Borders and Brethren: Iran and the Challenge of Azerbaijani Identity 9780262194778, 0262194775, 9780262692779, 0262692775

Table of contents :
Contents
Introduction
1 The Azerbaijanis until 1920
2 The Azerbaijanis under the Soviet and Pahlavi Regimes
3 The Islamic Revolution and the Azerbaijanis
4 Between Two Revolutions
5 The Republic of Azerbaijan's Independence
6 Lessons on Iran and Identity Theory
Appendix: The Azerbaijani Population
Selected Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

Borders and Brethren Iran and the Challenge of Azerbaijani Identity The BCSIA Studies in International Security book series is edited at the Belier Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government and published by The MIT Press. The series presents books on contemporary issues in international security policy, as well as their conceptual and historical foundations. Topics of particular interest to the series include the spread of weapons of mass destruction, internal conflict, the international effects of democracy and democratization, and U.S. defense policy.

Brenda Shaffer

A complete list of BCSIA Studies appears at the back of this volume.

BCSIA Studies in International Security

The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England

© 2002 by the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

John F. Kennedy School of Government Harvard University Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138 (617) 495-1400

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means - electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise-without permission in writing from the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 79 John F. Kennedy Street, Cambridge, MA 02138.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Shaffer, Brenda. Borders and brethren : Iran and the challenge of Azerbaijani identity / Brenda Shaffer. p. cm. - (BCSIAstudies in international security) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-262-19477-8 (hc.:alk. paper) ISBN 978-0-262-69277-9 (pb.)

1. Nationalism-Azerbaijan-History-20th century. 2. AzerbaijanisIran-Ethnic identity. I. Title. II. Series.

DK697.3 .549 2002 305.8'009553-dc21

2001054651

On the cover:The Astara border crossing between Azerbaijan and Iran. Astara is a divided city. Photo by Rahim Gadimov. Design assistance from Donna Whipple. Printed in the United States of America

The MIT Press is pleased to keep this title available in print by manufacturing single copies, on demand, via digital printing technology.

In memoryof MelanieRose Silvermanand EdwardSilverman

Contents

Acknowledgments

ix

Note on Transliteration and Terms

xi

Map

xiii

Introduction

1

Chapter 1

The Azerbaijanis until 1920

15

Chapter 2

The Azerbaijanis under the Soviet and Pahlavi Regimes

47

Chapter 3

The Islamic Revolution and the Azerbaijanis

77

Chapter 4

Between Two Revolutions

117

Chapter 5

The Republic of Azerbaijan's Independence

155

Chapter 6

Lessons on Iran and Identity Theory

205

Appendix

The Azerbaijani Population

221

Selected Bibliography

227

About the Author

237

viii /

BORDERS AND BRETHREN

Index

239

About the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

251

Acknowledgments

Many people have been generous with their time, ideas, and materials and have contributed to this research. I would like to express my special gratitude to Professor David Menashri and Professor Yaacov Ro'i, who served as my advisers in the doctoral dissertation at Tel-Aviv University that formed the basis for this book. I am also indebted to Professor Ronald Grigor Suny, Professor Tadeusz Swietochowski and Professor Ervand Abrahamian, whose comments were essential to this book. Professor Abrahamian also shared many materials with me, such as his collection of the Khalq-e Musulman newspapers. Professor Nasib Nasibli served as an excellent teacher and shared essential documents with me. Dr. Alireza Asgharzade, Amir, Habib Azarsina, Dr. Hasan Shariatmadari and others whose names cannot be explicitly mentioned, taught me a lot about the Azerbaijanis in Iran and events there. Professor Hamlet Isaxanli, President of Khazar University in Baku, who made extensive comments on this manuscript and provided important insights. At the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Graham Allison, Steven Miller and Melissa Carr provided outstanding support and I am grateful to them. Tom de Waal gave insightful comments, as did Professor Gabriel Sheffer, Professor Nikki Keddie, Professor Gerard Libaridian, and Professor AzadeAy~e Rorlich. Azerbaijan's Ambassador to the United States, Hafiz Pashayev, encouraged me to publish this book and conducted lively and interesting debate with me on various aspects of Azerbaijani history and culture. I am grateful to Miriam Avins who was an outstanding editor; BCSIAExecutive Editor Karen Motley, Sean Lynn-Jones, Emily Goodhue, Arman Grigorian, and Saba Mwine; a special debt of gratitude goes to John Grennan, researcher, editor, and indexer extraordinaire. The Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Raymond and Jenine Bollag Fund generously supported my research. A number of people referred me to important materials and gave assistance in translation: Evan Siegal, Rovshan

X

I BORDERS

AND BRETHREN

Guseinov, Mirza Michaeli, Elshan Alekberov and Hasan Javadi. Gulbaniz, Javid and Zohrab Safraliyev shared their home in Baku with me, as did Jane Greenhood and Arthur Hughes in Cambridge. I especially thank Yehuda, Yael, and Omri Shaffer.

BrendaShaffer Jerusalem,Israeland Cambridge,Massachusetts

Note on Transliteration and Terms

The research in this book is based on a number of primary sources, mostly in Azerbaijani, Persian, and Russian. The sources in Azerbaijani are written in three different alphabets: Latin, Cyrillic, and Arabic. In Soviet Azerbaijan, the Cyrillic alphabet was in use for Azerbaijani for most of the period under analysis. In the successor Republic of Azerbaijan, the Latin alphabet is officially in use. In Iran, Azerbaijanis use the Arabic alphabet to write the Azerbaijani language. To help researchers locate the original sources, separate transliteration systems have been used for each alphabet. As a result, in the notes some Azerbaijani words and names appear in different forms. There are differences between the transliteration used within the text and in the footnotes. In the text, many non-English terms, names and writings are referred to phonetically, so that readers who are not familiar with Turkic languages can read the text freely. The notes have precise transliterations. In the notes, the open pronounced a in Azerbaijani is represented by a.Many of the references to Azerbaijani texts written in the Arabic alphabet appear in the notes without precise vowel representation, since the original texts provide no vowel notation. Some personal and place names that have a widely known spelling in English have not been transliterated from the Azerbaijani original, such as the name Aliyev and the city Baku. In Azerbaijani, the city is called Baki. The spelling of the names of some major figures as they have appeared in other academic works has been retained, and this has caused some inconsistency in spelling in this work. For instance, in some cases there are two spellings for a name pronounced the same: For example, '.Ali bay Huseynzade, and Sheikh Husayn Najaf. Journals that are widely-known by certain transliterations, such as Adiibiyyatvii Injiisiiniit, are referred to in the commonly known manner in the text and notes.

xii

I BORDERS AND

BRETHREN

Most of the geographical place names in areas where Azerbaijanis live are spelled according to Azerbaijani pronunciations. The term Araz River is used, rather than the Persian Aras or the Russian Araxs; Ardebil is used and not the Persian version, Ardabil; Savalan Mountain and not Sabalan; and Shamakhi rather than the Russian pronunciation, Shemakha. The names of some individuals mentioned in this work appear with varying name endings. For instance, the nineteenth-century writer and political thinker known as Mirza Fath 'Ali Akhundzade in Iran is often referred to in Azerbaijan as Akhundov, with a Russian name ending. Some individuals have changed their name endings as a conscious reflection of their identity. For instance, Nasib Nasibzade, a Baku scholar who served as the Republic of Azerbaijan's first ambassador to Iran, changed his last name to Nasibli, replacing the Persian name ending with a Turkic one. Until the early 1990s, most Azerbaijanis in Iran referred to themselves as Turks. Some researchers and Azerbaijanis themselves refer to this group as the Azerbaijani Turks, emphasizing that the group is basically Turkic and that the Azerbaijani identity is as such a shade of Turkic identity. However, in conducting the research it became apparent that the term used in self-reference is not necessarily an expression of identity, except among highly educated and very politically conscious Azerbaijanis. I have used the term most commonly employed by the Azerbaijanis today, and which is considered most neutral. This is "Azerbaijani." In this book, the terms north and south Azerbaijan are used without a political connotation and only to denote geographic areas north and south of the Araz River. Since the political division of Azerbaijan in 1828, the area north of the Araz River has been part of the Russian Empire; was the short lived Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (1918-1920);became Soviet Azerbaijan; and since 1991 has been independent again as the Republic of Azerbaijan. South of the Araz today is land within Iran. When Azerbaijanis use the terms north and south Azerbaijan, they do not always have a political intention either. For instance, Ayatollah Shariatmadari, who firmly defended the preservation of the territorial integrity of Iran, referred to the Azerbaijani provinces in Iran at times as "south Azerbaijan."

MAP

Rl'SSIA

Caspian Sea

.

Ganja

·\ZE RB\ IJ .\'\Baku

·,Tabriz •

!:.AC::·• L,r-"'\.-,.J

VVEST

IRAQ

I

..

Ardebil

-

•

'

Zenjan •

11{,\ :\ Qom

•

I xiii

Introduction

Iran is a multi-ethnic society in which approximately 50 percent of its citizens are of non-Persian origin. The terms "Persians" and "Iranians," however, are often used interchangeably, just as once we called all the citizens of the Soviet Union "Russians." Among the ethnic minorities in Iran are large number of Azerbaijanis, Kurds, Turk.men, Arabs, and Baluch. Most of the non-Persians are concentrated in the frontier areas and have ties to large numbers of co-ethnics in adjoining states, such as Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Turkey, Pakistan, and Iraq. Ethnic politics in Iran is linked to events beyond Iran's borders. Iran's ethnic minorities and especially the Azerbaijanis were strongly affected by the Soviet breakup and the ensuing renewal of ties with co-ethnics in the new states of the former Soviet Union. Approximately 7 million Azerbaijanis live in the Republic of Azerbaijan, which was established at the end of 1991, but the overwhelming majority of the Azerbaijanis live across the Araz River in neighboring Iran: approximately 20 million of Iran's population of 64 million are Azerbaijani. 1 Most of them live in three predominately Azerbaijani provinces (East Azerbaijan Province, West Azerbaijan Province, and Ardebil Province), and many Azerbaijanis refer to most of northwest Iran as "south Azerbaijan." A sizeable number of Azerbaijanis live in multi-ethnic Tehran. The establishment of the Republic of Azerbaijan challenged the identity of co-ethnics beyond the borders of the new state and led many Azerbaijanis in Iran to identify with the Azerbaijani ethnic group, though 1. See Appendix for analysis of the number of Azerbaijanis and other ethnic groups in Iran.

2

I BORDERS

INTRODUCTION

AND BRETHREN

not necessarily with the new state itself. Since the early 1990s, political expressions of Azerbaijani ethnic identity have increased. This rising Azerbaijani identity has generated few calls for the three Azerbaijani provinces to secede from Iran and join the new republic, but rather has focused on cultural rights within Iran. This rising ethnic identity is affecting the character and the stability of the regime in multi-ethnic Iran. Indeed, Tehran's response to the Soviet breakup and the subsequent establishment of the new Muslim republics showed its awareness that the establishment of ethnic-based states on its north border could have ramifications for the ethnic groups in Iran. Tehran Times wrote: The first ground for concern from the point of view in Tehran is the lack of political stability in the newly independent republics. The unstable conditions in those republics could be serious causes of insecurity along the lengthy borders (over 2000 kilometers) Iran shares with those countries. Already foreign hands can be felt at work in those republics, specially in Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan republics, with the ultimate objective of brewing discord among the Iranian Azeris and Turkmen by instigating ethnic and nationalistic sentiments.2 Despite Iran's multi-ethnic composition, few studies on ethnic identity or nationalism include the modem state of Iran as a case for analysis.3 The lack of contemporary research on ethnic-based politics in Iran is difficult to fathom; if Iran actually has succeeded in preventing the cohesion of separate identities among its various ethnic minorities and fostering Iranian state identity as the primary identity of most of the residents of the state, Iran is an extraordinary case for study. However, if the contrary is true, and ethnic-based political activity is present in Iran, then it is also vital to study this large and influential state, especially in light of the security challenge that Iran poses in its region and beyond. The dissolution 2.

TehranTimes, December 30, 1991, p. 2.

3.

Examples include: Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities(New York: Verso,

1991); Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism:The Quest for Understanding(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994); Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (Reno: New York: University of Nevada Press, 1991). In Smith's Theoriesof Nationalism(New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1983), he even gives "Persia" as an example of a case of

"culturally homogenous group" that is "ethnically (almost) homogenous," p. 224. In contrast, Hugh Seton-Watson in Nations and States:An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politicsof Nationalism(Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977), pp. 251-255, discusses the multi-ethnic character of Iran. Nevertheless, Seton-Watson concludes that except for the Arabs and possibly the Kurds, there is little evidence of ethnic assertion.

I3

of dynastic empires and states is often regarded as a major catalyst for the fostering of separate, ethnic-based nationalisms or nation-states among their former subjects.4 Moreover, ethnic-based nationalism is seen as a major factor contributing to the demise of many multi-ethnic states and empires. 5 The cases most often cited in discussing the connection between termination of dynastic empires and the emergence of nationalism are the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, and Russian Empires. Iran is rarely included in this list, despite the fact that two Iranian dynasties have been toppled in the last century. 6 The vast majority of new states and sovereign political entities that have entered the international system in the last decade do not encompass large amounts of territories that the new states consider their historical lands. Moreover, significant numbers of co-ethnics reside outside the borders of the new states, which they nominally or otherwise claim to represent. In some cases, the overwhelming majority of the co-ethnics of a state's core ethnic group live beyond the borders of the states or political entities. In many cases, co-ethnics reside contingent to the new states. The establishment of an ethnic-based state adjacent to large number of members of that same ethnic group can impact and challenge the identity and political behavior of the co-ethnics abroad, and becomes an important factor in the bilateral relations of the neighboring states.7 The behavior and response of contingent co-ethnics to the establishment of an ethnic-based state differs from that of non-contingent diaspora members. 8 4. Anderson, ImaginedCommunities,p. 36; E.J. Hobsbawm, "The End of Empires," in Karen Barkey and Mark Von Hagen, eds., After Empire:Multiethnic Societiesand Nation-Building(Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997), pp. 12-16. 5.

Victor Zaslavsky, "The Soviet Union," in Barkey and Von Hagen, After Empire,p.

84.

6.

These are the Qajar Dynasty in 1921 (officially in 1925) and the Pahlavi Dynasty in

1979.

7. For further discussion on the relationship between ethnic-based states, co-ethnics abroad and foreign policy, see Rogers Brubaker, NationalismReframed:Nationhoodand the National Question in the New Europe, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996);Charles King and Neil J.Melvin, eds., Nations Abroad:DiasporaPoliticsand International Relations in the Former Soviet Union (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1998); Charles King and Neil J. Melvin, "Diaspora Politics: Ethnic Linkages, Foreign Policy, and Security in Eurasia," InternationalSecurity, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Winter 1999/2000), pp. 108-138. 8. In this book, a distinction is made between co-ethnics in territories contiguous to a state's borders which have been inhabited by that group for a significant period of time and is considered by them as part of their homeland, and a diaspora. Diaspora is used to refer to members of a group who have left or been forced to leave their traditional place of residence. The term diaspora is discussed in Gabriel Sheffer, "A New

4

I

BORDE.RS AND BRETH.REN

Moreover, the existence of a sizeable community of co-ethnics beyond an ethnic-based state's borders obligates the state to create a policy toward them; and the question of co-ethnics abroad often becomes an integral part of the wider debate in a state on the question of state identity and on the relationship between ethnic identity in a state and the state itself. The Azerbaijanis are a particularly interesting case study of relations between ethnic-based states and their co-ethnics abroad, since most of the Azerbaijanis live beyond the borders of the Republic of Azerbaijan, and the majority of the territory considered by the Azerbaijanis as part of Azerbaijan is beyond the boundaries of the new state.9 The Azerbaijanis in Iran and in the Republic of Azerbaijan (and its predecessor states) provide almost laboratory conditions for studying ethnic identity. The populations have been split since 1828, when the Turkmenchay Treaty divided the Azerbaijani people and lands between the Russian Empire (and later the Soviet Union) and Iran. Most of the Azerbaijanis on both sides of the Araz are Shi'i Muslims, and most speak Azerbaijani Turkish as their native language. 10 Family ties have played an important role in maintaining a common identity between the people. Despite their separation under fundamentally different political and cultural systems and in spite of having undergone a different historical experience for over 150 years, the Azerbaijanis share a common ethnic identity. Yet, their more than 150 years of separation under very different regimes have created some differences-most notably, for political scientists, in the degree to which the two groups comfortably hold differing state and ethnic identities. This book examines trends in Azerbaijani collective identity from the period of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, through the Soviet breakup and most of the first decade of the Republic of Azerbaijan (1979-2000). It looks at both populations and at their connections and mutual influence. Few works dealt comprehensively with the history and politics of both Azerbaijans. This book shows that Azerbaijani identity has been the predominant form of collective identity of the Azerbaijani population in both Soviet Field of Study: Modem Diasporas in International Politics," in Gabriel Sheffer, ed., ModernDiasporasin InternationalPolitics(London: Croom Helm, 1986), pp. 9-10. 9. Examples of similar cases are the impact of the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (and subsequent Palestinian state) on Palestinians beyond its borders, and of the foundation of the Kurdish autonomy in Iraq on adjacent Kurdish communities in Iran, Turkey, and 10. T'nis language belongs to the Oghuz language group, which includes the Turkish predominantly spoken today in the Republic of Turkey, and the Turk.men language. Some linguists consider Azerbaijani Turkish a dialect of Turkish, while many think of it as a separate language.

INTRODUCTION

j 5

Azerbaijan and its successor, the Republic of Azerbaijan. Few Azerbaijanis north of the Araz River became Soviets in terms of self-identity, and almost none considered themselves Russians, including those for whom Russian became their primary language. For most, Turkic identity forms a substantial and inseparable element of Azerbaijani identity, but rarely takes precedence over distinct Azerbaijani self-perception. In Iran, Azerbaijani identity has remained a significant collective identity among most of the Azerbaijanis in Iran, and for many their primary collective identity. Each time central control over freedom of expression in Iran has diminished; for example, during the period of the Islamic Revolution, Azerbaijanis amplified their expressions of Azerbaijani identity and their demands for expanded cultural and language rights. In terms of primary identity, great diversity exists among the Azerbaijanis in Iran. Non-Persians in Iran separate between Iranian and Persian identity; they may strongly identify with the Iranian state and history, but do not define themselves as Persians. Some Azerbaijanis in Iran, such as those who form a significant portion of the ruling elite today, see their primary identity as Iranian, although many members of this group also express ties to Azerbaijani ethnic culture and language. Others, including many intellectuals during the period of the Islamic Revolution, maintain strong Azerbaijani identity, but strive to maintain state identity as Iranians in a future supra-ethnic Iran. Many see no contradiction in maintaining both Azerbaijani and Iranian identity. Others see their primary identity as Azerbaijani, though not all of them are actively pressing for a political manifestation of that identity. However, especially since the early 1990s,a small number of Azerbaijanis have become involved in political activity evincing their Azerbaijani primary identity. This political activity has emphasized many abstract demands, such as a change in the Azerbaijanis' image in the media, in addition to the concrete fulfillment of legal rights, such as the right to education in their language and use of Azerbaijani in the courts. This stress of abstract issues may emanate from the Azerbaijanis' perceived gap between their high economic and professional status, and their low social status in Iran. The conclusion that a distinctive Azerbaijani identity exists on a meaningful level in Iran challenges the view of the mainstream of contemporary Iranian studies, which contend that Azerbaijanis in Iran are a "well-integrated minority," harbor little "sense of separate identity," and have assimilated into Iranian identity. 11 The Azerbaijani ethnic factor 11. Patricia J. Higgins, "Minority-State Relations in Contemporary Iran," Iranian Studies,Vol. 17, No. 1 (Winter 1984), pp. 37-71; Hooshang Amirahmadi, "A Theory of Ethnic Collective Movements and its Application to Iran," Ethnic and RacialStudies

6 j BORDERS AND BRETHREN

must be a part of studies on Iranian society and assessments of regime stability in Iran. This book also shows that Azerbaijani political activity was a facet of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, and that the failure of the revolution to meet many of the Azerbaijanis' expectations for language and cultural rights affected their ensuing support for the regime and their identity as Iranians. Similarly, this book challenges the view of many articles on the Soviet period-that the ethnic Azerbaijani movements and activity in Iran were primarily a Soviet invention, and a mere instrument of Moscow's policies toward Iran. 12 In fact, wide-based Azerbaijani ethnic sentiments in Iran emerged many times in the twentieth century, often when the Soviet Union was not actively encouraging them. For example, in contrast to many of the Western depictions of the 1945-46 Provincial Government of Azerbaijan, this book shows that ethnic-based local Azerbaijani demands played a significant role in the emergence of the autonomy movement and were reflected in the policies of the short-lived autonomous government. Many important works on the development of the Azerbaijani national movement in the Soviet Union claim that the Azerbaijanis began to assert their national identity in the late 1980s, and chiefly in response to challenges from Armenia and the struggle for control over the province of Nagomo-Karabagh. 13 However, expressions of Azerbaijani national identity were dearly present in the Soviet Union before the inauguration of glasnost in the mid-1980s.14 While the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict had Vol. 10 (1987), pp. 363-391; and Touraj Atabaki, Azerbaijan:Ethnicity and Autonomy in Twentieth-CenturyIran (London: British Academic Press, 1993), p. 182. 12. For a comprehensive review of Soviet attempts to foster Azerbaijani ethnic sentiments in Iran, see David Nissman, The Soviet Union and IranianAzerbaijan:The Usesof Nationalismfor PoliticalPenetration(Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1987). 13. See, for instance, Mark Saroyan, "The Karabagh Syndrome and Azerbaijani Politics," Problemsof Communism,Vol. 39, No. 5 (September /October 1990),pp. 14-29; and Helene Carrere d' Encausse, The End of the SovietEmpire(New York: Basic Books, 1993), p. 59. 14. In most of the central literature on collective identity, the role of the other, or the "you," is stressed in the formation of the "we." The most central aspect of construction of identities is the definition of borders between members of the collective and outsiders. Neighboring peoples and groups from which a collective emphasizes its differences often play an important role in the coalescence of a group's national identity. However, one must be careful not to overestimate the impact of the outsider, or to assume that the "other" was the main or only factor in the coalescence of national identity of a group of people. Even though one-time events and interactions, especially conflicts with another group, can have huge impact on the identity and formation of a nation, one should be careful not to apply that factor backwards, and assume that in

INTRODUCTION

I7

a significant impact on the activization of an Azerbaijani national political movement, it was far from its basis. The fall of the Soviet Union has led to a dramatic change in the nature of the borders that now divide between the new states and their neighbors, such as Iran. Many of these borders have become hubs of exchange and cooperation, and epicenters of vibrant intellectual innovation. The independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan, for example, led to a dramatic increase in the importance of the Azerbaijani provinces in Iran. This new status has led to demands for greater resources from the central government. Most important, having conducted many of the cooperative endeavors directly with Baku, circumventing Tehran, they have acquired an appetite for increased unimpeded foreign ties and cooperation, affecting center-periphery relations in Iran. The center has traditionally been viewed as the place with the most access to resources and the nucleus of a state's activities. Peripheries are usually considered "cut off" or "dead-ends." However, the change in the nature of the border regions may have made being in the periphery an asset, and Iran's provinces, especially during difficult economic times in Iran, have attempted to transform their location into an advantage by strengthening their ties to the new state. This has had important political implications. Chapters 1 and 2 provide historical background for this study, surveying the development of the Azerbaijani identity from the tenth century through the beginning of the twentieth century, and tracing developments during the Soviet and Pahlavi regimes. Chapter 3 examines the events of the Islamic Revolution, the role of the Azerbaijanis in the revolution, and its effect on the self-identity of the Azerbaijanis in Iran and in the Soviet Union. Chapter 4 focuses on 1983-1991. Chapter 5 examines the relationship between state and ethnic identity in the new Republic of Azerbaijan and how its independence affected co-ethnics beyond its borders, in Iran. Chapter 6 discusses the impact of Azerbaijan on the Iranian state, and draws theoretical conclusions on collective identity.

Nations,EthnicGroups,Collectiveand NationalIdentity In political science, there is little consensus over the definition of the most widely used concepts for study and description of collective identity, such as nation, ethnic group, and nationalism. Many people use these terms interchangeably with each other and, at times, with the term the past the "other" or the conflict was also a major force in the formation of a common identity of a group, or to presuppose that a national identity did not emerge prior to the significant interaction of the "other."

8

I BORDERS

AND BRETHREN

"state." In this book, I suggest three separate terms to describe three forms of identity: state identity, national identity, and ethnic identity. At times, some of these forms of identity are congruent, at times they are different and even competing and conflicting. Different members of a collective attach diversified feelings toward the group. Rarely is there complete consensus in a collective regarding feeling a sense of a nation. Often, different identities do not conflict and can be accommodating or compatible, and many individuals do not possess clear awareness of their primary identity. People possess different forms of communal identity concurrently. Since identities do not always conflict or demand prioritization, an individual may feel comfortable identifying with a number of collectives. Some members may view their ethnic identity as primary, while coethnics may feel primary attachment to their state identity. This diversity is common among the Azerbaijanis in Iran. The various self-perceptions within a people are the basis of interesting political interactions, and also fuel the claims of external opponents who deny the people the right to nationhood. Since the French Revolution, much of mainstream western political thought has considered an individual's ethno-linguistic community as his or her primary collective identity, or nation. However, many people prefer units other than their ethno-linguistic community as their object of primary identity, particularly in non-European countries. For instance, in Tajikistan, regional groupings containing both Tajiks and Uzbeks often take priority for many over ethno-linguistic identity. 15 Furthermore, some individuals have joined supra-ethnic communist movements and worked against their own ethnic group's national movements, feeling greater allegiance to these non-ethnic-based ideological movements. Gender may be developing as a primary identity for some women, uniting them with other women more than ethno-linguistic bonds with males of their same ethnic group. NATIONAL

IDENTITY

National identity is one's primary collective identity, and the nation is the group to which one usually attributes one's primary political allegiance. A nation is based on some collective-such as an ethnic group, a tribe, a clan, a gender, common citizenship, an extended family grouping, inhab15. This is based on the author's 1986 conversations with Tajiks living in Samarkand in Uzbekistan. Some remarked that it was socially acceptable for Tajiks and Uzbeks to marry each other in Samarkand, which seems to indicate that their respective ethnic groups share another binding identity.

