Bolivia and Coca: A Study in Dependency 9781685858964

Table of contents :
Contents
List of Tables and Figures
Foreword
Acknowledgments
Maps of South America, Bolivia, and the Chapare
1 The Rise of Coca
The Coca Boom
The Income from Coca
2 From Coca to Cocaine
Coca Farmers, Rural Elites, and Paste Production
From Paste to Cocaine
3 The Coca-Cocaine Economy
Production and Value
Employment
Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia
4 The Costs and Benefits
The Economic Effects
Financial Speculation
Food Production
The Impact on the Environment
Consumption
Corruption
5 Policies to Curb the Drug Trade
Legislation
Interdiction
Eradication
Military Options
6 Alternative Development
Introduction
Aid for Alternative Development
The Chapare Regional Development Project
IBTA-Chapare
Alternative Crops
Associated High Valleys Project
Credit Policy
The United Nations Projects
Further Observations
7 Conclusions
Notes
Glossary of Acronyms
Bibliography
Index
About the Book and Author
About the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) and the United Nations University (UNU)

Citation preview

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BOLIVIA AND C O C A

STUDIES O N THE IMPACT OF THE ILLEGAL D R U G TRADE LaMond Tullis, Series Editor

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A Project of the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) and the United Nations University (UNU)

BOLIVIA AND COCA • • •

A Study in Dependency James Painter

LYNNE RIENNER PUBLISHERS

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BOULDER & L O N D O N

Published in the United States o f America in 1994 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 1994 by the United Nations University and the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. All rights reserved by the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Painter, James. Bolivia and coca : a study in dependency / by J a m e s Painter. p. cm.—(Studies on the impact o f the illegal drug trade : v. 1) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-55587-490-8 (alk. paper) 1. Coca industry—Bolivia. 2. Cocaine industry—Bolivia. 3. Narcotics, Control of—Bolivia. 4. Bolivia—Economic policy. 5. Bolivia—Rural conditions. I. Title, II. Series. HD9019.C632B6458 1994 363.4'5'0984—dc20 93-32723 CIP British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library. T h e United Nations University Press has exclusive rights to distribute this book in J a p a n and Southeast Asia: United Nations University Press T h e United Nations University 53-70, Jingumae 5-chome Shibuya-ku, Tokyo 150 ISBN 92-808-0856-7

Printed and bound in the United States o f America _ v

T h e paper used in this publication meets the requirements o f the American National Standard for Permanence o f Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984.

To Sophia, Maya, and Cassie

Contents

List of Tables and Figures Foreword, LaMond Tullis Acknowledgments Maps of South America, Bolivia, and the Chapare

1

T h e Rise of C o c a

ix xi xiii xiv

1

T h e Coca Boom, 1 T h e Income f r o m Coca, 9 2

F r o m Coca to Cocaine

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Coca Farmers, Rural Elites, and Paste Production, 23 From Paste to Cocaine, 28 3

T h e Coca-Cocaine Economy

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Production and Value, 35 Employment, 40 Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia, 42 4

T h e Costs a n d B e n e f i t s

53

T h e Economic Effects, 53 Financial Speculation, 60 Food Production, 63 T h e Impact on the Environment, 65 Consumption, 68 Corruption, 70

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viii 5

CONTENTS

Policies t o C u r b t h e D r u g T r a d e

77

Legislation, 77 Interdiction, 80 Eradication, 85 Military Options, 91 6

Alternative Development

105

Aid for Alternative Development, 108 T h e Chapare Regional Development Project, 112 IBTA-Chapare, 114 Alternative Crops, 116 Associated High Valleys Project, 119 Credit Policy, 122 T h e United Nations Projects, 127 Further Observations, 132 7

Conclusions

139

Notes Glossary of Acronyms Bibliography Index About the Book and Author About the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) and the United Nations University (UNU)

147 173 177 183 193

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Tables and Figures

Tables 1.1 1.2

Area U n d e r Coca Cultivation in Bolivia, 1963-1991 Population Estimates for the Chapare and Carrasco Provinces of Cochabamba, 1967-1990 1.3 Chapare Farmers by Year of Arrival 1.4 Origin of Chapare Farm Population 1.5 Economic Indicators, 1980-1990 1.6 Mean Area per Farm Dedicated to Coca and O t h e r Crop Production in the Chapare 1.7 Estimates of Net Income from 1 Hectare of Coca in 1990 1.8 Net Annual Incomes of Alternative Crops and Coca in 1990 3.1 Coca Production in Bolivia, 1963-1991 Paste, Base, and Cocaine Production, 1986-1990 (I) 3.2 3.3 Paste, Base, and Cocaine Production, 1986-1990 (II) 3.4 Value of Coca-Cocaine Production in 1990 3.5 Coca-Cocaine and Legal Exports, 1986-1990 3.6 Income from Coca-Cocaine Economy Staying in Bolivia in 1990 3.7 Income from Coca-Cocaine Economy Staying in Bolivia, 1986-1990 3.8 N u m b e r of Workers Employed in the Coca-Cocaine Industry by Sector in 1990 3.9 Estimates of the N u m b e r of Workers Employed in the Coca-Cocaine Industry 3.10 T h e Coca-Cocaine Economies in Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia 4.1 Discarded Materials Used in the Manufacture of Paste and Cocaine in 1988 ix

15 16 16 17 18 19 19 20 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 50 50 51 75

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5.1 6.1 6.2 6.3

• TABLES AND FIGURES

Coca Eradication, 1985-1992 U.S. Government Development Aid to Bolivia, 1984-1992 USAID Alternative Development Aid to Bolivia Actually Disbursed, 1983-1990 N u m b e r of Years Before Commercial and Full Production After Seeding for Crops in the C h a p a r e

104 137 138 138

Figure 1.1

Coca Prices, April 1986-July 1991

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Foreword • •• L A M O N D TULLIS

James Painter's excellent book is part of a multicountry study of the socioeconomic and political impact of the production, trade, and use of illicit narcotic drugs. T h e project is sponsored by the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), the United Nations University (UNU), and Brigham Young University (BYU). T h e first phase of the project, a review m o n o g r a p h and a n n o tated bibliography entitled Handbook of Research on the Illicit Drug Traffic: Socioeconomic and Political Consequences (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press), was issued in 1991. T h e second phase is a series of country-specific books that both describe and analyze the interplay of economics, politics, society, and illicit drugs and drug-control policies t h r o u g h a careful analysis of causes and consequences of production, trade, consumption, and control. Since the early 1980s the national and international traffic in and consumption of cannabis, opiate, and coca derivatives have exploded, perhaps now tapering off in the United States but vigorously e x p a n d i n g in Western and Eastern E u r o p e and the f o r m e r Soviet Union. Consumption has also rapidly increased in the principal socalled p r o d u c e r countries (for example, Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, Myanmar, Afghanistan). T h e socioeconomic and political costs of c o n s u m p t i o n a n d efforts to suppress it have m o u n t e d . Policy initiatives to reduce those costs have, in the worst cases, simply aggravated the problem. In the best cases the initiatives have apparently had only a marginal impact. Although the literature on illicit drugs is now rapidly expanding, most of it has focused on consumption and drug-control problems in major industrialized countries. Less attention has been paid to the developing countries. This is highly u n f o r t u n a t e , because illicit-drugcontrol initiatives have concentrated mostly on supply-reduction xi

xii • • • FOREWORD efforts in developing countries. In the wake of a general failure of these supply-reduction strategies to control consumption anywhere, a strong shift is now expected in international drug-control efforts. T h e p u r p o s e of the country studies in this series is to increase the level of information and awareness about costs and consequences of the present policies and to consider the implications of proffered new solutions for developing areas. We desire to contribute to an enhanced quality of policy review discussions by bringing t o g e t h e r a rich array of historical a n d c o n t e m p o r a r y i n f o r m a t i o n and careful analyses regarding specific countries. James Painter's book makes a substantial contribution to this effort. Bolivia is a principal p r o d u c e r of coca, the agricultural precursor to cocaine. Painter describes the coca b o o m in Bolivia, the development of a cocaine industry in the country, and the catastrophic s u r r e n d e r of the Bolivian economy to that industry. He also looks into the costs and benefits of the industry and the impact of various policies to curb the d r u g trade. A m o n g the latter he examines "alternative development," the present prospective solution to r e d u c e crop production. Although alternative development has not received a fair shake in Bolivia, Painter is n o t optimistic that even its success would materially alter Bolivian coca production or the availability of cocaine for the international market. Nevertheless, he concludes with the following challenge: "Even if a successful policy did little to stop the availability of cocaine in the United States, at least policymakers favoring alternative development could be left with the honorable objective of contributing to Bolivia's efforts to escape underdevelopm e n t and helping p o o r farmers in their efforts to escape poverty —which was, after all, why most of t h e m started growing coca in the first place." Painter shows how coca and cocaine are inextricably linked to Bolivia's long-term development problems, to its economic stabilization prospects, to incipient militarization of the society, to internal political dynamics, and to a frantic search—involving everyone f r o m peasants to elites—for a solution to the underlying p r o b l e m s of poverty in the country. Readers will be pleased with his lucid style and intimate familiarity with Bolivia as he shows us, step by step, how a country struggling to survive in today's world becomes b e h o l d e n to and integrated into an international illegal economy. Aside f r o m acknowledging the financial s u p p o r t of UNRISD, UNU, and BYU, we thankfully acknowledge the excellent s u p p o r t f r o m Chelita Pate and h e r BYU staff of assistants in p r e p a r i n g the country-study manuscripts. Lani Gurr, in particular, has provided matchless service for this project, for which we are truly grateful.

Acknowledgments

The research for this book was carried out d u r i n g a period of three years, lrom O c t o b e r 1988 to D e c e m b e r 1991, while I was working and living in Bolivia as a journalist. During that time, many people helped me to a deeper understanding of the complexities of Bolivia's coca and cocaine production. However, special thanks are d u e to the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC), now called the United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP), and particularly Giovanni Quaglia and Jaime Idrovo. Various officials of the Bolivian and U.S. governments went out of their way to find time to speak to me, including representatives of SUBDESAL, PDAR, UMOPAR, the DEA, the NAU, and USAID. Most of them talked on condition of anonymity, so they shall remain nameless. Representatives of the coca federations and nongovernmental organizations in Cochabamba (particularly Alberto Rivera f r o m CERES) and La Paz were also most helpful. Among those providing detailed and insightful comments on the text, I should like to thank Solon Barraclough, Carlos Pérez-Crespo, Francisco Thoumi, and LaMond Tullis. But the responsibility for any errors or dubious interpretations remains mine. JP-

xiii

The Chapare

Area S h o w n PACIFIC OCEAN

ATLANTIC OCEAN

South America

Bolivia

xiv

The Rise of Coca

The Coca Boom In the early 1980s, Roberto Suarez Gomez, probably Bolivia's bestknown cocaine trafficker, p r e s e n t e d a highly ambitious plan to the government of General Luis Garcia Meza. Basing his vision on studies carried out by Spanish and J a p a n e s e academics, Suarez Gomez imagined it would be feasible to finance a new multinational corporation capable of transforming Bolivia's excess coca leaf production into medicinal products for a mass market. History relates that Suarez Gomez's idea was dismissed perfunctorily by a government already deeply aware of the financial benefits to be won by coca's better-known derivative, cocaine. However unlikely Suarez Gomez's a p p a r e n t conversion from trafficker to healer may seem, his vision stemmed f r o m a centuries-old tradition in Bolivia of the use of the coca leaf for medicinal, cultural, and religious purposes. Its first use can be traced back to at least 3000 BC.1 During the colonial period, Q u e c h u a and Aymara Indian laborers in the silver mines consumed coca—or the hoja sagrada, as it is commonly known in Bolivia—as a stimulant and as protection against altitude, h u n g e r , a n d cold. 2 Five h u n d r e d years later, the practice known as acullico, in which the coca leaf is chewed and held in a wad in the cheek, is still regularly adopted by at least one million Bolivians, mostly Indian peasants and miners. 3 Some observers believe the chewing of coca supplies some of the vitamins and minerals missing from poor peoples' diet, particularly calcium, iron, and phosphorous. 4 Moreover, coca remains an integral part of indigenous community life, used extensively in rituals, as a natural medicine, and as a highly valued gift in the mink'a system of reciprocal favors. T h e original version (invented at the end of the last century) of what we now know as Coca-Cola drew on the medicinal benefits of 1

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BOLIVIA A N D COCA

coca before any of its fourteen alkaloids are removed. This was perceived to be the only way to c o m p e t e with a p o p u l a r tonic of the time, vino Mariani, a favorite of such notables as the a u t h o r H. G. Wells, Pope Benedict XV, and U.S. president William McKinley. Now, as the Coca-Cola Company is keen to stress, any trace of an addictive drug has been taken out of its product, but the company still buys coca from Bolivia to be used as flavoring. 5 Such stories are a salutary r e m i n d e r that the illicit production of cocaine—which few Bolivians consume—stems from a long period of legal consumption and production of coca in Bolivia. Such was the legitimacy of coca and the i m p o r t a n c e of coca p r o d u c t i o n to the economy that the g o v e r n m e n t passed a decree in 1940 declaring coca "an article of prime necessity" and ordering its compulsory sale in mining and railway companies (unless otherwise noted, all translations are the a u t h o r ' s ) . 6 T h e Bolivian g o v e r n m e n t did ratify the 1961 United Nations Convention on Drugs, which included not only cocaine but the coca leaf on its list of proscribed products, but the narcotics law passed a year later did not include coca. (According to the UN convention, the acullico was technically typified as an illegal use of drugs, and even the act of picking coca leaf constituted producing a drug.) 7 It was regarded as a major triumph for Bolivia when the 1988 UN Vienna convention recognized in its Article 14 the "traditional legal uses" of coca leaf in its natural state, a change that was apparently greeted by a standing ovation by the convention delegates. 8 Even though coca remained a proscribed d r u g u n d e r the 1961 convention, the Bolivians felt the addition—though vaguely worded—was at least one step on the path toward the "rehabilitation" of coca. It was only with the passing of the Ley del Régimen de la Coca y Sustancias Controladas (Law Regulating Coca and Controlled Substances, or law 1008) in July 1988 that a Bolivian law specifically prohibited the growing of coca outside "traditional zones." Even now, it remains legal to grow coca within most of these zones u n d e r certain conditions (see pp. 77-80). Until the 1940s most of Bolivia's coca was grown in a region known as the Yungas, a 11,000-square-kilometer area of deep, plunging valleys three hours' drive northeast of the capital, La Paz. During the colonial period, p r o d u c t i o n levels in the Yungas b o o m e d and slumped largely in response to the f o r t u n e s of the silver mines, where most of the coca was c o n s u m e d . Most of the p r o d u c t i o n was carried out on large, terraced, commercial plantations, or haciendas, in sharp contrast to c o n t e m p o r a r y small-scale peasant p r o d u c t i o n . To this day, most of the 10,000 to 20,000 tonnes of coca c o n s u m e d

THE RISE OF C O C A

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each year in Bolivia are grown in the Yungas, partly because its coca is regarded as sweeter than that grown in the Chapare. According to the agrarian census of 1937, the Yungas accounted for 97 percent of the country's coca fields, with the r e m a i n d e r f o u n d in Cochabamba (2 percent) and Santa Cruz (1 percent). By the time of the 1950 census, the share of the Yungas had d r o p p e d to 67 percent, and the balance was coming principally f r o m the Chapare, a subtropical rainforest area in the eastern lowlands of the d e p a r t m e n t of Cochabamba. 9 By 1967 the Chapare had overtaken the Yungas, accounting for over half the total hectares (ha) u n d e r coca cultivation (see Table 1.1). T h e rapid consolidation of the C h a p a r e as the country's main coca-growing region—before the real boom in international d e m a n d for cocaine—was a product both of its natural advantages and state colonization policies. Farmers in the Chapare did not have to build steep terracing and could expect higher annual yields, partly because of the richer nutrients in the soil and partly because of the Chapare's four harvests every year compared to the three most c o m m o n in the Yungas. As early as 1963, the C h a p a r e was p r o d u c i n g nearly 3,500 tonnes of coca f r o m only 1,300 hectares c o m p a r e d to the 1,400 tonnes f r o m the 1,700 hectares in the Yungas. By 1970 the Chapare accounted for 83 p e r c e n t of national p r o d u c t i o n (of 8,500 tonnes) from just 850 hectares more of coca. 10 In the 1930s and 1940s governments gave a m a j o r impetus to a long-held desire to thin out highland areas by relocating farmers to the warmer eastern lowlands. Roads began to penetrate the low-lying areas of Cochabamba to encourage colonization in part as a protection against predatory neighboring countries. 1 1 More important, the g o v e r n m e n t h o p e d the resettlement program would forge stronger political and economic links with outlying tropical areas and thereby build a stronger sense of the Bolivian nation, increase domestic food production to achieve food self-reliance, and create an escape valve for demographic pressures elsewhere in the country. 1 2 Migration to the Chapare was given a f u r t h e r impetus in the 1960s and early 1970s with the onset of internationally f u n d e d colonization projects and the building of a paved road to the area financed by USAID (United States Agency for International Developm e n t ) . 1 3 By the time international d e m a n d for cocaine exploded in the mid-1970s, the Chapare was p r o d u c i n g all b u t 1,300 t o n n e s of Bolivia's national production of 27,000 tonnes of coca. Its vast, flat lands with a myriad of small paths and roads r u n n i n g off a main artery compared sharply with the steep terrain of the Yungas, where n o small airplane could land and whose main entry point f r o m La

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Paz was (and remains) an extremely hazardous road easily monitored by checkpoints. According to figures f r o m the Bolivian research institute UDAPE (Unidad de Análisis de Políticas Económicas), national coca production grew f r o m an average of 9,000 tonnes a year between 1963 and 1975 to an average of 79,000 tonnes f r o m 1976 to 1988 (see Table 3.1). This expansion was mostly d u e to new areas being cultivated with coca rather than improved productivity f r o m existing areas. 1 4 New coca areas, mostly in the C h a p a r e but also in the Yungas, expanded every year from an average of 690 hectares in the earlier period to 3,747 hectares a year in the latter period. 1 "' T h e gross value of coca production as a percentage of total national agricultural production increased from 8 percent in 1980 to 17 percent in 1983 and 19 percent in 1988.i T h e population of the Chapare grew accordingly. Between 1967 and 1981, the n u m b e r of colonies in the Chapare increased from 54 with a settler population of 24,000 inhabitants, to 247 and a population of 84,000 inhabitants. By 1987 this population had probably more than doubled again to around 200,000, including residents and transients (i.e., those resident for only part of the year with primary residence elsewhere, particularly day laborers, coca stompers, and small traders). 1 7 As early as 1981, an estimated 400,000 people and 29,000 vehicles were moving in and out of the region, making an accurate breakdown of the resident versus transient population very difficult. Government estimates from 1989 suggest that as much as 60 percent of the population in the Chapare may have been transient. 1 8 Some recent calculations of more than 300,000 for the population of the C h a p a r e now seem exaggerated, 1 9 and the increase in the total population is probably closer to the estimates outlined in Table 1.2, which clearly shows the dramatic rise in the early 1980s. New research by the Bolivian sociologist Alberto Rivera suggests that the population d r o p p e d dramatically in late 1989 when coca prices collapsed, causing the mass exodus of thousands of people, particularly from the transient population. 2 0 However, many analysts and representatives of the coca u n i o n s deny the extent of the exodus. They suggest that many, but n o t all, r e t u r n e d after coca prices began to improve in mid-1990 and beyond. An extensive survey of m o r e than 10,000 C h a p a r e farmers carried out between 1985 and 1989 by the state eradication agency, DIRECO (Dirección de Reconversión Agrícola), shows that of the settler farmers, 19 percent arrived in the second half of the 1970s and a massive 43 percent in the first five years of the 1980s (see Table 1.3).2i

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T h e s a m e survey shows t h a t of t h e 10,000 q u e s t i o n e d , n e a r l y two-thirds c a m e f r o m within t h e C o c h a b a m b a d e p a r t m e n t , twelve p e r c e n t f r o m t h e d e p a r t m e n t of P o t o s i a n d a f u r t h e r f o u r p e r c e n t f r o m O r u r o , f o r d e c a d e s two of Bolivia's p o o r e s t a r e a s (see T a b l e 1.4). L a n d scarcity in t h e h i g h l a n d s was t h e m a j o r m o t i v e f o r mig r a t i n g . A study carried o u t by t h e C o c h a b a m b a - b a s e d r e s e a r c h institute CERES ( C e n t r o d e E s t u d i o s d e la R e a l i d a d E c o n o m i c a y Social) in t h e early 1980s i n d i c a t e d t h a t 62 p e r c e n t of t h e f a r m e r s in the C h a p a r e at that time h a d n o l a n d in t h e i r h i g h l a n d c o m m u n i t i e s p r i o r to m i g r a t i o n , a n d of t h o s e w h o d i d have l a n d , half of t h e m o w n e d o n e h e c t a r e or less. 2 ' 2 T h e s e results b r o a d l y c o i n c i d e with a l a t e r study by CERES of 180 C h a p a r e f a r m e r s in 1989, w h i c h c o n c l u d e d t h a t only 40 p e r c e n t of t h e l a n d o w n e r s in t h e C h a p a r e also h a d land in t h e i r h o m e areas. O f these, 64 p e r c e n t o w n e d less t h a n 1 hectare.23 T h e r e was n o t h i n g new in large-scale m i g r a t i o n . T h e C h a p a r e was simply t h e latest c h a p t e r in a l o n g history of m i g r a t i o n a n d sett l e m e n t by r u r a l p e o p l e f r o m the altiplano ( h i g h l a n d areas) l o o k i n g for off-farm i n c o m e for their survival. 2 4 A l t h o u g h r u r a l - u r b a n migration is the most usual p a t t e r n , rural-rural m i g r a t i o n is also c o m m o n , as p e a s a n t s seek off-farm e m p l o y m e n t d u r i n g t h e harvest season of cash crops, particularly in t h e S a n t a C r u z d e p a r t m e n t , A r g e n t i n a , a n d Chile. T h i s u b i q u i t o u s s e a r c h f o r e m p l o y m e n t away f r o m r u r a l h o m e s has its r o o t s in a c o m p l e x i n t e r p l a y of f a c t o r s i n c l u d i n g increases in t h e r u r a l p o p u l a t i o n ; a g o v e r n m e n t e m p h a s i s o n e x p o r t o r i e n t e d a g r i c u l t u r e (which t e n d s to e m p l o y fewer p e a s a n t s ) at t h e cost of d o m e s t i c f o o d p r o d u c t i o n ; t h e lack of agro-ecological sustainability of excessively p a r c e l i z e d l a n d in l a r g e a r e a s of the altip l a n o ; a n d g o v e r n m e n t credit, i n v e s t m e n t , a n d p r i c i n g policies t h a t p r e j u d i c e d the small p r o d u c e r . M u c h of this was t r u e of t h e C o c h a b a m b a d e p a r t m e n t . A 1990 study of the p o p u l a t i o n of C o c h a b a m b a showed that m o r e t h a n forty p e r c e n t h a d migrated at least o n c e b e f o r e 1983 a n d nearly half b e f o r e 1988. 2 5 T h e m a i n attraction of the C h a p a r e was n o t only t h e immediate financial gain b u t also its g e o g r a p h i c a l proximity a n d a l o n g history of close p r o d u c t i o n r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e u p l a n d a n d lowland areas of t h e d e p a r t m e n t . T e m p o r a r y m i g r a t i o n was facilitated by t h e c o m p l i m e n t a r y seasons—and t h e r e f o r e p e r i o d s of h i g h a n d low l a b o r d e m a n d — b e t w e e n the two z o n e s of C o c h a b a m b a . A 1984 study also shows the s t r o n g links m a i n t a i n e d b e t w e e n the C h a p a r e a n d h i g h l a n d h o m e c o m m u n i t i e s . Half t h e p e o p l e q u e s t i o n e d said they c o n t i n u e d to own h o u s e s in their h o m e towns o r villages of the C o c h a b a m b a valley, while m o r e than half sent m o n e y back to invest. 2 6

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T h e structural factors causing f r e q u e n t p e r m a n e n t or temporary migration were c o m p o u n d e d in the early 1980s by climatic disruption and a national economic slump, which undoubtedly gave a huge fillip to the exodus to the Chapare. T h e c o n j u n c t i v a l "push factors" have b e e n well d o c u m e n t e d , - 7 and they include a widespread and sustained drought in 1983-1984 in central and southern parts of the country and the virtual collapse of the formal economy t h r o u g h o u t the whole country. The drought was widely regarded as Bolivia's worst this century, causing a major d r o p in the availability of staple crops (particularly potatoes and maize), a drastic fall in rural incomes, and the death of large n u m b e r s of livestock. All these factors pushed even more rural families to migrate for survival. Ironically, a credit relief p r o g r a m sponsored by USAID designed to help families bear the effects of the drought in the upper Cochabamba area encouraged migration to the Chapare. Farmers forced by credit institutions to repay their loans before the drought was over responded by migrating temporarily to the Chapare to acquire the ready cash to meet repayment demands. In some cases, their n u m b e r s included farmers who had not visited the Chapare before. 2 8 T h e boom in the d e m a n d f r o m abroad for cocaine coincided with Bolivia's worst economic slump this century, caused essentially by government m i s m a n a g e m e n t but c o m p o u n d e d by falling commodity prices and growing debt-service payments. T h e crisis started in the early 1980s and was hardly resolved by the beginning of the next decade. GDP declined by an average 2.2 p e r c e n t annually from 1980 to 1986 and barely outstripped population growth until 1991, when good rains reversed years of poor agricultural output to push the overall growth rate over 4.0 percent (see Table 1.5). From 1980 to 1985 per capita consumption declined by over 30 percent, family income by 38 percent, and the purchasing power of wages by 50 percent. Bolivia became synonymous with hyperinflation, which spiraled out of control to exceed 8,000 percent in 1985, by repute the seventh highest ever recorded in the world. It was mainly caused by the unwillingness of the g o v e r n m e n t of President H e r n á n Siles Zuazo (1982-1985) to cut government spending in the face of the d e m a n d s of organized labor, high debt servicing, falling tax revenues, and a rapid decline in new dollar loans from abroad. T h e Siles Zuazo gove r n m e n t proved incapable of following a consistent set of macroeconomic policies, at times favoring o r t h o d o x deflationary measures harming labor, and at o t h e r times attempting stabilization policies while maintaining wage indexation. 2 9

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Official unemployment j u m p e d from 5.8 percent in 1980 to more than 21 percent in 1985, as at least 60,000 people were sacked in the manufacturing and mining sectors. The best documented of these were 27,000 miners who lost their jobs as a result of a tin price slump in October 1985 and a government response to it of closing seventeen state mines. 30 Tin had formed the backbone of the country's formal export economy for most of the century, but a price fall from U.S. $12,000 a ton to U.S. $5,000 a ton virtually overnight compounded a more gentle decline in production and export value already apparent from the early 1980s. In 1980 Bolivia produced 28,000 tonnes of tin worth U.S. $378 million, but by 1986 its high-cost, low-grade mines could only produce 6,000 tonnes worth a meager U.S. $48 million. Tin exports, worth 40 percent of exports in 1980, fell to only 8 percent in 1987. It is not clear how many of these sacked miners actually migrated permanently f r o m mining districts such as Potosí and O r u r o to the Chapare. Certainly, press reports in 1986 suggested that at least in the early stages, their numbers were significant. 3 1 Of all the settlers interviewed in the DIRECO survey, 7.9 percent said they arrived after 1985, and 16.4 percent said they came from Potosí and O r u r o , which would give a figure of nearly 800 arriving from those two departments after the tin crash (assuming a population of 60,000 permanent settlers in the Chapare). Anecdotal evidence suggests that some ex-miners have remained, but reports f r o m church-based organizations working with mining communities in the late 1980s suggested that many others had already r e t u r n e d to their mining communities after e n c o u n t e r i n g difficulties with the new lifestyle, different climate, and unaccustomed diseases in the Chapare. Others stayed in the lowlands as miners, looking for gold in the rivers of the Beni, Pando, and tropical regions of La Paz department. It hardly needs stating that the national economic slump and the virtual collapse of the tin mining industry worsened many of Bolivia's social statistics, which for years have kept Bolivia rooted near or at the bottom of the Latin American poverty league. In 1989, 165 out of every 1,000 children born died b e f o r e their Fifth birthday, and 105 b e f o r e their first birthday—both rates are the worst in Latin America, including Haiti. 3 2 The same r e p o r t indicated that m o r e than half of Bolivian children between ages two and five have stunted growth d u e to malnutrition. UNICEF (United Nations International Child r e n ' s Emergency Fund) statistics showed Bolivia to have registered a slower rate of improvement since 1960 than virtually all other Latin American countries. As recently as 1991, a World Bank report compared the conditions of Bolivia's p o o r to those more publicized cases in sub-Saharan Africa. 3 3

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It comes as no surprise to learn that p e r m a n e n t settlers and temporary workers in the Chapare blame poverty—and particularly the lack of land, money, and employment—in their zones of origin for their migration. Of the 176 settlers questioned in the CERES survey, 42 percent said lack of land, and 41 p e r c e n t pointed to insufficient income in their h o m e areas. Although t h e r e are important differences between settlers and laborers, these are the same reasons given by most rural inhabitants seeking to migrate to cities. 34 T h e attraction of the Chapare for many migrant settlers was inextricably linked to the d o m i n a n t system of land tenure, which is almost exclusively small peasant plots. T h e r e is not one large-scale plantation of over 20 hectares dedicated to coca in the Chapare. The DIRECO survey suggests that the mean-size plot is between 9 and 12 hectares, of which 1.25 to 4 hectares are u n d e r cultivation. Coca is only one crop in a diversified cropping system, but it is the most important, r e p r e s e n t i n g an average 0.9 hectares (a range of 0.5 to 1.25). T h e rest of the plot is dedicated to bananas, cassava, corn, rice, citrus fruits, or other m i n o r crops (see Table 1.6). SUBDESAL (Subsecretaría de Desarrollo Alternativo) calculated that by 1988 coca represented 46.9 percent of the total area u n d e r cultivation in the Chapare. It is interesting to note that, regardless of how much property farmers have, they rarely dedicate more than 1.5 hectares to coca. 35 Coca fields are f o u n d very close to the houses where farmers live, thus making it very difficult to use herbicides or defoliants without damaging people and o t h e r crops. It should be stressed that life in the Chapare is a long way from the utopia conjured up by some writers. Surveys suggest that migrants would prefer not to have to travel there if suitable j o b opportunities existed in their home areas and even if the local wage were lower than the rates in the Chapare. 3 6 O n e study suggests that Chapare wages have to be higher than 1.6 times the going rate at h o m e to attract farmers or workers. 37 Fear of police violence and of disease (particularly yellow fever, tuberculosis, and various lung diseases) are common reasons cited by interviewees for their dislike of the Chapare. T h e Chapare is also o n e of the wettest areas in the world, mainly because of a sharp d r o p in elevation of m o r e than 4,000 meters in less than 100 kilometers. It registers a rainfall of between 2,700 and 4,900 millimeters (mm) a year (and once in 1982 of 7,500 m m ) , and an average t e m p e r a t u r e of 22 degrees Centigrade—not conditions familiar to highland dwellers. What is familiar is the lack of social services. In 1989 no town could count on drinking water, p r o p e r drainage, or an electricity supply (Chimore alone had some water and locally generated electricity). Although the Chapare has no electricity,

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high-voltage lines carry electricity g e n e r a t e d in the higher regions of the C h a p a r e to Santa Cruz. This is a n o t h e r symbol of the outwardlooking development of the Chapare. 3 8 Schools are sparse and poorly a t t e n d e d , partly because many family heads are known to travel without their children and remit their money to their families in their h o m e communities. Ministry of Education figures in 1988 suggested that only 9,000 students were enrolled in schools in the Chapare, while informal conversations give the impression most children study outside the Chapare, primarily in Cochabamba. 3 9 And there are insufficient medical posts to cope with widespread yellow fever, tuberculosis and other lung diseases, and others such as measles and skin infections. 4 0 Anemia, vitamin deficiencies, and malnutrition are e n d e m i c a m o n g children, causing some to estimate infant mortality u n d e r one year of age to be as high as 50 percent. Venereal diseases are also particularly acute a m o n g the young female population.'" Although the Chapare has a n u m b e r of diverse microregions, the region as a whole is not particularly suitable for growing other crops due to heavy erosion, the excessively high rainfall, and the high level of acidity and aluminum toxicity. Lime could help to neutralize the acidity and toxicity of the soil to allow plants to absorb nutrients more readily, but lime is one of the controlled substances in the Chapare because it is used in the m a n u f a c t u r e of coca paste, the first stage in the manufacture of cocaine.

