Beyond Settlement : Making Peace Last after Civil Conflict [1 ed.] 9780838643372, 9780838641835

Citation preview

Beyond Settlement

................. 16928$

$$FM

09-09-08 08:21:19

PS

PAGE 1

................. 16928$

$$FM

09-09-08 08:21:20

PS

PAGE 2

Beyond Settlement Making Peace Last after Civil Conflict

Edited by

Vanessa E. Shields and Nicholas D. J. Baldwin

Madison • Teaneck Fairleigh Dickinson University Press

................. 16928$

$$FM

09-09-08 08:21:20

PS

PAGE 3

 2008 by Rosemont Publishing & Printing Corp. All rights reserved. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use, or the internal or personal use of specific clients, is granted by the copyright owner, provided that a base fee of $10.00, plus eight cents per page, per copy is paid directly to the Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, Massachusetts 01923. [978-0-8386-4183-5/08 $10.00  8¢ pp, pc.]

Associated University Presses 2010 Eastpark Boulevard Cranbury, NJ 08512

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Beyond settlement : making peace last after civil conflict / edited by Vanessa E. Shields and Nicholas D. J. Baldwin p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-8386-4183-5 (alk. paper) 1. Peace-building—Case studies. 2. Conflict management—Case studies. I. Shields, Vanessa E., 1981– II. Baldwin, Nicholas. JZ5538.B49 2008 327.1⬘72—dc22 2008016779

printed in the united states of america

................. 16928$

$$FM

09-09-08 08:21:20

PS

PAGE 4

To LN and OM.

Your absence has gone through me Like thread through a needle Everything I do is stitched with its color —W. S. Merwin, ‘‘Separation’’

................. 16928$

$$FM

09-09-08 08:21:20

PS

PAGE 5

Peace is a process, a way of solving problems. Our problems are manmade—therefore, they can be solved by man. And man can be as big as he wants. No problem of human destiny is beyond human beings. Man’s reason and spirit have often solved the seemingly unsolvable —President John F. Kennedy

The fundamental principle on which peace is based is the acceptance that the future can only be governed successfully by people working together, equal before the law, equal in mutual respect shown by all and equally committed to sharing power and securing peace. That is the only basis upon which true democracy can function and by which normal politics can at last—after decades of violence and suffering—be achieved. A lesson for conflict everywhere: define the right political framework since only through politics can come peace that lasts. To get external forces working in alignment with those internal forces striving for peace. But above all to persevere, never to give up, never to accept that the true will of the people is conflict when they are given the chance to live in peace. —Prime Minister Tony Blair

It is from numberless diverse acts of courage and belief that human history is shaped. Each time a man stands up for an ideal, or acts to improve the lot of others, or strikes out against an injustice he sends forward a tiny ripple of hope, and crossing each other from a million different centers of energy and daring those ripples build a current which can sweep down the mightiest walls of oppression and resistance. —Robert F. Kennedy

................. 16928$

$$FM

09-09-08 08:21:21

PS

PAGE 6

Contents Foreword The Right Honorable The Lord Howe of Aberavon, Kt, CH, QC

9

Preface

11

Acronyms

13

Introduction Vanessa E. Shields and Nicholas D. J. Baldwin

21

Afghanistan: Political Reform Amin Tarzi

41

Afghanistan: Security Sector Reform Richard Scarth

62

Bosnia and Herzegovina: Consolidating Democratic Institutions Denis Hadzovic and Florence Gaub Cambodia after Democratization: Accountability Trap Kheang Un

85 101

Consolidating Peace in Cambodia: Stabilization without Security Sector Reform Christina Willie

120

Guatemala Stuck in the Middle: The Challenges of Institutionalizing Democracy Marc Belanger

140

Lebanon: Confessionalism, Institution Building, and the Challenges of Securing Peace Karen Abi-Ezzi

159

7

................. 16928$

CNTS

09-09-08 08:21:23

PS

PAGE 7

8

CONTENTS

Nepal: Democracy, Armed Insurgency, and the Peace Process HomRaj Dahal Nepal: From Armed Conflict to Arms Management HomRaj Dahal Northern Ireland: The Search for a Democratic Settlement Thomas G. Fraser

173 188

210

Northern Ireland: Securing the Peace Cathy Gormley-Heenan

224

Palestine Roland Friedrich

237

South Africa: A Case Study in Institution Building Susan Booysen

254

South Africa: Security Transformation Gavin Cawthra

276

Spain Lynn M. Maurer

288

Spain: Security Sector reform: From Transition to Consolidation of Democracy Jose´ A. Olmeda

303

Between Power and Empowerment: Building Political Institutions in Postsettlement Sudan Simon Roughneen

318

Challenging the Settlement: Politicized Insecurity in Sudan Simon Roughneen

335

Concluding Observations Vanessa E. Shields and Nicholas D. J. Baldwin

356

Notes on Contributors

405

Index

411

................. 16928$

CNTS

09-09-08 08:21:23

PS

PAGE 8

Foreword CONFLICTS CAN OCCUR BETWEEN MANY DIFFERENT KINDS OF COM-

batant: between nations, ethnic groups, cultures, philosophies, religions, communities, even just individuals. The degree of belligerence can be equally variable: from sharp, sustained argument about principle or detail, to fierce increasingly violent conflict. Despite this inevitable diversity, experience shows that each stage in the resolution, management, or final settlement of a dispute requires two components: the establishment of a framework within which the parties can start speaking to (and listening to and understanding), rather than shouting at, each other; and the participation of individuals with courage and personality enough to energize those frameworks—before, through, and after negotiation. Such was my experience in situations ranging from the Hong Kong Joint Declaration, through the trail-blazing Anglo-Irish Agreement (November 1985), to the conclusion of the Cold War itself—alongside people like Deng Xiaoping, Garret Fitzgerald, Margaret Thatcher, and Mikhail Gorbachev. This book—with contributions from a large number of experts and practitioners from around the world—offers a deep and wide-ranging study of what is involved in making peace last after civil conflict. Most important of all, it explores and underlines the need to define, and to facilitate, the moves that are so necessary beyond settlement. It will thus be of real value to all those who may find themselves addressing such questions in today’s complex international environment. The Rt. Hon. The Lord Howe of Aberavon, Kt, CH, QC Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 1983–89 and Deputy Prime Minister 1989–90

9

................. 16928$

FRWD

09-09-08 08:21:27

PS

PAGE 9

................. 16928$

FRWD

09-09-08 08:21:28

PS

PAGE 10

Preface THE WORLD HAS SUFFERED—AND CONTINUES TO SUFFER—FROM PO-

litical, ideological, and ethnic conflicts which have resulted in countless deaths, the creation of many millions of refugees, untold human suffering, the destruction of livelihoods, and widespread human rights abuses, to say nothing of the economic destruction that has been and is also involved. Beyond Settlement examines and evaluates both institution building and security sector reform in conflict states. It does so through an analysis of eighteen case studies covering eleven countries, spanning five continents and six decades. Some of these case studies address only institution building, some address only security sector reform, and some address both institution building and security sector reform. Each case study is written by an expert/practitioner. As far as institution building is concerned, the analysis is of four democratic levers, namely elections, the legislature, the executive, and devolution. In taking this approach we are focusing on how the structure and function of these political institutions contributes to the management and reduction of conflict and to the consolidation of fragile democracies. As far as security sector reform is concerned, the analysis is of how military, police, and intelligence institutions are reformed in states that are coming out of conflict—states that are moving beyond settlement. Some of the conflicts in this study are ongoing (e.g., Palestine) while others have been resolved (e.g., Spain, South Africa), while still others are in a peace-building or immediate postconflict stage (e.g., Northern Ireland). The rationale behind having such a variety of case studies is so as to be able to examine the process of institution building—both political and security sector—over time and through a variety of stages in order to identify and evaluate similarities and differences, successes and failures. In all of this the role of the editors has been to see if there are identifiable similarities and elements that can be applied across civil conflicts in attempts to make peace last as nations and peoples move beyond settlement. 11

................. 16928$

PREF

09-09-08 08:21:30

PS

PAGE 11

12

PREFACE

 Many people have helped in the preparation and development of the text. First and foremost we would like to express our thanks to all those who have contributed chapters—without them there would be no book! We would also like to thank Harry Keyishian and all at the Fairleigh Dickinson University Press and Associated University Presses for their encouragement of this project and their support throughout. Vanessa E. Shields United States of America

and

Nicholas D. J. Baldwin Wroxton College Fairleigh Dickinson University Wroxton, England

January 2008

................. 16928$

PREF

09-09-08 08:21:31

PS

PAGE 12

Acronyms ABC ADB AEC AMF ANA ANC ANKI ANBP ANP AP ARENA ARP ASAC ASEAN

Abyei Boundary Commission Asian Development Bank Abyei Executive Commission Afghan Military Force Afghan National Army African National Congress National Army of Independent Kampuchea Afghanistan New Beginning Program Afghan National Police Popular Alliance Nationalist Republican Alliance Administrative Reform Program Assistance on Curbing Small Arms and light weapons in Cambodia Association of Southeast Asian Nations

BCD BMZ

Beirut Central District (German) Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development

CA CACIF

Constituent Assembly Committee of Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial and Financial Associations Central African Republic Consultative Group for Cambodia Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea Ceasefire Joint Military Committee Comprehensive Peace Accord/Comprehensive Peace Agreement Ceasefire Political Commission Cambodian People’s Party Comprehensive Peace Treaty

CAR CG CGDK CJMC CPA CPC CPP CPT DCAF DDR DIFD

Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Department for International Development

13

................. 16928$

ACRO

09-09-08 08:21:38

PS

PAGE 13

14

ACRONYMS

DIAG DPA

Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups Darfur Peace Agreement

EASC ECAC EPA ESPA ETA EU

Elections Appeals Sub-Commission Election Complaints and Appeals Council Eight Political Parties Alliance Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement Basque Homeland and Freedom European Union

FMLN FRG FSLN FUNCINPEC

Farabundo Martı´ National Liberation Front Guatemalan Republican Front Sandinista National Liberation Front United Front for a Co-operative, Independent, Neutral, and Peaceful Cambodia

GAP GCPP GDP GDZ

Government Action Plan Global Conflict Prevention Pools Gross Domestic Product (German) Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit Government of National Unity Government of South Sudan German Gesellschaft Fu¨r Techmsche Zurammenarbeit

GNU GoSS GTD HDZ HRC

Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica (Croatian Democratic Union) Human Rights Commission

IC ICG ICRC IDF IDMC IDP

Interim Constitution International Crisis Group International Committee of the Red Cross Israel Defence Forces Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre Internally Displaced People

IFP IICD IMC INC INGOs IRA ISAF

Inkatha Freedom Party Independent International Commission on Decommissioning Independent Monitoring Commission Interim National Constitution International Non-Governmental Organizations Irish Republican Army International Security Assistance Force

JAM JEM

Joint Assessment Mission Justice and Equality Movement

................. 16928$

ACRO

09-09-08 08:21:38

PS

PAGE 14

15

ACRONYMS

JEMB JPCC JSAC

Joint Electoral Management Body Joint Provincial Coordination Center Japan Assistance Team for Small Arms Management in Cambodia

KM KPNLAF KPNLF KPRAF KR

Bosnia-Herzegovina Convertible Mark Khmer People’s National Liberation Armed Forces Khmer People’s National Liberation Front Khmer People’s Revolutionary Armed Forces Khmer Rouge

LJRP LNM LRA

Legal and Judicial Reform Project Lebanese National Movement Lords Resistance Army

MoD

Ministry of Defence

NADK NATO NCD NCOP NCP NCP-M NCP-UML NDDRCC NGOs NIA NICOC NPS-A NRF NSC NSO NWPP

National Army of Democratic Kampuchea North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Nepalese Congress Democratic National Council of Provinces National Congress Party Nepal Communist Party—Maoist Nepal Communist Party-Unified Marxist-Leninist National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Coordination Council Non-Governmental Organizations National Intelligence Agency National Intelligence Coordinating Committee Nepal Sadvawana Party-Anandevi National Redemption Front National Security Council National Security Office Nepal Workers and Peasants Party

OHR oPt OSA OSCE

Office of the High Representative Occupied Palestinian territory Intelligence and Security Agency Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PAC PCE PDK PDPA PF PICCR

Pan Africanist Congress Communist Party of Spain Party of Democratic Kampuchea People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan People’s Front Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizen’s Rights

................. 16928$

ACRO

09-09-08 08:21:39

PS

PAGE 15

16

ACRONYMS

PLC PLO PNA PNV PP PPA PRK PRL PSNI PSOE PUP

Palestinian Legislative Council Palestine Liberation Organisation Palestinian National Authority Partido Nacionalista Vasco (Basque Nationalist Party) Popular Party Paris Peace Agreement People’s Republic of Kampuchea Political Reform Law Police Service of Northern Ireland Spanish Socialist Workers Party Progressive Unionist Party

RCAF RFE/RL RPP

Royal Cambodian Armed Forces Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Rastriya Prajatantra Party (National Democracy Party of Nepal) Republika Srpska Royal Ulster Constabulary

RS RUC SAF SANDF SAP SASS SDA SDP SDS SDLP SEILA SF SNSD SNTV SOC SPA SPLM/A SRP SRSG SSR SzBiH

Sudanese Armed Force South African National Defence Force South African Police South African Secret Service Party of Democratic Action Social Democratic Party Serbian Democratic Party Social Democratic and Labour Party meaning ‘foundation stone’ in Khmer Sanskrit Sinn Fein Alliance of Independent Social Democrats Single Non-Transferable Vote State of Cambodia Seven Party Alliance Southern Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army Sam Rainsy Party Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Afghanistan Security Sector Reform Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina

UCD UCN ULF UML UN UNAMA

Union of the Democratic Centre Union of the National Centre United Left Front United Marxist Leninist United Nations United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

................. 16928$

ACRO

09-09-08 08:21:39

PS

PAGE 16

17

ACRONYMS

UNDP UNHCR UNICEF UNMIN UNMIS UNO UNTAC URNG USA USAID USSC UUP

United Nations Development Programme United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Children’s Fund United Nations Mission in Nepal United Nations Mission in Sudan United Nations Organisation United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia Unidad Revolucionario Nacional Guatemalteca United States of America United States Agency for International Development United States Security Coordinator Ulster Unionist Party

WDP

World Development Report

................. 16928$

ACRO

09-09-08 08:21:39

PS

PAGE 17

................. 16928$

ACRO

09-09-08 08:21:39

PS

PAGE 18

Beyond Settlement

................. 16928$

HFTL

09-09-08 08:21:42

PS

PAGE 19

................. 16928$

HFTL

09-09-08 08:21:42

PS

PAGE 20

Introduction Vanessa E. Shields and Nicholas D. J. Baldwin Premise

WHEN

NATIONS—WHEN PEOPLES—SEEK TO MAKE A TRANSITION

from a state of violent conflict to a state of peace—lasting peace, they are confronted with the issue of how best to turn the page of history, how best to put the past to rest, and to do so without either reviving conflict or sowing the seeds of future conflict. This raises the issue of process. What is the process not merely for putting an end to violent intrastate conflict but for moving beyond settlement and establishing a secure and lasting peace? Beyond Settlement seeks to make a distinctive contribution to the consideration of this topic and the debate surrounding it. Our belief is that understanding can be derived from an analysis of past experience, understanding that can be utilized for future endeavors. Given that there are a large number of case studies that could have been included in this collection, we should perhaps explain the criteria that has governed our selection here. We wanted to have a broad regional sample, therefore, we chose case studies from a variety of regions including: Latin America, Western and Southern Europe, South and Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Southern Africa. Equally, we wanted our case studies to cover conflicts which have successfully moved beyond the settlement stage to the stage where democratic behavior has been consolidated and political and security institutions are able to successfully manage internal conflict. For instance, we included Spain which had a failed democracy and a dictatorship for over thirty-five years. Some may view the inclusion of Spain as strange. However, the Spanish case is an excellent example of moving beyond settlement, and is a particularly interesting case of negotiating a system of devolution to prevent future conflict. Furthermore, the Spanish case allows us to gain insight into the settlement and resolution of a civil war which occurred decades before the discourse on peacebuilding 21

................. 16928$

$CH1

09-09-08 08:21:54

PS

PAGE 21

22

VANESSA E. SHIELDS AND NICHOLAS D. J. BALDWIN

began. Spain is a successful case of conflict transformation as Lynn Maurer has said, ‘‘Nearly thirty years after its peaceful transition, the representative process continues to mitigate potential conflict through its institutions.’’1 Although the redesign or establishment of representative democratic systems does not always correlate with good governance, for example, in Marc Belanger’s chapter on Guatemala he says the ‘‘current party system in Guatemala are not a function of how the system operates and cannot be easily corrected by new institutional designs.’’2 This case study reinforces that institutional reforms of course cannot—indeed, do not—guarantee good governance. Corruption, nepotism, and crime can be particularly difficult to overcome in postconflict states like Guatemala and Cambodia, for instance. The case studies on Cambodia provide insight on the danger involved in promoting stabilization at the expense of good governance which can entrench a system which lacks accountability. Equally, the chapter on security sector reform in Cambodia explains the importance of including security sector reform as a component of the settlement process. The South African case studies illustrate an example of a country that moved successfully beyond settlement after protracted conflict. While the chapters on Northern Ireland illuminate a critical moment in Northern Ireland’s settlement process which may allow the country to move beyond settlement and consolidate democracy. Bosnia and Herzegovina is an interesting case study to examine as it has been in the peacebuilding process for over a decade but it is continuing to function in a massively decentralized system which, some may argue, reinforces sectarian divisions instead of building bridges across communities. The chapters on Afghanistan provide insight into institutional reform as a nation-building exercise lead by the United States where the government is highly centralized in an attempt to combat terrorism and warlordism. Meanwhile, the case on Sudan explains a particularly complex situation which sees a deescalation of the 1983–2005 North-South conflict,3 the management of a low-level conflict in Eastern Sudan, and a raging conflict in Sudan’s western Darfur region, which is linked to a de facto regional conflict encompassing Chad and the Central African Republic. The Palestinian Territories is a unique case to examine security sector reform because it is a nonstate regime and thereby lacks the fundamental characteristics of a state including territorial sovereignty, economic independence, and a monopoly on

................. 16928$

$CH1

09-09-08 08:21:54

PS

PAGE 22

23

INTRODUCTION

the use of force. Equally, the Palestinian Territories are engaged in an ongoing internal and external conflict which has made security sector reform difficult if not impossible. In the case of Palestine, although settlement appears distant, security sector reforms are seen as a route to stabilization. The inclusion of the case study on Nepal is particularly contemporary as the Peace Accords were signed in November 2006 and the Maoists entered government in January 2007. Due to this settlement being recent, it is difficult to judge the stability of the internally negotiated settlement at this point. However, a description of the settlement for those unfamiliar with it is provided. In short, there are specific reasons for the choice of each of the case studies contained here. Together they comprise a diversity of perspectives, opinions, context, and experience that we believe is sufficient to provide for comparisons and to stimulate debate. Nonetheless, this is not simply a collection of disparate voices—valuable though that in itself might be; rather, it also comprises discussions on the strengths and weaknesses of the political and security reforms, the motives of the players involved, suggestions for future reforms, and potential long-term problems with the structural reforms established after settlement.

 Context For much of the twentieth century violent conflict occurred between states. However, during the Cold War conflict within states—or intrastate conflict—became an increasing feature.4 Many of these intrastate conflicts were characterized as protracted as they were particularly difficult to resolve due to a complex set of structural and relational factors between and among the parties to the conflict. The structural factors included undemocratic political structures, institutional failure leading to human insecurity and unequal access to resources, and lack of economic development. For the purpose of this study the use of the word conflict includes those violent conflicts resulting in twenty-five or more military or civilian deaths per year5 as developed by Professor Nils Petter Gelditsch, International Peace Research Institute (PRIO). In addition to the traditional threshold of one thousand battle deaths per year used for

................. 16928$

$CH1

09-09-08 08:21:55

PS

PAGE 23

24

VANESSA E. SHIELDS AND NICHOLAS D. J. BALDWIN

determining internal and international wars6 as developed by J. David Singer, Correlates of War Project.7 The inability—or unwillingness—of political leaders to ensure that social and political institutions met basic human needs was compounded by—or indeed was the result of—ethnic/identity conflicts. When such conflicts develop into armed violence the result is the destruction of livelihoods and infrastructure; the breakdown of law and order; human rights abuses; and the creation of a large number of refugees and internally displaced peoples. The longer such conflicts continue can result in the militarization of entire societies. In his chapters on Sudan contributor Simon Roughneen described the terrible toll that violent conflict has had on Sudanese civilians and how conflicts in neighboring states have further escalated the violence in Sudan. ‘‘Up to 400,000 people have died in the western Darfur region since early 2003, with another 2.5 million seeking refuge in Chad or internally displaced (IDPs) in Sudan. The Darfur conflict now dovetails with wars simmering in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR), where both countries have been accused of supporting Darfurian rebels, and who in turn accuse Khartoum of aiding Chadian and CAR dissident fighters.’’ Furthermore, violent conflict has a devastating impact on economic development. HomRaj Dahal’s chapters on Nepal provide additional insight on the impact of violent conflict on infrastructure. Finance Minister Ramsharan Mahat estimated that the damage to infrastructure alone amounted to some $246 million—approximately 15 percent of Nepal’s annual (2007) budget. As a result of this destruction the much needed poverty reduction programs and the development initiatives that had been implemented severely suffered, while the scale of physical damages inflicted on public and private properties was both alarmingly high and financially disastrous. In short, a poor economy—although one that was venturing to move forward—was substantially set back. The country that had achieved an average annual economic growth of 4.9 percent in 1990 faced a sharp drop to 1.9 percent between 2002 and 2004.

Indeed, the devastating effects of violent conflict take decades to overcome. This process includes not only reforming the political and security frameworks of a country but also rehabilitating survivors of war and reestablishing trust. These long-term facets of the peace-building process will be examined further in Susan Booysen and Gavin Cawthra’s chapters on South Africa and in Lynn Maurer and Jose´ Olmeda’s chapters on Spain.

................. 16928$

$CH1

09-09-08 08:21:55

PS

PAGE 24

25

INTRODUCTION

It is necessary to note that the process of democratization in itself does not necessarily improve security as democratization challenges the status quo of the political elite and raises the expectations of the people.8 For example, contributor HomRaj Dahal said that after King Birendra of Nepal relinquished his absolute power over the country, ‘‘Long suppressed grievances burst onto the surface, demands grew from all quarters; expectations were high. However, internal divisions . . . corruption, scandals, premature dissolutions of the House of Representatives, and measures designed to appease the king, all led to unstable government and an undermining of politicians and of political parties in the eyes of the masses.’’ Despite, there being limits to what structural reforms can accomplish, democratic governance is seen by academics, politicians, and the international community as a way to manage conflict, promote economic development, and contribute to regional and global security. There appears to be some statistical basis that democratic states (defined as democratic based on a stringent set of criteria)9 are more often at war with autocratic states and rarely—if ever— fight one another. Thus, it has been deduced that in a world of many democracies there would be more peace and less interstate armed conflict.10 However, there are criticisms of this theory not least of all that the evidence upon which it is based is not statistically significant; that there is a lack of consensus on what makes a country democratic; and that correlation does not equal causation as there may be other explanations for peace between democracies.11 Nonetheless, democratic governance—or good governance—is widely supported by international development agencies. Indeed, democratic governance is seen as an important facet of achieving the Millennium Development Goals and was reinforced as such at the Millennium Summit of 2000. The term ‘‘democracy’’ is ubiquitous—no country claims to be ‘‘undemocratic’’—and there are a multitude of systems and institutions worldwide which practice democratic governance.12 The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) defines governance as: The system of values, policies and institutions by which a society manages its economic, political and social affairs through interactions within and among the state, civil society and private sector. It is the way a society organizes itself to make and implement decisions—achieving mutual understanding, agreement and action. It comprises the mechanisms and processes for citizens and groups to

................. 16928$

$CH1

09-09-08 08:21:55

PS

PAGE 25

26

VANESSA E. SHIELDS AND NICHOLAS D. J. BALDWIN

articulate their interests, mediate their differences and exercise their legal rights and obligations. It is the rules, institutions and practices that set limits and provide incentives for individuals, organizations and firms. Governance, including its social, political and economic dimensions, operates at every level of human enterprise, be it the household, village, municipality, nation, region or globe. (UNDP, Governance Indicators: A User’s Guide, Strategy Note on Governance for Human Development, [New York: UNDP, 2004]), 2.

Producing an agreed upon definition of the term democracy has never been easy. What is clear, however, is that for countries coming out of protracted conflict, democratic governance is difficult—if not impossible—to pursue without first—and continuously—addressing, and upholding, human security needs. Protracted violent conflict is often linked to institutional failure and undemocratic political structures leading to human insecurity, lack of economic development, and unequal access to resources. The 1994 UNDP Human Development Report set out to redefine the concept of security and in doing so moved it beyond traditional, narrow, military concerns. In short, here are two main aspects of human security: ‘‘safety from chronic threats, like hunger, disease and repression, and protection from sudden disruptions in the patterns of daily life.’’13 In Simon Roughneen’s chapters on Sudan he said, ‘‘Democracy is critical to achieving human security, via a better redistribution of power and resources in contexts of extreme poverty, socioeconomic marginalization, and political violence. Democracy can fail, however, when it is weakened or undermined by political interests serving narrow tribal or ideological interests. In such contexts, the presence of political institutions may be unable to provide law and order or resolve social conflict through politics.’’ Therefore, transforming the state security institutions and their civilian oversight bodies to promote accountability and effectiveness is also an essential element of democratization after conflict. It can ease tension after settlement, foster trust, and limit the possibility of violent conflict in the future. As contributor Roland Friedrich has said in his chapter on Palestine, security sector reform ‘‘is a political and social process that stretches over a prolonged period of time, and its success is highly dependent on the political, socioeconomic and cultural context.’’

Focus Beyond Settlement uses eighteen case studies of transitioning and transformed protracted conflicts—drawn from eleven coun-

................. 16928$

$CH1

09-09-08 08:21:55

PS PAGE 26

27

INTRODUCTION

tries from five continents over six decades and all written by experts and practitioners—to examine actual political and/or security sector reforms implemented in current—or recently resolved—armed conflicts as well as conflicts which have been transformed beyond settlement into a lasting, stable peace. The manner of political reform examined in these case studies focuses primarily on elections, executive types, legislatures, and devolution. The case studies on security sector reform focus primarily on police, judicial reform, the military, and intelligence. Each of the eighteen case studies include discussions on the strengths and weaknesses of the political and security reforms, the motives of the players involved, suggestions for future reforms, and potential long-term problems with the structural reforms established after settlement. The book is aimed at providing interested and concerned individuals with concise, descriptive, and analytical accounts of the complicated process of structural reform after the cessation of armed conflict. Having said this, it must be noted that some of the case studies included in this collection may quickly become outdated due to the changing nature of the ongoing conflict features, including in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Palestine, Nepal, and Sudan. Nonetheless, in an attempt to make this book useful for examining structural reform in the long-term, the case studies can be analyzed based upon the particular stage of conflict that country has reached at the time of publication. Figure 1.1 is useful in illustrating that conflicts rarely—if ever—flow clearly from one phase to another without some overlap or regression. Conflict Stages

Intensity

(Hurting) Stalemate

De-escalation/Negotiation

Conflict Escalation Conflict Emergence

Dispute Settlement Latent Conflict

Postconflict Peacebuilding Time

Source: Data from Eric Brahm, ‘‘Conflict Stages,’’ Beyond Intractability, ed. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess (Boulder: Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, 2003), http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/conflict.stages/

................. 16928$

$CH1

09-09-08 08:21:56

PS PAGE 27

28

VANESSA E. SHIELDS AND NICHOLAS D. J. BALDWIN

For instance, at the time of writing, the case studies on Sudan and Afghanistan are in a stage where negotiations have taken place and—in the case of Sudan—a peace accord has been signed, but violent, low-level conflict continues to occur. When reading the case studies it will be evident that there is not a ‘‘one size fits all’’ model for democratization. Indeed, the process of democratization is a lengthy one which can be derailed, sidetracked, or destroyed particularly after settlement has—apparently—been reached.

Setting the Scene: Peacebuilding There is an obvious connection between democratic practices—such as the rule of law and transparency in decisionmaking—and the achievement of true peace and security in any new and stable political order. These elements of good governance need to be promoted at all levels of international and national political communities. —Butros Butros Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, 1992.

The concept of peacebuilding was established by former UN secretary general Butros Butros Ghali in the 1992 document An Agenda for Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping. Butros-Ghali viewed peacebuilding as a longterm process that occurs after peacemaking and peacekeeping. An Agenda for Peace defined peacebuilding as ‘‘[postconflict] action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify a peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.’’14 A second way of conceptualizing peacebuilding is as an overarching concept that includes peacemaking and peacekeeping as well as transformative activities such as preventative diplomacy. In short, the mission of postconflict peacebuilding is to create a stable, sustainable, and just society that has the appropriate mechanisms to manage future conflicts of interest through peaceful means. This means moving beyond managing, controlling, containing, and reducing actual or potential violence, through peacekeeping for instance, to the establishment of positive peace. Positive peace is more than just the absence of violence, it is the presence of social justice through equal opportunity and equal access to resources. This means eliminating the root causes of conflict and injustice which includes—but is not limited to—addressing institutional failure and undemocratic

................. 16928$

$CH1

09-09-08 08:21:56

PS

PAGE 28

29

INTRODUCTION

political structures which are, incidentally, a contributor to human insecurity.

Peacemaking Peacemaking is the process of creating a settlement between warring parties through negotiation and discussion. In Amin Tarzi’s chapter, he discusses how Afghanistan’s current institutional order was established after the fall of the Taliban through a ‘‘hastily arranged meeting of Afghan personalities in Bonn’’ resulting in the Bonn Agreement.15 In Cathy Gormley-Heenan’s chapter on Northern Ireland, she discusses the 1998 Belfast Agreement which enshrined democratic and peaceful principles. Importantly, the Belfast Agreement addressed the fears held by both Nationals and Unionists, as ‘‘Nationalists were reassured that it was for the people of Ireland alone to exercise self-determination, and that if in the future their decision was in favor of a united Ireland, the two governments would legislate to bring that about. Meanwhile, unionists were given the guarantee that self- determination would be exercised through the two jurisdictions, and that the consent of a majority in Northern Ireland would be required for any move toward a united Ireland’’.16 In both Nepal and South Africa, reaching settlement was an internal process which was largely negotiated independent of thirdparty mediators.

Peacekeeping Peacekeeping is the process of putting in an intermediary between the warring parties in order to stop violent conflict. This intermediary is generally a military force that is lightly armed and does not have the authority to use force. UN ‘‘blue helmets’’ are often seen monitoring cease-fires and guarding buffer zones between warring groups. In general, peacekeepers are largely unsuccessful if the warring parties they are monitoring do not wish to cease fighting.

Preventative Diplomacy It is also necessary to note the existence of preventative diplomacy. Preventative diplomacy is an attempt to resolve disputes

................. 16928$

$CH1

09-09-08 08:21:56

PS

PAGE 29

30

VANESSA E. SHIELDS AND NICHOLAS D. J. BALDWIN

through nonviolent means before full-scale violence erupts while—in contrast—peacebuilding is a process that is undertaken in order to prevent a recurrence of violent conflict. Preventative diplomacy can include placing UN or European Union (EU) sanctions on a state in order to pressure them to change their policies; assisting a state suffering from latent conflict with reforming their political institutions and security sector institutions before armed conflict erupts; or holding negotiation sessions with warring parties through a third-party mediator. Third-party mediation is often used to break deadlocks. The third party may be an individual, group, or institution and may pursue official (Track 1) or unofficial (Track 2) negotiation with the conflicting parties as was seen in Northern Ireland. However, as stated earlier, some conflicts do not utilize third-party mediators.

Peacebuilding and the International Community Former secretary general of the United Nations (1997–2006), Kofi Annan, said that post-conflict peacebuilding requires ‘‘a multifaceted approach, covering diplomatic, political and economic factors.’’17 In other words, institutional reform of the political and security sectors cannot be pursued in a vacuum. Focusing exclusively on structural reform of the political and security sectors in postconflict states—as this text does—should not be taken to imply that the many additional facets of peacebuilding—undertaken by both internal and external actors —including, but not limited to, economic transformation, enhancing educational opportunities (particularly for girls and women), managing reconciliation and truth commissions, establishing strong civil society, and encouraging the growth of independent media are not equally important. Indeed, these are vital components of a peacebuilding process. International organizations such as the UN, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are significant external actors involved in postconflict peacebuilding. Furthermore, regional organizations such as the EU and African Union (AU), as well as state-funded development organizations such as the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) and the German Agency for Development Cooperation (GTZ), and both

................. 16928$

$CH1

09-09-08 08:21:57

PS

PAGE 30

31

INTRODUCTION

local and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are also actively involved in peacebuilding activities. In taking the approach that we do, this book also does not focus on the work of donors, nonetheless, it should be recognized, however, that they do play an increasingly important and active role in postconflict peacebuilding as well as preventative diplomacy and promoting good governance in developing countries.18 Indeed, it is the donor community that has shaped, defined, and redefined the discourse on security sector reform, peacebuilding, good governance and conflict prevention, management, and transformation. The donor community has included these concepts in wider discussions on development and continues to search for ways to have a unified strategy not only for implementing reform projects but also in measuring their successes.19 According to the 2005 UN Human Development Report there are a number of coordination and policy problems that need to be rectified by the international community in order to improve the success of international interventions in postconflict states. To rectify these problems the international community continues to focus on improving institutional coordination and policy coherence. Institutional coordination is essential for preventing the duplication of projects. Furthermore, coordination is essential when working with both international and national civilian agencies and independent military commands. Policy coherence problems are common when international agencies pursue divergent goals without first ensuring that they complement existing mandates.20

Why Structural Reform? In chapter 14, Susan Booysen emphasizes the importance of inclusive and legitimate institutions that effectively channel postapartheid South Africans’ needs and frustrations in times of political turmoil. Booysen reiterates that the strength of these institutions helped to stabilize democracy in the fragile postsettlement period and that their continuing legitimacy has ‘‘helped bridge the second phase of institutional consolidation, namely that of retaining the esteem of institutions and the associated political processes in times of continuous policy deficits—in particular, the persistent gap between popular expectations and realization of effective policy implementation.’’21 Specific types

................. 16928$

$CH1

09-09-08 08:21:57

PS

PAGE 31

32

VANESSA E. SHIELDS AND NICHOLAS D. J. BALDWIN

of structural reform at the political level include the inclusion of minority groups through a power-sharing government system to mitigate a previous imbalance of power between the ruling party and politically underrepresented minority groups.22 Simon Roughneen says in his chapter on Sudan, ‘‘Democratic institution building is integral to preventing a return to violence.23 Democracy aims to inculcate behavioral norms such as negotiation, compromise, and cooperation among political actors. As such democracy can promote peace by giving hitherto marginalized groups access to decision making and resources.’’24 However, settlement and institution building certainly have limitations as half of all civil conflicts revert to violence within five years of settlement being reached. There are many factors which may increase the likelihood of a return to violence including lack of economic development, poor donor coordination and policies, work of conflict spoilers who continue to use violence as a means to maintain power, status, or wealth, and/or a lack of security sector reform which maintains feelings of insecurity.25 Coping with structural reforms and relational factors must be undertaken in a secure environment, therefore, the role of the security sector is an essential component of the process of structural reform.26 The security sector includes: core security actors such as the police, border patrols, customs, military, and intelligence forces; security management and oversight bodies such as the executive, national security advisory bodies, and civil society groups; justice and law enforcement institutions; and nonstatutory security forces such as private body guard units and private security companies, as explained below. Figure 1.2: The Security Sector • CORE SECURITY ACTORS armed forces; police; paramilitary forces; gendarmeries; presidential guards; intelligence and security services (both military and civilian); coast guards; border guards; customs authorities; and reserve or local security units (civil defense forces, national guards, militias). • SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT BODIES the executive; national security advisory bodies; legislature and legislative select committees; ministries of defense, internal affairs, foreign affairs; customary and traditional authorities; financial management bodies (finance ministries, budget offices, financial audit and planning units); and civil society organizations (civilian review boards and public complaints commissions).

................. 16928$

$CH1

09-09-08 08:21:57

PS

PAGE 32

33

INTRODUCTION

• JUSTICE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTIONS judiciary; justice ministries; prisons; criminal investigation and prosecution services; human rights commissions and ombudsmen; and customary and traditional justice systems. • NONSTATUTORY SECURITY FORCES liberation armies; guerrilla armies; private bodyguard units; private security companies; and political party militias. Source: Data from United Kingdom Department for International Development, ‘‘Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform’’ (2002), 7. www .dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/supportingsecurity.pdf

In general the goal of structural reform within the security sector is to create procedures designed to facilitate the management of conflict through peaceful means and create the conditions for the effective management, transparency, and accountability of the public sector. Through the reform or creation of democratic institutions in countries coming out of protracted conflict, establishing norms that political bargaining must be pursued with respect for the rule of law, as opposed to using violence, is imperative. However, in Sudan, Simon Roughneen stated that ‘‘poorly managed democratic institutions can also inflame communal conflicts [and] mobilize ethnicity while ‘a combination of majoritarian political institutions and elections can make things worse.’ ’’27 Indeed, structural reforms in themselves are not sufficient. In Cathy Gormley-Heenan’s chapter on Northern Ireland, she stated that ‘‘attitudes and perceptions of the key protagonists does not necessarily correlate with the actual structural reforms taking place’’ particularly when trust is broken after settlement as it was in Northern Ireland after the Police Service of Northern Ireland claimed that Sinn Fein was spying on their political opponents in Stormont (2002).

WHAT IS SECURITY SECTOR REFORM? ‘‘Security sector reform is the transformation of the security system which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions, so that it is managed and operated in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework. Responsible and accountable security forces reduce the risk of conflict, provide security for citizens and create the right environment for sustainable development. The overall objective of security sec-

................. 16928$

$CH1

09-09-08 08:21:58

PS

PAGE 33

34

VANESSA E. SHIELDS AND NICHOLAS D. J. BALDWIN

tor reform is to contribute to a secure environment that is conducive to development.’’ —Berghof Handbook Dialogue Series No. 2, 10

For states coming out of protracted conflict, reform of the security sector is often seen as a way to ease tension after settlement, foster trust, and limit the possibility of violent conflict in the future. It is for this reason that this book examines security sector reform alongside political reform due to the close—and oftentimes volatile—relationship between the military and political power.28 Nicole Ball stated that ‘‘the termination of civil war offers a unique opportunity to address fundamental imbalances between the security forces and the rest of society that contribute to conflict and insecurity and make sustainable, poverty-reducing development more difficult to achieve.’’29 In short, without proper democratic control of the security sector, including strong civilian oversight, expenditure management, accountability, transparency and good governance, it is difficult—if not impossible—to pursue peacebuilding and sustainable development goals. In protracted conflicts, the military, security, and intelligence forces can be responsible for perpetuating a sense of insecurity because they are closely involved with the political, economic, and social foundation of the state. Additionally, civilian governments may rely on the work of the state’s core security actors to maintain power. In effect, they become—or are seen to have become—part of the problem. Consequently, if the security sector is seen as part of the problem, it cannot be ignored during the peace process. The transformation of its role from a perpetrator of human rights abuses and human insecurity to one of a protector of human rights and human security can help ensure the serviceability of a peace accord long beyond the initial settlement period. Using the typology developed by Nicole Ball the case studies examined in this book include those in the negotiation and cessation of hostilities phases as well as the peacebuilding phases of transition and consolidation, as shown in the table. Within states coming out of protracted conflict, public distrust of the military, the police, and the intelligence forces are often substantial as the security sector is seen as—or indeed was—the perpetrator of human rights abuses, such as the displacement of civilians, disappearances, torture, murder and rape; as well as the destruction of farmland, businesses, schools, and hospitals. Overcoming this historical baggage can be incredibly

................. 16928$

$CH1

09-09-08 08:21:58

PS

PAGE 34

35

INTRODUCTION

Peace Processes The Peace Process in Countries with Negotiated Peace Settlements STAGES PHASES MAIN OBJECTIVES

Cessation of Conflict Negotiations Agreeing on key issues to enable fighting to stop

Peacebuilding

Cessation of Hostilities Signing peace accords Establishing ceasefire Separating forces

Transition

Consolidation

Establishing a government with adequate legitimacy to enable it to rule effectively

Continuing and deepening reform process

Implementing reforms to build political institutions and establish security

Continuing economic and social recovery efforts Continuing promotion of societal reconciliation

Inaugurating economic and social revitalization Promoting societal reconciliation Source: Data from Nicole Ball, ‘‘The Challenge of Rebuilding War-Torn Societies’’ in Turbulent Peace, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2001), 721–22.

difficult, but necessary for the effective consolidation of democracy and the establishment of a transparent and accountable security sector. Furthermore, the management of internal disagreements through political outlets (including public debate, elections, and through independent media, for example) and the effective and professional management of potential or actual violent conflict with respect for human rights and the rule of law is a central facet of democratization and securing a lasting peace beyond settlement. Indeed, the relationship between political institutions and the security sector is a strategic component of peacebuilding and crisis prevention. If structures are not in place to provide fundamental services (not least of all security) to citizens and to manage conflict through nonviolent means, future conflict may rise out of systemic maladies. Therefore, disengagement from politics by the security sector should be a part of a wider discourse on effective public management of the security sector. This is often easier in theory than in practice. In practice, obstacles stemming from a lack of administrative reform at the government level (which may be due to a lack of resources, the work of spoilers, or a lack of capacity) may in-

................. 16928$

$CH1

09-09-08 08:21:59

PS

PAGE 35

36

VANESSA E. SHIELDS AND NICHOLAS D. J. BALDWIN

hibit the mutual strengthening of civil and political institutions and the security sector itself.30 This may result in a lack of security sector reform resulting in a perpetuation of mistrust between citizens and the security sector, lack of demilitarization of citizens due to their mistrust of the security sector, an inability to provide civilian oversight of the security sector’s activities and budget, and abuse of power. Security sector reform was part of the development discourse in the 1960s where the proper role of the military was discussed, particularly regarding their use of financial resources and their intervention in political life.31 During the Cold War, development practitioners backed away from discussions on security sector issues because of the complicated political and ideological implications that followed from any such analysis. However, with the end of the Cold War and throughout the 1990s security sector reform became an increasingly important component of postconflict peacebuilding.32 However, it must be noted that there is no one model of security sector reform that is suitable in all contexts; the case studies on security sector reform contained in this collection all will emphasize this. According to Michael Brzoska there are, however, four broad areas that a reformed security sector should reach. At the political level the goal is to have objective and subjective civilian control of the military, for example, through a review of strategic options incorporating discussions on peace and disarmament, regional cooperation, and global arms control. At the economic development level it is necessary to look into restructuring both the expenditure and size of the security sector so that wider development and reconstruction projects can take place. At the institutional level the armed forces, police, and other forces (border and customs, for example) must professionalize. This includes improving management skills, upholding and respecting human rights norms and other necessary rules to govern the use of force, and balancing the need for new technology with cost reductions in the security sector. At the societal level civilian control of the security sector is paramount, including democratic, civilian oversight and improving the capacity of civil society to monitor and report on military, intelligence, and police matters in an accurate, balanced, and knowledgeable way.33 Programs designed to bring about the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of troops became increasingly

................. 16928$

$CH1

09-09-08 08:21:59

PS

PAGE 36

37

INTRODUCTION

popular during the 1990s, particularly in Africa and Latin America. Traditionally, DDR was carried out by UN peacekeepers. Today, however, development agencies such as DFID, USAID, and the GTZ—among others—are involved in this field. DDR takes place during both peacekeeping and peacebuilding phases and is also seen as a means to preventing deadly conflict.34 Disarmament is the collection, control, and disposal of small arms and light weapons of ex-combatants and—in some cases— armed civilians who may present a threat to moving beyond settlement. There are a variety of medium and long-term disarmament goals including establishing a system for the future management of weapons ownership, purchasing systems, and transfers both within states and among states. Effective crossborder controls, marking and tracing of arms, and training in weapons collection, destruction, and stockpile development are all important components of curbing the illicit trafficking, possession, and misuse of small arms and light weapons. A number of national, regional, and international frameworks have been established to regulate and advance these efforts, for example, through the South African Development Community Protocol on Firearms, Ammunition, and Related Materials and the UN Program of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons.35 The implementation of these protocols and programs can be seen as conflict prevention measures—including the prevention of the reemergence of conflict. The illicit trafficking and possession of small arms and light weapons in areas of high social, political, and economic tension may speed the transition into violent conflict. Equally, the presence of large numbers of illicit weapons can threaten the establishment of democratic governance, the process of refugee returns, and the rebuilding infrastructure (including, schools, hospitals, power stations, transport systems, and water and sewage treatment plants, for example). In short, it can undermine attempts to move beyond settlement. Demobilization is the process of downsizing or completely disbanding government troops and/or opposition forces. The reintegration of ex-combatants into society can include the provision of a compensation package, financial assistance, and/or jobrelated training to help them reintegrate into their communities. When the resources are available, psychological assistance is sometimes given to the former combatants, particularly to children and women, as well as to the communities and families who are receiving former combatants. Indeed, these combatants

................. 16928$

$CH1

09-09-08 08:22:00

PS

PAGE 37

38

VANESSA E. SHIELDS AND NICHOLAS D. J. BALDWIN

may have perpetrated crimes against families from their communities and therefore the reintegration phase of DDR can be embedded in a wider program of reconciliation and forgiveness.

Concluding Summary Political reform can contribute to peacebuilding in a number of ways including: • restructuring or redefining the power and scope of both the executive and legislative branches so that they are representative, inclusive, and responsive; • legitimizing and consolidating new government arrangements and systems; and • developing institutions through which conflicts may be managed and resolved without violence.

Security sector reform underpins and supports—indeed, it is the essential prerequisite for—the process of democratic institution building in postconflict states. However, there are a number of challenges to political sector reform to democratization in the aftermath of protracted conflict. These challenges include: poverty; alienation; mistrust between former warring parties; the absence of the rule of law and of a framework for the observance of human rights; strong ties between political elites and elements within the security sector; refugees and internally displaced people; the existence of ex-combatants; and institutional breakdown. The case studies contained within this collection outline the complexities involved in the processes of political and security sector reform. It is hoped that students and scholars, those involved in the fields of peace research and development, and concerned citizens will find this book introduction to what is surely one of the most significant—and necessary—areas of activity in the twenty-first century—namely, how states, how peoples, can move from conflict to lasting peace beyond settlement.

Notes 1. See Lynn Maurer, chapter 16. 2. See Marc Belanger, chapter 7. 3. Sudan’s conflicts are a series of center-periphery engagements in which

................. 16928$

$CH1

09-09-08 08:22:00

PS

PAGE 38

39

INTRODUCTION

marginalized non-Arab ethnic groups protest political and economic marginalization by the narrow Arab-tribal e´lite centred around Khartoum and the northern Sudanese River Nile. Thus, the North-South paradigm inherent to the CPA, although taking in the disputed areas of Abyei, Southern Blue Nile, and the Nuba mountains, does not fully reflect the multiplicity of social and political conflict in Sudan. 4. Monty G. Marshall, Third World War: System, Process, and Conflict Dynamics (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999). See the Center for Systemic Peace Web site for current trends: http://members.aol.com/CSPmgm/ conflict.htm. 5. This does not include indirect deaths of those people dying from starvation or disease in the aftermath of conflict. 6. Nils Petter Gleditsch, ‘‘Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset,’’ Journal of Peace Research 35 no. 5 (September 2002), 615–37. 7. David J. Singer and Melvin Small, The Wages of War, 1816–1965: A Statistical Handbook (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1972). 8. Robin Luckham, ‘‘Democratic Strategies for Security in Transition and Conflict’’ in Governing Insecurity, ed. Gavin Cawthra and Robin Luckham (New York: Zed Books, 2003). 9. See Center for the Study of Civil War at the International Peace Research Institute (PRIO), Oslo, and Uppsala Conflict Data Program at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, http:// new.prio.no/CSCW-Datasets/Data-on-Armed-Conflict/UppsalaPRIO-ArmedConf licts-Dataset/; and Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, Polity Data Set, http://www.cid cm.umd.edu/polity/. 10. Nils Petter Gleditsch, ‘‘Toward a democratic civil peace? Democracy, political change and civil war 1816–1992,’’ American Political Science Review 95 (2001), 33–48. 11. See Melvin Small and David J. Singer, ‘‘The War Proneness of Democratic Regimes, 1816–1965,’’ Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 1 (1976): 50–69; and David E. Spiro, ‘‘Give Democratic Peace a Chance? The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace,’’ International Security 19, no. 2 (Autumn 1994): 50–86. 12. David Collier and Steven Levitsky. ‘‘Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research,’’ World Politics 49, no. 3 (April 1997): 430–51. 13. United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report: New Dimensions of Human Security (New York: UNDP, 1994), 23. 14. Butros Butros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, Report of the Secretary General, A/47/277-S/ 24111, June 17, 1992. 15. See Amin Tarzi’s chapter 2 on Afghanistan. 16. See Cathy Gormley-Heenan’s chapter on ‘‘Northern Ireland: Securing the Peace.’’ 17. Kofi Annan, The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa, Report of the Secretary General, A/52/871-S/1998/318. 18. Nicole Ball, ‘‘The Challenge of Rebuilding War-Torn Societies,’’ Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aal (Washington, DC: USIP Press, 1996), 726.

................. 16928$

$CH1

09-09-08 08:22:01

PS

PAGE 39

40

VANESSA E. SHIELDS AND NICHOLAS D. J. BALDWIN

19. Clem McCartney, Martina Fischer, and Oliver Wills, eds., ‘‘Security Sector Reform: Potentials and Challenges for Conflict Transformation,’’ Berghof Handbook Dialogue Series No. 2 (Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2004), 24. 20. United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report: International Cooperation at a Crossroads (New York: UNDP, 2005), 177. 21. See Susan Booysen, chapter 14. 22. I. Harb, ‘‘Lebanon’s Confessionalism: Problems and Prospects,’’ United States Institute of Peace Briefing (March 2006). For the seminal articulation of this approach, see A. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977). 23. Half of all civil conflicts revert to violence within five years of a settlement being reached. There is burgeoning literature outlining the reasons for this: winner-take-all conceptions of politics and resources; insufficient international attention and inappropriate donor policies; continuing poverty; and an unreformed security sector all contribute to a return to violence—all of which apply to Sudan. See Paul Collier, Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy (Washington, DC, World Bank/Oxford University Press, 2003). 24. See Simon Roughneen, chapters 18 and 19. 25. Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy. (Washington D.C., World Bank/Oxford University Press, 2003). 26. Albrecht Schnabel and Hans-Georg Ehrhart, eds., Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding (Tokyo: United Nations Press, 2005), 3. 27. Ben Reilly and Peter Harris, eds., Democracy and Deep Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators, (Stockholm: Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 1998), 17. 28. Gavin Cawthra and Robin Luckham, ‘‘Democratic Control and the Security Sector: The Scope for Transformation and Its Limits’’ in Governing Insecurity (London: Zed Books, 2003). 29. Nicole Ball, ‘‘The Challenge of Rebuilding War-Torn Societies,’’ Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aal (Washington, DC: USIP Press, 1996), 725. 30. United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID), Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform (2002), 18. 31. Michael Brzoka, ‘‘The Concept of Security Sector Reform,’’ in Security Sector Reform, ed. Herbert Wulf, Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) (June 2000), 6. 32. Security sector reform is not exclusively pursued as a postconflict peacebuilding task. It is also utilized as a conflict prevention/democratization tool. However, this book focuses on the security sector reform in countries which have experienced—or are experiencing—protracted conflict. 33. Brzoka, ‘‘The Concept of Security Sector Reform,’’ 9–11. 34. Peggy Mason, ‘‘Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programs as a Means to Prevent Deadly Conflict,’’ in Security Sector Reform, ed. Herbert Wulf, Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) (June 2000), 37–43. 35. See International Action Network on Small Arms at http://www .iansa.org/ (particularly the Biting the Bullet Reports) as well as Small Arms Survey at http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/.

................. 16928$

$CH1

09-09-08 08:22:02

PS

PAGE 40

Afghanistan: Political Reform Amin Tarzi The Afghan State in Context

THE FALL OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN IN 1978 MARKED THE BE-

ginning of the end of Afghanistan as a nation-state. With foreigners at the helm, the period between 1979 and 1989 stripped Afghanistan of its national sovereignty and reduced it to a battlefield for the superpowers and its neighbors. Coming out of the Soviet occupation, Afghanistan was a skeleton of its former self, no longer a state, but rather a fragile, starved, fragmented nation. It is often difficult, if not unwise, to attempt to assign definite moments for the beginning or completion of the evolution of a state’s administrative structures. In the case of Afghanistan, there is ample documentary evidence to show that the rudimentary arrangement that existed in the first half of the nineteenth century, and was somewhat elaborated immediately prior to the Anglo-Afghan war of 1879–80, saw significant modifications and expansion in the 1880s and 1890s, in the reign of Amir ’Abd al-Rahman Khan. Most historians believe that the reign of Amir ’Abd al-Rahman (1880–1901) marks the beginning of the modern Afghan state. It was at this time that the country’s international boundaries were drawn and fixed by international treaties, central authority was firmly established over the entire land, and the law of the land became codified and was applied uniformly in newly established Afghan courts.1 Until the reign of ’Abd al-Rahman, Afghanistan was a loosely governed country, with many parts of it devoid of government (hukumat), areas which the amir often described as yaghistan or land of the unruly. It was his clear determination to impose the ordinance of government (a’in-i hukumat) on the entire domain over which he was sovereign. By conceding his foreign policy decisions to the British in return for guarantees of support in case of foreign (as he understood it, Russian) threat and for substantial subsidy payments, he was able to concentrate his energies 41

................. 16928$

$CH2

09-09-08 08:21:57

PS

PAGE 41

42

AMIN TARZI

and his resources on consolidating his internal authority. Among the strategies used by the amir in state building were indeed the use of terror, intimidation, and forced exile, all made possible by the creation of a strong, centralized, and surprisingly loyal national army. He also managed, with help from his British patron, to fix Afghan boundaries, thus creating a defined geographical entity over which to exercise his sovereignty.2 In the political entity formed by ’Abd al-Rahman, the central authority—i.e. the amir—had for the first time in Afghanistan’s short history as an emerging state, the monopoly over the use of physical violence—a prerequisite of the modern Weberian definition of a state. In the militarist tradition of state theory, Michael Mann writes that the state is ‘‘nothing in itself: it is merely the embodiment of physical forces in society. The state is not an arena where domestic economic/ideological issues are resolved, rather it is an arena in which military force is mobilized domestically and used domestically and, above all, internationally.’’3 The Afghan state formed in the later decades of the nineteenth century corresponded to Mann’s views with the exception of the use of physical violence internationally. What legitimized the ’Abd al-Rahman’s drive for creation of a centralized and defined state was an Islamization process which began with the reorganization and expansion of the judicial system. The amir inextricably linked the legitimacy of his rule (and the implicit illegitimacy of any opponents) to clearly understood Islamic notions of justice and governance, and he repeatedly insisted that any divergence from his rule was tantamount to deviation from Islam. Justice and good governance then were effected through visible, accessible mechanisms for local remedies for injustice. He consistently and repeatedly asserted the idea that if people obeyed the state (i.e., the amir), then they would not only ensure their own safety and security, but would also be afforded a defined, fair, and transparent system of judicial recourse.4 Through institutions, legitimized on Islam and centered on the amir himself, ’Abd al-Rahman began a process which continued with less or more rigor until the communist putsch in 1978. While on paper Afghanistan was a highly centralized state under ’Abd al-Rahman, in reality the center’s ability to effectively govern the peripheries was severely limited. Historically, government was viewed by a majority of Afghans as a usurper of their independence rather than a symbol of unity. ’Abd alRahman’s draconian measures plus his reliance on foreign

................. 16928$

$CH2

09-09-08 08:21:57

PS

PAGE 42

43

AFGHANISTAN: POLITICAL REFORM

protection enabled him to extend hukumat into the hitherto independent—or unruly—yaghistan; however, the process of decentralization began almost immediately after his death. During the twentieth Century, the relationship between the central Afghan authorities in Afghanistan and the outlying provinces generally was one of distrust and dependency rather than of cooperation for common cause.

Post-Taliban State Institution Building The process that has led to the establishment of the current institutional order—after the collapse of the Taliban regime— was designed during a hastily arranged meeting of Afghan personalities in Bonn. The ‘‘Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions,’’ known as the ‘‘Bonn Agreement,’’ led to the establishment of the Interim Authority in Afghanistan in December 2001 and the transfer of power to the Transitional Authority of Afghanistan in June 2002. The Bonn Agreement envisaged holding free elections in the country by June 2004.5 Fulfilling these requirements was challenging, particularly because Afghanistan has very little state structure, a quarter of a century of armed conflict with outside forces, and internal wars supported by foreign backers. Executive The cornerstone of the Bonn Agreement was the establishment of the executive branch of the Afghan governing system. Under the agreement, Hamid Karzai was designated in absentia as interim chairman, and a skeletal executive structure was formed. The governing body consisted of five vice-chairs and twenty-four department heads, which ostensibly acted as cabinet ministers. To assist the nascent executive branch in establishing political control and security, the international community provided additional support through the United Nations and the International Security Armed Forces (ISAF). The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) had two main areas of responsibility: political affairs and relief, recovery, and reconstruction.6 The UNAMA was tasked to monitor the status and implementation of the Bonn Agreement and to provide assis-

................. 16928$

$CH2

09-09-08 08:21:57

PS

PAGE 43

44

AMIN TARZI

tance to the Afghan authorities. ISAF’s initial mandate was to provide security in Kabul to allow the executive the space to establish and centralize control without interference from various armed political groups vying for power in the vacuum left by the demise of the Taliban. Under the Bonn Agreement, the head of the executive branch was designed to be the mechanism through which Afghanistan would begin its steps toward becoming a state and then a democracy. The Bonn Agreement called for the creation of a constitution prior to the holding of elections to establish a legislative branch. Normally, the legislative structure provides the constitutional frameworks. In the case of Afghanistan under the Bonn Agreement, the executive, with UNAMA support, oversaw and directed the formulation of Afghanistan’s new constitution. Contrary to democratic principles, the constitutional process was conducted in secrecy. Instead, Afghanistan was issued a draft constitution in November 2003, incorporating a strong presidential system. The Afghan public was then given one month to debate the draft before it went to the Constitutional Loya Jirga for adoption.7 Viewed retrospectively, the planners of Afghanistan’s march to nation-statehood were forging a scheme around a particular individual not the system. That individual was Hamid Karzai, until then a relatively unknown Afghan political personality.8 Focus on personality rather than institutions resonated with Afghanistan’s historical evolution of statehood. Reflecting back to ’Abd al-Rahman and his top-down approach to centralize power and provide security, it makes sense in Afghanistan to focus on establishing a strong executive first. However, from the outset, challenging the executive’s strength and this historical identification of a strong leader was the presence, in the executive structure, of the National Islamic United Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (Jabha-ye Mottahed-e Islami-ye Melli Baraye Nejat-e Afghanistan)—better known as the ‘‘Northern Alliance.’’ While Karzai was selected as the chairman of the Interim Administration for Afghanistan in Bonn, initially real levers of power were in the hands of the Northern Alliance, represented by the triumvirate of Vice-Chair and Minister of Defense Muhammad Qasem Fahim, Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Abdullah, and Minister of Interior Muhammad Yunos Qanuni. The Northern Alliance, in violation of the Bonn Agreement, remained in Kabul and maintained control of the military.

................. 16928$

$CH2

09-09-08 08:21:58

PS

PAGE 44

45

AFGHANISTAN: POLITICAL REFORM

As Max Weber defines state, a state must have a monopoly over the use of physical violence.9 For the constitution to have any merit and to carry out the elections, the state must have/ exert control over the use of physical force. Karzai asserted, ‘‘[a] constitution will be meaningless without a central army, a central police force, without the measures that are necessary to give the Afghan people the freedom to exercise their right to vote.’’10 The splintering of the key functions of state divided the executive branch’s authority between the Northern Alliance and the executive, leaving the executive exposed. Because of this, the executive sought to ensure his political authority and thus needed to have success in the constitutional process. This led to the sacrifice of democratic principles in return for political victory. The Constitutional Loya Jirga approved a revised version of the draft constitution, simultaneously praised as ‘‘a milestone on the Afghan people’s path to democracy’’11 and chastised as a ‘‘step backwards for democracy.’’12 As an expediency measure to gain approval for a highly centralized governmental structure with a strong executive, deals were struck with conservative religious groups and personalities. The most glaring concession in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is found within Article 3. In the draft version of the constitution, Article 3 stated that ‘‘no law can be contrary to the sacred religion of Islam’’ and the values enshrined in the constitution. In the adopted version, the article, which now stipulates that in ‘‘Afghanistan, no law can be contrary to the beliefs and provisions of the sacred religion of Islam.’’13 was amended to include the additional term ‘‘mu’taqedat [beliefs]’’ and omitted the reference to the values enshrined in the constitution.14 The inherently vague and contradictory nature of Article 3 tested Afghanistan’s democratic nature, at least in the Western world’s viewpoint. On the one hand, Islam is central to the constitution, and the country is officially an Islamic republic, not a secular state. On the other hand, the constitution requires the state to abide by its international agreements, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which has a clear provision on freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, including the right to change one’s religion.15 The much-celebrated March 2006 case of ’Abd al-Rahman, the man who was on trial in Kabul for having abandoned the religion of his birth for Christianity, brought this issue to the forefront. ’Abd al-Rahman was presented with the choice of reconverting to

................. 16928$

$CH2

09-09-08 08:21:58

PS

PAGE 45

46

AMIN TARZI

Islam or to be judged according to Islamic law. Under the Hanafi school of jurisprudence, adhered to by Afghanistan’s Sunni majority and privileged by the Afghan Constitution, apostasy—the rejection of Islam in favor of another religion—is a crime punishable by death.16 The case against ’Abd al-Rahman could be deemed unconstitutional or constitutional depending on whether the judges are conservative or reformers.17 While ’Abd alRahman’s case was solved through intervention of the executive, with pressure from abroad, the case revealed that Afghanistan’s democratic tools, including the Constitution, are beholden to a person, the executive, not institutions and laws. This can very easily lead to the denigration of democratic values within a society. The fragile democracy in Afghanistan is protected right now because of the individual at the helm. For democracy to flourish in the long term, institutions and laws need to be put in place so that personality and personal preferences do not dictate the state under which the society functions. Elections To promote institutional construction, the Bonn Agreement established June 2004 as the deadline for general elections. The first two and a half years were dedicated to establishing a strong centralized authority and crafting the constitutional framework for the country. The next step in the democratization process was the involvement of the general electorate in decision making. In July 2003, the Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB) was established to oversee Afghanistan’s electoral process. JEMB membership was composed of the UN and the executive branch. This allowed the executive branch to have direct access to, and thus significant influence on, the electoral process. In a commentary, Kabul daily Arman-e Melli voiced the grievances heard around the country regarding the partiality of the JEMB. According to the paper, JEMB’s leadership was selected by Karzai, and the body ‘‘acts directly according to the instructions of the central government.’’18 The foreign employees of the JEMB were selected by the UNAMA which, according to Arman-e Melli, ‘‘[was] not expected to act impartially,’’19 as judged by its involvement in Afghan affairs and support of the executive branch. Since Karzai was a candidate for the presidency, and he also formed the ‘‘election office and [ran] all government facilities for his election campaign,’’20 the commentary argue that the ‘‘elections will, by no means, be free and fair.’’21 Furthermore,

................. 16928$

$CH2

09-09-08 08:21:59

PS

PAGE 46

47

AFGHANISTAN: POLITICAL REFORM

according to figures gathered by the BBC prior to the election, the head of the transitional administration had control ‘‘over 75% of all state TV and radio coverage’’ dealing with the election campaign.22 Concern that democratic processes would be stifled continued to mount as election day approached. The growing influence of warlords in the electoral process was also a concern. Warlords were using intimidation tactics to ensure they or their candidates received votes.23 While the international community and the Afghan administration were growing more concerned about the threats from the Taliban and other insurgent and terrorist outfits, the majority of the Afghan populace, said they feared the local factional leaders and military commanders—namely warlords.24 Afghans stated that their country had a ‘‘warlord problem; a problem with military factions dominating government and national institutions, including local governments and the army, police, and intelligence services.’’25 Karzai, following the Weberian concept of state, campaigned on a security platform.26 Karzai explained that his main campaign theme would be ‘‘the question of security for the Afghan people now, [and] in the future the building of national institutions that will enable’’ the Afghans to provide for their own security.27 However, due to mounting concerns over violence and technical difficulties, on March 28, 2004, Karzai announced that elections were to be postponed until September 2004. He explained, ‘‘We are focused on having both presidential and parliamentary elections at the same time . . . [but] the UN and the electoral commission said, ’If you want the presidential election, we can have it on time [in June], but if you want both the presidential and parliamentary elections together, it is not possible due to some technical problems.’ That is why we have decided to have them both in September.’’28 Special Representative of the Secretary General for Afghanistan, Jean Arnault, told a news conference in Kabul the same day in which Karzai spoke that the delaying of Afghan elections would allow time for the UN-backed Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) program to disarm a large number of militiamen. According to Arnault, free and fair elections were impossible as long as unauthorized armed factions existed.29 presidential elections In an unexpected turn of events, in July 2004 the JEMB with the approval of the executive branch decided to hold the presi-

................. 16928$

$CH2

09-09-08 08:22:00

PS

PAGE 47

48

AMIN TARZI

dential election first, followed by parliamentary elections. The departure from the need to hold joint presidential and parliamentary elections has not been fully explored. With the DDR program behind schedule, it was not a result of improved security conditions or lessening of warlord intimidation that drove the electoral process. Already the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) had deemed the situation in Afghanistan too difficult for holding free and fair elections in accordance with international standards.30 As such, OSCE refused to monitor the election, instead opting to ‘‘put together a set of recommendations’’ to be used in future elections in the country.31 Was Afghanistan ready for this election or were the framers of the Bonn Agreement more interested in checking boxes on their task list than ensuring the proper conditions were in place to hold Afghanistan’s first-ever democratic presidential election? The campaign for Afghanistan’s first open presidential elections began in August 2004 with eighteen candidates competing for the country’s highest office. According to JEMB numbers, over 10.5 million Afghans from an estimated population of over twenty million registered to vote, of which over 41 percent were women.32 The overwhelming response of the general populace and the high level of participation of women, who in recent history had been completely denied a public voice, instilled a sense of hope in democracy and its process. Thus, over eight million of the registered voters cast votes on an unseasonably cold day in October to exercise their political voice and participate in governing their lives. The election resulted in Karzai winning over 55 percent of the vote, followed by Muhammad Yonus Qanuni, head of a newly formed political party, who secured 16 percent of the votes.33 Despite low expectations for a free and fair election and the overarching state of insecurity in parts of the country, the fact that the presidential election took place at all was regarded by most observers, Afghan and international alike, as a monumental achievement. William Safire, writing in the New York Times, referred to the election as ‘‘the Afghan Miracle,’’ and in challenging the OSCE’s assessment of irregularities, commented that ‘‘the most irregular thing in that part of the world is anything approximating a free election.’’34 Of course, there were irregularities which Karzai himself acknowledged. However, Karazi accepted these irregularities as an indication of people exercising their democratic power enthusiastically instead of as a

................. 16928$

$CH2

09-09-08 08:22:00

PS

PAGE 48

49

AFGHANISTAN: POLITICAL REFORM

violation of democratic principles. When questioned in August 2004 about whether he was bothered by allegations that some Afghan voters had obtained more than one voting card, Karzai answered, ‘‘As a matter of fact, it doesn’t bother me . . . [if] Afghans have two registration cards, and if they would like to vote twice, well, welcome. This is an exercise in democracy. Let them exercise it twice.’’35 He continued on to suggest that multiple voting would not affect the outcome of the election anyway, which led certain observers to question the results of the election.36 Despite this, after the elections, even the OSCE admitted that even though there were ‘‘irregularities . . . the election was a remarkable accomplishment given the security and infrastructure problems.’’37 For the average Afghan citizen, the elections and promise of democracy generated very high expectations. Afghanistan has lived through republicanism, socialism, Islamism, and Talibanism, while democracy, as alien as the idea may have been to the average Afghan, ushered the hope of security and prosperity. According to a 2006 survey,38 the highest percentage of respondents—41 percent—said that democracy would bring them peace, followed by freedom (37 percent); rights and law (33 percent); and Islamic democracy (31 percent).39 The majority of Afghans, however, were hesitant to label elections as the ‘‘most important’’ component of democracy. They were simply a first step in a very long journey. parliamentary elections After the October 2004 presidential election, eleven months passed before the long-awaited parliamentary elections were held. In the interim, the newly elected executive branch of government ruled by decree without any checks or balances on its power. Despite OSCE recommendations to create an ‘‘interim consultative body to which the President’’ would be accountable,40 no oversight mechanisms were established, further cementing the authority of the executive and challenging the authority and role of the soon-to-be-elected parliament. On September 18, 2005, Afghans went to the polls again to elect their country’s legislature—members of the National Assembly’s lower house Wolesi Jirga (People’s Council)—and also to elect Provincial Council members to represent Afghanistan’s thirty-four provinces on a local level. Another local election was to occur at the same time; however, these District Council elec-

................. 16928$

$CH2

09-09-08 08:22:00

PS

PAGE 49

50

AMIN TARZI

tions were postponed indefinitely, in large part due to disagreements over jurisdictional limits and numbers of districts in the country.41 This complicated the formation of the upper house, a third of whose members were to be drawn from the District Council leaders. Legislature The success of the presidential election invigorated the populace to enter into the parliamentary electoral process. Approximately 5,800 candidates, including 582 women, competed for seats in the Wolesi Jirga and Provincial Councils. As Article 83 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan stipulates, at least two female delegates were to be elected from each province, guaranteeing a minimum of 64 female representatives among the 249 members of Wolesi Jirga. In the absence of the district council elections, the National Assembly would lack a fully representative upper house or 102-member Meshrano Jirga (Elder’s Council). According to Article 84 of the Afghan constitution, members of the Meshrano Jirga are to be taken from the Provincial and District Councils (one-third each), with the remaining one-third of members appointed by the president ‘‘from among experts and experienced personalities—including two representatives from the disabled and impaired and two representatives from the kuchis [nomads].’’ To ensure female representation, half of the presidential appointees must be women under the constitution.42 Thus, responding to the new constitution’s provisions, candidates poured out of every province at the outset of the call for candidates. However, the year between the presidential and parliamentary elections lessened people’s enthusiasm for democracy and what they envisioned as the hope of democracy. Security and prosperity did not arrive. As a twenty-two-year old Kabul resident told Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), many of the people’s expectations following the presidential election remained largely unmet, and this led to a frustration which made people react differently toward the parliamentary and Provincial Council elections.43 When the parliamentary and provincial election finally occurred, the turnout was lower than in the presidential election. According to JEMB’s official statistics, approximately 53 percent of Afghans voted in the parliamentary and Provincial Council elections as compared to the over 70 percent of registered

................. 16928$

$CH2

09-09-08 08:22:01

PS

PAGE 50

51

AFGHANISTAN: POLITICAL REFORM

voters who had participated in the presidential election.44 Voter participation in Kabul was just 36 percent—lower than in many far-off provinces where threats against candidates and voters were much more prevalent.45 Furthermore, voters were turned off by the presence of former and current warlords and notorious human rights abusers— including former communist and Taliban strongmen—on the candidates’ lists. There were also candidates with little or no public recognition on the lists. This latter point was made worse by the short campaign period, which prevented unknown candidates from reaching out to voters. Prior to the 2005 polls, when confronted with the fact that many people with very murky backgrounds were standing as parliamentary or Provincial Council candidates, Afghan President Karzai stated that the Afghans would choose the right candidates to represent them.46 However, public confidence in democracy waned even more as warlords and criminals accompanied other elected parliamentarians to their seats in government. During the electoral process, the executive sought to reduce the influence of political parties. Afghanistan’s Political Parties Law was drafted in September 2003. This law permitted the formation of political parties and was seen as fundamental to the success of the electoral process. However, it languished in the cabinet for ‘‘nearly a year’’ before being approved.47 The delay had significant repercussions on the development of political dialogue during the lead up to the elections. Only those political parties with established infrastructure, namely the former mujahedin, the former communists, and to some degree the Taliban, were able to garner political support based on ideology or political issues rather than personality. Newcomers did not have the time to organize before the elections and thus, had to depend on personal recognition and individual political platforms. Furthermore, the adoption of the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system in 2005 for the parliamentary and Provincial Council elections resulted in further minimizing the ability to enter into collective political debate. The executive’s justification for backing SNTV—a system used very rarely around the globe—was that it would prevent ‘‘large regional or ethnic parties or parties associated with violence, illegal militias or the drug trade from entering and controlling the parliament through bribery and coercion.’’48 Other reasons provided by the administration were that the system made vote counting simpler and that it would ‘‘be easier to convey election results to a largely

................. 16928$

$CH2

09-09-08 08:22:02

PS

PAGE 51

52

AMIN TARZI

rural and uneducated population.’’49 According to Thomas Rutting, SNTV resulted in political parties ‘‘reduc[ing] their activities and the internal reform mechanisms fail[ing].’’50 The International Crisis Group (ICG) criticized the administration’s reliance on SNTV, commenting that instead of ‘‘empowering political parties essential for a successful political transition,’’ SNTV undermined the development of ‘‘nascent democratic groupings,’’ and more importantly, allowed the established Islamist groups access to power.51 The elections resulted in an absence of fresh political dialogue. With dialogue and debate on key political and social issues absent, the executive remained secure, unchallenged by political shifts or opposing political winds. As anticipated, the election results for the Wolesi Jirga ushered in those from the established political groupings from Afghanistan’s history— the mujahedin, the Taliban, and the communists. There were some successful independents, technocrats, and tribal leaders unaffiliated with political parties also brought into the new parliament, which demonstrated Afghanistan’s willingness to move beyond its history for a new political discussion.52 Within the Wolesi Jirga, parliamentary groups formed; however, their role in representative governing was minimal. According to a report produced by the ICG, these groups ‘‘have no direct links to grassroots membership’’ outside the parliament and are based on the European ‘‘practice of allowing many small parties in legislature to come together to give some order to proceedings.’’53 Since many ‘‘impulses’’ for the creation of these groups, such as regional, linguistic and tribal, are barred, the report deems their existence as ‘‘meaningless.’’54 functionality of the legislature While it is too early to draw a meaningful conclusion on the working of the Afghan National Assembly and Provincial Councils as tools in consolidating Afghanistan’s nascent democratic experience, the first few weeks of parliament illustrated two trends that bode well for democratic development. First, the Wolesi Jirga appeared prepared to pursue a populist agenda whenever circumstances allowed it to do so. Second, the Wolesi Jirga demonstrated that it would challenge the executive branch’s seemingly exclusive hold on power.55 Two examples of the latter are the election of Qanuni, the leader of the National Understanding Front, the largest unoffi-

................. 16928$

$CH2

09-09-08 08:22:02

PS

PAGE 52

53

AFGHANISTAN: POLITICAL REFORM

cial opposition bloc in the Wolesi Jirga, as the speaker of the Wolesi Jirga and the confirmation process of cabinet and supreme court nominees. After much backdoor maneuvering, Qanuni was elected as the body’s speaker by a narrow margin of 122 votes to 117 over ’Abd al-Rabb al-Rasul Sayyaf, the leader of a former mujahedin party and the candidate favored by Karzai.56 During the confirmation hearings of Karzai’s cabinet and Supreme Court nominees in April and in August respectively, the Wolesi Jirga illustrated a degree of independence from the executive branch by rejecting five of the twenty-five cabinet nominees and not accepting Karzai’s nominee for the Supreme Court’s Chief Justice on grounds of qualifications.57 In February 2006 the Wolesi Jirga began reviewing all the executive decrees that had been passed in the absence of the National Assembly as stipulated by Article 161 of the Afghan Constitution and under which the executive had been governing. One of the first reviews undertaken by the Wolesi Jirga was the review of the executive decrees relating to the makeup of the cabinet and the Supreme Court. The Wolesi Jirga now is beholden to review other laws and regulations. The test will be by which mechanism or under which principles the laws will be reviewed. Some laws, such as the law on mass media decreed by Karzai days before the inauguration of the National Assembly in December 2005, are reportedly under review by the Wolesi Jirga’s committee in charge of religious, cultural, and educational affairs.58 Of concern is that this committee, which is dominated by the conservative members of the Wolesi Jirga, apparently wants to ‘‘prevent the occurrence of an ideological crisis’’ in Afghan society and ‘‘bind the private and state-run media to respect [Afghan] customs, culture, and religion.’’59 If the committee manages to change the mass media law, Afghanistan may lose one of its greatest post-Taliban achievements—a relatively free media. Another concern is the lethargy of some of the parliamentarians to represent the Afghan people. These elected and appointed officials have been slow thus far to link the executive branch of the government to their constituencies. The gap between center and the periphery seems to be widening, as the representatives seem more focused on their own political survival than on the concerns and issues facing their constituents. Some members of the National Assembly have argued in private that until they gain power and recognition in the center, they cannot help their districts or provinces.

................. 16928$

$CH2

09-09-08 08:22:03

PS

PAGE 53

54

AMIN TARZI

Decentralization Afghanistan’s history as a distinct political entity began in 1747 when Ahmad Khan Abdali—later Ahmad Shah Durrani— carved a mini empire out of the Safavid and Mughal empires in what is modern-day Iran and India/Pakistan respectively. The Durrani system of administration was based on a loosely governed system of token allegiance by the outlying areas to the capital, Kandahar, and later Kabul. Centralization of the Afghan state began in the early nineteenth century, and the country became a unified state during the reign of ’Abd al-Rahman. In the twentieth century, the fragile and rudimentary centralized state structure began to unravel after the communist takeover in 1978 and the invasion by the Soviet Union a year later. The state ceased to exist in any tangible measure after the Mujahedin took control of Kabul in 1992. The Taliban, while trying to restore some form of formal control over the country, lacked the capacity to rule a multi-ethnic country and also became pawns of international terrorists. This latter occurrence, of course, resulted in the establishment of the current political order. The Bonn Agreement set out to reverse the years devoid of a functioning governmental system by first establishing a strong centralized authority based on democratic principles. To reach decentralization, one must start with centralization. The current Afghan Constitution is based on a highly centralized system of government. Once a strong, centralized government elected by the people has established law and order in the land, power can be devolved to the provinces and districts. This will be a challenge in Afghanistan because this concept of centralized authority, while rooted in Afghanistan’s history, is in contrast to Afghanistan’s experience during the past quarter of a century. This most recent history has found the outlying provinces either completely free of Kabul’s authority or demanding that Kabul, the center, meet their demands. Constitutionally, the decentralization process in Afghanistan is based on the concept of the Provincial Councils and District Councils. Article 138 of the Constitution stipulates that each of the country’s thirty-four provinces will maintain a Provincial Council that is to ‘‘take part in securing the development targets of the state and improving its affairs in a way stated by law’’ and give ‘‘advice on important issues falling within the domain of each province.’’60 The key word in the function of the Provincial Councils is ‘‘advice.’’ Thus far the Provincial Councils have

................. 16928$

$CH2

09-09-08 08:22:04

PS

PAGE 54

55

AFGHANISTAN: POLITICAL REFORM

done little in terms of empowering the provinces to share governance with Kabul. The smallest official devolution forums—the District Councils—are yet to be elected. Prior to the election of the Provincial Councils in December 2004, a UN Development Program mission on local governance visited Afghanistan. According to UN Special Representative Arnault, this mission recommended a ‘‘gradualist approach to the empowerment of these bodies.’’61 Arnault elaborated more on the yet-to-be-elected councils saying that ‘‘for the time being, the councils could be given an advisory role to the executive bodies at the local level.’’62 In November 2006, the ICG put forth a series of recommendations to counter the mounting problems of insurgency in Afghanistan, some of which focused on devolution of power from the center to the periphery. The ICG suggested that the Afghan National Assembly delineate administrative boundaries and pass laws for district and municipal elections as well as create a ‘‘special commission on subnational governance to examine devolution of more powers and budget to the provinces.’’63 In at least one case, more power was given to the provinces by NATO. However, NATO was not following a parliamentary recommendation but rather sought an expedient solution to mounting violence in one of the most volatile districts in southern Afghanistan. By empowering traditional tribal structures, NATO-ISAF (International Security Armed Forces) hoped to minimize losses of NATO forces and increase security in the region. In mid-October 2006, British forces serving with ISAF under NATO direction evacuated Helmand Province’s Musa Qal’a district. Musa Qal’a was considered a stronghold of the insurgents. ISAF commander British General David Richards explained this move as ‘‘a desire’’ on NATO’s part ‘‘to do what the people want.’’64 Richards insisted that a deal was not made with the insurgents but rather was ‘‘with local elders principally.’’65 Helmand Governor Mohammad Da’ud argued that NATO’s deal on Musa Qal’a was not a defeat for the Afghan government, adding that the ‘‘government’s flag will fly’’ over the district offices.66 Qari Mohammad Yusof, speaking for the Taliban, contradicted the governor’s claims, asserting that the Afghan government’s flag would not fly over Musa Qal’a nor would the government run the affairs of that district.67 No matter which flag is flying over Musa Qal’a’s district offices, the manner in which the devolution has occurred—with pressure by a violent

................. 16928$

$CH2

09-09-08 08:22:04

PS

PAGE 55

56

AMIN TARZI

opposition—stands as a step backward in Afghanistan’s statebuilding and democratization process.

Conclusion After the Taliban period, Afghanistan was left without functioning political structures. The building of democratic institutions in the post-Taliban era can be viewed both as an amazing success story and as a squandered opportunity. When compared to the draconian rule of the Taliban and its predecessor Mujahedin and Soviet-installed regimes, the post-Taliban experience can be deemed a success. Opening the political system up to all Afghans, including women, within a short time is a major achievement. The nascent democratic structures, while fledging, give hope to the promise of representative governance. However, the action plan under the Bonn Agreement created unrealistic expectations in a country ravaged by decades of war and lacking in formal democratic institutions. The overemphasis on democratic tools, such as elections, rather than the end state has led to many missed opportunities, and sexy facades have marked ‘‘success’’ in Afghanistan to the detriment of sound political institutional construction.68 Instead of using the Potemkin village model of development, Afghanistan must focus on bringing security and justice through governance to its people. ‘‘For Afghanistan to become a more inclusive and tolerant society, merely holding elections and putting other democratic institutions in place does not make the country a democracy. The country needs to work on a long-term program to establish a civil society, including a reformed and balanced judiciary.’’69 Until this is done, Afghanistan will continue in the vicious cycle of a failed state plagued by violence and will see an increasing disillusionment with the very concept of democracy. The building of long-term functional institutions in Afghanistan is hampered by the ongoing insurgency, while the insurgency feeds off the weak institutions. The Commander of U.S.led Combined Forces Command—Afghanistan, Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, testified in the U.S. House of Representatives in June 2006 and emphasized that ‘‘[t]he enemy we face is not particularly strong, but the institutions of the Afghan state remain relatively weak.’’70 Eikenberry’s point is a reminder that parts of Afghanistan have become devoid of hukumat. Governance must return and reach all of Afghanistan. The centralized

................. 16928$

$CH2

09-09-08 08:22:05

PS

PAGE 56

57

AFGHANISTAN: POLITICAL REFORM

government must empower the existing subgovernment structures and link them into the larger national framework to ensure a cohesive political system. The democratic experiment in Afghanistan has a long way to go. Elections and forming formal political institutions are but the very beginning in a long journey on the road less traveled in current state-building strategies. Afghanistan needs to look beyond facades and delve into the hard work of laying solid foundations upon which to construct a representative government.

Notes I wish to thank Erika Tarzi for her ideas and for reviewing this piece. 1. Amin Tarzi, ‘‘The Judicial State: Evolution and Centralization of the Courts in Afghanistan, 1883–1896’’ (PhD diss. New York University, 2003), 2. 2. Ibid. 306. 3. Michael Mann, ‘‘The Autonomous Power of the State,’’ in Political Geography: A Reader, ed. John Agnew (London: Arnold, 1997), 59. 4. Tarzi, ‘‘The Judicial State,’’ 306. 5. For a full official text of the Bonn Agreement, see ‘‘Letter dated 5 December 2001 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council,’’ UN Security Council document S/2001/1154, December 5, 2001. 6. ‘‘Rebuilding Afghanistan: The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA),’’ Henry L. Stimson Center, Peace Operations Backgrounder, June 2002 www.stimpson.org. 7. See Amin Tarzi, ‘‘Why The Delay In Afghanistan’s Constitutional Loya Jirga?’’ in Crosslines Afghanistan Monitor, no. 5 (October 1, 2003): 18–19; Amin Tarzi, ‘‘Afghanistan’s New Constitution: Towards Consolidation or Fragmentation?,’’ in RFE/RL Afghanistan Report 2, no. 3 (January 16, 2003), www.rferl.org/afghan-report; ‘‘Afghanistan’s Flawed Constitutional Process,’’ International Crisis Group (ICG), Asia Report, no. 56 (June 12, 2003), www .crisisgroup.org; Farooq Wardak, ‘‘Response Of The Secretariat Of The Constitutional Commission On The ICG Report’’ (July 1, 2003), www .constitution-afg.com. Also see Nigel J. R. Allen, ‘‘Rethinking Government in Afghanistan,’’ in Journal of International Affairs 56, no 1 (Spring 2003): 193– 202. 8. Amin Tarzi, ‘‘Karzai, Hamid (1957–)’’ in Encyclopedia of World Terrorism 1999–2002 ed. Frank Shanty and Raymond Picquet (Armonk, NY: Sharpe Reference, 2003), 184–85. 9. Maximillan Weber, ‘‘Politik als Beruf,’’ speech delivered at Munich University, 1918, published in 1919 by Duncker & Humblodt, Munich. English translation entitled ‘‘Politics as a Vocation’’ obtained from Pfeiffer University Web site www2.pfeiffer.edu/-Iridener/DSS/Weber/polvoc.html. 10. Farhan Bokhari, ‘‘Hamid Karzai Interview,’’ Financial Times, April 23, 2003, www.ft.com. 11. Zalmay Khalilzad, ‘‘Afghanistan’s Milestone,’’ Washington Post, January 6, 2006. Khalilzad at the time of writing his commentary served as the Spe-

................. 16928$

$CH2

09-09-08 08:22:06

PS

PAGE 57

58

AMIN TARZI

cial Presidential Envoy and Ambassador of the United States to Afghanistan. He is regarded as one of the main forces managing to obtain an agreement on the final version of the constitution. 12. James Ingalls, ‘‘The New Afghan Constitution: A Step Backwards for Democracy,’’ Foreign Policy in Focus (March 2004), www.fpif.org. 13. Da Afghanistan asasi qanun/Qanun-e asasi-ye Afghanistan, (Kabul: Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan Constitutional Commission Secretariat, 2004), 1. 14. See Amin Tarzi, ‘‘Apre`s l’adoption de al Constitution,’’ in Les Nouvelles d’Afghanistan, no. 104 (March 2004) 3–6; Amin Tarzi, ‘‘Afghanistan’s New Constitution Is Flawed,’’ in Afghanistan, ed. Jann Einfeld (Detroit: Thomson Gale, 2005), 42–45. 15. Article 7 of the Afghan Constitution stipulates that the ‘‘state shall abide by the UN Charter, international treaties, international conventions that Afghanistan has signed, and by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.’’ 16. Amin Tarzi, ‘‘Apostasy Case Reveals Constitutional Contradictions,’’ in RFE/RL Afghanistan Report 5, no. 9 (April 3, 2006). 17. Amin Tarzi, ‘‘Limits to Afghan Democracy,’’ San Francisco Chronicle, March 26, 2006. 18. ‘‘There Will Be No Free and Fair Elections,’’ Arman-e Milli (Kabul), August 4, 2004. Obtained from and translated by Open Source Center (OSC), www.opensource.gov. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid. 21. Ibid. 22. Andrew North, ‘‘Heavy Poll Bias Towards Karzai,’’ BBC, October 4, 2004 http://www.bbc.co.uk. 23. See ‘‘The Rule of the Gun: Human Rights Abuses and Political Repression in the Run-up to Afghanistan’s Presidential Election,’’ Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, September 2004, www.hrw.org. 24. Ibid. 2. 25. Ibid. 26. While not investing much political or military capital to sideline the warlords, in the run-up to the elections, Karzai did manage to make a few inroads in curbing the power of warlords within the executive branch such as he appointed Muhammad Isma’il Khan, the self-styled amir (commander/ruler) of Herat as a cabinet minister and did not choose his powerful Defense Minister Marshall Muhammad Qasem Fahim as his running mate; see Amin Tarzi, ‘‘Mas’ud’s Legacy,’’ RFE/RL Afghanistan Report 3, no. 27 (August 5, 2004) and Amin Tarzi, ‘‘Herat: A Prelude To The End of Warlordism?,’’ RFE/RL Afghanistan Report 3, no. 34 (September 14, 2004). Internationally, the United States reportedly pressured Pakistan to curb the Taliban during the election; see ‘‘Afghanistan: From Presidential to Parliamentary Elections,’’ ICG Asia Report, no. 88 (November 23, 2004): 10. 27. Amin Tarzi, ‘‘Karzai Confirms Elections Will Be Delayed,’’ in RFE/RL Afghanistan Report 3, no. 13 (April 13, 2004). 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid. 30. Amin Tarzi, ‘‘OSCE Says Afghan Elections Will Be Challenged To Meet International Standards,’’ RFE/RL Afghanistan Report 3, no. 36 (October 8, 2004).

................. 16928$

$CH2

09-09-08 08:22:06

PS

PAGE 58

59

AFGHANISTAN: POLITICAL REFORM

31. Ibid. 32. Andrew Reynolds and Andrew Wilder, ‘‘Free, Fair or Flawed: Challenges for Legitimate Elections in Afghanistan,’’ Briefing Paper, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, September 2004, 4. 33. ‘‘Decision of the Joint Electoral Management Body,’’ JEMB, Decision No. 2004–102, November 3, 2004, www.elections-afghanistan.org.af. 34. William Safire, ‘‘The Afghan Miracle,’’ New York Times, October 6, 2004. 35. Amin Tarzi, ‘‘Afghan Leader ’Not Bothered’ By Multiple Voter Registrations,’’ RFE/RL Afghanistan Report 3, no. 29 (August 18, 2004). Karzai in a later news conference corrected himself saying that there were mechanisms to prevent multiple voting. 36. Ibid. 37. ‘‘OSCE Election Support Team to Afghanistan: Recommendations,’’ October 18, 2004, 3. 38. ‘‘Afghanistan in 2006: A Survey of the Afghan People,’’ The Asia Foundation, 2006, 38. The survey was conducted by the Asia Foundation between June and August 2006, covering thirty-two out of Afghanistan’s thirty-four provinces of 6226 in-person interviews with Afghans of eighteen years of age or above. In answering what democracy meant to them, elections was chosen as least important category among eight choices. The top response was freedom at 54 percent and peace at 37 percent. 39. Ibid. Other responses included: government of the people (29 percent); women’s rights (23 percent); and prosperity (22 percent). 40. ‘‘OSCE Election Support Team to Afghanistan: Recommendations,’’ October 18, 2004, 11. 41. See Amin Tarzi, ‘‘Afghanistan’s Election Process,’’ RFE/RL Afghanistan Report 4, no. 25, September 2, 2005. 42. Ibid. 43. Ibid. 44. Amin Tarzi, ‘‘The Message of Lower Voter Turnout,’’ RFE/RL Afghanistan Report 4, no. 27, October 14, 2005. 45. Ibid. 46. Ibid. 47. Thomas Rutting, ‘‘Islamists, Leftists—and a Void in the Center: Afghanistan’s Political Parties and where they come from (1902–2006),’’ Afghanistan Office of Konrad Adenaur Stiftung www.kas.de, 18. I would like to thank Mr. Rutting for providing me an advance copy of his article and for insightful assistance while stationed in Afghanistan. According to November 27, 2006 report by Xinhua News Agency, in order to compete in his country’s 2009 presidential election, Karzai is planning to form his own political party—Afghanistan Democratic Party. 48. ‘‘Political Parties in Afghanistan,’’ ICG Policy Briefing no. 39 (June 2, 2005): 6. [The SNTV system was used in Japan from 1948 to 1993. By 2005, the system was in use only in Jordan, Vanuatu, the Pitciam Islands, and (partially) in Taiwan; see Reynolds and Wilder, ‘‘Free, Fair or Flawed,’’ 12]. 49. Ibid. ICG Policy Briefing no. 39, June 2, 2005, p. 6. 50. Ibid. 51. ‘‘Afghanistan Elections: Endgame or New Beginnings?,’’ ICG Asia Report, no. 101 (July 21, 2005: i. 52. Amin Tarzi, ‘‘New Parliament Must Cope With Deep Divisions,’’ RFE/

................. 16928$

$CH2

09-09-08 08:22:07

PS

PAGE 59

60

AMIN TARZI

RL Afghanistan Report 4, no. 29 (December 20, 2005). The composition of the Wolesi Jirga is roughly divided into four broad and often overlapping camps: first, former mujahedin—anti-Soviet Islamist groups, including approximately forty members of Hizb-e Islami who have distanced themselves from the party leader and current antigovernment fugitive Gulbuddin Hekmatyar; second, independents, technocrats and those tribal leaders who are not affiliated with specific political parties; third, former communists and other leftists (ironically some of the former communists abandoned their mustaches—the symbol of Afghan communists—in favor of beards and joined mujahedin parties and even allied themselves with the Taliban, so there can be some overlap between this group and groups one and four); and fourth, former members of the Taliban establishment. Since a large number of the Taliban leadership had previous association with the mujahedin, this last group could overlap with first group. Mujahedin or mujahedun, the plural form of the Arabic term mujahid, are those who wage jihad. According to doctrinal and historical applications of Islamic law, jihad indicates military action for the defense or expansion of Islam. While in the course of Islamic history the term mujahedin has been used by different groups to identify their struggles to defend Islam, the term gained global currency in the latter decades of the twentieth century after the leftist coup d’e´tat in Afghanistan on April 27, 1978. The resistance groups first opposed the Afghan communist regime, declaring it atheist. They then turned their attention to the Soviet Union, when it invaded Afghanistan on December 27, 1979. Fighting the Soviet Red Army, they collectively referred to themselves as mujahedin waging jihad against a communist power occupying an Islamic land. Hekmatyar was one of the leading mujahedin figures and was in the center of most of the civil wars that engulfed Afghanistan after the collapse of the communist regime in that country in 1992. Beginning in spring 2002, U.S. officials acknowledged a possible alliance between the former Taliban, alQa’ida, and Hekmatyar. The idea of a ‘‘triangle of terror’’ gradually gained more currency as Hekmatyar became more vocal about his anti-Western coalition sentiments. In February 2003, the United States designated Hekmatyar a terrorist for supporting ‘‘terrorist acts committed by al-Qa’ida and the Taliban’’ but refrained from assigning the same label to his political party. See Amin Tarzi, ‘‘Mujahidin,’’ Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World, (New York: Macmillan Reference USA 2004), 490–91; Ishtiaq Ahmad, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar: An Afghan Trial from Jihad to Terrorism (Islamabad: Society of Tolerance and Education, Pakistan, 2004). 53. ‘‘Afghanistan’s New Legislature: Making Democracy Work,’’ ICG Asia Report, no. 116 (May 15, 2006): 12. 54. Ibid., i. 55. Amin Tarzi, ‘‘New Parliament Goes on the Offensive,’’ RFE/RL Afghanistan Report 5, no. 1 (January 6, 2006). 56. Amin Tarzi, ‘‘Qanuni Brokers His Way to Parliament Speaker,’’ RFE/RL Afghanistan Report 5, no. 1 (January 16, 2006). Also see Amin Tarzi ‘‘Rivals Compete for Parliament Speaker Post,’’ RFE/RL Afghanistan Report 4, no. 26 December 20, 2005). 57. Amin Tarzi, ‘‘Confirmation Debate Opens Doors for Legislature, Opposition,’’ RFE/RL Afghanistan Report no. 10 (April 15, 2006) and ‘‘New Afghan Supreme Court Could Mark Genuine Departure,’’ RFE/RL Afghanistan Report 5, no. 22 (August 22, 2006). Karzai had nominated Fazl Hadi Shinwari to the post of Chief Justice, a position Shinwari had held since the formation of the

................. 16928$

$CH2

09-09-08 08:22:07

PS

PAGE 60

61

AFGHANISTAN: POLITICAL REFORM

post-Taliban administrations. The Wolesi Jirga rejected Shinwari’s nomination based on lack of proper evidence of his educational background and because of his advanced age. Shinwari, an ultraconservative, was backed by Karzai’s Islamist allies in the National Assembly. See Amin Tarzi, ‘‘Afghan Judicial Sector Requires Immediate Action,’’ RFE/RL Afghanistan Report 5, no. 6 (February 28, 2006). 58. ‘‘Afghan Parliamentary Committee Plans New Media Law,’’ Tolo Television, October 18, 2006. Obtained from and translated by OSC. Also see Amin Tarzi ‘‘The Brief History of Media Freedom in Afghanistan,’’ RFE/RL Afghanistan Report 5, no. 13 (May 7, 2006). 59. ‘‘Afghan Parliamentary Committee Plans New Media Law,’’ Tolo quoted Committee Chairman Mohammad Mohaqeq. 60. Amin Tarzi ‘‘What Will Become of the Provincial Councils?,’’ RFE/RL Afghanistan Report 4, no. 28 (November 28, 2005). 61. ‘‘Briefing by Mr. Jean Arnault Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral for Afghanistan to the United Nations Security Council, Monday 10 January 2005,’’ UNAMA Documents, http://www.unama-afg.org. 62. Ibid. 63. ‘‘Countering Afghanistan’s Insurgency: No Quick Fixes,’’ ICG Asia Report, no. 123 (November 2, 2006): iii. 64. See Amin Tarzi, ‘‘Will North Waziristan Peace Deal Spawn Imitations,?’’ RFE/RL Afghanistan Report 5, no. 27 (November 7, 2006). 65. Ibid. 66. ‘‘NATO Confirms Withdrawal of Forces from Troubled Afghan District,’’ Afghan Islamic Press (Peshawar-based), October 17, 2006. Obtained from and translated by OSC. 67. Ibid. 68. See Amin Tarzi in ‘‘Experts Urge Smarter Aid, Border Security Measures to Save Afghanistan,’’ Council on Foreign Relations, Interview, October 5, 2006, http://www.cfr.org. 69. Tarzi, ‘‘Limits to Afghan Democracy.’’ 70. ‘‘Opening Statement of Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry, Commander, Combined Forces Command—Afghanistan, Testimony Before the House Armed Services Committee, June 28, 2006, Washington, DC,’’ U.S. House of Representatives Web site http://www.house.gov.