INTRODUCTION

I9

itants of a territorial unit, or holders of a value or ideological orientation. Thus, members of a nation usually have a number of tangible common or binding traits, and often elements of a common culture, beyond their political allegiance. These traits often make it difficult for researchers to differentiate between national identity and other collective identities, such as ethnic identity. A nation, in contrast to the groups on which nations are based, implies an element of choice and preference. People possess a variety of identities-gender, family, tribe, clan, ethnic group, region, value system (liberal, communist, ecological). One's nation is the object of collective identity that one cherishes most. It is the collective element that, when push comes to shove, commands our greatest loyalty. Single events can have a profound impact, and can determine the choice of primary identity. While historical ties often have important influence in determining the formation of a nation, national identity can and often does change. As Renan pointed out, "a nation is a daily plebiscite."16 Researchers often point to the historic bonds and common nationhood as Iranians which is shared by Azerbaijanis and Persians to dismiss the existence of separate Azerbaijani national identity. Yet historical relationships only influence the present-day choice of a nation; 17they do not dictate it, and new circumstances can give birth to new identity preferences. For example, Russians and Ukrainians speak a mutually understandable language, share a faith, and have been historically linked so much that the first Russian state was founded in Kiev in 860. Yet, by the nineteenth century and certainly under the Soviet system, separate Russian and Ukrainian national identities coalesced. A nation is created by choice and should be defined accordingly. According to Hugh Seton-Watson: a nation exists when a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form a nation, or behave as if they formed one. It is not necessary that the whole of the population should so feel, or so behave, and it is not possible to lay down dogmatically a minimum percentage of a population which must be so affected. When a significant group holds this belief, it possesses 'national consciousness.'18 16. Ernest Renan, "What Is a Nation?" in Omar Dahbour and Micheline R. Ishay, The Nationalism Reader (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1995), p. 154. Originally appeared in Oeuvres Completes(Paris, 1947-1961), Vol. 1, pp. 887-907. 17. Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 73. 18.

Seton-Watson, Nations and States, p. 5.

10

I BORDERS AND

BRETHREN

A group, once it feels it is a nation, will act and make demands like one, so academic attempts to deny "nationhood" to a certain group by applying various criteria and definitions are superfluous. The fact that children of parents belonging to different nations can choose their own primary identity illustrates that national identity is selected. 19 Size is also a factor in determining a group's status as a nation. In distinguishing between an ethnic group and a nation, Benjamin Akzin wrote, The point at which the ethnic group enters our special field of interest is that at which it has both exceeded purely local dimensions and become of significance in the political sphere. It is at that point that the appellation of nation or nationality can be applied to it. Size is an important aspect of this phenomenon. 20 People can lose the external symbols of the ethnic or other group upon which the nation is based, while retaining their national identification with it. For instance, many leaders of national movements are not native speakers of the language the activists are striving to preserve. It is precisely because national identity is a state of mind that it is so difficult to objectively assess, and so vulnerable to change. Due to the fluctuating nature of national identity, all nations and states should be viewed as tentative and vulnerable to change. This change can lead to the dissolution of a nation; it may become a state or become assimilated into another grouping. A state's name and approximate borders may remain, but may undergo such fundamental change that it is questionable whether the same state still exists. Moreover, it seems that nations often become dormant. The British and French nations are widely recognized as nations but we know that the Scottish and Welsh, Corsican and Breton identities are looming in the background, and events can cause members of a people to revive a latent selfhood. Political movements often have an interest in activating seemingly lost identities as a rallying point against an existing political system. Even the United States, confident in its multi-ethnic national creed, seems alarmed by demands for bilingual education, illustrating awareness that it, too, is potentially vulnerable to change in national identity. Negative factors, such as attempted genocide, exile, discrimination, or competition over territory, can contribute to the emergence of a nation. National consolida-

INTRODUCTION

I

11

tion as a result of negative factors does not make a nation any less a collective than one formed by positive factors. Some specialists have claimed that the Azerbaijanis have lost their identity as separate from Iranians. 21 However, determinations of this type are only valid for a specified point in time. Primary identity is the shifting result of a continual process. ETHNICITY

In contrast to a nation, ethnicity seems to connote both inborn and inbred sets of characteristics. One cannot choose to be an ethnic Italian, but one can join the American nation. At the same time, ethnicity is beyond race. A child of one ethnic group adopted by a family that belongs to another ethnic group does not automatically acquire all of the elements of ethnicity of the adopting family. Nor will he or she have all the ethnic characteristics of the group of origin, since many, such as language and social mores, are learned. Ethnicity is also a set of behaviors and codes by which an individual measures reality and knows how he or she is expected to live.22 A person may choose not to live by this code, but is raised to know how to. The ethnic group is a set of habits, while the nation is a set of choices. The ethnic group defines one's main food staple, how to mark the life cycle, which utensil one feels most comfortable eating with, how one's bed is arranged when growing up, and how one feels most comfortable washing. The ethnic group sets norms for parent-child relations, generation order (who waits on whom, who finances whom), and the proportion of resources invested by a society in education and social welfare. One often prefers or maybe even mandates the marriage of a child to a member of one's own ethnic group. As one Azerbaijani from Tehran stated, while trying to explain the difference between Azerbaijanis and Persians: "Of course, we are different from them, they eat rice and we eat vegetables. They write poetry and we sing songs." STATES

States usually base their identity on that of an existing nation, or else foster a nation to support the state. Congruity of state, national, and ethnic identity seems to contribute to stability. We too frequently accept that the state's version of the identity of its citizens and the state identity that it is trying to promote accurately represents the identity of the residents of the 21.

For example, Atabaki, Azerbaijan:Ethnicity and Autonomy in Twentieth-Century

19.

Hobsbawm, Nations and NationalismSince 1780 (1990), p. 45.

Iran, p. 182.

20. 37.

Benjamin Akzin, States and Nations (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1964), p.

22. See Dusan Kecmanovic, The Mass Psychologyof Ethnonationalism(New York: Plenum Press, 1996), p. 2.

12

I BORDERS

AND BRETHREN

state. Researchers of the Soviet Union, and Iran, have missed opportunities to understand many trends emerging in those societies in this way. The extent to which the dominant community in a state permits assimilation of members of minority groups affects the collective identity of those minorities. In addition, the degree to which ethnic, national, and state identity are compatible is often determined by the ideologies each of these units adopts and the tolerance of each for the other identities. This is often true for multi-ethnic societies, such as the United States and Brazil, that base their identity on the value of being a community of tolerance of sub-national identities. In such societies, the state rarely tests the national identity of its citizens to see whether it is based on the ethnic group, for instance, or the state. Some states may decide to base themselves on one or another of the ethnic or other groups that comprise the state, often forcing citizens to choose between their ethnic identity and their state identity. State identity and policy can also become more accommodating to alternative identities, but this will not always command the loyalty of the alternative groups, if they perceive the existence of a "score to be settled" with a community that treated the minority group inequitably in the past. This is illustrated by the desire of the Slovaks to leave Czechoslovakia, despite the Czechs' adoption of a policy of multi-ethnic accommodation in the post-communist period. Events beyond the borders of a state, such as a war involving co-ethnics of some of its citizens, or the establishment of an independent state or other political unit based on ethnic or other collective identity, can also challenge the relationship or harmony between various identities and lead people to determine a primary identity. Democracy and democratization in a state can have varying impacts on the collective identity of members of groups within a state. At times, democratization and pluralism in the society provide for accommodation of the members of various collectives, strengthening their attachment to and identification with it. Under other circumstances, democracy leads to increased demands by the members of collectives within the state and increases their feeling of legitimacy in demanding self-rule, thus weakening the ties to the existing state. Members of a nation do not always actively seek to establish a state. 23 A nation may choose to be a part of a supra-national political community that does not conflict with the components' national affiliation. On the other hand, members of a nation sometimes prefer to have an independ-

23.

Smith, National Identity, p. 74.

INTRODUCTION

I

13

ent national state, but view the chances of achieving it as meager, or consider the price of attaining it (war, economic isolation, etc.) as too high. A nation is often activated to achieve statehood during historical "earthquakes" -when borders and state structures are reshuffled significantly and opportunity for statehood emerges.

Historyand Identity Formation A group's version of its prior history is an important vehicle for expressing current national or ethnic identity. Groups generally seek to show that they possess primordial ties and are not new nations. In part, this is because nations today are generally born under conditions of resource shortages and competition and look for justification for the possession of disputed territories and symbols. A newly asserted national identity, especially if it manifests itself through nationalism, usually challenges adjacent nations for resources considered by both nations as their own national possession, such as territory, revered landmarks, etc. These properties are often claimed by more than one nation. Members of other nations often try to deny the rights of challengers to their nationhood in an attempt to undermine their claims to these resources. Thus, the rhetoric of two conflicting groups is often a dispute over the extent of each other's primordial ties. In the current international system, respect and support is given for preserving existing nations, rather than for creating newer ones. This process compounds a nation's desire to look into its past to justify its right to be a nation. In addition, nationalist activists often use a sense of common history and primordial ties dating back to antiquity to foster national identity among a group of people. Hence, as Azerbaijanis have become more national, they have expressed heightened interest in their past-by means of archaeology and historical research, for example--and have stressed a view of possessing an ancient common origin. Yet the impact of historical facts on the formation of identity should not be overestimated. The identity of any people is influenced by its historical myths more than by concrete facts; the uncovering of new archives does not usually alter group identity. 24 The significance of historical events is generally measured by their impact on future developments. When examining the ethnic and national identity of a group, we must look at their perceived view of history to understand history's impact.

24. For the role of the myth of common descent in shaping national identity, see Connor, "Ethnonationalism: Looking Backward," pp. 205-206.

Chapter I

The Azerbaijanis until 1920

The Azerbaijanis live in an area that has been a center of ideological activity, confrontation, and accommodation between different cultures. Until the second half of the nineteenth century, the delineation between their identities as Turks, Azerbaijanis, Iranians, and Muslims was not clear, and Azerbaijanis rarely referred to themselves as "Azerbaijani." The development of the Azerbaijanis' collective identity intensified and became a struggle toward the end of the nineteenth century, when a distinctive Azerbaijani national identity emerged as a political force. The polemics and competition over the identity of the Azerbaijanis were stimulated by revolutionary changes occurring in all the empires surrounding the Azerbaijanis, their increased exposure to the growing nationalism of the peoples around them, the idea of modern nationalism, and the political activities of various ideological movements that competed in the region at that time: Pan-Islam, Pan-Turkism, Iranian nationalism, and communism. The competition between these rival ideologies further intensified in the first quarter of the twentieth century after the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent disengagement of Muslim and Ottoman identities, and the division between Turkic cultural identity and Turkish state identity that occurred with the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. The change in the state identity of Iran also intensified the struggle over the identity of the Azerbaijanis. Until the establishment of the Pahlavi regime in the twentieth century, the identity of Iran was not exclusively Persian, but supra-ethnic. From the eleventh century until the founding of the Pahlavi regime, the political leadership of Iran was mostly Turkic, and both Turkic and Persian cultural elements influenced

16

I BORDERS

AND BRETHREN

the ethnic character of the regime and the culture of the country. The various Iranian empires were distinguished by cultural diversity. 1 Throughout much of this period, the capital cities of Iran were in Azerbaijan, and from the eleventh century until the 1920s, Tabriz was Iran's major commercial center. Once the Pahlavi regime began its policy of emphasizing exclusively the Persian character and composition of Iran-a policy that has been partly continued under the Islamic Republic-Azerbaijani or Turkic identity came into clear conflict with Iranian identity; this intensified the struggle over Azerbaijani national identity in Iran. Advances in technology in the second half of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century also made the question of national identity more pressing. Vast improvements in infrastructure in both Russia and Iran increased the centralization of the empires and their ability to touch the lives of populations that had previously been virtually autonomous. In many cases, interaction between the center and the periphery created an awareness of differences and also contributed to the development of a sense of common identity among co-ethnics from adjoining areas, thus forming the basis for the development of a common identity separate from the identity of the state. In other cases, exposure to the center spurred the assimilation of some of the minority members into Persian culture in Iran. This chapter and the next survey the historical events leading up to 1979-2000. This chapter covers the major waves of Turkic immigration into Azerbaijan in the tenth century, the establishment of the Safavid regime in 1501, and the first decades of Qajar rule in the late eighteenth century; the split of Azerbaijan in 1828, after the Russian conquest of north Azerbaijan, until 1905, the period when a separate Azerbaijani national identity began to emerge as a political force and in literature; and the period from 1905 until the establishment of the Pahlavi regime in Iran and the establishment of Soviet rule in north Azerbaijan. Chapter 2 looks at the period of Pahlavi rule in Iran, and Soviet rule through the late 1970s.

THE PERCEIVED ROOTS OF THE AZERBAIJANIS

Historians debate the ethnic-linguistic composition of the areas north and south of the Araz River and the historical borders of Azerbaijan before the major waves of Turkic migration in the tenth and eleventh cen1. Many historians see Turkic-Persian tension as a constant factor in the history of Iran. According to E.G. Browne, the history of Persia: "from the legendary wars _between the Kiyanian kings and Afrasiyab down to the present day, is the story of a struggle between the Turkish races ... and the Persians." See A YearAmongst the Persians (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1959) pp. 109-110.

THE AZERBAIJANIS

UNTIL 1920

I 17

turies. Many Azerbaijani sources claim that much of the population was Turkic, or of other non-Persian origin; Persian sources generally maintain that prior to the tenth century the people were predominantly Persian. This debate has been confounded by supporters of various ideologies-Iranian nationalism, Turkism, and Azerbaijani nationalism-who have attempted to manipulate historical materials to justify or deny the Azerbaijanis' "right" to certain identities, or courses of action, and as a basis for the claim that those living in the north and those living in Iran are not the same nation. In addition, many researchers base their claims on the works of the historian Ahmad Kasravi, whose ideological convictions and political goals tainted his research on Azerbaijan. 2 Some researchers have attempted to dismiss the idea that the populations on both sides of the Araz belong to the same people, claiming that the area north of the Araz River was not part of the historical territory of what has been called for many centuries "Azerbaijan," and that the people inhabiting this area are not part of the same people as those in Iranian Azerbaijan. In the pre-Islamic period the area in the north was known as Albania or Caucasian Albania, and after the Islamic conquest (639--643)as Arran. However, whether Arran was a separate entity from Azerbaijan or a subentity, it seems that they often interacted culturally as one region. In addition, at least since the Muslim conquest, the areas were administered together within most of the various empires that ruled the area, and were subject to similar influences until the division of the territory in 1828.3 Finally, territorial borders in the region were quite fluid, especially before the establishment of the Safavid regime in 1501. The Islamization of Azerbaijan took place during the Arab conquest under 'Omar's caliphate sometime between 639 and 643.4 Zoroastrianism was prominent in both north and south Azerbaijan at the time of the Is2. Along with his own strong Iranian identity, Kasravi's unwavering commitment to eradicate any subidentities to Iranian identity calls into question his ability to conduct objective research on Azerbaijan. As Ernest Renan wrote: "Getting its history wrong is part of being a nation" ( Renan, "What is A Nation?" p. 145). Kasravi himself claimed that historical materials on the origins of the Azerbaijanis in Iran were often manipulated to suit interested parties' needs in the political polemics raging in the area. (See Ahmed Kasravi, al-'Irfan, Tishrin I, 1922, pp. 121-123, Evan Siegal translation). 3. C.E. Bosworth, "Azerbaijan," in EncyclopediaIranica (London and New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1989) p. 224; and Audrey Alstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks (Stanford: Hoover Institute, 1992), p. 9. On the common administration of the territories in the Safavid period, see Javad Heyat, "Origins of the Name and Boundaries of Azerbaijan," Reform, Vol. 1, No. 1 (March 1995), p. 24. 4.

Bosworth, "Azerbaijan," EncyclopediaIranica,p. 225.

18

I

THE AZERBAIJANIS UNTIL 1920

BORDERS AND BRETHREN

lamic conquest, and one of the Azerbaijani terms of capitulation was Arab agreement to respect the sanctity of the fire temples there. 5 The conquest of Azerbaijan did not instill any universal Muslim identity. The region served as the base of the socially motivated revolt of Babak that began in 816-17 and lasted over twenty years. To Azerbaijanis, Babak and the revolt he led still symbolize resistance to foreign rule. 6 His rebellion was glorified in the national museums of both Soviet Azerbaijan and the Republic of Azerbaijan, and the name Babak is common in north Azerbaijan and Iran. Under Seljuk rule in the tenth and eleventh centuries, major waves of immigration of Oghuz Turks into Azerbaijan created a clear Turkic majority and unified the ethnic basis of both north and south Azerbaijan. More Turks came during Mongol Ilkhanid rule from the thirteenth through the fourteenth centuries, and during the Qara Qoyunlu and Aq Qoyunlu Turkmen dynasties in the fifteenth century, which had their capital in south Azerbaijan, at Tabriz. In north Azerbaijan, a native Shirvanshah dynasty ruled through the sixteenth century. Historians give varying dates for the establishment of this dynasty, beginning with the ninth century. In this period, Turkic and Persian cultural elements were quite fluid. Until the nineteenth century, Azerbaijani cultural figures wrote in both Persian and Azerbaijani, and throughout most of this period there was no formal separation between the Azerbaijani and Turkish languages. During the twelfth century, the most prominent Azerbaijani poet, Nizami Ganjevi, wrote in Persian. His epic work Khamsa, a collection of five poems including the classic love story of "Khosrow and Shirin," is highly esteemed by Azerbaijanis. Hassan-oglu Izzeddin, wrote in both Azerbaijani and Persian. 7 Nasimi Imadeddin, a fourteenth century author, wrote in Azerbaijani, as well as Arabic and Persian. 8 Azerbaijanis attach special meaning to the works of Muhammed Suleiman-Oglu Fizuli, and his poem, "Leyli and Majnun," written in Azerbaijani in the sixteenth

I 19

century, is especially revered in the contemporary national culture of Azerbaijan. 9 AZERBAIJAN-BASED

RULE IN IRAN: SHI'A

IMPOSED

ON THE PEOPLES

OF IRAN

The establishment of the Safavid regime in Tabriz in 1501 had a major impact on the development of the identity of the peoples of the region and the events of the time. Under the Safavids, Iran returned to local rule and to its larger pre-Islamic borders, and regained its position as a major regional power. The Safavids united the peoples of Iran under the ideology of Shi'i Islam, which they established as the state religion of Iran, forcibly imposing it on its peoples, who were predominantly Sunni. 10 While the ethnic roots of the Safavid dynasty's founder, Shah Isma'il, are under debate, 11 he was raised in Ardebil and was a native Turkic-speaker,12 as attested to by his poetry written in Azerbaijani under the pen-name of Khata'i. 13 Shah Isma'il's poetry set a precedent in the development of Azerbaijani literature because he was one of the first major writers to use the colloquial language, and generally avoided the Perso-Arabic vocabulary.14He based his regime on the power of the Qizilbash Turkic tribes, who shared his language. Indeed, these linguistic ties formed one of the main bases for unity between them. At the Safavid court, Azerbaijani Turkish was predominant, especially among the early rulers of the dynasty, and during this period Turkic grammar and words influenced Persian and vice versa. 15 In the Safavid period, an estimated 1,200 Azerbai9. Fizuli Muhammed Suleiman-Oglu (1498-1556) lived in Baghdad and died in Karbala, today part of Iraq. 10. Roger Savory, Iran Under the Safavids (London: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 29. 11. See A.H. Morton, The Early Yearsof Shah Isma'il in the Afzal al-tavarikhand Elsewhere,Pembroke Papers 4 (1996),pp. 27-51; and Savory, Iran Underthe Safavids,p. 2. 12. Shah Isma'il reportedly only learned Persian as a young adult. See E. Denison Ross, "The Early Years of Shah Isma'il," Journalof the RoyalAsiatic Society(1896),p. 288.

5. Urmiya (in southern Azerbaijan) is considered to be the birthplace of Zaratushta. Christianity was also present, especially in Nakhchivan and Tabriz. 6. Gholam-Reza Sabri Tabrizi, Iran: A Child's Story, a Man's Experience(Edinburgh: Mainstream, Ltd., 1989), pp. 143-144. 7. Nizami (1141-1209)was a native and resident of Ganja, today in the Republic of Azerbaijan. Izzeddin lived at the end of the thirteenth century and the beginning of the fourteenth century, in Asfarain, a town near Khorasan. 8. Imadeddin was born in 1369 or 1370. According to some sources, he was born in Shamakhi, which is in the Republic of Azerbaijan.

13. Vladimir Minorsky, "The Poetry of Shah Isma'il I," Bulletinof the Schoolof Oriental and African Studies, Vol. 10, No. 4 (1942), p. 1007a. Not only was his poetry in the Azerbaijani language, but its form was also influenced by Azerbaijani folk poetry, and the traditional 'a.seq style. See H. Javadi and K. Burrill, "Azeri Literature in Iran," EncyclopediaIranica, p. 251. 14. A. Caferoglu, "Adhari (Azeri)," in Encyclopediaof Islam, (New Edition) Vol. I, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1986), p. 193. 15. John R. Perry, Persianin the SafavidPeriod:Sketchfor an Etat de Langue,Pembroke Papers 4 (1996), pp. 272, 279.

20

I BORDERS

THE AZERBAIJANIS

AND BRETHREN

jani words entered Persian, mainly those dealing with administration and military spheres, areas that were chiefly in the hands of the Turkic peoples in Iran at this time. 16 The dominant ideology of the regime was Shi'i Twelver Islam. Yet, despite this banner of unity, Turco-Persian tensions characterized the Safavid regime. 17 Nevertheless, Shi'i identity and identity with the Iranian Safavid state were strong enough that during the various periods of confrontation with the Ottoman Empire there were few incidents of desertion to the Ottoman side, with whom the Turks of Iran shared a Turkic language. 18 The advent of the Safavid regime was an important event in the development of Azerbaijani national identity. The Safavids, considered by many Azerbaijanis today as an "Azerbaijani" dynasty, and portrayed as such in Azerbaijani historiography, serve as an important symbol of Azerbaijani identity and power. 19 At the same time, the Safavid imposition of Shi'i on the peoples of Iran and the regime's antagonism and rivalry with the Ottomans and Uzbeks, and the major Turkic regimes competing with them during the period, divided the Azerbaijanis from the rest of the Turkic peoples and increased their ties to Persians. However, being the only major Turkic people of Shi'i domination, over time, bound the people north and south of the Araz River, and contributed to the formation of their distinctive and common Azerbaijani identity. Between 1514 and 1603, and again from 1722 to 1728, Tabriz and other parts of Azerbaijan were frequently attacked and occupied by the Ottomans. Due to its vulnerability to Ottoman attack, the capital of Iran 16.

G. Doerfer, "Azeri (Adari) Turkish," EncyclopediaIranica,p. 246.

17.

See Savory, Iran Under the Safavids,p. 31.

UNTIL 1920

I 21

was moved from Tabriz to Qazvin, and later on to Isfahan. This last move strengthened Persian language in the Safavid court, although Turkish was still of great consequence. 20 Following the demise of the Safavid regime in 1722 and the assassination of its first successor, Nadir Shah, in 1747, the Iranian empire fell into chaos. Lack of central rule in the eighteenth century led to a period in which various groups vied for power; in south Azerbaijan the chief contenders were Afghan groups, Qajar chiefs, and local Kurdish chiefs. 21 Principalities were formed in Tabriz, Urmiya, Ardebil, Khoi, Maku, Karadagh, and Maraga. 22 In the north, local leaders took advantage of the power vacuum to assert their independence, establishing local khanates in Baku, Kuba, Sheki, Shamakhi, Karabagh, and Nakhchivan. Regional identity was strengthened in this period. The khans who ruled these states in the north were of Turkic origin. 23 Central rule was reinstated in Iran in 1779 with the establishment of the Qajar dynasty. 24 The Qajar drive to reimpose rule on the khanates in northern Azerbaijan led to conflict with Russia, which also aspired to incorporate them. Under Qajar rule, Azerbaijan became the residence of the heir apparent, and Tabriz, with its location on Iran's major trade routes with Russia and Europe, was the major commercial capital of Iran. Thus, the Azerbaijanis were exposed more than other peoples in Iran to foreign ways and ideas. Many foreign states had consulates in Tabriz, and Azerbaijanis formed a large percentage of Iran's representatives abroad. 25 During the Qajar regime, Turkish was the predominant spoken language at the Iranian court, while Persian was the predominant literary language. 26 Linguistic diversity was characteristic of the Qajar re-

18. In contrast, there were some incidents of desertion to the Uzbek dynasties (which are also of Turkic origin), especially during periods of heightened confrontations during the Safavid period.

