new strategic concept for its defence presented in 2009 (Norwegian Government, “Evne til Innsats: Strategisk Konsept for Forsvaret,” 2009, https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/fd/dokumenter/ evne-til-innsats_strategisk-konsept-for-forsvaret.pdf. Archer, “Norway and the United Kingdom,” 326. Clive Archer, “Norway and the UK: A Defence and Security Perspective,” British Politics Review 6, no. 4 (2011). https://www.duo.uio.no/ bitstream/handle/10852/68544/British-Politics-Review-04_2011.pdf? sequence=1&isAllowed=y. Liam Fox, “Northern Grouping Initiative,” House of Commons, vol. 518, col. 12WS, 9 November 2010. Government of Norway website, no date. https://www.regjeringen.no/ globalassets/upload/fd/dokumenter/mou-norge-storbritannia_6-mars2012.pdf. Haugevik, “Fra Storpolitisk Allianse,” 73. My translation. The New York Times website, 7 June 2010. https://www.nytimes.com/ 2010/06/08/world/europe/08britain.html. Liam Stanley, “’We’re Reaping What We Sowed’: Everyday Crisis Narratives and Acquiescence to the Age of Austerity,” New Political Economy 19, no. 6 (2014). Norwegian Petroleum website, “Eksport av olje og gass,” last updated 29 June 2020. https://www.norskpetroleum.no/produksjonog-eksport/eksport-av-olje-og-gass/. Office for National Statistics website, “Who Does the UK Trade With?,” 3 January 2018. https://www.ons.gov.uk/businessindustryandtrade/int ernationaltrade/articles/whodoestheuktradewith/2017-02-21. Statistics Norway website, “Norges viktigste handelspartnere,” 30 January 2018. https://www.ssb.no/utenriksokonomi/artikler-og-publik asjoner/norges-viktigste-handelspartnere. Paul Bolton, “Energy Imports and Exports,” House of Commons Library, Briefing Paper No. 4046, 19 October 2018. https://common slibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn04046/. Ibid. Aftenposten, 11 August 2018. Ibid. See for example Chapter 7. Lise Rye, Norge i Europa (Bergen: Fagbokforlaget, 2019), 182. The Progress Party’s Election Manifesto for 2017–2021, “EU og EØS,” https://www.frp.no/tema/utenriks/eu-og-eos.

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37. Aftenposten, 27 June 2020. My translation. 38. Norwegian Government website, “Norway in Europe: The Government’s Work Programme for Cooperation with the EU,” https://www. regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/work_programme_2019/id2631053/. 39. Norwegian Government, “Setting the Course for the Norwegian Foreign and Security Policy”, White Paper (St.meld.), 36 (2016–2017), 21 April 2017. 40. Official Norwegian Reports, NOU 2012: 2, “Outside and Inside: Norway’s Agreements with the European Union,” 2012, 838. 41. Stortinget website, “Stortinget og EØS-avtalen,” fact sheet from the Storting, updated July 2019. https://www.stortinget.no/globalassets/ pdf/eu_open/faktaark_stortinget_og_eos_avtalen.pdf. My translation. 42. Report from Norway’s EU Ambassador, Oda Helen Sletnes, leaked in Aftenposten, 3 September 2009 and later published on the Norwegian Government’s webpage. https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokume ntarkiv/stoltenberg-ii/ud/Nyheter-og-pressemeldinger/2009/eos_rap port/id575673/#. 43. Politico, 15 June 2016. https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-referendumlook-before-you-leap-norways-pm-tells-brexiteers/. 44. Jarle Trondal and Anne Elizabeth Stie, “Blir handlingsrommet større med egen europaminister?,” Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift 32, no. 2 (2015). 45. Dagens Næringsliv, 17. januar 2018. 46. Parliament Debates (Norway), 2011/2012, 22 November, 605; Parliament Debates (Norway), 2011/2012, 15 May 2012, 3369. 47. Newsweek website, “The U.K., European Union and Norway: The Troubling Search for Alternatives,” 2 November, 2015. https://www.new sweek.com/uk-eu-and-norway-troubling-search-alternatives-388917. 48. Sara Hobolt, “The Brexit Vote: A Divided Nation, a Divided Continent,” Journal of European Public Policy 23, no. 9 (2016). 49. Sieglinde Gstöhl, Reluctant Europeans: Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland in the Process of Integration (London: Lynne Rienner, 2002). 50. European Commission, Standard Eurobaromter 88, Autumn 2017. file:///C:/Users/06017382/Downloads/eb88_publ_en.pdf. 51. David Gowland, Arthur Turner, and Alex Wright, Britain and European Integration Since 1945: On the Sidelines (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), 241. 52. The Sun, 1 November 1990. 53. The Sun, 13 December 2007. 54. Garnett, Mabon, and Smith, British Foreign Policy, 304–305. 55. Pauline Schnapper, “The Dilemma of Pro-European Parties in the UK: The Case of Labour and the Liberal Democrats Since 2010,” in The UK Challenge to Europeanization: The Persistence of British Euroscepticism, ed. Karinne Tournier-Sol and Chris Gifford (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 117–133.

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56. UK Parliament website, Queen’s Speech, 25 May 2010, House of Lords. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201011/ldhansrd/ text/100525-0001.htm#1005255000153. 57. Andrew Gamble, “Better Off Out? Britain and Europe,” The Political Quarterly 83, no. 3 (2012). 58. Karine Tournier-Sol, “The UKIP Challenge,” in The UK Challenge to Europeanization: The Persistence of British Euroscepticism, ed. Karinne Tournier-Sol and Chris Gifford (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 134–147. 59. Geoffrey Evans and Anand Menon, Brexit and British Politics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2019), Chapter 2. 60. David Laws, Coalition: The Inside Story of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition, Kindle ed. (London, Biteback, 2016), in section “Europe: The Iceberg Resurfaces”. 61. The Daily Mail website, “We Risk Being Like Norway If We Quit EU, Says Cameron—PM Warns Britain Will Be ‘Unable to Influence Laws,’” 11 December 2012. https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-224 6192/We-risk-like-Norway-quit-EU-says-Cameron--PM-warns-Britainunable-influence-laws.html#ixzz2EioyeC1W. 62. Ibid. 63. Gamble, “Better Off Out?,” 469. 64. Julie Smith, “Gambling on Europe: David Cameron and the 2016 Referendum,” British Politics 13, no. 1 (2018), 3–4. 65. Evans and Menon, Brexit, 7. 66. The Telegraph website, 14 May 2016. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/ news/2016/05/14/boris-johnson-interview-we-can-be-the-heroes-ofeurope-by-voting/. 67. Garnett, Mabon, and Smith, British Foreign Policy, 321. 68. Evans and Menon, Brexit, 66. 69. Harold D. Clarke, Matthew Goodwin, and Paul Whiteley, Brexit: Why Britain Voted to Leave the European Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017). 70. Smith, “Gambling on Europe,” 10. 71. Garnett, Mabon, and Smith, British Foreign Policy, 322. 72. The Telegraph website, 14 May 2016. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/ news/2016/05/14/boris-johnson-interview-we-can-be-the-heroes-ofeurope-by-voting/. 73. Evans and Menon, Brexit, 14. 74. Garnett, Mabon, and Smith, British Foreign Policy, 321. 75. Christopher Hill, The Future of British Foreign Policy: Security and Diplomacy in a World After Brexit (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2019), 46–47. 76. Evans and Menon, Brexit, 14.