................. 16928$

$CH2

09-09-08 08:22:08

PS

PAGE 61

Afghanistan: Security Sector Reform Richard Scarth Background

AFGHANISTAN—DESCRIBED

BY ROBERT BLAKE AS A ‘‘MYSTERIOUS,

mountainous, half-savage land’’—has suffered from chronic instability and conflict throughout its modern history.1 Its strategic position—sandwiched between the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Indian subcontinent along the ancient ‘‘Silk Route’’—meant that the country has long been fought over. It was from Afghanistan that northern conquerors invaded India; it was the ‘‘gateway’’ for any Russian advance in to central Asia; and it was at the center of the so-called ‘‘Great Game’’ in the nineteenth century when Imperial Russia and the British Empire in India vied for influence. The British became involved in three Afghan wars between 1839 and 1879—1839–42, 1878, and 1879—as the political status of Afghanistan was seen as a potential threat to the whole stability of British rule. Indeed, it was not until 1919 that Afghanistan was able to assert its independence after yet another war against British forces trying to bring the country under their sphere of influence. Afghanistan, however, became a key battleground in the Cold War. In 1953 General Mohammed Daud became prime minister and turned to the Soviet Union for economic and military assistance. He introduced a number of social reforms, such as the abolition of purdah (the practice of secluding women from public view), but was forced to resign in 1963 in the face of mounting opposition. The following year saw the introduction of a constitutional monarchy, but the situation deteriorated as a result of political polarization and power struggles. In 1973 Mohammed Daud seized power in a coup, declared a republic, and pursued a policy of playing off the Soviet Union against Western powers. However, in 1978 he was overthrown and killed in a coup by the leftist/Marxist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan led by Hafizullah Amin and Nur Mohammed Taraki. But the party’s 62

................. 16928$

$CH3

09-09-08 08:21:59

PS

PAGE 62

AFGHANISTAN: SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

63

two factions ‘Khalq’ and ‘Parcham’ fell out, leading to a mass purge (and exiling) of most ‘Parcham’ leaders. At the same time, conservative Islamic and ethnic leaders who objected to social change began an armed revolt in the countryside. A power struggle between Hafizullah Amin and Nur Mohammed Taraki was won by Amin, but the revolts in the countryside continued and the Afghan army faced collapse. Concerned by the situation, the Soviet Union sent in troops to help remove Amin and restore order. Babrak Karmal, leader of the People’s Democratic Party Parcham faction, was installed as ruler, backed by Soviet troops. However, anti-regime resistance intensified with various mujahedin groups fighting Soviet forces. The United States, Pakistan, China, Iran, and Saudi Arabia all supplied money and arms. The Mujahedin came together in Pakistan to form an alliance against Soviet forces. By this time it was estimated that half of the population of Afghanistan was displaced by war, with many having fled to neighboring Iran or Pakistan. Soviet forces became bogged down in an increasingly unpopular conflict and in 1985 the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev announced that he would withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan. In 1988 Afghanistan, the Soviet Union, the United States, and Pakistan signed peace accords and the Soviet Union began pulling out troops—the last of whom left in 1989. Nonetheless, civil war continued as the Mujahedin pushed to overthrow the Soviet-backed government of Najibullah (who had replaced Babrak Karmal in 1986). In 1991 both the Soviet Union and the United States agreed to end military aid to both sides. The following year resistance closed in on Kabul, Najibullah fell from power, and rival militias vied for influence. In 1993 Mujahideen factions agreed on the formation of a government, and ethnic Tajik Burhanuddin Rabbani was proclaimed president. Nonetheless, factional disputes continued and in 1994 the Pashtun-dominated Taliban— originally a group of Islamic scholars—emerged as a major challenge to the Rabbani government. Two years later—1996—the Taliban seized control of Kabul and introduced a hard-line version of Islam, banning women from work, and introducing Islamic punishments, which include stoning to death and amputations. Rabbani fled to join the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. Although in control of about 90 percent of Afghanistan by late 2001, most countries refused to recognize the Taliban regime as

................. 16928$

$CH3

09-09-08 08:21:59

PS

PAGE 63

64

RICHARD SCARTH

the legitimate government (although both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia did recognize the Taliban government). The Taliban’s extreme version of Islam attracted widespread criticism and opposition, both internally and externally. Internally, the opposition consisted of an alliance of factions drawn mainly from Afghanistan’s minority communities based primarily in the north of the country. External opposition existed not least of all because of the presence on Afghan soil of Osama bin Laden, the individual responsible for masterminding the bombing of U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998 and the attacks on the Twin Towers on September 11, 2001. As a direct result of the Taliban’s refusal to hand over Osama bin Laden, the United States and Great Britain initiated aerial attacks on Afghanistan in October 2001. From then on events moved quickly: in November opposition forces seized Mazar-e Sharif and within days took Kabul and other key cities; on December 5 Afghan groups agreed on a deal in Bonn for establishing an interim government—the Bonn Process; on December 7 the Taliban finally give up their last stronghold of Kandahar; and on December 22 Pashtun royalist Hamid Karzai was sworn in as head of a thirty-member interim power-sharing government. Following this, in 2002, a traditional assembly, or loya jirga, approved a new government; a second loya jirga produced a new constitution; presidential elections took place in October 2004 (won by Hamid Karzai); and parliamentary and provincial elections were held in September 2005, resulting in a new parliament being inaugurated in December 2005. Nonetheless, infighting between local commanders over power, territory, and control over Afghanistan’s lucrative drug industry (an industry that is estimated to make up around 60 percent of the nation’s economy) became a feature of the postTaliban period, despite the continued involvement of NATO forces in the country. The fledgling democratic government was faced with the task of forging national unity where none had previously existed and soon found that they were unable to extend their authority and exert control beyond Kabul. Consequently, militant violence continued as a feature of the Afghan polity and the drug trade boomed. Supporters of the Taliban regime regrouped and, with external support from Al-Qaeda in the shape of new recruits, new weapons, and new tactics imported from Iraq, have became a force challenging the government of President Karzai and NATO forces.

................. 16928$

$CH3

09-09-08 08:22:00

PS

PAGE 64

AFGHANISTAN: SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

65

 As a direct consequence of the attack on the World Trade Center, the invasion of Afghanistan became the focus of the world’s attention. In 2001, the Bonn Agreement2 set out the framework on how to rebuild Afghanistan, a failed state and country. As a result, Afghanistan’s interim administration received the support, expertise, and financial pledges that it requested from the international community in the belief that it would be able it to emerge from years of conflict and insurgency into a functioning democracy, an evolution which was seen by many in the West as a panacea for all of Afghanistan’s ills. Although presidential and parliamentary elections did take place in 2004 and 2005 respectively, subsequently all is not well. Security reforms have taken longer then expected, the economy has become reliant on international funds and many of the people—poor, unemployed, insecure, and disillusioned—have been left to their own devices which is particularly problematic in a country where the business of conflict has been the number one employer for as long as anyone can remember and where involvement in the drug trade is seen by many as the only viable activity.

Post-2001 In 2001, any immediate threat to security was deemed—by the West—to be posed not by the Afghan mujahideene but rather by the warlord’s militias that had came together temporarily to defeat their common enemy, the Taliban. Indeed, the signatures to the Bonn Agreement expressed their appreciation to the mujahideene, declaring that it was they: ‘‘who, over the years, have defended the independence, territorial integrity and national unity of the country and have played a major role in the struggle against terrorism and oppression, and whose sacrifice has now made them both heroes of jihad and champions of peace, stability and reconstruction of their beloved homeland, Afghanistan.’’3 The reality on the ground, however, proved to be very different, and the security situation deteriorated as a result. Indeed, insecurity in Afghanistan reached alarming levels—to the extent that Foreign Minister Abdullah, speaking in Washington, DC, in July 2003, declared that if urgent action were not taken to address the security situation the country would once again

................. 16928$

$CH3

09-09-08 08:22:01

PS

PAGE 65

66

RICHARD SCARTH

become ‘‘a failed state . . . ruled by drug lords, warlords, by forces of darkness, unstabilized by terrorism.’’ Clearly, economic reconstruction could only be achieved if the country’s security situation could be resolved. Security was the essential precondition for development. It was apparent that a new approach to security was required, one that would create efficient, effective, and accountable state security institutions. It was this assessment that led to the development—and adoption—of the Five Reform Pillars approach. Formally established in April 2002 at a security donors conference in Geneva, security sector reform (SSR) in Afghanistan was divided into five pillars, each supported by a different donor state: military reform (United States); police reform (Germany); the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR) (Japan); judicial reform (Italy); and counternarcotics (United Kingdom), each of the named nations agreeing to take the lead in funding and rebuilding the security sector in their stipulated area. The security donor’s initial optimism about the approach adopted was short-lived as it became increasingly apparent that achieving the necessary transformations was far from being either easy or straightforward. Since 2001 although the international community has had some successes, there have also been failures: • the U.S. State Department hired private contractors to assist in reforming and training an illiterate, often mistrusted (not least of all by the general population), poorly paid Afghan National Police (ANP) force—subsequently the contractors came to be regarded as not up to the task; • the Afghan government promoted the introduction of an Auxiliary Afghan National Police force—openly perceived to be recruited from local militias that were meant to be disbanded by the DDR program; • the Pentagon funded a financially unsustainable and unmotivated Afghan National Army (ANA)—whose strength was soon perceived as insufficient to deal with the internal and external demands placed upon it; • the Coalition, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and the Afghan government are funding the ANP and ANA, the DDR program, and the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) program but have also sought to work with the militias and factional leaders, the very individuals that are undermining the authority of local government representatives;

................. 16928$

$CH3

09-09-08 08:22:01

PS

PAGE 66

AFGHANISTAN: SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

67

• regional and local warlords, factional leaders, and even criminals are perceived by many to be untouchable. Consequently, they act with apparent impunity and have become increasingly brazen in their actions and activity, consolidating their fiefdoms in the knowledge that the police are ineffective and the judicial system is in a nascent stage; • President Karzai has been criticized for making poor choices in some of those appointed as provincial governors and police chiefs. His approach has been that of the ‘‘big tent,’’ but what he regards as a wise strategy designed to bring everyone on board, others see as a sign of weakness; • the counternarcotics program is failing—as evidenced by the fact that since the fall of the Taliban the drug trade has boomed, the country becoming the world’s leading cultivator of opium poppies, the raw ingredient of heroin.

Consequently, despite all of the international funding and expertise provided to Afghanistan by the international community, little progress has in fact been made. This lack of progress is partly due to the government’s inexperienced leadership, lack of institutional knowledge and subject matter expertise, and conflicting friendships and interests. A comprehensive overview and approach is still required and will be vital to ensure that progress across all five pillars can be made. All five are necessary; without one pillar, the others collapse. Unfortunately, as time passes, confidence in reform, optimism in the outcome, and the patience of the people is being lost as some citizens are losing hope. Indeed, the task of reforming the security sector is complex but too often it is made unnecessarily complicated by the complexity of UN/NATO/international involvement.

Afghan Military Forces In November 2001, Kabul had been liberated from the Taliban, and the Northern Alliance’s Marshall Fahim Khan had staked his claim to become the new minister of defense. Although this was acceptable to some warlords and their commanders it was not to others. Old grievances and ethnic tensions quickly reemerged and they refused to allow their militia to pledge their allegiance to a Tajik minister of defense. Those units that supported Marshal Fahim Khan became known as ministry-of-defense-funded Afghan Military Forces (AMF). Those units that chose not to follow this path became

................. 16928$

$CH3

09-09-08 08:22:02

PS

PAGE 67

68

RICHARD SCARTH

known as independent units and received no public funding. Rightly or wrongly the attention in the Bonn Agreement focused on the Afghan Military Forces and the independent units were allowed to drift away out of public view—only to reemerge again as a threat some fours years later (as a result of which they were redefined as Illegal Armed Groups4).

Postconflict Reforms Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) is only one aspect of a complex web of interrelated postconflict issues that have to be resolved in order to provide secure foundations upon which to build and ensure future stability. However, in Afghanistan DDR became a generic term for all of the various postconflict reform programs, something that created confusion among the donors, implementers, and participants who were unable to differentiate between the requirements and benefits of individual programs. This occurred despite the expert knowledge and experience of those involved. For example, the UNfunded Afghanistan New Beginnings Program (ANBP) only discovered the need to develop additional programs at the first disarmament event held in Ghazni in October 2003 when commanders unexpectedly arrived to hand over ammunition and heavy weapons. As a direct result, further programs were devised and funding sought for initiatives, such as the successful Heavy Weapons Cantonment Program and the vitally important Ammunition and Anti-Personnel Stockpile Destruction Program, which were inherited by ANBP and run in parallel to the more obvious security sector reforms of the police and army.

The International Players When working in a postconflict environment it is difficult, particularly as ‘‘mission fatigue’’ sets in, to attract and continually recruit the appropriate caliber of persons—not least of all when seen as being in competition with more glamorous locations and better career opportunities elsewhere. In addition, the potential dangers, poor living conditions, and the need to be away from home for extended periods of time deter most people. As a result, the person working in the field has either been sent there, wants to be there, or is motivated by career progression,

................. 16928$

$CH3

09-09-08 08:22:02

PS

PAGE 68

AFGHANISTAN: SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

69

money, or the cause, but may also be unemployable or simply not know what to do with their lives. As a result, the suitability, commitment, and level of knowledge and motivation of the appointed internationals have to be carefully considered. The experience and successes of the applicant have to be carefully assessed and researched in detail.5 It is far too easy for an individual to start something and leave before the results are known. The motivation, practical capabilities, and experience of the individual significantly impact on the effectiveness of the programs. A civil servant sent by their host country should be experienced in the fields that they are working in. The military officer appointed to an ad hoc role for which there is no branch should already have specialized expertise. The NGO worker, with a public sector background, should have the vision to understand that the country must move quickly from a grant, giving environment to paying for services and expertise. In short, they must ensure that the country quickly moves back to being self-sustaining and supported by a strong private sector. Returning Afghans should be appointed not because of who they know or because of their English language skills but on their technical abilities. The UN should speed up capacity building, transfer of skills, and ease the transition of staff and resources into the government’s hands. For these reasons, the careful appointment of personnel working in the extreme environment is essential to the success of programs and future sustainability. Successful appointments are further complicated by the routine turnover of staff every nine to fifteen months, leading to a lack of institutional knowledge. Continuity, detailed records, or physical handovers from outgoing personnel to incoming personnel are notably rare.

Afghan National Army As a result of the Bonn Agreement the command of all mujahideen, Afghan army, and armed groups was transferred to an interim authority to be reorganized according to the requirements of the new Afghan security and armed forces—the Afghan National Army (ANA). This reform was to be led and controlled by the United States and assisted by other members of the Coalition. The American military took on the role of creating the ANA,

................. 16928$

$CH3

09-09-08 08:22:02

PS

PAGE 69

70

RICHARD SCARTH

the process being overseen by a brigadier general, and accepted assistance from the French (who trained the officers), the British (who trained the NCOs), and the Canadian military. A new army was deemed necessary to provide the government with access to a loyal, reliable Western style, ethnically representative, professionally trained force. It was decided at the time that the new government would not be able to reform the existing forces but rather would have to start afresh. The belief was that the ANA would be trained and deployed in parallel to disbanding of the Afghan Military Forces through the DDR program. At the time, the AMF commanders were maintaining security throughout the country, on their individual terms but providing some sense of stability—but at all times remained loyal to their commander and his warlord. Recruitment The ANA personnel pass a recruitment process and then attend fifteen weeks of basic and specialist training before being assigned to their unit. Unlike the police, the ANA are deployable nationally out of one of almost sixty locations in the country. In the unit, they are mentored by embedded international training personnel totaling almost 5,200—3,600 of which are U.S. National Guards. The recent increase in trainers is to accelerate turnover of personnel through the Kabul Military Training Center to around 2,000 personnel a month. Of these, five battalions, each comprising between 300 to 600 soldiers, are reported to be able to operate on their own, but will continue to work with ISAF and Coalition troops. This optimism is, however, not shared privately by others who have predicted that it could be very many more years before the personnel are sufficiently trained and totally independent.6 Retention In 2006–7 pay for soldiers increased from about $70—$20 above the reported national average—to $100 a month to counter the number of personnel deciding not to reengage at the end of their three-year period and seek alternative better paying and safer incomes available elsewhere. The pay may be comparable to a policeman but for those from the cities, particularly Kabul, where a driver can earn $250 a month, the pay is minimal and the work incredibly dangerous. This in turn means that the

................. 16928$

$CH3

09-09-08 08:22:04

PS

PAGE 70

AFGHANISTAN: SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

71

ANA salary attracts rural recruits, over those from the urban centers. Desertion rates have fallen from a reported high of 25 percent to around 15 percent but the target is to reduce them further to 10 percent. For many, the discipline and lifestyle is too tough and some decide to leave. Others, classified as AWOL, are often found to be back late as they have been delivering their salaries to their families, often several days away, or sometimes found at home helping out during harvest time. Efforts are now being made to pay troops through bank accounts to assist the families and improve welfare. The current quoted force of 46,000, less desertions, of which 50 percent are deployable, comprise operational Kandaks (battalions) operating under five regional commands in Gardez, Herat, Kabul, Kandahar, and Mazar-I-Sharif. The creation of a new army has since identified issues that have led to changes in training to provide more enhanced training, the need for specialized logistical and support services, and a means to become economically sustainable in the mid to long term. The U.S. military has already begun to procure armored Humvees and better Kevlar helmets and body armor to equip new elite Afghan infantry battalions at a cost of some forty-seven million U.S. dollars. The date for completion of the task is continuously being revised, varying between 2007 and 2010 depending on the circumstances and the level of insurgency. The number of personnel in the ANA has been consistent at around seventy thousand7 but recently the Afghan Ministry of Defense has been privately suggesting that the force should be expanded to over one hundred thousand to meet the demands placed on it by the growing insurgency. Similarly, recent announcements are now talking of an air force comprising some two hundred aircraft. Of all the Pillars, the ANA appears the most effective, sustainable and clearly moving in the right direction.

Afghan National Police The reform of the Afghan National Police (ANP) has been politically led by the German government and since 2002 it has spent $89.7 million, training some sixteen thousand police, most of them officers and noncommissioned officers. However, the actual role and commitment of the Germans in leading this Pillar of Reform has been questioned and criticized—publicly by

................. 16928$

$CH3

09-09-08 08:22:04

PS

PAGE 71

72

RICHARD SCARTH

NATO at the international, regional, and local level—not least of all because, as of November 2006, Germany had only fortyone police officers involved in training the Afghan police. In reality, however, the process has been run by the U.S. State Department who outsourced the work on the ground to what was the Office of Security and Cooperation—Afghanistan (OSC-A). The United States has spent $862.2 million training forty-thousand police, mostly highway and border personnel. In accordance with the revised goals set out in the Afghan Compact in January 2007, the ANP will recruit an additional eight thousand police officers and a further twelve thousand border police to reach a complement of sixty-two thousand by 2010. In addition, according to a recent announcement, a twenty thousand strong auxiliary police force is also to be recruited locally, at the suggestion of the president, to boost numbers in areas where security is particularly weak, predominately in the South. However, the nature of their command and control is yet to be determined. The three key areas of reform of the police involve training, modernizing the command structure and increasing pay and benefits. As far as training is concerned, both literate (30 percent) and illiterate (70 percent) recruits are budgeted to receive between twelve and ninety days training. However, in practice, on the ground, this could mean less then ten days (certainly as far as recruits to the auxiliary police are concerned). In order to enable the ANP to attract and retain the best possible recruits, funding is provided through the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA). These funds are available in the short to medium term, but it is not clear how the government could sustain the expense in the long term and, consequently, everything could ultimately be in vain. Outside of Kabul, the UN’s SRSG (Special Representative of the Secretary-General) report in March 2006 noted that the ANP had little capacity in terms of leadership, equipment, and facilities. This view was reiterated three months later in an American government report where the ANP’s capabilities were described as ‘‘far from adequate,’’ despite having had over $1 billion spent on reforms.8 The report noted that ‘‘obstacles to establishing a fully professional ANP were ‘formidable’ and included pervasive corruption, illiterate recruits, a history of low pay, an insecure environment, and problematic management of the police training contract.’’ It also suggested that effective coordination between State Department contract managers and the Combined

................. 16928$

$CH3

09-09-08 08:22:05

PS

PAGE 72

AFGHANISTAN: SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

73

Forces Command—Afghanistan (CFC-A), responsible for executing ANP training programs on the ground through private contractors, had been lacking. Among the report’s principal recommendations were the expansion and better management of a mentoring program, described as ‘‘a key component to effect institutional change and build a capable, self-sustaining national police force.’’ A key component of any such reform must be an attempt to update the historic command and control structure. This is necessary to create a modern force with a clear, defined chain of command. The current structure is top heavy with three officers employed for every two sergeants. From the outset, senior appointments in the ANP were reviewed in a three-phase process to ensure that those personnel retained were the most professional, competent, and respected and the restructuring of the ANP’s senior management was completed almost as originally timetabled. In January 2007 the SRSG stated: ‘‘Strengthening the rule of law across Afghanistan needs to be a priority for all our efforts in 2007. Reform of the Afghanistan National Police is central to this if we are to build a police force able to serve the people of Afghanistan with professionalism and integrity. . . . The appointments represent the culmination of the work of a joint Ministry of Interior and international community probationary board that was established last summer to review appointments.’’9 These appointments completed reforms which initially selected the 31 most senior and competent officers in the force—12 Pashtun, 16 Tajik, 2 Hazaras, and 1 Uzbeck—and then identified second and third rounds of 86 and 1,014 officers, respectively, to go through the process. Those chosen successfully submitted applications that were reviewed by a panel, passed background checks, sat a written exam, gone before an oral selection board, and obtained the president’s personal approval. It is anticipated that these reforms will, over a period of time, make a large number of officers redundant. Proposals for a redundancy package were discussed at the Doha conference in February 2006, but despite the reforms proceeding, discussions on this matter are still ongoing. Without effective and honest administrators, police, or judges, the state can do little to provide internal security. However, it has been said that military commanders who have been demobilized by the Defense Ministry have subsequently found positions in the Interior Ministry and that, in this new role, they

................. 16928$

$CH3

09-09-08 08:22:05

PS

PAGE 73

74

RICHARD SCARTH

have become ‘‘the main body providing protection to drug traffickers.’’ Indeed, ‘‘Positions such as police chief in poppyproducing districts are sold to the highest bidder. The going rate was reported to be $100,000 for a six-month appointment to a position, with a salary of $60 per month.’’10 The future for the police currently looks bleak if the current program devised by the internationals continues to train, mentor, and supervise the force as it has been doing. Training is inadequate and the population mistrusts the police, a factor compounded further by recent reports of Taliban dressing up as members of the police to carry out acts designed specifically to discredit the ANP. A reform such as making every police officer accountable by providing them with a named, publicly displayed, photo ID card and a personal number on their epaulettes that would enable individuals to make complaints against officers acting inappropriately to an international third-party organization would go a long way to improving transparency and winning the support of the population. Those training the police need to harness whatever motivates a traffic officer paid seventy dollars a month to stand in the street every day directing the traffic, come rain or shine, when every motorist ignores him. There are plenty of good ANP but they need to be led, mentored, and gain the respect for the job that they are being asked to do before the ANP can move forward. What has become clear is that unless or until there is a respected justice system the police will act, certainly outside Kabul, essentially only as a paramilitary force predominantly focusing on maintaining security. Reforms have been put in place designed to create a modern, respected police force with the capacity to enforce law and order. However, the inherent contradiction involved in, on the one hand, seeking to empower central government via control of a strong, unified, disciplined national police force, but on the other hand recruiting and training a police force whose personnel are nominated by local elders from among the ranks of the militias who had stood down under DDR, has been problematic, to say the least. In Kandahar, Canadian Colonel Gary Stafford has observed that the reluctance of the recruits to obey police commanders might be related to their loyalty to more powerful figures in Kandahar, namely the governor and the president’s brother. Colonel Stafford declared that ‘‘unfortunately, what’s happening throughout the region is that in the initial influx of candidates that we’re received for this training, the majority of them are militias from governors.’’ (Graeme Smith, The Globe

................. 16928$

$CH3

09-09-08 08:22:06

PS

PAGE 74

AFGHANISTAN: SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

75

and Mail (Canada), November 8, 2006 cited on www.ddrafg .com/anp.htm). In short, the program could allow militias and criminals to infiltrate the force from the outset. Another problem is that the effectiveness of the force created has been undermined because it has not had the capacity to retain recruits. The role of the auxiliary police force remains marginal and its worth is questioned by academics and those with institutional knowledge. The funding, arming, command, and control of the local militia appears to be an ad hoc process open to abuse. For ISAF and the Coalition, adopting such an ad hoc approach undoubtedly looks as though it would provide a quick fix. The problems associated with this approach were demonstrated when the Taliban reentered Qala Musa and the auxiliary police force—nominated by the elders—was nowhere to be seen. In short, will these young men honestly serve their country and resist the influence of tribes, warlords, and drug money? Are their units strong enough, after less than ten days’ training? The cost and effectiveness of the auxiliary force in the short to medium term must seriously be questioned and the auxiliary’s long-term role and accountability reconsidered.

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) Of the five Afghan Security Pillars of Reform, only one has been declared completed, namely, the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Program (DDR).11 The $142 million program was nominally led but almost fully funded by the Japanese government together with political and financial support of additional donor nations.12 The program was managed and implemented through the United Nations’ Development Program’s Afghanistan New Beginnings Program (ANBP). Both the issues raised by and lessons learned from the DDR program could and should have been applied to all of the other reform pillars, not least of all because they highlighted all of the political, tribal, cultural, and economic factors involved. ANBP’s first pilot disarmament event took place in October 2003. The final disarmament ceremony occurred in July 2005, by which time over 63,000 personnel had been disarmed, 53,415 of whom would participate in a reintegration option. However, the reality on the ground was rather different: the personnel of the 259 regional Afghan Military Force (AMF) units that partici-

................. 16928$

$CH3

09-09-08 08:22:06

PS

PAGE 75

76

RICHARD SCARTH

pated in the disarmament process were, once their UN administered reintegration training was completed, simply left to their own devices. Consequently, many former AMF personnel—in particular professional, midlevel officers—felt bitter and let down by the process. Some 350 years ago, at the end of the English civil war, Oliver Cromwell effortlessly stood his men down. Clearly he knew something that today’s politicians, civil servants, and UN development experts failed to appreciate let alone replicate. In difficult times, strong leadership and a rule of iron are essential prerequisites to facilitate the absorption into a society and an economy of a large number of underemployed men who would otherwise have time on their hands and be in search of paid employment, the lack of which leaves many open to manipulation by others. Afghanistan New Beginnings Program (ANBP) At the beginning of 2004 the pilot phase of the DDR program had commenced and the main phase was scheduled to be launched in May. Presidential elections were planned for later that year and the existence of the warlords and large numbers of armed personnel were a significant threat to the ability to hold a free and fair election. The task of disarming an estimated (certainly an alleged) one hundred thousand personnel was daunting to say the very least. ANBP established its head office in Kabul and nine regional offices throughout the country, mirroring the organizational structure of the AMF. From there, mobile disarmament units would deploy once an advance party, comprising ANBP personnel and DDR liaison officers, confirmed that the unit commander was agreeable to commencing disarmament. The location and date of the disarmament was in accordance with an agreed Ministry of Defense matrix defining which unit would be disarmed on what day. However, the ANBP placed little focus on building the capacity of the Afghans to develop their own program. In addition to which a general lack of experience and expertise among the ANBP management, UNAMA, and the donors, as well as a failure to draw upon and use DDR experience from elsewhere, led to unnecessary mistakes in terms of both funds and time. This was further compounded by the fact that a number of the individual international nations that were involved had their own

................. 16928$

$CH3

09-09-08 08:22:07

PS

PAGE 76

AFGHANISTAN: SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

77

agendas. Conflicts of interests among the partners began to emerge which led to compromise resulting in ineffective decisions. The aim of the program was to disband the Afghan Military Forces, break the matriarchal link between the commanders and their personnel, reintegrate the personnel, and provide them with an economic future. However, ISAF and the Coalition perceived security vacuums that, with hindsight, never existed, while UNAMA gave the impression of preferring not to make decisions so as to ensure it could never be blamed for anything. ANBP focused on the disarmament task, although apparently with no real belief that it would be able to move into the reintegration process. The leadership of the Afghan Ministry of Defense continued to look after old friends, giving rise to nepotism and accusations of conspiracies of the North disarming the South, Pashtuns being disarmed by Hazarahs, and any other excuse designed to prevent the various militias entering the program. In April 2004, the reality on the ground was that the regional warlords, commanders, and subcommanders were being asked to give up their day jobs by those in Kabul for little in return. So began a game of hide and seek with commanders playing for time as they sought to remove, store, or sell their stockpiles of weapons and ammunition. In addition, political interventions, delays, and protracted negotiations at a micro level, involving every minor player, became the order of the day. Jean Arnou of UNAMA officially declared DDR as stalled. In the summer of 2004, the (interim) president finally intervened. As a result, unit commanders immediately began to comply. This meant that AMF personnel were suddenly ready to demobilize and begin the reintegration process—all at once. This created a logistical nightmare for ANBP in the run up to the presidential elections. During this whole process the ANBP’s leadership and the donors lost their way and failed to realize that they had to adjust their programs to reflect the reality that existed on the ground. In the Joint Provincial Coordination Center (JPCC) report, recommendations were made that were ignored by ANBP and the donors which—with hindsight—was unfortunate and ultimately a shortcoming of the Japanese (which as a lead nation should have overruled the ANBP). Further recommendations were made in the crisis report, which again were overlooked by the self-policing committee of ANBP, UNAMA, and the donors.

................. 16928$

$CH3

09-09-08 08:22:07

PS

PAGE 77

78

RICHARD SCARTH

The involvement of a third-party social responsibility organization might have complicated things from the outset, but with hindsight could have brought some balance to the decisionmaking process and may have also suggested asking the Afghans how they would propose dealing with the problems. Unfortunately, the Afghan leadership was often the last to be asked and, even then, was often only provided with a fait accompli. Disarmament ANBP’s operations team was meeting regularly with their Ministry of Defense counterparts in order to devise a timetabled matrix of units to be disarmed. The plan devised was to adopt a two-phase approach. Phase one was to downsize every AMF unit initially by 40 percent. Phase two was to formally decommission the units. In all of this, however, the actual definition of disarmament was not clear. Commanders were knowingly hiding, selling, or falsely declaring (overstating personnel and understating armaments) that they had. The internationals knew this but the commanders were not held to account—as it was deemed politically unacceptable in an unstable environment to challenge them in this way. This, however, provided the first clues to the commanders that the internationals were weak—a costly mistake which ultimately led to the failure of the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) program which, despite all of the funding and time taken, has failed to really disband a single illegal armed group. In reality, the logistical process of disarmament was handled well by ANBP and carried out by those responsible with military precision. But this was a problem: the leadership never really believed that disarmament would occur and focused almost entirely, in terms of its funds and resources, on the logistical process of disarmament to the detriment of the most important aspect of DDR, namely reintegration. Demobilization Individuals were issued with a temporary ANBP ID card when they disarmed and were told when they should report to the regional office to demobilize. Demobilization was, wherever possible, usually scheduled for the following day at one of ANBP’s

................. 16928$

$CH3

09-09-08 08:22:08

PS

PAGE 78

AFGHANISTAN: SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

79

nine regional offices. Individuals would report to the regional office, attend a briefing and counseling session, and complete various administrative tasks. The quality of the briefings and the counseling session depended on the individual case worker’s sincerity, training, and the numbers being processed that day. The demobilization phase was, in reality, a half-day administrative activity designed to process the individual, assign a reintegration option, and provide a food and clothing allowance that was to ensure that his family had food until the first payment was made a month after starting the reintegration process. For many, Afghanistan’s geography and weather made attending the reintegration an often impractical ordeal. However, when it really was impractical, ANBP would provide a mobile demobilization service. For the majority, who had nothing better to do, it was a day out for which they received a per diem. Due to the sheer numbers being processed, compounded by backlogs that were created by units initially failing to comply, it was easy to forget that every individual involved was just that, an individual, that ought to be sensitively processed and not a component of an assembly line. More use of combining the disarmament process with parallel demobilization in the field may have helped personalize and regionalize the process and in doing so, slightly reduced the dropout rate between disarmament and demobilization. In addition, and more importantly, such an approach might have caught those that were skeptical or uninformed. In fact, demobilization was a phase of DDR that was straightforward but where improvements could have been made if they had focused on the need for greater public information and awareness so as to ensure informed choices could be made. Locally targeted public information in the weeks and days before disarmament, combined with staging demobilization fairs in the days before disarmament—fairs where individuals would be encouraged to meet and talk to the implementers and compare and review their options—would have been beneficial. The increased levels of awareness would have stimulated debate that would have involved the family and led to more informed decisions being made by the participants. Unfortunately, as things turned out, many participants did not know why they were participating in the disarmament event and knew nothing of what options were available to them.

................. 16928$

$CH3

09-09-08 08:22:08

PS

PAGE 79

80

RICHARD SCARTH

Reintegration—buying time The political objective of the DDR program was never precisely defined by either the UN, donors, or the Afghan government. Was the political objective to stand AMF personnel down and remove them from the payroll of the Ministry of Defense or was it, as eluded to in the Bonn Agreement, to provide individual AMF personnel with the means to be economically independent and, consequently, no longer reliant on their patriarchal commander? Initially, ANBP’s focus, partly due to the strengths, weaknesses, and backgrounds of the senior management involved, was almost entirely on the logistical demands of disarming the personnel. In March 2004 no one genuinely believed that the regional and local commanders, who had so much to lose and little to gain, would allow their units to join the program. Regardless, even if the disarmament timetable had been implemented as planned, we would have still have discovered that the program was designed back to front—the focus was on disarmament not on the most important element of any DDR initiative, namely producing an economically independent individual within society that could truly be described as successfully reintegrated. The Afghan program should have firstly reviewed and drawn upon the UN and donors’ experience of global DDR programs elsewhere and identified the successful elements appropriate for Afghanistan. Secondly, those lessons learned should have been placed into a framework that would assume that each individual would be successfully reintegrated by working backward from the end goal to ensure that all of the necessary buildings blocks would be put in place. Disarmament turned out to be a token process but it was glamorous, tangible, and captured the imagination of those donors involved—the long-term value of reintegration was not understood.13 Further issues arose, one of which was working out what to do with the senior AMF commanders—many of whom were unable to read and write and were only in place as a result of nepotism. Almost five hundred senior commanders were identified for a special redundancy program that would reflect their status and try to segregate them from their troops—breaking the command and control link that existed between them and their men. The commanders’ previous earnings were assessed and salaries were agreed that would be paid for up to twenty-four months if they

................. 16928$

$CH3

09-09-08 08:22:08

PS

PAGE 80

AFGHANISTAN: SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

81

stayed out of trouble and attended a three-week residential course. The course, however, should have been designed to engage them throughout the two-year period on a national and regional basis with the key players, specifically developing suitable skills and identifying appropriate opportunities. Failure would mean that the commanders would emerge from the program without the means to legitimately maintain their lifestyles and the status that they once had among their communities.14 At the same time the DDR program failed to differentiate between ranks. This created significant social issues for the professional, mid-level, officers who found themselves among the men being demobilized. Many of the officers felt that they were losing their social status and their ability to earn a relatively good salary. The officers in question were career soldiers, professionally trained up to degree level, who had worked under the Russian system. Their inability to transfer into the new ANA and finding themselves thrown out of the only trade that they knew created a lot of resentment—which ironically came to light at the first official media disarmament event in May 2004 when, in front of the world’s media, the officers refused to disarm. Focusing on reintegration, the most vital piece of any DDR program, and fully assessing what was required, would have significantly increased the cost of the program. Nevertheless, these initial costs would have been funded by the donors if they had been budgeted for from day one, not least of all because the AMF was perceived at the outset to be the greatest threat to the future stability of the country.15 Understanding what reintegration meant was, again, not clearly defined. To some it meant providing the individual with assistance to help him reintegrate, but to others it meant providing assistance to ensure that he was reintegrated. What became clear was that some people naturally needed more assistance then others and it was not possible to create one glove that could fit all.

Conclusion The Security Sector Reform outlined in 2001 as part of the Bonn Agreement has been slow to come to fruition. Six years on, hundreds of experts have passed through and millions of U.S. dollars have been spent with little tangible evidence to show for

................. 16928$

$CH3

09-09-08 08:22:09

PS

PAGE 81

82

RICHARD SCARTH

it on the ground. The expertise has clearly been lacking, the coordination among programs and donors regularly rotating in and out has been poor, and an overall lack of applied common sense and straight talking has been all too apparent. Cumulatively, this has resulted in considerable disappointment among the Afghan population. Today, the optimism on the ground of 2001 has evaporated and there is little sign of the lessons learned over the intervening six years being applied to new programs. Unfortunately, this will be more and more difficult as donor fatigue and funding cuts set in and new governments are elected back home on the popular ticket of ending the commitment and ‘‘bringing our troops home.’’ In parallel, the Afghan population is becoming less patient and is looking around for someone or some movement that can deliver the security for which they yearn to enable them to be able to go about their daily business. The Afghan population is tired of fighting after nearly thirty years of conflict but, with half the population under the age of twenty, many of whom barely remember the reasons for the current conflict and with little economic future ahead, the dangers of returning to the conditions that sparked the current conflict are real and could so easily be exploited by those that seek personally to gain from the chaos of conflict.

 The success of any future security sector reforms in Afghanistan depends upon the establishment of a knowledgeable, independent umbrella body that: • understands and oversees the coordination of postconflict reform programs • is able to monitor real progress and real results; • is able to develop and implement ‘‘good practice’’; • that is clearly able to identify problems that exist—including identify failing programs—before they become issues among and between any of the actors and participants involved.

The success of any such initiative depends on the commitment of the individuals tasked to run such an organization and the authority of the person heading it up in relation to involved donors and the UN. The body should be tasked to coordinate and objectively monitor timelines, provide quality control, implement best practices, understand and intervene in sensitive issues, and be able to settle disputes when problems affecting the

................. 16928$

$CH3

09-09-08 08:22:09

PS

PAGE 82

AFGHANISTAN: SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

83

delivery of the five individual pillars of reform arise. In the medium term, such a body should also establish a conflict vulnerability assessment in order to provide the means to measure the indicators of success and, more importantly, identify areas that are deemed to be failing and to devise the means to fund and address them, before conditions reemerge that created the original conflict in the first place. Success also depends on there being sufficient commitments from foreign donors to provide the required funding and quality expertise to support the delivery, implementation, and Afghanization of the objectives of the five pillars of security sector in the short, mid, and long term. In all of this clear syllabi, quality control, and monitoring of results are vital. The recognition of the importance of parallel, sustainable, private sector-led programs designed to target and support the unemployed former security sector and related personnel is also vital. Failing to support those former security sector staff deemed unfit or unsuitable to serve in the new regime has proved to be counterproductive. Employment must be provided for these personnel—and for other vulnerable groups—until the security sector is sufficiently mature to be able to enforce the rule of law, extend the authority of the government, and appropriately deal with groups in society as and when they pose a threat to peace.

 It is now 2008 and the international community has been in Afghanistan since 2001. Time is running out; the international community must understand that, over time, the Afghans have seen foreigners come and foreigners go—indeed, it should not be forgotten that they have also told them to go. We must ensure that measures are put in place to enable Afghans to improve not only in terms of security but also economic well-being. We must also ensure that they have the capacity to govern themselves. If the job is not done, then we only have ourselves to blame. The Afghans have been patient, they gave us the time, but they cannot—and will not—wait forever.

Notes 1. See Angelo Rasanayagam, Afghanistan: A Modern History (London: I. B. Tauris, 2005).

................. 16928$

$CH3

09-09-08 08:22:10

PS

PAGE 83

84

RICHARD SCARTH

2. ‘‘Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions.’’ See http://www .afghangovernment.com/AfghanAgreementBonn.htm. 3. Bonn Agreement, par. 4. http://www.afghangovernment.com/Afghan AgreementBonn.htm. 4. Further information on the disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups can be found on: www.ddrafg.com. 5. It has been all too common to learn of consultants being appointed that had no experience of the subject or that had been sacked from previous appointments. 6. See Declan Walsh, ‘‘Thirsty to fight, hard to wake up,’’ Guardian, May 4, 2007. 7. Prior to the Taliban resurgence there were suggestions that the force would be reduced to forty thousand. 8. Afghan police readiness ‘‘far from adequate’’: US November 15, 2006, Washington (AFP) Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness Program. www.DDRAFG.com/ANP.htm. 9. Kabul, January 13, 2007 SRSG. www.DDRAFG.com/ANP.htm. 10. See Judy Dempsey, International Herald Tribune, November 15, 2006, and Graeme Smith, Globe and Mail (Canada), November 8, 2006. 11. ANBP Fact Sheet, July 1, 2006: The completion of the reintegration phase of DDR by June 30, 2006, has marked the end of the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration process in Afghanistan—in time and within costs (U.S. dollars 141 million). In addition, as the reintegration phase was brought to an end, 25 percent of the ex-combatants have found a long-term and sustainable activity. See Harumi Ozawa, ‘‘Afghan conference mulls fresh measures to disarm militia,’’ Tokyo, July 5, 2006 (AFP). 12. ANBP Fact Sheet, July 1, 2006. The $141 million program was funded by: Japan, the lead nation, $91 million; the United Kingdom $19 million; Canada $16 million; USA $9 million; the Netherlands $4 million; Norway $0.8 million; Switzerland $0.5 million; and the European Union $0.1 million. Note: In parallel USAID funded additional DDR-targeted initiatives. See www.ddrafg .com. 13. Shortly after the final disarmament took place, the weekly donors meetings with the MoD were changed and the emphasis turned to DIAG—those running the program assumed DDR was now done. 14. For a more detailed overview see www.ddrafg.com. 15. UNAMA was politically concerned about the political power of the regional warlords, and the Coalition and ISAF were initially aware that central government would be unable to extend the rule of law with the militia still in place. They subsequently became concerned about security vacuums developing as disarmament picked up and the expansion of the ANP and ANA were occurring at different rates.

................. 16928$

$CH3

09-09-08 08:22:10

PS

PAGE 84

Bosnia and Herzegovina: Consolidating Democratic Institutions Denis Hadzovic and Florence Gaub Introduction

IN NOVEMBER 1995, AFTER THREE AND A HALF YEARS OF WAR, 2.2

million displaced, and 258,000 dead,1 the General Framework Agreement, also known as the Dayton Agreement, put an end to violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina and paved the way for the reconstruction of the country and its institutions. The war that broke out in 1992 was triggered by the breakup of Yugoslavia. Following the independence of both Slovenia and Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the most multiethnic of all Yugoslav republics with three constituent ethnic groups, was confronted with the question of independence as well. While Croats and Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims), 17.4 percent and 43.5 percent of the Bosnian population respectively, largely favored independence, Bosnian Serbs (31.2 percent of the population) rejected this.2 After the first round of free elections, nationalist parties, split along ethnic lines, came to power, thus aggravating tensions. In February 1992 in a referendum on independence which saw a voter turnout of 64 percent—it was boycotted by Serbs— Bosniaks and Croats voted by 94.4 percent for independence. After weeks of tensions, war broke out in April 1992; the war saw Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims confronting each other. From 1993 to 1994 the former Croat and Bosniak allies split and were only reconciled by the Washington Agreement that established the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was not until the Dayton Agreement of 1995 that hostilities came to an end. Based on the Dayton Agreement, Bosnia and Herzegovina today comprises two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska. The Federation, which is essentially Croat and Bosniak, is subdivided into ten cantons, of 85

................. 16928$

$CH4

09-09-08 08:22:12

PS

PAGE 85

86

DENIS HADZOVIC AND FLORENCE GAUB

which five have a Bosniak majority, three have a Croat majority, and two are ethnically mixed and have no clear majority for either ethnic group. The Republika Srpska represents the largely Serb part of the country. It has municipalities, but is all in all more centralized than the Federation. While Bosnia had, before the war, ethnic groups scattered in patches all over the country—with an appearance rather akin to a leopard’s skin, ethnic cleansing and only limited refugee return since the war have created two largely homogenous entities.3 Remnants from the war are mirrored everywhere in public and political life; although the Dayton Agreement has provided the state with a basis for the establishment of democratic institutions, consolidation is slow and setbacks are frequent. For example, although the implementation of property return has been completed there has been only very limited return of refugees, or only in areas where their ethnic group is dominant. Created by the Dayton Agreement, and given exceptional powers, the High Representative is responsible for civilian aspects of its implementation and acts as a supervisor of democracy. With this as the necessary background, in what follows we analyze the executive types that exist in Bosnia and Herzegovina, its legislative procedures, the main elections that have taken place since 1995, and the special position of devolution in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Executive types There are two executive types in Bosnia and Herzegovina. There are the governments of the two entities (the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska), and there is the government on the state level. The specific responsibilities of the entities and the state are stipulated in the Dayton Agreement. Article III.1 defines the areas of responsibilities of the state, including: • • • •

foreign policy monetary policy immigration criminal law enforcement

The entities are responsible for all governmental institutions not expressly assigned to the state, except those that ‘‘are neces-

................. 16928$

$CH4

09-09-08 08:22:13

PS

PAGE 86

87

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

sary to preserve the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, and international personality’’4 and those that have been agreed to by the entities. This aspect shall be discussed further in the section on devolution. The presidency of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina consists of three members, one Croat, one Bosniak, and one Serb, each directly elected by the people. The Croat and Bosniak member are elected by the voters of the Federation, and the Serb member is elected by the citizens of Republika Srpska. The term of office is four years and the chairmanship rotates every eight months. The responsibility of the presidency lies mainly in foreign policy and the budget. Also, they appoint the prime minister, which is then confirmed by the House of Representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The executives of the two entities are similarly structured. Aside from the prime minister, the Federation has a president and two deputies; the three individuals consist of one Croat, one Bosniak, and one Serb—each of whom are elected for four years by the House of Representatives of the Federation. In the sixteen member Cabinet an ethnic quota determines all posts; at the end of 2006, it was composed of eight Bosniaks, five Croats, and three Serbs. The Republika Srpska has a presidency that is directly elected by the people. The president—a Serb—has two deputies from the two other constituent groups, one Croat and one Bosniak. In addition, there is a prime minister, whose ethnicity is not specified in the Constitution. However, his two deputies have to be from different constituent groups. They are elected by the National Assembly on recommendation of the prime minister. As for the government, an ethnic quota prevails here as well. Eight ministers have to be Serb, five Bosniak, and three Croat; all are approved by the National Assembly. However, the functioning of the executive has been disrupted several times by the so-called ‘‘Bonn powers.’’ In 1997, realizing that the politicians from the three constitutent groups were not as cooperative as needed—and not even close to it—the Peace Implementation Council in Bonn decided to request ‘‘the High Representative to remove from office public officials who violate legal commitments and the Dayton Peace Agreement, and to impose laws as he sees fit if Bosnia and Herzegovina’s legislative bodies fail to do so.’’5 In practice, this lead to the removal of several elected officials on all levels. The first to be removed was Pero Raguz, the mayor of Stolac, because of his obstructive behavior in the return of refugees.6 From 1998 until the end of

................. 16928$

$CH4

09-09-08 08:22:13

PS

PAGE 87

88

DENIS HADZOVIC AND FLORENCE GAUB

2006, 116 decisions have been taken by the high representative regarding the suspension, removal, or prevention of taking office of persons regarded as obstructive to the implementation of the Dayton Agreement.7 The highest politicians included two Croat members of the state presidency, Ante Jelavic in 20018 and Dragan Covic in 2005,9 as well as the Serb member of the presidency, Mirko Sarovic in 2004, and the president of the Serb entity, Republika Srpksa, Nikola Poplasˇen in 1999.10 The reasons for the removal of these politicians differed from one case to another. While Ante Jelavic´ was accused of aiming at establishing a parallel structure in the Croat part of the Federation and thereby undermining the constitution of the Federation, Dragan Covic was removed because of his indictment for abuse of office, organized crime, and conspiracy to perpetrate a criminal offense, in order to preserve public trust in the state institutions—since he refused to step down. Mirko Sarovic stepped down after intense pressure because of illegal arms trade of a RSbased company with Iraq in 2003.11 He was later removed from his position as vice president of the Serb Democratic Party for directly or indirectly supporting the still-missing Radovan Karadzic.12 The president of Republika Srpksa, Nikola Poplasˇen, was removed because the high representative deemed he had obstructed democratic principles ‘‘by hindering the implementation of the elections results, refusing to abide by the decisions of the National Assembly and consistently acting to impede the formation of a legitimate government with the support of the National Assembly.’’13 While the aim of these decisions was essentially to promote democratic values and to neutralize political personnel that obstruct the democratic political process, it is nonetheless, in essence undemocratic: the removal of elected representatives by an unelected official. Since 2003, the number of persons removed from office has decreased markedly. The reason for this lies not only in the altered behavior of political personnel, but also in the fact that the threat alone to remove somebody has had the desired effect. For example, when the prime minister of Republika Srpksa, Milorad Dodik, threatened to organize a referendum on the question of secession, the high representative Christian Schwarz-Schilling simply declared that this was illegal according to Dayton and that, if he persisted, his position as prime minister would consequently be in danger.14

................. 16928$

$CH4

09-09-08 08:22:13

PS

PAGE 88

89

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Legislatures The parliamentary system of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a twochamber system at both the entity level and the state level. On the entity level there are two Houses of Representatives and two Houses of People, one of each in the Federation and the Republika Srpska. In the Federation, the House of Representatives consists of ninety-eight seats, elected by party lists according to proportional representation, and the House of People, consisting of fifty-eight seats, of which seventeen are for each ethnic group plus seven for ‘‘others’’ (Jews, Romas, and other minorities). It consists of representatives delegated by the cantonal parliaments. The mandate is for four years. In Republika Srpska the National Assembly consists of eighty-three members, directly in the municipalities elected, and the Council of People that has twenty-eight members, eight from each ethnic group and four ‘‘others.’’15 Its members are selected by the delegates of the National Assembly, and the mandate is also for four years.16 At the state level there are two chambers, the House of Representatives and the House of Peoples. The House of Representatives consists of forty-two members, of whom twenty-eight are elected by the people of the Federation, and fourteen by the people of Republika Srpska. The House of Peoples consists of fifteen members, five of each ethnic group. Its Bosniak and Croat members are elected respectively by the Bosniak or Croat members of the Federation House of Peoples, while the Serb members are elected by the Council of People of Republika Srpska.17 The duty of this House is to make sure that all three constituent groups agree on the laws passed, acting as a safeguard for ethnic sensitivities. What marks the legislative structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina is the aim to ensure that all three constituent groups are equal in rights and offices. Hence, the state constitution, as well as Federation constitution and the rules of procedure of both parliaments, include special measures in order to protect the parity of Serbs, Bosniaks, and Croats. In both parliaments the speaker and the two deputy speakers have to be from the three constituent groups. The Council of Peoples of the Republika Srpska, was created in 2002—under pressure from the high representative—in order to ensure minority rights and gained importance after the return of refugees, which happened slowly but consistently. The Constitutional Court ruled in its Decision on the Constituent People’s Status that some changes had to be made to the consti-

................. 16928$

$CH4

09-09-08 08:22:14

PS

PAGE 89

90

DENIS HADZOVIC AND FLORENCE GAUB

tution of the Republika Srpksa because ‘‘that exclusion of one or other constituent people from the enjoyment not only of citizens’ but also of peoples’ rights throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina was in clear contradiction with the non-discrimination rules contained in the said Annex 4’’18 of the Dayton Agreement. Any law or regulation voted by the National Assembly that is of vital interest of any constituent people can come into force only after adoption by the House of Peoples. As in the case of the executive, the legislative framework can be bypassed by the high representative, as aside from being empowered to remove politicians from office, he is also entitled ‘‘to impose laws as he sees fit if Bosnia and Herzegovina’s legislative bodies fail to do so.’’19 Since 1996, the respective high representatives have imposed and enacted 210 laws,20 not counting the numerous amendments that have also been imposed. These laws ranged from rather technical or economic ones, such as the Law on the Banking Agency of the Federation, to politically sensitive ones, like those on flag and national anthem.21 Depending on the office holder, the number of laws enacted or imposed has varied considerably. While the number reached its peak with seventy-six laws in 2002 under Paddy Ashdown, it was only seven in 2001 under his predecessor Wolfgang Petritsch. The high representative has the powers to annul laws, as Wolfgang Petritsch did in 1999 on several occasions in Republika Srpksa with regard to laws on return of seized land and property.22 However, in other cases (as the Law on the Intelligence and Security Agency), the high representative has not simply enacted the law, but used his powers to propose the law to the Parliamentary Assembly in order to circumvent further delay.23 In short, the high representative, as in the case of the executive, acts as an adjustment factor in favor of democracy and peace. Although in doing so he is often forced to use measures that essentially contradict democratic principles, he does so in order to guarantee further integration and stabilization of democratic institutions. In considering this context, one should bear in mind that Bosnia and Herzegovina is not only a post conflict state, but also one that is experiencing transition from a socialist system to a democratic one. For that purpose, in 2001 the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) established a Parliamentary Support Program in order to enhance the parliament’s effectiveness. One of its major successes was the establishment

................. 16928$

$CH4

09-09-08 08:22:14

PS

PAGE 90

91

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

in 2005 of six joint committees, strengthening the work of MPs in both Houses.24

Elections Since the end of the war in 1995, a number of elections on several levels have taken place in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Only ten months after the Dayton Agreement, in 1996, voters were called to the polls and, since then, general elections have been conducted in 1998, 2002, and 2006. When analyzing these elections, one repeatedly finds the same areas of concern, although progress is visible. Technically speaking, the elections usually go well and voting is properly conducted—in 97 percent of polling stations in 1996, for example.25 The international presence, however, is heavy with international observers in the polling stations, not to mention the presence of the high representative and the security forces. The elections are repeatedly below OSCE standards in those areas where the international community is either unable to intervene, or where it does intervene but such intervention is contradictory to democratic standards. The campaign ambiance was, obviously, particularly violent in the first elections in 1996. Threats of secession by Republika Srpska from Bosnia and Herzegovina, violence of party activists, and nationalist rhetoric were all parts of a campaign that was sharply divided between the Federation and the Republika Srpska (RS). This kind of rhetoric has been a continuing feature in all elections, although it declined, superficially at least, in the elections of 2006. That is, it was still present, but in a less obvious way. Again in 2006, politicians from the Republika Srpska threatened to conduct a referendum, resulting in an unambiguous statement from the high representative that any such referendum would be against the spirit of Dayton. However, threats of secession are usually preceded or followed by comments of politicians from the Federation questioning the existence of the RS altogether and expressing a strong desire to abolish it. Voting of displaced persons and refugees is a constant area of concern; in order to reverse the effects of ethnic cleansing, refugee return, or at least voting in the area where people were registered before the war, has been an important aspect of elections. However, during the first elections, very few crossed the InterEntity Boundary Line on election day; they were allowed to

................. 16928$

$CH4

09-09-08 08:22:15

PS

PAGE 91

92

DENIS HADZOVIC AND FLORENCE GAUB

travel only on nineteen designated routes regularly patrolled by security forces.26 Since refugee return has been lower than desired, the effect of the war on ethnic composition is still very visible and impacts on the homogeneity of the campaigns as well. Furthermore, election campaigns have only timidly started crossing the Inter-Entity Boundary Line. Parties lobby for a targeted ethnic group. Hence, two campaigns take place, with two messages. Due to the level of refugee return that has occurred, some parties have started campaigning in the ‘‘other’’ entity as well. However, the target of their message has been the communities of former refugees, in short, ‘‘their’’ ethnic group, so their impact on bridging the political divide has been very limited. In general, campaigns are very personal, rarely focusing either on reform or on issues to tackle, such as corruption or unemployment. The electoral system, which is probably the most complicated system in Europe,27 does not encourage parties with a multiethnic outlook. Thus, persons who do not declare themselves as Serb, Croat, or Bosniak cannot run for Bosnia and Herzegovina presidency; also, voters registered in the Federation can only vote for the Bosniak or Croat member of the state presidency, whereas voters in the Republika Srpska can only vote for a Serb. Also, a Serb registered in the Federation can’t run for state presidency.28 This is not only clearly contradictory to democratic principles, but contributes also to the freezing of ethnic identity. The current election law was adopted in 2001 with amendments to it—as well as changes of the entities’ constitutions affecting the electoral system—being pushed through in 2002 by the high representative. Consequently, several hundred persons are barred from the elections. ‘‘Such decisions are within the mandate granted to the High Representative by the UN Security Council. In other circumstances, such measures would be irregular by international standards.’’29 Also, forty-two candidates were removed in 1998 from party lists by the Elections Appeals Sub-Commission (EASC) due to violations of the rules and regulations, including elected officials. The candidates removed from the lists had intimidated members and supporters from other parties or from their own party in case they wanted to join another political formation. With twenty candidates removed, the Croat party Croatian Democratic Union HDZ was the most severely punished.30 These exceptional powers were, however,

................. 16928$

$CH4

09-09-08 08:22:15

PS

PAGE 92

93

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

sharply criticized and subsequently reduced by the 2001 Election Law. Since then, the Election Complaints and Appeals Council (ECAC) has had the capacity to remove candidates from the party lists, but its authority to do so is limited to the electoral process only.31 As for the electoral process, it has been transferred step by step to the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 2002, elections were conducted by the national authorities, although still supervised and assisted by the international community.32 This international assistance further regressed in 2006, leaving responsibility for the elections entirely with Bosnia and Herzegovina’s authorities.33 Bosnia and Herzegovina now has a permanent Election Commission34 (as opposed to the Provisional Election Commission that existed until 2001),35 and elections in 2006 were, according to the International Election Observation Mission, ‘‘generally in line with international standards for democratic elections.’’36 However, voter turnout is consistently low, at around 54 percent.37 Political interest is only marginally developed, as is civil society in general. Consequently, the most energetic and committed voters are those with a nationalist outlook. Nationalist parties have continuously dominated the political scene of Bosnia and Herzegovina and complicated the political process due to contradicting conceptions of the state. The three major parties that won in 1991 are still present. However, in 2006 HDZ, the Croat party, suffered major losses (from 10.1 percent in 2002 to 4.9 percent), as did the Bosniak Party of Democratic Action (SDA) (from 23.7 percent in 2002 to 16.9 percent) and the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) (from 15.2 percent to 7.7 percent).38 The lost votes have gone to parties with even stronger nationalist outlooks, such as the Bosniak Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (SzBiH) (15.5 percent) and the Serb Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) (19.1 percent).39 Nonetheless, an interesting incident is represented by the election of Zeljko Komsic. Running for the Social Democratic Party (SDP), Zeljko Komsic managed to win the seat of the Croat member of the presidency. Komsic, who fought in the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina during the war, had attracted votes from Bosniaks and Croats, and, consequently, secured more votes than his opponent from the nationalist HDZ (Horvatska Demokratska Zajednica). His election might be interpreted as a first, albeit timid, sign of cross-ethnicity voting.

................. 16928$

$CH4

09-09-08 08:22:16

PS

PAGE 93

94

DENIS HADZOVIC AND FLORENCE GAUB

Devolution In a country like Bosnia and Herzegovina, where constant fear of each other dominates everyday life and politics, devolution seemed to provide an answer, ensuring that every ethnic group would control its own political structure. The CarringtonCutileiro peace plan of 1991 was the first one to propose devolution from central government to local ethnic communities in order to preserve peace, and the Washington Agreement of 1994, establishing the Federation, as well as the Dayton Agreement of 1995 saw in devolution the key to peaceful coexistence of formerly warring factions. However, post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina has a form of extended devolution that now constitutes an obstacle to development and efficient bureaucracy. In the Dayton Agreement, devolution was initially quite extensive, for example, preserving three armies in one country.40 Although this has been now abolished in the framework of defense reform, and the three armies are being merged into one, the country is still decentralized to an unprecedented level. It has four levels of administration, thirteen prime ministers, 148 municipalities, over 180 ministers, and 760 members of various legislative bodies. In a country of 4.49 million inhabitants41 that constitutes one prime minister for 300,000 inhabitants, to say nothing of the costs involved. Excluding the costs for pensions and the health care system, government expenses account for 1.8 million KM (Bosnia-Herzegovina Convertible Mark) (930,000 Euros). This means that every adult citizen in Bosnia and Herzegovina has to pay 900 KM every year for its government’s salaries, which equals three average monthly salaries—although Bosnia and Herzegovina has 235 million KM (122.4 million Euros) of debts.42 Sixty percent of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s GDP is spent on maintaining the apparatus.43 The central state is weak, leaving most powers to the two entities. As mentioned previously, the central state is responsible only for the areas outlined in the constitution, such as fiscal policy and foreign policy, thus leaving a large number of responsibilities to the entities. Furthermore, entities are responsible for collecting revenues, leaving the center dependent on them for funds.44 The entities are also allowed to establish relationships with other states—in this case, Serbia and Croatia would be the ones in mind; although, formal agreements and treaties must be approved by the central government.45 There has been some progress, though. The number of ministries on the state

................. 16928$

$CH4

09-09-08 08:22:17

PS

PAGE 94

95

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

level has increased from three to nine today, and State Border Services are uniform since 2000.46 Also, a state-level Intelligence and Security Agency (OSA) was formed in 2004, based on the two corresponding entity-level agencies.47 While Republika Srpska is less decentralized, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina has ten cantons, which each have a prime minister with a cabinet. Also, there are cantonal assemblies, and cantons are subdivided into seventy-eight municipalities. In the Federation, education lies within the responsibility of the cantons, meaning that it has ten ministers of education, each defining education policy for the canton. Consequently, decisions over textbooks and curriculum become highly politicized, especially in the mixed cantons of Central Bosnia and Herzegovina-Neretva. There, ministries of education have to follow quota recruitment in order to ensure ethnic balance.48 It is, therefore, not surprising that Bosnia and Herzegovina does not have a history book that is used in all schools in the country. Although it is the decentralized structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina that made peace possible, reform is necessary in order to create a more efficient state. As former High Representative Carl Bildt points out, Bosnia and Herzegovina needs ‘‘de-devolution,’’49, not more devolution. A first attempt to reform the constitution in order to strengthen the central government in April 2006 failed to gain the necessary support from the parliament. However, it is expected that this reform will be discussed again.

Conclusions The democratic institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina have been marked, ever since their creation, by two essential features: first, their basic functioning, and second, their constant lack of support from varying parts of the population. As a largely imposed construction, the postwar Bosnian state has been questioned repeatedly not only by politicians from Republika Srpska, but also by Croat members of the Federation, attempting to create a third entity. In return, Republika Srpska’s existence is being rejected on a regular basis by Bosniaks who see it as a product of genocide. The central government’s weakness was once more visible when its Serb members resigned en masse in 2004, paralyzing its functioning and highlighting its fragility and the lack of consensus that is prevailing among the members of different ethnic groups. Reconciliation and genuine efforts for pre-

................. 16928$

$CH4

09-09-08 08:22:17

PS

PAGE 95

96

DENIS HADZOVIC AND FLORENCE GAUB

war neighborly relations are virtually absent. Its institutions are marked by consociationalism, or rather confessionalism, hence blocking effectiveness by ethnic quota and perpetuating ethnic identity. That the state is basically functioning is largely due to the international presence, intervening to restrict undemocratic tendencies, providing security, and pushing reform. While Bosnia and Herzegovina has the necessary institutions, it is suffering from a lack of political personnel that is willing and able to use them appropriately. Hence, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s challenge is not so much the small parties that reject democracy as such, but the nationalist parties who in theory accept democracy, but in fact have severe difficulties thinking across their own ethnic group. However, there are positive developments as well. Bosnia and Herzegovina has observed war, the breakdown of institutions and good relationships, and is slowly rebuilding what has been damaged. People are traveling across entity borders, uniform currency and license plates are contributing to the growing together of state and nation. One should not forget that eleven years are, after all, a very short period in history.

Notes 1. Keane Rory, Reconstituting Sovereignty. Post-Dayton Bosnia uncovered (Burlington: Ashgate, 2002), 69. 2. Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Federal Office of Statistics, Stanovistvo Prema nacionalnoj pripadnosti, popisima 1961–1991, http://www .fzs.ba/Dem/Popis/NacStanB.htm. 3. International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, Human Rights in the OSCE Region: Europe, Central Asia and North America, Report 2006 (events of 2005) p.89—90. http://www.ihf-hr.org/documents/doc_summary .php?sec_id58&d_id4255. 4. The General Framework Agreement, Annex 4, Article III 5a, http:// www.nato.int/ifor/gfa/gfa-an4.htm. 5. PIC Bonn Conclusions, Main Meeting, XI, Bonn December 10, 1997, http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id5182. 6. Office of the High Representative, Decision Removing Pero Raguz from his position of Mayor of Stolac, 4.3.1998, http://www.ohr.int/decisions/ removalssdec/default.asp?content_id256. 7. Statistics according to the archive of the Office of the High Representative, http://www.ohr.int/decisions/removalssdec/archive.asp. 8. Office of the High Representative, Decision removing Ante Jelavic from his position as a Member of the BiH Presidency, 7.3.2001, http://www.ohr.int/ decisions/removalssdec/default.asp?content_id328. 9. Office of the High Representative, Decision removing Dragan Covic

................. 16928$

$CH4

09-09-08 08:22:18

PS

PAGE 96

97

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

from his position as a Member of the Presidency of BiH, 29.3.2005, http:// www.ohr.int/decisions/removalssdec/default.asp?content_id34397. 10. Office of the High Representative, Decision removing Mr. Nikola Poplasen from the Office of President of Republika Srpska, 5.3.1999, http://www .ohr.int/decisions/removalssdec/default.asp?content_id267. 11. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Press Release (2003)035, April 2, 2003, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/p03–035e.htm. 12. Office of the High Representative, Decision removing Mr. Mirko Sarovic from his position in the Serb Democratic Party, 10.2.2004, http://www .ohr.int/decisions/removalssdec/default.asp?content_id31798. 13. Ibid. 14. ‘‘Serbische Bosnier wollen nicht nach Belgrad,’’ Berliner Morgenpost, 2.10.2006. 15. Agreement on the Implementation of the Constituent Peoples’ Decision of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 27.3.2002, http:// www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/legal/const/default.asp?content_id7274. 16. NationalAssembly of Republika Srpska, http://www.narodnaskupsti nars.net/eng/naslovna/naslovna.php. 17. Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina, http://www.parlament.ba/eng/ index.php. 18. Office of the High Representative, HR Decision Amending the Constitution of Republika Srpska 150/02, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/legal/oth-le gist/doc/hr-dec-amending-the-rs-consti tution-21–02.doc. 19. Office of the High Representative, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/geninfo/2. 20. Office of the High Representative, http://www.ohr.int/decisions/ar chive.asp. 21. Office of the High Representative, Decision imposing the Law on the National Anthem of BiH, 25.6.1999, http://www.ohr.int/decisions/statemat tersdec/default.asp?content_id354. 22. Office of the High Representative, Decision annulling the RS Law on Return of Confiscated Property and Compensation, 30.8.2000, http://www.oh r.int/decisions/plipdec/default.asp?content_id216, and Decision annulling the RS Law on Return of Seized Land, 30.8.2000 http://www.ohr.int/decisions/ plipdec/default.asp?content_id218. 23. Office of the High Representative, Decision proposing the Law on the Intelligence and Security Agency of BiH to the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH, 17.12.2003, http://www.ohr.int/decisions/statemattersdec/default.asp ?content_id31400. 24. Organisation for Security and Cooperation, http://www.oscebih.org/ democratization/pspro.asp?d31. 25. Organisation for Security and Cooperation, The elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Preliminary Statement of the Co-ordinator for International Monitoring, Sarajevo, 1996, 2 and.5, http://www.osce.org/item/1367.html. 26. Ibid, 3. 27. Bosnian voters are called to choose candidates for the House of Representatives out of seven thousand candidates (and forty parties) and vote for them directly; the presidency members are elected according to ethnicity, whereas the National Assembly members of Republika Srpska are elected directly. The members of the Federation House of Representatives, as well as those of the cantonal assemblies, are elected according to the proportional system.

................. 16928$

$CH4

09-09-08 08:22:19

PS

PAGE 97

98

DENIS HADZOVIC AND FLORENCE GAUB

28. Election Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chapter 8, Article 8.1, http:// www.oscebih.org/documents/25-eng.pdf. 29. Ibid., 4. 30. Ibid., 20. 31. OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights: Bosnia and Herzegovina General Elections, October 5, 2002, Final Report, Warsaw, 2003, 14 http://www.osce.org/item/1361.html. 32. Ibid., 1. 33. International Election Observation Mission: Bosnia and Herzegovina— General Elections, October 1, 2006, Sarajevo, 2006, 1, http://www.osce.org/ item/20826.html. 34. Centralna Izborna Komisija Bosne i Hercegovine, http://www.izbori .ba/. 35. OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights: Bosnia and Herzegovina General Elections, October 5, 2002, Final Report, Warsaw, 2003, 7 http://www.osce.org/item/1361.html. 36. International Election Observation Mission, Bosnia and Herzegovina— General Elections, October 1, 2006, Sarajevo, 2006, 1 http://www.osce.org/ item/1361.html. 37. International Election Observation Mission, 2002 General Elections Bosnia and Herzegovina: Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, Sarajevo, 2002, 2, http://www.osce.org/item/1361.html; Parties and Elections: Bosnia and Herzegovina http://www.parteien-und-wahlen.de/bosnia.html. 38. Parties and Elections: Bosnia and Herzegovina http://www.parteien -und-wahlen.de/bosnia.html. 39. Centralna Izborna Komisija Bosne i Hercegovine, http://www.izbori.ba/ rezultati/parlament_bih/index.htm. 40. Robert Hayden, Blueprints for a House Divided (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 126. 41. CIA Worldfactbook, Bosnia and Herzegovina, https://www.cia.gov/cia/ publications/factbook/geos/bk.html. 42. Office of the High Representative, Inaugural Speech by Paddy Ashdown, the new High Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 27.5.2002, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/presssp/default.asp?content_id8417. 43. Council of Europe, Constitutional Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Resolution 1513/2006, http://www.coe.ba/pdf/Resolution_Constitutional_re form_in_Bosnia_a nd _Herzegovina.doc. 44. William Fox and Christine Wallich, ‘‘Fiscal Federalism in Bosnia-Herzegovina: The Dayton Challenge’’ (Washington, DC: World Bank, Central Europe Department, January 1997). 45. Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Article III, Section 2, available at the Constitutional Court site, http://www.ccbh.ba/constitution/. 46. Jeremy King, A. Walter Dorn, and Matthew Rodes, An unprecedented experiment: Security Sector Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina (London: Saferworld, 2002) 22, http://www.bicc.de/publications/other/report_saferworld/ report_security.pdf. 47. Center for European Integration Strategies, Police and Intelligence Reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Urgent Action Needed, CEIS Policy Brief 04– 2006, http://www.ceis-eu.org/Policy_Briefs/2006/policy_brief_04_2006.htm. 48. Council of Europe, Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Governance, Finance and Administration, Report for the World Bank, Strasbourg, 1999, http://www.seerecon.org/bosnia/documents/education_report.pdf.

................. 16928$

$CH4

09-09-08 08:22:20

PS

PAGE 98

99

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

49. Carl Bildt, ‘‘Bosnia between 1995 and 2014,’’ International Conference for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Geneva, October 20, 2005, 7 http://www.bildt .net/dbdocuments/cb000116.doc.

Bibliography Bildt, Carl. Bosnia between 1995 and 2014: International Conference for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Geneva, October 20, 2005, 7 http://www.bildt.net/ dbdocuments/cb000116.doc. Bosnia Daily. ‘‘Wars in BiH, Croatia Displaced Three Million Persons.’’ October 31, 2006. CIA Worldfactbook. Bosnia and Herzegovina, https://www.cia.gov/cia/pub lications/factbook/geos/bk.html. Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Article III, Section 2. Available at the Constitutional Court site http://www.ccbh.ba/constitution/. Council of Europe. Constitutional Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Resolution 1513/2006. http://www.coe.ba/pdf/Resolution_Constitutional_re form_in_Bosnia_and_Herzegovina.doc. ———. Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Governance, Finance and Administration. Report for the World Bank, Strasbourg 1999. http://www.see recon.org/bosnia/documents/education_report.pdf. Election Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chapter 8, Article 8.1. http:// www.oscebih.org/documents/25-eng.pdf. Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Federal Office of Statistics, Stanovistvo Prema nacionalnoj pripadnosti, po popisima 1961–91. http://www.fzs.ba/ Dem/Popis/NacStanB.htm. Hayden, Robert. Blueprints for a House Divided. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999. ———. Bosnia and Herzegovina—General Elections 1, Sarajevo, October 2006, 1. http://www.osce.org/item/1361.html. International Election Observation Mission. General Elections Bosnia and Herzegovina: Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, Sarajevo, 2002, 2. http://www.osce.org/item/1361.html. International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights. Human Rights in the OSCE Region: Europe, Central Asia and North America, Report 2006 (events of 2005), 89–90. http://www.ihf-hr.org/documents/doc_summary .php?sec_id58&d_id4255. Office of the High Representative. Decision annulling the RS Law on Return of Confiscated Property and Compensation, August 30, 2000. http://www .ohr.int/decisions/plipdec/default.asp?content_id216. Decision annulling the RS Law on Return of Seized Land, August 30, 2000. http://www.ohr.int/ decisions/plipdec/default.asp?content_id218. ———. Decision imposing the Law on the National Anthem of BiH, June 25, 1999. http://www.ohr.int/decisions/statemattersdec/default.asp?content _id354. ———. Decision proposing the Law on the Intelligence and Security Agency of BiH to the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH, December 17, 2003. http:// www.ohr.int/decisions/statemattersdec/default.asp?content_id31400.

................. 16928$

$CH4

09-09-08 08:22:20

PS

PAGE 99

100

DENIS HADZOVIC AND FLORENCE GAUB

———. Decision removing Ante Jelavic from his position as a Member of the BiH Presidency, March 7, 2001. http://www.ohr.int/decisions/removalss dec/default.asp?content_id328. ———. Decision removing Dragan Covic from his position as a Member of the Presidency of BiH, March 29, 2005. http://www.ohr.int/decisions/removals sdec/default.asp?content_id34397. ———. Decision removing Mr. Nikola Poplasen from the Office of President of Republika Srpska, March 5, 1999. http://www.ohr.int/decisions/removal ssdec/default.asp?content_id267. ———. Decision Removing Pero Raguz from his position of Mayor of Stolac, March 4, 1998. http://www.ohr.int/decisions/removalssdec/default.asp?con tent_id256. ———. HR Decision Amending the Constitution of Republika Srpska 150/02, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/legal/oth-legist/doc/hr-dec-amending-the-rs -constitution-21–02.doc. ———. Inaugural Speech by Paddy Ashdown, the new High Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, May 27, 2002. http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/ presso/presssp/default.asp?content_id8417. Organisation for Security and Cooperation. The elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Preliminary Statement of the Co-ordinator for International Monitoring, Sarajevo, 1996, 2 and 5. http://www.osce.org/item/1367.html. OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights: Bosnia and Herzegovina General Elections October 5, 2002, Final Report. Warsaw, 2003, 14. http://www.osce.org/item/1361.html. Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina. http://www.parlament.ba/eng/index .php. PIC Bonn Conclusions. Main Meeting, XI, Bonn, December 10, 1997. http:// www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id5182. The General Framework Agreement, Annex 4, Article III, 5a http://www .nato.int/ifor/gfa/gfaan4.htm. William Fox and Christine Wallich, ’Fiscal Federalism in Bosnia-Herzegovina: The Dayton Challenge’, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, Central Europe Department, January 1997.

................. 16928$

$CH4

09-09-08 08:22:21

PS

PAGE 100

Cambodia After Democratization: Accountability Trap Kheang Un Introduction

HAVING

EMERGED FROM THE IMMENSE TOLL OF DESTRUCTION

caused by civil war, foreign occupation, isolation, and genocide, Cambodia, like other postconflict countries, faced issues of rebuilding not only of its infrastructure but also social and political institutions. This chapter examines institutional building processes in Cambodia following the 1993 United Nations’ sponsored elections including: the executive branch, the legislature, elections, and decentralization, analyzing their structures and interactions and assessing their impact on Cambodia’s democratization.

Historical Context of Democratic Building Recent Cambodian history has been marked by tragedy, the darkest of which occurred during the Democratic Kampuchea regime (1975–79), better known as the Khmer Rouge (KR) period. Driven by ultranationalist and utopian thought, the Khmer Rouge undertook massive socioeconomic engineering, depopulating urban centers, enslaving the entire population, and forcing them to engage in intense agricultural activities with heavy workloads and little food. To achieve its utopian goal, the KR abolished existing sociopolitical institutions, placing the country under the totalitarian control of the KR apparatus, known as Angkar (the organization). Facing economic failure and paranoid of enemy infiltration of the revolution, the KR searched for enemies, a drive that ran through the entire polity and finally cut deeply into the regime’s governing structure. The insistence upon security led to an increasing sense of insecurity the out101

................. 16928$

$CH5

09-09-08 08:22:13

PS

PAGE 101

102

KHEANG UN

come of which was the death of over 1.7 million people of starvation, overwork, disease, and outright execution.1 Given a prewar population of between seven and eight million people, the per capita scale of the mass killing surpassed other human rights atrocities of the twentieth century. When Vietnamese forces toppled the Khmer Rouge in 1979, Cambodia had no semblance of a functioning state. The entire population was demoralized, impoverished and diseased. The government of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), installed by the Vietnamese occupying forces, had to rebuild the country from scratch. Because of geopolitical rivalries, the Cambodian conflict, like other conflicts in the developing world during the Cold War era, emerged, as Muthia Alagappa argues, ‘‘as bilateral (Khmer-Vietnamese) and domestic (intra-Khmer) but became internationalized by the dynamics of deep-seated Thai-Vietnamese and SinoVietnamese and Soviet-American rivalries.’’2 Consequently, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the People’s Republic of China, and the West under the leadership of the United States overlooked the grave human rights violations of the KR and supported the remnants of the KR forces and two noncommunist forces, the United Front for a Co-operative, Independent, Neutral, and Peaceful Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) and the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF). The three coalition factions formed an internally divided Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), with Norodom Sihanouk as its president, to oppose the PRK. Domestic and international rivalries sustained the Cambodian conflict for over a decade, a conflict marked by cycles of rainy season offensives by the guerillas, followed by dry season advances by the PRK and Vietnamese forces. These seasonal battle cycles left along their path burned-down houses, dead civilians, displaced people, and millions of landmines. Despite these problems, life improved tremendously in comparison to the Khmer Rouge era. The PRK government restored many social, cultural, and economic features that had been banned during the Khmer Rouge regime. In general, the policies of the Vietnamese-backed PRK were humane, but there was a certain level of systematic oppression. As a Leninist state, the communist party imposed tight control and did not tolerate free expression let alone opposition politics.3 In the late 1980s, the transformation of global geopolitics, coupled with changes within the PRK government, brought dra-

................. 16928$

$CH5

09-09-08 08:22:13

PS

PAGE 102

CAMBODIA AFTER DEMOCRATIZATION: ACCOUNTABILITY TRAP

103

matic changes in the Cambodian conflict. The demise of the Soviet Union and its satellite states in Eastern Europe ended the funding for the proxy conflicts of the Cold War, including the funding for the Vietnamese military presence in Cambodia. The Vietnamese government withdrew its troops in 1989. At the same time, the PRK instituted a number of conciliatory changes such as the reinstitution of market economy and Buddhism as the state religion. The internal and external shifts created the opportunity to jump-start negotiations between Norodom Sihanouk and Hun Sen, then prime minister of the Phnom Penh regime, which resulted in the historic comprehensive settlement of the Cambodian conflict in 1991 known as the Paris Peace Agreement (PPA). Although the PPA was originally intended to end Cambodia’s civil war, its unprecedented outcome was a democratic building project with the end goal of imposing democracy on Cambodia. The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was given a far-reaching mandate including the organization of free and fair elections and the promotion and protection of human rights.4 Armed with over twenty thousand civilian and military personnel and some two billion dollars, UNTAC organized multi-party elections for a Constitutional Assembly in 1993. The Constitutional Assembly drafted a new constitution which contained all the necessary elements for liberal democracy such as periodic multiparty elections, political and civil liberties, and the mechanisms of checks and balances.5 Moreover, the international community through the Consultative Group for Cambodia (CG) continued its engagement by providing assistance to rebuild Cambodia’s economic, social, and political institutions. Since 1993 the CG has provided Cambodia with around $500 million dollars annually for economic and democratic building, a sum that constitutes approximately 50 percent of the annual national budget.

Building Democratic Institutions Elections The constitution declares the principle of popular sovereignty in article 51: ‘‘the Cambodian people are the master of their own country.’’ The exercise of popular sovereignty is manifested in regular periodic multiparty elections to elect members of the

................. 16928$

$CH5

09-09-08 08:22:14

PS

PAGE 103

104

KHEANG UN

National Assembly. Examination of the 1998 and 2003 general elections demonstrates that Cambodia has held relatively free and fair elections. However, beneath the freeness and fairness there are undemocratic elements such as unequal access to the media, state resources, and institutions. This was the product of the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP, the former ruling party of the PRK)6 well-calculated plan as it embarked on the negotiation process. In anticipation of a political settlement to the Cambodian conflict, Hun Sen, at a 1989 meeting of the Council of Ministries, stated: ‘‘If there is a political solution and if [opposition politicians] came [to Cambodia], there should be mutual giveand take. They repay us by recognizing us as the central leader. We repay them by recognizing them as a legal party.’’7 Following the 1993 elections, the ruling CPP manipulated the electoral process in its favor. However, it is important to note that the strategies of manipulation have changed substantially from the initial use of intimidation and violence to patronage politics in the form of material inducements such as individual gifts and construction projects. The 1998 and 2003 general elections were broadly considered to be free and fair as far as the mechanics of voting and counting were concerned. The National Election Commission organized the elections competently. In the 1998 elections over 90 percent of eligible voters cast their votes, while in 2003 approximately 81 percent of 6.34 million registered voters went to the polls.8 In both elections over half of the eligible voters voted for parties other than the CPP.9 The two elections were not free from controversy: the two major rivals to the CPP, FUNCINPEC and the Sam Rainsy Party (SRP), protested the result of the elections, citing political violence, intimidation, and partial electoral machinery. However, without evidence of massive fraud that could have significantly distorted the results, the international election observers declared the two elections free and fair in accordance with international standards. Critics argued that the CPP’s victory was a by-product of its ability to employ local authorities to conduct surveillance and intimidation aimed at creating a climate of fear and blocking villagers from forming close contacts with opposition parties. Shortly before the 2003 elections, Human Rights Watch released a report stating that: ‘‘As Cambodians prepare to go to the polls to elect a third legislature in ten years, they will do so with minimal information about their political choices and with concerns

................. 16928$

$CH5

09-09-08 08:22:14

PS

PAGE 104

CAMBODIA AFTER DEMOCRATIZATION: ACCOUNTABILITY TRAP

105

about their safety and livelihood if the ruling party is not returned to office.’’10 Though intimidation might have played a role in the CPP’s 2003 electoral victory, it can be argued that the fundamental factor behind the CPP’s victory was its ability to garner state resources and employ state institutions to consolidate and extend its networks of patronage politics through the provision of local infrastructure development and gifts to villagers. Given the near total absence of service delivery by the state in the last thirtyfive years, many voters considered the CPP’s gifts acceptable. Financing these activities made the CPP dependent upon businesses and individual government officials for donations, a relationship that generated massive and systematic corruption. The CPP benefited disproportionately from contributions from big business leaders who expected rewards in the form of ‘‘government contracts, tax breaks, or agreement to overlook illegal activities.’’11 While using gifts to attract votes, the CPP prevented the opposition party from having access to the mass media. Opposition parties were granted the freedom to publish newspapers whose contents were critical of the government and (at times irresponsibly) insulting to government officials. Given the limited readership and circulation of newspapers—not least of all because of the low level of literacy—only 9 percent of Cambodians read newspapers on a regular basis (in contrast to 90 percent who watch television and listen to radio),12 rendering printed media ineffective in disseminating opposition politics. Electronic media is firmly under CPP control. All six Cambodian television stations are either affiliated with or owned by the CPP and its leaders. Among the thirteen radio stations only two are fully independent of the government. Even so, the director and owner of one of these independent radio stations, the Beehive, has been harassed and briefly detained by the authorities on charges of defamation. Many critics have suggested that unequal access to the media was one of the significant factors that contributed to the opposition parties’ failure to capture a plurality of votes.13 Although this allegation has not been substantiated by empirical research, it is important to note that the experiences of other transitional and postconflict societies around the world indicate that unequal access to the media creates an uneven playing field that allows the dominant party to monopolize the provision of information and thus shape voters’ perceptions.

................. 16928$

$CH5

09-09-08 08:22:15

PS

PAGE 105

106

KHEANG UN

The Legislature Under the 1993 constitution, Cambodia’s legislature is a unicameral National Assembly. As a way to break the political impasse after the 1998 elections, when a conciliatory move by the CPP and FUNCINPEC required additional honorary posts for their senior party leaders, the constitution was amended in 1999 to add another chamber, the Senate, to the parliament. The constitution provides the National Assembly a broader legal mandate than the Senate, whose role is limited to reviewing legislation passed by the National Assembly and initiating legislation. Per constitutional mandate the legislature is an independent and equal branch of the government vested with legislative and oversight power. In addition to the right to initiate legislation, the parliament also has ‘‘investigative’’ and ‘‘quasi-judicial’’ functions through which it can file charges against members of the government who commit serious crimes. The parliament can also call on government officials to testify on matters of importance to the nation.14 In reality the parliament plays a reactive and subordinate role to the executive. There are a number of factors underlying this legislative subordination; the first is the historical absence of a strong legislature. Since its independence from France in 1954, the Cambodian parliament served as an arena for political legitimization rather than an oversight institution or a forum for democratic debate. Second, the party leaders of FUNCINPEC and CPP maintain tight control over their members. Having strong party discipline is normal in parliamentary democracies. However, in Cambodia such discipline is a product of patronage politics and network building that emerged out of political mistrust; this unconstrained process is undermining the idea of democratic representation. Third, members of parliament lack capacity or training to draft, analyze, or review laws. Consequently, members of the National Assembly defer the right to the executive to draft legislation. Available data from 1993 to 2000 indicates that the legislature initiated no legislation.15 The executive branch regularly manipulated the drafting process. Legislation submitted by the government to the National Assembly tended to be late and vague. For instance, the annual budget legislation often arrived two weeks before the start of the new fiscal year. Because of deficiency in time and deference to the executive, the outcome is that ‘‘the National Assembly has never changed a single budget

................. 16928$

$CH5

09-09-08 08:22:15

PS

PAGE 106

CAMBODIA AFTER DEMOCRATIZATION: ACCOUNTABILITY TRAP

107

line’’ of the government initiated drafts.16 These vague laws could be enforced by subdecrees enacted by the Council of Ministers. Even so, there is often a lack of political will on the part of the executive, resulting in delays that can postpone the implementation of many proposed reforms indefinitely. In other instances, due to an absence of legislative oversight, some laws that are aimed at creating good governance simply create new opportunities for rent-seeking behavior for ministries through the issuance of proclamations (parkas).17 In developed parliamentary democracies, the legislature can also pass vague laws which give the executive flexibility in implementing legislation. However, the issue is more critical in a postconflict society where there is an absence of accountability, and where politics is based upon patronage networks backed by corruption. Institutions such as the Constitutional Council and the Supreme Council of Magistracy—which were respectively designed to examine the constitutionality and the proper function and independence of the judiciary—have not performed according to their constitutional mandate. Despite clear constitutional requirement, not all laws have been forwarded to the Constitutional Council for review. Meanwhile, the judicial system has been incapable of maintaining the rule of law due to scarce human and capital resources, low intra-institutional cooperation, corruption, political dependence and subordination, and widespread impunity. All of these problems are intertwined with patronage politics and the ruling elites’ halfhearted commitment to democracy.18 The Executive Despite the constitutionally mandated democratic system based on a foundation of checks and balances, the power rests in the hands of the executive. Chief executive power lies with the prime minister who is appointed by a majority of votes in the National Assembly.19 Due to the need for national reconciliation, in addition to a desire to maintain trust between FUNCINPEC and the CPP, the transitional provisions in the 1993 constitution allowed for the appointment of two prime ministers (first and second). Furthermore, important ministries, such as the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of National Defense, were headed by co-ministers, one from FUNCINPEC and another from the CPP. Despite the conciliatory arrangements established in the 1993

................. 16928$

$CH5

09-09-08 08:22:16

PS

PAGE 107

108

KHEANG UN

constitution, disagreements and mistrust within and between the two parties increased. This resulted in two coups d’e´tats, one in 1994 and another in 1997. The 1994 coup was launched by dissatisfied elements within the CPP and was aimed at ousting Hun Sen and Prince Ranariddh. By 1996, when FUNCINPEC demanded more of a share of executive power within the coalition government, particularly at the subnational government levels, the relationship between Hun Sen and Prince Ranariddh deteriorated. The tension finally exploded in two days of violence in Phnom Penh between forces loyal to Hun Sen and those loyal to Prince Ranariddh on July 5–6, 1997. From this battle Hun Sen emerged triumphant as the sole leader of Cambodia. Since the 1998 elections, Hun Sen has served as sole prime minister and has been labeled Cambodia’s ‘‘strongman.’’ However, as Sorpong Poeu explains: ‘‘The Prime Minister’s political survival continues to depend on the goodwill of other CPP officials and military leaders who have also reaped the benefits from the CPP’s political hegemony. Those who have benefited from Hun Sen’s grip on power are those who have helped to keep him in power.’’20 Such power is structured as interlocking pyramids of patronclient networks, serving as a means of exclusion and inclusion in a multinetwork competition. In Cambodia, as in many countries in the developing world, the government is not built on rational institutions in Weberian terms, but on partimonialism, a political pattern wherein a leader’s power comes from his ability to capture and maintain loyalty of key sections of the political elite by fulfilling their material aspirations through the distribution of perquisites.21 Political compromise, in the form of a coalition government between FUNCINPEC and the CPP to solve political deadlock following the 1993 United Nations-sponsored elections, only added another layer of patron-client networks onto the pervasive existing ones which had been built by rivals within the ruling CPP. The expansion of patron-client networks has resulted in interparty and intraparty suspicion and mistrust, noticeably between and within FUNCINPEC and CPP. To consolidate the CPP’s power and his own, Hun Sen manipulated the Cambodian transition, building his patronage networks so as to penetrate state institutions and the private economic sphere. The ability of his patronage networks to operate beyond and in the place of state institutions has led to widespread corruption, violence, and the exploitation of natural resources. It also led to the politicization of state institutions, undermining the mechanisms of checks

................. 16928$

$CH5

09-09-08 08:22:16

PS

PAGE 108

CAMBODIA AFTER DEMOCRATIZATION: ACCOUNTABILITY TRAP

109

and balances outlined in the constitution. It is widely recognized that corruption is hierarchically institutionalized in a way that Cambodians characterize as ‘‘thum sit ma thum touch si tam touch’’ (the big eats big the small eats small). Corruption is detrimental to overall social, political, and economic development of the country for it distorts market forces, and prevents the strengthening of democracy. Further, corruption deprives the government of resources and hence restricts its ability to provide critical services to the public, particularly those outside of the patronage networks, most predominantly rural people. Fighting widespread corruption requires effective mechanisms, namely laws and institutions that have the power to investigate suspected illegal activities and effectively enforce the law. Thus far, no anticorruption laws have been passed, and institutions such as the judiciary and the police charged with investigative and prosecutorial power have been co-opted. Without an independent judicial system, elected officials and other government employees cannot be held accountable for their actions; and a vicious, unbreakable cycle of patronage, corruption, and abuse of power is set in motion. Many reports and studies consistently indicate that in Cambodia the application of justice does not rest on the principle of law; rather it is based on the concerned parties’ bargaining power. Consequently, elites’ interests and power have been perpetuated by an inequitable justice system, while the poor lack access to safeguards against the abuse of state and nonstate actors. In this context, poverty and insecurity particularly in rural areas have been perpetuated.22 The Cambodian judiciary’s weakness, corruption and political dependence reflect the existing power configuration centered on extended clientelism and elites’ lack of commitment to genuine democracy. The problems in the judiciary are endemic for two reasons. First, corruption is a practice that judges, to varying degrees, must be involved with in order to be appointed to and retain their positions on the bench. Second, judges and prosecutors are subject to encroachment from the executive and party leaders who can remove them from the bench if they find judicial decisions offensive. In many ways, the judiciary is a tool of the powerful to legitimize their actions and strengthen their power at the expense of the principle of checks and balances. The government has made efforts to reform the judicial system such as the training of judges and increasing the salaries for judges and prosecutors. In

................. 16928$

$CH5

09-09-08 08:22:17

PS

PAGE 109

110

KHEANG UN

other instances, the government, in responses to widespread allegations of corruption and ineffectiveness of the judicial system, has taken ad hoc measures like the transfer of judges and prosecutors and re-arrest of previously released prisoners. However, the government needs to systematically move beyond such ad hoc actions. Ad hoc reform is not conducive to long term democratic development because it does not promote horizontal accountability, the responsibility of one branch of government to another. Urgent steps are needed to ensure that the judiciary is independent, effective, and trustworthy. Widespread corruption, lack of rule of law, and patronage politics extend networks of protection throughout the state apparatus that negatively affect sustainable economic development and the distribution of resources. Under these networks of protection, state and nonstate actors at all levels have been able to engage in commercial exploitation of resources for personal enrichment and other intrigues at the expense of the regular people. There were numerous cases of land expropriation by local authorities and military officers and illegal logging by the military and police officers.23 The poor are those who stand to lose, as their livelihoods depend upon common resources; and their ability to protest social injustice is low given the level of insecurity and lack of avenues for complaint and redress. This in turn generates public distrust of officials and government institutions. A survey by Asia Barometer, the Institute for Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo, shows that people’s trust in the government institutions and the government’s ability to tackle these issues is low. In the survey, 52.2 percent stated that they ‘‘trust to a degree’’ government institutions, 27 percent ‘‘don’t really trust,’’ and 6.7 percent ‘‘don’t trust at all.’’24 Low levels of people’s trust in the system will generate a downward spiral effect wherein people are further encouraged to collude with state officials in evading laws and regulations. Government has been lukewarm in its effort to promote horizontal accountability despite international criticism and domestic outcry. Horizontal accountability institutions include anticorruption laws, anticorruption bodies, an independent and effective judicial system, and a strong parliament. Without autonomous functioning institutions, Guillermo O’Donnell argues, ‘‘any degree of democratization achieved is precarious and potentially explosive.’’25 Independent institutions help promote horizontal accountability because the latter requires government agencies that have the power, de jure and de facto, to over-

................. 16928$

$CH5

09-09-08 08:22:18

PS

PAGE 110

CAMBODIA AFTER DEMOCRATIZATION: ACCOUNTABILITY TRAP

111

see and to impose criminal penalties on any illegal activities committed by other state agencies and their leaders. Without independent institutions, actions of the political elites are constrained only by ‘‘the hard facts of existing power relations.’’26 The WDR (World Development Report) 2006 stresses, the ‘‘justice system can do much more to level the playing field in the political, economic, and socio-cultural domains.’’27 Without the rule of law, there will be no checks and balances and hence no guarantee that the rich and the powerful will act within legal and institutional boundaries.28

Devolution Cambodia is a unitary state structured on the principle of political hierarchy in which administrative structures are divided into provinces and municipalities. Provinces are further divided into districts (srok) which in turn are subdivided into communes. Municipalities are divided into sections (khan) which are further divided into sangkat. Up until early 2002, Cambodia was highly centralized, a system that prevented local participation in decision-making processes and opposition parties from establishing a foothold in local politics. The CPP has monopolized local politics since the fall of the Khmer Rouge in 1979. After 1993, FUNCINPEC pushed for local elections, but the CPP blocked the move. Consequently, throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, commune chiefs appointed during the People Republic of Kampuchea in the 1980s continued to dominate local authorities providing the CPP with a formidable base for nationwide accumulation and extension of power.29 In 1996, in an effort to promote effective and responsive local development, donor agencies in collaboration with the government set up the SEILA Program. SEILA, which means ‘‘foundation stone’’ in Khmer Sanskart, has the objective of instituting decentralized systems and strategies for planning, financing, and management of rural development.30 SEILA provides multisectoral provincial-rural development committees with control over the allocation of rural development budgets. These committees worked closely with village and commune development committees that decide on projects undertaken with support from advisors through local planning processes.31 Overall, SEILA was seen as a success in rural development by the international

................. 16928$

$CH5

09-09-08 08:22:19

PS

PAGE 111

112

KHEANG UN

community and not seen as a threat to the status quo by the CPP. With its grip on power secure, and with pressure from the donor community, the CPP agreed to implement a devolution process. The notion of devolution in Cambodia involves decentralization and deconcentration. Decentralization refers to ‘‘the delegation of political and administrative authority, from the central to the commune/sangkat level,’’ while deconcentration entails ‘‘the delegation of administrative responsibilities, decision making and authority from central ministries to subnational provincial departments and/or district offices.’’32 The devolution process embarks on a dual goal to improve local democratic participation and to enhance participation in local economic planning and development. Decentralization began with the 2002 election of 1,621 commune/sangkat councils of which 1,510 are in rural communes, while 111 are urban sangkat located in the four municipalities of Phnom Penh, Khep, Pailin, and Sihanoukville. With long monopoly over local government, well-organized networks, and abundant financial and human resources, and that power compounded by some violence and intimidation, the CPP was able to capture 62 percent of the total votes, winning 97 percent of the local top offices. Despite the CPP’s overwhelming victory, these local elections opened new possibilities for local politics, governance, and development. Decentralization has generated more positive outcomes in the further democratization of local politics; first, the local elections terminated the CPP’s sole control over local politics and opened a new vista of contestation for opposition parties that now could establish a presence in the hinterland. Commune elections have produced ‘‘new attitudes and practices’’ at the local level.33 Decentralization has increased interparty collaboration leading to a reduction in politically motivated violence.34 In turn, decentralization has increased collaboration between local government and nongovernmental organizations. Decentralization has also increased the quality of service delivery and thereby generated further demands by people from their elected councilors, deviating from the previous era when ‘‘people have never expected much from the commune.’’35 Despite these positive developments, there is doubt over the effectiveness of decentralization due principally to inadequate devolution of power and financial resources and secondarily to the lack of capacity among local councilors. First, decentraliza-

................. 16928$

$CH5

09-09-08 08:22:19

PS

PAGE 112

CAMBODIA AFTER DEMOCRATIZATION: ACCOUNTABILITY TRAP

113

tion’s objective of alleviating poverty through local participatory development remains largely unrealized due to a lack of resources and the absence of autonomy. Currently, commune councils are mainly funded by (1) commune/Sangkat fund, (2) local contributions, and (3) income through service delivery such as civil registration and issuance of marriage, birth, and death certificates. Commune/Sangkat councils have not been given legal power to raise local revenues or to manage local resources such as forest and land.36 The commune/sangkat fund, a form of national transfer, constitutes around 2 percent of national revenues, which in 2003 allocated each commune/sangkat $5,000 for development and $3,000 for administration. However, the actual reimbursement per commune was $2,500 and $1,800 respectively. Limited revenues restricted commune councils to providing only small-scale development projects such as village roads, canals, and bridges.37 In the meantime, local contributions have been limited while revenues through service delivery are insignificant.38 Furthermore, Cambodia’s devolution process has not created the necessary space conducive for elected councils to function as ‘‘autonomous, independent . . . [and] predominately downwardly accountable’’ institutions.39 Thus far, the National Committee for Support to the Commune has not issued any regulations that differentiated the role of governors, district chiefs, and commune councils. Consequently, the interactions between these institutions are based on ‘‘the legacy of top-down.’’40 A nationwide survey of commune councilors found that 34 percent of councilors ‘‘strongly agree’’ and 36 percent ‘‘somewhat agree’’ that commune councilors are subordinate to the district and provincial authority.41 Such subordination is a by-product of the commune councilors’ reliance on the district and provincial level for training and expertise, and the nature of party hierarchy. Council members are elected through proportional representation and who will be chosen to stand as the candidate is controlled by the party hierarchy, a mechanism that reinforces upward accountability. Furthermore, the pattern of top-down interactions is reinforced by Khmer traditions of ‘‘observance of strict hierarchies of authority.’’42 Problems of decentralization are also linked to the process of deconcentration. The two are closely intertwined; however, the deconcentration process has been stalled by the central government’s unwillingness to relinquish its control over provinces and municipalities. Within the decentralization framework, pro-

................. 16928$

$CH5

09-09-08 08:22:20

PS

PAGE 113

114

KHEANG UN

vincial/municipal administration is given a supporting role to commune/sangkat councils. However, sub-national tiers have been weak as power has been concentrated in the central ministries. Currently, most government resources are planned, budgeted, and implemented in a highly centralized and fragmented manner by various ministries. Consequently, governors have limited involvement in development, planning, and budgeting with line departments which maintain vertical accountability to central ministries.43 Furthermore, structure roles and functions of provinces and districts are not well defined; nor have decentralization and deconcentration been well coordinated. The Organic Law which defines the role and responsibility of subnational-level government has not been passed. The resultant consequence is the absence of clear roles and responsibilities between commune, district, and provincial authorities.44

Conclusion Cambodia’s democratization suggests that international intervention to impose democracy went forward despite the country’s existing social, economic, and political conditions. Democratization accompanied by the adoption of a liberal constitution is necessary but not sufficient in promoting the rule of law, government accountability, and genuine political participation. As this chapter has shown, self-interested political elites, patronage, corruption, and the absence of trust have reinforced each other and pervaded the political system. The embedded nature of these elements in Cambodian politics prevents the reform or establishment of political institutions and the emergence of the rule of law—both of which are crucial for democratic consolidation. For democracy to advance, democratic systems must be translated into democratic governance. This development requires the consolidation of democratic institutions and the strengthening of democratic practices. As this chapter has shown, each party and faction in Cambodia does whatever it can to retain power for themselves. Furthermore, their actions are aimed at furthering their own immediate interests without taking into account the impact these actions have on the country’s future politics or economics. Instead of obeying established democratic rules, they treated them as what Pinkney has called ‘‘contingent arrangements to be bent or dismissed when the opportunity

................. 16928$

$CH5

09-09-08 08:22:20

PS

PAGE 114

CAMBODIA AFTER DEMOCRATIZATION: ACCOUNTABILITY TRAP

115

presents itself.’’45 Resources in Cambodia are limited outside the state. Therefore, access to and control of the state offers elites wealth, power, and prestige. Patronage and corruption are the instruments of choice. The interlocking of corruption and patronage politics did not diminish with the introduction of electoral democracy. Instead elites transformed patronage politics to fit with democratic rhetoric. As electoral victory has become the base of internal and international legitimacy, the interweaving of patronage politics and corruption have been molded to accommodate electoral democracy. Institutions designed to promote vertical and horizontal accountability are not given meaningful roles. The parliament with limited human capacity and resources is dominated by a more resourced, staffed, and politically assertive executive branch. In the meantime, the executive, despite its rhetoric of devolution, has not shown the will to decentralize real power. Despite some successes, the stated goal of decentralization and deconcentration was to shift power to local and subnational government; the process thus far has not yet begun to transform the nature of personalized and centralized Cambodian politics wherein power rests in the hands of the executive which is controlled by a few politicians and their patronage networks. In the foreseeable future, Cambodia will face an accountability trap wherein despite the presence of elections and institutions of checks and balances the country will be run by a few individuals without horizontal or vertical accountability.

