Beyond Turnout: How Compulsory Voting Shapes Citizens and Political Parties 0198832923, 9780198832928

Table of contents :
Cover
Series page
Beyond Turnout: How Compulsory Voting Shapes Citizens and Political Parties
Copyright
Preface
Acknowledgments
Contents
List of Figures and Tables
1: Introduction
1.1 The Semantics of “Compulsory Voting”
1.2 Arguments For and Against Compulsory Voting
1.2.1 Compulsory Voting and the Question of a Duty to Vote
1.2.2 Compulsory Voting and the Democratic Collective Action Problem
1.2.3 Compulsory Voting and Democratic Legitimacy
1.2.4 Compulsory Voting and Democratic Representation
1.2.5 Ripple Effects of Compulsory Voting
1.3 Compulsory Voting: When and Why?
1.4 Compulsory Voting Today
1.5 Recent Events Surrounding Compulsory Voting
1.6 Ways to Study the Impact of Compulsory Voting
1.7 A Summary of this Book
2: The Consequences of Compulsory Voting
2.1 Compulsory Voting, Turnout, and the Composition of Voting Populations
2.2 Compulsory Voting and Invalid Balloting
2.3 Compulsory Voting and Political Engagement and Knowledge
2.4 Compulsory Voting and Political Attitudes
2.5 Compulsory Voting and the “Quality” of Votes
2.6 Compulsory Voting and the Success of the Left and Right
2.7 Compulsory Voting and Party Behavior
2.8 Compulsory Voting and the Economy
2.9 Conclusion
3: How Compulsory Voting Affects Individuals
3.1 The Effects of Coercion
3.2 Theory: Compulsory Voting’s Divergent Effects on Citizens
3.3 Observable Implications and Hypotheses
3.4 Conclusion
4: The Correlates of Support for Compulsory Voting
4.1 Background Information
4.2 A Test of Hypothesis 1
4.3 Conclusion
5: The Effects of Compulsory Voting on Individuals: Empirical Tests
5.1 Cross-Country Tests of Hypotheses 2–4
5.2 Within-Country Tests of Hypotheses 2–4
5.2.1 Schaffhausen, Switzerland
5.2.2 Argentina
5.2.2.1 Tests of the Continuity Assumption
5.3 Conclusion
6: How Compulsory Voting Affects Parties
6.1 Mainstream and Non-Mainstream Political Parties
6.2 Theory: Compulsory Voting’s Divergent Effects on Political Parties
6.3 Observable Implications and Hypotheses
6.4 Conclusion
7: The Effects of Compulsory Voting on Political Parties: Empirical Tests
7.1 A Cursory Cross-Country Test of Hypothesis 5
7.2 Within-Country Test of Hypothesis 5
7.3 Cross-Country Tests of Hypotheses 6a and 6b
7.4 Conclusion
8: Conclusion
8.1 A Review of this Book
8.2 Future Directions for Academic Research
8.3 Implications for Policymakers and Reformers
8.3.1 Making it Easier to Register to Vote
8.3.2 Making it Easier to Vote
8.3.3 Rewards for Voting
8.4 Should Voting Be Compulsory?
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

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Beyond Turnout

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C OMPAR ATIV E POLI TICS Comparative Politics is a series for researchers, teachers, and students of political science that deals with contemporary government and politics. Global in scope, books in the series are characterized by a stress on comparative analysis and strong methodological rigour. The series is published in association with the European Consortium for Political Research. For more information visit www.ecprnet.eu The series is edited by Susan Scarrow, John and Rebecca Moores Professor of Political Science, University of Houston, and Jonathan Slapin, Professor of Political Institutions and European Politics, University of Zurich.

ot her titles in this series Party System Closure Party Alliances, Government Alternatives, and Democracy in Europe Fernando Casal Bértoa and Zsolt Enyedi The New Party Challenge Changing Cycles of Party Birth and Death in Central Europe and Beyond Tim Haughton and Kevin Deegan-Krause Multi-Level Democracy Integration and Independence Among Party Systems, Parties, and Voters in Seven Federal Systems Lori Thorlakson Citizen Support for Democratic and Autocratic Regimes Marlene Mauk Democratic Stability in an Age of Crisis Agnes Cornell, Jørgen Møller, and Svend-Erik Skaaning Coalition Governance in Central Eastern Europe Edited by Torbjörn Bergman, Gabriella Ilonszki, and Wolfgang C. Müller The Reshaping of West European Party Politics Agenda-Setting and Party Competition in Comparative Perspective Christoffer Green-Pedersen Parliaments in Time The Evolution of Legislative Democracy in Western Europe, 1866–2015 Michael Koß Inequality After the Transition Political Parties, Party Systems, and Social Policy in Southern and Postcommunist Europe Ekrem Karakoç Democracy and the Cartelization of Political Parties Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair

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Beyond Turnout How Compulsory Voting Shapes Citizens and Political Parties SHA N E P. SI N G H

1

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3 Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP, United Kingdom Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries © Shane P. Singh 2021 The moral rights of the author have been asserted First Edition published in 2021 Impression: 1 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Control Number: 2021939090 ISBN 978–0–19–883292–8 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198832928.001.0001 Printed and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials contained in any third party website referenced in this work.

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Preface My interest in compulsory voting began during an undergraduate semester abroad in Australia in the first part of 2003. (An earlier study abroad trip to Brazil failed to pique this interest, not least because I was at the time fully unaware of the country’s legal requirement to vote.) This interest remained dormant until I entered graduate school in political science at Michigan State University. Toward the end of my doctoral program, my graduate school colleague and roommate, Judd Thornton, brought to my attention an article in Political Behavior by Costas Panagopoulos (2008). The article shows that turnout is higher where voting is compulsory, especially where abstention penalties are strong and enforced. Panagopoulos’ article had three immediate effects on my thinking. First, it showed me that good journals were publishing empirical research on compulsory voting. Second, as Panagopoulos used aggregate-level measures to test hypotheses that operated at the individual level, it made me realize that there was room for further contribution in this domain. Third, it conjured up an earlier conversation I had with Judd and another grad school colleague, Benjamin Lundgren, during the Midwest Political Science Association Annual Conference. In that late-night discussion, set in a cheap Chicago hotel room, a simple idea popped up: people who abstain in countries with compulsory voting probably have systematically different reasons for doing so than people living under voluntary voting. Shortly thereafter, I crafted an extensive research agenda on compulsory voting, which is focused on the effects of the requirement to vote on political behavior beyond turnout. This book represents the culmination of more than a decade of my learning, thinking, and writing about compulsory voting. While I have previously published articles and chapters on the topic in academic journals and edited volumes, both alone and with coauthors, this book represents a broader and deeper investigation than any of this work. Most of the theorizing herein is new, and all of the arguments are more fleshed out than what appears in my articles and chapters, given the luxury of space that a book provides. The empirical tests, some of which rely on data collected for the purposes of this book, are also new. This book was written over a six-year period. Keeping with the comparative focus, its composition and the associated data collection and analyses took place in cities throughout the United States and the world (and on several forms of public transit). In order of time devoted, from most to least, this book was researched and composed in the following cities: Athens, GA; Cambridge, MA; Verona, Italy; Oxford, U.K.; Ann Arbor, MI; Somerville, MA; Chicago, IL; Orange Beach, AL; and Rochester, MI.

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Acknowledgments I am fortunate to have benefited from the feedback, advice, guidance, assistance, and support of several people during the multiyear period over which I wrote this book. This came in various forms, whether in informal conversations, email and text messages, or academic presentations. This project improved due to feedback from: Kris Dunn, who gave me tips on the psychological portions of the theory; Scott Mainwaring, who spoke with me about the relevance of my theory to Latin American party systems; Quinton Mayne, with whom I had stimulating discussions about many portions of the theory; Jonathan Polk, who provided expert feedback about the theoretical expectations regarding party behavior; and Matthew Singer, who provided me with helpful feedback on various portions of this book on multiple occasions. I am particularly grateful to Robert Lupton, who was a great source for insights on many topics, especially those relating to political parties. I presented this project in various stages of completion at: the Department of Political Science at the University of Connecticut in an event sponsored by the Political Economy Workshop and the Department Colloquium Committee; the School of Politics and International Studies Seminar Series at the University of Leeds in an event sponsored by the Centre for Democratic Engagement; and the Department of Political Science at the University of Copenhagen. I am grateful to audience members at each presentation for helpful comments. I also thank Robert Lupton and Matthew Singer, Kris Dunn, and Peter Thisted Dinesen for organizing these events, respectively. Many individuals provided me with helpful information pertaining to compulsory voting. I thank Reinhold Gärtner for meeting with me to discuss the use of compulsory voting in Austria, Narayanappa Sivanna for information on the use of compulsory voting in Karnataka, and Daniel Hidalgo for helpful information on the history of compulsory voting in Brazil. This book would not have been possible without the data made available from a number of organizations. It relies heavily on data from: the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems at the Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan and the GESIS-Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences; the Swiss Election Study at the Swiss Centre of Expertise in the Social Sciences at the University of Lausanne; the Latin American Public Opinion Project at Vanderbilt University; and the Comparative Manifestos Project housed at the WZB Berlin Social Science Center. I also benefited from the data made available by the Varieties of Democracy

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acknowledgments vii project, which is headquartered in the Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg, and the Polity IV Project, which is housed at the Center for Systemic Peace. I am also grateful to Jill Sheppard for sharing with me data from the 2013 ANUpoll and to Netquest for partnering with me to conduct the survey of Argentinians that features multiple times in this book. I also thank those who provided research assistance. Linan Jia did an excellent job helping to identify and catalog public opinion surveys that include questions about attitudes toward compulsory voting. Neil Williams provided valuable assistance gathering and summarizing the literature regarding arguments for and against compulsory voting. In the later stages, Jackson Tilley diligently proofread the manuscript. During the writing process, I benefited from accommodation provided by the Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation at the Harvard Kennedy School. I thank Miles Rapoport and E.J. Dionne for welcoming me into their Universal Voting Working Group, a collaborative effort hosted at the Kennedy School and the Brookings Institution. My participation in the group helped to sharpen my thinking on the arguments surrounding the use of compulsory voting, and it gave me the opportunity to discuss the scientific research on mandatory voting with a diverse group of scholars, activists, attorneys, politicians, and practitioners. Primary accommodation and financial backing for this project was provided by the School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA) at the University of Georgia. SPIA has been my academic home base for the duration of the project, and I am fortunate to work in the supportive environment that it provides. I am especially grateful to Markus Crepaz, who served as my department head as I started my career and provided me with the support and freedom necessary to craft a viable research agenda. As I embarked on this project, the academic book publishing process was entirely new to me. I am indebted to Paul Kellstedt for his generous help with the publication process and for detailed feedback on my book proposal. I also benefited from discussions about the publication process had with Jamie Carson, Rongbin Han, Amanda Murdie, and Jae-Jae Spoon. I also thank those who provided me with assistance throughout the publication process at Oxford University Press (OUP). In the proposal stage, I benefited from the responses of three anonymous reviewers recruited by OUP. In particular, I thank Dominic Byatt, who was kind, supportive, and accessible during the proposal, review, and acquisitions process. I owe a great debt to those who have helped nurture my career to this point. In particular, William Jacoby, my doctoral advisor, taught me the tools necessary to be a successful, empirically oriented social scientist early in my career, and he provided unfailing support as I advanced from a graduate student through to

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viii acknowledgments tenured professor. André Blais has also provided generous mentorship, and his kindness, humility, and relentless hard work have served as a guidepost. I am also grateful to my parents, who greatly influenced my career path and any professional successes I have had to this point. My mother demonstrated the immense benefits of self-discipline and hard work, and my father instilled in me a fascination with politics in other countries and an appreciation for mathematics. Finally, I thank my wife, Leyna. During my work on this project, our family doubled in size as we welcomed the arrival of our children, Isla and Orion. When I think back on the years over which this book was composed, I will remember most fondly our adventures in raising two very young kids while also moving about the United States and the world. Without Leyna and all her love, intelligence, determination, passion, support, laughter, and companionship, my life outside of work would be a lot less bright. And that is more important than any data set, identification strategy, statistical model, peer-reviewed journal article, or book with a top university press.

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Contents List of Figures and Tables

xi

1. Introduction 1.1 The Semantics of “Compulsory Voting” 1.2 Arguments For and Against Compulsory Voting

1 3 5

1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7

1.2.1 Compulsory Voting and the Question of a Duty to Vote 1.2.2 Compulsory Voting and the Democratic Collective Action Problem 1.2.3 Compulsory Voting and Democratic Legitimacy 1.2.4 Compulsory Voting and Democratic Representation 1.2.5 Ripple Effects of Compulsory Voting

5 8 9 10 11

Compulsory Voting: When and Why? Compulsory Voting Today Recent Events Surrounding Compulsory Voting Ways to Study the Impact of Compulsory Voting A Summary of this Book

16 18 22 31 34

2. The Consequences of Compulsory Voting 2.1 Compulsory Voting, Turnout, and the Composition of Voting Populations 2.2 Compulsory Voting and Invalid Balloting 2.3 Compulsory Voting and Political Engagement and Knowledge 2.4 Compulsory Voting and Political Attitudes 2.5 Compulsory Voting and the “Quality” of Votes 2.6 Compulsory Voting and the Success of the Left and Right 2.7 Compulsory Voting and Party Behavior 2.8 Compulsory Voting and the Economy 2.9 Conclusion

38

3. How Compulsory Voting Affects Individuals 3.1 The Effects of Coercion 3.2 Theory: Compulsory Voting’s Divergent Effects on Citizens 3.3 Observable Implications and Hypotheses 3.4 Conclusion

57 58 60 63 66

4. The Correlates of Support for Compulsory Voting 4.1 Background Information 4.2 A Test of Hypothesis 1 4.3 Conclusion

67 67 71 79

38 43 46 49 50 52 54 55 56

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x contents

5. The Effects of Compulsory Voting on Individuals: Empirical Tests 5.1 Cross-Country Tests of Hypotheses 2–4 5.2 Within-Country Tests of Hypotheses 2–4 5.2.1 Schaffhausen, Switzerland 5.2.2 Argentina

5.3 Conclusion

80 81 99 100 119

131

6. How Compulsory Voting Affects Parties 6.1 Mainstream and Non-Mainstream Political Parties 6.2 Theory: Compulsory Voting’s Divergent Effects on Political Parties 6.3 Observable Implications and Hypotheses 6.4 Conclusion

133 134 135 139 141

7. The Effects of Compulsory Voting on Political Parties: Empirical Tests 7.1 A Cursory Cross-Country Test of Hypothesis 5 7.2 Within-Country Test of Hypothesis 5 7.3 Cross-Country Tests of Hypotheses 6a and 6b 7.4 Conclusion

142 143 145 151 164

8. Conclusion 8.1 A Review of this Book 8.2 Future Directions for Academic Research 8.3 Implications for Policymakers and Reformers

167 167 171 173

8.3.1 Making it Easier to Register to Vote 8.3.2 Making it Easier to Vote 8.3.3 Rewards for Voting

8.4 Should Voting Be Compulsory?

Bibliography Index

175 176 177

178

179 205

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List of Figures and Tables Figures 4.1. The Mean Level of Support for Compulsory Voting Across Countries

73

4.2. Support for Compulsory Voting and Dissatisfaction with Democracy Across Countries

75

4.3. Correlates of Support for Compulsory Voting Across Countries (1)

77

4.4. Correlates of Support for Compulsory Voting Across Countries (2)

78

5.1. Intentions to Cast a Valid Ballot and Dissatisfaction with Democracy in Voluntary Systems

84

5.2. Reported Turnout and Dissatisfaction with Democracy in Voluntary Systems

85

5.3. Distributions of the Dependent Variables in the AmericasBarometer

88

5.4. Distributions of the Dependent Variables in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems

89

5.5. Conditional Effects of Dissatisfaction with Democracy on Support for Authorities and Indicators of Political Sophistication over Levels of Compulsory Voting

93

5.6. Conditional Effects of Dissatisfaction with Democracy on Vote Choice Extremity and Errors in Perceptions of Parties’ Ideologies over Levels of Compulsory Voting

95

5.7. Support for Authorities and Indicators of Political Sophistication over Dissatisfaction with Democracy in Voluntary and Strict Compulsory Voting Systems

97

5.8. Vote Choice Extremity and Errors in Perceptions of Parties’ Ideologies over Dissatisfaction with Democracy in Voluntary and Strict Compulsory Voting Systems

98

5.9. Reported Turnout and Dissatisfaction with Democracy in Cantons with Voluntary Voting

102

5.10. Reported Turnout and Age in German-Speaking Cantons with Voluntary Voting and Schaffhausen

103

5.11. Distributions of the Dependent Variables in the Swiss Election Study

106

5.12. Conditional Effects of Dissatisfaction with Democracy on Support for Authorities over Age Group in German-Speaking Cantons with Voluntary Voting and Schaffhausen

109

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xii list of figures and tables 5.13. Conditional Effects of Dissatisfaction with Democracy on Vote Choice Extremity over Age Group in German-Speaking Cantons with Voluntary Voting and Schaffhausen

111

5.14. Conditional Effects of Dissatisfaction with Democracy on Political Interest over Age Group in German-Speaking Cantons with Voluntary Voting and Schaffhausen

112

5.15. Conditional Effects of Dissatisfaction with Democracy on Errors in Perceptions of Parties’ Ideologies over Age Group in German-Speaking Cantons with Voluntary Voting and Schaffhausen

113

5.16. Support for Authorities over Dissatisfaction with Democracy by Age Group in German-Speaking Cantons with Voluntary Voting and Schaffhausen

115

5.17. Vote Choice Extremity over Dissatisfaction with Democracy by Age Group in German-Speaking Cantons with Voluntary Voting and Schaffhausen

116

5.18. Political Interest over Dissatisfaction with Democracy by Age Group in German-Speaking Cantons with Voluntary Voting and Schaffhausen

117

5.19. Errors in Perceptions of Parties’ Ideologies over Dissatisfaction with Democracy by Age Group in German-Speaking Cantons with Voluntary Voting and Schaffhausen

118

5.20. Reported Valid Voting and Dissatisfaction with Democracy Among Individuals Not Required to Vote in Argentina

121

5.21. Reported Turnout and Age in Days Among Those Subject to Voluntary and Compulsory Voting in Argentina

123

5.22. Distributions of the Dependent Variables in the 2019 Argentina Election Survey

124

5.23. Support for Authorities According to Dissatisfaction with Democracy Among Those Just Below and Above Age 18: Regression Discontinuity Results

125

5.24. Support for Authorities According to Dissatisfaction with Democracy Among Those Just Below and Above Age 70: Regression Discontinuity Results

126

5.25. Political Interest According to Dissatisfaction with Democracy Among Those Just Below and Above Age 18: Regression Discontinuity Results

127

5.26. Political Interest According to Dissatisfaction with Democracy Among Those Just Below and Above Age 70: Regression Discontinuity Results

128

5.27. Changes in Covariates at the Age 18 and Age 70 Thresholds: Regression Discontinuity Results

130

5.28. The Distribution of Respondents’ Ages Days on October 27, 2019

131

7.1. Candidate and Party Contact with Voters and Compulsory Voting Rules

145

7.2. Distribution of the Voter Mobilization Variable in the 2019 Argentina Election Survey

146

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list of figures and tables xiii 7.3. Voter Mobilization Among Those Just Below and Above Age 18: Regression Discontinuity Results

148

7.4. Voter Mobilization Among Those Just Below and Above Age 70: Regression Discontinuity Results

149

7.5. Voter Mobilization According to Ideology Among Those Just Below and Above Age 18: Regression Discontinuity Results

150

7.6. Voter Mobilization According to Ideology Among Those Just Below and Above Age 70: Regression Discontinuity Results

151

7.7. Distributions of the Dependent Variables in the Comparative Manifestos Project

153

7.8. Conditional Effects of Left-Right Position on Parties’ Policy Emphases over Levels of Compulsory Voting and Mainstream/Non-Mainstream Status

157

7.9. Emphasis of Patriotism and Nationalism over Left-Right Orientations in Voluntary and Moderate or Strict Compulsory Voting Systems for Mainstream and Non-Mainstream Parties

159

7.10. Pro-Equality Emphasis over Left-Right Orientations in Voluntary and Moderate or Strict Compulsory Voting Systems for Mainstream and Non-Mainstream Parties

160

7.11. Emphasis of Environmental Protection over Left-Right Orientations in Voluntary and Moderate or Strict Compulsory Voting Systems for Mainstream and Non-Mainstream Parties

161

7.12. Emphasis of Pro-Law-and-Order Positions over Left-Right Orientations in Voluntary and Moderate or Strict Compulsory Voting Systems for Mainstream and Non-Mainstream Parties

162

Tables 1.1. Where Compulsory Voting is Currently Used for National Elections

19

4.1. Public Opinion Surveys with Questions about Attitudes Toward Compulsory Voting

72

5.1. Surveys Included in the AmericasBarometer Sample

91

5.2. Surveys Included in the CSES Sample

92

5.3. Surveys Included in the Selects Sample

107

7.1. Country-Year Pairings Included in the CMP Sample

156

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1 Introduction Former U.S. president Barack Obama spoke favorably of compulsory voting during a 2016 speech at the University of Chicago Law School and at a town hall event in Cleveland the previous year. During his remarks in Chicago, President Obama suggested that, were the United States to compel turnout, the impact would be “transformative.” In contrast, in Paraguay in 2013, newly elected president Horacio Cartes admitted to a lifetime of abstention due to disenchantment with politicians and the political system, despite his country’s decades-old requirement to vote. Such diverging orientations toward compulsory voting often feature in debates over its merits and drawbacks. These are not confined to classrooms and newspaper editorials; they also occur at high levels of government. In many of the countries that legally compel turnout, lawmakers have recently engaged in deliberations over the abolition of compulsory voting. Conversely, in many countries with voluntary voting, there are routine debates over the adoption of a legal requirement to vote.1 In some cases, consideration has given way to action. Bulgaria, Samoa, and two Indian states (for select local elections) have adopted compulsory voting within the past ten years. Conversely, Chile and Cyprus abolished mandatory voting in 2012 and 2017, respectively. In 2019, the Flemish government nullified the requirement to vote in municipal and provincial elections, an obligation that had existed since 1893.2 When policymakers deliberate over compulsory voting, their arguments generally center on turnout, the legal and moral justifiability of an obligation to vote, and the feasibility of implementation and enforcement. Occasionally, the potentially educative effects of compelled turnout feature in these debates, but broader effects on citizens’ attitudes and political behavior are rarely considered. Consequences for political parties—and other actors and outcomes further removed from the election itself—are given almost no attention. This may be because there was, for many years, a paucity of academic work on the downstream effects of compulsory voting. Research on its secondary 1 Using Google News and translation software, I monitored media reports mentioning “compulsory voting,” “mandatory voting,” or “obligatory voting” and their Dutch, French, German, Greek, Gujarati, Hindi, Kannada, Portuguese, Spanish, Turkish, and Thai equivalents from 2014 through the finalization of this book. I found evidence of high-level debates over the adoption or abolition of compulsory voting in over a dozen countries during this time period. See Section 1.5 for discussion of these debates. 2 Compulsory voting is still in force in regional, federal, and European elections in Belgium, as well as in local and provincial contests outside of Flanders.

Beyond Turnout: How Compulsory Voting Shapes Citizens and Political Parties. Shane P. Singh, Oxford University Press. © Shane P. Singh 2021. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198832928.003.0001

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2 beyond turnout and tertiary consequences is now blossoming. More academic articles have been published on the topic in the past ten years than in the preceding century, and the annual count of such studies is rapidly trending upward.3 Policymakers and politicians can now pull from a rich body of scholarship when crafting their arguments for or against compulsory voting. Still, there are few published projects devoted to an in-depth analysis of compulsory voting and its putative effects. As of this writing, there exist seven4 books on various aspects of compulsory voting. The first to appear is by Henry Abraham, who published a short summary of his doctoral dissertation (1952a) as a book (1955), putting forth arguments about the compatibility of democracy and mandatory voting and providing details on its use. Several decades later, Anthoula Malkopoulou published much of her doctoral dissertation (2011) as a book (2015). Both contributions by Malkopoulou provide a finely detailed history of compulsory voting in Europe, including information on the debates surrounding its use. In a volume aptly subtitled For and Against (2014), Jason Brennan and Lisa Hill advance competing philosophical arguments in favor of and in opposition to compulsory voting. Brennan is a well-known opponent of compulsory voting, while Hill is a prominent proponent, and their coauthored book revisits many of the themes present in their earlier writings. Judith Brett’s From Secret Ballot to Democracy Sausage: How Australia Got Compulsory Voting, which was published in 2019, provides a political history of mandatory voting focused on Australia. Also in 2019, Peru’s National Office of Electoral Processes published a Spanish-language collection of three essays focused on the history, use, and consequences of compulsory voting in Peru and, to a lesser extent, Latin America more broadly (Valenzuela 2019). In 2020, Johnson and Orr published Should Secret Voting Be Mandatory?, which advances an argument that making voting, and voting in secret, compulsory would lead to cleaner elections.5 Most notably, Sarah Birch’s 2009 book, Full Participation, has proved hugely important for the study of compulsory voting. Birch’s manuscript provides a wealth of background information and data on mandatory voting provisions around the world, and it was one of the first projects, booklength or otherwise, to empirically examine compulsory voting’s effects beyond turnout. It is also influential, having been cited in most subsequent research on compulsory voting.

3

This is based on an extensive search conducted with Google Scholar. A comprehensive search uncovered no additional published books on compulsory voting written in a major world language. 5 There are a number of master’s theses and doctoral dissertations on compulsory voting that were not published as books, including those of Bandlow-Raffalski (2018); Bóveda (2013); Freire (2020); Kato (2008); Mackenna (2014); Maldonado (2015); Phillips (1974); Rangel (2017); Rovenský (2008); Solhaug (2016); and Talbot (2020). 4

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introduction 3 This book differs from, builds upon, and goes beyond Full Participation in a number of ways. First, it places comparatively little focus on pro- and anticompulsory voting arguments and the history of compulsory voting. Birch’s monograph devotes two full chapters to these topics (the above-mentioned manuscripts of Brennan and Hill (2014), Brett (2019), and Malkopoulou (2015) also feature a wealth of information on the arguments and history surrounding compulsory voting). In addition, while Birch presents sundry empirical analyses of mandatory voting’s potential second-order consequences, I focus on testing those explicitly derived from the theory I advance in earlier chapters. In doing so, I also place more emphasis on causal identification. While Birch’s key empirical analyses rely heavily on multiple regression analyses using variables from preexisting data sources, a number of analyses in this book use an original data set purpose-built for studying the causal effects of compulsory voting. Finally, this project comes more than a decade after Full Participation, and it provides an up-to-date review of the contemporary use of compulsory voting and the academic literature on the topic. It also includes discussion of the many changes to and from mandatory voting laws that have taken place since Birch’s contribution. In the remainder of this introductory chapter, I first discuss the meaning of the term “compulsory voting.” I then review arguments for and against the requirement to vote, with particular focus on matters of duty, collective action, legitimacy, representation, and reputed downstream consequences. Subsequently, I very briefly outline the history of compulsory voting and the potential reasons for its use. I then provide information on where and how compulsory voting is used today and lay out a detailed discussion of recent events surrounding compulsory voting throughout the world. From there, I discuss various empirical methods available to academic researchers for assessing the effects of compulsory voting. I conclude with a roadmap of the remainder of this book and a summary of its empirical findings.

1.1 The Semantics of “Compulsory Voting” Compulsory voting rules, which are usually established in a country’s constitution, but may be additionally or exclusively stipulated by the electoral code, generally set out an obligation to vote without clearly specifying what voting is. For example, Section 245 of Australia’s Commonwealth Electoral Act requires “every elector to vote at each election.” Article 14 of Brazil’s constitution reads, “Electoral enrollment and voting are mandatory for persons over eighteen years of age.”6 Articles 6 The original Portuguese reads, “O alistamento eleitoral e o voto são obrigatórios para os maiores de dezoito anos.” Article 14 also notes that voting is voluntary for the illiterate and those aged 16–17 and over 70 (see Table 1.1).

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4 beyond turnout 62 and 68 of Belgium’s constitution, which respectively reference elections to the lower and upper houses, note, “voting is obligatory and secret.”7 The ambiguity of such clauses has led to a common argument that the phrase “compulsory voting” is a misnomer, in that individuals need only to show up to the polls to have their names checked off the roll (e.g. Hill 2004; Lijphart 1997, p. 11; Orr 1997; but see Pringle 2012).8 Irrespective of the text of the law, the ubiquity of the secret ballot means that one can easily go into the voting booth and cast a blank or spoiled ballot nearly everywhere compulsory voting is used, thus avoiding a penalty for abstention without actually lodging a preference. Tellingly, invalid balloting is more common where voting is compulsory than where it is voluntary (e.g. Kouba and Lysek 2016, 2019; Power and Garand 2007; Reynolds and Steenbergen 2006; Uggla 2008). However, valid voting rates also tend to be higher where voting is mandatory (Wilford 2017), as many compelled voters do cast a legitimate ballot (Solvak and Vassil 2015; Uggla 2008, pp. 1158–1160). Whether or not compulsory voting laws require citizens to merely show up to the polls or to actually cast a valid ballot, their effect is to make both more likely. Further, any displeasure generated by being compelled to the polls is unlikely to be fully assuaged by the fact that one may not be legally required to fill out the ballot paper. To borrow an analogy from Lever (2008, p. 64, note 4), a non-Christian who is forced to attend church will find little consolation in learning that he or she is not required to pray. Not all places with compulsory voting explicitly mandate voter registration, meaning a citizen may be able to dodge fines for nonvoting by never enrolling. However, such a strategy is often impossible. As discussed in Section 1.4, many countries with compulsory voting require that one votes to gain access to certain government services and privileges instead of, or in addition to, levying cash fines. Neglecting to enroll will also prevent one from accessing such services. Moreover, compulsory voting has a strong and positive association with turnout across countries even when turnout is measured as the percentage of the votingage population, rather than the enrolled population, that participated in elections (Fornos, Power, and Garand 2004; Panagopoulos 2008). This robust link would not exist if mandatory voting were enfeebled by mass avoidance of registration. The semantics surrounding legal requirements to vote are thereby not a concern of this book. Lexically, I will take the words “compulsory,” “mandatory,” “obligatory,” and “required” to have the same meaning, along with their respective

7 The Belgian constitution has official versions in Dutch, French, and German. Respectively, the original wording in each language is as follows: “De stemming is verplicht en geheim,” “Le vote est obligatoire et secret,” and “Die Stimmabgabe ist obligatorisch und geheim.” 8 Though, in the state of South Australia, the election law and ballot papers themselves explicitly state that blank ballots do not breach the requirement to vote.

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introduction 5 cognates. Further, unless otherwise noted or implied, I use the terms “voting” and “turning out,” as well as “to vote” and “to turn out,” interchangeably.

1.2 Arguments For and Against Compulsory Voting Political philosophers including St. Thomas Aquinas, Thomas Hobbes, Immanuel Kant, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau saw coercion as a fundamental and necessary role of the state. John Stuart Mill also saw state coercion as sometimes necessary but argued against cajoling citizens into behaviors merely because they are deemed by society to be good. Mill (1859a, p. 22) writes, “[an individual] cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise.” Yet Mill (1861) also wrote that “[a citizen’s] vote is not a thing in which he has an option; it has no more to do with his personal wishes than the verdict of a juryman” (pp. 198–199; see Birch 2009, p. 41). Thus, for Mill, it seems that voting is inherently a duty, though perhaps not one that should be enforced by the state. A number of subsequent authors have engaged with the deontology of electoral participation as it relates to compulsory voting: is there a duty to vote, and if so, is compulsory voting justifiable as a means of enforcing this duty? In this section, I first consider the question of the duty to vote before reviewing common arguments for and against compulsory voting.

1.2.1 Compulsory Voting and the Question of a Duty to Vote The presumed duty to vote has a civic foundation, in that being a good citizen in a democracy involves contributing to collective decisions by expressing one’s preference. It also has a gratitude foundation, in that one should not desecrate one’s freedom to vote by failing to do so (Brennan and Hill 2014, pp. 62–65). Morally suasive voter turnout campaigns sometimes reference these sources of duty with slogans such as “your vote makes a difference” and the more asperous “people died for your right to vote.” For some, democratic citizenship entails no duty to vote, and voting is not obviously superior to abstention. Morris-Jones (1954) writes that the idea of a duty to vote is totalitarian and voter apathy is itself a virtue, in that it signals that people have the freedom to engage or disengage from politics as they please. Lomasky and Brennan (2000) make the case against the duty to vote as follows: one has no

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6 beyond turnout duty to pursue one’s own interests, and, in any case, one’s vote has an infinitesimal chance of being pivotal; there is no guarantee that one’s vote will enhance the social choice; high turnout is not obviously more satisfactory than low turnout; voting is “palpably inadequate to qualify as a significant act of political expression” (p. 82); and nonvoting is itself a form of expression. Volacu (2020) argues that, if there is a duty to vote, it is a duty to vote well, which is harder to defend and impossible to enforce. Further, contrary to the idea of an inherent duty to participate in elections, the right to vote could imply a right not to vote (see, e.g., Saunders 2018, pp. 101–103). If such a right to abstention exists, forcing a citizen to vote would be inimical to his or her democratic prerogatives. Yet, a positive right does not necessarily imply a negative right (e.g. Lardy 2004). For example, a citizen cannot, and very likely would not, reject the right to a fair trial or a minimum wage (Birch 2018, p. 25). Still, Blomberg (1995, p. 1049) argues that the right not to vote deserves legal protection “in order to reassure the individual voter that he or she retains freedom of choice in an election.” In response to this argument, Lijphart (1997, p. 11) notes that compulsory voting does not impose political expression, as citizens may opt not to cast a valid vote after showing up at the polls. Engelen (2007, p. 28), Hill (2002, pp. 85–86), and Lardy (2004, p. 318) further note that nonvoting actually expresses nothing, in that the reasons for abstention are not known. They thereby suggest that ballot papers include a “none of the above” option or a space to formally register complaints. For the entirely disaffected citizen, though, even the act of showing up at the polls could constitute an endorsement of the democratic system. Several courts have weighed in on this debate. In 1971, the European Court of Human Rights rejected an Austrian petitioner who claimed that he should not have been forced by the country’s then-mandatory voting system to choose among candidates he found unsuitable, on the grounds that he was free to cast an invalid ballot (Brennan and Hill 2014, p. 160). In Australia in 2013, the High Court refused to hear an appeal in a case in which the petitioner had unsuccessfully argued before lower courts that voting is a right and not a duty. This decision aligned with many earlier court cases in Australia that had rejected the existence of a right not to vote (Hill 2015). The United States Supreme Court, for its part, has found that the First Amendment to the Constitution protects the right not to communicate. For example, it has invalidated a requirement that students recite the Pledge of Allegiance and ruled against compelling citizens to display state mottos on car license plates (Singh 2018b; Singh and Williams 2021). Still, U.S. federal courts have never explicitly found a constitutional right not to vote, despite having had the opportunity to do so. Notably, in separate 1991 and 2017 cases in which the petitioners held that voter purge statutes violate the right to abstention, federal courts ruled against

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introduction 7 the plaintiffs and neglected to establish a constitutional protection of abstention (see Blomberg 1995; Wise 2018).9 In India, the Supreme Court rejected a private petition in favor of compulsory voting in 2009. However, in 2014 the court directed the central government and the Election Commission to consider mandatory voting in reaction to a subsequent petition (the court itself formally rejected the 2014 petition in 2019; see also Section 1.5). The Election Commission responded that compulsory voting would violate constitutional protections of free speech and expression, and the government argued that voting is not a duty and that a legal requirement to do so would be undemocratic. This reasoning was based on a report by the Law Commission, which, in addition to labeling compulsory voting undemocratic, deemed it “illegitimate, expensive, unable to improve quality political participation and awareness, and difficult to implement” (Guha and Chauhan 2016). Those who recognize a right not to vote tend to abhor the prospect of statemandated turnout. Conversely, for most writers who view voting as an inherent duty, compulsory voting is rather uncontroversial. One is obligated to act in accordance with his or her duties, and if a citizen of a democracy has a duty to vote, state coercion of citizens to the voting booth seems defensible. To use a perhaps strained analogy, a citizen’s duty to behave nonviolently toward others (in peacetime, and excluding situations of self defense) is largely uncontested, and there are thus very few debates over a state’s right to punish those who commit assault, rape, or murder. Compulsory voting could also externally create a duty to vote. Though they argue strongly against any inherent basis for such a duty, Lomasky and Brennan (2000, pp. 64–65) allow that, if there is a moral duty to follow the law, there may be a duty to participate under compulsory voting. Per Lacroix (2007, p. 193), “liberty does not mean the absence of obligations but rather the respect of the laws that men have made and accepted for themselves.”10 Manufactured duty aside, the matter of an inherent duty to vote may be immaterial, as states routinely coerce citizens into following laws for the societal good, whether or not they are written to enforce obvious democratic duties. For some coerced activities, such as waiting at a red light when there is no traffic in sight or removing trash bins from the curb within 24 hours, the case for duty may be tenuous. Others, such as serving on a jury and educating one’s children, are

9 A right not to vote has been established at the state level, however. In an 1896 case (Kansas City v. Whipple, 136 Mo. 475 [1896]), the Supreme Court of the U.S. state of Missouri struck down a compulsory voting law adopted by Kansas City for municipal elections, writing that “it is not within the power of any legislative authority, national or state, to compel the citizen to exercise [the right to vote].” 10 The question of whether one is morally obligated to obey a law that is unjust—whether in perception or in reality—remains.

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8 beyond turnout seen by most to be ingrained duties in a democracy.11 I next consider whether compulsory voting might be needed to ensure that democracy does not fall victim to a social dilemma whereby turnout sinks to unsustainable levels.

1.2.2 Compulsory Voting and the Democratic Collective Action Problem Electoral democracy can be conceptualized as a collective good. In this view, for democracy to appropriately function, each elector must fulfill his or her role and vote. If the individual incentive to turn out is weak, or the costs of doing so are relatively high, free riding via abstention becomes a “rational” way for one to enjoy the fruits of democracy without expending the effort needed to participate. Umbers (2020) discusses free riding at the group level, noting that abstainers exploit the members of their own social groups who do vote, garnering the representational benefits of their participation without contributing. More drastically, if all citizens were to behave in an individually rational way, a democratic system would cease to function. Compulsory voting helps solve this collective action problem by giving individuals an added incentive to vote. Birch (2018, p. 26) writes that compulsory voting provides an “effective and convenient coordination mechanism enabling [citizens] to overcome the electoral collective action problem.” Just as societies overcome collective action problems by requiring jury duty or forcibly collecting taxes, they can ensure that electoral democracy persists by requiring that citizens do their part and vote. In the words of Lijphart (1997, p. 11), “compulsory voting entails a very small decrease in freedom compared with many other problems of collective action that democracies solve by imposing obligations.” Opponents of such ideas often claim that abstention from voting is not really free riding, in that nonvoters rarely abstain with the goal of selfishly benefiting from some collective good. Instead, abstainers may be “inadvertent recipient[s] of benefits not deliberately sought” (Lomasky and Brennan 2000, p. 64). Moreover, some may choose to abstain not because they are shirking, but because it is the most effective way to send the message that they approve of all competing parties equally (Lever 2010, p. 911). A separate challenge to the idea that low turnout represents a collective action problem questions whether democracy is really a collective good that thrives with more participation. Conversely, because some people are more capable than others, democracy could be better off with less participation among the 11 Thaysen and Albertsen (Forthcoming) consider the case of obligatory organ donor registration, which they find to be more justifiable than compulsory voting.

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introduction 9 misinformed or ignorant (cf. Rosema 2007). Indeed, to some, epistocracy, under which those with knowledge of public affairs are given more political power, is preferable to democracy (see, e.g., Brennan 2016). Per this view, nonvoting, which tends to be more likely among those who are less knowledgeable (Smets and van Ham 2013), could be beneficial for democracy.

1.2.3 Compulsory Voting and Democratic Legitimacy The collective action argument puts forth that higher turnout is good because it is necessary for democracy to function as it should. The legitimacy argument instead sees elevated turnout as a way to confer legitimacy on elected governments. The social contract intrinsic to democratic governance relies on the consent and validation of the government on the part of the governed. Thus, compulsory voting, by increasing electoral participation, can legitimize election outcomes and the power of those who are elected. Supporters of the legitimacy argument often note that governments elected on low turnout—perhaps below half of those eligible—cannot truly claim a mandate (e.g. Engelen 2007, p. 25; Hill 2010, p. 918). If everyone voted, the policies of elected governments would, in theory, be closer to the median preference in the population. Maskivker (2016) invokes the Condorcet Jury Theorem, the “miracle of aggregation,”12 and the benefits of cognitive diversity for collective decisionmaking to argue that more people participating boosts the likelihood that the democratic system will arrive at decisions consistent with the public interest. In a challenge to the legitimacy argument, Lever (2010, pp. 914–915) notes that many of those who choose not to vote may still deem the government legitimate. Thus, low turnout under voluntary voting could in fact signal satisfaction with the current regime. Conversely, if those who deem the regime illegitimate stay home, low turnout could serve as a valuable signal of dissatisfaction among citizens. Either way, one might question whether high participation rates truly confer legitimacy on a government if they are reached unwillingly. Chapman (2019, p. 107) allows that, because compulsory voting removes the costless option of staying home, it prevents dissatisfied individuals from abstaining to signal their discontent. Thus, high turnout under compulsory voting is not a reliable signal of perceived legitimacy in the electorate. However, since compulsory voting prevents disaffection-based abstention, it incentivizes the disillusioned to seek other outlets for voicing dissent.

12

This states that if errors by ignorant voters are random, they will cancel out in the aggregate.

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10 beyond turnout

1.2.4 Compulsory Voting and Democratic Representation Members of disadvantaged socioeconomic groups are generally less likely to vote, meaning their concerns are less likely to be addressed by politicians than those of the better off, who turn out at a higher rate. Consequently, the argument for compulsory voting as a vehicle for better representation states that, if socioeconomically disadvantaged voters were compelled to the polls, thereby ironing out disparities in turnout rates, their relative political influence would increase and governments would become more broadly representative. In this vein, speaking at a civil rights symposium in 1972, former U.S. president Lyndon B. Johnson argued that boosting African American participation rates by compelling turnout would enhance democratic representation. With compulsory voting, Johnson concluded, the United States would be “a better country” and “a purer democracy”. Arend Lijphart forcefully advocated for mandatory voting on similar grounds in his addresses to the meetings of five different political science associations in the mid 1990s. His 1996 Presidential Address to the American Political Science Association, which was published in the American Political Science Review in 1997, has received more scholarly attention than any other piece on compulsory voting.13 Indeed, many authors refer to the argument that compulsory voting can reduce turnout-based representational inequalities as the “Lijphart Thesis” or something similar (e.g. Carey and Horiuchi 2017; Hooghe and Pelleriaux 1998; Loewen, Milner, and Hicks 2008; Maroto and Došek 2018). Lijphart’s reasoning is backed up by a formal theoretical model presented by Bugarin and Portugal (2015). At the same time, compulsory voting may place a particular burden on the less fortunate. Turning out to vote often entails material costs, including transportation and lost wages. Such costs are relatively high for the socioeconomically disadvantaged individuals, who tend to have lower incomes and less flexibility in work schedules. Thus, avoiding the fines associated with abstention may be effectively more costly for the underprivileged. Further, for socioeconomically disadvantaged individuals who do elect to abstain, the resulting fines will make up a relatively large portion of their incomes. Arguably, even if these initial costs of compulsory voting weigh more heavily on the less fortunate at first, the long-term benefits of their participation, discussed below in Section 1.2.5, will justify this imbalance. More immediately, holding elections on weekends or national holidays, as many countries with compulsory voting do, helps diminish the costs associated with missed work. And, progressively linking penalties for abstention to income or wealth can address inequities 13 According to Google Scholar, Lijphart’s piece has been cited almost 2,500 times in the academic literature, as of this writing. Few other pieces on compulsory voting have garnered even 10 percent as many citations.

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introduction 11 in their potency. Peru’s compulsory voting law, for example, adjusts for the wealth level of the district in which a citizen resides, and fines in Brazil were formerly indexed to the regional minimum wage. Still, making abstention more costly for those in richer areas could decrease the extent to which compulsory voting reduces representational inequalities by incentivizing turnout most strongly among the rich. Further, failure to pay fines for abstention in Peru prevents nonvoters from using public services, such as banking and passport offices, which may be unimportant to poorer individuals. The use of such sanctions, which are applied in similar form in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, and Uruguay, could, counter the Lijphart Thesis, actually reinforce or elevate socioeconomic inequalities in turnout. The ability of compulsory voting to serve as a tool to cajole the rich, in particular, was recognized by the authors of some early essays on compulsory voting in the United States, who argued for penalties that would, by design, most forcefully encourage participation among the well-to-do (Broomall 1893; Holls 1891). I review empirical work related to the Lijphart Thesis in Section 2.1.

1.2.5 Ripple Effects of Compulsory Voting Many scholars and proponents of compulsory voting argue that, beyond increasing or equalizing participation rates, compulsory voting can have desirable effects on individuals, society, and politics. Here I consider these arguments and their retorts, while also reviewing the insights of some theoretical models of mandatory voting. I do not, however, consider empirical studies of compulsory voting’s effects, as these are reviewed in detail in Chapter 2. Foremost among the potential downstream benefits of mandatory voting is an increase in citizens’ levels of political knowledge and engagement. As stated by Mill (1859b, p. 22), “the possession and the exercise of political, and among others of electoral, rights, is one of the chief instruments both of moral and of intellectual training for the popular mind.” Many early writers suggest that the educative effect of voting will manifest even when it is coerced. Holls (1891, p. 598) argues that compulsory voting in the United States would give individuals a strong incentive to become politically informed, as the obligation to vote would spur the “desire of doing so intelligently.”14 Broomall (1893), who argues for a system of compulsory voting in the United States implemented via tax credits (pp. 94–95),15 explains, “in time the voter who begins by voting merely to save 14 Holls is less sanguine about the prospect of “ignorant foreign and negro voters” seeking out political information in order to cast a well-reasoned vote (p. 603). 15 This setup is more consistent with a system of rewards for voting (see Section 8.3.3), though Broomall explicitly frames his suggested reform as a variety of compulsory voting.

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12 beyond turnout his money will soon find himself acquiring an interest in the business apart from that feature of it, and will gradually come to act from the higher motive of serving his country” (p. 96). Nerincx (1901) refers to compulsory voting as “the alpha of electoral organization” (p. 88) and goes on to argue, “there is every reason to think that, everywhere the obligation would breed the custom of attendance and that this in turn would awaken a new interest in political campaigns” (p. 90). Reflecting on the use of compulsory voting in Belgium, Barthélemy (1912) argues that it helped engender a politically educated electorate in that country. Such ideas were reflected in deliberation over the adoption of compulsory voting in Australia, with one member of the House of Representatives stating in 1924, “by compelling people to vote we are likely to arouse in them an intelligent interest and to give them a political knowledge that they do not at present possess” (Morris-Jones 1954, p. 32). More recent authors take a similar stance on compulsory voting’s capacity to engender political engagement and information. Lijphart (1997) made this argument in his above-mentioned addresses to several political science associations in 1995 and 1996, stating that compulsory voting could serve as a “form of civic education and political stimulation” (p. 10). Lijphart’s claim is echoed in writings by Engelen (2007), Hill (2000), and Lacroix (2007). In pieces drafted for U.S. law reviews, Matsler (2003, p. 955, note 14) writes, “presumably, if Americans are required to vote, they will take the time to learn about issues that they might not learn about under a voluntary voting scheme,” and See (2007, p. 597) notes, “another indirect benefit of compulsory voting is that it might lead to the kinds of changes in American political culture that could increase political awareness and engagement.” Grayling (2017, p. 161) suggests making voting compulsory at an early age for similar reasons: “if voting begins at sixteen in the context of civic education there will be a greater chance of responsible and thoughtful voting continuing thereafter.” Elliott (2017) argues that a requirement to turn out nudges those who do not believe they have a reason to vote to the polls by reminding them that participation may be in their best interests. For Elliott, such a nudge should incentivize engagement and thereby prevent a “fall into utter disconnection from politics” (p. 665). Chapman (2019) similarly argues that forced voting reminds citizens of their political agency, thus giving them reason to become informed and engaged. Discussing the Australian case, Brett (2019, p. 178) writes that repeated compelled electoral experience leads voters to become “better informed and more interested than had voting been a matter of choice.” Others cast doubt on the assertion that mandated turnout would spur engagement and knowledge, instead arguing that it would bring the unknowledgeable to the polls and even lead some to (further) withdraw from politics. While Donaldson (1915) suggests that compulsory voting might remind individuals of the importance of their civic duty to vote (p. 461), he goes on to state that “the wisdom of any attempt to improve the character of our electorate by a law

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introduction 13 compelling the universal exercise of the suffrage is extremely doubtful” (p. 464). Crisp (1950, p. 91) suggests that the introduction of compulsory voting in Australia may have discouraged political education and led people to view voting as a burden rather than a privilege (though he admitted this was not testable at the time of his writing). Also in Australia, Mackerras (1968) attributes the prevalence of “donkey voting,” the practice of simply ranking candidates in the order in which they appear on the ballot, to the country’s use of compulsory voting (but see Hill 2006), while Aitkin (1982, p. 80) notes that compulsory voting in Australia “brought to the polls the indifferent and the apathetic.” More recently, while sympathetic to compulsory voting, Hasen (1996, p. 2175) notes that “the risk of poor decision-making is an unavoidable side effect.” Saunders (2010a, p 74) similarly worries that compulsory voting encourages participation among those unable to “use their votes wisely”. Fishkin (2009, pp. 28–29) writes that compulsory voting in Australia “has done little or nothing to improve the level of knowledge or engagement among voters,” and he further speculates that it has reduced these traits. Brennan (chp. 4 of Brennan and Hill 2014, entitled “Should We Force the Drunk to Drive?”) takes perhaps the most extreme stance against the idea that compulsory voting can engender sophistication, arguing, for example, that compulsory voting “is like a magic wand that makes the electorate dumber about politics” (p. 104). If this is true, compulsory voting could harm the social choice: Jakee and Sun (2006) create a formal theoretical model that demonstrates how compulsory voting can lead to the election of less popular candidates if it indeed compels the less informed to the polls without also incentivizing a political education. Other authors use formal models to glean insight into the relationship between compulsory voting and political information seeking itself. Börgers (2004) shows that, for majority voting in small electorates, compulsory voting encourages individuals to disinvest time spent seeking information because it decreases the probability that one’s vote will be pivotal, and Faravelli, Man, and Nguyen (2016) demonstrate that Börgers’ model generalizes to non-majority voting. However, Krasa and Polborn (2009) illustrate that it is specific to the cases of an evenly divided electorate or a preexisting high turnout rate, and Ghosal and Lockwood (2009) show Börgers’ finding reverses when voters commonly value a feature of the competing candidates (such as competence).16 Tyson (2016) postulates that compulsory voting incentivizes information gathering, as it impels individuals to ensure that the vote they cast will provide them with a benefit, though he also

16 Krishna and Morgan (2012) show that Ghosal and Lockwood’s finding itself reverses when electorates are large.

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14 beyond turnout notes that compulsory voting “cannot ensure that all votes are informed votes” (p. 1017).17 If compulsory voting incentivizes engagement with the political system, it may also foster pro-democracy orientations. This idea has been used to support proposals for making voting compulsory in the first election for which one is eligible (Birch and Lodge 2015; Saunders 2010b); turning out to vote, even under coercion, could empower citizens, instill a habit of voting, and foster a sense of civic duty. Poama and Theuns (2019) advocate making turnout temporarily compulsory for those convicted of serious crimes and thus in violation of democratic norms. A voting obligation, they argue, would bring offenders “back into the democratic fold” (p. 808). Conversely, individuals may turn out under compulsory voting “simply to comply rather than to contribute” (Lardy 2004, p. 320), meaning it is unlikely that compelled voting could socialize into voters lofty civic orientations. Worse yet, they may develop negative attitudes toward a system in which their participation is forced. In particular, among those who are unlikely to vote by their own volition, any negative attitudes toward electoral democracy may be heightened by mandatory participation. Consistent with this idea, Robson (1923, p. 576–577), in an early essay considering the consequences of the adoption of compulsory voting in the United Kingdom, argued that it would induce political education, but only if it did not “cause widespread irritation” among the politically apathetic. Abraham (1952b, pp. 349–350), who acknowledges but doubts that compulsory voting could induce interest in political issues, also notes that it “could repel and disgust” otherwise routine voters. At the party level, compulsory voting may lead to moderation. The logic goes that political moderates are less likely to hold views intensely, and thus less likely to participate in elections where voting is optional. As a result, where moderates are compelled to the polls, widely appealing campaign platforms are more likely to be successful, and centrist political parties are more likely to come to power (Birch 2009, p. 52; Brett 2019, pp. 178–179; Tingsten 1937, p. 183). This line of reasoning was used by proponents of compulsory voting during debates over its potential introduction in Belgium and Greece (Birch 2009, p. 30; Malkopoulou 2015, p. 141), and it “has been used diachronically as the main principle that 17 Some consider debates over the link between compulsory voting and political engagement and sophistication immaterial. Per Engelen (2007), democracy is not to be valued for its efficiency, but instead because all individuals’ preferences are treated as equally valuable. Voters should be free to arrive at their preferences in any way they choose, and concern about the potential impact of compulsory voting on citizens’ political competence thus dangerously “implies deciding beforehand which votes are worthy and which are not” (p. 29). Taking a rather different position, during debates over the introduction of compulsory voting in the Australian parliament in 1924, Senator Albert Gardiner stated, “I hold the view that the opinions of the negligent and apathetic section of the electors are not worth obtaining” (Kato 2008, p. 45).

