Being Young, Male and Saudi: Identity and Politics in a Globalized Kingdom 9781316882801

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Contents

Acknowledgements page  ix List of Abbreviations x

Introduction and Background

1

1 What Is Saudi? Identity, Religiosity and Generational Divides

17

2 The Saudi ‘Social Contract’ Under Strain: Employment, Housing and Healthcare

57

3 The New Media Revolution, Public Opinion and the Relationship between the Governing and the Governed

112

4 Education, Societal Transformation and Globalization

152

5 Masculinity, Gender Relations and Marriage

196

6 Distrust, Fault Lines and Recreation

236

7 Saudi Vision 2030 and National Development

281



Conclusion: Youth –​Saudi Arabia’s Human Capital

313

Bibliography Index

329 355

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Abbreviations

AGSIW CEDA CoE CPP DTV EI GaStat GCC GDP GEA GEM GPA HR ILO IMF ITC KACND KACST KAEC KAFD KASP KAU KAUST KFCRIS KFH KFU KFUPM KKF KKU KPI KSU KSYC

Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington Council of Economic and Development Affairs Colleges of Excellence Aramco’s College Preparatory Program Dhahran Techno Valley Entrepreneurship Institute General Authority for Statistics Gulf Cooperation Council Gross domestic product General Entertainment Authority Global Entrepreneurship Monitor Grade point averages human resources International Labour Organization International Monetary Fund information and communications technology King Abdulaziz Center for National Dialogue King Abdullah City for Science and Technology King Abdullah Economic City King Abdullah Financial District King Abdullah Scholarship Programme King Abdulaziz University King Abdullah University of Science and Technology King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies King Fahd Hospital King Faisal University King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals King Khaled Foundation King Khalid University key performance indicator King Saud University King Salman Youth Center

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newgenprepdf

List of Abbreviations

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MBSC Prince Mohammed Bin Salman College for Business and Entrepreneurship MENA Middle East and North Africa MGI McKinsey Global Institute MNC multinational corporations MoCI Ministry of Commerce and Investment MoE Ministry of Education MoH Ministry of Housing MoH Ministry of Health MoI Ministry of the Interior MoL Ministry of Labor MoSA Ministry of Social Affairs NGO non-governmental organization NTP National Transformation Program NWC National Water Company OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development PIF Saudi Arabian Public Investment Fund PNU Princess Nourah Bint Abdulrahman University PSU Prince Sultan University QU Qassim University REDF Real Estate Development Fund SABIC Saudi Arabian Basic Industries Corporation SAMA Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency SAMI Saudi Arabian Military Industries SANG Saudi Arabian National Guard SAR Saudi Arabian Riyal SCTH Saudi Commission for Tourism and National Heritage SEC Saudi Electricity Company SEU Saudi Electronic University SME small and medium-sized enterprise SMEA Small and Medium Enterprise Authority SOE state-owned enterprise SPA Saudi Press Agency STEM science, technology, engineering and mathematics SYLEP Saudi Young Leaders Exchange Program UAE United Arab Emirates ULC University College London VAT value-added tax WEF World Economic Forum WWE World Wrestling Event

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Dedicated with gratitude to all the students I  have had the pleasure to teach at King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals as well as all the young Saudis who contributed to this book.

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Being Young, Male and Saudi

Although the position of Saudi women within society draws media attention throughout the world, young Saudi men remain part of a silent mass, their thoughts and views rarely heard outside of the Kingdom. Based on primary research across Saudi Arabia with young men from a diverse range of backgrounds, Mark C. Thompson allows for this distinct group of voices to be heard, revealing their opinions and attitudes towards the societal and economic transformations affecting their lives within a gender-​segregated society and examining the challenges and dilemmas facing young Saudi men in the twenty-​first century. From ideas and beliefs about identity, education, employment, marriage prospects and gender segregation, to political participation and exclusion, this study invites us to reconsider the future of Saudi Arabia as a globalized Kingdom. is Assistant Professor of Middle East Studies at the King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals, and Senior Associate Fellow at King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, Saudi Arabia. With articles published in the Journal of Arabian Studies, Asian Affairs, Middle Eastern Studies, Middle East Policy and Gulf Affairs, he is the author of Saudi Arabia and the Path to Political Change: National Dialogue and Civil Society (2014) and co-​editor of Policy-​Making in the GCC: State, Citizens and Institutions (2017) with Dr Neil Quilliam. MA R K C. T HO MPS O N

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Being Young, Male and Saudi Identity and Politics in a Globalized Kingdom Mark C. Thompson King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals, Saudi Arabia

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University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom One Liberty Plaza, Floor, New York, NY 10006, USA 477 Williamstown Road, Port 3 Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia 314–​321, Floor, Plot 3, Splendor Forum, Jasola District Centre, New Delhi –​110025, India 79 Anson Road, #06-​04/​06, Singapore 079906 Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge. It furthers the University’s mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of education, learning, and research at the highest international levels of excellence. www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781107185111 DOI: 10.1017/9781316882801 © Mark C. Thompson 2019 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 2019 Printed and bound in Great Britain by Clays Ltd, Elcograf S.p.A. A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-​in-​Publication Data Names: Thompson, Mark C. (Mark Colin), author. Title: Being young, male and Saudi : identity and politics in a globalized kingdom / Mark Thompson, King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals, Saudi Arabia. Description: Cambridge, United Kingdom; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2019. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2019019453| ISBN 9781107185111 (hardback) | ISBN 9781316636367 (pbk.) Subjects: LCSH: Young men – Saudi Arabia – Social conditions. | Young men – Political activity – Saudi Arabia. | Men – Identity. | Saudi Arabia – Social conditions – 21st century. Classification: LCC HQ799.8.S33 T46 2019 | DDC 305.242/109538–dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019019453 ISBN 978-​1-​107-​18511-​1 Hardback ISBN 978-​1-​316-​63636-​7 Paperback Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-​party internet websites referred to in this publication and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

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Acknowledgements

It is impossible to name all the individuals who assisted me in the research process; however, I  am particularly indebted to a few people:  Bader Al Mubarak, Abdulkarim Al Jarallah, Abdullah Al Khamis, Mohammed Amro, Munthor Al Hawas, Mohammed Al Dossary, Ali Al Ahmari and Abdullah Alsaeedi. I  would also like to thank my friend and colleague Dr Saud Al Sarhan, director-​general, King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies (KFCRIS), for his unfailing support for my projects. In addition, thanks to the KFCRIS team for their invaluable assistance in helping to organize the KFCRIS workshop related to this book. Additionally, I  would like to thank my editor, Maria Marsh, who was enthusiastic about this project from the outset. Finally, this book would not have been possible without the input of all the individuals who participated in focus groups across Saudi Arabia, responded to surveys or granted me one-​to-​one interviews. Naturally, this includes my wonderful King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals (KFUPM) students. I am tremendously indebted to all of the above for your interest, encouragement, time and invaluable insights.

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Introduction and Background

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A Kingdom of Young People

At some point, any visitor to Saudi Arabia will end up in one of the Kingdom’s ubiquitous shopping malls, as, until 2017, ‘going to the mall’ provided one of the few opportunities for ‘entertainment’ and (a degree of) gender mixing.1 During a visit to the mall, what will strike the visitor immediately is the sheer volume of young people, nearly all of whom will be talking or texting on at least one smartphone. Indeed, Saudi Arabia is a young country in terms of its demographics. At least 26 per cent of the total population is less than 15  years old; 19 per cent are between the ages of 15 and 24; approximately 47 per cent are between 25 and 54; but only 3.2 per cent are older than 65.2 Significantly, these young Saudis have adopted social media usage as a societal norm, with WhatsApp, Snapchat, Instagram and Twitter essential components of a young Saudi’s daily transactions. The young people the visitor sees in the popular urban malls are by and large well-​educated, aspirational and interconnected not just with their domestic peers, but very often also regionally and internationally. This youthful population is driving the desire for change to the extent that the government has become increasingly aware that it cannot inoculate itself from the consequences of widespread Internet usage and modern life.3 I am often asked about the most significant change I have witnessed since first arriving in Saudi Arabia in early 2001. In my opinion, it is this young population’s desire to engage with the world. Back in 2001, the Kingdom still seemed relatively isolated; however, nowadays when I ask my students where they can find the outside world, they reply ‘in our pockets’ as they point to their iPhone XRs, Samsung Galaxy Note 10s and Huawei Mate 20s. For decades Saudi Arabia has been governed by ageing monarchs and officials. In a patriarchal society this was often interpreted as the natural order of things, with popular monarchs such as King Faisal, King Khalid and King Abdullah being seen as ‘father of the nation’. Nevertheless, over the years a sense emerged that a ‘disconnect’ existed between the 1

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Introduction and Background

authorities4 and the predominantly young population. All of this began to change with the ascension to the throne of King Salman in January 2015 and in particular with the appointment of his son Prince Mohammed bin Salman as Deputy Crown Prince, Defence Minister and head of the Council of Economic and Development Affairs (CEDA).5 In addition, between 2015 and 2017 greater numbers of young princes and technocrats were appointed to key positions, culminating in June 2017 with the elevation of 31-​year-​old Prince Mohammed bin Salman to Crown Prince alongside a cohort of younger officials.6 Suddenly, Saudi Arabia witnessed the generational change many young people had been hoping for  –​not to the expected ‘fifty-​something’ generation (as exemplified by former Crown Prince and Interior Minister Prince Mohammed bin Nayef), but rather to the ‘thirty-​something’ Prince Mohammed bin Salman and his generation. It was, according to many young Saudis, the moment the Kingdom began to modernize.7 2 Rationale My principal research interests focus on Saudi societal transformation and youth issues. I focus in this way because contemporary Saudi societal issues remain an under-​researched area, particularly by non-​Saudi academics, in part due to lack of access to diverse Saudi societal constituencies. This can lead to a limited understanding of contemporary Saudi society in all its diversity, as well as an overuse of generalizations to describe increasingly complex domestic environments. It is my strong belief that we cannot understand a state without studying its society, or diverse societies, and that in the case of Saudi Arabia it is not enough to focus on ‘high politics’ such as foreign policy or the succession ad infinitum, as so often happens. Young people are the key to Saudi Arabia’s future prosperity, and this necessitates studying the issues –​many in the area of ‘low politics’ such as employment and housing –​that they consider important. Indeed, I believe that Saudi Arabia’s greatest resource is not oil. Rather it is its human capital in the form of the Kingdom’s aspirational young people who are more than willing to participate in the decision-​making process. I have been working on youth-​related issues in Saudi Arabia since approximately 20088 and my current interest in this area stems from my work at King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals (KFUPM).9 Indeed, I am extremely fortunate to be immersed daily in discussions about Saudi socio-​political, economic and cultural issues with young Saudi men from all parts of the Kingdom and all walks of life. Furthermore, my experience is not limited to KFUPM, as since

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Rationale

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early 2001 I have also worked with young Saudis at other institutions in various parts of Saudi Arabia, including Prince Sultan University (PSU) and the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG). Nevertheless, from my own experience as a participant at numerous ‘youth events’ in Saudi Arabia, what was sometimes striking was the lack of input from youth itself. For example, at the 2014 Jeddah Economic Forum on ‘Growth through Youth’10 whilst there were many interesting presentations related to issues such as employment and entrepreneurship, only one session included presentations from two youth participants (both male). This absence of a ‘youth voice’ at an official forum dedicated to youth issues and in a country where the median age is approximately 26 appeared to me to constitute a glaring omission, particularly as Saudi demographics are central to understanding some of the most important issues facing the Kingdom in the immediate future.11 Fortunately, since 2016 the situation has improved and we have seen a greater focus on youth-​centric issues, particularly in forums such as the Misk Global Forum (plus related Misk programmes)12 and institutions such as King Salman Youth Center (KSYC).13 There is not even close to enough literature on males in the Gulf in terms of development, education and wider societal issues; when this is narrowed down to Saudi Arabia, the available literature is particularly small. Notable exceptions include Yamani’s Changed Identities14 and Menoret’s admirable Joyriding in Riyadh,15 as well as Murphy’s online report ‘A Kingdom’s Future’16. However, there is a dearth of primary research on Saudi youth, and relatively little on what young Saudi men in the contemporary Kingdom actually think. Yet, as a blind reviewer of this book’s initial proposal observes, the role of young Saudi men in society is critically important.17 Thus, the overall aim of this book is to gauge perceptions about a variety of important societal issues in order to uncover young Saudi men’s opinions and concerns. What is extremely significant is not only the speed of societal transformation, but also the way that perceptions are changing. We can see that attitudes to Saudi socio-​politics, economics and culture are being affected by a potent combination of demographics, improved educational standards (at some levels) and burgeoning social media usage, which in consequence appear to have led to greater social and politico-​economic awareness amongst Saudi youth. Hence, the scope of the book covers issues such as perceptions of national identity, attitudes to aspects of the social contract such as employment and housing, youth and societal transformation, social media usage and its effects, gender issues and marriage, and recreation and boredom, as well as attitudes to national development and accompanying initiatives such as Saudi Vision 2030.

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Introduction and Background

Another aim of this book is to demonstrate that many young Saudi men want to be taken seriously; they need to feel empowered, valued and heard as well as to be given the chance to participate constructively. Furthermore, many young men do not simply want jobs; they want rewarding careers which will enable them to contribute to individual, corporate and national development. For this reason, it is imperative that we understand not only the aspirations and concerns of young Saudi men, but also how they see their futures in today’s world. Indeed, one of the comments from one of the book proposal’s blind reviewers resonated, as, in my opinion, it rang very true: It has often struck me in the past, especially when I have been in Saudi Arabia giving lectures in universities there, that I myself have little concept of how young Saudi men actually think. One catches glimpses of what a limited range of individuals may think (and sees some of the outcomes in terms of significant numbers joining militant Islamist movements and leaving the country), but those who express their opinions to foreigners are almost certainly an unrepresentative sample. The vast mass of young Saudi men remains to me a silent mass whose thoughts and views are concealed.18

Hence, examining the opinions and attitudes of young Saudi men is paramount because without taking into consideration their hopes and fears, the future of Saudi Arabia is difficult to assess with any degree of accuracy. The perspective of young Saudi men is often also obscured as academic, policy and media attention usually focuses on Saudi women. In fact, as the same reviewer points out, we know more about the views of Saudi women partly because women are seen as occupying a particularly problematic position, and therefore, researchers have seen their position as a worthwhile area of study.19 In consequence, the viewpoints of young men have been overlooked even though they themselves feel a great deal of anxiety regarding issues related to societal transformation, politico-​ economic reform and socio-​cultural change. Furthermore, traditional notions of masculinity amongst young Saudi men are being challenged as increasing numbers of Saudi women enter higher education and the workforce. Still, I would like to stress that my emphasis on young male perceptions has nothing to do with ignoring the female perspective  –​indeed I have conducted separate research projects into issues related to Saudi women20 –​but rather I feel that the views of young men are sometimes disregarded. In fact, many Saudi societal issues are often looked at from the female viewpoint, particularly in the West –​the most famous being women driving. When the driving ban was still in place, many academics and journalists rarely considered the impact of the ban on young men,

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Rationale

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particularly those from less well-​off families. In reality, these young men frequently acted as unpaid chauffeurs for their female relatives. No matter what his nationality, for any ‘twenty-​something’ young man this was seriously ‘uncool’, as he would much rather spend time with his friends. Accordingly, even if a young Saudi man was raised to believe that women should not drive, his reality questioned these norms. This disconnect between accepted norms and everyday life is one of the conundrums that many young Saudi men face, particularly in the urban centres of Riyadh, Jeddah and the Dammam-​Khobar-​Dhahran conurbation in the Eastern Province. I  see this daily with both my KFUPM students and young men outside the university who increasingly encounter conflicts between accepted societal norms and the realities of contemporary, increasingly globalized Saudi Arabia. Another point I would like to make is that experience has taught me that many of the generalizations that are used to describe young Saudis, particularly young men, are frequently erroneous or completely disregard diverse local contexts. For example, in 2011, it was reported by the Saudi–​US Relations Information Service that ‘In general, employers say that young Saudi male graduates have an overdeveloped sense of their own value in the marketplace and an underdeveloped commitment to hard work’.21 This often-​repeated idea assumes that self-​motivation and career aspirations in Saudi Arabia, as related to personal fulfilment through study and/​or work, do not constitute an important factor for any young Saudi man.22 However, this type of sweeping generalization dismisses an entire constituency of individuals, many of whom desire to play a constructive role in the development of the Kingdom. Additionally, is it really true that all young male Saudi employees have an underdeveloped commitment to hard work? Of course not, as in any society you will find sub-​standard customer service or individuals who lack a work ethic. Yet, my own experiences with young male employees at the traffic police, Riyadh Bank, Ikea, Dammam University Hospital, Fitness Time and Hyundai Motors, to name but a few, have been for the most part positive. Furthermore, in the case of many university and college graduates, these young men not only expect to assume significant work responsibilities upon entering the workforce, but in fact also want to do so; they consider that their studies have prepared them for this eventuality. Indeed, the enormous interest amongst young Saudis in start-​ups is testament to their desire to make something of their lives. That said, even though many young men want to assume work responsibilities, they are often disappointed and, more dangerously, demoralized. Unfortunately, as these young people undergo the transition from education to employment they sometimes find themselves ‘underemployed’

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Introduction and Background

once in a full-​time position. Regrettably, some individuals believe this sometimes mirrors the societal environment –​one in which young male Saudis are caught between two opposing attitudes. On the one hand, they are either ignored or marginalized, and on the other, young unmarried men (shabab)23 are deemed to be irresponsible and in consequence are blamed for social ills. Thus, not surprisingly, some youth-​related problems stem from the fact that, rightly or wrongly, young male Saudis can feel neglected, because at times there is a sense of not being able to participate constructively either in the workplace or in society. 3

Methodology: Focus Group Discussions

This book is based on fieldwork conducted in Saudi Arabia, including focus group discussions, personal interviews and responses to written online surveys. The most important component of this fieldwork comprised approximately 50 focus groups convened at multiple locations across the Kingdom. The majority of these groups were held between October 2016 and 4 February 2018, with each group consisting of between three to eight members. For the most part, the group participants were young Saudi men aged from 18 to 26 who came from a wide variety of backgrounds in terms of, for example, employment status, region, tribe/​family, sect and/​or economic stratification.24 Krueger and Casey point out that a focus group study is a carefully planned series of discussions designed to obtain perceptions on a defined area of interest in a non-​threatening environment.25 With this in mind, I decided to use focus groups as a qualitative method, as Saudi Arabia is a particularly community-​focused country where associational life is deeply implanted.26 As Montagu observes, the Kingdom thrives on associational life which ‘has to take the place of open political discussion’.27 Hence, in the Saudi context focus groups comprising young men make sense as they represent a social event with, very often, an already existing group or shilla. These shilal (pl.), Menoret notes, which are often purely recreational, in the absence of independent clubs, associations and societies constitute informal spaces of sociability that are in a way the backbone of urban society.28 Furthermore, the compelling logic for conducting research in a group rather than in an individual setting, contend Stewart and Shamdasani, is to facilitate observations of how and why individual accept or reject others’ ideas.29 Again, this was highly applicable to these focus group discussions, where due to the ‘social’ atmosphere of the groups, participants felt free to voice their opinions and agree/​disagree with others. In fact, I tried to keep the atmosphere social and informal, as this prompted more open discussion. For this reason, the focus groups were convened

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Methodology: Focus Group Discussions

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in people’s houses, coffee shops, desert camps, parks, beaches and istirahat (usually a rented room or small property where friends go to relax in their free time). Once the participants were comfortable, focus group discussions centred on the main themes of the book, i.e. the chapter titles, which in turn were determined by issues and themes raised in these discussions. At this point, I would like to stress that all focus group members and individual interviewees consented to their views being expressed in this book; nonetheless, I respect the wishes of focus group participants, individual interviewees and online respondents who, unless named in this study, asked to remain anonymous. The focus groups were conducted in a variety of locations, including the main urban centres of Riyadh, Jeddah and the Dammam-​Khobar-​ Dhahran conurbation. However, as I will argue later in the book, there is frequently an over-​emphasis on the ‘urban belt’ that stretches across the Kingdom from Jeddah to the oil-​producing areas of the Eastern Province, much to the detriment of other regions of Saudi Arabia. As a result, there is danger that the researcher remains within an urban ‘echo-​ chamber’, engaging with a well-​educated constituency already familiar with academic research projects. The result is the further marginalization of voices outside the recognized elites or those beyond the main cities. Therefore, I also convened focus groups in other regions, including Asir and Qassim, in cities and towns such as Abha, Khamis Mushait, al-​ Mithnab and Onaizah. It was also necessary to travel beyond the boundaries of the major cities within their respective provinces, for example to towns such as al-​Majmaah and Aflaj (north and south of Riyadh respectively) or al-​Ahsa and Qatif in the Eastern Province. A few examples: I met with groups of young doctors in al-​Ahsa and Abha, petrochemical employees in Jubail, would-​be entrepreneurs in Riyadh, primary-​school teachers and their unemployed peers in Aflaj, and SANG soldiers in Qassim. I also felt it would be beneficial to arrange different groups within specific areas, as this provided an opportunity to talk to members of disparate constituencies residing in the same geographic area. Thus, I  convened multiple groups in Riyadh and Jeddah, often based around a common interest and/​or background. Sometimes these focus groups occurred on consecutive days with different group members, but on occasion the same group reconvened for another discussion. As examples: one of the Jeddah groups comprised Shari’ah law students from Umm Al-​Qura University in Makkah, another final-​year high-​school students; a focus group in Riyadh consisted of underground musicians (rappers), another of young consultants working on Saudi Vision 2030 projects. Moreover, in order to try and break down some of the generalizations often ascribed

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Introduction and Background

to parts of Saudi Arabia, I convened focus groups in different urban districts. For example, in Qatif in the Eastern Province, I  held groups in different municipal areas including Awamiya, Safwa and Tarout Island. Significantly, due to widespread internal migration in Saudi Arabia, predominantly to the main urban centres, I  was able to include many individuals from other parts of the Kingdom in the focus groups, including young men from places such as Ar-​Ar, al-​Qurayyat, al-​Baha, al-​Jouf, Hail, Madinah, Tabuk, Taif and Wadi Aldawasir, to name but a few. Unfortunately, it was not advisable to visit Najran province in 2016–​ 18 due to the ongoing conflict on the Saudi–​Yemeni border, but I was able to meet groups of Najranis in the Eastern Province who were either studying or working there.

Map 1 Principal Saudi cities and towns

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Methodology: Focus Group Discussions

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I also endeavoured to meet young men from a wide cross-​section of society in terms of background and employment, in order to achieve a balance wherever possible, as my aim is to identify not just differences, but also commonalities. Focus group participants included, but were not limited to, final-​year high-​school students, college and university graduates, government/​ public-​ sector employees, private-​ sector employees, entrepreneurs with their own start-​ups, military personnel, healthcare personnel, oil and petrochemical employees, gym and/​or hotel receptionists, and the unemployed. In fact, when I initiated this project I wanted to ensure that it would be very much a collaborative effort. Therefore, I  encouraged my focus group members, students and their combined networks to contribute to the research in order for it to reflect their opinions and concerns. Consequently, the views expressed in this book are very much informed by those of focus group members, interviewees, and/​or data from surveys and student projects. Certainly, the opinions expressed by these young men can sometimes be contradictory, not always factually true or only partially correct. Indeed, at times the views of these individuals are based on perceptions. Nonetheless, I believe perceptions shared by many young men in different parts of the Kingdom are significant, because perceptions, even if incorrect, matter. The central question is why these perceptions become widespread and accepted as fact. Certainly, in order to build a network of contacts that facilitates extensive interviews in various locations, working in Saudi Arabia on a full-​time basis provides a distinct advantage. Having lived in the Kingdom since January 2001, I have had sufficient time to build trust with both individuals and institutions and establish a network of contacts. Furthermore, from my previous experience of conducting research in the Kingdom I was aware that as I was conducting an exploratory study, my approach would necessarily be far less structured than a confirmatory one. In addition, as I noted in my 2014 book about Saudi state–​society dialogue,30 it was apparent that in the Saudi context my fieldwork needed to be open to unsuspected phenomena which may have been concealed by what Miles and Huberman term ‘prior instrumentation’.31 Despite having already established a Kingdom-​wide network of personal contacts, due to the interconnectedness of Saudi society and the importance of personal relationships, as in the past, I was aware that it would be necessary to adopt to a greater degree a chain referral or ‘snowballing’ approach, in order to penetrate hitherto difficult-​to-​access constituencies. This procedure involves recruiting individuals for focus group discussions by means of informal contact between them. For example, when my KFUPM students graduate I  ask them to join me on LinkedIn not only to follow

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Introduction and Background

their progress, but also to widen my Kingdom-​wide network. As I have taught over a thousand KFUPM graduates who now work in multiple sectors, including for companies associated with Saudi Vision 2030, this has proved to be an invaluable chain referral resource. Referrals matter, states Okruhlik, but they must be used wisely because who the referrer is also matters. In addition, the researcher must be constantly vigilant to guard against biases inherent in chain referrals and, whenever possible, self-​consciously seek diversity.32 Drawing on Okruhlik’s experience, I recognize that ‘snowballing’ necessarily injects an element of randomness into the research process, but at the same time I have found that, used wisely and carefully, it directs me towards individuals who ultimately make significant contributions to the research. Additionally, it is impossible to conduct qualitative fieldwork in Saudi Arabia without establishing a degree of trust. Without this trust, not only would it not be possible to establish contacts, but focus group members would not feel comfortable to suggest others known to them who might have something interesting to contribute to the research. Okruhlik concurs, noting that an early lesson was that people were not impressed by professional accomplishments or degrees. Rather, they were made comfortable by personal demeanour and character.33 In fact, Saudi behaviour is highly personalized, to the extent that Long and Maisel point out that personal rapport is the sine qua non of good relations.34 Okruhlik stresses that she ‘cannot over-​emphasize the importance of integrity and of building personal relationships of trust’, a viewpoint I share wholeheartedly.35 Due to the ‘trust’ issue, I did not record the focus group deliberations, as in the past I have found that this can have a detrimental impact on the discussion. Rather, I took copious notes, which were written up after each session. Of course, I prepared several generic question sets for group discussions, but I have always been acutely aware that it is often beneficial to ‘follow the flow’ of the conversation, particularly when group members highlight areas of importance to themselves. Again, Okruhlik observes that in Saudi Arabia the researcher should not gather data to support an inflexible line of argument. Rather the researcher should listen, observe and ask questions, as the Kingdom’s socio-​political context require fluidity in methodology. If the researcher is rigidly fixated on a single methodology and/​or line of enquiry, the danger is that the complexity and nuances of contemporary societal debates will be missed.36 For example, I spent around three hours in animated discussion regarding local healthcare issues in Asir with a group of medical interns in Abha because this was the topic of most concern to them. I was also fortunate to direct a workshop at King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies (KFCRIS) in April 2017 that focused on

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Methodology: Online Research and Student Projects

11

various social aspects pertaining to young Saudi male identity. Topics discussed at this workshop included: how young Saudi men connect with each other on social media, and how it is seen as both a positive and negative force; perceptions of the recent socio-​cultural changes in the Kingdom, and how they may have consequences on the young Saudi male identity; perceptions of employment and career aspirations; the role of education and religion; and perceptions of marriage and the generational divide.37 I am grateful for the valuable insights provided by the participants. 4

Methodology: Online Research and Student Projects

Although focus group discussions constituted the principal component of the fieldwork, I also conducted several written online surveys based on open-​ended questions that allowed respondents to express their views at length. These included, but were not limited to, attitudes to notions of masculinity, personal faith, national development, the impact of globalization and allowing women to drive. The aim of these one-​question surveys was to support and/​or provide additional commentary to the main themes of the book. Certainly, as Monier stresses, confidentiality is crucial in encouraging respondents, particularly when the topic is sensitive; therefore, my online surveys (in Arabic) were always anonymous.38 These one-​question written surveys were supplemented by a quantitative approach in the form of online multiple-​choice surveys on topics such as perceptions of societal transformation, levels of individual political awareness, attitudes to social media usage, and career aspirations and work motivation. To date, this ongoing quantitative research has been conducted with approximately 5,000 individuals across Saudi Arabia as well as approximately 1,000 male undergraduate students taking globalization and international relations courses at KFUPM in the academic years 2013–​19. Responses to these questions also facilitated the identification of major themes and trends discussed throughout the book. Considering online surveys as a research method, Wright notes that it has its advantages because it provides access to groups and individuals who might be difficult, if not impossible, to reach through other channels.39 Online surveys are also useful, as respondents can answer at a time convenient to them and take as much time as they need to answer individual questions.40 However, Wright also points out that self-​selection bias is a major limitation of online survey research, as there will always be individuals who are more likely than others to complete an online survey  –​with the result that this can inhibit a researcher’s ability to make generalizations about study findings.41 In addition, there is usually

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Introduction and Background

no human contact in online surveys and, as Evans and Maher argue, this can limit the ability of the researcher to probe in depth regarding a particular issue.42 For this reason, online surveys, whilst useful, cannot replace the human contact that focus groups provide. Certainly, I recognize that, standing alone, the surveys I  conducted cannot represent ‘thick data’,43 but rather they offer a ‘picture’ of youth attitudes related to some of the discussed trends whilst simultaneously supporting some of the qualitative findings from the focus group discussions.44 In addition, social media and email communication, websites, and discussion forums also provided primary material for the study. I have also been extremely fortunate to be able to draw on additional research data generated by KFUPM student projects, including reports, Prezi presentations and documentary films that were submitted as part of my political science courses from 2013–​19. Moreover, my students have allowed me to use their own survey results on issues covered under projects titles such as ‘Social Media and its Effect on Saudi Society’, ‘Globalization and the Divorce Rate in Saudi Arabia’ and ‘Globalization and Its Effect on the Spoken Language in Saudi Arabia’, as well as more specific topics including ‘Globalization and the Family in Najran’, ‘Societal Transformation in Al Ahsa’, ‘Globalization and Its Effect on the Marriage Age in Qassim’ and even ‘Globalization’s Influence on Al Shalat’ (traditional Saudi music). I am extremely grateful to these young men who every semester produce fascinating projects related to societal change in the Kingdom. 5

Organization of the Book

As previously mentioned, the content of the book and chapter themes were determined by focus group discussions. Chapter 1 discusses issues related to national identity and asks what it means to be Saudi. It reflects on the importance of tribe and family, and considers how internal migration impacts on society. The chapter also examines religiosity and young men’s relationship with their faith. Finally, it reflects on generational divides brought about by technological advances such as social media. Chapter 2 looks at reimagining the Saudi distributional system or ‘social contract’ in the twenty-​first century. This includes discussion of the highly contentious issues of employment (or lack thereof), affordable housing and healthcare. Chapter 3 focuses on the new media revolution, in particular social media, which arguably has become a Saudi norm. It also highlights the growing importance of public opinion, and young men’s perceptions of government accountability and transparency. Chapter 4 examines the role of education before moving on to discuss perceptions

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Concluding Remarks

13

of civil society and societal transformation. The chapter concludes by considering the impact of globalization on Saudi society. Chapter  5 reflects on notions of masculinity and issues related to changing gender relations. It also discusses young men’s attitudes to marriage, including the high cost of getting married in the Kingdom. Sadly, a growing percentage of these marriages end in divorce, and young men reflect on why the divorce rate might be worsening. Chapter 6 looks at fault lines in society, including issues that impact negatively on young men such as boredom, frustration and marginalization, as well as radicalization. The chapter also considers the growing problems of substance abuse and mental health concerns. Chapter 7 discusses Saudi Vision 2030 and national development. It asks whether Vision 2030 is a viable response to youth aspirations and concerns. Finally, the book concludes by highlighting one of Saudi Arabia’s undeniable assets –​namely its human capital. 6

Concluding Remarks

In Saudi Arabia, humour is everywhere, and Saudi youth are one of the most entertaining groups in the world. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that conducting the research for this book was not only extremely interesting, but also great fun. In fact, humour is seen as one of life’s most important aspects precisely because, as one young man says, humour adds flavour to life.45 Young men use jokes for every occasion, whether for the televised announcement of the annual budget or football live streams.46 Yet, black humour in Saudi Arabia is also used to express concern or discontent about a subject, for example the appalling road fatality statistics: ‘What is the fastest animal in the world? Answer: a Saudi in a Toyota Camry.’47 Furthermore, during focus group discussions, humour was used to break the ice and facilitate interaction with others as long as the discussions remained ‘within the limits’ of accepted societal and religious norms.48 One young man believes his generation’s sense of humour veers towards the black side. In contrast, the older generation’s humour is more light-​hearted, which he attributes to them coming from ‘a poorer, simpler time’ before the advent of the Saudi industrial age and technological revolution.49 Indeed, what is striking is that these young men’s jokes reflect their concerns. What is also salient is that the concerns of the young men are often remarkably similar to those of their peers in other parts of the world:  worrying about finding a suitable job, being able to get on the housing ladder and coping with the rising cost of living. Consequently, I hope that this book will go some way to rectifying many of the misconceptions and misunderstandings that are attached to young

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Introduction and Background

Saudi men. I also hope that it will allow an interesting and distinct group of Saudi voices to be heard regarding many of the important issues facing Saudi Arabia today, because in the final analysis, young Saudi men are individuals and not a silent mass. The future of Saudi Arabia is also their future and accordingly, their opinions should be heard. Notes 1 See, for example: Commins, D., Islam in Saudi Arabia, I.B. Tauris, London, 2015, p. 92. 2 See, for example: GaStat, Demographic Survey 2016, General Authority for Statistics, Riyadh, 2016, p. 20, available at: www.stats.gov.sa/​sites/​default/​files/​ en-​demographic-​research-​2016_​2.pdf; CIA, ‘The World Factbook:  Saudi Arabia’, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC, 2017, available at: www.cia.gov/​library/​publications/​the-​world-​factbook/​geos/​sa.html; https://​ stepfeed.com/​facts-​and-​figures-​on-​the-​population-​of-​saudi-​arabia-​6295. 3 See, for example: El Khawaja, N., ‘Look to Social Media for the Gulf’s Burgeoning Debates’, Chatham House, London, 27 July 2017, available at: www.chathamhouse.org/​expert/​comment/​look-​social-​media-​gulf-​s-​burgeoning-​debates. 4 When referring to the authorities, this includes not only members of the Al Saud government, but also business and tribal leaders, clerics and heads of institutions such as universities. 5 Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has initiated Saudi Vision 2030 in order to diversify the Kingdom’s economy away from oil and petrochemicals. Tagged ‘Young Prince in a Hurry’ by The Economist, the prince’s policies are ambitious, but controversial. See: Anon, ‘Young Prince in a Hurry’, The Economist, 9 January 2016, available at:  www.economist.com/​news/​briefing/​21685467-​muhammad-​bin-​salman-​gambles-​intervention-​abroad-​and-​ radical-​economic-​change-​home. 6 See, for example: Kalin, S. and Maclean, W., ‘Saudi King Empowers Young Reformer Son in Succession Shake-​Up’, Reuters, 21 June 2017, available at:  www.reuters.com/​article/​us-​saudi-​succession-​son/​saudi-​king-​empowers-​ young-​reformer-​son-​in-​succession-​shake-​up-​idUSKBN19C0AN. 7 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 8 You can find a chapter related to youth in my book Saudi Arabia and the Path to Political Change: National Dialogue and Civil Society, I.B. Tauris, London, 2015; Additionally, see book chapters: ‘Self-​Motivation, Career Aspirations and Work Responsibilities: The Perspective of Saudi Male Undergraduates at King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals’, in Kropf, A. and Ramady, M.A. (eds) Employment and Career Motivation in the Arab Gulf States:  The Rentier Mentality Revisited, Gerlach Press, Berlin, 2015, pp.  35–​ 55; ‘Re-​ evaluating the Saudi “Social Contract”:  The Perspective of Saudi Male Graduates’, in Jones, D. and Sahraoui, S. (eds) The Future of Labour Market Reform in the Gulf: Towards a Multi-​Disciplinary Evidence-​Based and Practical Understanding, Gerlach Press, Berlin, 2017, pp. 31–​54. 9 KFUPM is situated in Dhahran in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia adjacent to the main Saudi Arabian Oil Company (Aramco) compound.

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15

Notes

15

Unusually for Saudi Arabia, students live on campus as they come from every part of the Kingdom. 10 Jeddah Economic Forum, ‘Growth through Youth: Post-​Event Report of the Jeddah Economic Forum’, Jeddah Economic Forum, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, 2014, available at:  www.jef.org.sa/​files/​Jeddah_​Econ_​Forum_​2014_​WEBr3 .pdf. 11 See also: Thompson, ‘Self-​ Motivation, Career Aspirations and Work Responsibilities’, pp. 37–​8. 12 See:  http://​miskglobalforum.com; Rasooldeen, M., ‘MiSK Forum Aims to Help Saudi Youngsters to Rise Up in Life’, Arab News, 16 November 2017, available at: www.arabnews.com/​node/​1194136/​saudi-​arabia. 13 See: www.ksyc.org.sa/​?lang=en. 14 Yamani, M., Changed Identities: The Challenge of the New Generation in Saudi Arabia, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 2000. 15 Menoret, P., Joyriding in Riyadh: Oil, Urbanism, and Road Revolt, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014. 16 Murphy, C., ‘A Kingdom’s Future:  Saudi Arabia through the Eyes of its Twentysomethings’, The Wilson Center, Washington, DC, 2013, available at:  www.wilsoncenter.org/​sites/​default/​files/​kingdoms_​future_​saudi_​arabia_​ through_​the_​eyes_​twentysomethings_​0.pdf. 17 Cambridge University Press, blind proposal reviewer number two, 2016. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 20 See: Thompson, M.C., ‘Saudi Women Leaders: Challenges and Opportunities’, Journal of Arabian Studies, Vol. 5, Issue 1, 21 August 2015, available at: www.tandfonline.com/​ d oi/​ a bs/​ 1 0.1080/​ 2 1534764.2015.1050880; Thompson, Saudi Arabia and the Path to Political Change, pp. 176–​95. 21 Editor, ‘The Challenge of Change in Saudi Arabia:  A Conversation with Thomas Lippman’, Saudi–​US Relations Information Service, 2 March 2011, available at:  http://​susris.com/​2011/​03/​02/​the-​challenge-​of-​change-​in-​saudi-​ arabia-​a-​conversation-​with-​thomas-​lippman. 22 This is discussed in greater depth in:  Thompson, ‘Self-​Motivation, Career Aspirations and Work Responsibilities’, pp. 35–​55. 23 ‘Shabab’ is used to describe young men, sometimes affectionately, but also in a derogatory way, implying young men ‘up to no good’. 24 The average number of participants was five and the length of the sessions varied. The shortest lasted just over an hour, but most were much longer, lasting several hours. At times, when discussing contentious issues, the focus groups resembled group therapy sessions. 25 Krueger, R.A. and Casey, M.A., Focus Groups: A Practical Guide for Applied Research, Sage, Los Angeles, 2015, p. 2. 26 Montagu, C., Civil Society in Saudi Arabia:  The Power and Challenges of Association, Chatham House, London, 2015, pp.  3–​ 4, available at:  www .chathamhouse.org/​ s ites/​ f iles/​ c hathamhouse/​ f ield/​ f ield_​ d ocument/​ 2 015 0331SaudiCivil.pdf. 27 Ibid. 28 A shilla is a circle of friends who meet at a communal istiraha. See, for example: Menoret, Joyriding in Riyadh, pp. 38–​9.

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Introduction and Background

29 Stewart, D.W. and Shamdasani, P.N., Focus Groups: Theory and Practice, Sage, Los Angeles, 2015, p. 10. 30 Thompson, Saudi Arabia and the Path to Political Change, p. 9. 31 Miles, M.  and Huberman, A., Qualitative Data Analysis, Sage, London, 1984, p. 42. 32 Okruhlik, G., ‘Authoritarianism, Gender, and Sociopolitics in Saudi Arabia’, in Clark, J.A. and Cavatorta, F. (eds) Political Science Research in the Middle East & North Africa, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018, p. 49. 33 Ibid. 34 Long, D.E.  and Maisel, S., The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2nd Edition, University of Florida Press, Gainesville, FL, 2010, p. 50. 35 Okruhlik, ‘Authoritarianism, Gender, and Sociopolitics in Saudi Arabia’, p. 49. 36 Ibid., p. 47. 37 See: http://​kfcris.com/​en/​eve/​view/​41. 38 Monier, E., ‘Online Media as Research Topic and Research Tool’, in Clark, J.A.  and Cavatorta, F.  (eds) Political Science Research in the Middle East & North Africa, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018, p. 212. 39 Wright, K., ‘Researching Internet-​ Based Populations:  Advantages and Disadvantages of Online Survey Research, Online Questionnaire Authoring Software Packages, and Web Survey Services’, Journal of Computer-​ Mediated Communication, Vol. 10, Issue 3, April 2005, available at:  http://​ onlinelibrary.wiley.com/​doi/​10.1111/​j.1083-​6101.2005.tb00259.x/​full. See also: Thompson, M.C., ‘Societal Transformation, Public Opinion and Saudi youth: Views from an Academic Elite’, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 53, Issue 5, 2017, pp. 835–​6. 40 Evans, J.R. and Mathur A., ‘The Value of Online Surveys’, Internet Research, Vol. 15, Issue 2, 2015, pp. 195–​219, available at: http://​dx.doi.org/​10.1108/​ 10662240510590360. 41 Wright, ‘Researching Internet-​Based Populations’. 42 Evans and Mathur, ‘The Value of Online Surveys’. 43 ‘Thick data’ is about a complex range of primary and secondary research approaches, including surveys, questionnaires, focus groups, interviews, journals and/​or videos. 44 Surveys are in Arabic, although an English-​language version is also available for individuals who feel more comfortable commenting on more contentious issues in English. 45 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. 46 Jeddah focus group, December 2016. 47 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017. The Toyota Camry is an extremely popular car in Saudi Arabia. 48 Layla, al-​Aflaj focus group, April 2017. 49 Riyadh focus group, February 2017.

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1

What Is Saudi? Identity, Religiosity and Generational Divides

1

What Is Saudi?

1.1

Perceptions of National Identity

In the second decade of the twenty-​first century, new challenges including socio-​economic pressures and regional conflicts proliferate; however, as young Saudi men enter a rapidly changing world, Karolak notes that one of the core questions likely to shape the coming decades is the issue of identity.1 Yamani posits that national identity formation in Saudi Arabia has three main aspects: firstly, the consolidation of the core of the nation around the Al Saud; secondly, the development of the state’s institutional framework; thirdly, the development of a national political culture based on the state projection of Najdi political and religious culture.2 In fact, Karolak explains, the creation of a strong national identity requires the anchoring of the nation-​state’s history in the first aspect, namely the founding myths shared by all citizens. The concepts of the citizen and citizenship, Kattan writes, are communicated through mediums including ‘legal frameworks, official state rhetoric, societal norms and education’.3 In Saudi Arabia, Al Rasheed observes, in relation to the first aspect, the state has relied heavily on projecting itself as the guardian of Islam, as well as historical narratives that emphasize the Al Saud family’s role, the creation of the contemporary Saudi state and the modernization of the Kingdom.4 Indeed, coherent communities exist as a result of these shared perceptions of ‘the past, present, and future events that transcend … individuals, linking their lives to those of their predecessors and their successors in a meaningful way’.5 However, according to a Saudi political scientist in Riyadh, whilst Saudi Arabia is recognizably a state, it is not yet a nation6  –​ implying that although the Kingdom possesses the politico-​economic aspects that determine a ‘state’, it does not, in his opinion, exhibit the socio-​cultural aspects that comprise a coherent national identity. Menoret speculates

17

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What Is Saudi?

that Saudi Arabia is the opposite of a ‘melting pot’ in which a new national identity can be built. He wonders how it is possible to determine the status of Saudi national identity, located as it is between regionalism and globalization.7 Furthermore, a young man in the Eastern Province says that we should recognize that the origin of the political term ‘Saudi’ derives from a decision made by King Abdulaziz to name the newly unified Kingdom after his Al Saud family.8 Some individuals see this decision as positive9 but others disagree, arguing that this ‘Saudi word’ is intangible, in particular as their own family names existed long before the creation of the modern-​day Saudi state. Indeed, according to one focus group a sense of belonging to their land is more important than allegiance to a name that is not theirs.10 Accordingly, for some, ‘Saudi’ is simply a term that outlines a political entity rather than affirming a clear-​ cut national identity. Discussion at a 2016 Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington (AGSIW) workshop questioned the limits of national identity in a monarchy uniquely associated with the founders of the state that bears its name. The workshop report asks whether full social inclusion can be achieved in a state named after a ruling family, but also acknowledges that over time many Saudi citizens have reached a level of comfort in referring to themselves as ‘Saudis’.11 In 2000, Yamani maintained that the youth represented the ‘full embodiment of the national identity that originated with the establishment of the state of Saudi Arabia in 1932’.12 However, national identity remains a contested and complex issue. When I posed the question ‘What is Saudi?’ to my focus groups I was frequently provided with vague definitions or answers, with varying degrees of disagreement amongst group members as to what actually constitutes ‘Saudi’.13 Whilst the majority of young men I surveyed agreed that a Saudi national identity exists, the coherence of this national identity is contested. Indeed, one young man argues that civil society has failed to develop constructive, inclusive ideas about national identity, thereby illustrating that there are clear demarcation lines between diverse Saudi constituencies.14 In consequence, this raises the question of to what extent young men identify themselves first and foremost as Saudis. Certainly, for some young men there is no question that a Saudi national identity exists. They point out that their education taught them to be proud of both their Saudi nationality and their corresponding duties as citizens.15 Kattan examines an explicit articulation of this educational process, giving as an example a Saudi civic education textbook that exemplifies how the state imagines and constructs the ideal citizen in Saudi Arabia. This textbook, al-​shabāb wi-​qiyam al-​muwaṭana fy al-​mujtama‘ al-​‘araby al-​sa‘udy (Youth and Concepts of Citizenship in

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What Is Saudi?

19

Saudi Society), is used at the university level to teach tarbiyya wattaniyya (civic education) and is required for all university students. (Kattan also notes that the textbook can also be used at the high-​school level, as its ideas and themes are compatible with the high-​school curriculum.)16 The central focus of this conceptualization of society lies in the critical injection of values (qayam), as these values constitute the focal point around which societal life is organized: Societal formation, its growth, survival and sustainability, rely principally on the preservation of these values. And this is substantiated by ‘analyses and studies that show the impact values have on the continuation and stability of groups and society’. The authors list a slew of values and principles, the most critical of which are, ‘shura, human rights, social responsibility, social solidarity, and dialogue’. Islam, as divine revelation, ‘is the ultimate source of these values and principles and provides the most efficient and effective model in its application’.17

In addition to state educational constructions of national identity, young men point out that government-​sponsored events such as Saudi National Day (23 September) and cultural festivals18 such as Souk Okaz and Janadriyah19 staged throughout the Kingdom ‘have brought Saudis together’ and help foster national identity and pride.20 The Janadriyah National Culture and Heritage Festival, held at a huge, desert-​encircled fairground north of Riyadh, is the Kingdom’s most prominent annual cultural event, drawing upwards of 600,000 visitors. Established by the late King Abdullah, the rationale behind Janadriyah –​like that of Saudi National Day –​is to nurture Saudi national identity.21 In a 2011 study, Moaddel and Jong maintain that Saudis’ self-​definition of identity has shifted from religious to national. In fact, they note that between surveys conducted in 2003 and 2011, those defining themselves as Saudis above all increased from 17 to 48 per cent, whilst those identifying as Muslims dropped from 75 per cent to 46 per cent.22 To measure identity, respondents were asked, ‘Which of the following best describes you: (1) above all, I am a Saudi, (2) above all, I am a Muslim, (3) above all, I am an Arab, or (4) other?’23 Moaddel and Jong argue that the finding that ‘only 46 per cent of the public self-​identify as Islamic may be indicative of profound changes in values’ that are occurring in Saudi Arabia.24 Nonetheless, national identities can be both inclusionary and exclusionary; thus, aside from the categories of ‘Saudi’ and ‘Muslim’, some young men argue that their backgrounds work against them –​for example, religious sect, tribal and/​or regional affinity. For this reason, there is a sense amongst these individuals of not having achieved national belonging.25 The previously cited AGSIW workshop highlighted the fact that in

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20

What Is Saudi?

Saudi Arabia, those unrecognized in the state’s identity are marked as outsiders.26 As Partrick argues: If national fealty is officially compromised by a hierarchy of belonging, and if those who are full nationals are not equal in their legal as well as informal status, then the nation is a narrow, elite, project with little relevance to active citizenship. Nationals are in this case, simply, muwatinoon (nationals) holders of a jinsia (passport), not proper citizens.27

Indeed, for these ‘outsiders’ there is a belief that sectarian, tribal and/​or regional identities continue to hamper attempts of disparate constituencies to unify themselves as Saudis precisely because many consider that there is a lack of an inclusive national identity.28 For example, a group of Shia petrochemical employees in the Eastern Province claim that citizens of Qassim province celebrated Saudi National Day by attacking other constituencies (on social media) in the Kingdom and claiming that these groups are not Saudi. They believe this situation could have been avoided with the introduction of more inclusive policies in school curricula.29 (Conversely, some religious conservatives in Qassim refuse to celebrate Saudi National Day because they say it is haram (forbidden) to celebrate National Day, as this would make them ‘like the Shia celebrating their religious festivals’.30) Hence, is it the case that whilst these young men may consider themselves as Saudi, the secondary status they are allocated by the state (and the marginalization of their communities) heightens their loyalty to alternative identities. These can be broad categories such as belonging to the Arab and/​or Muslim nation,31 or more specific ones including primary allegiance to family, tribe, region and/​or sect.32 Economic turmoil and regional conflicts have also impacted perceptions of national identity. For instance, there is a sense that economic austerity brought about by the dramatic 2014 oil price decrease has heightened tensions between different constituencies, especially those who feel marginalized, thereby having a detrimental effect on an inclusive national identity.33 Furthermore, at the outset of the Yemen conflict in 2015, Saudi participation in the war raised the urgency of questions of nationalism and national identity. As AGSIW states, the Saudi leadership presented the Yemen intervention as a war of necessity, not choice, and at the beginning of the conflict, ‘the atmosphere of patriotism was tangible as the state rallied support for the war and encouraged demonstrations of support for the troops’.34 Nonetheless, failure to bring the conflict to an end, coupled with domestic economic cut-​backs, dampened the patriotic mood.35 In addition, another individual maintains that internal societal divisions have been exacerbated by conflict and unrest in places such as Turkey, Syria and Bahrain.36 For example, he contends that inside Saudi

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Arabia there was more societal division regarding the 2016 coup attempt against President Erdogan than in Turkey itself. In consequence, he believes these domestic societal divisions over regional political issues demonstrate a failure by the government and civil society to develop notions of national identity beyond the ‘cosmetic’ Saudi National Day variety.37 According to a group of young men from mixed regional backgrounds, ‘most Saudis judge on appearance’.38 This superficial approach creates people ‘who stick their noses into issues they are not even interested in or know anything about’.39 One young man, complaining about lack of civility in public life –​understood in terms of Keane’s definition of civility as respect for others expressed as politeness towards and acceptance of strangers40 –​ complains: Saudi society is not civil, but peasant and no matter how much society develops, it will remain a degraded society. You can find civil Saudis in all parts of Saudi Arabia but they just resemble a drop of water in a sea. Additionally, most people in Saudi society are not well-​cultivated and very few citizens use their minds in solving problems. In fact, Saudi society judges issues quickly, based on appearances or what it has seen before.41

To get around this problem some individuals create a ‘shield’. For example, a young man can grow a beard and wear a thobe (rather than Western clothes) so that everyone thinks he is religious or conservative. One member of the group from al-​Qurayyat in northern Saudi Arabia recalls how a college peer was on course to receive a fail grade in an Islamic Studies course. The student went to an Islamic Studies instructor who he knew was particularly devout and because the student had a long beard and ‘looked pious’, the Islamic Studies instructor gave him an excuse to miss the exam. Of course, this had nothing whatsoever to do with religion; rather it was based on the individual’s appearance.42 Indeed, a group of Shari’ah law students at Umm Al-​Qura University in Makkah maintain that many outwardly religious students who study Islamic law do not follow the rules themselves; for example, they see these students smoking between lectures, which is haram.43 From my own perspective, what was striking about this Umm Al-​Qura University focus group was how it shattered stereotypical notions of the ‘typical’ Shari’ah law student profile. As one of these young men remarked, it surprises many people that some devout Shari’ah students are in favour of cinemas opening. This individual contends this is because some continue to rely on what he calls ‘lazy generalizations’.44 Certainly, there is discrimination (and racism) on many levels in Saudi Arabia in relation to religion/​ sect, family, tribe and economic background. A focus group in al-​Ahsa voices a complaint heard across

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the Kingdom, noting that whenever a young man meets someone new they are asked questions such as ‘Who are you? Where do you come from?’ Yet, they assert that no one really questions the root cause of this problem, although in their opinion, problems related to identity and discrimination are embedded in society.45 Indeed, a young man from Jeddah points out that Riyadh citizens still say that people from Jeddah are not real Saudis, that they do not have ‘pure tribal blood’ because they are ‘left-​behinds’.46 This viewpoint echoes Yamani’s observation that Najdis from central Saudi Arabia call the inhabitants of the Hijaz tarsh al-​bahr (flotsam of the sea) and bagaya hujjaj (pilgrimage remnants) due to the alleged ‘impurity’ of Hijazis’ Arab descent owing to intermarriage with non-​Arab Muslims.47 To make matters worse, a Riyadh focus group reflects, discrimination and racism are directed not only at ‘outsider Saudis’, but also at non-​Saudi nationals, in particular migrant workers from the Indian sub-​ continent. According to this group, there are levels of racism starting at the top, with comments such as ‘migrant workers are smelly’, to the bottom, with unacceptable comments such as ‘migrant workers are mentally deficient’. This racism is compounded by many in their generation seeing themselves as an elite race.48 Yet, although young Saudis are better educated than in the past, a focus group in Hofuf supposes that in all likelihood racism and discrimination will probably increase. As one group members remarks, ‘It is a case of everyone in their ivory tower thinking only of himself and his group; everyone suffering from silo-​mentality’, but the real issue is that this could limit growth in the Kingdom.49 Hence, the central questions that need to be addressed are:  how can Saudi society overcome this discrimination? How much will this affect national development and growth?50 There is also an argument that national identity is more important to Saudis when they are outside the Kingdom. According to some focus groups, their ‘Saudiness’ is more pronounced abroad; however, when they return to the Kingdom, other more specific identities such as sectarian, tribal or regional ones can reassert themselves.51 For instance, a Najran focus group says that when Saudis travel outside the Kingdom they ‘like each other more’ than when they are at home, where other identities can cause divisions between groups. One group member recites a saying:  ‘Inside the Kingdom it is me and my brother against my cousin, but outside it is me and my brother and my cousin against foreigners.’52 Still, an Eastern Province focus group comprised of ex-​ King Abdullah Scholarship Programme (KASP)53 students disagrees.54 According to these young men there are frequently competing identities amongst groups of Saudis outside the Kingdom. For example, one of

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the group members who studied in the USA remarks that there were few problems when there was a small group of Saudis, even if the group included Sunni and Shia. However, once the group size increased, then sub-​ groups were created based on other identities such as tribal or regional ones.55 Therefore, the inclusive national Saudi identity evident outside the Kingdom might not be more than ‘a public relations type exercise’ to mask the underlying differences between diverse domestic identity groups, including those who are considered part of the state’s version of national identity and those who are deemed outsiders.56 1.2

Tribal Identity

The 1970s and 1980s witnessed the rise and strengthening of the modern central state whilst tribalism weakened systematically, explains Al Kuwari: This was particularly the case as citizens found more relief, more of their needs met, more of their conflicts resolved, and even their livelihoods depending on the functioning of the modern central state. In contrast, the tribe systematically lost these critical functions and its relevance on the economic, political and even on the social level was significantly weakened.57

Regional or tribal identities have ‘been tamed’, wrote Yamani in 2000, giving rise to a more pronounced sense of national identity.58 Conversely, Yizraeli argues that since 2000 tribal affiliation and tribal identification have increased in importance. Cooke concurs, saying that the concept of the tribe has not only survived, but in fact has become more salient than before.59 Al Qassemi also asserts that tribalism in modern-​day Arabia is alive and well.60 Furthermore, there is often a financial factor related to tribalism, as many young men turn to the tribe for support when they want to get married and start a family.61 Still, financial (and family) support can be dependent on a young man marrying a girl either from his own tribe or at least from another with an equivalent social pedigree.62 Despite the state’s expansion into the traditional domains of the tribe, Samin argues that the idea of tribe and tribal belonging has persisted in Saudi imagination. Samin also draws attention to the role of the state in ‘breathing new life’ into tribal identity through practices that render the tribe ‘one of the only meaningful forms of civic association permissible in the Kingdom’.63 Whilst Yizraeli concedes that the ‘onset of tribal reawakening is difficult to pinpoint’, government awareness of the growing phenomenon appeared around 2007. She cites examples of ‘tribal youth writing blogs, telling stories of their tribes, and trying to connect

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with other members of the tribe’.64 Furthermore, as Maisel observes, Saudi tribes have increasingly used newly provided spaces to ‘publicize their agenda during a time when other elements of Saudi society, such as Islamists, liberals, and Shias, faced restrictions and obstacles getting their voices heard’.65 Maisel attributes this success to the tribes’ agenda being less threatening to the Al Saud and more in line with the national interest than the agendas of the other groups: The tribes consciously focused their public relation campaigns on apolitical sectors of the public life, for example, literature, television, and popular culture. Through this avenue they avoided government scrutiny and reprisals. Although the tribal message received some opposition from liberal and religious circles, due to its deep roots and popular embedment, it also attracted a larger audience. The message called for a renewed interest in tribal histories and values, which worked well alongside the government-​sponsored movement to incorporate local heritage into the discourse of national identity.66

Being able to trace a lengthy genealogy through a historically recognized Arabian tribe, notes Samin, connects Saudis to their history in a meaningful way. It grounds them in a sense of continuity with the past –​one that is difficult to locate in the contemporary shopping mall culture of the Kingdom.67 This renewed interest in tribal history and values resonates with a young man from the Al Otaibi tribe. He recognizes the importance of belonging to his tribe both in historical and contemporary terms and stresses that whilst his tribal identity means something to him, on a personal level, as history, for other members of family ‘this is very much of today’.68 This is especially true of some of his young Al Otaibi cousins, who like to ‘leave the tribe’s sign [505/​511] as graffiti on the walls of public buildings’.69 Indeed, according to Hertog, whilst tribes have lost collective agency and autonomy, both real and reinvented tribes remain very important as social identity markers.70 Rather than constituting solely an economic form of sustenance as in the past, nowadays, tribal identity represents behaviour that is based on norms and a common belief in the hierarchical patronage system. Primarily, Maisel observes, tribal members look for support within their own families or kin groups, resulting in an increase in different forms of tribal affirmations, self-​representations and accounts.71 Indeed, a young economic consultant in Riyadh remarks that in an increasingly online society, checking an individual’s Twitter account to see who the account holder follows as well as his/​her followers can indicate the individual’s tribal identity group.72 Some young men see tribalism in a negative light, with one Riyadh focus group comparing it to racism as found in the US between ‘blacks and whites’.73 It is also an exaggerated and ‘overrated idea’ that in the

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long term does not make a young man genuine friends. Tribalism is not as pronounced in the main urban centres where there is not as much ‘tribal thinking’, i.e. there is less collectivism and greater individualism.74 Some even argue that in cities such as Riyadh it is a dying concept, which explains the easing of some traditional socio-​cultural practices.75 Naturally, there are regional variations. For example, tribalism is not as evident in Jeddah (hence, fewer social restrictions); when comparing Qassim with Jeddah, according to a SANG soldier from Onaizah, ‘they are 180 degrees’.76 In Shia Qatif, in the Eastern Province, tribal issues are not as important as in Najd or the Hijaz. A focus group from Qatif says that although they belong to the Banu Abdul Qais tribe, the focus is on the nuclear family and close relatives rather than the tribe. According to this group, tribal issues are more significant in Najd because the population was nomadic, but in Qatif the population has been settled in the area for a long time as there was no need to move around to find food.77 Yet, out in the rural villages in regions such as Najd and Asir, tribalism remains a particular problem.78 A  young man from Bisha explains his situation: In my town it is rare to find ambitious young men –​they all expect or want to become soldiers. This is the tribal culture of the rural villages; you are expected to become a soldier. In fact, being ambitious in the village is seen as a crime and there will be a lot of peer pressure to try and stop you doing something different. If you are strong you can break away, but if you are weak the tribal culture will break you. I was very lucky –​I managed to escape and become a medical student because my parents were both teachers and they supported me.79

Furthermore, the tribal system, according to some, causes problems including exacerbating the issue of wasta,80 which impacts on employment opportunities and which many believe cannot be eliminated or even decreased.81 According to some individuals, even during interviews for leading Saudi companies the first thing an interviewee is asked relates to his family background.82 For instance, another SANG soldier says that tribal identity plays a part in the interview process for positions in the forces: I know a young man who was trying to join the army and noticed that the major giving the test was asking candidates about their family background first. He then changed the questions he asked them depending on the family background. So some guys got difficult questions such as ‘What was the battle fought just after the Prophet Mohammed (pbuh) died?’ or very easy ones such as ‘What states are west of Saudi Arabia?’ The level of the questions depended on the background so someone from a village was given an easy question such as ‘Who is head of the armed forces?’ –​the king of course. But the guy could not answer that simple

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question because he did not even understand it. So the major asked him to read something from the Qur’an. Everything depends on your background.83

Even though this revival of tribalism has mainly been confined to the cultural sphere,84 there have also been political examples. As Hertog observes, during the municipal polls in November 2005, candidates were prohibited from using ‘historic or tribal names’, reflecting continued unease about tribes as political entities.85 Yet, Maisel points out that although it is illegal to run on a tribal platform, ‘in order to circumvent this restriction, tribal candidates have formed informal alliances to make sure non-​tribal candidates’ were excluded.86 In addition, new media tools such as social media apps, blogs and discussion forums are frequently used in support of tribal candidates.87 Moreover, an economic consultant speculates that if Saudi Arabia were to suddenly hold free and fair elections most people would vote for family and/​or tribal members. He admits this is not particularly rational behaviour for someone who is well educated, but he would vote for a tribal member precisely because it relates to his identity. As he points out, this is exactly what happened in the municipal elections in some areas.88 In an era of great uncertainty and regional instability, the Al Saud is a ‘known quantity’. This is highly relevant due to an innate societal fear of fitna (sedition, civil strife, unrest). By maintaining stability in the Kingdom and keeping fitna at bay, the Al Saud consolidates its legitimacy in the eyes of its contrasting societies; that is, the family is the ‘glue’ that holds a disparate group of tribes, regions and constituencies together. The significance of this was demonstrated in 2013 when discussions in majalis and diwaniyyat frequently centred on fear of state fragmentation along tribal (rather than regional) lines. At that time a map of a fragmented Saudi Arabia was being circulated online that illustrated how the Kingdom’s unity could be threatened by tribal differences, the Sunni–​ Shia divide and (pre-​2014) economic challenges. The map showed how Saudi Arabia could split into the five regions that preceded the modern state, and this sparked societal disquiet and discussion about possible state break-​up.89 Nonetheless, a focus group from Qassim states that whilst the Saudi state unifies the tribes under the leadership of the Al Saud, this does not mean that inter-​tribe harmony always exists, or indeed harmony between different tribal branches such as the northern and southern Al Qahtani groupings.90 For example, a young man from Khamis Mushait in Asir remembers how at high school, he and his family members were always fighting with pupils from other tribes.91 He says the issue of inter-​tribal fighting amongst the boys was so serious that it necessitated a police car

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being positioned outside the school every day. The problem was not confined to high school and also occurred within the surrounding area. He recalls how he and his cousins went to a wadi to build a camp, but then ‘some guys from another tribe appeared with guns asking us what we were doing on their land. So we left quickly and returned with extra guys (and guns) from our tribe so we could confront them, but we managed to sort it out in the end.’92 Another issue, according to a focus group from Onaizah in Qassim, is that although their society is tribal, it can be differentiated into hadhar and badu –​as Menoret explains, ‘civilized people’ and those who ‘suddenly appear and just as suddenly disappear’.93 Still, one Qassimi observes that whilst badu in Onaizah have different accents and norms, they are still considered part of Onaizah society. As an example, he cites Eid, when both hadhar and badu pray together in the town’s communal prayer area.94 However, regardless of whether an individual is hadhar or badu, the tribal nature of Qassimi society means that societal reforms, even if they are an improvement, are difficult to implement. In fact, a SANG soldier says most Qassimis resist and/​or reject societal reform because of socio-​tribal norms –​he jokes that Qassimis reject anything new.95 In the past there was also the issue of political rivalry between the hadhar populations of the Qassim towns of Buraydah and Onaizah, although the rivalry decreased as the towns became ‘modernized’.96 For example, an Onaizah resident says that both towns tried to influence the location of Qassim province’s Prince Nayef bin Abdulaziz Airport to their advantage. Another example is a community college for boys in Onaizah, which was built after local residents complained to the regional prince that they did not want to send their sons to Buraydah.97 This young man also recounts a popular historical story about the rivalry: Twenty years ago in Onaizah town center market there was a catapult directed north to Buraydah, and of course, the people in Buraydah complained to the regional prince about it. The prince went to Onaizah and demanded to know the reason for this catapult. And the good people of Onaizah replied that it was not pointed at Buraydah at all –​it was pointed at Israel!98

The main problem, according to an Onaizah focus group, is that Qassimis are never in the middle: instead they tend to become extremists at both ends of the spectrum.99 For example, it is generally assumed that most people in Buraydah are conservative, says one focus group, but in their opinion there are two extremes. At one end of the spectrum are found the utmost ‘liberali’, such as Turki Al Hamad,100 and at the other the extreme conservatives101 –​although another group member asserts that in comparison with hadhar, badu hold more extreme views.102 Yet, according to a

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focus group from the town of al-​Mithnab in Qassim, in the larger urban centres of Onaizah and Buraydah it is possible to be more ‘open-​minded’ than in smaller local towns.103 For instance, the group says that when the popular fast food restaurant Kudu opened in al-​Mithnab in 2016 there was an argument amongst the local community about whether a family section should be allowed. As the argument raged, a family section was opened, then closed, then reopened. To date it is the only restaurant with a family section in the town.104 Another young man from Onaizah (a hadhar) who works as a car salesman espouses very negative views of his badu peers. He claims that when badu try to be ‘open-​minded and civilized’ they overdo things, in particular in the way they dress, as they become ‘soft’-​looking.105 In addition, the young man alleges that hadhar want to work their way up in a business step by step, whereas badu ‘come in and want to go straight to the top immediately’.106 He also declares that badu take out bank loans in order to climb socially, but they are usually unsuccessful because ‘there is a saying in Arabic: when you fill your mouth with rice and try and eat it in one gulp you will choke’.107 These negative opinions of another societal constituency, whether between tribes or between hadhar and badu, are not uncommon. As another example, a young man from Najran says that his father and an uncle who both work at Najran University have told him since childhood that ‘badu are much better than hadhar’.108 1.3

Internal Migration

Unlike other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, Saudi Arabia has a relatively large, diverse population dispersed over a wide geographic area. However, since the advent of the oil era, vast numbers of Saudis have relocated to cities due to more favourable economic conditions there. These cities are located on the urban belt stretching from Jeddah in the west through the ever-​expanding Riyadh to the Dammam-​Khobar-​ Dhahran conurbation in the east. The process of urbanization resulting from this internal migration from the provinces to the urban belt has exposed large sections of the population, in particular young Saudis, to other previously ‘unknown’ Saudi societal constituencies, not to mention expatriates. This raises the question of whether internal migration and urbanization facilitate the creation of more homogenized ‘national citizens’ whose loyalty to traditional identities is diluted. Or is the reverse true? Are existing identities strengthened within new localities? In Saudi Arabia it appears, in line with Hoogvelt’s argument, that the geographic core–​periphery polarization (urban centres–​provinces) is being replaced by a social core–​periphery one based on economic

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stratification that drives a policy of exclusion.109 For instance, one young man observes that nowadays it is clear that societal norms in the well-​off cosmopolitan areas of Eastern Province such as Dhahran and al-​Khobar are different from those of other regional cities or towns such as Abqaiq or al-​Ahsa. This is due to the impact of the oil industry and the presence of a foreign workforce, which in turn has changed the local culture and work ethic.110 Menoret documents how waves of migrants moved to Riyadh from the steppes and highlands of central Arabia. In addition, a large share of the capital’s population move back and forth between the capital and their home villages, where they spend weekends and holidays. This makes Riyadh ‘an extension of the patch of scorched earth on which they were born and where they were entrenched in dense social networks’.111 A  young man from Onaizah in Qassim who works in Riyadh agrees, noting the huge number of Qassimis who have moved to the capital.112 However, he also remarks that whilst in Riyadh he and his compatriots are simply ‘Qassimis in general’, probably because urban migration, note Long and Maisel, has cut off a growing number of families from traditional support systems such as relatives and close friends in small towns and villages.113 However, when they go home to Qassim at the weekend or for the Eid holidays he notices that suddenly identities associated with specific tribes, towns and villages reassert themselves.114 A Jeddah resident tells a similar story, saying that when he and his relatives gather in their tribal home in Asir province during the summer, he sees that they all revert to their tribal roots in terms of behaviour and language. Yet, as soon as they return to the main urban centres, and take up their everyday lives, their clothes and even their voices revert back to their ‘city lifestyles’.115 Significantly, a lack of employment and educational opportunities is forcing many young men to leave their hometowns in the provinces. Still, not all young men want to move to the main cities:  many would like to find a job in their hometowns where they prefer to settle and start a family. Besides, many are more comfortable with the lifestyle in smaller towns and villages, as described by this young man from Asir: In my village women have always driven, people do not go to the cities, there is no Western lifestyle, no PlayStation, no social media, people are shepherds and we follow a traditional way of life. In my opinion, this is good, there are no distractions, no time to play and in fact, people work very hard.116

Another distinct advantage for some is that in small provincial towns the community is well connected, whereas in large cities such as Riyadh this is not usually the case. There are some neighbourhoods in the capital

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that resemble small villages, observes a group member who moved to Riyadh for work, but he admits this is rare.117 In fact, the lack of community spirit in the cities is the reason that many young men return to their hometowns when they can afford to do so. Not only is there a greater sense of community, but the quality of life is better and less expensive.118 Still, as a young man from Wadi Aldawasir in Najd, he has no choice but to move to Riyadh to study for his diploma in human resources because he cannot do this in his hometown (or anywhere nearby). Thus, to achieve this he must find a permanent job in Riyadh in order to be able to take the diploma at night school.119 According to a focus group in al-​Aflaj, if a young man moves to Riyadh he can find a public-​sector job in the capital, but if he wants a similar position in al-​Aflaj then he needs luck or most likely a great deal of wasta. Hence, the group claims that around 90 per cent of young men leave al-​Aflaj to find work: in other words, they are forced to move to the cities.120 Nonetheless, living in the main urban centres is not always economically advantageous due to the cost of renting an apartment and the higher costs of living. Therefore, young men might be better off in smaller towns121 as at least in their hometowns they can live with their families.122 In Qassim, when residents leave the towns to find work in the urban centres the badu move into the towns from the surrounding villages.123 A focus group in the town of al-​Mithnab believes this population replacement has a detrimental effect on the town, as it hinders urban development.124 Therefore, in order to stop the flow of young men away from provincial towns, the group thinks the government should establish more colleges or universities, which in turn would create employment opportunities. One young man from Onaizah says that the government should emulate successful businessmen such as those from the Al Zamil family who originate from the town, and, whilst not living there, finance initiatives such as cultural festivals and new hotels in order to improve the local economy by creating employment opportunities.125 Nevertheless, a trainee doctor from Qassim speculates the main problem is that Saudi Arabia needs more urban centres, not just the three principal ones that straddle the urban belt. As he points out, there are no large cities in either the north or south, which in his opinion is problematic.126 2

Religion and Faith

2.1 Religiosity

To comprehend the roles that religion plays in Saudi Arabia, Commins explains that it is essential to have in mind five elements: the state-​sponsored

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Wahhabi doctrine, the Al Saud dynasty, government institutions, the diversity of society and relations with the Muslim world.127 Wahhabism, writes Davis, is conventionally and popularly understood to be a conservative version of Islam originating in Saudi Arabia, where it has a substantial following, and contemporary Saudi society is regarded as the quintessential society ordered according to Wahhabi religious doctrine.128 However, Commins also notes that naming the state-​sponsored doctrine preached by Muhammad ibn Abd al-​Wahhab has never been a simple matter. Some have classified it as a sectarian heresy to the extent that the term Wahhabi stigmatized the doctrine as ‘the ravings of a misguided preacher’.129 Saudis do not call themselves and have never called themselves Wahhabis, observes Menoret.130 Alshamsi refers to the state-​ sponsored doctrine as Saudi Islamism whilst noting that Wahhabism remains ‘a structure’ in Saudi Arabia and is a transnational Islamic concept, as it focuses on tawhid (monotheism).131 Still, the tendency to refer to the doctrine as Salafi is a recent development, says Commins, that first emerged amongst Wahhabism’s defenders outside Saudi Arabia well before the Wahhabis themselves adopted the term.132 Yet, according to Farquhar, the term ‘Salafi’ is also notoriously slippery, ‘used by various commentators at various times to label a plethora of different phenomena’. Nonetheless, Farquhar documents that the Salafi tradition is an exclusively Sunni phenomenon, ‘the sunna which is so central to this mode of religiosity consisting in the corpus of traditions recorded in the canonical Sunni hadith collections’.133 As the effects of globalization and societal transformation impact on young Saudi men, one question that is asked frequently is whether young Saudis are more or less religious than in the past. In fact, Commins wonders whether deeply ingrained social habits have roots in social practice or in divine guidance, for example, praying five times daily, which may represent the Wahhabi imprint on individual behaviour, ‘be it either from eager compliance or grudging acquiescence’.134 Certainly, external factors such as globalization, social media, foreign films and TV series, as well as overseas travel, are believed to be impacting, usually negatively, on religious values and beliefs.135 In fact, senior religious scholars such as the late Abdulaziz ibn Baz have perceived great danger in sending young Saudis to study overseas, fearing that their Islamic beliefs would be compromised.136 Yet, for many young men the answer is simple: Saudi Arabia is synonymous with Islam and therefore, in their opinion, levels of religiosity remain constant.137 Although there are a few individuals who believe Islam is a religion they were ‘born into’ and that, similarly to family, tribe and nationality, this is a factor over which they have no, or limited, control,138 others

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judge that the important question is less about whether levels of religiosity are increasing or decreasing and more about how Saudis reflect on their personal religious beliefs vis-​à-​vis the state’s interpretation of Islam.139 According to a devout young man from al-​Ahsa, regardless of whether levels of religiosity are increasing or decreasing, the vast majority of Saudis insist on adhering to the Five Pillars of Islam, which constitute the framework of Muslim life.140 That said, members of an al-​Ahsa focus group (convened during Ramadan in 2017)  note that ordinary Saudis are able to worship Allah with more knowledge because they are better educated than in the past.141 In other words, there is greater scepticism regarding the Wahhabi doctrine’s so-​called ‘people of knowledge’, those who Al Rasheed remarks ‘claim to articulate its message, uphold its traditions and guard its spirit’.142 Until around a decade ago, a great many Islamic scholars were widely trusted, declares this al-​ Ahsa focus group, but nowadays the same scholars sometimes ‘come under fire’ from members of society due to increased levels of scepticism, in particular regarding those Islamic scholars known to have strong ties to the government.143 People like this, asserts another individual in al-​Ahsa, sometimes use religion, including Islam, as powerful political tool to control the masses. This is a double-​ edged sword, he avers, as it can be used for right or wrong.144 This scepticism is also articulated by a group of young men from King Saud University (KSU) who protest that they are always told there is ‘only one way to do things religiously’, which is to adhere to the state doctrine. Their anger and contempt is frequently aimed at ‘extreme conservative-​ religious people’ such as members of the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, better known in Saudi Arabia as the hai’a (religious police). Until 2016 the hai’a’s remit to interfere in society was extensive,145 but after curbs were placed on the religious police, ordinary Saudis took to social media in an unprecedented way to criticize the hai’a’s previous behaviour, declaring that society is better off without them.146 Indeed, the KSU students assert that ‘it is well-​known’ that many hai’a members were formerly petty criminals, and hence feel guilty about their past behaviour. As a result, these individuals become more extreme and ‘holier than thou’, which ruins the whole concept of religion for others.147 However, a young man whose father is a prominent Islamic studies professor disagrees. He says that whilst many hai’a members might not be the best candidates for the job, they are not ‘as black’ as portrayed; in fact, many are knowledgeable about Islamic teachings.148 Nonetheless, there are two problems: firstly, hai’a members often lack the social skills needed for their tasks and secondly, negative media stereotypes are widely accepted regardless of their actual veracity.149

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Islam Is ‘Everything’

A survey conducted for a 2014 Boston Consultancy Group report on Saudi youth found that 97 per cent identified Islam as the main influence that shapes identity.150 Islam is totally ingrained in the fabric of contemporary Saudi Arabia, observes Yamani.151 It is an integral part of Saudi culture,152 as Islam marks daily life, shapes family relations and future aspirations. Undeniably, for the vast majority of young men Islam is ‘everything’: it determines the way Saudis view life itself.153 For them Islam is an identity, a lifestyle, a guide to politics; it guarantees the rights of both genders and constitutes a ‘perfect’ social system in every aspect.154 In fact, there is ‘no life without it’,155 as Islam represents life’s spine, life’s cornerstone and a safety raft. Accordingly, as Long and Maisel point out, the scope of Islam is all-​embracing, based on the idea that Allah is the creator of all things.156 Thus, worshipping Allah is a great blessing that is priceless, explains a Riyadh focus group: when anyone reads the Qur’an they will understand. Islam means standing up for the oppressed, obeying Allah and Allah’s messenger the Prophet Mohammed (pbuh) as well as the ruler.157 Therefore, an individual must have complete faith in Allah, who has no partner and no equal.158 He must submit to Allah almighty by following his orders and obeying him, with Allah’s help.159 Finally, Islam is the key to paradise  –​and avoiding hell  –​after Allah’s mercy. It is the foundation of everything and for this reason the vast majority of young men thank Allah they are Muslim.160 There is also consensus amongst young men that Islam ensures societal order by guiding their lives according to Islamic teachings, how to worship Allah, how to understand the universe and how to deal with all God’s creatures, whether human or animal. In essence, the majority of young men believe strongly that Islam is a religion for all people based upon compassion, mercy, justice, love, peace and doing what is right. Islam is the secret of happiness; it is the light that illuminates a person’s path through life.161 One young man explains his belief: Islam and all other religions are important to humans because they unify and guide us. For example, in the past, Islam unified the Arabs. All religions are important because humans are emotional, reason does not always move them, but emotion does. And religion is the strongest emotion that unifies people and guides them.162

Moreover, the duties a Muslim must observe, as well as prohibited practices, are all designated through the love of Allah, and following these teachings will unify and bring peace for all Muslims.163 Through its teachings, Islam provides guidance on how to avoid sin, how to be merciful,

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and Yamani says it acts as a ‘social stabilizer’ for both body and spirit.164 In essence, Islam is the complete guide for life.165 Another young man says that Islam instructs a person how to treat other people in relation to manners, love and giving to someone who needs it most, and ‘in many more ways that can be counted’.166 Another individual notes that Islam represents law, science, tranquillity, affection, comfort, security, honesty, rightful equality, cohesion, clemency and true happiness, as well as the answers to all questions, combined in one entity, in one religion.167 For another young man, Islam can be explained by four simple words:  peace, love, perfection and satisfaction.168 Indeed, Islam is a ‘divine lifestyle’ based on justice, mercy and kindness that completes the relationship between ‘the creator and his creatures and his creatures between themselves’, and in consequence, this mutual relationship creates a feeling of belonging.169 In sum, Islam is about having a deep understanding of and complete faith with everything that surrounds you, having trust that leads you to safety; Islam, in other words, is about peace.170 According to many young men, Allah guides humankind to seek the correct path in life, and this makes individual seek for themselves the truth of Islam  –​nobody can change the facts about Islam or distort them.171 The teachings of Islam are crystal clear, asserts one young man, far removed from the thinking and inaccuracies that some people believe in.172 In fact, according to his focus group, many people who claim to be Muslims are not actually Muslims, because they do not follow the teachings of the Qur’an; hence, in reality, Islam means nothing to them –​it is simply a name. These young men argue forcefully that Islam represents peace and forgiveness and does not signify excess, negligence or abhorrent extremism.173 For this reason, there is concern that the true meaning of Islam has often been ‘hijacked’ and in consequence, has suffered at the hands of extremists to the extent that Islam loses its spiritual value.174 Fatany concurs, arguing that those who adhere to extremist ideologies have ‘disassociated themselves from their societies and have chosen to be in constant confrontation with their fellow Muslims who reject their extremist views and principles’.175 2.3

Personal Faith

Generalizations about Islam (or any other religion) are easy, observes a focus group from Jeddah. However, it is necessary to differentiate between Islam as a religion  –​in particular the Saudi state doctrine  –​ and faith, namely an individual’s personal relationship with Islam.176 This is because Islam signposts a young man’s way in life, by informing

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his mindset, principles and actions; in other words, it is a young man’s ideological path to Allah almighty.177 An individual from Asir states that Islam is the ‘legislator’ of his life, and its guide, by instructing him in prayer obligations and providing direction for daily life and state of mind.178 Significantly, he says that Islam not only lights his way: it also takes him out of the ‘interior darkness’ by protecting him from the evils within himself and guiding him to do his best.179 Another young man from al-​Jouf observes that his life depends on Islam: it determines his actions and decision-​making in all matters.180 Others concur, explaining that their faith covers all aspects of life; for example, it informs them about how they should talk, the way they should eat and drink, the way to deal with other people, and how to confront life’s challenges and problems.181 Islam is an invaluable source of information; it is why a human is created, and what a human wishes to die ‘holding on to’.182 Another young man says Islam constitutes the optimal path to a successful life, because Allah guides him in the Qur’an in all matters.183 Indeed, before he does anything new, he checks whether this is compatible with Islamic teachings, only doing what is halal (permitted) and avoiding what is haram.184 In sum, Islam is about knowing the reasons for existence and what is waiting for humans after death, because Islam represents part of young men’s lives that cannot be diminished.185 One individual says that no words can explain what Islam means to him,186 whilst another declares that his feelings are too powerful to put into words.187 Indeed, without their faith, life would have no meaning at all.188 As another young man stresses, if he lost Islam, he would lose everything, as the survival of his faith is his salvation at doomsday.189 2.4

Sectarian Issues

Saudi Shia, Ismail writes, struggle to ensure that their freedoms and rights are protected under law.190 Residing principally in the oil-​rich Eastern Province, Ibrahim observes, the Shia –​as a distinct sect in terms of ethos, religious outlook and political potentiality –​constitute the greatest dissenting element in Saudi Arabia.191 The Kingdom’s Shia citizens are not confined to the Eastern Province; there is also a community in Madinah and an Ismaili community in Najran. Nonetheless, Shia in the Eastern Province comprises 40 to 60 per cent of the oil industry’s workforce, although the Saudi authorities, for political, security and socio-​economic reasons, regularly underestimate the size of the population.192 Regardless of whether they live in the Eastern Province or elsewhere, Shia citizens face judicial discrimination  –​either collective discrimination by the

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justice system or individual cases of discrimination within that system.193 Sometimes the discrimination is overt, but often it is implicit. Discrimination is worse amongst older generations, contend some young Shia men, as younger Saudis, certainly the better educated, tend to be more open-​minded.194 For example, a British-​educated Shia university graduate experienced a more tolerant atmosphere when he lived with young Saudi Sunnis in the UK: I was at Newcastle University with nine other Saudis and I was the only Shia. At first I was very defensive as I thought it would be the same as at home, but it was fine. Sometimes we even joked about it. They were all fine with me although some reverted to their usual ways when they returned to Saudi Arabia, but others did not. However, I do not think it is so much a problem with individuals, I think it is the system and unfortunately the system is supported by the family, which in turn is supported by the government.195

In fact, another individual blames the government for escalating Sunni–​ Shia divisions when it needs to divert attention away from economic problems.196 Nevertheless, even in areas known for better Sunni–​Shia relations, things are not always as they seem. A Hofuf focus group remarks that everyone ‘always says al-​Ahsa is a mixed Sunni–​Shia society, but in reality it is not’. The group acknowledges that Sunni and Shia constituencies live in the same town, but states that the two communities are not integrated, as residents live in clusters.197 Yet, there are also some positive stories. On Tarout Island in Shia Qatif, a Sunni community of about 1,000–​1,500 people live in an area called Dareen. A young man from Tarout Island says there are ‘absolutely no problems between us. We eat together and play together. My mother even taught Sunni girls in Dareen.’198 Still, according to the Hofuf group, in the past the social interaction between Sunni and Shia in the town was better (when it was a single community)  –​but the group blames the media for changing this.199 In fact, personal opinions concerning sectarian issues are guided by the media, but the problem is that ‘the media is being controlled’. As these young men deem themselves well educated, they consider themselves to be fairly objective, but they say they have friends and colleagues who are overly influenced by the media.200 Many young Shia men interviewed for this book have experienced discrimination in the workplace or have relatives and close friends who have suffered. One individual cites the example of a friend who, whilst being interviewed for a well-​known Saudi oil company in October 2016, was asked at the start of the interview ‘What is your category?’ in order for the young man to affirm that he was Shia and not Sunni.201 This matches Matthiesen’s observation that recruiters often look at first or last

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names, and locations of issuance of national identity cards, to find out if someone is Shia.202 The brother of another young man faced similar discrimination in Riyadh in 2017. His brother wished to continue with his medical studies at KSU after graduating from Imam Abdulrahman Bin Faisal University (formerly Dammam University).203 Although two positions were available, the authorities informed his brother that they were satisfied with filling only one position and rejected him for the other because he was Shia.204 After navigating the interview process and landing a job, many young Shia men soon realize that their promotion prospects are blocked by a glass ceiling205 (although some also stress that this depends on the line of command above the employee). For example, a young man from Awamiya maintains that in the Eastern Province’s oil and petrochemical sector, no matter how diligent and conscientious Shia employees are, companies evaluate them differently to their Sunni counterparts.206 In consequence, some of these young men find that junior Sunni employees get promoted much faster than they do. To make matters worse, Shia never get promoted beyond a certain level even if they are more hard-​ working than an ‘Al Otaibi or Al Qahtani’; one individual declares that these are ‘facts not fables, the glass ceiling exists’.207 However, discrimination is not confined to the workplace. Other young men have encountered similar problems in everyday life, such as this example cited by an individual from al-​Ahsa: After I got a new job in al-​Khobar, I was looking for an apartment and I found a good one in a house in Dhahran. The landlord was a decent man, but when I went to rent the apartment he asked me my family name and where I was born. And then he said he was not comfortable renting me the place. Of course, he was Sunni and I am Shia, but that was never mentioned although I understood what had happened.208

Another young man from Qatif has a cousin who is a dental student in Dammam. This cousin complains that his Sunni peers routinely get higher grades from certain professors. According to this individual, this is an example of injustice being embedded in the system, as he argues, ‘we all know there are quotas used to discriminate against us’.209 For many young Shia men this raises the question of whether to accept the status quo and stay silent or speak out about issues such as the glass ceiling. Whilst he recognizes that the Shia are a minority, another individual from Qatif points out that this presents a dilemma. On the one hand, failure to speak out could affect issues that are going to shape his future and that of his children. On the other hand, speaking out could land him in serious trouble.210 Hence, a great many young men and their

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families prefer to keep a low profile (at least politically), says a Shia man from Tarout Island who works in Riyadh. According to him, many do not want to jeopardize good jobs in the oil and petrochemical industry as well as the respect and social standing associated with working for a company such as Aramco.211 They also do not want to jeopardize or damage the prospects of siblings on full university scholarships either in the Kingdom or overseas on the KASP. This individual also remarks that he drives a good car, owns several smartphones and goes abroad on holiday. Accordingly, he wonders if it is really worth speaking out.212 For many people outside Saudi Arabia, or even the Eastern Province, Qatif is often associated with the unrest in the district of Awamiya.213 A young resident of Awamiya, speaking before the government’s assault on the district in summer 2017,214 says that when looking at life in Awamiya the unrest and protests seem to be simultaneously an exaggeration (particularly in the media) and an understatement, depending on the individual perspective.215 Still, Awamiya district has long been a hotspot of oppositional Shia political movements, notes Matthiesen,216 and became synonymous with the executed Shaikh Nimr Al Nimr.217 It was in Awamiya in 2009 that Al Nimr said that Shia might seek the secession of the oil-​rich Eastern Province from the Saudi state, thereby marking him as a dangerous political enemy to the ruling family.218 However, young men who knew Al Nimr paint a different picture. A young man from Awamiya who knew Al Nimr personally recalls that the cleric taught his elementary-​school teacher and this had an indirect impact on his own education.219 At a later stage the young man met Al Nimr in his middle-​school years, when the cleric became a mentor to him. According to this individual, Al Nimr was welcoming and saw the good in young people because he knew about ‘the importance of building a generation’. Al Nimr was also one of the first shaikhs to welcome women into the mosques, says this young man, who points out that, unlike in the past, many women now attend mosques. Nonetheless, in the young man’s opinion, Nimr had a serious, often overlooked, problem: Because Nimr was an activist, this matched what Awamiya youth felt, but actually this did not match Nimr’s real vision. So these young men would say they were a Nimr Al Nimr group, they would start a website (which is easy) and state that they were affiliated to him even though this was not accurate.You know there are a lot of these groups who used his name (you only have to google his name to find these). So in my opinion, his name is being abused by both sides in order to promote their own interests and agendas.220

In fact, this individual does not believe that Nimr Al Nimr was a political person; rather, Al Nimr was a social activist who understood politics