20. E.G. Browne, A LiteraryHistory of Persia,Vol. 4: Modern Times (1500-1924) (London, 1924), p. 14.

For official historiography in the Soviet period, see "Shah Ismayil" in Aziirbayjan Sovet Ensiklopediyasi;Vol. 10 (1987), p. 473-474, and "Iran," AziirbayjanSovet Ensiklopediyasi;Vol. 4 (1980), p. 504. Other works from the Soviet period: I.A. Huseinov, Ismail Sefevi (Baku, 1943); and O.A. Efendiev, Obrazovanie azerbaidzhanskogo gosurdarstvaSefevidovv nachale XVI v. (Baku, 1961). Examples of the Safavids being termed an "Azerbaijani government" in the post-independence period: Oqtay Efendi, Azerbayjan Sefeviler Dovleti (Baku: Azerbaijan State Government Publishers, 1993), Mahmud Ismayi1, AziirbayjanTarikhi(Baku: Azerbaijan State Government Publishers, 1993); p. 151; and AziirbayjanTarikhi:An GiidimDovrliirdiinXX Asrin AvviilliiriniiGiidiir (Baku: Elm, 1993), p. 164. In 2001, the five-hundredth-year anniversary of the dynasty was celebrated in the Republic of Azerbaijan at official state functions. In addition, the Safavids are often venerated in Azerbaijani literature and art forms, especially carpets. One of the central pieces in the Baku State Carpet Museum is a carpet depicting the Safavids.

22. Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russia and Azerbaijan:A Borderlandin Transition(N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1995), p.2.

19.

21.

23. 8.

See Bosworth, "Azerbaijan," EncyclopediaIranica,p. 230.

Audrey Alstadt, The AzerbaijaniTurks (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institute, 1992), p.

24. The Qajar Turks had served in the Safavid administration as lords and local governors. See Ira M. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 300. 25. Hasan Taqizadeh, "The Background of the Constitutional Azerbaijan," Middle East Journal,Vol. 14 (1960), p. 457. 26.

Movement in

Henry D.G. Law, "Modern Persian Prose (1920s-1940s), in Thomas M. Ricks, ed.,

CriticalPerspectiveson Modern Persian Literature(Washington, D.C.: Three Continents Press, 1984), p. 132.

22

I

BORDERS AND BRETHREN

gime. 27 The position of the Azerbaijani language and of the Azerbaijanis themselves was so significant that all of the students first sent abroad in the beginning of the nineteenth century from Iran to study in Europe were from Azerbaijan. 28 To the astonishment of their hosts abroad, most had not even mastered Persian. 29 THE SPLIT OF AZERBAIJAN

In the early nineteenth century, Russia and Iran fought for control of the Caucasus and southern Azerbaijan. Iran was defeated in the first military campaign. The sides concluded the Treaty of Gulustan in 1813, and Iran ceded a large part of the Caucasus to Russia. Major confrontation erupted again in 1825, and once more Iran was defeated. In February 1828, the Treaty of Turkmenchay was signed, and Iran lost the rest of the Caucasus. The border was set at the Araz River, thus dividing the Azerbaijanis under two separate regimes. In the eyes of many Azerbaijanis, this treaty symbolizes the separation of the people, and how one felt about it became an indicator of national identity. This section focuses on the Azerbaijanis north of the Araz River, since they became incorporated into the Russian Empire while those in the south remained under the same rule. As part of the Turkmenchay agreement, Russia gained special economic rights in southern Azerbaijan, and so exerted its influence over this territory as well. Despite the formal division of Azerbaijan, direct ties between the Azerbaijanis on both sides of the border continued, especially due to the active economic interaction between the two areas. Iran and northern Azerbaijan seemed to remain one intellectual and cultural sphere. Mutual influences were quite significant, and important thinkers and activists constantly moved between the territories of northern and southern Azerbaijan. Mutual cultural ties continued and common poetry, songs, and fables developed among the Azerbaijanis on both sides of the Araz. 30 Moreover, the split gave the Azerbaijanis a unique role as conduit 27. Ervand Abrahamian, "Kasravi: The Integrative Nationalist of Iran," in Elie Kedourie and Sylvia G. Hahn, eds., Towardsa ModernIran:Studiesin Thought,Politics and Society(London: Frank Cass, 1980), p. 99. Toward the end of the Qajar dynasty, Persianization of the court and the elite occurred. 28.

Pierre Oberlang, "Iran," in Margaret Bainbridge, ed., The TurkicPeoplesof the

World(London: Kegan Paul, 1993), p. 151. Major Southerland, report from July 16, 1812:P.R.0., F.O., 60, in David Menashri, Educationand theMakingofModernIran (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992),p. 49.

29. 30.

Swietochowski, Russiaand Azerbaijan:A Borderlandin Transition,p. 21.

THE AZERBAIJANIS UNTIL 1920

I 23

of ideas among the three empires around them, especially since they could read texts published in Turkish and Russian (among them works translated from European languages) and could pass on the ideas in them to their co-ethnics in Iran. They could also pass along ideas prominent among Iranian intellectuals, Muslims in the Russian Empire, and the Ottoman Empire. Muslim groups in the Russian Empire were the first Muslims to fall under European colonial rule. As part of Russia's colonial policy, most of the powers of the Muslim clerical establishment were usurped. Freed from the constraints of the ulama (clerical establishment), the Azerbaijanis and other Muslims in Russia became a beachhead of secularism and strong proponents of modem education in the Muslim world. Three major trends in the collective identity of the Azerbaijanis emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century. First, the majority of the political activists seemed to possess a Muslim identity that was chiefly supra-ethnic and was especially identified with a greater Muslim sphere that included Iran, the Russian-occupied Caucasus, and parts of the Ottoman Empire. Their careers often spanned different parts of this zone, and their ideological works seemed to be concerned with the situation in all these areas. Azerbaijanis could consider themselves as both Turks and Iranians, or Russian subjects, with little conflict. Some were active in political movements in all three of the regions, concurrently or at different times of their careers. Second, regardless of the nature of the political movement to which they belonged, many prominent Azerbaijani intellectuals advocated liberal values. Many rejected authoritative rule, including that led by Muslims, and supported freedom of thought and the establishment of modern education, free from the limitations of the traditional Muslim religious establishment. Many Azerbaijanis attempted to merge liberal values with ideologies such as Pan-Islam, which was particularly attractive to Azerbaijanis as a way to bridge the gap between their unique combination of identity as Shi'i and Turks. Third, some Azerbaijanis were beginning to write about local Azerbaijani nationalism. Most of them viewed Turkic cultural identity as an important component of Azerbaijani identity and most advocates of Azerbaijani national identity in this period referred to themselves as Azerbaijani Turks. The most important expression of the emerging Azerbaijani nationalism was the appearance of the Azerbaijani language press toward the end of the nineteenth century. In this period, Azerbaijani nationalism was significantly more prominent in north Azerbaijan, proba-

24

I

I

BORDERS AND BRETHREN

bly because of Russian authorities' discrimination against them, especially in the economic field. 31 THE IMP ACT OF RUSSIAN COLONIAL

RULE ON AZERBAIJAN!

NATIONAL

IDENTITY IN THE NORTH

Within fifteen years of its conquest, Russia abolished the khanate (local principality rule) system and the till land allocation system in the parts of Azerbaijan under its rule. 32 These reforms, while upsetting the traditional administrative and legal systems, contributed to the internal cohesion of the Azerbaijanis of the Caucasus; they removed a level of division that had promoted local particularism and they facilitated the economic integration of northern Azerbaijan. 33 In contrast to British and French colonial rule in the Arab East, the Russian Empire struck at the power of the Muslim clerics in the areas it ruled, denying them control over education and personal status. Much of the Muslim clerical assets and properties were confiscated and the functions of the Shari'a courts were limited. Many mosques and madrasas (Muslim schools) were closed, and the remaining clerics were expected to show loyalty to Russia. 34 Although this policy generated animosity among many of the Azerbaijanis, it also released them, at an earlier stage than most of the Muslim world, from the constraints of the traditional clerical establishment and enabled the introduction of secular education. 35 As subjects of the Russian Empire, Azerbaijanis in the north were allowed to study in the institutions of the Russian civil service, and in the 1840s a group of professionally trained Azerbaijani bureaucrats emerged who had been exposed to European-style education. In addition, the Azerbaijanis learned about and participated in limited local government.

31. The Russian authorities extended more rights to the Christian Armenians than to the Muslim subjects in the Caucasus. The Armenians often served as facilitators of Moscow's policies in the area. See Alexandre Bennigsen, "Azerbaijan" (paper prepared for conference of the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, The Wilson Center, May 1979), p. 4. 32.

The till is the traditional system of land allocation between the local nobility

(beysand aghas). 33. Swietochowski, Russiaand Azerbaijan:A Borderlandin Transition,p. 16. Strong regional identity still persists among the Azerbaijanis, in both north and south Azerbaijan. 34. Muriel Atkin, Russiaand Iran 1780-1828(Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis, 1980), p. 150. 35.

Alstadt, The AzerbaijaniTurks,p. 18.

I t

I I I

THE AZERBAIJANIS UNTIL 1920

I 25

The Russian Empire Municipal law of 1870 provided for the formation of local assemblies (Duma); the election of mayors and municipal councils, and in 1878, in Baku, a local government council was formed. This exposure to small-scale self-rule may have influenced the co-ethnics in Iran; Azerbaijanis in Tabriz were later the driving force of the Constitutional Revolution and the subsequent movements to preserve its accomplishments. Russian education also led to the emergence of an Azerbaijani "intelligentsia"36 who had received a Russian version of European-style education. The emergence of this secular, educated class was exceptional at this time in the Muslim world, especially in neighboring Iran, where very few had been exposed to this type of education. Thus, the Azerbaijanis began to emerge as the spearhead of many important movements for change in their part of the Muslim world. In fact, two of the main political thinkers influencing Iran at the time, Mirza Fath '.Ali Akhundzade and 'Abdul al-Rahim Talebzade, were Azerbaijanis who lived most of their lives and published primarily outside of Iran, in the Caucasus. 37 There, Muslims were free from the threats of the ulama cleric establishment and could produce more radical writings, as well as read Western writings. As Muslims, Azerbaijanis were denied the right to become full citizens of the Russian Empire, making cultural and political assimilation within the Russian Empire unattainable. Therefore, most continued to see themselves as part of the Muslim world; their writings reflected this and tended to concentrate on the situation in the greater Muslim world, not just in Russia. This combination of anti-clericalism and radicalism, plus their concern for the plight of Muslims elsewhere, made their political writings unique and significant. Mirza Fath 'Ali Akhundzade is an important national figure in both Iran and Azerbaijan. In Azerbaijan, he is venerated as the founder of the modern literary Azerbaijani language, while in Iran he is considered one of the chief Iranian enlightenment ideologists. His writings and those of thinkers influenced by him, such as Malkum Khan and Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani, had an important impact on the Constitutional Revolution in 36. Until the Soviet takeover of north Azerbaijan, migration between the north and south was very frequent and many Iranian Azerbaijanis as well as northern were educated in the Russian-held Caucasus. 37. Mirza Fath 'Ali Akhundzade (Akhundov), 1812-1878. He was born in Sheki. At the time of his birth, it was part of Iran. After the Turkmenchay Treaty, Sheki came under Russian rule.' Abdul-Rahim Talebzade (Talebov) (1834-1909). Talebzade was born in Tabriz and emigrated with his family to the Russian-held Caucasus at age sixteen, where he resided mainly in Tbilisi, Georgia, which at the time had a large Azerbaijani population.

26

I

BORDERS AND BRETHREN

Iran. 38 Akhundzade was one of the most prominent Muslim advocates of secular education. He felt that it was necessary to break the hold of the Muslim clerics on the population and expressed his atheism in very strong terms for the time. Akhundzade campaigned for a major reform in the Arabic alphabet. Akhundzade wrote many of his works in Azerbaijani, which he referred to as Turki, in order to best communicate his liberal ideas to the masses. 39 His decision to write in Azerbaijani was an important precedent that broke the prevailing custom among the Azerbaijani elite of using Persian for publications. In 1850-55, Akhundzade published in the Azerbaijani language the first European style plays in the Muslim world. These plays satirized the problems in Azerbaijani society, which he claimed were rooted in religious superstition and ignorance. Akhundzade's plays were written predominantly in simple colloquial Azerbaijani, and have been depicted as "full-scale portraits of the customs and mores of the people of Azerbaijan."40 They were first performed by pupils in state schools in Azerbaijan toward the end of the 1870s.41The production of his plays in Baku was an important indication of the emerging Azerbaijani native cultural revival. Akhundzade' s career and activities epitomized the fluidity and often multi-layered collective identity among the Azerbaijanis at the time. He served as a Tsarist official, yet had a great interest in Persian culture, and emphasized the greatness of pre-Islamic Iran in his writings, which became a basis for the development of modern Iranian nationalism. He also used the term "vatan," a word of Arabic origin meaning homeland, to relate to both Iran and Azerbaijan, yet his writings in Azerbaijani played a major role in sparking the modem literary revival of the language and the consequent cultural and national assertion of Azerbaijani identity.

38. Further evidence of the magnitude of Akhundzade' s impact on Iran was the discovery that some of Akhundzade's works were incorrectly attributed to Mirza Aqa Khan Kerrnani. For instance, Akhundzade's first volume of "Three Letters" of the strongly anti-Islamic "Kamal od Dowleh and Jalal od Dowleh" was erroneously credited by E.G. Browne to Kermani. See the note by Nikki Keddie and 'Abdul Hossein Zarrinkub in Taqizadeh, "The Background of the Constitutional Movement in Azerbaijan," p. 459. 39. Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, 1905-1920:The Shaping of National Identity in a Muslim Community (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 26. Hasan Javadi, Satire in Persian Literature(London: Associated University Press, 1988), p. 258.

40. 41.

"Akhund-Zada," in Encyclopediaof Islam, p. 332.

THE AZERBAIJANIS UNTIL 1920

I 27

'Abdul-Rahim Talebzade, also of Azerbaijani ongm, lived and worked in the Caucasus, and had a substantial impact on the liberal political awakening that took place in Iran. Like Akhundzade, he was exposed to Western thought through Russian translations and evidently Turkish publications as well. While Talebzade advocated constitutional restraints, he supported strong central government and large integrated state structures.42 Writing in the Russian Empire, away from the threats of the ulama, Talebzade was, like Akhundzade, strikingly explicit in his support for the rule of secular law and anti-clericalism. He presented the ulama as a reactionary force whose unscientific approach "delayed human development," and he called the high-ranking clerics hypocrites. 43 In contrast to Akhundzade, Talebzade published exclusively in Persian. His writings were read throughout Iran and the Caucasus. While Akhundzade seemed to possess a multi-sided identity, Talebzade apparently identified chiefly with Iran, which he stated should be united as one country, one nation, under one religion. 44 Yet, many of his ideas were influenced by his particular perspective as an Azerbaijani-he had the opportunity to work outside of Iran, where he could write strongly critical and anti-clerical treatises. Talebzade played an important role in conveying ideas from Azerbaijan to Iran; he established, in Baku, the first Muslim school based on a modern secular curriculum, which later served as a model for the Jadidistschools in Iran that included Western, technological, and secular subjects in their curricula. The rapid growth of the oil industries brought a major influx of foreigners to the area, and affected the formation of the identity of the Azerbaijanis in both the Russian Empire and Iran. 45 By the 1870s, Baku became a multi-ethnic commercial center. Contact with large numbers of non-Muslims strengthened the distinctive identity of the Azerbaijanis: the social discrimination they endured from the non-Muslims and their second-rate legal status in the Russian Empire helped cement the ties between the Azerbaijani elites and masses and fostered philanthropical

42.

This idea was later advocated in a more extreme form by Ahmad Kasravi.

43. Quoted in Mongol Bayat, Mysticism and Dissent: SocioreligiousThought in Qajar Iran (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1982), p. 157. 44. Talebzade is quoted in M. Reza Ghods, A ComparativeHistorical Study of the Causes, Development, and Effects of the Revolutionary Movements in Northern Iran in 1920-21 and 1945-46, (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, 1991), p. 109. 45.

By 1891, Baku supplied half of the world oil consumption.

28

I

BORDERS AND BRETHREN

work by wealthy Azerbaijanis. In addition, the discrimination made leftwing political ideologies attractive to some Azerbaijanis. A separate Azerbaijani identity was further strengthened by the economic differentiation of the oil industries. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, Russians and other non-Muslim foreigners owned the majority of the wells, Armenians filled most of the white-collar positions, and Azerbaijanis performed most of the menial, blue-collar jobs and were over all the poorest segment of the population. 46 The oil boom in Baku also intensified contacts among the Azerbaijanis because a huge influx of Azerbaijani laborers from Iran came in search of jobs. While this strengthened the connections between the north and south, it also led to some animosity between the local population and the immigrants, who resented the superior financial position of the indigenous Azerbaijani population. 47 This migration significantly strengthened the transmitting role of the Azerbaijanis. The migrant population was exposed to political ideas being developed among the Azerbaijanis in the Russian Empire, especially constitutionalism and socialism. Azerbaijani activists in the north subsequently mobilized this migrant Azerbaijani population and formed cells of many of their political movements within Iran. A second generation of Azerbaijani intelligentsia emerged in Baku in the 1870s. Like the first generation, they generally advocated liberal and enlightened political thought, and stressed education, secularism, and constitutionalism. However, this group was highly influenced by the Tanzimat( constitutional reform, 1856-76) in the Ottoman Empire. This attraction to the Tanzimatseemed to augment their interest in their Turkic roots and strengthened their Turkic identity. In the second half of the nineteenth century, ethnic tension between the Turkic and Persian speakers was evident, even among the religious Shi'i. Najaf, in Iraq, is the major center of Shi'a holy places and educational institutions. Muslim students came from around the Islamic world to study there. Islam recognizes no ethnic differences among believers, but evidence shows that even at this Islamic center ethnic differences af-

46. Ronald Grigor Suny, "Nationalism and Social Class in the Russian Revolution: the Cases of Baku and Tillis," in R.G. Suny, ed., Transcaucasia: Nationalismand Social Change(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1983), p. 244. 47. While the local Azerbaijans held predominantly unskilled jobs, their lot was better than that of the transient Azerbaijani population from the south. A small group of Azerbaijans owned oil wells and industrial plants and were among Baku's wealthy residents.

THI! AZERBAIJANIS UNTIL 1920

I 29

fected behavior. The sojourn to Najaf, instead of binding the Azerbaijanis to other Shi'i, often accentuated their differences and strengthened separate ethnic consciousness. 48 In Najaf, Azerbaijanis overwhelmingly tended to emulate Azerbaijani ayatollahs, such as Sheikh Husayn Najaf, while the Persian students there usually followed ayatollahs of their ethnic origin. Donors to the institutions in Najaf tended to earmark funds for students from their regions or ethnic group, a practice that reinforced separation on the basis of ethnic groups. In addition, interethnic marriages were very rare among the ulama families. The Azerbaijani ("Turk") students in Najaf experienced ethnic discrimination. They complained to the Azerbaijani ayatollahs that they suffered at the hands of Arab and Persian ayatollahs, and suggested that the Persian and Arab students should not be treated equally by the Azerbaijani clerics.49 In Najaf, students were generally housed only with members of their own ethnic group and a madrasa was built for Azerbaijani students after they had protested that they suffered discrimination by Persians. Even the ashura precessions, the supreme unifying symbol of Shi'i Islam, were often conducted separately on an ethnic basis in Najaf.50 POLEMICS

ON NATIONAL

IDENTITY

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the internal debate over the national identity of the Azerbaijanis accelerated. Polemics were waged between differing ideologies that often espoused clashing identities. The Azerbaijani-language press, which emerged in Baku at this time, became a major arena for polemics. In 1875, proponents of particularistic Azerbaijani identity began publishing the newspaper Akinchi (The Cultivator). Written in the style of the spoken Azerbaijani language, it caused much controversy on both sides of the Araz. Akinchi was circulated among the Azerbaijanis in Iran. Many local proponents of Pan-Islam protested against publishing a journal in any language but Persian. Akinchi's editor, Hasan bay Zarbadi, often coined new words in Azerbaijani to avoid using Persian and Arabic terms. In 1877, Akinchi was forced to close down by the Russian authorities, on the premise that a Turkic-language newspaper should not be published in Russia during the Russian-Ottoman War.

48. Meir Litvak, Shi'i Scholarsof Nineteenth-CenturyIraq: The 'Ulama' of Najaf and Karbala(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 31. 49.

Ibid., pp. 33-34.

50.

Ibid., p. 34.

30

I

One of the other newspapers founded in this period was Kashkul (Dervish's ritual dish). Kashkul introduced in writing the term "Azerbaijani Turk," and dealt directly with the question of Azerbaijani peoplehood and the ties between the Azerbaijanis on both sides of the Araz, while drawing a distinction between the nation and the religious community. In Kashkul,authors criticized the use of the term millet to denote both nation and community. 51 An imaginary dialogue published in Kashkul reflects the exploration of identity in Azerbaijan: Question: What is your nationality (millet)? Answer: I am a Muslim and a Turk. Question: Are you an Ottoman? Answer: No, I am bijanli(a play on words in Azerbaijani meaning "soulless"). Question: Where is the land of the bijanlis? Answer: As far as I can tell, on the other side of the Araz live the Azeris-on this side the bijanlis.Together, it makes Azerbaijani. But separately we are bijanlis. Question: Your language is Turkic so you are a Turk? Answer: There is no word to describe my position. I am a Turk, but bijanli. Question: Instead of being a bijanli Turk, why don't you solve your dilemma by calling yourself an Azerbaijani Turk?52 The post-Akinchi press in Azerbaijan was written predominantly in Ottoman Turkish and turned away from the colloquial Azerbaijani language.53 The written use of colloquial Azerbaijani received a decisive blow in 1891, when the Russian government ordered the closing of Kashkul. Until 1904, no other Turkic-language journal received permission to publish in the north, but Azerbaijanis continued to air many social questions in the Russian-language Kaspii.The majority of its contributors advocated self-government for the Muslims of the Caucasus, within the framework of a liberalized and reformed Russia. Yet, in its liberal spirit, Kaspii printed articles reflecting a variety of orientations, including those espousing Pan-Turkism. Kaspii was edited by 'Ali Mardan-bay Topchibashi,54 and was published under the sponsorship of the Baku oil baron Zeynal 'Abdin Taghiyev. 51.

THE AZERBAIJ ANIS UNTIL 1920

BORDERS AND BRETHREN

Kiishkiil,No. 22 (1891), quoted in Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan1905-1920, p.

32.

52.

Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan1905-1920, p. 32.

53.

Ibid., p. 29.

54.

'Ali Mardan bay Topchibashi (1868-1934).

I 31

The Azerbaijani-language press was renewed with the publication of Sharq-iRus. Its editor, Mehmed Agha Shakhtakhtinskii, was a proponent of secular nationalism as the means for progress for Muslims. 55 In Iran as well, some Azerbaijanis took an interest in the literary revival of the Azerbaijani language. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, Mirza Shadiq Asadulla-ogli published a book advocating the use of Azerbaijani as the language of instruction in elementary schools, and he wrote textbooks in the language. 56 In the second half of the nineteenth century, some Azerbaijanis espoused Pan-Islamic ideology, 57 and many of the supporters of Pan-Islam identified with Iran at this time. In addition, many Azerbaijanis were interested in their Turkic identity in a cultural sense, but few supported political unity with other Turkic peoples. 58 However, some Azerbaijanis played an important role in the development of Pan-Turkism in Istanbul. The most significant was 'Ali bay Huseynzade (1864-1941). In Istanbul, Huseynzade became one of the founders of Ittihad-i Osmaniyye, which was a forerunner of the Young Turk movement. Huseynzade's poem, Turan, was the first poetic call for unity among all ethnic Turks.59 The chief ideologist of the Pan-Turkist movement, Ziya Gokalp, cited Huseynzade as one of his most important teachers, from whom he adopted the slogan "Turklashtirmak, Islamlashtirmak, Avrupalashtirmak" (Turkify, Islamicize, Europeanize). 60 Ziya Gokalp's use of this slogan was embraced as one of the main mottoes of the Pan-Turkist movement.

55. See Edward J. Lazzerini, "Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani from the Perspective of a Russian Muslim," in Kedourie and Haim, Towards a Modern Iran: Studies in Thought, Politicsand Society,p. 57. 56. Mirza Shadiq Asadulla-oghli, quoted in Sakina Berengian, Azeri and PersianLiterary Works in Twentieth-Century Iranian Azerbaijan (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1988), p. 47. Many Azerbaijanis claim that Sayyid Jamal al-Din Afghani, the first modem proponent of Pan-Islam, was actually of Azerbaijani origin. Afghani was born in the late 1830s in an Azerbaijani-speaking village outside Hamadan, which indicates that he grew up in an Azerbaijani-speaking area. See Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 62. 57.

58.

Swietochowski, Russia and Azerbaijan:A Borderlandin Transition,p. 33.

59.

Alstadt, The AzerbaijaniTurks, p. 69.

60. Ziya Gokalp, ThePrinciplesofTurkism (Leiden, 1968), pp. 5-t,; and U. Heyd, Foundations of Turkish Nationalism: The Life and Teachingsof Ziya Gokalp (London: 1950), pp. 107-108, quoted in Swietochowski, Russia and Azerbaijan:A Borderlandin Transition, p. 34.