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introduction 15 justifies and motivates the endorsement of compulsory voting” (Malkopoulou 2015, p. 37).18 Malkopoulou (2020) argues that compulsory voting can stem populist challenges to moderate politics by: undercutting populist parties’ mobilization of the discontented; decreasing representational inequities (see Section 2.8) and thereby lessening a source of populist discontent; and reducing socioeconomic inequality (again see Section 2.8), which drives support for populist political parties. There is, conversely, a logical pathway by which compulsory voting promotes polarization. Those who prefer extreme parties with little chance of victory may, in fact, rationally abstain where participation is voluntary but turn out and cast a vote for their preferred party where it is required. Further, uninformed voters who are compelled to vote may choose haphazardly, thus increasing the likelihood that fringe parties win votes, and those who turn out against their will could plump for fringe or antiestablishment parties out of protest. With regard to campaigns, many writers posit that compulsory voting’s mobilizing effect leads parties to focus on conversion rather than getting out the vote (e.g. Aitkin 1982, p. 253; Birch 2009, pp. 59–60; Crisp 1950, p. 89; Jackman 2001; Karp, Banducci, and Bowler 2008; Lijphart 1997).19 It may also disincentivize attempts to purchase support. Many authors posit a negative link between compulsory voting and vote buying (e.g. Donaldson 1915; Holls 1891; Johnson and Orr 2020, pp. 83–84; Schaffer 2008, p. 124; see also Gans-Morse, Mazzuca, and Nichter 2014, and Morgan and Várdy 2012, who differentiate types of vote buying). Quite simply, it costs more to buy enough votes (or abstentions) to win an election when the number of voters rises, and people who are externally incentivized to participate are less likely to require a payment to turn out (or to accept a payment to stay home). Holls (1891, pp. 598–599) provides an example of a farmer who would have to forgo income from a lost harvest in order to spend time voting. To get the farmer to the polls, Holls suggests, campaigners are prone to offer him a compensatory payment. Compulsory voting, he argues, would prevent this turnout-buying scenario from taking place (see also Donaldson 1915, p. 461). In line with this, in Belgium and Thailand, supporters of the introduction of compulsory voting argued that it would help to curtail parties’ attempts to buy votes (Birch 2009, chp. 2; Hicken 2007; Malkopoulou 2015, chp. 3; Malkopoulou 18 Valerie Jarrett, a senior adviser to former U.S. president Barack Obama, advocated for mandatory voting on these grounds during a November 2018 talk at Princeton University and on a popular podcast a few months earlier. Julia Gillard, a former Australian prime minister, made the same argument, again on a podcast, in November 2019. 19 Kim Beazley, who has held positions as the leader of the opposition and deputy prime minister of Australia, the Australian ambassador to the United States, and the governor of Western Australia, noted that parties in Australia are unconcerned with getting out the vote due to the country’s system of compulsory voting in a February 2019 conversation with the Universal Voting Working Group at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C.

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16 beyond turnout 2016, p. 165; Murray 1998), as did the proposer of a trio of unsuccessful bills meant to implement compulsory voting in Canada in the late 1800s (Courtney and Wilby 2007). Even in modern Australia, where elections are comparatively very clean (Norris 2017), concerns were voiced during a 1996 government review of electoral matters that the repeal of compulsory voting could lead parties to pay for votes. Prominent contemporary leaders elsewhere have linked compulsory voting to a decline in vote buying in recent years. For example, Bulgaria’s former president, in the country’s deliberations over the 2016 introduction of compulsory voting, argued that it would reduce the relative impact of purchased votes on electoral outcomes. In Mexico, the former president of the Federal Electoral Institute suggested multiple times between 2017–2019 that the country should begin enforcing its constitutionalized but unenforced mandatory voting requirement to reduce vote buying and other forms of clientelistic vote seeking. In Colombia, a member of the National Electoral Council argued in 2020 that implementing compulsory voting would lessen vote buying and make citizens commit to democracy for nonmonetary reasons, an argument that was echoed by a representative who introduced a bill aimed at establishing mandatory voting shortly thereafter. If compulsory voting lessens vote buying, it would also boost the overall integrity of elections. Further, any increase in electoral integrity due to compulsory voting (see Section 8.2) would reinforce its potential to enhance democratic legitimacy, as discussed above in Section 1.2.3.

1.3 Compulsory Voting: When and Why? The first recorded example of compulsory voting comes from Ancient Greece. Although only select male citizens were eligible to vote in Athens, there was an apparent need to provide an impetus for participation, as exemplified by Solon’s Law on Stasis. Aristotle’s Athenaion Politeia records the law as follows: And as he saw that the state was often in a condition of party strife, while some of the citizens through slackness were content to let things slide, he laid down a special law to deal with them, enacting that whoever when civil strife prevailed did not join forces with either party was to be disfranchised and not to be a member of the state (Malkopoulou 2015, p. 52).

There are other measures for ensuring participation in Athens on record. Perhaps most memorable among these—even if apocryphal—is the use of reddyed rope to corral the delinquent to meetings of the democratic assembly. Those with red markings on their body or clothes could be identified and subjected to a fine (see Malkopoulou 2015, p. 53).

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introduction 17 There were also measures for compelling political participation in medieval and early modern Europe. In the 1300s, Toulon, France, had in place a system of local government where councilors would be compelled to represent their communities (see Malkopoulou 2015, pp. 56–57). In Switzerland in the late 1700s and early 1800s, certain cantons required attendance among those eligible (with a sword in tow) at assembly meetings. Depending on the canton, those in violation could be denied a free dinner, disenfranchised, fined, or suspended from public office (Birch 2009, p. 22; Malkopoulou 2015, pp. 57–58; Robson 1923, pp. 570–571). Greece codified an obligation to vote in 1833 (Malkopoulou 2015, p. 59), and by the early 1900s compulsory voting had spread to around 20 countries in Europe and Latin America. Voting was also mandatory in some of the American colonies in the 1600s and 1700s (Birch 2009, p. 20). So why, historically and contemporarily, do some countries make voting mandatory? Colonialism and cultural tires are a strong predictor of the adoption of a requirement to vote. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, a rare example of an African country with compulsory voting, inherited the institution from Belgium. Cyprus likely adopted its former compulsory voting rule with reference to those in Greece and Turkey, to which it has historical ties. Nauru chose to employ compulsory voting as an independent nation after separating from Australia (Birch 2009, p. 35). Countries with Spanish heritage are relatively likely to mandate participation, though this is unlikely due to the influence of Spain, which did not itself adopt compulsory voting until 1907,20 after many former Spanish colonies had begun requiring turnout. Like other electoral rules (e.g. Bol, Pilet, and Riera 2015; Lijphart 1992), compulsory voting also has “neighborhood effects,” in that countries are more likely to begin mandating turnout if geographically proximate states already do so. For example, in Latin America, compulsory voting was first introduced in Central America, and from there it spread southward. Fiji adopted compulsory voting after observing its use in nearby Australia (Birch 2009, p. 35). Mandatory voting is also historically tied to authoritarian government. In Brazil, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Paraguay, voting was made or kept compulsory by authoritarian regimes (Birch 2009, pp. 25, 142; Ochoa 1987; Power and Roberts 1995). Higher participation via compulsory voting can give the impression of regime legitimacy (Norris 2004a, p. 168). Relatedly, compulsory voting has been introduced to disincentivize election boycotts (Malkopoulou 2015), which can tarnish the international reputations of nondemocratic ruling parties.

20

Spain’s compulsory voting rule was rescinded in 1923.

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18 beyond turnout Compulsory voting has also frequently been adopted as a part of a package of broader reforms. Compulsory voting in Fiji and Thailand came about alongside new constitutions in the 1990s, and in many countries, compulsory voting was adopted alongside expansions to suffrage. Indeed, compulsory rules have often been adopted as part of broader moves toward democratic governance, as noted by Baeza (1998) with regard to Latin America. Political strategy may play a role. In Belgium, compulsory voting was seen by members of both the political left and the political right as a way of preventing the outsized influence of the working class, which held radical political views (Birch 2009, p. 30; Stengers 2004). In Australia, the Labor Party supported compulsory voting as a way to ensure that turnout among its supporters would help keep it competitive with the opposition (Mackerras and McAllister 1999, p. 232). Maldonado (2015, chp. 2) argues that, in some Latin American countries, expanding the franchise along with the adoption of compulsory voting represented a strategic calculation among coordinated elites: extended suffrage would quell the demands of disenfranchised, potentially insurgent groups, while compulsory voting would safeguard the continuation of the elites’ power by ensuring participation among their bases. Kaempfer and Lowenberg (1993) suggest that ruling parties adopt compulsory voting in response to societal and party system polarization, as high turnout can help a party that appeals narrowly to certain social groups maintain representation. They also suggest that, by increasing the number of political parties that have a stake in elevated turnout, proportional representation can stimulate the adoption of compulsory voting. As this section and Section 1.4 below make clear, compulsory voting is widespread, past and present. Further, countries have adopted compulsory voting for multiple, scattershot reasons, making it difficult to attribute to any singular cause. Contemporarily, the circumstances surrounding the (proposed) adoption or elimination of compulsory voting are similarly varied, as discussed in Section 1.5.

1.4 Compulsory Voting Today In Table 1.1, I list places where voting in national elections21 is compulsory and provide a classification of the severity of compulsory rules based on informa21 This table thus omits places where voting is compulsory only in subnational elections. Currently, the Indian states of Gujarat and Karnataka mandate voting in some local elections. In 2015, Gujarat’s High Court stayed its mandatory voting law (see Section 1.5). In Switzerland, a number of cantons once made voting compulsory only at the cantonal or municipal levels. The table also omits the Pitcairn Islands, which is a British Overseas Territory. There, voting is currently compulsory for local elections but not U.K. general elections.

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introduction 19 Table 1.1 Where Compulsory Voting is Currently Used for National Elections Country or Federal Subunit

Age of Enfranchisement

Ages for Which Voting is Compulsory

Severity of Penalties and Enforcement

Argentina Australia Belgium Bolivia Brazil Bulgaria Costa Rica Dem. Rep. of the Congo Ecuador Egypt Gabon Greece Honduras Liechtenstein Luxembourg Mexico Nauru North Korea Panama Paraguay Peru Samoa Singapore Schaffhausen, Switzerland Thailand Turkey Uruguay

16 18 18 18 16 18 18 18 16 18 18 17 18 18 18 18 20 17 18 18 18 21 21 18 18 18 18

18–69 All enfranchised All enfranchised 18–69 18–69 All enfranchised All enfranchised All enfranchised 18–64 All enfranchised All enfranchised 17–69 All enfranchised All enfranchised 18–74 All enfranchised All enfranchised All enfranchised All enfranchised 18–74 18–69 All enfranchised All enfranchised 18–64 All enfranchised All enfranchised All enfranchised

Low Medium Medium Low Medium Low Low Low Medium Medium Low Low Low Low Medium Low High High Low Low High Not Yet Known∗ Medium Medium Medium Low High

Note: This information and the index of rule severity are based on data from the Varieties of Democracy project (Coppedge et al. 2017) and my own reading of constitutions, electoral laws, and news sources. ∗ Samoa will use compulsory voting in a nationwide election for the first time in 2021.

tion from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project22 and my own reading of constitutions, electoral codes, and news sources.23 This classification jointly considers the magnitude of sanctions for abstention and the likelihood of their enforcement.24 I refer to the compulsory rules in countries with the weakest

22 V-Dem is housed in the Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg (https://www.v-dem.net/). Here, I refer to Version 7 (Coppedge et al. 2017). 23 For up-to-date and detailed data on the use of compulsory voting around the world, see https://www.shanepsingh.com/compulsory-voting.html. 24 V-Dem categorizes countries using the following classification rule: • Countries with voluntary voting • Countries that mandate voting but do not employ or enforce sanctions for abstention

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20 beyond turnout sanctions and enforcement as “low,” those with middling sanctions and enforcement are “medium,” and those with biting sanctions that are strongly enforced are “high.” In the democratic world,25 roughly one in seven people live where voting in national elections is required by law.26 Penalties for abstention and their likelihood of being enforced vary widely across countries with compulsory voting. Many places simply levy monetary fines. For example, in Singapore, abstainers are required to pay S$50 (about US$35), and those in Nauru can be fined up to AU$200 (about US$150). In Luxembourg, the first abstention is punishable by a fine of €100–250 (roughly US$115–285). In the event of a repeat abstention within five years, the fine is €500–1,000. Yet, enforcement is unusual, making it unlikely that a nonvoter in Luxembourg would ever have to pay these hefty sums.27 In the Swiss canton of Schaffhausen, where enforcement is strict, the fine for abstention a much smaller CHF6 (about US$6). At the federal level in Australia, where enforcement is routine, abstainers are charged AU$20. An Australian who abstains in a federal election and fails to pay the initial fine can be prosecuted and charged up to one “penalty unit” (currently AU$222), plus court costs. Penalties for abstention in state-level elections vary across the Australian states. For example, in Queensland a nonvoter is fined AU$133.45. First-time abstainers in the state of Western Australia accrue a AU$20 fine, which increases to AU$50 for repeat offenders. Those who fail to remit payment can have their driver’s license suspended. In South Australia, penalties can be severe and go well beyond a monetary fine. A nonvoter who ignores the initial AU$70 penalty is subject to a AU$125 levy. One who does not pay either fine can have his or her vehicle registration and driver’s license suspended, money deducted from his or her bank account or paycheck, or property seized. The state government may even publish a nonvoting elector’s name online. South Australia is not alone in applying non-monetary penalties. In Argentina, where enforcement is generally lax, fines of 50 to 500 pesos28 (about US$0.70 to US$7) can be imposed on abstainers, who are by law ineligible for public office for three years after the election in which they failed to participate. An offender who •

Countries that have and enforce legal sanctions for abstention, but impose minimal costs upon abstainers • Countries that mandate turnout and enforce sanctions, which impose considerable costs on offenders 25 Following the rule used in several analyses presented later in this book, I do not consider countries that fall below a 5 on the Polity IV Index to be democratic. The Polity IV Project is housed at the Center for Systemic Peace (http://www.systemicpeace.org/). 26 Population data are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (http://wdi.worldbank. org/). 27 The obligation to vote in Luxembourg extends to noncitizens, who are entitled to vote in local elections after five years of residence. 28 Fines in Argentina vary by election type and election cycle.

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introduction 21 does not pay the fine can also be denied certain government services for one year. In Belgium, where enforcement has waned in recent electoral cycles,29 the first instance of nonvoting attracts an initial monetary penalty, and the second a larger fine. Since 2017, these range from €40–80 and €80–200, respectively.30 Further, a citizen who fails to participate four or more times in a 15-year period can lose the right to vote for ten years. In Bolivia, as of 2020, abstainers who neglect to pay a fine of 210 bolivianos31 (about US$31) lose access to banking, passport services, and public employment for 90 days following the election. In Brazil, nonvoters attract a fine indexed to 3 to 10 percent of a “fiscal reference unit,” multiplied by a factor 33.02. Since 2003, this has equated to R$1.05 (about US$0.20) to R$3.51. Nonpayment can make one ineligible for civil service exams, government jobs, passport services, loans from public banks, and enrollment in public universities. In Peru, fines for abstention are strictly enforced and, since 2006, are progressively larger according to the percentage of a district’s population living in conditions of extreme poverty, poverty, or non-poverty, as defined by the country’s National Institute of Statistics and Informatics. The fines themselves are indexed to national tax units. As of 2019, there are three tiers equal to 21 soles (about US$6), 42 soles, and 84 soles. An abstainer who neglects to pay can lose access to a range of public services, such as obtaining a passport, opening a bank account, or registering a birth, marriage, or divorce. Fines in Uruguay, which are also routinely collected, are equal to one “resettable unit” for first-time abstainers and three for repeat offenders. As of 2020, a resettable unit is worth about US$30. Nonpayment can mean losing access to public employment and certain public services. As noted in Table 1.1, very young and older citizens are often exempted from the requirement to vote. Most places with mandatory voting also make exceptions for nonvoters with valid reasons for abstention. What is considered a valid reason varies from country to country, though commonly accepted justifications include sickness and disability, natural disasters, travel, and religious belief.32 In Belgium, 29 Nevertheless, the Ministry of the Interior advises citizens to hold on to the proof of voting certificates they receive at the polling station for three months in case they are erroneously recorded as having not voted. 30 The fines in Belgium have grown progressively larger in size every few years since the early 1990s. 31 The fine for abstention in Bolivia is set before each election and tends to vary significantly. 32 The COVID-19 pandemic led some governments to alter the accepted justifications. In the Australian state of Queensland, local elections went ahead in March of 2020 during the pandemic. While voting was mandatory per Queensland’s compulsory voting law, individuals who were showing symptoms and self-isolating could apply to have the fine waived. Ultimately, Queensland opted not to fine anyone who abstained in the March election alone. For its July 2020 national election, Singapore made special arrangements for elderly people to vote in the morning and those with high fevers to vote later in the day. In late 2020 in Peru, the National Jury of Elections reported that medically vulnerable people, including anyone over 65 years old, would be exempt from the voting requirement in the 2021 general election due to the COVID-19 pandemic. In Bolivia, the maximum age at which compulsory voting applies was lowered from 70 to 60 in the October 2020 national election due to concerns about the susceptibility of elderly people to COVID-19. In Egypt, the state took a different route and moved to

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22 beyond turnout those who are unable to fulfill their obligation to vote due to sickness, work, study, religious attendance, or other hurdles are allowed—and expected—to enlist someone to cast a ballot in their stead. Anyone with the right to vote can serve in such a proxy role (but one may cast only a single proxy vote). Some countries, such as Mexico, Paraguay, and Turkey, simply refrain from enforcing their compulsory voting laws. In other places, such as Greece, Honduras, and the state of Karnataka in India, which has mandatory voting in some local elections, there is a legal requirement to participate, but the law specifies no penalties for abstention. Finally, in a number of countries, including Colombia, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Guatemala, the constitution mentions a “duty” to vote, but neither the constitution nor the electoral code specifies a legal obligation to partake in elections or mentions penalties for not doing so. The classification I present here considers voting to be voluntary in such countries.33

1.5 Recent Events Surrounding Compulsory Voting In recent years, compulsory voting has frequently made headlines around the world. The genesis of these has often been debates over proposed switches from voluntary to compulsory voting, though serious deliberations about the elimination of the legal requirement to vote have occurred in many countries with mandatory turnout. In many of these cases, the result has been the adoption or abolition of compulsory voting. Here, I review some recent examples of proposals for the adoption or removal of compulsory voting, and I discuss the events surrounding recent changes to the law.34 Latin America has the highest density of countries with compulsory voting of any world region, and nearly all of its democracies with voluntary or wholly unenforced compulsory voting have seen recent deliberations over the adoption of a requirement to vote. In the Dominican Republic in 2017, a party advocated amending the electoral law to include compulsory voting over objections that such an obligation would contravene the constitution, which in 2010 was amended to explicitly prohibit compulsory voting. In 2018, a block of parties again pushed for compulsory voting as part of a package of reforms. In Paraguay in 2018, proponents of electoral reform proposed revisiting legislation introduced in 2010

prosecute around 54 million people who abstained in the August 2020 upper house election, in which turnout as a percentage of those eligible was under 15 percent. 33 I take the word “duty” to indicate a personal responsibility rather than a legal mandate (see Maldonado 2015, p. 78). 34 This overview covers events through late 2020. For an up-to-date rundown of events surrounding compulsory voting, see https://www.shanepsingh.com/compulsory-voting.html.

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introduction 23 and 2015 that would have harshened penalties for nonvoting. In Honduras in 2019, a member of congress introduced a bill to sanction abstainers under the age of 70.35 In Mexico, where the constitution stipulates a one-year suspension of citizenship rights for those who abstain but turnout is effectively voluntary,36 dozens of national and state legislators from both large and minor political parties have made recent public statements or advanced bills in support of enforcing compulsory voting. In 2016, a senator advocated fining nonvoters and, pursuant to the constitution, suspending their suffrage rights for one year. A member of the lower house advocated for a similar policy in 2018, as did a state governor who unsuccessfully contested that year’s presidential contest. In 2019, a federal senator from the leftleaning Citizens’ Movement party launched a conspicuous compulsory voting movement—complete with a #VotoObligatorioMX social media hashtag. Later that year, a group of senators from the right-leaning National Action Party (PAN) proposed implementing sanctioned compulsory voting in Mexico. At the state level, in 2020 a group of PAN state legislators put forth a proposal to introduce compulsory voting in Sonora, and a motion to make the vote mandatory was discussed during a meeting of state legislators from Hidalgo. In Chihuahua, the governor, a PAN member, sent an initiative to the state legislature that would implement a compulsory rule for intraparty elections modeled after the primary system used in Argentina. In Colombia in 2014, a senate commission considered building compulsory voting directly into a referendum on a package of reforms that would follow a peace accord with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) rebel group. While this did not come to fruition, in 2017 Colombia again mulled making turnout compulsory, with most proponents suggesting that the mandatory voting provision only be in place in a limited number of elections after the passage of the law. Supporters of compulsory voting also argued that the agreement with the FARC included a tacit endorsement of a requirement to vote in its goal of enhancing political participation. Critics dismissed this possibility, citing a passage in Colombia’s constitution that recognizes voting as a right and a duty but also states that it shall be exercised without any form of coercion. After some legislative debate, voluntary voting was retained. Nevertheless, the issue surfaced again in Colombia’s 2018 election campaign: a group of candidates for the senate attended a debate devoted solely to compulsory voting; a departmental governor called for the adoption of compulsory voting; and a minor presidential candidate proposed requiring turnout in the first two elections for which a citizen is eligible. A few

35 Honduras’s constitution stipulates an obligation to vote, but there are currently no penalties for failing to do so. 36 In an AmericasBarometer survey of Mexicans conducted in early 2017 by the Latin American Public Opinion Project, about 10 percent of respondents identified turnout in Mexico as compulsory.

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24 beyond turnout months after the election, a group of opposition parties introduced an ultimately unsuccessful electoral reform bill that included provisions for mandatory voting. In 2020, a member of congress introduced legislation that would make voting mandatory for 12 years. Moving beyond Latin America, in Israel the chairman of the Yisrael Beiteinu party, Avigdor Lieberman, made the introduction of a compulsory voting bill a precondition to the party’s entry in any governing coalition formed after the September 2019 election, but suggested rewards for voting rather than penalties for abstention (see Section 8.3.3). When it became evident that a coalition agreement would not be reached, Lieberman again recommended compulsory voting for the ensuing rerun of the election. In France in 2015, the president of the National Assembly proposed compulsory voting for all elections, and his successor, who took over in 2017, also publicly supported compulsory voting. Compulsory voting further featured as a minor topic in the 2017 presidential race, when its implementation was advocated by Jean-Luc Mélenchon, one of the main contenders in the first-round election. Also in 2017, several right-leaning members of parliament introduced a bill to making voting mandatory, but without any formal sanctions for abstention. In 2018, both the Socialist Party and Mélenchon’s leftist La France Insoumise proposed a requirement to vote during deliberations over constitutional reform. In response to mass protests that begun in late 2018 in opposition to an increase in fuel taxes but spiraled to encompass social and political issues, the French government in early 2019 began a “Great National Debate” on institutional reform and other topics. One of the key considerations was the implementation of mandatory voting (in tandem with the recognition of blank ballots), and many prominent politicians held public discussions around the country on the topic and made statements for and against compulsory voting. In April of 2019, President Emmanuel Macron rejected compulsory voting on the grounds that it is hard to enforce and does not address the root of democratic crisis: “I do not believe that when there is disaffection and disinterest in an election, we respond by making it mandatory” (Bulant 2019). However, calls for a voting obligation resurfaced among politicians across in ideological spectrum after record low turnout in the 2020 municipal elections, which were held during the COVID-19 pandemic. Bulgaria had a particularly tumultuous experience with compulsory voting in 2016 and 2017. Having compelled participation in elections in the late 1800s and early to mid 1900s, the National Assembly readopted mandatory voting in the spring of 2016. Under the new compulsory voting law, a new “I don’t support anyone” option was added to ballots, and those who abstained in two consecutive elections of the same kind could be removed from the electoral rolls. Compulsory voting was then put to the electorate in a referendum held alongside the November presidential election. While voting in the presidential contest was mandatory,

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introduction 25 partaking in the referendum remained voluntary. A majority of voters supported compulsory voting, but turnout was not high enough to meet the quorum. Nevertheless, voting remained compulsory due to the earlier legislation of the National Assembly. In early 2017, Bulgaria’s Constitutional Court struck down the disenfranchisement penalty for nonvoting. As a result, voting remained compulsory, but without any sanctions for abstention. In 2019, a Bulgarian celebrity launched a political movement and television station dedicated to implementing the issues put to the electorate in the under-quorum 2016 referendum (which in addition to mandatory voting included ending subsidies to political parties and implementing a two-round electoral system for legislative contests). Elsewhere in Europe, in 2014 in Romania, a group of parliamentarians introduced a bill making voting compulsory, with a steep fine of 1000 leu (about US$300 at the time) for abstention. In the Czech Republic in 2018, President Miloš Zeman called for compulsory voting during the traditional presidential Christmas address, and he reaffirmed his support for a voting obligation on television in late 2019. Around the same time, a member of parliament in the Netherlands called on the government to reintroduce the requirement to vote, which was in place from 1917 through 1970. In Portugal in 2019, the leader of a newly formed far-right movement suggested mandatory voting as a solution to declining participation rates and accused established political parties of dismissing the possibility of compulsory voting because high levels of abstention serve their interests. He repeated his call for compulsory voting again in 2020. The Duke of Braganza, who claims the defunct Portuguese throne, in 2019 suggested his country use compulsory voting until its institutions are reformed to better represent the will of the voters. At the subnational level in Switzerland, bills were tabled in 2017 and 2018 to make voting compulsory in the cantons of Geneva and Jura, respectively. Both of these were unsuccessful. In 2019 in Ticino, a group of citizens used their petitionary powers, as granted by the Swiss constitution, to lobby the cantonal government to adopt a compulsory voting law based on that used in Schaffhausen (see Section 1.4). Around the same time, the head of the youth wing of the Swiss People’s Party in Grisons suggested the canton adopt mandatory voting. At the supranational level, in 2018 Chancellor Angela Merkel rejected the idea of making voting obligatory for Germans in European Parliament (EP) elections. Contrarily, in 2019 the European Commission president, Jean-Claude Juncker, advocated European Union-wide compulsory voting in EP elections, noting its effectiveness in keeping turnout high in Luxembourg, where he was a long-serving prime minister. Turning to the English-speaking world, in New Zealand in 2016 a member of parliament suggested making voting mandatory in local elections, and in 2017 three former prime ministers came out in support of compulsory voting. In Samoa,

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26 beyond turnout compulsory voting was adopted in 2018 and first used in a 2019 by-election. It is scheduled to be implemented on a national scale in the country’s 2021 general election. Nearby Vanuatu saw calls for compulsory voting after low turnout in a 2018 municipal contest in the capital city. In Canada, the Liberal Party pledged to form a committee to study compulsory voting and other electoral reforms as part of its 2015 election campaign. Upon winning the election, the Liberals made good on that promise, convening a Special Committee on Electoral Reform. The committee issued a detailed report on compulsory voting in 2016. In preparing the report, it conducted an online consultation that attracted over 22,000 Canadians. While a thin majority of these self-selected participants supported compulsory voting in principle, only a minority endorsed a legal sanction for abstention. In part because of this tepid public support, the committee recommended against compulsory voting. In 2017, the government announced it would not pursue reforms to Canada’s voting system.37 In 2015, the Indian state of Gujarat enacted compulsory voting in elections to some local bodies, making India the third country to apply compulsory voting in select federal subunits after Austria (which has since switched to voluntary voting nationwide) and Switzerland. The law stipulates a fine of |100 for nonvoting (about US$1.60 at the time of enactment). Along with compulsory voting, Gujarat also added to ballots a “none of the above” option. The Gujarat bill was originally introduced in 2009 by the government of Chief Minister Narendra Modi, who would go on to become India’s prime minister. Modi referred to the compulsory voting as “a revolutionary step in the history of independent India” that would “become a major motivational force for the youth of the nation.” Despite his enthusiasm, Gujarat has not yet administered an election under compulsory voting, as the state’s High Court stayed the law’s implementation on a question of its constitutionality shortly before the 2015 municipal contests. Regardless of the court’s decision, the small village of Raj Samadhiyala in western Gujarat will carry on with compulsory voting. There, an unwritten rule stipulating a fine of |51 for abstention, along with a tight-knit social fabric, has kept the turnout rate well over 90 percent since 1983. The Indian state of Karnataka also adopted compulsory voting for select local elections in 2015. Like Gujarat, Karnataka added a “none of the above” option to its ballots. However, unlike the compulsory rule in Gujarat, Karnataka’s law does not specify any sanctions for abstention. Compulsory voting in Karnataka also appears to have had little effect: turnout in its first election under mandatory voting was roughly the same as in the previous contest. Still, in 2018 the chief minister of the neighboring state of Maharashtra expressed his support for compulsory voting in

37

For more on compulsory voting in Canada, see Singh and Williams (2021).

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introduction 27 local elections, as did a member of the legislature in the newly formed and adjacent state of Telangana. At the national level, in the midst of India’s April-May 2019 general election, the head of the Indian government’s official policy think tank endorsed compulsory voting, praising the Australian model. This sparked a flurry of print, online, and televised media attention and drew a firm rebuke from the former chief election commissioner on the grounds that “your right to vote includes the right not to vote.” Following the 2019 election, a private member’s bill introducing compulsory voting at the national level sparked a debate in Parliament, though the law minister made it clear in a written statement that the government had no plans to introduce compulsory voting. Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court declined to hear a private petition filed five years prior seeking nationwide mandatory voting. Parliament again took up the issue of compulsory voting in November of 2019, in a debate that took place over several weeks and was characterized by diametrical opinions, even among members of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party. In the United Kingdom, compulsory voting has been recently endorsed by politicians from all of its component countries. A member of the Northern Ireland Assembly put forth an ultimately unsuccessful motion to adopt compulsory voting in 2010. In Scotland, the first minister voiced his personal support for compulsory voting in 2015 (while recognizing that it was not popular among his colleagues). Several times in recent years members of the Welsh Assembly and Welsh members the U.K. House of Commons have advocated making voting mandatory in Wales. And, an English member of the House of Commons proposed legislation enshrining a civic obligation to vote in 2015. Though the measure explicitly excluded penalties for nonvoting, it failed to advance further in the Commons. In early 2019, a breakaway group of Conservative and Labour members of parliament called for lowering the voting age to 16 and mandatory voting in the first election of eligibility. Later that year, a Labour MP stated a preference for compulsory voting during the general election campaign.38 In the United States, as mentioned at the outset of this book, former President Barack Obama spoke in favor of compulsory voting toward the end of his time office. While his ideas gained little traction at the federal level, mandatory voting legislation has been recently proposed at the state level. In 2017, an assemblywoman in New York introduced a bill making voting compulsory. A trio of state representatives did the same in Massachusetts in 2019,39 as did an assemblyman in California in 2020.40 38 The United Kingdom makes voting mandatory in a 2019 episode of the popular BBC drama, Years and Years. The episode is set in 2027. Time will judge the prescience of this plot point. 39 Massachusetts is the only state whose constitution explicitly gives the state legislature the authority to make voting mandatory (Article LXI). 40 For more on compulsory voting in the United States, see Singh (2018b) and Singh and Williams (2021).

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28 beyond turnout There have also been calls for the adoption of compulsory voting in countries that are less than fully democratic. In Malaysia, the Election Commission floated the idea of compulsory voting in 2016. This did not come to fruition, and in 2019 the prime minister cited compulsory voting’s inability to produce full turnout when explaining his preference for voluntary voting. In Russia in 2016, some members of parliament raised the possibility of mandating turnout (which was the practice during Soviet times). In Zimbabwe, a leading opposition politician in 2017 called for compulsory voting coupled with automatic registration. In Algeria in 2017, a leader of a democratic movement pushed for mandatory voting, as did a failed presidential candidate and minor party leader in Cameroon in 2018. In Morocco in 2019, the Ministry of the Interior reportedly held meetings with party leaders over the introduction of compulsory voting for the 2021 elections.41 While participation remained voluntary in that contest, the introduction of compulsory voting featured as a campaign issue. In Madagascar, the Public Life Observatory, an official body in charge of identifying and suggesting remedies for social problems, in 2019 suggested mandatory voting as a response to recent turnout declines. Deliberations surrounding compulsory voting have also been common in recent years in countries where the obligation to turn out is deeply entrenched, and some of these have led to the abandonment of the requirement to vote. In Australia, where voting has been mandatory for nearly a century, a senator in 2016 attempted to attach to a bill an amendment that would have ended compulsory voting. This followed a 2013 High Court decision to dismiss a challenge to the country’s use of fines for nonvoting, which aligned with several earlier judicial decisions in support of compulsory voting. Taking a different tack, in 2018 another senator proposed voluntary voting in Australia, but only for those aged 16 and 17 (who would also be enfranchised). In 2019, a member of the Australian Capital Territory Legislative Assembly put forth a similar motion for elections in that jurisdiction. In Belgium, also a long-term democracy with a generations-old compulsory voting law, the debate surrounding the obligation to vote has taken place mostly in the Flanders region. In 2017, the New Flemish Alliance (N-VA) introduced an ultimately unsuccessful bill to eliminate fines for nonvoting and remove the provision for compulsory voting from the Belgian constitution. In 2019, a prominent politician from the Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats (Open Vld) renewed calls for countrywide voluntary voting. These same parties called for the abolition of mandatory voting during the discussions of a parliamentary working group on political renewal in 2017. While the N-VA and Open Vld have not found success in implementing voluntary voting at the federal level in Belgium, they, in coalition with the Christian Democratic and Flemish party, abolished compulsory voting 41 Shortly after the meetings appeared in press reports, their existence was denied by a government spokesperson, who also stated compulsory voting was not part of the government’s agenda.

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introduction 29 for local and provincial elections in Flanders in 2019. This met some resistance in the public, and a demonstration in favor of maintaining the voting obligation was held in Leuven. To the south, the majority of the Walloon parties maintained steadfast support for compulsory voting.42 In Cyprus, compulsory voting in national elections was discontinued in 2017, having been law for nearly 60 years. An overwhelming majority of parliamentarians voted to switch to a voluntary rule, and, at any rate, penalties for abstention were unenforced in the two preceding decades. Still, turnout in the presidential election of 2018, the first under the new voluntary voting law, dropped sharply from its average level in recent presidential races held under compulsory voting. In 2018, Cyprus also removed the provision for compulsory voting in European elections from its electoral code. Fiji ended compulsory voting in 2013, having first adopted it in 1997. However, in contrast to the drop in participation seen in Cyprus, turnout in the subsequent elections was only about two percentage points lower than the average rate in the three contests Fiji held under compulsory voting. In Brazil, many constitutional amendments aimed at rescinding compulsory voting have been proposed in the past decade, and an ultimately unsuccessful bill introducing a plebiscite on the continuation of compulsory voting was put forth in 2017. In online public consultations of the Brazilian public held at that time, around 70,000 respondents expressed support for abandoning compulsory voting, with fewer than 5,000 disapproving. Around the same time, the country’s president more than once expressed an interest in re-evaluating the country’s use of mandatory voting, and a former president came out against it. Nevertheless, the abolition of compulsory voting was not seriously considered in the lower house during deliberations over an omnibus reform of Brazil’s electoral system. The idea of ending compulsory voting again surfaced in Brazil during its 2018 presidential election campaign. A switch to optional voting was endorsed by the candidate for the once-powerful Brazilian Social Democracy Party, and two minor party candidates made abolishing the obligation to vote a key part of their platforms. In 2020, a member of congress proposed making voting voluntary in that year’s municipal elections due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, and a senator subsequently introduced language that would suspend compulsory voting into a constitutional amendment meant to delay those contests. While the elections were delayed, voting remained mandatory. The COVID-19 pandemic also spurred the interior minister in Ecuador to consider suspending the fine for abstention in the country’s 2021 general election. 42 Calls for voluntary voting are less common among Walloon parties than those in Flanders. Nevertheless, in 2016 a member of the Reform Movement, a Walloon political party, publicly mulled the idea of reforming the constitution to make voting voluntary.

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30 beyond turnout In Peru in 2019, a political reform commission established by the president included among its proposals a recommendation that the country consider ending compulsory voting—but also suggested making voting compulsory in primary elections. Abolishing compulsory voting also featured as a minor issue in Peru’s January 2020 legislative election, gaining vocal support from some congressional candidates. A millenarian party that came in third in voting called for the abolition of mandatory voting in its parliamentary agenda. In late 2020, a congressman introduced a bill aimed at establishing one-off voluntary voting in the upcoming 2021 election, given concerns about the COVID-19 pandemic. In nearby Chile, compulsory voting was abolished in early 2012. At the same time, a system of automatic voter enrollment replaced the previous system of voluntary registration. In the first presidential election under the new rules, held in 2013, turnout as a percentage of the voting-age population was just under 46 percent, down from an average of 62 percent in the previous three contests. The winner of that election, Michelle Bachelet, promised to review the new voluntary voting law, and senators from various political parties advocated a return to mandatory voting. The drop in turnout in the first municipal elections under voluntary voting was even sharper, and in 2016 low turnout in the subsequent municipal contests renewed calls for a return to compulsory voting. In the 2017 presidential election campaign in Chile, a minor candidate suggested a return to mandatory voting. Further, Bachelet, now the outgoing president, expressed regret for previously supporting the introduction of voluntary voting. “I was wrong,” she said, “as I thought that people had a greater civic spirit than they have shown, but it is evident that many voted only because it was mandatory” (Assad 2017). Her enthusiasm for a reversion to compulsory voting was not unique: a poll of nearly all Chilean parliamentarians in 2018 found that about two thirds supported a return to compulsory voting. Correspondingly, there have been a number of legislative efforts to restore compulsory voting in Chile. In late 2017, a Chilean legislator announced a bill to bring back mandatory voting. While this did not become law, when the government sought to reduce the size of the lower and upper houses a year later, one deputy conditioned her support for the reduction on the return to obligatory voting, and a bill to institute both reforms simultaneously was introduced. In early 2019, a committee led by the Chilean interior minister proposed the restoration of compulsory voting. In late 2019, in the midst of mass protests over inequality and the cost of living held throughout Chile, the debate over a return to compulsory voting intensified. Support for reinstatement in the public reached 65–70 percent, up from 58 percent just five months earlier, and politicians from across the ideological spectrum began publicly advocating for compulsory voting. The head of the Electoral Service stated that compulsory voting should be reinstated to aid in accurately assessing majority

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introduction 31 opinion (and thus, in his opinion, preventing the type of protests that led to the unrest). Subsequently, the lower house established a commission to study a return to mandatory voting.43 Despite opposition from the executive branch, the commission unanimously favored a return, sending a draft constitutional reform to the lower house that stipulated the obligation to vote would apply from ages 18 to 75. In its first form, this bill passed the lower house with nearly three quarters of deputies in support. However, in a subsequent reading in January of 2020, the bill failed to reach the required three-fifths quorum by four votes. The push for the restoration of a voting requirement did not end there; in March of 2020, committees in both legislative houses continued discussions of a return compulsory voting. In August of 2020, a senator entered a motion aimed at restoring compulsory voting, and, in November of that year, four more senators introduced a bill to amend the constitution to reinstate mandatory voting. A referendum on the creation of a wholly new constitution and the process for its creation was held in October of 2020 under voluntary voting.44 Voters supported the creation of a new constitution drawn by an assembly to be elected under voluntary voting in 2021. The constitution will be subject to a ratifying plebiscite, scheduled for 2022, in which voting will be mandatory.

1.6 Ways to Study the Impact of Compulsory Voting As with any law or policy, qualitative and quantitative researchers seeking to identify the effects of compulsory voting are met with a steep challenge. There are numerous variables that are related to both compulsory voting and outcome variables that cannot be identified and taken into account. In addition, it is possible that compulsory voting itself may be caused by something it is purported to affect. These scenarios of omitted relevant variables and reverse causality both introduce endogeneity into estimated relationships between compulsory voting and the

43 During the commission’s debates, a petition urging it to reinstate mandatory voting circulated on social media and garnered thousands of signatures. At the same time, the Chilean Association of Municipalities held a nationwide citizen consultation on returning to mandatory voting, along with other political and social topics. While the consultation was conducted online and was unrepresentative of the population, over 85 percent of those consulted expressed support for compulsory voting. There was also majority support for a new constitution to be drawn up by a constituent assembly, itself popularly elected via a mandatory vote. A pair of more representative polls conducted around the same time found about 70 percent in support of mandatory voting. 44 Many legislators and commentators opposed the voluntary nature of the referendum, which was hotly debated by legislators as plans for it and the subsequent ratifying plebiscite were drawn up. When the referendum was delayed from its originally scheduled April 2020 date due to the COVID-19 pandemic, several prominent politicians again argued that participation in the postponed referendum should be made obligatory.

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32 beyond turnout outcome of interest, meaning any explanatory power attributed to a purportedly causal variable is likely overstated or illusionary. Until recently, the most common approach to assessing the effects of compulsory voting involved comparing macro- or individual-level outcomes across countries or federal subunits with and without a requirement to vote. Such examinations have value in that they shed light on the real-world correlates of compulsory voting. They are, however, generally unable to convincingly demonstrate whether any variation in outcomes is caused by compulsory voting, due to the aforementioned omitted variable and reverse causality problems. Imagine, for example, that the researcher’s dependent variable is voter turnout. Even in this simple case, where it is almost certain that compulsory voting exerts a causal influence on the outcome, there could be unmeasurable cultural differences that explain both compulsory voting and voter participation. Additionally, countries with high levels of voter participation perhaps tend to enshrine elevated turnout by requiring it. Researchers can instead look for pre-post changes in relevant variables in places that introduced or abrogated compulsory voting. This time-series approach can bring to light interesting patterns, but it again suffers from endogeneity threats. First, factors that are related to the outcome variable under study can change at the same time that compulsory voting is adopted or removed, and these might not be known to the researcher. Second, it could be that a change in the outcome variable of interest precipitates a change to the voting law. Survey-based researchers can assess the effects of compulsory voting by asking respondents in countries with compulsory voting whether they would vote under a counterfactual scenario in which voting is voluntary. The researcher then compares the outcome variable among those who would turn out under voluntary voting and those who would not. Selb and Lachat (2009, pp. 577–578) argue that this counterfactual approach is superior to cross-national and cross-regional designs, as studies comparing compulsory and voluntary systems cannot account for the array of political factors that also vary across and within countries. Still, attributing any differences across reluctant and willing voters to compulsory voting requires the perhaps tenuous assumption that people who reportedly would and would not vote under compulsory rules are, on average, the same on uncontrolled factors related to the outcome variable.45 If this assumption is not met, the result is, again, endogeneity in the relationship between compulsory voting and the outcome. Fortunately, there are methods that can be used to more credibly identify the causal effects of compulsory voting. The first involves exploiting age-based thresholds in the requirement to vote. In many countries, voting is not compulsory 45 Jackman (1999a; 1999b) finds that, due to social desirability bias in survey responses, the use of the counterfactual approach in Australia underestimates the impact of compulsory voting on turnout.

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introduction 33 for citizens above or below a certain age (see Table 1.1), meaning age operates as a discriminating variable. Researchers can compare outcomes across individuals subject to voluntary (the “control” group) and compulsory (the “treatment” group) rules nearby these age thresholds.46 Exploiting these thresholds requires that observations on either side are comparable in a manner that allows the researcher to attribute any observed differences to the requirement to vote. Regression discontinuity analysis, the most commonly employed thresholdbased empirical model, for its part invokes the “continuity assumption.” This stipulates that the trend in the average of the outcome variable is a continuous function of the discriminating variable for both the control and treatment groups in the neighborhood of the threshold. In terms of compulsory voting, the continuity assumption implies that, under the counterfactual scenario in which there was no change in the requirement to vote, the relationship between age and the expected value of the outcome variable would smoothly cross over the threshold for those in the control and treatment groups (Cattaneo, Idrobo, and Titiunik 2019; de la Cuesta and Imai 2016). An alternative regression discontinuity approach invokes the stronger “local randomization” assumption, in which control and treatment status are thought of in the context of a randomized experiment, meaning that observations slightly above and below the threshold are assumed to be, on average, the same on all factors but the treatment (Cattaneo, Idrobo, and Titiunik Forthcoming; de la Cuesta and Imai 2016).47 In places that adopted or abolished compulsory voting, researchers can also use difference-in-differences analysis to assess its effects. With difference-indifferences, the researcher measures differences in changes in the outcome variable across control (no change to voting law) and treated (change to voting law) groups. This helps to alleviate the above-mentioned endogeneity issues that can plague simple pre-post comparisons. Under the assumption that the treated unit(s) would have followed the same trajectory on the outcome variable as the untreated units absent a change to the law,48 any difference in differences can be causally attributed to compulsory voting. Synthetic control analysis provides an additional way to assess the causal effects of changes to the voting law, and unlike difference-in-differences analysis, it does not require the researcher to assume equal trajectories among different sets of countries (or federal subunits in the case of within-country analyses). Instead, 46 Threshold-based designs can also be used to exploit abrupt geographical changes in sanctions for nonvoting. These are currently used in Peru, where districts are assigned to one of three potential fine levels based on their poverty rates, as discussed in Section 1.4. 47 Both assumptions require that there are no other theoretically relevant changes at the age threshold, such as eligibility for retirement benefits. They also require that people do not manipulate their legal age to avoid or attract compulsory voting in a way that systematically relates to the outcome variable. 48 This is the “parallel trends” assumption.

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34 beyond turnout it allows the researcher to construct a “synthetic” version of a “treated” unit—that which experienced a change to or from compulsory voting. To do so, it borrows information from “donor units,” which are the countries or federal subunits in the data set that did not take up or remove a requirement to vote. Each donor unit’s contribution is determined with an algorithm that seeks to ensure that the synthetic unit closely resembles the treated unit in the period before the change to the voting law. The researcher can then plausibly attribute post-intervention differences in the outcome variable across the synthetic and treated units to compulsory voting. Finally, researchers can all but eliminate endogeneity threats, and thereby convincingly demonstrate causality, with randomized assignment of participants to voluntary and compulsory voting scenarios in a controlled setting. Such experimentation represents the gold standard for assessing causal effects, but the supervised environments in which it takes place do not necessarily generalize to real-world democracy. For example, in such setups participants are often asked to complete voting-related tasks on a computer terminal after being assigned to voluntary or compulsory conditions that may only circuitously approximate actual elections. A more externally valid method of experimentation would involve legally mandating turnout in actual elections among a randomly selected group of citizens and then tracking their behavior. While such a design would be great for studying the effects of compulsory voting, its ethicality would be debatable, and it would require the power to craft election law at will—a capacity that social scientists have not yet acquired. In this book, I use both correlational and causal methods to assess compulsory voting. Chapter 4 examines univariate and multivariate statistics across countries. Portions of Chapters 5 and 7 use multilevel regression models to compare the behavior of individuals and parties, respectively, across countries with and without legal compulsion to vote. While these models do not conclusively demonstrate causality, I attempt to isolate the effects of compulsory voting by including controls for theoretically relevant confounders. In additional analyses presented in Chapters 5 and 7, I more credibly identify causal relationships by leveraging exogenous age cutoffs in the requirement to vote present in Argentina and Schaffhausen, Switzerland.

1.7 A Summary of this Book This chapter reviewed the common arguments for and against compulsory voting, briefly discussed the origin and history of mandatory voting laws, provided an overview of where compulsory voting is used today, reviewed recent salient events surrounding the adoption and abolition of compulsory voting, and summarized

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introduction 35 the various empirical approaches for assessing the consequences of compulsory voting. As Section 1.5 makes clear, compulsory voting has received a considerable amount of recent attention among elected officials and policymakers. The academic literature on the consequences of compulsory voting for turnout rates and a host of secondary and tertiary outcomes has seen a correspondingly sharp uptick. In Chapter 2, I review this growing literature. Chapter 3’s theory relies on the straightforward expectation that individuals with negative orientations toward democracy are less likely to support compulsory voting. With reference to extant research on the psychological, attitudinal, and behavioral effects of coercion, I argue that compulsory voting can amplify the links between orientations toward democracy and support for political authorities, support for outsider or extremist parties, and political sophistication. On the one hand, negative orientations are more likely to be predictive of “antidemocratic” attitudes and behaviors, as well as a lack of political sophistication, where voting is compulsory and reluctant individuals are therefore cajoled to the polls. On the other hand, pro-democratic orientations are more likely to boost attitudinal and behavioral support for the democratic system and its authorities, as well as inculcate political sophistication, under obligatory rules. For those favorably inclined toward electoral democracy, the positive downstream effects of voting are able to manifest. I empirically probe the relationship between attitudes toward democracy and support for compulsory voting in Chapter 4. To do so, I make use of several public opinion surveys that include questions about attitudes toward compulsory voting and satisfaction with how the democratic system works, which I use to capture orientations toward democracy. Results indicate that individuals who are dissatisfied with democracy tend to be less supportive of compulsory voting, though the strength of this relationship varies across countries and, to a lesser extent, over time within countries. With Chapter 4 having established that those who are democratically disenchanted are also unsupportive of mandatory voting, in Chapter 5 I test my expectation that compulsory voting conditions the effects of orientations toward democracy on political attitudes, behavior, and sophistication. To do so, I initially rely on cross-national survey data from the AmericasBarometer and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). Multilevel models estimated using these data provide partial support for my expectations. I find that compulsory voting— especially the enforced variety—amplifies the negative relationship between dissatisfaction with democracy, which I use to measure orientations toward democracy, and political interest and understanding of political issues, which I use to capture political sophistication. Unexpectedly, however, compulsory voting does not shape the link between dissatisfaction and individuals’ ability to correctly place political parties on an ideological scale—another gauge of sophistication. I also

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36 beyond turnout find that, in line with expectations, routinely enforced penalties for abstention boost the extent to which dissatisfaction with democracy predicts the extremity of vote choices, with the least satisfied being most likely to choose extremist parties where abstention is punished. Finally, counter to my expectations, I find no evidence that compulsory voting shapes the link between satisfaction with democracy and support for authorities. In the latter portion of Chapter 5, I use data from the Swiss Election Study (Selects) and original survey data from Argentina to further probe the crossnational patterns found in the AmericasBarometer and the CSES. The Selects data are valuable because the canton of Schaffhausen enforces compulsory voting only for those eligible to participate under the age of 65 (see Table 1.1). Argentina is also an excellent setting for this project, as voting is only required for those aged 18–69. Individuals aged 16–17 and 70 and over are entitled to vote, but they are not penalized for abstaining (again see Table 1.1). These plausibly exogenous age thresholds help me identify the causal effects of compulsory voting. The analyses of the Selects data show that, as anticipated, being compelled to vote amplifies the negative relationship between dissatisfaction with democracy and support for authorities and makes it more likely that dissatisfied individuals will choose extreme political parties. Compulsory voting in Schaffhausen also intensifies the negative link between dissatisfaction and political interest, as expected. However, counter to my expectations, I find no evidence that compulsory voting causes dissatisfied individuals to make more mistakes when placing political parties on an ideological scale. In Argentina, I find that, in line with expectations, compulsory voting can exacerbate the tendency of those who are dissatisfied with democracy to be unsupportive of authorities. Yet, contra expectations, I find no evidence that compulsory voting furthers the negative link between dissatisfaction and political interest. In Chapter 6, I put forth my theoretical expectations about the impact of compulsory voting on the ways in which political parties seek votes. As with individuals, I expect that the influence of compulsory voting on political parties is conditional on their underlying orientations. Specifically, I argue that compulsory voting shapes the ways in which parties seek votes—and that this influence is dependent upon whether or not a party belongs to the political mainstream. Echoing previous writings, I first argue that compulsory voting will lead parties to expend less effort mobilizing citizens to vote, and I further put forth that the de-emphasis of mobilization tactics under mandatory rules will be stronger among mainstream parties. For non-mainstream parties, get-out-the-vote efforts may still pay dividends under compulsory voting, which brings to the polls reluctant voters who may be prone to cast protest votes for fringe competitors. I then develop expectations about compulsory voting’s effects on the ways in which parties position themselves in ideological space to attract votes. For mainstream parties,

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introduction 37 I hypothesize that mandatory voting incentivizes movement toward the center of ideological space, which will help them to appeal to voting populations that are broadly reflective of the country’s population. For non-mainstream parties, alternatively, I expect that mandatory voting incentivizes vote seeking at the extremes in order to appeal to voters who are compelled to the polls against their will. I test my hypotheses about compulsory voting’s effects on parties in Chapter 7. Results shown in the initial part of the chapter leverage the CSES data and my own survey data from Argentina. The CSES results are cursory but consistent with a pattern by which parties do less to mobilize turnout under strict mandatory voting. The results from Argentina provide little evidence that parties, on average, target their get-out-the-vote efforts at those not required to turn out. There is, though, some weak evidence that, while moderates are less likely to be mobilized when subject to mandatory rules, individuals with fringe ideologies are more likely to be urged to the polls. This is consistent with the expectation that mainstream parties become less likely to expend effort turning out the vote when voting is required, while non-mainstream parties will alternatively ramp up efforts to ensure that compelled voters do not shirk their obligation to participate. Results provided in the latter portion of Chapter 7 rely on data from the Comparative Manifestos Project, which records the extent to which parties emphasize an array of issues in their official manifestos. I focus on parties’ emphases of issues related to patriotism and nationalism, equality, environmental protection, and law and order. Emphases of each issue are, as one would expect, correlated with a party’s general left-right ideological orientation. For mainstream parties, these correlations tend to be weaker where voting is compulsory, especially where abstention is significantly and routinely penalized. This aligns with my expectations and suggests that mainstream parties downplay ideologically salient issues in an effort to moderate their stances under enforced compulsory voting. For non-mainstream parties, there is some evidence that, as anticipated, left-right orientations are more strongly correlated with emphases of ideologically salient issues where compulsory voting is enforced. This suggests that non-mainstream parties take more polarized positions where people must vote. The book concludes with Chapter 8, which reviews the findings and discusses their implications for academic research and for policymakers. I also discuss alternate ways of increasing turnout that may have fewer downstream consequences than a requirement to vote. I wrap up with reflections on the justifiability of compulsory voting in democracies.