The Income from Coca Undoubtedly the major pull factor to the Chapare was the expectation of higher income levels. Although it has almost become a truism that coca is the "green gold of the Andes," against which other crops could hardly compete, there are surprisingly few detailed studies of just how m u c h income coca generates c o m p a r e d to its rivals. However, anecdotal evidence and the studies that are available do point to the spectacular gains to be m a d e f r o m coca, particularly in the boom period of the early 1980s when migration to the Chapare was at its highest. What is certainly true is that the expectation of good incomes, even after the price had b e g u n to fall, encouraged people to move to the Chapare. Basing their figures on the estimates of others, two economists at Harvard University, Mario de Franco and Ricardo Godoy, have made the following comparison between the 1960s and the early part of the 1980s:

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T h e return a farmer o b t a i n s p e r h e c t a r e f r o m s e l l i n g c o c a leaves and coca paste has i n c r e a s e d fifteen f o l d in real terms s i n c e 1960. In 1960 a farmer c o u l d e x p e c t to e a r n 12,000 b o l i v i a n o s (in 1966 bolivianos) per year . . . by 1985 a f a r m e r e a r n e d 178,842 bolivianos (in 1966 b o l i v i a n o s ) . Put in real growth rate terms, d u r i n g 1 9 6 0 - 1 9 8 5 the returns from coca cultivation grew by 11 p e r c e n t per year. In contrast, the real price of p o t a t o e s , the principal f o o d a n d cash c r o p in the h i g h l a n d s , has d e c l i n e d steadily . . . since 1936. 4 -

De F r a n c o a n d Godoy use a m i d p o i n t value of U.S. $1,000 p e r year f o r t h e n e t a n n u a l i n c o m e f r o m o n e h e c t a r e of coca in t h e 1960s, a n d U.S. $5,000 for 198 5. 4 3 T h i s latter f i g u r e is low c o m p a r e d to the f i n d i n g s of a study c a r r i e d o u t by t h e OAS ( O r g a n i z a t i o n of American States) for 1984, which suggests a n a n n u a l i n c o m e of U.S. $9,000 f r o m 1 h e c t a r e of coca, n i n e t e e n t i m e s h i g h e r t h a n the i n c o m e of U.S. $500 f r o m t h e s e c o n d most p r o f i t a b l e c r o p in t h e C h a p a r e at that time, citrus fruit. However, a study by t h e Bolivian r e s e a r c h institute CERES in C o c h a b a m b a suggests a lower figure, between U.S. $5,000 a n d U.S. $6,000 p e r h e c t a r e in 1982-1983. 4 4 M u c h d e p e n d s o n the price of coca at the time of the calculation of i n c o m e , as prices t h r o u g h o u t t h e 1980s f l u c t u a t e d widely. Figure 1.1 shows t h e s h a r p variations in p r i c e even f r o m m o n t h to m o n t h f o r t h e p e r i o d f r o m April 1986 to J u l y 1991. Until N o v e m b e r 1989 the price d r o p p e d only twice below t h e U.S.-calculated break-even p o i n t of U.S. $30 a carga, t h e 1 0 0 - p o u n d b a g used t h r o u g h o u t the C h a p a r e as the universal m e a s u r e m e n t f o r coca. Prices fell sharply in July 1986 as a result of a m u c h - p u b l i c i z e d a n t i d r u g o p e r a t i o n known as Blast F u r n a c e f r o m July to N o v e m b e r 1986, w h e n U.S. t r o o p s were d e p l o y e d in s u p p o r t of the Bolivian a n t i d r u g police. Prices c l i m b e d back again soon a f t e r t h e U.S. t r o o p s left, b u t they are yet to recover the levels p r i o r to the o p e r a t i o n . T h e variations in coca prices may a c c o u n t f o r a f i g u r e calculated by USAID in t h e mid-1980s of only U.S. $2,600 a year f r o m o n e h e c t a r e of coca. T h i s f i g u r e is only f o u r times g r e a t e r t h a n t h e reve n u e f r o m avocados or citrus fruits, with which USAID h o p e d to replace coca at the time, b u t is also f o u r times USAID's calculation of the 1986 p e r capita i n c o m e . 4 5 A l t h o u g h prices r e g i s t e r e d h i g h v a r i a t i o n s in t h e late 1980s, t h e r e was an i n e x o r a b l e d r o p f r o m t h e highs of U.S. $300 a carga in the earlier part of t h e d e c a d e . Even t h o u g h coca prices w e r e a p p a r ently locked i n t o a d o w n w a r d t r e n d , a n d m o r e f r e q u e n t l y falling below U.S. $30 a carga, t h e a d v a n t a g e s of c o c a — o f which h i g h e r inc o m e was only a p a r t — w e r e still self-evident. T h e study of t h e Chap a r e carried o u t in 1990 by A l b e r t o Rivera suggests t h a t even w h e n

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coca prices were at t h e i r lowest sustained r a t e f o r a d e c a d e f r o m Nov e m b e r 19, 1989, to J a n u a r y 22, 1990 ( b e t w e e n U.S. $8 a n d $30 a carga), f a r m e r s were still receiving an i n c o m e b e t w e e n U.S. $204 a n d $735 p e r cosecha (harvest). 4 6 A s s u m i n g f o u r c o s e c h a s a year, this w o u l d have given t h e f a r m e r with 1 h e c t a r e of coca (slightly above the average f a r m size in t h e C h a p a r e ) a gross a n n u a l i n c o m e between U.S. $816 a n d $2,940. Rivera calculates t h a t the costs of p r o d u c t i o n at t h e t i m e a m o u n t e d to U.S. $582 p e r h e c t a r e , b r o k e n d o w n i n t o $28 f o r t h e p u r c h a s e of coca plants (24,000), $117 e a c h f o r t h e p u r c h a s e of insecticides a n d h e r b i c i d e s , a n d $320 f o r c o n t r a c t l a b o r . 4 7 T h e s e ass u m p t i o n s would give a n e t a n n u a l i n c o m e of between U.S. $200 a n d $2,300 if those prices r e m a i n e d low f o r an e n t i r e twelve-month period (which, in fact, they were n o t ) . However, Rivera p o i n t s o u t that t h e l a b o r costs can b e r e d u c e d to U.S. $160 if the o w n e r of a f a r m takes o n daily l a b o r i n s t e a d of m a i n t a i n i n g the m o r e n o r m a l practice of s h a r e d c o n t r a c t s with outsiders. Interviews carried o u t in the C h a p a r e at t h e time of t h e p r i c e s l u m p at the e n d of 1989 suggested t h a t o w n e r s were i n d e e d s h e d d i n g l a b o r or n o t c o n t r a c t i n g o u t s i d e l a b o r in o r d e r to c o u n t e r cash flow p r o b l e m s . Calculations by a f o r m e r chief e c o n o m i s t f o r USAID in Bolivia, Clark J o e l , suggest lower i n c o m e figures f r o m a h e c t a r e of coca, mainly because h e assumes lower yield Figures. Rivera works o n the ass u m p t i o n of a yield of 24.5 cargas p e r harvest, giving a n a n n u a l prod u c t i o n of 9,800 p o u n d s of coca. USAID assumes a yearly o u t p u t of 2.2 t o n n e s f r o m a hectare of coca (an average of its u p p e r estimate of 2.76 t o n n e s a n d lower estimate of 1.6 t o n n e s ) , equivalent to a p r o d u c t i o n of only 4,851 pounds. T h e UNDCP (United Nations D r u g Control Prog r a m ) unofficial figure is for a similar a n n u a l o u t p u t of a r o u n d 5,000 p o u n d s . T h e d i f f e r e n t yield figures reveal d i f f e r e n t n e t i n c o m e s for a h e c t a r e of coca, d e p e n d i n g on the price of a carga a n d the estimates of p r o d u c t i o n costs (see Table 1.7). J o e l assumes p r o d u c t i o n costs of U.S. $1,455 a hectare, which gives h i m lower n e t incomes. T h e U N D C P d o e s n o t publish official figures f o r its estimates of i n c o m e , b u t conversations with t o p U N D C P officials s u g g e s t e d t h a t in 1991 they used a w o r k i n g f i g u r e of a r o u n d U.S. $3,000 f o r gross i n c o m e f r o m a h e c t a r e of coca, a s s u m i n g a n average p r i c e of a r o u n d U.S. $40 a carga f o r t h e year. 4 8 It has to be r e m e m b e r e d that T a b l e 1.8 only shows e x p e c t e d inc o m e f o r a price r a n g e f o r coca of b e t w e e n U.S. $20 a n d $60 a carga. U n t i l N o v e m b e r 1989, p r i c e s were, o n average, well a b o v e t h e U.S. $60 m a r k a n d o f t e n w e r e sustained at over $100 f o r t h e first five years

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of t h e d e c a d e . In t h e s e c o n d half, they p e a k e d at U.S. $120 in August 1988, w h i c h , u s i n g Rivera a n d J o e l ' s m e t h o d o l o g i e s , would have given a n e t i n c o m e r a n g e of b e t w e e n $5,000 a n d $10,000. T h e figures f o r i n c o m e s f r o m coca even in a s l u m p c o m p a r e favorably with the 1989 average a n n u a l i n c o m e in Bolivia of j u s t over U.S. $500 a n d a m i n i m u m wage of a r o u n d U.S. $300. 4 9 W h e n times were g o o d in t h e early 1980s, a n d f a r m e r s could e x p e c t at least U.S. $5,000 a year, i n c o m e f r o m coca r e p r e s e n t e d as m u c h as fifty times t h e average i n c o m e f r o m a plot smaller t h a n 5 h e c t a r e s elsewhere in t h e c o u n t r y . O n plots less t h a n 1 h e c t a r e p e r capita, i n c o m e was est i m a t e d to be a m e a g e r U.S. $63, a n d f o r f a r m e r s with land r a n g i n g f r o m 5.0 to 9.9 h e c t a r e s , t h e f i g u r e was $120. A l t h o u g h t h e r e were i m p o r t a n t regional variations, only r u r a l h o u s e h o l d s with m o r e than 10 h e c t a r e s — o r 13 p e r c e n t of t h e total n u m b e r of r u r a l househ o l d s — r o s e above critical poverty levels. 50 But coca's advantage is n o t simply that of i n c o m e . A f a r m e r can e x p e c t to have some sort of i n c o m e within twelve m o n t h s of p l a n t i n g coca, full p r o d u c t i o n a f t e r two to t h r e e years, a n d a n average plant lifespan of f i f t e e n years (in s o m e cases twenty-five years). Coca gives f o u r c r o p s a year, r e q u i r e s less a t t e n t i o n a n d i n v e s t m e n t t h a n o t h e r c r o p s o n c e it has b e e n p l a n t e d , a n d r e q u i r e s only m a n u a l labor to pick. It is also easy to pack a n d t r a n s p o r t ( o f t e n on t h e back of a bicycle) a n d has a virtually assured n e a r b y m a r k e t r i g h t t h r o u g h t h e year. In m a n y cases, comerciantes ( m e r c h a n t s ) will even c o m e to t h e f a r m to buy the coca. It is also a c r o p with which g e n e r a t i o n s of rural Bolivian families are familiar. In short, as m a n y d e v e l o p m e n t e c o n o mists have p o i n t e d o u t , in o t h e r c i r c u m s t a n c e s it would be the ideal i n c o m e - g e n e r a t i n g c r o p to alleviate poverty a n d u n d e r d e v e l o p m e n t . T h i s is n o t to say that t h e r e are n o financial risks associated with g r o w i n g coca. O n c e t h e coca is p i c k e d , it has to b e s p r e a d o u t a n d d r i e d in t h e sun, a n d sold usually within t h r e e days. If the leaves a r e n o t d r i e d in t h r e e days (for e x a m p l e , if it rains) t h e coca leaves t u r n black. But even t h e n t h e p r o d u c t is still m a r k e t a b l e , a l t h o u g h at a lower price. Rivera p o i n t s o u t t h a t in n o t o n e of his interviews (even d u r i n g the great p r i c e collapse) did a f a r m e r r e p o r t a case of having to r e t u r n f r o m the local coca m a r k e t with his coca unsold. 5 1 And this p e r h a p s is t h e most o v e r l o o k e d b e n e f i t of coca: It can provide ready a n d g u a r a n t e e d liquidity virtually at any time of t h e year—a type of i n s t a n t convertibility i n t o cash w h e n times are g o o d o r b a d . T h a t is to say, r e t u r n s over a p e r i o d are less significant t h a n t h e i m m e d i a t e e f f e c t coca has o n easing cash flow. It is illustrative to c o m p a r e t h e difficulties associated with t h e p r o d u c t i o n a n d sale of t h e o t h e r c o m m o n c r o p s grown in t h e

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C h a p a r e , n a m e l y rice, citrus fruits, cassava, b a n a n a s , a n d papaya. All t h e c r o p s s u f f e r f r o m q u i c k spoilage a n d t h e a b s e n c e of a g o o d inf r a s t r u c t u r e to get t h e m quickly to m a r k e t . Rice, f o r e x a m p l e (which gives an average yield of a r o u n d 1.5 t o n n e s / h e c t a r e a year in t h e C h a p a r e ) , has to b e t r a n s p o r t e d rapidly to the n e a r e s t peladora (deh u s k i n g p l a n t ) b e c a u s e t h e r e a r e few silos to s t o r e t h e rice in t h e area. T h e t r a n s p o r t c h a r g e plus the costs of the p e l a d o r a can a m o u n t to half t h e final costs, a n d even t h e n a rice p r o d u c e r has to c o m p e t e with i m p o r t e d o r c o n t r a b a n d rice, which k e e p prices low. 5 2 A hectare of cassava could yield an i n c o m e of as m u c h as U.S. $400 in 1990, but it is m o r e costly a n d difficult to transport (usually to markets outside the C h a p a r e ) a n d gives only a "one-off' i n c o m e in the year c o m p a r e d to the regular i n c o m e f r o m coca t h r o u g h o u t the year. 5 3 B a n a n a s a n d p a p a y a are highly p e r i s h a b l e , a n d t r a n s p o r t costs very high. O n e h e c t a r e of papaya will yield twice a year a r o u n d eight to ten crates of a b o u t 100 p a p a y a s e a c h . Of the m a r k e t p r i c e (in 1990) of a r o u n d U.S. $7 a crate, $5 goes o n t r a n s p o r t to m a r k e t s eit h e r in C o c h a b a m b a or t h e capital, La Paz. 5 4 A f a r m e r is f o r t u n a t e to achieve a p r o f i t of U.S. $50 a f t e r six m o n t h s of l a b o r . Similarly, ban a n a s can be p r o f i t a b l e (see discussion o n p. 117), b u t , again, transp o r t costs are the key obstacle. B a n a n a s , too, usually have to b e sent by truck to u r b a n centers, a n d truck drivers (in 1990) w e r e c h a r g i n g between U.S. $70 a n d $80 f o r e a c h trip to La Paz. T h e C h a p a r e is full of r o t t i n g o r a n g e s , l e m o n s , a n d g r a p e f r u i t . Oversupply, h i g h t r a n s p o r t costs, a n d l o n g d i s t a n c e s to m a r k e t s m e a n that o f t e n it is simply n o t w o r t h a f a r m e r ' s even picking t h e m u p off the g r o u n d w h e r e they fall. In 1990 a t r u c k l o a d of o r a n g e s f e t c h e d a r o u n d U.S. $75 in La Paz, r o u g h l y the same as t r a n s p o r t i n g them there.55 USAID f r e q u e n t l y carries o u t studies of the relative profitability of alternatives to coca. If we a s s u m e a n average p r i c e of U.S. $40 a carga for 1991, a n d take t h e average of t h e Rivera, J o e l , a n d U N D C P estimates ($3,338; $485; a n d $2,000 respectively) to arrive at a n e t inc o m e p e r h e c t a r e of $1,940, t h e n only m a c a d a m i a n u t s a n d r u b b e r o u t of eleven p r o d u c t s c h o s e n by a 1990 USAID study w o u l d have given a f a r m e r a g r e a t e r i n c o m e t h a n coca that year (see T a b l e 1.8). But f a r m e r s would have h a d to m a k e t h e risky decision to grow those two c r o p s a n u m b e r of years previously. T h e r e is a wait of seven years before macadamia nuts are ready for commercial production (and n i n e years f o r full p r o d u c t i o n ) , o r a wait of ten years f o r r u b b e r to start p r o d u c i n g (or fifteen years f o r full p r o d u c t i o n ) . In fact, n o f a r m e r s were r e c e i v i n g any i n c o m e f r o m e i t h e r m a c a d a m i a n u t s o r r u b b e r in 1990, t h o u g h s o m e h a d p l a n t e d m a c a d a m i a seeds.

14

•

•

•

BOLIVIA A N D COCA

It is also i m p o r t a n t to stress t h a t t h e s e c a l c u l a t i o n s of i n c o m e d o n o t t a k e i n t o a c c o u n t t h a t m o r e a n d m o r e c o c a f a r m e r s in t h e l a t e 1980s a n d early 1990s w e r e i n v o l v e d in t h e early stages of c o c a p a s t e m a n u f a c t u r e , in s o m e cases n e a r o r o n t h e i r f a r m sites, w h i c h w o u l d h a v e m a i n t a i n e d t h e i r i n c o m e levels d u r i n g h a r d t i m e s . T h e a t t r a c t i o n s of c o c a a r e of c o u r s e n o t c o n f i n e d t o o w n i n g a c o c a f a r m . T h o u s a n d s of u n e m p l o y e d f a r m e r s o r f a r m l a b o r e r s — a n d p a r t i c u l a r l y y o u n g m a l e s — a r e also i n v o l v e d in p i c k i n g c o c a , o r t h e e a r l y s t a g e s of c o c a i n e m a n u f a c t u r e , p a r t i c u l a r l y as pisacocas ( c o c a s t o m p e r s ) , f o r w h i c h they e i t h e r r e c e i v e d a fixed daily w a g e o r p a r t of t h e g r o s s e a r n i n g s . It is c a l c u l a t e d t h a t w o r k as a n u n s k i l l e d lab o r e r in c o c a i n e p r o d u c t i o n in t h e m i d - 1 9 8 0 s p a i d t w e n t y t i m e s m o r e t h a n t h e w o r k as a p u b l i c e m p l o y e e . 5 6 O n e r e p o r t in a C o c h a b a m b a n e w s p a p e r a r t i c l e s u g g e s t e d t h a t in l a t e 1984 70 p e r c e n t of s c h o o l t e a c h e r s in t h e r e g i o n , w h o s e m o n t h l y s a l a r i e s t h e n a v e r a g e d U.S. $ 1 5 to $20, w e r e w o r k i n g in c o c a i n e factories."' 7 T h e c o n s e n s u s view is t h a t in t h e m i d - 1 9 8 0 s r u r a l l a b o r e r s in t h e C h a p a r e e a r n e d t h r e e to five t i m e s m o r e t h a n w h a t t h e y c o u l d h a v e e a r n e d in t h e i r h o m e l a n d s . r > s D e s p i t e t h e p r i c e c o l l a p s e in l a t e 1989, d a y w o r k e r s o n c o c a f a r m s c o u l d still e a r n b e t w e e n U.S. $ 1 . 6 0 a n d $ 4 . 0 , o r , as s t o m p e r s at n i g h t , b e t w e e n $5 a n d $6.60. 5 9 T h i s is a s h a r p d r o p f r o m t h e p e a k of U.S. $ 4 0 a day a p i s a c o c a c o u l d e a r n in 1986 b u t still c o m p a r e s f a v o r a b l y with t h e e a r n i n g s of a r u r a l t e a c h e r o r a j u n i o r m e m b e r of t h e a n t i d r u g p o l i c e ( U M O P A R , o r U n i d a d Movil d e P a t r u l l a j e R u r a l ) of less t h a n $2.0 a d a y in t h e early 1990s.

THE RISE O F COCA

Table 1.1

1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 b

• • • 1 5

Area Under Coca Cultivation in Bolivia, 1963-1991 (in hectares) La Paz Department (Yungas)

Cochabamba Department (Chapare)

Total

1,700 1,800 1,900 1,900 1,900 1,500 1,500 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,600 2,000 2,300 3,795 4,933 6,418 4,392 4,902 5,452 6,043 6,675 7,348 8,912 8,885 8,467 8,206

1,300 1,300 1,297 1,289 2,080 1,100 1,100 2,650 3,630 4,340 5,360 6,100 9,685 10,000 10,000 15,065 15,900 16,370 23,312 26,558 30,023 33,707 37,611 41,734 51,798 49,005 46,983 39,438

3,000 3,100 3,197 3,189 3,980 2,600 2,600 4,450 5,340 6,140 7,160 7,900 11,285 12,000 12,300 18,860 18,860 22,788 27,704 31,459 35,475 39,750 44,286 49,082 60,710 57,890 55,450 47,644

U.S. State Department Estimate

33,165 35,612 40,360 48,925 52,900 50,300 a 47,900

Sources: SUBDESAL, Superficie y Producción de Coca en el Chapare y Yungas, M i m e o (La Paz, Bolivia: SUBDESAL, 1991). U.S. State D e p a r t m e n t figures a r e f r o m U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of S t a t e , B u r e a u of I n t e r n a t i o n a l N a r c o t i c s Matters, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Statistical T a b l e s ( f o r 1 9 8 7 - 1 9 9 1 ) , a n d M a r c h 1988 f o r p r e v i o u s years. Notes: A. T h i s is b r o k e n down into t h e C h a p a r e , 35,230 h e c t a r e s ; t h e Yungas, 14,100; a n d A p o l o in t h e S a n t a C r u z d e p a r t m e n t , 1,000. b. P r o j e c t i o n e s t i m a t e .

16

•

•

Table 1.2

•

BOLIVIA A N D C O C A

P o p u l a t i o n Estímales for the C h a p a r e a n d C a r r a s c o P r o v i n c e s of C o c h a bamba, 1 9 6 7 - 1 9 9 0

Year

Population

1967a 1976a 1980b 1981a 1983 e 1987d 1988e 1990'

24,000 33,000 40,000 84,000 142,000 215,000 208,000 63,700

Of which transient n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 27,300

Sources: C a r l o s P é r e z - C r e s p o , Why Do People Mipate? 22. a. J o s é B l a n e s a n d G o n z a l o F l o r e s , Campesino, migrante y colonizador (La Paz: C E R E S , 1982). b . O r g a n i z a t i o n of A m e r i c a n S t a t e s , Integiated Regional Development Planning: Guidelines and Case Studies jrom OAS Experience ( W a s h i n g t o n , D C.: O A S , 1 9 8 4 ) . c . J o s é B l a n e s a n d G o n z a l o F l o r e s , ¿Dónde? d . A n a v e r a g e f i g u r e of t h e r a n g e of b e t w e e n 1 9 6 , 0 0 0 a n d 2 3 5 , 0 0 0 f o u n d in J . D u r a n a e t al., Population Estimate for the Chapare Region, Bolivia ( W a s h i n g t o n , D C.: Desfil, 1 9 8 7 ) . e. C I D R E , Estrategia y plan de acción para la formulación de un plan de desarrollo del trópico cochabambino ( C o c h a b a m b a : C I D R E , 1 9 8 8 ) . f. A. R i v e r a , Diagnóstico socioeconómico.

Table 1.3

C h a p a r e Farmers by Year of Arrival Percentage

Pre-1960 1960-1964 1965-1969 1970-1974 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 Total

4.1 4.8 8.3 13.2 19.2 42.5 7.9 100.0

Source: A d a p t e d f r o m M. P a i n t e r a n d E. B e d o y a G a r l a n d , Socioeconomic using D I R E C O database (Bolivian state coca e r a d i c a t i o n agency).

Issues,

12,

THE RISE O F C O C A

Table 1.4

•

•

•

17

Origin of Chapare Farm Population

Department

Percentage

Cochabamba Potosi Oruro Chuquisaca La Paz Santa Cruz Others No r e s p o n s e

65.2 12.3 4.1 2.9 1.4 0.6 0.3 13.2

Total

100.0

Province of Origin of T h o s e f r o m C o c h a b a m b a D e p a r t m e n t Provine e Chapare Quillacollo Aran i Ayopaya Capinota Punata Arque Tapacari Cercado Carrasco Esteban Arce Mizque Campero Jordán Bolívar No response Total

Percentage 28.8 15.0 7.0 7.0 5.9 5.2 4.2 4.0 3.6 3.1 2.8 1.9 0.8 0.7 0.0 9.7 100.0

Source: A d a p t e d f r o m M. P a i n t e r a n d E. Bedoya G a r l a n d , Socioeconomic Issues, 1920, based o n DIRECO database of interviews with 10,531 f a r m e r s (of which 6,867 w e r e from Cochabamba).

18

•

o CTI CTI

X X o>

•

•

BOLIVIA A N D C O C A

iD C*l (N Ò CÒ

cri

O X

—

in

x

O CM o c; o

in — to »n o-i

o o IO ^

O O

_ C/5

bto

£

Su

' E "O T3 £

«

•

•

•

1 3 7

138

• •

Table 6.2

• BOLIVIA A N D COCA USAID Alternative Development Aid to Bolivia Actually Disbursed, 19831990 (in millions of U.5.$) 1983-1987

1988

1989

1990

Total

Chapai e regional development ( C R O P )

16.5

5.3

3.6

8.3

33.8

E c o n o m i c recovery 3

—

8.0

12.0

33.0

53.0

Export promotion

—

1.3

1.5

2.8

Small enterprise development

—

1.5

1.1

0.1

2.7

1.2

0.9

0.7

4.6

2.6

1.0

Private voluntary organizations

—

1.8

Community and child health Household survey

—

—

—

Total

18.3

18.6

20.0

1.7

5.3

0.4

0.4

45.7

102.6

Souire: U S A I D / B o l i v i a , "Assistance f o r Alternative D e v e l o p m e n t , " M i m e o ( L a Paz, October 1991). Note: a. T h i s is balance-•of-payments s u p p o r t tied to the successful m e e t i n g o f eradication targets.

Table 6.3

Number of Years Before Commercial and Full Production After Seeding for Crops in the Cbapare Years B e f o r e Commercial Production

Years B e f o r e Full Production

Macadamia nuts

7

9-10

Black pepper

4

5

10

15

Rubber Cacao

4

Corn

1

8 —

Coffee

4

6

Annatto

3

5

Bananas

2

Hearts o f palm

4

5

Pineapples

1

9

Oranges

4

7

Coca

1

2-3

—

Source: E x t r a p o l a t e d f r o m C. J o e l , "At W h a t Price o f C o c a Is O u r C o m p e n s a t i o n a n d C r e d i t Program Effective in I n d u c i n g E r a d i c a t i o n ? A n d W h a t Is the Relative Profitability o f Alternative C r o p s ? " M i m e o , U . S . Embassy, L a Paz (May 1 9 9 0 ) , T a b l e A.