32

I

BORDERS AND BRETHREN

Azerbaijani political attitudes were influenced by the confrontations with the Armenians during the Armenian-Tatar War (1903-05) that waged in the Caucasus. 61 It also affected the Azerbaijanis in Iran, for many of the Muslim victims of the violence were migrant Azerbaijani workers from the south. 62 In response to these events, a clandestine Azerbaijan self-defense organization, Difai (defense) was formed in Ganja, which represented an important shift away from dependence on Russian protection. This was one of the first developments in a series of events that gave Ganja a more pronounced Azerbaijani nationalism than Baku, among the cities in the north. 63 THE REVOLUTIONARY

ERA, 1905--20

In 1905-08, three major political revolutions occurred in the areas surrounding the Azerbaijanis: the 1905 Russian Revolution, the Constitutional Revolution of Iran in 1906, and the Young Turk Revolution in 1908. Many Azerbaijanis played a role in these events, which also catalyzed developments in their own national identity and orientation. These three revolutions were followed by further revolutions and counterrevolutions in these three countries, a world war, and periods of brief foreign occupation of parts of Azerbaijan by Ottoman and later British forces. This period is marked by a number of substantial political developments. First, an Azerbaijani left-wing movement emerged. Second, an all-out Azerbaijani nationalism developed, which is best illustrated by the foundation of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic in the north. Prior to the establishment of the republic, it seems that few Azerbaijanis felt complete independence was attainable, and had coupled their nationalism with an orientation toward a foreign power which they would join in a federation or confederation that could provide protection. Third, and in contrast to the north, many Azerbaijanis in Iran identified with and participated in the general Iranian revolutionary movements, and many advocated embracing Persian culture and language. Fourth, the role of the Azerbaijanis as conveyors of ideas and activists was especially pronounced in this period in Russia, Turkey, and Iran; activists in each of these countries passed the lessons they had learned to an adjoining arena. Finally, in almost all the movements they joined, the Azerbaijanis contin61. This was a series of intensive violent clashes between the Muslims and Armenians in the Caucasus. In the Russian Empire, non-Muslims referred to Azerbaijanis and many other Muslim groups by the misnomer "Tatar." 62.

THE AZERBAIJANIS

I 33

ued to be at the forefront of Muslims advocating the adoption of liberal values and enlightenment. One example of this is the insistence on the emancipation of women advocated by political parties in both north and south Azerbaijan. Revolutionary reforms in Russia, Iran, and Turkey ushered in a period of relative freedom that allowed the airing of views that had previously been censored. Indeed, the revolutionary events not only helped to shape the ideas of the Azerbaijanis, but also allowed their publication. Following the 1905 limited constitutional Russian Revolution and the end to the ban on Turkic-language newspapers, a plethora of Azerbaijani newspapers, both in the local Azerbaijani vernacular and in modified Ottoman Turkish, began to appear in north Azerbaijan. The press reflected the Azerbaijani engagement with the question of self-identity, and the related polemics, such as the debate over what should be the preferred language and the appropriate remedies for improving their social situation. Among the terms that began to appear at this time in the Azerbaijani press are milliyatchilik(nationalism), and the foreign loan word, nasyonalizm.64 The choice of language generally reflected the political and often the national identity orientation of the newspaper. The newspapers Sharq-i Rus, TazaHayat, and Hayat were written in Azerbaijani, and espoused a liberal, secular, ethnic-nationalist position. Fuzuyat, which was written in modified Ottoman Turkish, reflected the authors' secular-liberal orientation and support for strong ties with Turkey and Pan-Turkism. It was edited by 'Ali bay Huseynzade, who returned to Baku from Istanbul following the Young Turk Revolution. Huseynzade wrote that the Azerbaijanis, as Oghuz Turks, were basically the same people as the Ottoman Turks, and thus there was no need for separate identification. Many of the Azerbaijani journals had an extensive following and much influence in Iran and the Muslim world. The most important and well-known journal was Molla Nasreddin, which rejected writing in foreign languages, such as Persian and Russian, and Ottoman Turkic grammar. It supported Azerbaijani in the style spoken by most of the people. One of the famous caricatures from the journal depicts an Azerbaijani man and three foreigners (representing Russian, Persian, and Arabic) trying to stuff tongues into his mouth; he responds, "Hey, brothers, I was not born tongue-less that you have to stuff my mouth with these tongues." 65

Swietochowski, Russia and Azerbaijan:A Borderlandin Transition,p. 40.

63. By 1897, the local population in Ganja had began to call themselves "Azerbaijani Turk." See Alstadt, The AzerbaijaniTurks, p. 79.

UNTIL 1920

64.

Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan,1905-1920,p. 57.

65.

Molla Nasreddin,December 22, 1906.

34 j

TIIB AZERBAIJANIS

BORDERS AND BRETHREN

After restrictions were relaxed in north Azerbaijan and after the 1905 revolution in Russia, the local intelligentsia led a cultural revival that included the founding of additional Azerbaijani-language schools. One of the highlights of this cultural revival was the staging in 1908 of the Azerbaijani opera, Leyli and Majnun, based on the poem of the famed Turkic poet, Fizuli, set to the music of the native composer Uzeir Hajibayli. This was the first Western-style opera performed in a language of a Muslim people. At this time, many Azerbaijanis expressed a desire to educate their children in the Azerbaijani language. In 1906, the Conference of Muslim Teachers convened in Baku and addressed the issue of the "nationalization of primary schools." 66 The teachers stressed the need to use Azerbaijani as the language of instruction in the schools and the importance of developing Azerbaijani-language textbooks, and pointed out that Muslim parents opposed sending their children to Russian-language schools. In addition, in July 1913 workers held a strike; one of their main demands was the establishment of Azerbaijani-language school. In the Russian Empire, Azerbaijani national identity was affected by the discrimination of the Russian authorities against Muslims, and the competition and tension with the Armenians, who were granted preferential treatment by the imperial authorities. In addition, separate Azerbaijani identity was fostered by both the Muslim and Russian political parties, which tended to emphasize the Azerbaijanis' disadvantageous position in an effort to recruit them into their various movements. 67 Violence between Armenians and Azerbaijanis erupted a number of times in the first quarter of the twentieth century, and this affected the identity and political development of each of the sides. Following the first Russian Revolution in 1905, leftist political forces became prominent among Azerbaijanis, especially in Baku. Among the most important of them was the Himmet,which drew its members chiefly from Azerbaijanis in Baku and the migrant workers from Iran. It was the predecessor of the communist parties of both Azerbaijan and Iran. Within the Himmet,a separate section, Adalat,was formed for the migrant workers from Iran, which later served as the basis for the socialist movement within Iran. Adalat published the bilingual Azerbaijani-Persian newspaper, Hurriyet.The Himmet was associated with the Russian Social-Democrat Workers' Party (RSDWP). The Azerbaijanis attained a unique status for the Himmetamong the socialist organizations operating in the Russian

Quoted by Alstadt, The AzerbaijaniTurks,p. 201.

67. Mangol Bayat, Iran's First Revolution:Shi'ism and the ConstitutionalRevolutionof 1905-1909(N.Y.:Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 79.

I 35

empire: At the time of its founding in 1904, Lenin sanctioned their request that the Himmet retain its ethnic character and remain an allMuslim group. In contrast, the Jewish Bund's request to retain exclusively Jewish membership was denied. 68 The unique nationalistic character of the Azerbaijani left is also illustrated by the activities of some of its activists, such as Nariman Narimanov, one of the founders of the Himmet, who later became the Chairman of the Government of the .Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan. Narimanov worked for the language rights for the Azerbaijanis, and in 1906 served as the co-chairman of a committee set up in Baku to address language rights in education. 69 At the time of the Soviet takeover of Baku, Narimanov asked the Russian Bolsheviks that Azerbaijan be granted independence.7° Another Himmet leader, Azizbeykov, was also active in trying to set up educational institutions in the Azerbaijani language. An additional sign of the national cohesion of the Azerbaijani left is that Azerbaijani workers showed little signs of class solidarity or cooperation with Russian or Armenian workers; clashes between them were frequent. During the period of the independent Azerbaijani Republic (1918-20), Himmet restricted its membership to Muslims. Even after the Soviet takeover of Azerbaijan, many Himmetist supporters sought to sustain Azerbaijani autonomy within a Soviet framework. 71 At this time, no important figures in Azerbaijan called for the adoption of Russian cultural identity. In any event, the extreme Russian discrimination against Muslims effectively blocked assimilation. Some liberal bourgeois figures, such as Topchibashi, advocated close cooperation with Russia after the 1905 Revolution, although he did not express any form of self-identity with it. Even Topchibashi, after his expectations of achieving Muslim equality under Russian rule were not met, turned to Azerbaijani nationalistic activity. Most activists in north Azerbaijan had an ambivalent relation toward Russia, an important trend throughout the twentieth century. While they resented the Russian discrimination and condescension, they appreciated Russia's role as a conduit of secular and 68. Bennigsen, "Azerbaijan," p. 7; and Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, Muslim NationalCommunismin the Soviet Union:A RevolutionaryStrategyfor the ColonialWorld(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 12. 69.

66.

UNTIL 1920

Alstadt, The AzerbaijaniTurks, p. 55.

70. Bennigsen and Wimbush, Muslim NationalCommunismin the Soviet Union, p. 56. Narimanov claimed that as an independent country, Azerbaijan would be a role model for communist revolution in other Muslim-populated states. 71.

Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan1905-1920,p. 194.

36

I BORDERS

AND BRETHREN

THE AZERBAIJANIS

UNTIL 1920

I 37

scientific education. Since most groups in north Azerbaijan then believed that full Azerbaijani political independence was infeasible, many felt that some sort of federative relationship between Azerbaijan and Russia was inevitable. Between 1905 and the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917, some Azerbaijanis supported the establishment of a political federation with other peoples of the Caucasus. When the Russian Empire collapsed, Azerbaijan joined the Transcaucasian Federation, which fell five weeks after its founding. No major proponents of Caucasian identity emerged at this time. After the 1908 Young Turk Revolution in Turkey, the language debate and the question of the identity of the Azerbaijanis as Turks intensified in north Azerbaijan. In Baku, Pan-Turkists advocated that all the Turkic peoples adopt the newly modified Ottoman Turkish, now devoid of many of its Arabic and Persian words. In 1912, Azerbaijanis who supported the adoption of Ottoman Turkish as the literary language of the Azerbaijanis began publishing Shalalain the new Ottoman Turkish. The declared goal of the newspaper was to "serve the cause of the unification of Turkic peoples on the basis of the Ottoman dialect used by the most advanced of all literatures in the Turkic-speaking world." 72 The Azerbaijanis were singled out for special attention by the Ottoman Turks, due to their special affinity with them; their languages stem from the same Turkic group, the Oghuz. During this revolutionary period, a new ideological movement, oghuzism,emerged in Istanbul, stressing the special ties within this Turkic group. Some of the Azerbaijanis living in Istanbul were active in this group, while others there joined the Pan-Turkish movement that emerged after the Young Turk Revolution. A prominent Pan-Turkish proponent was Ahmad bay Agaoglu.73 He became the leading writer of one of the most important Pan-Turkist journals, Tiirk Yurdu. Agaoglu's articles on Pan-Turkism and the Turkic nation in Turk Yurdu reflected the special Azerbaijani desire to bridge the Shi'a-Sunni split, which was especially important to the Azerbaijanis since they were both Shi'i and Turks, and were strongly anticlerical, as were many Azerbaijani intellectuals. A few Azerbaijanis were active at this time in the Pan-Islamic movement in the Russian Empire, and especially in the formation of the Ittifaq al-Muslim. The Azerbaijanis' activities within this movement reflected

The Young Turk Revolution in Turkey in 1908 gave impetus to Turkic cultural identity and to local nationalist trends that were emerging among the Azerbaijanis in the Russian Empire. These trends were accelerated by the return of absolute rule in Iran, which made Iran less attractive. The disillusionment with the Revolution of 1905 in Russia, which failed to end the extreme discrimination against the Muslims in the Russian Empire, also strengthened this process. Nevertheless, few Azerbaijanis called for full political independence; most saw this goal as unrealistic until the collapse of the Russian Empire during the 1917 Russian Revolution. The rising Azerbaijani identity was embodied in the Musavat (Equality) Party, which was founded in 1911. Its first published platform included a commitment to secular Turkic nationalism and the establishment of an autonomous Azerbaijan in association with Russia, within a federation of free and equal states.74 Musavat strove to encompass Muslims of different political orientations and create unity among them. The use of both phrases, "autonomous" and "free and independent," in the different platforms suggests that the authors were not clear on the actual degree of independence they desired for Azerbaijan, or at least they feared to call forthrightly for independence. Musavat formed cells within Iran, especially in Tabriz, Rasht, Ardebil, Khoi, and Maku, and also in the border area. 75 The collapse of the Russian army in the Caucasus during the Revolution gave the Musavats the opportunity to establish an independent state, initially as part of a Transcaucasian federation. When the federation dissolved, Azerbaijan became an independent state. During the period surrounding the declaration of the new state, Nasib bay Ussubekov, one of the chief activists of Musavat, expressed reservations about proclaiming a state in north Azerbaijan without the south, at a time when he estimated that Azerbaijani nationalist sentiments were high there as well. 76

72. Shiilalii,No. 21 (1913), quoted in Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan 1905-1920, p. 62.

74.

Swietochowski, Russia and Azerbaijan:A Borderlandin Transition,p. 62.

75.

Ibid., p. 129.

76.

Ibid., p. 65.

73. Earlier in his career, Agaoglu had advocated Pan-Islamist ideology. Agaoglu is often referred to with a Russian name ending as Aghayev.

their unique perspective; they called for the need to put aside sectarian Sunni-Shi'i divisions, and for the Muslims of Russia to unite in the struggle to attain their rights within the empire. The members of this movement opposed Turkic nationalism and any form of particularistic Azerbaijani nationalism. GROWING AZERBAIJAN! AZERBAIJAN

IDENTITY: THE ESTABLISHMENT

DEMOCRATIC

OF THE

REPUBLIC

38

I BORDERS AND

THE AZERBAIJANIS UNTIL 1920

BRETHREN

On May 28, 1918, the Azerbaijan Provincial Council proclaimed t~e establishment of the new state, the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (Azerbayjan Khalq Jumhuriyet). The declaration stated that:

1. Azerbaijan is a fully sovereign state; it consists of the southern and eastern parts of Transcaucasia under the authority of the Azerbaijani people. 2. It is resolved that the form of government of the independent Azerbaijani state will be a democratic republic. 3. The Azerbaijan Democratic Republic is determined to establish friendly relations with all, especially with the neighboring nations and states. 4. The Azerbaijan Democratic Republic guarantees to all its citizens within its borders full civil and political rights, regardless of ethnic origin, religion, class, profession, or gender. 5. The Azerbaijan Democratic Republic encourages the free development of all nationalities inhabiting its territory. 6. Until the Azerbaijani Constituent Assembly is convened, the supreme authority over Azerbaijan is vested in a universally ~lected National Council and the provisional government responsible to this Council. 77

I 39

official language of the state. State employees were to conduct all business in that language within two years, in an attempt to end the predominance of Russian. A debate was conducted over whether to adopt Azerbaijani Turkish versus Ottoman Turkish. The Musavat Party Program, issued at the Second Party Congress in December 1919, stated that the Ottoman dialect would be mandatory in Azerbaijan's high schools. Turkic language instruction was introduced at all levels in all the schools in Azerbaijan, and the study of Russian history was replaced by the history of the Turkic peoples. One of Musavat's early goals was the opening of a university in Baku with instruction in Azerbaijani. In September 1919, this goal was realized. After the Soviet takeover of the republic, Russian was imposed as the primary language at the university. The Red Army of the newly established Soviet state attempted to reconquer the territories of the former Russian empire that had declared independence. On April 27, 1920, Soviet forces, with the assistance of Azerbaijani communist supporters, conquered the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic, bringing its independent statehood to an end after only twenty-three months and incorporating it in the territory of the Soviet Union. 79

Identity in Iran

The retention of the name Azerbaijan fostered fears in Iran that the new republic intended, with Ottoman support, to detach south Azerbaijan from Iran. In an attempt to allay Iranian app~ehension,_the government referred to the new republic as the CaucasumRepublic of Azerbaijanin much of its correspondence abroad. The constitution of the new republic declared equal rights for all citizens regardless of religion, ethnic origin, or gender, making Azerbaijan the first Muslim state to grant women the vote. Polemics continued to be waged over the national identity of the new state. Azerbaijan's external orientation shifted rapidly, mostly on the basis of which foreign state seemed willing to support the fledgling state's independence, and less on the basis of ideological factors or as a r~sult of national identity.78 The republican government declared Turkish the

In the beginning of the twentieth century, Iranian Azerbaijanis spearheaded the Iranian Constitutional movement, and most of the Azerbaijani intelligentsia identified as Iranians. Two main trends of identity emerged among the Azerbaijani activists in Iran at this time: Some supported the Persianization of the Azerbaijanis and other minorities in Iran, to increase unity and ease the development of a modem state. Others advocated the establishment in Iran of a reformed constitutionally-based and supra-ethnic regime that would allow for cultural autonomy. Some members of this group supported autonomy for the Azerbaijanis and the other ethnic groups in Iran as a means to form liberal political structures in Iran, at least on a local scale. Generally, activists who had been educated in the Caucasus and had extended contacts with their co-ethnics in the north, including the leftists,

77. Nasib Nasibzada, Aziirbayjan Demokratik Respublikasi"(Baku: Elm, 1990), PP· 43--44. 78. Some Azerbaijanis unsuccessfully attempted to create an alliance with Great Britain while others initiated negotiations with Iran toward confederation, mainly out of a desire to achieve ties with south Azerbaijan. See Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan,1905-1920, pp. 157-158.

79. Swietochowski cites a Soviet source that claims that in April 1920 there were approximately 4,000 members of the Communist Party in Azerbaijan. In Swietochowski' s opinion, the local communists were a less critical factor leading to the fall of the ADR than public fear of the overwhelming Soviet military might and infighting among the Azerbaijani nationalist groups. See Swietochowski, Russia and Azerbaijan:A Borderlandin Transition,p. 91.

40

I BORDERS AND

BRETHREN

tended to support the preservation of Azerbaijani cultural and linguistic rights within Iran. In contrast, those who had not had extended contact with their co-ethnics in the north, and were most often educated in Tehran, usually supported the Persianization of the Azerbaijanis in Iran. Tabriz, the major Azerbaijani-populated city, was the center of revolutionary activity in Iran in the first quarter of the twentieth century. The demonstrations that triggered the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1906 began in Tabriz. The majority of the Azerbaijani activists in the Iranian Constitutional Revolution wished to pursue goals that would affect the regime in all of Iran. However, in their efforts to preserve the constitutional regime, Azerbaijanis, on a number of occasions, threatened to separate from Iran in their confrontation with the Shah's regime. 80 This indicates at least an awareness of their distinctive identity within the Iranian framework, and a perception of its potential political power. A few writers in Iran were working to strengthen particularistic Azerbaijani identity in this period. Among them was the Azerbaijani educator Mirza Hasan Roshdiyeh, who in 1905 published a textbook, Vatan Dili, in Tabriz. Written in Azerbaijani, it was based on Azerbaijani literature and folklore.81 Some writers contributed to the bilingual Azerbaijani-Persian newspaper, Azerbayjan, which began to appear in 1907. It published varying views on the question of national identity, and emulated the satirical journal, Molla Nasreddin.82 After the 1906 Constitutional Revolution in Iran, local councils, or anjumans, were established to supervise local parliamentary elections. The Tabriz Anjuman extended its authority far beyond this role and even remained in permanent session after the elections, a move that illustrates Azerbaijani desire for local rule. 83 In 1908, the Qajar Shah, Mohammad Afi, attempted to reverse the successes of the Constitutional Revolution and reimpose autocratic rule in Iran. Under the leadership of Sattar Khan, an Azerbaijani, the residents of Tabriz were the first to stand up against the Shah. Sattar Khan's troops captured Tabriz in the name of the Tabriz Anjuman, and replaced the Ira80.

Abrahamian, Iran BetweenTwo Revolutions,p. 91.

81.

Mirza Hasan Roshdiyeh (1850-1943), Vatan Dili (Tabriz, 1905).

THE AZERBAIJANIS UNTIL 1920

I 41

nian flag with the flag of the Tabriz Anjuman. Sattar Khan declared that the "nation of Azerbaijan" refused to recognize the sovereignty of Mohammad Afi Shah, and declared Tabriz the temporary capital of Iran. While the Azerbaijani activists in the Constitutional Revolution in Iran had mostly advocated the Persianization of the Azerbaijanis and the centralization of government in Iran, literature appeared during the period of Sattar Khan's revolt that glorified Azerbaijan's role in Iranian history, called Azerbaijan the homeland, and extolled the virtues of the Azerbaijanis. In addition, the publication of an Azerbaijani-language newspaper in Tabriz, Ana Dili (Mother Tongue), began at this time; it stressed indigenous Azerbaijani language and culture and often published literary works from north Azerbaijan. 84 Sattar Khan had close ties with the left-wing Firqeh-iIjtima'iyyun 'Ammiyyun party, which was based in the Caucasus. 85 The end of the Qajar monarchy was preceded by three revolts in north Iran: in Gilan, Khorasan, and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijani activists from both the north and south, as well as other groups from the Caucasus, were active in the uprisings. These revolts were led by reform-minded individuals who believed that the establishment of democratic reforms in their own regions would lead to the basis for liberalization of the rest of Iran. 86 Of the three revolts, the revolt led by Khiyabani in Azerbaijan was the most threatening to the Iranian regime. Khiyabani, a well-educated cleric, had embraced radical ideas while studying in the Caucasus. 87 He was exiled by the Turkish forces that had occupied Iranian Azerbaijan in 1915, because he rejected the Pan-Islamist ideology that the Turks were trying to promote at the time and had warned against what he viewed as their attempts to annex the province. 88 Early in the revolt he convened a conference of representatives from most of the towns in Iranian Azerbaijan. After the conference, a bilingual Azerbaijani-Persian newspaper, Tajaddod,was established and the name of the Azerbaijani branch of the Democratic Party was changed to the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan, emphasizing its separateness. The Tabriz Democrats established a chap-

84. Ghods, A ComparativeHistoricalStudy, pp. 135-136; and Berengian, Azeri and Persian Literary Works in Twentieth-CenturyIranianAzerbaijan,pp. 47-48.

82. Aziirbayjanoften published caricatures in which the lines spoken by the sympathetic peasant are in Azerbaijani, while the lines spoken by the landowner, the tax collector, etc., are in Persian, reflecting an intertwining of ethnic and social grievances.

85. Afary, "Peasant Rebellion of the Caspian Region during the Iranian Constitutional Revolution 1906-1909," p. 151.

83. Janet Afary, "Peasant Rebellion of the Caspian Region during the Iranian Constitutional Revolution 1906-1909,"InternationalJournalof Middle East Studies,Vol. 23 (May 1991), p. 142.

86.

Atabaki, Azerbaijan:Ethnicity and Autonomy in Twentieth-CenturyIran, p. 3.

87.

Abrahamian, Iran BetweenTwo Revolutions,p. 112.

88.

Ghods, A ComparativeHistoricalStudy, p. 171.

42

I BORDERS

AND BRETHREN

ter in Baku, which in 1918 began to publish its own newspaper, Azerbayjan.89 Among the demands the conference in Azerbaijan sent to Iran's central government were the appointment of a governor of Azerbaijan who would be trusted by the people of the province; the immediate reconvening of the National Assembly in Tehran; and the reconvening of the anjumans, as provided by the constitution. 90 In his closing speech at the conference, Khiyabani charged that Azerbaijan, despite the sacrifices that it had made in the Constitutional Revolution, received neither fair parliamentary representation nor equitable budgetary allocations from the central government. 91 When the Shah rejected their demands, Khiyabani proceeded to take over and govern the whole province of Azerbaijan, establishing the autonomous government of Azadistan (Land of Freedom) in April 1920. Khiyabani decreed the right to use the Azerbaijani language in the province. His insistence on protecting journalists who wrote in Azerbaijani led to an open split with Ahmad Kasravi, who was deported from Iranian Azerbaijan because he criticized the use of the Azerbaijani language in the province. 92 Like many of his northern Azerbaijani counterparts, Khiyabani differentiated between identifying culturally as Turks and forging political links to Turkey; he supported the right of the residents of the province to use their native Turkic language, and also struggled against the Ottoman presence and its influence in Azerbaijan. Khiyabani also promoted a local literary revival under the direction of Mirza Taqi Khan. Khiyabani' s demands reflected both Azerbaijani and Iranian identity. Khiyabani did not aspire to separate the Azerbaijan provinces from Iran, but advocated a change between center and periphery relations and the retention of language rights for Azerbaijanis. He strove, as well, for the formation of a reformed democratic Iran that would allow for cultural pluralism. Khiyabani used the term vatan to refer to both Iran and Azerbaijan. 93 As part of the reforms he instituted during the short-lived autonomy, Khiyabani worked to establish Azerbaijani-language schools

89.

Swietochowski, Russia and Azerbaijan:A Borderlandin Transition,p. 65.

90.

Abrahamian, Iran Between TuJORevolutions,p. 112.

91. Similar claims were be made sixty years later by Azerbaijani activists, referring to their sacrifices in the Islamic Revolution. 92. Ervand Abrahamian, "Communism and Communalism in Iran: The Tudah and the Firqah-i Dimukrat," InternationalJournalof Middle East Studies, Vol. 1, No. 4 (1970), p. 294. 93.

Swietochowski, Russia and Azerbaijan:A Borderlandin Transition,p. 99.

THE AZERBAIJANIS UNTIL 1920

I 43

in Iranian Azerbaijan, often employing teachers from north Azerbaijan or Turkey.94 Khiyabani' s reforms and cultural programs were cut short after his rebellion was quelled in September 1920 by Reza Khan's forces, which dispersed the Democrats and later executed Khiyabani. Reza Khan's success in subduing the autonomy movements was an important rallying point in his rise to power as Shah of Iran.