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and knew that it is a game with unfair rules,221 even though from 2011 onward, he became a figurehead for young protesters.222 If a young man has Awamiya listed as his place of birth on his national identity card, this makes life more difficult for him at police checkpoints. Hence, according to three Awamiya residents, it helps if the individual was born in a Dammam hospital rather than in Awamiya  –​even if he now lives there. Furthermore, when these individuals started college they were told by a senior student not to mention coming from Awamiya, as many of their college peers would automatically think they were Iranian fifth-​columnists. According to them, this notion of hidden Iranian fifth-​ columnists exemplifies the government’s policy of ‘divide and rule’ vis-​à-​ vis Awamiya. Thus, the government highlights ‘terror cells’ in Awamiya in order to frighten people both in the district and in other areas of Qatif. The policy is effective, as some people from other parts of Qatif believe this propaganda and, consequently, do not invite Awamiya residents into their lives. In fact, these young men assert that there are people from Qatif who if they know a young man is from the district will ignore him and not make friends –​‘they do not like us’.223 These individuals believe that within Qatif there is a hierarchy with Awamiya at the bottom, although they concede this is probably more pronounced amongst school children and teenagers than adults. Yet, when asked if they feel that other Qatifis believe local discrimination exists between areas or groups, one of the young men laughs and replies ‘We have an expression in Arabic: stay with this craziness so not to have something crazier’.224 Because the rules of the game are biased against the Shia, a focus group in Qatif says, the nature of the Saudi leadership needs to be considered, in particular as the Saudi government, contends Abdo, does not shy away from exploiting sectarian sentiment as a tool to ensure its stability in the face of external threats such as the Arab Spring.225 In the past, the late King Abdullah was ‘open-​minded’ with the Shia (or the group believes at least that the advisors around him were). The king lessened the marginalization of the Shia by inviting Shia religious leaders such as Shaikh Hassan Al Saffar to the National Dialogue process.226 Furthermore, in 2012, King Abdullah and his immediate circle were said to be alarmed by rising sectarian hatred in Saudi Arabia.227 Yet, regrettably, in 2016, the Asda’a Burson-​Marsteller Youth Survey found that 75 per cent of youth in GCC states agreed that relations between the two sects had worsened.228 In fact, at the time of writing, these young men were unsure about King Salman’s (or Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s) attitude towards them.229 Nonetheless, young Shia men emphasize they are just like other Saudis:  they have common interests, and they

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worry about the same everyday issues as their Sunni peers, such as jobs, housing, healthcare and being able to afford a weekend in Bahrain.230 3

Generational Divides

3.1

Modernity versus Tradition

The central question for many young men is how to define generations. It seems to them that in the past, the generation gap was around 30 years, but nowadays due to technological advances the gap has been reduced to ten to five years.231 Nonetheless, the generational divide has contributed to misunderstanding, leading to a divergence of ideas and beliefs as well as a conflict of interests.232 For example, a young man from Jeddah says that the Arab Spring divided society, with most young people supporting it whereas older people were alarmed by the protests.233 Thus, he contends, this generational divide manifests itself in areas such as attitudes to economic policies, religion, social norms and intellectual beliefs.234 The main difference between the younger and older generations, maintains a young man from Jeddah, is that the former identify with progress and development whilst the latter wish to hold on to familiar norms and traditions.235 This correlates with Yamani’s argument that young Saudis experience problems that arise from the need to negotiate between the ‘traditional’ social basis of their lives and contemporary pressures seen as emanating from outside.236 Indeed, for many young Saudi men there is growing frustration with what they see as the ‘patronizing’ attitude of the older generations who feel that ‘they know best’. Long and Maisel point out that with the lengthening of life expectancy in Saudi Arabia due to better healthcare, the elders are living longer, but are loath to turn over the reins to the next generation.237 The problem is compounded by the availability of technological communication, better education and growing awareness of global trends, which Al Seghayer contends leads ‘inquisitive young Saudis to question decision-​makers’.238 Thus, for many younger individuals the problem occurs when decision-​making is in the hands of one generation that does not consider the aspirations and concerns of another. Until the rise of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and other young princes in their late twenties or thirties to positions of power,239 most influential decision-​makers came from the older generations.240 Certainly, this is a universal issue, but the problem is particularly acute in Saudi Arabia, as young men often feel that their elders are out of touch with the realities of everyday life in the contemporary Kingdom.241 A common refrain is ‘older generations do not understand us’, as they criticize young men for the way they behave, such as if they

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visit relatives wearing jeans and are admonished because this is ‘shameful’.242 Moreover, because older generations ‘think in the past’, this influences the rules they force on their children. One young man believes the older generations should heed the Islamic saying ‘do not force your children to live the way you live’.243 Young Saudis acknowledge that older generations experienced a great deal in their lives, including religious extremism and terrorism, but the older generations ‘thoughts and ideas’ are still limited by their upbringing.244 The problem is further compounded by societal norms, as ‘neither Saudi families nor schools teach young Saudis how to stand up for their own ideas or thoughts’.245 Yet, a group of young men from Najran say that due to technology they are more connected horizontally to Saudis from other societal constituencies. Thus, young people are more accepting of other constituencies and their norms, resulting in younger Saudis better understanding other young Saudis from different constituencies.246 Conversely, older generations are less accepting of other groupings different to their own, because, one focus group maintains, older people believe their traditions are best. However, it should be the responsibility of the older generations to try and bridge the gap by understanding the differences and coping with technological advances.247 Yet, even if older people embrace technology (which many have), one of the most important issues is to have a public discussion about the ramifications of a growing generational divide. It is necessary to search for solutions to this problem, argues one young man, as this is a cornerstone to building a balanced society that bridges the gap between the generations.248 A great many young men recognize that there is a divide between themselves and their grandparents, but less so with their parents.249 According to a young man from Najran, this generational divide is based on three main issues:  social media (which has made younger generations more open-​minded), education, in particular the KASP, and the impact of globalization.250 Indeed, younger generations are more affected by Western cultural influences due to social media, cinema and television programmes (such as the hugely popular Game of Thrones)251 and this is exacerbating the generational divide. Younger generations are more comfortable with Western norms, some of which many young men acknowledge their parents do not accept.252 A young man from Asir acknowledges that as a young man his father was not exposed to Western entertainment in anything like the manner to which he and his peers have been.253 For others, the generational divide varies according to community. For example, some argue that well-​educated urban-​residing Saudis are able to bridge the generational divide more successfully than those from

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rural areas,254 although others disagree. Furthermore, the generational divide is often determined by either the community or specific families. One young man maintains that generational divides are frequently most pronounced between fathers and sons, provoking disagreement in the areas of education, ideology and culture.255 For example, a focus group from al-​Aflaj recalls that some local fathers prevented their sons from going overseas on educational scholarships such as the KASP because they wanted these young men to remain at home and do jobs for the family.256 The fathers were also concerned that their sons might take permanent positions overseas and not return home. Added to these worries, fathers were concerned their sons would start drinking alcohol in the US (although the group laughs that the sons ‘could do that here’).257 Another father–​son issue concerns the raising of camels. In the past, explains one individual from Najd, camel festivals were organized by ‘rich local people’, but nowadays there are official ones such as the King Abdulaziz Camel Festival in Rumah, just outside of Riyadh, or the Crown Prince Camel Festival in Taif.258 In his opinion the government is wrong to encourage people to raise camels, as he believes there are more important things in life. Unfortunately, a lot of fathers are interested in raising camels as they see this as ‘quick money’: I disagree with all these camel festivals such as the King Abdulaziz Festival because some fathers tell their sons to leave high school. They bribe them by saying ‘I will get you a new car’ or ‘Do not worry, I’ll look after you and you look after the camels’. In my opinion, education is the key to the future, not camels.259

Still, two young men from al-​Ahsa stress that in Islam the father is responsible for his family regardless of his children’s age, whereas they believe in the West that when young men reach 18 years of age, ‘they are no longer their parents’ responsibility’.260 Indeed, the family in Saudi Arabia is one complete indivisible unit, in contrast to the West where, according to these young men, ‘families are often separated’ when children leave home at 18 –​a belief that is widespread amongst young Saudi men. These young men believe that ‘Western values’ have affected Saudi society to the extent that some young men disobey their parents, saying they are adults at 18 and therefore no longer their parents’ responsibility. For example, sometimes when the son becomes an adult and gets married he might live apart from his family, whereas in the past married sons usually lived with their parents. In consequence, ‘Western values’ have affected Saudi society because nowadays many families are not as close. Sadly, these two young men say, some parents end up alone when they reach old age.261 Yet, not everyone agrees that the generational divide

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is most pronounced between fathers and sons. A young man from the northern town of al-​Qurayyat notices that some of his peers behave with their fathers ‘as though they are friends’. To him this is extremely strange, but he believes this is a result of some fathers and sons ‘sharing their lives’ on social media applications.262 3.2

Family Matters

Undoubtedly, in some families and communities there is a huge generational gap that can cause inter-​generational problems. For example, a young man in al-​Ahsa remarks that his mother is illiterate whilst he holds a PhD from a Western university, leading to the question of how this ‘intellectual’ gap can be bridged.263 Another individual, from Qassim but living in Riyadh, remembers an incident in his hometown that exemplifies this gap: I drove my grandmother in my car around town and whilst we were driving she thanked King Fahd for bringing electricity to the town –​I mean she thought he actually came to the town and installed the street lights himself! But her generation is more appreciative of things like that because before they had very little, whereas we younger generations are extremely spoiled.264

In fact, many young men comprehend that their generation lives far more comfortably than previous ones. A focus group in Qassim declares their grandparents ‘were like “supermen”, they did everything and had a really tough life’. One young man’s grandfather used to walk regularly from al-​Mithnab to Riyadh looking for work, whilst another walked from Qassim to Kuwait for the same reason.265 Another grandfather went to work in India, which turned out to be a blessing as he learnt English and on returning to Saudi Arabia was accepted for work by Aramco even though he had received no formal schooling.266 Living in contemporary Saudi Arabia, their grandsons cannot imagine this type of life, but they recognize the hardships their grandfathers endured.267 Unfortunately, the simple life lived by their grandfathers has been replaced by a world where appearances, attention-​seeking and selfishness are more important than genuine beliefs.268 Other young men argue that the younger generations have forgotten their history, manners and culture to the extent that some individuals ‘act in a savage and uncivilized way to a degree that no man would want to leave his children in such an environment’.269 Young men’s manners have become skewed towards committing sins even in public, and this type of behaviour has nothing to do with Saudi culture, religious beliefs or the example set by their grandfathers’ morality.270

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Many young men point to another generational divide, namely one between themselves and their younger siblings. They highlight this difference because they lived normal childhoods that were not dominated by technology.271 Indeed, an individual from Qassim notes that he and his friends played outside in the street, but in contrast, their younger brothers are always glued to some sort of screen.272 Another member of this focus group considers that his younger brother’s childhood has been unhappy because all he does is ‘play with his iPad, eat and get fat’.273 This problem is also highlighted by members of a Riyadh focus group who observe that on SaudiTube274 many of the ‘trending’ videos appeal to a very young audience –​one that is on its electronic devices 24/​7. For example, a video with over a million views is often watched by teenagers or younger because they all own iPads.275 Nonetheless, the group worries that this behaviour produces children with shorter attention spans, even if they are more exposed to the outside world. The solution as implemented by some ‘good parents’ is to limit the amount of screen-​time allowed to children to a couple of hours a day, or to use this time as an incentive for good behaviour. As a result, children regard it as a special treat.276 In fact, of great concern is that this exposure to online videos at such a young age will alter Saudi identity.277 Some young men might disagree that the generational divide is greatest between themselves and their younger siblings,278 but they also recognize that many older people are not aware of the extent to which very young Saudis are able to access any type of content on the Internet.279 For example, grandparents will buy their grandchildren mobile phones without realizing that the grandchildren use these to look at inappropriate material such as violence, sex and ‘drifting’ (tafhit, or joyriding) videos.280 These issues are critical, as they affect the way Saudis raise the next generation, and failure to ensure healthy and productive childhoods could lead to serious societal damage.281 3.3

The Worship of Money

At the individual level in Saudi Arabia, becoming modern is assumed to be related to the acquisition and consumption of certain status goods and a preference for the Western lifestyle, observes Assad. Expenditures on expensive consumer goods such as computers, mobile phones and other important markers of social status are regarded as indispensable. However, Assad also points out that the downside is emulation of either Western or celebrity lifestyles by many in Saudi society, especially younger generations, which takes the form of increasingly wasteful

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expenditures:  luxury homes with swimming pools, increased expenditures on leisure, taking vacations abroad and purchasing jewellery.282 A young Toyota salesman in Onaizah agrees, saying that in the past Saudis did not have a great deal of money and, therefore, there was no over-​consumption of fashion items, cars and fancy foreign holidays. He points out that just because a man owns a Bentley, that does not mean he can actually afford it, or even afford to run it: it is simply a case of showing off –​especially if he is paying in instalments rather than cash.283 The main problem, according to this young man, is that many Saudis want to flaunt their purchases to other people.284 A Riyadh focus group concurs, arguing that there is little concept of money amongst some Saudis.285 For example, one young man from the group recalls how a classmate was going to Dubai to study, but because his father is addicted to buying and selling cars (a Lexus is as low as he gets) his friend was denied the opportunity to study in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), because his father spent the money on a luxury vehicle.286 This focus group laments that everyone wants to own a Mercedes or an expensive house, but they are not prepared to earn the money to buy them. Another young man says that he sees a lot of people ‘depending on God’ rather than actually working for something; for example, he maintains that his father would rather pray for a Lamborghini than actually go to work and save money.287 Yet, there is also recognition amongst some young men that Saudis need to change their consumption habits and behaviour. Fortunately, this has already started to happen (with fuel, for example, after the 2017 price hike) because ordinary people are not spending as much on expensive, unnecessary items.288 Certainly, public-​ sector cuts acted as a wake-​up call to those who were guilty of over-​ consumption, although some argue that this type of fiscal policy should have been implemented a long time ago, particularly as a lot of families are reliant on more than one breadwinner nowadays.289 Another young car salesman in Onaizah highlights a related problem. He observes that in the past the government was concerned about remittances generated by the huge number of migrant workers in the Kingdom.290 However, nowadays, the government is concerned about money sent out of the Kingdom by citizens, as well as all the money that is spent outside the Kingdom by Saudis on holiday. The salesman maintains that ‘Saudis have become even worse than expats at sending money out of the country or spending all their money overseas’.291 It is a case of ordinary Saudis taking out loans for travel and spending money in Dubai or Bahrain.292 The other members of this group agree, and note that migrant workers might send 1,000 Saudi Arabian riyals (SAR) to their families every month, but Saudis routinely spend SAR 50,000 in Dubai –​which in their opinion is

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an economic disaster.293 Moreover, in the past when access to money was ‘limited’, the government had a better idea of how much money was leaving the Kingdom, but nowadays the government does not know the exact figure due to the huge increase in easy bank loans.294 Regarding contemporary attitudes to money, although some individuals claim that Saudis’ understanding of the value of money is changing,295 not everyone is in agreement.296 One individual dismisses being careful with his money as ‘unimportant’, claiming that today’s ‘twenty-​ something’ generation can be dependent on their families as most families have sufficient wealth to support their children. Hence, this young man says, ‘there is little worry about losing anything since there is always someone who can take care of me’. The problem is exacerbated for children from very wealthy backgrounds who end up so spoilt that they cannot find employment because they do not know how to work:297 I know a young man who is the son of a minister and he had a Cadillac, but he said ‘I am going to change it for a Porsche’ for no real reason other than he could. But when I asked him what he was going to do with his life he just said he would get some money from his father and start a business. But he has no idea about business or the value of money; he is just following a trend.298

Others point out that young Saudi men from not-​so-​wealthy backgrounds continue to spend too much money on smartphones and cars, usually by borrowing money from a bank and thereby increasing their personal debt. Another young man notes that observing the ‘social niceties’ also places young men, and young married couples, under unnecessary financial strain: I think it is foolish that we spend so much money because of generosity (on guests). I know we are expected to do this, but many younger people think it is stupid and a waste of money. People today should have a better understanding of money and realise that you can be generous without being ridiculous and throwing away a fortune on food and drink.299

The problem is exacerbated by Saudi banks giving loans without ‘asking too many questions’, so that young men are even taking out loans to pay off other loans. (One individual jokes that a man can have so many loans that this will bring on a heart attack, but then he has the problem of taking out another loan to pay for a decent hospital.)300 Many young men also take out loans to pay accumulated traffic fines (I have heard amounts of around SAR 30,000), but the fear is that if an individual continues to borrow money he will eventually ‘lose his freedom’, by storing up huge problems for the future.301 To make matters worse, young men are also beginning to understand that they are in danger of becoming over-​indebted. As a result they will have to reduce personal

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and household consumption, which in turn puts additional strain on the existing social contract. Notes 1 Karolak, M., ‘Identity and Culture in the 21st Century Gulf: Overview’, Gulf Affairs, ‘Identity & Culture in the 21st Century Gulf’, Autumn 2016, p. vi. 2 Yamani, Changed Identities, pp. 29–​31. 3 Kattan, F., ‘A Review and Critique of the Saudisation Metanarrative: Bringing “the Citizen” into Focus’, in Thompson, M.C. and Quilliam, N. (eds) Policy Making in the GCC: State, Citizens and Institutions, I.B. Tauris, London, p. 219. 4 Al Rasheed, M., A History of Saudi Arabia, 2nd Edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010, p. 11. 5 Karolak, ‘Identity and Culture in the 21st Century Gulf: Overview’, p. vi. 6 Interview with Saudi political scientist, Riyadh, July 2016. 7 Menoret, P., The Saudi Enigma: A History, Zed Books, London, 2005, p. 32. 8 Qatif focus group, November 2016. They also argue that ‘most ideas about the Kingdom came from the past, either from Islam or the Arab people. In fact, the purest Arabic accent is from Makkah. This is important because Saudi Arabia is the centre of Islam.’ 9 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 10 Qatif focus group, December 2016. 11 Smith Diwan, K. with Alfoory, S. (eds), Gulf Societies in Transition: National Identity and National Projects in the Arab Gulf States:  Workshop Report, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, Washington, DC, 10 June 2016, available at:  www.agsiw.org/​wp-​content/​uploads/​2016/​06/​National-​Identity_​ Web-​1.pdf, p. 8. 12 Yamani, Changed Identities, p. 26. 13 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. In fact, one young man noted that the question intrigued him, as it was an issue he had not considered before. 14 Qatif focus group, October 2016. 15 Qassim focus group, Onaizah, March 2017. However, some individuals blame a failure in the educational system for societal divisions and a lack of coherent national identity. 16 Kattan, ‘A Review and Critique of the Saudisation Metanarrative’, p. 219. The textbook, written by Turki Al Harthi, Mushabeb Al Asmary, Mohamed Al Ghamdi, Fateeha Al Qarshi and Haifa Kobrah, was first published in 2011 by Dār Ḥāfiẓ. 17 Ibid, p. 220, quoting Al Harty et al. 18 See, for example:  Hassan, R., ‘25 Tourism Festivals Lined Up for School Break’, Arab News, 13 March 2016, available at: www.arabnews.com/​saudi-​ arabia/​news/​894341. 19 See, for example: Black, I., ‘Janadriyah Heritage Festival Celebrates Symbols of Saudi Identity’, The Guardian, 4 April 2013, available at: www.theguardian .com/​world/​blog/​2013/​apr/​04/​janadriyah-​heritage-​festival-​saudi-​identity. 20 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017.

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21 Murphy, C., ‘Saudi’s Cultural Colossus Attracts 600,000 to Former Camel Race’, The National, 26 March 2010, available at:  www.thenational.ae/​ world/​mena/​saudi-​s-​cultural-​colossus-​attracts-​600-​000-​to-​former-​camel-​ race-​1.497494. 22 Moaddel, M. and De Jong, J., ‘Trends in Values among Saudi Youth: Findings from Survey Values’, in Journal of the History of Childhood and Youth, Vol. 6, Issue 1, 2013, pp. 160–​1. 23 Ibid. ‘Comprehensive values surveys of nationally representative samples of 1,526 and 2,003 Saudis (age fifteen and over) living in urban areas, which constitutes 85 per cent of the Saudi population, were carried out in 2003 and 2011 by a research firm in Saudi Arabia. Both samples contained roughly equal numbers of male and female respondents. The 2003 sample included 1,026 Saudi citizens and 500 foreign residents. We have excluded non-​Saudi respondents from these analyses for comparability reasons. In terms of age, 30 per cent were ages 15–​24, 29 per cent were 25–​34, 26 per cent were 35–​ 44, 11 per cent were 45–​54 and 4 per cent were 55 or older. The majority of the respondents identified themselves as members of either the upper middle class (49 per cent) or the lower middle class (34 per cent); the rest identified themselves as upper class (10 per cent) or working or lower class (8 per cent). In terms of education, 80 per cent had less than a university education whereas 20 per cent had a university education. The 2011 sample included only Saudi citizens but drew an oversample of residents from the primarily Shi’a city of Hofuf. We have calculated a population-​based weight based on Saudi census data to account for the excess Hofuf sample’; pp. 154–​5. 24 Ibid. 25 Hofuf focus group, December 2016; Qatif focus group, Awamiya, April 2017; Abha focus group, November 2016; Najran focus group, October 2016. 26 Smith Diwan with Alfoory, Gulf Societies in Transition, p. 8. 27 Partrick, N., ‘Nationhood and Citizenship –​in General, in the UAE, in the Gulf and Wider Middle East’, 1 October 2017, p.  11, available at:  www .neilpartrick.com/​publications. 28 Qatif focus group, October 2016. 29 Qatif focus group, Awamiya, April 2017. 30 Ibid. 31 Dhahran focus group, November 2016. In addition, ‘Saudis feel very closely related to their Gulf brothers because as brothers they share norms in a way that they do not with other Arabs such as Egyptians for example’. 32 Views expressed primarily by multiple non-​Najdi focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 33 Qatif focus group, October 2016. 34 Smith Diwan with Alfoory, Gulf Societies in Transition, p. 8. 35 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 36 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. 37 Ibid. 38 Dhahran focus group, November 2016. 39 Ibid: although they concede that there are important individuals ‘who do the Kingdom proud’.

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40 Keane, J., Global Civil Society? Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 12. 41 Anonymous respondent to author’s online survey. 42 Ibid. 43 Umm Al Qura University focus group, Makkah, February 2017. 44 Ibid. 45 Hofuf focus group, December 2016. 46 Dhahran focus group, November 2016. 47 M. Yamani, Cradle of Islam: The Hijaz and the Quest for an Arabian Identity, I.B. Tauris, London, 2004, p. 17. 48 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. 49 Hofuf focus group, December 2016. 50 Ibid. ‘They thought about addressing this two years ago in the majlis al-​shura, when they discussed issues related to identity and discrimination.’ 51 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 52 Najran focus group, October 2016. At the time of writing, due to the conflict in Yemen, it was not possible –​or advisable –​for a Westerner to visit Najran province. However, considerable numbers of Najranis moved to other areas of the Kingdom due to the war. 53 The King Abdullah Scholarship Programme (KASP) is now officially the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques’ Overseas Scholarship Program, although it is usually referred to by its former name. 54 Dhahran focus group, November 2016. 55 Ibid. 56 Qatif focus group, October 2016. 57 Al Kuwari, M., ‘Tribal Revival in the Gulf:  A Trojan Horse or a Threat to National Identities?’ The London School of Economics and Political Science, Middle East Centre Blog, 31 August 2018, available at:  http://​ blogs.lse.ac.uk/​mec/​2018/​08/​31/​tribal-​revival-​in-the-gulf-​a-trojan-horseor-​a-​threat-​to-​national-​identities. 58 Yamani M., Changed Identities, p. 26. 59 Cooke, M., Tribal Modern: Branding New Nations in the Arab Gulf, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 2014, p. 52. 60 Al Qassemi, S., ‘Tribalism in the Arabian Peninsula: It Is a Family Affair’, Jadaliyya, 1 February 2012, available at: www.jadaliyya.com/​Details/​25199/​ Tribalism-​in-​the-​Arabian-​Peninsula-​It-​Is-​a-​Family-​Affair. 61 Layla, al-​Aflaj focus group, April 2017. 62 Ibid. ‘I want to marry a girl from Najran because the Al Yami is a good tribe and they are very nice people.’ This issue is discussed in greater depth in Chapter 5. 63 Samin, N., Of Sand and Soil: Genealogy and Tribal Belonging in Saudi Arabia, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2015, p. 6. 64 Yizraeli, S., ‘Al Saud:  An Ambivalent Approach to Tribalism’, in Rabi, U. (ed.) Tribes and States in a Changing Middle East, C. Hurst & Co., London, 2016, p.  107. Examples of tribal blogs:  http://​alshuweir.com; http://​johina .net; www.alharbitop.com/​vb; www.gazzaz.net/​index.php. 65 Maisel, S., ‘The Resurgent Tribal Agenda in Saudi Arabia’, Issue Paper No. 5, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, Washington, DC, 2015,

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available at: www.agsiw.org/​wp-​content/​uploads/​2015/​07/​Maisel_​Resurgent-​ Tribal-​Agenda.pdf, p. 5. 66 Ibid. 67 Samin, Of Sand and Soil, p. 165. 68 Dhahran focus group, November 2016. 69 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 70 Hertog, S., ‘The Political Decline and Rise of Tribal Identity in the GCC’, The London School of Economics and Political Science, Middle East Centre Blog, 25 July 2018, available at: http://​blogs.lse.ac.uk/​mec/​2018/​07/​25/​ the-​political-​decline-​and-​social-​rise-​of-​tribal-​identity-​in-​the-​gcc. 71 Maisel, ‘The Resurgent Tribal Agenda in Saudi Arabia’, p. 5. 72 Interview with Bader, Riyadh, April 2017. 73 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. 74 Ibid. This is especially true of young people, but is happening amongst older generations too  –​although a young man in Riyadh says this tends to be ‘silent’. 75 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. 76 Qassim focus group, Onaizah, March 2017. This is the Saudi version of ‘black and white’. 77 Qatif focus group, December 2016. ‘In fact, many of our family names refer to professions similar to Britain, for example, Al Khabbaz means baker.’ 78 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. 79 Abha focus group, November 2016. 80 Qatif focus group, December 2016. 81 Riyadh focus group, March 2017. 82 Hofuf focus group, December 2016. 83 Qassim focus group, Onaizah, March 2017. However, this differentiating between individuals based on tribal background does not just occur based on the tribe’s regional background; it is also based on its socio-​economic background. 84 Yizraeli, ‘Al Saud: An Ambivalent Approach to Tribalism’, p. 110. 85 Hertog, ‘The Political Decline and Rise of Tribal Identity in the GCC’. 86 Maisel, ‘The Resurgent Tribal Agenda in Saudi Arabia’, p. 7. 87 Ibid. However, Maisel says that because of the small number of elections it is difficult to identify a persistent pattern of tribal voting behaviour. 88 Interview with Bader, Riyadh, April 2017. 89 See, for example:  Wright, R., ‘How 5 Countries Could Become 14’, New York Times, 28 September 2013, available at:  https://​archive.nytimes .com/ ​ w ww.nytimes.com/ ​ i nteractive/ ​ 2 013/ ​ 0 9/ ​ 2 9/ ​ s unday- ​ r eview/ ​ h ow- ​ 5 countries-​could-​become-​14.html. 90 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017. 91 Interview with Abdulrahman, Khamis Mushait, October 2017. 92 Ibid. 93 Menoret, The Saudi Enigma, p.  33. Even though the population of different towns in Qassim is hadhar, there are variations in accents and norms. Interview with Abdullah, Onaizah, January 2017. 94 Interview with Abdullah, Onaizah, January 2017.

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95 Qassim focus group, Onaizah, March 2017. 96 Ibid. 97 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017. 98 Qassim focus group, Onaizah, March 2017. 99 Ibid. 100 See, for example: AFP, ‘Detained Saudi Writer Turki Al Hamad Freed’, Gulf News, 5 June 2013, available at: http://​gulfnews.com/​news/​gulf/​saudi-​arabia/​ detained-​saudi-​writer-​turki-​al-​hamad-​freed-​1.1193165. 101 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017. 102 Qassim focus group, Onaizah, March 2017. 103 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017. 104 Qassim focus group, Onaizah, March 2017. 105 Ibid. Another group member believes that ‘this guy is angry with society and with everyone and has probably never been out of Qassim. He is also divorced.’ 106 Ibid. 107 Ibid. 108 Najran focus group, October 2016. 109 Hoogvelt, A., Globalization and the Postcolonial World, 2nd Edition, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2001, pp. 64–​5. 110 Dhahran focus group, November 2016. 111 Menoret, Joyriding in Riyadh, p. 26. 112 Interview with Abdulkareem, Riyadh, March 2017. 113 Long and Maisel, The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, p. 69. 114 Qassim focus group, Onaizah, March 2017. 115 Jeddah focus group, December 2016. 116 Abha focus group, November 2016. 117 Layla, al-​Aflaj focus group, April 2017. 118 Ibid. 119 Interview with Ahmad, Wadi Aldawasir, April 2017. 120 Layla, al-​Aflaj focus group, April 2017. 121 Qatif focus group, Awamiya, April 2017. 122 Ibid. One of the group members contends that it is the same across the Arab world –​people have to go to the main cities for work. 123 Qassim focus group, Onaizah, March 2017. 124 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017. 125 Ibid. 126 Ibid. 127 Commins, Islam in Saudi Arabia, p. 2. 128 Davis, R., Western Imaginings: The Intellectual Contest to Define Wahhabism, American University of Cairo Press, Cairo, 2018, pp. 8–​11. 129 Commins, D., ‘From Wahhabi to Salafi ’, in Haykal, B., Hegghammer, T. and Lacroix S. (eds) Saudi Arabia in Transition: Insights on Political, Economic and Religious Change, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015, p. 151. 130 Menoret, The Saudi Enigma, p. 57. 131 Alshamsi, M.J., Islam and Political Reform in Saudi Arabia:  The Quest for Political Change and Reform, Routledge, Abingdon, 2011, pp. 22–​3.

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132 Commins, ‘From Wahhabi to Salafi ’, p. 151. 133 Farquhar, M., Circuits of Faith:  Migration, Education, and the Wahhabi Mission, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 2017, p. 6. 134 Commins, Islam in Saudi Arabia, p. 71. 135 al-​Ahsa focus group, June 2017. 136 Al Rasheed, M., Contesting the Saudi State:  Islamic Voices from a New Generation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, p. 35. 137 Najran focus group, February 2017. 138 Amalgamated anonymous responses to author’s online survey. 139 Najran focus group, February 2017  –​although for two members of the group this is seen as something of a mixed blessing. 140 al-​Ahsa focus group, June 2017. 141 Ibid. 142 Al Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State, p. 27. 143 Ibid. 144 al-​Ahsa focus group, June 2017. 145 Hammond, A., The Islamic Utopia:  The Illusion of Reform in Saudi Arabia, Pluto Press, London, 2012, p. 16. 146 See, for example: Anon, ‘A Year after Curbing Its Power, the Saudi Religious Police Is Deemed Redundant by Many’, Arab News, 30 March 2017, available at: www.arabnews.com/​node/​1076321/​saudi-​arabia. 147 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. This focus group maintains that individuals who follow Islam are more devout than those who follow any other religion –​apart from ‘some Christians in the USA’. 148 Interview with Majed, Riyadh, December 2017. 149 Ibid. 150 Hildebrandt, J., El Abbouri, M.  and Alibraheem, M., ‘What Matters Most to Saudi Arabia’s Youth? Helping Policy Makers Address the National Challenges’, The Boston Consulting Group, June 2014, available at:  www.bcglondon.com/​expertise_​impact/​Industries/​Public_​Sector/​ PublicationDetails.aspx?id=tcm:86-​163411&mid=tcm:86-​163410, p. 5. 151 Yamani, H.A., To Be a Saudi, Janus Publishing Company, London, 1997, pp. 4–​5. 152 Anonymous response to author’s online survey. 153 Yamani, To Be a Saudi, pp. 4–​5. 154 Amalgamated anonymous responses to author’s online survey. 155 Ibid. 156 Long and Maisel, The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, p. 53. 157 Riyadh focus group, May 2017. 158 Anonymous response to author’s online survey. 159 Umm Al Qura University focus group, Makkah, February 2017. 160 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 161 Ibid. 162 Anonymous response to author’s online survey. 163 Umm Al Qura University focus group, Makkah, February 2017. 164 Yamani, To Be a Saudi, p. 86. 165 Layla, al-​Aflaj focus group, April 2017. 166 Anonymous response to author’s online survey.

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167 Ibid. 168 Riyadh focus group, May 2017. 169 Anonymous response to author’s online survey. 170 Amalgamated anonymous responses to author’s online survey. 171 Ibid. 172 Abha focus group, November 2016. 173 Ibid. 174 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 175 Fatany, S., Modernizing Saudi Arabia, Amazon, Bedford, UK, 2013, p. 10. 176 Jeddah focus group, December 2016. 177 Ibid. 178 Abha focus group, November 2016. 179 Ibid. 180 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 181 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 182 Qassim focus group, Onaizah, March 2017. 183 Umm Al Qura University focus group, Makkah, February 2017. 184 Ibid. 185 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 186 Dhahran focus group, November 2016. 187 Anonymous response to author’s online survey. 188 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 189 Dammam focus group, November 2016. 190 Ismail, R., Saudi Clerics and Shia Islam, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016, pp. 105. I have a large proportion of Shia students from either Qatif or al-​Ahsa in my political science classes. 191 Ibrahim, F., The Shi’is of Saudi Arabia, Saqi Book, London, 2006, p. 17. 192 Ibid. 193 Ismail., Saudi Clerics and Shia Islam, pp. 101. 194 Safwa focus group, January 2017. 195 Qatif focus group, November 2016. 196 Qatif focus group, October 2017. In his opinion, external issues such as the 2017 Qatar crisis are simply smokescreens used to obscure economic woes. 197 Hofuf focus group, December 2016. 198 Qatif focus group, Tarout Island, November 2016. 199 Hofuf focus group, December 2016. 200 Ibid. 201 Qatif focus group, November 2016. 202 Matthiesen, T., The Other Saudis:  Shiism, Dissent and Sectarianism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015, p. 113. 203 Safwa focus group, January 2017. Qatif does not have its own college or university, but actually, in the opinion of this group, that would be a bad idea because if there was a college or university they would face increased discrimination. 204 Ibid. 205 See, for example: Matthiesen, T., Sectarian Gulf: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the Arab Spring That Wasn’t, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 2013, p. 23.

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206 Qatif focus group, Awamiya, April 2017. 207 Ibid. 208 Hofuf focus group, December 2016. 209 Qatif focus group, November 2016. ‘When we say we are targeted as Qatifis, it is actually true to say that the actual borders of Qatif are shrinking –​it’s a government policy.’ 210 Qatif focus group, Awamiya, April 2017. 211 Ibrahim, The Shi’is of Saudi Arabia, p. 115. 212 Interview with Ali, Riyadh, November 2017. 213 According to some young men from Awamiya, the district is not so different from other parts of Qatif. Qatif focus group, Awamiya, April 2017. 214 Ibid. Until the summer 2017 crackdown on ‘rebels’, these individuals heard a great deal more of the disturbances than they actually saw. See, for example:  Nabil, S., ‘Awamiya:  Inside Saudi Shia Town Devastated by Demolitions and Fighting’, BBC News, 16 August 2017, available at: www.bbc.com/​news/​world-​middle-​east-​40937581. 215 Ibid. 216 Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf, p. 78. 217 See, for example:  Nasseri, L., ‘Who Was the Cleric Saudis Executed and Why His Death Matters’, Bloomberg, 3 January 2016, available at:  www .bloomberg.com/​news/​articles/​2016-​01-​03/​who-​was-​the-​cleric-​saudisexecuted-and-​why-​his-​death-​matters. 218 Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf, p. 78. 219 Qatif focus group, Awamiya, May 2017. 220 Ibid. 221 Ibid. 222 Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf, p. 78. 223 Qatif focus group, Awamiya, May 2017. ‘We are talking about people we know, people we meet there.’ 224 Ibid. 225 Abdo, G., The New Sectarianism: The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shia-​Sunni Divide, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017, p. 145. 226 See, for example: Thompson, Saudi Arabia and the Path to Political Change, p. 157. 227 Ibid., p. 214. 228 ASDA’A Burson-​Marsteller, 8th Annual ASDA’A Burson-​Marsteller Arab Youth Survey: Inside the Hearts and Minds of Arab Youth, ASDA’A Burson-​ Marsteller Dubai, p.17, available at: http://​arabyouthsurvey.com. 229 Qatif focus group, Awamiya, April 2017. 230 Views expressed by multiple focus groups in Eastern Province, 2016–​18. 231 Qassim focus group, al-​ Mithnab, January 2017; Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 232 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 233 Jeddah focus group, December 2016. 234 Amalgamated anonymous responses to author’s online survey. 235 Ibid. 236 Yamani M., Changed Identities, p. 2. 237 Long and Maisel, The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, p. 67.

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238 Al Seghayer, K., Real Face of Saudi Arabia:  Critical Insider Perspectives on Educational, Lifestyle, and Social Issues in the Kingdom, Hala Print Co., Riyadh, 2015, p. 73. 239 See, for example:  Henderson, S., ‘Meet the Next Generation of Saudi Rulers’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 10 November 2017, available at:  www.washingtoninstitute.org/​policy-​analysis/​view/​ meet-​the-​next-​generation-​of-​saudi-​rulers. 240 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 241 Ibid. I  received a KFUPM student project on ‘Generational Conflict in Saudi Arabia’. 242 Najran focus group, November 2016. 243 Riyadh focus group, May 2017. 244 Anonymous respondent to author’s online survey:  ‘That is why I  cannot find a photograph of my father or mother when they were young or their wedding.’ 245 Al Seghayer, Real Face of Saudi Arabia, p. 16 246 Najran focus group, October 2016. 247 Safwa focus group, January 2017. 248 Hofuf focus group, December 2016. 249 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 250 Najran focus group, October 2016. 251 Game of Thrones is popular because many of its dynastic themes resonate with young Saudi men; not for nothing have political developments in the Kingdom been describes as ‘Game of Thobes’. 252 Dhahran focus group, November 2016. This group also says that Western fast food has been adopted as a norm because it is easy and convenient whereas cooking kapsa takes a long time. 253 Jeddah focus group, December 2016. 254 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 255 Interview with Hamad, Layla, al-​Aflaj, April 2017. 256 Layla, al-​Aflaj focus group, April 2017. 257 Ibid. 258 See, for example:  Khan, G., ‘World’s Biggest Camel Fest Kicks Off in Rumah’ Arab News, 20 March 2017, available at:  www.arabnews.com/​ node/​1071076/​saudi-​arabia; Al Sulami, M., ‘The Saudi Crown Prince Camel Festival Celebrates the Region’s Most Popular Export’, Arab News, 1 September 2018, available at: www.arabnews.com/​node/​1364946/​ saudi-​arabia. 259 Interview with Hamad, Layla, al-​Aflaj, April 2017. 260 Interview with Abdulrahman and Amr, al-​Ahsa, May 2017. 261 Ibid. 262 Dhahran focus group, November 2016. 263 Interview with Abdullah, al-​Khobar, November 2016. 264 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 265 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017. 266 Ibid. 267 Ibid. 268 Riyadh focus group, April 2017.

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269 Anonymous response to author’s online survey. 270 Umm Al Qura University focus group, Makkah, February 2017. 271 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 272 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017. 273 Ibid. 274 Saudi YouTube. 275 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 276 Ibid. 277 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 278 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017. 279 Jeddah focus group, December 2016. 280 Najran focus group, November 2016. 281 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 282 Assad, S.W., ‘The Rise of Consumerism in Saudi Arabian Society’, International Journal of Commerce and Management, Vol. 17, Issue 1/​2, 2008, p. 76. 283 Qassim focus group, Onaizah, March 2017. 284 Ibid. 285 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. 286 Ibid. 287 Ibid. 288 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 289 Riyadh focus group, October 2016. 290 Remittances in Saudi Arabia decreased to SAR 30,707 million in the second quarter of 2017 from SAR 32,036  million in the first quarter of 2017. Remittances in Saudi Arabia averaged SAR 27,269.80 million from 2006 until 2017, reaching an all-​time high of SAR 38,101 million in the second quarter of 2016 and a record low of SAR 12,479 million in the first quarter of 2007. See: https://​tradingeconomics.com/​saudi-​arabia/​remittances. 291 Qassim focus group, Onaizah, March 2017. 292 Ibid. 293 Ibid. 294 Ibid. 295 Dhahran focus group, November 2016. 296 Ibid. 297 Ibid. 298 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. 299 Interview with Abdullah, Riyadh, March 2017. 300 al-​Khobar focus group, February 2017. 301 Ibid. ‘Al Inma Bank actually calls all graduating senior KFUPM students offering them loans (but at 10 per cent interest).’

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The Saudi ‘Social Contract’ Under Strain: Employment, Housing and Healthcare

1

The Saudi ‘Social Contract’

1.1

Delineating the Saudi Social Contract

Since April 2016 a new generation of Saudi leaders led by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has transformed the traditional state–​society relationship, specifically with the launch of the National Transformation Program (NTP) 2020 and Saudi Vision 2030.1 In turn, this has resulted in the Kingdom’s predominantly youthful, and often well-​ educated, population re-​examining the existing social contract at a time of significant socio-​economic change. This is because the economics of the social contract have come under increasing strain as a result of oil price fluctuations impacting on Saudi Arabia’s economy, in particular on the related issues of employment, housing and healthcare. With many young male Saudis struggling to enter the domestic labour market and get on the property ladder, it is imperative to examine societal attitudes towards the changing role of economic structures and policies in shaping citizen–​state relations –​that is, to evaluate the ways in which the existing Saudi ‘social contract’ is evolving in light of recent economic realities. Moreover, following the 2014 drop in oil price, the Saudi government started to impose fiscal restraint, presenting a significant challenge since its citizens are accustomed to government largesse.2 Following the 1970s oil boom, the Saudi state was able to gather income from oil production and distribute it throughout the economy and society. As Champion argues, this was compatible with traditional Arabian values and allowed the ruling family to enhance its: unique blend of religious and political ruling legitimacy with a comprehensive system of largesse known as the ‘Saudi social contract’. This ‘unwritten’ contract committed the state to taking charge of the welfare of its population in return for acceptance of the established political order.3

The rulers would distribute significant portions of the oil income to secure a high living standard for nationals, note Selvik and Utvik, whilst 57

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the latter would accept being denied access to political decision-​making.4 Nonetheless, the participants at a 2016 Chatham House workshop on ‘The Social Contract in the Gulf Cooperation Council’ agreed that as GCC governments respond to the challenges of fluctuating revenues and the need to diversify their economies away from hydrocarbons, the impact of contemporary socio-​economic realities on the existing social contract will require ‘new strategies of consulting and communicating with the various domestic stakeholders and managing public expectation’.5 Indeed, as Hertog notes, each economic crisis in Saudi Arabia creates pressure for ‘radical’ reform and/​or a redefinition of the Saudi ‘distributional’ system or ‘social contract’.6 However, the usage of the term ‘social contract’ is often criticized as being Euro-​centric –​as well as not being understood in the same way when translated to Arabic –​and thus, not explaining adequately the relationship between the governing and the governed in the Kingdom.7 In the Saudi context, as Ayubi argues, a concept such as the social contract (presumed by many to be behind the formation of modern European states) is difficult to pin down.8 Furthermore, when used to refer to Saudi Arabia, the English-​language usage often has negative connotations, as it suggests ‘cooptation’ of diverse societal constituencies by the Saudi government. Hence, according to a Saudi academic, in the domestic context the idea of a social contract is best understood as ‘mutual benefits’ between authorities and citizens. That is, the government benefits from this contract as the citizen pledges loyalty to the political system, and in return the government provides welfare and, for example, a job for life.9 Thus, as Belbagi argues, the force holding the social contract together is ‘the good citizen’, whereby citizens perform their civic duties and in consequence, difficulties in governing cease.10 Yet, how do young Saudi men interpret this ‘mutual bond’ between the government and citizens? Does their interpretation of these mutual benefits match that of the authorities? If a mismatch exists then this requires a revision of the role of the state in the economy or a transformation in the government’s economic relationship with society. Quite clearly, distributive politics and the social contract entail not simply socio-​economic factors, but also, as Okruhlik points out, non-​ economic elements such as citizenship. Although from the perspective of the state, ‘granting or revoking citizenship is about national security, from the perspective of a new citizen it is about access to the welfare state and all that entails’.11 Other non-​economic elements can include values, justice, socio-​ political participation and inclusion in decision-​ making processes. Hence, to what extent do these young Saudi men consider these non-​economic elements to be an integral part of a social contract?

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How are they linked to an individual’s perception of his role in society, his place in the labour market, and his willingness and desire to contribute to national development? Accordingly, a comprehension of how young male Saudis perceive the changing nature of the social contract is applicable not only in the overall Saudi national context, but also in multiple Saudi domestic contexts. This is particularly pertinent in light of oil-​market fluctuations, economic policy and diversification plans such as the NTP 2020 and Saudi Vision 2030, as well as their impact on politico-​economic and socio-​cultural change. For this reason, it is crucial that we understand the aspirations and concerns of young Saudi men with regard to new socio-​economic realities and how these affect the crucial areas of employment, housing and healthcare. 1.2

Awareness of a Social Contract

A social contract, according to many young men, comprises a collection of rules and regulations between the government and the people that help citizens organize their daily lives because without such a contract, fitna would dominate.12 Indeed, a social contract is essential, as it assists both the government and society to organize daily life.13 Young men who understand or have an awareness of a social contract say it describes a mutual relationship between the citizens and the government14  –​ that is, ‘symbiotic interests’ in order to maintain Saudi Arabia’s security and stability with both sides profiting from the contract.15 Furthermore, an effective social contract increases productivity and contributes to national development16 because an effective and viable social contract enhances societal development by increasing knowledge levels, cultural awareness and economic growth.17 For those individuals who see the social contract in a positive light, it is also about the individual fulfilling his civic duties to the government and vice versa: I am very aware of the Saudi social contract and I think it is about obeying the king, maintaining social unity and the individual’s contribution in developing the Kingdom through knowledge, economy, security and religion. In turn, I benefit from government services and land resources. I think that this social contract is very important because it explains the relationships and corresponding responsibilities between all Saudis.18

In fact, for many individuals the social contract incorporates necessary ‘life services’ provided by the government, such as education, jobs, housing and healthcare. They argue strongly that any social contract can

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only be effective if the government is able to provide these essential life services,19 but that an ‘effective social contract should not humiliate the citizen in return for security and benefits’.20 Some young men say the idea of a social contract is vague to them and are unsure about whether a social contract exists in Saudi Arabia or not.21 Others are also unclear about what a social contract entails, saying for example that it is probably important, but its exact details remain imprecise.22 Yet others are unaware of a social contract, but say that if ‘it means providing living necessities such as water and electricity for extra payment’ then this becomes ‘problematic’, as it alters the ‘understood’ balance between state and society.23 According to another individual, the most important element of the Saudi social contract is that it ‘protects the citizen and his freedoms’ through legal and just government rules  –​but only as long as the citizen adheres to these rules. This is because the Saudi social contract is understood to represent the ‘foundation of citizenship’  –​that is, the citizen has both rights and duties.24 Indeed, citizenship, as Kattan argues, ‘is a major institutional contrivance that regulates the distribution of rights and values in society’, as well as acting as an analytical framework for state–​society relations including societal integration, participation and economic justice.25 Thus, whilst a social contract is seen as important, what is more significant is for the citizen to understand their contractual obligations in terms of ‘the rights and responsibilities of both sides’. For example, if the government is seen to be doing its best to provide jobs, houses, healthcare and security then the average Saudi citizen will contribute to the contract by utilizing their knowledge and respecting their duties.26 Nevertheless, even if the government provides services for society, there is sometimes confusion regarding an individual’s corresponding civil duties. Niblock points out that (until the economic downturn) Saudis could benefit from ‘governmental munificence, but they could not play any part in how communities ordered themselves’.27 Consequently, some young men are confused because they would like to participate in decision-​making processes, but do not know whether this is acceptable to the government or not.28 After the government introduced austerity following the 2014 decrease in oil prices, Hertog documents how there were fairly open expressions of discontent on Saudi social media and even in some local newspapers. Nonetheless, ‘to the surprise of many observers the scaling-​down of decades-​old distributional commitments did not give rise to any open unrest or oppositional mobilization’.29 Yet, in the opinion of some, as the impact of oil price fluctuations impacts government expenditure, a major headache for the authorities is that society is reluctant to accept

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changes to, for example, power and water subsidies. In truth, as Niblock and Malik note, the Saudi government often has difficultly imposing its economic agendas on society.30 Thus, in order for the government to initiate socio-​economic reform effectively, society needs to be educated to accept these changes.31 For this reason, astute individuals argue that it is necessary to start establishing a post-​oil mentality in Saudi society.32 1.3

Different Social Contracts?

Society in Saudi Arabia is not homogeneous.33 In fact, even within a seeming single geographic area such as the metropolitan conurbation of Dammam-​Khobar-​Dhahran34 there are multiple societal constituencies, both Saudi and expatriate. Therefore, do these young Saudi men think that there are different contracts for diverse Saudi constituencies? Given the straitened socio-​economic climate in 2016–​19, if young men believe that different social contracts exist, who benefits and who loses? Different contracts are visible between diverse societal groups, according to one individual; for example, the social contract between the government and business has economic dimensions and that between the government and a religious establishment has religious dimensions.35 Nonetheless, other individuals stress that amongst these diverse constituencies there are those with power that impose their influence inside the government, thereby weakening and marginalizing other societal groupings.36 Some young men identify this constituency as the ‘Salafists’ or Saudi religious establishment, an opaque body that Mouline notes is characterized by some scholars and observers as existing only to satisfy the desires of the ruling Al Saud family.37 According to Yamani, ‘most Saudi youth, whether liberal, conservative or radical’ believe that the religious establishment must be reformed.38 Certainly, the religious establishment maintains a strong influence over political decisions and, as Al Atawneh contends, more than in any other Middle Eastern state, plays a vital role in the state judicial system.39 Still, in the eyes of some young men, ‘the winner will always be the government and those close to it’40(but, ultimately, both the state and society could suffer if the former ‘fails to occupy the same space as the people’41). Nonetheless, even though the government is the sole winner, other individuals argue that the services it provides are not proportionate to its income (at least in comparison with neighbouring Gulf States) so citizens can only ‘win’ when the cost of living is acceptable, the price of goods low and there are no taxes.42 Indeed, the idea of paying taxes ‘frightens everyone’. This in turn affects the economy, says a focus group in Qassim, although in the long term things will stay much the same,

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as what is taken from the individual will be given back via the Citizen Account Program.43 The national Citizen Account Program was created to protect Saudi households from expected direct and indirect impacts of various economic reforms, and is used to distribute allowances to low-​and middle-​ income families.44 The support is offered through direct cash transfers to beneficiaries, which are reviewed every three months to ensure that the amount of the benefit meets the requirements of the households according to the changes.45 The programme is mandated year by year, and additional stipends to adjust for cost-​of-​living increases of about SAR 975 per month were granted by King Salman in January for all public-​sector employees for 2018.46 Yet, a young entrepreneur in Riyadh claims that some Saudis are critical about this civil support because it could create gaps in the middle class by making the poor poorer and the rich richer –​although he also believes the Citizen Account could constitute a ‘quick win’ for the government.47 Nonetheless, there is a degree of cynicism regarding income inequality, as the government ‘represents a bank and Saudis the borrowers’ –​the government/​ruling family is the winner, with only small benefits for Saudi society.48 After all, it is always the powerful and wealthy that benefit most.49 In fact, Okruhlik agrees with these young men, pointing out the ‘playing field is not level in Saudi Arabia; the ruling family structures it to their advantage’.50 Regardless of whether the government or citizens ‘win’, in an era of fluctuating oil prices it is difficult for many to ascertain winners and losers, particularly as the Saudi government attempts to overhaul economic policy. Nonetheless, others take a longer view, believing that ultimately, the loser will probably be the government because inequality will undermine the emergence of nascent Saudi nationalism.51 In reality, major inequalities already exist between constituencies, in particular, as Menoret observes, between Najd and other provinces and between urban and rural populations.52 Yamani states that within the established political hierarchy: The Najdis, who are native to the Al Saud’s base in the central region of the Kingdom, maintain privileged status, while the Hijazis of Mecca and Medina are partly included, and the Shia in the Eastern Province and southern tribes of Asir –​especially the Ismailis –​are practically shunned.53

Yet, there is widespread consensus that regardless of the existence of disparities between different consistencies, the main issue is that all the Saudi citizens should benefit from a fair social contract.54 Unfortunately, there is a danger that certain societal constituencies, including tribal, urbanized/​modernized ones, or those with religious and/​or philosophical ideologies, would seize the opportunity to promote and/​or strengthen

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Employment

63

their own interests and ideologies within a fragmented weak government. If this should transpire, then regrettably, the losers in the absence of a fair and equitable social contract would be ordinary citizens, who would be forced to support one of these powerful constituencies so as to maintain their benefits as part of a reconfigured social contract.55 2 Employment 2.1

Unemployment and Jobs for Life

Tackling unemployment amongst young Saudis will be one of the toughest challenges faced by the Saudi government, according to Timothy Callen, the assistant director for the Middle East and Central Asia department at the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In early 2017 he pointed out that for Saudi nationals, unemployment was already high at around 12 per cent, with the young population still growing.56 Unfortunately for the government in 2018, the unemployment rate amongst Saudi nationals rose to a record 12.9 per cent in the first quarter of 2018, from 12.8 per cent in the previous quarter.57 It remained the same in the second quarter,58 but fell to 12.7 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2018, according to official data published by the General Authority for Statistics (GaStat).59 At the time of writing, this did not bode well for the government’s goal of lowering the unemployment rate to 7 per cent, as stated in the Saudi Vision 2030 document.60 In response to the 2018 statistics the government quietly re-calibrated its goal of reducing unemployment to 9 per cent by 2020 to 10.5 per cent by 2022.61 A 2018 report produced by Strategic Gears (an all-​Saudi Riyadh-​ based consultancy) summarized the most important changes in the labour market statistics released by GaStat62 for the first quarter of 2018 (January–​March). The report notes that to achieve the goal of reducing the unemployment rate to around 10 per cent, a goal of the NTP 2020, employment of nationals needs to increase by 170,000 annually till 2020. The report also provides a number of interesting and important statistics: • Whereas the number of Saudis joining the workforce increased by around 12,000, the number of employed Saudis decreased by more than 13,000; • In the public sector, the total number of workers decreased by more than 3,000; • In the private sector, the total number of Saudi employees decreased by more than 10,000, and the number of foreign workers decreased by around 220,000, 57 per cent in the construction sector; • 60 per cent of unemployed Saudi males hold a high-​school degree or lower;

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• 70 per cent of unemployed Saudis are less than 30 years old; • 91 per cent of unemployed Saudis have no previous work experience; • Al-​Jouf and the Northern Borders province of Saudi Arabia have the highest unemployment rate, with an average of almost 25 per cent.63 These very rates of unemployment prompt young men to question how this is possible in a wealthy country such as theirs.64 This is underscored by Saudi social commentators who warn that the high rate of unemployment amongst the youth constitutes a pressing matter for young Saudi men.65 In fact, in April 2018, Ahmed Kattan, Deputy Minister for Labour, sounded the alarm over rising unemployment, and other Saudi officials worry that if they do not tackle youth unemployment it could fuel other social problems.66 Undoubtedly, unemployment is having a detrimental effect on the twenty-​something generation including graduates from tertiary education who are attempting to enter the labour market. For example, until summer 2014, it was a given for KFUPM graduates to receive four to five good job offers either in the public sector, or from companies such as Saudi Aramco, Haliburton and Schlumberger. As Saudi Arabia’s ‘best and brightest’ in the fields of petrochemicals, engineering and commerce, these young men are selected and educated to take their place as leaders within their respective fields, and by extension contribute to the creation of a twenty-​first-​century knowledge-​based Saudi economy and society. Niblock and Malik contend that KFUPM engineering graduates are considered to be as good as those of anywhere in the world and that the university is ‘consistently complimented’.67 However, following the drop in the oil price, significant economic transformations have impacted dramatically on the Saudi labour market. For example, in summer 2015, KFUPM graduates received at best two to three job offers and by January 2016 graduates were lucky to receive one. In 2017, one astute student pointed out that if KFUPM was affected, then the employment prospects for other young Saudi male graduates further down the academic scale were likely to be much worse. For instance, in February 2016, young Saudi job-​seekers were furious after a video was posted on YouTube taken at the Career Fair at KSU in Riyadh. In the video a cleaner explains how he found all the job applicants’ CVs in the garbage bins: these are shown in the video. As one young Saudi says, ‘the companies could not even be bothered to take the CVs with them, they just threw them all away at the fair. Is that what they think of us?’68 That said, in 2018, employment prospects for KFUPM graduates improved  –​although not to pre-​ 2014 standards. Certainly, KFUPM

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students maintain that it is easier for them to find employment than for their peers from other Saudi universities, but many individuals are under no illusions that the ‘dream job’ may not materialize –​particularly given the economic climate –​and in consequence, there has been a growing realization that they might have to compromise. In fact, as a result of the contracting Saudi labour market, young male students across the Kingdom comprehend that after graduating a first position might not be a perfect fit and the threat of unemployment may force some of them to accept positions they do not really want. Hence, it is probably not surprising that many young men feel varying degrees of anxiety about entering the workplace.69 Still, employment is a key issue because it is how many individuals judge the government, particularly those who believe that it is the government’s duty to provide everyone with a job.70 Accordingly, for these young men employment prospects are one of the ‘hottest topics’ of discussion in their social circles because they concern everyone, in particular as the labour market is being flooded, with the large number of colleges and universities turning out students, not to mention those returning to Saudi Arabia from the KASP.71 The problem of finding all these graduates jobs has been highlighted by Hertog, who observes that the expansion of higher education ‘has allowed the temporary parking’ of young people, many of whom would otherwise be unemployed. Hertog argues that by ‘kicking the employment problem down the road’ through the over-​expansion of tertiary education, the government has exacerbated it.72 Significantly, the majority of young Saudi men I talk to worry about employment because their futures and making a good marriage depend on finding a reasonably well-​paid job. Indeed, for some, a career is not the main goal; rather, what they seek is family security. This link between unemployment, family security and marriage has been highlighted by Singerman. She points out that in Arab society, adulthood equals being married; unemployment makes it difficult for many young men to get married, which in turn leads to social exclusion and a state of limbo called ‘waithood’.73 A related problem, according to multiple focus groups, is that ‘most young men and in particular graduates’ are looking for a job for life: a position in the public sector (or with a major corporation or state-owned enterprise) whereby the individual is guaranteed a life-​long salary plus accompanying benefits such as healthcare for both himself and for his family.74 Hertog gives emphasis to this critical problem: The GCC public sector is notoriously overstaffed and is dominated by nationals enjoying high wages, short working hours, and generous fringe benefits. The

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wage gap between the public and private sectors, which is predominantly staffed by expatriates, is enormous. The average salary of Saudi civil servants is SAR 9,000 per month, whilst the average wage for Saudis in the private-​sector has been fluctuating around SAR 3,000.75

An Eastern Province focus group also maintains that many young Saudis want public-​ sector jobs or a position with a state-owned enterprise (SOE) such as Saudi Aramco, as everyone knows that ‘Saudis are never fired from the public sector. Foreign companies fire Saudis, but Saudi companies do not.’76 The downside to this, in the opinion of one young man, is that a lot of people do not bother to work hard simply because they have a job for life. Nonetheless, his focus group recognizes that the impact of the low oil price has reduced these job-​for-​life opportunities.77 Therefore, in order to change this attitude and wean young Saudis away from desiring a job for life, there must be increased investment in education that highlights a wider range of job opportunities, in particular in the private sector. Indeed, the ‘usual mentality amongst most young men’ is to get a job, buy a car and find a house, and then the man is ‘free to do whatever he wants’.78 The main problem is changing the ‘mentality’, because for some young men their first priority is income level rather than work motivation or career aspirations.79 The old mentality has to be ‘rethought’, as it is a case of young Saudis being protected for too long,80 and without viable educational reform the current socio-​cultural mentality will remain the same.81 Nevertheless, despite the fact that, as Seghayer points out, ‘there are job opportunities out there for young Saudis’, employers in the private sector frequently offer unattractive salaries and long working hours;82 one individual argues that young Saudis are willing to work hard, but not for a low salary.83 Still, there appears to be a wide consensus amongst young men that in Saudi Arabia a job for life is important for a young man’s marriage prospects, as it provides a stable future. Even issues related to work motivation are often dependent on marital status.84 For example, an individual might get a first job in the private sector or with a start-​ up, but he will then try to move into the public sector or to a company such as Aramco as this will increase his chances of a good marriage.85 I know many young men who have followed this path. Indeed, the significance of being able to make a good marriage cannot be underestimated, highlighting as it does the importance of understanding the Saudi socio-​ cultural context.86 Yet, one individual believes that finding a job for life is a personal choice and, in fact, more ambitious young men who are actively seeking a challenge will change jobs in order to gain valuable experience.87

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For instance, graduates have benefitted from the expansion of the consultancy sector in Saudi Arabia and work for companies such as McKinsey (and Saudi subsidiary Elixir), Boston Consultancy Group and Strategic Gears. According to one young consultant, even though he works extremely long hours, his current position will ‘kick-​start’ his career and might facilitate entry into government service at a deputy ministerial level.88 Other young men understand that in the current economic climate they might have to change jobs in order to advance their careers.89 Hence, some expect to hold different positions because they are actively seeking different experiences, as well as the opportunity to work with a variety of people –​although these young men recognize that many of their peers would still prefer a job for life.90 2.2

Economic Problems and Finding a Job

The 2014 economic downturn meant that finding a job became difficult. In 2016–​17 it frequently took six months to a year to find a suitable position, if the young man was lucky, although for students with low grade point averages (GPA) the process could take much longer.91 For example, a civil engineering graduate says that in his field many civil engineers and architects could not find jobs, in particular as construction was downsized by 30 per cent in 2016.92 A finance graduate from KSU says that jobs were available, but competition for positions increased ‘in a negative way’.93 A young university lecturer in al-​Ahsa stresses this is one of the key issues facing young Saudis because until recently there was little competition. In his opinion, the main problem is that young Saudis have not been educated to accept new socio-​ economic realities.94 This mindset and lack of urgency amongst those without jobs is highlighted by Jones, Punshi and Gupta, who point out that many young men are prepared to wait for several years for the ‘ideal job’, and remain stuck at home, rather than accept an entry-​level position.95 As Ramady notes, for social reasons many young Saudis do not consider themselves unemployed, as they are engaged in looking for work whilst remaining dependent on their families.96 A Najran focus group agrees, noting that some young men refuse to take an entry-​level position even though the economic downturn has impacted on people’s incomes, some of which have already been reduced by 30 per cent.97 On top of these difficulties, the highly contentious Article 77 of the Saudi Labour Law allows companies to fire people (even Saudis) either without any or with only short notice.98 Aldosari notes that a 2017 revision

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of Article 77 granted employers the right to terminate workers’ contracts for modest compensation, which caused a reversal of Saudization, with the proportion of Saudis in the workforce dropping by 38 per cent:99 In the last nine months alone, 50,000 Saudis’ contracts were terminated and 170,000 new foreigners were hired. It is therefore unlikely that the projected 450,000 jobs for Saudis will be created in the private sector by 2020. Small measures were planned to absorb the public fury, such as the Shura Council meeting with unemployed Saudis, after receiving thousands of petitions, and a decision to suspend companies accused of blanket layoffs. However, businesses continue to terminate employment contracts to manage the rising cost of operations.

For example, after the oil price drop, within the oil and petrochemical industries young Saudi employees were ‘let go’ simply because it was a case of ‘last in, first out’.100 In consequence, at that time college and university graduates ruefully noted that if they had graduated a few years earlier they would have been luckier due to the greater number of opportunities and greater job security.101 Recent college/​university graduates understand that they are in a much better position than most, and point out that as doctors or engineers they can earn decent incomes –​unlike soldiers, for example. Moreover, a significant part of an ordinary soldier’s salary consists of allowances because he earns a low basic salary of around SAR 4,000. Thus, when a man leaves the military  –​even if he is still relatively young  –​ he will lose all his allowances, making his financial situation extremely difficult.102 Significantly, if an individual loses his job, he also loses benefits and allowances related to his family. In fact, this potential loss of benefits and allowances results in many Saudis becoming more concerned about their secondary incomes than about their primary ones (secondary incomes are frequently small individual and/​or family businesses such as running a mobile phone shop). Some young men point out that in the public sector in particular there are ‘lots of lazy people who take it easy in their primary job as they are concentrating on making money in their second job’.103 For instance, an engineer in Jubail says that he sees people come into work at his plant, sign in and then proceed straight to their own businesses.104 This is coupled with what Hertog terms the ‘phantom employment’105 of Saudis who receive a salary from the company, but are told to stay home.106 Still, it is not only the difficulty of unemployment that affects young Saudi men. There are also the often demoralizing problems of underemployment or deadening routine with little opportunity for professional development. One individual complains that he has worked for a major oil company in the Eastern Province for seven years and ‘the routine is

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killing me’.107 Another example, a technician working in an oil and petrochemical plant in Jubail, says: In November 2016, at my place of work, 70 per cent of the workforce was laid off and most of them were Saudis. The plant has been put in mothballs so all we do is check everything is OK first thing in the morning. But that only takes five minutes and after that there is nothing to do. We just sit around playing cards or checking our social media messages –​it is really boring.108

In addition, there are regional issues that exacerbate the problems of unemployment and underemployment. Many who live in locations such as Asir, al-Jouf, Qassim and Najran province complain that young men need a lot of things that are unavailable in their hometowns because there are ‘no factories, no companies, and very few job creation schemes away from the main urban centres’.109 For instance, amongst the five members of a focus group in the small town of Layla, al-​Aflaj (south of Riyadh), one is an Arabic primary-​ school teacher in Najran;110 another is deputy head of a private elementary school in Narjis, Riyadh; and one unemployed young man attended Prince Sattam University in al-​Aflaj, then worked for a bank in Riyadh for a year and a half, and at the time of writing was applying for a position with Jawazat in the capital.111 The final two remain out of work because they do not want to leave their hometown, even though they have very little chance of finding a job there. In fact, for some young men moving away from their hometowns and families is never an option. As Bosbait and Wilson observe, ‘there is a marked preference for Saudis to work close to home’,112 and it is unthinkable for some young men to move away from their extended families. As an example, an individual who registered for Aramco’s College Preparatory Program (CPP)113 says that one of the programme’s conditions is that the applicant must work for two years in a place chosen by the company:  ‘They wanted me to work in Jubail, but I refused because I do not want to leave my family in Riyadh.’114 Another young man from the capital faced a similar issue: he wanted to work away from his family in Jubail, which he knew would further his career, but he faced family pressure to find another job in the capital so he could stay at home with them.115 The situation is similar in small towns in Qassim province, namely, many young men are obliged to leave Qassim to find work in Riyadh. As one group in al-​Mithnab complains, ‘the government needs to create more employment opportunities in this region, but good jobs because at the moment we do not want to work here because of the low salaries’.116 The group says that after graduating from college or university it is possible to work in al-​Mithnab for the Saudi Electricity Company (SEC) or

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for the municipality, but the salaries are a lot less than those of public-​ sector jobs in the capital or large companies such as Saudi Arabian Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC)117 or Aramco.118 A  focus group in al-​ Majmaah agrees, saying that ‘some young Saudis work eight hours a day, six days a week, for around SAR 5000 a month or less’ in their hometown.119 One option for a medical student at Qassim University (QU) is to open his own clinic as a general practitioner in his hometown of al-​Mithnab.120 In fact, the group says that if reasonably well-​paid work was available in al-​Mithnab they would stay, particularly as cities such as Riyadh and Jeddah are becoming increasingly expensive and crowded.121 Yet, even applying for a position in one of the main cities can be problematic. A young man from Abha in Asir claims that job applicants from his hometown are called by the human resources (HR) manager of a company late afternoon and informed that an interview is scheduled for 9am the next day in Riyadh. Naturally, it is extremely difficult to get to the capital at such short notice to be in time for the interview, but this young man maintains that ‘This happens all the time and is a way of “blocking” people they do not want from the provinces’.122 Furthermore, when some young men apply for positions in other regions of the Kingdom they face another problem. One individual recalls visiting a company in Riyadh and giving the manager his CV; the manager remonstrated with him, saying: ‘You are from the Eastern Province so why are you applying for jobs in Riyadh and not locally?’123 In 2011 the Ministry of Labor (MoL) launched the Nitaqat (‘Ranges’) initiative to replace the existing Saudization programme.124 The then Labour Minister (and former Minister of Economy and Planning) Adel Fakeih claimed the new system was more dynamic than its predecessor because it derives its nationalization quotas from actual business performance. Fakeih also acknowledged that the size of the Kingdom’s youthful population was exerting pressure on the labour market due to the increased numbers of young Saudis trying to enter it.125 The goal of Nitaqat is to boost the nationalization of private-​sectors jobs by providing Saudi nationals more rapidly with a better standing in the labour market. Whereas the former Saudization programme required all employment sectors to enforce a blanket quota of 30 per cent nationals, Nitaqat has more flexible rules that are dependent on the size of the company. As Cowen points out, whilst there are sanctions for companies in non-​ compliance, there are also incentives for those in compliance with the advancement of the Saudization agenda.126 Still, many young men do not consider that Saudization/​ Nitaqat has been implemented ‘in the correct way’.127 If the programme had been implemented properly then unemployment might have been

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brought under control. One individual says that the main problem with Saudization is a lack of willingness on the part of employers to train Saudis; rather, Saudi companies only hire to meet percentages.128 For example, a 2016 engineering graduate with a high GPA recounts how he was offered a job with a drilling company, but that actually he could have earned a better salary working as a supermarket cashier. According to him, the only reason the drilling company wanted to hire him was to have a Saudi on their books  –​in other words, complying with Saudization. He says: ‘Of course, I am not taking this job as I might as well work as a supermarket cashier and make more money.’129 Another problem, contends Cowen, is that the Nitaqat scheme can put unnecessary burdens on the private sector because of additional costs for companies, particularly small and medium-​sized enterprises (SMEs).130 For instance, a young man who owns a family restaurant in al-​Ahsa maintains that small businesses suffer because of Saudization: If you open a small business in a village you still have to be part of the national scheme and I do not understand that. We have a restaurant and I employ four Saudis and 21 expats so our business is in the Nitaqat green category. But I end up losing money because of Saudization because I have to compensate for the extra money I have to pay due to the Nitaqat scheme. Or I pass the costs on to the customer so he loses out. In the end, all the money goes to cover a government law that is not applicable in this case.131

Hence, this individual argues that Nitaqat needs to be reorganized because it is not suitable for SMEs, and at times the law actually discourages people from starting a business.132 He complains that it is the ‘same old story:  you cannot treat Saudi Arabia as one large homogeneous unit’.133 In addition to this issue, an Eastern Province focus group claims that young men are also at a disadvantage under the scheme, as the MoL encourages companies to hire more women because ‘a Saudi woman counts for two Saudi men in Saudization terms’.134 2.3

Socio-​Cultural Issues

In 2016, a KFUPM student told me that ‘Saudis will not do certain jobs’ such as construction work because many young Saudi men want ‘luxury positions’ and some professions, such as being a barber, are not considered to be ‘manly’.135 Attitudes to the former could change in the future, says one focus group  –​for example, tiling and interior design work  –​but the latter is still unacceptable given Saudi notions of masculinity.136 However, Ramady observes that ‘due to social values, many young Saudis do not want, although some unemployed Saudis are beginning to accept, seemingly social “demeaning” jobs’ such as supermarket

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cashiers and gym receptionists.137 In fact, the sudden oil price decrease acted as a ‘shock to the system’ and began to change the mentality of young Saudis to employment, broadening the boundaries of acceptable employment. Accordingly, from around 2016 it became more commonplace to see young Saudi men doing jobs that were previously considered socially unacceptable, such as working (full-​time and part-​time) as sales assistants in retail outlets such as Jarir Bookstore138 and waiters in coffee shops. According to a Dhahran focus group, other acceptable sectors of employment include retail, hospitality, restaurants, transport (e.g. Careem driver), tourism, sport (e.g. gyms), medicine (e.g. doctors and nurses), maintenance or mechanics (e.g. mobile phones and cars), and rescue services (cars).139 In fact, many young Saudis have lowered their expectations of high salaries and automatic public-​sector jobs, writes Ramady, thereby acknowledging that the low oil price transformed their socio-​economic environment.140 Certainly, socio-​cultural norms regarding certain types of jobs that were once considered beneath Saudis are changing. A  focus group in al-​Mithnab says that young Saudi men ‘are fighting for jobs in fast food restaurants here  –​especially if the salary is good’.141 Moreover, focus group members in Onaizah commented that in early 2017 when a large dust storm blew over Qassim province, a lot of young local men offered to clean people’s houses for fairly modest sums of money.142 Another group points out that in Qatif, specifically in Awamiya district, there are small construction companies employing locals, demonstrating that Shia people are willing to work with their hands in workshops as mechanics or do manual labour –​because of high unemployment in poorer areas such as Awamiya, young men will work anywhere.143 Another diligent young Saudi, Abdulaziz Alshuaibi, has taken it upon himself to develop his talents in building construction and to encourage other Saudis to join in nationalizing this sector after his knack for renovating his own home inspired him to make a living in the field. Abdulaziz shares his knowledge on social media, and has launched a campaign to encourage youths to work hard and improve the Kingdom: The previous generations believed any work was important and that there is no shame in any field. Our country was built by our grandparents and earlier generations. Today, there are lots of graduates with engineering diplomas, but none of them are willing to start from the bottom.144

Another young man maintains that the prospect of unemployment means that in general young men are taking work more seriously.145 Hence, some individuals have jobs that were previously considered ‘unacceptable’ socially, because they realize that it is better to earn a salary, even

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if it is low, than take money from their families.146 Nonetheless, old attitudes prevail. For instance, a young man remarks that ‘a friend told me that in Jizan, companies are begging young Saudi men to start doing manual work, but they refuse because it is culturally not acceptable’.147 Reflecting on this reluctance to do manual work, another individual points out that: A lot of young Saudis do not understand that they can make money from manual work. I recently paid someone to tile the floor of my house. It cost SAR 14,000 in total, SAR 25 per square metre, and that was the work only. I suddenly realised that if the tiler only completes two houses a month he would earn more than me, and I am an engineer!148

Unfortunately, according to an Eastern Province focus group, oil-​ dependency has led young men away from jobs such as plumbing or construction, with the result that Saudi Arabia cannot be categorized as a ‘real working society’.149 In consequence, there should be concrete government policies to encourage young men to accept lower-​paid blue-​ collar jobs, because, as one individual maintains, for the time being, low-​ paid manual work is still considered to be a ‘humiliation and rather than doing this type of work it leads to some people becoming engaged in illegal activities’.150 If the government wants to motivate young Saudis to engage in different types of manual work, it needs to make life easier for them by providing benefits and better working conditions.151 Certainly, some college and university graduates are taking blue-​collar jobs, but only because they are forced to because of economic circumstances.152 However, one focus group maintains that many young Saudis are uneducated about the realities of work (even if they have certificates). These Saudis sometimes create problems for employers because they refuse to do ‘dirty work’.153 For instance, a young man in the Eastern Province who works on a test and inspection project for a major corporation in Ras Tanura says that the company needs workers to clean and restore the machines. However, ‘it is very hard and dirty. It is also dangerous at times, but I have never seen a Saudi do this type of work.’154 Another individual from the same focus group does not entirely agree. He says that young Saudis working in the oil and petrochemical sectors are frequently categorized as being lazy and inefficient. However, when visiting the oil-​fields or rigs in the Eastern Province, ‘you can see that 80–​90 per cent of the workers are Saudis  –​and the work can be very dangerous’, although the vast majority of these Saudi workers come from al-​Ahsa and Qatif.155 Still, it is not simply that the job-​seekers perceive some occupations as beneath them; as Al Anazi observes, this is also frequently the attitude of

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their parents.156 However, when I ask young men about the types of jobs their grandparents were willing to do, they always reply that their grandparents ‘did everything’.157 Other young men agree, saying that the root of the problem is historic. A group in al-​Ahsa points out that 50 years ago, local people were involved in agriculture, farming and handicrafts. However, following the oil boom, Aramco recruiters came to the local schools and offered the young men jobs with free housing and other benefits. This resulted in a whole constituency abandoning agriculture, farming and handicrafts to go to work for the company. Subsequently, the same men hired expatriates from the Indian sub-​continent to do their old jobs, and according to this focus group this ‘sudden industrial jump created the current mentality and new material expectations’.158 These collective answers demonstrate that the ‘some jobs are beneath us’ mentality is a relatively new phenomenon –​one that education and necessity must change if Saudi Arabia is to wean itself off its dependency on migrant workers. Another problem identified by certain focus groups is the sub-​ contracting of work, particularly by large companies in the oil and petrochemical sectors. According to one group, these companies prefer to sub-​contract because they want to avoid responsibility for workers’ health and safety.159 For example, when a large contractor wins a billion riyal project, the company does not do the work, but instead finds a smaller contractor and gives it SAR 900,000 –​and this procedure repeats itself as the work gets sub-​contracted multiple times.160 Hence, many employees seemingly working for a major multinational are in reality working for a sub-​contractor.161 This troubles some young men working in these sectors. Recalling an incident at an Eastern Province petrochemical plant, an engineer says that the company initiated a project to replace the ceiling, but one of the workers was killed when he fell from the scaffolding. He believes a great many company errors led to this unnecessary death, but no one was punished. This was because the dead man worked for a contractor, and this resulted in the contracting company being banned from operating at that plant for a few years. In the meantime, the work contract was re-​sub-​contracted because ‘that is how the system works’.162 Recognizing this as a serious problem with potentially long-​term ramifications, another engineer argues that if a foreign company inspects the safety records of a domestic company that is interested in nuclear energy, the foreign company might confront the domestic company’s management by asking how it can be trusted with nuclear power when it cannot protect its workers in a petrochemical plant.163 A final contentious issue concerns competition for jobs with women, especially as greater numbers of Saudi women enter the workforce.

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Not surprisingly, this has come as something of a shock to many young men:  one individual jokingly refers to it as ‘womanization’.164 For instance, members of a Riyadh focus group believe that women are ‘definitely’ taking some jobs from men because ‘increasing numbers of employers prefer women to men’. A  group member claims that in the Saudi marketing sector, although it is still relatively easy to get a job if an applicant speaks good English, around 60 to 70 per cent of positions being offered are to women, but he complains that the companies do not explain this policy to young male applicants.165 Another group member attributes a preference for female job applicants to women having higher GPAs because, unlike young men, ‘female students study all the time’. However, he acknowledges that women must work much harder to succeed and also concedes that young men still have more job options.166 That said, many young men comprehend that it is necessary for Saudi women to work, and agree with Al Rasheed’s contention that increasingly Saudi women are seen as crucial for future economic prosperity.167 Some also point out that there are Saudi families without sons and therefore, if the female family members do not work, who will provide for the family, in particular aged parents or grandparents?168 Yet, others have a different perspective. Although they have no issue with Saudi women working, they believe that ‘womanization’ is just ‘to prove to the West that Saudi women have rights –​it is a political decision’.169 This explains women being appointed to top jobs at Saudi Arabia’s stock exchange and one of its large national banks, a Riyadh focus group argues.170 In fact, some young men are convinced that the 2017 appointments were simply ‘a government initiative in order to show the world that Saudi women are not discriminated against in the workplace’.171 Finally, as more women enter the labour market, some young men have been surprised, and disconcerted, by what has happened to them at job interviews. One KFUPM graduate from Riyadh discusses his experience, and what is interesting here is not so much his reaction, as the fact that he was able to articulate how he felt: I went for an interview with Zain Telecommunications Company in Riyadh. I was sitting and waiting for the interview to start when the interviewer came out of the room and called my name. I was extremely shocked because the interviewer was a Saudi woman with her face uncovered and to make matters worse for me she was a beautiful woman. I followed her into the room and then things got even worse. There was a man taking notes, but the second interviewer was also a Saudi woman –​and she was also beautiful. So my face was bright red throughout the interview and it was awful even though I got the job. Now, I am from Najd and I am only used to talking to my female relatives. So this situation was completely new for me and although my head told me it was OK, but heart and background made me feel very embarrassed.172

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2.4

The Perennial Problem of Wasta

The vast majority of young Saudi men I  spoke to assert that the biggest problem they face is finding suitable employment, but that the difficulty of finding a decent job is exacerbated by a nepotistic hierarchy, i.e. wasta.173 According to Ramady, wasta is used to find jobs or obtain government services ‘that would otherwise be out of reach or would take a long time or effort to obtain’. Ramady also notes that although wasta is not identical to corruption, ‘a Western perspective would clearly regard it as an abuse of power to meet private ends’, as it causes inequality and inefficiency.174 The practice of wasta, in particular gaining economic benefits through family connections, Yamani notes, is widely criticized by young Saudis.175 They complain vociferously that people who do not deserve good jobs get these positions anyway because of wasta.176 Young men who do not enter tertiary education point out that if they want to join the military or police they still need wasta.177 Indeed, a constant refrain from young men across the Kingdom is that they find it difficult to get a good job because of wasta and its ‘sister’, corruption.178 Indeed, so many employment issues across Saudi Arabia boil down to the perennial problem of wasta because everything is tainted with it.179 As one individual elucidates: Unfortunately, people get jobs in companies using wasta because they heard that ‘Miteb’ [a relative] got a job there. It is the same when you go to the hospital all the staff members are cousins  –​all from the same family even though the building is empty because they are all busy with their own businesses! There is an advanced petrochemical plant in Jubail that has been taken over by the Al Ghamdi tribe. You get four management levels all from the same family. But the problem is that when you have this situation they start fighting with each other because some are from the southern branch of the tribe and some from the northern branch –​so they start to compete with each other internally. And wasta is to blame for all these problems.180

Another example: a young man from the south says he was applying for a position at Jawazat in Riyadh where there was a very long queue of applicants waiting to see an official. As he was waiting in line, an officer came out from the interview room and took another young man from the back of the line into his office for an ‘interview’. This, according to the young man from the south, constituted a clear example of wasta in practice.181 Others complain that members of the ‘elites’ from ‘certain big families’ will send their sons to prestigious universities and then on to major Saudi companies where ‘everyone will take care of them and after a decade these sons will hold very senior positions’. They also note that those with

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wasta will be sent on special courses, trips abroad and similar, but doubt very much that this would happen to those with insufficient wasta. There is widespread consensus that the low oil price and subsequent economic downturn has aggravated wasta in all regions of Saudi Arabia. Many young men believe that in the past, good qualifications and experience counted at least to a degree, but that since 2014 wasta has increased. As one individual laments, ‘wasta is like a cancer and it is getting worse’.182 Another young man says that in order to get a public-​sector job in his hometown of al-​Aflaj, ‘on paper’ he needs a Master’s degree and/​or at least three years’ work experience, but in reality he needs wasta.183 In fact, there is a grim realization that nowadays young men face a deadly combination of competition for jobs and wasta –​ and wasta is poison.184 2.5

Start-​Ups

According to the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor GEM Saudi Arabia 2016/​17 National Report, a strong entrepreneurial streak runs through young Saudis, who are becoming ‘incredibly open to starting up a business of their own’.185 There is a reason for this –​the demographics of Saudi Arabia are a double-​edged sword, argues Andreessen, in his Foreword to Start-​Up Rising:  The Entrepreneurial Revolution Remaking the Middle East: on the one hand, ‘the vast numbers of young people coming into adulthood’ provide an unprecedented talent pool to create and innovate; on the other hand, traditional business models cannot absorb them all. Therefore, entrepreneurship will have to be part of the answer, as SMEs, especially when compared with those of advanced economies, are not yet major contributors to Saudi gross domestic product (GDP).186 Indeed, Ahmed Al Kholifey, governor of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), notes that the non-​oil sector, in particular the private sector incorporating SMEs, only represents 38 per cent of GDP.187 However, there is recognition of this problem: responding to the challenge posed by lower oil prices to the sustainability of the economy, the Saudi government has encouraged entrepreneurship amongst young Saudis as one of the initiatives of Saudi Vision 2030 in order to promote SMEs’ contribution to the Kingdom’s GDP.188 Currently, Saudi Arabia is 31st in the global entrepreneurship ranking,189 and through entrepreneurship the government aims to increase the contribution of SMEs to the Kingdom’s GDP from 20 per cent in 2015 to 35 per cent by 2030.190 Ramady states that the Saudi government recognizes that SMEs constitute an important economic segment that needs to ‘survive, flourish and grow in a more dynamic environment’.191 According to the Saudi Vision 2030 document,192 the Small and Medium Enterprise Authority

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(SMEA)193 encourages young entrepreneurs ‘with business-​ friendly regulations, easier access to funding, international partnerships and a greater share of national procurement and government bids’ –​although some argue that SMEs continue to be over-​regulated.194 In recent years, a number of other organizations have begun to provide funding, incubation and know-​how to new start-​ups. These include the Entrepreneurship Institute (EI)195 located in the Dhahran Techno Valley (DTV),196 Saudi Aramco’s Wa’ed programme,197 King Abdullah University of Science and Technology’s (KAUST) Taqadam accelerator,198 King Abdullah City for Science and Technology’s (KACST) Badir programme,199 Flat6Labs Jeddah,200 Riyadh Techno Valley hosted by KSU,201 King Khaled Foundation (KKF),202 Wadi Makkah,203 Prince Mohammed Bin Salman College for Business and Entrepreneurship (MBSC),204 as well as Misk and Meras.205 Since the 2014 oil price decrease, an entrepreneurship career has become more attractive to young Saudis who believe increasingly that a start-​up may offer better employment opportunities, a greater degree of freedom and higher financial rewards than traditional public-​sector jobs. Moreover, starting your own business has become a trend not only because it is a way to make money, but also because a young man can pursue a career he is interested in rather than the major that he was sometimes forced to take. For example, a finance student at KSU told me that he was working on his personal training certificate because he wants to start his own personal training business after graduating from university.206 Another example from the Eastern Province: two chemical engineering graduates run an online business on Instagram selling semi-​ precious stones.207 And there are countless other examples. As Burton highlights, Saudi Arabia’s demographics force the age composition of its entrepreneurial class, with most start-​ups believed to have been launched by Saudis under 40 years of age –​‘a relatively safe presumption given the youthful demographics of the country’.208 In fact, at the Misk Global Forum convened in Riyadh in November 2017,209 entrepreneurship was the main highlight of the forum where youth mixed in open dialogue with policy-​ makers, decision-​ makers, innovators and world-​renowned entrepreneurs.210 The moderator of a panel discussion focusing on entrepreneurship asked the audience for a show of hands in answer to the question ‘Who wants to start their own business?’ The response was astounding, with approximately 70 per cent of the predominantly young audience answering in the affirmative.211 This mirrors the views of numerous young Saudis I have spoken to who believe that start-​ups represent a more ‘hopeful scenario’ in terms of long-​term career prospects.212 Consequently, the pros and cons

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of start-​ups are discussed widely by young Saudis, amongst themselves and on social media.213 Importantly, a start-​up can also offer an escape from the wasta still dominant in the Saudi economy, although others argue that nepotistic hierarchy remains present in the entrepreneurial sphere, because where the licensing/​regulatory bodies are inefficient, entrepreneurs sometimes have to rely on known human networks to speed up transactions.214 At its most extreme, as an entrepreneur without wasta, you would be seen as a threatening competitor to existing well-​established companies, stresses Oukil, and every obstacle is there to prevent the entrepreneur from launching a business.215 According to a Saudi investment consultant, in the not-​too-​distant past, ‘dabbling in entrepreneurship’ was considered a phase similar to a ‘gap year’ before the individual returned to the real world of ‘proper work’.216 However, nowadays, the mindset of young Saudi men is changing; they commit to their start-​ups and are willing to take risks, and in consequence, their behaviour could become one of the main drivers of the eco-​system, in particular if these would-​be entrepreneurs are provided with the necessary skill sets as part of their education.217 A young businessman in Riyadh, recognizing entrepreneurship as a popular trend in Saudi Arabia (although possibly a long-​term one), understands this entrepreneurial spirit as representing a ‘revolution of ideas’  –​in other words a new way of doing business that is replacing more traditional models.218 However, this new way of doing business can still draw on inherent Saudi values. For example, Saudis have the ability to become successful entrepreneurs by following the teachings of Islam. Islam is a disciplined faith, requiring the individual to pray five times a day, and this same discipline can be applied to entrepreneurship.219 For some young Saudis the rising cost of living necessitates supplementing their main income, as they cannot depend on a single income source.220 This is one of the reasons that many young men, both employees and students, work as Careem or Uber taxi drivers in their free time.221 In addition, fear of being laid off or remaining unemployed long term pushes some young men to seek independent income sources such as starting a business.222 A  secondary income is also seen as a way to achieve economic independence as well as to obtain expertise through implementing a business plan by ‘living the experience and gaining skills in real working life’, often in a preferred sector. For others studying in more specialized fields such as flight and space engineering, job opportunities are scarce in Saudi Arabia, and therefore an optimum solution is to initiate a project with a group of like-​minded colleagues who possess complimentary skill sets.223 Working with a small dedicated team can

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provide a better working environment, and avoids time wasted searching for non-​existent job opportunities following graduation.224 Accordingly, start-​ups have become attractive alternatives in a contracting labour market with a scarcity of well-​paid jobs.225 However, a young entrepreneur in the Eastern Province cautions that although entrepreneurship can contribute to economic diversification, it is only part of the answer.226 Furthermore, entrepreneurship should not be viewed as a ‘one size fits all’ solution to national economic problems, as there are diverse needs in different regions of the Kingdom that require specific attention –​in particular outside the major urban areas of Riyadh, Jeddah and the Dammam-​Khobar-​Dhahran conurbation.227 Many young men believe a start-​up not only provides essential knowledge of the commercial world, but also helps to increase national productivity.228 Indeed, start-​ups are seen as benefitting Saudi Arabia nationally, as they provide new services and increase job opportunities. Even though at the outset the start-​up will only provide these in its locality, if the enterprise becomes well established replicating the business in other localities becomes easier, thereby creating jobs.229 Furthermore, some Saudi start-​ups are breaking into markets previously dominated by foreign companies. An excellent example is Maestro Pizza,230 which has become more successful than Domino’s Pizza and Pizza Hut in Saudi Arabia. The company was launched in November 2013 by Khalid Al Omran with a single outlet in Riyadh before spreading across the Kingdom.231 Nonetheless, in 2017–​19 not everyone was in agreement that the economic climate was conducive to starting a business; indeed, some saw the economic downturn as a distinct hindrance, preferring to wait for a few years in order to assess market conditions.232 The 2014 oil price decrease and subsequent economic downturn caused hesitation in some would-​be entrepreneurs who, due to the economic risks involved, fear that a start-​up could fail and amongst whom finding a full-​time job, particularly in the public sector, is therefore seen as the safer option.233 For instance, a young man in his final year at university with a ‘passion for entrepreneurship’ came to the conclusion that 2017–​18 was not the best time to start a business and instead found a position with Aramco.234 The GEM Saudi Arabia 2016/​ 17 National Report also notes that, although Saudis have high entrepreneurial intentions, some of them remain risk-​averse: around 41 per cent of the adult population considers fear of failure as an obstacle to starting a business.235 Yet, mentors in the Saudi entrepreneurial eco-​system stress that young entrepreneurs need to learn how to tolerate failure; however, learning to overcome failure should be done in a way that is compatible with the Saudi context –​a case of failing and then succeeding in an acceptable manner within the

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Saudi environment.236 This perspective is starting to gain traction. As one young man points out, even if an entrepreneur’s first business venture fails, the experience will provide him with an invaluable opportunity to learn about his strengths and weaknesses; accordingly, the entrepreneur will be able to bounce back and succeed.237 Nevertheless, a young entrepreneur whose start-​up is being incubated at EI maintains that the absence of a well-​developed bankruptcy regime –​despite the 2018 introduction of bankruptcy laws238 –​makes many Saudis feel that they only have ‘one chance’. Thus, they tend to hesitate to launch a business, even when investment is offered, for fear of ‘getting burnt’ and going into debt –​although this concern is withheld from would-​be investors for fear of investment being withdrawn.239 Additionally, some would-​be entrepreneurs are fearful that their ideas might be stolen, and thus are reluctant to share them with investors.240 Paradoxically, for other entrepreneurs the risk of failure is overshadowed by a risk of succeeding. In this scenario, there is a fear that the individual will become tied to the project and will be unable to extricate himself as the start-​up will take over his life.241 Running a business is time-​consuming, as ‘a start-​up takes your morning, afternoon, and night, and when asleep dreams are dominated by thoughts of how to improve it and make more money’; accordingly, some young men do not think they could withstand the pressure of managing their own businesses.242 This fear of failure, in reality, appears to be more pronounced in some sectors than others. For instance, there is perceived risk in the field of online applications (apps), where the market is already extremely crowded. Some Saudi entrepreneurs contend there are too many apps and these should only be part of the Saudi entrepreneurship story.243 Whilst there have been apps whose incubation and initial launch into the market proved successful, such as Sarahah (Honesty)244, Wain Nakel (Where to Eat?)245 and Faheem (Expert),246 many apps continue to face significant challenges. For example, finding a technical co-​founder is often a major problem. This was a serious issue for the co-​founder of Faheem, which links specialist tutors to students, as for a long time he was unable to locate a technical co-​founder with relevant experience.247 Furthermore, launching an app is risky because apps make money from subscriptions, and whilst an app may enjoy instant success, it can also encounter serious problems.248 Take Sarahah as an example:  the app, which allows users to receive anonymous constructive feedback, was launched as an Arabic-​language app in December 2016, with the English-​ language version coming online in June 2017. A month later Sarahah was top of the App Store charts, and by February 2018 it had approximately 320 million accounts.