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77. Ibid., 76. 78. Geir K. Almlid, “Bureaucratic Politics on Europe: Inside Whitehall 1970 to 1972,” British Politics (2019). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41293019-00128-1. 79. Evans and Menon, Brexit, 52. 80. The Telegraph website, 14 May 2016. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/ news/2016/05/14/boris-johnson-interview-we-can-be-the-heroes-ofeurope-by-voting/. 81. The Independent website, 27 June 2016. https://www.independent.co. uk/news/uk/home-news/brexit-vote-leave-wipes-nhs-ps350m-claimand-rest-its-website-after-eu-referendum-a7105546.html. 82. Andrew Reid, “Buses and Breaking Point: Freedom of Expression and the ‘Brexit’ Campaign,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (2019): 627. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-019-09999-1. 83. Evans and Menon, Brexit, 59–60. 84. Smith, “Gambling on Europe”. 85. Matthew Goodwin, Simon Hix, and Mark Pickup, “For and Against Brexit: A Survey Experiment of the Impact of Campaign Effects on Public Attitudes toward EU Membership,” British Journal of Political Science 50, no. 2 (2020): 482. 86. BBC website, 24 June 2016. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politicseu-referendum-36616018. 87. A survey during the campaign of nearly 600 journalists, academics and pollsters predicted that the country would vote to remain in the EU; only 5% predicted Brexit (Clarke, Goodwin, and Whiteley, Brexit, 3). 88. Evans and Menon, Brexit, 73. 89. Andrew Marr, “Anywheres vs. Somewheres: The Spilt That Made Brexit Inevitable,” New Statesman international ed. Website, 17 March 2017. https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/uk/2017/03/anywhe res-vs-somewheres-split-made-brexit-inevitable. 90. Smith, “Gambling on Europe”. 91. David Marsh, “Brexit and the Politics of Truth,” British Politics 13, no. 1 (2018). 92. Evans and Menon, Brexit, 68–74. 93. YouGov webpage, “How Britain Voted at the EU Referendum,” 27 June, 2016. https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/ 2016/06/27/how-britain-voted. 94. Evans and Menon, Brexit, 83. 95. David Goodheart, The Road to Somewhere: The Populist Revolt and the Future of Politics (London: C. Hurst, 2017). 96. Evans and Menon, Brexit, 84. 97. Goodhart maintains that few belong completely to either group: “we All Have a Mix of Achieved and Ascribed Identities—And There Is a Large Minority of Inbetweeners” (Goodhart, The Road, 4).

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98. Evans and Menon, Brexit, 80. 99. Ibid., 76. 100. Satnam Virdee and Brendan McGeever, “Racism, Crisis, Brexit,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 41, no. 10 (2018). 101. Smith, “Gambling on Europe”. 102. Nicholas Allen, “‘Brexit Means Brexit’: Theresa May and PostReferendum British Politics,” British Politics 13, no. 1 (2018): 106. 103. Seldon, May at 10. 104. Smith, “Gambling on Europe,” 14. 105. CNN website, “Deal or No Deal: How a Day Changed Brexit,” 5 December 2017. http://edition.cnn.com/2017/12/05/europe/bre xit-theresa-may-trouble-intl/index.html. 106. Aftenposten, 7 June 2018. 107. The Guardian website, “Brexit: May’s Threat to Europe: ‘No Deal for Britain Is Better Than a Bad Deal’”, 18 January 2017. https://www. theguardian.com/politics/2017/jan/17/prime-minister-vows-to-putfinal-brexit-deal-before-parliament. 108. BBC website, 23 January 2019, “No-Deal Brexit ‘Means Hard Border’—European Commission”, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-nor thern-ireland-46961982. 109. Time Magazine website, 28 August 2019 (updated 29 August 2019), “U.K. Government Announces Plans to Suspend Parliament Before Brexit: Here’s What That Means,” https://time.com/5663212/borisjohnson-suspend-parliament/. 110. Eric Shaw, “How Labour Failed to Connect with the British Working Class,” The Conversation, 16 December 2019. https://theconversat ion.com/how-labour-failed-to-connect-with-the-british-working-class128082. 111. Winston Churchill replaced Neville Chamberlain as prime minister after the failed Narvik mission. See Chapter 1. 112. The Daily Mail website, 11 December 2012. https://www.dailymail. co.uk/news/article-2246192/We-risk-like-Norway-quit-EU-says-Cam eron--PM-warns-Britain-unable-influence-laws.html#ixzz2EioyeC1W. 113. The Guardian webpage, “Cameron Tells Anti-EU Campaigners: ‘Norway Option Won’t Work for Britain,’” 28 October 2015. https:// www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/oct/28/cameron-to-confrontnorway-option-anti-eu-campaigners. 114. The Guardian webpage, “EU Exit: ‘Norway Option’ Would Leave UK with 94% of Current Costs—Think Tank,” 16 March 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/mar/16/eu-exitnorway-option-costs-thinktank. 115. Duncan Watts and Colin Pilkington, Britain in the European Union Today, 3rd ed. (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2005), 53.

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116. The Guardian webpage, “Cameron Tells Anti-EU Campaigners: ‘Norway Option Won’t Work for Britain,’” 28 October 2015. https:// www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/oct/28/cameron-to-confrontnorway-option-anti-eu-campaigners. 117. Verdens Gang webpage, “Mener Norge kan redde britene fra katastrofebrexit,” 23 November 2018. https://www.vg.no/nyheter/utenriks/i/ J1eqP6/mener-norge-kan-redde-britene-fra-katastrofe-brexit. My translation. 118. BBC webpage, “Brexit: Amber Rudd Says Plan B Options Plausible,” 8 December 2018. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-46490642. 119. The European Surveillance Agency (ESA) functions for EFTA as the European Commission does for the EU members’ implementation of new laws. The ESA can, if not satisfied, take a matter to the EFTA Court. The EFTA Court is situated in Luxembourg, the same place as the EU Court, to facilitate close cooperation. The EFTA Court enforces the applicable Single Market legislation. 120. BBC webpage, “Norway Foreign Minister Brende: UK Better Off in EU”, 1 June 2015. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-329 57134. 121. Dagsavisen, “Erna Solberg håper Brexit blir avlyst,” referring to interview with NTB in Brussels, 10 April 2019. https://www.dagsavisen.no/nyh eter/innenriks/erna-solberg-haper-brexit-blir-avlyst-1.1464054. 122. The Guardian webpage, “We Pay, But Have No Say: That’s the Reality of Norway’s Relationship with the EU,” opinion, Espen Barth Eide, 27 October 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/ oct/27/norway-eu-reality-uk-voters-seduced-by-norwegian-model. 123. Politico, “Norway to Britain: Don’t Leave, You’ll Hate It”, last updated 17 January 2017. https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-referendum-lookbefore-you-leap-norways-pm-tells-brexiteers/. 124. Nei til EU , “Brexit er en seier for demokratiet,” press statement 31 January 2020. https://neitileu.no/aktuelt/-brexit-er-en-seier-fordemokratiet. 125. Sigbjørn Gjelsvik, “London Calling,” the Centre Party’s webiste, 6 June 2018. https://www.senterpartiet.no/aktuelt/london-calling. 126. The Guardian webpage, “Sturgeon Demands Scottish Independence Referendum Powers After SNP Landslide”, 13 December 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/dec/13/nicolasturgeon-to-demand-powers-for-scottish-independence-referendum. 127. Time Magazine webpage, “Brexit Has Revived the Prospect of a United Ireland: Could It Actually Happen?,” 7 February 2020. https://time. com/5779707/irish-reunification-likelihood/.