TIES AND MUTUAL

INFLUENCES

ACROSS THE ARAZ

Despite the division of the Azerbaijanis under separate and very different empires, they continued to interact as one intellectual and cultural sphere, and the commercial and family ties between the two populations remained vibrant. For most of the period, there was constant migration between the two sides, and each side was a refuge when turmoil occurred on the opposite side. The Azerbaijanis continued to play an important role as a conduit of ideas and as activists in Russia, Iran, and Turkey. Azerbaijanis from Iran who had significant contact with co-ethnics from the north tended to be more attached to their Azerbaijani identity than those who did not have this contact. They usually strove to promote this ethnic culture even within the framework of other ideological movements, such as communism or Iranian nationalism. Many of the major liberal Azerbaijani political activists in Iran had spent time in the Caucasus, and had connections with and received aid from Azerbaijanis there. For instance, a group of Tabriz intellectuals who had spent time in Baku founded a literary circle in 1895 that later served as a basis for liberal oriented political and education activity and for secret and semi-secret activity devoted to constitutionalism. Zeynal 'Abdin Taghiyev' s philanthropical activities illustrate the social and cultural cohesion of Azerbaijanis from both sides of the Araz in the nineteenth century, and how identity with co-ethnics often extended beyond the border. Taghiyev' s activities touched Azerbaijanis beyond his home in the north. In Tabriz, he underwrote the first Jadidisthigh school which served as a model throughout Iran and a modern library, and he funded the distribution of liberal newspapers to clerical students in Najaf.95 Free from the threats and limitations of the ulama, an educated and secular Azerbaijani intelligentsia emerged in the Russian Empire before anything similar in most places in the Muslim world. Many members of 94.

Ibid., p. 97.

95.

Ibid., Russia and Azerbaijan:A Borderlandin Transition,p. 23.

44

I BORDERS

AND BRETHREN

this group were exposed to and adopted liberal political thinking. These ideas were easily transmitted to their co-ethnics in Iran. Through their frequent contacts with each other and common language, Azerbaijanis channeled ideas and influence to both sides of the Araz. In addition, many publications from Baku were distributed among Azerbaijanis in Iran and had significant impact there. The most prominent are the works of Miza Alekber Sabir Tahirzade, published mostly in the Azerbaijani journal Molla Nasreddin.96 Sabir' s works influenced not only the Azerbaijanis of Iran, but also intellectuals throughout the country. Many Iranian political movements, such as most of the Iranian socialist parties, were organized and run from Baku. The Azerbaijani migrant workers who formed the bulk of the membership worked in Azerbaijan for only part of the year, and brought back with them radical ideas and forms of protest when they returned to Iran. 97 Another illustration of Azerbaijanis' role as conveyors of activity was that volunteers from the Caucasus, many of Azerbaijani origin, joined in the struggle to retain the constitutional regime in Iran. For example, fighters from the Caucasus were among the forces that set out from Gilan and overthrew Muhammad 'Ali in Tehran on July 16, 1909, and arms were sent from Baku to the fighters in Tabriz. On both sides of the border, many Azerbaijani intellectuals active during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were often affected by the same revolutionary events. The intellectuals' careers also illustrate how both Azerbaijans functioned as one intellectual and political sphere with much movement between the two regions. The career of Mehmet Emin Rasulzade best reflects this mobility and the interconnections of events in north and Iranian Azerbaijan. One of the founders of the Himmet socialist party in Baku, Rasulzade also had been active during the Constitutional Revolution in Iran, and worked as the editor of the Persian newspaper, Iran-i Nou. When Iran returned to despotic rule, Rasulzade spent a period in Istanbul, and then became one of the leading activists of the Azerbaijani nationalist Musavat Party in Baku. There, he edited the Azerbaijani journal Achiq Soz from 1913. In his contributions to this paper, he referred to the Azerbaijanis by the term Turk. In 1918, Rasulzade was elected to serve as the first head of the National Council of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic.

96.

Miza Alekber Sabir Tahirzade was born in 1862 in Shamakhi.

97. Afary, "Peasant Rebellion of the Caspian Region during the Iranian Constitutional Revolution 1906-1909," p. 141.

THE AZERBAIJANIS

UNTIL 1920

I 45

Conclusions Prior to the mid-nineteenth century, it is difficult to speak of a separate "Azerbaijani" identity among the residents of this area; but rather, there was a separate Turkic, or Muslim, and regional identity. Even in the Safavid period, when the Azerbaijanis formed the ruling elite of Iran, and strongly identified with the Iranian state and the Shi'i people of Iran, a distinct Turkic identity existed and Turco-Persian tensions remained high. Later, balancing between those groups became a mark of the Qajar regime. Thus, even in this period, there were distinctions of identity between Turks and Persians in the area. Nevertheless, during the Safavid and Qajar periods, Azerbaijanis could identify with Iran in supra-ethnic terms, especially since the political leadership of these regimes shared a common ethnic and linguistic background with them, and in this period ethnic identity was less pronounced in general. There was no inherent conflict between identifying with the Iranian state and Turkic culture. In later years, the Safavids came to symbolize for many Azerbaijanis their own sovereignty and leadership over Iran. Today, when some Azerbaijanis say that they identify themselves as Iranians, they are not necessarily implying that they identify with Persian culture and leadership, but rather with an Iran that accommodates both Turkic and Persian culture and language, along the lines of the Safavid model. The imposition of Shi'a on the population of Iran led to important developments in terms of collective identity. Adherence to Shi'a expanded the ties between Azerbaijanis and Persians and linked them together in the Shi'i state of Iran. Yet, as the only major Turkic-speaking Shi'i group, Azerbaijanis in Iran forged a separate Azerbaijani identity that cemented the ties between the Turkic speakers on both sides of the Araz River. Thus, the Shi'i factor that unites the Azerbaijanis with Iran also links them with Azerbaijanis beyond the borders of Iran. In later periods the cultural orientation chosen by certain Azerbaijanis was not always directly translated into a political orientation. For instance, interest in and identification with Turkic culture did not always lead to a desire for political alliance with or orientation toward Turkey. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, forces from different ends of the political spectrum promoted Azerbaijani cultural rights in the Russian Empire, especially the use of their language. In Baku, many groups, including Marxist ones such as the Himmet and the Firqeh,as well as individuals such as Nariman Narimanov and Mehmet Emin Rasulzade, supported Azerbaijani cultural rights. Even more orthodox Marxist groups were often willing to use rhetoric in support of

46

I

BORDERS AND BRETHREN

Azerbaijani cultural and language rights, which illustrates their assessment that these goals were popular among many Azerbaijanis and that such a stance would help mobilize support. In contrast, many prominent Azerbaijanis in Iran advocated assimilation into Persian language and culture. One of the reasons for the difference may be that in the Russian Empire, Muslims could not assimilate into the majority group. In Iran, in contrast, Azerbaijanis and members of other minority groups could choose to identify themselves as Iranians. Furthermore, Russian discrimination against Azerbaijanis and other minorities and Azerbaijani contact with non-Muslims in the Russian Empire seem to have reinforced the minorities' distinctive identities. In contrast to their co-ethnics in the north, during the nineteenth century, Azerbaijanis in Iran had much less frequent contact with non-Azerbaijanis in Iran. In this period in Iran, provincial power was predominant, and the Qajar Shahs had limited control and influence outside of the capital. 98 Moreover, official cultural discrimination emerged later in Iran, as part of Reza Shah's centralization policies; as will be shown in the next chapter, this had a significant impact on the collective identity of the Azerbaijanis in Iran. 98.

See Nikki R. Keddie, "The Iranian Power Structure and Social Change 18001969: An Overview," InternationalJournalof Middle East Studies Vol. 2 (1971), p. 3; and

Shaul Bakhash, "Center-Periphery Relations in Nineteenth-Century Iran," Iranian Studies Vol. 14 (Winter-Spring 1981), p. 35.

Chapter 2

The Azerbaijanis under the Soviet and Pahlavi Regimes

A

new period for the Azerbaijanis was ushered in with the fall of the short-lived independent Azerbaijan Democratic Republic and its subsequent Sovietization, and the crushing of Khiyabani' s autonomous Azerbaijani movement in Iran and the rise of the Pahlavi regime (1921-79). This chapter covers the period from the Soviet conquest of the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic in 1920 through the late 1970s; and the rise of the Pahlavi regime in Iran in 1921, the brief Provincial Azerbaijani Government, and the second Pahlavi reign until 1979. Ties between the Azerbaijanis across the border were severely limited by the new regimes. Until this period, interchange and contacts between the two sides of Azerbaijan, especially in the spheres of commerce, family, and culture, were quite free despite its political division since 1828. These ties were significantly restricted (except for a brief respite in 1941-46) from the beginning of Stalin's purges in the Soviet Union until the end of the 1970s, when new opportunities for limited contact were created after the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Under Iran's Pahlavi regime, the Azerbaijanis in Iran and other ethnic minorities began to experience extreme cultural suppression and discrimination. As in the Russian Empire a century earlier, where a policy of discrimination toward non-Christians had catalyzed an exploration of collective identity among the Azerbaijanis and forced the prioritization of identities, the policies of the new regime in Iran greatly affected the development of national identity among the Azerbaijanis there. Reza Shah set out to increase the centralization of his regime in Iran and to extend the regime's power in the periphery, and he allocated more resources

48 [

BORDERS AND BRETHREN

to the center. In addition, Reza Shah forced most of the nomads in Iran-many of whom were Turks-to settle. The new regime's extension of government functions into various outlying regions of Iran made contact between members of the minority groups and the Persian-dominated center more intense. Toward the end of the Qajar period, state control outside the capital was weak and most areas of the periphery enjoyed de facto autonomy. Some Azerbaijanis made their first contact with non-Azerbaijanis in Iran in this period. The interaction with the center propelled many Azerbaijanis in Iran to begin to explore their relationship with the center and their relationship with their co-ethnics. Reza Shah also implemented a policy of fostering Iranian nationalism by merging the identity of the Iranian state and nation with those of the Persian people and the Persian language. In this manner, Reza Shah merged state identity with the identity of the largest ethnic group in Iran. As part of this policy, the regime aggressively attempted to assimilate the various ethnic groups in Iran. This policy included closing minoritylanguage schools and publications. This policy hit the Azerbaijanis hardest of all the ethnic minorities in Iran, since they were more urbanized than the other minority ethnic groups and had developed their own institutions and publications in their own language, unlike many of the other ethnic groups. 1 By the 1930s, many places in Azerbaijan were given Persian names, and the authorities put obstacles in the way of those who wished to give their children non-Persian names. Many of those interviewed for this book recounted the almost comical manner in which Azerbaijani teachers, who usually had very distinctive accents in Persian, were forced to conduct their lessons with Azerbaijani students who themselves struggled to answer in Persian. Yet private exchanges with the teachers, such as questions during recess, or greetings when meeting the teacher in the street or at a wedding were always in Azerbaijani. Some interviewees described how they were beaten or fined for speaking Azerbaijani in the classroom. 2 Reza Shah singled out the Azerbaijanis for special discrimination, economic disadvantages, and cultural repression, possibly to punish them for their part in the Khiyabani-led rebellion in 1920.3 In 1937, most

1.

Abrahamian, Iran BetweenTwo Revolutions,p. 163.

2.

See also "Letter from Nosarat Khavani," Varliq(April-June, 1991), p. 93.

3. Homayoun Katouzian, The PoliticalEconomyof Modern Iran (London: Macmillan, 1981), pp. 133, 150.

THE AZERBAIJANIS UNDER THE SOVIET AND PAHLAVI REGIMES

[

49

of Azerbaijan, which had been administered as one Iranian state (iyalat), was divided into two provinces (ostan).4 Some of Azerbaijan's traditional territories were annexed to other Iranian provinces. 5 The poor economic situation of the province in this period-caused largely by Tehran's policies favoring development of the center, specific discrimination against the Azerbaijani provinces, and the severing of direct economic ties with Soviet Azerbaijan and Russia-led to emigration within East Azerbaijan province to Tabriz, and from the Azerbaijani provinces to the center of Iran, mainly to Tehran. A significant portion of Azerbaijan's merchant class moved to Tehran under Reza Shah's reign. A large number of middle-class Azerbaijanis moved to Tehran during World War II, and the largest exodus took place in the 1970s as people went in search of the jobs created by the increased oil revenues. The economy of the Azerbaijani provinces was also damaged because Azerbaijanis could no longer travel to Baku for seasonal work, which had been a major source of income in Iranian Azerbaijan. The migration to central Iran increased contacts between Azerbaijanis and Persians. For some Azerbaijanis this led to assimilation; for many others this interaction accentuated the differences between themselves and the Persian citizens of Iran and hastened the development of their particular Azerbaijani identity. Despite the extreme limitations of the Pahlavi period, some Azerbaijanis still expressed desire for ties with their co-ethnics in Soviet Azerbaijan, which can be an articulation of Azerbaijani identity. One of the most momentous events during this period was the establishment of the autonomous Provincial Government in Iranian Azerbaijan during 1945---46.This local government and its subsequent demise had a major effect on the development of the identity of Azerbaijanis in Iran.

4. Iran was previously divided into four large iyalat (Azerbaijan, Khorasan, Fars and Kerman), which each had their own governor, and numerous smaller velayat. Under the new division of the country, inaugurated between 1937-38, Azerbaijan was divided into two ostans: the Third Province (today known as East Azerbaijan) with Tabriz its capital, and the Fourth Province (today known as West Azerbaijan), its capital Reza'iyeh (formerly Urmiyeh, an important historical name in Azerbaijan, renamed in honor of Reza Shah). Parts of Kurdistan province, including the cities of Mahabad and Sardast, became part of East Azerbaijan. See Atabaki, Azerbaijan:Ethnicityand Autonomy in Twentieth-CenturyIran, p. 59.

5. Shokat Tagieva in interview in "Istoriia odnoi granitsy," Bakinskiirabochii,March 24, 1990, p. 3.

50

I BORDERS

AND BRETHREN

THE AZERBAIJANIS UNDER THE SOVIET AND PAHLAVI REGIMES

Identity in IranianAzerbaijan

I

51

Kasravi's treatment of the origins of the Azerbaijanis in Iran reveals many contradictions. In 1922, for instance, he wrote in the journal al-'Irfan:

During the Pahlavi period, three major trends of identity emerged among the Azerbaijanis in Iran. One group advocated assimilation into Persian culture and language. They associated diversity with inefficiency and unity with progress. While they advocated Persianization of the Azerbaijanis in Iran and the elimination of a separate Azerbaijani identity, it would be difficult to call them Persian nationalists. They tended to see Persian culture and language in a utilitarian way, as a tool to unite all the citizens of Iran and promote the implementation of their social and political programs. For most there was no emotional identification as Persians; rather, they identified as Iranians and felt that they were among the inheritors of ancient Iranian culture and history. This stance was prominent among Azerbaijani intellectuals from the 1920s through the beginning of the 1940s. During World War II and after this position became less popular. A second position advocated an Iranian state identity and Azerbaijani ethnic identity. It aimed for Azerbaijani cultural autonomy within the Iranian state. Proponents saw Iranian identity as predominantly supra-ethnic, and did not equate it with Persian identity. The formation of the Provincial Government of Azerbaijan (1945-46) by the leaders of the Firqeh-iDimukrat during the Allied occupation of Iran in World War II was a manifestation of this conception of identity. However, some of the activists of the Provincial Government identified more as Azerbaijanis than as Iranians. A third trend was the emergence of class identity, held by proponents of socialist and communist ideologies. Days after the abdication of Reza Shah in September 1941, the Tudeh Communist Party was founded. Under the Pahlavi regime, many Azerbaijanis pursued universalistic ideologies, which espoused eliminating ethnic differences, partially in the hope that this would end discrimination against members of the minority groups. Orthodox Marxists, such as the majority of the Azerbaijani Tudeh members in the 1940s, advocated Persianization as a means to achieve their political goals. In contrast, a second group of communists advocated retaining Azerbaijani cultural autonomy within Iran.

In his later writings, he adopted the opposite view of the ethnic origins of the Azerbaijanis, claiming that they and the other Turkic speakers in Iran were actually Iranians who had been forced to speak Turkish beginning in the tenth century. Kasravi is often referred to as the "father of Iranian nationalism"; his ideology is instrumental. He viewed unity and the formation of large units within a state as a fundamental key to achieving modernization.7 By advocating a utilitarian approach to the linguistic and cultural assimilation of the Azerbaijanis, he echoed the statements of other Azerbaijanis that preceded him, such as Talebzade. Kasravi' s preference for Persian over Azerbaijani or other minority languages in Iran was not motivated by an emotional attachment to Persian: "These languages are all good, but their existence within one state causes dissension. It is always best to have one common language in a nation." 8 Kasravi wrote that Azerbaijani, in its own right, "has all that a language needs in order to be a refined language, despite the fact that it is not a literary language; indeed, it meets within it all the criteria and has qualities that distinguish it over many refined languages." 9 Kasravi wrote many works dealing with the ancient and modern history of Azerbaijan. Yet, his ideologically laden view of history and his vehement opposition to expressions of Azerbaijani nationalism suggest that he did not objectively reflect events and forces in Azerbaijan. According to Abrahamian, for example, Kasravi' s opposition to the use of minority languages was so intense that he even distorted facts in his own autobiography: in describing how, as a cleric in Azerbaijan, he refused to preach

ASSIMILATION

6.

INTO PERSIAN-BASED

IRANIAN

IDENTITY

The most outspoken Azerbaijani advocate of Persianization was Ahmad Kasravi. Kasravi published chiefly in the 1920s to the 1940s. He fanatically opposed any form of autonomy for different sectors in Iran, whether based on class, ethnicity, or religion. He defined a nation as the inhabitants of a territorial unit, and he rejected diversity within those units.

The Turkish speakers among the Iranian population who were spread through every region of Iran were not Persians who were forced to abandon their original language and forgot it and learned Turkish. No one spoke Turkish as a result of being vanquished by the Turkish conquerors over their lands, as was the opinion spread throughout Iran.6

Kasravi, al-'Irfan,pp. 121-123.

7. Abrahamian refers to Kasravi as the "integrative nationalist of Iran." See Abrahamian, "Kasravi: The Integrative Nationalist of Iran," pp. 97-131. 8. Ahmad Kasravi, "Concerning Languages," Parcham-iHaftagi (April 22, 1944), quoted in Ibid., p. 115. 9.

Kasravi, al-'Irfan.

52

I

to his followers in Arabic which he opposed as a foreign influence on Iran, he does not mention that he preached in Azerbaijani, not Persian. 10 In Kasravi's works Tarikh-iMashrutah-iIran and Tarikh-iHijdahSalah-i Azarbayjan,he focuses on his view that the destiny of Azerbaijan is with the rest of Iran and that the autonomy movements hurt Iran's reform efforts. His attacks on the autonomy movements and discussion of the issue of Azerbaijan's relations with the center show that Azerbaijanis' connection with the rest of Iran was an important question at the time. Among the prominent Azerbaijanis who advocated Persian assimilation was Dr. Taqi Arani, a prominent figure in "the Fifty-three" Movement in Iran.11Arani's views seem to have been based on orthodox Marxism and his view that centralization was a key to state efficiency. Arani also saw events in Azerbaijan as an integral part of the history of Iran. Tudehactivist Khalil Maleki shared Arani' s support for the Persianization of Azerbaijanis and often angered his fellow Azerbaijanis by refusing to talk with them in his native language. 12 Most of the Azerbaijanis who advocated cultural assimilation in Iran, such as Arani and Maleki, had been educated in Iran and had not spent much time in north Azerbaijan. Conversely, most of those who had spent significant time in north Azerbaijan, such as Jafar Pishaveri, generally emphasized Azerbaijani identity, often together with socialist or liberal goals. In the 1940s, the Tudeh leadership, which was composed mainly of Persians and assimilated Azerbaijanis who lived in the center of Iran, were often confronted with grassroots demands from Azerbaijanis for ethnic autonomy and a solution to the ethnic-based conflicts that broke out among workers, evidence of the tensions between different ethnic groups in Iran. 13 Conflict within the Tudeh leadership emerged in 1944 over the refusal of Azerbaijani delegates to the First Congress of the Tudeh to address the delegates in Persian; instead, they chose to speak in their native Azerbaijani. In its political activities, the Tudehsucceeded in reach10. W. Stele, "The Intellectual Development of Ahmad Kasravi" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton, 1966), quoted by Abrahamian, "Kasravi: The Integrative Nationalist of Iran," p. 129. A recently unearthed document reveals that Kasravi admitted that Persian was not his native language. See Kasravi, al-'Irfan. 11. "The Fifty-three" refers to a group of 53 men who were arrested in 1937 and accused of Marxist activities. Most of them were Persians and this was not an ethnic-based group. This group became the nucleus of the Tudeh Party. 12. Abrahamian, "Communism and Communalism in Iran," p. 305. His insistence was almost comical; Maleki spoke Persian with a strong Azerbaijani accent. 13.

THE AZERBAIJANIS

BORDERS AND BRETHREN

Ibid., p. 302.

UNDER THE SOVIET AND PAHLAVI REGIMES

I 53

ing people beyond the elite level and it discovered that many Iranian citizens could not even speak Persian. 14 Azerbaijanis who espoused Azerbaijani nationalism, such as 'Ali Shabistari, the editor of the party newspaper in the province, who had spent most of his life in north Azerbaijan, were ousted from the Tudehin this period. 15 WORLD

WAR II-AZERBAIJAN!

TIES BETWEEN

NORTH

AUTONOMY

IN IRAN

AND THE RENEWAL

OF

AND SOUTH

The Allied invasion and consequent abdication of Reza Shah in 1941 ushered in a period of political liberalization in Iran that tolerated open political activity and made it possible to publish many ideological and cultural works that had been written earlier. Some of the publications and activities revealed that Reza Shah's centralization policies had generated much resentment in Iran; many of these resentments were voiced by the Azerbaijanis in Iran. Under the Allied occupation of Iran during World War II, Azerbaijan was in the Soviet sector, and there was a renewal of contacts between Azerbaijanis on both sides of the Araz River. Many border installations and customs posts were removed, facilitating direct contact. 16 The Soviets placed predominately Azerbaijani-speaking troops in northern Iran and sent Azerbaijanis from Soviet Azerbaijan to operate Soviet propaganda organs in Iran. The Soviet Azerbaijanis led the production of many Azerbaijani-language publications, such as the newspaper Vatan Yolunda (published in Arabic characters). A common theme of these publications was the shared heritage of the Azerbaijanis on both sides of the Araz and the importance of renewing ties between them. Moscow clearly had an interest in this policy; it wished to promote admiration for the Soviet Union among the ethnic minorities in Iran, and to encourage ethnicbased sentiments as a possible lever for pressure on Tehran. However, it seems that the main proponents of this policy were from Baku, and many of them used it to advance their own ethnic-based agenda. In September 1945, the Firqeh Dimukrat Azarbayjan movement was formally established in Iran under the leadership of Jafar Pishaveri. The Azerbaijani branch of the TudehParty almost immediately defected to the Firqeh.The Firqeh,like the Tudeh, was communist and Soviet-oriented. 14.

Ibid., p. 303.

15. Afterwards, Shabistari continued to publish Aziirbayjanas the organ of the Firqeh. Shabistari also founded the Society for Azerbaijan, which was dedicated to the preservation of Azerbaijani culture and language. 16. Ivar Spector, The Soviet Union and the Muslim World 1917-1958 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1959), p. 197.

54

I

BORDERS AND BRETHREN

THE AZERBAIJANIS UNDER THE SOVIET AND PAHLAVI REGIMES

I 55

However, it advocated language rights for the ethnic minorities in Iran, and differed from the Tudeh on the degree of centralization that Iran should have in relation to the provinces, and on the question of priority of ethnic identity over class identity. The Firqehadvocated Azerbaijani unity more than class conflict. The founding nucleus of the Firqehconsisted of Azerbaijanis who had spent significant time in Soviet Azerbaijan. In contrast, most of the Tudehactivists lived in the Persian-dominated center of Iran. The new organization adopted the same name as Khiyabani' s political movement to illustrate continuity; indeed, many of its founding members had been part of the Khiyabani revolt. In its first declaration, the Firqehdefended Iranian Azerbaijan's right to have its own provincial councils and to use the Azerbaijani language in its schools, among other points. In October 1945, protected from Tehran's wrath by the Soviet troops that occupied northern Iran, the Firqehled an almost bloodless revolt for control of southern Azerbaijan, and established the Provincial Government of Azerbaijan. In January, a similar revolt was led by Kurdish activists, who established a provincial government in Mahabad, the capital of the Kurdish province. Most Western accounts of the revolt in Azerbaijan and the short-lived provincial government in 1945-1946 tend to present it as a Soviet puppet-state, not a local phenomenon. 17 While Soviet support was clearly essential in providing opportunity and tools, many of the goals and demands of the provincial government were primarily local. Initially, local support for the provincial government was quite extensive, and at first, most of the population supported the measures taken in the spheres of economy, infrastructure, and status of the Azerbaijani language.18 In contrast to most external references to the Provincial Government, its leaders never referred to it as the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR). This name creates the impression that the Provincial Government was simply a Soviet fiction instead of the fruit of independent autonomous aspirations. In its first statement as a provincial government, the Firqehleaders declared that the Azerbaijanis were a distinct nation (millet). They also stated that they did not aspire to secede from Iran. They voiced three ma-

Linking themselves to Azerbaijani history, the new regime called their military forces Babak,after the infamous leader of the revolt against Arab rule in Azerbaijan, and Qizilbash,the name of the Turkic military forces of the Safavid regime. Under the Provincial Government, the Azerbaijani language was used in the schools and the Azerbaijan University, the first provincial uni-

17. Seefor instance,RobertRossow,"TheBattleof Azerbaijan,1946," The Middle East Journal,Vol.10 (Winter1956), pp. 17-32, and RichardW. Cottam,Nationalism in Iran: UpdatedThrough 1978 (Pittsburgh:Universityof PittsburghPress,1979), p. 118.

20.

18. Many middle-classmerchants,however,moved to Tehranin this period, evidently due to the severanceof economicties with the center,where their majorbusiness were.