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2 The Consequences of Compulsory Voting In Chapter 1, I discussed several arguments in favor of and against compulsory voting. While some such arguments are purely philosophical, others are grounded in the putative real-world effects of a requirement to vote. Empirical research, most of it recent, has made strides in connecting compulsory voting to not just voter participation, but many outcomes beyond turnout, including the composition of voting populations, invalid balloting, political engagement and knowledge, attitudes, electoral behavior and election results, party strategies, and economic outcomes. In this chapter, I review extant empirical studies of the effects of compulsory voting.

2.1 Compulsory Voting, Turnout, and the Composition of Voting Populations Scholars have long demonstrated turnout is higher where voting is compulsory (e.g. Gosnell 1930; Robson 1923; Tingsten 1937), and recent literature reviews and meta-analyses confirm this association (Blais 2006; Cancela and Geys 2016; Geys 2006; Smets and van Ham 2013; Stockemer 2017). While compulsory voting laws have the greatest upward impact on turnout where sanctions for abstention are both enforced and meaningful, even unenforced or inconsequential penalties for abstention can increase the turnout rate (cf. Fornos, Power, and Garand 2004; Funk 2007; Panagopoulos 2008; Singh 2011). Very early on, Donaldson (1915) used survey data from Cincinnati and Columbus to demonstrate that turnout is lower among poor and non-white individuals, and he suggested that compulsory voting could make the composition of the voting population more reflective of eligible voters. In line with this, and in support of the “Lijphart Thesis” discussed in Section 1.2.4, more recent, crossnational analyses routinely suggest compulsory voting lessens the impact of many socioeconomic and demographic forerunners of turnout: Carlin and Love (2015) find that partisanship and political interest are relatively weak predictors of turnout in countries with compulsory voting; Carreras and Irepoglu (2013) and Haime (2017) find that trust in elections matters less for turnout under compulsory voting; Córdova and Rangel (2017) find that mandatory voting weakens the link

Beyond Turnout: How Compulsory Voting Shapes Citizens and Political Parties. Shane P. Singh, Oxford University Press. © Shane P. Singh 2021. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198832928.003.0002

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the consequences of compulsory voting 39 between gender and turnout; Dassonneville, Hooghe, and Miller (2017) find that compulsory voting reduces both knowledge- and education-based inequalities in turnout; Gallego (2010; 2015, pp. 51–53) finds that education has a weaker relationship with turnout where voting is mandatory; Rose and Borz (2013, p. 418, note 3) find that there is less class-based bias in turnout under compulsory voting; Franklin, van der Eijk, and Oppenhuis (1996), Oppenhuis (1995), Söderlund, Wass, and Blais (2011), and Solvak and Vassil (2015) find that political interest is less consequential for turnout under compulsory rules; and Singh (2015) finds that age, income, political knowledge, the perceived efficacy of the democratic process, and partisan attachments all matter less for turnout where voting is mandatory.1 Most of these studies find that compulsory voting most effectively diminishes the link between socioeconomic and demographic characteristics and turnout where abstention is meaningfully and reliably punished. Still, not all studies find the socioeconomic and demographic forerunners of turnout to matter less in countries with compulsory voting. While they only analyze data from Australia, King and Leigh (2009, p. 84) note that the United States has larger ballot order effects than those they find, which they take as evidence that compulsory voting does not boost participation among politically uninterested or ignorant voters. More broadly, Quintelier, Hooghe, and Marien (2011) find that the effects of gender and education on turnout are stable across compulsory and voluntary systems, whereas age matters more for the turnout decision under mandatory voting. Similarly, Perea (2002) finds that age, along with education and income, has a stronger relationship with turnout in compulsory systems.2 A handful of studies have leveraged within-country variation in the use of compulsory voting to ascertain its impact on turnout. In Switzerland, where compulsory voting has been employed in select cantons, there is a positive link between required turnout and participation rates (Freitag 2010; Robson 1923, p. 571). Bühlmann and Freitag (2006) demonstrate that compulsory voting in Switzerland boosts participation, and they find that it does not lessen the positive relationship between political interest and turnout. This contrasts with the conclusions of Wernli (2001) and Singh (2015), which indicate that individuallevel variables commonly linked to turnout tend to matter less in Swiss cantons 1 Layton and Smith (2015) find that receiving economic assistance from the state has a stronger relationship with vote choices under compulsory than voluntary voting, which is consistent with the idea that poorer individuals are more likely to vote where doing so is mandatory. 2 Perea reaches this conclusion with reference to the coefficient estimates in a logistic regression model, which represent the estimated impact of the covariates on the log odds of a binary outcome. However, when she examines the predicted probability of turnout rather than the log odds, she reaches the opposite conclusion: age, education, and income have a weaker relationship with voting in compulsory systems.

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40 beyond turnout with compulsory rules, and with the findings of Eschet-Schwarz (1989), which indicate that opposition to referenda mobilizes turnout more strongly in cantons with noncompulsory voting. In Austria, where voting is now voluntary nationwide, several states once mandated turnout. Hirczy (1994) presents evidence that turnout was higher in Austrian states where voting was compelled, as compared to those where it was voluntary, and Hoffman, León, and Lombardi (2017) show that the positive impact of compulsory voting on turnout in Austrian states was larger among women, those with lower incomes, those with less political interest and knowledge, and those with no party affiliation.3 Starting as early as 1955 (Aitkin 1982, p. 33, note 24), researchers have used responses to counterfactual survey questions to assess the impact of compulsory voting on turnout. Respondents in countries with compulsory voting who indicate they would no longer vote if doing so were made voluntary are compared to those who would continue to participate, and any differences in these groups are attributed to compulsory voting. Selb and Lachat (2009, pp. 578–580) show that those who report an intention to disobligingly abstain in a hypothetical future election held under noncompulsory voting in Belgium are also relatively likely to report having abstained in a recent national election. Also using the counterfactual survey approach in Belgium, Hooghe and Pelleriaux (1998) and Hooghe, Marien, and Pauwels (2011) infer that compulsory voting brings politically distrusting voters to the polls and levels out socioeconomic disparities between voters and abstainers. In Brazil, Elkins (2000) similarly finds that those who would stop voting under voluntary rules tend to be poorer and less educated. Further insight into the impact of compulsory voting on turnout comes from polities that switched from compulsory to voluntary voting or eased the severity of their compulsory voting laws. Across countries, Birch (2009, chp. 5) finds that the abolition of mandatory voting or the lessening of sanctions for abstention are generally followed by a drop in participation. In Austria, where compulsory voting was introduced and repealed on a state-by-state basis, voter participation increased when voting became mandatory and declined once the legal requirement to vote was removed (Ferwerda 2014; Gaebler, Potrafke, and Roesel 2020; Hirczy 1994; Hoffman, León, and Lombardi 2017). Further, the switch to noncompulsory voting did not have uniform effects. For example, as compared to larger cities, the drop

3 While compulsory voting is applied in every Brazilian state, Power (2009) shows that its upward effect on turnout is strongest in states with relatively large proportions of individuals who are likely to “feel” the law, such as those working in the formal sector. These workers are most likely to be affected by the non-monetary penalties for abstention present in Brazil, which include prohibitions on taking civil service exams, holding government employment, obtaining a loan from a state-owned bank, passport services, and enrollment in public universities.

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the consequences of compulsory voting 41 in turnout was smaller in villages and small cities,4 perhaps because individuals in such areas were more likely to experience social pressure to vote, even once voting became voluntary. Consistent with this, Ferwerda (2014) shows that turnout declines were smaller in rural areas in Austria, but larger in municipalities with less-educated populations and a higher proportion of manual workers. In Peru, León (2017) finds that individuals who were informed of a recent reduction in the fines associated with abstention became less likely to vote, and this effect was strongest for those with low levels of political interest, those with less political knowledge, and those with centrist ideologies. In Chile, Barnes and Rangel (2014) show that turnout was lower in presidential elections after the country dropped compulsory voting (while at the same time adopting automatic voter registration). Barnes and Rangel (2018) show that turnout in mayoral elections also decreased post-reform, and this decrease was sharpest in larger districts, where electoral races were not close, and where there were many equally popular candidates. Argote (2020) finds that the link between age and turnout in mayoral contests became weaker after the Chilean reform. Brieba and Bunker (2019) find that the reform was followed by a decrease in turnout in both mayoral and presidential elections—and that the reform increased class bias in turnout in urban districts, while reducing age-based disparities in turnout in both urban and rural districts. Brieba and Bunker also find that participation gaps between small and large districts shrank after the reform in national elections but intensified in local elections. In Switzerland, several cantons have switched from mandatory to noncompulsory voting in recent decades. Funk (2007) finds that these shifts produced a drop in turnout, even where fines for abstention were minimal. A switch to voluntary in the Netherlands, where voting was legally mandated from 1917 until 1970, also led to a drop in turnout (Birch 2009, pp. 85–87; Hirczy 1994; Miller and Dassonneville 2016). The decline was sharpest among the young, the less educated, and the politically uninterested and alienated (Dassonneville and Hooghe 2017; Irwin 1974; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978, pp. 6–9). Evidence regarding the impact of compulsory voting on turnout can also be gleaned from countries and subnational units that switched from voluntary to compulsory voting. Birch (2009, chp. 5) finds evidence that the adoption of compulsory voting tends to be followed by immediate and substantial upward movement in turnout. Australia’s introduction of compulsory voting at the national level in 1924 corresponded with a sharp increase in turnout and more equal participation rates across socioeconomic groups (Crisp 1950; Hirczy 1994; Jackman 2001), as did the state-by-state implementations that took place between 1914 4 This trend was described to me during a personal communication with Professor Reinhold Gärtner on May 29, 2015, in Innsbruck, Austria.

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42 beyond turnout and 1941 (Fowler 2013). Bechtel, Hangartner, and Schmid (2016; 2018) show that the implementation of compulsory voting boosted turnout in the Swiss canton of Vaud.5 Finally, Taşkin (2015) demonstrates that Turkey’s adoption of compulsory voting was followed by a sharp increase its turnout rate. Some authors have leveraged the cutoff ages described in Table 1.1 in order to identify the impact of compulsory voting on turnout. Canton and Jorrat (2003) find that turnout gaps across unskilled and other types of workers are essentially erased in Argentina for those who are compelled to the polls and thus more likely to vote. However, these gaps resurface among those over age 70, for whom turning out is voluntary. Jaitman (2013) also leverages the compulsory voting cutoff age of 70 in Argentina, and she similarly shows that compulsory voting boosts turnout most notably for those working in jobs that require at most a highschool education. In Brazil, the voting age is 16, but turnout is not compulsory until one turns 18. Leveraging this threshold, de Leon and Rizzi (2014) show that turnout is higher for those just over it than those just under it. Also in Brazil, Cepaluni and Hidalgo (2016) examine turnout behavior among those aged nearby the age thresholds of 18 and 70 and find that compulsory voting increases turnout. However, contrary to Canton and Jorrat (2003) and Jaitman (2013), they find that this boost is bigger among those with higher levels of education. This may be because nonvoters in Brazil who fail to pay a monetary fine can be rendered ineligible for civil service exams, government jobs, passport services, loans from public banks, and enrollment in public universities. Such penalties may matter relatively little to the less educated (see Section 1.2.4). Julcarima Álvarez, Tuñón, and Feierherd (2019) also leverage an exogenous threshold, but rather than focusing on age, they exploit Peru’s tiered fine structure. In Peru, the fine for nonvoting is determined by the percentage of a district’s population living in conditions of extreme poverty, poverty, or non-poverty (see Section 1.4). Because districts with very similar levels of poverty can fall into different fine categories due to small differences in their poverty distributions, the authors are able to identify the impact of higher fines on turnout within Peru. They find that higher fines increase turnout, especially in subnational elections. Unlike Cepaluni and Hidalgo (2016), they find little evidence that effects are stronger among the more educated, despite the fact that, like in Brazil, abstainers in Peru can lose access to state services of particular value to those with high socioeconomic status. On the whole, research on compulsory voting and turnout uncovers two empirical regularities. First, forced voting boosts electoral participation, especially where sanctions for abstention are large and enforced. Second, the socioeconomic 5 More generally, Bechtel, Hangartner, and Schmid (2016) find that the adoption and abolition of compulsory voting across Swiss cantons affects turnout in the expected ways.

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the consequences of compulsory voting 43 and demographic determinants of turnout are less important to the decision to vote where turnout is legally compelled. To this end, compulsory voting makes the voting population more reflective of the electorate.

2.2 Compulsory Voting and Invalid Balloting The invalid balloting rate is relatively high in countries where voting is compulsory (e.g. Abraham 1952b; Cohen 2018a; Kouba and Lysek 2016; Martínez i Coma and Werner 2019; Power and Garand 2007; Reynolds and Steenbergen 2006; Uggla 2008). In Chile, Barnes and Rangel (2018) show that invalid balloting was more common before it rescinded the requirement to vote (and adopted automatic voter registration). In Austria, where obligatory voting was previously employed on a state-by-state basis, Hirczy (1994) and Hoffman, León, and Lombardi (2017) find evidence that it boosted invalid balloting. Contrarily, Gaebler, Potrafke, and Roesel (2020) do not uncover a positive impact of compulsory voting on invalid balloting in Austria, instead finding limited evidence that it decreased invalid ballots. In a meta-analysis, Kouba and Lysek (2019) find not only that compulsory voting increases invalid balloting, but that it also has the largest and most consistent effect of nine individual- and macro-level variables. Such patterns can be understood with reference to Hirschman’s (1970) “exit, voice, and loyalty” model, in which those with weak “loyalty” to a system are least likely to take part in it. In democracies, the “disloyal” are the politically unknowledgeable and uninterested, those who are distrusting of democratic institutions, and the democratically disaffected. Such individuals prefer to abstain from elections, but where voting is compulsory, the “exit” option becomes relatively unattractive in that it can engender a sanction. Many “disloyal” individuals thus instead turn out to the polls to avoid a penalty, but cast invalid ballots, either because they do not have enough information to lodge a meaningful vote or because they are unwilling to do so and thus cast an invalid ballot as a form of protest. Accounts from countries with compulsory voting illustrate this phenomenon. In Argentina, invalid ballots are referred to colloquially as voto bronca, or “angry votes” (Uggla 2008, p. 1141). Spoiled ballots, which became more common in Australia after its adoption of compulsory voting (Crisp 1950), receive a good deal of attention in that country. A judgment in a 2009 court case6 over a disputed state election in Queensland provided several examples of what appear to be intentional ballot spoilage, or attempts at it. These included writing in the name of

6

The court case is Caltabiano v Electoral Commission of Queensland & Anor (No 4) [2009] QSC 294.

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44 beyond turnout a cartoon character, adding obscenities and vulgar messages to the ballot papers, lewd drawings, and various instances in which the voter obliterated a portion of the ballot. Beyond these anecdotes, a host of studies provide evidence that, in countries with compulsory voting, invalid voting is indeed driven by politically unsophisticated, uninterested, and disaffected individuals. In Australia, McAllister and Makkai (1993) show that recent immigrants, who tend to have lower levels of political knowledge, are more likely to spoil their ballots. Hill and Rutledge-Prior (2016) find invalid balloting to relate positively to disapproval of compulsory voting, the belief that voting makes no difference, and the perception that the two major parties are the same, each of which is more common among youth. Hill and Young (2007) and Young and Hill (2009) attribute the relatively high rate of invalid balloting in Australia to the interplay between such sociological factors and the complexity of its electoral system. In Belgium, Hooghe, Marien, and Pauwels (2011) find that politically distrusting individuals are more likely to cast blank or spoiled ballots. Dejaeghere and Vanhoutte (2016) show that, across Belgian municipalities, unemployment and internal immigration have a positive impact on the invalid balloting rate. Regarding the latter, they speculate that internal immigrants may be relatively unknowledgeable about local politicians and thus more likely to lodge an invalid vote (p. 95). Pion (2010) finds invalid balloting to be higher in areas near the borders with France and Luxembourg, a result he attributes to a relative lack of interest in Belgian politics among those with international ties. Driscoll and Nelson (2014), examining invalid balloting in judicial elections in Bolivia, find that support for the ruling party and the president is negatively related to blank and spoiled balloting and that invalid ballots are more common in opposition strongholds.7 In Brazil, Borba (2008) finds that those who feel negatively about political institutions, those with low levels of political efficacy, and those who are dissatisfied with democracy are more likely to cast invalid ballots. Katz and Levin (2018) similarly find that invalid voting in Brazil is more common among the less politically knowledgeable, those who do not feel that candidates represent their views, and those who are unsatisfied with democracy,8 and Katz (2018) finds that policy-based alienation and indifference drive invalid voting.9 Examining blank and spoiled balloting under Chile’s former compulsory rule, Carlin (2006) shows it 7 Driscoll and Nelson (2014) take this to be supportive of the hypothesis that ballot spoilage signals protest. Unusually, they also find that more educated individuals are more likely to spoil their ballots. When examining municipality-level data, Driscoll and Nelson find that the illiteracy rate is positively related to blank voting but negatively related to ballot spoilage. 8 Borba (2008) and Katz and Levin (2018) reach different conclusions with regard to the impact of socioeconomic factors on invalid voting in Brazil. While Borba finds that such factors are unrelated to invalid balloting, Katz and Levin find that invalid voting is more common among the less educated. 9 Though Katz (2018) lumps abstention and blank and null balloting into one variable.

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the consequences of compulsory voting 45 to be positively related to youth, low political interest, and discontent with regime performance, democratic institutions, and political authorities. Across Brazilian states, Power and Roberts (1995) find that the illiteracy rate is positively related to the invalid voting rate, and Kouba and Mysicka (2019) find a negative correlation between income inequality and invalid balloting10 and a positive correlation between illiteracy rates and invalid balloting across Ecuadorian cantons.11 These intra-country studies do not establish whether the common forerunners of invalid balloting are stronger in compulsory than in voluntary systems, as is implied by the “exit, voice, and loyalty” explanation. To this end, four recent studies examine ballot spoilage patterns at the individual level across compulsory and voluntary systems. Singh (2019b) finds that low political sophistication, political distrust, and negative orientations toward democracy lead to invalid balloting, and that this link is particularly strong where voting is compulsory. Moral (2016) similarly finds that low-information voters are especially likely to cast invalid ballots where voting is mandatory and there are many distinct party families.12 While Cohen (2018b) does not find differential effects of several attitudinal and demographic factors across compulsory and voluntary systems, she does find that the politically alienated and uninterested are more likely to cast invalid ballots where voting is compulsory than where it is voluntary. Solvak and Vassil (2015), alternatively, do not find the effect of political interest on invalid voting to differ across individuals living in voluntary and compulsory systems. At the aggregate level, Martínez i Coma and Werner (2019) find that, across countries, enforced compulsory voting amplifies the positive links between ethnic fractionalization and invalid balloting and between corruption and invalid balloting. In a controlled experiment in which participants were randomly assigned to voluntary or mandatory voting conditions, Ambrus, Greiner, and Sastro (2017) observe invalid balloting among uninformed participants only in a condition with compulsory voting and without an option to cast a “none of the above” vote. These macro-level and experimental findings further evidence a pattern by which the mandatory vote intensifies the impact of the forerunners of invalid voting.

10 A lower rate of invalid balloting where incomes are more unequal suggests that the more well-todo, who make up an especially disproportionate share of the voting population in unequal societies, are less likely to cast invalid ballots. 11 In Mexico, where compulsory voting is constitutionalized but not enforced, Cisneros (2013) finds that municipalities with higher education levels had relatively low invalid balloting rates in lower house elections from 1994–2006. However, this pattern reversed in 2009, before which there was a citizen movement advocating purposeful invalid balloting. Further, Cisneros (2016) finds that, in many Mexican states, higher average schooling levels are related to lower invalid voting rates. 12 However, Moral’s (2016) measure of compulsory voting is error laden. He classifies Belgium, Estonia, Greece, and Italy as having compulsory voting in the 2001–2011 time period. While his classification of Belgium and Greece is correct, Estonia and Italy are misclassified. Estonia has never used compulsory voting, and Italy ended the practice in 1993.

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46 beyond turnout In the words of Abraham (1952b, p. 349), “the voter, like the proverbial horse, can be forced to the voting trough, but he cannot be made to drink.” Indeed, invalid balloting is more common where voting is compulsory, and it appears this is because many of those who are compelled to the polls either lack the sophistication necessary to cast a valid vote or because they deliberately spoil their ballots in protest. Some policymakers seem to be aware of this link: the recently adopted compulsory voting laws in Bulgaria and the Indian states of Gujarat and Karnataka stipulated the inclusion of a “none of the above” option on the ballots (see Section 1.5).

2.3 Compulsory Voting and Political Engagement and Knowledge As discussed in Section 1.2.5, going back over a century, the theoretical and normative literature on compulsory voting’s effects on political engagement and political knowledge is both rich and contentious. Empirical research on the topic is similarly expansive and incongruous. First, a handful of studies report evidence that compulsory voting produces higher levels of engagement and knowledge. Großer and Seebauer (2016), in a controlled experiment, find that individuals assigned to a compulsory voting condition were most likely to seek out information and to use it when deciding how to vote. Also using an experimental design, Shineman (2018) finds that individuals who were compelled to participate in a municipal election under threat of losing a US$25 gift card became more politically knowledgeable, as compared to those in a control group. Similarly, Miles and Mullinix (Forthcoming) show that students who were prompted to register with their professor an anonymous preference in a U.S. presidential election under threat of losing extra credit points demonstrated significantly more political learning than those in a control group.13 In Brazil, Bruce and Costa Lima (2019) find that young people who are compelled to vote are more likely to watch television news than those who are not, especially if they do not have strong feelings about the incumbent government. In cross-national analyses, Gordon and Segura (1997), Berggren (2001), and Sheppard (2015)14 uncover a positive link between political sophistication and compulsory voting. Also looking across countries, Córdova and Rangel (2017) 13 Miles and Mullinix (Forthcoming) do not find evidence that their experimental treatment prompted political learning when conducted in conjunction with a local primary election. 14 Sheppard (2015) finds that individuals living in countries with strongly enforced compulsory voting tend to be more knowledgeable than those in voluntary systems. However, she finds no evidence that moderately enforced compulsory voting induces knowledge, and, among those who are highly educated, moderately enforced compulsory voting decreases political knowledge (pp. 303–305). Sheppard also drops countries with weakly enforced compulsory voting from her main analyses.

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the consequences of compulsory voting 47 find that compulsory voting correlates positively with engagement and political information, particularly among women.15 In Switzerland, Wernli (2001) attributes relatively high levels of political knowledge in Schaffhausen to the fact that it is the only canton to enforce compulsory voting. Feitosa, Blais, and Dassonneville (2020) show that the level of belief in a duty to vote in Chile dropped after it abolished compulsory voting (and adopted automatic voter registration), which suggests that mandatory voting can instill democratic engagement. A larger number of studies find little or no evidence of a link between compulsory voting and engagement or knowledge. Selb and Lachat (2009, p. 575, note 1) argue that the findings of Gordon and Segura (1997) and Berggren (2001) are methodologically flawed, and their re-estimations of Gordon and Segura’s and Berggren’s models indicate no evidence of a link between compulsory voting and sophistication. Bühlmann and Freitag (2006, p. 31, note 19) and Gaebler, Potrafke, and Roesel (2020) find no evidence that canton- and state-level variation in compulsory voting in Switzerland and Austria, respectively, explains differences in political interest, and Birch (2009, pp. 65–67) finds no cross-national link between compulsory voting and political knowledge. Carreras (2016), examining countries from the Americas, finds little evidence of a link between compulsory voting and several indicators of political engagement, though he does show that such a relationship may exist for the least educated. In Brazil, de Leon and Rizzi (2014; 2016) find no evidence that students who are compelled to vote are more likely to correctly answer questions about presidential candidates. In the 2014 study, they also find no evidence that compulsory voting induces political news consumption or political discussion. Holbein and Rangel (2020) are similarly unable to detect any impact of being compelled to vote on political interest, political knowledge, or membership in social and political organizations. In Peru, León (2017) finds that individuals who stopped voting due to a reduction in the fines for abstention were less interested in, and less informed about, politics, which suggests that reluctant voters—those who turn out only under mandatory rules—are the least politically sophisticated. Further, León finds no evidence that fines for abstention affect information acquisition around election time. In an in-depth study of young people in Australia, Winchester, Hall, and Binney (2015) note a trend in which respondents simultaneously lacked an understanding of politics and a desire to seek out political information, but still intended to vote 15 In light of Córdova and Rangel’s finding it is surprising that compulsory voting has also been negatively linked to women’s representation. Studlar and McAllister (2002) find an inverse relationship between compulsory voting and women’s representation in parliaments, and Wauters and Devroe (2018) correspondingly demonstrate that individuals in Belgium who report an intention to abstain if turning out were made voluntary are less likely to select female candidates. Birch (2009, pp. 119–121), though, finds no link between compulsory voting and women’s representation.

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48 beyond turnout per the country’s compulsory rules (pp. 261–262). Tracking participants’ behavior in an online simulation of an Australian election, Singh and Roy (2018) find that those who turn out involuntarily are least likely to gather political information. Correspondingly, Oganesyan and Jensen (Forthcoming) find these reluctant voters to be least able to correctly answer trivia questions about Australian government and politics. Also simulating an election, in the German context Holderberg and Ballowitz (2020) randomly assign participants to voluntary and compulsory conditions and find little evidence that mandatory voting induces political knowledge or engagement. In one of the earliest studies of the downstream effects of compulsory voting, Loewen, Milner, and Hicks (2008) randomly assign Canadian students to voluntary and compulsory voting conditions and find no evidence of increased knowledge and engagement among those who were required to vote. In a comparison of European countries and analyses of immigrants to and from Australia, Bilodeau and Blais (2011) find little evidence that compulsory voting socializes individuals into discussing politics, being politically interested, or feeling positive toward voting. Similarly, leveraging the introduction and abolition of compulsory voting in the Austrian state of Carinthia, Gaebler, Potrafke, and Roesel (2020) find no evidence of a long-term impact of compulsory voting on turnout. Further, looking across Austrian states, they find a negative link between compulsory voting and political participation outside the voting booth. Bechtel, Hangartner, and Schmid (2018) are likewise unable to conclude that compulsory voting induces long-term engagement with politics; once compulsory voting ended in the Swiss canton of Vaud, turnout dropped, even for those who were socialized under compulsory rules. Bechtel, Hangartner, and Schmid do find that compulsory voting in Vaud had some spillover effects, increasing turnout in voluntary federal elections and referendums. However, these effects are most notable when such contests were concurrent with mandatory cantonal elections, and they do not extend to political engagement outside of elections. Lundell (2012) casts further doubt on a link between compulsory voting and political engagement, showing that those who live in countries with mandatory voting are less likely to join political organizations or interest groups. While Birch (2009, pp. 69–71, 76) finds no evidence that compulsory voting leads individuals to be more politically communicative with other citizens or politicians and campaigns, she does uncover a positive link between mandatory voting and participation in political demonstrations. Karp (2012) also finds no link between compulsory voting and political engagement in the form of interpersonal persuasion or campaign involvement. In sum, most empirical examinations of the link between compulsory voting and political engagement and knowledge fail to uncover the existence of any such relationships. Further doubt about such a link is sown by the robust, positive link

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the consequences of compulsory voting 49 between compulsory voting and blank and spoiled balloting, which is discussed in Section 2.2, and the negative link between compulsory voting and the “quality” of ballots, which is discussed in Section 2.5 below. It is unlikely that a more engaged and informed voting population would be more likely to cast invalid or poorly reasoned ballots.

2.4 Compulsory Voting and Political Attitudes From a theoretical standpoint, the nature of the potential link between compulsory voting and attitudes is unclear. As noted in Section 1.2.5, while some argue that compulsory voting can foster pro-democracy orientations by incentivizing political engagement, others suggest that it could exacerbate negative attitudes toward electoral democracy. Adding to this lack of clarity, there are relatively few empirical examinations of the relationship between mandatory voting and attitudes. Birch (2009, pp. 112–115) finds that compulsory voting is positively associated with satisfaction with democracy and gives some evidence that it enhances citizens’ perceptions of representation,16 and Lundell (2012) uncovers a positive link between compulsory voting and trust in political institutions. Contrastingly, Berggren et al. (2004) show evidence of a negative link between compulsory voting and satisfaction with democracy, Henn and Oldfield (2016) show that the introduction of compulsory voting in the U.K. could reinforce existing feelings of resentment toward the system, and Birch (2009, pp. 67–68) finds that individuals living in countries with sanctioned compulsory voting are less likely to feel that their vote makes a difference. Using an experimental design, Miles and Mullinix (Forthcoming) show that students who were prompted to register with their professor an anonymous candidate preference in local primary and U.S. presidential elections under threat of losing extra credit points experienced more general anger than those in a control group. Leveraging the state-by-state application of compulsory voting in Austria, Gaebler, Potrafke, and Roesel (2020) find that compulsory voting is negatively correlated with feelings of having free choice in life and of national pride. Others have found the link between compulsory voting and political attitudes to be absent. Ergun, Rivas, and Rossi (2019) and Karp (2012) find no evidence of any link between mandatory voting and satisfaction with democracy, Karp

16 Analyzing the same concepts in a different pathway, André and Depauw (2017, p. 395, note 9) examine whether compulsory voting conditions the positive link between representational congruence and satisfaction with democracy. Using responses to a counterfactual survey question in Belgium to gauge compulsory voting, they find no evidence for this.

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50 beyond turnout fails to detect a link between compulsory voting and beliefs about the efficacy of voting and elections, and Holbein and Rangel (2020) find no evidence that prosocial attitudes such as tolerance and respect for human rights vary across young Brazilians subject to compulsory and voluntary voting. A number of studies find that compulsory voting may shape political attitudes indirectly by conditioning the effects of more proximate individual-level factors. Singh (2018a) finds that compulsory voting intensifies the tendency of those with negative orientations towards democracy to be dissatisfied with democracy. Zechmeister (2019) finds that, as compared to individuals who stayed true to their vote choice, those who voted for the incumbent in a previous election but intend to support the opposition in a forthcoming election—or vice versa—are more likely to be unsatisfied with democracy where voting is compulsory, but not where it is voluntary. However, relative to maintaining vote choices, vote switching has a stronger negative association with internal and external political efficacy where voting is voluntary than where it is compulsory. Weitz-Shapiro and Winters (2011) show that, while the act of voting is associated with life satisfaction across countries in which turnout is voluntary, this association is not present where participation is compulsory. Findings regarding the link between partisanship, which is sometimes conceived of as an attitude (e.g. Bartle and Bellucci 2009; Greene 2002), and compulsory voting are more straightforward. Though Birch (2009, p. 74) finds no evidence of cross-national relationship between partisanship and compulsory voting, Dalton and Weldon (2007), Carreras (2016), and Córdova and Rangel (2017) find partisan attachments to be more likely where voting is mandatory, and de Leon and Rizzi (2016) find that young Brazilians who are compelled to vote are more likely to report having a party preference than those who are not. Pronounced partisanship in Australia is often attributed to compulsory voting (e.g. Aitkin 1982, p. 351; Brett 2019, p. 178; Mackerras and McAllister 1999), and, across countries, partisan attitudes are indeed more strongly held where voting is mandatory (Singh and Thornton 2013).

2.5 Compulsory Voting and the “Quality” of Votes As outlined in Section 1.2.5, many opponents of compulsory voting argue that it increases poor decision-making, as reluctant voters are unlikely to cast wellreasoned ballots. At the same time, many in favor of compulsory voting argue that it forces a political education, which instead suggests it should lead to more meaningful vote choices. As discussed in Section 2.3, many studies have directly examined the link between compulsory voting and political engagement and

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the consequences of compulsory voting 51 knowledge. A number of recent studies have also tested for a relationship between compulsory voting and the “quality”17 of vote choices. The first purposive test of this link came from Selb and Lachat (2009), who compare vote choices among Belgians who would and would not vote if compulsory voting were hypothetically abolished. Selb and Lachat find that those who turn out involuntarily cast votes that are less correspondent with their preferences. This finding is echoed by Hooghe and Stiers (2017), who use a similar empirical approach and provide evidence that reluctant voters are less likely to choose ideologically proximate parties in Australia and Belgium. Dassonneville et al. (2019) also find that hostile voters are less likely to cast ideologically congruent votes in Australia and Belgium, though they find no evidence for this in Brazil. In a controlled experiment, Bhattacharya, Duffy, and Kim (2014) further find that those who are compelled to vote are relatively unlikely to vote according to their (induced) preferences. Wauters and Devroe (2018) show that reluctant voters in Belgium are more likely to cast “easier” votes, such as selecting only the head of a party list, as opposed to more “sophisticated” votes, such as giving a preference to several candidates. de Leon and Rizzi (2016) find that those compelled to the polls in Brazil are more likely to cite charisma as an important candidate characteristic, which might imply that more “meaningful” political cues are less salient for such voters. In line with this, Oganesyan and Jensen (Forthcoming) find that reluctant voters in Australia’s compulsory system are unable or unwilling to reward or punish incumbents based on pocketbook economic considerations. Hellwig and McAllister (2016), though, find no evidence that willing and reluctant Australian voters differ in the extent to which they incorporate economic perceptions into their vote decision calculi. Freire and Turgeon (2020) demonstrate that haphazard electoral behavior may drive differences in the “quality” of vote choices between inclined and reluctant voters, showing that Brazilians who would opt to stay home under voluntary voting are more likely to admit to voting randomly because of the obligation to vote. This is especially evident in low-profile elections, such as state-level legislative contests, and random balloting is more common among less educated and less politically interested voters. Others have taken a comparative approach, assessing the character of vote choices across places with and without compulsory voting. Dassonneville, Hooghe, and Miller (2017) show that in countries with mandatory voting individuals are more likely to choose parties that are weakly matched to their

17 Of course, the “quality” of one’s vote may be immaterial. Individuals in a democracy are free to choose how to vote based on whatever criteria they prefer, and there is no indubitably “correct” way to arrive at a vote decision (see Engelen 2007, p. 29).

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52 beyond turnout ideologies, and they also find some evidence that voters are less likely to punish incumbents for poor economic performance. Singh (2016) finds that the correspondence between ideology and political preferences and vote choices is relatively weak in countries and Swiss cantons with compulsory voting. Further, looking across countries and Swiss cantons respectively, Singh (2010) and Dassonneville et al. (2019) report additional evidence that voting for ideologically nearby parties is less common among individuals in compulsory systems than among those in voluntary systems. A handful of studies uncover additional patterns that are consistent with the idea that compelled voters cast less “meaningful” ballots. Jensen and Spoon (2011) demonstrate that, across countries, high turnout in the presence of compulsory voting correlates with more parties and more ideological dispersion in governments. They propose this link is driven by haphazard, unreasoned ballots cast by compelled voters. Studies by Bélanger (2004), Carreras (2012), Miller and Dassonneville (2016), and Rich (2015) further support the idea that votes are more indiscriminate under compulsory voting, showing that its use correlates with more support for nonviable, outsider, minor, or fringe parties and candidates. Ferwerda (2014) correspondingly demonstrates that the abolition of compulsory voting in Austria slightly decreased support for minor parties, and Banerjee and Rich (2016) suggest that the proliferation of candidates in Mexican legislative elections is partially driven by its (unenforced) compulsory voting law. Other studies find no evidence of such a link or find it to run in the opposite direction. Carreras (2017) finds no indication of a cross-national relationship between compulsory voting and the success of political neophytes, and Birch (2009, pp. 121–124) finds that smaller parties may do worse in countries with compulsory voting than in those without.

2.6 Compulsory Voting and the Success of the Left and Right Though findings are conflicting and inconsistent, studies of turnout and election outcomes, on balance, find an association between higher participation under voluntary voting and the success of the political left (cf. Aguilar and Pacek 2000; Bohrer II, Pacek, and Radcliff 2000; Bol and Giani Forthcoming; Brunell and DiNardo 2004; Burnham 1965; Citrin, Schickler, and Sides 2003; DeNardo 1980; Erikson 1995; Grofman, Owen, and Collet 1999; Hansford and Gomez 2010; Highton and Wolfinger 2001; Kohler 2011; Martinez and Gill 2005; Nagel and McNulty 1996; Pacek and Radcliff 1995; Radcliff 1994; Remer-Bollow, Bernhagen, and Rose 2019; Rubenson et al. 2007; Shaw and Petrocik 2020; Sides, Schickler, and Citrin 2008; Tucker, Vedlitz, and DeNardo 1986). The putative link between high turnout and left-of-center election outcomes may suggest that implementing

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the consequences of compulsory voting 53 compulsory voting would serve to benefit left-leaning parties. Still, this requires the assumption that nonvoters who decide to turn out do not change in any other way (Highton and Wolfinger 2001; Lutz and Marsh 2007). Such an assumption is perhaps plausible in an optional voting regime, yet compelled and voluntary voters are qualitatively different; an electorate that approached full turnout voluntarily would differ meaningfully from one that did so due the threat of legal sanctions for abstention. Thus, when speculating about the effects of compulsory voting on election outcomes, it is important not to conflate high turnout due to voluntary behavior and high turnout due to compulsion (cf. Czesnik 2013; Lacy and Burden 1999; Sides, Schickler, and Citrin 2008). Several studies use research designs that are appropriate for assessing the effects of compulsory voting on vote choices and election outcomes. At the individual level, de Leon and Rizzi (2016) examine whether compulsory voting causes individuals to change their partisan preferences. Within a sample of students from São Paulo, they find that, as compared to those under 18 who are eligible but not required to attend the polls, those who are just over 18 and compelled to vote are more likely to self-identify as far-left. Somewhat incongruously, those obligated to vote are also more likely to prefer the centrist Brazilian Social Democracy Party. León (2017) also finds that compulsory voting may bring moderates out to the polls, demonstrating that Peruvians who were informed of a recent reduction in the fines associated with abstention became less likely to vote and that this effect was strongest for those with centrist ideologies. Elkins (2000) finds that Brazilians who reported that they would continue voting if it were made voluntary tend to be more right-leaning in their party preferences, which suggests that parties of the left benefit from compulsory voting. In Australia, Jackman (1999b) and Mackerras and McAllister (1999) find that those who would stop voting under a voluntary rule prefer the center-left Labor Party. Though, in Belgium, using a similar empirical approach Hooghe and Pelleriaux (1998) find that patterns of party support are insensitive to compulsory voting. Comparing countries with and without mandatory voting, Jensen and Spoon (2011) find little evidence that compulsory voting helps any particular party family or shapes the left-right positions of governments. This finding is echoed by Birch (2009, pp. 123–128), who does not uncover much of a cross-national relationship between compulsory voting and the electoral success of left or right parties. A number of studies assess the link between compulsory voting and the success of the left and right by leveraging changes in compulsory voting laws. Fowler (2013) finds that the 1924 adoption of compulsory voting in Australia boosted both the vote and seat shares of the center-left Labor Party. Yet, in the Netherlands, Miller and Dassonneville (2016) find that the center-left Social Democrats received a higher vote share under voluntary voting. Ferwerda (2014) shows that the removal of compulsory voting in Austrian states increased

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54 beyond turnout support for mainstream parties—and the Social Democratic Party, in particular— though Hoffman, León, and Lombardi (2017) find no evidence that the Austrian reforms affected the fortunes of any particular party. Also examining Austria, Gaebler, Potrafke, and Roesel (2020) find that right-wing parties did better under mandatory voting, while left-wing parties suffered, but they caution that their findings may be confounded by coterminous variation in right-wing populism. In Switzerland, Bechtel, Hangartner, and Schmid (2016) find that the introduction of compulsory voting into the canton of Vaud strongly increased support for leftleaning policies, and across Swiss cantons there is a positive association between compulsory voting and leftist outcomes in direct votes.

2.7 Compulsory Voting and Party Behavior If compulsory voting can affect voter behavior and preferences, it may also shape the ways in which parties seek votes. Yet, there are few studies of this potential link, and those that do exist are weakly intertwined. Using probability analysis, Fry, Jakee, and Kenneally (2009) show that compulsory voting can decrease the number of competitive legislative seats, which may serve to focus party and candidate attention on a small subset of competitive districts. Singh (2019a) shows that compulsory voting leads political parties to place more emphasis on their policies and ideological positions—and to rely less on clientelistic strategies such as vote buying—when seeking votes. Anecdotal evidence from Australia also suggests a negative influence of compulsory voting on vote buying. Voting for indigenous peoples, who gained universal suffrage in 1962, was not compulsory until 1984. During the 1962–1984 period of voluntary voting, indigenous groups were routinely and specifically targeted with bribes to stay home from the polls (Orr 2004, p. 117). Conversely, GansMorse, Mazzuca, and Nichter (2014, p. 425, note 29) note that individuals in countries with compulsory voting are more likely to claim to have received offers of gifts or favors in exchange for their votes. León (2017) finds that individuals who were informed of a recent reduction in the penalties for not voting in Peru were no less likely to report experiences with vote buying, though he does find evidence that easing the compulsory voting rule increased the average reported price paid for a vote. Despite the widespread belief that compulsory voting leads parties to de-emphasize voter mobilization in favor of conversion (see Section 1.2.5), Birch (2009, pp. 75–77) and Karp (2012) find no evidence that it affects the extent to which campaigns contact voters in an effort to persuade them. There does, however, exist some conjectural evidence that compulsory voting influences whether campaign efforts pay off. Ben-Bassat, Dahan, and Klor (2015) find no

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the consequences of compulsory voting 55 indication that campaign expenditures affect vote shares in Israel’s voluntary voting system, a result they contrast with that of da Silveira and de Mello (2011), who demonstrate such a link in Brazil’s compulsory voting system. Ben-Bassat, Dahan, and Klor argue that this disjuncture arises because those who turn out due to external pressure are more susceptible to advertising. Denemark (2005) similarly attributes his finding of campaign effects in Australia to the country’s compulsory voting rule. Argote (2020) finds that incumbency advantage in Chile weakened after the country switched to voluntary voting (and adopted automatic voter registration), which he claims is because the marginal benefit of campaign spending among challengers was smaller under the country’s former compulsory system.

2.8 Compulsory Voting and the Economy Though there are relatively few studies of the link between compulsory voting and economic outcomes, a scholarly exchange over its effects on government consumption took place in the journal Economics & Politics in 1995. In a 1993 paper, Crain and Leonard show a negative cross-national correlation between compulsory voting and growth in overall government expenditures, which is consistent with their hypothesis that increased voter turnout under compulsory voting helps to counterbalance interest group rent-seeking. In response, O’Toole and Strobl (1995) criticize Crain and Leonard’s measurement decisions and show that compulsory voting is actually associated with higher levels of government spending in certain domains. Yeret (1995) further claims that Crain and Leonard’s findings are an artifact of the inclusion of non-democracies in their sample. Crain (1995) responds with models estimated using an expanded sample, the results of which he interprets to show that compulsory voting’s negative effect on expenditure growth is most pronounced in democracies with low levels of GDP growth.18 Conflicting conclusions are also apparent in more recent research on compulsory voting’s economic consequences. Chong and Olivera (2008) link compulsory voting to a more equal distribution of income across countries, which they argue is driven by higher levels of government redistribution. This purported redistribution mechanism is supported by Fowler’s (2013) finding that Australia’s adoption of compulsory voting boosted pension spending, and it is also consistent

18 Crain’s (1995) interactive regression models do show that the negative link between compulsory voting and expenditure growth is restricted to democracies with very low or negative levels of GDP growth. He neglects to mention that they also show a positive correlation between compulsory voting and expenditure growth in democracies and non-democracies with moderate or strong GDP growth.

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56 beyond turnout with Guntermann, Dassonneville, and Miller’s (2020) demonstration that the representational gaps favoring the rich over the poor are smaller in compulsory voting countries than in those with voluntary voting. Chong and Olivera’s empirical results are also bolstered by Carey and Horiuchi’s (2017) finding that Venezuela’s abolition of compulsory voting increased income inequality. Birch (2009, pp. 130–131) further finds a negative link between compulsory voting and inequality across the countries of Latin America and Western Europe. Yet, Maroto and Došek (2018) find a positive correlation between compulsory voting and income inequality and no evidence that it shapes redistributive policies. Hoffman, León, and Lombardi (2017) also find no indication that the use of compulsory voting in Austrian states affected government expenditures.

2.9 Conclusion This chapter reviewed the known consequences of compulsory voting. Most notably, and least surprisingly, compulsory voting has an upward impact on voter participation. In turn, this boost tends to lessen the impact of many socioeconomic and demographic forerunners of turnout, thereby making the composition of the voting population better reflect the distribution of eligible voters where voting is mandatory. Requiring turnout also changes voters’ behavior once at the polls. First, invalid balloting tends to be more common under compulsory voting, especially among those who are politically distrusting, uninterested, or otherwise negatively oriented toward democracy. In addition, compelled voters are less likely to cast ballots that correspond with their preferences. Many studies indicate that mandatory voting has an educative effect and can socialize people into political engagement, which would suggest that, in the long run at least, it could lessen invalid balloting and stimulate voters to cast better-reasoned ballots. Still, the empirical literature on this possibility is discordant. A small number of studies have assessed whether compulsory voting shapes attitudes, election outcomes, the behavior of political parties, policy characteristics, and income growth and inequality, with few clear patterns yet established. Whether the outcome is turnout or one of compulsory voting’s putative secondary or tertiary effects, extant research generally indicates an escalatory influence. That is, compulsory voting laws have the greatest impact where sanctions for abstention are both enforced and meaningful, but even unenforced or inconsequential penalties for abstention tend to generate different outcomes than would be seen under purely voluntary rules. Even toothless legal requirements can impact behavior, but those with teeth tend to have the most bite.

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3 How Compulsory Voting Affects Individuals Democratic theorists and opinion journalists, along with a growing number of empirical researchers, are divided as to the effects of forced voting on individuals’ attitudes, information levels, and voting behavior. Two segments from popular television programs reflect this cleavage. In an August 2016 episode of CNN’s Fareed Zakaria GPS, after noting the United States’ comparatively low turnout levels and President Barack Obama’s praise for compulsory voting, the host advanced an argument that compulsory voting increases political information in the population.1 To the contrary, in an October 2014 episode of HBO’s Last Week Tonight with John Oliver, the host argued that compulsory voting, rather than incentivizing well-thought votes, leads Brazilians to cast ballots for unserious candidates as a form of protest against coercion. In Oliver’s words, “when you make something obligatory, people resent it, and when they resent it, they fuck with it.” Citizens are required to turn out to the polls where voting is compulsory irrespective of whether they are legally allowed to spoil their ballots, leave them blank, or choose “none of the above.” So while individuals may not be compelled to express a political preference under compulsory voting, when enforced it does place on them an actual demand. Disjunctures in claims about the effects of compulsory voting may arise due to differing beliefs about the extent to which this coercion shapes citizens. Some essayists claim that, even among those who may be predisposed toward abstention, mandated turnout should be educative and enhance attitudes toward democracy. Many years ago Broomall (1893, p. 96) argued that voters who initially turn out to avoid losing money will eventually acquire “an interest in the business apart from that feature of it, and will gradually come to act from the higher motive of serving his country.” A century later, Lijphart (1997, p. 10) put forth the argument that compulsory voting could serve

1 In the segment, Zakaria made reference to research by Sheppard (2015) to support his contention that compulsory voting increases information. This is somewhat curious. While Sheppard finds that individuals living in countries with strongly enforced compulsory voting tend to be more knowledgeable than those in voluntary systems, she finds no evidence that moderately enforced compulsory voting induces knowledge, and she drops countries with weakly enforced compulsory voting from her main analyses. She also finds that, among those who are highly educated, moderately enforced compulsory voting decreases political knowledge (pp. 303–305).

Beyond Turnout: How Compulsory Voting Shapes Citizens and Political Parties. Shane P. Singh, Oxford University Press. © Shane P. Singh 2021. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198832928.003.0003

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58 beyond turnout as a “form of civic education and political stimulation.” If such claims are accurate, compulsory voting will be minimally coercive, in that many of those who might be disinclined to participate will come to endorse the requirement to vote. Yet, other writers see compulsory voting as a form of plain external pressure. Brennan puts it simply: “Advocates of compulsory voting want governments to coerce people into voting” (Brennan and Hill 2014, p. 8). For Saunders (2010a, p. 71), “compulsory voting [means] some people [are] coerced into voting— or at least turning out—when they do not want to.” Writers in this tradition tend to reject the idea that compulsory voting can instill engagement and civic orientations (see Section 1.2.5). In this chapter, I claim that the coercion inherent in mandatory voting systems has the potential to be palpable, especially among those who are disinclined to turn out. For others, turning out is volitional, and many such individuals will support compulsory voting and “integrate” it into their own value structure. Thus, the extent to which coercion is felt—and thereby consequential—will vary by individual. Those with positive orientations toward democracy have intrinsic motivation to participate and are more likely to see value in legally mandated turnout. For these individuals, the requirement to vote is essentially inconsequential, and the positive effects of their pro-democracy orientations on engagement with, and support for, the democratic system and its authorities will persist under compulsory voting. Conversely, among individuals who are negatively oriented toward electoral democracy, the legal requirement to turn out is a form of tangible external pressure. As such, compulsory voting will exacerbate the effects of such negativity on attitudes toward political actors and levels of political engagement, and it will heighten the extent to which it fosters antisystem sentiment. In the remainder of this chapter, I first review the known effects of coercion. I then advance my theory, incorporating insights from the psychology and political science literatures. Finally, from my theory, I derive a set of testable hypotheses.