• • • ^^ • • • Conclusions

The Bolivian experience of the coca-cocaine industry is distinct from those evident elsewhere in Latin America. First and foremost, as argued in Chapter 1, the production of coca and cocaine in Bolivia is essentially an economic or development problem. It is inextricably linked to the country's long-term structural poverty and underdevelopment, which has made it the second-poorest country (after Haiti) in the Western Hemisphere, with social statistics more similar to those of sub-Saharan Africa. Thousands of landless and land-hungry farmers migrated to the Chapare in the early 1980s to take advantage of the improved incomes offered by coca, at a time when Bolivia was suffering f r o m the social costs, first, of a prolonged economic recession, and then, after 1985, a radical economic restructuring designed to escape from it. Coca's economic rewards helped to cushion the worst extremes of poverty but did not bring sustained development in terms of improved housing, education, or health (see Chapter 2). T h e nature of Bolivia's entry into the international cocaine trade was such that the thousands of poor f a r m e r s — t h o u g h clearly better off by growing coca—received less than 2 p e r c e n t of the final multimillion-dollar profits. As such, Bolivia has repeated its historical role of supplying world markets with a raw material, now coca (previously silver and tin), without being the m a j o r beneficiary. T h e small g r o u p of rich traffickers to benefit showed patterns of consumption shaped by U.S. tastes a n d fashion but little inclination to invest their narco-dollars into productive activities to s u p p o r t the formal economy. T h e traffickers remain capitalists par excellence and only invest when they perceive good profits to be made. C h a p t e r 3 described the economic benefits of the coca-cocaine industry to such a battered economy as Bolivia's, particularly the i m p r o v e m e n t in rural incomes, employment, and inflow of foreign 139

140

• •

•

BOLIVIA AND COCA

e x c h a n g e . T h e total value of t h e i n d u s t r y in 1990—a b a d year because of t h e fall in prices f o r coca a n d coca paste—was p r o b a b l y in the r a n g e of U.S. $700 million to $900 million, of which a r o u n d $200 million, or 20 p e r c e n t of t h e value of legal e x p o r t s , stayed in t h e c o u n t r y . M o r e may have b e e n l a u n d e r e d back i n t o t h e c o u n t r y t h r o u g h c o n t r a b a n d a n d o t h e r e c o n o m i c activities f i n a n c e d by narco-dollars. B e f o r e the price fall, a b o u t 180,000 Bolivians w e r e e m p l o y e d in the various b r a n c h e s of the industry, equivalent to 10 p e r c e n t of the economically active p o p u l a t i o n (EAP). While the overall value of the industry has p r o b a b l y d e c l i n e d f r o m its h e i g h t in t h e mid-1980s (to a r o u n d 12 p e r c e n t of GDP in 1989), a m a j o r attack o n it would still cause severe social, political, a n d e c o n o m i c d i s r u p t i o n . T h e small size of the Bolivian e c o n o m y c o m p a r e d to t h o s e of o t h e r Latin A m e r i c a n c o u n t r i e s (particularly C o l o m b i a a n d P e r u ) has e x a g g e r a t e d the i n c i d e n c e of the coca-cocaine e c o n o m y in relation to t h e size of the f o r m a l e c o n o m y , a n d m a d e t h e e c o n o m i c n a r c o - a d d i c t i o n c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y m o r e p r o n o u n c e d . A l t h o u g h the i n c o m e staying in the c o u n t r y is less t h a n in C o l o m b i a or P e r u , as a p e r c e n t a g e of GDP or legal e x p o r t s it is p r o b a b l y h i g h e r . Similarly, m o r e workers are employed in the industry in P e r u , b u t t h e Bolivian figures are the highest in the r e g i o n as a p e r c e n t a g e of t h e EAP. Alt h o u g h reliable figures are notoriously h a r d to find, in the late 1980s Bolivia may have b e e n the c o u n t r y in the world with t h e h i g h e s t deg r e e of d e p e n d e n c e o n the r e v e n u e a n d j o b s f r o m t h e p r o d u c t i o n and trafficking of a narcotic. T h e b e n e f i t s of the coca-cocaine trade h e l p e d to e n s u r e t h e "success" of t h e stabilization p l a n initiated in 1985, by p r o v i d i n g n a r c o dollars t h a t gave t h e g o v e r n m e n t m o r e flexibility in e x c h a n g e r a t e a n d m o n e t a r y policy a n d h e l p e d to f i n a n c e i m p o r t s (see C h a p t e r 4). T h e m a j o r d r a w b a c k s were—initially at least—an o v e r v a l u e d exc h a n g e rate, which w e a k e n e d local industry a n d lowered the value of n o n t r a d i t i o n a l exports; a n d a b o o m in financial s p e c u l a t i o n t h a t occ u r r e d w h e n a n u m b e r of saving c o m p a n i e s c o l l a p s e d in t h e early 1990s, a n d affected t h o u s a n d s of p o o r Bolivians. T h e costs associated with coca a n d c o c a i n e p r o d u c t i o n , such as youth a d d i c t i o n , ecological d e g r a d a t i o n , a n d w i d e s p r e a d c o r r u p t i o n , have so f a r b e e n c o n s i d e r e d i n s u f f i c i e n t in d o m e s t i c p u b l i c o p i n i o n to j u s t i f y e n d a n g e r ing t h e overall e c o n o m i c b e n e f i t s of t h e c o c a - c o c a i n e i n d u s t r y by l a u n c h i n g a c r u s a d e against it. T h e w e a k n e s s of t h e Bolivian e c o n o m y a n d its d e p e n d e n c e o n the goodwill a n d aid of the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t a n d m u l t i l a t e r a l a g e n cies has m a d e Bolivia p a r t i c u l a r l y v u l n e r a b l e to t h e d e m a n d s of

CONCLUSIONS

•

•

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o u t s i d e (usually U.S.) g o v e r n m e n t s to follow t h e i r p r e s c r i p t i o n s f o r c o m b a t i n g t h e d r u g s t r a d e . N o w h e r e was this m o r e a p p a r e n t t h a n in the U.S. insistence o n a role for the Bolivian army in a n t i d r u g operations in 1991, which p u t u n d u e e m p h a s i s o n repressive solutions to coca a n d c o c a i n e p r o d u c t i o n , c a u s e d w i d e s p r e a d o p p o s i t i o n to the policy, a n d probably u n d e r m i n e d s u p p o r t f o r U.S. a n t i d r u g efforts in g e n e r a l (see C h a p t e r 5). T h e policy also t h r e a t e n e d to alter Bolivia's p o o r but p e a c e f u l status, a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c n o t s h a r e d by C o l o m b i a a n d P e r u , w h e r e social a n d political drug-linked violence has exacted a heavy toll on national political life. With some n o t a b l e exceptions, particularly the massacre at Villa T u n a r i in J u n e 1988, d r u g - r e l a t e d d e a t h c o u n t s are n o t the Bolivian statistics that attract the a t t e n t i o n of the world. M o r e attention is focused on the figures for eradication, the a m o u n t s of U.S. aid, a n d t h e value of the t r a d e to t h e e c o n o m y . T h e violence t h a t d o e s exist is p e r c e i v e d m o r e as s t e m m i n g f r o m r e p r e s s i o n , the state, a n d the U n i t e d States a n d n o t f r o m any isolated or sustained challenge to the Bolivian state f r o m local traffickers. Still less is the violence seen as originating f r o m the coca growers, w h o have drawn on the Bolivian p o p u l a r m o v e m e n t ' s long history of passive resistance to p u r s u e their d e m a n d s , particularly t h r o u g h the use of r o a d blockades. T h e y have c h a n n e l e d these d e m a n d s t h r o u g h well-organized federations, whose leaders have o f t e n n e g o t i a t e d successfully with g o v e r n m e n t s . T h e t h r e a t of a s i g n i f i c a n t b r e a k with Bolivia's relatively quiesc e n t past still exists, b u t it stems less f r o m t r a f f i c k e r s ' a r m e d resist a n c e t h a n f r o m the a t t e m p t s of U.S. g o v e r n m e n t s to i m p r o v e interd i c t i o n results. W a s h i n g t o n will certainly d e e m it necessary to step u p f o r c e d e r a d i c a t i o n in the C h a p a r e to build o n the small n e t eradications a c h i e v e d in 1990 a n d 1991. Insensitive t r e a t m e n t of coca g r o w e r s r e l u c t a n t to e r a d i c a t e in t h e a b s e n c e of o t h e r alternatives could d e p r i v e Bolivia of its o t h e r peculiarity a m o n g d r u g - p r o d u c i n g c o u n t r i e s — t h e a b s e n c e of any g u e r r i l l a or significant p a r a m i l i t a r y f o r c e s with close links to t h e c o c a i n e t r a d e . M u c h has b e e n m a d e of the possible galvanizing e f f e c t the militarization policy h a d o n t h e a p p e a r a n c e of two new, small left-wing guerrilla g r o u p s , the CNPZ (Comisión N e s t o r Paz Z a m o r a ) , a n d the EGTK (Ejército G u e r r i l l e r o T u p a c Katari), in 1990 a n d 1991. 1 It may be t h a t t h e r e a r e s o m e links b e t w e e n s u c h g r o u p s (particularly t h e EGTK) a n d some coca growers in t h e C h a p a r e (the Bolivian governm e n t certainly believes it), b u t such r e p o r t s s h o u l d b e t r e a t e d with c a u t i o n b e c a u s e they clearly serve the interests of o t h e r sectors t h a n t h e c o c a growers. Like all left-wing g r o u p s t h r o u g h o u t Latin America, t h e C N P Z a n d t h e EGTK's ideology i n c l u d e s a s t r o n g anti-U.S.

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position, b u t t h e r e are a myriad of possible j u s t i f i c a t i o n s f o r s u c h a stance in the Bolivian c o n t e x t o t h e r than the U.S.-inspired policy of militarizing t h e d r u g war. However, the possibility of an a r m e d g r o u p — r i g h t - or l e f t - w i n g — e x p l o i t i n g t h e g e n u i n e g r i e v a n c e s of coca growers to gain c o n s i d e r a b l e s u p p o r t s h o u l d never be u n d e r e s timated, especially as the C h a p a r e r e m a i n s a political p o w d e r k e g . A s s u m i n g that the U n i t e d States will n o t p r o v i d e any m o r e m o n e y f o r militarization, t h e n t h e Bolivian a r m e d f o r c e s w e r e rew a r d e d with m o r e U.S. aid in o n e year t h a n coca g r o w e r s received f o r eight years (1983 to 1990). This imbalance between m o n e y for int e r d i c t i o n a n d m o n e y f o r alternative d e v e l o p m e n t (actually disb u r s e d ) will c o m e as n o s u r p r i s e to many o b s e r v e r s despair i n g of U.S. priorities f o r " p r o d u c e r countries."- It is worth reiterating, however, that such an e m p h a s i s fails to address t h e essential m a n n e r in which the coca-cocaine t r a d e manifests itself in Bolivia—as a develo p m e n t p r o b l e m that a f f e c t s t h o u s a n d s of p o o r f a r m e r s a n d n e e d s d e v e l o p m e n t - o r i e n t a t e d solutions. T h e i m b a l a n c e is also i m p o r t a n t to register f o r those who, exp o u n d i n g variations on t h e t h e m e of " n o t h i n g can c o m p e t e with coca," are k e e n to dismiss a l t e r n a t i v e d e v e l o p m e n t o u t of h a n d ; or w h o think t h a t growers s h o u l d b e simply left to the vagaries of Bolivia's latest c o m m o d i t y b o o m a n d bust. Of course, the search f o r alternative sources of i n c o m e r e m a i n s an a r d u o u s o n e — i n f r a s t r u c t u r e a n d t r a n s p o r t are still very u n d e r d e v e l o p e d , storage a n d p a c k i n g are difficult, a n d p r o f i t r e t u r n s are l o n g in c o m i n g . T h i s s e a r c h may prove fruitless, b u t t h e r e is a s t r o n g case f o r a r g u i n g t h a t alternative d e v e l o p m e n t has n o t really h a d its c h a n c e , b e c a u s e t h e a m o u n t s of m o n e y actually r e a c h i n g c o c a growers in the C h a p a r e f o r t h o s e alternatives have b e e n so pitiful. In 1990, when coca growers c h o p p e d down a r o u n d 8,000 h e c t a r e s of coca, worth at least U.S. $30 million in f u t u r e r e v e n u e a c c o r d i n g to t h e growers, 3 USAID p r o b a b l y invested n o m o r e than U.S. $ 3 million in the C h a p a r e . Peasant f a r m e r s h a d clearly k e p t their side of t h e e r a d i c a t i o n b a r g a i n e n s h r i n e d in law 1008, whereas the c o m p l i a n c e of the g o v e r n m e n t a n d the U n i t e d States was m o r e q u e s t i o n a b l e . While growers were e r a d i c a t i n g t h e i r coca in the a b s e n c e of t h e o t h e r o p t i o n s p r o m i s e d by law 1008, USAID was p o u r i n g m o s t of its m o n e y i n t o t h e h i g h valleys of C o c h a b a m b a , an area outside the C h a p a r e ( c o n t r a v e n i n g the spirit of Article 22) f o r the probably u n r e a l i z a b l e aim of c u r b i n g m i g r a t i o n . If coca p r i c e s d o r e m a i n lower t h a n the p e a k s c o m m o n in t h e early p a r t of the 1980s, t h e n m o r e f a r m e r s will b e i n t e r e s t e d in alternatives. It was very p o i g n a n t to visit the C h a p a r e d u r i n g the time of the price s l u m p at the e n d of 1989 a n d talk to coca f a r m e r s q u e u i n g

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u p to e r a d i c a t e t h e i r coca a n d e a g e r for m o r e i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t alternative d e v e l o p m e n t o p p o r t u n i t i e s . Such a window of o p p o r t u n i t y was p r o b a b l y lost to t h o u s a n d s of t h e m f o r t h e sort of r e a s o n s outlined in C h a p t e r 6 — i n s u f f i c i e n t f u n d s , i n s t i t u t i o n a l i n f i g h t i n g , bureaucratic b u n g l i n g , inefficient allocation of r e s o u r c e s in the w r o n g area, a u s u r i o u s credit policy, a n d t h e lack of f a r m e r p a r t i c i p a t i o n in the p l a n n i n g a n d e x e c u t i o n of alternative d e v e l o p m e n t p r o g r a m s . T h e a r g u m e n t of this b o o k is n o t that the e x p e r i e n c e of alternative d e v e l o p m e n t has b e e n so p o o r that it s h o u l d be dismissed as an o p t i o n . R a t h e r , it could be m a d e to work better, a n d s h o u l d b e given a c h a n c e to d o so over t h e n e x t five years, particularly as t h e longterm d o w n w a r d t r e n d in coca p r i c e s would seem to o f f e r f a v o r a b l e c o n d i t i o n s f o r d o i n g so. More coca f a r m e r s a p p e a r increasingly conc e r n e d a b o u t price instability a n d the d o w n w a r d t r e n d a n d m o r e p r e p a r e d to diversify away f r o m coca, if not give it u p c o m p l e t e l y . T h e Bolivian a n d U.S. g o v e r n m e n t s seem to have b a c k e d off f r o m the militarization policy, which would have m a d e such diversification m o r e difficult to i m p l e m e n t . Large-scale electrification of the C h a p a r e , mostly f u n d e d by the UNDCP, will have an i m p a c t by improving the possibility of c r e a t i n g i n c o m e - g e n e r a t i n g agro-industrial projects. T h e U N D C P has provoked s t r o n g o p p o s i t i o n in s o m e sectors for its work in t h e Yungas, but at least it seems to have placed m o r e e m p h a s i s o n c o n c e n t r a t i n g on f a r m e r participation in the C h a p a r e . T h e U N D C P can also p o i n t to g r e a t e r receptivity in two years' work than U S A I D / P D A R has h a d in eight, a s e n t i m e n t that was clearly expressed in the s e c o n d m e e t ing of all five coca f e d e r a t i o n s in C h i m o r e in J u n e 1992. Effective f a r m e r p a r t i c i p a t i o n will be the key test for any successful alternative d e v e l o p m e n t p r o g r a m , a n d t h e r e f o r e far g r e a t e r emphasis s h o u l d be p u t o n c o n t a c t s a n d discussions with coca u n i o n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s f o r j o i n t e l a b o r a t i o n a n d e x e c u t i o n of p r o j e c t s . T h e political climate for such an a p p r o a c h seems m o r e favorable b e c a u s e t h e coca u n i o n s ' 1991 PACP, while p e r h a p s a little a m b i t i o u s in t e r m s of t h e a m o u n t of m o n e y b e i n g r e q u e s t e d , was a n i m p o r t a n t indication of t h e i r willingness to take part in serious j o i n t discussions on alternative d e v e l o p m e n t . T h e resolutions of the J u n e 1992 meeting of coca f e d e r a t i o n s also strongly s u p p o r t e d t h e p r i n c i p l e of a l t e r n a t i v e d e v e l o p m e n t a n d stressed the n e e d f o r t h e i r active participation, particularly t h r o u g h the national, regional, a n d local comm i t t e e s f o r a l t e r n a t i v e d e v e l o p m e n t (CONADAL, C O R E D A L , a n d COLADAL). 4 As a r g u e d by the 1990 team of USAID evaluators, m o r e e m p h a s i s s h o u l d b e p u t o n i d e n t i f y i n g a n d s u p p o r t i n g t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of

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i n c o m e - g e n e r a t i n g activities t h r o u g h t h e m a r k e t i n g of p r o f i t a b l e c r o p s r a t h e r t h a n o n e s t h a t c a n s i m p l y b e g r o w n in t h e C h a p a r e , w i t h i n a c o n t e x t of t h e g e n e r a l e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e C h a p a r e . T o t h a t e n d , it w o u l d s e e m a p p r o p r i a t e t o r e v e r s e P r e s i d e n t Paz Z a m o r a ' s s l o g a n of coca por desarrollo ( c o c a f o r d e v e l o p m e n t ) to desarrollo por coca, t h e r e b y s h i f t i n g t h e p r i o r i t i e s . S o m e a u t h o r s r i g h t l y s t r e s s t h a t in t h e p a s t a l t e r n a t i v e d e v e l o p m e n t p o l i c i e s h a v e b e e n i m p l e m e n t e d w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t of a f r e e m a r k e t e c o n o m i c m o d e l , w h i c h a p p e a r s t o w o r k at c r o s s - p u r p o s e s with U.S.-Bolivian d r u g policy. 5 T h e n e w e c o n o m i c policy i n t r o d u c e d in 1985 h a s p r o b a b l y e x a c e r b a t e d t h e n a t i o n a l a n d r e g i o n a l a g r i c u l t u r a l d e c l i n e by s t i m u l a t i n g i n c r e a s e d a g r i c u l t u r a l i m p o r t s a n d m o r e l a b o r m i g r a t i o n to t h e C h a p a r e . It m a y b e a little u n r e a l i s t i c to e x p e c t any radical reversal in Bolivia's e c o n o m i c m o d e l in t h e n e x t five years, b u t a g r e a t e r e m p h a s i s o n e c o n o m i c g r o w t h with m o r e social s p e n d ing and m o r e income redistribution would undoubtedly strengthen a l t e r n a t i v e d e v e l o p m e n t e f f o r t s . T h i s m a y b e a u n l i k e l y p r o s p e c t in t h e p r e s e n t e c o n o m i c c l i m a t e , a n d e v e n m o r e so in Bolivia w h e r e t h e r e is little m o n e y to r e d i s t r i b u t e . B u t it is an a i m t h a t c o u l d b e p u r s u e d m u c h m o r e v i g o r o u s l y t h r o u g h t h o u g h t f u l tax r e f o r m s to raise g o v e r n m e n t r e v e n u e , less d e f e n s e s p e n d i n g a n d m o r e o n h e a l t h a n d e d u c a t i o n , a s e c o n d a g r a r i a n r e f o r m to r e d u c e l a n d l e s s n e s s , a n d a nat i o n a l a g r a r i a n c r e d i t a n d i n v e s t m e n t policy to s t i m u l a t e f o o d self-sufficiency a n d security f o r l a n d - p o o r s m a l l - p l o t p r o d u c e r s . U n d o u b t e d l y , m o r e m o n e y will b e n e e d e d f r o m W e s t e r n g o v e r n m e n t s . As m e n t i o n e d in C h a p t e r 6, t h e U N D C P talks of U.S. $ 1 0 0 m i l l i o n a year n e e d e d f o r e i g h t years, w h i l e t h e c o c a g r o w e r s a n d Bolivian g o v e r n m e n t say they n e e d U.S. $ 3 0 0 m i l l i o n a y e a r f o r t h e n e x t five.6 W h a t e v e r t h e f i g u r e , it will h a v e to b e s i g n i f i c a n t l y m o r e t h a n t h e U.S. $ 3 0 m i l l i o n a v a i l a b l e f o r 1991, a n d m u c h m o r e of it will h a v e to b e d i r e c t e d t o t h e C h a p a r e . T o t h o s e f l i n c h i n g at s u c h a p r o s p e c t in a n e r a of t i g h t f i s c a l s p e n d i n g a n d d e m a n d s of aid f o r f o r m e r Soviet-bloc c o u n t r i e s , f a m i n e - a f f l i c t e d c o u n t r i e s in A f r i c a , o r e c o n o m i c r e c o n s t r u c t i o n in C a m b o d i a a n d V i e t n a m , it is p e r h a p s w o r t h p o i n t i n g o u t t h a t U.S. $ 1 0 0 m i l l i o n w o u l d r e p r e s e n t j u s t o v e r 1 p e r c e n t of t h e U.S. $ 9 b i l l i o n t o t a l U . S . d r u g - c o n t r o l b u d g e t f o r 1 9 9 0 , o r n e a r l y t h e e q u i v a l e n t of t w o y e a r s of U . S . m i l i t a r y a i d e a r m a r k e d f o r t h e Bolivian a r m y f o r 1991 a n d 1992. 7 Perhaps, too, targets a n a l o g o u s to those f o r eradication could be set f o r t h e e f f e c t i v e d i s b u r s e m e n t o f e c o n o m i c aid f o r a l t e r n a t i v e d e v e l o p m e n t e f f o r t s in t h e C h a p a r e . T h u s e r a d i c a t i o n t a r g e t s w o u l d b e c o m e m o r e i n t o l i n e with t h e s t a t e ' s f i n a n c i a l a n d p r o d u c t i v e c a p a c ity t o p r o v i d e a l t e r n a t i v e s , as e n v i s a g e d by law 1008. T h i s w o u l d also

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h e l p to c o r r e c t the c u r r e n t u n h e a l t h y r e l a t i o n s h i p of u n e q u a l s between Bolivia a n d the U n i t e d States—at p r e s e n t t h e U n i t e d States can a n d d o e s w i t h h o l d aid w h e n Bolivia fails to m e e t e r a d i c a t i o n targets, but Bolivia has little r e c o u r s e if t h e U n i t e d States fails to r e d u c e the n u m b e r of c o c a i n e users. It may b e t h e case t h a t w h a t e v e r r e d u c t i o n in coca Bolivia achieves, it will have little effect o n the availability, price, a n d theref o r e c o n s u m p t i o n of cocaine in the U n i t e d States. Many have a r g u e d convincingly that successful e r a d i c a t i o n o r i n t e r d i c t i o n in o n e a r e a or country will almost certainly shift it to a n o t h e r — a process t h a t was clearly taking place even within Bolivia. Bolivia could m a k e headway, b u t t h e g e n e r a l c o c a i n e supply would n o t b e a f f e c t e d if C o l o m b i a a n d P e r u c o n t i n u e p r o d u c i n g it a n d t h e d e m a n d r e m a i n s h i g h . Moreover, widely known r e s e a r c h by Dr. P e t e r R e u t e r of the RAND C o r p o r a t i o n has suggested that, because t h e price of the coca leaf acc o u n t s f o r less t h a n 1 p e r c e n t of the final retail price ( a n d even at the p o i n t of e x p o r t , the price of processed c o c a i n e is still only 3 to 5 p e r c e n t of t h e c o n s u m e r p r i c e in the U n i t e d States), even an e n o r mously successful c r o p eradication p r o g r a m able to triple the costs of p r o d u c t i o n f o r f a r m e r s would raise c o c a i n e prices in the U n i t e d States by 1 p e r c e n t , if at all. 8 T h e s a m e RAND study suggests that even if i n t e r d i c t i o n p r o g r a m s were able to seize an unlikely 50 perc e n t of all t h e c o c a i n e arriving f r o m C o l o m b i a , this w o u l d a d d less t h a n 3 p e r c e n t to the retail p r i c e of c o c a i n e in t h e U n i t e d States. T h e realities b e h i n d these f i g u r e s are t h a t t r a f f i c k e r s are so a d a p t able a n d the costs of labor in the final p r o d u c t are so low. 9 If true, t h e logical c o n c l u s i o n of such analysis is t h a t only dem a n d - s i d e solutions, or t h e legalization or d e c r i m i n a l i z a t i o n of coc a i n e to take o u t the h u g e profits at t h e retail a n d d i s t r i b u t i o n e n d , will work to r e d u c e the c o c a i n e trade. It is n o t the place h e r e to discuss the efficacy of demand-side solutions or review the well-rehearsed a r g u m e n t s in favor of a n d against decriminalization or legalization. 1 0 However, it may be worth p o i n t i n g o u t that Bolivia could n o t take the d e c r i m i n a l i z a t i o n or legalization o p t i o n o n its own w i t h o u t r u n n i n g the risk of b e c o m i n g the destination of the m o r e unsavory m e m b e r s of Latin A m e r i c a ' s "most successful m u l t i n a t i o n a l . " Such a n initiative would have to c o m e f r o m the U n i t e d States b u t seems unlikely while t h e r e is little public acceptance for it, a n d while supply-side solutions are politically m o r e p o p u l a r a n d easier to explain. Tackling u n d e r l y i n g p r o b l e m s of poverty could h e l p to s t e m coc a i n e use a n d coca p r o d u c t i o n . Federal s p e n d i n g o n alleviating the misery of u n e m p l o y m e n t , p o o r h e a l t h c a r e , a n d h o u s i n g in N o r t h A m e r i c a n u r b a n m a r g i n a l p o p u l a t i o n s , w h e r e c o c a i n e use is h i g h ,

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has b e e n widely a d v o c a t e d . An o v e r w h e l m i n g l y clear o p t i o n f o r a m o r e effective alternative d e v e l o p m e n t policy in Bolivia could place the same sort of e m p h a s i s o n alleviating misery a n d have the a d d e d b o n u s of r e d u c i n g the possibility of violence. Bolivian observers a r e n o t a l o n e in n o t i n g the relatively few n u m b e r of d e a t h s as a result of c o c a i n e use worldwide, c o m p a r e d to t h e p o t e n t i a l n u m b e r of Bolivians w h o c o u l d die as a result of an ill-conceived policy to c o n t a i n c o c a i n e ' s p r o d u c t i o n a n d d i s t r i b u t i o n . " Even if it proved impossible to find e c o n o m i c alternatives to coca, even if coca p r o d u c t i o n were to move e l s e w h e r e , a n d even if a successful policy did little to s t o p the availability of c o c a i n e in the U n i t e s States, at least policymakers favoring alternative d e v e l o p m e n t c o u l d be left with the h o n o r a b l e objective of c o n t r i b u t i n g to Bolivia's efforts to e s c a p e u n d e r d e v e l o p m e n t a n d h e l p i n g p o o r f a r m e r s in t h e i r e f f o r t s to escape poverty— which was, a f t e r all, why m o s t of t h e m s t a r t e d g r o w i n g coca in t h e first place.

Notes

Notes for Chapter 1 1. Antonil, Mama coca ( L o n d o n : Antonil Publications, 1 9 7 8 ) , 17. 2. A m a d o C a n e l a s and J u a n C a r l o s C a n e l a s , Bolivia: Coca cocaína (La Paz, Bolivia: Los Amigos del L i b r o , 1 9 8 2 ) , 2 9 - 9 7 . 3. It is almost impossible to have an a c c u r a t e estimate o f the n u m b e r of regular users. Many Bolivian e x p e r t s say the figure o f o n e million is conservative, but most a c c e p t that the n u m b e r is p r o b a b l y dwindling due to increased urbanization. 4. S e e for e x a m p l e the study by C E E D I - L I D E M A , Evaluación ecológica de los cultivos de coca (La Paz: C E E D I - L I D E M A , 1 9 9 0 ) . 5. F o r a discussion o f Coca-Cola and attempts by a C o c h a b a m b a - b a s e d family firm, C o i n c o c a , to m a r k e t a wide r a n g e o f medicinal coca-based products, see J a m e s P a i n t e r , "Bolivians P r o s p e c t New N i c h e for C o c a , " Christian Science Monitor, 17 May 1991. 6. J o s é A n t o n i o Quiroga, Coca/cocaína: Una visión boliviana (La Paz, Bolivia: A I P E / P R O C O M - C E D L A - C I D , 1 9 9 0 ) , 13. 7. J o s é A n t o n i o Q u i r o g a , Coca/cocaína, 55. 8. S e e Guillermo Bedregal and Ruddy Viscarra La lucha Boliviana contra la agresión del narcotráfico (La Paz, Bolivia: L o s Amigos del L i b r o , 1 9 8 9 ) , 4 7 7 . Article 14 (pp. 5 5 0 - 5 5 1 ) states in its s e c o n d p a r a g r a p h , " T h e measures to be adopted must respect fundamental h u m a n rights and must take into a c c o u n t traditional legal uses, where there is the a p p r o p r i a t e historical evidence, and the p r o t e c t i o n o f the e n v i r o n m e n t . " 9. A m a d o Canelas and J u a n Carlos Canelas, Bolivia, 108. T h e C h a p a r e usually refers to t h r e e provinces o f the C o c h a b a m b a d e p a r t m e n t , Carrasco, C h a p a r e , and T i r a q u e . It covers an a r e a o f 2 4 , 8 0 0 s q u a r e k i l o m e t e r s at a height o f between 2 0 and 1 , 2 0 0 m e t e r s above sea level, a l t h o u g h most o f the c o c a farms lie between 2 0 0 and 3 0 0 meters. T h e r e are i m p o r t a n t d i f f e r e n c e s between the five m i c r o r e g i o n s o f the C h a p a r e , particularly t h e agro-ecological c o n d i t i o n s ( t h e r e are at least ten distinct life zones) a n d the m e a n landh o l d i n g size. 10. Figures taken f r o m C h a r t l b , S U B D E S A L ( S u b s e c r e t a r i a de Desarr o l l o A l t e r n a t i v o ) , Superficie y Producción de Coca en el Chapare y Yungas, M i m e o (La Paz, Bolivia: S U B D E S A L , 1 9 9 1 ) .