21. National Congress of Azerbaijan,"The Declarationof National Autonomy," Azerbaijan,Vol.26 (November1945), quoted in Abrahamian,Iran BetweenTwo Revolutions, pp. 400-401.

jor demands: the use of the Azerbaijani language in local schools and government offices; the retention of tax revenues for the development of the region; and the establishment of the provincial assemblies promised in constitution. 19 The Firqeh'sleadership denounced Tehran for disregarding their provincial grievances and proclaimed that their language, history, and culture had endowed the people of Azerbaijan with a "distinct national identity." 20 In its proposed program, presented in November and reaffirmed by the National Majlis in Tabriz in December 1945, Azerbaijan is clearly referred to as a nation (millet). At the same time, the program states a commitment to the preservation of the integrity of Iran. This declaration reflects the Firqehleaders' national identity as Azerbaijanis, within a political framework of Iran. The program states: 1. The people of Azerbaijan have been endowed by history with distinct national, linguistic, cultural and traditional characteristics. These characteristics entitle Azerbaijan to freedom and autonomy, as promised to all nations by the Atlantic Charter. 2. The Nation (millet) of Azerbaijan has no desire to separate itself from Iran or to harm the territorial integrity of Iran, for it is aware of the dose cultural, education, and political ties that exist between itself and other provinces and is proud of the great sacrifices it has made for the creation of modern Iran. 3. The Nation of Azerbaijan officially and openly declares that it has the right to form its own government, like other living nations, and to administer its internal and national affairs, observing the integrity of Iran. 4. The Nation of Azerbaijan has a special attachment to its national and mother language. It realizes that the imposition of another language on the people of Azerbaijan has hindered their historical progress. This Congress therefore instructs its ministers to use the Azerbaijani language in schools and government offices as soon as possible.21

19.

Abrahamian,Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 399. Ibid., p. 217.

56

I

BORDERS AND BRETHREN

versity established in Iran, was established in Tabriz; it conducted lessons on Azerbaijani language and literature. 22 A radio station broadcasting in Azerbaijani was also opened in Tabriz.23 In the summer of 1946, the authorities published a series of textbooks that dealt intensively with Azerbaijan's history and culture. In this series, only one reference is made to Iran. 24 During this period, Azerbaijani literature flourished and Azerbaijani-language plays resumed in 1941, becoming quite popular. Among the staged performances were: Shah Ismail, Arshin Mal Alan, Koroghlu, Mashdi Ebvad,and Anamin Kitabi.25 Like Khiyabani before him, Pishaveri did threaten to secede from Iran if Tehran did not meet the provinces' demands, though he had seemed initially committed to the preservation of the territorial integrity of Iran. 26 The local population was enthusiastic about the Provincial Government's policy toward the Azerbaijani language and culture, but many Azerbaijanis-especially those who had commercial ties to Tehran and other cities in the center-became increasingly apprehensive about rumors that the Provincial Government intended to secede. 27 In September 1946, the Pishaveri government unveiled a new flag for the province and the Iranian national anthem was abolished in the territory.28 In the second half of 1946, local support for the Pishaveri regime began to wane as the province's economy deteriorated due to its isolation from the Iranian economy. After the withdrawal of Soviet troops from north Iran in May, Tehran could now attack the provincial government in Tabriz. On December 12, 1946, the local government in Azerbaijan surrendered to troops from Tehran. The terms of submission reflect the importance the Azerbaijanis attached to retaining language rights and the economic autonomy of the province: the demands included the right to educate their children in Shahrzad Mojab and Amir Hassanpour, "The Politics of Nationality and Ethnic Diversity," in Saeed Rahnema and Sorab Behdad, Iran after the Revolution:Crisesof an Islamic State (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996), p. 232. 22.

23. Javad Heyat, "Regression of Azeri Language and Literature under the Oppressive Period of Pahlavi and its Renaissance after the Islamic Revolution," First International Conferenceof Turkic Studies (Bloomington, Ind.: May 19-22, 1983), p. 11. 24.

Atabaki, Azerbaijan:Ethnicity and Autonomy in TwentiethCentury Iran, p. 167.

25.

Heyat, "Regression of Azeri Language and Literature," p. 12.

26. Aziirbayjan,Vol. 5, No. 9 (1945), quoted in Swietochowski, Russia and Azerbaijan: A Borderlandin Transition,p. 143. 27.

Ghods, A ComparativeHistoricalStudy, p. 563.

Jody Ememi-Yeganeh, "Iran vs. Azerbaijan (1945-46: Divorce, Separation or Reconciliation?)" CentralAsian Survey, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1984), p. 15. 28.

THE AZERBAIJANIS

UNDER THE SOVIET AND PAHLAVI REGIMES

I 57

their native language; the retention of 75 percent of tax revenues collected in the province; and the allocation of 25 percent of the customs revenue from the province to the Azerbaijan University. 29 Tehran did not honor this agreement. Cultural repression against the Azerbaijanis became even harsher. In addition, Tehran's troops executed thousands of Azerbaijanis, and many others were forced to flee.30 Many members of the Pishaveri regime and cultural figures fled to Soviet Azerbaijan, where they later fostered ties with Iranian Azerbaijan and continued the development of their common culture, symbols, and literature. Many of the prmninent poets of Soviet Azerbaijan in the post-World War II period were from Iranian Azerbaijan. The loss of fainily members in the purges that followed the demise of the Provincial Government and the forced exile and escape of many Azerbaijani activists became an important factor in shaping the identity of the Azerbaijanis in Iran. It instilled in many a sense of hatred toward the Pahlavi regime; according to activists, this hatred propelled some Iranian Azerbaijanis to take leading roles in the 1979 revolution against the Shah. Even after Moscow withdrew its forces from north Iran as part of a deal with Tehran, Baku continued to produce many literary and other works that expressed a strong desire to renew ties with Iranian Azerbaijanis and condemned the cultural repression of the Azerbaijanis in Iran. In 1947, for example, Baku released a film in the Azerbaijani language about Iranian Azerbaijan, dramatically showing the repression of the Azerbaijanis in Iran and the restrictions on the use their native tongue. Throughout the film, the Araz River is portrayed as a strong symbol of the separation of the Azerbaijanis. The continued production of cultural materials expressing a desire for ties between the Azerbaijanis after the Soviet withdrawal and Moscow's change in policy toward Iranian Azerbaijan shows that this activity had roots in Baku, and was not just ordered by Moscow.

29. "The Agreement Between the Iranian Central Government and the Representative of Azerbaijan (June 13, 1946), P.O. 371/52740, Tabriz Diary, June 1946, as it appears in Atabaki, Azerbaijan:Ethnicity and Autonomy in Twentieth-CenturyIran, Appendix.

Amirali Lakhrudi, chairman of the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan (the successor of Pishaveri's party, which moved its headquarters to Baku in 1946), and a witness to the December 12, 1945, takeover in Tabriz, stated that when Tehran retook the city, 30,000 people were killed and 300,000 deported, and 10,000 emigrated to Soviet Azerbaijan. Zerkalo,December 2, 1995, p. 8. Other Azerbaijani participants in the Provincial Government have estimated that more than 10,000 Azerbaijanis were killed in the takeover. Iranian government reports estimate that 800 were killed. See, Atabaki, Azerbaijan:Ethnicity and Autonomy in Twentieth-centuryIran, p. 220. 30.

58

I

BORDERS AND BRETHREN

THE AZERBAIJANIS

In the post-World War II period, during the premiership of Muhammad Mossadiq, some political restrictions were relaxed in Iran, allowing limited Azerbaijani literary activity, mainly within the framework of Azerbaijani cultural societies centered in Tehran.31 Examples of these are the AzerbaijanDostlariJam'iyati(the Society of Friends of Azerbaijan), and the Azerbaijan YazichilarHey'ati (The Association of Writers of Azerbaijan). The publication of a bimonthly literary periodical in Azerbaijani, EdebiEserler,was begun in 1951 by Sayyed Hasan Qorashiyan. 32 This and other Azerbaijani-language papers were forced to cease publication with the end of Mossadiq's premiership. The most important Azerbaijani literary piece written in the postWorld War II period in Iran is the poem by Muhammad Huseyn Shahriyar, HeydarBabayaSalam(Greetings to Heydar Baba).33 This poem, published in Tabriz in 1954 and written in colloquial Azerbaijani, became quite popular among the Azerbaijanis in Iran and in Soviet Azerbaijan and in many places in the Turkic-speaking world. In HeydarBabayaSalam, Shahriyar expressed his identity as an Azerbaijani attachment to his homeland, language, and culture. Heydar Baba is a hill near Khoshknab, the native village of the poet. ON THE EVE OF REVOLUTION

IN IRAN

Despite the extreme limitations imposed on ethnic minorities under Muhammed Reza Pahlavi's regime throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Azerbaijanis in Iran continued to explore their collective identity often through literature, folklore, and children's stories, with which it was easier to circumvent the censor. This subject was also examined in political manuscripts that were distributed unofficially and formally published after the fall of the Shah's regime. In the 1960s, many Azerbaijanis were active in left-wing movements and promoted both Azerbaijani culture and leftist political ideas. Among them were Samad Behrengi and Gholam Husein Sa'edi. Both were concerned with the situation of Iran's poor and opposed the Pahlavi regime. Behrengi's stories reflect his abhorrence of the income gaps in Iranian soMossadiq was of Qajar origin. He had served as Governor of Azerbaijan Province and he spoke Azerbaijani. 31.

Sayyed Hasan Qorashiyan had served in a senior position in the Pishaveri regime. See Berengian, Azeri and Persian Literary Works in Twentieth-Century Iranian Azerbaijan,p. 189. 32.

Miihammiid Huseyn Shiihriyar, "Heydar Babaya Salam," (1954), in Yalan Danya (Baku: Aziirbayjan Ensiklopediyasi:, 1993). Shahriyar was born in Tabriz in 1906.

33.

UNDER THE SOVIET AND PAHLAVI REGIMES

I 59

ciety and the need to change, if necessary by violent means. 34 Behrengi was outspoken in his drive to preserve Azerbaijani language, literature, and culture. In his works, he often mocked Azerbaijanis who tried to assimilate into Persian culture and who had given up their native language. 35 In one of Most notable in this respect is his poem Agha-yeCox Bakhtiar. his most famous works, Kand va Kav Dar Masa'el-e Tarbiati-yeIran (An Investigation into the Educational Problems of Iran), Behrengi criticizes how children in Tabriz are forced to call their fathers by the Persian word of endearment, baba, instead of the Azerbaijani ata or dada. 36 He insisted that his colleagues call his native language Azeri, and not Turki, as the regime referred to it. 37 Behrengi published collections of Azerbaijani folk-tales and primers for teaching reading to Azerbaijani school children, which he was forced to translate into Persian after his request to publish them in Azerbaijani was rejected. 38 He often wrote in the style and language of Azerbaijani folk tales. According to his colleagues, Behrengi felt an ethnic and linguistic connection to the Azerbaijanis in the north and was "aware of this separating sickle which is (the) Araz." 39 Upon his death by drowning in the Araz River, the writer Al-e Ahmad eulogized, "He has entered the Araz! This separating sickle, this bisector of one culture and one language. You see, I had known that these names were as sacred to Samad as Medina is to his older brothers." 40 Here, Al-e Ahmad referred allegorically to the change in national identities from one generation to the other, from Muslim to Azerbaijani.

34. See, for instance, "Twenty-Four Restless Hours" and "The Bald Pigeon-Keeper" in Samad Behrengi, The BlackFish and Other Modern PersianStories (Washington, D.C.: Three Continents Press, 1987). 35. Samad Behrengi, "Agha-ye Cox Bakhtiar" (A Very Lucky Man), unpublished poem.

Quoted in Brad Hanson, "The 'Westoxication' of Iran: Depictions and Reactions of Behrengi, Al-e Ahmad, and Shari'ati," InternationalJournal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 15, No. 1 (February, 1983), p. 5. 36.

Jalal Al-e Ahmad, "Samad and the Folk Legend," in Michael C. Hillmann, ed., Iranian Society:An Anthology of Writings by JalalAl-e Ahmad (Lexington, Ky.: Mazda Press, 1982), p. 138. 37.

One of the folktale collections is Afsanaha-yeAzarbayjan (Tales of Azerbaijan), translated from Azerbaijani into Persian. Vol. 1 (Tabriz, 1965). Vol. 2 (Tehran, 1968) which was co-authored with fellow Azerbaijani writer, Behruz Dihqani, who was killed under torture in a Savak prison. 38.

39.

Al-e Ahmad, "Samad and the Folk Legend," p. 138.

40.

Ibid., pp. 141-142.

60

I BORDERS

AND BRETHREN

Behrengi's friend and colleague, Gholam Husein Sa'edi, also dealt with the position of the poor of Iran in his works, which are strongly anti-clerical and anti-religious. Like Behrengi, Sa' edi wrote regularly in an Azerbaijani supplement to the Tabriz weekly, Mahad Azadi, a legal Azerbaijani publication. In contrast to many of Sa'edi's earlier works, which are set in Azerbaijan, the setting for most of his later writings is in the south of Iran, in the Persian Gulf coastal area. 41 Behrengi wrote that Sa'edi's works reflect his Azerbaijani spirit. 42 Close friends of Sa'edi spoke of the importance Sa' edi attached to his Azerbaijani identity, and his hope of producing a journal in the Azerbaijani language in Iran. 43 In 1964-65, a group of Azerbaijani intellectuals in Tabriz, encouraged by a visit from Al-e Ahmad, organized an Azerbaijan cultural group. Among their activities was the compiling of an Azerbaijani dictionary and the composition of songs in Azerbaijani, with accompaniments for Azerbaijani instruments. Among the participants in this group was the author Reza Baraheni, who wrote in this period about his self-identity as an "Azerbaijani Turk" in Iran, and about the cultural suppression of ethnic minorities under the Pahlavi regime. These themes appeared in his works published in the late 1960s and early 1970s.44 In CrownedCannibals, Baraheni wrote how Azerbaijanis in Iran were not even allowed inscriptions on their tombstones in their native language, and described the punishments inflicted on teachers taught in Azerbaijani. 45 Baraheni explains why he struggled for the rights of the ethnic minorities in Iran in the Persian language and how Persianization had affected him, and his national self-identity: I came to feel that I had been cheated out of the most valuable aspect of my identity. I came to recognize my enemy, the present establishment in Iran. I 41. For example, Pani Namayishnamah; az ingilab-i mashrutit. (Tehran: Sazman-i Intisharat-i Ashrafi, 1345 (1966). 42. See Samad Behrengi, "A Look at Today's Literature: A Study of (Gholam Hosayn Sa'edi's) the Mourners of Bayal," in Thomas M. Ricks, ed., CriticalPerspectiveson Modem PersianLiterature(Washington, D.C.: Three Continents Press, 1984), p. 351. 43.

THE AZERBAIJANIS

UNDER THE SOVIET AND PAHLAVI REGIMES

I

61

raised my voice, trying to strike back at the enemy who had done all he could to paralyze the language of my entire consciousness. I could not hit back in the language of which I had been deprived through an historical necessity devised by the enemy. I took the sword of the enemy in my hands. 46 The enemy, by imposing his conditions on me, had given me training useful in combat. The enemy's strongest weapon was his language, his culture, and these I had learned as much as any of the songs of the daughters of the enemy. I tried to be the tongue of my oppressed nationality in the language of the oppressor. Linguistically speaking, the deep structure of my revolt against the establishment was in the language of my own nationality, but under the given historical conditions the deep structure had transformed itself into the surface structure of the Persian language. I tried to sing in the words of the master against the dominion of that very master. Now the falcon could not hear the falconer, the center could hold no longer. I was free.47 In the 1960s, two prominent Azerbaijani thinkers, 'Ali Tabrizli and 'Ali Reza Nabdel, wrote treatises on the Azerbaijani national question in Iran. Neither were allowed to officially publish their works in Iran, but both spread their ideas in underground literature among opposition groups in Iran and among Azerbaijani youth. 48 Both Azerbaijani authors, though ultimately representing two very different points of view, agreed on the irrelevance of arguments about the ethnic origins of the Azerbaijanis to the contemporary national question in Iran. Official Iranian literature published at this time emphasized that the Azerbaijanis were of Persian ethnic stock in attempt to delegitimize separate identity. According to Nabdel, "Chauvinists try to make the most of the fact that the population of Azerbaijan had spoken Persian, let's say eight hundred years ago, and they imagine that having proved this fact ... they have already solved the crucial problem of our time." 49 Nonetheless, Nabdel, who was a radical Marxist, condemned those, such as Pishaveri, who raised ethnic-based grievances, instead of only class issues. He wrote, "No nation is superior to others, and there must be unity of the masses for class struggle. Any other method of struggle is doomed to fail. Death to Persian chauvinism, death to provincial nationalism. Provincial nationalism in-

Based on conversations with close friends of Gholam Sa'edi.

44. Among Baraheni's works that deal with the question of ethnic minorities in Iran published during the Pahlavi regime are Masculine History, written in 1969 and published in 1972; his poems, "The Forest and the City" (1963) and "The Culture of the Oppressor and the Culture of the Oppressed" (1973) and Ta/adar Mes (Tehran: Zaman, 1968). 45. Reza Baraheni, The CrownedCannibals:Writings on Repressionin Iran (New York: Vintage Books, 1977), p. 88.

46.

He refers here to the Persian language.

47.

Baraheni, The CrownedCannibals,p. 113.

48. Nasib Nasibzade, "A. R. Nabdel i A. Tabrizli: Dva uklona v ideologii natsional'no-osvoboditel'nogo dvizheniia azerbaidzhantsev v Irane," AVAz.SSR Izvestiia, Seriia istoriia filosofii, No. 2 (1988), p. 60. 49.

A.R. Nabdel, Aziirbayjanva masala-yimelli, p. 4, quoted in ibid., p. 61.

62

I

BORDERS AND BRETHREN

jures Marxism." 50 Thus, for Nabdel, primary identity was class identity, and he rejected both Persianization and Azerbaijani nationalism. Tabrizli emphasized a more Azerbaijani and Turkic identity. He idealized the ancient "Turks" of Azerbaijan in many books glorifying the history of Azerbaijan, and saw the struggles between Turks and Persians as a major theme in Iranian history.51 Tabrizli seemed to support the preservation of Azerbaijani ethnic identity within a reformed supra-ethnic Iranian framework. He maintained that "each ethnicity is distinguished from the other by its language, literature, history, and culture, but all of them together constitute the 'Iranian nation."' 52 At the same time, Tabrizli used the term "Turkish nation of Iran" to refer to the Azerbaijanis, and claimed that of all the names used to describe his ethnic group-Turk, Azerbaijani Turk, Azeri, Azerbaijani, etc.-the name Turk was the most appropriate. 53 In the 1960s, Tehran launched a literacy campaign throughout the country, partly as cover for a Persianization campaign aimed especially at Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. The campaign indicates that the Azerbaijani language continued to be widely spoken in Azerbaijan. Many Azerbaijanis commented in interviews that most residents of East Azerbaijan Province could not speak Persian on the eve of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. In the 1970s, extensive development of infrastructure, such as roads and communications, was conducted in Iran. Abrahamian claims that technological advances helped consolidate separate ethnic identity in Iran: These developments, together with the commercialization of agriculture and the settling of some tribes, produced two paradoxical results. In the central provinces, national identity took root in the countryside as the rural population lost its traditional insularity and forged links with both the towns and the central government. In the peripheral provinces, however, ethnicity grew as communal identity based on one's immediate village and tribe gave way to a broader identity based on one's language and culture. Villagers and tribesmen who had in the past viewed themselves as belonging to small local AR. Nabdel, Azarbayjanva masala-yimelli, quoted in Ghods, A ComparativeHistoricalStudy, p. 688.

50.

THE AZERBAIJANIS UNDER THE SOVIET AND PAHLAVI REGIMES

communities now saw themselves as Kurds, Turkomans, Arabs, Lurs, Baluchis, or Azeris.54 The rise of oil prices in the international market brought higher revenues to Tehran and created many new jobs in the capital that led to a large migration of Azerbaijanis from West and East Azerbaijan to Tehran in the 1970s.55 The rate of migration from rural settlements in the Azerbaijan provinces to Tehran and Tabriz was the highest in Iran. 56 Communal cohesiveness among many of the Azerbaijanis who went to Tehran remained. In the slum neighborhoods of south Tehran, Azerbaijanis and other Turkic-speakers continued to live together more than other communal groups. 57 Many of these Azerbaijanis worked in the construction industry, which further contributed to their cohesiveness. 58 Migration to the center strongly affected Azerbaijani collective identity in Iran. For the first time, many saw the gaps in income and opportunity between their provinces and the Persian-dominated center, and encountered prejudice and neglect by the regime. The Azerbaijanis were commonly the subject of ridicule and jokes by Persians. Far from their native province, many Azerbaijanis felt a longing for their native culture, and thus grew to appreciate it more. At the same time, many Azerbaijanis in Tehran succeeded in assimilating into Persian culture. Many married into Persian families, and during the Pahlavi regime, Persianized Azerbaijanis formed a large segment of the Iranian elite. For instance, the Shah's wife, Farah, is of Azerbaijani origin and often spoke in the language with Azerbaijani guests at the palace. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Shah's regime implemented social and economic programs that increased the gaps between the Persiandominated center of the country and the Azerbaijanis (and the other eth54.

Abrahamian, Iran BetweenTwo Revolutions,p. 428.

55. From 1971 to 1976, 601,200 people over the age of five migrated from East Azerbaijan to Tehran. At the same time, 113,600 arrived from West Azerbaijan. Estimates of the Azerbaijani-speaking population in the Iranian capital reached 1.5 to 2 million. See Plan Organization, Statistical Center: Censusof Populationof Housing,Tehran Sharestan (Tehran Plan Organization, 1979), quoted in Akbar Aghajanian, "Ethnic Inequality in Iran: An Overview," InternationalJournal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 5 (1983), p. 223; and Swietochowski, Russia and Azerbaijan:A Borderlandin Transition,p. 178.

His books include Shah Isma'il, Vurgun Azerbayjan, Babak, and Atropat. See Berengian, Azeri and PersianLiterary Worksin Twentieth-CenturyIranian Azerbaijan,p. 195.

~6-

52. Tabrizli in Nasibzade, "A. R. Nabdel i A. Tabrizli: Dva uklona v ideologii natsional'no osvoboditel'nogo dvizheniia azerbaidzhantsev v Irane," p. 63.

57.

Ibid., p. 65.

58.

Sabri Tabrizi, Iran: A Child's Story, A Man's Experience,p. 243.

51.

53.

Ibid.

I 63

Farh~~ Kazemi, Povertyand Revolutionin Iran: TheMigrant Poor,UrbanMarginality and Politics(New York: New York University Press, 1980), p. 30.

64 I BORDERS AND BRETHREN

nic minorities). Moreover, the ethnic minorities in the provinces gained little from the overall improvement of the Iranian economy that came with the oil boom, which made the distribution of resources among the ethnic communities more unequal. 59 The state mainly invested oil profits in the industrial sector, which was Persian-dominated, further enlarging the income gap with the predominantly agricultural minorities. 60 By 1975, half of Iran's manufactured goods were produced in Tehran, where only 22 percent of the country's industrial labor force lived. Relative to the center, Azerbaijan was predominantly agricultural. In Tehran, for every worker employed in manufacturing, 0.7 were employed in agriculture. In East Azerbaijan, on the other hand, the ratio was 1:2.6 and in West Azerbaijan 1:13. In contrast to Persians, Azerbaijanis in the provinces were disadvantaged by almost every common standard of measurement, although less so than the Baluchis and Kurds. For instance, in the mid-1970s the literacy rate in Tehran was 62 percent, and 27 percent in East Azerbaijan. The percentage of children attending school was 74 percent in Tehran, but 44 percent in West Azerbaijan. In the mid-1970s, Tehran had one doctor for every 974 people, one dentist per 5,626, and one nurse per 1,820 people. In contrast, East Azerbaijan had one doctor per 5,589, one dentist per 66,156, and one nurse per 12,712.61 In addition, an estimated 75 percent of the Persian households had electricity, compared with 25 percent of the Azerbaijani households. 62 However, government allocations strongly favored the Persian-dominated center of the country. For instance, in 1972-73, the central province, with 20.7 percent of the country's population, received 32.7 percent of the budget; East Azerbaijan, with 10 percent of the population, received only 4.8 percent of the budget. 63 Abrahamian claims that the resentments created by these ethnic and class inequalities were hidden in the early 1970s, but once "cracks appeared in the Pahlavi regime, they rushed forth into a torrent to engulf the whole sodety." 64 An expression of this resentment is that Azerbaijanis 59.

Aghajanian, "Ethnic Inequality in Iran," p. 222.

60.

Ibid, p. 221.

61.

Abrahamian, Iran BetweenTwo Revolutions,p. 449.

62.

Aghajanian, "Ethnic Inequality in Iran," pp. 216-217.

63. Ibid., p. 221. See also Nasib Nasibzade, "K ekonomicheskoi politike shakhskogo pravitel'stva v Iranskom Azerbaizhane v 60-70-kh godakh," Problemyekonomicheskogo razvitiiastran Azii i SevernoiAfriki (Moscow: Nauka, 1983). 64.

Abrahamian, Iran BetweenTwo Revolutions,p. 449.

THE AZERBAIJANIS UNDER THE SOVIET AND PAHLAVI REGIMES

I 65

were the main founders of underground opposition groups to the Shah, such as the Mujahedin.65 Other Azerbaijanis formed the opposition group Nahzat-i Radikal (the Radical Movement). 66 On the eve of the revolutionary period of the 1970s, the regime made some concessions to the Azerbaijani provinces' demands for local language use. These concessions included the publication of a few books in Azerbaijani and permission for some lectures at Tabriz University to be conducted in the Azerbaijani language.