3.1 The Effects of Coercion In the words of deCharms (1968, p. 269), “man strives to be a causal agent, to be the primary locus of causation for, or the origin of, his behavior.” The consequences of acting against one’s own volition are well described by selfdetermination theory (see Deci and Ryan 2011), which sets out two different types of motivation: intrinsic and extrinsic. An intrinsically motivated activity is done for its own sake, rather than because of external pressure. Extrinsic motivation, alternatively, implies that an activity is undertaken as a means of achieving a separate consequence, such as obtaining a reward or avoiding a sanction.

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how compulsory voting affects individuals 59 Individuals prefer to feel as if they acted by their own volition and derive more value from tasks that are intrinsically motivated. Consequentially, intrinsic motivation is positively associated with satisfaction, effort, performance quality, interest, and prosocial behavior. As stated by Atiq (2014), “a goal pursued out of a sense of its intrinsic worth offers an actor occasion to reflect on its being valued in this way—a mode of reflection that likely has an educative and fortifying effect.” Koestner, Zuckerman, and Koestner (1987), for example, find that intrinsic motivation leads people to pursue difficult tasks, to be more innovative, and to better respond to challenges. In the workplace, intrinsic motivation is positively associated with job satisfaction and commitment to the organization (Tremblay et al. 2009). Extrinsic incentives for a behavior can “crowd out” intrinsic motivation to engage in that behavior and decrease subsequent interest in it absent external incentives (deCharms 1968; Deci 1971). Extrinsic incentives can also lead individuals to focus on the separate consequence of a particular activity, rather than the task at hand. As a result, individuals are less likely to learn about portions of the task that are not directly relevant to the external incentive (Kohn 1999). Deci and Ryan (2008, p. 15) note, “the clearest examples of extrinsically motivated behaviors are those performed to obtain a tangible reward or to avoid a punishment.” Activities undertaken due purely or mostly to external coercion have deleterious consequences for attitudes and behavior. Threatened and applied punishments, in particular, have significant effects on emotions, attitudes, and behavior. This is clear from the findings of research on familial dynamics and juvenile behavior. For adolescents, coercion in the home can amplify problem behaviors (Williamson, Guerra, and Shadowen 2016, p. 302). Laub and Sampson (1995), for example, show that punitive discipline by parents can increase criminal behavior during adolescence. More broadly, Patterson, Forgatch, and DeGarmo (2010) find that reducing coercion in the family engenders positive interpersonal relationships. Biglan (2016) suggests that reducing coercive processes in society would have a broad benefit for public health. Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) show that the introduction of a monetary fine at daycare centers for parents late to pick up their children increased tardiness. Even coercion without associated penalties can decrease motivation to engage in a behavior, both in the short and long term. Evidence for this comes from studies of compensation and rewards, which have been shown to send a signal that a task is not interesting in and of itself—it is something that requires outside inducement. Deci (1971; 1972) finds that rewards for job performance led to a decrease in intrinsic motivation that did not recover after several months, and that monetary rewards for a puzzle-solving task decrease subsequent desire to engage in a related task. Ariely et al. (2009) find that rewards are detrimental to task performance,

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60 beyond turnout and that this effect increases with reward size. Titmuss (1970) argues that the introduction of monetary incentives undermines individuals’ sense of civic duty, and in line with Titmuss’, argument, Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) show that individuals become more resistant to NIMBY projects when compensation is offered. These insights into the effects of coercion extend straightforwardly into the realm of voting. As I outline below, the act of voting can instill desirable traits associated with democratic citizenship. But the extent to which it does so depends on whether the voting act feels coerced.

3.2 Theory: Compulsory Voting’s Divergent Effects on Citizens Electoral participation has a number of potentially desirable second-order effects. Voting can increase political trust (Hooghe and Stiers 2016), diffuse support for the political regime (Finkel 1987), satisfaction with democracy (Kostelka and Blais 2018), and external political efficacy—the belief that one can impact the political process (Clarke and Acock 1989; Finkel 1985). It can also instill a habit of continued voting (Dinas 2012; Gerber, Green, and Shachar 2003). But, this does not necessarily imply that compulsory voting, by boosting turnout, will engender in people democratically desirable attitudes and behaviors. If the decision to turn out is made due to external coercion, as will be the case for many where voting is mandatory, this assumption becomes particularly implausible. Indeed, the effects of coercion can preclude or reverse any positive effects of voting. Discussing self-determination theory, Ryan and Deci (2000, pp. 61–62) lay out a typology of extrinsic motivation that ranges from “integration,” in which one psychologically aligns any external pressures with his or her own needs and values, to “external regulation,” in which a behavior is purely extrinsically motivated. As with purely intrinsically motivated activities, behaviors undertaken due to integrated extrinsic motivation have many positive corollaries. These include increased engagement (Connell and Wellborn 1991; Sheldon and Kasser 1995), increased academic performance and perseverance (Grolnick and Ryan 1987; Miserandino 1996; Vallerand and Bissonnette 1992), and greater well-being (Sheldon and Kasser 1995). With external regulation, the deleterious consequences of coercion are likely to manifest. The effects of coercion can also be viewed through the lens of reactance theory (Brehm 1966), which posits that placing demands or restrictions on individuals encourages resistance. This can lead to attitudes and behaviors that run counter to the activity in question, and the more important one views his or her freedom with regard to the activity to be, the stronger the reactance will be. Being pressured

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how compulsory voting affects individuals 61 into an activity will arouse relatively little reactance for an individual who is intrinsically motivated to take part in it. But, for an individual who is opposed to participation, such pressure is akin to external regulation and will foster significant reactance. This reactance, in turn, may produce negative attitudes toward the impelled activity and could even decrease one’s likelihood of engaging in it. These “boomerang” effects are most likely when the threat associated with resisting the external pressure is significant (see Brehm and Brehm 1981, chps. 3 and 4). Sidman (1989) further explains that the attitudinal and behavioral effects of acting due to coercion are conditional upon individuals’ orientations toward the coercer. Reicher, Haslam, and Smith (2012), in a reanalysis of Milgram’s (1974) famous obedience studies, find that participants were least likely to agree to administer a severe electric shock in scenarios in which they were unlikely to identify with the experimenter and the scientific community that he represented. In the political realm, perceived injustice in lawmaking and government policy decreases support for elected leaders and makes it less likely that individuals will view political institutions as legitimate (Tyler, Rasinski, and McGraw 1985; Tyler 1994). Responses to punishment of oneself or others are also conditional on perceptions of fairness: when one perceives a punishment to be unfair, he or she will be less satisfied with the authority that applied the punishment (Tyler 2006). In the workplace, individuals are more satisfied with their tasks and perform better when they view punishments as just (Trevino 1992, pp. 662–663). Individuals that receive a criminal sanction that they perceive as unjust are more likely to feel defiant and thus more likely to reoffend (Sherman 1993). Moving to the realm of compelled public activities, there is evidence that the impact of compulsory jury duty on attitudes is conditional on prior orientations. Gastil et al. (2012) find that serving on a jury in the United States boosts confidence in the jury system, increases perceptions of the fairness of criminal juries, and engenders confidence in state and local judges. For political conservatives in particular, jury duty also increases confidence in the Supreme Court and Congress. Allen (1977) reports a positive effect of jury service on attitudes about the legal system, though this does not extend to individuals who are summoned for jury service but never sit on a trial. Shuman and Hamilton (1993) find that serving on a jury increases perceptions of fairness of the criminal justice system, and the size and significance of this effect is conditioned by a number of demographic factors and partisan identification. Durand, Bearden, and Gustafson (1978) find that prior jury service can itself moderate relationships between beliefs about certain aspects of jury service and overall attitudes toward jury duty. The interactive influence of external compulsion and intrinsic motivation on attitudinal and behavioral outcomes extends to mandatory voting. Many people in compulsory systems vote by their own volition, due to intrinsic motivation. Others may turn out with the instrumental goal of penalty avoidance, but at the same time

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62 beyond turnout respect and endorse the requirement to vote as a part of their country’s democratic structure. For these individuals, voting, while mandatory, is also “volitional and valued by the self ” (Ryan and Deci 2000, p. 62); they accept the legal requirement to turn out and have integrated it into their own value structure. For others, compulsory voting is a form of external regulation: they turn out to the polls solely to avoid a penalty, or they abstain and risk a sanction.2 Of course, in compulsory systems, those cajoled into participation may simply turn out and invalidate their ballots rather than stay home and risk a penalty. Indeed, mandatory voting increases the likelihood that an individual will cast an invalid ballot, especially among those who are politically alienated, politically distrusting, politically unsophisticated, and negatively oriented toward democracy (cf. Cohen 2018b; Moral 2016; Singh 2019b). Arguably, such individuals are thus unlikely to respond negatively to coercion, as casting a blank or spoiled ballot allows them to sidestep participation in the democratic process. But this argument is unconvincing; the mere requirement to participate is likely to aggravate those who are politically disinclined and predisposed against electoral democracy. Further, not all those who turn out involuntarily cast an invalid ballot. As shown by Solvak and Vassil (2015), even politically uninterested individuals are more likely to cast a valid vote than to abstain where voting is compulsory as compared to where it is optional (see also Uggla 2008, pp. 1158–1160). Compulsory voting thus has real coercive power in that it brings to the polls some people who would abstain in a voluntary regime; this is why it has a robust, positive effect on turnout. Further, it is not the case that living under compulsory voting for an extended time—even one’s entire life—will automatically induce a habit of voting and an acceptance of the legal requirement to do so. This is shown by Bechtel, Hangartner, and Schmid (2018) and Gaebler, Potrafke, and Roesel (2020), who find no evidence compulsory voting in Austria and Switzerland inculcated a long-term habit of participation. It is also evident in countries where mandatory voting does not apply for those at or above a particular advanced age, typically 70 years (see Table 1.1). Once individuals reach the age when voting becomes voluntary, their probability of turning out drops abruptly (Cepaluni and Hidalgo 2016; Jaitman 2013; see also Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2). Individuals who feel positive toward democracy and democratic performance are more likely to take part in it by their own volition. Birch (2010), for example, finds that those who perceive elections to be conducted fairly are more likely to participate in them. Both Birch and Brockington (2009) find that the belief that 2 Maldonado (2015, chp. 4) finds that Peruvians who were primed to think about their country’s compulsory voting rule with a reminder of the monetary and non-monetary penalties for abstention became less likely to report a belief that voting is a duty, and he reasonably argues that such a belief captures intrinsic motivation to vote. Thus, Maldonado’s finding suggests that, for the average individual, compulsory voting is a form of external regulation that reduces intrinsic motivation.

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how compulsory voting affects individuals 63 one’s voice matters in the political process and satisfaction with the democratic system correlate positively with turnout, and Brockington additionally finds evidence that people who believe that who is in power matters and that parties care about the average voter are more likely to vote. Grönlund and Setälä (2007) find that turnout is positively related to trust in parliament and politicians, satisfaction with the way government and democracy works, and the belief that votes matter to the political process. Karp and Milazzo (2015) similarly find that those who are skeptical about democracy as a form of government and dissatisfied with the way democracy works are less likely to vote. Thus, the extent to which compulsory voting is a form of integrated extrinsic motivation versus external regulation will depend upon individuals’ orientations toward the democratic system. For individuals who are positive toward democracy, the requirement to turn out does not undercut the voluntariness of the activity. These individuals will be more likely to vote due to intrinsic motivation— or to endorse the institution of compulsory voting and thereby incorporate it into their own value system. Thus, they will experience the favorable effects of activities undertaken due to intrinsic and integrated extrinsic motivation, which include increased engagement, interest, task performance, satisfaction with activities, and commitment to coercers. As noted above, the act of voting, in particular, can generate political trust, pro-regime attitudes, and political efficacy. Conversely, those who are negatively oriented toward democracy are unlikely to support the legal requirement to turn out, they are unlikely to vote by their own volition, and they are less likely to view punishments for abstention as fair. For these individuals, compulsory voting is a form of external regulation, and the adverse consequences of coercion and the resulting decline in internal motivation will be realized. These include lower support for authorities and leaders, defiance, lower satisfaction with the activity, antisocial behavior, decreased effort, lower interest, and a decline in engagement.

3.3 Observable Implications and Hypotheses The theory outlined above generates a number of observable individual-level implications. First, those with positive orientations toward democracy, who are generally intrinsically motivated to vote, will incorporate mandated participation into their own democratic values and thus endorse the institution of compulsory voting. Those who are negatively oriented toward democracy, alternatively, will see compulsory voting as something to be endured. Such individuals are more likely to be unsupportive of compulsory voting. Second, the requirement to vote will condition the impact of orientations toward democracy on support for political authorities. For those who are coerced

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64 beyond turnout to the voting booth, the resulting antipathy and disgruntlement will reinforce negative affect toward political leaders. This aligns with the findings of Henn and Oldfield (2016) and Singh (2018a), who find that compulsory voting can induce resentment and dissatisfaction with democracy among those who are predisposed against electoral participation. For those who vote due to intrinsic motivation or endorse the requirement to vote, the requirement to vote will bolster support for political authorities. Weitz-Shapiro and Winters (2011) provide evidence suggestive of such a bifurcated pattern, showing that voting is positively related to life satisfaction where turnout is voluntary or where compulsory rules are unenforced but that this link is largely absent where voting is coerced. Third, the same mechanisms that affect attitudinal support for political authorities will shape voting behavior, as votes for extreme or non-mainstream parties are often used to signal protest (cf. Bakker, Jolly, and Polk 2020; Birch and Dennison 2019; Cutts, Ford, and Goodwin 2011; Kselman and Niou 2011; Oesch 2008; Passarell and Tuorto 2018). Thus, on the one hand, for those who are externally coerced, any intention to vote for extremist or outsider political parties will be reinforced. On the other hand, those who value the act of turning out and agree with the legal requirement to do so will be more likely to vote for mainstream parties under mandatory rules. Such individuals are relatively unlikely to vote for an extremist or outsider party out of protest, and they may also select a mainstream party as a signal of support for a country’s current democratic system and its authorities. In line with this, Eckles et al. (2014) and Morgenstern and Zechmeister (2001) show that individuals who are averse to potential changes to the status quo are more likely to support establishment and incumbent parties. A handful of studies have considered the effects of compulsory voting on the success of fringe and mainstream parties (see Sections 2.5 and 2.6). Birch (2009, pp. 121–124) finds some evidence that small parties perform better under voluntary voting. Yet, studies by Bélanger (2004), Carreras (2012), Miller and Dassonneville (2016), and Rich (2015) show that support for nonviable, outsider, minor, or fringe parties and candidates is greater in countries with compulsory voting, and Ferwerda (2014) finds that the abolition of compulsory voting in Austrian states slightly decreased support for minor parties. None of these studies has taken into account the potential interaction between compulsory voting and orientations toward democracy in shaping vote choices, which may explain their mixed conclusions. A fourth observable implication is that compulsory voting will shape the effects of orientations toward democracy on political sophistication. There is a long and discordant literature on the putative educative effects of compulsory voting. Many scholars argue that compulsory voting brings uninterested and unknowledgeable citizens to the polls, thus provoking a decline in the political sophistication level of the average voter (e.g. Aitkin 1982; Brennan in Brennan and Hill 2014; Crisp 1950;

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how compulsory voting affects individuals 65 Donaldson 1915; Fishkin 2009; Saunders 2010a). Others suggest that compulsory voting simulates an interest in politics and a desire to get informed, thereby boosting political sophistication (e.g. Barthélemy 1912; Broomall 1893; Chapman 2019; Elliott 2017; Engelen 2007; Hill 2000; Holls 1891; Lacroix 2007; Lijphart 1997; Nerincx 1901). The empirical findings regarding this link are correspondingly mixed (cf. Bechtel, Hangartner, and Schmid 2018; Berggren 2001; Bilodeau and Blais 2011; Birch 2009; Bühlmann and Freitag 2006, p. 31, note 19; Carreras 2016; Córdova and Rangel 2017; Gaebler, Potrafke, and Roesel 2020; Gordon and Segura 1997; Großer and Seebauer 2016; Holbein and Rangel 2020; Holderberg and Ballowitz 2020; Karp 2012; de Leon and Rizzi 2014, 2016; León 2017; Loewen, Milner, and Hicks 2008; Lundell 2012; Oganesyan and Jensen Forthcoming; Selb and Lachat 2009 p. 575, note 1; Sheppard 2015; Shineman 2018; Singh and Roy 2018; Wernli 2001; Winchester, Hall, and Binney 2015). This incommensurateness may, in part, stem from the fact that extant empirical studies do not search for conditional effects. I expect that, for those who are coerced to the polls, any feelings of defiance, disinterest, and detachment from the voting process will be amplified, leading to a withdrawal from politics and a decrease in political sophistication. Conversely, for those who vote due to intrinsic motivation or value the requirement to vote, mandatory voting will boost engagement and interest and thereby increase political sophistication. Because compulsory voting most powerfully shapes attitudes and behavior where sanctions for abstention are steep and enforced (e.g. Birch 2009; Dassonneville, Hooghe, and Miller 2017; Panagopoulos 2008; Singh 2011, 2018a, 2019b), the theorized relationships are most likely to manifest where rules have “teeth.” Accounting for the escalatory influence of compulsory voting strictness, the observable implications of this chapter’s theory are expressed in hypothesis form as: Hypothesis 1: Individuals who are more negatively oriented toward electoral democracy are less likely to support compulsory voting. Hypothesis 2: Compulsory voting enhances the negative relationship between negative orientations toward democracy and support for political authorities, especially where rules are strictly enforced and include significant sanctions for abstention. Hypothesis 3: Compulsory voting enhances the positive relationship between negative orientations toward democracy and support for extremist and outsider parties, especially where rules are strictly enforced and include significant sanctions for abstention. Hypothesis 4: Compulsory voting enhances the negative relationship between negative orientations toward democracy and political sophistication, especially where rules are strictly enforced and include significant sanctions for abstention.

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66 beyond turnout

3.4 Conclusion Compulsory voting reliably increases turnout, especially where sanctions for abstention are meaningful. It does so by shaping citizens’ decisions about whether or not to vote (Panagopoulos 2008; Singh 2011). But, compulsory voting’s effects on turnout are heterogeneous in the electorate (see Section 2.1), which suggests that individuals “feel” compulsory voting differently. In this chapter I consider whether compulsory voting may also condition the impact of individual-level factors on outcomes beyond turnout. For some, the drive to participate is inherent, and compulsion to vote may go unnoticed. For others, even if pressure to participate is discerned, they will endorse and accept this coercion. But, for those who are less civically minded and would prefer to abstain, external compulsion to attend the polls will be palpable. Extant research and essays on compulsory voting largely fail to take into account variation in the extent to which compulsion is felt by citizens. Perhaps because of this, authors arrive at conflicting predictions about how compulsory voting may shape individuals. In my theoretical treatment I take into account predispositions toward electoral democracy, which shape the extent to which coercion to the polls is discerned and therefore the effects that it may have on individuals. From my theory, I arrive at a set of testable hypotheses. In Chapter 4, I test the expectation of Hypothesis 1, that those with negative orientations toward electoral democracy are less likely to support the institution of compulsory voting. In Chapter 5, I test the expectations of Hypotheses 2–4, that compulsory voting conditions the effects of such orientations on political attitudes, behavior, and sophistication.

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4 The Correlates of Support for Compulsory Voting Compulsory voting does not enjoy universal support where it is used. To date, there are no published cross-national studies of the correlates of support for compulsory voting, and in this chapter I probe whether support for and opposition to compulsory voting has a systematic basis. Specifically, I test Hypothesis 1 of Chapter 3, which states that those who are negatively oriented toward electoral democracy—who are less likely to be intrinsically motivated to vote—are less likely to favor compulsory voting. By contrast, those who are positive toward electoral democracy should endorse the institution of compulsory voting. The establishment of such a link would undergird the claim, advanced in the subsequent hypotheses of Chapter 3, that people who are unfavorable toward democracy are especially likely to be aggravated by a requirement to participate in elections, as they will “feel” the compulsion more intensely. And, it would support the idea that those who are positively oriented toward democracy are more likely to experience the beneficial downstream effects of voting, even when it is obligatory, because such individuals incorporate the requirement to vote into their own value system. If it turns out that orientations toward democracy do not predict attitudes toward compulsory voting, there would be reason to doubt the idea that compelled participation should have differential effects on individuals dependent upon such orientations. My data come from several academic public opinion surveys conducted in Australia, Belgium, and Latin America. Results show variation in the average level support for compulsory voting across countries, and they are also indicative of a systematic, negative effect of dissatisfaction with democracy on support for compulsory voting within countries. This effect is present even after accounting for political interest, ideology, and a number of demographic variables.

4.1 Background Information While there is a paucity of literature on the drivers of support for compulsory voting, a number of studies have assessed the correlates of support for various electoral setups. There is some evidence that people prefer the familiar. For

Beyond Turnout: How Compulsory Voting Shapes Citizens and Political Parties. Shane P. Singh, Oxford University Press. © Shane P. Singh 2021. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198832928.003.0004

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68 beyond turnout example, Donovan and Karp (2006) and Bowler, Donovan, and Karp (2007) find the most support for the use of referendums in Switzerland, the country with by far the most historical experience with direct democracy. There is also a clear trend of individuals being more likely to support voting rules that they believe will help achieve their policy goals and see their preferred parties win or maintain power (Aldrich, Reifler, and Munger 2014; Banducci and Karp 1999; Blais et al. 2015; Karp and Bowler 2001; Landwehr and Harms 2020; Werner 2020). Qvortrup (2018, pp. 370–373) identifies 20 referendums that were held on switches to the electoral system between 1980 and 2015. Half of these failed, either because voters chose to maintain the status quo or because turnout fell below necessary levels. Results have also been mixed in referendums that took place after Qvortrup’s data end. In 2015, voters in Poland supported a change to the electoral system, though at about 8 percent turnout was well below the 50 percent threshold. In the U.S. state of Maine, voters supported an electoral system change in 2016— and again in 2018 after implementation was stymied by the legislature. Bulgaria is the only country to have held a referendum on compulsory voting. In the 2016 vote, a majority supported the legislature’s recent adoption of mandatory voting, but turnout failed to meet the necessary quorum (see Section 1.5). Public opinion polls reveal that the extent to which ordinary citizens support compulsory voting varies widely in countries where it is law. In Australia, the public is particularly supportive of the long-standing compulsory voting rule. Clear majorities have routinely expressed support for compulsory voting from the 1940s through the present (Aitkin 1982, pp. 30–31; Hill 2010; Mackerras and McAllister 1999). In the Indian state of Gujarat, over three quarters of respondents expressed support for compulsory voting in a 2010 poll (Sardesai 2014, p. 91).1 In a poll conducted by Grupo Radar in Uruguay in 2018, 68 percent of respondents expressed support for compulsory voting. Conversely, a 2017 poll in Flanders conducted by De Standaard newspaper found 54 percent in opposition to Belgium’s system of compulsory voting.2 In Brazil, 61 percent and 74 percent of poll respondents expressed opposition to compulsory voting in polls conducted by Datafolha in 2014 and by Ipsos for Brazil Pulse in 2017, respectively. Maldonado (2014) also reports supermajority opposition to extant compulsory voting regimes in Ecuador and Peru. Public support for mandatory voting also varies extensively across countries with voluntary voting. In the United Kingdom, polls conducted in 2015 and 2017 by YouGov found clear majorities in support of a switch to compulsory voting. In a 2017 poll conducted in France by BVA Group, 61 percent of respondents favored mandatory voting in local and national elections. Contrastingly, in the United 1

Gujarat enacted compulsory voting for local elections in 2015 (see Section 1.5). Flanders abolished compulsory voting for municipal and provincial contests in 2019 (see Section 1.5). 2

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the correlates of support for compulsory voting 69 States, a pair of 2015 polls by YouGov and Rasmussen Reports found only about a quarter of respondents in support of mandatory voting. Similarly, polls conducted in 2017 and 2018 by Pew Research Center found that about one in five U.S. respondents favored a requirement to vote. Support for compulsory voting was strongest among racial minorities, younger people, and Democrats, but was always firmly a minority position. In a 2020 Rasmussen poll, about 30 percent of likely U.S. voters favored mandatory voting with sanctions for abstention. In Canada,3 a slim majority expressed support for maintaining voluntary voting in a 2016–2017 consultation commissioned by the national government and executed by Vox Pop Labs. However, three out of five respondents indicated support for compulsory voting in a 2019 poll by Research Co. In Portugal, 41 percent of respondents expressed support for mandatory voting in a 2018 poll by Expresso newspaper. Little research has been conducted on the individual-level correlates of support for compulsory voting, either within or across countries. An early exception comes from a 1967 survey in Australia, which showed that less politically interested individuals were less favorable toward the country’s compulsory voting law (Aitkin 1982, pp. 32–33). This was reinforced by a 2016 study conducted by Karp et al. (2017, p. 38), who also found political interest to be a strong correlate of Australians’ support for compulsory voting. In Ecuador, Maldonado (2014) finds that political interest, right-wing ideology, and support for the incumbent president are positively related to support for compulsory voting rules, while in Peru he finds more support for compulsory voting among urbanites and those with a party identification. In India, the idea of compulsory voting is most popular among the young, those in urban areas, those who believe their vote matters, and those who are more interested in politics (Sardesai 2014).4 A pair of survey experiments conducted by the ANUPoll (McAllister 2013) at the Australian National University give further insight into the causes of support for compulsory voting. In the first experiment, all respondents were asked a question about whether they feel voting should be compulsory in Australia, but the wording was randomly manipulated for each of three near-equal-sized groups. The three questions were: • Do you think that voting at federal elections should be compulsory, or do you think that people should only vote if they want to?

3 See Section 1.5 for additional discussion of opinion toward compulsory voting in Canada, as measured in a report prepared by the Special Committee on Electoral Reform in 2016. 4 In a cross-national study only of youth (individuals aged 13–20), Pesek (2014) finds the least support for compulsory voting in Colombia and the United States, the two countries in the sample with voluntary voting, although compulsory voting also failed to attain majority support in Ecuador, where sanctions for abstention are enforced. Respondents were most supportive of mandatory voting in Mexico and Peru, which employ unenforced and enforced compulsory voting, respectively.

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70 beyond turnout • Do you think that voting at federal elections should be compulsory, or do you think that people who have different party preferences to you should only vote if they want to? • Do you think that voting at federal elections should be compulsory, or do you think that people who don’t know much about politics should only vote if they want to? For each question, around two thirds of respondents stated support for compulsory voting, and a bit under one third expressed that voting should be voluntary (McAllister 2013, p. 11). This suggests that attitudes toward compulsory voting in Australia are not driven by animosity toward those with different political preferences or beliefs about the political astuteness of others. The second ANUpoll experiment dealt with raising the fine for abstention, and the wording was again manipulated across three randomly selected groups of respondents of roughly equal size. The three questions were: • Do you think the fines for nonvoting should be increased to $100 for people such as yourself? • Do you think the fines for nonvoting should be increased to $100 for young people? • Do you think the fines for nonvoting should be increased to $100 for disadvantaged groups? Respondents were much more resistant to an increase in fines for abstention for young people and disadvantaged groups. When the increase was targeted at “people such as yourself,” 58.8 percent of respondents opposed raising the fine; for young people, 65.4 percent were in opposition; and for disadvantaged groups, 72.7 percent opposed an increase (McAllister 2013, p. 11–12). This suggests that attitudes toward fines for abstention in Australia are related to preferences for egalitarianism—or perhaps beliefs about who would be likely to participate absent state compulsion. There is also some research on attitudes toward compulsory voting among political elites, and like with ordinary citizens, these cannot be fully explained by a country’s present voting rule. In a 2019 survey of 98 members of the Australian Parliament by Democracy2025, over one fifth nominated compulsory voting as the country’s best democratic feature—and another third nominated Australia’s high rate of political participation. Australian political candidates surveyed between 1999 and 2002 favored maintaining its mandatory voting law by a ratio of nearly four to one, whereas those in Germany and the Netherlands were overwhelmingly supportive of present voluntary voting regimes. New Zealand candidates also expressed a preference for the country’s voluntary voting rule,

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the correlates of support for compulsory voting 71 though a majority of those who had lost a recent election favored the adoption of compulsory voting (Bowler, Donovan and Karp 2006). French parliamentarians, like their constituents, are relatively sanguine toward compulsory voting. In a 2018 survey of 71 members of the National Assembly by Le Journal du Dimanche, 41 expressed support for a switch to a mandatory rule. In Peru, less than half of 91 legislators interviewed by the Latin American Elites project of the University of Salamanca favored maintaining the country’s compulsory voting law, and support was unrelated to their demographic characteristics or party affiliation (Maldonado 2014).

4.2 A Test of Hypothesis 1 As discussed in Chapter 3 and stated in Hypothesis 1, I expect that those who are negatively oriented toward electoral democracy—who are less likely to possess an intrinsic motivation to vote—are less likely to favor compulsory voting. While the opinion polls outlined in the preceding section give a sense of overall support for compulsory voting in different countries, there exists little empirical insight about the relationship between orientations toward democracy and citizens’ attitudes toward compulsory voting. To better assess this potential link, I searched for academic public opinion surveys that included a question about attitudes toward compulsory voting in countries where turning out is required. I located 19 such surveys, which are identified in Table 4.1. The bulk are from Australia, though Belgium and a number of Latin American countries with mandatory voting are also represented. The wording of the questions used to gauge support for compulsory voting varies across the surveys. For example, in the Australian Election Studies, the typical item asks respondents a question of the form: “Do you think that voting at Federal elections should be compulsory, or do you think that people should only have to vote if they want to?” Respondents are then given four or five response options, ranging from strong support for voluntary voting to strong support for compulsory voting. Other surveys present a binary option. For example, the AmericasBarometer surveys in Ecuador and Peru simply ask respondents whether they think voting should be mandatory or voluntary. To help facilitate comparisons across surveys, within each I constrain responses to each question about support for compulsory voting to vary from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating more support. In Figure 4.1, I plot the mean value of the rescaled measure across surveys. Support for mandatory voting appears to be highest in Australia. In Ecuador, support was much higher in 2014 than in 2008, and support for compulsory voting is relatively low in Bolivia and Peru. Of course,

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72 beyond turnout differences across and within countries could be an artifact of variation in question construction, meaning these comparisons are indirect. To measure orientations toward electoral democracy, I rely on a survey question about satisfaction with democracy, which is asked widely in the surveys listed in Table 4.1. In each survey, the question is exactly or near to: “On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in [name of country]?” I constrain responses to vary from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating more dissatisfaction. Table 4.1 Public Opinion Surveys with Questions about Attitudes Toward Compulsory Voting Country of Survey

Year

Survey Organization

Australia Australia Australia Australia Australia Australia Australia Australia Australia Australia Australia Australia Belgium Bolivia Bolivia Ecuador Ecuador Peru Uruguay

1987 1993 1996 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2013 2016 2016 1995 2014 2017 2008 2014 2012 2014

Australian Election Study Australian Election Study Australian Election Study Australian Election Study Australian Election Study Australian Election Study Australian Election Study Australian Election Study Australian Election Study ANUPoll Australian Election Study Australian Voter Experience (AVE) Belgium General Election Study AmericasBarometer AmericasBarometer AmericasBarometer AmericasBarometer AmericasBarometer AmericasBarometer

Note: The 2001 Australian Election Study conducted interviews in 2001 and 2002. The 2004 Australian Election Study conducted interviews in 2004 and 2005. The 2007 Australian Election Study conducted interviews in 2007 and 2008. The 2010 Australian Election Study conducted interviews in 2010 and 2011. The 2013 Australian Election Study conducted interviews in 2013 and 2014. The 1995 Belgium General Election Study conducted interviews in 1995 and 1996. The Australian Election Study is housed at Australian National University (https://australianelectionstudy.org/). ANUPoll is a quarterly survey of Australian public opinion housed at the Australian National University (http://csrm.cass.anu.edu.au/research/surveys/anupoll/). The 2016 Australian Voter Experience survey was conducted by the Electoral Integrity Project, based at Harvard University and the University of Sydney (https://www.electoralintegrityproject.com/). The 1995 Belgium General Election Study was undertaken by the Interuniversitair Steunpunt Politieke Opinieonderzoek at the Catholic University of Leuven and the Point d’appui Interuniversitaire sur l’Opinion Publique et la Politique at the Catholic University of Louvain-La-Neuve (https://easy.dans.knaw.nl/ui/datasets/id/easy-dataset:65023/). The AmericasBarometer is conducted by the Latin American Public Opinion Project, housed at Vanderbilt University (https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/).

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the correlates of support for compulsory voting 73 Australia 2007 Australia 2013 (ANUpoll) Australia 2013 Australia 2016 Australia 2004 Australia 2010 Australia 1998 Australia 2001 Australia 1996 Australia 2016 (AVE) Ecuador 2014 Australia 1993 Uruguay 2014 Australia 1987 Belgium 1995 Ecuador 2008 Bolivia 2014 Peru 2012 Bolivia 2017 .3

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Figure 4.1 The Mean Level of Support for Compulsory Voting Across Countries Note: Data sources are listed in Table 4.1. Support for compulsory voting is scaled to range from 0 to 1. Horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals.

To be sure, there is debate over the meaning of satisfaction with democracy and what this survey item captures. Canache, Mondak, and Seligson (2001) argue that satisfaction with democracy captures support for authorities, system support, and general support for democracy as a form of government, though it has also been taken to represent a diffuse emotional expression of approval of the democratic system (e.g. Aarts and Thomassen 2008; Anderson and Guillory 1997;

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74 beyond turnout Blais and Gélineau 2007; Singh 2014) or support for how it functions (Anderson 1998; Fuchs, Guidorossi, and Svensson 1995; Singh and Carlin 2015). Here, I do not take a position on the precise meaning of satisfaction with democracy, but instead rely on the fact that it captures myriad aspects of support for, and attitudes toward, democracy; indeed, it has been found to share variance with a number of theoretically nearby concepts (e.g. Canache, Mondak, and Seligson 2001; Klingemann 1999; Kornberg and Clarke 1994; Sarsfield and Echegaray 2006; Singh, Lago, and Blais 2011). To help identify the effect of dissatisfaction on support for mandatory voting, I include a number of variables that might correlate with both in the models. First, I include in the models measures of political interest and political ideology. I gauge interest with responses to questions of the form, “How much interest do you have in politics?” Response options differ across surveys, and I thus constrain responses to vary from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating more interest in politics. To measure ideology, I use responses to questions asking respondents to place themselves on a left-right scale. As the range of the scales varies, I again constrain responses to vary from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating more rightward political ideologies. In addition, I include in the models standard demographic measures of age, education, income, and gender. In every survey, age is measured in years. Depending on the survey, education is either an ordinal measure of highest grade or degree completed or total years of education. Income is measured in brackets, and the number of available brackets differs across surveys. I constrain age, education, and income to vary from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating more of each. To measure gender, I create a dummy differentiating those who report being female and those who report being male. The 1987 and 1993 Australian Election Studies and the 2013 ANUPoll did not ask the necessary questions to create one or more of the variables. As a result, I exclude these surveys, and I am left with 25,755 respondents in 16 surveys. Because of the differences in question wording, I estimate unique effects of each covariate in each survey. I do so in a single linear model, regressing attitudes toward compulsory voting on each covariate, dummies for each country-year survey (with one arbitrarily excluded as the reference), and an interaction between each covariate and each included survey dummy. I also estimate the effect of each covariate over all individuals in all surveys. The underlying model’s associated R2 value of 0.18 indicates that just under a fifth of the variance in attitudes toward compulsory voting is jointly explained by the dissatisfaction and the other independent variables. Figure 4.2 plots the coefficient on dissatisfaction with democracy in each survey, as well as the coefficient estimated over all 16 surveys that included the questions necessary to measure dissatisfaction with democracy and the other variables.

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the correlates of support for compulsory voting 75 Australia 1996 Australia 1998 Australia 2001 Australia 2004 Australia 2007 Australia 2010 Australia 2013 Australia 2016 Australia 2016 (AVE) Belgium 1995 Bolivia 2014 Bolivia 2017 Ecuador 2008 Ecuador 2014 Peru 2012 Uruguay 2014 Overall Effect −.6

−.3

0

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Effect of Dissatisfaction with Democracy on Expected Support for Compulsory Voting

Figure 4.2 Support for Compulsory Voting and Dissatisfaction with Democracy Across Countries Note: Data sources are listed in Table 4.1. All variables are scaled to range from 0 to 1. Predicted effects are from an interactive linear regression model that includes dissatisfaction with democracy, political interest, left-right ideology, age, education, income, and gender as covariates and estimates a separate coefficient for each covariate in each survey. The overall effect is calculated over the entire sample. Horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals. The number of observations in the model is 25,755.

Figures 4.3 and 4.4 depict results for each of the remaining covariates. Because all independent variables are constrained to the unit interval, each coefficient gives the expected change in support for compulsory voting—itself constrained to vary

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76 beyond turnout from 0 to 1—associated with an increase from the minimum to the maximum value of the covariate.5 Starting with Figure 4.2, with the other variables taken into account, dissatisfaction with democracy negatively impacts support for compulsory voting in nearly all of the included surveys. This negative relationship is sturdiest in Australia, where the coefficient on dissatisfaction hovers around -0.25. This indicates that a move from the minimum to the maximum value of dissatisfaction in Australia is associated with decrease in support for compulsory voting equivalent to about 25 percent of its range. In Belgium and the Latin American countries, the negative associations are smaller and often statistically imprecise, though the negative impact of dissatisfaction is large in Ecuador in 2014 and in Peru in 2012. Overall, these findings provide strong support for Hypothesis 1 of Chapter 3: those who feel less positive toward democracy tend to be unsupportive of the requirement to participate in elections. Moving to the other variables, more politically interested individuals are more pro-compulsory voting, other things being equal. As demonstrated in the left-most panel of Figure 4.3, in no survey is the coefficient on political interest negative, and in most it is both positive and meaningfully different from zero. Further, political interest has a stronger association with attitudes toward compulsory voting in Australia and Belgium than in the Latin American countries. With the other variables accounted for, ideology does not have a strong association with support for compulsory voting, as is clear from the center panel of Figure 4.3. In Australia, rightward ideologies are reliably correlated with negativity toward compulsory voting, whereas being on the political right weakly associates with support for compulsory voting in Ecuador and antipathy toward compulsory voting in Bolivia. Elsewhere there is scant evidence of any meaningful link between ideology and compulsory voting. As evidenced by the trivial size of the overall coefficient on ideology, these varied and unreliable effects essentially cancel out in the aggregate. Regarding age, the right-hand panel of Figure 4.3 indicates that there is little evidence of a difference in support for compulsory voting across generations, all else equal, though it seems to be more popular among older individuals in Australia.6 Figure 4.4 indicates that education levels, gender, and income all have cross-nationally inconsistent and small relationships with support for compulsory voting, with the other variables accounted for. 5 To be sure, the models are built to identify the effects of dissatisfaction with democracy, while the control variables are used to account for sources of spuriousness. As such, their relationships with support for compulsory voting should not be given a causal interpretation. Figures 4.3 and 4.4 are provided only to give an idea of how the political and demographic controls associate with support for compulsory voting across countries. 6 I tried specifications in which I allowed age to have a curvilinear effect with support for compulsory voting and did not find strong evidence of such a pattern.

Australia 1996

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Association Between Age and Support for Compulsory Voting

Figure 4.3 Correlates of Support for Compulsory Voting Across Countries (1) Note: Data sources are listed in Table 4.1. All variables are scaled to range from 0 to 1. Predicted associations are from an interactive linear regression model that includes dissatisfaction with democracy, political interest, left-right ideology, age, education, income, and gender as covariates and estimates a separate coefficient for each covariate in each survey. The overall associations are calculated over the entire sample. Horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals. The number of observations in the model is 25,755.

.6

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−.6

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Association Between Female Gender Identity and Support for Compulsory Voting

Figure 4.4 Correlates of Support for Compulsory Voting Across Countries (2) Note: Data sources are listed in Table 4.1. All variables are scaled to range from 0 to 1. Predicted associations are from an interactive linear regression model that includes dissatisfaction with democracy, political interest, left-right ideology, age, education, income, and gender as covariates and estimates a separate coefficient for each covariate in each survey. The overall associations are calculated over the entire sample. Horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals. The number of observations in the model is 25,755.

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the correlates of support for compulsory voting 79

4.3 Conclusion Support for, or antipathy toward, compulsory voting could signal something beyond beliefs about obligatory voting itself. Chapman (2019, p. 105) claims that citizens who support mandatory voting laws “clearly express a public belief in and commitment to the value of all citizens’ participation in democracy.” In support of Hypothesis 1 of Chapter 3, the findings of this chapter show that individuals who are more positive toward democracy are more supportive of compulsory voting. It could be that, in line with Chapman’s supposition, these individuals are affirming their allegiance to the value of full democratic participation by expressing support for the requirement to vote. Alternatively, endorsements of mandatory voting could be more immediate. For example, someone who is dissatisfied with democracy may detract from compulsory voting simply because they wish to preserve citizens’ legal ability to signal discontent via abstention. At the same time, someone who feels negatively toward the democratic process might be unsupportive of mandatory voting not because they see little inherent value in high turnout levels, but because they doubt that the government will implement the social choice and thus see little justification for forcing citizens to take part in it. While the drivers of the empirical associations uncovered in this chapter are contestable, the associations are real, and they help undergird Hypotheses 2–4 of Chapter 3, which suggest that negative orientations toward electoral democracy will be aggravated by mandatory voting. In the next chapter, I test these hypotheses.

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5 The Effects of Compulsory Voting on Individuals Empirical Tests

This chapter empirically tests the key predictions of the theory advanced in Chapter 3, which argues that compulsory voting amplifies the attitudinal and behavioral consequences of orientations toward electoral democracy. In particular, Hypotheses 2–4, derived from the theory, expect compulsory voting to strengthen the link between these orientations and support for authorities, support for extremist and outsider parties, and political sophistication, respectively. The hypotheses further expect that this process will be most apparent where rules are strictly enforced and include significant sanctions for abstention. The first set of empirical tests leverage cross-national variation in the use and strength of compulsory voting laws. My cross-national data come from the AmericasBarometer and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). Since 2004, the AmericasBarometer has roughly biennially surveyed the publics of most countries in the Western Hemisphere. The surveys included in my analyses cover the years 2004–2017. The CSES is a collection of harmonized post-election surveys from around the world. I use its first four modules, which cover dozens of countries and the years 1996–2016. Both survey organizations ask similar or identical questions over time and across countries, which makes them valuable for cross-country analyses. The second set of empirical tests leverage intra-country variation in the application of compulsory voting. The first source of intra-country data is the Swiss Election Study (Selects), which includes surveys of residents of all cantons over the 1971–2015 time period. These data are valuable for my purposes, as the canton of Schaffhausen enforces compulsory voting but exempts citizens aged 65 or above. I am thus able to gauge the effect of compulsory voting by comparing those just younger and just older than Schaffhausen’s compulsory voting cutoff. Further, many of the questions in the Selects are similar to those asked by the AmericasBarometer and the CSES. I also use within-country data from Argentina, where I fielded a survey purposebuilt for testing Hypotheses 2–4 (and, in part, Hypothesis 5; see Chapters 6 and 7) in the wake of its 2019 general election. I included in my survey questions similar to those in the AmericasBarometer, the CSES, and Selects that I use to gauge Beyond Turnout: How Compulsory Voting Shapes Citizens and Political Parties. Shane P. Singh, Oxford University Press. © Shane P. Singh 2021. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198832928.003.0005

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the effects of compulsory voting on individuals 81 my dependent concepts. Argentina is an excellent setting to test my expectations as, while voting is mandatory, those aged 16–17 and 70 and over are allowed to vote but not obligated to do so. I was able to obtain precise information on survey respondents’ age in days, which allows me to use a regression discontinuity approach to estimate the causal effects of being required to vote. The results of the cross-national and within-country analyses, while not entirely consistent and in many cases statistically uncertain, on balance provide support for my expectations. The findings evidence an overall pattern whereby compulsory voting amplifies the deleterious consequences of negative orientations toward democracy. Equivalently, this indicates that compulsory voting boosts the extent to which positive democratic orientations engender outcomes typically thought of as good for democracy. These include support for authorities, support for moderate parties, and political sophistication.

5.1 Cross-Country Tests of Hypotheses 2–4 The key explanatory factor in Hypotheses 2–4 is orientations toward democracy. Following the measurement strategy of Chapter 4, I gauge such orientations with responses to a question about democratic satisfaction, which is asked in every AmericasBarometer1 survey and nearly every survey of the CSES.2 In each, the wording of the question is exactly or similar to: “On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in [name of country]?” I assign a 1 to respondents who reported being “very satisfied,” a 2 to the “fairly satisfied,” a 3 to the “not very satisfied,” and a 4 to those “not at all satisfied” with the way democracy works in their country. Thus, higher values indicate more dissatisfaction with democracy. As noted in Chapter 4, there is disagreement over the meaning of satisfaction with democracy and what it captures. For my purposes, it is particularly important that satisfaction with democracy captures the aspects of orientations toward democracy that I theorize shape the ways in which individuals respond to compulsory voting. Much of the logic behind the expectations advanced in Chapter 3 hinges on the idea that those with negative orientations toward democracy are less likely to endorse compulsory voting or to vote by their own volition, due to intrinsic motivation. Regarding the former, Figure 4.2 of Chapter 4 verifies that dissatisfaction with democracy associates negatively with support for compulsory 1 The AmericasBarometer is part of the Latin American Public Opinion Project, which is housed at Vanderbilt University (https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/). 2 The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems is housed at the Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan and the GESIS-Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences (http://www.cses. org/).

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82 beyond turnout voting. Before proceeding to the tests of Hypotheses 2–4, I use the AmericasBarometer and CSES data to verify that the responses to the satisfaction with democracy question correlate with the propensity to turn out voluntarily. I restrict the samples to only include individuals in places with fully voluntary voting3 and use the resulting data to estimate regression models of turnout behavior on dissatisfaction with democracy. With the AmericasBarometer, which is not an election survey, I use reported intentions to cast a valid vote as the outcome variable. The relevant survey question asks, “If the next [presidential/general] elections were being held this week, what would you do?” I code those who report an intention not to vote or to cast a blank or spoiled ballot as 0, and I assign a 1 to those who intend to cast a valid ballot. With the CSES, which includes surveys conducted in the wake of national elections, I use reported turnout in the recent election as the outcome variable. This variable is constructed differently depending on the nature of the questions asked in the relevant national post-election survey. For example, some surveys gauge turnout with a vote choice question that includes abstention as an option among the competing candidates or parties, while others directly ask respondents whether they turned out to vote. In any case, the variable is coded 0 for those who reported not voting and 1 for those who reported casting a ballot. For both sources, the data consist of individuals clustered in surveys, which are themselves clustered in countries. I exclude data from countries that were undemocratic at the time of a given survey with reference to the Polity IV Index,4 which classifies countries according to their level of free and fair contestation

3 I identify countries with fully voluntary voting using the classification of the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project (Coppedge et al. 2017). V-Dem is housed in the Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg (https://www.v-dem.net/). The Dominican Republic appears in the analyses of this chapter that use the AmericasBarometer data, and my reading of its constitution and electoral code (see Section 1.4) conflicts with V-Dem’s coding. V-Dem codes the Dominican Republic’s voting rule as weakly compulsory. Consistent with earlier versions, the 2010 Dominican Constitution, in Article 75, states that voting is a “fundamental duty.” However, Article 208 of that constitution, while also referring to a “duty” to vote, additionally states that “no one may be obligated or coerced under any pretext in the exercise of his or her right to suffrage or to reveal his or her vote.” I do not take the word “duty” to alone indicate obligatory voting, and V-Dem itself is inconsistent on this. A duty to vote is also mentioned in the constitutions of Colombia (Article 258), El Salvador (Article 73), and Guatemala (Article 136), each of which is coded by V-Dem as having voluntary voting. Still, to avoid the appearance of expedient coding decisions, I maintain V-Dem’s coding of the Dominican Republic. All results shown in this chapter are insensitive to recoding it as having fully voluntary voting. In the CSES data, I account for respondents living in the canton of Schaffhausen, in which voting is compulsory (see Table 1.1). Module III of the CSES, which includes a 2007 post-election study from Switzerland, does not include a cantonal identifier. As such, I drop the 2007 Swiss data from the CSES sample. 4 The Polity IV Project is housed at the Center for Systemic Peace (http://www.systemicpeace.org/). For countries not rated by Polity IV, following Persson and Tabellini (2003, pp. 75–76), I use the average of the Freedom House’s civil rights and political liberties scores to approximate the Polity IV score. The Freedom House scores are available from https://freedomhouse.org/.

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the effects of compulsory voting on individuals 83 and inclusion.5 The index ranges from −10 to 10, with higher values indicating consolidated democracy, and I omit countries that fell below a 5 in the year of the survey.6 After also excluding observations with missing data, the models using the AmericasBarometer data include 53,534 individuals in 42 surveys, which cover 14 countries, and the models using the CSES data include 187,238 individuals in 126 surveys, which are conducted in 41 countries. I estimate multilevel logistic regression models with turnout as the dependent variable and dissatisfaction with democracy as the independent variable, allowing the constant and the coefficient on dissatisfaction to vary randomly over the surveys. The models are intentionally bivariate, meaning it could well be that any recovered association between dissatisfaction and turnout is partially driven by attitudes that correlate with both. This would not be troubling, as the goal here is not to identify the causal impact of dissatisfaction, but instead to gauge its power as an explainer of participation. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 plot the relationship between predicted turnout and dissatisfaction in voluntary systems using the results of the AmericasBarometer and CSES models, respectively. There is a negative and statistically and substantively significant relationship between dissatisfaction and the probability of casting a voluntary vote. As shown in Figure 5.1, the probability of a respondent who is most dissatisfied with democracy reporting an intention to cast a valid ballot is about 20 percentage points lower than that of a respondent who is most satisfied. Somewhat less dramatically, as shown in Figure 5.2, the probability of a respondent who is most dissatisfied with democracy reporting having cast a ballot in the most recent election is roughly 12 percentage points lower than that of a respondent with the highest level of satisfaction with democracy. Most important for my purposes, results from both analyses verify that dissatisfaction with democracy is strongly associated with absenteeism under voluntary voting. This helps establish its viability as a measure of orientations toward democracy, or at least the aspect of those orientations in which I am interested here—the intrinsic motivation to vote. The AmericasBarometer and CSES also include questions that allow me to measure the dependent concepts of Hypotheses 2–4. These are, respectively, support for political authorities, support for extremist and outsider parties, and political sophistication. To gauge support for political authorities, I use responses to five 5 Polity IV classifies countries with reference to Dahl’s (1971) conceptualization of democracy. For Dahl, a fully democratic country allows for contestation through the freedom of assembly, the freedom of speech, the freedom to form political parties, and free and fair elections, and it does not bar any group from inclusion in the democratic process. 6 For the AmericasBarometer, these are: Haiti in 2010; Haiti in 2012; Haiti in 2014; Venezuela in 2010; Venezuela in 2012; Venezuela in 2014; and Venezuela in 2016. For the CSES, these are: Belarus in 2001; Belarus in 2008; Hong Kong in 1998; Hong Kong in 2000; Hong Kong in 2004; Hong Kong in 2008; Hong Kong in 2012; Kyrgyzstan in 2005; Russia in 1999; Thailand in 2007; and Turkey in 2015.

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84 beyond turnout

Pr(Intend to Cast Valid Vote)

.95

.85

.75

.65

.55

.45

1

2 3 Dissatisfaction with Democracy

4

Figure 5.1 Intentions to Cast a Valid Ballot and Dissatisfaction with Democracy in Voluntary Systems Note: Data are from the AmericasBarometer. Predicted values are from a multilevel logistic regression model that includes dissatisfaction with democracy as the sole covariate. The constant and the coefficient on dissatisfaction are allowed to vary randomly across country-year surveys, of which there are 42. The histogram along the horizontal axis illustrates the distribution of dissatisfaction in the estimation sample. The shaded area represents a 95% confidence interval. The number of observations in the model is 53,534.