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11. Bolivia lost 15 million h e c t a r e s of its tropical rain forest to Brazil after the Acre War f r o m 1899-1903. T h e loss was in part a t t r i b u t e d to the lack of investment and population in the tropics. 12. José Blanes and Gonzalo Flores, ¿Dónde va el Chapare? (Cochabamba, Bolivia: CERES, 1984), 48-50. 13. Mario de Franco a n d Ricardo Godoy, "The Economic Consequences of Cocaine Production in Bolivia: Historical, Local and Macroeconomic Perspectives," m i m e o (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Institute for International Development, J u n e 1990), 9; a n d Kevin Healy, "The Boom Within the Crisis: Some Recent Effects of Foreign Cocaine Markets on Bolivian Rural Society a n d Economy," in D e b o r a h Pacini a n d Christine Franq u e m o n t , eds., Coca and Cocaine, Effects on People and Policy in Latin America (Boston: Cultural Survival, 1986), 102. 14. As Carlos Pérez-Crespo points out in Why Do People Migrate? Internal Migration and the Pattern of Capital Accumulation in Bolivia (Binghamton, NY: Institute for D e v e l o p m e n t A n t h r o p o l o g y [IDA], J a n u a r y 1991, 1), t h e r e is virtually n o data available on the effect of fertilizers on coca p r o d u c t i o n , even though farmers in the C h a p a r e use fertilizers extensively. 15. Cited in Mario de Franco a n d E. Godoy, "The Economic Consequnces," 11. 16. Carlos Pérez-Crespo, Why Do People Migrate? 17. 17. M. Painter a n d E. Bedoya Garland, Socioeconomic Issues in Agricultural Settlement and Production in Bolivia's Chapare Region ( B i n g h a m t o n , NY: IDA, 1991), 9. 18. J. Tolisano et al., Environmental Assessment of the Chapare Regional Development Project, Bolivia (Washington, D.C.: D e v e l o p m e n t Alternatives Inc., September 1989), 27. 19. J. Tolisano et al., Environmental Assessment, 26. 20. See A. Rivera, "El C h a p a r e actual," in Debate regional: El Chapare actual; sindicatos y ONCs en la región ( C o c h a b a m b a , Bolivia: ILDIS/CERES, 1990). Rivera doubts many of the previous calculations of the p o p u l a t i o n , as they tend to simply multiply the n u m b e r of families registered in u n i o n lists by the n u m b e r of family members. He says often a colonist does not live with all his family in the C h a p a r e , and the union lists include all the farms in the Chapare (which may or may not be occupied). 21. It should be stressed that the DIRECO survey does show bias because only farmers willing to a p p r o a c h DIRECO (with at least a potential interest in voluntary eradication) are i n c l u d e d . But P a i n t e r a n d Bedoya argue the sample is sufficiently large to be a useful preliminary profile of the Chapare. See M. Painter and E. Bedoya Garland, Socioeconomic Issues, 1 - 4 . 22. José Blanes a n d Gonzalo Flores, ¿Dónde"? 99. 23. M. Painter a n d E. Bedoya Garland, Socioeconomic Issues, 24, quoting CERES survey. 24. M. Painter a n d E. Bedoya Garland, Socioeconomic Issues, 10. 25. C. Ledo, Urbanización y Migración en Cochabamba, volume 1 (Cochabamba, Bolivia: O I T / P R E A L C , 1990), 57. Cited in Pérez-Crespo, Why Do People Migrate? 2. 26. Kevin Healy, "The Boom," 104, q u o t i n g José Blanes a n d Gonzalo Flores, ¿Dónde? 113. 27. See for example, Kevin Healy, "The Boom," 107-110; James Dunkerley, Political Transition and Economic Stabilization: Bolivia, 1982-1989 (London:

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University of L o n d o n , Institute of Latin A m e r i c a n S t u d i e s R e s e a r c h P a p e r s , 1990), 15-20; a n d a p p e n d i c e s , P é r e z - C r e s p o , Why Do People Migrate? 1 6 - 1 9 . 28. M. P a i n t e r a n d E. Bedoya G a r l a n d , Socioeconomic Issues, 14. 29. J a m e s D u n k e r l e y , Political Transition and Economic Stabilization, 15. 30. For a g e n e r a l t r e a t m e n t of t h e e n s u i n g issues, s e e J o h n C r a b t r e e et al., The Great Tin Crash: Bolivia and the World Tin Market ( L o n d o n : L a t i n America B u r e a u , 1987). 31. See, f o r e x a m p l e , t e s t i m o n i e s in J o h n C r a b t r e e et al., The Great Tin Crash. Most m i n e r s did n o t go to t h e C h a p a r e , p r e f e r r i n g to m i g r a t e to cities or to stay on as m e m b e r s of m i n i n g c o o p e r a t i v e s e i t h e r in t h e i r h o m e a r e a s o r in t h e La Paz, P a n d o , a n d Beni d e p a r t m e n t s , w h e r e t h e r e a r e small deposits of alluvial gold. 32. UNICEF, The State of the World's Children 1991 ( O x f o r d : O x f o r d University Press, 1990), 102. 33. Cited by J a m e s P a i n t e r , "Bolivia's F r e e Market Plan S p u t t e r s , " Christian Science Monitor, 15 August 1991. 34. Q u o t e d in Carlos Pérez-Crespo, " T e n d e n c i a s m i g r a t o r i a s en las a r e a s de p r o d u c c i ó n de coca en c o c h a b a m b a , Bolivia"; M i m e o ( C o c h a b a m b a : Circulated u n d e r t h e auspices of SARSA [ C o o p e r a t i v e A g r e e m e n t o n S e t t l e m e n t a n d Resource Systems Analysis] a n d f u n d e d by USAID, M a r c h 1991), 16. 35. T h i s suggests to s o m e o b s e r v e r s t h a t f a r m e r s a r e s t r i k i n g a b a l a n c e b e t w e e n a g u a r a n t e e d m i n i m u m i n c o m e f r o m coca a n d t h e associated risks, such as police r e p r e s s i o n a n d p r i c e f l u c t u a t i o n s . 36. M. P a i n t e r a n d E. Bedoya G a r l a n d , Socioeconomic Issues, 16. 37. J. C . J o n e s , " T h e C h a p a r e : F a r m e r P e r s p e c t i v e s o n t h e E c o n o m i c s a n d Sociology of Coca P r o d u c t i o n " ; w o r k i n g p a p e r ( B i n g h a m t o n , NY: SARSA, Institute f o r D e v e l o p m e n t A n t h r o p o l o g y , 1990). 38. Carlos Pérez-Crespo, p e r s o n a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n , O c t o b e r 1992. 39. J . T o l i s a n o et al., Environmental Assessment, 28. 40. A. Rivera, Diagnóstico socioeconómico de la población del Chapare (Cochab a m b a , Bolivia: CERES, April 1990), 47; CIDRE, Monografía del trópico: departamento de Cochabamba ( C o c h a b a m b a : H I S B O L , 1990), c o n t a i n s a full list of all t h e schools, roads, a n d m e d i c a l posts in t h e C h a p a r e . 41. A. Rivera, Diagnóstico socioeconómico, 15-16. 42. M a r i o d e F r a n c o a n d R i c a r d o G o d o y , " T h e E c o n o m i c C o n s e q u e n c e s , " 12. 43. As t h e a u t h o r s stress, t h e r e is little indication of t h e a s s u m p t i o n s beh i n d the estimates relating to p l a n t i n g a n d clearing costs o r n e t p r e s e n t values. 44. Q u o t e d in Kevin Healy, "The B o o m , " 140. 45. Q u o t e d in J a m e s D u n k e r l e y , Political Transition, 44. 46. A. Rivera, Diagnóstico socioeconómico, 35. 47. J o s é A n t o n i o Q u i r o g a , Coca/cocaína, 14, s u g g e s t s a h i g h e r s t a r t - u p cost of b e t w e e n U.S. $800 a n d $1,000, m o r e t h a n f o r c o f f e e o r citrus f r u i t s . G. J u s t i n i a n o , "La e c o n o m í a d e la coca e n Bolivia," in SEAMOS, La economía de la coca en Bolivia: Análisis macro y microeconómico (La Paz: E D O B O L [Editorial O f f s e t Boliviana L t d a ] , 1992), 27, c a l c u l a t e s a h i g h e r f i g u r e of U.S. $1,409 p e r h e c t a r e ; w h e r e a s S a m u e l D o r i a M e d i n a , in "Coca P o r Desarrollo: Dos A ñ o s D e s p u é s , " in SEAMOS, La Economía de la Coca en Bolivia, supra, 84, suggests $522 a h e c t a r e f o r r u n n i n g costs o n c e s t a r t e d . 48. O n e s e n i o r U N D C P official in C o c h a b a m b a said h e a s s u m e d a yield of a r o u n d 12 cargas a harvest, which w o u l d p r o d u c e a r o u n d 5,000 lbs or 2.26

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t o n n e s a year. He c a l c u l a t e d p r o d u c t i o n costs at U.S. $ 1 , 0 0 0 a year, which would give a n e t i n c o m e of a r o u n d U . S . $ 8 0 0 to a f a r m e r owning o n e h e c t a r e . O t h e r U N D C P officials worked on a lower figure f o r gross i n c o m e (just after the slump) of between U.S. $ 1 , 0 0 0 and $ 1 , 3 0 0 . 49. B a r b a r a Durr, " W h e r e a G r e e n Leal Brings the G r e e n b a c k s , " Financial Times, 22 August 1989. T h e m i n i m u m wage was raised to 110 bolivianos ( U . S . $ 3 0 ) a m o n t h in August 1 9 9 1 , but many e m p l o y e r s c o n t i n u e d to ign o r e it. 50. Carlos Pérez-Crespo, Why Do People Migrate'? 11. 51. A. Rivera, Diagnóstico socioeconómico, 36. 52. A. Rivera, Diagnóstico socioeconómico, 32. 53. A u t h o r interviews with C h a p a r e ( a i m e r s growing c o c a and cassava, S e p t e m b e r 1991. 54. D. G r e e n , "Bolivian ( . o c a F a r m e r s Fight to Survive," Cuardian, 19 May 1990. 55. A. Rivera, Diagnóstico Socioeconómico, 32. 56. L a M o n d Tullis, " C o c a i n e and F o o d : Likely Effects of a B u r g e o n i n g T r a n s n a t i o n a l Industry on F o o d P r o d u c t i o n in Bolivia and P e r u , " in Pursuing Food Security: Strategies and Obstacles in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle Fast, W. Ladd Hollist, and L a M o n d Tullis, eds. ( B o u l d e r , C o l o r a d o : Lvnne R i e n n e r , 1 9 8 7 ) , 2 6 6 - 2 6 7 . 57. Los Tiempos, " P r o f e s o r e s rurales derivaron en la f a b r i c a c i ó n de coc a í n a , " 27 March 1985. 58. M a r i o de F r a n c o and R i c a r d o Godoy, " T h e E c o n o m i c Conseq u e n c e s , " p. 13. 59. A. Rivera, Diagnóstico socioeconómico, 8. My own interviews with c o c a growers in late 1989 suggest that it was very rare for a day worker to earn as m u c h as U.S. $4.

Notes for Chapter 2 1. U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of State, B u r e a u of International Narcotics Matters, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) ( W a s h i n g t o n , DC: U.S. G o v e r n m e n t Printing O f f i c e , March 1 9 9 1 ) , 86. 2. T h e official DEA view is that, prior to 1973, the c o c a i n e industry was essentially based in Chile as a cottage industry transforming paste from Peru and Bolivia into cocaine and supplying a small market in the United States via C o l o m b i a n m i d d l e m e n . T h e c o u p o f G e n . Augusto P i n o c h e t in S e p t e m b e r 1973 is thought to have finished the participation of Chileans, who were soon replaced by traffickers based first in Medellin. See for e x a m p l e , Guy Gugliotta and J e f f L e e n , Kings of Cocaine (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1 9 8 9 ) , 22. 3. Kevin Healy, " T h e Political A s c e n t o f Bolivia's P e a s a n t C o c a L e a f P r o d u c e r s , " Journal of Interamerican Studies 33, no. 1 (Spring 1 9 9 1 ) , 8 7 - 1 2 1 . 4. F o r a full list o f the b l o q u e o s , see R e n s s e l a e r W. L e e III, The While Labyrinth: Cocaine and Political Power (New Brunswick, NJ: T r a n s a c t i o n Press, 1 9 8 9 ) , 62; a n d j a m e s D u n k e r l e y , Political Transition, 40-43. 5. Kevin Healy, " T h e Political A s c e n t , " 91. 6. Sympathizers with the left-wing Movimienlo Bolivia Libre were on the executive b o a r d o f the F E T C T C a n d F C C T in 1990, but support for most o f

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the country's m a i n political parties can be f o u n d within the federations. See A. Rivera, Diagnòstico socioeconòmico, 57. 7. It m a y s e e m f a c i l e to l a b o r t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n c o c a a n d c o c a i n e , b u t m a n y W e s t e r n o b s e r v e r s still o f t e n e q u a t e c o c a i n e t r a f f i c k e r s a n d c o c a g r o w e r s . B o l i v i a n s f r e q u e n t l y p o i n t o u t t h a t c o c a i n e is e s s e n t i a l l y a p r o b l e m for industrialized " c o n s u m e r countries," whereas the acullico has b e e n pract i c e d f o r c e n t u r i e s in Bolivia w i t h o u t c a u s i n g s o c i a l o r p o l i t i c a l p r o b l e m s . 8. P r e s i d e n t Paz Z a m o r a e s t i m a t e d t h a t i n c r e a s i n g e x p o r t s of c o c a t e a t o 5 p e r c e n t of t h e w o r l d m a r k e t w o u l d g e n e r a t e g r e a t e r r e v e n u e t h a n t h e c o u n t r y ' s g a s e x p o r t s t o A r g e n t i n a ( w o r t h U . S . $ 2 1 5 m i l l i o n in 1 9 9 1 ) . S e e C h r i s t o p h e r P h i l i p s b o r n , "Bolivia S e e s P o t s oí P r o f i t in C o c a C u p p a , " Financial Times, 3 J u n e 1992. 9. T h e b e s t k n o w n s t u d i e s a r e L. Gill, " C o m m e r c i a l A g r i c u l t u r e a n d P e a s a n t P r o d u c t i o n : A S t u d y of A g r a r i a n C a p i t a l i s m in N o r t h e r n S a n t a C r u z , " P h . D . d i s s e r t a t i o n , C o l u m b i a U n i v e r s i t y , 1984; L a t i n A m e r i c a B u r e a u , Narcotráfico y politica, militarismo y mafia en bolivia ( M a d r i d : I E P A L A , 1 9 8 2 ) ; a n d R e n é B a s c o p é A s p i a z u , La vela bianca, coca y cocaína en Bolivia ( L a Paz, Bolivia: E d i c i o n e s A q u í , 1 9 8 2 ) . 10. Kevin H e a l y , " T h e B o o m , " 1 0 4 - 1 0 5 . 11. B a s c o p é a r g u e s t h a t t h e first p h a s e of e x p a n s i o n of c o c a i n e p r o d u c t i o n o c c u r r e d as a d i r e c t r e s u l t of a d e l i b e r a t e p o l i c y of g o v e r n m e n t p r o m o t i o n u n d e r t h e r e g i m e of G e n . H u g o B a n z e r f r o m 1971 t o 1 9 7 8 . J a m e s D u n k e r l e y Rebellion in the Veins ( L o n d o n : V e r s o , 1984) r e c o g n i z e s t h e inv o l v e m e n t of B a n z e r ' s c l o s e c o l l e a g u e s a n d r e l a t i v e s in d r u g t r a f f i c k i n g off e n s e s ( B a n z e r ' s p r i v a t e s e c r e t a r y , s o n - i n - l a w , a n d n e p h e w w e r e all a r r e s t e d in t h e 1 9 7 0 s ) , b u t c o n c l u d e s ( p . 3 1 5 ) t h a t t h e r e was n o f i r m e v i d e n c e o f a " c o n c r e t e p o l i c y of u n q u a l i f i e d s l a t e b a c k i n g a n d p a t r o n a g e u n d e r B a n z e r rather than a generally benevolent attitude." 12. Kevin H e a l y , The Boom, 1 0 6 - 1 0 7 . 13. S e e f o r e x a m p l e , R e n s s e l a e r W. L e e III, The White Labyrinth, 119. 14. F o r a d e t a i l e d a c c o u n t of t h e G a r c í a M e z a r e g i m e , s e e J a m e s D u n k e r l e y , Rebellion, 2 9 2 - 3 4 4 . A r c e G ó m e z w a s e v e n t u a l l y e x p e l l e d by t h e Paz Z a m o r a g o v e r n m e n t t o M i a m i in D e c e m b e r 1989; in M a r c h 1991 h e was sent e n c e d to t h i r t y y e a r s ' i m p r i s o n m e n t by a c o u r t in F o r t L a u d e r d a l e . H i s fort u n e s — a n d t h o s e of t h e G a r c í a M e z a r e g i m e — d e c l i n e d a f t e r a C B S T V p r o g r a m b r o a d c a s t in M a r c h 1981 l a b e l e d h i m t h e " M i n i s t e r o f C o c a i n e . " F o r Ultima m o r e d e t a i l s o n A r c e G ó m e z , s e e "El C a s o A r c e G ó m e z , " Páginas, Hora, 15 A p r i l 1991, a n d " F a c e t a s , " La Razón, 2 3 D e c e m b e r 1 9 9 0 . 15. R e n s s e l a e r W. L e e III, The While Labyrinth, 119. 16. F o r f u r t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n o n R o b e r t o S u á r e z G ó m e z , s e e Newsweek, 2 8 J u l y 1 9 8 6 , p p 2 8 - 2 9 ; Criterio ( L a P a z ) , 1 A u g u s t 1988; C. H a r g r e a v e s , Snowfields: The War on Cocaine in the Andes ( L o n d o n : Z e d , 1 9 9 2 ) , C h a p t e r 3; a n d D u n k e r l e y , Rebellion, p. 3 1 6 . 17. New York Times, 2 7 O c t o b e r 1984. T h e r e a r e s e v e r a l v e r s i o n s o f t h i s o f f e r . A n o t h e r is t h a t S u á r e z G ó m e z o f f e r e d t o p a y o f f t h e d e b t a n d h a n d h i m s e l f i n , if t h e U . S . g o v e r n m e n t r e l e a s e d h i s s o n , R o b e r t o S u á r e z Levy, w h o h a d b e e n a r r e s t e d in F l o r i d a o n d r u g t r a f f i c k i n g c h a r g e s in 1981. 18. T h e r e a r e s e v e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of S u á r e z G o m e z ' s a r r e s t . S o m e say h e w a s h e a v i l y in d e b t t o C o l o m b i a n o r g a n i z a t i o n s a n d w a s l o s i n g h e g e m o n y of B o l i v i a n o p e r a t i o n s t o h i s n e p h e w , J o r g e R o c a S u á r e z . T h i s m a y h a v e s o f t e n e d h i s r e l u c t a n c e t o g o to j a i l . S u á r e z h i m s e l f c l a i m s t h a t h e " h a d h i s suit-

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cases r e a d y a n d f a c i l i t a t e d h i s c a p t u r e " (La Razón, 8 D e c e m b e r 1 9 9 1 ) . B u t interviews w i t h t h e U M O P A R c a p t a i n w h o m a d e h i s a r r e s t s u g g e s t t h a t S u á r e z G ó m e z was i n d e e d c a p t u r e d , a n d was k e e n to o f f e r s u b s t a n t i a l b r i b e s f o r h i s i m m e d i a t e r e l e a s e . H e is c u r r e n t l y s e r v i n g a fifteen-year s e n t e n c e in t h e P a n ó p t i c o p r i s o n in La Paz. 19. G u y G u g l i o t t a a n d J e f f L e e n d e s c r i b e P a b l o E s c o b a r as a h i r e d g u n , k i d n a p p e r , a n d car thief of working-class origins; J o r g e Luís O c h o a Vásquez was "a l o w e r - m i d d l e class k i d " ; a n d G a r l o s L e h d e r , t h e y o u n g e s t s o n of a c o n s t r u c t i o n e n g i n e e r , was a p e t t y c r i m i n a l . T o g e t h e r w i t h J o s é G o n z a l o Rod r i g u e z G a c h a ("The M e x i c a n " ) , the f o u r c o n t r o l l e d m o r e t h a n 50 p e r c e n t of t h e c o c a i n e e n t e r i n g t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s in t h e m i d d l e of t h e 1980s. G u y G u g l i o t t a a n d J e f f L e e n , Kings of Cocaine, 18. 20. T h e U.S. A m b a s s a d o r to Bolivia f r o m 1988 t o 1991, R o b e r t G e l b a r d , u s e d B o l i v i a ' s n e w r a n k i n g in p a r t t o j u s t i f y t h e u s e of t h e B o l i v i a n a r m y t o c o u n t e r the d r u g s trade (see pp. 9 1 - 1 0 3 ) . T h e Bolivian g o v e r n m e n t never p u b l i c l y a c k n o w l e d g e d its n e w w o r l d s t a t u s , p e r h a p s f e a r i n g i n c r e a s e d i n t e r national pressure. 21. U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of S t a t e , B u r e a u of I n t e r n a t i o n a l N a r c o t i c s M a t t e r s , 1NCSR ( W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of S t a t e , B u r e a u o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l N a r c o t i c s M a t t e r s , M a r c h 1 9 9 1 ) , 84. 22. T h i s m o v e t o Bolivia s h o u l d n o t b e o v e r s t a t e d . I n t h e l o n g r u n , m o s t C o l o m b i a n t r a f f i c k e r s r e m a i n e d in C o l o m b i a b e c a u s e t h a t was w h e r e t h e y were safest. 23. B a r b a r a D u r r , " W h e r e a G r e e n L e a f B r i n g s t h e G r e e n b a c k s , " Finannal Times, 22 A u g u s t 1989. 24. Independent, 31 M a r c h 1992. 25. B B C W o r l d S e r v i c e d i s p a t c h f r o m S a o P a u l o , B r a z i l , 18 J u n e 1 9 9 1 , quoting Juan Carlos Antoniassi, Interpol's senior Latin American d r u g officer. 26. A u t h o r ' s i n t e r v i e w w i t h s e n i o r D E A o f f i c i a l , La Paz, N o v e m b e r 1991. 27. S e e J a m e s P a i n t e r , " B o l i v i a n M i l i t a r y L e a d e r Q u e s t i o n s D E A ' s R o l e in D r u g B u s t G o n e Awry," Christian Science Monitor, 12 J u l y 1991, 6. 28. W i l s o n G a r c í a M é r i d a , "El c u i d a d a n o : T e c h o d e P a j a , " in La RazónFacetas, La Paz, 2 3 D e c e m b e r 1990, 4. T h e p r e c i s e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n R o c a S u á r e z a n d t h e C o l o m b i a n c a r t e l s is d i f f i c u l t t o e s t a b l i s h . S o m e m a i n t a i n t h a t h e was i n d e e d s u c c e s s f u l in a s i g n i f i c a n t b r e a k w i t h t h e m , o t h e r s t h a t h e remained a major supplier. 29. C a b l e of t h e S p a n i s h n e w s a g e n c y , EFE, r e p r o d u c e d in La Razón, 16 D e c e m b e r 1990. F o r d e t a i l s of R o b e r t o S u á r e z ' s w e a l t h , s e e p p . 5 8 - 5 9 . 30. F o r a f u l l list o f t h e c l a n , s e e Hoy, 18 A u g u s t 1 9 9 1 , 2. 31. It is s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t B o l i v i a n d r u g t r a f f i c k i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n s always s e e m t o b e c a l l e d c l a n s r a t h e r t h a n c a r t e l s . T h i s is b e c a u s e t h e y o f t e n t e n d to be family-based, with m a n y i n t e r m a r r i a g e s , a n d they n e v e r c o n t r o l t h e m a r ket sufficiently to be called a cartel. 32. F r o m 1988 R i v e r o V i l l a v i c e n c i o in p a r t i c u l a r w a s s o u g h t by t h e U . S . g o v e r n m e n t . H e a v o i d e d a t l e a s t t w o m a j o r o p e r a t i o n s to c a p t u r e h i m in 1989 a n d 1991. T h e U . S . e m b a s s y said h e h a d t h r e e r a n c h e s in t h e vicinity of Santa A n a — S a n t a Rosa, D o n a c i o n e s , a n d I n d i a — w h e n c e h e s u p p l i e d Colombian traffickers. 33. Q u o t e d in J a m e s P a i n t e r , " B o l i v i a n Military L e a d e r Q u e s t i o n s D E A ' s R o l e in D r u g B u s t G o n e A w r y , " Christian Science Monitor, 12 J u l y 1991, 6. It is w o r t h n o t i n g t h a t D E A o f f i c i a l s o f t e n s p o k e of a m a r k e d d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n

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t h e p e r i o d u n t i l t h e m i d - 1 9 8 0 s , w h e n virtually all t h e m a j o r t r a f f i c k e r s w e r e r a n c h e r s o r e x - r a n c h e r s . B u t it w o u l d s e e m t h a t m a n y of t h e y o u n g e r t r a f fickers t o e m e r g e in t h e 1980s w e r e s e c o n d - g e n e r a t i o n m e m b e r s of r a n c h i n g o r l a t i f u n d i s t a families w h o m a i n t a i n e d t h e i r close links with e a c h o t h e r . 3 4 . Ultima Hora, 17 J a n u a r y 1989. 3 5 . T h e f u l l list r e a d R o c a S u á r e z , Gil, B a r r i e n t o s , R i v e r o V i l l a v i c e n c i o , Winston Rodríguez, J o s é Cuellar, G u i m b e r t Suárez, C a r m e l o N u ñ e z del Pi a d o , J o s é L u í s N a c i f f , R o s a R o m e r o d e H u m e r e z ( L a C h o l a R o s a ) , M a r i o A r a o z ( " T h e K i n g of I n s i n u t a " ) , a n d two C h á v e z b r o t h e r s . 36. Ultima Hora, 12 J a n u a r y 1990. 37. F o r a f u l l e r l i s t i n g of d i f f e r e n t lists p u b l i s h e d s i n c e 1984, s e e Hoy, 18 A u g u s t 1991. 38. J e s s i c a d e G r a z i a , DEA: The War Against Drugs ( L o n d o n : B B C B o o k s , 1991), C h a p t e r s 2 - 5 . 39. J e s s i c a d e G r a z i a , DEA, 49. 40. J e s s i c a d e G r a z i a , DEA, 4 9 - 5 1 , a n d 81. 4 1 . J a m e s P a i n t e r , " C o l o m b i a n s E l b o w in o n B o l i v i a n D r u g T r a d e , " Christian Science Monitor, 10 D e c e m b e r 1991, 3. 42. O n e o t h e r t r a f f i c k e r , A l c i d e s G u a r d i a ( " T h e M e x i c a n " ) , also t u r n e d himself in o n 22 S e p t e m b e r u n d e r t h e t e r m s of t h e d e c r e e , g i v i n g a t o t a l of e i g h t . G u a r d i a was f r o m t h e t o w n of G u a y a m e r i n in t h e B e n i b u t p r o b a b l y h a d c l o s e l i n k s t o t h e S a n t a A n a c l a n . B i s m a r k B a r r i e n t o s ( a n d at l e a s t o n e o t h e r ) r e p o r t e d l y o f f e r e d t o t u r n h i m s e l f i n , b u t m a y h a v e b e e n d e t e r r e d by c o m m e n t s f r o m t h e t h e n U.S. a m b a s s a d o r , R i c h a r d B o w e r s , t h a t t h e U . S . was n o t g o i n g t o f o r g o its " r i g h t " t o s e e k t h e e x t r a d i t i o n of t o p t r a f f i c k e r s . S e e J a m e s P a i n t e r , " C o l o m b i a n s E l b o w in o n Bolivian D r u g T r a d e , " Christian Science Monitor, 10 D e c e m b e r 1991, 3. 4 3 . A u t h o r ' s i n t e r v i e w w i t h s e n i o r D E A o f f i c i a i , La Paz, N o v e m b e r 1991. 4 4 . Ultima Hora, 19 S e p t e m b e r 1991. 4 5 . La Razón, 25 S e p t e m b e r 1991, a n d Ultima Hora, 18 O c t o b e r 1 9 9 1 . 4 6 . T h e g o v e r n m e n t h a d s o m e r e a s o n t o b e p l e a s e d . O f a list of t e n t o p t r a f f i c k e r s c i r c u l a t e d by Defensa Social in May 1 9 9 1 , o n l y o n e r e m a i n e d a t l a r g e in D e c e m b e r 1991. H e was Isaac E c h e v e r r í a , a p i l o t w h o h a d o n c e b e e n p h o t o g r a p h e d c a m p a i g n i n g w i t h P r e s i d e n t J a i m e Paz Z a m o r a . T w o o t h e r t r a f f i c k e r s o n t h e l i s t — H u m b e r t o Gil a n d Micky A r r e n d o n d o — h a d b e e n arr e s t e d e a r l i e r in t h e y e a r in B u e n o s A i r e s , A r g e n t i n a . 47. J a m e s P a i n t e r , " C o l o m b i a n s Elbow in o n Bolivian D r u g T r a d e , " Christian Science Monitor, 10 D e c e m b e r 1991. 4 8 . P. M a c F a r r e n , Bolivia's War on Drugs Becomes Airborne, A s s o c i a t e d P r e s s , C h a p a r e , B o l i v i a , 2 6 M a y 1992. T h e D E A a l s o s a i d t h e C o l o m b i a n s were b r i n g i n g a r m e d traffickers into the Chapare.

Notes for Chapter 3 1. S e e f o r e x a m p l e , J o s é A n t o n i o Q u i r o g a , Coca cocaína: Una visión boli34. 2. O n e o f t h e f u l l e s t lists is f o u n d in M a r i o d e F r a n c o a n d R i c a r d o G o d o y , " T h e E c o n o m i c C o n s e q u e n c e s o f C o c a i n e P r o d u c t i o n in B o l i v i a : H i s t o r i c a l , L o c a l a n d M a c r o e c o n o m i c P e r s p e c t i v e s , " T a b l e 4. U S A I D in La P a z r e g u l a r l y u p d a t e s its e s t i m a t e s , as d o e s U D A P E a s e m i - i n d e p e n d e n t g r o u p o f B o l i v i a n e c o n o m i s t s w o r k i n g in La P a z . T w o o f t h e m o s t u s e f u l viana,

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surveys have b e e n written by J o s é A n t o n i o Quiroga, " T h e E c o n o m i c Conseq u e n c e s " (although some o f the data are now dated) ; and by J e f f r e y Franks, "La e c o n o m í a de la c o c a en Bolivia: ¿Plaga o salvación?" Informe Confidencial, no. 6 4 (La Paz, J u n e 1 9 9 1 ) , which is widely q u o t e d in this c h a p t e r . 3. U.S. Embassy in La Paz, unclassified m e m o on the c o c a i n e e c o n o m y , 1991,7. 4. U.S. D e p a r t m e n t o f State, B u r e a u o f International Narcotics Matters, 1NCSR ( 1 9 9 1 ) , 22. 5. E x t r a p o l a t e d from Jeffrey Franks, "La e c o n o m í a de la c o c a , " 18. 6. J e f f r e y Franks, "La e c o n o m í a de la c o c a , " 5. 7. M a r i o de F r a n c o and R i c a r d o Godoy, " T h e E c o n o m i c Conseq u e n c e s , " 14. 8. U.S. $ 5 0 1 million is the m e d i a n o f the r a n g e o f $ 4 1 9 million and $ 5 8 3 million, arrived at by adding the value r e m a i n i n g in the country plus an i n c o m e multiplier o f 2.8. 9. C O N A L I D , Programa nacional de inversión de desarrollo alternativo (La Paz, Bolivia: C O N A L I D , 1 9 9 1 ) , 4. C O N A L I D estimates the value o f cocac o c a i n e p r o d u c t i o n in 1989 at U.S. $ 7 2 6 million, o f which $ 2 1 0 million stays in the country, or 26 p e r c e n t o f the value o f formal exports. 10. T h e r e is universal a g r e e m e n t that this was the figure for 1989. Figures for m e m b e r s h i p o f the five c o c a federations suggest a r a n g e o f between 5 8 , 0 0 0 and 6 2 , 0 0 0 . 11. A. Rivera, Diagnóstico socioeconómico, 7 - 9 , 3 5 - 3 8 . 12. O n e o f the fullest lists is f o u n d in Mario de F r a n c o and R i c a r d o Godoy, " T h e E c o n o m i c C o n s e q u e n c e s , " T a b l e 3. 13. J e f f r e y Franks, "La e c o n o m í a de la c o c a , " 7; and F e d e r i c o Aguiló, "Movilidad espacial y movilidad social g e n e r a d a por el n a r c o t r á f i c o , " in Efectos del narcotráfico, Baldivia et al., eds. (La Paz: I L D I S , 1 9 8 8 ) , 5 3 - 7 3 . H . J e f f r e y Franks, "La e c o n o m í a de la c o c a , " 7. 15. Aguiló, Movilidad, 5 8 - 5 9 . 16. A u t h o r interviews, 1 9 8 8 - 1 9 9 0 . 17. USAID Update, "Estimates o f t h e E c o n o m i c Impact o f C o c a and Derivatives in 1 9 9 0 , " M i m e o , La Paz, April 1991. 18. U.S. Embassy, unclassified m e m o , La Paz, 1991, 13. 19. S e e J e f f r e y Franks, "La e c o n o m í a de la c o c a , " C h a r t s n o . 7, 2 3 for full c o m p a r i s o n . 20. U S A I D (interview with s e n i o r official, S e p t e m b e r 1 9 9 1 ) assumes 2 2 , 0 0 0 families left, while S a m u e l Doria M e d i n a uses the figure o f 1 0 , 0 0 0 in "Coca por desarrollo: Dos años después," M i m e o , La Paz, O c t o b e r 1991. 21. Samuel Doria Medina, "Coca p o r desarrollo," section 2. 22. Q u o t e d in Hoy, 5 S e p t e m b e r 1991. 23. Soya is not officially r e g a r d e d as an alternative c r o p to c o c a a n d is not p r o d u c e d as such despite g o o d i n t e r n a t i o n a l prices. U.S. f a r m e r s have m o u n t e d an effective lobby. J . G. J u s t i n i a n o , "La e c o n o m í a de la c o c a , " Mimeo for S E A M O S , Santa Cruz, O c t o b e r 1991, 4. 24. La Razón, 3 May 1991.