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At that time, its founder and CEO ZainAlabdin Tawfiq stated that Sarahah had reached 100 million accounts faster than any other social media app.249 However, later in the same month the app was dropped from Apple and Google stores after accusations that it had facilitated bullying amongst young (non-​Saudi) teenagers.250 Following an online petition to have Sarahah banned, Tawfiq says his company has upgraded its filtering system to use ‘artificial intelligence and machine learning’ to block offensive language. Tawfiq also claimed that his app was not meant to be used by younger teenagers, although as the app originally launched in Saudi Arabia where a sizeable proportion of social media usage comprises younger teenagers, this comment appeared disingenuous.251 A young economic consultant for EI points out that the app’s ‘anonymous aspect is something we like in Saudi Arabia’ and that the comments that caused Sarahah problems might have been viewed in Saudi Arabia ‘as a bit of a joke, but outside the Kingdom they were understood as bullying so in my opinion there was a lack of socio-​cultural understanding on the founder’s part’.252 The consultant speculates as to whether Sarahah considered regulations about online bullying, or discussed this issue with lawyers, in particular when the company scaled up internationally. This app was a success story, notes the consultant, but a contentious issue such as bullying has the potential to bankrupt an online company.253 Fear of failure does not appear to have affected the Saudi ‘food truck’ phenomenon. In 2017 the Kingdom witnessed the proliferation of food trucks, mostly run by young men, in public places and events. As Arab News reported, although the concept of food trucks is the norm in the US and other countries, Saudi Arabia experienced an increase in the number of food trucks at festivals such as at the al-​Janadriyah where ‘food trucks definitely won attention’.254 The trend began in May 2016, when food connoisseur and author Ahmed Mesawa obtained the first license for a travelling restaurant in Saudi Arabia which he named Strit Shef (Street Chef). Rather than paying extortionate rental prices for a restaurant location, Mesawa came up with the idea of importing a food truck from the UK, and preparing it for work in Saudi Arabia.255 In no time at all, the food truck trend swept across Saudi Arabia and suddenly, young men stuck at home and bored began to realize that their friends running a food truck were not only making some money, but also had the chance to socialize and, of course, flirt with girls. Suddenly, getting out of the house and doing the same seemed very attractive. However, Mesawa notes that when it started, Strit Shef was making sizeable profits, ‘but in recent times, with the spread of the phenomenon, the profits have dwindled noticeably’.256 Moreover, the proliferation of food

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trucks has been chaotic, with many simply following the trend without having any culinary experience or expertise:  in other words, no substantive knowledge of the market. On the plus side, according to an al-​Khobar-​based entrepreneur, ‘anyone savvy enough’ can see that it is easier to be more creative than most of the local completion, as Saudi food trucks offer ‘coffee and burgers’ ad infinitum and therefore anything different stands out.257 Young Saudis are often not aware of the risks associated with a start-​up because entrepreneurship is marketed as a ‘dream’ in the Kingdom. For some would-​be entrepreneurs it is a case of being willing to take a risk with a start-​up but, significantly, unable to calculate the risk –​most probably due to education and lack of experience. Thus, an erroneous perception exists that if a young man cannot find a job he becomes an entrepreneur and ‘the next Khalid Al Omran or Khalid Al Khudair’,258 although as an EI-​based entrepreneur points out, according to Y Combinator,259 ‘90 per cent of start-​ups fail and out of the next 10 per cent, maybe 90 per cent of those fail in the next five years’.260 Still, even though a lot of young Saudis are not fully aware of risk, another entrepreneur does not agree that fear of failure is a significant impediment to starting a business, because entrepreneurs are risk takers by their very nature. He argues that because entrepreneurs start with limited budgets, if the start-​up fails, it fails without incurring huge losses.261 In fact, the GEM report observes that Saudis’ self-​perceptions of entrepreneurialism far exceed, relatively speaking, their fear of failure (or success).262 Significantly, for some would-​be entrepreneurs there is a sense of fear that they are going to ‘lose their moment’; therefore, with the socio-​economic reforms introduced by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman since 2016 this is the perfect time for a start-​up.263 From this observation, one might infer a more optimistic outlook (realistic or otherwise) for entrepreneurship in Saudi Arabia.264 Certainly, there are a myriad of challenges and obstacles that young entrepreneurs need to overcome, not least the fact that many regulations are either out of date or unclear. In fact, regulations are considered one of the largest pain points:  it is simply too complex to start a business. Additionally, some argue that the procedural complexity of the Nitaqat system works against entrepreneurs.265 Many young Saudis believe that one way to increase the numbers of young people entering the workforce and simultaneously enhance job satisfaction is greater government encouragement for entrepreneurship. They note that there are many barriers to the development of entrepreneurship  –​in particular technology start-​ups  –​although some stress that there is an over-​reliance on new technology and apps in many Saudi start-​ups at the expense of

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production and services.266 Yet, the complexity of laws and regulations and not knowing ‘who to talk to’ pose real challenges for young people with innovative ideas.267 In addition, entrepreneurs face difficulty in finding the necessary capital: a case of young people having the ideas, but not the cash.268 For example, a KFUPM student project about entrepreneurship cites market entry regulations, shortage of funds and lack of market experience as three of the principal problems facing would-​be entrepreneurs.269 Although would-​be entrepreneurs complain about the difficulties in starting a business due to opaque regulations and the difficulty in finding the necessary capital, others consider that the main issue is ‘know-​how’. What most young business people need is constructive advice270 such as how to deal effectively with bureaucracy,271 as well as being able to talk to suitable individuals or organizations who can evaluate their progress.272 Certainly, many young Saudis have good ideas, but they do not know where to locate constructive feedback and evaluation, and ultimately this obstructs delivery of these ideas.273 In fact, according to an entrepreneur in the Eastern Province, having the opportunity to talk to people with relevant experience and know-​how is critical.274 Indeed, visible successes can motivate aspiring entrepreneurs and help reduce the perception of barriers and risks, as well as highlighting the tangible rewards.275 Still, there is widespread recognition of an urgent need for increased mentoring opportunities across the Kingdom.276 These mentorship opportunities could assist Saudi Arabia to build national champions, maintains one entrepreneur, in much the same way as happened in South Korea.277 Furthermore, another young man argues that there is a real need for viable apprenticeship schemes in all Saudi administrative regions, because in terms of effective mentoring, one of the most important elements that is missing in the Saudi eco-​system is industrial incubation and on-​the-​job training –​mentorship that is industry-​driven rather than determined by colleges or universities.278 Mentoring is already happening to a degree in institutions such as EI. In early 2018 EI had 120 mentors/​mentees, making it the foremost institute supporting entrepreneurship in Saudi Arabia.279 Aspiring entrepreneurs incubated at EI stress the importance of its location, pointing out that as the institute is based in DTV, this facilitates access to individuals from industry who visit the many international companies based there on a regular basis.280 As an example, an EI entrepreneur says that many of his colleagues continue to draw on the advice given to them by the speaker at one of EI’s special one-​off coaching sessions on app and website development. Even though the session was a one-​off, another young man says entrepreneurs continue to benefit from the speaker’s advice

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long after the event.281 Indeed, one expert asserts that if an entrepreneur does not have a mentor then he needs to find one through mentorship programmes offered by organizations such as EI or Flat6Labs Jeddah.282 Young entrepreneurs believe that more assistance from those in influential positions in the private sector, such as leaders in conglomerates, should and could be provided to them, in particular through organizing mentoring programmes. In reality, however, if a would-​be entrepreneur contacts a company seeking advice, it is likely that he will be either simply ignored or charged a high consultancy fee.283 SMEA advises any would-​be entrepreneur to take a course in business basics, provided by organizations such as Badir, EI or KKF, in order to learn how to write items such as business plans and feasibility studies.284 Badir also convenes ‘boot camps’ around Saudi Arabia that assist entrepreneurs by honing their skills and talents with input from technical and business experts who give aspiring entrepreneurs a summary of their experiences in the areas of investment, leadership, information and communications technology (ICT) and corporate creation. The boot camps also include ‘lectures on the marketing of ICT and presentation of ideas to investors, their perspective on dealing with failure, and how to move start-​ups from the initial stages to the stages of growth’.285 Other individuals have also benefitted from a variety of government schemes and boot camps. For example, a young man in al-​Aflaj received government assistance on training under the Saudization scheme and was able to open a successful mobile phone shop in early 2017 with a partner. He says that the government offers useful short courses that help with the running of a mobile phone shop, including courses on how to repair different types of devices.286 Five years ago if you were not working in the oil and gas industries you were not considered to be ‘doing business’, maintains Yasir Al Kadi.287 However, since then the environment has transformed considerably, with acceleration in the pace of change occurring from the latter part of 2017.288 Nowadays, SMEs are creating jobs linking them inextricably to the goals of Saudi Vision 2030. This is crucial, because ultimately it is young Saudis who will make significant contributions through entrepreneurship to the Vision. For that reason, many young Saudis are energized by the possibilities entrepreneurship offers, linked as they are to socio-​ economic reform, more personal freedom and greater self-​expression. However, if the government fails to respond to this energy and desire to engage in a viable and positive way, if it fails to support the entrepreneurial aspirations of young Saudis by providing the necessary support and access to know-​how, then this energy and enthusiasm could mutate into cynicism and apathy.289

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Andreessen highlights the ‘intriguing idea’ that, regardless of government assistance, entrepreneurial eco-​systems are being built ‘anyway, bottom up, enabled by access to software’.290 That said, there is concern amongst a lot of young men that due to the economic slowdown, starting a business constitutes a huge risk,291 particularly as some believe that government bureaucracy, for example the Nitaqat system, works against new entrepreneurs.292 Others contend that it is either difficult or extremely risky to start a business without having a full-​time job. Not only could the entrepreneur suffer from a lack of funds, but there would also be no ‘Plan B’, i.e. a full-​time job, should the start-​up fail.293 Yet, other individuals argue that economic recessions can be a ‘good time to start a business’, as other doors open and opportunities arise.294 An al-​Ahsa focus group concurs,295 believing that diversification of the economy is going to happen from the bottom up and not the top down as outlined in Vision 2030, with some of these small start-​ups becoming the large companies of the future.296 However, many young entrepreneurs admit that access to know-​how and establishing contacts are real challenges in the field, as entrepreneurs without sufficient exposure to the business environment tend to lack knowledge of how to manage a fledgling company. To effectively start up and scale up, these young businesspeople require constructive advice from established experts in the sector. In fact, Fahd Al Rasheed, MBSC vice-​chairman, argues in the GEM report that for Saudi Arabia to harness the capabilities of its youth, institutional support for entrepreneurship needs to be overhauled. Moreover, ‘regulations around opening and funding a new business venture need to support the establishment of new engines of job creation’. Most importantly, Al Rasheed contends there is a real need to close the gap between the entrepreneurial aspirations of the population and the skills they acquire through their education.297 If the gap between entrepreneurial aspirations and skills is decreased, if regulations are made more coherent and young Saudis are provided with the necessary know-​how, then Saudi Arabia’s aspirational and entrepreneurial young people will be able to contribute effectively to national development. 3

Housing and Healthcare

3.1

Not Enough Houses

For decades, housing –​or more specifically the lack of affordable housing –​has been a major cause of concern for ordinary Saudis. The preference of developers for building luxury housing means there has been a

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serious shortfall of homes for the Kingdom’s rapidly expanding low-​and middle-​income populations.298 Yet, the importance of adequate housing for citizens and residents of any society cannot be over-​emphasized, argue Opoku and Abdul-​Muhmin, as ‘adequate housing is so much an integral part of the needs of every society that its value for individuals, families, communities, and society at large is hardly questioned’.299 The conundrum for many young Saudis is why this integral need is lacking, in particular as Saudi Arabia is a wealthy state in terms of natural resources and land. A young Riyadh resident complains: ‘There is nothing here, only desert. Why is it so expensive when we have so much space and such a small population? It does not make sense.’300 In Saudi Arabia, the housing crisis is a central part of the Vision 2030 reform package, as access to affordable housing touches on many of the key concerns of a young and growing population. Young points out that a central goal of Saudi Vision 2030 is for 70 per cent of Saudis to own their own homes.301 In fact, many young men believe strongly that it is the responsibility of the government to provide housing or the funds to build or buy a house.302 Certainly, conscious of public opinion regarding expectations and the lack of affordable homes, in July 2016 the Ministry of Housing (MoH) launched 27,658 housing projects across the Kingdom within its sakani (housing) programme, to allocate and deliver 280,000 housing products in 2017. According to Arab News: The programme includes 7,700 financially supported products to be funded by banks and financing institutions; 7,723 land parcels without financial support; and 12,235 land parcels on maps (Wafi) in cooperation with real estate developers. The number of housing and funding products has so far reached 127,957 since the inception of the program in February this year. Announcing details of the program in a press briefing at the SPA [Saudi Press Agency], ministry officials said the Riyadh region has the highest rates of funded housing products with 2,174, and 1,061 housing units within the Wafi program. The Makkah region received 1,155 funded products and 175 Wafi housing units, while Madinah, Qasim, the Eastern Province, Asir, Tabuk, Hail, the Northern Border, Jazan, Najran, Baha and Jouf received 528, 871, 834, 657, 301, 275, 216, 112, 198, 149 and 230 funded housing products, respectively.303

In fact, the MoH, in partnership with the private sector, aimed to provide ‘thousands of housing units’ with prices ranging from SAR 250,000 to SAR 700,000 to suit the purchasing power of eligible candidates. The number of housing units to be sold on the Wafi programme reached 110,000 in 2017 (deliverable to citizens over a three-​ year period). Nonetheless, in May 2017 approximately 1.6 million Saudis were still on waiting lists for government housing.304

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In December 2017 the government allocated an additional 21 billion riyals for housing and 14 billion riyals for efficient home design and engineering.305 Moreover, in 2017 the Real Estate Development Fund (REDF) managed to shorten the housing waiting period from eleven to five years.306 Nonetheless, not surprisingly, as Salama highlights, due to rapid urbanization, fuelled by the influx of rural and desert populations into urban areas, the problem of providing affordable housing to the populace is particularly acute in the large urban centres:307 Saudi Arabia needs to build nearly 414,000 houses in 2017 to meet the needs of its rapidly growing population, a report in Zawya.com said, citing a report in the Arabic language daily Al-​Madina which based the information on official statistics from the Saudi Ministry of Housing. The Kingdom must play catch up in order to meet soaring demand for homes. Housing applications submitted by Saudi citizens to the government showed that the demand for homes far outstripped supply in 15 key cities in Saudi Arabia, the report said. The deficit in housing supply is 413,944 units compared to the number of applications received by the Housing Ministry. The largest shortage is in the capital, Riyadh, where demand outpaces supply by 61,146 units. Jeddah also fell short of demand by 52,459 homes, Makkah by 24,096 units, and the eastern port of Dammam required about 22,189 homes to meet demand. The survey, conducted by the ministry in 2017, showed that only the Southern Jazan province was not suffering from a housing supply gap.308

In early 2018 the MoH launched the first phase of its housing programme with around 20,000 housing units either built or allocated funding. The second phase included 125,000 housing units in partnership with the private sector, and 75,000 free residential land plots, in addition to 100,000 units funded, powered by a partnership between the national REDF, banks and financial institutions.309 By September 2018, Mohammed bin Saud Al Ghazwani, general supervisor of the real estate development sector at MoH, said that the sakani programme was continuing to implement its policy of increasing the allocation numbers of housing units at prices between SAR 250,000 and SAR 750,000, as part of the ministry’s efforts to increase the home ownership rate to 60 per cent in line with Saudi Vision 2030.310 In 2016, the MoH estimated the percentage of Saudi home owners at 47 per cent,311 although the Population Statistic Center at KSU records that in small cities and towns such as al-​Baha, Jazan, Abha and Jubail, more Saudis tend to own their homes due to higher purchasing power and social traditions.312 Results of the GaStat 2017 housing census show that nearly one in two Saudi homes is owned (49.91 ownership), with just over a third (38 per cent) of Saudi housing units rented.313 Yet, the home is the physical representation of social and economic mobility, of

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readiness to marry and start a family. Young stresses that it is the centre of social and family life in Saudi Arabia; hence, the inability to afford a home is a source of popular discontent.314 This is true, as a great many young Saudi men bemoan the fact that many people do not own their own homes. When asked about home ownership statistics, the overall perception in a number of different focus groups was that around 70 per cent of Saudis still rent. There was considerable scepticism about official figures, as many young men contend that it is difficult to ascertain the exact percentage of Saudis who own their own homes because it is uncertain who calculates this.315 That said, there is widespread consensus that more affordable housing could constitute a ‘quick win’ for the government, for example if it built 10,000 new apartments in each city. Another popular option would be for the government to lower the price of land, allowing citizens to buy land and build their own homes rather than being dependent on the government for houses.316 Nonetheless, others point to apprehension over existing housing projects, such as an al-​Ahsa government housing project consisting of around 4,000 units. A local focus group says that it is unclear to whom the units will be allocated. Apparently, there is a waiting list based on individual income and family size, although ‘no one really knows when these houses will be finished’.317 However, there is another major concern:  many young men complain that construction companies do not know how to build proper homes, and that a great deal of the work is sub-​ standard. Even new houses and apartments are characterized by shoddy workmanship, cheap building materials and poor maintenance.318 Sadly, due to the speed of construction and lack of coherent building regulations many brand new buildings are already in a sub-​standard state even before they have been completed. 3.2

Cost of Housing and Land

The members of a Riyadh focus group say that their dream is to own an 800-​square-​metre home due to the average size of the Saudi family (around six members). Therefore, a man needs a house for his family, but it is also ‘part of the culture’ for men to build big houses even if only two people live there.319 Furthermore, an architectural graduate from Riyadh points out that Saudis tend to build horizontally rather than vertically, a perspective that becomes crystal clear when flying over the urban sprawl of the capital.320 Others recognize that this is a waste of space and question why more young people do not ‘start small and then move to larger places’ as their

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family grows –​and then downsize as their family moves out.321 However, a young man from Qassim contends that because of socio-​ cultural issues, in particular the importance of hospitality, a house must have a large majlis322 and dining room.323 There also needs to be one of each for both male and female family members, although he says on average the majlis and dining room are only occasionally used, depending on the social status of individual families.324 In fact, according to a study presented at an architectural seminar organized by the Asharqia Chamber of Commerce in Dammam in December 2017, Saudis allocate 40 per cent of the space in their homes to entertaining guests, and these spaces are only used on 19 days per year on average. In consequence, large areas are wasted in homes, and if the space allocated to entertaining guests was reduced it could save between 100 and 150 square metres per house; but due to socio-​cultural norms, many Saudis would not accept this idea.325 Property and land prices vary according to region or district. Needless to say, the cost of buying a house is widely discussed in much the same way that these young men’s peers in London (for example) worry about being able to get on the property ladder. They note that things were different in the past when their fathers could afford to build houses and then split them into apartments for rent.326 Naturally, after getting married young men want to start families, but it is becoming increasingly difficult for the less well-​off to own a property.327 As a result, these individuals become frustrated, as they worry that rising house and land prices will prevent them from being able to afford a home. A Hofuf focus group contends that purchasing a property is also complicated by the lack of a clear real estate policy, the lack of ‘proper real estate agencies’ and the high price of raw materials –​a problem exacerbated by (greedy) landowners refusing to sell land at affordable prices. Moreover, they are confused by ‘strange rules such as you cannot build on all your land, some part of the property must not be built on’.328 Some young men accept that buying a small apartment might be the first (and only) option, as purchasing a house might not be a realistic goal until they reach their forties or fifties.329 In fact, many young men acknowledge that after getting married it could take upwards of a decade to save enough money to buy or build a house,330 and therefore, increasing priority should be placed on the provision of small properties.331 Other individuals remark on how they have watched friends and relatives work for over 20 years to purchase a house, to the extent that it became a ‘life objective’.332 However, they also point out that after spending all their effort, time and money to buy a house, some men find that ‘by that time their children are all married and the parents end up living in an empty home  –​this is quite common’.333 Accordingly, many believe that they

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should forgo travelling abroad and avoid over-​consumption on unnecessary items in order to save for a house.334 According to Young, the cost of a roughly 2,600-​square-​foot home in a major Saudi city is SAR 697,500–​847,500. This is ten times the annual salary of a low-​income family. For example, Saudis who receive the Citizen Account stipend (a monthly payment from the government based on income level) make about SAR 8,475 per month, which is an average monthly salary in the Kingdom.335 In Riyadh, a young man says that property in the capital costs around SAR 1,200 per square metre, although online sources quote from SAR 4,283.23 to SAR 2,692.21 depending on proximity to the city centre.336 Due to these high prices –​ in relation to an average salary –​he and many of his peers imagine living with their fathers for a long time into the future.337 Another Riyadh resident hopes to start thinking about buying a property in his late twenties, but acknowledges that renting a cheap one-​bedroom apartment (SAR 700/​800 per month, but can rise to SAR 2,000 in the city centre) is the first option. It is his intention to take out a bank loan in his mid-​to latethirties in order to buy his own place.338 In Makkah, a focus group notes that there are very few available apartments, in particular as it is the most expensive city in Saudi Arabia. A small, basic four-​room apartment costs SAR 30,000 per year to rent, making it impossible for ordinary young men to think about purchasing an apartment in the city.339 Another option, if they cannot afford to buy in Makkah itself, is to purchase a property in the villages around the city. Nowadays, it is rare for a young man to buy a property in Makkah itself unless he comes from a rich family. In fact, most of the properties and land have been owned by the same families for generations.340 To make matters worse for the locals, the wealthy build hotels on their land in Makkah or invest in property –​something that is impossible for many young men to do. For the above reasons, the group members all agree that buying a house is problematic, so they will probably rent until they get married and then start thinking about saving for a house –​even though, once again, they envisage this taking a very long time.341 An Eastern Province focus group says that in the past (around 30 years ago), if a young man was an Aramco employee it was possible for him to buy land and even farms in the Eastern Province, but nowadays this is beyond most ordinary peoples’ means. Moreover, it used to be quite common for families and friends to band together to build houses, but nowadays this rarely happens.342 According to the group, the cost of land varies considerably according to location. For example, in al-​Ahsa land is between SAR 1,000 and SAR 2,000 per metre, but they point out that in nearby Dammam it is more expensive (SAR 3,000), whilst further north

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in Eastern Province towns such as Hafr al-​Batin land is much cheaper (SAR 100).343 The group jokes that ‘nowadays, no young man can afford to buy or build his house with the complete expenditure already in his pocket’.344 In Layla, al-​Aflaj in Najd, a focus group states that ‘decent property’ costs around SAR 1  million for 500 square metres and between SAR 100,000 and 600,000 for 300 square metres, depending on the quality of the house. If they had a choice, the focus group members would prefer to remain in al-​Aflaj because life is easier and houses cheaper than in Riyadh. However, until they can afford to buy a property (and get married) they will continue to live at home with their parents.345 On the plus side, in 2017 the group said, the government was building 400 new housing units in al-​Aflaj for low-​income families.346 Another focus group, in al-​Mithnab in Qassim, estimates that it costs SAR 1–​2 million for land and a house. The group also points out that in the past young men could apply for a government loan of SAR 500,000 (payable over a 10–​15-​year period), but nowadays, housing loans are only provided by private-​sector companies such as Saudi Home Loans.347 Yet, even with a loan the group complains, the high cost of repayments makes it extremely difficult to afford.348 One individual from Onaizah was furious when the regulations were changed, as he was already registered and was ‘entitled’ to a government loan. Unfortunately for him, nowadays he is obliged to organize a loan from a bank. In his opinion, ‘new people’ should be obliged to go to the bank rather than those already registered with the government.349 The urban centres are the most expensive areas in terms of rent and property prices. Certainly, it is possible to buy a cheaper house in the provinces, but as there are very few jobs this is not often seen as a viable option. Still, many focus groups point out that a lot of Saudis prefer to build the family house in their hometowns even though the husband/​ father might be working in one of the large cities. For example, a group of Shari’ah law students at Umm Al-​Qura University say their preference is to stay in Makkah because it is their home, even though they concede that this is dependent on future employment opportunities.350 According to another group in al-​Ahsa, local people do not want to move away from the town. Thus, if someone works in al-​Khobar or Dammam then he either commutes every day from al-​Ahsa or stays in the city during the week and returns for the weekend, because ‘we are so attached to our homes, land, extended families and villages’. However, other group members also believe this process has contributed to rising land prices in the al-​Ahsa municipality, because ‘no one moves away’.351 Coupled with this, a great many people from the south, for example from Najran

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province, have moved and settled in al-​Ahsa for work, further increasing the population.352 One young engineer says this has resulted in the rapid expansion of the town: If you look at photos of al-​Ahsa 30 years ago you will see houses like stones in the middle of large green carpets. But that has all changed, because if someone cannot afford to build his house on his land he will cut down all his trees and then sell the land. That’s why my village now has a population of 15,000. It’s no longer a village, it’s a small town.353

Regrettably, a great many young men accept that buying a property will probably necessitate taking out a large bank loan. In fact, many individuals across the Kingdom remark that ‘nowadays banks are always advertising housing loans’. Some joke that this is so they will be saddled with a bank loan forever,354 but they also see value in taking out a mortgage (the first mortgage law was introduced in 2012)355 for an apartment over a 10–​15-​year period rather than paying rent. Yet, they also point out that due to the current economic situation young men are having second thoughts about getting a mortgage because they are worried about losing their jobs and, in consequence, not be able to keep up with mortgage repayments.356 Finally, on a brighter note for young Saudi men, after the government introduced dependents’ annual fees in July 2017, many expatriates opted to send their families back home rather than pay the fees, resulting in, for the first time in many years, apartments being vacated and cheaper rents.357 3.3

Standardized Healthcare

Another aim of Saudi Vision 2030 is to provide doctors with better training to improve treatment for chronic diseases such as heart disease, diabetes and cancer that threaten the Kingdom’s health.358 Better-​trained family doctors will be able to facilitate better primary care.359 Moreover, Saudi Health Minister Tawfiq Al Rabiah has said that digital health technologies such as e-​healthcare will play a central role in the transformation of health services envisioned by the Ministry of Health (MoH) and Vision 2030. For example, the Mawid app, a centralized system, enables patients to book, amend or cancel appointments in primary healthcare centres and rate the quality of services provided. Al Rabiah notes that the MoH ‘appreciates the pivotal role of the physician, which is indispensable’, but that this technique will reduce pressure on doctors and facilitate access to health services for common ailments.360 The Saudi government provides all citizens and expatriates working within the public sector with full and free access to all public

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healthcare services.361 The MoH provides health services at three levels: primary, secondary and tertiary. Almalki et al. note that primary healthcare centres supply primary care services, both preventive and curative, referring cases that require more advanced care to public hospitals (the secondary level of care), whilst cases that need more complex levels of care are transferred to central or specialized hospitals (the tertiary level of healthcare).362 Indeed, Saudi Arabia should be able to afford quality healthcare, argue most young men, even if it cannot always match healthcare standards in the UAE or Kuwait due to disparities in population size.363 A  KSU medical student also notes that although only ‘30 per cent of consultants and healthcare providers’ in Saudi hospitals are nationals (with the remainder made up of foreigners), he believes and hopes that in 20 years’ time at least 75 per cent will be Saudis.364 Almalki et al. also note that whilst many steps have been undertaken by the MoH to reform the Saudi healthcare system, a number of challenges remain: These relate to the health workforce, financing and expenditure, changing patterns of diseases, accessibility to health care services, introducing the cooperative health insurance scheme, privatization of public hospitals, utilization of electronic health (e-​health) strategies and the development of a national system for health information.365

The high turnover of heath ministers in recent years is seen as another problematic issue,366 particularly when reflecting on the development of the MoH over the same period.367 The problem is compounded by the MoH providing all the necessary resources and opportunities for hospital administrators, but, according to medical trainees, not selecting the most suitable people to lead the hospitals. Moreover, because the MoH has a monopoly on decision-​making, ‘healthcare issues are one-​sided as it is all about what the MoH wants’.368 According to a group of trainee doctors and second year medical students from King Khalid University (KKU) in Abha, Asir province, the primary healthcare system is effective, but the main problem is in its application and in lack of awareness of health issues and services in society. These young men say Saudis are often unaware that primary healthcare facilities are available and end up going to secondary or tertiary services.369 In other parts of Saudi Arabia the situation is different. For example, a group of medical students from King Faisal University (KFU) say that in al-​Ahsa (and other regions) the standard of primary healthcare suffers from a lack of family doctors. For instance, a KFU medical intern maintains that specialists end up seeing 20 patients when

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they should only be seeing three, because in reality, the other 17 require only the assistance of a general practitioner.370 These young medical interns are concerned that the MoH fails to consult practitioners even though they believe strongly that doctors should contribute to health policy. Unfortunately, even when doctors have some influence on the decision-​making process it is only indirectly, when they should be part of the consultation and decision-​making processes, as it is doctors who know and understand the health system best.371 Rory Hendrikz, director of Ashridge Middle East, concurs, and says that the region’s healthcare issues such as diabetes can be tackled better by giving leadership training and power to those at the front line of care, such as doctors, nurses, clinicians, consultants and dieticians, by bringing them together for voluntary leadership roles to make change happen.372 Nevertheless, the interns remain sceptical about whether the MoH would want to include medical professionals, especially younger doctors, in these processes.373 Unfortunately, other difficulties arise due to a lack of standardization in public healthcare and training across university hospitals, colleges, cities or regions. For this important reason, the standard and quality of doctors in Saudi Arabia depends very much on the location of a specific hospital and whether healthcare is public or private –​which trainee doctors argue are serious problems.374 Mousa and Aldehayyat agree with these medical students, pointing out that the private-​sector heathcare in Asir has the lowest efficiency in comparison with other inefficient regions in Saudi Arabia.375 Young Asiri men assert that public healthcare should be uniform and standardized, even if this means importing North American and/​or European supervision of training programmes for trainee Saudi doctors and specialists.376 A priority for the MoH is training. Nonetheless, a KFU medical intern (who also trained in Canada) claims that the MoH does not always adhere to its own stated goals and standards. He declares that the MoH will follow up on a doctor’s/​specialist’s conduct after qualifying ‘to a degree’, but not as rigorously as in Canada/​North America, where a doctor/​specialist is required to meet all standards. This intern admits that the same procedures happen in Saudi Arabia, but he believes they are often applied in a ‘weak way’.377 3.4

Problematic Issues

Another goal of the Vision is to develop private medical insurance to improve access to medical services and reduce waiting times for

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appointments with specialists and consultants.378 Still, in Asir province private hospitals have higher standards than public ones and, according to local trainee doctors, ‘if you visit a private hospital in Jubail and then another in Abha you will see that they are totally different’. This is because many people in Jubail have Aramco health insurance, whilst there is no equivalent in Abha and this leads to a lower standard of care.379 KFU medical students in al-​ Ahsa agree, saying that decent healthcare depends on medical insurance, and whilst some people in al-​Ahsa are fortunate to have Aramco insurance, the majority do not.380 These trainee doctors note that the MoH believes that if hospitals are privatized then medical insurance will be less expensive. Still, if all hospitals were privatized then each hospital would be able to build a better reputation, but this would need to be done from scratch and can only work if it is done in tandem with the insurance system.Yet, the way medical insurance works is confusing because insurance companies have different medical policies.381 These trainee doctors recognize that these are widespread problems across Saudi Arabia, which they attribute to a lack of real health education especially in the provinces, particularly related to diabetes, obesity and unhealthy lifestyles.382 They also believe the problems are worse outside the principal urban areas383 because the main cities receive better resources. For example, there is a difference between King Fahd Hospital (KFH) in al-​Ahsa and Riyadh hospitals (one intern claims that sometimes KFH does not even have tissues).384 Every large Saudi city or town should have its own good-​quality hospital, and each village should have a high-​standard clinic. For example, one young man recalls how his friend’s mother was bitten by a snake in the hills above her village in Asir; because the local clinic did not have any serum she was sent to Abha, but unfortunately she died on the way.385 KKU medical students also complained in late 2016 that King Faisal Medical City in Abha (with 1,350 beds and due to open in 2016) was still not operational and apparently would need an additional three years’ work.386 Furthermore, this focus group noted that another hospital planned for Abha, King Khalid University Hospital (commissioned 14 years ago, with 800 beds) was also not operational (even though the buildings are finished), as the opening kept being postponed. In 2017, one of these students asked the dean of his college when the hospital would open and was told he would graduate before that happened –​and this young man still had five more years of study. According to the student, ‘everything in Abha stopped because of the conflict in Yemen’.387 What frustrates these trainee doctors is that over 15,000 patients (mainly

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in oncology) are transferred from Asir to Riyadh every year. As they argue convincingly, imagine if both of these hospitals were open: there would be no need to transfer all these people  –​not to mention their families –​to Riyadh hospitals, and this would reduce the huge cost. To make matters worse, oncology samples are sent to Germany for examination rather than being inspected in Asir, again at huge and unnecessary cost.388 Certainly, these individuals agree that hospitals in large cities such as Riyadh have sufficient beds, but this still puts huge and unnecessary pressure on the capital’s healthcare services. Furthermore, it can take up to six months to get a transfer, so many people who are either too sick or old may die before this happens. In the short term, if someone wants an urgent transfer then wasta is needed.389 In al-​Ahsa, the KFU medical students complain about waiting lists at KFH, arguing that the region needs another hospital similar to KFH because it is normal to wait for one or two months for an appointment.390 Moreover, there are also long waits for dental treatment: around six to eight months for an appointment unless the patient decides to go private, which is a lot more expensive.391 The KFU medical students also say that oncology departments are only found in the main cities. One of the trainee doctors remarks that he sees oncology patients from al-​Ahsa going to Dammam on the train for treatment as there is no oncology treatment in al-​ Ahsa.392 This problem was identified by Mousa and Aldehayyat, who point out health policy-​makers in Saudi Arabia need to consider the differences between the regions to improve the efficiency of healthcare services. Thus, some of the resources need to be switched between the regions to improve efficiency.393 Although it is ‘common knowledge’ that 25 per cent of the government budget is spent on health (in 2017, health and education accounted for 45 per cent of the budget),394 at a state-​run hospital ‘you find corruption as soon as you go through the entrance’. To make matters worse, wasta is necessary to get into a good public hospital –​thus, many young men believe there is room for significant improvement.395 Furthermore, this situation is worse if a person is taken ill in one of the less well-​off provinces.396 However, unlike housing, quality healthcare cannot result in a ‘quick win’ for the government as it will take at least 10–​15 years to address the current problems.397 In fact, for some young men the main difficulties are the waste of money and resources. One individual recalls that after an accident he required physiotherapy on his leg at a ‘special place for this with lots of expensive equipment and even a pool, but when I went in the afternoon I was always the only one there’. In his opinion, this was a case of badly managed resources.398

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Notes 1 An earlier version of this section on the social contract was written in 2016. See:  Thompson, M.C., ‘Re-​evaluating the Saudi “Social Contract”:  The Perspective of Saudi Male Graduates, in Jones, D.B. and Sahraoui, S. (eds) The Future of Labour Market Reform in the Gulf Region:  Towards a Multi-​ Disciplinary, Evidence-​ Based and Practical Understanding, Gerlach Press, Berlin, 2018, pp. 36–​43. 2 These issues were discussed at a Chatham House workshop where the author was a participant: Chatham House, The Social Contract in the GCC: Middle East and North Africa Programme Workshop Summary, Chatham House, London, 11–​12 January 2016, available at: www.chathamhouse.org/​sites/​files/ chathamhouse/​events/​110416-​GCC-​Social-​Contract-​Workshop-​Summary .pdf; See also: www.chathamhouse.org/​event/​social-​contract-​in-​gcc; www .chathamhouse.org/​ a bout/​ s tructure/​ m ena- ​ p rogramme/ ​ f uture- ​ t rendsgcc-​project. 3 Champion, D., The Paradoxical Kingdom: Saudi Arabia and the Momentum for Reform, Columbia University Press, New York, 2003, pp. 309–​10. 4 Utvik, B.O., ‘Introduction’, in Selvik, K. and Utvik, B.O. (eds) Oil States in the New Middle East: Uprisings and Stability, Routledge, Abingdon, 2016, p. 2. 5 Chatham House, The Social Contract in the GCC, p. 2. 6 Hertog, S.  ‘Segmented Clientelism:  The Political Economy of Saudi Economic Reform Efforts’, in Aarts, P.  and Nonneman, G.  (eds) Saudi Arabia in the Balance:  Political Economy, Society, Foreign Affairs, C.  Hurst & Co., London, 2005, p. 111. 7 In order to counter this problem, the two online surveys conducted for the paper on which this section is based both provide an explanation of the term ‘social contract’. English: A Social Contract is an implicit/​understood agreement between citizens and the government whereby the citizens are provided with services and benefits by the government in return for citizens fulfilling their civic duties that contribute to the nation. Arabic: ‫العقد اإلجتماعي هو اتفاق‬ ‫ضمن ّي بين المواطن والحكومة بحيث يتلقى المواطن الخدمات والفوائد مقابل أدائه لواجباته المدنية التي تساهم‬ ‫في إعمار الوطن‬ 8 Ayubi, N., Over-​Stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East, I.B. Tauris, London, 2006, p. 48. 9 al-​Khobar focus group, April 2017. 10 Belbagi, Z., ‘Renegotiating the Social Contract in the GCC: Lessons from the Rousseau Playbook’, Gulf Affairs, ‘Labour Markets Dynamics in the GCC States’, Autumn 2015, p. 3. 11 Okruhlik, G., ‘The Politics of Distributive States’, in Selvik, K. and Utvik, B.O. (eds) Oil States in the New Middle East: Uprisings and Stability, Routledge, Abingdon, 2016, p. 25. 12 Response to author’s survey. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid.

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18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid. 25 Kattan, ‘A Review and Critique of the Saudisation Metanarrative’, p. 217. 26 Response to author’s survey. 27 Niblock, T., Saudi Arabia:  Power, Legitimacy and Survival, Routledge, Abingdon, 2006, p. 71. 28 Response to author’s survey. 29 Hertog, S., ‘Challenges to the Saudi Distributional State in the Age of Austerity’, in Al Rasheed, M. (ed.) Salman’s Legacy: The Dilemmas of a New Era in Saudi Arabia, C. Hurst & Co., London, 2018, p. 94. 30 Niblock, T. and Malik, M., The Political Economy of Saudi Arabia, Routledge, Abingdon, 2007, p. 20. 31 Amalgamated anonymous responses to author’s survey. 32 This concept of promoting a post-​oil mentality was part of an international project with the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) I was involved with. See:  Thompson, M.C., ‘Saudi Arabia:  Civil Society and Natural Resource Management’, in Overland, I.  (ed.) Public Brain Power: Civil Society and Natural Resource Management, Palgrave Macmillan/​Springer International, Cham, Switzerland, 2018. 33 For an explanation of regional and sectarian divisions in Saudi Arabia, see, Al Shihabi, A., The Saudi Kingdom: Between the Jihadi Hammer and the Iranian Anvil, Markus Wiener Publishers, Princeton, NJ, 2016, pp. 90–​1. 34 Nowadays, Shia Qatif is basically a suburb of Dammam. 35 Response to author’s survey. 36 Ibid. 37 Mouline, N., The Clerics of Islam:  Religious Authority and Political Power in Saudi Arabia, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 2014, p. 14. 38 Yamani, M., ‘Saudi Youth: Initiative and Inertia’, in Khalaf, S. and Khalaf, R. (eds) Arab Youth: Social Mobilisation in Times of Risk, Saqi Books, London, 2011, p. 124 39 Al Atawneh, M., ‘ Saudi Arabia: Why the ‘Ulama Are Stalling Liberalization’, in Teitelbaum, J. (ed.) Political Liberalization in the Persian Gulf, C. Hurst & Co., London, 2009, p. 88. 40 Response to author’s survey. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid. 43 See, for example: Taha, S.M., ‘New Guide Sheds Light on Citizens Account Program’, Arab News, 9 January 2017, available at:  www.arabnews.com/​ node/​1036221/​saudi-​arabia; Staff writer, ‘Saudi “Citizens Account” Program Explained’, Al Arabiya, 25 December 2016, available at:  https://​ english.alarabiya.net/​ e n/​ business/​ e conomy/​ 2 016/ ​ 1 2/ ​ 2 5/ ​ S audi-CitizensAccount-​program-​explained-​.html. 44 Onaizah focus group, March 2017.

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45 Obaid, R., ‘ “Citizen Account Program” to Help Saudis Face Economic Changes’, Arab News, 13 December 2017, available at: www.arabnews.com/​ node/​1208256/​saudi-​arabia. 46 Young, K.E., ‘A Home of One’s Own: Subsidized Housing as a Key Lever of Gulf Domestic Policy’, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, 15 June 2018, available at:  https://​agsiw.org/​a-​home-​of-​ones-​own-​subsidized-​ housing-​as-​a-​key-​lever-​of-​gulf-​domestic-​policy. 47 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 48 Response to author’s survey. 49 Ibid. 50 Okruhlik, G., ‘State Power, Religious Privilege, and Myths about Political Reform’, in Ayoob, M.  and Kosebalaban, H.  (eds) Religion and Politics in Saudi Arabia: Wahhabism and the State, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, CO, 2009, p. 99. 51 Response to author’s survey. 52 Menoret, The Saudi Enigma, p. 108 53 Yamani, M., ‘Saudi Youth’, p. 114. 54 Response to author’s survey. 55 Ibid. 56 Cronin, S., ‘Youth Unemployment One of Toughest Challenges for Saudi Arabia, IMF Official Says’, The National, 17 January 2017, available at: www .thenational.ae/​business/​youth-​unemployment-​one-​of-​toughest-​challenges-​ for-​saudi-​arabia-​imf-​official-​says-​1.61693. 57 See, for example: www.stats.gov.sa/​en/​816; Business News, ‘Unemployment Rate among Saudis Rises to Record 12.9  percent in First Quarter’, Reuters, 5 July 2018, available at:  www.reuters.com/​article/​us-​saudi-​labour/​ unemployment-​rate-​among-​saudis-​r ises-​to-​record-​12-​9-​percent-​in-​first-​ quarter-​idUSKBN1JV0TA. 58 SUSTG team, ‘Unemployment Unchanged in Saudi Arabia in Latest Labor Market Report’, Saudi–​US Trade Group, 30 October 2018, available at:  http://​sustg.com/​unemployment-unchanged-​in-​saudi-arabia-​in-​latestlabor-​market-​report. 59 Anon, ‘Saudi Arabia’s Unemployment Rate Drops to 12.7%’, Arab News, 2 April 2019, available at: www.arabnews.com/node/1475471/business-economy. 60 Government of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Saudi Vision 2030, available at: https://​vision2030.gov.sa/​en, p. 39. 61 England, A. and Al Omran, A., ‘Saudi Arabia: Why Jobs Overhaul Could Define MBS’s Rule’, Financial Times, 28 February 2019, available at: www .ft.com/content/fc240c0e-29fb-11e9-88a4-c32129756dd8. 62 See: www.stats.gov.sa. 63 Anon, Summary of the Main Changes in the Labor Market in Q1–​ 2018, Strategic Gears Management Consultancy, Riyadh, September 2018, available at:  www.strategicgears.com/​wp-​content/​uploads/​2018/​09/​Summary-​of-​ teh-​Main-​Change-​in-​the-​Labor-​Market-​Q1-​2018.pdf, p. 4. 64 Hofuf focus group, December 2016. 65 Al Seghayer, Real Face of Saudi Arabia, p. 71. 66 See, for example: Al Omran, A., ‘Saudi Arabia Raises the Alarm over Rising Unemployment’, Financial Times, 24 April 2018, available at:  www.ft.com/​ content/​df579534-​47c3-​11e8-​8ae9-​4b5ddcca99b3.

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67 Niblock and Malik, The Political Economy of Saudi Arabia, p. 209. 68 See: ‫السعودية‬# ‫فضيحة معرض التوظيف فى جامعة الملك سعود‬, https://​youtu.be/​ rS2oSkwD4EU. 69 For pre-​2014 attitudes to employment see:  Thompson, ‘Self-​Motivation, Career Aspirations and Work Responsibilities’, pp. 35–​55. 70 al-​Khobar focus group, November 2016. 71 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 72 Hertog, S., ‘Back to the Seventies? Saudi Youth and the Kingdom’s Political Economy after the Arab Uprisings’, in Selvik, K. and Utvik, B.O. (eds) Oil States in the New Middle East: Uprisings and Stability, Routledge, Abingdon, 2016, pp. 85–​6. 73 Singerman, D., ‘The Economic Imperatives of Marriage: Emerging Practices and Identities among Youth in the Middle East’, Wolfensohn Center for Development: Dubai School of Government, No. 6, Wolfensohn Center for Development, Dubai, 2007, pp. 7–​8. 74 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 75 Hertog, S., ‘Redesigning the Distributional Bargain in the GCC’, in Hudson, M. and Kirk, M. (eds) Gulf Politics and Economics in a Changing World, World Scientific, Singapore, 2014, p. 36. 76 Dhahran focus group, December 2016. 77 Ibid. Even the number of available work internships was affected. 78 Hofuf focus group, December 2016. ‘One thing I think is worth mentioning is the stock market event. This affected a lot of people because they lost so much money, which had an effect on real estate.’ 79 Ibid. 80 Ibid. 81 Qatif, Tarout Island focus group, October 2016. 82 Al Seghayer, K., Real Face of Saudi Arabia, p. 55. 83 al-​Ahsa focus group, June 2017. 84 Dhahran focus group, November 2016. He concedes that it is different for long-​term non-​Saudi residents, but also believes that some have a job for life. 85 Ibid. 86 This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6. 87 Dhahran focus group, December 2016. 88 Riyadh focus group, February 2018. 89 Dhahran focus group, November 2016; ibid: ‘Everyone is talking about the current economic and political situation. In fact, even kids talk about political issues such as the oil price and Syria these days.’ 90 Ibid. 91 I know chemical engineering graduates who were unemployed for up to two years. 92 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 93 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. 94 Ibid. 95 Jones, D., Punshi, R. and Gupta, G. ‘Youth Employability and Its Cultural and Institutional Context: Do Current Institutions and Policies Promote or Prevent Greater Productivity and Positivity Within Local Labour Markets Towards the Knowledge-​Based Economies of the Future?’, in Thompson,

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M.C. and Quilliam, N. (eds) Policy Making in the GCC: State, Citizens and Institutions, I.B. Tauris, London, 2017, p. 178. 96 Ramady, M., The Saudi Arabian Economy:  Policies, Achievements and Challenges, 2nd Edition, Springer, New York, 2010, p. 378. 97 Najran focus group, November 2016. 98 See, for example: Al Saud, S., ‘MOL’s Article 77 Is Designed to Humiliate Saudi Workers!’, Saudi Gazette, 5 December 2015, available at:  http://​ saudigazette.com.sa/ ​ a rticle/ ​ 1 43859/ ​ M OLs- ​ A rticle- ​ 7 7- ​ i s- ​ d esignedto-​humiliate-​Saudi-​workers! 99 Aldosari, H., ‘Saudi Arabia’s Post-​ Oil Future’, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, 15 May 2017, available at:  www.agsiw.org/​saudi-​ arabias-​post-​oil-​future/​#more-​14121. 100 Views expressed by multiple Eastern Province focus groups, 2016–​18. 101 Umm Al Qura University focus group, Makkah, February 2017. 102 Hofuf focus group, December 2016. 103 Ibid. 104 Safwa focus group, January 2017. 105 Hertog, S., ‘Back to the Seventies?’, p. 82. 106 Safwa focus group, January 2017. 107 Ibid. 108 Interview with Sami, Jubail, March 2017 109 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017. 110 ‘I spend my weekends in Aflaj but I work in Najran so I drive 600 kilometres there and back every weekend (at top speed!). I like my job but we get disturbed by the sound of gunfire in the hills on the border.’ Layla, al-​Aflaj focus group, April 2017. 111 Jawazat is one of the agencies in the Ministry of Interior (MoI). It is also called General Directorate of Passports (GDP), and is responsible for controlling immigration, Saudi citizen passports and expatriate visas. 112 Bosbait, M.  and Wilson, R., ‘Education, School to Work Transitions and Unemployment in Saudi Arabia’, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 41, Issue 4, 2005, p. 542. 113 See: www.saudiaramco.com/​en/​home/​careers/​saudi-​applicants/​our-​programs/ high-​school-​and-​diploma-​graduates/​CDPNE.html. 114 Dhahran focus group, November 2016. 115 Interview with Aziz, Riyadh, April 2017. 116 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017. ‘Also I cannot go to Bahrain at the weekend.’ 117 Saudi Basic Industries Corporation. See: www.sabic.com/​en. 118 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017. 119 al-​Majmaah focus group, March 2017. 120 Ibid. 121 Ibid. 122 Abha focus group, November 2016. 123 Ibid. 124 See:  Perrin, H.  ‘The Nitaqat Program:  What Employers in Saudi Arabia Need To Know’, Norton Rose Fulbright, 11 November 2013, available at: www.globalworkplaceinsider.com/​2 013/​1 1/​t he-​n itaqat-​p rogram-​w hatemployers-​in-​saudi-​arabia-​need-​to-​know.

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125 Jabarti, S., ‘Nitaqat Is Fair to All:  Fakeih’, Arab News, 13 August 2011, available at: www.arabnews.com/​node/​387500. 126 Cowan, D., The Coming Economic Implosion of Saudi Arabia:  A Behavioral Perspective, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, Switzerland, 2018, p. 35. 127 Hofuf focus group, December 2016. See, for example: www.realsaudi.com/​ nitaqat-​system-​categories-​of-​employerkafeel-​or-​companies-​ksa. 128 Ibid. ‘The problem with Saudization is that it is being done solely with small businesses such as mobile phone shops –​it should be done at much higher levels.’ 129 Interview with Mohammed, Dhahran, March 2017. 130 Cowan, The Coming Economic Implosion of Saudi Arabia, p.35. 131 Interview with Mohammed, Dhahran, March 2017. 132 Hofuf focus group, December 2016. 133 Ibid. 134 Qatif, Tarout Island focus group, October 2016. 135 Layla, al-​Aflaj focus group, April 2017. 136 Dhahran focus group, October 2018. ‘Because we want to go to either a Turkish or Moroccan barber, not a Saudi one –​it’s about quality. Although there are videos on social media that show you “how to barber” and these are quite popular. But there is still the issue of social status especially amongst parents and older relatives.’ 137 Ramady, M., ‘Gulf Unemployment and Government Policies: Prospects for the Saudi Labour Quota or Nitaqat System’, International Journal Economics and Business Research, Vol. 5, Issue 4, 2013, pp. 476–​98. 138 See: www.jarir.com/​sa-​en. 139 Dhahran focus group, October 2018. 140 Ramady, The Saudi Arabian Economy: Policies, Achievements and Challenges, p. 480. 141 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017. 142 Qassim, Onaizah focus group, March 2017. 143 Safwa focus group, January 2017. 144 Damanhouri, L., ‘Abdulaziz Alshuaibi  –​the Saudi Construction Worker Breaking Stereotypes’, Al Bilad, 30 November 2018, available at:  www .albiladdailyeng.com/ ​ a bdulaziz- ​ a lshuaibi-saudi- ​ c onstruction-workerbreaking-​stereotypes. 145 Qatif, Tarout Island focus group, October 2016. 146 al-​Ahsa focus group, June 2017. 147 Safwa focus group, January 2017. 148 Ibid. 149 Ibid. 150 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 151 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 152 Hofuf focus group, December 2016. 153 Safwa focus group, January 2017. 154 Ibid. 155 Hofuf focus group, December 2016. According to him, at the Arabian Drilling Company 95 per cent of workers come from al-​Ahsa. 156 Al Anazi, A., Behavioral Attitude the Cause for High Unemployment in Saudi Arabia, Open University of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, 2010, p. 25.

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157 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 158 Hofuf focus group, December 2016. 159 Safwa focus group, January 2017. ‘It concerns them that most contracted workers live in terrible conditions.’ 160 Qassim, Onaizah focus group, March 2017. 161 Qatif, Awamiya focus group, April 2017. 162 Safwa focus group, January 2017. 163 Ibid. 164 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. ‘Yes, it is bad for young men trying to find jobs, but the competition is fair in my opinion.’ 165 Ibid. 166 Ibid. According to one individual, although it is a fact that women do not have the options that men do, women still ‘demand their rights and want to keep their privileges’. 167 Al Rasheed, M., ‘Caught between Religion and State:  Women in Saudi Arabia’, in Haykal, B., Hegghammer, T. and Lacroix S., (eds) Saudi Arabia in Transition: Insights on Political, Economic and Religious Change, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015, p. 305. 168 Riyadh focus group, May 2017. 169 Ibid. 170 See for example:  Acton, G., ‘Women Take Top Roles in Saudi Finance Giants’, CNBC, 20 February 2017, available at:  www.cnbc.com/​2017/​02/​ 20/​women-​take-​top-​roles-​in-​saudi-​finance-​giants.html. 171 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. 172 Interview with Bandar, al-​Khobar, March 2016. 173 Wasta means having influence through connections: it is not what you know, it is who you know. 174 Ramady, M.A., The Political Economy ofWasta: Use and Abuse of Social Capital Networking, Springer, Cham, Switzerland, 2016, p. vii. 175 Yamani, ‘Saudi Youth’, p. 120. 176 Layla, al-​Aflaj focus group, April 2017. 177 Ibid. 178 An Qassim focus group complains that ‘Corruption is the main problem in Saudi Arabia. Even UAE leader Shaikh Mohammed bin Zayed says it is the main problem here.’ 179 Safwa focus group, January 2017. 180 Ibid. 181 Layla, al-​Aflaj focus group, April 2017. 182 Hofuf focus group, December 2016. 183 Layla, al-​Aflaj focus group, April 2017. This group included a medical equipment supervisor at Prince Sattam University; a fourth year English language student at Prince Sattam University (who cannot speak English) –​ a mobile phone shop owner; and a young man works for a private company that runs the main hospital. 184 Hofuf focus group, December 2016. ‘But you could argue that the concept of wasta is fine, it is the application that is the problem.’ 185 Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, GEM Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Report, Global Entrepreneurship Research Association, London, p.  5, available at: www.gemconsortium.org/​country-​profile/​141.

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186 Andreessen, M., ‘Foreword’, in Schroeder, C.  Startup Rising:  The Entrepreneurial Revolution Remaking the Middle East, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2013, p. xii. 187 Al Baqmi, S., ‘SAMA: Non-​Oil Sector Contribution in GDP Likely to Rise’, Asharq Al-​Awsat, 27 October 2017, available at: https://​aawsat.com/​ english/​h ome/​a rticle/​1 065316/​s ama-​n on-​o il-​s ector-​c ontribution-​g dp-​ likely-​r ise. 188 Riyadh focus group, February 2018. 189 Anon, ‘Best Countries:  Entrepreneurship Rankings’, US News & World Report, 2018, available at:  www.usnews.com/​news/​best-​countries/​ entrepreneurship-​full-​list. 190 Government of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Saudi Vision 2030, p. 39. 191 Ramady, M., The Saudi Arabian Economy, p. 195. 192 Government of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Saudi Vision 2030, p. 36. 193 See: https://​smea.gov.sa/​en. 194 Interview with Rozana, Jeddah, February 2017. 195 See: http://​ei.kfupm.edu.sa. 196 See: www.dtvc.com.sa. 197 See: https://​waed.net/​en/​home.html. 198 See: https://​innovation.kaust.edu.sa/​taqadam. 199 See: https://​badir.com.sa/​en. 200 See: www.flat6labsjeddah.com/​en. 201 See: http://​r vc.com.sa/​?lang=en. 202 See: www.kkfeng.org. 203 See: http://​wadimakkah.sa. 204 See: www.mbsc.edu.sa. 205 See: https://​meras.gov.sa/​Home/​MerasCenter?landingpage=3. 206 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. 207 Interview with Hussain and Ali, Dhahran, December 2016. 208 Burton, E., Business and Entrepreneurship in Saudi Arabia: Opportunities for Partnering and Investing in Emerging Businesses, John Wiley & Sons Inc., Hoboken, NJ, 2016, pp. 120–​1. 209 See: http://​miskglobalforum.com. 210 Damanhouri, L., ‘Misk Promotes Entrepreneurship’, Saudi Gazette, 15 November 2017, available at:  http://​saudigazette.com.sa/​article/​521998/​ SAUDI-​ARABIA/​Misk-​promotes-​entrepreneurship. 211 Author’s observation, Riyadh, November 2017. 212 Views expressed by multiple entrepreneurs across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 213 Safwa focus group, January 2017. 214 Interview with Bader, Riyadh, November 2017. 215 Oukil, M.S., ‘Wasta and Development in Arab and Muslim Countries’, in Ramady, M.A. (ed.) The Political Economy of Wasta: Use and Abuse of Social Capital Networking, Springer, Cham, Switzerland, 2016, p. 132. 216 Discussion at KFUPM 5th Entrepreneurship Forum ‘Collaborative Entrepreneurship:  An Imperative for Saudi Vision 2030’, Dhahran, February, 2018. 217 Ibid. 218 Riyadh focus group, February 2018. ‘I think the start-​up trend will die eventually, but in the long term, because this has just started here.’

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219 Discussion at KFUPM 5th Entrepreneurship Forum. 220 Response to author’s online survey: ‫ هل تفضل البدأ بمشروع عمل‬،‫إذا توفرت لك الفرصة‬ ‫خاص بك؟ لم\لم ال؟‬ 221 See: www.careem.com/​en-​ae/​cities/​riyadh. 222 Response to author’s online survey: ‫ هل تفضل البدأ بمشروع عمل‬،‫إذا توفرت لك الفرصة‬ ‫خاص بك؟ لم\لم ال؟‬ 223 Discussion at KFUPM 5th Entrepreneurship Forum 224 Response to author’s online survey: ‫ هل تفضل البدأ بمشروع عمل‬،‫إذا توفرت لك الفرصة‬ ‫خاص بك؟ لم\لم ال؟‬ 225 Ibid. 226 Interview with founder of Faheem, Dhahran, February 2018. 227 Discussion at KFUPM 5th Entrepreneurship Forum. 228 Response to author’s online survey: ‫ هل تفضل البدأ بمشروع عمل‬،‫إذا توفرت لك الفرصة‬ ‫خاص بك؟ لم\لم ال؟‬ 229 Ibid. 230 See: https://​maestropizza.com/​#/​home. 231 See, for example, https://​destinationksa.com/​a-​slice-​of-​saudi-​pride. 232 Response to author’s online survey: ‫ هل تفضل البدأ بمشروع عمل‬،‫إذا توفرت لك الفرصة‬ ‫خاص بك؟ لم\لم ال؟‬ 233 Ibid. 234 Interview with volunteer EI consultant, Dhahran, March 2018. 235 Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, GEM Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Report, p. 13. 236 Discussion at KFUPM 5th Entrepreneurship Forum: ‘Not love failure, but tolerate it as a case of both wanting and needing to encourage failure.’ 237 Response to author’s online survey: ‫ هل تفضل البدأ بمشروع عمل‬،‫إذا توفرت لك الفرصة‬ ‫خاص بك؟ لم\لم ال؟‬ 238 Al Baqmi, S., ‘Saudi Arabia: New Bankruptcy Law Pushes Investment Climate, Facilitates Business Performance’, Asharq Al-​Awsat, 20 February 2018, available at: https://​aawsat.com/​english/​home/​article/​1181601/​ saudi-​arabia-​new-​bankruptcy-​law-​pushes-​investment-​climate-​facilitates-​ business. 239 Interview with Ahmad, EI, DTV, December 2017. 240 Ibid; discussion at KFUPM 5th Entrepreneurship Forum. 241 Interview with Mohammed, EI, DTV, December 2017. 242 Response to author’s online survey: ‫ هل تفضل البدأ بمشروع عمل‬،‫إذا توفرت لك الفرصة‬ ‫خاص بك؟ لم\لم ال؟‬ 243 Interview with volunteer EI consultant, Dhahran, March 2018. 244 See: www.sarahah.com. 245 See: http://​wainnakel.com. 246 See: https://​faheemapp.com. 247 Interview with founder of Faheem, Dhahran, February 2018. 248 Interview with volunteer EI consultant, Dhahran, March 2018. 249 Discussion at KFUPM 5th Entrepreneurship Forum. The start-​up was also awarded a US$180,000 scholarship from Microsoft. The founder and CEO ZainAlabdin Tawfiq was a former student of the author. 250 Cassin, E., ‘Sarahah:  Anonymous App Dropped from Apple and Google Stores after Bullying Accusations’, BBC News, 26 February 2018, available at: www.bbc.com/​news/​blogs-​trending-​43174619.

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251 Ibid. 252 Interview with volunteer EI consultant, Dhahran, March 2018. 253 Ibid. 254 Khan, S. ‘Food Trucks: Concept of Mobile Street Vendors comes to Saudi Arabia’, Arab News, 24 March 2017, available at: www.arabnews.com/​node/​ 1073071/​food-​health. 255 Afnan, A., ‘Saudi Arabia’s Food Truck Craze’, Raseef22, 30 March 2017, available at: https://​raseef22.com/​en/​life/​2017/​04/​30/​saudi-​arabias-foodtruck-craze. 256 Ibid. 257 Interview with founder of Hobby District, Dhahran, February 2018: ‘It is easier to stand out in Saudi Arabia, unlike in the UAE.’ 258 See, for example: Buller, A., ‘Khalid Al-​Khudair: The Saudi Diversity Don’, Arab News, 13 April 2018, available at: www.arabnews.com/​node/​1284406/​ saudi-​arabia. 259 See: www.ycombinator.com. 260 Interview with founder of Faheem, Dhahran, February 2018. 261 Ibid. 262 Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, GEM Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Report, p. 23. 263 Riyadh focus group, February 2018. 264 Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, GEM Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Report, p. 23. 265 Interview with Bader, Riyadh, November 2017. 266 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 267 See: Thompson, ‘Self-​ Motivation, Career Aspirations and Work Responsibilities’, pp. 35–​55. 268 Al-​Aflaj focus group, April 2017. 269 KFUPM: GS 447 Globalization course, student project, May 2015. 270 Riyadh focus group, February 2018. 271 Interview with Abdulkareem, Riyadh, March 2017. 272 Discussion at KFUPM 5th Entrepreneurship Forum. 273 Riyadh focus group, February 2018. 274 Interview with founder of Faheem, Dhahran, February 2018. 275 Isenberg, D.J., ‘How to Start an Entrepreneurial Revolution’, Harvard Business Review, 1 June 2010, available at:  https://​institute.coop/​sites/​ default/​files/​resources/​Isenberg%20-​%20How%20to%20Start%20an%20 Entrepreneurial%20Revolution.pdf. 276 Views expressed by multiple entrepreneurs across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 277 Discussion at KFUPM 5th Entrepreneurship Forum. 278 Riyadh focus group, February 2018. However, another individual believes the ‘philosophy of mentorship’ is still lacking in Saudi Arabia. 279 Discussion at KFUPM 5th Entrepreneurship Forum. 280 Interview with Ahmad, EI, DTV, December 2017. 281 Ibid. 282 Discussion at KFUPM 5th Entrepreneurship Forum. 283 Interview with Ahmad, EI, DTV, December 2017. 284 Interview with Abdulkareem, Riyadh, February 2017. 285 See: www.badir-​bootcamp.com/​en.

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286 Layla, al-​Aflaj focus group, April 2017. 287 Discussion at KFUPM 5th Entrepreneurship Forum. See, also:  www .mainmena.com/​angel-​groups/​oqal. 288 Ibid. 289 Riyadh focus group, February 2018. 290 Andreessen, M., ‘Foreword’, p. xi. 291 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 292 Hofuf focus group, December 2016. 293 Interview with Ahmad, DTV, December 2017. 294 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 295 Hofuf focus group, December 2016. 296 Riyadh focus group, October 2016. 297 Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, GEM Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Report, p. 4. 298 Middle East Business Intelligence, ‘Housing Crisis Looms in Saudi Arabia’, MEED, 1 April 2010, available at:  www.meed.com/​sectors/​construction/​ real-​estate/​housing-​crisis-​looms-​in-​saudi-​arabia/​3104147.article. 299 Opoku, R.  and Abdul-​Muhmin, A., ‘Housing Preferences and Attribute Importance among Low-​Income Consumers in Saudi Arabia’, in Habitat International, Vol. 34, Issue 2, 2010, p. 219. 300 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. 301 Young, ‘A Home of One’s Own’. 302 Al Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017. ‘Others disagree and consider this the individual’s responsibility, as the government already provides free education and healthcare.’ 303 Taha, S., ‘Housing Ministry Launches 27,658 Housing Products across Kingdom’, Arab News, 16 July 2017, available at: www.arabnews.com/​node/​ 1130141/​saudi-​arabia. 304 Paul, K. and Rashad, M., ‘Saudi Arabia Says Close to Major Deals in $100 Billion Housing Scheme’, Reuters, 3 May 2017, available at:  www.reuters .com/​article/​us-​saudi-​housing/​saudi-​arabia-​says-​close-​to-​major-​deals-​in-​ 100-​billion-​housing-​scheme-​idUSKBN17Z1MG. 305 Schatzker, E. and Nereim, V., ‘Saudi’s $19 Billion Stimulus Will Prioritize Housing and Small Business’, Bloomberg, 14 December 2017, available at: www.bloomberg.com/​news/​articles/​2017-​12-​13/​saudi-​19-​billion-​stimulusto- ​ p rioritize-​ h ousing-​ s mall-​ b usiness?cmpid=socialflow-​ t witter-​ business&utm_​content=business&utm_​campaign=socialflow-organic& utm_​source=twitter&utm_​medium=social. 306 Taha, S., ‘Housing Ministry Launches 27,658 Housing Products Across Kingdom’. 307 Salama, A., ‘A Lifestyle Theories Approach for Affordable Housing Research in Saudi Arabia’, Emirates Journal for Engineering Research, Vol. 11, Issue 1, 2006, p. 67. 308 SUSTG team, ‘Demand for Homes in the Kingdom Soars, But Supply Falls Short’, Saudi–​US Trade Group, 12 April 2017, available at:  http://​sustg .com/​demand-​for-​homes-​in-​the-​kingdom-​soars-​but-​supply-​falls-​short. 309 Anon, ‘Saudi Housing Ministry Unveils Four New Housing Projects’, Asharq Al-​Awsat, 1 February 2018, available at:  https://​aawsat.com/ english/​home/​article/​1161676/​saudi-​housing-​ministry-unveils-four-newhousing-​projects?amp.

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310 Anon, ‘Ninth Batch of Saudi Sakani Program Launched’, Arab News, 17 September 2018, available at:  www.arabnews.com/​node/​1373066/​ saudi-​arabia. 311 Anon, ‘Saudi Home Ownership Rate To Be Boosted, Says Hugail’, Argaam, 16 May 2016, available at:  www.argaam.com/​en/​article/​articledetail/​id/​ 426746. 312 Al Jassem, D., ‘52 Per Cent of Saudis in Riyadh Rent Houses’, Arab News, 7 February 2013, available at:  www.arabnews.com/​saudi-​arabia/​ 52-​saudis-​riyadh-​rent-​houses. 313 Anon, ‘Nearly 50 Per Cent Citizens Own Houses in Saudi Arabia’, Arab News, 26 January 2018, available at:  www.arabnews.com/​node/​1233301/​ saudi-​arabia. 314 Young, ‘A Home of One’s Own’. 315 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​17. 316 Hofuf focus group, December 2016. However, one young man argues that in order to reduce land prices the government needs to offer people apartments, as it is all about increasing supply to reduce demand. 317 Ibid. 318 Ibid. See, for example: Shabrawi A. and Alsabti, M., ‘Apartment Owners Lament Shoddy Construction, Poor Maintenance’, Saudi Gazette, 28 February 2014, available at:  http://​saudigazette.com.sa/​article/​76348/​ Apartment-​owners-​lament-​shoddy-​construction-​poor-​maintenance. 319 See, for example: www.arcgis.com/​home/​item.html?id=413039ecc1fa4488 9bfdbed3dde3f226. 320 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 321 Ibid. 322 A majlis is a ‘sitting place’ where family and friends gather to exchange news, receive guests, socialize, watch television and be entertained. 323 See, for example: Long, D., Culture and Customs of Saudi Arabia, Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 2005, p. 65. 324 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 325 Anon, ‘Saudi hospitality: 40 per cent of space in homes dedicated to guests’, Arab News, 16 December 2017, available at:  www.arabnews.com/​node/​ 1209781/​saudi-​arabia. 326 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 327 Ibid. 328 Hofuf focus group, December 2016. 329 Ibid. 330 Ibid. ‘Saudi men believe it is their right to build a house, even if there are socio-​financial implications such as housing tax and transportation issues as you move horizontally outwards.’ 331 Opoku and Abdul-​ Muhmin, ‘Housing Preferences and Attribute Importance’, p. 225. 332 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 333 Ibid. 334 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 335 Young, ‘A Home of One’s Own’. 336 See, for example: www.numbeo.com/​property-​investment/​in/​Riyadh. 337 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. 338 Ibid.

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339 Umm Al Qura University focus group, Makkah, February 2017. 340 Ibid. 341 Ibid. 342 Ibid. 343 Hofuf focus group, December 2016. 344 Ibid. 345 Ibid. 346 Layla, al-​Aflaj focus group, April 2017. 347 See: www.saudihomeloans.com/​phase2/​en/​homee.aspx. 348 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017. 349 Qassim focus group, Onaizah, March 2017. 350 Umm Al Qura University focus group, Makkah, February 2017. They also note that if a young man is from a tribal village then he will probably want to stay in that village. 351 Ibid. 352 Ibid. 353 Hofuf focus group, December 2016. 354 Riyadh focus group, May 2017. 355 Allam, A., ‘Saudi Arabia Approves First Mortgage Law’, Financial Times, 3 July 2012, available at:  www.ft.com/​content/​327154d6-c46111e1-9c1e-​00144feabdc0. 356 Hofuf focus group, December 2016. 357 Anon, ‘Expat Dependents’ Fees Reduce Apartment Rents’, Saudi Gazette, 8 April 2017, available at: http://​saudigazette.com.sa/​article/​514683/​SAUDI-​ ARABIA/​Expat-​dependents. 358 Government of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Saudi Vision 2030, p. 29. 359 al-​Ahsa focus group, June 2017. 360 Hassan, R., ‘Technologies Will Play a Key Role in Transformation of Health Services, Says Saudi Minister’, Arab News, 11 October 2018, available at: www.arabnews.com/​node/​1385876/​saudi-​arabia. 361 al-​Ahsa focus group, June 2017: ‘We should not forget that we get free treatment and free medication here.’ 362 Almalki, M., Fitzgerald, G. and Clark, M., ‘Health Care System in Saudi Arabia:  An Overview’, Eastern Mediterranean Health Journal, Vol. 17, No. 10, 2011, pp. 784–​93. 363 Ibid. 364 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 365 Almalki, Fitzgerald and Clark, ‘Health Care System in Saudi Arabia’, p. 789. 366 Hamad bin Abdullah Al Manie, 2003–​ 09; Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Rabiah, 2009–​14; Adel Fakeih 2014 (acting); Dr Mohammed Al-​Hayaza 2014–​January 2015; Ahmed Al Khatib January 2015–​April 2015; Mohamad Al ash-​Sheikh April 2015–​April 2015; Eng. Khalid Al Falih April 2015–​ May 2016; Dr Tawfiq Al Rabiah May 2016–​present. 367 Abha focus group, November 2016. 368 al-​Ahsa focus group, June 2017. 369 Abha focus group, November 2016. 370 Ibid.

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371 Abha focus group, November 2016. 372 Anon, ‘Leadership Development Can Help Tackle KSA’s Healthcare Issues:  Ashridge’, Saudi Gazette, 29 June 2017, available at:  http://​ saudigazette.com.sa/ ​ b usiness/ ​ l eadership-​ d evelopment-can-helptackle-​ksas-​healthcare-​issues-​ashridge. 373 Abha focus group, November 2016. 374 Ibid. 375 Mousa, W. and Aldehayyat, J.S., ‘Regional Efficiency of Healthcare Services in Saudi Arabia’, Middle East Development Journal, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2018, p. 170. 376 Abha focus group, November 2016. 377 Ibid. 378 Government of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Saudi Vision 2030, p. 29. 379 Ibid. ‘Although I  believe that Aramco insurance is no longer valid for retirees.’ 380 al-​Ahsa focus group, June 2017. ‘From an economic point of view it costs the government a lot, but the decision to make insurance for every individual is a good idea.’ 381 Abha focus group, November 2016. However, they believe that the MoH needs to identify a programme that it can use as a model, for example the two-​year programme at Saudi Aramco. 382 al-​Ahsa focus group, June 2017. 383 Ibid. 384 Ibid. 385 Abha focus group, November 2016. 386 See:  www.hdrinc.com/​portfolio/​king-​faisal-​and-​prince-​mohammed-​medicalcities. 387 Abha focus group, November 2016. 388 Ibid. 389 Abha focus group, November 2016. 390 al-​Ahsa focus group, June 2017. ‘There are two hospitals here: KFH and the SANG hospital, which is about 15 years old.’ 391 Ibid. 392 Ibid. 393 Mousa and Aldehayyat, ‘Regional Efficiency of Healthcare Services’, p. 170. 394 Staff writer, ‘More Than a Third of the Saudi Budget Goes to Education, Health and Development’, Al Arabiya, 22 December 2016, available at: https:// ​ e nglish.alarabiya.net/ ​ e n/ ​ business/ ​ e conomy/ ​ 2 016/ ​ 1 2/ ​ 2 2/ ​ M orethan-​ a -​ t hird- ​ o f- ​ t he- ​ S audi- ​ b udget- ​ g oes- ​ t o- ​ e ducation- ​ h ealth- ​ a nd-​ development.html. 395 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 396 Ibid. 397 Ibid. 398 Riyadh focus group, February 2017.

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The New Media Revolution, Public Opinion and the Relationship between the Governing and the Governed

1

The New Media Revolution

1.1

Transforming Political Culture: The Technological Revolution and the Advent of Social Media

Whilst Saudi government decision-​ making remains ‘top-​ down’, the dynamic within this approach has shifted, as the top-​down system has incorporated a consultation process that includes newly established civil society institutions alongside recognition that public opinion cannot always be ignored in the new/​social media age. Indeed, of particular significance in Saudi Arabia is growing public awareness, particularly amongst young educated Saudis, of the need for government accountability, transparency and best practices. In addition, there have been indications that the Al Saud leadership  –​to a degree  –​recognizes the necessity of being answerable to society on domestic policy-​ making issues that affect citizens’ lives. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to assess perceptions of new media usage,1 most specifically social media, as well as the importance of public opinion, government transparency and awareness of political issues, and the impact these have on daily life as linked to politico-​economic and socio-​cultural change in Saudi Arabia.2 The Jeddah floods are recognized as the point when Saudis’ use of new media changed the dynamics of the state–​society relationship. During the deadly floods, which ‘officially’ killed around 120 people, ordinary Saudis caught up in the chaos of the flooding filmed what they were witnessing and simultaneously uploaded their videos to YouTube. In consequence, other Saudis across the Kingdom were able to see the extent of the disaster as well as attempts  –​through non-​official civil efforts due to the lack of an effective government response –​to save those trapped in cars and flooded underpasses. There was widespread and immediate anger not only in Jeddah but across Saudi Arabia, directed at the perceived corruption of government officialdom, which was blamed by society for exacerbating the impact of the floods.3 Significantly, the videos posted on YouTube determined the national narrative, and for the first time the 112

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Saudi government was forced to respond to bottom-​up pressure rather than dictating the narrative or agenda from above. Although Chaudhary says that credible work has been undertaken to define the concept of ‘social networking sites’, the precise meaning of the term ‘social media’ remains ambiguous.4 In fact, there are different interpretations of ‘social’, argues Fuchs, such as information, communication, communities and collaboration. Therefore, Fuchs contends that when we use the term ‘social media’ we should specify which meaning of ‘social’ is being used, because ‘understanding social media critically means, among other things, to engage with the different forms of sociality on the Internet in the context of society’.5 According to the Global Social Media Impact Study, based at University College London (ULC) Department of Anthropology, social media has created new spaces for groups between the public and private. Before social media, communication was primarily either private and one-​to-​one, such as letters or the telephone, or public broadcasting, such as radio, television and newspapers. By contrast, the study argues, social media is mainly devoted to groups, and allows us to scale different sizes of audience and degrees of privacy.6 Indeed, both individual users and governments have embraced new media, explains Van Dijck, as a tool for connecting individuals and communities of users. Twitter, for example, has provided a platform that ‘empowers citizens to voice opinions and emotions’.7 More than simply a new form of connecting, communicating and networking, Zayani observes, Twitter ‘is proving useful for negotiating the lived reality and creating alternative communities’. In the Saudi context, it became a means for shedding restrictive lifestyles and loosening rigid gender barriers.8 Nevertheless, there is a growing theoretical debate amongst scholars regarding the impact of new media usage on public opinion, government transparency, and politico-​economic and socio-​cultural transformations. In fact, very often new media, and in particular social media, is portrayed as a principal agent in mobilizing politico-​economic or socio-​cultural change. However, Chaudhary argues that new media acts as an auxiliary actor rather than the protagonist of change,9 because, as Fuchs maintains, new media is embedded into the contradictions and the power structures of contemporary society; it alone does not cause public demonstrations or protests.10 In fact, Aljabre notes that the role that new media played in the Arab Spring is disputed –​was it really a ‘Facebook revolution’? –​but argues that what is undeniable is that new media facilitated the dissemination of information in a way that was both swift and widespread.11 Sukarieh and Tannok observe that the social media usage of young people (netizens) is characterized by being autonomous, global, open

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and participatory12 and, notable in the Saudi context, citing Hirschman’s explanation,13 rather than being vertically organized (expressions of protest against superiors) it is spread horizontally (communication amongst peers). Moreover, as Gunter et al. point out, new media provides citizens of non-​democratic states with opportunities to obtain news from uncensored sources, thereby allowing them to ‘absorb different news agendas other than the ones promulgated by their own government-​controlled media’.14 Hence, the significance of new/​social media cannot be underestimated, and, in fact, it is hard to overstate the importance of social media in Saudi Arabia. At a 2017 Chatham House workshop on ‘State, Society and Social Media in the GCC’, co-​hosted by Kuwait’s Alsalam Centre (27 ​March 2017), I  was one of the speakers who argued that social media has driven a ‘cultural revolution’ in the Gulf. Undoubtedly, non-​traditional methods of state–​society interaction, in particular social media platforms such as WhatsApp, Snapchat, Twitter, Instagram and Facebook, have contributed to this profound change.15 As El Khawaja observes, social media has created new spaces for entirely new practices, including discussion of sensitive topics such as politics and governance; ‘with a number of caveats, there is a palpable sense of new, albeit relative, freedoms to discuss historically taboo issues in the virtual sphere, often under the cloak of anonymity’, and this includes discussing and debating key issues in the GCC, thereby shifting the relationship between state and society in the region. In fact, winning the battle for the social media narrative is now a crucial policy goal for many Gulf States, including Saudi Arabia.16 The findings of the 2016 ASDA’A Burson-​Marsteller Youth Survey echo those of Chatham House: Social media is far too important to ignore. Many young people are on social networks for several hours a day and these channels can dominate –​and massively influence –​their online experience. For some audiences, social media is the primary means by which news and information is both discovered and distributed; a trait which is only going to become more prevalent.17

This is particularly pertinent in the Saudi context because the Kingdom’s predominantly young population relies a great deal less on traditional media than on new media.18 This mirrors the findings of the ASDA’A Burson-​Marsteller Youth Survey, which documents how, for the first time, more young Arabs say they get their news on social media (63 per cent) than via television (51 per cent):  ‘This marks a major shift since 2015 when only 25 per cent cited social media as a source for news, compared to 60 per cent saying they were getting their news on TV.’19

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Furthermore, as Ahmed notes, ‘jaded from years of restrictions’ and ‘accustomed to the continuous litany of impediments to communication’, young Saudis have the know-​ how to bypass the government’s online blocking, such as when in 2010 restrictions on BlackBerry’s BBM messaging prompted Saudis to find alternative platforms for instant communication.20 Besides, as Momani points out, young Arabs are nimble online, able to challenge censorship, voice their opinions and outwit the state’s electronic armies.21 In fact, circumventing official censorship in the Kingdom by obtaining a proxy is relatively simple. In consequence, Yamani says, this has ushered in a new political culture.22 1.2

An Online Generation

The year 2009 is recognized as the point at which social media usage accelerated in Saudi Arabia, with a huge increase in online participation on social networking sites and instant-​messaging applications  –​a phenomenon that has continued unabated ever since. In early 2018, the number of Internet users in Saudi Arabia rose swiftly to 30 million people and Internet penetration in the Kingdom reached 91 per cent.23 WhatsApp, Twitter and Shapchat are ubiquitous, as these applications are intrinsically enmeshed in a Saudi’s daily transactions. Young Saudis have become the ‘online generation’, with awareness that they are more connected to the outside world than would have been possible a decade ago. Hertog highlights findings of the Arab Youth Survey, which show that regionally, it is Saudis who put the highest priority on Internet access and have the highest reported daily Internet usage.24 Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to say that new/​social media usage has become a Saudi norm, with one of the driving forces behind it being the high rate of smartphone ownership. Yet, the massive popularity of social media in Saudi Arabia can be explained. Social media applications simply act as a technological tool or extension of existing family and social networks already present in one of the most interconnected societies on earth. Hence, social media ‘makes sense’ in Saudi Arabia, as it fits in with these social networks and facilitates faster and more effective communication. These social media platforms have served to enhance the familial and religious values of Saudi society whilst simultaneously opening up Saudi minds to new ideas and concepts.25 In its report ‘The State of Social Media in Saudi Arabia Volume 3’, Jeddah-​based consultancy, the Social Clinic, observes that Twitter is so huge in Saudi Arabia that 40 per cent of the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) Twitter base comes from Saudi Arabia alone, and the Kingdom’s 33 per cent share of global tweets in Arabic is the highest of

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any country in the world.26 The Arab Social Media Report notes that Saudi Arabia, with more than 2.6 million Twitter users, accounts for 29 per cent of all active users in the Arab region. Saudi Arabia, alone produces around 274 million tweets per month.27 According to the Social Clinic the 18–​35 age group dominates social networks in Saudi Arabia, and more than 90 per cent of Facebook users live in the urban conurbations of Riyadh, Jeddah and Dammam-​Khobar-​Dhahran.28 In fact, 84 per cent of Saudi nationals live in cities, where the adoption of mobile technologies has been much faster than in the rest of the Kingdom as cities offer easy availability of superfast Internet connections. The average mobile Internet connection speed in Saudi Arabia almost doubled in 2018.29 The Arab Social Media Report rated the most popular applications in Saudi Arabia as follows: WhatsApp, used by 91 per cent of the population; Facebook, 80 per cent; Twitter, 53 per cent (because the news is more up-​to-​date30); Instagram, 43 per cent; and YouTube, 40 per cent.31 However, as this research was conducted in 2014, Snapchat was not included. In 2017–​18, messaging platforms continued their phenomenal growth in Saudi Arabia. WhatsApp is the most used chat platform, with 24.27 million users and a Saudi market presence of 73 per cent. Facebook’s Messenger had 13.30  million users in the Kingdom, adding one million users during 2017.32 Snapchat (in Saudi Arabia it is simply referred to as ‘Snap’) was the third most popular chat app with 12.97  million users, but showed faster growth than Facebook’s Messenger. Although Snapchat is used by all age groups, most users in Saudi Arabia are young people, especially teenagers, young adults (below 25) and children, who form the core of Saudi society.33 For many young men, Snapchat is a ‘great instant communication tool, easy to use, great fun and everyone is on it’, as well as being useful for finding all kinds of news stories and excellent for social communication.34 One young man says that Snapchat is one of the most important means of communication in the world, as everything is available, from comedy to help finding a good restaurant to tips and stories.35 It also facilitates sharing ‘wonderful moments with both genders’, underscoring the importance of Snapchat’s ‘content mortality’  –​that is, the fear that shared private images could become permanently public, clearly something that is extremely important for a great many young Saudis.36 Saudi Arabia also has the largest share of Instagram users in the Gulf region, at around 30 per cent.37 Twitter, Instagram and Snapchat have also given birth to many of Saudi Arabia’s ‘Generation S’38 social media influencers and stars, such as Riyadh-​based Instagram comedian

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Tareq Al Harbi, social and religious commentator Ahmed Al Shugairi, Jeddah-​based lifestyle guru NiloHaq, photographer Faisal Bin Zarah, and Mashhour Al Dabyan and Ali Al-​ Qar’awi of the phenomenally popular Saudigamer (@saudigamer). Religious clerics also understand the importance of social media as a medium through which to reach out to a large audience and expand their profiles and influence.39 Some of Saudi Arabia’s Islamic scholars have seen their popularity increased ten-​ fold by means of Twitter, and in fact, Dr Mohammed Al Arefi (with 21.3  million followers) is the most followed Saudi individual on Twitter.40 Other influential social media clerics include Dr Aaidh Al Qarni, Salman Al Awdah,41 Al Kabani, Saleh Al Moghamsy, Dr Nasir Al Omar, Mohammed Saleh Al Monajjad, Dr Khaled Al Mosleh and Khaled Al Jubair.42 As Dubai-​based Global Media Insight reports, ‘from just being networking platform, social media has morphed into a potent force for social change in Saudi society’.43 Not wanting to be left behind, government ministers (and ministries) as well as individual members of the Al Saud are also active on social media. For example, the government has been effective in utilizing social media to engage with citizens and to gauge public opinion. Members of the government such as the young and up-​and-​coming Prince Badr bin Abdullah bin Farhan Al Saud, Minister of Culture (@BadrFAlSaud), and the popular Tawfiq Al Rabiah, Minister of Health (@tfrabiah), use their social media accounts to disseminate information about government policies and initiatives. Although Crown Prince Mohammed does not have a public social media account, he frequently releases photographs and videos through other accounts on applications such as Twitter, Snapchat and Instagram. These show Prince Mohammed with ordinary Saudis in ordinary situations, minus the usual Al Saud protocol and pomp. The overall narrative of these images and videos is of the crown prince as ‘man of the people’, approachable and in touch with their daily lives. Tellingly, these images are not released by official Saudi government outlets such as spa.gov.sa, but rather through informal social media channels, where they attract a much larger, and younger, domestic audience. Clearly, the crown prince and his advisors understand the necessity of communicating with the Kingdom’s predominantly youthful –​and online –​population using language and media familiar to them. When I ask young Saudi men if they watch television, particularly the Saudi state channels, they frequently reply that they cannot remember the last time they did so, as these are boring (apart from football) and only advocate the government’s position. Indeed, deprived of recreational

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opportunities (and with gender segregation in public spaces), Yamani says, new media screens have become youth’s main attraction.44 For many young Saudi men this is ‘very important and something that cannot be ignored’.45 New/​social media has connected young Saudis to the outside world, in direct contrast to their parents, whose only option was to watch the Saudi state television channels KSA 1 and 2.  Still, some young men point out correctly that television was equally controversial when it was first introduced to Saudi Arabia, even though acceptance of the new technology varied according to region.46 One individual explains that radio and television were not haram when they were introduced in the north of the Kingdom (unlike in Riyadh): ‘Of course, initially most people rejected TV, and then it was a case of accepting certain channels, first KSA 1, and then MBC and so on. It was a gradual process.’47 As an example, two brothers from Am Shairi village, which is located south of Hail and north of Madinah, say it was only in 2005 that television came to their village because prior to that there was no electricity supply. Hence, this was the first time they became connected to other people in the ‘outside world’. Then, in 2011, their village received an Internet connection and they became further interconnected via social media, although the brothers stress that there are positive and negative aspects to this interconnectedness.48 1.3

New/​Social Media: Positive Consequences

Ali notes that television, newspapers and radio shows provided the primary source of news for most Arabs pre-​2009,49 but post-​2009, social media replaced these for young Saudis. As a result, if a young man wants to use social media, for example the ubiquitous instant-​messaging service WhatsApp,50 he has to learn to write and read; this encourages young pupils to acquire these skills.51 Furthermore, according to a Jeddah focus group, social media allows young men to ‘figure out the real issues that affect society in the Kingdom’. Indeed, young Saudis can read about and discuss controversial issues on social media  –​something that was impossible when the news was confined to television and traditional print media. Nowadays, a great variety of subjects are discussed on social media, ‘especially about what young people think’, remarks a final-​year schoolboy in Jeddah. For example, he says that in early 2017 there were a lot of online discussions about ghosts ‘because our grandparents always talked about them in order to frighten us’.52 Another young man from Jeddah maintains that social media has allowed young men to talk about national problems with other individuals, thus connecting them to other constituencies across the Kingdom (and beyond). Thus, technological