Notes 1. David Chandler, The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War, and Revolution Since 1945 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991). 2. Muthiah Alagappa, ‘‘Regionalism, and the Quest for Security: ASEAN and the Cambodian Conflict,’’ Australian Journal of International Affairs 47, no. 2 (1993): 450. 3. Evan Gottesman, Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge: Inside the Politics of Nation Building (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003). 4. Michael Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC Civil Mandate (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995); United Nations Department of Information, The United Nations and Cambodia, 1991–1995 (New York: United Nations, 1995). 5. Steven Marks, ‘‘The New Cambodian Constitution: From Civil War to a Fragile Democracy,’’ Columbian Human Rights Review 26, no. 45 (1994): 45–110. 6. The Cambodian People’s Party is the current ruling party in Cambodia. It is the successor to the Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Party (KPRP) in-

................. 16928$

$CH5

09-09-08 08:22:21

PS

PAGE 115

116

KHEANG UN

stalled to power following the Vietnamese ouster of the Khmer Rouge in 1979. The KPRP changed its name to the Cambodian People’s Party to distance itself from its communist past. 7. Gottesman, Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge, 306. 8. COMFREL-NICFEC. 2003. The Findings of Polling Day, Polling and Ballot Counting Periods, Phnom Penh, August 6, 2003. Available from hppt:// www.bohchnout.info/PDF_Files/07-08-03%20COMFREL%20NICFEL.pdf; Patrick Vander Weyden, ‘‘Parliamentary Elections in Cambodia 1998,’’ Electoral Studies 19, no. 4 (2000): 615–21. 9. The CPP received 42.4 percent and 47 percent respectively in 1998 and 2003 elections. 10. Human Rights Watch, The Run-Up to Cambodia’s 2003 National Election: Political Expression and Freedom of Assembly under Assault (2003). Available from http://hrw.org/background/asia/cambodia/cambodia061203.pdf. 11. National Democratic Institute, Money Politics: A Study of Party Finance in 22 Countries, Kingdom of Cambodia (Washington D.C.: National Democratic Institute, 2005). Available at http://www.accessdemocracy.org/li brary/1848_polpart_moneyinpolitics_010105_48_68.pdf. 12. The Asia Foundation, Democracy in Cambodia—2003: A Survey of the Cambodian Electorate (Phnom Penh: Asia Foundation, 2003), 15. 13. National Democratic Institute, ‘‘Statement of the NDI-Pre-Election Delegation to Cambodia’s 2003 National Assembly Elections.’’ Available online at http://www.ndi.org/worldwide/asia/cambodia/statements/statement_ 060503.asp. 14. Sorpong Peou, ‘‘Cambodia after the Killing Fields,’’ in Government and Politics in Southeast Asia, ed. John Funston (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001) 47–48. 15. Cambodian Development and Resource Institute, Cambodia: Enhancing Governance for Sustainable Development (Phnom Penh: CDRI, 2000), 115. 16. Ibid., 48. 17. Ibid., 115. 18. Kheang Un, ‘‘Democratization without Consolidation: The Case of Cambodia, 1993–2004’’ (PhD diss. Northern Illinois University, 2004), chap. 5. 19. Before a 2005 amendment to the constitution, the vote required a twothirds majority. 20. ‘‘Cambodia,’’ 59. 21. Dwight King, ‘‘Corruption in Indonesia: A Curable Cancer?,’’ Journal of International Affairs 53, no. 2 (Spring 2000): 609. 22. Caroline Hughes, The Political Economy of Cambodia’s Transition, 1991–2001 (Richmond, UK: Corzon Press, 2003). 23. Hughes, The Political Economy; Global Witness, Taking a Cut: Institutionalized Corruption and Illegal Logging in Cambodia Aural Wildlife Sanctuary. Available at http://globalwitness.org/reports/show.php/en.00066.html. 24. Kheang Un, ‘‘Beliefs and Perceptions in a Post-conflict Society: Cambodia in 2005,’’ Asia Barometer (Tokyo: Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo, 2005). 25. Gillermo O’Donnell, ‘‘Transitions, Continuities, and Paradoxes,’’ in Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democratic Comparative Perspective ed. Scott Mainwaring, Gillermo O’Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 22.

................. 16928$

$CH5

09-09-08 08:22:21

PS

PAGE 116

CAMBODIA AFTER DEMOCRATIZATION: ACCOUNTABILITY TRAP

117

26. Gillermo O’Donnell, ‘‘Delegative Democracy,’’ Journal of Democracy 5, no. 1 (2005): 60. 27. World Development Report 2006, Equity and Development, 175. 28. O’Donnell, ‘‘Delegative,’’ 60. 29. Kheang Un and Judy Ledgerwood, ‘‘Cambodia in 2002: Decentralization and Its Effects on Party Politics,’’ Asian Survey 43, no. 1, 113–19. 30. Peter Blunt and Mark Turner, ‘‘Decentralization, Democracy and Development in a Post-Conflict Society: Commune Councils in Cambodia,’’ Public Administration and Development 25 (2005): 75–87; Alex White, ‘‘Decentralization, Governance and Capacity Building in Cambodia,’’ Local Economy 21, no. 4 (2006): 423–28. 31. White, ‘‘Decentralization,’’ 425. 32. World Bank, Cambodia at the Crossroads (2004), 50. Available at http:// siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCAMBODIA/Resources/chap3.pdf. 33. Kim Ninh and Roger Henke, Commune Councils in Cambodia: A National Survey on their Functions and Performance, with a Special Focus on Conflict Resolution (Phnom Penh: Asia Foundation, 2005), 33. 34. Caroline Rusten, Kim Sedara, Eng Netra, and Pak Kimchoeun, The Challenge of Decentralization Design in Cambodia (Phnom Penh: CDRI, 2005), 107. 35. Rusten et al., The Challenge, 170. 36. Ibid., 134–47. 37. Leonardo Romeo and Luc Spyckereller, ‘‘Decentralization Reforms and Commune-Level Services Delivery in Cambodia,’’ case study submitted at a workshop on ‘‘Local Government Pro-Poor Service Delivery,’’ Manila, February 9–13, 2004. 38. Blunt and Turner, ‘‘Decentralization,’’ 84. 39. Rusten et al., The Challenge, 96. 40. Ibid., 58. 41. The Asia Foundation, Democracy, 36. 42. Blunt and Turner, ‘‘Decentralization,’’ 84. 43. Kimchoeun Pak, Vuthy Horng, Sovatha Ann, and Theary Gnoun Ngo, Strengthening Provincial Governance in Cambodia’s Decentralization and Deconcentration Reforms: Accountability in the New Management System (Phnom Penh: Cambodia Development Resource Institute, Governance and Decentralization Unit, 2005), 10. 44. World Bank, Cambodia at the Crossroads, 56–57. 45. Robert Pinkney, Democracy in the Third World (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 179.

Bibliography Alagappa, Muthiah. ‘‘Regionalism, and the Quest for Security: ASEAN and the Cambodian Conflict.’’ Australian Journal of International Affairs 47, no. 2 (1993). Asia Foundation. Democracy in Cambodia—2003: A Survey of the Cambodian Electorate. Phnom Penh: Asia Foundation, 2003. Blunt, Peter, and Mark Turner. ‘‘Decentralization, Democracy and Development in a Post-Conflict Society: Commune Councils in Cambodia.’’ Public Administration and Development 25 (2005).

................. 16928$

$CH5

09-09-08 08:22:22

PS

PAGE 117

118

KHEANG UN

Cambodian Development Resource Institute. Cambodia: Enhancing Governance for Sustainable Development. Phnom Penh: CDRI, 2000. Chandler, David. The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War, and Revolution Since 1945. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991. COMFREL-NICFEC. The Findings of Polling Day, Polling and Ballot Counting Periods, Phnom Penh, 06 August 2003. Available from hppt://www .bohchnout.info/PDF_Files/07-08-03%20COMFREL%20NICFEL.pdf. Doyle, Michael. UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC Civil Mandate. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995. Funston, John, ed. Government and Politics in Southeast Asia. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001. Gottesman, Evan. Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge: Inside the Politics of Nation Building. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003. Hughes, Caroline. The Political Economy of Cambodia’s Transition, 1991– 2001. Richmond, UK: Corzon Press, 2003. Human Rights Watch. The Run-Up to Cambodia’s 2003 National Election: Political Expression and Freedom of Assembly under Assault. Available from http://hrw.org/background/asia/cambodia/cambodia061203.pdf. King, Dwight. ‘‘Corruption in Indonesia: A Curable Cancer?’’ Journal of International Affairs 53, no. 2 (Spring 2000). Mainwaring, Scott., Gillermo O’Donnell and J. Samuel Valenzuela, eds. Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democratic Comparative Perspective. South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992. Marks, Steven. ‘‘The New Cambodian Constitution: From Civil War to a Fragile Democracy.’’ Columbian Human Rights Review 26, no 45 (1994). National Democratic Institute. Money Politics: A Study of Party Finance in 22 Countries, Kingdom of Cambodia Washington, D.C.: National Democratic Institute, 2005. Available from http://www.accessdemocracy.org/library/ 1848_polpart_moneyinpolitics_010105_48_68.pdf. ———. Statement of the NDI-Pre-Election Delegation to Cambodia’s 2003 National Assembly Elections. Available from http://www.ndi.org/world wide/asia/cambodia/statements/statement_060503.asp. Ninh, Kim, and Roger Henke. Commune Councils in Cambodia: A National Survey on their Functions and Performance, with a Special Focus on Conflict Resolution. Phnom Penh: Asia Foundation, 2005. O’Donnell, Gillermo. ‘‘Delegative Democracy.’’ Journal of Democracy 5, no. 1 (1994). Pinkney, Robert. Democracy in the Third World. 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003. Rusten, Caroline, Kim Sedara, Eng Netra, and Pak Kimchoeun. The Challenge of Decentralization Design in Cambodia. Phnom Penh: CDRI, 2005. Un, Kheang. ‘‘Beliefs and Perceptions in a Post-conflict Society: Cambodia in 2005.’’ Asia Barometer. Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo, 2005. ———. ‘‘Democratization without Consolidation: The Case of Cambodia, 1993–2004.’’ PhD diss., Northern Illinois University, 2004. Un, Kheang, and Judy Ledgerwood. ‘‘Cambodia in 2002: Decentralization and Its Effects on Party Politics.’’ Asian Survey 43, no. 1 (2003).

................. 16928$

$CH5

09-09-08 08:22:22

PS

PAGE 118

CAMBODIA AFTER DEMOCRATIZATION: ACCOUNTABILITY TRAP

119

United Nations Department of Information. The United Nations and Cambodia, 1991–1995. New York: United Nations, 1995. Weyden, Patrick Vander. ‘‘Parliamentary Elections in Cambodia 1998.’’ Electoral Studies 19, no. 4 (2000): 615–21. White, Alex. ‘‘Decentralization, Governance and Capacity Building in Cambodia.’’ Local Economy 21, no. 4 (2006). World Bank. Cambodia at the Crossroads, 2004. Available from http://sitere sources.worldbank.org/INTCAMBODIA/Resources/chap3.pdf.

................. 16928$

$CH5

09-09-08 08:22:22

PS

PAGE 119

Consolidating Peace in Cambodia: Stabilization without Security Sector Reform Christina Willie

Introduction

CAMBODIA HAS UNDERGONE A REMARKABLE PROCESS OF POSTCON-

flict stabilization. For some thirty years internal conflict and violence tore Cambodian society apart costing millions of lives, destroying the economy, and devastating the country’s infrastructure.1 The Paris Agreement of 1991 marked the beginning of the end of the conflict and started a process where members of the opposition factions were incorporated into the state system. The military conflict was finally brought to an end in 1998 when the last Khmer Rouge faction defected to the government side. Security has improved dramatically bringing wide-ranging benefits to the population. The overall homicide rate halved between 1998 and 2003.2 GDP growth has averaged by 8 percent per year since 2000.3 However, the benefits of security and stabilization have not been accompanied by improvements in governance of the security sector. Instead stabilization has entrenched a system of political patronage, rent seeking, and resource exploitation within the security sector that now makes reform more difficult.4 The stabilization process has turned the security forces into key organs in Cambodia’s political and economic system with implications for internal security and economic development. The army is involved in natural resource extraction, and individuals within the army and police utilize their powerful positions for personal gain. NGOs and UN institutions have highlighted human rights abuses by security forces. The security sector is a dominant force in Cambodia, and civilian institutions are incapable of providing sufficient checks and balances. The power of 120

................. 16928$

$CH6

09-09-08 08:22:17

PS

PAGE 120

121

CONSOLIDATING PEACE IN CAMBODIA

the security sector originates less from their military or organizational strength and more from the way their structures are linked into the political economy and social structure of Cambodia. Improved security and the emergence of the security forces as key organs within the Cambodian state occurred as part of the establishment of ‘‘an ever more monolithic system’’5 in which Prime Minister Hun Sen through his (CPP) consolidated almost complete control over the state and electoral machinery.6 This has reduced the possibility for armed violence in Cambodia, but at a cost to democracy and good governance. The system depends on the ability to utilize the security forces as a system for reward in return for political loyalties. Security sector reform (SSR), understood as the transformation of the state security institutions and the civilian oversight bodies in order to promote accountability and effectiveness, has not been carried out in Cambodia. Over the last fifteen years several initiatives directed at the security forces have been funded by international donors, but few have made a lasting impact on the way the security sector operates. Cambodia’s successful stabilization process following the peace settlement tells a story with important lessons for the international community concerned with building effective states in postconflict countries. These lessons include: • The emergence of a strong and controlling political structure can help to stabilize a country and prevent a return to conflict. • In focusing solely on stabilization, there is a risk that systems of governance can become entrenched that damage prospects for democracy and development. • The example of Cambodia suggests that security sector reform needs to be built into postconflict stabilization strategies from the outset. • Security sector reform should begin with a thorough understanding of the country’s social, political, and economic context.7 • Support from the international community needs to be long-term, consistent, engaged with local politics, and needs to work in close cooperation with local civil society.

This chapter starts by explaining how the security sector operates today and its relation to the broader political system. It then explains how these structures emerged in the postconflict period as a result of stabilization. The second part of the chapter will

................. 16928$

$CH6

09-09-08 08:22:17

PS

PAGE 121

122

CHRISTINA WILLIE

analyze international programs in support of the security sector, their impact, and the difficulties encountered.

The Emergence of Cambodia’s Present Day Security Sector: Stabilization in the Absence of Security Sector Reform Cambodia’s Security Organs Today Cambodia maintains three key security organs: the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF), the police, and the gendarmerie. There are also a navy and air force but they are small and relatively insignificant. Cambodia has no central intelligence agency. Instead security organs maintain their own units tasked with intelligence gathering. Cambodia’s three main security organs maintain large numbers of personnel on their payroll, but remain underresourced, insufficiently trained, and badly managed which prevents them from fulfilling their security mandate effectively. Precise figures are hard to obtain, but the latest official statements suggest that the armed forces number around 110,000 men.8 Paramilitary troops within the police and gendarmerie number some 51,000 to 67,000 on the official payroll. The security organs’ effectiveness is hampered by a lack of clear definition of roles and responsibilities. The systems of control rely to a large extent on personalities rather than institutions with clear mandates and transparent procedures. Domestic security capabilities are an important factor in Cambodian poliReported Strength of the Security Forces in Cambodia Army Provincial Forces Navy Air Force Gendarmerie Police Total

75,000a 45,000a 2,800a 1,500a 7,000b 44,000c 175,300

Sources: a Military Balance 2005–6, 269 b Author Interview, Phnom Penh, March 2005 c Wille, ‘‘How many weapons are there in Cambodia?’’, 2006a, 31

................. 16928$

$CH6

09-09-08 08:22:18

PS

PAGE 122

123

CONSOLIDATING PEACE IN CAMBODIA

tics and consequently, all three of the main security organs have some internal security responsibilities.9 The formal institutions making up the security sector differ from the informal reality where power is highly concentrated and personalized. The role of the Ministry of Defense is, for example, limited to logistics and finance of the armed forces. Individuals report directly to the highest political level, bypassing the formal institutional structure. The real power lies with the commander-in-chief who operates from the High Command Headquarters and reports to the prime minister. Until 1999 the prime minister was himself commander-in-chief of the RCAF.10 The Research and Intelligence Department is also located within the High Command Headquarters, and reports to the prime minister rather than through line ministries. Since 1993 the police have been formerly under the control of the Ministry of Interior, but observers have pointed out that real power continues to be exercised through the political process at the local level. Local commanders who held territory during the conflict and their successors continue to exert influence through positions in the RCAF and the police. It has been essential for commanders to build up their support base at the local level. In spite of reforms aimed at centralization and formally abolishing the local security committees, centrally appointed officers, who have lacked local support, have remained basically powerless. Oversight bodies are incapable of ensuring that the security forces always adhere to the rule of law. A particular difficulty for oversight bodies is the fact that officers within the police mix law enforcement and judicial functions. Police officers reportedly perform quasi-judicial functions by offering mediation services to both victims and perpetrators.11 Some observers claim that as many as a quarter of criminal cases are mediated by the police directly, and are never referred to a court of law.12 NGOs have also documented numerous cases of extrajudicial killings linked to well-connected security officials. An examination conducted by a group of NGOs in 1999 of 209 homicides alleged to have been perpetrated by the security forces found that not a single perpetrator was brought to justice. The report concludes that both the courts and the police are vulnerable to intervention, pressure, and directives from high-ranking political leaders or other powerful people protecting their subordinates.13 The problem has also attracted the attention from the special representative of the UN secretary-general in Cambodia, who has highlighted a ‘‘continuing problem of impunity’’ where

................. 16928$

$CH6

09-09-08 08:22:19

PS

PAGE 123

124

CHRISTINA WILLIE

‘‘individuals and groups responsible for committing serious violations of human rights, in particular members of the military, police, the gendarmerie and other armed forces, have not been arrested or prosecuted.’’14 Foreign observers have often pointed to shortcomings, ineffectiveness, and weak governance of the security services. Yet their recommendations have found little resonance within the Cambodian political establishment. As Ashley explains in ‘‘Between War and Peace,’’ state power is both a means and an end for Cambodian political parties and the security apparatus has been used to strengthen the most powerful party, the CPP, at the expense of formal institutions and governance. Informal relationships continue to override formal rules making political manipulation easier. Cambodian society has traditionally been organized around patron–client relationships. Khmer people have been described as organizing ‘‘their daily interactions with others by attaching themselves to someone higher in the social hierarchy.’’15 They are provided with benefits by their superiors in return for loyalty. These complex webs of social relations and obligations provide powerful individuals with a support base, and offer a means of social advancement for their supporters. The security forces were recognized as key instruments for building and maintaining power bases within the Khmer system by all parties at the end of the conflict. In order to maximize influence it has been advantageous for powerful political and military figures to keep a maximum number of beneficiaries on the official payroll of the security forces, including so-called ‘‘ghost soldiers,’’ who only exist on paper. Emergence of the system: the security sector as a mechanism for control and reward The size and functioning of the armed forces and the police reflect their role in stabilization following the peace agreement of 1991. The RCAF was founded in 1993 through the official amalgamation of previously warring factions into one state army. The most significant force within the Khmer People’s Revolutionary Armed Forces (KPRAF), the official state army of the Vietnamese-supported government in Phnom Penh. The anticommunist opposition forces, the Khmer People’s National Liberation Armed Forces (KPNLAF) and the National Army of Independent Kampuchea (ANKI) were smaller in numbers, but

................. 16928$

$CH6

09-09-08 08:22:19

PS

PAGE 124

125

CONSOLIDATING PEACE IN CAMBODIA

no less keen to enlist as many of their supporters into the state security forces as they could. The Khmer Rouge fighting forces, the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK) officially left the peace process and did not incorporate its units into the newly founded RCAF. Individual battalions, however, did defect to the RCAF between 1993 and 1998 when the last significant desertion took place. Defected units were equally keen to obtain a place within the new security forces. Positions within the security forces have been a key instrument in Cambodian politics over the last decade. Appointments within the security forces have been a crucial instrument in the system of handing out rewards for loyalties that allowed the CPP to consolidate its hold on power, ousting their main political rival, the Front uni national pour un Cambdoge independent, neuter, pacifique et cooperative (FUNCINPEC). Between 1993 and 1996 peace between the two main parties, the CPP and FUNCINPEC, was maintained through an unwritten powersharing arrangement that embraced the entire state including the security apparatus. As Ashley describes, a dual command structure was set up with each position of authority ‘‘shared’’ between a representative from the CPP and one from FUNCINPEC. With this system in place both factions maintained control over their armies and police forces within the RCAF and the Khmer police. However, real power rested not on the formal position, but the ability to obtain loyalty from the largest number of inferiors within the security forces. Over time the CPP eliminated the FUNCINPEC representatives taking sole control of the state and security apparatus by building and maintaining the stronger power base built on informal networks of patronage rather than formal institutions of the state. Estimates on Faction Strength in Early 1990s Faction

Lower Estimate

Higher Estimate

KPRAF Provincial units Military forces ANKI (formerly ANS) KPNLAF Khmer Rouge (NADK) Total

55,000 6,000 20,000 7,000 8,000 40,000 136,000

75,000 12,000 38,000 14,000 14,000 50,000 203,000

Source: Wille, ‘‘How many weapons are there in Cambodia?’’, 2006a

................. 16928$

$CH6

09-09-08 08:22:20

PS

PAGE 125

126

CHRISTINA WILLIE

The ability to reward loyalties with privileges has been very important in this struggle. As has been pointed out, the CPP’s ability to prevent Ranarridh from awarding his followers positions of authority, at the grassroot level, was an effective mechanism to weaken FUNCINPEC.16 The royalist FUNCINPEC was progressively weakened as key members were brought into the CPP through the offer of lucrative positions. As a result, Prince Ranariddh lost power and authority within his own party while the CPP extended its control over crucial ministries. Following the coup in 1998 Hun Sen succeeded in dismantling FUNCINPEC’s parallel military and bureaucratic structure within the state. Senior FUNCINPEC officials in the army and the police were captured and executed. Those willing to cooperate were brought into the state structure.17 Of particular importance in the reward system for loyalties is access to local economic opportunities. The system of concessions for fisheries, plantations, and forest exploitation played a key role. Such concessions have been granted since the early 1990s. In 1995, 35 percent of Cambodia’s territory had reportedly been allocated under the concession scheme.18 According to the NGO Global Witness (GW), the armed forces are effectively the largest land concession holder in Cambodia. The army was granted over seven hundred thousand hectares of so-called Military Development Zone land in the early 1990s as part of the peace dividends.19 Logging profits are the best documented element in the economic reward system through the security forces. During the conflict, the timber trade provided a useful source of financing the conflict.20 After the conflict many military commanders continued these activities for private gain.21 To ensure continued loyalty from local commanders the government rarely interfered with these activities. Officially, all concession logging activities were suspended in December 2002 mainly due to international pressure to halt deforestation, but there is evidence that illegal logging continues on a large scale.22 There appears to have been a shift among security force personnel from direct involvement in the timber trade to rent seeking made possible through the legal restrictions on logging.23 Today, private companies carry out most of the logging. Officials are reported to provide protection against law enforcement in return for payments. Such money is passed up the chain of command from junior officers to superiors, and ultimately to senior officials in the capital.24 There is also evidence that high-level

................. 16928$

$CH6

09-09-08 08:22:20

PS

PAGE 126

127

CONSOLIDATING PEACE IN CAMBODIA

politicians benefit directly from the timber trade.25 Official security personnel are also at times seconded to private companies to provide protection. They are classified as ‘‘inactive’’ soldiers, but remain on the RCAF payroll.26 A position within the police force also provided great economic advantages during the 1990s. The sale of state property that occurred on a large scale, in a nontransparent manner and often outside a legal framework provided opportunities for police officers to interpret and ‘‘enforce’’ the rule of law in accordance with their own vested interests.27 Today, the system appears to have shifted somewhat, but continues to provide numerous rent-seeking opportunities. In order to find additional sources of income some policemen are reported to sell their services, including the threat of the use of official force, on the private market or to demand payment from victims before investigating a case.28 Well-connected individuals have been able to build large scale private businesses utilizing the police force. The Ministry of Interior partly owns the private company MPA Security Services. Half of the company’s personnel come from the Ministry of Interior, and most are serving police officers.29 There is no evidence that the profits from this enterprise flow back into the state budget. It is through this system of reward and loyalties that the security forces continue to play a pivotal role in maintaining the power and wealth of the government and military elite. This explains why there has been limited progress in the reform of the security services on the basis of rational organizational principles.

Limited Progress in Implementing Western Ideas of Efficient Security Sector Management In spite of several attempts by Western donors to promote SSR in Cambodia, little progress has been made. As defined by the OSCE in 2005, SSR is today understood to cover three interrelated factors: the institutional framework for security provision, the governance of the security institutions, and the accountability of the security forces. This concept of SSR is less than a decade old, and was not a guiding principle at the time when the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was established and the first actions in support of the security services were undertaken. In the late 1990s international insti-

................. 16928$

$CH6

09-09-08 08:22:21

PS

PAGE 127

128

CHRISTINA WILLIE

tutions, motivated by budgetary concerns, focused on reduction in the size of the armed forces. Cambodian security forces have received direct Western assistance at times, and since 2000 small arms programs have been implemented in Cambodia. These have included programs for weapon storage and management by the security forces. However, the implementation of a comprehensive SSR agenda seeking to transform the security architecture of the state has not yet been attempted in Cambodia. Security sector related initiatives that went against the interest of the ruling elite achieved little lasting effect. Their impact was limited because the underlying institutional and political processes in Cambodia were not well understood and were not addressed. The small arms programs were more successful because their focus on reducing uncontrolled weapons proliferation coincided with the governments concern to establish increasing control over the entire country and to disarm potential adversaries. These deficiencies with the design of early security sector programs are increasingly recognized. UNTAC and external military assistance The Paris Peace Accords tasked the UN mission with security sector related responsibilities. However, initiatives launched by the UN were discontinued and others failed to achieve a deep and lasting impact. The military component of the ‘Agreement on a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict’’ of 1991 included responsibilities for the UNTAC mission for cantonment, disarmament, and demobilization of all forces.30 Despite a deployment of 14,300 troops, the UN was unable to enforce the disarmament process, and cantonment was suspended in late 1992 because one of the factions, the former Khmer Rouge Party of Democratic Kanguchea (PDK), did not comply with the terms of the agreement. Some forty thousand cantoned troops were released and the UNTAC mission concentrated on the election process.31 Following the election and completion of the UNTAC’s mandate, the UN influence on the creation and organization of the RCAF declined sharply. Twenty unarmed UN military liaison officers were sent to Phnom Penh for six months tasked with liaising with the government. They were later replaced first by three and then by a single military adviser.32 The RCAF meanwhile was developing into a key institution within Khmer politics as outlined above. Some governments, notably Australia, France, the United

................. 16928$

$CH6

09-09-08 08:22:21

PS

PAGE 128

129

CONSOLIDATING PEACE IN CAMBODIA

States and Indonesia, provided direct military assistance during the early 1990s to the RCAF. Efforts focused on strengthening the fighting capabilities against the Khmer Rouge, but did not attempt to influence the management or architecture of the RCAF. The UNTAC mission also included responsibilities for the civil administration. However, UN initiatives were unable to dismantle the existing Khmer structures and their impact was limited to training programs that did not fundamentally alter the underlying incentives for the organizational structure. Under the civil administration component the UN formally exercised full control over national defense and public security, and 1,780 civilian police monitors were tasked with supervising and controlling the Khmer civil police responsible for law enforcement.33 Run under the civil administration and human rights component, much of the UN’s work concentrated on human rights training programs also directed at judges. However, as has been pointed out the CPP was able to maintain ‘‘its tight control of the bureaucracy, army, police, media and judiciary,’’ and because the UN lacked a mandate from its member states it was unable to remove key state structures from factional domination.34 Consequently the UN was able to document human rights abuses, prevent some abuses from occurring wherever the police monitors were placed, but failed to achieve a lasting structural impact on the police force with their human rights training program. Individuals within the police continued to use their position to build up patronage networks and derive lucrative income from rent seeking. Police reform limited to the creation of the Gendarmerie and training initiatives In the early 1990s it was generally accepted that the Cambodian police were ineffective and unable to perform their functions. No far-reaching police reform had been carried out and working practices were carried over from the Khmer Rouge and State of Cambodia (SOC) regimes. The police acted as a spy force for the ruling party rather than as a law enforcement agency. Police action at that time was mostly directed against political opponents and antisocial behavior. By the late 1990s the police had turned into what commentators described as a ‘‘joint forum of armed wings of various political parities’’ though the integration of the different factional supporters.35

................. 16928$

$CH6

09-09-08 08:22:21

PS

PAGE 129

130

CHRISTINA WILLIE

The creation of the gendarmerie in 1994 was intended to remedy the problems apparent in the Khmer police. However, in the final analysis this only created an additional player in the political power struggle in Cambodia. The establishment of the gendarmerie was primarily driven by the former colonial power France and aimed to return Cambodia’s security forces to the structure that existed prior to the Khmer Rouge takeover in 1975. Under this system the police had the responsibility to collect taxes, while the gendarmerie were responsible for law and order. There was a belief that a return to pre-Khmer Rouge arrangements would improve law and order. However, the newly formed gendarmerie became subject to political interference, and gained notoriety during the 1998 coup when it was used by the government as the key force to fight the opposition FUNCINPEC. The lack of coherence in the objectives and strategies of the assistance strategies of foreign donors allowed the Khmer government to play one donor off against the other, and to pursue its own political aims. Western police training, for example, has always included a strong human rights component, but this has not been the case for police support provided by China and Vietnam. Western initiatives for human rights training for the police continued post-UNTAC. Numerous initiatives have been undertaken, including dedicated Australian support and a sizeable component of the EU Assistance on Small Arms Management in Cambodia. In parallel, China and Vietnam have assisted the Khmer police. While little is known about the specifics of these programs, there is no indication that these trainings pursued a strong human rights agenda. Due to the multiple sources and lack of coordination between assistance programs of Western and Eastern donors there was no possibility to impose SSR conditionality. Following the coup in 1998, when security forces were deployed against the elected coalition partner FUNCINPEC, Australia and the United States suspended defense cooperation. The Chinese government then stepped in, clearly signaling to the government in Phnom Penh that there was a limit to which it had to bow to Western ideas of how to manage its internal politics and security services.36 Downsizing the army to free budgetary resources Motivated by the financial strain that high military spending has placed on the Cambodian budget, downsizing of the armed

................. 16928$

$CH6

09-09-08 08:22:22

PS

PAGE 130

131

CONSOLIDATING PEACE IN CAMBODIA

forces has been a major discussion point between the government and the aid community since the mid 1990s. However, little lasting effect has been achieved. In 1997, the national budget allocated 48 percent for defense.37 Military personal was reported to total 143,000 in 1998 and 12.5 people per thousand population were in the armed forces.38 The international community encouraged demobilization and offered to assist with integration of the demobilized personnel into civilian communities. After many delays, a Veteran Assistance Program, (CVAP) was launched at the end of the 1990s which resulted in 15,551 irregulars being removed from the payroll, and 1,500 soldiers and 15,000 ex-combatants demobilized in 1999 and 2000.39 However, the second phase of the demobilization programme was suspended in 2003 following the discovery of corrupt procurement practices within the Cambodian government.40 Attempts at downsizing the RCAF achieved little impact because donors misjudged the root of the problem, ignored the realities of incentives within the Khmer system, and failed to see the security sector within the broader context. As Richardson and Sainsbury pointed out, donors concluded that the high military spending was the result of an excess number of soldiers rather than being a product of the military-state relationship that centered on patronage networks and siphoning off resources through the armed forces using inter alia, the official budget.41 By ignoring these realities the reintegration package unwittingly provided incentives for corrupt practices. The program allocated dollar amounts per soldier, which as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) recognized in its report in 2000, created strong financial incentives for individuals within the military to seek ways to pad their official troop numbers with nonmilitary personnel for later demobilization and payment.42 The Western reform agenda followed a misguided sequence of reform and failed to address the fundamental issues of security sector management. The reform agenda was led by budgetary experts from international financial institutions who concentrated narrowly on the military budget rather than the broader focus on security governance. The program did not include any consideration of Cambodia’s security needs and thus the required personnel size, qualifications, and equipment needed to carry out professionally the required security tasks. It consequently failed to make an impact on the security architecture and simply provided further opportunities for individuals to enrich themselves and to reward supporters.

................. 16928$

$CH6

09-09-08 08:22:23

PS

PAGE 131

132

CHRISTINA WILLIE

A new focus on capacity and governance The latest donor projects have emphasized institution and capacity building. These programs tend to assume that the government possesses the political will to undertake reform, but lacks the policy making and technical capacity.43 Australia is presently assisting in building police capacity to combat transnational crime with a particular focus on cooperation to counter trafficking in human beings and sexual exploitation of children.44 The EU’s Assistance on Curbing Small Arms and War Weapons in Cambodia (ASAC) program (2000–06) focused on surplus weapons destruction and safe storage, as well as human rights training courses. The Japan Assistance Team for Small Arms Management in Cambodia (JSAC) has carried out similar programs targeted at the police. Most recent programs have been more alert to the risk of financial mismanagement, have introduced tightly controlled payment and procurement procedures, and have avoided cash payments. The EU, ASAC, and JSAC programs have made significant contributions to government weapons collection programs. Some 131,000 guns have been removed from circulation and placed under the control of the security forces since 1998.45 Violence indicators demonstrate that programs contributed to a reduction in armed violence in Cambodian society thus aiding the stabilization process and improving human security.46 The programs have been relatively successful because the programs’ primary objective of reducing gun proliferation coincided with the ruling party’s aim to remove access to weapons that could fall into the hands of political opponents. In the final analysis, therefore, the small arms programs contributed to the government’s ability to extend its control and weaken the opposition. The government’s latest reform plans recognize the need for fundamental changes to the system. The Governance Action Plan (GAP) calls for military reform and states ‘‘public safety and social peace hinge on successful redefinition of the role and size of the military.’’47 To kick-start military reform, Australia has assisted Cambodia in drafting the White Paper on Defense.48 The Administrative Reform Program (ARP) and the Legal and Judicial Reform Project (LJRP) designed under the GAP include reform initiatives directed at the police. The GAP takes a broad approach and focuses on ‘‘law enforcement,’’ which includes the judiciary and magistrates. The plan includes establishing guide-

................. 16928$

$CH6

09-09-08 08:22:23

PS

PAGE 132

133

CONSOLIDATING PEACE IN CAMBODIA

Rate of firearms use in homicides, acts of violence, and causes of hospital admissions (%), 1991–2004 Rate of firearms use in homicides, acts of violence, and causes of hospital admissions (%), 1991–2004 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1991

1992 1993

1994 1995

1996 1997

1998 1999 2000

2001 2002 2003 2004

% of violent acts reported in Phnoom Penh Post involving firearm use, 1994–2004 % of hospital admissions for assault involving firearms % of homicides reported in Phnom Penh Post committed using a firearm, 1994–2004

Source: Wille 2006b, p. 68

lines and standard procedures for law enforcement agencies, but these are not listed among the fifty-eight selected short- and medium-term priorities.49 While these plans look impressive on paper it is not clear that they are fully owned by the government. It remains to be seen whether they will be implemented to a significant extent and whether they will make progress in tackling the deep seated governance problems affecting the security sector.

Conclusion Cambodia’s story poses a dilemma: Stabilization has been achieved, but at the cost of entrenching a deeply corrupt system of governance based on the power of the security forces. It is without doubt an achievement that Cambodia has not reverted to conflict since 1991 as so many postconflict countries have done. Moreover, Cambodia is unlikely to return to open conflict because the ruling party exerts near complete control and because there is no credible or effective opposition. The stabilization process was successful because it offered the warring parties

................. 16928$

$CH6

09-09-08 08:22:24

PS

PAGE 133

134

CHRISTINA WILLIE

greater rewards through cooperating with the system rather than by continuing the civil war. The benefits to Cambodian society are clear. Violence has reduced making Cambodia a much safer country, and there are more economic opportunities than ever before. Many private companies engaged in business in Cambodia accept the system of patronage and corruption as a price worth paying for security, predictability, and for getting things done. Business people involved in the logging industry, for example, do not perceive extortion by the military or other groups as a threat to their business because the trade is very profitable, in spite of the heavy ‘‘taxes’’ levied by the security forces taking their cut.50 However, it is questionable whether the Cambodian system of governance is capable of establishing a legal and administrative framework that encourages long-term productive investments, sustainable use of natural resources, and a competitive business environment that the country needs to lift itself out of poverty. The immediate gains from stabilization will go no further without more comprehensive SSR. Cambodia now urgently requires broad-reaching SSR. Better governed security services would save budgetary resources, improve security, reduce abuses of power and help to uphold the rule of law. SSR is inherently difficult because it touches on the interests of the most powerful individuals in Khmer society. Western attempts have in the past been unsuccessful because they threw technical solutions at a problem rooted in Cambodia’s social structure, politics and culture. There may be a general limit to what outside powers can achieve when there is no uniformity on principles and priorities. Rising Chinese influence and willingness to provide military aid and police training in particular offer a rather different perspective that is unlikely to advance key security sector reforms based on principles of accountability and transparency. It may be that change will only be achieved from within Cambodia. Ultimately the demand for change must come from civil society and the educated elite. At the time of the UN intervention in Cambodia the concept of SSR was not well developed and was not explicit in the UN’s mandate. With hindsight it is clear this limitation in the international community’s approach to bringing about stabilization has had long-term negative consequences for the management of the security forces and broader governance. The approach brought a quick fix to the conflict, but there was little awareness among the international community about the long-term dan-

................. 16928$

$CH6

09-09-08 08:22:25

PS

PAGE 134

135

CONSOLIDATING PEACE IN CAMBODIA

gers of corrupt governance. Many donors have remained in denial of the nature of the governance system in Cambodia that emerged from the peace settlement. The lesson for the international community from Cambodia is that SSR needs to be built into a postconflict stabilization process from the outset. Opportunities have been missed, and it will now be very difficult to bring about fundamental reform because corrupt practices and networks of patronage have become entrenched and systemic. It must be acknowledged that, as in many postconflict environments, the emergence of a patronage state has perhaps been the price of peace and is the glue that continues to hold the country together. It would have been very difficult to have brought warlords into the political process without providing them with strong individual incentives to give up fighting. However, the costs of this arrangement are now becoming increasingly apparent in terms of governance failures, corruption, the weakness of the rule of law, the absence of transitional justice, the abuse of power, and human rights violations. The case of Cambodia illustrates that SSR in a postconflict environment is always highly political, but in spite of the difficulties, the international community should never lose sight of the fundamental need to strengthen the accountability of the security sector. Efforts at promoting stabilization should always be matched an equally vigorous drive to promote SSR.

Notes 1. The precise death toll is subject to debate. Estimates range from 1 million (Kiljunen, 1984) to 1.2—3.4 million over a period of ten years, 1970–80 (Heuveline, 2001). 2. The overall homicide rate is estimated to have dropped from 6.9–9.0 per 100,000 in 1998 to 3.1–4.0 in 2003 (Wille, 2006b). 3. WoldBank World Development Indicators. 4. ‘‘Rent seeking behaviour’’ refers to the transfer of income to one person or a group at the expense of others through the manipulation of free and competitive markets, often through the control of government regulations and exemptions. 5. Ledgerwood, ‘‘Cambodia since April 1975’’, 1. 6. Ashley, 1998. 7. This argument has been advocated by the New Political Economy Perspective (NPEP) (Landell-Mills, Williams, and Duncan, November 2006). 8. The Cambodian government stated in March 2006 that the army had 110,000 men and that around 38,000 staff cuts would be made (Samean, 2006). 9. United States of America, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, ‘‘Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—2000,’’ 1.

................. 16928$

$CH6

09-09-08 08:22:25

PS

PAGE 135

136

CHRISTINA WILLIE

10. Royal Government of Cambodia, Defending the Kingdom of Cambodia, p. 31. 11. Tieng, Long, and Hicks, 2004, 45. 12. Ratha, Long, and Vijghen, 2003, 36. 13. Adhoc, Licadho, and HRW, 1999, 37–38 and 3. 14. Leuprecht, 2004, 2. 15. Ledgerwood, ‘‘Understanding Cambodia: Social Hierarchy, PatronClient Relationships and Power,’’ 5. 16. Roberts, 2002, 527. 17. Ashley, 1998, 10. 18. GW, 2002, 3. 19. GW, 2004, 26. 20. Trade Environmental Database (TED), 1996. 21. GW, 1996, 2. 22. World Bank, 2004, 2; UNCOHCHR, 2004; Economic Institute Cambodia (EIC), 2004, chap. 9.2. 23. GW, 2004, 19. 24. Ibid. 25. GW, 1997a; 1997b. 26. UNCOHCHR, 2004, 28, 29. 27. Marcillino quoted by Muzamil Jaleel, 1998, 2. 28. Hendrickson, 2001, 74. Tieng, Long, and Hicks, 2004, 45. 29. Hendrickson, 2001, 74. 30. UNDPKO 2003, 4. 31. Ibid., 13. 32. Ibid., 21. 33. Ibid., 5. 34. Ashley, 1998, 4. 35. Alex Marcillino, quoted in Jaleel, 1998. 36. Hendrickson, 2001, 70–71. 37. Kato et al., 2000, 22. 38. Ibid., 23. 39. Economic Institute of Cambodia (EIC), 2005. 40. Richardson, 2005. 41. Richardson and Sainsbury, 2005, 291. 42. Kato et al., 2000, 68. 43. The Asian Development stated in 2000 that the government had demonstrated political will but lacked the capacity to carry out policy planning. Toshiyasu Kato et.al., 2000, 67. 44. Australian Government, AusAID, Australia’s Aid Program to Cambodia, http://www.ausaid.gov.au/country/cbrief.cfm?DCon1061_5593_8716_ 8236_8498&CountryID34. 45. Wille 2006c. 46. Wille 2006b, 68. 47. Royal Government of Cambodia, ‘‘Plan of Action for Implementing the Legal and Judicial Reform Strategy,’’ 3. 48. Royal Government of Cambodia, ‘‘Defending the Kingdom of Cambodia, Security and Development,’’ 2000. 49. Royal Government of Cambodia, ‘‘Plan of Action for Implementing the Legal and Judicial Reform Strategy,’’ 2005, 5. 50. GW, 2004, 20.

................. 16928$

$CH6

09-09-08 08:22:26

PS

PAGE 136

137

CONSOLIDATING PEACE IN CAMBODIA

Bibliography Adhoc, Licadho, and Human Rights Watch. ‘‘Impunity In Cambodia: How Human Rights Offenders Escape Justice.’’ Report HRW 11, no. 3 (1999). Ashley, David. ‘‘Between War and Peace: Cambodia 1991 to 1998.’’ Accord. Cambodia’s Constitutional Challenge, 1998. Australian Government. AusAID, Australia’s Aid Programme to Cambodia. http://www.ausaid.gov.au/country/cbrief.cfm?DCon1061_5593_8716_ 8236_8498&CountryID34. Economic Institute of Cambodia (EIC). ‘‘Cambodia Economic Watch II.’’, April 2005. http://www.eicambodia.org/publications/cewII/chapterix_civiladminis tration.php. ———. ‘‘Cambodia Economic Watch.’’ October 2004. http://www.eicambodia .org/publications/cew/forestrymanagement.php. Global Witness. ‘‘A Tug of War. The Struggle to Protect Cambodia’s Forests.’’ A Briefing Document by Global Witness. (March 1997b). ———. ‘‘Corruption, War, Forest Policy—the unsustainable exploitation of Cambodia’s Forests.’’ Global Witness Report. (February 1996). http://www .globalwitness.org/reports/download.php/00087.doc. ———. ‘‘Deforestation without limits.’’ Global Witness Report. (July 2002). ———. ‘‘Just Deserts for Cambodia? Deforestation and Co-Prime Minister’s Legacy to the Country.’’ A Briefing Document by Global Witness. (June 1997a). http://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/forests/cambodia/deserts/ contents.htm. ———. ‘‘Taking a Cut. Institutionalized Corruption and Illegal Logging in Cambodia’s Aural Wildlife Sanctuary.’’ Global Witness Report. (November 2004) http://www.globalwitness.org/reports/download.php/00208.pdf. Hendrickson Dylan. ‘‘Cambodia’s Security Sector Reforms: limits of a downsizing strategy.’’ Journal of Conflict, Security and Development 1, no. 1 (2001): 67–82. Heuveline, Patrick. ‘‘The Demographic Analysis of Mortality Crises: The Case of Cambodia, 1970–1979.’’ Forced Migration and Mortality. 2001, 102–29. http://www.nap.edu/openbook/0309073340/html/102.html. International Institute for Security Studies. The Military Balance 2005/06. London: Routledge, 2006. Jaleel, Muzamil. ‘‘Cambodia: Cambodian Police and the Need for Reform.’’ Human Rights Solidarity no. 11 (November 1998). http://www.hrsolidarity .net/mainfile.php/1998vol08no11/1841/. Kato, Toshiyasu, Jeffrey A. Kaplan, Chan Sophal, and Real Sopheap. ‘‘Cambodia Enhancing Governance for Sustainable Development.’’ Asian Development Bank. October 2000. Kiljunen, Kimmo, ed. Kampuchea: Decade of the Genocide. Report of a Finnish Commission of Inquiry. London: Zed Books, 1984. Landell-Mills, Pierre, Gareth Williams, and Alex Duncan. ‘‘Tackling the Political Barriers to Development: The New Political Economy Perspective.’’ Policy Practice Brief Number 1. November 2006. http://www.thepolicypractice .com/papersdetails.asp?code8.

................. 16928$

$CH6

09-09-08 08:22:26

PS

PAGE 137

138

CHRISTINA WILLIE

Ledgerwood, Judy L. ‘‘Cambodia since April 1975.’’ http://www.seasite.niu .edu/khmer/Ledgerwood/Part6.htm. ———. ‘‘Understanding Cambodia: Social Hierarchy, Patron-Client Relationships and Power.’’ http://www.seasite.niu.edu/khmer/Ledgerwood/patrons .htm. Leuprecht, Peter, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Human Rights in Cambodia, ‘‘Advisory Services and Technical Co-operation in the Field of Human Rights: Situation of Human Rights in Cambodia.’’ UNECO SOC Report. New York: UNECOSOC, December 20, 2004. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) ‘‘Security System Reform and Governance.’’ Reference Document, DAC Guidelines and References Series. Paris: (OECD), 2005. Ratha, Sourn, Dianna Long, and John L.Vijghen ‘‘Gun and Livelihood. The Use of Small Arms and their Impact on People’s Livelihood.’’ Research Series on SALW Issues in Cambodia—Report No 5. Phnom Penh. December 2003. Richardson, Sophie. ‘‘World Bank shares blame for demob failure.’’ Phnom Penh Post, Issue 14/05. March 11–24, 2005. http://www.phnompenhpost .com/TXT/comments/c1405–1.htm. Richardson, Sophie and Peter Sainsbury. ‘‘Security Sector Reform in Cambo dia.’’ Security sector reform and post-conflict peace-building. Edited by Sch nabel Albrecht and Hans-Georg Ehrhart Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2005. Roberts, David. ‘‘Democratization, elite transition, and violence in Cambodia, 1991–1999.’’ Critical Asian Studies 34, no. 4 (2002). Royal Government of Cambodia. ‘‘Defending the Kingdom of Cambodia, Se curity and Development.’’ 2000. ———. ‘‘National Strategic Development Plan, 2005–2010.’’ December 22, 2005. ———. Council for Legal and Judicial Reform, ‘‘Legal and Judicial Reform.’’ Adopted by the Council of Ministers on June 20, 2003. ———. Council for Legal and Judicial Reform. ‘‘Plan of Action for Implement ing the Legal and Judicial Reform Strategy.’’ Adopted by the Royal Govern ment of Cambodia at the Plenary Session on April 29, 2005. ———. Council for Legal and Judicial Reform. ‘‘Overview of Legal and Judicial Reform and Implementation Mechanism in Cambodia.’’ February 2006. ———. Council of Administrative Reform (CAR). ‘‘Governance Action Plan.’’ Samean, Yun. ‘‘Retirement Age of Low-ranking Soldiers Slashed.’’ Cambodia Daily. March 2, 2006. Tieng, Saman, Diana Long, and Natalie Hicks. ‘‘Security Promotion Efforts. Existing State Mechanisms to Control and Prevent Urban Gun Crime in Cambodia.’’ Research Series on SALW Issues in Cambodia—Report No 6. Phnom Penh. December 2004. Trade Environmental Database (TED). ‘‘Cambodia Timber Export Ban (CAM WOOD Case.’’ Case no. 285. 1996. http://american.edu/TED/camwood .htm. United Nations Cambodia Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNCOHCHR). Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Human Rights in Cambodia. ‘‘Land concessions for economic purposes in Cambo

................. 16928$

$CH6

09-09-08 08:22:27

PS

PAGE 138

.

139

CONSOLIDATING PEACE IN CAMBODIA

dia. A human rights perspective.’’ November 2004. http://cambodia.ohchr .org/report_subject.aspx?sg_id5. United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO). ‘‘Cam bodia: United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).’’ 2003. United States of America. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. ‘‘Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—2000, Cambodia.’’ Released February 23, 2001. http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/eap/681.htm. Wille, Christina. ‘‘Finding the Evidence: The Links Between Weapon Collec tion Programmes, Gun Use and Homicide Rates in Cambodia.’’ African Se curity Review 15, no. 2 (2006b). Wille, Christina. ‘‘How many weapons are there in Cambodia?’’ Small Arms Survey Working Paper No. 4 Small Arms Survey, Geneva, June 2006a. Wille, Christina. ‘‘Stabilizing Cambodia: Small Arms Control and Security Sector Reform.’’ Small Arms Survey 2006: Unfinished Business. 2006c 119–39. World Bank. Development Indicators. http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EX TERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,menuPK:232599⬃pagePK:64133170⬃piPK: 64133498⬃theSitePK:239419,00.html. World Bank. ‘‘Seizing the Global Opportunity: Investment Climate Assess ment and Reform Strategy for Cambodia.’’ Report No 27925-KH. August 12, 2004. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCAMBODIA/Resources/Globalopportunity.pdf.

................. 16928$

$CH6

09-09-08 08:22:27

PS

PAGE 139

Guatemala Stuck in the Middle: The Challenges of Institutionalizing Democracy Marc Belanger

THE SIGNING OF THE GUATEMALAN PEACE ACCORDS IN 1996 SIG-

naled the end of military conflict in one of Latin America’s most fabled and troubled countries. Long associated with the eternal spring of stunning highland scenery and Mayan communities, the country’s long-running conflict struck many outsiders as especially cruel. While the 1996 accords generated hope, most observers were quick to note that the consolidation of democracy in Guatemala would not be an easy process. All the issues that haunt postconflict societies were present in abundance: weak legal and political institutions, a fragile, dependent economy further weakened by internal conflict, an extensive legacy of state repression, and a strong, unbowed military. While the peace accords mandated solutions for each of these issues, the challenge would be in their enactment. More than a decade later, Guatemala’s electoral institutions have survived but public confidence in the rule of law and the legitimacy of political leadership has declined. This chapter will analyze the weaknesses of Guatemalan political institutions as vehicles of democratization. In doing so, it is important to stress that institutions are not abstractions. When institutions falter, it is generally not simply a matter of poor design. Institutions are given meaning by actors with their own values, assumptions, and history. Institutions work when it is in the interest of key actors that they do so, but failure emerges from complex conditions. This analysis will focus on three key issues: the nature of Guatemalan political order prior to 1996, the actors and forces in competition since 1996, and the impact of global forces. It will draw on Charles Tilly’s analysis of trust networks and citizenagent dynamics as key dimensions of democratization. Tilly emphasizes the historical context of institutions in order to under140

................. 16928$

$CH7

09-09-08 08:22:27

PS

PAGE 140

141

GUATEMALA STUCK IN THE MIDDLE

stand how those institutions have come to operate as they do and how they have been effected by shifts over time in the larger political context in which they operate. While the principal focus of this chapter is on domestic dynamics, I will argue that democratization in Guatemala has been impacted for better and worse by transnational factors and will suggest that Guatemala may remain in a state of weakly institutionalized democracy for the foreseeable future.

Conceptualizing Democratization Since 1986, five Guatemalan presidents have taken office through elections in which it is generally agreed that the candidate who received the most votes was declared the winner. Guatemala thus meets the ‘‘procedural minimum’’ standard often associated with Schumpeter.1 Most Guatemalan political actors either accept the legitimacy of democracy or view it as the system most likely to serve their interests. John Booth found that Guatemalans express the strongest ‘‘antidemocratic’’ sentiments in their region, but argued nonetheless that given the level and duration of repression, Guatemalans’ prodemocracy sentiments are remarkably high despite their hostile environment.2 However, rising levels of crime and vigilante violence as well as the emergence of former military dictator Efrain Rios Montt as a serious presidential candidate in 2003, provide less encouraging evidence regarding support for democratic norms. Edelberto Torres-Rivas concluded that Guatemala presents ‘‘a coexistence of healthy authoritarian forces, institutions, and personalities together with several other weak and inexperienced institutions, party forces and incipient democratic social forces.’’3 In survey data gathered by the Latin American Opinion Project at Vanderbilt University, Guatemalans continued to express more pessimistic sentiments toward democracy than their neighbors in Central America.4 These tensions illustrate the need for a more demanding standard for evaluating democratic consolidation. McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly offer one such criterion: ‘‘A regime is democratic insofar as it maintains broad citizenship, equal and autonomous citizenship, binding consultation of citizens at large with respect to governmental activities and personnel, as well as protection of citizens from arbitrary action by government agents.’’5 In his recent work, Tilly developed the concept of ‘‘protected consulta-

................. 16928$

$CH7

09-09-08 08:22:27

PS

PAGE 141

142

MARC BELANGER

tion’’ as an essential feature of the relationship between citizens and the state.6 Democratization occurs, Tilly argues, as a product of ‘‘changes in social relations [which] take place in three interacting sectors: public politics, categorical inequalities, and networks of trust.’’7 When citizens see state agents as capable of following through on public commitments, they become willing to trust those agents in their financial and human resources and to use public institutions as vehicles for the realization of personal and collective goals. Tilly’s analysis of democratization and political contention in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe identifies three basic variables for measuring the relationship between states and political actors they hope to control: coercion, capital, and commitment. The first two variables measure state capacity in terms of administrative resources and the wealth to develop and deploy them. Commitment measures the loyalty that residents of a particular state attach meaning to, and the impact that loyalty has on their relations with the agents and institutions of the state. Commitments can take the form of shared religion or ethnicity, trading ties, work-generated solidarities, and much more. They include networks of trust, those webs of commitment on which people rely when engaging in long-term, high-risk, socially contingent activities.8 Tilly argues that the development of democratic institutions in Europe was preceded by strengthened state capacity. Increased levels of state power weakened local authorities and jurisdictions and made the state the focus of political claims. It is difficult to democratize states which lack the capacity for effectively addressing the demands of new political actors. As long as the state is unable to do so, its subjects are likely to maintain the traditional ‘‘trust networks’’ that provide their most important needs. While Tilly’s argument is grounded in his analysis of Europe, it provides useful analytical tools to examine Guatemala. The Guatemalan state has sought in various ways to strengthen its tools of coercion and to weaken the power of the competing commitments of its residents. The inability of the Guatemalan state to generate a basis for legitimacy has necessitated the deployment of ever higher levels of coercion but without success. In 1985, the Guatemalan military attempted to increase the levels of capital and commitment through the establishment of a highly controlled political opening. This program used the language and some of the institutions of liberal democracy in an effort to foster greater levels of political legitimacy and control. While this project failed in terms of the goals of the officers who

................. 16928$

$CH7

09-09-08 08:22:28

PS

PAGE 142

143

GUATEMALA STUCK IN THE MIDDLE

designed it, it has at the same time left a fundamental imprint on Guatemala’s democratization process.

The Authoritarian Roots of Democratization in Guatemala Guatemala has received little attention in studies on democratization. O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead’s landmark multivolume study mentioned Central America only in passing. 9 Guatemala was emerging from a war in which the military had brutally defeated its foes on the battlefield when Christian Democrat Marco Vinicio Cerezo took office in 1985 as the country’s first civilian president in over three decades. His election was lauded in Washington as the ‘‘final consolidation of democracy in Guatemala’’ but most independent observers found little empirical evidence to support the assertion.10 Cerezo’s election was the result of a limited political liberalization organized by the leading officers of the Guatemalan military. This strategy reflected their analysis of the roots of the guerrilla war of the early 1980s and an extension of policies begun with the military coup against General Romeo Lucas Garcia in March 1982. The immediate goal of the program, called the National Plan for Security and Development, was the defeat of a guerrilla insurgency and the pacification of indigenous communities in the Western and Central Highlands. To that end, over four hundred villages were destroyed and thirty thousand civilians killed over the next year. But this was more than simply a brutal pacification program. The military officers who constructed that program understood that the war they were fighting had a profound political dimension grounded in the historic failure of the Guatemalan state to construct a legitimate political order. The central concept which framed this analysis was ‘‘national stability.’’ Explaining this concept in a 1987 article, Defense Minister He´ctor Gramajo acknowledged that the insurrection was not simply the product of Soviet-Cuban interference. After being easily defeated in the 1960s, guerrilla leaders confronted their political weakness among the population and, learning from experience, ‘‘moved to the West [Guatemala’s heavily Mayan Western Highlands] where they were able to take advantage of the lack of government attention to development. In these conditions the terrorist groups were organizing and strengthening, stimulating the resentment of the local popula-

................. 16928$

$CH7

09-09-08 08:22:29

PS

PAGE 143

144

MARC BELANGER

tion regarding the abandonment to which they were condemned.’’11 From this perspective, winning the ‘‘political war’’ required the establishment of institutions which more fully integrated Guatemala’s indigenous peoples and weakened the appeal of independent social and political movements.12 Presenting these programs in an assertive discourse of national development, the military sought ‘‘the reconciliation of the Guatemalan family in order to favor national peace and harmony, . . . to establish a nationalistic spirit and lay the foundations for the participation and integration of the different ethnic groups which make up our nationality, . . . [and] to stimulate among the various pressure groups which represent the activity of the nation a new way of thinking which is developmentalist, reformist and nationalist.’’13 The human costs of the programs, including the construction of model villages and civil patrols, have been extensively documented.14 While these programs may have done little in practice, they demonstrated the degree to which some military officers saw the problem of generations of poverty, exploitation, and racism as reflections of the deeper failure of the Guatemalan state to develop a modern national project of economic and political development. The old solutions were no longer adequate; repression had crushed insurgency but it had also revealed the national dimension of the political threat and the need to establish stronger forms of institutional control. The transition to civilian rule via elections in 1985 was thus one part of a broader process of concertacio´n. Gramajo hoped this process would not only encourage the country’s key political actors but also overcome the fragmentation and cleavages which pervaded Guatemala’s political and economic leadership. Gramajo explicitly attributed Guatemala’s problems to the attitudes of the country’s traditional oligarchy: ‘‘To this point the war against terrorism had been the total responsibility of the army while political organizations, private sector, the government, and other groups remained outside as spectators and negative critics.’’15 In his view, ‘‘national security’’ doctrine had made the military an ‘‘occupying force’’ on behalf of foreign interests and a small domestic elite. ‘‘National Stability’’ was genuinely Guatemalan and Gramajo believed it provided the foundation for a legitimate political order. The key civilian actor in this project was the Guatemalan Christian Democratic Party (PDCG). While this party had been

................. 16928$

$CH7

09-09-08 08:22:30

PS

PAGE 144

145

GUATEMALA STUCK IN THE MIDDLE

the target of military repression in the 1970s and early 1980s, the platform put forward by President Marco Vinicio Cerezo was circumspect about challenging traditional sources of power. Agrarian reform was discussed as was the establishment of a more effective judicial system, but with little effect. The alliance with the military did little to improve the PDCG’s standing with the private sector, however. The tensions were obvious in a 1987 conflict over tax reform. Gramajo was also required to fend off coup attempts. Although ‘‘popular sector’’ and leftist groups had initially taken a ‘‘wait and see’’ attitude toward the government, by 1987 protest began to reemerge.16

Concertacio´ n Lost The Guatemalan process in these years illustrates the tensions which Przeworski identified with ‘liberalization.’ Liberalizers believe that a carefully controlled process of limited political openness can co-opt key regime opponents and forestall the need for a more thoroughgoing democratic opening.17 This kind of opening is difficult and fragile because once the clamp on civil society is lifted the ensuing process of renewed political mobilization is very hard to control. By 1990 it was increasingly evident that the opening was moving well beyond the intended. The failure of Cerezo’s administration and the inability of other political parties to energize the country’s electoral system undermined a key element of the military’s program and generated a wider political dialogue. Human rights and labor organizations, while still repressed, were able to use the limited space opened up by the rhetoric of democratization to slowly force it wider. One product of this growing democratic space was the ‘‘dialogue of national reconciliation begun in 1990.’’18 The Central American Peace Accords of 1987 had called for such dialogues in each country but Gramajo and Cerezo had argued that as the guerrillas in their country had been defeated, the reconciliation process was irrelevant to Guatemala. However, a small number of guerrillas remained in Guatemala’s hinterlands. The Catholic Church organized meetings between Guatemala’s guerrilla coalition, the Unidad Revolucionario Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG), and groups from across the political spectrum. This gave the URNG a new political importance which outraged the military. The end of the Cold War and a worsening economic cri-

................. 16928$

$CH7

09-09-08 08:22:30

PS

PAGE 145

146

MARC BELANGER

sis convinced many Guatemalans that a new direction was necessary and the signs were visible in the media. The four leading daily newspapers published uncensored proclamations of the URNG as well as reports of human rights abuses committed by the military. The murder of anthropologist Myrna Mack in September 1990 and a military massacre in December of that year in Santiago Atitla´n received attention inconceivable two years before. Against this backdrop, Jorge Serrano Elias’s move from political unknown to Guatemala’s president in January 1991 reflected a political culture that was both more democratic and more fragmented. Increased support for broader political dialogue did little to legitimate the political system. When he announced the suspension of the constitutional order on May 25, 1993, Serrano assumed that positioning himself in opposition to an unpopular Congress would rally public support, and that Guatemala’s business sector and military would welcome a step toward stability. In his attempt to borrow the Fujimori model of the presidential autogolpe, Serrano immediately confronted a civil society which, for all its divisions, rejected the authoritarianism of the past. If the failure of the 1993 coup didn’t reflect the triumph of a new democratic order, it did mark the death of the system which Gramajo and other officers had realized was in crisis a decade earlier. While this period is often passed over in order to analyze the peace accords, it was a turning point in Guatemalan political history. Much of the structural and cultural rubric which maintained authoritarian rule crumbled. While violence remained a fact of daily life, Guatemalan political culture was democratized. With the failure of the military and the economic elite to support Serrano, the need for the kind of political discussion that led to the signing of the peace accords became stronger. Whether that can translate into consolidation of effective democratic institutions will be the focus of section four.

Democratic Consolidation and State Capacity The literature on democratization has included extensive analysis of institutions. Presidential, legislative, and party systems have been examined with an emphasis on the strengths and weaknesses of different kinds of systems for democratic consolidation. When applied to Guatemala, this kind of institu-

................. 16928$

$CH7

09-09-08 08:22:31

PS

PAGE 146

147

GUATEMALA STUCK IN THE MIDDLE

tional analysis can generate useful insights into the limits of proportional representation systems when political parties have weak support bases. The two principal parties in the 1990 election, the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) and the Union of the National Center (UCN), had become irrelevant by the 1999 elections.19 The election of Alfonso Portillo, a candidate of the Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG)—the party led by General Efrian Rios Montt—provided further reason for uncertainty, while the 2003 elections were contested by two new electoral coalitions. Yet, the limitations of the current party system in Guatemala are not a function of how the system operates and cannot be easily corrected by new institutional designs. They are a reflection of the particularities of Guatemala’s political history, a point illustrated by comparison with its two neighbors that also experienced civil war in the 1980s. The Nicaraguan party system is a legacy of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) regime and the opposition that confronted it in the 1980s and while the quality of governance which Nicaraguans have received since 1990 can be examined critically, the foundations for stable and enduring political parties are clearly in place. In El Salvador, the Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) and the Farabundo Martı´ National Liberation Front (FMLN) were the principal ideological protagonists in the civil war. When that war became a bloody stalemate in the wake of the 1989 FMLN offensive, each side sought peace. In this way, the 1992 Chapultepec Accords in El Salvador were a genuine peace settlement while the 1996 accords in Guatemala are more usefully understood as an attempt at negotiating a social pact. The Guatemalan Peace Accords forced the Guatemalan military to negotiate a political settlement with an organization, the URNG, which they had defeated decisively in the 1980s. On paper, the Guatemalan accords went further on issues such as land reform and indigenous rights than in El Salvador, but the URNG remained politically weak and far less able to build a political party than was the FMLN. At the same time, the Guatemalan economic elite have not developed an electoral vehicle comparable to ARENA.20 Tilly’s analysis of coercion, capital, and commitment applies directly to the Guatemalan experience. The Guatemalan state’s capacity for coercion was ruthlessly demonstrated in the 1980s but Gramajo’s conception of national stability included development of a stronger sense of national identity that would increase

................. 16928$

$CH7

09-09-08 08:22:31

PS

PAGE 147

148

MARC BELANGER

the levels of capital and commitment received by the state. In important ways, the program worked but, as is often the case, not precisely as the military intended. The process of national dialogue brought together more Guatemalans from more corners of national life than ever before. After the implementation of the accords there was more commitment to political democracy and a less debilitating level of coercion. But there was still serious contention over precisely what the accords called for. In May 1999, Guatemalan voters were presented with a referendum on fifty amendments to the Guatemalan constitution, the most controversial of which involved two issues that were central but unresolved in the peace accords, namely, the establishment of unprecedented levels of cultural autonomy for Mayan communities and the establishment of stronger civilian control/oversight over the military. While the victory of the antireferendum forces was not overwhelming, a voter turnout of only 18 percent of eligible voters dismayed many observers.21 That outcome reflected at least in part that the issues of constitutional reform were of less interest to most of the population and not issues for which the parties mobilized their constituents. Turnout was higher, at 53.8 percent, for the presidential elections later that year.22 President Portillo, like his predecessors, sought to distance himself from ideological labels (he was a Christian Democrat until 1995 and a guerrilla supporter in the 1980s) and called for all Guatemalans to work together. However, he was not able to work effectively within Guatemala’s fragmented party system and weak state institutions.23 The defeat of General Rios Montt, FRG candidate in 2003, was hailed as an important victory for Guatemalan civil society and democracy. But in the wake of four decades of military rule and nearly two decades of economic liberalism, Guatemalan democratization was occurring in the context of declining public confidence in the state. The most obvious reflection of this was the response to crime. In her nuanced analysis of the form of vigilante justice known as mano dura, Angelina Snodgras Godoy argued that the emergence of ‘‘zero tolerance’’ attitudes toward crime and participation or passive support for hundreds of instances of vigilante justice in the first half decade after the peace accords reflected public anger about the impotence of democratic institutions. In her interviews with dozens of Guatemalans, Godoy identified a persistent belief that democratically elected officials did not

................. 16928$

$CH7

09-09-08 08:22:31

PS

PAGE 148

149

GUATEMALA STUCK IN THE MIDDLE

care about their daily concerns and that the emergence of democratic institutions coincided with a precipitous increase in crime.24 Among the most troubling manifestations was her respondents’ perception of human rights. Godoy was asked why human rights activists focused on the rights of people in detention but showed little concern for the ways their daily lives were beset by crime. ‘‘The ones who have human rights are the criminals,’’ one person told her.25 Crime and responses to it provide a fundamental example of the dynamics of what Tilly calls trust networks. When states are able to convince subjects that state institutions can be counted upon, the power of the local networks which previously guaranteed such protection is weakened and commitment is earned by the state. The legitimacy of state coercion is also increased. The existence of mano dura reflects the creation of trust networks outside the lines of democratic politics. It invites the remilitarization of politics and corrodes belief that democracy can protect the rule of law. Godoy argued that the counterinsurgency had a devastating impact on many of the community institutions which had long been the de facto state institutions in some communities, and particularly in the indigenous Western Highlands. The loss of those institutions and the weakness of democratic institutions left a void which vigilante justice partially filled. She concluded that executions were not spasmodic acts of irrational violence but possessed a ritual dimension which suggested a process of community building. The legal standards of democratic institutions seek a broader, less contextual conception of justice. But if they cannot perform the minimal expectations of most communities, the prospect for democratic legitimacy is both dim and distant. Matters of criminal justice are, of course, inseparable from the issue of what role the military will play in postconflict Guatemala. A 1998 evaluation of the peace accords noted that ‘‘regional realities of the 1990s, the peace process, and expanded political space for civilian governments have subjected the army to pressures to adapt itself organizationally and politically.’’26 At the same time, the Guatemalan military remains the most powerful military in Latin America relative to civil society. Again, comparison with El Salvador supports this. No Guatemalan party comes close to El Salvador’s FMLN or ARENA in institutional strength. The URNG sought to cast itself in a role parallel to the FMLN, but whereas the URNG was decisively defeated militarily, the FMLN held a better-armed force at bay for an-

................. 16928$

$CH7

09-09-08 08:22:32

PS

PAGE 149

150

MARC BELANGER

other decade. Two things happened because of that. The FMLN established a genuine social base which the state was unable to destroy and in doing so, they forced the economic elites to develop their own political voice, ARENA, and negotiate a genuine restructuring of the country’s political system. ARENA represented social groups that no longer looked to the military or military-dominated parties to protect their interests. Hence, there was no serious resistance to internationally supervised restructuring of the country’s police and military forces. El Salvador has not been free of the problems of crime and lingering repression but the military is no longer a significant, independent political force. Guatemalan economic elites have created their own version of ARENA. No longer threatened by war or a well-organized left, the political agenda of Guatemala’s private sector over the past decade has changed. While their unwillingness to support Serrano’s autogolpe in May 1993 reflected doubts about his competence for the job, there were more fundamental considerations as well. No longer dependent, in a changing economy, on repressing a rural peasantry, business leaders saw more problems than solutions in authoritarian states. While declining state capacity might occasionally cause inconvenience and expense, nondemocratic regimes threaten their interests more directly. As diplomatic sources told Central America Report in October 1994, ‘‘There is virtually no possibility that the United States would allow Guatemala into a trade bloc, given the current levels of political instability and human rights violations.’’ These considerations led the Committee of Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial and Financial Associations (CACIF), the preeminent private sector organization, to grudgingly support the peace process.27 It was hoped that the accords would bring increased aid and investment from the United States and the EU, but the social reforms it mandated were much less appealing. It has resisted efforts, supported by the World Bank, to reach the peace accords target that the taxes increase to 12 percent of the GNP. The tensions illustrate the important role played by international factors.

Transnational Politics and Guatemalan Democratization: Globalization and Institutional Development International actors and forces played a crucial role in Guatemala’s democratization process. The end of the Cold War

................. 16928$

$CH7

09-09-08 08:22:32

PS PAGE 150

151

GUATEMALA STUCK IN THE MIDDLE

brought changes in United States policy that led it to oppose the Serrano autogolpe and support the peace accords in ways that would have been hard to imagine a decade before. The transnational prominence of democracy as a political ideal enabled Guatemalan civil society organizations, with the support of the Catholic Church, to claim and expand the political space they inhabited beyond what the Guatemalan military had intended in 1985. The support of the international community, through the United Nations and human rights organizations, provided vital oxygen for the peace process. Indigenous, labor, and human rights organizations used their connections with international organizations and movements to protect and expand available political space.28 International governmental and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have played an especially important role in Guatemala since the signing of the peace accords. In January 1997, representatives from over twenty multilateral organizations met in Brussels. As the consultant group, these donors pledged over $2.5 billion in assistance. While the actual amounts received fell somewhat short of that total, the levels of aid were significant. The practical significance of this aid is more uncertain. In part, the impact of the aid was limited by the capacity of the state to effectively process and carry out funded programs. Luis Pa´sara argues that there was a more basic level of disconnection between international donors and some of Guatemala’s key political actors. After placing pressure on Guatemala’s political and economic elites to sign the accords, international actors tended to assume, somewhat disingenuously Pa´sara suggests, that those elites supported the accords’ call for fundamental reforms in the nation’s social, legal, and fiscal order. ‘‘In May 1999, when constitutional reforms were rejected in the referendum external actors went through a period of perplexity and stupor.’’29 The influence of international forces in Guatemala is also a volatile presence within the country’s political rhetoric and internal debates. Opponents of the May 1999 Consulta Popular denounced the referendum as ‘‘a plot to destroy Guatemala.’’ While CACIF was more muted in its criticism, given Clinton administration support for the referendum and fear of losing foreign aid, it too eventually came out in favor of a ‘‘no’’ vote and condemned the pressures exerted by international organizations.30 The influence of transnational actors and forces merits closer study. The Guatemalan government often deploys nationalist rhetoric in the effort to discredit domestic actors with transna-

................. 16928$

$CH7

09-09-08 08:22:32

PS PAGE 151

152

MARC BELANGER

tional connections but is caught in the political paradox of globalization. When the state and private sector have embraced global market forces, it is hard to impossible to keep out all the political consequences of globalization. International trade regimes and global competition have altered the political agenda of the Guatemalan private sector, while the economic and political dimensions of globalization have transnationalized Guatemalan civil society. Peace has made the country an attractive investment target but while foreign investment and new market opportunities have promoted export agriculture and generated new production, income inequality, the loss of rural employment, and landlessness have increased. Migration to urban centers has generated demands for services and employment that overwhelm state capacity.31 As Guatemala’s political system is increasingly subject to economic globalization, manifestation of political globalization has also increased as activists change how they hold states accountable.32 The technologies which allow the production process to cross multiple borders before arriving at its corporate or individual consumer can also be used to promote political agendas. These networks deploy technologies of pressure which exploit the speed of communication technology and the difficulties in controlling the flow of information across borders. The ability of the Guatemalan state to shield itself from international criticism has been greatly reduced by information and communication technology. International organizations have provided essential technical and financial support to domestic political actors working to strengthen Guatemala’s legal systems. Social capital, the building block of democratic citizenship in much contemporary democratic theory, has a transnational dimension in Guatemala.33 These developments raise fundamental challenges for state building. The expansion of democracy in Western Europe coincided with the expansion of state capacity. It was when a state had the capital and coercive power to compel citizens to accept its authority that the state was able to turn around and bargain over the benefits of citizenship. The case demonstrates the tight link between Tilly’s three concepts. Commitment to a national political community in the past was generally built upon the capacity of the state governing that community to demonstrate its ability to enforce its law. The capacity to do that in turn required the ability to generate the revenues required for effective administration. Citizens pay taxes

................. 16928$

$CH7

09-09-08 08:22:33

PS

PAGE 152

153

GUATEMALA STUCK IN THE MIDDLE

because they believe the government will use them somewhat effectively or because they fear punishment if they do not. In this environment, Guatemala may remain stuck in the middle between authoritarianism and democracy. In his analysis of path dependence in Central America, James Mahoney argued that policy choices are not isolated actions at a point in time.34 As state capacity diminishes or simply stagnates, new kinds of transnational links may produce meaningful increases in democratic participation as well as steady increases in social and economic problems. As a result, the consolidation of a wellinstitutionalized liberal democracy may be increasingly out of reach.

Conclusion This chapter has argued that the 1996 Peace Accords were the result of a fundamental change in Guatemalan political culture. A complex conjunction of domestic and global forces had transformed the attitudes of Guatemalan political actors, making authoritarian rule far less likely and democracy, for now, the ‘‘only game in town.’’ At the same time, the ambitious agenda for transformation of Guatemala’s economic and social order which the accords called for has not been realized. Weak institutions and the lack of will among the country’s economic elites and military present the most immediate problems. I have also argued that, these problems not withstanding, Guatemala faces a present context with features quite distinct from the experience of waves of democratization. The chapter could be read as justification for effectively writing off the prospects for democracy in Guatemala and many other societies, but my goal is to construct a more realistic conception of what form of democratization might be possible in Guatemala. It is not a critique of Guatemala, therefore, but of the nearsightedness of academic models. Over the past two decades, many Guatemalans confronted the most brutal counterinsurgency program ever carried out in Latin America and in the face of state-sponsored terrorism and ‘‘low-intensity democracy,’’ accomplished an extraordinary change in the political culture of their country. The courage and public spirit of Mayan activists, labor organizers, human rights activists, peasant organizers, and many other Guatemalan citizens made the release of the 1998 report Guatemala: Nunca Ma´s possible.35 Evidence of

................. 16928$

$CH7

09-09-08 08:22:33

PS

PAGE 153

154

MARC BELANGER

the weakness of Guatemala’s civic culture is also still easy to find.36 The ‘‘democratic revolution’’ De Tocqueville saw and analyzed so profoundly in the 1830s shows no signs of being slowed by globalization, but the challenges of turning that ‘‘impulse’’ into democratic governance have certainly grown.

Notes 1. See Jose Nu´n, Democracy: Government of the People or Government of the Politicians (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), 18–23. Nun argues that Schumpeter’s analysis contained an historical and social dimension often passed over by those who use his work. 2. See John Booth, ‘‘Global Forces and Regime Change: Guatemala within the Central American Context’’ in Globalization on the Ground: Postbellum Guatemalan Democracy and Development, ed. Christopher Chase Dunn, Susanne Jonas, and Nelson Amaro (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), 36. 3. Edelberto Torres-Rivas and Gabriel Aguilera Peralta, Desde El Autoritarismo A La Paz (Guatemala City: Flacso Guatemala, 1999). 4. See Dinorah Azpuru, Building Democracy in Post-conflict Societies: A Comparative Analysis of Guatemala and El Salvador (Guatemala City: ASIES/IDRC, 2006). Dr. Azpuru was a research fellow at LAPOP at Vanderbilt in 2004–5. 5. Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 265. 6. Charles Tilly, Contention and Democracy in Europe, 1650–2000 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 14. 7. Ibid., 15. 8. Ibid., 47. 9. Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Latin America (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). 10. The most important comparative work to appear on democratization in Central America was John Booth and Mitchell Seligson’s Elections and Democracy in Central America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989, updated in 1995). 11. He´ctor Alejandro Gramajo Morales, ‘‘Contrainsurgencia en Guatemala: un caso de estudio,’’ Revista Militar, no. 39 (1987): 65–66. 12. While estimates vary, roughly half of Guatemala’s population are Maya Indians. They reside largely in the country’s Western Highlands and comprise twenty-three language groups. The efforts of colonial and national governments to assimilate the Maya transformed their economic and cultural life, but did not eliminate ethnicity as the principal source of political and cultural identity among the Maya. Changing that fact once and for all was a central goal of the counterinsurgency policies under discussion here. I have provided a fuller account of relations between the military and the Maya elsewhere: Marc Belanger, ‘‘Rethinking Political Culture: Counterinsurgency, Democracy, and Political Identity in Guatemala,’’ (PhD diss., University of Massachusetts, Amherst, 1993), 117–80.

................. 16928$

$CH7

09-09-08 08:22:34

PS

PAGE 154

155

GUATEMALA STUCK IN THE MIDDLE

13. Plan Nacional, reprinted in George Black, Garrison Guatemala (London: Zed Press, 1984), 189–190. 14. The best analysis of the military’s program is Jennifer Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project: A Violence Called Democracy (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998). I analyzed these themes more fully in my Belanger, ‘‘Rethinking Political Culture,’’ pp. 181–253. 15. Gramajo, ‘‘Contrainsurgencia en Guatemala,’’ 70. 16. Good accounts of this period are offered by Robert Trudeau, Guatemalan Politics: The Popular Struggle for Democracy (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1993); Susanne Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991); and Ken Anderson and Jean-Marie Simon, ‘‘Permanent Counterinsurgency in Guatemala,’’ Telos, no. 73 (1987): 9–46. 17. See Przeworski, Democracy and the Market, 54–66. 18. See Belanger, ‘‘Rethinking Political Culture,’’ 299–350; Susanne Jonas, Of Centaurs and Doves: Guatemala’s Peace Process (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000), 37–68. 19. See Horacio Boneo and Edelberto Torres-Rivas, Por que´ no votan los Guatemaltecos (Guatemala City: IDEA, 2000), 39–40. 20. A similar argument is made by Dinorah Azpuru, Building Democracy in Post-conflict Societies, 130. 21. Only 15 percent of eligible voters turned out to reject a 1994 referendum on constitutional reform. President Ramiro de Leon Carpio, the former Human Rights Ombudsman who took office in the wake of Serrano’s demise tried to use his prestige to construct a ‘‘social pact.’’ But without a significant political base, he was drawn into a power struggle with Guatemala’s political parties in Congress which made him appear weak, while his Grande Acuerdo Nacional was rejected by private sector groups. 22. Data on voter turnout is compiled by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) and is available on their Web site at http://www.idea.int/vt/. See also Edelberto Torres-Rivas and Secundino Gonza´les, ‘‘Introduccio´n a un Laberinto: Las Elecciones en Guatemala’’ in Construyendo la democracia electoral en Guatemala, ed. Edelberto Torres-Rivas (Guatemala City: FLACSO, 2001), 19–72. See also Horacio Boneo and Edelberto Torres-Rivas, Por que´ no votan los Guatemaltecos. (Guatemala City: IDEA, 2000). 23. The victory of Alvaro Arzu´ in 1996 was offered as evidence that his Partido de Avanzada Nacional (PAN) had achieved a national base. However, Arzu´ lost in eighteen of Guatemala’s twenty-two departments, and only won the presidency on the basis of his strength in the capital, where he had been mayor. 24. Angelina Snodgrass Godoy, ‘‘Democracy, Mano Dura, and the Criminalization of Politics,’’ in Uncivil Societies: Human Rights and Democratic Transitions in Eastern Europe and Latin America, ed. Rachel A. May and Andrew K. Milton (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), 109–37. 25. Ibid., 124. 26. Jack Spence, et. al., eds. Promise and Reality: The Implementation of the Guatemalan Peace Accords (Cambridge, MA: Hemispheric Initiatives, 1998), 22. 27. For a detailed analysis of this evolution of the Guatemalan private sector’s attitudes, see Rachel McCleary, Dictating Democracy: Guatemala and the End of Violent Revolution (Miami: University Press of Florida, 1999). 28. I analyze these factors in more depth in ‘‘Democratization, Globaliza-

................. 16928$

$CH7

09-09-08 08:22:34

PS

PAGE 155

156

MARC BELANGER

tion, and Social Movements in Latin America,’’ in Uncivil Societies: Human Rights and Democratic Transitions in Eastern Europe and Latin America, ed. Rachel A. May and Andrew K. Milton (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), 51–86. 29. See Luis Pa´sara, Paz, Ilusio´n, y Cambio en Guatemala: El Proceso de Paz, Sus Actores, Logros y Limites (Guatemala City: Instituto de Investigaciones Jurı´dicas, 2003), 267. 30. Dinorah Azpuru et. al., ‘‘The Consulta Popular and the Future of the Peace Process in Guatemala’’ (working paper, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC, 1999), 42. 31. The evidence is well synthesized by Saskia Sassen, Globalization and its Discontents (New York: New Press, 1998), 31–53. 32. Sassen examines the ‘‘de facto trans-nationalization of immigration policy.’’ between Mexico and the United States (Sassen, Globalization and its Discontents, 5–30). 33. Maya political movements in Guatemala are another complex example of the transnationalization of politics. See Kay B. Warren, Indigenous Movements and Their Critics: Pan-Mayan Activism in Guatemala (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998) and Edward K. Fischer and R. McKenna Brown, Mayan Cultural Activism in Guatemala (Austin; University of Texas Press, 1999). 34. James Mahoney, The Legacies of Liberalism: Path Dependence and Political Regimes in Central America. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001) See also Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions and Social Analysis. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004) 35. The report was released on April 24, 1998, as a result of the Recovery of the Historical Memory (REMHI) project. The project was organized by the Catholic Church and largely financed by foreign donors (see data in Pa´sara, Paz, Ilusion y Cambio en Guatemala, 259). 36. These weaknesses are discussed, supported by interview and survey data, by Luis Pa´sara, Paz, Ilusion y Cambio en Guatemala, 115–25.

Bibliography Anderson, Ken, and Jean- Marie Simon. ‘‘Permanent Counterinsurgency in Guatemala.’’ Telos, no. 73 (1987): 9–46. Azpuru, Dinorah, Demetrio Cotjı´ Cuxil, Carroll Rı´os de Rodrı´guez, Bernardo Are´valo de Le´on, Edelberto Torres-Rivas. The Consulta Popular and the Future of the Peace Process in Guatemala Washington, DC: Working Paper Series/Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1999. Belanger, Marc. ‘‘Democratization, Globalization, and Social Movements in Latin America.’’ Uncivil Societies: Human Rights and Democratic Transitions in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Ed. Rachel A. May and Andrew K Milton. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004. 51–86. ———. ‘‘Rethinking Political Culture: Counterinsurgency, Democracy, and Political Identity in Guatemala.’’ (PhD diss., University of Massachusetts, Amherst, 1993). Black, George. Garrison Guatemala. London: Zed Press,1984.

................. 16928$

$CH7

09-09-08 08:22:35

PS

PAGE 156

157

GUATEMALA STUCK IN THE MIDDLE

Boneo, Horacio, and Edelberto Torres-Rivas. Por que´ no votan los Guatemaltecos. Guatemala City: IDEA, 2000. Booth, John. ‘‘Global Forces and Regime Change: Guatemala within the Central American Context.’’ Globalization on the Ground: Postbellum Guatemalan Democracy and Development. Ed. Christopher Chase Dunn, Susanne Jonas, and Nelson Amaro, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001. 21–48. Booth, John, and Mitchell Seligson. Elections and Democracy in Central America. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,1989. Fischer, Edward K, and R. McKenna Brown. Mayan Cultural Activism in Guatemala. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1996. Fox, Jonathan. ‘‘The Difficult Transition from Clientelism to Citizenship: Lessons from Mexico.’’ The New Politics of Inequality in Latin America. Ed. Douglas A. Chalmers et al. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. Godoy, Angelina Snodgrass. ‘‘Democracy, Mano Dura, and the Criminalization of Politics.’’ Uncivil Societies: Human Rights and Democratic Transitions in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Ed. Rachel A. May and Andrew K. Milton. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004. Gramajo Morales, Hector Alejandro. ‘‘Contrainsurgencia en Guatemala: un caso de estudio.’’ Revista Militar, no. 39 (1987): 61–81. Inforpress. Central America Reports. Weekly. Guatemala City. Jonas, Susanne. The Battle for Guatemala: Rebels, Death Squads, and U.S. Power. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991. ———. Of Centaurs and Doves: Guatemala’s Peace Process. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000. Mahoney, James. The Legacies of Liberalism: Path Dependence and Political Regimes in Central America. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001. McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. Dynamics of Contention. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000. McCleary, Rachel M. Dictating Democracy: Guatemala and the End of Violent Revolution. Miami: University Press of Florida, 1999. Nu´n, Jose. Democracy: Government of the People or Government of the Politicians. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003. O’Donnell, Guillermo, and Phillippe Schmitter, eds. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives: Latin America. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. Pa´sara, Luis. Paz, Ilusio´n, y Cambio en Guatemala: El Proceso de Paz, Sus Actores, Logros y Limites. Guatemala City: Instituto de Investigaciones Jurı´dicas, 2003. Pierson, Paul. Politics in Time: History, Institutions and Social Analysis. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004. Przeworski, Adam. Democracy and the Market. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1991. Sassen, Saskia. Globalization and its Discontents. New York: New Press, 1998. Schirmer, Jennifer. ‘‘The Guatemalan Military Project: An Interview with Gen. He´ctor Gramajo.’’ Harvard International Review 13, no. 3, (1991): 10–13.

................. 16928$

$CH7

09-09-08 08:22:35

PS

PAGE 157

158

MARC BELANGER

Schirmer, Jennifer. The Guatemalan Military Project: A Violence Called Democracy. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998. Schmitter, Philippe. ‘‘Transitionology: The Science or the Art of Democratization?’’ The Consolidation of Democracy in Latin America. Joseph Tulchin and Bernice Romero, eds. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995. Smith, Carol A. ‘‘Origins of the National Question in Guatemala.’’ Guatemalan Indians and the State. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1990. 72–95. Spence, Jack, David R. Dye, Paula Worby, Carmen Rosa de Leon-Escribano, George Vickers, and Mike Lanchin, eds. Promise and Reality: The Implementation of the Guatemalan Peace Accords. Cambridge, MA: Hemispheric Initiatives, 1998. Tilly, Charles. Contention and Democracy in Europe, 1650–2000. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Torres Rivas, Edelberto, and Gabriel Aguilera Peralta. Desde El Autoritarismo A La Paz. Guatemala City: Flasco Guatemala, 1998. Trudeau, Robert. Guatemalan Politics: The Popular Struggle for Democracy. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 1993. Warren, Kay B. Indigenous Movements and Their Critics: Pan-Mayan Activism in Guatemala. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998. Zelaya, Raquel. El Proceso de Paz en Guatemala: Logros y Desafı´os. Washington, DC: Latin American Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1999.