SovietAzerbaijan:Institutionalizationof Identity After the establishment of the Soviet Union, Moscow attempted to mobilize the non-Russian peoples to support the new regime. 67 The Soviet Union encouraged the development of ethnic groups' literature, though with heavy censorship on the content of works. Thus, Moscow facilitated the development of Azerbaijani literature and culture. The Latin alphabet was officially adopted in Soviet Azerbaijan in 1924, predating its adoption by the Republic of Turkey in 1928.68 In the 1930s, though, Stalin's purges stifled independent cultural and political expression in almost any form throughout the Soviet Union. Between 1934 and 1937, almost all the members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan were executed. Among the first to be killed were the past members of the Himmet, who had founded the Azerbaijani Communist Party. Moscow's extreme secularization campaigns accelerated the weakening of Azerbaijanis' and other Soviet Muslims' ties to Islam, and especially to its clerical institutions. In addition, Stalin had severely limited direct contacts between Azerbaijanis across the border. During World War II and the Soviet occupation of north Iran,

65.

Ibid., p. 489.

66.

Ibid., p. 504.

67. For an excellent discussion of Soviet nationality policies, see Ronald Grigor Suny, The Revengeof the Past:Nationalism,Revolutionand the Collapseof the Soviet Union (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993). 68. In 1940 Moscow imposed the Cyrillic alphabet on Azerbaijan. Some authors claim that Ataturk's decision to adopt the Latin alphabet in the Republic of Turkey was influenced by the Azerbaijani precedent. See Hugh Seton-Watson, Nations and States,pp. 258-259. Azerbaijani activists who left Azerbaijan after the fall of the independent state in 1920 and found refuge in the Republic of Turkey evidently lobbied for the adoption of the Latin alphabet in Turkey. See Swietochowski, Russian and Azerbaijan:A Borderlandin Transition,p. 114.

66

I BORDERS AND

BRETHREN

many of these restrictions were temporarily lifted. In addition, during the war Moscow encouraged the use of religious and ethnic symbols that were dear to the Soviet peoples to cultivate support for the war effort. For example, in this period Azerbaijani literature frequently featured Babak and his struggle for the motherland against foreign armies. Soviet Azerbaijani collective identity was especially influenced by the stationing of many in Iranian Azerbaijan as part of the military and civilian occupation forces. While it seemed that Moscow wished to stimulate the attachment of the Iranian Azerbaijanis to the north, the influence flowed both ways, and among the northerners who served there, a sense of increased identity with their co-ethnics seemed to emerge. The Azerbaijanis who worked to foster ties between the north and the south in Tabriz during World War II were not simply fulfilling Moscow's orders. After returning home, most of those who had been active in the propaganda organs in Tabriz continued to express a desire for a renewal of ties in Azerbaijani journals in Baku that were not intended for consumption in Iran. On the grassroots level, the desire to renew ties was fostered by the fact that most Soviet Azerbaijanis had relatives in Iran. Some authors suggest that the head of the Communist political leadership in Baku, A.A. Bagirov, proposed to Moscow the adoption of a policy aimed at uniting Soviet and Iranian Azerbaijan. 69 By the postwar period, Azerbaijani identity had become the primary collective identity of most of the Azerbaijanis in the Soviet Union. They were among the least Russified of the Soviet peoples. 70 Many Azerbaijani cultural figures praised their ethnic cultural tradition, and continued to produce numerous works in their native language. Even members of the republic's communist leadership implemented policies that showed their commitment to the preservation of Azerbaijani language and culture. For instance, in the 1950s, First Communist Party Secretary Imam D. Mustafayev advanced a policy encouraging the migration of Azerbaijanis into Baku in order to tip the balance in favor of the indigenous population. 71 He also promoted the economic autonomy of the republic and resisted

69.

Ghods, A Comparative Historical Study, p. 479.

70. Soviet Azerbaijanis, for instance, seldom intermarried with non-Azerbaijanis and had one of the lowest rates of emigration from their national republic in the Soviet Union. See S. Enders Wimbush, "Divided Azerbaijan: Nation Building, Assimilation, and Mobilization Between Three States," in William 0. McCagg, Jr., and Brian D. Silver, eds., Soviet Asian Ethnic Frontiers,(New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), p. 71. 71.

Alstadt, The AzerbaijaniTurks,p. 165.

THE AZERBAIJANIS UNDER THE SOVIET AND PAHLAVI REGIMES

I 67

Moscow when it sought to change the status of the local languages in the schools in the non-Russian republics. His stand on this issue may have been the reason for his dismissal by Moscow. 72 In addition, Azerbaijan Communist Party and later Politburo candidate member Heydar Aliyev at times tried to promote Azerbaijani interests within the limits of the Soviet system. He worked to create jobs inside the republic so that Azerbaijanis would not leave in search of work. He objected to Moscow's plans to move "surplus labor" from Azerbaijan to Siberia. Aliyev also brought the body of nationalist playwright Husein Javid to Azerbaijan for burial. 73 Some Azerbaijanis interviewed stated that during the Soviet period, Azerbaijanis fiercely sustained their cultural traditions in their homes, which were seen as the only place Soviet and Russian culture could not permeate. For example, most Azerbaijanis devotedly prepared their traditional foods. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the Azerbaijan SSR Writers' Union and intellectual groups continued to grapple with the issue of Azerbaijani cultural and national development. The Azerbaijani intelligentsia's writings of the 1960s and 1970s revealed a firm interest in Azerbaijani identity and culture and an effort to preserve that culture. For example, many works of traditional Azerbaijani ashugpoetry were published.74 Many Azerbaijani dictionaries and other philological works were produced throughout the 1960s and 1970s, and many literary works expressed identity with Azerbaijan. Azerbaijani literary journals published many works extolling the Azerbaijani homeland that had been written earlier by poets who were Communists who had been decorated by the regime. These works were not rejected by the censor due to the positions of the authors in the regime. Their poems included the obligatory praise of Communism, but also their love for Azerbaijan as their homeland. A posthumously published book on Samad Vurgun' s poetry includes the following poem:

72. Yaroslav Bilinsky, "The Soviet Education Laws of 1958-59 and Soviet Nationalities Policy," Soviet Studies Vol. 14, No. 2 (October 1962), pp. 138-157. 73. Husein Javid was killed in 1937 in a Siberian labor camp during Stalin's purges. He was accused of being a "bourgeois nationalist" and "Pan-Turkist." 74. See, for instance, Muzaff~~ Shukur, ed., Ashik Shiimshir (Baku: Azerbaijan State Publish~rs, 1973); "Ashik Adabiyyafi," Aziirbayjan,Vol. 12 (1964), pp. 72-74; and "Ashik Alasqarin Anadan Olmasi:ni:n 150 Illiyi," Aziirbayjan,Vol. 5 (1972), pp. 16-34.

68 j

BORDERS AND BRETHREN

The nation knows that you are mine, My homeland, 75 my nest, you are my home, They say, you are my native land! 76 I have been separated, heart from soul? Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan! In 1967, poet Bakhtiyar Vahabzade expressed his anger at the attempts to stifle the Azerbaijani language, evading the censor by referring to the Latin language, in his poem "Latin Dili": If you cannot say in your mother tongue "I am free, I am independent." Who would believe that you are? What kind of freedom is that, which cannot say its name If your mother tongue is prisoner 77

Many Azerbaijani nationalistic writers and academics later served as the hard core of political activists who led the opposition and national movement that were openly active in the end of the 1980s. Among the most important activists is Abulfez Ekhibey, who was imprisoned in 1975 due to his nationalistic political activity in Azerbaijan. The use of the Azerbaijani language remained prevalent in the republic. In April 1978, Azerbaijan, along with Armenia and Georgia, rebuffed Moscow's efforts to grant Russian the same status as the local languages in the republics' constitutions. 78

THE AZERBAIJANIS UNDER THE SOVIET AND PAHLAVI REGIMES

I 69

Moscow's policy toward ethnic minorities and the intensity of its drive for Russification fluctuated throughout the Soviet period, but overall, the Soviet regime was strikingly more tolerant in allowing collective expressions of Azerbaijani culture than was Tehran in this period. 79 Iran attempted to centralize its regime and the identity of all its citizens. The Soviet Union, except during part of the Stalinist era, more or less granted autonomy to local elites in the Muslim republics in exchange for their maintaining stability and the flow of resources to the center. Moscow stressed both ethnic and territorial-based identity; this created inherent tensions. The Soviet Union termed many of the larger ethnic groups in the country as nations, and granted them territorial units. In addition, it institutionalized the ethnic identity of its citizens: in internal passports, most other identifying documents, and many official administrative forms, the ethnic identity of the citizens was always noted. This process strengthened the ethnic awareness of each citizen. Rogers Brubaker claims that this Soviet policy of incorporating ethnic identity into the state structures was an unprecedented displacement of nationhood and nationality, as organizing principles of the social and political order, from the state-wide to the sub-state level. No other state has gone so far in sponsoring, codifying, institutionalizing, even (in some cases) inventing nationhood and nationality on the sub-state level, while at the same time doing nothing to institutionalize them on the level of the state as a whole.80

The extremely different policies of the Soviet Union and the Pahlavi regime in Iran toward their ethnic minorities affected the development of the national identity of each Azerbaijani population in different ways.

Children automatically received the ethnic identity of their parents. Those that were born to parents of two different ethnic groups could choose the ethnic identity of one of their parents at age sixteen, but they could not freely select their self-identification. Thus, paradoxically the Soviet system prevented the assimilation of ethnic groups into larger units, despite its Russification policy.

75. Here he uses the Turkic word yurd and not the Arabic-origin word vatan. Samed Vurgun 1906-1956: Bibliografiya(Baku: Azerbaijan SSR Academy of Sciences Publishing, 1965), p. 11.

Every Soviet citizen was born into a certain nationality, took it to day care and through high school, had it officially confirmed at the age of sixteen and then carried it to the grave through thousands of application forms,

Nationality Policiesof Moscow and Tehran

76. This is possibly a reference to the separation between north and south Azerbaijan. 77. Bakhtiyar Vahabzade, "Latin" (1967), as published in Hadi Sultan-Qurraie, ed., SelectedWorksof BakhtiyarVahabzade(Bloomington: Indiana University Turkish Studies Publications, 1998) pp. 52-53.

79. This is illustrated by Javad Heyat's.claim that the Akhundzade Library in Baku contains more than 50,000 books published in Azerbaijani from 1930s to the 1980s. In the same period, fewer than fifty books were published in Azerbaijani under the Pahlavi Regime in Iran. See Heyat, "Regression of Azeri Language and Literature," p. 10.

78. "O proekte Konstitutsii (Osnovnogo zakona) Azerbaidzhanskoi Sovetskoi Sotsialisticheskoi Respubliki i itogakh ego vsenarodnogo obsuzhdeniia," Bakinskii rabochii,April 21, 1978, pp. 2-4.

80. Rogers Brubaker, NationalismReframed:Nationhoodand the National Questionin the New Europe(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 29.

70

I BORDERS

AND BRETHREN

certificates,questionnaires and reception desks. It made a difference in school admissions and it could be crucial in employment, promotions and draft assignments.81 Moscow's political interest in institutionalizing ethnic identity was to present itself, in contrast to capitalist states, as a country in which minority groups have cultural rights. However, since the Soviet Union imposed extreme limitations on expressions of identity, policies that increased individuals awareness of their own distinctive identity simultaneously created an inherently agitated situation. Despite ideological rhetoric, Russian society rarely allowed full assimilation of many of the non-Russians, especially the Muslim minorities, though complete loyalty to the Soviet regime gave Azerbaijanis access to positions of power and resources and minimized the discrimination against them as non-Russians. The political borders and the ethnic borders were rarely congruent. Thus, many Soviet citizens lived in republics belonging to ethnic groups other than their own. This also created tension, due to the problematic relationship between the republics and their co-ethnics beyond their borders in other Soviet republics, and between members of the ethnic minorities within the republics. This became evident in many of the conflicts that erupted in the glasnost and post-Soviet period, such as the Nagomo-Karabagh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. In contrast, the Pahlavi regime of Iran offered the option of assimilation and Persianization, and this served as a way to enter into the country's upper echelons. Tehran discriminated against non-Persian groups, but rarely against individual non-Persians who accepted the Persian language and culture. In contrast to the Soviet Union, the Pahlavi regime and the Islamic Republic did not note the ethnic status of citizens of Iran in any official form and did not recognize separate ethnic groups. For example, since the 1950s Tehran has not included in official censuses questions on ethnic identity. In Pahlavi Iran, Azerbaijani and Iranian identity could not coexist. The Pahlavi regime defined Iranian identity as Persian. Iranian identity was no longer supra-ethnic, encompassing all the national groups in Iran. No collective rights were recognized by the Pahlavi regime for non-Persian ethnic groups. While Moscow allowed Soviet and ethnic identity to coincide, the Pahlavi regime in Iran demanded that the

81. Yuri Slezkine, "The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism," in Geoff Eley and Ronald G. Suny, eds., BecomingNational(New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 228.

THE AZERBAIJANIS

UNDER THE SOVIET AND PAHLAVI REGIMES

I

71

members of the minority groups Persianize and assimilate in order to participate fully and advance. 82 . The regimes differed greatly in their handling of government appomtrnent~ a~d ~anguage policy. Moscow generally appointed a member of the mam mdigenous ethnic group to head a republic's communist party. The leaders of the republics generally had local power bases and wer~ versed in_the culture and ways of the dominant ethnic group. They routmely appomted associates who were close to them, often from their own ethnic _andeven regional and clan grouping. In contrast, Tehran generally appomted people from outside the dominant ethnic group to serve as governors of the provinces, and most often non-natives of the region. . ~ehran ~id not t~lerate ~he use of languages other than Persian in any officia:,p~bli; capacity. C~Ildren who mistakenly used Azerbaijani and other tribal languages m the classroom were fined and sometimes beaten. Pe~ssion to ~ublish in the ethnic languages was rare. By the eve of the Islamic Revolution, most educated Azerbaijanis were well-versed in Persian and it_w~s their primary language for reading and writing. However, the maJonty of the Azerbaijanis were still monolingual and illiterate at this time. Overall, Tehran succeeded in instilling its message that Persian is a "higher" and more developed language than the Turkic and other languages used by many of the peoples in Iran, and its use became a mark of prestige by many of the members of the non-Persian groups. Moscow achieved similar results through very different methods. Most of the non-Russian languages were officially recognized and the development of their literatures encouraged within the limitations of official ideology. Cultural elites in the republics were allowed to write in t~eir "national languages" and to publish classical "national" literary pieces as long as they included revolutionary and pro-proletarian messages. From the 1930s, Moscow implemented a policy of Russification among the Soviet peoples. Instead of formally limiting the official use of non-Russian languages, generally positive incentives for Russification were cr~ated: greate~ resources were given to the Russian language schools m the republics, lessons at the top universities across the Soviet Union wer~ conducted in Russian, and access to positions of power in the center reqmred a full command of Russian. Members of the non-Russian groups had to learn Russian to attain major positions of power in their own republics and in the center, whereas Russian residents of non-Rus-

82. Fred Halliday, Iran: Dictatorshipand Development, 2d. ed. (London: Penguin Books, 1979), p. 216.

72

I BORDERS AND

BRETHREN

sian republics were not forced to learn the local languages, even when they filled important positions in those republics. In Soviet Azerbaijan, the Azerbaijani language remained both the primary literary and spoken language in the republic. Mostly the educated elite adopted Russian as its primary language. In Iran, Azerbaijani was chiefly a spoken language. Due to the limitations on publications in languages other than Persian, few writings were produced in Azerbaijani. These were read mostly by highly educated Azerbaijanis, who also knew Persian and thus did not need these publications to be written in the Azerbaijani language.

TiesbetweenAzerbaijanis Despite the limitations imposed on both sides after World War II, interest in cross-border ties persisted among the Azerbaijanis. Soviet Azerbaijan intellectual publications indicate that the subject of the connection between Azerbaijanis in the north and south was of constant interest throughout the post-World War II period. These writings, produced primarily for readers in the republic of Soviet Azerbaijan, were published almost exclusively in Azerbaijani and rarely appeared in Russian. In certain periods, such as 1941-46, Moscow encouraged Soviet Azerbaijanis to inspire a heightened identity among their co-ethnics in Iran. The drive to encourage Azerbaijani identity continued after Moscow stopped promoting this policy, indicating that it was based on local desires of many Soviet Azerbaijanis. After the Soviet Azerbaijanis returned from Iran at the end of World War II, many who had served in Tabriz, as well as many veterans of the Pishaveri regime who had fled to Soviet Azerbaijan after its fall, continued to publish literary works on their emotional attachment to the south, and on the ties between north and south Azerbaijan. One of the most important works of this period is Suleyman Rustem' s lid Sahil (Two Shores) published in 1950. The title refers to the two banks of the Araz River. Mirza lbrahimov was for a long time the most outspoken champion in Baku of the cause of "South Azerbaijan." lbrahimov served for many years as the head of the republic's Writers' Union. He and many other writers in Soviet Azerbaijan set many of their literary works in Iranian Azerbaijan and used the Araz and Tabriz as important motifs. 83 While he was head of Azerbaijan's Writers' Union, lbrahimov received many 83. See, for example, Mirza Ibrahimov, Qiiltibiitinin Aziirbayjan,Vol. 10 (1965). Famil Mehdi, "Tabriz Khafisi:," and "Man Kichik Deyilam," Aziirbayjan,Vol. 5 (1978), pp. 128--129,134-136.

THE AZERBAIJANIS UNDER THE SOVIET AND PAHLAVI REGIMES

I 73

awards from the republic's political leadership, exemplifying their support or at least their tacit acceptance of his drive to increase contact between the Azerbaijanis. 84 In 1958 one of Azerbaijan's mof'lt important poets, Bakhtiyar Vahabzade, wrote "Gulustan," about the 1813 Gulustan Treaty, which divided Azerbaijan between the Russian and Persian Empires. "Gulustan" was published in 1960 in a local newspaper in Sheki. The poem describes the tragedy of two brothers who became separated as a result of this treaty, allegorically referring to the separation of the two Azerbaijans. The author asserts that Iran and Russia had no right to divide up a land that they do not own-" After all, this land has its owners!" 85 Vahabzade and the editor of the newspaper were reprimanded by the authorities. 86 Despite the official ban on the poem, it became well known among the Azerbaijanis, many learning it by heart. 87 Balash Azeroglu, a Soviet Azerbaijan poet, expressed solidarity with co-ethnics in Iran and distress over their lack of cultural rights in his poem, "The Motherland Demands Just Such a Son." Among its lines: "No schools to teach the language of Azerbaijan/ No Alphabet to learn the ABC/ This is the vengeance of great Tehran/ 'We are a mighty nation,' says Iran. Encouraging, they pat our shoulder blade, yet use of our own language, they forbade . . . Who will pay for this atrocious crime!"88 Official cultural institutions of the Azerbaijan Republic consistently portrayed Iranian Azerbaijan as an integral part of Azerbaijan. For instance, in the Carpet Museum in Baku, carpets from different regions of Azerbaijan, such as Karabagh, Kuba, and Tabriz, were displayed without 84. In AzerbaijanianPoetry: Classic,Modern and Traditional(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969), Mirza Ibrahimov discusses cities of north and south Azerbaijan as part of one entity. For example, he states, that "Ganja, Tabriz, Ardebil, Baku, Shamakhi, Nakhchivan, Urmiya, Shusha, and other ancient towns mentioned in medieval historical literature are situated on Azerbaijanian soil and it is these towns which gave Azerbaijanian culture its splendid poets, musicians, artists, architects, and sculptors." (p. 24). 85. Bakhtiyar Vahabzade, "Giiliistan," quoted in Hadi Sultan-Qurraie, "Introduction," in SelectedWorksof BakhtiyarVahabzade(Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Turkish Studies Publications, 1998), p. 16. 86. In September 1988, "Giiliistan" was republished in the Azerbaijani journal Genjlik. 87. Mirza Michaeli," Azerbaijan Notebook," Reporton the USSR (RFE/RL) 155/1989 (March 15, 1989), p. 29. 88. Quoted in Ibrahimov, ed., AzerbaijanianPoetry: Classic,Modern and Traditional, p. 411.

74

I BORDERS

any note that Tabriz is in Iran. In the historical museums, the maps of Azerbaijan included south Azerbaijan, and exhibits presented historical and cultural figures from Iranian Azerbaijan as part of Azerbaijani history, without pointing out that they are in a separate country. The press in Soviet Azerbaijan often published articles about Azerbaijani authors and poets from Iran, such as Behrengi, and published their works both in Azerbaijani and translated from the Persian in which they were usually forced to publish. 89 Throughout the post-World War II period, many academic works published in Soviet Azerbaijan dealt with Iranian Azerbaijan. 90 Radio Baku broadcasts targeted to Azerbaijanis in Iran were another means used for forging ties between Soviet and Iranian Azerbaijan. In interviews, some people stated that these broadcasts had a wide following in Iran, especially in the Ardebil region, where the broadcasts were picked up very clearly. Some of the interviewees mentioned that they listened to the broadcasts to hear music in their native language. Others said that they tuned in to Baku in order to hear classical music. Music continued to be a bond between the Azerbaijanis on both sides of the Araz River. In the 1960s, '.A.Ji Salim's" Ayriliq" (Separation) was im91 mensely popular among Azerbaijanis in Soviet Azerbaijan and Iran. The singer Rashid Behbudon, of Baku, and the singer "Gugush," of Tehran, a popular singer of Azerbaijani descent, popularized the song, which later played a symbolic role in Baku's quest for independence in the 1980s. Tapes of Azerbaijani music from Soviet Azerbaijan were quite popular and frequently purchased, clandestinely, by Azerbaijanis in Iran. In addition, Azerbaijani intellectuals in Iran often succeeded in obtaining Azerbaijani books in Arabic script published in Baku.92 Many interviewees from Iran stated that despite the formal restrictions, many Azerbaijanis maintained ties with relatives on the other side of the border. Some Azerbaijanis illegally crossed the border into Soviet Azerbaijan, while others traveled through Moscow to Baku. 89. See for instance, Siimiid Biihriinqi, "Miihiibbiit Naghili:,'' in Aziirbayjan,Vol. 6 (1976), pp. 190-202; Ilqar Gasi:mov, "Abadi Mubariziidii," Adabiyyat vii Injiisiiniit,December 9, 1978, p. 6. 90. For examples, see Vostokovednyetsentryv SSSR, Vol. I (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine) (Moscow: Glavnoe izdatel'stvo vostochnoi literatury, 1988), pp. 40-41. 91. '.AliSalim, a musician of Azerbaijani origin, lived in Iran. Born in Baku, his family emigrated to Iran in 1938. 92.

THE AZERBAIJANIS

AND BRETHREN

Based on a conversation with an Azerbaijani from Urmiya.

UNDER THE SOVIET AND PAHLAVI REGIMES

I 75

Conclusions Azerbaijani identity was often strengthened by the discrimination, cultural repression, and economic disadvantages propagated by the regimes that ruled the Azerbaijanis, both in Russia and Iran. Since 1828, Russian colonial rule exposed the north to discrimination and foreign rule. In the south, the Pahlavi regime's centralization policy achieved some results opposite of those intended: while the policy aimed to create national unity, the more the center pressed for Persianization, the faster it seemed to alienate some Azerbaijanis from the regime and motivate them to explore alternative identities. By equating the Iranian state and nation with the Persian people and language, the Pahlavi regime gave rise to the question of the identity of the Turkic-speakers in Iran. During the Pahlavi period, the regime propagated the theme of the greatness of the Iranian nation as a Persian people, the magnificence of Persian literature and language, and the exalted level of Persian culture. Non-Persian cultures in Iran were generally treated by the regime as primitive, uncivilized, and underdeveloped. Many non-Persians internalized these messages and viewed their own ethnic culture through the prism of the regime. Samad Behrengi's poem "Agha-ye Cox Bakhtiar" mocks the assimilated Azerbaijani who has given up his native culture and language while attempting to assimilate into Persian culture. The embracing of Persian culture and the attempt to assimilate into it was common among Azerbaijanis, especially in Tehran in the late Pahlavi period, and so Behrengi' s poem reflects a substantive trend. By the eve of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, a significant percentage of the Azerbaijanis living in the center of Iran had adopted Persian culture. Most scholarship on Iran describes the Azerbaijanis in the Pahlavi period as well absorbed into Iranian society and cites few illustrations of Azerbaijani nationalism or lack of affinity with the regime. 93 Azerbaijani national activity, when mentioned at all, is described as a phenomenon belonging to the period following the Islamic revolution, or more frequently, following the breakup of the Soviet Union. In fact, this chapter shows that a separate Azerbaijani or Turkic identity was expressed by some of the Azerbaijanis during the Pahlavi period. Extreme limitations and sanctions were imposed on any expressions of Azerbaijani national identity in the Pahlavi period, and individuals who engaged in nationalistic activity were subject to torture and impris-

93.

See, for instance, Cottam, Nationalismin Iran:UpdatedThrough1978,pp. 118-133.

76 \

BORDERS AND BRETHREN

onment, and some were even killed. 94 Thus, most expressions were subtle and limited to the cultural field. In almost all the instances when central authority was weakened during the Pahlavi period, temporarily removing the threat of repercussions, Azerbaijanis and other ethnic minorities voiced cultural demands and tried to acquire autonomy. These episodes indicate that ethnic aspirations probably existed when central authority was strong, but fear and the regime' s oppression prevented their open declaration. Leading political scientists have claimed that advances in infrastructure and communications should augment citizens' identity with their state. 95 In contrast, the Azerbaijani example shows that advances such as mass communications and modem infrastructures can work to reinforce alternative identities. Some felt that modem advances would significantly boost identity with the state by increasing exposure to the center, creating attractive institutions, generating and facilitating contacts with citizens outside one's community, and through the state's use of the means of mass communications to cultivate state identity. The Azerbaijani example, particularly in the case of those living in Iran, showed that increased interaction with the center, which was facilitated by technological advances, often led to increased ethnic-based identity. These infrastructures brought the state to the village, and as such disrupted traditional aspects of life, often producing indignation. As the center extended infrastructures to all comers of the state, questions and competition arose regarding such issues as distribution of resources and the language that would be used in these newly established institutions. The interaction between Azerbaijanis and Persians, while often fostering common Iranian identity, also contributed to emphasizing the contrasts between the two peoples and the elements shared with co-ethnics. Throughout the Soviet period, Azerbaijani national identity was retained in Soviet Azerbaijan by most of the ethnic Azerbaijanis in the republic. Literary works were the major venue reflecting nationalist Azerbaijani identity. 94. Many Iranian Azerbaijanis believe that Samad Behrengi, for instance, did not die in an accident, but rather was killed by the regime. 95. Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1953); Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983).