AmericasBarometer questions that inquire about respect for political institutions; the need to support the political system; confidence in the national legislature; confidence in political parties; and confidence in the executive. Respondents are asked to indicate their level of confidence in each on a scale ranging from 1 to 7, with higher values indicating more favorable views toward the object.7 I create a summated rating scale of responses to the questions, standardizing each item,

7

The wording of the five items is as follows: 1. Respect for political institutions: “To what extent do you respect the political institutions of [name of country]?” 2. The need to support the political system: “To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of [name of country]?” 3. Confidence in the national legislature: “To what extent do you have confidence in the [national congress/parliament]?” 4. Confidence in political parties: “To what extent do you have confidence in political parties?” 5. Confidence in the executive: “To what extent do you have confidence in the [president/prime minister]?”

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the effects of compulsory voting on individuals 85

Pr(Voted in Recent Election)

.95

.85

.75

.65

.55

.45

1

2 3 Dissatisfaction with Democracy

4

Figure 5.2 Reported Turnout and Dissatisfaction with Democracy in Voluntary Systems Note: Data are from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. Predicted values are from a multilevel logistic regression model that includes dissatisfaction with democracy as the sole covariate. The constant and the coefficient on dissatisfaction are allowed to vary randomly across country-year surveys, of which there are 126. The histogram along the horizontal axis illustrates the distribution of dissatisfaction in the estimation sample. The shaded area represents a 95% confidence interval. The number of observations in the model is 187,238.

summing them, and dividing by the number of items over which the sum was calculated.8 Unlike the AmericasBarometer, the CSES does not ask questions that can be used to gauge support for authorities. However, because it is a collection of postelection surveys, it is rich in data on reported vote choices. Thus, I am able to use it to create a measure of support for extremist and outsider parties. To do so, I first measure the left-right ideological positions of competing political parties. Citizens, politicians, and media outlets routinely refer to “left” and “right” (Hinich and Munger 1997), and while the left-right scale does not capture all aspects of political competition and its substantive meaning varies by country, it is valuable for depicting party positions over a range of policies and predicting vote choices (Adams 2001; Gabel and Huber 2000; Huber and Inglehart 1995). Indeed, citizens are able to absorb new issues into the left-right dimension as they arise (Knutsen 1995), and it explains a good amount of variance in 8 I only retain respondents who answered at least two of the questions. The reliability coefficient is 0.78.

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86 beyond turnout individuals’ attitudes and voting behavior even on non-economic policies, such as immigration, religion, and gay rights, in both developing and developed countries (e.g. van der Brug, Fennema, and Tillie 2005; Zechmeister and Corral 2013). To gauge parties’ left-right ideological positions, I rely on a CSES question battery that asks respondents to place parties on a left-right ideological scale, where 0 means left and 10 means right.9 Similar to the strategies of others who use individual-level party placements (e.g. Alvarez and Nagler 2004; Golder and Stramski 2010), I take each party’s left-right position to be the mean left-right placement provided by respondents who have at least a post-secondary or college education.10 To measure the extremity of each party in each survey, I record the absolute distance between the party’s left-right position and that of the mean respondent.11 I capture support for extremist and outsider parties by recording the extremity of the party for which a respondent reported voting in the lower house election.12 In electoral systems that use party lists for lower house elections, I record the list vote. In electoral systems with candidate voting, I record the candidate vote. In electoral systems that use a mix of party-list and candidate voting for elections to the lower house, I record the party vote, which is “commonly understood to be the best indication of [a voter’s] preferred party” (André and Depauw 2017, p. 383).13 This not only captures party extremity directly, it is also a good indicator of the extent to which a party is outside of the mainstream, as mainstream parties tend to gravitate toward the center of the distribution of voters, while outsider parties occupy the space near the extremes (Adams et al. 2006; Castles and Mair 1984). Both the AmericasBarometer and the CSES surveys include questions that can be used to measure political sophistication, which is often taken to reflect both political interest and knowledge (e.g. Druckman 2003; Fiske, Kinder, and Larter 1983; Miller 2011; Zaller 1990).14 The AmericasBarometer routinely asks 9 The wording of the question is: “In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place [name of party] on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?” 10 The CSES also includes expert party placements on the same 0–10 scale. These are provided by the individual or team responsible for administering each survey. The qualitative conclusions reported below are the same when I use these instead of the averaged individual-level placements. 11 The CSES asks respondents to place themselves on the same left-right scale as the parties with this question: “In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?” 12 I do not use data from CSES surveys conducted in the wake of purely presidential or upper house elections. These are: Chile 1999; France 2002; France 2012; Japan 2004; Japan 2007; Japan 2013; Kyrgyzstan 2005; Lithuania 1997; Philippines 2010; Romania 2009; Romania 2014; Russia 2000; Russia 2004; Taiwan 2004; and Taiwan 2008. 13 For respondents who faced both a list and candidate vote but neglected to cast a list vote, I record the candidate vote. 14 The AmericasBarometer and the CSES both ask trivia-type questions to gauge respondents’ political knowledge. Because of known issues with the comparability of responses to these questions across time and space, even when their content is constant, I do not use them here. See: http://www.csesblog.org/2016/12/the-tough-decision-to-remove-political-knowledge-from-thecses-module-5/.

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the effects of compulsory voting on individuals 87 respondents to place their level of interest in politics into one of four ordered categories,15 and it often asks them to assess whether they feel that they understand important political issues in their country using a 1 to 7 scale.16 While Modules I–IV of the CSES do not include an item about political interest, its above-noted question about parties’ left-right ideological placements can be used to assess political sophistication. A number of existing studies have used individuals’ ability to correctly identify parties’ left-right positions to measure of political sophistication (e.g. Arnold 2012; Clark 2017; Gordon and Segura 1997), and this type of measure correlates significantly with other measures of political information (Aldrich et al. 2018). I follow these studies and use perceptual deviations to create a measure of political sophistication. I consider the “correct” position of each party to be the mean placement on the 0 to 10 left-right scale given by respondents who have at least a postsecondary or college education.17 For each respondent, I calculate the absolute value of the difference between his or her placement of each party and the “correct” placement.18 I then sum these absolute deviations and divide by the number of parties a respondent placed. The resulting measure gives a respondent’s average perceptual error over the parties he or she placed on the ideological spectrum. Figure 5.3 illustrates the distributions of the three outcome variables from the AmericasBarometer, and Figure 5.4 plots the distributions of the two CSES-based outcome variables. To help isolate the effect of dissatisfaction with democracy, the key explanatory factor, I account for a number of variables that are plausibly related to it and the outcomes (to avoid post-treatment bias, I do not control for anything that could be a result of dissatisfaction with democracy). I control for a number of demographic variables, including gender,19 age in years, education,20 and 15 The wording of the question is: “How much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, little, or none?” 16 The wording of the question is: “‘You feel that you understand the most important political issues of this country.’ How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?” 17 The CSES also includes expert party placements on the same 0–10 scale. These are provided by the individual or team responsible for administering each survey. The substantive conclusions reported below are the same when I use these instead of the averaged individual-level placements to capture parties’ “correct” positions. 18 In a handful of CSES surveys, the slate of parties respondents were asked to locate varied by their location in the country. For example, in the United Kingdom in 2015, only those located in Scotland were asked to place the Scottish National Party, and only those located in Wales were asked to place Plaid Cymru. I do not consider parties whose presentation to respondents was mutually exclusive with that of another party. 19 Those who reported being female are coded 1, and those who reported a male gender identity are coded 0. 20 In the AmericasBarometer, education is generally, but not always, measured on an 18-point ordinal scale. I constrain the AmericasBarometer education measure to range from 0 to 10 across surveys to account for differences in the number of categories. In the CSES, education is measured on different ordinal scales across surveys. While the CSES harmonizes these into a standard five-point scale in most surveys, three- and four-point scales are used in some. I also constrain the CSES education measure to range from 0 to 10 across surveys.

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88 beyond turnout

.4

.4 Density

.6

Density

.6

.2

.2

0

0 −2

−1 0 1 Support for Authorities

2

None

Little Some Political Interest

A Lot

.6

Density

.4

.2

0 1

2 3 4 5 6 Understanding of Political Issues

7

Figure 5.3 Distributions of the Dependent Variables in the AmericasBarometer

income.21 I also control for individuals’ left-right ideology22 and its square. This takes into account the possibility that ideological extremity correlates with support for authorities, preference for nontraditional parties, and political sophistication— and is also related to satisfaction with democracy (cf. Allen 2017; Zhirkov 2014). 21 To measure income with the AmericasBarometer data, I use a measure of household possessions reported in quintiles. See Córdova (2009) for more information on this index, which has broader coverage than other AmericasBarometer income measures. In Chapter 4, I used income brackets rather than the household possessions index in the models that employ the AmericasBarometer data. In that chapter, I directly compared the effects of income in the AmericasBarometer samples with effects estimated using other survey sources, all of which measure income in brackets. To measure income with the CSES data, I use annual income expressed in quintiles. 22 In the AmericasBarometer, left-right ideology is assessed with this question: “On this card there is a 1–10 scale that goes from left to right. The number 1 means left and 10 means right. Nowadays, when we speak of political leanings, we talk of those on the left and those on the right. In other words, some people sympathize more with the left and others with the right. According to the meaning that the terms ‘left’ and ‘right’ have for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where would you

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the effects of compulsory voting on individuals 89

.4

.4 Density

.6

Density

.6

.2

.2

0

0 0

2 4 Vote Choice Extremity

6

0 2 4 6 8 Mean Error in Perception of Parties’ Ideologies

Figure 5.4 Distributions of the Dependent Variables in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems

At the survey level, I control for the level of democratic development in a given country-year with the Polity IV Index, which has a theoretical range of −10 to 10, with higher values indicating consolidated democracy (see notes 4 and 5 of this chapter). Following the rule discussed above, I fully exclude data from countries that fell below a 5 on the Polity IV Index in the year of the survey. Finally, I include an indicator variable for individuals in countries in Latin America, which, as compared to other regions in the data set, has a lower incidence of consolidated democracy (which likely correlates with both the outcome variables and satisfaction with democracy) and a higher proportion of countries with compulsory voting. Hypotheses 2–4 put forth that compulsory voting is more likely to be impactful where sanctions for abstention are sharp and enforced. Thus, I produce a four-part measure of the severity of compulsory rules using information from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project (Coppedge et al. 2017) (see note 3 of this chapter). The four categories are: • VV: Countries with voluntary voting. Respondents in these countries are assigned a 0. • CVlow : Countries that mandate voting but do not employ or enforce sanctions for abstention. Respondents in these countries are assigned a 1.

place yourself on this scale?” In the CSES, left-right ideology is assessed with the same question used in the creation of the party extremity measure (see note 11 of this chapter): “In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?”

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90 beyond turnout • CVmed : Countries that have and enforce legal sanctions for abstention, but impose minimal costs upon abstainers. Respondents in these countries are assigned a 2. • CVhigh : Countries that mandate turnout and enforce sanctions, which impose considerable costs on offenders. Respondents in these countries are assigned a 3. For countries not covered by V-Dem, I use my own classifications. I classify respondents in the CSES data living in Schaffhausen, Switzerland as subject to mandatory voting (see Table 1.1).23 The canton of Schaffhausen has strict enforcement, but, relative to the average income, a trivial fine. For the three Swiss elections in the data set (see Table 5.2), this was CHF3 (about US$3).24 Following V-Dem’s classification scheme, which considers both the magnitude of sanctions for abstention and the likelihood of enforcement, I place Schaffhausen in the CVmed category. To test whether the impact of dissatisfaction with democracy on support for authorities, extremist voting, and political sophistication is amplified by compulsory voting, as predicted by Hypotheses 2–4, I estimate interactive multilevel linear25 regression models with dissatisfaction with democracy as the key independent variable. In each model, I allow the constant and the coefficient on dissatisfaction to vary randomly over the surveys, and I interact dissatisfaction with the level of compulsory voting. To help facilitate comparisons across models, I constrain all of the outcome variables to range from 0 to 1. After excluding observations with missing data on the outcome variables or covariates,26 the resulting models using the AmericasBarometer data include 117,879 individuals in 104 surveys, which cover 23 countries, and the models using the CSES data include 105,086 individuals in 134 surveys, which are conducted in 47 countries. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 list the countries and years of the surveys included in the AmericasBarometer and CSES samples, and they provide the classification of the voting rule employed in each country-year pairing. Figure 5.5 displays the key results of the models estimated with the AmericasBarometer data. The point estimates in the figure represent the effects of dissatisfaction with democracy on the expected value of the relevant outcome variable at a given value of the compulsory voting scale. The top-left panel 23 Module III of the CSES, which includes a 2007 post-election study from Switzerland, does not include a cantonal identifier. As such, I drop the 2007 Swiss data from the CSES sample. 24 The fine was raised to CHF6 in 2014. 25 The political interest measure from the AmericasBarometer has four categories. As such, I also estimated a multilevel ordered logit model with interest as the outcome variable. Results are not substantively different across the linear and ordered logit specifications. 26 I also exclude respondents living in places with compulsory voting who are not compelled to vote due to being under or over a certain age threshold (see Table 1.1).

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the effects of compulsory voting on individuals 91 Table 5.1 Surveys Included in the AmericasBarometer Sample Country

Year Severity of Country Penalties and Enforcement

Year Severity of Country Penalties and Enforcement

Year Severity of Penalties and Enforcement

Argentina Argentina Argentina Argentina Argentina Belize Belize Belize Belize Bolivia Bolivia Bolivia Bolivia Bolivia Brazil Brazil Brazil Brazil Brazil Chile Chile Chile Chile Chile Colombia Colombia Colombia Colombia Colombia Costa Rica Costa Rica Costa Rica Costa Rica Costa Rica

2008 2010 2012 2014 2017 2008 2010 2012 2014 2008 2010 2012 2014 2017 2008 2010 2012 2014 2017 2007 2010 2012 2014 2017 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016

2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2008 2010 2012 2014 2017 2009 2010 2012 2014 2008 2017 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2008 2010 2012 2014 2017

2008 2010 2012 2014 2017 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2008 2010 2012 2014 2017 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2008 2010 2012 2014 2017 2010 2012 2014 2008 2010 2012 2014 2017 2008

Low Low Low Low Low Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Medium Medium Medium Medium Low Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Low Low Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Low Low Low Low Low

Dom. Rep. Dom. Rep. Dom. Rep. Dom. Rep. Dom. Rep. Ecuador Ecuador Ecuador Ecuador Ecuador El Salvador El Salvador El Salvador El Salvador El Salvador Guatemala Guatemala Guatemala Guatemala Guatemala Guyana Guyana Guyana Guyana Haiti Haiti Honduras Honduras Honduras Honduras Honduras Jamaica Jamaica Jamaica Jamaica Jamaica

Low Low Low Low Low Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Low Low Low Low Low Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary

Mexico Mexico Mexico Mexico Mexico Nicaragua Nicaragua Nicaragua Nicaragua Nicaragua Panama Panama Panama Panama Panama Paraguay Paraguay Paraguay Paraguay Paraguay Peru Peru Peru Peru Peru Trin. & Tob. Trin. & Tob. Trin. & Tob. Uruguay Uruguay Uruguay Uruguay Uruguay Venezuela

Low Low Low Low Low Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low High High High High High Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary High High High High High Voluntary

Note: This table lists the countries and years of the surveys included in the AmericasBarometer data used to test Hypotheses 2 and 4 of Chapter 3. Categorization of compulsory rule severity is from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project (Coppedge et al. 2017). For countries not covered by V-Dem, I use my own classifications.

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92 beyond turnout Table 5.2 Surveys Included in the CSES Sample Country

Year Severity of Country Penalties and Enforcement

Year Severity of Country Penalties and Enforcement

Year Severity of Penalties and Enforcement

Albania Australia Australia Australia Australia Austria Austria Belgium Belgium Brazil Brazil Brazil Brazil Bulgaria Bulgaria Canada Canada Canada Canada Canada Chile Croatia Czech Rep. Czech Rep. Czech Rep. Czech Rep. Czech Rep. Denmark Denmark Denmark Estonia Finland Finland Finland Finland France Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Greece Greece Greece

2005 1996 2004 2007 2013 2008 2013 1999 1999 2002 2006 2010 2014 2001 2014 1997 2004 2008 2011 2015 2005 2007 1996 2002 2006 2010 2013 1998 2001 2007 2011 2003 2007 2011 2015 2007 1998 2002 2005 2009 2013 2009 2012 2015

1998 2002 1999 2003 2007 2009 2013 2002 2007 2011 1996 2003 2006 2013 2006 2013 2011 2014 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 2012 1996 2002 2008 2011 2014 1998 2002 2006 2010 1997 2001 2005 2009 2013 2006 2011 2016 2004 2016

1997 2001 2005 2007 2011 2002 2005 2009 2015 1996 2004 2012 2014 2000 2004 2008 2012 2010 2016 1996 2004 2008 2011 1996 2000 2004 2008 1998 2002 2006 2014 1999 2003 2011 1996 2001 2011 1997 2005 2015 2004 2008 2012 1998 2009

Voluntary Medium Medium Medium Medium Voluntary Voluntary Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Low Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Low Low Low

Hungary Hungary Iceland Iceland Iceland Iceland Iceland Ireland Ireland Ireland Israel Israel Israel Israel Italy Kenya Latvia Latvia Mexico Mexico Mexico Mexico Mexico Mexico Mexico Montenegro N.Z. N.Z. N.Z. N.Z. N.Z. Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands Norway Norway Norway Norway Norway Peru Peru Peru Philippines Philippines

Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary High High High Voluntary Voluntary

Poland Poland Poland Poland Poland Portugal Portugal Portugal Portugal Romania Romania Romania S. Africa S. Korea S. Korea S. Korea Serbia Slovakia Slovakia Slovenia Slovenia Slovenia Slovenia Spain Spain Spain Spain Sweden Sweden Sweden Sweden Switzerland Switzerland Switzerland Taiwan Taiwan Turkey U.K. U.K. U.K. U.S. U.S. U.S. Ukraine Uruguay

Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Mixed Mixed Mixed Voluntary Voluntary Low Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary High

Note: This table lists the countries and years of the surveys included in the CSES data used to test Hypotheses 3 and 4 of Chapter 3. Categorization of compulsory rule severity is from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project (Coppedge et al. 2017). For countries not covered by V-Dem, I use my own classifications. Switzerland has compulsory voting in one canton (see Table 1.1).

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the effects of compulsory voting on individuals 93 .1 Effect of Dissatisfaction with Democracy on Expected Political Interest

Effect of Dissatisfaction with Democracy on Expected Support for Authorities

.1

.05

0

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−.1

.05

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−.1

−.15

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VV

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CVhigh

VV

CVlow

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CVhigh

Effect of Dissatisfaction with Democracy on Expected Understanding of Political Issues

.1

.05

0

−.05

−.1

−.15

Figure 5.5 Conditional Effects of Dissatisfaction with Democracy on Support for Authorities and Indicators of Political Sophistication over Levels of Compulsory Voting Note: Data are from the AmericasBarometer. All outcome variables are scaled to range from 0 to 1. The distributions of the outcome variables on their original metrics are displayed in Figure 5.3. Dissatisfaction with democracy is measured on a four-point scale, with higher values indicating more dissatisfaction. Compulsory rules are classified using information from the Varieties of Democracy project (V-Dem). For countries not covered by V-Dem, I use my own classifications. Predicted marginal effects are from multilevel linear regression models that include an interaction between dissatisfaction with democracy and the compulsory voting scale, with gender, age, education, income, left-right ideology and its square, democratic development, and an indicator for Latin America as controls. The constant and the coefficient on dissatisfaction are allowed to vary randomly across country-year surveys, of which there are 104. Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals. The number of observations in the model is 117,879.

displays the results of the model built to test Hypothesis 2, which expects that the negative link between dissatisfaction and support for authorities will be exacerbated by compulsory voting, especially where sanctions for abstention are strict and enforced. The model provides no support for this expectation. Dissatisfaction

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94 beyond turnout has a strong, significant, and negative association with support for authorities, but this does not vary over the range of the compulsory voting scale.27 The remaining panels of Figure 5.5 display the results of the tests of the expectation of Hypothesis 4, which anticipates that dissatisfaction with democracy will have a sharper downward impact on political sophistication as compulsory voting rules become more severe. The top-right and bottom-left panels have expected political interest and expected subjective understanding of political issues as outcomes, respectively—each an indicator of political sophistication. Starting with political interest, the results provide clear support for Hypothesis 4. Where voting is voluntary, a unit increase in dissatisfaction associates with an expected decrease in the interest variable of just under 0.03 units—or less than 3 percent of the range of the variable (recall that all outcome variables are rescaled to range from 0 to 1). Where voting is compulsory, this negative association is sharper, and it is especially robust where sanctions are steep and routinely enforced.28 In the countries with the most severe compulsory rules, a unit increase in dissatisfaction corresponds with an expected decrease in interest equivalent to nearly 5 percent of its range. The bottom-left panel of Figure 5.5 provides further support for Hypothesis 4: where compulsory voting is used, the negative link between dissatisfaction with democracy and one’s understanding of political issues is stronger, especially where sanctions for abstention are strong and routinely applied.29 Under voluntary voting, a unit increase in dissatisfaction with democracy associates with about a 0.02-unit expected decrease in the political understanding measure. Under the strictest compulsory rules, the associated decrease is nearly 0.4 units. Figure 5.6 displays the key results of the models estimated with the CSES data. Results in the left-hand panel, in which the outcome is expected vote choice extremity, support Hypothesis 3’s expectation that compulsory voting will amplify the positive relationship between negative orientations toward democracy and support for extremist or outsider parties.30 Where voting is voluntary, a unit increase in dissatisfaction with democracy associates with about a 0.01unit increase in the expected ideological extremity of the party for which one 27 The two-sided p-value associated with the coefficient on interaction between dissatisfaction with democracy and the compulsory voting scale is 0.930, providing no evidence of a statistically meaningful conditioning effect of compulsory voting. 28 The two-sided p-value associated with the coefficient on interaction between dissatisfaction with democracy and the compulsory voting scale is 0.007, suggesting a statistically meaningful conditioning effect of compulsory voting. 29 The two-sided p-value associated with the coefficient on interaction between dissatisfaction with democracy and the compulsory voting scale is 0.024, suggesting a statistically meaningful conditioning effect of compulsory voting. 30 The two-sided p-value associated with the coefficient on interaction between dissatisfaction with democracy and the compulsory voting scale is 0.053, providing evidence of a statistically meaningful conditioning effect of compulsory voting.

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the effects of compulsory voting on individuals 95 Effect of Dissatisfaction with Democracy on Expected Mean Error in Perception of Parties’ Ideologies

Effect of Dissatisfaction with Democracy on Expected Vote Choice Extremity

.1

.05

0

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−.15 VV

CVlow

CVmed

CVhigh

.1

.05

0

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−.1

−.15 VV

CVlow

CVmed

CVhigh

Figure 5.6 Conditional Effects of Dissatisfaction with Democracy on Vote Choice Extremity and Errors in Perceptions of Parties’ Ideologies over Levels of Compulsory Voting Note: Data are from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. All outcome variables are scaled to range from 0 to 1. The distributions of the outcome variables on their original metrics are displayed in Figure 5.4. Dissatisfaction with democracy is measured on a four-point scale, with higher values indicating more dissatisfaction. Compulsory rules are classified using information from the Varieties of Democracy project (V-Dem). For countries not covered by V-Dem, I use my own classifications. Predicted marginal effects are from multilevel linear regression models that include an interaction between dissatisfaction with democracy and the compulsory voting scale, with gender, age, education, income, left-right ideology and its square, democratic development, and an indicator for Latin America as controls. The constant and the coefficient on dissatisfaction are allowed to vary randomly across country-year surveys, of which there are 134. Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals. The number of observations in the model is 105,086.

voted in the recent lower house election. This association increases along with compulsory voting rule severity, and in places with the strictest compulsory rules, a unit increase in dissatisfaction corresponds with a more than 0.03-unit increase in the expected extremity of a voter’s chosen party—or over 3 percent of the variable’s range. The right-hand panel of Figure 5.6 further probes Hypothesis 4, which puts forth that compulsory voting will amplify the relationship between dissatisfaction with democracy and political sophistication. Here, the outcome is expected errors in ideological perceptions of political parties, meaning higher values indicate lower sophistication. There is evidence of the anticipated positive relationship between dissatisfaction and perceptual errors, but it is small, and, contra Hypothesis 4, stable across the categories of compulsory voting.31

31 The two-sided p-value associated with the coefficient on interaction between dissatisfaction with democracy and the compulsory voting scale is 0.672, providing little evidence of a statistically meaningful conditioning effect of compulsory voting.

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96 beyond turnout The results of the interactive multilevel models can also be depicted with figures in which the relationships between dissatisfaction with democracy and the expected values of the outcome variables are plotted according to the voting rule in use. Taking this approach, I graph the predicted relationship between dissatisfaction and each outcome variable in countries with fully voluntary voting and in those with the strictest compulsory rules—those in the CVhigh category— in Figures 5.7 and 5.8. To avoid clutter, I exclude the CVlow and CVmed categories from the graphs. In several of the interactive multilevel regression models underlying the figures, the coefficient on the multiplicative term between compulsory voting and dissatisfaction with democracy is estimated with a good amount of statistical precision (see notes 28, 29, and 30 of this chapter). Above I take compulsory voting to moderate the impact of dissatisfaction on the outcome variables, in line with Hypotheses 2–4. By symmetry, a meaningful interaction between compulsory voting and dissatisfaction also suggests a process by which the influence of compulsory voting on the outcome variables is itself conditioned by dissatisfaction with democracy (Berry, Golder, and Milton 2012). Figures 5.7 and 5.8 have the added utility of providing a straightforward test of this possibility, in that they make it possible to assess whether the expected level of each outcome variable is statistically different in the voluntary and strict compulsory voting settings across the values of dissatisfaction with democracy. To facilitate this comparison, in each of the panels of Figures 5.7 and 5.8, I plot 84 percent confidence intervals around the expected values of the outcome variables. With confidence intervals of this size, it is possible to approximate a hypothesis test of a two-tailed difference between two point estimates at the 5 percent significance level. A lack of overlap of the confidence intervals suggests one can reject the null of equivalence (see, e.g., Bolsen and Thornton 2014). There is limited evidence that the impact of compulsory voting on the outcome variables is conditioned by the level of dissatisfaction with democracy. First, the top-left panel of Figure 5.7 confirms that there is no meaningful interaction between compulsory voting and dissatisfaction with democracy in determining support for authorities. At all levels of dissatisfaction, the difference in expected support between those in voluntary voting systems and those in strict compulsory systems is not statistically distinguishable. When it comes to political interest, the top-right panel of the figure provides some evidence that compulsory voting has divergent effects among the very satisfied and the very dissatisfied. For the most satisfied with democracy—those who score a 1 on the dissatisfaction scale—strict compulsory voting is positively associated with political interest, relative to voluntary voting. For the least satisfied with democracy, being subject to strong compulsory voting is associated with less political interest than living under voluntary voting rules. However, as evidenced

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the effects of compulsory voting on individuals 97 .85

Expected Political Interest

Expected Support for Authorities

.85

.65

.45

.25

.45

.25

.05

.05 1

Expected Understanding of Political Issues

.65

2 3 Dissatisfaction with Democracy

4

1

2 3 Dissatisfaction with Democracy

4

.85

.65 VV .45

CVhigh

.25

.05 1

2 3 Dissatisfaction with Democracy

4

Figure 5.7 Support for Authorities and Indicators of Political Sophistication over Dissatisfaction with Democracy in Voluntary and Strict Compulsory Voting Systems Note: Data are from the AmericasBarometer. All outcome variables are scaled to range from 0 to 1. The distributions of the outcome variables on their original metrics are displayed in Figure 5.3. Compulsory rules are classified using information from the Varieties of Democracy project (V-Dem). For countries not covered by V-Dem, I use my own classifications. Predicted values are from multilevel linear regression models that include an interaction between dissatisfaction with democracy and the compulsory voting scale, with gender, age, education, income, left-right ideology and its square, democratic development, and an indicator for Latin America as controls. Predictions are made with the control variables held at their means. The constant and the coefficient on dissatisfaction are allowed to vary randomly across country-year surveys, of which there are 104. Shaded areas represent 84% confidence intervals, overlap in which can be used to approximately test the null hypothesis of equivalent point estimates at the 5% significance level, two-sided. The number of observations in the model is 117,879.

by the overlapping confidence intervals, these differences are not statistically different from zero at the 5 percent level, two-sided. With regard to the subjective understanding of political issues, it appears that dissatisfaction meaningfully conditions the impact of compulsory voting.

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98 beyond turnout As shown in the bottom-left panel of Figure 5.7, for those who are more satisfied with democracy, compulsory voting has no influence on one’s belief that he or she understands political issues. However, for those who are moderately or very dissatisfied, being subject to strict compulsory voting, rather than voluntary rules, is negatively associated with understanding issues, and the lack of overlap in the 84 percent confidence intervals suggests that this association is statistically meaningful. It is also substantively important. The most dissatisfied individuals in voluntary systems have a predicted value of political understanding of about 0.47. For the same individuals in voluntary systems, the expected value is about 0.42, meaning the difference in expected understanding of political issues is equivalent to roughly 5 percent of the range of the variable. (Recall that the outcome variables are rescaled to range from 0 to 1.) Turning to Figure 5.8, the left-hand panel indicates that compulsory voting’s upward impact on extremity in vote choices is moderated by dissatisfaction with .85 Expected Mean Error in Perception of Parties’ Ideologies

Expected Vote Choice Extremity

.85

.65

.45

.25

.05

.65

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.05 1

2 3 Dissatisfaction with Democracy

4

VV

1

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4

CVhigh

Figure 5.8 Vote Choice Extremity and Errors in Perceptions of Parties’ Ideologies over Dissatisfaction with Democracy in Voluntary and Strict Compulsory Voting Systems Note: Data are from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. All outcome variables are scaled to range from 0 to 1. The distributions of the outcome variables on their original metrics are displayed in Figure 5.4. Compulsory rules are classified using information from the Varieties of Democracy project (V-Dem). For countries not covered by V-Dem, I use my own classifications. Predicted values are from multilevel linear regression models that include an interaction between dissatisfaction with democracy and the compulsory voting scale, with gender, age, education, income, left-right ideology and its square, democratic development, and an indicator for Latin America as controls. Predictions are made with the control variables held at their means. The constant and the coefficient on dissatisfaction are allowed to vary randomly across country-year surveys, of which there are 134. Shaded areas represent 84% confidence intervals, overlap in which can be used to approximately test the null hypothesis of equivalent point estimates at the 5% significance level, two-sided. The number of observations in the model is 105,086.

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the effects of compulsory voting on individuals 99 democracy. For the most satisfied individuals, living in a strict compulsory system is associated with more extreme vote choices. However, the expected increase in extremity is markedly smaller than that for the most dissatisfied citizens. The distinct 84 percent confidence intervals on expected vote choice extremity suggest that differences in expected vote choice extremity across voluntary and strict compulsory systems are statistically meaningful over the range of dissatisfaction with democracy. Finally, the right-hand panel of Figure 5.8 confirms that there is no meaningful interaction between compulsory voting and dissatisfaction with democracy in determining individuals’ ability to accurately place parties on an ideological scale, as is also clear from the right-hand panel of Figure 5.6. Regardless of the voting rule, dissatisfaction with democracy weakly and positively associates with errors in perceptions of parties’ ideologies. It is important to restate that the theory advanced in Chapter 3 anticipates a moderating effect of compulsory voting on the link between orientations toward democracy and the outcome variables for two reasons. First, negative orientations are more likely to be predictive of “antidemocratic” attitudes and behaviors, as well as a lack of political sophistication, where voting is compulsory. Second, pro-democratic orientations are more likely to engender increased attitudinal and behavioral support for the democratic system and its authorities, as well as higher political sophistication, under mandatory rules. The results depicted in this section can be taken as evidence for both purported mechanisms. To wit, the effects depicted in Figures 5.5 and 5.6 give estimates of the impact of dissatisfaction with democracy on the outcome variables over the range of the compulsory voting scale. These can also be interpreted as the effect of satisfaction with democracy on the same outcome variables reflected over zero. Thus, looking at the top-right panel of Figure 5.5, for example, satisfaction with democracy has a stronger positive association with political interest where voting is compulsory than where it is voluntary. This dynamic is also apparent in Figures 5.7 and 5.8. For instance, the top-right panel of Figure 5.7 again illustrates that people who are most satisfied with democracy are especially politically interested, relative to the least satisfied, in countries with strict compulsory voting.

5.2 Within-Country Tests of Hypotheses 2–4 As discussed in Section 1.6, researchers can exploit age-based continuities in the legal requirement to vote to help identify the causal effects of compulsory voting. In this section, I leverage three such discontinuities to probe the predictions of Hypotheses 2–4. First, I compare individuals below and above the compulsory voting cutoff age of 65 in the canton of Schaffhausen, Switzerland. Next, I compare

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100 beyond turnout individuals nearby the cutoff ages of 18 and 70 in Argentina, using data I collected for this purpose just after the country’s 2019 general election.

5.2.1 Schaffhausen, Switzerland Switzerland has notoriously low levels of voter participation (Blais 2014), though turnout tends to be relatively high in Schaffhausen, which is currently the only of the country’s 26 cantons to enforce compulsory voting in federal elections. Crucially, those at or over age 65 in Schaffhausen are not legally required to vote (see Table 1.1). Because this threshold selects those eligible to vote in Schaffhausen into optional and compelled voter groups, I can exploit it to partially test Hypotheses 2–4, which argue that compulsory voting amplifies the effects of negative orientations toward electoral democracy on political attitudes, political behavior, and political sophistication. Because there is no variation in the level of enforcement or the size of the sanction for nonvoting within elections in Schaffhausen, I cannot use the age cutoff to test the second part of Hypotheses 2–4, which expects the conditioning role of mandatory voting will be most apparent where rules are strictly enforced and include significant sanctions for abstention. I gather data from the Swiss Election Study (Selects), which provides a cumulative file of post-election survey data gathered after Swiss national elections.32 I use the most up-to-date file as of 2019, which includes data starting with the 1971 election and continuing through the 2015 contest.33 Fortunately for my purposes, Selects contains a disproportionate amount of respondents enfranchised to vote in Schaffhausen. While Schaffhausen contains less than half a percent of the Swiss population, nearly 5 percent of survey respondents in the cumulative Selects data are enfranchised in the canton.34 Keeping with the measurement strategy employed above in the analyses of the AmericasBarometer and CSES data (see Section 5.1), I measure orientations toward democracy with responses to a question about democratic satisfaction, which is asked in every Selects survey but the 1975, 1987, and 1991 waves. Respondents in latter waves are asked to report whether they are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with democracy or government

32 The Swiss Election Study is centered at the Swiss Centre of Expertise in the Social Sciences (FORS) at the University of Lausanne (https://forscenter.ch/projects/selects/). 33 Since 1995, the surveys have been carried out directly by Selects. Previous surveys were administered by precursor organizations and integrated into the cumulative file by Selects researchers. There are no data pertaining to the 1983 election. Respondents from the 1999, 2003, and 2011 Swiss Election Studies are also included in the CSES sample analyzed above (see Table 5.2). 34 While Selects oversamples Schaffhausen in each round, the overrepresentation of the canton is strongest in the 1995 and 2003 waves.

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the effects of compulsory voting on individuals 101 in Switzerland. I assign a 1 to respondents who reported being “very satisfied,” a 2 to the “fairly satisfied,” a 3 to the “not very satisfied,” and a 4 to those “not at all satisfied.” Thus, higher values indicate more dissatisfaction. There are some differences in wording and response categories in earlier waves, and I follow the Selects harmonization scheme create a single dissatisfaction measure.35 The expectations of Hypotheses 2–4 are grounded in the idea that those with negative orientations toward democracy are relatively unlikely to vote by their own volition, due to intrinsic motivation. Thus, as with the above analyses of the AmericasBarometer and CSES data, here I first validate dissatisfaction with democracy as a predictor of abstention under voluntary voting. I thus restrict the Selects sample to cantons for years during which voting was fully voluntary.36 Each Selects survey asks respondents whether they voted in the most recent election. The questions do not distinguish those who cast valid votes from those who turned out but lodged a blank or spoiled ballot. I thus code the variable as 0 for those who reported not voting and 1 for those who reported casting a ballot. I then estimate a logistic regression of reported turnout in the recent election on dissatisfaction with democracy. After excluding respondents with missing data, the model includes 30,397 respondents in 173 surveys, which cover 25 cantons. Using the results of the model, Figure 5.9 plots the relationship between predicted turnout and dissatisfaction in cantons with voluntary voting. There is a negative and statistically and substantively significant relationship between dissatisfaction and the probability of casting a voluntary vote. As shown in the figure, the probability of a respondent who is most dissatisfied with democracy reporting participation is about 19 percentage points lower than that of a respondent who is most satisfied. Most important for my purposes, this helps establish the viability of dissatisfaction with democracy as a gauge of the intrinsic disinclination to vote. To leverage Schaffhausen’s compulsory voting cutoff age in my test of Hypotheses 2–4, I must take into account the fact that the retirement age in Switzerland, which determines when national pensions can be drawn, is 65 for men and 64 for women. Because this age is coterminous (for men) or nearly coterminous (for women) with the age at which it is no longer mandatory to vote, it is not possible to

35 In the 1971 wave, respondents were asked whether the Swiss political system was “bad,” “not very good,” “acceptable,” “rather good,” or “very good.” Following the Selects harmonization scheme, these responses are coded as 1, 1.75, 2.5, 3.25, and 4, respectively. In the 1979 wave, respondents were asked whether the Swiss political system was “bad,” “not very good,” “acceptable/OK,” “good,” or “very good.” Following the Selects harmonization scheme, these responses are again coded as 1, 1.75, 2.5, 3.25, and 4, respectively. In the 1995 wave, respondents were asked whether they were “not at all satisfied,” “fairly satisfied,” or “satisfied” with democracy in Switzerland. Following the Selects harmonization scheme, these responses are coded as 1, 2.5, and 4, respectively. 36 Compulsory voting was abolished in Switzerland on a canton-by-canton basis. I exclude data from cantons for years in which voting was mandatory for any level of election (local, cantonal, or federal).

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102 beyond turnout

Pr(Voted in Recent Election)

.95

.85

.75

.65

.55

.45

1

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4

Figure 5.9 Reported Turnout and Dissatisfaction with Democracy in Cantons with Voluntary Voting Note: Data are from the Swiss Election Study. Predicted values are from a logistic regression model that includes dissatisfaction with democracy as the sole covariate. Standard errors are clustered by canton-year, of which there are 173. The histogram along the horizontal axis illustrates the distribution of dissatisfaction in the estimation sample (see note 35 of this chapter for an explanation of the non-integer values). The shaded area represents a 95% confidence interval. The number of observations in the model is 30,397.

attribute any estimated differences in empirical patterns for those just below and above 65 in Schaffhausen to compulsory voting alone. As such, I estimate models that include all cantons that, like Schaffhausen, have German as their sole official language.37 I only include the other officially German-speaking cantons for years during which voting was fully voluntary. These canton-years thus serve as a control group; if compulsory voting is responsible for any observed differences among those just under and over age 65, the patterns in Schaffhausen should differ from those manifest in the other cantons. Thus, the quantity of interest is a difference in differences: the difference in the relevant outcome between those under and over 65 in Schaffhausen as compared to the difference in the outcome between those under and over 65 in other officially Germanophone cantons. To increase the 37 The officially Germanophone cantons are listed in Table 5.3. The remaining cantons have French, Italian, or Romansh as an additional or sole official language. Restricting the sample in this way helps to account for unobservable differences that might confound comparisons of Schaffhausen with other cantons.

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Reported Voting

the effects of compulsory voting on individuals 103

Pr(Voted)

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.85

.8

Reported Abstention

.75

60

61

62 63 64 65 66 67 Age at Time of Survey Interview

68

69

Schaffhausen German−Speaking Cantons with Voluntary Voting

Figure 5.10 Reported Turnout and Age in German-Speaking Cantons with Voluntary Voting and Schaffhausen Note: Data are from the Swiss Election Study. Predicted values are from local polynomial regressions estimated separately among observations on either side of the age cutoff in Schaffhausen and in other officially German-speaking cantons. The local polynomial regressions use a Epanechnikov kernel and a bandwidth of 2. The jittered points near the top and bottom of the plot represent observed reported turnout and abstention, respectively. Solid black circles represent respondents enfranchised in Schaffhausen, and open grey circles represent respondents enfranchised in officially German-speaking cantons subject to compulsory voting. The solid vertical line demarcates respondents in Schaffhausen subject to compulsory voting (under 65) and voluntary voting (65 and over). The number of observations is 2,647.

likelihood that any observed differences in the impact of dissatisfaction are a result of compulsory voting, I restrict the individuals in the sample to those aged 60–69, giving five ages subject to mandatory rules (60–64) and five subject to voluntary voting (65–69). To verify that the age 65 threshold affects voter participation in Schaffhausen, I examine the difference in recalled electoral turnout among those aged just below (ages 60–64) and above the cutoff (ages 65–69). As discussed, I evaluate this difference with reference to the difference across the same two age groups in other officially German-speaking cantons. Accordingly, Figure 5.10 plots the relationship between age and the probability of reported turnout in the younger and older age groups in Schaffhausen and in the other officially German-speaking cantons. Fines for abstention in Schaffhausen have been raised twice since the 1970s. Before 1973, the fine was CHF1, and from 1973 through 2014 it was CHF3. In

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104 beyond turnout early 2014, the cantonal parliament raised the fine to CHF6 (about US$6 at the time and at present). As noted, I use the most up to date Selects surveys as of 2019, which include data starting with the 1971 election and continuing through the 2015 contest. I exclude the 1971 survey in Schaffhausen. I also exclude the 2015 survey from Schaffhausen due to the abrupt doubling of the abstention fine just before that year’s election. As a result, the fine for nonvoting in Schaffhausen is CHF3 for every year in the data.38 As shown in the figure, among those aged 60–69, turnout is actually slightly higher for those who are not legally compelled to vote in Schaffhausen— individuals at or over age 65—than those under 64 and younger and thus subject to mandatory rules. However, the results relative to the comparable Germanophone cantons suggest the bump in turnout in the older age group would be substantially larger if not for compulsory voting. At the same time, it is clear that the gap in turnout between Schaffhausen and the other cantons is much bigger for those aged 60–64 than those 65 and over. This is likely because compulsory voting elevates turnout among those in the younger group in Schaffhausen. Thus, the figure provides evidence that the age cutoff in Schaffhausen affects voter turnout: those under the age of 65 vote a higher rate than they would if subject to voluntary rules.39 The Selects surveys include questions that allow me to measure the dependent concepts in Hypotheses 2–4. These are, respectively, support for political authorities, support for extremist and outsider parties, and political sophistication. Similar to the scale created using the AmericasBarometer data in Section 5.1, to gauge support for political authorities, I use responses to three Selects questions that inquire about: confidence in the national parliament, confidence in political parties, and confidence in the executive. Respondents are asked to indicate their level of confidence in each on a scale ranging from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating more favorable views toward the object.40 I create a summated rating 38 According to data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (http://wdi. worldbank.org/), inflation in Switzerland, as measured with the GDP deflator, averaged about 2 percent over the time period covered. 39 There is statistical support for this assertion. Averaged over the entirety of the two age ranges, the predicted turnout rate for those below and above the threshold in Schaffhausen is 88.5 percent and 90.6 percent, respectively, a difference of about 2.1 percentage points. For those in other officially Germanspeaking cantons, the predicted turnout rate for those below and above the threshold is respectively 75.6 percent and 82.7 percent, a difference of about 7.1 percentage points. The difference in these differences, which is about 5 percentage points, is statistically different from zero (p-value = 0.031, two-sided). 40 The wording of the three items is as follows: 1. Confidence in the national parliament: “Can you tell me your level of confidence in [The Federal Assembly]?” 2. Confidence in political parties: “Can you tell me your level of confidence in [the federal political parties]?” 3. Confidence in the executive: “Can you tell me your level of confidence in [The Federal Council]?”

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the effects of compulsory voting on individuals 105 scale of responses to the questions, standardizing each item, summing them, and dividing by the number of items over which the sum was calculated.41 I also create a measure of support for extremist and outsider parties with the Selects data. The procedure is the same as that used in Section 5.1 with the CSES data. I first gather the left-right ideological positions of the competing parties (see Section 5.1 for a defense of the use of the unidimensional left-right scale). To gauge parties’ positions, I rely on a Selects question battery that asks respondents to place parties on the left-right spectrum, where 0 means left and 10 means right.42 As in Section 5.1, I take each party’s left-right position to be the mean placement provided by respondents who have at least a post-secondary or college education. To measure the extremity of each party in each election, I record the absolute distance between the party’s left-right position and that of the mean respondent in the corresponding election survey.43 Again following Section 5.1, I capture support for extremist and outsider parties by recording the extremity of the party for which a respondent reported voting in the recent lower house (National Council) election.44 Selects also includes questions that can be used to gauge political sophistication. First, Selects asks respondents to indicate their level of interest in politics using one of four ordered categories.45 As in Section 5.1, I use the Selects question about parties’ left-right ideological placements as an additional measure of political sophistication. I consider the “correct” position of each party to be the mean placement on the 0 to 10 left-right scale given by respondents who have at least a post-secondary or college education. For each respondent, I calculate the absolute value of the difference between his or her placement of each party and the “correct” placement.46 I then sum these absolute deviations and divide by the number of parties a respondent placed. The resulting measure gives a respondent’s average

41 I only retain respondents who answered at least two of the questions. The reliability coefficient is 0.83. 42 The wording of the question is: “In politics we sometimes speak of left and right. Where would you place [name of party] on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?” 43 Selects asks respondents to place themselves on the same left-right scale as the parties with this question: “In politics we sometimes speak of left and right. Where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?” 44 In Switzerland’s panachage system, voters are allowed more than one vote in the same ballot. I record respondents’ reported first (or only) choice vote. 45 The wording of the question is: “In general, what is your interest in politics: very interested, rather interested, not very interested, or not interested at all?” 46 In the 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, and 2015 surveys, the slate of parties respondents were asked to locate varied by their location in the country. For example, in 2015 only those enfranchised in Geneva were asked to place the Geneva Citizens’ Movement, and only those enfranchised in Ticino were asked to place the Ticino League. I do not consider parties whose presentation to respondents was mutually exclusive with that of another party.

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106 beyond turnout

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perceptual error over the parties he or she placed on the ideological spectrum.47 Figure 5.11 illustrates the distributions of the four outcome variables from Selects. To test Hypotheses 2–4 using the aforementioned difference-in-differences approach, I estimate linear48 regression models that include dissatisfaction with democracy as the key independent variable, a dummy that differentiates the 60–64 and 65–69 age groups, and a dummy that differentiates Schaffhausen from the other officially German-speaking cantons. The models also include a

47 Like the AmericasBarometer and the CSES, Selects surveys ask trivia-type questions to gauge respondents’ political knowledge. Because of known issues with the comparability of responses to these questions across time and space, even when their content is constant, I do not use them here. 48 The political interest measure from Selects has four categories. As such, I also estimated an ordered logit model with interest as the outcome variable. Results are not substantively different across the linear and ordered logit specifications.

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the effects of compulsory voting on individuals 107 Table 5.3 Surveys Included in the Selects Sample Canton Aargau Appenzell Ausserrhoden Appenzell Innerrhoden Basel-Landschaft Basel-Stadt Glarus Lucern Nidwalden Obwalden Schaffhausen Schwyz Solothurn St. Gallen Thurgau Uri Zug Zurich

Years 1979; 1995; 1999; 2003; 2007; 2011; 2015 2003; 2007; 2011; 2015 2007; 2011; 2015 1979; 1995; 1999; 2003; 2007; 2011; 2015 1979; 1995; 1999; 2003; 2007; 2011; 2015 1995; 1999; 2003; 2007; 2011; 2015 1979; 1995; 1999; 2003; 2007; 2011; 2015 1979; 2003; 2011; 2015 2003; 2007; 2011; 2015 1979; 1995; 1999; 2003; 2007; 2011 1995; 1999; 2003; 2007; 2011; 2015 1979; 1995; 1999; 2003; 2007; 2011; 2015 1979; 1999; 2003; 2007; 2011; 2015 1995; 1999; 2003; 2007; 2011; 2015 1979; 2003; 2007; 2011; 2015 1979; 1995; 1999; 2003; 2007; 2011; 2015 1995; 1999; 2003; 2007; 2011; 2015

Note: This table lists the cantons and years of the surveys included in the Selects data used to test Hypotheses 2–4 of Chapter 3.

three-way interaction among these variables and its three constitutive bivariate interactions. As with the models reported in Section 5.1, to help isolate the effect of dissatisfaction with democracy, I control for a number of pre-treatment variables that are plausibly related to it and the outcome variables. These include gender,49 education,50 and income.51 I also control for individuals’ left-right ideology52 and its square. I cluster the standard errors by canton-year to account for intra-canton and survey wave-dependent correlation in the errors. Observations with missing data on the covariates are excluded,53 and Table 5.3 lists the cantons and years of the surveys included in the analyses. To facilitate comparisons across models, I constrain all of the outcome variables to range from 0 to 1.

49 Those who reported being female are coded 1, and those who reported a male gender identity are coded 0. 50 In the cumulative Selects file, education is measured on a 9-point ordinal scale. 51 In the cumulative Selects file, income is measured in quintiles. 52 In the cumulative Selects file, this ranges from 0 (self-reported far left) to 10 (self-reported far right). 53 Unlike the analyses of the AmericasBarometer and CSES data presented earlier in this chapter, I only exclude observations with missing data on a given outcome variable in the model in which the variable is included. While this means that the set of observations differs across models, it is necessary to maintain a sufficient number of observations, as the analyses using the Selects data only include individuals aged 60–69 who live in German-speaking Swiss cantons.

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108 beyond turnout This approach to leveraging the age-based threshold in the enforcement of mandatory voting differs from a regression discontinuity approach, as used below in Section 5.2.2 (see also Section 1.6). The Selects data do not include exact information on age, meaning I cannot precisely determine whether or not a respondent was required to vote. Instead, Selects records age at the time of the post-election surveys, and someone who was 65 years old at the time of his or her survey interview was not necessarily 65 at the time of the election.54 Thus, unlike a regression discontinuity setup, my models do not identify the effect of mandatory voting right at the age 65 threshold. Instead, the regression approach I take here is more akin to a typical cross-national comparison of countries with and without compulsory voting, but with one key advantage: there is a strong likelihood that those aged 60–64 and 65–69 in Schaffhausen are, on average, similar on unobservables, making the assumption of selection on observables (or “unconfoundedness”) inherent to such designs much more plausible. Figures 5.12–5.15 display the key results of the models estimated with the Selects data. The point estimates in each figure represent the estimated marginal effect of dissatisfaction with democracy on the expected value of the relevant dependent variable over the 60–64 and 65–69 age groups, displayed separately for Schaffhausen and the other officially German-speaking cantons. In each figure, the quantity of interest is a difference in differences: the difference in the marginal effect of dissatisfaction with democracy on the dependent variable between those aged 60–64 and 65–69 in Schaffhausen compared to the difference in the same marginal effect between those aged 60–64 and 65–69 in other officially Germanophone cantons. Figure 5.12 presents the results of the model used to test Hypothesis 2, which expects that the negative link between dissatisfaction and support for authorities will be amplified by compulsory voting. First, it is clear that the impact of dissatisfaction is most strongly negative for those compelled to vote in Schaffhausen, at about −0.10 units. For those in the older 65–69 age group in Schaffhausen, the estimated marginal effect of dissatisfaction with democracy on support for authorities is much weaker, at about -0.05 units. While the negative impact of dissatisfaction is also stronger in the younger age group than in the older age group in the reference Germanophone cantons, the difference in these marginal effects is relatively small. The difference in the differences in the age-specific marginal effects across Schaffhausen and the reference cantons, which is about

54 Still, the Selects surveys tend to conclude within a few weeks of the late October elections, especially in more recent waves. If there are individuals who reported an age of 65 in their survey interview but were in fact 64 years old at the time of the recent election, and thus subject to mandatory rules, their classification into the age 65+ voluntary voting group would make it harder to find evidence for Hypotheses 2–4.

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the effects of compulsory voting on individuals 109 Schaffhausen

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Figure 5.12 Conditional Effects of Dissatisfaction with Democracy on Support for Authorities over Age Group in German-Speaking Cantons with Voluntary Voting and Schaffhausen Note: Data are from the Swiss Election Study. Support for authorities is scaled to range from 0 to 1. The distribution of support for authorities on its original metric is displayed in Figure 5.11. Dissatisfaction with democracy is measured on a four-point scale, with higher values indicating more dissatisfaction. Predicted marginal effects are from a linear regression model that includes an interaction among dissatisfaction with democracy, a dummy for being aged 65 or over, and a dummy that differentiates Schaffhausen from the other officially German-speaking cantons, as well as each constituent variable and two-way interaction, with gender, age, education, income, and left-right ideology and its square as controls. Standard errors are clustered by canton-year, of which there are 72. Only individuals aged 60–69 are included in the models. Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals. The number of observations in the model is 1,458.