Notes for Chapter 4 1. L a M o n d Tullis, Beneficiaries of the Illicit Drug Trade (Geneva: U N R I S D , March 1 9 9 1 ) , 7.

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2. S e e , f o r e x a m p l e , J o s é A n t o n i o Q u i r o g a , Coca/Cocaína: Una vision Boliviana, 3 8 ff. 3. Bolivia was o n l y s e c o n d c o u n t r y in L a t i n A m e r i c a a f t e r C h i l e t o u n d e r g o a severe o r t h o d o x r e a d j u s t m e n t a n d f r e e - m a r k e t p r o g r a m of a type t h a t w o u l d s w e e p t h e c o n t i n e n t in t h e l a t e 1980s. 4. S e e J a m e s D u n k e r l e y , Political Transition, 3 2 - 3 9 , f o r a f u l l e r d i s c u s s i o n of t h e m o d e l . 5. A s i m i l a r p o i n t is m a d e in J e f f r e y F r a n k s , "La e c o n o m í a d e la c o c a , " 18; a n d Q u i r o g a , Coca/cocaína, 39. Q u i r o g a a r g u e s t h a t t h e Bolivian e c o n o m y t r a d i t i o n a l l y r e q u i r e d a t o t a l l i q u i d i t y of U . S . $ 6 8 0 m i l l i o n . In 1986, h e calc u l a t e s , t h e e c o n o m y f u n c t i o n e d w i t h o n l y U.S. $ 3 4 0 m i l l i o n , w h i l e a n a d d i tional $200 million c a m e directly or indirectly f r o m cocaine trafficking. 6. P e t e r A n d r e a s , " C o c a D e n i a l , " in Bolivia: The Poverty of Progress, Report on the Ameritas, N A C L A 25, n o . 1 ( N e w York, J u l y 1 9 9 1 ) , 1 4 - 1 5 . 7. A g u i l a r is q u o t e d in Ultima Hora, 20 N o v e m b e r 1 9 8 8 . R e n s s e l a e r L e e s u g g e s t s t h a t a n i n c r e a s e in d o l l a r r e s e r v e s f r o m U.S. $ 1 4 4 m i l l i o n in t h e seco n d q u a r t e r of 1985 t o $ 2 5 2 m i l l i o n in t h e t h i r d q u a r t e r of 1986 c o u l d h a v e b e e n d u e to t h e i n f l u x of c o c a i n e d o l l a r s i n t o t h e b a n k i n g s y s t e m . S e e Renss e l a e r W. L e e III, The While Labyrinth, 37. 8. Q u o t e d in Ultima Hora, 14 D e c e m b e r 1988. T h e i n t e r i o r m i n i s t e r u n d e r Paz E s t e n s s o r o , J u a n C a r l o s D u r a n , e v e n t h r e a t e n e d to s t a r t legal p r o ceedings against Roberto J o r d á n , a f o r m e r planning minister, for suggesting t h a t Bolivia was l a u n d e r i n g c o c a i n e m o n e y t h r o u g h t h i s s y s t e m . S e e Presencia ( L a P a z ) , 15 D e c e m b e r 1988 a n d 2 7 J a n u a r y 1989. 9. S o m e a n a l y s t s d i s p u t e w h e t h e r t h e i n f l u x of c o c a i n e d o l l a r s was t h e m a j o r c a u s e of c u r r e n c y o v e r v a l u a t i o n s , o r e v e n w h e t h e r t h e c u r r e n c y is o v e r v a l u e d . S o m e of t h e i n f l o w s o f f o r e i g n e x c h a n g e c a n of c o u r s e b e att r i b u t e d t o t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s m a c r o e c o n o m i c p o l i c i e s ( a n d n o t c o c a reve n u e ) , particularly the high interest rates, that o f t e n cause large short-term inflows that overvalue the currency. 10. M a r i o d e F r a n c o a n d R i c a r d o G o d o y , " T h e E c o n o m i c C o n s e q u e n c e s , " 21. 11. S e e M a r i o d e F r a n c o a n d R i c a r d o G o d o y , " T h e E c o n o m i c C o n s e q u e n c e s , " 15 ff, f o r a s s u m p t i o n s a n d d i s c u s s i o n of t h e i r m o d e l . 12. J e f f r e y F r a n k s a r g u e s t h a t c o c a p r o d u c t i o n r a i s e s all i n c o m e s by a n a v e r a g e o f at least U.S. $ 4 3 , o r 6.4 p e r c e n t , u s i n g a low e s t i m a t e o f t h e v a l u e of c o c a - c o c a i n e r e v e n u e r e m a i n i n g in t h e c o u n t r y . S e e F r a n k s , "La e c o n o m í a d e la c o c a , " 10. 13. A c e t o n e , e t h e r , s u l f u r i c a c i d , a n d h y d r o c h l o r i c a c i d a r e b r o u g h t in by r o a d , r i v e r , o r rail f r o m Brazil, A r g e n t i n a , a n d C h i l e . 14. M a r i o d e F r a n c o a n d R i c a r d o G o d o y , " T h e E c o n o m i c C o n s e q u e n c e s , " 20-21. UDAPE uses a similar m o d e l a n d q u o t e s similar results. U D A P E e s t i m a t e s every c o c a d o l l a r e x p o r t e d r e q u i r e d U.S. $ 0 . 0 4 w o r t h of inp u t s , c o m p a r e d t o $ 0 . 2 7 in m o d e r n a g r i c u l t u r e , $ 0 . 0 7 in t r a d i t i o n a l a g r i c u l t u r e , $ 0 . 1 0 in h y d r o c a r b o n s , $ 0 . 1 3 in m i n i n g , $ 0 . 3 0 in i n d u s t r y , a n d $ 0 . 6 1 in c o n s t r u c t i o n . U D A P E , Estrategia Nacional de Desarrollo Alternativo 1990 ( L a Paz: P r e s i d e n c i a d e la R é p u b l i c a , 1 9 9 0 ) , 13. 15. S e e Kevin H e a l y , " T h e B o o m . " 16. A m i l i t a r y - o w n e d s u l f u r i c a c i d f a c t o r y n e a r O r u r o c l o s e d d o w n in t h e mid-1980s. 17. Kevin H e a l y a l s o n o t e s t h a t d u r i n g a s i x - m o n t h p e r i o d in 1981, 3 0 0 l a r g e t r u c k s w e r e p u r c h a s e d by p e a s a n t s m a l l h o l d e r s in t h e C h a p a r e , " T h e

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B o o m , " p. 115. T h o s e days h a v e l o n g s i n c e p a s s e d , r e p l a c e d by a n i n f l u x of J a p a n e s e a n d U . S . j e e p s b o u g h t a n d r u n by t h e l a r g e n u m b e r of t h e e m p l o y e e s of U S A I D , U N D C P , P D A R , a n d o t h e r s w h o n o w r e g u l a r l y c o m m u t e t o t h e C h a p a r e . In a c h a n c e m e e t i n g , a l o c a l N i s s a n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t o l d m e in 1991 t h a t s a l e s h a d n e v e r b e e n b e t t e r . 18. A. R i v e r a , Diagnóstico socioeconómico, 4 8 - 4 9 . 19. J a m e s P a i n t e r , "Bolivia T r i e s t o B r e a k Its E c o n o m i c A d d i c t i o n , " Christian Science Monitor, 24 May 1991, 5. 20. J o s é B l a n e s a n d G o n z a l o F l o r e s , ¿Dónde va el chapare? a n d a u t h o r int e r v i e w s . K e v i n H e a l y , " T h e B o o m , " 129, says e x t r a i n c o m e ( e a r n e d in t h e e a r l y 1980s) w a s n o t i n v e s t e d in l a n d a n d a n i m a l s as it is in t r a d i t i o n a l p e a s ant communities. 21. R e n s s e l a e r W. L e e III, The White Labyrinth, 3 6 - 3 7 , gives a n u n u s u a l p i c t u r e of t h e C h a p a r e w h e n h e says, " F o r r u r a l d w e l l e r s e s p e c i a l l y , t h e coc a i n e i n d u s t r y o f f e r s a k i n d of i n s t a n t i n t r o d u c t i o n i n t o m o d e r n life styles ( i i r j — t h e c h a n c e to e n j o y c o l o r television [ a n d ] videocassette r e c o r d e r s . " H e m u s t b e r e f e r r i n g t o t h e e a r l y 1 9 8 0 s , as s u c h t r a p p i n g s o f m o d e r n c o n s u m e r s o c i e t y a r e n o w few a n d f a r b e t w e e n . 22. B a r b a r a D u r r , " W h e r e a G r e e n L e a f B r i n g s t h e G r e e n b a c k s , " Financial Times, 22 A u g u s t 1989. 23. S e e , f o r e x a m p l e , R e n s s e l a e r W. L e e III, The White Labyrinth, C h a p t e r 1. 2 4 . Q u o t e d in Ultima Hora, 2 0 N o v e m b e r 1988. 25. J a m e s D u n k e r l e y , Rebellion, 3 1 6 . J o u r n a l i s t s w h o v i s i t e d S u á r e z G o m e z ' s e s t a t e n e a r S a n t a A n a d e s c r i b e d it as n o t p a r t i c u l a r l y l u x u r i o u s . 2 6 . Q u o t e d in C l a r e H a r g r e a v e s , Snowfields: The War on Cocaine in the Andes ( L o n d o n : Z e d , 1 9 9 2 ) , 72. 27. H a r g r e a v e s , Snowfields, 108. C h a p t e r s 3 a n d 5 p r o v i d e d e t a i l s of S u á r e z G ó m e z a n d of t h e G a r c í a M e z a r e g i m e . 28. S e e La Razón, 19 D e c e m b e r 1990, a n d 2 3 D e c e m b e r 1990. 29. S e e La Razón-Facetas, 2 3 D e c e m b e r 1990, f o r a f u l l d e s c r i p t i o n of h i s n e t w o r k of s u p p o r t e r s . {Facetas is a s e p a r a t e s u p p l e m e n t a c c o m p a n y i n g La Razón—a daily p a p e r — o n w e e k e n d s . ) 30. U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of S t a t e , B u r e a u of I n t e r n a t i o n a l N a r c o t i c s M a t t e r s , ( 1 9 9 1 ) , 80. 31. S e e , f o r e x a m p l e , Ultima Hora, 2 8 A p r i l 1989. 32. It w o u l d b e t e m p t i n g t o i m a g i n e t h a t this i n f l u x of c a p i t a l ( a n d possibly c o c a i n e d o l l a r s ) r e l e a s e d f u n d s f o r b a n k s to i n c r e a s e l e n d i n g t o s t i m u l a t e e c o n o m i c activity. B u t s u c h w a s t h e e x c e s s l i q u i d i t y o f t h e b a n k s t h a t b a n k e r s i n i t i a l l y c h o s e t o p l a c e t h e i r e x c e s s f u n d s in C e n t r a l B a n k C D s (certificados de depósito). T h e g o v e r n m e n t set t h e r a t e of C D s h i g h t o a t t r a c t doll a r s ( t o b o l s t e r i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e s e r v e s ) , w h i c h in t u r n f o r c e d b a n k s t o s e t their rates high to c o m p e t e . 33. T h e y were, in o r d e r of i m p o r t a n c e , Finsa, Multiactiva, O r c o b o l , C o m c e r , O r b o l , C o b o l , a n d Vial. T h e y w e r e all b a s e d in C o c h a b a m b a , b u t m a n y h a d b r a n c h e s in o t h e r cities. F o r a full a c c o u n t of t h e p h e n o m e n o n o f t h e inmobiliarias, s e e C E D O I N , Inmobiliarias: La estafa del siglo ( L a P a z , 1992). 34. F i n s a w a s t h e s a v i n g s c o m p a n y m o s t closely a s s o c i a t e d w i t h c o c a i n e trafficking, b u t t h e r e were o t h e r e x a m p l e s of c o m p a n i e s g o i n g b a n k r u p t or t h e i r o w n e r s ' f l e e i n g . I n 1 9 8 8 I n m o b i l i a r i a A n d i n a in S a n t a C r u z l e f t t h o u -

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s a n d s of d e p o s i t o r s in t h e s t r e e t w h e n its o w n e r s f l e d , as d i d I n m o b i l i a r i a C o l ó n in La Paz in 1989. T h e t h r e e c o m p a n i e s t o g e t h e r d e f r a u d e d their depositors of a r o u n d U.S. $100 million. T h e o w n e r of Vial in C o c h a b a m b a also fled in mid-1991, leaving nearly 4,000 d e p o s i t o r s with little c h a n c e of recove r i n g nearly U.S. $10 million. For a f u l l e r a c c o u n t of t h e Finsa case, see, f o r e x a m p l e , Edwin Pérez, " U n a Historia d e Estafa, N a r c o t r á f i c o e Inversión d e Valores," Presencia, 24 M a r c h 1991. 35. T h e r e was c o n s i d e r a b l e s p e c u l a t i o n in t h e Bolivian press t h a t t h e DEA h a d p u s h e d t h e Bolivian a n t i d r u g police i n t o carrying o u t t h e raid. But private c o n v e r s a t i o n s with U.S. officials s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e DEA at least was c o n c e r n e d by t h e p o t e n t i a l ( a n d as it t u r n e d o u t , real) adverse publicity f o r t h e m f r o m angry Finsa d e p o s i t o r s . 36. An i n t e r n a l a u d i t r e v e a l e d in N o v e m b e r 1991 t h a t of t h e U.S. $ 5 6 million d e p o s i t e d , $37 million h a d c o m p l e t e l y d i s a p p e a r e d . 37. T h e r e was f r e q u e n t s p e c u l a t i o n that s o m e of t h e "big-time" depositors h a d r e c o v e r e d s o m e of t h e i r m o n e y . See, f o r e x a m p l e , Ivan Canelas, " P r o h i b i d o d o r m i r t r a n q u i l o c u a n d o se p r e s t a d i n e r o , " Presencia Reportajes, 11 August 1991. (Reportajes is a s e p a r a t e s u p p l e m e n t of n e w s p a p e r [Presencia] on w e e k e n d s . ) 38. See J u a n Javier Zeballos, "Financieras, el más g r a n d e f r a u d e del ult i m o t i e m p o , " La Razón, 25 O c t o b e r 1991. 39. Presencia, 2 August 1991. 40. For e x a m p l e , Kevin Healy, " T h e B o o m , " 1 2 8 - 1 2 9 , a n d L a M o n d Tullís, " C o c a i n e a n d F o o d , " 2 4 7 - 2 8 3 . 41. UDAPE, Estrategia nacional del desarrollo alternativo, 5. 42. Kevin Healy, " T h e B o o m , " 128. 43. Kevin Healy, in " S t r u c t u r a l A d j u s t m e n t , P e a s a n t A g r i c u l t u r e a n d C o c a in Bolivia," p a p e r p r e s e n t e d at t h e 16th I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n g r e s s of t h e Latin A m e r i c a n Studies Association, W a s h i n g t o n , D.C., April 1991, 6, uses a f i g u r e of 80 p e r c e n t . Several o t h e r o b s e r v e r s c o n s i d e r this to b e too h i g h , p r e f e r r i n g 65 p e r c e n t . 44. M a r i o d e F r a n c o a n d R i c a r d o G o d o y , " T h e E c o n o m i c Consequences," 22-23. 45. T a k e n f r o m M u l l e r Associates, Estadísticas económicas 1991 (La Paz: Muller Associates, 1991), 6 3 - 6 4 . 46. W o r l d B a n k , Bolivia Poverty Report, i n t e r n a l d o c u m e n t r e p o r t n o . 8646, 1990, q u o t e d in Kevin Healy, "Structural A d j u s t m e n t , " 7 - 8 . 47. CEDLA, NPE: Recesión Económica (La Paz: CEDLA, 1990). 48. Kevin Healy, "Structural A d j u s t m e n t , " 9. 49. UDAPE, Estrategia nacional de desarrollo alternativo 1990, 4. 50. Most notably these have b e e n f r u i t f r o m Chile; p o t a t o e s , barley, a n d s o m e v e g e t a b l e s f r o m P e r u ; rice a n d c o r n f r o m Brazil; a n d p o t a t o e s a n d tinned foods from Argentina. 51. U.S. Congress, S e n a t e C o m m i t t e e o n G o v e r n m e n t a l Affairs, Cocaine Production, Eradication, and the Environment: Policy, Impact and Options (Washi n g t o n , D.C.: U.S. G o v e r n m e n t P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1990), passim. 52. T h e discussion a n d p a p e r s s u b m i t t e d to t h e S e n a t e h e a r i n g s covered 192 p a g e s of f i n d i n g s , b u t Bolivia is h a r d l y m e n t i o n e d . 53. J. T o l i s a n o et al., Environmental Assessment, A p p e n d i x F. 54. CEEDI-LIDEMA, Evaluación ecológica de les cultivos de coca. 55. M. P a i n t e r a n d E. Bedoya G a r l a n d , Socioeconomic Issues, 63.

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56. Fires f r o m l a n d c l e a r a n c e s to p l a n t new c o c a in t h e C h a p a r e can cause s m o k e to h a n g a r o u n d in t h e a t m o s p h e r e f or days. See J a m e s P a i n t e r , " B r e a k i n g t h e C o c a i n e - g r o w i n g Cycle Proves T o o Costly f o r Bolivia," Independent, 21 D e c e m b e r 1988. 57. U.S. Congress, S e n a t e C o m m i t t e e on G o v e r n m e n t a l Affairs, Cocaine Production, 5. 58. M. P a i n t e r a n d E. Bedova G a r l a n d , Socioeconomic Issues, 63. 59. News d i s p a t c h f r o m t h e S p a n i s h news agency, EFF., Rio de J a n e i r o , 4 J u n e 1992 60. M. P a i n t e r a n d E. Bedova G a r l a n d , Socioeconomic Issues, 63. 61. See J a m e s P a i n t e r , " T h e R a p e of t h e Forest," in South Magasine, August 1989, 109. Bolivia's a n n u a l rate of f o r e s t d e p l e t i o n is e s t i m a t e d to b e 0.35 p e r c e n t , o n e of t h e worst in S o u t h A m e r i c a a n d only marginally slower t h a n Brazil's 0.41 p e r c e n t . 62. La Razón, 23 N o v e m b e r 1991. 63. J. T o l i s a n o et al., Environmental Assessment, 2. 64. U.S. Congress, S e n a t e C o m m i t t e e on G o v e r n m e n t a l Affairs, Cocaine Production, 94. 65. D. F a r r a h , " C o c a i n e M a k e r s Give t h e A m a z o n a T o x i c O v e r d o s e , " Sunday Times, 30 D e c e m b e r 1990. 66. U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of Stale, I\'CSR, M a r c h 1991, 83. 67. See, f o r e x a m p l e , José A n t o n i o Q u i r o g a , Coca/cocaína, 48; a n d J. Bal divia el al., Efectos del narcotráfico (I.a Paz: ILDIS, April 1988), 86. 68. Q u o t e d in Presencia, 19 ( u n e 1988. 69. Presencia, 27 J u n e 1989.' 70. U.S. Embassy, u n c l a s s i f i e d m e m o , L.a Paz, 1991, 10. [ n o title, n o address]. 71. Universidad A u t ó n o m a Gabriel R e n e M o r e n o , Universidad, sociedad, uso indebido de drogas (Santa Cruz, Bolivia: Editorial Universitaria, 1991), 145. 72. Aguiló, "Movilidad," 67. A g u i l ó settles l o r a f i g u r e of 102,000 cons u m e r s of base a n d 138,000 c o n s u m e r s of H C L , a l t h o u g h it is n o t clear w h e r e h e gets these figures. 73. T h e s a m e p e r c e n t a g e is used by J e f f r e y F r a n k s , La Economía de la Coca, 11. 74. Ultima Hora, 26 J u n e 1989. 75. F r a n k l i n Alcaraz, " A f t e r w o r d , " in Effectos del narcotráfico, Baldivia et al., eds. (La Paz: ILDIS, 1988), 110 ff. 76. See Alcaraz, " A f t e r w o r d , " a n d U n i v e r s i d a d A u t ó n o m a G a b r i e l R e n é M o r e n o , Universidad, sociedad, 147-148. 77. U n i v e r s i d a d A u t ó n o m a Gabriel R e n é M o r e n o , Universidad, sociedad, 347. 78. See, f o r e x a m p l e , Igor T a d i c , "Afterword," in Efectos del narcotráfico, Baldivia et al., eds. (La Paz: ILDIS, 1988), 8 8 - 9 2 . 79. Kathryn Leger, "Bolivians Awaken to T r a g e d y of Child D r u g Addiction," Christian Science Monitor, 8 S e p t e m b e r 1986. 80. U.S. Congress, H o u s e C o m m i t t e e on G o v e r n m e n t O p e r a t i o n s , United Stales Anli-narcolic Activities in the Andean Region ( W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: N o v e m b e r 1990), 41. 81. DEA Review, D e c e m b e r 1989, 58, q u o t e d in U.S. C o n g r e s s , H o u s e C o m m i t t e e o n G o v e r n m e n t O p e r a t i o n s , United States Anti-narcotic Activities, 41.

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82. U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of State, B u r e a u of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Narcotics Matters, INCSR (1990), 105 ff. T h e t h e n U.S. A m b a s s a d o r , R o b e r t G e l b a r d , was so inf u r i a t e d with t h e pervasive c o r r u p t i o n within t h e navy that h e t h r e a t e n e d to c u t off all aid to it until it c l e a n e d u p t h e i r o p e r a t i o n s . 83. U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of State, B u r e a u of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Narcotics Matters, INCSR, 1991, 80. 84. U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of State, B u r e a u of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Narcotics Matters, INCSR, 1992, 94. 85. J a m e s P a i n t e r , " B r e a k i n g t h e C o c a i n e - g r o w i n g Cycle Proves T o o Costly f o r Bolivia," Independent, 21 D e c e m b e r 1988. 86. See Informe R (La Paz), nos. 119, 120, 121, 235, a n d 241; a n d WOLA, Issue brief no. 4 (Washington, D.C.: WOLA, S e p t e m b e r 1991), 17-18, f o r a flavor of t h e full story of H u a n c h a c a . At t h e time of writing, it was still n o t known who was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e killings, n o r f o r t h e s h o o t i n g of Edm u n d o Salazar in 1987, who was a m e m b e r of a p a r l i a m e n t a r y c o m m i s s i o n investigating t h e killings. 87. For a partial list, see H e n r y O p o r t o C a s t r o , "Bolivia: El c o m p l e j o coca-cocaína," in Coca, cocaína y narcotráfico, Diego Garcia-Sayan, ed. (Lima, Perú: Comisión A n d i n a de Juristas, 1989), 178. 88. J a m e s P a i n t e r , "U.S., Bolivians Fall O u t over Drugs," Christian Science Monitor, 18 M a r c h 1992. 89. S o m e of the m o r e florid d e s c r i p t i o n s of t h e C a p o b i a n c o case by top DEA officials in La Paz suggest t h a t t h e r e c e i p t of d r u g m o n e y d u r i n g t h e MIR g o v e r n m e n t went f u r t h e r , involving very s e n i o r MIR officials. T h e r e is n o p u b l i s h e d evidence of this, a l t h o u g h it is h a r d n o t to believe t h a t s o m e officials m u s t have k n o w n what their c o l l e a g u e s were d o i n g . 90. M. Isikoff, "Blunt Assessment of Bolivia I g n o r e d , " Washington Post, 1 March, 1990, A4. 91. See J a m e s P a i n t e r , "Bolivian Right Plots Army Rule a n d C o c a i n e E c o n o m y , " Independent, 13 J a n u a r y 1989; a n d Informe R, n o . 165 f o r a full transcription of the tapes. Vargas Salinas says at o n e p o i n t that B a n z e r knew a b o u t t h e m e e t i n g , t h o u g h Arce C a r p i ó e m p h a t i c a l l y d e n i e s h e was r e p r e s e n t i n g B a n z e r . T h e ADN won t h e 1985 e l e c t i o n b u t e n d e d u p in a l l i a n c e with t h e MNR u n d e r t h e p r e s i d e n c y of Dr. Victor Paz Estenssoro. In fact, the f r e e - m a r k e t m o d e l i n t r o d u c e d by t h e MNR did allow n a r c o - d o l l a r s to e n t e r t h e f o r m a l e c o n o m y a n d h e l p to stabilize it. 92. H e n r y O p o r t o Castro, "Bolivia," p. 179. T h e MNR's bete noir was the H u a n c h a c a case, in which I n t e r i o r Minister F e r n a n d o B a r t h e l e m y was suspected of giving official protection to d r u g traf fickers. T h e case against t h e MIR was n o t just Guillermo C a p o b i a n c o ' s links, apparently t h r o u g h C a r m e l o Meco D o m í n g u e z . A so-called " n a r c o - p h o t o " showed J a i m e Paz Z a m o r a with a pilot, Isaac Echeverría, who regularly f e a t u r e d on lists of t o p suspected traffickers. 93. J a m e s P a i n t e r , "Drugs May F u n d Bolivia C a m p a i g n , " Independent, 6 J u n e 1989. T h e La P a z - b a s e d weekly Siglo X X / r e p o r t e d t h a t 10 p e r c e n t of c a n d i d a t e s in t h e 1989 e l e c t i o n s h a d links with t r a f f i c k e r s . Most s u s p i c i o n , b u t n o p r o o f , s u r r o u n d e d Max F e r n á n d e z , t h e m u l t i m i l l i o n a i r e h e a d of t h e UCS (Unidad Cívica Solidaridad) party. 94. S o m e o b s e r v e r s even suggest t h a t t h e c o c a i n e t r a d e h a s i n d i r e c t l y b o l s t e r e d d e m o c r a c y by i n c r e a s i n g i n c o m e a n d s t a n d a r d s of living d u r i n g h a r d t i m e s a n d p r o v i d i n g an a l t e r n a t i v e "milk cow" f o r t h e military. See Mario d e F r a n c o a n d R i c a r d o Godoy, " T h e E c o n o m i c C o n s e q u e n c e s , " 1.

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Notes for Chapter 5 Ì . J o s é A n t o n i o Q u i r o g a , Coca/cocaina, 52 ff. 2. T h e aim of 50,000 h e c t a r e s e x c e e d s t h e e s t i m a t e f o r t h e total h e c t a r e s f o u n d in T a b l e 1.1, b u t official f i g u r e s of t h e t i m e w e r e u s i n g h i g h e r estimates. 3. Maria L a u r a Avignolo, "Bolivia: C o c a Law F e e d s Anti-U.S. Sentim e n t s , " Latin America Press, 15 S e p t e m b e r 1988; a n d S u s a n n a h R a n e e , "Bolivia: New Coca C o n t r o l Law Aggravates T e n s e Situation," Latin America Press, 28 July 1988. 4. U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of State, B u r e a u of I n t e r n a t i o n a l N a r c o t i c s Matters, INCSR (1989), 7. 5. A l t h o u g h it was n o t spelled o u t in t h e law, t h e total a m o u n t to be red u c e d over a ten-year p e r i o d was 35,000 h e c t a r e s . New coca p l a n t i n g s were also b a n n e d in t h e C h a p a r e . F a r m e r s growing coca in t h e r e c e n t e x p a n s i o n a r e a of t h e Yapacani in t h e S a n t a Cruz d e p a r t m e n t were given o n e year of g r a c e to r e d u c e t h e i r plantings, d u r i n g which t i m e they w o u l d be c o m p e n sated a n d eligible for credit. 6. C O N A L I D is c h a i r e d by the f o r e i g n minister, a n d i n c l u d e s the ministers f o r d e f e n s e , the i n t e r i o r , a g r i c u l t u r e , a n d p l a n n i n g . 7. A n y o n e d o u b t i n g this s h o u l d r e a d p a r t 1 o f j . de Grazia, DEA: The War Against Drugs ( L o n d o n : BBC Books, 1991), which t h o u g h r e m a r k a b l y f r e e of criticism of t h e DEA, s h o u l d nevertheless be c o n s u l t e d b e c a u s e of the a u t h o r ' s privileged access to DEA o p e r a t i o n s . T h e U.S. State D e p a r t m e n t tacitly a c c e p t e d U M O P A R ' s ( n o r m a l ) subservience w h e n it c o m m e n t e d in 1991 o n t h e "positive d e v e l o p m e n t [of] the d e m o n s t r a t e d willingness of U M O P A R to initiate raids a n d o p e r a t i o n s ; previously they would have left t h e initiative to USG advisors" (U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of State, B u r e a u of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Narcotics Matters, INCSR, March 1991, p. 80). 8. See U.S. C o n g r e s s , H o u s e C o m m i t t e e on G o v e r n m e n t O p e r a t i o n s , United States Anti-narcotics Activities, 77, f o r an i n d i c a t i o n of t h e level of hat r e d towards t h e DEA at times e x p r e s s e d by t h e navy. 9. U.S. officials a c c u s e d A l d e r e t e of b e i n g c o r r u p t , b u t A l d e r e t e was k n o w n f o r his s t r o n g anti-U.S. s e n t i m e n t s . H e cited cases w h e r e t h e DEA a n d U M O P A R w e r e b o t h l o o k i n g f o r t h e s a m e k n o w n coca p a s t e b u y e r in t h e C h a p a r e b u t were p u r s u i n g two d i f f e r e n t p e o p l e b e c a u s e of t h e i r f a i l u r e to share intelligence. 10. J . P a i n t e r , "Bolivian Military L e a d e r Q u e s t i o n s DEA's Role in D r u g Bust G o n e Awry," Christian Science Monitor, 12 July 1991. T h e DEA was in fact n e v e r e x p e l l e d . DEA officials have b e e n accused several times of c o m m i t t i n g a b u s e s against Bolivians, b u t n o official has ever b e e n f o u n d guilty a n d expelled from the country. 11. U.S. Congress, H o u s e C o m m i t t e e on G o v e r n m e n t O p e r a t i o n s , United Stales Anti-narcotic Activities, 24-25. For evidence of the conflict between the DEA a n d U.S. army in Bolivia, see "The Newest War," Newsxueek, 13 J a n u a r y 1992. 12. U.S. Congress, H o u s e C o m m i t t e e on G o v e r n m e n t O p e r a t i o n s , United Slates Anli-narcotics Activities, 21. 13. U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of State, B u r e a u of I n t e r n a t i o n a l N a r c o t i c s Matters, INCSR (March 1991), Statistical Tables. 14. U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of State, B u r e a u of I n t e r n a t i o n a l N a r c o t i c s Matters, INCSR (March 1991), Statistical Tables.