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128. Norwegian Petroleum, “Everything You Need to Know About Norwegian Petroleum Activities,” last updated 2 July 2020. https://www.nor skpetroleum.no/en/. 129. Hill, The Future. 130. Norwegian Government website, “Regjeringas Tyskland-strategi 2019,” 13 June 2019. https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/tyskland_ strategi/id2654427/. My translation. 131. Kristin Haugevik, “Diplomacy Through the Back Door: Norway and the Bilateral Route to EU Decision-Making,” Global Affairs 3, no. 3 (2017), 285. 132. Professor Richard Whittman, University of Kent, Verdens Gang website, “Britisk forsker: – Brexit vil gi tettere forhold til Norge,” 29 September 2018. https://www.vg.no/nyheter/utenriks/i/ngxx6m/britisk-forskerbrexit-vil-gi-tettere-forhold-til-norge. 133. Politico, “Norway to Britain: Don’t Leave, You’ll Hate It,” last updated 17 January 2017. https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-referendum-lookbefore-you-leap-norways-pm-tells-brexiteers/. 134. Norwegian Government, “Setting the Course for the Norwegian Foreign and Security Policy”, White paper (St.meld.), 36 (2016–2017), 21 April 2017. 135. TV2 (Norway) webpage, “Britiske styrker har forhåndslagret militært materiell i Troms,” 9 June 2016. https://www.tv2.no/a/11489543/. 136. Government of Norway website, “Biannual Address to the Storting on Important EU and EEA Matters”, 18 April 2017. https://www.regjer ingen.no/en/aktuelt/biannual_170418/id2549368/. 137. Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation website, “Erna Solberg frykter brexit-forhandlingene går for sakte”, 19 October 2017. https://www. nrk.no/urix/erna-solberg-frykter-brexit-forhandlingene-gar-for-sakte-1. 13740817. My translation. 138. Matthew Ward, “Statistics on UK-EU Trade,” House of Commons Library, Briefing Paper No. 7851, 17 June 2020. file:///C:/Users/06017382/Downloads/CBP-7851%20(1).pdf. 139. UK Government, “UK Trade in Numbers,” Department for International Trade, February 2020. Britain has its third biggest trade deficit with Norway. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/ uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/868378/200227_UK_ trade_in_Numbers_full_web_version_final.pdf. 140. E24, “Brexit-deadline nærmer seg: fiskeriministeren frykter overraskelser,” 7 January 2020. https://e24.no/naeringsliv/i/2G0z54/ brexit-deadline-naermer-seg-fiskeriministeren-frykter-overraskelser. My translation.

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141. Politico, “UK Drifts Closer to a Norway-Style Brexit Transition”, last updated 14 August 2017. https://www.politico.eu/article/brexit-eeanegotiation-transition-uk-drifts-closer-to-norway-style/. 142. Aftenposten, 7 June 2018. Interviews with prime minister Solberg and Tore Myhre, the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise. 143. The Guardian website, “Take It from a Norwegian MP: We Don’t Want Britain in the EEA,” opinion, Heidi Nordby Lunde, 7 December 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/ dec/07/norwegian-mp-britain-eea-norway-eu-brexiters. 144. Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation, “Dagsnytt 18,” 22 March 2019. My translation. 145. Norwegian Government website, “Norway in Europe: The Government’s Work Programme for Cooperation with the EU”. https://www. regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/work_programme_2019/id2631053/. 146. Aftenposten, 7 June 2018.

CHAPTER 10

Britain and Norway in Europe—Continuity and Changes

Building a united Europe is not an easy task: it involves the realisation of one of the great political ideas of this century. It needs patience and it needs determination.1

British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart was right when he said this in 1968. His government pushed for membership of the European Community then, and the subsequent Heath government succeeded in this endeavour. But overall, for the whole period 1945–2020, neither Britain nor Norway had the determination to build a united Europe. An analysis of two countries’ foreign relations over three-quarters of a century naturally comprises a number of significant developments and events. Many of these have been different for the UK and Norway. But the similarities are more striking. Above all, Britain and Norway have been European outsiders. This chapter provides an overview of the role Britain and Norway have played for each other from 1945 until today and compares their foreign policies, with particular emphasis on European integration. It adopts a long-term perspective. What are the main themes that most accurately define and explain these interlinked British and Norwegian bilateral and individual relations?

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Bilateral Relations When reviewing the bilateral relationship as a whole, two characteristics stand out: it has been close and good throughout the period, and its importance has had a downward trajectory. Political relations were at their strongest in the early post-war years. The two Labour parties had “unusually close” links.2 But this also went beyond political party familiarity; “the bonds of friendship with Great Britain are now stronger than ever before”, the UK ambassador reported from Oslo in 1946.3 From the 1960s, a changing pattern became clearer: Britain and Norway were drifting apart. When Prime Minister Macmillan visited Norway in 1960 there was “amicable interaction in public”, but when Thatcher did the same in 1986 “bonds of kinship and affection” were no longer the dominant theme.4 Of course the animosity and violent protests had something to do with the fact that Thatcher was a controversial politician. But she would almost certainly not have received a similar reaction in 1960. The reduced significance of the bilateral relationship is evident in a longer perspective as well. During Macmillan’s visit “press comment was full and uniformly favourable and the programme was front-page news in papers of all political persuasions”.5 When David Cameron came to Oslo in 2012, it was not a big news story. So when Erna Solberg and Theresa May met in London in June 2018 and focused on the “long-term and strong bonds” between the states, their statement was correct, but also typical diplomatic jargon.6 Several aspects explain the reduced importance of the bilateral relationship. One is that Norway looked less to Britain for political leadership. The UK had been essential in defeating Hitler and, indeed, the liberation of Norway. Britain had been the home of the Norwegian king, government and very modest military. Friendships were formed among many of those who would sit in key political and military positions after the war. Norwegians instinctively sought and accepted foreign policy leadership from London. As the war moved further away in people’s minds over time, these ties mattered less. In 1969, the UK Oslo ambassador commented that the younger generation in Norway “have no personal experience of wartime comradeship to colour their thinking”.7 Related to this was Britain’s diminishing international muscle. The UK had been one of the world’s most powerful countries in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Suez crisis of 1956 and the withdrawal of military forces from east of Suez in the 1960s were vivid demonstrations of

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Britain’s dwindling global role. In another report from 1969, the UK Oslo ambassador referred to a prevalent feeling in Norway: “Britain is not quite what she was” as a great power and democratic beacon.8 Norway’s increased self-confidence internationally also mattered. It wanted to be treated more like an equal. On many occasions when Britain introduced a new policy that would have negative effects on Norway, such as the 1964 import surcharge, it was not the policy itself that was the biggest disappointment but the fact that Oslo was not consulted beforehand. Another aspect was the development of their economies and bilateral trade. The UK was of course always the bigger economy. But Norway developed into a prosperous Western economy during the first three post-war decades. Then, from the 1980s oil and gas revenues made the country one of the richest per capita in the world. The UK economy struggled enormously as a result of the war efforts, and in the 1950s and 1960s Britain’s economic growth was slower than it was for many other European states. These developments reduced Norwegian dependence on London. For example, Norway was practically forced to follow the Attlee government’s devaluation in 1949 as it was so reliant on the pound. But when Wilson devalued the pound in 1967, the Norwegians decided not to follow suit. This was related to developments in their trade patterns. In the 1960s, Britain lost its role as the number one exporter to Norway— Germany and Sweden were more competitive. The bilateral balance of trade has been in Norway’s favour since then. From the 1990s, however, trade in oil and gas has strengthened the bilateral relationship. This also applies to cooperation on exploration and exploitation of petroleum in the North Sea since the 1970s. Energy is one of the main pillars of the UK-Norwegian relationship today. Their parting of ways with respect to European integration in 1973 was also significant. This area will be discussed in depth below, but here it is important to mention that Britain and Norway had fewer meeting points politically than when they were EFTA partners, and on several issues they ended up naturally on different sides of the table. For example, on fisheries the UK had to negotiate via the European Commission on such matters as quotas and shared stocks. But the Norwegians saw Britain as one of the most friendly and helpful EC/EU members. This was evident already when Norway negotiated its free-trade agreement with the EC in 1973. Nevertheless, this always had its limits. The general view of British governments was that Norway had to accept the consequences