Chapter 3 The Islamic Revolution and the Azerbaijanis

The "Islamic Revolution" -the 1979 overthrow of the Shah-was carried out by a wide coalition of forces with varying ideological orientations and goals, united by their shared opposition to the monarchy in Iran. Only some wished to establish an Islamic Republic, and few of the Islamists envisioned that this element would prevail and eventually eliminate all other political forces. During the revolutionary period, when the Shah was overthrown, members of ethnic minorities played an especially prominent role. Many of them expected that democratization of Iran would bring greater freedom for the ethnic minorities. Tabriz, with the highest Azerbaijani population in Iran, was a center of the revolutionary activity that precipitated the fall of the Pahlavi regime. Members of the ethnic groups took advantage of the regime's weakened hold over their activities to express ethnic identity and make ethnic-based demands, and many publications appeared in the minority languages such as Azerbaijani, Kurdish, and Armenian. 1 The day after the Shah fled Iran, Azerbaijani activists began publishing the first Azerbaijani-language newspaper of the period, Wduz.2 Its authors called for ethnic rights, starting with the right to use the Azerbaijani language. 3 In its first year, the Islamic Republic's publication policy was relatively lenient, but after the 1. See Hasan Javadi, "Research Note: Azeri Publications in Iran," Critique, No. 8 (Spring 1996), p. 85.

2. Ulduz began publication on January 17, 1979, and included articles in Azerbaijani and in Persian. 3. E. Ch. Babaev, "Iuzhnyi Azerbaidzhan v iranskoi revoliutsii 1978-1979 gg," Jtinubi AziirbayjanTariklziMiisti/iiltiri(Baku: Elm, 1989), p. 128.

78

I BORDERS

AND BRETHREN

THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION AND THE AZERBAIJANIS

I 79

consolidation of the regime many non-Persian publications were forced to halt production and it became more difficult to publish books in the ethnic languages. Ayatollah Khomeini gained power in Iran in February 1979. By the spring of that year, the regime faced demands from all the major ethnic groups in Iran. Through most of 1979, the regime engaged in an all-out military confrontation with the Kurds to establish control in the Iranian Kurdish province, and conducted a second military offensive against the Kurds beginning in April 1980. Azerbaijani activists rebelled against Khomeini in December 1979 and effectively controlled Tabriz for over a month. Confrontation between Ayatollah Kazim Shariatmadari, the Azerbaijanis' most widely followed religious figure in this period, and Ayatollah Khomeini posed one of the most serious threats to the legitimacy of the Islamic regime in the initial period. Many of the provinces that were populated predominantly by ethnic minorities boycotted some of the new regime's first attempts to legitimize its rule, such as the referendum on the establishment of the Islamic Republic (April 1979), the referendum on the establishment of ultimate power in the hands of a supreme leader (December 1979), and the first presidential and parliamentary elections (1980).4 The events of the revolutionary period initially led to a significant weakening of the center. As in other periods of Iranian history, various ethnic groups took advantage of the regime's weakened hold over their activities, to express their ethnic identity and make demands. Yet few works have chronicled and analyzed the special role and goals of the ethnic minorities in the revolutionary period. Some studies examine the Kurds, the Arabs, or even the Turkmen, but very few mention the Azerbaijanis. 5 Ethnic minorities played an especially important role in the Islamic Revolution for three reasons. First, ethnic minorities had developed networks of connections among themselves in different locations throughout Iran, making them a force that was relatively easily mobilized for the anti-regime activity of the revolution. Second, the ethnic groups had compounded grievances toward the Pahlavi regime, which had suppressed

their ethnic culture and given preferential treatment in the economic sphere to the Persian-dominated center. Lastly, many Azerbaijani and Kurdish fainilies had relatives who had been killed or exiled by the regime after the fall of the provincial governments in 1946. In the initial period of the revolution, the primary goals of most of the Azerbaijanis were all-Iranian; by the end of the period, their disappointment with the results of the revolution strengthened some Azerbaijani ethnic identity and activity. For example, the revolution's failure to bring significant democratization attracted some Azerbaijanis, who had previously identified themselves chiefly as Iranian, to ethnic-based messages. Most Azerbaijanis in Iran had assumed that democratization would end the restrictions on their language and culture, so even those with nationalist Azerbaijani goals tended to be active in general Iranian political movements during the revolutionary period. Moreover, Ayatollah Shariatmadari' s ostracism from the new regime, and his eventual defrocking and humiliation by it, contributed to a sense of alienation from the revolution and its messages by many Azerbaijanis who had previously supported and identified with the Islamic Revolution. The Islamic revolutionary period provides an important opportunity to learn about the identity of the Azerbaijanis and other ethnic minorities in Iran. After the fall of the Pahlavi regime, most restrictions on publications were briefly lifted, including those on the use of the ethnic languages. Moreover, since the revolution led most Iranians to believe that individual and collective liberties would be respected, an unprecedented number of materials in the ethnic languages were published dealing with the role of the Ininorities in Iranian society. Thus, this brief period is a window into the ideas and beliefs of the Azerbaijanis in Iran. This chapter concentrates on the collective identity of the Azerbaijanis in Iran that was expressed during the period of the Islamic Revolution. It begins with examining the events that precipitated the open revolutionary activity beginning in 1977 and continues through 1983, when the new regime had become consolidated and most opposition and ethnic political organizations and publications had been successfully suppressed. The impact of the Revolution on the identity of the Azerbaijanis in the Soviet Union is also briefly analyzed.

4.

RevolutionaryTabriz

Mojab and Hassanpour, "The Politics of Nationality and Ethnic Diversity," p.

238-239; and Ervand Abrahamian, RadicalIslam: The Iranian Mojahedin(London: I.B. Tauris, 1989), pp. 59-62.

5. On the demands of the Kurds and other ethnic groups in Iran at the time of the Islamic Revolution, see Mojab and Hassanpour, "The Politics of Nationality and Ethnic Diversity," pp. 229-250; and Dilip Hiro, Iran Under the Ayatollahs(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985), pp. 111-115.

One factor that contributed to the wide early support for the revolution among the Azerbaijanis was their mass migration from the villages to the major cities in the Azerbaijani provinces and to Tehran in the 1960s and 1970s. At the time, the largest percentage of migrants to Iran's urban cen-

8o

I BORDERS

THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION AND THE AZERBAIJANIS

AND BRETHREN

ters came from the Azerbaijani provinces, where high birth rates and a lack of new jobs produced surplus labor. 6 Many of these migrants lived in difficult conditions in shanty towns adjacent to Tehran and Tabriz that lacked the support and constraints of the traditional villages they had left. The children born in the shanty towns were further removed from the traditions of their parents' homes. Under these conditions the migrants were mobilized into revolutionary activity. In addition, in the Persian-dominated center of the country, many Azerbaijanis encountered for the first time treatment as second-class citizens and slurs from Persians, which contributed to their alienation from the regime. The Pahlavi state policy of economic discrimination toward the periphery,7 and especially toward Azerbaijan, also fostered support for the revolution among the Azerbaijanis, as did the cultural suppression of ethnic minorities. However, although Azerbaijanis constituted a significantly large proportion of the revolutionary activists and Tabriz was a center of the anti-Shah demonstrations, Azerbaijanis could be found in the nucleus of the Pahlavi regime. Toward the end of 1977, anti-Shah activity became assertive and openly oppositional. Tabriz, and especially its university, was a center of this activity. Although most of the activity was part of the general Iranian revolutionary movement, its particular intensity in the Azerbaijani provinces illustrates that their inhabitants were especially alienated from the regime. In addition, many Azerbaijanis involved in the revolution protested in their own language and called for collective ethnic rights. For instance, on November 28, 1977, participants, at a demonstration in the Tabriz bazaar, carried signs bearing anti-Shah slogans and cried out demands in Azerbaijani. 8 Many of the Tabriz bazaarisexpressed their support for the demonstrators. 9 Following this, on December 3, 1977, a group of teachers and educational staff protested in front of the Supreme Administration of Education building in Tabriz. Among their demands was the release from prison of opposition writers and the establishment of professional unions which would defend their interests and rights. Tabriz University was the focal point of some of the most aggressive anti-regime activity in this period. Beginning in December 1977, students

6. Kazemi, Poverty and Revolution in Iran, p. 30; and Babaev, "luzhnyi Azerbaidzhan v iranskoi revoliutsii 1978-1979 gg, pp. 99-100.

I 81

conducted a wave of protests against the Pahlavi regime. On December 5, students gathered at the entrance of the university and shouted in Azerbaijani: "We demand democracy!" and "We demand freedom!" 10 They staged one of their most important demonstrations on December 12 (21 of Azar according to the Iranian calendar). This date has important meaning for Azerbaijanis for it commemorates both the day of the establishment and the fall of the Provincial Government of Azerbaijan in Iran in 1945 and 1946.11 Two hours into the peaceful demonstration military units began brutally attacking the students who had assembled there. The demonstration was only completely broken up the next day. Angry students leaving the university smashed cars near the guard booth of the campus and gathered in the main street of Tabriz, shouting antigovernment slogans. Although most of their slogans supported common Iranian goals, the choice of the date illustrates their special awareness as Azerbaijanis and the importance they attached to the struggle of their predecessors. 12 Sensitive to any signs of ethnic political activity, the regime reported in the newspaper Ettela'at that the demonstration had taken place on December 19. Anti-regime demonstrations in Iranian Azerbaijan were not confined to Tabriz. In February 1978, students conducted a number of demonstrations at the University of Reza'iyeh (Urrniya). 13 Throughout 1978-79, Azerbaijani ashugs frequently appeared in buses in Iran, promoting revolution through their poetry. In Tabriz, the anti-Shah regime activity entered a new phase on February 18, 1978. In response to the killing of approximately 162 demonstrators in Qom on January 9, Ayatollah Shariatmadari called on the people of Iran to strike on the fortieth day of mourning for the victims. 14 Demonstrations were held throughout the country, but the protest in Tabriz was the most contentious and became violent. The incidents in Tabriz were followed by a series of disturbances throughout Iran that intensified, raising the level of confrontation with the Pahlavi regime.

10.

Nii.sib Nii.sibzadii., "Tii.briz Universiteti," Ulduz, Vol. 9 (1983), p. 46.

11. During the Shah period, the fall of the Provincial Government in Azerbaijan was celebrated on December 12 as a national holiday commemorating the regime's victory. These celebrations were not continued by the Islamic regime.

7.

Aghajanian, "Ethnic Inequality in Iran," p. 221.

12.

Babaev, "Iuzhnyi Azerbaidzhan v iranskoi revoliutsii 1978-1979 gg," p. 104.

8.

Babaev, "Iuzhnyi Azerbaidzhan v iranskoi revoliutsii 1978-1979 gg," p. 101.

13.

Ibid., p. 106.

9.

Ibid.

14.

Muslims traditionally commemorate mourning on the fortieth day after death.

82

I

During the Tabriz incidents, the local police refused to fire on the demonstrators, so the Shah transferred military forces from outside the Azerbaijan provinces to quell the demonstrations. 15 This presumably reflects his lack of trust in the local forces, which were primarily composed of Azerbaijanis. After the disturbances, local police officers who had refused to give orders to open fire on the demonstrators were transferred from Azerbaijan. A purge was carried out in the local ranks of the SAVAK security forces because a number of its members had been unwilling to act against the demonstrators in Tabriz.16 The demonstration soon became an uprising, and the city was paralyzed by the strikes of factories, bazaars, and schools. Demonstrators, incensed by the killing of one of the protesters, attacked property throughout the city. Individuals from diverse sectors of the Azerbaijani population participated in the Tabriz incidents, where calls of "Death to the Shah!" were heard for the first time. The slogans at the demonstration reflect the different goals and forms of identity prevalent among the Azerbaijanis at the time. On the one hand, people had answered the call of the religious leadership to demonstrate, and many of their slogans were pro-Islamic. Yet, many other slogans called for democratization, and even left-wing organizations, such as the Mujahedin Khalq, played an especially active role. Most of the slogans were voiced in Azerbaijani, illustrating the goal of cultural expression and the centrality of the Azerbaijani language to the people. 17 The regime responded to the uprising in Tabriz with massive repression and arrests. It took the security forces two full days to quell the dashes, and hundreds were left dead or injured. The Shah blamed ethnic separatism as a factor in the demonstrations. He added that, "in certain geographical regions, there is no alternative but chauvinism. Iran is one of these regions; otherwise, you would disappear and your name would no longer be Iran, but Iranistan." 18 The Tabriz demonstration set off a forty-day cycle of similar events throughout Iran to commemorate the "Tabriz massacre." Following the 15.

THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION AND THE AZERBAIJANIS

BORDERS AND BRETHREN

[

83

Tabriz uprising, anti-Shah activity broke out all over Iran. This was one of the catalysts that shattered the control of the Pahlavi regime. In Tehran, the Azerbaijani bazaarisplayed an important role in mobilizing a strike of the bazaar in protest against the killings in Qorn.19 The Azerbaijanis published a statement supporting a strike, defying the instruction of Ayatollah Khansari, the highest-ranking religious leader in Tehran at the time, who objected to such an action. However, the main ethnic Azerbaijani ayatollah, Shariatmadari, had called for protest. On April 13, 1978, the main municipal bazaar in Tabriz closed as a sign of solidarity with the demonstrating students of Tabriz University, where a student had been killed. On May 8, another demonstration was held at the university, and in clashes with security forces another student was killed, and twenty-two seriously injured. Most of the teachers and staff at the university supported the student protests. Many Azerbaijanis were enraged during the mourning period; on May 10, 1978; government forces violated the traditionally respected right to take sanctuary in the homes of religious leaders. They chased a group of protesters and shot dead two theological students in Ayatollah Shariatmadari's home in Qom. On May 22, a student demonstration in Urmiya spilled over to the city streets. On August 24, a large demonstration was held in Tabriz, simultaneous with protests in Tehran and Rasht. Mass rallies were held throughout Iran on October 1, including in Urmiya, Zenjan, and Hamadan, cities with large Azerbaijani populations. On October 21, demonstrations demanding the release of political prisoners were held in Tabriz and Ardebil. One of the biggest demonstrations of the revolution was held on December 10 in Tabriz; 700,000 people participated. On the same day, large demonstrations were also held in Ardebil and Zenjan. In a demonstration on December 18 in Tabriz, in which 15,000 protestors participated, soldiers of the Tabriz garrison whose job was to suppress the demonstrations instead joined them. Additional soldiers then joined the demonstrations. 20 Violent demonstrations broke out in Tabriz on January 8, 1979, and demonstrators set fire to many public buildings. The Shah left the country on January 16.

Cottam, Nationalismin Iran: UpdatedThrough1978, p. 353.

16. Le Matin, Vol. 16, No. 5 (1978), quoted in Babaev, "Iuzhnyi Azerbaidzhan v iranskoi revoliutsii 1976-1979 gg," p. 111; and Cottam, Nationalism in Iran: Updated Through1978, p. 354. 17. Babaev, "Iuzhnyi Azerbaidzhan v iranskoi revoliutsii 1976-1979 gg," p. 109; and "Report of the Patriotic Muslim Students of Tabriz on the Tabriz Uprising," RIPEH/The Review of IranianPoliticalEconomyand History, Vol. 2, No. 2 (June 1978), p. 67. 18. Interview with Muhammad Shah, Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, May 13, 1978 (FBIS-MEA-78-94).

19. Misagh Parsa, Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1989) p. 111.The bazaarisin Tehran are organized by ethnic and regional groupings and generally maintain separate mosques and other religious institutions as well. The Azerbaijanis form the largest regional bloc within the Tehran bazaarisand the Azerbaijani mosques and institutions often have ties with the bazaaris and organizations in the Azerbaijani provinces. 20.

Babaev, "Iuzhnyi Azerbaidzhan v iranskoi revoliutzii 1976-1979 gg," p. 126.

84

I BORDERS

The next day, Azerbaijani activists immediately began publishing Ulduz, the first Azerbaijani-language newspaper of the period (the newspaper also included articles in Persian). The authors called in Ulduz for the granting of ethnic rights, especially, the right to use the Azerbaijani language, along with general Iranian goals.21 The speedy publication of Ulduz proves that ethnic-based demands existed previously and that many Azerbaijanis assumed that the revolution would provide cultural freedom for them.

The IslamicRepublic The activities and expressions of the Azerbaijanis in the initial period after the return of Ayatollah Khomeini and the formal establishment of the Islamic Republic reveal the diversity of their identities. The Azerbaijani leaders of the Islamic Republic held a primary Iranian and Islamic identity, whereas leaders of the movement for liberal democracy in Iran and the left-wing movements expressed both Iranian identity and class identity, while many also held particularistic Azerbaijani identity. Those active in the Azerbaijani autonomy movements usually possessed both Azerbaijani and Iranian identity, and believed that democratization in Iran would provide for autonomy. They struggled for democracy throughout Iran, assuming that this would lead to autonomy for Azerbaijan. The Islamic Revolution's slogans of equality between all the ethnic groups and its stress on the universalism of Islam led many members of the ethnic minorities to believe that they would be on equal footing with the Persians in the new regime. The Shah's regime was associated with Persian-centered policies and severe suppression of the various ethnic minorities; the new regime hated the Pahlavi policies, thus many of the members of the ethnic minorities were led to believe that it would eliminate those policies. The initial vanguard of the Islamic Republic included a significant number of Azerbaijanis who seemed to share primarily Islamic and Iranian identity. This group included Ayatollahs Musavi-Ardebeli, Khoi, Khamane' i, and Khalkhali, and the first prime minister of the Islamic Republic, Mehdi Bazargan, who was appointed by Khomeini. The existence of this group and their predominant role in the revolution indicates that an important segment of the Azerbaijani population held chiefly Islamic and Iranian identity. Nevertheless, many members of this group played 21.

THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION AND THE AZERBAIJANIS

AND BRETHREN

Ibid., p. 128.

I 85

an important role in shaping Azerbaijani identity. Azerbaijani members of the clerical elite, such as Musavi-Ardebeli and Khalkhali, used Azerbaijani in public and in interviews in the Tabriz press. According to many Azerbaijanis who were in Iran in this period, this was an important factor in making it acceptable to use non-Persian languages in public, and instilled in them a sense of pride and the legitimacy of the use of their language; this was a stark contrast with the attitudes in the Pahlavi period. In addition, some clerics of Azerbaijani origin openly condemned the derogatory slurs commonly used against the Turkic population in Iran. It seems that the Azerbaijani clerics used their native tongue not because of rising Azerbaijani identity, but because many of them had difficulty in speaking Persian. The revolution propelled to power many second-rank clerics from the provinces. Moreover, representatives of the new regime wanted to communicate with the Azerbaijani masses, many of whom did not know Persian. Nonetheless, their decision to speak publicly in Azerbaijani was influential. When problems arose in the Azerbaijani provinces during the initial revolutionary period, Azerbaijani clerics were generally sent to represent the regime or appeal to the residents in the name of the regime, due to their special link to their birthplace and their ability to speak Azerbaijani. Prime Minister Bazargan was of Azerbaijani origin, but was raised as a Persian-speaker and spent most of his career working for general Iranian issues. However, Bazargan illustrated his support for cultural rights for the ethnic minorities in Iran at a rally on March 25, 1979 in Tabriz, and apologized for making his address in Persian: "I would have wishedand it would have been more appropriate--to have spoken in the Turkish language." 22 Bazargan was fully committed to Iran's territorial integrity and held Iranian identity, yet he was not opposed to granting a limited form of autonomy to the provinces, including local government and control of schools. He stated that the local rights granted in the Islamic Republic would go far beyond those granted by the Pahlavi regime. 23 As in the past, members of ethnic groups tended to emulate and accept the opinions of co-ethnic ayatollahs. During the revolutionary period, many traditional and secular Azerbaijanis highly respected Ayatollah Kazim Shariatmadari. Ayatollah Shariatmadari was not a part of the new regime, and did not seek to hold a political position in the Islamic Republic. He believed that clerics should not become professional politicians, but rather advise and assist them. The dispute over the desired role of

22.

Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, March 25, 1979 (FBIS-MEA-79-059).

23.

See Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, April 3, 1979 (FBIS-MEA-79-066).

86

I

THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION AND THE AZERBAIJANIS

BORDERS AND BRETHREN

clerics in politics and the degree of centralization of the regime was the major issue that divided between Ayatollah Shariatrnadari and Ayatollah Khomeini. 24 Evidently, Shariatrnadari's opposition to centralization of the regime in Iran was influenced by his background as an Azerbaijani who had spent most of his life in an Azerbaijani province. THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION'S

AZERBAIJAN!

"PRAGUE

SPRING":

LITERARY EXPRESSIONS OF

IDENTITY

Immediately after the Shah's departure, a plethora of new publications appeared in Iran, many of them in the minority languages. However, once the Islamic Republic was consolidated, its publication policy became far more severe; fewer non-Persian publications and books were published. The only Azerbaijani-language publication that started in that period-and still exists-is Varliq.It was established in April 1978. It is published under the editorship of Professor Javad Heyat, and its original founders included Dr. Hamid Nothgi, and the poets Savalan and Sonmez. The founders chose the name of Varliq, which means "existence," to signify that the Azerbaijanis and their distinctive culture had continued to exist under the Pahlavi regime in Iran, and that the regime did not succeed in eradicating their separate identity. Varliqcontains articles in Azerbaijani (in Arabic script) and Persian, along with poetry from Turkey and Soviet (and later the Republic of) Azerbaijan. In its first issue, which appeared in June 1979, it was stated that Varliqis the orga~ of th~ Committee in Charge of Cultural and Literary Affairs of the An;uman-1 Azerbaijan (The Council of Azerbaijan). Varliq's opening editorial spelled out in Azerbaijani its goals: Each and every people (khalq)of the world has the historical and legal right to preserve its national (milli) culture, identity and la_11;~age,n? matter how long those people have had historical and cultural affiliations with other peoples throughout history. . . . . The people (khalq)of Azerbaijan, together with t~e other peoples li:'mg m Iran, have shared a common destiny and have contributed to the creation of a common culture, yet have retained a national identity, character, and mother tongue... . . . The people (khalq) of Azerbaijan, although they retained their national (milli) culture and language, nevertheless remained loyal to Iran, even more so than those who wave the flag of "national unity"; the Azerbaijan people did not fail to carry out their historical and revolutionary duty when their services were needed.

We believe that our journal, in the great and honorable path we wish to follow, will be well accepted and honored by everyone who respects the national and cultural freedom of all peoples. 25 The founders of Varliqclearly express their national culture, identity, and language as being Azerbaijani, and their state identity as Iranian, stressing that they share with other Iranians a common culture. This declaration also illustrates the expectation that expressions of ethnic culture and freedom would be permitted. In its first issue, Varliq published a poem by the Soviet Azerbaijani poet Bakhtiyar Vahabzade, "Mother Tongue," demonstrating the editor's connections to co-ethnics in the north and their awareness of the cultural activity taking place there. In 1982, Javad Heyat commented that Varliq had accomplished two important tasks: "It has standardized written Azeri despite the various local spoken dialects and it has reformed and adapted the alphabet so as to phoneticise it."26

At this time, one of the most popular Azerbaijani publications in Tabriz was the left-wing journal Yoldash.The distribution of this journal was eventually stopped by Revolutionary Guards, who frequently confiscated it at check points. The government itself published a journal in Azerbaijani, Islami Birliq.It appeared in both Arabic and Cyrillic characters, evidently with the hope of influencing Azerbaijanis in the Soviet Union as well. This publication, which existed for three years due to its official sponsorship, had few readers; many of those who read Azerbaijani had left-wing or ethnic orientations, and did not enjoy the journal's religious approach. In addition, the articles were written mostly by clerics who had little experience with literary Azerbaijani, and it was unattractive to Azerbaijani intellectuals, who were the main consumers of writings in their native tongue. In 1979, a limited number of editions of Molla Nasreddin, a journal with a leftist orientation, were published. It featured some articles on Azerbaijani historical cultural figures, such as Taherzade Sabir, who had written in the original version of Molla Nasreddin.27 Other journals that appeared at this time in the Azerbaijani language include the literary journal Dada Gorgud, which often contained writing from Soviet 25. Editorial of Varliq, Vol. 1, p. 3. English translation found in Illian Bashgoz, "Varliq" (Book review), Turkish Studies AssociationBulletin, Vol. 3, No. 2 (September 1979). 26.

24. See David Menashri, "Shi'ite Leadership: In the Shadow of Conflicting Ideologies," Iranian Studies, Vol. 13 (1980), p. 126.

I 87

Heyat, "Regression of Azeri Language and Literature," p. 17.

27. Molla Nasreddin,Vol. 3 (May 16, 1979), quoted in Javadi, Satire in PersianLiterature, p. 282.

88

I BORDERS

AND BRETHREN

THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION AND THE AZERBAIJANIS

Azerbaijan and by local Azerbaijani writers, and Koroghlu,Ishiq (published in Urmiya), Chanlibel,and Azerbayjan Sesi. Most of these Azerbaijani journals did not last beyond 1981. Two professors of literature at Tabriz University have described the post-revolution period in Iran as "a renaissance in Azerbaijani literature."28 According to Varliq's editor, Javad Heyat, more than 150 books were published in Azerbaijani in Iran in the years 1979-83, the majority of which dealt with literary and religious subjects, language instruction, linguistics and foll