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15. J a m e s P a i n t e r , " B o l i v i a n M i l i t a r y L e a d e r , " Christian Science Monitor, 12 J u l y 1 9 9 1 . F o r a f u l l d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e S a n t a A n a o p e r a t i o n a n d t h e c o n t r o v e r s y s u r r o u n d i n g it, s e e W O L A , Issue Brief no. 4 ( W a s h i n g t o n : W O L A , S e p t e m b e r 1991), 14-17. 16. T h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t of t h e s e c l a s h e s in r e c e n t y e a r s h a v e b e e n O c t o b e r 1 9 8 6 - U M O P A R a t t a c k e d by t h e p o p u l a t i o n o f S a n t a A n a ; O c t o b e r 1 9 8 8 — U M O P A R w i t h d r a w n f r o m G u a y a m e r i n in t h e B e n i a f t e r c l a s h e s w i t h t h e p o p u l a t i o n ; J u n e 1 9 8 9 — s i x k i l l e d in e x c h a n g e of f i r e b e t w e e n U M O P A R a n d l o c a l navy d e t a c h m e n t d u r i n g o p e r a t i o n t o d e t a i n t r a f f i c k e r s in S a n t a A n a ; S e p t e m b e r 1 9 9 0 — D E A a g e n t w o u n d e d in c l a s h w i t h t r a f f i c k e r s . 17. J a m e s P a i n t e r , "In Bid t o C u r t a i l V i o l e n c e Bolivia M o v e s t o S u s p e n d E x t r a d i t i o n o f D r u g L o r d s , " Christian Science Monitor, 22 J u l y 1991. T h e gove r n m e n t s a i d it was a f r a i d of t h e f o r m a t i o n of p a r a m i l i t a r y g r o u p s t o p r o t e c t traffickers. 18. T h e U . S . S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t list e x c l u d e d " I c o " R i v e r o , b u t i n c l u d e d C a r m e l o R o d r í g u e z R o m a . S e e U . S . D e p a r t m e n t of S t a t e , B u r e a u of I n t e r n a t i o n a l N a r c o t i c s M a t t e r s , INCSR, M a r c h 1992, 93. 19. J a m e s P a i n t e r , " C o l o m b i a n s E l b o w in o n B o l i v i a n D r u g T r a d e , " Christian Science Monitor, 10 D e c e m b e r 1 9 9 1 . T h e h e a d of D e f e n s a S o c i a l , E l i a s G u t i é r r e z , was f i r e d in l a t e 1 9 9 1 , in p a r t f o r s u g g e s t i n g t h a t t h e t r a f f i c k e r s c o u l d still b e m a n a g i n g o p e r a t i o n s f r o m t h e i r cells. 20. P. M a c F a r r e n , " B o l i v i a ' s W a r o n D r u g s B e c o m e s A i r b o r n e , " Associa t e d P r e s s , C h a p a r e , 27 May 1992; a n d U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of S t a t e , B u r e a u of I n t e r n a t i o n a l N a r c o t i c s M a t t e r s , INCSR ( M a r c h 1 9 9 2 ) , 91. 21. T h e d e c i s i o n p r o m p t e d s t r o n g o p p o s i t i o n f r o m s o m e s e c t o r s o n t h e g r o u n d s that the S u p r e m e Court should have authorized the expulsion. But others, i n c l u d i n g s o m e left-wing d e p u t i e s , privately a d m i t t e d t h a t they were g l a d to s e e A r c e G ó m e z leave t h e c o u n t r y , d e s p i t e t h e illegal m e t h o d of h i s departure. 22. U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of S t a t e , B u r e a u of I n t e r n a t i o n a l N a r c o t i c s M a t t e r s , INCSR ( M a r c h 1 9 9 2 ) , 9 5 , s t a t e s t h a t t h e U . S . g o v e r n m e n t " c o n t i n u e s t o b e lieve t h a t t h e 1 9 9 0 t r e a t y s h o u l d b e c o n c l u d e d . " 23. C O N A L I D , D i r e c c i ó n E j e c u t i v a N a c i o n a l , Programa nacional de inversión de desarrollo alternativo (La Paz: C O N A L I D , 1 9 9 1 ) , 13. 24. U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of S t a t e , B u r e a u o f l n t e r n a t i o n a l N a r c o t i c s M a t t e r s , INCSR, E x e c u t i v e S u m m a r y ( M a r c h 1 9 8 9 ) , 7. 25. J a m e s P a i n t e r , "Bolivian C o c a G r o w e r s V o l u n t a r i l y E r a d i c a t e T h e i r C r o p s as P r i c e D r o p s , " Christian Science Monitor, 21 F e b r u a r y 1990. 26. J a m e s P a i n t e r , "Bolivian C o c a G r o w e r s V o l u n t a r i l y E r a d i c a t e T h e i r C r o p s as P r i c e D r o p s , " Christian Science Monitor, 21 F e b r u a r y 1 9 9 0 . S o m e U . S . g o v e r n m e n t o f f i c i a l s e v e n s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e i n v a s i o n o f P a n a m a in D e c e m b e r 1989, a n d t h e s u b s e q u e n t seizure of G e n . M a n u e l N o r i e g a , also h a d s o m e effect on coca prices, a l t h o u g h this s e e m e d fanciful. 27. U . S . C o n g r e s s , H o u s e C o m m i t t e e o n G o v e r n m e n t O p e r a t i o n s , United States Anti-narcotics Activities, 20. 28. U . S . D e p a r t m e n t of S t a t e , B u r e a u o f l n t e r n a t i o n a l N a r c o t i c s M a t t e r s , INCSR ( M a r c h 1 9 9 2 ) , 9 3 . 29. "U.S. H o l d s B a c k P a r t o f A i d P a c k a g e , " Latin American Weekly Report, W R - 9 2 - 2 6 , 19 J u l y 1 9 9 2 . 3 0 . M u c h t e n s i o n f o l l o w e d a n a n n o u n c e m e n t in J u n e 1 9 8 9 t h a t t h e gove r n m e n t was g o i n g t o s t a r t f o r c e d e r a d i c a t i o n a r o u n d Y a p a c a n i , a n a r e a w e s t

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o f the m a i n C h a p a r e r e g i o n in t h e S a n t a Cruz, d e p a r t m e n t that had b e e n d e e m e d illegal for c o c a growing by law 100. In any event, farmers were given m o r e time to eradicate b e y o n d a j u l y deadline. S e e J a m e s Painter, "Bolivia to Crack Down on C o c a , " Christian Science Monitor, 21 July 1989. 31. U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of State, B u r e a u o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l Narcotics Matters, INCSR ( M a r c h 1 9 9 1 ) , 83. S e e also, U . S . O f f i c e o f I n s p e c t o r G e n e r a l , Drug Control Activities in Bolivia, Audit Report 2-CI-001 ( W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: U.S. Office o f I n s p e c t o r G e n e r a l , O c t o b e r 1 9 9 1 ) , 58. 32. See, for e x a m p l e , G u i d o T a r q u i , a C S U T C B leader, q u o t e d in Ultima Hora, 13 S e p t e m b e r 1991. 33. U.S. D e p a r t m e n t o f State, B u r e a u o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l Narcotics Matters, INCSR ( M a r c h 1 9 9 1 ) , 8 7 . T h e State D e p a r t m e n t r e c a l c u l a t e d t h e average yields f o r c o c a b u s h e s f r o m 1.6 m e t r i c t o n n e s p e r h e c t a r e to 2.7 m e t r i c tonnes per h e c t a r e (for bushes over two years o l d ) . 34. Institute o f the Americas, Seizing Opportunities: Report of the Inter-American Commission on Drug Policy (San Diego, California: C e n t e r for Iberian and Latin American Studies, University o f California, J u n e 1 9 9 1 ) , 5. 35. Institute o f the Americas, Seizing Opportunities, 3 2 - 3 3 . 36. J . G. J u s t i n i a n o , "La e c o n o m í a de la coca en bolivia," in S E A M O S , La economía de la coca en bolivia ( L a Paz: E D O B O L [ E d i t o r i a l Offset Boliviana Ltda], 1 9 9 2 ) , 14. 37. S e e J o s é A n t o n i o Q u i r o g a , q u o t e d in " D e s a r r o l l o Alternativo e Interdicción: Palos y Z a n a h o r i a s , " Informe R (La Paz), 1991, issue 2 1 9 , 9. 38. Interview with U N D C P official, La Paz, S e p t e m b e r 1991. 39. Author interview with s e n i o r DEA official, La Paz, S e p t e m b e r 1991. 4 0 . T h e results o f the o p e r a t i o n were that 2 0 , 0 0 0 p e o p l e temporarily fled the area, and the c o c a p r i c e t e m p o r a r i l y d r o p p e d , but n o traffickers were arrested. C o c a paste p r o d u c i n g o p e r a t i o n s were temporarily moved to the upper C o c h a b a m b a Valley. 41. No active laboratories were f o u n d , few arrests were made, and little c o c a i n e was seized. C o c a prices did d r o p below the level o f production costs but soon b o u n c e d b a c k after t h e d e p a r t u r e o f the troops in N o v e m b e r , alt h o u g h prices never r e a c h e d t h e i r p r e - o p e r a t i o n levels. T h e use o f U . S . troops provoked widespread protests against the Paz Estenssoro g o v e r n m e n t . O n e o f the m o r e p e r t i n e n t o b s e r v a t i o n s f r o m J o s é A n t o n i o Q u i r o g a (Coca/cocaína, 6 4 ) was that t h e U . S . C o n g r e s s only a p p r o v e d the use o f troops in antidrug o p e r a t i o n s in the U n i t e d States in 1988. 42. F o r a g o o d discussion o f t h e d o m e s t i c c o n s e q u e n c e s o f P r e s i d e n t Bush's war on drugs, see M. J . B l a c h m a n and K. E. S h a r p e , " T h e War on Drugs: A m e r i c a n D e m o c r a c y U n d e r Assault," World Policy Journal 7, n o . 1 (Winter 1 9 8 9 - 1 9 9 0 ) , 1 3 5 - 1 6 3 . T h e two authors argue that the strategy erodes basic liberties, c o n t r i b u t e s to official abuses o f power, a n d u n d e r m i n e s t h e U.S. tradition o f k e e p i n g the military out o f civilian and police affairs. 43. For a full analysis o f the A n d e a n Strategy, see W O L A , Clear and Present Dangers: The U.S. Military and the War on Drugs in the Andes ( W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: W O L A , 1 9 9 1 ) . 4 4 . U.S. O f f i c e o f I n s p e c t o r G e n e r a l , Drug Control Activities in Bolivia, Audit Report 2-CI-001 ( W a s h i n g t o n , D . C . : U . S . O f f i c e o f I n s p e c t o r G e n e r a l , O c t o b e r 1 9 9 1 ) , 4. 45. T h e Bolivian air f o r c e flies a fleet o f U.S.-owned V i e t n a m - e r a U H - 1 H Huey h e l i c o p t e r s ( 1 6 in 1 9 9 1 ) , a n d t h e navy o p e r a t e s U.S.-supplied p a t r o l boats (8 in 1 9 9 1 ) , all in support o f U M O P A R o p e r a t i o n s .

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4 6 . T h e r e w a s s o m e d i s a g r e e m e n t o v e r t h e final figure. T h e U . S . E m bassy in L a P a z g a v e t h e figure of U . S . $ 4 4 . 5 m i l l i o n , w h i c h i n c l u d e d s p e c i a l d i s p e n s a t o r y f u n d s a n d a i d n o t u s e d by t h e P e r u v i a n g o v e r n m e n t . T h i s r e p r e s e n t e d a massive n i n e f o l d i n c r e a s e o n 1989, a n d a s p e c t a c u l a r j u m p f r o m t h e a m o u n t s of m i l i t a r y a i d t h r o u g h o u t t h e 1980s: U . S . $ 0 . 4 m i l l i o n in 1988, $ 1 . 2 m i l l i o n in 1 9 8 7 , $ 1 . 5 m i l l i o n in 1986, $ 3 . 4 m i l l i o n in 1985, a n d $0.1 million in 1 9 8 4 . 47. S e n i o r a r m y o f f i c e r s said t h a t U . S . o f f i c i a l s h a d " f o r c e d " t h e m t o acc e p t a r o l e by t h r e a t e n i n g t o give t h e m o n e y e a r m a r k e d f o r t h e a r m y u n d e r A n n e x III t o U M O P A R . H o w e v e r , t h e a r m y w a s n e v e r u n h a p p y at t h e t h o u g h t o f r e c e i v i n g a m a j o r i n f l o w of n e w m i l i t a r y e q u i p m e n t a n d t r a i n i n g . 48. F o r G e l b a r d ' s c o n t r o v e r s i a l r o l e i n B o l i v i a , s e e P a u l K n o x , "Bolivia U n e a s y w i t h A l l i a n c e , " Toronto Globe and Mail, 10 A p r i l 1991; J a m e s P a i n t e r , " B o l i v i a n M i l i t a r y L e a d e r Q u e s t i o n s D E A ' s R o l e in D r u g B u s t G o n e Awry," Christian Science Monitor, 12 J u l y 1991; " A l g u n a s P e r l i t a s d e M r . G e l b a r d , " lnforme R, L a P a z , n o . 2 2 2 , 12. T h e r e w e r e s e v e r a l t h e o r i e s as t o w h y G e l b a r d was so k e e n l y in f a v o r of law e n f o r c e m e n t s o l u t i o n s . O n e of t h e m o r e c h a r i t a b l e was t h a t h e t h o u g h t "they g a v e m o r e b a n g f o r t h e b u c k " ( q u o t e d in J . d e G r a z i a , DEA: The War Against Drugs, 8 3 ) . T h e O c t o b e r 1991 A u d i t R e p o r t of t h e U . S . O f f i c e o f I n s p e c t o r G e n e r a l (Drug Control Activities in Bolivia, Audit Report 2-CI-0U1, 4) q u e s t i o n e d in its findings w h e t h e r " t h e E m b a s s y c o u l d h a v e a d o p t e d a l o w e r p r o f i l e style in a c h i e v i n g U . S . c o u n t e r n a r c o t i c s objectives." 49. A u t h o r i n t e r v i e w w i t h s e n i o r c a b i n e t m i n i s t e r , La P a z , N o v e m b e r 1991. T h e U . S . $ 1 9 6 m i l l i o n of U.S. e c o n o m i c a i d e a r m a r k e d f o r Bolivia f o r FY 1992 r e p r e s e n t e d a r o u n d 20 p e r c e n t o f p l a n n e d c e n t r a l g o v e r n m e n t s p e n d i n g . T h e W o r l d B a n k a n d t h e I D B e a c h b u d g e t e d o v e r U . S . $ 1 0 0 mill i o n in l o a n s t o Bolivia every y e a r . 50. S e e , f o r e x a m p l e , G o n / . a l o T o r r i c o , s u b s e c r e t a r y f o r t h e d r u g s fight, q u o t e d in bv P a u l K n o x , "Bolivian A r m y J o i n s A n t i d r u g B a t t l e , " Toronto Globe and Mail, 8 A p r i l 1991. 51. Presencia a n d Ultima Horn, 7 M a r c h 1 9 9 0 . 52. U . S . O f f i c e o f I n s p e c t o r G e n e r a l , Drug Control Activities in Bolivia, Audit Report 2-CI-001, 39. 53. U . S . O f f i c e o f I n s p e c t o r G e n e r a l , Drug Control Activities in Bolivia, Audit Report 2-CI-001, 39. 54. Q u o t e d in C. H a r g r e a v e s , Snowjields, 122. A n o t h e r U . S . o f f i c i a l t o l d t h e U.S. C o n g r e s s , H o u s e C o m m i t t e e o n G o v e r n m e n t O p e r a t i o n s (United Stales Anli-narcolics Activities, 45) t h a t t h e Bolivian a r m y was a m a j o r hind r a n c e t o n a r c o t i c s c o n t r o l a c t i v i t i e s , a n d U . S . e f f o r t s w o u l d b e m o r e succ e s s f u l if t h e m i l i t a r y w e r e e n t i r e l y e x c l u d e d . 55. D o n F e r r a r o n e , t h e n h e a d o f t h e D E A , was s a i d t o h a v e b e e n t h e last t o h o l d o u t a g a i n s t t h e p o l i c y a n d A m b a s s a d o r G e l b a r d . O t h e r U . S . s t a f f , inc l u d i n g U S A I D officials a n d embassy staff, also privately a d m i t t e d their fears a b o u t t h e p o l i c y o n a n u m b e r of o c c a s i o n s . S o m e p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e U . S . p e o p l e w o u l d p r o b a b l y n o t a c c e p t a r o l e f o r t h e B o l i v i a n a r m y o n U . S . soil. T h e D E A p r o b a b l y h a d t h e m o s t t o l o s e , b e c a u s e it w o u l d p r o b a b l y h a v e h a d t o s u r r e n d e r s o m e of its c o n t r o l t o a n o r g a n i z a t i o n o v e r w h i c h it h a d little i n f l u e n c e , w h e r e a s in its view it h a d w o r k e d w e l l w i t h U M O P A R . 56. See, f o r e x a m p l e , U.S. C o n g r e s s , H o u s e C o m m i t t e e o n G o v e r n m e n t O p e r a t i o n s , United Stales Anli-narcolics Activities, passim; b r i e f i n g s b y t h e W a s h i n g t o n O f f i c e o n L a t i n A m e r i c a ( W O L A ) ; I n s t i t u t e o f A m e r i c a s , Seizing

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Opportunities, J u n e 1991; a n d , t h e U . S . I n s p e c t o r G e n e r a l ' s O c t o b e r 1991 A u d i t R e p o r t ( U . S . O f f i c e o f I n s p e c t o r G e n e r a l , Drug Control Activities in Bolivia, Audit Report 2-CI-001). A m o n g t h e U . S . a c a d e m i c s c r i t i c i z i n g t h e p o l i c y w e r e Melvyn B u r k e f r o m t h e University of M a i n e , E d u a r d o G a m a r r a f r o m t h e U n i v e r s i t y of F l o r i d a in M i a m i , a n d D o n a l d M a n d y f r o m t h e U n i v e r s i t y of Mississippi. A l a n C r a n s t o n was t h e m o s t o u t s p o k e n s e n a t o r in t h e U . S . in o p position to the policy. H e a r g u e d that t h e e m p h a s i s s h o u l d b e o n e c o n o m i c aid for alternative d e v e l o p m e n t , a d d i n g that f o r c i n g the A n d e a n c o u n t r i e s to u s e t h e i r m i l i t a r y f o r c e s a g a i n s t d r u g p r o d u c e r s e v e n e x c e e d e d w h a t t h e U.S. g o v e r n m e n t d i d in its o w n c o u n t r y . 57. C r i t i c s a l s o p o i n t e d o u t t h a t i n c r e a s e d m i l i t a r y a i d t o Bolivia in t h e e a r l y 1960s c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e e n d of civilian r u l e in 1964. T h e c o u n t r y d i d n o t f u l l y e m e r g e f r o m m i l i t a r y d i c t a t o r s h i p s u n t i l 1982. 5 8 . S e e W O L A , Issue Brief no. 4 ( W a s h i n g t o n , D . C . : W O L A , S e p t e m b e r 1 9 9 1 ) ; a n d t h e I n s t i t u t e f o r t h e A m e r i c a s , Seizing Opportunities, 5. G u i l l e r m o Richter, an MNR deputy f r o m the Beni, c o m p l a i n e d that the U n i t e d States " c a n n o t solve t h e p r o b l e m of c o c a i n e t a k i n g in t h e U.S. by t h r e a t e n i n g Bolivia's social p e a c e . " 59. F o r g e n e r a l i z e d c o r r u p t i o n , s e e p p . 7 0 - 7 4 a b o v e . In A u g u s t 1991, a Bolivian air f o r c e l i g h t a i r p l a n e was f o r c e d to m a k e a n e m e r g e n c y l a n d i n g in n e i g h b o r i n g P a r a g u a y a n d f o u n d t o h a v e b e e n c a r r y i n g s i x t e e n k i l o s of coc a i n e o n b o a r d . T h e p l a n e h a d previously b e e n c o n f i s c a t e d f r o m d r u g traff i c k e r s a n d h a n d e d o v e r to t h e air f o r c e t o h e l p a n t i d r u g activities. In 1989, an a r m y g e n e r a l a n d t h r e e o t h e r o f f i c e r s w e r e f i r e d a f t e r a c c u s a t i o n s they w e r e p r o t e c t i n g d r u g t r a f f i c k e r s in t h e C h a p a r e — e v e n t h o u g h t h e y h a d n o f o r m a l r o l e in a n t i n a r c o t i c s activities. 60. Presencia, 2 6 M a r c h 1991. 61. Presencia, 2 4 M a r c h 1991. 62. Ultima Horn, 21 M a r c h 1990. 63. U . S . C o n g r e s s , H o u s e C o m m i t t e e o n G o v e r n m e n t O p e r a t i o n s , U n i t e d S t a t e s A n t i - n a r c o t i c s Activities, 42. 6 4 . N o t all t h e a r g u m e n t s a r e i n c l u d e d h e r e . F o r e x a m p l e , s o m e p r e d i c t e d that t h e policy w o u l d c a u s e a w e a k e n i n g of p o p u l a r s u p p o r t f o r ant i d r u g o p e r a t i o n s a n d f o r c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h t h e U . S . in g e n e r a l . O t h e r s p o i n t e d o u t t h a t very few d r u g t r a f f i c k e r s in Bolivia h a d e v e r b e e n c a p t u r e d as a r e s u l t of a n t i d r u g o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t l a b o r a t o r i e s , w h i c h was t h e i n t e n d e d m o d u s o p e r a n d i o f t h e a r m y . I n s t e a d , m o s t w e r e s e i z e d away f r o m t h e i r h o m e s o r l a b o r a t o r i e s as a r e s u l t of i n t e l l i g e n c e w o r k . 65. Christian Science Monitor, 2 9 N o v e m b e r 1 9 9 0 . 6 6 . It was w i d e l y s u s p e c t e d t h a t t h e a r m y was p u t t i n g p r e s s u r e o n t h e g o v e r n m e n t t o a c c e p t t h e U . S . a i d a n d its n e w r o l e . S e e La Razon, 3 0 M a r c h 1991. 6 7 . It was w i d e l y q u e s t i o n e d w h y t h e U . S . w a s t r a i n i n g r e c r u i t s w h o w o u l d o n l y stay in t h e a r m y f o r a y e a r . T h e first r e c r u i t s to b e t r a i n e d a t t h e M o n t e r o b a s e w e r e d u e t o f i n i s h in D e c e m b e r 1 9 9 1 . O f f i c i a l s s a i d t h a t t h e t r a i n i n g of officers w o u l d give t h e p r o g r a m s o m e c o n t i n u i t y , while t h e recruits w o u l d be e n c o u r a g e d to j o i n U M O P A R o n c e they h a d c o m p l e t e d their t r a i n i n g a n d one-year military service. 68. F o r a f u l l e r a c c o u n t o f t h e t r a i n i n g , s e e Christian Science Monitor, 2 5 J u n e 1991. 6 9 . Ultima Hora, 9 S e p t e m b e r 1991.

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70. It is w o r t h p o i n t i n g o u t that several coca growers, i n c l u d i n g leaders, a d m i t t e d privately t h a t t h e a r m y m i g h t n o t m a k e t h a t m u c h d i f f e r e n c e because they were already t h e victims of c o n s t a n t h a r a s s m e n t f r o m U M O P A R . 71. See Evo Morales, q u o t e d in Newsweek, 20 May 1991. 72. Christian Science Monitor, 17 May 1991. T h e C S U T C B h a d originally called a n a t i o n a l b l o c k a d e f o r 17 May, b u t this was c a l l e d off at t h e last m i n u t e f o r f u r t h e r n e g o t i a t i o n s with t h e g o v e r n m e n t . 73. O n e coca g r o w e r d i e d as a result of an a c c i d e n t d u r i n g t h e army a n d police b r e a k u p of t h e m a r c h , b u t t h e coca u n i o n s a d m i t t e d t h a t security forces h a d n o t in g e n e r a l used excessive f o r c e . 74. Ultima Hora, 23 O c t o b e r 1991. 75. La Razón, 9 a n d 10 O c t o b e r 1991; Presencia (La Paz), 11 O c t o b e r 1991; a n d Hoy, 9 O c t o b e r 1991. 76. La Razón, 17 N o v e m b e r 1991. 77. La Razón, 17 N o v e m b e r 1991. 78. T h e official U.S. verdict s p o k e of t h e effective c o o r d i n a t i o n of t h e army a n d U M O P A R , a n d t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s resolve to press a h e a d with "this d o m e s t i c a l l y c o n t r o v e r s i a l issue'' (U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of State, B u r e a u of Int e r n a t i o n a l Narcotics Matters, INCSR, 1992, 93). 79. P e r s o n a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n , J u n e 1992. 80. Q u o t e d in WOLA, Andean Initiative—Legislative Updates ( W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: W O L A , J u l y 1992), 4. 81. Q u o t e d in La Razón, 20 July 1992. 82. Later, it e m e r g e d that even if t h e army were to participate in s o m e antidrug capacity in the f u t u r e , it would be the p r e s i d e n t who d e c i d e d it—a principle e n d o r s e d by P r e s i d e n t Bush in a letter to P r e s i d e n t Paz Z a m o r a in September. T h e reiteration of such a chain of c o m m a n d was apparently p r o m p t e d by a h u g e row over the p r e s e n c e of 120 U.S. troops in the Beni d e p a r t m e n t in 1992, w i t h o u t t h e a u t h o r i z a t i o n of C o n g r e s s . A U.S. official said t h e t r o o p s were t h e r e to carry o u t civic action p r o g r a m s , b u t at least o n e r e p o r t suggested that they were c o n s t r u c t i n g a DEA base. See Informe R, n o . 242, May 1992. 83. WOLA, Clear and Present Dangers, 3.