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of their decisions to stay on the outside—they could not get many benefits without paying for them in one way or another. Although difficult to measure, it seems that Britain’s slight propensity to act on behalf of Norway inside the EC/EU gradually diminished. The former EFTA ties grew weaker over the years, and by 1995 most of the other original members of the Association had joined the EU. EFTA then had little political or economic importance for Britain after that. Moreover, with the growing number of EU member states, there were so many others that the UK needed to keep happy. Norwegian views mattered less. Security cooperation was the cornerstone of the British-Norwegian relationship from 1945 until 1990. Three interlinked factors were important. The first comprised the bilateral security bonds that had existed since 1905 and had strengthened so much during the Second World War. Britain naturally took an active role in the construction of a new Norwegian military and provided equipment and weapons. The second was the fact that Norway was crucial for UK security. If the Soviets gained control over Norwegian land and sea territory, it would pose a serious threat to Britain. The third aspect was that the UK and Norway joined NATO, the most comprehensive and binding alliance ever. This strengthened their partnership. They maintained an especially close bilateral relationship in terms of training of personnel. Nevertheless, the USA was the most important security provider for both after NATO was founded. This reduced the importance of the UK-Norwegian relationship as the Cold War developed over the decades. But Britain was always expected to have a key role in the defence of Norway in case of Soviet aggression. The security relationship became less significant after the Cold War. While NATO still remained vital for both countries’ defence strategies, Norway became less important for Britain once the Soviet Union was removed as a threat to Western Europe. In the “out-of-area” conflicts there was no reason for an especially close UK-Norwegian relationship. These international military operations were based on varieties of expressed ethical convictions, but primarily they were demonstrations of how the two countries’ eagerness to please the Americans did not diminish after the Cold War. The British-Norwegian relationship has remained good in the twentyfirst century. They have many common values, such as the importance of human rights, rule of law and democratic ideals—but they share these with a larger group of Western European countries. In general, since the Second World War Britain and Norway have drifted apart in a number

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of areas, at least relative to their bilateral relations with other countries. These changes are closely interlinked with their European relations.

European Integration Despite their different relationships to the EU and its predecessors, Britain and Norway have shared a similar perspective on the nature of European integration. Already in the late 1940s, when the OEEC and the Council of Europe were founded, Norway and the UK agreed that the cooperation should be intergovernmental, and whatever integration structure that was established later should not hurt the Atlantic link. These common objectives have in various shapes and forms been permanent during the entire post-war period. However, Britain and Norway could not just bury their heads in the sand and let the EC/EU develop their integration. The deeper and wider cooperation of the continental states over the decades since 1950 has made these states stronger and also affected all of Europe, economically and politically, underlining further the strength of the European Union. This has made it increasingly more difficult for those countries that are more sceptical to surrendering national sovereignty. “Any development in Europe is a development for Norway”, Oslo governments have realised for decades—the same has applied for London governments.9 Whether they fundamentally wanted to or not, they have integrated to a very high degree with continental Europe. For almost five decades, Norway and Britain chose different avenues—one on the outside, the other on the inside. Prime ministers such as Macmillan, Heath and Blair acknowledged Britain’s reduced international role and considered that this could be alleviated by joining Europe. However, a mismatch between the UK’s real power and the notion of power among Britons has endured, and this also came into play in the Brexit debates. Gowland et al. point to the “failure to adjust to reality… and an inflated sense of British capacity and influence as the leading player in Europe”.10 Reluctance to commit to European integration, particularly during the first decades after the war, was also fuelled by strong trade links with the Commonwealth and feelings of superiority after their war efforts. Tony Blair succinctly summed up his country’s approach to European integration since 1950: “first we said it wouldn’t happen, then we said it wouldn’t work, then we said we wouldn’t need it and Britain was left behind at every step of the way”.11

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At the same time as seeking EC/EU membership or deciding to continue with it, UK governments have been unwilling to make Europe the principal circle of their foreign policy. We have seen that Heath was perhaps an exception to this. The UK global outlook and its emphasis on the Americans has been present at all times. One example is Blair’s close relationships to American presidents. Moreover, on many issues Britain chose a backseat position inside the EC/EU, for instance opting out of the euro and Schengen. The UK was an eager supporter of enlargement, however, in part because more members would mean more difficulties in finding deeper federal solutions. A reluctant and reactive pattern has also been dominant for Norway. From 1945 to 1972, it followed in the footsteps of Britain. The trade and security links were paramount. They trumped bonds with the Scandinavian countries, which were also important trading partners and had much in common in terms of culture, language and history. But in 1972 the Norwegian people refused to follow the advice of its government to join the EC together with Britain. From the middle of the 1980s pressure to react grew strong again. The EC agreed on the SEA and transformed into the European Union. The EEA agreement gave Norway access to the Single Market. But when Sweden and Finland applied for EU membership, the Norwegian government decided to do the same. In other words, since the first Norwegian membership application in 1962, the fear of being left outside was stronger than the desire to be inside. After 1994, no new EU development or new members have had enough effect on Norway to fuel a new substantial membership debate. However, the EU has mattered increasingly more to Norway. Norwegian governments have steadily integrated more than any other non-member country, and indeed, in several areas more than the member Britain. A deep-rooted fear of abandoning sovereignty has been mutual for Britons and Norwegians who have opposed EC/EU membership. In both Norwegian referendums, this was the most important issue. And it constantly fuelled UK Euro-scepticism from the 1990s, culminating in the Brexit referendum. Norwegians emphasised their history, more or less consciously. Norway had been under Danish and Swedish rule for centuries until 1905, and its experiences from the Second World War made sovereignty even more important. Moreover, the traditionally strong role of agriculture and fisheries was significant, and this, too, was related to sovereignty. Many Norwegians wanted these areas to remain

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shielded from foreign competition and to have different kinds of subsidies and organisational control over production and sales. It should be up to Norwegians themselves to decide these matters. History also mattered to Britain. The former role as a superpower, and the feeling of being superior to the other European states prevailed for a long time. Indeed, this feeling persists today. In this light, the 1973 accession, decided by the House of Commons, as well as the large majority in favour of remaining in the 1975 referendum, is perhaps peculiar. But we must remember that opposition was substantial during the 1970–71 negotiations. Moreover, as a great power, the British expected to be able to control and steer the EC to a high degree, there was no reason to fear that too much sovereignty would be lost. At the governmental level, this view was illustrated well by Foreign Secretary George Brown’s comment that Britain would “take the lead” in the EC.12 However, it turned out that the UK was dominated more by Europe than what many Britons preferred. Unelected bureaucrats in Brussels and other member states had a great deal of influence on British society through the EC/EU. Not in all cases of course; UK governments agreed on and shaped many EU acts and policies. But, on the whole, many felt that EU membership subordinated Britain’s parliament. This was unusual for a traditionally strong country like the UK. The common British and Norwegian reluctance to accept deep European integration may also be linked to their geographical positions on the outskirts of Europe. This has definitely shaped their security policies. As an island, Britain has had different strategic needs than the other great powers of Europe. Norway, with its border with the Soviet Union/Russia and a vast Atlantic coastline, has been mainly concerned about the far north. These considerations have then been transferred to their European policies. A similar pattern applies to Britain’s and Norway’s traditional trading: on the seas and not primarily with the continent. Moreover, Grindheim points to the Catholic Church’s strong role on the continent.13 It was supranational in character, with a common identity, culture and political power that transcended national borders. Furthermore, Britons and Norwegians seem to feel less European. One expression of this feeling is that they often talk of Europe as somewhere else—about joining Europe or going to Europe. Another expression has been scepticism to Europeans and foreigners. This has been particularly visible in Britain since the 1990s. In Norway, a similar distrust was most noticeable around the time of the two referendums. One should be careful