................. 16928$

$CH7

09-09-08 08:22:35

PS

PAGE 158

Lebanon: Confessionalism, Institution Building, and the Challenges of Securing Peace Karen Abi-Ezzi

WALID EIDO, A MEMBER OF THE LEBANESE PARLIAMENT, WAS ASSASSI-

nated on June 13, 2007.1 Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was killed when his car was blown up as he was traveling through the Lebanese capital of Beirut on February 14, 2005. The Industry Minister Pierre Gemayel was gunned down in his car in broad daylight in November 2006. The three parliamentarians who were assassinated were all vocal critics of Syria’s hegemony in Lebanon and part of the March 14 coalition.2 Saad Hariri, the leader of the Future Movement and son of the assassinated prime minister holds Syria responsible for these assassinations which he argues is a deliberate strategy to reduce the March 14 majority in Parliament and clear the way for a president pliant to Syria’s wishes to be elected in the September 2007 presidential elections.3 The Lebanese constitution stipulates that the president must be elected by a two-thirds majority of deputies. The political situation was plunged into further uncertainty in November 2006 when six Shiite members of the Council of Ministers resigned. The constitution stipulates that the Council of Ministers must represent all of the major religious sects in Lebanon and decisions on major issues have to be carried by a majority of twothirds. The subsequent pitching up of tents in Beirut, Central District by supporters of the opposition has resulted in a tense political stalemate which has also impacted negatively on the Lebanese economy as shops and restaurants in downtown Beirut have been left empty. The contention made in this paper is that although the Ta’if agreement effectively ended the civil war, it nevertheless maintained the confessional nature of the Lebanese polity thus leaving the initial dilemma faced by President Khoury and Prime Minister Sulh back in 1943 unresolved.4 Al159

................. 16928$

$CH8

09-09-08 08:22:28

PS

PAGE 159

160

KAREN ABI-EZZI

though political institutions were reformed after 1990, the dilemma present at the birth of the First Lebanese Republic—that is to say how to reconcile two divergent visions of Lebanon (namely, that of the Lebanese Christians who look to the West and that of the Lebanese Muslims who look to the Arab East)— was not addressed. This phenomenon, what Kamal Salibi called Lebanism versus Arabism, is a particular feature of the Lebanese political scene.5 Through a number of amendments to the constitution proposed in the Ta’if accords of October 1989 which were ratified by Parliament in 1990, political power was effectively moved away from the Maronite president toward the Council of Ministers headed by a Sunni prime minister and the Speaker of the House, a Shiite. The Ta’if accords thus diminished the Maronite Christian community’s political power in favor of increased Sunni and Shiite political power.6 It is against this backdrop that a study of institution building in Lebanon following the official end of the civil war in 1990 must be considered. Locked between the Mediterranean Sea to the west and two powerful neighbors, Syria to the north and east and Israel to the south, and made up of eighteen officially recognized religious communities representing Christians and Muslims in the main, Lebanon has—since its independence on November 22, 1943— been pulled in two different directions. These divergent identities which fall along confessional lines are shaped by contending historical narratives. Muslims and Christians have struggled to find a modus vivendi. As Kamal Salibi explains: ‘‘in Lebanon, from the very beginning, a force called Arabism, acting from outside and inside the country, stood face to face with another exclusively parochial social force called Lebanism; and the two forces collided on every fundamental issue, impeding the normal development of the state and keeping its political legitimacy and ultimate viability continuously in question.’’7 The proponents of Arabism are Muslim in the main, while advocates of Lebanism are Christian Maronites. It is this coincidence of a specific geography and demography, a very small country with a population comprised of two dominant religious communities that are roughly of equal size but that differ significantly socioculturally and subsequently politically, that has led each community to seek to strengthen its political position domestically by forging alliances with foreign powers who are co-religionists: the Christians with the West generally and France specifically, the Sunnis with Saudi Arabia, and the Shi-

................. 16928$

$CH8

09-09-08 08:22:29

PS

PAGE 160

161

LEBANON

ites with Syria and, particularly, Iran. The challenge for the first postindependence Lebanese government was to find a way of ensuring that the largest sects in Lebanon had a political voice commensurate with their size. Thus, a system of consociationalism was put into place by the Christian Maronite President Bishara al-Khoury and Sunni Muslim Prime Minister Riad alSolh through the ‘‘National Pact.’’ According to this ‘‘gentleman’s agreement,’’ the three most powerful political positions, namely president, prime minister, and Speaker of the House, were to be allocated to the three largest confessional groups in the country as they were found to be in a 1932 census, the Maronite Christians, the Sunni Muslims, and the Shiite Muslims, respectively. This agreement was essentially a compromise between the Muslims and Christians ‘‘affirming Lebanon’s special identity among the Arab states and dividing power along confessional lines.’’8 Lebanon would neither lean too far West nor too far East. The Christian Maronite community’s historical ties with the West, particularly with France, would have to be tempered, as would the Muslim community’s penchant for Arab nationalism.9 As Kamal Salibi contends, ‘‘the Lebanese Republic gained its independence on the basis of a polite fiction of national unity among its people.’’10 This ‘‘polite fiction’’ was put to the test on April 13, 1975, when twenty-six Palestinians were shot dead in retaliation for the attempted assassination of Pierre Gemayel, the leader of the Kata’ib or Phalangist militia representing the Christian Maronite community. Palestinian refugees had originally entered Lebanon in 1947–48 during the first Arab-Israeli conflict. The second wave of refugees came following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. There are twelve official refugee camps in Lebanon housing them. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) moved its headquarters to Lebanon when it was expelled from Amman, Jordan, by King Hussein in 1970–71. In the main, Lebanese Muslims wished to see the Lebanese government support their Palestinian brethren in their struggle for self-determination, whereas the Christians did not. This political fault line which fell along confessional lines had a precursor in the 1958 Lebanese civil war. The struggle then was between Muslim and leftist groups who came together under the banner of the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) led by the Druze Chieftain and leader of the Progressive Socialist Party Kamal Jumblatt. The LNM opposed President Camille Shamoun’s decision to join the Baghdad Pact. The LNM sought to curtail the president’s power to determine

................. 16928$

$CH8

09-09-08 08:22:29

PS

PAGE 161

162

KAREN ABI-EZZI

Lebanese foreign policy. Seventeen years later, these fault lines appeared once again. The LNM allied with the Palestinians clashed with the Christian Phalangists.11 After a lengthy and bloody civil war that lasted fifteen years the Document of National Reconciliation (also translated as the Document of National Accord) commonly referred to as the Ta’if Agreement—taking the name of the Saudi Arabian city in which the document was negotiated—officially ended the war.12 Propitious regional and international realignments coincided with a domestic political scene that was ripe for a political settlement. As Hassan Krayem observes, ‘‘internal changes coincided with developments on the regional and international levels that also favoured a political settlement in Lebanon.’’13 The agreement was signed on October 22, 1989. Significantly, it was presented as a fait accompli having been ratified in a foreign land. In addition to questions as to how legitimate and representative these deputies were having been elected two decades earlier, the legitimacy deficit was also exacerbated by the absence of a national conference to debate the terms of the agreement.14 Negotiated in the main by a group of sixteen of the sixty-two MPs who had traveled to Ta’if who were ‘‘split evenly between Christians and Muslims,’’15 and mediated by a number of external regional players, the agreement addressed both domestic and international aspects of the Lebanese conflict. Significantly, it maintained the consociational system but effectively shifted power away from the president toward the prime minister as head of the Council of Ministers or cabinet. The president’s power was to be substantially diminished in the Second Republic while that of the prime minister would be enhanced. The division of power in the National Pact drew on demographic findings of the national census of 1932. There has not been a census since, but it is widely believed that the Shiites today comprise the largest single confessional group—constituting around one-third of the population16 —and that the Sunnis and Maronite Christians, the two second largest groups, have roughly equal numbers. However, as Professor Farid el Khazen notes, ‘‘Their [the Shiites] numerical edge over the Maronite Christian and Sunni communities is slight.’’17 In recognition of the changes in the relative sizes of the three largest sectarian communities during the war, parliament would no longer be split along a 6:5 ratio to privilege the Christian Maronite community, but would now be equitably distributed and expanded to include 108 deputies. As Zahar observes,

................. 16928$

$CH8

09-09-08 08:22:30

PS

PAGE 162

163

LEBANON

‘‘[o]f all the aspects of the Ta’if Agreement, this was by far the most successful and the least controversial.’’18 Another area where Christians felt their wings were being clipped related to the disarming of their militias. The Ta’if Agreement called for all nonnational militias to be disarmed. However, Hizbullah, a Shiite Muslim militia, would be exempt as its political leaders argued that it was engaged in a national struggle to liberate South Lebanon from Israeli occupation. On the international front, the agreement called for the withdrawal of Israeli as well as Syrian forces from Lebanese territory. A loose time frame stated that Syrian troops would redeploy to the Beka’a plain two years after political reforms were implemented.19 In the debates and arguments that followed, particularly within the Christian community around whether to support the agreement or not, some argued that although imperfect, it did call for Syrian withdrawal within a fixed time frame.20 This phased approach could be seen as a positive as it would allow the Lebanese to set up state institutions and structures that had collapsed at the start of the war.21 Seen in this light, some argued that ‘‘it [the Ta’if Agreement] provides not peace but one of the last chances to move towards peace.’’22 However, critics contested that it was unclear what criteria would be used to determine that reforms had been implemented. This being the case, from what point would the clock start ticking to determine the passage of two years?23 Since Syrian redeployment was fixed to this time frame, many doubted the Ta’if Agreement’s ability to deliver on this issue. The immediate effect of the Ta’if Agreement was to provide for political reforms that would eventually lead to the institutionalization of the National Pact. Members of the Lebanese Parliament voted and approved the constitutional reforms based on the Ta’if Agreement on August 21, 1990. Up to that point, the pact had remained a verbal, unwritten agreement. The Ta’if accords therefore acted as an important vehicle which led to the constitution being amended in a number of significant ways. Although there were no declared winners or losers at the end of the civil war, many Lebanese Christians felt that Ta’if was clear evidence of their diminished power.24 It is important to say something about the amnesty law that was issued by Prime Minister Omar Karami’s government in August 1991. This law in effect meant that no warlord would ever be held accountable for war crimes committed. This move signaled an early government penchant for something akin to

................. 16928$

$CH8

09-09-08 08:22:31

PS

PAGE 163

164

KAREN ABI-EZZI

state-sponsored amnesia. This was, however, challenged by the relatives of the estimated five to six thousand individuals who ‘‘disappeared’’ during the civil war.25 Led by Wadad Halwani, one of the two founders of the ‘‘Committee of the Families of the Kidnapped and Disappeared in Lebanon,’’ these relatives whose, sons, fathers, or husbands were abducted during the civil war lobbied the government to launch an inquiry into their whereabouts. Ministers have been reluctant to take this up for fear of what such an inquiry might uncover. Several former warlords are today prominent politicians. However, the Hoss government did rise to the challenge and appointed an official commission of inquiry in 1999–2000. In contrast to both South Africa and Guatemala where an amnesty was granted to those who admitted their crimes, in Lebanon an amnesty was granted pardoning all those who had committed war crimes not for truth but at the cost of the truth.26 As Marie-Joelle Zahar observes, in the case of Lebanon, ‘‘Stability has come at the expense of human rights, democracy, and national reconciliation.’’27 The signing of the Ta’if accords signaled a cutoff point vis-a`vis the war. The political leadership has wanted to look to the future. The past seems to be a repository of complexities that are too big to handle and political sensitivities that many argue are still too raw to broach. Conversely, the fallout from the war, be it reconstruction or the returning of the displaced, has seemed more pressing and immediate. The enormity of the task of returning the displaced—as Zahar notes, ‘‘It is estimated that onequarter of the Lebanese population are internally displaced.’’28 —is evidenced by the setting up in 1993 of a new ministry to deal with this. Working in conjunction with the UNDP, a substantial amount of funding was earmarked for this project.29 However, illustrating the gap between a government vision for reunifying the country and popular feeling among the internally displaced, research conducted in 1987—by St. Joseph University (Beirut) working in partnership with Laval University (Canada)—found that over half of those interviewed, 57 percent, felt that it would be impossible to return at that time and that 43 percent of respondents felt it was possible but would prove difficult due to material and security concerns.30 The importance accorded to this ‘‘fixing’’ approach can also be seen in the massive construction and redevelopment project spearheaded by Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. A billionaire businessman who had made his fortune working on development projects in Saudi Arabia, Rafik Hariri was first

................. 16928$

$CH8

09-09-08 08:22:31

PS

PAGE 164

165

LEBANON

elected prime minister in October 1992. In 1993, he announced a ten-year reconstruction project—‘‘Horizon 2000’’31—with an estimated cost of $10 billion. Solidere, the French acronym for the Construction and Redevelopment Company, was set up to rebuild Beirut Central District (BCD). While the onus was on pouring funds into the rebuilding of the BCD, the 1990s politically were characterized by ever-increasing Syrian influence on Lebanese domestic politics. This was particularly sharply felt— and challenged—by the Christians (and others) in the lead-up to the parliamentary elections of 1992, 1996, and 2000. The 1992 elections were symbolic as they were the first such elections in twenty years. However, the mood of optimism was curtailed just four weeks before the elections were due to be held when government officials adopted a new electoral law which effectively ensured that the Christians were ‘‘marginalised.’’32 As Paul Salem explains, ‘‘The 1992 election law . . . dealt unevenly with districting. It followed the Ta’if Agreement, using the muhafazat as electoral districts in the North, South, Biqaa Valley and Beirut. For the muhafaza of Mount Lebanon, however, the smaller qada’ districts were used as the electoral constituency in violation of the principle. This was done to protect the position of Druze leader Walid Jumblatt in the southern part of Mount Lebanon and to fragment the power of the Christian opposition in the northern parts of Mount Lebanon.’’33 Calls for the elections to be postponed voiced by both Christians and Muslims fell on deaf ears and the elections went ahead as planned. In protest, Christian voters stayed away. The estimated overall turnout was 30 percent, the lowest in Lebanese history.34 Four years later, similar practices of gerrymandering were enabled by the 1996 election law. It was nonetheless approved by Parliament with only very minor changes made. Unsurprisingly, 95 percent of the seats were won by progovernment candidates. The 1994 naturalization decree passed by the Hariri government was another cause of Christian discontent. Riding roughshod over established legal practice where each prospective candidate for naturalization is investigated, in June 1994, in one fell swoop, the Lebanese population was increased by approximately 10 percent. Tellingly, the overwhelming majority of those naturalized, 80 percent, were Muslim and 40 percent of the total number had been Syrian nationals, thus increasing votes for pro-Syrian candidates.35 The negative trend set in the lead-up to the 1992 elections was an onslaught on the demo-

................. 16928$

$CH8

09-09-08 08:22:32

PS

PAGE 165

166

KAREN ABI-EZZI

cratic expression of pluralism in Lebanon and in effect weakened democracy. Using similar tactics, government officials working in alliance with Syria ensured that the Christian vote was watered down once again in the lead-up to the 2000 parliamentary elections. As a result, a strongly pro-Syrian parliament was returned. It is important to note that since 1994, public demonstrations have been banned, in effect suppressing any expression of discontent. Hariri’s authoritarianism, or functional authoritarianism as it has been called, was a very serious blow to civil liberties in general and the freedom of expression in particular, liberties which Lebanon has historically prided itself on. The elections held in 2005, however, told a different story. Much had happened in the interim. A unilateral Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon in May 2000 had robbed Syria of its rationale for maintaining its troops in Lebanon. The Council of Bishops had been vocal in its questioning of Syria’s continued presence in Lebanon. In September 2000, it issued a statement articulating its concerns in very blunt terms: ‘‘After Israel’s withdrawal, isn’t it time for the Syrian army to redeploy here in preparation for its final withdrawal in accordance with the Ta’if Accord and UN Security Council Resolution 520?’’36 Cardinal Nasrallah Butros Sfeir, head of the Council of Maronite Bishops, has been particularly forthright in his condemnation of Syria’s role in Lebanon. Writing in a leading Arabic newspaper AnNahar he declared: ‘‘The people know that their country is not ruled by its own people, and that the Syrians dominate everything.’’37 While disquiet was growing, the shocking assassination of Rafiq Hariri on February 14, 2005, brought matters to a head. Both domestically and internationally, fingers pointed at Syria. The deep split along sectarian lines within Lebanese society was once again evident.38 On March 8, 2005, a Hizbullahsponsored rally in Beirut saw some five hundred thousand take to the streets in support of their ally Syria. Just a few days later on March 14, 2005, the yellow Hizbullah flags were replaced with the red and white of the Lebanese flag and the ‘‘Cedar Revolution’’ was set in motion. Domestic pressure for Syria to withdraw its troops from Lebanon was reinforced by international support for this, most notably from the United States and France. In April 2005, just two months after Hariri’s assassination, Syria succumbed to the pressure and withdrew its troops after twenty-nine years. It is important to note, however, that Syria’s political influence in Lebanon continues and is exercised to a greater or lesser extent through its relationship with ‘‘the

................. 16928$

$CH8

09-09-08 08:22:32

PS

PAGE 166

167

LEBANON

three Presidents’’: the Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, the Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, and particularly with the President, Emile Lahoud. The first round of the 2005 parliamentary elections was held less than one month after Syria had completed its pullout from Lebanon. These were the first free elections to take place in Lebanon since 1972. Unlike the three preceding elections since the Ta’if Agreement of 1989, the elections in 2005 saw a much larger Christian turnout and, significantly, the participation of key Christian leaders in the elections. General Michel ‘Awn, for example, who had fought the ‘‘War of Liberation’’ against Syria between 1988 and 1990 returned to Lebanon from his exile in France on May 7, 2005. The warmth of the welcome he received upon his return was translated into political dividends for ‘Awn’s coalition, the Free Patriotic Movement, which secured twenty-one seats in the new Parliament.39 Samir Ja’ja’, another anti-Syrian Christian leader and the head of the Lebanese Forces (and the only wartime militia leader who was tried for war crimes he committed during the civil war for which he served an eleven-year prison sentence), also received support from a broad and loyal Christian constituency. His parliamentary bloc won six seats. As Ajami notes, ‘‘The 2005 vote is considered an historic event in the sense that it assured the return directly from exile and imprisonment of two important Christian political heroes. Rather than being marginalised, they were thrust again into the heart of political life in Lebanon.’’40 The outright winner in the 2005 elections, however, was the son of the assassinated Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, Saad. His coalition, the Future Movement, won 72 seats in the 128-seat Parliament. An assessment of the postsettlement period in Lebanon illustrates a number of salient political features. Certain continuities straddle the Ta’if Agreement: the consolidation and ratification of consociationalism, the dominant Syrian role in Lebanese domestic politics, and the linkages between confessional groups within Lebanon with their co-religionists abroad. An assessment of institution building after the war has also shown a reluctance at a state level to engage with the Lebanese civil war and particularly with the causes of the war. It is generally accepted that significant inequalities in the distribution of wealth was an important contributing factor to the outbreak of the civil war. Hariri’s redevelopment and reconstruction of the Beirut Central District—which channeled vast sums of borrowed money accruing an enormous national debt—has in practice

................. 16928$

$CH8

09-09-08 08:22:33

PS

PAGE 167

168

KAREN ABI-EZZI

done little to achieve a more equitable distribution of wealth among the different sectors of Lebanese society.41 As Haifa Hammami contends: ‘‘[O]ne lesson of Lebanon’s civil war was that a large segment of the population contested the aspirations of the powerful elite—aspirations similar to those articulated in the master plan. In doing this—in creating a modern business centre—the city Solidere has planned not only ignores the aspirations of many but, more important, it erases the memory of what made Lebanon what it is today—namely the war, the needs of poor and middle-class communities, and the ongoing segregation of Christians and Muslims.’’42 Finally, the attention given to the Ta’if Agreement in this paper underscores the importance of this agreement in reshaping or reforging Lebanese political life after 1990 through the ratification of key constitutional amendments. To summarize, significant power shifts were implemented which relocated power away from the Maronite Christian community toward the Shiite and Sunni communities. However, the core edifice that has defined Lebanese politics since Lebanon gained its independence in November 1943, consociationalism, was strengthened through the Ta’if accords. It seems appropriate to give the last word to Hassan Krayem whose writings published a decade ago seem prophetic: ‘‘‘The Taif Agreement constitutes a step forward, but does not yet provide the basis for a more stable and democratic system in Lebanon. In fact, the civil war experience showed that the modern state cannot be built on the basis of sectarian identities. There is a need to transcend such an identity and to establish a clear conception of the national identity. Unless such a state is achieved, the Lebanese might not be able to develop or maintain this Agreement and the dangerous options of partition, disintegration and war remain possible.’’43

Notes 1. Eido is the seventh anti-Syrian figure and the third member of the parliamentary majority to be killed since Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was assassinated in February 2005. It now has 68 MPs in the 128-member Parliament. 2. Following the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in February 2005, calls were made both domestically and internationally for Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon. A rally was held in Beirut on March 8, 2005, in support of Syria’s continued presence in Lebanon. On March 14 another rally was organized by political forces calling for Syria’s immediate withdrawal from Lebanon. Both rallies attracted a record number of people—an estimated five hundred thousand people. Bowing to international pressure, Syria withdrew its

................. 16928$

$CH8

09-09-08 08:22:33

PS

PAGE 168

169

LEBANON

thirty-five thousand troops from Lebanon at the end of April 2006. The political grouping in Parliament supporting a continued Syrian political role in Lebanon is known as the 8 March Forces and those against such a role are known as the 14 March Forces. 3. Telecommunications Minister Marwan Hamadeh who himself survived an assassination attempt in October 2004 also pointed to Syria. ‘‘It is the same serial killer who wants to liquidate the parliamentary majority; it is a physical liquidation by the Syrian regime.’’ See Rym Ghazal and Hani M. Bathish, ‘‘March 14 MP Walid Eido assassinated in Beirut bombing,’’ Daily Star, June 14, 2007, 2 4. A stated objective in the Document of National Accord—or the Ta’if accords for short—is the deconfessionalization of politics in Lebanon at some point in the future. However, this is left vague. No date or means of achieving such an end are mentioned. 5. Kamal Salibi, ‘‘How it all began,’’ A House of Many Mansions, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 37. 6. Augustus Richard Norton, ‘‘Lebanon After Ta’if: Is the Civil War Over?,’’ Middle East Journal, 45, no. 3 (Summer 1991). For a summary of the changes ushered in by Ta’if, see table on page 462. 7. Salibi, A House of Many Mansions, 37. 8. Judith P. Harik, ‘‘The Effects of Protracted Social Conflict on Resettlement of the Displaced in Postwar Lebanon’’ in Conflict Resolution in the Arab World, ed. Paul Salem (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1997), 388. 9. Some called this the ‘‘double negation agreement.’’ 10. Salibi, A House of Many Mansions, 2. 11. See Hassan Krayem, ‘‘The Lebanese Civil War and the Taif Agreement’’ in Conflict Resolution in the Arab World, ed. Paul Salem (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1997), 441–35. 12. The Ta’if accords were mediated by the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Algeria represented in the Tripartite Committee which was appointed by the Arab League. The agreement was negotiated by sixty-two of the seventy-one surviving members of the Lebanese parliament who were elected in 1972. 13. Krayem, ‘‘Lebanese Civil War,’’ 419. 14. See Farid el Khazen, ‘‘Lebanon-Independent No more,’’ Country Survey, Middle East Quarterly 8, no. 1 (2001): 43–50. 15. Norton, ‘‘Lebanon After Ta’if: Is the Civil War Over?,’’ 461. 16. It is estimated that there are 1.3 million Shiites in Lebanon (out of an estimated total population of approximately 4 million); 1.3 million is the figure quoted by Graham Usher in ‘‘Hizbullah, Syria and the Lebanese Elections,’’ Journal of Palestine Studies 26, no. 2 (Winter 1997): 61. 17. See Farid el Khazen, ‘‘Lebanon-Independent No More,’’ 44. 18. Marie-Joelle Zahar, ‘‘Peace by Unconventional Means: Lebanon’s Ta’if Agreement,’’ Ending Civil Wars, ed. Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth M. Cousens (London: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 577. 19. There were approximately thirty-five thousand Syrian troops stationed in Lebanon. 20. The leaders of all the main Christian political parties accepted the agreement including the Christian Maronite spiritual leader, Patriarch Mar Nasrallah Butrus Sfeir. The leader of the Lebanese Forces Samir Ja’ja’ after an initial reluctance, eventually came around. The only Christian figure to reject it out-

................. 16928$

$CH8

09-09-08 08:22:34

PS

PAGE 169

170

KAREN ABI-EZZI

right was General Michel ‘Awn who had fought a bitter war against Syria between 1988–1990. He argued that the agreement did not call for a full Syrian withdrawal from all Lebanese territory but only Syrian redeployment to the Bika’a valley two years after the accord was ratified. 21. See Farid el Khazen, The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon 1967–1976, (New York and London: I. B. Tauris in association with The Centre for Lebanese Studies, 2000). 22. Fawwaz Traboulsi, ‘‘Confessional Lines,’’ Middle East Report (January– February 1990): 10. 23. An interview with an Arab journalist who writes under the pseudonym Mansour Raad. ‘‘Everyone misunderstood the depth of the movement identifying with Aoun,’’ Middle East Report (January–February 1990) 12. 24. Many Christians are resentful of the post-Taif political order of the Second Republic which represents what is often referred to as al-ihbat al-Masihi or Christian frustration. See Volker Perthes, ‘‘Myths and Money: Four Years of Hariri and Lebanon’s Preparation for a New Middle East,’’ Middle East Report (Spring 1997): 19. See also Augustus Richard Norton, ‘‘Lebanon After Ta’if: Is the Civil War Over?’’ 464. 25. See Michael Young, ‘‘The Sneer of Memory: Lebanon’s Disappeared and Postwar Culture,’’ Middle East Report, no. 217 (Winter 2000): 42. 26. See Priscilla Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity (London: Routledge, 2001). 27. Zahar, ‘‘Peace by Unconventional Means,’’ 567. 28. Ibid., 572. 29. According to figures provided by el Khazen writing in 2001, the government spent ‘‘more than’’ $600,000 over a five-year period between 1993–1998. It is also important to note the sectarian sensitivities in this domain since, as el Khazen notes, ‘‘[s]eventy percent of Lebanon’s nearly half million displaced persons are Christians, further skewing the vote.’’ See Farid el Khazen, ‘‘Lebanon: Independent No More,’’ 48. 30. See an unpublished paper by Nayla Nauphal, ‘‘Healing the Wounds of War: Civil Reconciliation in Post-war Lebanon,’’ (Oxford: Refugees Studies Program, 1995), 7–8; and Judith P. Harik, ‘‘The Effects of Protracted Social Conflict on Resettlement of the Displaced in Postwar Lebanon,’’ 394. 31. Michael Young, ‘‘Two Faces of Janus: Post-War Lebanon and its Reconstruction,’’ Middle East Report (Winter 1998): 5. 32. Farid el Khazen, ‘‘Lebanon: Independent No More,’’ 47. 33. Paul Salem, ‘‘Skirting Democracy: Lebanon’s 1996 Elections and Beyond,’’ Middle East Report (Spring 1997): 27. 34. It is, however, significant to note that Hizballah decided to take part in these national elections and won eight seats ‘‘forming the largest single party bloc in the Lebanese parliament.’’ See Graham Usher, ‘‘Hizballah, Syria and the Lebanese Elections,’’ 64. 35. el Khazen, ‘‘Lebanon: Independent No More,’’ 49. 36. Daily Star, 21 September 2000. Quoted by Augustus Richard Norton in ‘‘Lebanon’s Malaise,’’ Survival 42, no. 4 (January 2000) 48. 37. An-Nahar, 22 August 2000. Quoted by Norton, ‘Lebanon’s Malaise’, op. cit., 48 38. Ussama Makdisi, ‘‘Reconstructing the Nation-State: The Modernity of Sectarianism in Lebanon,’’ Middle East Report (July–September 1996) 25. See also Rania Maktabi, ‘‘The Lebanese Census of 1932 Revisited. Who are the Lebanese?,’’ British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 26, no. 2 (1999): 232.

................. 16928$

$CH8

09-09-08 08:22:34

PS

PAGE 170

171

LEBANON

39. Joseph Ajami, ‘‘Lebanese Elections 2005 Version: Land Liberation or Mind Liberation?,’’ American Behavioural Scientist 49, no. 4 (December 2005): 636. 40. Ibid., 636. 41. The national debt stands at over $41 billion. 42. Haifa Hammami is a New York-based architect who worked in Lebanon shortly before writing the article. ‘‘The Reconstruction of Beirut: Mimicking the Past, not Learning from it,’’ Middle East International, no. 592 (January 29, 1999): 25. 43. Krayem, ‘‘Lebanese Civil War,’’ 431–32.

Bibliography Ajami, Joseph. ‘‘Lebanese Elections 2005 Version: Land Liberation or Mind Liberation?’’ American Behavioural Scientist 49, no. 4 (December 2005). Ghazal, Rym and Hani M. Bathish. ‘‘March 14 MP Walid Eido Assassinated in Beirut Bombing,’’ Daily Star, June 14, 2007. Hammami, Haifa.‘‘The Reconstruction of Beirut: Mimicking the Past, not Learning from it.’’ Middle East International, no. 592 (January 29, 1999) Harik, Judith P. ‘‘The Effects of Protracted Social Conflict on Resettlement of the Displaced in Postwar Lebanon.’’ Conflict Resolution in the Arab World. Ed. Paul Salem. Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1997. Hayner, Priscilla. Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity. London: Routledge, 2001. Khazen, Farid el. The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon 1967–1976. New York and London: I. B. Tauris in association with the Center for Lebanese Studies, 2000. ——. ‘‘Lebanon-Independent No more.’’ Country Survey. Middle East Quarterly n. 1 (2001). Krayem, Hassan. ‘‘The Lebanese Civil War and the Ta’if Agreement.’’ Conflict Resolution in the Arab World. Ed. Paul Salem. Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1997. Makdisi, Ussama. ‘‘Reconstructing the Nation-State: The Modernity of Sectarianism in Lebanon.’’ Middle East Report (July–September 1996). Maktabi, Rania. ‘‘The Lebanese Census of 1932 Revisited. Who are the Lebanese?’’ British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 26, no. 2 (1999). Nauphal, Nayla. ‘‘Healing the Wounds of War: Civil Reconciliation in Post-war Lebanon’’ Unpublished paper, Oxford, Refugees Studies Program, 1995. Norton, Augustus Richard. ‘‘Lebanon After Ta’if: Is the Civil War Over?’’ Middle East Journal 45, no. 3 (Summer 1991). ———. ‘‘Lebanon’s Malaise.’’ Survival 42, Issue 4 (January 2000). Perthes, Volker. ‘‘Myths and Money: Four Years of Hariri and Lebanon’s Preparation for a New Middle East.’’ Middle East Report (Spring 1997). Raad, Mansour. ‘‘Everyone misunderstood the depth of the movement identifying with Aoun.’’ Middle East Report (January–February 1990). Salem, Paul. ‘‘Skirting Democracy: Lebanon’s 1996 Elections and Beyond.’’ Middle East Report (Spring 1997).

................. 16928$

$CH8

09-09-08 08:22:35

PS

PAGE 171

172

KAREN ABI-EZZI

Salibi, Kamal. A House of Many Mansions Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988. Traboulsi, Fawwaz. ‘‘Confessional Lines.’’ Middle East Report (January– February 1990). Usher, Graham. ‘‘Hizbullah, Syria and the Lebanese Elections.’’ Journal of Palestine Studies 26, no. 2 (Winter 1997). Young, Michael. ‘‘Two Faces of Janus: Post-War Lebanon and its Reconstruction.’’ Middle East Report (Winter 1998). ———. ‘‘The Sneer of Memory: Lebanon’s Disappeared and Post-War Culture.’’ Middle East Report (Winter 2000). Zahar, Marie-Joelle. ‘‘Peace by Unconventional Means: Lebanon’s Ta’if Agreement.’’ Ending Civil Wars. Ed. Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth M. Cousens London: Lynne Rienner, 2002.

................. 16928$

$CH8

09-09-08 08:22:35

PS

PAGE 172

Nepal: Democracy, Armed Insurgency, and the Peace Process HomRaj Dahal Background: Monarchy and Democracy

NEPAL’S MODERN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT BEGAN AFTER KING TRIB-

huhvan of the shah dynasty overthrew the Rana regime and reclaimed the throne, he became king in 1906but fled to Iran in 1950. The end of the Rana regime was mediated by India at the time when the Nepalese Congress Party—which was supported by communists—was leading a democratic movement. During this period (1951–55), King Tribhuvan reneged on his pledge to hold elections for a constituent assembly and began to restore the powers of the monarchy. Despite the absolutist ambitions of King Mahendra who succeeded to the throne in 1955, the constitution promulgated in 1959 opened the way for limited parliamentary and multi-party activity. Nonetheless, the 1962 constitutional amendments formalized and consolidated the autocratic power of the king. King Birendra continued the course of powerful monarchy through until 1990 when, in an atmosphere of growing popular support for a restoration of democracy, he agreed to relinquish his absolute power and function as a constitutional monarch. This transformed Nepal’s political makeup as it became a system where sovereignty lay with the people and where power was exercised by their elected representatives. The constitution of 1990 ended the era of the supremacy of the king and of the monarchy as an embodiment of absolute power. The constitution of 1990 confirmed the king as the constitutional monarch while the parliament was given power to amend the constitution. However, the parliament could not go against the spirit of the preamble of the constitution which outlined the basic values upon which the state was to be run. The constitution recognized no discretionary power of the king in any area of 173

................. 16928$

$CH9

09-09-08 08:22:36

PS

PAGE 173

174

HOMRAJ DAHAL

activity except in matters dealing with Royal palace employees and with regard to the succession to the throne. This fact notwithstanding, these two provisions were susceptible to parliamentary amendment. The monarch was accorded a dignified position as the symbol of Nepalese nationality and unity, as defender and follower of the constitution, and as an institution standing above political controversy. In contrast, the prime minister was to be selected by the parliamentary party with the majority in the lower house of the parliament and ministers were to be selected by the prime minister and appointed by the king. The king had no constitutional power to impose a view or position on either the government or the parliament. He could, however, seek to influence them. For example, the king could send messages to parliament or make his opinions known to the Council of Ministers. On October 4, 2002, King Gyanendra arbitrarily dismissed the elected prime minister and assumed absolute power. Subsequently, on February 1, 2005, King Gyanendra reformed the Council of Ministers under his own chairmanship. Supporters of the king saw these moves as direct responses to the persistent divisions among the politicians and the political parties and the failure of the politicians to deal with the growing threat posed by the Maoist insurgency. Critics of the king saw the king’s actions as evidence of his autocratic, antidemocratic tendencies and of his raw, personal ambition.

Political parties The Nepalese Congress first waged an armed struggle against the king and only later embarked upon peaceful political activity. At the same time the Communist Party of Nepal split into various factions and a variety of communist and neocommunist parties emerged, some along moderate lines and some with more radical, even extremist, agendas. The more radical and extreme parties were influenced by the Naxalite movement, the radical, often violent, revolutionary communist groups that arose out of splits in the communist movement in India and which derived their ideology from various strands present within Maoism. With the constitutional changes of 1990 the ban on political parties was removed, panchayati institutions and organizations were dismantled, and on April 19, 1990, the government of the pachayati period had gone, replaced by one consisting of a vari-

................. 16928$

$CH9

09-09-08 08:22:36

PS

PAGE 174

DEMOCRACY, ARMED INSURGENCY, AND THE PEACE PROCESS

175

ety of political leaders and activists who had, for some three decades, been persecuted and banned. They were pledged to introduce a new era of democracy, to prepare a new democratic constitution, and to hold democratic elections. The interim Congress-Communist coalition government of 1990, was headed by Krishna Prasad Bhattarai. The Nepalese Congress and the United Left Front (ULF) were responsible for the new constitution that was drafted by the Constitution Recommendation Committee. This was adopted by the coalition government of the transition period and supported by King Birendra. Democracy unleashed people’s energy. Long-suppressed grievances burst onto the surface, demands grew from all quarters, and expectations were high. However, internal divisions, confrontations between the Congress and Nepal Communist Party—United Marxist-Leninist (NCP-UML), corruptions, scandals, premature dissolutions of the House of Representatives, and instances of measures designed to appease the king, all led to unstable government and an undermining of politicians and of political parties in the eyes of the masses.

The Maoist Insurgency In 1996 the Nepal Communist Party—Maoist (NCP-M), a militant communist organization, started a bloody insurgency with the declared goal of establishing communist totalitarian regime. Nepal was plunged into deep political crisis. The so-called ‘‘Peoples’ War’’—which had started in the remote hilly districts of west Nepal—escalated and spread throughout the kingdom. Thousands were killed and the country’s infrastructure was severely damaged. The Maoist’s used a variety of terror tactics in an attempt to achieve their goals. These tactics included: attacking police posts, eliminating ‘‘class enemies,’’ extorting money from individuals through intimidation, and looting of banks and government financial institutions. They succeeded in attracting a large number of undereducated youths to their cause. During the early phase of the insurgency the then democratic government sought to use only minimum force against those involved. The national military—under the direct command of the king— withheld using maximum force until the king began to feel threatened. The Maoist rebellion was the antithesis of what was necessary

................. 16928$

$CH9

09-09-08 08:22:37

PS

PAGE 175

176

HOMRAJ DAHAL

for the consolidation of the newly instigated democratic system. For the people of Nepal democratic norms and values were not yet understood or embraced. Civil society and the press were only just learning how to safeguard democratic norms and values. During this critical phase of the democratization process, many of the main political players were given the responsibility of strengthening democratic norms and values and failed in their responsibilities. This failure was the result of the fact that many of the political leaders were too busy playing at politics— focusing on toppling the government and seeking to become ministers themselves at any cost. In addition, some political figures had an allegiance to a particular familial or caste-based group rather than looking to what could be called the national interest. The divide between key political players and the public grew to the extent that they were no longer able to give a lead to the masses. In short, they were not able to deliver good governance. The Nepalese Congress was unable to address issues of social and regional disparity, unemployment, and the heightening aspirations of young people. The main opposition party, the moderate communist party NCP-UML, consistently obstructed many government programs and actions. The king appeared reluctant to offer help. Extremist elements in effect declared war on parliamentary democracy. When the Maoist’s started their guerrilla war the King appeared indifferent, failing to rally forces to the defense of democracy and of democratic institutions. Many viewed this as evidence of the fact that the king himself had what could only be described as a negative attitude toward the idea of democracy and a distaste of democratic leaders. Indeed, the king’s critics came to the belief that the king’s supporters— along with the king himself—were happy at the activities of the Maoist insurgency because they showed a failure of the democratic system, opening the door to what was described as ‘‘active’’ monarchy, namely the actual, active involvement of the king in the government of the country.

An Isolated Monarchy King Gyanendra ruled Nepal with absolute power under the guise of democracy from October 4, 2002. The king’s direct rule was consolidated further when, on February 1, 2005, he dismissed the elected prime minister, declared himself the chair-

................. 16928$

$CH9

09-09-08 08:22:37

PS

PAGE 176

DEMOCRACY, ARMED INSURGENCY, AND THE PEACE PROCESS

177

man of the council of the ministers, and began ruling the country in a personal capacity, doing so with an iron fist. As a result, democracy in Nepal was far from a reality. In his February 1, 2005, takeover speech the king tried to convince the Nepalese people about his genuine intent to solve the nation’s political problems and bring peace. In doing so he promised to abide by the constitution and return the country to an elected civilian administration in three years’ time. The expectation was that he would be able to resolve the Maoist problem either by use of force or through dialogue and negotiation. However, it subsequently became apparent that even though the king was dedicated to resolving the Maoist problem he was not inclined to give up what was in effect absolute power. The insurgency continued as the king solidified his hold over Nepal’s institutions of government, although becoming increasingly isolated in doing so, not least of all from the international community. The international community—in particular India, the United States, and the United Kingdom—was suspicious of the king’s actions and approach. To counter this concern, the king tried to convince people that his objective was to crush the Maoist insurgency and that then, when the situation had been normalized, he would return the country to democracy. But the insurgency was not crushed and things were not normalized. Indeed, far from it. Violations of human rights, mass arrests, the curtailing of the media and corruption all rose to a climax. All of which caused India, the United States, and the United Kingdom to withdraw their support from the king. This was of enormous significance as each of these countries had important, multifaceted relationships with Nepal.

Bipolar Conflict Concluding that it was not in fact possible to capture total power militarily, the Maoist leadership resolved to adopt a more flexible manner in order to seek to resolve the decade-long civil war. They also reached the conclusion that there would have to be unity among the king’s many critics before the king would return sovereignty—power—to the people. It was this analysis that prompted them to unilaterally declare a four-month ceasefire. The king declined to reciprocate. A significant development occurred when the Seven Party Al-

................. 16928$

$CH9

09-09-08 08:22:37

PS

PAGE 177

178

HOMRAJ DAHAL

liance (SPA) and the Maoist’s (NCP-M) reached a twelve-point agreement for the restoration of democracy in the country. The agreement was historic if for no other reason than because the Maoist rebels talked about laying down their arms and concentrating upon practical, peaceful politics for the first time. The Maoist supremo, Pushpa Kumal Dahal, in an interview given to a national daily newspaper, expressed his party’s willingness to enter into open and competitive politics; indeed, he declared that his party was ready to abide by any kind of verdict expressed by the people in the course of an election for a constituent assembly. In short, the Maoists spoke of their commitment to democratic values based on multiparty competition, civil liberties, human rights and the rule of law. As a consequence of the twelve-point agreement, the conflict in Nepal in effect became bipolar, with the king and his supporters on the one side and the political parties and Maoists on the other. The king was unwilling to compromise. On the first anniversary of the coup he continued to ignore the political pressures of the day, clearly indicating that he was not ready to compromise. He also reiterated his stance of refusing to enter into dialogue with the Maoists. His attitude only served to aggravate the situation. There was widespread agreement throughout Nepal, including among the Maoists, that the resolution of the armed conflict would only be possible as and when the root causes of the conflict were addressed and that it would be necessary for elections to a constituent assembly to be held and for a redrafting of the constitution to take place in order for the immediate political crisis to be resolved. Thus the demand for the constituent assembly became the common agenda of the mainstream national political forces. It was not, however, the agenda of the king. Despite widespread international pressure urging compromise and reconciliation—from India, the European Union, and the United States—the king chose confrontation rather than reconciliation. In an apparent bid to show—not merely his internal critics but more especially the international community—that he was in the process of handing over power to elected civilian bodies, the king ordered municipal elections to be held. However, boycotted by all the major political parties and elements of civil society as well as by the Maoists, the municipal polls proved to be a disaster for the king. Nearly half of the seats remained vacant due to a shortage of candidates while voter turnout was as low as 5 percent in most of the municipalities. As a

................. 16928$

$CH9

09-09-08 08:22:39

PS

PAGE 178

DEMOCRACY, ARMED INSURGENCY, AND THE PEACE PROCESS

179

result, the king was more isolated than ever, both domestically and internationally. Nonetheless the king continued to seek a military option, a path which only served to deepen the crisis— and undermine the position of the king—still further, not least of all because, in the course of the fighting, the royal army came to be seen as portraying a wanton abuse of human rights.

Peoples’ Victory Soon after the failure of the king’s local municipal election plan—in February 2005—the Supreme Court of Nepal dismissed the Royal Commission. Former Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba and other leading politicians were released from jail. In the election of the Free Student Union 99 percent of seats were captured by opposition students leaders, namely those opposed to the king. This of itself should have been enough to persuade the king to enter into dialogue; he, however, again resorted to autocracy. The SPA called for mass demonstrations to be held from April 6, 2006, and called an indefinite nationwide strike. It was an initiative supported by the Maoists. Some five million people came on to the streets. Running battles were fought for nineteen days. The forces of the royal government killed twenty-five people and many thousands more were injured. In addition, thousands were rounded up and put in jail. Telephone, internet, newspaper, and radio services were suspended. Basic supplies ran short. Nepal seemed to be on the verge of civil war. However, on April 26, 2006, King Gyanendra capitulated. He proclaimed that the people were sovereign and that Parliament would be restored.

A New Constitutional Settlement The reinstated Parliament declared that the people were the sole source of state power and sovereignty and set about restoring an inclusive state by formulating a new constitution and underpinning a sustainable peace through participatory democracy. The constitution outlined the following: As far as a legislature was concerned, all the rights and responsibilities regarding a legislative body in Nepal were to be executed through a House of Representatives. The calling of sessions was to be done by a Speaker on the recommendation of the prime minister. The

................. 16928$

$CH9

09-09-08 08:22:39

PS

PAGE 179

180

HOMRAJ DAHAL

Speaker was to be able to fix the date for special sessions if requested to do so by one-quarter of the total number of members of the House of Representatives. As far as the executive power was concerned, all the executive rights of the state of Nepal were allocated to a Council of Ministers. With regard to royal powers, the ‘’Royal Advisory Council’’ was scrapped and the right to make laws regarding the succession to the throne was removed from the personal disposition of the king and instead given to the House of Representatives. In addition, the private property and income of the king was to be taxed and acts performed by the king were to be open to question both in Parliament and in the courts. It was also stipulated that royal staff were to become part of the civil service rather than be a separate entity as had previously been the case. Similarly, arrangements for the security of the royal palace were made a responsibility of the Council of Ministers.

Milestone Agreement In a major breakthrough, on November 8, 2006, the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) and the Maoist (NCP-M) reached an agreement over almost all of the contentious issues that had separated them and announced that it was their intention to form an interim legislature by November 26 and an interim government by December 1, 2006. According to this landmark agreement, a constituent assembly would decide the fate of the monarchy, with elections to the constituent assembly being held by mid-June 2007. It was also determined that the management of armies and their arms would precede the formulation of an interim government. The SPA and the Maoist agreed to keep their weapons under the supervision of the United Nations beginning on November 21, 2006. While the UN was to monitor the Maoist weapons, the Maoists’ arms were to be confirmed within twenty-eight cantonments in seven districts. The number of soldiers and weapons of the Nepal army under UN supervision were to be in proportion with the number of the Maoist combatants and their weapons. The management of both the arms and the army of the CPN (Maoists) were very important—crucial—to the success of the peace process. The Maoists set the pre-condition that they would only put their arms aside if the process was supervised by

................. 16928$

$CH9

09-09-08 08:22:39

PS

PAGE 180

DEMOCRACY, ARMED INSURGENCY, AND THE PEACE PROCESS

181

the UN. Without laying down their arms, the Nepal government was not prepared to include Maoists in either the interim Parliament or in the government. The Maoist army—disarmed—was put inside the cantonment so as to make sure that they were not in a position—either directly or indirectly, intentionally or unintentionally—to hinder the peace process. In exchange, the Nepal government promised not to use the Nepal army in any military activities. In effect both armies were placed in hibernation so as to move the peace process forward. The fact of there being an armed Maoist army had been the root cause for much of the insecurity felt not only among the politicians of the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) but also among the public at large. As the SPA saw it, it was impossible—in a normal functioning democracy—to accept the participation of Maoists as a political party if they were to hold on to their weapons. Consequently, lying down of their arms was a prerequisite for their participation. The Maoists, however, saw their army as a people’s army and would only accept putting their army inside camps if the Nepal army was ordered to stay inside their barracks. It was upon this basis that a compromise agreement was reached. The formation of an interim Parliament was possible only after a long process of consultation between the SPA and the Maoists. The number of seats given to each party showed the strength of that party in the country. Maoists were given 83 seats in recognition of their contribution in laying down their arms and becoming peaceful partners in the interim government. The Nepalese Congress was allocated 85 seats, the Nepal Communist Party United Marxist Leninist (NCP-UML) 83 seats, and the Nepalese Congress (Democratic) 48 seats. The remaining seats were to be shared among the smaller parties. The sharing of the seats in the interim government in this way clearly emphasized the approach to power sharing taken by what became the Eight Political Parties Alliance (EPA)—the SPA plus the Maoists. The EPA also agreed that the interim parliament would have 330 members. The seat division in the new legislative body agreed upon by the eight parties was: Nepalese Congress 75, NCP-UML 73, NCP-M 73, Nepalese Congress Democratic (NCD) 42, and Civil Society 19, with the remaining 48 seats allocated for smaller parties. In the discussions that led to these agreements it should be noted that there was throughout forceful agitation promoting

................. 16928$

$CH9

09-09-08 08:22:40

PS

PAGE 181

182

HOMRAJ DAHAL

the ‘‘rights’’ of ethnic, geographical, female, and dalits (lower caste) groups. Nonetheless, the parties also reconfirmed their commitment to democracy, peace, and restructuring the state by resolving caste, ethnic, regional, and gender-related problems existing in the country. In doing so they reaffirmed their full commitment to competitive, multiparty democracy, civil liberties, individual rights, human rights, full press freedom, and the concept of the rule of law as well as of democratic norms and values. However, these expressions were simply that, expressions. Any reality behind them was only going to be provided—at first—by the elected constitutional assembly. However, because of agitation from a variety of groups, elections to the assembly due in June 2007 were postponed until November 2007. In addition, it was agreed that steps were to be taken with a view toward recognizing and respecting those who lost their lives in the course of the conflict. It was also stipulated that appropriate compensation was to be provided to individuals who had been badly wounded in the conflict as well as compensation provided to the families of the ‘‘disappeared’’ (as determined by a commission established for this purpose). Finally, it was determined that a special program was to be launched to reconstruct the physical infrastructure and private property that had been destroyed in the course of conflict. A commission to bring about reconciliation among parties, individuals, and institutions that were involved in the conflicts was also to be formed. The commission was to conduct investigations on the human rights abuses that took place in the course of the armed conflict.

Peace Accord With the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Treaty (CPT) between the government of Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) on November 21, 2006—formally ending the eleven-year-armed conflict—Nepal entered a new era. The treaty unequivocally opens the door for a new and peaceful political, social, and economic order to be determined through a constitution drawn up by representatives of the people. The ten-section CPT draws the contours of a truly vibrant Nepal as the two sides have affirmed their faith in the fundamentals of governance— namely, through a forward looking democratic restructuring of

................. 16928$

$CH9

09-09-08 08:22:40

PS

PAGE 182

DEMOCRACY, ARMED INSURGENCY, AND THE PEACE PROCESS

183

the state, a competitive multiparty democratic polity, civil liberties and human rights, full press freedom, the rule of law, and adherence to democratic values.

Interim Constitution (2007) The Interim Constitution (IC) was promulgated in the New Year (2007). The IC made no mention of the issue of head of state but transferred all the authority previously exercised by the head of state to the prime minister for the transitional period. It was stipulated that the first meeting of the Constituent Assembly (CA) would decide the fate of the Monarchy. The IC provided for the representation of women, dalits (lower caste), and other communities in the 204 seats that were to be elected through a proportional representation system. The IC was made inclusive in that 205 of the constituencies were on the basis of geography. In addition 16 members were to be selected by the Cabinet, giving a total membership of 425 members.

First Amendment of the Interim Constitution The EPA government soon found itself obliged to amend the Interim Constitution as a result of unrest in Terai (Madhes) where some fifty people died during demonstrations. Consequently, the first amendment to the IC occurred in March 2007 and was done so as to create a federal system as the model of governance and to provide for proportional representation of the various groups within society and of the regions of the country. The amended IC provided for a Constituency Delimitation Commission—headed by a retired supreme court justice— whose function is to revise electoral constituencies. This will increase the number of members of the Assembly from the originally stipulated 425. It has also been decided that the Council of Ministers will nominate 17 members to the Assembly, one more than was stipulated in the IC.

Second Amendment of the Interim Constitution A second amendment of the IC was made on April 10, 2007. This amended article 159 of the constitution empowered the in-

................. 16928$

$CH9

09-09-08 08:22:40

PS

PAGE 183

184

HOMRAJ DAHAL

terim Legislature to abolish the monarchy by a two-thirds majority if the king was found to have been involved in conspiracy against the constituent assembly polls. The government has also proposed a provision for the ousting of the prime minister through a two-thirds vote in the interim Parliament and a provision requiring the prime minister to seek a vote of confidence and summon a parliamentary session upon a vote to do so from one-fourth of the members of Parliament.

Common Minimum Program (CMP) and Code of Conduct A meeting of top party leaders finalized the Common Minimum Program (CMP) of the interim government as well as a code of conduct for ministers, a commitment paper for creating an atmosphere conducive for elections and guidelines for the future of the coalition. As part of this general approach they agreed to set up a committee to maintain coordination among the parties involved. In the CMP, the parties gave priority to the promotion of the national interest, democracy, progression, improvement of the security situation, change and reforms in all state systems, and immediate relief for those affected by the conflict. The major points in the CMP are: • Constituent Assembly elections to be held by mid-June 2007 • Promotion of competitive politics, human rights, and press freedom • Strict implementation of the peace accord • Formation of a Peace and Rehabilitation Ministry, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and State Restructuring Commissions • An action plan to democratize the Nepal army • A special cabinet committee to oversee the integration and rehabilitation of Maoist combatants • Proper management of Maoist cantonments • An end to corruption • Nationalization of royal property • End to strikes • Reconstruction of destroyed infrastructure • Education and health institutions to be peace zones • Creation of investment friendly environment • Common development strategy and effective social reforms and welfare programs

................. 16928$

$CH9

09-09-08 08:22:41

PS

PAGE 184

DEMOCRACY, ARMED INSURGENCY, AND THE PEACE PROCESS

185

The parties also finalized a Code of Conduct for Ministers. The code included agreement on: • The immediate removal from office of Ministers found to have been involved in corruption • All political appointments to be based upon political consensus • The implementation of eight-party decisions to be the major duty of Ministers • No public comment to be made on matters of cabinet debate • Respect for a coalition culture and the creation of an environment conducive for elections • Maoists to stop extortion and intimidation and to return seized property • Both government forces and Maoists to vacate all forcefully captured buildings • All weapons outside cantonments to be declared illegal • The formation of joint committees in districts for monitoring the agreement • The formation of a United Coordination Committee (UCC) to assist the government in implementing the CMP

The Interim Government The interim government was comprised of five ministers from Nepalese Congress—six from NCP-UML, four from NC-D, and one each from Nepal Sadbhavana Party (Anandidevi) and the United Left Front. The international community in general welcomed the formation of the new interim government which included the once-banned Maoists, although the United States continued to view the Maoists as terrorists and demanded that they improve their conduct. The United Nations, the European Union, India, and the United States all stressed effective law enforcement so as to set the stage for the scheduled Constituent Assembly (CA) elections. Ian Martin, head of the UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN), stated that it was ‘‘a key moment’’ for the consolidation of Nepal’s peace process,1, while the European Union (EU) termed the formation of the new government an ‘‘important milestone in the peace process.’’2 Important milestone notwithstanding, the Election Commission (EC) has said that it is technically impossible to conduct free and fair Constituent Assembly (CA) elections on June 20, 2007 as had been proposed. Consequently, Nepal has entered

................. 16928$

$CH9

09-09-08 08:22:42

PS

PAGE 185

186

HOMRAJ DAHAL

into a period of uncertainty. When will elections to the Constituent Assembly take place? Will the eight-party coalition remain intact until that time? In the interim period, who actually has the people’s mandate to govern?

Himalayan Hopes Peace can be fortified, not by weapons, but by cotton, milk, timber and rice. These needs challenge this world in arms. —Dwight D. Eisenhower

The political settlement of the national crisis reached between the SPA and the Maoist NCP-M, along with the constitution drawn up by the Constituent Assembly elected by the sovereign voters, mark a new beginning. The settlement lay to rest the political dispute, unresolved for the past fifty-six years, surrounding whether Nepal should have a constitution derived from a constituent assembly. The six-point understanding is historic and unprecedented in Nepalese history, as the people—via their elected representatives—will, for the first time, be writing a constitution to govern themselves. By implication, they will be carving out their own destiny through the power of the ballot, subjecting all organs of the state—including the executive, judiciary, legislature, and the security forces—to a fundamental review and restructuring. In the days ahead, mutual trust between the political parties will be required more than ever before. Trust and a strict adherence to commitments entered into hold the key to the successful steering of the political process through the challenges that undoubtedly lie ahead. More than five decades of political experimentation largely failed to provide good governance, raise the people’s general standard of living, or to rein in corruption and abuse of authority. The Nepalese people are now pinning high hopes on the results of a process that has been formally set in motion with the historic accords. In this context, the political parties and their leaders must learn from both within and without—that is, from their own past mistakes and wrong practices, including those committed after the 1990 prodemocracy movements, as well as from the experience of other countries, those with long-standing experience of democracy and good governance and those who have themselves come out of conflict. Sixteen years ago Nepalese political leaders had assured the

................. 16928$

$CH9

09-09-08 08:22:43

PS

PAGE 186

DEMOCRACY, ARMED INSURGENCY, AND THE PEACE PROCESS

187

people that the constitution then in the making would be a lasting one. The promise did not hold as autocracy got the upper hand. Why should the current manifestation of democracy be any different? The situation today is different—vastly different—because the changes witnessed in the months following the April 2006 revolution are based on the solid foundation laid by the agreement reached between the SPA and the Maoists. It is this agreement that made the defeat of autocracy possible and it is this agreement that provides the firm foundation upon which a truly democratic system can be built. Today’s democratic gains are the most fundamental the Nepalese people have won in the country’s entire history. That also means that in order to consolidate these permanently through the Constituent Assembly, not only the nation’s political leaders but all citizens will need to show a high degree of alertness, maturity, wisdom, and courage.

Notes 1. Kathmandu Post, April 2, 2007 2. Rising Nepal, April 2, 2007

Bibliography Acharya, Nilambar. Breaking Deadlocks. Paper presented to Center for Studies on Democracy and Good Governance (CSDG) Seminar, Nepal, 2005. Coates, Ken. Albert Einstein, Bertrand Russel Manifesto 50. Nottingham, UK: BRPF, 2005. Dahal, HomRaj. Challenges to Parliamentary Democracy. Paper presented at seventh workshop of Parliamentary Scholars at Wroxton College, United Kingdom, 2006. Economist November 11–17, 2006, Himalayan, South Asian October Issue, 2006, Kathmandu. Himalayan Daily November 9, 2006 Himalayan Daily November 13, 2006 Himalayan Daily November 23, 2006 Kathmandu Post May 3, 2006 Kathmandu Post November 23, 2006 Kathmandu Post April 2, 2007 Rising Nepal November 8, 2006 Rising Nepal November 23, 2006 Rising Nepal April 2, 2007 Shrestha, Anand P. and Hari Uprety. Critical Barriers to Negotiation of Armed Conflict in Nepal. Kathmandu: NEFAS, 2004.

................. 16928$

$CH9

09-09-08 08:22:43

PS

PAGE 187

Nepal: From Armed Conflict to Arms Management HomRaj Dahal The Cost of the Conflict

OVER THE COURSE OF NEPAL’S ARMED CONFLICT THE FIGHTING LEFT

more than 13,000 people dead, a massive loss to a nation with a population of some 27 million people. In addition to which there were many wounded as well as a number of ‘‘disappeared’’ persons to be taken into account. Nepal’s Informal Sector Service Center (INSEC)1 data show that from 1996 to March 12, 2006, a total of 13,190 Nepalese lost their lives as a direct result of the armed conflict between the Maoist insurgency and the state. Out of this figure, 8,457 were killed by the forces of the state while the Maoist rebels killed 4,733. The INSEC figures show that the rate of killing escalated following the mobilization of the Royal Nepalese Army in November 2001. The total number of deaths in the five years between 2001 and 2005 was recorded at 11,492, an average annual figure of 2,298, while during the earlier period the number of recorded deaths stood at 1,698, an average of 340 deaths each year. In addition to the number of dead, wounded, and disappeared, the fear, insecurity, and mental tension caused by the ten years of conflict are very difficult to quantify. Cases of depression, mental illness, and psychological trauma can be found throughout the country. For example, depression and mental illness among security personnel and their family members rapidly increased as a direct result of their targeting by rebels.2 It can be assumed that the same would be true to the Maoist rebels and their immediate family members. The conflict also caused considerable damage to the country’s infrastructure and economy. Finance Minister Ramsharan Mahat estimated that the damage to infrastructure alone amounted to some $246 million— 188

................. 16928$

CH10

09-09-08 08:22:40

PS

PAGE 188

189

NEPAL: FROM ARMED CONFLICT TO ARMS MANAGEMENT

Number of People Killed In Conflict (Feb. 1996 to March 12, March 2006) Year

Killed by state forces

Killed by Maoist rebels

Total

59 16 334 328 180 243 3296 1217 1606 1030 148 8457

22 32 75 141 219 390 1351 646 1113 600 144 4733

81 48 409 469 399 633 4647 1863 2719 1630 292 13190

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total Source: INSEC, 2006

approximately 15 percent of Nepal’s annual (2007) budget. As a result of this destruction the much-needed poverty reduction programs and the development initiatives that had been implemented over the years3 severely suffered, while the scale of physical damages inflicted on public and private properties was both alarmingly high and financially disastrous. In short, a poor economy—although one that was venturing to move forward—was substantially set back. The country that had achieved an average annual economic growth of 4.9 percent in 1990 faced a sharp drop to 1.9 percent between 2002 and 2004.

Peace Accord On November 21, 2006, Prime Minister Koirala—on behalf of the Seven Party Alliance—and Prachanda—on behalf of the Maoist rebels—signed an historic peace accord.4 This agreement—the negotiation of which was formally done between the Nepal government and the Maoists but which involved consultation with international communities (especially the UN) with regard to the settlement and management of arms and the army—covered a variety of matters, not least of all the management of armed forces and of weapons.

................. 16928$

CH10

09-09-08 08:22:40

PS

PAGE 189

190

HOMRAJ DAHAL

The Maoist Rebel Forces It was agreed that Maoist combatants were to remain within seven stipulated areas (cantonments) and that the United Nations (UN) would both verify and monitor them. After placing the Maoist combatants within the stipulated areas, all of their arms and ammunition—except those required for providing security to the cantonments themselves—were to be securely stored. The UN was to monitor the process. Any subsequent examination of the weapons was to be done by the UN in the presence of those concerned. All technical details and the monitoring of what was involved were determined by a joint agreement between the UN, the Maoists, and the government of Nepal. It was also agreed that the government of Nepal was to make arrangements for the provision of rations needed by the Maoist combatants after placing them within the cantonments. Furthermore, the Council of Ministries was to form a special committee in order to inspect, integrate, and rehabilitate Maoist combatants while the government was to take responsibility for the security arrangements of the Maoist leaders. At first the Maoists were not ready to put their armed forces inside cantonment. But failure to do so—failure to disarm— would ensure that they would not be permitted to be included either in the Interim Parliament (IP) or in the government. In short, they were encouraged—forced—to accept cantonment as the price for achieving the goal of mainstreaming their party. Suspicion, however, continued to be a part of the picture with the Maoists concerned about the security of their leaders and cadres. It was for this reason—to allay their suspicion—that an agreement was reached whereby they were permitted to possess a small amount of arms for their own security guards. It was in such ways that, gradually, step-by-step, trust was generated. The role the UN played in the verification of both arms and armed forces was significant and very effective in the peace process in Nepal. Having said this, however, it should be noted that the Maoists had requested that the UN get involved in negotiating the conflict for some time. Nonetheless, technical problems—not least of all the decision-making process at UN headquarters in New York—together with a lack of available human resources delayed matters from the point of view of the UN. Undoubtedly, however the Nepalese political situation itself was a factor causing delay.

................. 16928$

CH10

09-09-08 08:22:41

PS

PAGE 190

NEPAL: FROM ARMED CONFLICT TO ARMS MANAGEMENT

191

The Nepalese Army It was agreed that the Nepalese Army was to be confined within their barracks. It was also agreed that their arms would not be used for—or against—any side party to the conflict. The Nepalese Army was to store the same amount of arms as the Maoist rebels and these were to be secured and monitored in the same way as the arms of the Maoists—namely, the UN was to monitor the process; any subsequent examination of the weapons was to be done by the UN in the presence of those concerned; and all technical details and the monitoring of what was involved were determined by a joint agreement between the UN, the Maoists, and the government of Nepal. It was also agreed that the Council of Ministers was to control and manage the Nepalese Army (as outlined in a new Military Act). In addition, Council of Ministers was to prepare and implement a detailed action plan for the democratization of the Nepalese Army, including such matters as determining the appropriate strength (in terms of personnel) for the Nepalese Army, as well as preparing a new command structure that was to reflect the national and inclusive character required as well as training them so as to understand both democratic principles and the value of human rights. The new Nepalese Army was to be given responsibility for border security as well as security of banks, airports, power houses, telephone towers, and the like. In addition, they were charged with the security of the central secretariat, the prime minister, ministers, heads of constitutional bodies, as well as the offices and residences of foreign diplomatic missions and international agencies.

Termination of Military Action and Armed Mobilization It was agreed that both sides would stop both direct and indirect use of any military action against each other as well as the use of any type of weapon against each other. It was also agreed that both sides would not recruit additional forces or conduct any military activities, including the transporting of weapons, ammunitions, and explosives. Similarly, the forces of both sides agreed not to bear arms or show their presence wearing combat fatigues during any public program, political meeting or civil as-

................. 16928$

CH10

09-09-08 08:22:42

PS

PAGE 191

192

HOMRAJ DAHAL

sembly. Equally, both sides agreed to issue circulars (‘‘orders’’) to the personnel of their respective armed bodies to stop addressing any armed personnel of the opposite side by the term ‘‘enemy’’ and to refrain from any behavior of a similar manner. (This peace accord is in fact attached to the constitution of Nepal under the heading ‘‘Termination of Military Action and Army Mobilization.’’)5 Furthermore, it was agreed that following the arrival of the Nepalese Army to its barracks and of the Maoist combatants to their temporary camps the holding, displaying, and use of violence as a means to create fear and terror in any form against the agreement and law was to be punishable by law. However, it was agreed that the security forces deployed by the interim government were to have the authority to conduct routine patrols and to prevent the illegal trafficking of weapons, explosives, or raw materials used in assembling weapons at the international border or custom points. In addition, the Nepal police and Armed Police Force were given the task of maintaining law and order along with criminal investigations as per the norms and sentiments of the peace accord and prevailing law. It was agreed that both sides would assist each other to mark the landmines and booby traps that they had used during the time of armed conflict by providing the necessary information within thirty days and by defusing and excavating them within sixty days. Both sides also agreed to maintain a record of the government, public, private building, land, and other property seized in the course of the armed conflict and to return them immediately.

Monitoring & Management of Arms & Armies The Nepal government and the Maoists (NCP-M), along with the UN, signed a tripartite agreement, paving the way for the UN to monitor the management of Maoist combatants and their weapons. In order to monitor the management of the arms and armies, a nine-member Joint Monitoring Coordinating Committee (JMCC) was to be constituted under the chairmanship of a UN-appointed official. The committee was to have two vicechairpersons, one each from the government and the Maoists. The remaining six members were comprised of two each from the government, the UN, and the Maoists. The JMCC was comprised of individuals from both sides because it was this body

................. 16928$

CH10

09-09-08 08:22:42

PS

PAGE 192

NEPAL: FROM ARMED CONFLICT TO ARMS MANAGEMENT

193

that was to verify the arms and personnel of both the Maoists and the Nepalese Army. The UN’s role was to coordinate and facilitate this process. The issue of monitoring and managing arms played a vital part in settling down violent conflict. In short, it was through involvement in the JMCC that confidence was both established and facilitated between the conflicting— but participating—sides. According to the agreement, Maoist weapons were to be stored in containers, which would be kept in a specified area surrounded by a ‘‘solid fence.’’ The UN was to keep a complete inventory of the weapons, including their types, caliber, and serial number. In order to monitor the weapons’ storage sites, the UN was to install twenty-four-hour surveillance camera systems at each location and make arrangements for the automatic switching on of floodlights during the hours of darkness. Likewise, the UN was to mount an inspection registration device on each container door, which would indicate when the storage container had been opened. In addition to this, it was determined that any unauthorized opening of the containers would set off an alarm system connected to sirens both in the UN inspectors and camp commanders’ offices in the locations concerned. The agreement authorized the UN mission to carry out inspections of the cantonment sites randomly and without warning. In order to be eligible for placement in the cantonments, Maoist combatants were to register with the UN and do so before May 25, 2006. The integration of elements of the Maoist People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into the national army, the Armed Police, and the civilian police and the integration of others into mainstream society is a policy designed to ensure that the individuals concerned do not simply find themselves unemployed. This is an approach taken not least of all because unemployment was one of the root causes of the conflict in the first place. The creation of jobs in the public sector and a policy of sending individuals to work in foreign countries are both initiatives that the government is taking as part of this general approach. Combatants under the age of eighteen were to be automatically disqualified but would be provided ‘‘assistance packages’’ agreed to by the concerned parties. Ineligible combatants were to lose the opportunity of being integrated into the national security forces. United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and its partners are responsible for making arrangements for the reintegration of those found to be minors. The Nepal government is allocating money for these disqualified persons in the annual budget for re-

................. 16928$

CH10

09-09-08 08:22:43

PS

PAGE 193

194

HOMRAJ DAHAL

integration. A clear picture of the assistance package and its structure will only become apparent following, firstly, the announcement by the prime minister of the national ‘‘policy and program’’ and, secondly, the budget speech by the finance minister, both of which are due in July 2007.

Safe Return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) At the time of the signing of the peace accord—according to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC)—it was estimated that there were nearly a quarter of a million internally displaced people in Nepal. Many were former political workers of the Nepalese Congress, the United Marxist Leninist (UML), or the National Democracy Party (RPP). Their safe return was a factor in the ability of all parties to be in a position to campaign freely and fairly for the elections to the Constituent Assembly. The Maoist leadership publicly stated that internally displaced people should be reintegrated unconditionally in their home villages. Organizations that work with internally displaced people—such as the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), the state body structured constitutionally to monitor the human rights situation as well as that of internally displaced persons, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which for some years had been active in Nepal monitoring the human rights situation, as well as some International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) and NonGovernmental Organizations (NGOs) active in the field—have stated that the only way to ensure a smooth, safe return is to decentralize the process and have the government work closely with Maoist cadres on the ground. Although this is a difficult process because several leaders of the ruling political parties who were displaced from their villages due to Maoist threats have been unwilling to return to their homes fearing Maoist reprisals, thus signifying a continuing lack of trust between the two parties involved. The interim government included a new ministry—the Ministry for Peace and Reconstruction—whose role it is to seek to solve this problem and settle disputes that arise. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Nepal has said that three UN agencies—the UN refugee agency (UNHCR) and the Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), in addition to the OHCHR—are

................. 16928$

CH10

09-09-08 08:22:44

PS

PAGE 194

NEPAL: FROM ARMED CONFLICT TO ARMS MANAGEMENT

195

jointly seeking a solution to the problem of the IDPs. OHCHR, OCHA, and UNHCR highlight two key messages: firstly, people in Nepal who have been displaced by the conflict come from all social and political backgrounds. Secondly, whatever a person’s background, they have the right to choose to return to their home in a safe and dignified way and to know that their rights will be protected upon return. The UN agencies have called on the government and the Maoists to fulfill the promise of the comprehensive peace agreement and work together to end the displacement of these people.

Action Against Perpetrators of Human Rights Abuses A high-level investigation commission headed by former justice of the Supreme Court Krishna Jung Rayamajhi was established to look into what action could be taken against, and what punishment would be appropriate for, those found guilty of human rights abuses at the time of the People’s Movement (Jana Andolan) of April 2006 (during which twenty-one people were killed and several thousand injured). This commission has subsequently submitted its report, but it has not been made public. It is believed that the report has identified some two hundred persons who are said to have been involved in killing and torturing people. The former Council of Ministers—then headed by the king—has been portrayed as the main culprit in this regard. Consequently, punishing the perpetrators would entail punishing the king. Many parliamentarians, the media, groups within civic society, and members of the general public have all demanded that the report be made public and that action be taken against those involved. Others have argued that because the monarchy has been punished and humiliated already, no further punishment is necessary. Still others have urged caution in the belief that the whole peace process itself may be in danger if actions are taken in this regard. A recent development on this issue has seen an amendment to the constitution to the effect that those found guilty of human rights abuses by the commission will be disqualified from contesting the Constitutional Assembly elections and that they will be barred from traveling outside of the country. In addi-

................. 16928$

CH10

09-09-08 08:22:44

PS

PAGE 195

196

HOMRAJ DAHAL

tion, a large proportion of the property of the monarchy is to be nationalized.

‘‘Normalization’’ The so-called ‘‘normalization’’ of the situation in Nepal was regarded as not merely desirable in and of itself, but as vital for both conflict resolution and the consolidation of democracy. It was only through normalization that Nepal would be able to move forward beyond the immediate peace settlement to permanent, lasting peace. In order to achieve ‘‘normalization’’ both sides committed themselves to a number of initiatives designed to put right previous injustices and to achieve justice, to lay the basis for reconciliation, and to go some way toward mitigating any possible future conflict. These initiatives included agreements:6 • to make public the status of the people under their custody and release them within fifteen days; • to make public within sixty days of the signing of the agreement the real name, casts and address of those ‘‘disappeared’’ or killed during the conflict and also to inform the family members of those concerned;7 • to constitute a National Peace and Rehabilitation Commission with the responsibility to maintain peace in society and to run relief and rehabilitation works for the people victimized and displaced as a result of the conflict; • to set up a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to investigate those involved in serious violations of human rights and crimes against humanity in the course of the armed conflict and to develop an atmosphere for reconciliation; • to abandon all types of war, attack, counterattack, violence, and counterviolence in the country with a commitment to ensure peace and forward-looking change in Nepalese society. It was agreed that both sides would assist one another in the establishment of peace and the maintenance of law and order; • to withdraw all accusations, claims, counterclaims, and complaints against individuals; • to allow without any political prejudice those displaced as a result of the armed conflict to return voluntarily to their respective ancestral or former residences, reconstruct the infrastructure destroyed as a result of the conflict, and rehabilitate and reintegrate the displaced people into the society; • to take both individual and collective responsibility for resolving

................. 16928$

CH10

09-09-08 08:22:44

PS

PAGE 196

NEPAL: FROM ARMED CONFLICT TO ARMS MANAGEMENT

• •

•

•

197

any problems arising in the aforementioned context and to do so on the basis of mutual consensus and creating an atmosphere conducive for the normalization of relationships and for reconciliation; not to discriminate against, or exert any kind of pressure on, any relative or family member of any individual from the ‘‘other side’’; not to create any kind of obstacle to the work by the members and employees of the government of Nepal and its public bodies’ employees and to assist them in their work, including allowing for their free movement; to allow unrestricted travel within the state of Nepal to representatives from the UN, international donor agencies and diplomatic missions based in Nepal, government organizations, the press, human rights activists, election observers, and foreign tourists; to operate publicity programs in a decent and respectable manner.

Combining these measures has gone some way to help to establish a degree of trust and to facilitate a level of reconciliation. They have also helped to create an environment that is conducive both to the possibility of economic development and to holding free and fair elections. As such they have undoubtedly contributed positively to the postconflict, postsettlement situation in Nepal.

Developments Post-Peace Accord Parliament’s foremost target has been King Gyanendra. It was the king who was widely regarded to have acted unconstitutionally, mishandling Nepalese politics and making matters worse. As a result, hundreds of thousands of people had taken to the streets in protest against the king and his autocracy. ‘‘As long as monarchy is there, democracy is in danger’’ came to be a widely held view. Indeed, the fear was that as long as the king had control over the army and the police he would be in a position from which he could implement a regressive policy or even try and stage another coup d’e´tat. It is because of this that the king has been reduced to little more than a figurehead. The interim constitution renamed the government ‘‘the Nepal Government,’’ dropping reference to ‘‘His Majesty’s Government.’’ Indeed, there is no clause or provision of monarchy in the new constitution. Article 159 of the constitution has five sub-Articles none of which gives any power to the king. Parliament has assumed power to legislate

................. 16928$

CH10

09-09-08 08:22:45

PS

PAGE 197

198

HOMRAJ DAHAL

for the succession (if indeed the monarchy survives under new constitutional arrangements8), the king is to be taxed, and his spending controlled, while his actions have been opened to scrutiny by both Parliament and the courts. In addition, the First Amendment of the interim constitution has provision that a two-thirds majority of Parliament may overthrow the monarchy if it is found to be working against democracy. Moreover, the fate of the monarchy is to be decided by a simple majority vote of the first meeting of the Constitutional Assembly. The military—traditionally the most powerful of the security forces in Nepal—had tarnished their reputation during the conflict because they were increasingly seen by a large and growing number of the public to be doing entirely the king’s bidding. For example, it was the military that was deployed to crush those demonstrating and campaigning for democracy. Similarly, it was the military that went against the constitution by arresting the then prime minister and other leaders. In short, the army came to be seen by many as being employed to serve the king, to serve the political interests and only the political interests of the king. As a result, the new political settlement sought to ‘‘rein in’’ and curtail the power of both the king and the army. It is for this reason that the link between the monarch and the army was completely severed and the control of military power was placed more firmly under the cabinet and a newly constituted body of authority.

Democratic Control of the Army Concern over the use—and abuse—of royal powers, not least of all through royal control over the nation’s military, led to moves designed to break the hold of the king on the army; in short, a series of reforms designed to ensure democratic control over the army have been introduced. For example, distaste over the influence of the monarchy was reflected in the renaming of the army: the prefix ‘‘Royal’’ having been removed. In addition, the army has been restructured; whereas previously the king was the supreme commander, the new provisions of the constitution have made the prime minister both ‘‘de jure’’ and ‘‘de facto’’ commander. Similarly, today it is Parliament and the Council of Ministers who have the sovereign power to decide about military issues, including mobilization. Military practice has also been changed with the army’s top officials now eating

................. 16928$

CH10

09-09-08 08:22:45

PS

PAGE 198

NEPAL: FROM ARMED CONFLICT TO ARMS MANAGEMENT

199

in mess or canteens in army camps so as to be seen to be more democratic. Overall changes have included: • the name ‘‘Royal Nepal Army’’ has been changed to ‘‘Nepalese Army’’; • the previous arrangement whereby the king was the supreme commander of the army has been revoked; • the chief of the army is now appointed by the Council of Ministers; • a National Security Council, under the chairmanship of the prime minister, has been established in order to control, determine the use of, and order the mobilization of the Nepalese Army; • any decision of the Council of Ministers to mobilize the Nepalese Army has in future to be tabled before—and endorsed within thirty days by—a special committee assigned by the House of Representatives for this purpose; • the formation of the Nepalese Army is to be inclusive and national in nature.

The Peace Accord Appreciated Undoubtedly, the peace accord was a landmark agreement for ending the war, establishing peace and paving the way for democracy, fundamental freedoms, human rights, and prosperity. The UN, India, the United States, the United Kingdom, China, and the European Union all warmly welcomed the agreement and urged the government and the Maoists to render their words into action. Even King Gyanendra expressed pleasure and expressed appreciation of the contributions of all those who had been involved during the course of the peace talks. In his firstever political statement following the establishment of democracy, he said that he was pleased that a peace agreement in keeping with the needs of the nation and the aspirations of the people had been concluded. Nonetheless, the agreement means that the king no longer has any state authority; indeed, the fate of the monarchy itself will be decided by the Constitutional Assembly. The agreement is an example of how a conflict can be resolved internally. There are various models for conflict resolution, not least of all involving the leadership of the UN or other forms of international mediation. But the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) and the Maoist rebels succeeded in resolving the problem themselves. External mediation was not a factor in the case of conflict

................. 16928$

CH10

09-09-08 08:22:46

PS

PAGE 199

200

HOMRAJ DAHAL

resolution in Nepal, and this makes it a worthwhile case study in itself, with perhaps lessons for others.

Beyond the Peace Accord: A Lasting Settlement? Peace accord not withstanding, there have been a large number of reports of the Maoists obstructing, often violently, the functioning of normal politics.9 The International Human Right Commission (NHRC) has said that 43 people were killed during the first six months of the peace. The National Human Rights Commission received a total of 1,158 complaints during the same period. According to the complaints registered, 177 persons were reported to have been abducted by the Maoists, and 168 others were found to have been ‘‘disappeared’’ by the security forces. In addition, 109 cases of killing by the security forces and 58 of killing by Maoists were registered during the same period. Similarly, there were 52 complaints of torture by the security forces and 31 of torture at the hands of Maoists (although it should be noted that most of these complaints are, however, related to the pre-ceasefire period). Furthermore, the killing,10 torture in police custody, army personnel beating up members of the general public, and police and security forces physically assaulting and threatening workers have continued, as have incidents of Maoists torturing people in Kailali, Nepalgunj, Bhaktpur, Dolkha, Rupandehi, and Kaski. The Maoists have continued to compel people to come before ‘‘people’s courts,’’ to force ‘‘donations’’ out of them, to seize property, not to return property (despite the terms of the ceasefire), and to abduct members of the general public; in short, an array of human rights’ violations continue. As a result, what is clear is that the government has not been able to ensure security; people continue to feel insecure. In addition to insecurity, Nepal faces three immediate problems. The first is growing unrest among ethnic and indigenous peoples—there are sixty-one ethnic communities in Nepal— concerned that their interests are being ignored. These groups would each like to be represented in the constitutional assembly, inclusively and proportionately. However, the EPA has determined that half of the candidates for the constitutional assembly shall be elected by first-past-the-post and half via proportional representation, a solution that is causing a degree of

................. 16928$

CH10

09-09-08 08:22:46

PS

PAGE 200

NEPAL: FROM ARMED CONFLICT TO ARMS MANAGEMENT

201

insecurity among ethnic groups, insecurity that could lead to renewed conflict. The second problem is growing unrest—even militancy—in a number or regions where the populations are seeking a level of autonomy (and in some cases full autonomy). Certainly many questions remain unresolved. Nonetheless, the people of Nepal have taken their first steps along the path beyond settlement. The third problem is the concern felt by many that there are elements close to the king who may either actively be conspiring against the peace settlement and the consequent democratization of the country or who, at the very least, would like to see the settlement collapse because they fear that the monarchy may be abolished as a result of the policies implemented by an elected constitutional assembly. War has ended but that has not meant that conflict has ended. Indeed, new dimensions of the conflict have arisen. What is clear is that the EPA, if united, can solve the problems and move the country beyond settlement. However, if it is divided, it is equally clear that the peace process will be in a difficult position and policies and initiatives designed to move the country beyond settlement will be hard to initiate and implement.

Appendix Chronology In 1990 a peaceful people’s uprising had forced the then king (Birendra) down the road of constitutional monarchy, ending thirty years of direct rule by the monarch. A new constitution was drawn up, elections took place, and democratically elected leaders came to power. Despite concerns over corruption, a new democratic system gradually took root. However, in 1996 the Maoists, under their leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal (known as Prachanda), launched an armed rebellion (people’s war) in protest at the government’s failure to move on matters of social, economic, and political reform (Prachanda’s forty-point demands—including abolishing the monarchy and ending feudalism)11 and set forth to use threats, extortion, intimidation, violence, and killings in an attempt to achieve their objectives. 1996 February 13: The Maoist Communist Party of Nepal launch the people’s war.

................. 16928$

CH10

09-09-08 08:22:46

PS

PAGE 201

202

HOMRAJ DAHAL

• In the following days, the Maoists carry out attacks on police posts in midwestern region. Then a soft drink bottling factory owned by a multinational company was attacked and a portion of the building torched in Kathmandu. • A liquor factory was blown up in Gorkha district. • Office of the Small Farmer’s Development Program of the stateowned Agricultural Development Bank in Chyangli attacked. • A landlord’s house was raided and cash and other items worth 1.3 million rupees seized, and loan documents worth several million rupees were reportedly destroyed in Kavre district. • Police posts were raided in the Rolpa, Rukum, and Sindhuli districts as well as at Athbiskot-Rari in Rukum; the stores of the outpost at Holeri in Rolpa were seized; and the Sindhuligadi police post in Sindhuli was attacked.

1998 April: Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala calls for talks, but the Maoists turn down the offer. 2001 January: The government forms the Armed Police Force (APF) to fight against the insurgents. June 1: King Birendra, Queen Aishwarya, and seven other members of the royal household were gunned down by Crown Prince Dipendra (who later shot himself). While undergoing treatment for his injuries, Dipendra was crowned king. Shortly thereafter he died. Gyanendra—brother of King Birendra— ascends to the throne. July 26: Prime Minister Koirala resigns to be succeeded by another Congress leader Sher Bahadur Deuba. July 27: The government and the Maoists declare a cease-fire. August 3: Peace talks start. November 23: Peace talks collapse as the Maoists walk out. Rebel attacks on police and army posts take place in forty-two districts. November 26: The government declares a nationwide state of emergency and deploys the army against the rebels. 2002 The United States Congress approves $12 million to train Royal Nepal Army officers and supply five thousand M16 rifles.

................. 16928$

CH10

09-09-08 08:22:47

PS

PAGE 202

NEPAL: FROM ARMED CONFLICT TO ARMS MANAGEMENT

203

May 11: The Royal Nepal Army (RNA) releases photographs of Maoist leaders Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda), Dr. Baburam Bhattarai, Hishila Yami, and Ram Bahadur Thapa (Badal) in western Nepal. May 22: Prime Minister Deuba dissolves Parliament (in order to thwart parliamentary opposition to the state of emergency) and announces fresh elections. July 11: Media reports disclose that Belgian arms manufacturer FN Herstal has been awarded a contract to provide 5,500 M249 ‘‘Minimi’’ rifles to the RNA. October 4: King Gyanendra deposes Prime Minister Deuba and the Council of Ministers, assumes executive power, and cancels the elections to the dissolved House of Representatives (scheduled for November 11). October 11: King Gyanendra appoints Lokendra Bahadur Chand as prime minister. 2003 January: United States’ military officials conduct joint drill with the RNA. January: Maoists gun down Armed Police Force Inspector General Krishna Mohan Shrestha, his wife Nudup, and his bodyguard when they were on their morning walk near Jawalakhel, Lalitpur. January 29: A second ceasefire announced and peace talks begin. May 13: Government and the Maoists sign ceasefire code of conduct. August 17: RNA kills nineteen rebels and civilians in Doramba, Ramechhap district. August 24: The Maoists threaten to withdraw from the ceasefire if the government fails to agree on the demand for a Constitutional Assembly within forty-eight hours. August 26: Maoist ultimatum expires. August 27: The rebels call for a daylong strike to denounce the army attacks on their cadre in Doramba. The rebels unilaterally withdraw from their ceasefire. In a statement, Prachanda reiterates his party’s demand for an end to monarchial rule and the establishment of a people’s republic. The statement read, ‘‘Since the old regime has put an end to the forward-looking solution to all existing problems through the ceasefire and peace talks, we

................. 16928$

CH10

09-09-08 08:22:47

PS

PAGE 203

204

HOMRAJ DAHAL

herein declare that the rationale behind the ceasefire and peace process has ended.’’ September 27: Twelve Maoists die in a gun battle with security forces at Chhita Pokhara in Khotang district. The Maoists kill two policemen, Purna Giri and Radha Krishna Rai, and a civilian street vendor named Kala Chaudhary in the JaljaleGaighat area. The rebels bomb the Road Department, the Nepal Electricity Authority, and a telecommunications tower, disrupting telephone service and power supplies. October 13: At least thirty-seven people die when an estimated one thousand Maoists storm a police training center in Bhaluwang. November 19: Four people (including Hirala Lal Shrestha and Gyaljen Sherpa) were caught at the Chinese Khasa border point on charges of smuggling weapons from Tibet into Nepal. Hirala Lal Shrestha and Gyaljen Sherpa were subsequently taken for interrogation to the Tibetan town of Xigatse. The Tibetan court pronounced a death sentence on Shrestha and life imprisonment for Sherpa. 2004 February 5: Security forces raid Bhimad village in Makwanpur district and fourteen suspected Maoist activists and two civilians were summarily executed. February 10: India hands over two central committee members of the Maoists, Matrika Yadav and Suresh Alemagar, to the Nepal government. February 15: Ganesh Chilwal, leader of Maoist victims’ association, shot dead in his Kathmandu office by two suspected Maoists. February 15: Security forces encounter Maoist guerillas in the jungle of Kalikot district where one thousand guerillas were undergoing training. February 17: A private helicopter carrying troops to Kalikot was hit by Maoist fire but returns safely to Kathmandu. February 18: Sixty-five people were reportedly killed in the Kalikot area. Khem Narayan Faujdar, a member of the Parliament dissolved by King Gyanendra in 2002, shot dead by two suspected Maoists in Nawalparasi district. April 4: Maoists attack a police post in western Nepal, killing at least nine policemen and wounding another seven. Some

................. 16928$

CH10

09-09-08 08:22:48

PS

PAGE 204

NEPAL: FROM ARMED CONFLICT TO ARMS MANAGEMENT

205

eight to nine rebels were reported dead. The fighting lasted for between two and three hours. April 5: A three-day national strike called by the Maoists begins but it was opposed by an alliance of five political parties that were protesting against the monarchy in the capital. Prachanda then calls for a joint movement—cooperation between the alliance and the Maoists. August 16: Maoists carry out an explosion at the main gate of Soaltee Hotel for defying their call to close down the hotel. September 10: A bomb goes off at the United States Information Service office in Kathmandu. No casualties. September 13: U.S. Peace Corps suspends operations and nonessential U.S. Embassy personnel were evacuated. December 15: Twenty security personnel die when rebels raid Arghakhanchi district headquarters, Sandhikarkha. December 16: Sixteen Maoists die in clashes with security forces in Dailekh district. December 23: Maoists announce blockade in Kathmandu. 2005 January 8: Maoists detain and later release three hundred passengers from six buses for defying their blockade of Kathmandu. January 10: Prime Minister Deuba announces an increase in defense spending to fight the Maoists unless they come forward for talks with the government. February 1: King Gyanendra dissolves Parliament and enforces curbs on the media. In the following days, scores of senior political leaders, journalists, trade unionists, human rights activists and civil society leaders were arrested. The government cut telephone and internet connections. April 13: Sixty Maoists die during clashes in an attack on a security patrol at Dalphing in Rukum district. April 19: Twenty-two insurgents and three soldiers die in clashes at Rankot and Ramja in Rolpa district. May 15: At least fifty Maoists and two soldiers die during a clash at Jarayatar in the Sindhuli district. June 6: More than thirty-eight civilians killed and over seventy injured after a packed passenger bus is ambushed in Bandermude in Chitwan district. June 7: Fourteen security personnel, one civilian and six Maoists die in a clash when hundreds of heavily armed Maoists attack a security patrol at Masuriya jungle in Kailali district.

................. 16928$

CH10

09-09-08 08:22:48

PS

PAGE 205

206

HOMRAJ DAHAL

June 25: Twelve soldiers and six insurgents die during a Maoist attack on an army patrol at Khandaha in Arghakhanchi district. July 3: Twelve insurgents die and two police personnel sustain injuries in a Maoist attack in Diktel, headquarters of the Khotang district. August 7: The RNA recovers at least forty bodies of its soldiers killed in a Maoist raid on the Pili base camp in Kalikot district. The Maoists concede the death of twenty-six cadres in the clash. August 9: Maoist rebels kill forty security personnel in an attack in midwestern Nepal. September 3: The Maoists declare a three-month unilateral ceasefire in an attempt to forge ties with opposition political parties. November 19: After negotiations, the Maoist rebels agree to work with opposition politicians as a common front against King Gyanendra’s direct rule. A twelve-point agreement was signed between the Seven Party Alliance and Maoists in New Delhi. 2006 January 2: Rebels end their four-month unilateral cease-fire saying that the government had violated the cease-fire with numerous attacks. February 8: The government conducts municipal elections amid widespread boycott. April 5: General strike begins along with Maoist blockades while the Maoists promise not to instigate violence. April 6 and 7: Protesters clash with police, hundreds arrested, dozens injured. April 8: The government—under the personal direction of King Gyanendra—issues ‘‘shoot-on-sight’’ curfew (10:00 p.m. to 9:00 a.m.) in Kathmandu and several places around the country. April 9: General strike nears end. The government extends curfew. Three protesters die during two days of unrest, as thousands of demonstrators defy the curfew. April 24: King Gyanendra relinquishes power in the wake of the massive nationwide demonstrations and reinstates the House of Representatives. April 27: Maoist insurgents, responding to a demand by the newly named Prime Minister, Girija Prasad Koirala, announce unilateral three-month truce.

................. 16928$

CH10

09-09-08 08:22:49

PS

PAGE 206

NEPAL: FROM ARMED CONFLICT TO ARMS MANAGEMENT

207

April 30: Koirala sworn in as prime minister. He invites Maoists for talks. June 16: Prachanda arrives in Kathmandu and starts talks with Koirala and leaders of the seven parties. The Seven Party Alliance (SPA) and the Maoists sign an eight-point agreement. On the same day, Prachanda makes a public appearance, his first in ten years. July 4: The government and the Maoists invite the United Nations to become involved in the management of arms and troops. Nov 8: The leaders of the seven parties and Prachanda sign a landmark deal on arms management—with rebel weapons being placed under UN monitoring—and on political issues including the establishment of a transitional government and the election of a Constitutional Assembly to draft a new constitution. Nov 21: Prime Minister Koirala—on behalf of the Seven Party Alliance—and Prachanda—on behalf of the Maoist rebels—sign a historic peace accord, declaring a formal end to the decade-long rebel insurgency.

Notes 1. INSEC can be found at: http://www.inseconline.org/. 2. Dilli Raman Dhakal, A Decade of Disaster, Research Report: Community Study Welfare Center (Kathmandu: 2006), 132. 3. A variety of development initiatives had been systematically initiated and implemented from 1951, but the process was accelerated following the reestablishment of democracy in 1990 with India, the United States, United Kingdom, Japan, China, the EU, and the UN all assisting. In addition, various NGOs/INGOs were involved in a variety of community development projects. 4. The Seven Party Alliance (SPA) consisted of: Nepalese Congress Party (NCP) Nepalese Congress Democratic (NCD) Nepal Communist Party-United Marxist Leninist (NCP-UML) People’s Front (PF) Nepal Workers and Peasants Party (NWPP) Nepal Sadvawana Party—Anandevi (NPS-A) Nepal Communist Party (Left Front). The peace agreement was formally called the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) and was signed in the Hall at the Birendra International Convention Center (BICC) in Kathmandu. Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala (of the Nepalese Congress Party but representing the Seven Party Alliance) signed the CPA on behalf of the government of Nepal and Mr. Puspa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda) of the NCP (Maoist) signed on behalf of the Maoists. 5. Interim Constitution of Nepal, 2063, (compromise document between eight political parties), (Kathmadu: Ayush Publishers, 2007), 80. 6. Ibid., 81–82.

................. 16928$

CH10

09-09-08 08:22:49

PS

PAGE 207

208

HOMRAJ DAHAL

7. On February 15, 2007, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) published the names of 812 people who had ‘‘disappeared’’ either at the hands of the state or of the Maoists. Source: Nepal Year Book 2007, International Forum Monthly (April/May 2007), 134–41. 8. An April 2007 poll conducted by the Nepalese team of the South Asia Study Group in collaboration with the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) showed that the 250 year shah-monarchy is likely to be abolished if the decision were to be left to the public: 59 percent of respondents advocating that the monarchy should be abolished. This is in comparison to a survey in 2004 in which only 15 percent of respondents had said that the monarchy should be abolished. Source: Nepalese Times, June 8–14, 2007, edition no. 352. 9. The Maoists have not permitted other political parties to engage in political activity in the areas in which they themselves hold sway—activities such as holding mass meetings or even opening offices—while the public have been discouraged—intimidated—from even expressing an inclination of support for other parties. In light of the CPA and the formation of both an interim government and Parliament, people had thought normalcy would come. However, reports from every corner of the country say that peaceful political campaigning in villages is still difficult because of the attitude and actions of the Maoists. The Nepalese Congress Plan (NCP), the NCD, the NCP-UML, the Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP) and the People’s Front have all been victims of this. 10. About fifty people were killed in an agitation by Madhesi (Plain) peoples in February and March 2007. In addition, twenty-seven Maoist were killed en masse at Rautahat, and two Bhutanese were killed at a demonstration at the Indo-Nepal border at Jhapa. The government is holding talks with representatives of Madhesis: People of Terai (Plains), ethnic communities, refugees, and other groups in an attempt to calm disputes and resolve conflict. It is expected that some sort of negotiated settlements will result. 11. See: Dhruba Sinkhada, Himal Magazine Monthly (November 2006).

Bibliography Constitution of Kingdom of Nepal. Kathmandu: HMG/Nepal, 1990. Dahal, Dev Raj. Conflict Situation in Nepal. Kathmandu: FES, 2004. Dahal, HomRaj. ‘‘Challenges to Parliamentary Democracy in Developing Nations.’’ Paper presented to seventh workshop of parliamentary scholars and parliamentarians. Wroxton, UK, July 29–30, 2006. Dhakal, Dilli Raman. ‘‘A Decade of Disaster.’’ Research report. Kathmandu: Community Study Welfare Center (CSWC), 2006. Himal South Asian, October 2006. Himalayan, December 14, 2006. INSEC. Nepal Human Rights Year Book. Kathmandu: INSEC, 2006. Josse, M. R. History and Genesis of Nepal’s Maoist Insurgency: Critical Barriers to the Negotiation of Armed Conflict in Nepal. Kathmandu: NEFAS, 2004. Kathmandu Post, November 28, 2006.

................. 16928$

CH10

09-09-08 08:22:49

PS

PAGE 208

NEPAL: FROM ARMED CONFLICT TO ARMS MANAGEMENT

209

Koirarala, Koshraj. Kathmandu Post. November 12, 2006. Rawal, Bhim. ‘‘Building a Partnership For Managing Confict.’’ Paper presented at the seminar organized by CSDSG, Kathmandu, 2006. Rising Nepal, November 29, 2006. Rising Nepal, November 30, 2006. Sahani, Ajaya. Kathmandu Post, November 13, 2006. Seddon, David. Nepal: A State of Poverty. Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1998. Sinkhada, Dhruba. Himal Magazine (November 2006). Tamang, S. R. Nepal: A Historical, Materialistic Investigation of Development of Human Society. Kathmandu: Nirantar Publication, 2004.