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advances have helped Saudis discover other Saudis, which in turn will make young men more tolerant and ‘flexible’ with their children.53 Social media is not only a source for social communication and entertainment.54 For example, Alsharkh notes that for many Saudis talking to a psychiatrist is still considered taboo; however, social media has allowed people to connect with psychiatrists online. Social media has also assisted the police on several occasions in Saudi Arabia, such as in finding missing persons. In addition, Alsharkh notes that Saudi women are extremely active online and as a result, women have a much louder voice that ‘forces society to listen to their opinions’  –​including young men.55 Wired women, notes Zayani, are challenging limiting gender roles and calling for social change.56 Every Internet user in Saudi Arabia watches at least one video on YouTube (or SaudiTube) every day, with family vlogger MrMrSnB2 the most popular YouTube channel in the Kingdom. The channel focuses on comedy videos featuring an Arab family and boasts nearly five million subscribers.57 Moreover, at least seven million users have uploaded videos once in their life.58 Indeed, young Saudis have turned to YouTube for both content consumption and, more significantly, content creation.59 Nowadays, young people generate entertainment videos in the convenience of their homes, and very often once uploaded these gain millions of followers.60 Zayani argues that youth-​generated media such as YouTube videos are ‘noteworthy not just because they are altering traditional processes of media production and consumption, but also because they are enhancing the exercise of agency’.61 Because most young Saudis find television boring, they have created their own programmes and channels nationally on YouTube (or SaudiTube)62 or regionally on Lines Media63 in Asir, Telfaz1164 in the Eastern Province, U-​Turn65 in Jeddah and Sa7i66 in Riyadh.67 Until 2018, YouTube was also a substitute for cinema.68 In fact, according to one individual, programmes targeted at young Saudis on national television have been trying to make themselves relevant to the younger generations by ‘aping’ social media language and trends, in particular from popular YouTube channels.69 This youth outreach extends to domestic broadcasting, says Diwan, as during Ramadan 2018 the Saudi Broadcasting Authority launched the channel SBC ‘with an eye to attract young viewers’.70 A  young doctor in Abha explains how he and his friends were surprised by the amount of attention they received when they started making and uploading short programmes to YouTube: Our second and third Rwaya shows were deleted by YouTube for some reason but we re-​uploaded the third show and it got more than 72,000 views in less

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than two weeks. Our episodes were about social norms, criticizing these norms through comedy. At the end of the seventh episode we reached eleven million views. And each episode in Season 2 reached one million viewers per episode. It was funny because this started amongst friends by accident. We believe that the episodes draw attention to these norms and have the ability to change mindsets because the average age of our viewers was 16–​24. Of course, there were some limitations (and self-​censorship), but we got in touch with Asir governor Prince Faisal [bin Khalid bin Abdulaziz Al Saud] and his team helped us a great deal. In addition, the Ministry of Health gave us SAR 100,000 to make a five-​minute film for one of its events.71

Certainly, in the Saudi context, until 2017, instances of public entertainment were few and far between; thus, new media participation can sometimes be understood as a creative outlet, as demonstrated by the young doctor and his friends in Abha. As Brake notes, these young Saudis ‘enjoy taking the raw material of their everyday lives and interactions and turning them into a form of art, whether through storytelling, the remixing of circulating creative content or sharing of photographs for artistic as well as documentary purposes.72 For example, Takki, a Saudi web series, is based on the personal life of young Saudi filmmaker Mohammed Makki and is extremely popular precisely because young Saudis relate to its content.73 In fact, there has been an explosion of creativity amongst young Saudis in areas such as, but not limited to, art, photography, documentary film-​making and stand-​up comedy. As Masry explains, new/​social media has provided a space for a ‘budding subculture that was in limbo, waiting for an outlet to display its thoughts and creativity’.74 Furthermore, a lot of young men understand that social media usage can also be beneficial for their start-​ups or businesses. For example, according to a focus group in Abha a local ‘social media star’ was paid to promote a juice bar, resulting in a significant increase in profits for the business:  ‘He earned SAR 7,000 for a 20-​second slot on social media applications such as Snapchat and the profits of the juice bar increased from SAR 35,000 to 150,000 in two branches.’75 Another positive side to social media usage is a perception that ordinary Saudis now have a degree of influence over the Saudi leadership’s decision-​making process by highlighting issues online such as the need for further socio-​ economic reforms.76 Alsharkh argues that Saudi youth, sometimes through an introduction to online Western culture, have developed more sophisticated opinions concerning government policies as a result of young people having more freedom to discuss politico-​economic and socio-​cultural issues via social media.77 Indeed, Kinninmont argues that in the Gulf States, Twitter, for example, is part

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of ‘a wider distribution of power over information away from governments and towards individuals’, especially youth.78 Jambi observes that the government has realized the significance of this rapidly developing ‘virtual Saudi Arabia’ and has taken measures to both control and court this sphere: On one hand, red lines have been drawn and enforced on social media sites and individual users. On the other hand, there have been efforts to engage with popular social media personalities. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Misk Foundation has been holding annual conferences for youth on Twitter since 2013, hosting officials, experts, and social media influencers. He has also engaged young social media influencers in meetings during both the launch and implementation of Saudi Vision 2030.79

The Mohammed bin Salman Foundation, Misk (the crown prince’s private charity), has cultivated relationships with social media influencers, recruiting them as advocates for the new regime, explains Diwan: Misk has also organized informational sessions on media, writing, and film to satisfy the desire for personal expression while providing a state-​approved framework for public engagement. Meanwhile, the emerging Saudi creative class has been embraced and provided new state-​sponsored platforms, both at home and abroad. The new Misk Art Institute recruited the well-​known Saudi artist Ahmed Mater to lead art education programs and cultural outreach. This augments the work done abroad by Saudi Aramco’s Ithra Foundation, which has showcased young Saudi filmmakers at programs such as Saudi Film Days in Los Angeles.80

Another Misk initiative, called ‘Shoof’, is an annual, youth-​focused event that presents opportunities and inspirations in digital visual media. The event brings together the leading success stories from the visual media sector, in turn helping to inform the attendees on the latest trends, insights and ideas shaping social media.81 At the Misk Shoof Digital Visual Media Forum in December 2017, Will Scougal, head of creative strategy at Snapchat, clarified that Snapchat was a tool not necessarily for social media, but for ‘creativity, communication, playfulness and fun’, with 33  million Snapchat users in the Middle East representing innumerable content creation opportunities.82 Certainly, young men comprehend that online interconnectedness via social media usage (and the accompanying creation of digital content) is happening across societal constituencies (and even divides), as well as facilitating new channels of communication with the authorities. Nonetheless, in terms of social media bringing the government closer to the people, then certainly there is an argument about whether the ‘online generation’ has any real political influence. However, what is significant

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is the perception amongst young Saudi men that a space has become available where they can voice their opinions and be heard. According to a young Saudi business graduate, ‘social media makes it easy for us to share our opinions and to communicate with the state’; thus, in his opinion, the public’s views are beginning to play a role in domestic policy decision-​making to the extent that the government has started to take the opinions of young Saudis seriously.83 1.4

New/​Social Media: Negative Ramifications

Although the vast majority of young Saudis use social media, a survey conducted for this book found that 70 per cent of young men believe it has a negative impact on society, 66 per cent say that Saudis rely on social media too much and 61 per cent believe it has killed conversation.84 This is interesting, as, paradoxically, when you see a group of young Saudi men sitting together they are invariably glued to their mobile phones –​ and even chatting to each other on WhatsApp rather than having an actual conversation.85 At Eid Al Fitr 2018, on their Twitter accounts, mubarak_​f and @7yyy7 shared a photograph from a family’s celebrations that showed all the young men glued to their smartphones whilst an elderly relative looked on, ignored and alone. They lamented that during their childhoods everyone was more sociable and happy whereas they worry that in the future, young Saudis will not know how to hold a conversation. In a 2004 study, on the effects of social media on the Saudi community, Al Saggaf concluded that Internet usage led Saudis to neglect their family commitments; in other words, the amount of time spent on family bonding, recreation and physical conversations was reduced because of the Internet.86 According to many young men, this is as true today as when the study was carried out, but considerably more so due to increased social media usage and, at times, social media addiction.87 Complicating matters is the issue of multiple online identities, which are often completely different to real-​life ones. Young Saudi men can create different identities depending on the online platforms they are using and in consequence, an individual can simultaneously be a different person on different platforms  –​a situation that is acknowledged as not being conducive to mental well-​being.88 One of the problems, says Alsharkh, is that young Saudis tend to seek ‘genuine relationships virtually which is impossible since real friends and actual human interaction cannot replace friendships shared online’. Moreover, ‘excessive exposure to virtual relationships affects how a huge section of young Saudi men treat their family relationships as well as

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their educational and career plans’.89 In addition, Alsharkh says, another ramification of online usage is that: The Internet has also damaged marriages in many societies as it is easier to maintain casual relationships on social networking sites. Studies show that many Saudis use the Internet to start immoral relationships. This was an extreme reaction by some young Saudis because of the closed life-​style and norms in which these young people were brought up.90

Al Saggaf also argues that Saudis ‘became intellectually confused’ due to the Internet exposing them to ‘views and ideas that could be against their religious and cultural values’, which in turn causes some to doubt what they have been brought up to believe.91 Certainly, many young men recognize that there is a darker side to the Internet that has had an adverse effect on others, because it has ‘opened a channel’ for the exploitation and manipulation of young, often vulnerable Saudi men. These young Saudis have been indoctrinated to become intolerant to whomever is different, and ultimately, some of them have been lured into extremism.92 Although his paper was published in 2004, Al Saggaf’s views resonate with some young men. For example, two brothers from Am Shairi village are proud of their village traditions, such as being generous and hospitable; however, they note that social media usage has started to change or replace some of these traditions. For example, people in their village used to visit each other daily, ask after each other and check if anyone needed any help, but nowadays this is all done via social media (if at all). Even worse, according to the two brothers, social media has facilitated contact between urban drug dealers and rural clients with the result that ‘drugs have spread between the youth of our village’.93 Even though popular applications such as Snapchat and Instagram have become ubiquitous on Saudi smartphones, some young men have reservations about their real value. A  young man in Dammam says he does not use Snapchat as the ‘app is utterly worthless because young Saudis just watch other people taking meaningless photos or videos’.94 Most people use Snapchat to follow celebrities, says another young man from al-​Majmaah, which in his opinion is wrong as it is supposed to be an application to share events with friends.95 A member of a Riyadh focus group, who is exasperated by Snapchat’s predominance, wonders: What are the point of Snapchat and the ever growing number of Saudi Snapchat celebrities? Actually, when you meet these social media ‘personalities’ in person they are completely different.96 I think it is sad how some people force themselves to be someone else on Snapchat. These guys all dress the same, trendy clothes, same hair, and same facial hair –​really pretentious Snapchat clones. But, I admit

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that Snapchat is addictive; you just scroll around and judge people! It is so bad, but it is influential with young people.97

The issue of whether online celebrities are of any real value is a universal one, says a Jeddah focus group. The group asserts that Snapchat celebrities rarely possess any good attributes; rather, it is simply a case of making ‘stupid people famous’.98 Indeed, with the removal of several socio-​cultural taboos, observes Al Maeena, young men and women have created a reality show of themselves  –​and their online followers have increased by the thousands.99 Another Riyadh focus group goes further and argues that ‘social media is a place to prostitute your personality’, especially on applications such as Snapchat.100 The influence of this concerns many, in particular the negative effect on children of some ‘online-​Snapchat celebrities’. For example, ‘respect in school’ is sometimes based on how many ‘likes’ a child has online, exactly as depicted in Black Mirror on Netflix. Incredibly, according to a group of young men in Riyadh, this is actually happening and is already causing social problems such as bullying and alienation.101 According to a young television journalist in Asir, although the activities of online celebrities are fairly recent, he believes their behaviour is having an adverse effect on children.102 Significantly, he points out this could be detrimental to society, as children are the Kingdom’s future.103 In his opinion, the online anti-​social activities of some online celebrities should be restricted because of the ‘negative trends’ they initiate or promote on social media –​for instance, drifting –​that harm socio-​ cultural and religious values.104 The journalist argues that if an individual causes damage to accepted societal norms and values, this person should be stopped.105 He complains that there are too many undesirable role models in online videos behaving in an anti-​social manner and using improper language.106 These online celebrities are acting as negative role models for young Saudis (across all aspects of the media) and they need to be replaced with positive ones: The need for good role models is critical. We know that many individuals active in new media have millions of followers so we should ask them to send positive messages to our youthful population. Individuals such as sports stars, football players and equestrians –​people with good ethics who are honest and patriotic. For example, the Hilal player Mohammed Al Shaloub is a good role model as he has never had a red card, or Faiz Al Malki, the actor from Taif who is famous for his social work and for donating to charity.107

The Asiri journalist believes strongly that young, often impressionable Saudi men do not need foreign heroes in movies who ‘fight, smoke and drink’, thereby sending negative messages that contravene Saudi

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socio-​cultural values. In his opinion –​one that is shared by many –​the Kingdom requires its own positive role models.108 1.5

A Double-​Edged Sword

Access to the Internet is seen as a double-​edged sword. On one hand, for some young men it is extremely beneficial as it provides not only valuable information, but also a variety of alternative ideas that assist an individual in becoming more open-​minded. Furthermore, the Internet allows young men to feel as though Saudi Arabia is at ‘the centre of a world that now includes us’.109 On the other hand, there are reservations about social media usage in Saudi Arabia, as a great deal of the content accessed by young men is considered either inappropriate or highly negative. For example, sometimes social media is used as a tool by different societal constituencies to slander and fight each other. Al Maeena agrees, pointing out that Arab Twitter users, young and old, spread division, hatred and malice amongst the Arab people, even if they do not explicitly mean to.110 An Eastern Province focus group argues that ‘you only have to look at Twitter to see that society can be poisonous and this makes a lot of people somewhat stupid’. In this group’s opinion, societal development cannot improve if the online situation remains this way.111 In 2018, Al Hussain observed that those slandering others online sometimes justify their stance by arguing that ‘there are attempts to jeopardize and hinder the reform process, hence one must aggressively defend any kind of criticism’.112 Conversely, others believe that new/​social media can help to lessen divides between disparate Saudi constituencies, particularly where they share common interests (although this often depends on the individual and family background).113 According to one young man, ‘social media can show us who we really are’, as what is posted online frequently highlights not only negative aspects of society such as sectarianism and racism, but also positive examples of tolerance and kindness. In sum, he argues that social media usage has both a ‘constructive and destructive side’.114 Other focus groups complain that contemporary online content is less political than in the past, as today the content is usually comedy-​ and entertainment-​related.115 For example, Fahad Albutairi’s videos used to have a socio-​political message, says one focus group, unlike his recent ones, which are more commercial  –​especially since he moved to Dubai.116 Indeed, this over-​commercialization of online content concerns some young men. They point out that a few years ago (starting around 2010), music, art and self-​generated YouTube videos were more

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political and socially conscious.117 However, since then, all of these have started to become institutionalized and over-​ commercialized to the extent that nowadays ‘the arts’ are mainly concerned with advertising and making money. With the advent of social media, a great many Saudis were excited by the opening of a shared online social space where they could say what they liked, when they liked. But, since 2015, due to online government monitoring and censorship, there has been a crackdown on freedom of expression on social media sites such as Twitter.118 Indeed, throughout the GCC states, arrests and prosecution for comments posted on social media are becoming common as cybercrime laws are put in place to control the parameters of online discourse. This has a ‘chilling effect’ and further restricts freedom of expression and association.119 Linked to this development was the 2017–​18 increase of allegedly pro-​government ‘bot’ or ‘troll’ accounts that replace critical Twitter hashtags with ones praising the government.120 In consequence, although many individuals ceased making overt political comments online, those Saudis who had sufficient influence and wasta continued to criticize government policies, but simultaneously toned down that criticism.121 Certainly, the Saudi government attempts to censor online content, but as Aljabre points out, censorship in Saudi Arabia is not confined to the government. Although Internet censorship and freedom of speech are sensitive topics, the government is not only open about its censorship practices, it also encourages Saudi citizens to take an active role ‘in maintaining the high standard of their society’ by permitting citizens to participate in the censorship process. In fact, individuals may submit requests to the Internet Services Unit to be evaluated for censorship.122 Yet, as Yamani asserts, the government cannot hope to ‘ban, bar and block’ all avenues of expression, and even if the Internet Services Unit attempts to monitor and control the Internet, the task is too daunting.123 Undoubtedly, some young men believe that freedom of expression has been reduced. According to these individuals, from 2011 to 2015 there was a wider, more diverse range of opinions aired on popular sites such as YouTube (many created by young Saudis), but since 2015 ‘everyone has been forced to keep quiet’.124 Furthermore, young men are frequently careful about information shared online. For example, when asked about information they do not share on social media, location came top with approximately 57 per cent, followed by political views (45 per cent), religious views (29 per cent), name (27 per cent) and social views (16 per cent).125 That said, Saudis, in particular younger, better-​educated individuals, are more politically savvy than they were in 2009. Growing political awareness has led people to become more circumspect online, with

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an understanding that there is a time and place to say certain things. Unquestionably, this can also be characterized as self-​censorship, but it does not mean that contentious topics are not discussed widely in society. 2

Public Opinion

2.1

Civil Society

As noted previously, the Saudi government’s educational policy provides a classic example of the ‘king’s dilemma’, when reforms from the top can increase demands for more radical change from the bottom.126 An increasingly educated population, particularly a youthful one, as is the case in the Kingdom, naturally starts to question government policy, socio-​cultural norms, and the very nature of their own constituencies and societies. Furthermore, as Montagu points out, Saudi Arabia is a community-​ focused society that thrives on associational life, thereby providing ‘spaces’ for group discussion about topical issues.127 In addition, burgeoning social media usage has exposed young Saudis to a barrage of information about their own state and communities. Naturally, this has prompted many young men to think closely about issues that affect not only them personally, but also wider Saudi society and beyond. Due to the rapid pace of Saudi societal change, ‘civil society’ in various forms is expanding its space vis-​à-​vis the state. But what is contemporary Saudi civil society? In order to answer this question we first have to identify the nature of civil society in the Kingdom, particularly as it is sometimes said that civil society in Saudi Arabia does not exist. On the contrary, Montagu argues, there is ‘considerable awareness of civil society, and the need for it, and many groups are active in this sphere’.128 For many young men, in the domestic context civil society is understood as containing ‘all associations and networks between the family and the state in which membership and activities are voluntary’. According to Edwards, these ‘voluntaristic mechanisms are used to achieve an association’s objectives through dialogue, bargaining and negotiation’.129 Still, many Saudis argue that to understand Saudi civil society it is imperative to focus on the local context and not apply Western-​centric interpretations. Additionally, they point out that Saudi civil society is not a homogeneous entity, so local context does not necessarily mean the Kingdom as a whole, but rather specific areas or constituencies. Thus, individuals raise the question: if civil society is understood as an overlapping public space between the state, the market and the ordinary household,130 in which people can debate and take action, does this space exist today in Saudi Arabia? ‘Absolutely’, affirm many young men; in fact, as discussed

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in the first part of Chapter 3, this space has increased as, in the last few years, a newer online version of civil society has emerged via the increased use of new/​social media, which young men recognize has become a Saudi norm. Thus, they point out that on Twitter, for example, it seems that everyone from King Salman down has an account, so they argue that the state, the market and ordinary households are all represented here.131 Yet, many young men point out that there is almost no formal (or viable) democratic process in Saudi Arabia other than municipal councils.132 They argue that an active civil society needs independent civil society organizations such as non-​governmental organizations (NGOs). However, many better-​educated young men believe that some of their peers do not have an understanding of politics and simply repeat the views of those they admire (particularly from online sources).133 More sceptical or cynical individuals believe that if Saudi civil society exists at all, it is best described as ‘hypocritically Islamic’.134 2.2

Critical Discussions about State and Society

Linked to expanding Internet access and the technological revolution has been the growing importance of public opinion, specifically as related to domestic policy issues. As the Kingdom’s diverse societies have become better educated and more connected to each other (and the wider world) as a result of the Internet, discussion of issues that impact individuals and their families –​especially their pockets –​has increased. The most common definition of public opinion, one widely accepted in public life today, is that it is an aggregation of individual opinions.135 Hence, according to Glynn et  al., when discussing the dimensions of public opinion, ‘most scholars agree that average citizens have opinions and attitudes that are at least potentially relevant to various policy issues’.136 Still, in Saudi Arabia (as elsewhere) opinions are extremely diverse, so it is problematic to say that the public in general has an opinion. Rather it is most likely the case that comments made in a public space, for example online, can gather a following, which in turn can influence government policy-​making, most specifically on domestic issues. In the Saudi context, when trying to categorize ‘who believes what’ it is likely that well-​educated Saudis, in particular English speakers who follow current affairs, tend to agree with the elites or form their opinions based on those of the elites.137 Yet, according to others, the educated elites are also conscious of the growing importance of public opinion and the fact that the general public has become more politically aware because of the interconnectedness between these two constituencies.138 That said, one young man argues that a great deal of Saudi public opinion is based

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on information from three main sources: family members, friends and social media, all of which are inherently biased and provide a distorted picture of reality.139 To what extent do young Saudi men believe that public opinion matters, and do they see public opinion playing a role in government decision-​ making? As Benkler points out, private conversations can become an initial step in generating public opinion in the public sphere if they are nodes in a network of communication that cross associational boundaries. He states that societies with governments that control the society-​wide communications facilities nonetheless: may have an active public sphere if social networks and individual mobility are sufficient to allow opinions expressed within discrete associational settings to spread throughout a portion of society and to take on political meaning for those who discuss them.140

These discrete associational settings exist in the Saudi context in the form of majalis, diwaniyyat and istirahat (social gatherings). From my own experience, discussion of political issues frequently spreads via these social gatherings across the Kingdom. This is reflected in classroom discussions with KFUPM students who come from diverse parts of Saudi Arabia and frequently express similar viewpoints based on discussions in the family majlis or hometown istiraha. This can indicate an emerging national consensus on specific issues, such as the likely impact of Saudi Vision 2030.141 Moreover, the extraordinary growth of social media usage in Saudi Arabia is not surprising when you consider that new/​social media acts as a technological extension of existing associational settings. In effect, as a 2014 study, ‘What Matters Most to Saudi Arabia’s Youth?’, notes, digital communication has been integrated into the traditional lifestyle.142 Hence, young educated Saudis have greater awareness of diverse public opinions due to increasing new/​social media usage, and thus they believe that these played a ‘major role’ in many of the domestic socio-​cultural reforms witnessed in 2017–​19.143 Still, there are clearly ‘red lines’. For example, two young Shia men from Qatif in the Eastern Province maintain that if non-​elite young men try and start a discussion group such as a diwaniya, the government will ‘crack down’ on the group for preaching dissent. In contrast, another new group, particularly if it is an elite one in Riyadh, will escape the government’s attentions, as ‘the members can say anything they want because basically the group has already been co-​opted’.144 A traditional method of citizen–​state communication is for a person to petition the Royal Diwan.145 This often happens if the individual has a

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serious problem and is able to arrange a meeting with a prince –​although having sufficient wasta will accelerate the solution to his difficulty.146 It is also possible to send a missive/​telegram to the Royal Diwan,147 although these are not so common nowadays due to the introduction of e-​government (in the form of an e-​services directory) via ministry websites.148 However, a focus group in Qassim says that contacting the Royal Diwan and some ministries (but not all) via websites remains problematic, and therefore many people revert to the more formal/​traditional method of sending a missive.149 (However, a young Ministry of Commerce and Investment (MoCI) employee from Buraydah jokes that ‘increasingly all government decrees are announced at night’. Whilst he used to send missives during the day, nowadays he sends these at night because ‘that is when everyone appears to be working’.150) A successful outcome from sending a missive can also depend on the situation or recipient. For example, whether a citizen receives a response depends on the official who takes delivery of the telegram at the minister’s office, because this administrator judges its level of importance –​rendering it difficult for an ordinary Saudi to communicate directly with senior government officials.151 In addition, the missives and letters sent directly to the minister filter through the various officials and administrators at the ministry in order for the veracity of the case to be checked.152 The missive or letter might also reach the desk of one of the vice-​ministers in a large ministry such as the MoCI, where there are four types of vice-​minister responsible for different areas such as consumer protection, internal and foreign trade, and rules and regulations.153 As a result, the minister’s opinion is often influenced by those of the vice-​ministers, making their opinions critical, in particular regarding specific individual issues.154 Nowadays, young men contend that new/​social media facilitates not only opinion-​sharing, but also improved communication with the state. Because opinions on social media are becoming increasingly forthright, one individual believes they are in turn influencing government decision-​ making, specifically on domestic issues.155 Others assert that this increase in new media usage has made the state ‘vulnerable’ due to documents and policies being leaked online, thereby sometimes coercing the government into seeking solutions to contentious socio-​economic problems such as the lack of affordable housing.156 Another young man disagrees strongly with the argument that the issues discussed by young Saudis on Twitter and Snapchat do not affect politics. In his opinion, online public opinion affects how decisions are made in Saudi Arabia.157 This development is seen as significant because it draws the government closer to issues that worry society and hence, government decisions will be informed by societal concerns.158 The case of ‘white land’ (unused land)159 is cited as an

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example of how an issue was highlighted in a YouTube video created by young Saudis.160 This then caught the attention of the general public to the point where the government was forced into addressing the issue seriously. In consequence, in June 2016 the government approved a ‘white land’ tax (aptly named Tax Law on Vacant Lands) that made it more expensive for owners of urban land to keep it empty.161 Since the 2014 oil price decrease and the subsequent implementation of taxation in the form of ‘sin taxes’ on tobacco products and energy drinks, five per cent value-​added tax (VAT), and price hikes in fuel and electricity, Saudis have become more vociferous about government policies that affect their incomes. Yet, there is clear evidence that the government monitors public opinion and when necessary reverses unpopular policy decisions because of negative public reaction. For example, in April 2017 King Salman repealed one of the government’s most unpopular austerity measures by reinstating benefits to civil servants and military personnel. The original 2016 cuts that affected the take-​home pay of two-​thirds of working Saudi nationals were the most severe measure taken to limit government spending in a time of low oil prices, but they had an instant impact on consumer confidence and business sentiment and generated negative public opinion.162 Another example was the surge in complaints to the National Water Company (NWC) about higher water bills resulting from the increased tariffs announced in late 2015. Water prices climbed as much as 500 per cent for Saudi nationals, according to John Sfakianakis, Riyadh-​based director of economic research at the Gulf Research Center.163 Although Abdullah Al Hussayen, the former Minister of Water and Electricity, announced that higher water tariffs would only affect wealthier sections of society,164 ordinary Saudis registered their displeasure on the NWC’s social media pages, claiming that their bills more than doubled after the new prices came into effect. Many also claimed that the NWC had failed to respond to their complaints. As Arab News reported: Former Hilal player Faisal Abu Thnain wrote on Twitter:  ‘Did the National Water Company change the quality of water pumped to citizens or has it added vitamins to it?’ He claimed that his water bill was now SR30,000, according to a report in a local publication on Monday. Other users also complained: Majed Al-​Saleh wrote that his bill had risen from SR8 to SR1,429, Eman Alarfaj posted a picture of her bill on Twitter showing an amount of SR3,393, and Ibrahim Alasim wrote that his bill had increased from SR86 to SR1,024.165

Conscious of adverse public opinion, (then Deputy) Crown Prince Mohammed said that the ministry’s implementation of the new water tariff was ‘unsatisfactory’. Subsequently, King Salman fired Abdullah

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Al Hussayen to stem the tide of negative public criticism, whilst Prince Mohammed assured the Saudi public that the government was working diligently on reforms within the water ministry.166 Criticism of the government’s austerity measures has not been limited to the general public. In January 2018 Saudi authorities arrested 11 princes for protesting against the suspension of state subsidies to pay the electricity and water bills of members of the royal family –​a rare example of open family dissent, and one which resonated with a great many ordinary Saudis.167 Still, for the authorities, burgeoning Internet usage has shed light on previously hidden areas. For example, it is now commonplace for Saudis to film ‘anything, anywhere’ on their smartphones and then upload and share the content on social media, with the result that the ‘next day that minister will be changed for a better one’.168 This has sometimes drawn (unwelcome) attention to inappropriate behaviour by government officials: Many officials  –​as well as entrenched elites like senior religious ­figures  –​had become accustomed to receiving only positive feedback in public. In the social media age they are being forced to accept negative commentary. The idea of senior leaders being above reproach or infallible is disappearing, as is any sense of insulation from societal concerns, participants agreed. It is becoming impossible to silence unwanted opinions as may have been done in the past.169

A famous example was when one of King Salman’s officials, Mohammed Al Tobayshi, was caught on camera slapping a journalist, with the clip going viral instantly on Saudi social media channels.170 Another famous example was the arrival of @mujtahidd on Twitter, which sparked enormous interest in Saudi Arabia (and beyond), with tales of Al Saud infighting and princely gossip. The anonymous user, who started tweeting in 2011, told the Beirut-​based news organization Al-​Akhbar that he or she is on a campaign that ‘starts with exposure of those who are corrupt and ends with their removal’.171 However, for many Saudis the novelty wore off as mujtahidd’s racy stories were interpreted by some as ‘point scoring’ by a disgruntled member of the Al Saud or someone close to the family. Yet another example comes from the brothers in Am Shairi village, who remark that, historically, school education in their village was sub-​ standard, with some teachers not fulfilling their duties adequately due to a lack of supervision from the Ministry of Education (MoE). However, after the Internet became available, villagers sent the MoE photographs and videos (principally via social media applications) of negligent teachers, with the result that overall school education improved due to the MoE responding to the villagers’ concerns and complaints.172 Accordingly,

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there is a belief that nowadays the general public has the online tools to deter or shame individuals from inappropriate behaviour, or indeed from committing crimes such as ‘embezzlement or fraud’.173 In the not-​too-​distant past, traditional bureaucracy meant that the door was always closed, asserts one young man, but nowadays because of social media it is easier for young Saudis to communicate with authority,174 leading to greater transparency.175 In fact, as Scott and Lawson contend, the idea that public opinion should be a necessary component in government decision-​making processes underscores the ‘notion of participation in public life, the idea a citizen is one who both governs and is governed, a sense of identity, an acceptance of societal values, and rights and responsibilities’.176 Still, even though public opinion has become increasingly important in the Kingdom, young men are concerned that it remains heavily influenced by the views of a small group of people such as religious clerics, prominent intellectuals and young Saudis who have ‘influential and active online profiles’; in consequence, it is their opinions that proliferate through society.177 Moreover, a focus group from Onaizah complains that an individual’s voice is only heard if it is part of a larger group of voices –​a single voice goes unheard;178 that is, a young man’s voice can only carry weight if it becomes part of wider public opinion.179 Overall, young men believe that public opinion is an important aspect of both state-​building and societal development. In other words, public opinion represents, according to Habermas, the existence of critical discussions about state and society within a ‘public sphere in which state authority is publicly monitored through informed and critical discourse by the people’.180 Indeed, young Saudis are better informed and thus, more opinionated than ever before. As a result, some government decision-​making reflects public opinion  –​for example, granting municipal elections.181 But owing to the fact that public opinion is rarely considered important, individuals say that Saudis tend to vent their frustrations on new/​social media.182 In addition, one young man declares that the government is also adept at ‘provoking public opinion so that it can be manipulated to affect decision-​making’.183 Problems arise when public opinion is marginalized and only taken into consideration for a few specific domestic issues.184 Hence, for some young men the impact of public opinion in Saudi Arabia is negligible –​they complain that ‘public opinion is not heard here and is usually silenced’.185 This results in the status quo being maintained, as no one can effect viable change, either alone or as part of a group.186 Others contend that it is a case of Saudis remaining passive and ‘waiting to see which way the wind blows’.187 Yet, Shihabi argues that the Saudi government needs to expose itself to ‘unfettered local public

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opinion’, as ‘high quality domestic feedback and information’ are critical for effective government.188 According to Ayubi, in Saudi Arabia there are ‘potential sources of contradiction and conflict that might well be expressed politically at the right moment’.189 He notes that a new educated middle class can start to encroach on hitherto sensitive areas such as government legitimacy and the ruling family’s privileges190 –​even if, as Yamani argues, this class is not yet cohesive.191 Certainly, we have witnessed this encroachment occurring on new/​social media. But according to some young men, although public opinion voiced on new/​social media is important, its voice remains weak and rarely impacts on government policy-​making –​with the result that for the time being the state remains the only significant player in the decision-​making game.192 2.3

Political Awareness

To what extent do young educated Saudi men feel that they are politically aware? If they are politically aware, does this change the way they think about their futures and that of the Kingdom? As discussed earlier, widespread Internet penetration and burgeoning new/​social media usage have had a significant impact on access to information. This awareness differs greatly according to age group, with younger generations being more influenced by online global media sources, whilst the older generations rely on their traditional domestic media equivalents.193 Until fairly recently, Saudis used to get their news from official government sources, but nowadays the proliferation of online 24/​7 news means that young Saudi men are exposed to diverse national, regional and global information resources. In consequence, they are starting to gain a broader and more objective understanding of current affairs. Indeed, Hertog observes that the general level of political awareness amongst young Saudis is far above that of any previous generation.194 This heightened awareness is reflected in the comments of some educated young men who argue that it is not an exaggeration to say that public opinion is an important factor that influences Saudi government policy-​making on particular domestic issues. As one engineer contends, ‘Youth is starting to understand the world much better so hiding the truth or audience manipulation is harder in this digital era’195 as young Saudis become more politically aware, more open-​minded and in many ways more sophisticated.196 Young men also note that they encounter political arguments on a regular basis due to the increase of political commentary on social media applications. Discussion of socio-​political issues within families is also more common, although sometimes this is conducted without a deep understanding of politics, as many family members ‘just

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use common sense’ to understand contemporary political issues.197 In fact, one Riyadh focus group asserts (controversially) that within families, Saudi males are more politically aware and amongst males, minorities are more aware of their rights as Saudi citizens.198 Yet, according to another young man, whilst in general Saudi society is becoming more politically aware, there is a problem in that society still regards every contentious political issue as a ‘conspiracy theory’.199 Young men recognize that politics affects the individual and his community across areas including social life, lifestyle, education and mindset.200 They comprehend that politics shapes both their own social circles and wider society, even if at times it is difficult for some young men to pinpoint the exact impact of politics. In fact, it is possible to link politics to many aspects of their lives, even relationships with their families and friends with whom they discuss socio-​economic, cultural and political issues. One individual remarks that politics is part of his everyday environment because the life he and his family leads is a consequence of political decisions –​that is, every society is affected by their leaders’ political decisions (and mistakes).201 For a few young men in tertiary education –​some of whom are already politically active –​politics is frequently more interesting than their university or college majors. They follow current affairs on a daily basis and read or listen to expert analysis. However, they also understand the need for objectivity and frequently display a healthy scepticism that motivates them to seek answers and different points of view.202 It is not enough to leave everything to the politicians, says an al-​Ahsa focus group; rather, young men should think about the important issues, and analyse the news because there is always a hidden story to uncover:203 We talk about what happens around us and the future of our country in the next five to ten years. Are we going to be able to achieve our goals? What will our relationships be like with other countries and our brothers in the Gulf? We think as Saudis, talking together, but we are all sure what happens behind the scenes is the real deal –​not what is said in the media.204

As a result of their experiences and political interests, these young men believe Saudi students in tertiary education should be provided with a more in-​depth comprehension of the global forces affecting their daily lives. This would enable students to acquire an improved understanding of political processes in Saudi Arabia, as well as facilitating better-​ informed decision-​ making regarding their individual futures and, by extension, national development.205 Clearly, there is also a ‘downside’ to greater political awareness. For instance, some young men remark that their increased political

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awareness, usually acquired via social media, makes them anxious and pessimistic about the future of the Kingdom.206 Moreover, the political realities of Saudi life can cause confusion and uncertainty amongst all Saudi constituencies, as there are times when a young man can be ‘open politically’, but others when, at least in public, he must be as ‘closed’ as possible.207 Not surprisingly, young Shia men from Eastern Province point out that politics (and their own awareness of political issues) affects all aspects of their daily lives due to their status as a minority.208 That said, even if political awareness is perceived to have a downside, many young men recognize the importance of government transparency and accountability as essential components of decision-​making processes.209 3

Government Transparency and Accountability

3.1

Responsibility to Society

When we discuss the advantages or disadvantages of transparency, the private right to manage and the public right to know can come into conflict. However, if we comprehend transparency as described by Jordan to incorporate transparency in the exercising of power, participation by society in the process of establishing policies and downward accountability of the governing to the governed,210 then to what extent do young Saudi men believe that government policy should be transparent? As discussed, new media allows youth to absorb and generate new ideas, and, as Momani says, this influences the way young people think about ‘how things ought to be in the relationship between governments and people’, as well as the capacity of youth to challenge state inadequacies.211 For some of these young men, a government should be transparent as this represents the cornerstone of the state; hence, they argue, a transparent government will encourage society to become more responsible. One young man’s views on transparency and accountability recall the argument made by Montagu212 –​although he doubts that ‘full transparency’ will transpire in the Kingdom, as he believes that must include: Respect for human rights, freedom of expression, constitutional monarchy, transparent elections, social justice, an end to discrimination, an independent judiciary and ending of corruption, and for women to have full rights as citizens.213

Government transparency should be a goal for every state and authorities should be held accountable, asserts one individual, because transparency and accountability are a necessity if the government wants to ensure societal contentment.214 In consequence, a government has a

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huge responsibility towards society.215 According to an Qassim focus group, this responsibility is reflected in Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s directive to each ministry to formulate a transparent plan and record its progress –​an instruction that earned this group’s approval.216 Another example: a government employee from MoCI states that transparency was one of the main goals of the well-​regarded Dr Tawfiq Al Rabiah when he was MoCI Minister: We had a problem with our direct manager and we contacted Minister Al Rabiah and he listened to us and solved the problem –​ten years ago this would not have happened. And nowadays, it is easy to communicate with the MoCI.You can find the phone numbers of all the officials and their email addresses on the website. You can contact them and they respond. The regional manager in Qassim even has his personal number listed.217

In fact, as Putnam argues, if a state has an active civil society as well as good governance then this in turn facilitates a higher level of networks and trust, thereby enabling society and the state to work constructively together, yielding better governance.218 Indeed, greater transparency and accountability will be reflected in society as individuals will become motivated to contribute to national development precisely because the government’s policies and actions are clear and understandable.219 Certainly, transparent policies and government accountability would ensure that all Saudi citizens are represented throughout the decision-​ making process, but there is recognition that whilst a government should be ‘transparent to the maximum’, caution is sometimes needed. For example, some young men believe that government policy should be fully transparent except in matters related to national security.220 This appears to correlate with Murphy’s observation that young Saudis appreciate the daily security they enjoy, compared with the chaos, bloodshed and economic disruption in nearby states.221 Notwithstanding the security issue, there is a strong belief that all government institutions should be subject to standards that are universally clear, and that anyone who does not adhere to these standards should be held accountable.222 However, for some individuals, 100 per cent government transparency is an impractical utopian aspiration, although they think that the government should at least attempt 50–​80 per cent transparency –​though the level of transparency could be determined by the situation or specific issues.223 Still, governments can benefit from fostering transparency as this cultivates a sense of belonging to the land as well as encouraging loyalty to the government –​even though Al Rasheed argues that in contemporary Saudi Arabia, ‘globalized and localized identities are articulated at the expense of national belonging’.224

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The government should be responsible for its ‘multiple societies in all matters and at all times’, argue several individuals from minority groups.225 In other words, the government must consider diverse groups within society from one end of the socio-​political spectrum to the other, whether ‘conservative’ or ‘moderate’, in order to resolve issues between diverse constituencies in a way that ensures that ‘divides or discrimination between these groups cease to exist’. Certainly, a successful government is perceived to be one that succeeds in eliminating barriers of fear between itself and society. Thus, if the Saudi government were able to achieve this then it could become a ‘role model’, for society resulting in stronger state–​society bonds.226 Accordingly, if the government desires to be seen as transparent then the most important issues it should address are sectarianism and religious discrimination, as well as treating each individual Saudi as a citizen who has rights.227 The views of these young men from minority groups mirror those of some young Saudi intellectuals who, Al Rasheed points out, are concerned about ‘the hegemony of the traditional Salafist thought that has dominated the Saudi public sphere and its political consequences’.228 3.2

Leading by Example

According to a Saudi political scientist in Riyadh, it is the responsibility of the government ‘to lead by example’, as the Kingdom’s youthful population ‘needs direction’.229 From the perspective of these young Saudis, the question is:  to what extent should governments lead by example? According to some young men, even though the government must do so (to a greater extent), this must be ‘limited’ because society must also be able to make choices.230 Moreover, even if the government is not able to lead by example at all times, it has to perform its duties in the best possible way –​something that individuals consider does happen, as demonstrated by the April 2017 appointments of new ministers, emirs, deputy emirs and senior state officials.231 The 2017 ministerial appointments appeared to signify an attempt at increased inclusiveness and transparency in policy-​ making.232 Accordingly, there is recognition that increased transparency in the ministries and the introduction of e-​government services has made life much easier for ordinary Saudis (and expatriates). Before, ‘everything was shady’, says one focus group, and as a result it was difficult to contact the government officials, but today regulations and procedures are clearer. Even the popular Saudi TV show Tash Ma Tash played a part in highlighting the failings of bureaucracy and encouraging improved government

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transparency.233 Nevertheless, Saudi citizens will not commit to actions ‘solicited by their government’ if they do not see the willingness of their government to commit as well. In consequence, there is consensus that a non-​transparent government cannot be trusted, in the eyes of its citizens.234 For this reason, the government should lead by example and show genuine commitment to good governance through legislation.235 Although public opinion can assist the government’s decision-​making process, some young men contend that the government has the right to make decisions by itself because ‘it is like a father who makes decisions after consulting his family’.236 In other words, although certain decisions should remain the government’s responsibility, the government must ensure that it maintains a bond of trust with society via a consultation process.237 Other young men argue that people are not always aware of the consequences (positive or negative) of their decisions, and cite Brexit and Trump as examples of the failings of ‘democratic’ processes.238 Indeed, a young man from al-​Ahsa declares that important decisions should be left to the political leaders because ‘they know what is happening’.239 This conforms to Sharabi’s idea that the patriarchal family’s significance in understanding neo-​patriarchal structures lies in its basic internal relations, above all in the relations of authority, domination and dependency.240 Hence, it is the patriarchal role of the government to discuss important issues openly, share its opinions with society (its family) and, whilst imitating the role of a father, listen to public concerns.241 By doing so, the government will be able to address societal concerns, including providing quality education and jobs with reasonable salaries. In this respect, the government can lead by example and respond to society’s needs and aspirations.242 Some political matters cannot be understood by most Saudis because their awareness of them is limited, argue some, although they also assert that it is not necessarily the government’s fault if people do not possess a basic knowledge of politics.243 Nevertheless, the government should set ‘parameters’ that are understood so as to deter individuals from transgressing; that is, for each specific issue there should be an explicitly understood red line. Indeed, some young men declare that they prefer that the final decision remain with the government; it should allow people to express their opinions, but not necessarily do as society wants, particularly if it is not in the national interest. Still, the government should ensure that citizens’ rights are ‘specified in writing’ so that they are clear and applicable to all citizens and societal constituencies. If this happens, it would constitute a significant step forward for the government in leading by example.244

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3.3

A More Accountable Leadership

Certainly, the advent of new/​social media usage has made public opinion more important, but it has also ‘opened people’s minds’ regarding a variety of issues. For instance, issues related to societal transformation –​ both positive and negative –​such as discrimination, whether religious, racial, tribal, or gender-​related, have been brought into sharper focus as a result of new/​social media usage. As a result, some young men have a noticed positive change; in general young educated Saudis are more tolerant in that they accept differences and diversity. Furthermore, these young individuals are more politically aware and less shallow. That said, the overall development of some young men remains slow due to a lack of social awareness and the fact that their interests and activities remain limited to certain areas or ‘their main purpose is having fun’.245 Still, according to one young man, despite the socio-​cultural reforms witnessed in 2017–​19, life in the Kingdom remains ‘restricted’ and ‘the culture of “everything is haram” ’.246 Nevertheless, he believes that young Saudis are increasingly awake in socio-​political and socio-​cultural terms, to the extent that the twenty-​something generation believes that ‘religious extremism’ was responsible for hindering the development of both state and society.247 Precisely because this awareness exists, this young man says: This makes us feel that the future will be better. I just hope that one day art will be something that has value in the Kingdom, that we will have music colleges and cinemas on every corner and that our opinions and interests will be taken seriously.248

In October 2018, this fear of ‘religious extremism’ and the possibility of a return to a closed, restricted social space prompted many young Saudi men to support Crown Prince Mohammed regardless of the fallout from the Khashoggi affair.249 Unquestionably, economic realities related to oil price fluctuations have necessitated a change in government policies, for example the introduction of the NTP and Saudi Vision 2030.250 Yet even before the 2014 oil price decrease, the government had allocated significant sums of money to education in order to establish a knowledge-​based economy. Consequently, the Kingdom’s youthful, frequently aspirational, population expects concrete policies from the government: effective ones that will improve the socio-​economic situation.251 Indeed, a young Jeddah-​ based Saudi journalist maintains that young people have become more questioning about government pronouncements.252 As Al Rasheed

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observes, this emerging reformist trend in the Kingdom is ‘still loyal to the government, but demands an opening of the political system to include a wide social base’253 –​one that includes a constructive response to societal concerns. The journalist concurs, and maintains that this scepticism does not translate into desiring a change of leadership. Rather, he argues, young Saudis want a more accountable leadership that reflects today’s political and economic realities, in addition to an end to the ‘corrupt practices of the past’. Indeed, the journalist contends that Crown Prince Mohammed appears to be responding to those concerns by saying ‘I belong to the same generation as you so I understand the path you would like the Kingdom to take’.254 The Saudi leadership is more sophisticated and realistic than many in the West imagine (or give it credit for),255 and Crown Prince Mohammed and his advisors clearly recognize the importance of public opinion regarding domestic issues such as utilities and employment. For example, since 2016 the crown prince has used telephone polling of Saudi citizens in order to gauge public attitudes to important domestic issues such as employment opportunities/​career aspirations and lack of affordable housing.256 A variety of projects were also commissioned from consultancy firms (located inside and outside the Kingdom) to measure public opinion, especially amongst youth, on topics such as attitudes to civic engagement and volunteering.257 Within the Royal Diwan, Crown Prince Mohammed also established a number of advisory committees. One of these, the Center for Studies and Media Affairs, monitors public opinion and relays its findings to the crown prince, the rationale being that the government will be able to respond to criticism (or pre-​empt it) if public opinion coalesces around a certain (domestic) position –​such as widespread public anger directed at the water bills fiasco. Nevertheless, economic realities related to the low oil price, the impact of online public opinion, and demands for greater government transparency and accountability via increased new/​social media usage are some of the issues that the Saudi government will have to confront. All the same, can new media usage influence political change? As the Annual ASDA’A Burson-​Marsteller Arab Youth Survey observes, the penetration and reach of social media into society is significant. It offers a stark reminder for governments and businesses that if they want to engage with young people in the Arab world, they need to prioritize social media.258 Moreover, Kinninmont points out that changes in the availability of education and information are likely to create new expectations for transparency and for more participation in the public sphere.259 If expanding new media usage fails to impact on politico-​ economic transformation then this could exacerbate frustration

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amongst young people. What is frequently healthy scepticism when it comes to government policies could mutate into negative cynicism, thereby undermining government initiatives to transform the Kingdom. In 2016, the Saudi government appeared to be responding by introducing initiatives such as Saudi Vision 2030, but this raises expectations particularly amongst youth and, ultimately, that could prove to be a double-​edged sword.260 Notes 1 New media, which includes social media, are forms of media that are native to computers, computational and relying on computers for redistribution. Most technologies described as new media are digital, often having characteristics of being able to be manipulated, networkable, compressible and interactive. Some examples may be the Internet, websites, computer multimedia, video games, CD-​ROMS, DVDs and social media, which is a subset of new media. See, for example:  www.christopherspenn.com/​2016/​10/​ whats-​the-​difference-​between-​social-​media-​new-​media. 2 For earlier versions of sections of this chapter such as that on social media, see:  Thompson, M.C., ‘Societal transformation, public opinion and Saudi youth: views from an academic elite’, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 53, Issue 5, 2017, pp. 834–​57. 3 See, for example: Haykel, B., Hegghammer, T. and Lacroix, S. (eds) Saudi Arabia in Transition: Insights on Social, Political, Economic and Religious Change, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015, p. 5. 4 Chaudhary, S., ‘The Role of Social Media as a Decisive Actor in Saudi Arabia’, in Gunter et al (eds) Social Media in the Arab World: Communication and Public Opinion in the Gulf States, I.B. Tauris, London, 2016, pp. 25–​44. 5 Fuchs, C., Social Media:  A Critical Introduction, Sage, London, 2014, pp. 5–​6. 6 UCL Department of Anthropology, Global Social Media Impact Study, available at: www.ucl.ac.uk/​global-​social-​media. 7 Van Dijck, J., The Culture of Connectivity: A Critical History of Social Media, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 73. 8 Zayani, M., Digital Middle East:  State and Society in the Information Age, C. Hurst & Co., London, 2018, p. 7. 9 Chaudhary, ‘The Role of Social Media as a Decisive Actor in Saudi Arabia’, p. 35. 10 Fuchs, Social Media, p. 207. 11 Aljabre, A., ‘Social Networking, Social Movements, and Saudi Arabia:  A Review of Literature’, ARPN Journal of Science and Technology, Vol. 3, Issue 2, 2013, p. 161. 12 Sukarieh, M. and Tannok, S., Youth Rising: The Politics of Youth in the Global Economy, Routledge, Abingdon, 2015, p.104. 13 Hirschman, A., ‘Exit and Voice. An Expanding Sphere of Influence’, in Hirschman, A.  (ed.) Rival Views of Market Society, Viking, New  York, 1986, p. 82.

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14 Gunter, B., Elareshi, M. and Al-​Jaber, K. (eds) Social Media in the Arab World: Communication and Public Opinion in the Gulf States, I.B. Tauris, London, 2016, p. 4. 15 Thompson, M.C. and Quilliam, N., ‘State, Citizens and Institutions: Policy Making in the GCC’, Middle East Policy, Vol. XXV, No. 3, Autumn 2018, p. 126. 16 El Khawaja, ‘Look to Social Media for the Gulf ’s Burgeoning Debates’. 17 ASDA’A Burson-​Marsteller, 8th Annual ASDA’A Burson-​ Marsteller Arab Youth Survey, p. 43. 18 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 19 ASDA’A Burson-​Marsteller, 10th Annual ASDA’A Burson-​Marsteller Arab Youth Survey: A Decade of Hopes & Fears, ASDA’A Burson-​Marsteller, Dubai, 2018, p. 61, available at: www.arabyouthsurvey.com. 20 Ahmed, Q., ‘Saudi Arabia’s Struggle with Social Media: Twitter Clowns and Facebook Fatwas’, The Blaze, 11 April 2013, available at: www.theblaze.com/​ contributions/​saudi-​arabias-​struggles-​with-​social-​media-​twitter-​clowns-​and-​ facebook-​fatwas. 21 Momani, B., Arab Dawn: Arab Youth and the Demographic Dividend They Will Bring, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2015, p. 48. 22 Yamani, ‘Saudi Youth’, p. 113. 23 Gmi_​ blogger, ‘Saudi Arabia Social Media Statistics 2018’, Global Media Insight, 2018, available at:  www.globalmediainsight.com/​blog/​ saudi-​arabia-​social-​media-​statistics. 24 Hertog, ‘Back to the Seventies?’, p. 86. 25 Gmi_​blogger, ‘Saudi Arabia Social Media Statistics 2018’. 26 The Social Clinic, ‘The State of Social Media in Saudi Arabia Vol. 3’, The Social Clinic, 2015, available at: www.thesocialclinic.com/​the-​state-​of-​ social-​media-​in-​saudi-​arabia-​vol-​3. 27 Governance and Innovation Program, Social Media and the Internet of Things. Towards Data-​ Driven Policymaking in the Arab World:  Potential, Limits and Concerns, 7th Arab Social Media Report, Mohammed Bin Rashid School of Government, Dubai, 2017, pp. 44–​5. 28 The Social Clinic, ‘The State of Social Media in Saudi Arabia Vol. 3’. 29 Gmi_​blogger, ‘Saudi Arabia Social Media Statistics 2018’. 30 Umm Al Qura University focus group, Makkah, February 2017. 31 Arab Social Media Influencers Summit, Arab Social Media Report:  First Report 2015, Dubai Media City, Dubai, 2015, available at:  sites.wpp.com/​ govtpractice/​~/​media/​wppgov/​files/​arabsocialmediareport-​2015.pdf, p. 4. 32 Ibid. 33 Dammam focus group, October 2016. 34 al-​Majmaah focus group, March 2017. 35 Ibid. 36 Onaizah focus group, March 2017. See also:  Zayani, Digital Middle East, pp. 6–​7. 37 Governance and Innovation Program, Social Media and the Internet of Things. 38 The ‘smartphone generation’. 39 Jones, C.J., ‘Religious Revivalism and Its Challenge to the Saudi Regime’, in Ayoob, M.  and Kosebalaban, H.  (eds) Religion and Politics in Saudi Arabia: Wahhabism and the State, Lynne Reiner, Boulder, CO, 2009, p. 119.

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40 See, for example:  Mirza, M., ‘9 of the Most Popular Saudi Sheikhs on Twitter’, Lovin Saudi, 11 August 2018, available at: https://​lovinsaudi.com/​ lifestyle/​technology/​9-​of-​the-​most-​popular-​saudi-​sheikhs-​on-​twitter. 41 In January 2018 Al Awda was detained by the government. 42 Mirza, ‘9 of the Most Popular Saudi Sheikhs on Twitter’. 43 Gmi_​blogger, ‘Saudi Arabia Social Media Statistics 2018’. 44 Yamani, M., ‘Saudi Youth’, p. 123. 45 Amalgamated anonymous responses to author’s survey. 46 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017. 47 Dhahran focus group, November 2016. 48 Interview with engineering students from Am Shairi village, April 2017. ‘Our village is relatively unknown, but it has some beautiful places and very good weather. Nowadays, some people visit our village because of pictures on social media. Here are some videos about our village: www.youtube.com/​ watch?v=k6byYCxg1s0; www.youtube.com/​watch?v=6pT8elo3sA8’. 49 Ali, M., ‘Facebook, Whatsapp and the Smartphone Fuel a Major Transformation’, Arab Youth Survey 2017, ASDA’A Burson-​Marsteller, Dubai, 2017, p. 62, available at: http://​arabyouthsurvey.com. 50 When I ask my students what percentage of Saudis use WhatsApp, they laugh and reply ‘100 per cent’. 51 Interview with engineering students from Am Shairi village, April 2017. 52 Jeddah focus group, December 2016. 53 Najran focus group, October 2016: ‘But some people also use it to enforce their racism.’ 54 Jeddah focus group, December 2016. 55 Alsharkh, Y., ‘The Social Media Effect on the Families of the Saudi Society from the Perspective of Youth’, Master’s thesis, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, 2012, p. 22, available at: https://​repository.asu.edu/​attachments/​ 93616/​content//​tmp/​package-​9oc5Q8/​Alsharkh_​asu_​0010N_​11662.pdf. 56 Zayani, Digital Middle East, p. 8. 57 Gmi_​blogger, ‘Saudi Arabia Social Media Statistics 2018’. 58 The Social Clinic, ‘The State of Social Media in Saudi Arabia Vol. 3’. 59 Allagui, I., ‘The Changing Nature of Socialization among ArabYouth: Insights from Online Practices’, in Zayani M.  (ed.) Digital Middle East:  State and Society in the Information Age, C. Hurst & Co., London, 2018, p. 44. 60 ASDA’A Burson-​Marsteller, 10th Annual ASDA’A Burson-​Marsteller Arab Youth Survey. 61 Zayani, Digital Middle East, p. 6. 62 See: www.youtube.com/​channel/​UCOhAKu7yJ48rkxqJhV7mhPA. 63 See: www.youtube.com/​user/​linesmedia. 64 See: www.youtube.com/​results?search_​query=telfaz11. 65 See: www.youtube.com/​results?search_​query=U-​turn+jeddah. 66 See: www.youtube.com/​results?search_​query=sa7i+channel. 67 Abha focus group, November 2016. One group member worked in social media; he was the CEO of YouTube: Lines Media. 68 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017. 69 Anonymous online response to author’s survey.

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70 Diwan, K.S., ‘Mohammed bin Salman’s Media Obsession –​and What It Means for Dissent’, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, 30 October 2018, available at:  https://​agsiw.org/​mohammed-​bin-​salmans-​media-​obsessed-​and-​ what-​it-​means-​for-​dissent; ‘The Saudi Broadcasting Authority has been given more independence from the Ministry of Culture and Information and placed under the direction of Dawood Al Shirian, a journalist known for his popular interview program as well as his willingness to criticize government ministries while championing the Mohammed bin Salman approach. The new station hopes to attract advertising dollars now spent abroad while relying upon and developing indigenous Saudi production talent.’ 71 Abha focus group, November 2016. 72 Brake, D.R., Sharing Our Lives Online:  Risks and Exposure in Social Media, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2014, p. 153. 73 Allagui, I., ‘The Changing Nature of Socialization among Arab Youth’, p. 44. 74 Masry, S., ‘Social Saudis:  Uses and Implications of New Media in the Kingdom’, in Kinninmont, J.  (ed.) Chatham House Report:  Future Trends in the Gulf, Chatham House, London, 2015, p.  36, available at:  www .chathamhouse.org/ ​ s ites/ ​ f iles/ ​ c hathamhouse/ ​ f ield/ ​ f ield_ ​ d ocument/​ 20150218FutureTrendsGCCKinninmont.pdf. 75 Abha focus group, November 2016. They also say that a young Saudi man from Asir won a competition on social media with a device that cleans art brushes, and as a result he was incubated by Al Zamil. 76 Certainly, many respondents say that as a result of social media young Saudis are developing and becoming more aware, but according to them this is not enough. 77 Alsharkh, Y., ‘The Social Media Effect’, p. 23. 78 Kinninmont, J., ‘To What Extent Is Twitter Changing Gulf Societies?’ Chatham House, February 2013, available at:  www.chathamhouse.org/ publications/​papers/​view/​189413. 79 Jambi, R., ‘The Virtual Gulf Empowers Young Voices’, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, 30 January 2017, available at: www.agsiw.org/​virtual-​ gulf-​empowers-​young-​voices/​#more-​12096. 80 Diwan, ‘Mohammed bin Salman’s Media Obsession’. 81 See: https://​misk.org.sa/​en/​services/​shoof-​2017-​en. 82 Bashraheel, A., ‘Storytellers Unite in 5th MiSK SHOOF Digital Visual Media Forum’, Arab News, 13 December 2017, available at: www.arabnews .com/​node/​1208391/​saudi-​arabia. 83 Interview with Saudi business graduate, Riyadh, April 2017. 84 Anonymous online response to author’s survey. 85 Personal observation, but one that is corroborated by many of my focus groups and students. 86 Al Saggaf, Y., ‘The Effect of Online Community on Offline Community in Saudi Arabia’, The Electronic Journal on Information Systems in Developing Countries, Vol. 16, 2004, pp.  10–​12, available at:  www.ejisdc.org/​ojs2/​index .php/​ejisdc/​article/​view/​97/​97. 87 Layla, al-​Aflaj focus group, April 2017.

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88 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 89 Alsharkh, ‘The Social Media Effect’, p. 19. 90 Ibid. 91 Ibid. 92 Amalgamated anonymous online responses to author’s survey. Apparently the young Saudi responsible for the Kuwait terrorist incident on 26 June 2015 was radicalized just 24 hours before the attack. 93 Interview with engineering students from Am Shairi village, April 2017. 94 Dammam focus group, October 2016. 95 al-​Majmaah focus group, March 2017. 96 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. 97 Ibid. ‘We could write a song about how it is cool to be yourself, but not one of the Snapchat clones.’ 98 Jeddah focus group, December 2016. 99 ASDA’A Burson-​Marsteller, 10th Annual ASDA’A Burson-​Marsteller Arab Youth Survey, p. 65. 100 Riyadh focus group, May 2017. 101 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 102 Abha focus group, November 2016. ‘Asir has the highest percentage of young people in Saudi Arabia.’ 103 Ibid. The journalist is working on a research presentation (joint project between KKU and Janadriyah) called ‘The Crisis of Role Models’. 104 Ibid. The journalist cites as an example a group in Eastern Province that has its own code of conduct and its own symbol on its cars. There are also a lot of people on social media who use bad slang, and this behaviour damages Saudi socio-​cultural and religious values. He claims one person who did this type of thing on TV was sent to prison. 105 Ibid. He does not think journalists should be biased; they should let the readership make up its own mind. The editor is a kind of gatekeeper to stop journalists from crossing red lines. 106 Ibid. 107 See, for example:  Anon, ‘Faiz Al-​Malki Donates His Twitter Account to Charity’, Arab News, 10 September 2013, available at: www.arabnews.com/​ news/​464084 108 Abha focus group, November 2016. 109 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. ‘Even so, many individuals recognize that social media can be used positively, such when it is used for college/​university communication/​information.’ 110 ASDA’A Burson-​Marsteller, 10th Annual ASDA’A Burson-​Marsteller Arab Youth Survey, p. 65. 111 al-​Khobar focus group, January 2017. 112 Al Hussain, E., ‘The Evolution of the Culture of Exclusion’, Eman Al Hussain blog, 29 October 2018, available at:  http://​emanalhussein.com/​ 2018/​10/​29/​evolution-​of-​exclusion. 113 Riyadh focus group, May 2017. 114 Qatif focus group, October 2016. 115 Riyadh focus group, April 2017.

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116 Ibid. See, for example: Middle East Institute, ‘Fahad Albutairi on Comedy and Social Media in Saudi Arabia’, YouTube, 19 November 2015, available at:  www.youtube.com/​watch?v=IKcg-​iwIf7I; Solomon, E., ‘Saudi’s First Stand-​Up Comic Fahad Albutairi on Humour and His Homeland’, Financial Times, 17 February 2017, available at:  www.ft.com/​content/​ ba279240-​f2bb-​11e6-​8758-​6876151821a6. 117 Riyadh focus group, May 2017. 118 Apparently, there is a special Twitter department in the Interior Ministry. 119 Chatham House, State, Society and Social Media in the Gulf:  Middle East and North Africa Programme Workshop Summary, Chatham House, London, 27–​28 March 2017, p. 3, available at: www.chathamhouse.org/​sites/​default/​ files/​events/​2017-​03-​27-​State-​Society-​Social-​Media-​Meeting-​Summary .pdf. 120 See, for example:  Trew, B., ‘Bee Stung:  Was Jamal Khashoggi the First Casualty in a Saudi Cyberwar?’, The Independent, 20 October 2018, available at: www.independent.co.uk/​news/​world/​middle-​east/​jamal-​khashoggisaudi- ​ a rabia-​ c yberwar-​ t rolls-​ b ee-​ a rmy-​ m issing-​ j ournalist-​ t urkey-​ u s-​ a8591051.html. 121 See, for example: http://​5pillarsuk.com/​2017/​09/​28/​saudi-​authorities-​arrestfounder-​of-​popular-​islamic-​website-​shaykh-​al-​munajjid. 122 Aljabre, ‘Social Networking, Social Movements, and Saudi Arabia’, p. 164. 123 Yamani, ‘Saudi Youth’, p. 113. 124 Dammam focus group, January 2017. 125 Author’s online survey: ‘‫’التحول اإلجتماعي و الرأي العام‬ 126 Ottaway, M.  and Dunne, M., (eds) Incumbent Regimes and the ‘King’s Dilemma’ in The Arab World: Promise and Threat of Managed Reform, Middle East Program, No. 88, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, 2007, p. 28. 127 Montagu, ‘Civil Society in Saudi Arabia’, pp. 3–​4. 128 Ibid. 129 Edwards, M., Civil Society, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2014, p. 20. 130 Ibid., p. 3. 131 See: Twitter@KingSalmanEN. 132 Elections were held in Saudi Arabia on 12 December 2015 for municipal councils, which have limited decision-​making powers on local issues. However, the elections appeared to receive greater attention outside Saudi Arabia than domestically, most likely because Saudi women ran as candidates. In fact, KFUPM students seemed somewhat underwhelmed by the whole process, which was perceived to reflect tribal realities rather than a ‘free and fair’ election. 133 Amalgamated anonymous responses to author’s survey. 134 Qatif focus group, November 2016. 135 Glynn, C., with Herbst, S., O’Keefe, G.J., Shapiro, R.Y. and Lindeman, M., Public Opinion, 3rd Edition, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 2016, p. 22. 136 Ibid., pp. 13–​14. 137 Interview with Saudi McKinsey consultant, Riyadh, March 2017. 138 Jeddah focus group, December 2016.

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139 Ibid. 140 Benkler, Y., The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, and London, 2006, p. 178. 141 Views expressed during multiple discussions with individual sources and classes. Saudi Vision 2030 launched in April 2016, promises a better future and better governance, but is raising hopes and expectations amongst ordinary Saudis. See Chapter 7. 142 Hildebrandt, El Abbouri and Alibraheem, ‘What Matters Most to Saudi Arabia’s Youth?’, pp. 5–​6. 143 Anonymous online response to author’s survey. 144 al-​Khobar focus group, January 2017. 145 The Royal Court. 146 Layla, al-​Aflaj focus group, April 2017. 147 Onaizah focus group, March 2017. ‘It costs SAR 40 to send one.’ 148 See, for example:  https://​mci.gov.sa/​en/​ServicesDirectory/​Pages/​Services .aspx?Category=Consumer%20interaction%20center. 149 Onaizah focus group, March 2017. 150 Ibid. 151 Ibid. 152 Ibid. 153 See:  https://​mci.gov.sa/​en/​AboutMinistry/​Pages/​OrganizationalStructure .aspx. 154 Onaizah focus group, March 2017. ‘But it’s different when it comes to security issues and/​or departments.’ 155 Amalgamated anonymous responses to author’s online survey. ‘Public opinion is a key factor in the development of societies.’ 156 Dammam focus group, January 2017. 157 al-​Ahsa focus group, June 2017. ‘It does: just look at Trump.’ 158 Ibid. 159 See, for example, Nereim, V.  and Fattah, Z., ‘Saudi Arabia Backs Tax on Empty Land as 40 per cent of Riyadh Sits Empty’, Bloomberg Business, 17 November 2015, available at: www.bloomberg.com/​news/​articles/​2015-​11-​ 17/​saudi-​arabia-​s-​shoura-​council-​approves-​tax-​on-​undeveloped-​land. 160 See: www.youtube.com/​watch?v=NMvCURQEhpM&feature=youtu.be. 161 Goodwin, D., ‘Saudi Arabia to Introduce New Land Tax’, Al Tamimi & Co., March 2016, available at:  www.tamimi.com/​law-​update-​articles/​ saudi-​arabia-​to-​introduce-​new-​land-​tax. 162 See, for example, Kerr, S., ‘Saudi Arabia Reverses Austerity Measure and Reinstates Benefits’, Financial Times, 23 April 2017, available at:  www .ft.com/​content/​002e6f0a-​2806-​11e7-​bc4b-​5528796fe35c. 163 Anon, ‘Saudi Arabia’s Water Minister Sacked after Complaints over Tariffs’, The National, 24 April 2016, available at: www.thenational.ae/​world/​saudi-​ arabia-​s-​water-​minister-​sacked-​after-​complaints-​over-​tariffs-​1.138178. 164 See, for example, Staff writer, ‘Only 13 Per Cent of Saudi Households to Pay More for Electricity, Water –​Minister’, Arabian Business, 30 December 2015, available at: www.arabianbusiness.com/​only-​13-​of-​saudi-​households-​ pay-​more-​for-​electricity-​water-​minister-​616757.html.

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165 Anon, ‘Higher Water Bills Create Angry Waves’, Arab News, 22 March 2016, available at: www.arabnews.com/​news/​899016. 166 Anon, ‘Saudi Arabia’s Water Minister Sacked after Complaints over Tariffs’. 167 Algethami, S.  and Habboush, M., ‘11 Saudi Princes Sent to Maximum-​ Security Prison after Protesting Utility Bills’, Bloomberg, 6 January 2018, available at:  www.bloomberg.com/​news/​articles/​2018-​01-​06/​saudi-arabiaarrests-​11-​princes-​protesting-​over-​bills-​okaz-​says. 168 Interview with Saudi business graduate, Riyadh, May 2017. 169 Chatham House, State, Society and Social Media in the Gulf, p. 5. 170 See, for example: Withnall, A., ‘Saudi Arabia’s King Salman Sacks Senior Aide for “Slapping” a Journalist Behind Him Live on TV’, The Independent, 5 May 2015, available at: www.independent.co.uk/​news/​world/​middle-​east/​ saudi-​arabias-​king-​salman-​sacks-​senior-​aide-​for-​slapping-​a-​journalist-​ behind-​him-​live-​on-​tv-​10225836.html. 171 Berlinger, J., ‘An Anonymous Twitter Account May Be Starting A  Quiet Revolution In Saudi Arabia’, Business Insider, 22 October 2012, available at:  www.businessinsider.com/​mujtahidd-​saudi-arabias-​rebel-tweeter2012-​10. 172 Interview with engineering students from Am Shairi village, April 2017. 173 Amalgamated anonymous responses to author’s online survey. 174 ‘Authority’ does not refer only to the government, but also to authority figures and/​or institutions across all sectors including, but not limited to, religious, educational or family/​tribal. 175 Onaizah focus group, March 2017. 176 Scott, D. and Lawson, H. ‘Introduction’, in Scott, D. and Lawson, H. (eds) Citizen Education and the Curriculum, Greenwood Publishing Group, Westport, CT, 2002, p. 1. 177 Dammam focus group, October 2016. 178 Onaizah focus group, March 2017. 179 Ibid. One young man says that the government allowed Mohammed Abdu to perform again in Saudi Arabia because of ‘collective public opinion’. 180 Habermas, J., The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1962, p. xi. 181 Anonymous response to author’s online survey. 182 Amalgamated anonymous responses to author’s online survey. 183 Anonymous response to author’s online survey. 184 Ibid. 185 Ibid. 186 Awamiya focus group, April 2017. 187 al-​ Khobar focus group, January 2017. ‘People joke that Crown Prince Mohammed is advised by his istiraha mates, he just brought them from there with him!’ 188 Al Shihabi, The Saudi Kingdom, p. 151. 189 Ayubi, Over-​Stating the Arab State, p. 235 190 Ibid. 191 Yamani, ‘Saudi Youth’, p. 114. 192 Amalgamated anonymous responses to author’s online survey. 193 Ibid.

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194 Hertog, ‘Back to the Seventies?’, p. 71. 195 Interview with Saudi engineer, Dhahran, February 2017. 196 al-​Khobar focus group, January 2017. 197 Ibid. 198 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 199 al-​Ahsa focus group, June 2017. 200 Anonymous response to author’s online survey. 201 Ibid. 202 Ibid. 203 al-​Ahsa focus group, June 2017. 204 Ibid. 205 Amalgamated anonymous responses to author’s online survey. 206 Anonymous response to author’s online survey. 207 Ibid. 208 Awamiya focus group, April 2017. 209 Ibid. 210 Jordan, L., ‘Global Civil Society’, in Edwards, M. (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Civil Society, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011, p. 97. 211 Momani, Arab Dawn, p. 47. 212 Montagu, ‘Civil Society in Saudi Arabia’. 213 Interview with KFUPM postgraduate student, December 2016. 214 Amalgamated anonymous responses to author’s online survey. 215 Ibid. 216 Onaizah focus group, March 2017. 217 Ibid. 218 Putnam, R., ‘Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 6, Issue 1, 1995, pp. 65–​78. 219 Anonymous response to author’s online survey ‘We have seen clear progress can be seen in this area.’ 220 Amalgamated anonymous responses to author’s online survey. 221 Murphy, A Kingdom’s Future, p. 62. 222 Amalgamated anonymous responses to author’s online survey. ‘There is a lot of discussion at the moment about how Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) are going to be introduced into all the ministries. This will be a departure from the way things were done in the past.’ 223 Ibid. 224 Al Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State, p. 18. 225 Amalgamated anonymous responses to author’s online survey. 226 Anonymous response to author’s online survey. ‘I believe unbiased media is the only means to find this balanced environment.’ 227 Amalgamated anonymous (Shia) responses to author’s online survey. 228 Al Rasheed, M., Muted Modernists: The Struggle Over Divine Politics in Saudi Arabia, C. Hurst & Co., London, 2015, p.135. 229 Interview with Saudi political scientist, Riyadh, January 2017. 230 Anonymous response to author’s online survey. 231 See, for example:  Toumi, H., ‘King Salman Reshuffles Cabinet, Reinstates Public Bonuses’, Gulf News, 23 April 2017, available at: http://​ gulfnews.com/ ​ n ews/ ​ g ulf/ ​ s audi- ​ a rabia/ ​ k ing- ​ s alman- ​ r eshuffles- ​ c abinetreinstates-​public-​bonuses-​1.2016074.

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232 Thompson, M.C., ‘Opening up the Decision-​ Making Process in Saudi Arabia’, Gulf Affairs, ‘Energy and the State: The Impact of Low Oil Prices’, Summer 2016, pp. 22–​3, available at: www.oxgaps.org/​gulf-​affairs. 233 Onaizah focus group, March 2017. See:  Qusti, R., ‘Tash Ma Tash:  A Barometer of Self-​ Criticism’, Arab News, 3 November 2004, available at: www.arabnews.com/​node/​257535. 234 Amalgamated anonymous responses to author’s online survey. 235 Ibid. 236 Dammam focus group, January 2017. 237 Hofuf focus group, December 2016. 238 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 239 al-​Ahsa focus group, June 2017. 240 Sharabi, H., Neopatriarchy:  A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1988, p. 41. 241 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017. 242 Ibid. 243 al-​Khobar focus group, February 2017. 244 Safwa focus group, January 2017. 245 Ibid. 246 Riyadh focus group, May 2017. 247 Ibid. 248 Ibid. 249 Views expressed by multiple individuals across Saudi Arabia, October 2018. 250 Interview with Saudi political consultant, Riyadh, February 2017. ‘If you like, you could say that the ball is in the government’s court.’ 251 Ibid. 252 Interview with Saudi journalist, Jeddah, December 2016. I  witness a ‘healthy skepticism’ among my KFUPM students. 253 Al Rasheed, Muted Modernists, p.39. 254 Interview with Saudi journalist, Jeddah, December 2016. 255 Butler, N., ‘Why There Are Signs of a Saudi Return to Tradition’, Financial Times, 20 August 2018, available at:  www.ft.com/​content/​ 5c5724d6-​a16b-​11e8-​85da-​eeb7a9ce36e4. 256 Many focus group members participated in these. Multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–18. 257 I participated in both of these projects. 258 ASDA’A Burson-​Marsteller, 8th Annual ASDA’A Burson-​Marsteller Arab Youth Survey. 259 Kinninmont, J., Chatham House Report: Future Trends in the Gulf, Chatham House, London, 2015. 260 Amalgamated anonymous responses to author’s online survey.

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1 Education 1.1 Background

The Saudi government is educating its young population, with the vast majority attending higher educational institutions in the Kingdom and the brightest students being sent to study overseas, sponsored by the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques’ Overseas Scholarship Programme1  –​better known in the West as the KASP.2 In fact, as Alnassar and Dow document, it was the leaders of the Kingdom’s universities, rectors and senior supporting personnel who convinced the Saudi government to transform the Kingdom into a knowledge-​ based economy and, by extension, society, by utilizing its considerable resources to better educate and build its human capital.3 In April 2011, former Minister of Higher Education4 Dr Al Anqari announced a new 25-​year plan for the development of higher education, and in 2012 SAR 137.9 billion was allocated to education and training in order to convert the Kingdom into a knowledge-​based society by 2022.5 In 2014, the government invested approximately SAR 21,000 for each Saudi6 aged 16 to 29 and in April 2016, education was designated as one of ‘pillars of Saudi Vision 2030’.7 In the 2017 budget, the largest budgetary allotment of roughly SAR 200 billion was allocated to education. Although the 2018 SAR 192 billion allocation for the education sector was 4.5 per cent lower year on year, it still accounted for close to 20 per cent of expenditure.8 Within the education sector, key projects include building 1,376 schools and facilities, additional female colleges and the overseas scholarship programme, which at the time of writing served over 207,000 students.9 Another key project is the King Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz Public Education Development Project, which aims to improve the quality of public education at a cost of SAR 11.8 billion to

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be distributed over five years from 2018.10 The project, to produce generations of Saudis who will be able to contribute to state–​society development, lists as its objectives: The development of educational curricula to comply with modern scientific and technical developments and meet the value-​ based, knowledge, professional, psychological, physical, mental and lifestyle needs of male and female students and re-​qualification of teachers and preparing them to carry out their educational duties. Among the goals of the project is improving the educational environment and preparing to utilize information and communication technology (ICT) in education to stimulate learning. This is in order to achieve a higher level of efficiency in acquiring information and training, as well as strengthening personal and creative capabilities, developing skills and hobbies, satisfying psychological needs of students, and strengthening ideas as well as national and social relations through extra-​curricular activities of various kinds.11

Indeed, Saudi Arabia spends more on higher education than most Organisation for Economic Co-​operation and Development (OECD) countries, said Ali bin Nasser Al Ghafis, Minister of Labour and Social Development, in 2017, with expenditure on tertiary education and training accounting for more than 7 per cent of the government’s budget.12 Naturally, this wide-​ranging educational process has raised the hopes and aspirations of young Saudis, but it also poses the question of how these young people, of both genders, are going to be gainfully employed after their education  –​particularly in an age of ‘austerity’. Indeed, Hertog observes that the expansion of higher education ‘has allowed the temporary parking of young Saudis many of whom would otherwise be unemployed’,13 thereby simply delaying the problem. 1.2

Educational Reform

As Smith and Abouammoh highlight, education in Saudi Arabia has four defining characteristics:  ‘a focus on the teaching of Islam, a centralized system of control and educational support, state funding (thus education is free at all levels in Saudi Arabia) and a general policy of gender segregation’.14 Smith and Abouammoh also point out that Saudi Arabia has received widespread international criticism regarding the quality of its education system, in particular the state curriculum and the ‘didactic nature of its pedagogy’.15 Furthermore, Elyas and Picard assert that teachers and instructors, in particular in tertiary education, are

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constrained by the direct hierarchical power of institutional structures and Saudi Arabian educational policy, as well as national political and economic drivers and transnational pressures.16 Despite the fact that the Saudi government maintains high levels of spending on education, government reform of the public-​sector education system is still lacking. This education system, argue Courington and Zuabi, continues to be ‘plagued by inefficient bureaucracy and heavy religious influence’.17 Indeed, curricula and high-​school materials are an extremely problematic and contested area because, in the words of one Saudi instructor, ‘education is the battleground’ between reformers and more religious-​conservative consistencies –​in other words, the battle to influence young hearts and minds.18 In fact, in 2005 Prokop highlighted the same issue: the ‘war of ideas’ or ‘battle’ over the revision of curricula, highlight how divergent and polarizing opinions are between conservative religious forces and more liberal voices over the pace, extent and shape of (educational) reform.19

In March 2018, Ahmed Al Issa, former Minister of Education, asserted that the power of religious extremists and in particular ‘the invasion of the Muslim Brotherhood in the education system is an indisputable fact’. In light of all the changes affecting the education sector, Al Hussain wonders what will replace themes and ideas that were promoted in textbooks for years. For instance, the transnationalism of the Muslim Brotherhood might be replaced with more Saudi nationalism. Al Hussain also believes that ‘relaxing social restrictions and introducing more social reforms will eventually weaken the conservative structure, especially since the majority of youth is supportive of reforms’.20 Furthermore, the decision by Ahmed Al Issa to include Ghazi Al Gosaibi’s book A Life in Management as a textbook in high school is a positive step: The late former Minister of Labor was a constant victim of harassment by conservatives who criticized his views, writings and work. Introducing his books in school is an important step towards acknowledging figures who strive to modernize regardless of the criticism they face.21

Yet, an Eastern Province focus group believes that even avowed educational reformers will ‘stick to a sub-​standard syllabus or textbook’ because they are worried about ‘radical ideas’ being present (or implied) in other materials.22 As Ghazi Al Gosaibi23 joked, ‘Invading a country is easier than changing the educational curriculum’.24 All schooling, asserts Starrett, is ultimately a form of social engineering,25 a complicated and usually troubled enterprise.26 Therefore, when new classes of educated professionals assume this social engineering

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task, taking it away from its previous administrators, the meaning of education begins to change and, in consequence, conflict arises. In the Saudi context, this disagreement between reformers and religious conservatives is longstanding, one of its more contentious aspects being the content of Saudi school curricula and accompanying textbooks. In 2004, Dankowitz reported on a major study presented at the Second Forum for National Dialogue,27 convened in December 2003. The study examined the religious curricula in boys’ schools in the Saudi state school system and warned that the curricula did little to prepare pupils for active integration into, and involvement in, society. Quite the opposite, the curricula at that time undermined the pupils’ sense of belonging to their environment, caused social alienation and pushed the pupils towards isolation from, and conflict with, their own society.28 However, one young man disagrees (and speaks for many) as he maintains that in the past it was religious culture rather than curricula that influenced pupils.29 Nowadays, due to technological advances, ‘2004 might as well have been 30  years ago’ and, in consequence, young men are more tolerant and open to new ideas than they were a decade ago.30 Today’s twenty-​something generation observe that in 2017–​19, education has changed from when they attended school. For example, a young man from Asir says he was part of the last cohort of high-​school pupils to use the ‘old textbooks’.31 Nowadays, the textbooks used by his two younger brothers, aged 18–​19, at state schools in Abha and Riyadh are completely different. The two brothers explain: As a student, most of my books are from McGraw Hill Education especially the scientific books which are good, but sometimes take a long time to read, specifically the equations, which depend on American methods. But they are good at showing the content and the sequence is organized.32 My books are really good –​more interesting than before, colourful, and they have images that illustrate different ideas in the lesson, which is really helpful. But I wish the supplementary books (called Activity Books) were used more in class because usually they are not used that much (we even forget about their existence) while actually they are really important and have good exercises.33

Undeniably, as Nazer observes, the most challenging aspect of the reform effort has been revising the educational curriculum itself –​a process he says is nearing completion: The revisions of the textbooks, while taking longer than had originally been anticipated, suggests that Education Ministry officials are making a sincere effort to inoculate Saudi youth against extremist thought. Officials overseeing education reform maintain that educational institutions have taken steps to socialize Saudi

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students so that they value engaging people from other cultures and followers of other religions in an open dialogue, imbued with a spirit of mutual respect.34

In fact, all textbooks used in state high schools from grades 1 through 12, for example in mathematics and the sciences, were replaced by textbooks by McGraw Hill Education. Additionally, separate Arabic-​language textbooks for each productive and receptive skill were amalgamated into one edition.35 Certainly, the principles of education in Saudi Arabia are strongly rooted in the teachings and values of Islam and Shari’ah law, but the idea is disputed that at the K-​12 level there is always a greater emphasis placed on studying religion, Saudi culture and history rather than subjects related to science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM).36 Both have equal emphasis, says a graduate from Qassim, because intelligent pupils either enter Islamic colleges or choose medicine and engineering.37 In this young man’s second year at high school, the majority of clever pupils chose to take science classes. Furthermore, he argues that this generalization disregards the diversity of high schools such as Holy Qur’an schools that focus on religious teaching in contrast to other high schools that focus on the sciences.38 Alnassar and Dow state that viable educational reform requires genuine commitment at many levels, ensuring instructors and students alike realize that ‘there is a strong unequivocal priority being given to advancing the effectiveness of teaching and learning’.39 Even though Alnassar and Dow are referring to Saudi university education, their argument is relevant to the Saudi educational system as a whole. Nonetheless, in 2010, Dr Naif Al Romi, Deputy Minister of Education Planning and Development, pointed to the daunting task of trying to reform thirty thousand schools and half a million teachers; something that cannot be achieved in a short period.40 Yet, the problem with educational reform, according to an ex-​KASP graduate and Aramco employee, is that it is difficult to implement quick and effective reforms.41 From his perspective, it is not simply a case of amending curricula or replacing classroom materials, but rather one of improving the quality of the instruction. Thus, educational reformers might say ‘better curricula are available’, but the teachers reply that they are not qualified to teach them. In other words, the curricula are updated or reformed but the human factor, the teacher, is rarely considered. Furthermore, the same problem occurs at teacher training colleges,42 in the form of inferior applicants with poor GPAs who are not sufficiently qualified to become good teachers. Certainly, teachers need to be given a degree of autonomy, points out a Riyadh focus group, but the selection process for teachers entering either the state school system or teaching training colleges must be more rigorous.43

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Recognizing the need to improve educational standards, the Saudi journalist Samar Fatany believes strongly that the MoE needs to start rehiring foreign middle-​and high-​school teachers, because in her view Saudization should not be applied to education.44 Medical students at KKU in Abha, formerly a branch of KSU, agree, noting that the MoE should recruit more foreign lecturers with the relevant experience, as there are ‘a lot of defects in the teaching we receive’. They say that KKU administration has hired Western lecturers, mainly from North America and the UK, but the curricula and teaching methods remain ‘old-​fashioned’. In other words, there is very little active learning and they are not given the opportunity to acquire information from people with experience.45 In consequence, one young man says, companies are complaining about the quality of graduates due to decreasing educational standards.46 This issue has been highlighted by Ramady, who, recognizing that there are ‘undoubtedly highly committed, dedicated and professional teachers at all levels’, nevertheless pointed out that in an employers’ survey, ‘there has been a noticeable decline in the quality of student graduates’ achievements’, with the result that Saudi private-​ sector employers have voiced concerns.47 Still, there is disagreement about the benefits of Western education obtained either by adopting Western approaches and techniques, or by importing Western educators or sending Saudi students overseas to study (usually on KASP). One young Saudi academic argues that the ‘assumed’ positive influence of Western education on Saudis is overrated; sometimes it has a negative impact, such as eroding national and socio-​ cultural identities. In fact, this academic asserts that the value of PhDs gained from the West is minor, whereas those from Saudi universities are often of more value. In his opinion, this explains why some ‘less-​ qualified’ employees, i.e. those with Saudi rather than Western qualifications, hold higher positions in the workplace.48 The academic also highlights another issue related to overseas study:  a Saudi goes to study in the West and obtains his Master’s or PhD. Yet, after returning to Saudi Arabia this individual begins a process of what the academic terms ‘stupidization’. The individual sits on his Western PhD laurels and never attempts any type of professional or personal development, such as writing academic papers and attending academic conferences. For example, this young Saudi academic observes that amongst some of his colleagues there is very little personal or professional development because many people are only interested in ‘the art of doing nothing’.49 Furthermore, encouraging, or turning a blind eye to, a culture of personal stagnation –​frequently the result of ‘easy money’ –​destroys the imagination, hopes and ambitions of young

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people.50 A young man from Safwa comments that in his diwaniya he has friends who have given up on personal or professional development, and it is ‘terrible because it affects intellectual people as well. I  know people who went away on the KASP and now they are in this position of basically doing nothing.’51 According to an educational psychologist in Jeddah, all levels of education should include public-​speaking courses. This would be beneficial because young men are not trained to present their ideas or opinions, and as a result they find it difficult to speak with authenticity and warmth.52 Besides, she believes that young Saudi men should be made to understand that it is not simply a question of how they can make a difference by just being a man, but rather what they can do and achieve.53 A  senior engineering student agrees, and maintains that in order to improve the overall educational system the mentality of students must also be reformed. However, this can only be achieved if the mindset of their families is addressed first. One way to do this would be to organize more effective parent–​ teacher meetings, but according to this young engineer these rarely happen more than once a semester and are usually ‘completely cosmetic’, going along the lines of ‘Your son is doing fine. Goodbye.’54 Nonetheless, this problem has been identified:  one of the aims of Saudi Vision 2030 is to promote greater parental engagement in their children’s education.55 The goal is for 80 per cent of parents to be involved in school activities and the learning process of their children by 2020 under the umbrella of the Irtiqaa programme. In sum, the aim is to measure how effectively schools are engaging parents in their children’s education.56 As discussed in Chapter 3, although new/​social media has become a ‘useful tool’ used to highlight public opinion, many focus group members maintain that this new/​social media is not having as much influence on educational standards.57 In fact, as also pointed out in Chapter 3, due to the poor quality of Saudi education, particularly in high schools, the majority of young Saudi men form their own opinions based on socio-​ cultural norms, the views of family and friends and, most importantly nowadays, social media, all of which are subjective.58 Therefore, according to one perspective, most young Saudis do not hold deep, objective views because the education system has not taught them how to think logically or critically.59 This issue is compounded by the fact that the same young men frequently follow overtly political or religious accounts on social media applications that influence their views and outlook.60 In fact, many students and educators believe that it should be the responsibility of the MoE to encourage and foster critical-​thinking skills, in line with Saudi Vision 2030, in order to create a knowledge-​based society

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and economy. Yet, in a Kingdom deeply rooted in religion, tradition and customs, the successful implementation of reform initiatives –​whether specific to education or wider programmes such as Saudi Vision 2030 –​ will require changes in the overall mindsets of individuals, families, communities and institutions.61 Another goal of Saudi Vision 2030 is to introduce ‘a modern curriculum focused on rigorous standards in literacy, numeracy, skills and character development’.62 This entails fostering critical-​thinking skills and life-​long learning skills in the Kingdom’s students. However, there is a degree of scepticism, or even resistance in some quarters, regarding the value of these skills. For example, at a KFUPM 2016 seminar on ‘Saudi Vision 2030 and Higher Education’ there was noticeable opposition from some educators to promoting critical-​ thinking and life-​ long learning skills at a technical university (despite these being included in the Saudi Vision 2030 document). Some engineering lecturers declared that these skills were not necessary for students who ‘were going to become technicians’. But many KFUPM students and graduates disagree strongly.63 In fact, in recent years engineering graduates (principally electrical and mechanical) have been recruited by major consultancy firms in Riyadh such as McKinsey and the Boston Consultancy Group. These graduates work on policy briefs including NTP projects and, according to several, ‘draw heavily’ on social-​science elective courses that they took whilst at a technical university.64 Indeed, I always remind my KFUPM students that an individual can be the best engineer in the world, but if he does not understand how the world works then he will not have much value in the labour market. 1.3

Quality and Standards

Despite government and institutional initiatives to improve educational standards, during focus group discussions across Saudi Arabia with this twenty-​something generation of young men it became apparent that the majority of them hold low opinions of their school education. Many are frustrated by the fact that the government allocates vast sums of money to education, but this was not reflected in their middle-​and high-​school experiences.65 One individual wonders why the standards were higher and examinations more difficult when his parents studied at Saudi high schools, in comparison with ‘nowadays when everything is 100 per cent different –​so what do these young men believe happened?’66 For many this frustration would appear to be directed partly at old-​ fashioned teaching styles, in particular rote-​learning, this being seen as a determining factor in low educational standards:

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The problem is the boring old way of teaching. It is just the teacher talking and students listening (or falling asleep). There is no thinking, because high-​school education does not educate us to think or generate new ideas or teach us new ways of doing things.67