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not to overestimate the impact of such feelings, but they have certainly had an effect on British and Norwegian governments’ European policies and actions. In the 1950s, there was broad parliamentary consensus in Britain and Norway on the main direction of foreign policy, including European integration. This changed when Macmillan opened for an EC application in 1961. Europe became one of the most contentious policy areas in both countries. It has haunted political parties and governments. This problem has cut across traditional party lines. Generally, the centre of the political scale was pro-membership, while groups and parties further out on the left and right ends of the scale were more against, for different reasons. In Britain, both major parties span the scale so widely that within themselves they have been divided on the issue. The left wing of Labour and the Conservative right have opposed membership. Labour and the Tories also switched positions on Europe, and the latter have been the most Euro-sceptic over the last three decades. In Norway, the Labour party in particular has been divided, and, as in Britain, its left wing has been more against membership. To the left of Labour is the anti-European Socialist People’s Party. The Norwegian Conservative party, largely united in its pro-European stance, has been and is more homogenous than its British counterpart. Farming interests are largely represented in the Centre Party, and the Christian Democrats and the Progress Party naturally belong on the right side of the political scale. These forces traditionally tend to be drawn to the Conservative Party in the UK. Moreover, as the most reluctant European party, the Centre Party reveals another important dividing line in Norwegian politics on the European issue: the centre-periphery cleavage. Because of these deviations from the traditional left-right scale, EU membership has been a no-go area for a long time in Norwegian politics. Internal party divisions on Europe have been important catalysts for the four membership referendums, two in each country. In Norway, Labour Prime Minister Gerhardsen decided in 1962 that a national advisory referendum was necessary in order to avoid serious party splits. This created a strong precedent. No Norwegian government would ever consider proposing that Norway join the EU without giving the people their say. In Britain, Wilson feared party disunity when he announced a referendum in 1974. Some have suggested that it did not really matter that much to him which way the party went on the issue as long as he could hold it together. David Cameron did not want a referendum on

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British membership, but party divisions forced him to hold one. In the end, it took three Tory prime ministers to leave the EU. The referendums in 1994 and 2016, in Norway and Britain respectively, determine the two countries’ present and future non-membership. They are often hailed as a public uprising and a democratic victory. Theresa May called the Brexit referendum “the biggest democratic exercise in our history”.14 However, this could be questioned. The turnout of 72 per cent was higher than in any general election since 1992, but it is not particularly high seen in a 1945–2019 perspective. The turnout in the Norwegian referendum was 89 per cent, the highest ever since the introduction of universal suffrage. Why was there such a big difference? One important reason could possibly be that the British Remain campaign was so weak that many who favoured membership were not bothered to vote. Moreover, distrust of politics and politicians has developed to a high degree in Britain in the twenty-first century. While many cherished the opportunity to send a message to the establishment in the referendum, the distrustful and passive attitude has become so ingrained for many that they did not bother to turn up at the polls in June 2016 either. A third possible explanation is that the polling companies generally predicted a Remain victory.15 Many therefore might have felt that there was no point in voting. The results of the 1994 and 2016 referendums, on the other hand, were strikingly similar: 48 per cent in favour of membership and 52 against in both. This tells us of a divided people. On the pro-membership side, there are both pragmatic and “true” Europeans. The former, focusing on economic and political benefits, claim that their country profits from membership based on rational considerations. This group also benefits themselves economically from EU membership and globalisation in general. The “true” Europeans like the economic benefits as well, but they also emphasise the ideal of a united Europe serving as a tool for peace, solidarity and prosperity for all countries in the region. They do not fear that their culture or nation will be erased. It is perhaps more difficult to categorise the no-side. We have discussed the scepticism to foreigners and the preference for one’s own nation among some. But there are also more rational arguments. Many voted against membership because they expected to lose economically on a personal level. In Norway, no-voters were typically farmers, fishermen and people working in industries selling to the domestic market. In Britain, voters with little education and living in former manufacturing areas opposed membership.

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They felt that many of the effects of European integration and globalisation were detrimental to their living standards. Such a group exists in Norway, as well, but it is smaller due to lower unemployment and more generous social benefits. British and Norwegian governments and parliaments have held all these contradictions within them. Whether on the inside or the outside, they have tried to gain as many benefits out of their relationship to the EC/EU as possible, while avoiding the drawbacks. A rational approach of course, but it is impossible to have your cake and eat it too in European relations. The EU is too strong for that. And the scepticism and party tensions domestically have often created difficult working conditions in Brussels for the London and Oslo governments. We have seen that the Norwegian Labour governments that negotiated for EC/EU membership in 1972 and 1994 had little room to manoeuvre in their attempts to reach a deal. And UK prime ministers often start out by saying they want a positive and close relationship with Europe, but they end up in trouble with their EU partners and at home. European relations play out on two levels—domestic politics sets the limits for what one can achieve on the international stage. There are many uncertainties about the future for Britain and Norway in Europe. The two countries will not return to the close relationship they had before 1973. Compared to when Britain established EFTA in 1960, the “outer” countries are much less significant today. Trying to organise another formalised group of these countries seems strategically unwise. Paris and Berlin will continue to be the most important European capitals for Britain, regardless of membership. For its part, Norway has developed such a strong relationship to the EU that a majority of Norwegians are not willing to break important bonds with the Union to return into the arms of Britain. Britain and Norway will continue to have close relations to the European Union in the future. But they will most likely not become members for a long time. Their fundamental attitude to the nature of European integration and their role in Europe will remain. They are European outsiders.

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Notes 1. “European Integration,” speech by Foreign Secretary Stewart in Copenhagen, 14 May 1968, British National Archives (henceforth BNA), FCO 9/276. 2. Tony Insall, “Haakon Lie, Denis Healey and the Making of an AngloNorwegian Special Relationship, 1945–1951,” in Britain and Norway: Special Relationships, ed. Helge Ø. Pharo and Patrick Salmon (Oslo: Akademia, 2012), 201. 3. “Scandinavia and the Baltic States,” UK Oslo ambassador Laurence Collier to Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, 4 January 1946, BNA, FO 491/31. 4. Hallvard Notaker, “Moderate Affection: The Norwegian Conservative Party Between Macmillan and Thatcher,” in Britain and Norway: Special Relationship? ed. Helge Ø. Pharo and Patrick Salmon (Oslo: Akademika, 2012), 277. 5. Report on Macmillan’s visit to Norway, 7–10 June 1960, UK Oslo ambassador Peter Scarlett to Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, 13 June 1960, BNA, FO 491/13. 6. Aftenposten, 7 June 2018. 7. “Norway: Annual Review for 1968,” UK Oslo Ambassador Frank Brenchley to Stewart, 6 January 1969, BNA, FCO 491/31. 8. “First Impressions of Norway,” Brenchley to Stewart, 19 February 1968, BNA, FO 491/13. 9. Record of conversation between Roy Hattersley (UK Minister of State) and Thorvald Stoltenberg (Norwegian State Secretary, Foreign Ministry), 21 April 1976, BNA, FCO 33/3069. 10. David Gowland, Arthur Turner, and Alex Wright, Britain and European Integration Since 1945: On the Sidelines (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), 217. 11. The Guardian website, “Blair: UK Has No Future Outside Europe,” referring to Blair’s speech to the European research institute at Birmingham University, 23 November 2001. https://www.theguardian.com/ business/2001/nov/23/emu.theeuro. 12. Willy Brandt, My Life in Politics (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1992), 420. 13. Jan Erik Grindheim, “Den Besværlige Unionen: Norge, Storbritannia og EU,” in Det Glemte Partnerskapet? Norge og Storbritannia i et Nytt Århundre, ed. Øivind Bratberg and Kristin M. Haugevik (Oslo: Akademika, 2012). 14. ITV News webpage, “Prime Minister Dismisses Revoking Article 50 After Petition Passes Two Million,” 22 March 2019. https://www.itv. com/news/2019-03-22/prime-minister-dismisses-revoking-article-50after-petition-passes-two-million/.

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15. The Guardian website, “How the Pollsters Got It Wrong on the EU Referendum,” 24 June 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/ 2016/jun/24/how-eu-referendum-pollsters-wrong-opinion-predictclose.