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110 beyond turnout 0.034 units, is both substantively and statistically55 meaningful. The negative impact of dissatisfaction on support for authorities is over 0.03 units—more than 3 percent of the range of the support for authorities variable—bigger among those compelled to vote in Schaffhausen than would be expected if voting were voluntary. Figure 5.13 presents the results of the model used to test Hypothesis 3, which anticipates that the positive link between dissatisfaction and support for extremist and outsider parties will be boosted by compulsory voting. The results show limited support for Hypothesis 3. Among those subject to mandatory voting in Schaffhausen, there is a positive link between dissatisfaction with democracy and the extremity of the party for which one voted. And, among those subject to voluntary rules in the canton, this link is negative. However, it is estimated with a fair amount of uncertainty within both age groups. In the other German-speaking cantons, the estimated impact of dissatisfaction on extremist voting is positive for both age groups, but again statistically uncertain in both cases. The difference in the difference in the estimated effects of dissatisfaction within Schaffhausen and the reference cantons, which is the quantity of interest, is about 0.064 units. Thus, the impact of dissatisfaction on extreme voting is over 0.06 units—over 6 percent of the range of the vote choice extremity variable—larger among those compelled to vote in Schaffhausen than would be expected if voting were voluntary. However, this estimated difference in differences is not statistically different from zero at conventional levels.56 Figures 5.14 and 5.15 show the results of the models used to test Hypothesis 4, which expects that the impact of dissatisfaction on political sophistication should be most pronouncedly negative for those compelled to vote. The dependent variables used to gauge sophistication in the figures are political interest and errors in the perceptions of parties’ ideological positions, respectively. Substantive conclusions differ markedly depending on which of these measures is employed. Starting with Figure 5.14, it is clear that interest tends to be lower among those who are most dissatisfied with democracy. In Schaffhausen, this negative association is relatively strong among those aged 60–64 and thus compelled to the polls, at about −0.05 units. For those in Schaffhausen aged 65–69 and therefore subject to voluntary voting, the analogous association is about −0.03 units. In the other Germanophone cantons, the difference in the marginal effects of dissatisfaction among the two age groups is smaller, and the impact of dissatisfaction on political interest is actually relatively weak for those in the younger age group.

55 In the model underlying Figure 5.12, the two-sided p-value associated with the difference-indifferences estimate is 0.084. 56 In the model underlying Figure 5.13, the two-sided p-value associated with the difference-indifferences estimate is 0.227.

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the effects of compulsory voting on individuals 111

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Figure 5.13 Conditional Effects of Dissatisfaction with Democracy on Vote Choice Extremity over Age Group in German-Speaking Cantons with Voluntary Voting and Schaffhausen Note: Data are from the Swiss Election Study. Vote choice extremity is scaled to range from 0 to 1. The distribution of vote choice extremity on its original metric is displayed in Figure 5.11. Dissatisfaction with democracy is measured on a four-point scale, with higher values indicating more dissatisfaction. Predicted marginal effects are from a linear regression model that includes an interaction among dissatisfaction with democracy, a dummy for being aged 65 or over, and a dummy that differentiates Schaffhausen from the other officially German-speaking cantons, as well as each constituent variable and two-way interaction, with gender, age, education, income, and left-right ideology and its square as controls. Standard errors are clustered by canton-year, of which there are 85. Only individuals aged 60–69 are included in the models. Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals. The number of observations in the model is 1,417.

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112 beyond turnout

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Figure 5.14 Conditional Effects of Dissatisfaction with Democracy on Political Interest over Age Group in German-Speaking Cantons with Voluntary Voting and Schaffhausen Note: Data are from the Swiss Election Study. Political interest is scaled to range from 0 to 1. The distribution of political interest on its original metric is displayed in Figure 5.11. Dissatisfaction with democracy is measured on a four-point scale, with higher values indicating more dissatisfaction. Predicted marginal effects are from a linear regression model that includes an interaction among dissatisfaction with democracy, a dummy for being aged 65 or over, and a dummy that differentiates Schaffhausen from the other officially German-speaking cantons, as well as each constituent variable and two-way interaction, with gender, age, education, income, and left-right ideology and its square as controls. Standard errors are clustered by canton-year, of which there are 97. Only individuals aged 60–69 are included in the models. Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals. The number of observations in the model is 1,920.

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the effects of compulsory voting on individuals 113

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Figure 5.15 Conditional Effects of Dissatisfaction with Democracy on Errors in Perceptions of Parties’ Ideologies over Age Group in German-Speaking Cantons with Voluntary Voting and Schaffhausen Note: Data are from the Swiss Election Study. Mean error in perceptions of parties’ ideologies is scaled to range from 0 to 1. The distribution mean error in perceptions of parties’ ideologies on its original metric is displayed in Figure 5.11. Dissatisfaction with democracy is measured on a four-point scale, with higher values indicating more dissatisfaction. Predicted marginal effects are from a linear regression model that includes an interaction among dissatisfaction with democracy, a dummy for being aged 65 or over, and a dummy that differentiates Schaffhausen from the other officially German-speaking cantons, as well as each constituent variable and two-way interaction, with gender, age, education, income, and left-right ideology and its square as controls. Standard errors are clustered by canton-year, of which there are 88. Only individuals aged 60–69 are included in the models. Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals. The number of observations in the model is 1,828.

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114 beyond turnout The difference in the difference in the age-specific estimated effects of dissatisfaction within Schaffhausen and the reference cantons is about 0.031 units, or just over 3 percent of the range of the political interest variable; dissatisfaction has a stronger negative association with political interest where voting is mandatory than would be expected if it were voluntary. However, this estimated difference in the differences is statistically uncertain.57 In Figure 5.15, the dependent variable is errors in the perceptions of parties’ ideological positions. Here, results are unexpected. Regardless of age, dissatisfaction with democracy is associated with less error in perceptions of parties’ ideological stances in Schaffhausen, and this negative association is larger among those compelled to vote. In the other officially German-speaking cantons, there is evidence of a small positive association between dissatisfaction and errors in perceptions of parties’ ideological positions, but only for those in the younger age group. Thus, if anything, compulsory voting in Schaffhausen decreases the impact of dissatisfaction on errors in party placements.58 The results of the interactive models can also be depicted with figures in which the relationships between dissatisfaction with democracy and the expected values of the outcome variables are plotted according to age group (60–64 or 65–69) and location (Germanophone cantons with voluntary voting or Schaffhausen). Taking this approach, I graph the predicted relationship between dissatisfaction and each outcome variable over age group and cantonal location in Figures 5.16–5.19. In Figures 5.12–5.15, I take compulsory voting to moderate the impact of dissatisfaction on the outcome variables, in line with Hypotheses 2–4. By symmetry, a meaningful interaction between compulsory voting and dissatisfaction also suggests a process by which the influence of compulsory voting on the outcome variables is itself modified by dissatisfaction with democracy (Berry, Golder, and Milton 2012). Figures 5.16–5.19 have the added utility of providing a straightforward test of this possibility, as they make it possible to assess whether the expected level of each outcome variable is statistically different at different values of the conditioning variables (age group and canton). To facilitate this comparison, as in Section 5.1, I plot 84 percent confidence intervals around the expected values of the outcome variables. This allows an approximate visual hypothesis test of a twotailed difference between two point estimates at the 5 percent significance level. A lack of overlap of the confidence intervals suggests one can reject the null of equal values (see, e.g., Bolsen and Thornton 2014).

57 In the model underlying Figure 5.14, the two-sided p-value associated with the difference-indifferences estimate is 0.311. 58 In the model underlying Figure 5.15, the two-sided p-value associated with the difference-indifferences estimate is 0.159.

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the effects of compulsory voting on individuals 115

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Figure 5.16 Support for Authorities over Dissatisfaction with Democracy by Age Group in German-Speaking Cantons with Voluntary Voting and Schaffhausen Note: Data are from the Swiss Election Study. Support for authorities is scaled to range from 0 to 1. The distribution of support for authorities on its original metric is displayed in Figure 5.11. Predicted values are from a linear regression model that includes an interaction among dissatisfaction with democracy, a dummy for being aged 65 or over, and a dummy that differentiates Schaffhausen from the other officially German-speaking cantons, as well as each constituent variable and two-way interaction, with gender, age, education, income, and left-right ideology and its square as controls. Predictions are made with the control variables held at their means. Standard errors are clustered by canton-year, of which there are 72. Only individuals aged 60–69 are included in the models. Shaded areas represent 84% confidence intervals, overlap in which can be used to approximately test the null hypothesis of equivalent point estimates at the 5% significance level, two-sided. The number of observations in the model is 1,458.

Starting with Figure 5.16, in which the outcome variable is support for authorities, it is clear that dissatisfaction with democracy has the sharpest downward impact on support among those compelled to vote in Schaffhausen. As a result, compulsory voting has divergent effect on support for authorities for those with low and high levels of dissatisfaction. For the most satisfied with democracy— those who score a 1 on the dissatisfaction scale—being just under 65, and thus subject to obligatory voting in Schaffhausen, is positively associated with support for authorities. For the most dissatisfied with democracy, the association between support for authorities and compelled voting is conversely negative and, as suggested by the thin overlap in the 84 percent confidence intervals, estimated with a fair amount of precision. In the other officially German-speaking cantons, expected support for authorities has a weaker relationship with age group at both low and high values of dissatisfaction. However, like in Schaffhausen, there is a negative association between being under 65 and expected support for those

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116 beyond turnout German−Speaking Cantons with Voluntary Voting

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Figure 5.17 Vote Choice Extremity over Dissatisfaction with Democracy by Age Group in German-Speaking Cantons with Voluntary Voting and Schaffhausen Note: Data are from the Swiss Election Study. Vote choice extremity is scaled to range from 0 to 1. The distribution of vote choice extremity on its original metric is displayed in Figure 5.11. Predicted values are from a linear regression model that includes an interaction among dissatisfaction with democracy, a dummy for being aged 65 or over, and a dummy that differentiates Schaffhausen from the other officially German-speaking cantons, as well as each constituent variable and two-way interaction, with gender, age, education, income, and left-right ideology and its square as controls. Predictions are made with the control variables held at their means. Standard errors are clustered by canton-year, of which there are 85. Only individuals aged 60–69 are included in the models. Shaded areas represent 84% confidence intervals, overlap in which can be used to approximately test the null hypothesis of equivalent point estimates at the 5% significance level, two-sided. The number of observations in the model is 1,417.

at high levels of dissatisfaction. As a result, the difference in the difference in expected support for democracy between those aged 60–64 and 65–69 who are most dissatisfied with democracy in Schaffhausen and the other Germanophone cantons is not statistically different from zero.59 With regard to extremity in vote choices, Figure 5.17 shows that dissatisfaction has a relatively strong upward impact for those obliged to participate in Schaffhausen. While the predicted level of vote choice extremity among those subject to voluntary and compulsory voting is essentially equal among those who are the least dissatisfied with democracy, for the most dissatisfied expected vote choice extremity is stronger for those who must vote. In the other officially German-speaking cantons, expected support for authorities is largely unrelated to age group at both low and high values of dissatisfaction. The difference in 59

The two-sided p-value associated with the difference-in-differences estimate is 0.656.

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the effects of compulsory voting on individuals 117 German−Speaking Cantons with Voluntary Voting

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Figure 5.18 Political Interest over Dissatisfaction with Democracy by Age Group in German-Speaking Cantons with Voluntary Voting and Schaffhausen Note: Data are from the Swiss Election Study. Political interest is scaled to range from 0 to 1. The distribution of political interest on its original metric is displayed in Figure 5.11. Predicted values are from a linear regression model that includes an interaction among dissatisfaction with democracy, a dummy for being aged 65 or over, and a dummy that differentiates Schaffhausen from the other officially German-speaking cantons, as well as each constituent variable and two-way interaction, with gender, age, education, income, and left-right ideology and its square as controls. Predictions are made with the control variables held at their means. Standard errors are clustered by canton-year, of which there are 97. Only individuals aged 60–69 are included in the models. Shaded areas represent 84% confidence intervals, overlap in which can be used to approximately test the null hypothesis of equivalent point estimates at the 5% significance level, two-sided. The number of observations in the model is 1,920.

the difference in expected vote choice extremity between those aged 60–64 and 65–69 who are most dissatisfied with democracy in Schaffhausen and the other Germanophone cantons is nearly 0.15 units, or 15 percent of the range of the extreme voting variable.60 Figure 5.18 plots the relationship between expected political interest and dissatisfaction with democracy for the younger and older age groups in Schaffhausen and the German-speaking cantons with voluntary voting. Divergent relationships between dissatisfaction and political interest mean the gap in expected interest associated with being compelled to vote in Schaffhausen is more pronouncedly negative for those who are most dissatisfied. In the other officially German-speaking cantons, expected political interest is unrelated to age group among the very dissatisfied. The difference in the difference in expected 60

The two-sided p-value associated with the difference-in-differences estimate is 0.160.

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118 beyond turnout

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Figure 5.19 Errors in Perceptions of Parties’ Ideologies over Dissatisfaction with Democracy by Age Group in German-Speaking Cantons with Voluntary Voting and Schaffhausen Note: Data are from the Swiss Election Study. Mean error in perceptions of parties’ ideologies is scaled to range from 0 to 1. The distribution mean error in perceptions of parties’ ideologies on its original metric is displayed in Figure 5.11. Predicted values are from a linear regression model that includes an interaction among dissatisfaction with democracy, a dummy for being aged 65 or over, and a dummy that differentiates Schaffhausen from the other officially German-speaking cantons, as well as each constituent variable and two-way interaction, with gender, age, education, income, and left-right ideology and its square as controls. Predictions are made with the control variables held at their means. Standard errors are clustered by canton-year, of which there are 88. Only individuals aged 60–69 are included in the models. Shaded areas represent 84% confidence intervals, overlap in which can be used to approximately test the null hypothesis of equivalent point estimates at the 5% significance level, two-sided. The number of observations in the model is 1,828.

political interest between those aged 60–64 and 65–69 who are most dissatisfied with democracy in Schaffhausen and the other Germanophone cantons is about 0.09 units, and this quantity is precisely estimated.61 The patterns displayed in Figure 5.19, in which the outcome variable is errors in individuals’ placements of the political parties, are not supportive of my expectations, as is also apparent in analogous Figure 5.15. Dissatisfaction with democracy actually decreases misperceptions of parties’ ideologies among those under 65 and thus subject to mandatory voting in Schaffhausen. In the other officially Germanophone cantons, dissatisfaction is associated with more misperceptions among those in the younger age group. For those in the older age group, the link between dissatisfaction and expected errors in party placements is relatively 61

The two-sided p-value associated with the difference-in-differences estimate is 0.053.

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the effects of compulsory voting on individuals 119 flat in both Schaffhausen and the other cantons. Resultantly, being 65 or older is associated with fewer misperceptions of parties’ ideologies among those most dissatisfied with democracy in Schaffhausen, while being 65 or older is associated with more errors in perceptions in the reference German-speaking cantons.62

5.2.2 Argentina Argentina held a general election, which included races for president and both houses of the legislature, on October 27, 2019. In anticipation of the election, I created and administered a survey with the goal of assessing Hypotheses 2 and 4 (and, in part, Hypothesis 5; see Chapters 6 and 7).63 I thus included in the survey a question about satisfaction with democracy and items comparable to those used in the AmericasBarometer, the CSES, and Selects to gauge support for political authorities and political sophistication.64 I chose Argentina because, while its constitution makes voting compulsory, the requirement is only enforced for those aged 18–69 (see Table 1.1). For these individuals, abstention in the 2019 contest entailed a fine of 100 pesos (about US$1.75). Nonvoters could also be restricted from public employment for three years following the election, and those who did not pay the fine or present a valid excuse65 faced restricted access to government services for a full year. Individuals aged 16–17 and 70 and over are entitled to vote, but they are not penalized for abstaining. As discussed in Section 1.6, if people do not manipulate their legal age to avoid or attract compulsory voting in a way that systematically relates to the outcome variables and there are no other theoretically relevant changes at the age thresholds, the cutoffs can be used identify the causal effects of compulsory voting. Regarding the former, it is very unlikely that people have the ability or

62

The two-sided p-value associated with the difference-in-differences estimate is 0.107. Hypothesis 3 pertains to voting for extreme and outsider parties. In the above analyses of the CSES and Selects data, I measure support for such parties by gauging the extremity of the party for which a respondent reported voting. Party positions are assessed left-right placements provided by respondents and considered relative to the ideology of the mean voter. While I asked respondents who they voted for in both the presidential and lower house contests in Argentina, due to the ephemeral, regional, and coalitional nature of Argentina’s party system, I did not ask them to place the competing candidates or parties in ideological space. Further, while Argentinian party positions created from expert assessments or the coding of party manifestos do exist in sources such as the CSES, the Comparative Manifestos Project, the Parliamentary Elites in Latin America study, and the scores of Wiesehomeier and Benoit (2009), these were not updated through the 2019 election at the time of writing. As such, I forgo using the Argentina data to test Hypothesis 3. 64 The University of Georgia’s institutional review board approved the survey design in Project ID#STUDY00002811 and Project ID#MOD00007539. 65 These include being more than 500 kilometers from one’s polling place on election day, being ill, and having a public occupation that requires one to perform tasks that preclude turning out to vote. 63

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120 beyond turnout desire to falsify their age in order to alter their exposure to compulsory voting. Regarding the latter, at age 18 individuals in Argentina also become eligible to legally purchase alcohol and tobacco, but such eligibilities should not affect the outcome variables examined here. Further, the pension age in Argentina is 65 for men and 60 for women, meaning the age 70 cutoff is unlikely to be confounded by retirement decisions. Moreover, school grade levels are determined by a student’s age at the outset of the school year in March. Because elections tend to be held in October, one’s qualification for compulsory voting in a particular election is not coterminous with his or her educational cohort. I contracted Netquest, an international market research firm, to recruit individuals from its proprietary list of Argentinian panelists to complete my survey. Members of Netquest panels receive points for completing surveys, which can be redeemed for gifts such as toys, cosmetics, sporting goods, and mobile electronic devices. I required that Netquest restrict their invitations to individuals aged 16–19 and 67–72 living in Argentina, specifying a wider range of ages among the elder group due to the relative paucity of available respondents. The survey was conducted online using Qualtrics, with fieldwork lasting from November 7, 2019 until January 7, 2020. After fieldwork was complete, I obtained from Netquest respondents’ dates of birth. A total of 1,265 respondents aged 16–19 and 777 respondents aged 67–72 at the time of the elections completed the survey and successfully answered an attention check.66 Keeping with the measurement strategy employed above in the analyses of the AmericasBarometer, CSES, and Selects data, I measure orientations toward democracy with responses to the survey item about satisfaction with democracy. I asked respondents to report whether they are very satisfied, satisfied, not satisfied, or very dissatisfied with the way democracy functions in Argentina. I assign a 1 to respondents who reported being “very satisfied,” a 2 to the “satisfied,” a 3 to the “not satisfied,” and a 4 to those “very dissatisfied,” meaning higher values indicate more dissatisfaction. The expectations of Hypotheses 2 and 4 are based on the assumption that those with negative orientations toward democracy are less likely than others to turn out 66 The attention check, which was answered correctly by 67.05 percent of respondents, stated: “Research in decision-making shows that people, when making decisions and answering questions, prefer to minimize their effort. If you are reading this question and have read all the other questions, select the box marked ‘other.’ Do not select ‘democracy.’ What was this survey about?” • The economy • Government • Democracy • Politics • Other Those who did not successfully answer the attention check were filtered out at the beginning of the survey.

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the effects of compulsory voting on individuals 121 to the polls due to intrinsic motivation. Thus, as with the above analyses, here I first validate dissatisfaction with democracy as a predictor of abstention for those who are not required to vote. I measure reported turnout with a question that asked respondents whether they abstained or cast a valid, blank, or spoiled vote, coding those who reported valid voting as 1 and the others as 0. I restrict the sample to individuals aged 16 or 17 and 70–72, for whom voting was not mandatory. After dropping respondents with missing data, there are 643 observations, 363 of which are in the younger age group and 280 of which are in the older group. I estimate a logistic regression of reported turnout in the recent election on dissatisfaction with democracy, allowing the impact of dissatisfaction to vary over age group. Using the results of the model, Figure 5.20 plots the relationship between predicted valid voting and dissatisfaction among those who did not face penalties for abstention. For both age groups, there is a negative relationship between dissatisfaction and the probability of casting a valid vote. While these are somewhat imprecisely estimated, as reflected by the wide confidence intervals, they are substantively nontrivial. As shown in the figure, the probability that a respondent aged 16 or 17 who is most dissatisfied with democracy reporting casting a valid ballot is roughly 12 percentage points lower than that of a respondent who is most satisfied. For those aged 70–72, the probability that a respondent who is most

.95

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Figure 5.20 Reported Valid Voting and Dissatisfaction with Democracy Among Individuals Not Required to Vote in Argentina Note: Data are from an original survey of Argentina conducted from November 2019 through January 2020. Predicted values are from a logistic regression model that includes dissatisfaction with democracy, a dummy variable distinguishing those aged 16 or 17 from those aged 70–72, and an interaction between dissatisfaction and the dummy. The histograms along the horizontal axes illustrate the distribution of dissatisfaction in the estimation sample for either age group. The shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals. The number of observations in the model is 643, 363 of which are in the younger age group and 280 of which are in the older group.

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122 beyond turnout satisfied with democracy lodged a valid vote is about eight percentage points lower than a respondent who is most satisfied. These patterns help establish the utility of dissatisfaction with democracy as a measure of the intrinsic disinclination to voluntarily participate. To verify that compulsory voting affects voter participation in Argentina, I examine the difference in reported electoral turnout among those aged just below and above the cutoffs. To account for the fact that compulsory voting incentivizes many to attend the polls without casting a valid ballot (see Section 2.2), here I consider participation among those who cast a valid vote as well as those who reporting lodging a blank or spoiled ballot. That is, I consider turning out to the polls rather than valid voting. Figure 5.21 plots the relationships between age and the probability of reported turnout nearby the age cutoffs. As is shown from the figure, the likelihood of turnout jumps sharply at the age 18 threshold and, to a lesser extent, abruptly drops at the age 70 threshold. The age thresholds in Argentina clearly affected turnout rates in the 2019 election.67 To test the predictions of Hypotheses 2 and 4, that compulsory voting amplifies the downward impact of negative orientations toward democracy on support for political authorities and political sophistication, I use a regression discontinuity (RD) design. As discussed in Section 1.6, RD models can be motivated by the continuity assumption. In the present analysis, this implies that, under the counterfactual scenario in which there were no age-based thresholds, the relationship between age and the expected value of the outcome variables would smoothly cross over the threshold for those in the control and treatment groups (Cattaneo, Idrobo, and Titiunik 2019; de la Cuesta and Imai 2016). The plausibility of the continuity assumption is bolstered by the fact that, as discussed, there are no other theoretically relevant changes at the age thresholds. It is further strengthened by the fact that is extremely unlikely that people manipulate their ages in order to sort themselves to a particular side of the mandatory voting thresholds (de la Cuesta and Imai 2016, pp. 383–384). I empirically probe the viability of the continuity assumption below after presenting the results of the RD models. I measure support for authorities using the same approach in the above analyses of the AmericasBarometer data. I included in my survey questions that inquire about respect for political institutions, the need to support the political system, confidence in the national legislature, confidence in political parties, and confidence in the executive. I asked respondents to indicate their level of confidence

67 There is statistical support for this assertion. In a more formal regression discontinuity analysis akin to the approach outlined in the tests of Hypotheses 2 and 4, the estimated jump in turnout at the age 18 threshold is 27.7 percentage points (p-value < 0.001, two-sided), and the estimated drop at the age 70 threshold is 10.7 percentage points (p-value = 0.036, two-sided).

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the effects of compulsory voting on individuals 123

Figure 5.21 Reported Turnout and Age in Days Among Those Subject to Voluntary and Compulsory Voting in Argentina Note: Data are from an original survey of Argentina conducted from November 2019 through January 2020. Predicted values are from local polynomial regressions estimated separately among observations on either side of the age cutoffs. The local polynomial regressions use an Epanechnikov kernel and a bandwidth of 150. The jittered points near the top and bottom of the plots represent observed reported turnout and abstention, respectively. Solid black circles represent respondents compelled to vote (aged 18–19 or 67–69), and open grey circles represent respondents for whom voting is optional (aged 16–17 or 70–72). The solid vertical lines likewise demarcate respondents subject to compulsory voting and voluntary voting on election day. The number of observations in the model is 1,244 in the left-hand panel and 776 in the right-hand panel.

in each on a scale ranging from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating more favorable views.68 I create a summated rating scale of responses to the questions, standardizing each item, summing them, and dividing by the number of items over which the sum was calculated.69 I again use political interest as a gauge of political sophistication, coding the variable with answers to a question that asked respondents to place their level of interest in politics in one of four ordered categories.70 Figure 5.22 illustrates the distributions of both outcome variables in both the younger and older age groups.

68

The wording of the five items is as follows: 1. Respect for political institutions: “To what extent do you respect the political institutions of Argentina?” 2. The need to support the political system: “To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of Argentina?” 3. Confidence in the national legislature: “To what extent do you have confidence in the National Congress?” 4. Confidence in political parties: “To what extent do you have confidence in political parties?” 5. Confidence in the executive: “To what extent do you have confidence in the president?”

69 I only retain respondents who answered at least two of the questions. The reliability coefficient is 0.79. 70 The wording of the question is: “How much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, little, or none?”

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124 beyond turnout Individuals Aged 16–19

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Figure 5.22 Distributions of the Dependent Variables in the 2019 Argentina Election Survey

I estimate separate RD models among the younger (16–19) and older (67–72) age groups. To implement the models, I estimate linear regressions of the outcome variables on a quadratic trend71 of age in days, which is itself interacted with an indicator variable that classifies respondents as subject to or free from the requirement to vote. The estimated effect of compulsory voting is the difference in the predicted value of the outcome variable for those just below and above a given compulsory voting threshold. To determine the window of observations included in the RD models, I use the data-driven procedure created by Calonico, Cattaneo, 71

Results are similar with a linear trend.

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the effects of compulsory voting on individuals 125 Very Satisfied with Democracy

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Figure 5.23 Support for Authorities According to Dissatisfaction with Democracy Among Those Just Below and Above Age 18: Regression Discontinuity Results Note: Data are from an original survey of Argentina conducted from November 2019 through January 2020. Support for authorities is scaled to range from 0 to 1. The distribution of support for authorities on its original metric is displayed in Figure 5.22. Predicted values are from a linear regression model that includes age in days and its square interacted with a dummy for being aged 18 or over on election day and dissatisfaction with democracy, as well as each constituent piece of the interaction. The window of included observations is determined by the optimal bandwidth procedure of Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014b), as implemented by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014a). Shaded areas represent 84% confidence intervals, overlap in which can be used to approximately test the null hypothesis of equivalent point estimates at the 5% significance level, two-sided. The number of observations in the model is 373.

and Titiunik (2014b) and implemented by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014a). This procedure seeks to minimize mean squared error in the vicinity of the thresholds, given the quadratic specification and my use of a uniform kernel, which gives equal weight to all observations that fall within the window of included observations and no weight to observations outside the window. To facilitate comparisons across models, I constrain support for authorities and political interest to range from 0 to 1. Hypotheses 2 and 4 anticipate an interactive effect of orientations toward democracy and compulsory voting on support for authorities and political sophistication. As such, I use multiplicative terms in the RD models to allow the estimated effects of the requirement to vote to differ conditional on dissatisfaction with democracy. Results, which are depicted in Figures 5.23–5.26, accordingly depict the estimated effect of the requirement to vote separately for those who are very satisfied with democracy and those who are very dissatisfied. Figure 5.23 shows the results of the RD model that leverages the age 18 threshold to examine the effects of compulsory voting on support for authorities. The lefthand panel shows that being compelled to vote causes an increase in support for authorities for those who are very satisfied with democracy. This is evidenced

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126 beyond turnout Very Satisfied with Democracy

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Figure 5.24 Support for Authorities According to Dissatisfaction with Democracy Among Those Just Below and Above Age 70: Regression Discontinuity Results Note: Data are from an original survey of Argentina conducted from November 2019 through January 2020. Support for authorities is scaled to range from 0 to 1. The distribution of support for authorities on its original metric is displayed in Figure 5.22. Predicted values are from a linear regression model that includes age in days and its square interacted with a dummy for being aged 70 or over on election day and dissatisfaction with democracy, as well as each constituent piece of the interaction. The window of included observations is determined by the optimal bandwidth procedure of Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014b), as implemented by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014a). Shaded areas represent 84% confidence intervals, overlap in which can be used to approximately test the null hypothesis of equivalent point estimates at the 5% significance level, two-sided. The number of observations in the model is 264.

by the abrupt jump in expected support for those who are just over 18 and thus obliged to vote, as compared to those just under 18 and thus subject to optional voting. At about 0.23 units, or 23 percent of the range of the support for authorities scale, this increase is substantively important, though it is not statistically different from zero at conventional levels.72 The right-hand panel shows that, for those who are very dissatisfied, being compelled to vote, if anything, decreases support for authorities.73 Though the estimates are imprecise, this pattern supports Hypothesis 2’s expectation that being compelled to vote should exacerbate the consequences of dissatisfaction with democracy for support for authorities.74 Figure 5.24, shows the results of the RD model which instead leverages the age 70 threshold to examine the impact of compulsory voting on support for authorities. Substantive results are the same, and effects are estimated with 72 The two-sided p-value associated with the difference in support for authorities for those just under and just over 18 who are very satisfied with democracy is 0.164. 73 The two-sided p-value associated with the difference in support for authorities for those just under and just over 18 who are very dissatisfied with democracy is 0.510. 74 The two-sided p-value associated with the difference in the estimated discontinuities for those very satisfied and very dissatisfied with democracy is 0.211.

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the effects of compulsory voting on individuals 127 Very Satisfied with Democracy

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Figure 5.25 Political Interest According to Dissatisfaction with Democracy Among Those Just Below and Above Age 18: Regression Discontinuity Results Note: Data are from an original survey of Argentina conducted from November 2019 through January 2020. Political interest is scaled to range from 0 to 1. The distribution of political interest on its original metric is displayed in Figure 5.22. Predicted values are from a linear regression model that includes age in days and its square interacted with a dummy for being aged 18 or over on election day and dissatisfaction with democracy, as well as each constituent piece of the interaction. The window of included observations is determined by the optimal bandwidth procedure of Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014b), as implemented by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014a). Shaded areas represent 84% confidence intervals, overlap in which can be used to approximately test the null hypothesis of equivalent point estimates at the 5% significance level, two-sided. The number of observations in the model is 244.

considerably more precision. The left-hand panel shows that being compelled to vote causes an increase in support for authorities among those who are very satisfied with democracy. Expected support is about 0.25 units higher for those who are just under 70 and thus obliged to vote, as compared to those just over 70 and thus subject to voluntary voting. This difference, which is equivalent to 25 percent of the range of the support for authorities scale, is estimated with a good amount of precision.75 Among those who are very dissatisfied with democracy, alternatively, being compelled to vote causes a decrease in support for authorities of about 0.22 units, an effect that is again estimated with precision.76 This pattern further supports the expectation, advanced in Hypothesis 2, that being compelled to vote amplifies the link between dissatisfaction with democracy and support for authorities.77 75 The two-sided p-value associated with the difference in support for authorities for those just under and just over 70 who are very satisfied with democracy is 0.088. 76 The two-sided p-value associated with the difference in support for authorities for those just under and just over 70 who are very dissatisfied with democracy is 0.063. 77 The two-sided p-value associated with the difference in the estimated discontinuities for those very satisfied and very dissatisfied with democracy is 0.045.

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128 beyond turnout In Figures 5.25 and 5.26, I plot the results of the RD models that examine the impact of being compelled to vote on political interest according to dissatisfaction with democracy, leveraging the age 18 and age 70 cutoffs, respectively. The patterns of Figure 5.25 evidence against my expectations. For the very satisfied, being over 18 and thus compelled to vote causes a decrease in political interest. For the very dissatisfied, being over 18 and thus compelled to vote causes an increase in political interest. While neither of these effects is statistically significant at conventional levels, the overall pattern suggests, counter to Hypothesis 4, negative orientations with democracy make people more likely to engage with politics when externally motivated to the polls.78 Figure 5.26 shows that, for the very satisfied with democracy, being under age 70 and thereby compelled to vote increases political interest by about 0.37 units, or Very Satisfied with Democracy

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Figure 5.26 Political Interest According to Dissatisfaction with Democracy Among Those Just Below and Above Age 70: Regression Discontinuity Results Note: Data are from an original survey of Argentina conducted from November 2019 through January 2020. Political interest is scaled to range from 0 to 1. The distribution of political interest on its original metric is displayed in Figure 5.22. Predicted values are from a linear regression model that includes age in days and its square interacted with a dummy for being aged 70 or over on election day and dissatisfaction with democracy, as well as each constituent piece of the interaction. The window of included observations is determined by the optimal bandwidth procedure of Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014b), as implemented by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014a). Shaded areas represent 84% confidence intervals, overlap in which can be used to approximately test the null hypothesis of equivalent point estimates at the 5% significance level, two-sided. The number of observations in the model is 264.

78 The two-sided p-value associated with the difference in political interest for those just under and just over 18 who are very satisfied with democracy is 0.249. The two-sided p-value associated with the difference in political interest for those just under and just over 18 who are very dissatisfied with democracy is 0.225. The two-sided p-value associated with the difference in the estimated discontinuities for those very satisfied and very dissatisfied with democracy is 0.185.

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the effects of compulsory voting on individuals 129 37 percent of the range of the political interest variable, a difference estimated with a fair amount of precision.79 For those who are very dissatisfied, alternatively, compulsory voting has an essentially null impact on political interest.80 Thus, Figure 5.26 provides mixed evidence for Hypothesis 4. Compulsory voting may inculcate sophistication among those who feel happy about democracy, but its effect among those who are negatively oriented toward democracy is unclear.81

5.2.2.1 Tests of the Continuity Assumption A discontinuous jump in variables associated with respondents’ background characteristics at the age cutoffs would make the continuity assumption used to validate the regression discontinuity models implausible. To investigate the accuracy of the assumption, I estimate RD models in which the dependent variables are gender, education level, family income, and political ideology. Self-reported gender is coded 1 for females and 0 for males. Education is created with responses to a question that asked survey respondents to report their maximum level of education on a ten-point scale, ranging from no education to post-graduate.82 Family income is measured on an 18-point scale ranging from no income to over 64,000 Argentinian dollars per month.83 To gauge respondents’ left-right ideological positions, I asked them to locate themselves on a left-right scale, where 0 means left and 10 means right.84 To determine the window of observations included in the RD models, I again use the procedure of Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014b), as implemented by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014a). I estimate separate RD models among the younger (16–19) and older (67–72) age groups. To implement the models, I estimate linear regressions of the covariates on a quadratic trend of age in days, which is interacted with an indicator variable that classifies respondents as subject to or free from the requirement to vote. I use a uniform kernel, and to aid comparability all covariates are scaled to range from 0 to 1. Results, which are depicted in Figure 5.27, show that the expected value of the covariates does 79 The two-sided p-value associated with the difference in political interest for those just under and just over 70 who are very satisfied with democracy is 0.101. 80 The two-sided p-value associated with the difference in political interest for those just under and just over 18 who are very dissatisfied with democracy is 0.760. 81 The two-sided p-value associated with the difference in the estimated discontinuities for those very satisfied and very dissatisfied with democracy is 0.235. 82 The wording of the question is: “What is the maximum educational level you have achieved?” 83 The wording of the question is: “In which of the following ranges does your household’s monthly family income fall, including remittances from abroad and the income of all working adults and children?” 84 The wording of the question is: “When talking about political issues, many people use the terms left and right. Where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means ‘left’ and 10 means ‘right’?”

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130 beyond turnout Female Education Level Family Income Ideology −.5

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Figure 5.27 Changes in Covariates at the Age 18 and Age 70 Thresholds: Regression Discontinuity Results Note: Data are from an original survey of Argentina conducted from November 2019 through January 2020. Female, education level, household income, and ideology all range from 0 to 1. Predicted values are from separate linear regression models that include age in days and its square interacted with a dummy for being aged 18 or 70 or over on election day. The window of included observations included in each model determined by the optimal bandwidth procedure of Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014b), as implemented by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014a). Horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals. The number of observations in the models that leverage the age 18 cutoff is: 506 (female); 230 (education level); 208 (household income); and 275 (ideology). The number of observations in the models that leverage the age 70 cutoff is: 315 (female); 267 (education level); 246 (household income); and 252 (ideology).

not change abruptly at the thresholds, which lends support to the continuity assumption. As a second test of the continuity assumption, I examine the density of observations in the neighborhood of the age 18 and age 70 thresholds. The continuity assumption would be violated if respondents systematically altered their legal ages in order to fall on a particular side of the compulsory voting cutoffs. Absent such sorting, the number of observations just below and above the cutoffs should be similar. That is, if the thresholds are truly exogenous, respondents should be essentially randomly assigned to either side of the cutoff and thus roughly equal in number (Cattaneo, Idrobo, and Titiunik 2019; de la Cuesta and Imai 2016). A simple visual examination of such a pattern can provide suggestive evidence for or against sorting. The distribution of respondents according to their age in days at the time of the election is displayed in Figure 5.28. While age is not uniformly distributed, there is also no clear evidence of a discontinuous jump in the number of respondents in the neighborhood of the thresholds. To more formally assess the distribution of respondents, I statistically examine whether the density of the running variable, age in days, is continuous at the cutoffs. I conduct this test using the procedure of Cattaneo, Jansson, and Ma (2018), in which the null hypothesis is continuity of the density functions for those above and below the cutoffs—or, less formally, no manipulation. The bandwidth

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the effects of compulsory voting on individuals 131

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Figure 5.28 The Distribution of Respondents’ Ages Days on October 27, 2019 Note: Data are from an original survey of Argentina conducted from November 2019 through January 2020.

of included observations is selected using the selector of Cattaneo, Jansson, and Ma, which is tailored for this particular estimator. As usual, I specify a quadratic functional form and use a uniform kernel. The two-sided p-value associated with the null hypothesis for the age 18 cutoff is 0.867, and for the age 70 cutoff it is 0.456. The test thus provides no evidence that respondents manipulated their ages to fall on either side of the thresholds, lending support to the continuity assumption.

5.3 Conclusion The purpose of this chapter was to test Hypotheses 2–4, which are theoretically derived in Chapter 3. The hypotheses argue that compulsory voting will strengthen the link between negative orientations toward democracy and support for authorities, support for extremist and outsider parties, and political sophistication, respectively, especially where rules are reliably enforced and include significant sanctions for abstention. To test the hypotheses, I bring to bear a large amount of data. The first set of tests uses mass survey data from dozens of countries that vary in their use of voluntary and compulsory voting—and the degree to which compulsory voting is enforced. The second set of tests leverages age cutoffs for compulsory voting within countries. I use satisfaction with democracy to gauge democratic orientations, and I employ a variety of indicators to measure the outcome concepts. The results of the cross-country analyses, reported in Section 5.1, give evidence of a process by which compulsory voting amplifies the negative relationship

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132 beyond turnout between dissatisfaction with democracy and political interest and understanding of political issues—or, equivalently, compulsory voting boosts the positive link between satisfaction with democracy and political interest and understanding. Results further show that compulsory voting expands the gap in the extremity of vote choices between those who are satisfied and dissatisfied with democracy. Compulsory voting’s influence tends to be strongest where rules have “bite.” Counter to expectations, I find no evidence that compulsory voting and dissatisfaction have an interactive influence on support for authorities or individuals’ ability to correctly place political parties on an ideological scale. In Section 5.2, I leverage within-country variation in the application of compulsory voting to further test my expectations. I analyze survey data from older respondents in Schaffhausen, Switzerland, where the requirement to vote ends at age 65. I also conduct an analysis of original survey data from Argentina, where, although voting is required, those aged 16 and 17 and 70 or over are allowed to vote but not punished for abstaining. Results from Switzerland mostly align with my expectations: dissatisfaction has a stronger negative impact on support for authorities, positive impact on vote choice extremity, and negative impact on political interest for those compelled to vote, though I find no evidence that compulsory voting and dissatisfaction have an interactive influence on individuals’ likelihood of accurately perceiving parties’ ideological positions. Results from Argentina, which use a regression discontinuity approach appropriate for discerning causal effects, demonstrate that dissatisfaction with democracy’s downward impact on support for authorities is magnified by the requirement to vote. However, results also unexpectedly show evidence of a process through which compulsory voting can engender political interest among young citizens who are democratically disaffected, while lessening interest among those who are satisfied with democracy. In sum, although findings are not always supportive of my expectations, on balance they lend support for Hypotheses 2–4. The cross-national comparisons and within-country threshold-based evidence together suggest that compulsory voting tends to exacerbate the deleterious consequences of negative orientations toward democracy for democratic citizenship. In the next chapter, I provide a theory of how political parties will shape their strategies to most effectively court votes in places with compulsory and voluntary voting.

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6 How Compulsory Voting Affects Parties Australia is probably the world’s most well-known case of compulsory voting. It is also a country with relatively tame, centrist party politics, at least in comparison to other prominent Anglophone democracies. This makes it tempting to attribute moderation to the mandatory vote. For example, in the wake of the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom and the United States’ election of Donald Trump as president, a number of newspaper opinion pieces and letters to the editor popped up proclaiming that Australia’s system of mandatory voting insulated it from such extremity. Of course, Australia has other features that might foster moderation, such as a preferential voting system for both of its legislative bodies, and thus little can be inferred from the contemporary Australian experience alone. In this chapter, I move beyond Antipodean anecdotes to provide a theoretical treatment of how compulsory voting systematically affects the ways in which political parties seek votes. The preceding chapters show that compulsory voting shapes the electorate: voters who are compelled to the polls feel and act differently than those who are not. I expect that political parties recognize that voluntary and compelled electorates are different and adjust their electoral strategies accordingly. My theory also argues that compulsory voting has a divergent impact on the strategies of mainstream and non-mainstream parties. This is largely because mainstream parties must worry about winning or maintaining votes from a broad swath of citizens, while non-mainstream parties tend to be supported by small groups of ideologically niche voters. I first consider how parties will tailor their mobilization strategies where individuals are required to vote. Following a common prediction found in the literature on compulsory voting, I argue that mainstream parties will spend less time getting out the vote where turnout is mandatory, instead focusing their efforts on conversion. However, I argue that non-mainstream parties stand to benefit from mobilizing turnout among their potential supporters, who are prone to abstention even where participation is required by law. Efforts to convert support from those who turn out will also be influenced by the effects that compulsory voting has on the electorate. Mainstream parties, for their part, will moderate their messages under compulsory voting, seeking to appeal broadly to an electorate that is reflective of society as a whole. Alternatively, because many reluctant but compelled voters hold antisystem and

Beyond Turnout: How Compulsory Voting Shapes Citizens and Political Parties. Shane P. Singh, Oxford University Press. © Shane P. Singh 2021. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198832928.003.0006

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134 beyond turnout outsider political views, which are heightened by the fact that their participation is forced, non-mainstream parties will make more appeals to the fringes under compulsory voting. These patterns will be most pronounced where abstention entails a strong, reliably enforced sanction. In the remainder of this chapter, I first review the distinction between mainstream and non-mainstream political parties. I then advance my theory, incorporating insights from the long literature on the ways in which political parties seek to win seats in response to external incentives. Finally, I derive a set of testable hypotheses from my theory.

6.1 Mainstream and Non-Mainstream Political Parties Political parties can be classified into families according to their positions on salient political cleavages. Though this sorting method is imperfect (Mair and Mudde 1998), it provides analytical leverage in allowing comparative political researchers to identify policy similarities among parties across countries. Further, while the party family schema was developed with reference to western Europe, it is applicable beyond the region (e.g. Kitschelt et al. 2010, chp. 3; Ware 1996). Though the names and number of party families vary by classification (Mair and Mudde 1998), recent groupings typically include all or most of the following: farleft (or communist or socialist); green (or ecologist); social democratic; liberal; Christian democratic; agrarian; conservative; far-right (or nationalist); and ethnic or regional. These families are often further grouped into a coarser mainstream versus others dichotomy. Typically, social democratic, liberal, Christian democratic, and conservative parties are classified as mainstream (e.g, Abou-Chadi 2016; Adams et al. 2006; Meguid 2005; Rooduijn, de Lange, and van der Brug 2014; Steenbergen, Edwards, and de Vries 2007), with the remaining parties either grouped into a single non-mainstream category (e.g, Rooduijn, de Lange, and van der Brug 2014; Steenbergen, Edwards, and de Vries 2007) or a grouping inclusive only of niche parties, which typically include the far-left, green, and far-right families (cf. Abou-Chadi 2016; Adams et al. 2006; Meguid 2005). While mainstream and nonmainstream parties’ avenues for maximizing votes differ (e.g, Adams et al. 2006; Ezrow 2008; Spoon 2011), they share the goal of shaping public policy.1

1 This is typically achieved by winning a sufficient amount of votes to enter office, but nonmainstream parties can also shape policy by influencing the policy positions of mainstream parties (e.g. Abou-Chadi 2016; Meguid 2005; Meijers 2017; but see Rooduijn, de Lange, and van der Brug 2014).

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how compulsory voting affects parties 135

6.2 Theory: Compulsory Voting’s Divergent Effects on Political Parties The distinct constituencies and policy goals that come with being inside or outside of the political mainstream shape the vote-seeking strategies parties use to try maximize support in a compelled electorate. As is clear from Sections 1.2.5 and 2.7, there is a limited amount of theoretical and empirical research on the relationship between compulsory voting and party behavior. Here, I advance a theory that considers how compulsory voting shapes parties’ vote-seeking strategies, taking into account the divergent incentives of mainstream and non-mainstream competitors. My theoretical framework, resultantly, does not require the disaggregation of mainstream and non-mainstream parties into more refined party families. Instead, the distinction between parties inside and outside of the mainstream provides a more parsimonious, yet equally powerful, explanation for understanding how parties seek votes in compulsory versus voluntary voting systems.2 Within the existent work on compulsory voting and party behavior, there is a clear expectation that compulsory voting will lead parties to focus on conversion rather than getting out the vote (e.g. Aitkin 1982, p. 253; Birch 2009, pp. 59–60; Crisp 1950, p. 89; Jackman 2001; Karp, Banducci, and Bowler 2008; Lijphart 1997). The logic here is straightforward: where individuals are procedurally incentivized to turn out, parties need not expend resources mobilizing participation. However, while a strong de-emphasis on mobilization makes sense for mainstream parties operating under compulsory voting, non-mainstream parties can still benefit from get-out-the-vote operations. Many individuals who abstain do so out of protest, even where (or because) voting is compulsory. This is evidenced by work showing that the politically alienated, disaffected, and disengaged are especially likely to invalidate their ballots under compulsory voting (cf. Cohen 2018b; Singh 2019b)— effectively abstaining without garnering a fine. Disaffected individuals who do cast valid ballots are more likely to vote for a non-mainstream than mainstream party. Indeed, a number of studies show that non-mainstream parties attract protest votes (cf. Bakker, Jolly, and Polk 2020; Birch and Dennison 2019; Cutts, Ford, and Goodwin 2011; Kselman and Niou 2011; Oesch 2008; Passarell and Tuorto 2018). Thus, non-mainstream parties stand to benefit from mobilizing turnout among the disaffected, even where voting is required, while mainstream parties have little incentive to invest resources getting out the vote. Mobilization efforts aside, all vote-seeking parties must seek to convert support from their competitors. One way of doing so is through vote buying. While the literature on the effects of compulsory voting on parties’ attempts at purchasing votes goes back over a century (e.g. Donaldson 1915; Holls 1891), Gans-Morse, 2 Similarly, Meguid (2005, p. 347, note 2) notes that the similarities between niche parties outweigh their differences when considering their behavior within the party system.

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136 beyond turnout Mazzuca, and Nichter (2014) provide an update that usefully differentiates types of vote buying (see also Nichter 2008). Parties can bribe individuals who are in opposition not to vote (“negative vote buying”3 ), they can purchase support from those likely to vote against them (“positive vote buying”4 ), or they can give money or favors to supporters who are unlikely to turn out in exchange for their participation (“turnout buying”). Gans-Morse, Mazzuca, and Nichter’s formal model predicts that negative vote buying should decrease under compulsory voting because it gives individuals added incentive to participate,5 and compulsory voting should also depress turnout buying, as individuals are already mobilized by the threat of a penalty for abstention.6 For positive vote buying, Gans-Morse, Mazzuca, and Nichter’s model alternatively predicts an upward influence of compulsory voting, in that it “increases the number of cheap vote buying targets” (p. 425)— those who do not have strong political preferences and only turn out to avoid a sanction.7 Counter to this prediction, Singh (2019a) finds a negative impact of compulsory voting on positive vote buying, but also reports patterns that weakly align with Gans-Morse, Mazzuca, and Nichter’s prediction of a downward effect of compulsory voting on negative vote buying and turnout buying. Of these three methods of purchasing votes, positive vote buying is likely the most expensive, as it requires paying people to change their preferences and the surveillance of vote choices (Nichter 2008). So, in countries where clientelistic linkages are commonplace, even if mandatory voting does increase the potential for positive vote buying, parties may turn toward other, less expensive strategies that do not involve purchasing preferences—especially if negative vote buying and turnout buying are made unviable by compulsory voting. In countries where clientelistic vote seeking is less common or absent, vote buying is unlikely to feature in parties’ toolkits, regardless of voting rules. Thus, to the extent that compulsory voting affects parties’ vote-seeking strategies beyond vote buying, it should do so in countries with or without strong clientelistic linkages between parties and voters. Here, I focus on the key non-clientelistic offer that parties can make to voters: non-contingent policy promises (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). I begin with the Downsian (Downs 1957) premise that voters prefer ideologically nearby parties, and, recognizing this, parties craft policy positions that they believe will be ideologically proximate to a sufficient number of voters to be elected. Empirical 3

Gans-Morse, Mazzuca, and Nichter (2014) call this “abstention buying.” Gans-Morse, Mazzuca, and Nichter (2014) call this “vote buying.” 5 The model of Morgan and Várdy (2012) similarly predicts that the secret ballot and compulsory voting should decrease negative vote buying in tandem. 6 The model of Gans-Morse, Mazzuca, and Nichter (2014) also predicts that compulsory voting will suppress “double persuasion,” which involves paying supporters of the opposition who are inclined to stay home to both participate and change their preferences. 7 Parties target non-policy benefits at voters who value them most in their electoral decisions (e.g. Calvo and Murillo 2019), and, as noted by Abraham (1955, p. 9), individuals who turn out against their free will are likely to feel that they “ought to be recompensed” (see Birch 2009, p. 105). 4

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how compulsory voting affects parties 137 evidence suggests that voters do prefer parties with similar ideologies (Blais et al. 2001; Lacy and Paolino 2010; Singh 2010), and Downsian behavior on the part of parties has been demonstrated by dozens of studies (e.g. Adams et al. 2004; Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009; Laver 2005). I also recognize that, when crafting their policy positions, parties can further benefit from accounting for non-policy traits, such as sociodemographic characteristics and sophistication levels, in the voting population (Ezrow, Tavits, and Homola 2014; Tavits and Potter 2015). Downs’s (1957) model, with reference to the work of Hotelling (1929) and Black (1948), leads to the median voter theorem. This states that, in two-party systems, parties will gravitate toward the median voter, who tends to sit at or near the center of ideological space. Where more than two parties are competitive, some are able to win election without moving centripetally (Calvo and Hellwig 2011; Cox 1990; Downs 1957, p. 126; Matakos, Troumpounis, and Xefteris 2016). For mainstream parties, moderation is no guarantee of electoral success, although shifts toward the center seem to attract more votes than they shed (cf. Abou-Chadi and Orlowski 2016; Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009; Ezrow 2005; Karreth, Polk, and Allen 2013). So, how might mainstream parties adjust their strategies to appeal to a compelled electorate? As discussed in Section 1.2.5, some authors (e.g. Brett 2019, pp. 178–179; Tingsten 1937, p. 183) suggest that moderates are compelled to the polls where voting is required, meaning parties will stand to gain by pitching centrist policy programs. The putative moderating impact of mandatory voting has also featured routinely in debates over the introduction of compulsory voting (Birch 2009, chp. 2; Malkopoulou 2015). Brett (2019, pp. 178–179) argues that mandatory voting in Australia induces parties to pitch policies that appeal to a wide swath of voters. Compulsory voting, she explains, “tempers the impact of passionate and committed voters” with the “votes of the moderate and indifferent,” thus leading elections to be “won and lost in the center.” This moderation argument relies on three assumptions. First, where turnout is voluntary, the “passionate and committed” are most likely to vote. Second, these voters are prone to cast ballots for extreme parties (see Birch 2009, p. 52). And third, indifferent individuals who are compelled to vote will choose moderate parties. Under these assumptions, “the logical conclusion is that mandatory electoral participation is a useful means of stemming extremism and promoting centrist outcomes” (Ibid.). In support of the first assumption, there is some evidence that intensity of partisan preference is positively correlated with voluntary participation (Campbell et al. 1960, p. 97; Sanders 2001). However, contra the second assumption, it is not necessarily the case those with intense preferences turn out to vote for extreme parties where voting is optional. In fact, under voluntary voting, ideologically extreme voters may be more likely than moderates to abstain due to indifference among equally undesirable centrist options (e.g. Brody and Page 1973; Downs 1957, pp. 39, 260–265; Lefkofridi, Giger, and Gallego 2014; Plane and Gershtenson 2004; Zipp 1985), meaning compulsory voting may actually bring to the polls

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138 beyond turnout those with fringe preferences. And, regarding the third assumption, while de Leon and Rizzi (2016) and León (2017) find some evidence from Brazil and Peru that compelled voters are more centrist, the bulk of empirical work does not support the contention that voters are more likely to select moderate options under compulsory voting (see Sections 2.5 and 2.6 and Figure 5.8). Nevertheless, for mainstream parties, pitching extreme policies as a method of attracting fringe voters could cost centrist support. Instead, broadly appealing and moderate policy programs can serve to attract some extreme voters without losing centrists’ votes.8 This is particularly true under compulsory voting. There is broad scholarly agreement that compulsory voting increases individuals’ propensity to turn out, and the preponderance of evidence suggests that this increase is larger for socioeconomically disadvantaged groups, less-educated individuals, those with less political interest and knowledge, and those who are politically distrusting (see Section 2.1). Because mandatory voting levels out disparities between the voting population and the electorate, parties will benefit from taking into account the preferences of all citizens. Bugarin and Portugal’s (2015) formal model of vote seeking under obligatory voting supports this, showing that mandatory rules induce parties to cater their policies broadly, and Guntermann, Dassonneville, and Miller (2020) show that, with regard to representation, governing parties (which tend to be mainstream) reduce their bias toward the rich under compulsory voting. Further, parties will consider how electoral rules shape non-policy traits in the electorate, which may in turn affect how they appeal for votes. For example, Karp, Banducci, and Bowler (2008, p. 95) argue that proportional representation’s upward impact on citizens’ efficacy levels increases the expected payoff of parties’ attempts to mobilize potential supporters. Under compulsory voting, parties may account for the influence of required participation on political information levels. Though empirical evidence as to the effect of compulsory voting on political sophistication (see Section 2.3 for a review), including that presented in Chapter 5, is inconclusive, mainstream party leaders are apt to operate as if it has an educative effect. Democratic political elites—who generally associate with mainstream political parties—tend to hold optimistic views of entrenched electoral institutions (Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger 1997). Indeed, records of debates over the implementation of compulsory voting demonstrate that those in power often view it as a creator of civic duty and political awareness (Brett 2019; Hughes 1968; Maldonado 2015; Malkopoulou 2011). Because the politically educated are more likely to be moderate in their voting behavior (Deary, Batty, and Gale 2008; Fernbach et al. 2013; Lubbers, Gijsberts, and Scheepers 2002; Rindermann, 8 Adopting a broadly appealing, catch-all strategy often entails a move toward the center. Though, as Somer-Topcu (2015, pp. 842–845) details, moderation is not necessary or sufficient for broad appeal, and it may also involve a party taking clear positions without taking “sides” or introducing ambiguity into its own issue positions.