Web sites www.cambatlaw.org www.insec.org.np www.Kantipuronline.com www.Nepalnews.com

................. 16928$

CH10

09-09-08 08:22:49

PS

PAGE 209

Northern Ireland: The Search for a Democratic Settlement Thomas G. Fraser

THE NORTHERN IRELAND CONFLICT WHICH BROKE OUT IN 1968–69

proved to be remarkably tenacious. It never reached the level of intensity of the civil war in Lebanon or the conflicts spawned by the breakup of Yugoslavia; nevertheless, it ate at the heart of Northern Irish society for almost three decades. Over 3,500 people were killed, tens of thousands were injured, both physically and mentally, the region’s economic and social infrastructure was degraded, and the population left residentially segregated. Like the Arab-Israeli conflict, with which it was sometimes compared, it seemed to defy solution. At its core lay a dilemma. The unionist section of the population saw itself as part of the United Kingdom, the country which had pioneered the principle of parliamentary government. Nationalists looked across the border to the Republic of Ireland, which prized its democratic values as integral to the cause of Irish freedom. Any solution to the problems of Northern Ireland had, therefore, to embrace democracy. That much was easy. But how could democratic structures accommodate the diametrically different national allegiances, and sense of identity, of the two communities? The signatories to the Belfast Agreement of 1998 hoped to resolve this problem. It was not the first attempt to do this, and the agreement itself proved difficult to implement. Progress stalled until the St. Andrews Agreement of October 13, 2006, opened up the possibility for further progress toward the creation of democratic structures and institutions with which both communities could feel comfortable. On Monday, March 26, 2007, the Reverend Ian Paisley, leader of the Democratic Unionist Party, and Sinn Fein president Gerry Adams announced that their parties would take part in a power-sharing executive on May 8. Between its establishment in 1921 and the prorogation of its parliament in 1972, Northern Ireland had a distinctive form of 210

................. 16928$

CH11

09-09-08 08:22:41

PS

PAGE 210

THE SEARCH FOR A DEMOCRATIC SETTLEMENT

211

democratic government within the United Kingdom. To understand how it worked, and why it ultimately failed, we must first consider the circumstances which produced it. The extension of the male franchise throughout the United Kingdom from 1832 onward meant that the desire of most Irish Catholics for some form of self-government, whether with a home rule parliament or as a separate republic, would ultimately prevail. Ireland’s Protestant minority, strongly concentrated in parts of the historic province of Ulster, would come under such a jurisdiction. As long as the House of Lords, where unionist sentiment predominated, retained its veto over legislation, the threat of Irish self-determination could be held at bay, but when this was removed by the Parliament Act of August 1911, the situation changed dramatically. Hence, when the Liberal government introduced the Third Home Rule Bill in 1912, its parliamentary progress could be delayed but not prevented.1 Under the leadership of Dublin lawyer Sir Edward Carson and County Down businessman Sir James Craig, northern unionists pledged themselves to resist home rule, mobilized through the Ulster Volunteer Force, and, crucially, enlisted the support of the British Conservative Party led by Andrew Bonar Law, a Canadian of Ulster Protestant origin. By the summer of 1914, the basis of a solution seemed to be that certain Ulster counties, whether nine, six, or four was in dispute, would be excluded from the operation of a home rule parliament, either permanently or for a specified period.2 The outbreak of war ensured that these issues were put to one side. However, by 1918 the legacies of the Easter Rising, and the subsequent rise to political dominance of Irish nationalism by Sinn Fein, pledged to full independence, meant that fresh ideas would be needed on the part of David Lloyd George’s coalition government.3 In order to understand Northern Ireland’s form of democracy one must also take into consideration the constraints Lloyd George and his ministers were working under as a result of the political dominance of Irish nationalism by Sinn Fein. Sinn Fein presented a political problem, while the outbreak of the war of independence in January 1919 meant that the security issue also had to be addressed. But northern unionism was as obdurate as ever, the more so since the prospect was now of an Ireland completely separate from the British system, and it had retained powerful allies in British politics. Just how important that support was can be seen in the way in which Lloyd George had to manage his Irish policy. Lloyd George was prime minister and

................. 16928$

CH11

09-09-08 08:22:42

PS

PAGE 211

212

THOMAS G. FRASER

the leader of a coalition in which his 136 Liberals sat with 339 Conservatives led by Bonar Law. During the election which they had jointly fought in November 1918, Bonar Law had secured from the Liberal leader the pledge that the six counties of Ulster would not be forced under a home rule parliament.4 This pledge provided the context for the sequence of events which led to the enactment of the Government of Ireland Bill in 1920. Since the Government of Ireland Act determined the nature of Northern Ireland until it was repealed in November 1998, we must look in some detail at its key provisions. The six counties of the 1918 pledge were Antrim, Armagh, Down, Fermanagh, Londonderry, and Tyrone, and took in the key cities of Belfast and Derry. This area was to remain part of the United Kingdom. In fact, only four of these counties had a Protestant and unionist majority. Fermanagh and Tyrone had large Protestant communities, but clear Catholic majorities, as did Derry city. Areas of the rest of what became Northern Ireland were also strongly nationalist; namely, south Down, south Armagh, the Glens of Antrim and parts of west Belfast. Overall, Catholics were some 34 percent of the population. This meant that while unionists were achieving their overriding aim of remaining part of the United Kingdom, nationalists were being denied their place in the independent country which emerged in 1922 as the Irish Free State.5 By the early twenty-first century, the Catholic proportion of the population had grown substantially. When Northern Ireland was kept within the United Kingdom, it was in a manner that did not resemble the contemporary position of England, Scotland, and Wales. Northern Ireland was given its own devolved government, with the Crown represented by a governor, a Senate and a House of Commons. In one sense, this was done in a democratic manner, since the parliamentary franchise reflected that of the rest of the United Kingdom. But it was also created in a rather unthinking way, since the parliamentary constituencies were territorial, as in the British House of Commons, but whereas in the latter seats could change hands, this was seldom the case in Northern Ireland. The first elections in 1921 illustrate this perfectly, with unionists taking forty of the fifty-two seats. This proportion did not change significantly over the next fifty years. While unionists exercised power, nationalists were excluded from it, fostering a sense of exclusion and alienation.6 This was reinforced by the nature of local government, or at least certain aspects of it. Local government franchise was restricted to householders and their

................. 16928$

CH11

09-09-08 08:22:43

PS

PAGE 212

THE SEARCH FOR A DEMOCRATIC SETTLEMENT

213

spouses, thus excluding lodgers and adult children living with their parents. While this applied across the community, its principal effect was felt by Catholics with large families living at home. Since local authorities had considerable patronage in the allocation of council houses, as well as control of jobs, this was a matter of some consequence. Of particular significance was the nature of Londonderry Corporation. The city had great symbolic importance for unionists, because of the siege of 1688–89 and the traditions associated with it. The ward boundaries were such as to give the unionist minority political control.7 In the course of the 1920s, unionists sought to assert the identity of the polity they had inherited. In doing so, they were acting no differently than their counterparts in the Irish Free State. But the Ulster Unionist Party was closely aligned with the Loyal Orange Institution, an exclusively Protestant fraternity, which sought to preserve the traditions of King William III and his victory over the Catholic forces of King James II at the Battle of the Boyne in 1690. Almost all unionist MPs and cabinet ministers were members of the Institution. When the government made the anniversary of the battle (July 12) essentially a public holiday in 1926, the Protestant characteristics of Northern Ireland were being asserted. The enduring symbol of the new polity came in 1932 with the opening by an unenthusiastic Prince of Wales of the imposing parliament building at Stormont.8 For unionists, Stormont embodied the kind of Northern Ireland they wished to preserve, while for nationalists it symbolized their marginalization. While devolution held Northern Ireland at arm’s length from the rest of the United Kingdom, its participation in the Second World War and the postwar extension of the welfare state served to bind it more firmly into the British system. In such circumstances, it comes as no surprise that most Catholics failed to identify with the state. They identified instead with the Catholic church, its social values, and system of education. The political expression of this was the Nationalist Party, a rather conservative alliance.9 Some republicans turned to violence, through the sporadic efforts of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), but a campaign between 1954 and 1962 petered out through lack of support. By the 1960s, unionism seemed high in the water, Northern Ireland’s position in the United Kingdom more secure than ever, with a Prime Minister, Terence O’Neill, attempting some accommodation with the Catholic minority. It was an illusion. The Catholic community was about to mobilize in new ways, and with a fresh generation of leaders. The demon-

................. 16928$

CH11

09-09-08 08:22:43

PS

PAGE 213

214

THOMAS G. FRASER

strations of the Civil Rights Movement after 1967, particularly in the city of Derry from October 5, 1968, changed Northern Ireland forever. As the pace of events quickened, Derry and Belfast spiraled into violence in 1969. The formation of the Provisional Republican Movement in December 1969/January 1970 was followed by the IRA’s challenge to Northern Ireland as part of the British state. This only came to an end in 1994 with the ceasefires of the IRA and their loyalist counterparts. By then, with the prorogation of the Stormont parliament in 1972, Northern Ireland’s political institutions had, in effect, collapsed. What then followed was a prolonged period of what has been described as the ‘‘democratic deficit.’’ The decisions taken with relation to Northern Ireland were those of the secretary of state and his or her team of ministers drawn from the governing party at Westminster. These ministers were in no democratic sense answerable to the Northern Ireland electorate. Northern Ireland still elected twelve, later extended to seventeen and then eighteen, MPs to Westminster, but the distinctive nature of their politics confined them to the back benches. What of local government, which had featured so strongly in the protests of the late 1960s? This was repositioned in the Macrory Report of 1970, which created twenty-six district councils. While this might be seen as devolving power to the 1oca11eve1, some were very small, and all lacked real power. In short, neither Westminster nor the locality offered much by way of substantive authority, the purpose, it might be argued, of democratic politics and institutions. Direct rule from Westminster was not believed to be anything other than a transitional phase until more acceptable governmental structures could be established.10 Why, then, did this take decades to accomplish? In protracted conflicts, such as in Northern Ireland, it is difficult to find mutually acceptable solutions in a society where two communities have such conflicting loyalties, and where the positions of each were regularly stiffened by what became, after 1970, a climate of continuing violence. The armed campaign of the Provisional IRA was matched by that of the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), adding a new dimension to the conflict. Initially, security was the responsibility of the army, aided by the locally recruited Ulster Defense Regiment. In 1976, however, security primacy was given to the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), again locally recruited, with a membership

................. 16928$

CH11

09-09-08 08:22:44

PS

PAGE 214

THE SEARCH FOR A DEMOCRATIC SETTLEMENT

215

overwhelmingly drawn from the Protestant community. When other groups, such as prison officers, are taken into account, it can readily be seen how much of the population was directly involved in—or affected by—the conflict. Not least, the analysis could be taken further to include such groups as building contractors, firefighters, medical staff, and other emergency services. Victims of the conflict also included surviving relatives of those killed, those who were injured, and people who lost their means of livelihood. The difficulty in reaching agreement on democratic structures in such a polarized society was compounded by the fragmentation of politics. In the spring of 1970, the Alliance Party was founded in an attempt to attract moderate Catholics and Protestants. In September, the Social Democratic and Labor Party (SDLP) was formed. Dedicated to an inclusive united Ireland through consent, it quickly routed the old Nationalist party. From 1979, its leader was the Derry civil rights leader John Hume, who interested influential figures in Europe and the United States in Northern Ireland’s affair, and was to become a pivotal figure in the peace process. In 1971, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), which had dominated unionist politics since its formation in 1905, was challenged by the formation of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). Led by the moderator of the Free Presbyterian Church, the Reverend Ian Paisley, the party managed to appeal both to rural Protestants and sections of the urban working class. The UUP’s leader during the critical period from 1971 to 1974 was Brian Faulkner, Northern Ireland’s last prime minister. From 1979 to 1995, the party was led by Westminster MP James (later Lord) Molyneaux. In 1981, political Republicanism emerged with the election to Westminster of IRA hunger striker Bobby Sands. When Sinn Fein’s (SF) Gerry Adams was elected for the West Belfast Westminster seat in 1983, it was clear that another major player had entered the political forum. Other political parties came and went, such as the Vanguard Unionist Progressive Party, formed in 1973 by former Unionist cabinet minister William Craig. The period immediately after the imposition of direct rule saw the British and Irish governments attempt to set in place a democratic structure which, they believed, could accommodate the aspirations and identities of both unionists and nationalists. The sequence of events in 1972–73 is instructive, both for the principles which were defined and their ultimate frustration. In Octo-

................. 16928$

CH11

09-09-08 08:22:44

PS

PAGE 215

216

THOMAS G. FRASER

ber 1972, the British government issued a Green Paper, The Future of Northern Ireland, which revealed the nature of its thinking. Although little was set out precisely, two main ideas were proposed, which have guided attempts at a settlement ever since. The first was that the nationalist minority should be given executive power, something so far denied. The second talked of an ‘‘Irish Dimension.’’ This was reminiscent of the Government of Ireland Act, which had envisaged a Council of Ireland bringing together the representatives of Northern Ireland and Southern Ireland for matters of common concern. The Green Paper was rejected by most unionists. Elections in June 1973 for a new seventy-eight-member Assembly exposed the fault lines dividing the unionist community. The Alliance Party performed modestly with eight seats, but with nineteen seats the SDLP was clearly the voice of constitutional nationalism. Unionists loyal to Faulkner won twenty-one seats. In contrast, an alliance of DUP, Vanguard Unionists, and ‘‘unofficial’’ Unionists, hostile to the Green Paper’s proposals, won twenty-six seats. In December 1973 agreement was reached at Sunningdale by the two governments, the UUP, the SDLP, and the Alliance party. It was planned that a Council of Ireland, with executive powers over eight areas was to be established between the power-sharing executive in Belfast and the government in Dublin. This, however, never occurred. Firstly because, on January 4, 1974, the plan was rejected by the Ulster Unionist Council, the party’s governing body, at which point Faulkner and his supporters seceded to form a new organization. Secondly because, in the United Kingdom general election, the United Ulster Unionist Council, an alliance of antiFaulkner Unionists, the DUP, and Vanguard, won eleven of the twelve seats. Thirdly because, on May 14, 1974, a newly created body, the Ulster Workers Council (UWC), began a strike to bring down the new structures. Thirteen days later, with large areas of Northern Ireland effectively in the hands of the UWC, Faulkner and his power-sharing executive resigned.11 The logical deduction was that a settlement could not be imposed if a large section of the population rejected it, but it made the pursuit of such agreement no easier, and a generation was to elapse before the possibility of locally accountable democratic structures was to emerge once again. By the end of 1993, the situation in Northern Ireland seemed as intractable as ever. Such was the continuing nature of violence that some thought a final confrontation possible. One

................. 16928$

CH11

09-09-08 08:22:45

PS

PAGE 216

THE SEARCH FOR A DEMOCRATIC SETTLEMENT

217

grim month, October 1993, may serve to illustrate the point. It saw twenty-seven people killed. On October 23, an IRA bomb killed nine people in a fish shop on Belfast’s Shankill Road. The UFF’s response was a gun attack on a bar in Greysteel, County Londonderry, in which six Catholics and one Protestant were killed. At various levels, nevertheless, moves had been taking place to bring about ceasefires which would open the way to political dialogue and then a negotiated settlement. On August 31, 1994, the IRA announced its complete cessation of military activities, followed on October 13 by a similar declaration by the Combined Loyalist Military Command. Although the IRA ceasefire was to lapse between February 1996 and July 1997, these events did set the conditions for the political discussions which were to culminate in the Belfast Agreement of April 10, 1998. Even so, community relations remained volatile. From July 1995, serious disputes arose over parades by the Orange Order and the Apprentice Boys of Derry in various locations. The discussions involved not only the British and Irish governments, the UUP, the SDLP, and Alliance, but Sinn Fein, now an increasingly effective challenger for the nationalist vote, was also fully involved, as were the Women’s Coalition, and two small loyalist parties, the Progressive Unionist Party and the Ulster Democratic Party. The negotiations were chaired by the experienced American politician George Mitchell and were encouraged by President Bill Clinton.12 Notably absent, however, were Ian Paisley’s DUP and the United Kingdom Unionist Party led by Robert McCartney, between them commanding some 40 percent of the unionist electorate. On the assumption that the representatives of 40 percent of the unionist electorate would not be party to an agreement, much would ultimately rest on how the UUP would respond. In September 1995, party leadership had passed to David Trimble, MP for Upper Bann and a former law academic at Queen’s University in Belfast. The agreement itself was a finely crafted document, necessarily so given the very different positions and aspirations of the signatories. Democratic and peaceful principles were enshrined from the start.13 Before setting out in detail how these democratic means would be expressed, the agreement dealt with the critical questions of identity and Northern Ireland’s constitutional position. Nationalists were reassured that it was for the people of Ireland alone to exercise self-determination, and that if in the future their decision was in favor of a united Ireland, the two governments would legislate to bring that about. Mean-

................. 16928$

CH11

09-09-08 08:22:45

PS

PAGE 217

218

THOMAS G. FRASER

while, unionists were given the guarantee that self- determination would be exercised through the two jurisdictions, and that the consent of a majority in Northern Ireland would be required for any move toward a united Ireland.14 The principle of consent lay at the heart of the agreement. It acknowledged the legitimate wish of a substantial part of the Northern Ireland population for a united Ireland, but went on to say that the present wish of the majority was to remain part of the United Kingdom.15 In an attempt to reassure nationalists that they would not be consigned to the position of a powerless minority under a devolved administration, the agreement provided assurances that there would be a powerful equality agenda which would ensure that there would be no return to discrimination. Moreover, the aspirations and identity of the two communities would enjoy parity of esteem.16 The details in the agreement flowed from these initial principles, but, as the cliche´ reminds us, the devil can be in the details. The devolved democratic structures, therefore, were carefully constructed around the principle of cross-community consent. The existing Westminster constituencies would use a system of single transferable vote to elect a 108-member Assembly, which would enjoy full legislative and executive powers over ten ministries. Key decisions would require cross-community support, either by a majority of those members present and voting, including a majority of unionists and nationalists, or through a weighted majority of 60 percent of members present and voting, including 40 percent of each designation. The executive was to be headed by a first and deputy first minister, and the ministries would be allocated to the parties on the basis of their strength in the Assembly.17 Nationalists’ sense of Irishness was acknowledged through the establishment of a North-South Ministerial Council which would, through agreement, work to adopt common policies where there was mutual benefit; examples given included teacher qualifications, animal and plant health, the planning of transport, accident and emergency services, and the promotion of tourism.18 This was balanced to some extent from the unionist perspective by the creation of a British- Irish Council, and a British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference, which were intended to address wider relationships.19 These interlocking elements in the political structure were designed to give maximum expression to the political desires and identities of the communities. If nationalists were not to achieve a united Ireland unless a majority of the Northern Ire-

................. 16928$

CH11

09-09-08 08:22:46

PS

PAGE 218

THE SEARCH FOR A DEMOCRATIC SETTLEMENT

219

land population consented to it, then their Irish identity and aspirations were acknowledged, as was their absolute right to equality. Other elements in the agreement proved more contentious. The two communities could not resolve the issue of policing. The agreement proposed an independent Commission on Policing, which through the mechanism of the Patten Report resulted in the establishment of the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) in 2001. The new policing structures were accepted by all the major political parties, with the exception, until 2007, of Sinn Fein.20 Prisoners from organizations observing a ceasefire were to be released over the next two years.21 Finally, there was the issue of the arms held by the various paramilitary organizations. The signatories affirmed their commitment to total disarmament, pledging to use their influence to achieve decommissioning over a two-year period.22 The agreement was to be endorsed by referenda in both jurisdictions. The overall result in Northern Ireland was never in real doubt. While there were republican dissidents, the SDLP and Sinn Fein could deliver the support of the nationalist community. The PUP and UDP could appeal to working-class loyalism. Broader unionist endorsement was much more problematic. The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and United Kingdom Unionists were strongly opposed, but there was also deep unease in sections of the UUP, especially over the issues of policing, prisoner releases, and decommissioning. While Trimble secured the backing of the Ulster Unionist Council, an influential group of Westminster MPs campaigned to reject the agreement. When the referendum was held on May 2, 1998, it was endorsed by 71.2 percent of those who voted, including, it seems, a bare majority of unionists, but emphatically by nationalists. In the Assembly elections the following month the SDLP won twenty-four seats, Sinn Fein eighteen, Alliance six, and the Women’s Coalition two. Of the pro-agreement unionists, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) took twenty-eight seats and the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) two. In the anti-agreement camp, the DUP secured twenty, the United Kingdom Unionists five, and independent unionists three. Unionism was split down the middle.23 The progress of devolution was slow. In November 1998, the Northern Ireland Act was passed, incorporating the constitutional provisions of the agreement, and repealing the 1920 Government of Ireland Act. On July 1, 1998, the Ulster Unionist leader David Trimble was elected first minister designate, with

................. 16928$

CH11

09-09-08 08:22:46

PS

PAGE 219

220

THOMAS G. FRASER

the SDLP’s Seamus Mallon as deputy first minister designate. Progress on the new devolved executive had to wait until November 29, 1999, with departments shared among the UUP, the SDLP, Sinn Fein, and the DUP. The DUP adopted the distinctive position of having two portfolios, but decided to the rotate the positions among their members, and did not attend meetings of the executive. Progress proved difficult, even so on February 11, 2000, the Assembly and executive were suspended. Restored on May 30, they were again suspended, in circumstances of considerable controversy, on October 14, 2002. The faltering progress of devolution was accompanied by dramatic developments elsewhere. The two-year period for arms decommissioning set out in the agreement came and went, but in late October 2001 the IRA made the first of what turned out to be four acts of decommissioning. On September 26, 2005, the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning, headed by Canadian General John de Chastelain, confirmed that the IRA had met a commitment to put all its armory beyond use.24 There was no matching action by the UFF or UVF, though on May 3, 2007, the latter made an announcement, ending its activities to assume a civilian role. On November 11, 2007, the standing down of the UFF was announced. Substantial changes were also under way in politics. The 2001 Westminster General Election saw the UUP just ahead of its DUP rival, with six seats to five, but Sinn Fein edged ahead of the SDLP, having four seats to the latter’s three. But when fresh Assembly elections were held in November 2003, the political map of Northern Ireland changed fundamentally. The DUP now had thirty members, to the UUP’s twenty-seven, but when three UUP assembly members switched parties, the DUP was well ahead of the UUP, by a margin of thirty-three to twenty-four. Winning twenty-four seats, Sinn Fein was decisively in front of the SDLP, with eighteen. There were also six Alliance, one PUP, one United Kingdom Unionist Party, and one Independent member. This electoral shift to the DUP and Sinn Fein was confirmed in the 2005 Westminster election, when nine DUP MPs were elected, five Sinn Fein, three SDLP, and the UUP reduced to one. The burning question was whether the DUP and Sinn Fein could be brought to an agreement which would see a restoration of devolved government. The central issues were whether Sinn Fein was prepared to support the PSNI, the courts, and the rule of law, and whether the DUP would share power with Sinn Fein in a new executive,

................. 16928$

CH11

09-09-08 08:22:47

PS

PAGE 220

THE SEARCH FOR A DEMOCRATIC SETTLEMENT

221

taking a full part in the All-Ireland Ministerial Council. These were explored with the main political parties at a conference convened by the British and Irish at St. Andrews in Scotland in mid-October 2006. The St. Andrews Agreement, published on October 13, set out the conditions, and a timetable, for the restoration of devolution. In it, the two governments repeated the principles which had for so long governed the attempts to reach a political and constitutional settlement: namely, acceptance of consent, democracy, inclusiveness in government, the equality agenda, and the establishment of balanced political institutions inside Northern Ireland, as well as those between Belfast and Dublin and across the islands. There were two key commitments demanded of the parties. The first was that they were to be publicly committed, in good faith and in a spirit of genuine partnership, to the full operation of power-sharing government and the North-South and EastWest arrangements. The second addressed the critical issue of policing. In a democratic society, support for the police and the courts was held to be fundamental. On the basis that the parties would agree to power sharing and support for the PSNI, a deadline of March 26 was set for the restoration of the devolved executive.25 What was being asked of these two old antagonists, the DUP and Sinn Fein, was clear enough. It was likely that there would be those within both parties who would find it difficult to accept these proposals, but a momentum had been created. After extensive internal consultations, on January 28, 2007 Sinn Fein convened an extraordinary Ard Fheis in Dublin, which endorsed a resolution committing the party to support for the PSNI, the Policing Board, and the District Policing Partnerships. New elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly took place on March 7, 2007. The results were instructive. With thirty-six and twenty-eight seats respectively, the DUP and Sinn Fein held the political high ground. The UUP’s representation fell to eighteen seats, and the SDLP to sixteen. These were to be the four parties of government. The Alliance Party had seven seats, with the Green Party, the Progressive Unionist Party, and Independents having one each. With the Sinn Fein resolution on policing, as the government’s March 26 deadline approached attention turned to the DUP. On March 24, 2007, the DUP’s executive resolved that the party would take part in a new executive at a date in May. With the political gap seemingly narrowed to a few weeks, on March 26 Stormont wit-

................. 16928$

CH11

09-09-08 08:22:47

PS

PAGE 221

222

THOMAS G. FRASER

nessed the historic encounter between Ian Paisley and Gerry Adams, at which the two leaders announced their agreement to enter into the institutions of government on May 8. On that date, in view of the world’s media and in the presence of the British and Irish leaders, the new Assembly convened. With DUP leader Ian Paisley as first minister and Sinn Fein’s chief negotiator Martin McGuinness as deputy first minister, and the portfolios of government shared among their two parties and the UUP and SDLP, Northern Ireland was embarking on a new political direction. This chapter has outlined the difficulties involved in creating viable democratic institutions in Northern Ireland. On a superficial level it might seem not to be an issue, since the people of Northern Ireland have always had the same parliamentary rights as everyone else in the United Kingdom. But the structures set in place by the Government of Ireland Act meant that for fifty years political institutions were dominated by the unionist community, who regularly reaffirmed their desire to remain part of the United Kingdom. But these institutions meant that Catholics had no access to political power, except in certain areas of local government where they were a majority. After the collapse of the Northern Ireland government in 1972, the abiding question was how to set in place institutions which would command the allegiance of both communities, while accommodating unionists’ sense of Britishness and nationalists’ sense of Irishness. The Sunningda1e Agreement of 1973 was an early attempt at this. The Belfast Agreement of 1998 and the St. Andrews Agreement in 2006 tried to set the political institutions of Northern Ireland on new democratic foundations which would respect the rights and aspirations of both communities.

Notes I am grateful to Mrs. Janet Farren, Dr. Martin Melaugh, and Dr. Leonie Murray of the University of Ulster for their assistance. Responsibility for the content is, of course, my own. 1. For a useful summary, see Michael Laffan, The Partition of Ireland 1911–1925 (Dundalk: Dundalgan Press, 1983). 2. A. T. Q. Stewart, The Ulster Crisis (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1967). 3. Michael Laffan, The Resurrection of Ireland. The Sinn Fein Party, 1916– 1923 (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 4. T. G. Fraser, ‘‘Ireland: the Government of Ireland Act,’’ Partition in Ire-

................. 16928$

CH11

09-09-08 08:22:47

PS

PAGE 222

THE SEARCH FOR A DEMOCRATIC SETTLEMENT

223

land, India and Palestine: Theory and Practice (London: Macmillan, 1984), chap. 2. 5. Nicholas Mansergh, ‘‘The Government of Ireland Act 1920: its Origins and Purposes—The Working of the ‘Official’ Mind,’’ in Nationalism and Independence. Selected Irish Papers by Nicholas Mansergh, ed. Diana Mansergh (Cork: Cork University Press, 1997); T. G. Fraser, ‘‘The Government of Ireland Act and the Partition of Ireland,’’ LSE Quarterly 1, no. 2 (June 1987). 6. See Stephen Gwynn, The History of Partition (Dublin: Browne and Nolan Limited, 1950). 7. Disturbances in Northern Ireland. Report of the Commission appointed by the Governor of Northern Ireland, Cmd 532 (1969), 59. 8. See James Loughlin, Ulster Unionism and British National Identity since 1885 (London: Pinter, 1995). 9. Brendan Lynn, Holding the Ground: The Nationalist Party in Northern Ireland, 1945–72 (London: Ashgate, 1997). 10. Sir Kenneth Bloomfield, Stormont in Crisis. A Memoir (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1994), 169. 11. Robert Fisk, The Point of No Return. The Strike that Broke the British in Ulster (London: Andre Deutsch, 1974). 12. Senator George Mitchell, Making Peace. The Inside Story of the Good Friday Agreement (London: William Heinemann, 1999). 13. The Agreement (April 10, 1998), Declaration of Support, par. 4, http:// www.nio.gov.uk/agreement.pdf?keywordstheagreement, Crown Copyright. 14. Ibid., Constitutional Issues, par. 1.ii. 15. Ibid., par. 1.iii. 16. Ibid., par. 1.v. 17. Ibid., Strand One, Democratic Institutions in Northern Ireland, par. 2 and 5. 18. Ibid., Strand Two, North/South Ministerial Council. 19. Ibid., Strand Three, British-Irish Council; British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference. 20. Ibid., Policing and Justice, 21. Ibid., Prisoners. 22. Ibid., Decommissioning. 23. T. G. Fraser, Ireland in Conflict (London: Routledge, 2000), 81–82. 24. Report of the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning, September 26, 2005, Northern Ireland Office, http://www.nio.gov.uk/ iicd_report_26_sept_2005.pdf, Crown Copyright. 25. Agreement at St. Andrews, Northern Ireland Office, http://www.nio.gov .uk,/st_andrews_agreement.pdf, Crown Copyright.

................. 16928$

CH11

09-09-08 08:22:48

PS

PAGE 223

Northern Ireland: Securing the Peace Cathy Gormley-Heenan Introduction

MORE THAN 3,600 PEOPLE WERE KILLED DURING THE NORTHERN IRE-

land conflict with many more physically and psychologically injured.1 Although the majority of those killed and injured were due to republican and loyalist paramilitary violence, state violence was also prevalent, ranging from an early policy of detention without trial (internment), an assumed shoot-to-kill policy, and much publicized collusion with loyalist paramilitaries.2 Clearly, any settlement within Northern Ireland would have much to consider in dealing with both state and nonstate violence. Formally, ‘‘dealing with the past’’ through a truth commission or other such similar structure based on the South African or Latin American models was left out of the eventual agreement, although the debate on how to move this issue forward remains.3 Instead, emphasis was placed on the future rather than the past and, as part of that future, the reform of the security sector in Northern Ireland was critical.4 The 1998 Good Friday Agreement primarily dealt with four issues in relation to security sector reform. These were: • • • •

the decommissioning of paramilitary weapons, the demobilization of security structures and apparatuses, the reform of policing, the release of political prisoners—although this issue does not fall within usual understandings of security sector reform.

However, in the postagreement period from 1998 until the present, these issues have become the cause of much consternation among the political parties and their constituents and, consequently, have led to continuous delay in the full implementation of the agreement. For Unionists, the main problem lay with the pace of the decommissioning of paramilitary weap224

................. 16928$

CH12

09-09-08 08:22:50

PS

PAGE 224

NORTHERN IRELAND: SECURING THE PEACE

225

ons, though there were also serious concerns over the reform of the police service and the release of political prisoners. For Nationalists, the reforms of the police service were also problematic but for a different reason. While Unionists felt that the reforms of the police went too far, Nationalists felt that they didn’t go far enough. In addition, Nationalist concerns focused on the slow pace of demilitarization by the British armed forces in Northern Ireland. In every instance of ‘‘suspension’’ of the fledging Northern Ireland Assembly, issues of security sector reform were central. For example, in July 1999, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) party leader and First Minister designate for Northern Ireland, David Trimble, refused to begin the appointment of the Assembly’s Executive Committee under the d‘Hondt rule until the decommissioning of paramilitary weapons had begun. The Sinn Fein argument was that decommissioning was only feasible in the context of prior power sharing and, thus, that the executive needed to be established first. Sinn Fein argued that Unionists were not serious about power sharing with Republicans and were merely using the issue of decommissioning as their ‘‘trump card.’’5 The Ulster Unionists argued that Sinn Fein wanted to maintain a dual strategy of ‘‘politics first, but with a military option as a fall-back possibility.’’6 This emerged as the first of many impasses in the postagreement period, with the issue of security sector reform always at the core. Devolution eventually occurred in December 1999 but was quickly suspended again, by the then Secretary of State, Peter Mandelson, in February 2000 when no decommissioning had been reported. Devolution was again reinstated in May 2000 after an IRA statement which committed to put its weapons ‘‘beyond use.’’ Two ‘‘mini-suspensions’’ in August and October 2001 were again related to the pace of actual decommissioning, though devolution ultimately remained. A fourth suspension occurred in October 2002 amid allegations of an IRA spy ring operation at Stormont, though four years later none of those alleged to have been involved had been convicted; indeed, the case against them was dramatically dropped by the prosecution in December 2005.7 Elections took place to a nonfunctioning Assembly in November 2003, which returned the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn Fein as the largest Unionist and Nationalist parties. Mindful that the DUP could veto the election of a first and deputy first minister if the newly elected Assembly were to actually

................. 16928$

CH12

09-09-08 08:22:51

PS

PAGE 225

226

CATHY GORMLEY-HEENAN

meet, the then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Paul Murphy, opted for continued suspension of the Assembly and direct rule from Westminster. In short, it is apparent that issues around security in Northern Ireland have continued to predominate and have caused four suspensions of the Northern Ireland Assembly. Ironically, much of the work in relation to security sector reform has taken place against a backdrop of direct rule rather than as part of new political dispensation. The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to chart the various provisions made in terms of security sector reform originally outlined in the Good Friday Agreement; to detail the structures established in support of such provisions; to pinpoint some of the successes and failings of the reforms and their effect on the political process; and to highlight some of the outstanding issues still to be resolved in the post-agreement period in Northern Ireland. It begins with an overview of the four issues in relation to security sector reform, namely decommissioning, demilitarization, police reform and the release of political prisoners.

Decommissioning It is claimed that some two hundred AK-47s were imported from South Africa by loyalist paramilitaries in 1987 and were divided between the UDA, the UVF, and Ulster Resistance. Similarly, the IRA is reported to have smuggled hundreds of AK-47s from Colonel Gaddaffi’s Libya in the mid-1980s.8 Undoubtedly the issue of paramilitary weapons would have to be ‘‘dealt with’’ in order to progress toward peace in Northern Ireland. The issue of decommissioning, therefore, was almost always on the political agenda. After the first IRA ceasefire in 1994, the expectation among Republicans was that Sinn Fein would quickly enter into dialogue with the British government for a negotiated settlement. However, in March 1995 a series of ‘‘preconditions’’ were set down by the then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Patrick Mayhew, which became known as the ‘‘Washington Three’’ conditions. Essentially, Mayhew said that Sinn Fein could only enter into negotiations when firstly, there was willingness by the IRA to ‘‘disarm progressively’’; secondly, there was agreement on the method of decommissioning; and finally, decommissioning had started. The political deadlock which resulted from the imposition of these preconditions led to an agreement

................. 16928$

CH12

09-09-08 08:22:51

PS

PAGE 226

NORTHERN IRELAND: SECURING THE PEACE

227

between the British and Irish governments to establish an international body to provide an independent assessment on the decommissioning issue. The first report of the International Body on Arms Decommissioning in 1996 recommended that ‘‘the parties should consider an approach under which some decommissioning would take place during the process of all-party negotiations.’’9 Further deadlocks stagnated the issue until the establishment of an Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) in September 1997 with a remit to oversee the decommissioning of weapons and to report on acts of decommissioning to the British and Irish governments. In addition, the text of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement contained a specific section on decommissioning which committed the political parties in Northern Ireland to: ‘‘continue to work constructively and in good faith with the Independent Commission, and to use any influence they may have, to achieve the decommissioning of all paramilitary arms within two years following endorsement in referendums North and South of the agreement and in the context of the implementation of the overall settlement.’’10 In all, the IICD has witnessed one act of decommissioning by a loyalist paramilitary organization, the LVF, in 1998 and four acts of decommissioning by the provisional IRA in 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2005. In July 2005, the leadership of the IRA formally ordered an end to its armed campaign and instructed all IRA units to ‘‘dump arms.’’11 In September 2005, it was announced by the IICD that the IRA had completed the decommissioning of all of its arms. With the exception of the 1998 Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) act of decommissioning, loyalist paramilitary organizations have not completed any other acts of decommissioning. Moreover, the most recent IICD report in February 2006 suggests that informal meetings with loyalist paramilitaries and/or their political representatives have not even yielded decommissioning proposals.12 The concentration now remains firmly focused on the delivery of decommissioning by loyalist paramilitary groups.

Demilitarization An often quoted Sinn Fein line during the peace process was that there was a need to ‘‘remove all the guns from Irish politics.’’ This was used in retort to the accusation that the IRA was

................. 16928$

CH12

09-09-08 08:22:51

PS

PAGE 227

228

CATHY GORMLEY-HEENAN

not decommissioning fast enough. In short, the Sinn Fein response pointed out that there were others involved in the conflict also holding weapons—not only the loyalist paramilitaries but also the British army. The text of the Agreement noted that ‘‘the development of a peaceful environment on the basis of this agreement can and should mean a normalization of security arrangements and practices.’’13 In other words, the normalization or demilitarization of security arrangements in Northern Ireland constituted a commitment by the British government to return to normal security arrangements which were consistent with the level of threat in Northern Ireland in a postagreement scenario. This would include a reduction in the number of army personnel, and the removal of security apparatus, emergency powers, and legislation pertaining to Northern Ireland. At the height of the conflict in Northern Ireland, the total number of British army personnel stationed in Northern Ireland exceeded 30,000, though just prior to the first ceasefire in 1994 this figure had dropped to 19,500. However, in the post-Good Friday Agreement period, progress in this particular area was initially excruciatingly slow. The British and Irish governments argued in their implementation plan of 2001, which was designed to ‘‘unlock’’ the deadlocked process that ‘‘provided the threat [of violence] is reduced, the British Government will carry out a progressive rolling programme reducing levels of troops and installations in Northern Ireland.’’14 In doing so, the British government effectively tied the issue of demilitarization to that of decommissioning. If decommissioning took place, demilitarization would happen. This required very careful choreography at certain junctures during the peace process. When the IRA issued its statement confirming that its military campaign was at an end in July 2005, the British Government announced just one day later that it would ‘‘move quickly to begin the normalization program.’’15 The text of the document outlining the British government’s normalization plans was released just three days later and gave a detailed account of the likely changes over a two-year period in terms of troop reductions, closure of military installations, and the repeal of counterterrorist legislation in relation to Northern Ireland.16 The British Ministry of Defense (MOD) confirmed in March 2006 that further troop reductions would take place to the planned level of no more than five thousand by July 31, 07.17 The eleventh report of the Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC), a body set up by the British and Irish governments in 2004 with a remit of reporting to the gov-

................. 16928$

CH12

09-09-08 08:22:52

PS

PAGE 228

NORTHERN IRELAND: SECURING THE PEACE

229

ernments on activity by paramilitary groups and on the normalization of security measures in the province, points out that all such normalization is subject to the requirement that an ‘‘enabling environment’’ exists.18 It argued that there remains a certain level of threat from dissident Republicans to members of the security forces and that Loyalist paramilitaries might also use violence against the police. In sum, while the normalization process is now well under way, the potential for it to be halted at any time remains.

Police Reform The most obvious aspect of the normalization process has been in terms of the police even though policing changes constituted, perhaps, the most sensitive aspect of the Good Friday Agreement. The agreement itself did not initiate a series of police reforms but rather established an Independent Commission on Policing to oversee this task. The commission, headed by Chris Patten, a former government minister and governor of Hong Kong, and comprising a number of world policing experts, undertook wide consultation within Northern Ireland about the future of policing. As expected, its eventual report, dubbed the Patten Report, recommended a radical reform of policing, with over 175 specific recommendations.19 The subsequent Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000 made provision for a new name for the police service (changed from the Royal Ulster Constabulary to the Police Service of Northern Ireland [PSNI]), a new badge and flag, a new code of ethics, a human rights oriented training package for staff, and balanced recruitment so as to ensure greater participation from among the Catholic community in the police service. In addition, measures were to be put in place which would alter the arrangements for accountability of the police service. This included the creation of the Northern Ireland Policing Board, a Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, and an oversight commissioner for Northern Ireland. The remit of the Policing Board was in relation to overall police accountability, but more specifically: ‘‘To hold the Chief Constable to account for all his actions and those of his staff; To monitor if the police act in line with the Human Rights Act 1998; To oversee the workings of the internal police complaints and discipline system; and has powers of inquiry which allow it to request from the Chief Constable reports on any area of the

................. 16928$

CH12

09-09-08 08:22:52

PS

PAGE 229

230

CATHY GORMLEY-HEENAN

activities of the Police Service. If we [the Board] are not satisfied with a report, we can begin an inquiry into the matter in question.’’ 20 The Police Ombudsman was established as a totally independent body charged with the investigation of complaints against the police in Northern Ireland, its wide-ranging powers particularly apparent when compared to its counterparts in the rest of the United Kingdom. Finally, the oversight commissioner was to be responsible for overseeing the implementation of the changes in policing arrangements and structures decided on in the context of the Patten Report. Originally this commission was to be established for a five-year term to see through the implementation of Patten’s recommendations. However, this was extended for a further two years in 2003, and again in 2005 with the process due to be completed in May 2007. In the most recent report from the oversight commissioner, it was stated that 86 percent of the Patten Commission recommendations had been fully or substantially implemented.21 Still outstanding issues included: the devolution of policing and justice to the Northern Ireland Assembly, an issue unlikely to be resolved by May 2007; securing the funding for the building and development of a new Police College for Northern Ireland; and further civilianization of the PSNI. Despite these ‘‘successes’’ in terms of police reform and the fact that such a high percentage of the recommendations have been implemented, it still remains an issue of significant contention. This is so particularly for Sinn Fein and its republican constituency base who have continued to use the issues around police reform as a bargaining chip in political negotiations with the British government. Arguing that the original reforms did not go far enough, they were dismayed that the proposals were watered down in the legislation and fell short of Patten’s vision. For example, it is arguable that an implementation deficit was created when the proposed new oath to be sworn by all officers would now only be sworn by new recruits. Also, the proposed powers of the Policing Board to oversee policing was met in the legislation by a secretary of state and a chief constable invested with power to override the Board’s recommendations; additionally, the proposal that police officers would have to wear name badges was stipulated as not being applicable during riots; and even the change of name of the police force was tempered by the legislative provisions in which the name RUC was retained in the title deeds.22 In spite of these concerns, and although the

................. 16928$

CH12

09-09-08 08:22:52

PS

PAGE 230

NORTHERN IRELAND: SECURING THE PEACE

231

issue remained a profoundly contentious one for many grassroots activists, the Sinn Fein executive in January 2007 voted to convene a special ard fheis (conference) for party members to vote on the issue of whether or not Sinn Fein should support the PSNI. Specifically, the motion at the conference would decide whether members will support the criminal justice system, the party taking places on the Policing Board, and authorizing Sinn Fein ministers to pledge their support for the forces of law and order. The actual ard fheis took place at the end of January 2007 and after a six-hour debate on the issues a vote was held and was carried with 90 percent support of those present and voting. This monumental change of policy was however part of a carefully choreographed sequence of events involving not only the Sinn Fein ard fheis voting support for the PSNI, but also new elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly in March 2007, the reestablishment of the political institutions and a power-sharing executive by May 2007, and the proposed devolution of policing and justice to the Northern Ireland Assembly by May 2008.

Release of Political Prisoners The final notable security issue dealt with as part of the Good Friday Agreement package was the highly contentious issue of the release of political prisoners. Prisoners belonging to paramilitary groups, then on ceasefire, were freed under terms known as an ‘‘early release scheme.’’ A proviso was put in place which intimated that if a released prisoner reoffended at any time then the early release license could be revoked and the prisoner jailed once again. This has already happened on a number of occasions since 1998, most recently with the reincarceration of the loyalist Michael Stone, who was jailed in 1989 for six murders and served a total of 11 years out of a 684-year sentence before his release in 2000. In November 2006, Stone attempted to bomb Parliament buildings at Stormont, the home of the Northern Ireland Assembly, but was captured by security guards present at the scene. The issue of political prisoners was only dealt with in part because it excluded from the agreement those political prisoners who had escaped from jail during their incarceration and had gone ‘‘on the run’’(OTR) from the authorities. By extension then, it also excluded those individuals with outstanding arrest warrants for crimes committed during the conflict. In total, the ‘‘on the runs’’ are assumed to number no more than

................. 16928$

CH12

09-09-08 08:22:54

PS

PAGE 231

232

CATHY GORMLEY-HEENAN

around 150 individuals.23 Resolving this problem has proved to be particularly difficult. Sinn Fein was said to have made a deal with the British government on the issue of the ‘‘on the runs’’ during the Weston Parks talks in 2001. However, it took until January 2006 for the British government to put forward a bill to Parliament at Westminster. The Northern Ireland Offenses Bill would have seen those accused of paramilitary crimes before 1998 appear in front of a special tribunal, then be freed on license. Although initially welcomed by Republicans, Sinn Fein later withdrew its support for the government’s controversial bill claiming this was because it linked the OTR issue with an amnesty for British security force members. Consequently, the OTR issue remains yet to be resolved.

Successes and Failings of Security Sector Reforms It is clear that the Good Friday Agreement took issues of security sector reform very seriously. However, the pace and nature of reforms by the protagonists on all sides of the conflict have created wider problems for the fledgling postagreement peace process. While the recently verified final act of decommissioning of Republican paramilitary weapons can be counted as a major success, the fact that decommissioning was directly linked to Unionist participation in a power sharing Assembly remains, arguably, one of its greatest failings since legitimate political leaders lost control of the implementation of the Good Friday Agreement to the paramilitaries.24 While the most recent report by the police oversight commissioner applauds the fact that 86 percent of the police reform recommendations and performance indicators have been successfully implemented, the continuing reluctance of the wider republican community to embrace these changes emphasizes its failure to ‘‘connect’’ with this community. At the heart of security sector reform lies the fundamental issue of trust. Unionists may ask, why did the IRA take seven years to formally declare that their war was over? Nationalists may ask, why has there seemed to be more emphasis on the decommissioning of IRA weapons than on loyalist weapons? Unionists may ask, why can we not see the evidence of the decommissioning of weapons with a photograph? Nationalists may ask, why is the evidence of state collusion with loyalist paramilitaries not discussed as part of this process?25 These ques-

................. 16928$

CH12

09-09-08 08:22:54

PS

PAGE 232

NORTHERN IRELAND: SECURING THE PEACE

233

tions and others demonstrate that while structural changes in the area of security sector reform can take place as part of a peace process, attitudinal changes are very much more difficult to bring about. Reforming the attitudes and perceptions of the key protagonists does not necessarily correlate with the actual structural reforms taking place. Trust has been broken on all sides. The saga of the Stormont spyring, for example, in which the PSNI claimed that they had found evidence of a spy ring within the Sinn Fein delegation at Stormont in 2002 and which resulted in the collapse of devolution for a fourth time, raised many more questions than it answered for all parties concerned, particularly because no charges were brought against those initially accused and the case was ultimately dropped by the public prosecution. Meanwhile, a November 2006 report by an Irish parliamentary committee found that British security services colluded with Loyalists involved in a series of attacks in the Republic. This raises the issue of trust once again, only this time between the British and Irish governments.26 Overall, attitudes to police reform in Northern Ireland demonstrate a distinctly sectarian differential and indicate that actual security sector reforms are not always enough—the perceptions of security sector reform are equally valid. As the Northern Ireland Life and Times survey results indicated in 2001 and 2003, almost 60 percent of Protestant respondents believed that police reform had gone too far, yet only a very small number of Catholics (3 to 4 percent) agreed. And, while 44 percent of Catholics felt that police reform had not gone far enough in 2001, only 4 percent of Protestants agreed. It has only been the minorities in both communities (37 percent of Catholics and 23 percent of Protestants in 2003) which have perceived police reform to be ‘‘about right.’’27 Resolving the final outstanding issues in relation to security sector reform might be reflected in a shift in perception in future surveys though this remains to be seen.

Conclusions The reform of the security sector in postagreement Northern Ireland has been one of the most wide-ranging and far-reaching root-and-branch exercises of its time. Given the extensive nature of the reform, it has been impossible to review everything. In addition to the reforms discussed in this chapter, it would be

................. 16928$

CH12

09-09-08 08:22:55

PS

PAGE 233

234

CATHY GORMLEY-HEENAN

remiss not to mention the substantial changes resulting from the Criminal Justice Review, which emanated from the Good Friday Agreement, and eventually made 294 recommendations for change across the criminal justice system and how the law operates in Northern Ireland (although it should be noted that policing, emergency legislation, nonjury courts, and paramilitary crime were excluded from the review). Equally important has been the establishment of the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission and the Equality Commission for Northern Ireland, which were designed to ensure that equality and rights were protected in any new political and legal dispensation in Northern Ireland. However, the issues of decommissioning, demilitarization, police reform and prisoner release remain the most obvious areas of security sector reform in postagreement Northern Ireland. In terms of decommissioning, the recent death in 2007 of the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) leader, David Ervine, has catapulted the issue of the lack of loyalist decommissioning to the center stage again. It remains to be seen whether his death will prompt the loyalist paramilitaries to complete the significantly unfinished work of loyalist decommissioning.28 While the demilitarization of army installations and the reduction of troop levels in Northern Ireland continues, this lies in obvious contrast to the ongoing development of a £20 million headquarters for British Intelligence Service (MI5), located just outside Belfast. As of 2007, MI5 was given responsibility for gathering intelligence on national security matters, but the precise nature of its role remains the subject of intense political debate.29 Acceptance of the police service and its structures by Sinn Fein is steadily embedding itself within the wider republican community. However, the recent death threats issued by dissident republicans to senior Sinn Fein members, including party leader Gerry Adams, is indicative of the levels of hostility which still exist in relation to the issue of police support. Finally, though the early release scheme for political prisoners is now complete, the outstanding issue of the ‘‘on-the-runs’’ remains to be resolved by the British government. In summation, almost nine years after the Good Friday Agreement, the security sector landscape has changed considerably and, in some instances, irrevocably. For example, the new PSNI will not revert back to the RUC should circumstances in Northern Ireland dramatically change and should violence become a

................. 16928$

CH12

09-09-08 08:22:55

PS

PAGE 234

NORTHERN IRELAND: SECURING THE PEACE

235

reality once more. In contrast, the normalization of Northern Ireland in relation to the reduction in size of British security personnel and apparatus is only possible in an ‘‘enabling environment.’’ Should the threat of violence or actual violence return, the British government has committed to increasing its military presence in Northern Ireland once again. The sensitive topics of decommissioning, demilitarization, police reform, and the release of prisoners and the necessity of careful choreography between them all have made for a complex post-agreement environment in Northern Ireland.

Notes 1. See Marie-Therese Fay, Mike Morrissey and Marie Smyth, Northern Ireland’s Troubles: the Human Costs (London: Pluto, 1999). 2. See Bill Rolston, ‘‘Dealing with the Past: Pro-State Paramilitaries, Truth and Transition in Northern Ireland,’’ Human Rights Quarterly, no. 3 (2006): 652–75. 3. See Brandon Hamber, Dorte Kulle, and Robin Wilson, eds., Future Policies for the Past (Belfast: Democratic Dialogue, 2001). 4. See Stefan Wolff, ‘‘The Politics of Fear Versus the Politics of Intimidation: Security Sector Reform in Northern Ireland,’’ in Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, ed. Albrecht Schnabel and Hans-Georg Enrhart (Tokyo: United University Press, 2005), 182–204. 5. Northern Ireland Devolution Monitoring Report, November 1, 1999, 33. 6. Ibid., 34 7. Sam Knight, ‘‘Shock as Stormont ‘Spyring’ Investigation Dropped,’’ Times (London), December 8,2005. 8. Amnesty International, ‘‘NI: AK-47: Northern Ireland paramilitary ’weapon of choice’ is world’s worst regulated weapon according to new report,’’ June 26, 2006. Accessed online at http://www.amnesty.org.uk/ news_details.asp?NewsID17005. 9. Report of the International Body on Arms Decommissioning, January 22, 1996. 10. The Agreement, April 10, 1998. 11. Irish Republican Army (IRA), Statement on the Ending of the Armed Campaign, July 28, 2005. 12. Report of the Independent Commission on Decommissioning, January 19, 2006. 13. The Agreement, April 10, 1998. 14. Implementation Plan issued by the British and Irish Governments, August 1, 2001. 15. Text of letter by Peter Hain, then secretary of state for Northern Ireland, to members of Parliament outlining the government’s response to the IRA statement announcing the ending of the IRA armed campaign, July 28, 2005. 16. Statement by Peter Hain, then secretary of state for Northern Ireland, Plans for the Normalisation of the Security Profile across Northern Ireland, August 1, 2005.

................. 16928$

CH12

09-09-08 08:22:56

PS

PAGE 235

236

CATHY GORMLEY-HEENAN

17. Announcement by Adam Ingram, then minister for the armed forces, Normalisation Plan for Military Sites in Northern Ireland, March 28, 2006. 18. 11th Report of the Independent Monitoring Commission, September 2006. 19. Independent Commission on Policing, 1999. 20. See Policing Board Web site—http://www.nipolicingboard.org.uk. 21. Oversight Commission, Overseeing the Proposed Revisions for the Police Service of Northern Ireland, Report 18, 2006. 22. See Jonathan Tonge, The New Northern Irish Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 232. 23. ‘‘On-the-run bill ‘just a cover-up,’ ’’ BBC News Online, November 16, 2005. See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/4440926.stm. 24. Wolff, ‘‘Politics of Fear,’’ 200. 25. Bill Rolston, ‘‘Dealing with the Past: Pro-State Paramilitaries, Truth and Transition in Northern Ireland,’’ Human Rights Quarterly 28, no. 3 (2006): 652–75. 26. ‘‘British Colluded With Loyalists,’’ BBC News Online, November 29, 2006. See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/6157379.stm. 27. Roger MacGinty, ‘‘Good Bargains,’’ NILT Research Update, No. 29 (April 2004). 28. ‘‘Viewpoint: Loyalist decommissioning would be a fitting tribute,’’ Belfast Telegraph, January 9, 2007. 29. Sharon O’Neill, ‘‘MI5 Plans Threaten ‘Successful Policing,’’ Irish News, March 16, 2006.

................. 16928$

CH12

09-09-08 08:22:56

PS

PAGE 236

Palestine Roland Friedrich

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM (SSR) IS, IN ANY CONTEXT, A COMPLEX

political and social process. However, reforming the security sector of a nonstate regime under the conditions of armed conflict and occupation is a challenge of a wholly different and infinitely more complex category. The absence of statehood, the deterritorialized nature of the Palestinian political system and the ongoing confrontation with Israel make the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) a rather unique setting for SSR. The general failure of SSR in the Palestinian context, sectoral progress notwithstanding, therefore comes as little surprise. This chapter will examine the Palestinian SSR efforts of the last six years and the involvement of international actors in the process.

The Palestinian Regime and its Security Sector: History and Structure The Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and its security sector are an institutional outgrowth of the Oslo process. Although the Oslo negotiations1 ostensibly aimed at establishing a Palestinian state at the end of the interim period, what they in fact brought about was a Palestinian self-government system with limited administrative and legislative authorities in limited areas of the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), mainly the Gaza Strip and the urban centers of the West Bank. The PNA lacks many fundamental characteristics of a state: territorial contiguity, sovereignty over land, water resources and airspace, and a solid fiscal base. Its statelike quality derives mainly from the Authority’s right to exercise violence in upholding law and order in the Areas A.2 Such was the basis on which the Palestinians began to set up their rudimentary state structure: an executive branch, an elected legislative body—the Palestinian Legislative Council—and a court system. 237

................. 16928$

CH13

09-09-08 08:22:53

PS

PAGE 237

238

ROLAND FRIEDRICH

Fundamental to the Oslo process was the notion of security. Israel allowed the establishment of Palestinian security institutions in the oPt for two reasons: to uphold law and order in the urban areas under Palestinian administration3 and, more importantly, to suppress the Islamist opposition, that is Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) and the Islamic Jihad. The Oslo II Agreement of 1995 ennumerated seven tasks for the new ‘‘Palestinian police,’’ among which ‘‘combating terrorism and incitement to violence’’ was the most important one.4 Thus Israel’s interest was in transforming the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) into a security surrogate that would police the oPt on its behalf, a view that certainly overrode in their minds any Palestinian aspirations of statehood and independence. It was in this context that the different PNA security organizations came into being. In 1994 the Palestinian leadership under Yasser Arafat began to deploy PLO military units from the Palestinian Diaspora in the oPt where they were reinforced with local recruits. At the same time, the leadership created new security organizations which consisted purely of local leaders and recruits. According to the Oslo II Agreement, all these security organizations were to constitute ‘‘one integral unit . . . composed of six branches’’5 under the authority of the PNA. However, what followed in practice was a rapid proliferation of forces and security personnel. On the one hand, there were the ‘‘official’’ security organizations, namely those mentioned in Oslo agreements: Civil Police; Preventive Security (responsible for internal intelligence); Civil Defense (the PNA firefighters); Presidential Security (responsible for the protection of the PNA president); Public Security (the PNA ‘‘quasi army’’); Naval Police (the PNA ‘‘quasi navy’’); and General Intelligence (responsible for external intelligence). On the other hand, the Palestinian leadership established a number of new organizations, either by separating certain functions from the ‘‘official’’ organizations or by building them up from scratch: The Military Intelligence, the Military Police and the Aerial Police (the PNA ‘‘quasi air force’’) were detached from the Public Security and made separate units; the Special Security and the Special Forces were new internal intelligence agencies personally created by Yasser Arafat in 1995 and 1999. In addition to this, many organizations also operated separate Gaza and West Bank branches. In this context, manpower in the PNA security forces increased from the original nine thousand security officers allowed under Oslo II to over thirty thousand by 1996.6

................. 16928$

CH13

09-09-08 08:22:54

PS

PAGE 238

239

PALESTINE

Such massive proliferation of forces was due to various factors. Firstly, the PNA security organizations were a basic pillar of Yasser Arafat’s rule, giving him a coervice instrument that could be used against the domestic Islamist opposition. Secondly, the Palestinian leadership perceived a full-fledged security sector to be an integral component of statehood and sovereignty. Thirdly, the Palestinian leadership had to provide jobs and funding for a large number of PLO cadres, Fateh activists of the first Intifada and youth from the refugee camps in Gaza and the West Bank; in this sense, the security forces, like the PNA public sector as a whole, became a big employment machine and thereby an important tool for internal stabilization. Finally, both Israel and the donor community quietly accepted the massive increase in numbers and organizations under the proviso of ‘‘combating terror’’ and supporting the ‘‘peace process.’’

The Palestinian SSR Process: Reforms and Setbacks ‘‘Divide et Impera’’—Security Sector Governance under Yasser Arafat (1996–2004) As long as Yasser Arafat was in power, there was essentially no institutionalized PNA security sector. What existed were different security agencies with overlapping functions which all reported directly to the PNA president and received their orders directly from him. The formal command structure that the PNA established in 1994 never became relevant. This personalized, informal and centralized mode of governance in some ways reflected the ‘‘revolutionary’’ tradition of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), but it even more so replicated Arafat’s traditional ruling technique of the Diaspora. Arafat’s strategy was predicated on the creation of different security organizations with parallel functions and the incitement of competition between their commanders, with himself functioning as the final arbiter. Further elements of his ruling technique included substantial financial patronage as well as a preference for political cooptation and micromanagement.7 The trend toward de-institutionalized security forces correlated with the interests of the principal international actors. From the onset, various security organizations, in particular the PNA intelligence agencies, received direct aid from the United

................. 16928$

CH13

09-09-08 08:22:54

PS

PAGE 239

240

ROLAND FRIEDRICH

States and the United Kingdom, including equipment, training, and financial assistance. This support aimed at the strengthening of Palestinian ‘‘counterterrorism’’ capabilities, not at institution building. Also, Israel, Egypt, and Jordan preferred to have a de-institutionalized Palestinian security sector as long as the PNA effectively clamped down on the Islamist opposition. In practice, Arafat’s approach, in combination with the AngloAmerican involvement, had grave consequences. Confusion over remits, inefficiency, and lack of coordination, sometimes even open confrontation between different branches, characterized the work of the security forces. Although some agencies made real efforts to work professionally, other organizations, especially those with intelligence functions, engaged in humanrights violations, including arbitrary detention and torture. Illegal rent seeking and nepotism further discredited the security sector in the eyes of the public which came to see the security organizations as guarantors of regime security rather than protectors of the people. The absence of any legal framework and weak parliamentary and judicial oversight prevented security personnel from being held accountable for human rights violations. The deliberate targeting of the PNA’s security infrastructure by Israel in the first years of the second Intifada only helped to exacerbate the situation. In 2001 and 2002, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) destroyed the bulk of PNA security installations, including police stations, barracks, training facilities, and communications infrastructure; the IDF also prohibited PNA security personnel from operating in the Areas A. The concomitant erosion of central authority and the disintegration of the PNA’s administrative structure prompted the rise of nonstatutory security actors. Thus, groups such as the military wing of Hamas (Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades) and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, a loose network of Fateh-affiliated militants, increasingly came to assume law and order functions, in addition to their para-military activities.8 The PNA’s apparent inability to provide human security for the Palestinians began to provoke internal criticism, with Palestinian academics and reform politicians explicitly calling for reforms in the security sector. As early as 1999, for example, the Independent Task Force on Strengthening Palestinian Public Institutions published a rather critical report on the performance of the PNA security forces.9 Also, the Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizens’ Rights (PICCR)—the official PNA

................. 16928$

CH13

09-09-08 08:22:55

PS

PAGE 240

241

PALESTINE

ombudsman—and NGOs such as Al-Haq-Law in the Service of Man started to draw attention to human rights violations committed by the security organizations. Yet, internal calls for reforms in the PNA and its security sector did not heed any results as long as Arafat was in full control of the Authority. It was only after the Israeli reoccupation of the West Bank in April 2002 that Arafat began to respond to the increasing domestic pressure to overhaul the PNA security forces as well as the governance system in general. The U.S. Administration as well as certain European governments, recognizing an opportunity to dispose of Arafat under the guise of ‘‘reform,’’ quickly began to add their own pressure on the Palestinians. The rationale of regime change became key to the Road Map, the 2003 peace plan of the quartet (United States, European Union, Russia, United Nations), which demanded the appointment of an empowered Palestinian prime minister and the drafting of a constitution. Moreover, reflecting the ‘‘counterterrorism’’ logic of United States policy, the Road Map made the strengthening of the PNA’s security capabilities central: The PNA security forces were to consolidate ‘‘into three services reporting to an empowered Interior Minister’’; a ‘‘rebuilt and refocused Palestinian Authority security apparatus’’ was to begin ‘‘sustained, targeted, and effective operations aimed at confronting all those engaged in terror.’’10 Some international actors sought to substantiate the Road Map with actions on the ground, especially after the United States had ended its direct involvement in PalestinianIsraeli security cooperation in 2001.11 In response to the growing domestic and international pressure, in May 2002 Arafat announced a so-called ‘‘100 Days Plan’’ that drew on the proposals and suggestions of Palestinian reformers. The plan contained various elements including the ratification of the Palestinian Basic Law (which had been awaiting Arafat’s signature since 1997), a cabinet reshuffle, financial reforms, and the announcement of executive and legislative elections for 2003. In relation to the security sector, the plan foresaw the merger of the three internal security organizations—Civil Police, Civil Defense, Preventive Security—with the Ministry of Interior and the appointment of a new minister; this would end Arafat’s tenure in that position.12 The plan also called for the creation of a new National Security Council (NSC) to manage and coordinate the reform process in the security domain. The reformers’ intention with these steps was to loosen the president’s grip on the internal security forces and to strengthen the

................. 16928$

CH13

09-09-08 08:22:56

PS

PAGE 241

242

ROLAND FRIEDRICH

authority of the Cabinet. The creation of the post of a prime minister in 2003, enthusiastically supported by the United States and the European Union, was intended as a further step in this direction. In practice, however, all these reforms had very little impact. The three internal forces were indeed brought under the Ministry of Interior, but Arafat never ceded any real control to the respective minister. The president personally continued to control all security forces: First through his chairmanship of the NSC; then, when the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) in late 2004 appointed the prime minister to head the NSC, again directly in circumvention of the Cabinet and the NSC. It soon became clear that Arafat’s consent to security reforms had been in fact a preemptive move to secure his position, enabling him to remove powerful security commanders and protect loyal followers. Political Co-optation and Failed Institutionalization—SSR under Mahmoud Abbas (2004–6) The death of Arafat in late 2004 signaled the end of an era in Palestinian politics and left a political vacuum that no successor could hope to fill, certainly in the short or medium term. In recognition of this and in the face of the Authority’s state of disarray, the new Palestinian leadership under President Mahmoud Abbas made reclaiming the monopoly of force for the PNA their declared priority. To this effect, Abbas devised a two-prong strategy of political co-optation and institutional reform of the security sector. The Palestinian leadership thereby hoped to meet the Palestinian security requirements under the Road Map, namely the obligations under Phase I to act against Palestinian armed groups and to reorganize the PNA security forces.13 On the political level, Abbas began to co-opt the Islamist opposition through a process of dialogue and negotiations which resulted in the ‘‘Cairo Agreement’’ of March 2005. Mediated by Egypt, the agreement obliged all Palestinian factions, including Hamas and Islamic Jihad, to a so-called ‘‘tahdi’a’’ or ‘‘period of calm.’’ This was basically a temporary ceasefire conditional upon Israeli reciprocity. In exchange for the ‘‘tahdi’a,’’ the Islamist factions would be admitted into a reformed PLO; forsaking its long-standing rejection of the Oslo framework, Hamas also agreed to run in future Palestinian elections. The ‘‘Cairo Agreement’’ resulted in substantial reduction of Palestinian violence

................. 16928$

CH13

09-09-08 08:22:56

PS

PAGE 242

243

PALESTINE

in 2005, and the Palestinian factions showed remarkable restraint during Israel’s ‘‘disengagement’’ from the Gaza Strip. In terms of institutional reforms, the new Palestinian leadership set out three priorities. First, the PNA in April 2005 started a process of consolidating its different security forces into three main branches: Internal Security Forces (Civil Police, Preventive Security, Civil Defense); National Security Forces (National Security Forces, Naval Police, Military Intelligence, Military Police, Presidential Security/Force 17); and General Intelligence. The Internal Security Forces and the National Security Forces were put under the command of the new Ministry of Interior and National Security, while the General Intelligence remained under the authority of the president. Other security agencies, such as the Special Forces and the Special Security, were disbanded. Abbas also set out to rejuvenate the PNA security leadership through the retirement of a large number of senior commanders. A second priority was the creation of a normative-legal framework for the PNA security sector. The PNA drafted and partly approved a series of laws that delineated the structures and responsibilities in the security sector, regulated the internal organization of the security forces, and defined the relations between the forces, the executive, and the PLC. Important laws included the Law on Service in the Palestinian Security Forces (2005), the General Intelligence Law (2005), the Salary and Insurance Law (2005), and the Law of the Financial and Administrative Control Authority (2004). Work also began on a White Paper that was meant to provide conceptual and planning guidelines for the security sector. Thirdly, the PNA made some efforts in the area of DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Combatants), in particular in relation to the Fateh-affiliated Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. President Abbas in early 2005 ordered all groups under the umbrella of the Brigades to merge with the official security forces. Subsequently, reintegration schemes were introduced in Gaza and the West Bank, including training courses and financial allowances to former militants. In sum, however, the SSR efforts of the new Palestinian leadership were of limited effect. Many reforms did not take hold. The envisaged three-pillar structure of the security forces in many ways only existed on paper. Commanders were unwilling to integrate their organizations under the Ministry of Interior and National Security in order to preserve their prerogatives. In-

................. 16928$

CH13

09-09-08 08:22:56

PS

PAGE 243

244

ROLAND FRIEDRICH

fluential individuals in the Ministry and the Cabinet worked toward maintaining decentralized and loosely structured security forces, contrary to the PNA’s official commitment to a centralization and institutionalization. All of this left the Ministry with very little capacity to assert executive control. Also, many of the draft laws regulating the security sector were not approved; those enacted were either not fully implemented or drafted to preserve the prerogatives of certain agencies. The outcome of international assistance to the incipient SSR process was equally mixed. With Arafat gone, donors quickly defined Palestinian SSR as the new policy priority. However, donor involvement continued to be shaped by different understandings of what security sector reform in this context actually meant. Soon after Mahmoud Abbas’s election, the U.S. administration dispatched a ‘‘security coordinator’’ (United States Security Coordinator) to the region. The United States Security Coordinator (USSC) had the mandate to coordinate the expected donor aid to the PNA security forces and facilitate security cooperation between Israel and the Palestinians. Also USAID (United States Agency for International Development) quickly drew up a program to strengthen the management capacities of the PNA Ministry of Interior and National Security; a community policing scheme was also intended. Yet, in terms of SSR the impact of the U.S. engagement was very limited. Although endowed with a substantial presence on the ground, the USSC primarily focused on the security aspects of ‘‘disengagement’’ and the smooth implementation of the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. The United States in many respects followed a rather technical approach— the USSC team primarily consisted of U.S. military personnel— with the unspoken aim of strengthening the hand of the PNA security forces vis-a`-vis the Islamist opposition rather than enhancing accountability and transparency. The EU’s involvement ostensibly focused more on strengthening civil-democratic security sector governance than the U.S. approach. In spring 2005, the EU deployed a high-level police advisory mission that aimed to assist the PNA Civil Police with improving its law enforcement capacities; transforming the Civil Police in order to bring it into line with civil-democratic standards was another priority. Although EUCOPPS (European Union Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support) was successful in providing the PNA with police vehicles, communications systems, and other equipment, it had marginal impact

................. 16928$

CH13

09-09-08 08:22:57

PS

PAGE 244

245

PALESTINE

on the reform of the management structures and processes in the police and the ministry. The Hamas Government and Security Sector Governance The Palestinian legislative elections of January 2006 and the subsequent ascension of Hamas to government marked a new phase in Palestinian security sector governance. Formerly a staunch opponent of the Oslo process, the Hamas movement suddenly found itself in a position where it had to govern. This was an unexpected outcome even for the Hamas leadership. Equally taken by surprise, the United States and the EU—strong proponents of Hamas’ participation in the poll prior to election day—reacted by cutting off all financial aid to the PNA. Also, Israel withheld the transfer of tax and customs revenues which it collects on behalf of the Authority. Although ostensibly aimed at ‘‘moderating’’ the new Hamas government, the thinly veiled aim of international and Israeli policies was to oust the movement from power.14 At the same time, and partly as a result of the international and Israeli policies, domestic tensions between Fateh and Hamas increased sharply. Open confrontation erupted between militants of both movements, especially in Gaza. The Preventive Security and the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades engaged in a fierce assassination campaign throughout 2006. The PNA’s inability to pay the salaries of its employees, including its security personnel, further exacerbated political and socioeconomic tensions. All these developments had a direct impact on security sector governance, and much of the struggle between both movements in fact played out in the security sector. Beginning shortly after Hamas’s victory, the PNA presidency took several steps to remove the Fateh-dominated security forces from the control of the government. Only one year after the official merger of forces, the National Security Forces were again separated from the Ministry of Interior and National Security and ordered to report directly to the president; Abbas also appointed a loyal officer as the chief of staff. Similar developments took place in relation to the Internal Security Forces, where Abbas appointed a loyal commander as the new directorgeneral of Internal Security in charge of the Civil Police, the Preventive Security, and the Civil Defense;15 Fateh then made efforts to set up a new autonomous structure of Internal Security in the Ministry of Interior in order to bypass the Hamas Minis-

................. 16928$

CH13

09-09-08 08:22:57

PS

PAGE 245

246

ROLAND FRIEDRICH

ter, Said Siyyam. In April 2006, Abbas, moreover, established a new ‘‘Public Administration of the Crossing Points and Borders’’ and staffed it with a loyalist commander. Simultaneously, the presidency separated the Presidential Guard from the Presidential Security/Force 17, recruited additional personnel, and set out to transform the unit into a rapid-intervention force under the direct control of the president; Presidential Guard units were sent to guard the Rafah crossing point between Gaza and Egypt. Facing increasing internal and external pressure, the Hamas government responded in April 2006 by creating the ‘‘Executive Force,’’ a new PNA security organization in Gaza under the control of Minister of Interior Said Siyyam. The ‘‘Executive Force’’ comprised some 3,200 operatives from the military wings of Hamas, the Popular Resistance Committee (Nasser Salahaddin Squads), and various smaller factions. In October 2006, the government announced plans to expand the ‘‘Executive Force’’ to some 6,000 personnel. The official mission of the organization was to support the PNA security forces in upholding law and order in Gaza for which the ‘‘Executive Force’’ enjoys considerable popular support. However, its creation also meant to provide Hamas with a strike capability in light of its difficulty to assert control over the Fateh-dominated agencies. In addition to that, Hamas also set out to extend its influence among the rank and file of the security forces through under-the-table payments. In October 2006, the Hamas government moreover announced plans to set up an ‘‘Executive Force’’ in the West Bank.16 The policies of the minister of interior encountered stiff opposition from the presidency which argued that the government had no legal authority to establish a new security force. Fateh also created its own new armed groups, for instance, in Jenin in the West Bank and in the southern Gaza Strip. Moreover, additional personnel were recruited into the Gaza branch of the Preventive Security. In October 2005, the presidency appointed Major General Haj Ismail Jabr, the former West Bank commander of the National Security Forces, to stem Hamas’s efforts to recruit personnel for the West Bank ‘‘Executive Force.’’ The presidency also requested Israel to allow the entry of the PLO’s Badr Brigade from Jordan into Gaza. The Badr Brigade received training from the Jordanian army and is considered close to the Fateh movement. For the incipient Palestinian SSR process, Hamas’s rise to power had two consequences. Internally, Palestinian-driven reform projects stalled as political crisis management took prior-

................. 16928$

CH13

09-09-08 08:22:58

PS

PAGE 246

247

PALESTINE

ity over the reform process. Parliamentary work toward the creation of the legal framework for the security sector, as well as the White Paper process, was put on hold; institutional and organizational reforms were stopped or reversed. In relation to the international scene, donors slowed down, reoriented, or stopped their SSR-related assistance, thereby contributing to the reversal of reforms that they had demanded earlier. USAID suspended its planned support program, and the USSC stopped all contacts with the PNA government. U.S. assistance shifted from support to institution building to a mere ‘‘train and equip’’ approach, with the declared objective of strengthening President Abbas and the Fateh movement against Hamas.17 This included the training of the Presidential Guard, the creation of a Gaza border management system under the control of the president, and the funding of various Fateh-dominated security forces. The EU also reduced its engagement. Although EUCOPPS maintained its presence on the ground, it limited its activities to technical contacts with the police and the continuation of some infrastructure projects. New projects, as well as the planned expansion of the mission, were put on hold. The politicized use of Western aid to Palestinian SSR prompted the Hamas government to seek assistance from countries that themselves figured as candidates for reform. In early October 2006, an agreement was reached between the PNA Ministry of Interior and the Iranian Ministry of Interior to train and equip the ‘‘Executive Force’’ in Gaza.18

SSR In The Palestinian Context: Challenges and Obstacles Palestinians seriously began to think about and work on SSR only in 2005. Given the long-term nature of any sustainable governance reform this is a very short time span. More than anything else, SSR is a political and social process that stretches over a prolonged period of time, and its success is highly dependent on the political, socioeconomic and cultural context. The influence of these factors on security sector reform is highly evident in the Palestinian case. The Palestinian polity is undergoing an excruciating transition from external rule and occupation to some form of statehood, and neither the vectors of this process nor its final outcome are clear. Until Operation ‘‘Defensive Shield,’’ in 2002, most observers would have pre-

................. 16928$

CH13

09-09-08 08:22:58

PS

PAGE 247

248

ROLAND FRIEDRICH

dicted a further consolidation of Palestinian institutions, coupled with possible progress on the peace track, however, over the last years the pendulum has swung back: Prolonged Israeli control of the West Bank and Gaza with only limited and localized Palestinian authority as the future scenario have become much more likely. Almost all challenges faced by those who advocate stronger civil-democratic security sector governance in Palestine are an outgrowth of this uncertain state-building process. Israel’s continuing occupation of the West Bank—including settlement expansion, the construction of the Separation Barrier, and the tightening of the closure system—and its control over the Gaza Strip, coupled with constant military action there, pose the most significant obstacle to Palestinian SSR. In a physical sense, the Israeli matrix of control makes it very difficult for Palestinian security officials, legislators, and civil servants to have a normal work routine. In a more political sense, the Israeli policy of territorial fragmentation—between the West Bank and Gaza, but also increasingly within the West Bank—lastingly undermines Palestinian hopes for just and peaceful solution of the conflict. Both policies weaken the viability of any Palestinian leadership that is eager to engage in compromise. Internally, the slow progress of SSR is closely linked to Fateh’s domination of the PNA and its institutions. This is a structural problem that goes much deeper than personal rivalries or political power struggles. The PNA security establishment is, apart from very few exceptions, almost entirely composed of Fateh members, with some of them holding also official positions in the movement. Fateh also dominates the lower ranks of the PNA security forces, with many rank and file being members of the Tanzim, Fateh’s grassroots organization. Although this does not equally apply to all organizations, some forces such as the Preventive Security have in fact acquired the character of a ‘‘party militia.’’ Strong patrimonial loyalties and the fact that many security commanders use their organizations to pursue personal political or financial interests compound the problem of the security sector’s partisan character. Some branches are indeed run like fiefdoms where current or former commanders secure the loyalties of their subordinates through financial patronage. The resulting patterns of patron-client relations and nepotism have led to what can be termed the ‘‘feudalisation of institutions.’’19 Attempts to reduce the impact of these networks through the dismissal of commanders have been only marginally successful,

................. 16928$

CH13

09-09-08 08:22:59

PS

PAGE 248

249

PALESTINE

with new leaders often tapping into the old channels of patronage. Factional loyalty also undermined effective parliamentary oversight and judicial review of the security sector. Until the January 2006 elections, Fateh controlled the PLC by a large majority. Parliamentarians had very little incentive to subject the security sector to effective scrutiny. Security commanders also interfered with the drafting of security sector legislation. Factionalism, corruption and political manipulation equally undermined public trust in the judiciary, with the result that traditional mechanisms of dispute resolution have gained new prominence. A consequence of all these factors was the lack of involvement of civil society in SSR. Although Palestinian support for tangible SSR continued to be widespread,20 the public was commonly not aware of any SSR activities, let alone their contents and objectives. Social support mechanisms, a key precondition for the sustainability of SSR, were therefore largely absent. The rise of Hamas added a new dimension to this picture because the power struggle between Hamas and Fateh began to play out not only on the streets but also within the PNA and its administrative bodies. Many observers had originally expected the legislative elections of 2006 to give a new push for institutional revigoration and reform. However, Fateh’s inability to accept its electoral defeat and the uncomprising international pressure on the Hamas government put the Islamists in a tight spot and left them very little room to govern. This resulted in three trends. First, combined domestic and international actions forced Hamas to increasingly rely on its own capacities and personnel: The movement brought loyalists into influential positions, created its own security force, and built up new networks and channels of patronage. From this it can be understood that Hamas does not consider relinquishing political power as an option. Secondly, the international financial boycott led to increased de-institutionalization and disintegration of authority in the PNA. This is a development that started already in the aftermath of the Israeli reoccupation of the West Bank 2002. However, institutional de-development assumed a new quality through the forced absence of PNA employees over a prolonged period of time, given the lack of salaries and the strike set up by Fateh-dominated unions. Finally, institutional disintegration and servere socioeconomic distress on the individual have prompted the rise of family networks in providing security and

................. 16928$

CH13

09-09-08 08:23:00

PS

PAGE 249

250

ROLAND FRIEDRICH

jobs. This process reinforces the emergence of localized, decentralized forms of authority to become the central mode of governance in the oPt.

Conclusion The Palestinian SSR process, still incipient and embryonic in its entirety, came to a halt after the government change of 2006 and the ensuing international boycott of Hamas in power. The future direction of Palestinian SSR will depend on a variety of factors. Key among them are the willingness of Hamas and Fateh to compromise and engage in a real dialogue, the socio-economic conditions in the oPt, Israeli policies, the position of the Western donors, and broader regional factors. What seems clear, however, is that political reconciliation and work toward an effective, efficient, and accountable security sector should be a top priority, first for the Palestinians themselves, but not less for Israelis and the donor community. The state of anarchy and chaos that characterized the oPt in 2006—and to which international policies contributed significantly—posed a grave threat to the institutional viability of the PNA and the Palestinian state-building enterprise as a whole. Needless to say, a full collapse of the PNA would have drastic consequences for Israel. What would be required to stabilize the situation is, first of all, effective internal consolidation on the Palestinian side, including a lasting power-sharing agreement between Hamas and Fateh. Some steps in that regard were made with the National Reconciliation Document of June 2006. Apart from calming down internal tensions and opening the way for a viable Palestinian leadership, the document could also provide the basis for the development of a comprehensive Palestinian vision of security, possibly in the form of a national security policy. What would also be required is a reorientation of Western policies toward more inclusiveness and the resumption of donor aid to the PNA. Hamas has many times stated its willingness to improve Palestinian governance in accordance with the tenets of accountability and transparency.21 It would be worthwhile for donors to test Hamas’s preparedness for this in practice. A depoliticized approach to aid could also help regain the trust of the Palestinian people. Finally, it would be in the interest of Israel to moderate its occupation policies and give the Palestinians political and practical space to put their house in order.

................. 16928$

CH13

09-09-08 08:23:00

PS

PAGE 250

251

PALESTINE

In the absence of these steps, the future perspectives for the oPt look bleak. The emerging picture is increasingly reminiscent of the ‘‘Somalia scenario’’ characterized by different localized authorities in different areas: kinship networks, local strongmen, ‘‘guns for hire,’’ and, possibly, Al-Qaeda in Palestine.

Notes 1. The Oslo process was a gradual negotiation process that began with the Declaration of Principles of 1993 and that was supposed to lead to Palestinian statehood at the end of the interim period in 1999. 2. The Oslo II Agreement divided the oPt in three areas—A, B, and C— with the PNA enjoying security and civilian authority only in the Areas A which constituted some 17 percent of the oPt; moreover, Israel retained the authority to control all access to these areas. 3. See also Roland Friedrich, Security Sector Reform in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (Jerusalem: 2004), 34f. 4. The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, September 28, 1995. 5. Ibid., Art. 4 (2a), Annex I. 6. See for a more detailed description Roland Friedrich, ‘‘The Palestinian Predicament: Security Governance in the Absence of Statehood,’’ in Challenges to Security Sector Governance in the Middle East, ed. Arnold Luethold and Rami Khoury DCAF (2006) 4–14, 27–28; and Strategic Assessments Initiative (SAI), Planning Considerations for International Involvement in the Palestinian Security Sector (Washington: 2005), 23–35. 7. See for more details Friedrich, Security Sector Reform, 21–33. 8. See International Crisis Group (ICG), Who governs the West Bank? Palestinian Administration under Israeli Occupation (Amman/Washington: September 28, 2004), 11–25; Friedrich, ‘‘Palestinian Predicament,’’ 12–14. 9. Independent Task Force Report, Strengthening Palestinian Public Institutions, Yezid Sayigh and Khalil Shikaki, principal authors (New York: 1999), 73–78. 10. Phase I—Security, A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, April 30, 2003. 11. From 1998 to 2001, the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) chaired a tripartite Palestinian-Israeli-United States security committee that coordinated security cooperation between the conflict parties. However, the Bush administration in 2001 decided to end the CIA’s quasi-diplomatic function on the ground, in line with its policy of disengaging the United States from direct involvement in the conflict. The British government made efforts to fill the vacuum left by the United States: In 2003 and 2004, the United Kingdom delivered technical assistance to the PNA Special Forces—which had not been involved in confrontations with the IDF—in order to strengthen Palestinian ‘‘counterterrorism’’ capacities; the United Kingdom also helped the PNA to establish two ‘‘antiterror’’ operations rooms in Ramallah and Gaza. 12. PNA Ministerial Reform Committee, Reform Coordination Support Unit, Overview of Palestinian Governmental Reform, June 2002—February

................. 16928$

CH13

09-09-08 08:23:01

PS

PAGE 251

252

ROLAND FRIEDRICH

2003, February 16, 2003, 3. From 1994 to 2002, Arafat had held both the position of the PNA president and the minister of interior. 13. This dimension of the agreement was spelled out in the following way: ‘‘Security: •

Palestinians declare an unequivocal end to violence and terrorism and undertake visible efforts on the ground to arrest, disrupt, and restrain individuals and groups conducting and planning violent attacks on Israelis anywhere. • Rebuilt and refocused Palestinian Authority security apparatus begins sustained, targeted, and effective operations aimed at confronting all those engaged in terror and dismantlement of terrorist capabilities and infrastructure. This includes commencing confiscation of illegal weapons and consolidation of security authority, free of association with terror and corruption.’’

A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, April 30, 2003. 14. The quartet in late January 2006 adopted a set of conditions that the Hamas government had to meet for the resumption of donor aid: commitment to nonviolence, recognition of Israel, and the acceptance of all previous agreements between the parties. (Quartet Statement S031/06, London, January 30, 2006.) These conditions were to a large extent congruent with the official Israeli demands toward the new PNA government. 15. Both the positions of the chief of staff and the director-general of Internal Security had been vacant until then. 16. Amos Harel, ‘‘Israel thwarting Hamas effort to set up West Bank security force,’’ Haaretz, October 26, 2006. 17. Aluf Benn, ‘‘U.S. arming and training PA guard against Hamas,’’ Haaretz, October 31, 2006. 18. Interviews, Ramallah/Gaza, October 24, 2006. 19. See DCAF/PASSIA, ‘‘Workshop on Security Sector Reform—Summary Report,’’ in DCAF/PASSIA, Palestinian Security Sector Governance, Challenges and Prospects (Ramallah: 2006), 19–21. 20. ADCAF/IUED (Institute for Development Studies, University of Geneva) survey conducted in May 2006—the time when the Hamas government took over power—found widespread support to SSR. Around 90 percent of the interviewees demanded reforms such as the improvement of training standards in the PNA security forces, more human rights training, the unification of services, stronger executive control, and more parliamentary oversight. See DCAF/IUED, Government Change and Security Sector Governance: Palestinian Public Perceptions, Summary Report (Geneva: August 3, 2006), 20–22 (http://www.dcaf.ch/mena/Palestine_Sec_Perceptions.pdf). 21. See for instance Ghazi Hamad, The Challenge for Hamas—Establishing Transparency and Accountability, Geneva, April 27, 2006, http://www.dcaf.ch/_docs/hamad-challenges-for-hamas.pdf.

Bibliography Friedrich, Roland. ‘‘The Palestinian Predicament: Security Governance in the Absence of Statehood.’’ Challenges to Security Sector Governance in the

................. 16928$

CH13

09-09-08 08:23:02

PS

PAGE 252

253

PALESTINE

Middle East, ed. Arnold Luethold and Rami Khoury. (Geneva: Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2006. ———. Security Sector Reform in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Jerusalem: PASSIA, 2004. Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)/Graduate Institute for Development Studies (IUED). Government Change and Security Sector Governance: Palestinian Public Perceptions, Summary Report. Geneva, August 3, 2006. http://www.dcaf.ch/mena/Palestine_Sec_Percep tions.pdf. Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)/Palestinian Academy for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA). ‘‘Workshop on Security Sector Reform—Summary Report.’’ Palestinian Security Sector Governance, Challenges and Prospects. Ramallah: DCAF/PASSIA, 2006, 11–28. Hamad Ghazi. The Challenge for Hamas—Establishing Transparency and Accountability. Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), April 27, 2006. http://www.dcaf.ch/_docs/hamad-challenges-forhamas.pdf. International Crisis Group (ICG). Who governs the West Bank? Palestinian Administration under Israeli Occupation. Amman/Washington, September 28, 2004. Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. September 28, 1995. PNA Ministerial Reform Committee, Reform Coordination Support Unit. Overview of Palestinian Governmental Reform, June 2002–February 2003. February 16, 2003. Sayigh, Yezid, and Khalil Shikaki. Strengthening Palestinian Public Institutions. Independent Task Force Report. New York, 1999. Strategic Assessments Initiative (SAI). Planning Considerations for International Involvement in the Palestinian Security Sector. Washington, 2005.

................. 16928$

CH13

09-09-08 08:23:02

PS

PAGE 253

South Africa: A Case Study in Institution Building Susan Booysen Abstract

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA PLAYED A CRUCIAL ROLE

in facilitating the transition from multifaceted conflict to a system that symbolizes victory over the past. Yet, the post-1994 dispensation has done more than symbolize victory: it has also helped create a culture of reconciliation and inclusivity. By the mid-2000s, conflict had been definitively resolved, and the victory over apartheid had become consolidated. This chapter tracks both the initial institutions and related processes that concretized the negotiated settlement and the institutional changes in the subsequent period. These changes followed in the wake of the overwhelmingly successful settlement and were in tune with the general acceptance of the new democratic order. In the period since the transitional period of the early to mid1990s, the institutions have proven durable and have been providing a framework for the channeling of continuing tensions. The popularly endorsed and democratically elected institutions have so far withstood periods of vigorous debate about their appropriateness and success in terms of living out South Africa’s 1994 democratic ideal, including affecting complete socioeconomic transformation. In the period since South Africa’s transition to democracy in 1994, South Africa has been described as a stable, consolidated democracy, and the process as a successful transition. The success of South Africa’s post-1994 political institutions can be attributed to four sets of factors. The first is the inclusiveness, thoroughness, and democratic ethos of the negotiation period of 1990–93. The negotiation process created the blueprint for both the political and judicial institutions, anchored the new dispensation in a justiciable constitution,1 and turned South Africa 254

................. 16928$

CH14

09-09-08 08:22:57

PS

PAGE 254

SOUTH AFRICA: A CASE STUDY IN INSTITUTION BUILDING

255

into a constitutional state. The second is the ‘‘miracle election’’ of 1994. In itself the election legitimized and ordained the negotiated dispensation. It provided the seal of widespread popular endorsement of the negotiations, which had created the democratic institutions. The third was the fact that, while in the subsequent decade of democratic governance the political institutions were elaborated and experienced crucial shifts that moved power from the legislative to the executive domain, the powerful executive would continuously be justified in terms of fulfilling the popular mandate. Government created supplementary institutions to facilitate institutional credibility through capacity and process building that would demonstrate the ability of institutions to deliver tangible results. The fourth factor, cutting across the preceding three factors, was that of the definitive and growing popular mandate that the African National Congress (ANC) received through elections. In the three sets of national and provincial elections of 1994, 1999, and 2004 the ANC increased its popular mandate. Opposition was exercised either within the ANC tripartite alliance, or through small opposition parties. The system retained high levels of legitimacy. Reconciliation and inclusion in South Africa inevitably affected state power, and the measures put in place to limit the power of both central government and the highly dominant former liberation movement, the ANC. Whereas South Africa’s earlier post-settlement phases had explicit conciliatory characteristics, the implicit controls on the power of the ruling party (which were also agreed in the period of transition) had the function of ensuring that minorities and the departing regime would feel assured of a continued place in the sun. Over time, the checks on the power of the ruling party have also performed a secondary role of conflict mediation. They have contributed to ensuring accountability, a relatively corruptionfree government, and quality checks on governance. These checks also help ensure that the voters find evidence of credible government efforts to advance the quality of socioeconomic life, despite many frustrations. As South Africa’s democracy progressed into its second decade, there was a scaling down of the explicit reconciliatory and inclusive dimensions of the earlier settlement phase. Most of these changing dimensions were related to an evolving political culture—one in which reconciliation and settlement actions by the government and governing party moved beyond reassurance and into a more assertive phase of postconflict entrenchment of

................. 16928$

CH14

09-09-08 08:22:57

PS

PAGE 255

256

SUSAN BOOYSEN

the new regime. This phase was accompanied by the absorption of remaining fragments of the former ruling party, the National Party (NP, later the New NP), into the structures of the ANC. The point of departure in this chapter is, therefore, that, whereas many of South Africa’s political institutions continue to evolve, the constitutional dispensation of the early to mid1990s laid the foundation for inclusive and legitimate institutions. These institutions withstood many of the tensions and pressures that continued to prevail in the years after the democratic elections of 1994. A strong belief in the relevance and pertinence of the institutions helped ensure that needs and frustrations would not only be channeled through the architecture of these institutions, but also that South Africans would turn to institutions in times of political turmoil. It was the strength of these institutions that first helped stabilize South Africa’s democracy in the fragile years following 1994. It was also the continued legitimacy of its institutions of governance that has helped bridge the second phase of institutional consolidation, namely that of retaining the esteem of institutions and the associated political processes in times of continuous policy deficits—in particular, the persistent gap between popular expectations and realization of effective policy implementation. The South African case confirmed, first, the primacy of a definitive and legitimate political settlement by launching a process of institutionalized channeling of political aspirations. Second, it demonstrated that the legitimacy of political institutions requires continuous work, for example, in the adaptation of institutions and in projects to ensure the continuous legitimation of the changing balance of power between the sets of political institutions. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to exploring the centrality of the constitution in stabilizing and anchoring political life in South Africa. Thereafter, it explores each of the institutional levers of elections, the legislature, the executive, judiciary, and devolution and the role they have played in building political stability in South Africa as a post-conflict country.

Constitutional Anchors and Phases in Institutional Development The Constitution of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 forms the essential documentary base of the postconflict institutional

................. 16928$

CH14

09-09-08 08:22:58

PS

PAGE 256

SOUTH AFRICA: A CASE STUDY IN INSTITUTION BUILDING

257

landscape in South Africa. The Interim Constitution of 1993 was the basis on which the final 1996 constitution was built. It was certified by the Constitutional Court on December 4, 1996, and came into effect on February 3, 1997. Not only did the document encapsulate the standard set of institutions that constitute the typical three branches of government, it also laid the groundwork for the so-called Chapter 9 institutions and the Constitutional Court. The 1993 and 1996 constitutions simultaneously articulate the liberation-transition-reconciliation culture that took hold in the mid-1990s. The popular reverence for the constitution as a document that guarantees rights and transformation became more subdued in the decade of the 2000s. Yet, the significance of the constitution as part of the ‘constitutional state’’ continued as part of a check on the power of the governing party and state. The constitution’s detailed specification of South Africa’s political institutions sets the groundwork for, and also defines the relations between, the branches of the state. However, there has been substantial institutional elaboration in the subsequent decade. The intricate set of institutions within the executive branch, and in particular in the presidency and the extensions to the cabinet structures and transformation of local government, are cases in point. These changes were initiated under the tutelage of President Thabo Mbeki (from 1999). The institutional focus has evolved since the 1990–94 settlement. At first, there was an emphasis on elections and parliament as the main embodiments of settlement. In this first period, roughly from 1994 until 1999, the mood was overwhelmingly inclusive, reconciliatory, and strongly protransformation. These sentiments were enduring, unifying forces. In the subsequent period, since 1999, the gains and victories of transition became entrenched. There was less need for continuing the process of reconciliation and peace-building between racial groups, cultural groups, and former apartheid apologists. Instead, the major concern became the rapid advancement of socioeconomic transformation. In pursuit of this transformation, the primary institutional emphasis shifted from the legislative to the political and bureaucratic formations of the executive—both the ‘‘political executive’’ (cabinet, the presidency, and its associated institutions) and the bureaucratic executive (civil service, and in particular the local government bureaucratic apparatuses). These institutions were revised and elaborated, all in an effort to give effect to a second layer of the consolidation of democracy. As

................. 16928$

CH14

09-09-08 08:22:59

PS

PAGE 257

258

SUSAN BOOYSEN

South Africa’s quest for the further realization of democracy, effective governance, and socioeconomic transformation continues, it is both institutions and policy outcomes that come under pressure.

Elections The constitutional negotiations in the period 1990–93 were complemented by a series of maneuvers to ensure inclusivity. For example, the continuing violence in parts of the province of KwaZulu-Natal required ongoing negotiations to bring the recalcitrant Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) on board. Furthermore, in the province of the North-West, right-wing forces aligned with one of the outgoing Bantustan regimes in an attempt to create an insurrection and challenge the transition. This uncoordinated rebellion was thwarted, and the IFP was brought into the electoral process a week before the April 1994 elections. Also in the final week before the polls, the ANC provincial headquarters in Gauteng were bombed, raising fears of the sustainability of the electoral process, but the process proved incontrovertible. The 1994 elections continue to be described in terms of ‘‘a miracle’’ in the process of transition. The turnout was estimated at 86 percent (see fig. 14.1). By all accounts, this powerful electoral ‘‘moment’’ eclipsed pockets of residual resistance. Popular support for elections has been sustained in a series of national and provincial (concurrent) and local elections (following in fiveyear cycles the year after the national-provincial elections) throughout the period since 1994. The electoral system on national and provincial levels, namely that of proportional representation on the closed-list system, was an essential part of the success of both the negotiations and the subsequent elections.2 It ensured that all political parties would have representation that was proportionate to their provincial and national levels of popular support. There was no minimum threshold of support, beyond the criterion that 0.25 percent of support would guarantee one seat in the fourhundred-member National Assembly.3 The national and provincial elections launched South Africa’s democracy and its associated institutions. Elections and multipartyism are constitutionally guaranteed. Elections generated a sense of popular ownership of government. Simultaneously, the extent of support for this democratic lever bestowed further legitimacy on the process. By the mid-2000s, elections continued

................. 16928$

CH14

09-09-08 08:22:59

PS PAGE 258

SOUTH AFRICA: A CASE STUDY IN INSTITUTION BUILDING

259

to play an integrative political role. Despite the fact that it was widely acknowledged that Parliament had become weakened as a result of the concentration of effective power in the executive, South African elections retained their character as events that affirmed the transition and rewarded the liberation party, the ANC. The potency of the 1994 elections was that they reflected the strength of the liberation movement while also guaranteeing political space for the other parties. In the first decade and a half of democracy opposition parties were both a symbol of multiparty diversity and an indication of the tolerance of diversity. Opposition political parties embraced multipartyism. For example, in the 2004 election twenty-one parties contested the national elections and ten won representation. Even if most of these parties have the status of microparties of less than 2 percent of national support (see table 1), they take great pride in having increases—even marginal—in their support levels. While opposition parties would frequently be critical of governing party failures, electoral contestation had in effect become the only game in town. Whereas the institutions for national and provincial government were mapped in the multiparty negotiating process of the early 1990s, local government elections and institutions lagged behind. Transitional institutions preceded the 1995–96 set of local government elections. Legislation to regulate the final form of local government was adopted in the late 1990s. The local level electoral system deviates from that of national and provincial elections in that half the councillors for each of the 283 municipalities are elected in terms of proportional representation, and the other half in terms of the local ward system. Local government in South Africa is dominated by the ANC. Yet, in many localities, particularly in the provinces of the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal, the two main opposition parties, the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Inkatha Freedom party (IFP), do control a number of councils. Multipartyism and representation of a range of community and resident associations, as well as independent candidates that gained representation prevail in most local councils, leaving space for expression of critiques of policies and governance.

Legislature Owing to its direct links with the liberation election, the Parliament of South Africa became the immediate and most visible

................. 16928$

CH14

09-09-08 08:22:59

PS PAGE 259

................. 16928$

CH14

09-09-08 08:23:00

PS

PAGE 260

0

7

—

9

2

82

—

—

43

7

252

Seats

Estimated 86%

No voters’ roll applies (estimated at 22.7 million)

19,533,498

0.82

1.25

—

2.17

0.45

20.39

—

—

10.54

1.73

62.65

Percentage (%)

246,000

113,000

125,000

127,000

229,000

1.1 m

—

547,000

1.4 m

1.5 m

10.6 m

Votes

89%

18,355,224

15,977,142

1.56

0.71

0.78

0.80

1.43

6.87

—

3.42

8.58

9.56

66.35

Percentage (%)

Second Election 1999

5

3

3

3

6

28

—

14

34

38

266

Seats

210,000

114,000

118,000

140,000

250,000

258,000

270,000

356,000

1.1 m

1.9 m

10.9 m

Votes

76%

20,674,926

15,612,667

1.34

0.73

0.75

0.89

1.60

1.65

1.73

2.28

6.97

12.37

69.68

Percentage (%)

0

3

3

4

6

7

7

9

28

50

279

Seats

Decade of Democracy Election 2004

Acronyms: ACDP: African Christian Democratic Party; ANC: African National Congress; DA: Democratic Alliance; DP: Democratic Party; FF(): Freedom Front (Plus); ID: Independent Democrats; IFP: Inkatha Freedom Party; (N)NP: (New) National Party; PAC: Pan Africanist Congress; UDM: United Democratic Movement Select sources: Reynolds 1994; Lodge 1999; Electoral Institute 2006; table compiled by author.

Turnout

Registered electorate

Total valid votes

159,000

Other parties

—

UCDP 244,000

425,000

FF/ FF

PAC

88,000

ACDP

4.0 m

—

ID

NP / NNP

—

2.1 m

338,000

1222 m

Votes

UDM

IFP

DP / DA

ANC

Party

Founding Election 1994

South Africa Three Parliamentary Elections, 1994–2004

SOUTH AFRICA: A CASE STUDY IN INSTITUTION BUILDING

261

embodiment of the negotiated settlement and the victory over the apartheid past. Its composition reflected both the inclusiveness of the settlement and the victory of the formerly subjugated. Its chambers’ membership included many of the luminaries of both the internal and the external struggles for South Africa’s liberation. In many respects, Parliament became synonymous with both transition and reconciliation. With its legitimacy beyond reproach it instituted public outreach programs and public hearings to enhance public participation and interest, and solicit specialist input into legislative and policy programs.4 The Parliament of South Africa is a bicameral institution comprising the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces (NCOP). The National Assembly has four hundred members, elected by popular vote under a system of closed-list proportional representation to serve five-year terms. Parliament has been characterized by two trends that directly impacted on its role in stabilizing and consolidating South Africa’s democracy. First, the ruling ANC has—over its three consecutive terms—consolidated its majority, which grew from 63 percent in 1994 to 70 percent in 2004. The ANC’s parliamentary growth was a result of elections, floor-crossing, and incorporation of the National Party (NP).5 Second, despite the continued ascendancy of the ANC, Parliament has been strong in its multiparty character. Opposition are guaranteed speaking times; the opportunity to raise issues that challenge government; representation in committees; and freedom of speech. Even if opposition parties have no current prospects of replacing the governing party, they have a place in parliamentary politics. Opposition parties are recognized for their watchdog role over both the executive and Parliament. In the period following the implementation of the final constitution in early 1997, the senate was disbanded and replaced by the NCOP. NCOP members are indirectly elected. The NCOP has ninety seats—consisting of ten members elected for fiveyear terms by each of the nine provincial legislatures. The NCOP also includes a delegation from the South African Local Government Association (Salga). Salga’s ten nonvoting representatives are chosen from the country’s nine provincial local government associations. The NCOP has powers to protect regional interests, including the safeguarding of cultural and linguistic traditions among ethnic minorities. The NCOP therefore ensures that the nine provinces—with their relatively diverse

................. 16928$

CH14

09-09-08 08:23:00

PS

PAGE 261

262

SUSAN BOOYSEN

identities, cultures, and economic interests—as well as local government, have a voice in Parliament. The NCOP may not carry the institutional esteem of the National Assembly, but legislation has been referred back to the National Assembly because of NCOP concerns. Over time, Parliament has suffered a decline in not only the seniority of its members but also their skills as parliamentarians (especially in the ranks of the ANC).6 After the first term of 1994–99, Parliament underwent a relative ‘‘juniorization’’ as talented parliamentarians were appointed to other parts of government, including the diplomatic service, the parastatals, and provincial governments. Others went into the non-governmental and business sectors. These processes negatively affected the legislature’s standing in relation to the executive. There is a debate in South Africa over the electoral system, with proponents of change hoping for a new system that will encourage accountability and lessen the distance between communities and their representatives. Whereas the entire government shares responsibility for not effectively countering poverty, it is often Parliament that is held accountable for this lack of improvement and the electoral system is blamed by some as a reason for this.

Parliamentary Committees Parliamentary committees make a variable contribution to the inclusive and conciliatory impact of South Africa’s legislative institutions. Although the majority status of the ANC in Parliament is widely asserted, it is standard parliamentary practice to have opposition party representation on parliamentary committees. As a result, some opposition parties, and in particular the DA, have earned cross-party respect for their activities in this regard. Parliamentary committees, however, suffer from the reputation of being ineffectual owing to both the lack of expertise and seniority of their members and large committee workloads. ANC members are also inclined to act deferentially to senior members of the ANC parliamentary caucus and executive. These factors impact negatively on the committees’ ability to exercise parliamentary oversight. Committees are highly dependent on national government departments to assist them in briefing and drafting documents. This results in external groups

................. 16928$

CH14

09-09-08 08:23:01

PS

PAGE 262

SOUTH AFRICA: A CASE STUDY IN INSTITUTION BUILDING

263

and organizations in lobbying activities often bypassing Parliament in favor of the executive.7 The ruling party has largely maintained the convention of having the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (Scopa) chaired by one of the opposition parties. This practice has nevertheless become less prevalent because the chair was taken away from the DA and awarded to opposition parties that were less robust in their critiques of the ruling party. Scopa has contributed to a sense of independent oversight of financial matters in government.8 In this function, Scopa relies on the regular audits of state finances by the auditor-general, one of the Chapter 9 institutions. This has helped sustain the credibility of government and has strengthened public perceptions of a relatively corruption-free government. Such perceptions are crucial to the longterm credibility and legitimacy of Parliament.