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491/3 491/31 491/4 491/5 491/6 491/7 491/8 491/9 800/500. FCO 160/283 /308/13 28/4280 30/1092 30/1105 30/1420 30/1504 /257 30/345 30/712 30/732 30/7345 30/791 33/10060 33/10641 33/1259 33/1576 33/1656 33/1661 33/1913 33/2285 33/2587 33/2591 33/2592 33/2815 33/2816 33/2817 33/2818 33/3063 33/3068 33/3069 33/3345

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33/3819 33/3830 33/3867 33/4284 33/4290 33/4291 33/4564 33/4581 33/4590 33/5294 33/5322 33/6264 33/6265 33/6767 33/7106 33/827 33/8336 33/8345 33/8892 33/8898 33/8901 33/9427 9/276 9/692 9/697 9/698 9/702. CAB 128/37 128/42 128/47 129/134 129/136 129/48/32 131/2 134/2596 170/66. PREM 13/2627 13/2974 15/356 15/368

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/370 15/62 19/3867. BT 11/6968. T 312/2870. The National Archives of Norway Foreign Office Archives 1940–49 25.1/4/viii 25.1/4.xi 25.1/4/xii 25.2.73/798B 25.5/x 33.3.3/iii 38.3.3/i 44.3/5 44.4.13/i. Foreign Office Archives 1950–59 25.2/124 25.2/804 25.4.13/26 44.3.5. Foreign Office Archives 1960–69 11.7.22 11.7.31 11.8/21 34.1/2 34.1/5 36.6.84 44.33/1. Prime Minister’s Office Cabinet Minutes 26 August 1970 Cabinet Minutes 15 April 1971 Cabinet Minutes 2 December 1971 Cabinet Minutes 8 January 1972 F01-0010. Norwegian Foreign Ministry Archive 1970–79 34.4/13 34.4/13/32 44.36/2

277

278

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44.36/5 44.36/5/37 44.36/5/38.

Index

A Acheson, Dean, 39, 89, 102 acid rain, 160 acquis communautaire, 110, 168 “active” European policy (Norway), 145, 146, 164, 197, 216 Adenauer, Konrad, 64, 66 Aden (military base), 80 Afghanistan, 138, 189, 214 Aftenposten, 159 Agriculture, 63, 64, 85, 87, 89, 94, 95, 112–114, 120, 121, 123, 124, 169, 174, 197, 198, 200, 203, 250, 253. See also Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) Anglo-American relationship, 93, 106 Anglo-Norse Society, 133 Anglo-Norwegian Economic Committee, 32 anti-Americanism, 82 anti-establishment, 219, 222, 223 anti-European, 97, 119, 120, 123, 124, 145, 170, 194, 217, 229, 252

anti-federalism, 174 anti-nuclear demonstrations, 161 “anywheres”, 224 Arctic, 4, 5, 190, 191, 205 Atlantic Treaty. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) atomic weapons. See nuclear weapons Attlee, Clement, 19, 24, 29, 40, 49, 51, 56, 83, 247 Austria, 74, 90, 173, 198 Austria-Hungary, 8 awkward partner (UK), 2, 145, 164, 185 B Bakke-Jensen, Frank, 231 balance of payments, 30, 50, 51, 53, 83, 113, 141, 163 Barents Sea, 137, 141, 190 Belgium, 8, 230 Benelux, 24, 32, 33, 56, 63, 108, 201 Benkow, Jo, 135 Berg, Eivinn, 174 Berlin blockade, 26

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 G. K. Almlid, Britain and Norway in Europe Since 1945, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61473-7

279

280

INDEX

Bevin, Ernest, 18, 20, 23–26, 28, 31, 34, 37, 39, 40 Black Wednesday, 172 Blair-Chirac declaration at St. Malo, 194 Blair, Tony, 159, 171, 185–187, 189, 191, 194–197, 203, 212, 218, 249 Board of Trade (UK), 71, 74, 95 Bondevik, Kjell Magne, 204 Borten, Per, 78, 92, 93, 107, 111, 114 Bosnia War, 189 Brandt, Willy, 92, 108, 109, 135 Bratteli, Trygve, 5, 107, 109, 111, 114–116, 120, 124, 129, 134, 158, 186 Brende, Børge, 228 Brexit election campaign, 212, 229 general election campaign issue, 143 interim deal/withdrawal agreement, 225, 232 referendum result, 133, 211, 212, 226 shock, 223, 233 voting patterns, 224 “Brexit means Brexit”, 225 Brexiteers. See Leavers (Brexit) bridge-building, 22–24, 85 Britain Stronger in Europe, 222 British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 223 British Empire, 6 British press, 117 Brown, George, 91 Brown, Gordon, 186, 195, 213, 218, 251 Bruges speech (Thatcher), 170 Brundtland, Gro Harlem, 158–161, 163, 167, 168, 172–174, 177, 186, 201, 209

Brundtland-Thatcher relationship, 159 Brussels Treaty. See Western Union Bush, George W., 189, 203

C Callaghan, James, 93, 102, 134, 136, 144, 145 Cameron, David, 212–215, 219, 220, 223, 227, 238, 246, 252 Carl, Prince of Denmark, 7 Castle, Barbara, 92 Catholic Church, 251 Centre Party (Norway), 92, 107, 134, 168, 169, 173, 178, 186, 199, 201, 217, 229, 252 centre-periphery cleavage (Norway), 252 Chiefs of Staff (UK), 190 China, 191 Chirac Jacques, 194 Christian Democrats (Norway), 92, 101, 134, 178, 252 Churchill, Winston, 11, 17, 19, 23, 44, 45, 56, 57, 59, 240 Clarke, Kenneth, 194 Clegg, Nick, 219 Clinton, Bill, 203 coal production, 56 Cod War, 148 Cold War, 4, 12, 23, 31, 33, 34, 43, 46, 47, 52, 58, 84, 137–139, 161, 162, 177, 188, 190, 191, 202, 214, 248 the end of, 81, 137, 162, 173, 175, 181, 185, 187, 194, 196, 203 Collier, Laurence, 18, 21–23, 27 Commission (of the EEC/EC/EU), 64, 166, 217, 247 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), 87, 93, 108, 112–114, 144, 145, 197

INDEX

Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), 114, 116, 149 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 169, 194, 201, 202, 231 common market, 60–63, 85–87, 92, 107, 109, 113, 117, 133, 144, 165, 166 Common Market Safeguards Campaign, 118 Commonwealth, 18, 44, 61, 62, 66, 73, 85, 87, 89, 92, 106, 112, 117, 249 Confederation of Trade Unions (Norway), 199 Conservative Party (Norway) and 1972 referendum, 107, 134, 138 and 1994 referendum, 186, 201 and the EEA Agreement, 169, 173, 198, 250 Conservative Party (UK), 5, 33, 85 and Brexit, 212 divisions over Europe, 119 on EC entry, 1, 117, 122 Constitutional treaty for Europe, 195 Cook, Robin, 189, 190 Corbyn, Jeremy, 212, 220, 226 Council of Europe (CoE), 33–35, 47, 56, 58–60, 79, 249 Council of Ministers, 64, 172, 199 Cripps, Stafford, 59 Crosland, Anthony, 95, 119 Crossman, Richard, 92 Cyprus, 46 D Daily Express, 117 Dain, David, 173 Davignon Report, 108, 146 decolonisation, 45, 46 defence, 8, 17, 20, 21, 24, 25, 27, 28, 34, 35, 43, 46–49, 58, 66, 80,

281

81, 97, 99, 124, 137, 138, 162, 188, 189, 194, 200, 202, 216 De Gaulle, Charles, 63, 77, 82, 87–89, 92–97, 106, 108, 195 Delors, Jacques, 166–169, 181 Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), 212, 226, 227 Denman, Roy, 106 Denmark, 21, 25, 32, 57, 62, 65, 68, 74, 83, 86, 89, 93, 105, 114, 115, 148, 155, 168, 171, 199, 201, 215, 230, 250 devaluation, 83, 84, 90, 113, 247 directives, 174, 199, 200 double-decker bus (Brexit campaign), 222 Douglas-Home, Alec, 68, 98 E east of Suez role, 80, 96, 246 Eden, Anthony, 41, 44–46, 59, 67 EFTA-EC relationship, 164 EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA), 169 Egypt, 45 Eide, Espen Barth, 215, 229, 241 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 48 Ekofisk field, 141 elections, 3, 19, 45, 65, 78, 80, 83, 106, 110, 158, 159, 171, 212, 213, 219, 223–227 Elektron incident, 191 energy cooperation (of UK and Norway), 193, 230 enlargement, 96, 105, 106, 146, 196, 203, 250 environmental issues, 160, 161 the “establishment”, 119, 120 establishment rights, 88 euro, 195, 216, 217, 219, 220, 250 Euro crisis, 222 Europautredningen, 197, 200, 206