Notes for Chapter 6 1. I n s t i t u t e of t h e A m e r i c a s , Seizing Opportunities; 1. T h e f o r m e r Bolivian a g r i c u l t u r e m i n i s t e r , G u i l l e r m o J u s t i n i a n o , was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r m u c h of t h e i n p u t o n Bolivia. 2. See f o r e x a m p l e , USAID/Bolivia, Alternative Development Strategy (La Paz: USAID, 1991), 3. "Only u n d e r such c o n d i t i o n s [of effective c o u n t e r n a r cotics law to k e e p coca prices d e p r e s s e d ] will t h e e c o n o m i c activities u n d e r t h e a l t e r n a t i v e d e v e l o p m e n t p r o g r a m s u c c e e d . . . ." 3. Author interview with senior USAID official, Cochabamba, October 1991. 4. A u t h o r interview, La Paz, S e p t e m b e r 1991. 5. See t h e criticisms e x p r e s s e d by C. B a l d e r r a m a , assessor of t h e F E T C T C a n d a r e s e a r c h e r at CIDRE, in Opinion, 23 J u l y 1991. 6. C. B a l d e r r a m a in La Razón-Facetas, 8 D e c e m b e r 1991, passim. 7. T h e r e were s o m e g r o u n d s f o r c o n c e r n . At t h e i n a u g u r a t i o n of a new r o a d b e t w e e n Villa T u n a r i a n d P u e r t o San F r a n c i s c o in 1986, o n e local

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i n h a b i t a n t told USAID officials t h a t it h a d b e e n so well-constructed that o n t h e p r e v i o u s e v e n i n g a small a i r p l a n e h a d l a n d e d o n it. See R. N. R a s n a k e a n d M. P a i n t e r , Rural Development and Crop Substitution in Bolivia: USAID and the Chapare Regional Development Project ( B i n g h a m t o n , New York: Institute f o r D e v e l o p m e n t A n t h r o p o l o g y , O c t o b e r 1989), 15. O n e of t h e most expensive highways to be built in Bolivia, f r o m Yapacani to Villa T u n a r i , right t h r o u g h t h e m i d d l e of t h e C h a p a r e , was u n d o u b t e d l y u s e d by light p l a n e s as a landing strip d u r i n g its c o n s t r u c t i o n p h a s e . T h e i n c r e a s e in traffic o n c e the highway was c o m p l e t e d in late 1988 (as t h e r o a d n o w b e c a m e t h e m a i n r o u t e linking C o c h a b a m b a a n d S a n t a Cruz) m a d e such l a n d i n g s h a z a r d o u s , even at n i g h t . T h e r o a d cost an e s t i m a t e d U.S. $90 m i l l i o n , f u n d e d in p a r t by t h e I n t e r - A m e r i c a n D e v e l o p m e n t Bank a n d t h e W o r l d Bank. See James Painter, "Breaking t h e c o c a i n e - g r o w i n g cycle proves t o o costlv for Bolivia." Independent, 21 D e c e m b e r 1988. S . J a m e s D u n k e r l e y , Political Transition, 46. 9. USAID/Bolivia, Alternative Development Strategy, 1991, 1-4. 10. For a f u l l e r d e s c r i p t i o n , see S a m u e l D o r i a M e d i n a , in "Coca p o r desarrollo." 11. J a m e s P a i n t e r , "Bolivia Seeks U.S. Aid to S t r e n g t h e n its E c o n o m y , " Christian Science Monitor, 15 F e b r u a r y 1990. 12. See, f o r e x a m p l e , C. B a l d e r r a m a , in La Razón-Facetas, 8 D e c e m b e r 1991. O b s e r v e r s also p o i n t o u t t h a t U M O P A R is effectively paid f o r bv t h e U.S. taxpayer. 13. A u t h o r interview, I,a Paz, S e p t e m b e r 1991. S. Wingert et al., "Review of USAID/Bolivia D e v e l o p m e n t Assistance S u p p o r t f o r Coca Eradication," Mimeo (Washington, D.C., 1988), 21, c o n f i r m s the 6 0 - 4 0 p e r c e n t a g e breakdown. 14. A u t h o r interview, C o c h a b a m b a , O c t o b e r 1991. 15. IBTA's b u d g e t in 1988, f o r e x a m p l e , was U.S. $1.5 million, a l t h o u g h only $415,000 was actually r e l e a s e d . S. W i n g e r t et al., "Review of U S A I D / B o livian D e v e l o p m e n t Assistance S u p p o r t , " 4. 16. Q u o t e d in La Razón, 6 D e c e m b e r 1991. M o s c o s o was a p p a r e n t l y inc l u d i n g i n v e s t m e n t s by U N D C P , which leaves little r o o m for USAID m o n e y . 17. PDAR, Informe técnico ( C o c h a b a m b a , Bolivia, May 1991), 237. 18. SUBDESAL actually b u d g e t e d U.S. $34.5 million for t h e C h a p a r e in 1990, which b r o k e d o w n i n t o t h e above q u o t e d f i g u r e s , plus $5.6 million f r o m UNFDAC, $9.7 million f o r DIRECO, a n d $12.5 million for PL-480. This c o m p a r e s with its b u d g e t of U.S. $12.2 million f o r t h e AHV p r o j e c t . A u t h o r interview with SUBDESAL official, La Paz, D e c e m b e r 1991. 19. An i n d e p e n d e n t r e s e a r c h c e n t e r in C o c h a b a m b a , CIDRE, h a s calculated t h a t f r o m 1 9 8 4 - 1 9 9 0 t h e Bolivian a n d U.S. g o v e r n m e n t s invested U.S. $131.3 million in all alternative d e v e l o p m e n t p r o j e c t s . T h e c e n t e r calculated that this r e a c h e d 1 p e r c e n t of t h e coca growers, o r an average U.S. $50 p e r f a r m e r annually. See La Razón, 6 D e c e m b e r 1991. 20. C O N A L I D , Programa nacional de inversión de desarrollo alternativo, 15. 21. A u t h o r interview with F i l e m ó n E s c o b a r , adviser to the c o c a f e d e r a tions, L o n d o n , April 1992. 22. A u t h o r interview with Giovanni Quaglia, U N D C P assessor, t h e Chap a r e , S e p t e m b e r 1991. 23. Q u o t e d in La Razón, 3 May 1991. 24. See R. N. R a s n a k e a n d M. P a i n t e r , Rural Development and Crop Substitution in Bolivia, 15-16.

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25. R. N. R a s n a k e a n d M. P a i n t e r , Rural Development and Crop Substitution in Bolivia, 21. 26. M. P a i n t e r , Institutional Analysis of the Chapare Regional Development Project (CRDP) ( B i n g h a m t o n , New York: I n s t i t u t e f o r D e v e l o p m e n t A n t h r o pology, 1990), 7. 27. U S A I D / B o l i v i a , "Executive S u m m a r y of I n t e r n a l E v a l u a t i o n , " Mimeo, La Paz, N o v e m b e r 1990, 2. 28. A u t h o r interview with s e n i o r USAID official, C o c h a b a m b a , S e p t e m ber 1991. 29. U S A I D / B o l i v i a , " P r o g r a m O b j e c t i v e s C h a p a r e , " Miineo, C o c h a b a m b a , S e p t e m b e r 1991, 3. 30. U.S. O f f i c e of I n s p e c t o r G e n e r a l , Drug Control Activities in Bolivia, Audit Report 2-CI-001, 63. 31. M. P a i n t e r , Institutional Analysis, 17. 32. U.S. O f f i c e of I n s p e c t o r G e n e r a l , Drug Control Activities in Bolivia, Audit Report 2-CI-001, 63; a n d A. Rivera, Diagnóstico socioeconómico, 63. 33. Figures f r o m interview with USAID official, C o c h a b a m b a , S e p t e m b e r 1991. 34. See l o r e x a m p l e , a MIR l e a d e r f r o m C o c h a b a m b a . B e r n a r d o Roc a b a d o , q u o t e d in La Razón, 25 O c t o b e r 1991. 35. Evo Morales, l e a d e r of t h e F E T C T C , q u o t e d in Opinión, 19 D e c e m b e r 1990. 36. A. Rivera, Diagnóstico socioeconómico, 64, has a list of the various IBTA prices f o r M a r c h 1992. 37. M. P a i n t e r , Institutional Analysis, 17. 38. U.S. O f f i c e of I n s p e c t o r G e n e r a l , Drug Control Activities in Bolivia. Audit Report 2-CI-001, 65. 39. A u t h o r interview with a USAID official, La Paz, S e p t e m b e r 1991. 40. T h e y i n c l u d e d r u b b e r , black p e p p e r , colorants (achiote), m a c a d a m i a nuts, h e a r t s of palm, maracuya, cacao, c o r n , coffee, a n n a t t o , b a n a n a s , p i n e a p ples, oranges, c o c o n u t , papaya, g u a n a b a n a , p a l m p e a c h , c a r d a m o m , p e a n u t s , t u r m e r i c , rice, b e a n s , cassava, g i n g e r , tea, vanilla, a n d various types of tropical fruit a n d flowers. S o m e observers say m o r e t h a n o n e h u n d r e d c r o p s have b e e n tried a n d all have failed. See K. Griffin, " T h e State, H u m a n Developm e n t , a n d t h e E c o n o m i c s of Cocaine: T h e Case of Bolivia," M i m e o (University of California—Riverside, 1991), 28. Cynics n o t e d that officials would c h a n g e f r o m o n e year to the n e x t what c r o p was seen as t h e favored alternative. 41. A u t h o r interview, La Paz, S e p t e m b e r 1991. O n e version given by USAID advisers of w h e r e t h e i d e a of b a n a n a s c a m e f r o m is t h a t a Bolivian b u s i n e s s m a n b a s e d in C o c h a b a m b a , w h o was i m p o r t i n g tires f r o m t h e p o r t of Arica in Chile, w a n t e d s o m e t h i n g to fill his e m p t y trucks o n t h e o u t w a r d j o u r n e y , a n d t h o u g h t of b a n a n a s f r o m t h e C h a p a r e . 42. T w o p r o c e s s i n g a n d c o o l i n g facilities a n d e i g h t e e n s m a l l e r collect i o n a n d w a s h i n g facilities w e r e b e i n g p l a n n e d f o r t h e C h a p a r e , a n d a p i n e a p p l e - p a c k i n g o p e r a t i o n was to be built n e a r M a r a p o s a s . 43. Evo M o r a l e s , e x e c u t i v e s e c r e t a r y of t h e F E T C T C , q u o t e d in La Razón, 5 O c t o b e r 1991. 44. C. B a l d e r r a m a , "Bolivia to crack d o w n o n coca," in Facetas, La Razón, 8 D e c e m b e r 1991. 45. See SUBDESAL, Informa, boletín d e prensa, no. 3 (La Paz: SUBDESAL, J u l y 1991), 5.

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46. M. P a i n t e r , Institutional Analysis, 5 - 6 . 47. T h e s h i f t in t h i n k i n g c o i n c i d e d w i t h a p e r i o d w h e n it was b e c o m i n g i n c r e a s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t t o w o r k in t h e C h a p a r e ; c o c a p r i c e s w e r e h i g h , a l t e r n a tive d e v e l o p m e n t p o l i c i e s h a d f a i l e d , a n d d r u g t r a f f i c k e r s still e n j o y e d a s t r o n g p r e s e n c e . T h e c h a n g e in p r i o r i t i e s t o t h e h i g h valleys was c e r t a i n l y providential. 4 8 . A u t h o r i n t e r v i e w with U S A I D o f f i c i a l , La Paz, S e p t e m b e r 1991. 49. M. P a i n t e r , Institutional Analysis, 6 - 7 . M . P a i n t e r a l s o a r g u e d o n p . 7 t h a t "USAID b e c a m e t h e first d o n o r to r e c o g n i z e explicitly t h e social a n d h i s t o r i c a l c o n t e x t in w h i c h t h a t p a r t i c i p a t i o n o c c u r s . " 50. C a r l o s P é r e z - C r e s p o , Tendencias migratorias, 9. 51. U S A I D / B o l i v i a , " E x e c u t i v e S u m m a r y of I n t e r n a l E v a l u a t i o n , " 1. 52. R. N . R a s n a k e a n d M. P a i n t e r , Rural Development and Crop Substitution in Bolivia, 23. 53. F o r f u l l list of a c h i e v e m e n t s , s e e U S A I D / B o l i v i a , Alternative Development Strategy, 4 - 5 . 54. T h e s a m e o f f i c i a l said t h a t it was o n l y a c o u p l e of h u n d r e d b e c a u s e n o t t h a t m a n y p e o p l e lived t h e r e in t h e f i r s t p l a c e , a d d i n g t h a t "it was n e v e r anticipated that the AHV would have a m a j o r impact on migration." 55. U S A I D / B o l i v i a , " E x e c u t i v e S u m m a r y of I n t e r n a l E v a l u a t i o n , " M i m e o , 4. 56. A. R i v e r a , Diagnóstico socioeconómico, 63. 57. A u t h o r i n t e r v i e w s w i t h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of N G O s , C o c h a b a m b a , S e p t e m b e r 1991. 58. P D A R , Informe técnico (May 1 9 9 1 ) , 34; U S A I D / B o l i v i a , Alternative Development Strategy, 3, c l a i m s 6 , 0 0 0 h e c t a r e s h a v e b e e n p l a n t e d in n e w c r o p s as a r e s u l t o f t h e l o a n s . 59. S. W i n g e r t e t al., "Review of U S A I D / B o l i v i a D e v e l o p m e n t A s s i s t a n c e S u p p o r t f o r C o c a E r a d i c a t i o n , " 12. 60. A u t h o r i n t e r v i e w w i t h P L - 4 8 0 o f f i c i a l in Y a p a c a n i , J u n e 1 9 8 9 . 6 1 . U . S . O f f i c e o f I n s p e c t o r G e n e r a l , Drug Control Activities in Bolivia, Audit Report 2-CI-OOU, 66. 6 2 . Presencia, 18 N o v e m b e r 1 9 9 1 . T h e c o c a f e d e r a t i o n s e s t i m a t e d t h a t 13,000 f a r m e r s w e r e eligible for credit, of w h o m 1,050 h a d received a l o a n . 63. J a m e s P a i n t e r , "Bolivia t o C r a c k D o w n o n C o c a , " Christian Science Monitor, 21 J u l y 1989. 64. La Razón, 5 N o v e m b e r 1991; a n d Presencia ( L a P a z ) , 18 N o v e m b e r 1991. 6 5 . S e e J a m e s P a i n t e r , Christian Science Monitor, 21 J u l y 1 9 8 9 . A s e n i o r U N D C P o f f i c i a l t h o u g h t 10 p e r c e n t was p r o b a b l y v i a b l e . 66. T h i s was p a r t i c u l a r l y t r u e o f t h e m o n t h s in l a t e 1 9 8 9 a n d 1 9 9 0 w h e n f a r m e r s w e r e k e e n t o e r a d i c a t e b e c a u s e t h e c o c a p r i c e w a s low. O n a t l e a s t o n e o c c a s i o n , f a r m e r s w h o w e r e s l e e p i n g o u t s i d e D I R E C O o f f i c e s in t h e C h a p a r e w e r e told to r e t u r n w e e k s later b e c a u s e D I R E C O was u n a b l e to c o p e with t h e d e m a n d . 67. A u t h o r i n t e r v i e w w i t h s e n i o r U S A I D o f f i c i a l , C o c h a b a m b a , S e p t e m b e r 1991. 68. M. P a i n t e r , Institutional Analysis, 33. 69. U S A I D / B o l i v i a , " E x e c u t i v e S u m m a r y o f I n t e r n a l E v a l u a t i o n , " 5. 70. M. P a i n t e r , Institutional Analysis, 33. 71. U S A I D / B o l i v i a , " E x e c u t i v e S u m m a r y o f I n t e r n a l E v a l u a t i o n , " 5.

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169

72. PDAR, informe técnica, 33, said t h e c h a n g e h a d already b e e n e f f e c t e d , but USAID officials said it was still u n d e r discussion. 73. C E D O I N , "A Roof of O n e ' s O w n , " Bolivia Bulletin (La Paz) 7 (June 1991 ):3. It is i n t e r e s t i n g to r e c o r d t h a t o n e s e n i o r USAID official a r g u e d a c r e d i t policy was n o t n e e d e d at all in t h e C h a p a r e , as t h e a r e a was "awash with liquidity." 74. Bolivia was f o r s o m e time a priority c o u n t r y for UNFDAC, a l o n g with Pakistan. Officially, since 1988, U N F D A C works u n d e r t h e d i r e c t i o n of SUBDESAL, in c o o p e r a t i o n with the U n i t e d N a t i o n s O f f i c e of P r o j e c t Services, in the U n i t e d N a t i o n s D e v e l o p m e n t P r o g r a m ( O P S / U N D P ) . 75. T h e Bolivian g o v e r n m e n t a s k e d U N F D A C to c o n t i n u e w o r k i n g in the Yungas w h e n 8 4 / 4 0 5 finished. P r o j e c t A D / B O L / 9 0 / 4 1 9 , w h i c h s t a r t e d in 1990, called "Alternative D e v e l o p m e n t f o r T r a n s i t i o n a l Areas in t h e Yungas," was e x p e c t e d to b e in o p e r a t i o n u n t i l late 1993, with t h e a i m of red u c i n g all t h e excess coca in the area. 76. UNFDAC, " C o u n t r y R e p o r t on Bolivia," M i m e o , La Paz, 1991. 77. E c o n o m e t r i c a , R e s u m e n Ejecutiva, Análisis del proyecto agroYungas: AD/BOL/84/405 (La Paz, 1990), 18. 78. E c o n o m è t r i c a , Análisis del proyecto agroYungas, 18. 79. See, for e x a m p l e , the c o m m e n t s of Miguel Quispe, the p r e s i d e n t of a Yungas coffee p r o d u c e r association, in Presencia (La Paz), 22 J a n u a r y 1991. T h e credit terms were reasonably soft—three years of grace at 3 p e r c e n t interest, a n d 5 p e r c e n t for the r e m a i n i n g four years. T h e average loan was for U.S. $1,525. 80. E c o n o m è t r i c a , Análisis del proyecto agroYungas, 28. T h e r e p o r t also suggests that f a r m e r s g r o w i n g t h e i m p r o v e d c o f f e e i n c r e a s e d t h e i r i n c o m e f o u r times over i n c o m e f r o m t h e t r a d i t i o n a l c o f f e e . 81. See P e t e r M a c F a r r e n , " P r o d u c t o r e s d e Coca D e c i d e n R e e m p l a z a r sus Cultivos," Ultima Hora, 3 D e c e m b e r 1990. 82. For a fuller d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e mayachasitas. a n d t h e a g r o - i n d u s t r i a l s c h e m e s , see E c o n o m è t r i c a , Análisis del proyecto agroYungas, passim. T h e E c o n o m è t r i c a r e p o r t suggests that if t h e families f r o m the mayachasitas are i n c l u d e d , a total of 3,900 families h a d b e n e f i t e d f r o m Agro-Yungas, o r 15 p e r c e n t m o r e t h a n t h e o r i g i n a l t a r g e t . G o v e r n m e n t estimates said this repr e s e n t e d 14 p e r c e n t of t h e total p o p u l a t i o n of t h e Yungas. 83. T h e La P a z - b a s e d n e w s p a p e r Presencia a n d a local r a d i o station gave p a r t i c u l a r p r o m i n e n c e to criticisms of t h e Agro-Yungas p r o j e c t , o f t e n carrying articles o r r u n n i n g p r o g r a m s , a r g u i n g t h a t , f o r most f a r m e r s , coca still gave a b e l t e r i n c o m e . See, f o r e x a m p l e , Presencia, 9 August 1990, 16 February 1991, 26 J u n e 1991, 1 August 1991. H o w e v e r , few f a r m e r s criticized t h e new social i n f r a s t r u c t u r e built by U N F D A C , which i n c l u d e d 500 k i l o m e t e r s of i m p r o v e d roads, m o r e t h a n 50 water systems, 21 r e p a i r e d o r new schools, a n d a controversial, b r a n d - n e w , 40-bed h o s p i t a l at C o r o i c o . 84. See G o n z a l o Flores, "Lo q u e d e j a agroYungas," Ultima Hora, 22 July 1990; a n d a u t h o r interview with E c o n o m è t r i c a r e s e a r c h e r s , O c t o b e r 1991. 85. M. P a i n t e r , Institutional Analysis, 7. 86. T h e official line is that " t h e r e is m u t u a l r e s p e c t o n d i f f e r e n c e of app r o a c h e s , " b u t U N F D A C officials o f t e n c o m p l a i n t h a t USAID d o e s n o t really believe in p u t t i n g m o n e y a n d p e r m a n e n t e m p l o y e e s i n t o t h e C h a p a r e a n d invests f a r t o o h i g h a p e r c e n t a g e in t h e h i g h valleys, m a k e s t o o m a n y p r o m i s e s , a n d i m p o s e s t o o m u c h c o n d i t i o n a l i t v , p a r t i c u l a r l y o n its c r e d i t s c h e m e . T h e y p o i n t o u t they have seventy professionals, virtually all Bolivians,

170

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working permanently in the Chapare (Villa Tunari, Chimore, and Ivirgarzama) on UNFDAC's three main projects. 87. UNFDAC officials said their unofficial aims are to preserve the ecological balance of the Chapare and to keep permanent farmers in the area. 88. UNDCP/MACA, Proyecto de desarrollo alternativo del trópico de Cochabamba AD/BOL/88/412—Informe de Evaluación (Cochabamba, Bolivia: UNDCP/MACA, 1991), 1 - 2 . 89. T h e money was divided into U.S. $4 million for A D / B O L / 8 8 / 4 1 1 (water supply and sanitation), $15.1 million for A D / B O L . / 8 8 / 4 1 2 (of which $6.9 million was for the electrification program, and $4 million for infrastructure, $1.5 million for agro-industry development), and $4.1 million for A D / B O L / 8 8 / 4 1 5 (the dairy and associated projects at Ivirgarzama). In 1990 the source of funding for an estimated expenditure of U.S. $13.3 million on alternative development was roughly divided as follows: Italy G5 percent, Sweden 17 percent, United Kingdom 14 percent, and the EC 4 percent. Some European countries, notably Holland, had not granted any money, in part because of the problems surrounding the Agro-Yungas project. 90. UNDCP/MACA, Proyecto de desarrollo alternativo, has a fuller description of the achievements of the various projects. T h e glucose project, for example, was aiming to substitute the 105 tonnes of glucose imported every year, or about 35 percent of national demand. 91. Informe Final de la Comisión Agroindustrial Ante Corcdal, Mimeo, Cochabamba, La Paz, August 1991, 14-15. Some observers also complained that other UNFDAC projects had not materialized—lor example, a coffeetoasting plant, a jam-making plant, and a fruit juice processing plant (I.a Razón, 27 January 1991). 92. C. Balderrama, in Facetas-La Razón, 8 December 1991, makes a sharp distinction between multilateral and bilateral aid for alternative development, and argues that the former (i.e., money from UNFDAC) allowed the Bolivian state to have more autonomy, and thus to reach more farmers. Farmers often pointed out that UNFDAC projects carried less conditionality. A. Rivera (Diagnóstico socioeconómico, 66), reported that in 1990 PDAC projects were hardly known, largely because of the absence of any PDAC office in the Chapare. 93. CEDOIN, "Productores de coca: II encuentro del trópico de Cochabamba," Informe R no. 244, J u n e 1992, 4 - 5 . 94. See Lupe Cajias, "¿Es posible el desarrollo alternativo o es parte de la guerra hipócrita?" Hoy, 3 0 J u n e 1991. 95. Kevin Healy, "The Political Ascent of Bolivia's Peasant Coca Leaf Producers, "Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs (1991a): 9 9 - 1 0 0 . 96. FONADAL formed part of the government's strategic plan to replace the whole coca economy. FONADAL was to form a bridge between the eradication and the maturing of long-term investments, providing short-term employment (for example, in public works projects) either in the Chapare or other areas. FONADAL's director said it needed U.S. $36 million from international donors in 1992, but at the time of writing it was unclear if even a quarter of that had been pledged. 97. See for example, Segundino Montevilla, quoted in Presencia, 29 May 1991. 98. T h e UNDCP has started a small farm complex so that women in the Chapare could improve nutritional levels and incomes by rearing hamsters

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171

a n d o t h e r a n i m a l s , b u t at t h e time of writing, only a h a n d f u l of w o m e n were participating. 99. Q u o t e d in "Desarrollo A l t e r n a t i v o Constituye u n R o t u n d o Fracaso en el C h a p a r e , " Opinión, 19 D e c e m b e r 1990. 100. Presencia, 27 D e c e m b e r 1990. N o t all g o v e r n m e n t officials say t h e lack of f u n d s is t h e p r o b l e m . S a m u e l D o r i a M e d i n a , t h e f o r m e r p l a n n i n g minister, has a r g u e d it is Bolivia's lack of capacity to s p e n d it that is t h e obstacle ( Q u o t e d in La Razón, 26 May 1991). 101. See, f o r e x a m p l e , U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of State, B u r e a u of I n t e r n a tional Narcotics Matters, INCSR (1991), 4. 102. USAID/Bolivia, Alternative Development Strategy, 4. 103. Q u o t e d in " F r o n d o s o p e r s o n a l en d e s a r r o l l o a l t e r n a t i v o i m p i d e más resultados," La Razón, 25 O c t o b e r 1991. 104. U S A I D / B o l i v i a , "Executive S u m m a r y of I n t e r n a l E v a l u a t i o n , " La Paz, N o v e m b e r 1991, 10. 105. USAID/Bolivia, "Executive S u m m a r y of I n t e r n a l Evaluation," 10. 100. U.S. O f f i c e of I n s p e c t o r G e n e r a l , Drug Control Activities in Bolivia, Audit Report 2-CI-001, 68; a n d Presencia, 25 J u n e 1990.

Notes for Chapter 7 1. WOLA, Issue Brief no. 4 ( W a s h i n g t o n D.C.: W O L A ) , S e p t e m b e r 1991; a n d WOLA, Clear and Present Dangers, 127. 2. See, f o r e x a m p l e , Carlos T o r a n z o s , " E c o n o m í a i n f o r m a l , e c o n o m í a ilegal: El p a p e l del n a r c o t r á f i c o , " p a p e r p r e s e n t e d at CERID C o n f e r e n c e , La Paz, M a r c h 1991. Many d e s p a i r , t o o , of U.S. overall p r i o r i t i e s in a t t a c k i n g p r o d u c t i o n a n d s u p p l y r a t h e r t h a n d e m a n d a n d c o n s u m p t i o n . In t h e p r o p o s e d U.S. f e d e r a l b u d g e t f o r FY 1992, 70 p e r c e n t of r e s o u r c e s were d e v o t e d to p r o g r a m s f o r supply r e d u c t i o n (mostly i n t e r d i c t i o n a n d law e n f o r c e m e n t ) , a n d only 30 p e r c e n t to p r o g r a m s f o r d e m a n d r e d u c t i o n . See Institute of t h e Americas, Seizing Opportunities, 3. 3. T h e s u b d i r e c t o r of F O N A D A L , J u a n J o s é T o r r e z , said in late 1991 t h a t t h e Bolivian g o v e r n m e n t n e e d e d U.S. $ 3 0 0 m i l l i o n to c o m p e n s a t e f o r t h e coca e r a d i c a t e d . 4. C E D O I N , " P r o d u c t o r e s d e coca: II e n c u e n t r o del t r ó p i c o de Cochab a m b a , " Informe R no. 244, La Paz, 5. 5. Kevin Healy, " S t r u c t u r a l A d j u s t m e n t , P e a s a n t Poverty a n d C o c a in Bolivia," p a p e r p r e s e n t e d at t h e 16th C o n g r e s s of t h e Latin A m e r i c a n Studies Association, W a s h i n g t o n , 4 - 6 April 1991. 6. T h i s is t h e estimate of C O N A L I D . O t h e r g o v e r n m e n t estimates suggest that t h e e r a d i c a t i o n of excess coca in e i g h t years would n e e d U.S. $434 million in t h e first year ($61 million f o r b a l a n c e of p a y m e n t s , $ 2 5 million f o r a social c o m p e n s a t i o n f u n d , a n d $ 3 4 8 m i l l i o n in g e n e r a l d e v e l o p m e n t f u n d s ) rising to $1.5 billion in t h e e i g h t h year. T h e s e larger figures take i n t o a c c o u n t b o t h t h e loss of i n c o m e f r o m c o c a - c o c a i n e p r o d u c t i o n a n d t h e i n d i r e c t e f f e c t s . UDAPE, Estrategia nacional de desarrollo alternativo 1990, 38-39. 7. U.S. O f f i c e of I n s p e c t o r G e n e r a l , Drug Control Activities in Bolivia, Audit Report 2-CI-001, 2.

172

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8. T e s t i m o n y of P e t e r R e u t e r b e f o r e the S u b c o m m i t t e e s on Legislation and National Security and G o v e r n m e n t I n f o r m a t i o n , J u s t i c e and Agriculture, W a s h i n g t o n , O c t o b e r 1989, q u o t e d in U.S. Congress, H o u s e C o m m i t t e e on G o v e r n m e n t O p e r a t i o n s , United Slates Anti-narcotic Activities, 3 3 - 3 5 . 9. U . S . C o n g r e s s , H o u s e C o m m i t t e e on G o v e r n m e n t O p e r a t i o n s , U n i t e d States Anti-narcotic Activities, 34. 10. Legalization is favored by such l u m i n a r i e s as Milton F r i e d m a n , and by the Economist and the New York Times. A useful summary o f the a r g u m e n t s is found in Muller Associates, La economia de la coca, 1 3 - 1 4 . 11. S e e , for e x a m p l e , P e t e r B o u r n e , a f o r m e r adviser to P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r , in " B r i n g C o c a i n e in f r o m t h e C o l d , " Financial Times, 6 S e p t e m b e r 1989. He estimates less than o n e thousand die e a c h year worldwide from the effects o f c o c a i n e , c o m p a r e d to the two million annually from the effects o f tobacco.