Chapter 9 Institutions Chapter 9 of the Constitution defines the state institutions that ‘‘strengthen constitutional democracy in the Republic.’’9 These institutions include the Auditor-General (AG), the Human Rights Commission (HRC), the Electoral Commission (IEC), the Public Protector, the Commission for Gender Equality, and the Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious, and Linguistic Communities. They provide checks and balances on the legislature and executive, and are also accountable to the National Assembly. The main function of the Public Protector is to ensure that public institutions serve private citizens and institutions and operate in an equitable way. The task of the Human Rights Commission is to promote a culture of human rights. It monitors government departments and other public institutions in areas that include housing, social security, education, and the provision of water and food. The Electoral Commission facilitates and manages all government elections. It has been highly effective in ensuring the management of free and credible elections—partly through the facilitation of continuous cooperation with and from all political parties. The Auditor-General audits the accounts of national and provincial departments, as well as those of municipalities and may report on the financial affairs of any institution that receives public money.10 The Auditor-General is independent, transparent, and accountable11 and has been

................. 16928$

CH14

09-09-08 08:23:01

PS

PAGE 263

264

SUSAN BOOYSEN

effective in keeping a check on the management of state finances. Whereas the Chapter 9 institutions are independent and subject ‘‘only to the Constitution and the law,’’ they have delivered uneven performances. On occasion, this has been attributed to insufficient capacity, or inability to stand up to political principles. By the mid-2000s, this vulnerability had been demonstrated by two developments—the appointment of a new Auditor-General who was widely seen as less assertive than his predecessor, and parliamentary hearings (initiated by the executive) on whether the Chapter 9 institutions should be rationalized.

Executive The inclusive nature of the executive level institutional arrangements for the 1994 South African government helped ensure acceptability of the new order. The 1994 dispensation entailed a powerful multiparty executive, in the form of the Government of National Unity (GNU). At the top level, the executive comprised the president and two executive deputy presidents. Under the terms of the Interim Constitution of 1993 the deputy presidents came from the two largest parties in Parliament. The two deputy presidents were thus drawn from the ANC and the NP. The constitution prescribed the matters on which the president had to consult them. The Interim Constitution also prescribed that any party holding twenty seats in the National Assembly (or 5 percent of national support), which participated in the GNU, was entitled to one or more cabinet portfolios.12 In 1994, the ANC became the largest party in the GNU. The former political prisoner Nelson Mandela became the president. The NP became the junior partner in the GNU, and the former president F. W. de Klerk became one of the two deputy presidents. Thabo Mbeki (the future president) became the second deputy president of the 1994 dispensation. The power shift from the NP to the ANC became a symbol of the transition and settlement. The GNU arrangement with the NP, however, lasted for a limited period. By 1998, the NP became the New National Party (NNP), repositioned itself as opposition and withdrew from the GNU. The final constitution of 1996 abandoned the formal GNU

................. 16928$

CH14

09-09-08 08:23:01

PS

PAGE 264

SOUTH AFRICA: A CASE STUDY IN INSTITUTION BUILDING

265

provisions, but parts of the practice were continued on an informal level. For example, a nonexecutive deputy presidency and cabinet positions were offered to the IFP. The IFP declined both. A deputy president was then appointed from the ranks of the ANC. Other GNU features were that a member of the Azanian People’s Organization (Azapo) was included in the cabinet, and, when the NNP in the aftermath of the 2004 election merged with the ANC while retaining its NNP identity for a further two years, it was given a cabinet portfolio. Formal aspects of the institutional arrangements of the executive include that the president is the head of state and government, and the cabinet and deputy president are appointed by the president.13 The president is indirectly elected by Parliament, and will therefore automatically be the candidate of the majority party. In South Africa’s first thirteen years of democracy it was accepted that the president of the ANC would become the ANC’s candidate for the presidency of the country. The fiveyearly national elective conferences of the ANC elect the president of the ANC. The ANC elections precede the national elections by approximately a year and a half. The South African case (as in most parliamentary systems) epitomizes the power of the executive over Parliament.14 In the first term of the democratically elected parliament, 1994–99, Parliament was reasonably successful as a counter to the power of the executive. However, in 1999, the ANC leadership became dispersed and redeployed to positions in provincial governments, parastatals, and the private sector. This consolidated the power of the executive over the legislature. During the Mandela presidency of 1994–99, the position of president became the focal point of politics. This was in part due to Mandela’s combination of status, power and charisma. Yet, even in the Mandela era, the then Deputy President Thabo Mbeki effectively managed government. Mbeki succeeded Mandela in 1999 and created an elaborate institutionalized presidency to integrate and coordinate government action in pursuit of effective policy making and implementation. Also located in the presidency is an expansive system of cabinet clusters, cabinet committees, and further cabinet support systems.15 As part of its mandate, the Mbeki government initiated civil service and cabinet portfolio restructuring to effect better coordination and integration of policy making and implementation. One of the major and ongoing initiatives that emerged in the mid-2000s was to create so-called superministries16 that would

................. 16928$

CH14

09-09-08 08:23:02

PS

PAGE 265

266

SUSAN BOOYSEN

link and coordinate related cabinet portfolios. Within the presidency, cabinet clusters had already been created, linking, for example, cabinet portfolios in the social sector, the economic sector, or the governance and administration sector into units that coordinate all aspects of policy. The potentially conciliatory and integrative functions of the cabinet extend beyond its structure and multiparty composition. Through its operations, which include the adoption of policies and national decisionmaking, the presidency and cabinet continuously reinforce political settlement. From approximately 2000 on, the executive has assertively balanced continuous reconciliation with efforts to consolidate power and the political victory. Presidency and ‘‘Makgotla’’ Much of the institutional action for policy coordination within a system of integrated governance17—the system that was implemented in the Mbeki era—was either located within the office of the presidency, or was directed from this nerve center. With respect to institutions and mechanisms reaching outward from the presidency, the emphasis was on the ministerial and director-general levels, where the action was to coordinate and provide stimuli for provincial and local government to ‘‘pull implementation together,’’ and on linkages between the spheres of government to ensure articulation and integration of policy initiatives. By 2007, the policy structures within the presidency were the powerhouse of policymaking. Whereas in 2001 strong trends of centralization and the reorganization of the presidency and cabinet clusters were emerging, these tendencies were consolidated and elaborated later.18 The cabinet and presidency are both interconnected and interdependent, as illustrated through the operation of Makgotla. The term refers to the cabinet meetings of January and July in each year, where members are joined by the president’s advisers and the departmental directors-general (the latter since 2004) to discuss essential issues of governance and policy, often on the basis of research by the Policy Coordination and Advisory Services (PCAS) and the Forum of South African Directors-General (FOSAD). Both these institutions were located in the presidency. Provincial premiers and directors-general were for the first time included in the cabinet Lekgotla of July 2005. Select local government representation followed soon thereafter. These moves

................. 16928$

CH14

09-09-08 08:23:02

PS

PAGE 266

SOUTH AFRICA: A CASE STUDY IN INSTITUTION BUILDING

267

were part of the effort to extend the coordination of the functions of national, provincial, and local government.

Judiciary South Africa’s judiciary, and in particular the Constitutional Court, were at the heart of the negotiated settlement. In the early 1990s, this judicial centrality helped provide assurances to the abdicating regime that it would retain recourse to the law, should the settlement not work out politically. South Africa has a justiciable constitution, and the constitution empowers the judiciary to uphold the constitution. The fact that the courts were empowered to ‘‘interpret and uphold the rights guaranteed in the Constitution against violation by organs of the state and, in some circumstances, private bodies’’ meant that the new dispensation brought a fundamental change in the role of the judiciary,19 enacting the principle of constitutional supremacy.20 The Constitutional Court was established to give effect to the supremacy of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, which is also contained in the Constitution. The Constitutional Court has the power to declare legislation and government action unconstitutional, should it conflict with the constitution.21 The Constitution provides that everyone has access to the courts. Judicial authority in South Africa is vested in the courts, and the courts are independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law, which they are required to apply without ‘‘fear, favor or prejudice.’’22 The courts are the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal, the High Courts, the Magistrates’ Courts, and any other court established or recognized by an Act of Parliament. These institutions are supplemented by the Judicial Services Commission. The commission exercises significant powers through its constitutionally assigned function to ‘‘advise national government on any matter relating to the judiciary or the administration of justice.’’23 These judicial powers mean that there is a recognized and constitutionally legitimated counterforce of power among the branches of government. The transformation of South Africa’s judiciary has not been as clearly demarcated as that of the executive and legislature. Whereas the Judicial Services Commission has contributed to changes in the racial and gender composition of the judiciary, the transformation of the judiciary, and in particular the coun-

................. 16928$

CH14

09-09-08 08:23:03

PS

PAGE 267

268

SUSAN BOOYSEN

try’s lower level court system, has not been definitive. Consequently, there has been widespread debate, especially in the period since 2000, that supplementary measures are required. These debates escalated in the period of 2005–7, when the government threatened intervention in the right to appoint judges, eliciting fears that the separation of powers between the executive and the judiciary might be compromised.

Devolution In South Africa, the three government ‘‘spheres,’’ namely national, provincial, and local, share responsibility for governance through ‘‘cooperative governance.’’24 Cooperative governance defines the spheres of government as being distinctive, interdependent and interrelated. In terms of the negotiated settlement of the early 1990s, the provinces would retain important powers in the new, unitary state with some federal features. The insistence on a measure of devolution was a part of what the outgoing regime’s negotiators hoped would constitute a counter against the incoming ANC. The Constitution specifies all competences that the provinces exercise as either ‘‘exclusive to the provinces’’ or ‘‘concurrent with the national.’’25 The relations between national, provincial, and local government are handled by the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act, 2005. The act specifies that when provinces develop policies or draft legislation that affect the local sphere of government, the provincial government is obligated to take into account national priorities and the interest of local communities in the province, and the local sphere must be consulted in the process. Provincial government South Africa’s nine provinces constitute the first level of devolution, and are also a tangible reminder of transition and transformation toward the country’s democratic dispensation. The provinces (Eastern Cape, Free State, Gauteng, KwaZuluNatal, Mpumalanga, North-West, Northern Cape, Northern Province—now Limpopo—and Western Cape) substituted the apartheid dispensation’s four provinces and ten Bantustans, which included four so-called ‘‘independent’’ homeland states. The integration and stabilization of the array of preceding inter-

................. 16928$

CH14

09-09-08 08:23:03

PS

PAGE 268

SOUTH AFRICA: A CASE STUDY IN INSTITUTION BUILDING

269

mediary-level institutions into the nine provincial administrations was a formidable task. Provincial government in South Africa consists of the provincial executive, which includes the provincial executive council and the premier, and the provincial legislatures, which range in size, depending on the size of the provincial population.26 Each of the provinces has an expansive provincial administration. An uneasy relationship has developed between the national and provincial governments. The provinces have largely remained functionally problematic. Only a handful of the provinces, especially Gauteng and the Western Cape, have gained reputations for effective governance, including spending allocated budgets and implementing policy programs. At one stage in 2005, there was a strong national executive initiative to reconstitute provinces into administrative units, instead of their prevailing political, executive, and administrative configuration. By early 2006, the strategy had settled on action within existing constitutional configurations of intergovernmental relations, but with enhanced emphasis on ‘‘cooperative task-team interventions.’’27 The Intergovernmental Relations Act, amendments to the Public Service Act and the Municipal Employees Bill ‘‘would enable government to set goals from the centre, monitor administration and exercise overall supervision of provincial government.’’ In the early years of South Africa’s democracy, two of the nine provinces remained under control of opposition parties. In the Western Cape it was the NP and the DA—although the precise configurations varied in terms of coalitions and floor-crossing. In KwaZulu-Natal, it was the IFP that controlled the provincial government. These two provincial enclaves of opposition control were important for the stabilization of the new democratic institutions. It demonstrated that the national-level government was tolerant and would respect electoral verdicts. In due course, however, two changes took effect. As a result of these provinces providing effective opposition platforms, there was assertive campaigning to gain electoral majorities in the ‘‘two remaining’’ provinces. Second, in the Western Cape the governing party used the mechanisms of electoral alliance with the dying NP and floor-crossing to establish its provincial dominance. In the more volatile KwaZulu-Natal, the ANC treaded gently. Despite gaining an outright provincial legislature majority through floorcrossing, it refrained from ousting the IFP in the run-up to the 2004 election. In both provinces in the subsequent 2004 elec-

................. 16928$

CH14

09-09-08 08:23:04

PS

PAGE 269

270

SUSAN BOOYSEN

tions, the ANC did gain the electoral majority. In KwaZuluNatal, it retained the system of executive power-sharing with the IFP up to 2006. To ANC supporters, these victories symbolized the near-final defeat of the old order. By 2007 and in the face of a decline of ANC support in the Western Cape, the ANC debated a reconfiguration of provincial boundaries, including those of the Western Cape. Local government Local government in South Africa was the last of three spheres to take shape. The first democratic local government elections of 1995–96 followed an interim phase of appointed local government. New local government legislative frameworks only followed in the late 1990s. Local government transition, therefore, only consolidated some time after the national and provincial. It has also remained vulnerable to a new generation of conflict, namely that which results from persistent difficulties in bringing more definitive service delivery and change in basic conditions of life at the grassroots level. These problems resulted in widespread local government protests from 2004 to 2007. In reaction to the protests, government strengthened efforts to ensure that local government would be more effective and viable than it had been in the first decade of South Africa’s democracy.28 The basic structure of local government follows the lines of metropolitan, urban and rural. The urban and rural councils are joined in District Councils. The Constitution determines that local governments shall be assigned such functions as may be necessary to provide services for the maintenance and promotion of the well-being of the community.29 It shall also receive the executive powers necessary to allow it to function effectively. The Municipal Structures Act of 1998 established the criteria for the category of municipality to be established in a particular area. Local governments have a degree of choice, for example, on the executive level they can choose whether to have an ‘‘executive committee system’’ (a small group of persons with the status of a minicabinet) or an ‘‘executive mayor system’’ (one person at times assisted by a mayoral committee). Local government in South Africa is also assigned a particular developmental role. In terms of the Municipal Systems Act of 2000, there are particular requirements of community participation and performance management.

................. 16928$

CH14

09-09-08 08:23:05

PS

PAGE 270

SOUTH AFRICA: A CASE STUDY IN INSTITUTION BUILDING

271

‘‘Project Consolidate,’’ launched in 2004, was the national government initiative to try to turn around underperforming local governments. It focused on capacity building to enhance local-level service delivery. This initiative was crucial, given the necessity to sustain belief in the institutions of local government to deliver on their part of the democracy deal. The 2004 local protests showed that the entrenchment of multiparty democracy and voting does not preclude protest. Indeed, the protests were a reminder that low levels of conflict can coexist with legitimate political and electoral institutions. By late 2006, none of the 139 municipalities that had required assistance in terms of Project Consolidate had graduated from the project.30

Conclusion This chapter demonstrates how the institutional dimensions of South Africa’s post-conflict settlement have contributed to a balance between reconciliation and inclusion, on the one hand, and affirmation that the oppressed had won definitive power, on the other hand. It also indicates the extent to which the political institutions have changed and started facing new sets of challenges in the postsettlement period. In this period, the concrete challenges of governance had to be met. The analysis pointed to the extent to which the old challenges of peace and acceptance of a constitutional dispensation and a new political culture gave way to the challenges of retaining institutional legitimacy. The ‘‘levers’’ of democratic settlement in South Africa that are addressed in this book—elections, the legislature, the executive, judiciary, and devolution—have all undergone substantial change from the time of settlement to the time of writing. Of the five, elections have changed the least. The legislature changed from strong to relatively weak, especially in relation to the executive. The executive changed in two ways. First it changed from a constitutionally obligated Government of National Unity to one that is multiparty only upon invitation of the ANC. Second, it changed from a modest executive operation to an elaborate and highly institutionalized presidency. The judiciary, although having withstood pressure for more executive say in judicial matters, at the time of writing was set to be pressured for more definitive change, especially at the lower levels of administration of justice. Provincial and local government were subject to pressures to turn themselves into more streamlined

................. 16928$

CH14

09-09-08 08:23:05

PS

PAGE 271

272

SUSAN BOOYSEN

and better-managed agencies in policy implementation and socioeconomic transformation. The institutions that helped secure South Africa’s transition from authoritarianism to democracy have done so largely in tandem with changes that have occurred in South Africa’s political culture. The forces of the ancien re´gime had accepted the inevitability of the transition. They fractured or transformed into a range of new political and socio-economic positions and roles. Reconciliation and inclusion—the two anchors of the initial settlement—have largely become a sideshow. More than a decade after settlement, South Africa has a new set of primary challenges. These challenges include pressure to advance socioeconomic development and deal with poverty and unemployment.

Notes 1. Juta Law, 2006, xi–xii. A justiciable constitution empowers the judiciary to uphold the Constitution. The Constitution is also recognized as the supreme law, ‘‘binding all parts of the state, including the legislative majority.’’ South Africa see www.jutastat.co.za. 2. An Electoral Task Team reviewed South Africa’s electoral system from 2002–3, and, by a majority, recommended change. Cabinet decided to follow the minority recommendation to retain the existing system. For an analysis of the process, see Lia Nijzink and Jessica Piombo, ‘‘Parliament and the electoral system: How are South Africans being represented?’’ in Electoral Politics in South Africa, ed. Jessica Piombo and Lia Nijzink (New York, Palgrave, 2005), 74–76. 3. For an analysis of the details of the electoral system, see Tom Lodge, Consolidating Democracy: South Africa’s Second Popular Election (Johannesburg: Wits University Press), 19–53. 4. Richard Calland, Anatomy of South Africa: Who Holds the Power? (Cape Town: Struik, 2006), 85–97. 5. Susan Booysen, ‘‘The Will of the Parties versus the Will of the People? Defections, Elections and Alliances in South Africa,’’ Party Politics 12, no. 6 (2006). 6. Calland, Anatomy of South Africa, 97–102. 7. Nic Dawes, ‘‘MPs seek new powers,’’ Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg), July 28, 2006. 8. Mpulelo Mkhabela, ‘‘MPs throw weight behind Scopa,’’ City Press (Johannesburg), November 12, 2006. 9. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Chap. 9, Art. 181. 10. Department of Public Service and Administration (Government of South Africa), The machinery of government: Structure and functions of government (Pretoria: Government Printer, 2003), 23–25. 11. Shauket Fakie, ‘‘The Auditor-General’s good governance: independence,

................. 16928$

CH14

09-09-08 08:23:06

PS

PAGE 272

SOUTH AFRICA: A CASE STUDY IN INSTITUTION BUILDING

273

transparency and accountability,’’ New Agenda, Issue 21 (First Quarter, 2006), in interview with Ben Turok, 9–15. 12. Juta’s Statutes Editors, The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Cape Town: Juta, 2006), Annexure B, 186–92. 13. The cabinet consists of the president as head of cabinet, the deputy president, and ministers. The president is free to select any number of members of the National Assembly to serve as cabinet members and a maximum of two from outside parliament. The number of cabinet members and deputy ministers has gradually increased over the years, ranging from forty in 1994 to fifty in 2004. 14. For an elaboration of this argument, see Calland, Anatomy of South Africa, 46. 15. Susan Booysen, ‘‘Consolidation of Control in the Centre: Trends in Public Policymaking in South Africa,’’ Journal of Public Administration 41, no. 4 (2006); Presidency of the Republic of South Africa (Cabinet Office), The functioning of the Cabinet, its committees and support systems (Pretoria: Government Printer, 2005). 16. Karima Brown and Vukani Mde, ‘‘ ‘Super-ministry’ for economy on cards,’’ Business Day (Johannesburg), May 12, 2005. 17. Joel Netshitenzhe, ‘‘An integrated approach to government,’’ (seminar, Graduate School of Public & Development Management, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, November 16, 2005). 18. Frank Chikane, interview, Johannesburg, October 25, 2005. 19. Juta’s Statutes Editors, The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, xii–xiii. 20. Rassie Malherbe, ‘‘The legal system and the judiciary’’ in Government and Politics in the New South Africa, ed. Albert Venter and Chris Landsberg (Pretoria: Van Schaik Publishers, 2006), 61–80. 21. Constitution, 1996, Section 172. 22. Department of Public Service and Administration (Government of South Africa), The machinery of government, 20; Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Art. 165. 23. Constitution 1996, Art. 178 (5). 24. Ibid., 3. 25. Ibid., Schedules 4 and 5. 26. For an elaboration, see David Pottie, ‘‘The first five years of provincial government’’ in Election ’99 South Africa: From Mandela to Mbeki ed. Andrew Reyonlds (Oxford: James Currey, 1999), 16–36. 27. Joel Netshitenzhe, ‘‘An integrated approach to government.’’ 28. Susan Booysen, ‘‘With the ballot and the brick . . . The Politics of Service Delivery in South Africa,’’ Progressive Initiatives in Development Studies 7, no. 1 (2007). 29. Constitution 1996, Chap. 7. 30. Minister of Provincial and Local Government, Sydney Mufamadi, quoted in Russel Molefe and Dan Dlamini, City Press (Johannesburg), October 8, 2006.

Bibliography Booysen, Susan. ‘‘Consolidation of Control in the Centre: Trends in Public Policymaking in South Africa.’’ Journal of Public Administration 41, no. 4 (2006).

................. 16928$

CH14

09-09-08 08:23:07

PS

PAGE 273

274

SUSAN BOOYSEN

———. ‘‘The Will of the Parties versus the Will of the People? Defections, Elections and Alliances in South Africa.’’ Party Politics, 12, no. 6 (2006). ———. ‘‘With the ballot and the brick . . . The Politics of Service Delivery in South Africa.’’ Progressive Initiatives in Development Studies 7, no. 1 (2007). Brown, Karima, and Vukani Mde. ‘‘ ‘Super-ministry’ for economy on cards. Business Day, Johannesburg, May 12, 2005. Calland, Richard. Anatomy of South Africa: Who Holds the Power? Cape Town: Struik, 2006. Chikane, Frank. ‘‘An integrated approach to government.’’ Seminar presented at the Graduate School of Public and Development Management, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, November 16, 2005b, unpublished. ———. Interview, Johannesburg, 25 October 25, 2005a. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108, 1996. Dawes, Nic. ‘‘MPs seek new powers.’’ Mail & Guardian, Johannesburg, July 28, 2006. ———. ‘‘Thabo Mbeki axes judges bills.’’ Mail & Guardian, Johannesburg, June 30, 2006. Department of Public Service and Administration (Government of South Africa). ‘‘The machinery of government: Structure and functions of government.’’ Pretoria: Government Printer, 2003. Electoral Institute of South Africa (IEC). www.elections.org.zat. Fakie, Shauket. ‘‘The auditor-general’s good governance: independence, transparency and accountability.’’ New Agenda, Issue 21 (First Quarter, 2006), in interview with Ben Turok. Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200, 1993. Lodge, Tom. Consolidating Democracy: South Africa’s Second Popular Election Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 1999. Malherbe, Rassie. ‘‘The legal system and the judiciary.’’ Government and Politics in the New South Africa. Ed. Albert Venter and Chris Landsberg. Pretoria: Van Schaik Publishers, 2006. Mkhabela, Mpulelo. ‘‘MPs throw weight behind Scopa. City Press, Johannesburg, November 12, 2006. Mufamadi, Sydney. Quoted in Russel Molefe and Dan Dlamini, City Press, Johannesburg, October 8, 2006. Netshitenzhe, Joel. ‘‘An integrated approach to government.’’ Seminar presented at the Graduate School of Public and Development Management, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, November 16, 2005, unpublished. Nijzink, Lia, and Jessica Piombo. ‘‘Parliament and the electoral system: How are South Africans being represented?’’ Electoral Politics in South Africa. Ed. Jessica Piombo and Lia Nijzink. New York: Palgrave, 2005. Pottie, David. ‘‘The first five years of provincial government.’’Election ’99 South Africa: From Mandela to Mbeki. Ed. Andrew Reyoolds. Oxford: James Currey, 1999. Presidency of the Republic of South Africa (Cabinet Office). The functioning of the Cabinet, its committees and support systems. Pretoria: Government Printer, 2005.

................. 16928$

CH14

09-09-08 08:23:07

PS

PAGE 274

SOUTH AFRICA: A CASE STUDY IN INSTITUTION BUILDING

275

Quintal, Angela. ‘‘Judicial reform only when judges agree.’’ Star, Johannesburg, July 31, 2006. Reynolds, Andrew. ‘‘The results.’’ Election ’94 South Africa: Campaigns, Results and Future Prospects. Ed. Andrew Reyonds. London: James Currey, 1994. Robinson, Vicky. ‘‘ANC move to scrap provinces. Mail & Guardian, Johannesburg, July 28, 2006.

................. 16928$

CH14

09-09-08 08:23:08

PS

PAGE 275

South Africa: Security Transformation Gavin Cawthra

SOUTH AFRICA IS WIDELY REGARDED AS A SUCCESSFUL MODEL FOR

what is now known as Security Sector Reform in the context of transitions from authoritarian forms of governance to democratic ones.1 South Africans pioneered this integrated, systematic approach to reform—which they preferred to call transformation—and did it mostly on their own, during as well as after the settlement that led to democratic elections in 1994. They turned around a country gripped by low-level civil war, which was also in conflict with its neighbors and in danger of balkanizing, into a relatively peaceful and stable state, with what is widely regarded as one of the most effective systems of political oversight and control of the security sector in Africa. Despite these positive attributes, progress has been uneven and fragmentary as policy intentions and commitments have not always been translated into practice, and transformation has engendered its own pathologies. In particular, the dominance of one party, the African National Congress (ANC), although it has been a stabilizing factor, has resulted in a proliferation of the politics of patronage, including, if not especially, in the security sector. A key element of success was that a broad framework for ending civil conflict was put in place during the transition to democracy, as a result of a ‘‘pacted’’ agreement between the major actors—chiefly the ANC and the outgoing apartheid regime—in which normative principles relating to human rights, political conduct and the ‘rules of the game’ for the transition were agreed. During the Mandela presidency (1994–99), security policy, including the foreign policy dimensions thereof, were highly normative. Principles of democratic governance, human rights, and constitutionalism dominated the policy discourses in all areas, although this was strongly inflected with the overriding requirements for ‘‘transformation.’’ 276

................. 16928$

CH15

09-09-08 08:23:02

PS

PAGE 276

SOUTH AFRICA: SECURITY TRANSFORMATION

277

Under the Mbeki presidency (1999–,) realpolitik became a more dominant trend in foreign as well as domestic security policy and the emphasis was on implementation. Promotion of human rights and democratization agendas internationally have given way to a concentration on conflict resolution, peacekeeping, good governance, and the promotion of national interests. Domestically, the focus has been on the ‘‘war against crime.’’ Transformation, however, has remained an overriding concern, democratic governance has been consolidated, and none of the normative intentions have been abandoned even if they have sometimes been difficult to put into practice. Since September 11, 2001, and the resultant ‘‘war against terror,’’ South Africa’s security policies have been realigned to deal with these new global realities. Government is currently undertaking a review of national security policy and defense policy, partly in response to these developments. Mbeki’s government introduced a more integrated process for executive decision making, through the ‘‘clustering’’ of various ministries into cabinet committees. The two key clusters for security governance are International Relations, Peace and Security (IRPS), and Justice, Crime Prevention, and Security (JCPS). The basic division of labor is that the IRPS is responsible for external security and the JCPS for internal security, although there is some overlap of membership and issues. Some concerns have been raised about the centralization of decision making in the presidency, and indeed this appears to have led to tensions between the presidency and ministerial or departmental functions (for example, on key foreign affairs issues, or commitments to deploy peacekeeping forces). Perhaps more importantly, the perception of centralization has contributed to political tensions within the ruling party—the ‘‘insider/ outsider’’ syndrome contributing to a split between Mbeki and his former deputy president, Jacob Zuma, who was dismissed for alleged corruption and arms acquisition. The ‘‘cluster’’ system is replicated at the level of senior officials, promoting coordination on security issues, and some dedicated interdepartmental offices have been set up to further promote coordination. All the security functions (including intelligence, although with some limitations) are subject to normal government auditing procedures and to scrutiny from the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA). In addition, they are also subject to oversight by the human rights monitoring agen-

................. 16928$

CH15

09-09-08 08:23:03

PS

PAGE 277

278

GAVIN CAWTHRA

cies set up in terms of Chapter 9 of the South African Constitution, such as the Gender and Human Rights Commissions.2

Defense During the negotiations that preceded the political transition, a broad set of principles relating to defense and security had been agreed to by the various parties, relating in particular to democratic political control, human rights issues, peaceful relations with neighbors, professional nonpartisan and properly equipped security forces, and the principles governing the integration of forces and the treatment of previous human rights abuses. Some of these principles were also entrenched in the interim Constitution.3 However, it was clear that these were insufficient as policy guidelines for the Department of Defense (DoD), and the new minister, Joe Modise, thus almost immediately implemented a process to produce a White Paper on Defense. The White Paper, pointedly entitled ‘‘Defense in a Democracy’’ was adopted unanimously by parliament in 1996. Much of it was taken up with elaborating principles of democratic control and specifying the roles and functions of the various actors. It also established a set of principles governing the overall approach of the state to security, which could be summed up as a human security approach domestically and a collaborative security approach externally.4 The White Paper remains the guiding policy framework for the DoD, although it is currently being updated to reflect South Africa’s increasing focus on African peace missions. With this policy framework in place, the DoD then embarked on a defense review, the aim of which was to come up with more concrete policies regarding force design, budget frameworks, main armament requirements, human resource policies, defense structures, and land-use and environmental policies.5 The new South African National Defense Force (SANDF) formally came into being at midnight on the day before the national elections. In reality, there was a high level of continuity between the SANDF and the old apartheid armed force, and many have argued that the process of amalgamating the seven armed formations amounted more to the absorption of guerilla forces into the existing defense force than integration. Perhaps this was inevitable given that the old defense force (including the ‘‘homeland’’ armies and civilian administrators) outnum-

................. 16928$

CH15

09-09-08 08:23:03

PS

PAGE 278

SOUTH AFRICA: SECURITY TRANSFORMATION

279

bered the guerilla forces by approximately three to one, and it was largely incumbent on the guerillas to accommodate themselves to a conventional army.6 As a result, the integration process was fraught with difficulty, and a number of mutinies took place, although it was largely accomplished without violence.7 The SANDF is still grappling with the problems of transformation. A key concern has been how to address race and gender inequities. Racial tensions have persisted and sometimes led to isolated acts of violence, despite a strong program of equal opportunities and affirmative action. To address political transformation, a civic education program has been introduced to ensure that officers and soldiers understand democratic politics, constitutionalism, democratic civilmilitary relations, military professional obligations, and international humanitarian law, but its implementation has been patchy. Integration has been followed by demobilization to get the SANDF down to planned levels. In practice, many former guerillas were excluded for reasons of health or age, and demobilization has been poorly handled through cash handouts and a badly executed Service Corps. Further demobilization is required, and this may have consequences for social and political stability.8 The SANDF has had to transform itself from a largely conscript-based force to a mostly full-time one and from a strategic offensive posture to a defensive one. It has had to prepare itself for new roles such as international peacekeeping. It is not clear if it has been able to devote sufficient attention to these challenges, given its preoccupation with integration and affirmative action, although it has developed an integrated ‘‘Human Resource 2010’’ program aimed at dealing with these issues in a holistic way. Executive control of defense is reasonably effective although as always in these cases much depends on the power and character of the minister appointed, especially as the ministerial staff itself is very small. For the sake of stability, an apartheid-era commander, General Georg Meiring, was left in command of the SANDF at first, and it took a political fallout over his misuse of intelligence information for him to be dismissed in 1998. Since then the minister, deputy minister, secretary, and chief of defense have all come from the same political party and liberation movement background. Indeed, the current minister, Mosiua Lekota, is also chair of the ANC. On the one hand this might

................. 16928$

CH15

09-09-08 08:23:04

PS

PAGE 279

280

GAVIN CAWTHRA

have been the cause for some concern; on the other hand it can probably be seen as contributing to stability. The constitution provides for a powerful Joint Standing Committee on Defense (JSCD) (joint in the sense that it involves both the National Assembly and the Council of Provinces), and Parliament also set up other committees for defense and security oversight. Given that the new government inherited a situation where there was in effect no ministry of defense, considerable progress has been made in establishing a functioning secretariat capable of policy development and interpretation, planning, and budgeting. Procurement, previously the responsibility mostly of the state armaments manufacturer, Armscor, has also been transferred to the secretariat. Initially thought of as a civilian body—and specified as such in the Constitution—the secretariat includes many military officers, and now forms part of an integrated military headquarters with the SANDF.9 The formal processes for planning, budgeting, and procurement clearly set out and follow international best practice, and require structured interactions between the executive, Parliament, civil servants, and military officers. A high degree of transparency and accountability is evident. However, considerable public unease and allegations of sleaze have been attached to the major procurement initiative, the Strategic Arms Package, which emerged from the defense review, where it was ascertained that the SANDF needed to be almost totally reequipped with major weapons systems for its primary role of conventional defense. The planning process for this was carried out in a systematic and transparent way, and at the time received wide public support, largely because it was claimed that it would lead to job creation and massive offset benefits. However, massive cost escalations, questions over the offsets, and, above all, the unraveling of many prima facie incidents of corruption and kickbacks involving some of the most powerful political figures have led to a media and political backlash. Question marks now hang over the integrity of the whole exercise, although only a few cases of corruption have been proven in court. This has reignited the public debate over whether the state is spending more than it should on defense rather than social or human security. At the same time, there is a growing perception among policy makers and leading military practitioners that the policy, plan-

................. 16928$

CH15

09-09-08 08:23:05

PS

PAGE 280

SOUTH AFRICA: SECURITY TRANSFORMATION

281

ning, and budgeting process emerging from the defense review, although technically proficient, was based on a fundamentally wrong assumption: that the SANDF should be designed, equipped, and trained mainly for conventional defense. In reality, it is involved with African peacekeeping, border protection, and support to the police.10 During the transition and immediate postelection period a wide range of civil society organizations, the media, and the public at large were energetically engaged in policy argument over defense, and this contributed substantially to legitimizing the process. This waned as a broad consensus was reached through the defense review. The executive, Parliament, and the department of defense itself all went out of their way to consult with civil society organizations. In part, this was occasioned by an acknowledged lack of expertise, and civil society was seen as able to plug some of the gaps. Since then, it is notable that the level of consultation with civil society has declined—although this may also be a reflection of wider governance trends and increased institutional capacity within government.

Safety and security The principal policy concerns in relation to policing during the transition period and immediately afterward can be summed up as establishing political control and overseeing a move from a militarized/repressive ‘‘force’’ to a community policing ‘‘service.’’ This entailed demilitarizing the police; introducing less confrontational public order policing; establishing mechanisms for accountability to communities and for civil control and oversight; integration and restructuring; and ending human rights violations and torture. Transformation—understood largely as addressing racial and gender inequities—has also been a principal concern.11 However, it was only in 1998 that a White Paper on Safety and Security was finalized, based on extensive public and political consultations, which included (as with the defense review) provincial and parliamentary public hearings, which ensured a high level of public ‘‘buy-in.’’ The White Paper focused on four issues: law enforcement, social crime prevention, institutional reform, and the enhancement of policing at provincial and local levels. The White Paper sought to move beyond the issues of control and community policing that had been the focus hitherto to con-

................. 16928$

CH15

09-09-08 08:23:05

PS

PAGE 281

282

GAVIN CAWTHRA

centrate on crime prevention and improving police effectiveness. This policy shift has become even more evident in recent years. Issues of accountability, democratic governance, and human rights, although still upheld, seem to have become less important than the ‘‘war against crime.’’ Policy now revolves around the National Crime Combating Strategy, leading to actions such as ‘‘Operation Crackdown’’ involving cordon-andsearch operations and roadblocks, usually with assistance from the defense force.12 The new government has worked toward establishing firm control over the police, which had been at the front line of apartheid repression. For this reason it resisted decentralization proposals, instead amalgamating the eleven nominally separate police forces—the South African Police (SAP), the forces of the ‘‘independent homelands,’’ and the forces of six ‘‘self-governing homelands’’ (which had police forces but not armies)—into one national South African Police Service (SAPS) which was made accountable to the minister of safety and security. A civilian Secretariat for Safety and Security was provided for in the Constitution and established in 1994 at national headquarters to deal with policy, budgeting, and political accountability issues. Its functions were defined as promoting democratic accountability and transparency in the service, monitoring policy implementation, conducting policy-oriented research, and offering legal services, communication, and providing advice to the minister. This system was replicated at the provincial level. The Safety and Security Secretariat has been much less successful than the Defense Secretariat, however. Reasons for this include institutional resistance within the police service, a failure to bridge the divide between policy and operations and between civilians and uniformed members, lack of knowledge and experience of civilian members, and personality factors.13 The police commissioner—essentially a political appointment—not the Secretariat, is seen as the main mechanism for government control. A further level of accountability is provided through the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD), a separately budgeted state institution independent of the police, which was specifically set up to investigate and deter human rights abuses on the basis of complaints submitted by the public. Today, most of the complaints are about service delivery.

................. 16928$

CH15

09-09-08 08:23:05

PS

PAGE 282

SOUTH AFRICA: SECURITY TRANSFORMATION

283

While there is no ‘‘joint standing committee’’ in Parliament for safety and security, multi-party committees exist in both houses and have played an active role in drawing up legislation, and also in formulating policy, monitoring compliance, and discussing issues of public concern. The extent to which they have actively exercised their powers has depended to a large extent on the strength of the leading personalities involved and their relationships with the minister. There are signs of growing frustration by the political leadership at the failure of the police to make a significant impact on crime. As the issue has become politicized (it is one of the main issues that opposition parties use to criticize the ruling party) a certain defensiveness seems to have crept in, perhaps indicated most clearly by an unwillingness to publish crime statistics.14 Institutional transformation initially involved the integration of eleven forces and the subsequent rearticulation of the service into eight new provincial services. Key functions such as public order policing remained under national command. Unlike the SANDF, the SAPS did not integrate any significant number of former guerillas (except into the VIP Protection Unit), but it did have to incorporate the ten former ‘‘homeland’’ forces. This had the effect, however, of radically changing the racial demographics of the force at all levels, although whites continue to dominate at senior management levels. The most important elements of civil society oversight are the Community Police Forums, meant to be established at every police station, in which community representatives are involved on a daily basis and in a structured way provided by law, in oversight of policing in their area. In practice, they tend to work best in wealthy white areas, where they have also been actively involved in supporting the police and garnering additional resources. Implementation of the Community Police Forums across the country has been patchy at best and they have failed to get off the ground in many of the areas where they are most needed.15

Intelligence The postsettlement government moved swiftly to establish a policy framework for intelligence through the White Paper on Intelligence of 1994, which sought to place the intelligence function firmly under constitutional and democratic control.

................. 16928$

CH15

09-09-08 08:23:06

PS

PAGE 283

284

GAVIN CAWTHRA

This was followed by the enactment of new legislation reorganizing the intelligence agencies, defining their functions, and providing for the amalgamation of the various ‘‘homeland’’ agencies and the integration of around one thousand former ANC and Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) intelligence operatives. Military Intelligence, the dominant agency in the dying years of apartheid, was downgraded and prevented from carrying out nonmilitary covert operations, while the SAPS’s intelligence function was restricted to criminal investigations. Two principal civilian intelligence agencies were set up, the South African Secret Service (SASS) for foreign intelligence, and the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) for domestic intelligence. Information gathered by all the agencies should be passed on to the National Intelligence Coordinating Committee (NICOC) which analyzes and interprets intelligence on behalf of the Ministry which is responsible for distributing it to the appropriate government structures. In addition, in November 2001 a Presidential Support Unit (PSU) was set up to support the president on issues related to conflict and conflict resolution, especially in Africa (it has been very involved in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Burundi peace processes). Four new acts were introduced in 2002 aimed at further aligning the intelligence agencies with democratic governance norms and other national legislation, and dealing with new threats such as cyber-intelligence. Formerly under a deputy minister, intelligence was upgraded to full ministerial and departmental status in President Mbeki’s government in 2001. The minister has proved to be proactive, and has actively sought to increase interactions between the intelligence community and civil society. A multiparty Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence has been active in carrying out legislative oversight and monitoring activities. Although it meets in secret, it is required to send an annual report to Parliament. Additional controls are provided by the auditor general, and an inspector-general for intelligence has been established with wide powers of oversight, although the inability of government to find an appropriate individual to take on this role must be a cause of concern. An Audit Committee, including outsiders, has been appointed as well and a presidential budgetary advisory committee. Remarkably, there was very little public demand for intelligence functions to be opened to public scrutiny, as happened, for

................. 16928$

CH15

09-09-08 08:23:07

PS

PAGE 284

SOUTH AFRICA: SECURITY TRANSFORMATION

285

example, when the German Democratic Republic collapsed. Instead, there seems to have been a high level of continuity, with files remaining closed or (mostly) being destroyed; no less than forty-four tons of government security-related documentation was shredded during the transition. It is unclear to what extent a break with past covert and intrusive practices has been made, even though a legislative and administrative framework consistent with best democratic practice has been put in place.16 Intelligence is not an area in which civil society can be expected to be extensively involved. However, the intelligence ministry has recently shown greater signs of openness toward civil society and academia, especially with regard to the declassification issue.

Lessons South Africa is often held up as an exemplar of Security Sector Reform in a post-settlement context. Some key elements of success include the following: • Normative and political frameworks for the broad approach to security were agreed by the principal parties through a complex process of negotiations before the actual transition to democracy, and interim multiparty control mechanisms were established. • A conscious decision was made to ensure that the security agencies remained functional throughout. Virtually nothing was disbanded and few individuals were dismissed, thus ensuring that the state retained control. • The integration of virtually all defense elements, police services and intelligence agencies (with almost all their personnel) linked to the adversarial parties contributed to nation building and stability. • The process was home grown and organic and not imposed by external actors, ensuring a strong sense of local ownership and responsibility. However, neighboring counties and major international actors were supportive, assisting in creating a climate of stability. • The process was transparent and accountable to legitimate authorities and involved a high level of civil society participation. • The objective was perceived to be the establishment of legitimate, civil, democratic control, which could be broadly accepted by most political actors. • Policy frameworks and clear roles and functions for the security

................. 16928$

CH15

09-09-08 08:23:07

PS

PAGE 285

286

GAVIN CAWTHRA

services were determined, and the security agencies were left with a clear sense of mission and a professional, legitimate role.

Challenges There remain, however, several key challenges, some of which arise from the compromises entailed in the transition, and some of which are the antithesis of the positive elements listed above. • Integration has resulted in the bloating of the defense and intelligence agencies, and downsizing presents many challenges (the police service, however, is being expanded). • An enormous number of policy changes have taken place in a short period of time. Some policies are too normative and are not aligned with political realities (for example, with regard to the role of the defense force). Policies are not always effectively implemented and do not necessarily achieve their envisaged goals. • Transformation, most clearly seen in the change in composition of the security services, has created tensions and may also have affected operational effectiveness: for example, the SANDF claimed for many years that it was unable to deploy in international peace operations because it was prioritizing internal transformation, while the police are widely seen as ineffective. • Considerable progress has been made in coordination of security policy and governance, and the Office of the Presidency has been strengthened. But this may be taking place at the expense of democratic accountability and local ownership. • Neither the defense nor safety and security secretariats are achieving in full their objectives as provided for in the Constitution. Relations between civilian and uniformed components remain problematic. • One-party dominance has both positive and negative features for a developing country like South Africa, which is also emerging from protracted conflict. On one hand, a dominant party provides the gel that holds together state, political society, civil society, and to some extent the private sector and establishes a national vision. But the intention of the ANC to gain control over state and society in the interests of transformation could have negative implications for governance, particularly within the security institutions. Moreover, once one party is seen as the key to power, conflicts within the party become more important than conflicts between the various parties, potentially leading to the abuse of the security agencies for intraparty purposes.

This brief survey has sought to demonstrate that South Africa has carried out a comprehensive, largely homegrown, reform, re-

................. 16928$

CH15

09-09-08 08:23:08

PS

PAGE 286

SOUTH AFRICA: SECURITY TRANSFORMATION

287

construction, and transformation of its security sector in the postconflict era. Twelve years on, however, serious challenges remain, and it is not clear whether the rather unique conditions of South Africa’s transition (which importantly were linked to the end of the Cold War) are applicable or replicable in other situations today.

Notes 1. See, for example N. Ball and K. Fayemi, eds. Security Sector Governance in Africa (Lagos: Center for Democracy and Development, 2004). 2. Republic of South Africa, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 3. G. Cawthra, Securing South Africa’s Democracy: Defense, Development and Security in Transition. (Houndmills: Macmillan), 54–65; J. Cilliers, and M. Reichardt, eds., About Turn: The Transformation of the South African Military and Intelligence. (Midrand: Institute for Defense Policy, 1995). 4. Republic of South Africa, Defense in a Democracy: White Paper on National Defense for the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 5. Republic of South Africa. South African Defense Review, 1998. 6. R. Williams, ‘‘Integration or Absorption? The Creation of the SA National Defense Force 1993–1999,’’ African Security Review 11, no, 2 (2002). 7. P. Frankel, Soldiers in a Storm: The Armed Forces in South Africa’s Democratic Transition (Boulder, CO: Westview 2001). 8. G. Cawthra, and B. Moeller, ‘‘Integration of Former Enemies into National Armies in Fragile African States,’’ Conference on Security Studies in Fragile States, Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen, 2006. 9. G. Cawthra,‘‘Security Transformation in Post-Apartheid South Africa’’ in Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies, ed. G. Cawthra and R. Luckham (London: Zed Books, 2003). 10. Len Le Roux, ‘‘The Post-apartheid South African Military: Transforming the Nation,’’ in Evolutions and Revolutions: A Contemporary History of Militaries in Southern Africa, ed. Martin Rupiya (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2005), 235–68. 11. J. Rauch, ‘‘State, Civil Society and Police Reform in South Africa,’’ (Johannesburg: Center for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 1993). 12. M. Shaw, Democracy’s Disorder? Crime, Policing and Citizen Responsibilities in Transitional Societies (Johannesburg: South African Institute for International Affairs, 2002). 13. E. Pelser, ‘‘The Accountability and Control Functions of the National Secretariat for Safety and Security’’ (master’s thesis, Johannesburg, University of the Witwatersrand). 14. E. Pelser (ed.), Crime Prevention Partnerships: Lessons from Practice (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2003). 15. Pelser. 16. S. Africa, ‘‘Management of Access to Intelligence Information in PostApartheid South Africa’’ (PhD thesis, Johannesburg, University of the Witwatersrand, 2006).

................. 16928$

CH15

09-09-08 08:23:08

PS

PAGE 287

Spain Lynn M. Maurer

SPAIN IS NOW A CONSOLIDATED DEMOCRACY IN WHICH PRIOR CON-

flict can be considered largely resolved by ongoing democratic mechanisms. Nearly thirty years after its peaceful transition, the representative process continues to mitigate potential conflict through its institutions. Here we examine four democratic levers in Spain: elections, the legislature, the executive, and devolution, which in Spain is known as regional autonomy or asymmetric federalism. These levers were formulated to meet current political demands, as well as to avoid the recurrence of historic catastrophes, such as the failed republic of the 1930s which ended in civil war. The framers of the new democracy hoped to avoid several crosscutting cleavages that had existed during the failed democracy of the 1930s. Although class and religious divisions had been mitigated during Franco’s dictatorship (1939–75), Spain still faced ideological divisions and the challenge of incorporating various nations within the new democracy. This challenge included threats of violence from the Basque ETA (Basque Homeland and Freedom) group which had formed under Franco and sought independence for Euskadi (Basque Country). In addition, the reactionary military had to be transformed into a democratic body.

Elections The first post-Franco democratic elections for the constituent parliament were held in 1977. Upon approval of the 1978 Constitution, the Constituent Legislature was dissolved and elections were held again in 1979 for the first official Congress of Deputies. The centrist Union of the Democratic Center (UCD) 288

................. 16928$

CH16

09-09-08 08:23:10

PS

PAGE 288

289

SPAIN

held executive power until the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) gained a majority in the elections of 1982 (in which the UCD all but disappeared). By the time of the 1982 elections, Spain was considered a consolidated democracy. The electoral formula chosen by countries in transition is of great importance in avoiding further divisions. Spain’s parliamentary electoral formula is a modified proportional representation (PR) system that has reduced the number of parties, and given little or no representation to extremist groups. The electoral formula has helped to stabilize the party system and minimized the number of parties while remaining representative, thus reducing fragmentation and ideological bipolarity. The electoral formula has also contributed to the formation of regional party systems in the Autonomous Communities as well as the national system. The electoral law, combined with the parliamentary system, has encouraged the development of cohesive, hierarchical, and highly disciplined parties. In terms of representation, the particular PR formula applied in Spain (D-Hondt with many small districts) has had effects that are similar to those of a single member district system.1 For example, Spain’s PR system favors two large national parties, reduces the number of small national parties, and allows for the representation of smaller regional parties. Spain’s original majority parties were the Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD) and the Socialist Workers Partyt (PSOE). When the centrist party disappeared in 1982, the centerright Popular Party (PP) took its place in the party system. In the original debate on parliamentary elections, ex-Franquist leaders argued for a single member district electoral law, believing that it would benefit the Right. The Communist and Socialist parties favored a purer form of PR than the one that was actually implemented. The centrists favored the modified PR system that won out in 1976, and has remained the standard for all subsequent electoral laws. The electoral decree law of April 1977 was the result of intense negotiations in an attempt to lend as much legitimacy to the new electoral law and the Congress. Candidates for the Congress2 are presented in closed, blocked lists in specified order for terms of no more than four years.3 The electoral law uses the D-Hondt method.4 According to Lijphart, the D-Hondt method of distribution ‘‘is the least proportional and systematically favours the larger parties.’’5 Since the existing provinces were used as the electoral unit, many small dis-

................. 16928$

CH16

09-09-08 08:23:10

PS

PAGE 289

290

LYNN M. MAURER

tricts with low magnitude (number of seats) resulted; of the fifty districts, over half receive less than five seats.6 A minimum of two deputies are awarded per province, of which there are fifty, plus one deputy each for the Spanish cities of Ceuta and Melilla on the African continent. Of the 350 seats in the Congress, this accounts for 102. The remaining 248 seats are awarded per district according to a formula in which a share quota is obtained by dividing the total Spanish population by 248. The resulting share quota is then divided by the population of the province or electoral district. This system provides the number of seats that will be awarded in addition to the two minimum seats. In practice, the number of seats in these multimember districts ranges from three seats to over thirty seats. The D-Hondt method is applied to translate votes into seats by using the divisors one, two, three, etc., up to the number of seats in each province. The first seat is awarded to the party that has the most votes (total vote divided by one); subsequently that party’s total vote is divided by two and compared to the number of votes won by the other parties. The party with the largest vote then wins the second seat and their total vote is divided by two. This process continues until all the seats have been awarded, always dividing the total vote. In a hypothetical district that has seven seats and six parties, the distribution of seats is shown in appendix 1. Party A wins the first seat because it has the most number of votes (168,000); after dividing its total number of votes by two, Party B has the most votes (104,000) and wins the second seat. After Party B’s vote has been divided by two, Party A wins the third seat with the largest number of votes (84,000). When the process is completed, Party A has won three seats, Party B two seats, with Parties C and D each being awarded one seat. Note that Parties E and F, in spite of having received 8.3 percent and 6.6 percent of the vote respectively, receive no seats. Party A with 35 percent of the vote has won three seats (43 percent), Party B with 21.6 percent of the vote has won two seats (29 percent ), Party C with 15 percent of the vote is awarded one seat (14 percent), and Party D is also awarded one seat with 13.3 percent of the vote. Thus, the larger parties are overrepresented while two of the smaller parties receive representation that is close to proportionate; meanwhile, the two smallest receive no seats. In this hypothetical district, the minimum percentage of votes

................. 16928$

CH16

09-09-08 08:23:10

PS

PAGE 290

291

SPAIN

needed in order to win a seat is 13.3 percent. This actually comes close to Lijphart’s ‘‘effective threshold’’7 figured for Spain for 1977–89 at 10.2 percent (in spite of the fact that the legal threshold is 3 percent.) Spain’s effective threshold falls among the top four highest of twenty-one electoral systems using the D-Hondt method, whereas about two-thirds have an effective threshold of 6 percent or below.8 Thus, fractionalization is more discouraged by the Spanish system than by most other PR systems. Except for the 1982 disappearance of the UCD, the net effect of the electoral formula has been to stabilize the party system, reducing excessive fragmentation, as well as party competition. It has encouraged the development of regional party systems, because geographically concentrated parties fare well. Thus, regionalist parties have not only been consistently represented in the governments of the Autonomous Communities, but they have also held seats on the national level. This in turn has led to their national policy-making influence. This point is particularly important given the multicultural aspects of Spain, with some of the regions having historic claims to regional power. A less stabilizing electoral formula may have led to a more polarized party system, when in fact the system chosen proved to minimize conflict and legitimize the electoral process.

The Legislature: The Cortes The centrality of the legislature during the transition process is important to the representative nature of the establishment of democracy and thus, to the legitimacy of the new regime. In Spain the parliament was central in two crucial instances: the Political Reform Law of 1976 and the 1978 Constitution. The politics of consensus was used in Congress during the formative years of Spanish democracy while majoritarian decision making did not take hold until after the democracy was consolidated. The 1976 Political Reform Law The Franquist legislature (the Cortes) had little or no decisionmaking power. However, in 1976 it voted to dissolve itself and called for democratic elections to a bicameral parliament. Franco had left Juan Carlos de Borbo´n in place as king, expecting him to exercise full political power and maintain authoritarianism. However, key elites were replaced by more liberal system

................. 16928$

CH16

09-09-08 08:23:11

PS

PAGE 291

292

LYNN M. MAURER

elites, leading to regime reform. By July 1976, Prime Minister Arias Navarro was dismissed and Adolfo Sua´rez, who replaced him, moved quickly with the king to open up the regime through existing laws toward a liberal democracy. The Political Reform Law (PRL) was approved in the Cortes 425 to 59 (with 13 abstentions) in November 1976. Not without objection by regime hardliners, the majority of the Cortes—aware of their reduced room for maneuvering—bowed to the emergency bill and ended its thirty-five-year existence. This stunning move signified both a continuity with the past and a legitimating of the new body from important elites who could have represented antiregime forces to the new democracy. The law was upheld by the public in a nationwide referendum the following month, in which all adult citizens could vote.9 The Political Reform Law called for a popularly elected Cortes, which would consist of both a lower and upper chamber (Congress of Deputies and Senate). It also set up the first free elections and provided a legal framework for the transition. In addition, it called for direct universal suffrage and recognized fundamental democratic freedoms.10 Moreover, the drafts were originally written with the intent to submit it directly to a referendum without consulting the Cortes. While such a move would have facilitated passage of the bill without intensive negotiations with the procuradores, by-passing the Cortes may have run contrary to intrinsic democratic principles. In Congress the bill was tightly controlled by the government in collaboration with the Congressional President, Ferna´ndezMiranda Hevia, who designated it emergency legislation. This meant that the bill’s time in the Cortes was reduced and that it did not need to be considered by a standing committee comprised of Franco loyalists. Instead, a temporary subcommittee was appointed that was limited both in time and in its ability to amend the bill. Those opposing the bill were defeated in the legislative debate by the promise of the PRL supporters to submit it to referendum, where the Spanish people would have the last say.11 Spurred by this success, Sua´rez disbanded the Franquist political party, the Movimiento, and the vertical trade unions of the corporatist structure, legalized political parties and class-based trade unions, pardoned political prisoners, and established provisional electoral rules before the elections on June 15, 1977.

................. 16928$

CH16

09-09-08 08:23:11

PS

PAGE 292

293

SPAIN

The Constituent Legislature (1977–79) The drafting of the Constitution primarily took place within Congress, however, at times the subcommittee met privately to work out issues that were too controversial for plenary debate. The seven-member subcommittee (ponencia) had been set up consisting of three UCD deputies, and one member each from the PSOE, the Communist Party of Spain (PCE), the Catalonian parliamentary group, and the Popular Alliance. They faced the task of drafting a document that would resolve longstanding conflicts involving labor and economic matters, the role of the Catholic Church, the legitimacy of the monarch, and regional demands for autonomy. From August to December 1977, the subcommittee met in private to negotiate a draft. The document was released to the public in December 1977. All political parties then had twenty days to submit amendments, at which time the subcommittee reconvened until a final draft was signed in March 1978.12 Compromise gave way to outright debate when the draft proceeded to the full Constitutional Committee. The disagreement and conflict of the first month in committee jeopardized the success of the process. A rift developed between the parties of the Left—the Socialists and the Communists—and parties of the Right—the UCD and the Popular Alliance (AP). As a result, the majoritarian decision-making rules were applied leaving nearly half of the members in opposition. Recognizing the threat to regime legitimacy, party leaders of the UCD and the PSOE—the two major groups in disagreement—met privately to resolve several areas of conflict, thereby implementing a period of what became known as the ‘‘politics of consensus.’’13 Gunther classifies this process as elite settlement, stressing the inclusion of all ‘‘politically significant elites, stating that successful democratic consolidation in Spain was primarily the product of a profound transformation of Spain’s political elites from disunity into consensual unity.’’14 Another requirement of elite settlement is that leaders of the significant players be granted authority to negotiate on behalf of the entire group. Such was the case of all groups involved including the Communist and the Catalonian groups. The leadership of the various political parties negotiated agreements on the constitutional treatment of religion, labor, and economics, and the role of the military.15 Implementing strict party control on all subsequent votes in the committee,

................. 16928$

CH16

09-09-08 08:23:12

PS

PAGE 293

294

LYNN M. MAURER

the remaining articles of the draft constitution were approved within one month. The ‘‘politics of consensus’’ remained prominent throughout this and the following legislative session when many fundamental issues left open in the Constitution still had to be determined. Like the Political Reform Law, the Constitution gained status and legitimacy through a nationwide referendum in which close to 90 percent cast a yes vote out of a 68 percent turnout of eligible voters.16 The negotiations over the Constitution were successful in establishing democratic pluralism and guaranteeing basic civil rights and liberties. It also resolved adequately or entirely the issues of the monarchy, political parties, the role of the Church, the electoral law, and some economic issues. However, it fell short of settling polarized sentiments over Basque demands for self-determination.17 The Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) deputies abstained from the Cortes’s vote by walking out and advocated abstention in the national referendum. In sum, the centrality of the parliament in the development of the foundational laws of the new regime helped incorporate a wide range of ideologies and opinions, and legitimized the new democracy through the representative process.

The Executive The executive in Spain was established to be democratically accountable. This was done through a dual executive (a constitutional monarchy), the early establishment of executive responsibility to the parliament, and overall executive-legislative relations that democratically limited the executive. The Dual Executive In addition to the prime minister and cabinet, the monarchy was incorporated into the new democratic executive. Certainly, this would not work in all fragile democracies. However, in the case of Spain the monarch was useful in the establishment of democracy and the resolution of conflict in both pragmatic and symbolic ways. Juan Carlos was democratic minded and was influential in putting Adolfo Suarez in the office of prime minister. The monarchy served as a symbol of legitimacy and continuation, and was accepted by the Left. Perhaps most importantly, the king was also influential in defeating the attempted coup of

................. 16928$

CH16

09-09-08 08:23:12

PS

PAGE 294

295

SPAIN

1982, as he was the only executive member that was not in Congress that day. His televised speech, as leader of the armed forces, called for the military to stand down and for the continuance of democracy. The Civil Guard members who had taken Congress hostage were forced to surrender. Thus, although the monarchy now functions as a largely symbolic formal role, in the early years of the transition the actions of the king were crucial in solidifying the democracy. The Establishment of Executive Responsibility to the Congress The nature of legislative-executive relations began to develop among the difficult issues that the parliament immediately faced, namely the writing of the Constitution. Temporary rules were devised by congressional attorneys to serve until the approval of provisional Standing Orders on October 17, 1977. The deputies worked hard to ensure that the notion of parliamentary control of the executive would materialize in practice. As stated by the Congress President Alvarez de Miranda: ‘‘Even in the absence of Standing Orders, there is no doubt that the Congress is the chamber where the work or the executive must be scrutinized, and in due time, criticized. Democratic control should be a reality in our country and it will be.’’18 Executive responsibility to the parliament was established when the government was submitted to a Motion of Censure in September 1977. The motion was a response of opposition parties to the Blanco Case in which Socialist Deputy, Jaime Blanco, was imprisoned during a demonstration in spite of the policy of parliamentary immunity. Many members of the Cortes considered this an aggressive act against parliament, reminiscent of Franquist tactics, and held the Ministry of Interior directly responsible. The government survived the Motion of Censure by a vote of 160 to 118 with 58 abstentions.19 However, the long-term significance was not the outcome of the vote but the fact that the vote took place at all, with the UCD government submitting itself to censure before the Constitution had been ratified. To fill the legal gap, the executive quickly submitted an emergency bill to the Cortes establishing provisional grounds for legislativeexecutive relations until they could be formally solidified by the Constitution and the Standing Orders. The government expressed its ‘‘willingness to submit itself institutionally to the control of the Cortes’’ and introduced the practices of Votes of Censure and Votes of Confidence.20

................. 16928$

CH16

09-09-08 08:23:12

PS

PAGE 295

296

LYNN M. MAURER

Constitutional Executive-Legislative Relation The relationship established between the legislature and the executive limits the powers of the Congress and favors the executive. The drafters of the Constitution, as well as the subsequent Standing Orders of Congress, designed the system to strengthen the executive for two reasons. First, they believed that minority governments would prevail in the future. Second, they possessed the historical memory of the fragmented and ideologically polarized parliament of the failed democracy of the 1930s and, in turn, hoped to ensure stable governments. The investiture vote and questions of confidence, both measures of support for the government, require only a simple majority (the investiture vote, if lacking an absolute majority on the first vote, may be passed by simple majority forty-eight hours later.)21 On the other hand, a motion of censure against the government requires an absolute majority and must be constructive, requiring a proposed replacement for the prime minister. The prime minister may dissolve the Cortes, but in order to avoid power struggles— such as have occurred in France and Russia—this action may not be taken while a motion of censure is pending,22 and may not be repeated for one year. Thus, the executive’s stay in office is well protected under the Constitution, while democratic safeguards protect the Congress from possible authoritarian moves against it by the executive. The dual executive along with the establishment of constitutional executive-legislative relations helped to stabilize the new democracy, particularly by avoiding frequent changes in the executive.

Devolution: Asymmetric Federalism In an aspiring democracy, the question of the structure of the state—unitary, federal, or some other arrangement—will be fundamental to regime legitimacy and the resolution of conflict. Distinct nationalities which may have been oppressed under a centralized authoritarian regime may strive to obtain and protect regional rights by calling for a federal structure or some devolution of national powers to regional governments. Federalism or devolution will involve varying degrees of separate decision-making bodies, fiscal competence, historical and cultural rights, and regional or state involvement in decision making.23 According to Macmahon, nationalist sentiments may lead to a

................. 16928$

CH16

09-09-08 08:23:13

PS

PAGE 296

297

SPAIN

decentralized unitary state. This was the case in Italy where its Constitution held the ‘‘emphatic promise of regional autonomy’’ which has been granted gradually over the years.24 Trantas classifies the state structure of Italy, Portugal, and Spain as regional. Regional state structures are distinguished from federal structures in that ‘‘the devolution of powers to the regions is achieved through state law.’’25 In Spain, this structure can be referred to as ‘‘asymmetric federalism’’26 since the regional governments enjoy varying powers. The more exact term, as used in Spain, is ‘‘state of autonomies’’ or autonomous state.27 The development of the state of autonomies was a response to Spain’s historic struggle between center and periphery. Two routes to regional autonomy were established by the 1978 Constitution. The structure of the state is not specified by the Constitution as federal or unitary or even as a state of autonomies.28 As the development of Autonomous Communities occurred over the first several years of the new democracy, the redistribution of authority has been fluid among government levels (national and regional), and among the governmental branches.29 Such a shift in national-regional jurisdictions has also occurred in democracies as diverse as Britain, Belgium, and Italy. However, in a new democracy, in which jurisdictions are somewhat malleable, it may be more difficult to ascertain the exact transfer of powers among institutions and levels. Asymmetric federalism is well suited to the case of Spain, as three of the regions have historic claims to autonomy: the Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia.30 Lancaster refers to this solution as the ‘‘cultural interpretation of federalism,’’ which he maintains, ‘‘views the central state as being built upon several groups of individuals with distinct collective identities whose rights must be constitutionally recognized, generally through some form of self-determination.’’31 Asymmetric formulas—in which regional powers are unevenly distributed—can be found in Canada, Italy, and to some degree, the United Kingdom. Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia formed their autonomous communities through negotiated statutes. Articles 148 and 149 of the Constitution defined the powers that could be assumed in the future by the regional governments while the parliament was given the power to legislate transfers of power.32 The Statutes of Autonomy were to specify powers granted to each Autonomous Community.33 Although the Constitution protected the jurisdiction of the national parliament, the Constitutional Court ensured that the parliament would not

................. 16928$

CH16

09-09-08 08:23:13

PS

PAGE 297

298

LYNN M. MAURER

expand its constitutional powers through legislation. This limitation was seen in the 1983 ruling that the Organic Law for the Harmonization of the Autonomy Process (LOAPA) contained several sections which were unconstitutional as the parliament had taken too many liberties with the law. By 1987, the seventeen Spanish regional executives and parliaments were in function with varying degrees of jurisdiction over regional political and fiscal matters.34 As mentioned above, the Autonomous Communities, each with their own parliament, have also developed their own regional party systems. The peaceful and gradual implementation of regional autonomy, Nathan argues, represents ‘‘an effort . . . to avoid political disintegration and therefore, represents one of the great successes of the Spanish democratic transition.’’35 The center-right and center-left governments have varied in their responses to autonomy—as well as to the continued (yet varying) threats of violence from the ETA. It is important to note that there is satisfaction with the current asymmetric arrangement and it is a workable solution to the historic nationalist conflicts.

Conclusion In summary, the Spanish success in resolving past conflict and establishing a consolidated democracy was largely attained by the four democratic levers considered here. The electoral system led to a mitigation of ideological divisions and established a party system that was both representative and favorable to moderate parties. The legislature was key in the process of establishing fundamental laws of the regime, especially the Political Reform Law and the 1978 Constitution. The dual executive which includes the constitutional monarchy was a solution that works well within the context of Spain—although it well may not in other countries—lending legitimacy and a link to the past. The government is limited in a democratic fashion, while being bolstered by the Constitution and the Standing Orders of Congress so that it is protected from frequent votes of no confidence. Last, the asymmetric federalist form of devolution was a response to cultural divisions and historic claims to autonomy. Conflict in Spain can now be considered widely resolved through these four democratic mechanisms.

................. 16928$

CH16

09-09-08 08:23:14

PS

PAGE 298

................. 16928$

CH16

09-09-08 08:23:15

PS

PAGE 299

168,000 104,000 72,000 64,000 40,000 32,000

A B C D E F

168,000 104,000 72,000 64,000 40,000 32,000

1st Seat 84,000 104,000 72,000 64,000 40,000 32,000

2nd Seat 84,000 52,000 72,000 64,000 40,000 32,000

3rd Seat 56,000 52,000 72,000 64,000 40,000 32,000

4th Seat 56,000 52,000 36,000 64,000 40,000 32,000

5th Seat

56,000 52,000 36,000 32,000 40,000 32,000

6th Seat

42,000 52,000 36,000 32,000 40,000 32,000

7th Seat

Data source: Central Electoral Commission, 1995, representation of the Spanish People Organic Act, Spanish Parliament: 105. Table: Author’s.

Total vote

Party

Appendix 1: Distribution of seats: Comparison of votes per seats

300

LYNN M. MAURER

Notes 1. Richard Gunther, ‘‘Electoral Laws, Party Systems, and Elites: The Case of Spain,’’ American Political Science Review 83, no. 3 (1989), 840. 2. The Congress is the more influential body of the bicameral parliament. Elections for Senate are held at the same time. 3. Representation of the Spanish People Organic Act, Section 44–46. 4. Arend Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies 1945–1990 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 21. 5. Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems, 23. 6. Gunther, ‘‘Electoral Laws, Party Systems, and Elites,’’ 839. 7. ‘‘Effective threshold’’ is the percentage of votes that is actually (not legally) necessary to win a seat. 8. Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems, 22. 9. Of eligible voters, there was a 77.7 percent turnout of which 73.2 percent voted in favor and 2.0 percent voted against. Juan J. Linz. ‘‘Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration,’’ The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, ed. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 121. 10. Enrique Arnaldo Alcubilla, ‘‘De la Ley para la Reforma Polı´tica de 4 de enero de 1977a la Ley de Elecciones Locales de 17 de julio de 1978,’’ in El Derecho de Sufragio de los Emigrantes en el Ordenamiento Espan˜ol (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Consitutionales, 1995), 237–38. 11. J. L. Paniagua Soto, ‘‘Spain: A Fledging Parliament,’’ Parliamentary Affairs 50 (1997): 410–22. 12. Richard Gunther, ‘‘Constitutional Change in Contemporary Spain,’’ in The Politics of Constitutional Change in Industrial Nations: Redesigning the State, ed. Keith G. Banting and Richard Simeon (London: MacMillan Press, 1985), 23–52. 13. Ibid. 14. Richard Gunther, ‘‘Spain: The Very Model of the Modern Elite Settlement,’’ in Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe, ed. John Higley and Richard Gunther (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 40. 15. Gunther, ‘‘Constitutional Change in Contemporary Spain,’’ 53. 16. Richard Gunther, Giacomo Sani, and Goldie Shabad, Spain After Franco: The Making of a Competitive Party System (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 124. 17. Gunther ‘‘Constitutional Change in Contemporary Spain,’’ 55–56. 18. No author, ABC, August 18, 1977. www.abc.es 19. No author, ABC, September 22, 1977. www.abc.es 20. No author, ABC, September 29, 1977. www.abc.es 21. Spanish Constitution 1978, Articles 99 and 112. 22. Ibid. Article 115. 23. Richard P. Nathan, ‘‘Defining Modern Federalism,’’ in North American & Comparative Federalism: Essays for the 1990s, Papers from the Fourth Berkeley Seminar on Federalism, ed. Harry N. Scheiber (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of Governmental Studies Press, 1992), 92–93. 24. Arthur W. Macmahon, ‘‘The Problems of Federalism: A Survey,’’ in Federalism Mature and Emergent, ed. Arthur W. Macmahon (New York: Russell &

................. 16928$

CH16

09-09-08 08:23:15

PS

PAGE 300

301

SPAIN

Russell, 1962), 8–9; Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). 25. George Trantas, ‘‘Comparing Legislative Instruments Across Nations,’’ in Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe, ed. Herbert Do¨ring (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 622–23. 26. Thomas D. Lancaster, ‘‘Complex Self-identification and Compounded Representation Federal Systems,’’ West European Politics 22, no. 2 (1999), 59–89. 27. Paul Heywood, ed., Politics and Policy in Democratic Spain: No Longer Different? (London: Frank Cass., 1999), 40. 28. Juan Jose´ Soloza´bal, ‘‘Spain: A Federation in the Making?’’ in Federalizing Europe? The Costs, Benefits, and Preconditions of Federal Political Systems, ed. Joachim Jens Hesse & Vincent Wright (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 240. 29. Jeanie Bukowski, ‘‘Decentralization in Spain: A Re-evaluation of Causal Factors,’’ South European Society & Politics 2, no. 3 (1997), 80–102. 30. Solozo´bal, ‘‘Spain: A Federation in the Making?’’; Lancaster, ‘‘Complex Self-Identification and Compounded Representation Federal Systems.’’ 31. Lancaster, ‘‘Complex Self-identification and Compounded Representation Federal Systems,’’ 78. 32. Spanish Constitution, Sections 148 and 149. 33. Solozo´bal, ‘‘Spain: A Federation in the Making?’’ 248–49. 34. Peter J. Donaghy and Michael T. Newton, Spain: A Guide to Political and Economic Institutions (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1989), chap. 7, 98–117. 35. Nathan, ‘‘Defining Modern Federalism,’’ 98.

Bibliography Alcubilla, Enrique Arnaldo. ‘‘De la Ley para la Reforma Polı´tica de 4 de enero de 1977 a la Ley de Elecciones Locales de 17 de julio de 1978,’’ El Derecho de Sufragio de los Emigrantes en el Ordenamiento Espan˜ol. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitutionales, 1995. Bukowski, Jeanie. ‘‘Decentralization in Spain: A Re-evaluation of Causal Factors.’’ South European Society & Politics 2, no. 3 (1997). Donaghy, Peter J., and Michael T. Newton. Spain: A Guide to Political and Economic Institutions. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1989, chapter 7. Gunther, Richard. ‘‘Constitutional Change in Contemporary Spain.’’ The Politics of Constitutional Change in Industrial Nations: Redesigning the State. Ed. Keith G. Banting and Richard Simeon. London: MacMillan Press, 1985. ———. ‘‘Electoral Laws, Party Systems, and Elites: The Case of Spain.’’ American Political Science Review 83, no. 3 (1989): 835–58. ———. ‘‘Spain: The Very Model of the Modern Elite Settlement.’’ Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe. Ed. John Higley and Richard Gunther. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Gunther, Richard, Giacomo Sani, and Goldie Shabad. Spain After Franco: The

................. 16928$

CH16

09-09-08 08:23:16

PS

PAGE 301

302

LYNN M. MAURER

Making of a Competitive Party System. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988. Hesse, Joachim Jens, and Vincent Wright, eds. Federalizing Europe? The Costs, Benefits, and Preconditions of Federal Political Systems. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. Paul, Heywood, ed. Politics and Policy in Democratic Spain: No Longer Different? London: Frank Cass, 1999. Lancaster, Thomas D. ‘‘Complex Self-Identification and Compounded Representation Federal Systems.’’ West European Politics 22, no. 2 (1999), 59–89. Lijphart, Arend. Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of TwentySeven Democracies 1945–1990. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. Linz, Juan J. ‘‘Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibrium.’’ The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes. Ed. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978. Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan. ‘‘Political Identities and Electoral Sequences: Spain, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia.’’ Daedalus 121 (1992): 123–37. Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan, eds. The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978. Macmahon, Arthur W. ‘‘The Problems of Federalism: A Survey.’’ Federalism Mature and Emergent. Ed. Arthur W. Macmahon. New York: Russell & Russell, 1962. Nathan, Richard P. ‘‘Defining Modern Federalism.’’ North American & Comparative Federalism: Essays for the 1990s, Papers from the Fourth Berkeley Seminar on Federalism. Ed. Harry N. Scheiber. Berkeley: University of California, Institute of Governmental Studies Press, 1992. Soto, J. L. Paniagua. ‘‘Spain: A Fledging Parliament.’’ Parliamentary Affairs 50 (1997): 410–22. Putnam, Robert D. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993. Soloza´bal, Juan Jose´. ‘‘Spain: A Federation in the Making?’’ Federalizing Europe? The Costs, Benefits, and Preconditions of Federal Political Systems.’’ Ed. Joachim Jens Hesse and Vincent Wright. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. Trantas, George. ‘‘Comparing Legislative Instruments Across Nations.’’ Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe. Ed. Herbert Do¨ring. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995.

................. 16928$

CH16

09-09-08 08:23:17

PS

PAGE 302

Spain: Secuirty Sector Reform from Transition to Consolidation of Democracy Jose´ A. Olmeda

THE FRANCOIST POLITICAL SYSTEM (1939–75) ORIGINATED IN A TRAGIC

military confrontation. What was initially perceived as an abortive pronunciamiento (1936), uncertain in its political and military leadership, continued as a civil conflict terminating in the victory of a coalition with an undisputed military and political leader, namely Franco (1939). The armed forces triumphed in an absolute armed conflict, in which the enemy was deemed the personification of evil and the object of which was to cause him as much harm as possible. The armed forces played a crucial role in creating and sustaining Franco’s authoritarian regime. One of the most important outcomes of this symbiotic relationship was the perception of the threat at the national level, emphasizing the theory of the domestic enemy. This political polarization implied a diminution of professional identity, impinging negatively upon individual and organizational professionalization. For almost fifty years, Spain had a severely limited role in international affairs. Spain and her armed forces did not share the formative influences and common experience of the modern European industrialized nations such as victory or defeat in World War II, postwar reconciliation and economic reconstruction, and the building of Atlantic and European transnational institutions. At the same time, throughout the Cold War, Spain was firmly anti-Communist. But this anti-Communism was matched by a similar hostility to liberal democracy. As a result, at the beginning of transition to democracy, the military had to reposition itself with respect to civil society, and, at the same time, had to rearticulate and justify a new professional role within a democratic polity. This was not going to be an easy process. Despite a tendency to view the Spanish process as linear and inevitable, the democratic transition, like all other political transformation of au303

................. 16928$

CH17

09-09-08 08:23:14

PS

PAGE 303

304

JOSE´ A. OLMEDA

thoritarian and totalitarian regimes, was extremely complicated and its outcome was far from predetermined. Scholarship on democratization has tended to focus on the need to remove military and police forces from authoritarian or totalitarian control, and has neglected the question of who controls the national intelligence community.1

The Military Reform The political transition implied an attenuation of the institutional presence of the armed forces, in terms of Burk.2 The military was central in the Francoist political system both as an actual or substantive actor in society, as well as in moral presence as an important institution in the normative order due to its role as socialization agent of male youth through compulsory military service. But the new political system also brought about a change in this presence. Gradually the military were not morally integrated with society, and were not substantively salient to society anymore; they had become alienated or isolated from the changing society, encapsulated from general societal change. There were more significant actors in the scene and the emergent normative order questioned military values. Therefore political and social change produced a kind of resentment toward democracy in the armed forces especially against the press who scrutinized its behavior for the first time in forty years. The armed forces accepted a quid pro quo of guarantees for their acquiescence to the transition. They were given guarantees concerning the unity of Spain, the consolidation of the reestablished monarchy, and respect for legality in the process of political change. They were given explicit commitments to modernize the armed forces through professionalism and the acquisition of new equipment and the training to operate it. The Royal Bylaw for the Armed Forces was sanctioned by the king the day following the sanctioning of the Constitution of 1978. The Royal Bylaw was elaborated by a military-only committee. This symbolic interchange condensed the mutual recognition of legitimacy which nurtures the political transition from dictatorship to democracy. On July 21, 1978, Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA [Basque Homeland and Freedom])—the terrorist branch of Basque nationalism—killed General Sa´nchez Ramos-Izquierdo and Lieutenant

................. 16928$

CH17

09-09-08 08:23:15

PS

PAGE 304

305

SPAIN: SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

Colonel Pe´rez Rodrı´guez while the Constitution was being debated in the Congress.3 It was clear at this point that the military was a target for the terrorists. But the main target was the Civil Guard (Guardia Civil), a security force of military nature, which took the burden of fighting ETA and incidentally suffered heavy casualties as a result. In fact, the armed forces and the security forces (Civil Guard, national police) would carry the heaviest casualties in the transition (1976–82). The military recognised the threat posed by terrorist Basque nationalism in part because they were frequently the target for ETA activity. However, ETA admitted that they did not want to provoke the coup of February 23, 1981. There were rumblings of discontent within the armed forces for a number of reasons including: the legalization of the Communist Party in 1977; the explicit recognition in the 1978 Constitution of the multicultural character of Spanish society: and the murders by ETA of military officers and policemen. It seems that ETA used the assassination to force the government into accepting the terrorists’ demands, to be acknowledged as belligerent, and to open political negotiations.4 ETA did not realize the effects of its own actions. The control modus of the armed forces in the Franco regime lay primarily in the personal leadership of Franco, the winner of the civil war also known as the generalı´simo, and, secondly, in the existence of three different ministries, one for each service, where there were no civilians employed and the military made all decisions. The armed forces were literally out of control.5 With the death of Franco and the beginning of transition, King Juan Carlos—Franco’s chosen ‘‘heir’’—became the supreme commander of the armed forces. King Juan Carlos had proved effective during the 1975 Sahara crisis when Morocco invaded the Spanish Sahara, meanwhile Franco became ill. Civilian supremacy was not at the top of the agenda at the beginning of transition because there were too many other urgent problems to solve, for example, the legal-constitutional means to pursue the political change. There was a lack of will to ensure civilian control of the military because the government—under Prime Minister Sua´rez—believed that the best way to secure the support of the military was to be seen to be understanding toward it. The idea was to get the support and advice of a respected high military chief to obtain the understanding, acquiescence, and loyalty of the armed forces; understanding would perhaps produce loyalty, but using a military leader to reach it is certainly not a type of civilian control. The effect of the 1976

................. 16928$

CH17

09-09-08 08:23:16

PS

PAGE 305

306

JOSE´ A. OLMEDA

appointment of General Gutie´rrez Mellado—following the resignation of General De Santiago—as a vice prime minister and minister of defense was twofold, as it had an impact on both society and upon the military. The presence of a man in uniform in the cabinet was intended to guarantee a strict observance of legal provisions and symbolize peaceful change. He needed to convince his comrades-in-arms of the righteousness of political reform and of military modernization. These aims would mean only a partial fulfillment of the requirements of civilian supremacy and were based on an erroneous analysis of the balance of power inside the government itself. This view cursified as ‘opponents of change’ (inmovilistas) only the elder generation of military officers when in fact the opposition was larger than that.6 By July 1977 the Department of Defense was created. It was modeled on the departments of defense in other democracies and on the previous projects from General Dı´ez Alegrı´a, in charge of modernizing the military sectors. Initially, the Department of Defense was barely a bureaucracy but gradually it assumed greater responsibilities. By the early 1980s it was handling budgets, personnel, and policy. In March 1979 a civilian minister of defense was appointed; he was the only civilian in the department until 1981. Only in 1984 the Joint Chiefs became a consultative and not a command body, and the minister of defense became responsible for overall military policy making, thanks to the measures implemented by the new Socialist government. From then on the Ministry of Defense became the bureaucratic vehicle for civilians to exercise control over the armed forces and its powers continued to expand. In addition, several more mistakes were made. First, Gutie´rrez Mellado pledged to discuss the political measures of the government with his military comrades in the barracks before Prime Minister Sua´rez made his decisions concerning political change to democracy public.7 Secondly, seniority and political loyalty— not simply competence—were the criteria for promotion to the highest posts within the military. Third, there was a lack of criteria to implement civilian control through the organizational design of the new politico-military organs like the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the minister of defense and his department, the prime minister and vice prime minister of the government, the Committee of National Defense, and the king. Fourth, an intelligence service to inform the minister of defense, reporting with priority to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had been created by Gutie´rrez Mellado within the new Ministry of Defense and this remained a

................. 16928$

CH17

09-09-08 08:23:17

PS

PAGE 306

307

SPAIN: SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

military prerogative.8 Fifth, numerous actions by conspiring military hardliners were not severely sanctioned. In practice the government chose to deal with the problem by muddling through, rather than making decisions. Finally, the resignation of Sua´rez as prime minister provided a formal opportunity for the coup and triggered the plans for it—as was stated by the accused in the subsequent trial resulting from the attempted coup, although, as has been observed, ‘‘Military explanations do not explain military interventions.’’9 The coup involved several tactical moves including: a mixture of coup de main,10 the seizure of the Congress by Tejero and his civil guards in order to kidnap the government and the parliament, a classical pronunciamiento11 of Spanish nineteenth century, Milans del Bosch’s edict decreeing his seizure of power in the III Military Region, deploying tanks and armored vehicles in the city of Valencia, and the seeking of support from the rest of the military regions.12 The culmination of the coup would have been the presence of General Armada in front of the kidnapped government and deputies, invoking the power vacuum and offering himself as president of the new government. That is a kind of soft coup like the one conducted by de Gaulle in 1958. These three different strategic lines clashed instead of converging because there was a lack of planning and coordination, a lack of military professionalism, so to speak, in the political intervention. This hastiness has been attributed by some to Sua´rez’s dismissal,13 which somehow precipitated the coup because of the opportunity window offered by the election of the new president in the Congress. Tejero did not accept the authority of Armada when he appeared at the Congress. Milans was not able to lead the captain generals of the remaining military regions. The entire operation was a failure. After the failed coup, the trial of the leaders of the coup highlighted a symbolic loss of power due to the ensuing spectacle of mutual accusations and lack of courage to accept responsibility for their actions.14 It was the first time since the civil war that military opponents to liberal democracy were accused and condemned before a military court. The hardliners lost their honor and despised their supreme commander, the king, while the image of the military in Spanish public opinion was badly tarnished. The level of support for the military in public opinion did not recover until 1994 following the humanitarian and peacekeeping operations in which the armed forces were involved. That being said, however, a more fine-grained analysis

................. 16928$

CH17

09-09-08 08:23:17

PS

PAGE 307

308

JOSE´ A. OLMEDA

may reveal that in comparison with political institutions such as the cabinet the military were still highly valued. The process of trials lasted from February 18 to June 3, 1982. The differences between the short petition of years in prison for the leaders of the coup of the military prosecution, the decision from the Supreme Council of Military Justice, and the final judgment by the national Supreme Court were significant. It was very important that the military accused were first judged by their own comrades. But much more significant was the decision made by the government to appeal to the Supreme Court. Thus, it was a civilian court which had the final word in a sentence against the military leaders of the coup. As a result, the civilian court had supremacy in the ruling. The government formed after the coup was the first without any military members in the cabinet since the beginning of the civil war. The aim of the government was to establish civilian control over the military, a policy that was finally at the top of their agenda. In doing this the government improved the image of the king as much as it could due to the campaign of the extreme Right against him.15 Nonetheless, the minister of defense sought to reassure the military over the shift to regional autonomy under the new democratic regime. The presence of ‘‘nationalist’’ political forces (demanding autonomy) in the Basque Country and in Catalonia was perceived as a threat to the unity of the fatherland by the military. So they looked with suspicion toward the self-government of the regions granted by the new Constitution and exerted through the Autonomy Statutes. The unity and cohesion of the armed forces was preserved, too, by limiting the number of military personnel accused of involvement in the coup. There was also a dilution of responsibilities for the lower hierarchical echelons participating in the coup attempt who got minor or nonguilty sentences. In short, there was a general change of attitude in the government about the role of the military. Consequently, there was a quick reaction against the so-called Manifiesto de los cien (Manifesto of the hundred), put out by middle- and lower-ranking officers protesting against negative press coverage of the military matters, and a move seen as being in favor of the leaders of the coup then under trial. The Manifesto argued that the military ‘‘in order to better fulfill their mission, do not need to be professionalized, democratized, or purged.’’ Legislation on budgetary appropriations for investment in the armed forces was promulgated in order to guarantee a minimum

................. 16928$

CH17

09-09-08 08:23:18

PS

PAGE 308

309

SPAIN: SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

cumulative purchase power of 4.432 percent to the final allocations of that year.16 This meant that for the first time since the civil war, there was a formal guarantee, irrespective of political majorities, of budgetary appropriations for the military granting them the financial resources for the improvement of equipment and an overall process of modernization. Financial comfort was a sure way to build mutual trust between elected authorities and the military. A growing level of political maturity gradually came to underpin the Spanish government’s ability to deal with—and ultimately to control—the nation’s armed forces. Spain’s entrance into NATO, in May 1982, was undoubtedly an extremely important incentive for a more modernized, politically uninvolved, professional military. Spain’s accession to the Atlantic Alliance was a key asset to redress the threat perception of the armed forces from the domestic to the international scene. Indeed, the government benefited tremendously from Spanish membership in NATO. First, by sending officers and civilians to NATO headquarters in Belgium and in the regional commands, the officers involved learned about all aspects of the armed forces in modern democracies. Officers also learned that civilian control of the military was the norm as far as their alliance partners were concerned. In addition, NATO helped to train a group of middle- and upper-level bureaucrats who could exercise civilian control over the armed forces.17

The Intelligence Services, the Police, and the Civil Guard At the end of 1975, as many as ten different police, military, and intelligence services were competing with one another, instead of pooling and coordinating their efforts under a single authority. The Higher Defense Intelligence Center (CESID) was brought into existence by Prime Minister Sua´rez because of his express wish to have a new intelligence service that would break with the methods associated with the days of Franco’s dictatorship, one that would become a staunch ally in the difficult transition to democracy. However, CESID developed from the fusion of the Central Service of Documentation (SECED), an entity involved in internal intelligence during the authoritarian regime, and the intelligence service of the military High Staff, the upper echelon of the armed forces. Thus, the first Spanish intelligence service was created in 1977 at the same time as the Department

................. 16928$

CH17

09-09-08 08:23:19

PS

PAGE 309

310

JOSE´ A. OLMEDA

of Defense. The royal decree that created the Department of Defense established that the CESID was going to depend in organizational and functional terms on this department, and that its mission was ‘‘to collect, assess, interpret and facilitate to the minister of Defense any information of interest for or necessary to National Defense.’’18 At the same time the military chain of command retained its own information services.19 This is why the intelligence service has been considered a military prerogative since then, because of its organizational dependence, its predominantly military staff, and its type of analysis. Following the failed coup in 1981, the intelligence service was reformed. Barrack surveillance was included among its new missions; effectively taking this responsibility from the three distinct military intelligence services.20 Although, there was still a requirement to report in this regard to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition, it was decided that the reformed service would depend functionally upon the prime minister and be drawn organically from the Ministry of Defense.21 The Socialist governments of the period 1982–96 did not alter this situation substantially; neither did the center-right popular reforms during the period 1996–2004. The reforms of 2002 generated great expectations (in contrast to what were regarded as the timid attempts at improving matters introduced after each of the different crises in the mid1990s). The reform was composed of two laws. The first replaced the old CESID with a new, dapper National Intelligence Center (Centro Nacional de Inteligencia—CNI) that continues its organizational links with the Ministry of Defense but is now functionally dependent on the prime minister’s office. The second law regulates prior judicial approval of CNI activities. Internally, the structure has been made more flexible to increase its capacity to adapt to threats that are in constant mutation and has stepped up its controls in view of an increased number of agents and the development of internal networks for electronic communication. With regard to objectives being set by the executive, important changes have indeed been made. The process has been formalized through a council on intelligence affairs that brings together members of the Spanish intelligence community. The law states that this council shall propose the annual objectives for the CNI to the president of the government; these objectives shall then be incorporated into a proposal for an intelligence directive that will at a later date have to be approved by the executive. In the law relating to the CNI, a single article es-

................. 16928$

CH17

09-09-08 08:23:19

PS

PAGE 310

311

SPAIN: SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

tablishes parliamentary control over the intelligence service. This function falls to the existing parliamentary committee that oversees and supervises secret funds.22 Some of these changes have been nominal and have not modified the organizational design of the intelligence service, instead maintaining the military prerogative because of its functional dependence on the Department of Defense. Since its inception the intelligence service inhibited the proper development of intelligence in all branches of the military. As the intelligence service was located in the Department of Defense, it has been the main provider of intelligence for the peacekeeping and military missions of the armed forces. If the intelligence service was located in a civilian agency, the military intelligence branches would have freely developed in organizational and personnel terms. During its transition to democracy Spain experienced an increase in terrorism from the likes of ETA, with its mixture of nationalist and revolutionary terrorism, GRAPO (Grupo de Resistencia Antifascista Primero de Octubre [Group of Antifascist Resistance October First]), a revolutionary terrorist organization and a minor nationalist terrorist organization with a loose network of extreme Right cells. These groups were at the time infiltrated by members of the security services who were hostile to the democratization process and who used terrorism as a way to destabilize the reform of the political system. These groups based their beliefs on a narrow idea of patriotism, and justified their actions on grounds of self-defense.23 The Franco regime’s authoritarian treatment of Basque nationalism fed the emergence of ETA, in part due to the existence of grievances and the lack of opportunity for political participation. Thus, a consequence of this mistreatment was going to be a heavy legacy on the shoulders of the new democratic regime which reacted to the ETA’s escalating campaign (1978–80) in a way regarded by some as inept, lacking understanding, subtlety, and practical efficiency. Such a response was seen by some as a result of a lack of adequate command and control by the executive over the activities of its security agencies. Cases of abuse reported from Spain’s Basque Provinces, especially during the crucial years of the democratic transition, appear to fall within this category. These were mostly attributed to agents and officials who had been trained under the Franco regime and who were, as a result, authoritarian and repressive in their approach to the maintenance of law and order.24 The upsurge in violence registered during Spain’s transition to democracy, and especially

................. 16928$

CH17

09-09-08 08:23:20

PS

PAGE 311

312

JOSE´ A. OLMEDA

during the 1978–80 period, was to some extent a consequence of the transfers of command, personnel shuffles, and organizational restructuring involved in the changeover from an authoritarian to a democratic regime. Until the latter months of 1980, counterterrorist policies implemented by successive governments of the Unio´n de Centro Democra´tico (UCD [Democratic Center Union]) had been particularly erratic. The guardians of public order at that time proved to be incapable of establishing a coherent and effective series of measures to replace the predominantly militaryinspired responses that the Franco regime applied to all internal security matters. The policing apparatus which the Franco dictatorship had left in place was only partially susceptible to pressures from the parliamentary opposition and the informal political arrangements that greased the wheels of the democratic transition. Some veteran specialists were reclassified or given new duties, and the hierarchy was shuffled by these changes in organizational positions, but it was not until 1979 that the security forces were given the thorough-going shake-up that was required. The whys and wherefores of this delay may be quite simply put: The politicians were afraid of provoking a rebellion by the militarized security forces, as evidenced by the eloquent testimony of Rodolfo Martı´n Villa, first minister of the interior (1976–79).25 As a result, the information-gathering mechanisms which are of critical importance in the fight against terrorism were not only inadequate but frequently operated with little government oversight. A total lack of coordination between the intelligence arms answerable to the various state security services was self-evident, indeed, notorious. Under such circumstances, it is scarcely to be wondered that most successful results in counterterrorist operations were obtained at the local or provincial level, though these, of course, were limited in their impact. Given such an outlook, the Spanish government had no choice but to turn to neighboring countries for intelligence and direct help in dealing with its terrorist problem.26 The national police was the agency preferred by the UCD politicians who were responsible for internal security issues from 1977 to 1982. At the same time, Martı´n Villa, the first minister of the interior, went abroad looking for advice on counterterrorism methods and approaches. In July and November of 1978, he traveled to the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom to find out about specialized antiterrorist units and appropriate information-gathering systems. The executive wanted

................. 16928$

CH17

09-09-08 08:23:21

PS

PAGE 312

313

SPAIN: SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

to increase the number of agents, to articulate adequate intelligence services, and to modernize technical resources within the police in order to improve efficiency in the fight against terrorism, a threat that by then was undoubtedly perceived as a major danger. However, as terrorism continued to escalate, the then civilian minister of interior was replaced in April 1979 by an army general. During this period, an office of the central government for security matters was opened in the Basque autonomous community and also in the autonomous community of Navarre, headed by another general linked to the national police.27 The point at which counterterrorist policy began to attain the operational agility it hitherto had so conspicuously lacked and, thus, to achieve the results it had so desperately failed to achieve coincided with the naming of Juan Jose´ Roso´n as interior minister (1980–82). That was the point at which terrorism was at its most bloody and feverish peak and the government was still unable to get a grip on the police forces because elected authorities shared a certain mistrust toward unreformed security forces. There was also a lack of political consensus as to how the terrorist threat should be addressed. Indeed, cases of insubordination within the police were fairly frequent during those years (1977– 81). The new minister lost no time putting his department in order and did not hesitate to use his authority to bring into line and coordinate the efforts of the various policing bodies, including those that had been conspicuous for their reluctance to pursue right-wing groups that were all but flaunting their impunity. In the wake of the abortive attempt of military coup in February 1981, the details of which have been explained earlier, Roso´n made a long-overdue effort to create a professional intelligence´ nico para la Lucha congathering apparatus, created a Mando U tra el Terrorismo (Single Command for the Fight against Terrorism) for coordinating the Interior Department, the police, the Civil Guard, and the intelligence service. And finally special operations groups and antiterrorist units from both the national police (the Grupos Especiales de Operaciones [Special Groups of Operations]) and the Civil Guard (the Unidades Antiterroristas Rurales [Rural Counterterrorist Units]) were deployed in the Basque Country. All this paled, however, alongside the bravery he showed in pushing for the creation of legal and administrative measures, such as selective amnesties, lowering the political costs of exit from terrorist organizations, thus allowing convicted terrorists who laid down their arms to regain a place in society. The most visible result of all this was the unprecedented

................. 16928$

CH17

09-09-08 08:23:22

PS

PAGE 313

314

JOSE´ A. OLMEDA

self-dissolution of ETA [political-military] late in September 1982, after an earlier declaration of cease-fire, and subsequent negotiations.28 Following the victory of the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) in the October 1982 general elections, efforts were made to continue and further develop existing counterterrorist policies. The primary guidelines around which the strategy evolved may be summarized as follows. First, an emphasis was put on more effective police work and on channeling greater human and logistic resources to this end. Secondly, special security plans were drawn up for most contingencies, and, third, considerable progress was made in developing infrastructure for a coordinating authority in the intelligence sector, despite some remaining confrontations eventually observed between the national police and the Civil Guard. As a result, security forces obtained a better idea of how the terrorist organizations were internally articulated and of the identity and likely whereabouts at any given moment of its militants. Next, as Spain gained an increasingly high profile on the international scene after her accession to the European Union (1985) and Spain’s NATO membership, the government finessed a number of diplomatic initiatives aimed at producing specific accords on intergovernment cooperation on terrorist questions. Then, over a period of time, it became possible, though not always easy, to bring legislation gradually into line so as to allow for a more effective policing action.

Conclusion From a very large military the Spanish armed forces today are much smaller, an all-volunteer force, internationally oriented, and a nonpartisan component of the democratic system. The intelligence service has remained a military prerogative in spite of reforms to the contrary. The police and the Civil Guard have evolved in a very democratic, professional, and efficient way. However, parliamentary oversight for defense and especially intelligence matters has been very weak. There is no legislative body assigned the task of supervising the intelligence service; there are no norms regulating access by deputies to the information needed to exercise control, and there is an apparent lack of interest on the part of the opposition and successive governments in knowing what intelligence agents are up to. How have these changes happened? There have been some re-

................. 16928$

CH17

09-09-08 08:23:22

PS

PAGE 314

315

SPAIN: SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

markable paradoxes in the process of achieving civilian supremacy in Spain. Whereas the center-right governments found themselves in a conflictive relationship with the military, the Socialists chose a policy of incremental change, implementing the reform of armed forces thanks to very effective collaborators among high-ranking, reform-minded officers in all three services. There are two reasons for this development. First, the principle of civilian supremacy was implemented by the last UCD government, thanks to the trial of the leaders of the attempted coup of 1981 and the final appeal to the Supreme Court by the government. Secondly, the electoral support for the new Socialist governments, coming out of the general election victories of 1982, 1986, and 1989, permitted them to implement civilian control of a more comprehensive and democratic type. The persistence of the terrorist threat helped to legitimize the security agencies in their effort to preserve their institutional continuity during the political change. Since the terrorist threat escalated, the security services were compelled to professionalize their organizational structures and personnel. These services had previously been important pillars of Franco’s dictatorship, effectively harboring individuals with decidedly authoritarian values. However, the security services also defended democracy from Basque terrorism, which was supported by Spanish public opinion. Thus a kind of functional imperative of organizational effectiveness prevailed against a possible dismantlement or restructuring of the security services. This may help to explain the lack of reprisals during Spain’s transition to democracy.