282

INDEX

European Battle Groups, 202 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 4, 43, 56, 57, 59, 60, 66, 104, 106 European Community/European Communities (EC) accession negotiations, 87, 91, 96, 105, 119, 143, 148 House of Commons ratification, 185 referendum on accession, 86, 97, 117 renegotiation of accession treaty, 145 trade agreement with, 143, 247 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 34 European Court of Justice (ECJ), 226, 228 European Defence Community (EDC), 58–61 European Economic Area (EEA) democratic deficit, 198–200 formation of, 157 reservation right, 199 Storting ratification, 143 European Economic Community (EEC), 43, 51, 60, 61, 63–66, 72, 74, 77, 84–93, 96, 97, 103, 104, 106, 110, 118, 136, 194 application for membership of, 77 European Economic Space, 165 European Free Trade Association (EFTA), 4, 33, 64–66, 74, 77, 84–86, 88–97, 108, 143, 146, 148, 164, 165, 167–169, 173, 198, 199, 211, 227, 232, 233, 241, 247, 248, 254 European Movement, 118, 122, 130, 175, 233 European Parliament, 167, 172, 177, 181, 217

European Parliament elections, 219 European Payments Union (EPU), 51, 59 European Political Cooperation (EPC), 146, 147, 167 European Regional Development Fund, 143 European Research Group, 219 European Round Table of Industrialists, 166 European Union (EU) and Blair, 194, 196, 203, 250 Brexit referendum, 123, 125, 144, 178, 197, 223, 250, 253 and enlargement, 157, 196, 203 laws, 112, 168, 169, 198, 199, 203, 215, 217, 226–229, 233, 241 making of, 231, 232 new Norwegian membership attempt, 176, 234 Norwegian referendum on, 178, 250, 253 Euro-scepticism, 145, 250 Eurosclerosis, 145, 146, 166 Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), 170, 171 exports, 29, 30, 50, 53, 83, 86, 107, 114, 120, 140, 163, 192, 215, 232

F Farage, Nigel, 222 Fellesforbundet (Norway), 218 Figgures, Frank, 102 financial crisis, 192, 215 Finland, 24, 74, 95, 198, 201, 230, 250 First World War, 8–10, 50 fisheries, 4, 8, 50, 51, 53–55, 82, 89, 94, 105, 112–116, 120, 121, 129, 143, 148–150, 155, 156,

INDEX

169, 174, 192, 200, 230, 232, 247, 250 fish fillets, 65, 95, 143 “Five a day” (number of EU acts adopted by Norway), 217 five economic tests, 195 Five, the (all EC members except France), 93 Foot, Michael, 159 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), 13, 95, 96, 109, 113, 116, 118, 124, 135–139, 146, 147, 149, 160, 168, 173, 176. See also Foreign Office (UK) Foreign Ministry (of Norway), 39, 74, 102, 135, 164 Foreign Office (UK), 11, 20, 33, 34, 38, 47. See also Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) Fox, Liam, 214 France, 7, 8, 11, 24, 32, 34, 35, 45, 56–59, 61–64, 77, 79, 82, 87, 89, 92–94, 96, 97, 108–110, 112, 115, 116, 124, 127, 145, 160, 162, 170, 195, 196, 201, 202, 213, 230 Franco-German relationship, 66 free trade area (FTA), 63, 64, 91 Frydenlund, Knut, 135, 136, 167 G Gaddafi, 213, 214 Gaitskell, Hugh, 85, 91 gas, 135, 140, 142, 150, 160, 163, 175, 191–193, 208, 215, 232, 247 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 29, 57, 90 Georgia, 214 Gerhardsen, Einar, 19, 45, 50, 78, 79, 81, 86, 98, 158, 252 German reunification, 162

283

Germany, 6–11, 20, 24, 29, 30, 35, 52, 56–58, 79, 80, 94, 108, 109, 121, 145, 162, 170, 187, 195, 201, 215, 221, 230 “get Brexit done”, 227 globalisation, 164, 224, 225, 253, 254 Good Friday Treaty, 227 Goodheart, David, 224 Gorbachev, Michael, 161, 162 Gove, Michael, 220 Grand Design, 62 great power status, 7 Greece, 20, 168, 222 gross domestic product (GDP), 30, 129, 148, 163, 192, 215 Guardian, The, 118, 119 H Hague summit of the EC, 106 hard Brexit, 226 Hattersley, Roy, 146, 151, 155, 194, 196, 207 Healey, Denis, 128 Heath, Edward, 38, 88, 102, 105– 107, 110, 111, 113, 115–118, 123, 124, 139, 145, 249 Helgesen, Vidar, 231 Heseltine, Michael, 170, 194 High Authority of the ECSC, 56, 57 Hoem, Knut, 116 House of Commons, 3, 17, 20, 23, 28, 39, 46, 56, 92, 106, 117, 118, 129, 171, 177, 214, 221, 225, 227, 228, 231, 251 Howe, Geoffrey, 152, 170, 174 human security, 190 Hurd, Douglas, 155, 170 I immigration, 198, 201, 221–225

284

INDEX

imports, 8, 9, 51–53, 64, 83, 89, 90, 112, 113, 164, 192, 215 import surcharge, 247 indicative votes (Brexit), 228 International Court of Justice (ICJ), 4, 22, 54, 55 Iraq war, 213 Ireland, 86, 105, 115, 227, 229, 230 iron curtain, 23 Ismay, Lord, 187, 204 Italy, 8, 10, 32, 60, 108

J Jagland, Thorbjørn, 186, 204 Japan, 59, 83, 106, 140, 164 Jay, Douglas, 92, 102 Jenkins, Roy, 92, 119, 150, 156, 159 Johnson, Boris, 211, 212, 219–222, 227, 229, 230 Johnson, Lyndon B., 82

K Keep Britain Out, 89, 118 Kennedy, John F., 80, 84 Khrushchev, Nikita, 28, 39 Kinnock, Neil, 159 Kinnock, Stephen, 228 Kola peninsula, 137, 188 Korean War, 50, 51, 58 Korvald, Lars, 143 Kosovo, 189, 214 Kuwait War, 189

L Labour Party/Labour (in Britain) and Brexit, 2, 220 divisions over Europe, 97, 119 on EC entry, 1 election manifesto, 137 and the euro, 171, 195

New Labour, 186, 194 Labour Party/Labour (in Norway) and 1972 referendum, 107, 134, 138 and 1994 referendum, 186, 201 division over Europe, 97 and the EEA Agreement, 169, 173, 198, 250 Lahnstein, Anne Enger, 173 Lange, Halvard, 21, 22, 24–29, 32, 34, 39, 41, 45, 57–59, 72, 86, 88 Lawson, Nigel, 170 League of Nations, 9, 22 Leavers (Brexit), 221, 222 Liberal Democrats (UK), 212, 218, 219, 224, 227 Liberal Party (Norway), 217 liberation of Norway, 17, 20, 246 Libya, 213, 214 Lie, Trygve, 22 Lloyd, Selwyn, 19, 44, 46, 49, 62, 68, 69, 255 London Declaration, 88, 93 Lunde, Heidi Nordby, 233 Luns, Joseph, 111 Luxembourg compromise, 92, 121 Lyng, John, 93, 98, 103

M Maastricht Treaty, 5, 169, 171, 172, 181, 182, 185, 194, 195 Macmillan, Harold, 44, 45, 50, 51, 53, 56, 64, 65, 77–80, 84, 85, 87, 89, 96, 97, 246, 249, 252 Major, John, 5, 158, 170–172, 174, 176, 186, 189, 193 Marshall, George, 26 Marshall Plan, 30, 31, 35, 40 Maudling Committee, 63, 64, 91 May, Theresa, 212, 225, 246, 253

INDEX

285

Messina, 60, 61, 63 military equipment, 25, 27, 231 Minister of EEA and EU Affairs (Norway), 217 Mutual Defence Assistance Program, 49