Acronyms

ADEPA ADN AHV AIPE

CEDIA

CEDOIN CEEDI

CEPB CERES

CERID

CESE CID CIDRE

Asociación de Productores de Algodón (Association of Cotton Growers) Acción Democrática Nacionalista (Nationalist Democratic Action—a principal Bolivian political party) Associated High Valleys Project (Valles Altos) Asociación de Instituciones de Promoción y Educación (Association of Promotion and Education Institutes) Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Laboral y Agrario (Center for Studies of Labor and Agrarian Development) Centro de Documentación e Información (Documentation and Information Center) Centro de Estudios Ecológicos y de Desarrollo Integral (Center for Ecological Studies and Integrated Development) Confederación de Empresarios Privados de Bolivia (Confederation of Bolivian Private Sector Businesses) Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Económica y Social (Cochabamba) (Center for Economic and Social Studies, Cochabamba) Centro par al Estudio de Relaciones Internacionales y el Desarrollo (Center for the Study of International Relations and Development) Campaña Educativa Sobre Estupefacientes (Educational Campaign Against Drugs) Centro de Información para el Desarrollo (Center of Information and Development) Centro de Invesigación y Desarrollo Regional (Center for Regional Information and Development) 173

174 • • • ACRONYMS CNPZ COB COFADENA COLADAL CONADAL CONALID

CONAPRE

CORDECO COREDAL CRDP CSUTCB

DEA DIRECO EAP EGTK ESF FCCT FECCh FETCTC

FEYCh FINSA FONADAL

Comisión Nestor Paz Zamora (Nestor Paz Zamora Commission) Central Obrera Boliviana (Bolivian Workers Central) Corporación de las Fuerzas Armadas para el Desarrollo Nacional (the Bolivian Army's development corporation) Consejo Local de Desarrollo Alternativo (Local Council on Alternative Development) Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo Alternativo (National Council on Alternative Development) El Consejo Nacional Contra el Uso Indebido y Tráfico Ilícito de Drogas (National Council Against Illegal Use and Trafficking of Illicit Drugs) Consejo Nacional de Prevención Integral del Uso Indebido de Drogas (National Council on Drug Abuse Prevention and Education) Corporación de Desarrollo de Cochabamba (Cochabamba Development Corporation) Comité Regional de Desarrollo Alternativo (Regional Council on Alternative Development) Chapare Regional Development Project Confederación Sindical Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (The Sole Sindical Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia) Drug Enforcement Administration (United States) Dirección de Reconversión Agrícola (Directorate of Agricultural Reconversion) economically active population Ejército Guerrillero Tupac Katari (Tupac Katari Guerrilla Army) Economic Support Fund Federación de Colonizadores de Carrasco Tropical (Federation of Colonizers of Tropical Carrasco) Federación Especial de Colonizadores de Chimoré (Special Federation of Colonizers of Chimoré) Federación Especial de Trabajadores Campesinos del Trópico de Cochabamba (Special Federation of Peasant Workers of the Tropics of Cochabamba) Federación Especial de Yungas-Chapare (Special Federation of the Yungas-Chapare) Firma Integral de Servicios Arévalo (Arévalo Integral Service Company) Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Alternativo (National Fund for Alternative Development)

ACRONYMS • • • FUCU IBTA-Chapare IDB ILDIS

INCSR

INE LIDEMA MACA MBL MIR

MNR

NAU OAS OIT ONDCP PACP PDAC

PDAR

PIDYS PREALC

175

Federación Unica de Centrales Unicas (Unitary Federation of Unitary Central Bodies) Instituto Boliviano de Tecnología Agropecuario (An agricultural research a n d extension center) Inter-American D e v e l o p m e n t Bank Instituto L a t i n o a m e r i c a n o d e Investigaciones Sociales (Latin American Institute of Social Research) International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, published by the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of State Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas (Institute of National Statistics) La Liga d e Defensa del Medio A m b i e n t e (League for the Defense of the E n v i r o n m e n t ) Ministerio d e Asuntos Campesinos y Agricultura (Ministry of Peasant Affairs a n d Agriculture) Movimiento de Bolivia Libre (Free Bolivia Movement) Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (Movement of the Revolutionary Left—a principal Bolivian political party) Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (Revolutionary Nationalist M o v e m e n t — a principal Bolivian political party) Narcotics Affairs LInit ( r e n a m e d NAS) (U.S. Embassy, La Paz) Organization of American States Organización Internacional d e T r a b a j o (International Labor Organization—ILO) U.S. Office of National D r u g Control Policy Plan de Acción a Corto Plazo (Short-term Action Plan) Proyecto de Desarrollo Alternativo de C o c h a b a m b a ( C o c h a b a m b a alternative d e v e l o p m e n t project; subsumed by PDAR) P r o g r a m a d e Desarrollo Alternativo Regional (Program for Regional Alternative D e v e l o p m e n t ) . Formerly known as PDAC (Proyecto de Desarrollo Alternativo de C o c h a b a m b a ) Plan Integral d e Desarrollo y Substitución (Integrated Development a n d Substitution Plan) Programa Regional del E m p l e o para América Latina y el Caribe (Regional E m p l o y m e n t P r o g r a m f o r Latin America a n d the Caribbean)

176

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• ACRONYMS

PRODES SEAMOS

SNC SUBDESAL UCS UDAPE UDP UMOPAR UNDCP UNDP UNFDAC UNRISD UNU USAID W O LA YPFB

Proyecto d e D e s a r r o l l o C h a p a r e - Y u n g a s ( C h a p a r e - Y u n g a s D e v e l o p m e n t Project) Sistema Educativo A n t i d r o g a d i c c i ó n y d e Movilización Social ( D r u g A d d i c t i o n P r e v e n t i o n a n d Mobilization Program) Servicio N a c i o n a l d e C a m i n o s (National R o a d Service) Subsecretaría d e Desarrollo Alternativo (Subsecretariat f o r Alternative D e v e l o p m e n t ) U n i d a d Cívica S o l i d a r i d a d ( U n i o n of Civic Solidarity) U n i d a d d e Análisis d e Políticas E c o n ó m i c a s ( U n i t of Analysis of E c o n o m i c Policies) Union Democrática y Popular (Democratic and P o p u l a r Unity) U n i d a d Móvil d e Patrullaje Rural (Rural Mobile Patrol Unit) United Nations Drug Control Program (formerly UNFDAC) United Nations Development Program U n i t e d N a t i o n s F u n d f o r D r u g Abuse C o n t r o l U n i t e d N a t i o n s R e s e a r c h Institute for Social Development U n i t e d N a t i o n s University U n i t e d States Agency f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l D e v e l o p m e n t W a s h i n g t o n O f f i c e o n Latin A m e r i c a Yacimientos P e t r o l í f e r o s Fiscales Bolivianos (Bolivian State P e t r o l e u m C o m p a n y )

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T o l i s a n o , ]., R i c h a r d Bossi, Ray H e n k e l , A l b e r t o Rivera, C h r i s S e u b c r t , David S m i t h , J o h n S u t t o n , a n d J a c k Swagerty. 1989. Environmental Assessment of the Chapare Regional Development Project, Bolivia. W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: Develo p m e n t Alternatives Inc. T o r a n z o s , C a r l o s . 1991. " E c o n o m í a i n f o r m a l , e c o n o m í a ilegal: El p a p a l d e l n a r c o t r á f i c o . " P a p e r p r e s e n t e d at C E R I D C o n f e r e n c e , La Paz, M a r c h . Tullis, L a M o n d . 1991a. " B e n e f i c i a r i e s of t h e Illicit D r u g T r a d e : Political C o n s e q u e n c e s a n d I n t e r n a t i o n a l Policy at t h e I n t e r s e c t i o n of S u p p l y a n d Dem a n d . D i s c u s s i o n p a p e r n o . 19. M a r c h . G e n e v a : U N R I S D . . 1 9 9 1 b . "Illicit D r u g T a k i n g a n d P r o h i b i t i o n Laws: P u b l i c C o n s e q u e n c e s a n d t h e R e f o r m of P u b l i c Policy in t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . Discuss i o n p a p e r n o . 21. M a r c h . G e n e v a : U N R I S D . . 1991c. Handbook of Research on the Illicit Drug Traffic: Socioeconomic and Political Consequences. W e s t p o r t : G r e e n w o o d Press. . 1987. " C o c a i n e a n d F o o d : Likely E f f e c t s o f a B u r g e o n i n g T r a n s n a t i o n a l I n d u s t r y o n F o o d P r o d u c t i o n in Bolivia a n d P e r u . " In Pursuing Food Security: Strategies and Obstacles in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, e d . W. H o l l i s t a n d L. T u l l i s , 2 4 7 - 2 8 3 . B o u l d e r : L y n n e R i e n ner Publishers. U D A P E . 1989. Estrategia nacional de desanollo alternativo 1990. La Paz: Presid e n c i a d e la R e p ú b l i c a . U N D C P / M A C A . 1991. Proyecto de desarrollo alternativo del trópico de Cochabamba AD/BOL/88/412—Informe de Evaluación. C o c h a b a m b a : U N D C P / M A C A . U N F D A C . 1991. " C o u n t r y R e p o r t o n Bolivia." M i m e o . La Paz. U N I C E F . The State of the World's Children 1991 ( O x f o r d : O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1990). U n i v e r s i d a d A u t ó n o m a G a b r i e l R e n e M o r e n o . 1991. Universidad, sociedad, uso indebido de drogas. S a n t a C r u z ; Bolivia: E d i t o r i a l U n i v e r s e r t a r i a . U S A I D / B o l i v i a . 1991. Alternative Development Strategy. La Paz: U.S. E m b a s s y . . 1991. "Assistance f o r A l t e r n a t i v e D e v e l o p m e n t . " M i m e o . La Paz. . 1991. " P r o g r a m O b j e c t i v e s C h a p a r e . " M i m e o . C o c h a b a m b a . . 1990. " E x e c u t i v e s u m m a r y of i n t e r n a l e v a l u a t i o n . " M i m e o . La Paz. U S A I D U p d a t e . 1991. " E s t i m a t e s of t h e E c o n o m i c I m p a c t of C o c a a n d Derivatives in 1990." A p r i l . M i m e o . La Paz. U.S. C o n g r e s s . H o u s e . C o m m i t t e e o n G o v e r n m e n t O p e r a t i o n s . 1990. United States Anti-narcotic Activities in the Andean Region. W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. U.S. C o n g r e s s . S e n a t e . C o m m i t t e e o n G o v e r n m e n t a l A f f a i r s . 1990. Cocaine Production, Eradication and the Environment: Policy, Impact and Options. W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: U.S. G o v e r n m e n t P r i n t i n g O f f i c e . U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of S t a t e . B u r e a u of I n t e r n a t i o n a l N a r c o t i c s M a t t e r s . 1 9 8 6 1992. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. U.S. O f f i c e of I n s p e c t o r G e n e r a l . 1991. Drug Control Activities in Bolivia. Audit Report 2-CI-001. W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: U.S. G o v e r n m e n t P r i n t i n g O f f i c e . W i n g e r t , S t e p h e n , H e l e n Soos, D a n i e l C h a i j , a n d J e r r y H a r r i s o n - B u r n s . "Review of U S A I D / B o l i v i a D e v e l o p m e n t A s s i s t a n c e S u p p o r t f o r C o c a E r a d i c a t i o n . " M i m e o . W a s h i n g t o n , D.C., 1988. W O L A . 1992. Andean Initiative—Legislative Update. J u l y . W a s h i n g t o n , D . C . : WOLA. . 1991. Andean Initiative—Legislative Updates. M a r c h , July, a n d O c t o b e r . W a s h i n g t o n , D C.: W O L A .

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. 1991. Clear and Present Dangers: The U.S. Military and the War on Drugs in the Andes. October. Washington, D.C.: WOLA. . 1990. Andean Initiative—Legislative Update. D e c e m b e r . Washington, D C.: WOLA. . 1989. Andean Initiative—Legislative Update. November. Washington, D C.: WOLA. Youngers, Coletta. 1991. "A Fundamentally Flawed Strategy: T h e U.S. War on Drugs in Bolivia." WOLA Briefing Series 3 (September). . 1990. "The War in the Andes: T h e Military Role in U.S. International Drug Policy" WOLA Briefing Series A (December).

Agencies, Newspapers, Magazines (Other Than Those in Bolivia) Associated Press Christian Science Monitor, Boston EFE News agency, Madrid Financial Times, London Guardian, London Independent, London Latin American Press, Lima Miami Herald, Miami Newsweek, New York New York Times, New York South Magasine, London Sunday Times, London Toronto Globe and Mail, T o r o n t o Washington Post, Washington

Bolivian Pubiications Bolivia Bulletin, La Paz Conosur, Cochabamba El Dia, Santa Cruz Hoy, La Paz Informe R, La Paz El Mundo, Santa Cruz Opinion, Cochabamba Presencia, La Paz La Razón, La Paz Los Tiempos, Cochabamba Ultima Hora, La Paz

Index

Acción Democrática Nacionalista (ADN), 59, 159n91; militarization and, 101; narco-video scandal and, 73-74 Acuerdo Patriótico (Patriotic Accord), 54, 77 Acullicos (chew-ins), 1, 2, 25, 151n7 ADEPA. See Asociación de Productores d e Algodón ADN. See Acción Democrática Nacionalista Agricultural credits, 122-126 Agriculture: coca dollars in, 58; decline in, 64; growth of, 56, 108; peasants a n d , 63; public e x p e n d i t u r e s on, 65. See also Farmers Agriculture Bank: cocaine b o o m and, 26; loans f r o m , 126 Agro-industrial projects, 112, 128, 133; building, 130; criticism of, 132; study of, 131 Agro-Yungas project, 127, 129 Aguilar, Anibal, 55 Aguiló, Federico: on employment, 40, 41 AHV project. Se? Associated High Valleys project Alderete, J o r g e , 31, 81, 160n9 Alternative crops, 24, 78, 80, 105, 107, 110, 113, 127, 133-134, 154n23; eradication and, 123; e x p e r i m e n t with, 125, 167n40; export of, 114; i n c o m e f r o m , 20 (table); markets for, 116-117; p r o d u c t i o n of, 138 (table)

Alternative d e v e l o p m e n t , 80, 95-96, 98, 105, 119, 170n92; committees for, 143; definitions of, 107; effectiveness of, 135, 146; eradication and, 106, 108; e x p e r i m e n t i n g with, 99, 132; interdiction and, 106-107; interest in, 96, 112, 122, 128-131, 133, 134, 142-143, 144; money for, 108-112, 113, 122, 134, 142; p r o b l e m s for, 8 8 , 9 0 , 114, 134; u n i o n s a n d , 115, 131, 132-133 Alvarez, Javier, 87 Amnesty plan, 83 A n d e a n Strategy, 91, 92 A n n e x III, 92, 99-100 A n t i d r u g operations, 90, 95, 98 Antidrug police, 27, 32, 112 Araoz, Mario ("The King of Insinuta"), 32, 153n35 Arce, J o a q u i n , 68 Arce Carpió, Alfredo, 73, 159n91; resignation of, 74 Arce Gómez, Luis, 27, 59, 95; expulsion of, 1 5 1 n l 4 , 161n21; trial of, 84 Arévalo, Eddy, 61, 62 Arévalo, Nelson, 61, 62 Aronson, B e r n a r d , 102 Arrepentidos ( r e p e n t a n t o n e s ) , 84 Asociación d e P r o d u c t o r e s d e Algodón (ADEPA), 26 Associated H i g h Valleys (AHV) project, 107, 109, 110, 113, 119-126, 134, 135, 1 6 6 n l 8 ; b u d g e t for, 120; credit schemes for, 126; impact of, 121, 168n54

183

184

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INDEX

Ayala, José Antonio, 73 Balance-of-payments support, 85-86, 87, 88, 102, 108 Bananas, 167n41; exporting, 117, 118; i n c o m e f r o m , 118; transporting, 13 Banco Agrícola: cocaine b o o m and, 26; loans f r o m , 126 Bánzer, H u g o , 58-59, 73, 159n91; cocaine p r o d u c t i o n and, 1 5 1 n l l Barco, Virgilio: interdiction by, 8 6 - 8 7 Barrientos, Bismark, 31, 32, 153n35, 153n42 Bascopé Aspiazu, René, 26 Base (sulfato base), 23, 37; consumption of, 69; production of, 26, 46 (table) Benedict XV, 2 Beni, sealing of, 95 Bennett, William, 91 Bloqueo (roadblocks), 25, 141; failure of, 9 8 - 9 9 Bolivian air force, antidrug efforts by, 81 Bolivian army: aid for, 93, 96-97, 102, 144; a n t i d r u g operations of, 24, 92, 9 6 , 9 7 , 100-102, 141, 163n54; c o r r u p t i o n in, 94; role of, 71, 94, 102. See also Militarization Bolivian Episcopal C o n f e r e n c e , alternative d e v e l o p m e n t a n d , 96 Bolivian navy: antidrug operations of, 81; c o r r u p t i o n in, 159n82 Bolivianos: devaluation of, 55, 124; interest rate on, 61 Bolivian S u p r e m e Court, 8 4 - 8 5 Bolivian thesis, 96 Bolsín (currency market), 55 Bribes, 74, 95, 125 Broker operations, 29 Building societies, 156n33, 156-157n34; financial speculation a n d , 61 Bush, George: Paz Zamora a n d , 92, 165n83; war on drugs and, 162n42 Buyers, 12, 40 Cali cartel, 28, 83 C a m p a ñ a Educativa Sobre Estupefacientes (CESE), 69 C a p o b i a n c o , Guillermo, 159nn89, 92; resignation of, 72

Carrasco: coca p r o d u c t i o n in, 147n9; p o p u l a t i o n of, 16 (table) Carriers, e m p l o y m e n t of, 40, 41 Cartagena summit, 101 Cartels, 27, 28, 83, 150n2; clans and, 152n31 Carvajal, Felipe, 72, 96 Catholic c h u r c h : alternative d e v e l o p m e n t and, 95-96; amnesty plan a n d , 83; d r u g war and, 94 CEDLA. See C e n t r o de Estudios para el Desarrollo Laboral y Agrario Central Bank, 27, 156n32; cocaine dollars in, 36, 54, 55 Centrales (central bodies), dues for, 24 Central O b r e r a Boliviana (COB), 25, 79; d r u g war and, 94 C e n t r o d e Estudios de la Realidad E c o n ó m i c a y Social (CERES), 5, 10 C e n t r o d e Estudios para el Desarrollo Laboral y Agrario (CEDLA), 64 CEPB. See C o n f e d e r a c i ó n de Empresarios Privados de Bolivia CERES. See C e n t r o de Estudios de la Realidad Económica y Social CESE. .See C a m p a ñ a Educativa Sobre Estupefacientes C h a m b e r of Deputies, investigation by, 73 Chapare: agriculture in, 66, 78; agroindustrial project in, 126, 131; aid for, 109-110, 112, 123, 134-135; alternative development in, 111, 116, 118, 129, 132, 134, 135, 144; climate of, 8, 9; coca p r o d u c t i o n in, 3, 4, 19 (table), 56, 64, 86, 89, 147n9; ecological d a m a g e in, 66-68; eradication in, 87, 141; exports f r o m , 117; farmers in, 16 (table), 17 (table); migration to, 6, 9, 6 5 , 6 7 , 119, 120, 121, 122, 126, 139, 144, 148n20; population of, 16 (table); p r o b l e m s in, 57, 58, 98; as transitional zone, 79; USAID a n d , 109-110, 136 C h a p a r e Regional Development Project (CRDP), 109, 135; m o n e y for, 110, 112-114; program of, 114, 119 Chemicals: discarding, 67-68, 75 (table); prohibition of, 80, 85

INDEX

Chew-ins (acullicos), 1, 2, 25, 151n7 Chimoré, protest in, 98 Chipiriri, research a n d extension center at, 114 Chola Rosa. See R o m e r o de H u m e r e z , Rosa Clan de los techos, 31 Clorhidrato de cocaína. See Cocaine HCL CNPZ. See Comisión Nestor Paz Zamora COB. Se* Central O b r e r a Boliviana Coca: advantages of, 2, 10-14, 25, 36; banning, 160n5; cocaine and, 25, 151n7; lor development, 108, 144; flavoring with, 2; gross value of, 4; income f r o m , 9 - 1 4 , 19 (table), 20 (table), 39, 49 (table), 50 (table), 112, 149n35, 150n48, 155nl2; land for, 19 (table), 36-37, 158n56; legal uses of, 1-2, 24, 25, 48 (table), 147n8; lobby, 25; reduction of, 105, 107, 126, 133-134, 145; risks f r o m , 12, 149n35 Coca-cocaine economy, 24, 105; backward and forward linkages in, 53, 56; benefits of, 53, 108, 139-140; by country, 52 (table); d e p e n d e n c e on, 53-54, 56, 60, 77, 107, 109, 140-141; as d e v e l o p m e n t p r o b l e m , 142; e m p l o y m e n t in, 40-42, 50 (table), 51 (table); laborers in, 63; value of, 35-40, 42, 47 (table), 111, 154n9 Coca-Cola, 1-2, 147n5 Cocaine: coca and, 25, 151n7; cons u m p t i o n of, 29, 145, 146; deaths from, 172nl 1; e x p o r t of, 6, 38, 48 (table); p r o d u c t i o n of, 1, 2, 14, 23, 28, 35, 36, 45 (table), 46 (table), 57, 63-65, 139, 150n2, 1 5 1 n l l Cocaine dollars; b e n e f i t of, 36, 54-55, 139, 140; influx of, 55, 65, 155nn7, 9, 156n32; investing, 56-57, 58; laundering, 60-61, 62, 65, 155n8 Cocaine HCL, 23, 37, 100; i n c o m e f r o m , 39; m a n u f a c t u r e of, 23, 26, 28, 29, 30, 40; p r o c u r i n g , 38 Cocaine paste. See Paste Coca por desarrollo (coca for d e v e l o p m e n t ) , 108, 144

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185

Coca p r o d u c t i o n , 15 (table), 44 (table), 139, 149-150n48; b o o m in, 56, 66, 67; elimination of, 111; e n v i r o n m e n t a l impact of, 65-68; estimates of, 3 7 - 3 8 Coca unions. See U n i o n s C o c h a b a m b a : agriculture in, 64, 118; coca-cocaine e c o n o m y in, 57; d r u g abuse in, 69, 70; e c o n o m i c decline for, 63; f a r m e r s in, 5, 17 (table); migration to, 119, 120; population of, 16 (table) COFADENA. See C o r p o r a c i ó n de las Fuerzas A r m a d a s para el Desarrollo Nacional Coffee: exporting, 128; prices for, 127-128; p r o d u c t i o n of, 130 Coimas (bribes), 74, 95, 125 COLADAL. See Consejo Local de Desarrollo Alternativo C o l o m b i a n d r u g trade, Bolivia and, 28, 30 Colonization, 3 - 4 C o m c e r , 156n33 Comerdantes ( b u y e r s / m e r c h a n t s ) , 12, 40 Comisión Nestor Paz Zamora (CNPZ), 141 Comités de autodefensa (self-defense g r o u p s ) , f o r m a t i o n of, 98 C o m m u n i t y works. See Public works projects Compradores (buyers), 40 CONADAL, 80, 133, 143 CONALID. See Consejo Nacional contra el Uso I n d e b i d o y Tráfico Ilícito de Drogas CONAPRE. See Consejo Nacional de Prevención Integral del Uso I n d e b i d o d e Drogas C o n f e d e r a c i ó n de Empresarios Privados d e Bolivia (CEPB), 101 C o n f e d e r a c i ó n Sindical Unica de T r a b a j a d o r e s Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB), 25, 101, 165n72; blockade by, 9 8 - 9 9 Consejo Local d e Desarrollo Alternativo (COLADAL), 80, 143 Consejo Nacional contra el Uso I n d e b i d o y Tráfico Ilícito de Drogas (CONALID), 85, 160n6, 171n6

186

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INDEX

Consejo Nacional de Prevención Integral del Uso I n d e b i d o d e Drogas (CONAPRE), 68 Consejo Regional de Desarrollo Alternativo (COREDAL), 80, 143; study for, 131 C o n t r a b a n d economy, growth of , 60, 65 C O R D E C O . See C o r p o r a c i ó n d e Desarrollo de C o c h a b a m b a COREDAL. See Consejo Regional de Desarrollo Alternativo C o r p o r a c i ó n de Desarrollo de Cochabamba (CORDECO), 119-120 Corporación de las Fuerzas Armadas para el Desarrollo Nacional (COFADENA), 27 Corr, Edwin, 107 C o r r u p t i o n , 53, 95, 164n59; drugrelated, 70-74, 159n89; g o v e r n m e n t , 73; military, 94, 159n82 Coups, in Bolivia, 95 Cranston, Alan: criticism by, 164n56 CRDP. See C h a p a r e Regional Development Project Credit p r o g r a m , 122-126, 133 CSUTCB. See C o n f e d e r a c i ó n Sindical Unica de T r a b a j a d o r e s Campesinos de Bolivia DEA. See Drug E n f o r c e m e n t Agency Decree no. 21060, 54, 55 Decreto de A r r e p e n t i m i e n t o (decree of r e p e n t a n c e ) , 33 Decreto Ley 18714 d e Control y Lucha contra Sustancias Peligrosas (Law N u m b e r 18714 f o r the Control a n d Fight Against D a n g e r o u s Substances), 78-79 Decriminalization, 172nl0; opposition to, 145 Defensa Social, 153n46; UMOPAR a n d , 81 Defoliants, 8; prohibition of, 85, 90 Deforestation, 65, 66-67, 148nl 1, 158n56 De Franco, Mario, 55; CGE m o d e l of, 56; o n coca income, 9-10; o n f o o d p r o d u c t i o n , 63

Desarrollo interdiclivo (repressive d e v e l o p m e n t ) , 106 Development, 136; interdiction and, 106-107; problems with, 119; U.S. aid for, 137 (table) D e v e l o p m e n t centers, 120; constructing, 121, 135; participation in, 128-129 Dipps, Javier, 73 Dirección de Reconversión Agrícola (DIRECO), 4, 86, 125, 126, 135, 148n21, 168n66; b u d g e t of, 166nl8; criticism of, 87; eradication and, 88, 124; survey by, 7, 8; UMOPAR and, 88 DIRECO. See Dirección de Reconversión Agrícola Disclosure requirements, relaxation of, 55 Diversification, 114, 129 Dollars: interest rate on, 61. See also Cocaine dollars Doria Medina, Samuel, 97, 171n98; on alternative d e v e l o p m e n t , 106, 108, 111; on cocaine industry, 35, 36, 43 Drought, 6, 56 Drug c o n s u m p t i o n , 53; in Bolivia, 68-70; children and, 70 Drug E n f o r c e m e n t Administration (DEA), 27, 34, 157n35, 160n9; Bolivian d r u g trade a n d , 29; o n cocaine industry, 150n2; criticism by, 94; criticism of, 160nl0; eradication targets a n d , 78; interdiction a n d , 29, 30, 82, 83; UMOPAR and, 81-82, 163n55 Drug rehabilitation centers, 70 Drug trade: Colombian, 28, 30; combatting, 140-141; costs of, 70-74; e c o n o m i c solutions to, 105 Drug war: militarization of, 77, 9 2 - 9 3 , 98, 100, 101, 132, 142, 143; problems with, 78. See also Eradication; Interdiction; War o n drugs EAP. See Economically active population EC. See E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t y Echeverría, Isaac, 153n46, 159n92 Economic aid, 91-92, 103, 108; U.S., 163n49; waste of, 89

INDEX

Economically active population (EAP), 41, 140 Economic Support Fund (ESF), 86, 88 Economist, legalization and, 1 7 2 n l 0 EGTK. See Ejército Guerrillero T u p a c Katari Ejército Guerrillero T u p a c Katari (EGTK), 141 Electrification, 58, 107, 130, 143 El Pais, narco-video scandal and, 73 Employment, in coca-cocaine economy, 40-42, 50 (table), 51 (table) Encinas, Gastón, 101 Environment, coca cultivation and, 65-68 Eradication, 42, 85-91, 129, 136, 142, 168n66, 170n96; alternative d e v e l o p m e n t and, 106, 108, 123, 134; compensation for, 35, 89, 90, 106; forced, 24, 79, 80, 87-88, 141, 161-162n30; problems with, 24-25, 63, 78, 89, 90; promoting, 82, 90; targets for, 77, 78, 85, 86, 105, 144-145; trends in, 104 (table); voluntary, 24, 79, 85, 88, 148n21. See also Drug war; Interdiction "Errors a n d Omissions" column, cocaine dollars in, 36, 55 Escobar, Oscar, 33 Escobar, Pablo, 33, 1 5 2 n l 9 ESF. See Economic S u p p o r t Fund E u r o p e a n Community (EC), aid f r o m , 134 Exchange rate: overvaluation of, 56, 65, 155n9; stabilizing, 54, 55 E x p o '92 World Fair, 25 Exports: coca-cocaine and, 48 (table); p r o m o t i n g , 108 Extradition, 83, 84 Farmers, 23-28, 40, 44, 141; alliances of, 25; coca earnings for, 57; migration of, 5; protests by, 98. See also Agriculture FCCT. See Federación de Colonizadores de Carrasco Tropical FECCh. See Federación Especial d e Colonizadores de C h i m o r é Federación de Colonizadores de Carrasco Tropical (FCCT), 24

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187

Federaciones (federations), 23, 168n62; alternative d e v e l o p m e n t and, 133; d e m a n d s of, 141; d r u g war and, 94; opposition f r o m , 2 4 - 2 5 Federación Especial d e Colonizadores de C h i m o r é (FECCh), 24 Federación Especial de T r a b a j a d o r e s Campesinos del T r ó p i c o de C o c h a b a m b a (FETCTC), 24, 131 Federación Especial de YungasC h a p a r e (FEYCh), 24 Federación Unica de Centrales Unicas (FUCU), 24 Federations, 23, 168n62; alternative d e v e l o p m e n t a n d , 133; d e m a n d s of, 141; d r u g war a n d , 94; opposition f r o m , 24-25 Fertilizers, 66, 1 4 8 n l 4 FETCTC. See Federación Especial de T r a b a j a d o r e s Campesinos del Trópico d e C o c h a b a m b a FEYCh. See Federación Especial de Yungas-Chapare Financial speculation, increase in, 60-63 Finsa. See Firma Integral de Seivicos Arévalo Firma Integral de Servicos Arévalo (Finsa), 156n33, 156-157n34, 157n35; closure of, 90; history of, 6 1 - 6 3 Flores Moisés, J o r g e , 31, 32, 33 FONDAL. See F o n d o Nacional de Desarrollo Alternativo F o n d o Nacional de Desarrollo Alternativo (FONDAL), 133, 170n96 Food p r o d u c t i o n , 122; cocaine and, 63-65 Franks,Jeffrey: on e m p l o y m e n t , 40, 41; o n p r o d u c t i o n , 37-38, 39 FUCU. See F e d e r a c i ó n Unica de Centrales Unicas García Meza, Lucas, 95 García Meza, Luis, 1, 27; cocaine c o u p and, 59 Gelbard, Robert, 72, 94, 152n20, 159n82, 163n55; interdiction and, 93, 163n48 Gil, H u m b e r t o , 32, 153nn35, 46 Godoy, Ricardo, 55; CGE m o d e l of, 56; on coca i n c o m e , 9 - 1 0 ; on f o o d p r o d u c t i o n , 63

188

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INDEX

Green Berets, training by, 81 Gutiérrez, Elias, 73, 1 6 1 n l 9 Guzmán, Erwin, 32, 33, 60, 84 Guzmán, Victor, 100 Hash, Charles, 109, 110 HCL. See Hydrochloride Health services, 58, 70 Healy, Kevin, 27; o n agricultural p r o d u c t i o n , 64; o n cocaine m a n u f a c t u r e , 26; on labor shortages, 63 Herbicides, 8, 79; prohibition of, 80, 85 H u a n c h a c a , 30, 159n86; scandal in, 71-72, 159n92 Hydrochloride (HCL), 23, 27; environmental d a m a g e f r o m , 67. See also Cocaine HCL Hyperinflation, 6, 54, 73 IBTA. See Instituto Boliviano de Tecnología Agropecuario IDB. See Inter-American Development Bank INE. See Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas Infant mortality, 7, 58 Infrastructure, u n d e r d e v e l o p m e n t of, 107, 142 Inmobiliarias (building societies), 156n33, 156-157n34; financial speculation and, 61 Instituto Boliviano de T e c n o l o g í a A g r o p e c u a r i o (IBTA), 111-116, 120, 135; alternative d e v e l o p m e n t a n d , 108, 110, 114, 115, 124, 131; credit policy a n d , 126; criticism of, 115, 116, 131, 133, 134; m a r k e t i n g a n d , 117 Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas (INE): o n agricultural p r o d u c t i o n , 64; e m p l o y m e n t figures by, 41-42 Inter-American Commission o n D r u g Policy, 89 Inter-American D e v e l o p m e n t Bank (IDB), aid f r o m , 93, 163n49 Interdiction, 78, 80-85, 145; alternative d e v e l o p m e n t a n d , 106-107; m o n e y for, 142; prices a n d , 91; p r o b l e m s with, 81-82, 90, 106, 141. See also Drug war

International Monetary Fund, 54, 93 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 68, 87, 95 Interpol, 29 Ivirgarzama, agro-industrial project at, 132 Joel, Clark, 11, 12, 13 J o r d á n battalion, 92, 97 Jornálelos (day laborers), 40 Judicial Commission ( C h a m b e r of Deputies), investigation by, 73 Justiniano, Guillermo, 165nl; on c o m p e n s a t i o n payments, 89 Kempff Mercado, Noel: d e a t h of, 71 La Asunta, transitional area in, 128 Laboratories, destroying, 82, 100 Laborers, 4, 40 Labor shortages, 63, 65 La Jota, research a n d extension center at, 114 La Liga de Defensa del Medio A m b i e n t e (LIDEMA), on e n v i r o n m e n t a l damage, 67 Landowners, agrarian r e f o r m a n d , 26 Land tenure, system of, 8 Law N u m b e r 18714 for the C o n t r o l and Fight Against D a n g e r o u s Substances, 78-79 Law 1008. 5>