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how compulsory voting affects parties 139 Flores-Mendoza, and Woodley 2012), the belief that the electorate is politically sophisticated further encourages centrism among mainstream parties. For small and niche non-mainstream parties, alternatively, policy moderation may be harmful, in that it can alienate core voters without necessarily converting support from mainstream contenders (e.g. Adams et al. 2006; Ezrow 2008; Spoon 2011; see also Gherghina and Fagan Forthcoming). And, under mandatory voting, such parties have an added centrifugal incentive: the subset of voters who are disenchanted with democracy are especially likely to be receptive to appeals from non-mainstream parties (see Figure 5.8 of Chapter 5). Further, a number of studies provide evidence suggestive of a pattern in which compelled voters choose fringe parties out of protest, whether or not they are ideological brethren (Dassonneville et al. 2019; Dassonneville, Hooghe, and Miller 2017; Hooghe and Stiers 2017; Jensen and Spoon 2011; Selb and Lachat 2009; Singh 2010, 2016). Thus, even ideologically centrist voters who turn out reluctantly to avoid a penalty may opt for an outsider party with an extreme position. The positive link between compulsory voting and the existence and strength of partisan attachments (Carreras 2016; Córdova and Rangel 2017; Dalton and Weldon 2007; de Leon and Rizzi 2016; Singh and Thornton 2013) further incentivizes non-mainstream parties to amplify extremist positions where voting is required. Voters tend to be most susceptible to messages delivered by parties with which they identify (cf. Leeper and Slothuus 2014; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Zaller 1992), and partisan identifiers tend to be relatively extreme in their ideologies and issue preferences (Abramowitz 2010; Bafumi and Shapiro 2009; Saunders and Abramowitz 2004) and more likely to hold beliefs in line with their parties’ core issue positions (Baldassarri and Gelman 2008; Lupton, Myers, and Thornton 2015, p. 377). Thus, under compulsory voting, non-mainstream parties will enjoy a particularly strong return on investment if they emphasize their outsider credentials, playing up any extreme stances for which they are known. For mainstream parties, the relative abundance of partisans under mandatory voting should be less consequential. Emphasizing their brands in an attempt to activate their identifiers would mean taking stances further from the center—a poor strategy for parties seeking to broaden their electoral appeal.

6.3 Observable Implications and Hypotheses My theory generates a number of observable implications about how parties should seek votes in compulsory, as compared to voluntary, voting systems, each conditional upon whether or not a party is of the political mainstream. First, compulsory voting, by providing a legal incentive for electoral participation, will free parties up from needing to mobilize turnout and allow them to expend

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140 beyond turnout resources on other efforts. For mainstream parties, this unambiguously suggests a de-emphasis of mobilization tactics under mandatory rules. However, any pivot away from mobilization under compulsory voting should be less pronounced for non-mainstream parties, which can benefit from inducing participation among voters who are apt to cast a vote in protest of the democratic establishment (which includes mainstream parties) when compelled to the polls. Second, compulsory voting incentivizes mainstream parties to move toward the center of ideological space in an effort to: (a) appeal more broadly to a voting population that resembles the entire electorate; and (b) to attract the votes of those who may become politically educated and centrist due to the voting requirement. For right-of-center mainstream parties, moderation entails de-emphasizing rightleaning policy stances and paying attention to some issues associated with the left. At the same time, left-of-center mainstream parties seeking to moderate must downplay typically leftward policy stances and emphasize some issues associated with the right. Observationally, this suggests that the association between mainstream parties’ ideological positions and their emphases of issues essential to their ideologies will be weaker where voting is mandatory than where it is optional. Contrariwise, compulsory voting will induce non-mainstream parties to move toward the ideological extremes in an effort to: (a) gather the support of disaffected voters, who are compelled to vote against their wishes and may opt to cast a protest vote; and (b) to reaffirm their outsider, extremist brands to their partisans. This polarization dynamic implies that right-of-center non-mainstream parties will place extra emphasis on right-wing issues where voting is mandatory, while avoiding any centrist or left-wing stances. For left-of-center non-mainstream parties, it implies extra emphasis on left-wing issues and an avoidance of any centrist or right-wing stances. Thus, for non-mainstream parties, the association between ideological positions and emphasis of issues essential to their ideologies will be stronger where voting is mandatory than where it is optional. As compulsory voting is most effectual where sanctions for abstention are steep and enforced (e.g. Birch 2009; Dassonneville, Hooghe, and Miller 2017; Panagopoulos 2008; Singh 2011, 2018a, 2019b), I expect the theorized effects to be most discernible where compulsory voting is enforced and sanctions for abstaining are strong. Taking this progressive influence of rule severity into account, the observable implications of this chapter’s theory are expressed in hypothesis form as: Hypothesis 5: Compulsory voting reduces the extent to which parties make efforts to mobilize turnout, especially if they are of the political mainstream. This will be especially apparent where rules are strictly enforced and include significant sanctions for abstention.

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how compulsory voting affects parties 141 Hypothesis 6a : Compulsory voting curtails the relationship between mainstream parties’ ideological orientations and their emphasis of policies fundamental to their ideologies, especially where rules are strictly enforced and include significant sanctions for abstention. Hypothesis 6b : Compulsory voting enhances the relationship between nonmainstream parties’ ideological orientations and their emphasis of policies fundamental to their ideologies, especially where rules are strictly enforced and include significant sanctions for abstention.

6.4 Conclusion While the amount of academic writing on mandatory voting’s effects on individuals has skyrocketed in recent years, there remain few explorations into the impact of compulsory voting on political parties (see Chapter 2). This may be because there are simply more data at the individual level than at the party level. Further, the impact of compulsory voting on individuals is more obvious and immediate, as mandatory voting laws say nothing about how parties must behave. But, theoretically, there is good reason to expect that compulsory voting affects parties. By shaping individuals’ turnout decisions and subsequent attitudes and behavior, compulsory voting changes the composition and character of the voting population. As a result, it should also affect how parties seek votes. In this chapter, I theorize about how parties might behave differently depending upon whether they are seeking votes from compelled or volunteer electorates. As in voluntary systems, parties operating under compulsory voting will consider both the traits and ideological preferences of the electorate and craft the strategies they believe will attract the most votes possible. I argue that there are systematic ways in which compulsory voting will alter this calculus for parties. Moreover, the extent to which it does so depends on whether a party is situated inside or outside of the political mainstream. From my theory, I arrive at a set of testable hypotheses. In the first portion of Chapter 7, I test the expectation of Hypothesis 5, which puts forth that compulsory voting makes it less likely that parties, in particular those of the political mainstream, will engage in get-out-the-vote efforts. In the latter portion of Chapter 7, I test the expectations of Hypotheses 6a and 6b , which state that compulsory voting shapes the extent to which parties emphasize policies fundamental to their ideologies, and that it does so in different ways for mainstream and nonmainstream parties.

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7 The Effects of Compulsory Voting on Political Parties Empirical Tests

This chapter empirically tests the hypotheses advanced in Chapter 6, which puts forth a theory that compulsory voting shapes the ways in which parties seek to maximize their electoral support. Hypothesis 5 expects compulsory voting will reduce the extent to which parties try to mobilize voter turnout, especially if they are of the political mainstream. Hypotheses 6a and 6b state that compulsory voting shapes the extent to which parties emphasize policies fundamental to their ideologies, and that it does so in different ways for mainstream and nonmainstream parties. On the one hand, mainstream parties should de-emphasize ideologically salient issues in order to moderate their stances under compulsory voting. On the other hand, non-mainstream parties should do more to highlight their fringe positions where voters are compelled to the polls. All of the hypotheses expect that the impact of compulsory voting on party behavior will be most apparent where mandatory voting laws are strictly enforced and include significant sanctions for abstention. I first test Hypothesis 5 using cross-national data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), which was also employed in Chapter 5. This initial examination is cursory, in that the questions included in the CSES are not ideal for gauging individuals’ experiences with parties’ mobilization efforts. I thus also test Hypothesis 5 using data from Argentina, where, in the wake of the country’s 2019 general election, I fielded a survey purpose-built for assessing many of this book’s predictions. As discussed in Chapter 5, Argentina provides an excellent setting for testing my expectations because, while voting is mandatory, those aged 16–17 and 70 and over are allowed to vote but not sanctioned for abstaining. I obtained precise information on survey respondents’ age in days, which allows me to use a regression discontinuity approach to estimate the causal effects of being required to vote on experiences with parties’ mobilization efforts. To test Hypotheses 6a and 6b , I gather data from the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP). The CMP gauges the emphasis parties’ place on various issues, which allows me to examine whether they downplay or accentuate ideologically salient positions in response to compulsory voting. The CMP also classifies parties into families. This provides the information necessary to differentiate mainstream and non-mainstream parties, which is critical for a complete test of the hypotheses. Beyond Turnout: How Compulsory Voting Shapes Citizens and Political Parties. Shane P. Singh, Oxford University Press. © Shane P. Singh 2021. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198832928.003.0007

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the effects of compulsory voting on political parties 143 Overall, the findings provide support for my hypotheses, though a number of estimates are imprecise or go against expectations. Regarding parties’ mobilization efforts, the results from the cursory cross-national models are consistent with a pattern through which strong compulsory voting laws lead parties to lessen getout-the-vote efforts. The results from Argentina show no overall evidence of such a pattern. They do, however, weakly suggest that ideological moderates are less likely to be mobilized when subject to mandatory rules, while individuals with extreme ideologies are more likely to be urged to the polls. This is consistent with the expectation that compulsory voting has divergent effects on mainstream and non-mainstream parties’ mobilization efforts. The results of the analyses of party platforms support the expectation that mainstream parties downplay ideologically salient issues in order to moderate their stances under enforced compulsory voting, while non-mainstream parties take more polarized positions where abstention is punishable.

7.1 A Cursory Cross-Country Test of Hypothesis 5 Hypothesis 5 of Chapter 6 posits that compulsory voting, particularly when strictly enforced and sanctioned, reduces the extent to which parties make efforts to mobilize turnout, especially if they are of the political mainstream. Existing cross-national data do not provide an opportunity to fully test this expectation. Data sources that rely on experts to measure party attributes do not include information on parties’ emphasis of voter mobilization or their get-out-the-vote efforts. Further, while a number of cross-national survey projects ask respondents whether they had recent contact with a political party or governmental actor, the originator and intent of such contact is rarely identified, and the questions do not ask respondents to identify which party they had contact with. For example, the CSES1 asks respondents whether they had contact with political parties in Modules I, II, and IV. Only in Module II does the question specify the purpose of the contact, asking whether a party or candidate contacted the respondent with the intention of courting his or her vote. The wording of the question is: “During the last campaign did a candidate or anyone from a political party contact you to persuade you to vote for them?” Thus, Module II’s contact question is clearly inappropriate for testing Hypothesis 5, which is explicitly about mobilizing citizens to the polls. The wording of the questions in Modules I and IV makes it ambiguous as to who initiated the contact and the nature of the exchange. In Module I, the wording 1 The CSES is housed at the Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan and the GESIS-Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences (http://www.cses.org/).

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144 beyond turnout of the question is: “During the past twelve months, have you had any contact with [a member of the national legislature] in any way?” In Module IV, the wording of the question is: “During the campaign, did a party or candidate contact you in person or by any other means?” The Module I and Module IV data do not identify which parties are responsible for contact, making it impossible to fully test the expectations of Hypothesis 5, which are conditional on whether or not a party is of the mainstream. They also do not identify whether or not the purpose of the contact was mobilization. Module I’s question is further restrictive, in that it only considers contact with sitting members of the legislature. With these significant deficiencies acknowledged, before moving to the within-country tests of Hypothesis 5, I proceed here with a simple bivariate exploration of the probability of party contact over the compulsory voting categories.2 In Modules I and IV, there are 18 election studies3 that include respondents subject to mandatory rules. These are Argentina in 2015; Australia in 1996; Australia in 2013; Brazil in 2014; Chile in 1999; Greece in 2012; Greece in 2015; Mexico in 1997; Mexico in 2000; Mexico in 2012; Mexico in 2015; Peru in 2000; Peru in 2001; Peru in 2016; Thailand in 2001; Thailand in 2011; and Switzerland in 1999 and 2011, where compulsory voting for national elections is used in one canton (see Table 1.1). Figure 7.1 shows that, as compared to voluntary systems, party-citizen contact is slightly higher in compulsory systems with weak or moderately strict rules, though differences are not statistically significant.4 Where compulsory voting rules have strong penalties and routine enforcement, a respondent is significantly less likely to experience contact with a politician or party, as compared to a voluntary voting setting.5 As the only country in the sample coded in the CVhigh category is Peru, this difference could be the result of other factors specific to the three Peruvian elections in the sample. The pattern in Figure 7.1 is, if indicative of anything at all, weakly suggestive of decreased mobilization efforts under strict compulsory voting, which is consistent with Hypothesis 5 as it regards mainstream parties. However, it is fully possible that this difference is muddled by differences in the wording of the party contact question across CSES modules or entirely due to factors specific to Peru and unrelated to compulsory voting. A cleaner test of this relationship is clearly needed. 2 I produce a four-part measure of the severity of compulsory rules using information from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project (Coppedge et al. 2017) (see Table 1.1). For countries not covered by V-Dem, I use my own classifications. 3 Following the rule established in Chapter 5, I excluded data from countries that fell below a 5 on the Polity IV Index (http://www.systemicpeace.org/) in the year of the survey. 4 The two-sided p-values associated with the differences, calculated with cluster-robust standard errors because election-based grouping of respondents likely introduces a violation of the assumption that observations are independently and identically distributed, are 0.799 (VV vs. CVlow ) and 0.785 (VV vs. CVmed ). 5 The two-sided p-value associated with this difference, calculated with a cluster-robust standard error, is less than 0.001.

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the effects of compulsory voting on political parties 145

Pr(Recent Contact with Candidate or Political Party)

.3

.2

.1

0 VV

CVlow

CVmed

CVhigh

Figure 7.1 Candidate and Party Contact with Voters and Compulsory Voting Rules Note: Data are from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. The vertical axis indicates the proportion of respondents who experienced any type of contact with a sitting member of the legislature (Module I) or political party or candidate (Module IV). Compulsory rules are classified using information from the Varieties of Democracy project (V-Dem). For countries not covered by V-Dem, I use my own classifications. The number of observations is 111,509.

7.2 Within-Country Test of Hypothesis 5 To more adequately test Hypothesis 5, I return to the survey I fielded in Argentina following its October 27, 2019 general election, which is described in detail in Section 5.2.2. To briefly recap, I built the survey for the purposes of this book, asking questions necessary to measure the dependent concepts in the hypotheses. I chose Argentina because, while voting is compulsory, the requirement is only enforced for those aged 18–69 (see Table 1.1). Individuals aged 16–17 and 70 and over are able to vote, but they are not sanctioned if they stay home. As discussed in Section 5.2.2, for those required to vote, abstention in the 2019 contest entailed a fine of 100 pesos (about US$1.75). Nonvoters could be barred from public employment for three years following the election, and those who neglected to pay the fine or present a valid excuse6 faced restricted access to government services for one year. With the goal of leveraging the two age cutoffs, I required that

6 These include being more than 500 kilometers from one’s polling place on election day, being ill, and a public occupation that requires one to perform tasks that preclude turning out to vote.

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146 beyond turnout Individuals Aged 16–19

Individuals Aged 67–72 .9

Pr(Contacted by Candidate or Political Party Mobilizing Turnout)

Pr(Contacted by Candidate or Political Party Mobilizing Turnout)

.9

.6

.3

.6

.3

0

0 Not Contacted

Contacted

Not Contacted

Contacted

Figure 7.2 Distribution of the Voter Mobilization Variable in the 2019 Argentina Election Survey

Netquest, the survey organization I hired to carry out the survey online, restrict their invitations to individuals aged 16–19 and 67–72. With Hypothesis 5 in mind, I included in the survey a question asking: “During the last campaign, did a candidate or anyone from a political party contact you to persuade you to participate in the election?” Figure 7.2 illustrates the distribution of this variable in both the younger and older age groups. Clearly, most respondents did not experience direct get-out-the-vote efforts, but were those subject to voluntary rules more likely to be mobilized? To assess this, I use regression discontinuity (RD) models. The continuity assumption driving my RD approach is discussed in detail and empirically investigated in Section 5.2.2. Figure 5.21 of that section further illustrates that the age thresholds in Argentina clearly affected turnout rates in the 2019 election: the

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the effects of compulsory voting on political parties 147 probability of participation jumps sharply for those just over 18 and falls sharply for those just over 70. I estimate separate RD models among the younger (16–19) and older (67–72) age groups. To implement the models, as in Section 5.2.2, I estimate linear regressions of the dichotomous voter mobilization variable on a quadratic trend7 of age in days, which is itself interacted with an indicator variable that classifies respondents as subject to or free from the requirement to vote. The estimated effect of compulsory voting is the difference in the predicted probability of experiencing mobilization for those just below and above the compulsory voting thresholds. I use a uniform kernel, meaning I give equal weight to individuals within a predetermined window of observations around the thresholds and no weight to those outside the window. To create this window, I use the data-driven procedure created by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014b) and implemented by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014a). Figure 7.3 shows the results of the RD model that leverages the age 18 threshold to examine the effects of compulsory voting on parties’ mobilization efforts. Results show that those 18 or over, and thus compelled to vote, are about 13 percentage points more likely to be contacted by a candidate or political party seeking to mobilize participation. However, as evidenced by the overlapping 84 percent confidence intervals at the cutoff, the predicted probability of being contacting by a political party mobilizing turnout is not statistically different at the 5 percent level, two-sided, for individuals free from and subject to compulsory voting.8 Figure 7.4 shows the results of the RD model that leverages the age 70 threshold. Results show that those under 70 and thereby compelled to vote are nearly 17 percentage points less likely to be contacted by a candidate or political party working to get out the vote. However, the estimated effect is again estimated imprecisely.9 Thus, the patterns in Figures 7.3 and 7.4 are in conflict; the former suggests that compulsory voting may increase parties’ mobilization efforts, while the latter suggests the opposite. Recall though that Hypothesis 5 anticipates that mainstream parties will be most likely to de-emphasize mobilization among compelled voters, as non-mainstream parties may stand to gain from inducing participation among those apt to cast a vote in protest of the democratic establishment. Because I do not have information about which parties contacted voters, I am unable to directly test this. However, under the assumption mainstream parties are unlikely to mobilize turnout among ideologically extreme voters, who should prefer similarly extreme 7

Results are similar with a linear trend. The two-sided p-value associated with the difference in the probability of being contacted for those just under and just over 18 who are very satisfied with democracy is 0.349. 9 The two-sided p-value associated with the difference in the probability of being contacted for those just under and just over 70 who are very satisfied with democracy is 0.305. 8

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148 beyond turnout

Pr(Contacted by Candidate or Political Party Mobilizing Turnout)

.9

.6

.3

0

−.3

−.6 −400

−300

−200

−100

0

100

200

300

400

Days from Age 18 on Election Day

Figure 7.3 Voter Mobilization Among Those Just Below and Above Age 18: Regression Discontinuity Results Note: Data are from an original survey of Argentina conducted from November 2019 through January 2020. The distribution of the voter mobilization variable is displayed in Figure 7.2. Predicted values are from a linear regression model that includes age in days and its square interacted with a dummy for being aged 18 or over on election day. The window of included observations is determined by the optimal bandwidth procedure of Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014b), as implemented by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014a). Shaded areas represent 84% confidence intervals, overlap in which can be used to approximately test the null hypothesis of equivalent point estimates at the 5% significance level, two-sided. The number of observations in the model is 376.

parties, I am able to shed some light on this expectation. To do so, I assess whether party mobilization efforts are stronger for those in the political center rather than on the left or right flanks. In the survey, I asked individuals to place themselves on a left-right ideological scale ranging from 0 to 10.10 I use multiplicative terms in the RD models to allow the estimated effects of the requirement to vote to differ conditional on political ideology. Since I am interested in comparing moderate respondents to ideologically extreme respondents, I “fold” the ideology measure at 5, which 10 The wording of the question is: “When talking about political issues, many people use the terms left and right. Where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means ‘left’ and 10 means ‘right’?” Figure 5.27 of Chapter 5 shows that ideology is not itself shaped by the requirement to vote.

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the effects of compulsory voting on political parties 149

Pr(Contacted by Candidate or Political Party Mobilizing Turnout)

.9

.6

.3

0

−.3

−.6 −400

−300

−200 −100 0 100 200 Days from Age 70 on Election Day

300

400

Figure 7.4 Voter Mobilization Among Those Just Below and Above Age 70: Regression Discontinuity Results Note: Data are from an original survey of Argentina conducted from November 2019 through January 2020. The distribution of the voter mobilization variable is displayed in Figure 7.2. Predicted values are from a linear regression model that includes age in days and its square interacted with a dummy for being aged 70 or over on election day. The window of included observations is determined by the optimal bandwidth procedure of Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014b), as implemented by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014a). Shaded areas represent 84% confidence intervals, overlap in which can be used to approximately test the null hypothesis of equivalent point estimates at the 5% significance level, two-sided. The number of observations in the model is 217.

represents the middle of the political spectrum. This leads to a measure in which those who place themselves in the center score the minimum of 0 and those on either the far left or far right score the maximum of 5. Results, which are depicted in Figures 7.5 and 7.6, depict the estimated effect of the requirement to vote separately for those who are centrist and those who are on the far left or right. The patterns in Figure 7.5, which display the results of the model leveraging the age 18 cutoff, do not suggest a pattern whereby the impact of compulsory voting on parties’ mobilization strategies differs for moderate and extremist voters. Regardless of personal ideology, there is no discernible effect of compulsory voting on the probability that a respondent reports being contacting by a turnoutmobilizing candidate or political party. Figure 7.6 displays the results of the model leveraging the age 70 cutoff. As is apparent from the wide confidence intervals at the threshold, the estimated impact

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150 beyond turnout Centrist Ideology

Extreme Ideology .9 Pr(Contacted by Candidate or Political Party Mobilizing Turnout)

Pr(Contacted by Candidate or Political Party Mobilizing Turnout)

.9 .6 .3 0 −.3 −.6

.6 .3 0 −.3 −.6

−400 −300 −200 −100 0 100 200 300 400 Days from Age 18 on Election Day

−400 −300 −200 −100 0 100 200 300 400 Days from Age 18 on Election Day

Figure 7.5 Voter Mobilization According to Ideology Among Those Just Below and Above Age 18: Regression Discontinuity Results Note: Data are from an original survey of Argentina conducted from November 2019 through January 2020. The distribution of the voter mobilization variable is displayed in Figure 7.2. Predicted values are from a linear regression model that includes age in days and its square interacted with a dummy for being aged 18 or over on election day and a “folded” ideology variable that takes on higher values for those further from the middle of the scale, as well as each constituent piece of the interaction. In the left-hand panel, the folded ideology variable is set to its minimum (centrists). In the right-hand panel, the folded ideology variable is set to its maximum (those at the left or right extremes). The window of included observations is determined by the optimal bandwidth procedure of Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014b), as implemented by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014a). Shaded areas represent 84% confidence intervals, overlap in which can be used to approximately test the null hypothesis of equivalent point estimates at the 5% significance level, two-sided. The number of observations in the model is 284.

of compulsory voting is imprecise, but effect sizes are large. The left-hand panel of the figure shows that, for centrist voters, being just under 70 and subject to compulsory rules lowers the likelihood that one reports being mobilized by a candidate or party by about 20 percentage points.11 It may be that mainstream parties do indeed do less to mobilize their supporters when they are already legally compelled to vote. The right-hand panel shows that, for respondents who are ideologically extreme, being compelled to vote makes it about 21 percentage points more likely that a candidate or party established contact in order to mobilize them to the polls.12 It may be that non-mainstream parties believe they can benefit from mobilizing turnout from political extremists, even where voting is required. Though the estimates contain a large amount of uncertainty, this pattern supports Hypothesis 5’s expectation that mainstream parties are less likely to mobilize 11 The two-sided p-value associated with the difference in the probability of being contacted for those just under and just over 70 who score a 0 on the folded ideology variable is 0.365. 12 The two-sided p-value associated with the difference in the probability of being contacted for those just under and just over 70 who score a 5 on the folded ideology variable is 0.674.

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the effects of compulsory voting on political parties 151 Centrist Ideology

Extreme Ideology .9 Pr(Contacted by Candidate or Political Party Mobilizing Turnout)

Pr(Contacted by Candidate or Political Party Mobilizing Turnout)

.9 .6 .3 0 −.3 −.6

.6 .3 0 −.3 −.6

−400 −300 −200 −100 0 100 200 300 400 Days from Age 70 on Election Day

−400 −300 −200 −100 0 100 200 300 400 Days from Age 70 on Election Day

Figure 7.6 Voter Mobilization According to Ideology Among Those Just Below and Above Age 70: Regression Discontinuity Results Note: Data are from an original survey of Argentina conducted from November 2019 through January 2020. The distribution of the voter mobilization variable is displayed in Figure 7.2. Predicted values are from a linear regression model that includes age in days and its square interacted with a dummy for being aged 70 or over on election day and a “folded” ideology variable that takes on higher values for those further from the middle of the scale, as well as each constituent piece of the interaction. In the left-hand panel, the folded ideology variable is set to its minimum (centrists). In the right-hand panel, the folded ideology variable is set to its maximum (those at the left or right extremes). The window of included observations is determined by the optimal bandwidth procedure of Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014b), as implemented by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014a). Shaded areas represent 84% confidence intervals, overlap in which can be used to approximately test the null hypothesis of equivalent point estimates at the 5% significance level, two-sided. The number of observations in the model is 206.

turnout when voting is required, while non-mainstream parties may still benefit from mobilizing turnout at the fringes.13

7.3 Cross-Country Tests of Hypotheses 6a and 6b The dependent concepts of Hypotheses 6a and 6b of Chapter 6 pertain to the amount of emphasis parties place on issue positions central to their ideologies. The Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP; Klingemann et al. 2006)14 is extremely useful for measuring these outcomes, as it records the percentage of statements in parties’ manifestos (their platforms or programs) 13 The two-sided p-value associated with the difference in the estimated discontinuities for those who score a 0 and those who score a 5 on the folded ideology variable is 0.502. 14 The CMP is part of Manifesto Research on Political Representation (MARPOR), which is housed at the WZB Berlin Social Science Center (https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/). In the analyses presented in this chapter, I merge the full Version 2018b and the South America Version 2018b (Krause et al. 2018; Volkens et al. 2018).

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152 beyond turnout that are attributed to various issues. It thus captures “the relative emphasis parties give to the different messages they wish to transmit to electors” (Klingemann et al. 2006, p. 116). The subject of a rigorous academic debate (cf. Benoit, Laver, and Mikhaylov 2009; Dinas and Gemenis 2010; McDonald and Budge 2014; Volkens 2007), the CMP data have been used over nearly four decades in dozens of studies, which span topics including electoral strategy, government formation, ideological dispersion in party systems, and democratic representation (see McDonald and Budge 2014, p. 67). The CMP data include hundreds of election-year party manifestos in dozens of countries. The bulk of the data are from the postwar period, though a handful of countries are included from 1920. Parties’ overall ideological orientations feature as a key independent concept in Hypotheses 6a and 6b . Helpfully, the CMP provides “a single-score summary of the overall policy position” of each included party (McDonald and Budge 2014, p. 70). This measure, called RILE, essentially gives a party’s position on a leftright ideological dimension. Though not encapsulating of all aspects of political competition and variant in meaning across countries, the left-right continuum has been shown time and again to provide a clear description of political competition and to help organize policy positions for both voters and parties (Adams 2001; Gabel and Huber 2000; Huber and Inglehart 1995). RILE is created as the percentage of a party’s manifesto dedicated to 13 issues a priori associated with the political right minus the percentage of that party’s manifesto dedicated to 13 issues a priori associated with the political left. As a result, higher values indicate a more rightward emphasis of a party’s manifesto, and the variable has a theoretical range of -100 to 100. In the sample analyzed here, RILE ranges from -52.67 to 91.89. To identify outcome variables, I searched the CMP codebooks for issues that are fundamental to parties’ ideologies but not a key component of RILE.15 I arrived at the following variables: “National Way of Life General: Positive,”16 which takes on higher values for party manifestos that favorably mention things such as patriotism, national pride, and suspension of freedoms to protect the state; “Equality: Positive,” which takes on higher values for manifestos that emphasize social justice and the need for fair treatment of all people, including special protections for 15 The CMP’s multiculturalism variables meet these criteria. However, I exclude these from the analyses presented here due to their extensive missing data for Latin America, which contains many of the countries in the analyses with compulsory voting rules. 16 The “National Way of Life General: Positive” variable forms a small piece of RILE, in that it accounts for half of the “National Way of Life: Positive” variable, which is one of the 26 components of RILE. The other half of the “National Way of Life: Positive” variable is “National Way of Life: Immigration: Negative.” For the model that includes “National Way of Life General: Positive” as the key outcome variable, I conducted an analysis in which I instead used a version of RILE that excluded “National Way of Life General: Positive.” I had to also exclude “National Way of Life: Immigration: Negative,” as, for many of the manifestos in the CMP data, it is not coded separately from “National Way of Life General: Positive,” but instead included along with it as part of “National Way of Life: Positive.” With these exclusions, results essentially become null, in contrast to what is reported below.

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the effects of compulsory voting on political parties 153

.2

.2 Density

.3

Density

.3

.1

.1

0

0 0

10 20 30 40 Emphasis of Patriotism/Nationalism (Percentage of Manifesto)

50

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20 30 40 Emphasis of Equality (Percentage of Manifesto)

50

Density

.3

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Emphasis of Environmental Protection (Percentage of Manifesto)

50

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Emphasis of Pro−Law-and-Order Position (Percentage of Manifesto)

Figure 7.7 Distributions of the Dependent Variables in the Comparative Manifestos Project

underprivileged groups and the fair distribution of resources; “Environmental Protection,” which takes on higher values for manifestos that emphasize the protection of natural resources and fighting climate change; and “Law and Order: Positive,”17 which takes on higher values for manifestos that emphasize strict law enforcement and tough-on-crime policies. Figure 7.7 shows the distributions of these four outcome variables. The key conditioning concept in my hypotheses is the mainstream status of the political party attached to a given manifesto. To create this, I rely on the families to 17 The “Law and Order: Positive” variable is, for some versions of the CMP coding rules, one of RILE’s 26 components. For the model that includes “Law and Order: Positive” as the key outcome variable, I conducted an analysis in which I instead used a version of RILE that excluded it. Results are nearly identical to those reported below.

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154 beyond turnout which the CMP assigns parties. Following extant classifications (e.g. Abou-Chadi 2016; Adams et al. 2006; Meguid 2005; Rooduijn, de Lange, and van der Brug 2014; Steenbergen, Edwards, and de Vries 2007), I consider parties classified as social democratic, liberal, Christian democratic, and conservative to be of the political mainstream. I consider those classified as ecologist or green, left or left-socialist, nationalist, agrarian, ethnic-regional, and special issue to be non-mainstream (see Section 6.1). Because my theory suggests that the divergent incentives provided to parties by compulsory voting depend not on their specific family or position on the left-right spectrum, but instead whether or not they are mainstream, I do not distinguish among non-mainstream parties by, for example, considering whether or not they might be considered “niche” competitors (cf. Adams et al. 2006; Ezrow 2008; Meguid 2005) or differentiating those of the ecological left and nationalist right. As in Chapter 5, I account for the severity of compulsory rules using information from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project (Coppedge et al. 2017). In V-Dem, the four compulsory voting categories are: • VV: Countries with voluntary voting. Party manifestos from these countries are assigned a 0. • CVlow : Countries that mandate voting but do not employ or enforce sanctions for abstention. Party manifestos from these countries are assigned a 1. • CVmed : Countries that have and enforce legal sanctions for abstention, but impose minimal costs upon abstainers. Party manifestos from these countries are assigned a 2. • CVhigh : Countries that mandate turnout and enforce sanctions, which impose considerable costs on offenders. Party manifestos from these countries are assigned a 3. For countries not covered by V-Dem, I use my own classifications, which are listed in Table 1.1.18 Unlike in Chapter 5, here I collapse the CVmed and CVhigh categories into a single group, which I call CVmed/high , due to data limitations.19 To test whether the impact of left-right ideology, as captured with RILE, on the outcome variables is conditioned by compulsory voting and party type, I estimate interactive multilevel linear regression models. These account for the clustering of party manifestos in country-years. Each model includes a three-way interaction of left-right ideology, the compulsory voting scale, and a binary variable that distinguishes mainstream and non-mainstream party families. In each 18 In Switzerland, the canton of Schaffhausen makes voting mandatory in federal elections. Because Schaffhausen comprises under 1 percent of the national population, I classify Switzerland as using voluntary voting. In Chapter 5 and Section 7.1, I am able classify cantonal voting laws separately, as the data include survey respondents clustered in cantons. 19 In the sample analyzed here, only Uruguay falls into the CVhigh category.

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the effects of compulsory voting on political parties 155 model, I allow the intercept and the coefficients on left-right ideology and the mainstream/non-mainstream dummy to vary randomly over country-years. To better isolate left-right ideology’s relationship with the outcome variables, I control for a country’s level of democratic development, which plausibly relates to both parties’ ideological proclivities and the extent to which they emphasize issues central to their ideologies. As in Chapter 5, I capture democratic development with the Polity IV Index,20 which classifies countries according to their level of free and fair electoral contestation and inclusion.21 This has a theoretical range of −10 to 10, with higher values indicating consolidated democracy. I also include an indicator variable for countries in Latin America, which, as compared to other regions in the sample, has a lower incidence of consolidated democracy and a higher proportion of countries with compulsory voting. Following the exclusion rule of Chapter 5, I drop data from countries that fell below a 5 on the Polity IV Index in the year of the election for which manifestos were coded. After also excluding observations with missing data, the models include 495 party manifestos clustered in 84 country-years, themselves clustered in 39 countries, from 1961 to 2017. Table 7.1 lists the countries and years of the observations included in the CMP sample, and it provides the classification of the voting rule in use in each country-year pairing. Figure 7.8 displays the results of each model estimated with the CMP data. In each panel, the point estimates show the relationship between left-right orientations and the expected value of the outcome variable at a given value of the compulsory voting scale for both mainstream and non-mainstream parties. For example, in the top-left panel, the outcome is the expected proportion of parties’ manifestos devoted to favorable mentions of issues such as citizenship, patriotism, nationalism, and the necessary suspension of freedoms to protect the state. Unsurprisingly, as indicated by the positive point estimates, more right-leaning parties are more likely to emphasize such ideas in their campaign documents. For example, in voluntary voting systems, the coefficient on left-right ideology for mainstream parties is about 0.13. This means that a ten-point move from left to right—or about 7 percent of the empirical range of the RILE variable—associates with, other things being equal, 1.3 percentage points more of a party’s platform being devoted to issues linked to patriotism and nationalism.

20 The Polity IV Project is housed at the Center for Systemic Peace (http://www.systemicpeace.org/). For countries not rated by Polity IV, following Persson and Tabellini (2003, pp. 75–76), I use the average of the Freedom House’s civil rights and political liberties scores to approximate the Polity IV score. The Freedom House scores are available from https://freedomhouse.org/. 21 Polity IV classifies countries with reference to Dahl’s (1971) conceptualization of democracy. For Dahl, a fully democratic country allows for contestation through the freedom of assembly, the freedom of speech, the freedom to form political parties, and free and fair elections, and it does not bar any group from inclusion in the democratic process.

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156 beyond turnout Table 7.1 Country-Year Pairings Included in the CMP Sample Country

Year Severity of Country Penalties and Enforcement

Year Severity of Country Penalties and Enforcement

Year Severity of Penalties and Enforcement

Argentina Argentina Argentina Argentina Argentina Argentina Argentina Argentina Australia Austria Austria Bolivia Bolivia Bos. & Herz. Bos. & Herz. Bos. & Herz. Bos. & Herz. Brazil Brazil Brazil Brazil Brazil Brazil Brazil Bulgaria Bulgaria Chile Chile

1989 1995 1999 2003 2007 2009 2011 2013 2016 2013 2017 2009 2014 2002 2006 2010 2014 1989 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014 2014 2017 1989 1993

1999 2005 2009 2013 2015 2016 2006 2011 2016 2017 2015 2017 2016 2017 2009 2012 2015 2014 2016 2006 2009 2013 2015 2014 2006 2010 2011 2014

2015 2014 2006 2009 2012 2016 1981 1982 2017 2014 2013 2015 2016 2016 2016 2016 2015 2016 2014 2015 1961 1965 1969 1995 2002 2017 2016 2014

Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Medium Voluntary Voluntary Medium Medium Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Voluntary Low Medium Medium

Chile Chile Chile Chile Croatia Croatia Cyprus Cyprus Cyprus Czech Rep. Estonia France Georgia Germany Greece Greece Greece Hungary Ireland Israel Israel Israel Israel Japan Latvia Latvia Latvia Latvia

Medium Low Low Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Medium Medium Medium Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Low Low Low Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary

Mexico Moldova Montenegro Montenegro Montenegro Montenegro Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands N.Z. Norway Portugal Romania Serbia Slovakia S. Korea Spain Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey Turkey Turkey Turkey Turkey U.K. U.S. Uruguay

Low Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Mixed Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Low Low Voluntary Voluntary High

Note: This table lists the countries and years of the party manifestos included in the CMP data used to test Hypotheses 6a and 6b of Chapter 6. Categorization of compulsory rule severity is from the Varieties of Democracy project (V-Dem, Coppedge et al. 2017). For countries not covered by V-Dem, I use my own classifications. In the analyses reported in this chapter, I collapse the CVmed and CVhigh categories into a single group, as the CVhigh category includes only a single country, Uruguay. Switzerland has compulsory voting in one canton (see Table 1.1).

More interestingly, as predicted by Hypothesis 6a , the relationship between leftright orientations and expected emphasis of patriotism and nationalism weakens for mainstream parties where compulsory rules are more severe. Where voting is voluntary, more rightward orientations have a positive and precisely estimated relationship with such emphases. Where compulsory rules are moderate or strong, this relationship attenuates and becomes indistinguishable from zero. This

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Effect of Left−Right Position on Expected Emphasis of Equality

Effect of Left−Right Position on Expected Emphasis of Patriotism/Nationalism

the effects of compulsory voting on political parties 157

.25

.15

.05

−.05

−.15

CVlow

.25

.15

.05

−.05

−.15

VV

CVlow

.15

.05

−.05

−.15

CVmed/high

Effect of Left−Right Position on Expected Emphasis of Pro−Law-and-Order Positions

Effect of Left−Right Position on Expected Emphasis of Environmental Protection

VV

.25

CVmed/high Mainstream Party

VV

CVlow

CVmed/high

VV

CVlow

CVmed/high

.25

.15

.05

−.05

−.15

Non−Mainstream Party

Figure 7.8 Conditional Effects of Left-Right Position on Parties’ Policy Emphases over Levels of Compulsory Voting and Mainstream/Non-Mainstream Status Note: Data are from the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP). The outcome variables measure the percentage of statements in parties’ manifestos that are attributed to each issue. The distributions of the outcome variables are displayed in Figure 7.7. Left-right position is measured using the RILE variable from the CMP, which has a theoretical range of -100 to 100 and gives a party’s overall policy position on a left-right ideological dimension, with higher values indicating a more rightward position. Mainstream status is based on the party families in the CMP: social democratic, liberal, Christian democratic, and conservative parties are coded as mainstream; ecologist, left or left-socialist, nationalist, agrarian, ethnic-regional, and special-issue parties are coded as non-mainstream. Compulsory rules are classified using information from the Varieties of Democracy project (V-Dem). For countries not covered by V-Dem, I use my own classifications. Predicted marginal effects are from multilevel linear regression models that include a three-way interaction among RILE, the compulsory voting scale, and a binary variable that distinguishes mainstream and non-mainstream party families, as well as each constituent variable and two-way interaction, with democratic development and an indicator for Latin America as controls. The constant and the coefficients on RILE and the mainstream vs. non-mainstream dummy are allowed to vary randomly across country-years, of which there are 84. Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals. The number of observations in each model is 495.

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158 beyond turnout suggests that mainstream parties of the left and right moderate their stances on patriotism and nationalism where citizens are compelled to the polls. Hypothesis 6b conversely puts forth that, for non-mainstream parties, the relationship between left-right orientations and patriotism and nationalism should strengthen. There is no evidence of this dynamic in the top-left panel of the figure, which shows only a trivially stronger relationship between left-right positions and expected emphasis of patriotism and nationalism for non-mainstream parties under compulsory voting. In the top-right panel of Figure 7.8, the outcome is parties’ predicted emphasis of social justice and fair treatment of all people. Here the patterns fit the predictions of both Hypothesis 6a and Hypothesis 6b . Where voting is discretionary, the relationship between rightward ideologies and such emphases is negative for both mainstream and non-mainstream parties. For mainstream parties, where voting is compulsory, and especially where mandatory rules have teeth, this relationship approaches zero; moderation incentives for mainstream parties mean that their left-right ideology has no discernible link with their emphases of social justice and equality where voting is mandatory. Outside of the mainstream, alternatively, polarization incentives under strong compulsory voting lead ideologically leftward parties to give extra prominence to issues of social equity, and, at the same time, ideologically rightward parties to further downplay such issues. The outcome in the bottom-left panel of Figure 7.8 is parties’ expected emphasis of environmental protection. Here, there is no support for Hypotheses 6a or 6b . The panel indicates that right-leaning parties are less likely than those of the left to emphasize environmental preservation, but the association between left-right orientations and the attention parties devote to environmental concerns in their manifestos does not vary with the voting rule. In the bottom-right panel of Figure 7.8, the outcome is parties’ expected emphasis of pro-law-and-order positions. Where voting is voluntary, the relationship between left-right ideological positions and such emphases is the same for mainstream and non-mainstream parties. For both types of parties, being more ideologically rightward associates with placing greater emphasis on pro-lawand-order positions. As predicted by Hypothesis 6a , this relationship attenuates for mainstream parties where voting is compulsory, especially where rules are enforced and include meaningful sanctions for abstention. And, as predicted by Hypothesis 6b , this relationship gains strength for non-mainstream parties where the electorate is compelled to the polls, especially where abstention will likely attract a fine. Mainstream parties move centripetally on issues of law and order under compulsory voting, seeking to moderate any ideologically triggering stances. Non-mainstream parties, for their part, move centrifugally under mandatory rules, playing up their dovish (if of the left) or hawkish (if of the right) credentials.

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the effects of compulsory voting on political parties 159 Voluntary Voting

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Figure 7.9 Emphasis of Patriotism and Nationalism over Left-Right Orientations in Voluntary and Moderate or Strict Compulsory Voting Systems for Mainstream and Non-Mainstream Parties Note: Data are from the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP). The outcome variable is the percentage of statements in parties’ manifestos that are attributed to favorable mentions of patriotism, national pride, and suspension of freedoms to protect the state. The distribution of the outcome variable is displayed in Figure 7.7. Left-right position is measured using the RILE variable from the CMP, which gives a party’s overall policy position on a left-right ideological dimension, with higher values indicating a more rightward position. Mainstream status is based on the party families in the CMP: social democratic, liberal, Christian democratic, and conservative parties are coded as mainstream; ecologist, left or left-socialist, nationalist, agrarian, ethnic-regional, and special-issue parties are coded as non-mainstream. Compulsory rules are classified using information from the Varieties of Democracy project (V-Dem). For countries not covered by V-Dem, I use my own classifications. Predicted values are from a multilevel linear regression model that includes a three-way interaction among RILE, the compulsory voting scale, and a binary variable that distinguishes mainstream and non-mainstream party families, as well as each constituent variable and two-way interaction, with democratic development and an indicator for Latin America as controls. Predictions are made with the control variables held at their means. The constant and the coefficients on RILE and the mainstream vs. non-mainstream dummy are allowed to vary randomly across country-years, of which there are 84. Shaded areas represent 84% confidence intervals, overlap in which can be used to approximately test the null hypothesis of equivalent point estimates at the 5% significance level, two-sided. The number of observations in the model is 495.

In Figures 7.9, 7.10, 7.11, and 7.12, I plot parties’ expected issue emphases according to their left-right ideological positions, whether or not they belong to the mainstream, and the voting rule under which they operate. These figures are built from the same models underlying the relationships shown in the four panels of Figure 7.8, but have on the y-axis the expected values of the dependent variables rather than the marginal effects of parties’ left-right positions. To facilitate assessments of whether the expected value of each dependent variable is statistically different across scenarios, the confidence level of the intervals shown in the figures is 84 percent. With confidence intervals of this size, it is possible to approximate a hypothesis test of a two-tailed difference between two point estimates at the

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160 beyond turnout Voluntary Voting

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Figure 7.10 Pro-Equality Emphasis over Left-Right Orientations in Voluntary and Moderate or Strict Compulsory Voting Systems for Mainstream and Non-Mainstream Parties Note: Data are from the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP). The outcome variable is the percentage of statements in parties’ manifestos that are attributed to social justice and the need for fair treatment of all people, including special protections for underprivileged groups and the fair distribution of resources. The distribution of the outcome variable is displayed in Figure 7.7. Left-right position is measured using the RILE variable from the CMP, which gives a party’s overall policy position on a left-right ideological dimension, with higher values indicating a more rightward position. Mainstream status is based on the party families in the CMP: social democratic, liberal, Christian democratic, and conservative parties are coded as mainstream; ecologist, left or left-socialist, nationalist, agrarian, ethnic-regional, and special-issue parties are coded as non-mainstream. Compulsory rules are classified using information from the Varieties of Democracy project (V-Dem). For countries not covered by V-Dem, I use my own classifications. Predicted values are from a multilevel linear regression model that includes a three-way interaction among RILE, the compulsory voting scale, and a binary variable that distinguishes mainstream and non-mainstream party families, as well as each constituent variable and two-way interaction, with democratic development and an indicator for Latin America as controls. Predictions are made with the control variables held at their means. The constant and the coefficients on RILE and the mainstream vs. non-mainstream dummy are allowed to vary randomly across country-years, of which there are 84. Shaded areas represent 84% confidence intervals, overlap in which can be used to approximately test the null hypothesis of equivalent point estimates at the 5% significance level, two-sided. The number of observations in the model is 495.

5 percent significance level. No overlap of the confidence intervals suggests one can reject the null of equivalence (see, e.g., Bolsen and Thornton 2014). To avoid clutter, I exclude the CVlow category from these graphs. Figure 7.9 plots the expected proportion of parties’ manifestos devoted to favorable mentions of issues such as citizenship, patriotism, nationalism, and the necessary suspension of freedoms to protect the state. From the left-hand panel of the figure, it is clear that such emphases are more common among more right-leaning parties where voting is voluntary, and this relationship is similar in strength for mainstream and non-mainstream competitors. Where voting is

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the effects of compulsory voting on political parties 161 CVmed/high

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Figure 7.11 Emphasis of Environmental Protection over Left-Right Orientations in Voluntary and Moderate or Strict Compulsory Voting Systems for Mainstream and Non-Mainstream Parties Note: Data are from the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP). The outcome variable is the percentage of statements in parties’ manifestos that are attributed to the protection of natural resources and fighting climate change. The distribution of the outcome variable is displayed in Figure 7.7. Left-right position is measured using the RILE variable from the CMP, which gives a party’s overall policy position on a left-right ideological dimension, with higher values indicating a more rightward position. Mainstream status is based on the party families in the CMP: social democratic, liberal, Christian democratic, and conservative parties are coded as mainstream; ecologist, left or left-socialist, nationalist, agrarian, ethnic-regional, and special-issue parties are coded as non-mainstream. Compulsory rules are classified using information from the Varieties of Democracy project (V-Dem). For countries not covered by V-Dem, I use my own classifications. Predicted values are from a multilevel linear regression model that includes a three-way interaction among RILE, the compulsory voting scale, and a binary variable that distinguishes mainstream and non-mainstream party families, as well as each constituent variable and two-way interaction, with democratic development and an indicator for Latin America as controls. Predictions are made with the control variables held at their means. The constant and the coefficients on RILE and the mainstream vs. non-mainstream dummy are allowed to vary randomly across country-years, of which there are 84. Shaded areas represent 84% confidence intervals, overlap in which can be used to approximately test the null hypothesis of equivalent point estimates at the 5% significance level, two-sided. The number of observations in the model is 495.

moderately or strongly compulsory, the left-right position of mainstream parties is a weaker predictor of appeals to patriotism and nationalism than where it is voluntary, as such parties moderate their stances where people are obliged to partake. For non-mainstream parties, alternatively, the relationship between leftright orientations and emphasis of patriotism and nationalism is similar across voluntary and compulsory systems. The result is that, when it comes to emphases of patriotism and nationalism, the gulf between mainstream parties of the left and right is comparatively small under compulsory voting.