Notes 1. Steven C. Boraz and Thomas Bruneau, ‘‘Democracy and Effectiveness,’’ Journal of Democracy 17, no. 3 (July 2006) 28–42. 2. J. Burk, ‘‘The Military’s Presence in American Society, 1950–2000,’’ in Soldiers and Civilians. The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security, ed. Peter D. Feaver, and Richard H. Kohn (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), 247–74. 3. General Sa´nchez was the first general of the armed forces killed since civil war. The first military killed by ETA was Major Imaz Martı´nez on November 26, 1977. 4. Florencio Domı´nguez Iribarren, ETA: estrategia organizativa y actuaciones 1978–1992 (Bilbao: Universidad del Paı´s Vasco, 1998), 225–31. 5. Jose´ A. Olmeda, Las Fuerzas Armadas en el Estado Franquista. Participacio´n polı´tica, influencia presupuestaria y profesionalizacio´n, 1939–1975 (Madrid: Fundacio´n Ortega y Gasset, El Arquero, 1988).

................. 16928$

CH17

09-09-08 08:23:23

PS

PAGE 315

316

JOSE´ A. OLMEDA

6. A note from the intelligence service (CESID), dated September 20, 1978, stated that 45 or 50 percent of the officers were remarkably rightist or ultrarightist and they were supported by the ultrarightist press. At the same time, a confidential survey to the civil population revealed that 58 percent polled that the position of the military was in the barracks but 37 percent approved of their intervention to ensure ‘‘order and prudence,’’ see Fernando Puell de la Villa, Gutie´rrez Mellado. Un militar del siglo XX (1912–1995) (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 1997), 196–97. 7. See his General Report 1, September 1976, as Army Chief of Staff in Gutie´rrez Mellado, 1981, 41–58. 8. Royal Decree 2.723, November 2, 1977. Its creation had been announced by Royal Decree 1448, July 4, 1977. 9. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press 1968), 194. 10. Action carried out by an armed force with surprise and audacity. 11. Coup d’etat by proclamation. 12. In 1874 Captain General Pavı´a assaulted the Congress in a similar vein, ending the I Republic. The cover of the weekly Heraldo Espan˜ol, August 7–13, 1980, depicted a drawing of a horse, and the heading ‘‘Who will ride this horse? A general is wanted’’; in the corresponding article the example of Pavı´a was invoked and the name of General Armada was mentioned. 13. Adolfo Sua´rez was the first president of the government after the democratic elections of 1977. 14. I use symbolic loss as implying a diminution of legitimacy of the military institution, impeding its function more or less effectively. This lack of agreement or consensus of beliefs about the armed forces and their proper role implies a diminution of the moral presence of the institution in the normative order of society and a loss of status of its members. 15. With his decisive intervention the king became a target for a new propaganda campaign of the extreme right. The version against the king, accusing him of changing sides during the coup is inconsistent with his behavior as the pilot of political change and with his familiar political experience. It seems that General Armada, who had been professor of the young prince and secretary of his house, utilized this personal relationship to present himself as a ‘‘royal ambassador’’ and aspiring president of the future government originated by the coup. 16. Law 44, July 7, 1982. 17. Thomas Bruneau, ‘‘Spanish Case Study’’ (Monterey, CA: The Center for Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School, November 2000). 18. Royal Decree 1558, July 4, 1977. CESID’s mission in Article 21. 19. Royal Decree 2723, November 2, 1977. 20. Royal Decree 726, March 27, 1981. 21. Ministerial Order 135, September 30, 1982. 22. Antonio M. Dı´az Ferna´ndez, ‘‘Halfway Down the road to Supervision of the Spanish Intelligence Services,’’ Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 3 (June 2006) 440—56. 23. Inserted between parentheses the date of founding of the organization or of the period of its criminal activities. 24. Fernando Reinares, ‘‘Democratic Regimes, Internal Security Policy and the Threat of Terrorism,’’ Australian Journal of Politics and History 44, no. 3 (1998) 369.

................. 16928$

CH17

09-09-08 08:23:23

PS

PAGE 316

317

SPAIN: SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

25. Rodolfo Martı´n Villa, Al servicio del Estado (Barcelona: Planeta, 1984), 150–58. 26. Fernando Reinares, ‘‘The Political Conditioning of Collective Violence: Regime Change and Insurgent Terrorism in Spain,’’ Research on Democracy and Society, 3 (1996) 313. 27. Fernando Reinares, ‘‘Political Conditioning,’’ 318–19. 28. ETA had split in two factions, so-called ‘‘military’’ or ETA (m) and political-military or ETA (pm) in 1974, the first did not accept the new democratic regime, the latter did, abandoning terrorism, and shifting to an electoral strategy in the date mentioned in the text. See Fernando Reinares, ‘‘Political Conditioning,’’ 313.

................. 16928$

CH17

09-09-08 08:23:23

PS

PAGE 317

Between Power and Empowerment: Building Political Institutions in Postsettlement Sudan Simon Roughneen When things are suddenly headed toward an agreement the work is hardly over. It has only begun.1

IN 2006, SUDAN MARKED FIFTY YEARS SINCE BECOMING THE FIRST SUB-

Saharan state to gain independence during decolonization. All but eleven of those years have been marked by large-scale civil unrest and violent conflict in Africa’s largest country. The latest phase, since 1983, has seen two million killed and over four million displaced in what was conventionally depicted as a North versus South, Muslim-Arab versus Christian-animist-African conflict. However, the North-South conflict contributed to two separate intra-Northern conflicts in eastern Sudan, and most seriously, the still-ongoing Darfur conflict in western Sudan. On January 5, 2005, the main North-South antagonists—the ruling National Congress Party (NCP)2 and the Southern Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A)—signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The agreement is designed to ‘‘provide a model of good governance in the Sudan that will help create a solid basis to preserve peace and make unity attractive . . . [the parties] . . . therefore undertake to adhere to the letter and the spirit of the CPA so as to guarantee lasting peace, security for all, justice and equality for the Sudan.’’3 Three months before the signing of the CPA, UN Special Envoy Jan Pronk outlined three conditions necessary for implementing a settlement in Sudan: legal and physical protection of people; promotion of poverty reduction and sustainable development via fair distribution of resources; and enhancement of political representation and participation through constitutional and institutional arrangements.4 The CPA reflects this tripartite 318

................. 16928$

CH18

09-09-08 08:23:14

PS

PAGE 318

BETWEEN POWER AND EMPOWERMENT

319

view—with provisions for security, wealth sharing, and power sharing forming the core of the settlement. The CPAs various sectors need to function together if the CPA is to settle Sudan’s longest conflict. However, this chapter will focus on power sharing, and addresses the question: How can democratic political institutions contribute to Sudan becoming a peaceful state? The CPA structure locates political institution building in the context of power sharing. This means empowering hitherto disenfranchised and marginalized regions of Sudan by creating effective and legitimate institutions that provide equal access to decision making to the Sudanese people—a process that will not be complete without addressing the local- and national-level causes of conflict in Darfur. Power in Sudan is monopolized by the NCP in the North, and to a lesser extent by the SPLM in South Sudan. New political institutions will not lead to a realignment of authority unless current power structures in Sudan are altered fundamentally.5 The CPA is a complex and multifaceted agreement, and requires implementation in a country with a history of corrupt military rule and violent conflict. Sudan has known only three years of democratic government since independence, from 1986 to 1989. Amid these immense challenges, building effective political institutions is difficult. To date, progress in implementing the CPA has been slow. The NCP is stalling on core issues, while the SPLM lacks cohesion and capacity, as it makes the transition from an autocratic military resistance movement to a political party, partner in national government, and leader of a devolved regional government with the potential for secession. The CPA leaves crucial issues unanswered: The border between North and South Sudan will be delineated at a later date; the boundaries of the disputed oil-rich Abyei region will also be determined in the future. The process for sharing oil revenues is outlined in the CPA, though sectoral transparency remains elusive. The composition of the Sudanese state remains unclear—as it is not until 2011 that South Sudan will hold a referendum to decide whether to secede or remain part of Sudan. Democratic institution building is integral to preventing a return to violence.6 Democracy aims to inculcate behavioral norms such as negotiation, compromise, and cooperation among political actors. As such, democracy can promote peace by giving hitherto marginalized groups access to decision making and resources. However, the NCP seems intent on mismanaging and undermining Sudan’s new institutions. This may undermine de-

................. 16928$

CH18

09-09-08 08:23:15

PS

PAGE 319

320

SIMON ROUGHNEEN

mocracy in Sudan and endow factions with the belief that military action is a preferable option in seeking political and economic ends. Creating an inclusive and accountable political system in Sudan is vital to ensuring that a country historically racked by violent conflict and continued militarization develops the means for attaining power and achieving political and economic goals through political bargaining under the rule-of-law. In Sudan and beyond, poorly managed democratic institutions can also ‘‘inflame communal conflicts [and] mobilise ethnicity’’ while ‘‘a combination of majoritarian political institutions and elections can make things worse.’’7 Sudan is far from being a postconflict society. While the NCPSPLM relationship is formally one of partnership, in reality mutual distrust is rife.8 Moreover, up to four hundred thousand people have died in the western Darfur region since early 2003, with another 2.5 million seeking refuge in Chad or internally displaced (IDPs) in Sudan. The Darfur conflict now dovetails with wars simmering in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR), where both countries have been accused of supporting Darfurian rebels, and who in turn accuse Khartoum of aiding Chadian and CAR dissident fighters. Ensuring the success of the CPA will be extremely challenging in such a prohibitive context. South Sudan President Salva Kiir stated that ‘‘I consider that there will be no comprehensive peace until Darfur is resolved.’’9 The October 2006 Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA) with the Eastern Front is welcome, but may signify the NCP desire to foreclose on Northern issues in advance of the 2009 elections.10 The Eastern Front is an Eritrean-backed coalition of the Beja Congress—a military-political rebel group representing the Beja, who comprise the majority population in parts of the east—and the Rashaida Free Lions. The Rashaida are nomads, descended from Bedouin immigrants, that settled in eastern Sudan in the nineteenth century. The Eastern Front engaged in low-level attacks on Sudanese Armed Force (SAF) positions, in protest against what they see as socioeconomic and political marginalization of the east by the NCP. Links have been established between the Eastern Front and elements of the Darfurian resistance, notably the quasi-Islamist Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), since incorporated into the National Redemption Front (NRF), the new anti-DPA alliance in Darfur. Sporadic violence continues in Southern Sudan; tribal disputes over land and cattle continue; various armed militias remain at large, and the Ugandan Lords Resistance Army (LRA) has carried out acts

................. 16928$

CH18

09-09-08 08:23:16

PS

PAGE 320

BETWEEN POWER AND EMPOWERMENT

321

of violence in southern Sudan since the CPA was signed. Meanwhile, the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and its almost ten thousand peacekeepers are present in South Sudan.11 A criticism made of the CPA (and of the peacemaking process that preceded the agreement)—was that the CPA was too narrowly focused on ‘‘north-south issues’’ and neglected the centerperiphery nature of Sudan’s power politics.12 A separate Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed in May 2006 but only includes one rebel faction from that region. The Sudanese government, its Janjaweed proxy militia, and the pro-DPA rebels continue to harass the beleaguered civilian population while also confronting the anti-DPA rebel alliance known as the National Redemption Front (NRF)—itself guilty of attacking civilians and harassing aid workers. At the time of writing, the Sudanese government had refused to allow a UN peacekeeping force to enter Darfur, despite the fact that fighting and civilian displacement increased in the months since the DPA was signed.13 The CPA is not as comprehensive as its nomenclature suggests; it nonetheless mandates over fifty national bodies and commissions to be formed, with multiple systems and levels of government, from the state level to the regional Government of South Sudan (GoSS) and at the national level the Government of National Unity (GNU). All of these are part of Sudan’s democratization and political institution building—but here Sudan’s new or impending executive, legislature, elections, and devolution will be examined in the context of Sudan’s political dynamics, to assess how political institutions and democracy are contributing to peace.

A Comprehensively Paradoxical Agreement—Unity, Devolution, or Secession? The CPA is based on an asymmetric federal model of government for the interim period, giving the South significant autonomy in the form of the Government of South Sudan (GoSS), with limited intranorthern and intrasouthern devolution to state levels. This will be maintained should South Sudan elect to remain part of Sudan in 2011. However, the entire transitional process is overshadowed by the Southern self-determination referendum and Abyei status referendum. Both referendums are scheduled for 2011, and it appears that both the NCP and SPLM believe

................. 16928$

CH18

09-09-08 08:23:16

PS

PAGE 321

322

SIMON ROUGHNEEN

that Abyei will defect to the South. Therein lies the paradox of the CPA. Can peace be maintained by an agreement that encourages both unity and devolution and also secession for the South? Indeed, the NCP fought to prevent secession in the first place. Autonomy is usually unsatisfactory to both sides in such conflicts—not enough for those seeking self-determination, and too much of a concession by those seeking to maintain the status quo. In Sudan, however, the stakes are raised even higher by Sudan’s potential oil wealth.14 South Sudan’s right to self-determination was accepted by the NCP in 2002, and it is certainly an advance in procedural democracy that Sudan’s most marginalized and traumatized civilians are entitled to make the ultimate decision about their status.15 NCP prevarication on crucial issues such as Abyei, the North-South boundary, and sharing of oil revenues/oil sector transparency must be seen in the light of the South’s potential secession, and undermines what likelihood there is of effective democratic expression being granted to Sudanese citizens. The CPA-mandated North-South Border Committee has met six times—but has yet to engage in meaningful demarcation activity, which hinders sharing of oil revenues. Sudan’s oil sector has expanded greatly in recent years, now constituting 85 percent of export earnings and providing 0.6 percent of the world’s supply. Total oil revenue for 2006 was estimated at about $7.6 billion. The CPA stipulates that during the interim period 50 percent of revenues from Southern oil must go to the GoSS, with 2 percent going directly to the state administration where oil is located, in North and South.16 However, what remains to be determined is exactly how much oil will belong to the North and South respectively as the North-South boundaries are not yet confirmed. Moreover, slow progress has been made in the establishment of the National Petroleum Commission—the commission was part of the Wealth Sharing Agreement in the CPA. This hinders sectoral transparency and curtails the revenue base for the GoSS. Intra-Southern social and political issues will be affected by the referendum as well. An independent South would likely be dominated by the Dinka ethnic group, historically the core of the SPLM. Other southern ethnic groups—particularly the Nuer—may not be entirely positive about southern secession should it lead to a de facto Dinka state.17 Violent Nuer-Dinka conflict took place during the 1990s, as SPLM/A splinter groups and other armed groups sponsored by the NIF emerged to challenge Garang and the SPLM/A dominance of the South’s rebel-

................. 16928$

CH18

09-09-08 08:23:17

PS

PAGE 322

BETWEEN POWER AND EMPOWERMENT

323

lion. While the devolved GoSS Legislative Assembly is running well and vigorous debate has taken place, just how representative South Sudan’s regional democracy will be remains to be seen. As with the NCP in the North, the SPLM has the advantages over political rivals in the South by virtue of being the incumbent in the GoSS and signatory to the CPA. The SPLM has held just two national congresses in its history and has repeatedly postponed internal elections, as well as historically suppressing civil society and media in the South, although this has been relaxed since the CPA was signed. The buildup to the 2009 elections will reveal whether Southerners trust the SPLM to take the region forward to secession, or whether rival political and ethnic entities emerge to challenge SPLM hegemony in the South.18 Before the 2008 elections, a national census must be completed. With over four million southerners displaced by war, the SPLM is keen to ensure the successful return of IDPs and refugees. Return will sharpen South Sudan’s postconflict recovery needs and the role of international donors in this region. Outlining recovery and development needs in Southern Sudan is material enough for a chapter in itself—but a number of statistics and anecdotes are helpful here to illustrate: Juba is the region’s bestdeveloped urban area but, as of mid-2006, still has no running water or electricity. Basic facilities such as water, sanitation, and healthcare are provided almost exclusively by aid agencies and NGOs, and other infrastructure is non-existent. Primary education enrollment was only 23 percent in the South in 2005, while over 90 percent of the population lives on less than $1 per day.19 At the level of CPA implementation, on October 14, 2006, the National Ministry for Justice stated that it had received only six of ten draft interim state constitutions for Southern states. This highlights the lack of human resources and capacity in the South. The model state constitutions were drafted in accordance with both the Interim National Constitution and the Southern Interim Constitution.20

Going to the Polls: Winner takes All? Elections are a superficial barometer of the workings of democracy, and have been used by the international community as a get-out-quick clause in transitional settings, as in Cambodia in 1993. Alternatively elections have been held too soon after

................. 16928$

CH18

09-09-08 08:23:18

PS

PAGE 323

324

SIMON ROUGHNEEN

settlement as guarantors sought local legitimization for the transition process. However, as in Bosnia and Herzegovina after Dayton, these merely recycled the sentiments and grievances pertaining to the conflict that preceded settlement, and resulted in little more than ethnic censuses. Elections in Sudan are scheduled for 2009, four years into the transitional period. After the 1989 NIF military coup, political parties were outlawed, and gatherings of more than five people required prior approval by the state. In 2000, presidential and legislative elections were held, returning the NCP and current GNU President, Oman alBashir, in predictable landslides, given that no effective opposition participated. Now, despite the formation of state, national, and devolved Southern legislature, none of the representatives have been elected. While unelected power sharing institutions are arguably preferable to hasty elections with no guarantee of power-sharing, it is discouraging that prerequisites for the elections, such as drafting the National Electoral Law and the establishment of the National Electoral Commission, have not yet been undertaken. What is most alarming, however, is not the tardiness with which institutions are established or laws passed, but that this backsliding occurs in a context of continued militarization, a history of mistrust and elemental communal violence, and the lack of trust and goodwill sufficient to move on key aspects of the CPA regarding borders and potential sovereignty over key natural resources. In contravention of the CPA timetable, President al-Bashir has called for early elections in part due to the NCP’s desire to maintain power in Khartoum. Early elections would benefit the two signatory parties, given the disparity in already-mobilized resources between them and other Sudanese parties and groupings. While the SPLM would be difficult to defeat in the South, the NCP may see the fragmentation and disunity in the SPLM since the death of John Garang as something to capitalize on. The NCP could seek to undermine any potential SPLM electoral success in the North, as well as capitalize on advantages over northern rival parties.21 In divided societies emerging from conflict, with a history of arbitrary rule, elections as a political institution require successive utilization to be effective, and to develop a measure of political learning in a society.22 Indeed, ‘‘the best indicator of a functioning democratic system is the second or third election, not the first one.’’23 In Sudan this is particularly important, given the history of conflict, coups, and winner-take-all politics. With

................. 16928$

CH18

09-09-08 08:23:18

PS

PAGE 324

BETWEEN POWER AND EMPOWERMENT

325

much focus on the 2009 elections as a stand-alone event, and with the 2011 referenda looming afterward, the danger is that elections may be seen as a zero-sum game, with losers consigned to the margins of Sudanese political economy. This dynamic, coupled with local Darfurian rivalries between settled farmers and nomadic herders over land and diminishing resources, such as water, contributed the launching of the Darfur rebellion in early 2003. Since 1989,24 political space has been largely monopolized and stifled by a large security apparatus. Creating a genuinely level playing field for Sudan’s political parties is paramount in the run-up to the 2009 elections. Political parties need resources and capacity to adequately contest elections in particular, and to capitalize on the opening up of political space in general.25 After months of slow progress the Political Parties Act was signed into law on February 6, 2007, and was controversial from the outset, with an opposition National Democratic Alliance questioning the act’s constitutionality.26 However, it remains to be seen how competitive 2009 elections will be in Sudan as a whole and in the SPLM-dominated South in particular. In any case, elections will be meaningless without a reassessment of how power is generated and maintained in Sudan today. There will be little point sending parliamentarians to a legislature that has little impact on executive decision making and is unable to legislate for an equitable redistribution of resources and economic opportunity across Sudan, as well as hold the executive accountable for the reformed security forces.27 Given the disparity in resources between the NCP (and the SPLM, to a lesser extent) on the one hand, and rival political parties, on the other, it will be difficult for these others to meaningfully contest elections without effective donor support for a fair and equal electoral process. Since 1990, forty-two out of forty-eight countries in sub-Saharan Africa have held multiparty elections, but democratization has not taken root, operating more as a one-off electoral event rather than part of a political process rooted in constitutional liberalism.28 Opening political space in Sudan may force the NCP and the SPLM into alliances with newly enfranchised parties representing marginal ethnic and political constituencies to enable the incumbents to retain power. However, minus effective institutional reform elsewhere, Sudan’s elections will at best see Sudan join the ranks of Africa’s many illiberal democracies. Elections may not ensure effective public participation in politics until socioeconomic constraints in education are over-

................. 16928$

CH18

09-09-08 08:23:19

PS

PAGE 325

326

SIMON ROUGHNEEN

come, infrastructure is developed, and freedom of the press is permitted. While donors can fund civil society organizations and other political parties and/or the electoral process, the realities of power as currently exercised in Sudan point to incumbents perceiving such activity as unwarranted interference financed by western interests.

No Legislating for Executive Distress: Government of National Disunity Sudan’s interim solution to who governs is through an unelected power-sharing agreement between the CPA signatories. However, power sharing is never a long-term solution to conflict29 as it entrenches the political divisions that spawned conflict in the first place. Creating and developing political institutions, as with elections, is part of a process of democratization—but it cannot be assumed that the necessary fundamental reform of how power is generated, allocated, and utilized will automatically follow. In some cases, transitional institutional arrangements actually limit the potential for democratization, while empowering the incumbent under a veneer of democratic legitimacy.30 A case in point is the interim national executive in Sudan as part of the Government of National Unity (GNU). At the apex of Sudan’s interim political pyramid is the Office of the Presidency, comprised of President Oman al-Bashir, Vice President (and President of the GoSS) Salva Kiir—the SPLM leader, and Ali Osman Taha, first vice-president and chief NCP negotiator of the CPA.31 Since the CPA was signed, power at the national level has been exercised by the president with decrees issued by al-Bashir. While this is not contrary to the letter of the CPA, in spirit it undermines the unity principle of the GNU, with the SPLM taking an apparently subservient role in Khartoum and at GNU/national level. Therefore, the trust, consensual decision making, and culture of political bargaining necessary to inculcating partnership and power sharing are abrogated from the outset. A multiagency cabinet forms the second part of the GNU executive. As expected, coveted ministries were fought over, but the level of NCP intransigence over its claim on the energy and mining portfolio, which deals with Sudan’s petroleum sector, added to the distrust.32 Most damaging was the NCP dismissal of the Abyei Boundary Commission (ABC) report, which defined Abyei’s boundary as encompassing

................. 16928$

CH18

09-09-08 08:23:20

PS

PAGE 326

BETWEEN POWER AND EMPOWERMENT

327

oilfields in the vicinity. Abyei will stage its own referendum in 2011, when its citizens will vote on whether it will be part of Bahr-el-Ghazal state in the South, or Kordofan state in the North. This referendum will run concurrently to the South’s vote on secession or renewed unification. If Abyei votes to join the South, and the South secedes, the North will lose the oil as defined by the ABC report—which the NCP has dismissed as merely advisory, while the SPLM regards it as binding. The ABC report was mandated under the CPA, requiring CPA signatories to abide by its outcome. From May 27 to 30, 2006, the NCP and SPLM leadership councils concluded a three-day meeting in Khartoum aimed at resolving their differences regarding the implementation of the CPA. The participants failed to agree on the adoption of the Abyei Boundary Commission (ABC) report and referred the matter back to the presidency. Meanwhile, the Abyei Executive Commission (AEC) is stillborn, due to the stalled ABC report, leaving a potential flashpoint area devoid of effective administration, and thereby hindering aid work and recovery/reconstruction. Democratization and power sharing are meant to function as conflict management devices in Sudan, but a dysfunctional GNU will only serve to heighten distrust between CPA signatories. It will also be used by the NCP to bolster its own powerbase during the transition to elections. The SPLM is fulfilling the role of opposition, as it must deal with NCP obstructionism at the national level. As one account puts it: ‘‘The performance of the NCP within the GNU is not encouraging. The NCP has accepted the CPA in letter but seems to ignore the spirit of it. It continues to stall the functioning of almost all critical institutions of the CPA and has not accepted . . . the SPLM as an equal partner. The isolation of the SPLM ministers . . . has relegated ‘making unity attractive’ to a distant dream . . . putting all important issues on the backburner.’’33 Confusion and tension in intra-GNU relations exacerbates NCP spoiler tendencies, as it sees or portrays the SPLM acting in a partisan, rather than a partner-based, manner. Spoilers are usually nonstate militia groups that disagree with a settlement, or are not signatories. However, in Sudan the NCP is arguably acting as a spoiler, as the international pressure and militarypolitical calculation that motivated signing the agreement has altered over time.34 All democratic institutions require greater capacity than counterparts in authoritarian states. Effective legislature means

................. 16928$

CH18

09-09-08 08:23:21

PS

PAGE 327

328

SIMON ROUGHNEEN

parliamentarians operating firstly from a background of political competition via elections and then having the material and human-intellectual resources to act as a check on executive power. Sudan’s unelected interim National Assembly is composed of 450 members. Membership is allocated according to the CPA power-sharing formula as follows: NCP 234 seats, SPLM 126 seats, other Northern political forces 55 seats, 27 seats for Southern political forces, and eight seats for national personalities. Of the 55 seats allocated to the Northern political forces, eight were allocated to the Umma Party (Mainstream) and the Popular National Congress led by Hassan al-Turabi, the now-estranged Islamist ideologue behind the 1989 NIF military coup. However, both declined to participate. If left to function effectively, the National Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC) may emerge as a useful check on executive decree, in tandem with a functional legislature. After a protracted wrangle, the NCRC has been reallocated its CPA-mandated remit to review any legislation put forward by the executive and the president. However, the NCRC’s sixty members were named by presidential decree, albeit sticking to the CPA, outlined quotas on NCP, SPLA, and other Northern/Southern representatives. However, with power and resources the preserve of a narrow elite around the NCP, Sudan’s legislature may struggle to operate as an effective check on executive power, even after elections, without a thorough reorientation of how power functions in Sudan. Otherwise Sudan’s bicameral interim legislature and postelection version will be a powerless rubber stamp for the executive branch.35

Conclusion The authoritarian governance model that has emerged in Africa is one that can be seen operating in both Russia and China and provides an alternative model to the democratic governance and market-reform-based western model. A strong ruling hand is deemed necessary for development36 in Sudan, and it is not surprising to find that Russia and China are permanent members of the UN Security Council that are diplomatic allies of Sudan, and in the case of China, is a prominent investor in the petroleum sector and purchaser of oil.37 While the CPA outlines a clear timetable for formal democratization, counter-pressures come from the NCP and SPLM who

................. 16928$

CH18

09-09-08 08:23:21

PS

PAGE 328

BETWEEN POWER AND EMPOWERMENT

329

want to entrench their positions in advance of elections. The NCP is benefiting from the increasing resource base available to the GNU via the growing petroleum sector, while Sudan’s investors from Russia and China practice a policy of noninterference in Sudan’s domestic political matters. The latter’s investments in the Sudanese oil sector and provision of much-needed hard currency, offsets ongoing sanctions imposed by western donors. With the ongoing Darfur conflict, it is difficult to envisage donors demonstrating the same political will that helped bring about the CPA in the first instance. In Sudan, political institutions have been commandeered as vehicles for the extension and retention of power by a narrow NIF-NCP elite that controls access to wealth and resources in the petroleum and commercial agriculture sectors; maintains an extensive security-patronage apparatus via proxy militias and allies bought off across Sudan; and exercises power through de jure and de facto military single-party rule. The SPLM has exhibited autocratic tendencies in South Sudan, though these have decreased since the pressure to sustain military conflict abated with the signing of the CPA.38 Developing democratic institutions while maintaining a grip on power is something that has been achieved elsewhere by regimes lacking the resources available to the NCP. Senior NCP members could face indictment for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur, something that would be more likely should the NCP lose power in an election. Thus it is likely that the ‘‘democratic’’ process could be adhered to in Sudan, while the nature of power politics remains the same.39 Getting beyond settlement in Sudan means transforming military conflict into political bargaining, while simultaneously demilitarizing politics. For institutions to consolidate democracy and move Sudan beyond settlement and into the peacebuilding stage, the police and judiciary must be reformed. Furthermore, the development of democratic oversight of a reformed security sector is crucial.40

Notes 1. John Paul Lederach ‘‘Cultivating Peace: A Practitioner’s View of Deadly Conflict and Negotiation’’ in Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes, ed. John Darby and Roger MacGinty (United Kingdom: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 37. 2. The NCP is a pared-down version of the National Islamic Front (NIF),

................. 16928$

CH18

09-09-08 08:23:22

PS

PAGE 329

330

SIMON ROUGHNEEN

an alliance of army officers and political Islamists that seized power in a 1989 coup. The SPLM/A was founded in 1983, in reaction to the government’s attempt to impose sharia law throughout Sudan and its unilateral abrogation of the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, which gave autonomy to South Sudan. The CPA gave the SPLA official status as the army of the Government of South Sudan (GoSS), and thereafter the SPLM and SPLA were referred to separately, in reference to their respective political and military status in the interim period in Sudan. 3. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army, xxii. The CPA comprises agreements on powersharing, wealth sharing, security arrangements, and protocols on the disputed areas of Abyei, Southern Blue Nile, and Southern Kordofan (Nuba Mountains). 4. Briefing to the Security Council by Jan Pronk, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Sudan. October 5, 2004. http://www.un.org/News/ dh/sudan/infocusnewssudan.asp?NewsID812&sID23. In October 2006, Pronk was expelled from the country by the Sudanese Government, after he alleged that the Sudanese Armed Forces had suffered heavy casualties in recent fighting with National Redemption Front rebels in Darfur. 5. See Robin Luckham, Ann Marie Goetz and Mary Kaldor, ‘‘Democratic Institutions and Democratic Politics’’ in Can Democracy be Designed? The Politics of Institutional Choice in Conflict-Torn Societies, ed. Sunil Bastian and Robin Luckham (London: Zed Books, 2003). The authors distinguish between institutions and politics, arguing that the spread of democratic institutions does not guarantee the spread of democratic politics. 6. Half of all civil conflicts revert to violence within five years of a settlement being reached. There is burgeoning literature outlining the reasons for this: winner-take-all conceptions of politics and resources; insufficient international attention and inappropriate donor policies; continuing poverty; and an unreformed security sector all contribute to a return to violence—all of which apply to Sudan. See Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy (Washington, D.C.: World Bank/Oxford University Press, 2003). 7. Ben Reilly and Peter Harris, eds. Democracy and Deep Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators, International IDEA (Stockholm, Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 1998), 17. 8. At a public ceremony intended to celebrate the two-year anniversary of the signing of the CPA, and attended by donors, diplomats, and international media, Salva Kiir and Oman al-Bashir engaged in a vitriolic public dispute, each accusing the other of failing to honor the agreement. 9. Government of South Sudan, president’s opening remarks on the occasion of the Sudan Consortium Meeting, Juba, March 21, 2004. 10. However, the ESPA may merely represent an improvement in relations between Khartoum and Asmara, as both support the Somali Islamists engaged in an attempt to oust the Ethiopian and western-backed Transitional National Government (TNG). 11. See Simon Roughneen, ‘‘Challenging the Settlement: Politicised Insecurity in Sudan’’ in Beyond Settlement Volume II: The Security Dimension, for a more in-depth analysis of ongoing political violence in Sudan. 12. See Emeric Rogier, Designing an Integrated Strategy for Peace, Security and Development in Post-Agreement Sudan, CRU Occasional Paper, Clingendael Institute, April 2005.

................. 16928$

CH18

09-09-08 08:23:22

PS

PAGE 330

BETWEEN POWER AND EMPOWERMENT

331

13. However, the DPA and ESPA mean that some alteration to the allotted positions in the legislatures set up by the CPA will be needed. This may mean an alteration to the INC to create additional seats for these signatories—a technical example of the narrow North-South focus of the CPA. 14. Internationally backed secession is rare since World War II. Decolonization aside, nationalist self-determination was curtailed, and new states adhered to colonial boundaries. In Africa, governments have united in their support for the status quo in terms of boundaries, despite these being largely colonial divisions that often cut through local tribal, ethnic, and religious groupings. 15. The Machakos Protocol, which was later included in the CPA, states that ‘‘the people of South Sudan have the right to self-determination, inter alia, through a referendum to determine their future status.’’ 16. See The Economist Intelligence Unit, September 2006. 17. See Ben Reilly’s discussion of how referenda almost always work to the detriment of minorities in ‘‘Democratic Validation,’’ in Lederach, ‘‘Cultivating Peace,’’ Contemporary Peacemaking, 37. 18. Riek Machar, a Nuer former militia leader and SPLM/A member, was appointed vice-president of the GoSS on August 19, 2005. However, the GoSS did not feature some of the smaller local tribes, or Southern Muslims. CPA Monitor, October 2006, 18. 19. Rogier, Designing an Integrated Strategy for Peace, Security and Development in Post-Agreement Sudan, 32. A separate Multi Donor Trust Fund was established for the GoSS, allowing donors to bypass Khartoum when allocating reconstruction funds for the South. 20. The INC, based on the CPA and the 1998 Sudanese Constitution, was signed into law by President al-Bashir on July 9, 2005. It was drafted by the National Constitutional Review Committee (NCRC) which comprises NCP and SPLM representatives, as well as delegates from other political parties and civil society. 21. Garang was greeted by a large (and ecumenical) crowd in Khartoum in mid-2005, prompting renewed speculation that the SPLM could develop into a national political movement, as per Garang’s ‘‘New Sudan’’ ideology which sought a united secular Sudanese state organized around quasi socialist-republican principles. The SPLM has moved its HQ to Khartoum from Juba, signaling its intent to develop a pan-Sudanese platform in advance of the 2009 elections. 22. See Ben Reilly, ‘‘Electoral Systems for Divided Societies,’’ in Journal of Democracy 21, no. 2 (2002). 23. Peter Wallensteen, Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace and the Global System (London: SAGE Publications, 2002), 140. 24. See Roughneen in Beyond Settlement Volume II for an examination of the NCP security and intelligence system, which remains the backbone of NCP power in Sudan. 25. B. C. Smith, ‘‘Political Parties & Party Systems’’ in Understanding Third World Politics: Theories of Political Change and Development (London: MacMillan Press) 198–220. 26. CPA Monitor, February 2006. 27. See Marina S. Ottoway and Martha Brill Olcott, Challenge of Semi-Authoritarianism, Carnegie Paper no. 7, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 1999. The authors point out that (semi) authoritarian regimes

................. 16928$

CH18

09-09-08 08:23:23

PS

PAGE 331

332

SIMON ROUGHNEEN

go through the motions of a democratic process, stifling electoral competition, keeping parliaments powerless, and judiciary cowed. 28. Michael Chege, ‘‘Between Africa’s Extremes,’’ Journal of Democracy, 6, no. 1 (1995). 29. Timothy Sisk, ‘‘Power-sharing after Civil Wars: Matching Problems to Solutions,’’ in Lederach, ‘‘Cultivating Peace,’’ Contemporary Peacemaking, 139. 30. Jean Grugel. ‘‘Democratisation and the State,’’ in Democratisation: A Critical Introduction (United Kingdom: Palgrave, 2002). 31. Taha recently spent an extended vacation period in Turkey, despite the heavy workload facing the NCP in implementing the CPA and dealing with international pressure over Darfur. His personal relationship with Garang facilitated the CPA negotiations, but Taha’s public profile and apparent political influence has declined since the CPA was signed. 32. The GNU includes one presidential assistant, twelve presidential advisors, twenty-eight federal ministers, and thirty-three state ministers. The NCP retained five sovereignty ministries (presidency, interior, justice, defense and federal government); six economic ministries (finance, energy/mining, irrigation, agriculture, international cooperation and animal resources); and four service ministries (labor and public service, culture and youth, social welfare, and guidance and endowment). The SPLM received two sovereignty ministries (Council of Ministers and foreign affairs); three economic ministries (foreign trade, investment and transportation); and three service ministries (health, humanitarian affairs, and higher education). Other northern political forces received one sovereignty ministry. 33. Jan Pronk, Statement on Sudan and Darfur to the UN Security Council, 18 September 2006. 34. See Roughneen in Beyond Settlement Volume II: The Security Dimension for an outline of potential spoilers and other armed groups in Sudan 35. Sudan’s interim legislature encompasses the Council of States and National Assembly. The Council of States has two members from each state, currently appointed by the presidency after consultation with state institutions. Apart from a handful of national figures, the current members of the Council of States are drawn from either the NCP or the SPLM. 36. Thomas Carothers, Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004), 158. 37. China purchases the majority of Sudan’s oil, and the China National Petroleum Company is a 40 percent stakeholder in the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company, the main oil-producing consortium in Sudan. 38. Until elections, the SPLM holds 70 percent of seats in the Southern Assembly and GoSS Council of Ministers, with the remainder divided between the NCP and other southern parties. 39. Thomas Carothers, ‘‘The End of the Transition Paradigm’’ in Journal of Democracy 13, no.1. 40. See Grugel, ‘‘Democratisation and the State.’’

Bibliography Draft Text of the Sudan Interim National Constitution. Available at http:// www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article9417.

................. 16928$

CH18

09-09-08 08:23:23

PS

PAGE 332

BETWEEN POWER AND EMPOWERMENT

333

Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy. (Washington, D.C.: World Bank/Oxford University Press, 2003. Governance, Development and Aid Effectiveness: A Quick Guide to Complex Relationships. ODI briefing paper, London, Overseas Development Institute. March 2006. Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead: ICG Africa Report no. 106, Nairobi/Brussels, International Crisis Group. March 31, 2006. Sudan: Human Rights Denied in the South. Relief international bulletin, May 3, 2006. Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army. http://www.unmis.org/english/documents/cpa-en.pdf. United Nations Mission in Sudan. CPA Monitor monthly report available at http://www.unmis.org/common/documents/cpa-monitor/. Bastian, Sunil, and Robin Luckham, eds. Can Democracy be Designed? The Politics of Institutional Choice in Conflict-Torn Societies. London: Zed Books, 2003. Brill Olcott, Martha, and Marina S. Ottaway. The Challenge of Semi-Authoritarianism. Carnegie paper no. 7: Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 1999. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/ publications/index.cfm?faprint&id142. Carothers, Thomas. Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004. ———. ‘‘The End of the Transition Paradigm.’’ Journal of Democracy 13, no.1 (2002): 5–21. Chege, Michael. ‘‘Between Africa’s Extremes.’’ Journal of Democracy 6, no. 1 (1995): 44–51. Crook, Richard C. Strengthening democratic governance in conflict torn societies: civic organisations, democratic effectiveness and political conflict. IDS working paper 129, Brighton, Institute for Development Studies, 2001. Darby, John, and Roger McGinty, eds. Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes. (United Kingdom: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003. Grugel, Jean. Democratisation: A Critical Introduction. Palgrave, United Kingdom: 2002. Huntington, Samuel P. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. Large, Judith, and Timothy D. Sisk. Democracy, Conflict and Human Security: Pursuing Peace in the 21st Century. International IDEA. (Stockholm: Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2006. http://www.idea.int/ publications/dchs/dchs_vol1.cfm. Leftwich, Adrian. ‘‘Debate: Democracy and Development. A Contradiction in the Politics of Economics.’’ New Political Economy 7, no.2 (2002): 269–81. Pronk, Jan. Briefing to the UN Security Council, October 5, 2004. http://www .un.org/News/dh/sudan/infocusnewssudan.asp?NewsID812&sID23. ———. Statement on Sudan and Darfur to the UN Security Council, September 18, 2006. http://www.unmis.org/english/2006Docs/SRSG-PS_22sep.pdf.

................. 16928$

CH18

09-09-08 08:23:24

PS

PAGE 333

334

SIMON ROUGHNEEN

Reilly, Ben. ‘‘Electoral Systems for Divided Societies.’’ Journal of Democracy 21, no.2 (2002): 156–70. Reilly, Ben, and Peter Harris, eds. Democracy and Deep Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators. International IDEA. Stockholm: Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 1998. Rogier, Emeric. Designing an Integrated Strategy for Peace, Security and Development in Post-Agreement Sudan. CRU occasional paper, Clingendael Institute, April 2005. http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2005/2005 0400_cru_paper_rogier.pdf. Sørbo, Gunnar. Peacebuilding in postwar situations: Lessons for Sudan. CMI report 13. Oslo: Christian Michelson Institute, 2004. Smith, B. C. Understanding Third World Politics: Theories of Political Change and Development. London: MacMillan Press, 2003. Wallensteen, Peter. Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace and the Global System. London: SAGE Publications, 2002. Zakaria, Fareed. The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad. New York: W. W. Norton, 2003.

................. 16928$

CH18

09-09-08 08:23:24

PS

PAGE 334

Challenging the Settlement: Politicized Insecurity in Sudan Simon Roughneen The security sector, as it existed, was managed by an e´lite that saw its interest as controlling, not protecting, the population.1

THIS IS A GENERAL OBSERVATION, BUT CAPTURES WELL THE MODUS

operandi of Sudan’s official security institutions. These have caused large-scale human insecurity across Sudan, functioning as agents of the National Congress Party (NCP). In the South, the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) curbed all internal dissent and fought other Southern militias, while prosecuting its war with the NCP/Sudanese government. At best, providing security for Sudan’s citizens has been subordinate to military exigencies and political ambitions. At worst, security has been deliberately withheld or undermined through political violence and targeted displacement, aimed at achieving specific military-strategic, political, and economic aims. Security sector reform (SSR) in postsettlement Sudan is inextricably linked to the political institution building. SSR, and preventing a return to large-scale insecurity, are vital to the success of Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), at least in the short to medium term. SSR is a technocratic process involving disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating (DDR) ex-combatants, reforming the military and intelligence, and developing accountable and impartial civilian security institutions. However, for SSR to be effective, it must be part of a wider governance agenda.2 As Sudan’s one-party state gives way to a more open polity, with elections due in 2009 and referenda on Southern secession and the status of Abyei in 2011, the prospect of the NCP and allied militias acting as spoilers cannot be ruled out, as democratization will undermine their dominance in the North 335

................. 16928$

CH19

09-09-08 08:23:25

PS

PAGE 335

336

SIMON ROUGHNEEN

and control over the petroleum-based political economy upon which their security-patronage networks are based. Implementing democratically legitimate SSR will be difficult given that the NCP maintained power through opaque and politicized security agencies—and is itself the lead agent in reforming these same institutions—albeit now in an unequal partnership government with the SPLM. Although insecurity in Sudan has been reduced by the de-escalation, for now, of the 1983–2005 North-South conflict,3 conflict continues in Sudan’s western Darfur region, and is linked to a de facto regional conflict encompassing Chad and the Central African Republic. Another low-level conflict in eastern Sudan has been managed for now by the October 2006 Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA).4 For security institutions—military, police, legal/judicial, and other agents of human security—to contribute to peace in postsettlement Sudan, political and economic challenges must be addressed by national and international stakeholders. Indeed, before institutions can be built effectively the conditions that will make institution building possible must be created. This means accounting for and addressing politicization of security and the role of spoilers, as well as the continued management of latent and violent conflict.

Intelligence Design: L’e´ tat, c’est pour qui? The security sector poses a threat to a peace process when security institutions do not view themselves as subject to the rule of law, or when they are used by conflicting parties as instruments to advance their particular interests, rather than serving the state sui generis.5 The NCP’s dubious legitimacy and lack of democratic credentials were the result of the expansion of security apparatuses for the purpose of maintaining power and quashing dissent in the North and expanding the Islamist project to the South. The SPLM/A led the Southern war effort as a highly centralized entity, and is still regarded as tribally partial by many non-Dinka groups. Only since the CPA has independent media and civil society been allowed to flourish in the South, but the SPLM/A has lacked any infrastructure comparable to the NCP’s pan-Sudan intelligence network. SPLM/A autocracy facilitated NCP expansion of its security apparatus into the South as it forged alliances of convenience with the SPLA’s Southern rivals during the North-South war. Most, if not all, of the formal

................. 16928$

CH19

09-09-08 08:23:25

PS

PAGE 336

337

CHALLENGING THE SETTLEMENT

and informal security structures established by the NCP remain extant, beyond the reach of consensus-based civilian control as per the power-sharing spirit and letter of the CPA. Established in 2002, the National Security Office (NSO) answers to the president and is arguably the most powerful and well-organized state institution in Sudan.6 The NSO has penetrated much of civil society and operates multiple front organizations, which enable it to gather and analyze information. The NSO operates a network of security companies and affiliated charities (al-sharikat al-amniya) through which the NCP operates its patronage-intelligence-militia network. The functioning of the NSO and affiliates cannot be understood in isolation from Sudan’s commercial agriculture and petroleum-based political economy which both funds the intelligence apparatus and buys off clients and militias among political rivals North and South. The CPA mandates reform and some civilian oversight of the intelligence services. However, no progress has been made on establishing the National Security Council (NSC) and the National Security Service (NSS). Relevant laws have not been brought into line with the Interim National Constitution (INC).7 Even so, the INC stipulates that ‘‘all assets of previous security organs shall fall to the NSS,’’ which is to be under the direct supervision of ‘‘the Institution of the Presidency.’’8 Subjecting intelligence services to democratic oversight is always problematic, given the necessary secrecy of intelligence work. Even in Western democracies, public consultation on intelligence is a recent development.9 However, the often inscrutable nature of power politics in Sudan and the role of the NSO and intelligence in this means that a reformed NSS, subject to cross-party influence, is vital to reining in the activities of the NCP-aligned security-intelligence apparatus as currently configured. Rather than protect the interests of Sudan and all Sudanese citizens, the intelligence agencies work directly for the NCP, and against NCP partners in the GNU as currently configured—the SPLA, Sudan Liberation Army-Minawi (SLAMinawi),10 and Eastern Front.

Forging a Legitimate Army Settlements aim to establish a legitimate state monopoly over the use of force.11 In most cases, SSR involves integrating all forces into a single national army. However, the CPA grants both

................. 16928$

CH19

09-09-08 08:23:26

PS

PAGE 337

338

SIMON ROUGHNEEN

the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the SPLA with official armed force status throughout the interim period.12 This parallels the asymmetric federal Sudan set up by the CPA for the interim period up to the 2011 referendum on Southern secession or continued unity. Just as the South has a regional government—the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) operating between the Government of National Unity (GNU) and individual state governments—the SPLA functions as the official armed force of the GoSS. The two separate armies are redeploying either side of the 1956 boundary, but maintain a presence across the North-South divide in the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs). These are combined SAF/SPLA units operating in the South, in contested Northern areas, and in Khartoum, paralleling the power-sharing agreement that sees the SPLM in the GNU and the NCP with a 15 percent representation in the GoSS. However, due to delays in the formation of the Joint Defense Board (JDB), designed to coordinate between the SAF and SPLA, the JIUs have been slow to form and deploy. Successful deployment of JIUs could enhance trust building, at least at the officer corps level. In Sudan, institutional failure is derived from continued mistrust. This in turn alludes to the need to create conditions that facilitate postconflict institution building: political opening and institution building, as well as economic growth and development.13 JIU redeployment involves a multilayered monitoring structure with a national and international presence. However, JIUs do not have effective enforcement mechanisms in place. Joint Military Teams report to one of eight Area Joint Military Committees, and in turn to the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee (CJMC), which is answerable to the Ceasefire Political Commission (CPC). The CJMC has been one of the more effective and active aspects of the CPA. However, its impact is contingent on an effective CPC, which comprises national and international stakeholders in the CPA. Instead of acting as a political body to solve political questions arising from CJMC reports on localized military and political issues on the ground—of which there are a multitude—the CPC is yet to resolve a single issue forwarded by the CJMC, referring every contentious issue to the presidency.14 The United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) reports on redeployment as it gets access to areas and to data. As of February 2006, UNMIS could only report on 1,900 SAF being redeployed from the South to the North. This process has gathered momen-

................. 16928$

CH19

09-09-08 08:23:26

PS

PAGE 338

339

CHALLENGING THE SETTLEMENT

tum as of late 2006, with over 60 percent redeployment reported.15 However the progress is offset by the Other Armed Groups (OAGs) process, whereby the NCP-SAF maintains proxies in the South as a counterpart to the GoSS-SPLA.16 Both sides are treading warily, and making contingency plans in the interim period. The National Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Coordination Council (NDDRCC) was established by presidential decree in February 2006, but did not meet until late December. The GoSS legislature has not yet passed legislation to formally establish the Southern DDR Commission. With DDR moving slowly, redeployment could stall. The SPLMs security dilemma requires it to maintain a credible military response to any NCP derogation of the CPA. Meanwhile the NCP seeks to retain power, which may be undermined by the opening of political space in Sudan and the potential secession of South Sudan. Both sides are treading warily, and making contingency plans in the interim period. Cheating on DDR is endemic after most settlements: be that to maintain a security reserve due to prevailing mistrust; to maintain political leverage for electoral intimidation; or to bide time until an erstwhile adversary engages in DDR.17 The NCPSAF continues to recruit potential spoilers and allied militias, while the SPLA is downsizing slowly as it absorbs some OAGs and retains its military deterrent. Both sides will not reduce force numbers before the NCP-SAF redeploys fully, not likely before July 2007, if at all. DDR will be difficult in Southern terrain rendered impassable during the April-November Nile floods, amid projected largescale IDP and refugee return. DDR and refugee return is occurring as the SPLM/A makes the difficult transition from volunteer rebel army to official military entity and dominant member of the GoSS.18 A headcount of all rebel volunteers was prepared but many volunteers have melted back into civilian life, salaries were slow to come, and others just did not show up to assembly. Unaccountable soldier payment makes for an unsatisfactory peace dividend for ex-combatants, especially as the first of the GoSS oil revenues were handed over by the GNU. The first postCPA payments to SPLA soldiers were via the wartime structure as commanders were given discretion over lump sums to disburse to foot soldiers. This raised questions about institutional capacity and transparency in the GoSS. The disaffection this caused among current and former soldiers is a direct security

................. 16928$

CH19

09-09-08 08:23:26

PS

PAGE 339

340

SIMON ROUGHNEEN

concern, as unpaid and disgruntled troops can be swayed by the benefits of SAF or allied militia membership. Some of the same socioeconomic needs apply to ex-combatants and returnees. Successful DDR and SSR are inextricably linked to alleviating massive recovery and reconstruction needs in South Sudan and the Three Areas. Approximately twenty thousand boreholes for water need to be built across the South.19 UNHCR is hoping to clear and de-mine twelve thousand kilometers of road over 2006–07 to facilitate the anticipated hundreds of thousands of returnees. Pledges have been made to spend oil revenue on agricultural development to facilitate return. However, there remains sixteen million square miles of mined land in South Sudan and the SPLA and SAF have both declined to mark or define mined areas.20 DDR needs early implementation during the postsettlement period, with a distinct timetable from the rest of security reform21 and postsettlement political reform. But DDR also requires political progress and economic development to work.22 Given Sudan’s politicization of security and SAF and SPLA wariness of troop reduction, DDR is not guaranteed. DDR cannot be a substitute for political will as a conflict management tool. DDR in itself cannot prevent a return to conflict, SALW infiltration, or ensure reintegration of combatants. Reintegration may depend on broader human security reforms, including economic development and postconflict reconciliation. More than half of the 120,000 SAF in South Sudan are Southerners, most of whom have to be reintegrated locally.23 DDR and broader SSR are contingent on political and economic issues outside any narrowly defined security paradigm. DDR will be directed by the National and Southern commissions. Given the presence of multiple ethnic groups and militias immersed in many localized conflict histories, particularly in the South, a state-specific DDR process might prove more effective, even if such a devolution could be difficult to implement and monitor given low indigenous capacity and the dilettant-ish donor support provided already. DDR and refugee return may also function better if there is some mechanism for transitional justice and/or reconciliation. The CPA states that ‘‘the Parties agree to initiate a comprehensive process of national reconciliation and healing . . . mechanism and forms shall be worked out by the GNU.’’24 In practice, anything resembling a South Africa or Sierra Leone-style Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) is not likely in Sudan.25

................. 16928$

CH19

09-09-08 08:23:27

PS

PAGE 340

341

CHALLENGING THE SETTLEMENT

A Darfur-Darfur dialogue between the local antagonists (but not involving the NCP-SAF) is mandated by the dead-letter DPA, as conflict rages. South-South dialogue is prone to NCP infiltration and has faltered. A revised and transparent dialogue based on goodwill would, however, provide an essential adjunct to Southern SSR—particularly DDR—and smooth IDP return in places where localized conflict was particularly bitter.26 Also relevant to managing local conflicts is the proposed National Land Commission, which would, if functional and transparent, adjudicate on land ownership based at least partly on customary norms. This would alleviate some of the tensions between ethnic groups and between farmers and pastoralists that have contributed to the outbreak of violence in South Sudan and Darfur. Beyond overcoming spoilers, DDR is the most important subgoal of peace implementation.27 But DDR in Sudan is atypical as it affects nonsignatory OAGs who are expected to adhere to the CPA. Moreover, there is no prospect of a ceasefire, much less DDR, in Darfur. Ex-combatants must assess the pros and cons of transition and determine whether it will meet their political and livelihood needs. Interim institutions must generate confidence and goodwill in the process, and in the case of Sudan, draw in combatants and political groups not party to the CPA negotiations. SSR should take place before elections, which otherwise may merely ratify the norms and institutions of conflict. In the first postsettlement election, recently warring parties tend to concentrate on short-term issues of security and vulnerability rather than longer-term political strategies.28 An unreformed security sector will benefit the incumbent SPLM and NCP in the buildup to the 2009 elections and negate a more open political system.

Spoilers and Saviors: Sudan’s Other Armed Groups Should the DPA be revisited, then room would have to be made for rebel signatories in the GNU, as has happened with Minni Minawi.29 However, since the DPA, fighting between the SAF and NRF and between NRF and the SLA-Minawi has increased, as have SAF and Janjaweed militia attacks on civilians. The NRF has twice led attacks on SAF positions outside Darfur and in strategically important areas of the North, signaling at least some intent to expand the conflict beyond Darfur and rally

................. 16928$

CH19

09-09-08 08:23:27

PS

PAGE 341

342

SIMON ROUGHNEEN

other marginalized groups in the North, which could destabilize the CPA given that the SPLA has alliances with Northern militia and political groups dating back to the 1990s. As mentioned previously, the CJMC is one of the most important pillars of the CPA as currently being implemented. If removed, the CPA would be paralyzed.30 Institutionally, the DPA is paralyzed because there is no support for its cease-fire monitoring commission, which has been flouted by the NCP-SAF since it was established. CPA security arrangements require that thirty-plus ‘‘Other Armed Groups’’ (OAGs) align with the SAF or SPLA during the interim period,31 before both army structures reform and downsize on this basis and in accordance with the redeployment, JIU formation, and DDR requirements of the interim period.32 Both SAF and SPLA have produced lists of the groups which have aligned with them, to commence the verification of OAGs. The Other Armed Group Collaborative Committee (OAGCC) has started meeting but the actual alignment status, composition, and location of OAGs is vague. Both the SPLA and the SAF listed aligned OAGs to the CJMC in May 2006.33 A number of OAGs were listed by both, pointing to shifting alliances and future difficulties in ensuring all groups will be incorporated transparently into the SSR process. Some commanders of the largest OAG, the South Sudan Defense Force (SSDF), have refused to abide by the Juba Declaration34 which integrates the SSDF into the SPLA.35 The Juba Declaration mandates intra-Southern DDR and security force harmonization in accordance with the CPA, and gives an amnesty to SSDF and SPLA for crimes committed during intraSouthern violence during the war. The SSDF dropped some of its demands, notably that the SPLA be renamed, concluding that a united South was necessary to implementing the CPA and preventing a return to war. Senior SSDF officers received a peace dividend of high office in the reformed SPLA and the GoSS. This demonstrates that political carrots can secure military concessions and enhance SSR. However, the SSDF is not monolithic. Many members continue to benefit from SAF material support. Minus greater GoSS efficiency, SSDF elements will be sifted from the GoSS-SPLA, which could destabilize the South. The SSDF had a relatively high number of ranking officers, unlike the centralized and oligarchic pre-Juba Declaration SPLA. SSR in Sudan—particularly in the South—is compounded by lack of expertise. Running a guerrilla movement is not akin to the com-

................. 16928$

CH19

09-09-08 08:23:27

PS

PAGE 342

343

CHALLENGING THE SETTLEMENT

plexities of running a regular security apparatus as part of a national and regional government structure.36 There appears to be tactical acceptance of the CPA settlements by various potential spoilers.37 Key militia leaders such as Gordon Kong, Thomas Mabior, and Gabriel Tang have all retained SAF affiliation, reflecting historic enmity with the Dinka-led SPLA, despite being fellow Southerners. Their strongholds are close to existing SAF deployments and JIU garrisons in the South in Upper Nile State, in oil-rich areas close to what will be the North-South border. In late November 2006, the Southern city of Malakal—site of a JIU barracks and capital of the Upper Nile region which produces at least 330,000 barrels of crude oil per day—saw serious SAF-SPLA fighting that left hundreds dead.38 The fighting started as a clash between Tang’s militia and local SPLA. Tang’s militia carried out other attacks displacing hundreds of civilians in Jonglei state throughout 2006.39 Militias led by Tang, Kong, and Mabior are part of the NCP-SAF security apparatus, and while they are capable of some autonomous action and localized vendetta settling, ultimately their role reflects the ambivalence of the NCP and SAF toward the CPA in general, and the potential loss of the South and its oil in particular, giving all concerned an interest in destabilizing the South. Another source of instability is the Ugandan Lords Resistance Army (LRA), which has been supplied and supported by the NCP and SAF out of eastern Equatoria since the mid-1990s. From September 2005 to June 2006, there were almost seventy confirmed LRA attacks across South Sudan, including one on a UN compound in Yei, site of SPLA HQ. These attacks were carried out by at least four distinct LRA units and notably occurred beyond the Acholi ethnic areas in South Sudan.40 The LRA resurgence occurred close to the SPLA heartland, and, to add to the confusion, as well as potential for distrust and fragmentation of CPA security arrangements, LRA attacks have been variously attributed to local SAF elements or disaffected SPLA, or renegade Southern militants acting at the NCP-SAF behest to destabilize the South. Sudanese President al-Bashir stated that dealing with the LRA is the SPLA’s job. Given the confusion surrounding the LRA presence, it is not clear who the SPLA would be fighting should they take on the LRA. Dealing with the LRA would be a task better allocated to some combination of functional JIUs and UNMIS. Riek Machar’s brokerage of the LRA-Ugandan government peace talks since July 2006 must be seen as partly a SPLM/A project to se-

................. 16928$

CH19

09-09-08 08:23:28

PS

PAGE 343

344

SIMON ROUGHNEEN

cure the South. However, his latest LRA-Ugandan government peace effort is fraught,41 and the logistics of its confidence-building measures may contribute to LRA-SPLA conflict, as LRA members in Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have proceeded to two cantonment locations in South Sudan. Should the peace talks fail or the LRA react to attempts to arrest its leaders, the SPLA may have to, in effect, imprison a foreign militia group supported by the NCP-SAF. A final armed group present in postsettlement Sudan is UNMIS.42 The UNMIS mandate is to protect civilians and its own forces—but not to enforce compliance with the CPA. UNMIS plays a monitoring and evaluation role and helps in restructuring the police, promoting the role of law and preparing for elections. UNMIS movement is restricted in Abyei, by both the SAF and SPLA. This does not mean that UNMIS mandate is relatively constrained by mission standards, but in its Sudanese operational context, it means that UNMIS’s role in contributing to a lasting settlement is limited. While most peace agreements restrict any international presence to monitoring, verifying, and facilitating demilitarization, the UNMIS DDR unit had just eleven staff in Khartoum, and more significantly, just one in the Southern capital Juba. Third-party involvement can create or facilitate spoilers, and often does not provide an incentive for peace.43 In Sudan, the UN presence is suspect in the eyes of the NCP, with an ongoing diplomatic struggle over a UN peacekeeping force entering Darfur and ICC indictments for war crimes and crimes against humanity likely for senior NCP, SAF, and Janjaweed leaders.44

Law of Rule or Rule of Law? Civilian SSR and Human Security in Sudan In order for any solution to be effective, the people . . . need to have confidence in the security services.45

Peace agreements offer unique opportunities to redesign civilian security institutions, making the judiciary independent of the executive and creating a professional, representative, and impartial police force. If institutional change is to lead to full democratization of the state it needs to involve significant reforms to the police and judicial system.46 In Sudan, creating legitimate and transparent civilian security is a matter of capacity

................. 16928$

CH19

09-09-08 08:23:28

PS

PAGE 344

345

CHALLENGING THE SETTLEMENT

and political will. Both are lacking, and law enforcement institutions must be built from scratch in the South or reformed significantly in the North. Peace agreements separately provide for overcoming economic marginalization and require recovery and development take place for the post-settlement period to prove a success. Together these account for the broader human security necessary to building peace after settlement, and overcoming the structural violence that has been often cited as a root cause of violent conflict in Sudan. In practical terms, civilian security reform is needed as crime almost always increases after a settlement. Postsettlement voids often create opportunities for conflict entrepreneurs to misuse former security forces and militias, something that is happening in South Sudan, which is awash with small arms and light weapons (SALW) and over thirty militias. Specialist police units are needed. However, this requires specialist training and resource allocation, and the curbing of the use of security services for narrow political ends by the NCP. The state security structure in the North continues to intimidate opposition parties, with heavy-handed tactics used against civilians protesting against government policies. Prior to the formation of the GNU, the NCP issued a number of outrageous decrees in a postsettlement context. For example, shoot-to-kill powers were suggested for the police. In mid 2006, police were used to quash Northern opposition party-led demonstrations in Khartoum, hardly a signal that the NCP and its security services will respond in spirit to the opening of political space and reemergence of political opposition.47 In the South police reform is decentralized to the GoSS in the interim period, while in the North there are two armed police forces dating to NIF-NCP single-party rule. These are: the Public Order Police, which is in charge of enforcing Islamic law; and the Volunteer Popular Police Force, which is partly interwoven with the Popular Defense Force (PDF) militias and has fought in South Sudan.48 Police in Sudan have operated with virtual impunity, often under states of emergency (now applicable only in Darfur since the CPA and ESPA) that have allowed for arbitrary arrest and detention without due process. Military and/or religious policing has been the norm, especially in the North. The expansion of sharia-based Islamists into the South is another key aspect of Sudan’s internal security dilemmas.49 The 1983–2005 war began partly as an attempt by the South to resist the nationwide imposition of sharia law, which reinten-

................. 16928$

CH19

09-09-08 08:23:28

PS

PAGE 345

346

SIMON ROUGHNEEN

sified after 1989. The CPA sought to resolve this via a compromise: the South regained self-determination and exemption from sharia in return for the NCPs unchallenged imposition of sharia in the North, with some exceptions for resident nonMuslims. A divisive National Judicial Service Commission Act passed through the National Assembly but bypassed the National Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC)50 in contravention of the INC. The SPLM criticized the terms of the act as well as the procedure, stating that these may contravene the INC and the Interim Constitution in the South, and effectively undermines the separation of powers in Sudan. Similar content and procedural wrangles surrounded the establishment of a National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), with no discussion or understanding of the essential elements of such a body in a state that mandates both secular and sharia law. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the World Bank, and GNU are cooperating to capacity build an independent judiciary in Sudan.51 Sudanese cultural values will be incorporated into the training and there will be separate hierarchies within the judiciary for sharia and so-called ‘‘civil’’ matters. The challenges are immense, however, and the legacy is prohibitive. Prior to the CPA and the INC, the judiciary was wholly subservient to the executive, with judicial appointments, including those to the Constitutional Courts, at the discretion of the president. Moreover, Sudan’s judicial system included Military Courts and Public Order Courts that had no appeal process and did not allow lawyers to appear. United States plans for turning the SPLA into a professional army are constrained by continuing sanctions on Sudan, while the EU cannot deal bilaterally with substate entities such as the GoSS.52 Where local capacity is low and difficulties are high, international actors must increase resources allotted to making and building peace.53 An independent judiciary needs welltrained judges, for whom implementing the rule of law is more complex than doing the bidding of the political authorities.54 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) argues for a holistic SSR, implementing development policy to mitigate against structural vulnerabilities as well as hard security threats.55 This harnessing of military, legal, economic, and political aspects is loosely defined as human security. Narrowly defining security is inadequate as it fails to account for how political and economic factors contribute to structural violence. Narrow conceptions of SSR are self-

................. 16928$

CH19

09-09-08 08:23:29

PS

PAGE 346

347

CHALLENGING THE SETTLEMENT

defeating, and can lead to a self-perpetuating security dilemma, as socioeconomic disparities persist. Violence is likely to recur as those on the margins see post-settlement politics as failing.56 Fundamentally, demilitarization and reforming security depends on solving structural problems and democratizing effectively.57 As such, human security complements state security.58 Democracy is critical to achieving human security, via a better redistribution of power and resources in contexts of extreme poverty, socioeconomic marginalization, and political violence. Democracy can fail, however, when it is weakened or undermined by political interests serving narrow tribal or ideological interests. In such contexts, the presence of political institutions may be unable to provide law and order or resolve social conflict through politics. Both rule-of-law and economic development can enhance SSR and, in tandem with broader SSR and political institution building, contribute to human security. The argument here is not that rule-of-law and economics follow each other in an axiomatic way59 —Sudan’s oil-fueled economic boom is not based on or yet led to the development of the rule-of-law—but that when implemented, these aspects of human security can harness economic growth to offset the structural factors that remain latent in Sudan. While, for example, institutional drivers can only do so much to promote rule-of-law in Sudan, one practical example highlights what is necessary. A professional and impartial judiciary will be needed to address compensation and relocation issues arising from IDP return and DDR, as Sudan’s postsettlement Land Commissions are established. Many of the displaced were uprooted by conflict, and specifically by clearing land for oil-drilling territory and for patronage-oriented commercial agriculture schemes.

Conclusion SSR rarely happens as outlined in settlement provisions or in donor funding prescriptions.60 What matters is that security institutions cannot continue to be misused as has been the case in Sudan. Civilian SSR and establishing the rule-of-law can aid democratization and postsettlement stability,61 and reforming the army is vital to legitimating the state. Conversely, democratic control of security institutions is crucial to democratization for two reasons. First, security institutions have an

................. 16928$

CH19

09-09-08 08:23:29

PS

PAGE 347

348

SIMON ROUGHNEEN

intimate relationship to political power. Second, security provision—perhaps the management of insecurity generated by elections—is vital to the survival of the democratization and the peace process. Encouragingly, some Sudanese parliamentarians disputed a recent report on Darfur issued by the minister for defense, vowing to set up a committee to conduct its own investigation into insecurity in the region.62 In general, the political context is not conducive to developing and enhancing such legislative oversight, as part of wider political, development, and security reforms. According to one account, the three most likely sources of postagreement failure are: • the presence of spoilers • the interests of third parties/external actors • the presence of easily marketable commodities63

All three factors are present in Sudan. The NCP is acting as a spoiler, while conflict in Darfur could yet destabilize the rest of Sudan. The United States, United Kingdom, European Union, Norway, Nigeria, the Arab League, the African Union, Kenya, Chad, Uganda, Ethiopia, Egypt, Libya, and Eritrea all either played some part in Sudan’s conflict and/or facilitated the CPA. Many of these same actors are involved in the Darfur conflict and/or its attempted management/prolongation. U.S. diplomacy was vital in persuading the NCP to sign the CPA. Finally, Sudan’s oil boom could provide the resources necessary for recovery in the South and equitable development elsewhere. However, in a volatile post-settlement context with war raging in Darfur, and an opaque governance system, Sudan’s oil revenues provide for unfettered military and intelligence spending by the NCP, and may fund SPLM dominance of the South. This will not promote democratic security institutions or contribute to a stable postsettlement Sudan.

Notes 1. David M. Law, The Post-Conflict Security Sector, Policy Paper no. 14 (Geneva: Center for Democratic Control of Armed Forces/DCAF, 2006), 5. 2. Nicole Ball, Tsjeard Bouta, and Luc van den Goor, Enhancing Democratic Governance of the Security Sector: An Institutional Assessment Framework. (The Hague: Clingendael Institute/Netherlands Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 2003).

................. 16928$

CH19

09-09-08 08:23:30

PS

PAGE 348

349

CHALLENGING THE SETTLEMENT

3. Sudan’s conflicts are a series of center-periphery engagements in which marginalized non-Arab ethnic groups protest political and economic marginalization by the narrow Arab-tribal elite centered around Khartoum and the Northern Sudanese River Nile. Thus, the North-South paradigm inherent to the CPA, although taking in the disputed areas of Abyei, Southern Blue Nile, and the Nuba mountains, does not fully reflect the multiplicity of social and political conflict in Sudan. 4. Sudan’s North-South divide is based for now on the 1956 demarcation, a de jure legacy of Anglo-Egyptian rule and a de facto division based on historic resistance by Southerners against Northern encroachment and slave trading. A border commission is to decide on the North-South border during the interim period however this has yet to make any progress. Darfur and Eastern Sudan are part of the North. 5. Gunther Baechler, ‘‘Conflict Transformation through State Reform,’’ in The Berghof Handbook of Conflict Transformation (Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2004). 6. Emeric Rogier, Designing an Integrated Strategy for Peace, Security and Development in Post-Agreement Sudan, CRU Occasional Paper (The Hague: Clingendael Institute, April 2005), 5. 7. Jan Pronk, Statement on Sudan and Darfur to the UN Security Council, September 18, 2006. 8. Sudan’s Interim National Constitution, 60. 9. Marina Caparini, Civil Society and Democratic Oversight of the Security Sector: A Preliminary Investigation, Working Paper 132 (Geneva: Center for Democratic Control of Armed Forces/DCAF, 2004), 20. 10. The SLA-Minawi is the sole Darfurian rebel faction to have signed the May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), which remains effectively a dead letter. The faction split from the mainly ethnic Fur SLA which has since joined with other anti-DPA rebels in the National Redemption Front (NRF), formed in July 2006. The SLA-Minawi is led by ethnic Zaghawa Minni Minawi, who has taken a position as assistant to the president in the GNU, as has a representative of the Eastern Front, since the October 2006 ESPA. 11. Charles T. Call and William Stanley, ‘‘Military and Police Reform after Civil Wars,’’ in Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes, ed. John Darby and Roger MacGinty (United Kingdom: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 212. 12. Hence the post-CPA division of the hitherto combined SPLM/A into its official SPLA military and SPLM political wings. 13. See Law, The Post-Conflict Security Sector. Law makes the point that formal security sector reform is not always possible immediately after conflict and is contingent on resolving political questions. 14. While the CPC could resolve politically contentious issues in a multistakeholder framework, it is ultimately answerable to the presidency in any case, which could overrule any recommendations made by the CPC. 15. As of November 2006, redeployment status as reported by the parties was: SAF: 63.16 percent (including troops earmarked for JIUs); SPLA: 100 percent. Of the reported redeployment, UNMIS had verified: SAF: 63.3 percent; SPLA: 64.9 percent. 16. In the North, a particularly contentious redeployment involved the withdrawal of the SPLA from the Eastern Sudan enclave of Hamesh Koreb, where the SPLA had supported the Eastern Front. This was due to take place

................. 16928$

CH19

09-09-08 08:23:30

PS

PAGE 349

350

SIMON ROUGHNEEN

by early 2006, but was delayed significantly as the ESPA was negotiated. The eastern process, and Darfur, demonstrates the narrow North-South focus of the CPA, which is not in keeping with what many argue to be the center-periphery nature of Sudan’s conflicts. 17. Virginia Gamba, ‘‘Managing Violence: Disarmament and Demobilisation,’’ in Contemporary Peacemaking (see note 11). 18. Over four million mainly Southern Sudanese were displaced by the 1983–2005 war, with a further six hundred thousand refugees in neighboring countries. two and a half million Darfurians are displaced by the conflict there. 19. ‘‘Sudan: Challenges of Returning Home,’’ IRINNEWS, October 12, 2006, http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID55921& SelectRegionEastAfrica&SelectCountrySUDAN 20. This contravenes the Land Mine Treaty, ratified by Sudan in 2003. 21. Robert Muggah, ‘‘Managing Post-Conflict Zones: DDR and Weapons Reduction,’’ in Small Arms Survey Yearbook 2005: Weapons at War, (Geneva, Small Arms Survey, 2005). 22. Robin Luckham and Gavin Cawthra, ‘‘Democratic Control and the Security Sector: The Scope of Transformation and its Limits,’’ in Gavin Cawthra and Robin Luckham. (eds), Governing Insecurity, Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies, ed. Gavin Cawthra and Robin Luckham (London: Zed Books, 2003). 23. See previous Roughneen chapter on Sudan for an outline of intra-South Sudan political tensions. 24. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army, 17. 25. TRCs are rare in interstate and state-formation conflicts (where one party seeks to exercise/attain self-determination through military action). Therefore such a body is unlikely in Sudan prior to 2011, especially while the higher-priority material and political aspects of the CPA are lagging behind 26. South-South dialogue has been conducted since 2003, but the SSDF did not get involved until 2005, when relations with the SPLM/A improved after John Garang’s death and with the Nuer ex-warlord Riek Machar’s accession to the GoSS vice-presidency. However the SPLM has been criticized for its inconsistent approach to the process. 27. Joanna Spear, ‘‘Demobilisation and Disarmament,’’ in Ending Civil Wars, ed. Stephen J. Stedman, Donald Rothschild and Elizabeth N. Cousens (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner, 2002). 28. Terrence Lyons, ‘‘Post-conflict elections and the Process of Demilitarising Politics: The Role of Electoral Administration,’’ in Democratisation 11, no.3 (2004). 29. In negotiating the DPA, the combined rebel factions had sought autonomy for Darfur similar to that allotted to the South, along the lines of the CPA asymmetric federal model. 30. See Pronk, Statement on Sudan. 31. Rogier, Designing an Integrated Strategy for Peace, Security and Development in Post-Agreement Sudan, 190. Prior to the Juba Declaration there were thirty-two NCP-aligned OAGs. 32. The parties were to establish an incorporation and reintegration ad hoc committee to lay down modalities for the incorporation of the OAGs into the regular forces of the parties or their reintegration into the civil service or civil

................. 16928$

CH19

09-09-08 08:23:30

PS

PAGE 350

351

CHALLENGING THE SETTLEMENT

society institutions. To date, this committee has not been formed by the parties, in spite of repeated encouragement from the CJMC. Similar delay has been observed in the formation of the OAG Collaborative Committee, which is to look at all issues concerning the Other Armed Groups. 33. SAF-aligned OAG strength was 45,259. SPLA-aligned strength was 2,345. 34. GoSS President Salva Kiir and SSDF leader Paulino Matip, now deputy commander-in-chief of the SPLA, signed the Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration of SPLA and SSDF on January 8, 2006. 35. Pronk, Statement on Sudan. 36. Laurie Nathan, ‘‘Obstacles to Security Sector Reform in New Democracies’’ in Security Sector Reform: Potentials and Challenges for Conflict Transformation, Berghof Handbook Dialogue Series, ed. Clem McCartney, Martina Fischer and Oliver Wils (Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2004), 30. 37. Often parties to violent conflict accept a settlement as a tactical measure, seeing it as the optimum course of action in terms of realizing its ambitions at a given time. Commitment to the settlement is thus contingent on conditions that incited the potential spoiler to accept the settlement in the first place remaining extant. See Donald Horovitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict: Theories, Patterns, and Policies (Berkeley: 1985), 2nd ed. (2000). 38. ‘‘UN confirms 150 Killed in South Sudan Malakal,’’ Sudan Tribune, December 3, 2006, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article19041 39. ‘‘Sudanese army instigates attacks on civilians—Jonglei Governor,’’ Sudan Tribune, October 6, 2006, http://www.sudantribune.com:80/imprim able.php3?id_article17978. 40. The Acholi is the main ethnic group in northern Uganda, bordering South Sudan. Acholi areas across the border have been the main hiding ground for the LRA since it established a Sudanese government-sponsored retreat in South Sudan. It must be added that despite being mainly Acholi, the LRA has lost almost all legitimacy among its ethnic peers, after twenty years of insurgency, the displacement of two million mainly Acholi northern Ugandans, and the kidnap/coercion of thousands of child soldiers and female sex slaves. The peace talks in South Sudan are overshadowed by arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for five LRA senior figures for war crimes and crimes against humanity. 41. There have been a dozen different peace talks between the LRA and Ugandan government, all typified by mistrust and backsliding. See Simon Roughneen,‘‘Deciding Peace, Justice in northern Uganda,’’ ISN Security Watch, July 13, 2006. http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID16383. 42. UNMIS is mandated by UN Security Council Resolution 1590, after the CPA endorsed a UN peacekeeping mission for Sudan. As of September 2006, 99 percent of UNMIS military personnel (9,618 out of a total of 9,692) have been deployed; 91 percent of UN police have been deployed (651 out of a mandated strength of 715). 43. Sustained UN involvement in Angola was not enough to allay UNITA rebel leader Jonas Savimbi’s fears of government recidivism after the Lusaka Accords, precipitating a return to war in the early 1990s. More recently, the world’s largest UN peacekeeping force in the DRC is regularly confronted by spoiler militias who see it as an agent of the interim government in Kinshasa. 44. UN Security Council Resolution 1706, August 31, 2006, mandates a UN

................. 16928$

CH19

09-09-08 08:23:31

PS

PAGE 351

352

SIMON ROUGHNEEN

peacekeeping force for Darfur and invites Sudanese government consent for this. 45. Clem McCartney, Martina Fischer and Oliver Wils, ‘‘Dilemmas of Security Sector Reform in the Context of Conflict Transformation,’’ in Security Sector Reform (see note 36). 46. Jean Grugel. ‘‘Democratisation and the State,’’ in Jean Grugel, Democratisation: A Critical Introduction (United Kingdom: Palgrave, 2002). 47. Namaa al-Mahdi, ‘‘Police Crackdown on Peaceful Demonstration,’’ Sudan Tribune, September 7, 2006. http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php? article17474. 48. The PDF had official status as a quasi-civil defense entity prior to the CPA, enrolling nomadic Arab militias into the NCPs Southern war. It is still active in Darfur as an effective arm of the SAF and is regarded as indistinguishable from the Janjaweed militia. 49. While the SPLM/A sees NIF-NCP political Islam as a threat, the NCPs relaxation of its Islamist drive has drawn criticism from Wahhabi clerics in Saudi Arabia, from Osama bin Laden, and from Hassan al-Turabi, the ideologue behind the 1989 coup and ensuing Islamization project. Al-Turabi is allegedly linked to the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), now part of the Darfur NRF, which would explain NRF attacks outside Darfur as a partly Islamist attempt to destabilize Northern Sudan and undermine the NCP. 50. See previous Roughneen chapter for more background.on the NCRC. 51. The GNU is giving $5 million while donors provide $13 million. UNDP-judiciary collaboration is long-standing in Sudan and was mooted during the international Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) set up in 2004 to report on reconstruction needs in Sudan as a settlement loomed. 52. A potential model may be the UK Global Conflict Prevention Pools (GCPP), which has taken tentative steps toward harnessing relevant crossministerial expertise on conflict prevention—such as the Dept. for International Development, Ministry of Defense, and Foreign and Commonwealth Office collaboration on examining UK SSR support in postsettlement contexts. See: www.flo.gov.uk[gcpp] 53. Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, ‘‘International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis,’’ American Political Science Review 94, no. 4 (2000). 54. Olcott and Ottoway illustrate this difference by reminding that ‘‘the enforcement of libel laws is a much more complex process than ordering the closure of a newspaper.’’ See Marina S. Ottoway and Martha Brill Olcott, Challenge of Semi-Authoritarianism, Carnegie Paper No. 7, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 1999. 55. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Security System Reform and Governance: Policy & Practice, DAC Guidelines and Reference Documents (Paris: OECD, 2005). 56. However, human security cannot be too broadly defined if to retain policy utility. Recent literature advocates a reseparation of ‘‘hard’’ military/police aspects from ‘‘soft’’ development/legal human security. See Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21st Century, Human Security Center, University of British Columbia (Oxford University Press, 2006). 57. Nathan, ‘‘Obstacles to Security Sector Reform,’’ 31. 58. Franc¸ois Fouinat, ‘‘A Comprehensive Framework for Human Security,’’ Conflict, Security and Development 4, Issue 3, Commission on Human Security (2004).

................. 16928$

CH19

09-09-08 08:23:32

PS

PAGE 352

353

CHALLENGING THE SETTLEMENT

59. Thomas Carothers, Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: The Problem of Knowledge, Working Paper 34 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 2003). 60. Marina Caparini, ‘‘The Relevance of Civil Society,’’ in Security Sector Reform (see note 36). 61. The relationship between democracy and rule-of-law, and of both to economic growth and development, is better analyzed as an elective affinity rather than axiomatic (as outlined by Carothers). 62. ‘‘Sudanese parliament to probe security situation in Darfur,’’ Sudan Tribune, November 24, 2006, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article18874. 63. Stephen .J. Stedman, ‘‘Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,’’ International Security 22, no. 2 (1997): 5–53.

Bibliography After Intervention: Public Security Management in Post-Conflict Societies: From Intervention to Sustainable Local Ownership. Geneva, Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces/DCAF, 2004. Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation. Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2004. http://www.berghof-hand book.net. Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21st Century. Human Security Center, University of British Columbia. Oxford University Press, 2006. http://www.humansecurityreport.info/. Draft Text of the Sudan Interim National Constitution. Available at http:// www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article9417. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Practice, DAC Guidelines and Reference Documents. (Paris: OECD, 2005. http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/ 8/39/31785288.pdf. Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead: ICG Africa Report no. 106. Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, March 31, 2006. Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army. http://www.unmis.org/english/documents/cpa-en.pdf. Small Arms Survey Yearbook 2005: Weapons at War. (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2005. United Nations Mission in Sudan. CPA Monitor. (October 2006). http://www .unmis.org/common/documents/cpa-monitor/CPA%20Monitor-0610%20final% 20-%20Power-sharing.pdf. Ball, Nicole, and Luc van de Goor. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration: Mapping Issues, Dilemmas and Guiding Principles. Netherlands Institute for International Relations. The Hague: Clingendael Conflict Research Unit, August 2006. Ball, Nicole, Tsjeard Bouta, and Luc van den Goor: Enhancing Democratic Governance of the Security Sector: An Institutional Assessment Frame-

................. 16928$

CH19

09-09-08 08:23:33

PS

PAGE 353

354

SIMON ROUGHNEEN

work. The Hague: Clingendael Institute/Netherlands Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2003. Brill Olcott, Martha, and Marina S. Ottaway. The Challenge of Semi-Authoritarianism. Carnegie Paper no. 7 Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 1999). http://www.carnegieendowment.org/ publications/index.cfm?faprint&id142. Carothers, Thomas. Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: The Problem of Knowledge. Working paper 34. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 2003. Cawthra, Gavin, and Robin Luckham, eds.,Governing Insecurity, Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies. London: Zed Books, 2003. Clegg, Ian, Robert Hunt, and Jim Whetton. Policy Guidance on Support to Policing in Developing Countries. Center for Development Studies. (Swansea: University of Wales, November 2000. Cooper, Neil, and Michael Pugh: Security-sector Transformation in Post-conflict Societies. University of Plymouth, International Studies Center, 2002. Darby, John, and Roger McGinty, eds. Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes. United Kingdom: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003. Doyle, Michael W., and Nicholas Sambanis. ‘‘International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis.’’ American Political Science Review 94, no. 4 (2000). Fouinat, Franc¸ois. ‘‘A Comprehensive Framework for Human Security.’’ Conflict, Security and Development 4, Issue 3, Commission on Human Security (2004). Gary, Ian, and Terry Lynn Karl. Bottom of the Barrel: Africa’s Oil boom and the Poor. Baltimore, MD: Catholic Relief Services, June 2003. Greene, Owen. Security Sector Reform, Conflict Prevention and Regional Perspectives.’’ Journal of Security Sector Management 1, no. 1, Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform, Cranfield University (March 2003). Grugel, Jean. Democratisation: A Critical Introduction. Palgrave, United Kingdom: 2002. Horovitz, Donald. Ethnic Groups in Conflict Theories: Patterns, and Policies. Berkeley, CA: 1985. 2nd ed. 2000. Large, Judith, and Timothy D. Sisk. Democracy, Conflict and Human Security: Pursuing Peace in the 21st Century. International IDEA (Stockholm: Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2006. http://www.idea.int/ conflict/dchs/. Lyons, Terrence. ‘‘Post-conflict elections and the Process of Demilitarising Politics: The Role of Electoral Administration.’’ Democratisation 11, no.3. (2004). Marenin, Otwin. Restoring Policing Systems in Conflict Torn Nations: Process, Problems, Prospects. Occasional paper no. 7. Geneva: Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces/DCAF, June 2005. McCartney, Clem, Martina Fischer, and Oliver Wils, eds. Security Sector Reform: Potentials and Challenges for Conflict Transformation. Berghof Hand-

................. 16928$

CH19

09-09-08 08:23:33

PS

PAGE 354

355

CHALLENGING THE SETTLEMENT

book Dialogue Series. Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2004. http://www.berghof-handbook.net. Nathan, Nathan, Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform, A Guide for Donors. Working paper. Global Conflict Prevention Pool, UK Dept. for International Development. September 2006. Pronk, Jan. Statement on Sudan and Darfur to the UN Security Council. September 18, 2006. http://www.unmis.org/english/2006Docs/SRSG-PS_22 sep.pdf. Rogier, Rogier, Designing an Integrated Strategy for Peace, Security and Development in Post-Agreement Sudan. CRU occasional Paper, Clingendael Institute: April 2005. http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2005/2005 0400_cru_paper_rogier.pdf. Sørbo, Gunnar, Peacebuilding in postwar situations: Lessons for Sudan. CMI Report 13. Oslo: Christian Michelson Institute, 2004. Stedman, Stephen J. ‘‘Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes.’’ International Security 22, no. 2 (1997). Stedman, Stephen J., Donald Rothschild, and Elizabeth N. Cousens. Ending Civil Wars. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner, 2002. Wallensteen, Peter. Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace and the Global System. London: SAGE Publications, 2002. Weinstein, Jeremy, and Macartan Humphreys. Disentangling the Determinants of Successful Demobilization and Reintegration. Working paper 69, Center for Global Development., September 2005.

................. 16928$

CH19

09-09-08 08:23:34

PS

PAGE 355

Concluding Observations Vanessa E. Shields and Nicholas D. J. Baldwin

AS AFGHANISTAN CONTRIBUTOR AMIN TARZI HAS SAID, ‘‘IT IS OFTEN

difficult, if not unwise, to attempt to assign definite moments for the beginning or completion of the evolution of a state’s administrative structures.’’ State actors are continuously reforming and refining themselves in order to adapt to changing circumstances in a globalized world and, even if only by default, the institutions that they work in, be it the legislature, executive, judiciary, police, or armed forces, also evolve. It is difficult, if not impossible, to accurately identify the point at which a country has the ideal institutional arrangements to foster open dialogue as a way to deal with conflict as opposed to resorting to violent confrontation. Indeed, strengthening institutions or holding elections in postconflict states is not a magic bullet, nor a static process. Instead, the development of norms to guide political and military behavior is a long-term objective. The work of spoilers and conflict entrepreneurs in fragile, postconflict states can reverse any structural reform process and plunge a country into armed conflict again. Moving beyond settlement is a dynamic process that stops and starts, moves backward as well as forward, as has been clearly evidenced in the case of Northern Ireland. It can be viewed as an evolutionary process, a process that is messy, a process that includes major setbacks and minor triumphs. Importantly it is also a process where the power and personalities of those involved in the process are as crucial to moving beyond settlement as any institutional changes that are implemented. Divided into three sections, what follows holistically examines structural reforms from the case studies. The first section focuses on political reforms with particular attention being paid to: • initial stabilization after settlement • how devolution can ameliorate the root causes of conflict

356

................. 16928$

CH20

09-09-08 08:23:28

PS

PAGE 356

357

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

• the arguments both for and against power-sharing agreements • the relationship between the executive and legislature, not least of all the impact of having a powerful executive and (comparatively) weak legislature • the importance of security sector reform as a precursor to elections • the difficulties associated with corruption in—some—postconflict states.

The second section focuses on security sector reform. If settlement is intended to give the state a monopoly over the use of force, the process of security sector reform is central to achieving this.1 This section includes: • • • • •

disarmament demobilization reintegration of troops reforming the military, intelligence, and police forces developing or reforming civilian bodies to oversee and manage security institutions

Particular attention is paid to the importance of building security sector reform into the peace process at the outset as well as to the challenges of reforming the security sector when power is overwhelmingly in the hands of a powerful elite. Furthermore, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration challenges are discussed as is the unique and challenging case of security sector reform in Palestine. However, security sector reform and institutional reforms do not exist in vacuums. What is clear is that both must be part and parcel of a wider governance agenda.2 An agenda that must address the root causes of conflict and refrain from prematurely rushing into elections before internal stabilization has occurred. The third section examines the longer-term process of reconciliation and inclusion. It is through such a process that democracy is consolidated and the roles of political and military institutions can become, and be seen to become, stabilizing forces as opposed to instruments of oppression. However, to reach this stage the case studies contained in this collection show that many—indeed most—states need international assistance, including training and capacity building. Indeed, the role of the international community—international governmental organizations but also the policies pursued by supportive governments individually—can have long-term impact, both posi-

................. 16928$

CH20

09-09-08 08:23:29

PS

PAGE 357

358

VANESSA E. SHIELDS AND NICHOLAS D. J. BALDWIN

tive and negative, on the capabilities of post-conflict states to move beyond settlement.