Al Seghayer agrees, writing that Saudi students are taught not to deviate from the instructor’s opinions or directions otherwise they will create difficulties for themselves and fail.68 In fact, a great deal of education limits the way students think, as learning only focuses on repeat processes and not on critical thinking. Moreover, some undergraduates complain that when a student questions an instructor, even if it is a valid question or opinion, sometimes the instructor replies ‘Do you think I am wrong?’ and this discourages the student from asking further questions; in other words, this type of outdated attitude kills critical thinking.69 Al Seghayer believes that such ‘restrictive practices are the direct result of rote-​learning’ and the outdated teacher-​centric system of education.70 The danger, Al Seghayer laments, is that the system creates ‘a generation of young Saudis who cannot, or are not willing to, express their thoughts and feelings freely’.71 The issue of rote-​learning (and student boredom) is compounded by a perception that the percentage of male teachers in high school who actually want to teach is minimal due to low salaries (with the only advantage of the job being the long summer holiday).72 In fact, Ridge notes that in the Gulf States female teachers are more likely to invest themselves in their work than their male counterparts, as teaching is not considered a low-​status profession for women.73 Besides, a group of university students from Makkah contend that even at the best public high schools in the city, inferior or non-​performing teachers will not be fired74 (although a Dhahran focus group notes ruefully that there is a saying in Saudi Arabia: ‘It is not good to be a teacher’75). A solution is not to change the subjects taught in schools, but rather that teachers should be trained in active learning techniques based on real-​life situations in order to make the subjects more engaging.76 Some young men also suggest starting the material for college/​university major subjects in high school, citing the example of Japan, where general engineering is taught in school.77 In addition, many young men recommend the introduction of elective courses in all high schools (this happens in some78) so that pupils are given the opportunity to study a variety of different subjects, such as economics, politics and art –​although there is disagreement about whether music or politics should be provided as electives, as both are considered contentious.79 Young men would also like to see more diversification in school sports, complaining that ‘All we have is football and even then the teacher just walks in, throws the ball and says “play” –​that is all sport entails’.80

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There are also regional variations in educational standards, as well as specific problems. For example, a young man from al-​Aflaj who works as a primary-​school teacher in Najran believes that the overall educational standard at his place of work is high, and certainly better than that of his hometown. He and his friends all agree that the main problem is the poor-​quality teaching in al-​Aflaj high schools.81 Other young men complain that high-​school education is ‘worse now than before’ due to poor-​quality material in which they see ‘nothing beneficial at all’. Yet, a focus group from Qassim does not entirely agree, saying that materials used in their high schools were of appropriate quality, but once again the main problem was poor teaching standards.82 The problem is exacerbated by low teacher motivation and teachers who become so demotivated they even lose their identities.83 This demotivation can result in a ‘lack of respect’ for students in both high-​school and tertiary education. A young man recalls how he watched a YouTube video of a Saudi teacher threatening his students and ‘his voice was really scary. He saw his students as absolutely nothing.’84 Individuals from other regions have had more positive experiences. For example, a young man from Taif (now studying in Makkah) says he has seen contemporary, effective teaching methods and approaches being used in Taif schools.85 Two young men from Awamiya in Qatif note that in terms of high-​school facilities and materials, ‘we had very little –​ only the classrooms’, studying computer science without a computer and taking physical education (nearly always football) in the street.86 However, high teaching standards were delivered by well-​qualified individuals; the young men cite the example of a KFUPM chemical engineering graduate teaching high-​school chemistry. (However, in 2017 the political situation in Awamiya had a direct impact on education, making it worse than in the rest of Qatif. The middle school was closed and the male school students sent to schools in nearby Safwa.87) In addition, many of these teachers gain the respect of their students due to their social conscience.88 Despite the lack of facilities and materials in Awamiya schools, these individuals point out that approximately 20 per cent of school leavers are accepted at KFUPM, reflecting the teachers’ commitment to their students’ academic performance.89 Indeed, another young man from al-​Qurayyat in the north of the Kingdom agrees that the quality of high-​school education is often dependent on individual teachers, but even if these state-​school teachers strive for high educational standards, they are not always provided with sufficient and appropriate MoE evaluation.90 Donn and Al Manthri concur, observing that teachers are often poorly trained and unqualified and their performance is rarely evaluated.91 In the opinion of the young man from al-​Qurayyat, it is the

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MoE that should take responsibility for training and motivating teachers to improve overall classroom performance.92 Another significant issue is that sub-​standard state school education is seen as disadvantaging some young Saudis in comparison with those who attend better private-​sector schools.93 For instance, one focus group points out that if teachers in state schools find themselves ‘free’ they are obliged to supply-​teach in other schools due to teacher shortages.94 Indeed, Donn and Al Manthri observe that because teachers remain underpaid, there are frequently staff shortages.95 Yet, another young man stresses that some state schools are excellent and cites his high school in Riyadh as an example, saying: ‘It was perfect and in fact, I still visit the teachers there’.96 Not everyone agrees that private-​sector education is better. One individual notes ruefully that he was sent to a private school by his father simply because it was the nearest school to the family home.97 Another student, from Riyadh, recalls that when he started at a private-​sector high school in the capital the educational standard was high, but once the school started to accept anyone who could pay the fees the standards dropped rapidly.98 In fact, a young vice-​principal at a private school in Riyadh complains that the wealthy students at his school are impolite and disruptive, resulting in the teachers ‘giving up’. Hence, educational standards are poor, as the students only come to school to play. He states that if he could, he would ‘bring back corporal punishment’ (banned by the MoE), but complains that ‘we are not allowed to hit the children these days’ (although other members of his focus group disagree strongly with his stance).99 Some young men also blame inadequate standards in high school, and corresponding lack of evaluation, for producing not only low academic standards, but also low moral ones. One group of ex-​KASP graduates in the Eastern Province claim that some overseas Saudi scholarship students are known for their academic misconduct, for example cheating at exams or even stealing exam papers. In their view, this serious misconduct is a direct result of negative domestic school experiences; these students were programmed to try and get everything done as quickly and as easily as possible.100 For example, a young man who attended a Riyadh high school remembers: The problem with the school was that we were not challenged. The teachers did revision for the exam by giving you the actual exam paper. In fact, we all bought the exam papers from the teachers. Of course, it is not legal for the teacher to sell the exams, but everyone does it and the price of the exam depends on the subject. So we did not need to study as we would get 100 per cent anyway. The

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problem is that getting 100 per cent inflates some peoples’ egos even though that is completely false.101

Unfortunately, according to many young men this problem was widespread when they were at school; for example, a young man from al-​Baha remarks that taking high-​school exams is often ‘very easy as sometimes students are given the exam answers’.102 As all these individuals point out, this type of attitude and behaviour can have long-​term ramifications, in particular for government initiatives such as Saudi Vision 2030. Indeed, a sub-​standard educational system damages society because students’ learning processes and critical-​thinking faculties are allowed to fail, resulting in what one young man contends are ‘fake students equalling a fake society’.103 Poor educational standards and low teacher motivation in high schools result in students not wanting to study because ‘they only go to school for fun’.104 An Eastern Province focus group says that high school in Saudi Arabia is about having time to play and enjoy life  –​it is most definitely not about education.105 An engineering student from Riyadh remarks that because his high-​school education was so lax, he had a great deal of free time which he filled by playing video games: ‘I completed twelve games in one semester, which is a total of 400 hours, because there was nothing else to do.’106 A member of a focus group from Qassim says he learnt more in one year at university than he did in seven years of general education, because pupils do not learn the basics at high school. Moreover, what is learnt tends to be forgotten quickly because there is little real knowledge at high school, i.e. little real information that resonates with pupils.107 Accordingly, many individuals who enter tertiary education criticize their high-​school education for not preparing them adequately for college or university. They argue that the fact that pupils do not cover the basics in high school is the reason that orientation programmes in tertiary education are necessary.Yet, orientation programmes often result in many students dropping out (particularly from KFUPM), because ‘real studying’ comes as a serious shock to young students who are ill-​prepared for formal study programmes108 –​‘we suffer so much when we start at a good college or university’.109 However, not all recent high-​ school graduates feel they were completely unprepared. Shari’ah law students from Umm Al-​Qura University in Makkah110 undertaking a four year Bachelor’s degree in fiqh (knowledge about Islamic legal rulings from their sources) via lectures, seminars and discussions say that for purely Islamic Studies courses, an orientation year is not required. (These students also study principles of Arabic language, Islamic history, pre-​Saudi

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history and Islamic finance.) However, there are young men who choose Shari’ah because they think it is easier than other subjects  –​but this focus group argues that students who do not study will not graduate.111 An advantage to studying Shari’ah at Umm Al-​Qura is that more employment opportunities are available to graduates  –​in addition to better salaries (due to their having more choices) –​than to students who take other majors.112 Graduates can work as judges (who must study Shari’ah), lawyers, teachers, consultants, financial advisors or detectives, as well as becoming officers in the various branches of the military.113 According to group members, in 2016–​17 around 10 per cent of Umm Al-​Qura students were able to find a job immediately after graduating, particularly those who started applying before finishing their studies  –​ although they point out that ‘there is no Saudization for Shari’ah’.114 Another issue for some young men is that most colleges and universities will not accept an applicant if he left high school more than five years ago –​regardless of whether the applicant has the necessary qualifications or experience.115 Fortunately, there is another option open to these young men: the Saudi Electronic University (SEU), with ten campuses across the Kingdom.116 Any Saudi can attend, regardless of background or age, for both graduate and post-​graduate programmes in subjects such as law, business studies or computer science. A student at SEU Dammam notes that the educational standard is good, with his courses comprising 25 per cent lectures and 75 per cent online study/​online classes. He and his friends point out that SEU provides quality educational opportunities for a great many ordinary Saudis, as it is not particularly expensive –​ around SAR 2,000 per semester (payment by semester).117 1.4

GPA and Examinations

For the majority of young Saudi men, attaining a high GPA is the most important element of their education. In fact, instructors frequently complain that students are fixated on their GPA level to the detriment of everything else. Not surprisingly, this GPA emphasis results in many students becoming afflicted with a sense of entitlement –​the ‘I deserve an A+’ syndrome –​regardless of either academic ability or performance. A  well-​educated Eastern Province focus group points out even Saudis who study abroad suffer from the same ‘GPA fixation’.118 The education system is to blame, they argue, as Saudi students become indoctrinated into focusing on scores and grades rather than the benefits of critical thinking and life-​long learning. Indeed, a rigid centralized curriculum requires teachers to focus on preparing students for examinations, which, as Ridge notes, limits the level of creativity they can bring to their

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teaching.119 In other words, students are instructed to follow procedures rather than to think critically. This group considers this to constitute a major flaw in the education system, as innovation comes from having the ability to think critically.120 Al Seghayer agrees, stating that his own experiences of visiting countless schools and colleges highlighted ‘one significant flaw in Saudi education’, namely that students are neither encouraged nor prepared to think independently, with the result that students graduate from school/​ college lacking the ability to analyse and think critically.121 Al Seghayer believes that: Teachers are the central force in helping students develop these skills by assigning critical-​thinking exercises and supporting students’ efforts to learn them. To foster our students’ critical-​thinking skills, teachers should first realize that critical-​thinking skills are teachable and learnable and that a critical mindset is the key to success; if we want our students to be successful citizens, we need to work hard to enable them to possess such vital characteristics. It is in the national interest that we strive to promote this concept and make it an essential part of every school subject.122

Dr Abdulaziz Al Omar concurs, asserting that Saudi students need to be able to think independently and not just copy from teachers or what they read in books. Students also need to think critically and deeply, without bias, so they can discuss subjects openly without any prejudice. They also need to listen to others without bias and focus on an idea and not on the person who expresses it, or indeed the background of that individual.123 As a group in Qassim points out, by only focusing on GPA and ignoring critical-​thinking skills, the natural talents of many young men are often completely disregarded, resulting in a significant loss to society.124 In fact, one individual laments that as the educational focus is on GPA and examinations, there is ‘no real soul in the teaching/​learning process’.125 The GPA-​examination issue is related directly to the fact that, ultimately, it is a high-​school pupil’s Qiyas or Taseel results that determine the subject he will study at college/​university and the career path he will take.126 This over-​emphasis on GPA and examinations such as Qiyas leads to some pupils questioning the benefit of studying, as examinations alone determine their futures. Accordingly, some simply give up at an early stage, decide that they do not care about education, and would rather find any job and get on with their lives.127 For this reason, a young man in Eastern Province thinks that the MoE should ‘get rid of all entrance exams for tertiary education and focus on interviews instead’. According to him, this already happens at some institutions, such as KAUST, where entrance interviews are conducted either in person or online.128

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Unfortunately, the over-​emphasis on Qiyas causes other serious problems, including cases of corruption and the ubiquitous wasta. One young man in Asir who worked as a high-​school teaching assistant recalls how he frequently saw ‘rich people’ who would pay to ensure their children passed the Qiyas exam.129 Another young man describes how his cousin who worked at the Qiyas centre in Jeddah used to receive phone calls constantly from wealthy or influential individuals saying, ‘My son must pass the exam’ or ‘My son must pass with the highest score’. Even though his cousin earned a decent salary of SAR 13,000 a month, he quit his job because he saw that it was simply the case that ‘money and influence will help a pupil graduate’ as long as his family had access to sufficient cash or wasta.130 1.5

Choosing a Career Path

A problem for many young men is that in high school they do not have a clear idea about what they would like to study in tertiary education or which career path to choose. This conundrum is blamed on high schools failing to provide academic and career guidance.131 Information about possible career paths should be provided during high school, says an Asir focus group, because a lack of guidance can result in young men not being able to find relevant jobs after they leave high school (or even tertiary education).132 For example, a young man from al-​Ahsa knows two high-​school graduates ‘one of whom ended up in the military and the other as a supermarket cashier’ because neither really knew what they wanted to do.133 Yet, he contends that there is a perception in society that these individuals failed at school, which he believes is incorrect. In his opinion, the problem was that they did not receive adequate guidance.134 Another focus group considers that progress has been made in this area. They cite the examples of career guidance courses and lectures being provided at high schools and training centres to 18  year olds to guide them to appropriate jobs.135 There is also the online site CYM, which provides services (such as a test), tools and a forum to assist high-​ school pupils choose a college or university major.136 Furthermore, in 2016–​17, the Maestro Group staged the CYM Forum, dedicated to educational and vocational guidance with the participation of more than 160 experts in five cities across Saudi Arabia.137 According to an al-​Ahsa focus group, this is a start, but it is not enough, and whilst guidance has increased in the last five years, the group members believe there should be more courses in high schools –​although one group member admits that ‘getting high-​school pupils interested in going to these’ is often problematic.138

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Multiple focus groups maintain that many pupils find themselves in a quandary during the final high-​school year as they do not know what major to choose –​even if in reality they would rather not apply for college or university.139 Sometimes, young men end up entering tertiary education but are unhappy there, as it is a case of their families forcing them to do a degree they hate or find boring.140 Even in the last semester of high school many pupils have often not decided on a college/​university major, with many opting for ‘well-​known major subjects’, particularly medicine and engineering.141 This is because family and society stress the importance of either medicine or engineering and push their sons into these –​with Shari’ah as the other option.142 Yamani observes that in Saudi Arabia there is: an intricate hierarchy of prestige regarding the subject area of degree study and training programmes. Whether educated at home or abroad young people have been socialized to consider certain categories of study more acceptable than others: certain disciplines, especially medicine, are regarded as ‘honorable’ and as such are unique status symbols.143

Medicine is the preferred choice, according to a group of KFU medical undergraduates, as when sitting in a family gathering relatives like to say, ‘Dr Mohammed, come and sit with us’, but rarely say ‘Engineer Mohammed, come and sit with us!’144 Yamani agrees, pointing out that young men garner social cachet from becoming a doctor over and above career advancement and monetary rewards.145 Certainly, it can be difficult for a young man if his family decides he must become a doctor or an engineer. Very often although this is not the young man’s optimal choice of career, he will do it anyway.146 Yet, young men acknowledge that families and society are not to blame, for a very valid reason: medicine and engineering are the best choices for their sons.147 Families want their sons to have a good life, and if the son does not become a doctor or an engineer then his life could be difficult.148 Others maintain that too much emphasis is placed on attending university, particularly as many high-​school graduates are unsuited to university education and hence would be better off pursuing different career paths. One young man thinks it is ‘not normal that all high-​ school students want to go to university these days’.149 According to an al-​Ahsa focus group, technical institutes (Colleges of Excellence; CoE)150 have decent educational standards and the apprentices who graduate from them are well qualified. However, the issue is that although employment opportunities exist, the technical colleges recruit too many students, so there is an over-​supply of graduates trying to enter the labour market.151

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1.6 Volunteering Promoting ‘a culture of volunteering’ is a goal of Saudi Vision 2030.152 Volunteering is considered to be particularly useful as it gives young Saudis an indication of the skills they might need in the future. The important point about volunteering, says a young volunteer for Aramco’s Ithra Center, is that ‘volunteering can be “anything/​anywhere” whereas part-​time work generally limits the individual to one particular skill-​ set’.153 For better-​ educated young men and those attending well-​ established educational institutions or working for reputable companies such as Aramco, volunteering offers opportunities to widen horizons, improve personal employability and meet new people.154 For example, a group of friends from Eastern Province volunteered at the Dammam Film Festival,155 the Dammam Theater Festival,156 Hakaya Misk,157 Ithra Youth158 and the Ithra Knowledge Programme (formerly the Saudi Aramco Cultural Programme), as well as those attending the KFUPM Volunteers’ Day.159 One of these young men remarks that Hakaya Misk, held at the Dhahran Expo (related mainly to media and culture), attracted approximately 90,000 visitors over four days and was, in his opinion, an excellent experience. Another of the volunteers at Hakaya Misk worked in the theatre, where he was able to listen and learn from famous journalists and ‘social media people’ who had visited the southern region of Najran Province and ‘told the audience about what the military personnel was experiencing’.160 These young men were also able to make useful contacts with other volunteers, as well as with workshop instructors. The volunteers say that at the Dammam Theater Festival there were around eight to ten male volunteers and approximately the same number of women, and at the Dammam Film Festival around fifteen male volunteers and ten female.161 This was the first time that they had been involved with theatre, although one young man knows ‘some actors from Hofuf who performed at Misk’.162 The volunteers were also evaluated by the company ADDEnterprise, the Riyadh-​based Saudi company which also has offices in Dubai and London that organized this event for Misk.163 One of the young men who volunteered as an usher at the Dammam Film Festival observes that there were even larger numbers of visitors than at Hakaya Misk. At both festivals this group of friends worked as ushers, noting that it was a worthwhile experience that they would definitely do again: What I learnt from the theatre festival was that I did not know that Saudi Arabia has these types of performers. This was surprising, not so much the production aspect, but the quality of the performers, in particular the performers from

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Najran such as Najran Club and Najran University and also performers those from Taif.164

Another young man says he was around 12 years old when he started volunteering for the local mosque community programme in al-​Ahsa, which is aimed mainly at young people (he is still involved in this programme).165 In addition, he participated in theatre-​type activities during summer camp, which is part of the Qur’an club. He helped to organize various competitions for youngsters as well as producing Islamic films and plays –​but ‘of course with no music’.166 Another individual started volunteering in Riyadh in 2012 for the TedEx Kids programme.167 For prospective volunteers, the easiest way to find relevant opportunities is through friends or being proactive and ‘going out and looking for them’,168 but some events such as the Dammam Theater Festival ‘you have to know about’, because, ‘for obvious reasons’, until the social reforms of 2017 this event was more low-​key. However, a lot of volunteering opportunities are advertised on social media applications such as WhatsApp, Snapchat and Instagram. For example, messages are sent on WhatsApp when the organizers are looking for volunteers for the film and theatre festivals.169 Other events such as those staged by Misk are advertised online and invite applications. In addition, there are a number of volunteering groups on social media applications that young Saudis can join at any time.170 Because of these groups and online advertising, one young man notes, hundreds of people applied for the Dammam Film Festival; he was fortunate to get a position due to his previous volunteering experience.171 Volunteering is not confined to socio-​cultural events such as those organized by Misk. A young man in Safwa district, in Qatif, is involved in a number of local social initiatives: I volunteer for mustakbili in Qatif. We are a group of volunteers who talk to high-​ school students about possible future majors. It started in 2007 and has grown dramatically. I have done this in a lot of Qatif schools because the students do not know what or where to study. They only really know engineering and medicine. The problem is that the lower-​grade students get ignored and then they drift into drugs or getting into trouble. But if you gave them the attention and pointed them in the right direction then they start to connect with you. That is why it is important to distinguish between students who could go to university and those who are better suited to apprenticeships.172

In fact, young men with prior experience are sometimes asked to participate at workshops where they talk about their personal volunteering experiences and how they benefit from these.173 For these young men, clearly there is value to getting involved in volunteering as they recognize

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that they gain valuable experience, make useful contacts, and improve their communication and social skills. One individual says volunteering has taught him how to deal with people, it has made him more humble and the interaction with other people from outside his usual circles has broadened his horizons.174 Certainly, volunteering is also good for the CV. Another young man states that it helped him when he applied for the Saudi Young Leaders Exchange Program (SYLEP) programme (and subsequently spent three weeks in Washington, DC).175 Another says that one of his cousins was accepted by Aramco’s Ithra Center (otherwise known as King Abdulaziz Center for World Culture)176 because of his volunteering experience.177 In 2018, Ithra had approximately 700 Saudi volunteers.178 There is also recognition that although volunteering might not lead directly to a job offer, the experience is extremely beneficial. For example, a company’s HR department will probably focus on what an applicant did or achieved when he volunteered rather than the fact of volunteering, i.e. they will want to ascertain if the person can actually do what he claims he did as a volunteer, such as tasks performed as a section leader. Finally, one young man argues that volunteering is a natural part of individual and national development, as it is all about giving back to society.179 2

Societal Transformation and Globalization

2.1

The Extent of Change

To what extent do these young Saudi men see society as changing? My online survey respondents believe that the Kingdom has witnessed ‘massive change’ in recent years, with the scope of change affecting both the youth and the older generations. In terms of the overall picture, over 80 per cent of respondents maintain that Saudi society is changing very quickly. Approximately 65 per cent consider the pace of change to be rapid, with 30 per cent saying there is a steady pace of change.180 Around 45 per cent of respondents believe that change is most visible within socio-​cultural aspects of society, whilst 40 per cent see the most visible change in the economy due to the impact of the oil price. When the same survey was conducted in 2015 (pre-​ Saudi Vision 2030)  only 9 per cent of young men saw transformations in political aspects of society; this increased to 15 per cent in 2017.181 Undoubtedly, this increase reflects the considerable socio-​political changes associated with Crown Prince Mohammed, such as the lifting of the ban on women driving. Whilst many young men –​around 67 per cent –​perceive these changes as constructive, they stress that societal transformation, whether

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positive or negative, is not uniform across the Kingdom. For example, over 70 per cent of survey respondents state that societal change is most pronounced in the main urban areas.182 In addition, over 75 per cent of respondents say that the youth are far more affected than the older generations, something that is borne out by conversations with young Saudis across the Kingdom.183 Hence, young men make the important point that societal transformation in Saudi Arabia varies according to, for example, location, age, education, tribal status and gender.184 Whilst there is widespread consensus that the most significant transformations have occurred in socio-​cultural and economic areas, there is considerable debate about whether this is a positive or a negative development.185 Those who interpret societal transformation in a positive way believe that contemporary Saudi society has become more ‘open-​ minded and civilized’, particularly amongst educated young people residing in large cities. This is also a result of greater interaction between diverse Saudi societal constituencies due to new/​social media usage.186 Yet, for many young men there are mixed feelings about the possible consequences of societal transformation. When asked whether they consider that societal transformation affects their conception of identity, around 40 per cent say it affects individual identity a great deal, with around 32 per cent believing that identity is being threatened to a certain extent –​for example, by the effects of globalization on Saudi society, and specifically the erosion of local culture and adoption of Western norms. Another individual points out that whilst the physical manifestations of societal change might be evident, the underlying social mentality is slow to change. He cites as an example a new park that opened near his house recently, ‘which I cannot visit because it is for families only’ despite the 2017 socio-​cultural reforms. Hence, in reality, this young man argues, a great many things stay the same.187 Looking to the future, nearly two-​thirds of young men surveyed believe that in the next decade, Saudi Arabia will continue to change. They predict that the greatest changes will occur in the economy (58 per cent of respondents) and society and culture (35 per cent); only 9.5 per cent believe that significant political change is likely, in comparison with 21 per cent when the same survey was conducted in 2015.188 This figure appears to reflect the consequences of political power being concentrated around Crown Prince Mohammed at the expense of traditional extended Al Saud consensus-​building. When young men are asked about which area they would like to see greater changes in, approximately 42 per cent say they would like to see an improved education system (as discussed earlier), followed by socio-​cultural change (26 per cent) and economic change (22 per cent). Interestingly, greater political change

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trails far behind on 9 per cent.189 Finally, when asked if life in Saudi Arabia will be harder or easier than today, 47 per cent say the former and 39 per cent the latter. Once again, young men identify employment, housing, healthcare and education as the most important issues. However, despite economic and socio-​cultural challenges, overall most young men are hopeful about their futures, with 37 per cent saying they are very optimistic.190 This optimism is reflected in the 11th Annual Asda’a BCW Arab Youth Survey 2019, where three-quarters of young Saudis surveyed told the pollsters that they expect to have a better life than their parents.191 2.2

Globalization: A Double-​Edged Sword

Globalization has created developmental opportunities for states and societies through diffusing technology, widening markets for goods and services, expanding investment, and internationalizing businesses and business processes.192 Furthermore, globalization, Harris contends, is seen to loosen young people’s traditional citizenship ties, especially in relation to national identifications, as a result of increased migration (in the Saudi context, internal migration), the Internet, the ease and popularity of travel, and the powerful reach of global youth consumer culture.193 Thus, globalization is often characterized as inevitable or inexorable  –​synonyms Sparke says are utilized to convey the sense of an impossible-​to-​stop force.194 Still, in a ‘globalized Kingdom’ the impact of globalization is not always perceived as being positive. As previously discussed, many young men are aware that Internet and new/​social media usage have a negative side, for example leading to excessive exposure to other cultures and social norms. Moreover, experience of Western education, either in Saudi Arabia or abroad, can cause confusion and even resentment. Not all young Saudi men who receive a Western(-​style) education become either ‘liberalized’ or Westernized. In fact, the opposite sometimes happens, as some individuals completely reject what they see as foreign values –​or Western soft power imperialism – t​hreatening their perceptions of traditional identity narratives. Another concern is that in education and academia, Arabic is being replaced by English. Hence, educated young men stress, the government should make a concerted effort to increase Arabic resources in the sciences, in particular at university and research levels. Moreover, undergraduates contend that some individuals who are scientifically gifted are being excluded from certain tertiary educational institutions because of poor English language skills, which they consider not only erroneous, but also short-​ sighted.195 The counter-​ argument is that if university

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textbooks, presentation of subjects and specialist terms, in particular in the sciences, are in English then, as Alnassar and Dow maintain, the subject needs to be taught in English. In fact, Saudi tertiary educational institutions should be producing graduates with the necessary English language competence to operate within the global economy.196 Moreover, globalization’s impact on traditional cultures and ideologies can cause a ‘backlash’ against perceived Westernization and soft power imperialism, which are seen by some as exacerbating the problems of extremism, radicalization and ultimately, terrorism  –​‘although only [amongst] a few individuals, thank Allah’.197 As one young man worries: Although I try to be conservative in my religious beliefs and habits, I feel that being conservative is more or less impossible these days. I find it irritating that I have been exposed to males and females from different cultures. As a result, my original norms have been compromised.198

I believe that this type of opinion illustrates the degree to which globalization (or Westernization/​Americanization, depending on the individual’s opinion) has impacted on some of these young men, above all in the urban conurbations, and by extension on Saudi Arabia. Globalization encompasses politico-​economic and socio-​cultural aspects, and although the term ‘globalization’ is widely used to describe the results of rapid modernization on Saudi Arabia, young Saudis frequently lack a deeper understanding of the processes and engines involved. Whilst the outward signs of increased globalization in the Kingdom are highly visible, such as the ubiquitous American fast food restaurants, the underlying effects, particularly in terms of politico-​economic and socio-​cultural aspects, are less so. Research conducted for this book demonstrates that young Saudi men clearly identify both positive and negative effects of globalization on Saudi society. Yet, there are frequently contradictions in young men’s opinions about the impact of globalization on their communities and everyday lives. For instance, in my Globalization course examinations, many individuals write that they are concerned that globalization is eroding Saudi socio-​cultural norms, but simultaneously, they wear jeans and Western sports clothes. This contradiction appears to signify a lack of understanding about the factors and processes driving globalization, and for this reason young men are sometimes unable to think critically about the impact of globalization on the transformation and development of their communities and wider Saudi society.199 This raises important questions regarding the consequences (positive or negative) of increased global interconnectedness on Saudi societal norms. Globalization is not new to the Kingdom, especially to the western Hijaz region. When Saudi Arabia was too poor to attract direct investment from

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the industrial democracies, Freeman notes, Saudi merchants offered to represent foreign companies and sell their products to both Saudis and foreign pilgrims performing Hajj.200 In addition, foreign pilgrims travelling to the holy cities of Makkah and Madinah for Hajj and Umrah via the port city of Jeddah frequently settled in the Hijaz over many centuries. Due to this globalizing process, as noted in Chapter 1, Najdis from central Saudi Arabia began to call the inhabitants of the Hijaz tarsh al-​bahr and bagaya hujjaj due to the alleged ‘impurity’ of Hijazis’ Arab descent owing to intermarriage with non-​Arab Muslims.201 Still, many young men from other regions of Saudi Arabia, especially those from urban centres such as Riyadh and the Dammam-​Khobar-​ Dhahran conurbation, believe that Saudi Arabia has been affected by globalization ‘probably more than most other states’, to the extent that one individual claims that prior to contemporary globalization, Saudi Arabia ‘was not even part of the world’.202 In fact, groups of KFUPM undergraduates who visited the Far East in 2016–​17 were surprised, and even shocked, to find that the level of globalization  –​or in some cases ‘Americanization’, i.e. high levels of consumerism and consumer culture203 –​was far greater in their homeland than in Japan and South Korea, and the use of the English language more widespread.204 As twenty-​first-​century globalization impacts on the Kingdom, ‘to be frank’, says another young man, ‘Saudis are struggling with the fact that the worst aspects of globalization have invaded their culture’.205 What is regrettable, according to some, is when ‘the worst of what already exists in Saudi Arabia combines with the worst from outside’ as a direct result of increased globalization.206 Mednicoff and Springer refer to this accelerated process of globalization, in terms of speed and scope in the Gulf States, as ‘hyperglobalization’.207 For some young Saudis the government’s 2017–​18 social reforms, such as sanctioning music concerts, lifting the ban on women driving and opening cinemas, illustrate the extent to which hyperglobalization is impacting Saudi Arabia  –​and in the opinion of some, not always for the better. Nonetheless, it appears that Saudi millennials broadly support the ‘globalized’ social reforms introduced by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. According to the 10th annual ASDA’A Burson-​Marsteller Arab Youth Survey in 2018, an overwhelming 92 per cent of Saudi youth (94 per cent of Saudi women and 91 per cent of Saudi men) are highly confident that the crown prince’s Saudi Vision 2030 will be a success208 –​in particular as many young people approve of social reform.209 That said, many believe that the principal aim of globalization is the ‘worship of money’ (as also discussed in Chapter 1) to the detriment

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of the Islamic values which are the most important ‘markers for the Saudi and Muslim identity’. For instance, increasingly high levels of consumerism are perceived as eroding Saudi socio-​cultural norms and traditional notions of identity. Promoting over-​consumption has nothing to do with societal improvement:  in reality it results in ‘societal degradation’.210 In fact, a study conducted by Al Saifi, an associate professor in the Information and Communication Department at King Faisal University in Ahsa, found that a common factor between families is a trend towards ‘consumption on a large scale regardless of the economic position of the family, the education levels of its members, or their individual purchasing powers’.211 Also of concern is that over the last three decades, excessive spending on items such as travel, cars and personal servants has not been matched by any other non-​oil Arab state.212 A Riyadh focus group agrees, saying that there is ‘no concept of money’ amongst some Saudis, citing individuals who buy expensive cars even though they cannot afford the petrol.213 Whilst the changing social environment can often be perplexing for Saudi millennials, younger generations have the ability to internalize societal transformation so that it becomes ‘normal to them’.214 Young Saudis also point out that the impact of globalization on Saudi society  –​and subsequent societal transformation –​might be welcomed by a substantial portion of young people, but it will be challenging for some elements in society to understand and accept. In the wider Middle Eastern context, Bayat notes, there are many ‘among the urban grass roots who find it difficult to function, live and work, within the modernizing economic and cultural systems’,215 whilst, Dresch observes, older generations used to living with kin and neighbours, living lives that made sense, are now mixed in with others and subject to forces they cannot control;216 both of these viewpoints are also highly applicable to Saudi Arabia. Young men also identify two other groups who are unhappy about the impact of globalization on the Kingdom and oppose the crown prince’s social reform initiatives: the Saudi ‘baby boomers’, and foreign Muslims who ‘see the whole Kingdom as “holy”, which is not true’.217 An improved higher education system that helps to develop the intellectual capacity of its citizens is seen by the Saudi government as the way to solve many of the issues facing the Kingdom, especially if student mobility across the globe can be encouraged, note Hilal, Scott and Maadad. This position reflects the Saudi government’s view of education as ‘helping to achieve a more skilled society so that it becomes an economic driver in the global knowledge economy’.218 Certainly, any discussion related to globalization, youth issues and education inevitably touches on the merits of KASP, particularly as the large

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numbers of overseas students are ‘in the most critical period of their lives (18–​25)’ and absorb foreign culture a great deal more than older generations. These young Saudis ‘will have the ability and skills to transform society when they return home’219 and, as a result of their experiences through exchange programmes with educational institutions in developed economies, diminish ‘prehistoric domestic norms’.220 Significantly, in marked contrast with other developing societies, the hundreds of thousands of Saudis who have been educated abroad have not chosen to stay overseas,221 but rather are drawn home by strong family ties and obligations.222 2.3

Resisting Globalization

In Saudi Arabia, there is a degree of consensus amongst young men that globalization is responsible for introducing inappropriate foreign cultural practices into the community that weaken traditional customs and religious norms.223 Moussalli argues that many nationalists and cultural trustees of the Arab world condemn the influence of globalization, maintaining that their culture cannot adhere to many globalized notions. For them, ‘any claim to the contrary is just an inspiration to degrade other cultures in favor of a dominant one’  –​namely, the modern version of Western culture.224 Certainly, in Saudi Arabia many young men, especially in the urban centres, habitually wear Western clothes rather than thobes; they sport ‘trendy’ haircuts; they eat Western fast food such as burgers and pizza in place of kapsa; they watch foreign television shows rather than local ones; they spend most of their free time playing video games such as on PlayStation 4, or take up ‘imported hobbies’ such as body-​building, boxing and painting; and they use English words whilst speaking Arabic to appear ‘more sophisticated’.225 Twenty years ago if a young man was seen wearing Western clothes in public, ‘society would have said he was betraying his culture’, but no longer. Indeed, the influence of Western soft power is having a ‘profound impact on Saudi identity as young Saudis copy everything they see’, to the extent that one undergraduate claims that ‘fashionable young people consider those who wear thobes to be cave-​men’.226 However, even though many young Saudis are comfortable wearing Western clothes and sporting Western haircuts, one individual maintains that this traduces Saudi traditions: Unfortunately, being ripped out of your own culture is unacceptable. The beauty of the world and life is being able to appreciate different cultures and customs, but globalization is eroding specific national cultures to the extent that we will all live in one large bland global village.227

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In fact, even though many young Saudi men might appear ‘globalized’ in terms of their outward appearance, some hold particularly strong views about changes and threats to Saudi and Islamic norms: Globalization has affected my community in a disgusting way to the point where I  do not even want to think about it. For instance, when I  see Arabs imitate Western practices such as disregarding modesty to a degree where they exploit their sisters and then call this freedom. The painful thing for me as a Muslim is that youth think this is right because they are either told or believe that Islam is a religion that does not adapt to societal transformation and the needs of this generation. They are also told that Islam is a religion made in the darkest times for people who closed their eyes to knowledge. Of course, globalization has positives, but Saudi Arabia has only adopted negatives. This makes me think that there is a conspiracy against Saudi youth, and although I say to myself that is false, my brain refuses it for some reason.228

Others agree strongly, believing that globalization has ‘colonized our way of thinking, the way we dress, what we eat and even the way we behave’. For instance, traditional food is only available in a few restaurants and cultural rituals such as traditional dances have been relegated to ‘touristic ceremonies’.229 In other words Western influences on Saudi society have become stronger and more damaging. Large numbers of young Saudis simply ‘follow … the globalization wave’, something that one individual laments is ‘happening faster than I  ever thought possible’.230 Indeed, the existence of differences between cultures and nations is what distinguishes us from each other, argues another young Saudi, whereas globalization creates a homogeneous world and strips individual societies of their identities.231 Yet, others disagree slightly, believing that globalization does not lead to the complete eradication of national identity. One young man says that when he visits a foreign country people identify him as Saudi, Arab or Muslim, so clearly he has a distinct identity. Rather, the most negative effect of globalization is that historical culture and values are weakened, allowing other cultures and values to take their place.232 Many young men think that the impact of globalization on Saudi Arabia should be considered, and accepted or rejected, at the personal level, as this depends on individual values. Certainly, young Saudis must be educated to benefit from the positives whilst disregarding the negatives, although ultimately this depends on the susceptibility of the individual to negative influences.233 That said, concerted efforts, in particular in education, need to be promoted to protect Saudi identities and accompanying socio-​cultural norms by emphasizing globalization’s positive attributes. This is particularly important, says one young man, because if there is a lack of effective education, in particular in elementary

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and secondary schools, then it is more likely that negative attributes will prevail over positive ones.234 Others point out that as Saudi Arabia is undergoing a rapid transition, there needs to be time and space for ‘a period of adaptation’. In this adaptation period the negative impacts of globalization might outweigh the positive, but no one should ‘stick his head in the sand’ and ignore these negatives. Rather, it is a case of a young man needing to adapt to this changing environment by learning to differentiate between the likely challenges he will be forced to confront.235 In fact, globalization compels a young man to reflect on his own behaviour and habits, in particular in relation to those of previous Saudi generations. For instance, one individual acknowledges that globalization influences every aspect of his life: home, work, the mosque he attends and the malls where he shops. Yet the danger is that because everyone is influenced by ‘globalized surroundings’, even if a person tries to remain unaffected, the individual might find himself emulating the habits and behaviour of those around him regardless of their compatibility with his personal values and norms. Even as a Muslim, an individual’s religious duties can be influenced by the people around him, to the extent that religious practices can be coloured by others’ behaviour.236 Nonetheless, another young man argues that technological advances associated with globalization can also assist a Muslim in fulfilling certain religious obligations. For instance, participating in a shared online social space made him realize the importance of highlighting his Islamic identity in order to present the ‘true nature of Islam’ to the wider world whilst attempting to steer susceptible individuals away from extremism and radicalization.237 In fact, for many young men, understanding the impact of globalization on Saudi Arabia requires placing it within an Islamic context; in other words, do the effects of globalization contravene Islamic rules? In truth, there is consensus that Islamic teachings provide the individual with a framework with which to either accept or reject specific aspects of globalization that impact on Saudi society.238 Furthermore, as Baktiari points out, people’s religious habits do not change quickly, as socio-​ cultural traditions ‘including religious ones maintain themselves through families and other interaction-​based social networks’.239 Certainly, cultural standards differ between individuals, families, tribes, regions and even sects, and thus a determining factor is personal perception.240 Yet, the fear is that globalization offers ‘forbidden temptations that excite many young people’ and that, in consequence, have a detrimental effect on personal morality. Others contend that the real problem is that young Saudis are often bound by ‘religious and social chains’. These force young people into a state of denial and ultimately leave them searching

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for what is haram. Therefore, in a more open society a young person will not be tempted by the ‘what is prohibited is desired problem’.241 Certain young men believe strongly that the globalization process needs to be halted, or at least slowed, as its harmful aspects encourage susceptible people to adopt habits that are incompatible with Islamic teachings. At its most extreme, globalization in the form of foreign influences is blamed for the alleged ‘spread of atheism’ in Saudi Arabia, a state of affairs that is anathema to the vast majority of Saudis.242 However, more mundane issues are also blamed on globalization’s harmful influence on religious norms. For instance, since 2016 live music has become more acceptable in certain parts of Saudi society, but others consider this haram, as they claim that it contradicts Islamic teachings. Another example: Arab television channels such as MBC show television series and films which contain social practices, such as smoking and drinking alcohol, which are not acceptable in Saudi culture. In the past, mainly due to lack of choice, Saudis started watching these shows and emulating these social practices, firstly in private and then sometimes in public. In consequence, this created a contradiction between what people believed, or averred, was religiously or socially right and what they were actually doing in their homes –​a situation some young men consider ‘very dangerous’ as it weakens the moral fabric of society.243 The rapid globalization of Saudi society can leave young men lost and confused, in particular when personal convictions appear to be in conflict with identity perceptions shared amongst wider societal or Islamic communities. Hence, for many young men, globalization is perceived as predominately negative, particularly in relation to its influence on socio-​ cultural norms and Islamic teachings. They see this impacting negatively on Muslims, but more significantly on Saudis.244 In their view, globalization –​or worse, Westernization/​Americanization –​endangers and diminishes the Saudi way of life as it strips away the community’s norms and values. In addition, many young men believe that the negative effects of globalization on Saudi society ‘serve outside political agendas’ that are not compatible with Saudi or Islamic socio-​cultural norms.245 Thus, there is concern that some young men are losing their identity, forgetting that speaking Arabic and adhering to traditional practices constitutes part of being Saudi. Indeed, some worry that ‘we are changing without noticing’, to the extent that the Kingdom is losing its unique attributes: ‘a nation without identity is a lost nation’. This is believed to be particularly true for societies with weak identities or a weak sense of belonging, because as a result of these weaknesses the impact of globalization is stronger.246 The situation is compounded when an individual is unaware that his religion is being compromised and identity lost, as there

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is nothing that can protect him from melting into another nondescript identity.247 Another young man says that as an Arab he always felt that he was gradually losing his identity until he attended a globalization course, which made him realize the importance of maintaining his identity and religious values.248 2.4

Uneven or Fair Globalization

The seismic political events of 2016, such as the Brexit vote in the UK and the election of Donald Trump as US President, highlighted the fact that globalization has exacerbated divisions within societies, in terms of the gap between rich and poor, elite and non-​elite, and those who identify themselves with a national boundary and those who perceive themselves to be part of a wider community. Young, educated Saudi men identify the principal problem causing these societal divisions not as globalization per se, but rather as what Baylis et al. refer to as ‘uneven globalization’.249 ‘Uneven globalization’ refers to the fact that some states, societies and constituencies benefit from globalization whilst others are harmed by it; in other words, there are clear winners and losers borne out of the processes of uneven globalization. Moreover, young men also recognize that uneven globalization benefits the rich (the winners) over the poor (the losers) not only amongst states, but also within states, including their own.250 In other words, as discussed in Chapter 1, the geographic core–​periphery polarization (urban centres–​provinces) is being replaced by a social core–​periphery distinction based on economic stratification that drives a policy of exclusion.251 Indeed, for the majority of individuals surveyed for this book the concept of uneven globalization is an easy one to understand –​even if winners and losers are a natural part of life.252 To what extent do these young men see uneven globalization as affecting the socio-​political, socio-​economic and socio-​cultural environments of Saudi Arabia? In Saudi Arabia, the processes of globalization are perceived as having both positive and negative effects in relation to oil. On the one hand, young men stress that oil benefits the Kingdom enormously. On the other, they acknowledge that the natural resource is also responsible for Saudi Arabia remaining dependent on other states for industrial products, such as ‘cars, phones, aircraft and military equipment’, thereby placing the Kingdom on the ‘losing’ side of the unevenly globalized world.253 According to some, a solution is for the government to focus its efforts on trying to attract more multinational corporations (MNCs) to invest in

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Saudi Arabia, as these MNCs could assist the Kingdom to become less oil-​dependent.254 King Abdullah Economic City (KAEC) is given as an example of a government project that has attracted foreign companies to operate in the Kingdom and, as Miller observes, ‘the success of high-​risk, high-​value projects’ such as KAEC will determine whether Saudi Arabia can transition to a post-​oil economy.255 Certainly, uneven globalization affects Saudi Arabia in different areas and sectors, but there is broad consensus that the Saudi economy is most affected by this unevenness. For example, the 2008 financial crisis and its global ramifications are cited as examples that impacted the Saudi economy negatively. As Hinds notes, the Kingdom was adversely affected by the extreme fluctuation in oil prices during the 2008 economic downturn, from US$147 a barrel in July 2008 to $38 in December 2008.256 Other individuals express concern over the 2014 oil price decline in relation to uneven globalization. As one young man states, ‘70 per cent of the Saudi economy is dependent on oil’, and he believes that Saudi Arabia could suffer from ‘a loss of power and influence’, particularly as the Kingdom does not yet possess an economic back-​up for oil rents.257 Of course, many young men are at pains to point out that the dramatic 2014 oil price decrease had a direct impact on ordinary Saudis. The contagion from the global economy resulted in some Saudis losing their jobs, and even in 2017–​19 others still could not find employment, resulting in many young Saudis having to lower their expectations of achieving high salaries and finding public-​sector jobs.258 Furthermore, as previously discussed, the government was forced to cut public-​ sector salaries and benefits to reduce expenditure259 –​although for political reasons this unpopular decision was reversed in April 2017.260 Nonetheless, some young men put their faith in the government’s Saudization initiative, which they see as promoting ‘Saudi jobs for Saudi people’ and reducing the country’s reliance on foreign labour.261 Yet, of great concern to many young men is that the Kingdom does not have (for the time being) other economic options to improve ‘itself and its society’.262 For many young Saudi men, globalization is understood as opening the domestic economy and society to those of other states, but they also recognize that this has positive and negative impacts on socio-​economic conditions. Certainly, globalization affects ‘every Saudi citizen’, but it exacerbates the gap between rich and poor  –​with, for example, the impact of the low oil price hurting poor people more.263 For instance, the cost of water, electricity and petrol have increased significantly for

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all Saudis (and expatriates),264 but one young man argues that for rich Saudis this increase is ‘not important because they do not even notice it’. To make matters worse, uneven globalization in Saudi Arabia is exacerbated by wasta. This is because Saudis with ‘connections and influence’ –​ that is, the winners  –​are able to assist their family members, friends and colleagues.265 The important point, according to many young men, is that uneven globalization affects the way ordinary Saudis live, and in particular the significant difference between rich Saudis, for whom globalization works in their favour, and poor people, whose standard of living suffers.266 Yet, it is not only the poor in Saudi Arabia who are affected by uneven globalization. The majority of people in Saudi Arabia are middle class, and uneven globalization also impacts their standard of living; thus, according to one young man, it is the Saudi middle classes who were most affected by the 2014 economic downturn. For example, he says that some of his relatives were obliged to sell their land and cars, and ‘went away empty-​handed because of these economic problems’, whereas ‘even in Saudi Arabia the clear and obvious winners were the bankers and capitalists’.267 Individuals point out that uneven globalization is also highly evident when living standards in the three major urban areas (Riyadh, Jeddah and the Dammam-​Khobar-​Dhahran conurbation) are compared with those of minor cities, towns and villages in the rest of the Kingdom. According to these young men, some of these provincial locations do not have basic public services and amenities.268 Of great concern to many young men is the fact that uneven globalization within the Kingdom has resulted in an over-​concentration of wealth, power and employment opportunities in the main cities, especially the capital Riyadh. In fact, when conducting focus groups away from the main urban centres, in particular in the northern and southern regions, there was a sense of marginalization, a feeling that it was necessary to migrate to the urban centres in order to find a job and ‘get on in life’.269 This is an issue that should be of concern to the Saudi government, as this sense of marginalization (and disregard by elites in the principal cities) was reminiscent of the anger and disempowerment that Donald Trump and the Brexit Leave campaigns tapped into successfully in 2016, thereby disrupting the political systems in the US and UK respectively. The concept of ‘fair globalization’, in contrast to the reality of uneven globalization, is one that resonates with many young Saudi men. As the International Labour Organization (ILO) acknowledges, there is widespread global concern regarding the potentially negative impacts of globalization, particularly on ‘employment, working conditions, equality, international labour standards and social protection’, with financial

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crises deepening this concern.270 This concept of fair globalization refers to achieving social cohesion by harnessing the benefits of globalization whilst promoting sustainable economic and social development.271 In other words, a fairer version of globalization means the concept of ‘winners and losers’ is negated in preference for the benefits of globalization being shared equally by all. Thus, all states and communities would have equal development opportunities through diffusion of technology, widening of markets for goods and services, expansion of investment, and internationalization of business processes.272 A group of finance students agree with the ILO’s stance that fair globalization would promote transnational collaboration between states by highlighting the importance of social dialogue amongst governments, workers and employer organizations so as to achieve social cohesion and promote international labour standards, which they believe would facilitate a more even version of globalization.273 These ‘even standards’ could provide opportunities in many areas, including international trade, investment, finance and migration, thereby building a sustainable economy.274 In fact, if the Saudi government implemented this concept correctly then it could not only enhance the Kingdom’s economy, but also help in achieving the goals of Saudi Vision 2030.275 Moreover, the government should supervise a fairer version of globalization by permitting the introduction of only those foreign norms that add to Saudi culture.276 In other words, the negative aspects of globalization that contradict Saudi culture and Islamic norms could be minimized or eliminated.277 A fairer version of globalization would mean that ‘everyone wins as often as possible’, or at least that losses are minimized. This, according to one young man, is particularly pertinent as many young Saudis worry about losing essentials, in particular jobs.278 Another individual maintains that if the government adopted this fairer approach, the everyday situation of ordinary Saudis would improve, as the government would be focusing more on citizens’ interests –​which he believes are currently disregarded due to uneven globalization.279 Indeed, mitigating the impact of uneven globalization would decrease unemployment whilst simultaneously creating a higher standard of living for ordinary Saudis. Hence, according to some, a fairer version of globalization could distribute wealth evenly throughout society whilst supporting sustainable social and economic development.280 However, this process would require greater societal participation in national development and, as Jones explains, would probably entail lessening citizen dependence on the state.281 Nonetheless, those young men with more ‘realist’ views argue that the phenomenon of fair globalization is purely ‘a dream where every state tries to maximize its relative gains in order to take the lion’s share’.282

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One university graduate remarks if the Kingdom’s ‘winners’ thought carefully about fair globalization and everyone was encouraged to be patriotic rather than nationalistic, then it might be achievable.283 Yet some feel that because the world is not homogeneous, the idea of fair globalization is impossible, as in reality it will always be uneven. Accordingly, there will always be winners and losers –​including in Saudi Arabia.284 Clearly, young Saudi men have conflicting perspectives regarding the ‘double-​edged’ influence of globalization on their lives and communities. From a positive perspective, Saudi Arabia has benefitted a great deal from globalization by becoming part of a wider community. Globalization also expedites information-​sharing and eases communication between people from all over the world.285 As a result, Saudi millennials (depending on individual characteristics) have a more opened-​minded perspective on the world than previous generations, as they have been exposed to multiple ideas and identities. In sum, globalization has facilitated a diversification of the knowledge pool available to young Saudis. One young man goes as far as to say that ‘it took me out of the darkness into the light’.286 Indeed, even if there is disagreement about the positive and negative attributes of globalization, many consider that Saudi Arabia is transiting to ‘a better place’.287 That said, whilst young Saudis can take into consideration new technological capabilities, as Brake asserts, they also need to be mindful of the consequences of their use and, in conjunction with the authorities, agree to limits in the interests of a more harmonious society.288 Young Saudis also understand that the Kingdom cannot isolate itself, as it has become increasingly interdependent –​economically, politically and culturally –​with other states, both regionally and internationally. Due to accelerating globalization, these young people need to be aware of global issues and not only those that directly impact on Saudi society. Hence there is growing realization amongst young Saudis that global issues, and global interconnectedness, affect not only the Saudi government’s decision-​making processes, but also the daily lives of the country’s citizens. For instance, young Saudis comprehend that environmental issues are no longer solely state issues, but global ones; in consequence, Saudi Arabia must engage in global governance in order to solve problems such as climate change. For this reason, young Saudis need to become involved in finding solutions to problems that impact on their lives and those of their families and communities.289 Certainly, some of the Saudi government’s 2017–​19 social reforms, such as lifting the ban on women driving, have challenged or altered Saudi norms, but according to some young men this does not necessarily mean they are either wrong or incompatible with these norms;

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rather, cultures are not static, and in any society they change and evolve naturally.290 That said, one of the most significant concerns for young Saudi men is the negative impact of globalization on Islamic teachings. Yet, in reality, globalization appears to have a greater impact on social attitudes than on religious beliefs and, very often, norms and attitudes that are ascribed to religious teachings are in fact more closely associated with Saudi socio-​tribal or cultural norms. It is these entrenched social attitudes that cause societal strain, argue many young men, such as continuing gender segregation, the spiraling cost of getting married (and the stress this causes the groom) and the way society perceives divorced women.291 In conclusion, it is paramount that young Saudis acquire an understanding of the global processes that are affecting their lives, both now and in the future. If there is space allocated within the education system to provide young Saudis with a more in-​depth comprehension of the global forces affecting their daily lives this will assist in developing an improved understanding of the impact of globalization on Saudi Arabia, as well as facilitating individuals to make better-​informed decisions regarding their own futures. In sum, according to one young man, ‘Globalization itself is not the problem; rather it is how we think about globalization and how we manage the impact of globalization on our diverse societies’.292 Notes 1 For more information, see, for example:  Saudi–​US Relations Information Service, ‘King Abdullah Scholarship Program:  The Saudi Arabian Educational Youth Stride’, SUSRIS, 30 July 2012, available at:  http:// susris.com/ ​ 2 012/ ​ 0 7/ ​ 3 0/ ​ k ing- ​ a bdullah- ​ s cholarship- ​ p rogram- ​ t he- ​ s audi-​ arabian-​educational-​youth-​stride. 2 The scholarship programme was established by King Abdullah in 2005, but since 2015, due to financial constraints, the Saudi government has scaled the programme back significantly by reducing the fields of study it will fund. It is now formally known as the King Salman Scholarship Program (KSSP), but is still referred to by most as the King Abdullah Scholarship Programme (KASP). See SUSTG team, ‘Popular King Abdullah Scholarship Program Reported to Have New Restrictions along with Reduced Budget’, Saudi–​US Trade Group, 10 February 2016, available at: http://​sustg.com/​oil-​price-​hits-​ king-​abdullah-​scholarship-​program-​months-​after-​expansion-​to-​include-​all-​ students. 3 Alnassar S. and Dow, K.L., ‘Delivering High-​Quality Teaching and Learning for University Students in Saudi Arabia’, in Smith L.  and Abouammoh, A.  (eds) Higher Education in Saudi Arabia:  Achievements, Challenges and Opportunities, Springer, Dordrecht, Netherlands, 2013, pp. 49–​50.

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4 In 2015 the Higher Education and Education ministries were merged into a single ministry called the Education Ministry. See, for example: Alruwaili, R., ‘Merger Prompts Fears for Future of Higher Education’, University World News, 6 November 2015, available at: www.universityworldnews.com/​article .php?story=20151103145947468. 5 Al Harithy, A., ‘25-​Year Strategy for Higher Education Launched’, Saudi Gazette, 20 April 2011, available at:  www.saudigazette.com.sa/​index .cfm?method¼home.regconandcontentID¼2011042098749. 6 Hildebrandt, El Abbouri and Alibraheem, ‘What Matters Most to Saudi Arabia’s Youth?’ 7 Anon, ‘Official: Education Is Pillar of Vision 2030’, Arab News, 31 May 2016, available at: www.arabnews.com/​node/​932381/​saudi-​arabia. 8 Khan, S.  and Saadi, D., ‘Saudi Arabia’s Expansionary Budget Positively Received by Economists’, The National, 20 December 2017, available at:  www.thenational.ae/​business/​economy/​saudi-​arabia-​s-​expansionary-​ budget-​positively-​received-​by-​economists-​1.689346. 9 Anon, ‘Saudi Arabia’s 2017 Budget Increases Spending in Line with Vision 2030 Priorities’, US–​Saudi Arabian Business Council, 22 December 2016, available at: www.us-​sabc.org/​i4a/​pages/​index.cfm?pageID=4435. 10 SUSRIS, ‘Glossary:  King Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz Public Education Development Project’, SUSRIS, 2017, available at: http://​susris.com/​glossary/​ king-​abdullah-​bin-​abdulaziz-​public-​education-​development-​project. 11 Ibid. 12 Anon, ‘Labor Minister: KSA Spends More on Education Than Most OECD Countries’, Arab News, 16 October 2017, available at: www.arabnews.com/​ node/​1178286/​saudi-​arabia. 13 Hertog, S., ‘Back to the Seventies?’, p. 85. 14 Smith, L. and Abouammoh, A., ‘Higher Education in Saudi Arabia: Reforms, Challenges and Priorities’, in Smith L.  and Abouammoh, A.  (eds) Higher Education in Saudi Arabia:  Achievements, Challenges and Opportunities, Springer, Dordrecht, Netherlands, 2013, p. 2. 15 Ibid., p. 6. 16 Elyas, T.  and Picard, M., ‘Critiquing of Higher Education Policy in Saudi Arabia: Towards a New Neoliberalism’, Education, Business and Society: Contemporary Middle Eastern Issues, Vol. 6, Issue 1, 2013, p.  34, available at: https://​doi.org/​10.1108/​17537981311314709. 17 Courington, K.  and Zuabi, V., ‘Calls For Reform:  Challenges to Saudi Arabia’s Education System’, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 12, Issue 2, Summer/​Fall 2011, p. 143. 18 Interview with Saudi assistant professor, Riyadh, March 2017. 19 Prokop, M, ‘The War of Ideas: Education in Saudi Arabia’, in Aarts, P. and Nonneman, G. (eds) Saudi Arabia in the Balance: Political Economy, Society, Foreign Affairs, C. Hurst & Co., London, 2005, p. 59. 20 Al Hussain, E., ‘The Fight Against the Muslim Brotherhood in the Education Sector’, Eman Al Hussain Blog, 13 April 2018, available at: http://​emanalhussein.com/​2018/​04/​13/​muslim-​brotherhood-​in-​education. 21 Ibid.

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22 Qatif, Tarout Island focus group, October 2016. 23 Renowned Saudi politician and poet. 24 Elliot House, K., On Saudi Arabia: Its People, Past, Religion, Fault Lines –​And Future, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2012, p. 145. 25 Jones uses the term ‘social engineering’ to refer to conscious efforts by state leaders to influence the hearts and minds, and consequently also the behaviours, of citizens. Jones, C., Bedouins into Bourgeois:  Remaking Citizens for Globalization, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017, p. 19. 26 Starrett, G., ‘Institutionalizing Charisma: Comparative Perspectives on the Promise of Higher Education’, in Davidson, C. and Makenzie Smith, P. (eds) Higher Education in the Gulf States:  Shaping Economies, Politics and Culture, Saqi Books, London, 2208, p. 79. 27 See: Thompson, Saudi Arabia and the Path to Political Change, pp. 66–​8. 28 The study was conducted by former Saudi judge Shaikh Abdulaziz Al Qassem and Saudi author and journalist Ibrahim Al Sakran, and concentrated on ‘an examination and critical analysis of three curricula for Saudi middle and high schools: al-​Hadith, a general curriculum on Islamic traditions; al-​Fiqh, a curriculum on matters of religious law and ritual, and al-​Tawhid, a curriculum on matters of belief. Dankowitz, A., ‘Saudi Study Offers Critical Analysis of the Kingdom’s Religious Curricula’, Inquiry & Analysis Series, No. 195, MEMRI, Washington, DC, 9 November 2004, available at: www.memri.org/​ reports/​saudi-​study-​offers-​critical-​analysis-​kingdoms-​religious-​curricula. 29 Interview with Abdulkareem, Riyadh, October 2017. 30 Ibid. 31 Interview with Saad, Riyadh, October 2017. ‘The first big change was presenting symbols and equations in English instead of Arabic.’ 32 Online discussion with Saad’s brothers, Riyadh, October 2017. 33 Ibid. 34 Nazer, F., ‘Saudi Education Reform Making Real Strides’, RiyadhVision, 26 July 2017, available at:  www.riyadhvision.com.sa/​2017/​07/​26/​saudieducation-​reform-​making-​real-​strides. 35 Interview with Mohammed, al-​Khobar, December 2017. 36 Mosaad, K., ‘How Will Saudi Arabia Revamp its Education System?’, Fair Observer, 25 May 2016, available at:  www.fairobserver.com/​region/​middle_​ east_​north_​africa/​will-​saudi-​arabia-​revamp-​education-​system-​11082. 37 Interview with Abdulkareem, Riyadh, October 2017. 38 Ibid. 39 Alnassar and Dow, ‘Delivering High-​ Quality Teaching and Learning’, p. 53. 40 Elliot House, On Saudi Arabia, p. 148. 41 Interview with ex-​ KASP graduate and Aramco employee, Dammam, November 2016. He notes that his is the ‘second educated generation’, with the third generation currently in school, but he believes that a sudden dramatic change in the education system is unlikely (for the time being). 42 See, for example: http://​foe.uj.edu.sa/​Default.aspx?Site_​ID=372&lng=EN. 43 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. 44 Interview with Samar Fatany, Jeddah, February 2017.

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45 Abha focus group, November 2016. ‘But there are a lot of positives at KKU. MoE gives us a clear plan and we have a dean with experience. I do not regret not going on KASP even though I was accepted.’ 46 Ibid. 47 Ramady, The Saudi Arabian Economy, p. 407 48 Interview with King Faisal University assistant professor, al-​ Khobar, November 2016. 49 Ibid. 50 Safwa focus group, January 2017. 51 Ibid. 52 Interview with Rozana, February 2017. 53 Ibid. 54 Dhahran focus group, November 2016. 55 Government of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Saudi Vision 2030, p.33. 56 Ibid. 57 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 58 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 59 Dammam focus group, January 2017. 60 Jeddah focus group, December 2016. 61 Mosaad, ‘How Will Saudi Arabia Revamp its Education System?’ 62 Government of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Saudi Vision 2030, p. 40. 63 Riyadh focus group, October 2016. 64 Companies such as Aramco and SABIC also prefer technical graduates who have taken social science courses, as the applicants are more well-​rounded individuals with an understanding of their environment. 65 Dhahran focus group, November 2016. 66 Ibid. 67 Umm Al Qura University focus group, Makkah, February 2017. ‘But I think the government knows this.’ Another young man talks about a video on YouTube about education in Finland, ‘where there is no homework, but great schools’. He reflects that his cousins spend hours doing homework, but find it extremely boring and, in consequence, hate school. 68 Al Seghayer, Real Face of Saudi Arabia, p. 16. 69 Dhahran focus group, September 2018. 70 Al Seghayer, Real Face of Saudi Arabia, p. 16. 71 Ibid. 72 Umm Al Qura University focus group, Makkah, February 2017. 73 Ridge, N., Education and the Reverse Gender Divide in the Gulf States: Embracing the Global, Ignoring the Local, Teachers College Press, New York, 2014, p. 104 74 Ibid. 75 Dhahran focus group, November 2016. 76 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017. 77 Ibid. 78 Dhahran focus group, November 2016. 79 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017; Layla, al-​Aflaj focus group, April 2017. 80 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017.

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81 Layla, al-​Aflaj focus group, April 2017. 82 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017. 83 Dhahran focus group, November 2016. 84 Interview with King Faisal University assistant professor, al-​ Khobar, November 2016. 85 Umm Al Qura University focus group, Makkah, February 2017. ‘But Taif is different, different tribes, cultures even food.’ 86 Awamiya focus group, May 2017. 87 Ibid. ‘Kids in Qatif say that kids from Awamiya are tough because they know how to fight.’ 88 Ibid. In addition, they note that there used to be two primary schools, one middle school and two high schools for males, but the high schools were combined into one school –​although due to ongoing violence in Awamiya the electricity periodically gets shut down, ‘And the middle school is sort of on and off.’ 89 Ibid. 90 Dhahran focus group, November 2016. 91 Donn, G. and Al Manthri, Y., Globalization and Higher Education in the Arab Gulf States, Symposium Books, Didcot, 2010, p. 39. 92 Dhahran focus group, November 2016. 93 Abha focus group, November 2016. 94 Qatif, Tarout Island focus group, October 2016. Nevertheless, despite poor standards, according to this focus group, some public-​school teachers can earn more that their private-​sector peers depending on the school and/​ or region. 95 Donn and Al Manthri, Globalization and Higher Education, p. 39. According to Donn and Al Manthri, monthly salaries at private schools are SAR 2,000, and public schools double this. 96 Interview with Riyadh high-​school graduate from al-​Qurayyat, November 2016. 97 Dhahran focus group, December 2016. 98 Interview with Riyadh high-​school graduate from al-​Qurayyat, November 2016. 99 Layla, al-​Aflaj focus group, April 2017. 100 Qatif, Tarout Island focus group, October 2016. 101 Ibid. 102 Interview with Ahmed from al-​Baha, November 2016. 103 Qatif, Tarout Island focus group, October 2016. 104 Dhahran focus group, December 2016. 105 Ibid. 106 Ibid. Sadly, it appears the solution for young men when they get bored at school or at home is to take out their PlayStations. 107 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017. 108 Dhahran focus group, November 2016. 109 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017. 110 See: https://​uqu.edu.sa/​en. 111 Umm Al Qura University focus group, Makkah, February 2017. 112 Ibid.

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113 Ibid. Popular courses have 50 or more students in each class, whilst elective courses usually have 20 or less. 114 Ibid. 115 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017. 116 See: www.seu.edu.sa/​sites/​en/​Pages/​main.aspx. 117 Safwa focus group, January 2017. 118 Ibid. 119 Ridge, Education and the Reverse Gender Divide, p. 31. 120 Qatif, Tarout Island focus group, October 2016. 121 Al Seghayer, Real Face of Saudi Arabia, p. 23. 122 Ibid, p. 24. 123 Al Omar, A., ‘This Is Our Goal in Education’, Saudi Gazette, 13 October 2017, available at:  http://​saudigazette.com.sa/​article/​519255/​Opinion/​ Local-​Viewpoint/​This-​is-​our-​goal-​in-​education. 124 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017. All members attended state high schools in al-​Mithnab apart from one. ‘I want to be a doctor because I want to help sick people. I love biology and chemistry’; ‘I do not know what I  want to do because I  am still a bit uncertain about my major’; ‘I like networking because I have been interested in this since I was a child. And also the people around me were interested in the same thing so they motivated me.’ 125 Umm Al Qura University focus group, Makkah, February 2017. 126 Taseel is an exam after high school which determines the accumulated knowledge of a high-​ school student, specifically in mathematics and science subjects. Qiyas/​ Qudarat are exams that test the IQ of the student. See, for example:  www.qiyas.sa/​Pages/​default.aspx; www.qiyas.sa/​ ApplicantsServices/​publications/​Docs/​CurrentList/​GAT%20general%20 aptitude%20test%20(English%20Version).pdf. 127 Abha focus group, November 2016. 128 Dhahran focus group, December 2016. 129 Abha focus group, November 2016. 130 Ibid. 131 Umm Al Qura University focus group, Makkah, February 2017. 132 Abha focus group, November 2016. 133 Hofuf focus group, December 2016. 134 Ibid. 135 al-​Ahsa focus group, June 2017. 136 See: www.cym.com.sa. 137 See: www.maestroevent.com/​cym-​2016.aspx; http://​cym.com.sa/​ruh. 138 al-​Ahsa focus group, June 2017. 139 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 140 Riyadh focus group, May 2017. 141 Umm Al Qura University focus group, Makkah, February 2017. 142 al-​Ahsa focus group, June 2017. 143 Yamani, Changed Identities, p. 49. 144 al-​Ahsa focus group, June 2017. 145 Yamani, Changed Identities, p. 49.

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146 Abha focus group, November 2016. ‘In my family, three brothers wanted to be doctors’; however, if an individual is encouraged by his father to become a doctor from childhood, then this is a great opportunity. 147 al-​Ahsa focus group, June 2017. 148 Ibid. 149 Dhahran focus group, December 2016. 150 See: Tago, A., ‘27 More Technical Colleges Planned’, Arab News, 11 April 2014, available at:  www.arabnews.com/​news/​553896; for a list of universities and colleges in Saudi Arabia see: www.cgijeddah.com/​listofuniversity .pdf. 151 Hofuf focus group, December 2016. 152 Government of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Saudi Vision 2030, p. 77. 153 Dhahran focus group, October 2018. 154 Of course, ‘meeting new people’ can often be interpreted as meeting the opposite sex. 155 See, for example: AFP, ‘Lights, Camera, Action as Saudi Film Fest Returns’, Arab News, 22 March 2016, available at: www.arabnews.com/​offbeat/​news/​ 899151. 156 See, for example:  Al Khuwaylidi, M., ‘Dammam Theater Festival Gives Momentum to Saudi Theater Movement’, Asharq Al-​Awsat, 20 June 2014, available at:  https://​english.aawsat.com/​m-​alkhuawlidi/​lifestyle-​culture/​ dammam-​theater-​festival-​gives-​momentum-​to-​saudi-​theater-​movement. 157 The Hakaya MiSK Festival aims to create content with cultural and educational values to encourage young people to express and showcase their ideas: https://​misk.org.sa/​en/​services/​hakayamisk6-​en. 158 See: www.ithraagroup.com. 159 See: www.kfupm.edu.sa/​sitePages/​en/​kfupm-​8th-​volunteer-​day.aspx. 160 Dhahran focus group, February 2017. 161 Ibid. 162 Ibid. 163 Ibid. See: http://​addenterprise.com. 164 Ibid. ‘The VIP section is mixed but otherwise women sit at the back.’ 165 al-​Ahsa focus group, February 2017. 166 Ibid. 167 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. 168 Dhahran focus group, February 2017. 169 Ibid. 170 al-​Ahsa focus group, February 2017. 171 Dhahran focus group, February 2017. 172 Safwa focus group, January 2017. 173 Dhahran focus group, February 2017. ‘We took part at a four day volunteering workshop in Dammam run by the community centres, talking about our experiences.’ 174 al-​Ahsa focus group, February 2017. 175 See: www.legacyintl.org/​our-​programs/​saudi-​young-​leaders-​exchange. 176 See: www.kingabdulazizcenter.com/​home-​en. 177 al-​Ahsa focus group, June 2017.

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178 Interview with Abdullah, Ithra volunteer, Dhahran, October 2018. 179 Ibid. 180 Author’s online survey: ‫المسح السعودي للتحول المجتمعي‬ 181 Ibid. I recognize that this data needs to be regularly updated due to the changing political environment. 182 Ibid. 183 Views expressed by multiple entrepreneurs across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 184 Ibid. 185 Amalgamated anonymous responses to author’s survey. Even if it is a com�bination of positive and negative, there are those who believe that the situation is difficult to assess because, in reality, social media conceals people’s real opinions about societal transformation. 186 Ibid. 187 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 188 Ibid. 189 Author’s online survey: ‫المسح السعودي للتحول المجتمعي‬ 190 Ibid. 191 Kane, F., ‘Young Saudis Optimistic About Future, Arab Youth Survey Shows’, Arab News, 1 May 2019, available at: http://www.arabnews.com/ node/1490621/saudi-arabia. 192 ILO, ‘Fair Globalization’, International Labour Organization, available at: www.ilo.org/​integration/​themes/​sdg/​lang-​-​en/​index.htm. 193 Harris, A., ‘Young People, Politics and Citizenship’, in Furlong, A. (ed.) Handbook of Youth and Young Adulthood: New Perspectives and Agendas, Routledge, Abingdon, 2009, p. 304. 194 Sparke, M., Introducing Globalization: Ties, Tensions and Uneven Integration, Wiley-​Blackwell, Chichester, 2013, p. 33 195 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 196 Alnassar and Dow, ‘Delivering High-​Quality Teaching and Learning’, p. 55. 197 Author’s survey response: ‫العولمة والهوية‬ 198 Anonymous response to author’s online survey. 199 An undergraduate says, ‘when I ask my peers if they know about globalization they all answer “of course”, but when I ask them to explain it in detail they do not know how’. 200 Freeman Jr., C.W., ‘Saudi Arabia and the Forces of Globalization’, Middle East Policy Council, 2017, available at:  www.mepc.org/​commentary/​ saudi-​arabia-​and-​forces-​globalization. 201 Yamani, Cradle of Islam, p. 17. 202 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. 203 See, for example: Ritzer, P. and Dean, P., Globalization: A Basic Text, 2nd Edition, Wiley Blackwell, Chichester, 2015, p 72. 204 Author’s observation. This troubles many young men due to Arabic being the language of Islam. 205 Response to author’s survey: ‫العولمة والهوية‬ 206 Ibid. 207 Mednicoff, M. and Springer, J.E., The Rule of Law and Political Liberalization in the Arab Gulf, in Hudson, M.  and Kirk, M.  (eds) Gulf Politics and Economics in a Changing World, World Scientific Publishing Co., Singapore, 2014, p. 97.

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208 Anon, ‘Arab Youth Overwhelmingly Back Reforms Initiated by Crown Prince’, Saudi Gazette, 10 May 2018, available at:  http://​saudigazette .com.sa/​article/​534495/​SAUDI-​ARABIA/​Arab-​youth-​overwhelminglyback-​reforms-​initiated-​by-​Crown-​Prince. 209 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 210 Ibid. 211 Anon, ‘E-​marketing Blamed for Excessive Consumerism in Saudi Society’, Arab News, 11 January 2016, available at: www.arabnews.com/​saudi-​arabia/​ news/​863361. 212 Ibid. 213 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. 214 Response to author’s survey: ‫العولمة والهوية‬ 215 Bayat, A., Life As Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 2010, p. 63. 216 Dresch, P., ‘Societies, Identities and Global Issues’ in Dresch, P. and Piscatori, J. (eds) Monarchies and Nations: Globalisation and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf, I.B. Tauris, London, 2013, p. 27. 217 Response to author’s survey: ‫العولمة والهوية‬ 218 Hilal, K.T., Scott, S.R. and Maadad, N., ‘The Political, Socio-​economic and Sociocultural Impacts of the King Abdullah Scholarship Program (KASP) on Saudi Arabia’, International Journal of Higher Education, Vol. 4, Issue 1, 2015, p. 254. 219 Response to author’s survey: ‫العولمة والهوية‬ 220 Ibid. 221 Freeman, ‘Saudi Arabia and the Forces of Globalization’. 222 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 223 Ibid. 224 Moussalli, M.S., ‘Impact of Globalization’, The Middle East Tribune, 23 March 2012, available at: https://​middleeasttribune.wordpress.com/​ impact-​of-​globalization. 225 Response to author’s survey: ‫العولمة والهوية‬ 226 Ibid. 227 Ibid. 228 Ibid. 229 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. 230 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017. 231 Response to author’s survey: ‫العولمة والهوية‬ 232 Dhahran focus group, March 2018. 233 Response to author’s survey: ‫العولمة والهوية‬ 234 Ibid. 235 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 236 Response to author’s survey: ‫العولمة والهوية‬ 237 Riyadh focus group, February 2018. 238 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 239 Baktiari, B., ‘Globalization and Religion’ in Globalization in the 21st Century: How Interconnected is the World?, The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, Dubai, 2008, p. 149. 240 Ibid. 241 Ibid.

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242 Response to author’s survey: ‫العولمة والهوية‬ 243 Ibid. 244 Response to author’s survey: ‫العولمة والهوية‬ 245 Ibid. 246 Riyadh focus group, February 2018. 247 Ibid. 248 Response to author’s survey: ‫العولمة والهوية‬ 249 Baylis, J., Smith, S. and Owens, P., The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, 2nd International Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017, p. 19. 250 Ibid. 251 Hoogvelt, Globalization and the Postcolonial World, pp. 64–​5. 252 Anonymous response to author’s online survey. 253 Ibid. 254 Ibid. 255 Miller, R., Desert Kingdoms to Global Powers: The Rise of the Arab Gulf, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 2016, p. 233. 256 Hinds, M., ‘Saudi Arabia:  What Are the Effects of the Global Financial Crisis on Saudi Arabia’s Economic Prospects?’, The London School of Economics and Political Science, 12 March 2010, available at: http://​blogs .lse.ac.uk/​ideas/​2010/​03/​saudi-​arabia-​what-​are-​the-​effects-​of-​the-​global-​ financial-​crisis-​on-​saudi-​arabias-​economic-​prospects. 257 Anonymous response to author’s online survey. 258 Ibid. 259 See, for example: Paul, K. and Browning, M., ‘Saudi Arabia Slashes Ministers’ Pay, Cuts Public Sector Bonuses’, Reuters, 26 September 2016, available at:  www.reuters.com/​article/​us-​saudi-​economy/​saudi-​arabia-​slashesministers-​pay-​cuts-​public-​sector-​bonuses-​idUSKCN11W1VS. 260 See, for example:  Martin, M., ‘Saudi Arabia Reverses Salary Cuts after Succession Shakeup’, Bloomberg, 21 June 2017, available at:  www .bloomberg.com/​ n ews/​ a rticles/​ 2 017-​ 0 6-​ 2 1/​ s audi-​ a rabia-​ r eversessalary-​cuts-​after-​succession-​shakeup. 261 Amalgamated anonymous responses to author’s survey. 262 Ibid. 263 Ibid. 264 See, for example:  Treadgold, T., ‘Cheap Oil Bites Saudi Arabia’s Budget with Gas, Electricity and Water Prices Hiked’, Forbes, 29 December 2015, available at:  www.forbes.com/​sites/​timtreadgold/​2015/​12/​29/​cheap-​oil-​ bites-​saudi-​arabias-​budget-​with-​gas-​electricity-​and-​water-​prices-​hiked/​ #5c63faed2d35. 265 Amalgamated anonymous responses to author’s survey. 266 Anonymous response to author’s online survey:  Yet another example, according to one young man, is the ‘interest taken from the investments of rich Saudis compared to that taken from normal and poor people’ –​that is, the amount of money taken from the rich does not affect their overall wealth, whilst the amount taken from normal or poorer Saudis has a huge impact on theirs.