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162 beyond turnout Voluntary Voting

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Figure 7.12 Emphasis of Pro-Law-and-Order Positions over Left-Right Orientations in Voluntary and Moderate or Strict Compulsory Voting Systems for Mainstream and Non-Mainstream Parties Note: Data are from the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP). The outcome variable is the percentage of statements in parties’ manifestos that are attributed to favorable mentions of strict law enforcement and tougher actions against crime. The distribution of the outcome variable is displayed in Figure 7.7. Left-right position is measured using the RILE variable from the CMP, which gives a party’s overall policy position on a left-right ideological dimension, with higher values indicating a more rightward position. Mainstream status is based on the party families in the CMP: social democratic, liberal, Christian democratic, and conservative parties are coded as mainstream; ecologist, left or left-socialist, nationalist, agrarian, ethnic-regional, and special-issue parties are coded as non-mainstream. Compulsory rules are classified using information from the Varieties of Democracy project (V-Dem). For countries not covered by V-Dem, I use my own classifications. Predicted values are from a multilevel linear regression model that includes a three-way interaction among RILE, the compulsory voting scale, and a binary variable that distinguishes mainstream and non-mainstream party families, as well as each constituent variable and two-way interaction, with democratic development and an indicator for Latin America as controls. Predictions are made with the control variables held at their means. The constant and the coefficients on RILE and the mainstream vs. non-mainstream dummy are allowed to vary randomly across country-years, of which there are 84. Shaded areas represent 84% confidence intervals, overlap in which can be used to approximately test the null hypothesis of equivalent point estimates at the 5% significance level, two-sided. The number of observations in the model is 495.

This moderating effect has statistical support. In the left-hand panel of Figure 7.9, the lack of overlap in the 84 percent confidence intervals indicates that the predicted emphases of patriotism and nationalism for a mainstream party of the far left, at the minimum value of the left-right variable, and a mainstream party of the far right, at the maximum value, are significantly different from one another in voluntary systems.22 In the right-hand panel, it is clear from the overlapping 84 percent confidence intervals that the analogous predicted values are not statisti-

22

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the effects of compulsory voting on political parties 163 cally different where voters are compelled to participate.23 Moderation incentives for mainstream parties in moderate and strong compulsory systems mean the emphasis of patriotism and nationalism for far-left and far-right parties are not statistically distinguishable. The outcome in Figure 7.10 is the expected proportion of parties’ manifestos devoted to the promotion of social justice and fair treatment. The left-hand panel shows that, in voluntary voting systems, the relationship between rightward ideological positions and emphasis of such issues is negative, and this link is stronger for mainstream political parties. Where voting is compulsory and penalties and enforcement are moderate or strong, the relationship between left-right positions and pro-equality emphases approaches zero for mainstream parties. While farleft and far-right mainstream parties’ predicted emphasis of equality issues are significantly different where voting is voluntary, moderation incentives make such emphases indistinguishable where voting is compulsory. Figure 7.10 provides evidence of the statistical significance of this pattern. In the left-hand panel, the lack of overlap in the 84 percent confidence intervals indicates that the predicted emphases of equality for a mainstream party of the far left, at the minimum value of the left-right variable, and a mainstream party of the far right, at the maximum value, are significantly different in voluntary systems.24 In the right-hand panel, it is clear from the overlapping 84 percent confidence intervals indicates that the analogous predicted values are not statistically different where voters are compelled to participate.25 For non-mainstream parties, the link between left-right orientations and emphasis of issues related to social justice and fair treatment strengthens under compulsory voting. For such parties, polarization incentives where voters are coerced to the polls means the gulf between left- and right-leaning competitors’ attention to equality issues increases. While predicted emphases of issues of equality are statistically different across far-left and far-right non-mainstream parties in voluntary26 and compulsory27 systems, this gulf is bigger where voting is mandatory. Specifically, the gap in the predicted percentage of statements in non-mainstream parties’ manifestos that are attributed to social justice and the need for fair treatment of all people across far-left and far-right parties in voluntary

23

The two-sided p-value associated with this difference is 0.201. The two-sided p-value associated with this difference is less than 0.001. 25 The two-sided p-value associated with this difference is 0.848. 26 In voluntary systems, the predicted emphases for a non-mainstream party of the far left, at the minimum value of the left-right variable, and a non-mainstream party of the far right, at the maximum value, are statistically different at p=0.018, two-sided. 27 In moderate and strong compulsory systems, the predicted emphases for a non-mainstream party of the far left, at the minimum value of the left-right variable, and a non-mainstream party of the far right, at the maximum value, are statistically different at p=0.062, two-sided. 24

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164 beyond turnout systems is 6.84 points; in moderate and strong compulsory systems, it is nearly twice as large, at 12.33 points. The dependent variable in Figure 7.11 is parties’ emphasis of environmental protection. As in the bottom-left panel of Figure 7.8, it is clear from Figure 7.11 that, contra expectations, compulsory voting does not condition the association between left-right orientations and parties’ attention to the environment. Regardless of the voting rule, more ideologically rightward parties are less likely to emphasize environmental protection. And, this association is slightly stronger for non-mainstream parties, again irrespective of whether a country has voluntary or compulsory voting. The outcome in Figure 7.12 is expected favorable mentions of strict law enforcement and tougher actions against crime in parties’ manifestos. In voluntary systems, there is a positive relationship between left-right ideology and such attention, and this is almost exactly the same for mainstream and non-mainstream parties. Where voting is moderately or strongly compulsory, this link weakens for mainstream parties and strengthens for those outside of the mainstream; moderation incentives lead mainstream parties of the left and right to temper their law and order positions under compulsory voting, whereas polarization incentives lead non-mainstream parties to pull away from the center on such issues. There is statistical support for these patterns. In voluntary systems, predicted emphases of pro-law-and-order positions for a mainstream party of the far left, at the minimum value of the left-right variable, and a mainstream party of the far right, at the maximum value, are significantly different.28 In moderate and strong compulsory systems, this difference is substantively much smaller and not statistically discernible from zero.29 For non-mainstream parties, predicted emphases of pro-law-and-order positions are statistically different across far-left and far-right parties regardless of the voting rule.30 However, the size of this gap is more than twice as big in moderate and strong compulsory systems, at 10.01 percentage points, than in voluntary systems, at 4.74 percentage points.

7.4 Conclusion The purpose of this chapter was to test Hypotheses 5, 6a , and 6b , which are theoretically derived in Chapter 6. In short, these argue that compulsory voting will lead political parties of the political mainstream to pivot away from 28

The two-sided p-value associated with this difference is 0.031. The two-sided p-value associated with this difference is 0.860. 30 In voluntary systems, the predicted emphases for a non-mainstream party of the far left, at the minimum value of the left-right variable, and a non-mainstream party of the far right, at the maximum value, are statistically different at p=0.021, two-sided. In moderate and strong compulsory systems, the analogous predicted emphases are statistically different at p=0.028, two-sided. 29

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the effects of compulsory voting on political parties 165 mobilization efforts and to moderate their ideological positions. Non-mainstream parties, alternatively, are expected to continue mobilizing the vote and to gravitate toward the ideological poles. To test the hypotheses, I use a large amount of individual- and party-level data. Most of the tests leverage variation in countries’ use of voluntary and compulsory voting—and the degree to which compulsory voting is enforced—though I also employ a purpose-built study of Argentina that leverages age cutoffs in its application of compulsory voting. Hypothesis 5 expects that compulsory voting reduces the extent to which parties make efforts to mobilize turnout, particularly if they are of the political mainstream, and especially where compulsory rules are strongly enforced and penalties are significant. In a cursory cross-national analysis presented in Section 7.1, I find that voters are less likely to report contact with political parties in Peru than in other countries. As Peru has a strict compulsory voting regime, this is consistent with Hypothesis 5. However, the nature of the party contact is not defined in the data used in the analysis, and the findings could be driven by other factors specific to Peru. In Section 7.2, I use more appropriate analyses that leverage age cutoffs in the application of compulsory voting in Argentina and make use of a question that specifically asks voters whether parties contacted them in an effort to get them to the polls. Results provide no evidence that parties, on average, were less likely to make such pitches to those subject to compulsory rules. There is some evidence that compulsory voting does more to suppress the mobilization of centrist voters, in particular, which accords with the idea that mainstream parties are especially likely to decrease get-out-the-vote efforts under compulsory rules. Yet, this evidence is weak, and it may be the case that neither mainstream nor nonmainstream parties alter their get-out-the-vote efforts in response to compulsory voting, which evidences against Hypothesis 5. Of course, such a non-finding could be specific to Argentina: the effects estimated in regression discontinuity analyses are not externally valid beyond the cutoff points (Cattaneo, Idrobo, and Titiunik 2019), let alone in other countries. Nevertheless, some earlier studies also fail to find negative a link between compulsory voting and the ways in which parties campaign (see Section 2.7), despite much academic and popular speculation that such a relationship exists (see Section 1.2.5). The widely believed pattern by which parties do less to mobilize turnout and focus more on conversion under compulsory voting, although very plausible in theory, has little empirical support. Hypothesis 6a expects that the relationship between mainstream parties’ core left-right ideologies and their emphasis of issues essential to their ideologies will be weaker where voting is mandatory than where it is optional. This is stems from the theoretical prediction that such parties will moderate their ideological positions under compulsory voting. Hypothesis 6b conversely puts forth that, for

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166 beyond turnout non-mainstream parties, the relationship between core ideologies and ideologically salient issue emphasis will be stronger under compulsory rules. This is consistent with the theoretical prediction that parties outside of the mainstream will ideologically polarize under compulsory voting. Results of cross-country models that analyze parties’ emphasis of issues in their manifestos vis-à-vis compulsory voting, in general, provide support for these hypotheses. Other things being equal, mainstream parties are relatively concentrated around the center with regard to their emphasis of ideologically salient issues where voting is compulsory, whereas non-mainstream parties are comparatively polarized. In sum, compulsory voting seems to shape the behavior of political parties when it comes to the ways in which they emphasize ideologically salient issues. But there remains work to be done on the causal direction of this relationship. There is no strong evidence of a historical process through which countries with political parties with certain traits are systematically more likely to adopt compulsory voting (see Section 1.3). Still, it is possible that compulsory voting is endogenous to parties’ strategies. After all, political parties, or at least the powerful political actors they house, have the ability to change institutional rules. If political parties see through the implementation of a requirement to vote for reasons that are systematically related to their vote-seeking strategies, the cross-national findings presented here could be confounded. I consider how future research might engage with this possibility in Section 8.2 of the next, concluding, chapter.

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8 Conclusion Compulsory voting is both philosophically and practically interesting. Normative theorists can and have battled about whether a liberal democratic government should force participation in its elections (see Section 1.2). On the applied side, democracies need to actually decide whether or not to make voting compulsory. Upwards of 25 have decided to do so at present (see Table 1.1), and active debates over the adoption and abolition of compulsory voting are taking place around the world (see Section 1.5). Scientific research has taken a corresponding interest in mandatory voting, and inquiries into its consequences, both immediate and postliminary, are growing rapidly. Still, there are few published projects devoted to an in-depth analysis of the impact of compulsory voting. I embarked on this book with three goals in mind: to provide a thorough review of what we know about the use of compulsory voting and its consequences; to advance a theory that connects compulsory voting to democratic citizens and, subsequently, to political parties; and to conduct careful, thorough empirical tests of the hypotheses derived from my theory. In the remainder of this concluding chapter, I summarize what precedes it. I then discuss the implications of this book for academic research and for policymakers and electoral reformers. I also provide an overview of alternate ways of increasing turnout, each of which may have fewer downstream consequences than compulsory voting. I wrap up by considering the looming question of whether voting should be obligatory.

8.1 A Review of this Book I open this book by addressing the need for a new full-length manuscript on compulsory voting and discussing the meaning of the term, which is disputed. With that out of the way, I review arguments for and against the requirement to vote, focusing mostly on matters of duty, collective action, legitimacy, representation, and the putative downstream consequences of compulsory voting. I subsequently briefly review the history of compulsory voting and the potential reasons for its implementation. I then provide data on where and how compulsory voting is used today and give a detailed overview of recent events surrounding compulsory voting throughout the world. From there, I discuss various empirical

Beyond Turnout: How Compulsory Voting Shapes Citizens and Political Parties. Shane P. Singh, Oxford University Press. © Shane P. Singh 2021. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198832928.003.0008

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168 beyond turnout methods available to the scientific community for assessing the effects of the legal requirement to vote. In Chapter 2, I review the growing literature on compulsory voting, most of which concerns its myriad secondary and tertiary consequences. Chapter 2 makes it clear that the compulsory voting research industry is in rude health—a stark contrast from the state of affairs just a few years ago when I set out to write this book. That said, there remains work to be done, as I discuss in Section 8.2 of this chapter. In Chapter 3, I first develop an expectation that individuals with negative orientations toward democracy are less likely to support compulsory voting. With reference to existing theory about the psychological, attitudinal, and behavioral effects of coercion, I then put forth expectations about how compulsory voting will amplify the relationships between orientations toward democracy and support for political authorities, support for outsider or extremist parties, and political sophistication. I argue that negative orientations are more likely to be predictive of “antidemocratic” attitudes and behaviors, as well as a lack of political sophistication, where reluctant individuals are compelled to vote. At the same time, I expect that pro-democratic orientations are more likely to boost attitudinal and behavioral support for the democratic system and its authorities, as well as to engender higher political sophistication, under mandatory rules. In Chapter 4, I empirically test the relationship between orientations toward democracy and support for compulsory voting. In doing so, I make use of a range of public opinion surveys which ask about attitudes toward compulsory voting. Results demonstrate variation in the average level of support for compulsory voting across countries. They are also indicative of a systematic, negative effect of dissatisfaction with democracy, which I use to capture orientations toward democracy, on support for compulsory voting within countries. This effect can be discerned even with controls for political interest, ideology, and a slate of demographic variables. This supports the uncomplicated but foundational expectation of the theory in Chapter 3: that those who are democratically disenchanted are also unsupportive of mandatory voting. In Chapter 5, I test the expectation that the effects of orientations toward democracy on political attitudes, behavior, and sophistication are moderated by compulsory voting. I first employ cross-national survey data from the AmericasBarometer and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). Results from multilevel regression models estimated using these data provide some support for my expectations. First, I find that compulsory voting, especially when strictly applied, boosts the negative relationship between dissatisfaction with democracy and political interest and understanding of political issues, which I use to capture political sophistication. Unexpectedly, however, I find no evidence that compulsory voting shapes the link between dissatisfaction and individuals’ ability

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conclusion 169 to correctly place political parties on an ideological scale, which I also use to gauge sophistication. I do find that, in line with expectations, routinely enforced penalties for abstention boost the extent to which dissatisfaction with democracy predicts extreme vote choices, with the least satisfied being most likely to choose fringe parties where abstention is sanctioned. Finally, counter to my expectations, I find no evidence that compulsory voting shapes the link between democratic orientations and support for authorities. In the second portion of Chapter 5, I use data from the Swiss Election Study (Selects) and novel survey data from Argentina to further probe the cross-national patterns found in the AmericasBarometer and the CSES. My analyses of these data leverage the plausibly exogenous, age-based thresholds in the application of compulsory voting in the canton of Schaffhausen, Switzerland and Argentina (see Table 1.1). Results of models estimated with the Selects data show that, as expected, being required to vote amplifies the negative relationship between dissatisfaction with democracy and support for authorities. As anticipated, a requirement to vote also increases the probability that dissatisfied individuals will vote for extreme political parties, and it intensifies the negative link between dissatisfaction and political interest. Yet, contra expectations, I do not find evidence that obligatory voting leads dissatisfied individuals to make more mistakes when assessing political parties’ ideological positions. The data from Argentina show that, as expected, compulsory voting may exacerbate the negative link between dissatisfaction with democracy and support for political authorities. Yet, going against my expectations, I find no evidence that compulsory voting heightens the negative link between dissatisfaction and political interest. In Chapter 6, I lay out my theoretical expectations about the impact of compulsory voting on the ways in which political parties seek votes. I argue that compulsory voting’s influence on vote seeking depends on whether parties are situated inside or outside of the political mainstream. Many previous authors argue that compulsory voting will lead parties to expend less effort mobilizing citizens to vote. Building on this, I put forth that parties’ de-emphasis of getout-the-vote tactics under mandatory rules will be stronger if they belong to the political mainstream. Outsider parties, alternatively, may actually ramp up mobilization efforts under compulsory voting in order to capture the votes of disaffected individuals who would stay home if left to their own devices. I then develop expectations about mandatory voting’s influence on the ways in which parties position themselves in ideological space to attract support. I hypothesize that compulsory voting incentivizes mainstream parties to move toward the center of ideological space in an effort to appeal to voting populations that are broadly reflective of society as a whole. For non-mainstream parties, alternatively, I expect that mandatory voting incentivizes vote seeking at the extremes in order to appeal to those who are cajoled to the voting booth against their will.

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170 beyond turnout In Chapter 7, I test my expectations about compulsory voting’s effects on political parties. Analyses shown in the first part of the chapter leverage the CSES data and my original survey data from Argentina. The results from the models estimated with the CSES data are somewhat perfunctory given that the available survey questions are not fully suitable for gauging get-out-the-vote efforts. However, they are consistent with a pattern by which parties expend less effort mobilizing turnout under strict obligatory voting. The analyses of the Argentinian data provide little evidence that parties, on average, target their mobilization efforts at those for whom voting is voluntary. I do, however, find limited evidence that ideological moderates are less likely to be mobilized when subject to mandatory rules, while individuals with extreme ideologies are more likely to be urged to turn out. This is consistent with the expectation that mainstream parties become less likely to try and get out the vote when turning out is required, while nonmainstream parties will instead enhance their mobilization efforts. In the latter portion of Chapter 7, I present analyses of data from the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP). The CMP measures the percentage of parties’ manifestos that are devoted to various political issues. I focus on parties’ stresses on issues related to patriotism and nationalism, equality, environmental protection, and law and order. Emphasis of these issues are unsurprisingly related to a party’s general left-right ideological orientation, but these correlations are dependent on party type and compulsory voting. For parties of the mainstream, as anticipated, I find that left-right orientations are more weakly related to issue emphasis where voting is compulsory, especially where abstention is meaningfully and reliably penalized. This indicates that mainstream parties de-emphasize ideologically salient issues in order to moderate their stances under enforced compulsory voting. For non-mainstream parties, I find some evidence that, as predicted, left-right orientations are more strongly correlated with emphasis of ideologically salient issues where compulsory voting is strict. This is reflective of a pattern whereby non-mainstream parties take more extreme positions where voters are compelled to the polls. In a nutshell, my findings are indicative of three empirical patterns. First, support for compulsory voting where it is used is not pervasive, and those who are negatively inclined toward electoral democracy are least supportive. Second, compulsory voting tends to amplify the consequences of orientations toward democracy for political attitudes, behavior, and sophistication, which opens up a gulf in the beliefs and conduct of those who are disaffected and contented with democracy. Third, conditional on their inclusion in the political mainstream, parties tend to emphasize issues in different ways when seeking votes from compelled and voluntary electorates. I next discuss the implications of these findings for researchers, policymakers, and those pushing electoral reform.

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conclusion 171

8.2 Future Directions for Academic Research Academic research on compulsory voting has exploded in the past decade (see Chapter 2 for a thorough review). Much of this has been driven by the increased focus on causal identification in political science; because compulsory voting laws often include plausibly exogenous age-based eligibility thresholds (see Table 1.1), there are abundant opportunities to credibly identify the consequences of the requirement to vote within countries. Not all new compulsory voting research is dependent upon age thresholds, however. Dozens of recent studies use traditional designs that compare places with and without compulsory voting, leverage counterfactual survey questions about intended behavior if there were no obligation to vote, exploit changes to compulsory voting laws, or employ controlled experimental designs. While the compulsory voting literature is no longer small, it is somewhat scattershot. The literature has shed much light on the myriad factors affected by the requirement to vote, but it has generally failed to consider more complex or indirect causal pathways. Having been given the luxury of space not available in an academic journal article, in this book I have taken a more holistic approach, theoretically connecting compulsory voting to voter behavior and attitudes and, subsequently, parties’ vote-seeking efforts. The theory suggests a process whereby compulsory voting polarizes behavior and attitudes, and broadens gaps in sophistication levels, among those with negative and positive orientations toward democracy. It thereby incentivizes mainstream political parties to moderate and smaller parties to move centrifugally. The empirical tests, which employ a wealth of cross-national and intra-country data, are generally supportive of this dynamic. However, many of the empirical results are imprecisely estimated, meaning they fail to achieve conventional levels of statistical significance. Subsequent research may help clarify which, if any, of my “near statistically significant” findings are indeed the result of chance. This book also leaves openings for future work on compulsory voting’s impact on political parties. Party-level research makes up an exceedingly small portion of the burgeoning literature on mandatory voting’s downstream consequences. While I have advanced and tested new theory about compulsory voting’s effects on parties, work remains to be done. First, I used cross-national regression models to examine whether compulsory voting affects party strategies. Subsequent studies should leverage intertemporal data on party behavior within a single country that changed to or from compulsory voting, perhaps by employing difference-in-differences or synthetic control designs. These methods would help guard against confounding from an endogenous process in which powerful parties that are prone to particular behaviors see

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172 beyond turnout through the implementation of compulsory voting. They could thus lend some causal backing to the relationships I uncovered in the cross-national comparisons. Future research on compulsory voting’s impact on parties might also shed light on the puzzle of why the widely believed pattern by which parties do less to mobilize turnout and focus more on conversion under compulsory voting, although very plausible in theory, has little empirical support. Neither my results (see Sections 7.1 and 7.2) nor those reported in previous work (see Section 2.7) find solid evidence of a negative link between compulsory voting and parties’ getout-the-vote efforts. Is it the case that parties actually continue to mobilize turnout under compulsory voting, or are the empirical models that have been used to test this relationship faulty? Later studies might also consider how electoral systems shape the impact of compulsory voting on political parties. For example, one might expect that its influence on non-mainstream parties will be relatively weak in countries with majoritarian electoral systems. There, smaller parties’ ability to convert votes into seats is handicapped, meaning adjusting their strategies in search of support from compelled electorates will have a relatively low payoff. Alternatively, under proportional electoral systems, which are permissive to small party entry, nonmainstream parties may stand to benefit substantially from tweaks to their voteseeking efforts. The analyses in this book could not meaningfully assess the influence of electoral systems, as the within-country models contain individuals subject to the same system, and nearly all of the countries in the cross-national models with compulsory voting also have proportional electoral systems. The consequences of compulsory voting for the economy also remain opaque. As discussed in Section 2.8, there are relatively few studies of the link between compulsory voting and economic outcomes, and the findings of the limited research on this relationship are inconsistent. Recent studies have begun using intertemporal analyses that leverage electoral reforms to help identify the economic consequences of compulsory voting, and more work in this vein would help resolve these divergent findings. Future research should also consider whether compulsory voting affects the integrity of elections. Political leaders in favor of compulsory voting have argued that it would help to enhance the overall integrity of elections by lessening vote buying (see Section 1.2.5). Compulsory voting has also been linked to vote buying in academic writings, and the limited empirical evidence on this relationship finds it to be negative (see Sections 1.2.5, 2.7, and 6.2). Future research should further assess whether compelled voters are more or less likely to be offered gifts or favors in exchange for their votes (or abstention). Compulsory voting could lessen other forms of clientelistic vote seeking by encouraging parties to pivot toward programmatic strategies (see Section 2.7). Such a rebalancing could enhance electoral integrity. Indeed, for Birch (2011,

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conclusion 173 pp. 13, 94) clientelism is conjoined with electoral malpractice. Clientelistic linkages upset the “playing field” by helping incumbents monopolize resources, thus outspending opponents and cornering media coverage, and by allowing them to influence election officials (Levitsky and Way 2010). Currently, there exists almost no work on the link between compulsory voting and broader measures of electoral integrity. Only Birch (2009, pp. 107–108) has assessed this link, finding that compulsory voting does not affect the likelihood that a country is rated as having a clean electoral process by Freedom House. Subsequent work should build on Birch’s investigation. Finally, this book has not theorized about or examined the origins of compulsory voting. As discussed in Section 1.3, countries that mandate turnout have arrived at compulsory voting through varied paths, and it is not clear that there are systematic reasons for its adoption. In some countries, it was likely implemented by ruling parties in an attempt to enhance their positions over rivals, though compulsory voting has also come about due to colonial ties, traditions, spatial diffusion, the efforts of authoritarian regimes seeking to signal legitimacy, and broader democratic reforms. However, if the historical pathways that lead to compulsory voting do in fact shape the outcomes it is thought to give rise to, this would confound the findings of extant comparative research that does not adequately control for such processes. I know of only a single published article that systematically investigates the origins of compulsory voting across countries, and it is nearly 30 years old (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1993).1 As many electoral laws and systems are known to be endogenously determined (e.g. Ahmed 2013; Colomer 2005; Rahat 2011; Renwick 2010), this leaves a large and important gap in the compulsory voting literature.

8.3 Implications for Policymakers and Reformers Academic research on compulsory voting matters for the real world. As discussed in Section 1.5, active debate about compulsory voting is ongoing in dozens of countries, many of which have adopted or abolished compulsory voting in recent years. While high-level deliberations over compulsory voting rarely reference academic findings, there are some welcome exceptions. In Canada, a Special Committee on Electoral Reform studied compulsory voting and other electoral reforms following a campaign promise made by the Liberal party during its victorious 2015

1 As reviewed in Section 1.3, there are plenty of academic accounts of the adoption of compulsory voting within single countries or regions, but none of these advance and cliometrically test a theory of mandatory voting’s origins. Helmke and Meguid (2008) do rigorously test a theory of compulsory voting’s strategic adoption, but their project remains unpublished.

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174 beyond turnout election campaign. The committee issued a detailed report on compulsory voting, which included interviews with high-profile scholars of elections and voting (see Section 1.5). In India, a 2015 report on electoral reforms by the Law Commission included several citations of academic research on compulsory voting (see Section 1.2.1). Still, neither Canada nor India changed its voting rules, and it remains unclear whether the authors of recent legislation adopting or abolishing compulsory voting have heeded or even consulted the results of scientific research. The findings of this book have implications that such reformers would do well to bear in mind. First, Chapter 4 shows that compulsory voting tends to be unpopular when it is used in less-developed countries, and throughout countries that mandate turnout, the requirement to participate is shunned by those who are dissatisfied with democracy. As also discussed in Chapter 4, public support for mandatory voting varies extensively across countries with voluntary voting, ranging from strong support in France to strong antipathy in the United States. Reformers interested in following public opinion may wish to avoid abrogating voting rules that the public supports or adopting those toward which it is disdainful. That said, buoyant attitudes toward compulsory voting may, like the denizens of the Field of Dreams, only surface once proper infrastructure is built. The relatively strong levels of support for compulsory voting in Australia, where it has been used continuously in federal elections for nearly 100 years, are consistent with such a process. Reformers and politicians interesting in boosting turnout with compulsory voting should also think about its downstream effects. The findings of this book and prior academic research show that compulsory voting does reliably increase turnout. This makes it an attractive tool. Yet, it is also a blunt tool, and it thus has a number of consequences beyond turnout, most of which seem undesirable. As demonstrated in Chapter 5, mandatory voting seems to increase extremist voting and can decrease support for authorities among those who are dissatisfied with democracy, and there is little evidence that such individuals become more politically engaged or sophisticated when compelled to the polls. Because the effects of compulsory voting uncovered in Chapter 5 are conditional on democratic satisfaction, compulsory voting can open up attitudinal and behavioral gaps between those positively and negatively oriented toward the democratic system. Such deconsolidation could further populist resentment among the disaffected, and it could heighten disdain for such agitators among the contented. On the supply side, as shown in Chapter 7, compulsory voting may encourage extremism among minor and peripheral political parties. Ideological polarization among these parties could intensify the voices of antiestablishment, populist outfits and those with xenophobic or dirigiste platforms antithetical to liberal democracy. For those interested in boosting turnout, such side effects may make it unattractive. There are a number of alternative policies that are often thought to increase

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conclusion 175 turnout, which I review next. While none are proven to be as effective as compulsory voting, each likely comes with fewer secondary and tertiary outgrowths than a legal requirement to participate.

8.3.1 Making it Easier to Register to Vote Researchers have long postulated that easing voter registration requirements should help increase turnout (e.g. Campbell et al. 1960, chp. 5; Merriam and Gosnell 1924; Tingsten 1937). The reasons for this putative link are spelled out clearly by Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980), who write that registering to vote “lacks the immediate gratification” associated with casting a vote, generally requires a longer commute and a more complicated procedure, and normally must take place “before interest in the campaign has reached its peak” (p. 61). Empirical research from the United States is largely supportive of a relationship between onerous voter registration laws and lower participation rates. Larger time windows within which individuals can register (Mitchell and Wlezien 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980), a greater amount of time before nonvoters are purged from the rolls (Mitchell and Wlezien 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980), more opportunities for registration (Highton and Wolfinger 1998; Knack 1995; but see Hanmer 2009, chp. 4), and the outright abolition of voter registration requirements (Ansolabehere and Konisky 2006; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993) are all associated with higher turnout. Allowing voters to register on the day of the election, which essentially combines the acts of registration and voting, is also positively linked to turnout (Brians and Grofman 2001; Burden et al. 2014; Fenster 1994; Leighley and Nagler 2013, chp. 4; but see Hanmer 2009, chp. 3). The effect of election day registration was particularly strong in states that were early adopters, likely because their implementations came before other registrationeasing reforms (Xu 2017). These empirical findings are all based on data from the United States, which is extremely rare among rich democracies in putting the onus of registration on the voter (rather than the government). Indeed, Powell (1986) concludes that comparatively low turnout in the United States is in large part due to its registration laws. Though, disincentives for participation stemming from voter registration requirements are likely not unique to the United States. In France, another unusual example of a developed democracy in which registration is selfinitiated, Braconnier, Dormagen, and Pons (2017) report experimental evidence that suggests easing registration requirements would increase turnout.2 2 In Chile, turnout dropped sharply after a 2012 electoral reform simultaneously abolished compulsory voting and implemented automatic registration (Barnes and Rangel 2014, 2018; Brieba

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176 beyond turnout

8.3.2 Making it Easier to Vote Even for those registered to the electoral roll, costs associated with voting can disincentivize participation. First, expenses associated with transportation to the polls dissuade turnout. Individuals whose closest polling place is far away are less likely to show up to vote than those with nearby voting locations (Brady and McNulty 2011; Dyck and Gimpel 2005; Gimpel and Schuknecht 2003; Haspel and Knotts 2005; McNulty, Dowling, and Ariotti 2009), especially when physical distance presents a particularly onerous barrier (Kudrnáč Forthcoming). Thus, boosting the number of polling places or moving them closer to population centers would increase participation, as would increasing or adjusting the hours during which polling places are open (Garmann 2017; Potrafke and Roesel 2020; Schafer and Holbein 2020; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). Scheduling elections to fall on weekends or holidays, which reduces costs associated with missing work or school, may also increase turnout, though findings on the impact of weekend and holiday voting are mixed, and studies that do find evidence of a positive influence report weak effect sizes (cf. Dubois 2012; Franklin 2002; Quinlan 2015). Strict voter identification requirements, which create a barrier to obtaining a ballot once at the polling place, are often thought to decrease turnout. However, empirical research on the effects of voter identification on participation arrives at inconsistent findings, and studies that do find evidence of a negative influence tend to uncover only small effects (Highton 2017). There is also only limited evidence that voter identification laws exacerbate differences in turnout across racial and ethnic groups (Ibid., pp. 163–164; also see the exchange between Grimmer et al. 2018 and Hajnal, Kuk, and Lajevardi 2018). Participation levels do tend to be higher where elections are conducted entirely by mail (Barber and Holbein 2020; Karp and Banducci 2000; Magleby 1987; Norris 2004b; Southwell and Burchett 2000; but see Kousser and Mullin 2007). However, in general, reforms that allow voters to cast a ballot before election day, whether in person or by mail, do not seem to raise turnout (cf. Burden et al. 2014; Fitzgerald 2005; Gronke, Galanes-Rosenbaum, and Miller 2007; Primo, Jacobsmeier, and Milyo 2007). Elections conducted entirely online—remote electronic voting—may also attract more participants. Here again, however, evidence of a positive effect on turnout is limited (cf. Germann and Serdült 2017; Goodman and Stokes 2020; Norris 2004b). This may be because mail voting is often a preexisting option at the time remote electronic voting is introduced.

and Bunker 2019). This suggests that compulsory voting, which was enforced in Chile, had a sharper upward impact on turnout than that spurred by automatic registration. See Section 1.5 for more discussion of Chile’s electoral reform.

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conclusion 177

8.3.3 Rewards for Voting Because compensation for participation offsets the costs associated with turning out voting, rewards effectively increase turnout. For example, Panagopoulos (2013) randomly assigned citizens to receive $2, $10, or $25 rewards for voting in municipal elections in two California cities, and found that the $2 inducement consistently failed to raise turnout in elections, but both the $10 and $25 incentives were generally effective in boosting participation. In another controlled study, Addonizio, Green, and Glaser (2007) randomly assigned a set of communities to receive election festivals, which featured music and free food, and found them to increase turnout by 6.5 percentage points. This suggests that even minor incentives may be able to significantly increase turnout. There is precedent for the official use of voting rewards, though it is limited. Bulgaria used a lottery to incentivize turnout in its 2005 parliamentary elections,3 as did a municipality in Norway in 1995. Both were subsequently abandoned. In Colombia, voting brings a number of rewards, such as reduced tuition at public universities (Maldonado 2015, pp. 101, 108, 140), priority entrance into universities in the case of tie scores on entrance exams, a one- or two-month reduction in the duration of conscripted military service, and a discount on passport services. In the U.S. state of Arizona, an unsuccessful 2006 ballot initiative would have created a $1-million lottery with automatic entry for those voting in the primary and general elections (Duffy and Matros 2014, p. 967; Panagopoulos 2013, p. 266). In Alaska, a remote borough offered voters gasoline reimbursement in a 1994 election. In Illinois, a lawmaker proposed a $25 tax credit for voting in 2019. In Israel, the chairman of the Yisrael Beiteinu party used a compulsory voting bill as a bargaining chip for its entry in any governing coalition formed after the September 2019 election and later suggested that citizens be given a free day off of work for voting rather than penalized for abstention (see Section 1.5). There are also cases of nongovernmental actors incentivizing turnout. In 2015, nonprofit groups in Philadelphia and Los Angeles offered prizes of $10,000 and $25,000, respectively, for participation in local elections. Like coercion with sanctions, rewards can lessen internal motivation (see Section 3.1). Yet, as noted by Tucker and Duell (2018, p. 438, note 13), while sanctions for abstention and rewards for participation are equivalent in that both leave those who turn out better off financially, inducements to participate may be less impactful than compulsory voting because people dislike losses more than they value equivalent gains (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Thus, it is possible that the positive consequences of incentivized voting might also come about with the

3

See Section 1.5 for a discussion of Bulgaria’s ensuing adoption of compulsory voting.

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178 beyond turnout use of rewards for turnout, albeit less dramatically than in the case of sanctioned abstention, while any undesirable effects could be mitigated or eliminated. Still, the legality of voting lotteries and other systems of rewards for turnout is contentious. In the United States, federal law prohibits payments for turnout, as do most state electoral codes (Hasen 2000, p. 1326). Further, if turnout rewards or lotteries are considered to be a form of vote buying, they will run afoul of the law in most countries.

8.4 Should Voting Be Compulsory? As I was writing this book, I gave several presentations on its contents in various stages of completion. During the question and answer portion of these presentations, I received plenty of useful feedback (see the Acknowledgments in the front matter). I was also routinely asked a version of the question, “So, do you think voting should be mandatory?” My answer to this query never quite satisfied the questioner. This is because I don’t think it’s my role to make such a recommendation. Instead, I see my job as crafting and carefully empirically interrogating theoretical predictions about how compulsory voting might impact citizens, parties, and democratic processes. In fact, I don’t know whether voting should be legally required. For many people in voluntary systems, voting is not privately rational, and these individuals would be better off doing something else on election day. Should governments make voting a rational decision for more people by sanctioning abstention and thereby effectively decreasing the costs of turning out? As Birch (2018, p. 24) puts it, “if ‘the people’ benefit from mandatory electoral participation, then it is an institution beneficial to democracy, provided it does not unduly impinge on individual rights.” The justifiability of compulsory voting thus hinges on whether compelling citizens to the voting booth has societal benefits that outweigh its infringements on democratic liberties. If the benefits for society are great, the case for compulsory voting is easier to make. Many argue that robust voter turnout alone justifies a legal requirement to vote and any violation of individual freedom it may entail. Perhaps this is true, but, as this book has shown, compulsory voting also has effects beyond turnout. A careful weighing of compulsory voting’s costs and benefits requires a familiarity with these downstream consequences. Anyone arguing for or against a requirement to vote would thus benefit from digesting the burgeoning body of academic research on compulsory voting’s secondary and tertiary effects. Policymakers and reformers in positions of power would also do well to consult this literature. One place to start might be this book.

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Index age, see compulsory voting and age age-based cutoffs, see compulsory voting, exemptions from law Alaska rewards for voting in 177 Algeria recent events pertaining to compulsory voting in 28 AmericasBarometer 23 fn.36, 35–36, 71–76, 81 fn.1, 80–99, 168, 169 ANUPoll 69–76 Aquinas, St. Thomas 5 Argentina compulsory voting in 20 fn.28, 19–21, 23, 36–37, 42–43, 80–81, 119–132, 142–143, 145–151, 165, 169–170 Aristotle 16 Arizona rewards for voting in 177 attitudes, see compulsory voting and political attitudes Australia adoption of compulsory voting in 18, 42–43, 53 compulsory voting in 2–3, 15 fn.18, 15 fn.19, 19–20, 32 fn.45, 44, 47–48, 50–51, 53–55, 133 compulsory voting in Queensland 20, 21 fn.32, 43 compulsory voting in South Australia 4 fn.8, 20 compulsory voting in Western Australia 20 elite support for compulsory voting in 70 public support for compulsory voting in 68–76, 174 recent events pertaining to compulsory voting in 16, 28 Australian Election Study 71–76 Australian Voter Experience, The 72–76 Austria abolition of compulsory voting in states 40–41, 53–54, 64 compulsory voting in 40, 41 fn.4, 43, 48–49, 52, 62 Austria, compulsory voting in Carinthia 48

Bachelet, Michelle 30 Beazley, Kim 15 fn.19 Belgium adoption of compulsory voting in 15, 18 compulsory voting in 1 fn.2, 3–4, 4 fn.7, 19, 21 fn.29, 21 fn.30, 21–22, 40, 44, 47 fn.15, 49 fn.16, 51, 53 compulsory voting in Flanders 1, 28–29, 68 fn.2 compulsory voting in Wallonia 29, 29 fn.42, public support for compulsory voting in 71–76 public support for compulsory voting in Flanders 68 recent events pertaining to compulsory voting in 28–29 Belgium General Election Study 72–76 blank votes, see compulsory voting and invalid balloting Bolivia compulsory voting in 19, 21, 21 fn.31, 21 fn.32, 44 public support for compulsory voting in 71–76 Braganza Duke of 25 Brazil compulsory voting in 3, 3 fn.6, 11, 17, 19, 21, 40, 40 fn.3, 42, 44–47, 50–51, 53, 57, 138 public support for compulsory voting in 29, 68 recent events pertaining to compulsory voting in 29 Brexit 133 Bulgaria adoption of compulsory voting in 1, 24–25, 177 fn.3 compulsory voting in 19, 46 recent events pertaining to compulsory voting in 16 referendum on compulsory voting in 68 rewards for voting in 177 Cameroon recent events pertaining to compulsory voting in 28

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206 index campaigning, see compulsory voting and party strategies Canada compulsory voting in 16 public support for adoption of compulsory voting in 26, 69 recent events pertaining to compulsory voting in 26, 173–174 Carinthia, see Austria, compulsory voting in Carinthia Cartes, Horacio 1 causal identification 31–34, 166, 171–172 causes of compulsory voting, see compulsory voting, origins of Chile abolition of compulsory voting in 1, 30, 41, 43, 47, 55, 176 fn.2 compulsory voting in 44–45 public support for adoption of compulsory voting in 30, 31 fn.43 recent events pertaining to compulsory voting in 30–31, 31 fn.43 coercion effects of 58–61, 177–178 Colombia duty to vote in 22, 82 fn.3 public support for adoption of compulsory voting in 69 fn.4 recent events pertaining to compulsory voting in 16, 23–24 rewards for voting in 177 Comparative Manifestos Project 37, 151 fn.14, 142–164, 170 Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 35–37, 81 fn.2, 80–99, 143 fn.1, 142–144, 168–170 compulsory voting and age 74–76 and democratic legitimacy 9 and economic voting 51–52 and education 74–76 and election outcomes 52–54, 64 and electoral integrity 172–173 and equality of turnout 38–43 and free riding 8–9 and gender 74–76 and ideology 74–76 and income 74–76 and income inequality 55–56 and invalid balloting 43–46, 56–57, 62 and party identification 50, 139 and party strategies 15–16, 36–37, 54–55, 133–166, 169–172, 174

and political attitudes 35–36, 49–50, 57–58, 60, 62–64, 80–81, 131–132, 168–171, 174 and political extremism 15, 35–37, 64, 80–81, 83–99, 104–119, 131–132, 137–140, 142–143, 147–151, 155–166, 168–171, 174 and political interest 74–76, 86–87, 94, 96–97, 105, 110–114, 117–118, 127–129 and political moderation 14–15, 36–37, 137–140, 142–143, 155–166, 169–171 and political polarization 15, 36–37, 137–140, 142–143, 155–166, 169–171 and political sophistication 11–14, 35–36, 46–49, 56–58, 64–65, 80–81, 83–99, 104–119, 122–129, 131–132, 138–139, 168–169, 174 and populism 15, 174 and proximity voting 51–52 and representation 10–11 and support for mainstream parties 64, 81, 83–99, 104–119, 131–132 and support for non-mainstream parties 35–36, 64, 80–81, 83–99, 104–119, 131–132, 168–169 and support for political authorities 35–36, 63–64, 80–81, 83–99, 104–119, 122–129, 131–132, 168–169, 174 and the duty to vote 5–8 and the economy 55–56, 172 and turnout 38–43, 56, 66, 101–104, 122, 174 and vote buying 15–16, 54, 135–136, 172 and voter mobilization 15, 36–37, 54, 133–135, 142–151, 164–165, 169–170, 172 and women’s representation 47 fn.15 contemporary use of 18–22 elite support for 70–71 exemptions from law 21–22, 36, 42, 80–81, 100, 119, 132, 142, 145–169, 171 meaning of 3–5 origins of 16–18, 166, 173 penalties for abstention 20–22, 103–104, 119, 145 prior books on 2–3 public support for 35, 63, 67–79, 168, 170, 174 theses and dissertations on 2 fn.5 Costa Rica compulsory voting in 19 COVID-19 pandemic 21 fn.32, 24, 29–30, 31 fn.44 Cyprus abolition of compulsory voting in 1, 29 adoption of compulsory voting in 17

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index 207 Czech Republic recent events pertaining to compulsory voting in 25 democratic legitimacy, see compulsory voting and democratic legitimacy Democratic Republic of the Congo adoption of compulsory voting in 17 compulsory voting in 19 difference-in-differences analysis 33, 171 dissatisfaction with democracy, see satisfaction with democracy Dominican Republic adoption of compulsory voting in 17 duty to vote in 22, 82 fn.3 recent events pertaining to compulsory voting in 22 duty to vote, see compulsory voting and the duty to vote early voting 176 economic voting, see compulsory voting and economic voting economy, see compulsory voting and the economy Ecuador compulsory voting in 19, 45 public support for compulsory voting in 68–69, 69 fn.4, 71–76 recent events pertaining to compulsory voting in 29 education, see compulsory voting and education Egypt compulsory voting in 19, 22 fn.32 El Salvador compulsory voting in 17 duty to vote in 22, 82 fn.3 election outcomes, see compulsory voting and election outcomes electoral systems 172 electronic voting 176 equality of turnout, see compulsory voting and equality of turnout European Court of Human Rights 6 European Union recent events pertaining to compulsory voting in 25 experimental analysis 34 extremism, see compulsory voting and political extremism extrinsic motivation 58–62

Fiji abolition of compulsory voting in 29 adoption of compulsory voting in 17, 18 fines for abstention, see compulsory voting, penalties for abstention Flanders, see Belgium, compulsory voting in Flanders France 44, 175 compulsory voting in Toulon 17 elite support for adoption of compulsory voting in 71 public support for adoption of compulsory voting in 68, 174 recent events pertaining to compulsory voting in 24 free riding, see compulsory voting and free riding Gabon compulsory voting in 19 gender, see compulsory voting and gender Germany elite support for adoption of compulsory voting in 70 get-out-the-vote campaigns, see compulsory voting and voter mobilization Gillard, Julia 15 fn.18 Greece adoption of compulsory voting in 14 compulsory voting in 16, 17, 19, 22 Guatemala compulsory voting in 17 duty to vote in 22, 82 fn.3 Gujarat, see India, compulsory voting in Gujarat Hobbes, Thomas 5 Honduras compulsory voting in 19, 22, 23, 23 fn.35 recent events pertaining to compulsory voting in 23 ideology, see compulsory voting and ideology Illinois rewards for voting in 177 income, see compulsory voting and income income inequality, see compulsory voting and income inequality India compulsory voting in Gujarat 18 fn.21, 26, 46, 68 fn.1

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208 index India (cont.) compulsory voting in Karnataka 18 fn.21, 22 fn.32, 26–27, 46 public support for adoption of compulsory voting in 69 public support for adoption of compulsory voting in Gujarat 68 recent events pertaining to compulsory voting in 1, 26–27, 174 Supreme Court of 7 intrinsic motivation 58–62 invalid balloting, see compulsory voting and invalid balloting Israel recent events pertaining to compulsory voting in 24, 177 rewards for voting in 177 Jarrett, Valerie 15 fn.18 Johnson, Lyndon B. 10 Juncker, Jean-Claude 25 jury duty 8, 61 Kant, Immanuel 5 Karnataka, see India, compulsory voting in Karnataka Lieberman, Avigdor 24 Liechtenstein compulsory voting in 19 Los Angeles rewards for voting in 177 Luxembourg compulsory voting in 19–20, 20 fn.27 Mélenchon, Jean-Luc 24 Macron, Emmanuel 24 Madagascar recent events pertaining to compulsory voting in 28 mail voting 176 Maine referendum on electoral reform 68 mainstream political parties 36–37, 134–143, 153–166, 169–170 Malaysia recent events pertaining to compulsory voting in 28 mandatory voting, see compulsory voting median voter theorem 137 Merkel, Angela 25 Mexico compulsory voting in 19, 22, 23 fn.36, 45 fn.11, 52

public support for compulsory voting in 69 fn.4 recent events pertaining to compulsory voting in 16, 23 Mill, John Stuart 5 mobilization, see compulsory voting and voter mobilization moderation, see compulsory voting and political moderation Morocco recent events pertaining to compulsory voting in 28 multilevel modeling 83, 154 Nauru adoption of compulsory voting in 17 compulsory voting in 19, 20 Netherlands abolition of compulsory voting in 41, 53 elite support for adoption of compulsory voting in 70 recent events pertaining to compulsory voting in 25 Netquest 120, 146 New Zealand elite support for adoption of compulsory voting in 70–71 recent events pertaining to compulsory voting in 25 Nicaragua compulsory voting in 17 non-mainstream political parties 36–37, 134–143, 153–166, 169–170 North Korea compulsory voting in 19 Norway rewards for voting in 177 Obama, Barack 1, 27, 57 obligatory voting, see compulsory voting Oliver, John 57 organ donation 8 fn.11 Panama compulsory voting in 19 Paraguay compulsory voting in 17, 19, 22 recent events pertaining to compulsory voting in 1, 22–23 party behavior, see compulsory voting and party strategies party families 134, 142

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index 209 party identification, see compulsory voting and party identification party ideology, see compulsory voting and party strategies party polarization, see compulsory voting and political polarization party positioning, see compulsory voting and party strategies penalties for abstention, see compulsory voting, penalties for abstention Peru compulsory voting in 2, 11, 19, 21, 21 fn.32, 41–42, 47, 53–54, 62 fn.2, 138, 144, 165 elite support for compulsory voting in 71 public support for compulsory voting in 68–69, 69 fn.4, 71–76 recent events pertaining to compulsory voting in 29–30 Philadelphia rewards for voting in 177 Pitcairn Islands compulsory voting in 18 fn.21 Poland referendum on electoral reform 68 political extremism, see compulsory voting and political extremism political interest, see compulsory voting and political interest political parties, see compulsory voting and party strategies political polarization, see compulsory voting and political polarization political sophistication, see compulsory voting and political sophistication Polity IV Project 20 fn.25, 82, 82 fn.4, 83 fn.5, 88–89, 144 fn.3, 155, 155 fn.20 populism, see compulsory voting and populism Portugal public support for adoption of compulsory voting in 69 recent events pertaining to compulsory voting in 25 proximity voting, see compulsory voting and proximity voting public support for compulsory voting, see compulsory voting, public support for punishment effects of 61 Queensland, see Australia, compulsory voting in Queensland

referendums 67–68 regression discontinuity analysis 33, 122–125, 129–131, 142, 146–147 representation, see compulsory voting and representation rewards for voting 177–178 right not to vote 6–7 Romania recent events pertaining to compulsory voting in 25 Rousseau, Jean Jacques 5 Russia recent events pertaining to compulsory voting in 28 Samoa adoption of compulsory voting in 1, 25–26 compulsory voting in 19 sanctions for abstention, see compulsory voting, penalties for abstention satisfaction with democracy 50, 72–76, 81–83, 100–101, 120–122 Schaffhausen, see Switzerland, compulsory voting in Schaffhausen self-determination theory 58, 60–61 Singapore compulsory voting in 19, 20, 21 fn.32 South Australia, see Australia, compulsory voting in South Australia Spain compulsory voting in 17, 17 fn.20 spoiled votes, see compulsory voting and invalid balloting support for compulsory voting, see compulsory voting, public support for support for mainstream parties, see compulsory voting and support for mainstream parties support for non-mainstream parties, see compulsory voting and support for non-mainstream parties support for political authorities, see compulsory voting and support for political authorities Swiss Election Study 36, 80–81, 100–119, 169 Switzerland abolition of compulsory voting in cantons 41 compulsory voting in 17, 18 fn.21, 39–40, 54, 62 compulsory voting in Schaffhausen 19–20, 36, 47, 80, 90, 100–119, 132, 154 fn.18, 169

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210 index Switzerland (cont.) compulsory voting in Vaud 42, 48, 54 recent events pertaining to compulsory voting at subnational level 25 referendums in 68 synthetic control analysis 33–34, 171 Thailand adoption of compulsory voting in 15, 18 compulsory voting in 19 Trump, Donald 133 Turkey adoption of compulsory voting in 42 compulsory voting in 17, 19, 22 turnout, see compulsory voting and turnout United Kingdom 14 public support for adoption of compulsory voting in 68 recent events pertaining to compulsory voting in 27 United States compulsory voting in 17 First Amendment to Constitution of 6 public support for adoption of compulsory voting in 68–69, 69 fn.4, 174 recent events pertaining to compulsory voting in 1, 10, 27 Supreme Court of 6 Uruguay compulsory voting in 19, 21

public support for compulsory voting in 68, 71–76 Vanuatu recent events pertaining to compulsory voting in 26 Varieties of Democracy project 19, 19 fn.22, 82 fn.3, 89–90, 144 fn.2, 154 Vaud, see Switzerland, compulsory voting in Vaud vote buying, see compulsory voting and vote buying voter enrollment, see voter registration voter identification 176 voter mobilization, see compulsory voting and voter mobilization voter registration 3–4, 175–176 voter turnout, see compulsory voting and turnout Wallonia, see Belgium, compulsory voting in Wallonia Western Australia, see Australia, compulsory voting in Western Australia women’s representation, see compulsory voting and women’s representation World Development Indicators, 20 fn.26 Zakaria, Fareed 57 Zimbabwe recent events pertaining to compulsory voting in 28