Political Reforms Stabilization After Settlement: The Role of Political Institution Building The emergence of democratic principles and good governance after a period of protracted conflict can only be the result of gradual changes in political culture. The reformation or restructuring of political institutions is only the first step to changing the foundation of political culture designed to lead to a more peaceful and just society. However, the initial postsettlement climate is often fraught with internal tensions and distrust as the former warring parties struggle with accommodation and compromise. It is at this time that the reigniting of conflict is most likely to occur. Thus addressing long-term political reforms must be done in tandem with addressing ongoing security dilemmas which threaten a fragile peace. A variety of—potential—internal security dilemmas exist in postsettlement states, including: • • • • • •

the absence of the political will to embrace change the presence of spoilers increases in crime and, as a result, in human insecurity politicized security agencies the proliferation of small arms and light weapons a lack of funding and technical expertise for implementing reforms

According to Stephen Stedman, the three most likely sources of postagreement failure are the presence of spoilers; the interests of third parties/external actors; and the presence of easilymarketable commodities.3 That this is so can be seen from the case of Sudan which suffers from all three of these factors. Spoilers in Sudan are not simply limited to nonstate actors but actually include settlement signatories. In Sudan democratization—including the schedule for elections and the question of federalism-devolution-regional autonomy (including the possibility of Southern succession)—threatens the power of traditional parties and militias, including their control of natural resources, not least of all oil. These factors make Sudan’s Com-

................. 16928$

CH20

09-09-08 08:23:29

PS

PAGE 358

359

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

prehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) particularly fragile and the whole situation dangerously ripe for re-escalation. Max Weber said that a state must have a monopoly over the use of physical violence.4 In postconflict states the process of stabilization after settlement is an essential component to preventing a return to conflict. Indeed, before institutions can be built effectively the conditions that will make institution building possible must be created. Contributor Christina Wille said about Cambodia, ‘‘The stabilization process was successful because it offered the warring parties greater rewards through cooperating with the system rather than by continuing the civil war.’’ Wille provides a list of lessons drawn from the Cambodian transformation process. One of these lessons illustrates the importance of the political structure as a stabilizing force which can help prevent a return to conflict. Defining the roles and responsibilities of the executive, including establishing the relationship between the executive and the legislature, are particularly important initial steps in the political reform process not least of all because the centralization of government under a powerful executive can be an option in countries coming out of conflict. Nonetheless, developing some form of power sharing which will provide a more equitable balance of power between and among the warring factions can also be significant. Power sharing encourages negotiation as an alternative to violence and seeks a political framework where minority groups and parties are included and given an incentive to work within the system not outside of it. Creating structures for devolved government can also be a useful way to mitigate future conflict and provide reassurance to minority, cultural, and ethnic groups. Devolution can be part of the peace accord itself or it may organically grow out of negotiations and the political reform process. Executives and Legislatures ‘‘Effective legislature means parliamentarians operating firstly from a background of political competition via elections and then having the material and human-intellectual resources to act as a check on executive power,’’ so observes Simon Roughneen in his case study of Sudan. In the same vein, the case studies on both Cambodia and South Africa cite the lack of capacity and training of parliamentarians as a reason for unchecked executive power, not least of all vis-a`-vis the legislature. In Afghanistan, however,

................. 16928$

CH20

09-09-08 08:23:29

PS

PAGE 359

360

VANESSA E. SHIELDS AND NICHOLAS D. J. BALDWIN

centralizing power and security in an overwhelmingly powerful executive has historically been seen as the solution, not the problem; namely as the way to mitigate conflict. Meanwhile, it is devolution and decentralization in both Spain and Bosnia and Herzegovina that has been widely regarded as playing a significant role beyond settlement. Two key, albeit alternative, methods of political organization have been identified in the case studies as effective not only in facilitating settlement but also in enabling nations to move beyond settlement. The first is the establishment of a powerful central executive (not least of all powerful vis-a`-vis the legislature). The second is the establishment of power-sharing arrangements with some form of decentralization or devolution. Both strategies have strengths and weaknesses associated with them and neither method would necessarily be applicable in all circumstances. Whichever method is implemented, however, it should be noted that any imbalances that exist can be difficult to alter once the power structures and personalities of those working in the systems become entrenched. Amin Tarzi underlines the importance of a strong executive by noting that ‘‘the fragile democracy in Afghanistan is protected right now because of the individual at the helm,’’ drawing attention to the fact of a powerful executive as well as to the importance of the actual individual in the position. The difficulty associated with this power structure is that democratic values may suffer because the personality and preferences of the individual executive can come to dominate state affairs. The drafters of Spain’s Constitution strengthened the power of the executive and limited the power of the Congress. Lynn Maurer points out that this arrangement was pursued for two reasons: ‘‘First, they believed that minority governments would prevail in the future. Second, they possessed the historical memory of the fragmented and ideologically polarized parliament of the failed democracy of the 1930s and, in turn, hoped to ensure stable government.’’ The drafters of the Spanish constitution ensured that the executive is not subject to frequent changes while the Congress is protected from unilateral and authoritarian moves by the executive. In Spain’s settlement period, this structure contributed to stabilizing democracy and was a factor in allowing the country to move beyond settlement into a consolidated democracy. In the case of Cambodia, the parliament—the National Assembly—is subordinate to the executive. There are two reasons

................. 16928$

CH20

09-09-08 08:23:30

PS

PAGE 360

361

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

for this. Firstly, the executive has historically been a centralizing force and, secondly, the two main political parties, FUNCINPEC and the CPP, exercise tight control over their members thereby limiting the ability of members of the legislature to play an independent role. Indeed, the power of the executive inhibits the legislature’s ability either to initiate new legislation or to challenge the executive over budgetary affairs. It is this power relationship that ensures that proposed reforms designed to strengthen the power of the legislature in Cambodia are largely unsuccessful. The legislature’s weakness is compounded by the lack of capacity and training of members of parliament to adequately draft, analyze or review laws. The case studies also show that strong patron-client networks can also inhibit not only the actions of members of parliament but also their ability to scrutinize and hold the executive to account and in check. In his chapter on Cambodia, Kheang Un explained patron-client networks as ‘‘a political pattern wherein a leader’s power comes from his ability to capture and maintain loyalty of key sections of the political elite by fulfilling their material aspirations through the distribution of perquisites.’’5 He went on to emphasize that ‘‘the government is not built on rational institutions in Weberian terms, but on partimonialism.’’ In Cambodia, patronage politics is very much the name of the game and it can be seen as undermining democratic governance through politicizing state institutions and insidiously weakening the mechanisms of checks and balances outlined in the Constitution. Not all postconflict states have a strong executive and weak legislature. In Susan Booysen’s chapter on South Africa, she explains that the power of the presidency has been countered by the democratically elected parliament. According to Booysen, the first democratically elected parliament (1994–99) after the end of apartheid ‘‘reflected both the inclusiveness of the settlement and the victory of the formerly subjugated.’’ The Parliament itself was instrumental in promoting reconciliation and transition through its public outreach programs where constituents were encouraged to provide input into legislative and policy programs. Nonetheless, there were concerns expressed within the African National Congress (ANC)—the ruling party—as a result of the president’s attempts to centralize decision making in the executive. According to South African contributor Gavin Cawthra this created an ‘‘insider/outsider’’ situation which contributed to a split within the ANC. Senior

................. 16928$

CH20

09-09-08 08:23:30

PS

PAGE 361

362

VANESSA E. SHIELDS AND NICHOLAS D. J. BALDWIN

members of the ANC from within Parliament have—according to Booysen—been ‘‘dispersed and redeployed to positions in provincial governments, parastatals, and the private sector.’’ This loss of senior, experienced members from within Parliament and the consequential increase in the numbers of inexperienced members of Parliament contributed to a shift in the balance of power between the executive and the legislature in favor of the executive. Nonetheless, in the case of South Africa, despite the imbalance between the executive and the legislature, the executive—president and the cabinet—continuously reinforce political settlement through a power-sharing agreement that ensures minority constituencies have a place in government. Power Sharing Power sharing is a technique that can allow deeply divided societies to reach consensus on difficult issues by apportioning all cultural, linguistic, ethnic, and/or religious groups a share of governmental power. A wide variety of power-sharing systems have been introduced and are in use in countries coming out of protracted conflict and a number of the case studies in this text show that this approach has been utilized. Power sharing is an alternative approach to governance from a winner-take-all or majoritarian system. Indeed, a majoritarian system can be extremely problematic in fragile states as it can—intentionally or unintentionally—exclude minority groups from power.6 Power-sharing agreements that emphasize the inclusion of minority groups are intended to establish a more equitable balance of power between conflicting groups. Power sharing, however, has its limitations. In Sudan, for example, although the unelected interim National Assembly—created during the negotiations for the Comprehensive Peace Agreement—was designed as a power sharing legislature, it entrenched the political divisions that spawned conflict in the first place and, consequently, could not be seen as a long-term solution to the conflict.7 Creating and developing political institutions is part of a process of democratization, but it cannot be assumed that determining the balance of powers involved—namely, how power is generated, allocated, and utilized—will automatically or easily follow. In some cases transitional institutional arrangements can actually limit the potential for democratization while empowering an incumbent under a veneer of democratic legitimacy.8 A powersharing agreement of itself is not the end of the matter. A contin-

................. 16928$

CH20

09-09-08 08:23:30

PS

PAGE 362

363

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

uing effort must be made to address the root causes of conflict at the local and national levels. As power-sharing arrangements can exclude some groups, the work of spoilers is particularly problematic. Due to this, power-sharing agreements often break down only to start up again at a later date—for instance, this stop-start approach became a feature of the peace process in Northern Ireland over the years. Power-sharing democracies can take either a consociational/ building-block approach or an integrative approach—or indeed a mixed system combining elements of both approaches. South Africa pursued an integrative approach to conflict in its 1993 constitution. An integrative approach encourages the formation of multiethnic political coalitions which in turn creates incentives for leaders to be moderate on divisive minority issues. The integrative approach does not use ethnic groups as the basis for the power-sharing agreement as seen in Lebanon’s confessional system, for instance. Rather, the integrative approach encourages nonethnic federalism that diffuses points of power, public policies that encourage inclusion, and bridge building across communities, as opposed to treating each community separately, and electoral systems that encourage preelection pacts across ethnic lines.9 In contrast, the consociational approach has four elements: (1) proportional allocation of political posts among communities according to their numerical representation in the population; (2) broad-based coalitions between ethnic communities; (3) communal or group autonomy in geographic regions, through federalism or asymmetrical federalism; and (4) Minority veto power, so that any decisions deemed detrimental by any community can be voted down.10 Bosnia and Herzegovina’s consociational power-sharing structure is determined by ethnic quotas in the two entities involved, namely the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, as well as in the national government. This complicated system of representation is intended to safeguard ethnic sensitivities through ensuring that the constituent groups agree on the laws passed. In Denis Hadzovic and Florence Gaub’s chapter on Bosnia and Herzegovina they stress that the three constituent groups, namely Bosnians, Serbs, and Croats, are given equal rights and representation. Thus the state and federation constitutions include measures to protect the rights of these groups. This is particularly important during the return of refugees, for example, as this can change the status quo in many

................. 16928$

CH20

09-09-08 08:23:31

PS

PAGE 363

364

VANESSA E. SHIELDS AND NICHOLAS D. J. BALDWIN

towns and villages which can result in increased tension between the constituent groups. Devolution In relation to Bosnia and Herzegovina former High Representative Carl Bildt has stated that there was a need for ‘‘de-devolution,’’11 not more devolution. Although devolution to ethnic groups made peace possible in Bosnia and Herzegovina, further reforms are needed in order to make central government more effective. This need for de-devolution is exemplified when looking at the highly politicized nature of the curriculum in operation—and more particularly the textbooks in use—in the schools of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina which has resulted in a multitude of history books written from different ethnic perspectives being used in different parts of the Federation, a factor which can engender or reinforce fear and mistrust among ethnic groups. The consociational approach has a number of related problems. For instance, proportionality in the electoral system may discourage bridge building across communities as any change in the system could be seen as jeopardizing the political power of the elites of one communal group or another. Similarly, a focus on group rights can minimize or undermine cross-community understanding. Furthermore, the establishment of broad-based ethnic coalitions may in fact actually encourage elites to initiate conflict in an attempt to bolster their power and the position of their group at the center in order to ensure that a majoritarian system does not transpire.12 Finally, group autonomy may be problematic in that it can limit opportunities for creating the conditions where various ethnic, linguistic, or cultural groups can live peacefully together. There is no internationally agreed upon definition of ‘‘autonomy,’’ however, Yash Ghai defines it as ‘‘a device to allow an ethnic group or other groups claiming a distinct identity to exercise direct control over important affairs of concern to them while allowing the larger entity to exercise those powers which are the common interests of both sections.’’13 Autonomy-based settlement can be pursued either through the development of symmetrical federalism, where all groups enjoy equal status and autonomy, or through asymmetrical federalism, where one or more regions hold more power than others. Lynn Maurer in her chapter on Spain provides an introduction

................. 16928$

CH20

09-09-08 08:23:31

PS

PAGE 364

365

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

to the importance of state structure. The structure of a state— whether it is unitary, federal, or some form of asymmetric federalism—is a fundamental component of the legitimacy of a state and can have a significant impact on a state’s ability to resolve conflict. Maurer makes the point that ‘‘distinct nationalities which may have been oppressed under a centralized authoritarian regime may strive to obtain and protect regional rights by calling for a federal structure or some devolution of national powers to regional governments. Federalism or devolution will involve varying degrees of separate decision-making bodies, fiscal competence, historical and cultural rights, and regional or state involvement in decision making.’’14 According to Arthur Macmahon, nationalist sentiments may lead to a decentralized unitary state. This was the case in Italy where its Constitution held the ‘‘emphatic promise of regional autonomy’’ which has been granted gradually over the years.15 Due to the Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia’s historic claims to autonomy, Spain adopted an asymmetric formula in which regional powers are constitutionally recognized. Maurer notes that there is ‘‘satisfaction with the current asymmetric arrangement and it is a workable solution to the historic nationalist conflicts,’’ while, according to Richard Nathan, the peaceful and gradual implementation of regional devolution represents ‘‘an effort . . . to avoid political disintegration and therefore, represents one of the great successes of the Spanish democratic transition.’’16 Sudan also, as part of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, adopted an asymmetric federalist model, one that held out the possibility of secession for the South. Contributor on Sudan, Simon Roughneen, points out that secession could exacerbate existing tribal tensions between the dominate Dinka ethnic group and other ethnic groups in the South, particularly the Neur, and notes the negative aspects of autonomy, namely that it ‘‘is usually unsatisfactory to both sides in such conflicts—not enough for those seeking self-determination, and too much of a concession by those seeking to maintain the status quo.’’ Devolution has been a particularly difficult process in Northern Ireland as each community has had entrenched hostility, mistrust, and antagonism of the other. However, in October 2006, the St. Andrews Agreement established conditions and a timetable for the restoration of devolution. The conditions that were stipulated by the mediators of the agreement, the governments from both London and Dublin, were the acceptance of

................. 16928$

CH20

09-09-08 08:23:32

PS

PAGE 365

366

VANESSA E. SHIELDS AND NICHOLAS D. J. BALDWIN

consent, democracy, inclusiveness in government, the equality agenda, and the establishment of balanced political institutions inside Northern Ireland, as well as those between Belfast and Dublin and across the islands. The power-sharing agreement set out in the Belfast Agreement of 1998 was resumed on March 26, 2007, when an historic encounter between Ian Paisley of the Protestant-Unionist-Loyalist DUP and Gerry Adams of the Catholic-Nationalist-Republican Sinn Fein took place. At this meeting the two leaders announced their agreement to enter into a power-sharing executive on May 8, 2007. As has been noted, devolution does not always mitigate conflict nor is it suitable in all postconflict situations. For example, according to Susan Booysen, in South Africa devolution to the local government level ‘‘remained vulnerable to a new generation of conflict, namely that which results from persistent difficulties in bringing more definitive service delivery and change in basic conditions-of-life at the grassroots level.’’ Indeed, Booysen goes on to make the point that the 2004–7 protests stemming from the lack of service delivery and development at the grassroots level ‘‘showed that the entrenchment of multiparty democracy and voting does not preclude protest. Indeed, the protests were a reminder that low levels of conflict can coexist with legitimate political and electoral institutions.’’ In Afghanistan the Bonn Agreement focused on first creating a strong centralized executive in order to establish law and order and other democratic norms. Only after that is accomplished will power be devolved to provinces and districts. Amin Tarzi stresses that devolution is a challenge in Afghanistan because the past quarter of a century has witnessed provinces either dictating their wishes to Kabul or ignoring it completely. However, centralization before devolution has in fact been scrapped by NATO in one of Afghanistan’s most volatile districts in the south, Here, according to Tarzi, NATO-ISAF have sought to empower tribal structures in an attempt to increase security in the region and minimize losses of NATO forces. Cambodia has a mixed system which includes both decentralization and deconcentration, as opposed to devolution. According to Kheang Un, ‘‘Decentralization refers to ‘the delegation of political and administrative authority, from the central to the commune/sangkat level,’ while deconcentration entails ‘the delegation of administrative responsibilities, decision making and authority from central ministries to subnational provincial departments and/or district offices.’ ’’17 Decentralization in

................. 16928$

CH20

09-09-08 08:23:32

PS

PAGE 366

367

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

Cambodia has had a number of positive results including increasing cross-party collaboration leading to a reduction in politically motivated violence;18 increasing collaboration between local government and NGOs; and increasing quality of service delivery resulting in people demanding more from their elected officials. The process of deconcentration has been less effective as the central government has been unwilling to relinquish control over provinces and municipalities. Kheang Un notes that ‘‘structure roles and functions of provinces and districts are not well defined; nor have decentralization and deconcentration been well coordinated. The Organic Law which defines the role and responsibility of sub-national level government has not been passed. The resultant consequence is the absence of clear roles and responsibilities between commune, district, and provincial authorities.’’19 The case studies contained in this collection show that there are a variety of power sharing solutions that postsettlement states can pursue once the parties to a conflict have reached a decision to move forward in this way—when parties to a conflict have reached what has been termed ‘‘a hurting stalemate,’’ namely where neither side(s) is able to make gains through violent conflict and, as a result, is highly motivated to de-escalate the conflict. Eventually, postconflict states need to move beyond the power sharing system and the deadlocks it creates. The integrative approach is particularly useful as it encourages crosscommunity understanding and bridgebuilding between communities. However, it is particularly difficult to pursue when a state is divided along ethnic lines after protracted conflict. What is clear, however, is that a power sharing system in and of itself cannot resolve the deep-seated animosities that exist between and among communities. Elections and Stabilization Although elections in themselves do not indicate that a country is transforming into a stable democracy—indeed, Simon Roughneen notes that ‘‘elections are a superficial barometer of the workings of democracy and have been used by the international community as a get-out-quick clause in transitional settings’’—provisions outlining the timeframe for elections are often included in settlements and the use of elections has been an important technique in attempts to stabilize a postsettlement state or territory.

................. 16928$

CH20

09-09-08 08:23:33

PS

PAGE 367

368

VANESSA E. SHIELDS AND NICHOLAS D. J. BALDWIN

In dealing with elections one thing is clear, namely the necessity of stabilizing the security situation both before and during elections. Elections which occur before any steps have been taken to address security can hamper democratic progress by, as Roughneen observes, ‘‘ratify[ing] the norms and institutions of conflict.’’ Even before elections are held security sector reform should be occurring. Christina Wille noted this, pointing out that the example of Cambodia ‘‘suggests that security sector reform needs to be built into postconflict stabilization strategies from the outset.’’ Indeed, a number of the contributors to Beyond Settlement discuss the importance of beginning to implement security sector reform from the very outset, before elections and institution building can begin. For instance, in Nepal, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) preceded the formation of an interim government and elections in order to build trust between the warring factions, namely the Maoists and the Nepalese Army. In the case of Afghanistan the Bonn Agreement envisaged holding free elections in 2004, two years after the transfer of power to a transitional authority. This was a particular challenge bearing in mind the fact that Afghanistan had very little state structure and a quarter of a century of armed conflict with outside forces and internal wars supported by foreign backers. According to Amin Tarzi this context raised the question: ‘‘Was Afghanistan ready for this election or were the framers of the Bonn Agreement more interested in checking boxes on their task list than ensuring the proper conditions were in place to hold Afghanistan’s first ever democratic presidential election?’’ Again according to Tarzi, Afghans were ‘‘hesitant to label elections as the ‘most important’ component of democracy. They were simply a first step in a very long journey.’’ In Afghanistan, despite DDR being behind schedule and the OSCE’s belief that the situation in Afghanistan was too difficult for holding free and fair elections in accordance with international standards,20 it was decided that elections would take place. Tarzi notes that this decision ‘‘invigorated the populace to enter into the . . . electoral process.’’ When parliamentary and provincial council elections did take place in Afghanistan in 2005 there were reports of voter intimidation and a variety of electoral irregularities. However, President Karazi saw these irregularities as ‘‘an indication of people exercising their democratic power enthusiastically’’ not as a ‘‘violation of democratic principles.’’21 Indeed, despite, the irregu-

................. 16928$

CH20

09-09-08 08:23:33

PS

PAGE 368

369

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

larities reported and the election of individuals from the mujahedin, the Taliban, Communists, warlords, and tribal leaders (independents and technocrats were also elected), Tarzi Amin notes that ‘‘the overwhelming response of the general populace and the high level of participation of women, who in recent history had been completely denied a public voice, instilled a sense of hope in democracy and its process.’’ The example of the 2006 Palestinian elections, however, illustrates the adverse effect elections can have on internal security. The unexpected outcome—the victory of Hamas—took both the United States and the European Union by surprise and, as Roland Friedrich observes, they reacted by cutting off all financial aid to the Palestinian National Authority. Meanwhile, Israel ‘‘withheld the transfer of tax and customs revenues which it collects on behalf of the Authority.’’22 The resulting financial repercussions heightened internal Palestinian tensions between Fateh and Hamas, socioeconomic tensions increased among the civil service as their salaries went unpaid, and violent confrontations ensued. In short, violent conflict was fueled by the results and consequences of the 2006 elections. Elections are often highlighted as a central tenant in a process of democratization. The case of Palestine, however, clearly highlights the fact that election results—and not least of all the international community’s response to those results—can threaten and undermine both internal and external security. According to Peter Wallensteen, ‘‘the best indicator of a functioning democratic system is the second or third election, not the first one.’’23 It is only through developing norms to guide elections that countries emerging from protracted conflict can begin to build an effective, well-functioning polity.24 Bosnia and Herzegovina’s first elections after settlement effectively acted as an ethnic census. By 2006 responsibility for elections was entirely in the hands of the permanent Election Commission and —according to the International Election Observation Mission—elections were ‘‘generally in line with international standards for democratic elections’’ although due to the structure of the electoral system, they still acted as an ‘‘ethnic census.’’25 Electoral Systems It is not simply the fact of elections but also the type of electoral system chosen by countries in transition that can have an

................. 16928$

CH20

09-09-08 08:23:34

PS

PAGE 369

370

VANESSA E. SHIELDS AND NICHOLAS D. J. BALDWIN

impact on stability. A number of potential, alternative electoral systems exist and are outlined in figure 20.1:

Alternative Electoral Systems • First-past-the-post/Simple Majority/Simple Plurality System— under which the candidate receiving the largest number of votes is elected. There is no requirement to obtain a majority over any or all candidates or to obtain a given proportion of the total vote. The only requirement is to secure one more vote than any other individual candidate. • Second (Two-Ballot) System—This uses single member constituencies, but requires a candidate to win over half the votes cast in order to be elected on the first ballot. Failure to do this triggers a second ballot (involving a limited number of candidates going forward from the first round—usually determined by a given percentage of votes received or finishing in a given place in the first ballot) in which the result is decided by simple plurality, that is to say first-past-the-post. • Supplementary Vote System (SV)—under which voters mark their first and second choice candidates on the ballot paper. First preferences are counted and if one candidate gets 50 percent of the vote or more, that person is elected. If no one gets 50 percent of the vote, all of the candidates, except the two with the highest number of votes, are eliminated and second preferences on the ballot papers of those eliminated candidates are then allocated to those remaining. Whoever has the most votes at the end of this process is declared the winner. • Alternative Vote System (AV)—under which candidates contest single-member constituencies and voters mark the candidates in order of preference. If a candidate secures over half the votes cast, the candidate is elected; but if no candidate in a constituency does so, then the candidate with the fewest votes is eliminated and the votes redistributed according to the preferences indicated. This process continues until the support for a candidate passes the 50 percent threshold. • Additional Member System (AMS)—under which a proportion of the seats are single member constituency seats directly elected on a first-past-the-post basis, and a proportion are allocated to parties on a regional list basis. The individual elector has two votes, one for the candidate and one for the party. It is the latter that determines overall representation as individual constituency results are ‘‘topped up’’ by members from party lists in proportion to the number required to ensure that the end result is proportional to the votes cast.

................. 16928$

CH20

09-09-08 08:23:34

PS

PAGE 370

371

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

• Limited AMS or AV Top-up—under which a majority of representatives are elected on an individual constituency basis by the Alternative Vote system and the remainder are elected on a proportionally corrective top-up basis using open party lists in local areas. • National Party List System—under which the whole country would constitute a single constituency. Each party draws up a list of its candidates and the voters vote for the party they prefer. Once the votes have been counted, the parties are allocated seats in proportion to the number of votes they obtained. Hence, if a party gets 25 percent of the vote, it gets 25 percent of the seats, with individual candidates securing election according to their position on their party’s list. • Regional Party List System—under which, within regions, each party draws up a list of its candidates and the voters vote for the party they prefer. Once the votes have been counted, the parties are allocated seats within the region in proportion to the number of votes they obtained. Hence, if a party gets 25 percent of the vote within a region, it gets 25 per cent of the seats from that region, with individual candidates securing election according to their position on their party’s list within the region. • Single Transferable Vote System (STV)—a complex system requiring multi-member constituencies in which voters are required to list candidates in order of preference. In order to secure election, a candidate needs to obtain a certain quota of votes. The quota is established by dividing the total number of valid votes cast by the number of representatives to be returned for the constituency plus one, and then adding one to this total. Hence, in a five-member constituency in which 375,000 votes were cast, the number of votes required for the quota (and hence election) would be 62,501 (about 17 percent of the votes cast). If five candidates obtain this number of first preference votes, this is the end of the process. If, however, fewer than five reach the quota, a process of transference, or redistribution, takes place. Firstly, the ‘‘excess’’ votes of the candidates who have gained more votes than the quota are transferred on the basis of second preferences, with the amount by which the votes of such candidates exceed the quota determining the value of the second preference votes. Consequently, if a candidate gains 1,500 first preference votes and the quota is 1,000, a third of the votes have not been used. This candidate’s second preference votes are therefore worth one-third of a vote each. As a result, if 600 second preference votes went to candidate X, candidate X would be allocated an additional 200 votes to add to his or her total of first preference votes. After the second preference votes of those with more than the quota have been transferred, and if five candidates have not yet obtained the quota, then the

................. 16928$

CH20

09-09-08 08:23:34

PS

PAGE 371

372

VANESSA E. SHIELDS AND NICHOLAS D. J. BALDWIN

candidate with the fewest first preference votes is eliminated and the votes transferred on the basis of second preferences. This process is then continued until enough candidates reach the quota and all seats are filled. • Single Non-Transferable Vote System (SNTV)—operates in multimember constituencies but in which each voter casts only one vote (for a candidate). Those candidates with the largest number of votes are elected. For example, in a four-member district, the four candidates who receive the largest number of votes are elected.

A variety of consequences can flow from the use of each of these alternative systems—for example, the election of a parliamentary majority based on a minority of the popular vote under the first-past-the-post system, or no single party emerging with an overall parliamentary majority under the single transferable vote system. Any assessment of the appropriateness of an electoral system is determined to a very large extent by views concerning what elections are seen as being for as well as of the nature of representation. As has been noted: We have to be clear about the nature of the function of assemblies and parliaments before we can determine the role of representatives within them and the mechanisms by which they should be elected. . . . no voting system can simultaneously satisfy a set of obvious conditions for social choice in a democratic society. Hence, the choice of electoral systems is always going to be in terms of second best. We should therefore approach the appraisal of alternative systems with an open mind, recognizing that there is no ideal system available.26

In short, the use of an electoral system—any electoral system—involves questions not only about the electoral system itself but about the nature of representative democracy, the role of parties, the nature of legislatures and assemblies and the kind of accountability there should be between a representative and those whom they represent. In addition an electoral system has to meet a wide-ranging set of criteria of acceptability. Not all these criteria are compatible with one another, and some are more applicable to take into account for the election of certain institutions in certain places at certain times, rather than for other institutions in other places at other times. In evaluating the suitability of an electoral system in a state coming out of conflict and moving beyond settle-

................. 16928$

CH20

09-09-08 08:23:35

PS

PAGE 372

373

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

ment we are, therefore, faced with the complex task of setting out the range of appropriate criteria, looking at the relationship between the criteria, deciding on the appropriate mix of criteria for specific institutions, and determining how these mixes relate to the evaluation of specific electoral systems for particular institutions. In a celebrated text written many years ago W. J. M. Mackenzie suggested four criteria by which an electoral system could be assessed, namely: • • • •

the fairness of the electoral results the degree of public confidence inspired the quality of those elected, and the effectiveness of the legislature27

More recently R. S. Katz observed that: ‘‘Democracy is a messy concept. . . . The definition . . . is not just a philosophical question, however, but also a question with profound implications in the world of practical politics. Different conceptions of democracy justify different institutional arrangements and different standards for evaluating their performance—and ultimately differing distributions of authority. Who wins may be determined by the rules and practices in place, and those, in turn, depend at least in part on which understanding of democracy is privileged’’. He noted that ‘‘legitimate elections must also be effective’’ but went on to raise the vital question ‘‘effective in doing what?’’28 In seeking to answer his own question Katz went on to stipulate that it is necessary to take into consideration such factors as: • • • • • •

universality of suffrage voter turnout constituency delimitation equality of votes proportionality of representation stability and coherence of the resulting government

However, in any such assessment it is important to draw a distinction between what can be called procedural criteria and what can be termed outcomes criteria. Procedural criteria involve assessing whether or not an election has been both ‘‘free and fair’’—namely, conducted in an open, transparent, and fair manner, factors which are key in determining the legitimacy of

................. 16928$

CH20

09-09-08 08:23:35

PS

PAGE 373

374

VANESSA E. SHIELDS AND NICHOLAS D. J. BALDWIN

the outcome. On the other hand, outcomes criteria, while still concerned with fairness, involve focusing on end results and consequences—namely fairness as far as proportionality is concerned, fairness in reflecting opinion, fairness in reflecting the major groups (ethnic and religious) in society, fairness between regions, fairness with regard to the value of each individual vote cast, and so on. These matters are of considerable importance in any nation; they take on added significance in those nations that are coming out of conflict and seeking to move beyond settlement. For example, the first elections in Cambodia saw extremely high voter turnout which served both to reinforce the peace and to facilitate transition beyond settlement, while the 1994 elections in South Africa highlighted and underlined the transition from apartheid to a full-suffrage, mult-party democracy. The question of whether or not elections held in such states conform to international standards is an important one, one that deserves considerable attention. Consequently, the conduct of elections in transitioning states is routinely evaluated by election monitors from bodies such as the UN, the EU, and the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe). As has been noted in this regard: ‘‘. . . if all one wants to do is identify electoral events or practices that are grossly inadequate, the task is easy. If ballot boxes are stuffed, or voters are credibly threatened with death, or opposition candidates are barred from campaigning, or government coffers are opened to fund the campaign of only one party . . . the legitimacy of the outcome [is] to be rejected.’’29 However, such matters are not always either simple or straightforward. It is often only a matter of time before questions of degrees of freeness and fairness are raised, and then the task becomes very much more complicated. As has been observed in this regard: ‘‘Most obviously, the problems of establishing thresholds of acceptability and measures that can be used to assess the placement of actual electoral events to those thresholds are far from trivial, and are only complicated by recognition that the reports of election observers may have a significant bearing on the likelihood of post-election violence and on the likelihood that a transition to stable democracy will be continued. Is a flawed election better or worse than no election at all? . . . even the standards by which acceptability might be judged depend on the understanding of democracy that one employs.’’30 The case studies outlined in this collection highlight the

................. 16928$

CH20

09-09-08 08:23:35

PS

PAGE 374

375

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

threat posed to democratic consolidation and the ability of a nation to move beyond settlement by an ‘‘illegitimate election.’’ An election can be undermined—made illegitimate—by what are described as ‘‘injured processes.’’ According to Therese Laanela ‘‘injured processes’’ occur when: • election results are, or are believed to be, inaccurate or manipulated; • a portion of the population is disenfranchised; • there is violence or intimidation of candidates or voters during the election campaign; • the electoral boundaries are delimited in such a way as to give, be seen to give, or be perceived as giving, an undue advantage to one party; • the elections are poorly organized, with ballot papers not arriving at polling stations, or with a substantial number of voters not finding their names on the voters’ roll; • there is a sense that the body organizing the elections is partial or partisan in the conduct of its activities.31

Many of these injured processes have been seen as commonplace in states coming out of conflict, resulting in an atmosphere of distrust that undoubtedly weakens—and can undermine entirely—not only the legitimacy of the elections but also the stability and sustainability of the postconflict system being forged. As a result, elections are intended to adhere to a number of key principles providing for what is termed ‘‘best-quality,’’ including: • • • • •

the right to vote the secrecy of the vote the equality of access for parties and candidates the security of the process the neutrality, nonpartisanship, and transparency of the electoral administration

In order to be able to deliver ‘‘best-quality,’’ the provision of certain ‘‘special mechanisms’’ within postconflict states has become the norm, not least of all: • the hiring of large numbers of electoral officers to facilitate nationwide voter registration • computerized voter registration • the provision of transportation (for example, via helicopter) of election workers to remote and difficult areas

................. 16928$

CH20

09-09-08 08:23:35

PS

PAGE 375

376

VANESSA E. SHIELDS AND NICHOLAS D. J. BALDWIN

• the availability of high quality materials such as ballot papers with security features, sturdy and specially designed ballot boxes, and tamper-evident bags for the transmission of results • the distribution of funds to political parties and candidates to enable them to conduct their campaigns • the recruitment and deployment of large numbers of domestic and international observers to watch and monitor the process in its entirety • the provision and deployment of security personnel to guard the process and to accompany the electoral materials at every step • extensive and high quality voter education campaigns—including the deployment of trainers throughout the country to do voter simulation exercises • the computerized counting and transmission of votes from counting centers to central headquarters32

Cambodia is an example of a case where parliamentary elections were an integral part of the peace agreement; indeed, the entire peace process was seen as resting upon the elections. Consequently, considerable financial and logistical support was provided by the international donor community in order to ensure that the legitimacy of the process was unassailable and that no doubts could legitimately be raised over its integrity. In taking this approach the UN and foreign donors were mindful of the fact that in previous cases failed elections had reignited conflict. It was for this reason that the considerable costs associated with the first Cambodian elections were met by an engaged international community. In the same vein, the international community—under the auspices of the OSCE—covered the costs involved in the elections in Bosnia. Nonetheless, what is also important—indeed vital—is that ‘‘best-quality’’ elections are sustainable in the medium and long term. Inflated expectations as a result of first elections can undermine the credibility of future elections when perhaps the resources are not available—or are not being provided—to enable the elections to be run in the same ‘‘best-quality’’ way. A lesserquality election can risk prejudicing the integrity of the electoral process, and therefore the result, by opening it up to accusations of inadequacy and this can have very serious consequences indeed for a peace process. This is something that has to be remembered as countries seek to move beyond settlement. The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina illustrates the complexities that can be inherent in a particular electoral system; indeed, Bosnia and Herzegovina has a particularly complicated electoral

................. 16928$

CH20

09-09-08 08:23:36

PS

PAGE 376

377

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

process, one which reinforces party politics along ethnic lines and which is, as Denis Hadzovic and Florence Gaub observe ‘‘not only clearly contradictory to democratic principles, but contributes . . . to the freezing of ethnic identity.’’ While on the subject of elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina it is worth noting the following judgment of Lord (Paddy) Ashdown, who served as the international community’s high representative from 2002 to 2006: ‘‘In Bosnia, holding elections was the international community’s first priority and there were lots of them—six elections in seven years, in all. This was a mistake. The Bosnians got very tired of constant elections, belief in democracy suffered and, because elections were held before the rule of law was established, the result was that those who ran the war, and profited from it politically or criminally, reinforced their positions by becoming elected to government. Very frequently early elections prove not to be a short route to Westernstyle democracy, but rather a quick road to the criminally captured state. Nor do elections, it appears, reduce the risk of conflict recurrence in the long term. A recent study has shown that although the risk of a return to conflict goes down in the year of the election, it tends to rise again afterwards.’’33 In short, Lord Ashdown concludes that elections should not be held as soon as possible, but as late as the interveners can get away with, noting that: ‘‘Democracy consists of much more than voting. To work properly, democracy needs the rule of law, an independent civil service, institutions of government in which there are built-in checks and balances to prevent the abuse of power, a free and vibrant press and an active civil society capable of holding the executive to account. It is better, if circumstances allow, to put as many of these other elements of democracy in place as possible, before launching into the business of voting.’’34 Moving to the case of Afghanistan, a number of reasons have been cited by the executive to justify the adoption of the Single Non-Transferable Vote System (SNTV) for the parliamentary and provincial council elections in 2005, including that it would prevent ‘‘large regional or ethnic parties or parties associated with violence, illegal militias or the drug trade from entering and controlling the parliament through bribery and coercion.’’35 However, as Amin Tarzi points out, ‘‘The International Crisis Group criticized the administration’s reliance on SNTV, commenting that, instead of ‘empowering political parties essential for a successful political transition,’’ SNTV undermined the development of ‘nascent democratic groupings,’’ and more impor-

................. 16928$

CH20

09-09-08 08:23:36

PS

PAGE 377

378

VANESSA E. SHIELDS AND NICHOLAS D. J. BALDWIN

tantly, allowed the established Islamist groups access to power.’’36 As Lynn Maurer explains, Spain adopted an electoral formula specifically designed to ‘‘reduce the number of parties, and give little or no representation to extremist groups.’’ The modified proportional representation system used ‘‘favors two large national parties, reduces the number of small national parties, and allows for the representation of smaller regional parties.’’ Maurer notes that this ‘‘helped to stabilize the party system and minimized the number of parties while remaining representative,’’ and concludes: ‘‘A less stabilizing electoral formula may have led to a more polarized party system, when in fact the system chosen proved to minimize conflict and legitimize the electoral process.’’ What becomes clear in all of this is that the use of one type of electoral system or another—the choice of one system over another—can be an important decision made by those involved in conflict resolution and attempting to move states beyond settlement. For example, introducing an electoral system the consequences of which provide incentives to participate can have very positive consequences for the development of a democratic process. Nevertheless, one system can encourages intra-group contestation and intergroup moderation in one case or one set of circumstances,37 while a different system may be more appropriate in another set of circumstances; one electoral system may reinforce ethnic division in one instance, but assist in building bridges across community divides in another.

Security Sector Reform Reforming the Security Sector In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, international institutions and donors focused their attention as far as security sector reform was concerned largely on the question of force reduction. More recently, however, a more enlightened approach to security sector reform has gained impetus. This development can be seen in the case of Cambodia. When the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was established—as Christina Wille notes—security sector reform ‘‘was not a guiding principle at the time.’’ However, since 2000, Cambodia has participated in a number of small arms programs in-

................. 16928$

CH20

09-09-08 08:23:36

PS

PAGE 378

379

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

cluding weapons collection and management as well as proper stockpile management procedures—although Wille does go on to point out that ‘‘the implementation of a comprehensive SSR agenda seeking to transform the security architecture of the state has not yet been attempted.’’ In contrast, South Africa had a particularly successful security sector reform process which was designed and implemented during and after the settlement process.38 Indeed, Gavin Cawthra notes in relation to the South African reform process and its actors: ‘‘They turned around a country gripped by low-level civil war, which was also in conflict with its neighbors and in danger of balkanizing, into a relatively peaceful and stable state, with what is widely regarded as one of the most effective systems of political oversight and control of the security sector in Africa.’’ In this case the transformation process was supported by the establishment of norms on human rights, political conduct, and ‘‘rules of the game’’ during the settlement process. Unlike many settlement processes, the South African situation was negotiated internally, not by outside mediators or third parties. The South African security sector reform process has gone through a variety of stages and has consequently evolved over time. For instance, and as Cawthra notes, ‘‘During the Mandela presidency (1994–99), security policy, including the foreign policy dimensions thereof, were highly normative. Principles of democratic governance, human rights and constitutionalism dominated the policy discourses in all areas, although this was strongly inflected with the overriding requirements for ‘transformation.’ ’’ During the Mbeki presidency (1999–), however, the ‘‘war against crime,’’ peacekeeping, national security, and regional security have become increasingly important. South Africa’s security sector reform process has had a number of key stabilizing elements that have been instrumental in upholding the development of norms such as good governance and the consolidation of democracy. Cawthra outlines a number of key points which are highlighted as having been essential components for the stabilization of South Africa beyond settlement. These key points included: • The fact that normative and political frameworks for the broad approach to security were agreed by the principal parties through a complex process of negotiations before the actual transition to democracy, and interim multiparty control mechanisms were established.

................. 16928$

CH20

09-09-08 08:23:36

PS

PAGE 379

380

VANESSA E. SHIELDS AND NICHOLAS D. J. BALDWIN

• The conscious decision to ensure that the security agencies remained operational throughout. Virtually nothing was disbanded and few individuals were dismissed, thus ensuring that the state and its agencies continued to function. • The integration of virtually all defense elements, police services, and intelligence agencies (with almost all their personnel) linked to the adversarial parties contributed to nation building and stability. • The fact that the process was homegrown and organic and not imposed by external actors, ensuring a strong sense of local ownership and responsibility. However, neighboring countries and major international actors were supportive, assisting in creating a climate of stability. • The fact that the process was transparent and accountable to legitimate authorities and involved a high level of civil society participation. • The widely perceived belief that the objective was the establishment of legitimate, civil, democratic control, which could be broadly accepted by most political actors. • The fact that policy frameworks and clear roles and functions for the security services were determined, and the security agencies were left with a clear sense of mission and with a professional, legitimate role to play.

In the case of South Africa it should also be pointed out that the role of an independent media and an engaged, involved public were additional factors in the stabilization process which undoubtedly facilitated the transition beyond settlement. As Cawthra explains ‘‘The media and the public at large were energetically engaged in policy argument over defense, and this contributed substantially to legitimizing the process’’ while ‘‘the executive, parliament and the department of defense itself all went out of their way to consult with civil society organizations,’’ an important normative step which helped fill any gaps in expertise on the part of the government. A rather different side to this matter can, however, be seen in the case of Spain. During the Franco years the military was a central actor in the political system. Nonetheless, as Jose Olmeda explains, the settlement process in Spain ‘‘brought about a change in this presence . . . [and] gradually the military were not morally integrated with society, and were not substantively salient to society anymore; they had become alienated or isolated from the changing society, encapsulated from general societal change.’’ During Spain’s reform process the media and civil society scrutinized and challenged traditional military val-

................. 16928$

CH20

09-09-08 08:23:37

PS

PAGE 380

381

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

ues for the first time in forty years which engendered a degree of resentment among some in the military at the democratization process. As is the case in many transitioning states, and as Olmeda stresses in the case of Spain, at ‘‘the beginning of transition to democracy, the military had to reposition itself with respect to civil society, and, at the same time, had to rearticulate and justify a new professional role within a democratic polity.’’ In the case of Spain the prospect of membership in NATO was a significant incentive; membership itself—secured in 1982— helped both to facilitate and encourage the military’s transformation into ‘‘a more modernized, politically uninvolved, professional military.’’39 In particular, NATO membership resulted in better-trained middle- and upper-level bureaucrats to oversee the military as well as officers learning that civilian control of the military was the norm in NATO member states.40 Equally important in Spain’s transformation was the establishment of a formal guarantee—through legislation on budgetary appropriations—that the military would have the resources to modernize. According to Olmeda, ‘‘Financial comfort was a sure way to build mutual trust between elected authorities and the military.’’ Without a legal framework to govern the security sector a wide variety of abuses can occur resulting in continued mistrust and fear among people living in a postconflict state. For instance, in Cambodia, the security sector lacks a clear definition of its roles and responsibilities in part because the security institutions lack clear mandates and transparent procedures. According to Wille, ‘‘Improved security and the emergence of the security forces as key organs within the Cambodian state occurred as part of the establishment of ‘an ever more monolithic system’41 in which the Prime Minister Hun Sen through his Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) consolidated almost complete control over the state and electoral machinery.’’42 This has provided internal stabilization while sacrificing good governance, accountability, and oversight procedures. Wille explains that oversight bodies in themselves cannot force the security services to abide by tenants of democratic rule. Instead, normative values must be established to guide and enforce oversight and accountability mechanisms. For instance, as Cawthra points out, South Africa implemented a civic education program for officers and soldiers to ensure that they ‘‘underst[ood] democratic politics, constitutionalism, democratic civil-military relations, military professional obligations and international humanitar-

................. 16928$

CH20

09-09-08 08:23:37

PS

PAGE 381

382

VANESSA E. SHIELDS AND NICHOLAS D. J. BALDWIN

ian law.’’ This training in human rights and democratic governance played an important part in consolidating democratic norms in the security sector. In seeking both to achieve settlement and to move beyond settlement it should be noted that police reform can play a particularly important part in developing trust between and among communities. That this is so can be seen from the case of South Africa. Reform of the police in South Africa included demilitarizing the police; introducing less confrontational public order policing; establishing mechanisms for accountability to communities and for civil control and oversight; integration and restructuring; and ending human rights violations and torture; in short, transformation. This was a process which, according to Cawthra, was largely understood to mean ‘‘addressing racial and gender inequities.’’43 This process of transformation included integrating ten ‘‘homeland’’ forces, effectively changing the racial makeup of the police force at all levels. This constituted an important development as it turned an institution that was distrusted—indeed hated—by much of the population into an integrated force, one that was much more representative of the entire population. The reform of the intelligence service—an entity equally distrusted by many people as a result of their role during apartheid—was similarly significant. South Africa’s reform of the intelligence sector began in 1994 with the publication of a White Paper on Intelligence, and was followed by the passage of legislation which defined and organized the role of the intelligence community. Cawthra notes that this resulted in the integration of around one thousand former ANC and PAC intelligence operatives. The reform agenda was significant in that it placed the intelligence sector under constitutional and democratic control. However, and as Cawthra noted, ‘‘there was very little public demand for intelligence functions to be opened to public scrutiny, as happened, for example, when the German Democratic Republic collapsed. Instead, there seems to have been a high level of continuity, with files remaining closed or (mostly) being destroyed; no less than forty-four tons of government security-related documentation was shredded during the transition.’’ The lack of norms on overseeing intelligence matters in the case of Spain is cited as potentially problematic, Olmeda pointing out that ‘‘there is no legislative body assigned the task of supervising the intelligence service; there are no norms regulating access by deputies to the information needed to exercise control,

................. 16928$

CH20

09-09-08 08:23:37

PS

PAGE 382

383

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

and there is an apparent lack of interest on the part of the opposition and successive governments in knowing what intelligence agents are up to.’’ However, Olmeda describes this lack of oversight as a ‘‘functional imperative’’ that can only be understood when seen in the context of recent Spanish history, namely a history of both internal (ETA, Basque separatists) and external (the Al-Qaeda Madrid bombings) terrorist attacks. In short, aggressive oversight bodies subjecting the security services to public scrutiny are not deemed necessary as the intelligence services today are viewed as protectors by the Spanish people, not as a threat as was the norm during Franco’s dictatorship. Despite the Palestinian territories not being officially recognized as a state, the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) has, according to Roland Friedrich, begun to develop a normativelegal framework for the security sector. Friedrich explains that the PNA has intermittently worked on initiatives designed to define and organize the security sector, as well as to provide conceptual and planning guidelines for it. However, the instability following the Hamas election victory has not allowed for the progression of these security sector reform initiatives. Friedrich calls the parallel security forces in the Palestinian territories the ‘‘Somalia scenario’’ which is ‘‘characterized by different localized authorities in different areas: kinship networks, local strongmen, ‘guns for hire,’ and, possibly, Al-Qaeda in Palestine.’’ According to Friedrich, stabilization in the Palestinian territories would require, ‘‘effective internal consolidation on the Palestinian side, including a lasting power-sharing agreement between Hamas and Fateh.’’ With the Hamas takeover of Gaza and their subsequent further isolation from the peace process, the willingness to compromise and engage appears to be more distant. Although, as Friedrich asserts, ‘‘What seems clear, however, is that political reconciliation and work toward an effective, efficient, and accountable security sector should be a top priority, first for the Palestinians themselves, but not less for Israelis and the donor community.’’ However, the security sector reform process in Palestine is a particularly difficult process not least of all because Palestine is not a state, but also because the process only began in earnest in 2005. As Friedrich explains, ‘‘Given the long-term nature of any sustainable governance reform this is a very short time span. More than anything else, SSR is a political and social process that stretches over a prolonged period of time, and its success is highly dependent on the political, socioeconomic, and cultural context.’’ Ad-

................. 16928$

CH20

09-09-08 08:23:38

PS

PAGE 383

384

VANESSA E. SHIELDS AND NICHOLAS D. J. BALDWIN

ditionally, the role of Western aid and Israeli policies also have an enormous effect on what goes on within the territories. Disarmament, Demobalization and Reintegration As Roughneen explains in his chapter on security sector reform in Sudan, ‘‘DDR needs early implementation during the postsettlement period, with a distinct timetable from the rest of security reform44 and postsettlement political reform.’’ Equally, DDR does not exist in a vacuum as political reform and economic progress are also important stabilizing factors which must be addressed in postconflict states.45 Understanding that DDR does not guarantee stabilization is essential, particularly if combatants from all sides party to the conflict do not feel that they can achieve more thorough participation in a peace process than by continued fighting. Former combatants often have clear, strong, political and economic motives for refusing to participate in a DDR process. Equally, they may believe that they do not have the requisite skills to do anything other than fight. Therefore, overcoming spoilers who may pray on the fears of former combatants is essential. It is within this context that Roughneen concludes: ‘‘Beyond overcoming spoilers, DDR is the most important sub-goal of peace implementation.’’46 A provision for cantonment, disarmament, and demobilization of all factions was included in Cambodia’s 1991 settlement, the Agreement on a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict.47 However, according to Wille, in 1992 United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)—who was in charge of implementing the military component of the settlement—suspended the process due to the Khmer Rouge PDK’s unwillingness to comply. Instead, cantoned troops were released and the UNTAC mission began to focus on the upcoming elections. Nepal’s settlement also includes a provision for the cantonment, disarmament and demobilization of Maoist rebels. The UN mission in Nepal (UNMIN) is responsible for verifying and monitoring the disarmament of Maoists in seven cantonments. During this time, according to HomRaj Dahal, the Nepali Army has been instructed to remain in their barracks where they are responsible for storing arms which are also monitored and verified by the UN mission. Similar to the DDR process in South Africa, a process of democratization of the armed forces is planned in Nepal. HomRaj Dahal explains that the democratiza-

................. 16928$

CH20

09-09-08 08:23:38

PS

PAGE 384

385

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

tion process includes ‘‘determining the appropriate strength (in terms of personnel) for the Nepali Army, as well as preparing a new command structure.’’ Training in democratic principles and the value of human rights is also planned. According to Dahal, the definition of the roles and responsibilities of the Nepalese Army postsettlement is to include ‘‘border security as well as security of banks, airports, power houses, telephone towers, and the like.’’ The impetus for the DDR process in the Palestinian territories came from a variety of civil society groups, academics, and reform politicians who drew attention not only to human rights abuses perpetrated by PNA forces, but also to the illegal rent seeking and nepotism prevalent in the security sector. Furthermore, the Middle East Quartet (the United States, Russia, the European Union and the United Nations), encouraged the centralization and institutionalization of the security services as a way to tackle terrorism. The absence of any legal framework and weak parliamentary and judicial oversight has, however, prevented security personnel from being held accountable for human rights violations. Equally the public’s lack of trust in the judiciary system has perpetuated the use of traditional dispute resolution systems. In 2005—according to Roland Friedrich—President Abbas ordered ‘‘all groups under the umbrella of the Brigades to merge with the official security forces.’’ Abbas wanted the security sector to be centralized and institutionalized, however, military commanders opposed this as they did not want to be accountable to the Ministry of Interior and National Security. Consequently, security sector reforms have been of limited effect. This is in part due to commanders using their authority to pursue financial and personal interests which has resulted in the ‘‘feudalization of institutions.’’48 The rise of militia groups in Palestine has been exacerbated by the PNA’s lack of control over the security apparatus of the Palestinian territories. According to Friedrich, ‘‘Groups such as the military wing of Hamas (Izz adDin al-Qassam Brigades) and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, a loose network of Fateh-affiliated militants, have increasingly come to assume law and order functions in addition to their paramilitary activities.’’49 According to Gavin Cawthra, the integration of former guerrilla forces into the new South African National Defense Force (SANDF) ‘‘was fraught with difficulty and a number of mutinies took place, although it was largely accomplished without vio-

................. 16928$

CH20

09-09-08 08:23:38

PS

PAGE 385

386

VANESSA E. SHIELDS AND NICHOLAS D. J. BALDWIN

lence.’’ 50 Again according to Cawthra, a common criticism of the integration process was that the existing defense force was larger than the guerilla forces by ‘‘approximately three to one, and it was largely incumbent on the guerillas to accommodate themselves to a conventional army.’’51 After the integration process was completed in South Africa, the process of demobilization took place in order to scale down the forces for their new role as peacekeepers, border protection, and police support. Consequently—and as Cawthra notes—‘‘many former guerillas were excluded for reasons of health or age, and demobilization has been poorly handled through cash handouts and a badly executed Service Corps. Further demobilization is required, and this may have consequences for social and political stability.’’52 As previously noted, the DDR process can be adversely affected by the presence of spoilers. The process can also be damaged by the unwillingness of some parties involved in a conflict to abide by the military provisions outlined in the settlement; by a lack of international donor support; and by such disparate factors as the return of refugees and Internally Displaced Peoples (IDPs) and the weather. Equally, as Simon Roughneen points out, insufficient compensation for soldiers ‘‘makes for an unsatisfactory peace dividend for ex-combatants.’’ Disgruntled troops are more likely to turn to criminality or rejoin militia groups in order to ensure their ability to survive. Similarly, many excombatants do not have any skills except their ability to fight. As a result, the transition to civilian life can be particularly difficult. As Roughneen suggests, ‘‘Successful DDR and SSR are inextricably linked to alleviating massive recovery and reconstruction needs.’’ Nonetheless, such things as infrastructure building (roads, railways, bridges, to say nothing of telecommunications), agricultural production, and even water drilling can be particularly difficult in postconflict situations not least of all because—as Roughneen explains using the example of South Sudan—‘‘there remains sixteen million square miles of mined land . . . and the SPLA and SAF have both declined to mark or define mined areas.’’53 Equally, Darfur has no DDR process as it does not have a ceasefire in place. Furthermore, the DDR process includes parties who are not signatories to the CPA. From this it is all too apparent that an ineffective or incomplete DDR process inhibits the democratization process. However, in focusing purely on stabilization—as Wille asserts— there is a risk that failing systems of governance can become entrenched, a devel-

................. 16928$

CH20

09-09-08 08:23:38

PS

PAGE 386

387

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

opment that damages prospects for democracy and development. Limiting Reform In Cambodia, patronage politics, widespread corruption, and lack of the rule-of-law have, according to Kheang Un, allowed both ‘‘state and nonstate actors at all levels . . . to engage in commercial exploitation of resources for personal enrichment and other intrigues at the expense of the regular people.’’ Indeed, as Wille outlines, reform of the security sector is particularly difficult to achieve when the ‘‘army is involved in natural resource extraction, and individuals within the army and police utilize their powerful positions for personal gain.’’ The process of stabilization after conflict can—as Wille explains—‘‘entrench a system of political patronage, rent seeking, and resource exploitation within the security sector that . . . makes reform more difficult.’’54 Thus, the security sector in a patronage state can inhibit economic revival and further the need for political reform. Although—as Wille clarifies—‘‘It must be acknowledged that, as in many postconflict environments, the emergence of a patronage state has perhaps been the price of peace and is the glue that continues to hold the country together. It would have been very difficult to have brought warlords into the political process without providing them with strong individual incentives to give up fighting.’’ Equally, these concessions have an effect on the openness and transparency of government as well as on the government’s ability to abide by the rule of law, resulting in potential human rights abuses. Cawthra explains that the ANC’s dominance in South Africa not only ensured stability but also perpetuated the politics of patronage, including in the security sector. In the Palestinian territories, Friedrich explains, the security sector became a tool for internal stabilization due to the Palestinian leadership’s use of political and security sector jobs for ‘‘a large number of PLO cadres, Fateh activists of the first Intifada and youth from the refugee camps in Gaza and the West Bank.’’ In contrast, patronage politics is not highlighted as a stabilizing factor in Sudan. Rather, the retention of power by a narrow elite who has access to and control of oil wealth and resources is regarded as one of the many root causes of the conflict. The lack of judicial reform—such as the training of judges, improving salaries and ensuring that the judiciary is independent

................. 16928$

CH20

09-09-08 08:23:39

PS

PAGE 387

388

VANESSA E. SHIELDS AND NICHOLAS D. J. BALDWIN

from other branches of government—can be as problematic as corruption, nepotism, and patronage politics. The absence of an independent judiciary facilitates the continuation of rent-seeking behavior. As Kheang Un points out: ‘‘Without an independent judicial system, elected officials and other government employees cannot be held accountable for their actions; and a vicious, unbreakable cycle of patronage, corruption, and abuse of power is set in motion.’’ Without judicial reform in postconflict states, the judiciary becomes another ‘‘tool of the powerful to legitimize their actions and strengthen their power at the expense of the principle of checks and balances’’—so notes Un. Similarly, Guillermo O’Donnell argues that ‘‘any degree of democratization achieved is precarious and potentially explosive’’ without independent institutions.55 Indeed, as Un explains, ‘‘Independent institutions help promote horizontal accountability because the latter requires government agencies that have the power, de jure and de facto, to oversee and to impose criminal penalties on any illegal activities committed by other state agencies and their leaders. Without independent institutions, actions of the political elites are constrained only by ‘the hard facts of existing power relations.’ ’’56 In South Africa, checks on the power of the ANC were important conflict mediation devices. Booysen stresses that checks on the ruling party’s power ‘‘ensur[ed] accountability, a relatively corruption-free government, and quality checks on governance. These checks also help[ed] ensure that the voters [found] evidence of credible government efforts to advance the quality of socioeconomic life, despite many frustrations.’’ However, in countries lacking any checks and balances on the ruling party, winning elections can reinforce the corrupt patronage politics that allow a narrow elite to retain a firm grip on political and security institutions, thereby making it more difficult to have true democratic reform in the future. Un calls this lack of checks and balances an ‘‘accountability trap’’ where elections provide international legitimacy for a regime that is run by a few individuals without any accountability to the people they represent.

Reconciliation and Inclusion Long-Term Processes For postconflict states to move beyond settlement to a stage where democracy is consolidated, a long-term process of recon-

................. 16928$

CH20

09-09-08 08:23:39

PS

PAGE 388

389

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

ciliation and inclusion must occur. Third parties involved in settlement often overlook these processes in favor of a quick fix solution to instability. However, good governance after protracted conflict comes out of changes in political culture. South Africa provides an excellent illustration of this process as we can look at it holistically starting from the postsettlement period (1994–99) where a process of inclusion, formal reconciliation, and peacebuilding occurred between racial and cultural groups as well as with members of the apartheid regime. Booysen explains: ‘‘As South Africa’s democracy progressed into its second decade, there was a scaling down of the explicit reconciliatory and inclusive dimensions of the earlier settlement phase. Most of these changing dimensions were related to an evolving political culture—one in which reconciliation and settlement actions by the government and governing party moved beyond reassurance and into a more assertive phase of postconflict entrenchment of the new regime.’’ In this second phase of peacebuilding the revision and elaboration of the executive functions (including the cabinet, the presidency, and its associated institutions as well as the civil service, and in particular the local government bureaucratic apparatuses) became a second layer of institutional transformation and democratic consolidation. Indeed, South Africa has new challenges including advancing socioeconomic development. Bosnia and Herzegovina are showing promising signs of growth as a state and nation. Sometimes these signs appear rudimentary but are actually important indicators of gradual steps toward reconciliation. There is not a formal process of reconciliation occurring in Bosnia and Herzegovina yet, as Denis Hadzovic and Florence Gaub explain, ‘‘people are traveling across entity borders, [while] uniform currency and license plates are contributing to the growing together of state and nation.’’ Hadzovic and Gaub go on to explain that, in order for reconciliation to occur, political institutions must move beyond consociationalism as the current system perpetuates ethnic identity instead of promoting inclusion. Indeed, this is one of the major criticisms of the consocialitional approach. However, in protracted conflicts, such as seen in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it can take generations to move beyond a confessional system (as the case of Lebanon shows). Transforming symbols of past abuses can also be an essential component of moving beyond settlement. Symbolism can be a factor which can keep protracted conflicts very much alive. For

................. 16928$

CH20

09-09-08 08:23:39

PS

PAGE 389

390

VANESSA E. SHIELDS AND NICHOLAS D. J. BALDWIN

example, in Northern Ireland symbolism came in many forms including declaring community allegiance by painting curbstones the color of either the British or the Irish flag. Painting murals to memorialize those who were killed—children and community members as well as members of paramilitary groups—was another way used to keep the conflict alive. Symbolism was strongly connected to factionalism/sectarianism, and was seen in relation to the police force in Northern Ireland as Catholic-Nationalist-Republican communities mistrusted the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) as they believed it was colluding with Protestant-Unionist-Loyalist paramilitary groups— indeed, the Stevens Enquiry57 confirmed that there had been collusion between elements within the security forces and loyalist paramilitaries. It was for this reason that police reform has played a necessary and significant part in the peace process in Northern Ireland and why—as Cathy Gormley-Heenan points out—the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000 ‘‘made provision for a new name for the police service (changed from the Royal Ulster Constabulary to the Police Service of Northern Ireland [PSNI]), a new badge and flag, a new code of ethics, a human rights oriented training package for staff, and balanced recruitment so as to ensure greater participation from among the Catholic community in the police service.’’ Oversight provisions were also put in place to ensure proper accountability. As HomRaj Dahal points out, similar provisions—for similar reasons—were made in Nepal where the name ‘‘Royal Nepal Army’’ was changed to ‘‘Nepalese Army’’; where the chief of the army was to be appointed not by the king but by the Council of Ministers; where a National Security Council, under the chairmanship of the prime minister, was established in order to control, determine the use of, and order the mobilization of the Nepalese Army; where any decision of the Council of Ministers to mobilize the Nepalese Army would in future have to be tabled before and endorsed within thirty days by a special committee assigned by the House of Representatives for this purpose; and where, in short, the previous arrangement whereby the king was not only the symbolic but also the actual supreme commander of the army was revoked. The intention is that these changes will foster trust and inclusion and effectively move the country beyond the settlement period and into a long-lasting, and thereby sustainable, peace. A formal reconciliation process has only been a feature in a

................. 16928$

CH20

09-09-08 08:23:39

PS

PAGE 390

391

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

minority of the case studies contained in this collection. Indeed, and as Cathy Gormley-Heenan points out, there is an ongoing debate about the value of a reconciliation or truth commission process such as was seen in South Africa and Latin America. However, Nepal’s settlement stipulated that steps were to be taken to recognize those who lost their lives during the conflict and a commission is being established to conduct investigations on human rights abuses committed during the conflict. In addition, a commission has been established to provide compensation to individuals who were badly wounded in the conflict as well as to families of the ‘‘disappeared.’’ In the case of Sudan, Simon Roughneen discusses that a process of transitional justice and/or reconciliation as well as the adjudication on land ownership by the National Land Commission may aid the process of DDR and refugee return, while the CPA itself stipulated that ‘‘the Parties agree to initiate a comprehensive process of national reconciliation and healing.’’58 Nevertheless, Roughneen himself concludes that ‘‘a South Africa or Sierra Leone-style Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) is not likely in Sudan.’’ In fact there is a school of thought that opposes initiating a formal reconciliation process, wishing to place the emphasis on the future and moving forward as opposed to looking back and focusing on past abuses.59 Indeed, finding a balance between justice and deeper reconciliation while limiting both the scope for, as well as actual acts of, retribution is particularly challenging in postconflict states. In the absence of a strong, engaged, active civil society, a vibrant, free, independent media, and a reformed and balanced judiciary, democracy is unlikely to take root.60 According to Amin Tarzi, unless steps are taken in Afghanistan to ensure that these exist, the state ‘‘will continue in the vicious cycle of a failed state plagued by violence and will see an increasing disillusionment with the very concept of democracy.’’ In the same vein Kheang Un stresses that ‘‘the experiences of other transitional and post-conflict societies around the world indicate that unequal access to the media creates an uneven playing field that allows the dominant party to monopolize the provision of information and thus shape voters’ perceptions.’’ Against this background it becomes clear that it is necessary to look beyond simply structural reforms as the route to transforming protracted conflicts and facilitating moves beyond settlement.

................. 16928$

CH20

09-09-08 08:23:39

PS

PAGE 391

392

VANESSA E. SHIELDS AND NICHOLAS D. J. BALDWIN

International Assistance The international community was highlighted in a number of the case studies as important contributors to the process of moving a state beyond settlement, particularly where internal capacity is low and difficulties are high.61 Equally, a number of criticisms of the international community were made including lack of donor coordination, insufficient time spent on areas such as DDR, different interpretations of what security sector reform entails, and the politicization of aid. The politicization of aid is particularly evident in the case of Palestine. Following the death of Yaser Arafat the United States Administration appointed a Security Coordinator (USSC). According to Friedrich, in doing this the ‘‘United States in many respects followed a rather technical approach—the USSC team primarily consisted of U.S. military personnel—with the unspoken aim of strengthening the hand of the PNA security forces vis-a`-vis the Islamist opposition rather than enhancing accountability and transparency.’’ With the election of Hamas, Western policies toward the Palestinian territories changed significantly. For instance—as Friedrich explains—the European Union reduced its engagement while the United States shifted from support for institution building to a mere ‘‘train and equip’’ approach, with the declared objective of strengthening President Abbas and the Fateh movement against Hamas. 62 Thus, the Hamas government was forced to look to other countries—countries that were in serious need of reforms themselves—for assistance. In the case of Guatemala, Jose´ Olmeda stresses that international and local NGOs were instrumental in acquiring aid after the peace accords. After a meeting in Brussels in January 1997 ‘‘donors pledged over $2.5 billion in assistance.’’ However, the Guatemalan state lacked the capacity to ‘‘effectively process and carry out funded programs.’’ Equally, there appeared to be some naivete´ on the part of donors that the political and economic elites that were party to the settlement were willing and able to carry out fundamental reforms to the nation’s social, legal, and fiscal order. UN missions in postconflict states to monitor and verify disarmament—as seen currently in Nepal—as well as assistance in the restructuring of police, separating combatants, and preparing for elections are often essential for postconflict states to move beyond settlement. However, a UN peacekeeping pres-

................. 16928$

CH20

09-09-08 08:23:40

PS

PAGE 392

393

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

ence can also cause difficulties as spoilers may view them as threatening. According to Roughneen, in Sudan ‘‘the UN presence is suspect in the eyes of the NCP, with an ongoing diplomatic struggle over a UN peacekeeping force entering Darfur and ICC indictments for war crimes and crimes against humanity likely for senior NCP, SAF, and Janjaweed leaders.’’63 Equally, peacekeeping forces may not have a large enough presence to effectively contribute to a lasting settlement. For instance, Roughneen expressed concern that the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) DDR unit was too small with only ‘‘eleven staff in Khartoum, and more significantly, just one in the southern capital Juba.’’ Roughneen expresses that United States and European Union efforts to participate in a process of SSR in Sudan are limited as the United States has sanctions on Sudan while the European Union ‘‘cannot deal bilaterally with substate entities such as the GoSS.’’64 Consequently, whereas international assistance is a vital component of moving a state beyond settlement to a stage of consolidated democracy, such assistance is not without its associated difficulties—technical, financial, and political.

The Challenge of Moving Beyond Settlement Building—or sometimes even more difficult, rebuilding—a state is a deeply complex enterprise with an infinite number of variables which should be viewed, in the words of Francis Fukuyama, as ‘‘more of an art than a science.’’65 It requires the application of intelligence, a high degree of political skill, vast resources and a sustained political will on the part of those who attempt it. It is not for the faint-hearted or the easily distracted. And the best that can be achieved is most probably only partial success.66

A modern, developed, technologically equipped military can win their digital wars in a few weeks, but that can be the (comparatively) easy part. Building peace—a lasting peace—after such military intervention will involve an enormous level of commitment and an awareness of the fact that it can take a considerable amount of time, decades even, to achieve. Despite the fact that no two cases are the same, there are lessons to be learned from past experience. Indeed, from the case studies contained in this collection it is apparent that there are two clear stages to conflict resolution, namely:

................. 16928$

CH20

09-09-08 08:23:40

PS

PAGE 393

394

VANESSA E. SHIELDS AND NICHOLAS D. J. BALDWIN

1. Activities and processes intended to end conflict (a) through the intervention of external/third-party military forces (peace-keeping); (b) through mediation, negotiation, arbitration, and conciliation (peacemaking); (c) through a combination of both (a) and (b). 2. Activities and processes intended to resolve conflicting interests, reconcile the underlying causes (structural, relational, and cultural) of conflict, and facilitate peaceful relations and outcomes. In short, actions designed to sustain, strengthen, and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict (peacebuilding).

As has been noted, ‘‘Peace agreements provide a framework for ending hostilities and a guide to the initial stages of post-conflict reform. They do not create conditions under which the deep cleavages that produced the war are automatically surmounted. Successfully ending the divisions that lead to war, healing the social wounds created by war, and creating a society where the differences among social groups are resolved through compromise rather than violent conflict requires that conflict resolution and consensus building shape all interactions among citizens and between citizens and the state.’’ 67 Consequently, if the successful negotiation of a peace agreement is the point at which conflicts are terminated formally, it is the process of peacebuilding that is crucial in facilitating movement beyond settlement. In 1992 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, at the time UN secretary-general, outlined the main tasks of ‘‘peacebuilding’’—as he saw them—as: ‘‘disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation.’’68 In 1997 the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan outlined the five main tasks of ‘‘peacebuilding,’’ as he saw them, namely: ‘‘the creation or strengthening of national institutions, the monitoring of elections, the promotion of human rights, the provision of reintegration and rehabilitation programs and the creation of conditions for resumed development.’’69 Although there is, of course, some similarity between the main tasks listed by both Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan, there are nonetheless differences. Indeed, if any six individuals involved in peacebuilding were to draw up a list, such an

................. 16928$

CH20

09-09-08 08:23:40

PS

PAGE 394

395

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

exercise is likely to produce at least six different lists, each with its own emphasis and priorities. Nonetheless, reviewing the case studies contained in this collection, what can be described as the ten basic components of peacebuilding can be determined. These can be seen in figure 20.2:

Peacebuilding components 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

Military Security Sector Human Rights Civil Administration Institutions of Government Electoral Repatriation Rehabilitation Civil Society Public Opinion

Military component Essentially this means the introduction or restoration of security and the maintenance of law and order under the rule of law. Following on from this, this component would also encapsulate such elements as the disarming of factions; weapons registration and weapons destruction; the organization of cantonment; and carrying out mine clearance and other such ordinance activities. Nothing will guarantee failure more than either failing to introduce or restore security from the outset or failing to maintain law and order under the rule of law in the medium and long term. This ‘‘golden principle’’ ‘‘must be item one, priority one, from day one. For without [this], there can be no proper democracy, no trust in the institutions of government, no efficient distribution of international aid, no chance of re-growing the economy and no peace for the people.’’70 Failure to make people feel safe leads to a loss of confidence and a loss of support. What is an important—indeed, the crucial—aspect to be aware of with regard to this component is that time is of the essence for, as has been noted: ‘‘The first 6 to 12 weeks following a ceasefire or peace accord is often the most critical period for establishing both a stable peace and the credibility of the peacekeepers.

................. 16928$

CH20

09-09-08 08:23:40

PS

PAGE 395

396

VANESSA E. SHIELDS AND NICHOLAS D. J. BALDWIN

Credibility and political momentum lost during this period can often be difficult to regain.’’71 Security Sector component Very much following on from the military component, this includes the reform, training, and supervision of the military, civilian police, and intelligence services. It most certainly does not mean disbanding the existing military, police, and intelligence services as this abolishes the only organizations powerful enough to maintain security and law and order. Those at the top of the old regime may have to be removed, but the rest will be needed to maintain security and provide for law and order. An important part of this component is arranging for effective redundancy provisions—financial and retraining—for those security sector personnel who are no longer required in either the military, civilian police, or intelligence services. Human Rights component This includes policies designed to create what can be termed a ‘‘human rights mind-set,’’ so that the importance of human rights can be established, recognized, and understood from the outset. This involves the introduction of laws and codes of practice designed to protect and promote human rights, and initiating education and training programs for the explanation and promotion of human rights particularly in the security sector. An important feature of this component can be procedures to provide for the establishment of truth and reconciliation and also the investigation of any alleged human rights violations. Civil Administration component This includes the provision of advisory and training support for state administrative personnel, not least of all in the criminal justice sector (including the judiciary, the prosecution service, and the penal authority), and can also include introducing new ‘‘codes’’ (for example, for ministers and civil servants) and ‘‘best practice’’ procedures. The importance of this component is to facilitate the existence of a merit-based bureaucracy that can function free from political interference.

................. 16928$

CH20

09-09-08 08:23:41

PS

PAGE 396

397

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

Institutions of Government component This includes the creation, reformulation, or strengthening of institutions of government—including the court system—at the national, regional, and local levels. When engaged in such activity it is particularly necessary throughout to be both aware of and sensitive toward local traditions and customs. The task is not to superimpose the polity of one country on to another but, rather, to establish the basic structures that can provide for good governance and the rule of law. It is also important not to act in haste because ‘‘institutions created before the conflict has been fully stabilized will reflect the character of the conflict, not what the country needs for a stable and enduring peace.’’72 Haste can lead to an inordinately complex (and consequentially expensive) structure; something that is understandable in the context of the circumstances and discussions that led to the settlement, but which has since burdened the country with a dysfunctional system. The cases of both Iraq and Afghanistan also highlight the adverse consequences of moving too quickly in this regard. Electoral component This includes conducting a complete demographic survey; either reforming an existing or introducing a new electoral system; reforming or introducing laws and procedures necessary for holding an election; registering voters; educating voters; supervising the electoral process; and verifying the electoral process. It has however been noted that ‘‘elections should not be held as early as possible, but as late as [one] can get away with.’’73 The reason for such an attitude can be seen from the fact that elections ‘‘can cripple the economies of those struggling to break out of destitution after war. In Afghanistan the initial round of elections cost $145.4 million. This represents more than half of the estimated total national income of the country. These first elections were largely paid for by the interveners. But subsequent ones will increasingly have to be paid for by the government— and the new Afghan constitution, assembled under the patronage of the interveners, requires that there shall be no fewer than eight to ten of these nationwide elections every decade, creating a completely unsustainable financial burden for the emerging Afghan state.’’74 Elections can be important, very important, but they should not be rushed into, they are not a panacea, while

................. 16928$

CH20

09-09-08 08:23:41

PS

PAGE 397

398

VANESSA E. SHIELDS AND NICHOLAS D. J. BALDWIN

their ‘‘downsides’’ need to be recognized—such as the costs associated with them—to say nothing of the fact that a result may not in fact produce the desired outcome (as the electoral victory of Hamas in the Palestinian territories clearly show). Repatriation component This includes organizing for the supervision and administration of the repatriation of refugees. Refugees and internally displaced people often return to their homes to find their villages and livelihoods decimated by violent conflict. The process of repatriation can include moving directly back to the locality the refugee or displaced persons came from or assisting in their resettling in a new residence elsewhere in their country after the end of violent conflict. Rehabilitation component This includes seeing to immediate food, health and housing needs; addressing the question of currency stability; beginning essential restoration work on infrastructure, particularly of public utilities and transport; and initiating economic assistance and development programs. Civil Society component This includes the promotion of both formal and informal methods for, and processes of, civil involvement and participation. Civil society cannot be created, handed down, but it can be facilitated and encouraged. Such an approach must, however, involve reforms to the system and practices of education, particularly where conflicts have involved ethnic and religious divisions. Integrated education can make a very positive contribution to establishing and fostering a feeling of national identity and, as such, can facilitate the emergence of a strong, functioning, civic society. Public Opinion component The focus here is of the need for an awareness of the importance of securing the support of the public for what is involved; in short, the battle for ‘‘hearts and minds’’—for the success, or otherwise, of reconstructing nations after conflict depends on

................. 16928$

CH20

09-09-08 08:23:41

PS

PAGE 398

399

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

the ability to win public support by winning the battle of ideas. Included in this component must be an understanding of the techniques of the media, of communications and of public relations, part of which must be the ability to construct clear, simple messages and to get these messages ’‘out.’’ The importance of this component has been stressed by Lord (Paddy) Ashdown from his experience as the international communities high representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina from May 2002 to January 2006: ‘‘The crucial battlefield that I had to win on was the battlefield of public opinion. . . . So we [had] to construct clear, simple messages for what we were trying to do which were understandable to ordinary people; we [had] to have a press operation that was efficient, powerful and embedded in the policy-making process; and we [had] to measure regularly, through opinion polling, the effectiveness of our messages and whether we were winning the arguments.’’75 In all of this, the case studies show that it is important to bear three facts in mind. FIRST: that, despite enumerating these components in this way, it must be both stressed and understood that they are not distinct and separate but, rather, must be viewed in a linked, interrelated, inte-connected way. Indeed, ‘‘Building peace is not a linear exercise. A state cannot be built sequentially, sector by sector—and it cannot be rebuilt that way either. It must be done on a broad front with the key actions being taken coincidentally not sequentially.’’76 SECOND: that the international community has an important role to play. Indeed, the case studies contained in this volume clearly show that a multiplicity of international governmental and nongovernmental institutions and agencies are involved in these activities. Nonetheless, the case studies also clearly show the crucial need for coordination. The lack of coordination can—and usually does—lead to muddle, duplication, waste, frustration, and even to failure. Consequently, coordination, cohesion, and speaking with a single voice are paramount. THIRD: that a peace accord in and of itself neither builds peace, nor guarantees peace. Indeed, warring factions can view a peace accord as simply facilitating the continuation of a conflict by other means. A peace accord will only be worth the paper it is printed on if the parties to it not merely sign it, but sign up for it—in short, that they commit themselves to move beyond settlement.

................. 16928$

CH20

09-09-08 08:23:41

PS

PAGE 399

400

VANESSA E. SHIELDS AND NICHOLAS D. J. BALDWIN

 We live in turbulent, instable, dangerous times, with the consequences and implications of 9/11 still unclear, to say nothing of matters such as global warming and resource scarcity, let alone of the potentially massive shifts in the tectonic plates of power that lay over the horizon. It is already a potent mix and is likely to get more potent. There are today some seventy-four conflicts in progress around the world, the overwhelming majority of which are taking place inside states between ethnicities. Writing in The Prince in 1532 Niccolo Machiavelli observed: ‘‘There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things. Because the innovator has for enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions, and lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new.’’ This may indeed be so, but as Robert Kennedy observed: ‘‘Some men see things as they are and ask ‘why’? I dream of things that never were and ask ‘why not’?’’ An observation that itself leads to a question, namely, ‘‘if not now, when?’’

Notes 1. Charles T. Call and William Stanley, ‘‘Military and Police Reform after Civil Wars,’’ in Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes,ed. John Darby and Roger MacGinty (United Kingdom: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 212. 2. Nicole Ball, Tsjeard Bouta, and Luc van den Goor, Enhancing Democratic Governance of the Security Sector: An Institutional Assessment Framewor. (The Hague: Clingendael Institute/Netherlands Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2003). 3. Stephen .J. Stedman, ‘‘Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,’’ International Security 22, no. 2 (1997): 5–53. 4. Maximillan Weber, ‘‘Politik als Beruf,’’ speech delivered at Munich University, 1918, published in 1919 by Duncker & Humblodt, Munich. English translation entitled ‘‘Politics as a Vocation’’ obtained from Pfeiffer University Web site www2.pfeiffer.edu/⬃Iridener/DSS/Weber/polvoc.html. 5. Dwight King, ‘‘Corruption in Indonesia: A Curable Cancer?,’’ Journal of International Affairs 53, no. 2 (Spring 2000): 609. 6. For a seminal approach on power-sharing democracy read: Arend Lijiphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977). 7. Timothy Sisk, ‘‘Power-sharing after Civil Wars: Matching Problems to Solutions,’’ in Contemporary Peacemaking (see note 1), 139.

................. 16928$

CH20

09-09-08 08:23:41

PS

PAGE 400

401

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

8. Jean Grugel, ‘‘Democratization and the State,’’ in Democratization: A Critical Introduction (United Kingdom: Palgrave, 2002). 9. Peter Harris and Benjamin Reilly, ‘‘Power sharing,’’ Democracy and Deep Rooted Conflict, IDEA (Korotan Ljubljana: Slovenia, 1998), 144 10. I. Harb, ‘‘Lebanon’s Confessionalism: Problems and Prospects,’’ United States Institute of Peace Briefing, March 2006, www.usip.org. 11. Carl Bildt, Bosnia between 1995 and 2014, International Conference for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Geneva, October 20, 2005, 7 http://www.bildt.net/ dbdocuments/cb000116.doc. 12. Timothy Sisk, ‘‘Power Sharing,’’ Beyond Intractability, ed. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess Conflict Research Consortium (Boulder: University of Colorado) Posted September 2003, www.beyondintractability.org/essay/power sharing. 13. Y. Ghai, ed., Autonomy and Ethnicity: negotiating competing claims in multi-ethnic states, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 14. Richard P. Nathan, ‘‘Defining Modern Federalism,’’ in North American & Comparative Federalism: Essays for the 1990s, Papers from the Fourth Berkeley Seminar on Federalism, ed. Harry N. Scheiber (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of Governmental Studies Press, 1992), 92–93. 15. Arthur W. Macmahon, ‘‘The Problems of Federalism: A Survey,’’ in Federalism Mature and Emergent ed. Arthur W. Macmahon (New York: Russell & Russell, 1962), 8–9; Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). 16. Nathan, ‘‘Defining Modern Federalism,’’ 98. 17. World Bank, Cambodia at the Crossroads, 2004, 50. Available at http:// siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCAMBODIA/Resources/chap3.pdf. 18. Caroline Rusten, Kim Sedara, Eng Netra, and Pak Kimchoeun, The Challenge of Decentralization Design in Cambodia (Phnom Penh: CDRI, 2005), 107. 19. World Bank, Cambodia at the Crossroads, 56–57. 43. Robert Pinkney, Democracy in the Third World (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 179. 20. Amin Tarzi, ‘‘OSCE Says Afghan Elections Will Be Challenged To Meet International Standards,’’ RFE/RL Afghanistan Report 3, no. 36 (October 8, 2004.) 21. Amin Tarzi, chap. 2 of this book. 22. Roland Friedrich, chap. 13 of this book. 23. Peter Wallensteen, Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace and the Global System (London: SAGE Publications, 2002), 140. 24. See Ben Reilly, ‘‘Electoral Systems for Divided Societies,’’ in Journal of Democracy 21, no. 2 (2002), and Simon Roughneen, chap.17–18 of this book. 25. International Election Observation Mission, Bosnia and Herzegovina— General Elections, October 1, 2006, Sarajevo 2006, 1 http://www.osce.org/ item/1361.html. 26. The Plant Report, Guardian Studies (1991): 22 27. See: W. J. M. Mackenzie, Free Elections (London: Allen & Unwin, 1958), 69–71. 28. Richard S. Katz, ‘‘Democratic Principles and Judging ‘Free and Fair,’ ’’, in Representation 41, no. 3 (London: McDougall Trust, 2005), 161–62 29. Ibid., 177. 30. Ibid.

................. 16928$

CH20

09-09-08 08:23:42

PS

PAGE 401

402

VANESSA E. SHIELDS AND NICHOLAS D. J. BALDWIN

31. See Therese Laanela, ‘‘Crafting Sustainable Electoral Processes in New Democracies’’ in Representation 36, no. 4 (London: McDougall Trust, 1999), 284–93. 32. Ibid., 285. 33. Paddy Ashdown, Swords and Ploughshares. Bringing Peace to the 21st Century (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2007), 87–88 34. Ibid., 88. 35. ‘‘Political Parties in Afghanistan,’’ ICG Policy Briefing no. 39, June 2, 2005, 6. The SNTV system was used in Japan from 1948 to 1993; by 2005, the system was in use only in Jordan, Vanuatu, the Pitciam Islands, and (partially) in Taiwan; see Andrew Reynolds and Andrew Wilder, ‘‘Free, Fair or Flawed: Challenges to Legitimate Elections in Afghanistan,’’ Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit (September 2004), 12. 36. ‘‘Afghanistan Elections: Endgame or New Beginnings?,’’ ICG Asia Report, no. 101 (July 21, 2005) i. 37. Sisk, ‘‘Power Sharing.’’ 38. See, for example N. Ball and K. Fayemi, eds. Security Sector Governance in Africa (Lagos: Center for Democracy and Development, 2004). 39. Jose´ Olmeda, chap. 17 of this book. 40. Thomas Bruneau, ‘‘Spanish Case Study,’’ Center for Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, November 2000. 41. Judy L. Ledgerwood, ‘‘Cambodia since April 1975,’’ http://www .seaske.niv.edu/khmer/ledgerwood/page6, htm, p.1. 42. David Ashley, ‘‘Between War and Peace: Cambodia 1991 to 1998,‘ Accord, Cambodia’s Constitutional challenge, 1998. 43. J. Rauch, ‘‘State, Civil Society and Police Reform in South Africa,’’ Johannesburg Center for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 1993. 44. Robert Muggah, ‘‘Managing Post-Conflict Zones: DDR and Weapons Reduction,’’ in Small Arms Survey Yearbook 2005: Weapons at War (Geneva Small Arms Survey, 2005). 45. Robin Luckham and Gavin Cawthra, ‘‘Democratic Control and the Security Sector: The Scope of Transformation and its Limits,’’ in Governing Insecurity, Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies, ed. Gavin Cawthra and Robin Luckham.(London: Zed Books, 2003). 46. Joanna Spear, ‘‘Demobilisation and Disarmament,’’ in Ending Civil Wars, ed. Stephen J. Stedman, Donald Rothschild and Elizabeth N. Cousens (Boulder, Lynne Reiner, 2002). 47. UNDPKO (United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations), ‘‘Cambodia: United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC),’’ 2003, 4. 48. See DCAF/PASSIA, ‘‘Workshop on Security Sector Reform—Summary Report,’’ in DCAF/PASSIA, Palestinian Security Sector Governance, Challenges and Prospects, Ramallah 2006, 19–21. 49. See International Crisis Group (ICG), Who governs the West Bank? Palestinian Administration under Israeli Occupation, Amman/Washington, September 28, 2004, 11–25; Friedrich, Palestinian Predicament, 12–14. 50. P. Frankel, Soldiers in a Storm: The Armed Forces in South Africa’s Democratic Transition (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2001). 51. R. Williams, ‘‘Integration or Absorption? The Creation of the SA National Defense Force 1993–1999,’’ African Security Review 11, no. 2 (2002).

................. 16928$

CH20

09-09-08 08:23:42

PS

PAGE 402

403

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

52. G. Cawthra, and B. Moeller, ‘‘Integration of Former Enemies into National Armies in Fragile African States,’’ Conference on Security Studies in Fragile States, Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen, 2006. 53. This contravenes the Land Mine Treaty, ratified by Sudan in 2003. 54. ‘‘Rent seeking behavior‘’ refers to the transfer of income to one person or a group at the expense of others through the manipulation of free and competitive markets, often through the control of government regulations and exemptions. 55. Gillermo O’Donnell, ‘‘Transitions, Continuities, and Paradoxes’’ in Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democratic Comparative Perspective ed. Scott Mainwaring, Gillermo O’Donnell and J. Samuel Valenzuela (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 22. 56. Gillermo O’Donnell, ‘‘Delegative Democracy,’’ Journal of Democracy, 5, no. 1 (2005): 60. 57. Stevens Enquiry, April 17, 2003 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/ northern ireland/03/stephens_inquiry /pdf/stephens_inquiry.pdf. 58. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army, 17. 59. See Stefan Wolff, ‘‘The Politics of Fear Versus the Politics of Intimidation: Security Sector Reform in Northern Ireland,’’ in Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, ed. Albrecht Schnabel & Hans-Georg Enrhart (Tokyo: United University Press, 2005), 182–204. 60. Amin Tarzi, ‘‘The Judicial State: Evolution and Centralization of the Courts in Afghanistan, 1883–1896’’ (PhD diss. New York University, 2003). 61. Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis. ‘‘International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis,’’ American Political Science Review 94, 4: (2000). 62. Aluf Benn, ‘‘U.S. arming and training PA guard against Hamas,’’ Haaretz, October 31, 2006. 63. UN Security Council Resolution 1706, August 31, 2006, mandates a UN peacekeeping force for Darfur and invites Sudanese government consent for this. 64. A potential model may be the UK Global Conflict Prevention Pools, which has taken tentative steps toward harnessing relevant cross-ministerial expertise on conflict prevention—such as the Dept. for International Development/Ministry of Defense/Foreign and Commonwealth Office collaboration on examining UK SSR support in postsettlement contexts. See 65. Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (United States: Cornell University Press, 2005), 58. 66. Paddy Ashdown, Swords and Ploughshares: Bringing Peace to the 21st Century, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2007), xi. 67. Nicole Ball, ‘‘The challenge of rebuilding war-torn societies,’’ in Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict, ed. C. Crocker and F. Hampson, (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 1996), 619. 68. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace (New York: UN, 1992), 32 69. Kofi Annan, Reform Announcement (New York: UN, 1997). 70. Ashdown, Swords and Ploughshares, 69. 71. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (the Brahimi Report), (New York: UN), para. 87.

................. 16928$

CH20

09-09-08 08:23:42

PS

PAGE 403

404 72. 73. 74. 75. 76.

VANESSA E. SHIELDS AND NICHOLAS D. J. BALDWIN

Ashdown, Swords and Ploughshares, 99. Ibid., 87. Ibid. Ibid., 225. Ibid., 78.

................. 16928$

CH20

09-09-08 08:23:42

PS

PAGE 404

Contributors Dr. Karen Abi-Ezzi lectures on Middle East politics and theories of conflict resolution at the Peace Studies department, University of Bradford in the north of England. Her research focuses specifically on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and on Lebanon. She is currently working on a book entitled Peacemaking Strategies in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: a re-evaluation which will be published by Routledge in 2008. In 2001 she directed a one-year research project in Lebanon looking at the role of civil society and of NGOs in particular and their contribution to processes of national reconciliation. Dr. Nicholas D. J. Baldwin is a member of the Study of Parliament Group and an associate of the Center for Legislative Studies. He has written and lectured extensively on British government and politics, served as a special assistant in the House of Lords, and been a parliamentary candidate. Since 1985 he has been dean and director of operations at Wroxton College, Oxfordshire, the British campus of Fairleigh Dickinson University. Dr. Marc Belanger is associate professor of political science and a member of the Intercultural Studies Program at Saint Mary’s College in South Bend, Indiana. His current research focuses on the impact of NGOs on democratization in Latin America. He is the faculty director of Saint Mary’s Summer Study Program in Honduras. Dr. Susan Booysen is professor in the Graduate School of Public and Development Management (P&DM), University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa. She is also council member and immediate past president of the South African Association of Political Studies (SAAPS). Her areas of specialization include South African and Southern African politics and policy, comparative politics (with a special emphasis on democracy, governance, policy, and elections), and research methodol405

................. 16928$

CTRB

09-09-08 08:21:48

PS

PAGE 405

406

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

ogy. In both her academic research and in her work as research consultant, she has focused on South and Southern African politics. Professor Gavin Cawthra is the director of the Center for Defense and Security Management, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa. Previously he was coordinator of the Military Research Group (South Africa), Research Officer at the International Defence and Aid Fund (London), and director of the committee on South African War Resistance (London). He spent many years in exile where he was active in the liberation movement and has written extensively on security and related issues in Southern Africa for over fifteen years, including authorship and coeditorship of three recent books. His recent research projects include: International Study Team on Peace Keeping Training in Southern Africa; co-ordination of defense review process; research, course design, and lecturing, International Peace Studies Program; research and writing of reports for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission; and research coordinator for the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA). HomRaj Dahal has been contributing to peace in Nepal as president of the Center for Conflict Resolution, Peace, and Development, Nepal. He has been a lecturer in sociology/anthropology at Tri-Chandra College and Purbanchal University, Nepal; member-secretary of the Ex-MP’s_Club; member of Foreign Affairs and Human Rights Committee (House of Representatives); member of Parliament, House of Representatives; member, Central Organization Department, Nepali Congress; general secretary of Parliamentary Club; executive and vice chairman, National Youth Council. He served as a member of the Delegation of HMG/Nepal to United Nation’s 59th General Assembly, New York, United States; member of Parliamentary Delegation to European Parliament, Belgium, Luxembourg, and France, and advisor to the District Committee of the Banned Nepali Congress, Sindhuli. He was jailed for three years for engaging in activities for the restoration of democracy in Nepal. Dr. Thomas G. Fraser is professor emeritus of history and honorary professor of Conflict Research, INCORE, University of Ulster. He served as provost, Magee campus, University of Ulster, 2002–6 and was Fulbright Scho1ar-in-Residence, Indiana University, South Bend, 1983–84. Authored books: Partition in Ire-

................. 16928$

CTRB

09-09-08 08:21:48

PS

PAGE 406

407

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

land, India and Palestine: theory and practice (1984); The USA and the Middle East since World War 2 (1989); The Arab-Israeli Conflict (3rd rev. ed., 2007; 2nd rev. Ireland in Conflict 1922– 1998 (2000; reprinted, 2004); with Donette Murray, America and the World since 1945 (2002). Edited books include The Irish Parading Tradition: Following the Drum (2000). Dr. Fraser has spoken on aspects of the Northern Ireland problem in the United States, Russia, Austria, Italy, Israel, the Palestinian Authority, India, and Sri Lanka. Roland Friedrich is adviser with the Middle East North Africa Programme at DCAF (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces) and works on Palestinian security sector governance and reform. His research interests include the international and domestic politics of the Middle East (especially the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the politics of Islamic and national identity), security sector reform, conflict management, and theories of international politics. Roland Friedrich holds an MA (Hon.) in Political Science, International Law and Spanish Literature from Bonn University and an MSc (Distinction) in Middle East Politics from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in London. Roland Friedrich is the author of Security Sector Reform in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (2004) and German Foreign and Security Policy in the Kosovo Conflict (2005). He has written extensively on SSR in the Palestinian context. Florence Gaub is a PhD candidate at Sorbonne University and Humboldt University, focusing on the challenges of multiethnic countries after a civil war. Her field studies have taken her to Lebanon, Nigeria, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Dr. Cathy Gormley-Heenan is a lecturer in the School of Policy Studies, University of Ulster, United Kingdom. She is a member of the university’s Social and Policy Research Institute, an associate researcher with the Transitional Justice Institute, and an associate of INCORE (International Conflict Research), where she held the 2004–5 Tip O’Neill Fellowship in Peace Studies. Her most recent publication is Political Leadership and the Northern Ireland Peace Process (2007). Denis Hadzovic has been the secretary-general of the Centre for Security Studies in Sarajevo since 2001. He has devoted him-

................. 16928$

CTRB

09-09-08 08:21:48

PS

PAGE 407

408

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

self to civil military relations, democratic control of the armed forces, reform of the security sector in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and post-conflict reconstruction issues. Previously he served as head of the office of the Minister of European Integrations within the Council of Ministies of BiH. Dr. Lynn M. Maurer is an associate professor and chair of the Department of Political Science at Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville. Her specialties include the Spanish parliament, comparative politics of Western and Eastern Europe, and women and international politics. Her research focuses on the policymaking influence of the Spanish Congress of Deputies. Her forthcoming book El Poder del Congreso: Parlamento y Polı´ticas Pu´blicas en Espan˜a, 1979–2000, will be published by the Centro de Estudios Polı´ticas y Constitucionales of the Spanish Ministry of the Presidency. She earned her PhD from Ohio State University in 1995. Dr. Jose´ A. Olmeda is professor of political science and public administration, Universidad Nacional de Educacio´n a Distancia (Distance Learning National University). He obtained his PhD in political science and sociology from Complutense University of Madrid in 1984. Served as research scholar, Department of Sociology, Texas A&M University in 1995, and in the International Public Administration Center, University of Southern California in 1987. He has authored several books on armed forces and society and public administration. In 2005 he edited Democracias fra´giles: las relaciones civiles-militares en el mundo iberoamericano. Simon Roughneen is senior analyst for the International Relations and Security Network/SecurityWatch and was media/advocacy officer for the international humanitarian agency GOAL. He has worked as a journalist, advocacy officer, and political researcher across Africa—in Sudan, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Niger, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Ghana—and in Pakistan, Israel, and Northern Ireland. He has since worked for the United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste as communications and electoral advisor. Richard Scarth is an experienced UK-registered general practice chartered property surveyor and Royal Navy reserve officer who has lived in Afghanistan since January 2004. After serving

................. 16928$

CTRB

09-09-08 08:21:48

PS

PAGE 408

409

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

with the NATO ISAF mission, Richard stayed on to initially assist with UN’s DDR public information campaign in the run-up to the presidential elections. Two and a half years later he had become the lead on USAID’s direct and indirect investments in numerous initiatives that he designed to assist the reintegrating soldiers, from microcontracting and setting up dedicated job centers, through to providing microfinance and other innovative ideas that would truly reintegrate the former soldiers in what is the fifth poorest country in the world. In parallel Richard also advised the U.S. State Department on the implications of the political discussions being held between the other donors and the Afghan government. Being independent of the UN, free of any security restrictions, and living in the country, Richard has— from ambassadorial meetings through to sitting down in the villages drinking tea with former soldiers—gained a unique insight into how the DDR program in Afghanistan really works. Vanessa E. Shields is a member of the International Association of University Presidents United Nations Commission on Disarmament Education, Conflict Resolution and Peace. Her publications have featured in the Journal of Legislative Studies, Conciliation Resources, The Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research report, European Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Explosive Remnants of War. She works as an independent consultant. Dr. Amin Tarzi is the Afghanistan analyst at RFE/RL’s office in Washington, DC. He earned his PhD from the Department of Middle East Studies at New York University. His dissertation was entitled ‘‘The Judicial State: Evolution and Centralization of the Courts in Afghanistan, 1883–1896’’ and is due to be published by Harvard University Press. Dr. Tarzi has worked on Afghan affairs as an activist, scholar, political advisor, and researcher for over twenty-five years. Dr. Kheang Un is adjunct professor of political science and assistant director of the Center for Southeast Asian Studies at Northern Illinois University. Dr. Un grew up and was educated in Cambodia before he left the country for higher education in the United States in 1992. Since then, he has spent considerable time in Cambodia conducting research and working in Cambodia, including interning at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and

................. 16928$

CTRB

09-09-08 08:21:49

PS

PAGE 409

410

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

International Cooperation, Kingdom of Cambodia, in 1997. Dr. Un’s publications on contemporary Cambodian politics dealing with issues of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, appear in Journal of Human Rights, Pacific Affairs, Asian Survey, and Asian Perspective. Christina Wille works as an independent consultant on human security based in Geneva. She has worked as senior researcher for the Small Arms Survey, where she carried out extensive field research in central and southeast Asia, central Europe, and sub-Saharan Africa. She has served as expert to the European Commission in Slovenia and has worked as researcher for the Asian Research Center for Migration in Bangkok and the Migration Policy Group in Brussels. She holds degrees from the Universities of Cambridge and Durham in the United Kingdom.

................. 16928$

CTRB

09-09-08 08:21:49

PS

PAGE 410

Index Afghan National Army (ANA), 69–71 Afghan National Police (ANP), 71–75 Afghanistan, 22, 41–84, Afghan National Army (ANA), 69–71; Afghan National Police (ANP), 71–75; background, 62–64; decentralization in, 54–56; Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) in, 75–81; elections in, 46–50; executive in, 43–46; in context, 41–43; institution building in, 43–56; legislature, functionality of, 52–53; military forces, 67–71; New Beginnings Program, 76–78; parliamentary elections in, 49–52; political reform and, 41–57; post-2001, 65–67; presidential elections in, 47–49; security sector reform and, 62–83 arms management, 188–209 armed insurgency, 173–87, 188–209 Bosnia and Herzegovina, 22; 85–100; consolidating democratic institutions in, 85–100; devolution in, 94–95; elections in, 91–93; executive types in, 86–88; legislatures in, 89–91 Cambodia, 22; 101–39; consolidating peace in, 120–39; democratization and, 101–19; devolution and, 111–14; elections in, 103–5; executive in, 107–11; historical context, 101–3; legislature in, 106–7; security reform and, 120–39; security sector in, 122–39 civil administration component and peacebuilding, 396 civil society component and peacebuilding, 398

Common Minimum Program: in Nepal, 184–85 confessionalism, in Lebanon, 159–72 conflict, stages of, 27–28 consolidating democratic institutions, 85–100, 140–58, 159–72, 254–75, 288–17, 318–34 consolidating peace, in Cambodia, 120–39 democracy, in Nepal, 173–87 demobilization, in Afghanistan, 78–79 democratic settlement, search for: in Northern Ireland, 210–23 devolution, 364–367; in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 94–95; in Cambodia, 111–14; in Spain, 296–98; in Sudan, 321–23 disarmament, in Afghanistan, 78 Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), 384–87; in Afghanistan, 75–81 elections, 367–78, 397–98; in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 91–93; in Cambodia, 103–5; in South Africa, 258–59, 260; in Spain, 288–91, 299; in Sudan, 323–26 electoral component and peacebuilding, 397–98 electoral systems, 369–78 executive, 359–62; in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 86–88; in Cambodia, 107–111; in South Africa, 264–67; in Spain, 294–95, 296; in Sudan, 326–28 Globalization and institutional development, in Guatemala, 150–53 Guatemala, 22, 140–58; authoritarian

411

................. 16928$

INDX

09-09-08 08:21:51

PS

PAGE 411

412

INDEX

roots of democratization in, 143–45; conceptualizing democratization in, 141–43; concertacion lost, 145–46; democratic consolidation and state capacity in, 146–50; democratization and transnational politics, 150–53; globalization and institutional development, 150–53; institutionalizing democracy in, 140–58 Human Rights component and peacbuilding, 396 Institution building, 41–57, 85–100, 101–19, 140–58, 159–72, 254–75, 318–34 institutions of government component and peacebuilding, 397 institutionalizing democracy, 41–57, 85–100, 101–19, 140–58, 159–72, 254–75 Internally Displaced Persons (IDP), in Nepal, 194–95 international assistance, reconciliation and, 392–93 intrastate conflict: context of, 23–26 Lebanon, 159–72; confessionalism in, 159–72; institution building in, 159–72; challenges of securing peace in, 159–72 legislature, 359–62; in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 89–91; in Cambodia, 106–7; in South Africa, 259, 261–62; in Spain, 291–94, 296 military component and peacebuilding, 395–96 Nepal, 23, 173–209; armed insurgency and, 173–87, 188–209; arms management and, 188–209; army in, 191, 198–99; bipolar conflict in, 177–79; Code of Conduct in, 184–85; Common Minimum Program in, 184–85; constitutional settlement in, 179–80; cost of conflict in, 188–89; chronology and, 201–7; democracy and, 173–87; Himalayan hopes and, 186–87; human rights and, 195–96; interim constitution

................. 16928$

in, 183–84; interim Government in, 185–86; internally displaced persons (IDP) in, 194–95; Maoist insurgency in, 175–76; Maoist rebel forces in, 190; milestone agreement in, 180–82; monarchy and 173–74, 176–77; monarchy and democracy in, 173–74; monitoring and management of arms and armies in, 192–94; new constitutional settlement in, 179–80; normalization and, 196–97; peace accord in, 182– 83, 189, 197–98, 199–201; peace process and, 173–87; peoples’ victory in, 179; political parties in, 174–75 Northern Ireland, 22; 210–36; decommissioning in, 226–27; demilitarization in, 227–29; democratic settlement, search for a, 210–23; police reform in, 229–31; political prisoners in, 231–32; securing the peace in, 224–36; security sector reform in, 232–33 Palestine, 22–23, 237–53; security sector reform in, 237–53 Peace Accord, in Nepal, 182–83, 189, 197–201 peacebuilding, 28–31, 38; civil administration and, 396; civil society and, 398; components of, 393–99; elections and, 397–98; human rights and, 396; institutions of government and, 397; military and, 395–96; public opinion and, 398–99; rehabilitation and, 398; repatriation and, 398; security sector and, 396; setting the scene and, 28–29; international community and, 30–31 peacekeeping, 29 peacemaking, 29 peace process, 21–23, 35; in Nepal, 173–87; in Northern Ireland 210–36 political reform, 38, 41–57, 85–100, 101–19, 159–72, 173–87, 210–23, 254–75, 288–302, 318–34, 358–78; devolution and, 364–67; elections and, 367–78; electoral systems and,

INDX

09-09-08 08:21:52

PS

PAGE 412

413

INDEX

369–78; executives and legislatures and, 359–62; in Afghanistan, 41–61; in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 85–100; in Cambodia, 101–19; in Guatemala, 140–58; in Lebanon, 159–72; in Nepal, 173–87; in Northern Ireland, 210–23; in Spain, 288–302; in South Africa, 254–75; in Sudan, 318–34; power sharing and, 362–64 power sharing, 362–64 preventative diplomacy, 29–30 public opinion component and peacebuilding, 398–99 Reconciliation, 388–93; inclusion and, 388–93; international assistance and, 392–93 rehabilitation component and peacebuilding, 398 reintegration, in Afghanistan, 80–81 repatriation component and peacebuilding, 398 security sector, the, 32–33; peacebuilding and, 396 security sector reform, 33–38, 62–83, 120–39, 188–209, 224–36, 237–53, 276–87, 303–17, 335–55, 378–93; in Afghanistan, 62–84; in Cambodia, 120–39; in Nepal, 188–209; in Northern Ireland, 224–36; in Pales-

................. 16928$

tine, 237–53; in South Africa, 276– 287; in Spain, 303–17; in Sudan, 335–55 South Africa, 22, 254–87; Chapter 9 institutions in, 263–64; defense in, 278–81; devolution in, 268–71; elections in, 258–60; executive in, 264–67; institution building in, 254–75; intelligence in, 283–85; judiciary in, 267–68; legislature in, 259, 261–62; limits on, 387–88; local government in, 270–71; parliamentary committees in, 262–63; safety and security in, 281–83; security sector reform in, 276–87 Spain, 21–22, 288–317; civil guard in, 309–14; devolution in, 296–98; elections in, 288–91, 299; executive in, 294–96; intelligence services in, 309–14; legislature in, 291–94, 296; military reform in, 304–9; police in, 309–14; political reform in, 288– 302; security sector reform in, 303–17 structural reform, 31–33 Sudan, 22, 318–55; armed groups in, 341–44; army in, 337–41; devolution in, 321–23; elections in, 323–26; executive in, 326–28; intelligence in, 336–37; political reform in, 318–34; security sector reform in, 335–55

INDX

09-09-08 08:21:52

PS

PAGE 413