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267 Ibid. 268 Amalgamated anonymous responses to author’s survey. 269 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 270 ILO, ‘Fair Globalization’. 271 Ibid. 272 Ibid. 273 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 274 Ibid. 275 Amalgamated anonymous responses to author’s survey. 276 Ibid. 277 Ibid. 278 Ibid. 279 Anonymous responses to author’s online survey. 280 Ibid. 281 Jones, Bedouins into Bourgeois, p. 16. 282 Ibid. 283 Anonymous responses to author’s online survey. 284 Amalgamated anonymous responses to author’s survey. 285 Response to author’s survey: ‫العولمة والهوية‬ 286 Ibid. 287 Jeddah focus group, April 2017. 288 Brake, Sharing Our Lives Online, p. 160. 289 Ibid. 290 Response to author’s survey: ‫العولمة والهوية‬ 291 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 292 Response to author’s survey: ‫العولمة والهوية‬

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1 Masculinity 1.1

Manliness versus Maleness

In order to understand contemporary Saudi society it is imperative to focus on local contexts, particularly as Saudi society is not a homogeneous entity. Indeed, local context does not necessarily refer to the Kingdom as a unitary body, but rather to specific constituencies and regional areas. This comprehension of diverse Saudi societies is more nuanced and expansive than the traditional perspective of a relatively homogeneous Saudi society, as it allows for a greater variation in the study of young Saudi male perceptions of masculinity, gender relations and marriage in everyday life. In addition, it provides a more accurate framework for studying the dynamics of socio-​cultural development and societal transformation in Saudi Arabia. This chapter discusses perceptions of masculinity, attitudes to gender relations and the vexing problems of making a ‘good’ marriage as related to accepted Saudi socio-​cultural norms. In fact, many young men maintain that a Saudi ‘social dictatorship’ exists, one based on historical socio-​ tribal attitudes and customs rather than solely on Islamic jurisprudence and religious norms.1 Indeed, there is widespread recognition that these socio-​cultural norms frequently govern the way ‘things are supposed to be’ in the community. Accordingly, failure to follow these accepted practices can lead to family conflict and, significantly, ‘loss of face’ within society. Mahadeen notes that whilst Arabic-​language engagements with masculinity have existed since the 1970s, ‘Arabizing’ the term ‘masculinity’ continues to pose challenges. As Reeser observes, the male body is the most common purveyor of masculinity,2 but in the Arab context, Mahadeen highlights the important issue of differentiating manliness from maleness: Masculinity is traditionally translated as a singular noun rujula (manliness) to differentiate it from dhukura (maleness). According to the Dictionary of 196

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Contemporary Arabic Language, rujula denotes the maturing of the male individual or the completion of his dhukura (maleness) by reaching a certain biological age.3

Therefore, rujula (manliness) refers to physical attributes such as facial hair whilst dhukura (maleness) denotes non-​biological attributes such as ‘bravery, authority, and control of women’.4 Referring to rujula, De Sondy writes that the growing of the beard or moustache has long been a sign of maturity and manliness in Islamic cultures,5 although Haykel observes that beards are sunnah, that is, recommended but not required of Muslim men.6 Still, facial hair can confer power, respect and gravitas as well as indicating piety, even if in reality the individual is not particularly devout.7 Facial hair is the most visible sign of manliness, agree young Saudi men, although the beard should not ‘grow unruly and look unkempt’: rather, the man is encouraged to groom it and keep it clean.8 These outward manifestations of manliness highlight male virility and the importance of ‘the penis’ to being a ‘real man’.9 Indeed, Saudi men are supposed to be ‘virile, tough and courageous’; they should not be feminine in either appearance or behaviour, because men should be able to start a family and provide ‘high values’ for its members.10 De Sondy concurs, pointing out that: from the beginning, faith was intertwined with rigid notions of masculinity: Muhammad’s disciple Ibn Abbas reported that the prophet ‘cursed those men who assume the manners of women and those women who assume those of men’. For men, the beard was said to be a part of the ‘fitrah’ –​the natural order.11

Furthermore, in contemporary Saudi Arabia, along with the necessary facial hair, the ‘right’ appearance is also considered important. Young men cite attributes such as, for example, wearing ‘good clothes’ including well-​known sports or designer brands,12 smoking cigarettes13 and owning a decent car.14 In fact, car ownership is seen as a sign of masculinity and even prestige, and thus it is not uncommon for a young Saudi man to obtain a bank loan to buy a ‘cool’ car even if, in reality, he cannot afford it, or in some cases afford to run it. Hence, one individual maintains it is all about ‘the look, the walk and the talk’, although others assert that young men should steer away from ‘tight clothes and weird haircuts’.15 In addition to physical appearance, there is also the important issue of ‘social appearance’. It is crucial for a young man to make a ‘good’ marriage and have a large number of children (and by extension through marriage, sons-​in-​law); and if his children are well educated and have decent jobs this confers power, respect and gravitas on the family patriarch and his male relatives.16

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1.2

Attributes of Saudi Maleness

Some young men recognize that in actuality there are two types of masculinity: the first is the apparent physical manliness which comes after puberty, including the voice dropping, and the appearance of facial and body hair.17 Dhukura, the second type  –​and for some young men the more important –​is different from manliness, as ‘manliness only requires a penis’. This maleness relates to personal behaviour because, according to one individual, if ‘maleness’ is understood in ‘colloquial Arabic slang’ then it relates to generosity, courage and not being treacherous. This young man cites an Arabic saying: ‘Not every male is a man, but every man is a male’ –​as, in reality, there are no physical signs of real maleness on the body.18 Genuine masculinity is usually found ‘within’; therefore, physical manifestations of masculinity such as facial hair are not significant. For others real maleness is characterized by generosity, humility, good manners, respect for others and avoiding discrimination or racism.19 Furthermore, maleness is different from being male; a young man can be male, but it is difficult to be a ‘real man’ because qualities of real maleness include honesty, wisdom, magnanimity, modesty, and not ‘gazing at women and showing them patience’.20 In addition, a man should take responsibility for himself and his family; he should be wise and be able to solve family problems; he should not complain and he should be able to hold his temper.21 This perspective mirrors Reeser’s observation that in some contexts ‘moderation has been a defining element of masculinity’, as self-​control justifies control of others: ‘inner control permits external control’.22 From the viewpoint of many of these young men, this idea that ‘the man who rules the self is justified in ruling the other’23 translates as respect for mothers, wives and other female relatives, but with the ultimate aim of protecting the family honour. Thus, a young man should respect women in general and not harass them in public places such as shopping malls.24 A real man also stands by his friends in time of need, he helps his neighbours and ‘treats good people well and bad people badly’.25 He must also support the weak and the oppressed whether they are male or female.26 Moreover, real masculinity conveys itself by honouring and obeying parents, and respecting elders and giving them priority over everyone else (whilst simultaneously being kind to the young). Above all, a man should act wisely ‘according to Islam in all situations’ by following Islamic teaching.27 For many young men, strength of character and self-​confidence also define real maleness in particular when in relation to religion, honour

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or money.28 Yet, manifestations of masculinity can also depend on the situation and the way that the man must deal with different people, in particular his ability to handle pressure and act wisely rather than recklessly by taking the right decisions and making the right choices.29 He should use his brain in discussions and ‘stay steady’ in difficult times.30 In other words, a man must be self-​confident and self-​reliant whilst not being afraid to admit his mistakes and accept the consequences of his actions.31 He will not stay silent about the truth; he will be open-​minded and avoid ‘envy and hate’ whilst being forgiving when possible.32 He will be committed to high ethical and moral standards and social responsibility, and will attempt to break down the barriers that delay his progress.33 Furthermore, in the opinion of one well-​educated individual, a real man should love knowledge and science; he should also be able to discuss culture whilst respecting the opinions of others. Significantly, he should categorize people according to their ideas and behaviour rather than by religion or family background.34 Finally, many young men declare that a Saudi man should also be proud of his nation, religion, language and culture.35 As Reeser notes, this relationship between masculinity and the nation-​state may be considered in terms of self-​identification: ‘A man identifies with the masculinized nation because he views himself, or would like to view himself, as masculinized as well’;36 and as Al Rasheed asserts, Saudi Arabia is most definitely a masculine state.37 Evidently, as demonstrated by focus group discussions and online survey responses on this topic, many young men hold ‘idealized’ views of masculinity as well as the role of a man in society, in particular in relation to family duties. It also became clear from focus group discussions that deviating from these idealized standards could attract societal censure, whether from family, friends or colleagues. Indeed, there is a real concern that this censure could lead to ‘loss of face’ not only for the individual, but also for his family, both nuclear and extended. This loss of face would have a detrimental impact on the standing of the young man in wider society, bringing shame on him and his family. Hence, these idealized views of masculinity reflect the social position that the majority of young men aspire to –​at least in public. In addition, for many young Saudi men, these views of masculinity have gained in importance due to the increased role of Saudi women in society, especially since 2014 when greater numbers of Saudi women entered the labour market. As McDowell points out, the nature of waged work in many societies  –​including nowadays in Saudi Arabia  –​has changed from a predominantly male environment to a mixed one, but often to the detriment of unskilled working-​class young men.38 Therefore, the increased female presence in the workplace is also challenging young

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Saudi men’s traditional notions vis-​à-​vis their masculine identity, gender relations and marriage. 2

Gender Relations

2.1

Gender Segregation

During a focus group discussion in a coffee shop in al-​Mithnab in Qassim province in early 2017, I asked the participants how they would characterize gender relations in Saudi Arabia. After a few minutes’ thought, one participant replied: That is simple; in Saudi Arabia, young men can drive and therefore, go anywhere. The problem is that when they arrive at their destination they are not allowed in. However, young women in Saudi Arabia are allowed in everywhere, but for them the problem is, they cannot get there!39

Although women have been permitted to drive since this focus group discussion, this young man’s joke revealed a growing disconnect between traditional Saudi socio-​cultural norms and the everyday realities of contemporary life. Saudi Arabia is trying to become a ‘modern society’, according to one young man, but society is unable to break away from socio-​cultural norms that govern gender relations, in particular gender segregation (ikhtilat)  –​although it should be emphasized that not all young men disapprove of gender segregation.40 Alhazmi and Nyland maintain that many Saudis consider the concept of ired to be the principal cause for the practice of gender separation. They note that the concept is ‘best described as associated with personal honour and in Wahhabi Islam, ired is the fourth of the five hierarchies, religion, self, mind, ired and wealth’: Thus many restrictions were imposed on women because the tribe and family honour is connected strongly with ired. One of the many restrictions placed on a Saudi woman is the need to keep away from a man who is not a family member, which is what gender segregation achieves.41

The segregation that characterizes gender relations is therefore exacerbated by tribal and family honour turning the Kingdom, according to another individual in Riyadh, into a ‘closed society by default’.42 Other individuals point out that because of enforced gender segregation, teenage boys start same-​sex relationships due to the extreme difficulty of meeting girls. Although ‘not advertised’, same-​sex relationships amongst teenagers are not uncommon. One focus group showed me a popular video doing the rounds on Snapchat of a teenage boy declaring his unrequited love for another boy and then being filmed jumping off the roof

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of his house and subsequently breaking his legs. According to the group, the video was being widely discussed online (in 2016).43 A medical student at King Abdulaziz University (KAU) in Jeddah contends that society ‘comprises two teams, male and female’, who compete against each other because there is no communication between the two genders; thus, there is little understanding.44 Yet, as Murphy observes, modern communication tools, in particular social media, are undermining the rigid gender segregation that has been a hallmark of Saudi society.45 In fact, during the focus group discussions across the Kingdom, when it came to talking about gender relations what I found most telling was that the vast majority of these young men acknowledged that they did not know how to communicate with the opposite sex.46 What is interesting is that these young men were able to articulate this concern –​thereby highlighting their collective awareness of the issue and the problems that this disconnect often creates. Abraham sums up this concern, stating that Saudi culture gives young men ‘no time to understand the opposite sex’, regardless of the fact that gender relations will ‘impact on the destinies’ of these young men’s lives.47 A solution to this problem, according to a young man from Makkah, is for young men to be given the opportunity to develop their communication skills in order to be able to interact effectively with the opposite sex.48 Still, as discussed in Chapter  3, the advent of new/​social media is breaking down gender segregation particularly amongst young Saudis. It is not uncommon to see young Saudis with multiple smartphones: one for family, one for friends/​work/​college/​university and another for communication with the opposite sex. Certainly, a problem for single young Saudis of both genders is the lack of places for socializing; hence, as they cannot meet easily, relationships are carried on largely via social media.49 As a group of young men in Riyadh point out, the easiest way to socialize with girls is through social media; thus if a young man wants to find a girlfriend, that is where he will look.50 In fact, most young men have girlfriends they found through social media, says one individual, but he stresses that they can rarely meet in public. He jokes that it is ‘top secret or like organized crime’, even though it is becoming more commonplace.51 According to an 18-​year-​old in Riyadh, ‘Everyone has a girlfriend, or boyfriend, these days, it is normal. Of course, we do not tell our parents because they would not understand.’52 In Eastern Province, I  heard the same story about how gender mixing is increasing due to social media and how many young people have ‘top secret’ girl/​boyfriends.53 A female graduate from Princess Nourah Bint Abdulrahman University (PNU) comments that she has many male friends made via social media and, in fact, she considers them to be as important as her

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female friends because in her opinion everyone needs to talk to the other gender.54 Nevertheless, she is very careful whom she tells, ‘because a lot of people here are extremely judgmental’.55 Real life may be segregated and compartmentalized, but for privacy and safety the same sometimes has to happen in the online world. Yet, nowadays, there are increasing opportunities to mix with the opposite sex through volunteering activities and hobby clubs (sometimes set up by the participants themselves) or as part of events hosted by organizations such as Hakaya Misk.56 For example, I have attended numerous ‘mixed’ art shows, including one held at al-Rashid Mall in al-​Khobar in 2016. The show was organized by a group called We Art that was started as a WhatsApp group between a few friends, but now numbers more than 200 members. The art show (approved by the municipality) showcased work by local male and female artists –​many of whom were in attendance, and who mixed freely with the unsegregated audience. Other examples of mixed groups in Eastern Province include Toastmaster groups in Saihat, Safwa and Qatif. In fact, these mixed hobby groups have resulted in some young people starting their own businesses and opening art galleries. One young man from Tarout Island says that participation in photography groups has prompted some young locals to establish their own photography businesses, taking either wedding pictures or pictures of products such as decorative cakes for start-​ups on Instagram.57 2.2

Gender Issues in Education and Employment

A KFUPM undergraduate says that sometimes he has to ‘escape’ the university campus, otherwise the only people he interacts with are other twenty-​something young men, which in his opinion is unnatural. For this reason, he works part-​time as a Careem driver in order to meet and talk to other members of society.58 In fact, strict gender segregation in education is cited as one of the principal problems that hamper effective communication with the opposite sex.59 In her book about young Saudi women, Le Renard writes that from ‘primary school to pedagogical universities for training teachers after high school’, female schools and campuses are separate from male ones and ‘surrounded by walls through which only women can pass’.60 Indeed, a university campus such as KFUPM is strictly male-​only (other than a few university nurses and female family members of faculty who live in university accommodation): students, faculty, administrators, cooks and cleaners are all male. Nonetheless, depending on the educational institution, in some fields such as medicine there is a degree of gender mixing. For

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example, female students at PNU undertake training at King Fahd Medical City in Riyadh, where they spend a month with their male peers from KSU. According to a PNU female group, in the initial stages of their training the male and female students did not want to interact with each other –​in particular as many of the male students were extremely shy. Yet, gradually, the male students started to ask the women about their studies, request course information and survey the young women’s opinions regarding the training session.61 According to these PNU students, for some individuals, but not all, the situation started to become ‘more normal’ as the month progressed, resulting in men and women becoming more familiar with each other.62 In fact, another PNU student says she knows two doctors who were able to make a ‘love marriage’ following this type of experience.63 For the same reason, a young male medical student from QU is looking forward to a similar experience and considers himself fortunate because in the near future he will practise medicine in a mixed environment with Saudi female students, so maybe he will be lucky enough to meet his future wife.64 As a result of the government’s efforts at increasing employment amongst Saudi nationals, greater numbers of men are working near, if not alongside, Saudi women, providing a plethora of romantic possibilities.65 Accordingly, many young men are aware about the increased possibility of making a love marriage  –​something that is ‘continually discussed’ amongst groups of male friends, says an individual in al-​Khobar.66 These types of love marriages are also happening in the banking/​commercial sector. For example, one young woman’s sister met her future husband whilst both were working for Riyad Bank. Initially her father was happy with the marriage but was put under pressure by his own father and uncles about the groom’s suitability, though in the end he did not oppose the marriage. This, according to the young woman, demonstrates how ‘social pressure’ can still have a negative effect on gender relations, in particular if socio-​ cultural norms are challenged.67 Other young men are at pains to point out that in some conservative families women are forbidden to attend college or university. These women are not even allowed to have mobile phones and the only computer they can use is in the living room: ‘Believe me, I know families like this and it is much more usual than many people realize’, states a young man from Riyadh.68 This has nothing to do with Islam; rather it is the system, which is ‘all about socio-​cultural norms and tribal identity’. As another young man avers, ‘It is society that influences this –​my mother went to school in secret because of these norms’.69 A Riyadh finance undergraduate says that an additional problem with all-​male educational institutions occurs when a young man is sent to

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a company for an internship (often referred to as ‘summer training’ or ‘Coop’ and commonplace at many Saudi colleges and universities). Frequently there is ‘confusion and awkwardness’ as suddenly these young men find themselves working alongside unrelated Saudi women:70 When I was an intern at Deloitte in Riyadh there were two male Saudi interns and two female. On the first day an American female HR employee came into the room and told the four of us to sit together at a table in order to ‘get to know each other’. But it was so difficult and embarrassing because neither the boys nor the girls knew what to say or indeed, how to get to know each other! We just sort of tried not to look at each other for a long time.71

Precisely this confusion and awkwardness, and maybe worse, prompted a young Saudi woman, Maria Almarzooq, to post a tweet directed at the KFUPM Coop internship programme on her Twitter account (@mearykm): ‘@KFUPM if u are going to send your students to international companies or any mixed company for Coop teach them how to deal with females first!’72 Another young man from Riyadh recounts a similar experience of confusion and awkwardness as told to him by one of his brothers: My brother had spent all his life in all-​male education and when he started his first job at a financial firm in the capital he was given a desk between two Saudi women. As they were unrelated to him and he was completely unused to dealing with women he basically spent the first three months having a nervous breakdown.73

Nonetheless, many young men recognize that gender relations are changing due to the break-​down of segregation in the workplace, in particular in the private sector.74 In fact, a focus group from al-​Ahsa observes that this is an economic necessity, with local women, including female family members, working as cashiers in banks and shops, in call-​centres and in customer service.75 Another focus group in al-​Mithnab points out that local women work as cashiers in places such as the Panda supermarket in Onaizah Mall, although the supermarket remains for families only as Onaizah life remains segregated.76 Indeed, one young man argues that if jobs are not made available to women then the Kingdom will have ‘half its society paralysed’, and for this reason many young men have reassessed their views of gender segregation in the workplace.77 According to a group of medical students from KFU in al-​ Ahsa, female employees outnumbered male employees in the local state hospital  for the first time in 2017. These medical students estimate that around 40 to 45 per cent of Saudi state hospital employees are Saudi women. They point out that ten years ago this would have been impossible, as most Saudi men would not have allowed their female family

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members to even study medicine, let alone work in a hospital.78 Yet, not all these medical students would be comfortable with female family members working in a public environment. For example, one young man asserts that he would not accept any of his female relatives becoming doctors because this is ‘more a lifestyle’ than a job: I could not accept my wife being outside the house for eight hours or more. I could not accept my wife/​sister/​daughter doing this even though I trust them. I could not accept this because the issue is mixing with other men even in a hospital; it is not about the work. Could you accept that your wife talks to unrelated men at work?79

But some of his peers disagree strongly, stating that socio-​cultural concerns connected to the issue of women working in public can be overcome and, in their opinion, the Kingdom needs Saudi women doctors.80 There is also divergence within the group about increased levels of female employment and its impact on young men. Indeed, the group members say that in Saudi society, if a man does not have a job then a woman will not accept him as her husband, but the same is not true the other way around. This is seen as a serious problem, as some believe that increased levels of female employment translate as fewer jobs for men. Additionally, young men maintain that in Islam it is the man who should pay for everything (iltizam) and therefore ‘it is more important for a man to have a job’.81 Even if the wife is employed, and maybe earns more than the husband, she is not responsible for the household budget –​it is all down to the man to provide the money82 and, as Yamani points out, supervise all household expenses.83 One group member states boldly that ten years ago, girls ‘did not think about studying or working’ because the man always paid.84 Thus, he believes if a job is available it should be given to the man, as after marriage he will take care of the woman.85 However, once again there is disagreement, with others pointing out that there are women whose male relatives are deceased. There are also poor Saudi communities where even if the man is supposed to pay, he cannot. Furthermore, another young man maintains that there are thousands of women who provide for their families because the man is an alcoholic, a drug-​addict or in prison. Additionally, he notes that many of the jobs women are taking were until recently not acceptable to Saudi men. His final argument is that many Islamic scholars he converses with say that it is not ‘completely forbidden for women to work in mixed environments’.86 Nonetheless, according to an Eastern Province focus group gender segregation constitutes a problem because of its ramifications for future national development. These young men say that there are too few Saudi women holding senior positions in either the public

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or private sectors. Despite some progress, it remains difficult for women to break into professions other than education, healthcare or the retail sector.87 Young men who have already entered mixed working environments also notice that it is much easier for Saudi women to talk to foreign men than to Saudis. This is something I observed when teaching Saudi female KASP students in Britain. I noticed they had no problems talking to foreign male students; however, if a Saudi male student joined the class, the class dynamics would change immediately. It was a case of ‘Does he/​she know my family? Who could he/​she talk to in Saudi Arabia about me and my behaviour?’ A recently married young man in Jeddah notes that this ‘Who might they know?’ problem even occurs when Saudis are holidaying abroad: When I was on honeymoon with my wife in Turkey we were very relaxed until we met other Saudis. Because if other Saudis see you abroad then they go home and tell everyone:  ‘I saw him with his mother/​wife and she was not wearing a hijab’. Basically they will make a big fuss out of it and cause a headache for you. That is why we say if you want to travel abroad, go somewhere where there are no Saudis!88

Another young man in Eastern Province concurs, noting that if a woman from his hometown of Qatif is seen talking freely to a Saudi man in the USA, her reputation at home could be damaged.89 This individual cites one of his own experiences when he was a scholarship student: I was an Aramco-​sponsored student in Tulsa and I was directed for information to a student counsellor who was a Saudi lady. I could tell from her accent that she was from my hometown. In fact, I found out that she was my neighbour. I said to her: ‘I know your father, your brother etc. but I do not know you’. Why do I have to come all the way to the USA to get to know a female neighbour? I also noticed that Saudi women had no problem talking to foreign men overseas: the problem was talking to Saudi men, which if you think about it is very weird.90

2.3

Behavioural Issues

The vast majority of the young men I  surveyed accept that in Saudi Arabia it is far more advantageous to be male than female, although many also point to a variety of problems that impact negatively on all aspects of their lives. Certainly, both young men and young women argue about the degree to which they are constrained by societal norms, with young women saying ‘Guys have cars so can go to the beach’, but the young men replying ‘Young women have no problem getting into malls and restaurants’.91 Yet, underlying gender relations are behavioural issues that colour perceptions of the opposite sex. For example, a young man from Jeddah maintains that there are two types of Saudi men: the first

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creates an invisible barrier between himself and women whilst the second ‘sort of plays with women’.92 Indeed, according to a Safwa focus group, for ‘most men’ a relationship with a woman is predominantly about sex; therefore, the chemistry between the two genders is damaged.93 Another young man agrees, saying that many women are ‘broken inside because they spend all day looking after the house and children then the man comes home and just wants sex’. In consequence, there is no meaningful relationship between the genders, as the root of the problem lies in the way men look at women (and vice versa).94 Another focus group identifies the main problem as young Saudi men not knowing, or understanding, the ‘social red lines’ when it comes to dealing with women because the boundaries are often unclear and constantly shifting.95 According to this group the situation is complicated by each Saudi woman having her own red lines, for example whether to shake hands (or not).96 Indeed, in the workplace ‘one woman will be insulted if you do not shake her hand when you meet for the first time, and another will be insulted if you do –​we do not know so we cannot win’, complains one young man.97 Nevertheless, a frequent (and vociferous) complaint from many young men is that Saudi women are asking for their rights, but in reality are not willing to forgo their privileges and still expect special treatment.98 For instance, one young man recalls that whilst he was waiting to check in at Dammam airport a lady ‘queue-​ jumped’ in front of him, and when he questioned her behaviour she replied angrily:  ‘Because I  am a lady I can queue-​jump’.99 Another individual remarks that his young wife became upset with him because he bought a new car. Apparently, his wife thought he would have been better off spending the money on an expensive trip to Europe, but he disagreed because holidays are ‘a waste of money’, whereas he needs the car to get to work in order to pay the bills.100 Nowadays, according to another group, some Saudi women expect special treatment even in large multinational companies. One young oil company employee says a non-​senior woman was given her own office even though senior male employees were forced to share one.101 Yet, not all young men agree with the view that Saudi women are unwilling to forgo their privileges –​in particular, as another young man maintains, today’s twenty-​something young women, many of whom ‘are trying very hard to prove themselves on their own terms’.102 Clearly, there is a great deal of confusion amongst many young men about how to behave with women. Frequently, there are also inflated expectations of a relationship with the opposite sex. In order to provide some balance to these issues and to identify commonalities as well as differences, I conducted two focus groups with young women in Riyadh,

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where we discussed the exact same issues as in the male focus groups.103 One of the groups, comprising female PNU graduates, complains that a great many young men still believe that they own the woman (either female relatives or their wives) as well as ‘the social space’ they inhabit.104 This idea of ownership is underscored by a male focus group in Jeddah, whose members joke that in Saudi Arabia ‘a girl’s happiness depends on the mood of her brother’.105 One of these young women says that when she criticizes her brothers they complain to her father, who understands this as a criticism of himself (although she notes that at least she could talk to her father).106 She observed that young boys spend a great deal of their time with older male relatives in the majlis, ‘picking up bad habits’. In consequence, mothers and female relatives find it problematic to criticize or correct the boys’ bad behaviour because this would be indirectly criticizing their husbands, fathers, brothers and other male family members –​and so the vicious circle perpetuates.107 Moreover, a PNU graduate does not believe that young men show that much support for their female counterparts.108 Amongst her five older brothers, some encourage her career aspirations –​or at least they do not make things difficult –​but they do not necessarily go out of their way to show support.109 She and her friends maintain that they want to express themselves as valued individuals, not simply as ‘women from their tribes’ –​which, in fact, mirrors the comments of many young men who are also seeking more defined individual identities.110 That said, two young female clinical psychologists believe that creating a more defined individual identity is easier for young women because they are able to express themselves emotionally. For this reason, they contend, the ‘gender role affects young Saudi men a great deal more’ due to many young men’s inability to express their feelings and emotions –​more often than not because of socio-​cultural taboos and restrictions.111 2.4

Women Driving

Until the September 2017 decision to permit Saudi women to drive, when discussing gender relations in Saudi Arabia, in particular outside the Kingdom, the issue of the ban on women driving remained highly contentious. For example, I  hold several video-​conferencing seminars each semester where the all-​ male KFUPM students interact with a mixed partner class from a foreign (sometimes Arab) university. In the past, at some point in our discussion, the ‘woman driving’ question would be raised only to be met by an audible groan from the KFUPM students, who frequently asked after the session why this was the only female-​related issue that non-​Saudis wanted to discuss. Certainly, whilst

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increased female participation in the workplace is accepted to a greater degree by the majority of young men in my focus groups, allowing women to drive remains controversial in some quarters. In fact, it was not unusual to hear strong opinions against allowing women to drive in focus groups across the Kingdom during 2016–​18. Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to the US, Prince Khaled bin Salman, younger brother of the driving force behind the decision to allow women to drive, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, described the decision to permit women to drive as a huge step that was not just about social change, but also part of economic reform. The government believed this was the right time for this decision because ‘in Saudi Arabia, we have a young, dynamic open society’.112 Indeed, the decision to lift the ban was a public relations success for Crown Prince Mohammed, as it had long been the prism through which much of the world’s media viewed Saudi Arabia. On 24 June 2018, when the law allowing women to drive came into effect, the international media was present to witness the first Saudi women take to the streets legally in their cars. What was not conveyed in international media reports was that these women came from elite circles and, by and large, were driving expensive vehicles that as many young men pointed out –​are out of the price range of ordinary Saudis.113 In fact, in the months immediately following the lifting of the ban what was noticeable in Saudi Arabia was the marked absence of women drivers on the Kingdom’s city streets,114 although in 2019 this changed rapidly as more women obtained their licences. (Paradoxically, the absence of women drivers contrasted with domestic media stories and public discourse preceding the lifting of the ban that fixated on Saudi Arabia’s already crowded urban thoroughfares being swamped by extra cars and the ensuing chaos this would cause.) The royal decree authorizing women to drive was issued late at night on 26 September 2017, resulting in what one young man described as ‘on-​fire WhatsApp groups’ all night long as Saudis debated the merits of the decision. According to this undergraduate student, whilst he personally was in favour of the decree, many of his relatives in Qassim were ‘very angry about it’.115 This anger is mirrored by two male friends from Hofuf who consider that allowing women to drive was just another ‘women-​ centric approach’ amongst others that they have witnessed since 2014.116 In their opinion, this is because the government wants to emulate the ‘Western revolutions for women’s rights’, but they argue that Saudi values are different from foreign ones. Moreover, they assert that the ban on women driving was not a problem ‘until other countries started talking about it’ and then suddenly it became a domestic Saudi issue. They believe this had a detrimental effect on society because the

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subject was raised in an ‘inappropriate way’ and was not compatible with socio-​cultural norms.117 Young men who are in favour of allowing Saudi women to drive maintain that this is not prohibited by Islam, but rather that societal opposition is based on tribal customs. These young men acknowledge that whilst there is an ‘area for debate’ regarding its legitimacy in Shari’ah, nothing is written that specifically prohibits women driving (although some stress it is permitted only after the woman’s guardian gives his consent).118 Rather, they point out that there is an argument against women driving based on the related notion of ‘closing the door to commit sin’, which some religious conservatives have argued may accompany women driving. Yet, in truth, if the law is applied strictly to everyone it will act as a deterrent and prevent anti-​social behaviour that contravenes Saudi socio-​cultural norms –​as already happens in other Gulf States.119 Indeed, one young man asserts that the fears of certain shaikhs and members of the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (the religious police or hai’a) are unfounded and ‘nothing but delusions’. In fact, he argues that ‘they are the cause for most of these problems’, because religious conservatives state that only a ‘loose woman’ would leave her home for ‘unnecessary reasons’ and as a result some of these individuals have actively encouraged the harassment of women in public to deter them from leaving their homes. Still, he believes the religious conservatives must now submit to the government’s decision as it represents the views of the majority; in fact the silence of religious conservatives in the face of this decision is clear evidence of that.120 Undoubtedly, widespread support amongst many young men for lifting the ban on women driving also has economic reasons. The Saudi economy and domestic households will benefit from the reduction in the number of private drivers hired by families who often also have to rent accommodation for the driver. Indeed, Saudi working women have long suffered from the absence of public transportation, thereby necessitating hiring a driver and losing a substantial portion of their salaries. Finally, being able to drive will facilitate greater numbers of women entering the workforce in both the public and private sectors and, in consequence, will contribute to the national economy.121 Nonetheless, there are young Saudi men who consider allowing a woman to drive as disadvantageous because ‘the cons outweigh the pros’. Whilst some do not disagree in principle, they do not support the idea in Saudi Arabia.122 For example, one young man does not think it suitable for an 18-​year-​old girl to be out alone and be responsible for a vehicle. In his view, if the girl had an accident or the car malfunctioned she might not know how to deal with the situation, thereby putting herself in

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danger. When I asked a group of 18-​year-​old male high-​school students in Jeddah whether they agreed with women driving, they emphatically disagreed. One even argues that nowadays, Saudi women do not need to drive as they have the Uber and Careem taxi services and in the future ‘we will have self-​driving cars’.123 Another of the schoolboys asks what would happen if a woman was driving and the car broke down between cities. He contends that a woman would not be able to repair the car, and for this reason he does not believe a woman should drive (although he was unable to respond when I  asked him if in the same situation he would be able to fix the car). He and his friends also believe that a woman should not travel alone; she needs to travel with two or three other women because serious problems could occur if she is unaccompanied.124 Indeed, for many of these young men, a woman driving is not haram in itself; rather, the problem is the societal complications that come from allowing it. As another young man argues forcefully, just because something happens outside (in the West), that does not mean that it is necessarily suitable for the Kingdom –​‘Saudis have their own ethics’.125 Another young man from Jeddah stresses that serving his mother by acting as her driver (and protector) is an important religious duty, and one which he does not wish to forgo.126 Whilst many young men were in agreement with the government’s decree allowing women to drive, there were serious reservations about, firstly, its implementation and the preparedness of the infrastructure; and secondly, strict laws and clear mechanisms to prevent harassment. In fact, in June 2018 there was a view that ‘now is not the right time to allow women to drive’ due to the poor state of the roads and overall traffic management infrastructure, which, in the opinion of many, was not ready to support potentially large numbers of new drivers. Moreover, traffic congestion (and sometimes gridlock) in the urban centres, in particular Riyadh, is a major problem. For some, a better solution to the women driving issue would be to provide public transport such as the new Riyadh metro. Certainly, many young men support a woman’s right to drive, but they also recognize that driving is extremely hazardous due to reckless high-​speed driving, especially on the highways and main thoroughfares. Whilst some argue that new strict rules should be introduced, others point out that in reality, the existing traffic laws are usually disregarded and a great deal of the time the traffic police does not enforce those laws.127 For example, it is not unusual to see very young boys driving cars and ‘nobody holds them accountable’; hence, one young man believes it may not be so far-​fetched to think that young girls will also be seen driving cars in the near future. Furthermore, another individual claims

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that there are large numbers of illegal workers without iqamas (resident permits) driving dangerously on the roads in often sub-​standard vehicles who could also pose a threat to women drivers.128 Yet, it has come as a surprise to certain young men that ‘some women are really good drivers’, and in fact much better than a great many of the young men on the Kingdom’s roads.129 In June 2018, other young men were concerned that society was not ready for women driving because harassment of women, already a problem in public places such as shopping malls, could only get worse. In order to prevent harassment, CCTV cameras need to be installed in all streets and malls, and strict rules and punishments must be introduced to prevent this type of behaviour. Furthermore, young men need to be educated about the anti-​social and dangerous nature of harassing women.130 Finally, one individual believes that preventing and punishing harassment should be the responsibility of the Commission of Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice and that powers taken from the religious police should be returned:131 In 2016, Saudi authorities clipped the hai’a’s wings quite short –​it can nag but no longer police. Saudis report that the all-​visible institution has become less visible. Even when it is seen, it seems far less relevant to the public life it had regulated to various degrees for decades.132

Indeed, there was widespread consensus amongst young men that the government needed to introduce the necessary rules and regulations (that agree with Islamic teachings) before allowing women onto the roads.133 These rules and regulations would cover issuing licences, providing break-​down services and establishing a dedicated body to deal with issues related to women driving. Indeed, without standardized rules and regulations there could be problems. One young man wondered what might happen if there was a car accident between a Saudi man and woman because, he argues, ‘a man’s testimony is worth two women’s, not because women are missing something, but because women lack a man’s courage and his steadiness when dealing with tough situations’.134 Indeed, if the traffic police official supervising the accident was male, whose testimony would he believe?135 Significantly, amongst young Saudi men, opposition to women driving in a theoretical sense was comparatively low. Still, underlying these young men’s views was a realization that ‘women driving’ was no longer an abstract concept, but something that directly involved their female family members and relatives. In class on the morning of the ban being lifted, it was telling to see how the issue had suddenly become personal, with concern or opposition to women driving shifting from ideological to being

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based around issues such as safety and harassment. At a personal level there was a great deal of disquiet over concerns about poor infrastructure coupled with Saudi Arabia’s appalling road accident statistics,136 as well as apprehension about sexual harassment from male drivers. In response to the concerns over sexual harassment, in June 2018 a new law to combat sexual harassment in the Kingdom, which is considered a crime according to Islamic law, was approved by a Council of Ministers.137 Yet, as so often happens in the Kingdom, once the initial furor over women drivers abated, public debate moved on to other contentious topics. 3 Marriage 3.1

Traditional Socio-​Cultural Norms

In Saudi Arabia the most important institution is the family (whether nuclear or extended) and family always comes first.138 Hence, getting married and starting one’s own family is a socio-​cultural requirement because, as one young man argues, in Saudi culture ‘marriage completes the other half of your religion –​this is important for us’.139 In fact, as noted in Chapter 2, before marriage young men are in a state of ‘waithood’140 and are frequently not considered to be an adult by society –​ they are simply shabab, who when left alone to their own devices can cause social problems.141 Consequently, there is enormous family pressure to get these young men ‘married off’ and, by extension, out of trouble’s way; a young man from Najran agrees, saying that ‘marriage stops young men from doing bad things’.142 Furthermore, ‘society is paranoid’ as every parent wants his or her children to get married quickly, because if they remain unmarried there is obviously some shameful secret to hide.143 Indeed, marriage in Saudi Arabia is a must; a young man cannot remain single because marriage ‘unlocks’ important aspects of life. Thus, it is not surprising that problems and issues related to marriage preoccupy a great many young Saudi men, including those who marry at a relatively young age.144 Young men across the Kingdom stress that choosing a wife constitutes a ‘big issue’ for their twenty-​something generation, so it is a subject they discuss constantly. Although the average age for getting married is 25, there are regional differences: for example, in Riyadh it can be as late as 30, Jeddah 28–​29, al-​Qurayyat 25, al-​Baha 25145 and in Qatif around 23, during the young man’s last year of university if he is an undergraduate or within a year of graduating.146 Of course, it depends on the individual when he gets married, says a mixed regional focus group in the Eastern Province, with some men waiting until 30 years of age so that ‘they can

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have fun’.147 Yet, during focus group discussions with young men from across Saudi Arabia, despite yearnings for a romantic love marriage, there was widespread acceptance of traditional marriage practices. The vast majority of these young men have faith that their female relatives will be able to find them an acceptable bride, with –​depending on family background –​many expecting to marry a cousin or female relative from the extended tribe.148 As El Hazmi et al. note, anthropologists have long agreed that the main achievement of consanguineous marriages is the inheritance of family structure and property. Marriage between relatives is considered beneficial as it maintains the family fortunes within the same family structure.149 Still, others say that if a young man finds a bride himself then that may be acceptable, but normally the prospective groom’s family will help him with his choice.150 However, Al Lily warns that if the young man is on bad terms with his female relatives they might deliberately find him an unsuitable bride or not assist him at all.151 A young man in Riyadh who in 2017 was thinking about getting married explains the expected procedure leading up to his wedding: When I  decide to get married I  will go to my mother, aunt or sister and ask her to find me a suitable girl. But I will probably ask my sister as she can relate to me. Anyway, you list down what you love about a girl in terms of physique, personality, education, family and tribe. Of course, I  am not allowed to get married to a girl from a tribe that is not the same level as mine. After this, my sister will start searching and every time she finds a suitable candidate she will let me know (or at least one that is close to my requirements). I will then tell my sister to proceed, and she will contact the family, but the family can reject me, for example, by saying the girl is not ready and wants to continue with her studies. If the family agrees, then there will be a one or two weeks’ preparation and then I will go to see her for the first time. I will sit with her father or brother (maybe a brother the first time) and then the daughter will come and sit with us and chat for five to ten minutes. But it will only be yes/​no answers because she will probably be shy. Following this meeting, both the man and woman can accept the proposal or not. After that there is the mandatory government medical check-​up152 and then the families proceed to negotiating the dowry and other necessary arrangements.153

Other young men complain that getting married has become very problematic precisely because there are so many steps the groom-​to-​be must follow. Thus, after following all these different procedures, by the time the man gets around to asking the father for his daughter’s hand in marriage, the prospective groom might feel too embarrassed or ashamed to say that he has changed his mind –​but he gets married anyway, knowing that the marriage is likely to fail.154 For other young men, choosing their bride is straightforward as they marry a ‘childhood sweetheart’ who is very often a close relative.155

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When I worked in the SANG many of the young cadets, most of who came from Qassim province, already knew the cousin they were going to marry as they had played together as small children. Yet even though other individuals understand that they are expected to marry within the tribe, they do not want to be forced to marry a close relative. That said, this situation is changing:  20  years ago, a young man would definitely marry a cousin, but nowadays it is possible to marry a girl ‘known to the family’.156 Nonetheless, if a man and woman get engaged and come from different societal constituencies or social classes then, according to a Riyadh focus group, problems can arise as people from wealthier urban families tend to be more open-​minded, which can lead to misunderstandings and conflict.157 A focus group from Najran notes that traditional marriages are not based on emotional needs, but rather the marriage is a traditional tribal ritual. According to this group, arranged marriages are a way of maintaining the tribe; therefore, families expect young men to marry into the same extended family.158 The group points out that these traditional tribal marriage norms are different from the understanding of marriage in Islam. Indeed, Islam does not say that a person should marry someone from the same tribe; this is tradition and, therefore, marriages are about socio-​cultural and tribal norms rather than religious ones.159 This issue of tribal identity and marriage angers some individuals. For example, a young man in Riyadh complains that if he wanted to marry his best friend’s sister he could not, because ‘we are from different tribes even though he is my best friend’.160 There would be opposition from both families even though, he concedes, that opposition might not be as strong as in the past.161 His best friend agrees, saying that even though some families, particularly urbanized and cosmopolitan ones, might want to appear to be ‘socially liberal’, in practice these families prefer to adhere to socio-​cultural norms. Accordingly, if he met a girl he wanted to marry but the families forbade the marriage based on family or tribal considerations then this would make him extremely angry.162 Actually, these two young men say that if a prospective bride’s family did not like them as people then ‘that would be cool’, but if the family objected because of their family names then that would be completely unfair. Sadly, in their opinion, ‘this situation is not going to change for the next 500 years’.163 A large number of families force their sons or daughters to marry a ‘specific type of person’ without any prior negotiation or consideration of personal opinion; this can lead to resentment, thereby storing up problems for the future.164 In fact, many young men complain of being compelled to get married when they are not ready, either financially or emotionally, in order to satisfy socio-​cultural norms. Not surprisingly,

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some young men are rebelling against this. A  young entrepreneur in Jeddah recalls: My grandmother called me and said ‘I have not seen you for a long time so you must come round’. I told her that I saw her last week, but she replied that that was a long time. So, of course I went to see her that evening and when I got there I was ambushed by all my female relatives who were lying in wait for me. They told me they had found a ‘suitable’ girl for me (a school teacher) and I should get married soon. But I was very angry and told them that I was not ready. I have too many work commitments and want to save money and prove myself first. They were not at all happy, because they do not understand my situation, or even try to understand it, but I stood my ground and refused.165

Another young man maintains that ‘families forcing their sons to marry a particular type of girl’ is not strictly about socio-​cultural practices; rather it is based on racism and discrimination. In his opinion, traditional marriage practices will not change, as there has been little social progress in the way Saudis marry. Discrimination also features in this story from a young man in Jeddah: My cousin was going to get married, but when the grandfather found out that his grandson was going to marry a girl with an Egyptian mother he told my cousin that he would cut all ties with him if he married ‘the daughter of an Egyptian’ even though he knew that the father of this girl was an important decision-​maker in Aramco. For my cousin and his father there was no issue with the girl’s family, but the problem was the grandfather’s traditional attitude and so the marriage did not happen.166

According to a young man from Najran, this type of tribal or family discrimination could be reduced if women get more involved in society. If this were to occur then marriage practices may alter, but he doubts this will happen at any time in the near future, saying: ‘If and when a woman can do anything a man can do then maybe the idea of marriage will be different’.167 Certainly, arranged marriages remain the norm, but there are other ‘sneaky ways’ of meeting a prospective wife, such as through work, tertiary education, overseas travel and of course online. However, there are mixed feelings about deviating from traditional marriage practices, as alternative ways of meeting a prospective bride are dependent on whether this is acceptable within the community’s socio-​cultural customs.168 In fact, the importance for young men of adhering to accepted norms was highlighted during a screening of Faisal Alharbi’s short film National Dialogue at the Short Film Competition at Riyadh’s King Fahd Cultural Centre on 20 October 2017. The film addresses the social dilemma of young Saudis struggling to find the right match: It dramatizes an encounter in the streets between an unrelated man and a woman, both checking each other out without talking. They appear to like each other, but

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in the film’s denouement the man rejects the woman, judging her to be immoral after she lifts her veil to give him a glimpse. Alharbi said the film intended to promote dialogue between the genders –​and the screening did just that. As the lights came on, the raucous crowd of men erupted into cheers. They were vigorously booed by the female audience.169

The contrasting cheers and boos of the different genders underscores the gender divide regarding perceived ‘immorality’ and the impact this has on choosing a ‘suitable bride’. Indeed, I  have heard young men complain about the ‘rarity of good women with convictions and manners’,170 although of course I have also heard the same about men from young women. Due to burgeoning social media usage, relationships also start online. However, many young men point out that these do not usually end up in marriage because when a young man starts an online relationship he is not respecting societal norms. More exactly, when he is online with a girl they are simply ‘hang-​outing for a short time’;171 hence, as Murphy notes, there is a clear distinction between virtual relationships and real life.172 In fact, a young man might be in conversation with multiple young women online, but according to many individuals when he wants to get married he will still ask one of his female relatives to find him a ‘respectable’ wife. This is because although he might get to know a girl on social media, he will ask himself ‘How can I  trust her?’ In fact, many young men stress that when it comes to prospective brides there is no guarantee of trust online and, therefore, marrying someone met online is to be avoided, although clearly this type of behaviour is hypocritical.173 Paradoxically, social media is also blamed for causing reluctance to get married amongst some young men. This is due to some young men absorbing ‘bad habit and opinions’ from social media and then projecting these onto wider society. This leads these young men to believe that they can never find a ‘perfect match’ and, therefore, they prefer to remain at home with their families.174 3.2

Getting to Know Her

It became apparent during focus group discussions that whilst most young men would consent to an arranged marriage, they felt very strongly that they should be allowed to get to know their future bride before the wedding. A young man from Qassim summarizes this succinctly: In my opinion, meeting in ways other than the traditional way is fine, but I am not against getting married in the traditional way. For me, the traditional way is acceptable, but you need to know more about each other before you get married.175

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Yet, getting to know the bride before the wedding is not always an option. A young man from Safwa says that one of his friends did not even see his bride until his wedding day.176 In Qassim, according to another focus group, the man is not allowed to talk to the woman before the engagement.177 However, another individual warns that not being allowed to get to know the young woman ‘can be a disaster’. He cites the example of a friend who became engaged and ‘it went all wrong because he was not allowed to get to know his bride. In the end, she was the first and last girl he ever talked to!’178 A young man from Najran complains that he is not allowed to meet the girl he is expected to marry, which he strongly opposes as he wants to see the woman with whom he is supposed to spend the rest of his life.179 Another young man from Wadi Aldawasir says: Young guys joke that getting married is a bit like having a scratch card.180 Until you scratch it you have no idea what you are going to get. I had to get married two weeks after my junior final exams because my father wanted to have small grandchildren running around him. I had no information about my future wife and I was really depressed.181

Indeed, this point about ‘getting to know her’ was raised time and time again in focus group discussions, which appears to indicate that the spectre of Saudi Arabia’s rising divorce rate weighs heavily with many young men. Yet, for others, things have changed  –​or at least semi-​ changed. Nowadays, if a young man is lucky, he can spend more time with his future wife before the wedding. He can sometimes sit with a young woman for four hours a day, maybe three days a week, and ‘even when the mother comes in and tells the man to leave, he can stay’.182 However, getting to know the prospective bride is more likely to happen in Riyadh or in the more cosmopolitan East and West of the Kingdom where people are perceived to be ‘more open-​minded’, whereas it is more problematic in regional areas such as Asir, Hail or Qassim. Still, at the end of the day, as many young men emphasize, the issue of whether the bride’s family allows a young man to get to know her first probably depends on individual families rather than regions.183 However, not everyone agrees that a groom and bride should meet before the wedding; from the viewpoint of one young man from Najran, ‘marriage should not be about loving the woman for her physical attributes, it should be about more than that’.184 A Makkah focus group says that traditionally there is a ‘first look’ moment between the bride and groom before the marriage contract is signed  –​in other words, a young man can see his bride once. This is called a shawfa, when the bride and groom meet and talk briefly. This depends on the individual family, but nowadays more families allow

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the prospective groom to meet (or at least call) the bride several times before the wedding, thus letting the young man get to know his bride to a degree.185 Nonetheless, a young man in Riyadh observes that sometimes the brother or cousin of the bride enters the room when a groom first meets his prospective bride and ‘threatens him’ in order to ensure the young man behaves.186 In addition to shawfa there is also the milkah period between the engagement and signing of the marriage contract. This is the ‘get to know each other time’, which can last from one month to a year. According to a Riyadh focus group, in Najd the milkah lasts between a month and four months, in the south a year and in Jeddah sometimes longer than a year. During this period if the man decides he does not want to marry the women he can call off the wedding.187 (As previously mentioned, during the engagement period, not all families allow the man to talk to his wife-​ to-​be, so in these cases it is easier to call off the wedding.)188 Another young man in Riyadh explains that after milkah the dowry is paid and on paper the bride and groom are ‘officially’ married, but they are not allowed to have sex, as social tradition prohibits the sexual act until after the wedding night189  –​which, this young man stresses, has nothing to do with religion. He also notes that milkah only used to last a couple of days, but nowadays the longer period allows the couple to decide if they are compatible. In his view, this is an example of social transformation, and he believes that the majority of young Saudis accept this change.190 3.3

The Cost of Getting Married

For many young men socio-​ economic realities of everyday life frequently clash with socio-​cultural norms, causing confusion, frustration and sometimes anger.191 For these individuals the difficulties in getting married have been exacerbated by straitened economic conditions that have resulted in a lack of job opportunities, company lay-​offs and salary/​benefits cuts, as well as the rising cost of living. As discussed in Chapter 2, lack of affordable housing constitutes a significant problem for many young men, as without a house or apartment marriage is problematic unless the newly-​weds choose to live with the groom’s family, as sometimes happens.192 In addition, increased real estate prices present an obstacle for many recently married couples looking to either buy or rent a property.193 Furthermore, a young man is expected to gain a college/​university degree and get a reasonably well-​paid job before he gets married, which in straitened times complicates and delays marriage, particularly as the cost of getting married is also rising. Unfortunately, if a prospective groom is not considered a good economic prospect who can

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provide financial stability, his proposal of marriage will be rejected, causing frustration and alienation. Significantly, polygamy, which increased dramatically after the first oil boom of the 1970s,194 was rarely broached in focus group discussions, precisely because young men are focused on the costs of a single marriage.195 Amongst young men across Saudi Arabia there is consensus that in the past getting married was easier and cheaper, whereas nowadays everyone expects a ‘luxury’ marriage, which is highly problematic for many cash-​strapped individuals. In truth, getting married is considered a huge socio-​economic responsibility.196 If a young man is lucky, he will have a wealthy father who will provide with him a sumptuous wedding, housing, a car and everything necessary for married life, but if his father is poor then the young man will have problems.197 Indeed, societal pressure linked to socio-​tribal traditions mean that if a father marries his son or daughter in a small wedding hall and does not ‘splash out’ a great deal of money then society will say he is not man enough198 –​in particular if the groom comes from an influential tribe and the family expects him to marry within the tribe.199 In consequence, the main problem for many young men wanting to get married is the cost that socio-​cultural practices imposes.200 Many of these costs are not traditional or historical at root, but rather are ‘new habits and weird conditions’ that have become socio-​cultural norms –​ones that require a great deal of money, adding to the high price of the wedding ceremony. As a result of these acquired practices, some young men hesitate or even question the need to get married.201 Many young men blame the bride’s family for demanding an excessive wedding dowry ‘equivalent to a brand new Mercedes and a lavish luxury wedding, and all sorts of ‘imaginary requests from the bride and her family’ that the groom can ill afford.202 It is almost as if the family is selling its daughter and the man is buying his wife, which is completely unacceptable, laments one young man.203 Additionally, many weddings are managed by female relatives who do not consult the bride and groom, resulting in the couple ending up with an enormous bill or, worse, seriously in debt. One frustrated young man contends that in the past the situation was better because ‘men used to manage these things’.204 Still, an Onaizah focus group is less concerned about the cost of the wedding and more concerned about the cost of the life after getting married, ‘which will set the man back 50 years before he even thinks about it’.205 Another young man who has ‘lived the experience’ notes that the material costs are prohibitive;206 therefore, in order to be able to afford the wedding, an individual from Makkah says, it is a case of trying to save money or, more likely, take out a bank loan.207

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A contemporary ‘luxury’ marriage, a Riyadh focus group explains, necessitates gold for the bride, a sumptuous wedding hall, a musical band or singer for both the men and women, a photographer and a large wedding party lunch or dinner feast –​for example, 30–​40 goats for the supper buffet –​in addition to a myriad of other expenses.208 According to the group this would be required for a ‘middle-​class’ wedding so that the groom can ‘please his bride’ and both families can ‘show off’. As an example, a focus group member’s cousin in Riyadh spent SAR 270,000209 for a single night that included the wedding ceremony, parties, musicians and dancers. Three years later, this man is still paying off the bank loan he was forced to take out. As his cousin points out, huge wedding expenses can cause the groom stress and anger, which in turn can damage the marriage.210 In provincial al-​Aflaj most young men have arranged marriages at around 25  years of age or when they get a public-​sector job, but the groom pays for everything, so the high cost of getting married is ‘killing guys here’.211 For instance, in al-​Aflaj the dowry is SAR 50–​80,000 and when the cost of the wedding ceremony and dinner is added on (with the four local wedding halls holding from 250 to 800-​plus people) the amount increases to around SAR 150,000. A young man from Makkah hopes to get married at around 26, but says this will be difficult due to the expense. He explains that in the Hijaz it will cost the groom around SAR 50,000 for the dowry, but the wedding itself can cost SAR 200,000 taking into account the bride’s gold, ceremony, party and honeymoon, but not including the price or rent of an apartment.212 In Jeddah, also in the Hijaz, the complete outlay of a wedding is approximately SAR 300,000, but a resident observes that a young man can build a completely new house for SAR 400,000, meaning that the marriages costs are roughly ‘in the same ballpark’. He notes that if a well-​paid individual saved all his salary it would take about 20 months to accumulate this amount of money. Certainly, the wedding can be organized for less if the groom and his family are willing to compromise, but this Jeddah resident says a lot of people would be angry if the groom does not spend ‘what he is expected to spend on the wedding’.213 In the small town of al-​Mithnab in Qassim province, it costs about SAR 100,000 to get married including the dowry, bride’s jewellery and wedding parties.214 However, a focus group from the town says that if the relationship between the two families is good then they will help each other financially. For example, the groom pays the dowry and the bride’s family pays about 50 per cent of everything else. According to this group, this is common practice throughout Qassim, in Hail and across Najd.215

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In Qatif the engagement costs SAR 50–​60,000, which includes SAR 25,000 for the dowry and SAR 17,000 for the gold. The wedding party can cost anything from SAR 100,000 to SAR 150,000.216 In the past, on Tarout Island in Qatif a groom needed to provide about 30 kilos of fresh fish for the bride’s family, which the family would distribute amongst the neighbours. Nowadays traditional gifts are a thing of the past and young men complain that everything is about money.217 Still, even within Qatif there are different socio-​cultural norms. For example, in Safwa the groom pays half of the wedding location costs and the bride pays the rest, but in nearby Awamiya the man pays for everything.218 Unfortunately, the financial problems can continue even after the wedding and honeymoon, in particular the demands placed on the young husband: The families put more on his shoulders than he can take! For example, every week someone in my family hosts a dinner for all our relatives (men and women) and it takes a lot of organizing and is very expensive. Is it really fair to expect the newly-​weds to do this immediately? Because you know they have to –​it is ‘expected’.219

Can a young man get married for less? It is possible, but this depends on the structure of specific communities, as marriage customs and norms can change from tribe to tribe, or region to region.220 For instance, in 2017–​19, ‘home or family weddings’  –​that is, parties organized at home to lower the cost –​started to become popular in certain areas and amongst certain communities.221 Another example:  a young man from Layla says that he knows wealthy families who manage to have small weddings because they do not want to waste money  –​a practice that meets with the approval of him and his friends.222 In the north of the Kingdom, a young man from al-​Qurayyat says that many Saudi men marry Jordanian or Syrian women so the wedding costs are a lot less.223 Another young man remarks that one of his friends married a foreigner so they were able to have a small wedding party. However, marrying a Saudi (from the right background) is still preferable because, as Al Rasheed observes, ‘Saudi men struggle to keep their genealogies fixed and pure’.224 However, these weddings are usually very large, such as those I have attended in Qassim and Riyadh, with a great many guests from both sides of the family. Indeed, many young men stress this is the reason Saudi–​Saudi weddings are so expensive.225 Another more economical model for getting married is exemplified by a ‘mass wedding’ I attended for 30 grooms in the al-​Battaliyah district of al-​Ahsa in Eastern Province. Whilst most of the grooms’ families contributed to the costs, some young men from poorer backgrounds had their

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wedding expenses paid for by the local municipality. However, in order to avoid any shame being attached to these grooms (or their families) the identity of the young men remained unknown. The mass wedding was a lively and happy occasion, with hundreds of male attendees of all ages from the entire district. In addition to food and refreshments, there were live music, calligraphy demonstrations and stalls set up by local voluntary groups including the local Harley-​Davidson club. Following the public celebration, each individual groom returned to his father’s home for the traditional family gathering. Clearly, the costs at this event were considerably less than those of 30 separate wedding ceremonies. 3.4

Incompatibility and Divorce

The Ministry of Justice (MoJ) statistics for divorce show, for 2014, 33,954 divorce cases; in 2015, with roughly 133,000 marriage contracts, there were approximately 40,000 divorces. In 2016, there were some 157,000 marriages and about 46,000 divorces, meaning that almost 30 per cent of couples ended up separating.226 According to a 2016 report by the General Authority of Statistics, one in five marriages ended in divorce at the rate of 127 cases per day, or about five cases every hour.227 One focus group claims that there are two divorces a day in Qatif alone.228 In 2017, social consultant Salman Bin Mohammed Al Amri documented that the number of divorce cases handled by courts across Saudi Arabia reached 53,675, or 149 cases per day. The office of the Grand Mufti approved 6,163 divorces during the same year, an increase of 846 cases compared with 2016.229 Yet, these figures do not include ‘silent divorce’, when couples stay together in name only due to tribal/​societal considerations because being married is considered a societal necessity.230 Al Amri notes that there are hundreds of divorces not recorded by the courts, so the actual figure could be much higher than that officially reported.231 As discussed earlier, many young men believe that one of the main reasons for the high divorce rate is the need for improved inter-​gender communication.Young men and women do not know how to talk to each other and, in consequence, there is no mutual understanding.232 In fact, before marrying, the problem is exacerbated by young women sometimes only knowing the groom’s name, job and whether he has money.233 Yet, even though the majority of young men support the traditional way of getting married, they argue that it is imperative that a space for communication is made available during the engagement so that the relationship can be ended if the couple is incompatible.234 Indeed, divorce does not occur because of arranged marriages; rather, it is a lack of knowledge about the other gender. Men do not know how to deal with women

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and vice versa  –​they are the ‘other’  –​thus, the relationship between men and women is not ‘normalized’. One young man says that even if a man considers himself ‘open-​minded’, when it comes to his wife his nurtured ‘deep mentality’ wins.235 A young woman in Riyadh observes that divorces are increasing not only because the two genders do not understand each other, but also because their expectations are totally different and frequently unrealistic.236 For example, young women are told that once they get married they can do everything, but they discover that the reality of married life is completely the opposite.237 Indeed, expectations of the future marriage partner (on both sides) are often wildly inflated. As long ago as 2000, Yamani observed that a symptom of these changing expectations was the rising divorce rate.238 At the outset of a relationship, usually during the engagement, the man attempts to come across as ultra-​masculine and the woman ultra-​ feminine, with the result that the environment is hyper-​ sexualized. Furthermore, in the early stages of the marriage the young man tries to show his ‘good side’, but he cannot sustain this attempt to be the ideal husband.239 It is a charade that does not represent reality. As one young man observes: Some girls have the impression that the man proposing is the knight of their dreams who will give her everything that she asks for. And some men think that the girls they are getting married to are going to bring back the days of their spoiled childhoods. But soon they discover that reality does not match their imaginary ideals and divorce happens.240

Indeed, the pretence can become exhausting. When reality kicks in and the ‘normal’ person is revealed  –​and after working an eight-​hour day –​the novelty of being married can wear off, to be followed by disappointment and sometimes anger. A young man from Safwa in Eastern Province speaks about his experiences: During the engagement the problem is the girl wants flowers, romance, foreign trips, expensive meals out and parties. But I need to save money for my marriage. She dreams her fiancé (and future husband) will take her to Bahrain, to expensive restaurants, but he wants to either go to the Corniche (which is free) or just stay in her apartment. So she lives in a dream world and he lives in the real world and this is a big problem. Therefore, you need to explain real life to her. Actually, some of my friends divorced because of this situation.241

Moreover, as the novelty of being a husband wanes, some young men realize that they would rather go to the istiraha242 to spend time with their friends than stay at home with their new wives –​in other words, a lot of young men quickly return to their bachelor lifestyles even though they are married, causing huge marital strain.243

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Sadly, young men are all too aware of the rising divorce rate because they see many of their friends divorced after short, unhappy marriages. Therefore, during the preparations for getting married there is a psychological problem as some young men ‘are already thinking about the marriage failing even before it has happened’; this in turn increases the number of bachelors.244 For instance, one young man’s 33-​year-​old friend is still unmarried because the man is extremely worried about getting married and then having to divorce quickly, resulting in this individual having ‘no confidence to talk to a woman, no clue what to do’.245 Divorce is making some young men shirk the responsibility of marriage because they think that marriage only brings unhappiness and ‘headaches’.246 In addition, the pressure on young Saudis to get married quickly is also blamed for divorce. A  young woman recalls how another young newly divorced family member was forced into a marriage, so not surprisingly she predicted her relative’s marriage would fail even before the wedding had taken place.247 In fact, multiple focus groups across the Kingdom emphasize that most divorces happen in the first year of marriage, after the couple is exposed to ‘real life’.248 Abraham recalls how he should have ended his marriage after only two months, as he had seen ‘even then’ that something was wrong with the relationship.249 This concern is echoed by Princess Sarah bint Musaed, chairperson of the Board of Directors of Mawadah Charitable Organization, who revealed that 60 per cent of divorce cases occur in the first year of marriage.250 Another problem is that many newly-​weds live beyond their means, thereby placing great strain on the relationship (often blamed on young people not being responsible enough).251 As a result some young men cannot cope with the financial cost of being newly married, often in the form of bank loans, triggering stress and disillusionment.252 In fact, materialism is considered a problem by many because marriage has become about money, fine things and extensive foreign travel; everyone (men and women) wants to emulate extravagant social media lifestyles.253 According to one focus group, divorce would not be such a problem if materialism were eliminated.254 A  young man from Najran cites the experience of a friend who was divorced by his wife, who came from a rich family, because she complained that her life with him was not the same as she was used to. Even though the couple had three children she divorced him for material reasons because she wanted the same level of wealth as she had had prior to her marriage.255 Thus, this young man says, if a prospective husband cannot provide material comforts, many women will reject him.256 Social media, popular television shows and films are also blamed for divorce, as representations of marriage on these media do not represent

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the real world. Instead, they present either perfection between married couples, or the complete opposite. One young man believes society is not aware of this problem, but the ramifications of trying to copy ‘imaginary situations’ increases the numbers of divorces. Social media is also hindering relationships, because it is very easy to be on the phone instead of talking. One family counsellor says that in contemporary Saudi Arabia, in the marriage bed a spouse’s phone is often his/​her partner, not the husband or wife.257 Social media also spreads ‘crime and adultery’,258 with 20 per cent of divorces taking place as a result of extra-​marital affairs unveiled through the exchange of messages and photos on social media.259 In addition, frequently, divorce happens because families interfere in the marriage.260 Rola Ashour, a licensed mental health practitioner and a family counsellor, believes that parents are one of the main causes of divorce between couples, saying:  ‘I have so many cases where the husband’s mother pulls the strings in the marriage’, and adding that husbands rarely stand up to their mothers.261 For example, one young man recounts how his cousin and his cousin’s new wife went to live in his parent’s home, but the wife started fighting with the mother-​in-​law, who was denigrating the wife to her son. In fact, many focus group participants cite ‘mother-​in-​law problems’ as a reason for divorce.262 Moreover, when problems arise between the husband and wife, the families take sides and once either family becomes involved the problem gets worse. Many young men say that this is a common occurrence, but if the problem remained between the couple then it could probably be resolved.263 It appears that once problems start in a marriage there is relatively little in the way of available counselling. By all accounts, even in Riyadh there are very few marriage counselling services, and according to a PNU psychologist even when marriage counselling is available, many people would not consider it as an option.264 As an example, she works as a volunteer for a group that offers a pre-​marriage counselling service, but unfortunately very few people ask for assistance. Undoubtedly, counselling is beneficial, and needed, but in her opinion the real question is whether ‘Saudis, who are extremely private people’, would accept it.265 Furthermore, cost and quality are also issues, as most decent counselling services are only available in the private sector at around SAR 500 a session.266 However, in other areas of the Kingdom marriage guidance and counselling is available for free. In Safwa there is a service called the Happy House, led by a religious cleric, who offers marriage counselling services.267 There are also popular online services such as the one provided by Dammam-​based Abdulhadi Al Bareeh (from al-​Ahsa), who discusses marriage issues on Snapchat.268

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Certainly, some young men believe that the divorce rate has forced families to be a little more flexible when it comes to arranged marriages. For men, divorce causes mental stress and financial difficulties such as the need to pay child support. Additionally, many divorced men are afraid of marrying another woman due to the failure of the first marriage.269 Still, young men acknowledge that whilst divorce is bad for men, it is more problematic for a woman. Socially it is more difficult for a woman to get remarried –​because when divorce occurs, it is usually the woman’s reputation that is damaged.270 For instance, a female divorcee loses the economic support and financial security provided by her husband, lowering her standard of living and making her a burden on the family. For this reason, both wider society and individual families should become more ‘open-​minded’ when considering the marriages of their children in relation to the Kingdom’s contemporary socio-​economic environment.271 Notes 1 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 2 Reeser, T.W., Masculinities in Theory:  An Introduction, Wiley-​Blackwell, Chichester, 2010, p.17. 3 Mahadeen, E., ‘Arabizing Masculinity’, in Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies, Vol. 12, Issue 3, November 2016, p. 450. 4 Ibid. 5 De Sondy, A., The Crisis of Islamic Masculinities, Bloomsbury, London, 2013, p. 144. 6 Zoepf, K., ‘A Saudi Woman Is Threatened after Tweeting about Beards’, The New Yorker, 19 February 2014, available at: www.newyorker.com/​news/​daily-​ comment/​a-​saudi-​woman-​is-​threatened-​after-​tweeting-​about-​beards. 7 As previously discussed in Chapter 1. 8 Anon, ‘Common Pitfalls for Men’, Saudi Gazette, 21 April 2016, available at: http://​saudigazette.com.sa/​article/​153390/​Common-​pitfalls-​for-​men. 9 Amalgamated anonymous responses to author’s online survey: ‫ماهي مظاهر‬ ‫وعالمات الرجولة ؟‬ 10 Anonymous response to author’s online survey: ‫ماهي مظاهر وعالمات الرجولة ؟‬ 11 ‘The association between beards and Islam goes right back to Muhammad himself, who is said to have sported a beard, although the Qur’an says nothing about facial hair specifically’. De Sondy, A., ‘The Relationship between Muslim Men and Their Beards Is a Tangled One’, The Guardian, 28 January 2016, available at: www.theguardian.com/​commentisfree/​2016/​jan/​28/​ muslim-​men-​beards-​facial-​hair-​islam. 12 Dhahran focus group, November 2016. 13 This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6. 14 Amalgamated anonymous responses to author’s online survey: ‫ماهي مظاهر‬ ‫وعالمات الرجولة ؟‬. Owning a car is also necessary ‘to be able to go drifting’. 15 Anonymous response to author’s online survey: ‫ماهي مظاهر وعالمات الرجولة ؟‬

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16 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. 17 Amalgamated anonymous responses to author’s online survey: ‫ماهي مظاهر‬ ‫وعالمات الرجولة ؟‬ 18 Anonymous response to author’s online survey: ‫ماهي مظاهر وعالمات الرجولة ؟‬ 19 Ibid. ‘It pushes him to love and help people as much as possible.’ 20 Ibid. 21 Amalgamated anonymous responses to author’s online survey: ‫ماهي مظاهر‬ ‫وعالمات الرجولة ؟‬ 22 Reeser, Masculinities in Theory, p.181. 23 Ibid. 24 Dhahran focus group, November 2016. See, for example: Al Bargi, A. and Al Asmari, S., ‘Dhahran Harassment Incident Sparks Outrage’, Arab News, 24 October 2013, available at: www.arabnews.com/​news/​468577. 25 Anonymous response to author’s online survey: ‫ماهي مظاهر وعالمات الرجولة ؟‬ 26 Ibid. 27 Amalgamated anonymous responses to author’s online survey: ‫ماهي مظاهر‬ ‫وعالمات الرجولة ؟‬ 28 Anonymous response to author’s online survey: ‫ماهي مظاهر وعالمات الرجولة ؟‬ 29 Ibid. 30 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 31 Anonymous response to author’s online survey: ‫ماهي مظاهر وعالمات الرجولة ؟‬ 32 Ibid. 33 Jeddah focus group, December 2016. 34 Anonymous response to author’s online survey: ‫ماهي مظاهر وعالمات الرجولة ؟‬ 35 Ibid. 36 Reeser, Masculinities in Theory, p.187. 37 Al Rasheed, ‘Caught between Religion and State’, p. 292. 38 McDowell, L., ‘New Masculinities and Femininities: Gender Divisions in the New Economy’, in Furlong, A. (ed.) Handbook of Youth and Young Adulthood:  New perspectives and agendas, Routledge, Abingdon, 2009, pp.  58–​9. 39 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017. 40 Dhahran focus group, December 2016. 41 Alhazmi A. and Nyland, B., ‘The Saudi Arabian International Student Experience: From a Gender-​Segregated Society to Studying in a Mixed-​ Gender Environment’, Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education, Vol. 43, Issue 3, 2013, pp. 352–​4. 42 Riyadh focus group, March 2017. 43 Safwa focus group, January 2017. 44 Jeddah focus group, April 2017. 45 Murphy, A Kingdom’s Future, p. 100. 46 This situation was mirrored in discussions with young women. 47 Abraham, A., Alienation: My Life in Saudi Arabia and America, iUniverse, Inc., Bloomington, IN, 2012, p. 54. 48 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017. 49 Brinley Bruton, F., ‘Tinder, Dating and Sex in Saudi Arabia –​Where Love Is a “Sin” ’, NBC News, 22 December 2017, available at: www.nbcnews.com/​ news/​world/​tinder-​dating-​sex-​saudi-​arabia-​where-​love-​sin-​n824101.

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Notes

229

50 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. 51 Ibid. 52 Interview with Mohammed, Riyadh, October 2016. 53 Dhahran focus group, December 2016. 54 Riyadh focus group, May 2017. 55 Ibid. 56 See: https://​misk.org.sa/​en/​services/​hakayamisk6-​en. 57 Qatif focus group, November 2016. 58 Interview with Abdullah, Dhahran, September 2017. Careem is a Middle East competitor of Uber and is more popular than the latter in Saudi Arabia. It is also easier to become a Careem driver, making it a part-​time job option for many young Saudi men. 59 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 60 Le Renard, A., A Society of Young Women: Opportunities of Place, Power and Reform in Saudi Arabia, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 2014, p. 32. 61 Riyadh focus group, May 2017. ‘We were with some of them for the whole month (four male and one female from KSU and seven female from PNU).’ 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid. She believes that love marriages are increasing gradually. 64 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017. 65 Brinley Bruton, ‘Tinder, Dating and Sex in Saudi Arabia’. 66 Interview with Fahad, al-​Khobar, December 2017. 67 Riyadh focus group, May 2017. 68 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. 69 Qatif, Tarout Island focus group, October 2016. 70 As discussed in Chapter 2. 71 Riyadh focus group, March 2017. 72 Qatif, Tarout Island focus group, October 2016. 73 Ibid. 74 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 75 al-​Ahsa focus group, June 2017. 76 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017. 77 Ibid. 78 al-​Ahsa focus group, June 2017. 79 Ibid. 80 Ibid. 81 Ibid. 82 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 83 Yamani, Changed Identities, p. 96. 84 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 85 Ibid. 86 Ibid. 87 Ibid. 88 Jeddah focus group, April 2017. 89 Safwa focus group, January 2017. 90 Qatif, Tarout Island focus group, October 2016. 91 Dhahran focus group, November 2016. 92 Jeddah focus group, December 2016.

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93 Qatif, Tarout Island focus group, October 2016. 94 Safwa focus group, January 2017. 95 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. 96 Ibid. 97 Ibid. 98 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 99 Dhahran focus group, November 2016. 100 Safwa focus group, January 2017. 101 Qatif, Tarout Island focus group, October 2016. 102 Ibid. ‘For example by joining volunteering groups.’ 103 Riyadh focus groups, May 2017. These female focus groups were con� ducted at King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic in Riyadh –​a secure and suitable environment. 104 Riyadh focus group, May 2017. 105 Jeddah focus group, December 2016. 106 Riyadh focus group, May 2017. 107 Interview with Jeddah-​based advisor and organizational leadership coach, February 2017. 108 Riyadh focus group, May 2017. 109 Ibid. 110 Ibid. ‘A young woman who studies medicine is considered a huge thing. Many of my uncles do not know I do this and that I will work in a hospital.’ 111 Riyadh focus group, May 2017. 112 Anon, ‘King Salman Issues Decree Allowing Women to Drive in Saudi Arabia’, Arab News, 27 September 2017, available at: www.arabnews.com/​ node/​1167916/​saudi-​arabia. 113 Views expressed by multiple individuals across Saudi Arabia, June 2018. 114 Author’s observation. 115 Interview with Abdullah, Dhahran, September 2017. 116 Interview with Ahmed and Munthor, al-​Ahsa, June 2017. 117 Ibid. 118 Ibid. 119 Ibid. 120 Anonymous response to author’s online survey: ‫ما هو رأيك في السماح للنساء لقيادة‬ ‫السيارة؟‬ 121 Amalgamated anonymous responses to author’s online survey: ‫ما هو رأيك في‬ ‫السماح للنساء لقيادة السيارة؟‬ 122 Ibid. 123 Jeddah focus group, December 2016. 124 Ibid. Another of his friends was at pains to point out during the discussion that ‘90 per cent of Saudi women also do not think they should be allowed to drive’. 125 Ibid. 126 Ibid. 127 Amalgamated anonymous responses to author’s online survey: ‫ما هو رأيك في‬ ‫السماح للنساء لقيادة السيارة؟‬ 128 Dhahran focus group, November 2017.

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129 al-​Khobar focus group, November 2018. 130 Ibid. 131 Anonymous response to author’s online survey: ‫ما هو رأيك في السماح للنساء لقيادة‬ ‫السيارة؟‬ 132 See, for example:  Brown, N., ‘Saudi Arabia Is Moving to Rein In Its Religious Police. Sort Of ’. Washington Post, 16 August 2017, available at: www .washingtonpost.com/​news/​monkey-​cage/​wp/​2017/​08/​16/​saudi-​arabia-​is-​ moving-​to-​rein-​in-​its-​religious-​police-​sort-​of/​?utm_​term=.698b16e8ee75. 133 Amalgamated anonymous responses to author’s online survey: ‫ما هو رأيك في‬ ‫السماح للنساء لقيادة السيارة؟‬ 134 Umm Al Qura University focus group, Makkah, February 2017. 135 At the time of writing, plans were being drawn up to hire and train Saudi female traffic police. See, for example: Al Dibais, F., ‘Saudi Women as Traffic Cops Under Consideration’, Saudi Gazette, 12 October 2017, available at: http://​saudigazette.com.sa/​article/​519237/​SAUDI-​ARABIA/​ Saudi-​women-​as-​traffic-​cops-​under-​consideration. 136 See, for example: Anon, ‘20 People Die in Saudi Road Accidents Daily: Reports’, Khaleej Times, 14 December 2017, available at: www.khaleejtimes .com/​region/​saudi-​arabia/​20-​people-​die-in-saudi-road-accidents-dailyreports-​. 137 Nugali, N., ‘ “Justice for All”: How Saudi Arabia’s Sexual Harassment Law Will Work’, Arab News, 3 June 2018, available at: www.arabnews.com/​node/​ 1314546/​saudi-​arabia. 138 Therefore, it is not surprising that Saudi Arabia is the only state in the world named after a family: the Al Saud. 139 Najran focus group, October 2016. 140 Singerman, ‘The Economic Imperatives of Marriage, pp. 7–​8. 141 Dhahran focus group, November 2016. 142 Najran focus group, November 2016. 143 Riyadh focus group, May 2017. 144 Even at KFUPM there are undergraduate students who are already mar�ried and have children, despite looking like little more than children themselves. 145 Dhahran focus group, December 2016. 146 Qatif, Tarout Island focus group, October 2016. 147 Dhahran focus group, November 2016. 148 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 149 El Hazmi, M., Al Swailem, A.R., Warsy, A., Al Swailem, A.M., Sulaimani, R.  and Al-Meshari, A., ‘Consanguinity among the Saudi Arabian Population’, Journal of Medical Genetics, Vol. 32, Issue 8, 1995, p. 626. 150 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017. 151 Al Lily, A., The Bro Code of Saudi Culture: 666 Rules of How the Human Body Should Act in Saudi Arabia, 3rd Edition, Amazon (self-​published), 2016, p.14. 152 A compulsory national premarital screening programme for sickle cell dis�ease (SCD) and thalassemia was established in Saudi Arabia in February 2004. See, for example: Al Aama, J. ‘Attitudes towards Mandatory National

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Premarital Screening for Hereditary Hemolytic Disorders’, Health Policy, Vol. 97, Issue 1, 2010, p. 32. 153 Interview with Abdullah, Riyadh, March 2017. 154 Qatif, Tarout Island focus group, October 2016. 155 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017. 156 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 157 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 158 Najran focus group, November 2016. 159 Ibid. One group member remarks that according to Islamic teachings, if a woman finds a man with good manners she can marry him. 160 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. 161 Ibid. 162 Ibid. 163 Ibid. However, another member of the focus group disagrees slightly and maintains that the situation might change over the course of one or two generations. 164 Anonymous response to author’s online survey. 165 Interview with Hassan, Jeddah, February 2017. 166 Jeddah focus group, December 2016. 167 Najran focus group, October 2016. 168 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 169 Anon, ‘Dialogue between the Genders: Saudi Films Get Rave Reviews at Riyadh Screening’, Arab News, 24 October 2017, available at: www .arabnews.com/​node/​1182381/​saudi-​arabia. 170 Safwa focus group, January 2017. 171 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 172 Murphy, A Kingdom’s Future, p. 101. 173 Qatif, Tarout Island focus group, October 2016. 174 Ibid. 175 Riyad focus group, February 2017. 176 Safwa focus group, January 2017. 177 Riyadh focus group, March 2017. 178 Safwa focus group, January 2017. 179 Najran focus group, October 2016. 180 This idea of marriage as a ‘scratch card’ was also mentioned to Caryle Murphy. See: Murphy, A Kingdom’s Future, p. 99. 181 Interview with Ahmed, Riyadh, February 2017. 182 Safwa focus group, January 2017. 183 Riyadh focus group, March 2017. 184 Najran focus group, October 2016. 185 Umm Al Qura University focus group, Makkah, February 2017. 186 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. 187 Interview with Abdullah, Riyadh, March 2017. 188 Ibid. 189 Al Rasheed, M., A Most Masculine State: Gender, Politics, and Religion in Saudi Arabia, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013, p.229. 190 Ibid. 191 Anonymous response to author’s online survey: ‫ماهي مظاهر وعالمات الرجولة ؟‬ 192 Ibid.

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193 Ibid. 194 Al Rasheed, ‘Caught between Religion and State’, p. 299. 195 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 196 Layla, al-​Aflaj focus group, April 2017. 197 Safwa focus group, January 2017. 198 Ibid. I have attended numerous student weddings in various parts of Saudi Arabia and indeed, some were extremely lavish. 199 Umm Al Qura University focus group, Makkah, February 2017. 200 Anonymous response to author’s online survey: ‫ماهي مظاهر وعالمات الرجولة ؟‬ 201 Ibid. 202 Jeddah focus group, December 2016. 203 Layla, al-​Aflaj focus group, April 2017. 204 Ibid. 205 Qassim focus group, Onaizah, March 2017. One group member, a Toyota salesman, has been married and divorced, so he maintains that marriage is not ‘essential’. Additionally, a man can get married ‘multiple times, and have different wives so it is no big deal’. 206 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 207 Umm Al Qura University focus group, Makkah, February 2017. 208 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 209 Approximately US$72,000. 210 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 211 Layla, al-​Aflaj focus group, April 2017. 212 Umm Al Qura University focus group, Makkah, February 2017. One group member says his brother only had to pay SAR 10,000 for his dowry, but this was a special case because his father helped him. 213 Dhahran focus group, November 2016. ‘In Jeddah we go to weddings at 9:30 in the evening. I recently went to a wedding in Riyadh at 9:30 in the evening and it was finished! It can get very busy in the school holiday and sometimes I go to three or four weddings a week. My father gets sick of weddings so he sends me to represent him.’ 214 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017. 215 Ibid. 216 Safwa focus group, January 2017. 217 Ibid. 218 Ibid. 219 Riyadh focus group, March 2017. 220 Interview with Basil, al-​Qurayyat, November 2016. 221 Interview with Abdullah and Abdulkarim, Riyadh, November 2018. 222 Layla, al-​Aflaj focus group, April 2017. 223 Dhahran focus group, November 2016. 224 Al Rasheed, ‘Caught between Religion and State, p. 301. 225 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 226 Beiter, K., ‘Divorce Rates Skyrocket in Saudi Arabia’, The Media Line, 28 September 2016, available at: www.themedialine.org/​women/​ divorce-​rates-​skyrocket-​saudi-​arabia. 227 See: Nadeem, S.A., ‘Saudi Divorce Rates Rise by 50 Per Cent’, Gulf News, 19 October 2017, available at: https://​gulfnews.com/​world/​gulf/​saudi/​saudi-​ divorce-​rates-​rise-​by-​50-​1.2109098; Tago, A., ‘5 Divorces Every Hour

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in KSA’, Arab News, 3 July 2016, available at: www.arabnews.com/​node/​ 948551/​saudi-​arabia. 228 Qatif, Tarout Island focus group, October 2016. 229 Saudi Gazette report, ‘A Rundown on Reasons for Rising Divorce Rate in Saudi Arabia’, Saudi Gazette, 9 February 2018, available at: http://​ saudigazette.com.sa/​article/​527994/​SAUDI-​ARABIA/​A-​rundown-onreasons-​for-​rising-​divorce-​rate-​in-​Saudi-​Arabia. 230 Ibid. For a short version of the chapter section, see: Thompson, M.C., ‘The Growing Problem of Divorce for Young Saudi Men’, Gulf Affairs, ‘Gender (Im)balance in Gulf Societies’, Spring 2018. 231 Saudi Gazette report, ‘A Rundown on Reasons for Rising Divorce Rate in Saudi Arabia’. 232 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 233 Ibid. 234 Ibid. 235 Qatif, Tarout Island focus group, October 2016. 236 Riyadh focus group, May 2017. ‘But I have a cousin who is very Westernized and in his marriage the husband and wife understand each other so it’s a good one.’ 237 Ibid. She says that two of her friends got divorced very young (around 20 years of age) and one has a child, although she is only 21. 238 Yamani, Changed Identities, p. 111. 239 Riyadh focus group, March 2017. 240 Ibid. 241 Safwa focus group, January 2017. 242 An istiraha is a place young men go to ‘chillax’ with their friends in their free time. See Chapter 6. 243 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. 244 Anonymous response to author’s online survey: ‫ماهي مظاهر وعالمات الرجولة ؟‬ 245 Qatif, Tarout Island focus group, October 2016. 246 Ibid. 247 Riyadh focus group, May 2017. 248 Safwa focus group, January 2017. 249 Abraham, Alienation, p. 81. 250 Tago, ‘5 Divorces Every Hour in KSA’. 251 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 252 Ibid. 253 Ibid. 254 Najran focus group, November 2016. 255 Ibid. 256 Ibid. 257 See: Nadeem, ‘Saudi Divorce Rates Rise by 50 Per Cent’. 258 Anonymous response to author’s online survey: ‫ماهي مظاهر وعالمات الرجولة ؟‬ 259 Abdul Ghafour, P.K., ‘Saudi Divorce Rate High: The “Message” Is Clear –​ Stop Abusing Social Media’, Arab News, 9 May 2015, available at: www .arabnews.com/​saudi-​arabia/​news/​744426.

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260 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. See also: Saudi Gazette report, ‘A run�down on reasons for rising divorce rate in Saudi Arabia’. 261 See: Nadeem, ‘Saudi divorce rates rise by 50 per cent’. 262 Najran focus group, October 2016. 263 Ibid. 264 Riyadh focus group, May 2017. 265 Ibid. ‘I love volunteering so I have a group on Whatsapp (male and female) volunteering for children and old people at hospitals and homes (around 200).’ 266 Ibid. 267 Safwa focus group, January 2017. 268 Ibid. ‘He became very popular in 2016.’ 269 Saudi Gazette report, ‘A rundown on reasons for rising divorce rate in Saudi Arabia’. 270 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 271 Safwa focus group, January 2017.

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6

Distrust, Fault Lines and Recreation

1 Distrust 1.1

Being Taken Seriously

Many young men are frustrated because they feel they are not taken seriously. When asked in an online survey if they think their opinions are considered by older generations, around 60 per cent reply that this sometimes or rarely happens.1 Yet, when asked if they think the opinions of young Saudis should be taken seriously by older generations, around 90 per cent of young men believe this is paramount, in particular if the subject concerns young Saudis and their future.2 An individual from Makkah points out that in Saudi culture young men have to listen to those with authority, or as Yamani describes them ‘the fathers of the nation, and never question their wisdom’,3 but he believes this should be the other way round as ‘today is our time’.4 Members of a Riyadh focus group say they want to see changes in attitudes to young men, rather than society trying to ‘bring them down’ all the time. If a young man shows an interest in something unusual or thinks of a good idea for a start-​up, a frequent response is ‘You are not going to go anywhere with those interests or hobbies’ or ‘It is not going to work’. This can be extremely frustrating, particularly when they see similar interests and ideas being accepted and nurtured in places such as Dubai.5 One young man laments that hope dies when society or even an individual’s own social circle becomes overly negative.6 In his opinion, this is highly damaging to potential national development, in particular if the huge potential of Saudi youth is disregarded. Therefore, it must fall on young Saudis themselves to push the red lines, because ultimately they want, and deserve, to live productive lives.7 Certainly, university students at reputable institutions such as KFUPM, recognizing their privileged position, maintain that the prestige attached to the university means that their opinions are considered (to a degree).8 Thus, these undergraduates contend that they occupy a 236

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unique position in Saudi Arabia because on certain topics they are taken seriously by the university –​as demonstrated by constructive meetings with the university rector and senior officials, and meetings with senior princes such as Eastern Province governor Prince Saud bin Nayef in March 20149 and deputy governor Prince Ahmed bin Fahd bin Salman in October 2017.10 Nonetheless, other young men speculate that ‘not being listened to’ in wider society might be a result of young men not knowing how to deliver important messages to those in positions of authority, which they blame on shortcomings in the education system.11 That said, many young men argue forcefully that they want the opportunity to express themselves and be valued as individuals, as well as being given the opportunity to contribute to national development.12 Indeed, what is the point of the government allocating such a large portion of the budget to education if the youthful population is not going to be heeded and encouraged? If this does not occur then the result will be a waste of the Kingdom’s considerable human capital. Furthermore, if decision-​makers believe that young people are in no position to participate in socio-​political and economic processes, then young Saudis will feel that they are being neither listened to nor taken seriously. In contrast, and frustratingly, a young Saudi can get his/​her message across to a global audience through the social media networks that are so widely used.13 The more young people are suppressed by the government, Yamani argues, the more young Saudis will rely on the ‘technologies of globalization to create a sense of transnational identity and search for freedom beyond the Kingdom’s borders’.14 At its most extreme, this dissatisfaction at being disregarded has forced some young Saudis to emigrate and find work overseas –​a phenomenon that increased sharply following the 2014 oil price decrease.15 This varies according to background and region, but in more marginalized communities such as Shia Qatif some young men say that their friends or schoolmates want to leave the Kingdom and even change their nationality.16 1.2

Issues of Trust

Rather than being taken seriously, young men are frequently treated simply as shabab who are expected to cause trouble. Society sometimes disregards or maligns shabab, even if the individual is an A+ student, solely because they are shabab, always asking the same questions of young men: ‘Where is he going? What is he doing?’17 Accordingly, young men argue that society’s marginalization and distrust of them remains a problem, in particular with regard to what is deemed ‘appropriate

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behaviour’. A focus group in al-​Khobar says: ‘Men are confident, until they are undermined and deflated by society.’18 A KFUPM undergraduate complains that the lack of trust explains why students are not allowed to cook in the dormitories (there are no kitchens), but he is uncomfortable eating alone in a restaurant because everyone thinks he ‘must be up to something’, when in fact he is simply hungry.19 Because societal trust is frequently lacking, many young men feel that they are ‘victimized’ and cannot win whatever they do.20 If young men wear Western clothes then they are ‘turning to the West’, and if they look overly ‘religious’ (e.g. wear short thobes and have long beards) then they must have joined Daesh.21 As an example, one young man recounts how: You often hear the old men saying ‘the shabab are going to Bahrain’ (implying we are up to no good, even though we are not), and in the majlis you often hear how ‘the shabab are turning to the West’. I suppose that is because older Saudis think that youth has become globalized due to dress and habits, but outward appearances do not necessarily mean a change in character. Sometimes it is simply to do with being young.22

Paradoxically, some complain that this lack of trust is sometimes coupled with familial lack of interest in a young man’s activities. For example, a young man might have a new car, but no one will ask him what he is doing or where he is going, i.e. his family does not check up on him. Consequently, one individual speculates that around 70 per cent of young men are probably without adequate supervision or direction.23 Because the worst is often expected of young men, they are sometimes barred from certain shopping malls and food courts even though they have ‘legally’ been able to enter since 2012.24 For example, the popular Dhahran Mall in Eastern Province generally allows young men entry during the day, but bans single men after 6pm, although two young men say that this depends on individual appearance and dress.25 Al-Rashid Mall, the other major al-​Khobar mall, has large signs displaying ‘not acceptable’ clothes and practices, including a sign warning against ‘No Style Hair’ accompanied by a photograph of a young man with an enormous afro hairstyle reminiscent of Motown circa 1972.26 Certainly, young men say that they do not get stopped going into malls as much as in the past, but it still happens, in particular if the young men are in a group. In these cases, the security guards claim that the young men are going to cause trouble so refuse them entry.27 A  group of Riyadh friends say that they were ejected from a local mall for looking like rappers –​or at least that is what security told them. This amuses one group member, who recounts how ‘years ago’ his uncle was stopped by the hai’a in a shopping mall because they said ‘he was trying to look like

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Michael Jackson. So what happened to us proves that things do not really change.’28 Another way for young men to get into shopping malls is to ‘hire a female relative’. Groups of women position themselves near mall entrances and charge single young men a fee for pretending to be their wives or relatives. Apparently, these women can earn up to SAR 1,000 a day, although there have been crackdowns on this practice since 2014.29 It is not only shopping malls that exclude young men. An Eastern Province focus group complains that wherever they go at the weekend they cannot stay, as they get ‘kicked out’.30 If these young men go to the al-​Khobar or Dammam corniches they are told to leave because they are ‘families only’. In fact despite the 2017–​19 social reforms there are limited public venues open to them.31 Therefore, members of a focus group from Najran assert that ‘at this age’ they hate families, because ‘they take everything away from us’. It is always the same story: new places open, but for families only, and this makes them angry.32 Yet, in reality, the group members concede that it is not simply an issue of a lack of venues for single men, but rather that until fairly recently there were so few good places to visit –​although certainly, there have always been more options for families.33 Nonetheless, as one young man in Riyadh observes, new venues such as The Boulevard Riyadh,34 Al Thaghr Plaza and Rubeen Plaza have opened for everyone.35 Another young man from Onaizah, who works in the capital, says he visited The Boulevard Riyadh in April 2017 (to flirt with girls) and was not surprised to see that members of the hai’a were visible again, checking on shabab, despite its public presence supposedly being curtailed.36 Still, another individual in Riyadh thinks that ‘families only’ policy is a good idea because ‘young men just make things messy’.37 Indeed, he points out when new venues such as The Boulevard Riyadh first open, these places become extremely ‘trendy’ and are swamped by teenagers and shabab trying to get in, although after a while things calm down as the novelty wears off and the shabab move on to newer venues.38 A group of thoughtful young men in the capital believe it is dangerous and counter-​productive to restrict the natural energy of the youth. They concede that the situation for young men used to be a lot worse because the hai’a would stop a young man if he had an inappropriate haircut and cut his hair in public simply because it did not conform to societal expectations. However, they argue that this is ‘stupid because having a crazy haircut when you are young is part of the normal transition from teenager to adult –​it is part of growing up’.39 Indeed, being young, maintains Bayat, is precisely about having a greater tendency towards experimentation, adventurism, idealism, autonomy, mobility and change.40 As Bayat

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argues, countering or curtailing youthfulness is likely to generate collective dissent.41 Thus, being ‘constrained’ for merely being young annoys many young men who maintain that a lot of things do not make sense. They wonder why there are no parks for them to visit at the weekends or why they are criticized for having long hair or wearing shorts. In fact, one individual says that some more conservative elements of society are concerned about ‘knee fetishists’ if young men wear shorts in public.42 That said, according to a Riyadh focus group, a lot of young men have become obsessed with following fashion trends to the extent that it is less about going out with your friends and having fun and more about ‘Look at us, we are so cool’.43 In the more up-​market areas of the principal cities such as on Tahlia Street in Riyadh, many of these individuals who follow trends end up looking like clones. As one member of the group comments: ‘It is like seeing Kanye West in front of you as you walk down the street’.44 This group says that the last few years have witnessed myriad trends including afro hair, backpacks, wearing teeth braces, Raybans and Louis Vuitton belts. The problem, in their collective opinion, is that youth culture ‘trendifies’ things. In 2011, if a fashionable young man did not have a picture of himself holding a jar of Nutella and a can of Red Bull he was not considered to be ‘in’, says one group member  –​and how strange was that? At one time all the fashionable young men in Riyadh were wearing blue shirts, beige shorts and flats with no socks. In 2016 a new trend emerged: a mask worn in the gym to improve breathing –​although it is debatable whether this really had any beneficial effect.45 2

Fault Lines

2.1

Death on the Roads and Drifting

In Saudi Arabia, car ownership figures very highly in the list of a young man’s requirements. As Lumsden documents, the car is tied to notions of gender and has traditionally been associated with masculinity as opposed to femininity – although this may change (to a degree) in Saudi Arabia once women become more visible on the roads.46 Furthermore, the car’s highly symbolic value is reflected in the role it plays in popular and celebrity culture more generally. Cars are status symbols, observes Lumsden, extensions of personality and important markers of identity in consumer culture.47 Still, in 2016, car accidents killed 9,031 people, 12 per cent of the total number of the 70,000 fatalities in the Kingdom that year, with an average of over 25 deaths a day and one death an hour.48 In 2017, Majed

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Al Arquobi, undersecretary for roads at the Ministry of Transport, said that there was one accident every minute and 20 deaths daily on Saudi roads. In 2017 the rate of traffic accidents in the Kingdom reached 26.8 for every 100,000 people –​extremely high by any standard.49 According to Seghayer, Saudi Arabia spends around $250 million annually to treat injured drivers, resulting in a massive waste of economic resources and health services.50 Whilst speeding and reckless driving are two of the main causes of accidents, a new problem has emerged earning the title of ‘silent killer’: the use of mobile phones whilst driving. In 2017 78 per cent of road accidents in Saudi Arabia were caused by texting while driving, claiming the lives of many young men.51 Khalid Al Otaibi, a psychologist, says: ‘No one has the ability to focus when driving and texting, which results in greater risks of accidents’. Al Otaibi stresses that when a driver is texting: He is 23 times more likely to crash. Replying to a text message takes 6 seconds of driving, which is just long enough to cross the length of a football field at 55 miles per hour. Is it really worth jeopardizing one’s life and the lives of others?52

Nevertheless, in Saudi Arabia the use of a mobile phone when driving is ubiquitous. Young men simultaneously speed, drive recklessly and text on their mobiles whilst sitting as low down in the driver’s seat as possible without wearing seat belts. Accidents and near-​accidents are commonplace whether on the inter-​city highways or in cities and towns. The central question is why so many young Saudi men continue to drive dangerously when the fatalities and hazards are well-​known. Indeed, across the Kingdom, young men concede that the number of traffic accidents is a terrible problem,53 but this does not seem to deter many of them from driving recklessly. Over the years, I  have had numerous students killed or seriously injured in car accidents. When I  ask those lucky to have survived horrific crashes (and often in need of serious rehabilitation) the reasons for their accidents, the responses are nearly always the same: speeding and texting. Additionally, when I asked various focus groups why so many young Saudi men drive dangerously, putting themselves, passengers and other drivers at terrible risk, boredom and the need for excitement were the most cited causes.54 For many young men, driving represents autonomy, adulthood and status, and provides an opportunity to indulge in risky behaviours. As DeNicola et al. observe, young drivers engaging in thrill-​ seeking are usually overconfident about their driving abilities.55 Another focus group suggests that this extremely reckless behaviour is due to the fact that some young men ‘almost do not see any value in themselves’.56 This lack of self-​esteem is frequently exacerbated by unemployment,

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because when young men are stuck at home with nothing to do then, according to one person, the ‘problems really start’.57 Yet others believe the main culprits are the socio-​cultural environment and the failure of the education system to highlight the dangers of reckless driving.58 In Saudi Arabia, obtaining a driving licence is relatively easy. DeNicola et  al. point out that all applicants for driving licences are required to complete a lecture course on traffic laws and regulations at minimum, as long as such a course is available in their particular area.59 However, in areas where driver education programmes do not exist, the norm is for young drivers to be taught by friends or relatives.60 As a result, young men almost never look in their mirrors –​proven by the fact that so many vehicle rear windows are thick with sand and dirt. Regrettably, many young men treat road fatalities and injuries as everyday occurrences that do not warrant undue attention. For example, one individual observes that ‘you get weird reactions’ when a young man is killed in a car crash, because he was probably driving too fast, texting and not wearing a seat belt. His friends say simply ‘Yes, he died’, accepting this without question, or stress that his death was ‘the will of God’. According to this young man this is not normal as the deceased would probably still be alive he had been driving more carefully.61 Sadly, death as a result of reckless driving not only brings heartbreak for family members, but sometimes also causes financial hardships and a change in household dynamics, especially if the dead family member was a major source of income.62 Undoubtedly, this issue is Saudi Arabia’s ‘blind spot’ in much the same way that the USA has a problem with gun violence and Russia with alcohol-​related deaths amongst men. Others argue that Saudi Arabia’s road fatalities are also caused by a failure to implement traffic laws. As one young man points out, apart from within the jurisdictions of Aramco or the Royal Commission in Jubail, enforcement of traffic regulation is extremely lax.63 The problem is exacerbated by a lack of traffic police and traffic police inefficiency. A young man in Eastern Province says that whenever he sees the traffic police they are always sat in their cars looking at their mobiles –​unless an important prince is travelling down the road.64 Still, even though the Saudi government introduced speed cameras on highways in 2015 (the Saher system, conceptualized by the government, but launched and operated by Dalla Albaraka Company)65 there is a popular perception that the system is all about ‘collecting money’ rather than road safety. For instance, one focus group recalls when the daughter of Saleh Kamel, the CEO of Dallah Al-​Baraka,66 got married a Twitter hashtag appeared almost immediately with young men tweeting ‘My traffic fines paid for her wedding dress’ or ‘Mine paid for the cake’.67

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There is also the issue of poor public transportation and fully booked domestic flights, which force people to use the roads. In consequence, young men become either bored or stressed because they have to drive very long distances across the desert between cities. These long-​distance journeys can result in some young men taking drugs such as Captagon to relieve that boredom.68 According to a number of individuals, long-​ distance lorry drivers and bus drivers also take Captagon because they also get extremely bored. Some have to wait hours, or even days, at checkpoints such as the border with Bahrain. As one individual argues, if a driver is stuck there for three days, what else is he going to do?69 In Saudi Arabia when young men become bored they can start getting into fights, taking drugs and of course, drifting.70 The latter phenomenon is both a youth-​driven pastime and an urban menace. As Levkowitz explains: Joyriding could be the most popular ‘sport’ among Saudi youth. Drivers execute extremely dangerous stunts, such as the natla (lateral skid), ugda (looping), and istifham (U-​turn at top speeds), or a combination of the above. Street skating is a derivative of the craze where riders lean out of their doors and ‘skate’ along the tarmac at top speeds. At its height in the mid-​1990s, official statistics reported, on average, a new case of joyriding every eleven minutes.71

Drifting is hugely popular, with many drifting videos uploaded to YouTube.72 These videos, as Menoret writes, contributed to turning ‘Saudi drifting’ into an internationally known phenomenon. Drifting and the videos of it also challenged the state’s narrative of Saudi Arabia as a deeply religious nation. Indeed, Menoret asserts, ‘they showed to the world that in the great Saudi cities the state was not in control of public spaces’.73 Needless to say, the government has attempted to crack down on drifting, arresting drifters and sentencing some to prison and lashes, including the late ‘King Al Nazeem’.74 In 2016, the Saudi government increased the penalty for the offence of drifting twenty-​fold in order to counter a social phenomenon detrimental to both drifters and pedestrians that also includes stealing cars and drug trafficking.75 As for ‘King Al-​Nazeem’, he returned to drifting after being released from prison, but in September 2016 was killed whilst racing on a highway.76 Boredom should not be an excuse for drifting, says a Najran focus group, but they concede that boredom is its most visible cause.77 The group also recognizes that the government has rather half-​ heartedly attempted to solve the drifting problem by providing some legal places for the activity, such as a field in Riyadh and one in al-​Ahsa.78 However, most young men consider these too small and the drifters do not like them precisely because they are restricted. Additionally, young men say that those who are below 18 years of age are too young to get in, which

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automatically disqualifies many who drift.79 Their dislike of the ‘official’ drifting areas is further compounded by a ruling that stipulates they must have ‘a certain type of car’.80 Clearly, the government’s attempts to legalize drifting take away the main reasons for doing it –​put simply, it is the illegality and danger that make drifting exciting. 2.2

Substance Abuse

There are places in the desert areas outside Saudi Arabia’s urban centres that are littered with the paraphernalia of drug use. Hashish, cocaine and heroin are all prevalent, as well as alcohol –​both bone fide brands and the local moonshine made from dates and known as ‘National Alcohol’.81 The serious problem of substance abuse was exacerbated by the economic downturn and despite the government’s efforts to halt the flow into Saudi Arabia, drugs, principally amphetamines and in particular Captagon –​the most popular drug amongst young people –​are readily available.82 Drug dealers are particularly active on weekends and loiter around cafes and other eateries to target youth, especially during student exam season because there is a misconception that Captagon boosts concentration skills.83 In Saudi Arabia, Robin observes, young people are more likely to consume synthetic drugs than opiates: For the youth of Saudi Arabia, the attractions of ‘uppers’ have proved to be multiple and compelling. School and university students saw it as an effective way of studying when fatigued; youngsters from poor backgrounds embraced it as a way of achieving a ‘high’, which had been scarcely available and mostly unaffordable before; even the athletic were attracted to it because it was claimed to bolster physical stamina; and young and old took it as a way of achieving enhanced pleasure during sexual intercourse.84