Norwegian Foreign Ministry (NFM), 39, 68, 135, 164 Norwegian Shipowners’ Association, 8 Norwegian Trench, 141, 142 nuclear weapons, 47, 48, 80, 137, 161

N Narvik, 11, 240 The National Fishermen’s Association (Norway), 115 Nei til EU, 175, 241 Netherlands, 111, 112, 196, 230 neutralism, 22, 139 New Zealand, 112 Nield, William, 109, 110, 127 Nobel Peace Prize, 219 “no deal” Brexit, 226–229, 231 Nordic, 22, 32, 81, 95, 96, 144, 167, 180, 192, 214 Nordic Council, 61 Nordic Economic Union (NORDEK), 32, 95, 96, 108 Nordic nuclear weapon-free zone, 138, 161 Nordli, Odvar, 138, 147, 158 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 3, 4, 17, 18, 26–28, 32, 34, 43–50, 58, 59, 64, 66, 79–82, 97, 108, 109, 134, 136–139, 146, 147, 161, 162, 170, 175, 176, 186–189, 194, 202, 213, 214, 231, 234, 248 Northern flank of NATO, 50 Northern Ireland, 136, 227, 229 North Sea, 4, 11, 35, 59, 85, 135, 140–142, 149, 159, 163, 192, 193, 215, 232, 247 Nortraship, 11, 30 “Norway debate” (UK), 227 “Norway option” (Brexit), 227, 240 “Norway plus” (Bexit), 228

O oil, 11, 45, 82, 135, 140–142, 146, 150, 163, 191–193, 208, 215, 232, 247 oil crisis, 139 O’Neill, Con, 112, 116, 125, 127 opt-outs, 115, 171, 185, 194, 201 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 165 Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), 29, 31, 32, 34, 35, 59, 63, 84, 249 Oslo Agreement, 190 Ostpolitik, 108, 135 Owen, David, 136, 159 P People’s Movement against EC membership (Norway), 122 petroleum. See gas; oil Plan G, 63, 74, 85 Polaris missiles, 80 Pompidou, Georges, 96, 108, 109, 111 populism, 219, 224 Portugal, 64, 74, 168 Powell, Charles, 158, 176 Powell, Enoch, 118, 159 Progress Party (Norway), 212, 216, 252 public opposition to EC/EU membership, 117, 122 pyrites, 8

286

INDEX

R racism, 225 Reagan, Ronald, 138, 161, 162 rebates on UK contributions to EC/EU budget, 145, 150, 221 Referendum in Britain 1975, 123, 144, 251 in Britain 2016, 231, 253 in Norway 1972, 107, 134, 138, 174 in Norway 1994, 186, 201, 253, 254 petition for (UK), 219 Reform deal, re-negotiations of British EU membership terms, 220 Remainers (Brexit), 222, 223, 227, 229 renegotiation of EC accession terms (UK), 143 Rhodesia, 136 Robinson, John, 95, 104 Robson, John, 153, 157, 179, 204 Rønbeck, Sissel, 160 royal family of Norway, 11 Russia, 6–8, 23, 26, 45, 81, 137, 162, 187, 188, 191, 202, 214, 231, 251

S Salmon (Norway), 198 Sarkozy, Nicolas, 214 Scandinavia, 7, 9, 10, 18, 21, 23–26, 32–34, 50–52, 59, 61–63, 65, 66, 88, 95, 96, 213, 250 Schengen, 200, 201, 203, 209, 250 Schumann, Maurice, 108 Schuman Plan, 56, 57 Schuman, Robert, 56 Scotland, 229 The Second World War, 10 security dilemma, 80

Single European Act (SEA), 157, 166, 167, 169, 177, 201, 250 Single Market, 157, 158, 165–168, 170, 172, 175, 185, 198, 203, 221, 226, 229, 232–234, 241, 250 Skaug, Arne, 39, 87 Soames, Christopher, 108, 127 Social Charter, 194 Social Democratic Party (UK), 159 Social Democrats against EU (Norway), 173 “social” Europe, 170, 194 Socialist Left Party (Norway), 161, 169, 173, 186 soft Brexit, 226 Solberg, Erna, 212, 216–218, 226, 228, 229, 232, 233, 246 “somewhere”, 224 Søreide, Ine Eriksen, 230 sovereignty, 1, 22, 35, 47, 56, 61, 64, 77, 86, 115, 117, 118, 121, 123, 125, 144, 169, 173, 174, 178, 182, 190, 215, 221–223, 225, 228, 229, 249–251 Soviet Union, 20, 21, 23, 24, 27, 28, 47–50, 58, 62, 81, 95, 106, 108, 137–142, 161, 162, 164, 170, 185, 187, 188, 190, 191, 248, 251 Spain, 168 special relationship (UK-US), 18, 26, 87, 89, 107, 145, 162 Statoil, 142 steel production, 6, 56 Stewart, Michael, 81, 94, 98, 106, 126, 245 Stockholm Convention, 74 Stoltenberg, Jens, 186, 212, 213 Stoltenberg, Thorvald, 109, 146, 155, 160, 207 Støre, Jonas Gahr, 187

INDEX

Storting, 3, 22, 24, 27–29, 46, 48, 55, 58, 65, 78, 86, 93, 101, 103, 107, 120, 121, 123, 134, 140, 169, 173, 174, 198, 199, 201, 203, 212, 217, 218, 231 Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), 161 strikes, 83, 135, 139, 140, 143, 189 Sturgeon, Nicola, 229 subsidiarity, 172 Suez crisis, 26, 45, 50, 62, 80, 84, 246 Sun, The, 218 suspension of parliament (UK), 200 Svalbard, 5, 190, 191 Sweden, 6, 7, 20, 25, 26, 32, 35, 49, 52, 61, 62, 70, 74, 83, 88, 89, 95, 104, 140, 163, 167, 173, 183, 198, 201, 215, 230, 247, 250 Switzerland, 74, 90, 198, 199 Syria, 214 Syse, Jan P., 168, 178 T “Take back control”, slogan, 222 tariffs, 63–65, 86, 89, 95, 113, 175, 198, 232 taxation, 78, 120, 142 Thatcher, Margaret, 112, 133–135, 138, 144, 145, 150, 157–161, 166–171, 174, 177, 186, 196, 201, 218, 246 Theatre Nuclear Force, 138 Times, The, 121, 124, 131 Torp, Oscar, 19 Trade Union Congress (UK), 39, 118, 170 Treasury (UK), 113, 195, 222 Treaty of Amsterdam, 201 Treaty of Lisbon, 196 Treaty of Rome, 60, 63, 64, 77, 88, 111, 143, 165, 166 Truman, Harry, 25, 39

287

two-speed Europe, 194 U U2 incident, 49 UK Independence Party (UKIP), 219, 222 UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 148, 149 UNISCAN, 32, 33, 63, 64, 74 United Nations, 22, 24, 34, 45, 46, 128, 187, 190, 213 United States of America (USA), 4, 6, 15, 20, 25–27, 47–49, 59, 62, 65, 78–82, 84–86, 90, 99, 106, 137, 138, 145, 147, 162–164, 189, 191, 192, 248 UN Security Council, 188, 213 V Vedum, Trygve Slagsvold, 217 veto, of British EEC membership, 88 Vietnam War, 82 Vote Leave, campaign, 228 W “war on terror”, 189 Werner Report, 170, 181 Western European Department (UK), 127, 136, 137, 147, 173 Western European Union (WEU), 59 Western Union, 24, 56, 59 West Germany, 24, 47, 51, 52, 56, 58, 59, 63, 70, 73, 77, 80, 83, 90, 108, 124, 135, 148, 163 Whitman, Richard, 231 Willoch, Kåre, 103, 134, 158, 160, 161, 163, 180 Wilson, Harold, 77, 78, 80, 82, 83, 90–97, 104, 106, 112, 117, 119, 134, 135, 139, 144, 150, 151, 218, 247, 252