In 2009 an estimated 700,000 Captagon pills were consumed on average in the Kingdom every day, and the number has been increasing ever since.85 Although Saudi customs officers seize millions of Captagon pills every year, substantial amounts go undetected.86 In 2017, security forces seized two million narcotic pills, whilst the number of tablets seized in 2018 was more than six times higher.87 As The Economist reported: The pills flooding into Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states sometimes have a fenethylline base. But many are simply ‘uppers’, or amphetamine-​type stimulants (ATS). And some of what is sold under the poetic street name of Abu Hilalain (Father of the Two Crescent Moons: an allusion to the entwining Cs on each pill) contains little but concentrated caffeine.88

Justin Thomas, author of Psychological Well-​ Being in the Gulf States, believes that part of Captagon’s appeal in Saudi Arabia, where the

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religious taboo against drug use is strong, may lie in its innocuous appearance: it is a small, scored white tablet that resembles any over-​ the-​counter drug. ‘My theory is that Captagon still retains the veneer of medical respectability’, says Thomas. ‘It may not be viewed as a drug or narcotic because it is not associated with smoking or injecting.’89 Captagon is everywhere nowadays, maintain various focus groups.90 It is also not particularly expensive:  four Captagon tablets cost around SAR 100 and the tablets are very easy to buy. Of course, the buyer must be careful when purchasing the drug, but according to one Eastern Province focus group, there are even sellers in public places such as along the al-​Khobar and Dammam corniches.91 Abdelelah Mohammed Al Sharif, secretary general of the National Committee for Narcotics Control and assistant director of Anti-​Drug and Preventative Affairs, states that the majority of drug users in Saudi Arabia fall in the 12–​22 age group.92 Sadly, comments from young men around the Kingdom confirm this and the overall percentage of young men who have experimented with drugs is considered high.93 Unfortunately, the ramifications of substance abuse, which by and large remained fairly hidden in the past, are now frequently visible. Numerous individuals tell stories about young men suffering from the long-​term effects of serious substance abuse. For example, a young man from Qatif says: I saw a distant relative staggering around in the street so I asked his uncle what was wrong. He told me that drink and drugs were the cause and in fact it was so bad he had to have a kidney removed and this relative was only 29.94

In al-​Aflaj, another individual recalls seeing young men in their twenties and early thirties wandering around aimlessly because they have ‘lost their minds’ due to drug use, in particular Captagon.95 This person insists that ‘there is a very dark side here’ and when young men graduate from high school with grades lower than a C there is a high probability that they will ‘journey on the dark road’, which usually means becoming victim to substance abuse. Certainly, some might still get into college, but he says that more often than not after a year or so they will be suspended because of substance abuse and related anti-​social behaviour.96 Yet, others are quick to point out that it is not only academically underperforming young men who fall through the social safety net, it is also high-​flyers. One individual cites the example of a highly intelligent young man who was sponsored by Aramco until he became addicted to drugs and in consequence became ‘useless’.97 As in every society, there are also young men who want to show off and play the ‘big guy’ in front of their friends: ‘They say look at me, I am a tough guy, but then slowly their drug use becomes a problem and ruins their lives and those of their families.’98

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Whilst many young men emphasize that the main reason for drug use is boredom, social problems are cited as another reason. For example, perceived failure, whether academic or social, can lead to substance abuse problems. Stressful life events such as the death of a close family member can also trigger drug use.99 Others say that some young Saudis start using drugs when they go abroad on the KASP and continue after returning home. One individual cites a friend who started on drugs whilst he was studying in the US, although he managed to quit when he came home.100 For those unfortunate enough to become addicted, there is often no proper rehab; rather, many will simply end up in jail.101 2.3

Mental Health Issues

The number of people, including young men, with mental health issues such as anxiety and depression is increasing in Saudi Arabia due to urbanization, marital or relationship problems, and not being able to deal with rapid societal change.102 As Thomas observes, periods of social transition can make life more interesting and challenging for some,103 but for others rapid societal transformation can cause great stress. In fact, the conflict associated with the realities of everyday life, socio-​cultural norms, the economic downturn and its impact on employment opportunities and cost of living, gender segregation and out-​of-​sync expectations of marriage –​all of these, whether in isolation, in combination or as a cumulative whole –​cause varying degrees of stress for many young men. Compounding these problems is the social stigma attached to mental health.104 Koenig et al. explain that in Arab societies, as in most societies, including those in the West, individuals with mental illness and their families are often stigmatized, rejected and isolated: This is because mental illness is still associated with evil spirits, effects of the evil eye, magic, and punishment from God, or with violence, addiction and suicide. Due to guilt and shame, family members often refuse to discuss mental problems with non-​family members, including medical physicians and mental health professionals. Furthermore, Islam promises special blessings on individuals and families who care for those who are sick, whether the illness be physical or mental. Islamic medicine that is based on the Qur’an and Hadiths holds that Muslims have a duty to care for the sick. As a result, families in Saudi Arabia usually make every effort to do so.105

Yet, a friend of one young man who works for the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA)106 says that the ministry constantly receives calls related to mental health issues such as depression. Based on the sheer number of calls, he estimates that Saudi Arabia needs one mental health clinic for every four households in the Kingdom. Asked why this has become such

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an issue, he replies that in his opinion, mental health issues are exacerbated by religious and societal pressure.107 Additionally, other young men contend that some families are guilty of treating all mental health issues (and disabilities) as if they are all one and the same. For this reason you find some families admitting people with serious mental health problems and individuals with Down’s syndrome into the same psychiatric wards and hospitals. This alarms a Riyadh focus group, whose members ask: ‘What does this say about our society?’108 However, others are not so sure that the problem is actually increasing; rather, they speculate that there is more awareness of mental health issues and greater visibility of mental health topics due to exposure on social media.109 When some young men become mentally ill, they frequently do not realize what is wrong with them. Over the years, this is a problem that I  have encountered with my own students, often hearing that a young man is unable to study or sleep, but with no idea what he can do to tackle this problem. Additionally, many young men appear to be fine in public –​ they put on their best faces, remarks an Eastern Province focus group –​ but in their homes there are no smiles; instead, they fight with everyone. Yet, as this focus group observes, if people find out a young man has visited a therapist then this can cause serious problems with relatives and friends as it puts his masculinity into question.110 In the developed or industrialized world, the psychiatric patient is often blamed for not doing enough to ‘pull himself out of his misery’, whilst in Saudi Arabia he is often accused of falling short in his religious beliefs.111 Another group of young men in Riyadh comments on this, saying that mental health issues are not taken seriously in Saudi Arabia because if an individual admits to his family and social circle that he has a mental health problem, they will simply reply ‘Go and pray and become more religious because otherwise you are going to hell’. In their opinion, this is ‘inhuman’.112 Group members also remark that they see plenty of people who are not religious and who appear to be happy, so none of this makes much sense to them.113 Yet, if a young man admits to feeling anxious or depressed then society immediately links this to his relationship with God, believing that ‘there must be something wrong with this’. As an example, a young man describes a friend who is mentally unstable because of family problems. However, the father ‘just gets a shaikh to come and pray when my friend is sick –​that is all his father does even though he has a degree in medicine’.114 This perspective is supported by a survey conducted by Alrahili et al.: out of 137 Saudi men and women, a total of 103 subjects believed that depression would not occur if one was close to God.115 Despite the seriousness of mental health issues in Saudi Arabia, particularly amongst youth, some young men maintain that ‘saying you have

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a mental health issue’ has become a trend amongst certain groups of young people, especially the well-​off and privileged. It angers and saddens them to hear some young Saudis say they are depressed simply to be ‘trendy’, but nowadays they claim it is common amongst both men and women.116 Everyone now seems to have anxiety or suffer from depression and feel suicidal, usually expressed on social media applications –​in particular Snapchat, says this focus group –​with ‘people saying they have a mental health problem and being snarky, cynical and sassy about it’.117 For example, some people claim to be bipolar, so they talk to an online ‘psychiatrist’ for ten minutes on social media who ‘diagnoses’ the person as bipolar and he/​she is happy about that.118 In the focus group’s opinion, the ‘mental health issue trend’ is purely attention-​seeking and an attempt to ‘look cool, because for some people being depressed and suicidal is cool’. These people listen to songs with lyrics that mention mental health issues and they think this is ‘controversial’, so they say ‘I can be trendy and suicidal, too’. The focus group argues that this is simply following a trend and has nothing to do with real self-​awareness and introspection: ‘the people who say these types of things rarely look at themselves seriously even though these privileged kids claim they are suffering from depression’.119 2.4 Radicalization Hegghammer observes that much has been written –​rightly and wrongly –​ about Saudi Arabia’s alleged role as an exporter of recruits, ideology and money to violent Islamist groups such as al-​Qaeda and Daesh.120 Indeed, the prominent role that Saudi youth have played in international jihad is highlighted by Al Shihabi, who points out that this has long been evident, from the days of the US-​supported insurgency against the USSR in Afghanistan, to the attacks of 9/​11, through to the emergence of Daesh in 2014.121 A young man from al-​Majmaah in Najd concurs, saying that when the US invaded Iraq in 2003 it prompted a lot of young men in his town to join various insurgent groups, as they wanted to emulate the mujahideen who fought in Afghanistan.122 Indeed, young men are over-​represented in radical ranks, observe Koomen and Van Der Pligt. Hormonal factors associated with impulsiveness play a role in this, and the parallels with other impulsive behaviours, including criminal activity and, tellingly in Saudi Arabia, reckless driving, are very marked.123 Undoubtedly, as Al Shihabi asserts, ‘the dangerous allure of violence for Saudi Arabia’s bored and frustrated young men can be very strong’.124 At the beginning of the Syrian uprising against the Al Assad regime, everyone in Saudi Arabia supported the Free Syrian Army, says a young

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man from Riyadh  –​even people who were not particularly devout. However, after 2012 the Free Syrian Army quickly lost its appeal, particularly after the emergence of Daesh.125 A  young man from al-​Ahsa says that when Daesh first appeared he and his friends discussed the group constantly. Everyone they knew was arguing about the significance of Daesh, says this individual, and whether its stated aims were Islamic or simply political; that is, was Daesh carrying out jihad in an appropriate way?126 Yet, in 2014, as Daesh grew in prominence, regionally it was Saudi Arabia that put the most effort into raising awareness of the threat of the radical group –​even though at that time Saudi citizens were the most responsive to joining Daesh, with semi-​official statistics showing the number of Saudi fighters at around 7,000.127 Nonetheless, in the opinion of some young men, from the beginning the West exaggerated the percentage of young Saudi men who joined Daesh and other extremist groups.128 According to a young man from Dammam, less than 1 per cent of all the people he knows were radicalized and he says he can count them on one hand: a young man from al-​ Ahsa and two from Dammam –​although he and his friends concede that the radicalization of young Saudi men was probably far less prevalent in Eastern Province than in parts of Najd.129 This viewpoint is confirmed by a young man from Buraydah who says that ‘a great many young guys’ he knows went to fight in Syria. From his perspective, this was foolish as these young men ‘were just throwing their lives away’, but the allure and excitement of jihad proved irresistible.130 In other parts of Saudi Arabia, joining Daesh was unpopular, say many focus groups, as from the outset Daesh had a very negative image in most parts of the Kingdom.131 Indeed, during the 2014 summer and autumn semesters I  was continually reminded by my students that Daesh did not represent Islam and therefore, was anathema to them. Nevertheless, the same individuals admit to knowing, or knowing of, young men who joined extremist groups, which appears to indicate that the problem was fairly widespread. For example, a member of an al-​Ahsa focus group cites a local man who joined the al-​Jazira Brigade and was killed early on in the Syria conflict.132 Another focus group member says he had two acquaintances who attended Shari’ah College in al-​Ahsa, but after a single semester they joined Daesh even though ‘they had no real knowledge of Islam’.133 As in other parts of the world, the central question is why young men become radicalized. The individuals I asked about the causes of radicalization identified a number of possible fators. First and foremost, there appears to be consensus that radicalization occurs because young men are often marginalized, exacerbated by a feeling that they cannot participate in decision-​making processes and in consequence are simultaneously

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ignored and constrained.134 Feeling marginalized and adrift leads some young men to want to feel part of something, says an individual in Riyadh, and groups such as Daesh can fulfil that need. It is a case of a socially isolated young man wanting to belong, wanting to feel part of a family or a cause135 –​although some assert that it is ‘mostly losers who join radical groups, mostly foolish people’.136 Other young men contend that some young men become radicalized because they are enthusiastic about showing their commitment to Islam. For example, certain shaikhs ask these young men what they are doing to support Islam, meaning: do they volunteer or support charities? However, these individuals misinterpret the question, thinking that the shaikhs want them to join radical groups; hence, this is what they do.137 Yet others say that they have read about how ‘being able to have lots of sex’ is a determining factor in persuading young men to join Daesh, but this is often dismissed as yet another exaggeration by the Western media, although the subject appears to make many young men uncomfortable.138 According to a young man from Hofuf, radicalization can be blamed on both families and the education system because they sometime fail to provide adequate knowledge and warnings about the ramifications of becoming radicalized.139 Of course, ‘we can also blame the Najdi way’, says a young man from Riyadh about the alleged connection between ‘Salafi practices and extremism’.140 Indeed, Daesh’s religious genealogy comes from the ‘Salafi-​Jihadi’ theological current that is very old in Islam, which is quite literalist, contends Haykel. The professor notes that its followers are extremely rigorous, and condemn other Muslims who do not share their theology, which ‘gives them the hard edge when it comes to violence, because they can justify it theologically’.141 However, the young man from Riyadh disagrees that there is a problem with Salafi religious beliefs (which he adheres to); rather, Salafi clerics need to change their approaches and the way that they present Islamic teachings. For example, there should be greater tolerance of other sects. In this young man’s opinion, Salman Al Awda, who taught his father, exemplifies how Islamic beliefs can develop so that they are in tune with contemporary Saudi life142 –​although Maher notes that Al Awda’s more nuanced approach is out of step with the uncompromising nature of Salafi-​Jihadism.143 Unquestionably, radicalization is a serious problem, as demonstrated by the number of young men joining extremist groups. Indeed, the accumulated stresses and fault lines linked to issues such as boredom, unemployment, social marginalization and sexual frustration provide fertile ground for extremist recruiters. The Saudi government has attempted to counteract radicalization through its deradicalization programme, understanding that it needs the participation of distinguished

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scholars, scientists and clerics to achieve its objectives. As a member of the deradicalization programme in Riyadh informed El-​ Said and Harrigan:  ‘Nobody is born a terrorist. Terrorism is a process.’144 That said, the problem of radicalization should be put into perspective, especially when compared with other serious issues. In reality, only a small percentage of young Saudi men become radicalized and travel abroad to join groups such as Daesh. In 2016–​17 there were an estimated 3,244 Saudi fighters.145 The more common, and widespread, problems that impact on large numbers of young men are substance abuse, mental health issues and death or maiming on the roads –​an average of about 20 traffic deaths every day, with approximately 73 per cent of those killed in traffic accidents under 40.146 3 Recreation 3.1

Boredom: ‘Nothing to Do, Nowhere to Go’

As Al Shihabi points out, young Saudi men ‘grow up in an environment that has few social freedoms and entertainment opportunities’ and this, coupled with enforced gender segregation, creates a potent and potentially explosive combination of boredom and frustration.147 The lack of employment opportunities, along with social exclusion (tufush) and sexual frustration, are blamed for causing this explosive mix. As Menoret documents, this frustration is linked to ‘social impotence’, often associated with the invisible wall of wasta.148 The lives of young men are also made more difficult by the dearth (until 2017–​19) of public entertainment and lack of recreational venues available to them. In fact, most young men protest that there is nothing to do and nowhere to go or that many of the new entertainment opportunities introduced in 2017–19 are too expensive and only aimed at elites.149 For a young man, free-​time options are limited: it is a case of going to cheap restaurants and cafes, then roaming around the city in their cars.150 Other options include going to the mall (if they are allowed in), going to the Corniche or the beach (if they do not get moved on), going to the gym (if they can afford it) or participating in illegal activities such as drifting. Of course, sport is an option, but not everyone likes sport,151 and in Saudi Arabia, ‘sport whether in school or outside is only about football’ –​very much to the detriment of other sports.152 Others point out that there are a number of summer camps, often run by schools or companies such as Aramco  –​but a common complaint is that the main activity is sport, with the usual over-​emphasis on football.153 In the past, there were activities such as ‘Water Week’ in al-​Khobar,154 and there

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are a couple of paintball venues that young men can visit. By all accounts the one in Riyadh is fun, although one group says it would be even better if there was laser-​tag, which would also be a great business opportunity for someone.155 In Eastern Province, there is a paintball park at the Sunset Beach resort and young men can go as visitors in a group, but they complain that it is too small and expensive.156 For the time being, there are no real social clubs or what could be called youth clubs,157 but according to one focus group there are online clubs that offer special courses. For example, one young man took a course in comic-​strip drawing in al-​Khobar.158 Naturally, young men often compare their own recreation opportunities with those in other countries they have visited. As one individual in al-​Khobar says: For example, in other countries such as Turkey you can use the ‘Couch Surfing’ app if you need a place to stay (and not pay) or if you want to arrange an event in your local area. It could be things such as language classes or just meeting like-​ minded people, but in Saudi Arabia there is nothing like this.159 We always say that everything forbidden is popular.160

Therefore, young men usually end up playing video games (as this uses up a great deal of time) and visiting relatives.161 Individuals in Eastern Province remark that they are lucky because they can cross the King Fahd Causeway to Bahrain, although they joke that they always say they are going to the cinema even if they are not.162 Away from the main urban centres of Riyadh, Jeddah and al-​Khobar-​Dammam recreational activities for young men are even fewer, as illustrated by comments from an al-​Baha University undergraduate that ‘there is nothing interesting to do here’163 and a focus group from Najran, according to which there is very little that interests young men in the province other than King Fahd National Park. This is a beautiful place, but there is only a very small area for single men as most of the park is allocated to families.164 The Najran group says that there is a local ‘tourism’ club that identifies new touristic sites in Najran province, but it is run by men in their thirties and forties. Young men can join if they want, but the problem is that ‘most of these things do not really attract young men’ as they find them boring.165 3.2

Creating ‘Something to Do, Somewhere to Go’

Probably the most popular way to avoid both boredom and the ‘nowhere to go’ problem is for groups of young men to establish an istiraha (literally: a relaxing place). According to an article on Al Arabiya, istiraha culture is popular amongst young men ‘perhaps partly, for the sanctuary

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it provides from the conservatism of public Saudi life’, but it is also a place in which to get away from their families, from the city and from work’166 –​in other words a place to feel free. Whilst entertainment opportunities in the main urban centres increased in 2017–​19, in provincial towns there are a few coffee shops that young men can frequent but no malls or decent gyms, so young men have the choice of driving aimlessly around or going to an istiraha. For example, in Qassim young men say that in the istiraha they watch movies and TV shows, play cards or PlayStation, and smoke cigarettes and shisha.167 Due to the dearth of entertainment in al-​Aflaj, a young man in the town says that at an istiraha he and his friends: Watch football, play video games and smoke. Some guys play games such as Baloot and others play Saudi Deal. We watch Game of Thrones, Vikings, Luther, foreign films especially from Hollywood or Spanish films because of the beautiful girls.168

A focus group in Makkah jokes that they use ‘Hasan’s house as our istiraha’. These friends have even established a Friday movie night when they watch US films together, but not TV series such as Suits, Westworld and House of Cards, which they watch alone as they are too long. Every week someone different picks a film to watch (‘This is our democracy!’) and afterwards they discuss it.169 In fact, it is very popular to set up a film/​ TV-​series-​watching group, although people do this mainly by downloading illegally from sites such as Torrent or Bay of Pirates. Netflix Saudi Arabia is also available, although the content (for the time being) is not as broad as its Western counterparts.170 Some more enterprising young men set up similar groups in their istirahat for other hobbies such as art, books and poetry,171 but the majority simply spend the time in the istiraha smoking whilst watching football, films and TV shows. The size, cost and location of these istirahat vary according to background, region and the number of young men in the group.172 For example, in Qassim, where there are a huge number of istirahat, an average one costs around SAR 10,000 a year, with the cost usually being shared by the group members. For this the group gets a majlis (seating area with television), a small kitchen, sometimes a tent (or an outdoor majlis) and a rudimentary bathroom. An al-​Mithnab focus group says that every young man over the age of 18 tries to have his own istiraha. These young men also like to buy a one-​door Toyota Hilux to get to and from each other’s istirahat, but point out that elsewhere in Qassim ‘the bedu guys like those from the Al Mutairi tribe prefer Datsun Nissans’.173 In Riyadh, the rental cost of an istiraha depends on the size and location. A very small istiraha with a tiny kitchen costs approximately SAR

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11,000 a year.174 In Jeddah, istirahat are sometimes called kabayin (the plural of kabin) because they are often located by the sea.175 However, in Dammam in Eastern Province, instead of finding an istiraha many young men rent an apartment for the same purposes instead. The cheapest are around SAR 1,500 a month, but are usually very small.176 A young Qassimi man says that he has been driving in the desert since he was a young boy. He likes to go to the desert alone, especially when he feels stressed or sad because the solitude of the desert makes him feel better.177 In fact, apart from the istiraha, the only other option for some young men is to go to the desert, particularly during the winter months when there are many temporary desert istirahat or camps. Once again, at a winter desert camp in Qassim a group of friends say they like spending time in the camp because they feel free. First, they find a suitable place in the desert together, then they mark out the land and buy the tents and all necessary equipment (one camp I visited had three separate tents). The group might also hire workers to cook, clean and make tea. Obviously, depending on the size of the camp this can be an expensive set-​up. A regular at a fairly sumptuous Qassim camp I visited explains why he and his friends enjoy spending time there: Everyone who comes here brings friends so it is a great way to meet new people. Most importantly, we do not feel judged here, we can smoke cigarettes or shisha and no one cares. It is good because there is no Internet connection so we have to talk to each other. But all the guys hang their phones from the roof of the tent so at least they can receive important calls.178

Another camp regular from the town of al-​Mithnab says that only two shops in the town sell cigarettes because smoking is considered haram. Young men should not be seen smoking in public because they will be judged ‘negatively’,179 so the freedom of the camp allows these individuals to smoke and behave in a more relaxed way away from socio-​cultural constraints, which for many is refreshing. Another popular desert activity is ‘dune bashing’ (tat’ees), particularly in the winter months. On several January afternoons after Friday prayers, I travelled with a group of local young men to al-​Sadr, a popular off-​road site in Qassim province, to watch a large group of young drivers race their customized vehicles up and down a steep dune. As reported in Arab News, dune bashing attracts hundreds of young participants and fans. Some of the most popular sites are located in Hail, Qassim, southern Riyadh and the Half Moon Bay area in al-​Khobar.180 In addition to the thrill and fun of racing up the dunes, many young Saudi men say that in the desert there is a great deal of camaraderie, with everyone helping each other if there is a problem.181

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One of the main activities in the istiraha or desert camp (and at home) is playing video games. In Saudi Arabia’s conservative culture, young men turn to video games as an outlet, says Abdullah Hamed, the vice president of a tech company that backs game development. In fact, the enthusiasm for gaming is part of the Kingdom’s overall embrace of online video and social media. Because Saudi culture in general is very restrictive of what the rest of the world considers entertainment, Hamed observes, ‘The best way to have fun is to play games. They are cool, pretty and entertaining.’182 A focus group in Eastern Province estimates that 75 to 90 per cent of young Saudi men play video games –​with the higher percentage probably being the more accurate.183 Some young men play every day, some only at weekends, but it is fairly normal to hear individuals say that they spend two hours a day or more gaming.184 For instance, a focus group from Makkah says that before watching a film in the istiraha, they will spend several hours on their PlayStations playing games such as Call of Duty, Battlefield and Fifa.185 Social networking, as Sisler notes, is also an indivisible part of contemporary gaming culture. Young men exchange games, discuss their qualities and circulate information to help others win. Sisler documents how these peer groups and collaborative networks ‘play an important role in the construction of youth identities’ through online gaming communities.186 Despite the fact that the majority of young men play video games, there is recognition that video-​gaming can become addictive and, in consequence, can isolate a young man from his family and friends.187 Interestingly, many twenty-​something young men do not identify themselves as being at risk; rather, it is the younger generations –​in particular their younger siblings  –​whom they believe are most affected. In fact, many young men already see the negative impact that video-​gaming is having on the communication skills of very young children.188 As a young man in Qatif says, his generation did not start playing video games until they were teenagers so when he looks at his friends (in their early twenties), gaming has not affected their communication skills, but when he looks at his younger brothers and their friends he sees the opposite.189 A young man in Qassim agrees, noting how things were very different when he was young. He observes that nowadays, many parents do not want their children to play outside and as a result the children simply stay indoors and play video games all day.190 That violent video games can exacerbate violent tendencies amongst young children is a recognized concern for families all over the world, including in Saudi Arabia: ‘My son does not pray any more, or delays his prayers to another time, has also ignored his studies, and is more violent with his siblings’, says one parent.191 A lesser known, but very

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real, problem is that young men, teenagers and even children are being radicalized through video games. Whilst governments monitor radicalization on social media, it seems a great deal less attention is being paid to video-​gaming. As a Gulf policy-​maker points out, two people completely unknown to each other can play a popular war game together. As they interact with each other, frequently whilst ‘shooting’ (the rationale of many games), one of the players has a perfect opportunity to influence the other. As this individual says, ‘My son can be sitting next to me on his PlayStation and I have no idea who he is talking to or what this person is saying as they “shoot people up”. When you think about it, this is extremely alarming.’192 According to this concerned father, recruiting is happening in gaming much more than on social media or in person, because what is significant is the private and unmonitored person-​to-​ person contact that occurs during gaming.193 In addition to video-​gaming, other more traditional pastimes such as playing cards, for example Baloot,194 or No Words (Saudi charades based on traditional proverbs) are popular with young men at the istirahat, although some say that most ‘old games’ are forgotten now.195 Still, in certain parts of Saudi Arabia playing board games has become something of a ‘new craze’.196 As reported by Zaini for the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington: In an age when the virtual world is becoming increasingly dominant, a culture of board games and non-​virtual games is flourishing in Saudi Arabia. Young Saudis are filling specialized coffee houses that provide games for customers, including ones designed by Saudis and other Arabs that draw upon Arab and Islamic culture and history. Companies producing the games are part of a new and growing native gaming industry.197

According to one focus group this phenomenon started in 2015 when young men began buying card and board games online. One of the most popular is Saudi Deal (available in local stores such as Jarir and Saco),198 which is a copy of the Monopoly Deal card game, but produced for the Saudi market.199 Some young men are also starting to buy more exciting board games from Amazon, Souk or Ebay, such as The Resistance or Coup D’état. Of course, video games remain extremely popular, but card and board games are seen as social activities and for that reason, in a very social society, are becoming fashionable. As one player says, these games allow groups to converse with each other and see how other people behave.200 Mahmoud Zaini, animation director and an artist at Inov8, a game company in Jeddah, agrees, saying that Arabs and Saudis play a lot of games due to the social nature of their culture. He points out that games usually involve sitting down together as a group, drinking

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tea and laughing the night away. Games that can encourage that cohesion and spirit are, for him, very important to all of humanity.201 Another young man concurs: And one of the most important things [is] to find games that a lot of people can play to make it more social. So for example, you can play Saudi Deal with 6 people; The Resistance 10 people; Werewolf 10–​ 15 people; Catan (from Germany) 4 people; Dixit 6 people and yes, Twister has arrived in Saudi Arabia! But we are also creative in updating or amending these games to make them more challenging. For example, we change the rules.202

One particularly active group says that they play these games from about 10pm all the way through to fajr prayer. They even have their own board game group of 28 people who come from different areas, universities and colleges. Still, some group members point out that Baloot is considered haram, any game with dice is haram and even chess is haram for certain people. If they played Saudi Deal with money it would be haram, so they argue that it is not the game per se that is the issue, but rather how the game is played.203 3.3 Gyms Public gyms are a relatively new phenomenon in Saudi Arabia. When I first arrived in the Kingdom in 2001, the majority of decent gyms were located on compounds or in places such as the Diplomatic Quarter in Riyadh. However, a Saudi chain of gyms called Bodymasters was established in 1992 and currently has 28 branches (male-​only), mostly in Riyadh but also in Qassim, Dammam and Khamees Mushait.204 I first start going to a public gym, a Bodymasters branch behind Al Andulus Mall in Riyadh, in 2007. The clientele was primarily expatriate Arabs with some Saudis, but the equipment had seen better days. Since that time, gyms have become very popular not only for their health benefits, but also because they offer locations for young men to socialize with friends whilst keeping fit.205 As one individual comments, ‘last Ramadan I had no plans and nothing really to do so I joined a gym with a friend because that was the only option’.206 Nowadays, the Saudi gym scene is dominated by the ubiquitous Fitness Time (owned by Leejam Sports Company). The first Fitness Time centre opened in 2006 with its mission to ‘promote a healthy lifestyle and encourage people to exercise daily’.207 Since then, Fitness Time has become extremely successful, spreading across the Kingdom, and offering six different ‘brands’ for Saudi men:  Fitness Time; Fitness Time Basic; Fitness Time Plus; Fitness Time Pro; Fitness Time Junior; and Fitness Time Academy.208

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Depending on the brand and branch, in addition to gym facilities, the centres can also include a swimming pool, coffee shop, billiards, barber and masseur. In another sign of changing times, Fitness Time receptionists and office staff are young Saudi men, although the majority of personal trainers are Egyptian. Needless to say, Fitness Time is hugely popular with many young men and despite the fees being on the expensive side (by Western standards) the facilities are generally excellent. This popularity was underscored by the company opening an additional 150 branches Kingdom-​wide in autumn 2017; later in December the company announced on its Instagram account that it had gained over a million members. Yet, in the opinion of one focus group, more gym chains are needed because although they like Fitness Time, as it does not face any real competition inside Saudi Arabia it can charge higher prices.209 In 2018, Fitness Time was not available everywhere in the Kingdom, but a ‘gym culture’ has developed in Saudi Arabia so that even those young men with no access to a Fitness Time branch will often go to a locally established gym. For example, a focus group in Makkah says that although there is no gym at their university (Umm Al-​Qura) they go to a local gym where they do weights and cardio to stay healthy. Another of the group members uses the gym for physio on an injured leg, although his friend remarks that his preference is to ‘just lie down!’210 Young men in more remote provincial towns rely on locally run gyms, but these are often very old, as is the case in al-​Aflaj (the gym opened 12 years ago), where the equipment is frequently sub-​standard. One individual in the town says that the gym is never particularly busy; he wonders if this is the reason that Fitness Time has not opened a local branch.211 3.4 Cinema In December 2017, the Ministry of Culture and Information announced that commercial cinemas would open in Saudi Arabia in spring 2018. The announcement marked the first time in 35 years that cinemas would be allowed to operate in the Kingdom.212 Actually, in 2017 it was common knowledge that cinemas would open, as many people including myself and members of a Riyadh focus group, had seen construction plans for cinemas in various malls.213 Certainly, these plans and the talk of cinemas opening in Saudi Arabia excited a great many young men. Most young Saudis love films and TV series and many feel that the ban on cinemas had no real justification.214 In fact, some argued that going to the cinema was a public right. Certainly, prior to cinemas opening in 2018, young men speculated about whether there would need to be separate viewings for single men, single women and families,215 as in the

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opinion of one focus group, ‘society will not allow gender mixing at these types of venues’.216 Yet, others speculated the concept of ‘cinema’ was the problem, as some interpreted ‘cinema’ as an opportunity for gender mixing. These young men argued that concerts involving live music, which started in 2017, should, in reality, be more of an issue than watching films in a cinema.217 For many young men the most important aspect of ‘going to the cinema’ is the social one; it is not about going to see the film per se, but rather, young men emphasize, it is about going to the film with friends –​ that is what is important.218 Opening cinemas is also beneficial to society as this will help decrease boredom, says a young man from al-​Qurayyat. Certainly, some religious conservatives will continue to argue that cinemas cause inappropriate behaviour, but he stresses that cinemas do not cause inappropriate behaviour  –​rather, it is people, and hence young Saudi men need to be educated on correct social behaviour.219 A group of Shari’ah law undergraduates from Umm Al-​Qura University agrees that opening cinemas is a good idea, although for the time being cinemas will probably be restricted to the main cities (although not in Makkah).220 These young men also argue that the main stumbling-​block to opening cinemas was not the government; rather, it was resistance from certain sections of society –​in particular ‘the Salafists’.221 Indeed, from the perspective of many young men, there was no real reason to ban cinemas –​ even though religious conservatives claimed cinema was haram –​ because, they argue, everyone had already seen the films at home. A young man in Riyadh points out that even when Saudis go to the cinema in Bahrain or Dubai, most of them have seen the films before. In his opinion, the ban on cinemas had nothing to do with showing films in public, but was rather fear of change.222 Yet, even before the ban was lifted in 2017, there were small cinemas that were used for showing football matches, such as ‘Fans-​Up’ in Riyadh.223 There were also operational theatres in places such as Qatif where every Eid, plays are staged for mixed audiences (the actors are men and boys),224 as well as film and theatre festivals such as those in Dammam and Jeddah. Even though many young men are extremely pleased that the ban on cinemas has been lifted, they comprehend that this alone does not solve existing social problems such as boredom and marginalization.225 A young man from Qassim contends that opening cinemas is not a ‘magic solution to societal problems, because in the West there are cinemas, but there are also the same problems such as drug abuse’.226 Opinion about the merits of cinemas is divided in some groups. In Layla, al-​Aflaj, half of the group would like to see a cinema open in the town, whereas the other half is vehemently opposed.227 Those against say that they do not agree

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with cinemas: they would rather see more entertainment opportunities similar to those available in the UAE, such as Ski Dubai.228 A  focus group in al-​Mithnab believes that only 5 per cent of local residents want a cinema in the town, although they think the percentages in nearby Onaizah (around 40) and in Buraydah (around 50) would be higher as these cities are more globalized.229 However, they also believe that if cinemas were to open locally, the danger would be that they would only show imported Hollywood films. In consequence, local culture and identity would be eroded: ‘we need to safeguard our culture’.230 Accordingly, the answer might be the creation of ‘Saudiwood’ (as has been planned), which would also encourage and promote Saudi filmmakers.231 In other words, young Saudis would be encouraged to make films that are socio-​ culturally appropriate.232 3.5 

Music

The 2017–​19 concerts and music in public places remained highly contentious, with opinion sharply divided about whether these were haram or not.233 Yet, Saudi musicians already exist in the Kingdom, making not just Arabic music but Western forms as well: rock, pop, rap, heavy metal, even black metal.234 That said, during focus group discussions even though there was frequently a divergence of opinion regarding music, many young men were uncertain about where or when music could, or should, be played.235 At the time of writing there is still no music allowed in shopping malls or some public gyms, including the Fitness Time branch I frequent (not necessarily always a bad thing), although some cafes, restaurants and hotels in the larger cities play background music. A young man in al-​Ahsa contends that most Saudis think that music is makrooh (a minor sin), and thus it is a case of ‘it is OK if you do it, but it is better if you do not’. Yet, he also believes that the case of music is not as clear cut as that of, for example, alcohol or prostitution. Certainly, no Islamic scholar would condone the latter, but what about music?236 His friend from al-​Ahsa believes that if 100 religious scholars were asked whether music is haram, 98 would say yes, but two would say it is acceptable.237 Others point out that ‘traditional’ live music is permissible at annual events such as the Janadriyah festival outside Riyadh,238 so why is the same thing not tolerated elsewhere?239 (Although young men joke that all these things are allowed to happen in Bahrain, which they say is ‘essentially part of Saudi Arabia’.)240 Other group members say that ‘personally’ they believe music is haram, but also point out that this is a matter of opinion as a lot of people love music.241 Others say it is only certain types of music that are haram -​for example rap and hip-​hop are

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definitely haram  –​but again they recognize that this is subjective. Yet, even with rap and hip-​hop, there are varieties that are more acceptable and are listened to in the Kingdom, although these tend to be the more mainstream versions.242 Another viewpoint concerns people who consider live music to be haram, but still attend concerts such as those given by Mohammed Abdu in 2017 because this is less about wanting to listen to the music and more about ‘going against the stream’ to make a political point.243 According to a group of young would-​be musicians in Riyadh, the way Saudi society consumes music is ‘all wrong because a lot of young men listen to music just because they want to look cool –​they are not really into music’.244 The group concedes that classic Arab singers and songs remain popular, but new Arab music is considered boring because the contemporary Middle East genre is all about ‘trashy love songs, which are cheesy’. Music is rarely important for Saudi society and on those occasions when it is, ‘society only listens to the mainstream variety like the stuff our parents enjoyed such as Boney M –​how uncool is that?’245 Nevertheless, one young man recalls how his love of music began through listening to Western music with his parents (even though they did not speak English).246 Another says that when his father was a young boy in Madinah he was considered a ‘street kid’ because he and his friends used to buy compilation cassettes of ‘edgy Western music’ on the black market. His mother, however, was completely different and liked Abba and the Beatles, so this young man grew up listening to both mainstream and alternative types of music.247 Another focus group member explains his introduction to music: When I was five my Mum used to sing a lot and both my parents listened to a lot of Arab music. Then when I was about six or seven (in 2002) my cousin who is seven years older than me introduced me to hip-​hop and rap. We used to hide and listen to it in secret –​I loved it because it was mean and rude! Also, my aunt’s husband introduced me to Eminem, which was exciting and that made me love music.248

The music of Mohammed Abdu was the inspiration for another young man. He remembers how, pre-​2017, Mohammed Abdu was not allowed to perform inside Saudi Arabia and so was forced to perform in Bahrain or Kuwait, and it was ‘crazy because 90 per cent of the audience was Saudi’. Apparently, Mohammed Abdu said to these audiences:  ‘Let’s meet in our own country next time because we are all Saudi’.249 When it was decided finally that he would be allowed to perform in the Kingdom, the first two planned concerts were suddenly cancelled ‘due to the war in Yemen’, but when his Jeddah concert was finally confirmed, the first for nine years, it sold out instantly.250

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Having music as a hobby is more rewarding than just sitting around doing nothing; it is also a way to have fun in a comfortable place with friends. As the Riyadh musicians stress, they meet and work on their music because it is a getaway, an escape and a way to express their feelings in a ‘cool way:’ We are learning how to write music, but it is sad because we all have ideas, but we do not really know how to make these sounds. There is nowhere to go and get instruction or help. Sometimes we can get help, but it is not the type of help we want or need. We need sound engineering, we can get the equipment online or from stores, but we do not know how to maximize the use. So we still use it in a very basic way. And of course, there is no teaching.251

For many, music lessons have had to be kept secret. Hence, there are not many young men who play instruments and if they do play something, it is only for a short time. If a young man wants to be a musician he needs to be self-​taught, so it is difficult for musicians to improve and become recognized.252 One individual who is already a guitarist says he would like to learn to play the piano if it was allowed, but for the time being it is too problematic.253 In 2016, another who expressed a desire to play the oud was concerned greatly that if he was seen with his oud in public ‘the hai’a would smash it and I could not stand that’.254 In fact, it is still difficult for a young man to say in public that he is a musician. However, young men can meet individuals with similar musical tastes through social media and for this reason there are a lot of groups, but this is kept very low-​key and as long as these would-​be musicians stay under the radar, they do not get into trouble.255 Certainly, these budding musicians often need the support and approval of their parents. For instance, one individual says his mother is very supportive but his father a lot less so, although he wonders if this is simply a universal ‘dad thing’.256 Of course, young men will always find a way to get around certain problems:  at an ‘open-​mike’ at Al Faisal University in March 2017 the Riyadh musicians read their ‘poetry’. In reality the group had turned their lyrics into poetry, but everyone understood what they had done and ‘the audience loved it’.257 Despite the many challenges, after graduating from KSU these young men would like to become professional musicians, although they concede that there are many obstacles ahead. When they started their group they kept it secret from most of their friends (in fact, a lot still do not know), declaring:  ‘It is our superhero thing  –​by day and by night!’258 The group writes and performs rap music, but they acknowledge that it will take a long time for Saudi society to accept it due to the content of their lyrics. They say that rap and hip-​hop is referred to as ‘yo-​yo stuff’ in

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Saudi Arabia and because of racism is also called ‘mousawi n***** stuff, meaning pretend n*****’. Indeed, rap is ‘stereotyped’ in Saudi Arabia as it is still considered to be ‘very 80s: all about money, sex and jewellery’.259 For this group, the biggest problem is ‘cultural opinion’:  when Saudis make rap music everyone laughs at it or takes it the wrong way, because ‘they are usually rich kids just trying to look cool unlike us –​we are just normal guys, but we are serious about our music’. The group explains that they are influenced by artists who focus on issues and tell stories. They hate country music and dubstep, and instead listen to rap, hip-​hop, industrial music and most importantly, boundary-​pushing music: We like it when musicians push the boundaries such as Ferouz’s son:  Ziad Rabbani. He is really famous with teenagers because he breaks taboos. He sang about drugs and economics as well as societal issues. He said things like ‘What if there is no more milk? Will you suck on your mother’s tit?’ A lot of people our age listen to him because he is really cool.260

They also like Mohammad Al Ghamdi, also known as Klash, the king of the Saudi rappers, who brought rap to the Kingdom in the mid-​2000s.261 As the group says (gleefully), his music can be ‘really offensive and if your mother knows you are listening to this then you will get whipped!’ In fact, after Klash was sent to prison these young men used to hide in cupboards and listen to his music in secret.262 3.6

The General Entertainment Authority

In line with one of the pillars of Saudi Vision 2030, the General Entertainment Authority (GEA)263 –​sometimes referred to sarcastically as the Ministry of Fun –​was established to ‘organize, develop and lead the entertainment sector by providing exciting entertainment options and tailored experiences to the needs of people from all walks of life around Saudi Arabia’.264 Certainly, many young men welcomed the 2017–19 GEA entertainment initiatives, but some point out that the majority of these events are ‘too fancy and expensive’ for ordinary Saudis. Moreover, when compared with what is available in neighbouring Dubai, they argue, the standard of entertainment offered in the Kingdom remains poor.265 Furthermore, the majority of GEA events are for families, once again disregarding the interests and needs of young men. Yet, even where there is scepticism, there is acknowledgement that this is a start266 as increased public entertainment is seen as proof that societal transformation is occurring.267 For example, one Riyadh focus group points out that nowadays food trucks are allowed in the plaza in front of King Fahd Library, where previously there was nothing.268 Amongst

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other events, Riyadh witnessed visits by the Harlem Globetrotters and Monster Jam (17–​18 March 2017) in King Fahd Stadium, although a Qassim focus group says ‘we had that in Qassim before so for us it is no big deal’.269 The Gathering270 is another new venue/​event in the capital:  a park with activities such as show-​jumping, fashion shows, children’s hobbies and food trucks. Tickets can be purchased online and sell out very quickly, but unfortunately this is yet another case of ‘families only’.271 Indeed, it is not surprising that many young men across Saudi Arabia believe that the ‘Ministry of Fun’ has so far not responded to their interests.272 As part of Saudi Vision 2030, and under the umbrella of the GEA, previously prohibited forms of public entertainment such as music concerts are now permitted. Culture and entertainment are seen as indispensable to the quality of life, and the government says it will support the efforts of regions, governorates, non-​profit and private sectors to organize cultural events.273 In fact, during 2017–​19 Saudi Arabia witnessed a huge increase in entertainment opportunities, with many genres imported from the West. Yet, although there was initial excitement about the new entertainment opportunities, many young men were quick to realize that some of the acts visiting Saudi Arabia were ‘seriously uncool’ –​for example, Greek musician Yanni –​so not surprisingly some of the excitement dissipated.274 Questions also remain as to the suitability of some of this entertainment, especially when it does not resonate culturally with young Saudi men  –​for instance, the June 2018 concerts given by the Mariinsky Orchestra.275 Young men point out that the targeted audience for this type of entertainment is ‘wealthy Westernized Saudis and expatriates’ rather than ordinary nationals. Additionally, these young men ask whether this type of entertainment is compatible with Saudi notions of national or Islamic identities. Not everyone is happy about the raft of new GEA entertainment initiatives. As mentioned previously, music and live concerts remain highly contentious276 to the extent that one individual argues that they are ‘killing society’  –​everything is about music, not to mention (once again) being too expensive for ordinary Saudis.277 For instance, GEA-​organized events such as Saudi Comic-​Con278 are seen by some critics as ‘cultural imperialism’, diverting the attention of Saudi youth away from Islamic values and traditional socio-​cultural norms.279 Others argue that these new entertainment opportunities are being offered as a way to distract public opinion from economic problems –​a cultural form of the diversionary theory of war.280 Moreover, 2018 entertainment events such as the first televised World Wrestling Entertainment (WWE)281 show held in Jeddah, which attracted 60,000 fans (including Saudi women), and

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the Kingdom’s first ever DJ Party (with world-​famous DJ Armin Van Buuren)282 left some Saudis feeling conflicted, as they feel uncomfortable with this type of entertainment being staged in the Kingdom.283 They argue that these events are not compatible with the Saudi domestic environment; rather, they are ‘outlandish and expensive’ –​characteristics that, once internalized by the younger generations, will weaken the roots of Saudi identity. These Western events damage Saudi culture, harm traditional notions of modesty, erode community values, have no discernible benefits and are completely inappropriate. One young man maintains: ‘this is a step down in Muslim history, may Allah not hold us all accountable for the actions of our sinners’.284 Another says: Of course I disagree with these events in religious, ethical, and cultural terms. These are not our sports, not our habits, and values, and do not match our religion. Saudi Arabia’s religion is the religion of its people and Muslims are 100 percent of its population. It is not simply about following Islamic teachings by growing a beard or wearing short thobes. We do not want alcohol, night clubs and solicitation in public –​may Allah steer us away. We do not want these things forced on us in the name of ‘legitimate entertainment’. In the past, we managed to live peacefully and gracefully and our fathers and grandfathers were satisfied with their lives and had no need to see such ugly things.285

Others concur, saying that WWE and DJ Party are un-​Islamic and un-​ Saudi as they contradict socio-​cultural norms and are ‘definitely, painful digressions’ that will cause an identity crisis especially amongst youth. Moreover, events such as WWE violate educational efforts being made to combat violence amongst young Saudis.286 For these individuals it is clear that importing foreign customs and practices into the Kingdom threatens their perceptions of national and Islamic identity, with accompanying ramifications not only for their own lives, but also for the lives of their future children. Others disagree strongly, viewing the introduction of these events as becoming part of the wider world. Many young men enjoy WWE and therefore are happy that the GEA has introduced new entertainment options, providing the opportunity for fans to watch wrestling live in Saudi Arabia.287 Another young man says that if someone believes a concert or an event such as Saudi Comic-​Con is haram he should remember that no one is forcing him to go.288 As he argues, if everyone considers it to be haram, then no one will go and the event will be cancelled because it would not make money.289 Other young men say the new events are compatible with current socio-​cultural standards because many Saudis, in particular the younger generations, are already heavily influenced by Western culture. Naturally, many of the older generation disapprove of these events, but as ‘everyone watches WWE and music concerts on

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YouTube’ there should not be an issue with the live versions.290 In fact, even though these new entertainment initiatives ‘intrude on traditional Saudi culture’, and are not part of the community’s cultural inheritance, ordinary Saudis have become accustomed to (and have absorbed) global cultural influences. This process has been heightened by social media to the extent that some of these influences have become embedded in contemporary Saudi identities. Hence, the idea of what is culturally acceptable is changing in the Kingdom. The key point is that these influences should not contravene Islamic teachings.291 For other young men the argument is not about cultural suitability but rather about ‘copying someone else completely’, as if Saudi Arabia has nothing original of its own to offer society. In their opinion, this is the wrong way forward, as ‘all we are doing is emulating the West to the detriment of our own culture’. Events such as WWE and DJ Party only appeal to ‘a minority of the population’ whilst damaging Islamic and Arab values. Instead, the younger generation should be encouraged to create entertainment that is original and compatible with the Saudi context.292 This does not mean that young Saudis do not welcome new or foreign cultural influences; rather, they must align with Islamic teachings. For this reason, many young men consider that there are better and more appropriate entertainment opportunities that the GEA could promote: a case of ‘yes to entertainment, no to inappropriate entertainment’. Simply copying the West does not contribute to Saudi societal development, as it is simply ‘subservience to other cultures’.293 Many young men stress that in the final analysis, the GEA must ensure that its entertainment programmes are halal rather than haram.294 3.7

Entertainment Preferences

Despite the GEA entertainment initiatives, many young men would like to see a wider variety of entertainment venues and events that they could attend. They would like more venues such as parks for young men (not families only), more bowling alleys and billiards halls (there are not that many and the facilities are often poor), and places such as youth clubs where they can play games, rather than being confined to ‘singles only’ restaurants and coffee shops.295 Additionally, young men would like more accessible venues such as Comic-​Con, Ithra, cinemas, theatres, sports facilities296(with food trucks), public attractions such as the Dubai fountain at Burj Khalifa, and poetry events297 –​not only music.298 Better beach activities, more gaming and science centres, and decent museums would also be welcomed.299 Some young men would like to see better public libraries, not only for reading but also as venues for socio-​cultural

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events;300 they say that in the existing libraries such as King Fahd Public Library in Riyadh, there are very few lectures or events of interest to them.301 Theme parks such as Wild Wadi in Dubai would attract large numbers of young men, because many visit these when they travel abroad.302 In fact, at the Misk Global Forum303 the CEO of 6 Flags met with Misk chairman Prince Mohammed bin Salman to discuss the opening a 6 Flags in Saudi Arabia.304 As one young man points out, if and when any (or all) of the above open in Saudi Arabia someone (probably a prince) is going to make a great deal of money.305 Another young man from Jeddah observes that 20  years ago there were funfairs in Jeddah, but worries that if these reopen they might be too expensive for many young men.306 Regardless of whether new venues are opened or new entertainment activities provided for young men, one individual in Riyadh probably speaks for a great many young men when he says ‘I will not go anywhere if there are no girls! Who wants to go to any of these places if it is just shabab?’307 When I asked the focus groups why young Saudis travel abroad, there was widespread consensus that they travel for entertainment because just about the only thing they do at home is watch or play football.308 As many young men note, Dubai is hugely popular with Saudis, both with young men and families. Saudis go to Dubai to enjoy a sense of freedom they often do not find at home: Some European men living in Dubai told me that they asked some Saudis why they visited Dubai. Was it to be able to drink and party? But the Saudis replied no:  they come to Dubai to feel more comfortable. Even though they do the same things in Dubai that they do at home, they said that there is no pressure in Dubai.309

An individual in al-​Ahsa says that around 250,000 Saudis went to Dubai at the end-​of-​semester break in January 2017. Indeed, I recall sitting in a Mall of Dubai cinema surrounded by what seemed to be half the population of Riyadh. Therefore, as part of Saudi Vision 2030 the government should ‘mimic Dubai’ and offer similar activities in the Kingdom in order to keep Saudis at home and, most importantly, get them to spend their money in Kingdom.310 For example, in 2017–​18 the previously mentioned Boulevard Riyadh was so successful that at weekends the police were forced to block the entry roads.311 Even the well-​established annual Riyadh Book Fair312 is packed with people  –​ not, as one young man points out, because ‘everyone likes books’, but because it is somewhere different to visit, as well as being a social activity.313

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Although the government is striving to promote domestic tourism (through the activities of the Saudi Commission for Tourism and National Heritage, SCTH),314 some maintain that the problem is that domestic travel can be more expensive than going abroad. One focus group says that if they go to Taif, for example, and want to stay in an international chain hotel, it will cost them more than the same hotel abroad, even though the local facilities might not be of the same standard. Of course, the facilities can be improved to match international standards, but this cannot be done overnight.315 One of Saudi Vision 2030’s initiatives is to promote both domestic and international tourism, as exemplified by the proposed Red Sea Beach Tourism Project announced in August 2017.316 Is a tourism industry in Saudi Arabia viable? Currently, there is only religious tourism for Hajj and Umrah in the Kingdom, and some wonder why foreigners would want to come to Saudi Arabia other than for religious reasons, as ‘it is not like London where there are many places to visit’.317 Others point out that the infrastructure for mass tourism is not in place, but maintain that the biggest obstacle would be that most Saudis are not ready for mass tourism.318 As one focus group contends, if the government wants to attract non-​GCC tourists then some Saudi socio-​cultural norms would have to change or be compromised. As a young man in Riyadh explains: Think about the basics: Western tourists would not be able to drink alcohol and women dress how they please. So in my opinion, we are not ready for tourism at the moment –​maybe after a decade.319

Indeed, developing a domestic tourism industry as well as a leisure sector is fraught with difficulties in Saudi Arabia due to a strict social code whereby women are required to wear loose-​fitting robes, alcohol is banned and public spaces are gender-​segregated.320 Notes 1 Author’s online survey: ‘‫’التحول اإلجتماعي و الرأي العام‬ 2 Ibid. 3 Yamani, ‘Saudi Youth’,  p.115. 4 Umm Al Qura University focus group, Makkah, February 2017. 5 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. 6 Riyadh focus group, May 2017. 7 Ibid. 8 Undergraduates say that in their neighbourhoods they are known, and their families respected, because they are KFUPM students. Nonetheless, whilst some students feel that they are listened to by the university as well as by family and friends, in wider Saudi society, recognition is considered to be ‘negligible’.

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9 In 2014–15 Prince Saud bin Nayef was keen to demonstrate to Eastern Province citizens that he understood the importance of transparency and accountability. The governor and his convoy stopped at red lights (and were photographed) when driving around the regional cities. Respondents commented that this would have been ‘unthinkable’ under his predecessor Prince Mohammed bin Fahd. 10 Anon, ‘The Global Standing of King Fahd University Is Our Pride’, KFUPM News, 17 October 2017, available at: https://​news.kfupm.edu.sa/​en/​2017/​10/​ 17/​global-​standing-​king-​fahd-​university-​our-​pride. 11 Amalgamated anonymous responses to author’s online survey: ‘‫التحول اإلجتماعي‬ ‫’و الرأي العام‬ 12 Ibid. 13 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 14 Yamani, ‘Saudi Youth’,  p.112. 15 The topic of young Saudis wanting to emigrate was raised at various majalis I attended in 2016–​18. 16 Awamiya focus group, April 2017. This concern was also voiced by other individuals in different locations across the Kingdom. 17 al-​Khobar focus group, November 2016. 18 Ibid. 19 Dhahran focus group, November 2016. Some would see the ruling of ‘no cooking’ as eminently sensible! 20 Ibid. 21 al-​Ahsa focus group, June 2017. 22 Dhahran focus group, December 2016. However, if a young man comes from a very religious or conservative family then, in his opinion, this might make a difference. 23 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. 24 Riyadh focus group, October 2016. See, for example: Anon, ‘Riyadh Eases Ban on Single Men in Shopping Malls’, Gulf News, 23 March 2012, available at: http://​gulfnews.com/​news/​gulf/​saudi-​arabia/​riyadheases-​ban-​on-​single-​men-​in-​shopping-​malls-​1.998695. 25 Ibid. One evening in Dhahran Mall in 2016, I saw a young Saudi man (who had managed to get in somehow) with long hair, and wearing a singlet and shorts. From the icy stares of other shoppers, it was perfectly clear that they considered the young man’s appearance to be completely unacceptable. 26 Large afro hairstyles were all the rage around 2010 when I taught at Prince Sultan University (PSU) in Riyadh. Much to the annoyance of the religious police, these hairstyles were accompanied by low-​hanging jeans, exposing the young man’s underwear. 27 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. 28 Ibid. 29 See, for example: Toumi, H., ‘Crackdown on Single Men Paying Women to Access Malls in Saudi Arabia’, Gulf News, 19 November 2014, available at: http://​gulfnews.com/​news/​gulf/​saudi-​arabia/​crackdown-​on-​single-​men-​ paying-​women-​to-​access-​malls-​in-​saudi-​arabia-​1.1414867.

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30 However, one individual says that as a young man he sometimes feels mar�ginalized and excluded, but when he is on the train and he is surrounded by ‘young girls giggling in same high-​pitched voice’ he gets annoyed with them. So it is better to move to the men-​only section where it is nice and quiet. 31 Dhahran focus group, November 2016. 32 Najran focus group, October 2016. 33 Dhahran focus group, December 2016. 34 See: www.theboulevard.com.sa. 35 Riyadh focus group, May 2017. 36 Onaizah focus group, March 2017. 37 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid. 40 Bayat, A., ‘Reclaiming Youthfulness’, in Khalaf, S. and Khalaf, R. (eds) Arab Youth: Social Mobilisation in Times of Risk, Saqi Books, London, 2011, p. 49. 41 Ibid. 42 Riyadh focus group, May 2017. When I first arrived in Saudi Arabia in 2001 it was unheard of to see a young man wearing shorts in public. This was because it was akin to walking around in your underwear. However, nowadays is quite common to see young men in (long-​ish) shorts. 43 Ibid. 44 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. 45 Ibid. 46 Lumsden, K., Boy Racer Culture: Youth Masculinity and Deviance, Routledge, Abingdon, 2013, p. 13. 47 Ibid., p. 19. 48 Anon, ‘Car Accidents Kill over 9,000 People in 2016’, Arab News, 11 May 2017, available at: www.arabnews.com/​node/​1097886/​saudi-​arabia. 49 Anon, ‘One Accident Every Minute, 20 Deaths Daily on Saudi Roads’, Saudi Gazette, 13 December 2017, available at: http://​saudigazette.com .sa/​article/​524118/​SAUDI-​ARABIA/​One-​accident-every-​minute-​20deaths-​daily-​on-​Saudi-​roads. 50 Al Seghayer, Real Face of Saudi Arabia, p. 80. 51 Anon, ‘Disasters of Distracted Driving’, Saudi Gazette, 29 September 2017, available at: http://​saudigazette.com.sa/​article/​518241/​SAUDI-​ARABIA/​ Driving. 52 Ibid. 53 For example, a group in Qassim says ‘here it is terrible, especially in al-​ Mithnab’; Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017. 54 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 55 DeNicola, E., Aburizaize, O., Siddique, A., Khwaja, H. and Carpenter, D., ‘Road Traffic Injury as a Major Public Health Issue in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: A Review’, Frontiers in Public Health, Vol. 4, 30 September 2016, p. 215. 56 Layla, al-​Aflaj focus group, April 2017. 57 Interview with Hamad, Layla, al-​Aflaj, April 2017.

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58 al-​Khobar focus group, November 2016. 59 DeNicola et al., ‘Road Traffic Injury as a Major Public Health Issue’. 60 Ibid. This is what most of the young men I ask tell me. 61 al-​Khobar focus group, December 2016. 62 DeNicola et al., ‘Road Traffic Injury as a Major Public Health Issue’. 63 Safwa focus group, January 2017. 64 Dhahran focus group, November 2016. 65 Saher is an ‘automated system’ for the management of traffic via e-​systems covering major cities in Saudi Arabia. It uses digital camera network technology connected to the National Information Center (NIC). See, for example: Anon, ‘New Mechanism for Saher System Launched’, Arab News, 3 November 2015, available at: www.arabnews.com/​saudi-​arabia/​news/​ 829816. 66 Saleh Kamel was one of the businessmen arrested on corruption charges in November 2017. 67 Safwa focus group, January 2017. 68 Ibid. 69 Ibid. 70 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017. 71 Levkowitz, J., ‘Kings of the Road: The Politicization of Saudi Drifting’, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, 8 December 2015, available at: www.agsiw.org/​kings-​of-​the-​road-​the-​politicization-​of-​saudi-​drifting. 72 There are countless videos of Saudi drifting (and accidents) on YouTube; see, for example: www.youtube.com/​watch?v=4lsdcPKSZ5c. 73 Menoret, Joyriding in Riyadh, p. 173. 74 See, for example: Anon, ‘King Al-​Nazeem, Saudi Drifting Phenomenon, Gets 1,000 Lashes’, The World Post, 13 March 2014, available at: www .huffingtonpost.com/​2014/​03/​12/​king-​al-​nazeem-​1000-​lashes-​saudi-​car-​ drifting_​n_​4950004.html. 75 The minimum drifters’ penalty in Saudi Arabia was approximately SAR 1,000 and the maximum SAR 2,000, before the Council of Ministers approved the modification of traffic law. For the first offence, the drifter would receive a SAR 20,000 penalty in addition to the car being impounded for 15 days. Second-​ time offenders would be fined SAR 40,000 and would be referred to court for the jail sentence to be determined. Their cars would also be impounded for a 30-​day period. Third-​time violators would be fined SAR 60,000 and the court would look into confiscating the vehicle permanently. See: Anon, ‘Saudi Arabia: Stringent Penalties on Drifting’, Asharq Al-​Awsat, 9 August 2016, available at: https://​eng-​archive.aawsat.com/​asharq-​al-​awsat-​english/​ news-​middle-​east/​saudi-​arabia/​saudi-​arabia-​stringent-​penalties-​drifting. 76 Anon, ‘Get the Drift: Top Stuntman Succumbs to Fatal Addiction’, Arab News, 25 September 2016, available at: www.arabnews.com/​node/​989381/​ saudi-​arabia. 77 Najran focus group, October 2016. According to this group, at its most extreme, boredom has been responsible for some young men joining Daesh. 78 Ibid.

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79 See, for example: Anon, ‘Young Reckless Saudi Drifter Records Own Moment of Near Death’, Al Arabiya, 26 December 2016, available at: https://​english.alarabiya.net/​en/​variety/​2016/​12/​26/​Young-​reckless-​Saudi-​ drifter-​records-​own-​moment-​of-​near-​death.html. 80 Najran focus group, October 2016. 81 See: Menoret, Joyriding in Riyadh, p. 137. 82 Fenethylline (BAN, USAN), also spelled phenethylline and fenetylline (INN), and also known as amphetaminoethyltheophylline and amfetyline, is a codrug of amphetamine and theophylline which behaves as a prodrug to both of the aforementioned drugs. It is marketed for use as a psychostimulant under the brand names Captagon, Biocapton and Fitton; https://​lamsaleb.org/​2018/​ 12/​03/​what-​is-​captagon. See also Hilleary, C., ‘Captagon: “Breaking Bad” in Saudi Arabia’, VOA News, 6 November 2015, available at: www.voanews .com/​a/​captagon-​breaking-​bad-​in-​saudi-​arabia/​3044225.html. 83 Saudi Gazette report, ‘17 Million Captagon Tablets Seized during Exam Season’, Saudi Gazette, 15 May 2018, available at: http://​saudigazette.com .sa/​article/​534953. 84 Robins, P., Middle East Drugs Bazaar:  Production, Prevention and Consumption, C. Hurst & Co., London, 2015, p. 127. 85 Ibid. 86 See, for example: Anon, ‘Two Million Captagon Pills Confiscated in Saudi Arabia’s Diba’, Al Arabiya, 4 June 2017, available at: https://​english .alarabiya.net/​en/​variety/​2017/​06/​04/​Two-​million-​Captagon-​pills-​ confiscated-​in-​Saudi-​Arabia-​s-​Diba.html. 87 Saudi Gazette report, ‘17 Million Captagon Tablets Seized during Exam Season’. 88 See: Anon, ‘Captured by Captagon: A New Drug of Choice in the Gulf’, The Economist, 22 July 2017, available at: www.economist.com/​news/​middle-​ east-​and-​africa/​21725167-​dangerous-arrival-dangerous-region-newdrug-​choice-​gulf. 89 See: Hilleary, ‘Captagon: “Breaking Bad” in Saudi Arabia’. 90 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 91 Safwa focus group, January 2017. According to a lot of young men, one of the main problems is that the ‘big dealers are friends with the drugs police or with princes’, so it is always the small dealers who get caught, never the big dealers. 92 Anon, ‘40 Per Cent of Young Saudi Drug Addicts Taking Captagon’, Arab News, 28 October 2015, available at:  www.arabnews.com/​saudi-​arabia/​ news/​826906. 93 Ibid. 94 Safwa focus group, January 2017. 95 Interview with Hamad Layla, al-​Aflaj, April 2017. 96 Ibid. 97 Jeddah focus group, December 2016. 98 Layla, al-​Aflaj focus group, April 2017. 99 Riyadh focus group, March 2017. 100 Umm Al Qura University focus group, Makkah, February 2017.

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101 Jeddah focus group, February 2017. 102 Aziz, A., ‘Depression the Silent Killer Needs Addressing’, Arab News, 30 July 2015, available at: www.arabnews.com/​saudi-​arabia/​news/​783826. 103 Thomas, J., Psychological Well-​Being in the Arab Gulf States: The New Arabia Felix, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, p. 98. 104 In this respect, Saudi Arabia is not very different to a lot of Western countries. 105 Koenig, H., Al Zaben, F., Sehlo, M., Khalifa, D., Al Ahwal, M., Qureshi, N. and Al Habeeb, A., ‘Mental Health Care in Saudi Arabia: Past, Present and Future’, Open Journal of Psychiatry, Vol. 4, Issue 2, 2014, pp. 120–​1. 106 This Ministry is responsible for ‘social insurance, and social care and development. It has charities and cooperative societies, as well as social research, within its jurisdiction’. In keeping with the Kingdom’s Islamic foundation, the Ministry is charged with ensuring that the less fortunate citizens of Saudi Arabia  –​people with disabilities or mental health problems, older people, and those who are destitute –​are cared for within a humane society. ‘Throughout the Kingdom, facilities for the disabled and those needing rehabilitation have been established’. See: www.saudinf.com/​main/​c6v.htm. 107 Safwa focus group, January 2017. 108 Ibid. 109 Ibid. 110 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. 111 Alrahili, N., Almatham, F., Bin Haamed, H. and Ghaziuddin, M., ‘Attitudes to Depression in Saudi Arabia: A Preliminary Study’, International Journal of Culture and Mental Health, Vol. 9, Issue 3, 2016, p. 258. 112 Riyadh focus group, March 2017. 113 Ibid. 114 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. 115 Alrahili et al., ‘Attitudes to Depression in Saudi Arabia’. 116 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. 117 Ibid. 118 Ibid. 119 Ibid. 120 Hegghammer, T., ‘Terrorist Recruitment and Radicalization in Saudi Arabia’, Middle East Policy, Vol. XIII, Issue 4, Winter 2006, p. 39. 121 Al Shihabi, A., The Saudi Kingdom, pp. 69–​70. 122 al-​Majmaah focus group, March 2017. 123 Koomen, W.  and Van Der Pligt, J., The Psychology of Radicalization and Terrorism, Routledge, Abingdon, 2016, p. 243. 124 Al Shihabi, A., The Saudi Kingdom, p. 72. 125 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 126 Hofuf focus group, October 2017. 127 Anon, ‘Saudis Most Likely to Join ISIS, 10 Per Cent of Group’s Fighters Are Women’, Middle East Monitor, 20 October 2014, available at:  www .middleeastmonitor.com/​20141020-​saudis-​most-​likely-​to-​join-​isis-​10-​of-​ groups-​fighters-​are-​women. 128 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18.

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129 Dammam focus group, January 2017. 130 Interview with Aiyoub, Riyadh, April 2017. 131 Ibid. 132 al-​Ahsa focus group, June 2017. 133 Ibid. 134 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 135 Riyadh focus group, May 2017. 136 Dhahran focus group, December 2016. 137 al-​Ahsa focus group, June 2017. 138 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 139 Interview with Hassan, Hofuf, June 2017. 140 Riyadh focus group, March 2017. 141 Anon, ‘Is Saudi Arabia to Blame for Islamic State?’ BBC News, 19 December 2015, available at: www.bbc.com/​news/​world-​middle-​east-​35101612. 142 Riyadh focus group, March 2017. 143 Maher, S., Salafi-​Jihadism: The History of an Idea, C. Hurst & Co., London, p. 204. 144 El-​ Said, H.  and Harrigan, J.  Deradicalizing Violent Extremists:  Counter-​ Radicalization and Deradicalization Programmes and Their Impact in Muslim Majority States, Routledge, Abingdon, 2013, pp. 211–​14. 145 See, for example:  McCarthy, N., ‘Scores Of ISIS Foreign Fighters Have Returned Home’, Forbes, 25 October 2017, available at:  www.forbes .com/​sites/​niallmccarthy/​2017/​10/​25/​scores-​of-​isis-​foreign-​fighters-​have-​ returned-​home-​infographic/​#1a56b9495e8e. 146 Anon, ‘Over 7,000 Die, 40,000 Hurt in Traffic Accidents Annually’, Saudi Gazette, 14 March 2017, available at:  http://​saudigazette.com.sa/​article/​ 174769/​Over-​7000-​die-​40000-​hurt-​in-​traffic-​accidents-​annually. 147 Al Shihabi, A., The Saudi Kingdom, p.  64. Shihabi draws attention to the important distinction between educated youth and underprivileged Saudi youth. 148 Menoret, Joyriding in Riyadh, p. 58. 149 Umm Al Qura University focus group, Makkah, February 2017. 150 Riyadh focus group, March 2017. See also: Murphy, A Kingdom’s Future, p. 129. 151 Qatif, Tarout Island focus group, November 2016. 152 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. In the opinion of one individual, the poor performance of the Saudi Olympic team is ‘shameful’; he blames this problem on school education due to this over-​emphasis on football. 153 Najran focus group, November 2016. ‘I went to a good one in Ras Tanura run by Aramco.’ 154 Dhahran focus group, December 2016. 155 Ibid. 156 Dhahran focus group, November 2016. 157 Ibid. Even at universities such as KFUPM the university clubs are relatively inactive, because of the way they are managed (by students) or because some believe that these clubs are used for ulterior purposes –​‘sometimes we are suspicious about their activities’. 158 Ibid.

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159 Ibid. 160 Najran focus group, October 2016. 161 Ibid. 162 Ibid. 163 Interview with Ahmed, al-​Baha, November 2016. 164 Najran focus group, November 2016. 165 Ibid. 166 Lawrence, M., ‘Istiraha:  A Rare Look Inside the Saudi Man-​ Cave’ Al Arabiya, 27 May 2015, available at: https://​english.alarabiya.net/​en/​variety/​ 2015/​05/​27/​Istiraha-​A-​rare-​look-​inside-​the-​Saudi-​man-​cave.html. 167 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017. 168 Layla, al-​Aflaj focus group, April 2017. 169 Umm Al Qura University focus group, Makkah, February 2017. One of the group members also says that this helps his English language skills more than studying at university. 170 Ibid. 171 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 172 There are also istirahat for families –​some very luxurious with swimming pools. 173 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017. 174 Ibid. 175 Ibid. 176 al-​Khobar focus group, January 2017. 177 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017. 178 Ibid. 179 Ibid. 180 Al Sughair, S., ‘Dune Bashing in KSA Needs Support’, Arab News, 1 September 2016, available at:  www.arabnews.com/​node/​978426/​saudiarabia. 181 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017. 182 Amos, D., ‘As Saudi Arabia’s Love of Online Gaming Grows, Developers Bloom’, Parallels, 10 August 2015, available at:  www.npr.org/​sections/ parallels/​2015/​08/​10/​431241078/​saudi-​arabias-​passion-​for-​online-​gaming. 183 Qatif, Tarout Island focus group, November 2016. 184 Umm Al Qura University focus group, Makkah, February 2017. 185 Ibid. 186 Sisler, V., ‘Virtual World, Digital Dreams’, in Zayani, M. (ed.) Digital Middle East:  State and Society in the Information Age, C.  Hurst & Co., London, 2018, pp. 79–​80. 187 Qatif, Tarout Island focus group, November 2016. University students who live on campuses such as those at KFUPM say that the university authorities block all gaming sites on the Internet (amongst other things). 188 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 189 Qatif, Tarout Island focus group, November 2016. 190 Onaizah focus group, March 2017. 191 Anon, ‘Video Games Promote Violence and Terrorism’, Arab News, 16 October 2105, available at: www.arabnews.com/​saudi-​arabia/​news/​821011. 192 Conversation with UAE policy-​maker, Kuwait City, March 2017.

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193 Ibid. 194 Baloot is a popular trick card game played in GCC countries, which is similar to the French game Belote. 195 Qatif, Tarout Island focus group, November 2016. 196 Ibid. ‘Maybe it’s mainly amongst educated guys and in the Eastern Province.’ 197 Zaini, S., ‘Nostalgia for the Past:  Saudis Lead Revival in Board Games’, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, 23 October 2017, available at: www.agsiw.org/​nostalgia-​past-​saudis-​lead-​revival-​board-​games. 198 I see the students playing this in the KFUPM Student Mall. See: www.jarir .com/​sa-​en/​non-​branded-​toys-​461667.html. 199 Qatif, Tarout Island focus group, November 2016.There is also Kuwaiti Deal, Bahraini Deal and even Khaleeji (Gulf) Deal. 200 Ibid. 201 Zaini, ‘Nostalgia for the Past’. 202 Ibid. 203 Qatif, Tarout Island focus group, November 2016. 204 See: www.bodymastersksa.com. 205 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. 206 Najran focus group, October 2016. 207 See: www.fitnesstime.com.sa/​english. 208 In 2017, the company launched Fitness Time Ladies, with chairman Abdulmohsen Al Haqbani announcing that the company planned to open 100 ladies-​only fitness centres in Saudi Arabia over the next six years. 209 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 210 Umm Al Qura University focus group, Makkah, February 2017. 211 Layla, al-​Aflaj focus group, April 2017. 212 Anon, ‘Cinemas to Re-​ open in Saudi Arabia as of 2018, Ministry of Information Confirms’, Arab News, 11 December 2017, available at: www .arabnews.com/​node/​1207261/​saudi-​arabia. 213 Riyadh focus group, October 2016. 214 Qatif, Tarout Island focus group, November 2016. 215 Riyadh focus group, May 2017. 216 Ibid. 217 Ibid. 218 Ibid. 219 Interview with Basil, al-​Qurayyat, December 2016. 220 Umm Al Qura University focus group, Makkah, February 2017. 221 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017. 222 Riyadh focus group, October 2016. 223 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. 224 Qatif focus group, December 2016. 225 Dhahran focus group, November 2016. 226 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017. 227 Layla, al-​Aflaj focus group, April 2017. 228 Ibid. 229 Onaizah focus group, March 2017. 230 Ibid.

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231 There are plans to start building a ‘Saudiwood’. See, for example:  Paul, K., ‘Sovereign Fund to Invest in New Saudi Entertainment City’, Reuters, 8 April 2017, available at:  www.reuters.com/​article/​saudi-​entertainment-​ six-​flags-​entmt/​sovereign-​fund-​to-​invest-​in-​new-​saudi-​entertainment-​city-​ idUSL8N1HG04I. 232 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017. 233 See, for example:  Anon, ‘Saudi Arabia Allows Concerts  –​Even Country Music’, The Economist, 1 June 2017, available at:  www.economist.com/​ news/​middle-​east-​and-​africa/​21722829-​puritanical-​kingdom-​experiments-​ entertainment-​saudi-​arabia-​allows. 234 Hunter-​Tilney, L., ‘The Secret Sounds of Saudi Arabia –​from Rock and Rap to Black Metal’, Financial Times, 8 March 2018, available at:  www .ft.com/​content/​2cc2fb5e-​2066-​11e8-​a895-​1ba1f72c2c11. 235 al-​Ahsa focus group, June 2017. 236 Ibid. 237 Ibid. 238 See, for example:  Khan, G.  and Taha, S., ‘Janadriyah Fest Celebrates Symbols of Saudi Identity’, Arab News, 5 February 2017, available at: www .arabnews.com/​node/​1049416/​saudi-​arabia. 239 Dammam focus group, December 2016. 240 al-​Ahsa focus group, June 2017. 241 Ibid. 242 Riyadh focus group, May 2017 243 al-​Ahsa focus group, June 2017. 244 Riyadh focus group, April 2017 245 Ibid. ‘I am half-​Lebanese so I have friends/​people there who give me tips and ideas.’ 246 Ibid. 247 Interview with Abdullah, Riyadh, April 2017. 248 Interview with Talal, Riyadh, April 2017. 249 Jeddah focus group, February 2017. 250 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 251 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. ‘In my free time, I mainly write music and poetry. I used to listen to music with my parents, but I did not decide what type of music I wanted to make until last year.’ 252 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. 253 Ibid. ‘And I have a friend who plays the piano. He is self-​taught and he is a great player.’ 254 Interview with Ali, Riyadh, December 2016. 255 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. ‘There is no Saudi music press, it is all from social media and even if there is something published somewhere, it is not advertised.’ 256 Interview with Abdulaziz, Riyadh, April 2017. 257 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. 258 Ibid. ‘We are going to be the Middle East version of the Beatles. Perhaps we should call ourselves the Dung Beatles!’ They point out that it becomes ten times more controversial if they talk to young women about their music project.

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259 Ibid. ‘We need to try and make this a movement like punk (anti-​ establishment).’ I  visited this group at one of the young men’s parents’ apartment in central Riyadh, where they played me their music. 260 Ibid. Although they concede that they also listen to ‘trash’ sometimes. 261 See, for example:  Dennaoui, H., ‘Klash:  New Direction, Same Passion’, Arab News, 24 December 2014, available at:  www.arabnews.com/​offbeat/​ news/​678906#photo/​2. 262 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. 263 The General Entertainment Authority is responsible for all active entertainment-​related activities in Saudi Arabia. It was created on 7 May 2016. See: http://​gea.gov.sa/​en. 264 Ibid. 265 Onaizah focus group, March 2017. 266 Riyadh focus group, March 2017. 267 See, for example, Abu-​Nasr, D. and Almashabi, D., ‘Why Saudi Arabia Is Suddenly Allowing a Lot More Fun’, Bloomberg, 5 January 2017, available at:  www.bloomberg.com/​news/​articles/​2017-​01-​05/​as-​shock-therapyhits-​home-​saudis-​get-​to-​have-​a-​little-​fun. 268 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 269 Onaizah focus group, March 2017. 270 The venue for this event changes as it takes place in different part of Riyadh. See: https://​twitter.com/​THEGATHERINGKSA. 271 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 272 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 273 Government of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Saudi Vision 2030, p. 22. 274 See:  Hameed, N., ‘Yanni “So Happy” to Perform in Saudi Arabia’, Arab News, 30 November 2017, available at: www.arabnews.com/​node/​1201696/​ saudi-​arabia. 275 See:  Saudi Gazette report, ‘Russian Mariinsky Orchestra Enthralls Audience in Dhahran’, Saudi Gazette, 20 June 2018, available at: http://​live .saudigazette.com.sa/​article/​537221/​SAUDI-​ARABIA/​Russian-​MariinskyOrchestra-​enthralls-​audience-​in-​Dhahran. 276 Riyadh focus group, May 2017. 277 al-​Ahsa focus group, June 2017. 278 See, for example:  Fareed, A., ‘7,000 Fans Flock to the First-​Ever Saudi Comic Con in Jeddah’, Arab News, 17 February 2017, available at:  www .arabnews.com/​node/​1055511/​saudi-​arabia; www.saudicomiccon.com. 279 Onaizah focus group, March 2017. 280 Dhahran focus group, December 2016. 281 See, for example: Al Mayman, H. and Abid, A., ‘First-​Ever WWE Greatest Royal Rumble Wows 60,000 in Jeddah’, Arab News, 28 April 2018, available at: www.arabnews.com/​node/​1292836/​offbeat. 282 Anon, ‘Saudi Arabia Plans First DJ Party amid Cultural Shake-​up’, Arabian Business, 20 March 2018, available at:  www.arabianbusiness.com/​arts/​ 392380-​saudi-​arabia-​plans-​first-​dj-​party-​amid-​cultural-​shake-​up. 283 Author’s survey: ‫ هل تعتقد أن الفعاليات التي تمت مؤخرًا في جدة مثل‬،‫ برأيك‬WWE ‫ و حفلة‬DJ ‫ تتناسب مع المعايير السعودية؟‬This short written survey with 150 male respondents

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gauged opinion about the suitability of WWE and DJ Party to Saudi norms. Two-​thirds hold negative views about these types of events. 284 Ibid. 285 Ibid. 286 Dhahran focus group, May 2018. 287 Ibid. ‘Me and my family used to watch wrestling ten years ago so we had a lot of fun watching the show, especially when the Undertaker showed up. We are looking forward to more, actually.’ 288 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. The Riyadh musicians believe that the government is experimenting to see how Saudi society reacts. Although these ‘music experiments’ are happening slowly, the group hopes for progress, but there is a need to tread carefully. 289 al-​Ahsa focus group, June 2017. 290 Author’s survey on WWE and DJ Party. 291 Ibid. For instance, a young man contends that the suitability of DJ Parties depends on the Saudi authorities segregating genders and selecting appropriate music. 292 Response to author’s survey: ‫العولمة والهوية‬ 293 Author’s survey on WWE and DJ Party. 294 Ibid. 295 Umm Al Qura University focus group, Makkah, February 2017. There is a new venue with billiards in Olaya district in Riyadh that is suitably dark. It has a typical ‘bar’ atmosphere –​but without alcohol, of course. 296 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017. ‘Yes we have football clubs, in fact my three brothers go to the local club every day for training (it makes my mother very happy) and this killed the boredom problem.’ 297 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. 298 Ibid. 299 Ibid. 300 Ibid. 301 Ibid. 302 Ibid. 303 See, for example:  Hassan, R., ‘Misk Global Forum to Explore Youth Entrepreneurship, Innovation’, Arab News, 14 November 2106, available at: www.arabnews.com/​node/​1010416/​saudi-​arabia. 304 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 305 Ibid. 306 Dhahran focus group, December 2016. 307 Riyadh focus group, May 2017. 308 Jeddah focus group, December 2016. ‘Also other families encourage you to go.’ 309 Ibid. 310 al-​Ahsa focus group, June 2017. ‘In the past, Saudis were not used to travelling, but then everyone started to go abroad and spent millions outside of the Kingdom. However, nowadays, because of the economic slowdown this is changing as ordinary Saudis tighten their belts. Therefore, Saudis might not travel as much in the near future unless they are upper-​middle class.’

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311 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 312 See, for example: Hassan, R., ‘Riyadh International Book Fair 2017 Begins Wednesday’, Arab News, 8 March 2017, available at: www.arabnews.com/​ node/​1064941/​saudi-​arabia; http://​riyadhbookfair.org.sa. 313 Jeddah focus group, December 2016. 314 See: https://​scth.gov.sa/​en/​Pages/​default.aspx. 315 Riyadh focus group, May 2017. 316 See:  Shahine, A.  and Nereim, V., ‘Saudi Arabia Plans a Huge Red Sea Beach Tourism Project’, Bloomberg, 1 August 2017, available at:  www .bloomberg.com/​news/​articles/​2017-​08-​01/​saudi-​arabia-​unveils-​plans-​formega-​red-​sea-​tourism-​project. 317 Layla, al-​Aflaj focus group, April 2017. 318 Riyadh focus group, May 2017. 319 Ibid. 320 Paul, K., ‘Sovereign Fund to Invest in New Saudi Entertainment City’.

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1

Saudi Vision  2030

1.1

Reaching Out to the Youth

Since then-​ Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman unveiled Saudi Vision 20301 in April 2016 and the NTP 20202 in June of the same year, a great deal of analysis has focused on the potential impact of Saudi Vision 2030 at the national level.3 Prince Mohammed, Diwan points out, wanted to establish a more direct connection with the young populace, but despite the prince’s strong youth appeal, in reality he is asking more of them: more contributions to the economy, more personal sacrifice for the country.4 Vision 2030 is a wide-​ranging plan to diversify the Kingdom’s economy and reduce oil-​dependency, thereby transforming Saudi Arabia’s economic model by making the private sector the engine for growth and jobs.5 In light of oil price fluctuations since 2014, the Saudi government has attempted to respond to socio-​economic pressures by introducing new policies and establishing a variety of new bodies such as CEDA in order to deal with a changing economic environment. On May 2016, as a part of Saudi Vision 2030, the government introduced a major restructuring of key ministries, including the Saudi oil ministry. Ali Al-​Naimi, in charge of Saudi Arabia’s energy policy since 1995, was replaced by Aramco CEO Khaled Al Falih, who now heads the newly created Ministry of Energy, Industry and Natural Resources. Other notable appointments included the popular Minister of Health Tawfiq Al Rabiah (formerly Minister of Commerce and Industry); Majed Al Qasabi, who heads the newly created Commerce and Investment Ministry, and Ahmed Alkholifey, governor of Saudi Arabia’s Central Bank (SAMA).6 Young Saudis are a natural constituency for this national transformation initiative and, not surprisingly, as Diwan observes, there have been concerted efforts by the government to reach out to the youth.7 For

281

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example, young social media personalities were present at the unveiling of Vision 2030 and others have been recruited for positions within the transition team. Moreover, simultaneously the Ministry of Culture and Information under the leadership of a young and liberal journalist, Adel Al Toraifi,8 courted Internet-​based entertainment groups popular with Saudi youth.9 In addition, in November 2016, 2017 and 2018 Crown Prince Mohammed’s Misk organization convened its Misk Global Forum in Riyadh, dedicated to discussing priorities related to the ‘enhancement of the life of Saudi youth’.10 Tagged ‘The Biggest Youth Event in the Middle East’, the aim of Misk Global Forum is to address related Saudi Vision 2030 issues such as improving the cost of living, providing affordable housing, increasing the safety of communities, creating opportunities for education and training, and driving healthier employment opportunities in order to ensure long-​term prosperity.11 The Misk Global Forum attracts large numbers of young Saudis, and is hugely popular. I attended the 2017 and 2018 events (‘Meeting the Challenge of Change’ and ‘The Skills for Our Tomorrow’) and saw how the issues raised at the forums resonated with young nationals. That said, events such as Misk Global Forum and Vision 2030, which promise improved futures and better governance, have raised expectations amongst many young people. Indeed, Almaeena argues in ‘No Turning Back’ that these new reforms are giving young Saudis hope, but this in turn could prove to be a double-​edged sword if expectations are raised, but not met.12 Many young Saudis surveyed for this book wonder whether their parents’ generation experienced the ‘good times’ and whether in the future their own lives will be easier or more difficult, particularly in socio-​economic terms.13 Therefore, how has Vision 2030 been interpreted by young Saudi men many of whom are struggling to enter the labour market at a time of economic uncertainty? Do these individuals see Vision 2030 as a viable response to their concerns and aspirations? In their opinion, can Vision 2030 address the potentially combustible combination of unemployment, lack of affordable housing and rising living costs as discussed in Chapter 2? Whilst an event such as the Misk Global Forum addresses these issues (to a degree), it remains primarily an ‘elite’ event, and therefore often beyond the means and reach of ordinary young men.14 Still, a central issue is that the under-​25 demographic is key to understanding the future of Saudi Arabia and thus, it is imperative that the Saudi government includes the majority of the population  –​youth  –​in consultation and decision-​making processes related to Vision 2030. In truth, a comprehension of how young Saudi men perceive Vision 2030 is not only pertinent in the Saudi national context (or indeed multiple Saudi domestic contexts), but also has

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wider regional relevance considering oil-​ market developments, economic policy and other regional national visions. 1.2

A Cautious Welcome

In Saudi Arabia it has often been the case that highly publicized government initiatives, for example King Abdulaziz Center for National Dialogue (KACND) National Meetings,15 go relatively unnoticed by large parts of the population (so the issue is why government initiatives frequently fail to connect with the public). Yet, when Vision 2030 was launched in April 2016 it appeared that the project resonated, and was welcomed, by many young Saudis as an encouraging step forward. Certainly, Vision 2030 was interpreted as a blueprint for more inclusivity and societal participation –​in other words, a renegotiated Saudi social contract –​with some declaring that Vision 2030 should free Saudi Arabia from socio-​tribal traditions that have stifled viable reform for years.16 Still, even at the outset, some young men maintained that if Vision 2030 fails to meet societal expectations then its socio-​economic perspective could suddenly assume significant socio-​ political significance, potentially destabilizing the existing social contract.17 Many young Saudi men I spoke to in 2016 were gratified that Prince Mohammed bin Salman ‘spoke his mind’ and appeared to be transparent not only about his plans, but also about the challenges facing Saudi Arabia. For instance, a young man in Eastern Province says that following the unveiling of Vision 2030, ‘social media accounts were inundated with positive comments from young Saudis’.18 Indeed, according to France-​ based social media monitor Semiocast some 190,000 Twitter users in Saudi Arabia actively took part in the ensuing debate about Vision 2030, generating more than 860,000 messages.19 This meant that the discussion reached 46 per cent of the 7.4 million active Saudi Twitter users; Semiocast described this level of outreach in a state-​sponsored debate as exceptional.20 The fact that Vision 2030 was promoted on social media constituted a ‘new development for the Kingdom’ and in consequence, in its initial stages, this was one of the main reasons that Vision 2030 resonated with many young people.21 The way Vision 2030 was announced on Al Arabiya was unprecedented. For these young Saudis this was something ‘new and exciting’ –​ a 31-​year-​old prince outlining the future of the Kingdom, and one who seemed to be more in tune with its young population.22 As many young men stress, young Saudis were used to hearing this type of news from the 60-​plus generation who, however well-​meaning, were usually out of touch with the Kingdom’s youthful population.23 Kinninmont notes

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that for the first time in Saudi Arabia, socio-​economic reforms are being espoused by a leader who is both very senior in the royal family and very young, belonging to the generation that will face the post-​oil age in their own lifetimes.24 An electrical engineering student in Eastern Province commented that he had never seen this kind of transparency before –​not just domestic transparency, but also global transparency in the interviews Prince Mohammed gave to international publications such as the New York Times, The Economist and Bloomberg.25 This initial transparency fostered a sense of optimism, with another young man declaring that Vision 2030 is significant because ‘it could change the Kingdom’s history forever’.26 Others point out that if only 75 per cent of the Vision is achieved this would still constitute a great success.27 Nonetheless, for some young men a major complaint was that in its initial stages they had to learn about Vision 2030 from foreign media sources rather than domestic ones, and this to them indicated a lack of openness.28 One young man complained that if a Saudi wanted to understand Vision 2030 then he needed to look at what was said at the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos29 or read articles on Bloomberg  –​ Saudis were not able to read about the same issues in Ar Riyadh, for example.30 That said, there was widespread consensus amongst young men that regardless of where Vision 2030 is publicized, the bottom line is that Saudi Arabia (and government) continues to follow and apply the teachings of the Holy Qur’an.31 Still, Vision 2030 is necessary, maintains an undergraduate finance student, because with oil price fluctuations it is paramount that the government takes action to reduce the Kingdom’s oil-​ dependency.32 Significantly, Saudi Arabia has critical domestic demands, including, as Saidi and McCall point out, Saudi youth employment and wage growth expectations.33 Hence, young men argue that the Kingdom must diversify its economy ‘sooner rather than later’ as alternative sources of income are required, especially as oil price variability impacts on government expenditure. Many young men concede that Vision 2030 is a case of ‘better late than never’, as it will encourage economic diversification, thereby bringing greater stability to the socio-​economic environment.34 This in turn will contribute to improvement in living standards for both Saudis and expatriates alike. Yet, even at the time of the Vision’s launch, there was consensus amongst these young men that reducing unemployment and providing affordable housing and decent healthcare should be the government’s ‘top priorities’, as these issues are considered the most contentious and problematic in wider society.35 As one young man argues: ‘basically if we have jobs, houses and good hospitals then everything is satisfactory’.36 In sum, young men believe strongly that

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Vision 2030 should be about improving the living standards of ordinary Saudis.37 Although the launching of Vision 2030 was accompanied by great fanfare and extensive media coverage, many young men contend that the implementation of it will be more important that the unveiling: ‘In the beginning, it was just an abstract’, says one individual, ‘but from now on it has got to be the full paper’.38 As an abstract concept, Vision 2030 has the support of many young Saudis  –​‘in theory it is perfect’  –​but the results need to be assessed on a yearly basis.39 Ulrichsen points out correctly that the intent to transform Saudi Arabia is clearly there, but it has to be matched and underpinned by capability40 and not disregard the Kingdom’s considerable human capital.41 Indeed, there is concern amongst some young men about whether Vision 2030 can be fully implemented, with some sounding a note of caution about it being ‘overly optimistic’. One young man’s comments reflect wider concern about how these ‘ambitious plans’ can be implemented by 2030. In his opinion this is certainly a ‘big ask’: implementation might be another thing altogether as, quite clearly, the ‘devil will be in the detail’42 –​in particular as the Vision’s momentum needs to be maintained right up to 2030.43 What is more, young men also stress that it needs to be ‘implemented correctly’ as this is an opportunity to prevent future economic crises and maintain, or hopefully raise, Saudi living standards.44 One young man in Riyadh believes that the government understands how to act politically vis-​à-​vis Vision 2030, but needs to prove to wider society that its economic policies are viable in the long term.45 In his opinion, the optimum solution would be to concentrate on spending Saudi Arabia’s oil revenue where it is most needed, but in 2017 he emphasized that the remaining timeframe for implementation was very short.46 In truth, many focus group members speculate whether the highly ambitious plans outlined in the Vision 2030 document can be achieved in the allotted time.47 Yet, for a member of another Riyadh focus group the answer is simple: more government transparency and accountability coupled with an attitude of ‘start doing and stop talking’.48 Another issue that concerns some well-​educated young men is the possibility that the oil price could recover to pre-​2014 levels. An economic consultant in Riyadh says he jokes with his team that if the oil price increases substantially then they will all be without a job, ‘as Vision 2030 would no longer be necessary’.49 The concern here is that should the oil price recover sufficiently, the government could lose the incentive to push ahead with economic reforms. It would be a case of returning to the ‘bad old ways’ of doing things and abandoning necessary socio-​economic transformation.

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One young man remarks that the concern about implementation does not mean that Saudis cannot be optimistic about Vision 2030 and wish that it achieves all its objectives.50 As Fahad Nazer observes, although scepticism about Vision 2030’s success abounds in the West as well as amongst some Saudis: There is also a significant segment of Saudis who appear to value it as a much-​ needed effort to wean the country off its dependence on oil revenue. At the same time, some Saudis are eager for a restructuring of the social contract that redefines the relationship between the state and its citizenry. Vision 2030 aims to make Saudi citizens stakeholders in building the future Saudi economy emphasizing public-​private partnerships, accountability, transparency, and efficiency. There is no doubt that the package of reforms is as ambitious in its goals as it is broad in its scope. The question remains if the stated commitment of the Saudi leadership to its implementation will survive the many challenges that lie ahead.51

According to another young man, although the Vision’s key performance indicators (KPIs) are ambitious, Vision 2030 needs to be so otherwise it would not be a vision.52 Moreover, another young economic consultant in Riyadh argues that a great many media sources missed the point by saying that the Vision ‘is just goals and that there are no real plans yet’. In his opinion, from the outset Vision 2030 had a clear and significant goal: to shift the attitude of the youth to become more future-​oriented, and to set goals and try and achieve these goals –​in other words, to be ambitious.53 Some young men observe that Vision 2030 is not one-​dimensional, as it also encompasses socio-​cultural issues:  for example, aiming to increase the number of Saudis who exercise daily from 13 per cent to 40 per cent.54 This is an interesting goal, remarks one individual, as Saudi society has rarely heard a senior prince (or princess, e.g.  Princess Reema bint Bandar)55 discuss this type of issue before.56 Another young man maintains that the Vision’s priorities should be ‘promoting freedom and respecting human rights’.57 He also argues that the government should implement strict laws that prevent anyone from overstepping the mark  –​including the government itself  –​and deal with anyone who expresses a personal opinion that defames another person or constituency: in other words, guaranteeing freedom of speech and thinking for the individual, and criminalization for everyone who ignites the flames of sectarianism and sedition between Saudis. Justice between all levels of society must be promoted as part of Vision 2030, and even if the current situation is bleak, hope and optimism are the only solutions for the future.58 However, there is broad consensus that none of the

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above should endanger national security, mirroring the widespread fear of fitna across Saudi society.59 Although there are young men who admit to having little detailed knowledge of Vision 2030, they still deem it important in the long term as Vision 2030 could demonstrate the extent that the rulers are interested in developing Saudi Arabia with significant input from its young citizens.60 Certainly, as discussed in Chapter 3 the pace of societal transformation is rapid, and therefore by 2030 the socio-​economic and socio-​cultural transformations could be enormous –​and, as some point out, not necessarily for the better.61 However, if certain aspects of the Vision are a success then, according to a focus group in Abha, ordinary Saudis will be content because Vision 2030 will ‘transfer them from the past to the future. It is a case of no pain equals no gain and Saudi Arabia needs to change.’62 At the launching of Vision 2030 in April 2016 Prince Mohammed bin Salman appeared to have the support of young Saudis, with many prepared to give his Vision the benefit of the doubt –​that is, a ‘honeymoon period’. Nonetheless, there is strong belief that Vision 2030 cannot succeed unless society is included, so ordinary Saudis, in particular the youth, must have a say in their country’s future. In the years after the Vision’s launch, whilst the domestic political space narrowed, the majority of young Saudis continued to support the crown prince’s socio-​economic reforms, mindful that a return to a more restrictive society was possible. For instance, many young men cite their own parents’ social experiences post-​1979.63 Yet when I look at the young men in my KFUPM classes or the young Saudis attending event such as Misk Global Forum, it is very clear that this human capital represents the future of Vision 2030. Indeed, Vision 2030 cannot succeed unless the architects of the Vision have Saudi society ‘on side’ and are able to implement the Vision’s goals whilst delivering on specifics. 1.3

Expectations and Aspirations

Undeniably, Saudi Arabia has entered a new era that requires adopting a new ‘post-​oil mentality’, with many young men understanding that the guiding principles behind Vision 2030 are necessary.64 Linked to this, Saudi government rhetoric and media reporting of Vision 2030 frequently cite the Kingdom’s demographics and the necessity of responding to youth expectations and aspirations. What exactly are those expectations and aspirations? To what degree do young Saudi men feel that Vision 2030 relates to their individual concerns and broader views on the development of the Kingdom?

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Firstly, according to one university graduate, any vision is better than having no vision at all –​you set the goals and then try to build a plan to achieve those objectives. If this is accomplished there will be improvements across all sectors, as indicated by Vision 2030 documentation,65 and, he argues, a ‘quantum leap for the Kingdom bridging the gap between education and industry’.66 Another individual says that there is no reason why Saudi Arabia cannot become a powerful player in the fields of industry and education as long as Vision 2030 ‘kick-​starts’ processes that have been moribund since the 1980s.67 There is consensus amongst these young men that improved educational standards are the ‘key’ to successful national development and to Vision 2030 achieving its stated goals. Improved educational standards are essential in order to create a diversity of income sources in the Kingdom that in turn will replenish the economy and create greater employment opportunities. Young men stress that high educational standards are the ‘building blocks’ for any state, and for this reason the standard of teaching –​in particular in state school education –​must improve.68 Kinninmont observes that technical and vocational education will also be of key importance, but acknowledges the often slow pace of educational reform, in particular as education is ‘one of the strongest bastions of clerical power’.69 She notes correctly that a generation of less-​educated youth will find it difficult to enter private-​sector employment as per one of Vision 2030’s objectives and, in consequence, are likely to need economic and social support.70 Some young men would like to work outside Saudi Arabia, in particular in non-​oil-​dependent states, in order to see how these governments manage their economies.71 This acquired expertise and experience could then be transferred back to the Kingdom. In turn, Saudi Arabia could have the Middle East’s largest industrial headquarters and ship the largest amount of technology overseas. There is belief that a strong economy, a strong currency and a more politically aware, well-​educated society will ensure that Saudi Arabia remains the ‘centre of the Middle East and west Asia’.72 For this reason, many young men believe it is the government’s duty to motivate the youth as well as to assist young men to acquire the experience they need to improve their employment opportunities in both the public and private sectors. In addition, some individuals argue that young people can help the public sector compete with the private sector, and this competition would be beneficial for the overall economy.73 This could achieve positive results, with one young man asserting it would ‘raise the Kingdom up economically, politically, and socially’.74 As one individual remarks, it is about not only developing the economy, but also increasing the productivity of the individual and by extension society.75

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Nonetheless, another person stresses that to achieve this goal it is necessary to change the mindset of young men so that they ‘do not restrict their ambitions and interests to public-​sector or military jobs’.76 The diversification of the national economy is a major concern for many young men. In fact, many complain that economic reform should have been implemented decades ago, whilst also stressing that lessons need to be learnt from past mistakes  –​particularly as they believe the national oil revenue was not exploited correctly.77 What is worse, according to many young men, was the vast sums of money wasted all too often on princely ‘vanity projects’.78 As one individual complains:  ‘All the money earned from oil in the last decade, where did it all go?’79 An opinion piece for a newspaper in Makkah makes the same point, with the writer noting that if every Saudi riyal received from oil exports had been used constructively without being tainted by corruption, the Kingdom’s economic condition would be far better: At present we face problems such as unemployment, shortage of housing, and a lack of qualified professionals. In seven years we earned SR7 trillion from oil exports but this huge revenue was evaporated as a result of imaginary projects and rampant corruption, which provided the chance for a few people to get rich. This not only delayed overall development in the country but also created a monopoly of goods and services. It also led to disruption of projects and massive disasters such as floods.80

Accordingly, young men think that the government’s number one priority should be to start working on creating alternative sources of income  –​‘not just talk, infographics and PowerPoints’  –​utilizing the national oil as a tool to achieve this goal.81 Government economic diversification plans must be viable so that they benefit leading Saudi businesses rather than being ‘purely cosmetic in order to show off or save face’.82 Indeed, many young men believe that Saudi Arabia must become more industrially self-​sufficient with better-​quality public transportation systems such as the Riyadh metro. Improvements in all service areas will contribute to the acceleration of future projects, which some see as moving the Kingdom from an industrial economy to a high-​tech one that will help to create high-​income job opportunities.83 For others, the government should also promote renewable energy opportunities so that Saudi Arabia can address its escalating electricity usage problem and become a pioneering state in the field of renewable energy.84 Yet others contend that there should be a total transformation of oil production to petrochemical production, because if Vision 2030 can achieve this then the Kingdom would become the pre-​eminent global petrochemical producer.85 A Dhahran focus group argues that the transformation from oil

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production to petrochemical production would enhance the Kingdom’s role in the global market, refill the state’s coffers and create ‘the highest civilization in the world’.86 For many young men, the central argument is whether Saudi Arabia can become a fully developed industrial state that is responsible for its own politico-​economic decisions. In other words, the Kingdom should be able to manufacture what it needs in terms of goods, as well as creating a domestic defence industry in order to defend its territory and that of its allies and neighbours.87 Yet, one young man in Makkah disagrees, arguing that Prince Mohammed bin Salman should minimize military spending,88 even though the majority of this focus group declares that the region needs more military spending.89 In fact, in May 2017, the Saudi Arabian Public Investment Fund (PIF) announced the creation of a new national military industries company, Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI), that will manufacture products and provide services across four business units:  Air Systems, which includes maintenance and repair of fixed-​wing aircraft as well as manufacturing and repair of unmanned air vehicles; Land Systems, which includes manufacturing and repair of military vehicles; Weapons and Missiles, including ammunition; and Defense Electronics, which includes radars and sensors as well as communication systems and electronic warfare.90 As Arab News reported: Wholly government-​owned, SAMI aims to become one of the world’s top 25 defense companies by 2030. It will directly contribute around SR14 billion to the Kingdom’s GDP in 2030, invest over SR6 billion in research and development by 2030, and create over 40,000 jobs, many of which will be in the engineering and technical fields. By partnering with universities, SAMI will provide students with apprenticeships and careers in cutting edge technologies, which were previously unavailable in the Kingdom. In line with Vision 2030, SAMI will contribute to diversifying the Saudi economy for the 21st century by reducing dependence on oil, while protecting and strengthening national security.91

The introduction of heavy industries such as defence, car or plane manufacturing is appealing to many young men. These individuals see transforming the Kingdom’s economy away from oil-​dependency to other sectors such as military equipment, car manufacturing and oil derivatives as a way to become ‘completely dependent on domestic production’.92 Saudi Arabia could create a new manufacturing sector, says a young man from Najran, and in consequence export many types of goods precisely because it has a young population to work in this sector.93 Indeed, there is consensus that the government should implement policies that would diversify the economy by building new domestic factories, ‘because we have the money and power to do this’.94 Moreover, this is perceived

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as a possible stepping stone to Saudi Arabia being able to ‘stand on its own; able to diversify its income sources so as to become a producing state rather than a purchasing one’.95 These young men contend that establishing factories in every industrial sector would create jobs for the unemployed across the Kingdom as well as for new graduates leaving the education system. This would also help to decrease dependency on foreign labour, with one individual asserting that foreign workers who do not have qualifications and experience that can benefit Saudi society ‘should be deported’.96 Even those with less extreme views contend that greater numbers of Saudis must enter the labour market, thereby reducing the number of expatriate workers, ‘which would be a good thing’.97 However, as Jones and Punshi point out, ‘fewer jobs for expatriates do not necessarily equal more jobs for nationals and vice-​versa’.98 The reality is that Saudi Arabia will continue to depend on the skills and talents of expatriates from all parts of the world to bolster its workforce and fill key positions.99 Other young men maintain that it is not simply a case of decreasing oil-​dependency by focusing on heavy industries, as economic diversification can also be achieved by promoting ‘soft industries such as domestic tourism’, with some predicting that Saudi Arabia has the potential to become a major tourist destination by 2030.100 As discussed in Chapter 6, many young men believe the government should strive to support domestic local tourism and provide ‘Kingdom-​wide entertainment venues to keep Saudi money inside the country rather than it being spent in Dubai or Bahrain’.101 Young points out that, in economic terms, the Vision’s focus on domestic tourism is an effort to capture the disposable income of Saudi nationals who currently choose to vacation abroad: The McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) estimates that between 2004 and 2012 the tourism industry in Saudi Arabia suffered a 30 per cent decline, which might be recaptured by encouraging citizens to explore their own country in an effort to celebrate cultural heritage and national identity. Tourism will also generate growth in construction, real estate, and new cities or sites of historical interest, directing investment toward new areas rather than overburdened urban centers.102

Better-​ quality entertainment options for nationals and promoting more religious tourism will increase domestic tourism, which in turn will contribute to the national economy. Yet others are not convinced, seeing tourism as problematic due to socio-​cultural norms and Saudi bureaucracy. For instance, a young man who works for a Riyadh-​based multinational describes how he went to visit some popular islands near Yanbu in 2017 with a couple of foreign friends. He says that when they

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arrived they were asked if they were all Saudis, and because some of his group were foreigners this necessitated various calls to the authorities; ‘As Saudis, we could go there directly, but not if we were with foreigners, even other Arabs. Is this really the correct way to promote domestic tourism, by tying everything up with red-​tape?’103 According to Monica Malik, chief economist at Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank, to prepare the economy for the post-​oil era, foreign companies are likely to play a larger role in implementing the objectives of Vision 2030.104 Young men agree, with many believing that economic diversification can be accelerated by encouraging foreign direct investment, although this will require an easing of restrictions on foreign investment in order to make Saudi Arabia more open to the world.105 In truth, economic diversification must also include foreign companies investing in sustainable Vision 2030 projects inside the Kingdom in order to create more job opportunities.106 Furthermore, decreasing unemployment through a process of industrialization will allow Saudi Arabia to compete with the developed Global North states in terms of production quality. Overall economic improvement could raise Saudi Arabia to the level of a ‘superpower’ that is able to ‘achieve prosperity for its citizens and society’ by providing ‘the best services and not leaving any city in the Kingdom behind’.107 Many young men also believe that the Saudi economy should become less centralized, which could be achieved by reducing current bureaucratic rules and regulations that discourage individuals from starting their own businesses. As discussed in Chapter 2, many would-​be entrepreneurs consider that government bureaucracy and outdated practices are hampering development and blocking young men from participating in the economy.108 An improved economy can only be achieved through well-​established regulations and more efficient systems. As one young man argues: To achieve all the Vision’s goals, the Saudi economy must change from a centralized economy to a productive economy based on alternative sources of income other than oil in order to allow public, private and industrial sectors to flourish.109

Therefore, the government needs to focus its efforts on better management of its officials and departments. Another young man suggests that all government divisions should be linked so that a citizen is not required to visit each and every division to complete a bureaucratic task; instead, everything should be done in a single place or –​the preferred option –​ via e-​ government services. In fact, Ulrichsen points out, the moves towards e-​government and m-​government (mobile government) services

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in GCC states, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, represent a partial attempt to open up government services and make them more interactive and responsive to citizen demands.110 Indeed, young men stress that there needs to be enhanced state–​society communication linking the citizen to the government.111 1.4

Corruption and Taxation

Many young men worry that the successful diversification of the national economy cannot happen unless there is a serious decrease in the use of wasta, as well as a significant reduction in corruption. This point is particularly pertinent because many young Saudis maintain that the oil price decrease exacerbated these problems. Only after wasta and corruption are eradicated will the Kingdom be able to prosper economically, provide more youth employment opportunities, and lower the price of goods and real estate.112 This in turn would help young Saudis find their ‘dream jobs’, in particular job opportunities for new graduates, devoid of the usual practices of wasta where ‘jobs are frequently given to people who are not qualified for the position’.113 There is also consensus that there should be a reduction in the price of real estate, even if this means that ‘certain individuals, i.e. princes, are obliged to let go of their real estate investments, especially if they remain undeveloped’.114 An individual in Riyadh argues that this issue is not just confined to real estate, and that the royal family’s spending should be reduced.115 In early 2017 a Jeddah focus group speculated that the perennial problems of wasta and corruption could be solved if Crown Prince Mohammed managed Vision 2030 personally and removed the most corrupt elements of society. Hence, it is not surprising that a great many young Saudis approved of the crown prince’s November 2017 anti-​corruption drive and shock purge of the Kingdom’s political and business elite, including prominent Al Saud princes such as former SANG head Prince Miteb bin Abdullah and businessman Prince Alwaleed bin Talal, CEO of Kingdom Holding Company.116 The arrests were welcomed by many young Saudis who believe their job prospects and economic growth have been slowed by a culture of graft.117 On 5 November 2017, the day after Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman took the initiative under the auspices of a new supreme committee within Nazaha,118 the anti-​corruption authority, to arrest at least 49 people (including 11 princes, business tycoons, four ministers and several former ministers),119 Al Arabiya reported that the hashtag in Saudi Arabia, ‘the king is fighting corruption’, became one of the highest worldwide trends on Twitter. The hashtag was used 536,000 times after the decree was announced ‘making it the trendiest in the

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world, with users sharing images of the king and the crown prince’.120 In a special report about the anti-​graft campaign, Gulf States Newsletter observes: Saudis on social media have always commented that the senior figures who benefit most from corruption always seem to escape with their ill-​gotten gains, if not their reputations, intact. There has almost been an acceptance that this is the immutable way of the world. Handled correctly, Prince Mohammed’s initiative could shake away such complacent assumptions –​provided it genuinely improves governance, rather than become a vehicle for setting political scores.121

Yet, even though in early November 2017 there was widespread support for the anti-​corruption campaign amongst young men –​for instance, the idea that eliminating corruption would create a better society122  –​ there was also a degree of scepticism in some quarters. Once again, some individuals pointed out that even if the crown prince, under the umbrella of Vision 2030, makes a genuine attempt to tackle the contentious issue of corruption, the implementation of a wide-​ranging and successful anti-​ graft drive would be difficult.123 Indeed, for anti-​corruption to be perceived as the main driver of the purge of corrupt princes, officials and businessmen, Dorsey says Crown Prince Mohammed will have to introduce due process, transparency and accountability to the process.124 Another contentious issue is taxation, with many young men stressing that the government should not interpret Vision 2030 as an opportunity ‘to increase taxes on citizens since most already have low incomes’. Yet, the problem is that Vision 2030 is sometimes understood as ‘collecting cash’ via taxation, with the government just trying to replace one source of income with another in order to maintain the status quo.125 Diversification of the economy can only occur by establishing new sources of income from domestic production and exports, and not by imposing taxes on society.126 Rather, the government should introduce a minimum wage of SAR 6,000 a month for ordinary Saudis.127 In fact, many young men are incredulous that so many Saudis are relatively poor given that the Kingdom is one of the ‘richest countries in the world’. Ramady concurs, observing that no other state is so rich, but so poor, and despite massive oil revenues, Saudi Arabia’s per capita income is below those of its GCC neighbours.128 Hence, there is widespread consensus (for the time being) that income tax is ‘off-​limits’ –​although by and large young men have come to accept the so-​called ‘sin taxes’ on tobacco products and energy drinks.129 Other young men accept some of the government’s other measures to increase revenue. For example, one focus group thinks the government can justify introducing a steep fine of SAR 3,000 for running a red light –​up from SAR 500 –​because

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an enormous amount of money is allocated to people who are injured in traffic accidents caused by reckless driving.130 Still, one young man says it is true that Saudis do not pay tax, but it is also true that they do not enjoy the same level of public services as found in Europe and the US. He thinks that many Saudis would be amenable to paying tax if they saw tangible returns such as adequate improvements in transportation, health and education –​although these outcomes would need to be visible in every sector. This young man argues that if he had some input into socio-​economic improvements then he would feel ‘part of the government’s decisions’, but if he had to pay taxes without any input in the decision-​making process then he would be extremely dissatisfied.131 Others maintain that Crown Prince Mohammed and his team recognize that income tax is an issue Saudi society rejects totally; therefore, income tax is not on the table for the time being.132 The introduction of VAT in January 2018 was another controversial issue.133 An April 2018 survey of 6,023 nationals found 65 per cent saying that their spending habits and purchasing power had been affected by the introduction of VAT.134 Khalid Al Zaidi, the director of the Jeddah-​ based Al Zaidi Financial Education Center, said that it is possible that the government will impose additional taxes on other products or increase VAT from 5 per cent as long as the results are found to be supportive of the Kingdom’s economy and VAT helps citizens to rationalize their consumption habits.135 Some are concerned that taxes including VAT could cause depression in the market, which in turn would be bad for business owners, but good for ordinary citizens if prices decrease.136 However, one young man thinks that up to the end of 2018 it was shop owners who were affected the most, not citizens, especially if a shopkeeper rents the property.137 Still, a KKU medical student argues that VAT is going to hurt poor people the most, and in his opinion this was an ill-​advised policy.138 Another young student concurs, saying that VAT does not harm the rich as they have ‘so much money it does not make any difference and it is a case of the poor getting poorer and the rich richer’.139 A Jeddah focus group, discussing the disparity between rich and poor, cite a November 2016  ‘happiness index’ published by the Misk Foundation.140 According to the index, 93 per cent of young Saudis were happy and 84 per cent optimistic about the future.141 However, this focus group points out that the sample was only 1,800 people, all of whom were of a ‘certain class so of course they are happy and optimistic –​they have wasta’. In fact, the group does not believe the findings, thinking the index to be ‘just some advertisement to establish confidence in the new leaders’. The disparity between the rich and the poor is a major concern for many young men. A focus group in Qassim maintains that, at times,

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government initiatives such as Vision 2030 appear to be about taking money from the poor and giving it to the rich,142 whilst another from Onaizah jokes that even though Saudis are known for their generosity and hospitality, because of Vision 2030 this will all disappear.143 1.5

The Danger of Healthy Scepticism Mutating into Cynicism

Vision 2030 sparked public debate about critical socio-​economic issues, which many young men consider positive. Yet, in the opinion of a Riyadh focus group, although Vision 2030 is a ‘trendy topic’, it divides public opinion.144 For instance, a common complaint amongst many young Saudis is that they have heard about these types of initiatives many times before –​the difference is that with Vision 2030 there is a great deal more publicity, such as ‘endless PowerPoints, Infographics and “attractive videos” on YouTube’.145 Thus, enthusiasm for Vision 2030 has evaporated amongst some young men, who complain that whilst they were hopeful when Vision 2030 was launched, as the months passed they became disappointed by the lack of tangible results –​with one remarking: ‘it is the same tune, but simply being played in a different way’.146 Things have changed since April 2016, when many thought that each year up to 2030 would be happier and more prosperous than the previous one. In fact, one individual says, real life has shown young men that they will suffer more annually until 2030, because unfortunately, to reach this level of happiness and prosperity ‘we must hurt to get there’.147 Another young man jokes that he likens Vision 2030 to a pregnant woman: ‘As the months go by it gets harder and harder and at the end you will end up with twins!’148 A  young Najrani concurs:  ‘the same old minds will dominate; the same minds with the same results in the same circles’.149 Other young men go as far to argue that Vision 2030 is ‘a bubble, nothing more’, and one which will burst soon without results, because they have seen similar projects such as five-​year plans –​with some of these projects not even leaving the drawing board.150 In fact, the ‘endless cycle of five-​ year plans’ has left many individuals jaded because few of these initiatives achieved their stated goals satisfactorily. That said, even if an individual is sceptical of Vision 2030, a group of young men from Najran believe it will help improve their lives to a degree.151 Yet, even when the national development plans had laudable policy objectives, Ramady observes that few, if any, were consistently followed.152 Therefore, according to a young man in Riyadh: The main issue is that a lot of people do not trust the government. You know every five years the government announces a new plan and then nothing happens.

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For this reason many young people do not trust Vision 2030. I actually work on an NTP project and I see the lack of trust and resistance to reform on the ministries. Only after we see some tangible results from Vision 2030 will people start to trust the government on this.153

This lack of trust is linked, according to some individuals, to the lack of a viable strategic plan.154 There is always great fanfare when the projects are unveiled, but more often than not the implementation is flawed.155 In fact, some young men point to ‘failed projects’ such as King Abdullah Financial District (KAFD) in Riyadh.156 One individual speaks for many when he argues that ‘the money was stolen and the real victims are ordinary citizens’.157 According to him, these projects can only succeed if they are supported by seriousness and responsibility. Certainly, Vision 2030 needs to deliver on important socio-​economic issues such as employment, housing and healthcare. In fact, these issues should be the foundation of Vision 2030 to bring Saudi Arabia in line with advanced economies such as those of the USA, Europe and China. Furthermore, Vision 2030 needs to be accountable and transparent, in other words a model of good governance, because the real goal of Vision 2030 should be to serve the needs of ordinary Saudi citizens first, and not the government and elites.158 Indeed, a Najran focus group asks why there was no direct involvement by KACND159 in Saudi Vision 2030. Instead, according to some group members, it appears that Vision 2030 was formulated in dark rooms whilst disregarding societal opinion.160 It also appears that for many young men there is a degree of confusion about what Vision 2030 is supposed to signify. For example, a young man in Qassim says that he sees Vision 2030 posters everywhere, but he and his friends do not really understand what they are supposed to mean.161 When asked what Vision 2030 signifies, another individual says he thinks it is about Saudi Arabia being less oil-​dependent, but wonders if he has misunderstood the message.162 Another source of confusion for many young men is that although the government shares the Vision’s goals, it does not explain adequately how these are going to be achieved and what role society is expected to play.163 An individual from Asir points out that in reality many ordinary Saudis are not aware of the Vision’s objectives, and thus in his opinion each step along the Vision’s path way should be clarified ministry by ministry  –​although he speculates that because the Vision’s aims are vague for citizens, they are probably also vague for the ministries.164 Others believe the government should provide society with ‘clear bullet-​points’ about what Vision 2030 is supposed to achieve, because for ordinary Saudis a great deal of basic information

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is lacking.165 A Qassim focus group says that if the government wants to promote greater awareness and understanding of Vision 2030 initiatives whilst simultaneously reaching a wider audience, the Vision’s goals and programmes must be promoted on social media.166 A  group of young Shia men argue that the government has failed to produce policies and plans that target specific Saudi societal constituencies. In their opinion, the government cannot treat the citizens of Qassim in the same way as the citizens of Jeddah or, for example, their own Shia community in Qatif. These are very different groupings with very different requirements and aspirations, all of whom require ‘different Visions’.167 Negative perceptions of Vision 2030 were often blamed on Vision 2030 being overseen by McKinsey management consulting company, with its main focus on ‘lowering government expenditure’ rather than ensuring a decent quality of life for ordinary Saudis.168 Indeed, as Saif points out, Saudi bureaucrats sarcastically labelled the world’s most prestigious consulting company the ‘Ministry of McKinsey’ for its key, often unpopular, role in Vision 2030.169 This unpopularity was exemplified by many focus group members remarking that their mothers and grandmothers believed that McKinsey was a ‘front for a Zionist plot’ to destabilize the Saudi economy.170 A young student in Abha says that Vision 2030 is a good idea and ‘nobody argues about that’, but the problem is that from the outset Vision 2030 became synonymous with cutting salaries, taxing people and stopping benefits.171 Indeed, many young men were concerned that the government’s focus was cutting costs without ensuring a reasonable quality of life for its citizens.172 This perception was exacerbated by the belief that these cuts affected poor people the most. For example, in late 2016 a medical student at KKU in Abha spoke of his own experience: I was an intern at a SANG hospital and most people there were angry about Vision 2030 because their salaries were being cut. The soldiers around here were also angry because they work all the time. It’s unfair to take SAR 1,000 from a 5,000 salary. My military father was angry because most of his salary and allowances were cut. Some people’s incomes were reduced by 30 per cent (except if you are a soldier fighting in the south). It seemed that the government wanted to solve economic problems by force. They did this by raising taxes but not explaining anything to us. Prices keep rising regardless!173

Certainly, the cuts to the salaries of civil servants and military personnel were extremely unpopular, affecting the take-​home pay of two-​thirds of working Saudi nationals, and constituted the most severe measure taken to limit government spending.174 An Eastern Province focus group recalls that until mid-​2016 there were many well-​known socio-​political commentators on social media, in particular Twitter, who for the most part

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supported government policy. Conversely, after the public-​sector cuts they became very vocal and blamed ministers and government officials for socio-​economic problems although they avoided criticizing the ruling family for fear of this being interpreted as disloyalty.175 However, one member of this group maintains that the problem is that most people in authority cannot distinguish between disloyalty and balanced argument, and this discourages constructive criticism that could be beneficial to the government. Another group member believes that religious power was used to stifle argument and opinion. He says that after the public-​ sector cuts were announced in September 2016 a lot of religious figures started to use ‘religious quotes’ in an attempt to stop ordinary Saudis from complaining about this unpopular government policy. This young man notes that many Saudis responded by posting pictures of the late King Abdullah on social media as a way of voicing their unhappiness with public-​sector cuts.176 Indeed, one of the most common complaints heard in 2017 was that the government did not inform society about its plans to cut salaries and benefits.177 Not surprisingly, in response to this public anger, in April 2017 King Salman reinstated the benefits.178 Certainly, many young men hope that Vision 2030 succeeds and moves Saudi Arabia away from oil-​dependency. They wish to see increased job opportunities and a better standard of living, but for some there is little optimism. A Riyadh focus group complains that prices keep rising and ‘Saudi Arabia is at war in Yemen’, which they blame as ‘one of the main reasons for all our economic problems’; at this rate, they laugh, by 2030 they will all be homeless.179 Others argue that Vision 2030 is ‘an illusion’ linked to oil price fluctuations –​a way for the government to make everyone think that everything is fine.180 In reality, new taxes and price increases are solely about maximizing the cash inflow of the government –​therefore this is the hidden reason behind Vision 2030.181 Another pessimistic young man says: I wish it to be as true as they claim. I wish to be rich, but I predict poverty. I do not expect that much from Vision 2030 because I think most of what we hear is media noise. I want Vision 2030 to achieve its goals, but I predict that it will not do so.182

Another concern is that Vision 2030 will anger religious conservatives in both the major urban centres and the provinces.183 For example, certain aspects of the Vision, namely public entertainment, in particular if it involves live music, are ‘upsetting’ to more conservative societal groupings. In addition, the restrictions placed on the hai’a might be welcomed by many of the residents of the urban centres (and Western media), but outside of these centres the hai’a is still present.184 Others complain that

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in reality there are no incentives for real substantive reform, but hope to be proved wrong. Others predict that the Vision will succeed partially, but ultimately they do not believe that Vision 2030 can achieve all its stated objectives.185 2

National Development

2.1 Participation

In a report issued by the McKinsey Global Institute entitled Moving Saudi Arabia’s Economy beyond Oil, the consultancy argues that all stakeholders, including the private sector, foreign investors and households, will need to be involved in national development.186 The key issue here is whether the Saudi government is willing to open the national decision-​ making processes further to those stakeholders, including greater numbers of young people, who are qualified and prepared to contribute to the Kingdom’s overall development. Certainly, the majority of young men who participated in this research project believe that Saudi youth should be 100 per cent involved in decision-​making processes related to Vision 2030, in particular at the consultation stage.187 If Saudi Arabia is to develop successfully, then youth consultation must be linked to Vision 2030 and this means finding the best-​qualified individuals from all sectors of society, including young men, who can facilitate national development. Indeed, a Riyadh focus group of young entrepreneurs argues that their opinions should be taken seriously as a great many decision-​makers ‘will be dead by 2030’;188 the group complains that for the time being Vision 2030 reflects the government’s views and not theirs.189 Yet, numerous young men point out that the government conducted telephone surveys in 2016–​18 canvassing their opinions regarding important socio-​ economic issues. For example, one individual was asked which issues he believed the government should prioritize. Not surprisingly, he replied employment and housing.190 That said, another Riyadh focus group maintains that the government must listen to people and allow more participation, rather than what sometimes happens –​when ‘the government just throws these ideas at society’, letting people fight amongst themselves before coming to frequently not very well-​informed opinions.191 Other groups disagree too, believing that although the government often listens to society, it only occasionally responds directly to societal demands.192 One young man points out that when the government informs society of ‘bigger decisions such as rules and regulations related to going on Hajj, for example, everyone receives text messages

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from the Interior Ministry (MoI)’, but this rarely happens for smaller, more specific issues.193 A young man from Makkah says that if he was in Crown Prince Mohammed’s position he would encourage more participation in public life, as this would help to improve employment opportunities, education and healthcare.194 Other young men believe that the political structure of the Al Saud needs to change so that it is in tune with the times. A new Al Saud structure should include ‘a system set’ within the family that includes all branches of the family.195 One individual contends that the offices of monarch and prime minster should be separated, but he believes that the prime minster should continue to come from the ruling family.196 Certainly, there are some Saudis who see their leaders as visionaries, says a Shia individual, but society has become more politically aware –​‘Society is not asleep or stupid any more’ –​and wants a say in public affairs.197 Whilst some consider that limited public participation is likely, they also believe that it might not be effective, but public pressure on the government is possible and, in fact, happens most frequently via social media.198 Another young man argues that institutional bodies such as the majlis al-​shura (Consultative Council) should be given more authority in order to acquire greater influence over important decision-​making processes. In his opinion, the majlis al-​shura is only consulted about insignificant matters; he argues that it needs to play a larger role in deliberating on Vision 2030 issues.199 Furthermore, only individuals over the age of 30 are appointed to the majlis, but Saudis younger than 30 should also be selected: because we need to be part of the decision-​making processes. I am not saying that we should be leading because we do not have the necessary experience, but we should be part of the consultation and decision-​making processes.200

That said, there is a great deal of scepticism regarding institutional bodies such as the majlis al-​shura. A  young Najrani argues that shura and municipal councils do not increase societal participation because ‘they just meet every week and discuss inconsequential matters, they have no real authority’. Neither does the same young man view the Kuwaiti parliament in a favourable light as, according to him, its members are ‘always fighting’.201 Unfortunately, some young men who are given the opportunity to participate are sometimes disappointed and frustrated by the results. A medical undergraduate at King Faisal University in al-​Ahsa who was a member of the Eastern Province Youth Council (2014–​16) under the patronage of Eastern Province governor Prince Saudi bin Nayef says

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he was chosen to participate in the two-​year scheme after receiving a call from the organizers.202 Members were selected from high schools, colleges and universities with an equal number of males and females from every town and district in the province. Initially, approximately 80 council members met with Prince Saud, who informed them that he wanted ‘to hear what young people think; I want you to be my eyes and ears’.203 According to this undergraduate, the members were asked to organize local meetings where they discussed issues related to Saudi youth (and sometimes organized events) before proceeding to the main meeting convened at the headquarters of Eastern Province governorate. At the beginning, the undergraduate and his al-​Ahsa group were enthusiastic as they believed this was ‘an excellent idea’. As a result, the group held approximately 20 meetings over the course of the two-​year period, but the members were surprised (and disappointed) to hear that other groups in the province held no meetings at all. The reason for this lack of participation from other groups became apparent when the al-​ Ahsa group attended the main meeting at the headquarters of Eastern Province governorate: ‘All we did at the main meeting was discuss logistics for around three to four hours such as where we were going to hold the next meeting, who was going to be in charge of running it and so on’, says the undergraduate. In addition, ‘there was no discussion of the real issues (as we had previously discussed at our local meeting) so it ended up being a waste of time’. In fact, the undergraduate says that when he raised the idea of establishing regional focus groups with young Saudis in order to gather feedback about socio-​economic problems, the organizers rejected his idea. As this young man complains, ‘people became disillusioned because nothing really happened, and members even started to quit the WhatsApp group we had put together’. In his opinion, there was a lack of organization: ‘there was no one to oversee what we were doing, no mentoring and no follow through. So in the end, everything sort of petered out, which was a shame.’ In spite of this, even though the two-​ year period expired, his al-​Ahsa group still meets for discussions, because ‘no one from the central administration told us to stop’.204 2.2

Addressing Societal Needs

The consistent refrain from this young constituency is that Vision 2030 should look to the future by addressing societal needs:  it should increase job opportunities (with decent salaries); provide better housing and healthcare; promote economic diversification and reduce oil-​ dependency. That said, the majority of these young Saudi men hope that Vision 2030 will succeed, and indeed they recognize the absolute

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necessity of ‘changing the way things are done’.205 However, there is also widespread recognition that viable national development must be linked to contributions from individual Saudis. As one young man argues, the most important aspect of Vision 2030 is that it recognizes that the Saudi individual is the cornerstone of the Vision. In other words, the success of Vision 2030 is inextricably linked to the success of the Saudi individual.206 Another young man maintains that if young Saudis are diligent they will automatically contribute to national development. However, he believes a major problem is that many young men simply do not care or, significantly, have not been educated to care. Hence, it is the government’s responsibility to ensure that young men feel they can be part of Vision 2030, because if young men understand that they can make meaningful contributions to national development, then in all probability many will contribute. If this transpires, then the individual and by extension the Kingdom as a whole can move forward and Saudi Vision 2030 will become reality.207 Indeed, contributing to national development is considered crucial because these young men want to live and raise their children in a better environment. This desire for greater participation in Vision 2030 as well as improved governance is summarized by one young man as follows: This is what I  hope Saudi Vision 2030 will achieve:  an economic system that depends on renewables rather than the usual oil-​dependency; that taxation does not replace a large portion of non-​oil income; sufficient spending and reducing of extreme waste in all government sectors; raising the percentage of the e-​government services; raising government transparency levels across all sectors; enhanced and direct public communication with all government departments; closing low-​efficiency government sectors; an education system that is balanced to reflect all aspects of contemporary life; better job opportunities with reasonable salaries that are in line with the cost of living; better business environment that promotes fair and beneficial competition; hiring in the public sectors based on merit not wasta; providing suitable places of entertainment for society; justice and equality across all levels of society.208

Yet, whilst there is belief that Vision 2030 will, hopefully, improve the overall economy, there is also recognition that there are going to be winners and losers. For example, those in traditional public-​sector jobs such as teachers and military personnel are going to see their wages stagnate in nominal terms and decline in real terms.209 Another loser could be the regional cities such as Abha or Hail, as these do not have (for the time being) as many private-​sector jobs.210 According to one young entrepreneur, this is a potentially serious political problem. He argues that there must be greater encouragement for SMEs by allowing

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and encouraging young Saudis, including public-​sector workers, to start their own small businesses. In his opinion, this could create a viable solution to the problem of unemployment, particularly in regional towns and cities.211 Many individuals hope that Vision 2030 will help to improve their lives (even if only a little), but reiterate the important point that Vision 2030 should not use taxation as the answer to dwindling government funds, as this would only make citizens’ lives more difficult.212 In addition, a Bahraini student who studies full-​time in Saudi Arabia says he hopes that the Vision will have tangible effects on Saudi Arabia that could also reflect positively on Bahrain and the other Gulf States.213 In his opinion, the Vision has two paths:  the concept and reality. The concept is that Saudi Arabia will have a 50 per cent oil-​based economy by 2030, but in reality he thinks that numerous stages are going to be required in order to reach this goal. Furthermore, he asserts that the ball is in the government’s court: it is the government’s responsibility to create viable opportunities for its youthful population.214 In fact, young men understand that if many aspects of Vision 2030 are implemented successfully this will be to the overall benefit of Saudi Arabia’s multiple societies.215 However, they are also under no illusions that many challenges lie ahead. Throughout this book, I  have stressed that Saudi Arabia’s greatest resource is not oil; rather, it is its human capital in the shape of many of the Kingdom’s educated and ambitious young people. However, these young Saudis need to feel empowered, valued and heard, as well as being given the chance to participate constructively. Critically, many of these young Saudis do not simply want jobs; they want rewarding careers that enable them to contribute to individual, corporate and national development. For this reason, it is imperative that the government listens to their aspirations and concerns. These young Saudis understand that current socio-​ economic changes have long-​ term consequences for their relationship with the state, and by extension with the implementation of Vision 2030. This Vision can only be viable and effective if the Kingdom’s youthful population is given a say in expanding the economy, as well as being allowed to participate in national decision-​ making processes. Therefore, it is appropriate to end with the thoughts of one young Saudi man: It’s difficult to predict the future as no one knows what will happen tomorrow except Allah, but I know that the youth of the Kingdom are eager to achieve what the past generations could not achieve. That is, we are given the opportunity to create a nation in the Arabian Peninsula that will be talked about far into the future.216

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Notes 1 See: Government of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Saudi Vision  2030. 2 See Government of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, National Transformation Program 2020, available at http://​vision2030.gov.sa/​sites/​default/​files/​NTP_​ En.pdf. 3 An earlier version of part of this chapter was published in 2017. See:  Thompson, M.C., ‘ “Saudi Vision 2030”:  A Viable Response to Youth Aspirations and Concerns?’, Asian Affairs, Vol. 48, 2017, pp. 205–​21. 4 Diwan, ‘Mohammed bin Salman’s Media Obsession’. 5 Kinninmont, J., Vision 2030 and Saudi Arabia’s Social Contract:  Austerity and Transformation, Chatham House, London, July 2017, p. 3, available at: www.chathamhouse.org/​publication/​vision-​2030-​and-​saudi-arabias-​socialcontract-​austerity-​and-​transformation. 6 See:  Thompson, ‘Opening up the Decision-​ Making Process in Saudi Arabia’, p. 22. 7 Diwan, K.S., ‘Youth Appeal of Saudi Vision 2030’, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, 6 May 2016, available at:  www.agsiw.org/​ youth-​appeal-​of-​saudi-​vision-​2030. 8 Al Toraifi was minister from January 2015 to April 2017. He was replaced by Prince Badr bin Farhan Al-Saud. 9 Ibid. 10 See: http://​miskglobalforum.com. 11 Ibid. See, for example: Anon, ‘Next Misk Global Forum to Focus on Focusing on Youth, Knowledge and Innovation’, Arab News, 31 August 2017, available at: www.arabnews.com/​node/​1153241/​saudi-​arabia. 12 Almaeena, K., ‘No Turning Back’, Trends: The international Magazine on Arab Affairs, Issue 210, February 2016, pp. 21–​2. 13 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 14 I attended the Misk Global Forum 2017 as a participant and can attest to the ‘elite’ nature of the event convened at the Four Seasons Hotel in Riyadh. A  great many of the young men interviewed for this book would not even dream about entering the hotel. 15 See: www.kacnd.org. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 Qatif, Tarout Island focus group, November 2016. 19 Westall, S. and McDowall, A., ‘Saudi Arabia’s Rulers Adapt Message for Social Media Age’, Reuters, 24 May 2016, available at:  www.reuters.com/​ article/​us-​saudi-​socialmedia/​saudi-​arabias-​r ulers-​adapt-​message-​for-​social-​ media-​age-​idUSKCN0YF1P0. 20 al-​Khobar focus group, February 2017. 21 Onaizah focus group, March 2017. 22 Abha focus group, November 2016. 23 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 24 Kinninmont, J., ‘Saudi Arabia Faces Its Future in Vision 2030 Reform Plan’, Chatham House, 29 April 2016, available at: www.chathamhouse.org/​expert/​ comment/​saudi-​arabia-​faces-​its-​future-​vision-​2030-​reform-​plan

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25 al-​ Khobar focus group, January 2017. See:  Friedman, T., ‘Letter from Saudi Arabia’, New  York Times, 25 November 2015, available at: www.nytimes.com/​2015/​11/​25/​opinion/​letter-​from-​saudi-​arabia.html?rref =collection%2Fcolumn%2Fthomas-​l-​; Anon, ‘Young Prince in a Hurry’, The Economist, 9 January 2016, available at:  www.economist.com/​news/ briefing/​21685467-​muhammad-​bin-​salman-​gambles-​intervention-​abroad-​ and-​radical-​economic-​change-​home; Almashabi, D., Carey, G. and Hamade, R., ‘Saudi Arabia’s Deputy Crown Prince Outlines Plans:  Transcript’, Bloomberg, 4 April 2016, available at:  www.bloomberg.com/​news/​articles/​ 2016-​04-​04/​saudi-​arabia-​s-​deputy-​crown-​prince-​outlines-​plans-​transcript. 26 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 27 Riyadh focus group, December 2016. 28 al-​Ahsa focus group, June 2017. 29 See: Anon, ‘Saudi Arabia’s Path to 2030’, World Economic Forum Annual Meeting, Davos-​ Klosters, Switzerland, 17–​ 20 January 2017, available at: www.weforum.org/​events/​world-​economic-​forum-​annual-​meeting-​2017/ sessions/​saudi-​arabias-​path-​to-​2030. 30 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017. 31 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 32 al-​Khobar focus group, January 2017. 33 Saidi, N.  and McCall, P., ‘The New Oil Normal Paradigm’, Gulf Affairs, ‘Energy and the State –​The Impact of Low Oil Prices’, Summer 2016, p. 21, available at: www.oxgaps.org/​gulf-​affairs. 34 Jeddah focus group, February 2017. 35 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 36 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. 37 Ibid. 38 Najran focus group, October 2016. 39 Riyadh focus group, March 2017. 40 Coates Ulrichsen, K., The Politics of Economic Reform in Arab Gulf States, Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, Houston, TX, June 2016, p. 12, available at: https://​scholarship.rice.edu/​bitstream/​handle/​1911/​91813/​ CME-​GulfEconReform-​060116.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. 41 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. This point was also raised in the Safwa focus group, January 2017. 42 Ibid. 43 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 44 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 45 Riyadh focus group, May 2017. 46 al-​Khobar focus group, January 2017. 47 Najran focus group, October 2016. 48 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. 49 Riyadh focus group, December 2016. 50 Qassim focus group, Onaizah, March 2017. 51 Nazer, F., ‘Saudi Vision 2030 and “A Day in Riyadh” ’, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, 25 October 2016, available at:  www.agsiw.org/​ saudi-​vision-​2030-​day-​riyadh. 52 Interview with economic consultant, Riyadh, November 2016.

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53 This former KFUPM student now works for a major consultancy firm in Riyadh. See:  Thompson, M.C., ‘Saudi Students Welcome Vision 2030’, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, 18 July 2016, available at: www.agsiw.org/​saudi-​students-​welcome-​vision-​2030. 54 See: Government of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Saudi Vision 2030, p. 25. 55 See, for example: www.weforum.org/​people/​reema-​bint-​bandar-​al-​saud. 56 Riyadh focus group, December 2016. 57 Qatif focus group, October 2016. 58 Ibid. 59 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 60 Riyadh focus group, December 2016. 61 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. 62 Abha focus group, November 2016. 63 Views expressed by multiple individuals across Saudi Arabia, 2017–​18. 64 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 65 See: Government of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Saudi Vision  2030. 66 Anonymous response to author’s online survey. 67 Ibid. 68 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017. 69 Kinninmont, ‘Vision 2030 and Saudi Arabia’s Social Contract’, p. 40. 70 Ibid. 71 Riyadh focus group, December 2016. 72 al-​Khobar focus group, February 2017; amalgamated anonymous responses to author’s online survey. 73 Amalgamated anonymous responses to author’s online survey. 74 Anonymous response to author’s online survey. 75 Qassim focus group, Onaizah, March 2017. 76 Ibid. 77 Najran focus group, November 2016. 78 Safwa focus group, January 2017. 79 Ibid. ‘Well, we know the answer!’ 80 Al Barjas, B.H., ‘The Scourge of Corruption’, Saudi Gazette, 6 December 2017, available at: http://​saudigazette.com.sa/​article/​523593/​Opinion/​Local-​ Viewpoint/​The-​scourge-​of-​corruption. 81 Abha focus group, November 2016. 82 Ibid. 83 Amalgamated anonymous responses to author’s online survey. 84 Qassim focus group, al-​ Mithnab, January 2017. See, for example Lahn, G. and Stevens, P., ‘Burning Oil to Keep Cool: The Hidden Energy Crisis in Saudi Arabia’, Chatham House, 1 December 2011, available at:  www .chathamhouse.org/​publications/​papers/​view/​180825. 85 Ibid. 86 Dhahran focus group, December 2016. 87 Amalgamated anonymous responses to author’s online survey. 88 Umm Al Qura University focus group, Makkah, February 2017. 89 Ibid. 90 See, for example: Hazaimeh, H., ‘Saudi Arabia Launches National Defense Company’, Arab News, 18 May 2017, available at: www.arabnews.com/​node/​ 1101071/​saudi-​arabia.

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91 Ibid. 92 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18; anonymous response to author’s online survey. 93 Najran focus group, October 2016. 94 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 95 Anonymous response to author’s online survey. 96 Ibid. 97 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017. 98 Jones, D.  and Punshi, R., Unlocking the Paradox of Plenty:  A Review of the Talent Landscape in the Arab World and Your Role in Shaping the Future, Motivate Publishing, Dubai, 2013, p. 99. 99 Ibid, p. 100. 100 Amalgamated anonymous responses to author’s online survey. 101 Qassim focus group, Onaizah, March 2017. 102 Young, K., ‘Understanding Vision 2030:  Anticipating Economic Change in Saudi Arabia’, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, 28 April 2016, available at:  www.agsiw.org/​understanding-vision-2030anticipating-​economic-​change-​in-​saudi-​arabia. 103 Riyadh focus group, December 2016. 104 Carey, G., Archana, N. and Shahine, A., ‘Saudi Billionaires Look for Ways to Protect Assets from Any Government Purge’, Bloomberg, 20 November 2017, available at:  www.bloomberg.com/​news/​articles/​2017-​11-​20/​saudibillionaires-​said-​to-​seek-​ring-​fencing-​assets-​amid-​purge. 105 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 106 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. 107 al-​Khobar focus group, January 2017. 108 Amalgamated anonymous responses to author’s online survey. 109 Ibid. 110 Coates Ulrichsen, ‘The Politics of Economic Reform in Arab Gulf States’, p. 18. 111 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 112 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 113 Jeddah focus group, February 2017. 114 Umm Al Qura University focus group, Makkah, February 2017. Known as ‘white land’. See, for example, Nereim and Fattah, ‘Saudi Arabia Backs Tax on Empty Land’. 115 Riyadh focus group, May 2017. 116 Anon, ‘Uncertainty Follows after Al-​ Salman Purge Establishes a New Model of Saudi Autocracy’, Gulf States Newsletter, Vol. 41, Issue 1,048, 20 November 2017. 117 Sorkin, A.R., ‘A Prince’s Uncertain Fate Deepens Mystery in Saudi Arabia’, New York Times, 27 November 2017, available at: www.nytimes.com/​2017/​ 11/​27/​business/​a-​princes-​uncertain-​f ate-​deepens-​mystery-​in-​saudi-​arabia .html?smid=tw-​share. 118 See: www.nazaha.gov.sa/​en/​Pages/​Default.aspx. 119 Anon, ‘Rising Stakes in Saudi Arabia’s Transformation’, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, 7 November 2017, available at:

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www.agsiw.org/​rising-​stakes-​saudi-​arabias-​transformation; Abu-​Nasr, D., Carey, G. and Nereim, V., ‘Saudi Purge Sees Senior Princes, Top Billionaire Detained’, Bloomberg, 4 November 2017, available at: www.bloomberg .com/ ​ n ews/ ​ a rticles/ ​ 2 017- ​ 1 1- ​ 0 4/ ​ s audi- ​ n ational-guard-chief-​ e conomyminister-​out-​in-​reshuffle. 120 Anon, ‘Saudi Hashtag “King Fights Corruption” Trends on Twitter after Royal Orders’, Al Arabiya, 5 November 2017, available at:  https:// english.alarabiya.net/​en/​News/​gulf/​2017/​11/​05/​Saudi-​hashtag-​king-​fights-​ corruption-​trends-​on-​Twitter-​after-​royal-​orders.html. 121 Anon, ‘MBS Blends Anti-​Graft Crackdown with a Political Purge’, Gulf States Newsletter, Vol. 41, Special Report, 7 November 2017. 122 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 123 Layla, al-​Aflaj focus group, April 2017. 124 Dorsey, J., ‘Tackling Corruption:  Why Saudi Prince Mohammed’s Approach Raises Questions’, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer, 25 November 2017, available at:  https://​mideastsoccer.blogspot.sg/​2017/​ 11/​tackling-​corruption-​why-​saudi-​prince.html. 125 Jeddah focus group, March 2017. 126 Riyadh focus group, May 2017. 127 Abha focus group, November 2016. 128 Ramady, M., The Saudi Arabian Economy, p. 479. 129 Qassim focus group, Onaizah, March 2017. See, for example: Deulgaonkar, P., ‘Saudi Arabia Introduces “Sin Tax” from Today’, Arabian Business, 11 June 2017, available at: www.arabianbusiness.com/​saudi-​arabia-​introduces-​ sin-​tax-​from-​today-​677317.html. 130 Qatif, Tarout Island focus group, October 2016. 131 Najran focus group, November 2016. 132 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 133 Anon, ‘VAT Implementation Regulations Approved’, Saudi Gazette, 25 September 2017, available at:  http://​saudigazette.com.sa/​article/​517937/​ SAUDI-​ARABIA/​VAT. 134 Altawi, N., ‘65 Per Cent of Consumers Changed Their Consumption Patterns after Introduction of VAT’, Ar Riyadh, 30 April 2018, available at: www.alriyadh.com/​1678338. 135 Al Kinani, M., ‘Saudi VAT Impact: Price Hike “Will Push Consumers to Find Ways to Save Money” ’, Arab News, 25 November 2017, available at: www.arabnews.com/​node/​1198771/​saudi-​arabia. 136 Onaizah focus group, March 2017. A Toyota salesman says: ‘Even selling cars is cheaper now, because there are a lot of cars in stock and the companies want to shift them.’ 137 Ibid. 138 Ibid. 139 Ibid. 140 See:  https://​misk.org.sa/​en; Kinninmont, ‘Vision 2030 and Saudi Arabia’s Social Contract’, p. 37. 141 Jeddah focus group, March 2017. Other focus groups wonder how this information was being gathered and how happiness can be measured.

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142 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017. 143 Qassim focus group, Onaizah, March 2017. There are a huge number of humourous memes related to Saudis getting poorer because of Vision 2030. 144 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 145 Abha focus group, November 2016. 146 Jeddah focus group, March 2017. 147 Umm Al Qura University focus group, Makkah, February 2017. 148 Ibid. 149 Najran focus group, October 2016. 150 Jeddah focus group, December 2017. 151 Najran focus group, October 2016. 152 Ramady, The Saudi Arabian Economy, p. 68. 153 Riyadh focus group, May 2017. 154 Najran focus group, November 2016. 155 Anonymous response to author’s online survey. 156 In November 2017, Saudi Arabia’s sovereign wealth fund finalized the take-​over of the management of Riyadh’s US$10 billion unfinished King Abdullah Financial District (KAFD), a large financial hub on the outskirts of the city, as the government attempted to revive the project. See, for example:  SUSTG team, ‘Saudi Arabia’s PIF Officially Takes Over Management of Riyadh’s King Abdullah Financial District’, Saudi–​ US Trade Group, 11 November 2017, available at:  http://​sustg.com/​saudi-​ arabias-​pif-​officially-​takes-​over-​management-​of-​r iyadhs-​king-​abdullah-​ financial-​district. 157 Riyadh focus group, December 2016. 158 Ibid. 159 See: www.kacnd.org. 160 Najran focus group, November 2016. 161 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017. 162 Ibid. 163 Umm Al Qura University focus group, Makkah, February 2017. 164 Khamis Mushait focus group, November 2016. 165 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017. 166 Ibid. 167 Qatif, Tarout Island focus group, November 2016. 168 Ibid. 169 Saif, S., ‘When Consultants Rein’, Jacobin, 9 May 2016, available at: www.jacobinmag.com/​2016/​05/​saudi-​arabia-aramco- ​salman-mckinseyprivatization. 170 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​17. 171 Abha focus group, November 2016. See, for example: Anon, ‘Saudi Arabia Unveils First Public Sector Pay Cuts’, BBC News, 27 September 2016, available at: www.bbc.com/​news/​world-​middle-​east-​37482690. 172 Layla, al-​Aflaj focus group, April 2017. What was interesting about this group was that they had read about Saudi Vision 2030 and understood the principles of it, which was unusual. 173 Ibid.

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174 Kerr, ‘Saudi Arabia Reverses Austerity Measure’. 175 Qatif, Tarout Island focus group, October 2016. 176 Ibid. 177 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017. 178 Kerr, ‘Saudi Arabia Reverses Austerity Measure’; Kinninmont, ‘Vision 2030 and Saudi Arabia’s Social Contract’, p. 5. 179 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. 180 Ibid. 181 Ibid. 182 Anonymous response to author’s online survey. 183 Interview with economic consultant, Riyadh, May 2017. 184 Whilst I was convening a focus group in a public park in al-​Aflaj in spring 2017, the hai’a stopped the discussions and told us to leave as it was time for isha prayer. 185 Amalgamated anonymous responses to author’s online survey. 186 Al Kibsi, G., Woetzel, J., Isherwood, T., Khan, J., Mischke, J. and Noura, H., ‘Moving Saudi Arabia’s Economy Beyond Oil’, McKinsey Global Institute, December 2015, available at: www.mckinsey.com/​global-​themes/​ employment-​and-​growth/​moving-​saudi-​arabias-​economy-​beyond-​oil. 187 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017. 188 Riyadh focus group, May 2017. Sadly, many feel that there is nowhere where their opinions are taken seriously. 189 Ibid. 190 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18; interview with Saudi entrepreneur, Riyadh, November 2017. 191 Riyadh focus group, March 2017. ‘In some universities such as KFUPM you are listened to, but nothing changes.’ 192 Qassim focus group, Onaizah, March 2017. 193 Layla, al-​Aflaj focus group, April 2017. 194 Umm Al Qura University focus group, Makkah, February 2017. ‘But actually in the Hijaz it is good.’ 195 Riyadh focus group, May 2017. 196 Ibid. 197 Qatif focus group, Awamiya, April 2017. 198 Ibid. See, for example: Carey, G. and Sabah, Z., ‘Saudi King Fires Water Minister after Complaints over Tariffs’, Bloomberg, 24 April 2016, available at:  www.bloomberg.com/​news/​articles/​2016-​04-​24/​saudi-king-​fireswater-​minister-​after-​complaints-​over-​tariffs. 199 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 200 Riyadh focus group, March 2017. 201 Najran focus group, November 2016. 202 Interview with medical undergraduate at King Faisal University, al-​Ahsa, July 2017. 203 Ibid. 204 Ibid. 205 Amalgamated anonymous responses to author’s online survey. 206 Jeddah focus group, March 2017.

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207 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. 208 Interview with junior petroleum engineering student, Dhahran, February 2017. 209 Interview with economic consultant, Riyadh, November 2016. 210 Ibid. 211 Ibid. 212 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 213 al-​Khobar focus group, January 2017. 214 Ibid. 215 Anonymous response to author’s online survey. 216 Interview with senior chemical engineering graduate, Dhahran, March 2017.

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Conclusion Youth –​Saudi Arabia’s Human Capital

1

What Issues Are Important to Young Saudi Men?

During focus group discussions and individual interviews across Saudi Arabia, it became apparent that the majority of participants found this opportunity to talk about issues that impact their lives beneficial and constructive. It also became clear during these deliberations, and when writing up my research notes, that seven major themes emerged. As outlined in the book’s chapters, these are issues linked to identity, specifically preserving Islamic and Saudi socio-​cultural values; the social contract, in particular employment, housing and healthcare; the relationship between the governing and governed; educational issues; gender issues and the cost of marriage; marginalization and fault lines; and national issues and participation in decision-​making processes. Certainly, this list is not exhaustive and does not include many specific issues that are discussed in the relevant chapters. We should also recognize that these youth attitudes are fluid due to the rapidly changing nature of the Saudi politico-​ economic and socio-​cultural environments. However, I believe this offers a ‘snapshot’ of some of the politico-​economic and socio-​cultural issues that are of greatest concern for many young Saudi men. Still, in 2017–​19 it was important to bear in mind that Saudi Arabia was in the midst of a transition that affected all aspects of life in the Kingdom  –​one that many young men pointed out was simultaneously exciting and sometimes troubling. 1.1

Preserving Islamic and Saudi Socio-​Cultural Values

For many young men, an area of concern is a perceived erosion of both national and Islamic values that can lead to unacceptable social behaviour. For them, preserving their religious values and protecting Saudi culture (or cultures) from the forces of Westernization and inappropriate foreign norms is paramount.1 Moreover, the forces of globalization –​or Westernization/​Americanization –​are seen as increasing the number of 313

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‘non-​believers’ in the Kingdom as well as the worship of money rather than religion. Indeed, money dominates everything, resulting in dangerous patterns of over-​consumption at a time of economic uncertainty. Coupled with this, Saudi Arabia is facing a ‘technological tsunami’, and hence, some argue strongly that young Saudi men should adhere to deep Islamic standards.2 Still, although young men comprehend that it is normal for youth to criticize society, some young men resist conservative rule and thought.3 That said, more astute individuals maintain that once many of the same young men get married, they become more conservative and start saying ‘shabab are dangerous’ –​in other words, they become their fathers. (For this reason, some argue that studying young Saudis might not always be an accurate way to predict the future.)4 Others maintain there should be a concerted effort to counter campaigns in the Western media that aim to deface Islam,5 even though, at the same time, some individuals lament that Muslims are ‘weak and helpless’ when confronted by Western cultural imperialism and believe that it is ‘only Allah that can make all these challenges go away’.6 Finally, there is also widespread consensus that Islam needs to be protected from ‘deviant’ variations by ‘those who pretend to be Muslims, but are far removed from the teachings of Islam’.7 This deviance leads to extremism and the rise of groups such as Daesh. Yet, significantly, other individuals, usually from minorities, point out that the true meaning of Islam is frequently undermined by the problems of sectarianism, racism and discrimination.8 1.2

The Social Contract in an Age of ‘Austerity’

The critical issues of employment, affordable housing and healthcare are causing major concerns throughout society, but particularly for young Saudi men. Unfortunately, there is a danger that lack of jobs and affordable housing coupled with rising living costs will push many young Saudi men to the margins of society. This must be addressed, otherwise it will place enormous social strain on the existing social contract and undermine any efforts to implement Saudi Vision 2030. For many, finding work, sometimes after college or university graduation, is the biggest concern. Following the 2014 oil price drop and subsequent price fluctuations, the number of available job opportunities decreased and jobs with decent salaries became scarce. However, although unemployment remains a critical problem in Saudi Arabia, on a brighter note total youth unemployment amongst 20–24 year olds declined from 42.7 per cent in 2017 to 36.6 per cent in 2018.9 For those pursuing degrees at reputable tertiary institutions, one of the challenges is finding employment that matches the individual’s degree, particularly in the engineering and

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industrial sectors. To make matters worse, many complain that economic problems following the oil price collapse prompted some companies to start ‘exploiting’ young Saudis. For example, companies offer inferior positions in relation to academic attainment and pay a lower salary even when the company is capable of paying a better one.10 Still, many young men, regardless of educational background, stress that any job is often preferable to graduating and remaining unemployed for a long period of time. Lack of decent employment opportunities also heightens anxiety about the necessity of ‘getting a good GPA’. As one individual contends: ‘Finding suitable employment as well as long-​term job security in this age of austerity is very difficult and that is the reason I fear for both my immediate and long-​term futures’.11 The social contract as related to jobs, housing and healthcare frequently boils down to issues of money  –​or the lack of it due to economic uncertainty. For residents of the main urban centres, there is also the problem that job and housing shortages are being exacerbated by large-​scale migration from the provinces to the large cities, in particular Riyadh.12 However, transformations in the social contract have only been partial, as the government has continued to provide services for citizens in areas such as education, health and employment opportunities even though it started to tax citizens.13 Taxation is a contentious issue, as most Saudi families are not wealthy and, as previously mentioned, often have two or more parallel incomes.14 For this reason, some young men do not accept government taxation policies, because ‘the government is assuming that the average ordinary national is wealthy which is rarely the case’.15 Thus, the idea that ordinary Saudis might have to pay income tax in the future is completely rejected by most young men. Rather than introducing income tax, they contend, the government should concentrate on implementing policies that discourage over-​consumption.16 A Jeddah focus group states that indirect taxes such as VAT are probably acceptable to society, but the main issue is a lack of ‘good services’, prompting people to ask why they should be taxed.17 Moreover, according to an Onaizah focus group, even after the Citizen Account18 was introduced (linked to the fact that salaries did not change), ordinary Saudis reacted as though they were earning less due to the rising cost of living and introduction of VAT. Yet, if indirect taxation means that ordinary people are going to start tightening their belts and saving money, these young men from Onaizah see this as a positive development.19 Nevertheless, the introduction of taxation and the government raising consumer prices for electricity and water remain contentious, in particular when many young men speculate that this only happens in order to pay for conflicts abroad. In sum, while young men agree that they should contribute to national development, taxation remains, for the time being, controversial.20

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Due to the desirability of a job for life, a great many young men would still prefer to work in the public sector.21 They want public-​sector jobs because they believe strongly that there is no job security in the private sector. The perception is that an individual can be fired at any time,22 even though one young man believes that this is a misconception and has become a ‘stereotype of public fears’.23 Undoubtedly, there is a great need to encourage private-​sector development, but simultaneously job security must be assured24 because it is common to hear individuals in private-​ sector employment hoping to transfer into the public sector. One young man speaks for many when he says he took a job in the private sector because the job was offered, but he would have no hesitation transferring to the public-​sector school if (or when) a position becomes available.25 Additionally, private-​sector companies should start trusting young Saudi employees, as a mutually beneficial relationship is essential to success.26 Other individuals contend that it is the responsibility of the government to encourage young Saudis to enter the private sector by decreasing working hours and increasing job security. This in turn would increase public trust in private-​sector employment.27 Nonetheless, greater acceptance of private-​sector employment opportunities will only happen if there is a clearer political will from the government. This is crucial, particularly as many public-​sector salaries, for example in education and the military, are stagnating.28 1.3

The Relationship between the Governing and Governed

For Saudi youth, in particular the growing numbers of well-​educated young men, there is a growing realization that greater political awareness not only affects socio-​political and economic issues, but is also transforming their attitudes to public opinion and government transparency. This is significant because Saudi Arabia’s greatest resource is not oil; rather, it is the Kingdom’s educated and ambitious young people, many of whom are more than willing to participate in the decision-​making process. Many young Saudis want to be taken seriously; they want their opinions heard and they want the chance to participate constructively and be valued as individuals. As Althari argues, socio-​economic realities have created a seismic shift in Saudi public opinion, with youth yearning for an active role in national decision-​making. Evidently, young Saudis are aware that this generation is sui generis, observes Althari: they embrace the rapid pace of societal transformation as an opportunity to rise above past alienation and repression.29 What cannot be ignored is that the emergence of the ‘shared social space’ provided by the Internet and social media has resulted in young Saudis becoming more involved

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in politico-​economic and socio-​cultural discussions. Yet, globalization, as Harris observes, means that politico-​economic decisions and socio-​ cultural trends occur ‘supra-​nationally’, and this can undermine young people’s belief and confidence in government efficacy.30 Hence, as this developing societal discourse clearly affects many young Saudis, with the result they are starting to demand a say in decision-​making processes, they should at least be given the opportunity and space to voice their opinions regarding domestic policy-​making.31 Yet sadly some of these young Saudi men believe their opinions and views are of no consequence to those in positions of authority, i.e. public opinion is not taken sufficiently seriously by the authorities; therefore, as one young man argues, ‘we need to push the “refresh button” in our society’.32 Clearly this constitutes a serious oversight, in particular when these opinions are relevant, insightful and carry weight. That said, for the time being there is no organized anger directed at the government. Rather, any opposition is based around socio-​economic issues as outlined in this book. In other words, the main issue is about holding a legitimate government to account. Still, many young men comprehend that they need to advocate for greater reform, otherwise this could ‘fizzle out’33 –​although some fear they are already trapped as the government attempts to constrain them. Nevertheless, as Yamani asserts, because the twenty-​something generation is demanding economic and political space, the entire system of government based on the idea of the Al Saud as ‘benevolent fathers to the nation and designed not to be challenged by citizens is now under great pressure’.34 1.4

Educational Reform

The standard of education in middle and high schools varies widely depending on location, as well as on whether the school is public or private. Yet, for many students, school education is a process of memorization –​specifically, rote-​learning –​in which they are not given the freedom to think critically about their futures or, for those considering tertiary education, how to select the optimal specialization. For final-​year high-​school students the main concerns centre around the individual’s success in the Qiyas and Taseel exams35 which will determine whether they can enter a college or university. In truth, due to a lack of career information in high school, many young men are apprehensive about making the wrong choices when it comes to choosing a suitable specialization or choosing one with few potential job opportunities. One young man worries that he could waste his future life, because when he chooses his area of specialization he might not have enough experience

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to determine what he wants to do with his life.36 Even when the student enters tertiary education the worry over the choice of degree remains, because the emphasis is on the challenge of proving both to themselves and to their families that they have made the right choice, in particular if they have opted for a major other than medicine or engineering. Finally, the overriding concern for school pupils and tertiary students is an over-​ emphasis on obtaining a high GPA in order to meet the requirements for finding a job in a competitive labour market, not to mention confronting the perennial problem of wasta.37 In the words of a young man from Jeddah: ‘As for the future only, Allah knows what is hidden ahead, but I think that getting a job fitting for my degree and experiences is the biggest obstacle that I will face’.38 An absolute priority for many young men is significant, viable long-​ term reforms in the Saudi educational system, although for most it is difficult to judge when this might happen.39 It is their strong belief that these necessary changes in the educational system, particularly at high-​ school level, will expand young people’s horizons, thereby making them aware of the world beyond their own societal constituency. In fact, Saudi youth will compare their country with more-​developed countries and this will encourage them to push for greater politico-​economic, socio-​ political and socio-​cultural reform, which will in turn facilitate significant national development in the coming years.40 1.5

Gender Issues: The Cost of Marriage

As the majority of young men complain, difficulties in finding a job exacerbate the problem of making a ‘good’ marriage –​something that is of particular concern to these individuals especially when compared with the not-​too-​distant past. This is because employment concerns, housing costs and the rising cost of living are all inextricably linked. For instance, affordable housing is seen as a major challenge for most young men (apart from those who come from wealthy backgrounds). These problems have been exacerbated by oil price fluctuations and the introduction of government austerity measures that created harsh conditions for many young men and their families. As one individual says: ‘It’s very difficult for me to start a family and provide everything, including a house, if I only depend on myself’.41 A real concern for many of these young men is that they will probably have to ask their fathers for funds or take out a substantial bank loan. In reality, greater numbers of young men find themselves burdened by large bank loans that they fear they will not be able to pay back in order to fulfil what they see as their social obligations to provide housing and a good life for their future wives and children.

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The problem is further aggravated by many marriages ending in divorce in the first year or the newly married couple becoming estranged. Accordingly, the issue of silent divorce means that the ‘official’ Saudi divorce rate is most likely unrepresentative of broken marriages, because conservative cultural norms mean that people stay in unhappy partnerships. Sadly, young Saudi men are all too aware of the rising divorce rate and incompatibility between husbands and wives because they see this happening to many of their friends. 1.6

Marginalization and Fault Lines

Throughout this book, many young men have aired negative views of their own society. But are there valid reasons for this? One justification could be the accumulated frustration brought about by the sense of being marginalized, in terms of trust, within society.42 Al Shihabi notes that young men ‘grow up in an environment that has few social freedoms and entertainment opportunities’43 and this, coupled with enforced gender segregation, creates a potentially explosive combination of boredom, frustration and, at its most extreme, radicalization. It is therefore not surprising that some young men ‘lash out’ at society.44 Certainly, in Saudi Arabia marginalization is usually associated with women and religious minorities, but it also applies to young Saudi men if they are not trusted and are treated simply as shabab. For young Saudi men, the important issues of being taken seriously and marginalization impact on an individual’s sense of self-​worth and the contribution he feels he can, or cannot, make to society. Additionally, in Arab societies adulthood equals being married, and therefore if young Saudi males are stuck at home, bored, with no job prospects, unable to marry because they cannot afford a dowry or rent, the accumulated social, economic and sexual frustration can result in problems such as substance abuse, mental health issues, reckless driving and radicalization. Furthermore, the social reality of young Saudi males is often overlooked as the problems facing Saudi women garner much greater attention in the international media. Accordingly, the marginalization of young unmarried males in Saudi society is frequently ignored. It remains difficult for young single men to mix with the opposite sex and, despite the 2017–​19 social reforms, there is still limited affordable public entertainment available, which inevitably creates social tensions that often lead to serious societal problems. This frustration and boredom is also acknowledged as a determining factor in the Kingdom’s appalling traffic accident statistics, as young men with nothing to do resort to street racing, resulting in economic losses running into the billions.45 In fact, Ridge argues

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that governments in the Gulf need to address the growing inequality for young men, but she recognizes that openly addressing issues related to young men is likely to generate fierce criticism as governments take a policy stance that is unpopular in the West, and as ‘they will have to do it in the context of already being stereotyped as societies that are patriarchal and male dominated’.46 1.7

Participation in Decision-​Making Processes

In 2018 it appeared that the ‘shock’ of the oil price decrease had receded as young Saudis adjusted to socio-​economic realities. Still, major concerns remained about oil price fluctuations, or another possible collapse in the oil price, which in turn highlighted the problems related to an oil-​dependent economy. For many young men, this raised the question of how government polices might be able to reduce oil-​dependency so as to diversify the economy without lowering the standard of living. Certainly, there is consensus that society cannot develop and advance as long as unemployment remains a critical issue. Other major areas of concern are a lack of affordable housing, poor educational standards, sub-​standard state healthcare, higher inflation, an increase in petty crime and, most contentiously, wasta and widespread corruption related to the perceived waste of money, often on ‘vanity projects’ that do not benefit society. All of the above are exacerbated by weak infrastructures in the main urban areas, such as a lack of public transportation in the big cities, coupled with the lack of a national train service, more expensive domestic flights and the increasing price of frequently poor telecommunication services.47 A  few individuals also raise the issue of climate change, in particular with reference to future water shortages. Others are concerned about the large number of foreign workers who dominate the labour market and a perceived new government orientation to make people poorer systematically.48 In truth, there is widespread consensus that failure to address these politico-​economic and socio-​cultural issues will impede the progress and development of the Kingdom, as well as undermining societal support for strategic government initiatives such as Saudi Vision 2030. Indeed, many young men believe strongly that Saudi Arabia cannot ‘return to its days of glory’ without significant improvements in education, industry and the military.49 A lack of a clear vision, transparency and accountability will affect the politico-​economic status of the Kingdom; thus, the biggest challenge for the government is to open up the decision-​making processes. Many young Saudi men, particularly the better educated, want and expect to contribute to national development, as it is the logical extension

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of government expenditure on education. Saudi youth must be included in national decision-​ making processes, especially decisions concerning youth in the Kingdom. Top-​down reform, argues Althari, must be coupled with bottom-​up involvement of the Saudi youth in reforms that impact their presence and influence in society.50 There is a great deal of frustration about a perceived lack of youth input into decision-​making processes.51 According to some individuals, ‘no one in the government wants to listen to us’ because the government ‘does not believe that youth can play a role’ –​even though national development cannot happen without youth input.52 Others maintain that the key to this input is building a knowledge-​ and skills-​oriented economy and society. If young men are educated and provided with the relevant knowledge and skills then future challenges will be easier to overcome. In fact, acquiring knowledge and access to information are the two essential ingredients that enable youth to develop; they are the ‘factors that differentiate between a young man who does not care and one who is able to face any challenge and overcome all obstacles because knowledge is the petrol of the mind’.53 Still, progress towards national development will not happen if correct guidance for the youth is not provided, along with emotional support from their families and communities. Many young men are frustrated (and angry) that they are categorized collectively as being lazy –​despite their talents and interests –​and in consequence often given ‘low levels of freedom and trust’.54 2

Concluding Remarks

For any young man anywhere, thinking about life, and in particular the future, can cause anxiety. This is no different for young Saudi men, many of whose aspirations and concerns are remarkably similar to those of their international peers. For instance, the overall well-​being of many young Saudi men is impacted by the fear of unemployment and the problems of making a good marriage and providing a decent standard of living for their future children. Undoubtedly, for the majority of young men jobs and housing are the most important issues, but in reality it is a series of problems that starts with leaving school, possible admission to higher education, finding a job, getting married and finally buying a house, all of which have become more problematic in the contemporary Kingdom.55 Not all Saudis are wealthy; many need to work, and whilst a job provides a salary it also benefits the individual by providing an alternative social network to the family one. Additionally, in Arab societies adulthood equals being married; unemployment makes it difficult for many young men to get married, which in turn leads to social exclusion. In addition, many individuals do not simply want jobs; they want

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rewarding careers that contribute to individual, corporate and national development. According to the individuals surveyed for this book, it is the role of the youth to expand the economy, to innovate and think creatively in order to help build their country. Still, in Saudi Arabia, there can be a sense that society does not trust (unmarried) young men and that sometimes society and family members dismiss or ridicule their ambitions  –​even when the individual actively seeks the blessing of his parents and wider society. Yet, many young men, in particular the well educated, argue that societal and national development cannot happen unless society supports youth ambitions. Certainly, there is realization that this entails many stages, including the transition from education to employment. Achieving individual goals might actually be the easy part, as it is often much harder to sustain a reasonable standard of living in the long term. As one individual says, ‘the biggest challenge is to prove myself and then impose myself on society so I can achieve my future dreams’.56 Even though proving themselves will be a challenge particularly when it comes to societal resistance, many young men say that if they study hard and develop themselves then the government must reciprocate by providing decent job opportunities that will allow younger generations to utilize their talents and minds. In other words, young Saudis should be encouraged to innovate, and in turn this will help to diversify the economy and reduce oil-​dependency.57 In fact, many young men stress that they want to contribute to national development and act as ambassadors for the Kingdom and Islam –​a case of them wanting to create a better place to live for their families and future children.58 Nonetheless, there are social problems that intrude on the lives of these young men and some worry about staying away from trouble, both now and in the future. They recognize what they understand as ‘bad behaviour’ amongst young men: behaviour that can lead to substance abuse, mental health problems, traffic violations, road accidents (or deaths), wasting time, and problematic social relationships with family and friends. Other individuals say that their biggest challenge is the inability to express themselves freely due to fear of societal or official responses.59 Nevertheless, during discussions with a variety of Saudi social commentators (principally in the main urban areas) concerning social problems as related to young Saudi men, what struck me was that their greatest concern was often extremism and radicalization and the threat that these pose to Saudi society. Whilst the threat of extremism and radicalization should never be underestimated, particularly given the number of Daesh attacks in Saudi Arabia, in reality far greater numbers of young Saudi men are in danger of falling victim to apathy, drug addiction and

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mental health issues. As much attention, if not more, should be given to these problems as to radicalization. Maybe some of these issues are more ‘mundane’ and sometimes taboo, but they affect countless numbers of young Saudis. Failure to address these problems seriously will lead to social commentators and leaders appearing as ‘out-​of-​touch’ elites in the eyes of many young people.60 Senior government officials and media commentators have been compelled to turn their attention to youth-​related issues and the alarming realization that failure to address youth aspirations could threaten Saudi Arabia’s stability and future. Indeed, Jones and Punshi point out that ‘our collective choices and actions’ will be determined by whether the GCC states ‘can reap this demographic dividend (youth aspirations) or decelerate towards a demographic disaster’.61 The Saudi journalist Samar Fatany concurs, recognizing the need to address youth aspirations and concerns seriously: In Saudi Arabia, there are many programs to address the aspirations of young people and many initiatives to rehabilitate those who have been radicalized. There are also concerted efforts to end unemployment, address corruption and promote sports, arts, film and theater. In order to engage youth in fruitful activities, schools have introduced extracurricular activities to protect youth from being easy targets for terrorists. However, these programs remain weak and need more capable professionals to effectively implement them.62

Nonetheless, these programmes are critical in order to nurture this twenty-​something generation who ultimately represent the Kingdom’s future leaders. There are myriad challenges ahead for these young men –​ but challenges can be positive, so these should also be viewed as energizing opportunities for Saudi Arabia. What will the future be like for these young men? Naturally, a great many were excited by the social reforms that were introduced in 2017–​ 19, although they also recognize that some reforms will take longer to implement than others. That said, in 2017–​19 there was a palpable sense amongst many young Saudis that their time had arrived.63 For example, one young man believes that in the near future Saudi Arabia will have an improved standard of living coupled with more societal tolerance. The Kingdom will continue to open up to the world, its citizens will be able to communicate more effectively and, in general, Saudis will become more self-​reliant.64 Life in the future will be very different from today, says a young man from Najran, as he does not believe the government will repeat the same problems of the past.65 Another individual hopes the Kingdom will be more prosperous, that there will be no wars such as the Syria conflict, no hidden agendas and no cold war with Iran.66

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Yet, there are also fears for the future. The concern for one young man is not the distant future; the real concern is tomorrow, as he considers that in the short-​term life in Saudi Arabia will be more difficult because of economic realities.67 Furthermore, an engineering graduate maintains that the narrative of ‘oil running out and returning to the desert’ is discussed in wider Saudi society. Young men discuss oil depletion and recognize that behavioural patterns have not changed, which constitutes a serious problem.68 A man from Buraydah remarks: My father talks about his life 50 years ago when things were very difficult and people were often hungry. You only have to see the mud house where our parents were born to understand this. It is only 50 years ago, but I worry we might go back to that. So I wonder about the future. Will educational standards get worse? Will we lose free healthcare? Will we be like Egypt and have lots of young men going to work overseas to make money to send home because there are no jobs?69

Indeed, a young man from Riyadh recalls his wise grandmother’s words: ‘I told you about the poverty we used to live in, but I am worried that you will tell your grandchildren about the wealth you used to live in.’70 As Saudi Arabia looks to the future, it appears that a great many young Saudis have given Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and his Saudi Vision 2030 the benefit of the doubt, as the Vision’s stated goals acknowledge many of their hopes and concerns. However, the danger is that expectations have been raised, with many young men believing that socio-​economic conditions will improve, and in consequence their futures will be brighter. Accordingly, Saudi Arabia’s youthful population is the crown prince’s natural support base. Hence, if the Vision does not deliver and either young Saudis’ aspirations are constrained or their hopes dashed, then the ramifications could be extremely serious. Indeed, following the late-​2017 arrest of members of the Saudi elite on charges of corruption, Coates Ulrichsen noted on his Twitter account in December 2017 that the crown prince: has promised, and now he has to deliver. He has clearly excited an amount of populist anger at those who have benefited from the system. But he is now the system, and it might not be possible to turn off that populist anger like a water faucet.71

An article in Bloomberg also pointed out that there is ‘no one left to stymie the prince’s plans’, and as expectations soar there is no one else to blame if they are not met.72 In other words, the ball is firmly in Crown Prince Mohammed’s court. From my own experiences with young Saudis from all walks of life, I  recognize that Saudi Arabia has massive potential in the form of its youthful and aspirational population, its veritable human capital. In the course of researching and writing this book, it was my great privilege to engage with these young men, to listen to their hopes, concerns and

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ambitions. For many of them the 2017–​19 reforms opened a door of opportunity, a chance to participate in national decision-​making processes and create a twenty-​first-​century Kingdom in their own image. Based on my interactions with all the young Saudis who contributed to this book, I sincerely hope that they have the opportunity to do so. Notes 1 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 2 Ibid. 3 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 4 Interview with Abdullah, al-​Khobar, November 2016. 5 Amalgamated anonymous responses to author’s online survey. 6 Qassim focus group, Onaizah, March 2017. 7 Umm Al Qura University focus group, Makkah, February 2017. 8 Qatif focus group, Awamiya, April 2017. 9 Saudi Gazette Report, ‘Saudi Youth Unemployment Declines by 6% in 2018’, Saudi Gazette, 17 April 2019, available at: http://saudigazette .com.sa/article/563562/SAUDI-ARABIA/Saudi-youth-unemploymentdeclines-by-6-in-2018. 10 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 11 Riyadh focus group, March 2017. 12 Ibid. ‘Plus there is an overconcentration of things in the capital.’ 13 Anonymous response to author’s online survey. 14 Dammam focus group, January 2017. 15 Hofuf focus group, December 2016. 16 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 17 Jeddah focus group, March 2017. ‘Most companies do not provide good services, for example telecommunications companies, and yet prices remain high.’ 18 Qassim focus group, Onaizah, March 2017. ‘This is the difference from increasing the price and the Citizen Account. The Citizen Account makes up the difference depending on your income.’ 19 Ibid. In addition, the group says that supermarkets such as Panda and Othaim are providing consumers with better offers, with the result that they will increase their profits and help people save money. 20 Jeddah focus group, December 2016. 21 Layla, al-​Aflaj focus group, April 2017. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 Riyadh focus group, March 2017. ‘I use to work for Caterpillar nine to ten hours a day, but my actual working hours were more than that. Now I work at KASCT and I would say that my actual productivity is about two hours a day.’ 25 Layla, al-​Aflaj focus group, April 2017. 26 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 27 Ibid. ‘In the private sector the working hours are 30 per cent higher than in the public-​sector, if not more.’ 28 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18.

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29 Althari, S., ‘The Relationship between Saudi Youth Empowerment and National Development’, Vision of Humanity, 2018, available at: http://​ visionofhumanity.org/ ​ p eace/ ​ r elationship- ​ s audi- ​ y outh-empowermentnational-​development. 30 Harris, ‘Young People, Politics and Citizenship’, p. 304. 31 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 32 Riyadh focus group, May 2017. 33 Ibid. 34 Yamani, ‘Saudi Youth’, p. 112. 35 See Chapter 4. 36 Abha focus group, November 2016. 37 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 38 Jeddah focus group, December 2016. 39 Anonymous response to author’s online survey. ‘Maybe it will be possible after 10–​15 years.’ 40 Ibid. 41 Dhahran focus group, January 2016. 42 Entertainment opportunities increased in 2017–​18, but there was still very little for young unmarried men to do. See Chapter 6. 43 Al Shihabi, The Saudi Kingdom, p. 64. This topic is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6. 44 Thompson, Saudi Arabia and the Path to Political Change, pp. 212–​13. 45 Ibid, p. 210; Al Seghayer, Real Face of Saudi Arabia, pp. 79–​80. 46 Ridge, Education and the Reverse Gender Divide in the Gulf States, p. 167. 47 Amalgamated anonymous responses to author’s online survey. 48 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 49 Ibid; Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 50 Althari, ‘The Relationship between Saudi Youth Empowerment and National Development’. 51 Anonymous response to author’s online survey. ‘I am not allowed to criticize a decision or protest and now the herd of goats are cheering Saudi Vision 2030. Vision my ass that will never change and it won’t change its stink.’ 52 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 53 Hofuf focus group, December 2016. 54 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 55 Qassim focus group, al-​Mithnab, January 2017. 56 Dammam focus group, November 2016. 57 Riyadh focus group, October 2016. ‘There are around 30 Saudi consultants out of 350 in our offices. Most of the others are Italians, Germans and Lebanese. Saudis from KFUPM, KSU and KFU, but the preferred school is AUB because they have better communication skills. Academically we are better, but socially they are.’ 58 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 59 Amalgamated anonymous responses to author’s online survey. 60 Views expressed by multiple focus groups across Saudi Arabia, 2016–​18. 61 Jones and Punshi, Unlocking the Paradox of Plenty, p. 19.

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62 Fatany, S., ‘Radicalization of Youth as a Global Challenge’, Al Arabiya, 10 October 2016, available at:  https://​english.alarabiya.net/​en/​views/​news/​ middle- ​ e ast/ ​ 2 016/ ​ 1 0/ ​ 1 0/ ​ R adicalization- ​ o f- ​ youth- ​ a s- ​ a - ​ g lobal- ​ c hallenge .html. 63 Riyadh focus group, April 2017. As one individual notes, when young people talk to their parents and/​or elder relatives they discover that life was different in the 1970s, or at least pre-​1979. They are told by their parents, ‘you did not see our generation when there was more fun’. 64 Riyadh focus group, March 2017. 65 Najran focus group, October 2016. 66 Ibid. 67 Najran focus group, November 2016. 68 Riyadh focus group, March 2017. 69 Riyadh focus group, February 2017. 70 Interview with Bader, Riyadh, August 2017. 71 See: @Dr_​Ulrichsen, Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Twitter, 7 December 2017. 72 Nereim, V., ‘Fatal Flood Leaves Saudis Asking When Their Prince Will Deliver’, Bloomberg, 6 December 2017, available at:  www .bloomberg.com/ ​ n ews/ ​ a rticles/ ​ 2 017- ​ 1 2- ​ 0 6/ ​ f atal- ​ f lood- ​ l eaves- ​ s audisasking-​when-​their-​prince-​will-​deliver.

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